State Responses To Nuclear Proliferation: The Differential Effects Of Threat Perception [1st Edition] 3030598004, 9783030598006, 9783030598013

Table of contents :
Acknowledgments......Page 7
About This Book......Page 11
Contents......Page 15
About the Author......Page 18
Abbreviations and Acronyms......Page 19
List of Figures......Page 21
List of Tables......Page 22
List of Maps......Page 24
Central Personalities......Page 25
1 Introduction......Page 42
Statement of the Problem......Page 47
Purpose of the Book......Page 49
Conceptual Underpinnings for the Study......Page 50
Limitations and Assumptions......Page 57
Power Projection Disparities......Page 58
Data Analysis......Page 60
The Differential Effects of Threat Perception......Page 63
Summary......Page 65
2 Literature Review......Page 67
Background......Page 68
Deterrence Theory......Page 70
The Spread of Nuclear Weapons......Page 73
Nuclear Motivations......Page 78
Proliferation Optimism and Proliferation Pessimism......Page 87
The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation......Page 91
Political Psychology......Page 93
Summary......Page 104
3 Cognitive Psychological Influences......Page 106
Cognitive Psychological Influences......Page 107
Historical Tragedy and Perceptions of Threat......Page 109
Israel—Historical Tragedy and  Perceptions of Threat......Page 111
Historical Analogies......Page 114
Adversarial Rhetoric......Page 116
Fixed Analogy......Page 118
The United States—Historical Tragedy and Perceptions of Threat......Page 120
Historical Analogies......Page 121
Adversarial Rhetoric......Page 124
Fixed Analogy......Page 126
History of Conflict......Page 127
Israel and Iraq......Page 130
Israel and Hezbollah and Hamas......Page 131
Israel and Syria......Page 133
Israel and Iran......Page 134
The Regional Hegemon......Page 140
The United States and Iraq......Page 142
The United States and Syria......Page 147
The United States and Iran......Page 149
Summary......Page 154
Israel—National Security Policy......Page 156
Foreign Policy Decisions......Page 160
The United States—National Security Policy......Page 161
The Truman and Eisenhower Administrations......Page 166
The Kennedy and Nixon Administrations......Page 167
The Reagan Administration......Page 168
The George H.W. Bush Administration......Page 170
The Clinton Administration......Page 171
The George W. Bush Administration......Page 172
The Obama Administration......Page 174
Nuclear Policy......Page 178
The United States—Nuclear Policy......Page 179
Summary......Page 183
5 Military Doctrine and Power Projection......Page 184
Israel—Military Doctrine......Page 185
The United States—Military Doctrine......Page 187
The Reagan Administration......Page 188
The Powell Doctrine......Page 190
The Bush Administration......Page 191
The Obama Administration......Page 192
Power Projection Capability—Airpower......Page 193
Israel—Power Projection Capability—Airpower......Page 196
The United States—Power Projection Capability—Airpower......Page 198
Summary......Page 205
6 The Middle East States and Threat Perceptions......Page 206
The United States and Israel—National Security Relationship......Page 210
The Israel Lobby......Page 215
Evangelical Christian Support for Israel......Page 220
Iraq—National Security and Threat Perceptions......Page 223
Syria—National Security and Threat Perceptions......Page 231
Iran—National Security and Threat Perceptions......Page 238
Summary......Page 254
7 Analysis of Data......Page 256
Heuristic for Threat Assessment Privileging Identity......Page 258
Heuristic for the Proliferation Response......Page 259
Iraq Case Study—1981......Page 260
Israel and the Raid on Osirak......Page 271
Iraq Case Study—2003......Page 273
The United States and the Iraq War......Page 289
Syria Case Study—2007......Page 290
Israel and the Raid on Al-Kibar......Page 299
Iran Case Study—2015......Page 301
The United States and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)......Page 317
8 Conclusion......Page 328
Implications......Page 334
Recommendations for Further Study......Page 336
Appendix A: Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)......Page 338
Article II......Page 339
Article IV......Page 340
Article VII......Page 341
Article IX......Page 342
Article XI......Page 343
Iraq......Page 344
Iran......Page 345
Syria......Page 347
Appendix C: Select U.S. Nuclear Proliferation-Related Legislation......Page 348
Appendix D: Chronology of Significant Middle East Events......Page 350
Glossary......Page 368
Bibliography......Page 391
Index......Page 428

Citation preview

State Responses to Nuclear Proliferation The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Brian K. Chappell

State Responses to Nuclear Proliferation

Brian K. Chappell

State Responses to Nuclear Proliferation The Differential Effects of Threat Perception

Brian K. Chappell Washington, DC, USA

ISBN 978-3-030-59800-6 ISBN 978-3-030-59801-3 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59801-3

(eBook)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © Alex Linch shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy and position of the Department of Defense, its Components, or the U.S. government. The public release clearance of this publication by the Department of Defense does not imply Department of Defense endorsement or factual accuracy of the material.

For the ancestors who endured and sacrificed everything to survive. Your dreams live. For Amir Pasha To my mother Jan and Grandmother Olivia

Acknowledgments

This book has been a goal since I was a student at the University of Michigan, and a work in progress since I began my doctoral work at Catholic University. After years of contemplation and revision, I now share it with you. To my inspiration, Amir Chappell, who consistently asks, “Daddy, why do you have so many books?” You will soon discover a world many can only imagine. I hope our trips to the bookstore and nightly readings planted a seed in you. I look forward to your growth and our lifelong discussions as you begin your journey. Behold, the only thing greater than yourself. To my mother, Jan Chappell, whose love was the spark that lit the fire. She skillfully guided me into a world that had only existed in our dreams. Her vision lit the path that became my reality. I can only hope that I have made her proud. I am immensely grateful to the Chappell family for their unconditional love and unwavering support. Thank you: Beverly Chappell, Gwen Chappell, Debra Chappell McIntosh, Camille Chappell Johnson, Kathy Chappell, Veronica Chappelle McCullough, Annette Chappell, Robert Reed, Rodney Reed, Brandon Chappell, Darren Chappell, Christian Chappell, Cedric Boswell, Rashid Johnson, Amirah Johnson, Larry Breland, Harold Tillman, Trevor Ruffin, Dayan Ruffin, Korey and Kristen McCullough, and Aisha Ruffin Atkins. Kim James Haygood and Tonya James, your humor and encouragement made this process a bit less stressful. I am thankful for both of you. Rosalind Boswell, thank you for always believing in me. You are the light that has shined brightly since my childhood. I owe immense gratitude and loving admiration to my grandmother Olivia Chappell, who truly understood the value and power of education because a segregated public school system limited her educational opportunities. Her century of wisdom is my guide. One professor played a critical role in my academic career and in the evolution of this book. Dr. Phil Henderson was my graduate school mentor, and I owe him tremendous gratitude for the years of friendship and guidance he provided. Phil never missed an opportunity to remind me that I needed to write this book. Most graciously, he was there every step of the way: graduate school lectures, honor society initiation, promotion ceremony, colloquium, comprehensive exams,

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dissertation proposal, dissertation committee, dissertation defense, graduations, and manuscript development. His generosity and dedication made all the difference. Every student should be so fortunate. Dr. Andrew Yeo served on my dissertation committee where his edits and reccomendations had a surgeon’s precision. I am grateful for the critical thought and academic rigor he added to my dissertation. Dr. Yeo’s knowledge and inputs made this a much better book. Dr. Willard Hardman, the “Vilnius Schoolmaster,” was crucial in advancing my line of critical thought. I credit him for guiding me to probe beyond politics and towards culture and political psychology because, as he famously stated, “There is never, ever, a single cause for war.” In memory of Dr. Wallace Thies, a true scholar and national security expert who chaired my dissertation committee. Wally was tough and often tested my knowledge and grasp of the literature, but he made me a better scholar and for that, I am thankful. He was a major influence in shaping my academic thought, and I am forever grateful for his brilliance and dedication to his profession. Wally helped make my vision a reality. Sadly, Professor Thies passed away while I was editing this book. This book involved the input and influence of many people to whom I am enormously grateful. Natasha, I am immensely thankful for your Iranian cultural expertise, Farsi translations, religious insight, and support. Your inputs and knowledge were invaluable to my research and the finished project. Thank you for answering all my random questions and helping me better understand the literature, history, and the culture. Yeki bood, yeki nabood. To the original Ph.D., Dr. Lucy Belle Lang-Chappell, thank you for blazing the path for me to follow. You will always be my favorite person in charge. Dr. Kahlil Johnson, thank you for the psychiatric and psychological perspectives, and for being a calming voice during the storm. Your wise counsel and reassurances played a pivotal role during the writing of my manuscript. Our conversations were a welcomed break from the madness. Stephan Pietszak, from day one we dreamt and encouraged one another to succeed. Despite the challenges and words of those who doubted us, we kept our heads when others lost theirs. Thank you, Brother. I owe a special thank you to Mohammed and Bonnie for their kindness and hospitality. They graciously shared their knowledge, and I am thankful for our Iranian history, political, and cultural discussions over chai, sharbat, and baghali polo. Tianna Johnson, thank you so much for the positive energy and reassuring encouragement. Alex Obaitan and Desiree Woodard, your support and encouragement were much-needed and welcomed voices. I extend a special thank you to Karyn Temple for the intellectual discussions, encouragement, and legal perspectives. I am indebted to Dr. Nesha Z. Haniff, who is one of my former professors at the University of Michigan. Dr. Haniff was the first person I met who had written a book. I thank her for inspiring me to learn about the African Diaspora and encouraging me to write a book of my own. I owe a special debt of gratitude to the early mentors who helped point me in

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the right direction: David Costa, Tony Grant, Phil Maddox, and William “Big Bill” Page. There are so many special people who encouraged me along the way, these are but a few: Keith Borden, Clifford Boswell, Richard Bramlett, Erica Chappell, Lamont Coleman, Erika Crawford, Ronnie Doaks, Helen Dye, Willie Hall, Ty Haygood, Bev Heck, Mary and Michael Henderson, Elliott Hogans, Jan Jett, Katie Johnson, Valerie Kiley, Pat Lavender, Dawn Lowe, Mike “Brother Black” Madison, Carl McIntosh, Nancy Monday, Tytonia Moore, Ken Moss, Susan Motley, Melvin Pree, Steve Rose, Dharamraj Singh, Mildred and Fred Stringer, Staci Stringer, Anna Trotter, Sara Underwood, Bobby Vinson, Scott Whalen, Francheska Wilson, and Esther Wise. I owe special recognition to my colleagues from the nuclear enterprise: Roosevelt “Ted” Mercer, Anthony Goins, Todd Kaegi, Andrew Kovich, James Bailey, and Billy Wade. I would be remiss if I did not recognize my Brothers from Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, Incorporated: Michael Tillman, Reginald Hampton, John Beardsley, Kameron McCullough, Larry Breland II, Freddie Knight, Jeff Williams, Darryl Mitchell, and Darryl Marshall. To my favorite teacher, Otto Zillgitt, who inspired me during my early years, when I needed it most. Otto was the teacher who made a difference. I am eternally grateful for our friendship and for his continued mentoring. I also owe special recognition to “Big Brian” Johnson for his unrelenting question, “Man, when are you going to finish that damn book?” I am grateful to the colleagues who contributed their time and expertise to help improve the quality of this book. Our conversations helped shape many of the insights contained in these pages. Dr. Seyyid Mohiaddin Mesbahi, your mentoring and insight on Iran and Islam were immensely helpful to my research and provided me a greater understanding of the region and its complexities. I am forever grateful for both your wisdom and your willingness to share your thoughts. Ilan Goldenberg, I am extremely appreciative of your knowledge and perspectives on Israel and the Holocaust. Thank you for helping me add depth and context to the discussion. Dr. Tiana Jackson, thank you for being the sounding board for an assortment of thoughts and for helping me to organize my ideas to make this a better book than it otherwise would be. Dr. Keita Franklin, thank you for the scholarly feedback and positive peer pressure. Dr. Andrew Radin, I am thankful for our discussions on Israel and for your publishing advice. Dr. Hasan Javadi, I enjoyed our talks and your lectures on Middle Eastern politics and Iranian history. I am also grateful to the intrepid Phil Caruso who gratiously gave of his time to add subject matter expertise and vision to the manuscript by proofing my chapters and adding critical thought to the national security discussion. Phil made astute observations about both structure and chapter content. Dean Fischer, I thank you for your insight and for our discussions on Israel and the Holocaust. Dr. Hassan Abbas, I am grateful for you sharing your Pakistan expertise and intricate knowledge of the region. Maaza Mengiste, your literary journey is an inspiration. You inspired me to put my thoughts on paper and to paint my words with colors. Thank you for setting

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the bar so incredibly high. For anyone I may have missed, please forgive my oversight. In honor of Billy and Roy Chappell, and Fred James Sr., the architects who built the foundation. and In memoriam Morgan Chappell, Stephen Cruise, Eliza Jefferson Thomas, Austin Chappell, Susie Cruise, Emma Foster, Edith Mills Walker, Noah Fairley, Clementine Breland, Linold Chappell, Flora Evans Chappell, William “Billy” Chappell, Fred James, Sr., Winnie R. James, Roy M. Chappell, Emma Matthews, Clarence Matthews, Annabelle Whaley, William Gregory Chappell, Todd O. Chappell, Edward Darin Chappell, Jamesenna Tillman, Chauncey O. Reed, Flossie Chappelle, and Jason James. They have never left me, even though they are gone. Washington, D.C. December 2020

Brian K. Chappell, Ph.D.

About This Book

Contemporary fears of rogue state nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism pose unique challenges for the global community. North Korea continues to defy international norms over its nuclear testing and ballistic missile launches, the India– Pakistan rivalry stokes concerns that their continued hostilities could spiral out of control and lead to a nuclear exchange, and Iran continues to challenge the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by enriching uranium beyond levels required for civilian use, hinting at a military component of its nuclear activities. Furthering these concerns are worries that a terrorist organization could acquire an inadequately secured nuclear device and detonate it in a populated area. Adding to this conundrum is the continued fear of the illicit trafficking in nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology, and the sharing of this technical expertise with nations of concern. Highlighting the importance of these issues, President Barack Obama stated, “For the first time, preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism are now at the top of America’s nuclear agenda.” Within this anarchic international system of potential shifts in the distribution of power, the United States has consistently stated its opposition to the further spread of nuclear weapons. Yet, while having the global-reaching military power to attack and disrupt the nuclear programs of all states of concern in their nascent stages, with the exception of Iraq in 2003, the United States bypassed military strikes and selected coercive diplomacy and economic sanctions as the mechanisms to address each state’s nuclear program. These non-kinetic actions ultimately failed to disrupt the targeted programs, and North Korea, India, and Pakistan crossed the nuclear threshold and became nuclear powers. In the contemporary case of Iran, the United States has used a combination of diplomacy, sanctions, suspected cyberattacks, and a nuclear agreement to impede Tehran’s nuclear program. Despite warnings from the United States and Israel, Iran continues to enrich uranium, which it states is for peaceful civilian-use purposes, and thus permitted by Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

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These contemporary cases illustrate the challenges additional proliferation poses to powerful states that wish to preserve the current power structure and prevent the rise of adversarial states whose behavior and policies already stress regional stability and challenge the existing power status quo. Saira Khan argues the relationship between these regional challenging states and the powerful state is highly politicized and deeply adversarial because a regional state that is supposed to bandwagon with the global power is, instead, challenging and competing against it. Thus, the global power singles out these rising states as the most salient threat and identifies them as rogue states or states of concern, and consequently develops security policies to address them as threats. These states are not threats in the traditional sense that they are able to militarily defeat or conquer the global power. They are perceived as threats because the global power deems they can disrupt regional and global stability. In these scenarios, the global power tends to miscalculate the intent and capability of the weaker state.1 Even though halting the further spread of nuclear weapons is at the forefront of American foreign policy, surprisingly, very little scholarship is devoted to examining why a powerful state, such as the United States, will use force against one state, but pursue diplomacy with another state to impede the progress of their nuclear programs. Understanding the causal mechanisms for these variations in state responses to nuclear proliferation is critical to determining the influences that contribute to a state’s threat perceptions and its proliferation response. Perhaps no other region is a better testbed for this examination than the Middle East, due to its history of conflict, nuclear proliferation, and preventive strikes. The United States and Israel are the two most vocal opponents of further nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Even so, historically, they have responded differently to the same proliferation cases. In the past forty years, there were four cases where three Middle East states were suspected of reaching significant milestones toward acquiring a nuclear weapon. In three of the four cases, either the United States or Israel used military force against the country suspected of proliferation—Iraq in 1981, Iraq in 2003, and Syria in 2007—while the other state either took no action or used coercive diplomacy as a proliferation response. In the fourth case of Iran in 2015, the United States brokered an internationally negotiated nuclear settlement— the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—while Israel criticized the deal and threatened to take unilateral military action to halt Tehran’s continued uranium enrichment. The existing literature does not provide a rigorous examination of these inconsistencies nor does it thoroughly discuss the motivations and psychological influences that shape a state’s threat perceptions and proliferation responses. The literature also fails to suggest a point at which a powerful state transitions from diplomacy to the use of force to address an opposing state’s nuclear ambitions. This is of particular importance as it pertains to rogue states because conventional wisdom argues that once a state acquires a nuclear weapon, it has a deterrent 1

Saira Khan, Iran and Nuclear Weapons: Protracted Conflict and Proliferation (New York: Routledge, 2011), 33.

About This Book

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capability and is able to establish redlines designed to prevent the overthrow of its current government and the destruction of the state. This book offers a unique approach to understanding the dilemma of why powerful states respond differently to similar cases of nuclear proliferation by examining the United States and Israel’s responses to the four most advanced cases of proliferation by Middle East states to determine whether and how their differing situations influenced their threat perceptions and responses to proliferation. The author argues cognitive psychological influences, including the trauma derived from national tragedies like the September 11th attacks and the Holocaust, and a history of armed conflict increases the threat perceptions of a powerful state’s foreign policydecision-makers when confronting a state seeking to challenge an existing power structure by acquiring a nuclear weapon. The study suggests these variations are caused by the state decision-makers’ differing perceptions of the threat posed by proliferation. The intensity of these threat perceptions is influenced by cognitive phenomena that ultimately shape the state’s foreign policydecision-making process. The research suggests variations in the intensity of a perceived threat will strongly influence the powerful state’s proliferation response. Lower perceptions of a threat will lead to either no action or the use of coercive diplomacy, while higher threat perceptions will lead to the use of military force. The study offers insight into improving approaches to contemporary nuclear proliferation by providing a more robust understanding of how threat perceptions influence a powerful state’s proliferation response. Determining why two powerful states with similarly aligned proliferation policies perceive and respond differently to the same proliferation case is essential to forecasting future responses to horizontal proliferation. The research examines the extent to which U.S. support of Iraq during the Iran– Iraq War may have lessened the United States’ perception of the threat posed by Iraqi proliferation in 1981. Concurrently, it examines the proposition that Israel’s sensitivity to a prospective nuclear-armed Iraq intensified its sense of urgency, resulting in the use of military force to halt Iraqi proliferation. The study attempts to answer the question of why there were two markedly different responses to Iraqi proliferation by two close allies. Relatedly, this study provides a better explanation for the United States’ preventive war with Iraq in 2003 by illustrating how subjective threat perceptions, political motivations, and misleading intelligence led to an exaggerated threat and, ultimately, a severely flawed rationale for war, which continues to influence the credibility and scope of U.S. proliferation responses. This study also examines why Israel deferred to the United States in dealing with Iraq in 2003. Specifically, the book explores the impact of how U.S. security guarantees and the perception that Iraq no longer posed a threat after the 1991 Iraq War helped shape Israeli deference to U.S. policy. The study also examines Israel’s 2007 strike against Syria’s al-Kibar nuclear reactor and assesses the Bush administration’s consultation with the Israelis before the attack. Lastly, the research seeks to explain why the United States pursued coercive diplomacy with Iran, which culminated in the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also called the Iran Nuclear Deal, by demonstrating the Obamaadministration’s preference for

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diplomacy and its opposition to the Bush administration’s use of force in Iraq influenced its proliferation policies with Iran. Finally, the study assesses the argument that Israel pursued a hard-line approach with Iran because it perceived a nuclear-armed Iran would challenge Israel’s regional dominance, disrupt regional stability, and provide a nuclear umbrella for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards-Quds Force and Iran-affiliated proxies throughout the region, as well as the potential that a nuclear Iran would spark a regional nuclear arms race. By providing a better understanding of how threat perceptions influence state policy responses, the book offers insight for improving approaches to contemporary nuclear state proliferation.

Contents

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2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Deterrence Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Spread of Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nuclear Motivations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Proliferation Optimism and Proliferation Pessimism The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation . . . Political Psychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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27 28 30 33 38 47 51 53 64

3 Cognitive Psychological Influences . . . . . . . . . . . . Cognitive Psychological Influences . . . . . . . . . . . . . Historical Tragedy and Perceptions of Threat . . . . . . Israel—Historical Tragedy and Perceptions of Threat Historical Analogies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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67 68 70 72 75

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Statement of the Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Purpose of the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Use of Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conceptual Underpinnings for the Study . . . Research Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Research Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Scope of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Limitations and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . Power Projection Disparities . . . . . . . . . . Interdependence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Data Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Adversarial Rhetoric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fixed Analogy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The United States—Historical Tragedy and Perceptions of Threat Historical Analogies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Adversarial Rhetoric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fixed Analogy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . History of Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Israel—History of Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Israel and Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Israel and Hezbollah and Hamas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Israel and Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Israel and Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Regional Hegemon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The United States—History of Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The United States and Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The United States and Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The United States and Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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77 79 81 82 85 87 88 91 91 92 94 95 101 103 103 108 110 115

4 National Security Policy and Nuclear Policy . Israel—National Security Policy . . . . . . . . . . . Foreign Policy Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The United States—National Security Policy . . The Truman and Eisenhower Administrations . . The Kennedy and Nixon Administrations . . . . . The Carter Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Reagan Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The George H.W. Bush Administration . . . . . . The Clinton Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The George W. Bush Administration . . . . . . . . The Obama Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nuclear Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The United States—Nuclear Policy . . . . . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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117 117 121 122 127 128 129 129 131 132 133 135 139 140 144

5 Military Doctrine and Power Projection . Israel—Military Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . The United States—Military Doctrine . . . . The Reagan Administration . . . . . . . . . . The Powell Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Bush Administration . . . . . . . . . . . The Obama Administration . . . . . . . . . . Power Projection Capability—Airpower . . .

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145 146 148 149 151 152 153 154

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Contents

xix

Israel—Power Projection Capability—Airpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 The United States—Power Projection Capability—Airpower . . . . . . . . . 159 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 6 The Middle East States and Threat Perceptions . . . . . . . . The United States and Israel—National Security Relationship The Israel Lobby . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Evangelical Christian Support for Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Iraq—National Security and Threat Perceptions . . . . . . . . . . Syria—National Security and Threat Perceptions . . . . . . . . . Iran—National Security and Threat Perceptions . . . . . . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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167 171 176 181 184 192 199 215

7 Analysis of Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Heuristic for Threat Assessment Privileging Identity . . . Heuristic for the Proliferation Response . . . . . . . . . . . . Iraq Case Study—1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Israel and the Raid on Osirak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Iraq Case Study—2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The United States and the Iraq War . . . . . . . . . . . . . Syria Case Study—2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Israel and the Raid on Al-Kibar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Iran Case Study—2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The United States and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289 Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295 Recommendations for Further Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297 Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299 Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391

About the Author

Brian K. Chappell, Ph.D. served twenty-eight years in the United States Air Force and is a veteran of the Afghanistan War (Operation Enduring Freedom). He is a career Nuclear and Missile Operations Officer with over twenty years of international engagement and national security policy experience. Brian has served as a Middle East Policy Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs, a South Asia Policy Senior Advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and as a Senior Advisor for Defense Governance to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Dr. Chappell holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, a Master of Science in Administration from Central Michigan University, a Master of Arts in International Affairs from Catholic University, a Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence from the National Intelligence University, and a Doctor of Philosophy in World Politics from Catholic University. He has traveled extensively throughout Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, and has conducted cultural research in Afghanistan, Botswana, Ethiopia, and Iraq. Dr. Brian K. Chappell is a member of Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity and lives in the Washington D.C. metro area.

xxi

Abbreviations and Acronyms

A2/AD ALCM APNSA CIA CJCS DIA DOD EMP EPW FARP FPDM FTO GBSD GWOT HEU HGV HVPW IAEA IAF ICBM IDF IRBM IRGC IRGC-QF ISIS JCPOA KT LEU LOC LYNW

Anti-Access/Area Denial Air Launched Cruise Missile Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Central Intelligence Agency Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Defense Intelligence Agency Department of Defense Electromagnetic Pulse Earth Penetrating Weapon Forward Arming and Refueling Point Foreign Policy Decision-Making Foreign Terrorist Organization Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent Global War on Terrorism High Enriched Uranium Hypersonic Glide Vehicle High Velocity Penetrating Weapon International Atomic Energy Agency Israeli Air Force Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (3100+ mile range) Israel Defense Force Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (1860–3100 mile range) Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (Daesh) Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (The Iran Nuclear Deal) Kiloton (Nuclear Yield Measurement) Low Enriched Uranium Line of Control Low Yield Nuclear Weapons

xxiii

xxiv

MAD MIRV MRBM MT NATO NC2 NDS NIE NMS NPR NPT NSC NSG NSS NUDET NWFZ NWS OCA PU QME SAM SIGINT SLBM SLV SRBM SSBN START U UN UNSC USAF USN WMD

Abbreviations and Acronyms

Mutually Assured Destruction Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle Medium Range Ballistic Missile (620–1860 mile range) Megaton (Nuclear Yield Measurement) North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nuclear Command and Control National Defense Strategy National Intelligence Estimate National Military Strategy Nuclear Posture Review Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty National Security Council Nuclear Suppliers Group National Security Strategy Nuclear Detonation Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Nuclear Weapons State Offensive Counter Air Plutonium Qualitative Military Edge Surface to Air Missile Signals Intelligence Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile Space Launch Vehicle Short Range Ballistic Missile (40–620 mile range) Subsurface Ballistic Nuclear (Submarine/Boomer) Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty Uranium United Nations United Nations Security Council United States Air Force United States Navy Weapons of Mass Destruction

List of Figures

Fig. 6.1 Fig. 7.1

Fig. 7.2

U.S. military aid to Israel over decades (Sharp, “U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel,” 7) (Source CRS Graphics) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 Heuristic for Threat Assessment Privileging Identity (Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero, “Identity, Power and Threat Perception,” 760) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218 Heuristic for the Proliferation Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218

xxv

List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 2.2 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table Table Table Table Table

4.3 5.1 5.2 7.1 7.2

Table 7.3 Table 7.4 Table 7.5 Table 7.6 Table 7.7

Table 7.8 Table 7.9 Table 7.10

Nuclear weapons states, 1945–2019 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Defining Tenets of Neorealism and Foreign Policy Decision-Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Total U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East, 1950–1970 (loans and grants; current year $ in millions) . . . Total U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East, 1971–2001 (loans and grants; current year $ in millions) . . . U.S. strategic nuclear forces under new START . . . . . . . . . Air Combat Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fighter Generations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Heuristic Question Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory vs The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Threat Assessment Forecasts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast—Iraq 1981 . . . . . . . . The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast—Israel and Iraq 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory— Proliferation Response Forecast—Israel and Iraq 1981. . . . . The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast—The United States and Iraq 1981 . . . The Differential Effect of Threat Perception Theory—Proliferation Response Forecast—The United States and Iraq 1981. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast—Iraq 2003 . . . . . . . . The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast—Israel and Iraq 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Proliferation Response—Israel and Iraq 2003 . . . .

..

34

..

58

. . 127 . . . . .

. . . . .

130 143 161 163 218

. . 219 . . 223 . . 226 . . 227 . . 230

. . 232 . . 236 . . 239 . . 240 xxvii

xxviii

Table 7.11 Table 7.12

Table 7.13 Table 7.14 Table 7.15 Table 7.16 Table 7.17

Table 7.18 Table 7.19 Table 7.20 Table 7.21 Table 7.22 Table 7.23 Table 7.24 Table 7.25 Table 7.26

Table 7.27

List of Tables

The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast—The United States and Iraq 2003 . . . The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Proliferation Response—The United States and Iraq 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast—Syria 2007 . . . . . . . The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast—Israel and Syria 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Proliferation Response—Israel and Syria 2007 . . . The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast—The United States and Syria 2007 . . The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Proliferation Response—The United States and Syria 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast—Iran 2015 . . . . . . . . The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast—Iran 2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory— Proliferation Response—The United States and Iran 2015 . . The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast—The United States and Iran 2015 . . . The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory— Proliferation Response—The United States and Iran 2015 . . Israel—Threat Perceptions of Nuclear Proliferation . . . . . . . The United States—Threat Perceptions of Nuclear Proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory (Kroenig)—Threat Assessment and Proliferation Response . The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory (Chappell)—Threat Assessment and Proliferation Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory vs The Differential Effects of Threat Perception – Actual Outcome Accuracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . 247

. . 249 . . 252 . . 256 . . 256 . . 258

. . 260 . . 269 . . 272 . . 274 . . 276 . . 277 . . 283 . . 283 . . 284

. . 284

. . 285

List of Maps

Map Map Map Map Map Map Map Map Map Map Map Map Map

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

The Middle East The Islamic Republic of Iran The Republic of Iraq The State of Israel The Syrian Arab Republic The Golan Heights Israeli Raid on Iraq’s Osirak Nuclear Reactor Nuclear Facility Strikes Attributed to Israel Previous Israeli Strikes and Iranian Nuclear Facilities Iranian Ballistic Missile Ranges Iran’s Major Nuclear Facilities Selected Iranian Ballistic Missiles Selected Iranian Partners, Proxies, and Affiliates

xxix

Central Personalities

Egypt Hassan al-Banna Gamal Abdel Nasser Sayyid Qutb Anwar Sadat

Founder of Muslim Brotherhood (Assassinated in 1949) President of Egypt, 1956–1970 Islamic fundamentalist scholar (Executed in 1966) President of Egypt, 1970–1981 (Assassinated in 1981)

India Homi J. Bhabha

Father of India’s nuclear program

Iran Fereydoon Abbasi Mojtaba Ahmadi Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Brig Gen Ali Reza Asgari Masoud Alimohammadi Shahram Amiri Akbar Etemad

Iranian nuclear scientist who survived an assassination IRGC cyberwarfare official (Assassinated in 2013) President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2005–2013 IRGC general who allegedly defected to the West in 2006 Iranian nuclear scientist (Assassinated in 2010) Nuclear scientist: defected/returned (Hanged in 2016) Father of Iran’s Nuclear Program

xxxi

xxxii

Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Brig Gen Esmail Ghaani Ardeshir Hosseinpour Maj Gen Mohammed Ali Jafari Mehdi Karroubi Ayatollah Ali Khamenei Mohammed Khatami Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini Massoud Ali Mohammadi Brig Gen Hassan T. Moghaddam Hossein Ali Montazeri Mohammed Mossadegh Seyyed Mir Hossein Mousavi Masud Naraghi Mohammed Reza Pahlavi Reza Shah Pahlavi Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani Darioush Rezaeinejad Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan Hassan Rouhani Major General Hossein Salami Ahmad Shah Majid Shahriari Major General Qassem Soleimani

Central Personalities

Leader of Iran’s nuclear program (Assassinated in 2020) Commander, IRGC-Quds Force, 2020-Present Iranian nuclear scientist died of asphyxia (Died in 2007) Commander, IRGC (Retired in 2019) Reformist Presidential Candidate (House arrest in 2011) Supreme Leader of Iran, 1989-Present President of Islamic Republic of Iran, 1997– 2005 Supreme Leader of Iran, 1979–1989 Iranian nuclear scientist (Assassinated in 2010) Head of Iran’s missile program (Assassinated in 2011) Grand Ayatollah; former designated successor to Khomeini Prime Minister of Iran, 1951–1953 (Overthrown in 1953) Prime Minister of Iran, 1981–1989 (House arrest in 2011) Nuclear scientist who defected to the United States Shah of Iran, 1941–1979 (Died in 1980) Shah of Iran, 1925–1941 (Died in 1944) President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1989–1997 Iranian nuclear physicist (Assassinated in 2011) Iranian nuclear scientist (Assassinated in 2012) President, Islamic Republic of Iran, 2013-Present Commander, IRGC, 2019-Present Final Ruler of the Qajar Dynasty, 1909–1925 Iranian nuclear scientist (Assassinated in 2010) Commander, IRGC-Quds Force (Killed in 2020)

Central Personalities

xxxiii

Iraq Faisal I Faisal II Ghazi I Saddam Hussein Jafar Dhia Jafar Yahya al-Meshad

King of Iraq, 1921–1933 King of Iraq, 1939–1958 (Executed in 1958) King of Iraq, 1933–1939 (Killed in 1939) President of Iraq, 1979–2003 (Executed in 2006) Father of Iraq’s nuclear program; Nuclear physicist Iraqi nuclear scientist (Assassinated in 1980)

Israel Ehud Barak Menachem Begin David Ben-Gurion Ernst David Bergmann Meir Dagan Golda Meir Benjamin Netanyahu Ehud Olmert Shimon Peres Tamir Pardo Yitzhak Rabin Ariel Sharon

Prime Minister of Israel, 1999–2001 Prime Minister of Israel, 1977–1983 Prime Minister of Israel, 1948–1954 Father of Israel’s nuclear program Director of Mossad, 2002–2010 Prime Minister of Israel, 1969–1974 Prime Minister of Israel, 1996–1999, 2009-Present Prime Minister of Israel, 2006–2009 Prime Minister of Israel, 1995–1996 Director of Mossad, 2011–2016 Prime Minister of Israel, 1992–1995 (Assassinated in 1995) Prime Minister of Israel, 2001–2006

Lebanon Bashir Gemayel Imad Mughniyeh Hassan Nasrallah

President-elect of Lebanon (Assassinated in 1982) Hezbollah senior commander (Assassinated in 2008) Secretary General of Hezbollah, 1992-Present

Libya Moammar Qaddafi

Leader of Libya, 1969–2011 (Executed in 2011)

xxxiv

Central Personalities

Non-state Actors Al Qaeda

Global terrorist network that conducted the September 11th attacks Iran-supported armed militia based in Lebanon Anti-Iran group; the United States designated it a terror group until 2012 Leader of Al-Qaeda, 1988–2011 (Killed in 2011) Leader of Al-Qaeda, 2011-Present

Hezbollah Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK) Osama bin Laden Ayman al-Zawahiri

North Korea Kim ll-sung Kim Jong-il Kim Jong-un Do Sang-rok

Supreme Leader of North Korea, 1948–1994 Supreme Leader of North Korea, 1994–2011 Supreme Leader of North Korea, 2011-Present Father of North Korea’s Nuclear Bomb

Pakistan Qamar Javed Bajwa Benazir Bhutto Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Abdul Qadeer (A.Q.) Khan

Chief of Army Staff (COAS), 2016-Present Prime Minister of Pakistan (Assassinated in 2007) Prime Minister of Pakistan (Hanged in 1979) Head of a nuclear technology black market ring

Palestine Mahmoud Abbas Yasser Arafat

President of Palestinian National Authority, 2005-Present President of Palestinian National Authority, 1994–2004

Saudi Arabia Salman bin Abdul Aziz Mohammed bin Nayef Mohammed bin Salman (MBS)

King of Saudi Arabia, 2015-Present Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, 2015–2017 Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, 2017-Present

Central Personalities

xxxv

Syria Bashar al-Assad Hafez al-Assad

President of Syria, 2000-Present President of Syria, 1971–2000

The United States Joe Biden George H.W. Bush George W. Bush Richard “Dick” Cheney Hillary Rodham Clinton William Jefferson Clinton Robert Gates General Curtis LeMay Barack Hussein Obama J. Robert Oppenheimer Colin L. Powell Ronald Reagan Condoleeza “Condi” Rice Susan E. Rice Donald Rumsfeld Caspar “Cap” Weinberger Paul Wolfowitz

Vice President of the United States, 2008–2016 President of the United States, 1988–1992 President of the United States, 2000–2008 Vice President of the United States, 2000–2008 Secretary of State, 2009–2013 President of the United States, 1992–2000 Secretary of Defense, 2006–2011 Commander, Strategic Air Command, 1948–1957 President of the United States, 2008–2016 Father of the Atomic Bomb, Director of the Manhattan Project Chairman, JCS, 1989–1993; Secretary of State, 2000– 2004 President of the United States, 1980–1988 APNSA, 2001–2005; Secretary of State, 2005–2008 US Ambassador to the UN, 2009–2013; APNSA 2013–2017 Secretary of Defense, 1975–1977, 2000–2006 Secretary of Defense, 1981–1987 Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2001–2005

Map 1 The Middle East (Source: Central Intelligence Agency2)

2

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/attachments/docs/original/ middle_east_phy.pdf?1555349777.

Map 2 The Islamic Republic of Iran (Source: Geography and Map Division, Library of Congress)

Map 3 The Republic of Iraq (Source: Central Intelligence Agency3)

3

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/cia-maps-publications/map-downloads/Iraq_ Physiography.jpg/image.jpg.

Map 4 The State of Israel (Source: Central Intelligence Agency4)

4

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/attachments/maps/IS-map. gif.

Map 5 The Syrian Arab Republic (Courtesy of the Central Intelligence Agency5)

5

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/cia-maps-publications/Syria.html.

Map 6 The Golan Heights (Source: Congressional Research Service6)

Jim Zanotti, “Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief,” Congressional Research Service (April 8, 2019), 7.

6

Map 7 Israeli Raid on Iraq’s Osirak Nuclear Reactor (Source: Reprint courtesy of Air Force Magazine/Map: Tsahi Ben-Ami)

Map 8 Nuclear Facility Strikes Attributed to Israel (Source: Courtesy of AFP)

Map 9 Previous Israeli Strikes and Iranian Nuclear Facilities (Source: Congressional Research Service7)

Jim Zanotti et al., “Israel: Possible Military Strikes Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities,” Congressional Research Service (September 28, 2012), 15.

7

Map 10 Iranian Ballistic Missile Ranges (Source: Defense Intelligence Agency8)

8

Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran Military Power: Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance U.S. Government Publishing Office (2019), 43.

Map 11 Iran’s Major Nuclear Facilities (Source: Arms Control Association, https://www. armscontrol.org)

Map 12 Selected Iranian Ballistic Missiles (Source: Defense Intelligence Agency9)

9

Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran Military Power: Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance U.S. Government Publishing Office (2019), 47.

Map 13 Selected Iranian Partners, Proxies, and Affiliates (Source: Defense Intelligence Agency10)

10

Defense Intelligence Agency, Iran Military Power: Ensuring Regime Survival and Securing Regional Dominance U.S. Government Publishing Office (2019), 58.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Contemporary fears of rogue state nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism pose unique challenges for the global community. North Korea continues to defy international concerns over its nuclear arsenal due to advances in its nuclear weapons technology, undeclared nuclear sites, and continued weapons and ballistic missile testing.1 Pyongyang withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003, conducted six nuclear tests between 2006 and 2017, and threatens nuclear strikes against Japan, South Korea, and the United States.2 In 2017, North Korea tested a thermonuclear device, miniaturized a nuclear warhead, and flight-tested an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of striking the United States.3 The India–Pakistan rivalry stokes concerns that their continued hostilities along the Line of Control and over the future of Jammu and Kashmir will eventually spiral out of control and lead to a nuclear exchange, as nearly happened during the Kargil Crisis in 1999, and again in the wake of a suspected Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001.4 Their posturing reached new heights in May 1998 when India conducted five sequential nuclear tests in two days, after which former government officials threatened rivals China and Pakistan, ushering in what Syed Hasnat called a new “Balance of Terror” era in South Asia.5 Pakistan responded by testing a series of five boosted fission highly enriched uranium 1 Mike

Chinoy, Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2008), 292. 2 “In Focus: North Korea’s Nuclear Threats,” The New York Times, April 16, 2013, accessed November 6, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/04/12/world/asia/north-korea-questi ons.html?_r=0. 3 Chung Min Lee, The Hermit King: The Dangerous Game of Kim Jong Un (New York: All Print Books, 2019), 158. 4 Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues,” Congressional Research Service (March 19, 2013): 16, accessed July 17, 2013, https:// www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf. 5 Syed Farooq Hasnat, Global Security Watch: Pakistan (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2011), 16. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 B. K. Chappell, State Responses to Nuclear Proliferation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59801-3_1

1

2

1 Introduction

(HEU) devices two weeks later, after which Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced Pakistan had “settled the score” with rival India.6 Rivalry tensions were so alarming that the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community stated the continued growth and development of the Pakistani and Indian nuclear arsenals increases the risk of a nuclear security incident in South Asia, and that tactical nuclear weapons will further stoke increased risks of regional escalation.7 The nuclear powers risked escalation again, in 2019, after the Pakistan-based militant group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) conducted a suicide bombing that killed 40 Indian paramilitary police in Pulwama, inside Indian-administered Kashmir. The two rivals exchanged air strikes inside each other’s territory before de-escalating the crisis.8 Likewise, Iran continues to challenge the provisions of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty by enriching uranium beyond levels required for civilian use, hinting at a military component of its nuclear activities, thus keeping it on a collision course with the United States and Israel. Iran declares its nuclear program is for civilian energy requirements, which is allowable under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini also dismisses accusations that Iran is seeking a nuclear capability because, he argues, nuclear weapons are forbidden in Islam. Despite Iran’s declarations, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu argues Iran is pursuing a nuclear capability and compared it to Nazi Germany and its “commitment to murder Jews.”9 The United States has suspected Iran of using its civilian program as cover for a militarized nuclear program and has pressured the Iranians to restrict uranium enrichment. Washington has also sought to impede the progress of Iran’s nuclear efforts by cutting off suppliers and imposing economic sanctions, while also stating that all options remain on the table to prevent Iran from becoming nuclear weapons state. In the face of Iranian assertions that its nuclear program is for civilian use, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continues to seek access to possible undeclared nuclear material and facilities. Suspicion surrounds activities at the Natanz uranium enrichment facility, the Arak heavy water reactor, and the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (Map 11). In an effort to avert war by finding a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, in 2015, the Obama administration brokered an international nuclear accord with Iran that limited its nuclear program, including shipping 97 percent of its low-enriched uranium (LEU) out of the country, in exchange for the easing of economic sanctions placed on Iran. Despite this agreement, Israel continues to threaten strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities, with Prime Minister Netanyahu arguing the Iran nuclear 6 Feroz

Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 282. 7 Daniel R. Coats, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, January 29, 2019, 10. 8 Sitara Noor, “Pulwama/Balakot and the Evolving Role of Third Parties in India-Pakistan Crises,” Stimson Center, March 25, 2020, accessed June 28, 2020, https://www.stimson.org/2020/pulwamabalakot-and-the-evolving-role-of-third-parties-in-india-pakistan-crises/. 9 Raphael Ahren, “PM Likens Iran to Nazi Germany in its ‘commitment to murder Jews’,” The Times of Israel, December 3, 2017, accessed December 9, 2020, http://www.timesofIsrael.com/pmlikens-iran-to-nazi-germany-in-its-commitment-to-murder-jews/.

1 Introduction

3

deal was a mistake, and that Israel would not be bound by the agreement because it sets a path for Iran to eventually produce nuclear weapons. Netanyahu later claimed Tehran had a secret nuclear weapons development site in Abadeh, Iran, where it “conducted experiments to develop nuclear weapons,” until destroying the facility after realizing Israel had learned of its existence after the Israelis stole a trove of documents related to Iran’s nuclear program from a Tehran storage facility in 2018. In response, Iran’s Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif strenuously rejected Netanyahu’s allegations that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon.10 Further complicating matters, in 2018, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the historic Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—the Iran nuclear deal—which was designed to limit Iran’s nuclear program. After withdrawing from the JCPOA, the United States implemented its “Maximum Pressure” campaign against Iran, which was designed to exert tremendous pressure on Iran’s economy by re-imposing economic sanctions and cutting off its oil revenue, in an attempt to compel the Iranians to renegotiate the Iran Nuclear Deal. The United States envisioned a renegotiated deal would also address Iran’s ballistic missile program, its support for regional proxies and affiliates, and Iranian threats against U.S. allies and partners in the region. Although the Maximum Pressure campaign squeezed the Iranian economy, it did not slow Iran’s ballistic missile program and had the unintended consequence of damaging U.S. relations with its European allies, who sought to salvage the nuclear deal. Iran also adapted to the sanctions regime and found loopholes by partnering with nations such as China and Venezuela. Perhaps of more consequence, in response to the United States exit from the nuclear accord, Iran stated it no longer felt bound by restrictions the 2015 agreement placed on its nuclear program and resumed enriching uranium.11 Heightening United States and Israeli concerns with Iran’s nuclear ambitions and its ballistic missile arsenal, in 2020, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), or Sepah-e Pasdaran, whom the United States designated as a foreign terrorist organization, successfully launched a three-stage Qassed space launch vehicle (SLV), which carried the Islamic Republic’s first military satellite (Noor-1) into orbit.12 Expanding this triumvirate of proliferation concerns is the fear of illicit trafficking in nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology, and the sharing of this technical expertise with states of concern. North Korea is suspected of providing technology and assistance to Syria for construction of its now-destroyed Al-Kibar nuclear reactor.13 Pakistan’s now-defunct A.Q. Khan Network was suspected of sharing nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology with Iran, Libya, and 10 Tsafrir Abayov, “Netanyahu Alleges Iran Had Secret Nuclear Weapons Development Site in Abadeh,” NBC News, September 10, 2019, accessed December 4, 2020, https://nbcnews.com/news/ world/netanyahu-alleges-iran-had-secret-nuclear-weapons-development-site-abadeh-n1051801. 11 Michael Singh, “A Better Iran Deal is Within Reach: How to Force Tehran Back to the Table,” Foreign Affairs, November 15, 2019, accessed March 26, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/art icles/iran/2019-11-15/better-iran-deal-within-reach. 12 “Launch of Military Satellite Wins Praise of Ranking Iranian Officials,” Tehran Times, April 24, 2020, accessed April 25, 2020, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/447143/Launch-of-military-sat ellite-wins-praise-of-ranking-Iranian-officials. 13 Balbina Y. Hwang, “North Korea: An Isolationist Nuclear State,” Handbook of Nuclear Proliferation, Harsh V. Pant, ed. (New York: Routledge, 2014), 209.

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North Korea.14 Exacerbating concerns over the spread of nuclear weapons technology, former Pakistan President Zia ul-Haq once stoked fears of a region-wide “Islamic Bomb” when he proclaimed, “When we [Pakistan] acquire the [nuclear] technology, the entire Islamic world will possess it with us.”15 Within this construct are U.S. national security concerns that a terrorist organization could acquire inadequately secured nuclear, biological, or radiological material and construct and detonate a “dirty bomb.”16 Former al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden once proclaimed, “Acquiring nuclear and chemical weapons is a religious duty. If I have indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank God for enabling me to do so… It would be a sin for Muslims not to try to possess the weapons.”17 In an interview two months after the September 11th attacks, when asked about Osama bin Laden’s threat to use nuclear weapons against the United States, Taliban leader Mullah Omar stated, “This is not a matter of weapons. We are hopeful for God’s help. The real matter is the extinction of America. And, God willing, it will fall to the ground.”18 Within this anarchic international system of potential shifts in the distribution of power due to a potential increase in the number of nuclear weapons states, the United States has consistently declared its opposition to the further spread of nuclear weapons. Yet, while having the global-reaching military power to attack and disrupt the nuclear programs of all states of concern in their nascent stages, with the exception of Iraq in 2003, the United States selected coercive diplomacy and economic sanctions as the primary mechanisms to address each state’s nuclear program. Wallace Thies and Patrick Bratton argue coercion literature treats these authoritarian states as the target of coercive pressures, applied primarily by the United States.19 In the case of North Korea, President Bill Clinton once considered a preventive strike against the Yongbyon reactor prior to Pyongyang conducting its first nuclear test, but, instead, promoted the Six Party Talks and initiated the “Agreed Framework” process whereby North Korea agreed to halt construction of its nuclear facilities in exchange for two light water reactors and heavy fuel oil.20 After suspicion that Pyongyang continued to work on its highly enriched uranium capabilities, the members of the Six-Party Talks worked with the United Nations Security Council to adopt Resolution 1718, which imposed economic sanctions on North Korea for its violations.21 Pyongyang 14 Jonathan Tirone, “Iran’s North Korea Links Draw Scrutiny at Nuclear-Weapon Meeting,” Bloomberg, July 17, 2013, accessed October 2, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-0717/iran-s-north-korea-links-draw-scrutiny-at-nuclear-weapon-meeting.html. 15 Elaine Sciolino, “The World: Buzz Words; Who’s Afraid of the Islamic Bomb?,” The New York Times, June 7, 1998, accessed November 26, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/07/weekin review/the-world-buzz-words-who-s-afraid-of-the-islamic-bomb.html. 16 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2017, 8. 17 Jerrold M. Post, The Mind of the Terrorist (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 240. 18 Jed Babbin, In the Words of Our Enemies (Washington DC: Regnery Publishing, 2007), 130. 19 Wallace J. Thies and Patrick C. Bratton, “When Governments Collide in the Taiwan Strait,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 27, no. 4 (December 2004): 557. 20 Christopher R. Hill, “The Elusive Vision of a Non-Nuclear North Korea,” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 36, no. 2 (Spring 2013): 9. 21 George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010), 425.

1 Introduction

5

then dangled the possibility of resuming nuclear negotiations with the Obama administration, but is unlikely to relinquish its nuclear arsenal since it is critical for regime survival, deterring rivals, and provides North Korean leader Kim Jong Un a position on the international stage.22 In the India–Pakistan case, the Clinton administration hoped to avert an arms race in South Asia, and imposed additional economic sanctions against both states after their series of back-to-back nuclear tests in May 1998, in accordance with the Arms Export Control Act. The United States had previously imposed a series of sanctions on Pakistan to “prevent the further development and testing of nuclear weapons.” In 1979, Washington imposed sanctions against Pakistan under the Symington Amendment, which prohibited U.S. economic and military assistance to any country in possession of nuclear equipment not under IAEA safeguards, in response to Pakistan’s construction of a uranium enrichment plant. The U.S. next imposed sanctions against Pakistan, in 1990, under the Pressler Amendment, which prohibited most forms of U.S. military assistance unless the president certified annually that Pakistan did not have a nuclear weapon. The United States was unable to certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon, therefore sanctions were imposed. Washington then imposed sanctions, via the Glenn Amendment, against both India and Pakistan after their nuclear tests in 1998. The Glenn Amendment prohibits all U.S. economic and military assistance to any non-nuclear weapon state (as defined by the NPT) that carries out a nuclear explosion. The sanctions remained in place until September 22, 2001, when President Bush exercised Congressional waiver authority and lifted sanctions against both states due to the need for their cooperation in fighting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).23 In the Iran case, prior to the Iran Nuclear Deal, the United States used its influence to lead an internationally coordinated effort aimed at forcing Tehran to halt uranium enrichment and allow international inspectors unhindered access to its nuclear facilities. As part of this framework the United States and the European Union (EU) imposed punishing sanctions, and the IAEA publicly criticized Iran for not cooperating with inspectors and urged it to ratify the Additional Protocol to the NPT. The United Nations Security Council also passed six resolutions imposing sanctions aimed at halting Iran’s uranium enrichment activities (UNSCRs 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, 1929). In addition to these coercive diplomatic efforts, Iran’s nuclear program has suffered a series of mysterious cyberattacks, explosions, and fires at its nuclear facilities, and at least six Iranian nuclear scientists have been assassinated, between 2010 and 2020 (Map 8). In 2015, the Obama administration brokered an international agreement to halt and delay aspects of Iran’s nuclear program. The international delegation, comprised of the United Nations Security Council’s five permanent members—The United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom—plus Germany (P5+1), successfully negotiated with Iran to implement the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 22 Jung H. Pak, “What Kim Wants: The Hopes and Fears of North Korea’s Dictator,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 99, no. 3 (May/June 2020): 98. 23 Alex Wagner, “Bush Waives Nuclear-Related Sanctions on India, Pakistan,” Arms Control Association, accessed October 22, 2013, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_10/sanctionsoct01.

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2015. The JCPOA established guidelines whereby Iran dismantled most of its nuclear program and gave international inspectors access to its nuclear facilities in exchange for the removal of crippling economic sanctions. Prior to the United States withdrawing from the agreement in 2018, critics argued the deal did not go far enough because key restrictions would expire after 15 years, and Iran’s role in regional conflicts and its ballistic missile program were not addressed by the agreement.24 These contemporary cases illustrate the challenges posed by additional nuclear proliferation, particularly by states whose behavior and policies stress regional stability and challenge the existing power structure. Even though halting the further spread of nuclear weapons is at the forefront of American foreign policy, surprisingly, very little scholarship is devoted to examining why a powerful state, such as the United States, will use force against one state, but pursue coercive diplomacy with another state to impede the progress of its nuclear program.25 Juxtaposed against the realities of nuclear proliferation and preventive war discussions, significant scholarly debate has instead focused on why states choose to proliferate or abstain, and whether the continued spread of nuclear weapons will increase or decrease regional instability or the likelihood of war, trigger a nuclear arms race, or lead to a terrorist nuclear attack. It is critical that the literature extend beyond debating the ramifications of proliferation, and place a renewed focus on why some states are willing to go beyond diplomacy and risk war to impede the proliferation efforts of an opposing state.

Statement of the Problem Powerful states have been inconsistent in their responses to attempted proliferation by non-nuclear weapons states, and the current literature provides an inadequate explanation for these variations. In cases such as North Korea, India, Pakistan, and Iran, powerful states considered the use of force, but ultimately relied on coercive diplomacy and sanctions to address their proliferation concerns. However, in the cases of Iraq and Syria, powerful states moved beyond coercive diplomacy and used force to disrupt these nuclear programs. The existing literature does not provide a rigorous examination of these inconsistencies nor does it suggest a point at which a powerful state transitions from coercive diplomacy to the use of force to address an opposing state’s nuclear ambitions. This is of particular importance as it pertains to so-called rogue states, also called states of concern, because conventional wisdom argues that once a state acquires a nuclear weapon, with a secure second-strike 24 Robert Einhorn, “Report: The JCPOA Should be Maintained and Reinforced with a Broad Regional Strategy,” Brookings, September 29, 2016, accessed April 25, 2020, https://www.brooki ngs.edu/research/the-jcpoa-should-be-maintained-and-reinforced-with-a-broad-regional-strategy/. 25 Matthew Fuhrmann and Sarah E. Kreps, “Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace: A Quantitative Empirical Analysis, 1941-2000,” Journal of Conflict Resolution (November 25, 2010): 2.

Statement of the Problem

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capability, it can deter rivals and is able to establish redlines designed to prevent the overthrow of its current government and destruction of the state. An additional concern for powerful states is the “zone of immunity” in which a state, such as Iran, moves its nuclear facilities deep underground where they are less vulnerable to attack by regional powers like Israel.26 The United States is not as restricted by underground facilities, as is Israel, because it possesses an inventory of earthpenetrating weapons (EPW), and the military capability to target and severely damage underground facilities. Consequently, it is critical to examine why powerful states will attack some proliferators, but not others, to gain a more thorough understanding of the possible triggers that might compel a state to use force to prevent an opposing state from obtaining a nuclear capability. Perhaps no other region is a better test bed for this examination than the Middle East, due to its history of proliferation and preventive strikes, the current tensions over Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and the potential for nuclear hedging by states, such as Saudi Arabia. The United States and Israel are the two most vocal opponents of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Even so, historically they have responded differently to the same cases of proliferation by Middle Eastern states. In the past four decades, three Middle Eastern states reached significant milestones toward acquiring a nuclear weapon. In three of the four cases—Iraq (1981), Iraq (2003), and Syria (2007)— either the United States or Israel attacked the country suspected of proliferation, while the other either took no action or used coercive diplomacy as a proliferation policy. In the fourth case of Iran (2015), the United States negotiated an international nuclear agreement, while Israel criticized the deal and continued to threaten unilateral military action against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. The current literature does not adequately examine these variations in state responses to nuclear proliferation and remains elusive when accounting for the motivations and influences that compel a powerful state to select diplomacy or military force to counter an adversary’s nuclear program. Kreps and Fuhrmann affirm this sentiment and argue there is little research that examines when and why countries target nuclear programs. In their study, Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace, the authors argue previous studies that examine military strikes against nuclear infrastructure tended to examine the consequences of the strikes rather than the motivations that drove the use of military force.27

26 K.T. McFarland, “Israel, the United States and Iran – Locked in the Dance of Destiny,” Fox News, July 15, 2015, accessed July 4, 2020, https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/israel-the-united-statesand-iran-locked-in-the-dance-of-destiny. 27 Matthew Fuhrmann and Sarah E. Kreps, “Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace: A Quantitative Empirical Analysis, 1941-2000,” Journal of Conflict Resolution (forthcoming), accessed March 29, 2020, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1587015.

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Purpose of the Book This book offers a unique approach to understanding the dilemma of why powerful states respond differently to similar cases of nuclear proliferation. The study defines nuclear proliferation as the spread or acquisition of nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or fissile materials to non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS). This study presents its Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory to argue that variations in state responses to nuclear proliferation are caused by the powerful state decision-makers’ differing perceptions of the threat posed by an opposing state’s proliferation efforts, and that the intensity of these threat perceptions is influenced by cognitive phenomena that ultimately shape the state’s foreign policy decisionmaking (FPDM) process, its behavior, and its proliferation response. The traditional realist focus on system- and state-level influences excludes valuable input provided by individual-level psychological factors that influence the behaviors and perceptions of decision-makers. The study further argues the decision-makers’ threat perceptions are influenced by cognitive psychological influences, including trauma suffered from national tragedies like the September 11th attacks and the Holocaust, and a history of armed conflict with the state that is seeking to challenge the existing power structure by acquiring a nuclear weapon. The study’s Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory conducts a systematic examination of the cognitive factors’ influence on a state’s FPDM to measure the degree of threat perceived by the powerful state, and then forecast whether the powerful state will take no action, use coercive diplomacy/sanctions, or employ military force to address the proliferating state’s actions. The research suggests variations in the intensity of a perceived threat will strongly influence the powerful state’s proliferation response. Lower perceptions of a threat will lead to either no action or the use of coercive diplomacy/sanctions, while higher threat perceptions will lead to the use of military force. The study argues the proliferation response options of the power-projecting state are supported by three additional independent variables: (1) national security policy, (2) military doctrine, and (3) power projection capability. Within these independent variables are the additional influences Robert Jervis argued affect a state’s policies, including its goals, the risks it is willing to take, its beliefs about its own military and diplomatic capabilities, and its beliefs about what is domestically feasible and popular.28 This study fills a gap in the nuclear proliferation literature by examining the psychological motivations and influences that contribute to powerful states’ divergent perceptions and responses to the potential spread of nuclear weapons. Nuclear proliferation scholars have traditionally focused on how to manage proliferation and debated whether the spread of nuclear weapons is good or bad for the international system. This traditional focus demonstrates the need for a more tailored approach to proliferation literature to enable a better understanding of why powerful states perceive the same cases of nuclear proliferation differently, and thus have divergent 28 Robert

Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 12.

Purpose of the Book

9

responses to them. The book’s objective is to contribute to proliferation scholarship by understanding how threat perceptions influence decision-makers and help shape a state’s proliferation response. This study connects the dots between the structural and cognitive approaches in proliferation literature by measuring the degree of perceived threat through the examination of cognitive influences, national security policy, and military power projection capability, as part of the foreign policy decision-making process.

The Use of Case Studies The study tests these assumptions by conducting a comparative analysis of the United States and Israel’s differing responses to the four most advanced cases of suspected proliferation by Middle East states—Iraq (1981), Iraq (2003), Syria (2007), and Iran (2015)—to explain why some powerful states pursue coercive diplomacy or sanctions while others use military force to impede a weaker state’s nuclear ambitions. The selection of the four case studies allowed for a more constructive comparative analysis of two powerful states’ responses to the same cases because United States and Israeli interdependence combined with their mutual opposition to nuclear proliferation in the Middle East linked them directly to the outcome of each case study state’s nuclear ambitions. Each case has additional research value because the United States and Israel voice steadfast concerns over a potential nexus between rogue state proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Adding to this concern, the U.S. State Department designated all three countries—Iran, Iraq, and Syria—as State Sponsors of Terrorism.29 Though, Iraq was later removed from the list in 2004 after Saddam Hussein was ousted from power and a more favorable government assured the United States it would no longer support acts of international terrorism.30

Conceptual Underpinnings for the Study The study offers insight into improving approaches to contemporary nuclear proliferation by providing a more robust understanding of how threat perceptions influence a powerful state’s proliferation response. Determining why two powerful states with similarly aligned proliferation policies perceive and respond differently to the same proliferation case is essential to forecasting future responses to horizontal proliferation. Kreps and Fuhrmann raise a similar concern and argue current proliferation

29 U.S. Department of State, “State Sponsors of Terrorism,” accessed October 24, 2013, http://www.

state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm. Department of State, “Iraq Removed from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List,” accessed April 19, 2020, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/rmo/hglt/37603.htm. 30 U.S.

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literature does not adequately account for “cross-national variations in states’ willingness to attack nuclear facilities” of one country but not another, such as why Israel attacked nuclear facilities in Iraq and Syria, but not in Libya or Pakistan.31 Realists attribute these variations to structural differences within the international system—primarily how differently situated states yield power. The realist rational actor model assumes states seek to maximize gains and minimize losses within the anarchic international system. Thucydides highlighted this premise in his study, The Peloponnesian War, when he recounted how a rival state’s rising power can lead to war, “The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made war inevitable.”32 Similarly, Saira Khan argues, “States coexist in the anarchic international system, ensure their survival, and perceive that military capabilities can keep them secure from external attack. Power is a means to an end – the end being security. Nuclear weapons are especially valuable in this context.”33 Advancing this argument further into the nuclear realm, Alexandre Debs and Nuno Monteiro argue, “nuclear proliferation affects the security of the state acquiring nuclear weapons, as well as the security of its adversaries and allies, which may attempt to prevent it.”34 Since the United States is a superpower and Israel is a regional power, realist thought argues they compete differently for the power required to survive because regional powers do not have the capability to inflict damage on a rival to the extent capable of a superpower. The United States, with its vast nuclear arsenal, global logistics infrastructure, and forcible entry and second-strike capabilities, has the added benefit of being a physically large nation separated from hostile states by two oceans, with two friendly states on its borders. Conversely, regional powers are not as able to absorb the damage inflicted by a rival, therefore, the introduction of nuclear weapons into a regional power’s sphere of influence shifts the delicate balance of power and is perceived to be a higher threat than it would be to a superpower.35 This lends credence to the argument that Israel is a geographically small state, located in a very tough neighborhood, so any threat is more likely to be perceived as existential. Whereas Israel perceives a nuclear Iran as an existential threat, the United States is more concerned about a nuclear Iran triggering additional horizontal proliferation in a historically volatile region. This presents a worst-case scenario in which the next regional war could escalate and go nuclear.36 Brendan Rittenhouse Green complements this assumption by expounding that the United States faces threats from states seeking to challenge its primacy strategy rather than 31 Matthew Fuhrmann and Sarah E. Kreps, “Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace: A Quantitative Empirical Analysis, 1941-2000,” Journal of Conflict Resolution (forthcoming), 4. 32 Robert B. Strassler, ed., Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to The Peloponnesian War (New York: Free Press, 1996), 16. 33 Saira Khan, Iran and Nuclear Weapons: Protracted Conflict and Proliferation (New York: Routlege, 2011), 27. 34 Alexandre Debs and Nuno P. Monteiro, Nuclear Politics: The Strategic Causes of Proliferation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 4. 35 Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 9. 36 K.T. McFarland, “Israel, the United States and Iran – Locked in the Dance of Destiny.”

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being prevented by it, and as a result, the United States has been able to leverage this primacy strategy to deter adversaries and reassure partners in order to mitigate threats that could produce “more dangerous power distributions.”37 The realist structural argument provides insight into the causal effects of a state’s reactions to a rival state; however, its levels of analysis—system and state—are structurally insufficient to explain an individual state’s responses on a case-by-case basis because these decisions are often made by individuals or groups of individuals. Therefore, these determinations are best-assessed by integrating individual-level analysis into existing broader theories, such as Matthew Kroenig’s power-based Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory. In addition to the structural limitations that exist within realist system- and state-level analysis, current proliferation literature is restrained due to a focus on the proliferation management debates. Proliferation optimists, including Kenneth Waltz, argue nuclear proliferation decreases the warproneness of states because it makes the cost of war too high and deters states from engaging in war against other nuclear powers.38 Pessimists, such as Scott Sagan, argue proliferation increases the likelihood of war and accidental nuclear detonation.39 While insightful in addressing how proliferation affects the international system, the proliferation management debates do not account for proliferation’s unique effects on differently situated states, as illustrated by the variations in the United States and Israeli responses to the four case studies. Matthew Kroenig’s Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory addressed this weakness in the literature by rightly arguing proliferation affects states differently and that proliferation may be good for some states, but bad for others. He posits the threat posed by nuclear proliferation depends on the threatened state’s ability to project power over the proliferating state. According to Kroenig, powerprojecting states are affected by proliferation because it constrains their ability to project conventional power in the region in which the proliferating state is located. The second and third-order effects of additional proliferation are reductions in the powerful state’s strategic and regional influence. For Kroenig, proliferation is less threatening to non-power-projecting states because they are already unable to use force to secure their interests; therefore, any increase in power by a neighboring state is of little consequence.40 Kroenig’s power-based theory defines power projection as “the ability to fight a full-scale, conventional ground war on the territory of the target state.”41 Using his power projection criteria, the United States is a power-projecting state in all 37 Brendan Rittenhouse Green, “Security Threats in Contemporary World Politics: Potential Hegemons, Partnerships, and Primacy,” A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security (Washington DC: Cato Institute, 2014), 248. 38 Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate, third edition (New York: W.W. Norton, 2013), 6. 39 Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 77. 40 Matthew Kroenig, “Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation,” Managing the Atom Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2009-14, Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University (November 2009): 2. 41 Kroenig, “Beyond Optimism and Pessimism,” 5.

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cases and Israel, with its small population and heavy reliance on airpower, is a non-power-projecting state in three of the four case studies—Iraq 1981, Iraq 2003, and Iran 2015—since it is logistically only able to fight a ground war inside neighboring Syria. This assumption is based on past Arab–Israeli wars in which Israel only conducted large-scale ground operations inside neighboring countries with a shared border—Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. According to Kroenig’s theory, as a global power-projecting state, the United States should feel threatened by all instances of nuclear proliferation, and Israel should feel less threatened in all cases except Syria. Actual events falsify Kroenig’s assumptions because Israel perceived a higher threat in three of the four cases (Iraq 1981, Syria 2007, and Iran 2015), and the United States perceived a higher threat in only one case (Iraq 2003). The study defines a threat as high when a powerful state either attacks or threatens to attack the weaker proliferating state. Correspondingly, a threat is defined as low when a powerful state pursues diplomacy, takes no action, or imposes sanctions. While Kroenig’s theory is similar to the realist structural argument in that it provides evidence to demonstrate proliferation has varying effects on different categories of states, and these variations drive different responses, it is elusive in demonstrating why similarly aligned states have different threat perceptions of the same proliferation case. Kroenig attributes the variations in threat perceptions and state behaviors to a state’s ability or inability to project power over the target state. Consequently, application of his power-based theory produces mixed and contradictory results because he argues a state that cannot project power over another state should not feel threatened by that state’s proliferation. The foundation of Kroenig’s theory that proliferation has differing effects on differently situated states is solid; however, to his detriment, the theory’s reliance on the ability to fight a ground war inside the target state restricts his definition of power projection, omits integrating the variations inherent in the perceptions of decision-makers, and fails to concede airpower’s power projection capability. Furthermore, his theory provides no mechanism to account for a state’s perceptions changing over time or why a state chooses to attack one nuclear program but not the other, due in part, because his theory is nested within systemand state-levels of analysis. In his study, Political Psychology and Foreign Policy, Jack Levy amplifies this point and argues “most neorealists” posit that system-level power distribution explains most of the relevant variations in foreign policy and international politics.42 Consequently, Kroenig’s Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory does not provide an adequate foundation to elucidate why the United States attacked Iraq in 2003 when it had no physical evidence of an Iraqi nuclear program; yet it chose not to attack states with confirmed uranium enrichment programs or covert nuclear facilities (Iraq 1981, Syria 2007, and Iran 2015). Kroenig’s theory also provides no theoretical basis to explain why Israel attacked Iraq in 1981, but not in 2003, since Tel Aviv perceives any regional proliferation as an existential threat. Nicholas 42 Jack

S. Levy, “Political Psychology and Foreign Policy,” Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, ed, David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 255.

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Miller also highlights three shortcomings in Kroenig’s theory: (1) it fails to explain changes in U.S. nonproliferation policy, (2) it does not adequately explain why U.S. policymakers at times perceived strategic benefits to proliferation in some cases, and (3) it does not explain why the United States reacted strongly against proliferation in states where it had “neither a strong alliance relationship nor any desire to use military force.”43 These theoretical inconsistencies indicate the nuclear proliferation literature should place a renewed focus on influences that extend beyond power and its system- and state-level analysis, and examine how decision-makers are influenced at the individual-level because decisions and policies are formulated and executed at this level. This study examines the linkage between decision-makers’ cognitive influences and the state’s national security policies and power projection capabilities to provide a more robust explanation of how decision-makers perceive and respond to nuclear proliferation. To provide a more intimate understanding of the role perceptions play within a state’s decision-making process and its response to a potential threat, the study turns to political psychology. Political psychology allows for the study of the influences that shape a leader’s threat perceptions and decision-making processes at the individual-level of analysis. This study argues these determinations provide better context to understand the changing proliferation policies and differing responses of powerful states. The importance of examining the human factor within a state’s decision-making process is critical to understanding the centrality of cognitive influences on individuals and groups. Research suggests wars are started by people’s behaviors and their political decisions, and the more one can understand the thought processes, beliefs, emotions, and motivations that contribute to those behaviors and decisions, the better one can understand why they occur and the cognitive processes that influence the decision.44 Similarly, Mintz and DeRouen argue cognitive limitations distort information processing, and that the uncertainty in foreign policy decision-making is related to an opponent’s motives, beliefs, intentions, or calculations.45 Political psychology emphasizes the importance of moving beyond systemic approaches and focusing more on understanding leaders in order to better understand the decision-making process. For realists, humans are political actors driven by a desire for self-preservation. Security is paramount so the actions one state takes to improve its security situation affects an opposing state’s threat perceptions. Thomas Hobbes emphasized this point in Leviathan, when he argued that in order to understand human action, it is necessary to understand the underlying passions which cause human behavior.46 For Hobbes, individuals exist in a state of nature and 43 Nicholas

L. Miller, Stopping the Bomb: The Sources and Effectiveness of US Nonproliferation Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018), 12. 44 Martha L. Cottam, Beth Dietz-Uhler, Elena Mastors, and Thomas Preston, Introduction to Political Psychology, Second Edition (New York: Psychology Press, 2010), 1. 45 Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen Jr. Understanding Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 4. 46 John H. Hallowell and Jene M. Porter, Political Philosophy: The Search for Humanity and Order (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice Hall, Canada), 299.

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1 Introduction

without a sovereign to regulate their behavior, they will attack one another even if they are not aggressively motivated.47 This pursuit of security can lead to misperceptions of intent, thereby increasing the likelihood of miscalculation and a spiral of violence. Robert Jervis tackled the cognitive process of perception and misperception in his landmark book, Perception and Misperception in International Politics. He argues it is nearly impossible to explain decisions and policies without referencing the decision-makers’ beliefs about the world and images of others because people in the same situations behave differently because of their differing perceptions of the world and other actors.48 For Jervis, decision-makers “often see imaginary dangers,” and are sensitive to threats to their security that more critical observers see as minor. He continues that the predisposition to perceive a threat varies with the person’s belief about his ability to counter the threat.49 For Jervis, it is imperative to understand why an actor acted the way she did because by understanding and reconstructing an actor’s internal processes, and separating internal from external influences, one can respond differently to the same behavior depending on the interpretation of why it happened. By inferring an understanding of why a certain action was taken, a rival can understand and predict an adversary’s behavior.50 Jervis argues differing perceptions of another state’s intention are often the root of policy debates, and dangers arise if a rival state perceives the status quo powers are weak in capability or resolve. He argues this will lead the challenging state to test the status quo power in small ways that increasingly escalate if the status quo power retreats or fails to respond. This malign behavior leaves the powerful state a choice of continuing to retreat or to fight. To avoid this scenario, Jervis asserts the powerful state “must display the ability and willingness to wage war.”51 In these situations, moderation and conciliation can be interpreted as weakness, thereby preventing a state from making overtures to end or avert a potential conflict.52 Correspondingly, a weaker state’s pursuit of security will produce aggressive actions if it requires a high sense of security or feels threatened by the stronger state.53 Yaacov Vertzberger argues Jervis’ hypothesis that states tend to see other states as more hostile than they actually are and their behavior as more organized and coordinated is flawed. For Vertzberger, these are symptoms and descriptions and

47 Andrew

H. Kydd, “Methodological Individualism and Rational Choice,” The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 432. 48 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 29. 49 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 372. 50 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 33. 51 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 58. 52 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 59. 53 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 64.

Conceptual Underpinnings for the Study

15

not sources of misperception.54 Concurrently, Mintz and DeRouen argue the importance of analyzing foreign policy decisions because they can uncover the cognitive processes that lead to foreign policy decision-making and “get into the minds” of the decision-makers. This study supports the argument on the criticality of understanding the cognitive influence on decision-makers and how predispositions can lead to differing threat perceptions of a proliferating state’s actions. Gordon and Arian explored the relationship between threats and information processing by analyzing the relationship between affective and cognitive components of decision-making under conditions of high and low threat by surveying Israelis and Palestinians about the Arab–Israeli conflict.55 The authors found that when one feels a high degree of threat, the decision-making is largely driven by emotion; however, under a low threat situation, both emotions and logic play a role in decision-making.56 For Gordon and Arian, feelings of threat correlate with decisions on how to deal with that threat, and the more threatened people feel, the more likely they will make choices to intensify the conflict. Similarly, lower levels of perceived threat produce choices that are less likely to intensify the threat.57 Political psychology provides insight into possible explanations for why two states with similar proliferation policies have differing perceptions of the same case. Studies suggest cognitive processes—distorted perceptions and selective inattention—contribute to misperceptions and these sources of misperception can further the understanding of the policymaking process.58 In cases of nuclear proliferation, states are presented with a security dilemma in which the actions taken by a state to increase its security are perceived to have the effect of decreasing the security of its neighbors. Since the true motivation of their neighbors cannot be determined with certainty, states make subjective decisions based on their beliefs about their neighbors’ motivations and capabilities.59 The cognitive processes actors use to interpret the actions of a rival state can lead to subjective and divergent perceptions of the same actions. This study’s Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory argues these insecurities and misperceptions of intent can lead to threat inflation, which may compel one state to attack, while another similarly aligned state chooses to take no action. To test these assumptions, the study addresses two research questions and two research hypotheses.

54 Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decision-making (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 17. 55 Rose McDermott, Political Psychology in International Relations (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2004), 185. 56 Carol Gordon and Asher Arian, “Threat and Decision Making,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 45, no. 2 (April 2001): 197. 57 McDermott, Political Psychology in International Relations, 185. 58 Noel Kaplowitz, “National Self-Images, Perception of Enemies, and Conflict Strategies,” International Society of Political Psychology, vol. 11, no. 1 (March 1990): 56. 59 Cottam et al., Introduction to Political Psychology, 295.

16

1 Introduction

Research Questions R1. When and why do states that have the military capability to use force to disrupt or destroy a proliferating state’s nuclear facilities choose instead to pursue coercive diplomacy or take no action? R2. When do states that have the military capability to use force to disrupt or destroy a proliferating state’s nuclear facilities turn to military force to prevent that state from acquiring a nuclear weapon?

Research Hypotheses H1. Cognitive psychological influences will strongly influence whether a power projecting state perceives a proliferating state as a low threat or high threat to its national security. H2. Lower perceptions of threat will lead to coercive diplomacy or no action, while higher threat perceptions will lead to threats of force or the actual use of military force.

Scope of the Study The study’s timeline begins with the 1981 Israeli raid on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor and concludes at the end of 2015, with the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. This period represents the initial use of overt kinetic force by either the United States or Israel against an advanced case of Middle Eastern state proliferation, and ends with the signing of the Iran nuclear deal. The scope of the study is also limited to U.S. and Israeli responses to the four proliferation cases.

Limitations and Assumptions This study has several limitations. The classified nature of intelligence collection sources, methods, and analysis limits the scope of understanding the complete picture of all the psychological and political motivations, and intelligence that influence a state’s foreign policy decision-making apparatus. To balance against these limitations, this study conducts a content analysis of open source key leader statements and speeches to contextualize the state’s threat perception by illustrating how political elites convey their concerns about a proliferating state. An additional limitation of this study is the uncertainty of how to categorize cyberattacks since they are a form of attack, but not a traditional military use of force kinetic

Limitations and Assumptions

17

attack. The Stuxnet and Flame viruses—collectively known as Olympic Games— targeted Iran between 2009 and 2010, and destroyed nearly a fifth of its uranium enrichment centrifuges.60 Stuxnet also severely infected Iranian computer systems at the Natanz uranium enrichment facility and at the Bushehr nuclear reactor.61 David Sanger argues the intent of Olympic Games was two-fold. First, the viruses were meant to cripple Iran’s nuclear progress. Second, the United States sought to convince Israel there was a smarter way to deal with Iran’s nuclear program than launching airstrikes that could possibly escalate into a broader Middle East regional war.62 Although both cyberattacks fall within the scope of the study (1981–2015), they are excluded because neither virus can be attributed verifiably to the United States or Israel.

Power Projection Disparities The study assumes there will be disparities between global and regional power military capabilities and their ability to successfully disrupt the proliferation actions of a state deemed to be a threat to a powerful state. To address potential differences in the power projection capabilities of powerful states, the study expands Matthew Kroenig’s narrow definition of power projection—“the ability to fight a full-scale, conventional ground war on the territory of the target state”—by utilizing airpower as the primary power-projecting instrument to improve on his approach by explaining a broader range of cases than were previously utilized. Because the United States is arguably the only state with the logistical capacity, and airborne and amphibious forcible entry capabilities to place ground troops around the world, a more inclusive definition of power projection is needed to effectively assess power-based theories and standardize the response options. This instrument of power projection is airpower. Airpower is advantageous as a counterproliferation instrument because it provides a state the capability to strike a diverse range of targets with minimal warning, while minimizing the logistics and sustainment, planning, casualties, collateral damage, and costs incurred through a ground invasion.63 The use of airpower to conduct precision kinetic strikes against nuclear targets can set a program back a number of years by destroying infrastructure, equipment, personnel, and fissile material, but it does not destroy a state’s accumulated knowledge of the nuclear process, much of which resides in the minds of scientists and technicians, nor can it ensure complete 60 William J. Broad, John Markoff and David E. Sanger, “Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay,” The New York Times, January 15, 2011, accessed October 2, 2013, http://www. nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html?pagewanted=all. 61 Yaakov Katz and Yoaz Hendel, Israel vs. Iran: The Shadow War (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2012), 102. 62 David E. Sanger, Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret War’s and Surprising Use of American Power (New York: Crown Publishers, 2012), 190. 63 Ramesh V. Phadke, “Air Power and Escalation Control,” The Henry L. Stimson Center, Working Paper, August 2003, 6.

18

1 Introduction

destruction of all facilities. In a counterproliferation strike against a nuclear target, airstrikes are the preferred method; however, ground troops and special operations forces (SOF) would also be needed if there were requirements to seize facilities or personnel, render-safe explosive ordnance, and secure and recover nuclear materials to prevent them from being “lost” or transported offsite by third parties. Additionally, boots on the ground (BOG) or intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets could conduct a battle damage assessment (BDA) to determine if additional airstrikes against the targets are required. As a counterargument to counterproliferation airstrikes, Richard Betts notes, destruction of a nuclear facility may actually incentivize and increase the speed at which an adversary rushes toward a nuclear weapon.64 It is argued Saddam Hussein went on a crash course to acquire a nuclear weapon after the Israelis destroyed Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981. The use of airpower allows for control of the independent variables of two states with differing overall military capabilities because airpower requirements are similar across powerful states, though aircraft capability, ordnance size and precision, and the range and sustainment of their power projection capabilities will likely differ. The study assumes the United States can project airpower globally, while smaller states, such as Israel, are limited to projecting power within their specific region, therefore, as with Kroenig’s theory, the study distinguishes between global and local power-projecting states, and non-power-projecting states. The study utilizes Kreps and Fuhrmann’s definition of attack to define the use of military force, which is “the state-sanctioned use of force against materials, commodities, or infrastructure related to a nuclear weapons program that has the intention of delaying a country’s acquisition of nuclear bombs.”65 Israel effectively employed airpower as a counterproliferation tool against Iraq (1981) and Syria (2007), and has advocated the same against Iran. Israel also demonstrated it can conduct limited strikes well outside its borders, as it did in 1985, when the Israeli Air Force flew 1,500 miles to bomb the PLO headquarters in Tunis, Tunisia. The United States used force in the Iraq (2003) case because it had the dual goals of destroying Iraq’s suspected weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program and instituting regime change. In his book, Fiasco, Thomas Ricks acknowledged the purpose of COBRA II, the ground component of the U.S. war plan, was to “force the collapse of the Iraqi regime and deny it the use of WMD to threaten its neighbors and U.S. interests in regions…. The end-state for this operation is regime change.”66 The latter required the addition of large numbers of ground troops to defeat the Iraqi army and capture and hold territory. The requirement to overthrow Saddam’s government necessitated the inclusion of ground troops, otherwise airpower would have been a sufficient counterproliferation instrument, if Iraq had actually reconstituted its WMD program. 64 Richard

K. Betts, “The Osirak Fallacy,” The National Interest, March 1, 2006, accessed April 1, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/article/the-osirak-fallacy-1093. 65 Fuhrmann and Kreps, “Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace,” 6. 66 Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: The Penguin Press, 2006), 116.

Limitations and Assumptions

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Interdependence The United States and Israel have a high degree of interdependence and often coordinate on key elements of Middle East security issues, such as their suspected collaboration on the Olympic Games cyberattacks against Iranian nuclear facilities. Despite this collaboration, the United States and Israel maintain a level of independence with respect to their perceptions of threats and the subsequent actions taken to mitigate these threats. Because of its lack of strategic depth, proximity to its adversaries, preponderance of former military leaders in key decision-making positions, historical tragedies, inability to use coercive diplomacy, and lack of strategic military doctrine and policies, Israel has traditionally been more willing to take unilateral action because it perceives nearly all threats as existential. Whereas, the United States is more apt to perceive threats as disruptions to the international order and its strategic influence, and is therefore predisposed to promote adherence to international protocols, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and employ multilateralism by seeking United Nations Security Council resolutions to build coalitions and impose sanctions to address threats. The United States enjoys the luxury of size and distance from its adversaries, therefore many threat streams do not have the sense of urgency as they do with Israel. The study acknowledges the ability of one state to affect or influence the response of the other; however, this influence is largely dependent on the immediacy and intensity of the threat, consultation between the two powers, and, at times, the relationship between each state’s leaders. The contentious relationship between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu created stark disagreement over how to interpret and effectively address Iranian proliferation, with Obama stressing the need for diplomacy and Netanyahu pressing for military strikes. These variations in threat perceptions further demonstrate the need to examine the cognitive processes of key decision-makers to determine possible reasons for differing levels of perceived threat across similarly aligned states.

Data Analysis Political psychology research demonstrates the intensity of threat perceptions influences decision-makers and whether their national security decisions will be driven by emotion, or a combination of emotions and logic.67 Research also demonstrates the importance of cognitive psychological influences and how they shape leaders’ perceptions of the security environment. To measure the psychological motivations of decision-makers, this study conducts a content analysis of key leader speeches and comments that discussed nuclear proliferation by the target state, as well as speeches and comments given by the target state’s decision-makers since this rhetoric also has 67 Carol

Gordon and Asher Arian, “Threat and Decision Making,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 45, no. 2 (April 2001): 197.

20

1 Introduction

an impact on the powerful state’s perception of a potential threat. Research demonstrates the language used by leaders to describe a conflict allows that leader to frame the debate and shape citizens’ interpretations of events and information.68 Robert Jervis argued the importance of examining words and deeds of others in his book, The Logic of Images in International Relations, when he asserted states examine the words and deeds of others to predict how they will behave, as both a cause and an effect.69 Studies also illustrate the speech patterns of leaders can convey their operational codes—philosophical and instrumental preferences and beliefs about the nature and use of power—whether they be to persuade or to deceive.70 Presidents use popular rhetoric to appeal to the public to explain, define, or seek support for policy initiatives and legislation. The practice of appealing directly to the people “over the heads” of Washington lawmakers and powerbrokers has had positive and negative consequences for presidents who have used this tactic. In The Rhetorical Presidency, Jeffrey Tulis discussed presidential popular appeal as a tool of presidential governance and explored the historic rise in the use of popular rhetoric by presidents to further their political agendas, and the impact its use has had on the United States’ political culture. Tulis argued the founders were worried about the dangers a powerful executive could pose to the system if the government’s power came from a popular leader. This was a concern because it was believed democracies were susceptible to demagoguery and majority tyranny.71 The ghosts of European monarchical rule still plagued the founders and they sought to prevent the cult of personality that enveloped some of their European brethren. The founders were also concerned with popular rhetoric leading to demagoguery because of an excess of passionate appeals. These appeals could be divided into hard and soft demagoguery. The soft demagogue flatters his constituents by asserting they know what is best and by demonstrating his closeness to them through his mannerisms. The hard demagogue attempts to create or encourage divisions in order to maintain his constituency. Both of these demagogues were seen as dangerous, thus the pre-constitutional concern regarding demagoguery was to prevent social disruption, division, and tyranny. The founders were also cautious of a powerful executive who ruled with the power of popular passions. Again, the founders sought to preempt the mistakes they viewed as having plagued Europe. Tulis also points out that the rhetorical prerogative is dangerous and that law is necessary to constrain discretion. This rhetorical presidency allows the president to defend the use of force and “other executive powers.”72 Samuel Kernell discussed the implications of going public in Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership. He described going public as a strategy where the president 68 Amy Gershkoff and Shana Kushner, “Shaping Public Opinion: The 9/11-Iraq Connection in the Bush Administration’s Rhetoric,” Perspectives on Politics, vol. 3, no. 3 (September 2005): 526. 69 Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations, 19. 70 Jonathan Renshon, “When Public Statements Reveal Private Beliefs: Assessing Operational Codes at a Distance,” Political Psychology, vol. 30, no. 4 (August 2009): 658. 71 Jeffrey K. Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 25. 72 Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency, 203.

Data Analysis

21

promotes himself and his policies in Washington by appealing to the American public for support.73 To illustrate the importance of key leader statements and the influence they have on a state’s national security policy, war rationale, and public opinion, the United States Senate convened a Select Committee on Intelligence to investigate “Whether public statements and reports and testimony regarding Iraq by U.S. government officials made between the Gulf War period and the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom were substantiated by intelligence information.”74 In undertaking this investigation, the committee analyzed five major policy speeches by Bush administration officials to verify the veracity of statements used to argue the threat posed by Iraq, its weapons of mass destruction programs, its ties to terrorist organizations, and the possible consequences of the U.S. invasion. The Committee argued the speeches are the “best representations of how the Bush administration communicated intelligence analysis to the Congress, the American people, and the international community.”75 A recent framework also analyzed how a political leader’s public threat response rhetoric portrayed an enemy by analyzing speeches of how President Bush and President Obama spoke about terrorism.76 The use of speeches and commentary provides insight into decision-makers’ cognitive processing and how a potential threat is relayed and received. Research suggests cognitive processes contribute to misperceptions and these sources of misperception can further the understanding of the policymaking process.77 Studies by Cottam and Herrmann examined a leader’s tendency to stereotype another country to infer felt threats and opportunities in the hopes of differentiating between offensively minded leaders and defensively minded status quo leaders.78 As Levy highlights, most foreign policy analysts argue systemic variables, alone, cannot explain the foreign policy behaviors of states. Rather, the assumption is “variations in the beliefs, psychological processes, and personalities of individual decision-makers explain a significant amount of the variations in foreign policy behavior of states

73 Samuel Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership, third edition (San Diego, CA: University of California Press, 1997), 2. 74 John D. Rockefeller IV and Christopher S. Bond, “Whether Public Statements Regarding Iraq by U.S. Government Officials Were Substantiated by Intelligence Information,” Select Committee on Intelligence, June 5, 2008, 1. 75 Rockefeller IV and Bond, “Whether Public Statements Regarding Iraq by U.S. Government Officials Were Substantiated by Intelligence Information,” 5. 76 Tabitha Courtland Gillombardo, “Bush, Obama, and Terrorism: A New Framework for Analyzing Threat Response Rhetoric,” (BA thesis, Wesleyan University, 2016), 4, https://wesscholar.wesleyan. edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2553&context=etd_hon_theses. 77 Noel Kaplowitz, “National Self-Images, Perception of Enemies, and Conflict Strategies.” International Society of Political Psychology, vol. 11, no. 1 (March 1990): 56. 78 Richard K. Herrmann, “Image Theory and Strategic Interaction in International Relations,” Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, ed. David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 297.

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1 Introduction

in the international system, and that these variables are not endogenous to systemic structures or domestic interests.”79 The study examines decision-makers’ use of historical tragedies, scripting, mapping, and analogical reasoning within those speeches and commentary to determine the degree of threat perceived. By examining the words of decision-makers, the study seeks to determine the causal mechanisms that drove the perceptions and misperceptions of threats. The psychological trauma of a historical tragedy, such as the Holocaust and the September 11th attacks, affects a nation’s collective selfimage and influences the way it perceives and responds to threats based on the recalled tragedy. Likewise, psychoanalytic theory posits the concept of an extended self and the connections between injury to the nation and subsequent aggressive reactions.80 Noted psychologist Robert Abelson articulated scripting presents a hypothesized cognitive structure that when activated organizes comprehension of event-based situations, such as ethnic genocide in Bosnia and Kosovo, the Rwandan Genocide, American Slavery, massacres of Native Americans, the Killing Fields of Cambodia, and the Holocaust to frame “ethnic cleansing” and mass genocide.81 Mapping is when leaders invoke analogies because of their perceived resemblances to a past event.82 Mapping contributes to worst-case scenario forecasting of threat perceptions and intent because of its relation to a traumatic event. During crises, leaders are often influenced by biases, and errors in decision-making occur because of cognitive limitations such as previous beliefs. These biases, in turn, may lead to misperceptions of other’s actions and intentions.83

The Differential Effects of Threat Perception To assess threat perception intensity, the research illustrates instances of analogical reasoning in key American and Israeli leader statements to assist in contextualizing their perspectives within the four case studies. Perception is defined as the process of apprehending, recognizing, and interpreting processed information.84 Because perceptions are often based on a combination of psychological stimuli, they may lead to errors in interpretation. Political psychologists trace motivated error and 79 Jack

S. Levy, “Political Psychology and Foreign Policy,” Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, ed, David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 255. 80 Kaplowitz, “National Self-Images, Perception of Enemies, and Conflict Strategies,” 42. 81 R.P. Abelson, “Psychological Status of the Script Concept,” American Psychologist, 36 (1981), 715. 82 Keith L. Shimko, “Metaphors and Foreign Policy Decision Making,” Political Psychology, vol. 15, no. 4 (December 1994): 661. 83 Mintz and DeRouen Jr, Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making, 38. 84 Janice Gross Stein, “Threat Perception in International Relations,” The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, second edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 2.

The Differential Effects of Threat Perception

23

the consequent misperception of threat to an actor’s fear, needs, and interests.85 In international politics, there are two broadly defined types of threat: conditional and situational. Conditional threats are when actors use strategies like deterrence to signal their commitment and resolve to a rival. A conditional threat’s execution depends on the rival state’s reaction to the threat. Therefore, the strategy’s success is not based on the threat itself but on the rival’s perception of the threat. Situational threats are difficult to discern because they are based on a state’s subjective perception of a particular situation. One state may perceive a situation as threatening while another may consider the same situation non-threatening.86 In aggregate, these psychological stimuli will facilitate determining the degree of perceived threat as part of the study’s data analysis. The study’s Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory utilizes two decisiontree heuristics to determine the threat perception and forecasted response of the powerful state to the proliferation case.87 Use of heuristics demonstrates the influence of cognitive influences and national security policies on powerful state threat perceptions and proliferation response selection. The threat level heuristic incorporates cognitive psychological influences to determine whether the powerful state perceives the proliferating state as a low or a high threat. The forecasted proliferation response heuristic incorporates psychological motivations, power projection capabilities, and national security policies to determine whether the powerful state will take no action, select coercive diplomacy, or use military force as a proliferation policy response. The study argues these additional factors account for the differing responses to a particular proliferation case. These criteria also account for the divergences from Kroenig’s predictions of power-projecting and non-power-projecting state perceptions of threats to their national security.

