Statecraft: And How to Restore America’s Standing in the World [Hardcover ed.] 0374299285, 9780374299286

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STATECRAFT And How

Restore America's Standing in the World to

DENNIS ROSS

P^

Canada $32.95

How

did

it

come

to

pass

terrorist attacks on the

that, not so long after the

World Trade Center and the

Pentagon brought the free world foreign policy

in a

is

our

to

side,

U.S.

shambles?

In this wise and thought -provoking book, the re-

nowned the

peace negotiator Dennis Ross argues that

Bush administration's problems stem from

its

inability to use the tools of statecraft— diplomatic,

economic, and military— to advance our national interests.

Statecraft it,

is

as old as politics: Plato

Machiavelli practiced

it.

wrote about

After the end of the cold

war, some predicted that statecraft would wither

away. But Ross explains that in the globalized

world— with

fluid borders, terrorist

its

and violent unrest — statecraft than ever,

if

networks,

more necessary

is

only to keep the peace.

In vivid and illuminating chapters, Ross outlines

how

statecraft helped shape a

1989.

He shows how

new world

order after

the failure of statecraft in Iraq

and throughout the Middle East has undercut the United States internationally, and makes clear that only statecraft can check the

rise

of China and the

danger of a nuclear Iran. He draws on

his expertise to

reveal the art of successful negotiation.

how

And he shows

the next president could resolve today's prob-

lems and define a Statecraft

is

realistic,

ambitious foreign policy.

essential reading for

anyone inter-

ested in foreign policy— or concerned about ica's place in the

world.

Amer-

ALSO BY DENNIS ROSS The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace

STATECRAFT

STATECRAFT AND HOW TO RESTORE AMERICA'S STANDING IN THE WORLD

DENNIS ROSS

Farrar, Straus

and Giroux

New York

—

Farrar, Straus

and Giroux

Union Square West,

19

Copyright

New York

10003

© 2007 by Dennis Ross

All rights reserved

Distributed in

Canada by Douglas

&

Mclntyre Ltd.

Printed in the United States of America First edition,

2007

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Ross, Dennis. Statecraft p.

:

and how

to restore America's standing in the

world / Dennis Ross.

cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN- 13: 978-0-374-29928-6 (hardcover ISBN-10: 0-374-29928-5 (hardcover 1.

Case

United States studies.

I.

—Foreign

relations

:

alk.

alk.

:

paper)

paper)

—2001-

2.

International relations

Title.

JZ1480.R674 2007

327.73—dc22

2006035767

Designed by Robert

C. Olsson

www.fsgbooks.com

1

3

5

7

9

10

8

6

4

2

To my

mother, Gloria Cherin,

who always encouraged me

CONTENTS

Preface 1:

IX

THE BUSH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE NEED FOR STATECRAFT 3 2:

CASES OF STATECRAFT

German 3:

Unification in

NATO

29

CASES OF STATECRAFT Bosnia 48

4:

CASES OF STATECRAFT

Undoing Iraqi Aggression 5:

73

W. Busk and the Iraq War

1

00

LESSONS OF STATECRAFT FOR TODAY 7:

8:

Kuwait

CASES OF STATECRAFT

Saddam, George 6:

in

STATECRAFT IN A

NEW WORLD

133

143

NEGOTIATIONS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF STATECRAFT 9:

NEGOTIATIONS

Twelve Rules 10:

to

Follow

187

MEDIATION IN A WORLD OF LOCAL CONFLICT 11:

ELEVEN RULES FOR MEDIATION 237 12:

173

PRACTICING STATECRAFT

The IsraeluPalestinian

vn

Conflict

259

216

Contents

13:

PRACTICING STATECRAFT

Radical Islam and the Challenge ofIran 286 14:

PRACTICING STATECRAFT China's Rise

319

CONCLUSION: STATECRAFT RESTORED

A Neoliheral Agenda for U.S. Foreign Policy 333

Notes 343

Acknowledgments 359 Index 361

Vlll

PREFACE

I

planned, after writing

my book

The Missing Peace, to write another book

exploring the practice of negotiations. tiations

would

The more

and how to do them, the more

serve as an effective

way

to say

I

perficial

I

thought about nego-

realized that such a discussion

something more generally about

American foreign policy This was early Bush, and

I

term of George W.

in the second

was motivated in no small part by

my

disquiet over the su-

way the debate on American foreign policy was being con-

ducted. I

had no problem with questions about American

White House and the Pentagon have

the

in Afghanistan to

one of choice

enhanced or diminished by our "axis of evil"

was such

a threat,

in Iraq?

shifted

Was

least

struction,

and doing so

little

a

Should

war of necessity

the war on terrorism being

efforts to oust

why were we

Saddam Hussein?

so focused

immediate danger with regard

posed the

from

priorities.

to

on

If the

which

Iraq,

weapons of mass de-

about North Korea and Iran, which posed

the greatest?

These were But

at

the

all

legitimate questions that needed to be thrashed out.

same time, the increasingly

shrill

debate tended

less

toward

answering those questions and more toward becoming riveted on the sue of multilateralism versus unilateralism. As such,

it

the essential point about the Bush administration and

its

seemed

is-

to miss

conduct of for-

eign policy. I

am

a multilateralist,

and

in

my view there

is

no doubt that

in

an era

of globalization and transnational challenges ranging from terrorism

and weapons proliferation to pandemics such

IX

as

AIDS, the United

Preface

States' capabilities will always

but to work with other

have

But the

states.

fiercest multilateralist

Iraq,

the

to treat

The president's we had conprotocols, we wouldn't

in themselves.

the diplomatic

all

—and

seemed

often have

opponents seem to think that

sulted our allies and followed

have any problems in

—too

end

collaborative diplomatic efforts as an

real choice

calls for multilateralism

Bush foreign policy

criticisms of the

and we have no

limits,

if

only

South Asia, or the Middle East

—and

that just

isn't true.

Multilateralism end.

important, even essential, but as a means, not an

is

When we speak of multilateralism or unilateralism, we are speaking

of the means or the tools terests in the world.

We

we

as a state

need

are speaking of

to

employ

how we

to achieve

our in-

define our purposes,

make assessments about what we can and must do, and then go about implementing our choices.

what

In a word,

policy today

is

And

yet the debate

seemed

missing from the discussion of American foreign

an understanding of statecraft.

is

to miss all that.

What is

statecraft? It

use of the assets or the resources and tools (economic, military, gence, media) that a state has to pursue

its

interests

havior of others, whether friendly or hostile.

It

and to

involves

is

the

intelli-

affect the be-

making sound

assessments and understanding where and on what issues the state

is

be-

ing challenged and can counter a threat or create a potential opportu-

good judgment

nity or take advantage of one. Statecraft requires definition of one's interests

and

well-being of one's citizens.

avelli

theorized about

it.

of

how

to exercise hard

to provide security and

It is as

and the desire to avoid or prevent

his objectives,

a recognition

economic power

military or soft

in the

promote the

old as conflict between communities

Plato wrote about statecraft. Machi-

it.

And Bismarck

and recognizing that

practiced

it,

his objectives

never losing sight of

should never exceed

his capabilities.

Statecraft

is

more

difficult

than ever in a world of rapid change, and

with fewer national boundaries; more actors

such

as religious

(at least

(states,

and non-state actors

groups and terrorist organizations); more diffuse power

economically); the smoldering resentments of have-nots and

failed states; continuing ethnic or

ested parties or groups in one state

the political and

power

intercommunal

who

conflicts;

and inter-

are determined to try to affect

realities in another.

Gordon Craig and Alexan-

Preface

der George, two of the more thoughtful observers of diplomatic history,

have suggested that "adaptation to accelerated change has become the

major problem of modern

ingenuity and the forti-

statecraft, testing the

tude of those charged with the responsibility both for devising means

and controlling international violence and for maintaining the security of their

own

countries."

1

In this situation, the practice of statecraft in U.S. foreign policy

down

to appreciating

our power while also respecting

more completely how the

sessing

and what new challenges we all

the tools in our toolkit of

can achieve

While

at

it

manageable

may

now

face;

changing

is

to

maximize what we

be more taxing than in earlier epochs, statecraft has

coming

in the

to as-

and to understanding how to use

power and influence

And

been missing in our foreign policy it

international landscape

comes

costs.

never been more important.

to fix

its limits;

years, the

if

one wants

to

and what

in the last years

answer

is

know both what is

has

necessary

statecraft.

Why has statecraft been missing (or certainly downgraded) lately? To answer

this question,

ministration and particular.

did

it

its

Where

it is

important to look

at the

approach to foreign policy

did

it fit

—

George

the

first

W Bush ad-

Bush term

in

the pattern of past administrations and where

depart from that pattern?

What guided

ideologically,

it

and why

did that ideological basis tend to disregard the basic tools of the trade? (Or, in

its

second term, when the administration has been more ideolog-

ically willing to

conducted

it

embrace

at least the

so ineffectively?)

and their answers tion of statecraft

as a basis

I

symbols of

statecraft,

why

has

it

will use a discussion of these questions

on which

and why restoring

more

to turn to a

its

centrality

serious examina-

and effectiveness

is

so

important to shaping a more successful American foreign policy in the years ahead.

The

starting point for such a discussion

American

statecraft

—must begin with

—

indeed, for understanding

a serious consideration

ideological point of departure for foreign policy.

of our

How should we see our

What vision both fits our national self-image and is likely to be sustainable? What challenges internationally should dominate our concerns, and how are they changing from what concerned us in the past? How do our means square with what we role (and our

power) in the world?

XI

Preface

would

more

shape internationally? And, therefore,

like to see take

effectively

employ our means

to protect ourselves

how

can

we

and achieve our

goals?

These questions are the they rarely get posed,

basis for

much

less

vide satisfactory answers to

one

will.

But

I

all

sound

answered.

statecraft,

And

of them.

I

the present

that this

of America's role in the world

will try to get at the nature

—who

at

make no claims

and the fundamental differences between those sus neoliberals

but

No one book is going to pro-

—

neoconservatives ver-

believe that the United States must play a leading

role internationally.

The book begins with a look at the Bush administration's foreign policy and how it has been weakened by the absence of statecraft. It goes on to offer an overview of what statecraft is, why we especially need it today, and how it worked in the past. It proceeds to delve more deeply into two

essential tools of statecraft (negotiations

explain what they are and

to

how

depends on negotiation

craft

in

to

conduct them. Every aspect of state-

some form. Negotiations

persuade or dissuade, and statecraft

means of influence leaders have

and mediation) in order to

is

are necessary

ultimately the art of using the

to affect the behavior of others.

And

be-

cause no discussion of statecraft can be purely historical or abstract, the

book in

also applies a statecraft

—

our foreign policy

approach prospectively to four challenges

the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran, our global

struggle with radical Islam, and the rise of China.

To

conclude,

—one

policy

hope

that

I

offer a guide to

employs

what

a neoliberal

statecraft as its inspiration

to provide insight into

why we have

to adjust

policy and refocus and retool our approach. But

have more than met the purpose

write

it.

xn

I

had

in

—ought

our sights

if the

to be.

I

in foreign

book helps

to trig-

how to enhance it, I mind when I decided to

ger debate about America's role in the world and will

American foreign

STATECRAFT

1.

THE BUSH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE NEED FOR STATECRAFT

Even more than

his actual

conduct of our foreign

George W.

affairs,

Bush's rhetorical approach to foreign policy has been criticized and car-

That he speaks

icatured.

in slogans

him unique. Every president

and general principles hardly makes

tries to

put his policies in a clear and un-

derstandable framework, and few succeed. that encapsulates the U.S. role

and

It is

not easy to find a slogan

interests in the

world and,

at the

same

time, offers a sense of direction about our foreign policy.

met

all

easy handle to describe U.S. foreign policy.

It

During the cold

ciple;

it

told us

war, "containment"

how

to organize ourselves,

our

sources to deal with a global Soviet threat. alliances,

these

tests. It

provided an

served as a guiding prin-

It

priorities,

and our re-

provided the logic for

and the commonly perceived threat forged bonds that held

those alliances together. With containment, wherever the Soviet

Union

was expanding directly or through proxy, we would meet and counter that expansion.

the

It

seemed

logical,

even compelling

—

until,

Kennedy and Johnson administrations saw Vietnam

as part

of the

The

cost of

global strategy of limiting Soviet or Soviet-backed advances.

such a deterministic approach became

all

too clear.

The

of course,

reality of local

nationalism unconnected to a global template was slowly and painfully

understood.

Even though the Nixon,

Carter, and

Reagan administrations refined

STATECRAFT the practice of containment,

Union to

to

it

would take the collapse of the Soviet

prompt American policy makers

to formulate a

new approach

our role in the world. In the George H. W. Bush administration

which ate a

I

worked under Secretary of State James Baker) we sought

(in

to cre-

"new world order" developing new organizations in Europe to pro-

mote security and guide emerging

states

from the former Soviet Union,

while also employing force collectively to

undo the

Iraqi aggression

against Kuwait and demonstrate that the law of the jungle

permitted in

this

new

era. In

would not be

the Clinton administration (in which

chief Middle East envoy), "democratic enlargement"

I

was

became the new

NATO's embrace of those in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union who would adopt democratic institutions and civil society but also others around the globe who would embrace democratic values and free markets. To be sure, force would be catchphrase, describing not only

employed where rogue actors threatened regional

stability

and engaged

in ethnic cleansing.

Of course, the guiding principles were observed generally and not always with great consistency. The Bush administration chose not to get involved as Yugoslavia disintegrated and Slobodan Milosevic began to seize parts of Bosnia

and Croatia, practice "ethnic cleansing," and expel

the non-Serb populations to create a Greater Serbia. Similarly, during the Clinton administration,

Hutu genocide of the

rival

Tutsi population

took place in Rwanda without a significant American or international response. In the interests

two terms of George W. Bush,

U.S. policy

and national security

have been governed by the war on terrorism. Defeating terror-

ism has been the preoccupation. But "promoting freedom" and "ending tyranny" have become the administration's rhetorical guideposts. Presi-

dent Bush has declared the promotion of freedom sure that terrorists such as

Osama Bin Laden do

to exploit. Insofar as terrorism,

which

after all

is

as the best

not have

way

fertile

to en-

ground

an instrument not a phi-

losophy or a belief system, depends on frustration and alienation to tract recruits, the president

is

right to focus

oppressive regimes that generate so

much

at-

on changing or removing

anger and hopelessness

among

their people.

Here, again,

we should

not expect perfect consistency between rhetor-

The Bush Foreign ical goals

and the Need for Statecraft

Policy

and foreign policy behavior. While

it

might be desirable

to see

greater consistency between our stated purpose and goals and our behavior,

After

it is

not easy for any administration always to meet this standard.

the world situation and our interests are not black and white,

all,

and hard choices, not so susceptible to made. President Bush, much

to be

a

simple slogan or principle, have

like his father

and President Clinton,

has decided that maintaining stability in oil-rich Saudi Arabia

important than pushing the royal family to democratize.

much

the

same judgment about Pakistan and

its

He

more made

is

has

president, General Per-

vez Musharraf. In this case, Pakistan's importance to the war on terrorism, and the dangers of a fundamentalist

coup

in a

nuclear-armed

state,

have trumped the administration's concerns about Musharraf's authoritarian rule

and

of the Taliban and of A. Q. Khan, the

his protection

fa-

ther of Pakistan's nuclear program.

When it comes to the gap between rhetorical slogans cies,

the Bush administration

than

its

is

predecessors. Similarly

—

caricatures notwithstanding

administration has not departed radically from it

comes

The

its

—

the Bush

predecessors

when

unilateralist

sim-

to unilateral versus multilateral behavior.

conventional wisdom that the Bush policy

ply wrong. eralist.

and actual poli-

not materially different from or worse

No

administration

is

is

is

ever entirely unilateralist or multilat-

No American president has ever been prepared to allow others to

veto a pathway that he considered to be vital to U.S. interests.

Nor

has

any American president, including George W. Bush, been unwilling to join with other states in

Indeed,

when

comes

it

responding to potential challenges and to the Iranian

threats.

and the North Korean nuclear

—answering

programs, the administration has been only multilateralist

charges during the 2004 presidential campaign about the growth of

North Korean and Iranian nuclear by pointing to

The is

its

efforts

issue has never

effectiveness.

The Bush

stinct for unilateralism

often has been tried

with

been

and

how poorly

capabilities during Bush's

allies to

first

address the problems.

unilateralist versus multilateralist.

Rather

administration's failing has not been its it

disdain for multilateralism.

UN

resolution endorsing the war in Iraq.

it

its

in-

Its failing

too

has practiced multilateralism.

and failed to persuade the

term

On

Iraq,

it

Security Council to pass a second It

tried

and

failed to gain Turkey's

STATECRAFT permission for U.S. forces to operate from Turkey's territory and send

—

ground troops across the Turkish-Iraqi border

U.S.

a failing that al-

lowed large parts of the Ba'ath regime and the Republican Guard forces to

melt away, avoid destruction, and regroup

gency. tried

Even

after

Saddam Hussein was

and failed to persuade our

as

an anti-American insur-

captured, the administration

NATO allies to help deal with the Iraqi

insurgency, reconstruct Iraq, and train indigenous security forces.

Whether on

Iraq or

on

efforts to blunt

its

North Korean and Iranian

nuclear development, the Bush administration has adopted a multilat-

but failed to achieve our national security objectives

eral approach,

did

so. If

the administration has not eschewed multilateralism,

why

as

it

is it

perceived as unilateralist? Is it it

because of its style?

has been

weak

in

its

Is it

because of its ideology? Or

is it

because

use of diplomacy and the tools of statecraft? All

three factors help explain both the perception and the costs internationally

of that perception.

STYLE MATTERS Style matters in foreign policy.

we

the substance of what

—

do.

It is

easy to dismiss

style,

and focus only on

But the "how" of foreign policy

—meaning

how we act also matters. While the how of our foreign policy involves many different tools all relating to implementation of policies once we've settled on them the way in which we carry out our steps and ap-

— —

ply the various instruments available to us this sense,

our

"style," or

the context in which

we

is

particularly important. In

our public positioning and packaging, creates

deal with others and they respond to us.

At times, different administrations might adopt similar approaches a given situation but

package their approaches very

pare, for example, the style of the

advance of the

first

differently.

Gulf War and the

style

Com-

W Bush administration of the George W Bush ad-

George H.

ministration in the run-up to the second

to

in

Gulf War. There was no

ence in the readiness of each administration to go

it

—and

but the two Bushes' styles were very different

alone

if

differ-

necessary,

got very different

results.

George H.

W Bush

said unequivocally that the Iraqi aggression

would

not stand, and then proceeded to put together an international coalition

The Bush Foreign

Policy

and the Need for Statecraft

and gain passage of UN Security Council resolutions that imposed sancand then authorized the use of force against Iraq

tions his

—

resolutions that

son would use to justify military intervention against Saddam Hus-

sein twelve years later.

How

did the elder Bush build his coalition and gain

Through

—

statecraft

in this case,

point, in

November

support?

through intensive and extensive efforts

persuade other leaders, often

to

UN

in face-to-face discussions.

1990, his secretary of state,

At one

James Baker, met with

the leader or foreign minister of every country on the Security Council in order to formulate

678,

and win support

for the crucial

UNSC

which authorized the use of "all necessary means"

to

Resolution

end

oc-

Iraq's

cupation of Kuwait. In public, Baker explained that he was consulting other national leaders

on the best ways

message was very

undo

it;

respond to the Iraqi aggression. In private,

different:

said the aggression

to

to

his

he told the leaders that President Bush had

would not stand and we would do what was necessary

the resolution that was being drafted would authorize the use

of military means to expel Iraq from Kuwait;

country and

leaders

its

would support the

something we could do to make

it

we hoped

resolution,

easier for

them

to

this particular

and

do

so,

if

there was

they should

know what that might be. However, at the end of the day, we would act collectively as we desired or on our own if we had to. The "style" of the approach was consultative, even if the "substance" was not. But in this case, style was substantial. By sending its top foreign policy official to many other countries, the United States demonstrated let

us

that the views of others mattered.

America was signaling

the positions and attitudes of foreign leaders

enough

its

respect for

to go to

solicit their input, to give

them an explanation

what they were doing, and

to enable those foreign leaders to

them and

for their publics as to

show

that

they were part of an international consensus they had helped to shape.

The

U.S. public posture did not

in a political corner.

tion was giving

On

make

the leaders defensive or put

them

the contrary, by going to them, the administra-

them an incentive

to

respond favorably.

Contrast this with the behavior of the younger Bush's administration in 2002.

From

the president's speech at the

he challenged the body to be relevant, to capitals to

make

UN in September, in which his failure to travel to other

his case or solicit views, to his challenging others

on the

STATECRAFT Security Council to "show their cards" as the president proposed a sec-

ond resolution

—and then declaring such

was clear the votes weren't there to adopt

it

unnecessary when

a resolution

—

it

the administration's

public posture was "give us the cover for what we plan to do anyway, or get out of the

way"

My point here is

not to address the issue of whether going to war in

Iraq in 2003 was right or wrong. Rather, trations that

were equally committed

it is

to

show

two adminis-

that

One un-

about gaining support for their goals in two very different ways. derstood that

how

it

went about positioning

itself

and framing

was very important; indeed, that the "style" of what impact on whether others would of

its

The

goals.

join

other showed very

went

to using force if necessary

it

goals

its

did would have an

in carrying out the "substance"

it

little

interest in the effect

style

its

might have on others.

Did the younger President Bush not want others

to join us?

No, he

has spoken often and with obvious sincerity about the international re-

who

sponse to terrorism, and he has referred to the countries in Iraq as the "coalition of the willing."

wanted partners

them

—

for the

war

in Iraq, but

and here the impact of 9/1

The

what he was willing

on the

1

issue was not

political

joined us

whether he to

do

to get

psychology of Pres-

ident Bush must be understood.

9/11 AND With the

ITS

terrorist attacks

a president

IMPACT ON THE BUSH STYLE

on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon,

who seemed to

lack his footing in the

first

eight

months of his

administration found his mission, his confidence, and his voice.

would combat the

evil

of terrorism and

its

threat to the United States and our values. fighting this

terrorists or those

alternative to

and there could be no

who supported them. His

no-nonsense manner of speaking seemed to a

us,

fit

He

as the leading

There was no

war that had been imposed on

compromise with the

emergence

the

blunt,

moment. This was not

time for nuance. Striking a strong, determined pose was necessary to reassure the

American

public.

It

was also the right policy, particularly because Osama

Bin Laden and his supporters had to understand that the United States

would not shrink from

this conflict.

8

Bin Laden had fully expected that

The Bush Foreign

we would.

America

In his eyes, an

marines to

a suicide

Policy

and the Need for Statecraft

soldiers during the Black

Hawk Down

any meaningful way to the bombings bassies in

Kenya and Tanzania

2000, despite the

would be

fled

Lebanon

after losing 18

Saudi Arabia in 1996, of our em-

in

and of the

in 1998,

mind, Bin Laden and

a tough, sustained

after losing 241

incident; and failed to respond in

numbers of Americans

resolute. In Bush's

there

had

that

bombing; withdrawn from Somalia

killed,

his

USS

Cole in

Yemen

appeared weak and

in ir-

adherents had to see that

know no

response and that they would

peace and find no refuge. This was not tics at

just the right

approach to policy;

home. President Bush adopted

reflected

who he

a style that

was. His speaking plainly

with the American public.

It

fit

was also good poli-

the

moment but also

and bluntly struck

gave the public confidence

fidence had been badly shaken.

It

when

chord

that con-

and to show support for

not surrender to such an evil but would confront

the president forge a

a

responded to our collective need to be

defiant in the face of such an outrage,

who would

it

bond with the American public

at a

it.

a leader

It

helped

time when one

was crucially needed.

When

any president

likely to depart

from

it.

finds his voice

—and

it is

authentic

—he

is

un-

Moreover, in an age of instant communication,

a

president cannot have one voice for America and another for the world.

Certainly

Clinton spoke in the same voice regardless of where he

Bill

was. His capacity to feel pain, empathize,

employed,

as

I

and connect with people was

witnessed, not only in this country, but also in

Budapest, Tel Aviv, and Gaza

—and

it

Moscow,

worked everywhere. George W.

Bush's blunt style would look cynically political if he used

it

in this

country but not elsewhere. Inevitably, then, Bush's blunt rhetorical style after 9/11

consequences for to go

his foreign policy.

For him

it

from finding Osama Bin Laden "dead or

insurgents to "bring

it

on"

—

began to have

was simply not

a big leap

alive" to challenging Iraqi

to badgering prospective allies to get with

Was the tone going to be different with potential partners? Was he going to try to cajole others into dealing with the "evil" of Saddam Hussein or simply declare that others should not shirk their duty? Of course, one might ask whether Secretary of State Colin Powell the program.

could have complemented the president by pursuing a James Baker-type solicitation

and consultation mission

—

at

once both providing others

STATECRAFT with reasons to join the coalition and softening the effect of President Bush's style. Clearly, Secretary Powell should have tried to follow the

Baker example and did

not.

ministration was eager for

and others undermined

However,

him

to

do

to so;

be

fair to

some

him, no one in the ad-

actively discouraged

him

his legitimacy as secretary, questioning

whether

To be

sure, the

he was authoritative and actually spoke for the president.

reason he did not speak for the administration was that the president, Secretary Rumsfeld, and other key (the bluster) into substance.

officials

They

came to translate

believed what they said and did not

think that the United States had to depend on anyone else

do

so,

they

felt,

would

—

indeed, to

signal weakness.

Once President Bush won this style

Bush's style

reelection, however, he

began to temper

and see the value of reaching out to others. Iraq had already

created a sobering reality

The United

States was tied

down

in Iraq

Afghanistan and had few forces available for other contingencies. costs of almost reflexive opposition of others in the international

munity, including from

come

many of America's European new

increasingly apparent, and argued for a

allies,

had

stylistic

and

The

com-

also be-

approach.

According to one report, President Bush "began signaling foreign leaders visiting first

much had gone wrong in his and that he had empowered Ms. Rice to put a new emphasis on

him

term,

in the

consultation and

Oval Office that he knew

teamwork with

allies."

1

New

secretary of state

Con-

doleezza Rice embarked almost immediately on fence-mending trips to

Europe and

mon

Asia. In

Europe, she went out of her way to emphasize

approach on the question of Iran's nuclear program.

And

a

com-

President

Bush, in his February 2005 trip to Europe, echoed the theme of consulting European leaders and listening to European attitudes on stop the Iranians from going nuclear. After the

change

trip,

he authorized

in the U.S. approach; previously the administration

distance from the British, French, and Iranians (even if

it

German

how best to had kept

a

its

negotiations with the

claimed otherwise in the 2004 presidential cam-

paign), but following the president's

European

began to coordinate with the European

trio,

trip,

the United States

and permitted them to offer

limited incentives to the Iranians on the United States' behalf. If

nothing

else,

the president began his second term exhibiting

greater awareness of the impact of America's public approach on others;

10

The Bush Foreign

Policy

and the Need for Statecraft

of state appeared even more sensitive in

his secretary

this regard,

so far as to remark in her senatorial confirmation hearing,

diplomacy

now." While

is

there can be

little

I

don't

doubt that the

multilateralism in the

first

mean

term was largely the

still

comes back

a

result of

George H. W. Bush

to substance.

right to have nuclear power,

But

policy

style,

it

Europe;

would never

and North Korea declared that

had nuclear weapons. Fences had been mended tive style,

its style.

initial trip to

however, the same day she flew home, Iran announced its

for

style,

By most European and Ameri-

can accounts, Secretary Rice had a very successful

forsake

"The time

diplomacy to

Bush administration's

failure of the

even had the administration adopted ultimately

to reduce

going

in

Europe with an

it

effec-

but the reality of real challenges to U.S. national security had

not been altered. Style matters precisely because

foreign policy. Style

how we shape in the

world

is

it

can help us affect the substance of

part of an approach to foreign policy. Style gets at

make us safer world more com-

the instruments at our disposal for trying to

—both removing

threats

and building

fortable for our values and purposes. But

we

national landscape that

it is

a

those threats and the inter-

are constantly trying to alter as

we pursue

foreign policy.

How we

go about dealing with the substance of our foreign policy

concerns has always been

may

wax

often

edge.

a subject

of debate, and appropriately

so.

We

nostalgic about the ideal of politics ending at the water's

And we have succeeded

at

times with a bipartisan foreign policy.

But that tends to be on big issues where the country truly does come together, as

surely did with 9/11.

it

Partisanship in foreign policy did not Bush's tenure.

of an

Woodrow

just

during George

W

Wilson, a Democratic president, lost his vision

League of Nations

activist

emerge

to opposition

from the Senate and the

Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Henry

Cabot Lodge. Henry mid-1970s

as

to opposition

Ideology,

League.

He

sacrificing

it

much

Kissinger's pursuit of detente fell victim in the

to the politics within his

Republican Party

as

it

did

from Democratic senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson.

more than

partisan politics, drove Lodge's opposition to the

did not believe in limiting America's freedom of action or to an international body. Similarly,

11

from different

parties,

STATECRAFT Ronald Reagan and Scoop Jackson opposed detente not to gain but because they believed that

it

was seriously flawed

—accommodating

a dangerous Soviet Union and reaching agreements with

should have been competing with

it,

exploiting

its

politically

it

when we

vulnerabilities,

and

The point is that differences in foreign policy goals and objectives may express themselves politically but are often based on ideological premises. And it is the idedemanding an end

to the oppression of

its

ological divide about the proper course for

needs to be understood; but

it,

people.

American foreign policy that

too, tends to

be oversimplified.

LIBERAL VERSUS CONSERVATIVE— WHAT HAPPENED TO THE DIFFERENCES? Traditionally, a liberal foreign policy (associated generally with

was guided by

crats)

a

Demo-

core set of principles: promote dialogue; restrain

aggression through collective security mechanisms rather than through

balance-of-power maneuvering; strengthen international institutions to

manage rights

human

international relations and mediate conflicts; foster

and support humanitarian interventions

militarily;

By

nation-building and the export of democratic values.

and engage

in

contrast, a con-

servative foreign policy (associated generally with Republicans) has

promote democ-

historically preferred to stabilize countries rather than racy;

more

carefully calibrate and narrowly define

of national

interest;

tional institutions;

what constitutes areas

use force unencumbered by others or by interna-

and engage in interventions guided by more hard-

headed national, not

strictly

humanitarian, interests.

Conservatives saw liberals as too ready to go on foreign policy moral binges that taxed our resources

—human and

to recognize the realities of

power and the

Liberals saw conservatives as

managing

material

costs of

—and

that failed

employing

a foreign policy

it

devoid of Amer-

ican values and in danger of making us dependent on other states stability at

home was imposed by

that the stability

whose

coercion. For liberals, this suggested

might be hollow and temporary, and

that, in

was contrary to American values of freedom and human and

On

badly.

any

case,

it

civil rights.

the use of force, the divide was less on the utility of force and

more on

its

purpose. True, liberals might have been

12

more

inclined than

The Bush Foreign

Policy

and the Needfor Statecraft

conservatives to shape U.S. interventions around collective responses,

but that was more to lead the world to erals,

saw only

tives

fulfill its

For

responsibilities.

lib-

our responsibility was to rescue and remake the world. Conservafolly in

such endeavors, and were convinced that alliances

had value not for transformative purposes but

for countering or defeat-

ing aggressors.

Has the world turned upside down? Are away from ever using

some of the servatives

force,

who shy

even for humanitarian purposes, taking on

And

attributes of traditional conservatives?

are today's con-

assuming some of the impulses for interventionism that char-

acterized liberals in the past? Perhaps there is

today's liberals,

is

some

role reversal, but

it

important to remember that the cold war began to blur the distinctions

between the two.

The

cold war produced convergences between

can and Democratic parties, such

who saw the competition with

as

some

in the Republi-

Ronald Reagan and Scoop Jackson,

the Soviet

Union

in terms not just of dan-

gerous weapons but also of values. While understanding the danger of gratuitous provocation, they saw the potential for defense against such

weapons and ultimately believed

that in

promoting our values we would

wear the Soviets down and eventually win the cold risk

of mutual annihilation meant that survival,

ability in

war. For others, the

stability,

and predict-

our relations with the Soviets had to supersede concerns about

values and

human

rights.

Direct confrontations were to be avoided, par-

ticularly because clashes over moralistic concerns could lead to inadver-

tent crises and catastrophic escalation. Republicans such as

Henry

Kissinger and James Baker had more in common with Democrats such as Warren Christopher and Madeleine Albright than they did with fellow

Republicans such

Today we lines

between

cans.

Some

terrorists

as

Senator Jesse Helms.

see echoes of liberals

some of the

past debates that blurred the

and conservatives and Democrats and Republi-

see the danger of terrorism, especially given the potential of

being armed with nuclear devices,

as requiring collaboration

with those such as the Saudis and Pakistanis, even

if it

means

sacrificing

our values and ignoring their human-rights abuses. Others might not dispense with such collaboration but also believe that place on our terms.

They

see

little

reason not to put

13

it

should take

much more

pressure

STATECRAFT on the Saudis and the Pakistanis

to democratize, believing that they

need us even more than we need them, and that our ter served over time

if

Of course, what tempers istrations

is

interests will be bet-

both regimes are transformed. 2 the differences of policy makers in admin-

that they have to

make hard choices

in

implementing

poli-

and, as noted earlier, they often opt for stability in the short run.

cies,

The Bush

administration has certainly done that, at least with both the

Saudis and Pakistanis. But that does not tional conservative or a "realist"

make President Bush

—someone who

cares

little

domestic character of other countries and their regimes. trary,

while being prepared to adjust to some

realities,

about the

On

he

is

a tradi-

the con-

overall an

and more revolutionary than conservative. Rather than seek-

"idealist,"

ing to preserve the status quo, he has recognized that in too

many

parts

of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, the status quo and internal oppression have fed the anger that both produces terrorists and provides a basis

for

them

to recruit

new

followers.

As President Bush declared

second inaugural address, "The best hope for peace in our world expansion of freedom in President Bush and

all

the world."

in his is

the

3

many of the so-called

neoconservatives of his ad-

They think big, conwe can end tyranny and must spread democracy. They are

ministration favor transformation, not preservation.

vinced that

Wilsonian in their moralistic view of foreign policy and their belief about the role the United States must play in the world. President Bush is

reported to admire Theodore Roosevelt. But Roosevelt was

of a

realist

than an

idealist,

much more

a believer in

much more

preserving balances

of power than in chasing the chimera of collective security, and

more

a

devotee of artful and supple diplomacy to counter threats to U.S.

interests

the

much

and meet U.S. needs.

embodiment of

idealism,

Woodrow Wilson, on the other hand, was and is in many respects a better guide to

President Bush's instincts and attitudes.

Wilson believed in the transformative power of the United Unlike those European countries that in his view sought only tage and so had ica

was

selfless.

produced the catastrophe of the

We

would be an example

man, and

his

advan-

World War, Amer-

did not seek national aggrandizement or colonies,

and we would not engage

We

First

selfish

States.

in a mindless competition for to others

and appeal

freedom-seeking nature.

14

We

power and arms.

to the basic

goodness of

would lead a world in which

The Bush Foreign

Policy

and the Need for Statecraft

there would be an end to imperialism and where self-determination would

allow colonized people to enjoy their freedom and their god-given rights.

Wilson saw the hand of divine providence resources, our decency

— and our

in

our

call to duty.

our unparalleled

role,

One

hears the echo of

Wilson's beliefs in President Bush's words.

To be

sure, there

is

one very profound difference between President

Bush's approach and Wilson's. President Wilson, the driving force be-

hind the League of Nations, the precursor to the United Nations, believed fervently in collective security and international law; both

would

limit national sovereignty, including ours,

and would constitute

a prac-

moral inhibition on the use of

force. In his eyes, the

United

and

tical

a

States, given

our standing and unselfish purposes, had to lead the way.

But America,

too,

would be bound by the international conventions

that

Wilson favored. President Bush wants no limits on the exercise of American power or

—not from

sovereignty

Criminal Court, and,

the United Nations, not from the International

we have

as

Geneva Convention on the

we combat in

seen, not even

from something

like the

we

seize as

rules governing torture of those

terrorism. Ironically, because he shares Wilson's conviction

our goodness, our

selflessness,

he opposes any

limits

on the exercise of

our might. For President Bush, our benevolence and our exceptionalism

mean we

our power only for good, and therefore that power

will use

should not be constrained by others. Traditional conservatives also don't

want others to limit our exercise of power. But unlike them, President

Bush seeks

to use

our power not for defensive but for transformative

purposes.

Some might argue George

W Bush's

a strong case to

that

real historical

be

made

gan, too, was a Wilsonian a hill"

tions

—and

like

Ronald Reagan, not Woodrow Wilson,

that

model. Certainly, here

Bush

at

home, there

a Reaganite. In foreign policy,

is

—speaking of America

as that "shining city

is is

Rea-

upon

Bush, he was instinctively opposed to external limita-

on our exercise of power. However, unlike Bush, Reagan was not

quick to use American military might. True, he would compete with the Soviet ing,

Union and drive up the

costs of empire

pursuing the Strategic Defense

sive shield against missile attack,

Initiative,

by raising defense spendor a "Stars Wars" defen-

and supporting insurgencies against

the Soviets in Afghanistan or Soviet proxies in Nicaragua. But he was

15

STATECRAFT not keen on using American military forces for foreign interventions.

One cannot compare

a low-cost

venture in Grenada, where there was

no indigenous military

essentially

force, to the

war

in Iraq.

Moreover, consider President Reagan's response in Lebanon: the

United States

initially

went into Beirut

to preside over the

PLO's depar-

ture from Lebanon, and did so as part of a small multilateral force of

which American forces were essentially an equal the multilateral forces subsequent to the

Lebanese

as

new

they reconstituted a

agreement with

Israel

on

Syrian opposition to the

its

PLO

new

bombing of the

in the fall of 1983, in

was to support the

withdrawal from Lebanon. But with intense

new Lebanese government's

Shi'a militia, internal fighting in

the suicide

exit

mission of

national compact and reached

resulting agreement) with the Israelis and the as a

The

part.

U.S.

which 241

negotiation (and

emergence of Hizbollah

Lebanon

escalated. Following

Marine barracks near the Beirut U.S.

marines were

killed,

airport

President Rea-

gan withdrew the American forces in early 1984. President Reagan was quick to cut our immediate let

losses.

He

did not

concerns about perceptions of our staying power prevent him from

pulling forces out.

Though

willing to use U.S. military forces in limited

circumstances, he was clearly wary of getting bogged down, and did not

look at American forces as the vanguard for producing political and regional transformation. President Reagan was an idealist in terms of the

American

role internationally. But, for him,

the world

more through the

force of

its

America could transform

example and

less

through the

force of its military.

Both Wilson and Reagan saw the power of our example. Both reflected well the ethos of Americans.

We

also

see ourselves as selfless and

willing to help others, eschewing any special gain for our country. Internationally, others

may

self-image, however,

is

see us and our purposes quite differently.

one

of sacrifice for a greater good.

Reagan before him, knows how eign policy

—something, not

of authenticity to

to speak to the

And

American idiom

surprisingly, that gave his

Our

Bush, like

approach

in fora ring

many Americans.

Again, however, policy comes back to substance, and while shaping a foreign policy that reflects our ethos threats that

must be dealt with and

16

is

important, there are

still

real

real interests or causes to pursue.

The Bush Foreign

The

ideological starting point

Bush

first

term,

it is

fair to

eign policy agenda and

Policy

and the Need for Statecraft

George W.

important, and certainly in the

is

say that the neoconservatives defined the for-

how

it

was pursued.

NEOCONSERVATISM VERSUS NEOLIBERALISM Like most caricatures, the description of the neoconservatives has been

—such Robert Kagan—

overly simplistic. Their current standard-bearers Perle,

David Frum, William

and

Kristol,

thinkers with a clear worldview.

4

To be

sure, those

Richard

as

are serious

who might

describe

themselves as neoconservatives are not homogeneous, but they do share a

number of general

a

very dangerous world; the United States

precepts: force and

and has the moral responsibility to use

power remain highly relevant

its

is

in

the world's premier state

power, including

its

unrivaled

military force, for good; the internal character of regimes matters;

malevolent leaders and terrorist groups (which usually have some connection) must be confronted and defeated; our readiness to do so will

undermine

all

such entities and reduce their coercive effect on others;

using our force can transform the political landscape, embolden cratic, reformist

demo-

elements regionally and internationally, and hasten the

day that democracy triumphs around the globe; though many of our ditional allies, particularly in Europe, instinctively force,

favors

—

we must not be

inhibited by their reluctance

accommodation of those who

tra-

oppose the use of a reluctance that

can, in fact, never be

accommo-

dated in their opposition to our values and purposes. In the eyes of

sponding to

many

threats. It

will over the

neocons, 9/11 resulted from our weakness in re-

was

far less

an intelligence failure than

preceding decade to confront those such

sein or the Iranians or Hizbollah or the Taliban or Al

was never seen primarily

as a

as

a failure

of

Saddam Hus-

Qaeda. Terrorism

law enforcement problem; rather

it

was

a

first-order threat that required a strong response against not just the

groups but also the countries that gave those groups support and sanctuary.

Ultimately, the neoconservatives are far

able to transform

human

tional conservatives.

5

more

optimistic about being

nature and international relations than tradi-

Like conservatives, they are not as a rule inclined

to intervene strictly for humanitarian purposes; unlike conservatives, they

17

STATECRAFT tend to see our military power as an agent of change that can be used to create an environment in which our ideas are able to flourish.

While some neoconservatives such

would put

Kristol

others

seem

facts

leading officials of the

new Bush

ers, it

administration as

was believed, would adjust to the

it

had

process was as

much

more pressure on But

East.

as

of creating

new to

assuming

as

was putting

a

far

Middle

policy-making far

more

likely

diplomacy between

futile

way the neocons envisioned or

fall

the

way many of them

Richard Perle believed that U.S. forces should have gone

removed Saddam Hussein, and withdrawn

such

withdrawal

the Bush administration did not prosecute the

war and the aftermath of Saddam Hussein's

in,

if

7

To be fair to them, for.

Initially,

realities as

Middle East than continuing

Obviously, Iraq has not turned out the

had argued

Oth-

Treaty, and the Arab-Israeli peace

Iraq or Iran to change the character of the

and Palestinians.

office in

we might create, even

regime change in either Iraq or Iran was

to transform the

hoped.

assumed

to be reestablished.

realities

one of the neocons wrote prior

position, forced

Israelis

a part

ABM

it

American power had

they expressed unhappiness about our behavior.

from the Kyoto Protocol, the

diplomatic logic. 6

to infuse the thinking of

a sense that respect for

during the Clinton years, and

lost

force and diplomacy,

own

its

on the landscape seemed

January 2001. There was

been

Robert Kagan and William

as

premium on marrying

to believe that force often creates

new

Creating

high

a

—

leaving Iraq for Iraqis

Ahmed Chalabi to manage. Others, such as William Kristol, were

highly skeptical of such an approach and instead saw the administration's

reluctance to use sufficient force to liberate territory and be able

to hold

it

as a

major

failing, particularly

gency to take root and undermine the Kristol's

because

it

allowed the insur-

ability to reconstruct Iraq quickly.

views converge, in part, with what might be described

neoliberal view of Iraq.

8

While there

is

as yet

as a

no clearly acknowledged

or identified body of scholars, policy makers, and commentators broadly described as neoliberals, als

I

will use the label

and define

it.

First, neoliber-

believe in the weight and importance of the U.S. role internationally.

Second,

just as the

neoconservatives tend to be Republicans, the neolib-

erals tend to

be Democrats

liberals (any

more than

all

—though

clearly not

all

Democrats are neo-

Republicans are neocons). Third, with regard

IS

— The Bush Foreign to Iraq, there

were some

and Joseph Lieberman

in

Policy

and the Need for Statecraft

Congress

—such

Senators Joseph Biden

as

—and many who served

in the

Clinton adminis-

was the right choice. 9

who To be sure, not all those whom I would define as neoliberals Francis Fukuyama and Joseph Nye, for example believed it was right to go to war in March 2003. But those who did raised questions about force size tration

believed that going to

war

in Iraq

—

—

and

its

Kristol

appropriateness to the military and political mission. Unlike

and other thoughtful neoconservatives, neoliberal supporters of

more preoccupied with what would be needed

the war were far

termath of Saddam's demise. There was ease of the mission and

much

much

less

in the af-

optimism about the

greater concern about the messiness of the

reconstruction or nation-building phase. Similarly, neoliberals were far

more

riveted

on the dangers of a vacuum

tions of this for security; the role of the

transition period; the

after

Saddam, and the implica-

former

Iraqi military

during

a

importance of having an international, not Amer-

of Iraq to avoid the symbolism of U.S. occupation;

ican, administrator

the need to create an early Iraqi administration; the risks of sectarianism, the likelihood of a Sunni insurgency, and the long-haul nature of

we would be assuming. 10 come to nation-building with an understanding

the responsibility

Neoliberals

that

transformations are about not just removing regimes but also focusing

on what takes their

place. Unlike the neocons,

who, Francis Fukuyama

observes, defined the task in Iraq as simply "getting rid of the old regime," neoliberals understand that regime change in general, and specifically in Iraq,

to

required a "slow and painstaking" process of constructing institutions

fill

the vacuum. 11

It

was the newspaper columnist Thomas Friedman,

a self-styled neoliberal,

who wrote

a

running stream of commentaries

supporting the war but cautioning that after" strategy, Iraq.

if

we

did not have a serious "day

we were in danger of creating a Balkan-type nightmare in

We could not simply destroy; we had

a responsibility to construct

recognizing that this would be a complex and very difficult

Friedman's eyes, the benefits of replacing a truly

evil,

task. Still, in

malignant leader

with a decent, roughly representative government in the heart of the

Middle East might als

are optimists

justify

who

such

a

Herculean

effort.

Ultimately, neoliber-

are guided by their hopes but

limits.

19

who

also recognize

— STATECRAFT Here we can see what

neoliberals have in

common

with neoconser-

where they diverge from them and the

vatives, as well as

power and force

day. Like the neocons, they see that

parts of international relations.

They

liberals

see real threats that require mili-

tary responses, and they understand that the United States to project

defensive

its

power. Unlike

when

it

likely to see the like

many on

must be

dam

comes

need

for

resisted. Indeed,

as victims/'

many of today's

They

engagement internationally and left,

must be able

liberals, neoliberals are

to the use of American force.

the political

are far

Neoliberals is

one

that there are forces in the world that

they tend not to "think of Milosevic and Sad-

know

that the world can be nasty and that

not against the principle of preemption us before they can succeed in doing

may be

places, in

so.

it

from

—

it.

Not

who

attacking those

until the threat

killing large

is

unmistakable

is

not their

to fostering positive changes world-

wide, but their doubts about where our use of force

more

threaten

numbers of Americans.

Ultimately, what separates neoliberals from neoconservatives

optimism and their commitment

American

surprisingly, they are

They see new security challenges

which waiting

too late to prevent

Neoliberals are

much

12

essential tool for dealing with

from murkier

un-

or to accept the "sort of affectless, neutralist, and smirk-

"left" today.

power

not

more

to believe,

ing isolationism" that Christopher Hitchens says characterizes too

of the

of to-

are inescapable

is

likely to succeed.

skeptical than the neocons that force can foster

democratic transformations, though they are more inclined to use force for humanitarian purposes in places

such

as

Rwanda or

Darfur.

Neoliberals see peace and democracy as having to emerge from within,

not as imposed from without.

They

are willing to

diplomatically, economically, politically, and militarily

make

—

to help

both peace and democratic change, but they realize that

ments

at

context.

our disposal must be employed and in

They have no

illusions

a

way

the effort

all

that

promote

the instru-

fits

the local

about the limitations and weaknesses of

international institutions such as the United Nations, but they also un-

derstand the value and greater legitimacy that results from taking actions

under such international umbrellas. Unlike neocons, neoliberals

also see the cost to the

United States when America defies international

conventions, rejects what

may be

a

20

broad international consensus on

The Bush Foreign

something such

Policy

change, and offers nothing to take the

as global climate

place of that which

it

and the Needfor Statecraft

opposes.

Neoliberals believe, to use Joseph Nye's term, in the use of smart

—meaning

power

objectives.

13

the optimal

mix of hard and

soft

While they don't rule out the need

power to

to achieve

engage

in

our

regime

change, they tend to favor the changing of the behavior of regimes, believing that can have a transforming effect.

Neoliberals as a rule are convinced that Iran must not be permitted to

develop or acquire nuclear capability, and that the North Korean nu-

weapons must be dismantled. But,

clear

liberals believe that

compelling, others

we

are

more

again, unlike the neocons, neo-

likely to

succeed by persuading, not

whom we may need to join us in countering these dan-

gers. It is too

simple to say that neoliberals are more likely than neocon-

servatives to

employ diplomacy over the use of force. But

that neoliberals are

more attuned than the neocons

the instruments of statecraft

—

to

it is

fair to

say

how to employ

all

at least at this stage in the articulation

and implementation of neoconservative

strategies. Indeed,

I

would

ar-

gue that the neoliberals are much more preoccupied than the neoconservatives with statecraft

—

largely because they have less confidence in

the consequences of using military force for political purposes.

WHAT Statecraft

cluding

is

all

IS

STATECRAFT?

not simply another way of referring to diplomacy. While in-

diplomatic procedures,

diplomacy.

Some

state affairs."

14

it is

much more

than only exercising

define statecraft generally as the "art of conducting

Others describe

it

more

specifically as the "organized ac-

governments take to change the external environment

tions

in general

or the policies and actions of other states in particular to achieve the objectives that

As

a

have been set by policy makers." 15

former policy maker,

I

would describe

statecraft as

knowing how

best to integrate and use every asset or military, diplomatic, intelligence, public, economic, or psychological tool to

meet our

who But

we

possess (or can manipulate)

objectives. Statecraft involves influencing others

are already friendly statecraft requires

—

those

and share our purposes, and those who do

more than simply orchestrating

21

all

not.

the resources

STATECRAFT directly or indirectly at our disposal. a

It

requires putting our

and our broad purposes.

requires a definition of objectives that are desirable, even ambitious,

but also tied to an appreciation of what

must be fashioned that create

match

a

is

possible. Strategies

—not

mismatch

a

premium on being its

possible consequences, and

which other actors have the Often those

who

tactics

statecraft puts

able to assess a threat or an emerging threat wisely.

Such assessments must evaluate the nature of the danger, of materializing,

and

—between aims

and the means available for acting on those aims. As such, a

into

broader context of goals and capabilities. Statecraft starts with understanding our role

It

means

its

its

likelihood

timing, as well as

capabilities to be helpful in countering

are not our allies

may have

it.

the greatest leverage on a

potential adversary, and statecraft involves determining and then

ploying the most effective means to bring those

who

em-

are not our friends

to exercise their influence constructively.

By also

the same token, statecraft

is

not only about fending off threats, but

about taking advantage of opportunities to

make

the world safer and

more responsive

alter the

landscape and

our interests or

to

goals.

Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger understood that an opening to China could be strategically beneficial, creating leverage vis-a-vis the Soviet

Union and giving the Chinese stability regionally

especially in

its

new

second term, appears to recognize the growing strategic

as the latter's

and how

weight

nizing a strategic opening

is

may be

it

is felt

integral to triangulating with

increasingly on the world stage. Recog-

certainly

one requirement of statecraft. Being

able to marshal the wherewithal to act final analysis, is

economic cooperation and

stake in

and internationally. Similarly, the Bush administration,

significance of India

China

a

on an opening and exploit

one of the better measures of

it,

effective statecraft.

in the

By

the

same token, missing opportunities or squandering them may be one of the better measures of statecraft poorly executed.

Chester Crocker, a scholar and former practitioner, describes "smart statecraft [as]

what you get when

so that leverage in

all its

political strategy that

statecraft

forms

is

wits, wallets,

and muscle pull together

harnessed to a

realistic action

plan or

can be set in motion by agile diplomacy. Smart

does not dispense with hard power;

it

uses hard power intelli-

gently, recognizing the limits as well as the potential of purely military

power, and integrating

it

into an over-arching strategy."

22

16

The Bush Foreign

Policy

and the Need for Statecraft

Shaping, in Dr. Crocker's words, "an over-arching strategy," requires

something tives.

One

else:

the capacity to establish meaningful and feasible objec-

should not assume that

makers. Did

Lyndon Johnson and

and achievable objectives visors (like

in

a given

is

with leaders and decision

main advisors

his

Vietnam? Did

Bill

me) understand what was possible

Clinton and his major adso long as Yasir Arafat was

the Palestinian leader and develop a strategy that

George W. Bush understand what he was getting he have established such ambitious objectives

establish meaningful

if

fit

Did

that possibility?

into in Iraq, and

would

he had? Obviously, hav-

ing flawed assessments about threats and opportunities will lead to mis-

guided objectives. Failing to understand the local circumstances or the setting in

which one

is

involving our forces or our national prestige

is

a

failure of statecraft.

In other words, statecraft involves developing aims and strategies that fit

both the context and the means available. Bad statecraft creates mis-

matches between means and ends; to tic

also misreads

it

what policies are

likely

be sustainable domestically and what must be done to preserve domessupport.

Vietnam was

a classic

example of

on nearly every

failure

measure, with disastrous consequences for our standing in the world, our self-confidence, and our readiness to exercise power, as well as a colossal loss

of life.

Will Iraq turn out to be different?

It is

hard to exaggerate the Bush

administration's fundamental miscalculations

on

Iraq,

including but not

limited to unrealistic policy objectives; fundamental intelligence ures; catastrophically

fail-

poor understanding of what would characterize

the post-Saddam period, and completely unrealistic planning as a result; denial of the existence of an insurgency for several months; and the ab-

sence of a consistent explanation to the American people or the international

community about the reasons

for the war. Small

wonder

that after

nearly four years of warfare, Iraq has been a disaster, costing thousands

of

lives,

requiring the expenditure of hundreds of billions of dollars,

stretching our forces and reserve system to the breaking point, and be-

coming

a

magnet

for terrorists

and

hostility

toward the United States

throughout the Muslim world. Could the war yet yield

a less disastrous

and possibly more hopeful outcome? It is

historic

possible.

The removal of Saddam Hussein could yet represent a in Iraq and the region. With Saddam gone, authen-

development

23

STATECRAFT tic, if

messy and

mit a

new

own

sectarian, politics

Iraq to

emerge

people. Such an

that

is

may yet become manageable and per-

a threat to neither

outcome could, over

on reformers and even publics

its

neighbors nor

its

time, have a liberating effect

in the region, convincing

them

that the

dangers of opposition to strongman rule need not be overwhelming.

But that

the best case, and few outside the Bush administration

is

would bet on

that being the

outcome

in Iraq. In the

near term, sectarian

violence threatens to tear Iraq apart. Unfortunately, a prolonged

war and the fragmentation of the country in Iraq

than the best case

still

may be

a

more

likely

civil

outcome

envisioned by President Bush. Even

if

we

we should have no illusions; in time for Iraq to become stable and

succeed in avoiding such an eventuality, the best of circumstances, self-sustaining.

Any such

it

will take

success will

still

have to be hard won, will re-

quire a U.S. presence for years to come, and will depend on giving the

Sunnis of the country It

new

a stake in the

Iraq.

will also require the Sunnis to adjust to a

the majority or dominant force in Iraq.

new

reality:

They will have

a role

but others will dominate. Like the Maronites of Lebanon,

commanding

heights of wealth and

have to accept

power

they are not

and

who

a share,

held the

for so long, the Sunnis will

a far less exalted position in Iraq.

To

be sure, stability does

not depend only on the Sunnis. Their readiness to accept a Maronite-

type posture in Iraq also requires the Shi'a to be willing to grant them a share of the national assets and power.

National reconciliation has not yet taken place.

A new national com-

pact as embodied in the constitution has not been accepted by the Shi'a, Sunnis, or Kurds

—with

the

amendments the Sunnis sought on

distribu-

tion of oil revenues, provinces not having the right to secede,

and an

agreed role on Islam in law and society never having been adopted.

Without

a real national

compact, Sunnis will continue to acquiesce in

the insurgency and Shi'as will not give their protection inflict

from the Sunnis

—

up the

militias that they see as

militias that

both exact revenge and

violent punishment while also preventing real national, not sec-

tarian, security forces

from emerging.

Perhaps seeing the abyss of unrelenting of the country, the

Shi'as, Sunnis,

civil

and Kurds

war and fragmentation

will decide to reconcile

and

accept the burden of responsibility for security in Iraq that the United States continues to carry.

Most

Iraqis don't

24

want American troops

there,

The Bush Foreign

and yet nearly will

withdraw

quires

them

all

Iraqis are afraid to

in a

to

way

And

have U.S. forces leave. Knowing we

that does not leave

them

assume responsibility could

in the lurch

still

save the day. But the

so long as the insurgency goes on, a violent Iraq will not be an

model

attractive

for others in the region.

—

—with

Moreover, the new Iraq not be especially close to

its

the Shi'a politically dominant

Arab neighbors such

Jordan, with their Sunni leaders and populations.

be

but that re-

and the insurgency won't immediately disap-

transition won't be easy, pear.

and the Needfor Statecraft

Policy

While not

hostile to Shi'a Iran.

a

Saudi Arabia and

as

Nor

puppet of the

will

new

Iraq

Iranians, the

new

will the

Iraq will not be part of any American-led efforts to isolate the Iranians

over their pursuit of nuclear weapons or their support of terrorist

groups such

How will fices

Hamas, and Islamic Jihad.

as Hizbollah,

the American public react

we have made

for Iraq,

we

at that point?

civil

given the sacri-

are faced with a leadership that opposes

our policy toward Iran and on other regional devolves into

If,

war or continuing

sion to go into Iraq be perceived?

issues, or

civil strife,

Even now

how

with an Iraq that

will the

a majority

Bush deci-

of the American

public believe the decision to go to war in Iraq was a mistake. to escape the conclusion that the Iraqi experience,

before

it,

will

make

much

like

It is

hard

Vietnam

the American public far less willing to support the

use of force in other contingencies.

Like other neoliberals,

I

share the doubts about too optimistically us-

ing force for effecting political change. But losing credibility in being able to use or threaten force statecraft.

Smart statecraft,

as

is

not good for the effective exercise of

Chester Crocker observed, depends on be-

ing able to orchestrate hard and not just soft (meaning nonmilitary or coercive) power. 17

Sometimes the perception

that

we

will use force if

other forms of leverage won't work creates pressures on others (who fear

when they otherwise might not, to resolve a If others doubt that we can use force because we are

our use of force) to

problem or

hamstrung

threat.

act,

—

constrained by domestic realities or self-doubt or military

forces stretched too thin

comes

far

Statecraft

—our

capacity to counter a threat before

more dangerous and is

it

be-

requires a response will be diminished.

unlikely to be effective if

with our arms tied behind our back.

25

it

has to be conducted literally

STATECRAFT

WHY

STATECRAFT SO NECESSARY TODAY?

IS

The challenges we we had to confront

face internationally today are different from those in the latter half of the twentieth century. Since the

United States has been

War With

II

—

a global

the main threats

we have

certainly since the

faced have

even those with

nation-states,

as the Soviet

—

power

Union and China had

come from

end of World nation-states.

a messianic, expansionist ideology,

at

one time, there

is

an address. Tra-

ditional forms of deterrence work. Costs that matter to these states can

be inflicted in response to certain behaviors.

The

leaders of these states

have something to protect and something unmistakable to culation

is

lose.

Miscal-

and war through inadvertence can certainly occur.

possible,

Nonetheless, leaders can be held accountable, and countering threats, while not easy

—witness

Iraq or Iran or

North Korea today

—

falls in a

familiar domain.

But what happens in

a

world where the principal, or

at least increas-

come from non-state actors? Where it is not so easy to find their addresses? Where traditional deterrence does not apply? Where our use of military power may actually increase the anger toward us and make terrorism more, not less, likely? Where threats of terror become increasingly destructive and know no borders? Where we are in a war but it is a war of ideas, and our moral standing and legitimacy may determine a struggle for hearts and minds that will affect who becomes ingly serious, threats

a terrorist? In

such a world, traditional standards and uses of power must

be redefined, and ers

all,

must be brought

critical to

Later

I

not just some, of our instruments for affecting othto bear. In such a world, effective statecraft will be

securing our national interests.

what is new and different in the how and why we need to apply statecraft to

will discuss in greater detail

international landscape and U.S. foreign policy.

For now, suffice

it

to say that America's leaders will

have to contend with the new reality of non-state actors (especially radical Islamists)

who

are driven not only by a

deep sense of grievance and

anger against the United States, but also by their desire to do great damage to America's interests and citizens

can succeed in doing

so. It is

—and by

their belief that they

not just that they employ terror, but also

26

The Bush Foreign that they seek

Policy

weapons of mass

and the Need for Statecraft

terror.

They

are trying to acquire or de-

velop nuclear or biological or chemical weapons, and the security of

—

such weapons and their components worldwide

mer

Soviet Union

—

much

leaves

to be desired.

such weapons or potential weapons stocks States can

do on

its

is

especially in the for-

Ensuring the security of

not something the United

own, any more than America alone can prevent the

spread of weapons of mass destruction to rogue regimes or terrorist groups.

America needs partners ical Islamists

and also

to

in a

new world

to

win the struggle with rad-

develop joint strategies for stopping acts of ter-

ror and for limiting the appeal of the Islamists to those throughout the

Muslim world who

are alienated from corrupt and nonresponsive

regimes. Similarly, our leaders must to forge a division of labor to failing

and weak

for conflict

know whom

to

work with and how

respond to the increasing phenomenon of breeding grounds

states, particularly in Africa, that are

and havens from which the radical Islamists base themselves

and operate.

And

if

these challenges weren't already daunting, America's foreign

policy must also

now be

able to marshal the

means

to

manage the emer-

gence of rising powers on the international stage such dia.

The world

as

we have known

it

China and In-

as

was dominated by the transatlantic

relationship of the United States and Europe. In the years ahead, three

of the four dominant powers,

Asian

—China, Japan, and

that the

Chinese

will

economically, are likely to be

India. China, in particular,

Japan and

assertive and, unlike it

at least

India,

is

is

becoming more

not democratic.

How

likely

is

view the international order the way Ameri-

cans do? If not, what tools can the United States wield, on

its

own and

with others, to shape Chinese choices and exert leverage in a way that creates incentives for

China

to play

by familiar and acceptable rules of

the game?

Whether dealing with the winning the

battle of hearts

qualitatively

statecraft effectively.

find-

more open and congenial

American foreign policy

a statecraft mentality.

actor threats or

and minds with the radical Islamists or

ing ways to integrate the Chinese into a ternational system,

new non-state

will

need

to be

in-

guided by

Our leaders will need to know how to conduct And ultimately that is what this book is about.

27

STATECRAFT While not ignoring what our

little in

the

now

be,

I

want

to focus as well

on

interests.

With an eye toward learning how to turn

must

Knowing what our policies should end if we don't know how to do what is necessary.

how to pursue our needs and be matters

policies

best to

do what

is

necessary,

to a survey of several historical cases of statecraft.

28

I

want

2.

CASES OF STATECRAFT German

There

is

Unification in

no better way to grasp

statecraft

NATO

done well or not so well than

to look at a

number of

more recent

cases for several reasons. First, since each of the cases either

straddles or follows the

historical examples.

end of the cold

I

have chosen to examine

war, each has particular rele-

vance to the international landscape that we are dealing with today. Second, in several of the cases,

I

was either directly involved with or

in a

position to talk to key decision makers and, thus, have a good under-

standing of what was driving the American decisions at the time. Third, the stakes in each case were high, and there to

measure the effectiveness of

is

no better

statecraft than in cases

basis

on which

where different

administrations believed that a great deal was riding on the achievement

of their objectives.

With those reasons pened

in

each case,

in

mind,

I

will offer an

why we developed

we

faced,

way

to

measure the effectiveness of

tives difficult to achieve? In

internationally

had something

In the

first

most no one

case,

statecraft

many of the

we

did,

to

And

do with

yet

we

what obsta-

thought

it

to ask:

were the objecwere seen by

the administrations

—

as

did achieve them. Surely, state-

it.

German unification

initially

is

cases, the objectives

—and even by some within

desirable but unachievable. craft

the objectives

and what were the means we used to overcome them. One

cles

many

overview of what hap-

in

NATO, it is safe to say that al-

conceivable that

29

Germany could be

uni-

STATECRAFT fied

and integrated into

NATO.

Indeed, had one queried leaders in Eu-

rope or most of those in the State Department or in the Washington punditry

they would have insisted that the Soviet leadership could

class,

never accept such an outcome. Yet the application of statecraft

made

it

happen.

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT Nothing more

embodied the cold war than the

clearly

division of

Ger-

many into Western and Eastern nations. It took on a life of its own, and the so-called Four

Powers

at the

— United —assumed

time

at

the

rious

the

Kingdom conclusion of World War II

France, and the United

States, the Soviet

rights

as a result

Union,

and responsibilities

of their victory.

The

victo-

powers became the supreme authority over Germany, and their in-

ability to

come

to an

agreement on

a final

a reconstituted political authority in

peace treaty or on the

Germany

fate

of

led in time to the cre-

ation of two states.

In reality, the Soviets, the British, and the French a horrific price in

power

in

German

united

wars with

Europe and had

Germany

little

feared the revival of

interest in

American

state.

—

—having paid such

attitudes

German

any early reconstitution of

were shaped

less

a

by history

and more by the fear of Soviet power spreading west into Germany. Suc-

American administrations thus pressed the

cessive

British

and French to

accept the need for prosperity in our zone of control in Germany, and for the advent of self-government. This, in turn, created the basis for the

establishment of the Federal Republic of Berlin remained under direct Four

Germany (West Germany).

Power

control,

and

in effect, the

Federal Republic had the legal status of an interim state whose "final structure and borders"

ment.

1

The

Soviets, having subsequently set

occupied, argued that it

would be determined

Germany as

had been replaced by two

a

in an eventual

up

country had

states:

peace

settle-

a state in the area

ceased to exist

they

and that

the Federal Republic (West Ger-

many) and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany).

The

position of the United States, Britain, and France, as

in their 1952 treaty

embodied

with the Federal Republic, was that international

conditions precluded the reunification of Germany. Until a peace settle-

ment could be

negotiated, the Four Powers

30

would

retain their rights

and

German responsibilities

unresolved.

and the

final

Unification in

NATO

borders of the

The presumption of

German

state

the treaty was that "Signatory States

common aim

[would] cooperate to achieve, by peaceful means, their a reunified

Germany

European com-

2

While reunification

(to

might have been the stated trary,

of

enjoying a liberal-democratic constitution, like

that of the Federal Republic, and integrated within the

munity."

would remain

the division of

policy makers,

be achieved through all-German elections)

no one acted to promote

goal,

Germany came

more sympathetic

On

it.

to be an accepted fact.

to the

Germans than any of the other

Four Powers, nonetheless came to see the German question

management of

ary to the overall

Union." 3 In time, West

German

the con-

American "second-

as

the U.S. relationship with the Soviet

leaders also adapted to this reality.

Even

Helmut Kohl, who more than other West German leaders maintained a public commitment to resolving the German question, dismissed the Gorbachev might

idea that Soviet leader Mikhail

many

at

some point by saying

futuristic novels

And

.

.

.

What you

yet the fantastic

as late as

ask now, that

became

bachev introduced "new thinking" found

stirrings in

offer unity to

October 1988, is

in the

"I

realm of fantasy." 4

quite real, and in short order. in 1986,

countries.

By

the

summer of

events that led to the Berlin wall its

coming down.

border with Austria, essentially

Germans began streaming flee to

into

Hungary

1989,

lifting

Hungary

Gor-

and by 1988 there were pro-

Poland and Hungary testing the

limits of Soviet

control and tolerance for increasing independence in Eastern 3

Ger-

do not write

set in

motion

European a train

of

When Hungary opened

the iron curtain there, East

in order to get to Austria

and

the West. Initially, the reformist Hungarian government would

not allow the East

Germans

to cross the Austrian border, but

unwilling to force them to return home. Soon Hungary into Austria, triggering a virtual

asylum. Even as the East

let

it

was also

them

cross

hemorrhage of East Germans seeking

German government

blocked direct transit to

Hungary, other routes were exploited, and soon swelling numbers of other asylum-seeking East

embassy

Germans camped out

in Prague. Fearing

contagion to their

Czech government worked out

a deal

in the

own

West German

population, the

with the help of the West

German

foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, in which the asylum seekers

were allowed

to

go to West

Germany after returning first to East Germany. 31

STATECRAFT (The East Germans accepted image of large

this deal,

hoping to end the embarrassing

numbers of asylum-seekers prior

planned for the fortieth anniversary of the

to the celebrations

state.)

Rather than staunching the flow of East Germans trying to get out of it new impetus. And at this point, Germany began to drop all pretenses of working with the East German government and seeking only legal, controlled emigration. Though the Soviets began to issue warnings to the West German government of the danger of not respecting "postwar

their country, however, the deal gave

the Kohl-led government of West

realities,"

Gorbachev was not prepared

olent crackdown in East

blunted what were

now

from power

Germany. Only such

daily demonstrations

Honecker, the aging East viet backing for such a

countenance

to

German

leader,

a draconian, vi-

crackdown might have

a

demanding change. Erich

knowing he could not get So-

crackdown, hesitated and was, himself, removed

in mid-October, barely a

week

after

Gorbachev had

GDR for the fortieth-anniversary celebrations. The

the

took his place sought to end the

new

course.

crisis in

East

With repression no longer an

reformers

who

Germany by promising

a

option, pent-up frustrations

gave way to continuing demonstrations, with ing out on the streets on

visited

five

hundred thousand turn-

November 4. Hoping to demonstrate

responsive-

ness and gain popularity, the reformist government eased restrictions

on

foreign travel.

There was no intention less,

to

remove the need

for an exit visa.

Nonethe-

on the night of November 9, Giinter Schabowski, one of the new

re-

formist leaders, gave a rambling press conference and, near the end of it,

new travel law that had just been approved by the Central Committee: "Requests for private trips abroad may be submitted from now on even in the absence of special prerequisites." 6 Rumors quickly spread that all restrictions had been lifted, and huge crowds almost immediately assembled at the Berlin wall. The guards read the text of a

simply gave way and opened the

and the next day

wall.

Crowds poured

—November —was 10

unthinkable was

now

and Four Powers

rights

a

into

day of euphoria

came down

West

Berlin,

in Berlin.

The

and The then literally on the night of November 9-10, 1989, and by September 12, 1990, there was a ceremony in which Germany formally was reconstituted wall

thinkable.

figuratively

and responsibilities ended.

How did it happen with

Soviet opposition and with low expectations

32

German

from nearly every quarter? As in

Bonn

NATO

Unification in

late as

October

American embassy

25, the

was reporting to decision makers in Washington that "virtually

no one believes reunification

the

is

first

7

German

order of business on the

German-

agenda." Only three days before the wall

Gorbachev

told his

never forgive us

if

ambassador

we

lose the

in

came down, Mikhail East Germany, "Our people will

GDR." 8

two weeks

Yet, less than

later

it

was unquestionably on the agenda, and the Bush administration fash-

Germany would be

ioned a strategy to make sure that a reunified

member of the

NATO alliance.

GERMAN

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION MAKES

REUNIFICATION If

it

a

IN

NATO

OBJECTIVE

ITS

had been up to the State Department, the United States would not

have embraced

German

NATO as a goal. The State bu-

reunification in

reaucracy was conditioned to think that unification would create insta-

and that the notion had few supporters even

bility

When

in the

two Germanys.

Robert Zoellick, the politically appointed counselor and confi-

dant of new secretary of state James Baker, asked a visiting West general in early 1989 about

German

attitudes toward reunification,

Ridgway, the then assistant secretary of state for European

buked him, saying unification was "the subject that terested in and no

German

reunification

—

Americans are

in-

9

had clearly begun.