85 Stein,

“Building Politics into Psychology,” 245. “Building Politics into Psychology,” 246. 87 Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero, “Identity, Power and Threat Perception,” 759. 86 Stein,

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1 Introduction

Summary This chapter sets the stage to discuss current concerns of emerging nuclear threats, addresses powerful state proliferation response options, and the factors that contribute to weaker state proliferation. The chapter also highlights shortfalls in the current nuclear proliferation literature to demonstrate the need for a more tailored approach to proliferation literature to enable a better understanding of why individual powerful states have differing perceptions and divergent responses to the same proliferation cases. Chapter 2 provides a deep dive discussion into nuclear proliferation literature and articulates the limitations of the existing literature by examining Matthew Kroenig’s expansion of the Waltz–Sagan debates of how proliferation affects differently situated states. The chapter outlines the study’s acceptance of Kroenig’s Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory, which argues nuclear proliferation has varying effects on differently situated power-projecting states and that these differing effects account for the variations in their proliferation responses. While Kroenig’s power-based theory rests on the assumption that the ability to project power over a state determines how it will be affected by proliferation, the study’s enhanced Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory argues proliferation’s differing effects are directly related to the threat perceived by the power-projecting state, and that these perceptions are shaped by cognitive psychological influences. Chapter 3 examines the cognitive psychological influences that shape powerful state threat perceptions to better understand the influences that shape how a power projecting state perceives a potential threat emanating from a weaker proliferating state. The chapter examines decision-makers’ perceptions of whether cognitive processes contribute to misperceptions of an adversary, resulting in threat inflation and overreach by the powerful state. The chapter also discusses the study’s argument that two interdependent cognitive psychological influences shape the threat perceptions of a power-projecting state, and influence how its leaders interpret and respond to horizontal proliferation. These two influences are: (1) a historical tragedy and (2) a history of conflict between the power-projecting and proliferating states. Studies show that a historical tragedy, such as the Holocaust or the September 11th attacks, influences a state’s perceptions of its enemies and can contribute to nationalism and a heightened propensity to identify emerging threats to the state. Studies also demonstrate that states with a pattern of conflict are inclined to have cognitive predispositions that can lead to an overestimation or inflation of a threat and an increased likelihood of a continuation of hostilities. Chapter 4 examines the United States and Israel’s national security policy and U.S. nuclear policy to provide insight into how each state’s policies contribute to their proliferation responses by illustrating the frameworks each state uses to respond to and address challenges to their security. The chapter highlights the differing approaches the United States and Israel take in formulating national security policy and executing their national security strategies. The United States is a global power with a structured national security policy framework that relies on multilateralism and utilizing all instruments of national power to secure its national security interests. As an isolated regional power, Israel’s national security policy is

Summary

25

largely based on a realist assumption that its relationship with the Arab world and Iran is a zero-sum game—meaning if one side gains, the other side loses—therefore, Israel’s strategy is that all threats must be negated because, in the absence of reliable international allies, Israel must be prepared to fight alone. Chapter 5 examines the military doctrine and power projection capabilities of the United States and Israel to understand the mechanisms available to respond to a threat. This study defines a threat as a combination of intent and capability. Perceptions provide for contextual framing of intent, and national security policy, and military capability provides the mechanisms and instruments for the response. The chapter discusses how Kroenig’s definition of power projection—the ability of a state to fight a fullscale, conventional military ground war on the territory of another state—is overly restrictive, particularly as it relates to counterproliferation. In defining power projection, Kroenig also argues that the ability to bomb a state without a corresponding ability to put boots on the ground is not a sufficient power projection capability. The chapter outlines the study’s argument that Kroenig’s power projection definition is outdated, as airpower has become the dominant power projection instrument for counterproliferation because the ground and naval forces are not suitable for striking dispersed, concealed, and hardened nuclear facilities. Chapter 6 provides an examination of the four case study countries’ national security and threat perceptions to provide a balanced approach to the study by examining possible causes for their decisions to pursue a nuclear weapon’ by providing insight into their relationships with the United States and Israel. This examination is intended to provide a better understanding of how threat perceptions affect differently situated states by assessing the national security concerns and potential threat perceptions of non-nuclear weapons states. The chapter also discusses the possible nexus between a non-nuclear state seeking a nuclear capability and how a nuclear state’s actions, rhetoric, and foreign policy decisions may compel the weaker adversarial state to seek a nuclear deterrent. Chapter 7 analyzes the data and conducts a comparison of cognitive psychological influences, and U.S. and Israeli national security policy and power projection capabilities by examining their regional goals and the effect proliferation has on their near and long-term national security interests. This chapter applies the four cases of proliferation to the study’s Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory’s two decision-tree heuristics to measure the degree of threat perceived by the powerful state and forecast whether it will take no action, use coercive diplomacy/sanctions or employ military force. The two heuristics applied eight questions to the United States and Israel’s responses to the four case studies. The responses illustrate the critical importance of including state and individual-level analysis into the proliferation literature. Chapter 8 summarizes the book’s findings and highlights the need to incorporate threat perception analysis into the nuclear proliferation literature. This inclusion will contribute to a better understanding of the determinants of the selection of counterproliferation tools by powerful states. The purpose of this book is to determine when and why do states that have the military capability to disrupt or destroy a weaker state’s nuclear facilities choose to take no action, pursue coercive diplomacy/sanctions, or use military force to halt or roll back a weaker state’s efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon. By providing a better understanding of how threat perceptions influence state policy responses, the book offers insight into potential lessons for improving U.S. and Israeli approaches to nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

To answer the central question of this study, “When and why do states that have the military capability to use force to disrupt or destroy a proliferating state’s nuclear facilities choose to take no action, use military force, or pursue coercive diplomacy?” the research first discusses the contributions and shortcomings of the existing proliferation literature. This critique contextualizes the foundation of nuclear proliferation literature before transitioning from the study of the aggregate to the individual effects of proliferation by discussing Matthew Kroenig’s power-based Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory, which argues nuclear proliferation has varying effects on differently situated power-projecting states and these differing effects account for the variations in their proliferation responses. For Kroenig, the threat posed by proliferation depends on a threatened state’s ability to project military power over the target state. His approach divides the world into three types of states: global powers, local powers, and non-power-projecting states, with global powers projecting power worldwide and local powers projecting power within their specific region. Further proliferation affects these powers because it constrains their ability to project conventional military force in the region and against the proliferating state. Proliferation is less threatening to non-power-projecting states because they are already unable to use conventional military force to secure their interests. This study accepts Kroenig’s central argument that proliferation has varying effects on differently situated states; however, this marks the study’s departure from his theory. While Kroenig rightly attributes proliferation’s varying effects to a state’s ability or inability to project power over the proliferating state, this study’s Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory argues proliferation’s differing effects on a powerful state, and its correlate response relates directly to the threat perceived by that state. This determination best accounts for divergent responses by similarly aligned states to the same proliferation cases. Since national actors formulate and execute foreign policy decisions, the research examines the psychological and operational milieu of these decision-makers to gain an understanding of the influences and motivations that affect their threat perceptions. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 B. K. Chappell, State Responses to Nuclear Proliferation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59801-3_2

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2 Literature Review

This is of particular importance as Mintz and DeRouen argue that no crisis or war can be understood fully “without direct reference to the decision making” of a state’s national leaders.1 These psychological influences will be explained through a survey of the political psychology literature, to include examining briefly why a weaker state may choose to proliferate. This survey highlights the importance of psychological motivations on foreign policy decision-makers and lays the foundation for the study’s theoretical approach to determining how threat perceptions contribute to a compelling state’s proliferation response.

Background In 1938, Nazi Germany chemists Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassman were experimenting with bombarding uranium atoms with neutrons and discovered the neutrons caused the nucleus to undergo fission by breaking apart, emitting large amounts of energy and additional neutrons in a chain reaction. Hahn and Strassman’s experiments demonstrated the energy produced by fission could produce an immensely powerful weapon if neutrons bombarded the right amount of uranium.2 The consequences of the Nazi’s atomic experiments were apparent to American physicists, who felt it critical to notify President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) of Nazi Germany’s atomic advances. The scientists approached Albert Einstein and asked him to warn President Roosevelt. Einstein had fled Nazi Germany and settled in the United States, where he worked at Princeton University’s Institute for Advanced Study. Having fled the Nazis, Einstein was well aware of the dangers posed by Adolf Hitler if he possessed an atomic bomb.3 In 1939, Einstein and Leo Szilard warned FDR of the Nazi’s atomic weapons program and urged him to initiate an American atomic program.4 Consequently, the United States established the Manhattan Project two years later, and tasked its director, Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, to develop an atomic bomb. On July 16, 1945, the United States tested its first nuclear device, known as “the gadget,” at the Trinity Site near Alamogordo, New Mexico. When Dr. Oppenheimer witnessed the detonation he quoted Hindu scripture from the Bhagavad-Gita, “I am become death, the destroyer of worlds.”5 In early 1945, General Henry “Hap” Arnold, Commander of the U.S. Army Air Forces asked Major General Curtis LeMay when he thought the war would end because Imperial Japan continued to fight even after Nazi Germany surrendered to Allied forces. LeMay estimated the war would be over by the beginning of September 1 Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen, Jr., Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 5. 2 Stephen N. Younger, The Bomb: A New History (New York: Ecco, 2009), 14. 3 Younger, The Bomb, 15. 4 Victor W. Sidel and Barry S. Levy, “Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Opportunities for Control and Abolition,” American Journal of Public Health, vol. 97, no. 9 (September 2007): 1589. 5 James A. Hijiya, “The ‘Gita’ of J. Robert Oppenheimer,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 144, no. 2 (2000): 123, accessed March 14, 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/151 5629.

Background

29

1945 because Japan would have no more targets for the Americans to hit by that time.6 Facing the prospect of a costly and bloody invasion, President Harry S. Truman gave the approval to drop America’s last two remaining atomic bombs on Japan. Three weeks after its first atomic test, America operationalized and deployed its two atomic bombs to the Pacific Theater. On the morning of August 6, 1945, seven B-29 Superfortress heavy bombers departed the South Pacific island of Tinian and vectored north toward Hiroshima, Japan. Hiroshima, home to roughly 290,000 civilians, 43,000 Japanese soldiers, and a number of American prisoners of war (POWs), was the first target city of America’s newly developed atomic bomb. At approximately 8:15 a.m., the “Enola Gay,” released “Little Boy” from its bomb bay, nearly 31,000 feet above the city. Little Boy, a 13 kiloton uranium-235 bomb, fell for 43s before detonating 1900 feet above ground zero.7 The blinding flash released radiation and an intense heat with a surface temperature of 13,892 degrees Fahrenheit (7700 degrees Celsius). Within seconds, much of Hiroshima was obliterated, along with 70,000 Japanese citizens and 20 American POWs, with those near the hypocenter incinerated immediately by temperatures that reached upwards of 7232 degrees Fahrenheit (4000 degrees Celsius).8 The Harry S. Truman National Historic Site provides a graphic firsthand narrative of what happened that morning in Hiroshima. The temperature near the blast site reached 5,400 degrees Fahrenheit. The sky seemed to explode. Birds ignited in midair; asphalt boiled. People over two miles away burst into crumbling cinders. Others with raw skin hanging in flaps around their hips leaped shrieking into waterways to escape the heat. Men without feet stumbled about on the charred stumps of their ankles. Women without jaws screamed incoherently for help. Bodies described as “boiled octopuses” littered the destroyed streets. Children, tongues swollen with thirst, pushed floating corpses aside to soothe their scalded throats with bloody river water.9

Three days later, on August 9, six more B-29s took off from Tinian Island and vectored toward the target city of Kokura, which housed one of Japan’s largest munitions plants. Due to extensive cloud cover, the bombers diverted to their secondary target, Nagasaki. At 10:58 a.m., the B-29 nicknamed “Bockscar” dropped “Fat Man,” a 21 kiloton plutonium-239 bomb over the city. As five-year-old Shigemitsu Tanaka played outside, he heard a tremendous explosion and witnessed the sky turn completely white as Fat Man detonated 1650 feet above the city’s Urakami Valley.10 An estimated 40,000–75,000 people were killed immediately, and thousands of others 6 Fred Kaplan, The Bomb: Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear War

(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020), 4. 7 Stephen M. Younger, The Bomb: A New History (New York: Ecco, 2009), 17. 8 Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, “Heat,” The Menace of the Atomic Bomb, accessed March 6, 2020, https://hpmmuseum.jp/modules/exhibition/index.php?action=ItemView&item_id= 59&lang=eng. 9 National Park Service, “Harry S. Truman’s Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb,” accessed April 17, 2020, https://www.nps.gov/articles/trumanatomicbomb.htm. 10 Motoko Rich, “Survivors Recount Horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,” The New York Times, May 27, 2016, accessed March 8, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/28/world/asia/surviv ors-recount-horrors-of-hiroshima-and-nagasaki.html.

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2 Literature Review

later died from radiation and burns.11 Still others, like Shigemitsu’s father, died years later from cancer and other illnesses brought on by the bomb’s radiation.12 The atomic bombings and their aftermath have had a lasting psychological impact on Japanese society, as stories recounted by the hibakusha—survivors of the bombings—are used to highlight the dangers of nuclear weapons, and by others to shape a doomsday mindset of a dark future. According to research detailed in a RAND report, “Japanese historical memory of nuclear devastation during WWII, especially Hiroshima, had a major psychological impact on postwar Japan and its consciousness. Survivor stories and apocalyptic fears penetrated Japanese popular culture after WWII and persisted.”13 The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki revolutionized warfare by demonstrating nuclear weapons can efficiently kill tens of thousands of people in a matter of seconds. To provide context to this efficiency, the destruction of Tokyo was achieved by 334 B-29 bombers dropping nearly 8000 bombs and killing 84,000 residents, while Hiroshima was obliterated by one plane carrying a single bomb that killed 70,000 residents.14

Deterrence Theory Since the first atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, scholars have debated the utility of nuclear weapons, the consequences of their possession, and whether they contributed to the “long peace” and stability of the Cold War. Initial debates centered on whether the United States should use force to maintain its nuclear monopoly to balance against the Soviet Union’s massive number of ground forces in the wake of the United States’ large-scale post-World War II demobilization. This monopoly later devolved into a nuclear duopoly after the Soviets crossed the nuclear threshold in 1949. Consequently, the debate shifted to nuclear deterrence theory and the impact of nuclear weapons on world peace and stability. Although early proliferation debates focused on whether nuclear weapons contributed to international peace, there was no escaping the fact that their efficient and annihilative power revolutionized the face of war by introducing the possibility of complete destruction. President Truman echoed this concern, “You have got to understand, that this isn’t a military weapon. It is used to wipe out women and children and unarmed people, and not for military uses. So we have got to treat 11 U.S.

Department of Energy, “The Manhattan Project: An Interactive History,” Office of History and Heritage Resources, accessed March 5, 2020, https://www.osti.gov/opennet/manhattan-projecthistory/Events/1945/hiroshima.htm. 12 Rich, “Survivors Recount Horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.” 13 Sara Daly, John Parachini, and William Rosenau, “Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor Implications of Three Case Studies for Combating Nuclear Terrorism,” RAND: Project Air Force (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), 8. 14 Eric Schlosser, “The Growing Dangers of the New Nuclear Arms Race,” New Yorker, May 24, 2018, accessed March 14, 2020, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-growing-dan gers-of-the-new-nuclear-arms-race.

Deterrence Theory

31

this differently from rifles and cannons and ordinary things like that.”15 As military strategist Bernard Brodie noted, prior to World War II the chief purpose of the United States’ military was to win wars. After World War II, due to the destructive nature of nuclear weapons, he argued this purpose transitioned to averting wars.16 Brodie also argued that suspicion of one’s rival was healthy and that deterrence was best achieved through preparing for war.17 Thus, the dawn of the nuclear age produced a strategy that heralded a willingness to make credible threats to go up to or over the brink of nuclear war in order to achieve one’s goals. This logic eventually fielded the classical deterrence theory, which suggested the United States and the Soviet Union maintained peace and stability based on nuclear weapons and a delicately maintained strategic balance.18 The Cold War signaled the beginning of a nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, as both sides increased their nuclear arsenals to ensure they maintained a viable deterrent to prevent war, while simultaneously preparing for it. As Kenneth Waltz stated in Man, the State and War, “with no system of law enforceable among them, with each state judging its grievances and ambitions according to the dictates of its own reason or desire—conflict, sometimes leading to war, is bound to occur. To achieve a favorable outcome from such a conflict a state has to rely on its own devices.”19 In this instance, the devices were the tremendous power of nuclear weapons. The Soviets and the Warsaw Pact gained a quantitative conventional force advantage in Europe and pursued a strategic nuclear superiority over the United States and NATO. Consequently, the United States designed its national security strategy around mutually assured destruction, and deterring a Soviet and Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe. The intent was to provide U.S. allies with an American nuclear umbrella to dissuade them from pursuing their own nuclear weapons, while the United States also sought to maintain strategic stability, reduce existing nuclear arsenals, and limit further proliferation.20 As discussions raged over the utility of nuclear weapons scholars focused primarily on the “usability paradox” in what Scott Sagan labeled the twin goals of secure deterrence and accidental war prevention.21 During the Cold War, the former emphasized the role of nuclear weapons in deterring a Soviet attack against the United States and its allies. The latter entailed preventing an accidental war; while at the same time, ensuring the weapon remained “usable enough” to convince 15 Scott D. Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 1989), 14. 16 Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour, Perfect Deterrence (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University

Press, 2000), 4. Zoellner, Uranium: War, Energy, and the Rock that Shaped the World (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2009), 97. 18 Zagare and Kilgour, Perfect Deterrence, 4. 19 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 159. 20 Perry and Schlesinger, “America’s Strategic Posture.” 21 Scott D. Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 4. 17 Tom

32

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the Soviets the United States would have a nuclear response to an attack on it or its vital interests.22 These two goals arguably contributed to stability and the “uneasy peace” which existed between the United States and the Soviet Union for nearly fifty years. They also shaped the central tenets of nuclear proliferation literature for the next half-century. In keeping with the deterrence rubric, Albert Wohlstetter espoused the “balance of terror” in which the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) had the ability to inflict unimaginable destruction on one another, a destructive capability later enhanced by the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and thermonuclear weapons. Wohlstetter argued deterrence in the 1960s was the product of “sustained intelligent effort” and would not be the result of the United States maintaining a qualitative technological edge over the Soviets. For Wohlstetter, strategic deterrence had limitations in that it was not very effective in preventing limited wars, preventing the accidental outbreak of war, or protecting major population centers.23 Instead, he argued although deterrence was difficult to maintain it could be bolstered by a reliable second-strike capability, which he also believed to be one of strategic deterrence’s greatest weaknesses because it relied on having enough nuclear weapons survive a first strike to have a credible and deterring second-strike capability. In describing the importance of deterrence, Wohlstetter posited two concepts: Extended Deterrence and Strategic Deterrence. The former relied on the threat of a first strike while the latter relied on a second-strike capability. With Extended Deterrence, he warned that being perceived as vulnerable could solicit an adversarial first strike. Wohlstetter also highlighted the many difficulties of Strategic Deterrence and emphasized it should only be part of a country’s military and foreign policy, and that foreign policy reorientation was required.24 This was embodied in the nuclear age’s elevation of bargaining, the superpowers’ manipulation of shared risk, and the use of threats—the diplomacy of violence. As the two superpowers achieved a degree of nuclear parity and relative stability, they proposed putting nuclear weapons under international control while at the same time, some might argue hypocritically, retaining their own vast nuclear arsenals.25 Accordingly, Perry and Schlesinger stated in their 1967 report America’s Strategic Posture, the U.S. nuclear arsenal peaked at 32,000 weapons and the Soviets possessed over 45,000 nuclear weapons.26 Consequently, early proliferation literature continued to focus on the efficacy of nuclear deterrence theories and policies— Assured Destruction, Damage Limitation, Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), 22 Sagan,

Moving Targets, 5.

23 Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” RAND Corporation (December 1958), 202. 24 Wohlstetter,

“The Delicate Balance of Terror,” 209.

25 “The Development and Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” accessed April 27, 2011, http://www.

nobelprize.org. J. Perry and James R. Schlesinger, America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2009), p. 4.

26 William

Deterrence Theory

33

Massive Retaliation, and Flexible Response—to prevent a large-scale war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Concurrently, literature during this period also focused on what Peter Feaver asserted were the associated measures of arsenal size, state foreign policies, and assessments of the regional balances of power.27 This scholarly debate continued the trend of focusing on the international and regional effects of proliferation. Jim Mueller challenged the assumption that nuclear weapons contributed to world stability when he argued major war among developed nations was unlikely and posited there would have been no war between the superpowers irrespective of nuclear weapons. He based his argument on the belief that both powers were content with the status quo because neither forgot World War II’s devastation and both feared the costs of escalation.28 Robert Jervis welcomed the view that nuclear weapons played a role in keeping what he labeled a “nuclear peace.” Jervis argued nuclear weapons gave states pause with regard to executing the nuclear option; however, he notes they did not prevent nuclear and non-nuclear states from engaging in lower levels of violence (Russia–China and Israel–Syria). Jervis concluded large nuclear stockpiles influenced superpower politics in three ways; (1) they convinced nuclear powers that the devastation from all-out war is unimaginable, (2) neither side could avoid this devastation, and (3) this devastation could come quickly, in most cases within 30 minutes of a ballistic missile launch.29

The Spread of Nuclear Weapons No other weapon possesses the sheer annihilative power and speed of delivery as found in nuclear weapons, and it is because of this destructive power that two major tenets of U.S. foreign policy have been to curb the spread of nuclear weapons technology and to prevent the emergence of additional nuclear states.30 Coinciding with this national strategy, early scholarship initially focused on deterrence theory and the possible consequences of proliferation beyond the initial cadre of nuclear weapons states. During the Cold War, it was believed nuclear proliferation would eventually expand beyond the original “Club of Five”—China, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States—and this new charge would be led by European countries—Germany, Italy, and Sweden.31 This assumption was based on the belief that 27 Peter D. Feaver, “Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations,” International Security, vol. 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992–1993): 160. 28 Jim Mueller, “The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World,” Nuclear Diplomacy and Crisis Management (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 4. 29 Robert Jervis, “The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons: A Comment,” Nuclear Diplomacy and Crisis Management (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 31. 30 Gerard C. Smith and Helena Cobban, “A Blind Eye to Nuclear Proliferation,” Foreign Affairs (Summer 1989), accessed May 24, 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/44631/gerard-csmith-and-helena-cobban/a-blind-eye-to-nuclear-proliferation. 31 Ariel E. Levite, “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited,” International Security, vol. 27, no. 3 (Winter 2002/2003): 60.

34 Table 2.1 Nuclear weapons states, 1945–2019a

2 Literature Review Country

Date

Nuclear testsb

Warheads (est.)

United States

1945

1054

6185

Soviet Union/Russia

1949

715

6490

United Kingdom

1952

45

200

France

1960

210

300

China

1964

45

290

India

1988

6

140

South Africa

1982–1990

None Confirmed

0

Pakistan

1990

6

160

Belarus

?–1996

None Confirmed

0

Kazakhstan

?–1995

None Confirmed

0

Ukraine

?–1996

None Confirmed

0

North Korea

2006

3

30

a Erik

Gartzke and Matthew Kroenig, “A Strategic Approach to Nuclear Proliferation,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 53, no. 2 (April 2009): 154 b Kelsey Davenport, “Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance,” Arms Control Association, July 2019, accessed May 28, 2020, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweapo nswhohaswhat

only the most developed countries had the capability and capacity to develop nuclear weapons.32 Despite this conventional wisdom, after the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was established in the late 1960s, international concern over European proliferation migrated to concerns over proliferation in the developing world.33 This proliferation by states that operate largely outside the political control of the United States and Russia reinvigorated the nuclear proliferation debate and forced scholars to analyze the potential consequences of further nuclear proliferation (Table 2.1). Despite early limitation efforts, proliferation did not stop with the superpowers and by the 1960s, the United Kingdom, France, and China all joined the nuclear club. It was at this point the international community sought a multilateral agreement to prohibit the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and to establish international 32 David

Albright, Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America’s Enemies (New York: Free Press, 2010), 5. 33 Ariel E. Levite. “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited,” International Security, vol. 27, no. 3 (Winter 2002/2003): 60.

The Spread of Nuclear Weapons

35

safeguards with ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.34 The NPT envisioned a world free of nuclear weapons and provided that states not in possession of nuclear weapons, as of 1967, agree to not acquire them. It also stipulated that states in possession of nuclear weapons agree to dispense of them over time. Though the United States and other nuclear powers backed the NPT, some nonnuclear states grew skeptical of the nuclear states.35 The NPT’s emphasis on halting horizontal proliferation—the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states—led some to view it as a way to manage hypocrisy because the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) claimed to be committed to nuclear disarmament under NPT Article VI, while retaining their own nuclear arsenals and encouraging non-nuclear weapons states to accept a “second-class” status by relegating them to civil nuclear programs. Noted African studies scholar Ali Mazrui highlighted the politics of race in discussions about proliferation by non-white nations by pointing out that after China’s successful nuclear test in 1964, Indonesian President Sukarno famously stated, “Now, one of us [non-white nations] has an atomic bomb.”36 In the late 1970s, Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto discussed the idea of an “Islamic Bomb,” which raised concerns Pakistan might share nuclear technology with other Muslim countries.37 Years later, members of F.W. DeKlerk’s government denied persistent rumors that one of the major reasons for South Africa’s denuclearization was to prevent a “Black Bomb” from falling into the hands of Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress (ANC)-led government in post-apartheid South Africa.38 The end of the Cold War and subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union heralded the proliferation literature’s further shift from deterrence theory to an increased concentration on the perceived dangers of the spread of nuclear weapons and the need to secure nuclear material. In this post-Cold War era, a “new international urgency to rein in the number of nuclear weapons on the planet” took root as the bipolar world’s fears of nuclear Armageddon were supplanted by fears of rogue state proliferation and nuclear terrorism.39 As the United States and Russia strengthened their strategic relationship and reiterated their intention to reduce the number of deployed nuclear weapons, the nuclear parity and stability that once resided within the Cold

34 Ben

Sanders, “A Short History of Nuclear Non-Proliferation,” Articles and Studies, 12.

35 George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear

Weapons,” accessed July 3, 2011, http://www.hoover.org. 36 Ali A. Mazrui, “Numerical Strength and Nuclear Status in the Politics of the Third World,” The Journal of Politics, vol. 29, no. 4 (November 1967): 791. 37 Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 383. 38 David Albright and Andrea Stricker, Revisiting South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Its History, Dismantlement, and Lessons for Today (Washington, DC: Institute for Science and International Security, 2016), 189. 39 Rodger Baker, “Changing Views of Nuclear Proliferation,” STRATFOR, accessed April 27, 2011, http://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/changing-views-nuclear-proliferation.

36

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War era “uneasy peace” gave way to securing existing nuclear material and countering the spread of nuclear weapons and technology.40 These fears gained traction due to several events: the discovery of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program following the 1991 Gulf War, fears of nuclear terrorism generated by the September 11th attacks, revelations of the A.Q. Khan Network’s nuclear black market, the pace of North Korea’s nuclear program, and fears of Iran’s nuclear ambitions.41 Stephen Peter Rosen affirmed the seriousness of Khan’s transgressions when he asserted the progress of North Korean and Iranian nuclear weapons programs pushed nuclear proliferation to the top of the U.S. national security agenda.42 The international nuclear nonproliferation regime was a product of this desire to rein in the spread of nuclear weapons in an attempt to promote international stability and reduce the likelihood of nuclear war; and the 1967 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the bedrock of this global regime. The Nuclear Threat Initiative defines the nonproliferation regime as a “broad international framework of agreements and organizations aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and contributing to arms control and disarmament.”43 The regime comprises the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the IAEA safeguards system, Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), UN Security Council resolutions, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements between supplier and purchasing states.44 In his study, Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, Paul Lettow argues the nonproliferation regime has been integral in slowing the spread of nuclear weapons and reinforcing the idea that “the further spread of nuclear weapons harms the security of all nations.”45 Luttow also notes the nonproliferation regime is stressed by states such as Iran, North Korea, and Syria because their nuclear programs exploited and bypassed structural weaknesses designed to detect, determine, and enforce violations of safeguard obligations.46 Feaver and Niou argue these post-NPT events highlight the weaknesses of the current international nonproliferation regime because it focuses primarily on halting the further spread of nuclear weapons, but not on coping with the consequences of this spread.47

40 Matthew Bunn. “Nuclear Terrorism: A Strategy for Prevention,” Going Nuclear: Nuclear Proliferation and International Security in the 21st Century (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010), 330. 41 Stephen Peter Rosen, “After Proliferation: What to Do if More States Go Nuclear,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 85, no. 5 (September/October 2006), accessed May 24, 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/61912/stephen-peter-rosen/after-proliferation-what-to-do-if-more-states-go-nuclear. 42 Rosen, “After Proliferation.” 43 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Non-Proliferation Regime,” NTI, accessed May 24, 2020, https://tut orials.nti.org/nonproliferation-regime-tutorial/. 44 Paul Lettow, Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, Council on Foreign Relations, Council Special Report No. 54 (April 2010), 6. 45 Lettow, Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, 7. 46 Lettow, Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, 9. 47 Peter D. Feaver and Emerson M. S. Niou, “Managing Nuclear Proliferation: Condemn, Strike, or Assist?” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 40, no. 2 (June 1996): 212.

The Spread of Nuclear Weapons

37

The United States’ nonproliferation regime took on increased urgency in the wake of the September 11th attacks, as concerns heightened over terrorist groups and rogue states acquiring a nuclear weapon and being more inclined to use these weapons than other members of the established nuclear club. Accordingly, President Barack Obama affirmed his concern when he stated, “For the first time, preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism are now at the top of America’s nuclear agenda.”48 Former Director of Central Intelligence, John Deutch then proposed the United States’ nuclear security schema include preventing rogue state proliferation, halting unauthorized transfer of nuclear technology to terrorist groups, and protecting existing nuclear stockpiles.49 Matthew Kroenig echoed Deutch’s concern about nuclear states providing supply-side nuclear assistance to other states or terrorist networks in his book Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons.50 Despite recent attention, concerns over terrorists possessing nuclear weapons is not a new phenomenon, as Thomas Schelling discussed this possibility in his 1976 study, “Who Will Have the Bomb?”51 Similarly, Kroenig stressed the fear of further proliferation with his pronouncement, “Nuclear proliferation poses a grave threat to international peace and security.”52 Most recently, four high-profile career politicians collectively known as “The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse,” George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, joined together to seek global support to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, prevent their spread to dangerous persons, and to end them as a threat to the world.53 Similarly, Barry Schneider stated this transference of national security priorities to rogue state proliferation highlights concerns about the stability of the current nonproliferation regime.54 Despite nuclear proliferation’s elevation to the top-tier of U.S. foreign policy, proliferation literature continued to focus on the aggregate effects rather than deconstructing and examining its individual impacts on particular types of states. Consequently, in the post-9/11 world, the crux of nuclear proliferation literature shifted further from comparisons of nuclear strategies and capabilities to discussions of why states develop nuclear weapons, and the concept of proliferation management.

48 Robert Burns and Anne Flaherty, “Obama’s Nuclear Policy Overhaul: Limits Use of Nukes, Denounces Development of New Ones,” Huffington Post, accessed July 3, 2011, http://www.huffin gtonpost.com. 49 John Deutch, “A Nuclear Posture for Today,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2005): 49. 50 Matthew Kroenig, Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Cornell, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), 1. 51 Thomas C. Schelling, “Who Will Have the Bomb?” International Security, vol. 1, no. 1 (Summer 1976): 84. 52 Kroenig. Exporting the Bomb, 1. 53 Henry A. Kissinger, Sam Nunn, William J. Perry, George P. Shultz, “How to Protect Our Nuclear Deterrent,” The Wall Street Journal, January 19, 2010, accessed June 25, 2011, https://www.wsj. com/articles/SB10001424052748704152804574628344282735008. 54 Barry Schneider, “Nuclear Proliferation and Counter-Proliferation: Policy Issues and Debates,” Mershon International Studies Review, vol. 38, no. 2 (October 1994): 209.

38

2 Literature Review

Nuclear Motivations A state’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons is often multifaceted and proliferation rationales include combinations of fear and insecurity, deterrence, national pride, technological imperative, regime survival, coercive diplomacy, and internal political pressures. The means by which a country pursues nuclear weapons is often covert, as is alleged in Iran’s case where it is speculated the Iranians used the cover of pursuing civilian-use nuclear energy to cloak a clandestine nuclear weapons program.55 Although many countries may aspire to achieve nuclear status and from their perspective have a justifiable rationale to do so, the difficulty lies in the economic and political costs as well as the technical capacity required of this enormous undertaking. Despite these formidable barriers, Stephen Meyer argues the nuclear weapons process was made easier by programs such as the United States’ Atoms for Peace program because these programs removed many “unconventional” technical hurdles and gave many states a latent capacity to produce nuclear weapons.56 Ironically, the United States provided Iran with its first 5-megawatt nuclear reactor during the 1960s, under the Atoms for Peace program.57 Jacques Hymans critiqued two traditional assumptions used to explain the slowdown in new nuclear states. These assumptions are that states resist urges to seek a nuclear weapon until an external event forces them to pursue the weapon, and that many states opt for a latent nuclear breakout capability rather than openly test and declare their nuclear arsenal. Hymans instead argues recent proliferant states in the developing world started and failed to attain a nuclear weapon because of program mismanagement that was not respectful of scientific and technical (S&T) workers’ autonomy. Hymans argues developed nation nuclear programs tend to be more successful because they have “legal-rational institutions” with strong institutional barriers against political micromanagement, while developing nations tend to have “neopatrimonial institutions,” in which political leaders interfere with technical decision-making and micromanage the nuclear program, thus slowing down and impeding weapons development.58 Historically, political leaders and regimes viewed nuclear weapons as the maximization of the pursuit of power. Thus, the realist belief of self-help in an anarchic world had a profound effect on proliferation literature and influenced its focus on the international and regional systems. Early realists such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes held pessimistic views of life and emphasized man was motivated by 55 Gaukhar

Mukhatzhanova, “Pride and Prejudice: Understanding Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: A Comparative Perspective, vol. 2 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 43. 56 Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 1. 57 Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 164. 58 Jacques E. C. Hymans, “The Threat of Nuclear Proliferation: Perception and Reality,” Ethics and International Affairs, vol. 27, no. 3 (Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, 2013): 286.

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self-interests and the pursuit of power in a world characterized by a constant state of anarchy. Hans Morgenthau echoed this sentiment when he asserted international politics is a struggle for power and the aim of states and political leaders is the striving for power while in pursuit of their goals.59 Within this realist rubric, John Mearsheimer posited five key assumptions of life in the international system which greatly influenced realist proliferation literature. First, the international system is anarchic and states recognize no central authority above themselves. Second, great powers inherently possess an offensive military capability and this capability gives them the ability to hurt or destroy one another. The third assumption is states can never be certain about another state’s intention and if it will use its offensive military capability to attack. Fourth, survival is the ultimate goal of great powers and these powers seek to maintain their territorial integrity and autonomous domestic political order. The fifth assumption is that great powers are rational actors who think strategically about how to survive in the international system.60 This realist view depicts a world in constant conflict and this contributes to the international and regional focus as well as the incessant fear within proliferation literature due to a belief that states always seek power, and nuclear weapons are the ultimate symbols of power and the guarantors of survival. In her landmark study, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East, Etel Solingen examined why some states pursued nuclear weapons while others eschew them. The study focused primarily on why Middle Eastern countries tended to pursue nuclearization while East Asian countries trended toward denuclearization since the 1970s. Solingen’s research has increased relevance since this study uses four cases of Middle Eastern proliferation as the central component of its research. In addressing the proliferation divergence, Solingen utilizes both the neorealist and neoliberal schools to explain state nuclearization and denuclearization. She asserts neorealists trace nuclear decisions to the balance of power (Waltz), selfhelp and the security dilemma (Mearsheimer), and that nuclearization is expected to induce similar responses from the state’s neighbors. She, in turn, argues neoliberals stress the importance of international nonproliferation regimes such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to enforce compliance despite there being no evidence the NPT has prevented Middle East nuclearization.61 Consequently, Solingen argues systematic differences among nuclear aspirants is explained by whether the country’s rulers seek integration into the global economy or whether they reject it, and in turn rely on self-sufficiency. For Solingen, states that seek integration into the global economy have incentives to avoid the political, economic, reputational, and opportunity costs associated with nuclearization because these costs impair a domestic agenda favoring internationalization. While states that reject global economic integration incur fewer costs and seek political

59 Hans

Morgenthau, “A Realist Theory of International Politics,” Essential Readings in World Politics, second edition (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), 50. 60 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), 30. 61 Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East, 11.

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gain by using nuclear weapons to exploit nationalism in order to retain power.62 This theory provides a rationale for the Asian and Middle Eastern states’ divergence on nuclearization, as majorities of Asian states sought economic integration into the global economy while many Middle Eastern states sought to retain power and increase their strategic position, which Ferial Saeed rightly argues is the case for Iran.63 Similarly, Bahman Baktiari, argues some states seek a nuclear capability not so much for purely security reasons, but to gain international legitimacy. He rightly argues this is the case of Iran and asserts the clerics have used the West’s opposition to Iran’s nuclear program to generate national unity based on upholding Iranian prestige and national honor, a concept known in Farsi as ezzat-e melli.64 Baktiari’s paper makes several crucial arguments. First, Iran’s leaders are preoccupied with international legitimacy. Second, Iranian society has a vision of defending Iran’s rights and its national sovereignty. Third, the struggle for international recognition as an independent and sovereign state has been a central tenet of Iranian politics for more than a century. Baktiari argues many Iranians question the government’s stance that its nuclear program is peaceful, yet they do not question Iran’s right to pursue nuclear technology and all gained from it.65 President Khatami, whom Khan asserts was the most moderate leader in Iran, did not halt the progress of Iran’s nuclear program during his administration. Instead, Khatami argued in support of Iran’s pursuit of peaceful nuclear energy. If there is concern over [a] nuclear bomb, why we, who have not yet achieved the peaceful nuclear technology, i.e. production of uranium with 3.5 percent enrichment – that serves as fuel for nuclear plants – are not trusted and put under pressure, while the powers that have hundreds of nuclear warheads in the region and are capable of producing tens of nuclear bombs a year, are not only put under pressure but are also supported? What is observed in the world is this double-standard logic; and we should in fact move into the world wherein we will be able to meet our needs by relying on our own power and on God.66

Hassan Abbas asserts political theorists note four contributing and competing factors that explain why states seek nuclear weapons: (1) security challenges, (2) prestige and power, (3) technological imperatives, and (4) domestic factors. First, Abbas argues a state that is located in a dangerous region where it feels threatened by an aggressive enemy is likely to seek the means to protect itself and to also project military power. In this scenario, nuclear weapons provide a sense of security and are a guarantor of a state’s sovereignty. Second, attaining nuclear status promotes national 62 Solingen,

Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East, 5. Ara Saeed, “Redefining Success: Applying Lessons in Nuclear Diplomacy from North Korea to Iran,” Institute for National Strategic Studies (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, September 2010), 28. 64 Bahman Baktiari, “Seeking International Legitimacy: Understanding the Dynamics of Nuclear Nationalism in Iran,” Middle East Strategic Perspectives 1: Nuclear Politics in Iran (Center for Strategic Research: National Defense University Press, May 2010), 13. 65 Baktiari, “Seeking International Legitimacy: Understanding the Dynamics of Nuclear Nationalism in Iran,” 19. 66 Khan, Iran and Nuclear Weapons, 14. 63 Ferial

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pride, demonstrates a state’s technical prowess, and bestows upon it international recognition as an advanced nation. Third, a state’s decision to weaponize may result from “technological momentum” derived from its civilian nuclear programs because of a desire to further explore nuclear weapons programs. Fourth, domestic politics and politicians may compel the state to pursue a nuclear weapon due to personal preferences and motivations.67 Abbas argues all four components were applicable to Pakistan’s nuclear program, with the ultimate goal of providing it a deterrent against India and preventing New Delhi from “threatening the territorial integrity of Pakistan.”68 These four components are also applicable to the present case of Iran. First, Iran faces military threats from the United States and Israel, both of whom alternately call for regime change and have threatened to attack. Second, despite the current state of its economy and international isolation, Iran sees itself as a technologically advanced nation with a rich history dating back to the Persian Empire. For many Iranians, the richness of their culture, greatness of their historical empire, and highly educated population are drivers for international recognition as an advanced state. Third, Iran’s nuclear ambitions date back to the Shah, when Iran received its first nuclear reactor as part of the U.S. Atoms for Peace program. Fourth, many hardline politicians have voiced support for a nuclear program, particularly former President Mahmud Ahmadinejad who used it to promote nationalism and rail against the West and Israel. However, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei has stated repeatedly that nuclear weapons are forbidden. In the case of the key and very beneficial nuclear science… when it was paired with a thirst for more power, it resulted in the creation of the nuclear weapons and turned into a major threat to the world and humanity. Although we have always had the ability to tread this path, we declared it haram [forbidden by religion] according to the verdict of the beloved Islam, and therefore there is no reason for us to expend our resources on developing and stockpiling a weapon that is absolutely prohibited [by Islam] to use.69

John Weltman challenges this approach by arguing middle states may proliferate if they sense a breakdown or change in the pattern of alignments within the international system. He argues this is the position of middle powers such as Germany, whose present security is assured via guarantees and treaty.70 Alternatively, Sagan, in his study “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” challenges the conventional wisdom that states proliferate when faced with a significant military threat to their security that cannot be met through alternate means, such as a conventional military response or diplomacy. He argues that 67 Hassan

Abbas, Pakistan’s Nuclear Bomb: A Story of Defiance, Deterrence and Deviance (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 45. 68 Abbas, Pakistan’s Nuclear Bomb, 47. 69 Nicholas Sakelaris, “Khamenei: Nuclear Weapons Forbidden by Islam, so Iran Will Not Use Them,” UPI, October 9, 2019, accessed April 26, 2020, https://www.upi.com/Top_News/WorldNews/2019/10/09/Khamenei-Nuclear-weapons-forbidden-by-Islam-so-Iran-will-not-use-them/ 5551570629882/. 70 John J. Weltman, “Managing Nuclear Multipolarity,” International Security, vol. 6, no. 3 (Winter 1981–1982): 189.

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focusing solely on national security considerations as the cause of proliferation is dangerously inadequate because nuclear weapons programs are more than tools of national security, they are political objects in domestic debates and internal bureaucratic struggles, and can serve as international symbols of modernity and identity.71 Waltz disputes this sentiment by arguing, “nuclear weapons do not equalize the power of nations because they do not change the economic basis of a nation’s power.”72 Waltz concludes great powers are strong because, in addition to nuclear weapons, they also have immense resources that allow them to generate and maintain other mechanisms of power projection. The levers of power and resources available to a great power are represented in the DIMEFIL concept, which consists of diplomatic, informational, military, economic, finance, intelligence, and law enforcement instruments of power (IOPs). Waltz’s view is supported by neorealists who assert power is more than just military power, it is the combined capabilities of a state, and this power gives a state a place in the world order and shapes its behavior within the international system.73 Returning to his argument that nuclear weapons are political objects and can serve as symobls of modernity and identity, Sagan constructs three models of why states decide to build or refrain from building nuclear weapons. First, the Security Model is when states build nuclear weapons to increase national security against foreign threats in the absence of credible security guarantees from a nuclear power. Second, in the Domestic Politics Model, states use nuclear weapons as political tools to advance parochial domestic and bureaucratic interests. Security threats are not the central cause of weapons decisions, they are merely windows of opportunity through which parochial interests enter. Third, the Norms Model argues nuclear weapons acquisition provides an important symbol of a state’s modernity and identity. Sagan asserts these three models exist in current literature, but have not been adequately analyzed or properly evaluated against empirical evidence, nor have they been placed in a comparative political framework.74 Sagan’s Three Model approach is compelling; however, its primary weakness lies in its compartmentalization of proliferation rationales. His approach bypasses the crosscutting cleavages, which incorporate portions of each of his models, particularly over a period of time, as different influences affect a state’s nuclear ambitions. In the current Iranian case, the Norms Model applied during the nascent stages of Iran’s nuclear program begun under the Shah. Though Iran was on friendly terms with Israel, the Shah sought a “full-fledged nuclear power industry” designed to symbolize Iranian progress and power through utilizing the United States-supplied research reactor.75 After the Shah was overthrown, Khomeini suspended Iran’s 71 Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” Going Nuclear: Nuclear Proliferation and International Security in the 21st Century (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010), 4. 72 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2010), 180. 73 Baylis and Smith, 209. 74 Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?” 4. 75 Abbas Milani, The Shah (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 332.

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nuclear program because he believed it to be un-Islamic. This suspension was shortlived due to Iraq’s use of chemical weapons during the eight-year Iran–Iraq War, in which Iran witnessed Western technology and intelligence assets support Iraq’s better-equipped forces.76 To the Iranians, a nuclear deterrent would prevent this type of warfare from reoccurring, thus in the wake of the Iran–Iraq War the Iranian model incorporated the Security Model to increase its security. This effort soon took on additional urgency after the United States invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, and in effect, surrounded Iran with U.S. combat forces on its eastern and western borders. The Iranian case also incorporates the Domestic Politics Model because President Ahmadinejad often used Iran’s future nuclear capability as a rally cry to incite nationalism and to deflect negative attention away from his government by pitting it against the West. Notably, on April 15, 2009, Ahmadinejad observed: Four and a half years ago, those who went to negotiate said to their interlocutors, after they agreed to freeze all [uranium enrichment], “We want [nuclear energy for the purposes of] science and technology. Give us permission to operate 20 centrifuges.” But the other side answered insolently… But today, with the grace of God, and thanks to Iran’s national unity… nearly 7,000 centrifuges are spinning today at Natanz, mocking them.77

Although Sagan’s Three Model approach is persuasive, it is not comprehensive because it does not fully take into account that over a period of time, a state’s rationale for proliferation often adjusts to its changing perceptions and realities. Similarly, Robert F. Goheen argues states have three motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons—aggressive intention, concern about security, and the pursuit of status or prestige.78 He asserts aggressive intention is the least likely objective for proliferation because of the responses that may occur from the immediate adversary or major nuclear powers.79 Goheen suggests a state may have a concern about security due to the superiority of a neighbor’s conventional arms or by its actual or imminent nuclear weapons capability. Using this premise, Goheen discusses Saddam Hussein’s response to Israel’s attack on its reactor at Osirak. He states Saddam appealed to his fellow Arabs to help him, acquire atomic bombs to confront the Israelis, not to champion the Arabs and not to fuel war, but to safeguard and achieve peace.80 Goheen argues a nuclear capability can also enhance the prestige and status of differing segments of society—national pride, scientific community, military, individual leaders, and the regime. This can serve a country well as it deals with a regional rival. He cites India’s example that nuclear weapons provide a country with enhanced influence in world affairs and signals it has arrived in the modern world by demonstrating its scientific and technological capabilities. This argument has similarities 76 Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2004), 228. 77 Anoushiravan Ehteshami, “Iran’s Tenth Presidential Election: Implications for Iran and the Region,” Middle East Strategic Perspectives 1: Nuclear Politics in Iran (Center for Strategic Research: National Defense University Press, May 2010), 43. 78 Robert F. Goheen, “Problems of Proliferation: U.S. Policy and the Third World,” World Politics, vol. 35, no. 2 (January 1983): 204. 79 Goheen, 204. 80 Goheen, 205.

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with one of the arguments made for Iran’s nuclear ambitions, in that Iran sees itself as a technologically advanced state, and the premiere symbol of an advanced state is a nuclear weapon. In The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, Jacques E. C. Hymans introduced the idea of leaders’ conceptions of their nation’s identities, a concept he calls their “national identity conceptions” or NICs, which are the leaders’ sense of what the nation stands for and how high it naturally stands, to explain their desire to abstain from or to pursue a nuclear weapon.81 Hymans argues we should view leaders at the individual level of analysis and look at his or her specific beliefs on national identity and how the leader interprets collective symbols and memories that are common to the nation to gain insight into their international perceptions. This reference back to collective memories is often used by leaders determined to prevent a repeat of a national tragedy, such as Pakistan’s loss of East Pakistan (Bangladesh), the overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh and the reinstatement of Mohammad Reza Shah in Iran, Syria’s military defeats and loss of the Golan Heights to Israel, the United States seeking to prevent another 9/11, or Israel wanting to prevent a second Holocaust. The argument for collective symbols can be used to argue for a national identity and how high it stands in comparison to competitors through the use of concepts such as American Exceptionalism. Hymans rightfully argues the vertical dimension of self-other comparisons is often ignored in the international relations literature. The view of self and the other are essential to understanding leader motivations and nationalistic undertones and messaging. For Hymans, these stimuli activate a leader’s NIC, which drives them to make decisions to ensure national survival due to emotional memories that affect cognitive and emotional pathways.82 The subsequent activation of fear and/or pride in the decision-maker affects their behavior, particularly as it relates to the level of perceived threat, the level of cognitive complexity, the felt urgency to act, and the ultimate goal sought by this action. Hymans rightly points out that on the cognitive level, fear creates a disposition toward higher threat perception which can result in the leader having a myopic view and disregarding contradictory data and intelligence about the perceived threat, thus the cognitive complexity is impaired because the leader is unable to adjust to new information. Abbas Maleki and John Tirman point to this when discussing critics’ reactions to the interim Iran nuclear agreement reached in November 2013. Maleki and Tirman assert that within days of the initial agreement, old misperceptions about Iran emerged, and critics charged Iran was untrustworthy, devious, fixated on regional dominance, and dedicated to Israel’s destruction.83 Fear directly contributes to lower levels of cognitive complexity and often results in further threat inflation. This increased threat perception contributes to a greater urgency to act on 81 Jacques

E. C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 16. 82 Hymans, The Political Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, 27. 83 Abbas Maleki and John Tirman, “U.S.-Iran Misperceptions: Introduction to a Dialogue,” U.S.Iran Misperceptions: A Dialogue, ed. Abbas Maleki and John Tirman (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 11.

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the perceived threat, with the ultimate goal of mitigating that fear by attacking the perceived threat created by a proliferating country’s nuclear program. More recently, Kelly P. O’Reilly sought to understand why states proliferate by examining how a leader’s beliefs and perceptions about the international system influence a state’s decision to pursue a nuclear capability. O’Reilly argues that understanding basic psychological motivations, such as the role of power, and perceptions of self and others forms a strategic context which provides answers about a leader’s willingness to proliferate. The author asserts proliferation willingness is a critical and overlooked component of the proliferation equation. Ultimately, it is the combination of willingness and opportunity—technical and scientific capabilities—that determines whether a country will pursue a nuclear weapon.84 O’Reilly presents the best case for determining why a state decides to go nuclear by examining the case at the individual-level of analysis and highlighting how the leader’s beliefs and perceptions influence a state’s decision to proliferate. The strength of O’Reilly’s study is the use of political psychology in calculating a state’s decisions since leaders, rather than the state as a whole, generally make the case for solutions to situations that pose a threat to a state’s national security. These leaders then seek public support for their desired outcome. The book’s limitation is that it explores only the proliferating state’s motivations, and does not contain a rigorous study of the powerful state’s motivations for limiting proliferation. Nicholas Miller takes a unique look at the motivations of states seeking a nuclear weapon, as well as of states seeking to limit proliferation. He examined how the U.S. nonproliferation regime has evolved over time and assesses its effectiveness in both unilateral and multilateral implementation. In his work, Stopping the Bomb, Miller argues U.S. nonproliferation policies have been critical in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons by deterring states from beginning a program and compelling others to halt their weapons development through the credible threat of economic sanctions.85 Miller suggests current literature accounts for four reasons why states seek to acquire a nuclear weapon independent of U.S. nonproliferation efforts: the nature of the security environment, domestic regime characteristics, normative commitments, and the supply of nuclear technology.86 In addressing current literature, Miller strikes down the argument of past predictions of nuclear cascades and a nuclear domino effect, and disputes studies that argue large-scale proliferation did not materialize due to the role of leader identity conception, norms embodied in the NPT, regional security environments, domestic regime type, and threats of force by adversaries. He instead posits that as the global hegemon, the United States can credibly threaten to cut off or weaken economic and military support to states that seek nuclear weapons thereby fending off nuclear programs by U.S. allies and partners. Miller rightly contends “rogue states” are now the primary proliferating 84 Kelly

P. O’Reilly, Nuclear Proliferation and the Psychology of Political Leadership: Beliefs, Motivations and Perceptions (New York: Routledge, 2016), 14. 85 Nicholas L. Miller, Stopping the Bomb: The Sources and Effectiveness of US Nonproliferation Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018), 244. 86 Miller, 14.

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concerns due to their lack of dependency on U.S. aid and assistance. In these cases, unilateral U.S. sanctions have often failed because these countries had a low dependence on the United States.87 Miller continues that multilateral economic sanctions have proven helpful at halting or deterring outlier nations, such as with Iran and Iraq.88 Miller’s research is extremely relevant to this study, particularly since it illustrates the critical nature of sanctions, which is one of the study’s three proliferation responses available to powerful states to halt or curtail nuclear proliferation. The reliance on economic sanctions as a primary diplomatic instrument has found scattered success when applied to adversarial states. The weakness of the sanctions regime is witnessed by North Korea’s continued nuclear intransigence, and Iran’s expansion of its uranium enrichment activities and its continued economic resilience despite the United States imposing economic sanctions as part of the Maximum Pressure campaign. The campaign was designed to inflict economic pain on Iran to force its leaders to renegotiate the U.S.-abandoned Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, curtail its ballistic missile program, and end its malign activities in the region. The Maximum Pressure campaign has been largely unsuccessful in recalibrating Iran’s activities, and has primarily affected its civilian population by choking the economy and cutting off access to critical medical supplies during the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite the reimposition of economic sanctions, Iran’s regional behavior has shown little signs of change as it continues to support allies in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. In their study, Nuclear Politics: The Strategic Causes of Proliferation, Debs and Monteiro examine why states develop nuclear weapons and how the security environment shapes a state’s decision to seek a nuclear weapon. The authors assert nuclear proliferation affects the security and strategic interaction of the state acquiring the nuclear weapon, as well as the security interests of its adversaries and allies who may attempt to halt this acquisition.89 This is a central tenet of Kroenig’s power-based theory and this author’s research, both of which argue nuclear proliferation’s differing effects are rooted in the prior balance of power. The authors argue a state will attempt to proliferate when it believes a nuclear deterrent will produce a security benefit to address a high-level threat, and this benefit must outweigh the costs of proliferation because the state could be subjected to an adversary’s preventive counterproliferation efforts. The study posits that a preventive strike against the proliferating state will be costly, so an adversary will likely weigh the costs of a strike vis-à-vis the cost of the proliferating state acquiring a nuclear weapon, which would result in a changed balance of power between the two states.90 Debs and Monteiro rightly argue the balance of conventional power between the proliferating state and the powerful state prior to nuclear acquisition influences whether the weaker state will pursue the nuclear option. If the proliferating state has 87 Miller,

8. 244. 89 Alexandre Debs and Nuno P. Monteiro, Nuclear Politics: The Strategic Causes of Proliferation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 4. 90 Debs and Monteiro, 10. 88 Miller,

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a high degree of conventional military power prior to proliferation there is a smaller security benefit of nuclear acquisition. Whereas, if there is a large disparity between the two states’ conventional military power, there is more incentive for the weaker state to seek a nuclear weapon to address the high-level threat.91 From the nonproliferation perspective, the authors’ theory includes a sticks and carrots approach to proliferation in which there are incentives and disincentives to proliferation. A stickbased approach includes coercive diplomatic actions, such as International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)-imposed nuclear facility inspections, limits to the nuclear supply chain, and economic sanctions, all of which were applied to Iran and Iraq. A carrot-based approach includes policies to boost the potential proliferator’s security through increased foreign military sales, security cooperation, joint military exercises, and security commitments.92 The Obama administration implemented a sticks and carrots approach to Iran as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, by easing economic sanctions while also reserving the right to impose “snapback” sanctions if Tehran violated the agreement. As this section focused on the possible motivations for nuclear proliferation, the next section examines the arguments on how to best manage this proliferation.

Proliferation Optimism and Proliferation Pessimism The study of the causes of war has traditionally been dominated by realist theories, which assume sovereign states act rationally to advance their security, power, and wealth in an anarchic international system.93 Consequently, realist concerns over how to manage the potential spread of nuclear technology and its effects on the stability of the international system led to the creation of the proliferation management framework. This framework divides itself into the twin concepts of proliferation optimism and proliferation pessimism.94 In their monumental debates, Kenneth Waltz (Optimism) and Scott Sagan (Pessimism), two of the best-known proliferation management scholars, advocate opposing positions as to whether nuclear proliferation is good or bad for international stability and peace. Waltz employs rational deterrence theory to argue the spread of nuclear weapons decreases the likelihood of war because the destructive power of these weapons make the costs of war too great, therefore they will deter aggressors.95 Accordingly, the rational deterrence model has three requirements for stable nuclear deterrence. 91 Debs

and Monteiro, 8. and Monteiro, 10. 93 Jack S. Levy, “Theories and Causes of War,” The Handbook on the Political Economy of War (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2011), 16. 94 Bradley A. Thayer, “What to Read on Nuclear Proliferation,” Foreign Affairs, November 12, 2009, accessed May 10, 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/readinglists/what-to-readon-nuclear-proliferation-0. 95 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” The American Political Science Review, vol. 84, no. 3 (September 1990): 731. 92 Debs

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First, there must be no preventive war during the transition period when one state has nuclear weapons and the other state has not developed a nuclear breakout capability. Second, both states must develop a survivable second-strike capability. Third, their nuclear arsenals must have a robust command and control system to prevent accidental or unauthorized use.96 Waltz’s assumption that nuclear weapons increase the likelihood of peace is based on the belief that the annihilative power of nuclear weapons dissuades states from going to war more so than conventional weapons because in a conventional war there is a chance to win, while in a nuclear war, both losing and winning could mean complete destruction of the state. Therefore, Waltz asserts rational states will avoid nuclear war because “Nuclear weapons deter nuclear weapons… The temptation of one country to employ increasingly larger amount of force is lessened if its opponent has the ability to raise the ante. Force can be used with less hesitation by those states able to parry, and to threaten at varied levels of military endeavor.”97 Waltz downplays alarmist fears of a nuclear arms race by arguing nuclear weapons have largely proliferated vertically and not cascaded horizontally as pessimists predicted. In the event of horizontal proliferation, he advocates allowing states to overtly develop their nuclear programs in order to receive international assistance to incorporate nuclear command and control system safeguards, which aid in preventing the unauthorized or accidental release of nuclear weapons and maintains positive control over them until the decision to authorize nuclear weapons is ordered by the competent authority. In this self-help environment, optimists downplay pessimist concerns of an aggressive nuclear state vis-à-vis a non-nuclear state—stability–instability paradox—and assert that since “rulers like to continue to rule” there is no reason to believe they will suddenly go mad and challenge the vital interests of another state or launch a nuclear first strike against an adversary.98 The question of whether Iran is a rational actor circulates in Western circles, particularly as it relates to the nuclear question. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu accuses the Iranians of being “apocalyptic,” and U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham declared, “I think they’re crazy.”99 Preceding the signing of the Iran nuclear deal, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon warned of Iran having an “apocalyptic messianic ambition.”100 Countering this argument of an irrational actor, Fareed Zakaria points to Kenneth Pollack, who reviewed decades of Iranian foreign policy and argues the Iranians are not only rational, but prudent when it comes to its foreign policy decision-making.101 96 Sagan

and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 50. Iran and Nuclear Weapons, 28. 98 Scott Sagan, Kenneth Waltz, and Richard K. Betts, “A Nuclear Iran: Promoting Stability or Courting Disaster?” Journal of International Affairs, vol. 60, no. 2 (Spring/Summer 2007): 139. 99 Fareed Zakaria, “Is Iran Rational?” The Washington Post, April 9, 2015, accessed May 25, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/is-iran-rational/2015/04/09/3c2cc5a8-def511e4-a500-1c5bb1d8ff6a_story.html. 100 Tovah Lazaroff, “Defense Minister Ya’alon: Iran Has ‘Apocalyptic Messianic Ambition’,” The Jerusalem Post, February 16, 2015, accessed May 25, 2020, https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/ Yaalon-Iran-has-apocalyptic-messianic-ambition-391169. 101 Zakaria, “Is Iran Rational?”. 97 Khan,

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Iran’s decision to launch a limited ballistic missile strike against two U.S. military bases in Iraq in response to the U.S. targeted killing of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force Commander (IRGC-QF), Major General Qassem Soleimani demonstrated Iranian prudence in not wanting to escalate the crisis, for the moment. Sagan utilized Organization Theory to stress the influences on decision-makers to champion the pessimist argument that proliferation increases the likelihood of war, promotes instability, encourages nuclear arms races, and increases the risk of accidental nuclear exchange due to military control over the nuclear command and control system. The foundation of Organization Theory rests on two major themes. First, large organizations function within a limited form of rationality and must develop routines to coordinate actions among different units. Second, complex organizations have multiple, conflicting goals, and the process by which objectives are chosen and pursued is very political.102 Under the pessimist rubric, proliferation increases the likelihood of nuclear war as unstable states are incapable of maintaining control over their nuclear arsenals, and their fear of a decapitating preventive first strike may drive them to adopt unsafe nuclear practices.103 Accentuating this fear of preventive strikes, Sagan argues U.S. foreign policy has given states incentive to pursue a nuclear deterrent due to Washington threatening them so often.104 This is a position advanced by Ted Galen Carpenter, who argues U.S. foreign policy often compels states to acquire a nuclear deterrent because the United States delegitimizes their national security concerns and demonstrates that without a nuclear weapon these states are susceptible to violent regime change.105 After the United States rout of Iraq in Desert Storm, former Indian Chief of Staff of the Army General K. Sundarji proclaimed, “The lesson of Desert Storm is, don’t mess with the United States without nuclear weapons.”106 North Korea’s official KCNA news agency echoed this sentiment, when harkening a Hobbesian view of the world when it stated the current international situation resembled the “law of the jungle” where only the strong survive. The news agency then alluded to a reason why North Korea will not denuclearize by referencing how Iraq and Libya suffered regime change because they did not have a nuclear deterrent, “The Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq and the Qaddafi regime in Libya could not escape the fate of destruction after being deprived of their foundations for nuclear development and giving up nuclear programs of their own accord.”107 Then-U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton sparked outrage 102 Sagan

and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 51. D. Feaver, Scott D. Sagan, and David J. Karl, “Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers,” International Security, vol. 22, no. 2 (Autumn 1997): 189. 104 Sagan, Waltz, and Betts, “A Nuclear Iran,” 144. 105 Carpenter, “How Washington Encourages Nuclear Proliferation.” 106 Brad Roberts, The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016), 52. 107 AFP, “North Korea Cites Muammar Gaddafi’s ‘Destruction’ in Nuclear Test Defense,” The Telegraph, January 9, 2016, accessed April 28, 2020, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wor ldnews/asia/northkorea/12090658/North-Korea-cites-Muammar-Gaddafis-destruction-in-nucleartest-defence.html. 103 Peter

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in Pyongyang by asserting the United States would look at the “Libya model of 2003, 2004,” as it pertains to North Korea’s disarmament.108 The Libya model is in reference to Moammar Qaddafi renouncing his weapons of mass destruction program and opening Libyan facilities to international weapons inspectors shortly after the United States-led invasion of Iraq because he feared he might be the next target of regime change. Nearly seven years after relinquishing his WMD program, Qaddafi was overthrown by insurgents with the assistance of United States-led NATO air support. Within this cycle of fear, instability and mistrust, pessimists profess the inherent dangers of aspiring nuclear states because they are often controlled by the military, which Sagan argues is more inclined than their civilian counterparts “to see war as likely in the near term and inevitable in the long term.”109 Sagan supports this position by arguing, “Preventive war is likely to be chosen when military leaders, who minimize diplomatic consideration and believe war is inevitable in the long term, have a significant influence over a state’s final decision.”110 Despite their robust arguments, neither optimists nor pessimists fully address individual state reactions to proliferation because their approaches are applied across a broad swath of states throughout the international and regional political systems. Accordingly, the debates provide prescriptions for how states should behave to maximize their prospects for survival and to minimize losses as opposed to how they will likely behave based on factors that affect their individual national security interests and perceptions.111 The shortfall of this approach is that it does not account for factors that affect states differently, such as a rival state’s political rhetoric or past relations between states. This schema is particularly relevant since Iran restarted its centrifuges in the wake of the 2018 U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA. If Iran approaches the weapons-grade enrichment threshold, world powers will likely be confronted with three primary options: acceptance, increased multilateral sanctions, or military strikes. The proliferation literature should account for how a powerful state perceives a weaker rival’s proliferation efforts because this perception will influence the powerful state’s response. The current proliferation management discussions often take a binary approach to the ramifications of the further spread of nuclear technology by focusing primarily on the “why” of proliferation—why do states proliferate and why is this proliferation either good or bad. This either-or approach creates a rigid landscape that fails to fully address the dynamics of proliferation since neither argument explains why some states feel more threatened than others do when faced with the possibility of a non-nuclear state going nuclear. Nor does this approach consider that a state may change its perceptions of another state over a period of time, such as the United States 108 Campbell

MacDiarmid, “What ‘Libya Model’ for North Korean Denuclearization?” The National, April 30, 2018, accessed May 25, 2020, https://www.thenational.ae/world/asia/whatlibya-model-for-north-korean-denuclearisation-1.726173. 109 Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 54. 110 Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 56. 111 John J. Mearsheimer, “Reckless States and Realism,” International Relations, vol. 23 (2009): 253.

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and Israel having alternating responses to the Iraq 1981 and 2003 proliferation cases. These determinations are critical to explaining differing proliferation responses. Matthew Kroenig argues this systemic focus on the relationship between nuclear proliferation and international stability does not provide insight into how proliferation affects different types of states.112 He continues, These scholars have examined whether nuclear proliferation increases or decreases the stability of international and regional systems. For this reason, the existing scholarship has devoted less attention to the differential effects of nuclear proliferation. In other words, optimists and pessimists do not explicitly examine whether nuclear proliferation may differentially affect different types of states.113

His Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory addresses proliferation’s varying effects on differently situated states, therefore it provides the study’s foundation to forecast when and why states that have the ability to destroy a rival state’s nuclear program choose to use coercive diplomacy or military force as a proliferation response. Although valuable in the focus it places on proliferation’s varying effects, Kroenig’s theory has several weaknesses, which are illuminated in the next section.

The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Kroenig expands the Waltz–Sagan debates on the aggregate effects of proliferation by examining how proliferation differentially affects states and therefore may be better for some and worse for others. Whereas the Waltz–Sagan debates focused on the international and regional effects of proliferation, Kroenig assesses proliferation’s effects at the system-level and state-level by dividing the world into two types of states: power projecting (global and local) and non-power-projecting.114 Powerprojecting states have the ability to project conventional military power over the target state. These powerful states have the most to lose because further proliferation: (1) constrains their ability to exert power over the target state; (2) reduces the effectiveness of their coercive diplomacy; (3) could trigger regional instability; (4) may weaken the integrity of their alliances; and (5) could ignite a nuclear arms race.115 By definition, non-power-projecting states are unable to project power against a target state and thus are less affected by proliferation because the power symmetry remains relatively unchanged.

112 Kroenig,

“Beyond Optimism and Pessimism,” 2. “Beyond Optimism and Pessimism,” 2. 114 Matthew Kroenig, Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Cornell, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), 3. 115 Kroenig, “Beyond Optimism and Pessimism,” 7. 113 Kroenig,

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Kroenig’s argument is supported by realist theory, which posits threats and the use of force are important for securing a state’s position in the international system.116 However, while examining the effects of proliferation relative to a particular state, Kroenig continues to emphasize the international system’s reliance on power as the primary determinant of proliferation’s effect on a state. In doing so, he defines power projection as a state’s “ability to fight a full-scale, conventional, military, ground war on the territory of a potential target state,” and argues the “ability to bomb a state alone without a corresponding ability to put boots on the ground in that state’s territory is not a sufficient power-projection capability.”117 This reliance on power projection as the primary factor for determining proliferation’s effects on a state limits his theory’s effectiveness because it does not consider additional variables that may influence a powerful state’s perceptions of another state’s nuclear ambitions.118 This study accepts Kroenig’s assertion that nuclear proliferation affects states in different ways. However, the study’s Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory improves on his Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory by arguing that states are affected based on how they perceive the proliferating state and its intentions, as opposed to Kroenig’s primary assertion that states are affected based upon their ability to project power over the rival state. In arguing the primacy of power projection, his theory imprecisely posits a state can only project power over another state if it has the ability to conduct a full-scale conventional ground war inside the target state. By drawing such a restrictive definition of power projection, Kroenig ignores the battle-proven experiences that the ability to conduct effective air operations against a country constitutes a form of power projection (Israel vis-à-vis Iraq in 1981, United States vis-à-vis Iraq in 1990, United States vis-à-vis Serbia in 1999, and Israel vis-à-vis Syria in 2007). This determination allows for the study’s use of independent variables where the two power-projecting countries have differing military capabilities, as in the cases of the United States and Israel. The use of airpower is the most immediate and effective counterproliferation tool, as many nuclear sites are dispersed and concealed, and airpower is the most efficient and practical means of attacking these sites. Critics may argue this determination is insufficient in explaining the Iraq 2003 case study because the United States invaded Iraq rather than simply launching air strikes against suspected targets. To this point the study argues the intent of the U.S. invasion of Iraq was not just to halt its suspected proliferation program, but, more importantly, to institute regime change. Thomas Ricks affirmed this point in his book Fiasco, where he documented the “end-state” of the U.S. invasion of Iraq was regime change.119 The Bush administration’s goal of overthrowing Saddam Hussein necessitated an actual invasion force rather than 116 Benjamin Fordham, “The Politics of Threat Perception and the Use of Force: A Political Economy

Model of U.S. Uses of Force, 1949–1994,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 42, no. 3 (September 1998): 570. 117 Kroenig, “Beyond Optimism and Pessimism,” 5. 118 Benoit Pelopidas, “The Oracles of Proliferation: How Experts Maintain a Biased Historical Reading that Limits Policy Innovation,” Nonproliferation Review, vol. 18, no. 1 (March 2011): 309. 119 Thomas Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: The Penguin Press, 2006), 116.

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just air strikes. Consequently, the study controls the question of disparate reactions within the cases by arguing the United States had two goals in the Iraq 2003 case study, halt suspected proliferation and institute regime change as a fountainhead to spread democracy in the region.120 Thus, the boots on the ground aspect of the Iraq 2003 case study was for regime change and not to attack suspected proliferation sites, for which intelligence later revealed were nonexistent. Kroenig posits if a state cannot project power over a target state, its strategic position is not undermined by proliferation.121 His theory does not account for instances when power-projecting states do not perceive a proliferating state’s actions to be a significant enough threat to warrant the use of force (United States vis-à-vis Iraq in 1981, United States vis-à-vis Syria in 2007, and United States vis-à-vis Iran in 2015) because, he argues power-projecting states are expected to feel threatened in all cases of proliferation. Kreps and Fuhrmann raised a similar concern in an excellent quantitative empirical study on targeting nuclear programs in war and peace.122 Consequently, Kroenig’s theory does not account for response variations in similar proliferation cases. These gaps exist because his theory is not structured to assess threat perceptions that influence the national actors who shape a state’s foreign policy and its correlate responses to international crises. To understand why powerful states respond inconsistently to similar nuclear proliferation cases, it is necessary to examine how the state’s decision-makers interpret and respond to horizontal proliferation. Research suggests the response is shaped by whether the opposing state’s actions are interpreted as a high or low threat. This necessitates a study of how the decision-makers’ perception of a potential threat, and the influences and motivations that drive this perception. Since national actors are responsible for foreign policy decisions, examining the psychological influences on these decision-makers demonstrates political psychology is the optimal theoretical foundation for explaining political decision variations, i.e., when and why do powerful states choose to attack proliferating states.

Political Psychology Research supports the argument that while system-level variables help to explain or predict broad historical trends, no crisis or war is understandable without referencing the decision-making of individual state leaders.123 Robert Jervis first studied foreign policy decision-making from a cognitive perspective in his book Perception and Misperception in International Politics, where he stressed the importance of a

120 Stephen

Kinzer, Overthrow (New York: Times Books, 2006), 293. Exporting the Bomb, 3. 122 Kreps and Fuhrmann, “Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace,” 6. 123 Jonathan Renshon and Stanley A. Renshon, “The Theory and Practice of Foreign Policy Decision Making,” Political Psychology, vol. 29, no. 4 (August 2008): 511. 121 Kroenig,

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decision-maker’s beliefs about the world, and how perceptions and images of others can influence crucial decisions and policies.124 Jervis argued, I think it is astounding that most of the political science literature seems to put aside the notion that at least some wars are fueled by passions and that one reason they are so hard to conclude is that people have come to hate each other and to find the notion of compromise repulsive.125

Political psychology demonstrates its importance in helping explain and predict national actor behaviors in response to certain events.126 When planning the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein’s negative image of America led to his miscalculation that the United States would not intervene in the region because he believed Washington still suffered from the Vietnam Syndrome and therefore was unwilling to accept mass casualties.127 In explaining former North Korean leader Kim Jong Il’s identification with and succession to his father, noted psychiatrist Jerrold Post argues Kim could not appear to abandon his father Kim Il Song’s founding principles of juche—self-reliance—and reunification of the Korean peninsula.128 Political psychology also illustrates the ways in which President George W. Bush’s psychological dispositions influenced his cognitive processing of how to respond to the September 11th attacks. Michael Hirsh argued Bush’s “Manichaean sense of right and wrong” combined with his evangelical Christian identity pushed him to view future U.S. actions from an “us-versus-them” perspective—“Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.”129 Similarly, Bruce Lawrence, professor of religious history at Duke University, argued the post-September 11th White House was characterized by religious fundamentalism. These included a “predilection to impose God’s will – the one true faith – on other peoples, an intolerance of dissent, and a central reliance on inerrant scripture for ideology and authority.”130 In using Attribution Theory to explain President Bush’s response to the September 11th attacks, political psychology argues Bush searched for a cause in the behavior of the 9/11 attackers, and his decision-making heuristic—mental shortcuts in processing information about others—was that those who attacked America were evildoers who hated our freedoms. Rose McDermott cautioned that defective decision-making can cause hostilities to erupt. 124 Robert

Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 28. 125 Robert Jervis, “Political Psychology: Some Challenges and Opportunities,” Political Psychology, vol. 10, no. 3 (September 1989): 488. 126 Martha L. Cottam et al., Introduction to Political Psychology, second edition (New York: Psychology Press, 2010), 4. 127 Cottam et al., Introduction to Political Psychology, 299. 128 Jerrold M. Post, Leaders and Their Follower in a Dangerous World: The Psychology of Political Behavior (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), 257. 129 Michael Hirsh, “Bush and the World,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, no. 5 (September/October 2002): 18. 130 Kevin Phillips, American Theocracy: The Peril and Politics of Radical Religion, Oil and Borrowed Money in the 21st Century (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 205.

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Once defective decision making and other factors cause hostility to emerge, a crisis can erupt. A crisis is defined as a situation with the elements of surprise, high threat, and short decision time. In these instances, a leader and his immediate advisers hold a great deal of power unto themselves because there is little time to respond and consult others. A leader’s freedom under such conditions also allows individual biases or pathologies to play a role in the decision-making process.131

In his book, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes, former U.S. intelligence official Michael Scheuer contested the idea that al-Qaeda hates the United States because of its freedoms. More succinctly, Scheuer studied Osama bin Laden’s speeches and statements, and argues bin Laden hated the United States for what he perceived as its anti-Islamic behavior, occupation of Islamic lands, lack of religious belief, focus on money, and its relentless persecution of Muslims.132 For Scheuer, to shape policy and actions to mitigate the threat posed by al-Qaeda, it is imperative to understand bin Laden, his ideology, and the circumstances that brought him to power.133 Professors Bruce Lincoln and David S. Domke analyzed the 2001–2005 speeches of top Bush administration officials from the perspective of their apparent religious and political goals. In Bush’s October 2001 speech to the nation, in which he outlined his planned military response to the 9/11 attacks, Lincoln argued Bush’s rhetoric was similar to that of Osama bin Laden. Lincoln posited, “Both men constructed a Manichean struggle, where Sons of Light confront Sons of Darkness, and all must enlist on one side or the other, without possibility of neutrality, hesitation, or middle ground.”134 Lincoln also described a “double coding” in which Bush signaled to attentive Christians that he shared their scriptural invocations—using phrases from the revelation of St. John (6:15–17, the wrath of the lamb) and Isaiah (evildoers hiding in caves and the lonely paths of the godless).135 Domke argued Bush constructed “a religious fundamentalist worldview with political language to create a political fundamentalism” acceptable to Americans. Accordingly, liberty and freedom were the God-defined norms for which Americans were fighting, and this was Bush’s remedy for fear and evil. For Domke, the White House heralded “the universal gospel of freedom and liberty” that were gifts from God, thus implying the United States, in waging the Global War on Terrorism and wars against Afghanistan and Iraq, was carrying out God’s will.136 As illustrated by the previous points, Bush’s evangelical psychological milieu influenced his decision to transition from twelve years of United States-led coercive diplomacy to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. In his book The President of Good and Evil: The Ethics of George W. Bush, Peter Singer warned against George W. Bush’s binary black and white mindset, 131 Rose

McDermott, Political Psychology in International Relations (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2004), 124. 132 Michael Scheuer (Anonymous), Through Our Enemies’ Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America (Washington, DC: Brassey’s Inc., 2003), 16. 133 Scheuer (Anonymous), Through Our Enemies’ Eyes, 3. 134 Phillips, American Theocracy, 206. 135 Phillips, American Theocracy, 206. 136 Phillips, American Theocracy, 207.

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while also highlighting the influence of beliefs and motivations on foreign policy decision-makers. It is a mistake to divide the world neatly into good and evil, black and white without shades of gray, in a manner that eliminates the need to learn more about those with whom one is dealing. For an unreflective person, having a sense of “moral clarity” that disregards the shadings in human motivation and conduct can be a vice, not a virtue. When it is coupled with a firm belief that the nation you lead is on the right side of history, pursuing “God’s justice,” and even that there is some divine plan that has put you in the position of leader of that nation, what you see as moral clarity, others will see as self-righteousness. When that selfproclaimed moral clarity is coupled with actions that fail to live up to the rhetoric, others will see it as hypocrisy. In the president of the most powerful nation on earth, self-righteousness and hypocrisy are dangerous vices.137

Similarly, former South African President Nelson Mandela criticized President Bush’s myopic worldview and his push for war in Iraq. It is a tragedy, what is happening, what Bush is doing. But Bush is now undermining the United Nations… What I am condemning is that one power, with a president who has no foresight, who cannot think properly, is now wanting to plunge the world into a holocaust.138

Similarly, then-Senator Barack Obama stated his opposition to the Iraq War, and singled out members of the Bush administration for their ideological agendas. Obama’s critique is compelling because by calling out Richard Perle, who served as the Chairman of the Defense Policy Board and was an advisor to Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, both of whom were influential in Bush’s decision to invade Iraq, Obama illustrated how foreign policy decision-making is not the sole responsibility of the head of state and that groupthink can also lead to a flawed decision. Senator Obama articulated his thoughts about the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, What I am opposed to is a dumb war. What I am opposed to is a rash war. What I am opposed to is the cynical attempt by Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz and other armchair, weekend warriors in this administration to shove their own ideological agendas down our throats, irrespective of the costs in lives lost and in hardships borne.139

These examples illustrate how psychological influences affected George W. Bush and Saddam Hussein’s decision-making heuristics, and demonstrate the importance of political psychology in both understanding national actor threat perceptions and in predicting their responses to a crisis. This study’s Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory argues individuallevel cognitive psychological influences on national actors account for the variations in power projecting state’s perceptions of potential nuclear threats. These perceptions, combined with state-level national security policies and military capabilities, 137 Jeffrey

Record, Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2010), 137. 138 Jarrett Murphy, “Mandela Slams Bush on Iraq,” CBS News, January 30, 2003, accessed December 7, 2013, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/mandela-slams-bush-on-iraq/. 139 Barack Obama, “Transcript: Obama’s Speech Against the Iraq War,” NPR, January 20, 2009, accessed May 25, 2020, https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=99591469.

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in turn, influence the national actors’ decision to select coercive diplomacy, take no action, or use military force as a proliferation response. This assumption is in opposition to neorealism, which argues sovereign states are the principal actors in the international system and state actions are motivated by the rational pursuit of security and survival; both of which are constrained by the distribution of military and economic power. Political psychologists argue this neorealist focus on structural and external constraints fails to address how decision-makers’ cognitive thought (operational codes); motivational goals (dissonance reduction); and emotional states influence their perceptions and actions. This study supports political psychology’s premise that a “variation in the beliefs, psychological processes and personalities of individual decision-makers” exert a decisive influence on a state’s foreign policy behavior.140 This study also seeks to explain how a state’s perception of a particular threat varies based on how its leaders distinguish between the psychological milieu—the world as the actor sees it—and the operational milieu—the world in which the policy will be carried out. How an actor perceives a threat must be weighed carefully against an adversary’s intentions and military capabilities. The human predisposition to perceive a threat varies with a person’s beliefs about her ability to take effective counteraction if she perceives the danger. As such, a statesman who believed he was powerless to bring about changes in his state’s policy if he detected a threat would perceive these threats less readily than a person who believed his views would matter (Table 2.2).141 Research suggests threats motivate protective behaviors and promotes support for aggressive foreign policies.142 This is critical as the study examines Israel’s fear of a second Holocaust and its equating Arab and Iranian nuclear programs to existential threats. Similar research noted evidence that threat perception has a substantial, positive impact on support for overseas military action.143 This contributes to explaining the Bush administration’s Iraq policy shift from smart sanctions—the containment of the Iraq regime, not its overthrow—to the use of force to topple Saddam Hussein and his Ba’ath Party after the 9/11 attacks.144 In responding to traumatic events, such as the September 11th attacks, political leaders can tap into widespread patriotism by appealing to national unity in the face of a threat. In a speech delivered from the Oval Office on the night of the 9/11 attacks, President Bush reassured the nation the

140 Howard

Levine, ed., “A Sketch of Political Psychology,” Political Psychology (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2010), xxxix. 141 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 377. 142 Leonie Huddy, Stanley Feldman, and Christopher Weber, “The Political Consequences of Perceived Threat and Felt Insecurity,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 614 (November 2007): 132 143 Huddy, Feldman, and Weber, “The Political Consequences of Perceived Threat and Felt Insecurity,” 148. 144 Dennis Ross, “The Mind-Set Matters: Foreign Policy Is Shaped by Leaders and Events, Not Lobbies,” Foreign Policy, vol. 155 (July–August 2006): 60.

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Table 2.2 Defining Tenets of Neorealism and Foreign Policy Decision-Makinga Neorealism

Foreign Policy Decision-Making

States are the primary actors in world politics. Non-state actors are acknowledged, but their role is minimal

Foreign policy elites acting on behalf of states and non-state institutions are the primary actors in world politics

States act on the basis of a rational calculation of self-interest

Foreign policy elites act on the basis of their “definition of the situation”

Foreign policy is best understood as the attempt Foreign policy is the unending task of to pursue security in an inherently conflictual sequential problem-solving by goal-directed world elites operating within organizational and cognitive constraints Power is the primary currency of international relations

Information is the primary currency of international relations

The structure of the global system is the primary The global system is an arena for the pursuit determinant of state behavior of projects by purposive elites Policy prescriptions involve adaptation to the dictates of rationality (e.g., recognize the limits of collective action)

Policy prescriptions involve efforts to compensate for individual misperception and organizational pathologies (e.g., tendency to stereotype enemies)

a Brian

Ripley, “Psychology, Foreign Policy, and International Relations Theory,” Political Psychology, vol. 14, no. 3 (September 1993): 406

United States would “bring justice” to the terrorists and “those who harbor them.”145 He then laid the foundation for the future use of military force by the United States. This is a day when all Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for justice and peace. America has stood down enemies before, and we will do so this time. None of us will forget this day. Yet, we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world.146

Nine days later, on September 20, 2001, Bush delivered another speech to the nation expanding his goal of bringing to justice those who attacked America by including terrorist organizations around the world, in what became the Global War on Terrorism. “Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”147 In expanding the war effort to transnational violent extremist organizations, the Bush administration used threat inflation to create concern for a threat that

145 James

N. Schubert, Patrick A. Stewart, and Margaret Ann Curran, “A Defining Presidential Moment: 9/11 and the Rally Effect,” Political Psychology, vol. 23, no. 3 (September 2002): 561. 146 George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on the September 11th Attacks,” Selected Speeches of President George W. Bush, 2001–2008, accessed November 7, 2013, http://georgewbush-whiteh ouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf. 147 George W. Bush, “President Bush Addresses the Nation,” Washington Post, September 20, 2001, accessed November 7, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/tra nscripts/bushaddress_092001.

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went beyond the scope and urgency that disinterested analysis would justify.148 The Bush administration later drew on this war against terrorism as a causal mechanism to invade Iraq by floating a potential worst-case scenario linkage between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. In a simple threat inflation process model decision-makers perceive threats, create communication strategies to inflate the threats, implement those strategies within the media, or marketplace of ideas, in an effort to shape opinions and influence policies. They either succeed or fail in their efforts to inflate the threat. In determining the degree of threat, political psychologists argue most problems arise in the information processing step as decision-makers fall victim to cognitive and emotional biases that affect their perceptions. Other psychologists argue these cognitive biases may lead the public to overreact to certain threats and to be overly receptive to decision-makers who emphasize worst-case scenarios.149 Rose McDermott argued, Once defective decision making and other factors cause hostility to emerge, a crisis can erupt. A crisis is defined as a situation with the elements of surprise, high threat, and short decision time. In these instances, a leader and his immediate advisers hold a great deal of power unto themselves because there is little time to respond and consult others. A leader’s freedom under such conditions also allows individual biases or pathologies to play a role in the decision-making process.150

Political psychology theories suggest people may misperceive national security threats due to cognitive biases that limit their ability to assess threats rationally. In the Iraq 2003 case, it is argued the Bush administration interpreted facts in ways that supported its expectations even though the facts did not warrant such conclusions. This may be attributed to the political psychological argument that people do not update their beliefs in response to new information, and instead use their previously formed beliefs as guidance for interpreting and understanding the world.151 The administration also fell victim to groupthink, as key elites integrated their own politicized biases and motivations into the decision-making calculus in pressing for war, and intelligence was subsequently tailored to support these goals. Phillip Henderson notes the groupthink that Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill observed at the first meeting of Bush’s National Security Council on January 30, 2001, when he witnessed a confirmed bias among many of the attendees in accepting George Tenet’s circumstantial evidence that Iraq was producing biological and chemical weapons. In an interview three years later, former Secretary of State Colin L. Powell acknowledged the sourcing for the intelligence on Iraq’s mobile weapons laboratories was

148 Jane K. Cramer and A. Trevor Thrall, “Understanding Threat Inflation,” American Foreign Policy

and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation Since 9/11 (New York: Routledge, 2009), 1. 149 Cramer and Thrall, “Understanding Threat Inflation,” 2. 150 McDermott, Political Psychology in International Relations, 124. 151 Cramer and Thrall, “Understanding Threat Inflation,” 5.

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“inaccurate and wrong,” and expressed regret that he used it to make the adminstration’s case for war during his testimony before the United Nations, on February 5, 2003.152 The United States and Israel are democracies in which a decision-making process underscores their actions whether it is Congressional debate or the forming of coalition governments. As such, their respective foreign policy decisions are indicative of a psychological process where options are weighed, and national actors’ expectations and beliefs influence perceptions of the event. Consequently, when a rival infringes on an accepted norm of behavior, such as by taking steps to weaponize nuclear materials, leaders assert the rival is no longer bound by conventional restraints, i.e., compliance with the NPT, and is therefore deemed a serious threat.153 A leader’s cognitive predispositions can induce them to misperceive a potential threat by either minimizing or exaggerating it. These leaders then categorize threats using schemata to relate new information to prior knowledge.154 During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israeli military planners focused on two key alternatives available to the Arabs—war or no war—while ignoring the possibility of a limited war option available to Egypt and Syria.155 Thomas Ricks notes that in making the case for war in Iraq, the George W. Bush administration looked at worst-case scenarios for weapons of mass destruction and dismissed contrary evidence. Ricks argues the Bush White House asserted Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons and was on the road to acquiring a nuclear weapon, while emphasizing the possibility of Saddam sharing these weapons with terrorists who would use them against the United States.156 This allowed the Bush administration to inflate the threat of Iraq and its intentions to attack the United States with a nuclear weapon. Furthermore, the perceptions of historical relations can influence current attitudes because history teaches lessons about the need for caution, suspicion, and toughness. President Bush’s push to declare Baghdad in material breach of over a dozen UN Security Council resolutions was influenced by twelve years of coercive diplomacy with a recalcitrant Iraq. This predisposition of Saddam Hussein’s assumed guilt was evident in Secretary of State Colin L. Powell’s address to the United Nations, For more than 20 years, by word and by deed Saddam Hussein has pursued his ambition to dominate Iraq and the broader Middle East using the only means he knows, intimidation, coercion and annihilation of all those who might stand in his way. For Saddam Hussein, possession of the world’s most deadly weapons is the ultimate trump card, the one he must hold to fulfill his ambition.157 152 Phillip

G. Henderson, “Anatomy of a National Security Fiasco: The George W. Bush Administration, Iraq, and Groupthink,” Humanitas, vol. xxxi, nos. 1 and 2 (2018): 46. 153 Janice Gross Stein, “Building Politics into Psychology: The Misperception of Threat,” Political Psychology, vol. 9, no. 2 (June 1988): 255. 154 Stein, “Building Politics into Psychology,” 249. 155 Mintz and DeRouen, Jr., Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making, 39. 156 Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 58. 157 “Full text of Colin Powell’s speech,” The Guardian, February 5, 2003, accessed August 14, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/feb/05/iraq.usa.

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Secretary Powell used a fundamental attribution error to assign a cause and effect to Saddam’s behavior. In doing so, Powell attributed Saddam’s actions to his dispositional qualities (personality and motivation) rather than to situational factors in the environment that may have caused two disastrous wars and contributed to Saddam’s behavior, the Iran–Iraq War and Gulf War, followed by twelve years of coercive UN diplomacy.158 In analyzing Saddam Hussein’s mentality, Jerrold Post argued that for Saddam, nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction were critical because he believed world-class leaders have world-class weapons.159 With this understanding, the United States could assume Saddam would never admit to no longer having these weapons and that they were all destroyed after the Gulf War. Admitting he no longer possessed these weapons would not only be an admission of weakness to his enemies in Tehran, Tel Aviv, and Washington, but also an admission that he was not a worldclass leader. Therefore, Saddam bluffed and chose to remain vague about his WMD arsenal, until the truth was discovered after the United States invaded Iraq. Another component of perceptions is the degree of legitimacy each party assigns to the other. In extreme cases, actors may derogate the legitimacy of the rival’s identity or existence, which can lead to each side attempting to eliminate the other’s political or physical existence.160 Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s’s anti-Semitic questioning the extent of the Holocaust derogated Israel’s identity and contributed to the Jewish State declaring Iran an existential threat, thus legitimizing Israel’s desire to destroy Tehran’s nuclear program before the Iranians achieve a nuclear breakout capability. For Ahmadinejad, “The creation of this Zionist regime [Israel] is based on false pretexts… It is a lie based on a declaration that is both unproven and mythical.”161 Similarly, Israel has militarily defeated all its neighbors; and maintains a significant qualitative military edge over all its rivals; however, even with this power asymmetry it still perceives its neighbors’ efforts to increase their security posture as existential threats. This existential threat perception is even extended to the Arab states attempting to purchase advanced air defense systems such as the Russian-built S-400 SAM system. These air defense systems are designed to enhance a state’s ability to defend itself from an air and cruise missile attack, and are not offensive in nature. Israel’s lack of empathy for the security requirements of its neighbors delegitimizes their need for security against what they perceive to be legitimate threats from the regional hegemon. Political psychology also highlights the way in which decision-makers frame a particular problem can be critically important in demonstrating how they will behave in making decisions.162 Since humans have cognitive limitations on the amount of information we can store and process, we often employ mental shortcuts, known as heuristics, to assist us with making decisions. One of the ways in which humans use 158 Cottam

et al., Introduction to Political Psychology, 296. Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World, 233. 160 Kaplowitz, “National Self-Images, Perception of Enemies, and Conflict Strategies,” 58. 161 Armin Arefi, Green Ribbons and Turbans: Young Iranians Against the Mullahs (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2011), 158. 162 Cottam et al., Introduction to Political Psychology, 305. 159 Post,

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mental shortcuts is to employ analogies to simplify complex issues by relating new situations to previous experiences or historical references. Because heuristics reduce the amount of time and effort it takes to make a decision, McDermott cautions they can lead to systematic biases that can distort assessments of events.163 As increased attention is placed on the relevance of political psychology, there is a correlate increase in literature focusing on the use of analogical reasoning to frame policy issues. Yuen Foong Khong conducted one of the most well-known studies of analogical reasoning in his book Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965, where he addressed leaders’ tendencies to use historical analogies to influence the selection of policy options.164 Two well-known analogies have been used historically to argue against military intervention (Vietnam analogy) and political compromise (Munich analogy). The Vietnam analogy suggests any U.S. military intervention will result in an open-ended commitment to a losing cause that will result in a large number of U.S. casualties and political unrest at home. The Munich analogy, in reference to British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s 1938 appeasement of Adolf Hitler’s territorial demands, argues if a state does not stand up to an aggressor, and instead seeks to appease them or make concessions in the hope of keeping the peace, the result will be to encourage them to be more aggressive. This aggression will likely result in the war the appeaser was trying to avoid in the first place.165 Former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon referenced the Munich analogy when voicing his opposition to the Bush administration’s attempt to build an Arab coalition after the September 11th attacks when he stated, “Don’t repeat the terrible mistake of 1938 [appeasement of Hitler] when the enlightened democracies of Europe decided to sacrifice Czechoslovakia for a temporary solution. Do not try to placate the Arabs at our expense… Israel will not be Czechoslovakia.”166 The Bush administration also used the Munich analogy to argue Saddam was incorrigible and needed to be removed from power; otherwise, he would continue to destabilize the region. Likewise, opponents of the Iraq War used the Vietnam analogy to argue the United States was already at war with those who perpetrated the 9/11 attacks (al-Qaeda) and those who sheltered them (Taliban) in Afghanistan. When criticizing President Bush’s push to war with Iraq, then-Senator Barack Obama argued, “You want a fight, President Bush? Let’s finish the fight with bin Laden and al-Qaeda…”167 Critics argued Iraq was an albatross that would result in increased financial and human losses on the part of Americans. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu continues the Munich analogy and routinely compares the Iran nuclear deal to the 1938 Munich agreement. Taking it a step further, Netanyahu’s defense minister, Avigdor Lieberman, once compared 163 Rose

McDermott, Political Psychology in International Relations (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2004), 58. 164 Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 24. 165 Cottam et al., Introduction to Political Psychology, 306. 166 Suzanne Goldenberg, “Furious Bush Hits Back at Sharon,” The Guardian, October 5, 2001, accessed December 4, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/06/israel. 167 Obama, “Transcript: Obama’s Speech Against the Iraq War.”

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President Barack Obama to British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, before retracting the statement.168 Chamberlain is known for his policy of appeasing Hitler by relinquishing Czechoslovakia to Nazi Germany in an attempt to avoid war and achieve “peace in our time.” Khong argues policymakers are unreceptive to information inconsistent with their schemas and are not likely to abandon their analogies even when challenged.169 This process was evident in the Bush administration’s continued assertion Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction long after intelligence indicated his WMD programs were destroyed after the first Gulf War. Similarly, Prime Minister Netanyahu continued to invoke analogical reasoning to map Iran’s nuclear program to the Holocaust and Nazi Germany. In a 2006 Knesset speech, Netanyahu stated former Iranian President Ahmadinejad was worse than Adolf Hitler, and continued, “Hitler went out on a world campaign first, and then tried to get nuclear weapons. Iran is trying to get nuclear arms first. Therefore, from that perspective, it is much more dangerous.”170 The use of worst-case scenario analogical reasoning can force leaders to paint themselves into a corner in which the use of force is the only plausible option since political compromise after tough talk may be perceived as weakness. Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak spoke out against Netanyahu’s extensive use of the Holocaust analogy to frame Israel–Iran tensions when he argued, “Israel is not European Jewry… We are a strong country to which the whole world attributes nuclear capabilities, and in regional terms we are a superpower.” Barak also expressed his distaste of using the Holocaust analogy to equate the perceived Iranian threat, “because it cheapens the Holocaust and stretches current challenges beyond their proper place. There is none that will dare to destroy Israel.”171 Similarly, Haaretz correspondent Chemi Shalev contested use of the Munich analogy to compare Israel’s current challenges with Iran. The Iran-Nazi analogy, however, suffers from one fatal flaw: The existence of an Israel – never mind the U.S. – that can, according to foreign sources, obliterate and evaporate Iran within minutes, bringing 4,000 years of Persian civilization to an abrupt end. If Jews had even a remotely similar capability during World War II, the Holocaust would have been over before it even started. Erasing this factor from the equation is a thus gross distortion of the

168 Chemi

Shalev, “Netanyahu, AOC, Concentration Camps and the Obscene Holocaust Hypocrisy of Right-Wing Rage,” Haaretz, July 10, 2019, accessed April 28, 2020, https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/.premium-netanyahu-ocasio-cortez-and-the-obscene-hol ocaust-hypocrisy-of-right-wing-rage-1.7488895. 169 Khong, Analogies at War, 226. 170 Chemi Shalev, “Netanyahu’s Rage at Iran Nuclear Deal Is Fueled by 1938 Western Betrayal at Munich,” Haaretz, November 11, 2013, accessed March 30, 2020, https://www.haaretz.com/.pre mium-bibi-trapped-in-38-western-betrayal-1.5289106. 171 Shlomo Ben-Ami, “Don’t Use the Holocaust to Define an Iranian Nuclear Bomb,” The Daily Star: Lebanon, August 5, 2010, accessed November 26, 2013, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opi nion/Commentary/2010/May-08/119933-dont-use-the-holocaust-to-define-an-iranian-nuclearbomb.ashx#axzz2nBp4lgqU.

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2 Literature Review history and what can arguably be portrayed as a perversion of the essence of the Holocaust: The total helplessness of the Jews in the face of the Nazi plan to exterminate their race.172

Likewise, James Fallows dismissed the Munich analogy on which then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz relied. Fallows argued, Nazi and Holocaust analogies have a trumping power in many arguments, and their effect in Washington was to make doubters seem weak – Neville Chamberlains, versus the Winston Churchills who were ready to face the truth… I ended up thinking that the Nazi analogy paralyzes the debate about Iraq rather than clarifying it.173

As illustrated, the use of political psychology to explain the influences on decisionmakers is critical in explaining the variations in foreign policy decision-making. By examining the speeches of national actors, political psychology provides insight into the beliefs, fears, and motivations of those responsible for formulating a state’s foreign policies. Furthermore, political psychology contributes to understanding a state’s political culture, thus illuminating how national traumas such as the September 11th attacks and the Holocaust influence a state’s patriotism and nationalist behaviors, and support for aggressive foreign policies.

Summary This chapter discussed the spectrum of proliferation literature, to include Deterrence Theory, nuclear motivations, the proliferation management debates, and the Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory, and illustrated the literature’s limitations in determining the reasons for variations in individual state proliferation responses. This discussion provides background and context for the study’s central question, “When and why do states that have the military capability to use force to disrupt or destroy a proliferating state’s nuclear facilities choose to take no action, pursue coercive diplomacy, or use military force?” The chapter then discussed Matthew Kroenig’s Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory and demonstrated that, while it provides a rich foundation to assess proliferation’s varying effects on differently situated states, it is ineffective in determining why states that have the ability to project power over the same state have differing proliferation responses to the same state. Kroenig’s approach is constrained by its narrow definition of power projection, which does not include airpower as a power-projecting capability. To apply his power-based approach, Kroenig divides the world into three types of states: global powers, local powers, and non-power-projecting states, and argues each state is affected differently by proliferation, depending on its ability to project power over the proliferating state. Global powers project power worldwide and local powers project power within their specific region, and the further spread 172 Shalev, “Netanyahu, AOC, Concentration Camps and the Obscene Holocaust Hypocrisy of Right-

Wing Rage.” Fiasco, 64.

173 Ricks,

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of nuclear weapons may constrain their ability to project conventional military force in the region and against the proliferating state. For Kroenig, proliferation is less threatening to non-power-projecting states because they are already unable to use conventional military force to project power to secure their national security interests, so an opposing state’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon does not necessarily alter the power dynamic between the two states. The chapter also discussed the study’s acceptance of Kroenig’s argument that proliferation has differing effects on differently situated states, but departs from his theory at this point to pursue an argument that provides for understanding why states that have the ability to project power over the same state have differing responses to the same proliferating state. The study’s Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory examines this phenomenon by expanding Kroenig’s power projection definition to include airpower, and argues proliferation’s differing effects on a state, and its subsequent response, are directly related to the intensity of the threat perceived by the powerful state. The study further illustrates these perceptions are shaped by cognitive psychological influences on state decision-makers. To illustrate the causal mechanisms for these variations in perceptions and responses, this chapter surveyed the political psychology literature. This literature provides a rich contextual basis for examining the cognitive psychological influences that contribute to national leaders’ differing views and perceptions of nuclear proliferation and the potential threat posed by proliferating states.

Chapter 3

Cognitive Psychological Influences

This chapter examines the cognitive psychological influences that shape dominant state threat perceptions and their proliferation responses. Because the methodology incorporates variables that influence a powerful state’s operational milieu, descriptive data is used to illustrate the importance of these influences. In doing so, the study examines decision-makers’ perceptions of whether cognitive processes contribute to misperceptions of an adversary, resulting in threat inflation and overreach by the dominant state. Research suggests cognitive processes such as distorted perceptions and selective inattention contribute to misperceptions and these sources of misperception can further the understanding of the policymaking process.1 As an illustrative point, Stephen Walt argues those who inflate threats not only exaggerate enemy capabilities, but also describe adversaries as “irrevocably hostile, irrational, and impossible to deter.”2 This equivocation asserts the threat must be dealt with immediately before it has a chance to spread, and is embodied in the sentiment that it is more advantageous to fight the enemy in his country than it is to wait for him to attack us here, in our country. When discussing the threat from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Senator John McCain’s criticism of President Obama’s strategy to fight ISIS belied this analogy, “You can fight them [ISIS] there [Syria] or you can fight them here. That’s your choice now. That’s your choice. And obviously, the President [Obama] wants to fight them here, but I would rather fight them there.”3 In portraying potential adversaries as impossible to deter or irrevocably hostile, cognitive psychological influences can prejudice how possible changes to the status quo are perceived and processed by states. In the international system, horizontal 1 Noel Kaplowitz, “National Self-Images, Perception of Enemies, and Conflict Strategies,” Interna-

tional Society of Political Psychology, vol. 11, no. 1 (March 1990): 56. 2 Stephen M. Walt, The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018), 153. 3 David Greene, “Sen. McCain on ISIS: I’d Rather Fight Them Overseas Than Here,” National Public Radio Morning Edition, November 17, 2015, accessed March 30, 2020, https://www.npr. org/2015/11/17/456326738/sen-john-mccain-on-isis. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 B. K. Chappell, State Responses to Nuclear Proliferation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59801-3_3

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proliferation can be perceived as more threatening to the status quo than vertical proliferation because in horizontal proliferation non-nuclear states acquire a new nuclear capability that allows them to deter existing nuclear powers and challenge the existing regional power structure, whereas vertical proliferation refers to states that already possess nuclear weapons increasing their arsenals or developing new types of weapons.4 As Christopher Fettweis notes, leaders of powerful countries deal differently with weaker countries than they do with peer competitors because these leaders objectify more readily and treat others as a means to their ends rather than as actors with interests that warrant consideration and respect.5 Steven Miller and Matthew Bunn examined U.S. perceptions of Iran and traced negative perceptions of Iran to the beginning of the Iranian revolution in 1979. For U.S. policy makers, Iran is a challenging and implacable theocratic enemy that cannot be trusted.6 Equally so, horizontal proliferation upsets the international system status quo and could ultimately lead to changes within the regional hierarchy. Therefore, it is critical to examine the impact of individual psychology within the nuclear proliferation calculus.

Cognitive Psychological Influences This study argues two interdependent cognitive psychological influences shape the threat perceptions of a power projecting state and influence how its leaders interpret and respond to horizontal proliferation by a weaker state: historical tragedy and a history of conflict between the power-projecting and proliferating states. A historical tragedy influences a state’s perception of its enemies, contributes to increased nationalist sentiment and a heightened propensity to identify emerging threats to the nation.7 Research suggests states that experienced a significant national tragedy tend to demonstrate increased support for the use of military force to address emerging threats.8 Studies also demonstrate that states that have a pattern of conflict are inclined to have cognitive predispositions that can lead to an overestimation of a threat and an increased likelihood of continued hostilities.9 Each case study country has a history of military conflict with both the United States and Israel. In the three cases in which the United States or Israel attacked the horizontal proliferator, the attacking state had previously engaged in combat operations with the contested state within the preceding 25 years. To provide for a 4 Victor

W. Sidel and Barry S. Levy, “Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Opportunities for Control and Abolition,” American Journal of Public Health, vol. 97, no. 9 (September 2007): 1589. 5 Christopher J. Fettweis, Psychology of a Superpower: Security and Dominance in U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 78. 6 Steven E. Miller and Matthew Bunn, “Interpreting the Implacable Foe: American Perceptions of Iran,” U.S.–Iran Misperceptions: A Dialogue, ed. Abbas Maleki and John Tirman (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), 61. 7 Cottam et al., Introduction to Political Psychology, 254. 8 Huddy et al., “The Political Consequences of Perceived Threat and Felt Insecurity,” 148. 9 Stein, “Building Politics into Psychology: The Misperception of Threat,” 249.

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more robust understanding of how cognitive psychological influences affect decisionmakers, the study conducts a content analysis of key leader speeches and comments to contextualize the motivations behind the powerful state’s proliferation response. McDermott defines content analysis as “a technique for making psychological inferences about politically relevant aspects of the personality of political actors from the systematic, objective study of written and transcribed oral material.”10 The study’s content analysis examines how political elites use scripting, mapping, analogical reasoning, and conditional and situational threats to frame the opposing state’s nuclear ambitions. This study acknowledges decision-makers are not always truthful and facts can be embellished, or fabricated, since underlying motivations are not always forthcoming in leader statements and speeches. Jervis argues deception is an integral component of international relations and that it involves minor changes in behavior to project a desired image.11 In examining projection of images, Jervis divides behavior into two categories: signals and indices. Signals are statements or actions whose meaning are established by tacit or explicit understanding among the actors. These signals are sent to influence the receiver’s image of the sender, both of whom understand the signal can be deceptive. Indices are statements or actions that have inherent evidence that the projected image is correct because it is linked to the actor’s capabilities or intentions. Signals include diplomatic notes, military maneuvers, and extending or breaking diplomatic ties. Indices are believed by the perceiver to be characteristics or information that can be used to predict an actor’s behavior. Examples include private messages the perceiver intercepts, patterns of behavior that disclose information, and major actions that involve high cost.12 Mohiaddin Mesbahi argues that states not only lie, but they also engage in “bullshitting” through repetition of language, narratives, structures of words, and phrases that are foreboding and delivered to sound authoritative and to win the argument on the spot through hyper-bullying.13 In the run-up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, President Bush and his senior advisors became fixated on going to war. It is alleged that the intelligence and facts were shaped around this policy of going after weapons of mass destruction. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz later admitted the administration decided to push the WMD issue “because it was the one reason everyone could agree on.”14 In questioning the legitimacy of Israel and the Holocaust, and Israel’s impact on the Palestinians, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei pushed an anti-Semitic conspiracy when he declared,

10 McDermott,

Political Psychology in International Relations, 31. The Logic of Images in International Relations, 11. 12 Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations, 18. 13 Mohiaddin Mesbahi, “Trust and U.S.–Iran Relations: Between the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Assurance Game,” Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs, vol. 4, no.1 (Spring 2013): 12. 14 Stephen Kinzer, Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq (New York: Times Books, 2006), 291. 11 Jervis,

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3 Cognitive Psychological Influences There are documents showing close collaboration of Zionists with Nazi Germany, and exaggerated numbers relating to the Jewish Holocaust were fabricated to lay the groundwork for the occupation of Palestine and to justify the atrocities of the Zionists.15

In 2008, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad assailed what he described as U.S. and European interference in Iran’s domestic affairs because of its nuclear program, “A few bullying powers have sought to put hurdles in the way of the peaceful nuclear activities of the Iranian nation by exerting political and economic pressures against Iran and also through threatening and pressuring the IAEA.”16 Likewise, in a January 2020 speech at Yad Vashem, during a Holocaust memorial, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu railed against the “Tyrants of Tehran” and his perception that Iran seeks nuclear weapons to destroy Israel, when he declared, We have yet to see a unified and resolute stance against the most anti-Semitic regime on the planet, a regime that openly seeks to develop nuclear weapons and annihilate the one and only Jewish state… Israel will do whatever it must do to defend our state, defend our people, and defend the Jewish future… there will not be another Holocaust.17

In addition to examining cognitive psychological influences that shape threat perceptions, the research also assesses how structural influences affect a powerful state’s national security policies by examining its national security strategy, military strategy, and nuclear policy. States whose national security policies advocate unilateralism and preventive war are more likely to employ force to prevent an emerging threat from materializing than are states that promote multilateralism and coercive diplomacy. Furthermore, a nation with a history of successful preventive war against its enemies is more likely to attack a state perceived to be a threat. The next section discusses the interdependent variables that affect a dominant state’s threat perceptions and its proliferation responses.

Historical Tragedy and Perceptions of Threat This section examines national tragedies and their influence in shaping how powerful states perceive and respond to strategic threats. The research illuminates how Israel and the United States drew linkages between respective national tragedies—the Holocaust and the September 11th attacks—and cases of suspected proliferation to heighten threat perceptions and justify the preventive use of force. The theoretical foundation for these assumptions is rooted in psychoanalytic theory and cognitive psychology. Research suggests the psychological trauma of a historical tragedy 15 Ray Takeyh, “Ahmadinejad Is No Hitler,” Los Angeles Times, November 19, 2006, accessed June

28, 2020, https://www.latimes.com/news/la-op-takeyh19nov19-story.html. Assails ‘Bullying Powers’,” CBS News, September 23, 2008, accessed June 28, 2020, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ahmadinejad-assails-bullying-powers/. 17 “Netanyahu Condemns ‘Tyrants of Tehran’ in Holocaust Speech,” Al Jazeera, January 23, 2020, accessed June 28, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/netanyahu-condemns-tyrantstehran-holocaust-speech-200123144406979.html. 16 “Ahmadinejad

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affects a nation’s collective self-image and influences the way it then perceives enemies and responds to threats based on the recalled tragedy. In addition, the psychoanalytic theory posits an extended self and a nexus between the injury to the nation and subsequent aggressive reactions.18 Related work suggests perceptions of history are an essential dimension of national self-imagery because they generate powerful feelings to avoid past experiences that were dangerous. Cognitive psychologists also emphasize an actor’s expectations and beliefs influence his or her perceptions because individuals often structure and contextualize the world’s complexities through categorization and the use of belief systems, or schemata, which relate new information to earlier knowledge.19 When historical tragedies are linked to emerging threats, a nation’s leaders often use analogies to simplify a current perceived threat’s complexity. This allows for attention-grabbing and is easily digestible by the public. While useful in deconstructing a traumatic event’s intricacies, analogies can create cognitive predispositions toward situations presented as similar to the historical event, such as arguing a particular event could become a second Holocaust or another 9/11. Research suggests national actors tend to learn only superficially from history and that their beliefs are shaped by events that had major consequences.20 President Lyndon B. Johnson often used the Munich analogy to simplify world events, which heavily influenced his early decision-making in Vietnam. Paul Warnke observed, I think that the principal analogy Johnson had was Munich. That there weren’t going to be any more Munichs… He’d often talk in terms of, that he had to stop this threat at the very beginning. If we’d stopped Hitler before Czechoslovakia, it would have made a big difference.21

In using analogies, actors often apply historical personas and scripts to generic expectations about people, situations, and events. These personas are cognitive structures that represent the personal characteristics and typical behavior of “stock characters,” such as Adolf Hitler and Saddam Hussein. In demonizing the enemy persona, the United States became Ayatollah Khomeini’s “Great Satan” (Shaytan-e Bozorg in Farsi), Colonel Moammar Qaddafi became Ronald Reagan’s “Mad Dog of the Middle East,” Yasser Arafat became Ariel Sharon’s “Osama bin Laden,” Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became Benjamin Netanyahu’s “Hitler,” and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei became Mohammed bin Salman’s “Hitler.” Noted psychiatrist Jerrold Post argues there is a splitting between good and evil in a world of friends and enemies. Within this dynamic, paranoid thinking can infect psychologically healthy people when the group with which they identify is attacked. Therefore, enemies are necessary for self-definition, which makes it essential to 18 Kaplowitz,

“National Self-Images, Perception of Enemies, and Conflict Strategies,” 42. “National Self-Images, Perception of Enemies, and Conflict Strategies,” 51. 20 Stein, “Building Politics into Psychology,” 249. 21 Stephen Benedict Dyson and Thomas Preston, “Individual Characteristics of Political Leaders and the Use of Analogy in Foreign Policy Decision Making,” Political Psychology, vol. 27, no. 2 (April 2006): 280. 19 Kaplowitz,

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have enemies in our midst.22 This sentiment is illustrated in Benjamin Netanyahu’s depiction of a nuclear Iran, “To understand what the world would be like with a nuclear-armed Iran, just imagine the world with a nuclear-armed al-Qaeda. Nothing could imperil the world more than a nuclear Iran.”23 Defining an enemy provides political advantages by deflecting attention from domestic issues and projecting them toward an external enemy to gain political capital. Projecting an intractable enemy also provides a leader a cause célèbre for remaining in power. Gareth Porter argues Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin did not perceive Iran to be a serious threat to Israel, but still invoked an “extraordinary threat from Iran,” which allowed him to deflect Israeli animosity away from the Palestinians to provide him political cover to pursue peace with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).24 The next section discusses the cognitive psychological influences and history of conflict between Israel, the United States, and the proliferating countries. Each section highlights how these interdependent psychological influences affect U.S. and Israeli perceptions of the case study countries and demonstrates how they influence American and Israeli foreign policy decision-makers, and their responses to each case of attempted horizontal proliferation.

Israel—Historical Tragedy and Perceptions of Threat The Holocaust is at the core of Israel’s foreign policy, and the near annihilation of Europe’s Jewish population shapes the Jewish State’s perceptions and reactions to perceived threats. To many Jews, the Holocaust (“Shoah” meaning calamity, in Hebrew) was not just an isolated catastrophe that occurred during World War II, but a continuation of historical persecution.25 A passage from the Passover Haggadah articulates this historic persecution, “…in every generation they rise against us to destroy us, and in every generation a Divine Power delivers us from their hands into freedom.”26 The tragedy of the Holocaust contributed to Israel’s conviction that it should have the military capability to ensure the physical survival and existence of the Jewish people against all perceived threats.27 Consequently, Israeli leaders have 22 Jerrold M. Post, Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World: The Psychology of Political

Behavior (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), 164. Heller, “Benjamin Netanyahu Says World Must Draw ‘Red Line’ for Iran,” Huffington Post, September 27, 2012, accessed January 9, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/27/ benjamin-netanyahu-world-red-line-iran_n_1920343.html. 24 Gareth Porter, Manufactured Crisis: The Untold Story of the Iran Nuclear Scare (Charlottesville, VA: Just World Books, 2014), 117. 25 Howard F. Stein, “The Holocaust, the Uncanny, and the Jewish Sense of History,” Political Psychology, vol. 5, no. 1 (March 1984): 7. 26 Eiran and Malin, “The Sum of All Fears,” 79. 27 Gawdat Bahgat, “Israel and Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East,” Middle East Policy Council, vol. XIII, no. 2 (Summer 2006), accessed May 12, 2020, https://mepc.org/journal/israel-and-nuc lear-proliferation-middle-east. 23 Aron

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invoked the horrors of the Holocaust when framing perceived and emerging threats to the state’s security and Jewish population. Shmulik Nili notes the Holocaust’s central position in Israeli security policy is derived from an analogical process in which the Holocaust analogy is used when confronting new threats.28 Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel emphasized this when he stated, “The Jew has never been an executioner; he is almost always the victim.”29 Israel’s fears of a second Holocaust or a similar loss of a large number of Jews, coupled with its adversaries’ threatening rhetoric and denial of the Holocaust, reinforces Israeli leaders’ use of the Holocaust analogy to frame threats as existential. Further complicating Israel’s position is that it is a physically small country located in a very volatile area of the world. Such a small country does not have the luxury of defense in depth, nor does it have the geography to disperse its population centers in case of attack. Consequently, just one nuclear bomb could potentially decimate a large percentage of Israel’s population. This is a point not lost on former Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, when he proclaimed in December 2001, If one day, the Islamic World is also equipped with [nuclear] weapons, then the imperialists’ strategy will reach a standstill because the use of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything. However, it will only harm the Islamic world. It is not irrational to contemplate such an eventuality.30

The emphasis Israel places on viewing rhetoric as an indicator of enemy intent to threaten the Jewish State and potentially annihilate a large portion of the world’s Jewish population is illustrated through the historic lens of Adolf Hitler’s anti-Semitic vitriol. From the rostrum of the Reichstag I prophesied to Jewry that, in the event of war’s proving inevitable, the Jew would disappear from Europe. That race of criminals has on its conscience the two million dead of the first World War, and now already hundreds of thousands more. Let nobody tell me that all the same we can’t park them in the marshy parts of Russia! Who’s worrying about our troops? It’s not a bad idea, by the way, that public rumor attributes to us a plan to exterminate the Jews. Terror is a salutatory thing.31

Similarly, Nazi Germany’s Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels’ anti-Semitic rhetoric, following a December 12, 1941 meeting Hitler had with leaders of the Nazi Party, provides a vivid reminder of why Israeli leaders are especially sensitive to the threatening statements made by their enemies. Goebbels argued, Regarding the Jewish question, the Fuhrer is determined to clear the table. He warned the Jews that if they were to cause another world war, it would lead to their own destruction. 28 Shmulik Nili, “The Nuclear (and the) Holocaust: Israel, Iran, and the Shadows of Auschwitz,” Journal of Strategic Security, vol. 4, no. 1 (2011): 37. 29 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), 79. 30 Ehud Yaari, “How Iran Plans to Destroy Israel,” The Washington Institute, August 2015, accessed June 28, 2020, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/how-iran-plansto-destroy-israel. 31 Manus I. Midlarsky, The Killing Trap: Genocide in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 137.

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3 Cognitive Psychological Influences Those were not empty words. Now the world war has come. The destruction of the Jews must be its necessary consequence. We cannot be sentimental about it. It is not for us to feel sympathy for the Jews. We should have sympathy rather with our own German people. If the German people have to sacrifice 160,000 victims in yet another campaign in the east, then those responsible for this bloody conflict will have to pay for it with their lives.32

The Holocaust analogy has not only been used by the Israelis to frame a threat, but also for geopolitical reasons. Peter Novick articulated how Holocaust imagery played a prominent role in mobilizing support for the 1991 Gulf War, when he noted President George H.W. Bush’s portrayal of Saddam Hussein being worse than Hitler.33 The media mapped alleged Iraqi atrocities to Nazi atrocities when it reported a false story about newborn Kuwaiti babies being torn from their hospital incubators and tossed on the floor to die. The Christian Science Monitor later reported Kuwaiti exiles fabricated the story as a means to “sell the war” to the American public.34 Finally, the Simon Wiesenthal Center stated German firms built “gas chambers” for Saddam. To these points, Novick argues the use of Holocaust imagery contributed marginally to building support for the first Gulf War in Congress and with the American public in general.35 Israel invoking the historical analogy is illustrated in the contemporary case of Iran when Israeli leaders use mapping to equate modern-day Iran with Nazi Germany. In a speech before the United Jewish Communities General Assembly, Prime Minister Netanyahu proclaimed, It’s 1938 and Iran is Germany. And Iran is racing to arm itself with atomic bombs… Believe him and stop him [Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad]… This is what we must do. Everything else pales before this.36

Similarly, Former Israeli Defense Minister Ephraim Sneh argued, When I see again a connection between radical ideology and absolute military capability I tell myself… this is something that once annihilated a third of the Jewish people.37

Not all Israeli leaders approve of using the Munich analogy to frame the perceived Iranian threat. Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak dismissed Netanyahu’s use of the Munich analogy to equate modern-day Iran with 1938 Germany and the situation faced by Europe’s Jews. 32 Midlarsky,

150. Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (New York: Mariner Books, 2000), 249. 34 Tom Regan, “When Contemplating War, Beware of Babies in Incubators,” The Christian Science Monitor, September 6, 2002, accessed April 10, 2020, https://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0906/p25 s02-cogn.html. 35 Novick, The Holocaust in American Life, 249. 36 Benjamin Netanyahu, “Netanyahu: It’s 1938 and Iran Is Germany; Ahmadinejad Is Preparing Another Holocaust,” Haaretz, November 14, 2006, accessed May 16, 2013, http://www.haaretz.com/news/netanyahu-it-s-1938-and-iran-is-germany-ahmadinejad-is-pre paring-another-holocaust-1.205137. 37 Ehud Eiran and Martin B. Malin, “The Sum of All Fears: Israel’s Perceptions of a Nuclear-Armed Iran,” The Washington Quarterly (Summer 2013): 79. 33 Peter

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I don’t like the comparison with what happened in 1938. I don’t think this is the same, because what is the conclusion of what happened? What should a Jew who found himself in 1938 Germany have done? In retrospect, he would have fled. I think it’s the opposite here. I will not flee anywhere.38

In another speech at the Auschwitz Concentration Camp in Poland, Netanyahu stated, From here, the place that attests to the desire to destroy us, I, the Prime Minister of Israel, the state of the Jewish people, say to all the nations of the world: The state of Israel will do whatever is necessary to prevent another Holocaust… We must not be complacent in the face of threats of annihilation. We must not bury our heads in the sand or allow others to do the work for us.39

On September 4, 2003, Israeli Air Force F-15I Raam (Thunder) strike aircraft conducted a victory flight flyover of the Auschwitz Concentration Camp, during the Polish Air Force’s 85th anniversary commemoration. Major General (Res’) Amir Eshel, the commander of Tel-Nof Air Force Base, decided that if the Israeli Air Force was flying to Poland, “we would hold a flyby over the extermination camps.” Eshel selected pilots who had a “deep connection to the Holocaust,” and they took the photographs of 21 Holocaust survivors with them and read their names out loud in Auschwitz. During the fly over, Eshel declared, We, the Air Force pilots in the skies of the camp of horrors, rose up from the ashes of the millions of victims. We carry their silent cry; we salute their bravery and promise to protect the Jewish nation and its land, Israel… Home, a place they’d never been to before.40

Historical Analogies The use of historical analogies by some Israeli leaders is often rigid and uncompromising. This form of reasoning requires flexibility because new issues are mapped using the same memories, thus locking the state into a cyclical psychological construct that prevents acknowledgment of the need for a more adaptive response, which may in turn drive a different threat perception. This inability to adapt to changed environments is termed a fixed analogy and is largely a part of the Israeli leaderships’ collective consciousness and the primary driver of its security doctrine.41 Consequently, Israel has a propensity to view threats using a worst-case scenario and is therefore more inclined to respond with force than with more measured responses, such as coercive diplomacy. 38 “Iran Won’t Use Nuclear Bomb Against Israel: Barak,” AFP, May 5, 2011, accessed December 5, 2013, http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Iran_wont_use_nuclear_bomb_against_Israel_Barak_ 999.html. 39 “Netanyahu at Auschwitz: Israel Will Defend Itself,” Detroit Free Press, June 13, 2013, accessed June 13, 2013, http://www.freep.com/usatoday/article/2418877. 40 Noa Rokni and Illy Pe’ery, “Flying Over Auschwitz,” Israeli Air Force, January 27, 2019, accessed July 12, 2020, https://www.iaf.org.il/9072-50902-en/IAF.aspx. 41 Nili, “The Nuclear (and the) Holocaust,” 39.

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Several noted Jewish scholars have cautioned against using the Holocaust analogy because they argue it cheapens the memory of the murder of millions of Jews in Nazi concentration camps, while others argue the historical comparison is inappropriate because it portrays Israel as a helpless victim and Iran as a crushingly powerful country bent on genocide.42 Prime Minister Netanyahu rejected calls to halt his “uncomfortable truths” comparisons of a nuclear-armed Iran to Nazi Germany and the Holocaust, “I know there are people who believe that it is forbidden to mention the unique evil of the Holocaust while talking about the current threats facing the Jewish people. They claim that doing so cheapens the Holocaust and insults its victims. I completely reject this approach… I will continue saying the truth to the world but first of all to my own people, who I know are strong enough to hear the truth. And the truth is that it is necessary to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. It is the duty of the world, but above all, it is our duty.”43 During a 2009 interview, Defense Minister Ehud Barak argued against labeling Iran as an existential threat. “I am not among those who believe Iran is an existential issue for Israel. Israel is strong; I don’t see anyone who could pose an existential threat.”44 Prime Minister Netanyahu frequently invoked the Holocaust analogy to warn of the dangers of Iranian proliferation and its growing regional influence, and critics charged Netanyahu’s invoking of the Holocaust analogy unnecessarily heightened tensions when the P5+1 states were pursuing a diplomatic solution to Iran’s nuclear program. The concern was Netanyahu’s IranNazi Germany comparison created a “moral imperative” that could force Israel to launch a preventive attack against Iran.45 Israeli leaders have also used the Holocaust analogy to criticize the country’s policies and responses to perceived threats. During a 2016 Holocaust memorial ceremony, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Deputy Chief of Staff General Yair Golan stated he saw trends in Israel that are similar to those in pre-Holocaust Europe, and warned against growing callousness and indifference toward those outside mainstream Israeli society. Golan argued, “If there is something that frightens me in the memory of the Holocaust, it is identifying horrifying processes that occurred in Europe… 70, 80 and 90 years ago and finding evidence of their existence here in our midst, today, in 2016.”46 Golan eluded to increased international criticism of Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians, and the settlement and annexation of lands that could be used for a future Palestinian state. 42 Tobias Buck, “Netanyahu’s Holocaust Rhetoric Under Fire,” The Financial Times, March 20, 2012, accessed November 9, 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b1a4609c-72ac-11e1-9be9-00144f eab49a.html#axzz2nBtdasmS. 43 Ronen Zvulun, “Netanyahu Defends Comparison of Iran, Nazi Holocaust,” Reuters, April 18, 2012, accessed December 18, 2020, https://reuters.com/article/amp/idUSBRE83H1EF20120418. 44 Katz and Hendel, Israel vs. Iran, 4. 45 Tobias Buck, “Netanyahu’s Holocaust Rhetoric Under Fire,” The Financial Times, March 20, 2012, accessed November 9, 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b1a4609c-72ac-11e1-9be9-00144f eab49a.html#axzz2nBtdasmS. 46 Raoul Wootliff, “A General’s Warning: Yair Golan Says Only Democratic Camp Can Mend Israel’s Ills,” The Times of Israel, July 30, 2019, accessed April 15, 2020, https://www.timesofis rael.com/a-generals-warning-yair-golan-says-only-democratic-camp-can-mend-israels-ills/.

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Caroline Glick notes that after the 1967 Six-Day War ended, the Israeli cabinet met to decide the fate of territory—Jerusalem, Judea, and Samaria—it had taken from Egypt, Jordan, and Syria because the international community did not support creation of another Arab state. The Israelis determined that until the Arabs expressed a willingness to negotiate with Israel, Israel would govern the areas using the IDF to set up a military government and civil administration. On September 1, 1967, the Arab League issued the Khartoum Declaration of the “Three No’s: no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no negotiation with Israel.” Consequently, Israel’s military governance over the territories became the status quo.47 Paul Danahar notes, after the Six-Day War, more secular and ultra-Orthodox Jews moved into the Occupied Territories in the West Bank and Gaza because the Israeli government provided them with cheap housing. He notes the 4th Geneva Convention prohibits the transfer of the occupying nation’s civilians to the land it occupies. The United Nations regularly calls on Israel to dismantle the settlements, based on Article 49 of the convention, however, Israel claims historical and biblical ties to the land and asserts the convention is not relevant to the territories because there was no “internationally recognized legal sovereign in either the West Bank or Gaza prior to the 1967 Six Day War,” therefore they cannot become “occupied territory” when control passed to Israel.48 President Obama expressed his concerns about the Israeli occupation to an audience of Israeli college students in Jerusalem, It is not fair that a Palestinian child cannot grow up in a state of their own, living their entire lives with the presence of a foreign army that controls the movements, not just of those young people but their parents, their grandparents, every single day. It’s not just when settler violence against Palestinians goes unpunished. It’s not right to prevent Palestinians from farming their lands or restricting a student’s ability to move around the West Bank or displace Palestinian families from their homes. Neither occupation nor expulsion is the answer. Just as Israelis built a state in their homeland, Palestinians have a right to be free people in their own land.49

Adversarial Rhetoric In addition to the Holocaust tragedy, Israel uses its neighbors’ rhetoric as an indicator of their intent to wage perpetual war against the Jewish State. Since its inception, Israel has cultivated an image of a small state surrounded by hostile neighbors bent on its destruction. This runs counter to the reality that Israel possesses an unrivaled air force, has a highly effective intelligence apparatus, operates a very efficient missile defense system, and is a close ally of the United States, which sells Israel some of its most advanced weapon systems. To their political and military detriment, some Arabs 47 Caroline B. Glick, The Israeli Solution: A One-State Plan for Peace in the Middle East (New York: Crown Forum, 2014), 110. 48 Paul Danahar, The New Middle East: The World After the Arab Spring (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2013), 150. 49 Danahar, 150.

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and Iranians contribute to Israel’s heightened threat perceptions and lack of empathy for their security concerns by exaggerating their military capabilities, promoting antiSemitic conspiracy theories, calling for the destruction of the Jewish State, denying the Holocaust, and supporting acts of terror against Israeli civilians. In 2018, Palestine Authority President Mahmoud Abbas gave a speech, condemned as anti-Semitic, in which he alluded to Jewish persecution and the Holocaust being a byproduct of their illegal money lending and banking practices. Abbas went on to question the ancestry of Ashkenazi Jews and argued they were not descended from biblical Israelites, but rather from the Khazars, who were a semi-nomadic Turkic people from Central Asia that converted to Judaism in the eighth century.50 This history of hostility toward Israel’s creation on what was considered by many to be Arab lands, resulted in the displacement of an estimated 750,000 Palestinians during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. In describing the possible future of the State of Israel, Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Ikhwan or Muslim Brotherhood, stated, “If the Jewish State becomes a fact, and this is realized by the Arab people, they will drive the Jews who live in their midst into the sea.”51 The connotation the Arabs want to drive the Jews into the sea remains a fixed analogy in Israeli political discourse. Consequently, Israeli leaders are prone to see the region as full of potential dangers that must be negated before they can fully materialize. Until the late 1970s, it was generally accepted that Arab hostility was so pervasive there was no way to alter Israel’s circumstances through either military or diplomatic means, so the status quo continued.52 The viability of these threats is arguable, because, although some Arab and Iranian leaders have the intent, they lack the military and nuclear capability to destroy Israel. Secondly, this rhetoric is often used by Israel’s rivals to deflect from domestic insecurities and prevent civil unrest by focusing anger and contempt at an external enemy, Israel. Adding to this conundrum are Israeli fears of Western abandonment and the fixed analogy of a second Holocaust with the loss of the “next six million” Jews.53

50 Isabel Kershner, “Palestinian Leader Incites Uproar with Speech Condemned as Anti-Semitic,” The New York Times, May 2, 2018, accessed May 2, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/02/ world/middleeast/palestinians-abbas-israel-jews.html. 51 Michael Handelzalts, “Word for Word: Who’s Throwing Who into the Sea?,” Haaretz, July 6, 2012, accessed June 3, 2013, http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/pen-ultimate/word-for-word-whos-throwing-who-into-the-sea-1.449269. 52 Charles D. Freilich, “National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and Strengths,” Middle East Journal, vol. 60, no. 4 (Autumn 2006): 637. 53 Daniel Gordis, Saving Israel: How the Jewish People Can Win a War That May Never End (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2009), 87.

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Fixed Analogy To avoid these existential catastrophes and another Holocaust, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion sought to ensure Israel’s survival. His early use of the fixed Holocaust analogy was enshrined in three essential lessons for Jews. First, self-reliance meant Jews must never rely on others for salvation. The second emphasized the absolute necessity of avoiding a single defeat because Israel lacked the resilience required to bounce back from defeat. The third lesson was deterrence was the best guarantee against a second Holocaust.54 Because of Israel’s proximity to its neighbors, the warning time for it to prepare for and respond to multiple inbound ballistic missiles is extremely compressed. If enough warheads are able to penetrate Israel’s Iron Dome missile defense system, a nuclear first strike, depending on the number of warheads and their yield, could potentially equate to a near extinction-level nuclear event against the State of Israel. The plausibility of this scenario contributes to heightened Israeli threat perceptions when it relates to adversarial states who have talked about the destruction of Israel, combining nuclear weapons with ballistic missiles. The ever-present fear of annihilation dominates Israeli defense strategy, and permeates the minds of its military-dominated national leadership and civilian population. Yoram Peri, a former political advisor to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, asserts two cultural systems coexist within Israeli society: security and diplomatic. Peri argues the long history of Arab hostility toward Israel made it difficult for the diplomatic culture to increase its influence in Israeli society, and after the Intifada began, many who had previously supported diplomacy voted for Ariel Sharon, who promoted the security culture.55 A poll conducted by the Institute of National Security Studies measured the Israeli public’s threat and security perceptions, and found that nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in the hands of an enemy state were viewed as the most serious threats for eight consecutive years.56 Because of its siege mentality and the perception that Arab and Iranian rhetoric and threats can somehow translate into a military capability, Freilich argues Israel built a disproportionate military capability to negate all threats and developed a “hunkering down” national security decision-making style geared toward a “garrison democracy.”57 Consequently, the perception remains that Arab and Iranian hostility is so great toward Israel that a large portion of Israeli politicians believe they have a limited range of military and diplomatic options with which to engage the Arab states and Iran.58 Some Israeli officials also look despairingly at political dialogue, as reflected in the statement of former Minister of Foreign Affairs Tzipi Livni when she declared her opposition to U.S.–Iran diplomacy in 2008. “We live in a neighborhood in which 54 Nili,

“The Nuclear (and the) Holocaust,” 39.

55 Yoram Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy (Washington,

DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006), 251. 56 Yehuda Ben Meir and Olena Bagno-Moldavsky, “The Voice of the People: Israeli Public Opinion

on National Security 2012,” Institute for National Security Studies (2013): 57. 57 Freilich, “National Security Decision-Making in Israel,” 635. 58 Freilich, “National Security Decision-Making in Israel,” 637.

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sometimes dialogue… is liable to be interpreted as weakness.”59 This rigid mindset increases the difficulty of pursuing diplomatic solutions to security-related issues and contributes to Israel’s use of military force when dealing with its adversaries. This military-first sentiment is reinforced by repeated wars with the Arab states, perpetual low-level hostilities with Iran, the failed peace processes with the Palestinians and Syria, and Israel’s “cold peace” with Egypt and Jordan.60 Two fundamental flaws exist in Israeli threat perception determination: it does not distinguish between intentions and capabilities, and it leaves little room for reassessment of its previous perceptions. Israeli leaders tend to perceive enemy threats and rhetoric as a component of a holistic existential threat no matter how credible. Within this paradigm, Israeli leaders believe their enemies cannot be deterred even by nuclear weapons because these enemies are fanatical and therefore must be attacked before they can develop a capability to destroy Israel.61 In an article for the prestigious Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Chuck Freilich echoed this sentiment when he warned of the possibilities of nuclear terrorism arising from Israeli peace agreements with its neighbors. He notes the cold peace that exists between Israel, Egypt, and Jordan because “neither country truly reconciled to the legitimacy of Israel’s existence.” Freilich also warns that any future agreements between Israel, and the Palestinians and Syria may be no different. Paradoxically, a peace agreement with the Palestinians, based on the establishment of an independent state, might heighten the risk of nuclear terrorism. A Palestinian state might create a sanctuary for terrorist organizations, which could use its territory, with or without its knowledge and cooperation, to develop and deploy a nuclear bomb on Israel’s borders and near major population centers. A peace agreement with Syria, which would presumably provide for a welcome severance of Syria’s military relations with both Iran and Hizballah [sic], might have a similar outcome.62

For Freilich, there seems to be no opportune way for Israel to deal with its neighbors because even if it negotiates an agreement with them, there is still a fear they will attack. Freilich’s argument about nuclear terrorism dismisses the extreme difficulty of acquiring a nuclear weapon, particularly with regard to the tremendous resources required to acquire, enrich, and weaponize enough fissile material to construct a nuclear device. One merely need examine the Iranian program to understand the difficulty of nuclear proliferation. Even with nuclear reactors, thousands of centrifuges, and technical assistance from the A.Q. Khan Network, Iran has not been able to produce a nuclear weapon since the Shah first voiced support for a nuclear capability nearly fifty years ago. Freilich’s comments are similar to those of President George W. 59 Trita

Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice: Obama’s Diplomacy with Iran (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012), 9. 60 Charles D. Freilich, Zion’s Dilemmas: How Israel Makes National Security Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), 1. 61 Nili, “The Nuclear (and the) Holocaust,” 42. 62 Chuck Freilich, “The Armageddon Scenario: Israel and the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism,” BeginSadat Center for Strategic Studies (2010): 7.

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Bush’s when he warned of worst-case scenarios of Saddam Hussein transferring nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations despite the reality that Iraq did not even have a nuclear weapon and that its nuclear program had been destroyed the decade prior, after Desert Storm. This mindset is also evident in Prime Minister Netanyahu’s dismissal of the legitimacy of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s successor, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, while correctly asserting that the true powerbroker in Iran is the Rahbar-e Moazzam, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. [The Iranian people] are governed not by Rouhani. They’re governed by Ayatollah Khamenei. He heads a cult. That cult is wild in its ambitions and its aggression… He calls the shots, Khamenei. [Rouhani] tells him — he tells his boss, the dictator of Iran, ‘I can get you the completion of the nuclear program by speaking nicely to the West. I can — what [President Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad tried to do with a frown, I’ll do with a smile.’63

These static beliefs and historical mistrust affect Israel’s ability to adapt to changing situations, which could possibly allow it to extricate itself from its security dilemma by negotiating with its enemies from a position of strength. The Israeli adherence to the fixed analogy reinforces Jervis’ assertion that individuals perceive what they expect to be present, and if they expect a state is hostile it will perceive that state’s actions to be hostile whether or not others perceive them to be neutral or friendly.64

The United States—Historical Tragedy and Perceptions of Threat Since its founding nearly 250 years ago, the United States has benefited from the relative safety of separation from the rest of the world’s conflicts by oceans on its eastern and western borders, having friendly states on its northern and southern borders, and by its dominant military and economic strength, and vast nuclear arsenal with its second-strike capability. This physical comfort and ability to conduct a defense in-depth strategy due to its large geographic area and nuclear deterrent force has allowed the United States to engage in both isolationist and interventionist foreign policies at will, while remaining unthreatened by neighboring countries. The United States also has the additional fortune of not being invaded by an existential foe in nearly 200 years, a fact that further insulates its population from the psychological impact of war.

63 Becky Bratu, “Netanyahu: Iran’s Khamenei ‘Heads a Cult’,” NBC News, October 2, 2013, accessed October 8, 2013, http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/10/02/20789538-netanyahu-iranskhamenei-heads-a-cult?lite. 64 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 68.

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Historical Analogies The United States has experienced five significant attacks on its soil, the American Revolution, the War of 1812, the U.S. Civil War, the Imperial Japanese Navy attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, and al-Qaeda’s attacks on September 11, 2001. The United States has also endured smaller attacks, such as Pancho Villa’s attack on Columbus, New Mexico in March 1916, which was repelled by Brigadier General John “Black Jack” Pershing and members of the Buffalo Soldiers’ 10th Cavalry, and 24th and 25th Infantry Regiments, which included Sergeant Linold Chappell. The Pearl Harbor attack forced the United States’ entry into World War II and facilitated its rise to preeminence following its defeat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. The United States’ large residual military force, atomic weapons, and strong economy further enhanced American global dominance as it filled the void left by British and French retrenchment. Washington soon saw its strength tested as it entered two back to back wars in Asia. The Korean War saw U.S. forces face North Korean and Chinese forces, ultimately battling to a draw. The subsequent U.S.-led war in Vietnam had a much more significant impact on the national psyche, as it inflicted 58,220 U.S. casualties between 1965 and 1975.65 The U.S. war effort also saw large-scale domestic protests against the U.S. war effort and the demonization of returning U.S. service members.66 Concerns with future U.S. interventions in the developing world following a similar trajectory led to the creation of the Vietnam syndrome. Yuen Foong Khong discusses the Vietnam syndrome and policymaker’s tendency to use America’s experience in Vietnam to draw lessons learned and apply them to current issues in order to better understand a threat.67 Khong notes two distinct lessons learned from the Vietnam War and the “no more Vietnams” mantra. First, many American war critics argue against intervening in civil wars where the United States is unlikely to achieve a clear and decisive victory. Second, the Americans who supported the war believe the United States should be able to fight future wars, unhindered by unrealistic expectations and restraints imposed by civilian authorities.68 In drawing lessons from the Vietnam War, neither group wanted to see a repeat of the costly 10year war, however, each side had divergent ways of accomplishing this goal. Despite the differing analogical approaches, the Vietnam syndrome continued to shadow U.S. military operations and its avoidance of being sucked into “another Vietnam” for the next two and a half decades. On September 11, 2001, tragedy struck America’s shores as the United States suffered the worst attack on its territory since the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor 65 “Vietnam War U.S. Military Fatal Casualty Statistics,” National Archives, April 29, 2008, accessed April 30, 2020, https://www.archives.gov/research/military/vietnam-war/casualty-statistics. 66 Neil Sheehan, Hedrick Smith, E.W. Kenworthy, and Fox Butterfield, The Pentagon Papers (New York: Racehorse Publishing, 2017), 546. 67 Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 258. 68 Khong, Analogies at War, 258.

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on December 7, 1941. Over the course of two hours, nineteen al-Qaeda terrorists hijacked and crashed four civilian airliners, killing 2976 people. The horrific tragedy of the September 11th attacks created a sense of vulnerability most Americans had never felt, and propelled the United States to fight simultaneous wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with a global campaign to fight terrorism. Al-Qaeda’s initial discussions of the attack reportedly began in Tora Bora, Afghanistan, when Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) approached Osama bin Laden to discuss striking their shared enemy, the United States. Mohammed’s nephew, Ramzi Yousef, had already bombed the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993. Khalid previously developed a plan to attack the United States by blowing up twelve American airliners over the Pacific Ocean, in a plot was dubbed, Bojinka.69 Bin Laden allegedly scaled back the September 11th attack plans and, along with Abu Hafs and KSM, decided to strike just four U.S. targets, with the intent of politically destroying America and causing it to relinquish world leadership.70 In his Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holiest Sites, bin Laden stated his rationale for waging war against the United States. This rationale included what he saw as historic injustices and tragedies committed against Muslims. It is not concealed from you that the people of Islam had suffered from aggression, iniquity and injustice imposed on them by the Jewish-Christian alliance and their collaborators to the extent that the Muslims’ blood became the cheapest and their wealth and assets looted by the hands of the enemies. All of that happened and the world watched and heard, and not only did not respond to these atrocities, but also with a clear conspiracy between America and its allies prevented the weaklings from acquiring arms to defend themselves by using the United Nations as a cover.71

In examining why bin Laden attacked the United States, former CIA intelligence officer Michael Scheuer argues we must first understand the man and his motivations. Scheuer posits bin Laden believed the United States was intent on destroying Islam, Muslims, and the Islamic world, thus he sought to rally Muslims to wage a defensive jihad against the United States, the West, and their Arab allies, whom he believed to be the enemies of Islam. Bin Laden’s ultimate goal was to restore Muslim dignity, holy places, and lost territories in order to facilitate the purity of God’s rule in the Muslim world.72 The crusaders were permitted to be in the land of the two holiest sites [Saudi Arabia]. Not surprisingly though, the [Saudi] King himself wore the cross… The King has violated the prophet’s command by allowing the crusaders to be in the Arab Peninsula. The Prophet said on his deathbed: “Expel the infidels from the Arabian Peninsula.” He also said, “If it should 69 Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Alred A. Knopf, 2006), 235. 70 Wright, The Looming Tower, 308. 71 Osama bin Laden, “Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holiest Sites,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, October 2013, accessed June 28, 2020, https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Declaration-of-Jihad-against-the-Ame ricans-Occupying-the-Land-of-the-Two-Holiest-Sites-Translation.pdf. 72 Anonymous, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2002), 4.

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3 Cognitive Psychological Influences please God Almighty that I live, I will expel the Jews and the Christians from the Arabian Peninsula.” My Muslim Brothers of the world: Your brothers in the land of the two holiest sites and Palestine are calling upon you for help and asking you to take part in fighting against the enemy, your enemy; the Israelis and Americans.73

In the 1990s, bin Laden sought the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Saudi Arabia and criticized the Saudi royal family for inviting foreigners to defend the Kingdom against Iraq, following Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait. Bin Laden argued the mujahedeen who defeated the Soviets should defend Saudi Arabia, rather than the Americans. Soon after, the Saudis expelled bin Laden and he went into exile in Sudan and Afghanistan. In 1996, he declared jihad against the United States and began criticizing the U.S. military presence in the region, international sanctions against Iraq, and the U.S. support for Israel.74 Scholars suggest al-Qaeda’s ideology is a blend of violent jihadist ideology, embodied by Egyptians Sayyed Qutb and Muhammad Abd al-Salem Faraj, and fundamentalist Salafism. With these two ideologies intertwined, al-Qaeda’s core belief is that jihad is not just a defensive concept, but one that requires Muslims to fight non-Muslims until Islam reigns around the world.75 These beliefs extended to his followers. Prior to the hijacking, the coordinator of the September 11th attacks, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, also known as Omar, stated, These hours were awesome, for you engage in a great battle with all its dimensions, a huge battle. It is a military operation that is unconventional against the mightiest force on Earth, who possesses all the weapons and intelligence equipment and spy satellites while her agents are spread all over the world. And you are facing them on their own backyard, amidst their forces and their soldiers, with a group of youths numbering nineteen.76

The attacks were a national tragedy, and the images of people jumping to their deaths from the burning Twin Towers burnished lasting images in the hearts and minds of Americans. The attacks saw the United States undertake a more confrontational foreign policy, to include fighting parallel wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the hunt for al-Qaeda’s leaders and planners, and a global campaign against the ideology that inspired the attacks. In an address to Congress, President Bush memorialized the sentiment of the surprise attacks on the American psyche. On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. Americans have known wars, but for the past 136 years they have been wars on foreign soil, 73 Osama bin Laden, “Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holiest Sites,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, October 2013, accessed June 28, 2020, https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Declaration-of-Jihad-against-the-Ame ricans-Occupying-the-Land-of-the-Two-Holiest-Sites-Translation.pdf. 74 Christopher M. Blanchard, “Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology,” CRS Report for Congress, February 4, 2005, 4. 75 Michael W.S. Ryan, Decoding Al-Qaeda’s Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 6. 76 Terry McDermott, Perfect Soldiers: The Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It (New York: HarperCollins, 2005), 233.

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except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of war, but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks, but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day, and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.77

In framing the September 11th attacks, President Bush emphatically declared it was because they hate our freedoms.78 Bush’s assessment is an example of a fundamental attribution error, which is when one seeks to explain another person’s behavior or actions based on their dispositional qualities, such as personalities or motivations, rather than the environmental situation that may have caused the behavior.79 Bush’s statement sought to explain al-Qaeda’s attack on the United States by arguing it was due to their hatred of the freedoms Americans enjoy, rather than U.S. policies they believe unfairly attack Muslims. Michael Scheuer argued Muslims perceive U.S. policies in the Middle East as challenging God’s word, attacking the Muslims and their resources, and occupying Muslim lands.80 Bush’s invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were described by bin Laden as “Crusades,” and prior to the 2004 U.S. presidential elections, he urged Americans to reevaluate their policies in the Muslim world and threatened to bleed the United States into bankruptcy.81 Nearly ten years after he sponsored the most devastating terrorist attack in U.S. history, Osama bin Laden was killed by U.S. Navy SEALs on May 2, 2011, in Abbottabad, Pakistan.

Adversarial Rhetoric A notable postwar distinction between the United States and Israel is that after the United States defeated Japan and Germany, Washington rebuilt its former adversaries with a design to limit their military capabilities by creating a patronage system to ensure they would no longer pose an existential threat to their neighbors or to the United States. In constructing this symbiotic relationship, the United States ensured its former rivals remained non-nuclear weapons states and dependent on U.S. security guarantees for protection against their shared enemies, the Soviet Union and China. During the Cold War, U.S. international concerns focused on the “red menace,” fear of a communist domino effect, and a U.S.–Soviet nuclear war. At home, polarizing Cold War rhetoric centered on the “red scare” and communist subversion in the United States, whose champion, Wisconsin Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy, used scare tactics to expose suspected communists residing in the United States. 77 “Text: President Bush Addresses the Nation,” The Washington Post, September 20, 2001, accessed

May 2, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushad dress_092001.html. 78 “Text: President Bush Addresses the Nation.” 79 Cottam et al., Introduction to Political Psychology, 296. 80 Michael Scheuer, Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006), 11. 81 Blanchard, “Al Qaeda,” 4.

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Within this construct, U.S. rhetoric largely focused on halting communist domination and deterring a Soviet nuclear attack. For the United States, the post-World War II monopoly on atomic power was shortlived as the Soviet Union achieved a nuclear capability in 1949, and soon challenged U.S. global dominance, ushering in the Cold War. Within this newly created bipolar world, the United States formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to balance against the Soviet Union and later the Warsaw Pact. With NATO Article V stipulating an armed attack on one is an attack on all, the NATO countries were treaty-bound to take steps they deemed necessary, including the use of force, to restore peace and security to the North Atlantic region. NATO alleviated U.S. fears of abandonment and lessened the need for an overly aggressive foreign policy because collective security requirements contained in the NATO charter provided guarantees. Accordingly, the United States and the Soviet Union avoided direct confrontation and instead used proxies to confront one another, thereby lessening the likelihood of direct conflict spiraling toward nuclear war. Despite the restraint demonstrated by the superpowers, the U.S. prohibition on preventive war did not stop U.S. military leaders from discussing strikes against the Soviet Union and China during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, to halt communist expansion and forestall their nuclear programs.82 Although, U.S. military leaders discussed attacking the Soviet Union and China during the Cold War, there was no serious discussion of attacking India, Pakistan, or North Korea during the early stages of their nuclear programs.83 Notwithstanding the U.S. reluctance to attack emerging nuclear threats, Israel was so concerned about Pakistan’s nuclear program that it allegedly requested permission from India to use an Indian air force base in Jamnagar to launch a preventive attack against Pakistan’s nuclear facilities. The Israel aircraft would refuel at an airfield in northern India and then track along the Himalayan Mountains to avoid radar detection before penetrating Pakistani airspace to bomb Pakistani nuclear facilities. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi allegedly approved the plan, but the United States forced India and Israel to abandon the attack.84 Unlike Israel, the United States had one primary rival and this enemy did not directly call for its destruction nor was there a history of direct-armed conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union military forces, as has been the case for Israel and the Arab states. The United States and the Soviet Union fought using proxies and their vast intelligence apparatuses, while Israel’s military and intelligence agencies engage directly with its adversaries’ military forces and proxies. Notwithstanding the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, prior to the September 11th attacks, Americans had yet to experience a collective and galvanizing national tragedy committed by an enemy. Unlike other states, many of America’s national tragedies were self-inflicted therefore few catalysts exist for a nationalist foreign policy. Though many consider 82 Sagan

and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 52. Confront and Conceal, 187. 84 Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 213. 83 Sanger,

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America’s treatment of Native Americans as genocide and the nearly 250 years of American chattel slavery followed by 100 years of Jim Crow segregation as America’s greatest sins, these national tragedies did not have the same psychological effect on America’s leadership nor imprint on the collective national conscious, in the manner the Holocaust affected the world’s Jewish population, because these tragedies were inflicted on America by Americans.

Fixed Analogy While America came out of World War II as victors believing in the power of democracy and American military might, many of Europe’s Jews came out of the war looking for a homeland from which to prevent their further annihilation, and for which many believed to be their religious right. Therefore, America’s leaders have traditionally lacked the ability to link a significant national tragedy to an emerging existential threat as a means to incite nationalism and heighten threat postures, as has been the case with Israel and its use of the Holocaust analogy. Consequently, U.S. leaders did not frame the Cold War using an analogical process that invoked a past tragedy, but instead used it to conjure worst-case scenarios of a world in which communism would spread if left unchecked by U.S. and NATO power.85 The United States’ use of the September 11th analogy is largely invoked when discussing actions necessary to prevent a terrorist group from attacking the United States and its interests, rather than confronting a true existential threat. The horror and devastation a nuclear-armed terrorist group could inflict on a state are unimaginable, and the consequences of such a weapon coming into contact with a terrorist organization must be avoided at all costs. A population center could be annihilated within seconds of a nuclear blast or a state could be held hostage by a terrorist group with a nuclear weapon. Consequently, decision-makers across both parties have used a worst-case scenario of a terrorist group armed with a nuclear weapon being an existential threat, however, the feasibility of this scenario is quite low due to the technical difficulties and costs associated with obtaining the requisite fissile material, weaponizing it, and then acquiring a delivery system to place it on target. The true difficulty in acquiring a nuclear weapon lies with securing enough fissile material and having the capacity to enrich it to weapons-grade levels. Many nuclear scientists already have the knowledge to construct a nuclear weapon, even if it is a crude device. The technology for the gun-type bomb dropped on Hiroshima (Little Boy) and implosion-type bomb dropped on Nagasaki (Fat Man) is eighty years old, and diagrams of these weapons are found on the internet. This contributes to why the United States and Israel focus their concerns on halting Iran’s uranium enrichment activities, because of the danger posed by weapons-grade fissile material in the hands of individuals who have the technical expertise to construct a nuclear weapon. It is

85 Gershkoff

and Kushner, “Shaping Public Opinion,” 526.

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not beyond the realm of possibility that a terrorist group could acquire a nuclear capability, but absent obtaining a fully assembled and functioning nuclear weapon, the terrorists would have to construct a device, have the logistical capability to get it to its target, and have the knowledge required to detonate it. At a minimum, this effort would include: building a uranium enrichment facility, obtaining centrifuges and the associated nuclear and computer modeling equipment, acquiring and enriching enough fissile material to weapons-grade levels to construct a bomb, developing and testing a warhead design and reentry vehicle that can withstand the stress and heat of reentering the Earth’s atmosphere, and constructing an ICBM-class ballistic missile and guidance system that no country in the region has thus far been able to engineer. The other possibility is to purchase or steal a nuclear weapon and then mate it atop a ballistic missile that can travel more than 7000 miles from the Middle East to strike the U.S. mainland. All these efforts must be accomplished while remaining undetected by the world’s most capable and effective intelligence agencies, and avoiding their coordinated military effort to track and destroy the group and its nuclear weapon. The potential for a terrorist group acquiring a functioning nuclear weapon is limited; however, the potential costs and psychological trauma of nuclear terrorism are too serious to disregard or downplay. Perhaps, a more urgent and compelling concern is a nuclear-armed rogue state, or state of concern. In addition to a nuclear weapon, a rogue state leader would have the state’s instruments of power at his disposal, to include military forces, intelligence services, economic industries and natural resources, additional weapons of mass destruction, and a nation of human shields. A rogue state has the potential to challenge rival states, short of nuclear war, and could rely on its nuclear arsenal to extort weaker powers or international institutions. In a confrontation with another nuclear weapons state, there is increased risk of miscalculation and a spiral of violence that could lead to a nuclear exchange. A nuclear rogue state poses a threat to the United States, although it is questionable if the degree of threat reaches the existential threshold. The United States’ distance from current states of concern means it can only be reached by an ICBM, SLBM, or a long-range air-refueled bomber, which limits the ability of most states to target it, and its large geographic area would allow it to absorb a nuclear attack more so than a smaller state that is closer to the rogue state. A rival state is likely to be situated near the rogue state, which means it can be targeted by multiple delivery platforms including aircraft, Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs), or even a nuclear device that was smuggled into the country over a land route. These differing experiences influenced American and Israeli national self-images, their leaders’ belief systems, and shaped the focus of their respective national security policies and threat perceptions.

History of Conflict A recent history of conflict between states can contribute to negative perceptions and the framing of present hostilities as a continuation of past conflicts. The study

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offers no insight into covert operations because of their secretive nature and the lack of publicly available information due to their classification level. Research suggests prolonged hostilities generate a culture and ethos of conflict imprinted in the collective memories of a society. This culture instills hostility and hatred toward the enemy in future generations thereby perpetuating the continuation of hostilities.86 Studies suggest individuals perceive what they expect to be present, and if a state is perceived to be hostile, its actions will be perceived as hostile whether others see the same actions as neutral or friendly.87 This lack of trust is embodied in Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s perception of Iran, which is due in no small part to former Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s minimizing and, in some cases denying the Holocaust. According to Ahmadinejad, The pretext [Holocaust] for the creation of the Zionist regime [Israel] is false… It is a lie based on an unprovable and mythical claim.88 Our dear Imam [Khomeini] said that the occupying regime [Israel] must be wiped off the map and this was a very wise statement. We cannot compromise over the issue of Palestine. Is it possible to create a new front in the heart of an old front? This would be a defeat and whoever accepts the legitimacy of this regime [Israel] has in fact, signed the defeat of the Islamic world.89

Soon after his inauguration, Ahmadinejad made remarks about the Holocaust, which centered on three points: (1) the Holocaust is a myth, and if it were not, the Europeans would not deny those who contest its reality the right to speak out, (2) those who deny the Holocaust have their rights to freedom of speech violated by the West, which simultaneously defends the right of others to blaspheme Islam, and (3) if the Holocaust did actually happen, those who committed the atrocities are the ones who should have given land to the Jews. For Ahmadinejad and many in the Arab world, there is wide consensus the European powers should have provided land for a Jewish homeland, rather than placing them in Palestine.90 Some see Ahmadinejad’s vitriol and anti-Semitism as a gift to Israel and its supporters because his rhetoric provides proof of an intractable enemy who will never accept the legitimacy of Israel. Palestinian academic Khaled Al-Hroub shared this sentiment when he spoke out about Holocaust denial and anti-Semitism, and its impact on the perceptions of Arabs and Muslims; Israel and its political leaders are delighted when the leaders of Hamas, the Muslim Brothers, Iran, or any Arab or Muslim at all, make statements denying the Holocaust or adopt a 86 Ervin Staub and Daniel Bar-Tal, “Genocide, Mass Killing and Intractable Conflict: Roots, Evolu-

tion, Prevention, and Reconciliation,” Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 712. 87 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 68. 88 Parisha Hafezi and Firouz Sedarat, “Ahmadinejad Says Holocaust a Lie, Israel Has No Future,” Reuters, September 18, 2009, accessed January 22, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/09/ 18/us-iran-idUSTRE58H17S20090918. 89 Jalil Roshandel, Iran, Israel and the United States: Regime Security vs. Political Legitimacy (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2011), 82. 90 Gilbert Achcar, The Arabs and the Holocaust: The Arab-Israeli War of Narratives (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2009), 267.

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3 Cognitive Psychological Influences discourse hostile to the Jews as members of a faith or Judaism as a religion. For all this confirms their propaganda, repeated everywhere, which has it that the Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims want to wipe out the Jews, contrary to what is in fact going on in Palestine. On the other hand, Israel, its political leaders, and all its lobbies will be disconcerted when the naïve, superficial discourse on the Holocaust and Jews in general put forth by a handful of [Arab or Muslim] leaders or intellectuals disappears for good and all.91

Israel is largely isolated and has sparse diplomatic relations with its neighbors. The degree of mistrust between the Arabs and Israelis contributes to heightened threat perceptions due to the absence of communication and a mutual lack of empathy. This point was emphasized by Efraim Inbar, Director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University, Israel, Israel doesn’t trust anybody, not even the American president… A word doesn’t mean anything. Not even a signed paper. So it’s a big gap between how liberal Americans think about international relations and how Israelis and Arabs [see it].92

Research notes a perceptual security dilemma may develop when psychological factors interact, and assessments are exaggerated by biases. This overestimation of hostile intent increases the likelihood of preventive war.93 The security dilemma is closely tied to perceptions of a change in the balance of power equation, such as when a new state develops a nuclear capability and achieves a degree of parity. When a state perceives a change in military capabilities in favor of an adversary, a sense of fear and vulnerability often drives an overestimation of the threat thereby issuing a call for action. Saideh Lotfian supports this assumption and argues realists predict power inequality could lead to heightened threat perceptions and conflict because states that are militarily weak are more likely to feel threatened by more powerful states.94 Kreps and Fuhrmann find states are willing to accept substantial costs in attacking the target state if they believe the acquisition of a nuclear weapon poses a serious threat to their national security.95 These vulnerabilities and insecurities are compounded by a lack of strategic depth, repeated war, and unsettled borders.96 Such is the case with Israel because of its concentrated urban population centers, numerous wars and conflicts since independence, and its physical proximity to adversaries.

91 Achcar,

The Arabs and the Holocaust, 268. Bryant, “Netanyahu to Obama: Don’t Be Naïve About Iran,” The Christian Science Monitor, September 30, 2013, accessed January 9, 2014, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Mid dle-East/2013/0930/Netanyahu-to-Obama-Don-t-be-naive-about-Iran-video. 93 Stein, “Building Politics into Psychology,” 260. 94 Saideh Lotfian, “Prevent and Defend: Threat Perceptions and Iran’s Defense Policy,” Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs, vol. 2, no. 3 (Fall 2011): 9. 95 Kreps and Fuhrmann, “Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace,” 5. 96 Stein, “Building Politics into Psychology,” 261. 92 Christa Case

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Israel—History of Conflict Israel has fought nearly all of its neighbors during a series of wars beginning with its founding. In the 1948 War of Independence or al-Nakba,—“the Catastrophe” to Palestinians—Israel fought Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria in simultaneous battles after it was attacked by the combined Arab armies. During the 1956 Suez Crisis, the United States demanded a cease-fire as Britain, France, and Israel attacked Egypt due to President Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal. In the 1967 Six-Day War, the Israelis conducted their first successful preemptive strike against the mobilized armies of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria. At the war’s conclusion, Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. During the war, Egypt was defeated because it did not fully comprehend the degree of perceived threat Israel felt to its existence.97 In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Egypt and Syria sought to regain territory lost during the 1967 Six-Day War by launching a surprise strike against the Jewish State on Yom Kippur. They regained a limited amount of land after Henry Kissinger brokered an agreement in which Egypt later regained all of the Sinai Peninsula after signing the Camp David Accords with Israel on March 26, 1979. After defeating the combined armies of its adversaries during successive wars, Israel’s relationship evolved into one of near constant conflict with its neighbors as it sought to fight preventive wars in their territories rather than inside Israel. The Arab states realized the difficulty in fighting conventional wars against Israel, so some increased their asymmetric capabilities by funding and using proxies and terrorist groups, some sought a cold peace with the Israelis, while others sought the security of a nuclear weapon to deter the militarily dominant Israel. In response, Israel launched incursions into neighboring states, invaded Lebanon to dislodge the Palestinian Liberation Organization, bombed the PLO headquarters in Tunisia, fought two wars against Hezbollah, battled Palestinians during two intifadas and amidst the ongoing hostilities in the West Bank and Gaza, fought Hamas in Gaza, conducts airstrikes against Iranian and Hezbollah targets inside Syria, and is suspected of conducting targeted assassinations throughout the region, including inside the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Syria, and Iran.

Israel and Iraq Israeli and Iraqi forces faced one another in combat during the 1967 Six-Day War and in the 1973 Yom Kippur/Ramadan War. During these wars, the Iraqi contingent was a component of the larger Arab forces engaged in combat with Israeli forces. Despite participation in the two wars, Iraqi forces had no measurable military success against Israel. Israel’s concerns about Iraq and Saddam Hussein were triggered by Saddam’s anti-Semitic rhetoric and support for regional terrorist groups. 97 Kaplowitz,

“National Self-Images, Perception of Enemies, and Conflict Strategies,” 54.

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These concerns were elevated when Israel discovered Iraq’s French-built nuclear test reactors would become operational within months. The Israelis feared a nuclear capability would allow Iraq to threaten Israel with a nuclear attack, or use its nuclear weapons status as a check against Israeli regional dominance. Israel previously established a redline that it would not allow a state to introduce nuclear weapons into the region. Iraq’s nuclear reactors crossed Israel’s redline, triggering the attack. Prime Minister Menachem Begin also made statements equating the radiation produced by atomic bombs to Zyklon B, which was a gas the Nazis used to commit the mass murder of Jews in the Nazi concentration camps. These possibilities were concern enough for Israel’s leaders to authorize a preventive airstrike to destroy Iraq’s nuclear reactors. In 1981, Israel attacked and destroyed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor after labeling it an existential threat. Saddam Hussein’s bellicose rhetoric drew Israel’s attention when he began developing a supergun and constructing a nuclear reactor. Saddam’s response to Israel’s attack on the reactor was an appeal to his fellow Arabs to help him “acquire atomic bombs to confront the Israelis, not to champion the Arabs and not to fuel war, but to safeguard and achieve peace.”98 Israel’s preventive strike against the Osirak reactor was thought to be a successful use of counterproliferation strategy; however, research suggests the raid actually compelled Iraq to accelerate and focus its nuclear proliferation efforts.99 Consequently, Iraq began a full-scale covert nuclear “crash program” that might have produced a nuclear weapon by the mid-1990s, had Saddam not invaded Kuwait in August 1990. Dr. Jafar Dhia Jafar, known as “the father of Iraq’s uranium enrichment program,” later told IAEA inspectors the destruction of the Osirak reactor was the catalyst for Iraq’s enrichment program; although the Israel Defense Force calls this assertion “unsubstantiated.”100

Israel and Hezbollah and Hamas In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon to dislodge Yasser Arafat and destroy the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The Israelis continued to attack various Palestinian groups during the two intifadas, and amid protests and indiscriminate rocket fire from Gaza. On July 22, 2002, an Israeli F-16 dropped a 2000 pound bomb on an apartment building, killing senior Hamas leader Salah Shehada, who had directed 52 terrorist operations against Israel, killing 220 civilians and 16 soldiers. In killing Shehada, Israel destroyed an entire apartment building, killing its target along with 98 Robert

F. Goheen, “Problems of Proliferation: U.S. Policy and the Third World,” World Politics, vol. 35, no. 2 (January 1983): 205. 99 David Albright, “Iraq’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Past, Present, and Future Challenges,” The Washington Institute, Policy #301, February 18, 1998, accessed March 31, 2020, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iraqs-nuclear-weapons-programpast-present-and-future-challenges. 100 Rafael Ofek, “The Story Behind the Iraqi Nuclear Weapon Program,” Israel Defense, September 15, 2016, accessed March 31, 2020, https://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/content/story-behind-iraqinuclear-weapon-program.

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his daughter and eight other children.101 In 2006, Israel launched a 34-day air war against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. As William Arkin articulated, this was the first sustained modern air campaign conducted by a country other than the United States.102 The campaign’s lack of a decisive victory led to the establishment of the Winograd Commission to determine the cause of Israel’s failure to defeat Hezbollah. The commission’s report illuminated numerous shortfalls relating to Israel’s poor decision-making, the lack of strategic thinking, and its failings in protecting the civilian population during a war initiated by Israel.103 In 2008, senior Hezbollah commander, Imad Mughniyeh (aka Hajj Radwan) was killed in a car bomb attack in Damascus, Syria. Among many offenses, Mughniyeh was responsible for smuggling operatives and weapons into Israel, launching terror attacks against Israelis in Argentina, and for firing rockets into Northern Israel. He was also responsible for the “1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, which took out the entire CIA station there, as well as the visiting head of the agency’s Middle East analysis branch.” Mughniyeh also reportedly planned the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in 1984, and watched the attack from a nearby building. He was also suspected of complicity in the hijacking of a TWA airliner in 1985, and is accused of being involved in the bombing of the U.S. Air Force housing complex at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, in 1986, which killed 17 Americans. In 1985, his Islamic Jihad Organization announced it had captured, tortured, and killed CIA Station Chief William Buckley in Lebanon.104 From December 2008 to January 2009, Israel conducted Operation Cast Lead— called the Battle of Al-Furqan by Hamas—in an effort to halt Hamas missile attacks. The 22-day campaign killed an estimated 1400 Palestinians. In another highly publicized killing, Hamas accused Israel of assassinating Mahmoud al-Mabhouh inside his hotel room in Dubai in 2010.105 Mabhouh was a senior member of Hamas and a cofounder of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, whom Israel accused of playing a role in the abduction and killing of two Israeli soldiers in 1989 and of smuggling weapons into Gaza. Dubai police publicly shared surveillance video of the assassination team wearing disguises as they tracked Mabhouh. The Dubai police chief stated

101 Daniel Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 85, no. 2 (March/April 2006): 95. 102 William M. Arkin, Diving Victory: Airpower in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2007), xviii. 103 “Winograd Commission Final Report,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 30, 2008, accessed August 22, 2103, http://www.cfr.org/israel/winograd-commission-final-report/p15385. 104 Matthew Levitt, “Why the CIA Killed Imad Mughniyeh,” Politico, February 9, 2015, accessed July 10, 2020, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/02/mughniyeh-assassination-cia115049. 105 Isabel Kershner, “Meir Dagan, Israeli Spymaster, Dies at 71; Disrupted Iran’s Nuclear Program,” The New York Times, March 17, 2016, accessed July 10, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/ 18/world/middleeast/meir-dagan-former-mossad-director-dies-at-71.html.

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he was “99 percent, if not 100 percent” sure that Mossad was behind the killing of Mabhouh.106

Israel and Syria Syria is the enduring confrontation state against Israel and has sought to achieve military parity over the years to more effectively resist Israeli military dominance. Syria’s foreign policy of Arab nationalism puts it into direct conflict with the Jewish State, and out of step with its Sunni neighbors, many of whom are warming to Israel. Syrian forces are largely incapable of challenging Israel’s military forces, though over the years they have attempted to upgrade their military equipment in an attempt to close the conventional military gap between the two states. Despite these efforts, the Syrians have been defeated by Israel during nearly every confrontation over the past 70 years. The two states have engaged in direct combat operations beginning with Israel’s independence in 1948, and these kinetic engagements have continued well into Syria’s Civil War, at the close of 2020. During the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel captured the strategic Golan Heights and repelled a Syrian attempt to retake it during the 1973 Yom Kippur/Ramadan War. The countries have been in a nearconstant state of conflict due to competing regional interests and mutual distrust. In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon, which was a Syrian client state, to oust the Palestine Liberation Organization from Lebanon. This invasion, again, put Israeli and Syrian forces into direct combat until Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 1985. In 2000, Israeli intelligence reported Syria was discussing a nuclear weapons program, and four years later the United States intercepted a volume of calls between Syria and North Korea. These intercepts ultimately led to the discovery that Syria was constructing a nuclear reactor with the assistance of North Korea, in its eastern desert near the Iraq border. Israel labeled the reactor an existential threat due to its longstanding policy that it will not allow a state to introduce nuclear weapons to the region. In assessing Syria’s 70 years of military defeat by the Israelis, the study turns to Sagan’s Security Model to examine Syria’s motivations for seeking a nuclear weapon. Sagan argues states seek to build a nuclear weapon to increase national security against foreign threats in the absence of security guarantees from nuclear power. In this case, Syria’s historic patron Russia had cut funding to its client states due to its weakened economy and shifting priorities closer to home. Without a nuclear patron saint, the Syrians attempted to acquire its own nuclear deterrent, with the assistance of North Korea. In 2007, Israel launched a preventive attack to destroy Syria’s Al-Kibar nuclear reactor, in a raid similar to the one it conducted 26 years earlier against Iraq. There were muted responses from the United States, Israel, and Syria. However, in 2018 Israel lifted censorship on the raid and a Haaretz 106 Robert F. Worth, “Inquiry Grows in Dubai Assassination,” The New York Times, February 24, 2010, accessed July 10, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/25/world/middleeast/25dubai. html.

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news report detailed the Israeli Air Force’s bombing of the Syrian reactor.107 Sanger and Mazzetti argue the Israelis conducted the raid to “demonstrate its determination to snuff out even a nascent nuclear project in a neighboring state.”108 Nearly four years after Israel destroyed its nuclear reactor, Syria was embroiled in an existential conflict that risked tearing the country apart. A Sunni-led insurgency erupted into a full-scale civil war in 2011. Syrian forces were stretched thin as they battled an array of rebels and terrorists, including ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates. Syria lost large swaths of its territory to disparate groups, as they carved out their own niches, with the Islamic State declaring its capital in the eastern Syrian city of Raqqa. Fearing a total collapse of his forces, President Assad requested assistance from Iran and Russia. Iran had its own interests in preserving Assad, as Syria serves as the ground line of communication (GLOC), or land bridge, between Iran and Hezbollah in neighboring Lebanon. Iran provided Hezbollah forces and other militias ground troops, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force sent in money, weapons, military trainers, and advisors. Russia provided airpower to conduct strategic bombing of rebel positions and close air support to the ground troops. This influx of manpower enabled Syrian forces to open multiple fronts and to cut rebel logistics lines. As of this writing, the majority of rebel forces are essentially under siege in Idlib Province. This military assistance did not come without resistance. Turkey, a U.S. NATO ally, shot down a Russian aircraft during combat operations and there have been tensions between U.S. and Russian forces on the ground, with Russia also deploying mercenaries from the Wagner Private Military Company (PMC). The Iranian IRGC-QF advisors and Hezbollah forces were also a concern to Israel because, for the first time, it put an Iranian military presence along Israel’s border. Israel had a history of conducting airstrikes along Iran’s GLOC in Syria to prevent the transfer of gamechanging weapons to Hezbollah. Now, the Israelis were directly targeting Iran’s military forces and advisors inside Syria. Tensions between Israel and Syria have a high probability of remaining high as long as Iranian forces are deployed on Syrian territory.

Israel and Iran In an article for Politico, Ronen Bergman discussed a May 2003 meeting of Israeli intelligence officials where they discussed ways to stop Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. According to Bergman, Tamir Pardo, the right-hand man to Meir Dagan, head of Mossad, argued, 107 Amos Harel and Aluf Benn, “No Longer a Secret: How Israel Destroyed Syria’s Nuclear Reactor,”

Haaretz, March 23, 2018, accessed March 1, 2019, https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/MAG AZINE-no-longer-a-secret-how-israel-destryoed-syrias-nuclear-reactor. 108 David E. Sanger and Mark Mazzetti, “Israeli Planes Struck Nuclear Site Inside Syria, Analysts Say,” The New York Times, October 13, 2007, accessed July 10, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/ 2007/10/13/world/africa/13iht-14weapons.7878090.html.

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3 Cognitive Psychological Influences The starting assumption is that a technologically advanced state with a wealth of resources like Iran, which seeks to attain an atomic bomb, will succeed in doing so at the end of the day… In other words, an immediate halt to the project can only be the result of a change of mind or a change in the identity of the political echelon in Iran… In this situation, Israel has three options. One: to conquer Iran. The second: to bring about a change in the regime in Iran. The third: to convince the current political echelon that the price they’ll pay to continue the nuclear project is greater than what they can gain by stopping it.109

The first and second options were not feasible, so the Israelis are alleged to have focused on the third option, actions to change Iran’s calculus and compel them to rethink their nuclear ambitions. To which, Meir Dagan asserted, In the meantime, until they reach the conclusion that it’s not worth it for them, we must employ a number of means to delay again and again their attainment of a bomb so that at the breaking point, they will not yet be armed with the weapon.110

Bergman asserts Dagan approved Pardo’s plan, resulting in a multifaceted strategy: international diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, support to Iranian minorities and opposition groups to encourage regime change, disruption of Iran’s nuclear supply chain and the impeding of equipment and raw materials, and a covert plan to sabotage installations and conduct the targeted killing of key players in Iran’s nuclear program.111 To this end, it is alleged the Israeli plan resulted in the breakdown of Iranian nuclear equipment, computers stopped functioning properly, transformers burned out, and a cyberattack severely damaged Iran’s uranium enrichment machinery and centrifuges. For the assassination of key personnel, Bergman argues Mossad compiled a list of 15 key Iranian researchers for assassination.112 Dan Raviv argues the purpose of the assassinations was twofold: (1) slow Iran’s progress toward developing a nuclear weapon, and (2) deter trained and educated Iranians from joining their country’s nuclear weapons program. Raviv claims at least five Iranian scientists were murdered, most by bombs attached to their cars as they drove to work.113 It is believed the assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists began in 2007. On January 14, 2007, Dr. Ardeshir Hosseinpour, a nuclear scientist at the Isfahan uranium plant died under suspicious circumstances after he was asphyxiated during a gas leak. The assassinations accelerated in 2010. On January 12, 2010, Dr. Masoud Alimohammadi, who had a doctorate degree in particle physics, was killed after leaving his home when a booby-trapped motorcycle exploded as he walked to his car. On November 29, 2010, two motorcyclists blew up the cars of two senior members of Iran’s nuclear 109 Ronen Bergman, “When Israel Hatched a Secret Plan to Assassinate Iranian Scientists,” Politico, March 5, 2018, accessed July 10, 2020, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/03/05/isr ael-assassination-iranian-scientists-217223. 110 Bergman, “When Israel Hatched a Secret Plan to Assassinate Iranian Scientists.” 111 Bergman, “When Israel Hatched a Secret Plan to Assassinate Iranian Scientists.” 112 Bergman, “When Israel Hatched a Secret Plan to Assassinate Iranian Scientists.” 113 Dan Raviv, “US Pushing Israel to Stop Assassinating Iranian Nuclear Scientists,” CBS News, March 1, 2014, accessed July 10, 2020, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-pushing-israel-to-stopassassinating-iranian-nuclear-scientists/.

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program by attaching magnetic bombs to their cars. Dr. Majid Shahriari was killed when the bomb blew up his car. Dr. Fereydoon Abbasi Davani and his wife, narrowly avoided assassination when they escaped their car before it exploded outside Shahid Beheshti University. After these assassinations, according to Bergman, the Iranians took tremendous force protection measures to protect their nuclear scientists, particularly Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Mahabadi, who was considered a key leader in Iran’s nuclear program. Fakhrizadeh was a brigadier general in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and a professor of physics at the IRGC’s Imam Hussein University. An IAEA report states he was the executive officer of the AMAD Plan, which allegedly conducted studies related to uranium, high explosives, and revamping a missile cone to accommodate a warhead.114 Fakhrizadeh was later assassinated in the Abe-Sard region of Damavand, approximately 40 kilometers northeast of Tehran, on November 28, 2020. In response, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif urged the European Union to condemn the attack and tweeted, terrorists murdered an Iranian scientist and the attack showed indications of an Israeli role. Zarif called on the international community to end its double standards and condemn Dr. Fakhrizadeh’s assassination as an act of state-sponsored terrorism. Raviv asserts the Obama administration sent signals the United States wanted Israel to halt the assassinations. Additionally, Raviv argues Mossad concluded the assassinations had gotten too dangerous and grew concerned that their most talented operatives could be captured and executed by the Iranians.115 In late 2010, the Israelis were alarmed the assassinations, economic sanctions regime, and the computer sabotage had not slowed Iran’s nuclear program enough, and were increasingly concerned the Iranians would enter a “zone of immunity,” where their nuclear program moved to underground facilities where it was less vulnerable to Israeli airstrikes. Bergman asserts Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Prime Minister Netanyahu ordered the Israel Defense Force and the intelligence community to prepare for an “all-out air attack in the heart of Iran.” Mossad Director, Meir Dagan, thought the plan was “insane” and believed the attack was designed by two politicians who wanted to exploit public support for the attack for their political gain in the next elections. Bibi [Netanyahu] learned a technique, the essence of which was to convey messages in a short time. He reached a remarkable level of mastery and control on this. But he is also the worst manager that I know. He has a certain trait, similar to Ehud Barak: Each of them imagines that he is the world’s greatest genius. Netanyahu is the only prime minister [in the country’s history] who reached the situation where the entire defense establishment failed to accept his position. I’ve known a lot of prime ministers… Not one of them was a saint, believe me, but they all had one thing in common: When they reached the point where the personal interest came up against the national interests, it was the national interest that always won. There was absolutely no question. Only about these two I cannot say it – Bibi and Ehud.

114 Fredrik Dahl, “U.N. Nuclear Report Puts Iran ‘Mystery Man’ in Spotlight’,” Reuters, November

11, 2011, accessed July 10, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nuclear-iran-fakhrizadeh/un-nuclear-report-puts-iran-mystery-man-in-spotlight-idUSTRE7AA43J20111111. 115 Raviv, “US Pushing Israel to Stop Assassinating Iranian Nuclear Scientists.”

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Dagan continued to openly criticize any Israeli attack against Iranian nuclear facilities in the immediate future and warned of second and third order effects of such an attack. An Israeli bombing would lead to a regional war and solve the internal problems of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It would galvanize Iranian society behind the leadership and create unity around the nuclear issue. And it would justify Iran in rebuilding its nuclear project and saying, ‘Look, see, we were attacked by the Zionist enemy and we clearly need to have it’ [a nuclear weapon].116

Dagan stepped down as the head of Mossad and was replaced by Tamir Pardo in 2010, and the assassinations of Iranian scientists resumed. In July 2011, Dr. Darioush Rezaeinejad, a nuclear physicist and senior researcher at Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization was shot in the head by a motorcyclist, near the Imam Ali Camp, a fortified Islamic Revolutionary Guard base. In January 2012, Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan, a chemical engineer at the Natanz uranium enrichment facility, was killed when a magnetic “sticky bomb” attached to his car by a motorcyclist exploded. Bergman reports Mossad believed the targeted assassinations were effective because they led to “white defections” among Iranian scientists, meaning some scientists were so frightened of being assassinated that they asked to be transferred to civilian projects.117 Bergman continues that assassinating scientists is illegal under U.S. law, and that the United States did not know about Israel’s program, nor did the Israeli’s tell them about their plans. In 2009, when President Obama asked CIA Director, General Michael Hayden about Iran’s stockpiled fissile material at the Natanz uranium enrichment facility, Hayden responded, Mr. President, I actually know the answer to that question, and I’m going to give it to you in a minute. But can I give you another way of looking at this? It doesn’t matter. There isn’t an electron or a neutron at Natanz that’s ever going to show up in a nuclear weapon. What they’re building at Natanz is knowledge. What they’re building at Natanz is confidence, and then they will take that knowledge and that confidence and they’ll go somewhere else and enrich uranium. That knowledge, Mr. President, is stored in the brains of the scientists. This [assassination] program has no American relationship whatsoever. It is illegal, and we [the CIA] never would have recommended it or advocated such a thing. However, my broad intelligence judgment is that the death of those human beings had a great impact on their nuclear program.

Hayden implied the assassinations had three lasting impacts: (1) the loss of knowledge contained in the dead scientists heads, (2) significant delays in the program resulting from the need for additional force protection measures to prevent penetration by western intelligence, and (3) experienced technical personnel abandoning the program due to fears they would be assassinated.118 The assassinations likely altered the calculus of some considering working in the government’s nuclear program, as the threat of death was a constant danger. 116 Jim Zanotti, Kenneth Katzman, Jeremiah Gertler, and Steven Hildreth, “Israel: Possible Military

Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities,” Congressional Research Service (September 28, 2012): 5. “When Israel Hatched a Secret Plan to Assassinate Iranian Scientists.” 118 Bergman, “When Israel Hatched a Secret Plan to Assassinate Iranian Scientists.” 117 Bergman,

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The United States remained concerned the Israelis would attack Iran unilaterally. David Sanger reported that in 2008, President Bush deflected an Israeli request for bunker-busting bombs it wanted for an attack on Iran’s primary nuclear complex, and told the Israelis he had authorized new covert action to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program. Bush was also alarmed by and denied Israel’s request to overfly Iraq to bomb Iran’s Natanz uranium enrichment facility.119 Sanger reports the Israeli request was out of disbelief in the United States’ 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) titled Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. The NIEs are the Intelligence Community’s (IC) “most authoritative written judgments on national security issues and designed to help American civilian and military leaders develop policies to protect U.S. national security interests.”120 The 2007 NIE made key judgments (KJs) about Iran’s nuclear program and released them to the public. Arguably, two of the most important KJs include: • We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program; we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. • Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to international pressure indicates Teheran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs. The 2007 NIE sparked controversy because it appeared to affect the arguments of those in favor of military action or increased sanctions against Iran. The CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence published a paper, “Support to Policymakers: The 2007 NIE on Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,” that addressed some of the controversies, noting the disconnect between intelligence and policy. The paper addressed the rationale for writing the 2007 NIE. First, the National Intelligence Council felt it was time to update the NIE on Iran’s nuclear program because it continued to enrich uranium, and there were natural questions of the status of Iran’s nuclear progress. Second, as members of Congress grew concerned the Bush administration would push for war with Iran, they added the requirement for a “comprehensive National Intelligence Estimate on Iran” be included in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 Defense Authorization Act. The origin of this request was the 2002 white paper on Iraq’s WMD that supported the Bush administration’s assertion that Saddam had reconstituted his WMD program.121 The white paper asserts President Bush declassified 2007 Key Judgements for two reasons: (1) It was the right thing to do because the U.S. had previously used intelligence assessments to persuade other states to act to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. (2) The belief the Key Judgments 119 David

E. Sanger, “U.S. Rejected Aid for Israeli Raid on Iranian Nuclear Site,” The New York Times, January 10, 2009, accessed July 10, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/11/washin gton/11iran.html. 120 National Intelligence Council, “Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,” National Intelligence Estimate (November 2007): 2. 121 Gregory F. Treverton, “CIA Support to Policymakers: The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,” Center for the Study of Intelligence (May 2013): 3.

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would leak anyway, so it was best to get in front of it and shape the narrative.122 The 2007 NIE caused frustration in both Tel Aviv and Washington by assessing Tehran had halted its nuclear program. Proponents of attacking Iran had maintained for at least the previous ten years that Iran was less than five years away from the bomb. Henry Kissinger highlighted the timing of the 2003 suspension of Iran’s nuclear program that could be tied to regional events. When Iran halted its weapons program and suspended efforts at enriching uranium in February 2003, America had already occupied Afghanistan and was on the verge of invading Iraq, both of which border Iran. The United States justified its Iraq policy by the need to remove weapons of mass destruction from the region. By the fall of 2003, when Iran voluntarily joined the Additional Protocol for Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Saddam Hussein had just been overthrown. Is it unreasonable to assume that the ayatollahs concluded that restraint had become imperative?123

In 2012, Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon argued for the international community to acknowledge diplomacy had failed to halt Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In a joint statement, Ayalon and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg declared Iran was one of the “greatest challenges” to Middle East stability and stressed the U.S.–Israeli effort to prevent it from developing nuclear weapons. Iran’s continued non-compliance with its international obligations related to its nuclear program, as well as its continued support for terrorist entities, are of grave concern to our two countries [The United States and Israel] and the entire international community.124

At that time, polls highlighted a majority of Israelis opposed a unilateral Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities; however, a majority would support a joint U.S.– Israel strike.125 When discussing a possible Israeli attack, former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who ordered the 2007 attack against Syria’s nuclear reactor argued, Worse comes to worst, and all options have been tried, then, naturally it may force Israel to act to defend its existence. But it must be clear that we tried with the international community, and particularly with the United States, to act together before we resort to the last option of an Israeli military operation.126

Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis famously stated, “The enemy gets a vote” when discussing military planning. As Israeli leaders openly discussed a potential preventive attack against Iranian nuclear facilities, Iranian commanders and Hezbollah indicated they would retaliate for any attack on Iran, and that this retaliation could include U.S. forces in the region. The United States sought to mitigate 122 Treverton,

“CIA Support to Policymakers: The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,” 5. 123 Treverton, “CIA Support to Policymakers: The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,” 7. 124 Roshandel, Iran, Israel and the United States, 1. 125 Zanotti, Katzman, Gertler, and Hildreth, “Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities,” 3. 126 Zanotti, Katzman, Gertler, and Hildreth, “Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities,” 4.