President Bush and his senior advisors saw

May

all

Roz

affairs, re-

The October 25 embassy cable hesitancy even when the march toward

cares about."

cited earlier signaled a similar

German

differently.

it

As early

as

—

come down the president said in an interview that he would "love to see" Germany reunified. 10 The president and those around him believed that the new Soviet glasnost would 1989

well before the wall had

lead to a far-reaching transformation in

Europe and

that

no such trans-

formation would be complete without the reunification of Germany.

The

cold war began there and

it

would end

there. In the

words of Robert

Zoellick, an architect of the policy, "President Bush, Secretary Baker,

and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and their colleagues recognized that their decisions would shape Europe for decades to

come

.

.

.

The

U.S.

aim was

to unify

Europe

in

peace and freedom, while

seeking to avoid a 'Versailles victory' that invited

33

its

own

destruction."

11

STATECRAFT The analogy to Versailles is critical for understanding how Bush's advisors applied statecraft to German reunification. It meant that Germany could not be singled out for special treatment that there could not be "restrictions on German sovereignty" as a price of the country's

—

unity In Zoellick's words, "any limits imposed from the outside would create the potential for future grievances"

when the Germany and set sailles,

—

they had after Ver-

just as

Allies required reparations that

bankrupted Weimar

the stage for the Nazi accession to power. 12

At the same time, Germany's history of violent conquest could not be

The president and his advisors believed that if Germany was not embedded in NATO, it would be a source of danger. If neutral, it would seek security by gaining its own nuclear capability, which would

ignored.

put Europe on a nuclear hair-trigger and cause the nuclear nonproliferation regime to unravel as other states capable of developing nuclear

weapons chose and that

Two

to

do

so.

How

Germany would be

could

we ensure

unified and in

considerations guided us. First,

if

this

would not happen

NATO?

we

identified

from the begin-

German aspirations and coordinated literally every step towith German leaders, they would not opt to remain neutral and

ning with gether

make

a separate

agreement with the

Soviets. Second, to

dence of others and lessen their fears of a German

win the

revival,

confi-

Germany

should be embedded in European institutions. Ironically,

it

was the

political leadership

of the administration (not

the mid- or working-level foreign affairs specialists) broader,

and

more

historic perception of the far-reaching

tried to position us in

cials

advance of them. In

fact,

who had

changes in Europe

the most senior

read Chancellor Kohl correctly and succeeded in winning his

Kohl saw almost instinctive U.S. support, came to count on the United States removing the

numerous

the

it,

offi-

trust.

and saw

obstacles to unification.

OBSTACLES TO ACHIEVING THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S OBJECTIVE

To

begin with, the Soviets, the British, and the French were not enthusi-

astic

about reunification. For the Soviets, the division of Germany sym-

bolized that

Germany could never

again threaten the Russian people.

For the British and the French, a unified

34

Germany

rekindled harsh

German

Unification in

NATO

memories of German domination, and they worried

that their respective

weight in Europe would be diminished. While they might favor an end

war and the division of Europe, they believed

to the cold

it

should occur

only gradually and in stages.

The

British

Gorbachev

and French preferred

as a Soviet leader in

stability,

whom

and they saw Mikhail

the West had a very high stake

because he would make cooperation, not conflict and confrontation, a

new

reality.

Margaret Thatcher and Francois Mitterrand, the

French leaders, believed that political disaster for

German

Gorbachev and would look

defeat, thus destabilizing

Europe

Bob Blackwell, the national in the

CIA, shared

as well as the

'lost'

now more

was

USSR. "if

it

were

—could pose

he [Gorba-

for the

USSR

—when combined with

a threat to his position.

has to have one eye on this contingency."

Union

to appear that

GDR,

Germany, and the security environment threatening, the domestic fallout

other complaints

a

an unmistakable

like

Soviet troops were being forced to retreat from the

chev] had

and

would be

intelligence officer for the Soviet

concern and wrote that

this

NATO

unification in

British

Gorbachev

at least

13

did. In late November 1989, he told MitterGermany unified, "a Soviet marshal will be sitting in When movement toward unification began to gain momen-

Gorbachev apparently rand that the day

my

chair."

14

tum, he bluntly responded to united

Germany being

absolutely ruled out."

in

question about Soviet attitudes toward a

NATO,

saying

"We cannot

agree to

that. It is

15

Some of Gorbachev's level

a

harsher public statements came after high-

meetings with either President Bush or Secretary Baker in which

the actual discussions, even while reflecting Soviet disquiet over unification,

were

far

more measured.

Clearly,

Gorbachev was under domestic

internal pressure, and for understandable reasons.

No

matter

how you

As Vadim Zagladin,

Germanys you want

a

sliced

it,

the Soviet

Gorbachev

—one was ours and one was

it

to be yours."

position in Eastern

16

But

this

Union seemed

advisor, said,

yours.

to be losing.

"There used

to be

two

Now there will be one and

was only part of the

story.

The

Soviet

Europe was unraveling, and there were increasing

challenges emerging within the Soviet Union as Lithuania was pressing for

independence. Everywhere Gorbachev looked, perestroika was caus-

ing problems, not providing salvation. In such circumstances, he could

35

— STATECRAFT hardly appear to be acquiescing in a defeat of historical proportions the removal of one of the major vestiges of the Soviet victory in the

Great Patriotic War and

its

incorporation into the alliance that was ar-

rayed against the USSR.

Moreover, Gorbachev knew he had leverage: the hesitancy of others in

Europe and what he presumed would be German

sition to unification.

fear of Soviet

oppo-

His conversations and communications with Thatcher

and Mitterrand made clear that he knew where the British and French stood on unification. Thatcher told Gorbachev that "although

NATO

had traditionally made statements supporting Germany's aspiration to be reunited, in practice

we were

rather apprehensive."

dubious, saying, "Reunification poses so

up

my mind

as events occur."

many problems that I shall make warned President Bush)

Germans

(and Mitterrand too) even worried that "the in war."

not reunification, and after

need

on democratizing the

GDR,

Douglas Hurd,

a ten-point plan for said, "I believe that

which says that nothing will be done

and

of Europe or create anxiety in the

minds of people who have In

to focus

for an eleventh point

to destroy the balance

cial

peace

Helmut Kohl unveiled

unification, her foreign minister, a

will get in

19

Thatcher urged President Bush

is

that

"the Japan of Europe, but worse than Japan." She

what Hitler couldn't get

there

Mitterrand was

18

In reality, Thatcher was afraid (as she

Germany would be

17

stability

a right to

be worried." 20

Germany such fears were bound to resonate domestically. The So-

Democratic opposition was particularly

the neighbors and the Soviets. But

it

was not

Minister Genscher was also uneasy. In

sensitive to the anxieties of just the opposition;

fact, after

Soviet foreign minister

Eduard Shevardnadze publicly posed seven, obviously newspaper Bild Zeitung offered that called

on Germany

to the

Shevardnadze queries

to consider abolishing

Pact or reducing the American presence in contingent."

not accept

21

full

negative, ques-

Genscher approvingly cited responses

tions about reunification,

Foreign

NATO

Germany

that the

—responses

and the Warsaw to a "symbolic

Genscher's ministry was convinced that the Soviets could

NATO membership for a united Germany, and Genscher

shared the view of Thatcher and Mitterrand that lective "interest to defy

Gorbachev

downfall and the end of perestroika." 22

36

if

it

was not in our col-

success meant the reformer's

German

also the

NATO

and French concerns were not enough, there was

If Soviet, British,

The

Unification in

unease of the Poles over the issue of Germany's eastern border.

Poles worried that their western border, which included areas that

had been annexed from Germany

Germany

claims a newly reunified

They

after the war,

in

NATO

certainly added to the obstacles the

was going to achieve

its

might now be part of

would make on Poland.

Bush administration faced

if it

objective.

THE MEANS TO OVERCOME THE OBSTACLES

The who

were formidable, but even

obstacles

in

The Bush Helmut Kohl.

seize the initiative can shape the reality.

was poised to do

so,

and had

partner in

a

Seizing the initiative, however, requires It

such circumstances, those

more than

also requires a clear objective that reflects a

tion and of

all

the players.

And

on the issue and force others

administration

just anticipation.

good reading of the

situa-

requires the ability to get out in front

it

respond to your formulations and ac-

to

tions.

The day

after

Helmut Kohl presented

would create unification confederation

in the

his ten-point plan

—

form of a federation following

— Secretary Baker

laid

a plan that

a period

of

out four principles to guide the ap-

proach to unification. The four principles had been drafted by Francis

Fukuyama, who was

my deputy on the Policy Planning Staff in the State

Department. They were:

(1)

Self-determination for the

Germans must

We should

not endorse or

be pursued without prejudice to

its

outcome.

exclude any particular vision of unity. the context of Germany's continued creasingly integrated

(2) Unification should occur in

commitment

to

NATO,

to an in-

European Community, and with due regard

for

the legal role and responsibilities of the Allied [Four] powers. (3) Unification should be gradual and peaceful. (4)

must be respected

as stated in the

The

inviolability of borders

Helsinki Final Act.

This formulation was important and savvy from several standpoints: It

addressed the perceived causes of potential instability: timing, pace,

and the inviolability of borders. for the Soviets, as

and

It

also addressed at least implicitly a role

one of the Four Powers, by referring to

responsibilities."

definitive response to

And

yet

it

their "legal role

did so before anyone else could shape a

what Kohl had called

37

for

and

also just prior to the

— STATECRAFT summit with Gorbachev tant to ter

in

Malta

—

a

summit

Gorbachev and one he had no

that was extremely impor-

interest in ruining.

(Two days

af-

the Malta Summit with Gorbachev, President Bush, with an eye to

cementing the four principles

them with

a slight modification in a

By framing

ers in Brussels.) basis for

as guidelines for unification,

how

repeated

speech to a summit of NATO lead-

the issue, the administration provided the

to resolve the unification question

and also began

neces-

a

sary conditioning process for transforming attitudes.

But the administration was not senior officials in private.

East

Germans

just

German

essentially rallied

framing the issue for leaders and

unification was a very public issue.

around unification and made

movement. History made unification publics in

it

a public

matter of concern for other

a

Europe and the Soviet Union. And no leaders could be

ferent to public concerns or interests.

As such, transforming

indif-

attitudes

was an obvious key to overcoming the psychological obstacles to Ger-

man unification

in

NATO; our words and actions had to be able to reach

out and affect different publics. Public diplomacy was a crucial tool for identifying with aspirations in

Germany, addressing concerns elsewhere, and pointing the way

to

Framing was involved but so was presenting new ways

to

resolution.

think about the changes taking place in Europe, particularly in Ger-

many, ways that highlighted new, hopeful

possibilities while also taking

account of concerns about security and freedom. That was the meaning of Secretary Baker's speech in Berlin ten days after the Malta Summit, in

which he offered to

a

new

become more of

architecture for Europe. Baker called for

a political

and

less

NATO

of a security alliance, and for

—

new forms of cooperation to make European integration East- West a new reality. Later in February, the same logic drove Baker to issue high-profile public statement to explain the

mechanism

that

a

had been

hammered out to manage the unification process. The process, "Two Plus Four," was designed in part to show Germans the prac-

privately

called tical

means

for

making

unification real, and to assure the Soviets that

they would have a place at the table and that any outcome would be

shaped by their participation and input. "Framing" and "public diplomacy" represented one

overcoming the

obstacles. They, of course,

38

were

a

set

of tools for

complement

to the

German

Unification in

NATO

necessary forms of personal and private diplomacy that were required to

move with

orchestrate every British

the Germans,

manage

the hesitancy of the

and French, and bring the Soviets along to see that their needs

would be addressed, particularly

as

they joined a train that they would

not be able to stop.

The diplomatic were remarkable ture.

The

of the administration

efforts at the highest levels

for their extensive, intensive,

and time-consuming na-

president and the secretary of state conducted a highly per-

sonal diplomacy that involved an extraordinary

number of face-to-face

meetings with other leaders. Certainly phone

calls

between meetings or

cially in the interim

meetings that had

just

were made, espe-

to brief other leaders

on the

taken place with their fellow leaders. This was es-

pecially true with both Kohl and Gorbachev. Following a meeting with

one, President Bush

now

stood.

would place

a call to brief the other

These were not perfunctory phone

calls;

on where things

they were highly

move the process along or undo a false might otherwise become rooted and create problems.

substantive and were designed to

impression that

Though

these

calls,

and meetings

lower

at

levels,

were an

essential part

of the diplomacy, there can be no doubt that the face-to-face meetings

at

the president's and secretary's level were the heart of the effort.

To

give an idea of the scope and intensity of the personal diplomacy

of the president and the secretary of

state, it is

dent Bush met Chancellor Kohl in either

worth noting that Presi-

strictly bilateral settings or

on

the margins of broader multilateral events nine times over a period of

roughly one year. (Four of those meetings were in only bilateral settings.)

He saw Prime

Minister Thatcher eight times during the same

period, of which three of the meetings were for exclusively bilateral

purposes.

same

He

also

saw President Mitterrand eight times

multilateral events, and

bilateral discussions.

meetings during

had two meetings

many

of the

set exclusively for their

With Gorbachev, he held two high-profile summit

this period.

The Baker meetings were

far

more numerous,

separate encounters with each of his viet counterparts this

at

—many on

British,

French, and So-

the margins of multilateral events during

same time period. Of course,

for meetings, or they visited

German,

totaling close to thirty

in

many

Washington.

39

cases he visited their capitals

When

he visited foreign capi-

STATECRAFT tals,

he would see not only the foreign minister but also the president or

prime minister

—

would have opportunities

and, of course, he

to speak

publicly in each locale. I

cite the

no

tainly has

number of meetings parallel with

tion of the scope of

—which was extraordinary and —only an

any other president

what was involved. But

to give

cer-

indica-

was the quality of the

it

meetings, and what was accomplished in them, that mattered. Because

we were

operating on the premise of identifying with the

aspirations even as

we managed

German

the fears of the other parties, both the

president and the secretary put a

premium on coordinating closely with

Germans before dealing with others. The president's private meetings with Kohl did much not only to win the confidence of the German chancellor but also to bring him along on core questions. Their discussions in Germany in May 1989 (prior to a speech the president made in Kohl's home province) began a process in the

which President Bush showed aspirations.

1989,

his

sympathy

Their meeting in Brussels

summit with Gorbachev deepened

ident's conditioning efforts

a

Germanys

Kohl's appreciation for the pres-

Camp

David

German chancellor had ever been

for solidifying the

2-3,

comments from Thatcher and Mitterrand

the summit. Finally, inviting Kohl to

time

and German

December

with Gorbachev, whose negative remarks had

triggered similarly negative

first

for unification

after the president's

a

in

—

February 1990

guest there

Two Plus Four negotiating process

—was

at

the

critical

(involving the two

plus the United States, Russia, France, and the United King-

dom), and for gaining an unmistakable commitment from the chancellor that unification

must take place with the new Germany

a full

member

of NATO.

Meanwhile, the Americans feared the Soviets would trade their support of unification for strict

and

his

—which

neutrality

the president

most senior aides believed would produce an enduring source of

instability States,

German

and competition between the

blocs.

Kohl looked

arguing that Gorbachev would concede on

to the

United

NATO only directly

with Bush. 23 In fact, the

American-German consultation on the approach

Soviets was remarkably close.

When

ardnadze and Gorbachev in the the

to the

Moscow to see Shevmiddle of February 1990, we informed Baker went to

Germans about what Baker planned 40

to

do and say prior to

his arrival.

— German

With Kohl scheduled drafted (before

we

to see

left

Unification in

Gorbachev immediately

Moscow)

a detailed letter

summarized what had transpired

Gorbachev used

NATO after

our

visit, I

from Baker to Kohl that

in the meeting: the key

arguments

against unification; Baker's rebuttal; his explanation of

why Germany in NATO was in Soviet interests and why a neutral Germany that might feel the need for its own nuclear deterrent was not; and, finally, our suggestions for how Kohl should handle his meeting with Gorbachev both

in

terms of tone and substance. Kohl was to

tell

Presi-

dent Bush that hearing from Baker prior to seeing Gorbachev had been extraordinarily helpful.

While Bush lobbied Kohl, Baker was working on each of his counterparts

—Genscher,

Hurd, Dumas, and Shevardnadze. Baker used

meetings and phone

calls

with

Hurd and Dumas

his

to mitigate Thatcher's

and Mitterand's opposition. Mitterrand was keen to transform the Euro-

pean Community into the European Union, creating that

would

allay

French fears of German unification: in

pean Union, with ate a

a

real integration his eyes, a

Euro-

common currency and common policies, would

cre-

German-dominated Europe. Here,

too,

European-Germany, not

a

Baker and Bush emphasized their support for European integration, provided

The

Germany was

a full

member

of NATO.

Soviets required a special effort.

The

challenge was to balance

two conflicting needs: winning Gorbachev's and Shevardnadze's

confi-

dence by showing that their concerns about unification would be addressed, while

also

leaving no doubt that

it

counterproductive to try to prevent unification.

one part of the equation would undermine the

would be

futile

and

Too much emphasis on

other.

Baker worked intensively to balance these messages for the Soviets.

From February to August 1990 Baker saw Shevardnadze nearly every other week at some venue around the world. Of course, a full array of issues

—ranging from arms

control to bilateral economic relations to the

internal changes taking place in the Soviet

were on the

table.

every discussion. Bush saw Gorbachev calling

him

Union and Eastern Europe

But German unification was

—sometimes

to brief

him

a centerpiece

less often,

but

after seeing Kohl,

made

of nearly a point

sometimes

of

to go

over an initiative such as putting a ceiling on U.S. and Soviet conventional forces in Europe.

And

Bush during the president's

this effort

call to

paid

off,

with Gorbachev telling

describe his conversations with Kohl

41

STATECRAFT at

Camp

will

David, "That

is

twice [you have called me], and

have to draw some conclusions from

The conclusion Gorbachev drew was mitted to helping him make perestroika

this."

I

am

in debt.

I

24

Bush and Baker were com-

that

succeed. This was Gorbachev's

highest priority, and he staked everything on

it.

He

understood

this

could not be achieved without moral support and enormous economic assistance

from the West.

Not surprisingly, he had initially worried that President Bush might see the changes taking place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as a sign

of weakness that could be exploited. But

by presenting twenty different ing

at the

initiatives

Malta Summit, Bush began

on U.S.-Soviet

relations, includ-

new proposals for arms control and economic cooperation. Gorbachev

responded by saying he had been looking for tangible expressions of U.S. support

—and now he saw

it.

Bush made

meetings with Gorbachev) to emphasize stated the U.S. response to the

mestic U.S. criticism for

Gorbachev

said he

Similarly, in his

it

—

of the Berlin wall

—drawing some do-

so as not to "complicate your

much more

Moscow, Shevardnadze in

how he had deliberately under-

had noted that and appreciated

Shevardnadze, Baker dealt

meeting

fall

point then (and in subsequent

a

at

life."

And

25 it.

extensive meetings with

Gorbachev and

length with Soviet fears.

One

time, in

Committee

arrived directly from a Central

which he and Gorbachev had come under personal attack

for

"weakening" the Soviet Union and bringing great "joy" to Soviet enemies. Baker listened sympathetically and, talked of ways to take

But Baker was not

working hard out the

this

and other occasions,

hard-liners.

just offering

sympathy and

to persuade, explaining

Germans

why

on the

on

why

it

advice.

He

was also

was important not to single

or to appear to be trying to deny

them

their aspira-

Germany would feel the need to guarantee its secua result that no Soviet or rity by having its own nuclear weapons American leader could want; why we should transform the institutions in Europe to take account of new realities; and why NATO, in these new tions;

a neutral

—

circumstances, would not be a threat to the Soviet Union.

Sympathy and persuasion, while important, would on deaf ears

if they, had

have fallen

not also been accompanied by a serious effort to

And here Baker went to great lengths both to be show Gorbachev and Shevardnadze how we were be-

respond to Soviet needs. responsive and to

likely

42

German ing responsive: (1) Four, which gave

NATO

Unification in

We proposed and produced the mechanism, Two Plus Gorbachev an "explanation," permitting him

that nothing was being decided without the Soviets or being

them, and that they had (2)

We

in

show

imposed on

shaping the outcome of unification.

put together a package of nine assurances that addressed Soviet

concerns on security,

many.

hand

a

to

(3)

We

political,

and economic issues

worked with the Germans

to

convey

in

Europe and Ger-

promise from them

a

on the ceiling of forces they would maintain even prior

round of

to the

conventional arms talks in which these limits would be adopted as part

of a broader reduction of forces in Central Europe. trade agreement at a time

More

than anything

must be able

NATO

to

show

when Gorbachev

else,

(4)

We

announced

a

desperately needed one.

Shevardnadze told Baker that Gorbachev

his critics that

were no longer threats

Germany, the United

States,

and

when

the

to the Soviet Union. In July,

Communist Party Congress would be held, Gorbachev would need to be able to show that the European landscape had been transformed and German unification in NATO could not become a new danger to the USSR. With

that in mind, the administration at the

lated a declaration for the

with the

Communist Parry Congress. President Bush decided

summit and

to

would not be

in the

NATO

counterparts,

"We do

is

a mistake.

We

formu-

to share

leaders on the eve of the

summit

at the

hands of bureaucrats, and Baker told not need to water

have one shot

at this.

down

These

this

it-

his

document.

It

are different times.

not business as usual." 26 Accordingly, the declaration was written

in direct political

nounced "truly

NATO

have Secretary Baker work on the draft

self. It

This

levels

NATO Summit that would be held in parallel

the draft declaration only with other

would be

most senior

a

—not

language

security or bureaucratic jargon.

It

pro-

new pathway for NATO and Europe, making nuclear weapons

weapons of last

resort"; eliminating U.S. nuclear artillery;

propos-

ing a new, less offensive military strategy; offering further cuts in conventional

weapons; inviting the members of the Warsaw Pact to open liaison

missions in

NATO;

and unveiling

gression that invited the

a declaratory

Warsaw Pact to

commitment

to

nonag-

reciprocate. Years of policy

being reversed in recognition of Gorbachev's needs.

To make

were

sure the

declaration was produced intact, President Bush had raised the stakes by

making leaders responsible

for finalizing

state preside over the process for

it

adopting

43

and by having it.

his secretary

of

— STATECRAFT Proclaimed during the Party Congress, the declaration had the desired effect of

undermining Gorbachev's challengers. Leaving

adopted so that the Soviet foreign minister could use

it

to

little

chance, Baker had shared the draft with Shevardnadze even before

it

was

internally to dis-

credit the arguments of the hard-liners. Shevardnadze reported back to

NATO Declaration had been decisive in holding off their

Baker that the critics

on Germany,

been

very

a

difficult

"Without the declaration,

saying,

thing for us to take our decisions on

you compare what we're saying document,

The

day and

like

it's

Berlin

document

speech he made

to

you and

night. Really

it,

would have

Germany

... If

Kohl now with our Berlin

heaven and earth." 27

that Shevardnadze referred to was actually a

at a ministerial

meeting of the

1990 (the forty-ninth anniversary of the Union). In

to

it is

it

Two Plus Four on June 22,

German

invasion of the Soviet

he retreated from understandings on unification that had

been reached over the preceding three weeks:

a Soviet

agreement to

re-

German sovereignty upon unification, and Soviet acknowledgment that Germany was free to choose which, if any, alliance it wanted

spect

to join. In Berlin, rights

Shevardnadze declared the opposite: the Four Power

would remain even

period

after unification,

Germany would remain

split

and for

between

Pact, with the alliance issue remaining

open

a five-year transition

NATO

and the Warsaw

after that.

How was it possible to manage the situation, given such a reversal? By using one other mechanism or tool that was

critical to

maintaining and

lubricating the high-level personal diplomacy of the president and the

—

secretary

Sergei

special back channels. In this case,

Tarasenko

—Shevardnadze's

proved indispensable. Normally

I

my

problems that would have to be managed;

to find out

so.

When

I

and confidant

would coordinate with Tarasenko be-

fore the meetings to avoid surprises or to find out

opportunity to do

relationship with

chief assistant

in this case

where there were

we had not had

rushed to see Tarasenko

the

after the speech,

what had happened, he explained that Shevardnadze had

been forced to present

Gorbachev would

act

tough in response to

a Politburo-drafted statement,

on the previous understandings this

as

and that he and long as

we were

statement and could deliver clearly on the

changed nature of NATO by the time of the Party Congress.

On it

this

and other occasions, the back channel with Tarasenko made

possible to understand a Soviet

move and how 44

U.S. or

German

re-

German

NATO

Unification in

sponses might affect the maneuverings in Moscow; plain

what we could and could not do; and

it

it

allowed us to ex-

also permitted us to design

the words and actions that each of us could use to help the other,

when

ing

lenge.

new

the timing was right to take a

know-

step or respond to a chal-

There were other back channels with the Germans

Blackwill, at the National Security Council,

— Robert

worked discreetly with

Horst Teltschik, Chancellor Kohl's national security advisor, and Robert Zoellick built a relationship of profound trust with Frank Elbe, Hans-

Dietrich Genscher's right-hand man. (At certain junctures,

we would

put Tarasenko and Elbe together to try to ameliorate German-Soviet

problems and prepare for crucial meetings.)

The back channels enabled us to prevent misunderstandings, to manage them when they occurred, and to condition attitudes of decision makers

in private.

Without the back channels, the

manage the process would have been

to

Of course, the

far

was required

trust that

more

difficult to achieve.

depended on the character of

ability to build trust also

the personal diplomacy conducted by the president and the secretary,

who were each

active in solving

points. President

on

their border,

problems that emerged

at different

Bush secretly mediated the German-Polish problems

problems created by Kohl's hesitancy, for

political rea-

sons prior to Germany's election, to recognize openly the existing border.

To

defuse the issue, President Bush called Kohl prior to Polish

prime minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki's

worked out language on the border

commit

to

visit to

issue that

the

White House and

Kohl would discreetly

and that Bush would privately show Mazowiecki, with the

American assurance

that this language

German-Polish treaty

after unification.

would be incorporated

into a

Mazowiecki accepted Bush's

assurance. 28

American

statecraft in

CONCLUSIONS producing German

successful for multiple reasons:

anticipated the issue and put in the landscape of

deep it

trust with the

moved quickly to

Europe;

it

The

unification in

NATO

administration at the highest levels

in the larger context of sweeping

it

main driver

was

developed

and forged

German

chancellor;

in the process, the

gain control of the agenda and

45

changes

a clear objective

it

framed the issue

for

STATECRAFT all

to deal with;

used public diplomacy not to shape our image abroad

it

how we framed

but to reinforce

European publics

mous time and in personal

in

the problem by appealing to different

terms they could understand;

it

reflected the enor-

the energy the president and the secretary of state spent

diplomacy with their counterparts;

it

used back channels to

underpin and smooth the personal diplomacy and to avoid misunderstandings;

developed

it

a

mechanism (Two Plus Four)

to steer the unifi-

cation issue and create a basis for resolving the legal and political

problems; and

managed those

it

parties

most

likely to

be able to derail

the process (principally the Soviets) by combining responsiveness and firmness,

and ensuring that Gorbachev and Shevardnadze had

a public

and private "explanation" for the process and the outcome. Notwithstanding

good fortune and

Gorbachev

all this,

luck, too.

and

well,

the process of German unification relied on

While the administration certainly read

as in all

good

statecraft,

developed and used

its

leverage effectively, Gorbachev was indecisive and failed to use Soviet leverage to force us to change or modify our objectives.

He made

tough

statements from time to time, but he assumed the British and French

would do more

Germany

to resist the

to

oppose unification, and certainly not give

membership

full

in

NATO. He

a unified

overestimated their readiness

American president and slow the diplomatic onslaught

And he was Germany because

that

the United States created.

reluctant to create a crisis with

the United States or

his priority

was perestroika and

he needed our support.

Luck and timing

The more

will

be

a part

of dealing effectively with any

effectively leaders position themselves, the

more

issue.

effectively

they anticipate events and read circumstances, the more likely they will

be to take advantage of moments and the "luckier" they here, timing

ments

is

to foreign policy as location

is critical.

is

be.

And,

to real estate. Seizing

By definition, they don't last and can easily be lost. window of opportunity is bound by time; fail to

very concept of a

and the window

may

moThe act,

closes.

Nowhere was this "truth" more clearly revealed than in the case of German unification. The critical Party Congress and NATO Summit came in July 1990. On August 2, Iraq invaded and seized Kuwait. Had the invasion come on May 1, would the president of the United States and his secretary

of state have been able to devote the time,

46

effort, energy,

German

and resources to

German

Unification in

unification?

the answer to this question. As

it

NATO

There can be

little

doubt about

happened, the pursuit of unification

and the trust that was developed with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze strengthened our hand in dealing with what has become first

up

Gulf War. Before turning to

to the

ongoing war

in Iraq, let

that case

me

first

and

its

known

as the

contrasts with the lead-

discuss another

European

case:

the collapse of Yugoslavia, the war in Bosnia, and the war's resolution.

47

CASES OF STATECRAFT Bosnia

During the cold rope.

It

war, Yugoslavia

was

a

unique Communist country in Eu-

did not share a border with the Soviet Union;

it

fought Nazi oc-

cupation during the Second World War, led by a partisan Tito,

who subsequently became

its

leader

— and

—

-Josip

Broz

was not liberated by

it

the Soviet army. Tito broke with Stalin after the war, unwilling to be

simply

a tool

of the Soviet leader. As the leader of Yugoslavia, Tito was

a fierce nationalist,

determined

to

keep Yugoslavia intact

and free of Soviet domination. While

as a

country

strongman and strong-arm rule

his

might have held Yugoslavia's diverse ethnic groups together in their spective republics, the pressures for disintegration

grew

in the

re-

decade

following Tito's death in 1980.

Serb nationalism, in particular, became an increasingly potent force

and was used by Slobodan Milosevic

to build his

power and

his follow-

ing in Serbia. His language invoking a greater Serbia incited passions

among fears

Serbs

who had

historically felt victimized

and

it

played on the

and the separatist impulses of the Croats, Slovenians, and Bosnian

Muslims. But his actions weren't limited only to orations; using the Yugoslav National

Army

(a force that

came

he began to arm ethnic Serbs and form cially in the Serbian parts

were frequent skirmishes

ment

to be

dominated by the

Serbs),

large paramilitary forces, espe-

of Croatia and Bosnia. By early 1990, there

in Croatia

in Slovenia.

48

and

a strong

independence move-

Bosnia

Independence

in Slovenia

could not be viewed in isolation. Should

Slovenia declare itself independent,

would

it

velopments: Croatia would likely follow

same

in Bosnia.

For

its

trigger other cascading de-

Serbia would undoubtedly

and join

try to separate the Serb part of Croatia

the

suit;

might

part, Croatia

it

to Serbia

and act

do

to

also seek to take the part

of Bosnia dominated ethnically by Croats. In short, Slovenia's declaration of independence would set in motion not but also a widening

And

civil conflict.

just the

unraveling of Yugoslavia

Belgrade, Lawrence Eagleburger, deputy secretary

how

ing on

the United States

would respond

of independence, said that while

we hoped

we would not do anything to

federation,

when visiting of state, in comment-

yet in early 1990

to a Slovenian declaration

Slovenia would not leave the

force

it

to reverse

its

policy.

1

Eagleburger was well aware of the consequences of a Slovenian move toward independence, but was also dubious that

much

could be done to

stop an unfolding tragedy, and highly fearful that Yugoslavia

come

a

quagmire. Earlier in his career, Eagleburger had served

American ambassador very well.

was more

main

a

in Belgrade, so his

But he was not operating in

special weight. this

would be-

He was well

as the

views on Yugoslavia carried a

vacuum, and he understood

aware that the unfolding drama in Yugoslavia

sideshow for the president and the secretary of

event. Their preoccupation was

managing the

state

than a

transition in the So-

viet

Union and ending the cold war; they focused on Gorbachev and

how

to

respond to

his

needs even while they worked with the

Eastern Europe newly freed from the Soviet grip.

velop a

by the

new

states

They looked

to de-

security architecture to shape a world no longer governed

realities

of the cold war.

Perhaps the disintegration of Yugoslavia, with the potential for war, ethnic cleansing, refugee flows,

and even the spread of

should have been seen by the administration tions they

posed

of

hoped

a full appreciation

conflict,

as a threat to the institu-

new Europe. However,

to construct in a

civil

this

presup-

of what was going to unfold in Yugoslavia.

While Deputy Secretary Eagleburger believed the

situation was

bad and

was going to get worse, he and the administration's decision makers

viewed the

conflict as localized. It

might have tragic consequences for

the Bosnians in particular, but the war was unlikely to spread and engage

our broader stakes in Europe; given our other the investment.

49

priorities,

it

was not worth

STATECRAFT Secretary Baker shared the view that, unlike in the Persian Gulf, our vital national interests

conflict

were not

had the potential to be

at stake.

He

later wrote,

intractable, but

it

"The Yugoslav

was nonetheless

a re-

gional dispute. Milosevic had Saddam's appetite, but Serbia didn't have Iraq's capabilities

or ability to affect America's vital interests, such as ac-

cess to energy supplies.

The

greater threat to

time lay in the increasingly dicey situation in to maintain

where

as

American

interests at the

Moscow, and we preferred

our focus on that challenge." 2 So our focus remained else-

Yugoslavia

volved quickly into

moved toward

disintegration and then, in 1991, de-

conflict.

MANY OBSTACLES

LIMITED OBJECTIVES, In the case of the

Bush administration's response

goslavia and the war in Bosnia, the obstacles to

to the

breakup of Yu-

American involvement

largely shaped the administration's determination to stay

Aside from rhetorical support for efforts to stop the

lines of the conflict. fighting, there

on the side-

was no real stomach for

even one

a serious intervention,

that was only diplomatic. Five factors drove the

Bush administration's

approach to Bosnia. First, as

viet Union,

Secretary Baker indicated,

our main preoccupation and

was going through us,

we had

other priorities.

rival for

a transition. Its leader

more than

who sought

was under increasing threat, and the country

itself

The So-

forty years,

partnership with

appeared on the

verge of unraveling. With thousands of nuclear weapons in Soviet arsenals, it

was understandable that President Bush and Secretary Baker

would be focused on the USSR. with

its

It

was the "dicey situation in Moscow,"

"global ramifications" that constituted a greater threat than Yu-

goslavia's disintegration. 3 Besides the

concern of what would happen in

the Soviet Union, there was also the sense of possibility in the Middle East,

and

as

Baker was to

say, "in

the

summer of

consumed by the Middle East peace process and ties to

the table."

1991,

we were

already

close to getting the par-

4

Second, the administration's leaders

felt that

Yugoslavia was a Euro-

pean problem and should be handled by the Europeans. With the cold war ending, the Europeans were looking identity and to

assume clear

to solidify a separate

responsibilities

50

European

on the continent

at a

time

Bosnia

when

plans for European integration

(known

"EC

as

92") were in the

and presaged the transformation of the European Community

offing

European Union.

into the

If

European leaders were anxious

EC

through the existing

strate their capacity

mechanisms

problems, the Bush administration was only too happy

with the Yugoslav

crisis.

John

who

Shalikashvili,

"We

commanding NATO,

to let

you went

in

four-star

very clearly:

Europe

1992 there was this enormous optimism about what the

in 1991

and

new Europe

The Europeans would handle this one, they were saying, Americans, who had just finished the Gulf war and were playing

could do

and the

them deal

American

later described this reality

forget this now, but everywhere

to handle

served as chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff following his stint as the

general

demon-

to

.

.

.

out their role too glad to

as the

overseer in the end of the Soviet empire, were only

accommodate them."

5

Third, the administration feared that to prevent Yugoslavia's disintegration and conflict

would take

and

a military intervention,

Eagleburger and Colin Powell, Shalikashvili's predecessor

man

of the Joint Chiefs of

Each saw us being dragged

know no

end, that

would

American public and

the

While there were some

inflict

who

after the

a slippery

as

a

messy

When

we need

the desired result

forward with talk of a

is

would

tire

of very quickly. 6

Chief of Staff of the Air

viewed

to

I

airstrikes as the first

The

last

thing he wanted

have ended the Vietnam syndrome,

war

again.

As he wrote

in a

New

York

get nervous when so-called experts

a little surgical

isn't

little

over again.

they escalated the conflict in 1991, they

civil

Times op-ed in 1992, "You bet all

as

slope toward a quagmire.

was to be sucked into

all

believed that American air power could

Gulf War, which seemed

suggest that

would

such

in the minority. Powell, especially,

on

Vietnam

Larry

high casualties on our forces, and that

political leaders

make quick work of the Serbs step

like

into an ethnically driven conflict that

in the military,

Force Merrill McPeak,

were

looked

Staff, it

for

as the chair-

obtained, a

bombing or

new

set

a limited attack.

of experts then comes

escalation. History has not

been kind

to this

approach." 7 Fourth, the administration's leaders had been going

seamlessly from one conflict.

When

crisis to

full

bore,

moving

the next from the onset of the Yugoslav

Larry Eagleburger was in Yugoslavia in February 1990,

the president and Jim Baker and their teams were in the midst of work-

51

STATECRAFT ing intensively on

German

unification.

The

high point of that

German

unification process passed just prior to Saddam's invasion of Kuwait,

which kept them

absorbed until the spring of 1991, when the internal

all

pressures and economic and political challenges to Gorbachev

more

far

acute.

When

became

the Serbian siege of Dubrovnik occurred in the

beginning of October 1991, Secretary Baker was consumed with the aftermath of the failed coup against Gorbachev and putting together

Madrid peace conference.

the

In short,

it

was not only other preoccupa-

tions that precluded involvement in the unfolding Yugoslav disaster,

was also fatigue. Taking on

someone

as largely localized,

problem, and too hard in any case, was simply more than

else's

the Bush administration intellectually drained Fifth, there

poll

was seen

a conflict that

it

were

—whose

leaders were already emotionally and

—was ready

also

numbers dropping

to contemplate.

domestic political

only in foreign policy and not domestic needs, the

Bush needed was

By

realities.

1992, with his

no small part because he seemed interested

in

to look like

thing President

last

he was going to go to war over another

dis-

tant problem.

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S LIMITED MEANS Notwithstanding the many factors limiting the Bush administration's in-

volvement

in Bosnia,

it

did

make

breakup of Yugoslavia. As violence grew in 1991, and to

mediate the conflict yielded

trip to

Belgrade to see

if it

was

stem the violent

a belated effort to

little,

efforts

Secretary Baker

possible to forestall the

made

by the a

EC

one-day

impending sce-

nario of unilateral declarations of independence and the almost certain civil

ing,

war that would ensue. In what amounted

to a shuttle in

one build-

he met with the leaders of each of the republics and found either

strange fatalism from

some of

those such as Milosevic,

and fomenting ethnic

his interlocutors or outright lying

who denied arming

conflict.

actions and

warned Milosevic of were no teeth

One effect

day's

the'

to avoid unilateral

consequences of promoting vio-

in the warnings.

commitment

on any of the

paramilitary Serb forces

While Baker pleaded

lence, there

a

from

leaders,

to discussions

and

it

did not.

was unlikely to have

Still, it

was not too

much

late to pre-

vent Milosevic's ethnic cleansing, even though he was becoming in-

52

— Bosnia

creasingly brazen in spelling out his intentions. During the

of Baker's

them

visit,

Milosevic had lunch with the

explained that he cared

little

EC

ambassadors and told

would carve out

that if Yugoslavia broke up, he

same month

a

new

Serbia.

He

about Slovenia but he would join the Serb-

populated areas of Bosnia, Croatia (especially Krajina), and Montenegro into a Greater Serbia. likely response

8

would be

Milosevic undoubtedly was testing what the to taking territories

from

neighbors as Yu-

his

goslavia dissolved, and he soon found out that egregious actions

part of the Serbs In early

prolonged

would provoke

little

reaction.

October 1991, Serb forces imposed

artillery

facing an international reaction. difficult military

and

a siege

and naval bombardment on Dubrovnik.

nal event, a test for Milosevic to see

on the

inflicted a

It

was

a sig-

what he could get away with before

Though Dubrovnik

did not present a

problem, with Serb artillery and naval guns highly vul-

nerable, there was

no Western military

Soon

reaction.

a

more

cruel and

brutal Serbian assault against the Croat city of Vukovar set in motion a

deepening pattern of ethnic cleansing.

As violence between Serbs and Croats worsened curity Council adopted a resolution calling for an

imposing an arms embargo on

all

tiators

worked out

—

a

When

from Croatia

to Bosnia.

Army moved

and

response that

the

UN nego-

a cease-fire in Croatia in early 1992, with Krajina

der Serbian control, the Yugoslav National artillery forces

to the conflict

parties in Yugoslavia

put the aggressor and victim in the same category.

UN Se-

in 1991, the

end

its

un-

armor and

While Croatia was not landlocked

and could get arms, the same was not true for the Bosnian Muslims

who remained

When came

largely at the

mercy of both Serbs and Croats.

the Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence

in 1992,

with the encouragement of the Germans and the

the conflict widened.

By late

Italians,

spring, the signs of ethnic cleansing

more apparent and more gruesome,

especially in Bosnia.

became

With the

sys-

tematic bombings of the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo, and the exposure by journalists of Serb-created concentration camps, the killings of

lim males in ers,

villages,

and the expulsion of Muslims

the Bush administration supported efforts by the

Serbs, tion

some Bosnian

all

Mus-

in oth-

UN to rein in the

impose economic sanctions on them, and provide some protec-

and humanitarian assistance to the Bosnians.

But the

UN forces that were sent were small in number (twelve thou53

STATECRAFT sand in

and their mandate was weak and very limited. The so-called

all),

UN

protection force

tice,

and the

Bosnia.

By

(UNPROFOR)

protection in prac-

little

remained deeply averse

U.S. military

late

offered

to

any involvement in

1992 the Serb irregulars and the Bosnian Serb army that

Milosevic had created had seized

a great deal

of Bosnian territory and

forced 750,000 Muslims from their homes.

With the

atrocities

no longer hidden from public view, and shocking

pictures of the concentration

camps appearing

presidential candidate Bill Clinton for standing

tions

by and doing

summer of

1992,

denounced the Bush administration

in the face of gross

human

rights viola-

He called for a change in policy, and supported

and Serb aggression.

air strikes against

little

in the

Serbs and an end to the arms embargo against the Bos-

nian Muslims, the main victims at this juncture of Serb aggression. In effect, Clinton the candidate was calling for a policy of strike": lift

Council but punished the weak Bosnians Serbs,

and

UN

the arms embargo that had been voted by the

strike the

far

"lift

and

Security

more than the arms-laden

Serb forces using significant

air

power. However,

not only did the Bush administration and the U.S. military oppose such a policy,

but also our

who made up

allies,

the bulk of

posture. Their forces

particularly the British, French, and Dutch,

UNPROFOR, were dead

set against

were on the ground and were too small

the Muslims, and unfortunately too

from retribution by Serb

weak even

any such

to protect

to protect themselves

forces.

Nonetheless, after the 1992 election, then secretary of state Lawrence

Eagleburger sought to get the Bush administration to adopt strike policy

They

rejected

it,

but there was one

implied real coercion

came known

a lift-and-

and was authorized to sound out the Europeans on the idea.

as the

—

final

—

warning

before President Bush

this

time one that

left office.

In what be-

Christmas warning, President Bush, in a message to

Milosevic, warned that "In the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by

Serbian action, the United States will be prepared to employ military force against Serbians in Kosovo and in Serbia proper."

9

Kosovo, an en-

clave along the Albanian border with a population that was 90 percent

Albanian and 10 percent Serb, had deep historic meaning to the Serbs.

It

was the place where in 1389, Serbs had committed suicide rather than surrender to the Turks.

It

was where Milosevic had played on the Ser-

bian sense of injustice to build his

own 54

following around a Serb nation-

Bosnia alist calling.

But

it

was also

a place that

could easily trigger a war with

Albania and a broader conflict in the Balkans as a whole.

Here the Bush administration drew ing been

made over

and spared

tions

a clear

red

Had such

line.

a

warn-

Bosnia, Milosevic might have contained his ambi-

his

people and the Muslims enormous pain and

suffering. Instead, the Clinton administration inherited the

Kosovo warn-

ing and a Bosnia increasingly controlled by Serb forces with atrocities

and ethnic cleansing continuing against the Muslims. It

flict

also inherited the so-called

in Bosnia.

Vance-Owen plan

for

ending the con-

Former secretary of state Cyrus Vance and former

foreign secretary David

Owen were

negotiate an end to the fighting.

UN envoys who

They put

made an

British

effort to

together a plan that would

have created ten cantons in Bosnia: three with a Serb majority, two with a Croat majority, three with a Muslim majority, one mixed Croat-

Muslim, and

a special

canton for Sarajevo.

quietly supported the plan, seeing

it

The Bush

administration had

as the best possible solution avail-

able and one likely to stop the bloodshed at a time

when no one was

pre-

pared to take tough measures against the Serbs. In the end, what guided the

"avoidance."

We would support the efforts of others to stop the

but would minimize our

heavy

Bush administration was an objective of

own

involvement.

lifting to the international

clined to protect Bosnia.

left

it

perhaps

a differ-

didn't perceive Bosnia as

problem, and didn't have the political will to intervene,

haved uncharacteristically in

the

left

indicated that had the

in a different light,

outcome could have occurred. But since

a serious

administration

community, which was similarly disin-

The Christmas warning

Bush administration viewed Bosnia ent

The

fighting,

this case,

it

be-

lacked effective statecraft, and

the cleanup to the next administration.

THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH:

NEW OBJECTIVE, SIMILAR MEANS The new Clinton

administration, however, did not like the

plan. For Clinton

and those around him, the plan legitimized Serb gains

made through

a

genocidal policy. While the administration was unwill-

ing to attack the plan publicly,

when

the State

Vance-Owen

its

coolness to

it

was unmistakable, and

Department spokesman, Richard Boucher, refused 55

to

STATECRAFT comment on whether

Owen

later

rubbing

But

wrote that

"salt in the

if

Vance-Owen plan ratified the no-comment answer was

the

wound."

ethnic cleansing, the equivalent of

10

the president and his team wanted to change the policy, they

failed to devise a plan for achieving the objective of in Bosnia.

Confronting

many of

the

same

ending the fighting

obstacles or constraints that

had faced their predecessors, the Clinton administration lacked the to act effectively in the Balkans.

will

Implementing any kind of change on

the ground would have required a pronounced diplomatic initiative to

organize our European

America's

own

allies

behind such action, willingness to deploy

military assets into the theater of conflict, and bureau-

implement

cratic unity within the administration to

decisions.

From

1993 to 1995, the Clinton policy toward Bosnia contained none of these

components war

at a level

necessary to counter the increasingly deadly

civil

in that country.

Our

military was against any U.S. involvement, and our

had troops on the ground, opposed the

lifting

who

allies,

of the arms embargo, fear-

ing their forces would bear the brunt of more severe fighting in escalating confrontation.

An American call for greater military pressure

the Serbs rang hollow, as the

our forces

at risk

expected Serb only It

if

new administration was

and the European forces were the ones exposed to the

retaliation.

we wanted

to

Our

allies

it

within a

to a

shift:

in policy

cost.

to talk about such a shift in the

was another to implement

policy, the Clinton administration

Balkans.

would be open

assume the military burden and

might have been one thing

paign;

against

not prepared to put

it

cam-

in office. Rather than launch a

launched

a

new

review of our policy in the

The review took three months and reflected the old divisions new administration. Some, most notably at the State Depart-

ment and

at

the National Security Council, saw the stakes in moral and

national security terms of allowing Bosnian Serb ethnic cleansing to go

unchecked, and favored using force against the Serbs. Others, most notably the military, led by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Colin Powell,

opposed any use of force, citing the likelihood of a quagmire. The compromise

at the

end of the review sounded much

didate Clinton had appeared to embrace:

lift

like the policy that can-

and

embargo and provide Bosnian Muslims the arms

56

strike. Lift

to

the arms

defend themselves,

Bosnia

and using

air

power, strike decisively at Bosnian Serb and Serbian forces

and infrastructure

May

In

as necessary.

sound out the Europeans on such sound

out\

went

1993, Secretary of State Christopher a policy shift.

The

to

Europe

to

operative words are

he went to consult and try to persuade, not to present

a policy

that the United States was prepared to implement, particularly if

meant any

U.S. military involvement. Perhaps, if

the allies of our

new approach and how we

it

he had gone to inform

intended to carry

out, the

it

reaction might have been different. But if he was asking and not telling,

—and they

then the answers were bound to be starkly negative

were. At

every stop starting in London, Secretary Christopher heard clear rejections of lift-and-strike. Lifting the

embargo would require revoking

a

Security Council resolution, and an increased flow of arms would only lead to an escalation in fighting that the British, French, and

feared would ensnare their troops already on the ground. strikes against Serbs to that

mix would only ensure Serb

Dutch

Adding

air

retaliation

against the international contingent in Bosnia. If the United States

wanted

to shift the policy,

it

would have

to take the lead with

its

own

military forces being exposed to the consequences.

Secretary Christopher returned, declaring to President Clinton that lift-and-strike as a policy

were prepared forces.

But

to insist

on

at this stage

priorities. It

was

his

could be implemented only with the

it

allies

and enforce

squander

his political capital

on an

clear opposition of the U.S. military

of

Staff,

it

the president

with American

of his administration, the president had other

domestic agenda that mattered

stupid" was the refrain that had elected Clinton to

if

issue in

—

"it's

the economy,

—and he was not about

which he faced the very

and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs

Colin Powell. Powell, the hero of the Gulf War, was in his

last

year as chairman and he, not Clinton, had stature on national security issues. If

anything,

Clinton's

reluctance to invest capital in Bosnia

notwithstanding his posture during the presidential campaign

—made

Christopher even more reluctant to press for greater U.S. involvement. Instead, after Christopher's

containment of the

conflict,

European even

trip,

the policy

as the rhetoric

the Serbs.

57

became one of

remained tough toward

— STATECRAFT

LIMITED OBJECTIVE, LIMITED MEANS Unfortunately, Serb aggression against Bosnian Muslims continued,

with the sieges and bombardment of Muslim ministration's options

cities

and towns. The ad-

remained very constrained. Unwilling

liance cohesion for the sake of Bosnia,

to risk al-

hamstrung by the Pentagon's

Hawk

opposition to any role for U.S. forces, stung by the imagery of Black

Down

Somalia and an inglorious American withdrawal of forces, and

in

by the president's increased hesitancy tration looked for

ways to increase leverage on Serbia

One mechanism for doing so was eration,

low

cost.

such a union in

words of Secretary of State Christopher, "The two

adversary, the Bosnian Serbs."

11

The

of the Muslims

sides

and more threatening

federation was designed to create

cause between Croats and Muslims, both of

were losing ground like

facilitating

to turn their energies against the stronger

common

at a

the forging of a Croat-Muslim fed-

and the administration succeeded in

1994. In the

needed

to invest in Bosnia, the adminis-

whom

had

lost or

to Serb offensives, but the Croatian president's dis-

made

this a difficult basis

against the Serbs. Nonetheless,

it

did

make

on which

to build leverage

a difference over

time

as

Franjo Tudjman, the president of Croatia, permitted arms to reach the

Muslims selves.

—of

course, with the Croats keeping

some of them

for

them-

Later in 1995, with the Bihac pocket in Bosnia surrounded by the

Serbs and with a slaughter of Muslims in the offing, the Muslims and

Croats forged a

common

front.

They fought

against the Serbs, with the

Croats, in particular, taking advantage of the Serbs' being overextended,

and began to turn the tide of battle on the ground.

The

administration sought to build leverage in other ways as well. In

an effort to improve coordination and present a more united front against Serbia, the administration created a tact

Group.

It

new forum

called the

Con-

consisted of the United States, the United Kingdom,

France, Germany, and the Russians. If nothing else, the messages to losevic and the Serbs

would be more in sync and would include the

Serbs' traditional friends

and protectors, the Russians. By July 1994, the

Contact Group developed 51

Mi-

a

peace plan, with

a detailed

map

that placed

percent of Bosnia under the Croat-Muslim federation and 49 percent

for the

Bosnian Serbs.

The Muslims and Croats accepted 58

the plan

Bosnia after

all,

they would be recovering roughly 20 percent of the territory

had been

that

mained

—and

the Serbs rejected

lost

a focal

Group

point of Contact

it.

Nonetheless, the plan re-

efforts.

In addition to forging the Croat-Muslim federation and the Contact

Group, the administration least limited

use of

air

through

also sought to pressure the Serbs

at

power. While not being able to persuade the Eu-

ropeans to accept a policy of lift-and-strike, the administration did win support for

NATO air strikes in response to

safe areas in Bosnia

There was

a price,

—Muslim

however: in order to support the U.S. proposal, the a

dual-key arrangement whereby

NATO and the UN had to sign off on when, where, and how such

air strikes

would occur before they could be authorized.

became an

keys

UNPROFOR.

enclaves protected by

Europeans required the creation of both

Serb threats against the six

inhibitor, not a facilitator,

of

In reality, dual-

chinery was rarely willing to go along with the proposed

when they were agreed upon, shelling of Bihac,

were so limited If

it

one of the

as to

be described

it

November

By

which the Serbs did

Dutch

air strikes

and with

forces that limited the ap-

might have been approved

in

UNPROFOR troops as hostages

in the spring of 1995

when

air strikes against

ammunition dumps and weapons were authorized

newed Bosnian Serb

NATO

1995, the fear of Serb retaliation was re-

placed by the fear of the Serbs' taking

350

1994, the air strikes

was the concern about triggering retaliation

power even when

response to Serb threats.

Even

as "pinpricks."

against the British, the French, or the plication of air

strikes.

of Serb threats and the

wasn't the difficulty of reaching agreement in

UN high command,

the

as in the case

safe areas, in

UN ma-

air strikes, as the

shelling of Sarajevo.

The

Serb

in response to re-

more than

Serbs seized

UN peacekeepers and chained them to ammo dumps and bridges

the possible targets of the air strikes. Rather than being frightened by

very limited tional forces

keepers into attacks.

air strikes,

which

were prepared

human

basically signaled

shields to protect

That ended the

how

little

the interna-

to do, the Serbs began to turn the

UN peace-

what they valued from any such

air strikes, since

protecting

UN

forces

more important than protecting the Bosnians and made the

became

safe areas

safe only for Serb attacks.

As the humiliation of UN forces became more pronounced, the tration within the administration

became more 59

acute.

When

frus-

Jacques

STATECRAFT Chirac, the

new

president of France, declared that the humiliation of

French forces was unacceptable, there was pressure from the French increase the

number of troops on

the ground

tect themselves. Chirac's insistence at the

must be implemented

—

to

be able to pro-

at least to

G-7 meeting that a new policy new look at options

in Bosnia helped to foster a

within the Clinton administration.

Both Warren Christopher and National Security Advisor Tony Lake began looking

at alternatives built

around not pulling the

but rather securing them, and tying a

a

comprehensive diplomatic solution

erated options for producing an

UN forces out

more secure presence to

endgame

diplomatically.

Any serious diplomatic effort to solve the Bosnian problem, as the

for

in Bosnia. Lake, in particular, gen-

required having serious leverage on the Serbs, and that was

But that was about to change,

push

a

however, missing.

still

Serbs overplayed their hand and the

Croats began effectively using their military forces for the

first

time.

MORE AMBITIOUS OBJECTIVE, MORE AMBITIOUS MEANS President Clinton's frustration had grown with a policy that

left

us ap-

pearing weak and irresolute; in response to his increasing anger over the choices he was being

with, the administration began to wrestle with

left

what Secretary Christopher described

possible ways to change

"problem from options,

hell."

on July

6,

Coincident with the administration exploring new

1995, the Serbs launched a brutal

by

brenica, a "safe area" protected

and on

its

a

a

new

assault,

on Sre-

Dutch contingent of UNPROFOR,

population of forty thousand Muslims. As the onslaught wors-

ened, the Dutch forces initially watched, and then

bombed

as the

few Serb

sites,

but

it

was too

Serbs had seized Srebrenica, and

thousand Muslim brenica, the Serbs

five

little

fled.

and too

NATO belatedly

late.

By July

11,

days later they had killed seven

men and boys. Not satisfied with having absorbed seemed poised

the

to go after

Sre-

two other supposedly pro-

—Zepa and Gorazde. swallow'The Pentagon's Srebrenica was much —Secretary William Perry and Chairman Chiefs John —both saw massacre

tected areas

too

to

civil

tary leaders

the

Shalikashvili

point.

Now

each

felt that for

60

of the Joint

as a decisive

the United States and

spond would put the alliance and our standing

and mili-

in the

NATO world

turning

not to reat risk.

For

Bosnia

West

Shalikashvili (or Shali, as he was known), the moral fabric of the

and

NATO

cause

it

was

literally at stake.

might tear

"The

before,

we were

reluctant to act be-

NATO apart, now Shali feared our failure to respond

would threaten NATO's saying,

If,

future.

Perry saw the challenge in similar terms,

issue was not taking

[UN] peace-keepers

hostage, the issue

12 was taking the whole policy of the international community hostage."

Previously,

it

was the Pentagon's leadership that resisted more aggressive

policies in Bosnia;

new

rules,

now

they were prepared to take the lead in creating

with Perry saying that the answer to a threat to Gorazde or

any other safe area must not be pinpricks but

a

"massive air campaign."

John Major called a conference to respond to the shock of Srebrenica, and the Clinton administration prepared the

approach

ground

a sustained air

The Lon-

campaign designed to "cripple" the Serb military capability.

don conference, with some administration arm-twisting

rules":

a

new consensus on what became known

required,

still

"Gorazde

as the

any Serb attacks against the safe areas would be met by sustained

and decisive use of

air

power throughout Bosnia. To

sponses, the "dual-key" system

facilitate

difficult,

in practice

involving a thirteen-hour meeting of the

foreign ministers to nail

down

NATO

the specifics, a clear threshold had been

change in how

crossed. Srebrenica in this sense triggered a profound

Serb aggression would be dealt with by the United States and

Two

civilian

13

Although ironing out how the Gorazde rules would work proved

such re-

would be modified by removing

UN officials from the decision-making process. still

new

with President Clinton telling French president

militarily,

Chirac that any attack on the safe areas should be met by

produced

for a

its allies.

other factors combined to transform the realities in Bosnia funda-

mentally. First, the fortunes

The

of the war changed dramatically on the ground.

Serbs not only overplayed their hand before the world, finally going

too far and triggering a response, but they were also overstretched with their forces.

they

When

the Croats

made quick work of

came

to the defense of

the Bosnian Serb forces.

Bihac on July 25,

Soon

thereafter, the

Croats launched an offensive against the Bosnian Serb forces in Krajina, the Croatian area taken by the Serbs in 1991; even though the State

partment had urged the Croats not to widen the war, the cessfully forced the Serb forces

and

61

latter

civilians to flee Krajina.

De-

soon suc-

By

early

STATECRAFT August, "for the

time in the four-year Balkan

first

Serbs had

conflict, the

14 suffered a significant military defeat." Suddenly, the balance of forces

on the ground had changed. Second, the administration also decided to go for

a

diplomatic solu-

Almost simultaneously with the Croat

tion to the conflict.

offensive, the

administration considered certain "endgame" papers for bringing the conflict to a conclusion. his words, that

few months

.

.

The

we needed

to "bust

We've got

.

to

our

ass to get a settlement in the

next

to exhaust every alternative, roll every die,

moment slip

take risks ... If we let this

From July

president saw an opening and believed, in

away,

August 1995, the dynamics

we

are history."

in Bosnia

15

were transformed.

Instead of the Muslims being on the brink of defeat in Bihac, with other safe areas

about to

fall

and with

talk increasing of

having to withdraw

UNPROFOR in humiliation, suddenly the Serbs were on the run, losing territory; the ful

West

for the

first

time was ready to threaten the meaning-

use of force; and the Clinton administration was about to present a

comprehensive plan for

Not only ending the

settling the conflict.

did the administration formulate a seven-point plan for

conflict,

but National Security Advisor

Tony Lake took an

interagency delegation with him to Europe to present the plan. Unlike Christopher, Lake was not going to consult on the virtue of the plan; he

was going to inform Europeans of what the United States had decided

and how we would proceed. Like James Baker during the

first

Gulf

War, he would ask in private for their support of a plan that would go

ahead whether or not European countries were prepared to go along with

us.

This time the European leaders, given four years of warfare, with 300,000 deaths and

1.2

million refugees, were ready to admit that they

could not deal with Bosnia and were ready to follow the American lead.

Everywhere the Lake team went they found strong support that

drew on the Contact Group's 51:49

for a plan

solution: a unified Bosnian state

with two autonomous entities involving the Croat-Muslim federation

and the Bosnian Serbs who had a readiness to

a special relationship

with Serbia; and

end the sanctions regime against Serbia and produce

broad economic reconstruction plan

Moreover, for the

first

time,

as part

embedded

of a diplomatic settlement.

in the plan

bination of carrots and sticks to be employed with

62

a

was

a serious

com-

the

Mus-

all sides. If

Bosnia

lims cooperated and the Serbs blocked an agreement, the

arms

Muslims would be

to the

air strikes in

good

support of the Muslims;

and

faith

lifted

the Serbs did, there

namely, there would be a

lifting

embargo on

and the Serbs would face massive if

the Muslims didn't negotiate in

would be

a lift-and-leave policy

of the embargo and sanctions against

the Serbs, no training or arms for the Muslims, and no air strikes against the Serbs.

new American

This

policy had to be implemented. Richard Hol-

brooke, the assistant secretary of state for European

American commitment

to carry out the

to

its

new

affairs,

policy.

was chosen

He

had long

called for a serious U.S. intervention to stop Serb aggression, the atrocities,

and the war

itself.

Now he would lead a small team to do so. He launched

of shuttle missions to make an all-out effort to end the war.

a series

MEANS

TO A DIPLOMATIC END: THE

During the

first

HOLBROOKE SHUTTLES

of his shuttles, his team could not

fly to

the siege, and had to travel on the winding, narrow Mt. get there. In trying to road, the French

maneuver around

armored personnel

a

Sarajevo, given

Igman Road

to

truck on the narrow mountain

carrier in

which

a

number of

the

team members were riding went over the side of the road and rolled

down

a cliff.

Ambassador Robert Frasure, Deputy Assistant Secretary of

Defense for European Affairs Joseph Kruzel, and U.S. Air Force colonel

Nelson Drew were of the team

Council

killed in the accident.

—representing

staff,

loss

of three key members

the State Department, the National Security

and the Pentagon

obligation to finish

The

—redoubled

what the team had

the sense of mission and

started.

Holbrooke embodied the president's attitude of pulling out

all

the

agreement that would end the war. The

first

shuttle mission was geared toward probing each side's intentions

and

stops in trying to forge an

interests.

The second

parameters of attack

mission would be designed to outline the broad

a settlement. It

on Sarajevo that

was preceded by

a

Bosnian Serb mortar

killed thirty-seven people.

Holbrooke under-

stood that he would have no credibility with either the Muslims or the Serbs

if

the "Gorazde rules" were not implemented. President Clinton

agreed, giving the hard."

command that "we have to hit 'em

16

63

[the

Bosnian Serbs]

STATECRAFT To

avoid the hostage-taking of the past, ninety-two

withdrawn from Gorazde, and fore the

UN troops were

massive bombing campaign started be-

a

Holbrooke team arrived

Though Holbrooke

in Belgrade.

ex-

pected Milosevic to be tough in their meeting, the Serb leader surprised

them with

the team by providing

by the seven members

a letter signed

of the Bosnian Serb leadership and by the patriarch of the Serb Ortho-

dox Church agreeing to

would have the

final

join a negotiating delegation in

which Milosevic

word. In addition, Milosevic agreed in the meeting

to the 51:49 ratio for Bosnia as the basis for negotiations.

For one year,

Milosevic had resisted representing the Bosnian Serbs and the 51:49 ra-

—

tio

yet now, under the pressure of intensive

Serbs,

he was showing

how

bombing of the Bosnian

responsive he could be. Only two hours into

the meeting did Milosevic ask for a

bombing

halt to help the negotia-

Holbrooke responded that the shelling of Sarajevo must

first

stop

and that the Bosnian Serb guns must be withdrawn from around the

city.

tions;

Holbrooke used the second shuttle mission to get an agreement on general legal and political framework for Bosnia. three foreign ministers

week

in

them

to

Geneva do

Serb,

were

it

He

proposed that the

Muslim, and Croatian

to endorse this

While

so.

up, and there

—

—meet within

up

a

framework, and succeeded in getting

took nonstop talks to make sure

crises

a

to the last minute,

all

would show

on September

8,

1995,

the three foreign ministers

came and signed what became known

as the

Geneva

would be one

Principles: Bosnia

state

with shared power be-

tween the Croat-Muslim federation and the Serbs; there would be free elections,

human

rights standards, binding arbitration of disputes,

and

parallel special relations with neighbors.

All this

had been agreed

in the context of a massive

bombing cam-

paign against the Bosnian Serbs. Coercion unmistakably worked, and

Holbrooke was

a

master of knowing

how to employ it. When the Bosnian

Serbs subsequently betrayed their promises to pull artillery back from

bombing pause Holbrooke had been working to he pushed to resume the intensive bombing and still pulled

Sarajevo as part of the negotiate,

—

off the agreement

The third

NATO

on the Geneva Principles.

shuttle mission

began with increasing pressure from within

and from the Russians to stop the bombing campaign. Both had

objected to the use of American larly

Tomahawks, with the Russians

angered over what they saw

as

64

particu-

coordination between the Croat-

Bosnia

Muslim ground

offensive against the Bosnian Serbs and the

attacks against Bosnian Serb infrastructure. set over targets

being struck that they

felt

NATO

Tomahawk

were

also

up-

went beyond those

that

had

allies

been agreed upon. Within the Pentagon, our military was

also saying

we

were running out of the "Option Two" targets that had been agreed upon, and they favored

a

bombing

want to bring the bombing cumstances,

it

might be

halt.

Holbrooke and

end but understood

to an

difficult to sustain

shuttle mission, therefore, they

it.

team did not

his

that,

given the cir-

At the outset of the third

knew they might have

what they

to see

could get from Milosevic in exchange for a suspension of the bombing.

Once

again the team was pleasantly surprised to see that

if the

bomb-

ing stopped, Milosevic was ready to produce an end to the siege of Sara-

He

jevo by the Bosnian Serb forces.

meet the Bosnian Serb

and

leaders,

asked Holbrooke and his team to

cepted an American plan in which they stopped ations

they ac-

after difficult discussions, all

their offensive oper-

around Sarajevo, began to relocate their heavy weapons, allowed

road access to Sarajevo, and permitted the opening of the for humanitarian missions

The Muslim

—

all

in return for a halt to the

leadership, believing that they

cisive military victories,

city's airport

bombing.

were on the brink of de-

were not happy over the bombing

halt.

But even

though the bombing was halted, the ground offensive led by the Croats continued.

The Holbrooke team saw

turely, particularly

because

it

value in not stopping

was changing the

and making the eventual negotiations on the

Washington might favor an end and

his

when

team did

not.

the Croats and

to the

They would

realities

map

it

prema-

on the ground

easier to conduct.

Croat offensive, but Holbrooke

press for restraint only at a juncture

Muslims might turn on each

other; otherwise,

brooke was reluctant to surrender leverage on the Serbs, and

at

Hol-

one point

he even urged Tudjman to take more towns in order to have land to give

away once the negotiations commenced. 17

As part of this same

shuttle mission,

Holbrooke and the team negoti-

ated "further agreed principles" that fleshed out the

and were concluded in York.

Much

like the

to the last minute.

a

to the

Geneva meeting,

this, too,

New

came down

question of whether the Bosnian elections had to

be direct and whether the sively" foreign policy

Principles

second meeting of foreign ministers in

run-up

The

Geneva

office

of the presidency would have "exclu-

powers created

65

a crisis, requiring

nonstop negoti-

STATECRAFT ations not only in

New

York but also in Belgrade and Sarajevo.

When

Muslim foreign minister, appeared to back out of an agreelast moment, Secretary Christopher told him that if he did

Sacirbey, the

ment

at

the

not relent and go along with the original understanding, President Clinton would announce the failure of the

Muslim government

for

it.

With

New York meeting and blame the

became known

as the

agreed principles were

that, the further

adopted by the three foreign ministers

"New York

on September

Principles," the

26, 1995. In

what

powers of the

joint

presidency, the parliament, and the constitutional court were agreed.

Two tle

days

later,

Holbrooke and

his

team

mission to the Balkans in six weeks.

to get an

produce

agreement and a cease-fire

out on their fourth shut-

set

The purpose of this

set a firm date for a

mission was

peace conference and to

throughout Bosnia. Milosevic had already indi-

come to a summit and was ready to deal; he had much by leaning on the Bosnian Serbs, pushing them to give

cated that he wanted to indicated as

up the

siege of Sarajevo, and recognizing Bosnia as an independent state.

Milosevic wanted an end to the sanctions on Serbia and wanted to be accepted internationally. Tudjman was also keen for an agreement, having

now Mus-

gained back most of the territory that mattered to the Croats and

beginning to see the Bosnian Serbs regrouping

militarily.

Only the

lims were resistant; their leadership was divided and feared that any set-

tlement might be a

trick.

The peace conference was designed

to

have

all

the leaders and their

delegations colocated and to conduct proximity talks, with the Hol-

brooke team acting

as the principal

talks to take place in the trol the setting,

go-between. Holbrooke wanted the

United States so that we would be able to con-

agenda, and course of the

talks.

Dictating the process

would, in Holbrooke's eyes, give us more leverage to make the negotiations succeed.

Holbrooke faced nearly united opposition

President Clinton's top advisors, for the talks

would magnify the

who

all

to this

from

feared that an American venue

costs of failure if they did not work.

However, Holbrooke's argument soon carried the day within the administration,

with the help and advice of Deputy Secretary of State Strobe

Talbott and

Tom Donilon,

best to craft his points.

Secretary Christopher's chief of staff, on

Concerns over European

sensitivities

how

about hav-

ing the United States running everything resulted in instructions that

Holbrooke work with the Contact Group on follow-up meetings or cer-

66

Bosnia

emonies

be conducted

to

Group would have

tact

Holbrooke

same time

European

team

wanted

also

that he

a

in a

capital.

of the negotiations.

at the site

to be able to

And, of course, the Con-

announce the

cease-fire at the

announced the peace conference. The Muslims, who

were the most chary of the cease-fire and the peace conference,

down

stiff

laid

conditions for the cease-fire: restored utilities to Sarajevo, a

demilitarized Banja Luka, and road access to Gorazde. In addition, Alija Izetbegovic, the president of Bosnia, cease-fire

would go

into effect.

wanted ten more days before

Serbs to pressure the Muslims, and also exerted his

minding Izetbegovic of the

a

Holbrooke used both the Croats and the

risks

own

pressure, re-

he was running by letting the fighting

continue too long, warning, "If you continue the war, you will be shoot18 ing craps with your nation's destiny."

Finally, Izetbegovic

agreed that

if

the gas lines to Sarajevo were func-

tioning and there was an open road to Gorazde he would accept a

and he wanted Milosevic's commitment to

ceasefire in five days,

Holbrooke went jevo.

to Belgrade but left

As Holbrooke worked

open phone

two members of

his

team

to get Milosevic's acceptance,

line to Izetbegovic to

this.

in Sara-

he had an

be sure he would not change his mind,

and one to Washington for consultations; and over

a

period of three

hours an agreement was reached on the cease-fire.

With

that in hand,

Holbrooke then worked the agreement on the an-

nouncement of the peace conference. This was October fire

was agreed to take hold on October

begin two weeks

11,

5.

The

cease-

and the conference would

later.

PEACEMAKING

IN

ACTION: THE DAYTON CONFERENCE

Prior to the beginning of the peace conference, intensive work was

needed on several

fronts. First,

peace treaty be completed.

ment begin

drafting in

them working on

a

Holbrooke directed that

He had had

September on

a small

all

team

a full-draft

in the State

legal questions, but

Depart-

now he had

framework agreement and seven annexes that ad-

dressed disengagement and the cessation of hostilities, constitutional structure, arbitration,

national

human

rights, refugees

and displaced persons,

monuments, and implementation. By October

together at least the

first

15,

they had put

cut of such a draft agreement. Soon thereafter,

67

STATECRAFT three annexes were added on the elections, public corporations, and

NATO's implementation

(IFOR)

for carrying out

any agreement

IFOR needed

to be conducted,

and were com-

forces

that was concluded.