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Israel’s concerns by enacting additional sanctions against Iran, expanding security cooperation with Israel under the U.S.–Israel Enhanced Security Cooperation Act of 2012, expediting foreign military sales (FMS), providing excess defense articles (EDA), increasing intelligence sharing, providing improved Israeli access to U.S. prepositioned war reserve stockpiles, and authorizing up to $680 million in additional funding for Israel’s Iron Dome short-range missile defense system.127 The United States was able to buy time and delay a potential unilateral Israeli airstrike while it negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Prime Minister Netanyahu publicly and frequently voiced his opposition to the nuclear agreement and warned Israel retained the right to defend itself and that all options remained on the table for it to halt Iran’s nuclear program. A nuclear Iran would challenge the existing regional power balance, and Israel has stated repeatedly that it will not accept a nuclear power in the region.

The Regional Hegemon Since its 1967 preemptive attack that launched the Six-Day War against Arab forces, Israel has projected virtually unchallenged military power against its neighbors and uses airpower to strike emerging targets before they materialize into a significant threat, as indicative of a power-projecting state. The Israelis have a history of success in using airpower to preventively attack targets deep inside enemy territory, which it used throughout the Syrian Civil War to prevent the transfer of potentially “game changing” military hardware from Iran to Hezbollah and other proxy forces. Israel initially had a limited tolerance of Iranian military forces inside Syria, but that shifted to a zero tolerance, and a subsequent increase in airstrikes directed at Iranian military forces and their affiliates.128 Former Israeli Defense Minister Naftali Bennett termed this approach the Octopus Doctrine, whereby Israel would no longer relegate attacks to Iranian surrogates (the tentacles), but will now include Iranian forces (the head).129 The Israelis were so concerned about Iranian forces becoming entrenched near Syria’s border with Israel, it is alleged they secretly armed and funded at least 12 rebel groups in Syria to fight Iranian-backed forces.130 The addition of a regional nuclear power could potentially constrain Israel’s ability to use military force as a foreign policy 127 Zanotti, Katzman, Gertler, and Hildreth, “Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear

Facilities,” 8. Behravesh, “Commentary: Inside Israel’s New Iran Strategy,” Reuters, September 17, 2018, accessed May 26, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-behravesh-israel-commentary/ commentary-inside-israels-new-iran-strategy-idUSKCN1LX1OF. 129 Herb Keinon, “Cyberwarfare and the ‘Octopus Doctrine’—Analysis,” The Jerusalem Post, May 20, 2020, accessed July 12, 2020, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/cyberwarfare-and-the-oct opus-doctrine-analysis-628737. 130 Elizabeth Tsurkov, “Inside Israel’s Secret Program to Back Syrian Rebels,” Foreign Policy, September 6, 2018, accessed May 26, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/06/in-secret-pro gram-israel-armed-and-funded-rebel-groups-in-southern-syria/. 128 Maysam

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instrument. This raises questions about Israeli concerns with Iranian proliferation and whether Israel is opposed to a nuclear Iran because it fears Iran will conduct a nuclear attack against it, or if its opposition is based on a nuclear Iran being able to eventually provide a Balance of Power in the region, thereby restricting Israel’s regional power projection. Of the three countries in the four case studies, Israeli forces engaged in significant direct combat operations against two: Iraq (1948, 1967, 1981) and Syria (1948, 1967, 1973, 1982, 2007, 2015–2020). Despite not having direct overt air combat engagements inside Iranian territory, Israel is suspected of engaging in covert operations against Iran’s nuclear program by assassinating Iranian nuclear scientists and sabotaging Iranian nuclear facilities. Because Israel lacks robust diplomatic relations with many of its adversaries, its ability to use coercive diplomacy or strategic messaging is extremely limited without U.S. support. There are approximately twenty-nine nations that do not have diplomatic ties with Israel, this inlcudes the three case study countries—Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Israel is also incapable of diplomatically and economically isolating a country, and, though it has the capability to inflict pain, it lacks the capacity to beat its adversaries to the point of instituting regime change. The animosity Israel faces due to its aggressive foreign policies, treatment of the Palestinians, military dominance, and near unwavering support from Washington, was illuminated in the aftermath of its 1981 attack against Iraq’s nuclear reactor. In a June 15, 1981 United Nations Security Council meeting Uganda’s Ambassador to the United Nations Olara Otunnu expressed his frustrations with the Jewish State, and what many perceive to be a double standard when it comes to Israel’s behavior. Unlike Iraq, Israel is not a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Israeli discourse on the need for a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East reminds me of an armed bandit who walks into a courtroom, takes everybody hostage and then lectures the group on the virtues of being a law-abiding citizen. The Israeli claims are the product of a political hallucination, a condition in which the Zionist leaders imagine most things to constitute a danger to Israeli security and most people to be enemies of Israel. It is not only the Arab world, which has been the victim of that political hallucination. The Security Council and the General Assembly have been subjected to constant Zionist vilification. Any man or woman of conscience who has dared to question Zionist policies of domination and expansion and who has raised a voice in support of Palestinian rights has been labeled an enemy of Israel or given some other equally ugly epithet. But there is rhyme and reason to this political hallucination. To be sure, the attack on Osirak is not an isolated incident; it is an integral part of a Zionist program, which includes the permanent oppression of the Palestinian people, the dismemberment of Lebanon and the domination of the entire Arab world. That is the meaning of the act of aggression of 7 June [1981]. Israel is the spoilt child of the Middle East, which has grown in arrogance and aggression on the indulgence of its benefactors. The spoilt child is so used to special treatment that it does not expect to be made to account for its actions any more. But the Security Council must act without fear or favor and impose sanctions against Israel under Chapter VII of the

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Charter of the United Nations. In that way, Israel will know that the policies of aggression and expansion do not pay.131

In addition to its limited diplomatic gravitas and inability to economically isolate a rival, the history of conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors and Iran creates a culture of conflict in which violence begets more violence from each side. This ethos influences each state’s mutual perceptions and the psychological predisposition created by a pattern of hostility contributes to Israel’s aggressive foreign policy and its inclination to use force against its rivals’ nuclear programs.

The United States—History of Conflict During the Cold War, the United States’ primary role in the Middle East was a patronage relationship in which it supplied security assistance and weapons to the Arab states to halt Soviet expansion, protected Israel, and ensured the flow of Persian Gulf oil to the world market. In the post-Cold War era, the United States’ became more involved in the region as it enhanced its patronage portfolio by adding the goals of containing Iraq and Iran, and resolving the Palestinian issue. Because its primary rival in the region was the Soviet Union, the United States has a limited history of direct and sustained military conflict with the three case study countries because the U.S.–USSR rivalries used proxies to fight their wars. Furthermore, because these countries never attained a military capability that directly threatened the United States they were not perceived as serious threats as long as their actions did not threaten the flow of Persian Gulf oil or other U.S. national security interests in the region.

The United States and Iraq The United States’ history of conflict with Iraq shifted over time. In the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the storming of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Washington sought to stem the spread of Iranian religious fervor and regional influence by backing Iraq in its war with the Islamic Republic. The United States initially supported Iraq toward the end of the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq War before attacking it three years later during the 1991 Gulf War and subsequenetly conducting operations to degrade its weapons of mass destruction and enforce no-fly zones before invading it to begin the 2003 Iraq War. During the Iran-Iraq War, Israel launched its preventive strike against Iraq’s nuclear reactor, which U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeanne Kirkpatrick condemned because the Reagan administration argued Israel faced no imminent threat from Iraq thereby violating international law due to 131 United Nations Security Council, UN Security Council Official Records: S/PV.2282, June 15, 1981, accessed December 31, 2013, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NL8/100/19/ PDF/NL810019.pdf?OpenElement.

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the unjustified attack. Although the United States condemned the Israeli attack, Kirkpatrick’s rebuke was a prepared statement that had little impact on the U.S.–Israeli special relationship.132 The eight-year Iran–Iraq War wrecked Iraq’s economy so Saddam Hussein reignited a Kennedy-era dispute over Kuwait’s sovereignty and the status of the Bubiyan and Warbah Islands, which provided Iraq secure access to its Khawr Abd Allah ports along the Persian Gulf. Saddam partially financed his war with Iran by borrowing money from the Gulf States, and at the end of the war he owed them $37 billion. Saddam appealed to the Gulf States to cancel Iraq’s debt because he argued the war protected the Arabian Peninsula from Iranian expansionism. When the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait refused to cancel the Iraqi debt, Saddam threatened Kuwait. The United States responded by conducting military maneuvers in the Gulf and warned Iraq not to invade the UAE or Kuwait; however, President George H.W. Bush took a conciliatory approach to Saddam, hoping to improve relations.133 Saddam misinterpreted the U.S. diplomatic moves as acquiescence, and invaded Kuwait to gain access to its oil fields in an attempt to bolster Iraq’s economy. The resulting 1991 Gulf War inaugurated twenty years of military conflict between the United States and Iraq (1991–2011). At the war’s conclusion, the United States enforced two no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq while also degrading its military and WMD capacity during Operation Desert Fox, and encouraging Kurdish and Shia rebellions in the north and south. This war of attrition continued unabated for twelve years until the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, under the auspices of destroying its reconstituted WMD program. Saddam Hussein was removed from power and hanged on December 30, 2006, however, the war continued until the United States withdrew most of its combat forces from Iraq in December 2011. The United States prior conflict with Iraq, combined with trauma derived from the September 11th attacks and prodding by neoconservatives, predisposed the United States to perceive Iraq as a high threat to U.S. national security interests in 2003. Although al-Qaeda orchestrated the 9/11 attacks and was harbored by the Taliban in Afghanistan, with nationalism running high, the Bush administration sought to find a linkage between the September 11th attacks and Iraq due to a long-held neocon desire to oust Saddam Hussein from power; the 9/11 attacks provided the justification.134 Former Bush counterterrorism advisor Richard Clarke stated he advised President Bush there was no link between Saddam and the 9/11 attacks, to which President Bush exclaimed, “Iraq! Saddam! Find out if there’s a connection.”135 Secretary of 132 John

Gerard Ruggie, “American Exceptionalism, Exemptionalism and Global Governance,” Faculty Research Working Paper Series, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (February 2004): 28. 133 Office of the Historian, “The Gulf War, 1991,” The U.S. Department of State, accessed May 26, 2020, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/gulf-war. 134 Jeffrey Record, “Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq: Making Strategy After 9/11,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Summer 2008): 65. 135 Andrea Stone, “Ex-Bush Aide: Bush Ignored Terror Threat,” USA Today, March 30, 2004, accessed August 24, 2013, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-03-20-clarke_ x.htm.

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Defense Rumsfeld also expressed his desire to bomb Iraq no matter its connection to the 9/11 attacks. According to Clarke, “Rumsfeld said there aren’t any good targets in Afghanistan. And there are lots of good targets in Iraq.”136 The September 11th attacks provided the cause célèbre for the United States to wage a preventive war to overthrow the Hussein government and attempt the democratization of the region. Underlying the attempt to link Iraq to the 9/11 attacks were numerous state- and individual-level influences that affected President Bush’s decision-making. The 9/11 attacks compelled Bush to take a look at worldwide threats. In Iraq he found a hyper threat, a state sponsor of terrorism, a sworn enemy of America, a hostile government that threatened its neighbors, a state that violated international norms, repressed its people, and pursued weapons of mass destruction.137 For Bush, Saddam was evil incarnate. He sympathized with terrorists, paid the families of Palestinian suicide bombers, and harbored international terrorists like Abu Abbas, who hijacked the Achille Lauro, and Abu Nidal, who attacked El Al Airline ticket counters in Rome and Vienna. Iraq fired on U.S. aircraft patrolling nofly zones over northern and southern Iraq, invaded Iran and Kuwait, and defied sixteen UN resolutions. Saddam tortured, raped, and murdered Iraqis, and used mustard gas and nerve agents against Kurds and Iranian troops.138 To Bush, Saddam Hussein was the personification of evil, hence Bush labeled Iraq as part of the “Axis of Evil.” Studies also demonstrate the Bush administration successfully convinced the American public there was a link between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda, and this framing of the Iraq War with the September 11th attacks led to high levels of public support for the war.139 After the September 11th attacks, President Bush developed a strategy to protect the country, in what became known as the Bush Doctrine. The doctrine outlined four goals: (1) make no distinction between terrorists and the nations that harbor them; (2) take the fight to the enemy overseas before they can attack the U.S. homeland; (3) confront threats before they materialize; and (4) advance liberty and hope as an ideological alternative to the enemy’s use of fear and repression.140 The United States had recently unveiled the Bush Doctrine to attack emerging threats, and these cumulative factors heightened the Bush administration’s threat perceptions of Iraq and became the symbols for Bush’s own Munich analogy of what would happen if he did not directly confront Saddam Hussein. Bush’s psychological milieu and his use of the 9/11 attacks to justify war against Iraq, along with a global war against an ideology (“radical” Islam) and a type of warfare (terrorism) greatly expanded the scope of U.S. military operations and increased the difficulties of the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan. In branding the Global War on Terrorism as a war against “Islamic Fascists,” the Bush administration contributed to an atmosphere that increased anti-Muslim sentiment in the 136 Stone,

“Ex-Bush Aide: Bush Ignored Terror Threat.” W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010), 228. 138 Bush, Decision Points, 228. 139 Gershkoff and Kushner, “Shaping Public Opinion,” 526. 140 Bush, Decision Points, 396. 137 George

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United States.141 The Pew Research Center reports hate crimes have continued to rise against Jews and Muslims in the United States since their high in 2001.142 Security expert Daniel Benjamin noted there was no connection between jihadists and fascist ideology, and argued Bush’s use of the pejorative was “an epithet, a way of arousing strong emotion and tarnishing one’s opponent, but it doesn’t tell us anything about the content of their beliefs.”143 President Bush’s use of a worst-case fixed analogy to generate domestic support for future U.S. military actions is illustrated in his post-9/11 speeches. Bush asserted, “The attacks of September 11, 2001 showed what the enemies of America did with four airplanes. We will not wait to see what terrorists or terror states could do with weapons of mass destruction.”144 Research demonstrates a correlation between rally events such as surprise attacks on a nation and surges in support for the president and his policies.145 Bush’s mapping of the fears associated with 9/11 demonstrates the importance of studying a leader’s operational code to forecast the direction of a state’s intentions toward a rival state and perceived threats. Further illustrating the importance of cognitive psychological influences on foreign policy decision-making, President Bush was suspected of seeking revenge against Iraq for Saddam’s reported attempt to assassinate his father, former President George H.W. Bush. President George W. Bush’s desire to attack Iraq highlighted an egocentric bias and predispositions, as reflected in his statement at a fundraiser in September 2002, “There’s no doubt his [Saddam Hussein] hatred is mainly directed at us. There’s no doubt he can’t stand us. After all, this is a guy that tried to kill my dad at one time.”146 President Bush’s rhetoric propelled the United States toward war because it left no room for negotiating with Iraq. Vice President Dick Cheney’s tendency to adopt the “one percent solution” or worst-case scenario perspective also heightened Bush’s perceptions of the Iraq threat. Cheney adopted as policy the actions needed to be taken if there is only a one percent chance a situation or perception might be true.147 Phillip Henderson notes that one year before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, noted neoconservative writer Ken Adelman predicted that demolishing Saddam Hussein’s government and liberating Iraq would be a “cakewalk.” A month prior to the invasion, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld predicted the war could last six days or six weeks, but he doubted 141 Hilal

Elver, “Racializing Islam Before and After 9/11: From Melting Pot to Islamophobia,” Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 21 (Spring 2012): 138. 142 Katayoun Kishi, “Assaults Against Muslims in U.S. Surpass 2001 Level,” Pew Research Center, November 15, 2017, accessed May 26, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/15/ assaults-against-muslims-in-u-s-surpass-2001-level/. 143 Richard Allen Greene, “Bush’s Language Angers US Muslims,” BBC News, August 12, 2006, accessed November 10, 2013, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4785065.stm. 144 Gershkoff and Kushner, “Shaping Public Opinion,” 528. 145 Schubert, Stewart and Curran, “A Defining Presidential Moment,” 561. 146 Todd S. Purdum and Elisabeth Bumiller, “Threats and Responses: Legislation; Congress Nearing Draft Resolution on Force in Iraq,” The New York Times, September 27, 2002, accessed November 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/27/world/threats-responses-legislation-congress-nearingdraft-resolution-force-iraq.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 147 Haass, War of Necessity, War of Choice, 218.

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it would last six months. Nearly eight years later, the Iraq War came to an end. In sum, it resulted in 4431 U.S. service members killed, 32,223 wounded, with a total cost estimated at $806 billion.148 Former U.S. Ambassador Peter Galbraith noted, “President Bush and his top advisors have consistently substituted wishful thinking for analysis and hope for strategy.”149 The administration’s desire to use an imagined nexus between Saddam Hussein, the 9/11 hijackers, and weapons of mass destruction to justify the invasion of Iraq was illustrated during President Bush’s 2003 State of the Union Address, Before September 11, 2001, many in the world believed that Saddam Hussein could be contained… But chemical agents and lethal viruses and shadowy terrorist networks are not easily contained. Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons, and other plans, this time armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take just one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known. We will do everything in our power to make sure that day never comes.150

Consequently, the administration used a worst-case scenario to develop and execute national security policy and rationalized schemata to argue Iraq must be hiding its weapons of mass destruction because the White House perceived Iraq failed to comply with previous disclosure demands. The Rob-Silberman Commission noted, “In front of the whole world, the United States government asserted that Saddam Hussein had reconstituted his nuclear weapons program, had biological weapons and mobile biological production facilities and was producing chemical weapons… And not one bit of it could be confirmed when the war was over.”151 The Bush administration demonstrated a lack of understanding of Arab culture by not giving Saddam a way to save face in the midst of his enemies. Saddam Hussein’s evasiveness about Iraq’s WMD program was posturing so he did not have to admit publicly the military weakness of his regime after two decades of hostilities with Iran and the United States. By admitting he had no weapons of mass destruction, the “Butcher of Baghdad” would have confessed to his enemies that he was a paper tiger who had no way of deterring an attack against his country. In January 2004, David Kay, the head of the Iraq Survey Group, which was the U.S government intelligence organization tasked with finding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, concluded Saddam destroyed his weapons stockpiles in the 1990s. Kay insisted Saddam tried to bluff his adversaries about still having WMD to maintain an image of strength and power. In the end, Kay admitted, “Everyone was wrong.”152 The fear of weapons of mass destruction allowed Saddam to use coercion to hold together a country comprised of three rival Muslim communities of Shi’a and 148 Henderson,

“Anatomy of a National Security Fiasco,” 46. Rumsfeld’s Wars, 163. 150 Michael R. Gordon, “State of the Union: The Iraq Issue; Bush Enlarges Case for War by Linking Iraq with Terrorists,” The New York Times, January 29, 2003, accessed November 10, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/29/world/state-union-iraq-issue-bush-enlarges-casefor-war-linking-iraq-with-terrorists.html?pagewanted=2. 151 Thomas Ricks, Fiasco, 377. 152 Thomas Ricks, Fiasco, 375. 149 Herspring,

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Sunni Arabs, and Sunni Kurds. Saddam, a member of Iraq’s Sunni minority, needed weapons of mass destruction to instill fear in the Shi’a majority and Kurdish communities to prevent them from rising up against his rule. These weapons also served to deter neighboring Iran because Saddam feared the increasing power of the Islamic Republic and that it would form an alliance with Iraq’s Shi’a population to overthrow his government.153 The Bush White House’s binary approach to negotiations failed to completely understand Saddam’s motivations and this limited the administration’s maneuverability because it left little room for Iraq to compromise. By demanding a head of state resign, the Bush administration laid the foundation for conflict because it put Saddam Hussein in an untenable position where he had to fight to preserve his honor. Using political psychology to examine the Bush administration’s approach to dealing with Iraq reveals Saddam Hussein would have reversed course if circumstances illustrated he miscalculated. In a psychological profile of Saddam, noted political psychologist Jerrold Post argued that despite accusations to the contrary, Saddam did not suffer from a psychotic disorder but, instead suffered from a narrow and distorted worldview. Saddam wanted to stay in power because he believed he was an important world leader, a modern-day Saladin, and the Bush administration’s calls for regime change put Saddam’s “back against the wall” where he was destined to fight.154 As both sides were poised to fight, defiant rhetoric, a lack of cultural understanding, and manipulated intelligence that resulted in an inflated threat perception led to misinterpretations and war.155 In its subsequent failure to find weapons of mass destruction, the United States’ most recent use of preventive war doctrine failed. The U.S. Department of Defense reports 4431 total U.S. deaths in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom, with 4418 of those being military casualties and 13 U.S. DoD civilian casualties.156 An academic study conducted by a team of U.S., Canadian, and Iraqi academics estimate the “total excess deaths attributable to the war” up to mid-2011 was 461,000 Iraqis.157

The United States and Syria The United States engaged briefly in direct combat operations against Syria after the 1983 terrorist attack against the U.S. Marine Corps 1st Battalion, 8th Marine Regimental Battalion Landing Team (BLT) barracks outside Beirut, Lebanon. On 153 Jonathan

Cook, Israel and the Clash of Civilisations: Iraq, Iran and the Plan to Remake the Middle East (London: Pluto Press, 2008), 1. 154 Post, Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World, 236. 155 Post, Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World, 221. 156 “Casualty Status,” Department of Defense, May 26, 2020, accessed May 30, 2020, https://www. defense.gov/casualty.pdf. 157 “Iraq Study Estimates War-Related Deaths at 461,000,” BBC News, October 16, 2013, accessed May 30, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24547256.

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October 23, 1983, suicide bombers linked to Iran attacked the barracks of the U.S. and French forces, killing 241 U.S. servicemen. Less than a week later, President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 111, which increased U.S. cooperation with Israel and Arab opponents of Syria, reducing Syrian influence over Lebanon’s Druze and Shi’a populations, and expanded the rules of engagement for U.S. air and naval support to the Lebanese Army.158 The French responded to the attack on the Multi-National Force (MNF) by attacking an Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps barrack in November 1983, an attack the United States did not join. On December 4, 1983, Syrian forces shot down two U.S. Navy aircraft that were on a bombing run against Syrian positions in Lebanon. The pilot of the A-6E Intruder, LT Mark Lange, was killed and his bombardier-navigator, LT Robert Goodman was taken hostage. Goodman was later freed when Syrian forces released him to Reverend Jesse Jackson. After increased congressional pressure and advances by pro-Syrian forces into West Beirut, Reagan announced on February 7, 1984, the withdrawal of U.S. Marines to offshore positions.159 Thus ending the last direct U.S. hostile engagement with Syria until the United States attacked Syrian government forces during its civil war. In March 2007, it is alleged that Mossad operatives infiltrated the home of Syrian Atomic Energy Commission director, Ibrahim Othman and extracted nuclear-related information from his computer after the United States and Israel became concerned about Syrian nuclear activities. The Israeli intelligence officers discovered dozens of photographs from inside a North Korean-built nuclear reactor in the Syrian Desert.160 In August 2007, suspected Israeli commandos from the IDF’s General Staff Reconnaissance Unit—known by its Hebrew name Sayeret Matkal—disguised as Syrian soldiers, conducted a covert intelligence collection mission into Syria to obtain photographs and collect soil samples near the facility.161 Israeli Prime Minister Olmert then approached President Bush with the intelligence and requested the United States conduct a preventive strike against the Al-Kibar nuclear complex. Bush requested an intelligence assessment from CIA Director, General Mike Hayden, who explained the CIA had high confidence the building was a nuclear reactor; however, CIA analysts could not confirm the location of a plutonium processing facility. Therefore, the analysts had low confidence of a Syrian nuclear weapons program. Consequently, President Bush declined to attack the Syrian reactor and told Israeli Prime Minister Olmert, “I cannot justify an attack on a sovereign nation unless my intelligence agencies stand up and say it’s a weapons program.” In his book, Decision

158 Office of the Historian, “The Reagan Administration and Lebanon, 1981–1984,” U.S. Department

of State, accessed May 3, 2020, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1981-1988/lebanon. of the Historian, “The Reagan Administration and Lebanon, 1981–1984.” 160 David Makovsky, “The Silent Strike: How Israel Bombed a Syrian Nuclear Installation and Kept It Secret,” The New Yorker, September 10, 2012, accessed May 3, 2020, https://www.newyorker. com/magazine/2012/09/17/the-silent-strike. 161 Yaakov Katz, Shadow Strike: Inside Israel’s Secret Mission to Eliminate Syrian Nuclear Power (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2019), 159. 159 Office

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Points, Bush states he then told Olmert he decided the United States would use the diplomatic option backed by the threat of force.162 President Bush declined the Israeli request because he did not perceive Syria as a high threat, but more importantly, the Bush administration lacked the credibility to use unilateral military force to destroy Syria’s suspected nuclear site because of its controversial preventive war to destroy Iraq’s nonexistent weapons of mass destruction stockpile. Bush lacked the political capital to authorize the preventive use of force against another Arab state’s suspected weapons of mass destruction program, and would have experienced significant difficulty persuading Congress and the American public, particularly as U.S. service members were still fighting and dying in Afghanistan and Iraq, and across the globe as part of the Global War on Terrorism. This new political reality was enshrined in the Bush administration’s release of its 2006 National Security Strategy, which returned the United States’ foreign policy to multilateralism and effectively shelved the Bush Doctrine’s preventive war policy. On September 5, 2007, four Israeli F-15Is and four F-16Is departed Israel to attack the Syrian reactor. Flying over the Mediterranean Sea and along the Turkish–Syrian border, the aircraft breached Syrian airspace at an altitude of 200 feet before climbing to release their ordnance on the reactor. In total, 20 tons of bombs were dropped on the Al-Kibar reactor, destroying it.163

The United States and Iran The United States has engaged in sporadic combat operations against Iran even though it has been involved in Iranian politics since World War II. Despite the limited direct combat operations between the two countries, the U.S.–Iran relationship has been contentious since the CIA and British MI6 orchestrated a coup in 1953 to overthrow Iran’s democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh, after he nationalized the country’s oil reserves and was suspected of communist sympathies.164 In overthrowing a democratically elected government and returning the autocratic dictator Mohammed Reza Pahlavi to the Peacock Throne, the United States and Britain set the stage for Iran’s revolution and the Islamic Republic’s continued anti-American and anti-Israel rhetoric and policies.165 On November 4, 1979, twenty-six years after the overthrow of the Mossadegh government, Iranian students stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran to protest President Jimmy Carter’s decision to allow the Shah to enter the United States to seek medical treatment for

162 Bush,

Decision Points, 421. Shadow Strike, 186. 164 Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2008), 164. 165 Kinzer, All The Shah’s Men, x. 163 Katz,

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cancer. The students demanded the United States return the Shah and his financial assets to Iran.166 The Shah and his intelligence service, the Sazeman-i Ettelaat va Amniyat-i Keshvar (SAVAK) or the State Security and Intelligence Organization, conducted widespread repression of political dissent, and imprisoned, tortured, and executed thousands of Iranian citizens, whom the Shah referred to as “Islamic Marxists.” The Shah claimed he was fighting both the “Red Threat”—insurgents who received guidance from Moscow, and the “Black Threat”—ordinary Iranian citizens and the Muslim clergy who claimed to represent the masses. SAVAK was founded in 1957, allegedly, with U.S. financial and technical assistance, and using Israeli techniques.167 SAVAK was a symbol of the Shah’s power, corruption, and suppression of political and religious dissent, and the Iranians wanted him returned for trial. The Americans refused their demands to return the Shah, so the Iranians held the U.S. Embassy staff hostage for 444 days, after first releasing all women and Black American staff members out of respect for women and as a sign of solidarity with Black America’s fight against American racism.168 The United States later attempted a hostage rescue operation on April 24, 1980 using a team of U.S. Army Delta Force operators (Operation Eagle Claw); however, the mission ended in disaster and resulted in the deaths of eight U.S. service members after one of the helicopters crashed into a C-130 cargo aircraft at the Desert One rally site. The Iranian Hostage Crisis ended in 1980, however, it elevated anti-Iran sentiment in the United States and continues to color U.S. perceptions of the Islamic Republic and its motivations. The Iranians hold a reciprocal view of the United States due, in part, to U.S. interference in Iran’s internal affairs, Washington’s continued calls for regime change in Tehran, and for reinstituting punishing economic sanctions following the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018. Seven years after Tehran freed the hostages, the United States conducted its first direct combat operations against Iran during the Tanker Wars (1987–1988). In the final years of the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), the United States provided Iraq with satellite imagery of Iranian positions and escorted American-reflagged Kuwaiti oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz to ensure their unhindered access to the world market. After discovering Iran laid mines in the Persian Gulf, the U.S. Navy launched Operation Praying Mantis to target Iranian mine-laying ships, resulting in the U.S. Navy’s largest surface engagement since World War II.169 Ironically, while these hostilities were underway, the Reagan administration was secretly working with the Iranians, through Israeli intermediaries, to sell U.S. military weapons to Tehran in exchange 166 Gary

Sick, “The Carter Administration,” The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), 130. 167 Richard T. Sale, “SAVAK: A Feared and Pervasive Force,” The Washington Post, May 9, 1977, accessed May 26, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1977/05/09/savak-a-fea red-and-pervasive-force/ad609959-d47b-4b7f-8c8d-b388116df90c/. 168 Mark Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah: The First Battle in America’s War with Militant Islam (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006), 198. 169 James G. Blight et al., Becoming Enemies: U.S.–Iran Relations and the Iran–Iraq War, 1979– 1988 (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), 294.

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for Westerners held hostage in Beirut, in what became known as the Iran-Contra Affair.170 The United States’ hostile relationship with Iran is tempered with moments of political outreach as both sides attempted to ease tensions. Between 2002 and 2003, Iran proposed exchanging senior al-Qaeda leaders—Saad bin Laden, Saif al-Adel, and Suleiman Abu Ghaith—it had captured in exchange for members of the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), an Iranian terror group once supported by Saddam Hussein and based in Iraq. Although the U.S. State Department designated the MEK as a terror group, the Bush administration declined the Iranian gesture due in part to members of the administration believing the MEK could be instrumental in overthrowing the Iranian government. Another contributing factor to the failed U.S.–Iran talks was an al-Qaeda attack on a residential compound in Saudi Arabia that killed thirty-one people, including nine Americans. Secretary Rumsfeld said the United States intercepted a phone call linking the al-Qaeda leaders in Iran with the attacks.171 In spring 2003, the Iranians sent a road map proposal to the Bush administration in an effort to establish a dialogue and de-escalate tensions. The Iranians proposed a six-point discussion on the following issues: (1) end of all sanctions against Iran; (2) U.S.–Iran mutual cooperation to stabilize Iraq; (3) full transparency over Iran’s nuclear program; (4) cooperation against terrorist organizations; (5) Iran’s acceptance of the Arab League’s 2002 “land for peace” declaration on Israel/Palestine; and (6) Iran’s full access to peaceful nuclear technology. The Bush administration dismissed the proposal and instead placed additional sanctions against Tehran.172 The administration’s dismissal of Iran’s proposals to exchange al-Qaeda leaders and to discuss its nuclear program was influenced by vestiges of the embassy hostage crisis as well as by Iran’s continued hostility toward the United States and Israel, and by hardliners within the Bush administration. Post-9/11 nationalist sentiment was high and the United States was on a war footing so there is high probability the White House felt no need to negotiate with its enemies. The Bush administration’s biases and scripting of the stability democratization would bring to the region led it to dismiss Iranian overtures and contributed to the failure to negotiate the future of Iran’s nuclear program. Barack Obama’s election to the White House brought renewed hope that the more liberal and worldly president would take a different approach to the Middle East than his evangelical predecessor. Obama telegraphed his intended departure from traditional U.S. foreign policy in his book, The Audacity of Hope, where he took issue with previous policies: 170 Michael

Rubin, Dancing with the Devil: The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes (New York: Encounter Books, 2015), 48. 171 Robert Windrem, “US, Iran Secretly Discussed Swap of al Qaeda Detainees for Iranian Dissidents,” NBC News, March 15, 2013, accessed August 22, 2013, http://investigations.nbcnews. com/_news/2013/03/15/17315494-us-iran-secretly-discussed-swap-of-al-qaeda-detainees-for-ira nian-dissidents. 172 Kelsey Davenport, “History of Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue,” Arms Control Association, accessed August 22, 2013, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Pro posals.

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Our tendency to view nations and conflicts through the prism of the Cold War; our tireless promotion of American-style capitalism and multinational corporations; the tolerance and occasional encouragement of tyranny, corruption, and environmental degradation when it served our interests.173

Because of his unique background as a Black man and son of a Muslim father from Kenya, as well as because of his culturally similar name, Barack Hussein Obama raised expectations of a restart of the United States’ Middle East policy during his campaign when he voiced strong opposition to the Iraq War and proposed meeting with Iranian leaders without conditions, declaring it was time for a “new beginning” in the U.S.–Iran relationship. The third source of tension is our shared interest in the rights and responsibilities of nations on nuclear weapons. This issue has been a source of tension between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. For many years, Iran has defined itself in part by its opposition to my country, and there is in fact a tumultuous history between us. In the middle of the Cold War, the United States played a role in the overthrow of a democratically elected Iranian government. Since the Islamic Revolution, Iran has played a role in acts of hostage-taking and violence against U.S. troops and civilians. This history is well known. Rather than remain trapped in the past, I’ve made it clear to Iran’s leaders and people that my country is prepared to move forward. The question now is not what Iran is against, but rather what future it wants to build.174

Despite this outreach, President Obama’s overture was rebuffed by Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, who said it would take more than “changes in words” to begin a new relationship between the United States and Iran. The Supreme Leader asserted that while the Obama administration stated it wanted to start anew, its actions of continuing sanctions illustrated it did not. Khamenei articulated his sentiment, They chant the slogan of change, but no change is seen in practice… We are observing, watching and judging. If you change, we will also change our behavior. If you do not change, we will be the same nation as 30 years ago… For you to say that we will both talk to Iran and simultaneously exert pressure on her, both threats and appeasement – our nation hates this approach.175 They say, ‘We have extended a hand toward Iran.’ What kind of hand is this? If the extended hand is covered with a velvet glove but underneath it, the hand is made of cast iron, this does not have a good meaning at all.”176

In response to Khamenei’s stubbornness, an Iranian official argued,

173 Colin

Dueck, The Obama Doctrine: American Grand Strategy Today (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 33. 174 Barack H. Obama, “Remarks by the President on a New Beginning,” The White House, June 4, 2009, accessed December 20, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-bythe-President-at-Cairo-University-6-04-09. 175 Tony Karon, “Obama’s Overture to Iran: Why Khamenei Won’t Budge,” Time, March 23, 2009, accessed August 23, 2013, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1887133,00.html. 176 Alex Altman, “Ayatullah Ali Khamenei: Iran’s Supreme Leader,” Time, June 17, 2009, accessed May 26, 2020, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1905079,00.html.

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If we can’t make nice with Barack Hussein Obama, who is preaching mutual respect on a weekly basis and sending us Nowruz [Persian New Year] greetings, it’s going to be pretty obvious that the problem lies in Tehran, not Washington.177

Khamenei’s dismissal of Obama’s overture illustrates both sides are affected by cognitive influences that affect their continued perceptions of one another. Ayatollah Khamenei’s continuance of Ayatollah Khomeini’s fixed perception and the enemy image of the United States as the “Great Satan” illustrate how preconditions can affect both sides and contribute to missed opportunities. Khamenei’s statements also highlight a limitation of coercive diplomacy due to the dichotomy of pursuing dialogue while continuing sanctions. In this case, the Iranians articulated they were willing to negotiate if the United States first eased the sanctions. In addressing chants of “eliminating Israel,” Khamenei issued a tweet arguing the statements are taken out of context. The enemies misinterpret the Islamic Republic’s idea of “eliminating Israel”. Eliminating Israel does not mean eliminating Jewish people. We are not #Antisemitic; Jews live in peace in Iran. Eliminating Israel represents elimination of the imposed Zionist regime.178

Barack Obama campaigned largely on domestic policy issues, championed his opposition to the Iraq War, and openness to meeting with U.S. adversaries without conditions. Soon questions arose as to the new administration’s grand strategy and its priorities. Colin Dueck argues the Obama administration viewed foreign policy through the prism of whether it “furthers, protects, or risks key components of his domestic agenda.”179 Dueck surmised President Obama did not believe conflict is the essence of international relations, but rather international cooperation was the key so “adversaries can listen to and accommodate one another.”180 The Obama administration sought a departure from the Bush administration’s unilateral tactics; but continued its dual-track approach of utilizing positive and negative inducements to convince Iran that changing its behavior would be the most rewarding decision. Although he continued the carrot and stick approach of his predecessor to make Iran yield to pressure on its nuclear program, Obama differed from Bush in that he publicly disavowed regime change and dropped diplomatic preconditions to diplomacy. By changing tactics, the Obama administration demonstrated its preference for international cooperation when it built a robust consensus for international sanctions

177 Karim

Sadjadpour, “Reading Khamenei: The World View of Iran’s Most Powerful Leader,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009), vi. 178 TOI Staff and Raphael Ahren, “Israel Urges Twitter to Boot Iranian Leader After His ‘Eliminate Israel’ Tweets,” The Times of Israel, May 25, 2020, accessed May 31, 2020, https://www.timesofis rael.com/israel-seeking-to-get-iranian-supreme-leader-kicked-off-twitter/. 179 Colin Dueck, The Obama Doctrine: American Grand Strategy Today (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 33. 180 Dueck, The Obama Doctrine: American Grand Strategy Today, 35.

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against Iran.181 The Iranians were cognizant of Obama’s approach, but continued to assert they would not yield to threats. In 2015, the international community reached a comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran to forestall its nuclear program and to provide IAEA monitoring of its nuclear sites. By signing the JCPOA, Iran committed to the P5+1 and the UN Security Council it would forever abide by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, its enriched uranium stockpile would be restricted to 300 kilograms for 15 years, and thousands of its centrifuges would be dismantled. Its remaining centrifuges would be limited to 5000, and monitored 24 hours a day, for 20 years. Its uranium enrichment would be limited to 3.67 percent, the country’s only plutonium reactor would be destroyed, all uranium mining would be tracked for 25 years, it would accept 130 additional inspectors working every day in Iran, and it would take Iran at least a year to have a break out capability.182 The Obama administration heralded the agreement as a keystone of its legacy, and the deal also provided Iran with many benefits after the economic sanctions were removed. According to Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, the Iranian economy grew by 12.5 percent in fiscal year 2016–2017, and created 700,000 new jobs, which was ten times as many as from 2006 to 2011. The Iranian middle class also saw the JCPOA as a means to anchor Iran’s economy to the West.183 The Iran nuclear deal was able to forestall the immediate need for a U.S.-led military strike against Iran, and it was notable because it had the support of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. Though the deal was deemed a success, notable critics including key members of the U.S. Republican Party, Saudi Arabia, and Israel believed the deal did not go far enough by failing to address Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal and its support for regional proxies, thus, it only delayed the inevitable military confrontation, and eventual U.S. withdrawal from the agreement once President Obama was no longer in office.

Summary This chapter discussed the cognitive psychological influences that shape powerful state threat perceptions and their proliferation responses. In assessing these influences, the chapter examined decision-makers’ perceptions of cognitive processes and how they may contribute to misperceptions of an adversary’s intent, resulting in overreach by the powerful state. The chapter also discussed how variances in a state’s threat perception and responses are attributable to cognitive psychological influences 181 Reza Marashi, “Dealing with Iran: If Washington Truly Engages in Diplomacy, a Disastrous War

May Be Avoided,” The Cairo Review of Global Affairs (Fall 2012): 38. Kerry, Every Day Is Extra (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2018), 523. 183 Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, “With the US Out, How Can Iran Benefit from the JCPOA?,” Brookings, May 16, 2018, accessed April 2, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2018/ 05/16/with-the-us-out-how-can-iran-benefit-from-the-jcpoa/. 182 John

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on the state’s national actors and decision-makers. The research examined how two interdependent cognitive psychological influences shape the threat perceptions of a power-projecting state and influences how its leaders interpret and respond to additional horizontal proliferation cases. The two influences are: historical tragedy and a history of conflict between the powerful and the proliferating state. The presence of a historical tragedy can influence a state’s perception of its enemies and contribute to an aggressive foreign policy. The study also discussed how states that have a history of conflict are inclined to have cognitive predispositions that can lead to overestimation of a threat and the increased likelihood of continued hostilities between the two states. The study illustrated how Israel continues to link the Holocaust to emerging threats as justification for an aggressive foreign policy, and how the United States’ traditional use of multilateralism and coercive diplomacy was affected by the September 11th attacks because of the Bush administration’s linkage of the tragedy to a perceived increased threat from Iraq. In both cases, the two power-projecting states used analogies to illustrate a perceived nexus between past and current threats to justify the use of force against the target countries. Furthermore, Israel’s two successful uses of the Begin Doctrine to attack its adversaries’ suspected nuclear sites increases the likelihood it will continue to use preventive war to negate future perceived threats. The United States’ use of the Bush Doctrine to invade Iraq resulted in a failed search for weapons of mass destruction and will likely limit the U.S. use of preventive war in the near future.

Chapter 4

National Security Policy and Nuclear Policy

A state’s national security policy provides the structural framework for protecting its citizens and its national security interests from foreign-based threats. The objectives of these policies provide the foundation for how a state will conduct its foreign policy, interact with allies and adversaries, address threats to the nation, and promote its vision, values, and economic well-being. Concurrently, a state’s nuclear policy provides the governing philosophies of the role of nuclear weapons in its foreign policy. This includes the guiding principles of its nuclear arsenal, primarily concerning the conditions under which nuclear weapons could be employed, including the state’s position on the first use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear policy could also affirm a state’s commitment to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, such as its signatory status on international nuclear protocols like the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty. This chapter examines the historical evolution of the United States and Israel’s national security policies to provide insight into how the two allies address perceived threats to their national security interests. The chapter also examines U.S nuclear policy and the role nuclear weapons have played in U.S. national security policy. The purpose is to provide insight into how each state’s policies contribute to their proliferation responses by illustrating the frameworks each state uses to respond to and address challenges to their security. The chapter demonstrates that despite states having codified national security policies, its leaders are still influenced by and susceptible to beliefs and biases that can alter their interpretations of perceived threats to the nation, which can lead to misperceptions and threat inflation.

Israel—National Security Policy Israel has not had a formal national security doctrine since its founding in 1948, despite it being in a near constant state of conflict with its neighbors for over 70 years.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 B. K. Chappell, State Responses to Nuclear Proliferation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59801-3_4

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Instead, Israeli national security doctrine is largely driven by leaders who are guided by the following principles: (1) Israel is constantly threatened by neighbors who seek to destroy it; (2) it cannot solve conflict by only using military force; and (3) it cannot count on any other state to safeguard its existence.1 With no guiding strategy, Israeli leaders often rely on these three principles to interpret and respond to perceived threats, which can lead to individual beliefs and values having an outsized influence on foreign policy decisions. This can contribute to misperceptions and threat inflation due to the subjective nature of this form of foreign policy decision-making. The lack of a memorialized doctrine allows Israeli leaders wide latitude in responding to perceived threats. Even so, major Israeli foreign policy decisions are obsessively deliberate and largely more aggressive than U.S. foreign policy decisions; however, the prime minister cannot order an attack by himself, and must get buy-in from key cabinet members before conducting military action.2 Israeli national security doctrine is based on the realist assumption that as the regional hegemon its relationship with the Arab world and Iran is a zero sum game, meaning if one side gains, the other side loses. From this perspective, Israel’s Arab neighbors and Iran are determined to destroy it, and because it has no reliable international allies, Israel must fend for itself.3 From the Book of 1 Samuel 17: 49–50, And David put his hand in his bag, and took thence a stone, and slang it, and smote the Philistine [Goliath] in the forehead that the stone sunk into his forehead; and he fell on his face to the earth. So David prevailed over the Philistine with a sling and with a stone.4

This perception has played out among Israeli hardliners because of the differing perceptions President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu had of Iran’s nuclear program. Israel’s foreign policy is intertwined with a desire to define the political boundaries of Zionism and determine the future borders of the state, thereby continuing hostilities with its neighbors over land and water rights.5 The implementation of Israeli foreign policy is also influenced by political and religious pressure groups, public opinion, recycled political leadership, and the increasing demands of political coalitions. It is also influenced by Zionist ideology, and considerable latitude is given to the personal preferences and worldviews of individual leaders such as Ehud Barak and Benjamin Netanyahu, both of whom are former military officers.6 Netanyahu, in particular, remains fixated on the intractable 1 Avner

Golov, Ory Vishkin, Ran Michaelis, and Rony Kakon, “A National Security Doctrine of Israel,” Argov Program in Leadership and Diplomacy, Policy Paper, May 23, 2010, 8. 2 Michael Doran, “Red Light, Green Light,” Hudson Institute, July 1, 2019, accessed July 12, 2020, https://www.hudson.org/research/15134-red-light-green-light. 3 Anthony H. Cordesman and Abdullah Toukan, “Study on a Possible Israeli Strike on Iran’s Nuclear Development Facilities,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (March 14, 2009): 6, accessed August 10, 2012, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090316_israelistrikeiran.pdf. 4 Mark Bowden, “The Desert One Debacle,” The Atlantic, May 1, 2006, accessed December 25, 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/05/the-desert-one-debacle/304803/? single_page=true. 5 Jones, “The Foreign Policy of Israel,” 116. 6 Jones, “The Foreign Policy of Israel,” 116.

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and apocalyptic Iran analogy to inflate the Iranian threat, and continues to cling to power so the possibility of a change in Israel’s perceptions of Iran are not forthcoming. In arguing his perception of the threat posed by a nuclear Iran, Netanyahu declared the future of Western Civilization depends on preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. His use of vivid apocalyptic imagery to incite and inflate the Iranian threat to Israel, the Arab states, and the world is illustrated below, You don’t want a messianic apocalyptic cult controlling atomic bombs. When the wide-eyed believer gets hold of the reins of power and the weapons of mass death, then the entire world should start worrying, and that is what is happening in Iran. Since the dawn of the nuclear age, we have not had a fanatic regime that might put its zealotry above its self-interest. People say that they’ll behave like any other nuclear power. Can you take the risk? Can you assume that?7

In examining Netanyahu’s perceptions of Iran, no corroborating information is provided to conclude Iran’s leaders are part of a messianic apocalyptic cult who are intent on destroying the world. The Iranians have demonstrated themselves to be rational actors who are adept at working around economic sanctions and have been committed to continuing work on various aspects of their nuclear program for the past three decades. The Iranians had measured responses to the killings of both Major General Qassem Soleimani and Dr. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh because a large number of public military response, particularly one that produced casualties, would likely have elicited a disproportionate response from the United States or Israel, and put their nuclear facilities at risk. To this end, the Iranians may be compelled to bide their time and play the long game as they march towards a nuclear capability because they are likely cognizant that their militiary leaders and scientists will continue to be attritted, and they will remain at risk of attack by the United States and Israel, until they either acquire a nuclear weapon, halt the military component of their nuclear program, or change their political trajectory and foreign policy objectives. Netanyahu invokes vivid imagery of Nazi Germany, the Holocaust, and a messianic apocalyptic cult to warn of a pending Iranian nuclear threat. There are legitimate concerns of the impact a nuclear Iran will have on horizontal proliferation, regional security and stability, and the existing power structure because of its ballistic missile program, and support for Shia militias and U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs), but bringing about the apocalypse is not likely one of them. A nuclear Iran will be more assertive in the region and will likely become more confrontational with the Gulf States and Israel as it seeks to secure its foreign policy objectives, which includes guardianship of the global Shiite community. As of 2020, there were eight declared nuclear powers in the world, and these states have an estimated total of 13,400 nuclear warheads, of which it is estimated the United States has 5800 warheads and Russia’s warhead total is 6735. In addition to their vast nuclear arsenals with second-strike capabilities, the United States and Russia have the capability to put warheads on target in nearly every country in the world using 7 Jeffrey Goldberg, “Netanyahu Confronts Obama, and a ‘Messianic Apocalyptic Cult’,” The Atlantic, March 3, 2015, accessed July 12, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/ 2015/03/netanyahu-vs-a-messianic-apocalyptic-cult/386650/.

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bomber aircraft, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Compared to the world’s eight nuclear powers, Iran has no nuclear weapons, no ICBM-class missiles, no long-range bombers, no air refueling capability, and no submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and a largely outdated conventional military that continues to fight the Vietnam-era F-4 Phantom and the 1970s-era F-14 Tomcat fighter aircraft. It is questionable to believe that a state with no nuclear weapons would suddenly rise as a nuclear power and threaten to destroy a world in which the nuclear arsenals of the eight nuclear weapons states would outmatch it 13,400 to 1. It is more probable that Iran would use its nuclear arsenal to forestall any attempt at regime change and to preserve velayat-e faqih, or Shia clerical rule. Tehran is likely to continue its regional power projection through its asymmetric capabilities, while focusing on upgrading and modernizing its outdated conventional forces to achieve a degree of parity with the Gulf States and Israel because of the usability paradox of nuclear weapons. The intent of Iran’s nuclear program is unknown; however, the decision to construct a nuclear weapon and deciding how these weapons will be integrated into Iran’s national security policy will be determined by one man, the Rahbar-e Moazzam, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini. The Iran case illustrates the importance of individual-level analysis to the nuclear proliferation literature because one person makes the decision on nuclear weapons in Iran. In forty years, Iran has had two Supreme Leaders, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Ali Khameini. This provides for a high degree of continuity between national leaders and their visions. In Westernized societies, there are usually changes in leadership every four to six years. Though there are transitions in leadership, it does not necessarily translate into new thoughts or ideas, as these leaders seldom deviate from the paths of their predecessors because there is continuity in political party platforms and staffers. Consequently, many of the biases and resistance to new information remains. Vipin Narang notes the frequency with which Israeli military leaders transition to civilian politics.8 The experiences and decision-making processes these former military officers bring to the civilian political sphere, while valuable, likely predisposes Israeli political leaders to select military-centric options to national security issues. Yoram Peri argues Israel’s military has substantial influence on its policymakers because of the weakness of the political echelon caused by the “intractable conflict with the Palestinians.”9 Narang notes the military is given substantial tactical leeway, but still exercises deference to civilian leaders.10 This creates a perception of a political elite dominated by former senior-level military officers.

8 Vipin

Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 204. 9 Yoram Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room: How the Military Shapes Israeli Policy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006), 13. 10 Narang, 204.

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Foreign Policy Decisions The military and intelligence community’s influence on Israeli foreign policy decisions is recognized in studies by political science professor Zeev Maoz. Maoz argues the use of military force dominates Israeli foreign policy because a centralized, selfserving and self-perpetuating military and intelligence community dominates the Israeli foreign policy decision-making apparatus.11 Correspondingly, the need to secure the state against external threats while preserving an internal Jewish majority drives the national interest.12 This desire to preserve the Jewish majority has led to accusations of xenophobia and racism due to Israel’s refusal to negotiate on the Palestinians’ right of return, and because of its refusal to grant asylum to African refugees and the labeling of them as “infiltrators.”13 Prime Minister Netanyahu exacerbated tensions when he stated he views the presence of many of the Africans in Israel as a threat to Israel’s Jewish social fabric and his government.14 Professor Maoz, a former academic director at the Israeli Defense Forces’ National Defense College, details six themes relative to the Israeli foreign policymaking structure. First, Israeli national security and foreign affairs policymaking are dominated by a preponderance of defense and intelligence community officials. This is indicative of the political strength of the security community and the weakness of Israel’s diplomatic community. Second, the defense and intelligence community’s dominance is enhanced by the lack of civilian institutions with which to provide policymakers with staff-related infrastructure. Third, the security community’s dominance is further enhanced by the large presence of former senior military officers in Israeli politics. Fourth, the Knesset [Israeli Parliament] has failed to oversee and limit the Israel Defense Force and security community dominance in foreign and security affairs. Fifth, the Israeli Supreme Court and the judiciary branch have traditionally deferred to the security community’s positions. Lastly, Maoz argues the dominance of the security and military communities in Israeli foreign policy decision-making has resulted in five findings15 : 1. It allows for trigger-happy and risk-taking management of violent conflicts. 2. It accounts for risk-averse behavior in peace management diplomacy. 3. It results in harebrained schemes of manipulating the domestic systems of other states and actors in the region.

11 Zeev

Maoz, Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel’s Security & Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2009), 499. 12 Jones, “The Foreign Policy of Israel,” 126. 13 Eric P. Schwartz and Mark Hetfield, “Israel Turns Its Back on African Refugees,” Washington Post, August 2, 2013, accessed November 10, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-0802/opinions/41000836_1_israel-s-asylum-seekers-refugee-protection. 14 Allyn Fisher-Ilan, “Thousands of African Migrants Protest Israel Detention Policy,” NBC News, January 5, 2014, accessed January 5, 2014, http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2014/01/05/221 89435-thousands-of-african-migrants-protest-israel-detention-policy?lite. 15 Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 502.

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4. It accounts for the ability to run a covert and unsupervised [weapons] programs that are driven by technocrats rather than by strategists and political leaders. 5. The structure allows the security community to cover up strategic mistakes and to prevent a critical evaluation of its actions and policies. Like most democracies, Israel’s foreign policies are influenced by a multitude of individuals and groups. However, Israel has the added influence of a large number of former high-ranking military officers turned politicians who often have firsthand combat experience against it’s adversaries. This experiences combined with a gutlevel instinctual decision-making process, and the lack of a guiding strategy, can lead to individual beliefs and values having an outsized influence on the foreign policy decision-making process. Whereas the Israeli foreign policy decision-making model is leader-centric, the U.S. foreign policy decision-making process can be more confrontational because of the separation of powers and the foreign policy roles and responsibilities of the President and the Congress are enshrined in the Constitution.

The United States—National Security Policy The U.S. Constitution divides the responsibility for foreign policy between the executive and legislative branches, with the president’s power residing in Article II and Congress’ residing in Article I of the document. This separation of powers gives the president command of the military, the power to make treaties and to appoint ambassadors, with Senate approval. Congress has the power of the purse and is empowered to regulate foreign commerce, declare war, and finance the military. Some scholars suggest foreign policy development requires the participation of the President, the executive branch, Congress, and the American public; while execution of this foreign policy resides solely with the President and his subordinates in the executive branch.16 The President and Congress frequently clash over the extent of presidential powers and Congressional oversight in carrying out national policy. In Federalist Number 70, Alexander Hamilton argued for a strong executive leader when he stated, Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws…. That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed. Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished.17

When future Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall was a congressman, he supported the idea of a strong executive leader when he proclaimed on March 7, 16 “How U.S. Foreign Policy is Made,” Foreign Policy Association, accessed May 3, 2020, https:// fpa.org/features/index.cfm?act=feature&announcement_id=45&show_sidebar=0. 17 Alexander Hamilton, “The Federalist Papers: No. 70,” Yale Law School: Lillian Goldman Law Library, accessed July 12, 2020, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed70.asp.

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1800, “The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.”18 These foreign policy struggles are not a new phenomenon and have spanned numerous presidencies and issues, ranging from George Washington’s Proclamation of Neutrality of 1793, to George W. Bush’s assertions of Iraqi WMD as the pretext for war with Iraq in 2003, to Barack Obama’s nuclear agreement with Iran. Much of the debate centers on two opposing conceptions of the prerogative to conduct foreign policy and wage (or declare) war. The Hamiltonian school of thought extols the virtues of presidential primacy in the conduct of foreign affairs, whereas the Madisonian school emphasizes a co-equal role for Congress in conducting foreign policy and waging or declaring war. As former Senator, John Tower observed, “the Constitution itself offers no clear definition as to where legislative authority ends and Presidential prerogative begins.”19 Perhaps no power is more contentious than the president’s use of emergency powers and the ability to send military forces into combat. The Constitution’s ambiguity in defining the executive and legislative relationships on foreign policy issues, and specifically, the use of force, frequently leads to power struggles between the two branches. Much of the debate centers on two opposing conceptions of the separation of powers in foreign policy mentioned above. During a crisis in which the government’s powers may be insufficient and it is too time critical to enact or amend an existing law, the president has the discretion to take extraordinary action and assume emergency powers until the crisis passes. This allows presidents to rapidly increase their authority, whether they are constitutional or not.20 The use of emergency powers could, in effect, allow a president to seize additional powers without congressional authorization. To mitigate any potential power grab, Congress passed the National Emergencies Act in 1976, which requires the president to specify which powers she intends to assume during a national emergency declaration. Implementation of this law has been flawed. Although Congress is supposed to meet every six months during the emergency to consider voting to terminate the national emergency, it has never met once in over forty years since the law was passed.21 The Constitution gives the Congress sole authority to declare war and the President, as Commander in Chief, the power to command U.S. forces. Conflict can

18 John G. Tower, “Congress Versus the President: The Formulation and Implementation of American Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs (Winter 1981/2), accessed May 6, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1981-12-01/congress-versus-presid ent-formulation-and-implementation-american. 19 Tower, “Congress Versus the President: The Formulation and Implementation of American Foreign Policy.” 20 Erin Peterson, “Presidential Power Surges,” Harvard Law Today, July 17, 2019, accessed May 6, 2020, https://today.law.harvard.edu/feature/presidential-power-surges/. 21 Elizabeth Goitein, “The Alarming Scope of the President’s Emergency Powers,” The Atlantic, January/February 2019, accessed May 4, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/ 2019/01/presidential-emergency-powers/576418/.

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occur when the President sends U.S. forces into combat without a formal declaration of war from Congress. When this happens, some members of Congress, understandably perceive that presidential use of force decisions may circumvent or usurp Congresses’ authority to declare war. The President’s decision to order the airstrike that killed Major General Qassem Soleimani, Commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards-Quds Force, on Iraqi soil, was rebuked by the U.S. Senate in a War Powers Resolution that passed the Senate 55–45 with six Republican Senators voting in support of the resolution. The Soleimani strike was interpreted by many as an act of war. The Senate Resolution condemning the President’s actions required the President to “cease all hostilities targeting Iran within 30 days unless explicitly approved by Congress.” Of course, this pointed to a weakness in the War Powers Act of 1973 in that the President is given a 60-day window to take action, which is plenty of time to go from a condition of peace to a near state of war. According to Politico, top administration officials struggled to defend the rationale—both strategic and legal—for the Soleimani strike in a classified briefing in the Senate.22 But ultimately, on May 6, 2020, the President vetoed the Congressional resolution to block further military action against Iran. Historically, one of the most vivid examples of executive committal of U.S. forces was during the initial stages of the Vietnam War when President Johnson proclaimed U.S. naval forces had been attacked off the North Vietnamese coast and he wanted to respond in kind. After the alleged attacks on the USS Maddox (DD-731), Johnson’s request for authorization to launch retaliatory strikes against North Vietnam was approved by Congress. This resolution gave Johnson, as Commander in Chief, the responsibility to take “all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.”23 Though Congress gave Johnson authority to launch combat actions in Southeast Asia, it had not intended for these actions to evolve into a full-scale war. Consequently, Congress adopted the War Powers Resolution of 1973, which calls for the President to consult Congress prior to sending troops into combat.24 The President must also end hostilities within 60 days unless Congress passes legislation authorizing the use of force. The War Powers Act has in turn contributed to the Executive branch perceiving Congress as trying to infringe on the President’s right to execute foreign policy and command U.S. forces. Leading thinkers, Louis Fisher and Senator John Tower had opposing views on this foreign policy relationship. Fisher was concerned with the uncontrolled

22 Marianne

Levine and Andrew Desiderio, “Senate Votes to Limit Trump’s Military Authority Against Iran,” Politico, February 13, 2020, accessed May 31, 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/ 2020/02/13/cotton-amendment-war-powers-bill-114815. 23 Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power, second edition (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1994), 131. 24 Jonathan Masters, “U.S. Foreign Policy Powers: Congress and the President,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 2, 2017, accessed May 3, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-foreign-pol icy-powers-congress-and-president.

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expansion of presidential power and Tower was concerned that Congress’ legislative nature was ill-equipped to “respond quickly and decisively to changes in the international scene.”25 In an essay for Foreign Affairs, McGeorge Bundy discussed executive authority and President Nixon’s use of force in Cambodia and his attempts to provide private security guarantees to South Vietnam’s President Nguyen Van Thieu to secure his acceptance of agreements with North Vietnam. For Bundy, commitments to use force, threats of force, and the actual use of force do not belong solely to the president. Bundy argued situations that require sustained military action should have public support and Congressional approval. This argument came in response to President Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger’s lack of transparency when asked about reassurances Nixon had given to Thieu because neither the American public nor Congress was interested in going back to war in Vietnam.26 Senator Jacob K. Javits also questioned presidential prerogative and argued against placing sole authority for waging war or seeking peace in the hands of one person. Javits argued the Founders, understanding this great responsibility, separated the powers of the Commander in Chief from the responsibility of declaring war, thereby leaving the decision to the American people.27 Congressman Lee Hamilton and Michael van Dusen note that in the 1950s and 1960s, the president could argue he was the sole power in formulating and conducting foreign affairs, particularly during the height of the Cold War when decisive and responsive leadership was needed. Hamilton and van Dusen argue the national trauma over the Vietnam War changed the calculus in terms of consensus and Congressional acceptance of the executive branch’s primary role. The authors note that since 1974, an increasingly activist Congress has played a more significant role in foreign policy by placing conditions on its authorizations and appropriations, and requesting congressional testimony and briefings in an attempt to regulate how foreign policy is executed.28 In 1947, an activist Congress sought to reform how the executive branch approached national security decision-making because of the Truman administration’s reliance on a select group of White House aides. In July, Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947, which created the National Security Council (NSC) to advise the President on how to integrate domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. Truman was not receptive to the NSC because he disliked the idea that his foreign policy advisors would be mandated by Congress, 25 Tower, “Congress Versus the President: The Formulation and Implementation of American Foreign Policy.” 26 McGeorge Bundy, “Reconsiderations: Vietnam, Watergate and Presidential Powers,” Foreign Affairs, Winter 1979/1980, accessed May 3, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/vietnam/ 1979-12-01/reconsiderations-vietnam-watergate-and-presidential-powers. 27 Jacob K. Javits, “War Powers Reconsidered,” Foreign Affairs, Fall 1985, accessed May 3, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1985-09-01/war-powers-reconsidered. 28 Lee H. Hamilton and Michael H. van Dusen, “Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process: Making the Separation of Powers Work,” Foreign Affairs, Fall 1978, accessed May 3, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1978-09-01/foreign-policy-and-democratic-pro cess-making-separation-powers-work.

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so he continued to rely on the Secretary of State as his principal advisor for foreign affairs.29 It wasn’t until the Eisenhower administration that the NSC emerged as a mechanism to advise the President on national security issues.30 The National Security Council functions as the President’s “principal forum” for his senior national security advisors and cabinet members to deliberate national security and foreign policy issues that require a Presidential decision. It also serves as the President’s primary mechanism for coordinating national security and foreign policies across the interagency.31 Importantly, the NSC serves in an advisory capacity and makes recommendations and presents options, but it does not make decisions.32 The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA), more commonly known as the National Security Advisor, leads the National Security Council and is one of the most prominent White House advisors to the President on foreign policy. Presidents rely on the NSC to coordinate policy proposals across the interagency before they are discussed during the Principals Committee (PC), which is the Cabinetlevel senior interagency forum for considering policy issues that affect the national security interests of the United States.33 Accordingly, “within this constitutional and statutory system, interagency actions at the national level may be based on both personality and process, consisting of persuasion, negotiation, and consensus building, as well as adherence to bureaucratic procedure.”34 Since its inception, the NSC has grown in both size and role in national security decision-making, and its influence varies from administration to administration. Under the Obama administration, the NSC staff rose to 400 members from the 40 members under the George H.W. Bush administration. The NSC has also assumed more of an operational role as opposed to its traditional focus on strategic planning and interagency coordination. Under the Obama administration, both Secretaries of Defense Robert Gates and Leon Panetta complained about the NSC and White House staff’s “centralization of decision-making and intrusion into operational and tactical details.”35 There is criticism that the NSC has evolved and become less of an advisory staff and more of an

29 Office

of the Historian, “A New National Security Structure,” The Department of State, accessed July 21, 2020, https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/security. 30 Robert Cutler, “The Development of the National Security Council,” Foreign Affairs, April 1956, accessed July 21, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1956-04-01/develo pment-national-security-council. 31 Executive Office of the President of the United States, “National Security Council,” The White House, accessed July 21, 2020, https://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/. 32 Cutler, “The Development of the National Security Council.” 33 Executive Office of the President of the United States, “National Security Presidential Memorandum,” The White House, April 4, 2017, accessed July 21, 2020, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ presidential-actions/national-security-presidential-memorandum-4/. 34 Joint Interagency Smartbook, Joint Strategic & Operational Planning: Planning for Planners (Lakeland, FL: The Lightning Press, 2014), 1.5. 35 Mark F. Cancian, “Limiting Size of NSC Staff: Assessing Defense Reform,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (July 1, 2016), 1.

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Table 4.1 Total U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East, 1950–1970a (loans and grants; current year $ in millions) Country/Region

Economic

Military

Total

Iran

2147.6

750.9

1396.7

Israel

1263.3

986.0

277.3

Egypt

884.1

884.1

0.0

Jordan

696.0

601.0

95.0

Libya

238.0

220.6

17.4

95.2

45.2

50.0

Iraq Total Near East (including other recipients not listed)

$5610.40

$2244.40

$7854.80

a Jeremy

M. Sharp, “U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends and the FY2011 Request,” Congressional Research Service (June 15, 2010): 23

operating agency.36 Consequently, there is continuing debate on right-sizing the role of future National Security Councils. As U.S. national security policy in the Middle East evolved, each successive administration often found itself embroiled in a crisis with at least one Middle Eastern state. The historic premise of U.S. national security policy in the region has been largely dominated by its support for Israel, while simultaneously backing Arab regimes because of their opposition to communism, Islamic fundamentalism, and Iran; and because these regimes provide the United States with the oil required to meet its substantial energy needs. The United States has often ignored corruption, rigged elections, political and religious repression, the Palestinian issue, murder, and torture, all of which contribute to anti-American sentiment in the region.

The Truman and Eisenhower Administrations Prior to World War II, U.S. involvement in the Middle East was limited because the region was dominated by the British and to a lesser degree the French. After the war, the United States began providing security assistance to halt the spread of communism in the region and to protect the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf (Table 4.1). President Truman established the Truman Doctrine, which declared the United States could intervene in foreign conflicts to “provide political, military, and economic assistance to all democratic nations under threat from external or internal authoritarian forces.”37 This marked the beginning of the United States security 36 I.M.

Destler and Ivo H. Daalder, “Report: A New NSC for a New Administration,” Brookings, November 15, 2000, accessed July 21, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/research/a-new-nsc-fora-new-administration/. 37 U.S. Department of State, “The Truman Doctrine, 1947,” Office of the Historian, accessed August 2, 2013, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/truman-doctrine.

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assistance to the Middle East and the initial implementation of George Kennan’s containment strategy. The Eisenhower administration continued the Truman administration’s policy of security assistance, but experienced increased Arab hostility toward the West because of Israel’s independence, and because of increasing Soviet influence in Egypt and Syria after the Suez Crisis of 1956.38 The Eisenhower administration further complicated the U.S. position when it supported a coup to overthrow Iran’s Prime Minister Mossadegh, the impact of which continues to affect Iranian perceptions of U.S. intentions to this day.

The Kennedy and Nixon Administrations The Kennedy administration did not place the Middle East high on its list of priorities and believed Iran or Saudi Arabia should play a larger role in Gulf security once the British departed.39 Due to misgivings about Saudi corruption and extravagance, Kennedy established a second pillar to support U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf by providing increased assistance to Iran and encouraging it to assume a larger role in promoting regional security.40 The Nixon Doctrine, which called on states to share the burden of fighting communism, addressed the political uncertainty of the newly created Gulf States as the Soviet Union attempted to expand its sphere of influence into the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. The Nixon administration was hampered in its efforts to influence the Gulf States due to its resupply of Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, an action that resulted in the 1973–1974 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo. Nixon later expanded support for the Shah by increasing the sale of military weapons to Iran in an effort to enhance Gulf stability and expand U.S. influence in the region.41 Nixon then initiated a covert plan to destabilize Iraq by enlisting Iran and Israel to support a Kurdish rebellion against Baghdad. The effort collapsed in 1975 when Iran came to an agreement with Iraq and abandoned the Kurds.

38 U.S.

Department of State, “The Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957,” Office of the Historian, accessed August 3, 2013, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/eisenhower-doctrine. 39 Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 137. 40 Little, American Orientalism, 147. 41 Jeffrey Kimball, “The Nixon Doctrine: A Saga of Misunderstanding,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 36, no. 1, Presidential Doctrines (March 2006): 72.

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The Carter Administration The Carter administration focused on resolving the Arab–Israeli conflict; however, it quickly morphed into responding to the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and increased regional anti-Americanism. In attempting to secure continued Western access to Persian Gulf oil, while also keeping the Soviets at bay, President Carter elevated the Gulf region’s stature by declaring it an American national security interest. This drove America’s preoccupation with Arab state stability and micromanagement of the Arab–Israeli conflict.42 Carter initially believed Moscow could help promote regional development, however, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan convinced him the Soviets were a threat to be countered and the United States would take all necessary actions to secure its vital interests in the region.43 Carter summed up his sentiments when he stated, The region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance: It contains more than two-thirds of the world’s exportable oil… Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and as such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.44

President Carter’s one-term presidency ended in embarrassment due to the U.S. Embassy Hostage Crisis and the subsequent failed Operation Eagle Claw hostage rescue mission at the Desert One rendezvous site in the Dasht-e-Kavir salt desert. In a final coup de grace against the Carter administration, the Iranians allowed the plane carrying the 52 American embassy hostages to take off twenty minutes after Ronald Reagan took the oath of office on Inauguration Day, January 20, 1981.45

The Reagan Administration The Reagan administration recalibrated the United States’ focus away from resolving the Arab–Israeli conflict and back to combating the Soviet Union. The Reagan Doctrine declared the fundamental threat to Middle East peace and stability was not the Arab–Israeli conflict, but the Soviet Union and its provocations. Reagan famously invoked an analogy that equated the Soviet Union to evil in his “Evil Empire” speech.

42 Thanassis Cambanis, “The Carter Doctrine: A Middle East Strategy Past Its Prime,” The Boston Globe, October 24, 2012, accessed August 2, 2013, http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2012/ 10/13/the-carter-doctrine-middle-east-strategy-past-its-prime-the-carter-doctrine-middle-east-str ategy-past-its-prime/xkDcRIPaE68mFbpnsUoARI/story.html. 43 Bernard Reich and Stephen H. Gotowicki, “The United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East,” The Decline of the Soviet Union and the Transformation of the Middle East, accessed August 2, 2013, http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/ussovme.htm. 44 Little, American Orientalism, 117. 45 Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah, 588.

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Table 4.2 Total U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East, 1971–2001a (loans and grants; current year $ in millions) Country/Region

Economic

Military

Total

Israel

78,908.6

28,402.9

50,505.7

Egypt

52,702.8

25,095.8

27,607.0

Jordan

4577.3

2440.1

2137.2

Lebanon

744.2

470.5

273.7

Palestinians

703.4

703.4

0.0

Syria

539.0

539.0

0.0

Total Near East (including other recipients not listed) $62,449.80 $82,519.20 $144,969.00 a Jeremy

M. Sharp, “U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends and the FY2011 Request,” Congressional Research Service (June 15, 2010), 25 Yes, let us pray for the salvation of all of those who live in that totalitarian darkness – pray they will discover the joy of knowing God. But until they do, let us be aware that while they preach the supremacy of the state, declare its omnipotence over individual man, and predict its eventual domination of all peoples on the Earth, they are the focus of evil in the modern world.46

To stem the tide of Soviet expansionism, Reagan argued the United States must restore its capability in the region by building up American forces, increasing security assistance to the region, and building a strategic consensus to oppose the Soviet threat (Table 4.2).47 As part of the Reagan Doctrine, the administration cut off funding to Iran, armed the Mujahedeen fighting Soviet forces in Afghanistan, and established United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) to demonstrate a continued U.S. military focus on the region. Reagan also broke with Kennan’s containment strategy and sought to “roll back” Soviet influence and expansionism, as ensconced in National Security Decision Directive 75 (NSDD-75).48 The Reagan administration focused attention on Iran due to fallout from the hostage crisis. Iran’s provocative violation of U.S. sovereignty increased tensions with the United States and resulted in both nations using slogans to demonize the other. In this spiral, to Iran the United States became “The Great Satan” and the Iranians initiated their slogan of “Death to America.” In turn, the Reagan administration began supplying satellite imagery of Iranian military positions to the Iraqis during the latter stages of the Iran–Iraq War, and in 1984 the United States authorized limited intelligence sharing with Iraq. The previous year, the United States launched Operation Staunch, whose goal was to convince Iran of the futility of fighting Iraq by using U.S. diplomatic efforts to block and impede Iran’s ability to 46 Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals

in Orlando, Florida,” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum, March 8, 1983, accessed May 16, 2013, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/30883b.htm. 47 Reich and Gotowicki, “The United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East.” 48 U.S. Department of State, “Reagan Doctrine, 1985,” Office of the Historian, accessed August 2, 2013, http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/rd/17741.htm.

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resupply weapons, ammunition, and other wartime supplies.49 It was also during Reagan’s first term that the Israeli Air Force bombed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor, an act the administration condemned at the United Nations. The Reagan administration did not view Iraq’s nuclear reactor as a high threat because the Reagan-era U.S. National Security Strategy focused on confronting the Soviet Union and deferred non-Soviet threats to regional powers. Although most historians and scholars have focused on the long-term impact the overthrow of Mossadegh has on U.S.–Iranian relations, it is important to not overlook the Reagan administration’s aiding of Iraq and its efforts to disrupt Iranian military efforts during the Iran–Iraq War. Ironically, the Reagan administrations most roundly criticized foreign policy blunder involved giving HAWK medium-range surface to air missiles (SAMs) and TOW antitank missiles to Iran in contravention of its own foreign policy tenets. In what became known as the Iran–Contra Affair, the Reagan administration surreptitiously supplied arms to Iran in return for empty promises to release American hostages. Reagan was actually misled by his own CIA director, William Casey, into believing, erroneously, that Iraq was winning its war with Iran, therefore providing a rationale for selling arms to Iran. The Tower Commission concluded that no matter what Reagan thought, this turned out to be an arms for hostages transaction that compromised U.S. policy and failed.

The George H.W. Bush Administration The George H.W. Bush administration faced a rapidly changing international landscape. The changed environment included: the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Iran–Iraq War cease-fire, the collapse of the Soviet Bloc in Eastern Europe, Soviet internal political and economic transformation, diminished Soviet military capability to threaten Southwest Asia, and increased U.S. dependence on Persian Gulf oil.50 After Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the Bush administration organized an impressive 35 nation coalition that included Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria and raised coalition forces of over 500,000 soldiers. The U.S.-led coalition quickly forced Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait consistent with United Nations Resolutions. After the defeat of Iraq by coalition forces, the Bush (41) administration shifted its Middle East focus to controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, identifying regional security requirements, and renewing efforts to resolve the Arab–Israeli conflict. In the post-Cold War world, the United States sought to establish a new security order in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East.51 The United States’ involvement in the Middle East during the Cold War was not one in which it engaged in direct hostilities with the Arab states but rather one in 49 Lawrence

Freedman, A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008), 165. 50 Reich and Gotowicki, “The United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East.” 51 Reich and Gotowicki, “The United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East.”

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which it supported embattled regimes in its ideological battle against Soviet influence. During the Cold War, the most important security concerns had been the prevention of a major war and halting the spread of communism. In the absence of a major rival, military engagement appeared to be a matter of choice and not necessity. As had been the case prior to World War II, the two oceans provided the United States a sense of security in preserving its way of life against external threats.52

The Clinton Administration The Soviet Union’s collapse drove a reappraisal of what constituted a threat to U.S. national security. The Clinton administration struggled with how to stratify newly actionable threats to U.S. interests. These debates discussed whether ethnic conflicts, struggles over natural resources, or humanitarian crises in failed states constituted the most serious threats to U.S. national security.53 As Hook points out, most postCold War conflicts were fought inside states and thus did not directly threaten U.S. sovereignty, territory, or political autonomy.54 Consequently, the United States, unlike Israel, continued to live relatively free from a direct or existential threat. In the absence of the Soviet Union, the Clinton administration pursued a democracyfocused foreign policy that included the dual containment of Iran and Iraq, a focus on Arab-Israeli peace, nation-building, securing nuclear materials, and halting nuclear proliferation. The administration prioritized domestic policies and the economy, but as the sole superpower it was forced to address humanitarian crises, including political upheaval in Haiti, refugee issues with Cuba, famine and security in Somalia, which culminated in the Battle of Mogadishu, and ethnic conflicts in Rwanda, Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the midst of these national security issues, the administration brokered the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinians, on September 13, 1993, but suffered the loss of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who was assassinated by a Jewish extremist on November 4, 1995. The United States was also forced to respond to increasingly sophisticated acts of terrorism. On February 26, 1993, terrorists used a truck bomb to attack the World Trade Center. The suspected mastermind, Ramzi Yousef, was later captured in Pakistan. In June 1996, terrorists attacked the U.S. Air Force housing facility at Khobar Towers, in Saudi Arabia, killing nineteen Americans. Two years later, the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 convinced the Clinton Administration that the terrorist threat posed by Al-Qaeda was now at least as important as state actors in the Middle East. 52 Richard

N. Haass, “Defining U.S. Foreign Policy in a Post-Post-Cold War World,” The 2002 Arthur Ross Lecture, Remarks to Foreign Policy Association, April 22, 2002, accessed August 2, 2013, http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/p/rem/9632.htm. 53 Steven W. Hook, U.S. Foreign Policy: The Paradox of World Power (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2005), 294. 54 Hook, U.S. Foreign Policy, 294.

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The George W. Bush Administration The nation-building focus of U.S. foreign policy ended on September 11, 2001. The al-Qaeda attacks caused a systemic shift in America’s security paradigm by demonstrating the homeland was susceptible to a transnational terrorist attack. Prior to 9/11, the United States had not witnessed a significant foreign-based attack on its territory in six decades. It now had a national tragedy that altered its self-image of invulnerability. Americans largely believed their military power and geography insulated them from a direct attack; however, the September 11th attacks created a sense of vulnerability that was alien to the American collective self-image. The attacks were especially vivid and affected the American national psyche because they were broadcast live on television. The video and still images of four hijacked aircraft being crashed deliberately into buildings as part of an orchestrated terrorist attack against the United States were seen around the world. American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175 crashing into the World Trade Center towers, people jumping to their deaths, both towers’ subsequent collapse, American Airlines Flight 77 crashing into the Pentagon, and United Airlines Flight 93 crashing into the Pennsylvania countryside became symbols of America’s pain, but also of its resolve to strike back. A senior officer in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) noted the lasting significance of a major catastrophe on a nation’s self-image when he told a U.S. think-tank, “You have your Pearl Harbor and September 11th, we have our 1999.” This was a reference to the Chinese view that the 1999 U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia during NATO’s air campaign over Serbia was a warning to Beijing not to challenge U.S. dominance in international politics.55 In reaction to the September 11th attacks, the Bush White House searched for a nexus between Iraq and al-Qaeda, and invoked images of another 9/11-style attack, this time with WMD, as the administration hyped the purported Iraqi threat to gain public and political support for a U.S. military intervention. In a 2002 speech to the American public, Bush stated, “America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof – the smoking gun – that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.”56 National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice also invoked the “mushroom cloud” analogy as a response to those who questioned whether Iraq had in fact reconstituted its nuclear weapons program. Rice argued, “The problem here is that there will always be some uncertainty about how quickly he [Saddam Hussein] can acquire nuclear weapons. But we don’t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.”57 As for the alleged Iraq–Al-Qaeda connection, Paul Pillar, the national intelligence officer responsible for the Middle East at the CIA, wrote in Foreign Affairs, “The Intelligence community 55 Ratner,

“Rebalancing to Asia with an Insecure China,” 22. W. Bush, “President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat,” The White House, October 7, 2002, accessed April 3, 2020, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/200 21007-8.html. 57 Wolf Blitzer, “Searching for the ‘Smoking Gun’,” CNN, January 10, 2003, accessed December 25, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/01/10/wbr.smoking.gun/. 56 George

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never offered any analysis that supported the notions of an alliance between Saddam and Al-Qaeda, yet it was drawn into a public effort to support that notion.”58 Vice President Dick Cheney employed another tact by suggesting that if the United States did go to war with Iraq, Americans would “be greeted as liberators” by the Iraqi population once the invasion began. This was a reference influenced by Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon when the liberators were given flowers by the local Shia population.59 The analogies were used to such effect that politicians and allies who opposed the war were often labeled unpatriotic or un-American. Military leaders were not immune from mistreatment, as illustrated by Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s treatment of Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki, who had questioned Rumsfeld’s desire for a small troop footprint in Iraq. Shinseki argued against Rumsfeld’s Iraq war plan by stating the United States needed to commit more troops to the fight if it were to be successful throughout all phases of the war, including post-combat stability operations. Rumsfeld wanted to save money by cutting Army programs and devoting more money to air and space power because he believed close combat was outdated and that the future belonged to missiles and technology. Shinseki disagreed and Rumsfeld later diminished the general’s authority by refusing to meet with him and by later leaking the name of his replacement fourteen months early.60 The September 11th attacks were the catalyst for the Bush administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy in which the United States declared its right to use “preemptive [sic]” war to prevent hostile acts by its adversaries. This policy of preventive war became the Bush Doctrine. Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke argued the Bush administration made “a radical break with 55 years of bipartisan tradition that sought international agreements and regimes of benefit to us.”61 George W. Bush’s myopic view of the world compelled him to view international relations as a zero sum game with his use of “either you are with us or you are with the terrorists” rhetoric.62 This rhetorical style is reminiscent of Israeli leaders’ use of the Hitler stock character analogy where each threat is viewed through the lens of the ultimate evil. Like the fixed Holocaust analogy, the Bush administration’s focus on the September 11th attacks prevented it from refreshing its perspective on perceived threats because the administration portrayed all threats as having the potential of becoming the next 9/11. The media added to the Bush administration’s inflated threat perception by reporting suspected attacks of terror possibly having roots to al Qaida by using the canned phrase, “bears the hallmarks of

58 Paul Pillar, “Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 85, no. 2 (March/April 2006): 20. 59 Thomas P.M. Barnett, Great Powers: America and the World After Bush (New York: Berkley Books, 2009), 23. 60 Herspring, Rumsfeld’s Wars, 32. 61 G. John Ikenberry, “Is American Multilateralism in Decline?” Perspectives on Politics, vol. 1, no. 3 (September 2003): 533. 62 Hirsh, “Bush and the World,” 18.

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al Qaida.”63 The state-level psychological imprint of the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent U.S. response to them altered U.S. foreign policy and the “Axis of Evil”—Iraq, Iran, and North Korea—became euphemisms for fear of another 9/11-inspired WMD attack against the United States by people who “hate our freedoms.” According to Bush, States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.64

As Jervis noted, the tendency to assimilate new data into pre-existing images is greater the more ambiguous the information, the more confident the actor is of this validity, and the greater his commitment is to this established view. Although the administration never publicly blamed Saddam Hussein for the September 11th attacks, it created an environment in which a linkage could be inferred due to its consistent linking of Iraq with terrorism.65 After the failed search for Iraqi WMD and a decline in the U.S. public’s support for the Iraq War, the Bush administration published its 2006 National Security Strategy, which deemphasized unilateralism and preventive war, and returned the United States to multilateralism.66 More importantly, the Bush administration’s ability to use force against a suspected nuclear site dissipated in the aftermath of the failed search for Iraq’s WMD program during the 2003 Iraq War. Consequently, the United States did not have the political capital to launch a preventive attack or provide support to Israel’s 2007 attack on Syria’s reactor. This new reality was illustrated in President Bush’s response to Israel’s request that the United States attack the Syrian reactor, “bombing a sovereign country with no warning or announced justification would create severe blowback.”67

The Obama Administration The Obama administration continued this multilateral approach and sought to redress some of the perceived wrongs of the Bush Doctrine by pledging to withdraw U.S. 63 Ariel

Zirulnick, “Morocco Bombing Bears Hallmark of Al Qaeda Group,” Christian Science Monitor, April 29, 2011, accessed April 3, 2020, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-sec urity/2011/0429/Morocco-bombing-bears-hallmark-of-Al-Qaeda-group. 64 George W. Bush, “Text of President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address,” Washington Post, January 29, 2002, accessed May 20, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/tra nscripts/sou012902.htm. 65 Gershkoff and Kushner, “Shaping Public Opinion,” 525. 66 Joel Roberts, “Poll: Fading Support for Iraq War,” CBS News, October 10, 2005, accessed April 4, 2020, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/poll-fading-support-for-iraq-war/. 67 Anna Newby, “Does Israel’s 2007 Attack on Syrian Al Kibar Inform Iran Policy Today?” Center for Strategic & International Studies, accessed May 23, 2013, http://csis.org/blog/does-israel%E2% 80%99s-2007-attack-syrian-al-kibar-inform-iran-policy-today.

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troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, and end the torture of terror suspects.68 Despite this embrace of multilateralism, the Obama administration drastically increased the use of drones to kill terror suspects including four U.S. citizens: Anwar al-Awlaki, Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, Jude Kenan Muhammad,, and Samir Khan.69 Critics pounced on the Obama administration for killing U.S. citizens without due process and without sharing the intelligence that led to the targeted killings of the men, including Anwar alAwlaki’s 16-year-old son Abdulrahman.70 Noting, al-Awlaki was a propagandist for Al-Qaeda and had denounced the United States, criticized U.S. policies, and encouraged the killing of Americans, Harvey Silverglate still criticized the Obama administration for executing U.S. citizens in the absence of an indictment, without them appearing in court, and without consulting Congress.71 Consistent with the George W. Bush administration, the Obama administration resisted Israeli pressures to bomb suspected Iranian nuclear facilities, preferring instead to engage Iran with coercive diplomacy via dual-track diplomacy—nuclear talks coupled with crippling economic and trade sanctions, which created unprecedented economic problems for Iran and devalued its currency.72 Despite the harsh economic conditions, the Iranians remained committed to their nuclear program. After IAEA talks collapsed in 2012, Ayatollah Khamenei proclaimed, With God’s help, and without paying attention to propaganda, Iran’s nuclear course should continue firmly and seriously. Pressures, sanctions and assassinations will bear no fruit. No obstacles can stop Iran’s nuclear work.73

When President Obama took office in 2008, one of his first major speeches was to the Arab world, in Cairo, Egypt. In his speech, President Obama promised a “New Beginning” for U.S. relations with the Middle East’s Muslim countries. We meet at a time of great tension between the United States and Muslims around the world – tension rooted in historical forces that go beyond any current policy debate. The relationship between Islam and the West includes centuries of coexistence and cooperation, but also conflict and religious wars. More recently, tension has been fed by colonialism that denied rights and opportunities to many Muslims, and a Cold War in which Muslim-majority countries were too often treated as proxies without regard to their own aspirations. Moreover, 68 Greg Myre, “Pledging to End Two Wars, Obama Finds Himself Entangled in Three,” NPR, October 15, 2015, accessed April 4, 2020, https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/10/15/448 925947/pledging-to-end-two-wars-obama-finds-himself-entangled-in-three. 69 Jere Van Dyk, “Who Were the 4 U.S. Citizens Killed in Drone Strikes?” CBS News, May 23, 2013, accessed April 4, 2020, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/who-were-the-4-us-citizens-killedin-drone-strikes/. 70 Conor Friedersdorf, “How Team Obama Justifies the Killing of a 16-Year-Old American,” The Atlantic, October 24, 2012, accessed April 4, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/ 2012/10/how-team-obama-justifies-the-killing-of-a-16-year-old-american/264028/. 71 Harvey Silverglate, “Obama Crosses the Rubicon: The Killing of Anwar al-Awlaki,” Forbes, October 6, 2011, accessed April 4, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/harveysilverglate/2011/10/ 06/obama-crosses-the-rubicon-the-killing-of-anwar-al-awlaki/#1eafbb16796f. 72 Kenneth M. Pollack, Unthinkable: Iran, the Bomb, and American Strategy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2013), 119. 73 Pollack, Unthinkable, 119.

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the sweeping change brought by modernity and globalization led many Muslims to view the West as hostile to the traditions of Islam… I’ve come here to Cairo to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual respect, and one based upon the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive and need not be in competition. Instead, they overlap, and share common principles – principles of justice and progress; tolerance and the dignity of all human beings.74

The president’s speech was well-received and demonstrated great promise for a reshuffling of relationships between the United States and the Middle East; however, despite early promise, the Obama White House soon demonstrated a continuation of Bush-era policies that diminished Arab enthusiasm for the president. The administration cast its first-ever veto in the UN Security Council to block a Palestinian-backed draft resolution denouncing Israel’s settlement policy as an “illegal obstacle to peace” in the Middle East, despite pledging to seek better relations with the Muslim world in his Cairo speech.75 This was the United States’ first UN Security Council veto since 2006, when the Bush administration vetoed a UNSC resolution calling for a halt to Israeli military operations in Gaza. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan E. Rice downplayed the Obama administration’s veto as an indication of U.S. support for Israeli settlements. For more than four decades, Israeli settlement activity in territories occupied in 1967 has undermined Israel’s security and corroded hopes for peace and stability in the region… continued settlement activity violates Israel’s international commitments, devastates trust between the parties and threatens the prospects for peace.76

Washington Post staff writer Colum Lynch argued that although the United States often criticizes Israel’s settlement policy, a U.S. vote in favor of the resolution would have angered Israel and its U.S. supporters, including evangelical Christians and Republicans who argue the United States should stand with Israel at all costs.77 Despite its desire to extricate itself from the Bush administration’s previous policies, the Obama administration’s Middle East foreign policy was overshadowed by inconsistencies, poor communication of its strategic messaging, perceptions of weakness, and public disagreements with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. In 2011, Obama called for the creation of a Palestinian state based upon the borders that existed before the 1967 Six Day War, i.e., prior to Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza. While advocating for a Palestinian state, Obama had to tread carefully to show respect for Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu rejected Obama’s endorsement of the Palestinian state based upon the 1967 borders, and argued Israel’s withdrawal to the pre-war borders 74 Obama,

“Remarks by the President on a New Beginning.” Plett, “Israeli Settlements: US Vetoes UNSC Resolution,” BBC, February 19, 2011, accessed April 4, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12512732. 76 Colum Lynch, “U.S. Vetoes Security Council Resolution Denouncing Israeli Settlements,” Washington Post, February 18, 2011, accessed October 21, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/02/18/AR2011021805442.html. 77 Lynch, “U.S. Vetoes Security Council Resolution Denouncing Israeli Settlements.” 75 Barbara

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would jeopardize its security and leave major West Bank settlements outside Israel’s borders.78 In 2012, there were additional concerns Netanyahu was attempting to force Obama’s hand by threatening to attack Iran while simultaneously pushing for him to threaten Iran by establishing redlines for its nuclear program during Obama’s 2012 reelection campaign.79 In addition to disagreements with Israel over Iran, the administration’s stalled Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations and its delayed reactions to Iran’s Green Movement protests during the 2009 Iranian presidential elections hurt its standing in the region. Furthermore, the administration appeared to waver when confronted with the Arab Spring demonstrations in Egypt and Bahrain, and in supporting the opposition during Syria’s Civil War. These missteps led to accusations of an inconsistent and incoherent U.S. foreign policy and perceptions Obama’s grand strategy was based on retrenchment and accommodation due to his focus on progressive domestic policies.80 Bipartisan politics also amplified the administration’s missteps by politicizing the murder of U.S. Ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens in Benghazi, and the administration’s reaction to Syria’s use of chemical weapons.81 In a direct rejection of President Obama and his request for Congress to stay out of the Iran nuclear deal negotiations, House Speaker John A. Boehner invited Prime Minister Netanyahu to speak directly to Congress, thus signaling an affront to American democracy by inserting a foreign leader into an American political debate to criticize the President of the United States and his policies.82 Notwithstanding these setbacks, the Obama White House had notable foreign policy successes in the region, including the killing of Osama bin Laden, the JCPOA agreement with Iran, and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. The Obama administration was later criticized for its withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq because critics argued the “hasty withdrawal” empowered al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which later morphed into the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and contributed to its expansion across Iraq and into Syrian territory during its civil war. Though the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq occurred during the Obama administration, the withdrawal timeline was established during the Bush administration. President Bush signed the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Iraq in 2008, which granted U.S. service members immunity from Iraqi law and set the timetable for the 2011 withdrawal of U.S. troops unless the Iraqi parliament 78 “Obama Backs Palestinians’ 1967 Border Claims,” CBS News, May 20, 2011, accessed December

26, 2013, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-backs-palestinians-1967-border-claims/. Gearan and Karin Brulliard, “In Israel, Speculation Rises of Pending Attack on Iran’s Nuclear Facilities,” Washington Post, August 17, 2012, accessed December 26, 2013, http:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-israel-speculation-rises-of-pending-attackon-irans-nuclear-facilities/2012/08/17/febeeb56-e88e-11e1-a3d2-2a05679928ef_story.html. 80 Dueck, The Obama Doctrine, 101. 81 Susan Rice, Tough Love: My Story of the Things Worth Fighting for (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2019), 310. 82 David Nakamura, Sean Sullivan, and David A. Fahrenthold, “Republicans Invited Netanyahu to Address Congress as Part of Spurning of Obama,” The Washington Post, January 21, 2015, accessed May 28, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-state-of-the-union-obama-takes-cre dit-as-republicans-push-back/2015/01/21/dec51b64-a168-11e4-b146-577832eafcb4_story.html. 79 Anne

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authorized them to remain in Iraq. Iraq’s parliament failed to authorize the continued U.S. military presence in the country and U.S. troops later withdrew in December 2011, ending more than eight years of combat operations in Iraq.

Nuclear Policy The United States and Israel are both firmly committed in their opposition to nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Yet, Israel is not a signatory to the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, while the United States is a signatory to the agreement. The United States retains the world’s second largest nuclear arsenal, Russia is first, and announced its intent to modernize its aging nuclear forces by phasing out legacy systems as newer systems enter service. The modernization of the U.S. nuclear triad includes developing new warhead designs, a new Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) to replace the 1960s-era Minuteman III ICBM, a new Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine to replace the current Ohio-class SSBN, and a new strategic bomber, such as the B-21 Raider, as the U.S. Air Force begins phasing out the B-1 “Bone” Lancer and the B-2 “Stealth Bomber” Spirit aircraft. Despite the modernization announcement and the development of new nuclear weapon systems, the United States has reduced the number of deployed warheads since the end of the Cold War, however, as of 2014, it fielded 2,152 warheads on its triad of Minuteman III ICBMs, Trident SLBM submarines, and B-52 and B-2 bombers.83 The U.S. nuclear strategy has evolved over time as it has gone through multiple Cold War iterations of Mutually Assured Destruction and Flexible Response, to a post-Cold War concern with nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. As national security concerns shift to rogue state proliferation, the United States signaled its nuclear arsenal is not solely for deterrence and has not adopted a “No First Use” (NFU) pledge of ruling out a nuclear first strike against a nuclear rival. The United States has pledged to not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and are in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations. In 2019, the United States began curtailing its committments to nuclear agreements. Washington ended its committment to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed in 1987, and withdrew from the Open Skies Treaty, signed in 1992, with the New START Treaty set to expire in 2021. The modernization of U.S. nuclear forces comes as Washington faces the near future possibility of a nuclear Iran, and potential power structure challenges by two other nuclear powers: China and Russia.

83 Congressional

Research Service, “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues,” CRS, RL33640, April 27, 2020, 8.

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The United States—Nuclear Policy The U.S. post-World War II grand strategy centered on two areas: containing greatpower rivals and opening the world’s economy and political systems to encourage the flow of trade, capital, and resources.84 In Nuclear Weapons and American Grand Strategy, Francis Gavin argues U.S. nuclear non-proliferation efforts to prevent nonnuclear states from acquiring a nuclear weapon and to mitigate the consequences of proliferation have been driving features of U.S. national security policy since the dawn of the nuclear age and that these efforts have been applied to friend and foe, alike.85 Washington has used sanctions, sabotage, threats of abandonment, and preventive military strikes against nascent nuclear programs.86 Gavin asserts the U.S. strategy is to inhibit new states from acquiring a nuclear weapon because of the power-equalizing effects of nuclear weapons and the impact additional proliferation would have on U.S. national security and its power dominance.87 Unlike Israel, the United States is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and therefore recognizes all states’ rights to peaceful nuclear energy. Secondly, U.S. nuclear policy is documented publicly in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which acknowledges the U.S. nuclear arsenal and states the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack on the United States, its allies, and partners.88 The NPR is a legislatively mandated review that establishes U.S. nuclear policy, strategy, capabilities, and force posture for the next five to ten years, and details how the United States will sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent for the United States and its allies.89 The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review acknowledged the international security environment has changed since the Cold War, and argued while the threat of global nuclear war has become remote, the risk of nuclear attack by nuclear-armed terrorists has increased.90 It also recognized the threat of nuclear proliferation and the defiance of Iran and North Korea and the associated potential for regional instability due to their proliferation efforts.91 The Obama administration’s Nuclear Posture Review narrowed potential U.S. nuclear targets by stating non-nuclear nations that have signed and are in compliance with their NPT obligations will not be targeted by a U.S. nuclear attack. There is no

84 Francis J. Gavin, Nuclear Weapons and American Grand Strategy (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2020), 75. 85 Gavin, Nuclear Weapons and American Grand Strategy, 83. 86 Gavin, Nuclear Weapons and American Grand Strategy, 90. 87 Gavin, Nuclear Weapons and American Grand Strategy, 84. 88 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, 15. 89 U.S. Department of Defense, “2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Fact Sheet,” Department of Defense Office of Public Affairs, April 6, 2010, accessed April 12, 2020, https://dod.defense.gov/ Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/NPR_FACT_SHEET_April_2010.pdf. 90 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, iv. 91 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, 3.

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ambiguity in U.S. first-strike nuclear policy, as the administration retained the longstanding U.S. threat to use nuclear weapons first.92 The NPR placed the prevention of nuclear terrorism and proliferation at the top of the U.S. policy agenda, and reflected the president’s five key objectives of U.S. nuclear weapons policies and postures93 : 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism Reduce the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy Maintain strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels Strengthen regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners Sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.

During the Cold War, the Middle Eastern states recognized U.S. nuclear weapons were to deter the Soviet Union, and the dominance of U.S. conventional military and nuclear power prevented these states from being perceived as existential threats to Washington. The dominance of U.S. power also meant that should the United States desire, it could advocate for regime change in any of the Arab states and Iran. Accordingly, these states recognized nuclear weapons are the only true deterrent to United States and Israeli use of overwhelming force against them in a time of crisis. For many, there is a reason the United States used force to support regime change in the non-nuclear states of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, but not in nuclear-armed North Korea and Pakistan. The desire for self-preservation fuels both sides of the nuclear proliferation debate. The Soviet Union’s collapse and the end of the Cold War ushered in a new age in which the global community instituted safeguards in an attempt to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and its associated technology. In its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the Obama administration highlighted the need to realign U.S. nuclear policies against its most urgent priorities, the dual threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.94 President Obama pressed that it sought a world free of nuclear weapons, while recognizing this will be a long-term effort.95 A Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) study asserts that in the wake of the Cold War, the United States faces multiple actors who present unique threats across the spectrum of conflict. The study analyzes the differences in NPRs that illustrate the transition and contrast with the 2018 NPR to remedy the decline within U.S. nuclear force doctrine and capabilities.96 The U.S. nuclear arsenal complements its conventional military power to provide a robust and active deterrence against any potential existential use of force. This deterrence has not, however, halted vertical proliferation by existing nuclear powers 92 Jonathan Weisman and Peter Spiegel, “U.S. Keeps First-Strike Strategy,” The Wall Street Journal,

April 6, 2010, accessed September 30, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405 2702304620304575166263632513790. 93 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, iii. 94 Robert Gates, “2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, April 2010, 8. 95 Gates, “2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report.” 96 Ryan W. Kort, Carlos R. Bersabe, Dalton H. Clarke, and Derek J. Di Bello, “Twenty-First Century Nuclear Deterrence: Operationalizing the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review,” JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly, issue 94, 3rd quarter 2019, 75.

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and near-peer competitors. While the United States was occupied with the Global War on Terrorism, and fighting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, other nuclear powers allocated resources to nuclear modernization. Countries already in possession of nuclear weapons have made significant technological advances and laid the foundation for a new arms race. According to Eric Schlosser, North Korea reportedly developed a hydrogen bomb, and its Hwasong-15 ballistic missiles may be able to employ decoys and other measures to counter the United States’ Ground-Based Midcourse Defense anti-ballistic missile system. France and the United Kingdom are developing follow-ons to their Vanguard and Triomphant ballistic missile submarines. China is fielding truck-mounted Dongfeng-41 ballistic missiles that are capable of striking the United States. Russia is developing new nuclear-capable missiles, bombers, and submarines, as well as the R-28 Sarmat missile, nicknamed Satan-2, which is capable of carrying up to sixteen warheads.97 Furthermore, in December 2019, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stated Russia deployed the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), which President Vladimir Putin said could penetrate current and future missile defense systems, though the Pentagon stated it would “not characterize the Russian claims.”98 Mounted atop an SS-19 “Stiletto” or R-28 “Sarmat” ICBM, the Avangard can be fitted to carry either a conventional or a nuclear warhead up to two megatons, with a range of over 6000 km, and can travel at speed in excess of 20 times the speed of sound (Mach 20/6.28 km/s) and is maneuverable.99 While these nuclear states were making technological advances, some U.S. national security policies sought to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. The United States and Russia entered into a new treaty on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, known as the New START Treaty, which went into effect on February 5, 2011. Under the New START Treaty, the United States and Russia agreed to decrease their aggregate limits of deployed ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber nuclear warheads (Table 4.3).100 Consequently, there are concerns the U.S. deterrence strategy may have atrophied as it relied on Cold War-era doctrine, as witnessed by a lack of updated joint nuclear operations doctrine since 2006.101 The deficiencies are also noted by two groups chaired by James Schlesinger, which found widespread inattention to the nuclear mission, the nuclear enterprise, and nuclear deterrence throughout the Department of Defense. The groups documented their findings in two reports: “The Air Force’s 97 Eric Schlosser, “The Growing Dangers of the New Nuclear Arms Race,” New Yorker, May 24, 2018, accessed March 14, 2020, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-growing-dan gers-of-the-new-nuclear-arms-race. 98 Jonathan Marcus, “Russia Deploys Avangard Hypersonic Missile System,” BBC, December 27, 2019, accessed March 15, 2020, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50927648. 99 Missile Defense Project, “Avangard,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 3, 2019, accessed March 15, 2020, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/avangard/. 100 “New START Treaty,” U.S. Department of State, accessed May 30, 2020, https://www.state.gov/ new-start/. 101 Ryan W. Kort, Carlos R. Bersabe, Dalton H. Clarke, and Derek J. Di Bello, “Twenty-First Century Nuclear Deterrence: Operationalizing the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review,” JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly, issue 94, 3rd quarter 2019, 75.

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Table 4.3 U.S. strategic nuclear forces under new STARTa System

Estimated forces, 2010 Launchers

Warheads

Planned under new START Total launchers

Deployed launchers

Warheads

Minuteman III ICBMs

450

500

454

400

400

Trident missiles

336

1152

280

240

1090

42

76

300

46

42

B-52 bombers B-2 bombers Total

18

200

20

18

18

880

2152

800

700

1550

Source Congressional Research Service a Amy F. Woolf, “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues,” Congressional Research Service (January 3, 2020), 8

Nuclear Mission” and “Review of the DoD Nuclear Mission.” The United States intends to remedy these issues by replacing the aging Minuteman III ICBM, first fielded in the mid-1960s, with the currently named Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) in the mid-2020s. The Air Force also intends to replace the AGM-86B Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) with the currently named Long Range Stand Off Weapon (LRSO), which will “ensure the bomber force continues to hold high-value targets at risk in an evolving threat environment, including targets deep within an area-denied environment.”102 The GBSD and LRSO are part of a larger plan to modernize the U.S. nuclear triad.103 The further proliferation of nuclear technology could upend the existing order and creates unique challenges for current nuclear powers and other powerful states. Scott Sagan warns against the dangers posed by personalist dictatorships acquiring a nuclear weapon. These dictators can make decisions on a whim, which can challenge the concept of nuclear stability because he argues they are not constrained by the rule of law and are more likely to use these weapons. For these dictators, nuclear weapons dissuade foreign military intervention and provide a way to counter external threats without increasing the risk of a coup.104

102 Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, “Innovation: Creating Tomorrow’s Air Force Today,” United States Air Force, accessed May 28, 2020, https://www.afnwc.af.mil/Innovation/. 103 Valerie Insinna, “Northrop Could Get $85 Billion Award to Make Next-Gen ICBMs Sooner Than Expected,” Defense News, April 16, 2020, accessed May 28, 2020, https://www.defensenews. com/space/2020/04/16/northrop-could-be-getting-an-85b-award-to-produce-next-gen-icbms-soo ner-than-expected/. 104 Scott D. Sagan, “Armed and Dangerous: When Dictators Get the Bomb,” Foreign Affairs, October 15, 2018, accessed March 13, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2018-1015/armed-and-dangerous.

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Summary This chapter discussed U.S. and Israeli national security policy and how it provides the structural framework for how each state protects its citizens and national security interests. These objectives also provide the foundation for how the state will conduct its foreign policy, engage with partners, address threats, and promote its values and economic well-being. Israel lacks a formalized national security doctrine despite it being in a state of near-constant conflict with its neighbors since its founding over 70 years ago. The chapter examined how Israel’s threat perceptions are viewed as a zero-sum game and how its national security strategy is largely shaped by leaders who rely on three principles to interpret and respond to threats: (1) Israel is under constant threat by neighbors who seek to destroy it, (2) Israel cannot solve conflict by only using force, and (3) Israel cannot rely on any other state to guarantee its security. This methodology allows for the individual beliefs and values of leaders to play an outsized role in foreign policy decision-making. The chapter then examined the United States’ more formalized notion of national security policy and noted how the U.S. Constitution divides the responsibility for foreign policy between the executive and legislative branches. Despite this delineation, there are often disagreements as to where the line is drawn between presidential powers and congressional oversight. The discussion then shifted to the national security policies of different U.S. administrations, spanning from President Truman to President Obama, to demonstrate the evolution of U.S. foreign policy and the gradual focus of U.S. national security policy on the Middle East. The chapter also discussed U.S. nuclear policy and the governing philosophy of its nuclear strategy, and the conditions under which nuclear weapons could be employed. The discussion included the risks posed by states of concern and the potential for a nuclear attack by nuclear-armed terrorists. The chapter next examined each state’s commitment to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and noted that the United States is a signatory to the agreement, while Israel is not a signatory. Within this dynamic are perceptions of a double standard that Israel, though it is not a signature to nuclear protocols, is a vocal critic of any Middle Eastern state that has nuclear ambitions. The purpose of this chapter was to provide insight into how each state’s national security policies contribute to its proliferation responses by illustrating the frameworks each state uses to respond to and address challenges to its security.

Chapter 5

Military Doctrine and Power Projection

In his study of the Differential Effects of Proliferation, Matthew Kroenig defines power projection as a state’s “ability to fight a full-scale, conventional, military, ground war on the territory of a potential target state,” and argues the “ability to bomb a state, alone, without a corresponding ability to put boots on the ground in that state’s territory is not a sufficient power-projection capability.”1 This study argues Kroenig’s definition of power projection is overly restrictive and outdated, as airpower has become the more dominant power projection instrument for counterproliferation because ground and naval forces are not suitable for sustained strikes against hardened and dispersed infrastructure. This is not an assertion that ground troops no longer play a role in national defense, because they remain a most critical aspect of U.S. power. In a counterproliferation environment, boots on the ground, to include special operations forces, and other civilian authorities would be required to secure nuclear facilities and personnel, and recover inadequately secured nuclear material and components to prevent them from being detonated, lost, or falling into the hands of non-state actors. The study argues airpower is the ideal platform for projecting power and striking nuclear infrastructure because it can rapidly and effectively deploy forces and employ kinetics to meet a state’s national security objectives, though this gap may be closing with the proliferation of advanced air defense systems, anti-access/aerial denial systems, and the dispersal and hardening of nuclear facilities. This emphasis is supported by Steve Kime, who argued U.S. doctrinal priorities need to shift away from maintaining ground forces that can deploy thousands of miles away and dominate battlefields for long periods of time.2 Kime suggests, the American concept of war has evolved and no longer supports “dabbling in unclear threats and incremental foreign military entanglement.” For Kime, the American 1 Kroenig,

“Beyond Optimism and Pessimism,” 5. F. Kime, “A 21st-Century Military Doctrine for America,” Joint Forces Quarterly, vol.88, (1st Quarter 2018): 60. 2 Steve

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 B. K. Chappell, State Responses to Nuclear Proliferation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59801-3_5

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public will support quick and decisive strikes against an enemy that will limit American casualties and avoid mission creep.3 With this in mind, this chapter examines the military doctrine and power projection capability of the United States and Israel to gain insight into how their doctrine and power projection capabilities are able to support a political decision to use force against a proliferating adversary.

Israel—Military Doctrine Israeli military doctrine stipulates Israel must have the capability to deter any possible Arab or Iranian attack. If deterrence fails, any war with the Arab countries must be short and decisive, and transferred to Arab territory in order to lessen the impact on Israeli infrastructure thus limiting further strategic risk. The Doctrine of Defense and the State of Armed Forces argues that since Israel would always be inferior in size and numbers to the Arab states, it needed to develop a qualitative military edge.4 This concept has given rise to a rapid offensive capability using airpower because of its high degree of mobility and ability to sustain continuous forward movement on the battlefield.5 It has also resulted in an Israeli propensity to pursue kinetic options rather than coercive diplomacy or sanctions against perceived or emerging threats, because Tel Aviv lacks the ability to effectively use either option. Additionally, airpower allows it to deliver quick, disproportionate response, and decisive results. Israel’s military doctrine has also been characterized as being ad hoc and operationally focused, and changes from crisis to crisis. The reason for Israel’s consistent use of force against its neighbors is that the limited use of force is perceived to be the state’s only rational response to the perceived Arab and Iranian threats to its survival.6 Maoz argues Israel’s limited use of force has three additional functions. First, Israeli political and military leaders use limited force as a deterrent to both prevent war and to provoke the Arabs into initiating war. Maoz notes the pre-planning for an Arab provocation was revealed by Prime Minister Olmert to the Winograd Commission when he stated Israel preplanned the 2006 Lebanon War with Hezbollah and merely awaited a provocation to initiate combat operations.7 This perception of a constant state of war, in which an ever-present danger is always over the horizon, allows Israeli leaders to boost public support for the government and mobilize its society for national security goals during times of peace.

3 Kime,

59. and Hendel, Israel vs. Iran, 35. 5 Cordesman and Toukan, “Study on a Possible Israeli Strike on Iran’s Nuclear Development Facilities,” 6. 6 Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 231. 7 “PM Says Israel Pre-Planned War,” BBC, March 8, 2007, accessed May 22, 2013, http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/6431637.stm. 4 Katz

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Second, Israeli strategy is based on a policy of disproportionate response to provocations and military initiatives and not in response to specific provocations. This strategy is captured in the Dahiya Doctrine, which stipulates Israel will use overwhelming and disproportionate force to attack residential areas that double as enemy command centers. Northern Command Major General Gadi Eizenkot expressed the logic behind the new doctrine when discussing its use during the 2006 Lebanon War, What happened in the Dahiya Quarter of Beirut in 2006 will happen in every village from which Israel is fired on… We will apply disproportionate force on it and cause great damage and destruction there. From our standpoint, these are not civilian villages, they are military bases.8

Third, these strategies have proven unsuccessful because they often resulted in inadvertent escalation and highlighted Israel’s inability to manage low-intensity warfare. This low-intensity strategy was the root of all Arab–Israeli wars, except the Yom Kippur War, because it forced Israel to fight aggressive wars that did not bring about the expected Arab responses. Instead, Israeli doctrine caused the Arabs to strike against Israel’s civilian population causing their responses to be perceived as a “strategic threat” to Israel.9 Gawdat Bahgat argues there are several components of Israel’s military doctrine. First, Israel’s conventional military must be qualitatively superior to its adversaries, whether individually or collectively. Second, its adversaries must not acquire a nuclear weapon. Therefore, Israel must include the option of preventive attacks in its defense strategy to ensure the Arab states and Iran do not attain a nuclear weapon capability.10 Although it can negotiate from a position of military power, Israel demonstrates little patience for negotiating with its adversaries. Leaders often retain fixed perceptions of adversaries and remain unable or unwilling to alter their perceptions, even when presented with additional information. This fixed perception of an adversary can result in lost opportunities to avoid hostilities. Yael Aronoff argues this was the case with Yitzhak Shamir and his “staunch adherence to Likud ideology, his cognitive rigidity, and orientation toward the past allowed him to maintain his hostile images of the Palestinians.”11 Aronoff maintains that Shamir remained steadfast in his belief the Arabs wanted to conquer Israel and drive the Jews into the sea, and often stated, “The sea is the same sea and the Arabs are the same Arabs.”12 This sentiment is reflected in Netanyahu’s vehement disagreement with Western calls for diplomatic negotiations to address Iran’s nuclear program, 8 Yaakov

Katz, “The Dahiya Doctrine: Fighting Dirty or a Knock-Out Punch,” The Jerusalem Post, November 6, 2013, accessed November 10, 2013, http://www.jpost.com/Features/Front-Lines/TheDahiya-Doctrine-Fighting-dirty-or-a-knock-out-punch. 9 Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 232. 10 Gawdat Bahgat, “Israel and Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East.” 11 Yael S. Aronoff, The Political Psychology of Israeli Prime Ministers: When Hard-Liners Opt for Peace (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 35. 12 Aronoff, The Political Psychology of Israeli Prime Ministers, xi.

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The world tells Israel: ‘Wait. There’s still time.’ And I say, ‘Wait for what? Wait until when?’ Those in the international community who refuse to put red lines before Iran don’t have a moral right to place a red light before Israel.13

The superior quality and effectiveness of Israel’s military forces and intelligence apparatus, combined with its demonstrated history of military successes allow it unparalleled dominance in the region. Consequently, Israel’s military policy is defined by aggressive and rapid use of force against its adversaries to fulfill its security concerns.

The United States—Military Doctrine A guiding principle of the United States is civilian control of the military. The U.S.’ military doctrine evolved over time, but has consistently been defined by its sheer power, which is based on superior technology, precision training, and overwhelming strength of force when addressing national security concerns. Unlike Israel, the U.S’ military doctrine is formalized and structured. The U.S. military’s doctrine is guided by two governing strategy documents: The National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS). The National Defense Strategy focuses on the Department of Defense’s role in implementing the President’s National Security Strategy to maintain global security and prosperity. The NDS must discuss the global strategic environment, force posture, and the United States’ role in global security.14 The U.S military doctrine is memorialized in the U.S. National Military Strategy, which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff uses to advise the President and the Secretary of Defense on the strategic direction of the U.S. armed forces.15 The National Military Strategy is adjusted regularly to address the major challenges faced by the military, such as nuclear deterrence, promoting global peace, regional instability, nuclear proliferation, displaced persons, supporting nations undergoing democratic reform, asymmetric threats, extremism, and unexpected technology events. The NMS provides a strategic framework for how the U.S. armed forces will execute the policy goals outlined in the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy.16 Each administration publishes its own strategy documents to shape how U.S. military forces will operate and under what conditions will they act to protect U.S. national security policy objectives around the world. The post-World War II era signaled a great expansion of U.S. power; however, the question remained under what circumstances would the United States use its 13 Marashi,

“Dealing with Iran,” 38.

14 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “National Defense Strategy,” Historical Office, accessed April

12, 2020, https://history.defense.gov/Historical-Sources/National-Defense-Strategy/. 15 Richard M. Meinhart, “National Military Strategies: 1990 to 2009,” Air University: Air War College Distance Learning Coursepack, 103. 16 Office of the Secretary of Defense “National Military Strategy,” Historical Office, accessed April 12, 2020, https://history.defense.gov/Historical-Sources/National-Military-Strategy/.

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military might.17 Washington is traditionally reluctant to initiate war, as articulated by President Truman when discussing the subject of preventive war as a strategic option, “We do not believe in aggressive or preventive war… Such war is the weapon of dictators, not of free democratic societies.”18 Notwithstanding Truman’s pronouncement, the United States signaled it would use force to contain communism, although some senior leaders and politicians advocated using atomic bombs to launch preventive strikes to secure America’s nuclear monopoly, to which the president resisted. After pressure from his military leaders to define U.S. nuclear policy, Truman approved NSC-30, which recognized “the military must be ready to utilize promptly and effectively all appropriate means available, including atomic weapons” in the time of war, with sole release authority residing with the President.19 The Soviet Union’s achievement of nuclear parity combined with the polarizing U.S. presence in Vietnam hampered achievement of a national consensus on the use of force.20 Anti-war protests and rising casualties from the Vietnam War ensured future U.S. military operations would involve serious debate and second-guessing. The next section examines the national security and military doctrines of the respective U.S. administrations that were in power during the periods of the four proliferation cases. This provides insight into the political machinations that shaped each administration’s processing of the proliferating state’s actions.

The Reagan Administration The Reagan Doctrine was largely defined by its realist perspective and determination to aggressively confront the Soviet Union and combat the spread of communism around the world, especially in Afghanistan and Latin America. Reagan believed communism was immoral and that the Soviets were intent on world domination, so he was determined to aid anti-communist “freedom fighters” like the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan, the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) which was led by Jonas Savimbi, and the Contras in Nicaragua in order to check communism’s global expansion. Believing the Soviets were economically weak, Reagan backed away from détente and conducted the largest military buildup in history—$220 billion in 1981—because he believed Moscow could not compete and would therefore seek a bargain. Reagan also believed the Soviets were cheating on the arms limitations set by the SALT II treaty, and that they continued to seek

17 Hook,

U.S. Foreign Policy, 306. U.S. Foreign Policy, 311. 19 Karl P. Mueller, Jasen J. Castillo, Forrest E. Morgan, Negeen Pegahi, and Brian Rosen, Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in U.S. National Security Policy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), 129. 20 Hook, U.S. Foreign Policy, 306. 18 Hook,

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nuclear dominance.21 In addition to his military buildup he increased anti-Soviet rhetoric, giving birth to the term “Evil Empire.” As Reagan continued his military buildup, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger recognized the need to outline criteria for U.S. military involvement and prescribed how the United States would avoid hot wars while it was still involved with the Soviets in the Cold War. The Weinberger Doctrine stipulated any future U.S. intervention must be thoroughly planned, to include contingency planning, before any offensive military action was undertaken.22 The intent of the Weinberger Doctrine was restraint in order to avoid mission creep. Despite Weinberger’s strength and influence, Reagan showed deference to the Department of State and relied heavily on his two Secretaries of State, Alexander Haig and his successor, George Shultz. In the Middle East, the White House deferred to the State Department because it was preoccupied with its domestic agenda.23 The administration continued to focus policy decisions toward its confrontation with the Soviet Union. In a turn of events, Mikhail Gorbachev became the new Soviet leader and realized the weak Soviet economy could not survive without significant restructuring. Gorbachev also envisioned a new relationship with the West, and this required a new approach. The restructuring of the Soviet economy—perestroika—combined with political liberalization—glasnost— would be the means to shift money away from the military and inject it into the economy.24 Prior to Reagan assuming office, Israeli Prime Minister Begin sent a message to President Carter in July 1980, requesting the United States “do everything possible to stop further enriched uranium shipments to Iraq before it was too late.” In December, three weeks after Reagan was elected, Secretary of State Pickering authorized the U.S. Ambassador to Israel to meet with Begin. Begin disclosed the Israeli military was pressuring him to launch a military strike against Iraq. The U.S. Ambassador stated the incoming Reagan administration must be briefed on the issue, however, it appears his reports to the Reagan transition team were either lost or ignored. Reagan’s Secretary of State Haig was viewed with skepticism by career State Department employees, and thus communication between the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv and main State were sparse. Alexandra Evans stated communication between the United States and Israeli lagged, so Begin is reported to have likely “viewed Washington’s silence as implied consent.”25 The apparent communication breakdown within the U.S. interagency and the U.S. Embassy in Israel contributed to poor communication between Washington and Tel Aviv. The Israeli Air Force attacked and destroyed Iraq’s Osirak reactor on June 7, 1981. 21 Lou

Cannon, “Ronald Reagan: Foreign Affairs,” University of Virginia: Miller Center, accessed April 4, 2020, https://millercenter.org/president/reagan/foreign-affairs. 22 Weinberger, “The Uses of Military Power,” 6. 23 Office of the Historian, “Reagan’s Foreign Policy,” Department of State, accessed April 4, 2020, https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/reaganforeignpolicy. 24 Lou Cannon, “Ronald Reagan: Foreign Affairs,” University of Virginia: Miller Center, accessed April 4, 2020, https://millercenter.org/president/reagan/foreign-affairs. 25 Alexandra Evans, “A Lesson From the 1981 Raid on Osirak,” Wilson Center, July 10, 2017, accessed April 5, 2020, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/lesson-the-1981-raid-osirak.

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In assessing the Carter and Reagan administrations’ responses to Prime Minister Begin’s request, neither administration appeared willing to strike the Iraqi reactor nor to consent to the Israelis. This illustrates additional factors contributed to their decisions to remain non-committal to the Israeli requests, and demonstrates a weakness in Kroenig’s power-based theory. For Kroenig, the United States should have felt threatened by Iraq’s nuclear reactor because a nuclear Iraq could curtail the United States’ ability to project power over it. The lack of U.S. response implies Washington likely did not perceive the Osirak reactor as a high threat and therefore chose not to attack it. In an article for The Christian Science Monitor, Christa Case Bryant argues Israel’s attack on Osirak put President Reagan in a difficult position because he supported Israel, but also supported Iraq in its war against Iran. Israel’s use of U.S.built aircraft to destroy Iraq’s reactor caused Reagan to lose face with Iraq. Israeli Ambassador Michael Oren concluded, to demonstrate to Iraq that the United States did not sanction this attack, Reagan delayed delivering additional fighter aircraft to Israel and allowed UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick to consult with her Iraqi counterpart to draft a UN Security Council condemnation of the raid.26

The Powell Doctrine One of the most important concepts of U.S. military strategy was presented by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin L. Powell, prior to the first Gulf War in 1990. Similar to the Weinberger Doctrine, the Powell Doctrine outlined eight conditions that should be met before committing U.S. troops to combat.27 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Vital national interests at stake? Clear obtainable objective? Costs and risks analyzed fully and frankly? Other nonviolent policy options exhausted? Plausible exit strategy to avoid entanglement? Have the consequences been fully considered? Support from the American people? Genuine and broad international support?

The Weinberger and Powell Doctrines are critical to understanding the U.S. predisposition to exercising restraint in its use of force to respond to international crises. The Weinberger Doctrine sought to avoid U.S. mission creep into U.S.–Soviet proxy wars, particularly in Central America. The Powell Doctrine was influenced by General 26 Christa Case Bryant, “Obama-Netanyahu Tensions: Not as Bad as 5 Other US-Israel Low Points,” The Christian Science Monitor, September 27, 2012, accessed May 8, 2020, https://www.csmoni tor.com/World/Middle-East/2012/0927/Obama-Netanyahu-tensions-Not-as-bad-as-5-other-US-Isr ael-low-points/1981-Israeli-strike-on-Osirak-nuclear-reactor-in-Iraq. 27 Stephen M. Walt, “Applying the 8 Questions of the Powell Doctrine to Syria,” Foreign Policy, September 3, 2013, accessed September 30, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/09/ 03/applying_the_powell_doctrine_to_syria#sthash.vkACW7sk.dpbs.

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Powell’s service in Vietnam and his desire to prevent U.S. troops from entering combat without clear objectives, the necessary forces to win, and a clear exit strategy. These doctrines encouraged U.S. policymakers to consider all viable options before committing U.S. forces to combat.28

The Bush Administration The Bush administration’s 2004 National Military Strategy heralded the U.S. responses to the 9/11 attacks and addressed four strategic objectives: secure the United States from direct attack; secure strategic access and maintain global freedom of action; establish security conditions conducive to a favorable international order; and strengthen alliances and partnerships to contend with common challenges.29 The NMS stressed the administration’s concerns with threats emanating from terrorist organization and rogue states, “The threats posed by terrorist groups and rogue states, especially those that gain access to WMD/E, mandate an active defense-in-depth. Achieving this objective requires actions to counter threats overseas and close to their source.”30 The strategy outlines securing the United States from attack as the first of its four strategic objectives. The Bush administration did not publish its National Military Strategy until a year after it invaded Iraq; however, many tenets of the NMS contributed to the decision to go to war. In the run-up to the war, President Bush stressed the danger of the potential nexus between state sponsors of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorist organizations. The 2004 NMS states, “Military forces can no longer focus solely on responding to aggression. The potentially horrific consequences of an attack against the United States demand action to secure the Nation from direct attack by eliminating certain threats before they strike.”31 The threat President George W. Bush perceived emanating from Iraq was high, and his military strategy later supported the use of force against perceived threats, like Iraq. Similar to its National Security Strategy, the Bush administration’s NMS advocated preventive strikes to eliminate threats before they could materialize. The counter-weapons of mass destruction rationale Bush used for the preventive war in Iraq never materialized, and this contributed to his apprehensive approach to further preventive strikes against suspected nuclear facilities.

28 Gates,

Duty, 175.

29 Richard B. Myers, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy for

Today, a Vision for Tomorrow (2004), 9. 30 Myers, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 9. 31 Myers, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 13.

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In 2007, Israel approached President Bush with intelligence on Syria’s nuclear reactor and requested the U.S. launch a preventive attack to destroy the facility. President Bush declined to attack, and instead voiced his preference for coercive diplomacy backed by the threat of force.32 This selection betrays a weakness in Kroenig’s argument that power projecting states are highly affected by nuclear proliferation because the United States should have felt threatened by Syria’s nuclear ambitions since it would curtail the United States ability to project power over Syria. This was not the case, since President Bush did not perceive the reactor to be a significant enough threat to the United States to attack it. In his book, Decision Points, Bush articulated U.S. intelligence could not confirm the location of a Syrian plutonium processing facility and as a result, there was low confidence of a Syrian nuclear program.33 Since U.S. intelligence could not confirm a nuclear program, it is implied that it was perceived to be a low threat. Additionally, Bush was dealing with building fallout from his invasion of Iraq and the absence of weapons of mass destruction. These two factors likely contributed to Bush’s decision to not attack Syria.

The Obama Administration The Obama administration’s 2011 National Military Strategy addressed demographic trends, prosperity and security, weapons of mass destruction, global commons and globally connected domains, and non-state actors, and heralded the use of all instruments of U.S. national power, not just military force. The strategy detailed the administration’s focus on nuclear proliferation and identified the potential nexus between rogue states, terrorist groups, and weapons of mass destruction as national security concerns, “The intersection between states, state-sponsored, and non-state adversaries is most dangerous in the area of WMD proliferation and nuclear terrorism.” Expanding its proliferation concerns, the strategy discussed the dangers North Korea’s nuclear program poses for regional stability and international nonproliferation efforts. It singled out Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and its support to regional terrorist groups as the most significant threats to regional stability, and expresses the belief Iran’s nuclear program could lead to a regional nuclear cascade and increase the likelihood of war, as other regional states seek nuclear parity to balance against an Iranian nuclear arsenal.34 The strategy also listed its concerns that additional proliferation could increase miscalculation or a non-state actor acquiring a nuclear weapon.35 To address these WMD concerns the administration envisioned working with international institutions to counter WMD, “We will counter WMD proliferation as it presents a grave and common threat to our Nation and others. 32 Bush,

Decision Points, 421. Decision Points, 421. 34 Michael G. Mullen, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: Redefining America’s Military Leadership (2011), 11. 35 Mullen, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 3. 33 Bush,

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Working through institutions, alliances and coalitions, we will dismantle proliferation networks… We will help allies and partners to develop WMD detection and elimination capabilities to protect their own populations.”36 The Obama administration’s diplomatic approach to Iran’s nuclear program was predictable because President Obama campaigned on his opposition to the Iraq War and boosting a domestic agenda. Throughout his presidency, he sought to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq and discussed withdrawing from Afghanistan. The Obama grand strategy heralded international institutions and the use of diplomacy to address issues, whenever possible. The administration’s pursuit of a negotiated deal to halt Iran’s nuclear program matched with President Obama’s preference for diplomacy, and his willingness to meet and negotiate with U.S. adversaries.

Power Projection Capability—Airpower A country’s power projection capability largely determines its method of responding to an actual or a perceived threat. For Kroenig, the ability to conduct a ground war inside a rival state defines power projection. For this study, power projection is the ability to conduct offensive air strikes in the rival country that are sufficient to destroy or seriously degrade the intended target. From a counterproliferation perspective, both ground and special operations forces, and other civilian authorities, are required to seize and secure nuclear material and components to prevent non-secured nuclear material, or a loose nuclear weapon, from falling into the hands of non-state actors because airpower is not likely to destroy everything. Even still, airpower is required to support these ground-based operations. The U.S. military’s Joint Publication 3–3, Joint Air Operations defines Control of the Air as the prerequisite to success for operations and campaigns because it “prevents enemy air and missile threats from effectively interfering with operations” of friendly forces, allowing them freedom of action and movement.37 Airpower’s ability to disrupt enemy ground troops and logistics supply lines has been evident since World War II’s bombing campaigns against Dresden, Tokyo, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki. More recently, airpower was used effectively by: (1) Israel to fly 1500 miles to strike the Palestine Liberation Organization headquarters in Tunisia in 1985, (2) the United States to decimate retreating Iraqi forces along the infamous “highway of death” during the first Gulf War, (3) U.S. B-2 Spirit bombers to fly multiple 30-hour round trip missions from Whiteman AFB, Missouri to bomb targets in Yugoslavia during Operation Allied Force, (4) U.S. B-52 bombers to bomb Taliban positions in Afghanistan in 2001, (5) U.S. forces to wreak havoc during the “shock and awe” campaign in the initial stages of the 2003 Iraq War, (6) the Israeli Air Force to prevent the transfer of advanced weaponry during Israeli interdictions 36 Mullen,

The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 7. of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Air Operations,” Joint Publication 3–30 (July 25, 2019), I–1.

37 Chairman

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of weapons bound for Hezbollah and other Iran-backed proxies inside Lebanon and Syria, (7) Russia to turn the tide of the Syrian Civil War through attacks against anti-Assad forces, and (8) the United States to dislodge and decimate the Islamic State inside Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. Airpower’s significance lies in its ability to exploit and shape the battlespace by striking targets deep inside enemy territory without mass mobilization or warning. This capability allows states with a robust offensive air capability to project power without the need to conduct significant ground operations, thereby minimizing the casualty risk to the attacking country. The NATO Joint Air Power Strategy argues the core attributes of air power are speed, reach, and height, and these attributes provide a state with a high degree of flexibility and the most responsive defense option. Speed enables air power to exploit time and control the tempo of the fight. Reach allows air power to employ its capabilities deep into enemy territory. Height allows for exploitation from an “unparalleled vantage point.”38 The combat-proven capability of the air components of the United States Air Force (USAF), United States Navy (USN), United States Marine Corps (USMC), United States Army (USA), and the Israeli Air Force (IAF) to impose their will on enemy states using coercive airpower illustrates the effectiveness of airpower as a counterproliferation tool. The United States is the only state with the global reach to project airpower over nearly every nation in the world. Israel’s ability to project regional airpower allows it to attack neighboring states and destroy emerging threats at will; therefore, this study defines Israel as a power-projecting state within the Middle East region. There will be increasing challenges to airpower, as more air defense systems and advance anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) technology is proliferated around the world. In their study, “An Air Force Strategic Vision for 2020–2030,” John Shaud and Adam Lowther discuss the capabilities the U.S. Air Force will need by 2030, and argue the most critical capability the Air Force will provide combatant commanders and the nation is power projection. For the authors, the increasing proliferation of advanced anti-access and area denial systems will make it increasingly difficult to establish bases within striking distance of adversaries, so the Air Force will increasingly rely on long-range power projection instruments.39 In the interim, conventional power projection against peer or near-peer competitors will continue to shape future Air Force requirements, and they expect the U.S. Air Force to be able to meet power projection requirements for the next two decades if it takes four actions: (1) fuse air, space, and cyber capabilities into existing platforms, (2) continue to refine a flexible power projection capability, (3) develop unmanned platforms that are enhanced by artificial intelligence, and (4) fuse offensive and defensive cyber capabilities into air and space platforms.40 38 North

Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO’s Joint Air Power Strategy,” NATO, June 26, 2018, accessed April 12, 2020, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_06/ 20180626_20180626-joint-air-power-strategy.pdf. 39 John A. Shaud and Adam B. Lowther, “An Air Force Strategic Vision for 2020–2030,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Spring 2011): 9. 40 Shaud and Lowther, “An Air Force Strategic Vision for 2020–2030,” 11.

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There are three notable air defense systems that deserve mentioning because of their potential ability to challenge United States and Israeli air dominance: the Russian-built S-300P (SA-10 Grumble), S-300 V (SA-23A Gladiator/SA-23B Giant) and the S-400 Triumf (SA-21 Growler). The S-300 is a Russian-built mobile surfaceto-air missile (SAM) system capable of engaging aircraft, unmanned aerial systems (UAS), cruise missile, and ballistic missile defense capability. The S-300P is an air defense-only system, while the S-300 V has an anti-ballistic missile capability. The S-300V is an upgraded system that Russia deployed to Syria and the Crimea. Of the case study countries, Iran and Syria possess the S-300P system, and Russian state media reported the S-300V was sold to Iran in October 2016, along with the S-300P models after a 2007 contract was renegotiated.41 The S-400 Triumf is a more effective upgrade to the earlier S-200 and S-300 series models, with capabilities comparable to the U.S. Patriot system.42 China, India, and Turkey have placed orders for the system. Washington was opposed to Ankara’s $2.5 billion purchase of the S-400, and subsequently removed Turkey from the F-35 Lightning II program. The White House weighed in on the purchase and stated, “[The] F-35 cannot coexist with a Russian intelligence collection platform that will be used to learn about its advanced capabilities.” There are concerns with having the S-400 system in close proximity to America’s most advance attack aircraft because it could potentially aid Russia in developing capabilities to better detect U.S. aircraft and determine the aircraft’s vulnerabilities.43 The S-400 capabilities pose a serious challenge to attacking aircraft because it is able to engage targets at ranges between 40 km and 400 km, and intercept targets flying as low as 5 meters off the ground.44 China and India have purchased the system, and the Saudis and Qataris also expressed interest. Russia rejected an Iranian request to purchase the system due to concerns the sale would increase regional tensions, and potentially damage Russian relations with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United States.45 The next section discusses the airpower capabilities of the United States and Israel. This discussion illuminates how the United States and Israel have used airpower to meet their national security objectives. Table 5.1 details a qualitative comparison of 41 Missile

Defense Project, “S-300,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 4, 2017, last modified July 13, 2018, accessed May 8, 2020, https://missilethreat.csis.org/def sys/s-300/. 42 Missile Defense Project, “S-400 Triumf,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 4, 2017, last modified July 15, 2018, accessed May 8, 2020, https://missilethreat.csis. org/defsys/s-400-triumf/. 43 Siobhan O’Grady, “What is the Russian S-400 Air Defense System, and Why is the U.S. Upset Turkey Bought It,” The Washington Post, July 17, 2019, accessed May 9, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/07/12/what-is-russian-s-air-defense-systemwhy-is-us-upset-turkey-bought-it/. 44 Stephen Bryen, “Why Russia’s S-400 Anti-Air System is Deadlier Than You Think,” The National Interest, November 9, 2019, accessed May 9, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-rus sias-s-400-anti-air-system-deadlier-you-think-94541. 45 Zainab Fattah and Ilya Arkhipov, “Russia Rejected Iran S-400 Missile Request Amid Gulf Tension,” Bloomberg, May 30, 2019, accessed May 9, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ articles/2019-05-30/russia-rejected-iran-s-400-missiles-request-amid-gulf-tension.

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the United States’ air forces and the Israeli Air Force to the air forces of the three target countries. This comparison illustrates the important components necessary to project power.

Israel—Power Projection Capability—Airpower The Israeli Air Force (IAF) enjoys unmatched regional air superiority because its F-15I Ra’am, F-16I Sufa, and F-35I Adir strike aircraft, air refueling, alleged clandestine foreign basing, and potential for Forward Air Refueling Points (FARPs) provide options to allow it to attack targets deep inside enemy territory without serious challenge. In an article for Foreign Policy, Mark Perry argues Israel gained access to strategically located airfields along Iran’s northern border, in neighboring Azerbaijan.46 In 2020, Israel requested the United States provide two KC-46A tanker aircraft earmarked for the U.S. Air Force in 2021, and asked the U.S. Air Force to take the two tanker aircraft to be given to Israel in 2023. The KC-46A aircraft will replace Israel’s aging Boeing 707 tanker aircraft that are required for long-range missions.47 Robert Farley argues the IAF’s ability to secure the battlefield and protect the civilian populace from an enemy attack enables the Israelis to fight at a huge advantage, while also demonstrating strategic reach and the ability to attack distant targets.48 Anthony Cordesman argues Israel is able to maintain air superiority over adversaries like Syria because the Arab states’ most advanced aircraft have obsolescent avionics and cannot compete with similar Israeli aircraft on a one-on-one basis.49 These countries also maintain relatively outdated air defense and warning systems, which allows Israel unchallenged interdiction capability into their airspace. Israel is also advantaged because it maintains a qualitative military edge (QME) over the Arab states and Iran, and relies on U.S. weapons sales, financial assistance, security cooperation, defense policies, and laws to maintain this advantage. Israel is able to maintain its qualitative military advantage over its Arab rivals due to U.S. laws and agreements that guarantee the U.S. defense industry will not sell any Arab state a weapon system that will give it a qualitative or quantitative military advantage over Israel. In 2008, Congress passed legislation requiring any proposed U.S. weapons sale to “any country in the Middle East other than Israel” must include a notification 46 Mark Perry, “Israel’s Secret Staging Ground,” Foreign Policy, March 28, 2012, accessed July 4, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/03/28/israels-secret-staging-ground/. 47 Anna Ahronheim, “Israel Asks United States to ‘Swap’ Two of their KC46 Tankers,” The Jerusalem Post, July 8, 2020, accessed July 9, 2020, https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/israelasks-united-states-to-swap-two-of-their-kc46-tankers-634290. 48 Robert Farley, “Why the Arab World Fears Israel’s Airforce,” The National Interest, January 23, 2020, accessed May 17, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/print/blog/buzz/why-arab-world-fears-isr aels-airforce-116186. 49 Anthony H. Cordesman and Aram Nerguizian, “The Arab-Israeli Military Balance: Conventional Realities and Asymmetric Challenges,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (June 29, 2010): 23, accessed May 16, 2013, http://csis.org/files/publication/100629_Arab-IsraeliMilBal.pdf.

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to Congress with a “determination that the sale or export of such would not adversely affect Israel’s qualitative military edge over military threats to Israel.”50 Andrew J. Shapiro, Assistant Secretary, Political-Military Affairs at the U.S. Department of State emphasized the U.S. commitment to Israel’s qualitative military edge in 2010. For decades, the cornerstone of our security commitment to Israel has been an assurance that the United States would help Israel uphold its qualitative military edge – a commitment that was written into law in 2008. Israel’s QME is its ability to counter and defeat credible military threats from any individual state, coalition of states, or non-state actor, while sustaining minimal damages or casualties… Each and every security assistance request from the Israeli Government is evaluated in light of our policy to uphold Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge. At the same time, QME considerations extend to our decisions on defense cooperation with all other governments in the region. This means that as a matter of policy, we will not proceed with any release of military equipment or services that may pose a risk to allies or contribute to regional insecurity in the Middle East.51

Superior weapons and training have allowed Israel to sustain an unmatched advantage over its adversaries. The Israeli Air Force demonstrated the effectiveness of its airpower in the 1967 Six-Day War and in the Bekaa Valley air campaign during the 1982 Lebanon War. In the Six-Day War, Israel launched successful preemptive airstrikes against the air forces of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq. These surprise attacks destroyed the Arab air forces’ offensive counterair (OCA) capabilities, and allowed the Israeli Air Force to project power over the Arab states by gaining air superiority, while also allowing the IAF to provide close air support (CAS) to Israeli ground forces. In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon to engage Palestine Liberation Organization forces, and to create a 25-mile buffer between Israel and PLO forces inside Lebanon. As part of this campaign, the IAF demonstrated its air dominance by destroying Syrian SAM batteries in the Bekaa Valley, precipitating major air-to-air battles between the Israeli and Syrian air forces. Over the course of a week, the Israeli Air Force shot down 86 Syrian fighters without the loss of a single IAF plane. In both the Six-Day War and the First Lebanon War, Israel demonstrated its unrivaled ability to project power over its neighbors by using technological advances and the basic principles of air warfare to outfight its enemies. In October 1985, Israeli Air Force F-16s flew 1500 miles to bomb the PLO headquarters in Tunis, Tunisia, killing 30–50 people. Israel stated the strike was in retaliation for the PLO commando unit Force 17 slaying three Israelis in Larnaca, Cyprus, an accusation denied by PLO officials. Prior to the attack, Yasser Arafat had moved the PLO headquarters to Tunisia after the PLO evacuated Beirut following Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982.52 In 2006, the Israeli Air Force conducted an air-based war against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. Despite its overwhelming technological advantages, the Israelis 50 Jim Zanotti, “Israel: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service (November 1, 2013): 24. 51 Andrew J. Shapiro, “The Obama Administration’s Approach to U.S.-Israel Security Cooperation: Preserving Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge,” U.S. Department of State, July 16, 2010, accessed December 26, 2013, http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/144753.htm. 52 Frank J. Prial, “Israeli Planes Attack P.L.O. In Tunis, Killing at Least 30; Raid ‘Legitimate,’ U.S. Says,” The New York Times, October 2, 1985, accessed July 3, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/1985/ 10/02/world/israeli-planes-attack-plo-in-tunis-killing-at-least-30-raid-legitimate-us-says.html.

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failed to achieve a clear and concise victory, and the subsequent Winograd Commission revealed poor decision-making, lack of strategic thinking, and inadequacies in preparedness and planning hindered the Israeli air war effort.53 The commission’s report illustrated that just as American political constraints hindered the effectiveness of U.S. airpower during the Vietnam War, political constraints affected the Israeli Air Force’s effectiveness against Hezbollah during the Second Lebanon War. Notwithstanding the controversy surrounding the 2006 war, the Israeli Air Force has a history of success in conducting both preemptive and preventive strikes against its adversaries. Israel has also used airpower as a counterproliferation instrument against the Iraqi and Syrian nuclear programs, against Iranian weapons transfers to Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria, as well as to conduct targeted killings of its adversaries. These successful uses of airpower will continue to bolster Israel’s confidence that unilateral actions can be used to achieve its national security objectives, particularly when adversaries do not respond with violence against Israel after these attacks.

The United States—Power Projection Capability—Airpower The United States enjoys unmatched global air superiority and power projection capability, and continues this dominance by deploying its naval carrier battle groups and employing its fifth generation aircraft, the F-22 Raptor and the F-35 Lightning II.54 The United States is able to project power globally through the range of its naval power and airpower, backed by its immense logistics and forcible entry—airborne and amphibious—capabilities. The U.S. dominance is illustrated in three central components: (1) Range of weapons systems (bombers, air combat aircraft, strike aircraft, air refueling, and naval vessels), (2) alliances and land-based forward basing, and (3) mobile basing via aircraft carriers and forward air refueling points. The United States’ long-range strike capability was displayed during the 1986 raid on Libya, called Operation El Dorado Canyon, in which 24 U.S. Air Force F-111s and five EF-111s flew 3500 miles from their bases in the United Kingdom, and linked up with 14 A-6E strike aircraft, and 12 F/18 and A-7 strike support aircraft from the USS Coral Sea and the USS America, to strike targets in Benghazi and Tripoli. One F-111 was shot down and both aircrew members were declared killed in action (KIA).55

53 Raphael Cohen-Almagor and Sharon Haleva-Amir, “The Israel-Hezbollah War and the Winograd

Committee,” Journal of Parliamentary and Political Law, 37, accessed April 5, 2020, http://cds. haifa.ac.il/articles/WinoReport_2ndLebanonWar.pdf. 54 Robbin F. Laird and Edward T. Timperlake, “The F-35 and the Future of Power Projection,” Joint Forces Quarterly, issue 66, (3rd Quarter 2012): 86. 55 Gregory Ball, “1986—Operation El Dorado Canyon,” Air Force Historical Support Division, September 18, 2012, accessed July 3, 2020, https://www.afhistory.af.mil/FAQs/Fact-Sheets/Article/ 458950/operation-el-dorado-canyon/.

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The 1991 Gulf War represented a military technical revolution that forever altered the nature of warfare.56 Prior to the Gulf War and the wide-scale employment of precision guided munitions (PGMs), air operations had largely supported ground forces and were used to conduct strategic bombing of industrial complexes. During the war, the U.S. military quickly gained air superiority over Iraqi air space, and cameramounted PGMs provided firsthand accounts of American air dominance and inaugurated real-time televised warfare—the CNN effect. The Gulf War demonstrated a nation could achieve its political goals through airpower projection.57 In 1999, the United States and NATO used airpower during Operation Allied Force to degrade and destroy the military and security structure that Yugoslavia and its President Slobodan Milosevic used to conduct the genocide of Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian population.58 The U.S. later used airpower to target Taliban positions during the war in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom). The United States and NATO also used airpower to support the overthrow of Libyan leader, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi after he relinquished his WMD programs and faced an insurgency during the Arab Spring. In 2003, Washington’s shock and awe campaign against Iraqi targets destroyed Iraq’s military, however, the lack of weapons of mass destruction called into question the U.S. decision to subsequently invade Iraq. The preventive war in Iraq will have future ramifications for the United States’ use of force to halt suspected nuclear proliferation because of the failure to find weapons of mass destruction despite the Bush administration’s insistence they existed. The U.S. hesitance to authorize another preventive attack against Syria in 2007 and Iran in 2015 is a second and third order effect of the flawed U.S. counterproliferation efforts in Iraq. More recently, the United States demonstrated the efficacy of airpower through the increased use of drones as a counterterrorism instrument. The Obama administration dramatically increased the use of drones to strike high value targets (HVTs) and other suspected terrorists around the globe, to include members of al Qaeda, al Shabaab, and ISIS, and their affiliates. The United States also used airpower to degrade Taliban forces in Afghanistan. The United States and Israel’s modern air forces allow them to maintain air superiority over the Arab states and Iran (Table 5.1).59 Israel’s Arab rivals are within logistical reach of its air force; however, Israel’s ability to project sustained airpower over Iran is challenged due to its distance from Israel. Although the distance between Israel and Iran could hinder Israel’s ability to conduct sustained air combat operations over Iran, the distance would not necessarily preclude an attack against specific nuclear facilities, particularly if such an attack originated from a clandestine base in a host country near Iran. In the event of an attack, Iran has an anti-access and area denial 56 Eliot

A. Cohen, “The Mystique of U.S. Air Power,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 1994), accessed August 14, 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/49442/eliot-a-cohen/the-mys tique-of-us-air-power. 57 Cohen, “The Mystique of U.S. Air Power.” 58 William S. Cohen, “Operation Allied Force,” Department of Defense, last modified June 21, 1999, accessed December 22, 2013, http://www.defense.gov/specials/kosovo/. 59 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2009: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009), 39.

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Table 5.1 Air Combat Capability 4th 5th Refuel & ISR and Generation Generation AEW&C UAVs Aircraft Aircraft

Air Defense

MNX & Joint Logistics Doctrine

UNITED STATES

F-15C/D F-15E F-16C F-16D F/A-18EF

F-22A F-35

KC-10A KC-135 E-3B E-3C E-4B

Satellites THAAD Robust MQ-1 HiMARS MQ-9 PAC-3 RQ-4A RQ-170

Yes

ISRAEL

F-15A F-15B F-15C F-15D F-15I F-16A F-16B F-16C/D F-16I

F-35

KC-130H Satellites Arrow RC-12D Iron B-707 Dome RQ-5A Searcher I/II MALE

Robust

Yes

IRAQ (1981) N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Poor

No

IRAQ (2003) N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Poor

No

SYRIA (2007)

MiG-29A Su-24

N/A

N/A

N/A

S-200 S-30060

Poor

No

IRAN (2015)

F-14A MiG-29A MiG-29B

N/A

N/A

Mohajer S-300 II,III, IV RF-4E

Poor

Unknown

(A2/AD) capability, along with the Russian-made S-300 air defense system. It is conceivable Israel could conduct limited airstrikes against select Iranian nuclear targets to achieve its national security objectives. Israel could extend the range of its attack aircraft through aerial refueling or it could also employ use of mobile forward arming and refueling points (FARP) to reach Iranian territory. The U.S. Air Force defines FARP as “fuel’s [sic] operations used to hot refuel aircraft in areas where fuel is otherwise not available. Fuel is transferred from a source aircraft’s (C-130, C-17, or C-5) internal tanks to receiver aircraft.”61 This is reminiscent of the United States attempted rendezvous point at Desert One inside Iran, where rescue helicopters were to refuel using fuel bladders flown inside C-130 aircraft. Employing the FARP concept, Israeli forces could land at an existing airfield or in a remote desert location to increase the range and tempo of attack aircraft operations. Under this construct,

60 Seth J. Frantzman, “Syrian Air Defense Missiles: Everything You Need to Know,” The Jerusalem

Post, December 26, 208, accessed May 30, 2020, https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Syrian-airdefense-missiles-Everything-you-need-to-know-575495. 61 Robert D. Davis, “Forward Arming and Refueling Points for Fighter Aircraft: Power Projection in an Antiaccess Environment,” Air & Space Power Journal (September/October 2014): 10.

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FARP includes rearming, refueling, and swapping pilots without the use of airfield infrastructure, within a span of 90–120 minutes.62 Concurrently, Israel’s Arab adversaries and Iran lack a robust air component, as their air forces are composed primarily of outdated United States, Eastern Bloc, and Chinese hardware, with subpar avionics. Consequently, the Arab states and Iran are unable to challenge United States and Israeli air dominance over their territory, thus giving the two powers unhindered power projection capability. Additionally, the Arab states traditionally procure aircraft and ground systems from multiple countries, which presents interoperability issues and prevents development of a concept of operations (CONOPS) battle plan that would allow these countries to integrate their aircraft with their air defense systems for a more robust defense of their airspace. As a result, the countries have the potential to suffer from coverage gaps due to the inability of their militaries to manage the battlespace by linking early warning systems with surface-to-air missile systems, air-to-air systems, and air-to-ground targeting systems. Iran is largely unable to update its military equipment due to crippling U.S. sanctions, which prevent Tehran from purchasing modern weapon systems on the global market. These prohibitions include enforcing current sanctions that preclude U.S. and non-U.S. companies from conducting business with specific entities based in Iran, North Korea, and Russia under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) (Public Law 115-44). As a result, Iran has developed a robust domestic defense industry that includes the Bavar-373 longrange air defense system.63 The Americans and Israelis are likely able to exploit these vulnerabilities with advanced air platforms combined with superior ISR capabilities, which provide them the capacity to project power over the target countries. When discussing potential U.S. or Israeli preventive attacks against proliferating states, the literature does not adequately address the response of the attacked state. In the two Iraq cases, Saddam doubled-down on his nuclear program after the attack on Osirak in 1981, and was overthrown during the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. In the Syria case, Bashar al-Assad downplayed the attack and stated the nuclear reactor was a normal building. The unknown for the Iran case is how it will respond. In the wake of the Soleimani and Fakhrizadeh killings, Iran’s responses were measured. It is unknown how the Iranians will respond to widespread attacks against their nuclear infrastructure, and if such an attack will draw in the United States and its regional partners as part of a much larger war, particularly if Iran decides measured responses are no longer possible because their redline has been crossed. The study compares each country’s ability to project airpower by listing important components of their power projecting capability (Table 5.1). For a state to project power over distant countries, it is essential that it possesses advanced and highly maneuverable attack and strike aircraft—fourth and fifth generation (Table 5.2).64

62 Davis,

“Forward Arming and Refueling Points for Fighter Aircraft,” 6. Tait, “Iran Displays Domestically Built Mobile Missile Defense System,” Reuters, August 22, 2019, accessed May 30, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-iran-missiles-idU SKCN1VC0FN.

63 Paul

The United States …

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Table 5.2 Fighter Generations Unique characteristics

Aircraft example

Generation 1

Jet propulsion

F-80, German Me 262

Generation 2

Swept wings; range-only radar; infrared missiles

F-86, MiG-15

Generation 3

Supersonic speed; pulse radar; able to shoot at targets beyond visual range

F-105; F-4; MiG-17; MiG-21

Generation 4

Pulse-Doppler radar; high F-14, F-15, F-16, Mirage 2000, maneuverability; look-down, shoot MiG-29 down missiles

Generation 4+

High agility; sensor fusion; reduced signatures

Eurofighter Typhoon, Su-30, F-16, F/A-18, Rafale

Generation 4++

Active electronically scanned arrays; continued reduced signatures or some “active” (waveform canceling) stealth; some super cruise

Su-35, F-15SE

Generation 5

All-aspect stealth with internal weapons, extreme agility, full-sensor fusion, integrated avionics, some or full super cruise

F-22, F-35

Potential Generation 6 Extreme stealth; efficient in all TBD flight regimes (subsonic to multi-Mach); possible “morphing” capability; smart skins; highly networked; extremely sensitive sensors; optionally manned; directed energy weapons

The air force should also possess an air refueling and airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) capability. An air refueling capability allows aircraft to fly to and from targets without having to land, thereby extending the combat radius of a state’s airpower projection capability. Airborne early warning and control aircraft allow an air force to detect aircraft at increased distances and vector friendly aircraft to the enemy aircraft, and coordinate airstrikes against ground targets. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities allow a state to gather intelligence, conduct long-term surveillance of enemy positions and key infrastructure, as well as to conduct short duration reconnaissance of targets. An ISR platform can be spacebased, manned aircraft, or unmanned aerial systems (UAS), i.e., drones. An ISR capability provides a military with the ability to conduct a battle damage assessment

64 John

A. Tirpak, “The Sixth Generation Fighter,” Air Force Magazine, October 2009, accessed December 6, 2013, http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2009/October%202009/ 1009fighter.aspx.

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(BDA) of previous airstrikes, which allows it to re-strike targets that were not sufficiently destroyed. A robust maintenance and logistics capability allows an air force to repair, refuel, and rearm strike aircraft, as well as swap out pilots. The logistics piece provides the ability to coordinate airstrikes by ensuring fuel, spare parts, and ordnance are supplied to the strike aircraft. Joint doctrine is a critical component of military operations because it provides a state’s military the capability to coordinate operations across military services. The need for a robust U.S. joint doctrine to lessen inter-service rivalry became evident in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, which led to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and in the wake of the failed U.S. embassy hostage rescue at the Desert One rendezvous site in Iran. In his study, “The Pentagon’s Wasting Assets,” Andrew Krepinevich argues America’s military global dominance and its ability to project hard power are eroding and becoming obsolete because the diffusion of advanced military technologies, and the rise of competitor states like China and hostile states like Iran will make it prohibitively expensive in blood and treasure for the United States to protect its interests around the world. Krepinevich argues the United States must adapt by developing a new strategic framework to exploit new areas of advantage, and responding to adversarial advances in technology, challenges posed by radical Islamist groups, and nuclear proliferation.65 Christian Brose argues the proliferation of longer-range, and more accurate and lethal weapons is disrupting the ability of U.S. forces to operate. He notes China’s increased capabilities make it increasingly difficult for U.S. air and maritime forces to operate in East Asia, and, to a lesser degree, Russia presents a challenge to U.S. air and ground forces in Europe. Brose also notes Iran presents a challenge in the Middle East due to its precision weapons, which it is also transferring to its regional proxies. Brose notes in particular, Iran’s shooting down of a $220 million U.S. RQ-4 Global Hawk surveillance drone with a surface-to-air missile in June 2019, as an example of Iran’s increasingly capable weapons that will challenge U.S. regional dominance.66 Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford voiced his concern with the United States falling behind technologically when he stated, “In just a few years, if we do not change our trajectory, we will lose our qualitative and quantitative competitive advantage.”67 Andrew Bacevich challenges Krepinevich’s assumption that global dominance is possible and that global power projection by the United States is “the most effective way of ensuring international peace and stability.” For Bacevich, force is an uncertain instrument and the United States’ reliance on force has produced many problems because decisive outcomes are rare, costs often exceed expectations, and unintended consequences are very common. To illustrate his point, Bacevich lists the U.S. experiences in Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the September 11th attacks as 65 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “The Pentagon’s Wasting Assets: The Eroding Foundations of Amer-

ican Power,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2009, accessed May 28, 2020, https://www.foreignaf fairs.com/articles/united-states/2009-07-01/pentagons-wasting-assets. 66 Christian Brose, The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare (Hatchette Books, 2020), 172. 67 Brose, The Kill Chain, x.

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incidents where the United States’ overwhelming power did not produce the expected results.68 In the face of these challenges, the United States and Israel maintain the most dominant presence in the Middle East, though it is questionable how long this dominance will continue in its current form. Russia increased its presence in Syria to assist Bashar al-Assad during the Civil War, and is suspected of expanding its presence into Libya in 2020. Turkey purchased the Russian S-400 Triumf air defense system, and is suspected of testing it against U.S.-manufactured F-16 aircraft in November 2019, despite U.S. and NATO opposition.69 Iran also expanded its asymmetric capabilities in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen through security cooperation with its Shia partners in those countries, as a hedge against U.S. and Israeli conventional military superiority. Iran’s asymmetric capabilities allow it to hold United States and Israel at risk through their ability to respond across a spectrum of targets. Ali Alfoneh observes these “Shia foreign legions” are also a critical component of Iran’s strategy to fill power vacuums created by the U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. These militias allow Iran to expand its influence in the Levant (Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories), Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen, often under the pretext of fighting Sunni radicalism. In a November 2017 letter to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Major General Qassem Soleimani wrote, “As I am completing the operation liberating Abu Kamal [a Syrian town bordering Iraq], the last bastion of ISIS [the selfproclaimed Islamic State extremist group], I am declaring the end of this evil and cursed organization.”70 The Gulf States continue to purchase billions of dollars in advanced U.S.manufactured weapon systems, with the aim of deterring or possibly fighting Iran and its proxy forces. With the buildup of advanced weapons in the Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia, there is concern within some circles of the possible consequences of a change in power within Saudi Arabia and the rise of a ruling government that is not so friendly to the United States or Israel. This scenario occurred in pre-revolutionary Iran, when the United States sold the Shah two of its most advanced fighter aircraft at the time, the Vietnam-era F-4 Phantom and the F-14 Tomcat, which was made famous in the motion picture “Top Gun.” Though, Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge should assuage some fears of an aggregate Arab military capability threatening Israel or its regional interests, it is still a potential concern.

68 Andrew J. Bacevich, “The Limits of Power Projection,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2009, accessed May 28, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/americas/2009-09-01/lim its-power-projection. 69 Seth J. Franztman, “Russia Says Turkey Tested its S-40s on US F-16 Jets,” The Jerusalem Post, July 8, 2020, accessed July 8, 2020, https://www.jpost.com/international/russia-says-turkey-testedits-s-400s-on-us-f-16-jets-634278. 70 Ali Alfoneh, “Tehran’s Shia Foreign Legions,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 30, 2018, accessed July 12, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/01/30/tehran-sshia-foreign-legions-pub-75387.

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Summary This chapter discussed how a state’s military doctrine and power projection capabilities influence its responses to perceived threats. Israel has a policy of using force to attack threats due to its limited diplomatic influence, small geographic size and physical location, and strong military presence in decision-making positions. Israeli military doctrine dictates Israel must have the capability to deter any possible Arab or Iranian attack, and if deterrence fails the subsequent conflict must be short and decisive and transferred to Arab or Iranian territory to lessen the impact on Israeli infrastructure and its civilian population centers. This doctrine has given rise to a rapid offensive capability using airpower because of its high degree of mobility and ability to sustain continuous forward movement. This strategy has also contributed to the Israeli propensity to use force rather than coercive diplomacy or sanctions against perceived threats because Tel Aviv lacks the international influence to utilize either option. The United States guiding principle is civilian control of the military, and its military strategies are codified in documents, which include the National Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy, the Joint Publications, and the Combatant Command Campaign Plans. U.S. military doctrine has evolved over time, however, it has been consistently defined by the United States’ overwhelming power when addressing national security interests and challenges to its national security interests. Washington has traditionally used international institutions and sanctions as the initial step to coerce states to comply with rule-based agreements, and when these options fail, the United States has the military power to enforce its will. The study highlights how conventional power projection against peer or near-peer competitors, such as China and Russia, will continue to shape U.S. airpower requirements. The chapter also discussed the increasing challenges to airpower as more air defense systems, such as the Russian-manufactured S-400 Triumf, and advanced anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) technology are employed throughout the world. Lastly, the chapter illustrated how the past successes of U.S. and Israeli airpower justify airpower’s inclusion as a power projection capability, particularly as a means to strike against dispersed and hardened nuclear infrastructure targets. The next chapter seeks to balance the book’s discussion of threat perceptions by discussing the Arab and Iranian target states and potential reasons for their nuclear ambitions and pursuit of a nuclear weapon. To accomplish this, the study examines actions and statements by U.S. and Israeli leaders to determine if they contributed to the proliferating states’ perception of a need for increased security measures to ensure their survival against threats from a militarily superior adversary.

Chapter 6

The Middle East States and Threat Perceptions

Adversarial rhetoric has a cognitive influence on the power projecting state decision-makers’ threat perceptions and how they perceive the intent of the nonnuclear-weapon state’s proliferation ambitions. These adversaries take actions and exchange rhetoric, which can contribute to inflated threat perceptions, especially if the two countries have a prior history of conflict or if the rising state’s acquisition of a nuclear deterrent will allow it to challenge the existing regional power structure. This is of particular importance when a state is pursuing a nuclear weapon while simultaneously calling for the destruction of its rival, even though it is currently unable to do so with conventional weapons. When a state already in possession of nuclear weapons threatens a non-nuclear state with attack or regime change, it can create a parallel effect by heightening threat perceptions and may compel the non-nuclear state to seek a nuclear deterrent to stand against an existential threat. To this point, the research examined the threat perceptions of the power-projecting states to contextualize how their decision-makers perceive and interpret the proliferation efforts of weaker states. To balance this approach and provide a more robust understanding of the differential effects of threat perceptions, this chapter examines how the foreign policy decisions and rhetoric of powerful states contribute to the heightened threat perceptions of weaker states and influences their decision to pursue a nuclear weapon. This approach of understanding the perceptions and motivations of one’s adversary is similar to the framework undertaken by Michael Scheuer in his study, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America, in which he examines Osama bin Laden to understand his motivations, complexity, and determination to attack the West. Scheuer argued that in order to shape policy and actions to nullify the threat posed by al-Qaeda, we must first understand Osama bin Laden and the underlying conditions that propelled his movement and its ideology.1

1 Scheuer

(Anonymous), Through Our Enemies’ Eyes, 3.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 B. K. Chappell, State Responses to Nuclear Proliferation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59801-3_6

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Just as the Arab states and Iran articulate their grievances and advocate to halt what they perceive to be U.S. and Israeli aggressive foreign policy, Scheuer argued bin Laden told Western media of his motivations for attacking the West. Still, this information was placed into a bucket of analysis that largely focused on the “what and when” of an attack, but was not overly concerned with “why” he was attacking.2 To illustrate this point, Scheuer highlights an excerpt from an article written by British journalist Robert Fisk in 1998. The use of the word “terrorist” – where Arabs who murder innocents are always called “terrorists” whereas Israeli killers who slaughter 29 Palestinians in a Hebron Mosque or assassinate their prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, are called extremists – is only part of the problem. “Terrorist” is a word that avoids all meaning. The who and the how are of essential importance. But the “why” is usually something the West prefers to avoid. Not once yesterday [21 August 98, the day after U.S. cruise missile attacks on bin Laden-related targets in Afghanistan and Sudan] – not in a single press statement, press conference or interview – did a U.S. leader or diplomat explain why the enemies of America hate America. Why is bin Laden so angry with the United States? Why – just not who and how – but why did anyone commit the atrocities in East Africa [Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the near simultaneous bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, which killed 224 people on August 7, 1998]?3

To address the central issue of why weaker states choose to proliferate, this chapter examines the threat perceptions of the Non-Nuclear-Weapon State to determine if there is a linkage between their decisions to pursue a nuclear weapon and the NuclearWeapon State’s actions and foreign policy decisions. Debs and Monteiro argue a state will seek a nuclear deterrent if it believes a nuclear weapon will produce a security benefit that addresses a high-level threat, and that this benefit must outweigh the costs of proliferation because the state could be subjected to the powerful state’s use of military force to halt the effort.4 Scott Sagan argues U.S. foreign policy and threatening behavior provides states incentive to acquire a nuclear deterrent.5 Likewise, Ted Carpenter asserts U.S. foreign policy compels states to pursue a nuclear deterrent because the United States delegitimizes their security concerns and demonstrates these states are susceptible to violent regime change because they do not have a nuclear deterrent.6 Critics argue the reasons why Libya’s Moammar Qaddafi and Iraq’s Saddam Hussein were overthrown, and subsequently executed, while North Korea’s Kim Jong Un remains in power, is because North Korea possesses nuclear weapons and Libya and Iraq did not have nuclear weapons. Critics also speculate this is the reason Israel is so aggressive in its rhetoric and threats against Iran and its nuclear program, because once, and if, Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, Israel can no longer attack it without placing itself at risk and exposing itself to a crisis that could spiral towards a larger conflict, as has nearly happened with rivals India and Pakistan. The research argues the case study countries sought nuclear weapons for both security and prestige, particularly since these countries have a history of conflict 2 Scheuer

(Anonymous), Through Our Enemies’ Eyes, xv. (Anonymous), Through Our Enemies’ Eyes, xvi. 4 Debs and Monteiro, 10. 5 Sagan, Waltz, and Betts, “A Nuclear Iran,” 144. 6 Carpenter, “How Washington Encourages Nuclear Proliferation.” 3 Scheuer

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with the United States and Israel, and have largely been unable to defend their territory and national security interests using solely conventional means. The Arab militaries suffered successive defeats and the loss of territory during wars with Israel in 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973, and with the exception of Hezbollah’s asymmetric fight during the Second Lebanon War, have largely been ineffective in challenging any Israeli incursion into their territory. The Iraqi army and the much heralded Iraqi Republican Guard fought poorly against U.S. forces in both the 1991 Gulf War and in the opening stages of the 2003 Iraq War. It wasn’t until members of Iraq’s disbanded army turned to asymmetric insurgent forces did the Iraqis begin to demonstrate military effectiveness. During the Syrian Civil War, the Syrian military was unable to effectively challenge Israel’s cross-border airstrikes against Syrian and Iranian targets. In nearly all circumstances, Arab conventional military performance has come up short when facing the United States and Israel. It is only when these forces turn to asymmetric warfare and insurgency, do they demonstrate battlefield effectiveness. Consequently, Iran largely focuses on its ballistic missile program and asymmetric warfare capabilities to balance against the U.S. nuclear arsenal and superior conventional militaries of the United States and Israel (Map 10). With the asymmetric capabilities of the IRGC-Quds Force and its affiliates, Iran can strike U.S. forces in the region, and reach into Israel by arming its affiliates in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria with increasingly accurate and lethal weapons (Map 13). Despite the verbosity of their rhetoric and the substantial number of troops and equipment fielded in their order of battle, the Arab states’ conventional militaries have rarely proven to be combat effective against U.S. and Israeli forces. The United States and Israel possess a preponderance of qualitative and quantitative military firepower, intelligence collection, and cyberwarfare capabilities that are unmatched in the Middle East. The United States, with its global logistics chain, air and maritime forces, and overseas basing, is able to project its military power throughout the region via sea, air, land, space, and cyberspace. Washington spreads its influence through partnering with friendly states, and is, therefore, able to secure military access and achieve interoperability with friendly nations through security cooperation activities, such as military exercises, joint combined exchange training (JCET), international military education and training (IMET), and the National Guard Bureau’s State Partnership Program (SPP). The United States has increasingly turned to security cooperation to train, advise, assist, educate, and equip foreign partners to balance their conventional capabilities against regional threats due to fiscal constraints and a desire to shift the security burden to its partners in order to decrease the U.S. footprint abroad. This security cooperation is designed to develop specific partner capabilities and capacity, while building institutions, and strengthening alliances and partnerships that facilitate U.S. access.7 The desired outcomes often do not survive first contact with the enemy because the plan’s execution depends on how the enemy responds. A situation characterized

7 “Who We Are,” Defense Security Cooperation Agency, accessed May 17, 2020, https://www.dsca.

mil/.

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by former Secretary of Defense James Mattis’ observation, “The enemy gets a vote.”8 Ken Pollack asserts the United States has spent tens of billions of dollars training Arab militaries with little quantifiable progress. He notes the U.S.-trained Iraq army collapsed when facing ISIS in 2014, and the U.S.-trained Saudi military has stalled in Yemen.9 In 2015, it was revealed that U.S.-trained Syrian rebels gave at least a quarter of their weapons to al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch, Jabhat al-Nusra. The $500 million train and equip program had “four or five” fighters in Syria, but later added an additional 70 fighters.10 The United States had planned to train 3000 to 5000 New Syrian Force fighters in the first year of the program, but failed to do so.11 U.S. security assistance has also not always produced the desired results. Jeremy Ravinsky reports over $25 billion was wasted on Iraq’s security sector assistance, and in Afghanistan, after the United States spent $67 billion in a decade of training and equipping Afghan forces, they collapsed when the Taliban captured Kunduz.12 In his book, Exporting Security, Derek Reveron notes weak states provide sanctuary for terrorists, pirates, and drug traffickers who challenge state authorities and societal norms. As a result, United States shifted its strategy from containment to engagement, thus generating a greater demand for U.S. security assistance and the training of foreign militaries.13 Israel is able to project regional power through its air forces and has used its power projection capability to bomb nuclear sites in Iraq and Syria, twice invade Lebanon, bomb the PLO headquarters in Tunisia, rescue hostages in Uganda, conduct covert evacuations of Jews from Iraq, Yemen, Ethiopia, and Sudan (Operations Ali Baba, Magic Carpet, Solomon, and Moses), and soundly defeat its adversaries in a series of Arab–Israeli wars. Norvell De Atkine examined the ineffectiveness of modern Arabic-speaking armies and concluded their conventional warfighting capabilities were deficient, especially against Israel. For De Atkine, this poor battlefield effectiveness was the result of over-centralized decision-making, discouraging initiative, unimaginative training, lack of flexibility, centralized control of information, lack of combined arms operations, and the absence of leadership development of junior officers. The Jewish State has also conducted targeted assassinations of 8 Jon B. Alterman, “The Enemy Gets a Vote,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, May 16, 2018, accessed July 8, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/enemy-gets-vote. 9 Kenneth M. Pollack, “The U.S. Has Wasted Billions of Dollars on Failed Arab Armies,” Foreign Policy, January 31, 2019, accessed May 9, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/31/the-u-s-haswasted-billions-of-dollars-on-failed-arab-armies/. 10 Bradford Richardson, “US-Trained Syrian Rebels Gave Weapons to Al Qaeda, Pentagon Admits,” The Hill, September 26, 2015, accessed May 17, 2020, https://thehill.com/policy/defense/255055us-trained-syrian-rebels-gave-weapons-to-al-qaeda-pentagon-admits. 11 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Only 4 to 5 American-Trained Syrians Fighting Against the Islamic State,” The Washington Post, September 16, 2015, accessed May 30, 2020, https://www.washin gtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/09/16/only-4-to-5-american-trained-syrians-fighting-aga inst-the-islamic-state/. 12 Jeremy Ravinsky, “The NDAA’s Bottomless Security Assistance Pit,” The Hill, October 15, 2015, accessed May 30, 2020, https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/256937-the-ndaasbottomless-security-assistance-pit. 13 Derek S. Reveron, Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the U.S. Military (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2010), 31.

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Iranian and Iraqi nuclear scientists, Palestine Liberation Operation (PLO) officials, and Hamas and Hezbollah leaders. In the face of these conventional military deficiencies, battlefield loses, and U.S. and Israeli regional dominance, some Arab states and Iran sought to increase their defensive capabilities by pursuing a nuclear deterrent. In turn, these actions were perceived as hostile by Washington and Tel Aviv, thus subjecting the Arab states and Iran to either coercive diplomacy or military force.14 The limited fighting effectiveness of regional partners combined with the nuclear ambitions of their mutual adversaries reinforces the U.S.–Israel relationship as security partners in the region.

The United States and Israel—National Security Relationship As the United States rose in prominence in the aftermath of World War II, British global influence subsided; and with its influence waning and its Mandate for Palestine ending, Britain referred the future of Palestine to the United Nations. On November 29, 1947, the United Nations passed Resolution 181, which partitioned Palestine into two states with Jerusalem being a United Nations-administered trusteeship. The Palestinians, represented by the Arab League-formed Arab Higher Committee rejected Resolution 181 and declared it illegal. This Arab declaration resulted in the establishment of only one of the two states envisioned by the United Nations.15 Seeing the possibility for conflict, the United States called for a ten-year cooling off period on Resolution 181 and recommended Palestine be placed under a trusteeship administered by either the United Nations or the United States.16 The Jewish leadership ignored this recommendation and declared Israel’s independence on May 14, 1948. Eleven minutes after its declaration, U.S. President Harry S. Truman de facto recognized the Jewish State, and Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran immediately followed the U.S. recognition of Israel.17 Though the Shah recognized the State of Israel in 1948, after he was overthrown during the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iran’s new leaders cut all ties with Israel and no longer recognize it as a state. The neighboring Arab states—Egypt, Transjordan [Jordan], Syria, Lebanon and Iraq— invaded Israel the day after it declared its independence, ushering in a regional conflict that largely continues to the present day. Although the United States had a limited role in Israel’s creation, it has found itself embroiled in seven decades of conflict involving the Arabs and Israelis. Early U.S. policy focused primarily on supporting the development of oil-producing countries, 14 Norvell B. De Atkine, “Why Arabs Lose Wars,” Middle East Quarterly, vol. 6, no. 4 (December 1999), accessed May 9, 2020, https://www.meforum.org/441/why-arabs-lose-wars. 15 Kylie Baxter and Shahram Akbarzadeh, US Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The Roots of Anti-Americanism (New York: Routledge, 2008), 36. 16 Baxter and Akbarzadeh, US Foreign Policy in the Middle East, 37. 17 Roshandel, Iran, Israel and the United States, 1.

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maintaining neutrality in the Arab–Israeli conflict while supporting Israeli security, and curbing Soviet regional influence. The U.S. ability to project power in the region secured what Michael Hudson described as the “holy trinity” of American interests: Israel, oil, and anti-communism.18 This post-World War II era marked what then-U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Raymond Hare called “the great divide” in U.S. Middle East policy. Hare argued the United States was “between our traditional national position of rejecting political responsibility in the Middle East and our post-war acceptance of responsibility on a global or great power basis.”19 As part of a broader policy to defeat the Soviet Union and communism, the United States supported authoritarian regimes that were opposed to communism and Soviet influence. This support was grounded in an East–West competition for geopolitical preeminence, therefore dictators’ repressive acts were often overlooked as long as they supported the United States and its struggle against communism.20 To support these objectives, U.S. policymakers supplied Middle Eastern countries with foreign assistance and weapons.21 This assistance continued for two decades until the United States shifted the structure of its aid package following the 1967 SixDay War, when Israel proved its military might and the Arabs demonstrated their military weakness. Consequently, Israel was no longer perceived to be a burden on U.S. national security because it clearly established itself as the regional hegemon.22 Despite this pro-Israel shift in U.S. policy, during the 1950–1970 timeframe, Iran received more U.S. military aid than all other Middle East countries combined. It is also notable that this 20-year timeframe, in which Iran received the largesse of U.S. military assistance, also spans two of Israel’s wars with its Arab neighbors—Sinai Campaign (1956) and the Six-Day War (1967). Coinciding with U.S. commitments in South Vietnam ending and the pro-Israel policy shift in Washington, the U.S.–Israel relationship strengthened and resulted in a preponderance of U.S. military assistance being redirected to Israel and away from the Arab states. Since 1976, Israel has been the largest recipient of U.S. foreign assistance and now averages $3 billion in direct U.S. foreign assistance each year (Fig. 6.1).23 The Congressional Research Service reports, since World War II, the United States has provided Israel $1423 billion in bilateral assistance and missile defense funding. In 2016, the United States and Israel signed a 10-year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), covering fiscal years 2019–2028, whereby the United States pledged $38 billion in military aid to Israel.24 Egypt, in turn, received an increase in U.S. assistance 18 Michael C. Hudson, “To Play the Hegemon: Fifty Years of US Policy Toward the Middle East,” Middle East Journal, vol. 50, no. 3 (Summer 1996): 329. 19 Hudson, “To Play the Hegemon,” 330. 20 Michael Singh, “Change in the Middle East: Implications for US Policy,” Harvard International Review (Spring 2011): 17, accessed June 7, 2013, http://www.freepatentsonline.com/article/Har vard-International-Review/256711238.html. 21 Sharp, “U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East,” 22. 22 Hudson, “To Play the Hegemon,” 334. 23 Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, 26. 24 Jeremy M. Sharp, “U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel,” Congressional Research Service (August 7, 2019), 1.

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Fig. 6.1 U.S. military aid to Israel over decades (Sharp, “U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel,” 7) (Source CRS Graphics)

after it signed the Camp David Accords and recognized Israel in 1979. That same year Iran was dropped from U.S. foreign assistance packages after its revolution and the subsequent U.S. Embassy Hostage Crisis. Despite the Cold War ending and with it the goal of halting communism’s spread realized, U.S. policymakers continued to support authoritarian regimes under the auspices of stability, even as these regimes continued to deny their citizens human and political rights—the very freedoms for which America stands. Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice acknowledged this contradiction when she stated, “for 60 years the United States pursued stability at the expense of democracy in the Middle East—and we achieved neither.”25 In their book, The Sixth Crisis: Iran, Israel, America and the Rumors of War, Dana Allin and Steven Simon note that circumstances have changed dramatically since the 1980s. Despite U.S. sanctions and Israeli threats, Iran is closing in on a nuclear breakout capability. After the 9/11 attacks and a wave of suicide bombings in Israel, the ideology of fear regarding a radical Islamist threat has been internalized in American and Israeli political discourse. Lastly, former Iranian reformist and conciliatory President Mohammad Khatami was replaced by the radical posturing and incendiary rhetoric of President Ahmadinejad.26 Jim Zanotti of the Congressional Research Service argues U.S. policymakers often consider Israel’s security as they make policy choices in the Middle East.27 Over the past 40 years, Israel has had numerous advantages—explicitly or implicitly backed by the United States—that minimize potential threats to its security and national existence: overwhelming conventional military superiority, and arrangements with 25 Singh,

“Change in the Middle East,” 17. and Simon, The Sixth Crisis, 39. 27 Zanotti, “Israel: Background and U.S. Relations,” 1. 26 Allin

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the Arab states aimed at preventing interstate conflict.28 Israel’s conventional military superiority is also maintained through United States law that ensures Israel maintains a qualitative military edge (QME) over its neighbors by limiting weapons sales and other forms of military aid to the Arab states. Additionally, economic sanctions and national security policy prohibit the sale of U.S. weapons to Iran. Zanotti notes Israel’s neighbors are challenging its other three assumed advantages. First, Iran’s nuclear ambitions are a direct challenge to Israel’s ability to assert influence in the region by giving Iran a deterrent capability. A nuclear Iran could also intimidate the Gulf States and force them to either adopt more pro-Iranian policies (bandwagon) or to pursue their own nuclear capabilities (balance). Second, Sunni Islamist-led states could apply political pressure on Israel to resolve the Palestinian issue or increase military forces near their shared borders, although the Palestinian issue no longer dominates Arab discussions, particularly since Mohammed bin Salman’s rise to power in Saudi Arabia. Third, instability and ungoverned areas near Israel’s borders are increasing as a result of unrest in Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria. Zanotti notes Israeli planners and decision-makers are scrambling to determine how to address these security challenges by adjusting resource allocations, military postures, and regional and international political activities.29 Raising the stakes, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman asserted Saudi Arabia will pursue a nuclear weapon if Iran acquires a nuclear capability.30 It is unknown how Egypt, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates would respond to a nuclear Iran. As part of the strong U.S.–Israeli bilateral relationship, Israeli leaders and their supporters have tried to persuade American decision-makers on two central issues. First, that Israel’s security and the broader stability of the region are critically important to U.S. interests. Second, Israel has substantial worth as a U.S. ally beyond temporary geopolitical issues and shared ideals and values.31 To this end, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak supported the efforts of President Obama to back Israel’s security interests in September 2011, Once again it’s been proven to all the doubters, President Obama is an ally and friend of Israel. The Obama administration gives backing to Israel’s security in a wide, all-encompassing and unprecedented manner.32

The special U.S. and Israeli relationship is based on a deep American interest to support a westernized Israeli state that is “secure, democratic, and Jewish;” however, this relationship has been strained and sometimes threatened by the stalemate over the

28 Zanotti,

“Israel: Background and U.S. Relations,” 13. “Israel: Background and U.S. Relations,” 13. 30 Vivian Salama, “Saudi Crown Prince: If Iran Makes a Nuclear Bomb, So Will We,” NBC News, March 19, 2018, accessed May 12, 2020, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/saudicrown-prince-if-iran-makes-nuclear-bomb-so-will-n857921. 31 Zanotti, “Israel: Background and U.S. Relations,” 20. 32 “America & Israel: An Unbreakable Bond,” Barack Obama: Organizing for Action, accessed January 20, 2014, http://l.barackobama.com/america-and-israel/. 29 Zanotti,

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issue of a future Palestinian state and Jewish settlements in the Palestinian Territories, also called the Occupied Territories.33 The United States has often called on Israel to halt the expansion of settlements in the West Bank.34 The requested freeze on settlements is due to the belief that they are a hindrance to a long-term solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict and the creation of a two-state solution.35 In 2020, Prime Minister Netanyahu began openly discussing the possibility of annexing parts of the West Bank, however, this move was delayed as of early July 2020. The Palestinians want the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza for a future Palestinian state and the current policies of Benjamin Netanyahu impede the possibility of a contiguous Palestine. The international community has endorsed a two-state solution based on the lines drawn prior to the 1967 Six-Day War.36 Despite this disagreement over the settlements, Israel maintains strong U.S. domestic political support for its security to include extensive U.S.–Israeli military cooperation through military aid, foreign military sales, direct commercial sales, joint exercises, information sharing, and the research and development of military technology.37 Israel is a Westernized democracy that shares similar enemies and strategic interests with the United States, and this is one reason for the strong support among U.S. politicians. Some U.S. politicians routinely accuse their opponents of not supporting Israel strongly enough, particularly during election time. During the 2012 presidential campaign, Republican nominee Mitt Romney traveled overseas, but did not visit U.S. troops in Afghanistan nor did he visit India, which is a key partner in the United States’ Great Power Competition with China. Instead, between stops in the United Kingdom and Poland, Romney visited Israel, where he criticized President Obama for not supporting Israel. Senator Romney asserted, I will reaffirm our historic ties to Israel and our abiding commitment to its security – the world must never see any daylight between our two nations.38

Romney’s statement was not an anomaly, Paul Miller argues both major U.S. parties—Democrat and Republican—regard Israel as a major concern in U.S. foreign policy, with the Republican Party voicing overwhelming support. Miller notes that during the October 2012 presidential debate between President Obama and Senator 33 Allin

and Simon, The Sixth Crisis, 63. Besser, “Obama Confident in Taking on Settlements,” The New York Jewish Week, June 3, 2009, accessed May 4, 2020, https://jewishweek.timesofisrael.com/obama-confident-in-taking-onsettlements-obama/. 35 Adam Entous, “The Maps of Israeli Settlements That Shocked Barack Obama,” The New Yorker, July 9, 2018, accessed May 4, 2020, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-map-of-isr aeli-settlements-that-shocked-barack-obama. 36 Edith M. Lederer, “Former World Leaders Warn Against Israel Annexation,” Associated Press, July 3, 2020, accessed July 5, 2020, https://news.yahoo.com/former-world-leaders-warn-against203633999.html. 37 Zanotti, “Israel: Background and U.S. Relations,” 21. 38 Paul D. Miller, “Evangelicals, Israel and US Foreign Policy,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 56, no. 1 (February/March, 2014), 7. 34 James

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Romney, more time and attention were spent on Israel than on the Arab Spring, the rise of China, or stability in Pakistan. In March 2013, during a visit to Israel, President Obama affirmed his commitment to Israel’s security, I see this visit as an opportunity to reaffirm the unbreakable bond between our nations, to restate America’s unwavering commitment to Israel’s security and to speak directly to the people of Israel and to your neighbors… I am confident in declaring that our alliance is eternal, is forever.39

Critics charge the U.S. commitment to Israel is based not only on shared democratic values and national security interests, but also because of domestic influences, to include pro-Israel lobby groups and evangelical Christians who promote their shared Judeo-Christian religious ties.

The Israel Lobby In 2007, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt sparked controversy when they published The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, which was an expansion of their 2006 essay, “The Israel Lobby.” In their study, Mearsheimer and Walt detailed the level of material and diplomatic support the United States supplies to Israel and argue that no other country is shown the deference from America’s leading politicians, as is Israel. Dana Allin and Steven Simon argue that U.S. Senators and Representatives who criticize Israel often find themselves facing well-funded political opponents, revealing an understanding that politically opposing Israel is not “worth the trouble.”40 Similarly, Allin and Simon note American politicians frequently invoke the Holocaust analogy to warn of threats to Israel.41 The close U.S.–Israeli relationship, Mearsheimer and Walt argue, is due to the political influence of the Israeli lobby, particularly the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). Accordingly, the authors posit these lobby groups work actively to push U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction.42 The AIPAC website promotes advantages of a strong U.S.–Israel relationship and that they share “An Essential Alliance,” The U.S.-Israel relationship is a mutually beneficial partnership that reinforces America’s moral values and strategic interests, and promotes peace and stability. This relationship with the only democracy in the Middle East is a key pillar of America’s regional security framework. Israel is a beacon of shared interests and values in a critically strategic region. Unlike other allies, Israel insists on defending itself by itself, relying on America only to help ensure it 39 Matt Spetalnick and Jeffrey Heller, “Obama Calls US Commitment to Israel ‘Unwavering’,” MSNBC, March 20, 2013, accessed January 20, 2014, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/obama-callsus-commitment-israel-unwaveri. 40 Allin and Simon, The Sixth Crisis, 151. 41 Allin and Simon, The Sixth Crisis, 156. 42 Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, 5.