Second, discussions on plicated not only

by different views within the administration on how

extensive the role and missions of the forces might be, but also by the

Russian desire to take part but not in a capacity subordinate to

NATO.

Holbrooke's team took a maximal view on what would be required for the forces in terms of assisting refugee return, providing security for

the elections, arresting war criminals, ensuring freedom of movement,

and the

like.

In the Pentagon, fear of mission creep (the expansion of a

project or mission ence.

The

were

far

its

original goals) led to a minimalist prefer-

minimalists wanted to be only peacekeepers; the maximalists

more geared toward compromise

tually offered a

work

beyond

in all

state-building.

General Shalikashvili even-

would grant IFOR the "authority"

that

—

such areas but not the "obligation" to do so

forces great discretion

on the scope of the mission. As

to

giving the

for dealing with

managed by both Strobe Talbott on a general ensure that Bosnia would neither spoil more general

the Russians, this was level

—helping

to

U.S.-Russian relations nor subvert the reformers in Russia military level by Secretary of Defense Perry.

—and on

the

Though it took time, work-

ing with Russian defense minister Pavel Grachev, Perry was eventually able to finesse the participation of the Russian forces in a

the local Russian

commander answering

charge of IFOR and not technically to

to the

way

that

had

American general

NATO. (The

in

former was accept-

able to the Russians; the latter was not.)

Third, the Holbrooke team worked with the Europeans on

mentation issues

—

civil

different Balkan parties

ence convened. In the ference,

—while

and military

all

imple-

also trying to condition the

on what would happen once the peace confer-

last

and shortest shuttle mission prior to the con-

Holbrooke brought Carl Bildt of the

EU

and Russian foreign

minister Igor Ivanov to meetings that started in Belgrade, where he an-

nounced

that the peace conference

would take place

at

Wright-Patterson

Air Force Base, in Dayton, Ohio.

Throughout managing three

this period, the

American

effort effectively required

parallel sets of negotiations involving the

68

Balkan par-

Bosnia ties,

the

NATO allies, and the Russians. All this, while also preparing the

choreography of a major peace conference.

The peace conference represented it

a roll

of the dice. Holbrooke saw

in "all or nothing" terms, understanding that

the sense of what was at stake for

would require

a

all

it

was essential to build

those involved. Ending this war

very clear awareness on the part of Milosevic, Tudjman,

and Izetbegovic of not they would be certain

just

what they could gain by success but what

to lose

by

failure.

Ultimately the conference

succeeded. It

build

went through different phases, with the

some

basis for progress

rial

issue that mattered to President

nia,

which was solely

also

working out the one

issues of the

map

first

Slavo-

week, there was

or the constitution. Progress

was very painful and slow throughout the second week the

territo-

Tudjman of Croatia, Eastern

Serbia-Croatia issue. In the

no movement on the core

—with most of

work being done by the American team shuttling between the

after direct

to

by formalizing the federation agreement

between the Croats and Muslims while

a

week designed

first

sides

meetings of the parties proved to be counterproductive. Di-

visions within the Bosnian

movement tended

team were paralyzing them, and most of the

to be driven by Milosevic,

who was

anxious to reach

agreement.

On the key issue of control over Sarajevo, it was Milosevic who broke the stalemate, on day sixteen, by simply conceding the issue to the lims, telling

them

that after three years of shelling

nian Serbs, the Muslims had "earned" the

city.

Mus-

by the cowardly Bos-

With Dayton hovering on

the brink of failure on day twenty-one, Milosevic again acted: First, in

conversations with Haris Silajdzic, he sought to resolve the key territorial

stumbling block of getting the Bosnian Serb territory up to 49 per-

cent,

and then, when overcoming the differences on the status of the city

Brcko became the only way to work out the offered the

compromise of

resolve the issue. conflict to end,

from

He

arbitration

territorial questions,

he

by an international mediator to

did not want Dayton to

fail.

He

was ready for the

and to gain the economic benefits that would result

that.

One

of the factors that contributed to Milosevic's concessions was

Holbrooke's use not just of coercive means but also of positive induce-

69

STATECRAFT ments. Holbrooke wanted to suspend sanctions against Serbia at the be-

ginning of the peace conference, believing that Milosevic also needed to

moment. While he faced opposition within

see the rewards at the right

the administration, Holbrooke read Milosevic's desire for economic relief

and manipulated

it

well.

The Bosnian Muslims on pher and Holbrooke putting at risk

all

as

the last day exasperated Secretary Christo-

they appeared unable to take yes for an answer,

they had achieved through the agreement that was

available. In the final hour, as the

United States grew frustrated with the

Muslims, Christopher told Izetbegovic that there were no more dead-

and the United States needed an answer immediately. Izetbegovic

lines

—

reluctantly agreed, and the Bosnian war was over

on paper.

at least

For a conflict that the United States had wanted no part of during the

Bush administration, and

which

for

had shown reluctance

it

to

assume

any military obligations during the Clinton administration, America

—

now was prepared to commit twenty thousand troops one third of the IFOR troops to help implement an agreement that U.S. leadership had

—

produced.

CONCLUSIONS The Bosnian

case represents both ends of the spectrum in statecraft.

During the Bush

German

years,

unification

it

was

and the

a conflict that

first

was avoided. Fatigue from

Gulf War reduced the

inclination to be

involved, and the president and his senior advisors rationalized our non-

involvement by convincing themselves that rope should manage.

this

was

a conflict that

When ethnic cleansing became unmistakable, with

the gruesome images of concentration

camps

in the

summer of 1992,

administration supported the development and deployment of

PROFOR;

later,

Eu-

when Serb

sion of the war, President

actions in

Kosovo risked

a possible

Bush warned Milosevic, but

this

the

UN-

expan-

came

at the

end of the administration. For the Bush administration,

this

was the wrong war

at the

wrong

time in the wrong place. Could more have been done to deter Milosevic

and

his

active

Greater Serbia ambitions? x\lmost certainly, but that required

involvement and

losevic

a readiness to

would have believed

credible.

70

use coercive diplomacy that MiIt

was not in the cards for an ad-

Bosnia

ministration that did not believe in the stakes and that

seemed guided by

an objective more of avoiding involvement than of solving the

But the Clinton administration arrived

in

conflict.

January 1993 with

a sense

of outrage over what Serbia was doing. Ethnic cleansing was decried, Serb aggression was not to be tolerated, arming the Muslims was called for,

and stopping

a conflict in

the heart of Europe was certainly seen as

an important American national security interest. the

summer of 1995

—and

And

the massacre in Srebrenica

yet

—

it

took until

to finally

move

the administration to transform the situation and produce the use of force and diplomacy to end the war.

What

is

remarkable about the period from August 1995 through the

end of the Dayton negotiations fective statecraft.

The way

many ways

that in

it.

The Clinton

internally.

changed

The

when some

as

we

differences

resisted alliance pressures to stop

of the Serb positions prematurely, and

to a point

way and

marriage of force and diplomacy was carried

off the calls to seek a cease-fire before the realities

settlement.

model of ef-

that generated support internationally, but also

out masterfully, particularly

NATO's bombing

a

administration not only framed

acted in a unified, disciplined fashion even

remained

it is

objective was finally defined in a clear

with a strategy to pursue the objective in a

is

itself

also held

on the ground had

where they served the prospects of

The diplomacy

we

a negotiated

was intense and nonstop, with coordi-

nation taking place simultaneously with the Contact Group, the Europeans, the

UN,

the Russians, and the various Balkan parties (including

within the Muslims, between the Croats and the Muslims, and with

Milosevic and the Bosnian Serbs).

And

a

sequence for negotiations was

developed and implemented, culminating in the marathon of Dayton.

Throughout the course of Holbrooke's involvement, coercive means were exploited to build leverage, inducements were employed to render rewards for good behavior, and communication channels were used to inform, explain, and assuage.

team worked constantly sions,

More

than anything

to deal with

Muslim

else,

fears

the Holbrooke

and internal

divi-

intervened whenever potential fissures between the Croats and

Muslims threatened

to erupt, acted to build Milosevic's interest in

man-

aging the Bosnian Serbs, and spent time briefing the Europeans

when

the potential for their resentment at the Americans' running the

show

might have become

a

problem.

71

STATECRAFT The assessment of the tives

different parties, their stakes,

and disincentives that could be orchestrated to

affect the parties

was done well and often on the run, befitting an intensive have worked

in

and the incen-

effort.

Could

it

1995 without the Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic's

wanting an end to Serbia's isolation, an end to the sanctions, and international acceptability for himself? Probably not, but give credit to

Richard Holbrooke and his team for reading him correctly and for understanding the dynamics of the Bosnian Muslim leadership.

And

give

credit to President Clinton for backing this all-out effort and for de-

ciding to

commit twenty thousand American troops

to

implement the

agreement. Presidential leadership and involvement play a far greater role in the first

Gulf War in 1991, but

are

managed very

ing the run-up to the Iraq war, in 2002-2003.

now

turn.

72

differently before and dur-

To those two

cases,

we

will

4.

CASES OF STATECRAFT Undoing Iraqi Aggression

On August 2,

Kuwait

in

1990, Iraq invaded neighboring Kuwait and seized a coun-

try Iraqi leaders

began referring to immediately

province" of Iraq.

The Bush

administration

as the

condemned

"nineteenth

the invasion and

called for the immediate, unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces.

moved

swiftly to get the

UN

It

Security Council to adopt a resolution in

which the invasion was unanimously condemned, and by Sunday, August

President Bush declared that "This will not stand

5,

—

this aggres-

sion against Kuwait."

With

that statement, the president was declaring that the United

States, either

on

own or with others, would

act to ensure that the Iraqi

would be undone.

a

its

seizure of Kuwait

It

was

particularly because the United States had to Kuwaiti security,

serious

American

and had done

remarkable declaration,

no preexisting commitment

before the invasion to signal any

little

interest in the fate of Kuwait.

Moreover, U.S. relations

with Iraq had steadily improved since the Reagan administration had taken Iraq off the terrorism U.S.-Iraqi relations tilted

toward

list

in 1982.

were restored

Iraq, favoring

though Iraq had invaded

it

in the

Iran, the

in 1984,

war

it

its

wake of the 1979-1981 hostage

secular Ba'athist regime, led by

Iran.

Even

American view of the threat posed by

the revolutionary mullahs ruling Iran (and in the

and American policy had

launched against

American antipathy

crisis) led

to Iran

us to support Iraq and

Saddam Hussein. Adopting the 73

tradi-

— STATECRAFT "enemy of my enemy is my friend," Ronald

tional realist posture that the

Reagan

—hardly

a disciple

of the realpolitik school of foreign policy

offered very tangible and meaningful support to Iraq. America provided

the Iraqi regime with intelligence and advanced radars that had a signif-

And in 1987, when Iran was attacking oil tankers to cut Iraq's oil revenues, we "reflagged" neutral tankers and proicant force-multiplying effect.

tected

them with

U.S. warships to prevent

such a

loss.

In addition, the

Reagan administration offered extensive credit guarantees

government

to

buy

agricultural goods

tained that program even after

were misusing the

from the United

we began receiving reports

credits to free

up funds

little

to affect

our

and main-

that the Iraqis

for military purchases.

the use of chemical weapons against the Iranians and

population did

to the Iraqi

States,

Iraq's

Even

own Kurdish

relations.

With the end of the Iraq-Iran War

in 1988, the policy of seeking to

improve relations with Saddam Hussein continued, and was embraced

by the Bush administration in

American policy began

first

its

to waver, as

year. It

was only in 1990 that

Saddam pressured

his

neighbors to

increase oil prices and threatened Israel, even implying a readiness to

employ chemical weapons bellicose posture against

against

its

it.

In response to Iraq's increasingly

neighbors, the Bush administration began a

review of the agricultural credit program, which eventually led not to revocation but to the suspension of a second tranche of million dollars in credits. In

May

1990,

Saddam charged

five

its

hundred

that Kuwait was

engaging in economic warfare against Iraq and demanded that

it

provide

Iraq with billions of dollars and territorial concessions; in late July, these threats escalated as

Saddam declared

that Kuwait

and the United Arab

Emirates were guilty of direct aggression against Iraq and declared that if

words had no impact, "something

effective

must be done."

1

Throughout the spring and summer of 1990, America's Arab in the

Middle East counseled

the Bush administration did

friends

restraint in the face of Iraq's threats,

little.

For the most

part, the policy

and

was be-

ing handled in the administration by second-tier officials as the time and

most senior

attention of the president and the

principally

on German unification.

level

remained riveted

Much like the Saudis, Egyptians, and

Jordanians, those American officials

Saddam was posturing beeven when the verbal threats be-

felt that

cause of increasing economic troubles;

74

Undoing Iraqi Aggression

came more pronounced and U.S.

ambassador

Kuwait

moved heavy concentrations of troops

Iraq

to the Kuwaiti border in the

in

second half of July, Arab regimes and the

to Iraq assured the administration's leaders of

Saddam

Hussein's benign intentions. Hosni Mubarak, Egypt's president, after

seeing Hussein, declared on July 25 that tion of attacking

Kuwait or any other party."

ofJordan told President Bush in a phone the attack

came four days

WHY The

"I

later,

.

.

.

has no inten-

And on July 29, King Hussein

call,

"Nothing will happen." 2 But

and America's policy was transformed.

UNDO

DID WE SEEK TO

Iraqi seizure

believe he

IRAQI AGGRESSION?

of Kuwait came as a shock. Even when Iraqi troops

crossed the border, the

initial

assumption was that the action might be a

limited land grab (perhaps the Rumaila oil field) as a

way of extracting

economic concessions from the Kuwaitis. Though even

a limited seizure

of territory would have been deeply disturbing, few in the neighborhood or in the administration foresaw the possibility of Iraq actually seizing all

of Kuwait. Their assessments were guided by wrongheaded assump-

tions about

The

Saddam Hussein.

administration had to scramble in response. Certainly the shock

of the invasion affected the administration's mind-set. But what shaped the adoption of its objective to reverse the invasion was the early recognition that far

more was

at stake

than the future of Kuwait. Iraqi forces

stood poised on the Kuwaiti- Saudi border, only 275 miles from the Saudi

separated the Iraqi forces from advancing

capital of Riyadh,

and

into the kingdom.

Suddenly the specter of Iraq seizing Saudi northern

oil fields

little

and the Saudi capital conjured up the image that

power could gain

a stranglehold

East, with potentially devastating

over the flow of

oil

a hostile

from the Middle

consequences for the economies of the

Western industrialized world. Preventing that outcome had long been defined as a fundamental U.S. interest. Previously, the Soviets were seen as the

prime

a threat

could enable

and use its

threat; the

Khomeini revolution

could be more localized.

its

it

to

And now

dominate the Gulf

in Iran indicated that

Iraq's

States,

such

absorption of Kuwait

determine the flow of

oil,

leverage on the oil supply to blackmail our allies and pursue

pan-Arab objectives

in the region

75

—including

its

anti-Israel agenda.

STATECRAFT The

Iraq seizure of Kuwait thus posed an unmistakable threat to

ica's interests in

the Middle East.

For President Bush, terests in the be.

The

Amer-

it

was not

just the threat to oil

and our

—

as

Middle East that were

at stake

as

important

vital in-

they might

president believed that Iraq's actions threatened the structure of

international relations after the cold war.

one era had ended. Would or the law of the jungle?

With the

fall

of the Berlin wall,

new one be governed by

this

Would

the rule of law

be characterized by order or disorder?

it

In James Baker's words, the president's instinctive sense from the begin-

ning was that "this was no ordinary

crisis,

that

it

truly

would become

a

how we responded would have a great influwould be a new world order terminology that

hinge point of history," and

ence on whether there

—

now began

President Bush

3

to use.

This concern for shaping the post-cold war world was gression could not stand and

why how we undid

it

why

was so important.

President Bush was prepared, in his words, "to deal with this laterally if necessary," it

Iraq's ag-

crisis

uni-

but he did not want the United States going

alone and making this a confrontation between America and Iraq. 4

Rather, for President against

Bush and Secretary Baker,

Saddam. There must be

world would not tolerate

this

a coalition that

it

must be the world

would

signal that the

kind of behavior. Indeed, for Bush and

Baker, the United States should lead an international coalition to counter this aggression

and undo the

Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.

Consequently, President Bush, in his words, "wanted the United Nations involved as part of our

"Decisive

first

"He

response

was convinced that

UN action would be important in rallying international oppo-

sition to the invasion

and reversing

"Almost by definition, the

first

it."

5

Secretary Baker affirmed that

stop for coalition building was the United

Nations." 6

Forging an international consensus would make our action legitimate

and define the ground rules of this new sion

would not be permitted and

mistakably

era. It

that those

would show

who engaged

in

that aggresit

would un-

lose.

While President Bush defined our objective simple task to fashion a strategy for achieving Iraqi military thrusts, especially into

in these terms, it.

it

Saudi Arabia, had to be the

76

was no

Deterrence of further first

or-

Undoing Iraqi Aggression in Kuwait

der of business, and the development of a coalition to undo the aggression could not simply be mandated;

it

had

to

be nurtured and con-

would take time

to put military forces

structed. Practically speaking,

it

in place to counter the

and the Saudis would have to accept the

Iraqis,

deployment of large American forces had always been loath

in the

kingdom

—something they numbers

to consider, fearing that admitting large

of "nonbelievers" to defend the "custodians" or protectors of the holy places might affect the very legitimacy of the royal family.

Building forces for deterrence was one thing; being able to put together an international coalition would be another. Each phase required time. Notwithstanding the president's declaration that the Iraqi aggres-

sion

would not stand, the early strategy of the administration

by the president and

his senior advisors in the

as

outlined

NSC meeting of August 4

was geared to deterrence and the gradual buildup of pressures on Iraq designed to make the occupation of Kuwait untenable. Coercive diplomacy, starting with political isolation and leading to economic sanctions,

was designed

would

"make Saddam Hussein pay such

to

realize the

would be

sufficient,

sanctions failed,

The and

a

need

to

withdraw from Kuwait.

a It

high price" that he

was hoped that

but the president understood that

Saddam would have

to be expelled

if isolation

by military

and

force.

7

depended on establishing an international consensus

strategy

broad-based coalition. "Having decided on building

we turned our

this

attention," Secretary

Baker said

later, "to

a coalition,

the practical

and arduous task of actually putting one together and maintaining throughout the

crisis ...

tion's solidarity

was even more

place."

In retrospect,

I

difficult

it

believe maintaining the coali-

than assembling

it

in the first

8

WHAT OBSTACLES DID WE FACE? The

obstacles to achieving the objective established by the president

were formidable. Some of them stemmed from ential countries

such

as the Soviet

a structural reality: influ-

Union would

find

part of a coalition designed to exert great pressure client state in the

Middle

East.

on

it

difficult to

be

a

Iraq, its principal

Other obstacles grew out of the inherent

complexities in the process the administration sought to use to apply

77

STATECRAFT pressure on Iraq

—namely,

tions Security Council.

oped among the

the adoption of resolutions in the United

Even assuming

Na-

that consensus could be devel-

permanent members of the Council on escalating

five

the pressure on Iraq (certainly not a given by any means), the nonaligned

bloc might balk over coercing a country in the developing world, and,

nothing

if

could prevent resolutions from appearing to have broad

else,

support. Still

other obstacles were bound to arise given the incremental nature

of the strategy, which by definition meant that there would be different phases. Gaining support

manding. But getting a sanctions

regime to

it

first

for political isolation

inflict

genuine penalties on

for the actual use of force to expel Iraq,

Necessarily, each go-round

were

might not be de-

again for sanctions, and then for enforcement of Iraq,

and

finally again

was bound to be very

difficult.

would re-create opposition from those who

instinctively hesitant, opposition that

would have

to be

managed

and overcome. If these structural obstacles

that

were not

sufficient, there

were others

were certain to be daunting: employing sanctions that imposed an

economy would damage

effective boycott against the Iraqi

those, such as

Turkey and Egypt, whose economies depended on commercial subsidized

oil

embargoes

if

nancially dollars.

from

They would

find

it

difficult to

that "bill"

would

rise

or

go along with

they were not compensated for what they were losing

—and

Who

Iraq.

ties

fi-

very quickly into the billions of

was going to provide that money to sustain the effective-

ness of the embargoes on

all

Iraqi trade?

easy to sustain the costs of our

own

Moreover, would we find

it

so

military buildup in the Gulf, partic-

ularly given our sudden turnabout in policy toward Iraq that inevitably raised questions about

with Iraq to coercing In this sense, the

how we

could go from trying to improve relations

it?

economic

costs

would

trigger political costs as well.

Bear in mind that the administration had done to

change the public perception of

Kuwait

as a

little

or no conditioning

Iraq. In addition,

country that was worth fighting

for.

few looked

at

So domestic opposition

was yet another important obstacle the administration would have to

contend with

if it

was to achieve

its

objective of forcing Iraq to disgorge

Kuwait. In retrospect,

it

appears that

Saddam counted on 78

creating a

fait

ac-

Undoing Iraqi Aggression

compli to which the world would have to that the international that

it

could not undo.

in

Kuwait

adjust.

community would

He

He expected that the

apparently assumed

but accept a reality

criticize

Soviets, his longtime patron

and supplier of the bulk of his heavy armaments, would block any meaningful pressures

on him.

He had

strong

the Soviet military estab-

ties to

lishment, and the Soviets had a large military support presence in Iraq that they larly,

Saddam probably

who had very tries

to jeopardize for the sake of the Americans. Simi-

were unlikely

interests in Iraq

and defense indus-

heavily dependent on large arms sales to the Iraqi military

understand

how much

nomic sanctions on

Saddam was

French,

justification, that the

—

commercial

large

some

believed, with

—would

they had to lose by imposing any significant eco-

his regime.

impediments to what we would

right to see

try to

do

from these two permanent members of the Security Council, each with a veto.

Beyond

this,

the Iraqi leadership apparently also believed, again

with some justification, that Arab countries would not be able to sustain

support for external pressure on try to

impose on

a

Iraq.

Joining with an outside power to

brother Arab would conjure up

all

the imagery of a

history of colonialism that the people of the region rejected

regimes would be fearful of domestic reactions

as a result.

—and

local

To make Arab

involvement in any international coalition against Iraq less likely, the Iraqis also

sought early on to make

against-Iraq, issue. Seeing initial

this

an Arab-Israeli, not a world-

condemnations of the

even in the Arab world, Saddam on August seizure of Kuwait

12

—

—

Iraqi invasion

ten days after the

offered a "peace plan," suggesting that he had in-

vaded Kuwait for the Palestinians, and declaring that the issue of Kuw ait T

could be discussed in the context of ending the

occupation of

Israeli

Palestinian territory. Later, Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz began to

say that if there were an attack against Iraq, Iraq missiles at Israel, taliation

something the

and make

it

Iraqis

would

assumed would

retaliate

firing

trigger Israeli re-

impossible for Arabs to act in a way that

appear to be siding with the

by

made them

Israelis.

Aziz told Secretary Baker

at their January 9

meeting

in

Geneva

that

the Arabs would defect from any coalition with the United States for essentially atavistic reasons:

and blood

is

spilled,

stinctively. If

"Once

a

people enter battle and

fire

prevails

then people go back to their origins and behave in-

you were

to attack an

79

Arab

state,

you

will

be the

enemy

STATECRAFT many Arab

in

echoed

Aziz's

countries."

words

in

9

Many American

experts on the Arab world

warning the Bush administration about the con-

sequences of using force against

Iraq.

One such expert,

meeting with President Bush, declared that

in a fall

against Iraq to oust

it

Christine Helms,

if

we went

war

to

from Kuwait, "no American would be able

do

to

business or set foot in the Arab world for the next twenty years." 10

matters

now

matters

is

It

not whether such experts were profoundly wrong; what

what the administration had

contend with

to

at the

time in

terms of real or perceived obstacles.

One

last set

of obstacles to achieving the president's objective should

be noted. Within the administration (and even with British prime minister

Margaret Thatcher) there were doubts

at certain

going to the United Nations Security Council.

The

curity Council might not agree to the resolutions tried for

them and

failed,

our

ability to

fear was that the Se-

we

sought, and

then use Article

Charter (the "self-defense" provision) to be seriously undermined. But for

key junctures about

justify

a president

5

1

if

of the

we

UN

our use of force would

who

believed that unmis-

takable international backing for our actions was important both for le-

gitimizing our steps and for establishing a crucial precedent for shaping a if

new

international order, gaining

UN endorsement was necessary even

there were obstacles. Similarly, gaining

UN

endorsement but lacking congressional and

home would create questions about our ability to sustain the policy we had adopted. And yet, when the administration in November 1990 (three months after the invasion) began to move from a popular backing

at

deterrence-and-sanctions approach to dramatically building up our forces to give us the offensive capability to expel Iraq

from Kuwait

necessary, leading figures in the Congress, such as Senators

—both —became openly

and Bob Kerrey sues

centrist

critical

Sam Nunn

Democrats and credible on security

of our policy Moreover, polls

indicated that 47 percent of the U.S. public

felt that

if

at the

is-

time

the administration

was "too quick to get American military forces involved rather than seeking diplomatic solutions." 11 With

former military Bush's

first

officials

such

Nunn

as retired

holding hearings in which

admiral William

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff,

J.

Crowe,

Jr.,

argued against the use

of force and for the maintenance of a sanctions-only approach, the ad-

80

Undoing Iraqi Aggression

in

Kuwait

ministration had a congressional problem, and ameliorating

was yet

it

another obstacle to overcome.

HOW COULD WE

USE STATECRAFT?

President Bush was very clear in establishing his objective and his desire to have an international consensus for backing

it.

Effectively, the

admin-

istration sought to "frame" the issue by building the international con-

sensus around the objective of the intolerability of the Iraqi seizure of

Kuwait and the need to see

it

reversed. Personal diplomacy was again

employed very intensely and

at

very senior

unification.

But

levels,

much

as

with

German

diplomacy, including the use

in this case, the personal

of back channels, was geared toward putting together a broad coalition to

demonstrate that Iraq was isolated; keeping key players on board of ratcheting up pressure on Iraq unfolded; sustaining

as the process

the coalition over time while managing problems as they

could be anticipated; and agreeing on event of war

—whether sending

who would

emerged or

play what roles in the

forces and/or financially supporting

the effort.

While the

UN Security Council remained the critical forum for ex-

pressing the international consensus, and President Bush was to call our

UN ambassador, Tom Pickering, shortly after the invasion to convene an emergency session of the Security Council, the

real starting point for

producing the coalition that the president sought was getting the Soviets

on board. They might be on the decline, but they were perpower and

still

a military su-

Iraq's principal military patron.

Without the

Soviets, there

would be no

clear international consensus.

Soviet opposition to our objective would provide protection and cover for

Saddam Hussein;

it

would give Arab

nationalists a reason to stay

on

it would give the French an excuse to assume a posture midway between us and the Soviets. Conversely, a joint US.-Soviet ap-

the fence; and

proach would make

it

impossible for the French to be softer on Iraq than

the Soviets. Additionally, should the Soviets join us in opposing and

pressuring Saddam, the realities at the

much

stronger basis for agreement

UN

among

would be transformed:

the permanent

would be created, and the nonaligned, who, belying

81

five

a

members

that description,

STATECRAFT would be much more

typically voted with the Soviets,

resolutions

No was

we might now

support

likely to

author.

wonder President Bush thought

that "Soviet help in particular

because they had veto power in the Security Council, but

key, first

12

also because they could

complete

Iraq's political isolation."

moved quickly

common

approach with the Soviets.

to forge a

We

thus

GETTING AND KEEPING THE SOVIETS ON BOARD

The

first

step

—and our

essential

first

"means"

stacles to the administration's objective

—

for

overcoming the ob-

was forging

a joint statement

with the Soviets in response to the Iraqi invasion.

At the time of the

Iraqi invasion

(August

1990), Secretary Baker

2,

was meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Irkutsk, Siberia,

and

I

When

was with him. 13

Baker reported to Shevardnadze on the

we had intelligence reports that suggested an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait now appeared imminent, Shevardnadze doubted morning of August

2 that

them but instructed Sergei Tarasenko

check and see what "our

to

people" know. Tarasenko reported back shortly that the Soviet "system" believed that nothing would happen. Shevardnadze was plainly embarrassed when, less than two hours later, Baker told

him

that Iraqi forces

had crossed into Kuwait; he was the foreign minister of thousands of

its

citizens (military

and he was blindsided by

and

a

country with

on the ground

civilians)

in Iraq,

his national security establishment, requir-

ing the visiting American secretary of state to inform

him of the

Iraqi

invasion.

Shevardnadze's embarrassment

may

work with us

up

readiness to

in setting

Baker leaving Irkutsk for a scheduled arranged with Sergei Tarasenko to nadze's plane, so Sergei and

had

felt

at this

a joint

Mongolia,

trip to fly

response

back to

I

initially.

had previously

Moscow on

could hold policy planning

With

talks.

Shevard-

While we

such talks would be useful, the real reason for holding them

time was that

planned the to

I

well have contributed to his

trip

wanted

I

back to

to get

Moscow

as

home

for the

weekend and had

an excuse to avoid going with Baker

Mongolia. Regardless of

my

less-than-altruistic motivations, the joint U.S.-

Soviet statement grew out of my presence in Moscow. Peter Hauslohner,

82

— Undoing Iraqi Aggression a

member of my staff, met us

in

in

Moscow and

Kuwait suggested

I

push for such

a

statement in response to the invasion. But such a statement, while useful for

putting the Soviets on record with us and for "framing" the issue

would have

internationally,

far greater

impact

were mutually an-

if it

That would leave no doubt

that this was a

nounced

at the political level.

common

policy and would send an extraordinary signal to the world.

Such an announcement, of course, would require Baker to leave Mongolia

and come to

Moscow to stand with Shevardnadze and make the state-

ment. Naturally, before raising this idea with Tarasenko, that Baker

would come.

I

know He imme-

needed

I

reached the secretary in Ulan Bator.

to

diately understood the value of the statement, and authorized

—with

pursue the idea with Tarasenko and Shevardnadze that the joint

announcement must have enough "meat"

in

it

me

to

the proviso to justify his

unexpected presence in Moscow.

Over the next twenty-four hours, Initially, I

was on

a

high

as

I

rode an emotional roller coaster.

both Tarasenko and then Shevardnadze

agreed that here was an opportunity to show the world that the cold war

was over and the United States and the

USSR were no longer adversaries

but rather partners in trying to develop a world of greater peace and staThat, of course, required a joint statement that did

bility.

merely condemn the

Iraqi invasion; in addition,

embargo on Iraq and further punitive measures not forthcoming.

Our

first

plied a readiness to go

did not withdraw.

it

told Baker,

strictly

The statement was

that

—and even im-

economic sanctions

it

approved.

and he made plans to come to Moscow;

now he knew

if

the Iraqis

written in blunt language, but

I

On this ba-

also

reached

who was with President Bush,

and he was surprised and pleased, believing

me

arms

withdrawal were

draft reflected these points

beyond

National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft,

telling

to call for an

if Iraq's

Tarasenko was confident he would be able to get sis, I

had

more than

this

was very significant and

the cold war was over.

Only one problem: Tarasenko 's confidence was misplaced. The Soviet bureaucracy fought back, seeing the draft: as serving America's interest,

East,

damaging

a client central to the Soviet position in the

and putting the Soviets on the ground

and the draft was completely emasculated.

me

threatening to

tell

in Iraq in potential

Middle

danger

We went back and forth, with

Baker not to come and arguing to the Soviets that

83

STATECRAFT we must not have

weak statement devoid of actions

a

how

world

strate to the

we could do

little

Iraqi aggression. In the end,

that

would demon-

together in response to the

Shevardnadze took

it

upon himself to over-

rule the Soviet traditionalist establishment and agreed to a forceful

statement, even acknowledging (as he stood with Baker and spoke to the

assembled media) that deciding to make

been no simple undertaking: "Let decision for us

with

Iraq.

steps

new

.

.

.

.

.

.

me tell you that it was a rather difficult

.

.

all

this ...

we

are being forced to take these

this aggression is inconsistent

with the principles of

with the civilized relations between

political thinking and, in fact,

nations."

14

Here was the Soviet foreign minister not only

ment with the

announcement had

because of the long-standing relations that we have

.

But despite

because

this joint

American counterpart but

his

way we wanted the world

determined to

stick

with

us,

to see

also

issuing a joint state-

framing the issue publicly

and respond to

it.

In private, he was

but he did ask Baker to promise that the

United States had no intention to use force anytime soon. Baker agreed, with the caveat that this assumed no American citizens were being threatened or harmed in Kuwait.

Why

did Shevardnadze do

it?

He

new

basis,

trip to

and Gorbachev believed that our

more

relations (and international relations

generally) needed to reflect a

and the secretary of state was going to make an unscheduled

Moscow

fication issue

to demonstrate this.

Having seen how the German uni-

and the transformation of NATO were handled, Shevard-

nadze and Gorbachev trusted Bush and Baker. But that did not mean we

were over the

hump

how

with them on

to

respond to

Iraq. Literally

every subsequent decision point on Iraq had to be managed carefully, particularly because of Gorbachev's opposition to the use of force and

because of the political backlash that began increasingly to brew in

Moscow

over the image and reality of declining Soviet power.

In this sense,

managing the Soviets and keeping them

was an ongoing challenge. In an Iraqi

oil

felt that

a resolution

an additional

military enforcement of the to try to get

August, the Soviets opposed stopping

tanker heading toward Aden, even though the Security

Council had passed

bachev

late

in the coalition

imposing

a trade

embargo on

Iraq.

Gor-

UN resolution was necessary to authorize

—and he wanted one more chance

embargo

Saddam Hussein

to

withdraw before enforcing the embargo

84

Undoing Iraqi Aggression

and adopting such

a resolution.

president's senior advisors credibility of the

But

sue with the Soviets.

much worse

Baker did

of the

Secretary Baker told Pres-

as

off losing the Soviets than

losing the ship," and the president gave Baker a few days to 15

all

to stop the tanker, believing that the

at stake.

ident Bush, "We're going to be

Kuwait

Other than Secretary Baker,

wanted

embargo was

in

so.

He

work the

is-

spoke daily to Shevardnadze,

seeking to affect the Soviet calculus by explaining not only the pressure

he was under but also the importance of having the mandatory Security

Council resolutions mean something. to

He

used the phone conversations

move Shevardnadze and Gorbachev, and effectively put Gorbachev in which his desire for delay became a test of Soviet abilities

a position in

to

change Saddam's behavior. Since they could

the coalition and supported a Later, in the

fall,

new

not, the Soviets stayed in

resolution.

the political counterattacks and pressure within the

Kremlin against Shevardnadze led Gorbachev makov,

come

a

to

longtime Soviet x\rabist with

to allow

a close relationship to

Washington to try to persuade us

to alter

in order to get

him

Saddam,

to

our approach away

from pressure on Saddam to an engagement strategy might be given something

Yevgeny Pri-

in

which Saddam

to withdraw.

My

back-

channel relationship with Tarasenko, which had proven so instrumental

during stages,

sent

German unification, again was useful at this point and in the later when we became primed to use force. At this juncture, Tarasenko

me

an extraordinary message through

a

both desperation and the extent of his trust in

secure channel, showing this relationship:

Dennis,

Primakov

is

coming over Shevardnadze's opposition. He

Saddam paying

a price.

He

Shevardnadze for.

as foreign

He must be

the United States. This

against

wants to reward him. His mission has

been pushed on Gorbachev and

working

is

if

he succeeds, he will replace

minister and end everything

we have been

seen as failing and creating problems with

is

a

desperate situation. Sergei

Needless to failing.

bachev

say,

the president

made

sure that Primakov was seen as

President Bush rejected Primakov's strategy and then sent Gora

message, saying Primakov's approach would offer Hussein

85

STATECRAFT would inevitably be seen

"face-savers" that

principles that he and

undo the

own

Gorbachev had agreed upon

joint statement issued in Helsinki in

Primakov and the

in their

September. 16

traditional elements in the Soviet national security

apparatus were stymied for the moment. But to

enforcement to

and would

as "rewards,"

a resolution that

move from

sanctions

would authorize the use of force

pel Iraq was a big leap for Gorbachev.

It

to ex-

took an intense lobbying effort

by Baker and the president, reminiscent of that on German

unification,

and Shevardnadze again proved instrumental in persuading the Soviet leader.

However,

what did the

in this case,

trick

was

—although we would help respond needs one —and more wards

provision of re-

to urgent Soviet

economic

the readiness to bring the Soviets into our

point

at

less the

confidence and be responsive to Gorbachev on the crafting of the most

important

Moscow

UN Security Council resolution. During a day in and around

in

which Baker would spend nearly thirteen hours with She-

vardnadze and then Gorbachev, explaining the need for a new resolution to authorize force against Iraq,

Baker offered something previously

unimaginable: a confidential military briefing by Lieutenant General

Howard Graves

to

Shevardnadze on how the U.S. military would

fight

the war if Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait. Given the sensitivity of the subject, only Baker, Graves, and Shevardnadze were present, and

both Tarasenko and

impressed by

this

I

were asked

to leave the

room. Shevardnadze was so

demonstration of our readiness to treat the Soviets

a partner that after

Graves

he asked Baker to delay

left

his

the

room and

Sergei and

I

as

had returned,

meeting with Gorbachev to give him some

time to "lobby" Gorbachev on the importance of the resolution. Later,

upon

listening to Gorbachev's concerns, Baker revised the lan-

guage of the draft resolution to take account of Gorbachev's reluctance to

mention "force"

explicitly,

authorize the use of

same

thing.

He

"all

and instead inserted language that would

necessary means"

—which

legally

meant the

also incorporated into the resolution a forty-five-day

clock before the ultimatum in the resolution would be operative and

"all

necessary means" would be authorized. Baker did this to accommodate

Gorbachev's concern about an ultimatum that ruled out one

last effort at

diplomacy. Gorbachev suggested that there be two resolutions: one with

an ultimatum for withdrawal and a second one to then authorize force;

86

Undoing Iraqi Aggression

in

Kuwait

Baker said two resolutions would render the

first

meaningless, but one

would address the Gorbachev concern.

resolution with a clock

WORKING THE SECURITY COUNCIL The

"all

necessary means" Security Council resolution transformed our

posture from deterrence and containment of Iraq in Kuwait to one of being able, with international sanctions and backing, to expel Iraq from

Even though we had

Kuwait.

successfully orchestrated the adoption of

Security Council resolutions

five

Thatcher did not favor pursuing

at this point,

this

—and National

one

sor Scowcroft and Defense Secretary

They worried

that

we would not be

Prime Minister Margaret Security Advi-

Dick Cheney supported her view.

able to garner a consensus

on actu-

going to war without some crippling amendments; to try and

ally

would make sition.

it

fail

appear that we were using force over international oppo-

Better simply to rely on the previous resolutions and Article 5 1 of

UN Charter. But as Secretary Baker said,

the

I

agreed with

such

all

of them that

a crucial vote. It

it

would be extremely damaging to

made no sense to

certain the votes were therefor approval.

sive

diplomacy could enable us

gued that

it

sufficient

it

believed, however, that inten-

I

to obtain the necessary support.

I

ar-

we would never submit Security Council for a vote unless we were certain we

commitments

the President agreed

Though

we were

could be done in such a way that

the issue to the

had

try for the resolution unless

lose

it

was a

to

know

risk

the ultimate result. In the end,

worth pursuing. 17 (Emphasis added)

took a special effort to produce

this resolution,

with Sec-

retary Baker meeting either the leaders or leading officials of every ting

member of the

the unusual

means

that

were employed from the outset to move the Se-

curity Council to adopt resolutions against Iraq.

The

administration op-

erated at three different levels in managing the Security Council. Pickering, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, terparts in tries

New

sit-

Security Council, the diplomatic effort exemplified

worked

his

Tom

coun-

York; in Washington, the ambassadors from the coun-

on the Security Council were called

Department; and

in the foreign capitals

87

in for

meetings

at the State

of the countries on the Security

STATECRAFT Council, our ambassadors discussed every resolution with their host countries.

The message was

that each of these resolutions mattered and

could affect the relationship of that country with

would be no

To reinforce the drafted

first

and that there

us,

"free" votes.

seriousness of our consultations, each resolution was

Washington and then shared with other

in

New

negotiations in

York even took place.

was

Little

capitals before

left to

chance on

the resolutions, especially on the "all necessary means" resolution.

Baker had promised the president that the resolution would not be

we did not have the votes; every month to see the Soviets, our

brought up trip

if

Egyptians, Kuwaitis, and Syrians, to

while Baker took an extended

NATO

manage the

allies,

European, and Arab constiruent parts) and to move another,

it

was

member of the Starting

my

its

Soviet,

from one phase

to

of every sitting

Security Council that were his most arduous.

on November

3,

he spent eighteen days traveling to twelve

met personally with

"I

Security Council counterparts in an intricate process of cajoling,

extracting, threatening, itics

it

his trips to see a senior representative

countries on three continents. In Baker's words, all

and the Saudis,

coalition (and

and occasionally buying

votes.

Such

are the pol-

of diplomacy" 18

With the Chinese, who were anxious the United States after the

to

end the

chill in relations

with

breakdown triggered by the Tiananmen

Square massacre in 1989, the question was whether there would be senior-level visit to

China by an American

official.

a

Even though Baker

would meet every one of his Security Council counterparts, he met the Chinese foreign minister, Qian Qichen, in Egypt, not

wanted

a presidential visit in rerurn for

promised only

a visit

by him the next

year.

The Chinese ultimately

G-7 debt forgiveness. With Malaysia, he made Such were the means and he succeeded

in

so.

88

to explore

clear that our bilateral re-

a "no" vote.

that Baker used to

doing

for a visit

abstained, permitting pas-

With the Ivory Coast, Baker promised

would be seriously affected by

Qian

support for the resolution; Baker

by the undersecretary of state to prepare

sage of the resolution.

lations

in China.

produce the necessary

votes,

Undoing Iraqi Aggression

Kuwait

in

PERSONAL DIPLOMACY

USED

IS

TO SUSTAIN THE COALITION

From early on

in the crisis, the president

and

his senior advisors

under-

stood that sustaining support for the coalition and for sanctions on Iraq

would be

not just politically but also financially. Countries such as

costly,

Turkey and Egypt

in particular

would be exposed

to

extreme economic

down Turkey. To

hardship for respecting the embargo. Turkey would have to close the Iraq oil pipeline, an extremely expensive proposition for

meet both our needs and the needs of those who could not sustain the embargo, Baker launched what came to be known to raise

Kuwaitis,

as his "tin-cup" trips

He focused principally but not exclusively on the

money.

Germans, and Japanese;

at the time, the latter

Saudis,

two were pro-

hibited by their constitutions from contributing any military forces.

Baker used

his leverage effectively

with these four, explaining that

our costs would eventually be measured in blood and sible for

him to defend to Congress countries

from our expelling Iraq share. lion

The

logic

if

Turkey and Egypt and were

19

Aid packages were put together

also instrumental in building

Much

how

Gorbachev's

a four-billion-dollar credit

manage urgent economic

the Saudis, understanding

needs. Baker did

critical the Soviets

were

so,

and

to the coalition,

20

as in the

German

case, the intensity

and scope of the personal

diplomacy conducted by the president and the secretary of extraordinary.

the

for

one point, Gorbachev asked

he could ask the Saudis to provide

line to the Soviets to

bil-

leaving us to absorb only

allies,

stake in staying the course: privately at

responded.

would gain immensely

was compelling, and we eventually collected $53.7

$7.4 billion of the costs of the war.

if

would be impos-

those countries were not paying their fair

from these four countries and other

Baker

that

it

German

state

were

While he held fewer face-to-face meetings than during

unification process, President

Bush nonetheless met

all

the

key leaders in the coalition (including Gorbachev twice), and his tele-

phonic diplomacy earned him the nickname the "mad

dialer."

the outset he was on the phone, calling our ambassador at the

him

instructions or speaking to the Saudi king

ident

Mubarak

"check the box"

to

make

calls;

21

From

UN to give

Fahd and Egyptian pres-

sure they would be responsive. These were not

he sought to gain support or to reinforce the posi-

89

STATECRAFT tions

and confidence of those

who might be

And

wavering.

on the eve of transition from

junctures, especially

war

air

at certain

to

ground

key war,

he held long phone conversations with Gorbachev and others. For his

part, Baker's travels

were exhaustive and exhausting. Consider

that after issuing the joint statement with Shevardnadze, he returned

home to take part in

an

NSC meeting with the president and then turned

around almost immediately and flew

to

Turkey

to

We

derstandings with Turkish prime minister Ozal.

ment with Turkey over cutting the bases in the event of war with Iraq.

work out

several un-

required an agree-

Iraq oil pipeline and using Turkish

The meeting

also

provided the Turks

the opportunity to outline what they needed to sustain these positions,

and we agreed to consult on each step should additional pressure need to be brought to bear against Saddam Hussein. Next, Baker flew to Brussels to gain

NATO

endorsement of our steps

—and put

member

vis-a-vis

Turkey

Baker's subsequent trips,

Middle East and then

to

most of which involved going

Moscow and back

to

a

NATO

first

explain to coalition

first

to the

Europe before returning

home, focused on holding the coalition together even ferent purposes:

—

the alliance on record against Iraq.

he pursued

as

dif-

the tin-cup exercise; then the effort discreetly to

members why we were moving from

a deterrence-

only posture militarily to one that would enable us to use force offen-

—and

sively if necessary

the additional monies and bases

we would need

for such an increase in forces; then the around-the- world effort to garner

support for the visits to

"all

necessary means" resolution; and,

Middle Eastern and

NATO

finally,

one

last set

of

countries both before and after the

meeting with Tariq x\ziz in Geneva to hold the

line

and prevent any back-

sliding or division in the coalition in the days leading

up

to the

end of the

ultimatum period.

Between the

trips

and

visits to

Washington and the phone

The

ing the coalition together was a daily effort. senior advisors were riveted on the

Gulf

words, "Everything else was secondary.

crisis

The

U.S.

or worse, revolved around this set of issues."

calls,

president and

and

in

his

hold-

most

Richard Haass's

government, for better

22

New ground could be broken for the sake of the coalition. In addition to the

unprecedented focus on the Soviets

and getting the Saudis to accept

as the

core of the coalition,

a massive U.S. military

90

presence in the

Undoing Iraqi Aggression

kingdom

to deter

and

Hafez

Asad

Damascus

al

in

in

Kuwait

later defeat the Iraqi army,

coalition aligned against

him

to enlist

an active

as

Saddam Hussein. While

was no need to have the secretary of

Baker also met with

had

I

state travel to

member

of the

felt that

there

Damascus and

give

this

kind of recognition to a leader whose country was on our terrorism

list,

particularly

when

Asad's

his support, the president

own enmity

with Saddam would generate

and the secretary saw

Syria's overt inclusion

Arab world. In

in the coalition as essential for gaining credibility in the

retrospect, they

were probably more right than

I

was:

Asad brought Arab

making Saddam's

nationalist credentials to the coalition,

isolation ap-

pear much more complete, even in the Arab world.

More

than anything

else,

the readiness to reach out to Syria

demon-

strated the priority the administration assigned to having a very broad

based coalition. Baker

made Damascus

on

a regular stop

his

Middle

Eastern trips in the run-up to the war; ironically, Israel was never a stop in

The fear of Saddam's being able and to make it harder for the Arab

advance of the war.

hostility to Israel

coalition to preserve their

to exploit

Arab

partners in the

anti-Saddam position led to

this

anomalous

situation.

That did not mean, however, to Israeli concerns. It

form the to undo

crisis

it

from

that the administration

was indifferent

simply did not want Saddam to be able to trans-

his seizure

of Kuwait and the world's determination

into an Arab-Israeli imbroglio. But as part of the effort to keep

the coalition intact, Baker used his trips starting in the threat of Iraq striking Israel if

it

came

to

war

November

to raise

to oust Iraq

from

Kuwait. With the Saudis, Egyptians, Syrians, and others in the Middle East,

he raised

Arab

states a

Israel did

this

contingency and elicited from the leaders of all those

commitment that they would

not strike

first

stay in the coalition, provided

but only retaliated after an Iraqi

strike.

Notwithstanding the conditioning and preexisting commitments,

when

the Iraqis did launch Scud missiles against Israel on the second

night of the war, the administration was convinced that the coalition

might be jeopardized air strike

if Israel retaliated,

particularly because an Israeli

would involve overflying one of

likely Jordan.

An

Israeli military action

its

Arab neighbors

words, "change the entire calculus for the coalition." 23

91

—most

would, in Brent Scowcroft's

STATECRAFT To

prevent such an escalation, Baker and the president spoke to

Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, and Secretary Cheney ister

Moshe

Israel

must

to

Defense Min-

Arens, to persuade Israel not to strike back. Arens

of its

retaliate for the credibility

own

felt that

deterrent, but

Shamir

was more understanding of the American entreaties not to transform the

war and thus play into Saddam's hands. However, the administration

more than words

fered

we promised

to persuade the Israelis:

western Iraq to prevent the Scuds from being

could employ far more assets for such targeting than triot missiles

shooting a

immediately to

down

the Scuds;

Israel,

we

and the deputy secretary of

team of senior

officials

were sent

we

Israel;

which we believed were

created a

new downlink to

few extra minutes of early warning on the

Iraq;

claiming that

fired,

state,

firing

of-

to target

we

sent Pa-

effective in

give the Israelis

of Scuds from western

Lawrence Eagleburger, and

a

to Israel as a sign of American support

and to be sure Prime Minister Shamir held the

line in the face of pres-

sures from the Israeli military to respond.

In fact, notwithstanding the

were thirty-nine limited, tense.

and

Iraqi

Israel did

Scud

American

prevent them, there

attacks against Israel. Material

damage was

not retaliate, though the pressure to do so was in-

—

Shamir withstood the pressure

American

efforts to

in large part because of the

assistance, reassurance, presence,

MANAGING OUR DOMESTIC

and pressure. 24

REALITIES

AND

GOING THE EXTRA MILE The

administration had been quick to frame the issue internationally

and had been successful in producing an international consensus based

on our core

objective. Its effort to

tions that isolated Iraq lic

produce

UN Security Council resolu-

and then imposed sanctions on

it

also

won it pub-

and congressional support. The focus of the administration's work

was international, geared to forming and sustaining the coalition.

The Congress was asked to do little, and no senior official in the administration made any effort throughout the first month after the Iraqi invasion to put what we were doing in the context of a larger explanation.

Standing with Shevardnadze and offering

condemned

a joint

statement that

the Iraqis and called for countermeasures, and getting off a

helicopter and declaring that this aggression

92

would not stand

—

as the

Undoing Iraqi Aggression president did

—

was on diplomacy

—

we were doing and why. The

private, not public.

Unlike with

focus of the

German

uni-

highly conscious of public sentiments in Ger-

when we were

fication,

Kuwait

signaled intent and resolve but did not offer a deeper

public explanation of what effort

in

many, the Soviet Union, and Europe, and

need

felt a

to address those

sentiments and try to shape them, the focus was different in this case.

Here the concern was

to

win the support of foreign governments with

the assumption that the publics

Thus, the very for

first

would

follow.

effort to craft a

broader conceptual explanation

our response to the Iraq invasion took place only in September, when

Secretary Baker had to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations mittee.

The

secretary and the president were not giving speeches; they

were working their counterparts

two

keep the pressure on Saddam. The

to

need not have been mutually exclusive, but

efforts

Com-

in this case the

effort to talk clearly, consistently,

and coherently about our response

and our strategy for undoing the

Iraqi aggression

tended to be made

mostly in private.

That did not become

a

problem

until

we sought

to shift course

deterrence and sanctions to the possible use of forces

we

did not have a built-in reservoir of support domestically.

trary,

we

faced serious domestic opposition.

came

sional delegation after

the

—and

to see President

When

Tom

point

On the con-

a bipartisan

congres-

—two days — Speaker of

Bush on October 30

Congress had adjourned for the midterm elections

House

at that

from

Foley gave the president a letter signed by eighty-one

Democratic congressmen that reflected deep concerns about reports that the "United States has shifted

ture and that war

members

from

may be imminent." The

believed "that the

means of resolving the Bush

letter

an offensive pos-

went on

to say that the

UN-sponsored embargo must be given

every opportunity to work and that

The

a defensive to

situation

all

multinational, non-military

must be pursued." 25

public conditioning had been limited to this point. As President

of our problem was that so

later explained, "part

much was hap-

pening away from public view, and few people outside of the top echelon in the White

Kuwait." tration

26

House were paying

While certainly

true, the

was simply not giving

of what was

at stake

attention to

problem was

a clear,

what was going on

in

also that the adminis-

coherent explanation to the public

and why force might prove necessary. The problem

93

.

STATECRAFT both was seen

as

and became more acute when Secretary Baker, near the

end of his global tour answered

resolution,

to

drum up support

a press

for the "all necessary

means"

question about our stakes in the Gulf by

saying, "jobs, jobs, jobs."

Why

did Secretary Baker, probably the most attentive of any of the

senior leaders of the Bush administration to the need for domestic and

congressional support for our policy, offer this rationale? Because, in his

words:

for

weeks

I'd

been frustrated by the administration's

collective inability

to articulate a single coherent, consistent rationale for the president's

policy

Our

public pronouncements had ranged from the principled

to the esoteric.

creating a

At times we talked of standing up

new world

order.

to aggression

and

At others we called Saddam the new

Hitler and cited the threat to global stability from rising oil prices

we had done

a lousy job of explaining not only the

nomic ramifications of Iraq's aggression but peace and at

home

stability

as a result

.

.

.

and we were beginning

to

fundamental eco-

pay

a political price

27

of our rhetorical confusion.

we had only narrow commercial

putting American lives at

risk.

"Why

response of a growing chorus of ditry class.

not

.

also the threat to global

Baker was, of course, correct, but his public response had made pear that

.

it

ap-

reasons for going to war and

let

sanctions play out?" was the

the Congress and in the pun-

critics in

The answer that sanctions were

not working and

Saddam was

simply digging in and fortifying his position in Kuwait was an appropriate response rhetorically but not politically. Politically, given increasing public doubts,

was important to gain

it

believed.

Cheney

Most of

—

his senior colleagues

—

Much

as

did not share his views.

ing a Security Council resolution on so, too,

a

—

congressional resolution of support to go to war

or so Secretary Baker

especially Defense Secretary

"all

they feared the risk of pursu-

necessary means" and

failing,

did they worry about the consequences of seeking and then los-

ing a congressional vote on a resolution that backed going to war. Presi-

dent Bush sided with Baker, not because he authority to

commit our forces

prove to be

costly,

to war.

and that to launch

94

felt

he lacked the

legal

He understood that the war might it

amid domestic opposition and

Undoing Iraqi Aggression

in

without congressional blessing would make

Kuwait it

very

difficult to sustain

the effort.

The

administration ultimately succeeded in winning a congressional

UN

on

vote on the war by employing two basic means:

first, it

record authorizing such a mission, and second,

proved that we had,

it

got the

in

fact,

exhausted every means available short of war for trying to get Sad-

dam

to

withdraw from Kuwait.

With regard

to the

UN,

the logic was essentially to build

for dealing with Congress's

momentum

doubts by obtaining an international man-

date for using force. In effect, the administration could then pose the question, were

members of Congress

less willing to

confront aggression

than the United Nations? Certainly questions about the legitimacy of using force were bound to be fewer in Congress once the Security

Council had adopted the was undoubtedly that

true,

necessary means" resolution. While this

"all

both President Bush and Secretary Baker

something more was needed

—

some

lengths to which the administration had gone to use diplomatic

produce

Iraqi withdrawal.

"the extra mile" the

means" resolution

The

And, in

morning

at the

fact,

felt

further demonstration of the

means

to

they acted to show they had gone

after the passage

of the

"all

necessary

UN.

president, Secretary Baker, and National Security Advisor

Scowcroft met, and the president then went out and announced, on the

morning of November 30, one last initiative to avert war: he invited Saddam Hussein to send his foreign minister to Washington, and he was offering to send Secretary Baker to Baghdad anytime between December 15 and January 15 for face-to-face discussions. This was a dramatic

announcement I

that caught everyone

by surprise, including senior

was appalled, and told Baker so afterward, saying that

bound not only on our

part,

to be seen

by our coalition partners

but even worse,

it

staff.

this initiative

as a sign

would give Saddam Hussein

was

of wavering

a perfect

op-

portunity to render the forty-five-day clock and deadline in the Security

Council resolution meaningless. After ary 15, and

now Saddam merely had

by offering

talks at or

all,

that clock ran out

on Janu-

to accept the president's initiative

near the deadline.

After additional consideration and

some pointed conversations with

Saudi ambassador Bandar bin Sultan, the president withdrew the offer

and dropped the idea of an exchange of

95

visits,

though Secretary Baker

STATECRAFT did meet Tariq Aziz in Geneva. Without getting into a discussion of some

of the external consequences of the announcement, the point here

our domestic needs

as

is

that

perceived by the president and the secretary pro-

And to be fair to Bush and Baker, they were correct in terms of its impact. The president's announce-

duced

this

going-the-extra-mile

ment changed the dynamics

initiative.

in the Congress,

and while the vote on the

subsequent resolution was close, the administration did gain a congressional resolution endorsing the use of force.

The

president's initiative

had one other salutary

other possible bad ideas in the forty- five-day clock

final

and the certainty of war

of Kuwait by January

15, a

effect: it

headed off

period leading up to the war. With a if

Saddam did not

pull out

wide variety of initiatives or intermediaries

might well have leaped into the vacuum created during

this period.

But

with the president's announcement and the expected direct U.S.-Iraqi discussions, there was

might not have his

no vacuum

fully appreciated

to be filled.

While some of his advisors

what the president was doing, he used

unique "means" to answer a genuine domestic problem and preempt

potentially unhelpful international interventions.

CONCLUSIONS Before least at

Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, the Bush administration, at the highest levels, was consumed with managing German unifi-

cation in

NATO.

It

was certainly not sending the kind of signals that

might have deterred the invasion; to be

sure, given

Saddam's enormous

capacity for miscalculation, that might not have mattered.

gue that because fined

its

it

Some may

was not paying attention before, and because

objectives basically as

undoing

Iraq's

it

ar-

de-

occupation of Kuwait and

not as destroying the power of Saddam's predatory regime, the George

H. W. Bush administration

—

later

a

view that many

left

in the

problems that had to be attended

to

George W. Bush administration came

to believe.

But George H. W. Bush was quick to frame

it

in a

way

sic strategy for

embraced

on

a clear objective

internationally.

He

settled

and to

on

a ba-

achieving the objective and built an international coali-

tion for carrying Iraq's

that was

settle

it

out.

Our

objectives once the

war began remained

expulsion from Kuwait and not the destruction of

96

Saddam Hus-

Undoing Iraqi Aggression

in

+

Kuwait

regime. This was the basis on which the international coalition had

sein's

been constructed and maintained.

Yes,

our military would destroy

much

of the infrastructure Saddam had developed for weapons of mass de-

would agree

struction during the war, and the international coalition

that the resolutions for a cease-fire should include inspections so Iraq

would not be able

The

to

develop

WMD and threaten

its

neighbors.

essence of the objective, however, remained the same, and the

determination to act on the basis of an international consensus guided the administration's policy. tion

communications with those

Its

were clear and ongoing. Problems were anticipated and dealt with

using intensive personal diplomacy at the highest

when

Hand-holding

levels.

when necessary, and high-level attention at all key members of the coalition was the norm, particularly

useful, pressure

times with the

when moving from one phase Notwithstanding in

in the coali-

to the next.

the attention and effort, luck

all

played a part

still

developing and sustaining the coalition. Indeed, there can be

doubt that having Saddam Hussein of the administration's objective

mained

intact

undone the

imposed

a partial

in the "all necessary

sumed he might do

had

little

have had.

made

this

it

means" resolution?

and then declare

We

a readiness to

—and we

if

he

constantly as-

withdraw further

tried to condition those coali-

we thought most vulnerable

doubt about the impact such an

And

launch the war

difficult to

withdrawal shortly before the January 15 dead-

once negotiations commenced tion partners

the coalition have re-

had Saddam Hussein been smarter? Could he not have

coalition or at least

had announced line

Would

easier.

made achievement

adversary

as the

little

to such an initiative. initiative

But we

by Saddam would

Saddam never took any real conciliatory steps to creOnly by striking Israel did he try to the coalition, and we managed that by getting the Is-

yet,

ate fissures within the coalition.

drive a

wedge

not to respond.

raelis

In truth, ficult for

tion,

in

Saddam Hussein had

it

in his

power

to

make

it

far

more

dif-

us to achieve our objective. But being the master of miscalcula-

he assumed he would win more by a war in which he believed he

could hold his again,

we

own and

force us eventually to give

see a case of statecraft

done well

up the

—perhaps with

effort.

Once

the exception

of poor framing of our stakes and rationale for action domestically. But the ultimate success, measured in terms of an objective achieved, was

97

STATECRAFT made

good fortune or luck

easier by

adversary

who could not use

Perhaps the administration's conditioning

its

manage more

—

and

agility in anticipating contingencies

coalition partners to

adroit

in this case, the luck of having an

the leverage he had.

them would have permitted

moves by Saddam Hussein.

Bush's sensitivity to the coalition, and

its

it

to

Certainly, President

sustainability,

made

more

this

likely.

So did

we had

his

determination not to expand the objectives in

on one

built the coalition

victory was in our grasp.

Was

basis

and could not

his reluctance to

was being completed? That was certainly

He

felt

alter that basis as

expand our objectives

come

driven by his desire not to have the coalition

Iraq.

also

apart as our mission

a factor in his thinking.

How-

him to resist the impulse either to go after Saddam Hussein or even to crush the Republican Guard and make Saddam's regime more susceptible to being overthrown. First, the president and those immediately around him felt that if U.S. forces went ever, other considerations led

to

Baghdad, they could trigger

a long,

messy war with an uncertain out-

come. Second, they worried about Iraq fragmenting and becoming both a source of greater instability in the Middle East and creating an opportunity for Iranian/Shi'a expansion into the Arabian peninsula. Third, the leadership of the U.S. military was dead set against continuing the war. tract

They had

from that or

to

and wanted nothing

a neat, clean victory

prolong their presence in southern

led to a profound reluctance to shoot

down

Iraq.

to de-

This desire

Iraqi helicopter gunships

that effectively destroyed the Kurdish and Shi'a uprisings after the war,

and

after President

Bush had called on the

dam Hussein. Our unwillingness

to

come

Iraqi

people to unseat Sad-

to the aid of the Shi'a in particular, as

they were being ruthlessly suppressed by Saddam us to this day. For some,

may have been done poorly

it

makes the Gulf War

a case in

which

statecraft

exercised well during the run-up to the war itself but

at the end, particularly

While some

after the war, plagues

criticism

may

because of the legacy that was

stopping the Iraqi military from using

and the Kurds, the larger question the right objective for the defining objectives and

left.

be warranted, especially for not at least

is

its

whether the administration had

Gulf War. An

making them 98

helicopters against the Shi'a

essential part of statecraft

feasible

is

and achievable. Inevitably,

Undoing Iraqi Aggression

in

Kuwait

"!

there could and should be questions raised about whether an objective

responds only to near-term needs or

is

also shaping a longer-term future

To the extent that the administration reversed Saddam's agand won international support for disarming his regime of its

effectively.

gression

weapons of mass destruction,

its

definition of objectives

only to the near term. Whether more was achievable

is

responded not

debatable.

The president made a judgment call. All major foreign policy decisions come down to that. In cases when statecraft is done well, all factors are carefully considered. Sometimes, with the passage of time, the judg-

ments turn out

to

be wrong. So long

as

they reflect careful consideration,

with thorough internal discussion, one cannot ask for more. In

this case,

the tools of the trade were skillfully employed, and the consideration of objectives

—even

at

the end

same about the approach

—was

serious. It

to the Iraq war.

99

is

not possible to say the

5.

CASES OF STATECRAFT Saddam, George

The

Iraq war

is

IV.

Bush,

and the Iraq War

ongoing, yet the Bush administration's decisions and

style provide a strikingly different in the case of the first

approach to statecraft from that seen

Gulf War. Because of the contemporary nature of

why

the case and the importance of understanding policy evolved as

it

did,

I

the administration's

have chosen to spend more time in

this

chapter

reviewing the background and context of the administration's approach.

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT In 1991,

Saddam

Hussein's seizure of Kuwait was undone, but America's

conflict with Iraq did not end.

Regime change was

an objective by President George H. W. Bush, stick to the

explicitly rejected as

who

resolved early on to

terms of the international coalition he had helped to forge.

There was agreement on expelling Iraq from Kuwait; however, there was no consensus on expelling Saddam Hussein from President Bush encouraged Iraqis to remove

would not intervene when

Shi'a in the south

Iraq.

Saddam Hussein, but he and Kurds

in the north

openly rebelled against Saddam's regime. Fear of mission creep and the disintegration of Iraq led the administration to stand aside and allow the

Republican Guard forces (which had emerged largely unscathed from the war) to use their superior firepower to decimate the uprisings.

While President Bush had been determined not 100

to redefine the mis-

Saddam, George

IV.

Bush,

and the Iraq War

sion to permit intervention internally in Iraq, he was not prepared to

permit Iraq to threaten war.

And

neighbors or destabilize the region after the

its

UN

here the administration was successful in also getting the

Security Council to embrace two additional objectives. First, the Iraqi

army's assault against the Kurds in the north triggered a massive refugee flow to

—and

in

some

cases across

—

the Turkish border. Given

delicate relationship with Turkey's Kurdish population,

not permit a massive influx of refugees. aster, a

protected area under

UN

To

were

autonomous from the

rest

Turkey would

control was established in the north,

stabilized, rebuilt,

of Iraq

own

prevent a humanitarian dis-

and most of the Kurdish refugees were able to return In time the Kurdish zones

its

—with

a "no-fly"

at least to this area.

and became largely zone for the

Iraqi air

force adding to the area's quasi-independence. Second, the Security

Council agreed that

Iraq's capacity to

develop or possess weapons of

mass destruction must be eradicated. The Security Council adopted an inspection and monitoring regime and

mandated

that

economic sanc-

tions could not be lifted until inspectors certified that all such capability

had been destroyed. According to the terms of the cease-fire resolution 687, Iraq was to cooperate with the inspection regime and to furnish

within fifteen days

programs,

But tial,

labs,

its

WMD

a pattern

of par-

information in any way connected to

all

or even scientists.

Iraqi cooperation

was not forthcoming. Instead,

grudging responses began. Only under great pressure would the

regime reluctantly respond and belatedly permit the inspectors to go to the facilities they sought to investigate.

The

Iraqi

approach came to be

described as one of "cheat and retreat." Iraqis would seek to block, inhibit, stall, sible.

and deceive the inspectors, making their work

Eventually,

United

when

as

the pressure grew and threats were

States, the Iraqis

would acquiesce

hard

as

pos-

made by

the

to particular inspections.

Notwithstanding the Iraqi-imposed impediments to their work, the inspectors succeeded in finding and subsequently destroying far

WMD-related

more

material during the period 1991-1998 than did our

forces during the 1991 war.

Certainly

Saddam remained unrepentant and continued

to try to

defy the international community. In 1993, he was responsible for an assassination plot to

kill

former president Bush and the Kuwaiti emir dur-

ing President Bush's visit to Kuwait. President Clinton authorized a

101

— STATECRAFT nighttime cruise missile attack against Iraqi intelligence headquarters in

Baghdad

in response. In 1994,

Saddam

again threatened Kuwait, requir-

ing a U.S. buildup offerees before he backed down. in 1998,

Saddam prevented

ing sensitive

1

Several years

inspectors for several months from monitor-

and the Clinton administration, following

sites,

later,

a

number of

warnings issued from the Security Council, was poised to carry out massive air strikes against Iraq in early

November. Only

in a letter

from Saddam to Kofi Annan prevented the

that time.

Within

a last-minute retreat

U.S. air

campaign

at

month, Saddam had walked away from the promises

a

he made to the secretary-general. As a

result, the

United States carried out

four days of intensive, far-reaching air and missile strikes that inflicted

heavy damage on In response,

all

suspected

Saddam

WMD and related military targets.

refused to allow the reentry of inspectors and

declared the end of the inspection regime. While that precluded any further inspections,

on

Iraq.

The

it

also

prevented the

lifting

of economic sanctions

sanctions had imposed terrible costs on the Iraqi public,

without staunching the flow of money Saddam used to maintain his omnipresent security system and the lavish lifestyle of his ruling clique.

The toll that sanctions took on the Iraqi population was very grim. The standard of living plummeted, health care deteriorated dramatically, and the country was generally impoverished. The suffering of the Iraqi public an image Saddam sought to cultivate and exploit

—

increasingly raised questions about the costs of the sanctions regime internationally.

To

sustain

it,

and to ease the impact on the

Iraqi public,

the Oil-for-Food program was developed at U.S. instigation, adopted by

managed by the UN. But corruption and Saddam's manipulation of the program helped to bolster him without doing

the Security Council and

much

to

change the image worldwide of Iraqi

Saddam's capacity to sustain the regime suffering

on most

international

Iraqis

—helped

to foster

suffering.

—while

inflicting greater

competing pressures

community and within the United

in the

States. Internationally,

concern for the plight of the Iraqi people triggered increasing pressure the sanctions. Domestically, there was a chorus of voices beginning

to

lift

to

demand

that

it

was time for regime change. Those lobbying for such

posrure were driven by the fears that the

make

mood

sanctions unsustainable and that once

102

internationally

Saddam

a

would

escaped the sanc-

Saddam, George

he would again become

tions,

domestic

all

Bush,

worlds:

the monies necessary

source of grave danger in the region. For

a

Saddam

success

its

upon the

and free to accumulate

New American Century sent Prespolicy,

for

is

regime change, and

to have leading positions in the

This group played a

few months

later

a pivotal

its

new Bush

—

all

Bush

as

of

letter

Donald

signers included

whom would

administration.

2

lobbying role with the Congress, which

adopted the Iraqi Liberation Act. Regime change

thus acquired a bipartisan character, even though

was done to act on

The

dangerously inadequate."

Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and Richard Armitage

come

which depends

steadfastness of our coalition partners and the

Saddam Hussein,

emphasized the need

promised to produce

WMD.

"The current

ident Clinton a letter stating that

cooperation of

this

free of sanctions

to feed his appetite for

In January 1998, the Project for a

for

and the Iraq War

of the Clinton administration,

critics

the worst of

IV.

practically

little

But for those who would be around George W.

it.

he prepared to run for the presidency, there was

preoccupation with Iraq and

a

shared perception

a

deep-seated

that, in the

words

of Richard Perle, "the feebleness of the Clinton Administration" was appalling.

The

3

how

legacy of

the war ended, and the conviction that

Saddam

was an ongoing threat, certainly shaped the views of key Bush advisors such

as

Paul Wolfowitz. Did they shape candidate Bush's views or did

they simply reinforce what he already believed? this

question with any certainty, but one thing

dential campaign,

is

It is difficult

clear:

one of the very few foreign policy

to

answer

during the presiissues

Governor

Bush would address and often highlight was Iraq and Saddam Hussein. Following the election,

House on December

when he met President Clinton

19,

at the

2000, the outgoing president told

him

White that

it

appeared from the campaign that the incoming president's national security priorities

were missile defense and

acknowledged that

THE

staff)

was correct.

and President-elect Bush

NEW BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND IRAQ

Upon becoming House

this

Iraq,

4

president, however,

was not riveted on

Iraq,

George W. Bush (and

and the

103

initial

his

White

policy was developed

STATECRAFT and managed largely by the State Department. "Smart sanctions" defined the policy, a policy designed not to accelerate

much more

regime change but to

The idea was

make

sanctions

tions

regime on nonmilitary, non-dual-use technologies and allow

sustainable.

more trade and investment with nomic

situation in Iraq while

The

Iraq.

it

difficult for

velop weapons of mass destruction. In this way, "in the box," but the pressure for lifting

much

logic was to ease the dire eco-

making

still

to loosen the sanc-

Saddam

Saddam would

to de-

be

still

the sanctions would dissi-

all

—

or so the theory went.

pate^

September

1 1

changed

Bush administration

The world was transformed

all this.

for the

in terms of threats, priorities, preoccupations,

missions. Both Secretary of Defense

and

Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary

Wolfowitz quickly focused on Saddam Hussein. Within hours of the tack,

Rumsfeld wrote notes

in

Hussein in response: "best info S.H. at

same

time."