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has the means to do so. Israel has never asked Americans to sacrifice their lives; instead, the Israeli people defend themselves while advancing vital U.S. national security interests. A strong U.S.-Israel strategic relationship and enhanced bilateral cooperation in homeland security, cybersecurity, space, sustainability and other key areas is helping both countries and other nations across the globe to confront emerging mutual challenges.43

Mearsheimer and Walt argue that Israel is falsely portrayed as a weak and besieged Jewish David surrounded by a hostile Arab Goliath. The authors assert Israeli leaders and sympathetic writers nurture this image, but the opposite is closer to the truth because Israel is the strongest military power in the region.44 Mearsheimer and Walt posit the U.S. justification for helping Israel is because it is portrayed as a valuable ally for dealing with its dangerous Arab neighbors and Iran. The authors further contend that it is because of this commitment to Israel that the United States perceives these Arab states as threats in the first place. They assert Washington would find it easier to deal with its conflicts with the Arab states if its policies were not constrained by its commitments to Israel.45 The authors posit that the U.S. patronage of Israel fuels Arab anger and resentment, and contend this approach hinders U.S. foreign policy in the region because the United States must find a way to bridge the gap between its current policies and the national aspirations of Palestinians and other Arabs.46 Mearsheimer and Walt further argue the Iran threat is overblown. They continue that U.S. concerns about Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction or Iran’s current nuclear ambitions are based on the threat they pose to Israel, and not the threat they pose to the United States. The authors state the justification for helping Israel is circular. Israel is portrayed as a vital ally for confronting its dangerous neighbors, but this commitment to Israel is an important reason why the United States sees these states as threats in the first place. The authors offer a quote from President Bush to support their argument, “The threat from Iran is, of course, their stated objective to destroy our strong ally Israel.”47 Mearsheimer and Walt argue the perceived threat of a nuclear Iran is overblown because of the military power that the United States and Israel possess. Yet given that both Israel and the United States have powerful [weapons] of their own, this danger is overstated. Attacking the United States or Israel directly is out of the question… If either country were ever attacked, the perpetrator would immediately face a devastating retaliation. Neither country could be blackmailed by a nuclear-armed rogue state, because the blackmailer could not carry out the threat without facing the same fate.48

The authors continue that Israel and the Israel Lobby have been successful in inflating the Iran threat and in doing so, nudging Washington to take action. 43 AIPAC,

“U.S.-Israel Relationship,” accessed July 8, 2020, https://www.aipac.org/relationship. and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, 81. 45 Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, 72. 46 Walter Russell Mead, “Jerusalem Syndrome: Decoding the Israel Lobby,” Foreign Affairs (November/December 2007), accessed January 5, 2014, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ 63029/walter-russell-mead/jerusalem-syndrome. 47 Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, 72. 48 Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, 72. 44 Mearsheimer

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Israel and the lobby have been remarkably successful at convincing Bush and other leading American politicians that a nuclear-armed Iran is an unacceptable threat to Israel and that it is the responsibility of the United States to prevent that threat from increasing.49

American leaders have consistently stated their fears of a violent terrorist organization obtaining a nuclear weapon. In April 2010, President Obama addressed this concern, The greatest threat to U.S. and global security is no longer a nuclear exchange between nations, but nuclear terrorism by violent extremists and nuclear proliferation to an increasing number of states.50

The authors pushed back against the impending danger of a rogue state transferring a nuclear weapon to a proxy or terrorist group. The danger that a rogue state might decide to give one of its nuclear weapons to a terrorist group is equally remote, because the country’s leaders could never be sure the transfer would remain undetected or that they would not be blamed and punished afterward. Indeed, giving away the nuclear weapons that they had run grave risks to obtain is probably the last thing such regimes would ever do.

John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt argue the Israel Lobby has an outsized influence on U.S. foreign policy and this explains America’s “willingness to conduct its foreign policy in ways that are intended to safeguard Israel.” The authors also argue this influence has been unintentionally harmful to both the United States and Israel. They assert Washington’s “reflexive support” for Israel fuels anti-Americanism throughout the Arab and Islamic world and undermines the U.S. image abroad. They contend the lobby group has made it difficult for the United States to pressure Israel on resolving the Palestinian issues, and that turning a blind eye to Israeli human rights abuses empowers terrorist group recruitment efforts.51 The authors argue the lobby’s influence has also hurt Israel because U.S. aid indirectly subsidizes Israel’s “prolonged and costly effort to colonize the Occupied Territories.” They assert Israel’s refusal to recognize Palestinian aspirations has not made it safer, and that its campaign to kill, imprison, and marginalize Palestinian leaders helped bring groups like Hamas to power and reduced the number of Palestinian leaders willing to negotiate with Israel. The authors contend the United States has three strategic interests in the Middle East: (1) maintain access to the region’s oil and natural gas, (2) discourage Middle East states from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, and (3) reduce anti-American terrorism by dismantling terrorist networks that threaten the United States and prevent new groups from emerging. Mearsheimer and Walt posit the United States should support Israel’s existence; however, they argue Israel’s security is not of strategic importance to the United States. They believe the United States must reverse the damage that recent U.S. policies have inflicted, and find a different approach to address the power of the pro-Israel lobby. As a solution, the authors propose five strategies the United States should take 49 Mearsheimer

and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, 295. and Flaherty, “Obama’s Nuclear Policy Overhaul.” 51 Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, 335. 50 Burns

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“to address the power of the lobby.” These steps include: (1) identifying U.S. interests in the Middle East, (2) outlining a strategy to protect those interests, (3) developing a new relationship with Israel, (4) ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through a two-state solution, and (5) transforming the Israel Lobby into a constructive force.52 Mearsheimer and Walt conclude, Israel’s creation and subsequent development is a remarkable achievements. Had American Jews not organized on Israel’s behalf and convinced important politicians to support their objectives, Israel might never have been established. U.S. and Israeli interests have never been identical, however, and Israel’s current policies are at odds with America’s own national interests and certain core U.S. values. Unfortunately, in recent years the lobby’s political clout and public relations acumen have discouraged U.S. leaders from pursuing Middle East policies that would advance American interests and protect Israel from its worst mistakes. The lobby’s influence, in short, has been bad for both countries.53

Critics dismissed Mearsheimer and Walt’s arguments and contend the book is conspiratorial and anti-Semitic. Anti-Defamation League Director Abraham Foxman argued, “Their conclusions are classic anti-Semitic canards - such as control of foreign policy against the interest of the U.S., the Jews controlling the media and getting America into war.”54 Harvard University law professor Alan Dershowitz compared the book to The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion, a historic antiSemitic book that accused Jews of trying to dominate the world.55 Johns Hopkins University professor Eliot Cohen charged Mearsheimer and Walt’s scholarship is shoddy and anti-Semitic, and an attack on the loyalty of American Jews. Inept, even kooky academic work, then, but is it anti-Semitic? If by anti-Semitism one means obsessive and irrationally hostile beliefs about Jews; if one accuses them of disloyalty, subversion or treachery, of having occult powers and of participating in secret combinations that manipulate institutions and governments; if one systematically selects everything unfair, ugly or wrong about Jews as individuals or a group and equally systematically suppresses any exculpatory information – why, yes, this paper is anti-Semitic… The authors dismiss or ignore past Arab threats to exterminate Israel, as well as the sewer of anti-Semitic literature that pollutes public discourse in the Arab world today. The most recent calls by Iran’s fanatical – and nuclear weapons-hungry – president for Israel to be “wiped off the map” they brush aside as insignificant.56

Walt and Mearsheimer also have their supporters. Michael Scheuer, the former CIA officer who headed the Alec Station unit that once hunted Osama bin Laden, argues Mearsheimer and Walt were basically correct in their argument. Scheuer asserts, “They should be credited for the courage they have had to actually present a 52 Mearsheimer

and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, 336. and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, 355. 54 Henri Aster, “US Storm Over Book on Israeli Lobby,” BBC News, November 22, 2007, accessed January 6, 2014, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7104030.stm. 55 Deborah Amos, “Paper on Israel Lobby Sparks Heated Debate,” NPR, April 21, 2006, accessed July 8, 2020, https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5353855. 56 Eliot A. Cohen, “Yes, It’s Anti-Semitic,” Washington Post, April 5, 2006, accessed January 6, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/04/AR2006040401282.html. 53 Mearsheimer

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paper on the subject.”57 Walt and Mearsheimer denied charges of anti-Semitism and argue that critics have “often misrepresented our arguments badly or tried to smear us by either saying or hinting that we are anti-Semitic.”58 Michael Koplow, an analyst with the Israel Policy Forum, argues the U.S.–Israel relationship is strong due to two key factors: intelligence sharing and ideological unity. He asserts Israel’s intelligence and insight into Middle East affairs is unrivaled and beneficial to the United States and its national security interests. Koplow argues Israel is the only liberal democracy in the Middle East and the shared values of open elections and peaceful transitions of power, in a region where many nations are ruled by either strongmen or monarchs, strengthens the relationship. Likewise, he argues Israel has its critics. He highlights that critics point to the amount of aid the United States contributes annually to Israel is a source of friction. In 2015, $3.1 billion, which was more than half of U.S. foreign military aid, went to Israel. While the United States and Israel have a strong intelligence sharing and military relationship, Koplow points to two confrontations that stressed this partnership. First, in 1967, the Israeli Air Force attacked the US Navy ship, USS Liberty, in international waters, killing 34 U.S. sailors. Israel claimed the attack was an error and apologized, but survivors of the attack claim it was intentional. Second, in the 1980s, Jonathan Pollard, a U.S. naval intelligence analyst, passed classified intelligence to the Israelis. Pollard pled guilty to conspiracy to commit espionage and served 30 years in prison. Likewise, Koplow highlights the United Nation’s resistance to Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians and Jewish settlements located outside Israel’s borders. The UN has called the settlements a “contravention of international law.” For Koplow, “If you’re a supporter of the Palestinian cause, it’s reasonable to ask why the U.S. is supporting Israel.”59 Miller dismisses the argument that candidates support Israel to win over Jewish voters because of their influence in Jewish lobby groups, because American Jews are not Israel’s strongest supporters. Jewish voters comprise 2 percent of the electorate and vote overwhelmingly Democrat. A 2012 exit poll found 69 percent of Jewish voters voted for President Obama. A 2012 Public Religion Research Institute poll found only 4 percent of American Jews said support for Israel was their primary concern, while 51 percent cited the economy, and 15 percent cited income inequality as their concern.60 He argues fundamentalist and evangelical Christians are the most ardent supporters of Israel, and this support is grounded in a “distinctive reading of the Old Testament and a unique eschatology” in which support of Israel is key. Miller argues using religion for political expediency has drawbacks because these beliefs tend to be inflexible and can obscure weaknesses and faults in an agenda. Specifically, he argues,

57 Amos,

“Paper on Israel Lobby Sparks Heated Debate.” “US Storm Over Book on Israeli Lobby.” 59 Alex Lockie, “Here’s Why the US and Israel Are Such Close Allies,” Business Insider, February 18, 2017, accessed July 8, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/us-israel-allies-2017-2. 60 Miller, “Evangelicals, Israel and US Foreign Policy,” 8. 58 Aster,

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In particular, the religiously grounded pro-Israel viewpoint distorts American policy towards the country with an unhelpful inflexibility and exaggerates its political importance – and, indeed, that of the whole Middle East – to the U.S. The time, attention and resources that the U.S. brings to bear on the region have become disproportionate to the political interests that the country has there.61

Miller asserts U.S. policymakers should develop tradition-based approaches to U.S. policy in the Middle East that focus on U.S. national security interests and human rights. For Miller, the United States should support Israel’s right to exist, but “not support every Israeli initiative and policy,” sustain the high amount of U.S foreign aid, nor focus on minor disputes in a “strategically secondary region of the world.”62

Evangelical Christian Support for Israel Christian evangelicals are a powerful force in the strength of the U.S.–Israel relationship. The evangelical community is politically active and often views the Middle East through the lens of the Bible. They are ardent supporters of the State of Israel and believe its existence is an indicator of God’s covenant with the Jewish people and His promise of the Holy Land to His chosen people. In Genesis 13:14–17, God promises to bless Abraham and to give him land, The LORD said to Abraham… Lift up your eyes and look from the place where you are, northward and southward and eastward and westward, for all the land that you see I will give to you and to your offspring forever. I will make your offspring as the dust of the earth, so that if one can count the dust of the earth, your offspring also can be counted. Arise, walk through the length and breadth of the land, for I will give it to you.63

Professor Elizabeth Oldmixon argues the recognition that God gave Jerusalem to the Jewish people is a core belief of evangelicals, The tenet of Christian Zionism is that God’s promise of the Holy Land to the Jews is eternal. It’s not just something in antiquity… When we talk about the Holy Land, God’s promise of the Holy Land, we’re talking about real estate on both sides of the Jordan River. So the sense of a greater Israel and expansionism is really important to this community. Jerusalem is just central to that. It’s viewed as a historical and biblical capital.64

In as much as there is overwhelming support among evangelicals for the State of Israel, some believe Jewish control of Jerusalem is necessary for the return of the Messiah and the beginning of the Rapture—the end times—and the ascent 61 Miller,

“Evangelicals, Israel and US Foreign Policy,” 9. “Evangelicals, Israel and US Foreign Policy,” 10. 63 Miller, “Evangelicals, Israel and US Foreign Policy,” 11. 64 Philip Bump, “Half of Evangelicals Support Israel Because They Believe It Is Important for Fulfilling End-Times Prophecy,” The Washington Post, May 14, 2018, accessed July 6, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2018/05/14/half-of-evangelicals-sup port-israel-because-they-believe-it-is-important-for-fulfilling-end-times-prophecy/. 62 Miller,

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of Christians into the Kingdom of God.65 Cristina Maza articulated the importance of Jerusalem to evangelicals and how it plays into the Rapture, during which “Christ comes to Earth to take the living Christians who believe in him to heaven and resurrect the dead who were true Christians… Afterward, it is believed that the Antichrist will reign on earth during the seven-year period of tribulation.” Jerusalem has a central role as the city of the prophecy and the place where the end of times plays out. According to the prophecy, a 1,000-year period of peace must be followed by seven years of tribulation, during which wars, disease, and natural disasters will lay waste to the earth. In the book of Revelation, Israel is described as a nation that exists during the time of tribulation, and Jerusalem’s Jewish temple is resurrected during this period. The last temple was destroyed around 70 A.D, and today there is a mosque on the Temple Mount where the previous two temples are believed to have stood. Evangelicals believe that a unified Israel with control over Jerusalem will facilitate the construction of a new Jewish temple, and set the groundwork for the end of times.66

In a paper for Politics and Religion, Inbari, Bumin, and Byrd argue evangelical support for Israel is driven by beliefs rooted in evangelical Christian theology, and a cultural and religious affinity with Jews, rather than geopolitical and security concerns, feelings of guilt over historical persecution of Jews, or a feeling of commonality based on democratic institutions. The authors argue that since the late 1970s, white evangelicals have been heavily involved in American politics and are predominately members of the Republican Party. Though their political agenda is primarily domestic and focuses on “family issues,” such as anti-abortion policies, preservation of the traditional family unit, and prayer in schools, the authors highlight that race was the key reason for white evangelicals realigning with the Republican Party. While their primary political agenda is domestic, support for the State of Israel is at the top of white evangelicals’ increasingly narrow international agenda.67 A LifeWay poll found that 80 percent of evangelicals believe the creation of Israel was fulfillment of biblical prophecy that will usher in Christ’s return. A similar Pew Research Center poll found that a third of Americans and 60 percent of evangelicals agreed that the existence of Israel fulfilled biblical prophecy.68 White evangelical Christians have significant influence in the Republican Party, and count among them some of the most powerful members in recent administrations, including: President George W. Bush, Vice President Mike Pence, and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. Edward Wong raised questions about “the extent to which evangelical beliefs are influencing American diplomacy.” In a 2019 speech, Mike 65 Paul Goldman and Saphora Smith, “Israel Orders Evangelical Christian Media Network God TV to Take Channel Off Air,” NBC News, June 29, 2020, accessed July 6, 2020, https://www.nbcnews.com/ news/world/israel-orders-evangelical-christian-media-network-god-tv-take-channel-n1232403. 66 Cristina Maza, “Trump Will Start the End of the World, Claim Evangelicals Who Support Him,” Newsweek, January 12, 2018, accessed July 6, 2020, https://www.newsweek.com/trump-will-bringabout-end-worldevangelicals-end-times-779643. 67 Motti Inbari, Kirill M. Bumin, and M. Gordon Byrd, “Why Do Evangelicals Support Israel?” Politics and Religion (January 2020): 2. 68 Philip Bump, “Half of Evangelicals Support Israel Because They Believe It Is Important for Fulfilling End-Times Prophecy.”

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Pompeo asserted, “As Secretary of State and as a Christian, I’m proud to lead American diplomacy to support Israel’s right to defend itself.” To this point of a nexus between evangelical support for Israel and American foreign policy, Miller argues, Among gentiles, Israel policy has become a cultural wedge issue that signals one’s tribal loyalties; it is a proxy for one’s broader world view. Being pro-Israel conveys sympathy for the conservative, evangelical agenda. In this environment, questioning U.S. policy towards Israel means risking one’s credentials as a conservative, a foreign-policy hawk or even a Christian. This sort of environment causes public debate to stagnate; even conservatives and evangelicals should recognize that this is unhelpful for their intellectual vibrancy to wall off an entire policy position from examination and scrutiny.69

Wong argues Bibi Netanyahu embraced this evangelical support for his right-wing policies and views the evangelicals as more reliable American allies of Israel than liberal American Jews.70 Walker Robins notes white evangelical supporters of Israel were among the leading domestic opponents of the Iran nuclear deal, and that the same groups that lobbied for the United States to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem— Christians United for Israel (CUFI) and American Christian Leaders for Israel—also lobbied against the nuclear agreement. Walker argues the evangelicals see Iran as a “central actor in various End Times scenarios” and the “architect” of a radical Islamic threat that “pits Judeo-Christian civilization against ‘radical Islam’.” These evangelicals are motivated by the belief that Jews are God’s chosen people and Christians should support the world’s only Jewish state, because God will bless those nations that “bless” Israel and curse those nations that “curse” it.71 A Pew Forum survey found that of all Americans, evangelicals have the most negative views of Islam and Muslims. For many, the September 11th attacks confirmed their views that Islam is a source of religious persecution and violence in the world.72 Prime Minister Netanyahu seized the opportunity to play on these beliefs in a speech to the CUFI annual summit in 2017, when he asserted the United States and Israel were engaged in, A struggle of civilizations… of free societies against the forces of militant Islam. The militant Sunnis led by ISIS, the militant Shiites led by Iran, they want to conquer the Middle East, they want to destroy the State of Israel, and then they want to conquer the world.73 69 Miller,

“Evangelicals, Israel and US Foreign Policy,” 18. Wong, “The Rapture and the Real World: Mike Pompeo Blends Beliefs and Policy,” The New York Times, March 30, 2019, accessed July 6, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/30/us/ politics/pompeo-christian-policy.html. 71 Walker Robins, “The Withdrawal from the Iran Deal Signals a New Power Player in Washington: Christian Zionists,” The Washington Post, May 8, 2018, accessed July 6, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2018/05/08/the-withdrawalfrom-the-iran-deal-signals-a-new-power-player-in-washington-christian-zionists/. 72 Robert McMahon, “Christian Evangelicals and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Council on Foreign Relations, August 22, 2006, accessed July 6, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/christian-evange licals-and-us-foreign-policy. 73 Robins, “The Withdrawal from the Iran Deal Signals a New Power Player in Washington: Christian Zionists.” 70 Edward

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Since the 1967 Six-Day War, the Israeli government and evangelicals have strengthened their relationship, which provides Israel additional influence and leverage with American politicians, particularly conservative Christians and evangelicals within the Republican Party. This bond has led to accusations the United States’ relationship with Israel prevents it from being a fair and honest broker in issues that involve Israel, the Palestinians, the Arab states, and Iran. The strength of the U.S.–Israeli relationship contributes to Arab and Iranian insecurities because of the perception they face a duality of militarily superior states that challenge their national security interests and government stability. When faced with a hostile adversary that has unchallenged conventional military power, and without security guarantees from a comparably powerful state, there is little recourse than to either accept the situation, take actions to mitigate frictions, or seek the great equalizer to provide a deterrent capability against an existential threat. This sentiment was echoed by Libyan leader, Colonel Moammar Qaddafi when he argued, The Arabs must possess the atomic bomb to defend themselves until their numbers reach one billion, until they learn to desalinate seawater, and until they liberate Palestine.74

Efforts to enhance the defense capabilities of the weaker state often increases the threat perceptions of their more powerful rivals. In each occurrence of attempted Arab proliferation, either the United States or Israel used military force to destroy or degrade the nuclear-related infrastructure before the state was able to achieve a nuclear breakout capability. In the Iranian case, Israel threatened a preventive strike, while the United States pursued diplomacy coupled with sanctions. The next section examines the national security interests and threat perceptions of the three case study countries to provide insight into their perceptions and to probe potential motivations for their pursuit of a nuclear weapon.

Iraq—National Security and Threat Perceptions Since the early days of its independence, Iraq’s national identity has been influenced by outside interference and the challenges of domestic turmoil brought on by three distinct religious and ethnic groups vying for power and autonomy. Compounding this effect, Iraq has also been in a near constant state of war against internal and external forces since it started the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988). Over the course of two decades, Saddam Hussein initiated a brutal eight-year war with Iran, gassed Iraq’s Kurdish population, invaded Kuwait, and brutally suppressed a Shi’a rebellion in the South and a Kurdish rebellion in the North. Israel attacked and destroyed its nuclear reactor in 1981. The United States expelled Baghdad from Kuwait after annihilating its army, and later invaded Iraq and overthrew Saddam Hussein, during 74 Wyn Q. Bowen, “Libya,” Nuclear Safeguards, Security and Nonproliferation: Achieving Security with Technology and Policy, James E. Doyle, ed., (Burlington, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2008), 332.

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a failed search for weapons of mass destruction. Iraq later battled through a Sunni insurgency and death squads, and lost large swaths of land to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) before regaining the territory with the assistance of U.S. miliary forces. Baghdad has also experienced a resurgence of Iranian political influence and the rise of Iran-back Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), such as Kataeb Hezbollah, the Badr Organization, Imam Ali Brigades, and Sayed al-Shuhada, groups that also have political influence as members of Iraq’s parliament.75 The pattern of upheaval in Iraq and the motivations that contribute to its national security decisions can be traced to the country’s origins and political uncertainties in the aftermath of World War I. After the Ottoman Empire was defeated in World War I, Britain gained control of modern-day Iraq and was given a mandate to govern it by the League of Nations until 1920 (Map 3). Soon after, Britain, France, and the United States seized the rights to 95 percent of the oil in Iraq.76 In 1921, the British installed Hashemite King Faisal I to rule over the former Ottoman territory of Iraq. Faisal ibn Hussein was born in modern-day Saudi Arabia and had served previously as the King of Greater Syria before being expelled by the French during the Franco-Syrian War. The British then placated Faisal at the Cairo Conference, which was presided over by Winston Churchill, and made him the new King of Iraq, a position he held until he died of cancer in 1933. Faisal was not an Iraqi and had never visited Iraq prior to becoming its king. His challenge was to rule over an artificial monarchy composed of three distinct groups of people—Sunni Kurds, Sunni Arabs, and Shi’ite Arabs—in a kingdom that was imposed by the British, who in turn crowned him, a foreigner, to rule as Faisal I, King of Iraq. Faisal’s rule was a delicate dance as he sought to balance British interests and Iraqi suspicions of his pro-Western policies.77 After his death in 1933, Faisal’s son Ghazi was crowned king. King Ghazi was later killed in a car accident in 1939, leaving his four-year-old son King Faisal II to assume the throne. King Faisal II, the boy king, was the cousin of another young monarch, King Hussein of Jordan. In 1958, Faisal II responded to a request for military assistance from King Hussein and ordered Iraqi troops to deploy to Lebanon to assist Jordanian forces with a crisis. Rather than deploy to Lebanon in support of the Jordanian request, the Iraqi army brigade commander, Brigadier Abdul Karim Qassim staged a coup and overthrew the pro-British King Faisal II on July 14, 1958. The entire royal family was subsequently executed on palace grounds, with some bodies being mutilated and dragged through the streets.78 The challenges the Hashemite monarchy experienced in balancing outside influences while ruling over a country with three distinct groups 75 Associated Press, “AP Explains: Who Are Iraq’s Iran-Backed Militias?” ABC News, December 31, 2019, accessed May 18, 2020, https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/ap-explains-iraqs-iranbacked-militias-68004437. 76 Michael Thornton, “Why Was Saddam Hussein Haunted by the Brutal Murder of Iraq’s Boy King?” Daily Mail, August 7, 2008, accessed May 16, 2020, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/art icle-1042749/Why-Saddam-Hussein-haunted-brutal-murder-Iraqs-boy-king.html. 77 Thornton, “Why Was Saddam Hussein Haunted by the Brutal Murder of Iraq’s Boy King?” 78 Thornton, “Why Was Saddam Hussein Haunted by the Brutal Murder of Iraq’s Boy King?”

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of people continue to this day and contributes to the political upheaval and national insecurities that drive many of Iraq’s political decisions. At the end of World War II, Iraq was an oil-rich state that aligned with the West as a member of the Baghdad Pact, along with Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Nearly seventy years later it struggles with economic, political, ethnic, and religious issues, all of which are complicated by the ascendance of Iran and its influence in Iraqi domestic politics. Baghdad has been largely ineffective in developing a robust foreign policy because it suffers from an international asymmetry of power, low levels of institutionalism, artificial boundaries, and a fractionalized domestic population.79 Iraqi foreign policy is also influenced by the need to maintain domestic stability while balancing the needs of its Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish populations. Prominent Iraq scholar Phebe Marr argues, when examining Iraq’s foreign policy emphasis between post-World War II and 1981, three themes emerge. First, Baghdad experiences difficulty forging a national identity because it was created with artificial borders and is surrounded by diverse and powerful countries.80 Its two strongest neighbors, Turkey and Iran, also influence Iraq’s domestic political arena due to Iraq’s large Kurdish population (15–20 percent) in the north and its Shia majority (60 percent) in the south. The Kurdish issue is an ethnic and linguistic matter, rather than a religious one, that has perplexed Baghdad because of the Kurdish desire for an autonomous Kurdistan, and the conflict this creates with Turkey. The Arabic language ties the Iraqi Shia to Iraq despite their religious and historical commonalities with Iran. This has shifted more toward an Iranian influence as Iran increased its regional influence after the United States overthrew Saddam Hussein and returned Iraq’s Shi’a majority to power. Iraq’s perception of its regional importance later shifted as the Gulf States, with their smaller populations, increased their living standards and military ties to the United States. The Gulf States’ threat perceptions heightened after the Iranian Revolution when Iraq devoted more of its oil revenue to increasing its military might and weapons of mass destruction capacity.81 Iran’s increased regional influence contributed to a regional power struggle between Tehran and Riyadh, as Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman consolidated power and shows a willingness to challenge Iran. Second, Iraq’s foreign policy is influenced by its desire for independence from U.S., British, and Russian influence. The country has a history of anti-colonial sentiment beginning with resistance to the pro-British policies of the Iraqi monarchy, and due to Iraq’s reactions to Britain replacing an anti-British government with one that was more pro-British in 1941. This was one of many instances of Western intrusions into Iraqi domestic politics that fueled anti-imperialism and suspicion of British and American foreign interference in its domestic affairs.82 For Marr, as Iraq gained 79 Phebe Marr, “Iraq: Balancing Foreign and Domestic Realities,” Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 181. 80 Marr, “Iraq: Balancing Foreign and Domestic Realities,” 182. 81 Marr, “Iraq: Balancing Foreign and Domestic Realities,” 184. 82 Marr, “Iraq: Balancing Foreign and Domestic Realities,” 184.

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greater wealth from oil revenue, its economic dependence on the West and Gulf States increased due to debt incurred from military spending as a result of its wars with the Kurds and Iran. This weakened economic stature contributed to Saddam Hussein’s decision to invade Kuwait in 1990.83 Third, Iraq’s geography influences its foreign policy because it shares borders with two powerful states (Turkey and Iran), two political rivals (Syria and Saudi Arabia), and two weaker states with strong ties to the United States (Kuwait and Jordan). Despite its size, Iraq has very limited access to the Arabian/Persian Gulf, which impedes its ability to transport its oil reserves. This increases its sense of vulnerability because of its dependence on neighboring states to transport its oil to the world market.84 Baghdad’s foreign policy is also influenced by its history of a near constant state of war. Iraq was vocal in its opposition to Israel’s independence and contributed troops to fight the Jewish state in 1948. Two decades later, Iraq contributed troops to fight in the 1967 Six-Day War and began a military buildup due to its poor military performance against the Israelis. This buildup bore results when Iraqi forces suppressed the Kurdish insurgency of 1974–1975. Ken Pollack argues the defeat of the Kurds demonstrated Baghdad could achieve its goals using military force. Secondly, the humiliation of having to accept the Algiers Accord in the face of Iran’s superior military illustrated only the strong survive in the Middle East. Despite efforts to modernize, the Iraqi army still suffered from its internal focus of protecting the regime and externally preparing for a possible conflict with Iran or Israel. The army also suffered from continued incompetence because the Ba’athists promoted officers based on nepotism and their loyalty to Saddam Hussein rather than use a merit-based system that values military competence, command and joint experience, professional military education, and job performance. Competent officers were, instead, rotated to prevent them from developing ties with their men, and more importantly to prevent them from becoming a threat to Saddam.85 In 1980, the Iraqis sought to take advantage of the chaos in the midst of Tehran’s 1979 revolution, and its subsequent purge of military officers who were deemed loyal to the Shah, by invading Iran to seize Khuzestan Province, which contained the bulk of Iran’s oil industry.86 Iraq initiated hostilities by conducting a preemptive strike against the Iranian Air Force, but failed to collect reliable intelligence on Iranian targets and, instead, relied on intelligence gleaned from defectors. The Iranian Air Force subsequently bombed, but did not destroy Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor. During the war, Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against Kurdish insurgents in Halabja, Iraq, and against frontline Iranian troops. The two sides engaged in World War I-era trench warfare to devastating effect, and the eight-year Iran–Iraq War resulted in a stalemate even though Iraq enjoyed the support of most of the Sunni Arab world

83 Marr,

“Iraq: Balancing Foreign and Domestic Realities,” 185. “Iraq: Balancing Foreign and Domestic Realities,” 186. 85 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 182. 86 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 183. 84 Marr,

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and received military intelligence from the United States.87 Washington supported Saddam because he was viewed as a necessary stopgap to halt the expansion of Iran’s revolutionary ideology. During this time, Saddam’s rhetoric drew Israel’s attention when he began developing a supergun and constructing a nuclear reactor. In the late 1980s, the Iraqis hired Canadian Gerald Bull to build a large artillery weapon, nicknamed the “supergun,” as part of Project Babylon.88 Bull originally designed the supergun to provide a more cost-efficient means to launch satellites into orbit, and had worked with the United States and Canada researching supergun technology in the 1960s; however, once he began working for the Iraqis, suspicion grew that the supergun’s dimensions would allow it to potentially fire munitions hundreds of miles into Israel. Bull resisted the idea that Saddam intended to use the supergun to launch artillery shells at his enemies, but General Hussein Kamel al-Majeed, a defector who supervised Iraq’s weapons development program, stated the supergun was “meant for long-range attack and also to blind spy satellites.”89 Bull was later assassinated by unknown assailants on March 22, 1990.90 In the late 1970s, suspicions grew over Saddam’s nuclear ambitions. The Iraqi nuclear program began in the 1950s with the purchase of a Soviet-made reactor. According to Brands and Palkki, Iraq’s nuclear program lagged for the next 15 years until Saddam Hussein took over the Iraqi Atomic Energy Committee in 1973. Saddam recruited Iraqi scientists and signed cooperative agreements with the Soviet Union, Italy, and France. The French later supplied Iraq with the 40-megawatt Osirak research reactor and highly enriched uranium. For Saddam, a nuclear weapon would “showcase Iraqi technological development” and allow it to deter attacks from its two primary enemies, Iran and Israel.91 Saddam’s desire to demonstrate Iraq’s technical prowess by acquiring a nuclear deterrent synchs with Sagan’s models of why states decide to build or refrain from building nuclear weapons. Saddam sought a nuclear deterrent to secure Iraq from the perceived threats of Iran and Israel (Security Model), while also believing a nuclear weapon would provide Baghdad a symbol of modernity (Norms Model).92 We have to have this protection for the Iraqi citizen so that he will not be disappointed and held hostage by the scientific advancement taking place in Iran or in the Zionist entity… 87 William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East, 6th ed. (Boulder,

CO: Westview Press, 2016), 443. 88 Kat Eschner, “The Bizarre Story of Saddam Hussein’s Failed ‘Supergun’,” Smithsonian Magazine, April 11, 2017, accessed May 12, 2020, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/bizarrestory-saddam-husseins-failed-supergun-180962820/. 89 William Park, “The Tragic Tale of Saddam Hussein’s ‘Supergun’,” BBC, March 17, 2016, accessed May 18, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20160317-the-man-who-tried-to-make-a-sup ergun-for-saddam-hussein. 90 William Scott Malone and David H. Halevy, “Who Murdered Gerald Bull,” The Washington Post, February 10, 1991, accessed May 12, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/ 1991/02/10/who-murdered-gerald-bull/bfce6e11-7dff-4964-864d-29db5e02753b/. 91 Brands and Palkki, “Why Did Saddam Want the Bomb?” 92 Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?” 4.

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Without such deterrence, the Arab nation will continue to be threatened by the Zionist entity and Iraq will remain threatened by the Zionist entity.93

Brands and Palkki argue Saddam’s desires went beyond Sagan’s Security and Norms Models, because he also wanted a nuclear weapon to wage a long-term conventional war with Israel. The authors also argue Saddam’s anti-Semitism was so intense that it fed his hostility toward Israel and his belief that war was inevitable. Based on transcribed audio files, Brands and Palkki assert Saddam informed his inner circle that The Protocols of the Elders of Zion was an accurate portrayal of Jewish and Israeli goals. The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) classifies The Protocols of the Elders of Zion as fraudulent and racist literature. It is falsely believed the book is the confidential minutes of a nineteenth-century Jewish conclave meeting, and anti-Semites use it as proof of a global Jewish conspiracy to start wars and create chaos in order to seize power and rule as kings over the rest of the world.94 Saddam argued, The Zionists are greedy – I mean the Jews are greedy. Whenever any issue relates to the economy, their greed is very high… We should reflect on all that we were able to learn from The Protocols of the Elders of Zion… I do not believe that there was any falsification with regard to those Zionist objectives, specifically with regard to the Zionist desire to usurp – usurping the economies of people.95

Saddam’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon was a desire for security and prestige, but with the added dimension of virulent anti-Semitism directed at Israel. According to Brands and Palkki, Saddam believed Jews and Israelis were “devious individuals motivated by sinister designs.”96 He argued if the Arabs again attacked Israel without having nuclear weapons, the Arab conventional advances could be stopped by Israeli conventional power. If, however, the Arabs had a nuclear deterrent, they could wage a conventional war of attrition with Israel because the Arab armies had larger numbers and were more willing to accept large numbers of casualties than were the Israelis. According to transcribed recordings, Saddam argued the inevitability of another Arab–Israeli war, This issue between the Arabs and Israel will never be resolved. It is either Israel or the Arabs… Either the Arabs are slaves to Israel and Israel controls their destinies, or the Arabs can be their own masters and Israel is like Formosa’s [Taiwan] location to China, at best.97

93 Hal Brands and David Palkki, “Why Did Saddam Want the Bomb? The Israel Factor and the Iraqi Nuclear Program,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, August 3, 2011, accessed May 16, 2020, https://www.fpri.org/article/2011/08/why-did-saddam-wat-the-bomb-the-israel-fac tor-and-the-iraqi-nuclear-program/. 94 Anti-Defamation League, “A Hoax of Hate: The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion,” ADL, accessed July 6, 2020, https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounders/a-hoax-of-hate-the-protocolsof-the-learned-elders-of-zion. 95 Brands and Palkki, “Why Did Saddam Want the Bomb?” 96 Brands and Palkki, “Why Did Saddam Want the Bomb?” 97 Brands and Palkki, “Why Did Saddam Want the Bomb?”

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With the long-term danger of Saddam Hussein with nuclear weapons, Israel decided to preempt the rise of an adversarial nuclear power, and the consequent shift in the regional power balance, before this threat could materialize.98 On June 7, 1981, the Israeli Air Force bombed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor, in a strike dubbed Operation Opera, because the Israelis perceived a nuclear Iraq would be an existential threat to the Jewish State. Saddam Hussein’s response to Israel’s attack on Iraq’s reactor was an appeal to his fellow Arabs to help him acquire an atomic bomb to confront the Israelis in order to achieve peace.99 Israel’s preventive strike against the Osirak reactor was thought by some to be a successful use of counterproliferation strategy. However, competing research argues the Raid on Osirak actually compelled Iraq to accelerate and focus its nuclear proliferation efforts covertly.100 Consequently, Iraq began a full-scale covert crash course nuclear program that would have remained undetected had Saddam not invaded Kuwait. On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded the Kingdom of Kuwait because it was confident coalition forces would launch an air campaign in response, and Iraqi forces would hunker down and await the ground war Saddam believed he could win by holding coalition forces to a stalemate. Despite Saddam’s initial beliefs, the coalition air campaign lasted from January 17 to February 24, 1991, far longer than his predicted ten-day air war. The ground war began on February 24 and ended on February 28, 1991, with a cease-fire. Despite its lopsided defeat, the Iraqi military was able to escape from the Kuwait Theater of Operations with enough forces intact to suppress the Shia and Kurdish rebellions that followed the war. Saddam then engaged in a war of attrition with the United States, as it used airpower to enforce no-fly zones during Operations Northern and Southern Watch, and UN-mandated WMD destruction during Operation Desert Fox. Over the next decade, Iraq played a game of cat and mouse with UN weapons inspectors. Saddam’s ability to evade accountability over his past pursuit of weapons of mass destruction was forever altered on September 11, 2001. After the September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States, members of the Bush administration sought a linkage between al-Qaeda and Iraq, even though there were none. President Bush never publicly blamed Saddam for the 9/11 attacks, and never publicly linked him to Osama bin Laden, but instead used vague language that provided an implicit nexus between al-Qaeda and Iraq. The language and transitions Bush used in his speeches “almost compelled listeners to infer a connection.”101 There are numerous theories and beliefs as to why the Bush administration pursued war with Iraq in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Stephen Kinzer argues Pentagon officials saw Iraq as a “proving ground for their theories” of how future wars could be fought with a smaller footprint. Kinzer argues the United States has been able to project power in the Middle East through the use of a proxy country. After World War II, the United States used Iran as its power projection territory, but this relationship 98 Kirschenbaum,

“Operation Opera,” 50. “Problems of Proliferation,” 205. 100 Albright, “Iraq’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Past, Present, and Future Challenges.” 101 Gershkoff and Kushner, “Shaping Public Opinion,” 525. 99 Goheen,

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ended after the 1979 revolution. Washington then turned to Saudi Arabia, but by the end of century, there were too many concerns about Saudi Arabia’s “long-term stability” due to concerns with religious radicalism, so officials looked at Iraq to be the next host.102 Still, others in the Bush administration argued Middle East stability could be “achieved only by crushing Israel’s enemies.”103 President Bush saw Iraq as a means to demonstrate America’s military power and a vehicle to spread representative democracy throughout the region, if not the world.104 With no evidence linking Baghdad to the September 11th attacks, the United States invaded Iraq in March 2003 and quickly toppled Saddam Hussein and his government. Saddam was later captured by U.S. forces outside his hometown of Tikrit, on December 13, 2003. After his capture and subsequent interrogation, Saddam revealed his chemical and nuclear programs were destroyed the decade prior in the wake of Operations Desert Storm and Desert Fox. When questioned as to why he used chemical weapons against the Kurds in Halabja, Saddam replied, “They were traitors and Iranians.”105 He admittedly remained purposely vague about his nuclear and chemical weapons programs to bluff Iran and to save face because he had little means of defending Iraq against outside powers due to U.S. attrition of his military forces during Desert Storm and the enforcement of the no-fly zones, and Desert Fox. During the same interview, Saddam denounced Osama bin Laden and asserted he had no dealings with al-Qaeda, contrary to Bush administration suggestions.106 In both the 1981 and 2003 Iraq proliferation cases, all roads led to Saddam. Leading up to Israel’s 1981 bombing of Osirak, Saddam’s desire for security and prestige, while espousing anti-Semitic rhetoric doomed his initial nuclear ambitions. As with the case of his nuclear program being discovered after the defeat of Iraqi forces during the Gulf War, Saddam’s actions were one of the greatest obstacles to Iraq becoming a nuclear weapon state. Iraq’s nuclear ambitions were also impeded by Saddam’s involvement in the nuclear program. Robert Goheen argues a state may have security concerns due to the superiority of a neighbor’s conventional arms or by its actual or imminent nuclear weapons capability.107 Saddam had high threat perceptions of his prime enemies Iran and Israel, and their power relative to Iraq. In the case of Israel, it has unrivaled conventional military dominance in the region, and Iran is accused of pursuing nuclear weapons. These threat perceptions and concerns with security and regime survival compelled Iraq to pursue a nuclear deterrent. The same motivations that drove it to pursue a nuclear capability also caused its collapse because Saddam would never admit to the world that he no longer had weapons 102 Kinzer,

Overthrow, 292. Overthrow, 292. 104 Kinzer, Overthrow, 293. 105 L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 258. 106 Glenn Kessler, “Saddam Hussein Said WMD Talk Helped Him Look Strong to Iran,” Washington Post, July 2, 2009, accessed January 4, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/art icle/2009/07/01/AR2009070104217.html. 107 Goheen, 205. 103 Kinzer,

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of mass destruction program out of fear of an Iranian or Israeli attack. The alleged presence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and a reconstituted nuclear program are the rationales the Bush administration used to justify the invasion of Iraq. The invasion resulted in the overthrow and death of Saddam Hussein, and the unintended rise of Iranian influence in Iraq because the United States vanquished Iran’s enemy and restored the Shi’a to power.

Syria—National Security and Threat Perceptions For the past seven decades, Syria’s foreign policy has been driven by a combination of Arab nationalism and confrontation with Israel. Syria’s historic position as the Arab state with the most radical stance toward Israel puts the two states into direct competition as they compete for sway over the same sphere of influence in the Levant, or Bilad Al-Sham, which is comprised of Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria.108 Jamal Wakim argues the region’s distinctive demographic composition drives an irreconcilable conflict between Damascus and Tel Aviv. Whereas Syria comprises different religious groups bound primarily by Arab ethnicity or nationality, Israel was founded as a “Jewish State and as refuge for the Jews of Europe.” Wakim argues these competing narratives compel each side to exert different dimensions within the same region. Syria stresses the nationalist dimension, arguing the Levant is a majority Arab region bound by one history, language, and culture, while Israel stresses a pluralist perspective, arguing the Levant consists of many religious groups.109 These competing visions drive threat perceptions, policies, and actions that perpetuate hostility between the two neighboring states (Map 5). The hostility manifests a one-dimensional military component because Syria is largely incapable of deterring or defending against Israeli military power. In 2007, Israel attacked and destroyed a suspected North Korea-built nuclear reactor in the Syrian Desert near Deir ez-Zor. Damascus has also been unable to challenge Israeli incursions into its airspace, it has failed to regain the strategic Golan Heights, and struggles to win a civil war that has ravaged the country since March 2011. The uprising began in Dera’a after fifteen teenagers, inspired by the Arab Spring, were arrested and tortured for writing anti-government graffiti on a wall: “The people want the overthrow of the regime.” The citizens responded by gathering after Friday prayers to protest and were fired on by Syrian security forces. Security forces then opened fire on a funeral procession the following day, after which pro-democracy protests spread across the city.110 President Assad’s brother, Maher, tried to suppress 108 Jamal Wakim, “Why Syria Considers Israel an Existential Threat: Conflicting National Security

Interests and Competition Over the Same Sphere of Influence,” Contemporary Arab Affairs, vol. 13, no. 2 (June 2020): 81. 109 Wakim, “Why Syria Considers Israel an Existential Threat: Conflicting National Security Interests and Competition Over the Same Sphere of Influence,” 83. 110 Danahar, The New Middle East, 372.

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the revolt, just as his uncle Rifaat had done three decades earlier when he crushed the Muslim Brotherhood uprising in Hama. After Maher’s efforts failed, unrest spread across the country and Syrians took up arms and demanded President Assad’s resignation. While Syrian forces struggled against the rebels, Israel was allegedly arming and funding at least twelve rebel groups aligned with the Free Syrian Army in southern Syria to prevent Iran-backed fighters and the Islamic State from seizing territory near the Israeli border. Syrian rebels were also being supplied by Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United States.111 As the uprising expanded across the country, Syrian forces fought against the Free Syrian Army, the Islamic State, and other assorted groups, losing large swaths of territory as government forces were stretched thin. To ensure survival of his government, President Assad requested Russian and Iranian military assistance. Russian airpower shifted the war’s momentum, and Iranian, Hezbollah, and Iran-backed militias provided much-needed boots on the ground to seize and hold territory, while also allowing Syrian forces to open multiple fronts across the country so rebel forces could not readily shift assets to resupply forces in neighboring territories. In the north, Syrian forces battled the last rebel stronghold in Idlib Province, while also skirmishing with Kurdish and Turkish troops along the border. The current regional power competition between Syria and its neighbors reflect historical divisions that date back to Syria’s independence as a republic. Syria’s borders are an artificial creation of Britain and France as part of the Sykes–Picot Agreement of 1916, which Paul Danahar observes was drawn up in secret because the British had already offered to recognize the same land as an independent Arab state to the Sharif of Mecca, Hussein Bin Ali, in return for him leading a revolt against Ottoman rule during World War I.112 These artificial borders cut across religious and ethnic lines and contribute to Syria’s contentious domestic political and internal power struggles. In the post-World War II years, Syria battled with the two Hashemite Kingdoms— Iraq and Jordan—and Egypt for influence as it sought to be portrayed as the pan-Arab champion of the Arab and Palestinian causes. On February 1, 1958, under the guidance of the Arab nationalist Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Syria briefly unified with Egypt to become the United Arab Republic (UAR). The union ended on September 28, 1961, when Syrian military officers staged a coup and wanted to discuss reforms to the agreement with Egypt. Nasser declined the request, and the Syrian officers ended the union between the two countries.113 The United States sought to assuage Syria’s security concerns by providing weapons and financial assistance, and guaranteeing its borders through the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, and the proposed Middle East Defense Organization of 1951. Syria’s political establishment rebuffed the U.S. offers because they were perceived as a veiled attempt to protect

111 Tsurkov,

“Inside Israel’s Secret Program to Back Syrian Rebels,” Foreign Policy. The New Middle East, 388. 113 John McHugo, Syria: A History of the Last Hundred Years (New York: The New Press, 2015), 141. 112 Danahar,

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Israel by attaching conditions to the aid packages.114 During the multiple Arab–Israeli Wars, Syria was the main combatant fighting against Israel. In spite of consecutive Arab defeats, the Soviet Union continued to provide diplomatic, economic and military support to the Arab countries. Using this aid, the Syrians portrayed themselves as the lone sentinel fighting U.S. imperialism and the Zionists, while also supporting the Palestinian cause.115 Despite continued Soviet military assistance, Syria lost the strategic Golan Heights to Israel during the 1967 Six-Day War and tried unsuccessfully to retake it during the 1973 Yom Kippur/Ramadan War (Map 6). Israel annexed the territory in 1981 and the United States recognized this annexation in 2019. In a February 1975 speech, Hafez al-Assad pressed the United Nations for a solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict, recognition of Palestinian rights, and acceptance of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. For our part we look upon peace in its true sense… a peace without occupation, without destitute peoples, and without citizens whose homeland is denied to them… Anyone who imagines that the peace process can be piecemeal is mistaken… We say now as we have always said – that peace should be based on complete withdrawal from the lands occupied in 1967 and on the full restoration of the rights of the Palestinian people. It is being said – and we might ask – what are these rights? Our answer is: let the PLO be asked. It is the PLO which will answer and we will support it in its reply.116

Learning from Syria’s previous defeats by the Israelis, Hafez al-Assad sought to build a unified Arab front against Israel and argued that any Arab negotiation with Israel should be a collective effort. In pursuing this approach, Assad also sought a united Arab front that could withstand U.S. and Soviet pressure while facing its primary enemy, Israel.117 Notwithstanding these efforts, Syria remained militarily weak due to a lack of funding to upgrade its military equipment and the absence of a robust indigenous defense industry. Syria began to see itself as the “confrontation state” and the primary Arab vanguard against Israel. This stance stood in contrast to Syrian internal strife that divided the country along different religions, ethnicities, and regional and class differences.118 After Egypt signed a peace treaty with the Israelis, Syria sought increased Soviet aid in an attempt to build a military parity with Israel. The Assad government then began reaching out to Iran and Lebanon’s Shia communities to strengthen its position and solidify its opposition to Israel. It sold military equipment to Iran during the Iran– Iraq War and publicly sided with Tehran because it argued Iraq was fighting a friend of the Arabs rather than fighting the Arab’s true enemy, Israel. As a reward for its efforts, Syria received financial assistance from Libya and the Gulf States.119 Soviet 114 C. Ernest Dawn, “The Foreign Policy of Syria,” Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International

Relations of Regional and Outside Powers, ed. L. Carl Brown (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 166. “The Foreign Policy of Syria,” 169. 116 McHugo, Syria: A History of the Last Hundred Years, 159. 117 Dawn, “The Foreign Policy of Syria,” 170. 118 Danahar, The New Middle East, 388. 119 Dawn, “The Foreign Policy of Syria,” 173. 115 Dawn,

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military assistance to Syria took a downward turn in the wake of a disruption to the international system and its balance of power equation following the collapse of the Soviet Union. After its withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Soviet Union began reducing financial assistance to its client states, thereby curtailing Syria’s pursuit of a conventional military parity with Israel. Syria’s national security interests were further tested after the Iran–Iraq War when Saddam Hussein supported Syria’s rival in Lebanon. Syria countered Iraq’s support for its rival by siding with the United States after Iraq invaded Kuwait. After the Gulf War, Damascus expanded its relationship with Tehran and assisted in supplying Hezbollah with weapons in its fight against Israel. In addition to their shared opposition to Israel, the Syrians and Iranians also share religious similarities. The Assad family is a member of the religious minority Alawite community (also known as Alawis), which venerates Ali ibn Abi Talib, the cousin and the son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammed. The Alawites are considered “an offshoot of Shi’ism” even though they broke from Shi’ism over 1000 years ago.120 Many Sunnis regard the Alawites as heretics because they see it as the “deification” of Ali.121 Nir Rosen argues that in the Arab world the Sunnis are the hegemon and contribute to the insecurity felt by minority sects, including Shia and heterodox sects like the Alawites because these religious minorities are often persecuted by Sunnis. Rosen states the secretive Alawite faith has little resemblance to mainstream Islamic doctrine and that it involves belief in transmigration of the soul, reincarnation, the divinity of Ali ibn Abi Talib—the fourth Caliph—and a holy trinity consisting of Ali, the Prophet Muhammed, and one of the Prophet’s companions, Salman al Farisi.122 Similar to the Shia, Alawites follow the custom of Taqiyya, which allows them to hide or deny their religious identity to protect themselves from religious persecution.123 Sunnis comprise 74 percent of Syria’s 22 million people, Alawites make up 12 percent, Christians comprise 10 percent, Druze make up 3 percent, while Ismailis, Yazidis, and Jews comprise smaller numbers.124 Historian Daniel Pipes addressed the minority Alawites ruling a predominately Sunni nation and the internal and regional strife it causes when he observed, “An Alawi ruling Syria is like an untouchable becoming maharajah in India or a Jew becoming tsar in Russia – an unprecedented development shocking to the majority population which had monopolized power for so many centuries.”125

120 “Syria’s

Alawites, A Secretive and Persecuted Sect,” Reuters, January 31, 2012, accessed May 18, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-alawites-sect-idUSTRE80U1HK20120131. 121 Danahar, The New Middle East, 389. 122 Nir Rosen, “Assad’s Alawites: The Guardians of the Throne,” Al Jazeera, October 10, 2011, accessed July 11, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/10/201110101224346 71982.html. 123 Danahar, The New Middle East, 389. 124 “Syria’s Alawites, A Secretive and Persecuted Sect,” Reuters, January 31, 2012, accessed May 18, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-alawites-sect-idUSTRE80U1HK20120131. 125 Danahar, The New Middle East, 389.

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Syrian attempts to create a unified Arab front against Israel have been tempered by conservative Arab monarchs’ distrust of its Alawite-led government.126 Much of the distrust of Syria is based on religious differences and Damascus’ relationship with Tehran. Since the early stages of the Syrian Civil War, Iran has increased its presence inside Syria, further expanding its influence in the Levant. The Saudis view Iran’s expansion with alarm and largely regard the struggle in Syria as a proxy war between itself and Iran, resulting in the Saudis arming and supplying Syrian rebels with the goal of toppling Assad. The Saudis have also pressed the United States to take increased action in Syria, and lobbied for additional lethal aid for anti-Assad forces and a proposed no-fly zone to ground Syria’s Air Force.127 The Saudis previously led a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) military intervention into Bahrain the same month the Syrian Civil War started, to suppress an Iran-support Shia uprising against Bahrain’s Sunni-led monarchy. While seeking a united Arab front against Israel, Hafez al-Assad also faced internal struggles emanating from anti-government Sunni forces. The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Suriya) which long considered the Alawites infidels and heretics, launched a rebellion against the Baathist government that led to devastating levels of violence from 1976 to 1982. The Muslim Brotherhood is a Sunni political group founded in 1928 by Islamic scholar Hassan al-Banna. With its slogan, “Islam is the Solution,” the Brotherhood promotes governing society based on Islamic principles and pursues political power through elections and occasionally by violence.128 When the secular Baathists took power in a 1963 military coup, they overturned Syria’s social pyramid and instituted reforms that hurt the Sunni elite and the urban middle class, who were among the Brotherhood’s strongest supporters. Yehuda Blanga observes that because the Baathists were secular-nationalists who supported religious minorities, including the Alawites, hostility toward the new government festered until clashes broke out. The Muslim Brotherhood was outlawed and its leaders arrested. Ideologically, the differences between the secular Alawiteled Assad government and the Muslim Brotherhood were untenable, and violence between the two forces continued. In 1975, Adnan Saad al-Din, of Hama, was elected the supreme guide of the Brotherhood. He reorganized Syria’s Brotherhood and oriented its ideology toward using violence to turn secular Syria into a sharia state. From 1976 to 1979, the Brothers conducted a campaign of violence against the government that included the assassination of government officials.129

126 W. Andrew Terrill, “Arab Threat Perceptions and the Future of the U.S. Military Presence in the

Middle East,” U.S. Army War Collee Strategic Studies Institute (October 2015), 8. “Arab Threat Perceptions and the Future of the U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East,” 9. 128 Mo Abbas, “What Is the Muslim Brotherhood, and What Does It Have to Do with the QatarSaudi Split?” NBC News, July 15, 2017, accessed July 11, 2020, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/ world/who-are-muslim-brotherhood-what-does-it-have-do-qatar-n782571. 129 Yehuda U. Blanga, “The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Syrian Civil War,” Middle East Policy Council, vol. xxiv, no. 3 (Fall 2017), accessed July 11, 2020, https://mepc.org/journal/rolemuslim-brotherhood-syrian-civil-war. 127 Terrill,

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In 1979, the Brotherhood initiated a campaign of assassinating Alawite intellectuals, judges, and doctors. The Brothers also massacred 83 Alawite military officer candidates at the Aleppo military academy, and later assassinated Sheikh Yusuf Sarem.130 The uprising gained strength and popular support as it grew to encompass strikes, demonstrations, and violent clashes between Brotherhood supporters and government forces. On June 26, 1980, the Brotherhood attempted to assassinate President Hafez al-Assad, who responded with an all-out assault against the insurgents that included massacring 1000 Muslim Brotherhood prison inmates in Palmyra. In February 1982, Syrian army and anti-government Sunni fighters began fighting during an uprising in the Brotherhood stronghold in Hama. Anti-government forces seized government buildings and declared the city liberated. Hafez’s brother Rifaat led the assault on Hama by laying siege and leveling the city with artillery. Over the ensuing three weeks, 25,000 people were killed, along with 1000 Syrian soldiers. Following the Hama massacre, Muslim Brothers were imprisoned, tortured, murdered, or disappeared. The group’s support base was destroyed and the remaining members went into exile in other Arab countries and Europe.131 The uprising was the last major episode of anti-government revolt until the 2011 Syrian Civil War, when the Brotherhood returned as a leader in the campaign to overthrow Bashar al-Assad. Until the 2011 Sunni-led insurgency challenged the Assad’s grip on power, Syria’s greatest national security threat had been Israel. Since 1948, the Syrians and Israelis have been in conflict over the Golan Heights, water rights, nuclear proliferation, continued hostilities from the various Arab–Israeli Wars, Syria’s support of Hezbollah, and the Iranian military presence inside Syria. The two countries have also fought proxy wars in Lebanon. Israel is perceived to be an existential threat to Syria because of its vastly superior conventional military, as well as due to its ability and willingness to interdict Syrian airspace and attack targets without fear of reprisal. From the Syrian perspective, the Israelis have continually initiated hostility in the region. Since its 1948 independence, the Syrians argue Israel has undertaken an aggressive anti-Arab policy and land grab, in which it disregards Arab concerns, occupies their lands, interferes with their rights to self-determination, and continually threatens the peace and security of Arab society.132 Damascus argues Israel’s qualitative military edge affects both Syrian and regional security by creating a regional power imbalance, and because of its military power, Israel has ambitions to expand further into Arab land without fear of a serious challenge or consequences.133 Syria’s national security and threat perceptions have been dominated by insecurity and a fear of Israel due to a history of military defeats, the loss of the Golan Heights, and an inability to challenge Israeli incursions into its airspace. Syria also has strained 130 Nir Rosen, “Assad’s Alawites: The Guardians of the Throne,” Al Jazeera, October 10, 2011, accessed July 11, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/10/201110101224346 71982.html. 131 Dara Conduit, The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 3. 132 United Nations, National Threat Perceptions in the Middle East (New York: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1995), 67. 133 United Nations, National Threat Perceptions in the Middle East, 72.

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relations with its neighboring states due to its partnership with Iran, and the large presence of Iran-backed Shia militias inside Syria because of its civil war. Syria’s threat perceptions are also elevated due to a history of internal strife and the domestic and regional influences on its political elites because they are a historically persecuted religious minority within its own borders, and are rejected and viewed as heretics by many of their Sunni neighbors. Despite Russian airpower and Iranian-supported ground troops helping shore up its forces and reverse tremendous territorial losses, Syria still battles insurgents in a civil war that has been raging since March 2011. In the midst of its civil war, it still faces frequent incursions of Israeli Air Force strike aircraft bombing Iranian and Iran-backed militias inside Syria. Syria has engaged in numerous combat operations against Israel and has been defeated in nearly all engagements. Its relatively weak economy and absence of large oil reserves combined with the collapse of Soviet patronage means Syria will remain militarily weak in relation to Israel for the foreseeable future. Israel’s proximity to Damascus and its ability to interdict Syrian airspace contribute to Syria’s insecurity because of its inability to deter Israeli aggression. With Saddam Hussein overthrown, Syria and Iran are the last two remaining states in the region that openly resist and remain hostile to Israel. Iran has the advantage of distance between it and Israel, while Syria is next door and within easy striking distance of Israeli strike aircraft. Leverett argues Syria uses its ties to Hezbollah to support its strategic goals of compelling Israel to negotiate peace, while also bolstering Syria’s position in Lebanon. Damascus maintains its influence with Hezbollah by being the conduit for Iranian military supplies going to Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon.134 The United States has expressed concern over Syria’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. U.S. intelligence assessments concluded the Assad government’s efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction are focused on achieving a “strategic deterrent based on ballistic missiles and chemical warfare capabilities, as the ultimate guarantor of regime survival.”135 A nuclear weapon would have given Syria a deterrent capability, a guarantor against regime change, and allow it to secure its current territorial integrity. In 2007, Israel attacked and destroyed an alleged North Koreabuilt nuclear reactor in the Syrian Desert in Deir ez-Zur Province, roughly 280 miles east of Damascus. The Israelis and Syrians initially downplayed the attack, with neither side immediately admitting it was a reactor. Prime Minister Netanyahu later wrote on Twitter, The Israeli government, the Israel Defense Forces and the Mossad [intelligence services] prevented Syria from developing nuclear capability. They are worthy of full praise for this… Israel’s policy was and remains consistent – to prevent our enemies from arming themselves with nuclear weapons.136

134 Flynt Leverett, Inheriting Syria: Bashar’s Trial by Fire (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2005), 13. 135 Leverett, Inheriting Syria, 13. 136 Tom Bateman, “Israel Admits Striking Suspected Syrian Nuclear Reactor in 2007,” BBC News, March 21, 2018, accessed May 30, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-43481803.

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It will take Syria decades to rebuild, once it finally achieves victory in its current civil war. In the interim, it will likely remain a battleground between Iran and Israel, for as long as Iran maintains a military presence inside the country and continues to use Syrian territory as a conduit to resupply Hezbollah. With its economy severely damaged during the 10-plus year civil war, Syria will struggle rebuilding its infrastructure and military equipment, therefore continuing its vulnerability to Israeli incursions into its territory. It still remains to be seen how much influence Russia and Iran will retain inside Syria, since their finances and military forces allowed Bashar al-Assad’s government to survive. These variables will figure into Syria’s threat perceptions and future political intrigue.

Iran—National Security and Threat Perceptions Iran’s national security policy is defined by the desire to defend itself against hostile powers, while maintaining Shi’a clerical rule or Velayat-e Faqih, protecting its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence.137 This policy is not unlike that of any sovereign nation; however, because of a pattern of behavior, implicit bias, and contentious relationships with the United States and Israel, many actions taken by Iran are viewed with distrust and suspicion. For Iran, the United States is the longstanding threat to its national security, followed closely by Israel. Many of Iran’s leaders believe the United States and Israel seek to institute regime change in Tehran and replace the Shi’a clerics with a more Western-friendly government. Consequently, Iran has sought to modernize its conventional military forces in anticipation of a military confrontation with the United States, Israel, or the Gulf States. Perhaps chief among Iran’s national security priorities is preservation of Velayat-e Faqih. Velayat-e Faqih is critical for Iran because it is the concept that places all political power and religious authority with the ruling clergy, who make nationallevel decisions. These decisions must then be approved by the Supreme Leader of Iran, or Rahbar-e Moazzam, who ranks above the President of Iran and whose power is absolute. Ray Takeyh observes that Iran perceives Israel as an existential threat to itself and the entire Islamic world. Consequently, Israel is considered a military and an ideological threat and Iran’s leaders agree on the strategic value of a nuclear weapons program.138 Tehran’ s foreign policy is also influenced by its desire to regain its past glory and prominence as a regional power reminiscent of the Persian Empire, retaining its autonomy while expanding its influence in a region where it is a religious minority, and challenging the regional power structure established by the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. A study conducted by RAND argues that Iran’s revolutionary religious fervor and Persian nationalism have also driven its

137 Saideh

Lotfian, “Prevent and Defend: Threat Perceptions and Iran’s Defense Policy,” Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs, vol. 3, no. 3 (Fall 2011): 10. 138 Khan, Iran and Nuclear Weapons, 61.

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confrontation with its neighbors, the United States, and Israel, though these influences on Iran’s foreign policy have declined in recent years.139 As a national security strategy, Iran has sought to distance itself from Western dominance while projecting asymmetric power throughout the region through its Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Quds Force, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Popular Mobilization Forces (Map 13). Its vast asymmetric and ballistic missile capabilities provide a balance to its adversaries’ military technological advantages, and provides Iran the capability to retaliate against its more powerful adversaries (Map 10). Tehran also challenges the existing status quo by supporting and building the military capacity of its allied partners in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Gaza, and Yemen.140 Iran sees itself as the guardian of the world’s Shiite population and the Supreme Leader of Iran as the leader of this global Shiite community. As part of this guardianship, Iran provides funding, weapons, and training to Shiite militias in the region to fight who they perceive to be their oppressors and rivals for power, the Sunni monarchs and Israel. The Gulf States and Israel, in turn, view this support as inciting rebellion within the Sunni Gulf States and aiding HAMAS and Hezbollah terrorist attacks against Israel. The United States has viewed Iran’s support to these groups as state-sponsored terrorism, since designating it in 1984, because many of these groups are designated by the U.S. State Department as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, including: HAMAS, Hezbollah, Katai’b Hezbollah, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF). Iran’s continued support for these Shi’a groups contributes to the U.S. position that Iran is the leading State Sponsor of Terrorism. As of 2020, the United States designates three countries as State Sponsors of Terrorism: Iran, North Korea, and Syria. This designation prevents these states from purchasing U.S. military equipment, receiving U.S. financial assistance, and from receiving aid or loans from the World Bank or International Monetary Fund (IMF). Kourosh Ziabari reports the IRGC provides military advisors, money, weapons, technology, and advanced training to Tehran’s partners and affiliates, and oversees Iran’s ballistic missile program. Ziabari also asserts the IRGC runs many domestic projects, including the Khatam-al Anbiya Construction Headquarters, as well as other projects tied to Iran’s oil and gas industry.141 The IRGC is not just a military power, it also possesses domestic political clout and is well-integrated into the Iranian economy, and is thought to have ties to companies that conduct more than $20 billion in business annually.142 Iran compensates for its outdated conventional weapon systems by increasing its domestic military industry capability and expanding its ballistic missile inventory 139 Daniel

Byman, Shahram Chubin, Anoushiravan Ehteshami, and Jerrold Green, Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 7. 140 Seth G. Jones, “War by Proxy: Iran’s Growing Footprint in the Middle East,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (March 2019), 5. 141 Kourosh Ziabari, “The IRGC, Iran’s Military Industrial Complex,” Asia Times, May 20, 2019, accessed July 12, 2020, https://asiatimes.com/2019/05/the-irgc-irans-military-industrial-complex/. 142 Alissa J. Rubin, “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards: The Supreme Leader’s Military-Industrial Complex,” The New York Times, April 9, 2019, accessed July 12, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/ 2019/04/09/world/middleeast/iran-revolutionary-guards-.html.

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and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program. Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Shamkhani declared “Iran has no scientific limitation to extend the range of its military missiles. Iran simply has not the will to extend the range of missiles based on its defense doctrine, however, it constantly works to increase (their) precision.” General Mohammad Ali Jafari, Commander of the IRGC, confirmed the range of Iran’s missiles is 2000 kilometers and that Tehran does not intend to extend beyond this range.143 The Iranians are also suspected of pursuing a nuclear weapons capability and have resumed uranium enrichment after the United States withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018. Despite U.S. and Israeli suspicions of a military component to Iran’s nuclear program, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei maintains Iran does not want nuclear weapons. We have [a] high level of scientific and technological capability in the field of nuclear issues. We do not pursue having nuclear weapons at all; not because of the United States, not because of the sanctions, but because of our ideology, which does not allow weapons of mass destruction such as atomic and chemical weapons and such. These are haram [forbidden], based on shari’ah. Some asked us to tell them to produce them, but do not use them. No! This is wrong, because if we produce them, we will face many costs without any benefits since we will not be using them, and the other side will know we do not wish to use them and this will be similar to not having them. It will make no difference. Therefore, we do not aim to produce them when we do not intend to use them, and this would not be logical and wise at all.144

Iran is concerned with foreign influence in its domestic and international affairs. This concern is largely derived from Russia, Britain, and the United States alternately meddling in its internal affairs over the past century. Iranian perceptions of their physical environment and historical fears of outside interference frame their reality and desire for political and economic independence.145 Abrahamian suggests the three military coups Iran experienced in 1908, 1921, and 1953, were traumatic events that led Iranians to conclude that events that took place in their country were determined by the imperial powers, and not the Iranians. This contributed to a feeling of alienation and isolation between the state and civil society.146 Seyed Hossein Mousavian argues Iran had largely been a client state under Western hegemony because its ruling Qajar state had weak institutions, a pre-modern military, an unindustrialized economy, and was thus dependent on Western patronage.147 The Qajar Dynasty ruled Persia from 1789 to 1925, but under its last ruler, Ahmad Shah Qajar, was overthrown in a 143 Staff

Writers, “Our Defense Doctrine is to Keep Range of Missiles to 2000 km: Shamkhani,” Tehran Times, January 29, 2019, accessed July 17, 2019, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/432 435/Our-defense-doctrine-is-to-keep-range-of-missiles-to-2000km. 144 Paul K. Kerr, “Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status,” Congressional Research Service (December 20, 2019), 52. 145 Anoushiravan Ehteshami, “The Foreign Policy of Iran,” The Foreign Policies of Middle East State (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 285. 146 Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essays on The Islamic Republic (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press), 116. 147 Seyed Hossein Mousavian, “Iranian Perceptions of U.S. Policy Toward Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei’s Mind-Set,” U.S.-Iran Misperceptions: A Dialogue, ed. Abbas Maleki and John Tirman (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 37.

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coup staged by Colonel Reza Khan (Reza Shah), who later established the Pahlavi monarchy under the name Reza Shah Pahlavi. Despite the establishment of a new monarchy, Persian dependence on the West continued throughout the reigns of Reza Shah and his son Mohammad Reza Shah, and triggered an Iranian movement for constitutional reform, and a strengthening and modernization of state institutions to reassert Iran’s independence and autonomy.148 Mousavian argues these events had a lasting impact on the Iranian national psyche, in that their recent history has been consistently interrupted by foreign powers as it moved toward a strong state supporting a democratic nation. The U.S. and British-sponsored overthrow of Iran’s democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh, during Operation Ajax, was intended to preserve the Pahlavi monarchy and protect Western oil interests in Iran. This lent credibility to Iranian claims of foreign manipulation. Mossadegh empowered a sense of national pride and a drive toward Iranian ownership of its natural resources and command of its fate, but these liberal ideas and his relationship with the communist Tudeh Party heightened Western threat perceptions, so in 1953, the United States assisted Mossadegh’s enemies in staging a coup to overthrow him.149 For Iranians, America’s role in the Mossadegh coup was hypocritical in that the United States championed itself as the defender of freedom while using covert action to overthrow an elected government in order to preserve its economic and geopolitical interests.150 The United States’ support for the Shah was especially hypocritical for many Iranians because the Shah was accused of rampant corruption, political repression, and murder, and used his secret police, the SAVAK, to jail, torture, and execute his political opponents.151 Adding to Iranian mistrust of America, SAVAK was reportedly established using U.S. financial and technical assistance, and Israeli techniques.152 The 1979 Iranian Revolution brought Iran into direct conflict with the United States, as memories of Operation Ajax influenced Iran’s perception of U.S. intent. On January 16, 1979, Mohammad Reza Shah fled Iran for a purported vacation, but never to return to the country. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned to Iran in February 1979, after spending 15 years in exile, and soon began inciting anti-American protests. The Shah, who had been supported by the United States, was diagnosed with cancer and the Carter administration allowed him to seek treatment in the United States. Khomeini increased his anti-American rhetoric and protests against the United States for its past involvement in Iranian affairs, and for its support of the Shah and SAVAK. The anti-American protests grew and there were demands 148 Mousavian,

“Iranian Perceptions of U.S. Policy Toward Iran,” 37. Secor, Children of Paradise: The Struggle for the Soul of Iran (New York: Riverhead Books, 2016), 11. 150 Associated Free Press, “Obama Admits US Involvement in 1953 Iran Coup.” 151 Jonathan Kandell, “Savak Agent Describes How He Tortured Hundreds,” The New York Times, June 18, 1979, accessed May 31, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/1979/06/18/archives/savak-agentdescribes-how-he-tortured-hundreds-trial-is-in-a-mosque.html. 152 Richard T. Sale, “SAVAK: A Feared and Pervasive Force,” The Washington Post, May 9, 1977, accessed May 26, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1977/05/09/savak-a-fea red-and-pervasive-force/ad609959-d47b-4b7f-8c8d-b388116df90c/. 149 Laura

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for the United States to return the Shah to Iran for trial. At the encouragement of Ayatollah Khomeini, Iranian students stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, on November 4, 1979, and the subsequent hostage crisis, which lasted for 444 days, had a long-lasting impact on U.S.–Iran relations. Kenneth Katzman argues Iran’s foreign and defense policies are driven by “their perceptions of threats the United States and its allies pose to their regime and their national interests.”153 Western interference in Iranian affairs has also led to a high degree of paranoia, mistrust, insecurity, and factionalism within Iranian politics.154 The high degree of distrust between Iran and the United States and its intentions has led some Iranians to believe the conspiracy theory that the United States created the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or Daesh, so it could wage war against Iran. The Iranian experience of foreign interference, combined with cultural and traditional suspicions, led to a societal attachment to conspiracy theories, particularly as it pertains to Western motivations and intentions. In Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic, Ervand Abrahamian argues this paranoid style permeates Iranian politics, so Khomeinists cast blame on colonialism-imperialism (este-c mar), being helped by a fifth column (sotun-e panjom), as being a constant threat to the Islamic Republic.155 Khomeini believed the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK) were the most dangerous of these sotune panjom, and labeled them monafeqin (hypocrites), who in the Quran pretended to be supporters of the Prophet Mohammad, but actually conspired against him alongside the Christian and Jews, whom he derisively referred to as yahodi.156 Within the realm of Iranian politics and conspiracy theories are terms used to describe hidden outside influences: tuteah (plot), jasouz (spy), khianat (treason), khatar-e kharejeh (foreign danger), naqsheh (designs), ummal-e kharejeh (foreign hands), asrar (secrets), nafouz-e biganeh (alien influence), posht-e pardeh (behind the curtain), and posht-e sahneh (behind the scene).157 In an article for The Guardian, Azar Nafisi illustrates the influence of conspiracy theories and satire within Iranian society through her discussion of the book, My Uncle Napoleon, in which a man who has failed at life fantasizes about becoming Napoleon Bonaparte and becomes convinced of a British plot to destroy him. Nafisi asserts the work of fiction is rooted in Iranian literary satirical tradition that dates back 700 years to the poetry of Obeyd Zakani, and more recently to writings by Sadegh Hedayat, Hossein Moghadam, Dehkhoda, and Iraz Mirza.158 A key to understanding Iranian perceptions and motivations, as well as their sense of pride in the concepts of self-sufficiency and the ability to withstand hardships, is found in understanding the martyrdom of Imam Husayn. On the tenth day of the 153 Kenneth Katzman, “Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies,” Congressional Research Service (April

29, 2020), 1. 154 Abrahamian,

Khomeinism, 113. Khomeinism, 120. 156 Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 122. 157 Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 111. 158 Azar Nafisi, “The Secret Garden,” The Guardian, May 12, 2006, accessed May 31, 2020, https:// www.theguardian.com/books/2006/may/13/featuresreviews.guardianreview26. 155 Abrahamian,

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holy month of Muharram, Shia Muslims show the distinctiveness of their faith by marking the anniversary of the martyrdom of Imam Husayn, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, through the festival of Ashura.159 According to Vali Nasr, young men lead a procession while carrying a staff covered in red, white, and green cloth, and sitting atop the staff is a triangular black pennant and an ornament of a human hand, representing the five holy people the Shia hold dear: the Prophet Muhammad, his daughter Fatima al-Zahra, his son-in-law and cousin Ali, and his grandsons Hassan and Husayn.160 The vivid images of men slashing their heads and whipping their backs with chains and swords are signs of mourning for Husayn’s martyrdom. During this procession, the women distribute food and drinks to the participants, while mourning for Husayn. The sacrifice and martyrdom of Imam Husayn is commemorated beyond the holy month of Muharram. Throughout the year, some Iranians also attend Roseh, which are passion play monologues where an Imam, or Roseh-khoon, recites the story of Husayn’s martyrdom. This recitation often brings attendees to tears.161 For many Shia, Imam Husayn’s death is a symbol of the struggle against injustice, tyranny, and oppression. Husayn ibn Ali was the son of Ali, who was the Prophet’s cousin and husband of his daughter Fatima. As a blood relative, Shia Muslims believe Ali should have been the first successor, or Caliph, of the Prophet, after his death in 632 AD. Shia recognize Ali as the first Caliph, and rightful heir to the Prophet, and believe his oldest son Hassan should have been the second Caliph. The Shia’s central belief is the successors of the Prophet Muhammad should follow his blood line succession through his daughter Fatima and her husband Ali, and down through their sons Hassan and Husayn, who were the Prophet Muhammad’s grandsons. Shiites recognize twelve divinely ordained Imams as the legitimate successors to the Prophet Muhammad, beginning with Ali and ending with the Twelfth Imam, Mohammad al-Mahdi, also known as “Mahdi” and the “Hidden Imam,” who went into hiding, or occultation (ghayba), in the tenth century. The faithful believe the Twelfth Imam will emerge with Jesus (Isa) to bring peace and justice to the world in anticipation of the Final Judgment. Due to disagreements within the Muslim community, or umma, over who would be the next Caliph, Ali was murdered in 661 AD and his heir-apparent, son Hassan, was passed over in favor of Muawiya, ruler of the Damascus-based Umayyad Dynasty. Muawiya stated that upon his death he would leave the selection of the next Caliph to the Muslim community; however, Hassan did not have the support to challenge Muawiya, so he made peace and retired to Medina, and Muawiya’s own son Yazid succeeded him. When Yazid demanded the umma swear allegiance to him, Husayn, who was recognized as the third Imam by Shias, refused and fled with his family to Kufa, in modern-day Iraq. Before they were able to get to Karbala’s safety, Yazid’s supporters intercepted and martyred Husayn and most of his family 159 Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), 31. 160 Nasr, The Shia Revival, 32. 161 Hooman Majd, The Ayatollah Begs to Differ: The Paradox of Modern Iran (New York: Anchor Books, 2009), 140.

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on the tenth day of Muharram, in 680 AD at the Battle of Karbala.162 According to Leverett and Leverett, for devout Shia, the message of Husayn’s death, and the holy day that commemorates it, is that truth must never be betrayed, even at the cost of great sacrifice. The authors argue supporters of Khomeini’s vision interpret this as the Islamic Republic of Iran must never surrender to outside influence, or external aggression or pressure. Ayatollah Khomeini proclaimed Iran’s revolution “stops the people, the leader of the revolution, and its administrators from any retreat, defeat, fear, or weakness. When you fight for God there is no defeat, let alone fear, weakness or retreat.”163 Abrahamian articulates how the complexity of Iranian politics has frustrated Western diplomats. In 1951, a British Foreign Office memorandum highlighted a culturally biased perspective to explain why Iranians were “emotional” in rejecting the British argument that Iran’s oil industry should remain under indefinite British control, the memorandum titled, “Paper on the Persian Social and Political Scene” stated, Most Persians are introverts. Their imagination is strong and they naturally turn to the agreeable side of things. They love poetry and discussion, particularly of abstract ideas… Their emotions are strong and easily aroused. But they continually fail to subordinate their emotions to reason. They lack commonsense and the ability to examine and reason from facts. Their well-known mendacity is rather a carelessness of the truth than a deliberate choice of falsehood. This excess of imagination and distaste for facts leads to an inability to go conscientiously into detail. Often, after finding the world does not answer their dreams, they relapse into indolence and do not persevere in any attempt to bring their ideas into focus with reality. This tendency is exaggerated by the fatalism of their religion. They are intensely individualistic, more in the sense of pursuing their personal interests than in the nobler one of wishing to do things on their own without help. Nearly all classes have a passion for personal gain… They lack social conscience and are unready to submit to communal interests. They are vain, conceited, and unwilling to admit themselves any wrong.164

The author notes the important caveat when discussing Iranian paranoia, in that it is a political style and mode of expression and not a form of psychological disorder. In a sense, it is a suspicion of others and their motivations. Saideh Lotfian asserts this is the case with Iran’s current distrust of the United States, which has carried over from the Mossadegh coup and the 1979 revolution. For these Iranian leaders, the 1953 coup influenced their threat perceptions to an obsessive concern with a foreign hidden agenda to institute regime change in Iran.165 The United States and Israel add to Iran’s suspicions of outside interference and heightened threat perceptions through their policies, statements, and actions, all of which are seen as a continuation of a much broader and far-reaching and historical anti-Iran sentiment. The United States has threatened regime change and has used punishing economic sanctions to cripple the Iranian economy. The preponderance of 162 Flynt

Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett, Going to Tehran: Why the United States Must Come to Terms With the Islamic Republic of Iran (New York: Metropolitian Books, 2013), 36. 163 Leverett and Leverett, Going to Tehran, 37. 164 Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 115. 165 Lotfian, “Prevent and Defend,” 18.

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U.S. power and the threat it poses to Iran are unmatched. In 2009, U.S. Ambassador James Dobbins stated, If Barack Obama or George W. Bush were elected president of Iran, they would be pursuing [a] nuclear capability; any leader in that geopolitical context would be… Iran crossing the nuclear threshold is not necessarily the end of the world.166

In 2010, Iran’s nuclear sites were crippled by a highly effective cyberattack known as Olympic Games. In 2018, even though the IAEA certified Iran was in compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—the Iran Nuclear Deal—the United States withdrew from the agreement, re-imposed crippling economic sanctions, and employed the “Maximum Pressure” campaign, which is designed to drive Iran’s oil exports to zero in an effort to deny the Iranian government revenue to fund its regional influence and ballistic missile development, and force Tehran to negotiate with the United States.167 In the wake of protests and the death of a U.S. contractor at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, the United States conducted a targeted killing of Major General Qassem Soleimani in January 2020. Hajj Qassem was the revered Commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force, which the United States designated as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) because of its role in arming and training Shiite militias to attack U.S. troops in Iraq.168 Soleimani, known by some in the West as the “Shadow Commander,” was instrumental in spreading Iran’s influence across the Middle East, including in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. He is alleged to have orchestrated attacks in Thailand, India, Nigeria, and Kenya, and was reportedly involved in a 2011 plot to hire a Mexican drug cartel to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States.169 The Quds Force also supplied explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) and training to Iraq insurgents, which they, in turn, used to kill at least 196 U.S. troops and wound nearly 900, resulting in a large number of amputations, between 2005 and 2011.170 Soleimani was an Iranian national hero and his killing was viewed by many as the latest instance of hostile U.S. overreach into Iranian affairs. Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif stated the Soleimani killing was “an act of terrorism and an act of war.” Zarif declared the attack had three characteristics. First, it violated Iraq’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Second, 166 Mousavian,

The Iran Nuclear Crisis, 31. of the Spokesperson, “Advancing the U.S. Maximum Pressure Campaign on Iran,” U.S. Department of State, April 22, 2019, accessed May 20, 2020, https://www.state.gov/advancing-theu-s-maximum-pressure-campaign-on-iran/. 168 Dan Lamothe, “Qassem Soleimani, Iran’s Spy Commander, Introduced to a New Generation,” The Washington Post, March 5, 2015, accessed May 20, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ news/checkpoint/wp/2015/03/05/qassem-suleimani-irans-spy-commander-introduced-to-a-newgeneration/. 169 Dexter Filkins, “The Shadow Commander,” The New Yorker, September 23, 2013, accessed May 20, 2020, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/09/30/the-shadow-commander. 170 Alex Horton, “Soleimani’s Legacy: The Gruesome, Advanced IEDs That Haunted U.S. Troops in Iraq,” The Washington Post, January 3, 2020, accessed July 12, 2020, https://www.washin gtonpost.com/national-security/2020/01/03/soleimanis-legacy-gruesome-high-tech-ieds-that-hau nted-us-troops-iraq/. 167 Office

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Soleimani’s killing devastated people across Iran and the rest of the world, and reaction to his killing will make it almost impossible for the United States to remain in the region. Third, the United States attacked a citizen and senior Iranian official.171 In spite of the Soleimani killing, President Rouhani vowed Iran will continue to resist the United States, Soleimani’s martyrdom will make Iran more decisive to resist America’s expansionism and defend our Islamic values. With no doubt, Iran and other freedom-seeking countries in the region will take his revenge.172

Israel has routinely threatened to attack Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and has carried out at least one exercise that “appeared to be a dry run for an attack on the enrichment plant at Natanz.” David Sanger reported, in early 2008, the Israelis asked Washington for a new generation of bunker-busting bombs, which can penetrate underground facilities, and air refueling equipment, which would extend the reach of Israel’s fighter and strike aircraft. President Bush reportedly deflected responding to the two requests and denied a third request for the Israelis to overfly Iraqi airspace for a bombing run into Iran.173 In addition to the constant threat of military strikes against its nuclear program, numerous Iranian nuclear scientists have been assassinated. Between 2009 and 2020, at least six Iranian nuclear scientists were assassinated, with suspicion falling on Israel. In November 2020, Dr. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, who was the alleged head of Iran’s Project Amad nuclear weapons program, was assassinated in a roadside ambush near Tehran. Israel is also suspected of coordinating with the United States on the Olympic Games cyberattacks against Iranian nuclear facilities (Map 8). While Prime Minister Netanyahu has been a staunch proponent of a preventive attack against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, others, such as former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, have urged a more measured and incremental approach to the use of force. Worse comes to worst, and all options have been tried, then, naturally it may force Israel to act to defend its existence. But it must be clear that we tried with the international community, and particularly with the United States, to act together before we resort to the last option of an Israeli military operation.174

Still, opponents of an Israeli strike against Iran caution it may have the opposite effect and lead to increased support for the government. Meir Dagan, the former head of Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency, warned, 171 Mary

Louise Kelly, “Transcript: NPR’s Full Interview with Iran’s Foreign Minister,” NPR All Things Considered, January 7, 2020, accessed July 12, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/01/07/794 175782/transcript-nprs-full-interview-with-iran-s-foreign-minister. 172 Parisa Hafezi, “Rouhani Says Iran More Determined to Resist U.S. After Soleimani’s Death,” Reuters, January 3, 2020, accessed July 12, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-sec urity-blast-iran-rouhani/rouhani-says-iran-more-determined-to-resist-us-after-soleimanis-deathidUSKBN1Z20EL. 173 Sanger, “U.S. Rejected Aid for Israeli Raid on Iranian Nuclear Site.” 174 Jim Zanotti, Kenneth Katzman, Jeremiah Gertler, and Steven A. Hildreth, “Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities,” Congressional Research Service (September 28, 2012), 4.

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An Israeli bombing would lead to a regional war and solve the internal problems of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It would galvanize Iranian society behind the leadership and create unity around the nuclear issue. And it would justify Iran in rebuilding its nuclear project and saying, ‘Look, see, we were attacked by the Zionist enemy and we clearly need to have it [a nuclear weapon].175

Despite these warnings, Prime Minister Netanyahu has upped the ante by comparing Ayatollah Khamenei to Adolf Hitler and invoking the Holocaust analogy to frame the perceived threat emanating from Iran. In a 2017 speech to the Brookings Institute, in Washington, DC, Netanyahu argued, Obviously, there are some important differences between Nazi Germany and the Islamic Republic of Iran… But both regimes do have two important things in common. One, a ruthless commitment to impose tyranny and terror. And second, a ruthless commitment to murder Jews…. I spoke so often about Iran because I read history. When tyrants call for the destruction of my people, I believe them. I don’t have the luxury of discounting their genocidal threats.176

Netanyahu’s use of the Holocaust analogy creates difficulty in finding a way to deescalate any future crisis with Iran because he frames a perceived Iranian threat as the possibility for the complete annihilation of the Jewish State. This posturing does not lend room for a potential off ramp during a crisis. Netanyahu’s anti-Iran rhetoric was given fuel by then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who presented Iran’s adversaries with the rhetoric they needed to heighten the perceived threat that Iran presents to the region. In a 2008 address to the UN, Ahmadinejad argued, [In] Palestine, 60 years of carnage and invasion is still ongoing at the hands of some criminal and occupying Zionists [Israel]. They have forged a regime through collecting people from various parts of the world and bringing them to other people’s land by displacing, detaining, and killing the true owners of that land. With advance notice, they invade, assassinate, and maintain food and medicine blockades, while some hegemonic and bullying powers support them. The Security Council cannot do anything and sometimes, under pressure from a few bullying powers, even paves the way for supporting these Zionist murderers. It is natural that some UN resolutions that have addressed the plight of the Palestinian people have been relegated to the archives unnoticed.177

When examining U.S. and Israeli perceptions of an Iranian threat, Iran’s conventional military forces (Artesh) are significantly weaker than U.S. and Israeli forces, and it does not have a nuclear weapons capability. To its credit, Iran gained valuable expeditionary force experience by deploying and sustaining ground forces to support Bashar al-Assad in Syria. This experience allowed Iran to project a conventional ground force over a long distance outside its borders, while maintaining an Air Line of Communication (ALOC) to sustain and replenish its forces inside Syria.178 175 Zanotti,

Katzman, Gertler, and Hildreth, “Israel,” 5. Ahren, “PM Likens Iran to Nazi Germany in Its ‘Commitment to Murder Jews’,” The Times of Israel, December 3, 2017, accessed May 24, 2020, https://www.timesofisrael.com/pm-lik ens-iran-to-nazi-germany-in-its-commitment-to-murder-jews/. 177 Mousavian, The Iran Nuclear Crisis, 318. 178 Paul Bucala and Ken Hawrey, “Iran’s Airbridge to Syria,” American Enterprise Institute (July 2016), 1. 176 Raphael

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This is in addition to the Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) it uses to sustain and rearm Hezbollah forces in Lebanon. In assessing actual military strength, the United States is a nuclear superpower and Israel is a regional power with the most dominant conventional military in the region. Therefore, the idea of a non-nuclear Iran with its 1970s-era conventional military force being an existential threat to either the United States or Israel is not supported by Iran’s current military and power projection capabilities. When applying the definition of a threat (threat = intent + capability), Iran has the intent by threatening the United States and Israel and the regional power structure status quo, but lacks the conventional military and nuclear capability to carry out this threat. Therefore, it is arguable that Iran presents a true existential threat to either power, though its nuclear ambitions and long-term strategic goals will likely alter this equation. Although it lacks significant conventional military power, Iran is a regional power based on its asymmetric reach and ballistic missile capabilities. These capabilities allow it to target its enemies, as illustrated in a UAV attack claimed by Yemen’s Houthi rebels, on the world’s largest oil processing plant in Saudi Arabia. This attack destroyed nearly half of Saudi Arabia’s oil production.179 Thus, the true examination of the current U.S.–Israel tensions with Iran is better scoped by examining the long-term consequences of an increasingly powerful Iran and its influence on the United States and Israel’s ability to exert influence and project power in the region. In the current Iranian threat perception, it is a non-nuclear state that is under the constant threat of attack and regime change by two militarily superior states, the United States and Israel. The Gulf countries also add to Tehran’s heightened threat perceptions because of the billions of dollars they spend on U.S. manufactured weapons systems. When it comes to the long-term implications of policy, it is argued the United States plays checkers while the Iranians play chess. Despite their qualitative advantage in advanced military weaponry, the Gulf States see Iran as an enduring national security threat and a source of regional instability. For them, the United States is in the region for now, Iran will be there forever. This sentiment was reflected by UAE Ambassador to the United States Yousef al Otaiba, when discussing Iran relative to U.S. security. At 7,000 miles away, and with two oceans bordering you, an Iranian nuclear threat does not threaten the continental United States. It may threaten your assets in the region, it will threaten the peace process, it will threaten the balance of power, it will threaten everything else, but it will not threaten you.180

In addition to the power struggle between Iran and its Gulf State neighbors, Persian nationalism influences Iran’s perceptions of its status in the region and the broader 179 Tim Lister, “Attack on Saudi Oil Field a Game-Changer in Gulf Confrontation,” CNN, September 15, 2019, accessed May 31, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/15/middleeast/saudi-oil-attack-lis ter-analysis-intl/index.html. 180 Richard Spencer, “UAE Ambassador Supports Military Action Against Iran,” The Telegraph, July 7, 2010, accessed November 6, 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/ unitedarabemirates/7877566/UAE-ambassador-supports-military-action-against-Iran.html.

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world (Map 1). A RAND report observes, “Since the days of the Shah, Iranian leaders have believed that Iran’s size, historical importance, and self-professed cultural superiority merit a significant role for the country in the region… Iran’s nationalism is strongly fueled by the history of intervention, manipulation, and exploitation of the country by foreign powers. Hence it defines national independence in terms of following its own path culturally and in foreign policy, of avoiding dependence and extolling self-reliance, and of having a role to play in general. The quest for influence and status will remain an important component of any future Iran.”181 Persian nationalism can also serve as a check on Iran’s regional adventurism, in which costly overseas commitments are protested in favor of Iran’s own interests. Ali Alfoneh highlights one such anti-government protest in January 2018, where citizens protested Iran’s stagnant economy, and political and social repression. Chants of “Let Syria be, think about our plight,” and “Neither Gaza, nor Lebanon, let my life be sacrificed for Iran.”182 This nationalism also causes some Iranians to view their Gulf Arab neighbors with disdain due to their perceived lack of history and culture, lavish spending, and because of their relationships with the United States and more recent interactions with Israel. For the Iranians, their culture spans over 2500 years back to the Persian Empire, with its storied architecture and mosques, to include the Nasir al-Mulk, Imam Mosque, Sheikh Lotfollah Mosque, Fatima Masumeh Shrine, Vakil Mosque, and the Jameh Mosque; heroic rulers Darius, Cyrus, and Xerxes; and celebrated intellectuals and poets like Hafez, Ferdowsi, Rumi, Omar Khayyam, Saadi, and Nizami Ganjavi. They view this in contrast to the Gulf States and their newly constructed skyscrapers and opulent lifestyles. It can be perceived that there is a degree of cultural haughtiness that tempers some Iranian perceptions of their Arab neighbors, particularly because of the latter’s nomadic origins and recent “new money”. While Iran’s economy has largely stagnated since U.S. sanctions were imposed after the 1979 Revolution, the Western-allied Gulf Arab economies flourished due to their oil wealth. The Gulf States spent lavishly on architectural projects in Riyadh, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Doha, and established educational exchanges and businesses dealings throughout the West, including a branch of the Louvre in Abu Dhabi. The Gulf States have also spent billions of dollars bolstering their small militaries with the latest U.S.-manufactured weapon systems, particularly advanced fighter aircraft and anti-ballistic missile systems. Iran’s archrival, Saudi Arabia, has increased weapon purchases and threatens to build a nuclear capability if Iran does so. Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have increasingly engaged in conflict using proxies in Syria and Yemen, as well as in other regional flashpoints. Iran’s growing regional influence and presence in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen has alarmed the Gulf States, as they perceive Tehran has hegemonic ambitions and is in pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. The Gulf States are also concerned with Iran’s religious and ideological fervor spreading to their Shiite populations, particularly since they already accuse Iran of inciting unrest and supporting dissenters within their Shiite communities. To 181 Byman, Chubin, Ehteshami, and Green, Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era, 9. 182 Alfoneh,

“Tehran’s Shia Foreign Legions.”

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underscore this perspective, in 2011, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates sent troops to Bahrain to help suppress an anti-government uprising after Bahrain’s Shiite majority held protests against the country’s Sunni monarch, Hamad bin Isa alKhalifa. Saudi Arabia has also increased a crackdown on its Shiite population, notably executing Shia cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, who was a critic of the royal family, in 2016, triggering global condemnation.183 The tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran center on regional power and influence, with Iran increasingly challenging Saudi Arabia’s traditional role as the region’s dominant Muslim state. The U.S. overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003 removed a critical check against Iranian power and facilitated its rise. Iran’s increasing influence in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen is seen as a direct threat to Saudi Arabia, a point which contributed to Riyadh sending troops to Bahrain in 2011 to squash a Shi’a rebellion, and intervening in Yemen since 2015 to battle the Iran-supported Houthi rebels on Saudi Arabia’s southern border. The Houthis are Zaydi Shiites. Saudi Arabia-Iran tensions have even extended to the annual hajj, with Iran accusing Saudi Arabia of mistreating Iranian religious pilgrims during the annual pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina. Iran also accuses Saudi Arabia of supporting Sunni terrorist groups, like ISIS and al Qaeda, and Saudi Arabia accuses Iran of fomenting instability in regional conflicts while trying to expand its influence. The United Arab Emirates also remains embroiled in a disagreement with Iran over Tehran’s continued occupation, since 1971, of three UAE-claimed Islands, Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb. Iran views itself as a regional power and seeks to prevent outside powers from shaping the region’s future political and security landscape.184 Similar to the Israeli perspective, Iran perceives it is surrounded by hostile states intent on meddling in its internal affairs and seeking to curtail its foreign policies. It engaged in an eight year war of attrition with Iraq, from 1980 to 1988, and endured missile attacks on its cities and frontline gas attacks against its troops. Although Iran is opposed to U.S. forces in the region, the presence of American troops provides Iran’s hardliners with a cause célèbre to deflect attention away from domestic political issues and a struggling economy, and reinforces their hardline views of the United States and Israel. From 2003 to 2011, the United States maintained a military presence on Iran’s western border in neighboring Iraq, during Operation Iraqi Freedom. At the height of the Iraq War, the United States had 166,300 troops in Iraq, in October 2007.185 On Iran’s eastern border, the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan from 1979 until 1989. Afghanistan was later invaded and then occupied by the United States from 2001 until an anticipated 2021 withdrawal date, as part of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS) 183 Ladane Nasseri, “Who Was the Cleric Saudis Executed and Why His Death Matters,” Bloomberg, January 3, 2016, accessed May 31, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-03/ who-was-the-cleric-saudis-executed-and-why-his-death-matters. 184 Anthony H. Cordesman and Abdullah Toukan, “The Iranian Nuclear Challenge: GCC Security, Risk Assessment, and US Extended Deterrence,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (February 1, 2011), accessed August 10, 2012, http://csis.org/files/publication/110202_ GCC_Secur_US_Extended_Deter.pdf. 185 “Chart: U.S. Troop Levels in Iraq,” CNN, October 21, 2011, accessed May 20, 2020, https:// www.cnn.com/2011/10/21/world/meast/chart-us-troops-iraq/index.html.

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and Resolute Support Mission (RSM). At its height, during Operation Enduring Freedom, the United States had 99,800 troops in Afghanistan, along with 18,971 private security contractors.186 Successive U.S.–Iranian interactions have involved intense rhetoric, and periodic episodes of violence. The United States and Iran have a history of conflict, which includes: the overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadegh, U.S. support for the Shah, the U.S. Embassy Hostage Crisis, U.S. support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, the United States declaring Iran a State Sponsor of Terrorism, the Iran-Contra Affair, the Tanker Wars, naval confrontations in the Strait of Hormuz, the USS Vincennes shooting down Iran Air Flight 655, Iranian involvement in the Khobar Towers terrorist attack, the United States declaring Iran is part of an “Axis of Evil,” the assassination of Qassem Soleimani, Iran’s ballistic missile strike against U.S. bases in Iraq, use of Iranian-developed explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) in Iraq, and Iranian-backed militias in Iraq attacking U.S. forces during the Iraq War. In one of the most sophisticated attacks of the Iraq War, twelve men suspected to be members of the IRGC-Quds Force disguised in U.S. uniforms, entered the Provincial Joint Coordination Center in Karbala and killed five U.S. troops and wounded three others in 2007. In addition to wearing U.S. military uniforms, the attackers had American weapons, spoke English, and knew detailed information about the compound and how it was defended. The United States subsequently offered a $15 million reward for information on the Quds Force commander they believed planned the attack, Abdul Reza Shahlai.187 In 2019, the Pentagon estimated IRGC-backed militias killed 603 U.S. troops during the U.S.-led Iraq War (Operation Iraqi Freedom).188 Iran’s geographic location contributes to a feeling of being under siege by enemies, which is also similar to the Israeli perspective. Mohiaddin Mesbahi suggests Iran’s “strategic loneliness” is caused by its lack of natural defensive borders, combined with the fact that it is the only country in the region that is both Shia and Farsispeaking, and is therefore “deprived of meaningful alliances and great power bandwagoning.”189 In the period between the Soviet and American occupations of Afghanistan, Afghan warlords and the Taliban, most of whom are Pashtuns who are hostile to Iran and Afghanistan’s Shia population of ethnic Hazara, ruled the country. To the east and south are Turkey and Pakistan, both of whom are Sunni-led states with Pakistan being a nuclear power and Turkey a member of NATO. Across 186 Heidi M. Peters, “Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Afghanistan and Iraq:

2007-2018,” Congressional Research Service (May 10, 2019), 9. Snow, “US Offering $15 Million for Info on Iranian Planner of 2007 Karbala Attack That Killed 5 US Troops,” Military Times, December 5, 2019, accessed May 31, 2020, https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2019/12/05/us-offering-15-million-bountyfor-info-on-iranian-who-planned-2007-karbala-attack-that-killed-5-us-troops/. 188 Kyle Rempfer, “Iran Killed More US Troops in Iraq Than Previously Known, Pentagon Says,” Military Times, April 4, 2019, accessed May 20, 2020, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/yourmilitary/2019/04/04/iran-killed-more-us-troops-in-iraq-than-previously-known-pentagon-says/. 189 Arash Reisinezhad, “Why Iran Needs to Dominate the Middle East,” The National Interest, April 10, 2015, accessed May 31, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-iran-needs-dom inate-the-middle-east-12595. 187 Shawn

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the Persian/Arabian Gulf are the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states—archrival Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait—whose Sunni royal families are highly suspicious of Iran and their own internal Shia populations. To compound Iran’s threat perceptions, the United States maintains a robust military presence in the region. The U.S. Navy houses its 5th Fleet Headquarters in Manama, Bahrain, and routinely conducts exercises in the Strait of Hormuz. At Al Dhafra Air Force Base in the United Arab Emirates, the U.S. Air Force maintains squadrons of F-15E Strike Eagles, F-35A Lighting IIs, KC-10 Extender air refueling aircraft, E-3 Sentry, and RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles.190 In 2019, amidst heightened U.S.–Iranian tensions, the United States increased its Air Force presence by flowing additional F-16 Vipers to Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, and F-15E Strike Eagles to Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia.191 Additionally, the United States has sold billions of dollars in advanced weapons systems to the Gulf Cooperation Council states. In 2019, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates agreed to $14.2 billion in weapons sales, far exceeding the $5.8 billion in agreed weapons sales reported for 2018.192 These foreign military sales and direct commercial sales provide a wedge against growing Iranian regional influence and ballistic missile capabilities. To counter these perceived threats, Iran has been diplomatically active in trying to convince the GCC states that their security is better ensured by signing mutual agreements with Tehran and not the United States. Iran has also stressed that it and the GCC states should rely on themselves for regional security and stability, rather than the Americans. Lastly, it is speculated Iran is attempting to acquire nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles as a power-projecting deterrent to compensate for conventional military and airpower deficiencies. Iran is also bolstering its asymmetric warfare capability by deploying Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Quds Force and actively providing political and military support to Hezbollah, Hamas, and Houthi rebels.193 To this point, Robert Kaplan argues Iran has “brilliantly erected a postmodern military empire, the first of its kind: one without colonies and without the tanks, armor, and aircraft carriers that have been the usual accompaniments of power.”194 During the Syrian Civil War, Iran provided a lifeline to Bashar al-Assad by bolstering his forces with Hezbollah and Shia militia forces, and IRGC-QF advisors, who were backed by Russian airpower. By throwing its weight behind Assad, 190 Stephen Losey, “F-15E Strike Eagles Deploy to Al Dhafra,” Air Force Times, October 24, 2019, accessed May 20, 2020, https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2019/10/24/f-15e-str ike-eagles-deploy-to-al-dhafra/. 191 Stephen Losey, “Here Are the Fighter Squadrons Currently in the Middle East,” Air Force Times, February 4, 2020, accessed May 20, 2020, https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-airforce/2020/02/04/here-are-the-fighter-squadrons-currently-in-the-middle-east/. 192 Dominic Dudley, “U.S. Arms Sales to the Middle East Have Soared in Value This Year,” Forbes, December 16, 2019, accessed May 20, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/dominicdudley/2019/ 12/16/arms-sales-middle-east-soar/#61d8bb6cfea8. 193 Cordesman and Toukan, “The Iranian Nuclear Challenge.” 194 Reisinezhad, “Why Iran Needs to Dominate the Middle East.”

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the Iranians sought to secure their ground lines of communication to Hezbollah forces in Lebanon. Without this land bridge through Syria, Tehran would have difficulty resupplying Hezbollah forces. This growing Iranian influence and presence in Syria brings another dimension of conflict between Tehran and Tel Aviv. By having a military presence in Syria, Iranian forces now have the capability to engage Israeli land forces along the border directly. Consequently, the Israelis have used airpower to attack Iranian and Hezbollah forces inside Syria. Israel argues an Iranian military presence inside Syria is a strategic threat and claims Iran is seeking a permanent presence along Israel’s northern border. Israeli Defense Minister Naftali Bennett asserted, We have moved from blocking Iran’s entrenchment in Syria to forcing it out of there, and we will not stop. We will not allow more strategic threats to grow just across our borders without taking action. We will continue to take the fight to the enemy’s territory.195

Despite Israeli opposition, Syrian President Assad invited Iranian troops into Syria and stated they are welcome to stay. This is due to the reality that Iran and Russia saved his military from defeat. Bahman Baktiari rightly argues the clerics have used the West’s opposition to Iran’s nuclear program to generate national unity based on upholding Iranian prestige and national honor, known in Farsi as ezzat-e melli.196 Ezzat-e melli is an ideal in which the clerics promote a sense of national pride and self-sufficiency because Iran is a solitary power, surrounded by many powerful enemies. Stephen Kinzer affirms early Iranian efforts to restore its past glory when it sought American assistance in forcing the Russians and the British to submit to its Parliament’s will after the two countries signed a “convention” to divide Iran among themselves.197 This desire for international prestige and the restoration of past glory remains part of the Iranian national conscious. Mukhatzhanova affirms this Iranian desire to improve its status and self-image due to its legacy of great empires, and history of humiliation and abuse by foreign powers.198 Consequently, Baktiari argues although many Iranians question the government’s stance that its nuclear program is peaceful, they do not question Iran’s right to pursue nuclear technology since many see this as the path to international prestige.199 President Ahmadinejad often used Iran’s nuclear capability to incite nationalism and to deflect negative attention away from the government by pitting the West against Iran. Notably, on April 15, 2009, Ahmadinejad observed,

195 Suleiman Al-Khalidi, “Syria Says Israeli Helicopters Strike Targets in Southern Syria,” Reuters,

April 30, 2020, accessed May 20, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-israel-att acks-idUSKBN22C3UR. 196 Bahman Baktiari, “Seeking International Legitimacy: Understanding the Dynamics of Nuclear Nationalism in Iran,” Middle East Strategic Perspectives 1: Nuclear Politics in Iran (Center for Strategic Research: National Defense University Press, May 2010), 13. 197 Stephen Kinzer, Reset: Iran, Turkey, and America’s Future (New York: Times Books, 2010), 19. 198 Mukhatzhanova, “Pride and Prejudice: Understanding Iran’s Nuclear Program,” 59. 199 Baktiari, “Seeking International Legitimacy: Understanding the Dynamics of Nuclear Nationalism in Iran,” 13.

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Four and a half years ago, those who went to negotiate said to their interlocutors, after they agreed to freeze all [uranium enrichment], “We want [nuclear energy for the purposes of] science and technology. Give us permission to operate 20 centrifuges.” But the other side answered insolently… But today, with the grace of God, and thanks to Iran’s national unity… nearly 7,000 centrifuges are spinning today at Natanz, mocking them.200

This assessment of overwhelming Iranian acceptance of its leaders’ nuclear ambitions was reinforced by Iranian opposition presidential candidate, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, in a Financial Times interview during the run-up to the 2009 election, when he stated, “No one in Iran would accept suspension.”201 In times of difficulty, Iran has taken pride in its idea of national self-sufficiency and ability to endure hardships, as represented by the commemoration of the martyrdom of Imam Husayn. The defiance in the face of intimidation and the desire to remain independent and autonomous in the face of threats from militarily superior force, can be summed up by Iran’s Nobel Peace Prize laureate in 2003, Shirin Ebadi, The Iranian people are exceedingly proud of their 2,500 history and culture. Iran as a country is larger and greater than its rulers and exists apart from any government in power at any particular time. If America attacks, however, Iranians will unite, forgetting their differences with their government, and they will fiercely and tenaciously defend their country.202

Summary This chapter discussed the relationship between the United States and Israel to contextualize the follow-on discussion of the backgrounds and threat perceptions of Iran, Iraq, and Syria. The chapter discussed how adversarial rhetoric has a cognitive influence on the power projecting state’s decision-makers’ threat perceptions and how they perceive the weaker state’s proliferation ambitions. When these powerful states make statements or take actions against the weaker state, it creates a parallel reaction by heightening the threat perceptions of the weaker state and compelling them to continue pursuing a deterrent against the dominant state. This discussion allows a balanced perspective to illustrate the nuclear proliferation argument is not a one-sided argument, as presented in President George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil” characterizations. As highlighted by Michael Scheuer, it is important to understand one’s adversary and his motivations in order to develop effective policies and strategies. The motivations of the Middle East states to attempt to acquire a nuclear weapon was more complex than simply to challenge U.S. and Israeli regional dominance. Examining the volatility of the region and how imperial and colonial powers have meddled in and influenced domestic politics and the foreign affairs of these countries provides 200 Anoushiravan

Ehteshami, “Iran’s Tenth Presidential Election: Implications for Iran and the Region,” Middle East Strategic Perspectives 1: Nuclear Politics in Iran (Center for Strategic Research: National Defense University Press, May 2010), 43. 201 Mohammed Ayoob, “Can the World Live with a Near-Nuclear Iran?” CNN, December 14, 2011, accessed December 14, 2011, http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/14/opinion/ayoob-iran-nulcear/. 202 David Barsamian, “Introduction,” Targeting Iran (New York: Open Media Series, 2007), 27.

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context to why they want to ensure the survivability of their ruling government structure, no matter how widely the West may disagree with the construct. The chapter briefly discussed the recent histories of Iran, Iraq, and Syria to highlight the external influences and internal forces that have shaped their foreign policy decisions and nuclear ambitions. The three states have engaged in some form of combat with the two most dominant military forces in the regions: The United States and the State of Israel. The study articulates how each case study country likely sought nuclear weapons for both security and prestige, particularly since they are unable to deter or defend their territory against U.S. and Israeli attacks using conventional military forces. As illustrated in this chapter, the three states perceived themselves at one point or another to be threatened by dominant regional powers, therefore some felt the only guarantor of their survival was a nuclear weapon.

Chapter 7

Analysis of Data

The importance of cognitive psychological influences, national security policies, and military capabilities in shaping a power projecting state’s perceptions and response to emerging nuclear threats was discussed in Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5. The Analysis of Data chapter incorporates these influences and applies them to the four proliferation cases using the Differential Effects of Threat Perception’s two decision-tree heuristics to forecast the power-projecting state’s degree of perceived threat, and how it is projected to respond to the non-power projecting state’s proliferation efforts. The study’s two heuristics are: (1) Heuristic for Threat Assessment Privileging Identity (degree of threat perception) and (2) Heuristic for the Proliferation Response (no response, sanctions, or force). The decision-tree heuristic was selected as the data analysis framework because it allows for the interaction between different levels of analysis in the foreign policy making decision-making process. The Heuristic for Threat Assessment Privileging Identity predicts the powerprojecting state’s degree of perceived threat. The heuristic uses three interdependent questions to address perceptions derived from cognitive psychological stimuli to determine whether a power projecting state perceives a non-power-projecting state and its nuclear actions as a low or high threat to its national security (Fig. 7.1). The Heuristic for the Proliferation Response forecasts the power-projecting state’s anticipated response to proliferation, and utilizes five questions to address power projection capabilities, national security policy, and public support to determine the expected response (Fig. 7.2). The decision-tree heuristic is not a traditional flow chart in which a single reply halts or continues the decision-making process flow. It is a combination of interdependent questions that, when taken together, holistically frames the threat and forecasts the action taken in response to the threat. The eight heuristic questions are divided into three categories, as explained in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 (Table 7.1). The responses to the heuristic questions are embedded in each case study review to illustrate the individual-level influences on powerful state national leaders and decision-makers. By providing a detailed response to each of the eight heuristic questions, this study demonstrates the richness and utility © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 B. K. Chappell, State Responses to Nuclear Proliferation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59801-3_7

217

218

7 Analysis of Data Q1: Do the states have a recent history of direct military conflict? Yes

No

Yes

Q2: Is the weaker state perceived to be developing a nuclear weapons capability? No

Low Threat

Q3: Has the powerful state perceived the weaker state’s actions as a threat to its national security? Yes

No High Threat

Fig. 7.1 Heuristic for Threat Assessment Privileging Identity (Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero, “Identity, Power and Threat Perception,” 760) Q4: Has the powerful state identified the weaker state’s actions as a high threat to its national security (Figure 7.1)? Yes

No

No Action

Q5: Does the powerful state possess an adequate airpower capability to disrupt the weaker state’s proliferation effort? Yes

No Q6: Does the powerful state’s national security policy advocate preventive strikes?

Yes

Coercive Diplomacy No

Q7: Has the weaker state crossed the powerful state’s established redlines? Yes

No Q8: Does the powerful state have domestic support for a military strike against the weaker state?

Yes

No Military Force

Fig. 7.2 Heuristic for the Proliferation Response Table 7.1 Heuristic Question Categories Psychological Influences

Military Capability

National Security Policy

Q1: History of Conflict

Q5: Airpower Capability

Q6: Preventive Strikes

Q2: Nuclear Proliferation Q3: Perceived Threat Q4: High or Low Threat Q7: Redlines Crossed Q8: Domestic Support

7 Analysis of Data

219

of the study’s Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory, when used as a counterproliferation instrument, as compared to Kroenig’s Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory, by articulating the importance of incorporating individual-level analysis into the proliferation literature.

Heuristic for Threat Assessment Privileging Identity The Heuristic for Threat Assessment Privileging Identity assesses a dominant state’s degree of perceived threat based on a series of cognitive psychological influences and perceptions (Fig. 7.1). Question 1 addresses whether the powerful state and weaker state have a recent history of direct military conflict within the past 25 years. As Chapter 3 discussed, states that have a history of conflict are more likely to perceive a rival’s actions as a continuation of earlier hostilities. These powerful states are also likely to perceive the weaker state’s acquisition of a “game-changing” military capability or technology as a direct challenge to it and the existing power structure. A negative response to Question 1 does not rule out the possibility the powerful state will perceive the proliferating state to be a high threat. The question implies a recent history of conflict means states are more likely to perceive rivals as a high threat; however, this is not a necessary requirement, hence the dotted line returning a negative response to continue the decision tree. Question 2 determines whether the weaker state is developing a nuclear breakout capability that will allow it to deter aggressors, challenge the power projecting state, and increase its regional influence. This study defines a breakout capability as procuring critical nuclear weapons components or acquiring enough weapons-grade uranium that a nuclear weapon can be assembled quickly. Question 3 illustrates the subjective situational threat posed to the powerful state by the weaker state’s actions. This question examines national actor statements and actions to determine the degree of perceived threat. The power projecting state’s perceived threat is identified separately within the study, as illustrated in the example (Table 7.2). The beginning of each case displays Kroenig’s theoretical prediction, and imbedded within each case following each heuristic, the study illustrates a combined table that compares Kroenig’s prediction, the study’s Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory prediction, and the actual outcome. Table 7.2 The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory vs The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Threat Assessment Forecasts

Perceived Threat

Israel

The United States

Differential Effects of Differential Nuclear Proliferation Effects of Threat Perception

Differential Effects Differential of Nuclear Effects of Threat Proliferation Perception

Low or High

Low or High

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7 Analysis of Data

Heuristic for the Proliferation Response The Heuristic for the Proliferation Response combines the perceived threat derived from the Heuristic for Threat Assessment Privileging Identity (Fig. 7.1) with four additional questions associated with the powerful state’s power projection capabilities, its national security policies, cognitive psychological influences, and public support to forecast how it will likely respond to a weaker state’s proliferation efforts (Fig. 7.2). The response to Question 4 was determined in the Heuristic for Threat Assessment Privileging Identity (Fig. 7.1). If the power-projecting state identifies the proliferating state as a low threat, it may choose to take no action (political statements or acceptance) or it may use coercive diplomacy (legislation, sanctions, or UN Security Council resolutions) as behavioral change mechanisms. The study examined key leader strategic messaging to assess the powerful state’s anticipated proliferation response to the case study country. In the Iraq 2003 case, the Bush administration’s statements served as indicators the United States intended to use military force, while in the Iran 2015 case, the Obama administration signaled its willingness to address Iranian proliferation with diplomacy. Question 5 remedies a weakness in Kroenig’s theory by including airpower as a power projecting capability, particularly as a counterproliferation instrument. A state possesses an airpower projection capability if it can operate its air forces against enemy targets without significant opposition while remaining free from serious enemy air incursions into its territory.1 Question 6 is intended to determine whether the powerful state’s national security strategy advocates preventive or unilateral military strikes against perceived threats. A state whose policies advocate preventive strikes is likely to use military force in response to an emerging nuclear-related threat because the use of force is consistent with policy, particularly if it has previous successes using preventive war as a policy option. Policy drives strategy, so if the strategy dictates the use of force then that is the likely outcome. The response to Question 7 is not as transparent because a powerful state may not establish a public redline due to the classification of the intelligence, or it may act on perceptions and biases that a state’s nuclear program is further along than it actually is due to the influence of previous beliefs or erroneous intelligence. Redline examples include specific program milestones such as enriching uranium to weapons-grade levels, testing warhead designs, or developing and testing a space launch vehicle or ballistic missile with a range in the class of an ICBM (minimum range of 3400 mi or 5500 km). For instances in which a powerful state does not establish public redlines, political actor statements are used to determine the intent of warnings directed at the proliferating state. The purpose of Question 8 is to gauge domestic support for a military strike. In Western democracies, public opinion and legislative authorization (Congress, Knesset, or Parliament) have a significant influence on foreign policy decisions. This support is often required for actions that will result in military casualties or funding requirements for extensive overseas commitments. 1 Warden

III, “The Air Campaign Planning for Combat,” 1.

Heuristic for the Proliferation Response

221

The next section applies the study’s two heuristics to the United States and Israel’s reactions to the four case study countries—Iraq in 1981, Iraq in 2003, Syria in 2007, and Iran in 2015—to determine their threat perceptions and forecast their proliferation responses. The research will then compare the actual outcome to the predictions made using Chappell’s Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory and Kroenig’s Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory, which posits that proliferation has varying effects on states based on their ability or inability to project power over a nuclear aspirant.2 These effects influence the degree to which the powerful state perceives the threat emanating from the aspiring nuclear state and whether it will threaten or promise to protect the proliferating state because once that state acquires a nuclear weapon, the powerful state’s “strategic advantage” is placed at risk or lost.3 The study argues Chappell’s threat perception theory is a more accurate tool to forecast the power-projecting states’ threat perceptions and responses to non-power-projecting state nuclear proliferation actions because it incorporates the influences that affect key decision-makers’ perceptions and motivations.

Iraq Case Study—1981 In the late 1970s, France sold Iraq a pair of test research reactors, Osiris and Isis, collectively known as the Osirak nuclear complex. On September 8, 1975, Saddam Hussein declared the reactors were the first actual step in the production of an Arab atomic weapon.4 Saddam believed a nuclear weapon would showcase Iraqi technological advancement and advance Iraq’s claim to lead the Arab world. He also asserted a nuclear weapon would provide Iraq a credible deterrent against his two primary enemies, Iran and Israel. In arguing his case for a nuclear weapon, Saddam proclaimed, Regardless of Iraq’s intentions and capabilities at the present and in the future, any country in the world which seeks peace and security, respects peoples and does not wish those peoples to fall under the hegemony or the oppression of external forces should assist the Arabs [in obtaining a nuclear weapon]. This will realize and achieve peace regardless of the Arab’s aims and capabilities.5

In this instance, Saddam revealed his cognitive biases and perceptions of insecurity concerning his psychological motivations with regard to Israel and Iran, and his desire to deter future Israeli and Iranian attacks. For Saddam, a nuclear weapon was a status symbol, a guarantor of self-preservation, and a shield to project Iraq’s power throughout the region. Israel, feeling threatened by Iraq’s nascent nuclear program 2 Kroenig,

Exporting the Bomb, 7. Exporting the Bomb, 3. 4 Reiter, “Preventive Attacks Against Nuclear Programs and the ‘Success’ at Osiraq,” 357. 5 Associated Press, “Iraq Asserts Arabs Must Acquire Atom Arms as a Balance to Israel,” The New York Times, June 24, 1981, accessed June 7, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/24/world/iraqasserts-arabs-must-acquire-atom-arms-as-a-balence-to-israel.html. 3 Kroenig,

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7 Analysis of Data

and Saddam’s accompanying rhetoric, conducted a series of covert operations to sabotage the two reactor cores, and allegedly assassinated an Egyptian and two Iraqi engineers affiliated with the program.6 Iraq had a significant stockpile of weapons of mass destruction, and Saddam demonstrated he would not hesitate to use them against his enemies. In the mid1980s, Iraq used chemical weapons to bomb Kurdish Iraqis during the al-Anfal campaign, killing over 100,000 people.7 During the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq War, Iraq used chemical weapons and missile attacks against Iranian cities to break the stalemate that had devolved into trench warfare. The war was a motivating factor for Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program, and Saddam increased pressure on his nuclear scientists to expand Iraq’s nuclear program and to develop the capability for radiation weapons.8 The Israelis feared the ramifications of a nuclear Iraq and ultimately bombed the larger Osiris reactor on June 7, 1981, before it became operational (Map 7). In response, the U.S. protested the preventive airstrike and temporarily halted the shipment of military equipment to Israel. In addressing Israeli strikes against potential threats, Prime Minister Yizhak Rabin declared, Israel must do everything to prevent an Arab state [from] reaching a serious potential for building a nuclear bomb or acquiring one. Israel must first exhaust all diplomatic means and covert operations. Yet, if these measures fail, I do not preclude Israeli direct military action designed to obstruct or delay the realization of a nuclear option (its elimination once and for all is impossible), particularly in a country whose leaders are of the Saddam Hussein or Muammar Qaddafi kind.9

With the strike on Osirak, Israel ensured no other country would introduce nuclear weapons into the region. Utilizing Kroenig’s Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory, Israel should have perceived a low threat from Iraq’s proliferation efforts because it could not project power over Iraq since it could not wage a ground war inside Iraqi territory. Kroenig’s restrictive definition of power projection limits the application of his theory because it relegates power projection to the ability to conduct a ground war inside an enemy’s territory and does not consider air power as a power projection capability. Kroenig’s theory dictates the United States, as a global power-projecting state, should have perceived a high threat from Iraq’s proliferation efforts because it could conduct a ground war inside Iraq (Table 7.3). For Kroenig, Iraqi proliferation would challenge the United States’ ability to project power over it, so Washington’s threat perception was expected to be high. The next section applies the Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory’s two decision-tree heuristics to the United States and Israel to test the study’s enhanced 6 Reiter,

“Preventive Attacks Against Nuclear Programs and the ‘Success’ at Osiraq,” 357.

7 Jerrold M. Post, The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to Al-Qaeda

(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 5. 8 Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, second edition (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 331. 9 Joshua Kirschenbaum, “Operation Opera: An Ambiguous Success,” Journal of Strategic Security, vol. 3, no. 4 (Winter 2010): 58.

Iraq Case Study—1981 Table 7.3 The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast—Iraq 1981

223

Perceived Threat

Israel

The United States

Low

High

theory against the 1981 Iraq case to demonstrate it more accurately accounts for the divergence in the United States and Israeli responses to the proliferation case. Q1: Do the states have a recent history of direct military conflict? Iraq and Israel have a history of direct military conflict within the span of the study’s 25-year period, 1956–1981. Israel fought against Iraqi forces during the 1967 Six-Day War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War/Ramadan War. While Iraq was part of the larger Arab force fighting the Jewish State, its forces engaged in direct combat with Israeli forces, albeit ineffectively. Iraqi air and ground forces were largely ineffective against Israeli forces in both wars. On one occasion, the Iraqi Air Force attempted to bomb an Israeli military base, but could not locate it so the Iraqi pilots instead dropped their ordnance on Israeli farmland. In the 1973 Yom Kippur War/Ramadan War an Iraqi Expeditionary Force sent volunteers to assist the Syrians.10 Despite their best efforts, the Iraqis had the worst performance of the four Arab armies fighting in the war.11 Iraqi forces attacked Israeli forces on several occasions, but were decimated by counterattacks.12 Although Iraq had no measurable military success against Israel in either war, Israel still perceived it to be a threat because of Saddam Hussein’s rhetoric and Iraq’s support of terrorist organizations. Israel’s UN Ambassador Yehuda Blum summarized Israel’s perception of Iraq in a 1981 address to the UN Security Council. There is no question that Iraq regards itself as being in a state of war with Israel. Its leaders admit this openly and have called time and again for the liquidation of my country… It is apparently perfectly in order to use the threat of force against Israel, to train and send in terrorists to commit mindless acts of murder, and to join in Arab wars of aggression against Israel in 1948, in 1967, and in 1973, and then to retreat to safety, using other Arab countries as a buffer between its heroic army and Israel…13

Q2: Is the weaker state developing a nuclear weapons capability? Yes, Iraq was attempting to acquire a nuclear weapons capability by operating the Osirak reactors. However, there is debate as to whether the reactors could have produced any fissile material due to their test research design. The reactors required 10 “Peace after the Yom Kippur War?” Al Jazeera, March 29, 2008, accessed September 30, 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/arabunity/2008/03/200852518428191556.html. 11 Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 173. 12 Nadav Safran, “Trial by Ordeal: The Yom Kippur War, October 1973,” International Security, vol. 2, no. 2 (Fall 1977): 156. 13 UN Security Council, “Security Council Official Records: S/PV.2288,” United Nations, June 19, 1981, accessed August 7, 2013, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NL8/100/34/PDF/ NL810034.pdf?OpenElement.

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a separate plutonium processing facility, which the Iraqis did not possess.14 Despite their inadequate design and limited supply of highly enriched uranium (12 kg), the Israelis perceived the reactors’ purpose was to provide Iraq a nuclear weapons capability, as evidenced by the following official Israeli government statement. The [Israeli] Government finds itself obligated to explain to enlighten public opinion why it decided on this special operation [Operation Opera]. For a long time, we have followed with grave concern the construction of the Osirak nuclear reactor. Sources of unquestioned reliability told us that it was intended, despite statements to the contrary, for the production of atomic bombs.15

The Israelis were concerned that if Saddam acquired a nuclear weapon, he could credibly threaten Israel with a nuclear attack or use Iraq’s nuclear status as a check against Israeli regional military dominance. The Israelis were also not certain if Saddam could be deterred from launching a nuclear strike even by the threat of an overwhelming Israeli conventional counterattack. For the Israelis, it is not always necessary for its adversaries to have the military capability to be perceived as a threat because there are instances when the intent to attack Israel will suffice in meeting its threshold of a threat. These perceptions and beliefs led Prime Minister Menachem Begin to authorize the preventive strike against the Osirak reactors.16 Q3: Has the powerful state perceived the proliferating state’s actions as a threat to its national security? Yes, Israel perceived Iraq’s Osirak reactors as a threat to its national existence and believed the reactors threatened the Jewish State with the possibility of a second Holocaust.17 The perceived threat was heightened because Iraq was considered an enemy state that intended to use the reactors as a means to construct nuclear weapons.18 The following official post-attack statement illustrates Israel’s high degree of perceived threat. The atomic bombs that this reactor would have been capable of producing, with enriched uranium or plutonium, were of the type dropped on Hiroshima. In this way, a danger to Israel‘s existence was being produced. Within a short time, the Iraqi reactor would have been in operation and hot. In such conditions, no Israeli Government could have decided to blow it up. This would have caused a huge wave of radioactivity over the city of Baghdad and its innocent citizens would have been harmed. We were therefore forced to defend ourselves against the construction of an atomic 14 Richard

K. Betts, “The Osirak Fallacy,” The National Interest, March 1, 2006, accessed April 5, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/article/the-osirak-fallacy-1093. 15 “Israeli and Iraqi Statements on Raid on Nuclear Plant,” The New York Times, June 9, 1981, accessed August 7, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/09/world/israeli-and-iraqi-statementson-raid-on-nuclear-plant.html. 16 Moshe Arens, Broken Covenant: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis Between the U.S. and Israel (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 148. 17 Aviezer Yaari, “Strategic Intelligence for the Attack on the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor (1981),” Israel’s Silent Defender: An Inside Look at Sixty Years of Israeli Intelligence (Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing, 2012), 96. 18 Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, 233.

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225

bomb in Iraq, which itself would not have hesitated to use it against Israel and its population centers. The goal for these bombs was Israel. This was explicitly stated by the Iraqi ruler. After the Iranians slightly damaged the reactor, Saddam Hussein remarked that it was pointless for the Iranians to attack the reactor because it was being built against Israel alone.19

Prime Minister Begin substantiated Israel’s fears when he issued a statement equating the radiation produced by atomic weapons to a gas used to exterminate Jews in the Nazi concentration camps. “What’s the difference if it’s radiation and not Zyklon B gas?”20 These statements are illustrative examples of the cognitive psychological influences and the chosen trauma that shaped Israeli leaders’ operational codes and perceptions of Iraq. The Hiroshima reference illuminates the destructiveness of nuclear power alongside the continuing trauma of the Holocaust in Menachem Begin’s mind and in Israel’s collective memory. Research suggests collective memory of past events provide leaders with the basis to mobilize mass support.21 Menachem Begin used the collective memory of the Holocaust to press for aggressive action against Iraq, although it was suggested that he ordered the bombing just prior to national elections to bolster his reelection bid.22 Kroenig’s theory forecasts Israel would perceive Iraq’s proliferation efforts as a low threat because it is unable to project power over Iraq due to its inability to conduct a ground war inside Iraqi territory, and would therefore be unaffected by its nuclear program. This assumption is falsified by actual events. Israel perceived Iraq’s nuclear program to be a high threat and ultimately launched a preventive airstrike against the Osirak nuclear complex. The study’s Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory successfully predicted the actual high degree of threat for Israel based on its history of conflict with Iraq in the 1967 Six-Day War and the 1973 Yom Kippur/Ramadan War (Q1), Israeli leaders percieved the construction of the Osirak nuclear complex was intended to produce nuclear weapons to attack Israel (Q2), and Israeli leaders’ statements linking Iraq’s nuclear program to the possibility of a second Holocaust (Q3). The use of the study’s threat perception theory demonstrates the influence of cognitive psychological stimuli on leader perceptions as nations seek security as a component of their regional security dilemmas (Table 7.4). Q4: Has the powerful state identified the weaker state’s actions as a high threat to its national security? Yes, Israel perceived Iraq to be a high threat based on the Heuristic for Threat Assessment Privileging Identity (Table 7.4). Israeli leaders mapped regional weapons 19 The

New York Times, “Israeli and Iraqi Statements on Raid on Nuclear Plant.”

20 Paul A. Gigot, “A Great American Screw-Up: The U.S. and Iraq,” Wall Street Journal, December

18, 1990, accessed July 23, 2012, http://www.proquest.com. 21 Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 26. 22 Yehuda Avner, The Prime Ministers: An Intimate Narrative of Israeli Leadership (New Milford, CT: Toby Press, 2010), 553.

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Table 7.4 The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast— Israel and Iraq 1981 Israel

Perceived Threat

The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation

The Differential Effects of Threat Perception

Actual

Low

High

High

of mass destruction as an existential threat and invoked the Begin Doctrine to prevent the introduction of a nuclear power into the region. The mapping of regional weapons of mass destruction as existential threats illustrated Israel’s heightened threat perception as highlighted in the following official statement, “On no account shall we permit an enemy to develop weapons of mass destruction against the people of Israel. We shall defend the citizens of Israel in good time and with all the means at our disposal.”23 Q5: Does the powerful state possess adequate airpower capability to disrupt the weaker state’s proliferation effort? Yes, the Israeli Air Force’s ability to project power is detailed in Chapter 5. Q6: Does the powerful state’s national security policy advocate preventive strikes? Yes, Israeli doctrine permits preventive war and is documented in Chapter 5. Q7: Has the weaker state crossed the powerful state’s established redlines? Yes, Israel perceived that Iraq crossed the established weapons of mass destruction redline by constructing the two reactors, with the possible goal of producing a nuclear weapon. Israel’s then-Ambassador to the United Nations Yehuda Blum articulated his dire view of Iraq’s nuclear efforts and Israel’s continued fear of annihilation. In light of Iraqi declarations and deeds, and Iraq’s refusal even to sign an armistice agreement with Israel, Israel had full legal justification to exercise its inherent right of self-defense to abort the Iraqi nuclear threat to Israel.24

Former Defense Minister and Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, also articulated his view on nuclear proliferation by confrontation states. The third element in our defense policy for the 1980s is our determination to prevent confrontation states from gaining access to nuclear weapons. Israel cannot afford the introduction of the nuclear weapon. For us it is not a question of a balance of terror but a question of survival. We shall therefore have to prevent such a threat at its inception.25

In addition to Iraq’s actions, Saddam Hussein’s negative and anti-Semitic views of Zionism, Jews, and Israel likely increased Israel’s threat perceptions of his nuclear ambitions. According to Saddam, 23 The

New York Times, “Israeli and Iraqi Statements on Raid on Nuclear Plant.” Nations Security Council, “UN Security Council Official Records: S/PV.2288,” United Nations, June 19, 1981, accessed August 7, 2013, http://domino.un.org. 25 Kirschenbaum, “Operation Opera,” 58. 24 United

Iraq Case Study—1981

227

Table 7.5 The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Proliferation Response Forecast—Israel and Iraq 1981 Israel

Power Applied

The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation

The Differential Effects of Threat Perception

Actual

No Action

Force

Force

Zionists are greedy – I mean the Jews are greedy. Whenever any issue relates to the economy, their greed is very high… We should reflect on all that we were able to learn from The Protocols of the Elders of Zion… I do not believe that there was any falsification with regard to those Zionist objectives, specifically with regard to the Zionist desire to usurp—usurping the economies of people… The extortionist Zionist enemy cannot survive without erasing the whole Arab nation.26

A nuclear weapon in the hands of a man who held such animosity toward Israel and Jews was an existential threat for Israel. Saddam’s nuclear program and associated anti-Semitic declarations came a mere 36 years after the Holocaust and the liberation of the concentration camps in Europe. Q8: Does the powerful state have domestic support for a military strike against the weaker state? It is debatable because Israeli leaders did not have overwhelming domestic support to attack Iraq’s nuclear reactor. Before the attack, Prime Minister Begin established a committee to examine other alternatives. The committee recommended Israel not attack Iraq, although proponents argued attacking Osirak would delay or even prevent Iraq’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon. Opponents argued bombing the reactor would make world opinion hostile to Israel and might even accelerate Iraq’s efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon.27 After the attack, Saddam expanded his previous resource allocation to Iraq’s nuclear program from 400 scientists and $400 million to 7000 specialists and a $10 billion budget.28 Kroenig’s theory forecasts Israel would take no action against Iraq’s nuclear reactors because its inability to project power over Iraq should have left it unaffected by Iraqi proliferation. This prediction is falsified by actual events. The Differential Effects of Threat Perception’s Heuristic for the Proliferation Response successfully predicted Israel’s use of force against Iraq (Table 7.5). The theory’s success is based on five interrelated criteria: Israel perceiving the reactor to be a high threat (Q4), the Israeli Air Force’s ability to successfully destroy the reactor (Q5), Israeli national security policies authorizing the use of military force against emerging regional 26 Brands

and Palkki, “Why Did Saddam Want the Bomb? The Israel Factor and the Iraq Nuclear Program.” 27 Aviezer Yaari, “Strategic Intelligence for the Attack on the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor (1981).” Israel’s Silent Defender: An Inside Look at Sixty Years of Israeli Intelligence (Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing, 2012), 98. 28 Robert S. Litwak, “Counterproliferation and the Use of Force,” Routledge Handbook of Nuclear Proliferation and Policy, ed. Joseph F. Pilat and Nathan E. Busch (New York: Routledge, 2018), 229.

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nuclear threats (Q6), Iraq crossing Israel’s weapons of mass destruction redlines by constructing a nuclear reactor (Q7), and it is debatable if Israel had domestic support to attack Iraq because of concerns an attack would turn world opinion against Israel, or have the unintended effect of accelerating Iraq’s proliferation efforts (Q8). Q1: Do the states have a recent history of direct military conflict? No, the United States and Iraq did not have a history of direct military conflict during the 1956–1981 timeframe. Prior to the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), the United States’ policy in the region was to bolster friendly regimes to halt communist expansion, Arab nationalism, and the growing Soviet influence. The United States and Iraq were not on favorable terms because the Ba’ath Party remained largely in the Soviet camp in the 1960s and 1970s. Relations between the United States and Iraq were also strained because Baghdad was highly critical of Israel and had severed diplomatic ties with the United States due to its support of the Jewish State during the 1967 Six-Day War. Washington’s view of Baghdad later softened, coinciding with its hardline view of Tehran after the 1979 Iranian Revolution due to U.S. fears of Shi’a regional dominance and animosity over the U.S. Embassy Hostage Crisis. Iraq’s relations with the United States were cordial enough for Saddam Hussein to receive the ceremonial key to the City of Detroit in 1979, courtesy of Mayor Coleman A. Young, after donating $450,000 to a Chaldean Church—Chaldean Sacred Heart, whose congregation was primarily Iraqi Catholics.29 After Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, the U.S. aligned its foreign policy to support Saddam near the end of the war when it appeared Iran might win. This support was also a surreptitious U.S. effort to drain the strength of the two rivals by allowing them to continue killing one another.30 This desire to limit the regional influence of both countries later evolved into the Clinton administration’s policy of the dual containment of Iran and Iraq. The absence of a history of direct military conflict between the United States and Iraq, the fact that Iraq lacked the capability to directly target the United States with ballistic missiles or long-range bombers, coupled with the U.S. backing of Iraq in its war with Iran, as well as Iraq’s compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty likely influenced U.S. perceptions that the Osirak nuclear complex was a low threat to the national security of the United States. Q2: Is the weaker state developing a nuclear weapons capability? Yes, Iraq was attempting to acquire a nuclear weapons capability by trying to obtain fissile material from the Osirak nuclear reactors even though the reactors were not suitable for this effort due to their test research design. The United States had low confidence the reactors could produce enough weapons-grade fissile material to construct a nuclear weapon. The CIA indicated the reactors’ test design was not well suited for plutonium production, and the Congressional Research Service estimated that in a best-case scenario, it would take Iraq 10–30 years to produce enough 29 Neal Rubin, “Unlocking a Mystery: Ceremonial Keys to the City Went to Elmo, Saddam—And Yes, Some Kid Named Jerry,” The Detroit News, November 14, 2013, accessed December 31, 2013, http://www.detroitnews.com/article/20131114/METRO08/311140038#ixzz2pDOSxpHk. 30 Fawaz A. Gerges, Obama and the Middle East (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 177.

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plutonium for a single warhead.31 Consequently, the reactors were not deemed an immediate threat to U.S. national security. Q3: Has the powerful state perceived the weaker state’s actions as a threat to its national security? No, the United States did not perceive Iraq’s Osirak nuclear complex to be a threat to its national security. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was a high threat to U.S. national security and non-Soviet threats were considered regional issues, as prioritized in the Reagan administration’s National Security Strategy. The administration emphasized that outside of Europe, the United States would rely on regional states to respond militarily to non-Soviet threats and the United States would remain the primary military power dealing with the Soviet Union.32 This Soviet-based focus likely contributed to the Reagan administration’s perception that Iraq’s nuclear program was not a significant threat to the United States. Since Iraq was no longer firmly in the Soviet camp and located outside the European theater of operations, the United States may have chosen to deflect any military response against Iraq to Israel. In addition to not perceiving Iraq’s reactors as a high threat, the United States very softly, but publicly, rebuked Israel for the Raid on Osirak. United Nations Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick articulated the Reagan administration’s opposition to the attack in a prepared statement, thus implying a low threat perception of Iraq’s nuclear program. Her statement emphasized the U.S. predisposition toward diplomacy in addressing Iraq’s nuclear program. It is precisely because of my Government’s deep involvement in efforts to promote peace in the Middle East that we were shocked by the Israeli air strike on the Iraqi nuclear facility and promptly condemned this action, which we believe both reflected and exacerbated deeper antagonisms in the region which, if not ameliorated, will continue to lead to outbreaks of violence. However, although my Government has condemned Israel’s act, we know it is necessary to take into account the context of this action as well as its consequences. The truth demands nothing less. As my President, Ronald Reagan, asserted in his press conference: “I do think that one has to recognize that Israel had reason for concern in view of the past history of Iraq, which has never signed a cease-fire or recognized Israel as a nation, has never joined in any peace effort for that … it does not even recognize the existence of Israel as a country… Israel might have sincerely believed it was a defensive move.” Nonetheless, we believe the means Israel chose to quiet its fears about the purposes of Iraq’s nuclear program have hurt, and not helped, the peace and security of the area. In my Government’s view, diplomatic means available to Israel had not been exhausted and the Israeli action has damaged the regional confidence that is essential for the peace process to go forward. All of us with an interest in peace, freedom and national independence have a high stake in that process. Israel’s stake is highest of all.33 31 Reiter,

“Preventive Attacks Against Nuclear Programs and the ‘Success’ at Osiraq,” 358. Reagan, “U.S. National Security Strategy: National Security Decision Directive Number 32,” Federation of American Scientists, May 20, 1982, accessed August 5, 2013, http://www.fas. org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-032.htm. 33 United Nations Security Council, “UN Security Council Official Records: S/PV.2288.” 32 Ronald

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Table 7.6 The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast— The United States and Iraq 1981 The United States

Perceived Threat

The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation

The Differential Effects of Threat Perception

Actual

High

Low

Low

Events falsify the Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory’s prediction. The theory would not have accurately forecast the low degree of perceived threat for the United States because Kroenig’s threat assessment asserts the United States would perceive Iraqi proliferation as a high threat since its ability to project power over it would be constrained by proliferation. The study’s enhanced theory successfully predicted the low degree of threat for the United States because of: the lack of a history of conflict with Iraq (Q1), the United States did not perceive Iraq would be able to develop a nuclear weapon using the Osirak reactors for the next 10–30 years (Q2), and U.S. leader statements did not imply Iraq was a threat to U.S. national security (Q3) (Table 7.6). Q4: Has the powerful state identified the weaker state’s actions as a high threat to its national security? No, the United States did not identify Iraq as a high threat based on the Heuristic for Threat Assessment Privileging Identity (Table 7.6). Q5: Does the powerful state possess adequate airpower capability to disrupt the weaker state’s proliferation effort? Yes, the United States’ ability to project airpower is documented in Chapter 5. Q6: Does the powerful state’s national security policy advocate preventive strikes? No, the Reagan administration’s 1982 National Security Strategy (NSS), issued a year after the strike, did not address the policy of preventive war to halt nuclear proliferation by states violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NSS focused primarily on the U.S.-Soviet rivalry, and specified the threat to the U.S. emanated from the Soviet Union, its allies, and clients. The document addressed nuclear proliferation by articulating one of the United States’ global goals was “To discourage further spread of nuclear weapons”; however, it did not detail how this would be accomplished.34 The NSS reflected the Cold War strategic environment as both superpowers exercised restraint when dealing with one another’s allies and client states. This was due to the potential for a broader war, as reflected in the following statement. The Soviet Union remains aware of the catastrophic consequences of initiating military action directly against the U.S. or its allies. For this reason, a war with a Soviet client arising from regional tensions is more likely than a direct conflict with the USSR. In a conflict with a Soviet client, however, the risk of direct confrontation with the Soviet Union remains.35 34 Reagan, 35 Reagan,

“U.S. National Security Strategy.” “U.S. National Security Strategy.”

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The Reagan administration addressed proliferation in more detail in the National Security Decision Directive Number 6 (NSDD-6) (signed July 16, 1981), United States Non-Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Policy. This document, which was signed a month after the Israeli Raid on Osirak, provides additional insight into the U.S. position on nuclear proliferation during the timeframe Israel attacked Iraq. The policy articulates the United States would seek to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives to additional countries—horizontal proliferation—as a fundamental security and foreign policy objective, and that it would work with other countries to combat proliferation.36 This implies a multilateral and diplomatic approach versus a unilateral use of military force, as evidenced in Jeanne Kirkpatrick’s prepared statement to the United Nations. The U.S.’ Non-Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Policy delegates primary responsibility of preventing proliferation to the Secretary of State, collaborating with the Department of Energy, and other interested agencies. The delegation of authority to the Secretary of State rather than the Secretary of Defense further illustrates the Reagan administration viewed nuclear proliferation as a diplomatic rather than a military issue. This distinction likely contributed to the administration’s soft rebuke of Israel’s preventive strike and demonstrated the U.S. preference for diplomacy. Q7: Has the weaker state crossed the powerful state’s established redlines? No, the United States did not establish redlines for Iraq’s nuclear program and did not feel directly threatened by the test research reactors. Additionally, Iraq lacked the capability to enrich uranium to weapons-grade level and it did not have a plutonium processing facility required to produce nuclear weapons-grade fissile material. Furthermore, Iraq lacked the capability—intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM), and refuelable long-range strike aircraft and bombers—to deliver a nuclear weapon to U.S. territory, and was thus not deemed a credible threat to the United States. Q8: Does the powerful state have domestic support for a military strike against the weaker state? No, U.S. leaders did not present the Iraqi reactor as a national threat to the American public; therefore, no domestic support for a military strike was required. Kroenig’s theory forecast the United States would use force in response to Iraq’s proliferation efforts. His theoretical assumption is the United States should have felt threatened because Iraq’s nuclear proliferation would restrict the United States’ ability to project power over it. Actual events falsify this prediction because the United States took no action against the Osirak reactors. The study’s enhanced threat perception theory predicted the United States would either take no action or use coercive diplomacy to halt Iraq’s nuclear program since it was perceived to be a low threat (Table 7.7). The United States did not attack the reactors because it did not 36 Ronald

Reagan, “United States Non-Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Policy: National Security Decision Directive Number 6,” Reagan Presidential Library, July 16, 1981, accessed August 12, 2013, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/reference/Scanned%20NSDDS/ NSDD6.pdf.

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7 Analysis of Data

Table 7.7 The Differential Effect of Threat Perception Theory—Proliferation Response Forecast— The United States and Iraq 1981 The United States

Power Applied

The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation

The Differential Effects of Threat Perception

Actual

Force

No Action

No Action

identify Iraq as a high threat (Q4), the United States had adequate airpower to disrupt Iraq’s proliferation efforts (Q5), U.S. national security policy did not advocate for preventive strikes (Q6), the United States did not establish red lines for Iraq’s nuclear program (Q7), and since the program was never presented as a threat to U.S. national security, the Reagan administration did not have to seek public support in order to take no action against Iraq (Q8). The actual events of the 1981 Iraq case study falsify Kroenig’s theoretical predictions. The two heuristics used in the study’s Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory more accurately forecast the United States and Israeli threat perceptions and responses by incorporating state and individual-level influences. These heuristics illustrate Israel was more inclined to perceive a high threat and use force to address the Iraqi threat while the United States would perceive a lower threat and select either coercive diplomacy or take no action. The United States took no action to address Iraq’s nuclear complex while Israel conducted a preventive airstrike and destroyed the larger Osiris reactor. After the attack, Israeli Ambassador Yehuda Blum declared, In destroying Osirak last Sunday, Israel was exercising its inherent and natural right to selfdefense, as understood in general international law and well within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.37

With the attack, Israel asserted its right to self-defense, as articulated in the statement by Ambassador Blum.

Israel and the Raid on Osirak In the fall of 1980, Israeli intelligence reported Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactors would become operational between July and November 1981.38 On June 7, 1981, the Israel Air Force bombed the Tammuz-I and II Material Testing Reactors (MTR), at the Osirak nuclear complex, at the direction of Prime Minister Menachem Begin

37 United

Nations Security Council, UN Security Council Official Records: S/PV.2280, June 12, 1981, accessed December 31, 2013, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NL8/100/21/ PDF/NL810021.pdf?OpenElement. 38 John T. Correll, “Air Strike at Osirak,” Air Force Magazine, April 2012, accessed 26 July 2012, http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2012/April%202012/0412osirak.aspx.

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(Map 7).39 The attack occurred at the beginning of the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) and surprised the United States because it was still reeling from the U.S. Embassy Hostage Crisis in Iran, and had been hoping the war would weaken both Iran and Iraq, and end in a stalemate. Iranian F-4 Phantoms had previously bombed the Iraqi reactors on September 30, 1980, causing only slight damage. In a press release following the Israeli attack, Prime Minister Begin stated he “will not be the man in whose time there will be a second Holocaust.”40 By invoking the Holocaust analogy, Begin mapped a potential nuclear-armed Iraq as the harbinger of another attempt to annihilate the world’s Jewish population, thus elevating the perception of the Iraq threat and implicitly equating Iraq with Nazi Germany. Fear of annihilation is intrinsic in the Israeli national psyche and the Holocaust analogy is frequently used by its leaders to warn against and categorize threats to the state. This fear comprises physiological and psychological reactions that seek to survive a dangerous situation by using an adaptive response.41 For Israel, the adaptive response is to strike and destroy the source of the threat. Israel assumed the Osirak reactors were designed to produce a nuclear weapon despite U.S. intelligence assessments that the test reactors were not the optimal design to produce plutonium. The Israelis also deduced that since Iraq was pursuing a nuclear weapon this device was meant to destroy the Jewish State.42 There is speculation that Iraq likely intended to deter Iran, and not Israel, since neighboring Iran was the more immediate threat, though after Iran attacked the reactors in 1980, Saddam stated the reactors were intended to deter Israel. Iraq’s population is majority Shi’a and Iran is overwhelmingly Shi’a, while Saddam and those in power inside Iraq were Sunni. Saddam feared Iran’s Islamic Revolution might incite Iraq’s Shi’a population to rise against him. Looking ahead to the 2003 Iraq War, Saddam’s fears were not off base because a Shi’a-led government with close ties to Iran replaced his regime when he was overthrown. After the Israeli attack on Osirak, Saddam stated Iraq’s nuclear program would now focus on deterring Israel. Saddam’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons as protection from Israel’s conventional military superiority is addressed by Sagan’s Security Model. The Security Model posits states proliferate to address threats to their security.43 Though Israeli threat perceptions of Iraqi intentions are clearly understandable since Saddam frequently engaged in anti-Semitic rhetoric and routinely spoke out against Zionism and the Jewish State. Understandably, Israel interpreted this bellicose rhetoric, coupled with Saddam’s nuclear ambitions, as an existential threat and 39 Joshua Kirschenbaum, “Operation Opera: An Ambiguous Success,” Journal of Strategic Security, vol. III, no. 4 (2010): 49. 40 “Operation Opera: The Israeli Raid on the Osirak Nuclear Reactor,” Jewish Virtual Library, accessed July 26, 2012, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/Osirak.html. 41 Daniel Bar-Tal, “Why Does Fear Override Hope in Societies Engulfed in Intractable Conflict, as It Does in the Israeli Society?” Political Psychology, vol. 22, no. 3 (September 2001): 603. 42 Donald G. Boudreau, “The Bombing of the Osirak Reactor,” International Journal on World Peace, vol. x, no. 2 (June 1993): 21. 43 Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security, vol. 21, no. 3 (Winter, 1996–1997): 57.

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therefore took action to negate this threat. In response to the attack, Ambassador Kirkpatrick relayed the following,44 The area that stretches from South-West Asia across the Fertile Crescent and the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean is, as we all know, torn not only by tension and division but also by deeply rooted, tenacious hostilities that erupt repeatedly into violence… Now comes Israel’s destruction of the Iraqi nuclear facility. Each of these acts of violence undermines the stability and well-being of the area. Each gravely jeopardizes the peace and security of the entire area. The danger of war and anarchy in this vital strategic region threatens global peace and presents the [United Nations Security] Council with a grave challenge.

The 1981 Iraq case illustrates Israel’s sensitivity to perceived threats and the U.S.’ reluctance to label Iraqi proliferation as a significant threat because of its focus on the Soviet Union. The case also demonstrates the effectiveness of Israeli airpower as a preventive strike option, which Kroenig’s theory discounts because it does not equate the ability to conduct airstrikes with his power projection definition of a sustained “boots on the ground” military operation. A post-attack assessment argued that although Israel’s attack on Osirak is heralded as a successful use of preventive airstrikes as a counterproliferation instrument, the attack may have actually been counterproductive because it compelled Saddam to accelerate his nuclear ambitions and to no longer comply with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. After the attack, Iraq’s nuclear program increased from 400 scientists and $400 million to 7000 scientists and $10 billion. It wasn’t until after the Gulf War, when inspectors from the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) discovered the enormity of Iraq’s covert nuclear program that the Israeli threat assessment of Iraqi nuclear intent was validated.45

Iraq Case Study—2003 After Iraq’s defeat in the 1991 Gulf War, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed a series of resolutions calling for the destruction of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, and compliance with United Nations Special Commission on-site inspections of its WMD-related facilities to verify compliance with previous UNSC Resolutions (UNSCR). Iraq failed to comply with the resolutions, resulting in the launch of Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, with the intent to degrade its WMD and air defense capabilities. The United States had already been enforcing no-fly zones over Iraq since the end of the Gulf War to protect Iraq’s Kurdish population in the north (Operation Northern Watch) and its Shiite population in the south (Operation Southern Watch) in support of UNSCR 688. The price tag to contain Saddam and deplete Iraq’s military capability through enforcement of the Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch no-fly zones was $1 billion a year.46 44 United

Nations Security Council, “UN Security Council Official Records: S/PV.2288.” “Preventive Attacks Against Nuclear Programs and the ‘Success’ at Osiraq,” 362. 46 Ricks, Fiasco, 15. 45 Reiter,

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After the September 11th attacks, with U.S. nationalism at an all-time high and a perpetual fear of terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction, the Bush administration took an increasingly hardline view of Iraq’s non-compliance with UN mandates, and pressured the UN Security Council to declare Iraq in material breach of previous UNSCRs. On November 8, 2002, the UN Security Council voted 15 to 0, under UNSCR 1441 terms, to give Iraq thirty days to submit a “currently accurate, full, and complete declaration” of all WMD programs. According to President Bush, “The resolution made clear the burden of proof rested with Saddam. The inspectors did not have to prove that he had weapons [WMD]. He had to prove that he did not.”47 The Bush administration sought to map al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks with the possibility of future terrorist organizations aided by Iraq, and used the UN Security Council material breach declaration as justification to launch a preventive war against Iraq. In the run-up to the war, President Bush invoked the September 11th analogy to warn against a perceived danger emanating from Iraq. Eleven years ago, as a condition for ending the Persian Gulf War, the Iraqi regime was required to destroy its weapons of mass destruction, to cease all development of such weapons and to stop all support for terrorist groups. The Iraqi regime has violated all those obligations. It possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking nuclear weapons. It has given shelter and support to terrorism and practices terror against its own people. The entire world has witnessed Iraq’s 11-year history of defiance, deception, and bad faith. We must also never forget the most vivid events of recent history. On September 11, 2001, America felt its vulnerability even to threats that gather on the other side of the Earth. We resolved then, and we are resolved today, to confront every threat from any source that could bring sudden terror and suffering to America… If we know Saddam Hussein has dangerous weapons today – and we do – does it make any sense for the world to wait to confront him as he grows even stronger and develops even more dangerous weapons?48

Bush made clear that a nuclear Iraq was a direct threat to U.S. national security. By invoking the September 11th analogy and Saddam armed with weapons of mass destruction, Bush sought to create a nexus between terrorism and nuclear weapons. Wirtz and Russell highlighted the Bush administration’s belief that rogue states and terrorist organizations collude and cannot be deterred; therefore these groups are characterized as terrorist states. Using this logic, Wirtz and Russell argue the Bush administration included Iraq as a component of the war on terrorism.49 This doomsday scenario was enough for the United States to use force to negate the perceived, but non-existent, threat emanating from Iraq. On March 20, 2003, the United States began combat operations against Iraq with the stated intent of destroying its reconstituted weapons of mass destruction program. Raphael Ofek of The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies observes that the war had nearly the full support of the American public, which was still affected by the recent memory of the September 11th

47 Bush,

Decision Points, 241. W. Bush, “Transcript: George Bush’s Speech on Iraq,” The Guardian, October 7, 2002, accessed March 5, 2019, https://amp.theguardian.com/world/2002/oct/07/usa.iraq. 49 James J. Wirtz and James A. Russell, “U.S. Policy on Preventive War and Preemption,” The Nonproliferation Review (Spring 2003), 115. 48 George

236 Table 7.8 The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast—Iraq 2003

7 Analysis of Data

Perceived Threat

Israel

The United States

Low

High

attacks.50 The U.S. public support for the Iraq invasion is supported by research that suggests states that experienced a national tragedy demonstrate increased support for the use of force to confront perceived threats.51 Israel avoided the war but still provided questionable intelligence to the United States and Britain that exaggerated the existence of Iraqi WMD stockpiles.52 Kroenig’s theory predicts Israel would perceive a low threat from Iraqi proliferation, and the United States, as a power projecting state, should feel a high threat posed by Iraq’s proliferation efforts (Table 7.8). This prediction is based on the theory’s definition of power projection being equated with the ability to conduct a conventional ground war inside the target state. Since Israel is unable to conduct a ground war inside Iraqi territory, Kroenig’s theory predicts it should feel less threatened by Iraq’s proliferation efforts since it is already unable to project power over it. The United States is able to project power over Iraq, therefore an Iraqi nuclear program should be a high perceived threat to Washington since it would challenge the existing power dynamic between the United States and Iraq. Kroenig’s prediction is consistent with his forecast for the previous Iraq 1981 case; however, in the 1981 case, Israel perceived Iraq as a high threat because of the existence of the Osirak nuclear complex, and the United States did not perceive Iraq to be a high threat. The next section applies the two heuristics to the United States and Israel to test the study’s Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory against the 2003 Iraq case to determine if it more accurately accounts for the expected United States and Israeli responses to the case study. Q1: Do the states have a recent history of direct military conflict? Yes, Israel’s destruction of Iraq’s nuclear reactor in 1981, and Iraq’s Scud missile attacks on Israel during the 1991 Gulf War occur within the study’s 25-year time span (1978–2003). Furthermore, Saddam Hussein’s bellicose and anti-Semitic rhetoric incited Israeli animosity toward Baghdad. In April 1990, Saddam threatened to “burn half of Israel” if the Israelis attacked Iraq.53 During the first Gulf War, Iraq fired 39 Scud missiles at Israel; however, Israel did not retaliate due to U.S. concerns that an 50 Raphael Ofek, “The Iraq War’s Intelligence Fiasco 14 Years On: The WMDs That Never Were,” BESA Center Perspectives, Paper No. 701, December 29, 2017, 6. 51 Huddy et al., “The Political Consequences of Perceived Threat and Felt Insecurity,” 148. 52 Molly Moore, “Israel Shares Blame on Iraq Intelligence, Report Says,” Washington Post, December 5, 2003, accessed April 6, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/ 2003/12/05/israel-shares-blame-on-iraq-intelligence-report-says/fa34cc5e-8a18-4faa-9615-19a 899f99fda/. 53 Louise Fawcett, International Relations of the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 278.

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Israeli counterattack might upset Arab members and fracture the coalition.54 During the planning phase of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the U.S. reassured Tel Aviv it would provide the Jewish State with Patriot missile batteries to forestall any potential Israeli response to Iraqi aggression. Although Iraq fired 39 Scuds at Israel, their inaccuracy and small conventional warhead caused little damage and resulted in the loss of one Israeli life, thus contributing to Israel’s restrained response to the attacks. In an opinion article for The Jerusalem Post, former Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens argues Israeli Prime Minister Shamir hesitated to respond to Iraqi Scud missiles because he was not faced with public pressure to retaliate since the attacks had caused minimal damage and casualties. Arens continues that the nexus between the U.S.-Arab relationship and resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been lost over time. He identifies Saudi King Fahd’s acknowledgment that Israel has a right to self-defense, and that the new priorities of Arab leaders indicate the Palestinian issue is no longer a high priority with many Arab leaders, as examples.55 The Iraqi defeat in the first Gulf War did not curtail Baghdad’s desire to foment discord within Israel. In 2000, Saddam offered to pay rewards to the families of Palestinians killed fighting against Israel. The family of a suicide bomber received $25,000, and the family of a combatant killed while fighting Israelis received a $10,000 payment. Between 2000 and 2003, Saddam is alleged to have paid out $35 million to Palestinian families for the deaths of family members killed fighting the Israelis.56 Q2: Is the weaker state developing a nuclear weapons capability? No, Iraq was not developing a nuclear weapons capability. Israel supplied the United States and Britain with questionable intelligence speculating Iraq had reconstituted its weapons of mass destruction program.57 Despite this assumption, Israel did not take active measures to negate any potential Iraqi threat. Thus lending credibility to the argument Israel did not believe Iraq was developing a nuclear capability. Q3: Has the powerful state perceived the weaker state’s actions as a threat to its national security? No, Israel did not perceive Iraq as a threat to its national security. Israel is vocal in its strategic messaging regarding threats to its national security; however, it remained largely silent during the pre-war debate surrounding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program. Jeffrey Record argued Israel initially opposed the Bush administration’s push for war with Iraq because the Israelis viewed Iran as its primary enemy and believed Iraq was a check on Iranian power. When it became clear the Americans

54 Moshe

Arens, “27 Years Since the Gulf War—Why Didn’t Israel Respond?,” The Jerusalem Post, February 12, 2018, accessed April 6, 2020, https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/27-years-sincethe-Gulf-War-why-didnt-Israel-respond-542437. 55 Arens, “27 Years Since the Gulf War—Why Didn’t Israel Respond?” 56 “Palestinians Get Saddam Funds,” BBC News, March 13, 2003, accessed November 11, 2013, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2846365.stm. 57 Moore, “Israel Shares Blame on Iraq Intelligence, Report Says.”

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were going to war with Iraq, Israel supported the invasion, while arguing Iraq should be the first step toward an eventual war with Iran.58 Retired Israeli General Shlomo Brom argued Israel exaggerated the Iraqi threat because of a desire to see Saddam Hussein overthrown.59 He further argued that although Israeli officials issued an order that an American-led invasion could trigger an Iraqi chemical or biological missile attack; Israeli civilians largely ignored the military’s directive to carry gas masks. Brom proclaimed, “Israeli intelligence was a full partner with the United States and Britain in developing a false picture of Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction capability,” and concluded, “Israel has no reason to regret the outcome of the war in Iraq.”60 Effraim Inbar, Director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies, rejected Brom’s findings and argued, “Intelligence has to warn of the worst-case scenario.”61 Israeli MP Yossi Sarid also dismissed Israeli intelligence on Iraq’s WMD program, arguing, “It was known in Israel that the story that [Iraq’s] weapons of mass destruction could be activated in 45 minutes was an old wives’ tale.” He continued, “Israel didn’t want to spoil President Bush‘s scenario, and it should have.”62 Adding to this assertion was former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter who told an Israeli newspaper that Israeli intelligence reached the conclusion years ago that Iraq no longer had weapons of mass destruction. Ritter surmised, “In the end, if the Israeli intelligence knew that Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction, so the CIA knew it and thus British intelligence too.”63 Former Israeli Diplomat, Dore Gold argued Iraq was no threat to Israel in 2003 because the Iraqi army’s capability was degraded in manpower and equipment, and UN sanctions impeded Iraq’s ability to rearm and reconstitute its military. Gold adds that former Defense Minister Moshe Arens concluded in 2002, the Iraqi missile capability was limited and the missile threat Israel would have to deal with came from Syria, and that Lieutenant General Moshe Ya’alon stated he doesn’t “lose sleep” over any threat posed by Iraq. Gold argued the U.S. war in Iraq had the “unintended sideeffect of removing a secondary or tertiary threat to Israel, but not a primary threat.” He asserted Iraq likely posed a primary threat to states Saddam either threatened or invaded—Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.64 It is clear Israeli political and military leaders were aware Iraq no longer posed a threat to the United States or Israel. Israel perceived Iraq to be a low threat to its national security (Table 7.9). This 58 Record,

Wanting War, 123. Press, “General: Israelis Exaggerated Iraq; Threat,” USA Today, December 4, 2003, accessed August 7, 2013, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-12-04-isr aeli-iraq-threat_x.htm. 60 Associated Press, “General: Israelis Exaggerated Iraq Threat.” 61 Associated Press, “General: Israelis Exaggerated Iraq Threat.” 62 The Guardian, “Israel Knew Iraq Had No WMD, Says MP,” The Guardian, February 4, 2004, accessed August 7, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2004/feb/04/iraq.israel. 63 The Guardian, “Israel Knew Iraq Had No WMD, Says MP.” 64 Dore Gold, “Wartime Witch Hunt: Blaming Israel for the Iraq War,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, vol. 3, no. 25, June 3, 2004, accessed April 6, 2020, http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief3-25. htm. 59 Associated

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Table 7.9 The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast— Israel and Iraq 2003 Israel

Perceived Threat

The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation

The Differential Effects of Threat Perception

Actual

Low

Low

Low

supports the forecast using Kroenig’s theory because Israel should feel less threatened by Iraqi proliferation since it is unable to project power over Iraq due to its inability to conduct a ground war inside Iraqi territory. The study’s enhanced threat perception theory predicted a low threat for Israel because Israeli leaders did not take any actions in response to alleged Iraqi WMD, nor did its strategic messaging provide indication that Israel perceived a threat from Iraq. Israel interprets all instances of regional WMD as an existential threat, and because it was not vocal about alleged Iraqi WMD this was indicative of a low threat perception. There is also speculation Israel knew Iraq had no weapons of mass detruction, despite passing along intelligence to the Americans and the British that stated otherwise. The study predicted Israel would have a low threat perception of Iraq’s suspected nuclear proliferation efforts. Although Iraq fired 39 Scud missiles at Israel during the first Gulf War, the missiles caused minimal damage and Israel did not respond due in part to U.S. fears an Israeli response would disrupt the Arab coalition. Iraq’s payments to the families of Palestinians killed while fighting Israel were an internal threat to Israeli security (Q1). Israel did not perceive Iraq was developing a nuclear weapons capability based on its lack of strategic messaging and a credible response to allegations of a reconstituted Iraq WMD program (Q2). Using statements made by Israeli officials who have spoken publicly about the Iraq WMD programs, it is argued that although Israeli intelligence undertook a worst-case assessment, the threat was perceived as low since Israel undertook no actions nor made any statements of its intent to negate any potential threat emanating from Iraq (Q3). Q4: Has the powerful state identified the weaker state’s actions as a high threat to its national security? No, Israel did not identify Iraq as a high threat based on the Heuristic for Threat Assessment Privileging Identity (Table 7.9). Q5: Does the powerful state possess adequate airpower capability to disrupt the weaker state’s proliferation effort? Yes, the Israeli Air Force’s ability to project power is illustrated in Chapter 5 and illustrated in Map 7. Q6: Does the powerful state’s national security policy advocate preventive strikes? Yes, Israeli defense doctrine advocates preventive strikes to address threats to its national security. Despite not specifically establishing redlines for the 2003 Iraqi case, Israel has a standing policy that it will not allow a regional state to acquire or introduce a nuclear weapon into the region. Because it chose not to attack Iraq, it can be surmised Israel no longer perceived Iraq as a potential nuclear threat.

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Table 7.10 The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Proliferation Response—Israel and Iraq 2003 Israel

Power Applied

The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation

The Differential Effects of Threat Perception

Actual

No Action

No Action

No Action

Q7: Has the weaker state crossed the powerful state’s established redlines? No, Israel did not establish any redlines for Iraq or its suspected weapons of mass destruction program. Israel believed Iraq’s program was impeded long ago and was more concerned with the threat emanating from Iran. Q8: Does the powerful state have domestic support for a military strike against the weaker state? No, Israeli leaders did not have domestic support for a military strike against Iraq because it was largely viewed as an American issue. However, a Peace Index survey found a large majority of Israelis supported an American attack on Iraq.65 The same report found 27 percent of Israelis regarded Iraq as a substantial threat for using weapons of mass destruction, and another 25 percent viewed it as a strategic threat to Israel. Although Israel attacked Iraq’s reactor in 1981 and was bombed by Iraqi Scud missiles during the first Gulf War, only a quarter of polled Israelis believed Iraq posed a significant threat to Israeli national security. Israeli leaders also downplayed the threat posed by Saddam, though they made it no secret that they would like to see his regime overthrown. As the Bush administration pushed for war with Iraq, the Israelis remained focused on its archenemy, Iran.66 Kroenig’s Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory would successfully forecast Israel would take no action against Iraq’s nuclear program because its inability to project power over Iraq should have left it unaffected by Iraqi proliferation. The study’s Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory also successfully predicted Israel would take no action against Iraq because it was not identified as a high threat (Table 7.10). Israel perceived Iraq’s WMD threat to be low (Q4), the Israeli Air Force possessed the capability to strike any suspected Iraqi nuclear facilities, but did not strike any targets in this case (Q5), Israeli national security policies authorize the use of force against emerging regional nuclear threats, however, Iraq did not pose a threat so no force was used (Q6), Israel did not establish any redlines because it did not believe a program existed (Q7), Israel did not have domestic support for an airstrike against Iraq because Iraqi WMD was largely viewed as an American issue, if a program actually existed (Q8). Q1: Do the states have a recent history of direct military conflict? Yes, the United States and Iraq had a history of conflict during the study’s 25-year timespan (1978–2003). On August 2, 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait because Saddam 65 Ephraim

Yaar and Tamar Hermann, “Peace Index/ Most Israelis Support the Attack on Iraq,” Haaretz, March 6, 2003, accessed April 6, 2020, https://www.haaretz.com/1.4876317. 66 Gold, “Wartime Witch Hunt: Blaming Israel for the Iraq War.”

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Hussein argued Kuwait was artificially detached from Iraq by British imperialists and was “Iraq’s 19th province” that was now stealing Iraqi oil. During the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam borrowed a significant amount of money from the Gulf States to finance his war effort with Iran. Consequently, Iraq’s economy suffered tremendously from increased spending during the eight-year Iran-Iraq War, and an invasion of Kuwait was perceived by Saddam as a way for Iraq to gain revenue by acquiring its massive oil fields.67 Washington perceived Iraq’s invasion as a threat to U.S. national security interests due to its dependence on Persian Gulf oil and because of fears Iraq could militarily dominate the region if left unchecked. After Saddam invaded Kuwait, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia feared it would be next, so King Fahd invited U.S. and Coalition troops to Saudi Arabia to deter Iraqi aggression. The arrival of hundreds of thousands of Western troops in the land of two of Islam’s holiest sites infuriated many Muslims, who were incensed by Christian armies being invited to Muslim lands to defend against another Muslim country. Those who took offense included Saudi citizen and Afghan-Soviet War veteran, Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden, who had established al Qaeda in 1988, requested the Saudi government allow the Arab Mujahideen, who had fought the Soviets in Afghanistan, to aid the Saudi military in defending the Kingdom against Iraq. The Saudis rebuffed his request in favor of U.S. and Coalition forces, after which bin Laden decried the Saudi government as corrupt and un-Islamic, and the Saudis subsequently stripped him of his citizenship. Bin Laden eventually left Saudi Arabia for Sudan, where he stayed briefly before relocating to Afghanistan, he then fled to Abbottabad, Pakistan where he was killed by U.S. Navy SEALs on May 2, 2011. After Iraq annexed Kuwait, the United Nations Security Council passed a series of resolutions condemning the invasion and imposing economic sanctions. On November 29, 1990, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 678 authorizing “all necessary means” to expel Iraq from Kuwait if it did not withdraw all forces by January 15, 1991. This came after Iraq failed to comply with eleven previous UNSC resolutions (660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677).68 Saddam failed to withdraw by the UN timeline and Operation Desert Storm began on January 16, 1991. By February 28, 1991, all hostilities between coalition forces and Iraq ceased and Iraq admitted defeat. The United States suffered 148 killed in action and 145 non-combat-related deaths.69 There is debate regarding the number of Iraqi military deaths during the war, with estimates ranging between 1500 and 100,000 Iraqis killed in action (KIA).70 In the aftermath of the first Gulf War, the United States and Iraq continued to engage in direct hostilities with the implementation of no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq. The no-fly zones were to protect Kurds in 67 Michael B. Oren, Power, Faith and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007), 563. 68 United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 678: Iraq-Kuwait (29 November),” UNSCR, November 29, 1990, accessed April 6, 2020, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/678. 69 National Guard Bureau, “The Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm Timeline,” accessed May 22, 2013, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=45404. 70 John Heidenrich, “The Gulf War: How Many Iraqis Died?” Foreign Policy, no. 90 (Spring 1993): 124.

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the north and Shia in the south, both of whom had risen up against Saddam following the war. In addition to the no-fly zones, the United States conducted combat operations against Iraqi military and suspected weapons of mass destruction sites during Operation Desert Fox in 1998. After the Gulf War, coalition forces discovered Iraq possessed an advanced weapons of mass destruction program and may have been within a couple of years of constructing a crude nuclear device. Soon after, Coalition Forces began destroying Iraq’s WMD facilities. At the end of the war, Iraqi nuclear scientist Khidhir Hamza revealed coalition forces only destroyed three of Iraq’s seven major nuclear sites.71 During this timeframe, the U.S. labeled Iraq a rogue state and subjected it to nearly 12 years of devastating sanctions designed to topple the Ba’athist regime. Saddam remained defiant in the face of overwhelming U.S. firepower and continued to resist U.S. calls for UN inspections of Iraq’s suspected WMD sites. George W. Bush’s victory in the 2000 U.S. presidential elections signaled the neoconservatives’ return to the White House. The neoconservatives previously issued calls for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the installation of a regime friendly to the United States, as elaborated in the Project for the New American Century’s open letter to President Clinton.72 Many of those who signed the letter became members of the Bush administration, including Paul Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld, Elliott Abrams, John Bolton, and Richard Armitage. The September 11th attacks provided neoconservatives the pretext required to bring about the changes outlined in their five-year-old letter to President Clinton. The Bush administration soon mapped linkages between Saddam’s regime and the September 11th attacks by invoking analogies using a doomsday scenario of “what if” the 9/11 hijackers were armed with weapons of mass destruction, as illustrated in Bush’s 2003 State of the Union Address. Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications, and statements by people now in custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of Al Qaeda. Secretly, and without fingerprints, he could provide one of his hidden weapons to terrorists, or help them develop their own. Before September the 11th, many in the world believed that Saddam Hussein could be contained. But chemical agents, lethal viruses and shadowy terrorist networks are not easily contained. Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons and other plans—this time armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known.73

After 12 years of hostilities with Iraq, the United States launched a preventive war under the pretense of enforcing suspected Iraqi violations of UN Security Council resolutions prohibiting the reconstitution of its WMD program. Q2: Is the weaker state developing a nuclear weapons capability? 71 Khidhir Hamza and Jeff Stein, Saddam’s Bombmaker

(New York: Touchstone Book, 2000), 258. to President Clinton on Iraq,” The Project for the New American, January 26, 1998, accessed August 7, 2013, http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm. 73 Joseph Cirincione et al., “WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications,” Carnegie Endowment (January 2004): 21. 72 “Letter

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Although Iraq was not developing a nuclear weapons capability, the answer to this question is “technically, yes” because the Bush administration perceived Iraq possessed WMD and was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. This illustrates the importance of including individual-level analysis and psychological influences within theoretical forecasts because the confirmation biases held by members of the Bush administration predisposed them to mistrust not only Saddam, but also any intelligence that conflicted with their beliefs and perceptions of him and his intent. The Bush administration perceived Iraq was developing a nuclear capability, and Vice President Cheney was one of the most arduous proponents of this view. On August 26, 2002, Cheney declared, The Iraqi regime has in fact been very busy enhancing its capabilities in the field of chemical and biological agents. And they continue to pursue the nuclear program they began so many years ago… But we now know that Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons… Many of us are convinced that Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon.74

Cheney’s assertion was later disputed in a 2008 Select Committee on Intelligence report that examined whether public statements by U.S. government officials were substantiated by intelligence. The report maintains the intelligence community assessed it would take Iraq at least several years to produce enough fissile material to construct a nuclear weapon.75 The 2002 CIA-produced National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which President Bush cited as providing proof Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program, was viewed as flawed and later debunked as inaccurate, false or misleading.76 The Council on Foreign Relations argued the principal reasons for the NIE’s intelligence failures was due to faulty analysis based on outdated intelligence, and a “fast track” completion timeframe.77 The U.S. assumption of Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction was supported by Israeli-supplied intelligence. Post-war intelligence assessments revealed Iraq’s WMD programs were halted after the first Gulf War. Furthermore, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) concluded Iraq did not attempt to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program nor did it continue uranium enrichment after 1991. Regarding the infamous “aluminum tubes” the Bush administration insisted could

74 John D. Rockefeller IV and Christopher S. Bond, “Report on Whether Public Statements Regarding Iraq by U.S. Government Officials Were Substantiated by Intelligence Information,” Select Committee on Intelligence, S. Report 110–345 (June 5, 2008), 4. 75 John D. Rockefeller IV and Christopher S. Bond, “Report on Whether Public Statements Regarding Iraq by U.S. Government Officials Were Substantiated by Intelligence Information,” Select Committee on Intelligence (June 5, 2008), 10. 76 David C. Gompert, Hans Binnendijk, and Bonny Lin, Blinders, Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn (Monterey, CA: RAND, 2014), 169. 77 Greg Bruno and Sharon Otterman, “Backgrounder: National Intelligence Estimates,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 14, 2008, accessed January 2, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/iraq/national-intell igence-estimates/p7758#p6.

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be used for uranium enrichment gas centrifuges, the Iraq Study Group determined the tubes were intended for conventional 81 mm rockets and not for gas centrifuges.78 Q3: Has the powerful state perceived the weaker state’s actions as a threat to its national security? Yes, the Bush administration perceived Iraq to be a significant threat to U.S. national security. This was conveyed in statements by senior Bush administration officials, later compiled in a 2008 Select Committee on Intelligence report that examined whether their statements were backed by intelligence.79 During the run-up to the Iraq War in 2003, the Bush administration was deliberate in its strategic messaging about Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. The administration dismissed intelligence that dissented from its view that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program, even going so far as to establish the Office of Special Plans in the Pentagon to supply raw intelligence to support its conclusions that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction because the administration no longer trusted the intelligence supplied by the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC).80 The IC includes the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and eleven other department, agency, and military service intelligence organizations. The CIA’s controversial 2002 National Intelligence Estimate supported the administration’s assertion Iraq had an active WMD program by concluding that it is with “high confidence” that “Iraq is continuing, and in some areas expanding, its chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile programs.” The NIE also stated Iraq “probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade.”81 The following statements provide insight into the speculative nature of the heightened degree of threat perceived and groupthink demonstrated by the Bush administration relative to the Iraqi WMD program. In separate speeches in October 2002 and March 2003, President Bush declared, The regime has the scientists and facilities to build nuclear weapons, and is seeking the materials needed to do so.82 The evidence indicates that Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program… Satellite photographs reveal that Iraq is rebuilding facilities at sites that have been part of its nuclear program in the past. Iraq has attempted to purchase high strength aluminum tubes and other equipment needed for gas centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy, or steal an amount of highly-enriched uranium a little larger than a single softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year.83 78 The

Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, “Report to the President of the United States,” March 31, 2005, 52. 79 John D. Rockefeller IV and Christopher S. Bond, 1. 80 Seymour M. Hersh, “Selective Intelligence: Donald Rumsfeld Has His Own Special Sources. Are They Reliable?” The New Yorker, May 12, 2003, accessed January 22, 2014, http://www.newyor ker.com/archive/2003/05/12/030512fa_fact. 81 Cirincione et al., “WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications,” 22. 82 Cirincione et al., “WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications,” 21. 83 Cirincione et al., “WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications,” 21.

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Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised.84

Likewise, on August 26, 2002, Vice President Cheney stated with confidence that Iraq was pursuing nuclear weapons. [W]e now know that Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons… Many of us are convinced that Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon.85

In the following statements from his presentation to the United Nations, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell used mapping and invoked analogies to present a worst-case scenario of a nuclear-armed Iraq and its threat to the world. We have no indication that Saddam Hussein has ever abandoned his nuclear weapons program. On the contrary, we have more than a decade of proof that he remains determined to acquire nuclear weapons… Saddam Hussein already possesses two out of the three key components needed to build a nuclear bomb. He has a cadre of nuclear scientists with the expertise, and he has a bomb design… Saddam Hussein is determined to get his hands on a nuclear bomb. He is so determined that he has made repeated covert attempts to acquire highspecification aluminum tubes from 11 different countries, even after inspections resumed… We also have intelligence from multiple sources that Iraq is attempting to acquire magnets and high-speed balancing machines… to enrich uranium… People will continue to debate this issue, but there is no doubt in my mind, these illicit procurement efforts show that Saddam Hussein is very much focused on putting in place the key missing piece from his nuclear weapons program, the ability to produce fissile material.86 Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons. Saddam Hussein has used such weapons. And Saddam Hussein has no compunction about using them again, against his neighbors and against his own people. Let me turn now to nuclear weapons. We have no indication that Saddam Hussein has ever abandoned his nuclear weapons program. Saddam Hussein’s intentions have never changed. He is not developing the missiles for selfdefense. These are missiles that Iraq wants in order to project power, to threaten, and to deliver chemical, biological and, if we let him, nuclear warheads. But what I want to bring to your attention today is the potentially much more sinister nexus between Iraq and the al-Qaida terrorist network, a nexus that combines classic terrorist organizations and modern methods of murder. Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, an associated collaborator of Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaida lieutenants. Some believe, some claim these contacts do not amount to much. They say Saddam Hussein’s secular tyranny and al-Qaida’s religious tyranny do not mix. I am not comforted by this thought. Ambition and hatred are enough to bring Iraq and al-Qaida together, enough so alQaida could learn how to build more sophisticated bombs and learn how to forge documents, and enough so that al-Qaida could turn to Iraq for help in acquiring expertise on weapons of mass destruction.87 84 Cirincione

et al., “WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications,” 21. et al., “WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications,” 21. 86 Colin L. Powell, “Transcript of Powell’s U.N. Presentation,” CNN, February 6, 2003, accessed November 3, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/02/05/sprj.irq.powell.transcript/. 87 The Guardian, “Full text of Colin Powell’s speech.” 85 Cirincione

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Jeffrey Record argues another objective of the Iraq War was to demonstrate a new U.S. willingness to use military force. Accordingly, neoconservatives within the Bush administration were contemptuous of the disparity between U.S. conventional military supremacy and the presidential willingness to use force on behalf of American interests and values.88 In advocating for the use of military force, the neoconservatives dismissed the tenets of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine as obsolete because both called for the overwhelming use of force if American troops were to be committed to war. The neoconservative perspective coincided with Secretary Rumsfeld’s desire for a smaller ground force footprint and the increased use of air and space assets.89 This groupthink led the Bush administration to focus solely on the removal of Saddam, and not on the long-term prospects of rebuilding Iraq and fighting an insurgency led by a radicalized and dispossessed Sunni minority. The groupthink focus on removing Saddam impeded the Bush administration’s ability to envision an Iraq free of Sunni domination, where its Shiite majority would return to power and bring Iraq closer to Iran’s sphere of influence. There is speculation the Bush administration neoconservatives sought to establish Iraq as an American strategic outpost in the Middle East, which would be used to spread democracy throughout the region. Record argues another White House objective for going to war in Iraq was to eliminate an enemy of Israel while simultaneously threatening another Israeli enemy, Iran, through a long-term U.S. military presence next door in Iraq.90 Dore Gold disputes this assessment and argues Bush critics used this assertion as an instrument to attack Bush in an election year by “ascribing the war to alien considerations having nothing to do with U.S. interests.”91 Record attributes these aims toppling an enemy of Israel to the personal and ideological ties of prominent neoconservatives to the state of Israel. Jacob Helibrunn observed, “It is quite true that while not all neoconservatives are Jews, the majority of neoconservatives were, and are, Jewish; it is also true that they tend to propose foreign policy goals that support and favor Israel.”92 In illuminating additional speculation for why the United States viewed Iraq as a high threat, Record notes the United States did not go to war for the sake of Israel’s security interests; although President Bush and administration neoconservatives believed the war had the added benefit of removing a declared enemy of Israel.93 Actual events prove Kroenig’s theoretical forecast that Washington would perceive Iraq’s proliferation as a high threat because the United States launched a preventive war against Iraq. The study’s Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory also predicted the high degree of threat for the United States based upon 88 Record,

Wanting War, 92. R. Herspring, Rumsfeld’s Wars: The Arrogance of Power (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 19. 90 James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 362. 91 Dore Gold, “Wartime Witch Hunt: Blaming Israel for the Iraq War.” 92 Record, Wanting War, 122. 93 Record, Wanting War, 123. 89 Dale

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Table 7.11 The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast— The United States and Iraq 2003 The United States

Perceived Threat

The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation

The Differential Effects of Threat Perception

Actual

High

High

High

its history of military conflict with Iraq (Q1), its mistaken belief Iraq was developing a nuclear capability (Q2), and U.S. national leaders’ statements affirming Iraq was a direct threat to U.S. national security (Q3) (Table 7.11). Although Kroenig’s theory correctly predicts the United States’ high threat perception, this prediction is based solely on the U.S. ability to project power over Iraq rather than the state- and individual-level influences that led to the Bush administration’s preventive war. The enhanced threat perception theory demonstrates the influence of cognitive psychological stimuli, such as groupthink, on leader perceptions that ultimately led the Bush administration to disregard dissenting views, and intelligence that conflicted with its belief that Saddam had reconstituted Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. Q4: Has the powerful state identified the weaker state’s actions as a high threat to its national security? Yes, the United States identified Iraq as a high threat as illustrated in the Heuristic for Threat Assessment Privileging Identity (Table 7.11). Q5: Does the powerful state possess adequate airpower capability to disrupt the weaker state’s proliferation effort? Yes, Chapter 5 outlines the global dominance of U.S. airpower. Q6: Does the powerful state’s national security policy advocate preventive strikes? Yes, the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy authorized the use of preventive war to address emerging threats. In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks the most profound change in American national security policy was the embrace of the highly controversial concept of preventive war—misidentified by the Bush administration as preemptive war—to target perceived threats to U.S. national security. The international community does not legally recognize preventive war because it uses the subjective rationale that a state may be attacked if there is a perception that it could possibly become a threat in the future. The U.S.’ unilateral and offense-based doctrine, known as the Bush Doctrine, became a euphemism for using military force to promote democracy around the world and the Bush administration’s embrace of unilateral action was a drastic departure from over fifty years of U.S. multilateralism. Q7: Has the weaker state crossed the powerful state’s established redlines? Yes, the United States declared that Iraq crossed established redlines, particularly related to its non-compliance with numerous UN Security Council resolutions. Colin Powell expressed this sentiment during his presentation to the United Nations.94

94 “Full

text of Colin Powell’s speech.”