They were not

fast. Judge

whether good enough

[to] hit

5

Bush was also thinking of Saddam when he was in the Situation Room, he told 12, counterterrorism team to "See if Saddam did this. See if he's linked

Hussein. his

alone. President

On September

any way." Richard Clarke replied by saying, "But, Mr. President,

in

at-

which he contemplated attacking Saddam

Qaeda did

this."

And

the president responded, "I know,

know but

I

al.

.

Saddam was involved. Just look. I want to know any shred." 6 Even though the president in the September 15 meeting at Camp

see if

David with

his national security

team did not accept Wolfowitz's prefer-

ence for making Iraq the focus of America's 9/11

—emphasizing

initial

military response to

instead that Afghanistan would be

take his eye off of Iraq. At the

end of the

Camp

—he

first

did not

David meeting, he

pri-

Hugh Shelton, if Saddam. The next day he

vately asked the outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs, it

was

a

mistake to focus on Al

Qaeda and not

told National Security Advisor

drawn up

if it

Condoleezza Rice that he wanted plans

turned out that Iraq was implicated in the 9/11 attacks,

and the following day, September "I

7

1

7,

he stated to

8

believe Iraq was involved." And, as early as

his senior advisors that

November

21, the presi-

dent privately asked the secretary of defense, "What kind of

do you have ter

for Iraq?

How do you

Rumsfeld expressed

his

feel

war plan

about the war plan for Iraq?" Af-

concern about the

104

a

state

of war plans in gen-

W Bush, and the Iraq War

Saddam, George eral,

President Bush

towers

—

Tommy

—seventy-two days

Donald Rumsfeld,

told

Franks looking

at

moving Saddam Hussein At a press conference feld to get started

on

a

if

"Let's get started

it

would take

we have

to."

on November

war plan

dam Hussein needed to developing

what

let

on

to protect

And

this.

get

America by

re-

9

26, fwt days after asking

Rums-

for Iraq, the president declared that Sad-

inspectors back into Iraq to prove he was not

WMD. When asked what the consequences would be if Sad-

dam did not do so, Bush replied, "He'll

Tommy

General

of the twin

after the destruction

On December 28, 2001,

find out."

Command,

Franks, the head of Central

president at the president's ranch in Texas on the

initial

briefed the

plans for Iraq,

and by February of 2002, the president ordered General Franks to begin shifting troops

from Afghanistan

dent Bush joined

Mr. Bush ing

him

a

left little

out."

to the Gulf.

10

The

next month, Presi-

meeting Condi Rice was having with three senators. doubt about

his intentions:

"Fuck Saddam. We're tak-

11

While the president would say he had no war plans on

his desk,

he

not only directed the preparation of war plans but also expected to go to

war

to

remove Saddam Hussein

a full year before

Richard Haass, then director of the policy planning

we went

to war.

staff in the State

De-

partment, has described a meeting he had in June 2002 with Condi Rice,

then national security advisor, in which he began to raise some of the

hard questions about going to war in Iraq, and she cut him "Save your breath.

do on

this."

The President has

actually made.

drift

already decided what he's going to

life

Momentum

built

it

was never

up behind the presumption of war and

summer of 2002, unease about

of its own. During the

the

toward war began to build outside of the administration. At a time

when

the administration

seemed

to

assume that

do whatever it deemed necessary in the war on a

saying,

12

For Haass, the decision to go to war simply "happened,"

took on a

off,

it

had

terror,

a

blank check to

and presumed that

war with Iraq could simply be mandated accordingly, questions began

to percolate

about the wisdom of such

a war.

But among many

gress and the foreign policy cognoscenti, these questions

in

Con-

remained

largely inchoate until Brent Scowcroft, the former national security advisor,

wrote an

article in

The Wall

105

Street Journal

on August

15. In

the

STATECRAFT article, entitled

"Don't Attack Saddam," Scowcroft argued that there

was "scant evidence to less to little

incentive to

Saddam

tie

the September

1 1

—our

an attack on Iraq it

at this time,"

would require the

against Iraq,

a virtual

consensus in the world against

and warned that "so long

U.S. to

real target

pursue

as that

sentiment

a virtual go-it-alone strategy

making any military operations correspondingly more

and expensive."

ficult

is

and even

observing that Saddam had

make common cause with Al Qaeda

Scowcroft asserted that "There

persists,

to terrorist organizations,

attacks." Besides

dif-

13

For a variety of reasons the Scowcroft article energized questioning

about the administration's course on

was

a virtual

Iraq. First,

news vacuum, and here was

it

was August, and there

a story: the national security

someone known

advisor to the elder President Bush,

to be very close to

the former president and unlikely to adopt a position that president

would

reject,

was seemingly challenging the course on which the

younger President Bush was launched. Second, the president and visors

had offered

little

seemed inexorably argument

his ad-

public explanation or justification for a path that

war with

to be leading to

Iraq.

Third, Scowcroft's

embrace and yet not be

created a focal point for others to

accused of being soft on fighting terrorism or defending an indefensible figure such as

Saddam Hussein

—

after

all,

Scowcroft had been the

national security advisor to two Republican presidents.

But

was not only those outside the administration who seized on

it

the Scowcroft article.

The

march toward war with

leading

Iraq,

official

who had doubts about

Secretary of State Colin Powell, used

marshal greater support for going through the threat. rights, else,

His argument effectively was,

and access

if

we

believe war

Powell argued that

gain what was necessary

UN.

is

we

the it

to

UN to deal with the Iraqi

will

need

bases, over-flight

going to be necessary;

if

nothing

we could not simply go it alone. If we were to from others in warfare we would, at least, have

to try for a diplomatic solution

the

14

first,

and that argued

for going

through

15

While Bob Woodward reports

that Powell called Scowcroft after the

article

appeared to thank him for providing the secretary "some running

room"

to

know from my own with Scowcroft that he spoke with Powell about their mu-

move on what was now

conversations

his "opportunity,"

106

I

Saddam, George

Bush,

IV.

and the Iraq War

about where the administration was headed on Iraq prior

tual misgivings

and Powell encouraged him to speak

to writing the article,

out.

16

Secre-

tary Powell was trying to steer the president toward the United Nations,

believing this might create an alternative to war by redirecting us

toward an international effort to restore inspectors in

With the president sembly on September

Iraq.

slated to address the United Nations 12, a

General As-

year and a day after the 9/11 attacks, Powell

was hoping to use the speech to focus on Iraq and the need for curity Council resolution. According to

made

the decision to

make

more

a

new

Se-

Bob Woodward, the president

UN

Iraq the focal point of his address to the

the day after the Scowcroft article appeared. In doing

so,

Bush instructed

Condi Rice and his speechwriter Mike Gerson to "tell the UN that it's going to confront this problem or it's going to condemn itself to irrelevance."

17

Vice President Cheney

through the

UN,

may

not have been enthusiastic about going

but he certainly favored the idea of challenging

relevant if the president was going to speak there about Iraq. that the

UN could be

a vehicle for dealing

it

to be

He doubted

with Saddam Hussein, and

feared that gearing ourselves to getting inspectors back into Iraq was potentially dangerous.

As he

said in a speech

the president's instruction to

on August

Mike Gerson on

his

26, ten

days after

UN address, "A return

of inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever of his [Saddam Hussein's] compliance with

great danger that

how

it

UN resolutions. On the contrary, there

would provide

false

is

a

comfort that Saddam was some-

'back in his box.'" And, for the vice president, there was "no doubt

Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, that

and against

us."

Here was

18

a call to action.

The

vice president was not just setting the

stage for the president's challenge to the

UN

or trying to counter the

secretary of state's preference for inspections as the

He

dam.

way

to contain Sad-

was also responding to increased public questioning triggered

by the Scowcroft

article

about the administration's policy toward

Iraq.

No

one from the administration had countered the burgeoning view

that

Saddam was not the prime

by putting the

threat and, in any case, could be handled

UN and inspectors on the case.

107

STATECRAFT The

vice president was mindful of the need to preserve a domestic

base for our actions, including his presumption that

war would be necessary

Even with the president was instrumental

in

to

—

like the president's

remove Saddam Hussein

UN,

slated to go to the

Vice President Cheney

developing a political strategy that focused on get-

ting a congressional resolution authorizing whatever

necessary for dealing with tion.

He wanted

every

Saddam Hussein before

member of Congress

midterm

elections in early

In fact, throughout the

fall, it

means might be

getting a

UN resolu-

to be forced to go

on where they stood on Saddam Hussein and fore the

as a threat.

his

on record

dangerous regime be-

November.

was the domestic strategy that was up-

permost in the minds of the White House. Unlike in 1991, forging

a

domestic, not international, base of support required and received the greatest attention.

A

full-court press with congressional leaders began

the day after Labor Day; the next day, two dozen senators from both parties

were invited to the Pentagon

for briefings

president, the secretary of defense, and

on Iraq with the vice

George Tenet, the director

of Central Intelligence. As one senior administration

White House lobbying campaign with the

official said,

the

Hill included "not-so-subtle

mentions of the regrets experienced by those lawmakers

.

.

.

who

did not

vote for the 1991 'use of force' resolution before the Persian Gulf war."

The domestic

19

strategy was built around getting a congressional reso-

lution authorizing the president to use force to deal with the Iraqi threat,

while the Iraq,

and

UN if

strategy was geared toward getting inspectors back into

Iraq failed to

could be authorized.

The

comply with

all

the requirements, then force

President's speech to the

great deal of activity, with the secretary of state in strike quickly to

ident's call for

The two

UN

New

did catalyze a

York trying

to

develop a consensus on action to follow up on the pres-

showing that the

UN could be relevant.

strategies could easily

have meshed, with broad-based con-

gressional support being a useful lever for

American diplomats

to use

with the Security Council. But the strategies tended to diverge in terms

of their objectives. With Congress, the administration was focused on the use of force to be rid of Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction.

With the UN, the focus necessarily became disarmament, not

regime change or even necessarily the use of force. The difference was significant insofar as the French, the Russians,

108

and others on the Security

— Saddam, George

IV.

Bush,

Council saw the return of inspectors

and the Iraq War " device to produce Iraq's disar-

as a

mament. Secretary Powell's

on September

ings with foreign ministers

consensus for pressure on

announced a clear, culty.

of activity

initial flurry

Iraq.

But when

1

—he held dozen meetUN —cemented a

3 at

Iraq,

the

the

working with Kofi Annan,

readiness to have inspectors return, our efforts to produce

its

unequivocal Security Council resolution quickly ran into

Neither the French nor the Russians were prepared for

worded resolution

that created an automatic trigger

a strongly

on the use of force

demands of a new

the Iraqis were not in compliance with the

diffi-

if

resolution.

Following nearly two months of discussions, Secretary Powell suc-

ceeded

producing

in

unanimous Security Council

a

which mandated unconditional and unfettered access promised "serious consequences"

if

resolution, 1441, for inspectors

The

Iraq failed to comply.

and

"con-

sequences" were, however, understood differently by France and the

United

States.

The

French, as their ambassador to the United Nations

declared in his explanation of his vote on 1441, understood that this resolution created a "two-stage approach," and that noncompliance lead "the Council violations

.

.

.

[to]

meet immediately

[and] France

to assess the seriousness of these

welcomes the

fact that ... all

tomaticity have disappeared from the resolution."

though Powell made

namely

a critical concession to

that the Council

would be convened

rebuffed the inspectors or was

American posture was

shown

that a failure to

would

to

20

elements of au-

By

contrast,

produce the resolution

to discuss

have

what

illegal

to

do

if

weapons

A month

Iraq

—

the

comply meant Saddam Hussein

was once again in "material breach," and that that was sufficient to ger the use of force.

even

trig-

21

prior to the adoption of

UN

Security Council Resolution

1441, the Congress voted to authorize the president to use force "as

he determines to be necessary and appropriate" to defend the nation against "the continuing threat posed by Iraq."

When

it

was clear that

congressional authorization would be forthcoming, a senior White

House

official asserted that

that has to

happen

in

"Once Congress

our system."

22

The

acts, that's final

point was that this

—

is

that's all

what was

going to govern the president's behavior, not the resolution in the Security

Council.

The

administration saw action at the Security Council as

falling in the desirable,

not necessary, category.

109

STATECRAFT When

Security Council Resolution 1441 passed,

now

president:

was hailed by the

it

the world must not, President Bush declared, "lapse into

unproductive debates over whether specific instances of Iraqi noncompliance are serious

... If

Iraq fails to fully comply, the United States and

Saddam Hussein." 23

other nations will disarm

The

president was clear, and the administration's efforts to seek sup-

port for military action, especially as access for our forces,

it

related to over-flight rights and

became more pronounced. At the same

buildup of forces in and around Iraq also became more administration,

comply or

activity

all this

else; for others, it

tial

For the

simply underscored that Saddam had to

—

or the "ambiguity," as

Wolf

Blitzer

in an interview with Secretary Powell shortly after 1441

it

adopted

visible.

signaled an American intent not to give the

new inspection regime a chance. The difference in perception called

time, our

—came back

haunt the administration

to

as it

saw Saddam's

was ini-

response being one of noncompliance. 24 Iraq was given one month to

provide a

full

accounting of

—including

and no one

its

WMD

capabilities

the French and Russians

port was responsive. But France and Russia

and infrastructure,

—believed

felt that

the Iraqi re-

the inspectors had to

be given a chance to go to Iraq and offer their findings.

And

it

was not only the French and Russians; most members of the

Security Council

felt that

UN weapons inspectors in Iraq must be given

the time to complete their work, even "if it hostilities."

25

On January

20, at a Security

means delaying the onset of Council meeting ostensibly

held on terrorism, in Secretary Powell's presence, the French and Ger-

man force.

foreign ministers

Dominique de

came out

strongly against any early resort to

Villepin, the

French foreign minister, who had

specifically asked for the January 20 session to level,

went so

action."

far as to declare,

justifies

at the ministerial

envisioning military

26

From seemingly

driving the train at the Security Council and being

in control of events, the

minority. Blair,

"Nothing

be held

United States looked increasingly to be

Even our most important

who was under

ally,

British

in the

prime minister Tony

increasing domestic pressure not to rush to war,

declared that the weapons inspectors must be given "time and space" to finish their

work, and that the January 27 date for Hans Blix, the chief of

110

Saddam, George

UN inspection team in

the

Bush,

IV.

Iraq, to report to the

regarded in any sense as a deadline."

The American

plan had, in

deadline for decision.

Tony

make matters worse,

Blair

needed

a

The

going to the less,

UN

fact,

Council "shouldn't be

27

been to use the Blix report

made

Blair's opposition

now made

second resolution

rize the use offeree.

and the Iraq War^

clear to President

To

Bush that he

Security Council to actually autho-

at the

fear of those such as Vice President

could become

as the

that impossible.

a trap

Cheney that

was now materializing. Nonethe-

President Bush, appreciating the importance of Blair and his do-

mestic needs, agreed to go for a second resolution. Here, again, however,

French opposition proved particularly troublesome.

The

French, particularly President Chirac and his foreign minister,

Villepin,

were

far

more

active in framing the issue

and lobbying for votes

we were. Chirac produced a trilateral statement with the Russian and German leaders, calling for "the substantial strengthening" of the "human and technical capabilities" of the weapons inspectors in Iraq. 28 program was to have the inspectors do The answer to the Iraqi

than

WMD

their job

and carry out

Russians, and

Iraqi

Germans,

—

disarmament

or, at least for

to see that the inspectors

were given enough

time to do the job and to resort to force only

when

Saddam Hussein would never permit them

do the

to

the French,

it

became

clear that

job.

Coun-

In response to Secretary Powell's presentation to the Security cil

on February

5,

Villepin,

who was

to travel to Africa to persuade key

nonaligned members on the Security Council, declared, "If

proach

fails

and leads us to an impasse, we

will not rule out

including, as a last resort, the use of force

.

.

.

this ap-

any option,

For now, the inspections

regime, favored by Resolution 1441, must be strengthened, since

not been completely explored

some unused space

To be cil

.

.

.

Why

go to war

sure, the administration

Council highlighted

evidence of ongoing Iraqi tion

there

still

it

has

exists

29 in Resolution 1441?"

made an

effort to

and others. Secretary Powell's February

rity

if

Iraq's

5

persuade the Coun-

presentation to the Secu-

continuing deception and presented

WMD programs. Powell and the administra-

were persuasive with what Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

called

ber of

"new Europe," the countries of Eastern Europe, and with

members of

a

num-

"old" Europe: the British, Italians, Spanish, Por-

111

STATECRAFT tuguese, and Danish. But with the exception of the British and Spanish

(and Bulgarians), most of our supporters were not on the Security Council. Soon after the second resolution was introduced, clear that the

American and

British positions

were

and chief

radei,

UN

progress was being

made with

members on

aligned

Mohamed

ElBa-

Blix reporting that at least

some

the Iraqis, efforts to persuade several non-

the Security Council, including Mexico, Chile,

Cameroon, and Guinea, became more to insist

difficult.

These members began

they would support a second resolution only

inspectors

With

in the minority.

the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency,

inspector Hans

became

it

more time and

if it also

if it

gave the

included benchmarks on Iraqi per-

formance or nonperformance.

The

administration was unwilling to go along with such a phased res-

olution, believing that

new

reasons for delay would be found

—and

the

debating of noncompliance would rule out our ability to use force. Even

though we introduced the second resolution, and President Bush even proclaimed cards,"

we

resolution,

one point that he wanted

at

all

members

to

"show

their

did not have the nine (out of fifteen) votes needed to pass a

and therefore chose not to bring our resolution to

a vote.

Unfortunately, having presented a second resolution, our failure on it

created the impression that

of the

UN

had the

legal basis

needed

defied the international try

on March

19,

to launch the

community since

war over the opposition

a

regime that had

1991. In speaking to the coun-

—

States

mercy of an outlaw regime

of mass murder."

war against

this conflict reluctantly

The people of the United the

to

2003, to announce the beginning of war, he explained,

"Our nation enters

at

we were going

Security Council. Nonetheless, President Bush believed he

yet our purpose

and our friends and

allies will

that threatens the peace with

is

sure.

not

live

weapons

30

THE END OF MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS AND THEIR AFTERMATH

The

military

campaign

three weeks. Cobra

II,

to take

Baghdad and oust Saddam Hussein took

the military plan for the campaign,

more on technology, high

depended

mobility, precision-guided weapons,

112

and

in-

Saddam, George W. Bush, and the Iraq War

formation dominance on the battlefield than on massive forces. Bypassing areas and not fully subduing

them

fit

the plan of getting to Baghdad

quickly and forcing a collapse of the regime.

concept of warfare, reflecting what he saw

It

was Secretary Rumsfeld's

as the revolution in military

made much more

For Rumsfeld, technology and surprise

affairs.

He

in this era

than employing large forces.

and Franks

in turn pressed his senior officers,

Tommy

pressed

such

as

sense

Franks,

General David

McKiernan, to reduce the number of forces used, keep their buildup time to

a

minimum, and not count on

forces continuing to flow to Iraq

once Saddam was ousted.

Anthony

Zinni, a

Marine Corps

general, had been the previous head

Command. He developed a war plan for Iraq that provided minimum of 380,000 troops to stabilize the country, minimize

of Central for a

chaos, subdue any remaining opposition, control

all

provinces in the

country, and safeguard the borders. His plans were rejected in favor of a significantly smaller force.

the military,

structure,

its

Rumsfeld had been determined

and

its

approach to war

tary plan for Iraq reflected his thinking.

He

similarly

wanted

fighting,

to transform

and the mili-

31

to transform the concept of

what

to

do

after the

end of major combat operations. In mid-February, one month before the war,

Rumsfeld gave

a

speech entitled "Beyond Nation-Building"; in

it,

how the postwar reconstructions of the 1990s bred a culture of dependency and were, therefore, wrongheaded. The Bush administrahe described

tion

would do things

differently in Iraq, reflecting the minimalist ap-

proach of Afghanistan. Unlike in the Balkans, where U.S. forces were tied

down in

a

long-term commitment,

be "enablers";

we would

limit

we would have

we would

after warfare

—

as in

own future. We would not rebuild or

not create a massive bureaucracy to run a country

Bosnia or Kosovo.

Much like the use of massive force

in military campaigns, the Balkans represented the "old"

about what needed to be done after

As Lawrence Di retired general

"war"

presence and

our presence and assistance and "enable"

the indigenous people to shape their reconstruct;

a smaller

spokesman, told Jay Garner

Rita, Rumsfeld's

Rumsfeld selected

way of thinking

conflict.

to

manage the period

—

the

in Iraq after the

—

the secretary was determined to avoid the mistakes that the State

Department had made

in the Balkans,

113

and we would not be creating

a

STATECRAFT long-term military or reconstruction

would be

this

quickly"

32

effort:

"DoD would be in charge,

totally different than in the past

(De Rita explained

to

Garner and

.

.

.

We

and

would be out very

his team, "All

but twenty-five

33 thousand soldiers will be out by the beginning of September.")

To reduce

our troop level from more than 160,000 troops in April to 25,000 in four

months suggested

a

very rapid withdrawal of our forces.

Rumsfeld's insistence on limiting the

on

a rapid

drawdown

led

Garner to

tell

number of troops

available

General McKiernan, "There was

no doubt we would win the war, but there can be doubt we peace."

34

Bremer

Unfortunately, Garner,

in

May

2003

and

who was

will

win the

replaced by L. Paul "Jerry"

running what became the Coalition

as the civilian

Provisional Authority, proved to be far closer to predicting reality than his boss,

Donald Rumsfeld.

CHANGING OBJECTIVES The

administration's goals in Iraq appeared straightforward.

change was

clear;

Saddam Hussein had

Bush gave instructions for Iraq in

November

to Secretary

to go.

Rumsfeld

From

Regime

the time President

to develop the

war plans

2001, the purpose had been to remove

Saddam

Hussein.

On

number of occasions, including with visiting leaders, the president made the point publicly that Saddam Hussein represented a danger a

to the international

UN

WMD

community, had developed

people and his neighbors

—and

that after 9/11,

in violation of

own we understood that we

Security Council resolutions, and had used

them

against his

could not risk the danger of Saddam's giving such weapons to

terrorists.

We would not let him do that; we would certainly not wait to be hit. The logic of the post-9/1

fore they trine

were

1

world demanded that we remove such dangers be-

inflicted

on

The

president's

new national

security doc-

of "preemption" provided a conceptual rationale for such

As President Bush was sein's

us.

also

a policy.

35

keen to point out, removing Saddam Hus-

regime predated preemption

as

our national security

strategy.

The

policy of the Clinton administration toward Iraq had also been regime

change his

—and

President Bush often noted this as a

way of suggesting that

determination to deal with Saddam was not a departure for Ameri-

can policy

114

Saddam, George W. Bush, and the Iraq War,

However,

in

August 2002,

questions began to be raised about the

march

administration's seeming

go to the

as

to war,

and President Bush decided

UN for an additional resolution, the administration's objective

began to morph into one of disarmament of Iraq. While the fear that rorists

to

might get their hands on

WMD— and

might be the one to give them such capabilities

ter-

Saddam Hussein

that

—was

certainly part of

President Bush's continuing rationale for pressing for action against him, the focus for the United Nations was disarmament and not regime

change.

This created an inevitable tension in terms of what we were saying

and what we would be seeking.

Tim

Russert raised the apparent contra-

Cheney

diction with Vice President

in an interview

president's address to the United Nations

russert:

If

Saddam did

on the eve of the

General Assembly:

the inspectors in and they did have

let

unfettered access, could you have disarmament without a regime

change?

vice president cheney: Boy,

We'd have

to see.

I

that's a

mean, that gets

tough one.

I

don't know.

to be speculative, in terms of

what kind of inspection regime and so

forth.

russert: But what's your goal? Disarmament or regime change?

vice president cheney: The president's made goal of the United States occasions.

With respect

regime change.

is

to the

He

it

comply with

all

on many

United Nations, clearly the

UN has a

Saddam

Hussein's

vested interest in coming to grips with the fact of refusal to

clear that the

said that

those resolutions

.

.

russert: So you don't think you can get disarmament without

a

regime change?

vice president cheney:

I

didn't say that.

objective for the United States

is still

I

said the president's

regime change.

separate set of concerns and priorities with the

We

have a

UN. 36

Russert was to raise the same basic question again with Secretary of State Powell a

month

later

on

his

show:

russert: So he [Saddam Hussein] can save himself,

remain

in

power?

115

in effect,

and

STATECRAFT secretary powell:

All

we

are interested in

weapons of mass destruction. lot better off

with

this resolution is

tive

getting rid of those

regime, but the

weapons of mass destruction, and

working on.

Here Secretary Powell would

is

think the Iraqi people would be a

a different leader, a different

principal offense here are

what

We

that's

37

describing regime change as something that

is

benefit the Iraqi people, but

it is

of eliminating Saddam's weapons

clearly secondary to the objec-

Leaving aside the ob-

capabilities.

vious difference in tone and content between the secretary and the vice president, the

two different objectives had very different implications

in

terms of U.S. action. Regime change by definition required the use of force;

sion

disarmament did

on objectives was

Of course,

not.

The

likely to create confusion

on means

as well.

such confusion could have been avoided had there been

and only

UN-run weapons

if this

destruction would be the ini-

was frustrated by the Iraqis would we then

—which

produce disarmament through the use of external force

sumably meant removing the Saddam Hussein regime tainly appears to be

what Secretary Powell had

as well.

That cer-

much more

in mind.

president appears to have set his sights on goals that went well be-

yond only disarmament and even regime change. Regime change, president's eyes,

In a speech to the war, President

and in the war on terrorism more generally.

American Enterprise

Bush declared that

Institute

one month before the

liberating Iraq

would be part of

broader approach to democratizing the Middle East.

would become

objective was to also

in the

would unleash much more far-reaching transforma-

tions in Iraq, internationally,

said,

pre-

mind.

in

President Bush, however, appears to have had

The

a

disarmament

clear and agreed-upon sequence of steps. For example,

through inspection and tial objective,

Our confu-

objective shaped the means.

a

a

Iraq, the president

democratic model for the region.

The

president's

win the war on terrorism not only by military means but

by implanting democracy

in the heart of the

Middle

East.

When

anger and alienation no longer existed in the Middle East because oppressive regimes were replaced by democratic ones, Jihadists

longer find

it

so easy to recruit terrorists; in this way,

not only would deal with the

would no

removing Saddam

WMD threat but would also change the

balance fundamentally in the Middle East and in the war on terrorism. 38

116

Saddam, George

The

were

goals

end

eration, an

lofty

IV.

Bush,

and the Iraq War

and visionary. Within

to tyranny,

Iraq, there

and the emergence of

moderation, pluralism, and democracy. Outside

regime would mean safe

haven for

a society

Iraq, the

that Iraq was no longer a threat to

terrorists

would be

lib-

based on

removal of the its

would disappear; an object lesson

neighbors; a for Iran

and

even North Korea would be created on the danger of going nuclear and resisting us;

and the emergence of

a

midst of the Arab world would likely

The

the area.

president's optimistic

new model of democracy in the have a domino effect throughout

view of what would be achieved by

regime change even extended to the Israeli-Palestinian

conflict:

on the

eve of the war he told one group that the liberation of Iraq would pro-

duce peace between the

Israelis

and the Palestinians. 39

These were the goals and expectations.

we

Much

later, in

2006, President

Bush began

to explain the difficulties

tives in Iraq

by saying that no military plan survives contact with the en-

emy.

It

would have been

faced in achieving our objec-

had the administration seen the

far better

obstacles in 2003.

OBSTACLES TO ACHIEVING OUR OBJECTIVES The

obstacles the administration faced ranged from the absence of in-

ternational support for

within Iraq

itself.

its

most important objective

Leaving aside what

lem the Bush administration had jective

to

it

might face in

to confront

to the realities

Iraq, the first

was opposition to our ob-

of regime change. There was consensus on forcing Iraq to

UN

prob-

Security Council resolutions and disarming

it

as a

live

up

consequence.

But on the Security Council, very few of the countries were prepared to support regime change.

France and Russia were both against

it,

and France, in particular, was

very energetic in mobilizing others to oppose regime change and the use of force. And, here, the tension in objectives between disarmament and

regime change was bound to make even an attempt

quenced approach problematic. After

all,

at

producing

a se-

there were basically different

mind-sets as to what constituted giving an inspection process a chance.

Our

position was that

Saddam was already

Security Council resolutions, and the justified the

use of force.

first

breach of

sign that he was resisting 1441

The French and 117

in material

fair

Russians

—and most of

the

STATECRAFT members of the Security Council called for in their eyes,

—took

and represented

a

a different view.

Patience was

major problem for the admin-

istration in terms of the time and content of any inspections process.

The ambiguity of

1441 only served to blur these differences and

approach more

a unified

when subsequent

difficult

make

negotiations took

place.

But even

if

the administration had been prepared to be

more

patient,

there was an additional problem with a sequenced approach: while

France was willing to support the use of force for purposes of disarma-

ment if it became unmistakable

that inspections could never work,

it

did

not necessarily follow that such a use of force automatically meant

regime change. In force

much

fact,

though President Chirac was not convinced that

would ever prove necessary, even as in 1991, force

disarm Iraq of

itself.

In other words,

it

still

believed that,

WMD and not neces-

could be used against the

regime

sarily against the

he

if it did,

was possible to forcibly

WMD without having to change the regime, which could

be very messy and create untold consequences. 40

Two

factors also

compounded our

readiness to

work the

UN process.

President Bush was mindful of the political difficulties his father had faced,

and was determined not to repeat them. Once he realized there

might be

a

domestic problem in acting against

Iraq, his administration fo-

cused a great deal of energy and effort on mobilizing domestic support for

That

military action.

the Congress

first

sought to get a to support

is

why his approach

in the fall of 2002

was geared to

and to the Security Council second. Whereas

his father

UN Security Council resolution to create a domestic base

our use of force, George

sional resolution

and saw

it

as the

W Bush worried

first

base for action at the

about a congres-

UN. But generat-

ing congressional authorization to use force against Iraq before achieving a Security

Council resolution on inspections raised red

on what the

real

greater pressure

flags at the

UN

purpose of that force was. While certainly generating

on the Security Council

to

produce

a resolution

on

foster-

ing disarmament through inspections, congressional authorization also

produced even greater determination among members of the Security Council to give inspections a chance and not create

Our buildup of forces, however, a

drawn-out process of inspections

left

us with

—or even

118

a

a

rush to war.

little

interest in having

second resolution that

Saddam, George

IV.

Bush,

and the Iraq War

might give Saddam more time and create benchmarks on performance for the Security Council.

Even

if

the forces involved were

much

than in 1991 or than General Zinni had envisioned, they

smaller

would

still

number more than 150,000 and the administration was loath to leave them in the area for an extended period of time. (Ironically, in 1990, we had nearly 250,000 troops in the Gulf region by the end of October, but did not go to war until January 16; a larger presence created far less pressure in the minds of administration leaders to use the force, lest

we

not

be able to sustain that presence.)

To be

sure, there

were other force-related

war plan counted on

obstacles.

Tommy Franks's

northern front, and that required being able to

a

muster an invasion force from Turkey. But the newly elected govern-

by the Muslim party

ment

there, led

Party

—was quick

to join the

olution authorizing force

—

chorus that

w as T

the Justice and

a

absolutely essential.

minister, Yasar Yakis, not only

Development

second Security Council res-

The Turkish

emphasized that such

foreign

a resolution

necessary from Turkey's standpoint, but also called attention to

was

more

a

fundamental problem of public opposition to Turkey's playing the role envisioned for

American

it:

"If

we

are talking about the extensive presence of

forces in Turkey,

ish public opinion. It

we have

may be

difficulty in explaining this to

difficult to see

Turk-

thousands of American

forces being transported through the Turkish territory into Iraq or being

somewhere

stationed or deployed strikes in Iraq."

in

Turkey and then carrying out

41

In addition to the international obstacles

course, the sectarian realities

mented the

T

Iraq

Ba'ath regime. Shi'as

brutality.

who depended on and

benefited from his his rule and,

Kurds faced Saddam's deliberate Arabization of areas that in the city

consequences flowed from Saddam's sectarian power, would

Shi'a underclass. feel that

and probably

had been subjected to even greater deprivation

had traditionally been Kurdish, especially

lost

faced, there were, of

Saddam's rule had ce-

became more of an underclass during

after the 1991 uprising,

dam

we

itself.

historical advantages for the Sunnis in Iraq,

generated one million people

and

w ithin

The

resist losing their

Shi'as,

who were

of Kirkuk. Several

policies: Sunnis, if

dominance

the numerical majority, would

they were finally entitled to receive their due within Iraq.

119

Sad-

to a traditionally

And

STATECRAFT the Kurds,

omy

who had enjoyed

a

protected status of nearly complete auton-

would not simply

since the creation of the northern zone in 1991,

retain a strong interest in preserving their quasi-independent status

from the

rest

Two

last

be noted.

model

of Iraq, but would also be determined to undo the Arabiza-

who had been

Kirkuk and repatriate the Kurds

tion of

expelled.

obstacles to achieving the administration's objectives should

First,

while the administration sought to make postwar Iraq a

for the rest of the region, this

were certain

emerge

to

was bound to face problems. Shi'as

as the leaders

of post-Saddam Iraq, given their

strong numerical majority, and most of the Arab world

is

Sunni. Wouldn't

others in the region find this a source of threat and not attraction? If so,

that

Making

would undercut the

and appeal of Iraq

credibility

Iraq nonsectarian and an

economic success would,

as a

model.

thus, be an

imperative.

However, success in Iraq

draw on

also

depended on the administration's being

all its

resources in a coherent, systematic fashion. Unfor-

tunately, here there

was another problem. The administration was

able to

plagued by poisonous relations that pitted the Defense Department and the vice president's office against the State Department and the CIA.

The former saw that his ouster latter

the great evil of

would have

tended to see Iraq

in

Saddam Hussein and

a transformative

terms of

divisive,

its

believed deeply

impact on the region. The "Balkan" character, re-

tained great skepticism about the region's potential socially and culturally for a result.

democratic change, and favored stability over transformation

Such an

that permitted a

with.

analytical divide

might have fostered

as

a creative tension

wider variety of problems to be anticipated and dealt

But that assumed an

ability to take

each other's concerns seriously

and respond to them. Instead, what emerged in the administration was

who were on

the perception that those

the other side of the ideological

divide were not to be trusted. Their concerns were not to be taken seriously, their motivations

were suspect, and therefore the questions or

problems they raised shouldn't be considered.

The Pentagon forbade officials from CIA ran before the war on what would

This reached absurd lengths: taking part in a simulation the

happen

in Iraq

when Saddam

Hussein's regime

fell

—

believing that the

problems that would surface would give credibility to those who argued against going to

war in the

first

place.

42

120

In addition,

Tom Warrick, who ran

Wat

Saddam, George W. Bush, and the Iraq

the Future of Iraq Project at the State Department, was fluent in Arabic,

and had great familiarity with

Iraq,

was kept off of Jay Garner's team

notwithstanding Garner's strong desire to have him

—because he was op-

posed by Secretary Rumsfeld and the vice president's

though

a

And, even

office.

consortium of think tanks offered the administration a panel of

experts to provide facts and options for postwar planning

Security Advisor Rice told them, "this

was vetoed because

it

is

just

—and National —

what we need"

the effort

implied "nation-building," and that was an unac-

ceptable doctrine in the White

House and the Defense Department. 43

Divisions within the administration were simply never resolved. attitudes differed fundamentally

the war and

manage

on what was needed both

to

The

conduct

Iraq in the aftermath of Saddam's demise. Secretary

Powell, in particular, raised concerns about insufficient troop size and

with the postwar planning, but his concerns were not ad-

difficulties

dressed. In the secretary's farewell meeting with President Bush, he told

the president that the national security decision-making process

meaning, principally, the

MEANS USED The

NSC process—was broken. 44

TO

OVERCOME THE OBSTACLES

administration certainly recognized

sought to deal with them. Secretary Powell rity

made an

obstacles and

effort at the

Secu-

Council to forge an international consensus on objectives.

worked hard its

some of the

favor.

12

—

1

a

50 phone

the day of President Bush's speech at the

10, the day the resolution was adopted.

ings at the capitals,

produce Resolution 1441 and did deliver

Along the way, he made an estimated

September

vember

to

He had

He

15-0 vote in

calls

between

UN—and No-

countless meet-

UN in New York and Washington. While he did not travel to

he worked hard to produce the resolution, and succeeded.

His success, however, did not bridge the differences on objectives;

it

simply masked them. Perhaps the secretary believed that the resolution

would create

a

new

reality. If so,

he was bound to be disappointed. The

French and the Russians interpreted resolution

—namely,

his

that the Council

key concession to produce the

must be reconvened

—

sion if Iraq were found to be in noncompliance

there could be no automatic resort to force.

They

as

for a discus-

mandating that

felt

confident that

they were raising obstacles to the use of force, while the secretary be-

121

STATECRAFT lieved that he was creating a path that

force because

done

Saddam would comply or

secretary's

means

because he had not

it

UN

judgment that the

route provided him his only

to try to reconcile the difference in objectives

standable. However, the only if

justify

for

so.

The real

would either obviate the need

UN path could have succeeded

way the

the inspectors had immediately reported that

Given Saddam's desire

changed his behavior. about his

was under-

Saddam Hussein had

to preserve ambiguity

WMD for deterrence purposes against Iran and for coercive

purposes domestically,

What about

the

that, unfortunately,

means used

achieving a second resolution

was never in the cards. second resolution? After

to get a

would have created

backed basis on which to use force against that a second resolution was essential,

Iraq.

a Security

Prime Minister

all,

CouncilBlair felt

and even though the administra-

tion believed 1441 to be sufficient authorization

and said so publicly,

President Bush understood his partner's needs, and instructed that

make

the public effort to secure a second resolution.

technique used for the

made numerous

first

calls to his

resolution was applied.

UN

phoned those most

recalcitrant,

in

basic

The secretary of state

New

York. In addition, the president tele-

such

as

Presidents Putin and Chirac.

—

members of the Security Council and the intermore generally Secretary Powell, who was considered

try to persuade

national public

The same

we

counterparts and also had meetings in Wash-

ington and at the

To

is

—

the most credible of administration leaders on the world stage, also

made

a detailed, televised presentation before the

Council, offering

evidence that Saddam Hussein was continuing to develop his

programs and obstructing the work of the inspectors

WMD

in defiance

of

Resolution 1441. 45

The

secretary and his key aides also discussed in

New York, or on the

phone, different ways to accommodate the concerns of countries such

Mexico and Chile enough votes

—each of whom,

if

persuaded, might have swung

to cross the threshold of having at least nine

members supporting

the resolution.

as

Had

that

been the

case,

Council

then either

France or Russia would have had to veto the resolution, and the French strategy, according to their

ambassador to the UN, was to block the

olution, not necessarily to veto

it.

122

res-

Saddam, George

made

Additional efforts were ministration to

won

IV.

Bush,

and the Iraq War

to gain international support; the ad-

the support of most of the Eastern European countries

back military action in Iraq and to garner both limited

some

logistic

and

in

cases small combatant force contributions to the effort. Statements

of support were also orchestrated to show that the United States did 46 have international backing for going to war.

The

administration also used offers of financial assistance to try to

win support from those whose involvement was seen

as critical. In the

case of Turkey, the administration, trying to persuade the Turkish gov-

ernment

to

permit American forces to operate from and through the

country, offered a sizable package of potential assistance: three billion dollars in aid, three billion dollars in financing,

one

billion dollars in free oil,

and promises to secure

and access for Turkish companies to re-

47 construction contracts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. With the Russians,

there were also hints of inducements, at least with regard to Russian oil

companies not losing out on the existing contracts they had Iraqi oil fields

ond

—assuming, of

resolution.

And

to develop

course, the Russians played ball on the sec-

with Chile, there was the suggestion that a Free

Trade Agreement could be reached quickly.

Whether on trying

to forge an international consensus

on objectives

or to produce support or important backing of others, the administration

made an

effort politically

not acting alone.

The

and economically to demonstrate that

it

was

secretary of state worked the phones and the envi-

rons of the Security Council in

New York. The deputy secretary of de-

fense was sent to Turkey to win Turkish support, and the undersecretary

of state for political

affairs

went

to

Moscow and

Paris to gain Russian

and French acquiescence. Though the president and the secretary took

one

trip to Russia, as

efforts

we

will see in discussing

and the means employed

why

failed, the level

the administration's

of the effort tended to

be too low, lacked intensity, and had to overcome other policies that soured the atmosphere.

How did the

administration deal with the obstacles related to the in-

ternal realities in Iraq

and the consequences of warfare?

deal with contingencies that briefing at the

it

found most

White House on February

likely

It

planned to

and dangerous. In

24, 2003, less

a

than a month be-

fore the war, the interagency preparations for providing "humanitarian

123

STATECRAFT support in Iraq in the event of any military action" were outlined.

The

displacement of people, a breakdown in the distribution of food, and the destruction of oil wells and infrastructure were uppermost in the concerns. plies

was

The need

list

of

to ensure the quick provision of humanitarian sup-

a clear priority.

Two

guiding principles for shaping our re-

sponse to these contingencies were

(1) to rely

primarily on civilian relief

48 agencies, and (2) to ensure effective civil-military coordination.

Representatives of several governmental agencies explained the nature of the planning to deal with the expected contingencies.

unmistakably clear

is

49

What

is

that planning for contingencies was geared toward

the disruptive humanitarian consequences of the war. Perfectly sensible

but not particularly related to sectarian realities and the consequences

of the collapse of the regime and the

To be

sure, the administration

vacuum

that

might result from

was mindful of minimizing the

impact of the war and the disruption of services, and

tended to see

it

strategy as cutting off the head of the snake but leaving the

In the words of Elliott

—

February 24

Abrams

the displacement and the services." a

50

—

damage

The assumption was

new Iraq could

would be designed

to the infrastructure

that with

rapidly emerge, provided

infrastructure and the Iraqis

had

body

the lead briefer at the White

the military campaign

Saddam and

we

that.

human

to

its

intact.

House on "minimize

and disruption of his cronies gone,

did limited

damage

to the

their oil intact to finance their recovery

and reconstruction. It

was not unreasonable to worry about the contingencies that the ad-

ministration considered and to develop the is

means

to deal with them. It

interesting, however, that destruction of oil wells

and displaced persons

reflect contingencies

when Saddam

Kuwaiti

set the

oil fields

on

and refugee flows

seen in the 1991 Gulf War, fire

and triggered

a massive

Kurdish refugee problem. While generals are often accused of preparing to fight the last war, a different

it

appears that Secretary Rumsfeld planned to fight

war of "shock and awe," with much smaller

pared for the contingencies of the

forces,

but pre-

last war.

The fact that Saddam had set Kuwait's oil fields on fire but not his own was a distinction considered not to be important. The assumption was that if Saddam was going down he would bring everything down with him. The problem was that Saddam thought he would survive, and he wasn't going to destroy the financial source of

124

his power. Similarly,

Saddam, George W. Bush, and the Iraq War

who were going

to

be the refugees of 2003? They would not be the

Kurds, because they remained protected. Displaced people from fighting

could certainly be created, but massive refugee flows were unlikely, particularly given the plan for the war,

Baghdad and bypass areas without

And

here

we

which was

fully

move

to

rapidly toward

subduing them.

see the gap in military and civilian planning. Notwith-

standing the claim that there would be close civil-military coordination

on

relief,

made

the military plan

that difficult, at least in the early going.

We would be bypassing areas, not acting to control them. Relief agencies would not be able tate the entry

and other areas throughout southern

to get into Basra

Iraq because the military

aim was

to get to

Baghdad

and security of those providing

There were certainly other not be given to or

fall

our forces

relief in areas

had already gone through on the way to the north. inconsistencies:

poses of the war was to deal with Iraq's

quickly, not facili-

51

one of the avowed pur-

WMD and ensure that they could

into the hands of terrorists. Yet the shock and

plan did not provide for the forces necessary to find and control sites ists

or to control the borders in a

from either going to such

way

sites

that

would have prevented

awe

WMD terror-

or smuggling what they acquired out

of the country.

Perhaps the reason

this inconsistency did

minds of the administration planners getting rid of Saddam.

everything would

sumption, and

it

Get

is

that the overriding objective was

of Saddam, produce regime change, and

rid

fall into place, not fall apart.

was based on

with assessments based on

That was the

is

and not on

faith. If

the intelligence failure on able to display the

we

must

start

are to under-

the starting point.

UNDERSTANDING THE FAILURES The greatest single failure in

critical as-

a flawed assessment. Statecraft

reality,

stand the failures in Iraq, this

not figure highly in the

Iraq

is

IN

IRAQ

related to the assessments. Certainly

WMD created a major problem; had we been

WMD to the world, the region, and the Iraqi public,

there would have been far greater acceptance of the legitimacy and im-

portance of the U.S. mission. With displays of truly awful biological toxins

and weapons, who would have challenged the need or the merits of

the mission? President Bush was sensitive to

125

this,

wanting there to be

STATECRAFT camera crews with forces who would seize the

what we were uncovering Ironically,

however,

in Iraq.

WMD to show the world

52

we were lucky

that there turned out to be

WMD, because we were so ill-equipped to

control

all

the possible sites

53 and to prevent terrorists from getting their hands on them.

again,

we

see flawed planning and flawed assessments.

we would be greeted

the assessment that

no

It is

as liberators

And

here,

not just that

proved to be

wrong; we also failed to anticipate the chaos, the looting, and the complete

breakdown of law and

Each of these our task in

Iraq.

struction vastly

order.

had

latter events

The

chaos and the looting

more

was twelve billion

difficult.

One

cost of repair, the materials lost

American

ther vitiated

of the revenues Iraq was pro-

and destroyed greatly complicated the

and reconstituting

oil

all,

in a

like

oxygen and breathed by everyone,

how we could remove

the seemingly all-powerful and un-

is

touchable Saddam Hussein in three weeks and yet looting or get the electricity resumed?

want to occupy

Was

production, and fur-

credibility with the Iraqi people. After

region in which conspiracy Iraqis asked

the challenge of recon-

year after the war. 54 Quite apart from the

first

task of providing electricity

made

estimate of the cost of the looting

dollars, the equivalent

jected to generate in the

impact on the nature of

a devastating

We

we could not prevent to; we must

must not want

Iraq.

looting something that was hard to imagine or prepare for? No,

outside humanitarian groups that

warned of it.

Similarly, in the State

there were also warnings of it.

met with administration

officials

Department's Future of Iraq Project,

And whenjalal

Talabani, today the pres-

came with other Iraqi opposition leaders to meet with Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in August 2002, ident of Iraq,

he called attention to the danger of looting, observing that there were

many poor people

in

would take the law

into their

Baghdad, and with no authority in Baghdad, they

own

hands. 55

Moreover, there were those both within the administration and outside

who were

focused on the need to establish law and order quickly.

One

official in

the Justice

Department proposed

a

plan that called for

fwQ thousand international police advisors to be rushed to "Iraq to

fill

the

law enforcement vacuum after the collapse of Saddam's government." 56

Robert Perito of the United States Institute for Peace briefed the De-

126

Saddam, George W. Bush, and the Iraq War fense Policy Board on February 28, 2003, only weeks before the war, calling for a civilian constabulary to keep order, that the United States

would not be able

meet the needs of providing law and

"to rely

order,

and

on

board

telling the

local authorities" to

and that "prior experience

indicates the regular Iraqi police will be unavailable, intimidated or un-

prepared to act

postwar environment." 57

in the chaotic

But such warnings and proposals flew tion's

image of what would happen

lems were seen

as largely

in the face

in Iraq after

of the administra-

Saddam

fell.

Our prob-

humanitarian; without Saddam, Iraqis would

no longer be oppressed and could assume their

responsibilities

impoverished and inhibited by a brutal dictator and

his

no longer

corrupt

elite.

Looting, disorder, lack of security, and insurgency were not part of the administration's assessment or planning.

insurgency,

its

While the CIA did not warn of

National Intelligence Council did warn that the "building

of an Iraqi democracy would be a long,

difficult,

and probably turbulent

process, with potential for backsliding into Iraq's tradition of authoritar-

ianism."

58

After generations of being oppressed,

it

would not be easy

to

share power. In the world of division and distrust in the administration, such

warnings were interpreted

as

an indication of opposing the enterprise of

who were

liberating Iraq

and bringing

the policy, and

who were convinced of what would be

it

democracy. For those

driving

achieved in Iraq,

there was every reason not only to dismiss the doubters as

wrongheaded

but also to dismiss and ignore the problems they raised. Secretary feld

might speak of planning, but such planning was limited, came

the process, and gave short shrift to the very problems that

we were in Iraq. To make matters worse, once we were in

Rumslate in

would plague

us once

denial of what was happening

combat operations, the

Iraq, there

was

a

continuing

on the ground. During the phase of major

attacks of fedayeen

Saddam were not seen

as a

precursor of an insurgency that required dealing decisively with these

demanded they not be allowed to melt away. Afterward, Secretary Rumsfeld denied that we were facing a guerrilla war, refused even to use the word insurgents, and continued to refer to violent inciforces and that

dents as being the work of dead-enders who, by implication, could not

amount

to

much.

Though an insurgency should have been 127

anticipated, and was not

by

STATECRAFT the administration policy makers, there were those certainty.

finding

—

dominance

tus of

times

They saw Sunnis in Iraq

—and they suggested

it

who

foresaw

it

as a

accept losing their sta-

difficult to

they had enjoyed since Ottoman

a status

that rather than submit to the Shi'a,

whom

they saw as an underclass, the remnants of the regime would find sanctuary in the tribal areas of the Sunni triangle and fight an insurgency

from there. 39

Had

such warnings been heeded, the administration would

have understood not only that

it

needed more

forces, especially to pacify

Anbar province (an area where the absence offerees made insurgency to take root), but also that

becoming the symbol of occupation symbol, the insurgency was bound to Perhaps,

if

we had

to avoid

it

easy for the

any possibility of

Once we became such become far more sustainable. in Iraq.

the administration had seen that

it

would be facing an

a

in-

surgency and needed to avoid the insurgents' acquiring legitimacy and sustainability,

would have understood the importance of having

it

backing for the war.

We did not need the Security Council backing to re-

move Saddam, but we

certainly

needed

it

afterward.

It

was essential that

the United States not be the administrator of Iraq after

be seen

an occupier.

as

We

needed

a

UN

But

vision

this

Saddam

lest

we

administrator or an interna-

tional administrator (such as Carl Bildt), but not an trator.

UN

American adminis-

was our victory and we, not others who did not share our

—whether

at

the

UN or in the

State

Department

—would shape

the post-Saddam Iraq.

We toward

did not foresee an insurgency; a

we foresaw

model democracy, and we would be

Ba'athify the system and

its

we would disband

movement

a rapid

enablers.

We would de-

—

the military

strategic

blunders on par with the decision to have an American administrator

Our assessments were The first task of statecraft is to have objectives that are clear and not confused. They can be ambitious, but they must fit the world as it is, not as we wish it might be;

guide post-Saddam Iraq to the promised land.

shaped by an ideology, not by the

it

realities

of Iraq.

takes well-grounded assessments to refine objectives and shape

so they

fit

them

reality.

Clearly the Bush administration failed in the Unfortunately, jective in a

it

way

also failed in the

first

task of statecraft.

second task of statecraft: frame the ob-

that gets others to accept

128

its

legitimacy. Colin Powell's

Saddam, George effort to

point.

reframe the objective

might even have been

It

Bush,

IV.

"disarmament" was successful to

as

successful in

—

disarmament and regime change if

and the Iraq War^ a

overcoming the gap between

the administration's real objective

Powell could have persuaded his boss and his colleagues to give the

inspection process enough time to

make

appear credible to others

it

on the Security Council, especially swing votes such as Mexico and Chile. In such circumstances, he might have been able to produce a sec-

ond resolution

at the

UN that would

still

have

won backing

for the use

of force.

But the failure on the second resolution, no doubt partly the result of the context in which the Bush administration was not willing to allow

more time

for the inspection process, also resulted

be described

as a failure

on the

diplomacy The diplomatic tremely limited. intensity of the

from what can only

third task of statecraft: effective use of

made by

effort

the administration was ex-

Where was the high-level attention? Where was the effort? Where was the constant working of issues and

readiness to preempt problems or to reassure at critical

Where was capitals to

show our concern

them an explanation with This

is

moments?

the travel by the most senior officials to the critical foreign

their publics?

not to say there was no

ber of phone

calls

needs of others and give

for the political

effort,

by the president, and

numwho made

but rather that a limited a secretary

of state

only one trip to Russia and China, are simply not sufficient in circumstances

where we have

to convince others of

what we are seeking

to do.

The higher our stakes, the greater our effort should be. However, in this case, as we raised our stakes to get ready for the use of force, and such use became even more controversial, our effort varied little. Certainly, Secretary Powell did not travel or even match the number of phone calls he made in advance of gaining support for Resolution 1441. Perhaps he felt that

such efforts could not pay

But with Turkey so

critical to

off.

our having

possible that the secretary of state

a

would not

northern front, visit that

how

is it

country? True,

the deputy secretary of defense went and, true, the incoming Turkish

leader was invited to the White

House

and, true as well, a very signifi-

cant package of assistance was offered. But the vote in the Turkish par-

liament went

down by

3

votes out of 514 cast.

129

Had

a

major public effort

STATECRAFT in

Turkey been made by the United

showing

States,

sensitivity to

Turk-

ish concerns, demonstrating publicly (not only privately) our respon-

siveness to Turkish

economic needs, giving interviews

electronic and print media,

Maybe

the

in

still

it

much more

reaching out

out.

to the

However, when

weak diplomatic

arguable that raising the profile of what

at least

Turkey

have gone down?

Turkey would have ruled

lose in parliament with a relatively

you barely is

mood

would the vote

in

effort, it

we were doing and

visibly to the Turkish public

—and thereby

strengthening the hand of those Turkish leaders arguing for responsiveness

—might

well have

made

the difference.

To prove the point,

contrast

the effort of the Bush 43 administration with that of the Bush 41 administration in the first

Gulf War. In the

made

Secretary Baker

six

months leading up

Turkish prime minister Ozal nearly sixty times

came

to the war,

three trips himself to Turkey; the president called

part of the public

domain

—phone

in Turkey, so that

calls that

be-

Ozal could speak

credibly about his talks with his "friend" President Bush. Acting in this

way with an

being responsive, even on those

ally builds their stake in

sues that are difficult, and in 2002-2003, fort that either

helped produce

raised the costs to the

Of course,

a

we simply

new dynamic

Turks of turning us down.

did not

make an

is-

ef-

within Turkey or even 60

the limited diplomacy cost us not only with Turkey. Sec-

retary Powell seems to have believed that visits to capitals couldn't ac-

complish

much more

than meeting

with his counterparts. Phone

ready

a

calls

at the

have

UN or talking on the phone especially if there

utility,

is al-

strong personal relationship. But face-to-face meetings with

counterparts will always be critical in any negotiating process. Face to face,

one can read the body language

to face, there

phone

it is

more time

come to

or

do

is

more opportunity

to

to explore the nature of differences

manage them; and

face to face, there

real strategizing: anticipating

come

may be

a

find

more

ways to over-

natural tendency

need

to

be shored up, and

helpful in persuading recalcitrant

along.

While meetings calls,

else

is

and

emerging problems, determining

in a possible coalition will

comparing notes on who parties to

persuade or dissuade; over the

always easier to say no. Face to face, there always seems to be

where someone

phone

as well as the verbal responses; face

in

New York could have overcome the limitations of

they were bound to have some disadvantages. Almost by

130

Saddam, George W. Bush, and the Iraq War

number of meetings with

definition, the

certain to limit the time for each.

different foreign ministers

Of course,

there

is

is

great value in hav-

ing multilateral settings for meetings, because coordination can take place far

more

easily. It

was not wrong for Secretary Powell to see the

UN. But such meetings could

utility of operating at the

not take the

place of going to capitals, where time, outreach, and context would have

more opportunity

created

to achieve

our desired end.

Unforrunately, the administration's statecraft failings were not lim-

confused objectives, disastrous assessments, misguided planning,

ited to

weak diplomacy, and poor communication and framing of the Perhaps the

was in

its

insisted

least

understandable failing of

approach to the second resolution

on the need

Blair thought

for a

a

application of statecraft

at the

second resolution, but

he would be better off with

trying to produce

its

issues.

UN. True, Tony

it is

Blair

hard to imagine that

very visible public failure in

it.

Contrast the administration's approach with Secretary of State James Baker's effort to

produce the

"all

necessary means" resolution in 1990.

Baker believed the resolution was necessary and yet was opposed in

this

by Prime Minister Thatcher and then secretary of defense Cheney both of

whom

argued that we had the necessary legal basis for war

ready and that we would undercut our position politically such

a resolution

and

failed.

al-

we went for

Baker responded that he would not go for

the resolution in public unless he

duce

if

knew without question he could pro-

it.

Baker explored the issue with the other members of the Security

Council in certain he

private,

had the

determined not to go public until or unless he was

—and

done the same

outcome

in

backing for

Blair

would certainly have been better off with an

which we were not going a

new

to

statecraft effectively

and likelihood of

difficult.

However,

after

having failed to win

how not to do statecraft. employed have made for a different situamodel

tion with far better prospects in Iraq? reality

war

UN resolution giving us the authority to do so.

In the end, the Iraq case stands as a

Could

Bush administration should have

votes. In 2003, the

a

vacuum

I

after

a realistic assessment

for

believe

so.

Given the sectarian

Saddam, Iraq was bound of what

we were

getting into, a

military plan that covered the full array of missions, a Baker-type

agement of the

UN Security Council, 131

to be

man-

and an international, rather than

STATECRAFT American, administration of Iraq, would have avoided

we made. The insurgency didn't have to And bolstering an effective and indigenous

many of the

mis-

on roots the way

takes

take

has.

Iraqi administration that

it

did not rely on exiles would have diminished the sectarian divide and

weakened Iranian

influence. Ultimately, statecraft

done well never guar-

antees success but certainly creates the best chance for initely

would have been true

in Iraq.

132

it

—and

that def-

6.

LESSONS OF STATECRAFT FOR TODAY

Several lessons

emerge from

Gulf War, and Iraq

a

review of the

cases. In the

cases, the objectives

German

German unification,

unification and the

were shaped clearly and

Bosnia,

Gulf War

administration leaders believed the stakes were very high and they

dated an intensive effort that they often curity bureaucracy

and the

—

The

at the highest levels.

led. In addition,

man-

the national se-

the State Department, the Defense Department,

NSC —worked in harmony. summer of

In Bosnia, this was generally not the case until the

1995.

Prior to that time, the objectives were clear in terms of our wanting to

shape the outcome, end Serb aggression, stop ethnic cleansing, and bring the war to a conclusion. But certainly in the

first

two years of the Clin-

ton administration, there was no consensus on the stakes, and the administration

was internally divided. As

a result, there

between objectives and means. This changed

when

was

in the

a

very clear gap

summer of

the stakes were suddenly seen as very great and the

1995,

means em-

ployed reflected that understanding.

Once

mon

that point was reached, statecraft in Bosnia

with the statecraft conducted on

Gulf War.

German

had much

in

com-

unification and the

In these cases, the objective, stakes, and

means were

first

clearly

harmonized. Not surprisingly, the national security apparatus was generally unified jective.

and the administrations were fixated on achieving the ob-

The diplomacy was

intensive and continuous, and there was an

133

— STATECRAFT ongoing and accurate assessment of the environment, the openings, the problems, the sources of leverage, and the role and effectiveness of potential partners. Finally, there

was deep presidential interest and effec-

tive follow-through.

In the case of

German

Gulf War, and Bosnia from

unification, the

August 1995, one sees policy not by slogan but by determined

Nothing

to

is left

action.

chance or to hopeful assumptions. The case of Iraq

and the confusion of objectives there leads

reflects wishful thinking,

confusion of means.

The

divisions within the administration are so poi-

sonous that they make reality-based assessment impossible. Those

know

to

who

the most about the realities on the ground in Iraq are relegated

to irrelevance

purposes.

The

because of their perceived opposition to the war and military's preferences for force size

its

and requirements

especially for creating law and order, controlling the borders, and sub-

duing the area most likely to give

by the secretary of defense. fare

is

He

rise to

an insurgency

—

are rejected

believes the military's mind-set

on war-

outdated in an era of mobility, precision weapons, and the force-

multiplying effects of intelligence and information technologies.

Planning for postwar reconstruction

is

given the responsibility for implementing

not taken seriously by those it.

Small wonder that with

weak planning, there was weak follow-through. That, unfortunately, has been

a

hallmark of the George W. Bush administration. Iraq in foreign

policy and Katrina in domestic policy are the poster children of an ad-

when

it

comes

done well requires both.

It

requires administrations not at

ministration that too often

fails

to planning

and follow-

through. Statecraft

war with themselves.

It

requires effective assessments and accountabil-

ity,

with someone taking the lead and acting or ensuring that things are

not

left to

chance. In the cases of German unification, the

and Bosnia beginning in the summer of 1995, we saw

ments

in action.

There

the other two cases.

consumed by

one factor that separates Bosnia

is

The very apex of the Clinton

Bosnia, the

To be

Gulf War,

of those elein 1995

from

administration was not

way the apex of the Bush 41 administration was

completely preoccupied and absorbed in dealing with tion and the

first

all

German

unifica-

Gulf War.

sure, Secretary

Christopher played

134

a pivotal role at certain

Lessons of Statecraft for Today

strategic

moments, especially

in

New

York and

at

Dayton, where

his

interventions were decisive. But his involvement was episodic, not per-

The same

petual.

certainly true of President Clinton. Episodic in-

is

of interest

—

from

volvement did not signal

his lack

prevent him from making

critical strategic decisions,

to

is

far

Nor

it.

did

one of which was

empower Richard Holbrooke and his team to do the job. And that is the point. The continuous, intensive effort made

in

Bosnia

carried out by a level below the president and secretary of state.

such,

showcases a different model of statecraft from the

it

and Gulf War cases insofar

fication

team

way

that runs the policy in a

as

it

employs

German

As

uni-

a small interagency

that certainly requires presidential

and secretarial involvement but does not demand nearly ident's

it

all

of the pres-

and secretary's time and attention.

Holbrooke had access

needed

it,

and had the

to the secretary of state

whenever he wanted or

backing for what he was doing.

latter's

Of course,

he had access to the national security advisor whenever necessary, but their relationship was complicated.

Don

serving on the National Security Council

Kerrick, a brigadier general staff,

was on Holbrooke's team

and he kept National Security Advisor Lake informed but also on board

—

getting

him

to

back what the team was doing. The other

same

bers of the team played the cratic players.

Wesley Clark,

mem-

role with the other essential bureau-

a three-star general, represented the Joint

Chiefs of Staff and kept the chairman apprised of what was going on and

what the team needed

to succeed

—including keeping up

the

bombing

when most of the allies (and our own military) were second-guessing it. James Pardew, who represented the secretary of defense, did the same, maintaining William Perry's support for what the team needed.

Without visions that

this

team functioning

hampered and

at

in this

way the same bureaucratic

di-

times paralyzed the policy from 1993 to

1995 would have continued. Instead, the team, under Holbrooke's leadership, thrashed out

their

home

what needed

agencies to back them.

to be

done on the road, and then got

The

value of having checks and bal-

ances was preserved because the team itself debated every issue; they

preserved a group dynamic but never think"

—where other

fell

victim to a dangerous "group

points of view are discredited and ignored, as was

the case with the Iraq war of 2003.

135

STATECRAFT One

and

trust

who

make

additional factor helped to active support of key

this

also played an essential role in

making the decision-making process

work. Strobe Talbott, the deputy secretary, president and to tell

Tony

Lake, would often

him when he would need

to

sure the process did not

Given ers in state

this

Tom

to

also frequently acted to

make

fall apart.

active intervention of leading play-

back the team, the president and the secretary of

Gulf War. In those

first

They

else.

Would

it

did not have

German

way they were in

cases, their internal discus-

and phone

sions and high-level meetings, their travels

time for anything

to

Donilon, the secretary of state's

to be the central players in this process the

tle

the case for Holbrooke or

played their roles and contributed to a success.

unification and the

also close to the

overcome the opposition

to

White House,

team concept, and the

Washington

who was

make

do more

the decisions he might be seeking.

chief of staff, with ties to the

work: Holbrooke had the

people around Secretary Christopher,

calls, left

them

lit-

have been better for the leaders of

the administration and those immediately around them

to

be

less

con-

sumed by German unification? Yes. They might have paid more attention to Saddam Hussein prior to his invasion of Kuwait. Similarly, if the run-up to the Gulf War had not been so administration might have had

all

consuming, the leaders of the

more energy and

inclination to deal

early with issues such as Yugoslavia's falling apart or the need to secure

Soviet weapons and scientists as the

The

issue of fatigue

—

USSR collapsed.

physical and emotional

duties of statecraft has received far too

occupation and having factors in

German

the case of the

first

little

little

—

in carrying out the

attention. It

is

not just pre-

time for anything else that were certainly

unification and the

first

Gulf War.

Gulf War, the president and

But, especially in

his senior advisors (the

so-called "group of eight") rode an emotional roller coaster from the

time of the Iraqi invasion until the end of the war. Over an eight-month period, which followed immediately tion effort, they

on the heels of the German

were involved with an exhausting process of responding

to the invasion, building an international coalition,

gether to see

if

unifica-

and holding

it

to-

Saddam out of Kuwait or if war Compounding the exhaustion was a gnaw-

pressure could force

would be required

to

do

so.

ing uncertainty about the likely costs of war both politically and militar-

136

Lessons of Statecraft for Today

The burden

ily.

that the president and his

team bore was immense, par-

unknowns about the scope of American

ticularly with the

casualties

and

with the very real fears that they could be high.

should

It

come

no surprise that the success of the war produced

as

exhilaration and relief

—but also

letdown.

a

It

was not conscious, but

was unmistakable. There was simply no energy, intellectually or tionally, to tackle

new and

it

emo-

different challenges. True, Secretary Baker

was prepared to launch an effort on Arab-Israeli peace, but that was seen as a

continuation of the effort, and in any case had been one of the prom-

made

ises

as

we

And one deeply

built the coalition.

up

to their word.

ment and had

They had

actively

given

planned an

it

as part

trait

commitment

President Bush and Secretary Baker was a profound ing

ingrained

of

to liv-

of the coalition develop-

initiative after the war.

Given the timing, tackling something such as Yugoslavia

—

given

its

messiness and our military's reluctance even to contemplate involve-

—was

ment even

if

argue that that might have been true

we had not just gone through an emotional binge

administration on debate,

One could

a nonstarter.

more of a

ting a conflict

Iraq.

at the

top of the

more of

Perhaps, but there would have been

a

discussion of our stakes and the consequences of let-

emerge

large refugee flows,

in

and

Europe with the potential a

for ethnic cleansing,

widening of the war. There

just wasn't the

en-

ergy for such a thrashing-out.

When there

isn't

affect "assessments" that are

And

that, too,

only in little

its

when there is such fatigue, it is going to made and the will to act more generally.

the energy,

was seen

at this

time in the Bush administration, and not

dealing with other potential conflicts. For example, there was

energy available to persuade the Congress that with the collapse of

the Soviet

Union we would have

to mobilize resources

internationally to secure the Soviet

Safeguarding the poses,

sites,

weapons

sites

on our own and

and Soviet

scientists.

converting weapons materials to civilian pur-

making sure nuclear

were not becoming destitute and,

scientists

therefore, vulnerable to being paid

by the Iranians or the Libyans to

hand over their nuclear know-how were

all critical

needs.

To be fair, made

they were understood by the administration and some effort was to address lize

each of these

issues.

But there was simply no energy to mobi-

the world, launch a major campaign, or actively

137

work the Congress

STATECRAFT to finance

lenges

what would be needed. In the end, the

initiative

on these chal-

came not from the administration but from Senators Sam Nunn

and Richard Lugar.

The

1

point here

not to criticize the Bush administration for ne-

is

done or even

glecting what needed to be fectiveness of

its statecraft.

The

fact

to raise questions about the ef-

George H. W. Bush

that in the

is

administration statecraft was conducted with extraordinary fort.

All the tools of the trade

point tion

consumed

is

for

sometimes the cost there

when

to note that

is

no alternative

is

administration. If war

the president and

ongoing

basis.

in

want to persuade the

bound

is

to be a cost.

to this kind of is

involved,

any

it is

involvement by the leaders of the not a choice but a requirement for

around him to be deeply involved on an

and the more we

case, the greater the stakes,

political leaders

of other countries to make hard

president and the secretary must be the only ones to

some circumstances other

political leaders

our

why

The

question

is

about

is,

more the

the case. In

need to hear directly from

certain choices are necessary.

to,

can their involvement be

ual that they have

make

not whether the president and secretary of state

should be involved; they have tion

And

borne afterward. Certainly, there are times when

choices and join us on tough issues, such as Iranian nukes, the

political leaders

ef-

the most senior leadership of an administra-

those closest

And,

and

were understood and exploited. Rather, the

extended times, there

is

skill

little

and they

also

made more

need

to travel.

strategic

time for anything else?

ques-

and not so perpet-

would argue

I

The that

it

can.

Perhaps the Bosnia-Holbrooke case provides the model for those cases

where the

stakes are high or

resolution.

team is

that

The

is

where we have

essence of the model

is

a

keen interest in conflict

the creation of an interagency

senior and has access to the top leadership

when

capable of managing bureaucratic divisions and yet can

essary bureaucratic resources for support;

only domestically but with those to bring in the president

it

is

seen

as

call

it

needs

on

all

nec-

having authority not

deals with internationally; and

and secretary not

it;

just for decisions

is

able

but also for

persuasion of others at decisive moments. I

don't offer this assessment only as an observer of the Holbrooke

team.

I

led a

team

ing for nearly

all

in

managing our approach

to

Middle East peacemak-

of the Clinton administration.

high-level as Holbrooke's, but

it

The team was not

as

did involve the senior experts from the

138

Lessons of Statecraft for Today

National Security Council

Defense Department,

on

trips to Syria

when

daily meetings in to

make sure

—even

had

I I

was required.

at 10:00 a.m. to

that nothing was going

I

needed support from the

taking lieutenant generals with

it

felt it

my office

and when

staff,

on

When

the administration and access to the secretary at

president

when

might

had authority across

I

times and to the

all

impediments were managed

necessary. Bureaucratic

nothing

else, this

level officials

is

in

shows that

a

could always

call on.

Holbrooke-type model with lower-

It is a

model

how to

relate

mechanically for

at least

statecraft effective. Clearly, statecraft

assessing

I

sustainable over time and not only for short, intense

bursts of activity.

tives,

had

and support across the administration, including from the

intelligence communities, was something If

I

we were doing and

plan what

in the administration that

be inconsistent with what our diplomacy required.

this fashion,

not on the road,

me

is

how

to

make

not just about defining objec-

our means to those objectives, and then act-

ing on them. Statecraft must necessarily also involve organizing our

bureaucratic agencies so they work together and can be

maximize the

tively to

to

we

mandate such harmony and

When to

tools

there

make

is

managed

have. Presidential leadership

effec-

needed

is

select cabinet officials with that in mind.

bureaucratic disagreement, presidents must be prepared

decisions, or at least authorize a

Holbrooke-type model that can

contend with the problem. President George H. W. Bush did

much

latter,

on the Middle

Unfortunately, President

East, Russia,

George W. Bush appears

and North Korea.

to

have done none

of the above, with bureaucratic dysfunction often being the administration spent

its first

Bill

authorizing Holbrooke-type envoys and

Clinton certainly did the

teams to lead our

efforts

of the former. President

term without

a policy

result.

The

toward Iran largely

because the Pentagon and vice president's office advocated isolation

and regime change while the State Department preferred engagement. Unwilling or unable to resolve

and

his

this internal conflict,

President Bush

National Security Council deferred the issue and wasted valu-

able time as Iran continued to progress in

its

quest to acquire nuclear

weapons.

When it comes to exercising statecraft, the starting point, nizationally,

is

at least orga-

to prevent bureaucratic dysfunction or paralysis.

that the executive branch functions well

139

and maximizes the

To

full

ensure

potential

STATECRAFT of our

assets, it is essential to

be able to integrate

our bureaucratic tools

all

and have someone responsible for spearheading them in

Nye

sponds to our strategic aims. As Joseph task, since

a

way

points out, this

many of the "official instruments of soft power

—

is

that re-

no simple

public diplo-

macy, broadcasting, exchange programs, developmental assistance, disaster relief,

military-to-military contacts

ernment, and there

minimum,

into an overarching national security

statecraft

all

presidential administrations.

done well demands having

knowing how

a

At

a

keen eye for organiza-

means we The president must desig-

to gain control over all the relevant

have in order to employ them synergistically. nate

to

2

This remains a challenge for

tion and

are scattered throughout the gov-

no overarching strategy or budget that ever tries

them with hard power

integrate strategy."

is

—

—presumably

someone

the national security advisor or the White

—to make sure that

House chief of staff

all

of our bureaucratic assets are

being used in a complementary or reinforcing fashion to help achieve

our policy objectives.

Of course,

statecraft

is

not just about the orchestration of the means

or the tools of the trade. Ultimately, to be effective, statecraft identifying and acting

One

on the

can certainly argue

right objectives.

—and

I

And

that

have publicly

is

—

is

about

rarely a given.

that given

who

we pursued the wrong objective; rather than a conflict-ending agreement, we should have focused on

Arafat was and his inability to

make

peace,

increasing the scope of Palestinian independence from Israeli control

and on broader cooperation between the two societies until

after Arafat

passed from the scene. That could have created the conditions for

peacemaking

Here we

for the post-Arafat period.

are

reminded that

if

the objectives are wrong,

ploy our tools and our leverage effectively and

comes. Sometimes

we might

still

we can em-

produce bad out-

identify the right objectives in the near

term, but not necessarily the right objectives for over time. Margaret

Thatcher was convinced that German unification in

wrong

objective because

it

would

NATO

was the

cost us Mikhail Gorbachev; perhaps

we would win the new "battle" for Europe but lose the war by losing a reformer in Moscow who would serve our longer-term aims of genuine partnership with the Soviet Union. The Bush administration made the

140

Lessons of Statecraft for Today

judgment that shaping

bedded

in

Western

a

new

architecture in Europe, with

was

institutions,

way

a surer

Germany em-

to safeguard

our long-

term interests than letting Gorbachev's needs be the arbiter of what was possible in Europe.

This

not to say the Bush administration was indifferent to Gor-

is

bachev's needs

—

far

from

But the president and

it.

wanting Gorbachev to succeed,

many ways beyond our control to

time was in all

we could

to help him,

and

still

the price of helping Gorbachev,

—and with

judgment

been better

losing

If

on both

disastrous consequences as a result.

made

as

call

on how

to

end the

a

judgment.

It

focused

sought to minimize the costs

it

Gorbachev, and worked with him to do a

a neutral

we might have ended up

on the most important objective even

made

we Germany as

he might not have succeeded.

In other words, the Bush administration

to

We might have done

affect.

had mortgaged the future of Europe by accepting

counts

while

his advisors,

made an assessment that his success over

first

to alter the objective either to

The

so.

administration also

Gulf War. Would

it

have

regime change or even to the

destruction of the Republican Guard, the main forces that protected the

regime?

Would having done

Looking

at the

so have prevented the war in 2003?

enormous

difficulty

and costs of our involvement

in

Iraq from 2003 to the present, and at the sectarian nature of the conflict there, the veterans of the

George H.

W

Bush administration would

answer that their judgment of ending the war cated. Others

as

they did has been vindi-

might argue that altering the objective

at least to destroy-

ing the key military forces underpinning Saddam's rule would have been the wiser course Is

when

thinking about the future.

the answer in such a debate obvious?

going to be true for every administration ing the right objectives difficult if

objectives.

between

one

is

is

I

as it

And

think not.

conducts

enormously important, but

that

statecraft.

also

is

also

Defin-

enormously

trying to find a balance between near and longer-term

Choices have to be made. Oftentimes there

objectives,

will

be tension

and leaders and their advisors have to choose based

on the best assessments they can make. The point

is

to

make assessments

so that at least the choices are conscious. Decision makers

must

at least

consider which objectives are ultimately the most appropriate for

and for over time.

141

now

— STATECRAFT And tion.

that argues for assessments that bring

all

factors into considera-

Faith-based or ideologically driven assessments will exclude what

needs to be considered.

The Bush

administration in 2002-2003 proved

the folly of such an approach.

So what does

all this

fective, statecraft starts

mean for how to think about statecraft? To be efwith being able to define

and meaningful objectives. fining the objectives to

fit

clear,

Hardheaded assessments

reality,

understandable,

are essential for re-

our relevant ambitions, and our means,

we can marshal with others. It is also critical to be able to "frame" what is at stake in a way that not only can mobilize and sustain domestic support but also does so in a way that makes our objective "legitimate" internationally and raises the costs to those who would including the means

oppose

it.

Active diplomacy (including back channels) and the orches-

tration of inducements in a

way

To why it

that

this point, is

and not

and penalties

—including

promotes our defined objectives I

have defined

statecraft,

showed how

in others,

and drawn some general

when and how more precisely,

to

use some of

it is

threats

and coercion

also a necessity.

explained in general terms

necessary,

it

is

has worked effectively in

its

some

cases

lessons. Before exploring

tools (negotiations and mediation)

important to discuss the

new

international land-

scape in which statecraft must be conducted. There are familiar features

of international relations today that reflect continuity with the past and also unfamiliar challenges that

on

pose

new threats and make new demands

statecraft.

142

7.

STATECRAFT

IN A

NEW WORLD

Statecraft can never be effective if its practitioners are divorced ality.

from

Our practitioners today must understand how the international

scape

is

changing. Sticking to assumptions that

fit

re-

land-

the international system

of the 1980s would certainly mislead us on what our foreign policy priorities

ought to be today. While some of the developments of the past

twenty years have shaped today's geoning sectarian a globalized

conflicts, there

world presents

realities, especially

can be

own

its

set

little

with regard to bur-

doubt that the landscape of

of challenges.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has acknowledged that the

United States faces new challenges, but she

post-World War

II

period.

dominant global power economically and logically

and

The United

for the

militarily.

first

There

States

finds parallels

with the

emerged from the war

as a

time, stronger than any other state

was, however, a

new competitor ideo-

and we had to adjust to a different reality that new American role. At that time, the advent of the cold new thinking and new institutions, both domestically and militarily,

also required a

war required

internationally. Secretary Rice

compares the early years of the cold war

era to the current period in terms of the need to develop a ture and

new

new

architec-

approaches. In no small part, she finds the analogy apt be-

cause in those early years of the cold war, there was not instant success. It

took several years to build institutions such

143

as

NATO,

and

to trans-

STATECRAFT form Germany and Japan into stable countries that could become

real

partners.

While one can quibble over whether new today or whether the occupations in sight into

there

is

not consider themselves defeated

—

ful insofar as it

tions

Germany and Japan

—where

what we face

who do

those

institutions are being built

we must

in Iraq

reminds us that

offer

much

in-

an insurgency led by the comparison

is

use-

at certain junctures in international rela-

refashion assumptions about our role in the world and the

means necessary

for carrying out that role.

Walter Russell

two challenges

Mead

has observed that the United States confronted

we had

in the postwar period. First,

to stop the spread of

communism in Europe and Asia while containing the Soviet Union. Second, we had to replace the British world system with a set of political and economic institutions and practices.

nomic system and failed,

alliances

would

also

impoverishment would be the

and we would

find

difficult to

it

ceed in both areas or we would

Mead points today: we must

out that

we

If

containment

fail,

but

USSR.

face

everywhere.

We

rorists,

der,

needed

to suc-

armed with

deal with fanatical terrorists, potentially

effective

If we fail to deal

economic

with the ter-

there could be a collapse of the global economic and political or-

but

if

we

fail

to develop

ways to manage that new order, many of the

new

world's people will suffer and the terrorists will be able to recruit allies.

2

In drawing this comparison,

and the differences between the

Mead

eras.

highlights both the similarities

What's similar is that security chal-

lenges cannot be separated from economic and social challenges. is

different

and

states

is

that during the cold

war we had

a great

—and

were the main source of danger

Union made the threat

arsenal of the Soviet

comes from non-state

actors;

the threat of violence

is

So what

is

the vast thermonuclear

existential.

Today,

and while our very existence

it is

is

not

main danger

is

not

at stake,

always around the corner.

familiar in the international landscape of today and

not? Terrorism

What

power competitor,

clear that any nation-state truly threatens our survival; the

is

it,

two similarly intertwined challenges

system for a globalized world.

political

would exploit

1

weapons of mass destruction, and we must build an and

eco-

the economic system

result, the Soviets

contain the

fail

if

failed, the

not a

new phenomenon. Nor 144

is

what

the danger of the

Statecraft in

New

a

World

spread of weapons of mass destruction to rogue or irresponsible regimes, or the emergence of new powers that seek influence to match their capabilities. Historically, the rise

come

of one power has

at

of existing or dominant powers, and produced conflict. That

new

the expense is

obviously

what worries many today about China. Each of these phenomena

is

fa-

miliar and requires the effective use of statecraft and the tools of the trade.

What deal with ist

different, clearly less easy to grasp,

is is

the

new

reality of threats

and

more complex

far

from non-state actors

groups that don't depend on state sponsors).

to

terror-

(i.e.,

The new phenomenon of

fewer and fewer being able to threaten more and more became a stark reality

mass

on September

casualties,

and

11,

it is

2001. Today, even small

clear that terror groups such as Al

offshoots are trying hard to

weapons

numbers can

in the worst

do

so. It is

inflict

Qaeda and

its

the possible marriage of the worst

hands that makes these apocalyptic

terrorist

groups so catastrophically dangerous.

Given the complexity of the challenge and the need the tools but the ideology of the

be called on to use

sarily will

ination and capability to will thus

all

to defeat not just

new purveyors of terrorism, we of the tools of statecraft

work with others

that

we can

—

all

neces-

the imag-

muster. Statecraft

be in great demand.

STATECRAFT AND THE FAMILIAR CHALLENGES ON THE INTERNATIONAL HORIZON STATE-SUPPORTED TERROR Terrorism

is

not new. In the past, state support facilitated the ability of

such groups to carry out terrorism. larly

when

The

Soviets saw terrorism, particu-

carried out by Palestinian rejectionist groups, as a

means

threaten our friends and the established order in the Middle East.

KGB

and

sive, if

its sister

security organizations in Eastern

covert and deniable, support

—

many of

The

Europe gave exten-

training, financing, intelligence,

fake documentation, logistical help, and sanctuary and protection

the leading terrorist groups in the Middle East and

from the 1950s

to

—

to

Europe

until the collapse of the Soviet Union.

State support of terrorism

still

exists today.

145

Both Syria and Iran

— STATECRAFT continue to provide operational and material support to Hizbollah,

Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, pressing them against Israel. Israelis

They seek

any possibility of peace between

to subvert

and Palestinians and to foment conflict more broadly in the re-

gion — which they

and

to carry out terrorist attacks

Iran, to a different extent

insurgents in Iraq.

Lebanon

certainly did in

—

in 2006. Similarly, Syria

has sponsored the operations of the

(Though declaring otherwise,

Pakistan's support for

Islamist groups carrying out terrorism against India over the disputed territory of

The to

Kashmir does not appear

to

have ended.)

Syrians have treated terrorist groups as "cards," designed either

show enemies the

costs of not responding to Syrian interests or to dis-

rupt developments that they find threatening.

through Hizbollah, to promote

fomented war between Hizbollah and rockets to Hizbollah after Israel

The

Israel

withdrew from Lebanon

who continue

eyes of the Revolutionary Guard,

bility,

Middle East more than

to

in 2000. In the

dominate the na-

and confrontation serve efforts

toward peace,

sta-

and reconciliation.

Where states

Lebanon. Iran

by providing roughly 7,500

tional security apparatus in Iran, polarization

Iranian interests in the

Iranians have sought,

a Shi'a-led Islamic state in

terrorist

groups remain primarily dependent on

can be held accountable. Leaders in states such

Pakistan can be

made

to

states,

the

as Syria, Iran, or

understand that their governments will be held

responsible if groups operating out of their countries carry out attacks in other states. Historically, the fear of the reaction probably limited

the scope and character of the terrorist operations that Syria, Iran, Libya, or other states have historically supported or countenanced.

They, no doubt, would always deny any involvement, making for us (or others) to justify attacks or reprisals against

also

knew

that if

we

suffered an egregious loss

it

harder

them, but they

we would

feel driven to

respond.

Deterrence of state-supported terror will continue to be an essential

aim and requirement of

statecraft.

A

related goal

behavior of those states that sponsor terror.

sought to do so with Pakistan.

communicated

Its efforts

directly to President

make, worked to

a certain extent: at

must be changing the

The Bush

immediately

Musharraf

administration has after 9/11,

that he

had

the time, Musharraf

146

a

when

it

choice to

made

a

choice

New

Statecraft in a

World

against Al Qaeda, and seemingly also the Taliban in Afghanistan. a threat that the administration

was both

of benefits in the form of increased aid

conveyed and

also the

—much of which

There

promise

has been deliv-

To date, President Musharraf has been helpful in terms of arrestof Al Qaeda, but Pakistan's record on the Taliban is, at best, members ing ered.

very mixed

—

and, of course, there has been a similar ambivalence

who

rooting out the groups U.S. fears of

who might

on

carry out terrorism in Kashmir and India.

replace Musharraf and our continuing stake in

have led the administration to try to encourage his positive

his help

against the Taliban and the

own reasons he needs to do more groups who operate against India. (India, to

own

pressure and inducements on Musharraf in

moves and convince him be sure, also applies

its

that for his

this regard.)

While

it is

sor terrorism to

not easy to change the behavior of those states that spon-

—and

the Bush administration's posture has often tended

emphasize regime change over changed behavior

and should be seen statecraft.

The

as

one of those areas

administration's record

on Libya has been much

better; here

it

in

on Pakistan

from American sanctions for

his

ways

if

—including

The problem was all

Am

after

Libya was

103 in

December

me

—

all

to offer to

sorts of

change

lifted.

that Qadhafi was willing to

meet only some but not

of the Clinton conditions: assuming responsibility and paying dam-

ages to the families of the victims of for terrorist groups, ingly,

Pan

and giving up Libya's

Qadhafi tried to see

up, while also

making

if

clear

Am

103, stopping

all

support

WMD programs. Not surpris-

he could go partway. Keeping the pressure

how he would be rewarded

if

he changed

behavior, characterized the Clinton approach, and over time also to

who

Qadhafi suffered not

flight

the Palestinians with

the sanctions were

record

a leader

Throughout the Clinton administration, Qadhafi used

intermediaries his

lifted.

Its

support of terrorism but also from

held responsible for the bombing of Pan 1988.

can be done,

mixed.

is

imposed by the Security Council

collective sanctions

it

had the benefit of

had sought since the 1990s to get sanctions just

—

which we need to practice

govern the Bush administration

his administration

effort.

his

came

President Bush and others in

have claimed that the war in Iraq persuaded Qadhafi

genuinely to turn over a

new

—which he has done with respect to

leaf

147

his

STATECRAFT

WMD program. Martin Indyk, who participated in the Clinton administration's effort to

WMD

wean Qadhafi away from

his terrorist-supporting

and

ways, has pointed out that Qadhafi had a change of heart only

came

understand that he would not get sanctions re-

when he

finally

lief until

he gave up terror and

There

is

to

WMD program.

his

probably merit in both arguments.

3

The ongoing

pressure

(including the Bush administration's interdiction of a shipment of nuclear

components

to Libya), the

image of Saddam Hussein being swept

out of power by the U.S. military, and the promise of restoring lifting sanctions ior.

Much

as

combined

to

produce the turnabout

in Qadhafi's

and

behav-

with Milosevic before him, the sanctions created domestic

They took time but

pressures on Qadhafi.

there were painful conse-

quences, and to get relief and the promise of

ment, Qadhafi was ready to

shift

The wielding of important ior

ties

ties

and economic invest-

course dramatically. of bad behav-

sticks that raised the price

was combined with the offer of meaningful carrots

—

carrots that

could become available only with demonstrative steps to prove that bad behaviors were, in

fact,

being stopped.

It

—and behavior—not

worked with Qadhafi

also

Milosevic, at least as far as settling the Bosnia conflict was concerned.

Here

is

the essence of statecraft: in terms of changing the

necessarily the regime

Libya, price,

a state

supporting terrorism. In the case of

required patience, real pressure with a real and meaningful

it

and partners who were prepared to join the sanctions regime and

sustain

it,

right time istration

to be

—of

while also going along with the promise of inducements at the

and

in the right way. (In the case of Qadhafi, the

might not have succeeded without the

tough but who

initially

British,

conducted and drove the

potential for gains for the Libyans

were

Bush admin-

who were ready

talks in

which the

also conveyed.)

PREVENTING THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Trying to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological, or chemical

weapons has been

a central feature

last forty years. In

the past, the effort focused on stopping the spread of

such weapons to new

of American foreign policy for the

states, particularly

148

those in volatile regions.

The

a

Statecraft in

New

World

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other multilateral instruments

the Australia

(e.g.,

Group focused on

the supply of chemical

weapons and precursors, the Missile Technology Control Regime, have been used to

forestall proliferation.

the last fifteen years, a

number of

and Ukraine

The fore.

We

in

programs (South Africa and Ar-

weapons based on

agreement with

their soil (Kazakhstan, Belarus,

Russia).

challenge today on proliferation

We must be focused

must

is

more complicated than be-

not only on states but also on non-state actors.

number of

try to strengthen the security of a large

have components, materials, or actual weapons

by

states or non-states.

to

make

it

more

successes. In

countries have renounced their nu-

clear ambitions and deactivated their

gentina) or returned

There have been

—

sites that

that could be exploited

We must strengthen the nonproliferation regime

difficult

and costly for those who might be tempted

acquire or develop such weapons.

And we must

find

fect their

interests

a

to af-

behavior and to be sure that others don't recalibrate their

own

on the merits of acquiring such weapons.

The danger of unsecured

WMD

Consider that

sites.

warhead could be highly portable, and off in

to

ways of imposing

on those who are defying the international community now

price

etc.)

mid-town Manhattan on and cause over $1

lion people

in the

a typical

ten-kiloton nuclear

words of one study

workday could

trillion in direct

essential that neither states seeking

a

kill

"if set

half a mil-

economic damage." 4

It is

such weapons (Iran) nor terrorist

groups (Al Qaeda) be able to gain access to unsecured

facilities

housing

nuclear warheads or artillery shells through penetration or bribery.

How

big

is

the problem of unsecured sites? At the beginning of the

Bush administration,

in 2001, a bipartisan task force assessed the threat

of "loose nukes" and concluded that "The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today

is

the danger that weapons of

mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to

terrorists or hostile nation states

and used against American

troops abroad or citizens at home." 5

Notwithstanding the Nunn-Lugar legislation of 1991 (devoted to the destruction and decommissioning of thousands of nuclear warheads),

CIA

director

George Tenet

told

Congress that "Russian

149

WMD materi-

STATECRAFT als

and technology remain vulnerable to theft or diversion." 6 Unfortu-

nately, there are

plenty of unsecured

still

sites,

and "thousands of

grams of military plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU)

Union (FSU)." As Graham Allison has

countries of the former Soviet

HEV

groups would have

theft; terrorist

until the year 2018 to be able to shop in Russia and

neighbors for nuclear weapons.

The problem, of course, Worldwide

is

at

not limited to the

1

to

make

outside Russia

a

is

former Soviet

sites in

the former So-

30 operational civilian research reactors in

forty countries. Since only 26.4

needed

its

8

estimated that there are 20 metric tons of

it is

highly enriched uranium

Nunn-Lugar

"44,000 potential nuclear weapons' worth of

still

and plutonium vulnerable to

viet Union.

in the

7

trenchantly pointed out, even after thirteen years of the

program, there were

kilo-

pounds of enriched uranium ore are

nuclear bomb, the scope of the potential problem even

daunting.

9

And the

fact that there

now an underworld

is

of "stealthy black market procurement networks of brokers, intermedi-

and front companies" only too ready to supply nuclear materials

aries,

for reasons of greed or ideology

means

that

it

has

become immeasurably

easier for states or terrorist groups to gain access to a nuclear weapon.

Securing nuclear tration has

made

sites

remains a major challenge.

efforts in all these areas,

needs to be an even higher

priority.

Reduction program, which,

as

10

The Bush adminis-

but the issue of unsecured

sites

The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat

noted above, has worked effectively in se-

curing nuclear weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union, needs

more funding

vastly

to accelerate

its

work. 11 Similarly, the Megaton to

Megawatts program, which takes highly enriched uranium from Soviet nukes and turns

been

effective,

into low-enriched fuel for nuclear reactors, has also

it

but

it,

too,

needs to be accelerated. The G-8 Global Part-

nership initiated in 2002 supports an array of nonproliferation initiatives;

here again, more

Private-sector

money and

a

higher priority

is

needed.

NGO (nongovernmental organization) initiatives have

also

been effective

sites

where biological agents have been developed. Former senator Sam

Nunn,

in

beginning to deal with the problem of securing

the cochairman and

CEO

of Nuclear Threat

Initiative,

has been

especially active with the Russians, initially in finding ways to tackle se-

curity problems associated with nuclear

weapons

sites

cently in trying to deal with biological and chemical

150

but more re-

sites.

Biological

Statecraft in

sites are especially sensitive, tial

production

sites; at

times

a

New

World

with the Russians denying access to poten-

NGOs may be a less threatening and more

politically sensitive vehicle for

approaching governments and should be

integrated into a comprehensive strategy for dealing with the security of

WMD

sites.

Strengthening the nonproliferation regime. Steps have

WMD.

the barriers to the acquisition of

been taken

The Bush

to strengthen

administration con-

ceived and launched the Proliferation Security Initiative, which has created an umbrella for countries acting in concert to openly interdict

WMD

supplies or

rubric, the trifuges

components going

United States seized

heading to Libya, and,

a ship

as

to

rogue countries. Under

with a cargo that included cen-

noted above, that was certainly

up

factor in influencing Qadhafi's decision to give

Other steps have been taken

this

his

a

key

WMD program.

to prevent the proliferation of nuclear

weapons, including through the more conventional means of closing loopholes in the existing regime. For example, the Additional Protocol to the

NPT was designed to provide for much more expansive monitor-

ing and verification of

NPT

all

related

sites.

This

is

especially useful, as the

permits monitoring and inspection of only declared (not unde-

clared) sites of nuclear- relevant activity. that loophole.

lem of the

The

Additional Protocol closes

does not, however, address the most fundamental prob-

It

treaty:

any signatory of the treaty

is

entitled to pursue

develop civilian nuclear pow er and receive technical help to do T

practice, this

means

cle of enriching

that signatories are allowed to

uranium and reprocessing

tion of being able to

produce either

cores for nuclear bombs.

so.

In

complete the fuel cy-

which puts them

it,

and

in a posi-

fuel for nuclear reactors or fissile

Having developed

monitoring, any country could then exercise

under

this capability its

from the treaty and produce nuclear weapons

legal right to

— and not be

full

withdraw

in violation

of the treaty.

One way

to deal with this

make

treaty to

it

a violation (in

problem

is

straightforward:

which the violator

is

amend

the

subject to Security

7

Council sanctions) to acquire nuclear technology under the aegis of the

XPT,

use

treaty. If

opening

it

to

develop nuclear weapons, and then withdraw from the

some countries

it

fear that

amending the

up with unclear consequences, an 151

treaty

would require

alternative approach

might

STATECRAFT be to produce another protocol outside the treaty that picks up on a

French suggestion raised in preparation for the ence

in

2005

—

last

NPT review confer-

namely, that any signatory that acquired nuclear technol-

ogy and then withdrew from the treaty would be required technology, destroy treaty if

be

did not do

it

or seal

so.

it

—and be declared

This proposal received

in violation of the

little

support but could

revisited.

Another way a

it,

to rerurn the

to deal with the fuel cycle

guaranteed source of nuclear fuel

at

problem could be

to provide

subsidized rates to any country

that forewent the acquisition of sensitive fuel cycle facilities

and

re-

turned the spent fuel to the suppliers. This would be economically

who genuinely sought

attractive for those

nuclear power for strictly

energy-generating purposes and would effectively make for

anyone

to use the treaty to acquire nuclear

weapons

it

impossible

legally

12

Non-

governmental organizations represent another tool available to help this regard. tive,

Warren

has offered

Buffett,

fifty

working through the Nuclear Threat

million dollars to help set

up an

Initia-

international nu-

bank that aspiring countries could use to receive reactor

clear fuel

rather than having to

make

it

on

their own.

13

in

fuel

With many countries now

declaring that they need nuclear power, including Egypt, the United States

mate

had better

find a

way

to create widely accepted

alternatives to countries acquiring the

cycle, lest

power

we

means

to

and

fully legiti-

complete the fuel

face a world of states capable of converting their nuclear

to nuclear weapons.

All this will not

mean much

if

we do not

also organize a

tional effort to deal with the "large secretive

dlemen,

scientists, engineers,

new interna-

networks of brokers, mid-

manufacturers and front companies"

who

circumvent the existing controls on the export of nuclear-related materials.

14

Clearly, states (such as Iran)

and non-state actors

exploit this nuclear black market unless

more

is

done

to disrupt

haps the United States could take the lead in getting the to

adopt

new

effective.

will continue to

G-8

it.

standards and techniques for making export controls

Working groups might be created and asked

Per-

plus China

to report

more

back to

the political leaders with proposals for enhancing existing controls at

both national and multinational

To be

sure,

it

will

levels.

be easier for the United States to lead in

152

this area,

Statecraft in

to mobilize others to take

New

a

World

on the challenge of dealing with proliferation

we

are also setting a moral example.

with greater urgency,

if

we

importance of nuclear weapons and to

act to reduce the

own

temptation to constantly modernize our it

will

be to set an example.

I

am

The more resist the

nuclear arsenal, the easier

not saying that

if

we only reduced our

nuclear capabilities, quantitatively and qualitatively, pressures would be inexorably created on others to follow

make

suit.

But

it is

surely hard for us to

the case that others should not have nuclear

weapons when we

keep improving our own; when we are one of the very few who have not

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; and when we

ratified the

re-

search low-yield nuclear weapons, seemingly with an eye to making easier to

True, there objective

it

employ such weapons.

—

may be

military utility in using these weapons, but our

particularly if

nuclear stockpile in

we

are not ready to seriously reduce our

—must be

any appreciable way

son not to go nuclear.

And

it is

undoubtedly easier to

lective pressures

on regimes such

own behavior

seen as more defensible and

Framing our

is

credible fashion

is

less

and explaining them in

policies

a must; so,

however,

promote international goods such

foster greater col-

and North Korea

as those in Iran

a

own

to give others a rea-

if our

provocative to others.

more compelling and

adopting policies that seem to

is

paying for the conversion of war-

as

heads to nuclear fuel and supporting, not opposing, the Comprehensive

Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Preventing Iran from going nuclear,

Nothing would reinforce our

and reversing North Koreas efforts to strengthen the

nuclear posture.

NPT

regime

more than success in preventing Iran from going nuclear or getting North Korea to change its course. We need to show that the prohibitions remain strong on crossing the nuclear threshold and that there to be paid

tempted

where those prohibitions are

—

to go nuclear

violated. Others

or acquire other

is

a price

who might be

WMD means—must see that

they pay an unacceptable price, and rather than becoming more secure, they

become

Iran and quisition ity that

less so.

North Korea have been

a focal

and spread of nuclear weapons,

point of concern in the ac-

in part

because of the possibil-

they might provide terrorist groups with these means, but also

153

STATECRAFT because of the threats they might pose in their regions. Each in

way

represents a "tipping point" in

which

need to

offset

Isn't it likely that Japan

North Korean

capability?

own

their acquisition of these

weapons creates an inexorable dynamic where others have the capability

its

feel they

must

also

and South Korea

will feel the

And, with

won't Saudi

Iran,

Arabia and also Egypt respond to the Iranian capability with one of their

own? The Saudis almost certainly were one of the A. Q.

Khan nuclear network and

are not coercible.

will

want the Iranians

make

Asia

these areas

may not ineluctably

the Middle East?

wiping

When

Israel off the

is,

having whole regions go nu-

more dangerous and

devolve into war, but can

uncertain.

we be

A

nuclear

so confident in

the Iranian president Ahmadinejad calls for

map, what kind of threshold are the

have vis-a-vis potential Iranian threats, especially clear capability?

to see that they

15

In these cases, the tipping point, that clear, will

beneficiaries of the

As one leading

Israeli

defense

if

Israelis likely to

Iran develops nu-

official said to

me, "We

think the Iranians intend to use nuclear weapons against us, and

won't wait for that to happen." likely to is

The

Israeli

leaders

come

material by

itself.

be on a hair trigger should

on the verge of producing

fissile

its

we

impulse toward preemption

is

to believe that Iran

That, alone, argues for preventing Iran's acquisition of such a capability.

The

international

community has been

nuclear program since 2002, that Iran

when

had been engaging in

seized with the Iranian

Iranian opposition groups revealed

secret, illicit nuclear activities

the nuclear watchdog agency, the IAEA,

and that

knew nothing of these

efforts.

International opposition expressed in votes of the thirty- five-nation

board of the

IAEA

termined to create an independent fuel

ued

made it clear that it is decycle. To date, Iran has contin-

notwithstanding, Iran has

to develop the infrastructure to be able to

and yet

it

produce nuclear weapons,

has paid no real price.

Will the United States have to threaten the use of force to prevent

—

Iran from going nuclear

or actually have to use force to prevent

our position in Iraq made us

less credible

particularly given Iran's potential to

make

and capable life

it?

Has

in Iranian eyes,

even more

difficult for

everyone in Iraq? Can we gain an international consensus for the use of force or, lacking that, for significant

economic sanctions against the

154

Ira-

Statecraft in

nians?

And even

if

we

New

a

can, will that raise the costs of going nuclear in

Iran sufficiently high that the Iranian In chapter thirteen,

culus and

how

I

and become

government

will defer

its

efforts?

discuss the prospects of changing the Iranian cal-

doing

to go about

so.

But one point should be very a

World

nuclear weapons

should Iran cross the threshold

clear:

state,

the international landscape will be

Not only could it make the Middle East stable, but it may also contribute mightily

more

affected profoundly.

far

dangerous and

to taking

less

what has been the "redline" against countries going nuclear and turning it

to "pink."

Whatever the

Proliferation Treaty

(NPT),

markably successful.

Many

and that within

a

and limitations of the Nuclear Non-

flaws

has created a regime that has been re-

it

predicted that the

decade or two

after its

NPT

would never work,

adoption in 1968 there would be

twenty to thirty nuclear powers. Yet nearly forty years

after the

entered into force, there are only eight nuclear weapons

NPT has provided a prohibition on going nuclear; the NPT redline become pink, we will be looking at internationally,

one that

is

far less predictable

miscalculation and preemption in It is

and

NPT

states.

The

however, should a

far

new

landscape

more prone

to

crisis.

not clear whose interests would be served by such a develop-

ment. Emerging powers such as China and India,

who need

stability, es-

pecially in terms of access to energy supplies to maintain their high

economic growth ment. Given

nent

rates,

its ties

member of the

affect the decisions

to

should not look favorably on such a develop-

North Korea and

Iran,

and

UN Security Council, China

its

is

status as a

in a

perma-

good position

to

of both the North Koreans and the Iranians on nu-

clear weapons. In the case of the

North Koreans, the Chinese have more influence

and leverage than anyone lieve or

cement

its

else.

isolation,

food North Korea consumes.

They border North

Korea, they can re-

and they provide the bulk of the

The Chinese

fuel

and

are very mindful of the prob-

lems North Korean nukes present, and are certainly keen on ensuring that Japan does not feel the

need

to go nuclear in response. Similarly, the

Chinese relationship with, and desire Korea

is

to affect the behavior of,

also an important factor in China's posture.

lead in the six-country talks and been far

155

more

South

China has taken the

active diplomatically

STATECRAFT than ever before. But the limits of China's readiness to pressure North

Korea must also be understood. China fears

Kim Jong

adept

II is

North Korean collapse

North Korean refugees streaming

that might trigger millions of

the border.

a

across

exploiting Chinese fears.

at

Perhaps he became overconfident in

Kim embarrassed

this regard.

the Chinese leadership when, over their public and private objections,

he conducted

a

nuclear

The

test.

Chinese, in turn, applied

much more

pressure on North Korea than ever before, producing resumption of the six-party talks and, clearly, a readiness on the part of

reach agreement in them.

ment (meaning China

its

persede

its

weapons

if it

them

we appear

if

system. China's fear of

to

whether the agree-

is

No

doubt,

agreement and whether

too insistent that North Korea

North Korea's collapse may

still

su-

concerns about North Korea preserving hidden nuclear has closed

Our own

to return.

now

will test the limits of the

will side with

open up

real question

denuclearization) will be implemented.

full

North Koreans

the

The

North Korea

down

nuclear reactor and allowed inspectors

its

must take account of this

strategy

our approach to South Korea needs to be understood

possibility, just as

as greatly affecting

our leverage in general and on China in particular. For the Iranians, the Chinese are also a erations.

them

A

either

Chinese veto in the

UN

critical factor in their

consid-

Security Council could protect

from international economic sanctions or from

a Security

Council resolution to use force against them. The Chinese have been reluctant to use their veto at the

more than

the Iranians for

related contracts for the to lock in their

related or

who

a

UN,

but they also have contracted with

hundred

billion dollars'

coming decade, and given

energy supplies, they

may

economic sanctions against the

worth of energy-

their

seeming desire

be inclined to block any

oil-

Iranians. For now, the Iranians,

see the strategic benefit of their growing economic ties with China,

seem

to believe that

In effect,

China

will protect

China may have

and not pressure them.

a choice to

make: try to enforce certain in-

ternational rules of behavior that in general

promote greater

stability,

or deviate from an international consensus against a country violating a is

broad norm because of

its

an interesting choice, and

coming will

years. Is

it

a rising

expand inevitably

to

preoccupation with

may

reveal

power whose

match

its

its

where China

is

oil supplies. It

headed

political ambitions

economic might 156

own

in a

way

in the

and reach

that threat-

ens others, or

power

a rising

is it

Or

ing international system?

is

mind us

that

China

a

World

that will integrate itself into the exist-

there a third alternative that combines

both integration and transformation? is

New

a

Statecraft in

The answers

to these questions re-

major new factor on the world stage and

will sig-

nificantly influence issues as diverse as the proliferation of nuclear

weapons, the fate of rogue regimes, and the protection of the planet's environment.

Given the increasing importance of China, tend with

its rise

I

will discuss

internationally in chapter fourteen.

how

My purpose

has been to highlight China as one of the familiar challenges

new

the

global landscape. Let

new

that confront us in the

me now

to con-

we

here

face in

turn to the unfamiliar challenges

international setting.

A NEW INTERNATIONAL LANDSCAPE, UNFAMILIAR THREATS

TERRORISTS AS NON-STATE ACTORS Non-state actors such

mass

acts

as

Al Qaeda that carry out terrorism, including

of terrorism, are different from previous terrorists (individuals

and groups)

in

one important

were backed by nation-states. Those lose

states

invariably

had something valuable

to

and could be held accountable. They could and often would choose

to control the groups, rorist

in a

Those groups almost

respect.

and

as such,

deter the state-backed ter-

groups by deterring the states in which those groups resided. But

world of non-state actor

we do

we could

it?

Can we

still

threats,

who

make deterrence

are

we

effective?

deterring and

how do

Our response to 9/11 Qaeda very

has already demonstrated our readiness not only to hit Al

hard but also to preempt Al Qaeda, and keep up

emption, by

still

making war on

That may have worked

to

states

some extent

we

a constant effort at pre-

believe sponsor terrorism.

in Afghanistan, but has

it

worked

in Iraq?

While the war

in Iraq has diverted at least

might have been better deployed the Taliban and root out

in

some

capabilities that

Afghanistan to finish the job against

Osama Bin Laden, our intelligence

efforts

have

been ongoing against Al Qaeda. Our intelligence organizations have sought to find Al Qaeda operatives and to disrupt their operations

157

—and

STATECRAFT why

that helps to account, in part, for

there has been no successful ter-

ror act in the United States since 9/11.

However, our actions against Al Qaeda represent more of

we

of "denial" in which

conduct

pability to

are trying to defeat

terrorist acts.

it

Deterrence

a strategy

and stop or inhibit

is

its

ca-

hard to achieve, because

our threatened military reprisals are not necessarily something that imposes a price on Bin Ladenism or

They are not troubled by because many of them have been

adherents.

its

tough military responses, particularly

martyrdom

socialized to believe that

nothing

more

is

more we

are likely to

kill

Qaeda constantly seeks with Islam and with

all

noncombatants

violent our response, the

—spreading an image

to exploit, of the U.S. killing

on Muslims. They want

sarily

more

glorious. Moreover, the

to

duty and that

their religious

is

and

that Al

inflicting pain

promote an image of America being

at

war

Muslims. Hizbollah, though Shi'a and not neces-

an ally of Al Qaeda, has had very

much the same

strategy vis-a-vis

the Israelis. In their war with Israel, they fired rockets from populated areas not only to try to use civilians as shields and to complicate Israeli

throughout the Islamic world

targeting, but also to trigger great anger

against the Israelis

bombings

killed

—and by extension

women and

the United States

—when

their

children.

Fomenting anger against the United States

essential for Al

is

Qaeda

and others to produce new recruits and to persuade those recruits to carry out acts of suicidal terrorism. This ing force against these groups. There

But

it is

a

reminder that deterrence

is

as

not an argument against us-

is

very

alternative to doing so.

little

we have

always

known

it is

not go-

ing to work with these groups and that military responses have to be

shaped with

political objectives in

mind.

Deterrence remains relevant for dealing with Syria. In a

States will

world of shadowy non-state

states

such

as Iran or

actors, however, the United

need different approaches and

will

need to employ other

tools or forms of statecraft. Indeed, to deal with this threat,

must be able

to

in the Islamic

work with

others,

and to

find

new ways to convince those

world that the United States can be

the radical Islamists

who

America

a partner in defeating

represent a threat to us both. Moderate

Mus-

lims must take the lead in competing with the radical Islamists, discrediting their claims

threat to Islam

of religious purity, and showing

itself.

158

how

they represent a

Statecraft in

The United

States doesn't

need

a

New

World

to invent reasons for

moderate Mus-

lims to take on the radical Islamists; they are the ones most immediately

threatened by them.

We

do, however, have to recognize

why

there has

been reluctance and hesitancy on their part to take on this task, and develop our responses accordingly of local moderates

is

One important

whether

that leading regimes,

Arabia, have often viewed

them

The regimes have wanted

to

as

factor in the hesitancy

more of

a threat

in

Egypt or Saudi

than the Islamists.

keep the alternatives available limited to

themselves or the Islamists, believing the Islamists would scare their publics and the outside world. Secular, reform-minded figures might

look too attractive as an alternative. In the end, these regimes have

felt

vulnerable and have appeared neither to want real political alternatives to

emerge nor

on those who claim

to be ready to take

to

be religiously

pure and devout. Lacking in legitimacy, these regimes have been too quick to take on the trappings of religious orthodoxy and too slow to

condemn

the radical Islamists in any but very narrow terms.

These regimes have United

States,

also

been very defensive about their

ties to

and moderates throughout the region have often found

that their calls for reform are caricatured, to

make them appear

serving an American, not a national, agenda. In this connection,

have to recognize

made

it

United

how America's

to be

we

also

behaviors and policies have frequently

harder for moderates to do what States,

the

we

want, and that often, the

not the Islamists, has been the source of the anger in the

Islamic world.

Traditional approaches won't work in this force, while necessary, will not

world of non-state actor

new

struggle.

The use of

be the key to our eventual success. In

threats, persuasion

more than coercion

will

a

be

necessary for wielding influence and getting others to join us in the essential task of discrediting

and delegitimizing the radical

Moderate Muslims can do statecraft in

such a context

for example, the

that; the

is at

United States cannot. The task of

least two-fold:

who

first,

use our leverage with,

Egyptian and Saudi regimes to get them to stop pressur-

ing moderate reformers; and, second, use our ers

means and the means of oth-

share our interests and concerns to help

empower or

the hand of Muslim moderate regimes (Jordan, Morocco, ation Council states) and reformers icals.

Islamists.

Whether they need

security,

who

strengthen

Gulf Cooper-

are prepared to take

on the rad-

economic, educational, or technical

159

— STATECRAFT means of

we must

assistance,

find a

way

to create an effective interna-

tional division of labor to help them in their societies and enhance their

compete with the

readiness and their capacities to

more

why and how

to say about

however,

it is

to

do

this in

radical Islamists.

I

have

chapter thirteen. For now,

important to explain what makes the non-state actors

especially the apocalyptic terrorist groups

—

so dangerous.

TERRORISTS AND MUSLIM ANGER Earlier, sible,

I

spoke of

WMD materials and components being far too acces-

both for the states seeking them and for non-state actors. There

can be

little

doubt that Al Qaeda and

its

global network of like-minded

radical Islamists certainly have the motivation to acquire

These

groups are

terrorist

far

more dangerous than

because their ambition, particularly

and use them.

their predecessors

as it relates to inflicting destruction,

dwarfs anything previous terrorist groups ever imagined.

Laden has spoken often of a global war inflict

against

pain and suffering on the United States and

way he charges the West with having Muslims worldwide.

On

at least

its allies

in the

to

same

and suffering on

inflicted pain

one occasion, Bin Laden has even bor-

rowed from the image of the cold war America and the

Osama Bin

America and the need

that was so often invoked

Soviets: "Just as they're killing us,

so that there will be a balance of terror. This

is

the

we have first

between

to kill

them

time the balance

of terror has been close between the two parties, between Muslims and

Americans, in the modern age. American politicians used to do whatever they wanted with

us.

The

victim was forbidden to scream or to moan." 16

Bin Laden has charged that America was leading "the most dangerous, fierce

and savage Crusade advanced against Islam," and that "a na-

tion of 1,200 million

Muslims

is

being butchered from

its

east to

its

west

every day in Palestine, Iraq, Somalia, the south of Sudan, Kashmir, the Philippines, Bosnia, Chechnya, and Asam." 17 His

the sake of the one God." As Bin

lam are waiting

a call "to sacrifice for

Laden has proclaimed, the "youth of Is-

for their scholars to say such words." 18

"Whether Osama

wghas begun."

is

is

killed or remains, thanks

be to

He

even

says,

God that the awaken-

19

In the face of such an "awakening," military responses or traditional

160

a

Statecraft in

New

World

forms of deterrence are not only irrelevant but probably also counter-

We

productive.

must use the instruments of statecraft

to use statecraft effectively,

how

the

we had

better understand

means of globalization promote new

Globalization, the Internet, terrorism's tively.

it is

recruits,

that images of

way. But

awakening and

it.

Globalization clearly has a dark side.

increasingly porous,

new

in a

this

and using

It is

intelligence effec-

not just that borders are

what "have-nots" lack and what

"haves" possess can be seen in any Internet cafe, and that mythologies of

Western

insults or impositions against Islam

can be spread instanta-

neously around the globe, spawning anger and deepening

The power of the

Internet

is

especially significant given the

graphic trends in the greater Middle East, where as

of the population

is

largely unresponsive to them.

They

They

few employment prospects and

They

much

demo-

70 percent

as

under the age of thirty. This younger population

susceptible to demagogic appeals.

better.

alienation.

thus have

little

is

see corrupt regimes that are

are impatient and dissatisfied, with

expectation that

little

life will

become

hope, and the absence of hope feeds their

twin impulses of frustration and anger.

There

is

something contagious about these

lim populations in Europe

may

not be growing as

East, but their sense of grievance

They

are in societies that

and

fast as in

social isolation

make them

Youthful

feelings.

feel different;

is

Mus-

the Middle

probably greater.

they face discrimi-

nation and exclusion even as they see the possibilities offered to others.

They

find

in the

mosque

connections with one another and often a sense of belonging

—and

the

mosque

Europe, unlike in the Middle East,

in

is

not tied to the social and religious fabric of the state and the larger community, with

its

traditions

and

habits.

observed, adds to their alienation.

And

that, as Francis

Fukuyama

has

20

The Muslims who planned and carried out the July 2005 bombings in London came from families living in segregated and lower-middle-class neighborhoods. At one time, they had been largely aimless, often on drugs, committing petty crimes, and then they found a sense of purpose,

however

diabolical, in the radical Islamist

strike

back

at

mosques and chat rooms.

who have

Violence gives power to those

whomever they hold

felt bereft

responsible for the

161

of

ills

it.

They can

and the sense

— STATECRAFT of grievance they

Like Bin Laden, they can stand up and show that

feel.

they will no longer give

The French

in.

November 2005 was

"intifada" of

carried out largely by

teenagers (and those in their twenties); they were typically unemployed

Having

"cages."

felt

and even respect. Such

Muslims. But using attacks, as the

of liberation and got them atten-

phenomenon

is

text messages

neither new, nor unique to

and blogs to organize arson

French police report the rioters

Europe and

are "wired"

a

a sense

phone

cell

left

did,

Muslim populations

Paradoxically, youthful in

areas they called

legitimately neglected by French society, they

found that violence provided tion

Muslim

in segregated, largely

and generally living

out in their

home

is

clearly

new 21

that feel disconnected

countries in the Middle East

and connected by the Internet to one another. And Al

Qaeda and the groups

that take their inspiration

from

it

know how

to

use the Internet to fight their fight and inspire actions with explosive potential.

Look Prophet

at

how

the cartoon controversy over the portrayal of the

Muhammad

in

European newspapers entered the world of cy-

berspace and triggered violent protests as a sites incited violence,

to protest the

many

with

result.

Radical Islamic web-

calling for an "embassy-burning day"

—

Muhammad

cartoons and with one

alghorabaa.net

urging people to throw Molotov cocktails and storm embassies. the

same websites spread wild rumors that are taken

at face

Many of

value and of-

ten feature pictures of beheadings and glorify acts of terrorism. 22 In Iraq today there are few, if any, traditional training

the insurgents

how

to build

camps teaching

improvised explosive devices; instead, there

camps over the Internet that teach how to bombs and conduct operations. 23 On websites one finds not

are "virtual" terrorist training

build the

only master

bomb makers

offering instructions

but also videos of successful

ondary bombs have initial

explosion.

killed

will

vail,

American

is

soldiers

superior;

we

I

will suffer the

bombs

where sec-

who came to respond to the can say that the message

are heroic;

impose on those who have humiliated us

and they

to build

attacks, including those

Having seen these videos,

always the same: our faith

we

bomb

on how

you are one of us;

for so long;

way they have forced us

is

we

will pre-

to suffer.

Terrorist training camps in the Libyan desert or outside of Damascus

or in the Bekaa Valley in

Lebanon represented the old landscape, with 162

Statecraft in

of

state sponsors

new

but the

New

World

These may not have completely disappeared,

terror.

landscape, with

homegrown Al Qaeda-type groups and

and an army of "shahids," or martyrs, ready to

cells is

a

sacrifice themselves,

increasingly growing out of this virtual training reality.

Of course, old-school training and direction still remain important. The lead plotters in the aborted effort in August 2006 to bomb multiple airliners flying les traveled to

from London to

New

York, Washington, and Los Ange-

much more know-how.

Pakistan to meet operators with

These kinds of connections create openings for intelligence organizations to disrupt such terror operations. In this case, the British,

Amer-

and Pakistani intelligence agencies worked together to preempt the

ican,

and making

airliner attacks, sharing information

Kingdom and

Pakistan. Developing formal

arrests in the

between intelligence organizations and their leaderships form of

United

and informal relationships is

an essential

and one of the key ingredients in any strategy for

statecraft

countering terrorism.

George Tenet has described how important close, often informal,

was for him to have

it

a

working relationship with each of his counterparts

heading intelligence organizations, and not only among formal American allies

but also with states with

In the

Middle

East,

I

whom we had no

saw Tenet's capacity

treaty relationships. to

24

do business with

his

counterparts in the region based largely on their trust in him. Such trust existed because he invested in building personal to

compare views on what was going on

ties,

spending the time

in the region, sharing his

under-

standing and information on threats to his hosts, demonstrating the benefits

of coordination, and even having frank discussions on our areas of

disagreements or where he believed internal change in the host country

was needed for reasons of their

self-interest.

Having developed the

rela-

tionships in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, and Pakistan, he could be frank even

Such relationships landscape. in

They

will

on

issues sensitive to his hosts.

pay big dividends

are one important

in the

measure of

new

international

statecraft that leaders

every American administration must be sure to develop. Unfortu-

nately, after

Tenet

left as

CIA

director, his successors

no longer pre-

served or sought to nurture the relationships with their counterparts the

way he

had.

This form of statecraft takes for granted that non-state terrorists are

163

STATECRAFT here to

stay.

At the same time, we must take up the more fundamental

challenge of cutting off the ability of the radical Islamists to recruit

new

followers. This

essence,

it is

is

obviously not just an intelligence problem. In

its

problem of hearts and minds.

a

The awakening and

the battle for legitimacy

and

Zbig-

the moral high ground.

niew Brzezinski, who was President Carter's national security

advisor,

argues that the terrorist "awakening" has explosive potential

among

youth throughout the developing world, Muslim and non-Muslim

and

is

creating "revolutionaries-in-waiting."

Al Qaeda seems to understand its

effort

and certainly Bin Laden's

non-Muslims tage:

this,

as well. In this

is

and while

to

alike,

25

its

focus

is

on Muslims,

undermine our behavior among

environment,

we have

major disadvan-

a

American power and purpose are deeply questioned, and the war in magnified the anger toward and rejection of

Iraq, fairly or not, has

American

policies.

26

To much of the Sunni Muslim world and beyond, confirm the American readiness to to U.S. interests.

kill

Notwithstanding claims that the Sunni-Shi'a

the Islamic world

is

split in

exaggerated, there has been a deafening silence

much of the Arab Sunni world

throughout

the war seems to

Muslims and subjugate them

bomb-

in response to suicide

ings that have taken, and continue to take, a horrendous and daily toll

the Shi'as in Iraq, including

Where

is

when they

the outcry from Arab leaders or leading Sunni clerics?

essentially nonexistent. Instead,

States

is

ing on

we hear

criticism of

doing to the Iraqi people and the costs

them

—

on

are worshipping in mosques.

its

It is

what the United

campaign

certainly not an illegitimate concern, but

is

impos-

where

is

the

outrage about the suicidal bombing campaign that targets primarily Iraqi civilians?

Similarly,

much of

the rest of the world, especially

among

those

revolutionaries-in-waiting, see us as the cause of the problem. In their eyes, just,

we have imposed

a

war on Iraq that

is

widely considered to be un-

perceived as inflicting great suffering on the Iraqi population, and

seen as guided by narrow, Israelis'

extensive

2006, which

many

selfish, oil-related interests.

27

In addition, the

bombing and destruction of Lebanon internationally and especially in the

164

in the

war of

Muslim world

Statecraft in

a

New

World

believed was not only sanctioned but also encouraged by the United States, has

As

deepened the sense of resentment toward America.

viewed

not

can change

because

new dark age

an environment in which America terrorists.

As hard

as

it

is

are to succeed in changing

younger population has

this vast

modern world, not

left

behind.

is

to accept

it.

And we

aspirations;

They

don't

or a dictatorship of religious intolerance. But

we

We must demonstrate that We must prove are not indifferent to the plight of Palestinians. We must show that on

must

we we

a

we

face reality if

it,

they want to be part of the

want

in

morally superior to

as

we must

this,

we must compete

a result,

ways

find

to address

them on

their terms.

are prepared to tackle broader issues of social justice.

—

community such as global warming, we are on the right side of the issues and

issues that affect the international

health pandemics, and poverty

leading the way.

It

cluding those in the reject the Islamists.

and

this, too, will

challenges that

if

tively are seen as

—

we will have to work with others, inMuslim world who may be critical of us but who also

won't be easy;

We will also need to work closely with the Europeans,

be complicated by the internal challenges they face not dealt with effectively will affect whether

we

collec-

holding the moral high ground.

The French and the Germans may believe that they are viewed differently than we are because they did not support the war in Iraq; because, together with their European partners, they commit much more material assistance proportionately and collectively to fighting global

much more open and limitations on their own

poverty; because they are

to favoring international

law, institutions,

sovereignty; and because,

much more with And yet, how these

particularly in the case of the French, they identify

the Palestinian cause than nations treat their tor internationally.

w ith T

Muslim populations As

I

dogma

among

alienated, marginalized

liberal

democracy be

—

is

increasingly going to be a fac-

have already noted, and

Steven Simon catalog, jihadist

failing

the cause of Israel.

as a

Muslims

model

if

as

Daniel Benjamin and

has found a fertile breeding ground in

Europe. 28

the Europeans

How

fail

—

as

attractive

can

they are

now

to integrate culturally diverse populations into a single, cohe-

sive national

community? Francis Fukuyama persuasively argues

that

"violence linked to unassimilated second- and third-generation Muslims in

Holland, France, and Britain represents a political time bomb." 29

165

STATECRAFT Won't the problems the Europeans are having with their Muslim populations have an effect on the struggle with the radical Islamists? If it is

likely to

do

we promote

should

so,

a

among and with the EuWould we have any credibility

dialogue

ropeans on issues of societal integration?

doing so? In an era in which domestic issues

may be

an integral part of

the struggle internationally with the radical Islamists,

address questions that traditionally policy.

And when we do

skills to

we

so,

the task. Anything

less,

form the psychological and radical Islamists

is

will

we may have

to

seemed outside the scope of foreign have to bring

and we may

social terrain

find

all

it

our tools and

very

all

our

difficult to trans-

on which the struggle with the

w aged. T

UNFAMILIAR THREATS: THE NEW DANGERS OF

WEAK AND FAILING STATES Weak and failing states are not necessarily new, but in today's world they create new opportunities for penetration by radical Islamists and criminal networks. One definition of a failed state is that it has lost control over most of its territory and has stopped providing even the most rudi-

mentary services

to

its

people.

Many states, particularly in Africa,

fit

this

category and are essentially powerless to stop terrorist groups from setting

up shop

in their territory.

Globally, the tially failing,

World Bank

describing

identifies close to thirty countries as essen-

them

as

"low income" and "under

stress."

The

UK Department for International Development identifies forty-six such "fragile" states, with these countries described as

ceptible to terrorism,

of

how one

port, the

armed

counts, the

World Bank

conflict,

problem

is

and epidemic

disease.

30

it

last

issued such findings.

In speaking of dealing with terror,

it

has

swamp"

helped to spawn

terrorists.

One

rorism depends on recognizing

becoming

31

become popular

—meaning undoing

to "draining the

Regardless

growing, not receding. In a 2006 re-

identified nine additional countries as

"fragile" in the three years since

oped

impoverished and sus-

to refer

the conditions that have

part of the strategy for defeating ter-

how

terrorist

networks can be devel-

in states that lack capabilities, institutions,

and infrastructure.

Failed or failing states such as Somalia or Cote d'lvoire (which was re-

cently added to the

World Bank's

list

166

of failing or fragile

states)

simply

Statecraft in

means

don't have the

to prevent terrorist

a

New

—law enforcement

World

or military or border controls

groups from situating themselves in their

Afghanistan remains a failing

state,

the weakness of the state that permitted Al stead, it

territories.

but under the Taliban

Qaeda

it

was not

to operate there; in-

was the Taliban's conscious choice to support Al Qaeda and give

it

The

the benefits of sanctuary and support.

Qaeda stood

for

Taliban believed in what Al

and was doing, and also benefited from Bin Laden's

largesse.

The

Taliban's support, then, constituted state-sponsored support for

much

terrorism and could have, and arguably should have, triggered

tougher responses from us prior to 9/1

1.

But what does one do when Al

Qaeda or others (Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Taliban) operate as

in places

such

Somalia or even in the hinterlands of Pakistan, which seem beyond

the reach of the national governments? Pakistan

biguous case.

and

It

has

much

a strong central

is

clearly a

government. However,

so). It also

army

previously supported

it

Lashkar-e-Taiba over the Kashmir (and to some extent ing

more am-

greater capability, with a professional

may

still

be do-

continues to demonstrate ambivalence and hesitancy in

going after Al Qaeda and Taliban elements along

its

Afghan border,

for

fear of igniting internal difficulties. In theory, Pakistan could be held

accountable either by the United States or by operating

now from

NATO over the Taliban,

the hinterlands of the country, but concerns over

preserving the stability of the Pakistani government, and not pushing too

far,

limit our collective willingness to pressure the

it

Musharraf gov-

ernment.

most cases of weak or

In

to hold accountable. ness, its

claiming that

it

The just

failed states, there

existing

a

government and not

uary 2005 that

his

simply no government

cannot control terrorist groups operating from

territory; certainly the president

heads

is

government can simply plead weakof the Palestinian Authority (who

a state) has

argued since

government was powerless

to stop

his election in Jan-

Hamas, the Islamic

Jihad, and the Al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades from carrying out acts of terror.

(After

Hamas won

number of seats in the Palestinian became more believable.) standpoint of terrorist groups, weak or fragile states may be the greatest

Legislative Council, this

From the even more desirable than already failed states as a place to base themselves. Their relatively more developed infrastructure may provide a 167

STATECRAFT more hospitable place

in

which

to operate,

and yet the absence of good

governance and the presence of extensive corruption offer easy access to these countries and likely to

inality

is

mafias

may

be rampant

United States

is

protection. In either case, crim-

weak or

means of support

offer additional

meeting the needs of groups such If the

some

in either

as

terrorists

failing states

for

and

local

movement and

for

Al Qaeda.

serious about "draining the swamp,"

we have to

find ways to strengthen weak or failing states and also to ameliorate or settle the local or regional conflicts that terial assistance sary.

keep them weak. Targeted ma-

from the international community

However, such assistance

is

is,

of course, neces-

almost certain to be squandered

if it is

not tied to the development of institutions for good governance: customs

and tax collection, port and maritime

security, air traffic control,

law en-

forcement, judicial reform, and the delivery of health care and education.

No

has the

on

its

one outside country, even one

means or the wisdom

as

capable as the United States,

and promote good government

own.

There states,

to develop

is

no magic

solution;

no shortcut

is

available.

To

restore failed

other governments and nongovernmental organizations will have

to share the labor.

There can be

a natural division

of labor between gov-

ernments who have greater experience in particular regions French

in Africa) or in particular

(e.g.,

the

forms of assistance for institution or

capacity development (the Norwegians) or in peacekeeping and nation-

building missions (the European Union). Similarly, Bill

NGOs

(such as the

and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Clinton Global

FAFO) and

the

World Bank must coordinate

Initiative,

in order to tackle, for ex-

ample, the health-related problems that undermine the capacity of failing or

weak

states to function

because sickness

literally saps their strength

and resources.

There

is

no shortage of those internationally who are committed

to

trying to deal with the challenges of weak and failing states. But this area

more than others

cries

out for effective statecraft carried out with

sense of urgency and commitment. This

of many different nations and

means orchestrating the

a

efforts

NGOs in a way that takes account of their

respective strengths and eliminating redundant and uncoordinated assistance efforts, other.

which often detract rather than complement one an-

As one example, the World Bank reports that

168

in Afghanistan, the

Statecraft in

a

New

World

Ministry of Finance receives competing "technical assistance for customs

modernization from the Bank, USAID, and the European Union,"

all

without these entities effectively talking to one another or ensuring that 32 they are tackling different slices of the problem. Apart from potentially

uncoordinated donor assistance, in the

vitiating the effect of the aid,

words of one developmental agerial

specialist, also constitutes "a

burden on low-capacity

tribute to the very

states."

cies

far too

Too

problem they are trying

things, forcing local beneficiaries

spend

33

much time

to

massive man-

often donor efforts con-

overcome

by,

and the most talented

among other people to

local

dealing with the needs of the donor bureaucra-

and consultants.

It is

not just that

Someone must

new approaches

are necessary. Leadership

is,

too.

take the lead internationally in providing impetus, di-

rection, coordination, follow-through, feedback, evaluation,

and the

pressure to act rapidly in dealing with the needs of failing states in conflict-ridden regions.

Can sons. a

the United States do

For one thing,

we rank

it?

Presently,

lowest

it is

unlikely, for several rea-

among leading industrial

nations (on

per capita basis) in our developmental assistance for poverty reduction.

For another,

we

lack the moral authority.

Having opposed Kyoto and the

Geneva

International Criminal Court, appeared to suggest that the

Convention on torture did not apply ism, and

to

our forces in the war on terror-

gone to war in Iraq over the apparent opposition of the Security

Council, the United States too often appears to be outside the international consensus

lems

is

on what serves the public good. What adds

that the reality of our

to

our prob-

power (and our way of wielding

it)

also

breeds resentment. In the post-cold war world, the use of our

among our Fukuyama

allies in

Europe even before the

power created anxiety

Iraq war.

Then,

has observed, the Bush administration's "contemptuous

brush-off of most forms of international cooperation," and

commitment to

a security doctrine

tual, believes that

the United States must restore

internationally.

its

public

of preemption fostered the growth of

anti-Americanism. 34 Josef Joffe, an Americanophile

good works

as Francis

its

German

intellec-

identification with

35

Perhaps the end of the Bush administration will create an opening

and ease the resentment of American hegemony.

169

If so, a

new

U.S. effort

STATECRAFT to

show

we

are willing to lead the

way on

issues such as global

environmental degradation, and poverty reduction

ing,

to

that

adopt the Joffe recommendation

But

were

I

prefer not to wait.

to set a

new tone and

—might

Even now,

I

suspect that

if

strategy.

Rice would have to do

Of course,

much more

money where our mouth

is

who

exploit poverty for purit

easier to attract

President Bush and Secretary

than change their tone. Putting our

on capacity building

certainly add to our credibility.

The

the United States

define capacity building as central to reduc-

ing poverty and also to dealing with those

common

in other words,

well have a great effect.

poses of terror, the Bush administration might find others to a

—

warm-

Lebanon

is

weak

in

would

states

an interesting case in point.

administration committed $230 million to the reconstruction effort

after the

we have

2006 war.

It

spoke of launching a major donor

seen, however,

is

that Iran

was more

initiative.

effective in getting

What

monies

immediately to Hizbollah, and the Western international community,

which has the means

to

produce much more assistance than Iran (espe-

cially given the willingness

of the Gulf oil states to contribute), took far

longer to get launched and then to ensure that donor monies got to those

who needed and could use them. Taking fine,

the lead in the donor efforts

is

but there must be follow-through and a continuing level of interest.

Onetime events

that get attention

ministration; outside of Iraq,

it is

seem too often difficult to see

to drive the

Bush ad-

where the administra-

tion has sustained the effort.

CONCLUSION Needless to

we

are

now

say, I

have not sought to discuss every challenge to statecraft

facing.

With polar

ice caps shrinking

global climate change will affect our need to

and oceans

work with

rising,

others. Oil de-

pendency and consumption have an impact not only on global warming but also on the security problems America faces with Iran, Venezuela,

and increasingly Russia. The higher the prices and the dependency, the

more

confident, assertive, and irresponsible these oil-producing states

are likely to become. it is

At

a

time when alternatives to

irresponsible for the U.S.

sidies,

government (using

imposed emission standards on

170

utilities

oil

are cost-effective,

a judicious

and

cars,

mix of sub-

and possibly

a

a

Statecraft in

gas tax) not to ity

New

World

make the end of oil dependency

a national security prior-

over the coming decade.

However, resolving these issues depends

on leadership. Surely there

less relevant to

Clearly, there are a

and more

statecraft

as Presidents

our na-

for

Ahmadinejad and

the United States and the rest of the world.

number of

issues

and countries

cussed in this chapter. As important as China

emerging power

on

no more important objective

making leaders such

tional security than

Chavez

is

less

is,

I

India

have not disis

also a large

that will affect the international landscape and create

interesting openings for U.S. statecraft. Russia, too, remains a colossus

on the world

nize that Russia can be a pivotal player

compounding

—

it

comes

I

certainly recog-

to ameliorating or

transnational threats and dangers such as proliferation

and climate change. While seeking

we can

when

stage.

on an

certainly

to gain Russia's cooperation

issue like Iranian nukes

—we need

to

where under-

stand that Russia will frequently try to stake out a posture that suits

its

desire to be an alternative to the United States internationally. Psychologically, Russia will strive to

recoup

lost

its

standing as a global power,

and certainly not one inferior or beholden to the United deliberately playing

American

on Russian

statecraft in the years

States.

and

feelings of insecurity

loss

Without

of stature,

ways to show the when their behavbecome far less relevant

ahead will need to

find

Russians that they can be effective on the world stage

and cooperative but

iors are responsible

when they

are not. If nothing else, this argues for coordinating very

closely with the Europeans

ing our ing

will

maximum

them when

on how best

to deal with the Russians, ensur-

leverage for either including the Russians or exclud-

their behavior warrants doing so.

The international realities we face in the early demand our understanding, effective assessments,

twenty-first century

the ability to match

our objectives and our means, the know-how to wield influence well and to get others to

do what we want, and the

policy instruments at our disposal. In a

which knowledge felt,

is

skillful application

—we have

especially after Iraq

is

little

more

the

are

likely to

more

in

intensely

be constrained

choice but to become far more

adept in exercising every aspect of statecraft.

171

all

more complicated world,

more widely shared, resentments

and the use of our hard power

of

STATECRAFT Ultimately, there

no aspect of statecraft that

is

does not depend on negotiations.

War

is

a

in

one way or another

form of statecraft, but

its

ter-

mination usually involves negotiations. Preventing war surely involves negotiations

—

or mediation; building collective approaches to security

does too. Promoting more enduring structures for peace requires negotiations;

and

so,

of course, does convincing others to work together to

defuse potential conflicts, build capacity in failing and weak states, or find

ways to empower moderate Muslims. In

lifeblood of statecraft.

It is

effect, negotiations are the

through negotiations that one persuades,

suades, induces, threatens, and presents choices. tions that

It is

dis-

through negotia-

one often discovers and exerts one's points of leverage. Having

described cases of effective and ineffective statecraft and the landscape that U.S. foreign policy

sion of when, why, and

must now contend with,

how to

let

us turn to a discus-

negotiate and mediate.

172

8.

NEGOTIATIONS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF STATECRAFT

Negotiations are probably the most essential tool of statecraft. Problems or crises can be resolved through negotiations. Wars might be averted

through negotiations, and when not averted, are oftentimes brought to an end by negotiations. Every single instrument of statecraft in one way or another involves negotiations. Indeed, even in those cases in which

declare that takes place

we

will not talk to another country,

—and with

communication

much

less

still

objectives clearly in mind.

Take, for example, the U.S. approach to Iran. Although talking,

we

meeting

directly,

we

are not

we send messages through

countries, designed to affect the Iranian calculus

—

other

and, of course, those

countries transmit messages back to us. While in the past

we might have

we would not negotiate over American hostages being held in Iran Lebanon, we did negotiate through third parties. Some may confuse

said

or

our stated declaration of never "bargaining" over the release of hostages as

meaning

that

we would not

negotiate. But, through the Algerians,

did negotiate with Iran to resolve the hostage the

Red Cross and other

private intermediaries,

sions with Hizbollah about the

ing the

why

crisis in 1980,

we held

American hostages held

George H. W. Bush administration.

When we

we

and through

indirect discus-

in

Lebanon dur-

tried to find out

hostages were being held or the circumstances in which they might

be released,

when we were conveying what might happen

173

positively if

STATECRAFT more ominously what would happen

they were released or not,

we were

if

they were

certainly negotiating.

Negotiations are employed not just to reach mutual understanding but also to achieve particular ends. Whether

When is

we

are trying to conciliate

mechanism we use

or coerce, negotiations are typically the

for

doing

so.

Prussian military thinker Carl von Clausewitz observed that war

an act of violence designed to achieve political ends, he was saying

that countries go to

achieved

war

at a lesser cost

to achieve particular goals. If those goals can be

through diplomacy, then so

much the better. But

coercion works best, using the threat or application of hard power to

make

clear to an adversary

through equals

—indeed,

what he

is

losing and

what he might yet

lose

Negotiations don't have to take place between

his actions.

Sometimes

in international relations, they rarely do.

countries will go to war to shake

up the

quo and give

status

their adver-

sary an incentive to change behavior through a negotiated process.

Anwar Sadat went to war in 1973 not because he expected Egypt's army to vanquish Israel's but because he thought he might alter the Is(and perhaps also the American view of the status quo)

raeli calculus

and produce

a negotiating process that

would eventually

yield the re-

turn of his country's land. Later, knowing that there would be only losses

from the further employment of force and frustrated by the diplomatic stalemate, Sadat

went

to Jerusalem

gesture of conciliation, he tiations that

—

believing that through a dramatic

would induce the

would rapidly lead

Israelis to

to their withdrawal

enter into nego-

from the

Sinai.

As the United States surveys the international landscape and pursues its

interests,

it

will

employ negotiations with

and with countries with

whom it would

adversaries, with friends,

like to

improve

relations. It will

negotiate in international forums to produce certain desired outcomes, to alter the behavior of those

tional sanction for

its

it

sees as a threat, or to produce interna-

use of force where diplomacy has

failed. In

2003

the Bush administration succeeded in negotiating one Security Council resolution, 1441, that

Saddam Hussein that respect,

and

national support.

it

thought would give

did not a

comply with

its

it

the backing to use force

demands.

It

if

miscalculated in

second resolution was required to achieve such inter-

The

administration's effort to negotiate the second res-

olution failed not because

it

was impossible to achieve such

a resolution

but because the administration was not willing to meet the terms of the

174

Negotiations as

an Instrument of Statecraft

key swing voters (Chile and Mexico) only

if

the administration gave

UN

who would

accept the resolution

inspectors another thirty to sixty

days to determine whether Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction.

Regardless of whether

we

are trying to head off threats or build

alliances or alter the terms of international trade or

any American president

While Americans ate, a closer

number of

will preside over a

like to think

of themselves

answer the broader

AIDS pandemic

challenge of contending with poverty and the

new

in Africa,

negotiations.

always willing to negoti-

as

look at our self-image and ethos suggests that our attitudes

toward negotiations have often been ambivalent.

We

have not always

embraced negotiations enthusiastically and have frequently ruled out talks

with certain countries and leaders. In a more complicated interna-

tional landscape,

our need to negotiate

may

increase, forcing us to get

past our ambivalence and prepare to negotiate in circumstances

might have excluded in the

we

past.

THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS

One

reason

principles

Woodrow Wilson was

were

inviolable.

not an effective negotiator

adjustment to others that required compromise with basic beliefs

and principles are important. They

should inform thinking and behavior.

freedom, individual

is

that his

There could be no concession on principle or

rights, respect

beliefs.

reflect basic values

And our

Such and

values and our belief in

and protection for minorities, and the

rule of law should not be compromised.

But negotiations are about mutual adjustment. That

compromise. Our values do not get self-image does.

We

in the

see ourselves as

is

way of negotiations, but our

selfless, as

adopting positions that

represent only a higher good. American "exceptionalism"

bedded

in

our national psyche.

It

the American public considers

only out of a higher purpose,

who

the essence of

is

deeply em-

how we act

creates an ethos that also informs its

how

behavior internationally. If easy

is it

to

compromise with those

don't?

Because of our self-image, we have often been attracted to concepts that

seem

to require

minimal diplomacy and negotiation. Containment

of the Soviet Union was straightforward

175

—

align with those

who would

STATECRAFT oppose the Soviets and provide them the military and economic support to

do

Certainly statecraft was involved, but the negotiation was lim-

so.

what military and economic payoffs were necessary

ited to seeing

to in-

duce or protect our potential partners. Negotiations to change the behavior of those

who

did not so easily

the world were not given tion

made

much

fit

priority.

into our cold

war division of

Only the Kennedy administra-

a serious effort in this regard. Its Alliance for Progress in Latin

—poverty and sentment of America's power and patronizing posture— might with Kennedy's who would be with Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt—one of new "nonaligned movement" — was of by of reflected an understanding that other factors

America

re-

influence

or against us. Similarly,

willing to align

pursuit

relationship

a

driven

the

the leaders

that the world was not black

necessarily ever, the

were

a belief

and white and that our cold war division un-

made enemies of those who might not be

complicated and ultimately

hostile to us.

futile negotiations

How-

with Nasser

reminder that those with regional ambitions were themselves

a

keen to exploit superpower competition for their

own

purposes.

1

Detente, unlike "containment," required mutual adjustment and

even accommodation with our adversary ior to

change

We were changing our behav-

theirs, confident that talking, as

opposed

to containing,

could create greater payoffs for our interests and make us more, not secure.

Not

less,

surprisingly, such a shift in course faced domestic criticism.

While the American public has supported negotiations, abstract, skepticism

at least in the

and fear of what we might be trading away have

al-

ways created constraints on policies that seemed to depend heavily on negotiations with adversaries. As noted in chapter

came under severe domestic criticism for his viet Union and was clearly constrained by it.

1,

Henry Kissinger

negotiations with the So-

Similarly, conducting negotiations or a dialogue with certain adversaries has

been seen

tionably, that

is

as legitimizing

how some

critics

them and weakening

with the Soviet Union during the Nixon years. to

us.

Unques-

of detente viewed U.S. negotiations

The

fear that

by talking

our adversaries we would strengthen them and give them greater

staying

power has shaped our approach

off-limits for years. Iraq,

way

Iran and

This

is

North Korea have

not to say that

to negotiations.

Cuba

has been

under Saddam Hussein, was treated the same at

times also been put in this category.

we should have been 176

talking to these countries

Negotiations as

or their leaders, or that less

an Instrument of Statecraft

we should be

willing to talk to everyone regard-

of the circumstances. There are those

whose behavior

is

who

deserve to be ostracized,

so unacceptable that isolation

not only to punish them but also for the signal

the only answer

is it

sends others about

behaviors that won't be tolerated or ever accommodated. There are,

however, also reasons to talk to adversaries, ranging from defusing

war to finding ways to change dangerous or objec-

threats and avoiding

The challenge is to know how to use negotiations for our purposes and to make good judgments on whom to talk to and when tionable behavior.

to

do

so.

NEGOTIATING WITH ADVERSARIES

When

considering negotiations with adversaries there

question to ask:

"What

are

you going

son to

talk,

talk.

enough common

is

interest for

rea-

and that was to avoid mutual annihilation. There could

common

interest,

though

it

was based more

a shared fear than a shared desire. Negotiations driven

fears

very basic

With the Soviet Union, we had one overriding

hardly be a more powerful

on

a

to talk about?" Clearly, the starting

point has to be deciding whether there the two sides to

is

more than hopes, won't

by negatives,

necessarily resolve conflict, but they can

reduce dangers; they can make relationships more predictable; they can lessen the prospect of miscalculation and conflict; and they can

competition. That

Union were designed

to do.

By

definition,

contain hostility; they don't remove

Even when deciding that there versary, leaders will also

worth the

need

achieve

is

damage

to other objectives.

ity.

Some

manage

what arms-control agreements with the Soviet

is

effort

is

to ask

such agreements channel or

it.

something to

talk

about with an ad-

whether the objective they hope to

and whether

Take Iran and

it

can be met without doing

its

pursuit of nuclear capabil-

see the danger of an Iran with nuclear

weapons

any other concern, and argue that talking to Iran

is

as

superseding

necessary to get the

mullahs to give up their nuclear ambitions. Others see the mullah rule in Iran as an enduring threat and are not prepared to countenance negoti-

ating with the Iranian leaders if the price of doing so

is

to

undercut

Ira-

nian reformers and democrats.

Whether with

Iran,

North Korea, or anyone 177

else,

negotiations are a

STATECRAFT two-way want

street. If

to receive

we

ask the other party to give

something they value

Korea will simply surrender

from

specific

its

in return.

survival.

its

will

Neither Iran nor North

nuclear ambitions or capabilities. Apart

economic and technological

seeks guarantees for

up something, they

payoffs, each of these regimes

Neoconservatives would have

a

hard

time supporting such a tradeoff, believing the regimes themselves are always constitute a grave threat, and must not in any

evil, will

gitimized or safeguarded. Indeed, during the

George W. Bush, neoconservatives' formation of any policy

who

first

way be

le-

term of President

belief in regime change blocked the

with regard to Iran. Between those

at all, at least

who

favored regime change and those (around Colin Powell)

sup-

ported negotiating an agreement with the Iranian regime, there was no

middle ground. So long

as the president did

two divergent approaches, there was no

not decide between these

policy, save for letting the

peans talk to the Iranians and dissociating ourselves from those

was

a policy

Euro-

talks. It

by default because the gap in the administration was never

bridged or overcome.

Early in his second term, President Bush shifted course and was

ready to give indirect negotiations a

try.

The

policy

became one not of

joining the Europeans in the talks but of coordinating with

them and

The neoconservawith Vice President Cheney and

permitting them to offer incentives to the Iranians. tives in the administration associated

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld seemed to believe that the negotiations

with the Iranians could not succeed and that

when they

failed,

regime

change would again become the preferred option.

From

this standpoint, the

neoconservatives continued to reject the

essence of what negotiations produce

both

sides.

—namely, something of

value for

For them, any gains for the Iranian regime would sustain

and dishearten

its

opposition, and avoiding that

outcome dwarfed

it

all

other concerns, including the nuclear one. If nothing else, this is a

fluence

how any American

cal leader) is

there

is

a

ceit, their its

reminder that multiple considerations

will in-

administration (or for that matter any politi-

going to approach negotiations with adversaries. With Iran,

profound mistrust of the mullahs, and of their perceived desupport for

friends in the

terror,

Middle

and their enduring

East.

No

hostility to

U.S. president

178

is

America and

going to ignore pub-

Negotiations as lie

an Instrument of Statecraft

perceptions of Iran or the possible political fallout from negotiating

The

directly with the Iranian leadership.

out negotiations, particularly Iranians from going nuclear

if

No

one

might not rule

the only other option for preventing the the use of force, but domestic concerns

is

are likely to figure prominently in

packaged publicly.

politics alone

how

negotiations are approached, and

be keen to be portrayed

will

as soft

on the

Iranian mullahs.

Domestic

political

concerns have also obviously affected the readi-

ness of different administrations to talk to Cuba.

the

Cuban

exile

community

and

in Florida

The

political

New Jersey,

weight of

together with

the wish to avoid doing anything that might strengthen Fidel Castro, has

influenced presidents from

Lyndon Johnson

George W. Bush.

to

Quite apart from these concerns, American presidents and their principal advisors

must

also consider

affected by our talking to those theirs too.

It

should come

as

how our

who

friends

and

allies will

be

are not only our adversaries but

no surprise that our friends typically see

such talks in zero-sum terms: gains for their adversaries are losses for them. Consider, for example, the case of the Koreas. For most of South Korea's history, call into

leader

it

feared anything that would strengthen the

question the American

Kim

II

Sung saw

commitment to

bilateral talks

North or

the South. In the North,

with the United States

as a

major

victory and as demonstrating our recognition and acceptance of the

North

after the cold war.

Not surprisingly, until South Korea adopted

its

"sunshine" policy of opening to the North, they saw U.S. bilateral talks

with the North as coming

at its

Similarly, during the 1970s

expense. 2

and 1980s, Yasir Arafat sought to gain

American recognition of the PLO, believing

that

would create an inex-

orable logic leading to Palestinian statehood. Israel, on the other hand,

saw any American discussions with the

PLO

prior to Oslo in 1993 as a

mortal threat. In each of these examples, to talk

would have been

a

North Korea and the PLO, our readiness

mistake unless

we developed

a clear

meaningful objective and coordinated with the South Koreans and prior to the talks. Since leaders such as

were so anxious consequence

for the direct talks,

in return for

it

Kim

II

Sung and

and

Israel

Yasir Arafat

was essential to get something of

holding negotiations. Naturally, the anxiety

179

— a

STATECRAFT that both the

them

led

South Koreans and the

Israelis felt

would probably have

impose onerous preconditions

to seek to

for

our talking

preconditions amounting to a surrender of what the North Koreans and

PLO

the

held dear. In such circumstances, our friends would likely have

made

created conditions that

talks impossible.

we talk in such circumstances, the fact remains that with some negotiations we will face a dilemma. To address it, we must satisfy ourselves that the potenWhile not wanting our friends

gains from holding talks are sufficiently high to overrule the objec-

tial

tions of

our

important

friends.

do

if

talking to the

and

a

a

the talks

would have been

plicit

At

minimum, our

—not only on what we

are likely to it

to be the arbiters of whether

PLO

easier to reassure the Israelis about the United States if

we had been very

clear that nothing less than ex-

recognition of Israel's right to exist as an independent, Jewish state

renunciation of terror would be acceptable as the conditions for

gan administration, launched

a

dialogue with the

tance of Security Council resolution 242 and

vaguer formulation that

and

on what we

what we want. As an example,

beginning negotiations. Instead, the United States,

far

must be clear and

are trying to gain, but also

to achieve

fail

objectives

left

left Israel

its

at the

end of the Rea-

PLO based on its accep-

—

readiness to negotiate

highly suspicious of the dialogue

the incoming Bush administration in a position of constantly

having to reassure the

Israelis.

Recognizing that our friends are likely to be highly fearful of talks with their adversaries, ever, at times, if

we need

to avoid surprises if at all possible.

How-

with great secrecy a breakthrough with strategic impli-

cations for the region or internationally

is

possible, there

is

probably no

choice but to keep an ally in the dark. Certainly the strategic payoff of the opening to China warranted, in the eyes of President

Henry

Kissinger, keeping their secret

other cases, domestic considerations it

surprises important friends. In late

Nixon and

diplomacy from the Taiwanese. In

may argue for taking a step even if November 1990, for example, after

the

UN

"all

necessary means" to expel Iraq from Kuwait, the Saudis were taken

Security Council adopted a resolution authorizing the use of

by surprise by President Bush's announcement the next morning that he was inviting Saddam Hussein to send an envoy to Washington, and that he would be sending Secretary James Baker to Baghdad to see Saddam Hussein.

180

Negotiations as

President Bush

felt that

an Instrument of Statecraft

he had to prove to our public that he had gone

the extra mile to avoid using force, particularly

judgment made

war. Domestically, his

if later

we had

sense. Unfortunately,

to go to

he

the

left

Saudis out of the equation, and his announcement shocked them.

The

me

and,

Saudi ambassador to the United States, Bandar bin Sultan, called highly agitated, charged that

we were

giving

Saddam

a great victory

and

sawing off the limb the Saudis had gone out on to receive American forces in the kingdom.

It

took time and effort to reassure the Saudis, and

Saudi pressure led the president to scale back his public only to have Secretary Baker meet a representative of

someplace other than

Iraq.

Even

offer,

Saddam

agreeing Hussein's

then, the Saudis remained suspicious.

3

Taking the Saudis into our confidence before the president's an-

nouncement might have

relieved their anxiety without robbing the an-

nouncement of its desired dramatic

effect. Naturally,

led the Saudis to talk the president out of his plan real reason for reluctance to take

our

it

—and

might

also have

that often

is

the

our confidence: the con-

allies into

cern that a president will have to overcome opposition to what he feels

our interests require.

Our

interests

and those of our friends are not

liances are the context for

identical.

But our

al-

our diplomacy. So, when contemplating nego-

tiations with the adversaries

of our friends,

we have

to prepare the

ground.

NEGOTIATING WITH HOSTILE NON-STATE ACTORS As non-state threats or actors make themselves to build to

felt,

pressures are going

engage them in dialogue. By definition, these groups are the

spearheads of violence and terrorism, and often pose existential threats to

our

friends.

Nonetheless,

it

did not take long for there to be calls for

the United States to begin talking to the insurgents in Iraq in order to stop the insurgency. Similarly, the electoral successes of Hizbollah in

Lebanon and Hamas

in the Palestinian Territories

produced

calls for the

United States to begin talking to them, even though each has been on our terrorism Israelis

list.

Imagine the reaction of the

Iraqi

government or the

or even the Lebanese government to an American willingness to

engage these groups.

Should those governments' prospective opposition prevent us from

181

STATECRAFT engaging any of these groups? Perhaps, but the challenge of coping with the threats they pose creates a rising chorus, especially

pean

on us

calling

allies,

Al Qaeda

likely to accept that

members

to negotiate. is

Even

not a

fit

among our Euro-

the European

if

Union

is

partner for discussions,

EU

Hamas were

part

clearly began to say that both Hizbollah and

of the political and social reality of Lebanon and Palestine, and as such,

must be dealt with. In

fact, if

they become acceptable partners, would

not be only a matter of time before the

Muslim Brotherhood and other

were seen in similar terms?

Islamists

Such

it

a prospect

should give us pause, because our willingness to talk

with them will legitimize them and often weaken their moderate opponents.

Moussa Abu Marzouk, one of the

that the outside world

among

Palestinians,

objectives. (In a

Hamas, has declared

must recognize the growing weight of Hamas

even though such recognition will not change

meeting in East Jerusalem with twenty

of Fatah, the leading secular faction

tives

that

leaders of

its

local representa-

among Palestinians,

was told

I

American or even European meetings with Hamas would undercut

them and persuade Hamas

were winning and need not

that they

alter

their behavior.) It

would be disastrous

groups such

as

for

American leaders

to enter into talks with

Hamas, Hizbollah, or the Muslim Brotherhood

without clear ground

rules.

We

must

Egypt

in

establish certain preconditions for

dialogue.

For selves

starters,

from

Arafat did it

it,

they must renounce violence: not only dissociate them-

but also act to discredit

—namely, denounce

out, or, worse, glorify terrorism

ded

in the

common

is

How

not enough to do what Yasir

Many

in the

Arab world

widely and loosely used, and

is

will say that

too

embed-

parlance to be dropped. Unfortunately, that

cisely the problem; a shahid has it.

It is

by saying that those who die while con-

ducting terrorist acts are martyrs. the term martyr (pv shahid)

it.

terrorism but wink at the groups carrying

done what

can terrorism be discredited

when

is

right,

those

is

pre-

and no one questions

who do

it

are

honored

and the term that conveys that honor can't be altered or questioned? Thus, our

criteria for dealing

with

Hamas

or Hizbollah or the

Mus-

lim Brotherhood or others must be their unmistakable dissociation from acts in

of terrorism and their willingness to declare that those

conducting terrorism (or glorifying

182

it)

who

persist

are a threat to their cause. But

Negotiations as

we must demand ist

that they go a step further: they

with Israel and be prepared to negotiate with

discuss with

them

if eradication

program? This

political

to

an Instrument of Statecraft

it.

must be ready

of the state of Israel remained part of their

especially true at a time

is

to coex-

What exactly would we when they

are trying

convince the Arab street that they represent the wave of the future

and that there

is

no need

to accept a two-state solution to the Israeli-

Palestinian conflict. All Palestinians

with those

will not deal

—

tionalize

or

it

Finally,

who

who remain committed

will

clear that they

argue that

must

give

—

as in

ra-

Northern Ireland

—

is

up

their weapons.

No

and even

this is unrealistic,

the hardest thing to do even in circumstances in struck

who

to violence or

are not prepared to coexist with Israel.

we must make

some

doubt,

and Lebanese should know that the United States

unfair. After

all,

which deals have been

to get formerly

underground or

sistance groups to surrender their weapons. Undoubtedly,

re-

Hamas and

Hizbollah supporters will argue that since Israel retains a large and well-

equipped army and

lem

is

air force,

they need to add on to their arms.

that groups such as Hizbollah or

Hamas and

even pretend to have altered their agenda, ever the criticisms of Gerry selves to nonviolence British.

And

Hizbollah nor

conflict.

up

their leaders

do not

at least as regards Israel.

What-

Adams and Sinn Fein, they committed them-

a political solution

with the Unionists and the

they also accepted the Mitchell Principles for negotiations,

which included

at giving

and

The prob-

Hamas

its

decommissioning of weapons. Neither

a process for the

has been willing to renounce violence or even hint

weapons,

let

alone embrace a peaceful resolution of the

On the contrary, both have declared that they will not give up vi-

olence as a tool, and in any case, they have opted for only taking part in the political process internally in tion to maintain their

arms

is

Lebanon or

Palestine.

The determina-

an indication that they seek to use them

as

leverage against the political process and against Israel. If they have truly joined the political process, there create pressure

on

is

no place

for their

weapons, except to

their political competitors or to preserve the option of

withdrawing from the

political process altogether. Either they are

com-

mitted to being political actors or they are not.

Of course, litically

it is

not up to the United States to determine

relevant actor and

who

is

who

is

a

po-

not in the Middle East. Lebanese or

Palestinians or local polities will determine that. But

183

we can

establish

STATECRAFT

We

our principles.

should be clear that Lebanese and Palestinians can

anyone they choose and that we

elect

will respect their choice.

That

we will automatically negotiate with them. We are just as entitled to make such choices as they are. And as they choose their leaders, they should know whether these groups will make does not mean, however, that

it

more or

less likely for

them

to have a relationship with the

United

States.

for example, the elected

If,

Hizbollah are prepared to accept

civil society,

olence, respect the law, and coexist with Israel, talk to

who

we should be premembers of Hamas and

follows that there are circumstances in which

It

pared to negotiate.

them

—

forsake and

condemn

vi-

we should be prepared to

again, closely coordinating with those allies or friends

are likely to be

most affected or

That

fearful of such talks.

is

com-

mon sense and good statecraft. To sum up, let me invoke the John F. Kennedy admonition: we should never negotiate out of fear, but we should never fear to negotiate. A willingness to talk

is

not a sign of weakness, unless

same token, avoiding or refusing on the contrary, often

strength;

More

than anything

with adversaries

talks

may

it

we make

it

is

signal uncertainty

else, it is essential to

one.

By

the

not a sign of

on our

part.

know what we want and can

reasonably expect to achieve in entering negotiation.

GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATIONS It

seems

safe to

conclude that negotiations today are more complex than

they once were. There will be more moving parts, and more actors with diverse interests to have to consider and reconcile. fective statecraft will talk to

be

specifically

their interests with ours. Similarly,

limitations of those

of doing and what Also, ties,

we

is

it

will

beyond in

their

must understand how willing to

do

know when

to

to talk about to align

be essential to understand the

means and

any given

what they are capable

inclinations.

which

actors, personali-

at a particular

moment. And we

situation,

and governments have influence

cise influence

what

are dealing with, including

we must know,

again, then, ef-

be important to

essential. It will

one party or another, and

Here

to energize those

who have

the capacity to exer-

and how to develop the circumstances in which they are

so.

184

Negotiations as

Of

an Instrument of Statecraft

we are to gain partners for our desired goals, we will know how to shape a public context internationally and domes-

course, if

have to

tically for

our preferred course of action.

It is a lot

join with us, particularly in opposition to those

need

see as threatening

if

and occupation of Kuwait was opposed

in chapter 4, Iraq's invasion

ternationally.

we

we have fostered a broader consensus on what conpeace and how best to deal with that threat. As we see

peace and security, stitutes a threat to

easier to get others to

That certainly made

for a collective response, but building a coalition for

sanctions was not a given.

To

in-

easier to get others to accept the

it

preserve that coalition and

imposing

move toward

the authorization of the use of force required a constant nurturing of private and, just as important, public attitudes about

what Saddam Hus-

sein was doing in Kuwait, the implications of his noncompliance,

and the

limited nature of our goals. In this sense,

we

are

reminded of the need

to constantly think of how

best to position ourselves and our objectives in public.

That means

ing and listening to putative partners and finding out what will politically easier for

them

make

it

to join with us, then crafting an "outreach strat-

egy" that will reach both the public and the party (or parties) with

we

talk-

whom

are negotiating.

Looking back years,

believe

I

I

at

was

convey messages to

the Middle East peace process during the Clinton far too cautious in all

sides

clear signs of losing patience

on both

(On Hebron,

sides.

endgame of the signals

I

and their publics. There were times when

would have created

a

very useful pressure

did use the media that way, but only in the

negotiations.)

through the media

using the media to set a tone and

But

I

could have employed messages or

much more

than

I

did on, for example,

mak-

ing clear that Palestinian nonperformance on security would lead to a

suspension of U.S. mediating

ment

activities

onus on Arab

on pointing out

efforts;

that Israeli settle-

were making our task impossible; and on putting the

states for

doing

little

to contribute to

peace and raising

the question of whether they had any serious interest in seeing an end to the conflict.

My

point

is

that

statecraft, there are

A

when employing negotiations as a many different pieces and activities

practitioner will instinctively understand

juggled both internally and externally.

185

all

leading tool of to be

managed.

the balls that have to be

STATECRAFT While there

is

a great deal

of literature on negotiations, most of it has

not been written by practitioners. This the negotiation literature. In

much

fact,

not to denigrate the value of

is

in this literature

is

especially

useful for identifying and explaining the basic concepts of negotiating.

Yet

if

one

is

to

understand

tool of statecraft (or

how

to

employ negotiations

effectively as a

even in business or other walks of

life), it

makes

sense to have a practitioner's guide to negotiations.

Why suggest

a practitioner's

guide to negotiations?

It is

not only be-

cause of the more complicated setting in which negotiations will take place as

we

safeguard our national security.

plays an integral part in likely to

need

to

be revealed by

how and what to do a practitioner.

be constantly mindful of their

likely to

also

because instinct

in negotiations,

and

is

more

Moreover, because practitioners

own

constituencies

—

may be negotiating with reflect how these more political

the parties that they

more

It is

—and

a practitioner's

those of

guide

is

concerns tend to be con-

sidered or managed.

With these and explain

factors

and the logic of statecraft in mind,

my twelve

rules for negotiations.

186

let

me

turn to

9.

NEGOTIATIONS Twelve Rules

In chapter

8, 1

to

Follow

discussed the "what" of negotiations as a tool

the tool

of statecraft. This chapter deals with the "how" of negotiations. Foreign policy will always require understanding what must be done and

ing

how to do it. What follows

are twelve rules that

I

believe offer a good guide to the

"how" of negotiations. Each of the rules

on how

tive

to

offers an insight

the talks and produce the desired results. that affect

negotiator

may

not succeed

if

Of course,

those he or she

provide greater insight into what rules can also reveal

1.

a

perspec-

way

to

differ-

map

surprises can

out

pop

any negotiation, and, unfortunately, even the most skilled is

capable or unwilling to reach agreement. If that

gest

and

conduct negotiations, not only taking into account

ent constraints and pressures, but also shaping the best

up

know-

is

whether any deal

ways to reduce the costs and

risks

negotiating with are inis

true, these rules will

possible and not possible. is

in the cards,

and

sug-

of the negotiation.

KNOW WHAT YOU WANT, KNOW WHAT YOU CAN

Nothing would seem more obvious than might seem. In

These

if it is not,

this.

a high-stakes negotiation,

But

it is

each side

LIVE

WITH

not as simple as

it

may know what it it may

wants in the abstract, but not really have thought through what

be able to accept.

The

process of negotiations can alter expectations by

187

STATECRAFT transforming the view of the adversary. Former Israeli prime minister

Ehud Barak once

me

said to

assume certain security

what

Israel

that if he

saw the Palestinians prepared

responsibilities,

it

would change

could ultimately afford to give up. While

this

his

to

view of

may have

sim-

ply been an attempt to get the Palestinians to do what they had not been doing, there can be

public would alter ners on security

little

its

doubt that Barak understood that the

views

if it

saw Palestinians acting

as

Israeli

genuine part-

—

or demonstrating that they would not countenance

Palestinian terror against Israelis. Thus, perceived

bottom

lines

can turn

out to be less-than-irreducible goals as circumstances and the perception of the negotiating partner change.

You should

anticipate such changes before entering negotiations.

One way to do so is to explore different scenarios in which the fundamentally adopts new positions. What do you do in

other side response?

Rarely do parties ask such questions or play out such scenarios. For

example, neither tions

—were

Israelis

nor Palestinians

—

for

most of

their negotia-

willing to ask themselves hard questions about what they

could accept on Jerusalem, refugees, and borders. Even an internal discussion of these issues was

deemed too

any internal discussion, no matter

sensitive.

how

private,

The

Israelis feared that

would be leaked

media, with explosive, even paralyzing results

Israeli

Palestinians dreaded incurring the wrath of Arafat,

to the

politically.

who might

The

claim

they were giving away Palestinian rights or betraying the cause.

As

a result, neither side

thought through their bottom lines on the

core issues. There was, however, an asymmetry in the negotiations. Israelis

never could articulate, even to themselves, what their vision of

the future was or what they wanted the

They knew

that they

have an idea of how

outcome of negotiations

would withdraw from

territories

much withdrawal they could

may

not have thought through bottom

lines,

but they did not

to.

The

Palestinians

but they did develop a con-

view of what the outcome of the negotiations should

knew they would not

to be.

accept nor did they de-

velop a rationale for what they needed to hold on

sistent

The

be.

They

get full withdrawal to the June 4, 1967, lines, with

East Jerusalem as the capital of their state and the right of return for Palestinian refugees to their homes. But this vision could be repeated like a

mantra; although

concessions,

it

it

forestalled

any hard internal discussions on

gave them a built-in advantage over the

188

Israelis.

As

Israeli

Twelve Rules negotiator

Oded Eran

not knowing what Ironically, the

it

Follow

me on more

confided to

side, unlike the Palestinians,

to

was always limited

than one occasion, his in the negotiations

more the

became

it

concede any part of it. At

to

the time that the Oslo process was agreed upon, in 1993,

Oslo negotiators) understood that

would have

to

I

have

little

Abu Ala or Hassan Asfour (the when it came time for permanent-

doubt that Palestinian negotiators such

and borders. They

on the

Palestinians repeated their mantra

outcome, the more problematic

status talks, they

by

wanted.

as

compromise on

issues such as Jerusalem

much

believed the Israelis would have to concede

more, but they knew they would not escape compromise. (The fact that

Abu Mazen,

other leading Palestinians, including negotiating delegation, pleaded with

he was the only one

who had

me

the formal head of the

not to give up on Arafat, since

the moral authority to concede on the

permanent-status issues, suggests that they, too, understood that com-

promise would be required.) But the permanent-status

supposed to begin

in

talks that

were

1996 did not begin until the end of 1999, and by

that time the Palestinian posture, adopted

by

all its

possible negotiators,

was that the Palestinians had already conceded on the nent, including Jerusalem,

by accepting the June

4,

territorial

compowhich

1967, lines,

represented only a small part of mandatory Palestine.

Upon

first

hearing this line of argument from Palestinians such as

Nabil Sha'ath and Saeb Erekat, Wasn't

now

it

made

all

asked what Oslo had been about. asked:

Are you

your concessions before entering the

talks? If

supposed to have started

saying you

I

a negotiating process?

so,

do you think that Yitzhak Rabin thought that

up

to?

is

I

what he was signing

They did not have much of an answer for me, but they had

the ad-

vantage of a clear vision of an outcome, and the Israelis could not offer a

comparable one. The

Israelis

would not say they were going

the territory but they could not bring themselves to say they half of

annex

would hold

it.

So they put themselves don't

to

know what you

at a disadvantage.

The

lesson

is this: if

you

want, your negotiating partner will develop a vi-

sion that serves his/her posture in the negotiation but not yours.

There

is

a

common

reason political leaders often go into negotiations

without such vision. They enter negotiations not because they expect an

agreement but because they need to reduce

189

political pressure

on them

STATECRAFT over

policy path they have chosen. Negotiations can prove that they

a

are "doing something."

As the war

in

Vietnam turned increasingly

into a

quagmire, for example, President Lyndon Johnson sought negotiations to

buy time and

to relieve

domestic pressures.

Ho Chi

Minh, recogniz-

ing the Johnson administration's motives, was in no rush to go to talks.

And when

the

North Vietnamese did

Johnson administration and little

go, their negotiators, first

with the

with the Nixon administration, showed

later

interest in reaching agreement. Either the

fectively surrender at the table or the

United States would

ef-

North Vietnamese would change

the realities on the battlefield and get their way. It is

if

certainly a mistake for any president to enter negotiations

he thinks they are largely for show

standing of acceptable outcomes. ical costs for

the

of

more

it

walking away.

tends to justify itself

its initial

Once

a vision

and an under-

in a negotiation, there are polit-

longer a negotiating process goes on,

— and the more one must not lose sight

purpose. American presidents must assume that the other

know what

side will

The

—without

—even

ter negotiations

gone beyond

it

wants, and

must be no

—having thought through

generalities,

prepared

less

as

they en-

different scenarios, having

and having determined

a

range of acceptable

outcomes.

KNOW EVERYTHING THERE

2.

IS

KNOW ABOUT

TO

THE DECISION MAKER(S) ON THE OTHER SIOE This, too, should be obvious, but too few systematic questions are really

examined about who makes decisions and who relevant decision

must be tions? is it

asked:

maker or makers. Before

What

Does the other

a deal (in

stances

is

able to influence the

is

negotiations, basic questions

are the leaders' reasons for entering the negotiaside really

want

a deal? If so,

content and scope) you can

live

what kind of deal, and

with?

Under what circum-

the other side's view likely to be modified?

on the other

side?

How

Who

has influence

likely are they to exercise that influence?

What

What

pres-

pressures are most likely to affect the other side internally? sures from the outside might

move

the other side positively?

pressures will harden, not soften, their positions? afraid of

What

is

What

the other side

and what do they value?

Just as in rule

number

one, where the president ought to

190

know why

Twelve Rules

he

is

Follow

to

going into negotiations and what he can

have a good picture of the other

side's

live with,

concerns, and what they want and require from the ier to

he also needs to

reasons for talking, their principal talks.

Surely

it is

eas-

produce basic answers to these questions when dealing with

friends or allies

—

typically because

we

are likely to have so

many more

sources of information and access to those within and with

ties to

the

leadership.

As we see

in chapter 2, President

George H. W. Bush found

that

Prime

Minister Thatcher and President Mitterrand shared Mikhail Gorbachev's opposition to the reunification of

NATO.

Germany and

its

integration in

But the president was in regular and personal communication

with both leaders, and while working to address their concerns, he also

came

understand from them that whatever their misgivings, they

to

would not block the negotiations

outright.

Negotiations conducted with friends are a challenge but a manageable one, because

you can generally

out what you need to know.

find

Knowing what you need to know before or during negotiations with adis much more difficult. They are often determined to keep you

versaries

from knowing by hiding

critical

information or misleading you.

So what can be done? Start by recognizing the problems, and then recognize that nothing

and

listening,

With

first

foreign ministers

in negotiations than probing,

I

would have long conver-

Tarasenko and Yuri Mamedov, key aides to the then

Eduard Shevardnadze and Andrei Kosyrev. Conversa-

them revealed

on arms control

—not

mation, but because to

more important

the Soviets and then the Russians,

sations with Sergei

tions with

is

testing.

I

a great deal

about what was and wasn't possible

necessarily because

I

was pumping them for infor-

asked questions that conveyed an interest in trying

understand the broader circumstances in which they had to operate. For example, sometimes

form was really cline

I

would ask questions about how much

possible. Frequently, this led to discussions

re-

about de-

and malaise in the Soviet Union, the advocates and opponents of

varying degrees of reform, their arguments, where arms-control agree-

ments or

fit

in,

and their views about where we and others could either help

harm the reform

process.

191

STATECRAFT One

essential attribute for

any negotiator

good

to be a

is

listener. It's

crucial to know when to talk but, more important, when to listen. You won't be learning when you are talking. You may be shaping or conditioning attitudes, but you will not be learning. You learn when you listen.

Being

listener conveys a level of interest

good

a

whom you

you take seriously those with

that

and respect.

are dealing.

You

It

shows

are likely

more when you convey such respect and listen actively. By active listening, I mean listening to what is being said and then asking questions based on what you have heard. This is a respectful way

to elicit

to understand It is

more about where the other

also essential for another reason.

side

is

coming from and why.

Whether trying

fore entering negotiations or learning

to learn

more during the

more be-

negotiations

themselves, oftentimes the other side will try out ideas not by explicitly giving away a major concession but by hinting at

ing in light of what you hear

is

the only

way you

it.

Listening and prob-

will

know whether you

have heard something meaningful.

When Asad

Secretary Albright and

December

in

for negotiations.

consistently posed conditions,

me.

To

wanted the

I

When we

I

initial

Albright's surprise,

a brief recess.

I

ask

him

if he

Because he was

sensed that

al

this

a leader

might be

who had

a signal

worth

probing to come from the secretary, not

asked Asad

secretary and

if the

were out of Syrian earshot,

thought Asad had said something itly

were meeting with President Hafez

1999, he said, seemingly in passing, that he did not

impose any conditions

probing. But

I

new and

I

I

could have

told her that

that she should

now

I

explic-

was ready to resume negotiations. Though Albright was

not sure that he had said anything meaningful, she agreed and posed the question. his

Asad nodded, saying, "They never

comment

belied the reality, and

I

really stopped." Here, again,

thought

this, too,

might indicate

a

greater openness on his part to approach the negotiations differently. So I

decided to press directly to see

talks

if it

was possible not only to resume the

but to raise them to the political level

agreed. For nine years, he had resisted doing

Perhaps Asad would have revealed actively

I

asked, he

this.

without our having listened

and probed with questions. But in negotiations, one never knows

when nuggets be.

this

—and when

are going to be

Sometimes they are

as in Asad's case, to

dropped

just a test.

to test

what the response might

Other times, they indicate

change course. The key

192

is

a readiness,

always to be listening.

Twelve Rules

is

maker

willing to do.

just as

testing his intentions. if

to

Follow

important for trying to determine what

Testing is

to

One

On

a decision

of our big mistakes with Yasir Arafat was not

a strictly bilateral basis

he was willing or able to make

we had

a

need

to

know

permanent-status deal. His response

a

our probing questions was always vague. Too often we simply inter-

preted this as reflecting his style and his pattern in negotiations. But

we

could have tested him, and should have.

To be precise, had we nent status

if

him we would not play any

he were not prepared to condition

mise on the core

was

told

issues,

we would have seen

role

on perma-

his public for

compro-

he was willing to do what

if

necessary for an end-of-conflict deal. Arafat not only valued the re-

saw us

lationship with us but also

He knew

Israelis.

sues unless historic

—

as leveling the

we were

actively pressing both sides to

So

this

make hard

we were

asking:

with the

—

was an excellent way to determine

prepared to make such decisions. However, concrete in terms of what

field

on the permanent-status

that nothing was possible

decisions.

playing

this

He

is-

indeed,

if

he was

required us to be very

had to say that compro-

mise was necessary for both sides and that he understood that neither the Palestinians nor the Israelis could get 100 percent of what they

wanted on Jerusalem, borders, and refugees. This would have had said publicly tioning,

to be

and repeatedly. With such public statements and condi-

we would

insist

on beginning permanent-status negotiations;

without such public positions,

we would

focus on interim issues and on

building cooperation. His unwillingness to take this step would have re-

vealed that he could not deal with the permanent-status issues, and

we

could have adjusted our approach accordingly.

Would

Arafat's failure to pass this test have

peace promotion? No, we could

ended our involvement in

have worked to promote increasing

still

Palestinian freedom from Israeli control, negotiated other interim steps to foster cooperation

Palestinians,

Arafat era,

and

a better

environment between

and generally managed

when

his successors

a process until a

Israelis

and

time beyond the

would have been psychologically more

capable of ending the conflict.

The point is that testing is an important way of determining what you know about the other side's leader and his or her decision-making

don't

193

— STATECRAFT and attitudes

instincts

especially

when

there

for the results of risk,

your

in

is

a

some

tests

others with more. But with any

for failing to pass

it.

With

Arafat, he

to condition his public would cost

status discussions

Devising

pared to

live

learning

all

tests that are

with

there

is

to

be prepared

test,

less

there must be a consequence

would know

that his unwillingness

him an American

role in

permanent-

the American stakes in him.

revealing and that you as a negotiator are pre-

no easy to

is

—you have

can be subtle and come with

— and probably reduce task.

know about

vations, capabilities, limitations,

However, they are a decision

maker

a

necessary part of

—and his/her moti-

and psychological hang-ups.

BUILD A RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST WITH THE KEY DECISION MAKER

3.

How

involved

risk

Some

test.

As with any other rule

negotiation.

does one build trust with the key decision maker, whether an ad-

versary or an ally? There are several requirements. First and foremost, establish deliver,

your

credibility.

You must never promise something and not

and you must always deliver

son here

to give

is

promises with great

vealing. Active listening permits a

two-way

exactly

street, so, too, is

you

what you promise. (The

care.)

les-

Second, be open and re-

to learn, but just as negotiations are

any dialogue. You,

too,

must be prepared

to

your leadership or decision maker.

offer insights into the thinking of

Third, protect confidences and never expose your counterpart. And, fourth, be prepared at a certain point to deliver

your counterpart that he or she knows indeed, even something that

Tarasenko

I

developed such

and bombers

in the

cost

difficult for

you

to

produce

you something. With Sergei

a close relationship

Secretary Baker, an easing of 7

may

is

something of value to

some of our

and produced, through

positions

on cruise

missiles

arms-control negotiations, positions that Sergei

knew had been difficult to change. For his part, he was consistently overcoming a deeply resistant Soviet foreign ministry on issues ranging from arms control

to

German

Iraq after the invasion of

Union condemning bargo against

The

unification to producing a joint statement

Kuwait

—

a joint statement that

Iraq, its erstwhile ally,

on

had the Soviet

and supporting an arms em-

it.

traditional national security apparatus in the Soviet

194

Union was

Twelve Rules

deeply opposed to such

a joint

to

Follow

posture with us, and

at

one

point, in the

of 1990, when Gorbachev was under enormous pressure from the

fall

Soviet military and other party leaders not to be supportive of possible military responses against Iraq, he sent Yevgeni

on

a special mission. Earlier

I

message Sergei sent

sensitive

and our hopes

for partnership

Primakov

to

Washington

referred to the back-channel and highly

me

indicating that Shevardnadze's job

were

at stake,

and we must

reject

what

Primakov was peddling.

Without an extraordinary degree of sent such a message that,

By

job.

if

we had obviously proven our bona

this time,

During

this period,

man

of

He

fides to

his

each other.

equally important with friends and

a similar relationship

German

Genscher was from

is

him more than

al-

Robert Zoellick, then the counselor in the State

Department, developed right-hand

Sergei would never have

revealed, might have cost

Developing such relationships lies.

trust,

with Frank Elbe, the

foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

a different

party than the chancellor,

was considerably more to the

left politically

supportive of the close U.S.-German

and

Helmut

Kohl.

less instinctively

than Kohl. Yet the Zoellick-

ties

Elbe relationship helped to foster increasingly close cooperation be-

tween Secretary Baker and Genscher, which paid dividends on the

German unification in NATO, conventional arms control in Europe, and German logistics and economic support for us in the first Gulf War none of which would necessarily have been predictable. negotiations over

—

I

cultivated similar relationships with Israelis and Palestinians, and

such

like all

ties

of trust, they helped

at critical

moments when

T

ing agreements. Trust will allow a negotiator to learn

negotiat-

much more

than

he would otherwise about what can and cannot work in the negotiations.

So much of negotiations are about learning where there may be openings,

and when the time

is

right to pursue

Every new idea must generate something good negotiator

will

want

to test if

it

them or

to raise a

in response,

will. If

new

idea.

and here, again,

you don't have

a

a trusted re-

lationship with your counterpart, the odds of producing the desired re-

—

sponse

or at least having confidence that you can

Building trust

is

rarely

done

in

are likely to be low.

formal settings. Informal settings

must be created. Back channels, which chapter,

—

I

say

more about

in the next

on mediation, should be developed and used. In such channels,

informal and noncommitting discussions can take place. Ideas can be

195

STATECRAFT tested without fear. But they won't be useful until trust

one needs private

When we tion, I

developed, and

settings to begin that process.

began Israeli-Syrian negotiations

at

the

Wye

wanted Uri Savir and Walid Mouallem to develop

I

knew each

well and had

become

each other.

to talk

would have

brought them together and explained

I

a friend

of mine and

why

I

know each

to recognize this in

why each had

found them trustworthy.

about their hopes and concerns, and then

several hours to get to

River Plantaa relationship;

They were both deep

close to both.

believers in peace, but they themselves

come

is

other. Later,

I

left

be-

asked them

I

them alone

for

when they had something

sensitive to discuss, they would meet alone, creating an informal channel

of communication. At one point, Mouallem asked Savir to set up a de-

marcation group to meet on the border, which presumed agreement

on the principle of withdrawal get

Shimon

that

Mouallem understand

June

4,

to the

June

4,

1967, lines. Savir had to

Peres's approval, but was ready to do so with a proviso:

—even w

that demarcating the border

1967, lines as the basis

—would

T

ith the

lead to tough fights between

them

about exactly where the border would be drawn. Mouallem tacitly ac-

knowledged

this,

indicating that he understood this was the beginning of a

tough negotiation, not the end. in 1996,

which led

Had it not been for four bombs in nine days

to the suspension of Israel's talks with the Palestinians

and Syrians and to the defeat of Peres in the that

May elections, I am convinced

agreement would have been reached, with Savir and Mouallem lead-

ing the negotiations. If nothing else, here

is

a

reminder that negotiations

take place in a real world of events and traumas and political pressures.

Trust

is

a

necessary part of making negotiations work. If trust

ited only to the negotiators,

side pressures.

By

The

point

is

is

lim-

won't insulate the negotiations from out-

definition, adversaries are unlikely to

beyond the negotiators oped.

it

— assuming such

have

a relationship has

much

trust

been devel-

that negotiators, while striving to build a relationship

of trust, will face pressures and obstacles even

when they succeed

in be-

lieving in each other.

Moreover, even when they do develop great personal still

tiator

tom

trust,

hesitate to reveal highly sensitive positions prematurely.

they will

No

nego-

should expect that trust alone will produce a revelation about bot-

lines before the

timing

is

right.

But

a relationship

of trust will

provide insight into which pathways will be productive and which will

196

Twelve Rules

be destructive. And, ultimately,

at

Follow

to

the crunch point that comes in any

high-stakes negotiation, trust will prove pivotal. In essence, every negotiation

about manipulation. Each side

is

other that

it

cannot concede on what

the other side must concede

while yours

is

pink. But

—

when

it

regards as

in effect,

—

if

there

he/she can do

is

trust, the

critical.

you are saying

By implication

my redline is red,

negotiations evolve to the point where the

fundamental decisions have to be made break

determined to convince the

is

—where

it

truly

make-or-

is

negotiator or leader will be able to say that

X and not Y, and that will be believed and not seen as one

more manipulation.

4.

MIND THE OTHER SIDE'S NEED FOR AN EXPLANATION

KEEP

IN

The concept of "explanation" may be one of the most important gotiations.

No

in ne-

matter what the transaction, no matter what walk of

no matter the stakes involved, explain to itself or others

in

making

a deal each side

life,

must be able

to

why the agreement was in its interest. The greater

the stakes involved in the negotiations, the greater the need for an explanation. Similarly, the

more

more important it becomes

significant the concessions being

to

be able to explain

made, the

why the concessions were

necessary to achieve something of greater value. Between countries regardless of whether they are democratic or authoritarian

need

A

to

—

there will

be an explanation, either for publics or for powerful constituencies.

negotiator must be thinking about

an important concession even as he/she

how

pushing for

is

ing to be open to being told that they must

the other side will explain

make

it.

No

one

is

go-

a historic concession

the kind of concession that for reasons of tradition, habit, or political

culture

would seem unthinkable

offsetting factor in negotiations

what

it

mitigating or

accompanying the proposal. Certainly, there are times

when one

will ultimately

may be deluding itself as to concede and may need to be shocked into

or the other side

have to

may be completely disruptive or even paralyzing if accompanied by a plan for how the concession regardless of the

reality.

not

—without some major

But the shock

difficulty

Once

—can be I

—

explained.

watched

Israeli negotiator

idea that the Palestinians

would have 197

Shlomo Ben-Ami introduce the to accept that there

would be no

STATECRAFT and that there would need

right of return for refugees

to be a modifica-

tion of the June 4, 1967, lines; but, in return, Palestinians

show

and the Arab world that for the

their public

first

would be able

to

time in 1,500 years

there would be internationally recognized Arab (namely, Palestinian)

sovereignty over East Jerusalem and the Islamic holy places. While Ala,

had

Abu

Ben-Ami's counterpart, was not about to surrender positions that a

mythical standing on the Palestinian side, he did not respond in a

peremptory fashion,

He

either.

and

his colleagues

were intrigued by

Ben-Ami's argument, and following that meeting, Abu Ala told me,

"Shlomo

Even

a

is

good man, and

in negotiations in

can do business with him."

I

which there

is

an asymmetry of power and in-

and one side may need the deal more than the other,

terest,

a credible

explanation will be required by the weaker side, not only for the sake of

concluding the deal but also to make sure

it is

sustainable and can be

implemented. In trying to gain Gorbachev's acceptance of

a unified

NATO —given the deeply ingrained Russian threat perceptions of Germany and NATO — we needed to create both a process Germany

that

in

would enable Gorbachev

outcome

to say

he had shaped the outcome and an

which he could say that NATO's relationship had changed

in

with the Soviet Union and

we

For the former,

we stage-managed great fanfare that

a

it

it

was no longer an enemy.

devised the

Two Plus

Four process. For the

latter,

NATO summit communique that announced with was

a

new

now

era and that the alliance was

being

transformed.

We

took Gorbachev's need for an explanation seriously.

stood the delicacy of his position internally.

ening him.

no

He

We had

We

no interest

under-

in

weak-

was challenged by those in the Soviet hierarchy who had

interest in cooperation

worried that an issue such

and partnership with the United as

States.

We

Germany, which evoked such emotions

the Soviet Union, could congeal the opposition to

in

Gorbachev and actu-

ally threaten his leadership.

In the end, in 1990, to

Germany was

manage the

unified in

NATO and Gorbachev was able,

political fallout domestically

explanation. His situation

is

a

reminder that

in

some

weakness of the negotiating partner needs to be kept

Helping friend

—

to shore

will not

up

a

because he had an

in

negotiations the

mind.

weak but agreeable adversary

be easy, but

if it is

—

or emerging

not done, any agreement

198

is

unlikely

Twelve Rules to survive. If the

Follow

agreement was important enough to negotiate, you

certainly want to see

it

critical.

An

feels

must be able

explanation certainly reflects something that the other side

—and being

about the agreement

to say publicly

a deal.

TO GAIN THE HARDEST CONCESSIONS, PROVE YOU

5.

UNDERSTAND WHAT

IS

IMPORTANT TO THE OTHER SIDE

While consistent with keeping the other side's need

as

it

Rule number

"sells" a deal.

demonstrating that you know not only what side but also

"empathy

why

certain concessions are so painful for

no concession other than

may be one of the

Consider that

very hard for

it,

if

take

is

to

good

little

side to

why what you

are asking

you ask

if

and indicate no clear understanding of why

Failing to appreciate

problems in it

the

what

is

will

do something

is

so difficult for

it.

all,

who

for

something very

it is

is

going to

difficult?

other side will stop listening, and

go on the offensive, believing

down

not.

hard for the other side creates two basic

a negotiation. First, the

high cost of proceeding

It is

chance of succeeding unless you can

you seriously or be willing to respond

second,

call this

best ways to look out for one's self-

the starting point for getting a hearing. After

difficult

it. I

sense. In a negotiation, dis-

you are asking the other

you have

demonstrate that you know This

important to the other

consider empathy to be a form of self-sacrifice.

playing empathy interest.

is

about

five is

rule."

Some might requires

for an explanation in

goes well beyond simply ensuring that the other side has

this rule

something to point to

It

is

also significant to the other side will be

is

aware of that will help both sides reach

mind,

will

implemented. Here, again, reconciling what

important to you with what

it

to

it

must prove

to

you the

the path you have chosen.

Displaying empathy and demonstrating a clear understanding of the

problems that would be created by your proposal mediate result but starter part

empathy

it

will

may

not yield an im-

make what might have been considered

of the negotiating landscape.

No

one was better

a

non-

at the

rule than Bill Clinton.

Clinton's effective use of the

"empathy rule" was not simply

a func-

tion of his ability to demonstrate that he understood the other leader's

problems.

It

was also that he married

199

his

"empathy" with an acute un-

a

STATECRAFT usw

the

find

Que

nt understanding the ott

j

rotiation

issues in

With Bona

Yeltsin,

could do that

and

>uld explain

Clinton she

Ye'.:

NATO

:

operate in

1

much

Israeli

prime minister Rabin

Arterward. Asad

:::

in

s::c va

s t

e

:e

d the

some depth.

expansion his under-

reed

j.. ti

the

:he

Middle Eav:ia. :h

:

ai

and he

is

h :.i??ec hie

s

heeds

bv the

— needs C and

ar:::

'::::;:: .is;

said.

"Y ;::

d

k:

But Resident Clinton is a real penoo Hespea

:

you with

ter,

e

:

c

Ar.

liked Preside

to

m

:"::

Heights

or'r...

hh.ed.

wav

e

A sad

exi

died with

3s

them

be

mincate that pressure

:

Asad

;'.

As j

:"

the sa

;a::ec

he

::

re'.anoh.sr.ir

with Russia and embodied in a "char si

iikelv to

great pressure, and :hen used his

.

of the detail to portr

I

more

rrob'.em

sice's

not in slogans but in specifics Ciintc tral

tar

is

American pre cussions with

;:den:>X:xon. Carter.

statement

While ulrimateh

-^

•;

- -^

>

— — _^

_i

•

and Clinton used terms publicly Asad mace

prepared to say about the come nl tort to soften the

Clinton words,

and he would

with

when In

t

at

side, the

that

it is

you

Udlill

I

Ult

UUCo

employed to gain something

will reach

mo:

must

Asa,

came to peace.

because

you show

e:"-

that C'.ihthh

how Clinton

any negotiation, applying the

sacrifice

side

it

live

h

::

in return.

•

v

\..

The more

out and that you do understand the other :

also understand

UK.' V. 11.

create an expectation that the other

your needs and respond to diem. And h i

u understand what is so difficult to do, it becomes possible

::•:

Twelve Rules for the other side to

Follow

to

contemplate making concessions

—provided they

know they have something significant to gain by doing so and something significant to lose if they

critical

make

tails to

While

is

it

it

not.

TOUGH LOVE

6.

Empathy

do

ALSO REQUIRED

IS

and must be married to an understanding of the de-

empathy

convincing. But

creates an opening and

produce agreement. For

that there

with

is

going to be

NATO

expansion,

were not going

that they

leverage to do

their acquiescence; to

remain

in

sition also

unlikely on

it is

consequence. With

German

Gorbachev and then

to stop either process.

own

unification

and

understood

Yeltsin

They

its

understanding

also be an

did not have the

Understanding their needs and conveying

so.

them

preciation of

a

must

that, there

first

limitations.

its

a readiness for the other side to consider

what might previously have been inconceivable, to

has

in isolation

a clear

ap-

(as well as their

need

for a public explanation for

made

them

to go along

it

easier for

—

and, of course,

power. But understanding the consequences of their oppo-

gave them an incentive to get what they could and do a deal.

In

both cases, the U.S. position was one of understanding the other

sides'

predicament, but always with an accompanying and unmistakable

message: this train station.

is

On German

moving, and you need to be on unification, this

before

it

it

more

to the hesitant

and French leaders and Baker more to Gorbachev and Shevard-

British

—

the ones

who most

would pay the most

for

clearly

doing

so.

had to acquiesce and who potentially

On

NATO expansion, Christopher and much more

Talbott tended to convey the message

clearly with Yeltsin

and Kosyrev than Clinton, but the president w ould convey T

ways with

Tough marrying

customary understanding.

his

his

empathy

to an

understanding of the

—

it

to do,

what the consequence would be

pay

a

came

to offering

tough love

heavy price and get nothing

it

as well, al-

1

love was not President Clinton's strength.

When us,

leaves the

message came from both Bush and

Baker, although the president tended to convey

nadze

it

When

details,

—

this

did not,

came

to

he had no peer.

telling the other side if it

it

how

it

what

it

would

had lose

was done better by others.

President Clinton tended to see the value of building his capital and

201

STATECRAFT nudging the other side along and embracing them decisions.

While necessary, empathy

is

as

they

made tough

not sufficient. In high-stakes ne-

when trying to resolve historic conflicts, where leaders are asked to make the hardest decision they will ever have to make, Clinton-style empathy is essential to get them to the point of making a decision. However, to get them to cross historic thresholds,

gotiations, especially

they must also feel that there will be a profound, adverse consequence if

they do not do

so.

Clinton's approach to Arafat in the make-or-break

meeting on January

2,

2001,

showed both the

president's impulse to

brace and his instinct to shy away from playing hardball

moment.

which Arafat had

In this meeting in

had taken the negotiations

as far as

White House

to

know

at

em-

the critical

that the president

he could, and Arafat's unwillingness

parameters would be seen and understood by

to accept the Clinton

the president as proof that Arafat was incapable of settling the conflict, the president could not bring himself to say

this.

At two junctures

meeting, he drew back rather than confront. First, his reservations regarding the

when

in the

Arafat outlined

Clinton parameters and these reservations

effectively destroyed the logic of the proposals, Clinton did not call

Arafat on what he was doing and say, "You have just rejected If

nothing

else,

such

a

my

ideas."

remark would have signaled that Clinton was not

fooled by Arafat's manipulation and that Arafat would not get away with dressing

up

a rejection as

mere

reservations.

Second, believing the meeting could not end with Arafat having that impression,

I

privately suggested to President Clinton that he

become

very blunt with Arafat about the consequences of what he was doing. President Clinton agreed. Unfortunately,

when he assumed

a

blunter

posture, he did so by saying that the chairman's position was "killing

Barak" and there was nothing more he (the president) could do. Arafat did not care rarely

if his

position

would harm

Israeli

prime minister Barak; he

showed much concern about the impact of his decisions on

raeli counterpart.

is

how his positions affected his What President Clinton should

His concerns were about

standing with Palestinians, not

have said

his Is-

"Your position

is

Israelis.

killing

me.

I

have gone out on

a

limb for

you, presented unprecedented, historic ideas to settle this conflict, and

your rejection exposes me.

making peace and

I

will

I

can only conclude that you are incapable of

have to convey

202

this

impression to

my successor."

Twelve Rules

This would

United told

at least

States.

The

to

Follow

have told Arafat that he would pay irony

is

that this

incoming President Bush

is

a price

precisely what President Clinton

about Arafat; unfortunately, Arafat left

the meeting not understanding that this

would be the

result.

Perhaps nothing would have changed Arafat. Perhaps

make an

end-of-conflict deal

with the

his inability to

would have trumped the best "tough love"

approach by President Clinton. But by not

making it

clear to

him the con-

sequences of rejection, by not adopting a blunt posture with him, Clinton

had no

possibility

of altering Arafat's calculus. Perhaps Arafat would have

considered a lesser deal

—

or created

ing proposed by those around Ultimately, the

more

possibilities for alternatives be-

him who were pushing

empathy and tough

love rules go

for an agreement.

hand

in hand.

might ask whether President George W. Bush might be effective regard.

He seems

to have an instinct for being blunt

without empathy and an awareness of the details

One

can only wonder

ond resolution

at the

in this

—but bluntness

unlikely to work.

is

how effective he might have been

in getting a sec-

UN or in getting Turkey to be a part of the coali-

war against Iraq had he been able

tion in the

One

communicate both

to

awareness and tough love.

EMPLOY THE GOOD COP-BAD COP APPROACH CAREFULLY uncommon in negotiations during the Clinton presidency for

7. It

was not

negotiators to be seen as harder-line and tougher than the president. In

no small

part, that resulted

shaped by

from the Clinton

style,

which was so heavily

his

impulse to embrace. In

his defense,

ment of other

leaders and constraints

imposed on them more

tively than is

not that

any of those negotiating on I

what Rabin was up against

In these cases, negotiations,

I

it

would be the one what lim-

as a leader

and

a

it

result. I

was the bad cop, and he was the good one. Usually, in

should be the other way around: the leader should be the

bad cop and the negotiator the good cop. The negotiator is

instinc-

could relate to the constraints and was often reluctant to push

other leaders as a

stance

the predica-

politically or

Asad and Arafat psychologically. But Clinton,

politician,

felt

Speaking for myself,

did not see the constraints; indeed, often

to explain to Clinton

ited

his behalf.

he

in the first in-

the one charged with trying to alter the behavior and positions

203

STATECRAFT of those with

whom he is negotiating. He tries to show an understanding

of their position and to explore ways of responding to their needs, but he

needs them to meet him partway because he must also persuade his boss to

respond to the other

side's needs. It is the boss

who

decides, not the

negotiator.

Of course,

thoritative,

meaning he can influence the boss and deliver on what he

fers.

But he must

still

the negotiator must be seen as influential and au-

persuade those

meaning he must persuade should never be taken "help

me

his boss or bosses

ident Clinton stances, the

—was seen

I

—and

negotiator,

their acceptance

would often say

in a negotiation,

something to work with." This often

—

the decision maker

in this case, Pres-

than the negotiator. In such circum-

as softer

to go

is

me

when

less likely

impulse

As

as a given.

to help you by giving

worked, but was

who have made him the

of-

around the negotiator and deal directly with

the leader. Barak, seeing Clinton's reactions, began insisting on dealing

with the president on nearly every issue.

When

a leader

is

so involved, he creates the equivalent of a court of appeal,

becoming the good

negotiator and inevitably

Good

willing to be

weakening the

cop.

cops and bad cops are naturally a part of a negotiation in which

there are multiple actors on each side, and there are differences of opin-

ion about not only what

is

acceptable in the talks but also what

it

will

And in any negotiation of this sort, the other who seems more sympathetic, more willing to find bridging

take to produce agreement. side will see ideas,

to

and more committed to producing a

work with

find

ways

deal. It

that individual, to try to forge

to help that

is

only natural to try

common

person overcome those

strategies,

less inclined (or

and

to

even op-

posed) to doing a deal.

But the impulse to work with

a

sympathetic individual

pered by the fear that apparent differences are part of Suspicion

is

also a part of nearly

other side

is

trying to get the better of you

And

there

is

a

may be tem-

manipulation.

every negotiation; the fear that the is

inherent in negotiations.

often a tendency to view the good and bad cops as contrived

or designed to suggest

artificial

differences or pressures for the purposes

of avoiding concessions. So playing the role of the good cop

be convincing

if

you, as the good cop, can deliver in a

responding beneficial to the other Alternatively, the

constraints

on

good cop, by

his side are

very

way

is

likely to

that

makes

side.

definition, will

clear.

be more credible

if the

Convincing the other side that you

204

Twelve Rules

need something

will

be

to

Follow

far easier if reality clearly limits

what you can

Rabin did not have to convince Arafat that he had

do. Yitzhak

problem

a

with Israeli settlers and therefore needed some understanding of the

very real pressures he faced on settler issues.

The

pressures were clear;

the demonstrations and even the threats were apparent. Because of that,

Arafat cut Rabin slack on the issue of settlement expansion.

Though not

usually concerned about the needs of the other side, even before the Rabin assassination, Arafat never

ment

activity.

if ever,

did

so.

made much of an

issue of Israeli settle-

His aides might raise concerns with Rabin, in turn, was

more

us,

but Arafat rarely,

tolerant than his security people

of what he thought Arafat could and could not do against Hamas. as if

It

was

each understood the constraints on the other and was prepared to

respect certain limitations as a result. Privately communicating on do-

mestic or internal pressures leaders, but such private lic

may build understanding and

communications

will ring truer if there

is

pub-

evidence of the problem. In the end, explaining constraints, what

is

possible,

circumstances under which change can take place a

between

trust

context in negotiations

—and

is

what

isn't,

and the

essential for setting

laying the groundwork for what any good

cop must do to demonstrate that he needs help to prevail against the bad cops on his

8.

side.

UNDERSTAND THE VALUE AND LIMITATIONS OF DEADLINES

Deadlines are essential in any high-stakes negotiation.

No political leader

ever wants to take a decision that will expose him or her to great political cost before absolutely necessary. Deadlines are a

have to be prepared to make your be ready to

close.

And you have

quences of having no deal

The

own

hardest concessions.

to

or at least not the one you envisioned.

no choice. In negotiations, there

—assuming

also

—

reluctant to undertake until they

line

You

You have

higher the stakes in a negotiation, the more a deadline

make but bottom

street.

to be willing to live with the conse-

be necessary to force concessions that each side

is

two-way

it is

truly

is

is

is

likely to

ultimately willing to

become convinced

that there

always reluctance to go to one's real

known

—

for fear that playing

what one

sees as his/her ultimate concession will prove insufficient if the other side

is

not equally ready to

make

decisions. In such circumstances, if

205

STATECRAFT your side reveals will

its

end up having

bottom

little

conclude to

al

He

a deal?"

finally

failure to achieve a deal.

Asad would frequently ask me, "Are the

determine

must

if

put

was not asking, do they want

cards on the table.

its

tom

know whether they

to

lines

on the

ready to do

is

I

a deal?

He

ready to

was trying

did not understand this distinc-

—and when

I

finally did,

are ready to close

own

but your

table,

that. If

you want

what you are prepared this

Israelis

they were ready to go to the endgame, where each side

tion until later in the process

want

doesn't move, you

still

choice but to go beyond your redline or see the

end of negotiations and the Hafez

and the other

line

to

I

now and put their real

bot-

behavior signals that you are not

go to an endgame, prove

in

it

me something to show the

to do; give

"You

told Asad,

terms of

Israelis that

not just an attempt to draw them out without revealing anything

on your

side." In fact,

Asad

his

posture

time to

negotiate with the Israelis, and

believing this was

now

when he changed

did this

his foreign minister for the first

finally

on resuming negotiations, sent

made

concessions even on borders

the endgame. Unfortunately,

denly believing that he must not look agreement, decided that

had not imposed

endgame and

it

like

Ehud

he was rushing to an

was not the time for the endgame

a deadline,

Barak, sud-

but Asad had believed

after

we were

all.

We

in an

that Barak was similarly ready to decide.

Deadlines are used to force each side to decide. pose them unless one

is

readv to

live

One

should not im-

with the consequences. Similarly,

deadlines should not be imposed unless you feel that you truly have

played out the string, meaning that nothing more can be done and the negotiations have

become

a

process of avoidance rather than of decisions.

Richard Holbrooke and Secretary of State Christopher understood in forging the

Dayton Accords on Bosnia. George Mitchell

stood that he could not conclude the

Good

also

this

under-

Friday Agreement on North-

ern Ireland without a deadline. In both cases, Holbrooke and Mitchell

what

realized

finally force

it

took to conclude

a deal,

each side to overcome

its

and with

a deadline,

they could

reluctance to decide and close

the deal.

One

other time to impose

a

deadline

stances exist to reach a deal but

may

is

when you

believe the circum-

change. Sometimes a deadline

is

necessary not only to force decisions but also because the political context in

which those decisions could be made

206

is

under pressure and not

Twelve Rules likely to raelis

be sustained.

When

Follow

to

was negotiating the deal between the

I

and Palestinians on Hebron,

imposed

I

a

Is-

deadline for both reasons:

I

could see that the gaps were bridgeable and that decisions had to be made,

and

the

at

same

time,

I

feared that

cumstances would change. act of terrorism,

deal

—and

New

we

if

did not close at that time, the cir-

would open

issues

and Netanyahu would lose

his base

where agreements are not

They

make hard

They

decisions.

are certainly nec-

but they are not sufficient for reaching agreements.

TAKE ONLY CALCULATED RISKS

negotiator worth his or her salt will avoid taking risks in a negotia-

tion. Naturally, the risks

be

a

possible, but rather they create the necessary

require great nerve and a sense of timing.

9.

No

make

don't produce agreements

pressure to overcome the inherent reluctance to

essary,

or need to

Arafat might decide that the deal no longer served his interests.

Ultimately, deadlines are derivative.

They

up, there could be an

risks nonetheless.

side (or sides) as

he or she takes

will

Reluctance to take

be calculated, but they will

risks will

be seen by the other

your needing the negotiations more than they do. Nei-

ther side in a negotiation wants to send the signal that

negotiating process or deal

breakdown

so

much

that

it

more than

its

needs the

it

opponent, or that

fears a

it

make the concessions needed just to keep

will

the other side in the game. That

surely a slippery slope.

is

They

Negotiations involve leverage.

involve convincing the other

side (or sides) that while a deal should serve both sides' interests and

produce ests are

a

win-win outcome, you can and

how

not served. But no matter

tion,

you cannot be

may

fear the

certain,

will

walk away

if

your inter-

well you feel you read the situa-

and others on your side of the negotiations

consequences of

breakdown and shy away from running

a

the risk of bringing everything to a head.

I

certainly faced this

when

try-

ing to close the deal on Hebron. I

had taken over the negotiations the

Netanyahu

that his negotiators could not

resolve the remaining issues

the Palestinians

if

"Go

make the necessary moves I

I

he would accept

or never, he said,

Prime Minister

—even though had helped narrow — and would what was

ferences between the two sides

now

last day, telling

for

it."

my

resolve

doing

so.

207

the dif-

left

Believing that

After working with

to

it

with

was

Abu Mazen and

STATECRAFT Saeb Erekat until well past midnight, we reached agreement on the issues.

I

told

them

would

I

what we had agreed

sell

last

Netanyahu and

to

they said they would do the same with Yasir Arafat. I

was able to do

me

called

my

part,

but in the middle of the night, Saeb Erekat

to say, "President Arafat

had some questions and we need

him

was done.

some

additional discussions."

and

would have no more discussions with them.

I

I

told

I

I

and other members of the Palestinian delegation began for a meeting.

I

my team

instructed

would not take any phone

that

I

my

had done

part

In the morning, Erekat calling,

pleading

would have no meeting and

I

from the Palestinians before they ac-

calls

knowledged what we had agreed upon. During the and ask

day, the Palestinians

—and upping

if

Mohammad

suggested that

I

me

I

told

him I would

leave that

al-Baz, the advisor to President

a similar call, as did the

Bassiouny.

at least

the ante,

Osama

there was no agreement.

Mubarak of Egypt, made Israel,

call

me to see them. I told him I would do so only when they acknowl-

edged our agreement night

persuaded King Hussein to

Egyptian ambassador to

Members of my team were nervous and

agree to talk to the Palestinians on the phone.

refused and put out publicly that

I

would be leaving

at

I

midnight.

My boss, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, called and asked if was certain that

this

was the right thing to do.

was. But shortly after speaking to him,

I

I

convinced him that

He

to

become the na-

was concerned and, leaving no doubt that he

was speaking for himself and the president, asked, "What talking to the Palestinians?" talking

I

him

told

anymore unless they

that they

had

is

the

to see that

I

harm

in

was not

acknowledged the understandings

first

from the previous night. Without everything would unravel

it

got a call from Sandy Berger, the

—who was about

deputy national security advisor tional security advisor.

I

that,

—indeed,

ply have been a test to determine

they would reopen the issues, and

their desire to talk

more might sim-

if they actually had to close

Arafat needed to understand that he had to decide

now

now

or lose our

involvement and what had been achieved. Berger reluctantly, and with obvious unease, accepted

Was

I

so certain

I

my

approach.

was right? No,

pressure built on me, the

more

I

Palestinian side, and the last thing relieve their anxiety. Moreover,

I

I

had

knew I

my

208

more the

there was nervousness on the

wanted

knew

doubts, but the

to

do

at that

that this posture

moment was

—

and

to

my with-

Twelve Rules

standing pressure

Follow

—would help with Netanyahu

had to go back to him and ask for close the deal.

to

As

it

turned out that

if it

on any of the

a modification

I

issues to

turned out, the Palestinians relented, acknowledged

my new demand of announcing that they would host a summit with Netanyahu and me that evening to finalize the deal. When finally met them before the summit, they asked for one miour agreement, and also met

I

nor change

—which

change we have "For I

real,"

we

then brought to Netanyahu saying, "With this

I

He

a deal."

ran the risk because

when

asked, "For real, Dennis?" and

saw the natural hesitancy to close

I

the gaps had effectively been bridged.

greater risk in not closing, and It

was

essential to

cumstance,

when

I

said,

at a

time

concluded the understanding on Hebron.

show no

a negotiator

I

read both sides as being ready

sign of wavering

cannot run a

tion he has adopted. Apart

a

my

if

pushed.

such a

part. In

a

cir-

from the negotiator's knowing that he has the

good assessment of where he is

on

was

he cannot sustain the posi-

risk if

necessary backing to sustain his position,

of timing. Timing

also believed there

I

is

comes back

it

in the process

to his

making

a

and having the right sense

—pushing when you should

key for any negotiator

when you need not will inevitably undercut what you want to achieve. Knowing when to run risks must be a part of the makeup of any negotiator. And being prepared as a negotiator to make threats at certain critical moments must be accompanied by a readiness not or conceding

to carry out

what you threaten.

10.

The most important old saying that your gotiator.

NEVER

LIE,

attribute for

NEVER BLUFF

any negotiator

word must be your bond

is

is

his credibility.

The

the lifeblood for any ne-

A negotiator's word must be trusted, his assessments

and obser-

vations taken seriously, and his threats and promises always believed.

Lies and bluffs will always be exposed, and once he tiator

may never

threat

on which he cannot deliver

ability to follow

recover his credibility. In

through

—

may never be completely asset

exposed, a nego-

negotiator makes a

—whether because of

it

will take a

penditure of real capital to recoup his

one

fact, if a

is

tremendous

losses.

reestablished.

A

Even

an in-

and the ex-

then, his credibility

negotiator's credibility

he must never permit to be devalued.

209

a bluff or

effort

is

the

STATECRAFT Upon

closing the

Hebron

deal,

I

was asked on

CNN, "Did you really

plan to leave as you announced earlier in the day?"

newsman

asking the question thought

his surprise,

I

said

mit and no deal. I

I

would have

had simply been posturing. To

I

I

had not been

of having

a position

Bluffs in the high-stakes

game of resolving

are almost always called.

The

real a threat

or

ation

ingly

is

might

make them.

historically rooted conflicts

stakes are simply too high not to test

bluffs are nearly always called, lies will also

are involved,

how

be exposed sooner

and the truth

in

any given

by someone.

A

negotiator must not

the other side something that

is

untrue.

bound

tell

a bluff called. If a ne-

be.

Too many people

later.

bluffing.

not prepared to act on his threats, he should not

is

While

had been no sum-

that night if there

stated very clearly that

I

would never put myself in

gotiator

left

was clear that the

It

to be revealed

qualify his assertion by

making the point

He

situ-

know-

can, however,

what he

that he "believes"

is

saying to be the case.

When, whether

for example,

Israel

Hafez

al

Asad asked Warren Christopher and

had any claims on Syrian territory

conveying from Yitzhak Rabin

his readiness to

Heights, assuming Israel's needs were met,

know

of."

While Rabin had,

say that his needs

we were

withdraw from the Golan responded, "Not that

we

in fact, not qualified his offer other than to

must be met,

saying something that was

I

time

at the

me

false.

I

did not want us to be in a position of

we

(This was fortuitous, as later

ered that Rabin and Asad had different definitions of what

discov-

full

with-

drawal from the Golan Heights meant.) Yitzhak Rabin was a leader

who would simply never

lie. I

erally never tell

anyone something that was not

true.

is

literally true

but not necessarily revealing.

whole

certainly not the

The

technical

The technical

truth

is

truth. In negotiations, especially given his ex-

pectation of Asad seeking constant advantage, the Rabin motto to be that he

lit-

But he was also

very practiced in the art of telling the "technical truth." truth

used to say

He would

about him that he was constitutionally incapable of lying.

would respond

to questions

from us

literally

seemed

but not com-

pletely.

For negotiators, there

might suggest bad that ensures that

faith,

is

a lesson here:

while never acting in a way that

be sure always to qualify what you say in a way

you have not

lied

and cannot be accused of lying. One's

210

Twelve Rules

counterpart can

live

to

Follow

many things in a negotiation other than being misled. Make it a rule not to do either.

with

lied to or deliberately

DON'T PAPER OVER DIFFERENCES none goes against basic human instinct more

11.

Of all one. a

the rules,

human

It is

good

nature to want meetings to go well or to conclude with

But negotiations are about overcoming differences, and

feeling.

the differences cannot be wished away.

While

it is

ilarly,

means

that a difficult, bitter

meeting may be the

which indidirectly,

result.

Sim-

the desire to leave a meeting with good feeling or a seeming

agreement can be dangerous and costly standing.

come back

will always

It

Let me

illustrate

egations,

I

knew

to

if it is

based on a misunder-

haunt you.

each point. Prior to going to the

summit involving the

tion

at

work and when differences must be taken on

rection does not if this

important to create a

moments

context and avoid being provocative, there are

even

than this

Wye

River Planta-

and Palestinian leaders with their del-

Israeli

that the Palestinians

needed

know

to

concretely, not

only in generalities, what they would be asked to do on security in terms of making

arrests, collecting illegal

infrastructure.

bad

faith

Leaving

on our

vague could provoke

part, charges that

and

false pretenses,

willing to adopt. So

man

this

a retreat I

weapons, and dealing with terrorist

we had

invited

them

Gaza and responsible

meeting we would have to go over some

was in no rush to do I

told

him

I

had

so.

When

to go over with

Dahlan, the

for dealing with the I

let

him know be-

difficult issues,

him what would be hard

him the points from

to read

summit on

and he

there was no putting off the task at hand,

tinians to accept but essential for reaching a deal.

wanted

to the

Mohammad

security issues in the negotiations for the Palestinians. fore the

with claims of

from positions they might otherwise be

arranged to meet with

in charge of security in

a shock,

a draft that

for the Pales-

And, to be precise,

we were planning

I

to

present at Wye.

Even though

knew as

I

prefaced

these points

would be

he listened.

He

my

remarks further by explaining

why

I

Dahlan could not contain himself

difficult,

—saying

exploded in anger

that if he

had

to accept

these points he would look like a quisling and be unable to face his men.

He

got so agitated that he literally needed to walk

211

it

off for about fifteen

STATECRAFT minutes

—

the while with

all

calm him down.

preter, seeking to

him

told

that

Gamal

Helal,

When

my

advisor and Arabic inter-

Dahlan returned

was not trying to damage him;

I

I

to the table,

points to hurt him, even though he believed they would. But

not going to mislead him and create a false promise for him. scribed

would be necessary;

make

easier to accept

vise

it

me how to do that

agreement without

if

there were ways

and explain

—

just so

his side's

long

I

was not making these

to say

I

was also

What

I

de-

it

differently to

in Palestinian terms,

he should ad-

he understood there would be no

as

meeting the substance of these

points.

Dahlan collected himself and went over each point, explaining what was hard but also letting

me know

that he was prepared to find a

meet the substance of each of the security concerns. In to

frame each obligation in a way that would make

on the Palestinian

street. Ultimately,

the ground in a meeting that

sure

I

we

did

so.

knew would be

we would have reached agreement

But

turn,

its

own

sake.

he asked

to

me

possible to be sold

it

if I

had not prepared

confrontational,

I

am

not

later.

Negotiations on hard issues will provoke harsh reactions. not to be provocative for

way

The trick

is

Pick your moments, and don't shy

away from them. And don't disguise disagreements; make sure they are known, even

if

you are not necessarily ready

to take

them

on.

The

logic

of creating understanding on lesser issues and building both good faith

and

momentum

must be

is

a

compelling one. But, again, the understandings

real.

Former secretary of state James Baker taught me the importance of never leaving a meeting with a false impression or understanding, even if it

produces

ill

feeling.

I

saw him do

this early in his

sue of short-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

Our

tenure on the

is-

position at the time

emphasized modernization, and most Europeans were opposed. With the French foreign minister suggesting there was basic agreement be-

tween us and everyone ready said

to adjourn

one particular meeting, Baker

—and proceeded

he was not sure we truly were on the same page

show

all

present that

small meeting;

I

we were not

really in accord at

all.

to

This was not

a

could see from the faces on our delegation that there

was distress over the fact that Baker had chosen to highlight the differences and not

he was

right.

let

the meeting conclude with a sense of agreement. Yet

There would have been

a false

sense of understanding,

which would have been more painful and costly to reverse

212

later on.

Tmdve Rules

No

one

in

mv

to FoIIozv

experience was more careful to avoid misunderstand-

ings or false agreements than Baker, and

me

guided

tween the

in negotiations. Israelis, Syrians,

tween Hizbollah and

much

Once

on

was

a

valuable lesson that

the end of seven days of shuttling be-

at

and Lebanese to stop an escalating battle be-

Israel,

I

to the consternation of

inglv been reached

it

prolonged

my

meeting with President Asad.

a

colleagues, after agreement had seem-

a cease-tire

document.

I

did so because

I

feared

there was one provision that was understood differently by the two sides.

and

wanted Asad

I

against Israeli forces,

I

Lebanese village

at the site.

I

wanted no sur-

wanted no subsequent charge from Asad that he did not under-

— and

a

perception that

finalized.

I

to

for

him

to

do so once

me

for pointing this

us.

mv own

conclude

I

failed to

principles in the process, and

Wye

At the end of the

we had secured an agreement, but one to

that

Netanyahu claimed

it

River Plantation summit,

Prime Minister Bibi Net-

after learning that President

Clinton would

not release Jonathan Pollard, the American convicted of spying for rael.

it

out

juncture between Israelis and Palestinians.

haunt

anyahu refused

there was hesitancy on our

would be harder

it

follow this rule, going against

came back

to avoid an early unraveling

did not buy that view and acted anvwav. and Asad.

uncharacteristically, thanked a different

wanted

Asad would back sway from the agree-

side to spell this out for fear

had been

I

mv concerns,

of the accord. Notwithstanding

At

a

under the terms of the self-defense provision the

stand the provision that wav, and

ment

came from

that if lire

would respond against Hizbollah

Israelis

prises;

know

to

Is-

that in private meetings with the president,

Clinton had understood that Bibi needed Pollard's release to deal in Israel and that the president

sell

the

would release him. Clinton claimed

made no such commitment. We were stuck for several hours, and two leaders met alone to resolve the impasse, the president told us that Bibi had thought about reducing the number of Palestinian prisoners to be released but decided he should not make Arafat pav the price he had

after the

for

our misunderstanding; instead, he would release fewer "security"

prisoners, as last

opposed

to those

who had committed

phase of releases. Arafat would

still

pettv crimes in the

get 750 prisoners released in

three phases, but in the last phase, the politically sensitive prisoners

would make up

The

president

a

felt

smaller proportion of the releases than

we might be

first

planned.

able to change this back to the oneinal

213

STATECRAFT formula

if

the implementation of the agreement

Secretary Albright and

Even though

I

felt a

Something

questions.

me

vagueness that

me

told

hours awake, knowing that

for the

if

—

had

asked

did not ask any

right,

but after eight

would have

went

along.

last forty-eight

Israeli

—

to be put

on hold

But in doing

became

it

totally different

releases

Soon the deal and the

sides.

I

when

created a big problem for ourselves sides

He

I

—having spent the

a Friday, the deal

meaning of the prisoner

well.

we did not conclude the agreement with

Sabbath and might unravel

weeks that the two

made me uneasy,

was not quite

this

days of very difficult negotiations

sundown approaching on

went

to go explain this to Arafat.

so,

clear within a

we few

understandings on the

emotional issue for both

a highly

government came

apart.

Perhaps both

would have happened anyway. But with all the pressures of the moment, I still should have made sure that we were not disguising a difference agreement

that could break the

later on.

The lesson is an important one. Don't rely on false understandings. They won't last, and everything that relies upon them will come apart.

12.

SUMMARIZE AGREEMENTS MEETING

AT THE END OF EVERY Clearly this rule

is

a logical extension

One way to make sure that there is

standing.

what has been agreed vergence

at the

is

to

a

common understanding of

summarize the points of agreement or con-

end of every meeting. By summarizing, the other side

will either agree or not agree least

of the need to avoid misunder-

on the points and their interpretation. At

then you and your counterpart will have a

where you

common

appreciation of

stand.

Clearly such summaries have a value in preventing misunderstandings.

But they can also contribute

namic

in negotiations in

in

another way:

if

only minimally.

advance, not retreat or merely holding the at

sought to create

a

dy-

which each meeting would advance the baseline

of the previous one, even

come

I

The psychology was one of line.

Summarizing the out-

the end of each meeting always provided a clear status report.

Both sides would know what the baseline was going in and coming out.

Summaries

also provided a concrete basis

ments on particular

issues.

I

was always

214

on which

to

make agree-

a firm believer in resolving

Twelve Rules

to

Follow

agreements on issues whenever possible. In in chapter 10,

you can, but

I

my

discussion on mediation

describe the importance of reaching agreement where

also note the circumstances

under which there can be ex-

ceptions to this rule. In

any

case, since

and always

set

misunderstandings frequently bedevil negotiations

them back, being

careful to

summarize what has been

both understood and not understood on each issue ing

is

a critical rule

more

rules will

make

century, negotiations will be

imizes what

it

possible to use negotia-

effective tool of statecraft. In the complicated landscape

of international conflict and diplomacy that first

end of a meet-

of thumb for negotiators.

Employing these twelve tions as a

at the

we want

needed

we

are facing in the twenty-

to create a climate that legit-

we seek or changes who might be a threat. Mediation, which obvinegotiation and many of the rules outlined above, is a reor produces partners for what

the behaviors of those

ously involves

lated tool of statecraft that in the last several years has

neglected.

It is

time to employ

it

more

215

extensively.

been increasingly

10.

MEDIATION

IN A

WORLD

OF LOCAL CONFLICT

Why

a separate

chapter on mediation? Mediation involves negotiations,

and the rules outlined in the ation effort. However, in a it

last

chapter will apply in nearly any medi-

book about

statecraft,

and how best to employ

to serve America's national security interests, mediation

separate discussion.

is

worthy of a

not about resolving our differences with an-

It is

other country or seeking to get another country to accept our positions; it is

about using

conflicts

a negotiation process to try to reconcile differences

between others. In the words of Saadia Touval and

Zartman, "Mediation

which find

a third

in a

best thought of as a

mode of

and

William

negotiation in

party helps the parties find a solution that they cannot

by themselves."

engaged

is

I.

1

By

definition,

our

own

interests are less directly

mediation process.

we have no interests. While our interests are less directly involved, we may still decide that we have an important stake in trying to stop or prevent a conflict between others. Maybe we see a terrible loss of life or abuse of human rights if such a conflict is not prevented. Maybe we fear destabilization of a region and the escalatory dangers of a possible war. Or maybe we decide that we have the ability This

is

not to say that

to settle or at least defuse a conflict In

and should do

such circumstances, mediation

lessen conflicts.

It is

is

a

so.

form of

U.S. intervention to

certainly cheaper than militarily intervening and

216

it

Mediation in a World of Local Conflict

can be used to prevent conflicts from turning violent and bloody or to

end them altogether. In recent

years,

it

been underused, or employed

that has

And

tensively

yet

a tool that

it is

has been one form of statecraft

ambitiously and far less in-

less

could be used to respond to conflicts

around the globe. The old saying that we don't have has always reflected an understandable logic:

a

dog

in that fight

Why involve ourselves, our

our diplomatic and material resources, in something that

prestige,

may

be very hard to resolve and doesn't appear to relate to us? In a world that was far less connected, that just that the

world

which everything

—

is

as

Thomas Friedman

might make sense.

—

has pointed out

It is

not

is flat,

in

connected and those around the globe can compete

much more level playing surface; it is that we are now in a world in which we will find it far more difficult to insulate ourselves from conflict. For those who are still not a part of the flat world, and who economically on

a

are unlikely to join

sources of conflict

any time soon, resentments run deep. Traditional

it

—competing claims

and intercommunal and ethnic abiding resentment of being

left

to power, land,

rivalries

—

and resources,

be compounded by an

will

out of global development, and as 9/1

proved, that will affect us sooner or

later.

Thus, quite apart from our responding out of genuine humanitarian

concern

—an impulse

that

is

more

neoliberal than neoconservative

there are very practical reasons to involve ourselves in conflict situations

through mediation. Foremost among these,

many

local conflicts fuel the

very anger and alienation that breeds ready recruits for Al Qaeda and offshoots.

The Palestinian issue is

ism, but the anger

by the radical as the

its

not the source of Bin Ladenism or Jihad-

and sense of grievance that radiates from

it is

exploited

Not every local conflict can be so exploited, but on its own merits wanes, its perpetrators will in-

Islamists.

appeal of jihad

creasingly seek to exploit local conflicts to keep their cause alive.

Surely mediation

is

not the answer in every situation. But

useful tool. If nothing else, actively and visibly a far

more favorable view of the

ternationally

make

it

—and building

role

and

employing

utility

It is

can be a

will create

of American power in-

the legitimacy of what

easier for others to be associated with us

purposes.

it

it

we

are doing will

and to embrace our

certainly far easier to influence others if our purposes are

accepted and not rejected.

217

STATECRAFT

MEDIATION TO PROMOTE AMERICAN ACCEPTABILITY One

objective of statecraft

foreign policy

we seek

—must be forging an

generally accepted.

is

more others

priate, the

will

—indeed, one fundamental

objective of our

international context in which what

The more our purposes are seen as approwith what we seek, and the more we

will identify

be able to influence others and find partners for dealing with chal-

lenges around the globe. In a world

others to be effective,

essential that

it is

our adversaries be seen

where increasingly we must

as illegitimate.

we

Richard Haass, using the concept

of integrating the other leading powers into a goes so far as to say that

act with

be seen as legitimate and that

common

we can never vanquish

policy approach,

threats

stemming from

loose nukes and terrorism without having others share our basic goals

and purposes. 2

The

failing

of the Bush administration in

that persuasion

term was to believe

was ultimately not necessary because others would ad-

just to the realities that

In the

its first

we

created.

Bush administration's second term, there has been

growing

a

awareness that our policies were repelling more than they were attracting others. Secretary of State Rice has thus emphasized outreach and a

new

slogan: "practical idealism."

The

United States will not back away from

them by engaging others

its

meant

to

convey that the

idealistic goals

but will pursue

slogan

is

actively, listening to

them, and taking their

concerns into account. While Secretary Rice has certainly fort to

show she

is

that the United States If

we we

ef-

still

preaches more than

it

is

seeks to persuade.

are to reduce the almost reflexive opposition to the United

States and nity,

made an

listening to others, the perception internationally

its

will

purposes throughout

have to do

much more

much of the to

international

commu-

change attirudes toward

us. In a

world of non-state actors posing threats, we need others to join with us

and believe that

is

the right thing to do. So, transforming our image,

building the acceptability of our actions, making ourselves less toxic,

and having others see that we are acting

—

necessary parts of statecraft

selflessly are all

particularly at a time

going to be

when we must

also

be competing for the hearts and minds of a population in the Islamic

world that has become angry and alienated from

218

us.

Hon in a World of Local Conflict

And, here, mediation can be

very valuable

a

virtue of showing the United States at

its

tool.

best. It

Mediation has the

can demonstrate con-

commitment to trving to resolve many in the Arab world criticized the

cern for others and an unmistakable

Throughout the

conflicts.

1990s,

United States was making

efforts the

to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict,

complaining that we were too biased toward

manding on the Arab that

it.

Indeed,

as

and too hard or de-

no one questioned

side in the negotiations. But

America cared about

to settle

Israel

and was making

this conflict

a

genuine effort

the most visible face of our mediation efforts,

found mvself often approached

in the

Arab world and told how much

mv work was appreciated. Even some of mv foremost Arab time, including the secretarv-general of the

now bemoan they miss

the fact that

me

less

am no

I

critics at the

Arab League, Amre Moussa.

longer the mediator; though

emblem

than thev miss the

I

ox

believe

I

America caring about

the issue.

Contrast

this

with the Bush administration and the perception that

has simplv disengaged from the conflict

Its

unwillingness to pursue me-

diation fostered an impression throughout the

Middle East

indifferent to a conflict that animated a basic grievance

the Arab and Islamic worlds.

—

—even

if

was

those in

our policies then were often ques-

its

purposes.

That

said,

effect

on our image. Clearlv. the main reason

mote

among

it

the Bush administration got no credit, only a deepening resent-

ment about

its

that

Whereas the Clinton administration got

credit for genuinely caring

tioned

it

mediation should be used

conflict resolution. Here, however,

realistically.

Xot even"

as a tool

is

also

for

mediating

is

to pro-

mediation must be approached

local conflict can be sealed.

mediation, like diplomacv more generallv. tivelv achieve. It

not simplv because or

what vou prevent,

is

But the measure of

not alwavs what vou posi-

limit, contain, or defuse.

MEDIATION, CONFLICT REDUCTION, AND LEVERAGE American mediation to

efforts

during the vears 2001-2006 were not going

end the Israeli-Palestinian

cially

while Yasir Arafat was

conflict. alive.

This was not

in the cards, espe-

Nonetheless, our efforts might have

limited the death, destruction, and victimization on both Israeli and Palestinian sides during the second intifada.

219

Had we made such

an ef-

STATECRAFT would have made the resumption of peacemaking

fort, it

ier

and

more

far

likely to

pay

efforts far eas-

more than

Instead, with a legacy of

off.

years of warfare and an accumulated set of grievances on each Israelis

and Palestinians have increasingly

situation

ward,

such

is

not moving for-

usually going backward and deteriorating. Restoring

it is

a

or other conflict zones, the

rarely static. If the process of peacemaking

is

both

peacemaking.

lost faith in

When it comes to Middle East diplomacy,

side,

live

faith in

when it is lost is not simple. Here the Bush administration comprehend the price of deterioration. It came into office be-

process

failed to

lieving that if

it

could not resolve the conflict, there was

do anything. However, and

rioration,

it

it

failed to

little

reason to

understand the psychic costs of dete-

failed to appreciate that U.S.

mediation might have kept

the conflict within bounds and limited the deterioration.

And doing

so

could have bought time to get beyond Arafat while also shaping an envi-

ronment

more conducive

that was

to

resuming

real

peacemaking

at a

later time.

In this sense, mediation should be seen as a tool serving different

purposes ranging from containment or reduction of conflicts to their resolution. Success can be flict

or

fail

to

do

so,

measured not by whether you resolve

but by whether you transform

a

con-

it

and make resolution

It

can be intensive and

possible at a later point.

Obviously mediation can take multiple forms.

designed to broker differences, bringing the sides to the negotiating table

and making proposals to bridge differences. This

at certain stages in

is

what was done

the Clinton administration on Bosnia, Northern Ire-

land,

and the Arab-Israeli process. Alternatively, mediation can be

more

passive, facilitating

communication and

far

clarifying differences but

shying away from actively brokering agreements. In the early years of the Oslo process,

we tended

to play this role.

The Norwegians were

pable of only a more supportive or facilitating role, and that

is

ca-

the one

they played in making the Oslo process possible.

To be

a

broker

country such

as

as

opposed

Norway could

any meaningful penalties. ers could replace

it.

It

It

when

offer

one needs leverage.

inducements but

it

A

could not offer

could walk away from the process, but oth-

wanted

the parties ultimately needed

could play a role only

to a facilitator,

to it

be involved in the process more than

to

be involved. In

the parties wanted

220

it

this respect,

to

do

so.

Norway

Mediation in a World of Local Conflict

The United if it

States

so desires.

is

far

It is

for fear of creating

more capable of imposing

itself in a

negotiation

harder for parties to say no to U.S. involvement,

problems

in the relationship. Israel, for

example,

could never easily reject U.S. involvement in a negotiating process

American administration pressed the

issue.

And

if

an

yet different adminis-

been reluctant to impose themselves when their presence

trations have

was not sought or desired.

impose American mediation resulted

Typically, this reluctance to

from the perception that

if

there was

enthusiasm for our playing the

little

that was achievable, and

what was the point of mediating?

role,

While the Bush administration has taken

this to

an extreme, the Clinton

administration was ready to play the

more ambitious mediator

when both sides wanted

—something

it

do so

to

Prime Minister Rabin's time only with

Netanyahu and Barak, there was

—and

mediation role

a

no

Syria.

role only

that was true during

(With Prime Ministers

keen interest

in

an active American

the Palestinians always sought such an Ameri-

can role because they believed

it

would

level the playing field with the

Israelis.)

Again, perceptions of there being a possibility to alternatively, a fear

of serious deterioration without our

tended to drive American readiness to play ern Ireland,

it

make

progress, or, efforts,

North-

a mediator's role. In

was the perception of possibility and the belief that we

could make a difference that prompted an activist mediator

role.

In Yugoslavia, however, our initial reluctance during the

H.

have

W Bush administration

to

assume

a

mediator posture resulted from

sense of hopelessness about the prospects of any settlement.

only too willing to

let

George

We

a

were

the Europeans take the lead, rationalizing this be-

havior with the belief that this was a conflict in their backyard and one that could help define an appropriate

European

role in the post-cold

war world. In the

first

two years of the Clinton administration, we remained very

hesitant about intervening in an active to a

UN-

state

way

—

leaving mediation efforts

and European Union-led process involving former secretary of

Cyrus Vance, representing

UN secretary-general Boutrous-Ghali,

and David Owen, the former British foreign secretary, representing the

EU. These two sides were not without leverage, but limited to moral suasion and

it

was primarily

economic pressure. Unfortunately, when 221

STATECRAFT Owen

Vance and

devised a plan for the resolution of the conflict, they

failed to get support

from the United

States,

and their

real leverage

was

limited and rarely exercised. Coercion and threats against Serbia re-

mained largely

absent.

When

losevic, the Serb leader,

dealing with someone like Slobodan Mi-

moral suasion carried

economic pressure was going

little

to take a long time to

produce an

effect.

times

appli-

Only the credible threat of hard military power (and cation) was likely to

make

prepared either to use

a difference,

weight and even

at

and the administration was not

or to back the Europeans with

it

egregious Serb behavior became

—

its

it.

The more

extensive ethnic cleansing, the Sre-

brenica massacre, the horrific mortar attack killing civilians in a Sarajevo

market

—

the greater the pressure for us to intervene with force, and the

greater our leverage

became on Milosevic to change

ways and accept

pathway.

a negotiated

The Europeans were

limited in their ability to be a mediator given

their inability to exert real pressure.

more than sanctions rible legacy

his

as the

They tended

way to change Serb

to see

inducements

behavior. Indeed, the ter-

of the twentieth-century wars in Europe has

made coercion

and the possible use offeree generally unacceptable to most Europeans. Their approach to interventions to limit conflicts has thus focused

more on

far

offering rewards rather than imposing penalties for fear that

such penalties might provoke more aggressive behaviors. Inevitably their leverage tends to

This

be more limited

not to say that mediators need to focus solely on penalties or

is

There almost always needs

sanctions.

penalties and rewards. Indeed,

needed

as a result.

to get

to be a

mix of both

inducements or reassurance often are

combatants to cross historic thresholds that otherwise

might be

difficult to cross.

gained

they are going to reverse historic positions.

if

needs leverage

because of

on

its

own

its

potential

—

They need an explanation of what Still, a

is

to be

mediator

the ability to affect the behavior of one or both sides

capacity significantly to help or hurt the position of each

or one in relation to the other. Usually leverage stems from

the ability not just to aid one or the other side in a conflict but also to

deny

it

what

who could

it

might want. Creating enmity in

a

materially support one's opponent

powerful outside party is

bound

think twice about resisting that party's effort at mediation.

222

to

make one

Not

surpris-

Mediation in a World of Local Conflict ingly, those

who have

mediators than those

more capable of being

leverage are far

who can only

offer their

good

offices

effective

and

little in

terms of side payments or threats.

WHEN While leverage

is

AND HOW

TO MEDIATE

critical,

there also must be

the intervention of a mediator can that are simply not ready to end

make

it

TO DO SO

some reason

to believe that

a difference. Parties to a conflict

may

be pressured to cease

fire

for a

short period but not engage seriously in conflict reduction or resolution.

The purpose of mediation Produce the cumstances

cease-fire will

in

such a context will tend to be quite limited.

and try

to find

change to make

a

ways

to preserve

and hope

it,

more enduring arrangement

cir-

possible

in time.

Outside parties will always be more willing to play an active mediating role if they believe the parties to a conflict are ready to

one come

easy by demonstrating a clear desire for change. Israelis

and the

end

it.

How does

judgment? Sometimes the parties themselves make

to such a

PLO

to

meet

secretly

The

and then engage

nition suggested that a historic threshold

it

readiness of the in

mutual recog-

had been crossed. Dramatic

changes in behavior from the past will always be convincing. At other times,

one or more parties may convey

ness to change. Certainly

joint efforts

by the

British

and

Irish

govern-

—and new by Sinn Fein and Gerry Adams toward nego— reason enough mediation might work. attitude

a

tiations

From

to believe intensive

as

the perspective of an

tant to assess conflict so

it

in

I.

American policy maker,

it

will

be impor-

whether there are openings for ending or transforming

can be resolved or

be guided in the

come,

mediator the readi-

on Northern Ireland the Clinton administration

saw renewed and intensive ments

to a possible

first

at least defused.

instance by an indication that the conflict has be-

William Zartman's words,

one where each side

a

Such assessments should

realizes that

it

a

"mutually hurting stalemate"

cannot win, that the costs of conflict

are less and less sustainable, that the losses themselves

may

threaten the

hold on power of leaders, and where each side begins to look for a way out.

Of course, one

can also look for more positive indicators:

leadership emerging that

is

less tied to

223

the past,

Is a

new

whose legitimacy does

STATECRAFT who seems

not depend on continuing the conflict, and

change?

poised for

3

to these questions will

At times the answers to play a

mediating role

may be

answers

clear,

relatively straightforward.

is

more opaque, ensuring

far

be

real

and the decision

At other times the

doubt about whether

mediation can be of use. Nonetheless, from an American standpoint, our interests

might

still

tional landscape initiative

dictate a desire to transform the regional or interna-

and lead us to explore these questions or even take the

with the parties to see

if they are

open

suming

that

we determine

we

still

have to decide what kind of role

will

mediator. Should

we

at

The

once with

a

we should be

of negotiations? Should

overcome deadlocks

playing as

is

in their talks?

a

we be more

active

and and

problem and offering propos-

Should we try to solve

all

grand bargain and push the parties to accept

right role in

as-

that they are and that mediation could help,

ambitious, intervening anytime there

lems

Even

limit ourselves to bringing the parties together

facilitating the process

als to

to outside help.

prob-

it?

mediation will depend on where the parties are in

the conflict-resolution process. If they are just beginning, but signal that

they want to resolve their differences ing process for

its

own

with each side what

Even

if

each

sake

it

—

can do and

how much

In other words,

of the parties.

more appropriate

they

is

theoretically possible.

may

major proposals

assuming the role of an it fits

A more

is

need

still

their respective concerns before

fort at resolution or at offering

make sense only when

a negotiat-

the mediator will need to explore privately

side's intentions are sincere,

know one another and

set

—and not simply have

to get to

any serious

ef-

attempted.

activist

broker

is

likely to

the stage of the negotiations and the mind-

limited facilitator or supportive role

as a negotiating

may

be

process begins. Fostering greater un-

derstanding between the two sides, trying to get each to appreciate the grievances of the other side, ensuring that neither side misinterprets

what the other side

is

saying at the table,

may be

very important for

—and

setting the stage for resolving the conflict over time

for these pur-

poses, playing a supportive role geared toward facilitating tions

may be

the most

fitting.

Such

a role

is

communica-

by definition limited, and

does not involve brokering differences or pressing both sides to change their behaviors

and adjust to what

is

necessary to produce agreements.

224

A

Mediation in a World of Local Conflict

mediator

is

likelv to start off

cation, of meetings,

working more

as a facilitator (of

communi-

and of the negotiating process generally) and then

graduate into more activist roles involving either presenting bridging proposals or pressuring each side to change

its

posture and accept real-

tradeoffs and outcomes.

istic

Arabs and

In dealing with the

more we could

do. But

I

had

to

Israelis,

I

be mindful of whether our involvement

would actually help or become an excuse steps

own.

was often probing to see what

for the parties to avoid taking

on their own, including offering possible compromises on their I

had

to consider

whether

it

was appropriate to make

suggestion

a

on the process of the negotiations (who should be negotiating and where thev should be doing

it

1

or a proposal on the substance of negotiations

my

(perhaps to break a deadlock), and whether

cepted or rejected. Rejection by ularly if

it

own

their

itself

was not always

forced the two sides together to as

an alternative to what

very acts would be ac-

I

a

bad thing, partic-

come up with something on Of course, there

was suggesting.

were times when the views of the negotiators on each side might be one thing and of the leaders quite another. During Prime Minister Rabin's time, his negotiator

with the Palestinians, Uri Savir, wanted to re-

solve differences without our intervention but was

much more open

to

American activism than was Prime Minister Rabin. Rabin was leery of

much American involvement

too

—

believing that inevitably

we would

put more pressure on Israel than on the Palestinians and also believing that the real proof of

changed Palestinian intentions would be their

will-

ingness to resolve differences directly with the Israelis and without outside help.

Whether

more limited facilitation of when to try to close on either

talking of active brokering or of

discussions, any mediator has to decide partial or full agreements.

Sometimes,

as

with the Dayton negotiations

on Bosnia and the Good Friday negotiations on Northern Ireland, there

may

be an underlying readiness to close

chological reasons, the parties find decisions.

They must be pushed

to

it

do

a deal,

but for political and psy-

very hard to make the necessary so.

They must know

don't thev will lose an opportunity to resolve the conflict. diator, taking a

ment

—

measure of the parties and

as well as

Here the me-

their readiness to reach agree-

— must make

the inhibitions on doing so

225

that if they

the judgment

— STATECRAFT that

imposing

a

deadline makes sense

or, as

Northern Ireland negotiations,

in the

George Mitchell believed

the only

is

way the

parties will

decide and reach agreement. Without a deadline, Mitchell reasoned that neither

and

4

ready but need the push or the pressure to

If the parties are truly

the hard decisions, a deadline can be quite effective, particularly

because

On

it

and the possibility of losing important

raises the stakes

the other hand, sometimes

it is

needed

is

we would

is

cast,

we

said no")

and the basic readiness to reach agree-

Before launching a mediation

exists.

lose a lot if

to close a deal.

In such cases, the die

ment

gains.

deadline than an explanation or

less a

excuse ("the Americans insisted, and that

when

the historic choices, and face the inevitable challenges

they did.

make

for that matter, British

prime ministers Blair and Ahern) would muster the courage

Irish

make

to

David Trimble nor Gerry Adams (or

diator needs to assess

what

is

effort,

any prospective me-

what difference his/her

possible and

intervention can make. Again, simply because a complete resolution of a conflict

is

deal might a

not possible still

complete deal

some

not a reason to avoid intervention. it

later on, or

it

is

might simply contain what

thus a tool of why, what, when, and

important to mediate, what

interesting that there

is

is

possible,

is

partial

for

a trouble-

fully, to

—

define

conflict in Sudan.

it

might be possible,

—former

available

There were

—

it

It is

several rea-

it

had

a

it

thought

ready and determined mediator

senator John Danforth, an ordained minister

cared about the issue gelical base

it.

and did so success-

the administration chose this one place to intervene:

that progress

why

one case where the Bush administration, though

end the north-south

why

how

and when and how to do

generally eschewing the mediation role, did play

sons

A

might be essential to creating conditions

conflict.

Mediation is

is

be useful;

and, perhaps most important,

was putting pressure on

it

to

its

who

Christian evan-

do something about the great

pain and suffering being inflicted on the Christians in the southern part

of Sudan. All these factors helped lead to

But

in this case, the fact that the

atively

to

low

visibility internationally

American prestige

in trying

its

decision to send a mediator.

ongoing Sudanese

and

—and

war retained

rel-

thus meant that the costs

failing to

226

civil

mediate would be low

Mediation in a World of Local Conflict

probably was

important to the Bush decision to mediate

as

was the

as

pressure from his political base.

Though comes

to the use of force,

it

it

seems to weigh heavily on

felt that

ineffectual

it

—something

much

in the

it

comes

way of

The

to mediation.

fear of

Perhaps

Middle

made

prestige and

that in the eyes of those

East,

it

look

around the president

American power. As such, mediation

translated into a loss of perceived that failed

when

efforts.

Clinton's efforts at mediation, especially in the

cost that administration

it

has been very chary of committing Ameri-

can diplomatic resources, especially to mediation failure

when

the Bush administration has not been risk averse

would subtract from our power, not add

to

it.

Also, perhaps

the president and his advisors felt that any high-visibility mediation effort

would inevitably require extensive presidential involvement, and

this president

was neither geared toward such

them. (His style

is

to set a course

into the nitty-gritty of issues

One

virtue of

Sudan was

it;

that

it

had low

who he

getting

cajoling,

is.)

visibility,

involved other

me-

and generated no expectations about presidential involvement.

Another was that

it

could show the administration's political base that

was making an effort to stop ern Sudan were

The Sudan had

nor willing to do

and spending time persuading,

threatening, and brokering does not reflect

diators,

efforts

and have others implement

still

civil

a conflict in

it

which the Christians of south-

being decimated by the Muslims of the north.

war had been fought for more than two decades and

inflicted a terrible

human

cost of roughly

two million

fatalities

and

four million displaced persons. Senator Danforth's involvement did

make

a difference.

While there were other mediators, including from the

United Kingdom and Kenya, Danforth played to forge

a

leading role in helping

power and revenue-sharing understandings

agreement and the prospect of ending the

conflict.

As

in

that

produced

any successful

mediation, Danforth and the other mediators were able to manipulate the needs and interests of the indigenous forces, while also inheriting a structural situation that

made ending

the conflict possible: the warring

had reached the stage of exhaustion in which agreement made more sense than continuing conflict, and the likely opposition within each camp (which continued to prefer ongoing struggle) no longer had

parties far

the capacity or strength to disrupt an agreement.

227

STATECRAFT

MYTHS AND REALITIES ABOUT MEDIATION AND MEDIATORS One of the most misleading conventional wisdoms about mediation is that it requires strict neutrality. One must be "evenhanded" and an "honEach sounds

est broker."

right, reflecting the

mediator ought not to be partial to one complicated; for a power such as diators,

it is

rare that

understandable logic that

And

side.

yet reality

the United States and

we would have such

its

is

a

more

possible

me-

distance from a conflict that

our interests between warring parties would be equal. Moreover, in most conflict situations

side as

more

tainty that

we

are likely to have

we

will not be strictly neutral

having done

To

put

ties to

—but

it is

almost a cer-

that has not prevented

effective roles,

and being applauded

so.

this in perspective, John

Danforth was not seen

tween the Christian south and the Muslim north brooke was not seen Balkans;

one side or see one

at fault. In fact, in cases of historic conflict,

American mediators from playing after

more

as neutral

in

as neutral

between the Muslims and the Serbs

George Mitchell was not seen

as neutral

and the Protestants in Northern Ireland.

5

be-

Sudan; Richard Holin the

between the Catholics

And I was

certainly not seen as

neutral between Israelis and Palestinians or Syrians.

What mattered was who could

Neutrality was not what mattered. fect

both parties and alter their behaviors.

It is

af-

not that in any of these

cases there was indifference to perceived bias; rather, in such conflicts

the greater concern

is

ior of one's adversary

who

has the capacity both to influence the behav-

and/or simply to get things done. And, obviously,

being close to one side in a conflict means also having influence and leverage with that side. For example,

Anwar Sadat described

States as having 99 percent of the cards in the

Middle

lationship with Israel.

American

United States to use

relationship with Israel was.

its

having the United States use

its

bias

was not

the United

East, given

its

re-

his concern; getting the

And

that impulse of

influence helps to explain in different

how Danforth, Holbrooke, Mitchell, and I were seen. To be sure, we all had something else in common: we understood that

cases

there was no

way

to reach

both sides, not only one real

measure.

agreement unless we could meet the needs of

side.

We became

effective brokers,

which

is

the

We were trusted by both sides because we were seen not as 228

Mediation in a World of Local Conflict neutral, but ultimately as genuinely trying to broker an

and able

to deliver

on what we were attempting

end

to conflict

to do.

Being able to deliver reflects another attribute of a successful media-

—

tor

mediator must be authoritative and have a clear mandate. In the

a

know immediately whether an envoy has authority or lacks it. They know power and they quickly recognize those who are limited and bound by constraints or simply unable to Middle

make

East, the different parties

decisions and act on them.

None of the envoys that the Bush dle East has been

empowered with

Palestinians have understood

Wolfensohn,

a

broad mandate, and

this limitation

who was appointed to

European Union,

States,

administration has sent to the

Mid-

Israelis

and

immediately. Even Jim

represent the "Quartet"

Russia, and United Nations

—

the United

—was given

a

man-

date only for the economic aspects of the Israeli disengagement from

Gaza.

He used his clout as former head of the World Bank and his capac-

ity to

help produce real assistance for the Palestinians to build his lever-

age.

of

Israeli

narrow and

specific, if highly useful,

purpose

disengagement from Gaza, and he did not touch any

political

But that clout was for

a

issues.

Unfortunately, ties feel

no

real

when

need

the mandate for a mediator

to respond.

is

very limited, par-

Mediators who can be ignored will

never have any impact. Mediators must be able to impose consequences for rejection of their suggestions.

even

States,

ers. It is

if

more

likely to affect

posing consequences and In

its first

Here

is

a

reminder of why the United

not strictly neutral, can have more of an effect than oth-

behavior because

it is

more capable of im-

costs.

term, the Bush administration not only was unwilling to

—both General Anthony Zinni and John Wolf mandates — but and

empowered envoy

use an

were given very limited

the president

his secretary

of state decided to disengage and not play a broker's role between raelis

and Palestinians. Here the Bush administration broke

tern of

US. mediating

efforts in the region

—

a clear pat-

a pattern that nearly

American president since Truman had embraced and

Is-

every

a pattern that

was

frequently accompanied by complaints about American bias in favor of Israel.

In a question-and-answer session following a speech

December

2004,

1

I

gave in Gaza in

responded to criticism of American bias toward

229

Israel

STATECRAFT to several statements that

and

we were simply unable

broker bv saving, "The United States has not been

— none

of

whom

one was prepared

role.

more "honest"

They understood

that neither the Europeans,

in their eyes,

would have been

—was capable of playing

the role, and had demonstrated

None

has the capabilities (or the will)

over the preceding four years.

this

—no

were better off with the United States not

UN — all of whom,

the Russians, nor the

last

hundred

had been shy about voicing their opinion

to sav they

plaving the broker's

broker for the

better off?" In an audience of several

four vears. Are vou

people

a

to be an honest

an honest broker typically reflect

to affect the parties. In truth, calls for a desire less to

have an honest broker than to have the broker assume

posture more sympathetic to the side that

Mediators will always be

criticized.

calling for a change.

is

That should be no

diation requires getting each side to adjust

a

its

surprise.

behavior to what

a

Me-

deal

is

going to require. Mediation requires constant explanation of what the reality

is,

and of how both sides have

ing the needs of one side to the other ated.

Each

requires explain-

that

his or

is

never appreci-

her advocate, not

easier

and

found, especially with the Palestinians,

I

far less costly to criticize

the Palestinian negotiators, told

could criticize

is

It

Opposition, anger, and criticism of the mediator are sim-

ply part of the territory As

much

it.

— something

side wants to see that the mediator

his adversary's.

was

to adjust to

me

me

at

Camp

me. Hassan Asfour, one of

David

knew he

that Arafat

and we would stay involved, but that

criticized the president or the secretary, thev

it

if

he or

might decide

his

to give

team

up the

effort.

The sible to

them

lesson

is

that

make both

one needs

a

thick skin to be a mediator;

sides happy, particularly because of the

to alter their behaviors.

But

it is

but also the passion to stay involved tance or setbacks. Here, again, mediators: dispassion

is

we

see

not just

it is

need

a thick skin that is

imposto press

required

when you face criticism and resisanother myth about mediation and

emphasized above

all else.

Mediators are sup-

posed to keep their emotional distance. Becoming emotionally involved will,

it is

argued, cloud your judgment and

make you

lose

your objec-

tivitv.

But those with actual mediation experience in intractable conflicts

know

that

it is

precisely their passion that sustains

the inevitable difficulties.

It is

them

in the face of

passion that produces the perseverance

230

Mediation in a World of Local Conflict that

is

when

so necessary

embedded

high stakes and deeply process

trying to resolve a historic conflict with very grievances.

going to be setback, not progress.

is

bring great

commitment and determination Look

likely to give up.

between

active role

at

The norm

If the

mediator does not

to the task,

he or she

the Bush administration efforts to play a

Israelis

Had

the situation,

it

it

is

more

and Palestinians. Besides not empowering

envoys, the administration was quick to disengage every time difficulties.

such a

in

its

faced

there been a real passion or determination to transform

would not have given up each time

—

faced problems.

it

What kept Clinton going what certainly kept me going and continuing was a deep sense of committo argue that we must preserve the effort ment

to the objective of

—

ending the Arab-Israeli

conflict.

Mediators need that sense of commitment to maintain an effort that requires endurance and patience. stant frustrations

Northern

Ireland.

George Mitchell

writes of the con-

and setbacks in the negotiations to end the conflict in

The more frustrated he became, the more determined

he became to overcome the problems; had he believed the cause impossible or

not worth the

effort,

he would never have persisted. But he acted

out of a profound conviction that

it

was time to end the suffering and to

prevent the purveyors of violence from being the arbiters of the future. 6 In any existential conflict

—whether Northern — mediator with no passion

the Israelis and the Palestinians

only

commitment

a limited

conflicts that

Ireland or between

in

a

to bear.

And

the

more one

is

will bring

dealing with

go to the heart of self-definition and identity, the more one

needs the kind of commitment that will produce staying power. diator

must believe not only

to negotiating tle

peace

is

a sense

peacemaking but

also that the alternative

completely unacceptable. There will be very

prospect of sticking with

mediator lacks

in

The me-

it,

and thus

little

prospect of success,

of mission in trying to end such

if

lit-

the

conflicts.

USING BACK CHANNELS EFFECTIVELY

To be

sure, success in resolving

depend on the

parties'

such existential conflicts will ultimately

being prepared to alter their behavior and con-

front history and mythology. Mythologies are torically rooted conflicts to avoid reality.

They tend

what allow parties

Myths

in his-

are never easy to undo.

to be part of the story that leaders tell publics over long

231

STATECRAFT They become

periods of time.

challenged

—except by

political system.

The

part of the belief system, and are rarely

who

those iconoclasts

are already outside the

myths perpetuate conflicts by effectively denying

the rights of the other side and by brooking no

compromise on what

is

treated as an article of faith. For Palestinians, the "right of return" for

refugees was one such mythology. Palestinians never questioned least not publicly.

and

to question

it

it

—

at

had been ground into the psychology of the PLO,

It

was to guarantee being accused of betraying the Pales-

tinian cause.

The

have an equivalent mythology: Jerusalem, both Jewish

Israelis

and Arab

would be the

areas,

"eternal, undivided capital" of Israel. Like

the right of return for Palestinians, this was untouchable for mainstream

even though

Israelis,

never even ventured into Arab neighbor-

Israelis

hoods of East Jerusalem such into the talk

Camp

as

Bayt Hanina and Shuafat. Until well

David summit, Prime Minister Barak was unwilling

me

about Jerusalem even in private with

does a mediator explore what

is

possible

to

how

or the president. So

on mythologies?

Back channels are an essential part of any negotiation. For mediators, back channels with each side are crucial. explosive issues, no discussion

litically

private

venue

in

which there

is

is

On

even possible

ground

a basic

the mythologies and po-

rule:

if

there

not a

is

anything can be dis-

cussed and nothing will ever be permitted to leak out publicly. Being able to explore possibilities in a noncommitting, unquotable, and nonreferral fashion is the

only way to see not only what might be possible on

extremely sensitive issues but also again, trust

must

and credibility are indispensable

cultivate these attributes

How does

a

for a mediator.

it is

A

Here,

mediator

and never squander them.

mediator build trust and acquire credibility?

any negotiation, to each side.

deliver

how to go about acting on them.

essential to prove

Much

as in

you understand what is important

Only make promises you can

what you promise. Never betray

deliver on, and never

a confidence,

fail

and never be

to

re-

sponsible for exposing those you are working with on politically sensitive or

that at

embarrassing issues

some point you

publicly

if

there

is

to

—without

will

at least

explaining well in advance

have to talk about these particular issues

be an agreement. Finally, find ways to

or deliver for each side

when each knows

As an example of such an approach,

232

at

it is

fix

problems

not easy for you to do

one point

I

so.

took a problem be-

Mediation in a World of Local Conflict

tween the

Israelis

and Syrians and acted to

fix it in a

way

that was appre-

Hafez

ciated for very different reasons by both Yitzhak Rabin and

al

Asad. Asad had been led to believe that President Clinton would provide

him

a

note of assurance on the location of the

lationship of the security arrangements to

final

—

it

—and

border

as part

the re-

of our effort to

produce an agreed statement on the security issues between the two

Though

sides.

the Israeli negotiator, Itamar Rabinovich, had not ob-

jected to this approach, Rabin belatedly did so with me, in Israel, the

before a

I

was to deliver the note to Asad

note would

Rabin's readiness to withdraw to the

needs were met), and put

comparable from Asad

in Syria.

Rabin argued that such

commitment from Rabin

take a private

in written

it

in

June

4,

day

to the president

on

1967, lines (provided his

form without getting anything

knew

return. Rabin

that both Secretary

Christopher and President Clinton saw nothing wrong with reaffirming in a short, highly qualified written

statement what

we had

already con-

veyed verbally to Asad about Rabin's commitment, and that both

now

feared retreating from something that had been promised to Asad and that he

now

expected. Yet

when

I

secretary and president to accept

accepted Rabin's point, persuaded the it,

and was

still

able to deal with Asad

and not lose the negotiations in the process, Rabin's trust in

me

as a

me-

diator was greatly enhanced.

Of course,

having done

lose Asad's in the process.

we had planned I

I

much

to gain Rabin's confidence,

did this by leveling with him;

to present the letter to him,

I

I

could not

explained that

and that Rabin had objected.

explained that since the letter involved a commitment from Rabin to

us,

we had

wishes

if

to respect his wishes, just the

he

felt

uncomfortable with our taking

from him and transforming proval.

But

I

did

more than

considered important. the

letter,

ings,

I

it

level with him.

him

told

instead

make

a

a verbal

commitment

into a written statement without his apI

that since

which would have been

we would

way we would respect Asad's

a

also

produced something he

we would not be providing

device to help broker understand-

major effort to

finalize

agreements on the

security statement of aims and principles by having his foreign minister

come

to

Washington immediately

would make

it

clear that the

two

after Rabin's

visits

were linked

upcoming in

visit.

our effort to bro-

ker security arrangements between the two sides. This was a effectively gave Syria a

new

We

first.

It

public standing in the process, and also

233

STATECRAFT offered a new, intensive brokering effort in Washington

—something

that

Asad always believed was essential for any agreement. (Like Sadat, Asad always believed that only Washington could determine whether there

would be agreements. Unlike Sadat, he saw Washington's actions

as a

substitute for his own.) In the end, a mediator

must be trusted and capable of using back

channels to avoid stalemates or to overcome them or to explore more

down

strategic tradeoffs

parties see

where

it is

it

a

as a

the road.

The back channel

functions best

if

the

place where testing possibilities can be done safely and

two-way

Each

street.

side

must have the confidence

to be

and be willing to ask sen-

open

in response to a mediator's questions,

sitive

questions of the mediator (and of each other). This also requires

that those participating in the back channels

must be authoritative and

personally confident of their positions. They, too, must be strongly

mitted to conflict resolution. With someone like Shlomo the Israeli side,

I

had

a

partner

was committed, trusted me, and

and with

felt that

a different Israeli

the United States played a role

ing,

but someone

—Itamar Rabinovich—

someone who happened

confidentially with

who was

also

Ben-Ami on

who was very forthcoming because he

that was indispensable to their reaching an agreement. stage,

com-

At I

a different

was working

to be a friend of long stand-

much more guarded and

less revealing.

(Rabinovich was confident but also very mindful that Rabin had entrusted no one else

on the

commitment

qualified

Israeli side

to us

on

with the knowledge of his secret

full Israeli

withdrawal from the Golan

Heights.) I

found similar differences on the Palestinian

Rashid would be very open to exploring

whom

I

possibilities,

had known longer and was personally close

guarded. Several factors account for their differences:

you are

in the process,

side.

to,

Mohammad

and Abu Ala,

was

much more

Timing and where

and where your counterparts believe you are in

the process; their personal stake in reaching agreement; their tactical ap-

proach to negotiations; their fear of being exposed on the readiness to run risks; their

own

issue; their

personal standing, either with the

leader or in the political system; their ambitions; and the nature of the political

system

in

Risk taking by

which your counterpart Israelis, Palestinians,

is

operating.

and Syrians varied. For

Israelis,

taking unauthorized positions that went well beyond the prime minis-

234

Mediation in a World of Local Conflict ter's

could potentially cost a negotiator his

However,

sponsibilities.

I

position after conveying

or at least his or her re-

job,

never saw anyone on the

compromises on

proved. True, there was a potential

risk,

Israeli side lose his

many (though

negotiators tended to act in discussions as

free agents

—exploring what they thought might be little

sense of risk was largely governed by what

they were nearly

possible, frequently

we were

discussing.

on what might be

freer in private discussions issues,

But here the

Palestinians.

On issues

and borders, the negotiators would be

other than Jerusalem, refugees,

much

if

definitely not

fear of doing so.

That was certainly not the case with the

permanent-status

were not yet ap-

issues that

but

all) Israeli

with seemingly

«•

possible.

On

the

however, the fear of being charged with selling

out the Palestinian cause was clearly inhibiting. Syrians were more

guarded than either ian system,

losing a job. (Walid

partner, was very

limitations

good

—and

Mouallem,

at testing the limits at

as a

larly

else

but also reminding

may be

a

me

of his

lost his job but, for

If a negotiation

you read that your counterpart

forthcoming or able to do much,

someone

Syrian back-channel

an

nonperson.)

Back channels may change over time. particularly as

my

one point he not only

extended period, was treated

tive,

because of their authoritar-

where the price of betraying what the leader wanted might be

more than only

own

Israelis or Palestinians

it

is

not produc-

not being particu-

is

makes sense

to see

more productive back-channel

whether

partner.

Back

channels can evolve as the players become better known, and as those

who

are

more trustworthy and

act with greater confidence reveal

them-

selves.

Mediators, like negotiators, must assess what

be most helpful

in

take steps to build

Having

up

his or

a leader see that that

other side

is

person

exercise.

Many such

is

most

conflicts

be resolved only in stages. That it

is

likely to

produce from the

It is

is

going to be a time-

have evolved in stages and can

certainly true for the Arab-Israeli

will take time.

Ultimately, using the mediation tool reasons.

who can

mediator should

part of the art of mediation.

is

conflict. So,

a

her counterpart in the eyes of the leader.

Clearly, in cases of historic conflicts, mediation

consuming

possible and

making things happen. Sometimes

makes sense

right to try to settle conflicts

235

and not

for

let

many

them

different

fester; it is

STATECRAFT important, especially in the broader Middle East, to deny radical lamists conflicts that they can exploit to play followers;

it

may be

an essential

weak-state syndrome; and, States

is

finally,

on anger and recruit new

for dealing with the failed-

and

mediation, by showing that the United

prepared to try to ameliorate conflicts that cause such pain, can

improve our standing

at a

questioned internationally

on what

means

Is-

basis,

when

to

do

time when our purposes are increasingly Knowing why it is so important to mediate,

so,

and what must be overcome for mediation

to be effective, are the starting points for

diation as a tool.

discussion of

Having discussed them

how

to

do mediation.

236

how to use mechapter, I now turn to a

understanding in this

11.

ELEVEN RULES FOR MEDIATION

Since mediation will also

a

is

form of negotiation, the rules for how to negotiate

apply for any mediator. But the circumstances and conditions

mediation obviously

for

differ,

and

as a result a

mediator has to have a

A

mediator must know the how to conduct them. Like any negotiator, a mediator must have a keen sense of timing and know when to run risks and when to back off. And while no negotiation or me-

number of particular requirements

in

mind.

basics of negotiations and have an instinct for

diation can ever be run mechanically or simply "by the numbers," there are,

I

believe, eleven guidelines (that

tions) that a

any practitioner ought

complement the

rules for negotia-

keep in mind when he or she enters

to

process of mediation.

1.

The circumstances particular rule sible

that

produce mediation

employed.

If the parties

will heavily affect

how

have either approached

a

mediator or responded to inquiries from an aspiring mediator

in the case

then

is

IDENTIFY SHARED OBJECTIVES

it is

Even

of the

Israelis

clear that at least in

more hopeful

this

pos-

—

as

and the Palestinians with the Norwegians

some shared

cases,

objectives already exist.

one of the

first

tasks of the

mediator

is

to

determine the scope of the shared objectives, and to expand that scope

where

possible. Building a sense of

commonality can

237

foster a belief that

STATECRAFT both sides have shared stakes in finding solutions. Moreover,

can also

it

enhance mutual confidence and hope, and thus help insulate the parties against inevitable disappointments or setbacks in a complicated negoti-

we and

ating process. (Both

the Norwegians at different points in ad-

vance of the Oslo process focused on what

we thought might be

shared objectives of reducing conflict, improving the quality of Palestinians in the territories, and

promoting

a

the

of

life

dialogue to build mutual

confidence.) In other cases, in

which

it is

the mediator initiating and reaching out,

the only possible shared objective

shed and suffering. little else. Still,

It

may be

may be

a negative one:

ending blood-

possible to get both sides to accept that and

no mediation

going to work

is

if

there are no

common

objectives, and even a shared negative objective can provide a basis

which

objective

is

for

doing so

is

having separate discussions with the

with an eye toward focusing each on what

with the other. tions,

on

a shared

is

the natural place to start with each side.

The technique sides,

determining whether there

to begin discussions. So,

they pay

They know what little

attention to

or at least not in conflict. to avoid conflict or if conflict is

it

may have

in

common

separates them, but in conflict situa-

where

their objectives

The mediator must

draw back from

it.

might be shared

try to cultivate the instinct

But he/she can be successful only

feared and not desired. Early efforts at mediation in the

Balkans faltered not just on distrust and the limited leverage of the outside mediators but also because leaders such as Milosevic and

saw that further

conflict served their objectives far

Tudjman

more than

negotia-

tions.

The more

positive the shared objectives, the

more ambitious

ator can be in setting the initial agenda for negotiations. also true.

But

a mediator's first challenge

ing with, what

why

is

possible,

is

to

common

medi-

The converse

see what he or she

and how to build on

a

is

is

work-

ground. That

is

an exploration and identification of possible shared objectives with

parties to a conflict

is

where

a mediator's

238

work

begins.

Elrcen Rules for Mediation

2.

This

is

a natural corollary to

two

thing, the

deals

more with

the parties have

ways

for

ASSESS WHAT CAN BE NEGOTIATED, AND FRAME THE TALKS the

sides have in

where

more

common

in

But

a

rule of determining what,

common.

assessing

to bridge differences

differences.

first

It

is

not the same because

their differences

and

it

might be bridgeable.

than they realize, to

any-

if

it is

If

easier to look

frame the discussions about those

mediator must also assess the character of their

ferences and which ones lend themselves

more

to

dif-

compromise than

others.

The combination of rules one and two ment of what can is

initially

shape

will

be discussed between two

an experienced mediator

who

a

mediator's judg-

Beutler

sides. Lisa

has worked on state and federal land-

many competing claimants. In responding to a on whether the parties knew what they might achieve at the

use issues involving question

beginning of one negotiating process she mediated, she captured the essence of what mediators face at the outset of a mediation: "Oh, no.

know what

They

didn't

They

didn't even have a single topic to discuss.

had

to

know

do was

assess

One

what could even be negotiated.

—no one even knew—what could

No

They had no

the agreements would be.

I

of the

mean

I

things

I

didn't even

potentially be discussed."

1

mediator should rush to bring the parties together before he she

knows what should be

initially discussed.

Optimally parallel discussions

with the sides should be held to develop an agenda for the

way meetings with the mediator and the go for quick agreements ularly meaningful sides see as useful.

—but

—which

in

to create a

parties.

any case are not

framework

a useful path.

is

three-

not to

likely to be partic-

for discussion that both

The

and begin

is

departure that channels the negotiations

parties

need

to feel that they are

discussions that can lead somewhere, build their are possible,

initial

The purpose

At the outset of mediated discussions, the objective

to create a productive point of

toward

first

idea.

to alter for the better

hope

each

engaging

in

that agreements

side's

perception of

the other side's intentions.

When

I

became

a

broker

—not

a facilitator

239

—

for the

first

time be-

STATECRAFT tween the

Israelis

from Hebron, sides,

I

and Palestinians on the issue of Israeli disengagement

focused

separate discussions with the two

initially, in

on what they wanted and what they feared. Naturally there were

wide gaps

Though

with me.

in their objectives, at least as first discussed

both sides accepted what had been agreed upon in the Interim Agree-

ment

—

Hebron would be divided

that

would be no ited

Israeli

two zones, one where there

into

presence (H-l), and one where there would be a lim-

number of Israeli

settlers

(H-2)

—they had fundamentally

different

The

ideas about the practical implications of creating such zones. raelis

wanted to preserve their control over security and

where four hundred

sector (H-2)

would be

Israelis

civil

twenty

living with

thousand Palestinians. The Palestinians wanted Hebron and both be treated

tors to

same

the

On

like

and

rights

principles that both could accept.

more

we came

While

I

a result,

more

we were

principles, including that

able to agree

I

saw certain guiding

I

did not have an agreement on

together for an intensive three-way discussion,

had done some important conditioning of both

As

sec-

any other Palestinian city in the West Bank with

discussed the issues with the two sides the

ing.

its

responsibilities.

the surface the gaps appeared unbridgeable, but the

these before

Is-

matters in the

on

in

advance of the meet-

common framework

a

I

Hebron would be resolved

of

six

consistent with the

guidelines in the Interim Agreement, that special security provisions

would be needed

for Israeli citizens living in

should be temporary, and that rity threat

Each

Palestinians did not act against a secu-

coming from H-l, the

side's

Israelis

Israelis

would.

concerns were addressed in the principles

tinian concerns about

about

if

Hebron not becoming two

Pales-

different cities and

that the negotiations

and about Palestini-

Israeli citizens

ans assuming real security responsibilities.

mean

—with

not being free to operate in H-l being balanced by Israeli

concerns about the means to protect

denly

H-2, that those provisions

The

principles did not sud-

—

would be easy

far

from

it.

But they

established boundaries within which to negotiate, and reassured each side that an

agreement was

possible.

As with negotiations more generally, ture of what can be negotiated and

how

it is

best to

lowed the model of drawing each side out together to forge a framework for the

240

essential to get an early pic-

talks.

first

do

it.

On

Hebron,

I

fol-

and then bringing them

Eleven Rules for Mediation

3.

SENSITIZE EACH SIDE TO THE OTHER'S

CONCERNS AND GRIEVANCES While the

first

two rules guide what

mediator should

a

initially set

out

to do in any mediation, this rule goes to the heart of what mediation all

about. In conflicts such as those in the

Middle East or

in the Balkans,

both sides harbor deeply rooted grievances. Each side sees

who

victim

has suffered at the hands of the other side.

and use of history shapes

its

and grievance of the other Diepeveen,

Bill

a

itself as the

interpretation it

to the hurts

side.

Canadian with much experience

colloquially described

my

Its

views, and too often blinds

is

many

as a mediator, has

"your grand-pappy did

conflicts as

it

to

grand-pappy." Because of that, the parties become "fixated" and

"identify themselves so

much

in history

relationships, that they can't see It is

the mediator's job to get

beyond

them

absorbed, and a mediator must get needs.

Nothing is more important in

it

a

and the bad

situation, the

bad

2

it."

to see

beyond

it.

Each

side

beyond focusing only on

is self-

its

own

mediation than to get each side off

what the mediation expert John Forester

"blame game" and

calls the

why In fact, a mediator will spend most of his/her time explaining why the other side has a problem psychologically, politically, and practically. One cannot beonto being aware of what

is

3

driving the other side and

—

gin to build bridges between the two sides until there

is

greater aware-

ness on each side of the concerns and needs of the other.

There are few more thankless conflict, It

tasks as a mediator than this. In

each side wants to see that the mediator understands

won't be happy

when

it is

assumption that the mediator

"our needs" and

much

I

its

own

Almost invariably

it

mediator

is

this

insufficiently focused

—and

on

will

must press the mediator much harder on

needs.

don't say this idly; at times, both Yasir Arafat and

me of being the other side's if a

is

too focused on the other side's needs

drive that side to believe that

recognizing

needs.

subjected to a mediator spending time to ex-

plain the other side's problems and perceptions. will trigger the

its

any

Ehud Barak accused

lawyer. This, too, goes with the territory, but

going to do necessary conditioning, and get each side to

be more mindful of the other's needs

241

—which

is

essential for

making

STATECRAFT compromise possible

—

the mediator has to bear the likely reaction of

the two parties.

What can be done to minimize such reactions, and the related impulse to become even more demanding about each side's particular needs? First, demonstrate how well you understand the grievances, conand needs of the side with

cerns,

particular concerns

thev relate to the other

to.

my

In

discussions with the Syrians, for example.

and then address the

make

it

Always

talking.

raise

its

how

In other words, don't treat the other side

side's.

the reasons the land

all

you are

context of those concerns and

a

but always in relation to the needs of the side you are talk-

in isolation,

ing

whom

and create

first

Golan Heights was

the

Israeli

I

would address

them

so important to

concerns that would have to be assuaged to

possible for Syria to get

land back.

its

Second, even after demonstrating

how

well you understand the griev-

ances of the side you are dealing with, don't hesitate to ask additional

probing questions about willing to learn and that

about

its

its

problems or concerns. Show you are

you don't

why

tions about

a

also offers the best

just

what

many

signals

It

ques-

genuine it

chance to gain greater insight into the thinking and

The

latter will certainlv

be important

are trying to craft possible bridging proposals.

Ultimately, mediators have to

more open

to possible

make an enormous

a

mediator must

important to each

side,

with ideas that can work gotiations. In

less

self-absorbed and

COMPROMISES

listen actively

and why

when

it is

The more

will rind

it

it

and come

important,

is

to

to

understand what

be able to

come up

there are inevitable stalemates in the ne-

any tough process, each side

tain positions. it

becomes

educate

compromises.

CRITICAL reason

it

effort to

THINK OUTSIDE THE BOX WHEN FORGING

4.

more

know

so important to each side and

is

each side to the needs of the other so

the

to

speak of the impor-

mediator, you cannot ask too

the logic or reasoning of each side.

when you

I

you need

certain positions are so important.

understanding

interest in

is

all

needs. Earlier, in discussing negotiations,

tance of active listening. As

One

you know

feel

still

is

going to get locked into cer-

states certain positions privately

difficult to explain

242

and publicly,

walking awav from them.

Eleven Rules for Mediation

At times, at

a side

becomes wedded

The only certainty is that a mecome up with compromises designed not just to split

other times for psychological reasons.

diator will have to

way

the differences but also to offer what amounts to a third

shapes the issues in 1998,

at stake.

when he was

I

explained this very concept to Ariel Sharon

would have

I

permanent-status negotiations. tiations but

dubious that

that

we had

we could not

possible because, as he said,

approach

we

"We

can-

want." In response,

I

change the model of negotiations and realize

find the

halfway point between the two positions on

borders or the other issues; instead,

we had

thinking about what divided the two

we can

to

He was desirous of getting into the nego-

much was

to

how

private chats on

not do what they want, and they cannot do what suggested that

that re-

the foreign minister of Israel.

At that time, he and

if

and

to positions for political reasons

sides.

open

to be

to other

As an example,

ways of

said,

I

"What

fuzz the issue of borders by creating industrial zones or special

economic zones

border areas that effectively put

in

Israeli

and Palestin-

sides of what would be the border? What we that security would be handled in these areas if, say by the Israelis? If we did, the very concept of borders would change." I told him I was not suggesting that this was necessarily the w ay to solve the border issue but it was an illustration that we could think unconventionally and come up with some solutions that were outside the rigid boxes of how each side now approached each permanent-status prob-

ian

economic enterprises on both

at the same time,

T

lem. it

He

liked the approach,

and might well have pursued something

had the government he was then

a part

like

of not fallen and been replaced.

Coming up with an unconventional approach

or idea

not a way to

is

avoid having to deal with the needs of both sides. Those needs are a given; however,

it is

defining issues or

a

way

to

meet the needs of both

coming up with

a distinctly

though not the mediator, came up with and

his colleagues

used

commissioning weapons

Northern

in

a

new

by

also re-

John Major,

idea.

concept that George Mitchell

order to find a way around the issue of de-

as a

precondition for all-party negotiations in

Ireland.

In trying to

produce all-party negotiations, the mediator found the

problem of the paramilitaries and their weapons sticking point. parties

sides

—was

The

British position

that there could be

—shared by

no negotiations

243

to be a

fundamental

the leading Unionist until the

weapons of

STATECRAFT the paramilitaries (principally the IRA) were decommissioned or until at least

some

decommissioning had been implemented. The

significant

Republicans (those

who wanted Northern

of Ireland and not

a part

Ireland to be a part of the rest

of the United Kingdom) argued that there

could be no decommissioning until the completion of the negotiations.

The Republican argument was

driven by psychological and practical

considerations: Psychologically, they felt that the British and Unionists

wouldn't negotiate seriously

knew

they

if

up and violence was never an option. could get the

IRA

to

the weapons had been given

Practically, they

disarm without a political solution.

Unionist argument was, not

doubted they

The

by twin

surprisingly, also driven

British

and

factors: the

Republican unwillingness to decommission weapons indicated that the

IRA was

not prepared to change

its

ways and accept

a nonviolent solu-

and further signaled that the Republicans would hold their

tion,

weapons

as leverage

and

if

they did not get what they wanted politically,

they would return to violence. Mitchell and his mediating partners from Canada and Finland devel-

oped of

a logical

(a)

compromise

requiring

all

around

built

a "split-the-difference"

parties to the negotiations to

democracy and nonviolence, weapons process (meaning

(b)

that

approach

embrace principles of

considering a parallel decommissioning

decommissioning would not precede but

run parallel to the negotiations), and

(c)

offering a detailed process to

achieve decommissioning. I

describe this as a split-the-difference approach not to denigrate

but to indicate that to

each

tion.

be

side. This,

However,

it

logically tried to provide

of course,

at times,

sufficient, so

is

what

a

became known

way or the

something outside the box

as the

something that mattered

mediator must do in any negotia-

the conventional

Prime Minister John Major provided

it

is

a third

existing ideas won't

required. And, in this case,

way

in his response to

what

Mitchell Principles for negotiations. Major sug-

gested a democratic mandate for holding all-party negotiations. While still

saying that decommissioning weapons

first

tablish the inclusive negotiations, the other

and those who received

a

might be one way to

way was

mandate could take part

es-

to have elections,

in the negotiations.

Mitchell saw the virtue of this alternative route to negotiations, and in fact,

inclusive all-party negotiations

were convened following an elec-

tion process. 4

244

Eleven Rules for Mediation

Thinking creatively

be essential for fashioning those

will always

compromises that meet the respective needs of parties so, a

mediator

may have

in conflict.

To do

about changing the frame of reference,

to think

by offering either entirely new concepts or ideas that seem on

a differ-

ent plane.

MAKE SURE THE PARTIES DEMONSTRATE

5.

THEIR SERIOUSNESS

The mediator cannot be

the only serious party in a process designed to

resolve or lessen conflict.

the easier

The more

the parties seek out the mediator,

to use the leverage of walking

it is

away

if

there

is

not

suffi-

cient seriousness, because the leverage of a mediator will increase the

may

longer the process goes on. Even those parties that

not have been

so enthusiastic for a mediation process initially will acquire increasing stakes in

it

as

Of course,

it

survives and builds expectations of change.

mediators also build higher stakes in success.

It is

not so

easy for mediators to walk away from a process in which they have heavily invested.

While

I

was more inclined to threaten to walk away or put

everything on hold in the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Syrian negotiations,

President Clinton was less

violence, and a failure pinned Ironically, all parties

so,

fearing collapse, a resumption of

on the United

—including

States.

the mediator

—tend

to

have their

sustained. Every-

stakes increase the longer the process of negotiations

is

one sees

reduces the media-

tor's

risks in the process ending,

readiness to walk away,

to insist

on

seriousness.

it

And,

and even

certainly as

I

still

if that

gives the mediator the ability

saw with the

Israelis

and Palestinians,

there was a constant concern that the Clinton administration not declare

publicly that one side was serious and the other was not. Precisely be-

cause expectations get raised during ongoing negotiating processes, neither side wants to be seen in for the

breakdown of the

The more advanced sues, the

more each

as

being responsible

process.

side will also

interest in proving to a it

own domestic terms

a process,

diator. In processes that are

ment. In part,

its

and the closer to dealing with core

want

to be taken seriously

is-

by the me-

reaching a climax, each side will have an

mediator that

it is

doing

all it

can to reach agree-

has this impulse to avoid being blamed publicly

245

if

there

STATECRAFT is

and

a stalemate,

in part

additional concessions.

move on It

it

The

want the mediator asking

also doesn't

desire

is

for

it

always to keep the onus for the next

the other side.

was

common

practice in the negotiations

I

was involved

in,

partic-

ularly with the Israelis and Palestinians, for each side to try to convince

me how much

was doing and

it

how

could not possibly be asked to

it

contemplate additional compromises on the core questions ofJerusalem, refugees, and borders.

I

understood both the

tactical reasons for this

more about

the genuine difficulties each side had in revealing

concessions on these existential questions. But

each side had an interest in convincing able, that

it

was doing

possible

understood that

also

me that it wasn't being unreason-

and that

part,

its

I

and

And I used

it

was mindful of not only

its

needs but the other's

as well.

that interest to try to

draw out

each side on what

might actually be able to do on the most

sensitive

it

issues.

me

Let

explain.

Knowing

seriousness and that it

it

that each side

was not focused only on

and knowing

to be responsive to the other)

that

it

come

own

could reveal more of its

its

me

tell

as well that

bottom-line positions

about his

own

day the

Israelis

I

was not pressing him

position; instead,

the Palestinian negotiators

I

it

(lest

tell

tell

press

did not feel

those be-

(lest

asked the lead

I

employed

me what

a

to reveal

more

technique of having

they thought

at

the end of the

could do on Jerusalem, refugees, and borders; and

the Israeli negotiators to

I

its

me what he thought the other could do on

the core questions. In other words,

me

to believe in

own needs

the departure point for additional concessions),

negotiator on each side to

to

wanted

I

asked

me what they thought the Palestinians could

ultimately accept on each of these issues. If

under these circumstances they had simply repeated maximal po-

sitions,

they

inevitably

knew

a result,

thought the other It

would

say,

you don't understand the other

would have pressed them more on meeting the

and concerns. As it

I

was not

in the

and

other's needs

each side gave an interesting account of what

end could accept.

just the desire to

that clearly counted for a

side,

prove to

lot. It

me

they were serious

—though

was also their recognition that

this

was

another way to reveal something sensitive about what they might be able to accept

without having to say anything about

246

it

themselves.

If,

for ex-

Eleven Rules for Mediation

ample, the Palestinian negotiators responded, as they did on Jerusalem, that Israel could accept the division of East Jerusalem provided they

could preserve the eight Jewish neighborhoods there, they were revealing something very important. After

ment, and they said the

acknowledgment

Israelis

their

all, if

cannot accept

that the Israelis

purpose was an agreethan

less

them of having offered

The technique of asking each can accept stage in

then their

needed the eight Jewish neighbor-

hoods also signaled what the Palestinians could accept vet no one could accuse

this,

side to explain

a

new

what

in the

end

—and

concession.' it

thinks the other

one that cannot be used prematurely. One must be

is

which much conditioning has been done on both

sides'

at a

needs

and also when the parties themselves have an incentive for showing the mediator that they are very serious and doing their part to produce an agreement.

6.

GET EACH SIDE TO ADJUST TO REALITY

While one indispensable

task of a mediator

just to reality

side's

more

needs does not mean that

giving

up what

it

mind

generally. Bear in

It is

its

must

also get

them

to ad-

that being aware of the other

a side is necessarily

wants. Conflict resolution

is

not "wants." Neither side can get everything able to achieve

each side to recog-

to get

is

nize the needs of the other (or others), he/she

it

prepared to adjust to

about meeting "needs," wants but

it

should be

most important needs.

never easy to get parties to give up what they want.

They must be

conditioned both to the circumstances under which an agreement that

meets their basic needs it is

not.

have

in

The

it

possible and to the circumstances

starting point surely

is

under which

recognizing what the other side must

order to be able to agree. But the ending point, the point where

the agreements

what

is

become

possible,

is

when each

side realizes that

has sought or wanted will not be achievable

if

there

is

some of to

be an

agreement.

When

mediating on the road to the

the Israelis and Palestinians, to be changed.

It

was

a

I

knew

Wye

River Agreement between

that the mind-sets

on both sides had

matter of explaining to each not just what the

other side needed but also that

its

own concept

2V

or approach had to

STATECRAFT change. With Arafat, this required telling

permanent-status negotiations

were to be negotiated

West Bank.

—

—

him before even beginning

where borders, Jerusalem, and refugees

that he was not entitled to 90 percent of the

required undoing his view that with three unspecified

It

redeployments called for in the Interim Agreement, he

Israeli force

should get 30 percent of the West Bank each time the Israelis withdrew their forces.

With Netanyahu,

required telling him that while he did

it

not have to negotiate with the Palestinians the three further Israeli rede-

Agreement by simply deciding ited

and

— a

as

one of

dunam."

his aides

under the Interim

Israel's obligations

ployments, he could not satisfy

would be lim-

that the redeployments

suggested publicly

—

to "a

dunam,

a

dunam,

6

Both sides saw the further redeployments and

how they were

carried

out as giving or denying them leverage for the permanent-status negotiations.

mize

That each side would want

its

to

maximize

counterpart's was no surprise. But

The further redeployments of be three over eighteen months

it

was not

Israeli forces

—were seen

terms and revealed a great deal about process and where

it

its

leverage and mini-

about leverage.

just

—of which

there were to

fundamentally different

in

how each

side

saw the negotiating

should lead. Neither side had a

and

realistic view,

we were to forge an agreement (which we did in time at Wye River), we would have to change their expectations and condition them to a different reality. And I did succeed in doing so over a period of several

if

months, ultimately getting Bibi Netanyahu to understand that he would

have to withdraw from

a double-digit

percentage of the West Bank, and

Yasir Arafat to understand that double digits

were closer

to 10 percent

than 30 percent.

Getting sides to adjust their expectations ation and

it is

never easy. But

it is

is

a

necessary part of medi-

easier than getting

them

their mythologies. In an existential conflict such as that

and Palestinians, an erosion of mythologies their conflict

once and

for

time, mythologies really

all.

While

become

it is

is

to give

between

Israelis

essential for resolving

prudent to try to do

the core of the problem

dealing with conflict resolution, not management.

up

It is at

olution that a mediator has to take on myths, which, as

I

this

over

when you

are

the stage of res-

observe

earlier,

have become part of the self-image of each side and what they have told themselves

is

so important.

248

Eleven Rules for Mediation

In ending conflicts and actually to reconcile to reality. Reconciling

then,

the challenge.

is

side to

The

what an agreement

increasingly their publics

best

making peace, one has myths

way

will take

—

to

is

to get each side

impossible; discarding myths,

do so

is

keep conditioning each

to

and constantly reminding each

that certain

—and

outcomes are simply out of the

question. President Bush's letter to Ariel Sharon in April 2004 was useful for conditioning

everyone to

West Bank

centers in the

(i.e.,

reality: that significant Israeli

population

settlement blocs) had to be taken into ac-

count in any permanent-status agreement, and that the problem of Palestinian refugees should

a Palestinian

and that Palestinian refugees should go there rather than to

state

The

Israel.

Palestinians objected mightily to each of these observations, but

what was the as

be resolved through the creation of

real source

of their angst? Put simply, they saw themselves

excluded from the decisions that affected their future. Once again,

sues that went to the core of

who

is-

they were and what they wanted as a

people appeared to be being decided without them. Thus, for process reasons, they objected.

Had

there been parallel discussions with them,

and had those discussions addressed myths on the all

of East Jerusalem, including

will

remain part of

Israel

—

its

entire

—such

Israeli side

as

Arab population of 225,000,

the Palestinian reaction might have been

very different. If

nothing

else, this

debunked, but likely to

cept

a

reminds us that mythologies can be taken on and

mediator has to create a context for doing

debunk mythologies

reality.

if

only one side

is

so.

One is un-

required to face and ac-

Both sides must be challenged, and both sides must see that

the mediator requires mutual adjustments to reality. Ultimately, no matter

how much

to give

conditioning has been done, there

up mythologies, and

litically painful.

no agreement

if

However,

is

no escaping the need

that will always be psychologically

and po-

in the Israeli-Palestinian case, there will

be

the Israelis are not prepared to see through the illusion

that Jerusalem, specifically East Jerusalem, can never be divided; Palestinians, for their part,

must understand

that reality requires

them

to

accept that there will be no right of return to Israel for Palestinian refugees.

249

STATECRAFT

SET ASIDE EACH SIDE'S PRINCIPLES

7.

AND FOCUS ON PRACTICALITIES a rule

of thumb for any mediator,

that

one

side's principle

If

there

is

the other side's impossibility. Principles drive each side to

is

rigid positions.

it is

its

most

Who wants to look like he is conceding on his principles?

Certainly not anyone I've ever worked with.

Breaking

down problems, however, and looking

overcome differences sides. In

a natural

is

way

these circumstances, no one

for practical

ways to

between two

to build bridges

seen as losing, and needs can

is

be met.

A

good example of solving

meeting

a

profound need

proach to water

at

a

in the process

—was

the time of the Interim

permanent-status discussions

at

—and

problem by avoiding principles

the Israeli-Palestinian ap-

Agreement and

the expert level.

later in the

The Palestinians wanted

the Israelis to accept the principle that the water resources were theirs

and that they had a right to the aquifers in the West Bank that must be recognized.

The

Israeli position

right or principle

Palestinians as a matter of

if the

had control over these aquifers,

tally threaten the quality

Israel

was that

and quantity of the

it

Israeli

would fundamen-

water supply

—and

could never accept such an outcome.

For the interim period, the two sides agreed to defer the question of principle and rights and focus instead tinians identified the

do

on water

allocation. If the Pales-

amount of water they needed, then the

their best to ensure that they received

it

—

Israelis

with, of course,

would

American

guarantees to support these undertakings or to supplement needs

if they

could not be met. In the permanent-status negotiations, the negotiators

came

to the conclusion that they

could never reach agreement on the

principle of water control, but they could

arrangements that both sides could

live with.

come up with Each might say

had been no agreement on the question of water rights to

concede the

in

the

point.

way of practical

While mediators

—

At the same time, they would not allocations that could

will

want

meet both

—

or at times

250

when

that there

so neither

let

had

principle get

sides' needs.

to create general principles that

negotiation process at the outset

practical

frame the

the most fundamen-

Eleven Rules for Mediation tal

issues are being tackled

on their

off a focus

—they

will eventually

principles. Focusing

on

want

practicalities,

to get the sides

and not debat-

ing each side's principles, can solve real problems, reduce differences,

momentum

and build

my years

mediator

as a

down

sense to nail

I

always operated on the premise that

it

made

understandings whenever they were available.

thinking was that firming

new

baselines of) agreement.

MAKE AGREEMENTS WHERE YOU CAN

8.

In

new

for (and

up an understanding was

My

useful and created

baselines from which to proceed. Oftentimes to reach an under-

standing or understandings on technical questions,

I

would remind every-

one that we were operating with the proviso that nothing was agreed

upon

until everything

amounted

was agreed. This allowed each side to reach what

to partial agreements, while protecting itself

done anything

that

would be binding

from having

agreement could be

until a final

concluded.

Reaching any agreements ing to be

difficult.

To

threshold.

The

first

in a

deeply rooted conflict

is

always go-

understandings represent the crossing of a

cross them, a mediator has to use devices

—

e.g.,

offer-

ing inducements or guarantees or assuring each side that what they are

now

agreeing to

The very side. It

larly

fact

won't compromise their position later in the process.

of crossing a threshold has a psychological effect on each

conditions

when

it

to the reality that

it

can reach agreements. Particu-

dealing with Israelis and Palestinians,

I

was always mindful

of the danger of an act of terrorism that might derail or set back the talks. In

the b ick of

my

mind,

I

was trying not

but also to safeguard progress where

of violence or terrorism sion

made

decision

—

it I

—

or

if

just to cross thresholds,

had been made.

it

If

we

faced an act

an Israeli decision on settlement expan-

difficult for Palestinians to

concede

in the face

of such

a

did not want the process going back to square one. So,

reaching agreements

when you can

is

a

good rule of thumb on which

to

operate.

Yet this rule

is

about concluding understandings when you can with-

out losing sight of the bigger picture.

which one does not have

full

I

say this because in a negotiation in

confidence in the purposes of the leaders,

251

STATECRAFT one

also has to take into

account the effect that each understanding

likely to have. For example, prior to reaching the

when of the

down

Wye

is

River Agreement,

trying to resolve the issue of the size of the further redeployment Israeli military in

Bibi Netanyahu's

ready accepted), but to tie this

agreement

to

chose not to do

I

one down so

Basically because

the West Bank,

as

not to lose

knew

I

that

1

percent

3

it.

would have been able

I

and yet

it,

(a figure

Normally, I

I

to nail

Arafat had

al-

would have wanted

chose not

Netanyahu w as about T

to.

Why?

to visit

America

and wanted to be able to say that he had agreed on the territory and that

now

And

the onus was on Arafat to agree on the security provisions.

knew that Netanyahu would likely up the ante on provisions in a way that would make them unachievable. If I

these circumstances,

the security

finalized this

agreement.

in

I

important provision,

I

risked not achieving the overall

Had I been completely confident at this

wanted such an agreement, derstanding on the

1

3

point that Netanyahu

would have proceeded

I

percent.

I

was not, and

I

to nail

needed

down

the un-

to maintain lever-

age on Netanyahu. In ally

any mediation, one must never lose sight of the big picture. Usu-

every understanding that you

your leverage. But

in

understanding that

lets

some

tie

cases, if

down

is

one side off the hook, and

in a position to

ACT SWIFTLY TO CONTAIN CRISES

any delicate mediation, where trust

is

low or nonexistent,

ten triggered by events outside the negotiations)

immediately. If a mediator event, he/she

may

fails

to act swiftly

crises (of-

must be dealt with

and decisively

in

such an

see everything unravel, and the process either set

back or actually undone. At

a

minimum,

a

mediator must be sensitive to

the impact of such external events and not hesitate in responding if it

—even

means responding unconventionally.

To

illustrate the point,

which he had lest

make

Most mediators wxmld prob-

the exception that proves the rule.

9.

In

momentum and

you are not thinking ahead, an

impossible demands, can be self-defeating. ably say this

will build

to

Richard Holbrooke recounts an incident in

respond immediately (and not according to protocol)

an incident in the town of Bosanski Petrovac, in which

Muslim

troops killed two Croat soldiers, trigger a crisis and unravel the process

252

Eleven Rules for Mediation

he was constructing.

Muslims

—

— Holbrooke acted

Tudjman

asked

preserve cooperation between the Croats and

the key to changing both the realities on the ground and the

Serb calculus

I

To

quickly:

[the Croatian president] if

he would agree to meet

with Izetbegovic [the Bosnian president] under American auspices to

common

forge a

position

retary of State convening

.

.

the idea of an American Assistant Sec-

.

two heads of state, who already knew each

other well and met regularly, seemed both presumptuous and odd.

The alarming sive situation

incident at Bosanski Petrovac changed that: the explo-

could undo everything. 7

summer of 1998, following a suicide bombing in Jerusalem, I did something similar. I knew that if the Israeli government saw a Palestinian In the

business-as-usual response to the tions

and

a

few symbolic but meaningless

understandably freeze

—and an

ity

bombing (make perfunctory condemna-

already stalemated process would begin to unravel.

stood that the Palestinians had to

act,

but

I

knew they would not

did not see the importance of doing so and of making

he

felt

Arafat,

he would have to all

live

up

So

to.

of his security chiefs, and

heads of the

Israeli

would

arrests), the Israelis

contacts with the Palestinian Author-

all political

I

I

under-

if

Arafat

commitments

Amnon Shahak and Ami Ayalon

—

Defense Forces and Shin Bet, respectively. Though

—and —

was highly unusual and had not previously been done with the American envoy organizing

it

that

asked to convene a meeting with

and presiding over

the

this

certainly not

it

I

knew

that

Arafat respected both Shahak and Ayalon and always wanted to be taken seriously by r hem. Both Arafat and

Prime Minister Netanyahu agreed

to

my convening the meeting at Arafat's headquarters. The meeting was successful and, for a time, did

The

lesson here

is

that in

events can create shocks. the to

make

A

a difference.

any high-stakes mediating process, outside mediator must make

damage and then decide how shock play

often needed, and the

quick assessment of

respond to contain the problem or

The luxury of passively sitting and itself out does not exist An urgent intervention is

change the focus and the

letting the

to

a

subject.

more unconventional the

intervention itself creates

drama and

and change the subject.

253

better, particularlv if the

gives everyone a reason to pause

STATECRAFT

ANGER AS

10. USE

TOOL-BUT USE

A

A mediator must know how to get the is

IT

RARELY

attention of each side in a

way that

The mediator must responded and when they have not when they aware

sharp and tough and at the appropriate moment.

make the must;

parties

when they

are asking for

when they go back on

up;

their word;

challenge the mediator's word. things, they

something outrageous and won't give

and when they avoid decisions or

When

they do any of these or related

get both barrels from the mediator.

must

it

They must know

they are about to pay a serious price and they must fear that they have

pushed the mediator beyond his/her endurance

when

a

tience

— and genuine anger

level.

mediator must convey that he/she has had

For those mediators

is

the most credible

who have

a

it

way

to

There and

is

are times

out of pa-

convey

that.

low-key approach, eruptions of real

anger are likely to have an effect because they are so out of character.

Richard Holbrooke has described a scene between Warren Christopher

and the Bosnian foreign minister, where Christopher chastised

principles was to be

announced

coun-

when

just before a state-

publicly,

he reneged on an

terpart in uncharacteristically blunt language

ment of

his

understanding that had been reached two hours

earlier,

and how

this

was

wholly unacceptable and would produce consequences that the Bosnians would regret. 8 I

witnessed

a similar

anger while saying

episode where Christopher exhibited great

little at all.

At the end of

1996 to achieve a cease-fire between lah,

a

week's shuttle mission in

Israel, Syria,

Lebanon, and Hizbol-

Christopher stood up and closed his briefcase in response to what he

perceived as the Syrian president's adding a condition to what was an

ready sealed agreement

—saying only

that he was finished

al-

and there

would be no agreement now. Asad was surprised because he had never seen the polite, proper, even-keeled, and meticulous secretary of state act this way.

That, of course,

is

precisely the point. For

someone

displays of anger were so out of character that they

an impact.

but

if

Most mediators

they use

authentic;

I

it

will use

to have

anger more often than Christopher,

too often, they devalue

was certainly not

like Christopher,

were bound

it.

as fiery as

254

Here, again, the key

someone

like

is

to be

Richard Hol-

Eleven Rules for Mediation

brooke; even he speaks of having a "controlled

make

a particular point.

9 I

fit"

when he wanted

used anger more sparingly, but would be

to far

more explosive than Secretary Christopher. I would not just get angry; I would blow up. Almost every time I did it, it was planned but far less controllable than

I

had intended.

when I blew up it was at a point of genuine exhaustion and after someone had reneged on his word or had challenged mine.

Usually always

The most dramatic blowup was during the second of my twenty-threeday shuttle missions on Hebron, and came after my telling Arafat that I was not simply going to stay in the area and I needed to know what he required to close a deal. Uncharacteristically, he responded directly and systematically, ticking off the six things he

had them

right,

I

work through the night with Netanyahu

And

would need. Just

repeated them, got his affirmation, and

I

to be sure

proceeded

produce what he asked

to

I

to

for.

when I returned to see Arafat, he denied that he had asked for what I had now produced. When I read him back exactly what he had asked for the previous evening and was now denying he had said, he asked if I was calling him a liar. To which I said, "If the shoe fits." Then I yet

stood up, stomped out of his

office,

and threw

my binder across the room,

inadvertently knocking over a pitcher of grapefruit juice. Arafat's

were

stunned. Here was

literally

I,

who never

My team

lost his cool,

was always the one to solve problems or defuse tensions or handle

blowing up and signaling that

Anger should be used est impact.

me

and the

James Baker had at particular

for those

it.

moments when

a

know

it

there could be no

can have the great-

temper that was legendary but typically used only

in

last

meetings on the way to the

October of 1991, Palestinians

Hanan Ashrawi were supposed

who would

more games or they

deal.

moments. In one of the

Madrid Conference issue of

had had

crises,

My explosion came at a moment when an agreement was within

reach and both sides had to

could lose

I

and

who

to finalize with

Faisal Husseini

and

him only the outstanding

represent the Palestinians on the joint Jordanian-

Palestinian delegation. Instead, they

but to reopen the Jerusalem issue

came not ready

—on which

stretched further than he had intended

to.

to speak about that

Baker had previously

Baker simply cut them

saying, with "you people" the souk never closes. But, as he said,

it

off,

had

with him, and they would never get what they wanted, since he was done

255

— STATECRAFT dealing with them.

He

then got up, wished them a nice

life,

and stalked

They were shocked and scared and asked me what could be done which I told them to drop what they were now asking on Jerusalem

out. to

and provide the delegates' names, and Baker soon got what he wanted. In short, pick

your moments and have the right provocation. Don't

overplay the anger card; reserve they are about to lose

for

it

when

the parties need to

know

something they value.

11. PUT

YOUR DRAFTS ON THE TABLE

At every phase, but particularly when moving toward agreements, the mediator needs to be the one to put drafts on the table for negotiation.

Whatever negotiators will

be invested in

it

for

one side write or present to the other

side,

they

and w ill be very reluctant to back aw ay from T

T

it.

Moreover, drafts by either side will always reflect their particular framing of the problem and will elicit reflexively negative responses from the

other side

—

no other reason than the

if for

latter's

seeing itself put in a

disadvantaged position. In

any negotiation each side

is

always trying to define the terrain in

which the discussion takes place. Each wants to be on the most favorable

ground issues

—ground

it

That

least is

that plays to

strengths.

Each wants

wants to discuss and focus on what

why when

must be the one

tor

its

it

to

comes

to putting

frame the

issues.

it

to fence off those

most has

paper on the

to gain.

table, the

media-

Papers by definition create

a

initially.

To reduce that and preserve each side's deniability, a may want to present a "nonpaper" that has less standing at least Nonpapers help with the framing of the issues and make such

framing

a little easier to

sense of formality.

mediator

swallow for the parties. But whether

a

nonpaper

or a proposed draft of general principles or the final agreement quired,

it is

the mediator

who needs

is

re-

to take the initiative in defining the

parameters of the negotiations and focusing the parties on what must be resolved.

Of course, it

is

there

is

another reason to present

to forge conceptual understandings, they

a paper.

must

As important

still

into concrete agreements that get expressed in writing.

as

be translated

Once

in black

and white, everything looks more permanent. Consequently, presenting a

paper without the necessary conditioning

256

may

trigger an explosively

Elrceti Rules for Mediation

negative response. In advance of both the

summits,

be coming.

I

River and

Camp

David

and Palestinians to what might

tried to condition both Israelis

I

Wye

was trying to reduce the potential for surprise, which

al-

most always produces negative responses, and get each side used to possible bridging ideas.

The

Wye was more

conditioning in the case of

sides. In part, there

much more time

was

the stakes were also far lower on

Wye;

it

successful with both

for conditioning, but obviously

was, after

all,

one more interim

The stakes with a permanent settlement were vastly greater and triggered much greater fear of the consequences of any paper that

agreement.

was to be put on the

table.

But the natural fear of such

a

paper should not necessarily prevent

a

mediator from presenting one. (At times, the fear of the parties can be used

as leverage, creating a perfect basis

on which

to say, "If you don't

do

more on your own, we will present a paper proposing the ways to overcome your differences.") The key determinant on whether to present papers of one scope or another must be the mediator's sense of timing. If the mediator

deems the time

right, either to accelerate the

is

mediation

process or to try to go for a deal, then a paper will be necessary.

Putting

paper on the table

a

Whether the mediator tion or

is

is

must

a

narrow the parameters

for discussion or crystallize the points of to

Note

on which

to create a basis

will

parties.

to establish

and

a

framework

—we

is

no way

agreed-upon

Northern Ireland or

later to

would be the Good Friday Accord, or when

gotiations from the outset

There

mo-

for

all

I

ongoing Israeli-Syrian ne-

when Richard Holbrooke wanted

gotiations, or

table.

the right

—he/she

paper to the

initially to negotiate in

define the outlines of what

wanted

a

or, at

when George Mitchell wanted

that

principles

and present

final

—

compromises

be resolved

ment, propose the actual terms of the to formulate

any mediation process.

trying to give the negotiations a solid founda-

agreement and the essential issues

need

in

to focus the

Dayton ne-

formulated and put papers on the

to reach final

agreement without the mediator

shaping, channeling, and narrowing the bounds of discussion. And, typically,

draft

no

final

agreement can be possible unless the mediator presents

peace treaty that constantly gets refined by the two parties

as

a

com-

promises are forged and tradeoffs in language (and the key issues em-

bodied

in that

language) are accepted.

257

STATECRAFT Drafting such papers or proposed treaties does not guarantee success.

But

if

mediation

is

required because the parties are unable or unwilling

to resolve their differences

without outside help, sooner or

ator will be drafting papers that

may

include

later, a

medi-

initial efforts to establish

the basic goals and principles that the parties share, limited agreements

on

at least

some of the problems, and eventually

a full-fledged

peace

accord.

As with any negotiation, the best approach may not succeed. Some factors or

developments are beyond the control of

employing these rules

will give a

a mediator.

But

mediator the best possible chance for

success.

258

12.

PRACTICING STATECRAFT The Israeli-Palestinian

one thing

It is

some of its use

it

to

I

guide to practicing

At

model of statecraft and

current challenges in American foreign

In the final

so.

statecraft,

it is

time for

chapters of this book,

I

of-

looking here at the Israeli-Palestinian

nuclear weapons, and contending with China as a rising power.

with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian, Iranian, and Islamist

least

sues, there

The

to apply

challenge of radical Islamists, the vexing question of Iran

conflict, the its

a

think not only that one can but that

America's decision makers to do

and

another to take

It is

how to approach

policy. Obviously,

fer a

how

understand what goes into statecraft and

tools in practice.

to lay out

Conflict

is

vision of Iran with nukes

the Israelis, and at

becoming

a

is-

an unquestioned linkage.

some point

certainly a major preoccupation of

is

Israel

nuclear power. Iran

is

may

act militarily to forestall Iran's

obviously aware of this, but

ship sees value in provoking Israel, with calls to wipe

it

its

leader-

—mostly be-

out

cause the Iranians believe they can put Arab regimes on the defensive

and gain

a greater following in the

gion's conflict with Israel.

Muslim world by

Of course,

exploiting the re-

Iranian provocation

to words, as they are the leading supporter, materially

is

not limited

and otherwise, of

Hizbollah and Hamas.

The

Israelis

have fought

that "round two" a

a

war with Hizbollah and are

may be coming

proxy war with Iran or

fully

expecting

in the next year or so, either as part

as unfinished business

259

of

stemming from the war

STATECRAFT in the

summer of 2006. And Hamas, now

ian political

making

social reality, represents a

and

so long as

Israel's existence.

Qaeda and

its

it

major impediment to peace-

defines itself as an Islamic

Both Hizbollah and Hamas are

offshoots, these

pete politically.

a leading factor in the Palestin-

They have

two groups have

a political standing

movement Islamists,

a social

that rejects

but unlike Al

agenda and com-

and use their presence

in

governments to limit what those governing bodies can do even while they use their militias outside the government to increase their leverage.

More generally,

the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to affect the

image of the United States and

we

not be the only challenge

not be a panacea

—

it

purposes in the region. While

its

—and

face in the area

its

it

resolution

may

would

remains an issue that creates a deep sense of griev-

ance in the region, one that radical Islamists exploit to promote anger

and recruit new followers. From that standpoint, dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

competing with radical

These two

must form

at least

one part of our strategy

issues or challenges are interrelated,

solving one will not

for

Islamists.

make

though clearly

re-

the other disappear. But dealing successfully

with one will surely create a climate in which dealing with the other be-

comes

The

easier.

starting point with a statecraft

clear and

knowing how

to act

Israeli-Palestinian conflict

on

model

it.

Our

must not only

is

having an objective that

is

objective in dealing with the reflect the

but also be guided by an assessment of what

is

hope

for settling

actually possible

it

now and

over time. In other words, our objective must be refined by an assessment

of

reality;

only then can

we

ing reality and working to ing to explain in

we must

In a

too

some

focus on the

fulfill

means we have

for transformI

background and the context

in

detail the

presently shape realistic objectives and

work

history and too

little

go-

which

to achieve them.

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT conflict that my colleague David Makovsky has described much

am

our hopes. With that in mind,

as

having

geography, one has to understand at least

the recent history to evaluate what

is

260

possible.

The Israeli-Palestinian

The

Conflict

1990s were characterized by intensive negotiations in which

limited interim agreements were reached.

There was an

five

active peace

which direct dialogue between the two sides was the norm.

process in

While hopes were high, the process ultimately proved to both sides. Israelis

a

disappointment

expected that Palestinians would give up terrorism

and promote reconciliation and not the virtues of continued resistance.

The

Palestinians expected that the Israelis

lives

and cease building settlements on land they expected to be part of

would stop controlling

their

their state.

The

process

came

to an

end with the

administration to negotiate a deal on

failure at the

all

end of the Clinton

the core issues of the conflict:

Jerusalem, borders, security, and refugees. As an architect of and a par-

know that the bridgeable. I know as well

ticipant in the negotiations,

negotiations were

all

gaps at the end of the

I

that notwithstanding the

disappointments and failed expectations built into the process, an agree-

ment was

possible

—and both

publics and both negotiating teams be-

lieved that to be the case.

Unfortunately for the Palestinians, they were led by Yasir Arafat, a revolutionary leader

who could

not transform himself and

become

a

statesman. Conflict had defined him, and he could not live without claims, grievances, or a cause. to have claims that

He

could accept

a process in

he could be struggling

for,

which he continued

but he could not end the

conflict.

His strategy over the years had been to make the Palestinians into victims.

But when he rejected what was available

at

Camp

David, he lost

the status of being the victim and the onus for failing to reach an agree-

ment was put on him.

In order to reestablish the Palestinians as victims

of Israeli military might, he sought to exploit the intifada that erupted in the

fall

of 2000.

Instead, he contributed to the

He

undoing of any peacemaking process.

supported violence against the

Israeli

Israelis,

government had been prepared

sions in the eyes of

its

public.

When

but in a context in which an

to accept

in January

unprecedented conces-

2001 Arafat rejected the

Clinton parameters (which went well beyond what had been on the table at

Camp

David), the Israeli public concluded that there was nothing

that the Palestinians

That conclusion

would accept other than

—combined with

Israel's

Palestinian violence

261

—

disappearance. killed the

peace

STATECRAFT camp

and produced

in Israel

Sharon,

The

who had vowed never Israelis

a

new

Israeli

to deal with Yasir Arafat.

were not alone

in their sense

that the Israeli response to the intifada

felt

government led by Ariel of grievance. Palestinians

had been draconian,

punishment on the people and treating them

ing collective

subhuman. Into

this

inflict-

as if they

were

mix the new Bush administration disengaged from

any effort to preserve some basis for Israeli-Palestinian cooperation and dialogue. Ironically, the administration

when

of 2001,

disengaged during a period, in the spring

Ariel Sharon, notwithstanding his

Arafat, was sending his son to talk to him,

vows not

even counseling

to deal with

his

son on the

need to show Arafat respect when dealing with him. As head of the opSharon had one

position,

He would

had another.

set

give

teenagers were killed in the

of responsibilities, but

up on Arafat only

prime minister he

as

after

twenty-one

Israeli

bombing of the Dolphinarium nightclub

in

Tel Aviv, in June 2001.

The

intifada,

which had involved daily violence, was transformed

bombing into

ter the

a

war with

far greater violence

af-

and suffering on both

sides.

The measure of the war could be seen in

From

the advent of the Bush administration in 2001 until the beginning

the casualties on each side.

of 2005, more than 1,100 Israelis and approximately 3,800 Palestinians

were

killed.

For the

Israelis, this

number exceeded

suffered in two of Israel's wars with

ties

The

losses

killing

The was

when

there had been a peace process. Whatever the

one another during

this

number of Israeli

period the way they would after

fatalities

one third of what they were

Between

Israelis

first

November of

its

four years of the

losses in the 1990s

The Bush

it is

were roughly

always better to have them

administration

limited attempts to stop the violence. But each was

sence of statecraft, not

ended.

in Bush's first term.

and Palestinians,

ralking rather than shooting.

it

throughout the previous ten years

than one quarter of those suffered in the

Bush administration, and the Palestinian

In

states.

of the Oslo process, Israelis and Palestinians were simply not

total less

neighboring

number of fatali-

were dramatically greater than those suffered during the

preceding decade, failings

its

the

made

a

number of

marked by an ab-

exercise.

2001, General

Anthony

262

Zinni, the former head of

The Central

Command, was

cease-fire.

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

sent by Secretary Powell to try to produce a

He would make

mandate was limited

a

genuine effort for several months, but

to security issues,

No

with either political or economic questions.

much

success

when

those he

is

his

and he was not empowered to deal

envoy

know

dealing with

is

going to have

that his

mandate

is

heavily circumscribed. Zinni's challenge would have been difficult in any

However, the prospect of gaining Palestinian responsiveness was

case.

very poor given that he could not touch issues that mattered to them. Later,

the

on the eve of going

Roadmap

for Peace.

It

to

war

in Iraq, the administration unveiled

was supposed to constitute

based path to the vision of two states coexisting side by

a

performance-

side that Presi-

dent Bush had articulated in his June 24, 2002, speech. As a concept, the

roadmap had promise, sides to take steps, Israelis,

particularly because

was phased, required both

and seemingly addressed what mattered to each:

Palestinians needed

tinians, Israelis

it

for

to act on security and reform, and for Pales-

were supposed

to freeze settlement activity

and with-

draw the checkpoints and controls on Palestinian movement.

The concept was fine, but the roadmap stood little chance of being followed because we negotiated it with everyone except those who had to implement it. The Israelis and Palestinians were supposed to act on a parallel set of obligations that, if fulfilled,

would transform the

realities

on the ground. The administration negotiated the roadmap with the other

members of the Quartet

—

the EU, the Russians, and the

not with the Israelis and Palestinians. tions in the fifty-two-paragraph

The

result:

UN—but

not one of the obliga-

document was understood the same way

by the two sides who had to carry them

out.

The

Israelis interpreted

Palestinian obligation maximally and their obligations minimally

every

—and

the Palestinians did just the opposite.

This might

still

the other Quartet

have been manageable

members had agreed on

a

if

the United States and

common definition for what

constituted performance by each side on each obligation. But that, too,

was not done. Statecraft requires a

Had

hands-on approach to working through

the administration been determined to

erational (not simply a rhetorical) guide,

terms with

Israelis

it

make the Roadmap an opwould have negotiated its

and Palestinians. Admittedly,

263

issues.

this

would have taken

— STATECRAFT time and required a grinding readiness to accept

tance to

fulfill

why unveil

effort.

And

with Yasir Arafat

commitments was often matched only by

them —

his reluc-

there was certainly risk to such an approach.

performance-based roadmap, emphasizing

a

—whose

its

Still,

performance-

work out

actual un-

derstandings on what each obligation required and then hold

up before

based character,

if

there was not a readiness to try to

the world which side was living up to not? If nothing else, that

sures

on both

Given the this a

sides to

obligations and which side was

its

might have created

a

new dynamic, with

change behaviors.

costs of the intifada to Palestinians, Arafat

might have found

convenient pretext to change course. For his part, Sharon,

important not to cross the U.S. administration serious, also future.

By

might have found

2004, he

felt a

need

this a

have found

genuine American

a

by intensive diplomacy,

way

when

it

demonstrated

show he had

to

who felt it

a

pathway

it

was

to the

to break the stalemate for Israel's reasons

and demographically

politically

pres-

a better

—by

acting unilaterally.

initiative,

backed not only by words but

—

way to go

Might he not

particularly because he might

have gotten something from the Palestinians?

When

it

comes

ever, hesitancy has

to investing in Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy,

how-

marked the Bush administration. The administration

has preferred diplomacy on the cheap, with limited effort, investment,

and exposure. Unfortunately, that instinct not only it

also

meant

doomed

that the openings occasioned

ments would be

lost,

the roadmap, but

by three historic develop-

leaving the prospects even worse off for peace-

making.

A LOST In

OPENING FOR PEACEMAKING

2004 and 2005, three dramatic developments created

resuming peacemaking

So long

much

as

less

he was

efforts. First, Yasir

alive,

Arafat died in

no change between

Israelis

a strong basis for

November

2004.

and Palestinians

within Palestinian society, or between Palestinians and the

—

U.S. administration was possible. Second, in January 2005, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) was elected as president of the Palestinian Authority

on

a platform

of nonviolence and reform. This was a

264

first,

with

Abu

The Israeli -Palestinian

Mazen making

clear rhat Palestinian interests

and with the

lence,

vorable view of

in

February 2004

Defense Forces, but

Bv

a vastly

more

fa-

intentions than of Arafat's. And, third. Ariel

pletely from Gaza, evacuating

drawal.

were not served by vio-

public and government having

Israeli

Abu Mazen's

Sharon not only declared

Israeli

Conflict

his intention to

withdraw com-

twenty-one settlements and pulling out the

in

August 2005 he implemented the with-

the withdrawal had the potential to transform the stale-

itself,

mate between the

Israelis

and Palestinians bv unfreezing the

on

realities

the ground.

However,

advantage of these developments someone had to

to take

and develop an

seize the openings

urgent game plan.

active,

To begin

with, there had to be an understanding that with Arafat gone. Palestinian behavior could change, but changes

might have won

had

to

come quickly Abu Mazen

mandate for his vision of nonviolence, but he had no

a

inherent standing on his own. Yes. he had been elected, but he was replacing an icon,

movement; unlike

estinian

needed paid

to build

it

movement

Arafat.

bv showing that

So he had

off.

who had symbolized the PalAbu Mazen lacked authority and

revolutionary leader

a

to

way

his

—

way of nonviolence

the

put people back to work and gain freedom of

—two accomplishments

Beyond Abu Mazen being seen

that

would be

as delivering,

bv

felt

on the

territory

Israeli

Palestinians.

there had to be

of urgency about producing coordination between the tinians

all

Israelis

a

sense

and Pales-

withdrawal from Gaza. The more the hand-off of

and settlements could look

as if

it

had been agreed upon or

more

at

least

coordinated between the two through

as a

vehicle for producing progress could be restored in the minds of

both

Israelis

Lastly.

1

1

the worst case,

— and we — we needed if

still

Gaza. Ensuring bility there

this

if

"negotiations*"

found to

it

coordination was difficult to establish difficult to

be sure that

life

help

Abu Mazen

Palestinians to

show the world and the

also?

— and

But

life

if

It

would allow the thev could

they could do that in Gaza,

265

left

stake in preserving sta-

Israelis that

could get better only

arrangements were worked out before

deliver

got better afcer the Israelis

would build the Palestinian

and preventing any attacks from Gaza.

their responsibilities

West Bank

the

and Palestinians.

effectively

much

talks,

if

Israel left

why

fulfill

not in the

"security for access"

Gaza, not

afcer. If

the

STATECRAFT Israelis felt there

movement

On

all

and out of Gaza, and that would cripple any possibility

into

of building an

were inadequate security provisions, they would deny

economy and improving

Abu Mazen, who

did very

avoiding decisions rather than making

do much more

had the means to

was

quantity. His strength

for

He had

him I

there.

three measures, our efforts were too

not to excuse

stinct.

life

in a

to be

way

than

did.

to

make

and too

This

late.

and acted

to help

them was

we

is

as if

But we

his objective.

Abu Mazen was

known

a

not his decision-making in-

decisions, even while

that built his authority

was not alone

little

his intentions,

pushed

little

and

in calling for the creation

we

delivered

his confidence.

of an international team to

be established in his office to create a work plan, with time lines for projects

and mechanisms for implementation. Such

Abu Mazen

to decide.

would

It

also

a

team would have pushed

have helped him to create

tioning office and to tackle the issue of corruption

— an

a func-

issue that cre-

among the Palestinian public. Of course Abu Mazen needed more than forms and mechanisms to produce projects; he needed the financing to make them possible. Donor efforts were organized, starting even the month prior to his election. But ated great anger

Here

the efforts produced pledges that were very slow to be honored. again

someone needed

immediate financing

The

to

spearhead the effort in a way that produced

for projects that

Palestinian per capita

years of the intifada.

would put people back

income had dropped by 30 percent

Had Abu Mazen produced

quickly,

—and

dramatically altered the political reality and context the costs for those

One

to work.

who might

resist

it

in the

could have

certainly raised

him.

obvious place to produce quickly for him was in financing for

housing. Palestinians had been the backbone of the Israeli construction industry.

work

Now,

for security reasons, they

in Israel in

were no longer permitted

to

any appreciable numbers. Palestinian construction com-

panies had the design and contracting wherewithal to use the financing

and put large numbers of laborers to work forthcoming. With Saudi Arabia, the cash from the rise in

oil

—provided

the financing was

UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar

and natural gas

prices, there

was an obvious

source for the financing that was needed. But someone had to priority;

someone had

campaign so that

it

to

make

would be

it

a

public issue;

difficult for the

266

flush with

someone had

Gulf states not

make to

this a

make

it

to respond.

a

The

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Unfortunately, the administration did very

approached the

little. It

Saudis and others quietly but never pushed with any insistence or specihcitv.

Nor was

making things happen on

there any urgency attached to

the ground.

The

secretary of state appointed General William

the Palestinians on security so the Israelis might

Ward

to

work with

checkpoints and

lift

ease Palestinian mobility, but Ward's mandate was extremely limited, and

he refrained from promoting the kind of Israeli-Palestinian security co-

made

operation that might have

a difference.

And

in

keeping w ith the T

administration's approach in foreign policy in general, no

one asked

Ward hard questions or created accountability for him and his mission. The same lack of urgency plagued the approach to forging a coordinated basis for Gaza withdrawal. To be sure, Ariel Sharon was not keen to

have such coordination. In his eyes,

this

did not want the Palestinians to be able to

But we had

Hamas

a stake in

how

it

came

was an

tell

Israeli decision

him how

it

and he

should be done.

We had a stake in ensuring that of We had a stake in using Gaza

out.

not be the main beneficiaries

it.

withdrawal to restore faith in Israeli-Palestinian cooperation and peace-

making

— and none of

this

was going to happen on

Here, again, the administration

worked against

its

objectives. James

made

its

own.

a belated effort,

but

its

hesitancy

Wolfensohn, the outgoing president of

the

World Bank, was appointed

the

management of the Gaza withdrawal. But

as the

envoy

for the his

Quartet to help with

mandate included only

the economics of withdrawal, not security.

Moreover, Wolfensohn was not appointed until

May 2005,

a little

more

than two months prior to the time of Israeli withdrawal. Already that was late in the day,

his

and though

his efforts

own making. When he w as T

It

much tools,

was

were heroic, they were largely of

not in the area, nothing happened.

as if the administration, especially in its

second term, had

better appreciation for the elements of statecraft and

but

it

was easing into using them with

Israelis

some of

and Palestinians

a

its

at a

time when the clock was ticking and time was the one thing we did not have.

And

its

instinctive hesitancy

tinued to hold

While

it

diplomacy,

it

hands-on

effort con-

hesitant on investing in intensive hands-on

was not hesitant on

the Middle East

in a

back.

may have been it

on investing

more

generally.

its

agenda

As such,

267

it

for

democracy promotion

in

pushed an obviously reluc-

— STATECRAFT tant

Abu Mazen

to hold parliamentary elections in

January 2006. The

administration saw elections as part of a renewal process.

But

failed to appreciate that

it

Hamas might do very

elections, particularly given the anger at Fatah for

its

well in the

corruption and

seeming indifference to the needs of the Palestinian public. While the

may have been more about voting against Fatah than voting for Hamas, the outcome, nonetheless, put Hamas in charge of the Palestin-

election

government.

ian

Hamas, an acronym rael's right to exist

against

it.

process

was

Movement,

rejects Is-

and remains deeply wedded to the idea of "resistance"

Hamas's election meant that the very premise of any peace

—namely,

now

for the Islamic Resistance

the

outcome should be based on

a two-state solution

rejected by those running the day-to-day affairs of the Palestin-

ian government.

So

having three historic developments

after

—

Arafat's death,

Abu

—the

Mazen's mandate for nonviolence, and Sharon's disengagement

net result was a Hamas-led government in the Palestinian Authority.

The

opening that existed throughout 2005 was closed in 2006. Thus, even before the

ground

war with Hizbollah

for

peacemaking. But

gagement"

still

with, especially

in the

2006, there was

commitment

from the perspective of statecraft.

AND DISENGAGEMENT

in power, the Israeli perception that there

tinian partner

little

to "disen-

gave the administration something significant to work

ISRAELI ELECTIONS

With Hamas

summer of

at least the Israeli

was more deeply cemented.

was no Pales-

If anything, that further

con-

vinced the

Israeli

to separate

from the Palestinians unilaterally The growing consensus

Israel

public that negotiations were fruitless and

was time in

was shaped by the desire to "be done with the Palestinians," get

out of their

lives,

and preserve the Jewish character of

the occupation of the Palestinians.

draw

it

unilaterally

withdrawal from

Israel

by ending

These motivations led Sharon

to with-

from Gaza and dictated continued disengagement and a large part

of the West Bank.

Kadima, the new party formed by Ariel Sharon prior to

had further disengagement

his massive

as its raison d'etre. Ehud Olmert, who had been deputy prime minister under Sharon and had joined the prime

stroke,

268

The Israeli-Palestinian

when he

minister

left

Conflict

the Likud Party to form Kadima,

became Sharon's

successor.

Running Olmert as

in the election

left little to

on

a

platform of

the Sharon legacy,

the imagination in the campaign: he

prime minister he would carry out

up

fulfilling

to 90 percent of the

a

made

clear that

disengagement (withdrawal) from

West Bank and even from

parts of

Arab East Je-

rusalem. While he preferred to do this with Palestinian agreement, he

declared that this was unlikely after the

would do have been

it

unilaterally if necessary.

strong as

as

and the

of votes,

And, while

some expected,

rightist parties

Hamas election and

his party

became

dropping from forty seats in the Knesset

A

his

won

a clear

therefore he

mandate might not the largest

number

—with Likud

minority

to twelve.

new, untested Israeli prime minister being elected on such a plat-

form gave the United States leverage toward the Palestinians and the

we were in a position to say that Israel is going to withdraw and can do it in a way that takes your needs into account. Or they can do it without you. Work with us, and we will press the Israelis to undertake withdrawal in a way that works with and not against With the

Israelis.

Palestinians,

you, and leaves open the possibility of negotiations on peace later on.

Olmert, on the other hand, also needed the United States.

If

he could

—which was

not get anything from the Palestinians for withdrawing

presumption that, as

sand

—he needed something from America. He needed

to

his

show

he evacuated up to seventy settlements and sixty to seventy thou-

settlers

from the West Bank, which unlike Gaza constitutes the heart-

land of Jewish history, he garnered meaningful

commitments from the

States. While he knew he could not get formal recognition of new boundaries that Israel was drawing, he wanted and needed US. acceptance of the new settlement blocs and an open American acknowl-

United the

edgment

tha^ there

would be no pressure from the United

States to

change these borders absent an unmistakable Palestinian partner ready to fulfill

all

of its obligations on terrorism. Olmert needed to be told that

he could only gain the U.S. support he needed by working with the Palestinians at least through our mediation and with our

Until the icy,

a

summer of 2006, disengagement remained

and the United States had leverage to

new

later

ground

rules.

the Israeli pol-

affect the situation

and create

baseline for preserving calm between Israelis and Palestinians and

pursuing peace. Unfortunately, that changed with the Lebanon war.

269

STATECRAFT

THE LEBANON

On July raeli

12,

WAR AND THE END

OF DISENGAGEMENT

2006, Hizbollah launched a barrage of rockets across the Is-

border

as

cover in which to kidnap Israeli soldiers. Israel responded

by trying "to destroy Hizbollah."

Israel

began

this

war with great under-

standing internationally, with support even from the Europeans that

was

justified in

it

responding to the Hizbollah attack, and with unques-

tioned backing from the Bush administration. But the indecisive conclusion to the war changed the political realities in Israel. After thirty-four

days of warfare, the Israeli public saw an outcome that raised basic questions about the

—how,

judgment and competence of its leadership

Israelis

asked, could their leaders squander the extraordinary circumstances in

which the war was launched; why did they not litical objectives;

campaign and do so belatedly

all

relate military plans to po-

and why did they equivocate in launching

Not surprisingly, credibility. Why?

at

ground

high cost?

the logic of disengagement Israel

a

now

also

seemed

to lose

had unilaterally withdrawn from Lebanon

2000 and Gaza in 2005. After the Lebanon war of 2006, what did the raeli public see?

Hizbollah had become stronger in Lebanon

in Is-

as a result

of

Israeli

withdrawal and had built up over six years a capacity that per-

mitted

it

to hit Israeli territory with

ing the course of the war. Similarly,

Gaza

after Israeli withdrawal,

withdrawal had rocket

from Gaza were

ets

Lebanon, but

as

fire

far less

roughly four thousand rockets dur-

Hamas had emerged

as the

power

and not for one day following the

from Gaza into

Israel ceased.

in

Israeli

True, the rock-

capable in range and payload than those from

Hizbollah had shown in Lebanon, that could change

in time.

What the Israel body politic saw was that unilateral withdrawals had made Israel more secure, and a comparable withdrawal from the

not

West Bank (which ties

is

far closer to all Israel's

than Gaza) would render

Israelis

now

all

face a conceptual

cities

The bottom line: comes to how to ap-

vacuum when its

it

neighbors.

say this because the policies of the political "left"

make peace with the

and communi-

of Israel vulnerable.

proach the future and relations with I

major

Palestinians

—were

negotiate and

discredited by the failure of

negotiations and the eruption of the intifada.

270

—

The

policies of the politi-

The Israeli-Palestinian

— —were

the status quo

cal "right"

adjust

The

failure of the left

—disengagement and

the "third way"

But

acceptable, and eventually the Arabs will

is

discredited by demographic realities and the costs of pre-

serving the occupation.

barrier.

Conflict

after

Lebanon,

this

at least in its unilateral form.

emerge gradually

as Israelis

ernment struggles

to survive

While there

will

the construction of a separation

conceptual pathway also was discredited,

A

fourth

way

is

Hamas

as the president

and

a

Israel,

life.

the Palestinians ap-

among Palestinians

is

one

A divided government, with Hamas prime

cabinet, has led to political paralysis.

refuses to accept the terms of the Quartet of recognizing Israel, all

and the Palestinian Authority, and

ment has

largely

as a result, the Palestinian

afloat.

Some

efforts to

produce

Hamas-dominated

a national

a

But even

Hamas movement based

in

Fatah, and

Damascus.

deal produced the guidelines for a national unity government.

they are implemented, the basic competition between Fatah

if

and Hamas

Hamas and

summit between Abu Mazen, the head of

Khalid Meshaal, the leader of the

The Mecca

ministries.

unity government failed until

the Saudis, worried about the growing violence between

convened

govern-

limited donor monies are going to

the office of the presidency, but not to the

Repeated

previous agreements between

been cut off from the kind of donor assistance that kept

the Palestinian Authority

Fatah,

likely to

Olmert gov-

as the

of the Palestinian Authority, a

Hamas-dominated

renouncing violence, and accepting Israel

is

and avoid elections.

be political weakness in

of deteriorating economic and political

minister,

needed and

debate their future and

pear hopelessly stalemated. Today the reality

Abu Mazen

and the right produced

and

will continue

likely intensify.

Given the circumstances, and the ship in Israel and Palestine, peace

is

reality

of weak and divided leader-

not something that will be possible

anytime soon. But preventing further deterioration and laying the foundation for progress

between the

Israelis

tinian Authority.

is

We

must

start

by trying

and Palestinians, and prevent

We

Palestinians and gives to

essential.

must do so

in a

way

to restore

a collapse

of the Pales-

that addresses the needs of

them hope even while we seek

to get

Hamas

change or to be supplanted by secular alternatives that believe In addition, at a time

Arab and Islamic worlds

more

in question than

it

when anger toward is

calm

either

in peace.

the United States in the

increasing and the concept of peace itself

has been since the

271

Madrid Peace Conference

is

in

STATECRAFT 1991

—with

Iran, Hizbollah,

exist

and making

work

practically

and Hamas

challenging

all

Israel's right to

Middle Eastern landscape

that part of the

— we have

to

on the ground and actively with others internationally

to reestablish support for a two-state solution.

many ambitious objectives, but they must be done eyes open. We do not have an interest in

possible to explore

It is

carefully and with our

launching

a

grand

initiative that

proves hollow and once again leaves the impression in the region that

diplomacy always

fails

and violence

is

the answer.

OUR OBJECTIVES Promote calm between

Israelis

and

Palestinians.

Notwithstanding the weak-

may each

nesses of both Israeli and Palestinian leaders, they

see great

advantage in reaching an understanding that stops Palestinian attacks against Israelis and stops the sions into

IDF from

carrying out almost daily incur-

Gaza or the West Bank. Olmert

(or for that matter

leadership) cannot look soft on Israeli security but

welcome an end

to rocket fire out of

Israeli

would undoubtedly

Gaza and attempted

Abu Mazen and Hamas

out of the West Bank. Both

any

suicide attacks

leaders such as Is-

mail Haniya are likely to want to ease the Israeli grip on the territories

and allow meaningful commerce

show they

Hamas always

out of Gaza. Both would

like to

are delivering something, and in the case of the internal is very likely a need for a respite. The question as Can they deliver what they promise? they also know that Israel will stop making arrests, will

leaders, there is

delivery:

Perhaps. If

stop targeted killings, and will

Gaza, which would do

make an call for

at least

effort.

Hamas

much

open the crossing points

to relieve the

an end to attacks (which

will agree to exert real efforts to

One way

to explore this

diate an understanding

would have

economic squeeze, they might

the key, because the issue

is

it

into and out of

is

not whether

it

will

has done in the past) but whether

prevent them (which

would be

for the

it

it

has never done).

United States to try to me-

between Olmert and Abu Mazen. Abu Mazen

to deal with

Haniya and Hamas, and while he could not

promise them recognition from the outside, he could promise them relief

from the pressure and fear of

part of the deal, they

Israeli arrests

would probably

272

insist

and targeted

on their

killings.

legislators

As

and cab-

The Israeli-Palestinian inet

members from

got that, and

from the

The

they

if

Bank being released from

knew they would be

jail,

would amount

to a cease-fire

up

the Palestinians were living

remove

along, they

and would

would have

Some may

for steps

it

Israelis. In all likelihood,

a deal until they

would not be

on each

is

that

on the Palestinian side

clear

difficult to create

Abu Mazen, and

would be

it

(as

have

an agreed-

to include

a clear

obviously have been required

initiative that

from any pre-

also separate this

a full cease-tire, affecting all attacks

incursions and arrests;

would

it

chain of

also

An

a violation.

is

what constituted

have agreed-upon responses to Israelis

have to make very

understanding of

a violation. It

a violation. In this respect,

command,

this

would have

In the past

was Islamic Jihad who violated

it.

the most likely initial violation

when

there was

mechanisms

they did not

with no response from the

for discussing

act.

act,

Xo

what

is

it

PA and Abu

being done by the Palestinians, the

and what the

issues

must be

Israelis

left

would be

cease-tire, this

all

do

if

to dif-

previous efforts

at a

one must be the product of a serious negotiation.

The United desires help

entitled to

open or vague or subject

ferent interpretations. In other words, unlike

States, as mediator,

must ask Abu Mazen

from the Egyptians and Jordanians

that he and Palestinians demonstrate

he needs or

the condition

something on their own

the crossing points or in patrols of the

273

if

—but with

same could be true of bringing some international at

for

a budna, or truce,

other than words. This time around, there must be agreed-upon

time they have to

help

to

because the

might be from one of the groups separate from Hamas or from Fatah,

example Islamic Jihad.

Mazen

Is-

well as the smuggling of weapons) and ruling

what happens when there

would have

the

side.

What would

to actively deliver.

vious such efforts

all Israeli

would

saw some demonstrations on

found wanting. However, there has never been an

out

if

say that similar initiatives have been tried in the past,

including between Olmert and

Hamas

and,

and Hamas working with

to see rocket tire stop

however,

first;

upon timetable

Gaza

checkpoints in the West Bank. For the Israelis to go

all

would not accept such

the ground

they

the closure of

lift

to all their security obligations,

Fatah to actively preempt attacks against raelis

if

relieved of continuing pressure

the crossing points for the transit of goods into and out of

also

but

they would have a large stake in acting.

Israelis,

deal

the West

Conflict

forces into

main rocket

The Gaza to

first.

tiring areas.

STATECRAFT As

make

commitment and

a

fulfill

The

it.

to

show

that they can

era of excuses must end.

A politi-

of accountability must replace a culture of victimization and,

cal culture

therefore, entitlement. In the

themselves

if

first

they are to build a

the context of cementing

In

need

a general principle, the Palestinians

tional forces

might play

instance, the Palestinians

need

this for

state.

a cease-fire

and enforcing

interna-

it,

supporting role that could be expanded to deal

a

with issues of smuggling weapons into Gaza. But, again, this must start with Palestinians establishing their

own

responsibilities

and making clear

that they will try to act on them as a condition of getting help from the outside.

A to

it.

U.S. -led

a

Quartet dimension

Multiple mediators create confusion. Inevitably, there

different take

hear

mediation effort would need to have

on an

—sometime genuinely and sometimes

a slightly

is

issue, or the parties interpret differently

what they

to play different mediators

one another. But the United States cannot ask the Europeans, the

off

UN,

or even the Russians to play a role later

if

they feel they are being

excluded. Therefore, they must be briefed by the United States regularly.

There can be general meetings, with the United

managing

a discussion

with Olmert and

Abu Mazen

States leading

and

(or other Israeli

and

Palestinian leaders or representatives), to brief Quartet representatives

on where the tation

and potential problems stand. Implemen-

cease-fire issues

committees can be

set up,

and the

EU in particular could

assume

responsibility for helping direct them.

There can thus be an international dimension and

role. International

forces could be tied to using the cease-fire not only to establish as a building

block politically. For example, should international forces

be brought into Gaza,

making an

effort

on

if

it

would have

their

the Israelis. Acting to

But

own

make

to be tied not only to Palestinians'

but also to a set of understandings with

sure there

is

no rocket

fire

would be

a given.

the responsibility included stopping the smuggling of arms,

might be tied to

a

declaration or resolution by the

that the Israeli occupation of

and would require the

with Gaza

—including ending

For those

it

UN Security Council

Gaza has ended. This would mandate new

responsibilities for the Palestinians there,

calm but

who may argue

and

for the international forces

Israelis to create a different relationship

the siege of Gaza. that international forces should also be

274

The Israeli-Palestinian

brought to the West Bank and that the sult,

there

is

no prospect of

Conflict

Israelis

could withdraw as

a re-

Gaza

this until international forces in

first

demonstrated over time their unmistakable effectiveness. Today the raeli

presence and freedom of action prevent nearly

coming out of the West Bank and United ing

States, will

up such

a

all

acts

be able to persuade or pressure the

Israelis into giv-

—and

the international

community

have to happen in the region

—

were convinced. (International forces ineffectual

UNSC resolution

it.

in Iraq, especially in

Lebanon, and with the behavior of Hamas and Hizbollah Israelis

tol-

will not only insist

also prove that their forces are efficient at preventing

Much would

ing

of terror

one, including the

presence until Palestinians have proven they will not

erate terrorism

on that but

No

into Israel.

Is-

—

in

before the

implement-

1701 on Lebanon will discredit any ambitious role

they might play in Gaza. Already the record on implementing 1701 in

Lebanon

is

not impressive.) But starting with mediating a cease-fire with

response mechanisms for possible violations and with a possible role for international forces in

more over Preserve

ties to the

its

a building block for

doing

much

time.

ing with Hamas. adjust

Gaza could be

Palestinian people.

We

We do not have to rule out ever deal-

do, however, have to

make

clear that

Hamas must

behavior to the international community's norms, not the other

way around. Achieving the

first

objective of a cease-fire will

depend on

Hamas but does not require our dealing with that group. To be sure, if Hamas began to enforce a cease-fire on others, that would be a sign that it

was changing. That would be

tance" as

its

a sign that

guiding principle. So long as

no longer regarded

it

it

does, so long as

act of terrorism against Israelis as legitimate,

not coexistence, and

it

it

it

"resis-

treats

any

will rationalize conflict,

cannot be a partner.

The mistake the Bush administration made was not in trying to isolate Hamas and force it to meet certain conditions. On the contrary, it was right to do

so. It

consensus requiring

was right to work with the Quartet and produce

Hamas to

was an act of effective ties to

a

accept Israel and renounce violence. This

statecraft. Its failing,

the Palestinian people at the

same

however, was not to create

time, to demonstrate our con-

cern for their well-being not in words but in actions.

To be

fair,

striking the balance was going to be difficult.

275

The more

STATECRAFT one made

make

it

clear that

Hamas could

not deliver on any of its promises to

life better for Palestinians unless

it

gave up

more the

sistance and rejection of Israel, the

commitment

its

to re-

Palestinian people had to

see the day-to-day consequences of having such a leadership.

And

with

donor assistance having largely evaporated, with the PA not being able to

pay

165,000 employees, there clearly have been consequences.

its

But other factors also had to be kept sure that the

PA

mind. There was

in

a

need

to en-

did not collapse, with ensuing chaos and the loss of

law and order. There was

need

a

to

all

show that we were not punishing the

Palestinian people in an act of retribution, only a leadership that thought it

could gain donor assistance from the international community while

rejecting the principles of the international

need to

community. And there was

demonstrate that we cared about the

a

Palestinian people and their

aspirations.

So what needs difficulties,

be done to square the circle? Notwithstanding the

to

work along two

the United States should

parallel paths:

first,

continue to hold the line on Hamas's having to make a choice on rejecting terror as a political instrument assistance

if it

wants to have direct

ties

with and

from the international community; and second, establish new

ways to get assistance to Palestinians outside of traditional channels.

The best way to hold the line is to work constantly with the other members of the Quartet on the ground rules for assistance to the Palesand to draw attention to what would benefit Hamas

tinians

the Palestinian public and

its

needs.

It

also

is

those

who

Israel

a feint.

Acting to enforce

violate

by saying

it is

it

a real

move.

a cease-fire

A

feint

is

opposed

means being quick

to

to distin-

move by Hamas and

guish in public and private what constitutes a real

what

as

by stopping or punishing

Hamas's implicitly accepting

"honors" previous agreements, even while continu-

ing to rationalize and support Israel's destruction and glorify terrorism against

As

it.

for establishing

new mechanisms

for assisting the Palestinians

outside of the governing ministries run by Hamas,

mechanisms. The

first

would involve providing

president's office in the Palestinian Authority.

going

now

to the president's office.

would

establish

two

Some donor monies

are

There should be

a significant in-

Abu Mazen

or a successor)

crease, provided rhe president

(whether

commits

and

to peaceful coexistence

I

assistance directly to the

276

a

renunciation of violence, creates

The Israeli-Palestinian the

means within

his office to

establishes the capacity to

Conflict

respond to social and economic needs, and

spend the money

in a transparent

way on

identifiable projects.

The second mechanism would involve the creation of new Palestinian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to be the recipients of assistance. As Hassan Abu Libdeh, the former minister of social affairs and labor in the Palestinian Authority, explained to me, there has been no

shortage of

NGOs

He

operating in the Palestinian areas.

there were 4,200, but they were not organized in a

way

observed that

to serve a larger

purpose, either economic or social or even political. Frequently involving only two or three people, they have had very limited effect. At a time

when we need to preserve our connections with Palestinian society and have some effect as we do so, we also need a new approach to NGOs.

Why not create a new, larger body of NGOs, with an international steering committee to provide oversight, to promote a network

working

tinians

The

at the grassroots,

and to drive

and institution building.

health,

To

support for the private sector,

give an

example of what

ular schools could be financed.

not use the

new

of projects?

civil society,

education and

1

this

could

Hamas

private religious schools in Gaza.

Why

a multiplicity

and employment assistance

projects could involve developmental

as well as

among Pales-

Palestinian

mean

in practice, private sec-

has financed and operated thirty

Why not have a secular alternative? NGOs with an international steering

committee to create what amounts to an alternative Dawa? Hamas used the Dawa, the provision of social services nutritional

programs

position, but

now

—

—

schools, clinics, food,

to build their following.

They

and

did this as an op-

are unable to fund the social programs and services of

the government, given their unwillingness to change their behavior.

Why not compete with them and fund alternatives, building pressure on them

them

if

to adjust their behavior

and credo but also an alternative to

they don't? Truth be told, such an alternative

of state building for the future, even

if

Hamas

is

is

necessary as part

prepared to modify

its

purposes and objectives.

The

administration needs to spearhead this effort, using the Quartet,

using the monies the Congress has appropriated for assistance to the Palestinians but frozen, and launching a

Arab

oil states to

new

effort to try to mobilize the

help fund such an approach. Interestingly, whatever re-

277

STATECRAFT Gulf may have

Hamas, there

ligious attachments

some

understanding that

Hamas makes confrontation, not

more

likely

—and

in the

to

is

a clear

conflict resolution,

the Saudis and others are not interested in seeing in-

creased confrontation or in seeing such confrontation promote Iranian purposes. As

we need

will explain below,

I

perception of

Hamas being an

Saudis to help fund and therefore least create incentives for

Hamas

to take advantage of the Saudi

Iranian instrument to

empower an

work with the

alternative to

Hamas

or at

to change.

The task is not a simple one. It requires very active engagement with members of the Quartet to be sure they remain on board; it requires active public diplomacy to frame what we are doing to help Palestinians even as Hamas leaves us no choice but not to deal with them; it other

requires an active negotiating effort with the

support; and

it

to develop specific projects they

urgency

Gulf

states to gain their

requires a hands-on effort with Palestinians, pushing

to get the

can act on and engaging with

them

a sense

of

NGOs up and running.

But the more active and visible we are in providing more assistance to the Palestinians (and in

credibility to to

Hamas

all

if it

of our

some

efforts,

cases investment), the

to the Islamists,

Dawa

alternatives to Islamists. It needs to

Muslim world more

I

its

behavior and credo.

and principles for settling the

the act of creating an alternative

with the Lebanese (and, as

is

conflict.

part of a strategy for fostering

be done with the Palestinians and

At

this juncture, there

may be

opportunity to generate the monies and support for doing

The war

in

Lebanon

in

Clearly

note in the next chapter, throughout the

generally).

the war, and throughout

will give

it

including the promotion of alternatives

continues to resist adjusting

Forge alternatives

more

a strategic

so.

7006 revealed the opening. At the outset of

its first

week, Saudi Arabia and the Egyptians,

members of the Gulf Cooperation Council provoking the war. The Saudis led the way,

Jordanians, Moroccans, and criticized Hizbollah for

charging that Hizbollah was not engaging in "resistance"

(a

hallowed

concept in the Arab world); instead the Saudis accused Hizbollah of "rash adventurism." this

It

was not only unprecedented for the Saudis to do

but also completely out of character, especially at a time

Hizbollah was fighting

Israel.

Why would they have

In a word, the reason was Iran.

The

278

when

acted in this way?

Saudis saw the Iranian hand in

The Israeli-Palestinian

Conflict

the Hizbollah attack. Shortly before the Hizbollah attack across the bor-

Hamas

der, the

leadership based in

Damascus and

also heavily tied to

which an

Iran was responsible for an attack across the Israeli border in Israeli soldier

Mazen and to a unity

was kidnapped

Hamas

the

— and

that attack

came

leadership in the territories

at a

time

agreement on terms that the Saudis favored. What the Saudis

perceived was that Hizbollah and nians, threatening to

make

evocative in the region

—

Hamas were

acting as tools of the Ira-

the Israel and Palestine issues

threat:

on the Arab

—

the most

ones that Iran could manipulate. For the Saudis,

few developments would be more ominous or constitute found

when Abu

had appeared close

a

more pro-

an emboldened Iran capable of mobilizing great passions

"street"

through the manipulation of these, the most sym-

bolic issues of grievance.

While the

situation was sufficiently real to get the Saudis to act out of

character and criticize Hizbollah publicly and in the Arab League, there

should also have been no

Lebanon and

its

illusions.

infrastructure

The

longer the Israeli bombing of

went on and the longer Arab publics

in

the Middle East were subjected to the images on satellite television of the suffering of Lebanese civilians as a result, the less the Saudis

would

keep the focus on Hizbollah and the more they would retreat in the face of an emotional backlash throughout the region.

by the Saudi criticism was interest

real

between the United

and reflected

States, Israel,

The opening provided

a strategic

and

a significant part

Arab Sunni leaderships. But the opening was bound and an absence of U.S. statecraft contributed to

What should have been done? The Bush

convergence of

to be short-lived,

its loss.

administration had to seize

the opening by mediating between Israel and Saudi Arabia. countries had the

reasons of

same

Lebanon and

of the

The two

interest of wanting Hizbollah to lose, both for for their

mutual desire

to

produce

a setback for

The administration should have gone to the Saudis immediately and said, we will act with the Israelis to stop their attacks, or at least shape

Iran.

them

so they

fit

a

more

strategic political

outcome

in

Lebanon,

if

you

put together an Arab political plan that gives cover to the Lebanese gov-

ernment first

to act

and

if you

move

swiftly to

implement it. Recall

that in the

days of the conflict, Hizbollah was on the defensive in Lebanon for

having provoked a war without any consideration for the country, and the Lebanese prime minister called for an Arab plan

279

—an unmistakable

STATECRAFT signal that he

was seeking an Arab cover to extend the authority of the

Lebanese government

at Hizbollah's

expense. With such a plan in hand

and the readiness to move quickly to act on then have gone to the

Israelis,

the administration should

it,

who would have

declared that they would

stop the bombing if the x\rab plan were implemented with international

The

forces.

Israeli

bombing gave them something to trade

time

at a

Hizbollah was turned into a hero in the Arab and Islamic world

gave the Saudis and others additional leverage to

call for

before

—and

the immediate

implementation of their plan.

As

have said so often, statecraft

I

counter threats;

when they

ings

it is

also

not just using the tools available to

is

having the wit and the wisdom to recognize open-

are there,

knowing where your leverage

is

to act

on those

openings, and then doing so quickly. In the case of Lebanon, the open-

may have been lost during the war, but the strategic reality

7

ing

of the Saudi

interest in seeing Iran contained has not disappeared.

The

now

trick

policies that

is

would

bolster

natives to Hizbollah

on the

to act

strategic reality

Lebanese and Palestinian moderates

and Hamas. The Saudis have an interest

Hizbollah weakened in Lebanon and contained. in seeing

ened liver

at

and translate

Abu Mazen and

it

into

as alter-

in seeing

They also have an interest

the noncorrupt elements of Fatah strength-

the expense of Hamas. Helping both

by providing massive funds for

social

Abu Mazen and

Fatah de-

and economic projects and

building the security capabilities of non-Hamas security forces

is

for

some-

thing that the Saudis and other oil-rich states of the Gulf Cooperation

Council could do. Oil prices were roughly twenty-seven dollars a barrel in 2003, rel,

and even

they have

if

still

no longer

at their

peak of nearly eighty dollars

more than doubled. The Saudis and

their

a bar-

Gulf part-

much more money than Iran, and have a who can limit the instrumentalities of Iran's

ners are awash in cash, have

reason to help bolster those strategy in the region now.

The Gulf states may bilize

them

to act,

moCon-

recognize their interests, but someone has to

and sustain their support. Secretary of State

doleezza Rice recognizes that something has changed in the region. While I

see a strategic opening with the Saudis, other

all

viewing Iran

haps

at

as a threat,

she

is

one point it could become

calling

it

leaders,

and

Israelis

a strategic "realignment." Per-

a realignment.

80

Arab

But for that to be the

case,

The it

must be expressed

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

in actual

behaviors and not only in words. Private ex-

mean

pressions of interest or threat perception

come

aligned

— and we

In the Saudi case,

will

we

policies don't be-

little if

have to painstakingly gruide such

are talking about a

tremendous

a process.

leap. It

won't

simply happen.

We

assuring and

times pressuring them to stay the course. For the Saudis,

at

will

need

to

work with them even* step of the way,

the temptation at certain points

buy

trving to

And. with the

we may

may

be to

fall

re-

back on their instinct of

Hamas or Hizbollah or to accommodate the Iranians. Mecca deal and Saudi discussions with Iran over Lebanon, off

already be seeing such signs.

For the Saudis not to hedge their bets or play

double game, they

a

will

have to see our staying power. Moreover, their readiness to work

out

a

coordinated approach

in

which we and they

strengthen the alternatives to Hizbollah and

by whether they believe the United States

is

act in parallel to

Hamas may be

influenced

willing to act practically,

not just rhetorically on the Palestinian problem.

While the Saudis may now be prepared

to

back

confrontational policy toward Hamas, this will

reason I

I

suggested

a cease-rire

do not believe Abu Mazen

is

a

still

more need

option to restore calm likely to confront

assertive or

even

to be tested.

The

is

largely because

Hamas. But there could

be an alternative he might back. While the cease-tire approach inevitably brings Fatah and

Hamas

together,

Abu Mazen could conceivably em-

brace an alternative designed to clarify the Palestinian political situation

and show that Hamas does not represent what most Palestinians want.

He

could

call for a

referendum (more legislative

national referendum. stark

He

and clarifying than

and presidential elections)

people on record for peace, provide

is

a

could declare that such his

needed

mandate

previous to

call for

a

new

put the Palestinian

for negotiating

on the

core issues of Jerusalem, refugees, and borders, and allow the international

community*

to

end their embargo on assistance

to the Palestinian

Authority.

The referendum would you support tinian

ask for a simple yes or no on two questions:

a two-state solution?

government

Do you

Do

support empowering the Pales-

to negotiate with Israel to achieve that

outcome?

Hamas would oppose any such referendum for two reasons. First, Hamas leaders are not interested in being exposed as outside of the

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