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When we confront a regime that harbors ambitions for regional domination, hides weapons of mass destruction and provides haven and active support for terrorists, we are not confronting the past, we are confronting the present. And unless we act, we are confronting an even more frightening future. We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction; he’s determined to make more. Given Saddam Hussein’s history of aggression, given what we know of his grandiose plans, given what we know of his terrorist associations and given his determination to exact revenge on those who oppose him, should we take the risk that he will not someday use these weapons at a time and the place and in the manner of his choosing at a time when the world is in a much weaker position to respond?

These statements illustrate Secretary Powell’s biases from his previous interactions with Saddam Hussein during the first Gulf War when he was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The statements are also indicative of the flawed intelligence analysis and read-aheads that were used to prepare Powell for his testimony. The statements imply that since Saddam was aggressive in the past, he will always be aggressive so the United States cannot trust him or his word. The United States will not and cannot run that risk to the American people. Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an option, not in a post-September 11th world.95

In the preceding statement, Powell, again, invoked the horrors of the 9/11 attacks as an analogy to imply the United States can never allow a threat against the United States to materialize therefore it must be prepared to strike first before it is attacked. My colleagues, over three months ago this council recognized that Iraq continued to pose a threat to international peace and security, and that Iraq had been and remained in material breach of its disarmament obligations. Today Iraq still poses a threat and Iraq still remains in material breach.96

Powell argued Iraq has crossed the redline with the United States because of the perception that Iraq was in material breach of UN Security Council resolutions forbidding its possession of WMD. This alleged breach posed a threat to the United States. Q8: Does the powerful state have domestic support for a military strike against the weaker state? Yes, the Bush administration had Congressional support for the preventive war in Iraq; however, it did not have solid American public backing. The tumultuous debate over the existence of Iraq’s WMD program and Western Europe’s resistance to the war led Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to label those European countries that opposed the war as “Old Europe” and therefore irrelevant to current events.97 Concurrently, Robert Kagan argued the importance of Europe. 95 Colin

L. Powell, “Transcript of Powell’s U.N. Presentation,” CNN, February 5, 2003, accessed July 12, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2003/US/02/05/sprj.irq.powell.transcript.10/index.html. 96 Powell, “Transcript of Powell’s U.N. Presentation.” 97 William G. Shipman, “Old Europe,” CATO Institute, May 14, 2003, accessed April 6, 2020, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/old-europe.

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Table 7.12 The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Proliferation Response—The United States and Iraq 2003 The United States

Power Applied

The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation

The Differential Effects of Threat Perception

Actual

Force

Force

Force

Herein lies the tragedy. To address today’s global dangers, Americans will need the legitimacy that Europe can provide, but Europeans may well fail to grant it. In their effort to constrain the superpower, they might lose sight of the mounting dangers in the world, which are far greater than those posed by the United States.98

International resistance to the war forced the Bush administration to bypass an additional UN Security Council vote to authorize the use of force in Iraq. President Bush reiterated the necessity of the preventive use of force against Iraq during a June 2002 speech at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries… the greater the threat, the greater the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.99

The administration further argued it did not need an additional UN Security Council resolution and, instead, sought Congressional approval, which it received in October 2002. The case for war in Iraq divided the nation and contributed to an emotionally charged domestic political debate over the use of force in lieu of diplomacy. Kroenig’s Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory forecasts the United States would attack Iraq because the U.S. ability to project power over Iraq would be affected by an Iraqi nuclear weapon. Actual events prove this assertion. The study’s Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory’s Heuristic for the Proliferation Response successfully predicted the United States’ use of force against Iraq (Table 7.12). The theory’s success is based on five interrelated criteria: the United States perceiving Iraq’s suspected WMD program to be a high threat (Q4), the U.S. Air Force’s ability to successfully destroy Iraq’s nuclear complexes (Q5), the 2002 National Security Strategy authorizing the use of military force against nuclear-related regional threats (Q6), Iraq crossing the United States’ redlines by not complying with UN Security Council resolutions (Q7), and the United States had Congressional support for the war due to the nationalism and fear created by the September 11th attacks (Q8). The results of the Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory’s two heuristics for the 2003 Iraq case study illustrate Israel perceived Iraq to be a low threat and the U.S. perceived it as a high threat. Using the power-based heuristic, Israel was inclined to take no action while the U.S. selected military force based upon their perceived 98 Roshandel, 99 Haass,

Iran, Israel and the United States, 22. War of Necessity, 221.

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threat levels. The actual events prove Kroenig’s theoretical prediction although the Heuristic for the Proliferation Response more accurately forecasts the United States and Israeli responses by incorporating state- and individual-level influences that better examined the components that influenced each state’s respective foreign policy decision-making. Israel was inclined to take no action because the United States was posturing to attack Iraq. The United States was more inclined to use military force because of its perceptions of Iraq’s intent and its predisposed desire to overthrow Saddam Hussein. The United States ultimately invaded Iraq, while Israel supplied pre-war intelligence and avoided the war.

The United States and the Iraq War The U.S.’ non-proliferation regime took on increased urgency in the wake of the September 11th attacks, as concerns heightened over terrorist groups and rogue states acquiring nuclear weapons and being more inclined to use these weapons than other members of the established nuclear club. This fear was heightened by the revelation Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan supplied nuclear technology to U.S. adversaries Iran, Libya, and North Korea.100 Revelations such as this led President Bush to use the term “Axis of Evil” to describe Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. This connection came even though there was little to no coordination or cooperation between the three countries. In 2001, Bush argued the United States had reached a crisis point with these three states and they had to be confronted because of their defiance of international norms of behavior. North Korea conducted a nuclear test, Iran refused to halt its uranium enrichment program, and Iraq was suspected of continuing its weapons of mass destruction program in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions.101 Bush argued, The gravest danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology—when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends—and we will oppose them with all our power.102

These fears led to the evolution of U.S. foreign policy and its embrace of preventive war in the form of the Bush Doctrine. The Bush Doctrine proclaimed the United States would act unilaterally, if needed, to preempt any rogue state and terrorist group before they could threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States, 100 Levy

and Scott-Clark, Deception, 389.

101 Glenn Kessler and Peter Baker, “Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil’ Comes Back to Haunt the United States,”

Washington Post, September 20, 2007, accessed December 17, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost. com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/09/AR2006100901130.html. 102 Dale T. Snauwaert, “The Bush Doctrine and Just War Theory,” The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution (Fall 2004): 122.

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its allies, and friends.103 The administration utilized this doctrine to invade Iraq with the aim of destroying suspected weapons of mass destruction facilities. It is argued the Bush White House deliberately invoked the idea of a nuclear-armed Iraq allied with al-Qaeda to garner public and congressional support to overthrow Saddam Hussein.104 Jeffrey Record argued another product of the Bush administration’s expansion of the Global War on Terrorism was the White House’s desire to reestablish an “imperial” presidency. By linking the 9/11 attacks to Iraq, the Bush administration sought to expand extraordinary presidential wartime prerogatives vis-à-vis the legislative and judicial branches. Record asserts these extraordinary prerogatives enlarged and extended the GWOT by including the power to authorize torture; conduct warrantless surveillance; arrest and detain enemy combatants without trial and deny them the protections of the Geneva Convention; ignore congressional statutes and international treaties that restrict the operations of U.S. military forces; and to interpret and enforce all congressional statutes as the executive branch saw fit. Vice President Cheney was the administration’s central proponent for the expansion of presidential prerogatives because he felt the executive branch’s prerogatives on matters of national security were unlimited and that neither Congress nor the Supreme Court should have any influence in framing issues of national security.105 The 2003 Iraq case illustrates how the U.S.’ heightened threat perception led to a flawed preventive war that continues to influence its proliferation responses and preventive war options. Concurrently, Kroenig’s theory would have successfully predicted Israel’s lack of response to alleged Iraqi proliferation, but not for the criteria outlined in his theory. Israel did not respond militarily to suspected Iraqi proliferation because the U.S. provided security guarantees and weapons to prevent it from attacking Iraq. Furthermore, it is suggested Israel did not respond to Iraq’s suspected WMD program because the Israelis knew Saddam’s programs had not been reconstituted after the Gulf War. The Iraq War began March 20, 2003, and ended on December 18, 2011, costing nearly $800 billion, and resulted in the deaths of nearly 4486 Americans and over 100,000 Iraqis.

Syria Case Study—2007 In 2000, Israeli military intelligence reported Syria was discussing a nuclear program that was to be overseen by the Syrian Scientific Research Agency.106 Four years later, the United States intercepted a high volume of phone calls between Syria and North Korea, which reportedly led to a 2007 covert operation in which Mossad 103 George W. Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002,” The White House, accessed June 7, 2013, www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf. 104 Record, Wanting War, 145. 105 Record, Wanting War, 133. 106 Follath and Stark, “The Story of ‘Operation Orchard’.”

252 Table 7.13 The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast—Syria 2007

7 Analysis of Data

Perceived Threat

Israel

The United States

High

High

agents reportedly installed a Trojan Horse software program on a Syrian government official’s computer. This discovery led to an assessment that Syria was constructing a nuclear reactor with North Korean assistance at the Al-Kibar nuclear facility near the provincial city of Deir el-Zor.107 Former Iranian Deputy Minister of Defense General Ali Reza Asgari, a high-level defector, later corroborated this intelligence assessment and stated the Al-Kibar reactor was to be a second Iranian uranium enrichment plant.108 Imagery from Israel’s Ofek-7 reconnaissance satellite, along with pictures surreptitiously taken inside the facility, confirmed United States and Israeli intelligence assessments that the Syrian reactor was identical to North Korea’s Magnox reactor at its Yongbyon nuclear complex.109 Israel promptly labeled the Syrian reactor an existential threat and on September 6, 2007, launched a preventive airstrike using seven Israeli Air Force F-15I Ra’am strike aircraft against the reactor during Operation Orchard (Map 8). President Bush had previously declined Israel’s request to bomb the reactor.110 Kroenig’s theory would predict a high degree of threat for Israel because of its ability to project power over Syria since it is able to conduct a substantial ground war within Syrian territory, as witnessed by its capture of the Golan Heights during the 1967 Six-Day War. Additionally, as the global power-projecting state, Kroenig’s theory posits the United States should perceive a high degree of threat since it should feel threatened by all cases of nuclear proliferation (Table 7.13). The actual events split his theory’s predictions because the United States diverged from its expected high degree of perceived threat and had a low degree of perceived threat relative to the Syrian nuclear facility, as illustrated by the Bush administration declining Israel’s request to bomb the reactor, in favor of diplomacy backed by the threat of force.111 Kroenig’s assumption that Israel would perceive Syria’s reactor to be a high threat was proven since Israel attacked the nuclear complex. The next section applies the two heuristics to the United States and Israel to test the study’s Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory against the 2007 Syria case to determine if it more accurately accounts for the divergence in the U.S. response and in doing so, better explains the Israeli response to the Syrian proliferation case. 107 Michael

Bar-Zohar and Nissim Mishal, Mossad: The Greatest Missions of the Israeli Secret Service (New York: HarperCollins, 2012), 279. 108 Follath and Stark, “The Story of ‘Operation Orchard’.” 109 Bar-Zohar and Mishal, Mossad, 283. 110 Bush, Decision Points, 421. 111 Bush, Decision Points, 421.

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Q1: Do the states have a recent history of direct military conflict? Yes, Syria and Israel were involved in near constant conflict within the 1982– 2007 timeframe. The Israel-Syria conflict actually extends to Israel’s founding and the current hostilities are a continuation of conflicts from the previous Arab–Israeli Wars. The major points of contention continue to be Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights, which it captured from Syria during the 1967 Six-Day War, competing interests in a shared sphere of influence in the Levant, and Syria’s role as the primary confrontation state. Notwithstanding previous conflicts, the study’s 25-year timeframe begins with the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon (Operation Peace for Galilee/First Lebanon War), which was designed to oust the Palestine Liberation Organization from Lebanon. The invasion was intended to be a limited war, but instead lasted until 1985. Lebanon was considered a Syrian client state with a significant number of Syrian military personnel stationed in the country at the time. Over the course of the three-year Israeli occupation, Syrian forces engaged the Israelis but were soundly defeated and lost numerous aircraft to the Israeli Air Force. During the First Lebanon War, members of the Maronite Phalange Party, a Lebanese Christian militia group, entered two Palestinian refugee camps, Sabra and Shatila, and raped and massacred nearly 800 Palestinian women, children, and the elderly while the Israeli army surrounded the camps.112 The massacre occurred September 16–18, 1982, and was in reprisal for the assassination of a former Phalange commander and Lebanon’s new President Bashir Gemayel, allegedly at the hands of Palestinians. After Gemayel’s murder, Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon ordered Israeli tanks into Muslim West Beirut and Israeli troops surrounded the two refugee camps. Israel was allied with the Christian-dominated Lebanese Armed Forces, and Sharon stated, “Let the LAF [Lebanese Armed Forces] go into the camps… they can kill the terrorists. But if they don’t we will.” The LAF commander refused to enter the camps; however, Gemayel’s men, the Phalange militia entered the camps and took revenge for his murder.113 In 1983, Israel’s Kahan Commission concluded the Phalange Party was directly responsible for the massacre, but also ruled several Israeli officeholders held indirect responsibility for the massacre. The Kahan Commission singled out Defense Minister Ariel Sharon for “ignoring the danger of acts of revenge by the Phalangists toward the population in the refugee camps. The Phalangists could be allowed to enter the camps only if the [Israeli Defense Force] IDF was able to supervise their activities effectively—but even that was not done.”114 In December 1999, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk Shara met to discuss Israel’s return of a majority of the Golan Heights; however, the talks collapsed due to disagreements over contested territory in the Golan Heights (Map 6). In August 2003, the Israeli Air Force conducted a 112 Seth

Anziska, “A Preventable Massacre,” The New York Times, September 6, 2012, accessed December 5, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/opinion/a-preventable-massacre.html? _r=0. 113 Tyler, A World of Trouble, 287. 114 “The Kahan Commission on the Sabra and Shatila Massacre,” Prime Minister’s Office Israel State Archives, February 7, 1983, accessed December 5, 2013, http://www.archives.gov.il/Archiv eGov_Eng/Publications/ElectronicPirsum/KahanCommission/.

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flyby of President Assad’s home to send a message for Syria to rein in Hezbollah and its leader Hassan Nasrallah, who had been attacking northern Israel. Hostilities continued in October 2003, when Israel attacked a Palestinian military training camp outside Damascus. In 2006, the IAF conducted another flyby over Assad’s home as a warning for his support of Palestinians who had captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit.115 Syria is the long-standing figurehead of Arab resistance to Israel’s existence since two of the other three states that share a border with Israel, Jordan and Egypt, have relatively stable relations with the Jewish State. The other border state, Lebanon was in Syria’s sphere of influence since it had largely been a Syrian client until Bashar al-Assad withdrew Syrian forces in 2005, after a nearly 29-year presence, following Syria’s complicity in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Q2: Is the weaker state developing a nuclear weapons capability? Yes, Syria constructed a North Korean-designed 25 MWt nuclear reactor that could have been capable of producing enough plutonium for one to two weapons per year in the eastern part of the country.116 Although Syria signed the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty in 1969, it had not signed the IAEA Additional Protocol, which allows for short-notice inspections of nuclear facilities. Prior to the 2007 revelation that Syria was constructing a nuclear reactor at the Al-Kibar complex, Syria’s sole nuclear reactor was under IAEA safeguards and reportedly monitored by the United States for any signs that the Assad government was attempting to expand its nuclear program.117 Q3: Has the powerful state perceived the proliferating state’s actions as a threat to its national security? Yes, Israel traditionally perceives all instances of Middle East nuclear proliferation as a threat to its national security. The notable exception to this rule was the 2003 case of Iraq because no solid intelligence existed that Iraq had reconstituted its WMD programs.118 The presence of a nuclear reactor inside neighboring Syria equated to an existential and therefore a high threat. In the summer of 2007, Israel shared intelligence with President Bush that Syria and North Korea were constructing the nuclear facility in eastern Syria. The Bush administration rebuffed Tel Aviv’s requests to bomb the reactor, but instead provided the Israelis with corroborating intelligence prior to the raid. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert stated to President Bush in 2007, Allow me to remind you, that at the beginning of these talks, when I presented the intelligence material to you, I said all along that the reactor needs to go away. If we reveal the data to

115 “Timeline: A Chronology of Israel-Syria Relations Since 1947,” Haaretz, September 6, 2007, accessed August 7, 2013, http://www.haaretz.com/news/timeline-a-chronology-of-israel-syria-rel ations-since-1947-1.228952. 116 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Syria,” April 2018, accessed March 5, 2019, https://www.nti.org/ learn/countries/syria/nuclear. 117 Alfred B. Prados, “Syria: US Relations and Bilateral Issues,” CRS Issue Brief for Congress (March 13, 2006): 10. 118 The Guardian, “Israel Knew Iraq had no WMD, says MP.”

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the UN, the Syrians will build a proverbial kindergarten on top of it and prevent a strike forever.119

President Bush addressed the Israeli strike in his book Decision Points, Prime Minister Olmert’s execution of the strike made up for the confidence I had lost in the Israelis during the Lebanon war. I suggested to Ehud that we let some time go by and then reveal the operation as a way to isolate the Syrian regime. Olmert told me he wanted total secrecy. He wanted to avoid anything that might back Syria into a corner and force Assad to retaliate. This was his operation, and I felt an obligation to respect his wishes. I kept quiet, even though I thought we were missing an opportunity. Finally, the bombing demonstrated Israel’s willingness to act alone. Prime Minister Olmert hadn’t asked for a green light, and I hadn’t given one. He had done what he believed was necessary to protect Israel.120

True to his word, President Bush made no statement about the attack. Israel made no public announcements about the raid and imposed strict censorship guidelines on Israeli media. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad downplayed the strike and asserted, The facility that was bombed was not a nuclear plant, but rather a conventional military installation… We could have struck back [against Israel]. But should we really allow ourselves to be provoked into a war? Then we would have walked into an Israeli trap. Perhaps the Israelis dropped it [uranium traces] from the air to make us the target of precisely these suspicions. Syria is fundamentally opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We want a nuclear-free Middle East.121

This censorship on the raid continued for over a decade until March 2018, when the Israeli newspaper Haaretz wrote an investigative story detailing the raid and the subsequent fallout.122 In assessing Israel’s threat perception of the Syrian reactor, it is rated high based on numerous Israeli statements that it would not allow an adversary to develop a nuclear weapon. Kroenig’s theory forecasts Israel would perceive Syria’s proliferation as a high threat because it is able to project power over Syria by conducting a ground war on Syrian territory is proven by actual events. Israel perceived Syria’s nuclear program to be a high threat and ultimately attacked it using airpower. The study’s Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory also successfully predicted the high degree of threat for Israel based on its history of conflict (Q1), the existence of the Al-Kibar reactor (Q2), and the Israeli linkage of a second Holocaust to Arab nuclear weapons (Q3) (Table 7.14). Use of the study’s enhanced threat perception theory demonstrates the influence of cognitive psychological stimuli on leader perceptions as nations seek security within their regional security dilemmas. 119 Katz

and Hendel, Israel vs. Iran, 71. Decision Points, 422. 121 Erich Follath and Holger Stark, “How Israel Destroyed Syria’s Al-Kibar Nuclear Reactor,” Salon, February 3, 2009, accessed December 5, 2013, http://www.salon.com/2009/11/03/syria_israel/. 122 Amos Harel and Aluf Benn, “No Longer a Secret: How Israel Destroyed Syria’s Nuclear Reactor,” Haaretz, March 23, 2018, accessed March 1, 2019, https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/MAG AZINE-no-longer-a-secret-how-israel-destroyed-syrias-nuclear-reactor. 120 Bush,

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Table 7.14 The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast— Israel and Syria 2007 Israel

Perceived Threat

The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation

The Differential Effects of Threat Perception

Actual

High

High

High

Q4: Has the powerful state identified the proliferating state’s actions as a high threat to its national security? Yes, this determination is based on the Threat Assessment Privileging Identity Heuristic (Table 7.14). Q5: Does the powerful state possess adequate airpower capability to disrupt the weaker state’s proliferation effort? Yes, the Israeli Air Force power projecting capability is detailed in Chapter 5. Q6: Does the powerful state’s national security policy advocate preventive strikes? Yes, Israel advocates preventive strikes to address emerging nuclear threats (Map 8). Q7: Has the weaker state crossed the powerful state’s established redlines? Yes, Israel declared it would never allow an adversary to acquire a nuclear weapon. Syria’s covert nuclear reactor crossed Israel’s nuclear redlines. Q8: Does the powerful state have domestic support for a military strike against the weaker state? Israel has a standing redline policy to attack threats deemed to be existential. The attack on Al-Kibar was kept out of the media and downplayed by Israeli and Syrian leaders. Thus, no public support was required since Israel maintains a standing policy to attack threats without the need to lobby the United Nations or the Knesset for approval. Though the prime minister does lobby key cabinet members to gain their support for a military operation. Kroenig’s Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory forecasts Israel would attack Syria’s Al-Kibar reactor because of its ability to project power over Syria. This prediction was proven because Israel destroyed the reactor. The study’s Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory’s Heuristic for the Proliferation Response successfully predicted Israel’s use of force against Syria (Table 7.15). The theory’s success is based on five interrelated criteria: Israel perceived the reactor Table 7.15 The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Proliferation Response—Israel and Syria 2007 Israel

Power Applied

The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation

The Differential Effects of Threat Perception

Actual

Force

Force

Force

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to be a high threat (Q4), the Israeli Air Force’s ability to successfully destroy the reactor (Q5), Israeli national security policies authorizing the use of military force against nuclear-related regional threats (Q6), Syria crossed Israel’s redlines by constructing a nuclear reactor (Q7) and Israel maintains a high-level of domestic support to attack perceived existential threats (Q8). Q1: Do the states have a recent history of direct military conflict? Yes, the United States and Syria engaged in direct military conflict in December 1983, which falls within the study’s 25-year timespan (1982–2007). Six weeks after 241 U.S. service members were killed in the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, on October 23, 1983, the U.S. Navy attacked Syrian anti-aircraft batteries east of the city (Map 5). The airstrikes were in retaliation for Syrian anti-aircraft fire directed at a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft supporting the U.S. Marine Corps’ peacekeeping force. Two U.S. Navy aircraft were shot down with one pilot killed. The Syrians captured and held his navigator LT Robert O. Goodman, Jr. prisoner for a month before releasing him in January 1984 to a United States delegation led by Rev. Jesse Jackson.123 Syria and the United States have historically had a tenuous relationship due to (1) the U.S. siding with Israel in the Arab–Israeli conflict; (2) United States concerns with Syrian WMD proliferation; (3) Syrian support of terrorist organizations; (4) Syrian influence in Lebanon; and (5) Syria’s close relations with Iran and Hezbollah. Syria, under former President Hafez al-Assad, sided with the United States during the first Gulf War and later influenced the release of Westerners held hostage in Lebanon. A decade later, Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad opposed U.S. military intervention in Iraq during the 2003 war. U.S.-Syrian relations further deteriorated due to Syria’s suspected role in assassinating former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005. Under pressure from the United States and the United Nations, Syrian forces withdrew from Lebanon in April 2005, after a nearly 29year presence.124 Despite its withdrawal from Lebanon, tensions between the United States and Syria continued to flare due to evidence that Damascus allowed Sunni insurgents to cross into Iraq from Syria to fight United States and Iraqi forces during the 2003 Iraq War. Under pressure, Syria took steps to police its borders to reduce insurgent infiltration into Iraq from its territory.125 The United States has used coercive diplomacy against Syria by imposing sanctions to limit U.S. trade and the exchange of dual-use technology between the two nations to compel Syria to curtail its support for terrorism and the expansion of its nuclear, chemical, and biological agents. The U.S. Congress also passed legislation prohibiting direct aid to Syria and restricting bilateral trade relations because Syria is a designated state sponsor of terrorism.126 In December 2003, President Bush signed 123 Bernard E. Trainor, “’83 Strike on Lebanon: Hard Lessons for U.S.,” The New York Times, August

6, 1989, accessed October 22, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/1989/08/06/world/83-strike-on-leb anon-hard-lessons-for-us.html. 124 Prados, “Syria: US Relations and Bilateral Issues,” 3. 125 Prados, “Syria: US Relations and Bilateral Issues,” 8. 126 Prados, “Syria: US Relations and Bilateral Issues,” 14.

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Table 7.16 The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast— The United States and Syria 2007 The United States

Perceived Threat

The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation

The Differential Effects of Threat Perception

Actual

High

Low

Low

the Syrian Accountability Act, which requires the president to impose additional penalties against Syria unless it ceases its support for terrorist organizations, ends its occupation of Lebanon, halts its WMD programs, and stops facilitating terrorist activity in Iraq.127 Q2: Is the weaker state developing a nuclear weapons capability? Yes, Syria constructed a North Korean-designed nuclear reactor in the eastern province of Dayr az Zawr (Map 5). Although it signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1969, Syria has not signed the IAEA Additional Protocol which allows for short-notice inspections of nuclear facilities. Prior to the 2007 revelation that Syria was constructing a nuclear reactor at the Al-Kibar complex, Syria possessed a Chinese-supplied nuclear reactor that was under IAEA safeguards and reportedly monitored by the United States.128 Q3: Has the powerful state perceived the proliferating state’s actions as a threat to its national security? No, the United States did not perceive Syria’s nuclear reactor as a high threat to U.S. national security. Although both American and Israeli intelligence corroborated the Syrian reactor’s North Korean design, the United States did not make an immediate response to the reactor out of concerns it might undermine the ongoing Six Party nuclear negotiations (2003–2009), which were designed to encourage North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program.129 Furthermore, Washington’s credibility on raising the alarm about weapons of mass destruction was damaged severely by its preventive war in Iraq that found no weapons of mass destruction.130 Kroenig’s theory forecast the United States would perceive Syria’s proliferation as a high threat is falsified by actual events (Table 7.16). The United States perceived Syria’s nuclear program to be a low threat and declined Israeli requests to destroy it. The study’s Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory successfully predicted the low degree of threat for the United States. The United States and Syria have a history of limited military conflict, dating to 1983, when two U.S. Navy aircraft were shotdown, with one pilot killed and a navigator-bombardier taken prisoner. (Q1), Yes, Syria was building a nuclear reactor that could have been capable of producing 127 Prados,

“Syria: US Relations and Bilateral Issues,” 15. “Syria: US Relations and Bilateral Issues,” 10. 129 Glenn Kessler and Robin Wright, “Israel, U.S. Shared Data on Suspected Nuclear Site,” Washington Post, September 21, 2007, accessed August 7, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/09/20/AR2007092002701.html. 130 Gates, Duty, 173. 128 Prados,

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plutonium for a nuclear weapon (Q2). The Bush administration did not articulate the reactor was a high threat to U.S. national security based on the lack of public statements and it declining to carry out Israel’s request to bomb the facility. The administration was also constrained by fighting simultaneous wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which was compounded by its failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The administration had little appetite, and would have difficulty gaining public and Congressional support to execute a preventive strike against another Muslim country suspected of pursuing nuclear weapons. The administration was also concerned about endangering the Six Party Talks with North Korea. Consequently, Bush recommended sanctions with the threat of force as the U.S. approach to AlKibar. Although it was constructing a nuclear reactor, at the time, Syria’s nuclear program was not a threat to U.S. national security This illustrates the importance of incorporating individual- and state-level analysis into the foreign policy decision making process of state leaders. (Q3). Q4: Has the powerful state identified the weaker state’s actions as a high threat to its national security? No, the United States did not perceive Syria’s reactor as a high threat. The administration was fighting simultaneous wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the failed search for Iraqi WMD likely influenced the Bush administration’s reluctance to label the Syrian reactor a high threat to U.S. national security. This is illustrated in the Heuristic for Threat Assessment Privileging Identity (Table 7.16). Q5: Does the powerful state possess adequate airpower capability to disrupt the weaker state’s proliferation effort? Yes, U.S. airpower projection capability is discussed in Chapter 5. Q6: Does the powerful state’s national security policy advocate preventive strikes? No, the 2006 National Security Strategy did not advocate preventive strikes. In the aftermath of the 2003 preventive war in Iraq, the Bush administration revised its offense-based 2002 National Security Strategy, set aside the Bush Doctrine, and embraced multilateralism in its updated 2006 National Security Strategy. Q7: Has the weaker state crossed the powerful state’s established redlines? No, the United States did not establish redlines for the Syrian nuclear program. Q8: Does the powerful state have domestic support for a military strike against the weaker state? No, the United States did not have domestic support to attack Syria’s nuclear reactor. The United States’ ability to justify preventive war was weakened by the failed search for weapons of mass destruction in the 2003 Iraq War. Kroenig’s Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory forecasts the United States would take action against Syria’s nuclear reactors because its ability to project power over Syria would be affected by Syrian proliferation. Actual events falsify this prediction. The study’s Differential Effects of Threat Perception’s Heuristic for the Proliferation Response successfully predicted the United States would either take no action or use coercive diplomacy against Syria (Table 7.17). The theory’s success is based on five interrelated criteria: the United States did not

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Table 7.17 The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Proliferation Response—The United States and Syria 2007

Power Applied

The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation

The Differential Effects of Threat Perception

Actual

Force

No Action

No Action

perceive the reactor to be a high threat (Q4), the U.S. Air Force’s ability to successfully destroy the reactor (Q5), U.S. national security strategy no longer promoted unilateral preventive war against suspected proliferating states (Q6), the United States did not establish redlines for Syria’s nuclear reactor (Q7) and the United States lacked domestic support for any potential strike against Syria’s nuclear facilities due to the fallout from the failed search for WMD in Iraq (Q8). The results of the Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory’s two heuristics for the 2007 Syria case study illustrate Israel perceived Syria to be a high threat and the U.S. perceived it as a low threat. Utilizing the Heuristic for the Proliferation Response, Israel was more inclined to utilize military force to address the threat while the U.S. selected to take no action. The power application predicted in the Heuristic for the Proliferation Response more accurately forecast the U.S. response by incorporating state-level influences. Furthermore, the United States ignored Israel’s request to bomb the Al-Kibar reactor, which resulted in Israel conducting a unilateral preventive airstrike to destroy the reactor.

Israel and the Raid on Al-Kibar Israel has long viewed Syria as a threat because of its alliance with Iran, support for Hezbollah and anti-Israel Palestinian groups, lingering hostilities from Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights, and because it refuses to recognize Israel diplomatically.131 Syria has been a high-priority intelligence target for the United States over the past several decades because it has fought several wars with Israel, invaded Jordan, allied itself with Iran, supported terrorists and militia groups in the region, and has developed weapons of mass destruction.132 Consequently, both the United States and Israel were alarmed when, in 2007, Israel disclosed to the Bush administration that North Korea had secretly built a nuclear reactor in eastern Syria.133 The Bush administration was divided over how to respond to the reactor because its heavy reliance on the Israeli-supplied intelligence limited U.S. options. Over the next several months, the Bush White House debated whether it should take military action, and how closely it should work with the Israelis.134 Secretary of Defense 131 Gates,

Duty, 171. Duty, 171. 133 Gates, Duty, 171. 134 Gates, Duty, 171. 132 Gates,

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Robert Gates stated Vice President Cheney believed a military strike should be the first and only option for the United States. Furthermore, Gates asserts Cheney “often raised the question of what our actions, or inaction, would have on our relationship with the Israelis and their own decisions about what to do.”135 Secretary Gates stated he was furious with the Israelis because Prime Minister Olmert asked for U.S. assistance, but was only giving Washington one option: bomb the reactor. Gates worried that if the United States did not capitulate, Israel would bomb the reactor and the United States could do nothing about it. The Defense Secretary feared bombing the reactor might lead to a wider war in which the United States would be blamed for not restraining the Israelis. Consequently, Gates argued, “the United States was being held hostage to Israeli decision making.”136 Our proposal [the first step being diplomatic/political] will emerge, making it look like the U.S. government subordinated its strategic interest to that of a weak Israeli government that already had screwed up one conflict in the region [against Hezbollah in the 2006 Second Lebanon War] and that we were unwilling to confront or cross the Israelis.137

On September 6, 2007, Israel unilaterally attacked and destroyed Syria’s AlKibar nuclear reactor (Map 8). The surprise attack followed months of heightened tensions between Israel and Syria over military exercises and troop buildups along the Golan Heights.138 Syria had crossed Israel’s redline by constructing the reactor. In the aftermath of the attack, the USA, Israel, and Syria remained largely silent about the raid. Syrian President Bashar Assad stated Israeli aircraft had dropped ordnance on an “unused military building.”139 President Bush stated, “I’m not going to comment on the matter.” In his memoir, Decision Points, Bush conceded that he chose the “diplomatic option backed by the threat of force” when Prime Minister Olmert requested the U.S. bomb Syria.140 Senior U.S. officials stated the purpose of the reactor was to create fuel for a nuclear weapons program because the reactor was not suitable for research or nuclear power generation. Syria disputed the allegations and highlighted the United States’ previous false allegations that Iraq had reconstituted its weapons of mass destruction program prior to the 2003 U.S. invasion. Bowing to IAEA pressure, Syria allowed UN inspectors to visit the Al-Kibar site on June 23, 2008; however, prior to the inspectors’ arrival, Syrian officials bulldozed the site and constructed a new building atop the mound. Despite these concealment efforts, the IAEA reported significant amounts of chemically processed natural uranium particles were found during the

135 Gates,

Duty, 172. Duty, 175. 137 Gates, Duty, 176. 138 Seymour M. Hersh, “A Strike in the Dark: What Did Israel Bomb in Syria?” The New Yorker, February 11, 2008, accessed August 7, 2013, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/02/11/080 211fa_fact_hersh. 139 Hersh, “A Strike in the Dark.” 140 George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Crown Publishing, 2010), 422. 136 Gates,

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inspection, warranting further investigation. Syria denied additional IAEA visits to related sites.141 In February 2009, the IAEA issued a follow-up report on Al-Kibar that revealed the traces of uranium did not come from Israeli munitions as the Syrians claimed. In response, Syria claimed the destroyed building had a conventional military purpose and was not subject to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Syria then repeatedly failed to respond to additional IAEA requests for information and access to associated sites. On May 24, 2011, the IAEA concluded, “the destroyed building was very likely a nuclear reactor and therefore should have been declared to the Agency.”142 Israel did not publicly acknowledge its Raid on Al-Kibar until nearly eleven years later, when it lifted its censor on the attack. Haaretz reported the Israel Defense Forces chose to remain silent about the attack, a “space of denial,” in order to allow the Assad government to save face and not feel obligated to retaliate against Israel, thus avoiding a broader conflict.143

Iran Case Study—2015 The international community continues to express concern with the intent of Iran’s nuclear program because of Tehran’s regional ambitions, continued uranium enrichment, covert facilities, and its refusal to ratify the Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which would require it to supply the IAEA with more detailed information and access to its nuclear sites.144 Iran’s strategic position makes it difficult to ignore, as it possesses the world’s fourth largest proven oil reserves, second largest natural gas reserves, and it sits along a critical chokepoint in the Strait of Hormuz.145 Iran’s nuclear ambitions began during the Shah’s reign, in 1960 with the U.S.-sponsored Atoms for Peace program. This program was designed to develop civilian-use nuclear energy, which is allowable under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Iran’s desires to enrich uranium beyond levels required for civilian use raised suspicions as to the true intent and nature of its nuclear program.146 Joseph Cirincione asserts Iran seeks to “master all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, including mining, milling, enrichment, fuel fabrication, and conversion.”147 Tehran’s continued 141 Nuclear

Threat Initiative, “Al-Kibar,” last modified December 6, 2013, accessed January 21, 2014, http://www.nti.org/facilities/461/. 142 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Al-Kibar.” 143 Harel and Benn, “No Longer a Secret: How Israel Destroyed Syria’s Nuclear Reactor.” 144 David Albright and Andrea Stricker, “Iran’s Nuclear Program,” The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010), 77. 145 U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Executive Summary: Iran” (January 7, 2019), 1. 146 Andrew Scott Cooper, The Fall of Heaven: The Pahlavis and the Final Days of Imperial Iran (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2016), 235. 147 Joseph Cirincione, Nuclear Nightmares: Securing the World Before It Is Too Late (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 164.

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advances in ballistic missiles and its burgeoning space launch program raise concerns it will have a reliable delivery system in place if it decides to construct a nuclear weapon. In addition to proliferation concerns, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Quds Force projects asymmetric power throughout the region through its support to regional proxies, bringing it into conflict with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. Iranian leaders have also exacerbated American and Israeli fears of a nuclear-armed Iran. In 2001, former President Akbar Rafsanjani stated, If one day, the Islamic world is also equipped with [nuclear] weapons… then the imperialists’ strategy will reach a standstill because the use of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything. However, it will only harm the Islamic world. It is not irrational to contemplate such an eventuality.148

Saddam Hussein’s use of gas and nerve agents against Iranian troops during the Iran-Iraq War demonstrated that Iran had to rely on self-help for protection by balancing against Iraqi aggression, and future threats from the United States and Israel. Ayatollah Khomeini spoke to this threat at the beginning of the Iran–Iraq War. Iran has tried to sever all its relations with this Great Satan [United States] and it is for this reason that it now finds wars imposed upon it. America has urged Iraq to spill the blood of our young men, and it has compelled countries that are subject to its influence to boycott us economically in the hope of defeating us… Let the Muslim nations be aware that Iran is a country effectively at war with America, and that our martyrs—the brave young men of our army and the Revolutionary Guards—are defending Iran and the Islam we hold dear against America. Thus, it is necessary to point out, the clashes now occurring in the west of our beloved country are caused by America.149

During this time, Ayatollah Khomeini saw himself surrounded by enemies, and this belied his insecurities and the need to secure the national security of an increasingly isolated Iran. In a September 13, 1980 message, Khomeini framed his security dilemma and issued a call for Muslim unity and the abandonment of ethnic and sectarian division. At a time when the superpowers are attacking Muslim countries like Afghanistan, inflicting pitiless and savage massacres on the Afghan Muslims who wish the destiny of their country to be free from foreign interference; at a time when America has a hand in every form of corruption; at a time when criminal Israel is unleashing a comprehensive onslaught against the Muslims in beloved Lebanon and Palestine, and is preparing to transfer its capital to Jerusalem and intensify and extend its crimes against the Muslims it has driven from their homelands; in short at a time when the Muslims stand in greater need than ever of unity, Sadat, the traitor and servant of America, the friend and brother of Begin and the dead, deposed Shah, and Saddam, another humble servant of America, are trying to sow dissention among the Muslims and will not hesitate to commit any crime their masters enjoin upon them in order to achieve their goal. America is engaged in continuous attacks on Iran, sending spies in the hope of defeating our Islamic Revolution and conspiring with Sadat to diffuse (by way 148 Judith

S. Yaphne and Charles D. Lutes, “Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran,” Institute for National Strategic Studies McNair Paper 69 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2005), 15. 149 Hamid Algar, Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini (1941–1980) (North Haledon, NJ: Mizan Press, 1981), 305.

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of Iraq) lies and false propaganda concerning the leaders of the Islamic government. The Muslims must beware of the treason to Islam and the Muslims that these agents of America engage in.150

In addition to historical concerns about threats emanating from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, the Iranians view Israel as an existential threat to the entire Islamic world— umma—and perceive themselves to be vulnerable to attack because of the belief that enemies who have historically been hostile to the Islamic Republic of Iran, surround them. After the September 11th attacks and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States had tens of thousands of troops in countries on both sides of Iran, fighting wars against its neighbors. The U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet is headquartered in nearby Bahrain and routinely conducts freedom of navigation patrols off the Iranian coast in the Strait of Hormuz. Additionally, the U.S. sells its most advanced weapons to the Gulf States and Israel, some of whom have called for attacks against Iran, while Iran’s own conventional military suffers from a lack of spare parts and modern weaponry. Following the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. boosted global weapons sales. Between 2002 and 2016, the United States sold Iran’s archrivals Saudi Arabia $25.8 billion and Israel $15.2 billion in weapons.151 Furthermore, the Bush administration’s call for regime change in Tehran gave Iran increased incentive to pursue a nuclear deterrent.152 Ken Pollack challenged the argument that the Bush administration should have pursued regime change in Iran during this time. For Pollack, an unprovoked attack against Iran would have caused blowback because it could come across as the Christian United States attacking another Muslim country to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons, and it could potentially undermine U.S. regional efforts by encouraging Iran to increase support to its proxies, and impede efforts for the Arab states to participate in a Middle East peace process.153 Within this construct, Iran found itself increasingly in the midst of a security dilemma and further entrenching itself in Sagan’s Security Model for nuclear proliferation. In 1987, President Khamenei reflected on Iran’s security dilemma, Regarding atomic energy, we need it now… Our nation has always been threatened from outside. The least we can do to face this danger is to let our enemies know that we can defend ourselves. Therefore, every step you take is in defense of your country and your revolution. With this in mind, you should work hard and at great speed.154

150 Hamid Algar, Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini (1941–1980)

(North Haledon, NJ: Mizan Press, 1981), 301. Trevor Thrall and Caroline Dorminey, “Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Cato Institute, March 13, 2018, accessed April 8, 2020, https://www.cato.org/pub lications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy. 152 Arjomand, After Khomeini, 196. 153 Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2004), 393. 154 Khan, Iran and Nuclear Weapons, 56. 151 A.

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Two decades later, former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad echoed a similar sentiment that Iran felt itself under siege and surrounded by enemies. But think of the things that were done to Iranians! We were attacked by Iraq [1980]. Eight years of war. America and some European countries supported this aggression. We were even attacked with chemical weapons and your country [Germany], among others, aided and abetted those attacks. We did not inflict an injustice on anyone. We did not attack anyone, nor did we occupy other countries. We have no military presence in Europe and America. But troops from Europe and America are stationed along our borders… We do not commit terror, but we are victims of terror. After the [Iranian] revolution, our president [Mohammad Ali Rajai] and prime minister [Mohammad Javad Bahonar] were killed in a bombing attack in the building adjacent to my office… As long as there is no justice, there can be no solution.155

President Ahmadinejad addressed his concerns about a double-standard regarding Israel’s national security and that of Iran. One cannot measure the world with a double standard—that was Mr. Bush’s big mistake. The Americans should not make the same mistake again. We say: We are willing to cooperate under fair conditions. The same conditions, and on a level playing field. The second observation concerns the warmongers and Zionists [Israel], whose existence thrives on tension and who have become rich through war. And then there is a third group, the intolerant, those who are only interested in power. Mr. Obama’s biggest problem has to do with domestic policy. On the one hand, America needs Iran and must newly realign itself. On the other hand, the new U.S. president is under pressure from these groups. Courageous decisions are needed, and the ball is in Obama’s court.156

Khan notes the United States does not have problems with Israel not signing the NPT.157 Although there are allegations that a nuclear-armed Iran intends to attack the United States or Israel, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates downplayed Iran’s hostile intent and echoed its security dilemma. While they [Iran] are certainly pressing, in my opinion, for nuclear capability, I think that they would see it [a nuclear weapon] in the first instance as a deterrent… They are surrounded by powers with nuclear weapons: Pakistan to their east, the Russians to the north, and us [The United States] in the Persian Gulf.158

In 2002, U.S. intelligence revealed Iran built an undeclared uranium enrichment facility at Natanz, outside the holy city of Qom, in addition to its already extensive nuclear infrastructure.159 The discovery coincided with the U.S.’ post-9/11 concerns about the spread of weapons of mass destruction to rogue states and terrorist organizations.160 This public disclosure led President Mohammad Khatami to suspend Iran’s 155 Der

Spiegel, “Spiegel Interview with Iranian President Ahmadinejad.” Interview with Iranian President Ahmadinejad,” Spiegel Online, April 10, 2009, accessed October 24, 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-interview-with-ira nian-president-ahmadinejad-we-are-neither-obstinate-nor-gullible-a-618559.html. 157 Khan, Iran and Nuclear Weapons, 60. 158 Katz and Hendel, Israel vs. Iran, 174. 159 David E. Sanger, Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret War’s and Surprising Use of American Power (New York: Crown Publishers, 2012), 152. 160 Shahram Chubin, “The Politics of Iran’s Nuclear Program,” The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), 83. 156 “Spiegel

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uranium enrichment and implement the NPT’s Additional Protocol, without ratifying it.161 A year later, Iran signed the Paris Agreement, which extended the temporary suspension of its nuclear program. By 2006, Tehran stopped implementing the Additional Protocol and refused to answer IAEA questions about nuclear weaponization and nuclear warhead development.162 Three years later, in 2009, the United States, France, and Britain revealed Iran had built the covert Fordow uranium enrichment facility in the holy city of Qom (Map 11). This disclosure increased concerns Iran was using the cover of civilian-use nuclear energy to cloak a clandestine nuclear weapons program.163 In 2006 and 2010, the UN Security Council passed four rounds of economic sanctions against Iran for its failure to suspend uranium enrichment and cooperate with the IAEA. Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani addressed speculation about the intent of Iran’s nuclear program during an address to the United Nations in 2013, Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction have no place in Iran’s security and defense doctrine, and contradict our fundamental religious and ethical convictions… Sanctions, beyond any and all rhetoric, cause belligerence, war-mongering and human suffering.164

Because of questions surrounding Tehran’s intent and the discovery of undeclared nuclear sites, Israel encouraged the United States to launch preventive airstrikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities. It is argued that Israel’s current military capability could delay Iran’s program by five years by destroying critical nuclear nodes and choke points, while the United States has the firepower to destroy heavily fortified sites, such as the Fordow uranium enrichment facility.165 The United States resisted Israeli pressure and continued its call for negotiations coupled with crippling sanctions, known as the dual-track approach. Israel then declared Iran an existential threat and threatened it reserved the option to strike unilaterally, if necessary. In addressing Israel’s concerns, President Obama declared all options remained on the table relative to the United States’ use of force or coercive diplomacy to halt Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In 2009, President Obama also acknowledged Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear power, Iran has a right to peaceful nuclear power that meets the energy needs of its people. But the size and configuration of this facility [Fordow] is inconsistent with a peaceful program. Iran is breaking all rules that all nations must follow—endangering the global non-proliferation regime, denying its own people access to the opportunity they deserve, and threatening the 161 Chubin,

“The Politics of Iran’s Nuclear Program,” 83. and Stricker, “Iran’s Nuclear Program,” 79. 163 Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, “Pride and Prejudice: Understanding Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: A Comparative Perspective, vol. 2 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 43. 164 Jim Sciutto, Jennifer Rizzo, and Tom Cohen, “Rouhani: Nuclear Weapons Have No Place in Iran’s Security,” CNN, September 25, 2013, accessed January 21, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2013/ 09/24/world/un-general-assembly-tuesday/index.html. 165 Paul Danahar, The New Middle East: The World After the Arab Spring (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2013), 264. 162 Albright

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stability and security of the region and the world… We remain committed to serious, meaningful engagement with Iran to address the nuclear issue through P5-plus-1 negotiations. Through this dialogue, we are committed to demonstrating that international law is not an empty promise; that obligations must be kept; and that treaties will be enforced.166

The Obama administration’s insistence on diplomacy rather than force paid off when the five permanent member of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany, collectively known as the P5+1, successfully negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran, in an agreement more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal. The Iran Nuclear Deal is a comprehensive agreement that sought to guarantee Iran’s nuclear program can only be used for civilian-use nuclear energy in exchange for suspension of United States, European Union, and United Nations sanctions. According to the Congressional Research Service, the JCPOA places constraints on Iran’s uranium enrichment and heavy water programs, and includes monitoring provisions to detect any Iranian effort to produce nuclear weapons. The agreement is also designed to extend the amount of time Iran would need to produce enough weapons-grade High Enriched Uranium for one nuclear weapon to a minimum of one year, for at least ten years. The agreement also prohibits Iran from undertaking any activities that could contribute to the design or development of a nuclear device.167 If Iran violates any terms of the agreement, previous sanctions would be re-imposed, or “snap-back,” immediately. Criticism of the deal began once negotiations were revealed. The Gulf States and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu were among the most outspoken critics of the agreement. One of the primary concerns was sanctions relief would provide Iran an influx of cash that would allow it to modernize its military and increase the reach of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards-Quds Force as a means to promote its interests throughout the region. The Gulf States accepted the deal, but voiced concern Iran would use the increased revenue to fund insurgent Shi’ite groups in the region. Benjamin Netanyahu vehemently opposed the deal and in March 2013, appeared before a joint session of the U.S. Congress to speak out against it. Speaker of the House John Boehner invited Prime Minister Netanyahu to speak before a joint session of Congress without consulting the White House or the Department of State. Netanyahu’s speech was highly critical of President Obama’s Middle East policies, particularly his engagement with Iran over its nuclear program. While Netanyahu preferred a hardline approach to Iran, President Obama took a more nuanced and diplomatic tone that provided incentives for Iran to negotiate with the United States over the future of its nuclear program. In his speech, Netanyahu recalled the historical tragedies and suffering of the Jewish people. We’re an ancient people. In our nearly 4,000 years of history, many have tried repeatedly to destroy the Jewish people. Tomorrow night, on the Jewish holiday of Purim, we’ll read the Book of Esther. We’ll read of a powerful Persian viceroy name Haman, who plotted to 166 Parsi,

A Single Roll of the Dice, 125.

167 Kenneth Katzman and Paul K. Kerr, “Iran Nuclear Agreement,” Congressional Research Service,

August 20, 2015, 9.

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destroy the Jewish people some 2,500 years ago. But a courageous Jewish woman, Queen Esther, exposed the plot and gave for the Jewish people the right to defend themselves against their enemies. The plot was foiled. Our people were saved. Today the Jewish people face another attempt by yet another Persian potentate to destroy us. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei spews the oldest hatred, the oldest hatred of anti-Semitism with the newest technology. He tweets that Israel must be annihilated—he tweets. You know, in Iran, there isn’t exactly a free Internet. But he tweets in English that Israel must be destroyed.168

Netanyahu continued his speech, and then compared Iran’s leaders to the ultimate evil, Nazi Germany. But Iran’s regime is not merely a Jewish problem, any more than the Nazi regime was merely a Jewish problem. The 6 million Jews murdered by the Nazis were but a fraction of the 60 million people killed in World War II. So, too, Iran’s regime poses a grave threat, not only to Israel, but also the peace of the entire world.169

Netanyahu reminded Congress of Iran’s support for terrorists who have killed Americans, and how it still chants “Death to America” and calls the United States the “Great Satan.” Although Iran fights against ISIS and views it as an extreme threat to Iran and Islam, Netanyahu created a nexus between the two groups by stating, Iran and ISIS are competing for the crown of militant Islam. Once calls itself the Islamic Republic. The other calls itself the Islamic State. Both want to impose a militant Islamic empire first on the region and then on the entire world. They just disagree among themselves who will be the ruler of that empire. So when it comes to Iran and ISIS, the enemy of your enemy is your enemy. The difference is that ISIS is armed with butcher knives, captured weapons and YouTube, whereas Iran could soon be armed with intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear bombs. We must always remember—I’ll say it one more time—the greatest dangers facing our world is the marriage of militant Islam with nuclear weapons. To defeat ISIS and let Iran get nuclear weapons would be to win the battle, but lose the war. We can’t let that happen.170

Netanyahu concluded his speech by urging the United States to seek a better deal that keeps restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program until its aggression ends, and cautioned that Israel will stand alone, if necessary. Kroenig’s theory does not accurately forecast the degree of perceived threat for the United States and Israel (Table 7.18). His theory predicts Iran’s nuclear program would be a high threat to the United States and a low threat to Israel based on his power projection definition. Actual events falsified his theory’s predictions because the United States and Israel diverged from their expected perceived threat. Israel felt highly threatened by Iran’s proliferation efforts and repeatedly urged the United 168 Washington Post Staff, “The Complete Transcript of Netanyahu’s Address to Congress,” The Washington Post, March 3, 2015, accessed April 8, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ post-politics/wp/2015/03/03/full-text-netanyahus-address-to-congress/. 169 Washington Post Staff, “The Complete Transcript of Netanyahu’s Address to Congress,” The Washington Post, March 3, 2015, accessed April 8, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ post-politics/wp/2015/03/03/full-text-netanyahus-address-to-congress/. 170 Washington Post Staff, “The Complete Transcript of Netanyahu’s Address to Congress,” The Washington Post, March 3, 2015, accessed April 8, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ post-politics/wp/2015/03/03/full-text-netanyahus-address-to-congress/.

Iran Case Study—2015 Table 7.18 The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast—Iran 2015

269

Perceived Threat

Israel

The United States

Low

High

States to attack it, while simultaneously threatening its right to conduct a unilateral strike if it desires. The U.S. dissuaded Israel from attacking Iran and encouraged it to allow the JCPOA time to work. The next section applies the two heuristics to the United States and Israel to test the study’s Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory against the 2015 Iran case to determine if it more accurately accounts for the divergences in United States and Israeli responses to the proliferation case. Q1: Do the states have a recent history of direct military conflict? Yes, Israel and Iran have a recent history of direct military conflict within the study’s 1990–2015 timeframe. Their militaries have never directly faced one another on the battlefield; however, they share over four decades of mutual animosity and distrust, which have turned increasingly violent. The Iranians and Israelis share a history of bellicose rhetoric and intense threats, in addition to targeted attacks against shared interests. The two archenemies compete for regional power and influence, and have engaged in hostilities since shortly after the 1979 Iranian Revolution and recently extended their hostilities into Syria, where they face off over Israel’s objection to the Iranian and Hezbollah presence so close to its border.171 To mitigate Iran’s growing regional influence and its nuclear ambitions, Israel is suspected of conducting covert attacks against Iranian nuclear facilities, assassinating Iranian nuclear scientists, and conducting airstrikes against Iranian proxies Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas.172 Iran has responded by using Hezbollah and Hamas to attack and retaliate against Israeli targets in the region, including inside Israel. Former Iranian President Ahmadinejad inflamed world opinion and brought additional attention to Iran’s uranium enrichment centrifuges because of his statements questioning both the extent of the Holocaust and the legitimacy of Israel’s existence.173 These actions heighten Israel’s perceptions that Iran seeks to annihilate it, thus allowing it to map the perceived threat of a nuclear-armed Iran to the tragedy of the Holocaust. Successive Israeli leaders, particularly Netanyahu, have warned repeatedly for at least the past 20 years of Iran’s intent to destroy Israel with nuclear weapons. While Iranian leaders, such as Khomeini and Ahmadinejad have indeed, questioned the existence of Israel and spoken of its destruction, Iran currently lacks 171 Nicholas

Blanford, “Iran-Backed Advance in Southern Syria Rattles Israel,” The Christian Science Monitor, March 6, 2015, accessed April 8, 2020, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Mid dle-East/2015/0306/Iran-backed-advance-in-southern-Syria-rattles-Israel. 172 Daniel Byman, A High Price: The Triumphs & Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 247. 173 James Buchan, Days of God: The Revolution in Iran and Its Consequences (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2012), 332.

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the capability to be an existential threat to Israel. When using the equation: threat = intent + capability, Iranian leaders may have the intent, but they lack the capability to be a true existential threat to Israel. The last modern aircraft and ordnance Iran purchased from the West are Vietnam-era F-4 Phantom and 1970s-era F-14 Tomcats. Iran’s extensive ballistic missile arsenal and asymmetric capabilities pose more of a challenge to Israel and other regional U.S. allies, than does its outdated conventional military forces (Maps 10, 12, 13). Israel possesses the most advanced conventional military in the region and operates the highly effective Iron Dome missile defense system. When examining the order of battle between Iran and Israel, Israel is much stronger and poses a much more significant and lethal threat to Iran than Iran poses to Israel. Israeli President Netanyahu has threatened continuously to attack Iran over concerns with its nuclear program and Israel is suspected of assassinating key nuclear scientists, leading Iran to perceive Israel as a threat to its existence. Former Prime Minister Ehud Barak was critical of Netanyahu’s bleak outlook when he stated, “Bibi is weak… [he] is shrouded by a deep pessimism… in the balance between fear and hope, he will always choose being more afraid; he calls it concerned.”174 For Iran and Israel, the cycle of threats and targeted strikes continue to feed mutual suspicions and may ultimately lead to a state on state conflict due to increased risk and miscalculation. Q2: Is the weaker state developing a nuclear weapons capability? Yes, Iran was enriching uranium toward weapons-grade levels and was suspected of concealing undeclared nuclear sites, in addition to increasing the range and accuracy of its ballistic missile arsenal (Map 10). Despite Iranian arguments its uranium enrichment was for a peaceful nuclear program, Israel perceived it to be a covert program designed to produce nuclear weapons. Q3: Has the powerful state perceived the weaker state’s actions as a threat to its national security? Yes, Israel perceived Iran’s uranium enrichment as an existential threat. Israeli– Iranian relations have steadily declined since the Iranian Revolution, as both countries have a high degree of distrust and worry about one another’s intentions and foreign policies. Israel has compared Iran to Nazi Germany and its quest to annihilate the world’s Jewish population, and has repeatedly requested the U.S. attack Iran’s nuclear infrastructure before the Iranians enter a zone of immunity or achieve a nuclear breakout capability.175 Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert invoked the historical persona of Adolf Hitler when discussing Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, “[Ahmadinejad] is a psychopath of the worst kind. He speaks like Hitler did of

174 Lahav

Harkov, “Barak in New Recording: Netanyahu is Weak, He Doesn’t Take Tough Steps Unless He’s Forced To,” The Jerusalem Times, August 23, 2015, accessed April 8, 2020, https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Barak-in-new-record ing-Netanyahu-is-weak-he-doesnt-take-tough-steps-unless-hes-forced-to-413032. 175 Washington Post Staff, “The Complete Transcript of Netanyahu’s Address to Congress,” The Washington Post, March 3, 2015, accessed April 8, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ post-politics/wp/2015/03/03/full-text-netanyahus-address-to-congress/.

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the extermination of the entire Jewish nation.”176 Similarly, Benjamin Netanyahu invoked the Holocaust analogy when discussing a nuclear-armed Iran’s ultimate intentions. Today, the regime in Iran openly calls and determinedly works for our destruction. And it is feverishly working to develop atomic weapons to achieve that goal. I know that there are those who do not like when I speak such uncomfortable truths. They prefer that we not speak of a nuclear Iran as an existential threat. They say that such language, even if true, only sows fear and panic. I ask, have these people lost all faith in the people of Israel? Do they think that this nation, which has overcome every danger, lacks the strength to confront this new threat? Did the State of Israel not triumph over existential threats when it was far less powerful than it is today? Did its leaders have any qualms about saying the truth? David Ben-Gurion told the people of Israel the truth about the existential dangers they faced in 1948 when five Arab armies tried to snuff Israel out in its cradle. Those who dismiss Iran’s threats as exaggerated or as mere idle posturing have learned nothing from the Holocaust.177

Although Iran and Israel have threatened one another for the past four decades, Iran lacks the capability to credibly threaten Israel’s existence. Iran can wound Israel, but it cannot destroy it. Israel has the military capability to cripple, if not destroy Iran. Though Iran lacks the conventional military capacity to inflict serious damage on Israel, its leaders’ rhetoric and actions have elevated Israeli threat perceptions and heightened their concerns of the potential dangers a nuclear Iran would pose to Israel and its freedom of movement in the region. Iran remains an asymmetric threat to Israel through its support of Hezbollah and Hamas, and because of its presence in Syria, but it lacks the conventional military force and nuclear arsenal to counter Israel’s overwhelming conventional firepower advantage. Without conventional parity or a nuclear arsenal with a secure second strike capability, Iran will not be an existential threat to Israel. As Iran approaches enriching its uranium stockpile to weaponsgrade levels, questions arise as to the intent of its nuclear program. Is Iran seeking a nuclear weapon to dominate the Middle East? Are the Iranians pursuing a nuclear weapon so they can destroy Israel? Is Tehran seeking a nuclear weapon to serve as a deterrent against what it perceives is a region full of militarily advanced and financially powerful Sunni states with close ties to its enduring enemy, the United States and warming ties with its archenemy Israel? Israel has likewise elevated threat percpetions in Tehran due to its consistent messaging of threatening to attack Iran, its alleged acts of sabotage against Iranian nuclear facilities, and its suspected assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists inside Iran. A major distinction between Iranian 176 “Olmert:

Ahmadinejad is a ‘Psychopath’ who ‘Speaks Like Hitler’,” Haaretz, April 30, 2006, accessed May 22, 2013, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/olmert-ahmadinejad-is-psycho path-who-speaks-like-hitler-1.186487. 177 Benjamin Netanyahu, “Text of Netanyahu’s Holocaust Remembrance Day speech ‘A NuclearArmed Iran is an Existential Threat to the State of Israel’,” Times of Israel, April 18, 2012, accessed May 16, 2013, http://www.timesofisrael.com/text-of-netanyahus-holocaust-remembrance-day-spe ech/.

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Table 7.19 The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast— Iran 2015 Israel

Perceived Threat

The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation

The Differential Effects of Threat Perception

Actual

Low

High

High

and Israeli threat perceptions is that Israel has the military and intelligence capabilities, and access to carry out its threats to attack Iran. Israel’s increasingly warm relations with the Gulf States will also contribute to Tehran’s feelings of isolation and “strategic loneliness” because these warming relationships could witness an anti-Iran alliance of rivals Israel and Saudi Arabia, and potentially pave the way for increased operations from states that are in much closer proximity to Iran, in the event of Israeli airstrikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities. Kroenig’s theoretical forecast that Israel would perceive Iran’s nuclear proliferation efforts as a low threat because it is unable to project power over Iran by conducting a ground war inside Iranian territory is falsified by actual events. Israel perceives Iran’s nuclear program to be a high threat and has repeatedly requested the U.S. conduct preventive airstrikes to destroy its nuclear infrastructure. The Israelis have also threatened to conduct unilateral strikes against Tehran’s nuclear program. The study’s Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory successfully predicted the actual high degree of threat for Israel based upon the countries having a history of armed conflict (Q1), Iran’s continued uranium enrichment (Q2), and Israel’s national leader statements mapping the potential for a second Holocaust to Iran’s nuclear program (Q3) (Table 7.19). Q4: Has the powerful state identified the weaker state as a high threat to its national security? Yes, Israel identified Iran’s nuclear program as an existential threat (Table 7.19).178 Q5: Does the powerful state possess adequate airpower capability to disrupt the weaker state’s proliferation effort? The Israeli Air Force’s power projection capability is documented in Chapter 5, although it is questionable if Israeli airpower alone would be able to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program without U.S. assistance. This is due to Iran’s distance from Israel as well the dispersal and fortification of its nuclear facilities. Whereas Iraqi (1981) and Syrian (2007) nuclear facilities were concentrated in one open location, Iran’s nuclear facilities are spread throughout the country, with some buried deep underground, thus increasing the difficulty of destroying its nuclear program with one strike. It would likely require sustained airstrikes to destroy or significantly disrupt Iran’s nuclear program and it is unknown if Israel has the capacity to sustain such an effort. Q6: Does the powerful state’s national security policy advocate preventive strikes?

178 Danahar,

263.

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Yes, Israel’s national security advocates a preventive strike policy so that none of its neighbors or rivals acquires a nuclear capability (Maps 8 and 9). Q7: Has the weaker state crossed the powerful state’s established redlines? Yes, during a September 2012 speech at the United Nations, Israeli President Netanyahu drew an actual redline on a graphic depicting an Iranian nuclear bomb with a fuse. Netanyahu’s redline was drawn below a label that read “final stage” to a bomb, in which Iran was 90 percent along the path toward having enough weaponsgrade fissile material.179 Israel stated if actions are not taken to stop it, Iran will reach a “zone of immunity” in which its nuclear program is irreversible. Netanyahu vowed to act before this becomes a reality, and asserted, “I believe that faced with a clear red line, Iran will back down. This will give more time for sanctions and diplomacy to convince Iran to dismantle its nuclear weapons program altogether.”180 Q8: Does the powerful state have domestic support for a military strike against the weaker state? Yes, as of 2015, Israel had domestic support for a military strike against Iran, as long as it had U.S. support. In a 2012 poll conducted by Israel’s Dahaf Institute, only 19 percent of Israelis supported an attack without U.S. backing, while 42 percent supported a strike if there was American support, and 32 percent opposed any Israeli strike.181 A Capital Politics poll for The Jerusalem Post stated 78 percent of Israelis felt the Iran nuclear deal endangered Israel, and 71 percent felt it would bring Iran closer to a military nuclear capability.182 Iran was labeled an existential threat and Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s bellicose rhetoric continued to stoke Israeli fears of a nuclear Holocaust. Although President Hassan Rouhani was a more moderate voice and attempted to lessen the impact of Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric as he and his Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif worked toward negotiating the Iran Nuclear Deal, the damage remained and the Israeli public remained suspicious of Iranian intentions because the true power broker in Iran remained the same—Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, who remains critical of Israel. Kroenig’s Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory correctly forecasts Israel would take no action against Iran’s nuclear program because of its inability to project power over Iran. Actual events support this prediction, as Israel advocated for a strike against Iran but remained hesitant to do so without American backing. The study’s Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory’s Heuristic for the Proliferation Response predicts Israel would use force against Iran by either encouraging a dual U.S.-Israeli strike or doing so unilaterally (Table 7.20). The study’s enhanced 179 Jeffrey

Heller, “Netanyahu Draws “Red Line” on Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Reuters, September 27, 2012, accessed March 5, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/amp/idUSBRE88Q0GI20120 927ers.com/article/amp/. 180 Zanotti et al., “Israel: Possible Military Strikes Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities,” 15. 181 Shibley Telhami, “Do Israelis Support a Strike on Iran?” Politico, February 28, 2012, accessed April 8, 2020, https://www.politico.com/story/2012/02/do-israelis-support-a-strike-oniran-073390. 182 Gil Stern Hoffman, “Poll: 78% of Jewish Israelis Say Iran Deal Endangers Country,” The Jerusalem Post, July 17, 2015, accessed April 8, 2020, https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Iran/ Poll-78-percent-of-Jewish-Israelis-say-Iran-deal-endangers-country-409312.

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Table 7.20 The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Proliferation Response—The United States and Iran 2015 Israel

Power Applied

The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation

The Differential Effects of Threat Perception

Actual

No action

Force

No Action/Nuclear Agreement

threat perception theory is based on five interrelated criteria: Israel perceiving Iran’s nuclear program to be an existential and high threat (Q4), the Israeli Air Force’s questionable ability to successfully destroy significant portions of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure (Q5), Israeli national security policies authorizing the use of military force against nuclear-related regional threats (Q6), Iran has not crossed Israel’s redlines by enriching uranium to weapons-grade (Q7), and Israel currently has the domestic support for attacking Iran (Q8). Q1: Do the States have a recent history of direct military conflict? Yes, the United States and Iran have been in direct and indirect military conflict within the study’s 1990–2015 timeframe. During the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq War, the United States sided with Iraq and provided satellite imagery of Iranian military positions to the Iraqis. From 1987 to 1988, the United States and Iran engaged in a tanker war in which the U.S. Navy escorted reflagged Kuwaiti oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz, drawing each country’s navy into direct kinetic engagements. This hostile environment contributed to the guided-missile cruiser USS Vincennes shooting down a civilian Iranian airline, Iran Air Flight 655, killing all 290 people on board, on July 3, 1988. The United States claimed the USS Vincennes mistakenly believed it was under attack by an Iranian F-14 Tomcat and that the ship’s crew may have mistaken the Iranian airliner as a “Stark profile,” in reference to the Iraqi Air Force’s missile attack on the USS Stark, which killed 37 U.S. sailors a year earlier, on May 17, 1987.183 The United States and Israel are also suspected of engaging in covert operations against Iran’s nuclear program. According to a New York Times article, Speaker Newt Gingrich conceived an operation where the CIA was to undertake an $18 million covert operation to destabilize Iran. As a counter, Iran’s Parliament announced it funded a $20 million operation “to counter the Great Satan” and its destabilization efforts. According to open source reporting, the operation was scrapped once it became public.184 Ten years later, Congress enacted the Iran Freedom Support Act (Public Law 109-293) to appropriate $10 million to support pro-democracy groups opposed to the Iranian government, which President Bush signed into law on 183 George

C. Wilson, “Navy Missile Downs Iranian Jet Liner,” The Washington Post, July 4, 1988, accessed August 7, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/flight801/stories/ july88crash.htm. 184 Tim Weiner, “U.S. Plan to Change Iran Leaders is an Open Secret Before It Begins,” The New York Times, January 26, 1996, accessed April 8, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/26/world/ us-plan-to-change-iran-leaders-is-an-open-secret-before-it-begins.html.

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September 30, 2006.185 Seymour Hersh reported, in 2008, President Bush signed a “non-lethal presidential finding” to focus on undermining Iran’s nuclear ambitions and attempt to undermine the government through regime change.186 These actions are in violation of the 1981 Algiers Accords between Iran and the United States, which stipulates, “It is and from now on will be the policy of the United States not to intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in Iran’s internal affairs.”187 The United States is also opposed to Iran’s support of Hezbollah, Hamas, and Shi’a militias in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, because these proxies allow Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Quds Force to expand its influence in the region, challenging the United States and Israeli dominance at the tactical and strategic levels. Q2: Is the weaker state developing a nuclear weapons capability? Yes, the Iranians were enriching uranium for a suspected covert nuclear weapons program prior to implementing the JCPOA. The United States recognizes Iran’s right to a peaceful civilian nuclear program, as allowed under the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty. However, the U.S. alleged Iran was in violation of IAEA safeguards and UN Security Council resolutions to halt its uranium enrichment program. Q3: Has the powerful state perceived the weaker state’s actions as a threat to its national security? No, the United States did not view Iran’s uranium enrichment as an existential threat to its national security in 2015. A nuclear Iran was more of a threat to regional stability, U.S. regional partners, and U.S. regional interests, but not the national security of the state. The Obama administration proclaimed a nuclear Iran was unacceptable; however, the administration did not believe Iran had reached a nuclear breakout capability and therefore emphasized the use of coercive diplomacy to curtail its uranium enrichment program. According to Secretary of Defense Gates, The current American administration[Obama] as well as those that follow it will exercise extreme caution before launching a pre-emptive military strike against an enemy state… I think one of the biggest lessons learned in this is, if you are going to contemplate preempting an attack, you had better be very confident of the intelligence that you have… They’re [Iran] not close to a stockpile, they’re not close to a weapon at this point, and so there is some time.188

This statement reflects the administration’s low threat perception of Iran’s nuclear program. 185 “H.R. 6198 (109th): Iran Freedom Support Act,” Govtrack, accessed April 8, 2020, https://www.

govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/hr6198. M. Hersh, “Preparing the Battlefield: The Bush Administration Steps Up Its Secret Moves Against Iran,” The New Yorker, June 29, 2008, accessed April 8, 2020, https://www.newyor ker.com/magazine/2008/07/07/preparing-the-battlefield. 187 Seyed Hossein Mousavian, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012), 23. 188 Anthony H. Cordesman and Abdullah Toukan, “GCC—Iran: Operational Analysis of Air, SAM and TBM Forces,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (August 20, 2009): 9, accessed May 16, 2013, http://csis.org/files/publication/090819_GCC_Iran_AirPower.pdf. 186 Seymour

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Table 7.21 The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Threat Assessment Forecast— The United States and Iran 2015 The United States

Perceived Threat

The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation

The Differential Effects of Threat Perception

Actual

High

Low

Low

Kroenig’s theoretical forecast that the United States would perceive Iran’s proliferation efforts as a high threat is falsified by actual events (Table 7.21). The United States perceived Iran’s nuclear program to be a low threat and declined Israeli requests to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities, preferring, instead, to employ economic sanctions in lieu of force as it negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The study’s enhanced theory successfully predicted the actual low degree of threat for the United States. This is in spite of a history of conflict with Iran (Q1), the United States was not convinced Iran had a nuclear breakout capability (Q2), and U.S. leaders’ statements did not imply a current Iranian nuclear threat to U.S. national security (Q3). Q4: Has the powerful state identified the proliferating state as a high threat to its national security? No, the United States identified Iran as a low threat (Table 7.21). Q5: Does the powerful state possess adequate airpower capability to disrupt the weaker state’s proliferation effort? Yes, U.S. airpower projection capability is discussed in Chapter 5. Q6: Does the powerful state’s national security policy advocate preventive strikes? No, the 2015 Obama administration’s National Security Strategy returned U.S. foreign policy to multilateralism and the desire to reinforce adherence to international protocols like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the New START, and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.189 The absence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq undercut U.S. credibility and undermined its ability to use preventive war to halt suspected WMD programs. An immediate result of the failed WMD search in Iraq was the U.S. resistance to Israeli pressure to bomb Syrian and Iranian nuclear facilities. Q7: Has the target state crossed the established redlines? No, the United States did not establish a public redline, however, President Obama vowed that a nuclear Iran was unacceptable. Q8: Does the powerful state have domestic support for a military strike against the weaker state? No, the United States did not have the domestic support to strike Iranian nuclear facilities in 2015. In a March 21–24, 2015, CBS News Poll, 29 percent of adults polled believed Iran’s nuclear program was a threat to the United States and required immediate military action, while 45 percent believed it could be contained for now, and another 18 percent believed it was not a threat. In a March 13–15, 2015, CNN/ORC 189 Barack

H. Obama, National Security Strategy, February 2015, 11.

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Table 7.22 The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory—Proliferation Response—The United States and Iran 2015 The United States

Power Applied

The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation

The Differential Effects of Threat Perception

Actual

Force

Coercive Diplomacy

Coercive Diplomacy/Nuclear Agreement

Poll, 68 percent of adults favored direct diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran to halt its nuclear program, while 29 percent opposed negotiations, and 4 percent were unsure.190 The U.S.’ previous flawed use of preventive war in Iraq, as well as the ongoing war in Afghanistan, continued to influence the Obama administration’s preference for coercive diplomacy and avoidance of war with another Muslim country over suspected weapons of mass destruction. Kroenig’s Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory forecasts the United States would use force against Iran’s nuclear program because its ability to project power over Iran would be affected by Iranian proliferation. This prediction was falsified by actual events due to the U.S. preference for coercive diplomacy, and the signing of the JCPOA. The study’s Heuristic for the Proliferation Response successfully predicted the United States use of coercive diplomacy (Table 7.22). The theory’s success is based on five interrelated criteria: the U.S. perceived Iran’s program to be a low threat (Q4), U.S. airpower has the ability to seriously degrade Iran’s nuclear infrastructure (Q5), the U.S. national security strategy promotes multilateralism and coercive diplomacy to respond to nuclear proliferation. The Obama administration stated repeatedly that it preferred diplomacy over no action or the use of force, as indicative of the P5+1 negotiations. (Q6), the U.S. avoided publicly establishing redlines for Iran’s nuclear program (Q7), and the United States lacked domestic support to attack Iranian nuclear facilities due to continued fallout from the failed WMD search in Iraq (Q8). The results of the Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory’s two heuristics for the 2015 Iran case study illustrate Israel perceived Iran to be a high threat and the United States perceived it as a low threat. Using the power-based heuristic, Israel was inclined to use military force to address the Iranian threat, while the United States was more likely to use coercive diplomacy. The proliferation response predicted in the Heuristic for the Proliferation Response more accurately forecast the U.S. response by incorporating state and individual-level analysis. While Israel continued to threaten unilateral airstrikes, while declaring it would not recognize the P5+1 nuclear deal with Iran. The United States continued its path of coercive diplomacy until it brokered the P5+1 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which called for the sanctions relief in return for Iran curtailing its nuclear program.

190 “Iran”

Polling Report, accessed April 8, 2020, https://www.pollingreport.com/iran.htm.

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7 Analysis of Data

The United States and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) As the United States brokered international negotiations to address Iran’s nuclear program, Israel continued to challenge the legitmacy of the nuclear accord. The Iran Nuclear Deal presented Israel with three options relative to Iran’s nuclear status: (1) accept a nuclear-armed Iran, (2) conduct military strikes to halt or degrade its nuclear program, or (3) accept a U.S.-brokered international agreement to curtail Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. The Israelis argued Iran was participating in nuclear talks to buy time, as it continued to enrich uranium for development of a nuclear weapon.191 While not all Israeli leaders believed Iran posed an existential threat, they agreed the prospect of a nuclear Iran was alarming and that it raised the possibility of a regional nuclear arms race. While urging military strikes, Israel took a three-pronged approach to Iran’s nuclear program. First, it urged harsher UN-imposed economic sanctions to prevent nuclear technology from reaching Iran. Second, it supported opposition and student groups that could overthrow the government. Lastly, Israel conducted a shadow war against Iran’s nuclear program, allegedly through covert acts of sabotage and the assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists.192 All the while, there were continued discussions of a possible unilateral strike against Iran. Uzi Arad, the former Mossad Director of Intelligence argued, A military strike may be easier than you think. It wouldn’t just be aimed at the nuclear sites. It would hit military and security targets, industrial and oil-related targets such as Kharg island [Iran’s main oil export terminal in the Gulf], and regime targets… Iran is much more vulnerable than people realize.193

The post-9/11 Bush administration was dominated by neoconservatives and had an aggressive and unilateral approach to national security. Yet, in the midst of two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a national security strategy that invoked the right to preventive war, the Bush administration used coercive diplomacy to target Iranian proliferation. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned of the unintended consequences of a strike on Iran, We must not make our vital interests in the entire Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and Southwest Asia hostage to another nation’s decisions—no matter how close an ally. Above all, we ought not risk what we have gained in Iraq or the lives of our soldiers there on an Israeli military gamble in Iran. [Israeli Prime Minister] Olmert has his own agenda, and he will pursue it irrespective of our interests… We will be bystanders to actions that affect us directly and dramatically… Most evidence suggest we have some time… The military option probably remains available for several years… A military attack by either Israel or the United States will, I believe—having watched these guys since 1979—guarantee that the Iranians will develop nuclear weapons, and seek revenge… A surprise attack on Iran risks a further conflict in the Gulf and all its potential consequences, with no consultation with the Congress 191 “Transcript of Netanyahu’s UN General Assembly Speech,” Haaretz, October 1, 2013, accessed

January 21, 2014, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.550012. 192 Katz and Hendel, Israel vs. Iran, 5. 193 Cook, Israel and the Clash of Civilisations, 79.

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or foreknowledge on the part of the American people. That strikes me as very dangerous, and not just for sustaining our efforts in the Gulf.194

Subsequently, the less-hawkish Obama administration continued the Bush-era UN Security Council sanctions, but was more aggressive in its use of additional sanctions targeting Tehran. The United States has issued a series of Executive Orders, implemented sanctions, and enacted laws addressing Iran’s proliferation efforts. Sanctions have been a major feature of U.S. foreign policy toward Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and UN and worldwide bilateral sanctions on Iran have been consistent since 2006. In addition to these measures, the United States waged a covert campaign to degrade Iran’s nuclear weapons program by encouraging key officials and nuclear scientists to defect.195 Katz and Hendel report the alleged program, called “Brain Drain,” was allegedly operated by the CIA’s Counterproliferation Division and started in 2005. Brain Drain reportedly led to the defection of four Iranian nuclear scientists between 2005 and 2008. The scientists allegedly provided critical information about Iran’s nuclear program, including information on the underground Fordow enrichment facility near Qom. After debriefing, the scientists were reportedly resettled throughout the United States in a program similar to the witness protection program.196 The objectives of U.S. sanctions on Iran evolved over time. In the 1980s, U.S. sanctions targeted Iran’s support for terrorist organizations and were intended to limit its regional power. Since the mid-1990s, U.S. sanctions targeted Iran’s nuclear program to ensure it was solely for civilian use.197 While on the 2008 presidential campaign trail, then-Senator Obama tried to distance himself from the Bush administration’s Iran policies and proposed engaging Tehran without pre-conditions. He came under fire for this position from his political opponents Senator John McCain and Sarah Palin. On Inauguration Day 2008, President Obama sent a message to Tehran saying in his first televised interview “if countries like Iran are willing to unclench their fist, they will find an extended hand from us.”198 On March 20, 2009, President Obama marked the Persian New Year—Nowruz—by addressing the people and leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran, You, too, have a choice. The United States wants the Islamic Republic of Iran to take its rightful place in the community of nations. You have that right—but it comes with real responsibilities, and that place cannot be reached through terror or arms, but rather through peaceful actions that demonstrate the true greatness of the Iranian people and civilization.

194 Gates,

Duty, 192. Miller, “CIA Has Recruited Iranians to Defect,” Los Angeles Times, December 9, 2007, accessed January 21, 2014, http://articles.latimes.com/2007/dec/09/world/fg-usiran9. 196 Katz and Hendel, Israel vs. Iran, 108. 197 Kenneth Katzman, “Iran Sanctions,” Congressional Research Service (July 26, 2013): 1. 198 Gerges, Obama and the Middle East, 180. 195 Greg

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And the measure of that greatness is not the capacity to destroy, it is your demonstrated ability to build and create.199

The American gestures sparked outrage in Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, as each country warned against Iran’s growing influence in the region. As Fawaz Gerges noted, in Saudi Arabia, Iran seems to have displaced Israel as public enemy number one. In 2010, WikiLeaks released U.S. diplomatic cables that highlighted the concerns of the region’s Gulf States. Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah told U.S. leaders that Iran posed a grave threat to Saudi Arabia and urged the United States to attack Iran and “cut off the head of the snake.”200 Secretary Gates argued against King Abdullah’s request for a United States attack against Iran, stating the King wanted America’s sons and daughters to go to war with Iran to protect Saudi interests. As far as I was concerned, he was asking the United States to send its sons and daughters into a war with Iran in order to protect the Saudi position in the Gulf and the region, as if we were mercenaries. He was asking us to shed American blood, but at no time did he suggest that any Saudi blood might be spilled. He went on and on about how the United States was seen as weak by governments in the region. The longer he talked, the angrier I got, and I responded quite undiplomatically. I told him that absent an Iranian military attack on U.S. forces or our allies, if the president launched another preventive war in the Middle East, he would likely be impeached; that we had our hands full in Iraq; and that the president would use military force only to protect vital American interests. I also told him that what he considered America’s greatest weakness—showing restraint—was actually great strength because we could crush any adversary. I told him that neither he nor anyone else should ever underestimate the strength and power of the United States: those who had—Imperial Germany, Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and the Soviet Union—were all now in the ashcan of history.201

Similarly, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Mohammed bin Zayed, employed an analogy famously used by Benjamin Netanyahu when he stated, “Ahmadinejad is Hitler.”202 These emotionally charged statements further illustrate the importance of incorporating political psychology into the proliferation literature due to its ability to explain human emotions and their influence on perceptions, beliefs, and policy decisions. Secretary Gates’ statement also illustrates the limitations placed on the future use of the Bush Doctrine to attack suspected nuclear facilities. Ultimately, Ayatollah Khamenei dismissed Obama’s overtures as simply talk, “They say they extended their arms toward Iran. What kind of hand? If it is an iron hand covered with a velvet glove, then it will not make any good sense… You change, and we will also change our behavior, too.”203 199 Jason Djang, “A New Year, A New Beginning,” The White House of President Barack Obama, March 19, 2009, accessed April 8, 2020, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2009/03/19/ a-new-year-a-new-beginning. 200 Katz and Hendel, Israel vs. Iran, 5. 201 Gates, Duty, 185. 202 Gerges, Obama and the Middle East, 182. 203 Gerges, Obama and the Middle East, 181.

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The Obama administration’s gestures toward Iran were undermined by Iran’s continued uranium enrichment and Washington’s adherence to crippling economic sanctions, which had seen the Iranian Rial lose 40-percent of its value against the dollar. The Iranians argued that if President Obama was serious about diplomacy, he would first ease America’s hostile policies and sanctions toward the Islamic Republic. In an effort to show his willingness to not interfere in Iran’s domestic issues, President Obama did not publicly back the pro-democracy Green Movement and its leader, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, during the 2009 Iranian presidential elections.204 Despite missed opportunities, the two negotiating sides—Iran and the P5+1 countries—agreed that diplomacy was the best course of action for resolving the dispute over Iran’s nuclear program. Iranian Ambassador Seyed Hossein Mousavian, a former spokesman for Iran’s nuclear negotiating team, stated diplomacy has traditionally failed because the West has tried to force Iran to compromise on its policies by using sanctions, pressure, sabotage, and threats. He asserted Iran has structured its foreign policy based on resisting these threats, defending its independence, and perseverance in the face of tyranny. Mousavian argued the Iranians believed accelerating their uranium enrichment was the only way of forcing the West to negotiate with them on an equal basis.205 As it turned out, Mousavian may have been right. The JCPOA was designed to halt Iranian uranium enrichment and other nuclearrelated activities in exchange for sanctions relief. The P5+1 countries, the European Union, and Iran reached a deal on July 14, 2015, thereby lowering the P5+1 nations and the European Union’s perceived threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program. The Iran Nuclear Deal placed constraints on Iran’s uranium enrichment levels and heavy water programs, and includes provisions for monitoring Iranian nuclear activities to detect any effort to produce nuclear weapons. The agreement extended the amount of time Iran would need to produce enough weapons-grade Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) for one nuclear weapon to a minimum of one year, for at least ten years. The agreement also prohibited Iran from any activities that could contribute to the design or development of a nuclear weapon. If Iran violated any of these terms, the previous sanctions would be re-imposed immediately. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or The Iran Nuclear Deal, was one of the crowning achievements for both U.S. President Barack Obama and Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani. Both men faced high expectations and their share of skeptics over the deal. In the end, both men and their negotiating teams achieved their goals and avoided military conflict between the United States and Iran. The Analysis of Data chapter applied the four cases of non-power projecting state proliferation to the Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory’s two decisiontree heuristics to forecast the power-projecting states’ degree of threat perceived and the courses of action they were likely to take in response to the weaker state’s nuclear proliferation. The Heuristic for Threat Assessment Privileging Identity predicted the degree of perceived threat by using three interdependent questions to address 204 Genevieve

Abdo, “Green Movement 2.0? How U.S. Support Could Lead the Opposition to Victory,” Foreign Affairs, February 18, 2011, accessed January 23, 2014, http://www.foreignaffairs. com/articles/67458/geneive-abdo/green-movement-20. 205 Mousavian, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis, 4.

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perceptions derived from cognitive psychological stimuli to determine whether a power-projecting state perceives a non-power-projecting state to be a low or high threat to its national security. The Heuristic for the Proliferation Response forecasted the power-projecting state’s expected response to proliferation by using five questions to forecast whether the power-projecting state is likely to take no action, use coercive diplomacy or military force to respond to non-power-projecting state proliferation. In the four cases of Middle Eastern state nuclear proliferation, the United States and Israel had differing responses in all four cases of proliferation. The intent of this study was to determine the reasons for these divergences. Matthew Kroenig’s Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory served as the baseline theory to determine the causes of the differing responses because it acknowledges that proliferation has differing effects on different types of states. This study improved Kroenig’s theory by suggesting its own Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory to enhance Kroenig’s Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory by including state- and individual-level variables—cognitive psychological influences, national security policies and military capability—since these variables affect a state’s and its leader’s threat perceptions and their associated policy responses. The study’s theory maintained the system-level concept of power but refined Kroenig’s power projection definition to include airpower since it was the primary preventive war instrument utilized in two of the three cases in which force was used to attack the proliferating state. The study’s Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory accurately forecast the perceived threat and expected responses in all four case studies—Iraq in 1981 and 2003, and Syria in 2007, and Iran in 2015. Kroenig’s theory accurately forecast the perceived threat and expected proliferation responses in two of the cases for Israel— Iraq in 2003 and Syria in 2007. Kroenig’s accurate theoretical predictions in the two cases are by default rather than a convincing argument. Because his theory is powerbased, it postulates Israel should have been threatened only by Syrian proliferation but not the cases of Iraqi and Iranian proliferation. Israel used force against Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007, while taking no action against Iraq in 2003. Using Kroenig’s Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation theory, Israel should not have attacked Iraq in 1981, because it should not have felt threatened by Iraq’s proliferation efforts, but it should have attacked Syria in 2007 because it would be threatened by Syrian proliferation. Concurrently, the United States was expected to use force in all cases of rival state proliferation, but used force on just one occasion, against Iraq in 2003. Therefore, Kroenig’s theory correctly forecast the United States would use force against Iraq in 2003, and that Israel would use force against Syria in 2007, by default rather than through an established set of criteria. Furthermore, his theory’s prediction that Israel would not feel threatened by Iraqi proliferation does not account for Israel’s divergent responses to the two cases of Iraqi proliferation when it attacked Iraq in 1981, but took no action in 2003. Kroenig’s static prediction is that Israel would not be threatened by Iraqi proliferation because it is unable to project power over it through the employment of ground forces inside Iraqi territory. This assumption is falsified in the 1981 case, and correct by default in the 2003 case. His theory correctly predicts that Israel would feel threatened enough by Syrian proliferation that it would attack. In examining the U.S. and Israeli reactions and responses in the Iran

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case, Kroenig’s theory predicted Israel would take no action and the United States would attack. The study’s Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory forecast Israel would use force and the United States would pursue diplomacy. At the end of the study’s timeline in 2015, Israel took no action, but threatened the right to use force to disrupt Iran’s nuclear activities, and the United States used diplomacy and signed an international agreement with Iran. The importance of using the study’s individual-level analysis is demonstrated in the Iran case. Kroenig’s powerbased theory remains static. In the study’s Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory, individual analysis allows for a state’s changing perceptions and also takes into account the personalities and potential biases of decision-makers. In 2015, the Obama administration chose diplomacy and eased sanctions as an incentive to get Iran to curtail its nuclear program. Just three years later, the United States reversed course after a new administration took office and withdrew from the nuclear deal, re-imposed sanctions, and discussed attack options against Iran. Kroenig’s theory does not account for changes in a state’s leadership, political dynamics, popular sentiment, and how they may influence and shape perceptions and policies towards a proliferating state. Kroenig’s theory also lacks a human factor in its methodology, and thus does not allow for change. The study demonstrated the reasons for Israel’s and the U.S.’ divergent responses to the same cases of Middle Eastern state nuclear proliferation are largely based on their perceptions and interpretations of threats emanating from proliferating states. These perceptions are influenced by cognitive psychological stimuli that caused each country’s national leaders to view the various nuclear programs from a different Table 7.23 Israel—Threat Perceptions of Nuclear Proliferation Israel The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation

The Differential Effects of Threat Perception

Actual

IRAQ (1981)

Low

High

High

IRAQ (2003)

Low

Low

Low

SYRIA (2007)

High

High

High

IRAN (2015)

Low

High

High

Table 7.24 The United States—Threat Perceptions of Nuclear Proliferation The United States The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation

The Differential Effects of Threat Perception

Actual

IRAQ (1981)

High

Low

Low

IRAQ (2003)

High

High

High

SYRIA (2007)

High

Low

Low

IRAN (2015)

High

Low

Low

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Table 7.25 The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory (Kroenig)—Threat Assessment and Proliferation Response Israel Threat Assessment

U.S. Threat Assessment

Actual Threat Level

Israel Proliferation Response Forecast

U.S. Proliferation Response Forecast

Proliferation Response Actual

Iraq (1981)

Low

High

Israel – High U.S. – Low

Israel – No Action

U.S. – Force

Israel – Force U.S. – No Action

Iraq (2003)

Low

High

Israel – Low U.S. – High

Israel – No Action

U.S. – Force

Israel – No Action U.S. – Force

Syria (2007)

High

High

Israel – High U.S. – Low

Israel – Force U.S. – Force

Israel – Force U.S. – No Action

Iran (2015)

Low

High

Israel – High U.S. – Low

Israel – No Action

Israel – Threats U.S. – Diplomacy

U.S. – Force

Table 7.26 The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory (Chappell)—Threat Assessment and Proliferation Response Israel Threat Assessment

U.S. Threat Assessment

Actual Threat Level

Israel Proliferation Response Forecast

U.S. Proliferation Response Forecast

Iraq (1981)

High

Low

Israel – High U.S. – Low

Israel – Force U.S. – No Action

Israel – Force U.S. – No Action

Iraq (2003)

Low

High

Israel – Low U.S. – High

Israel – No Action

Israel – No Action U.S. – Force

Syria (2007)

High

Low

Israel – High U.S. – Low

Israel – Force U.S. – No Action

Israel – Force U.S. – No Action

Iran (2015)

High

Low

Israel – High U.S. – Low

Israel – Force U.S. – Diplomacy

Israel – Threats U.S. – Diplomacy

U.S. – Force

Proliferation Response Actual

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Table 7.27 The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory vs The Differential Effects of Threat Perception – Actual Outcome Accuracy The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory – Actual Outcome

The Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory – Actual Outcome

Iraq (1981)

Incorrect

Correct

Iraq (2003)

Correct

Correct

Syria (2007)

Correct

Correct

Iran (2015)

Incorrect

Correct

perspective than their power projecting state counterpart. These differing views led to the variations in threat perceptions and the divergent responses to the perceived threat. States that have the military capability to destroy a proliferating state’s nuclear facilities are more likely to choose coercive diplomacy when there is a low level of perceived threat. The study based the perception of threat on the speech patterns of the power-projecting states’ political leaders. The leaders’ statements contained historical analogies and key phrases that reflected their fears and beliefs about the proliferating state. The intensity of these leaders’ rhetoric provided insight into whether the powerful state had a sense of urgency in halting or degrading the proliferating state’s nuclear program. In the Iranian case, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argued that Iran was not close to having a nuclear device.206 President Obama also downplayed the Iranian threat and sought to contain Iran’s nuclear program while simultaneously imposing crippling sanctions in the midst of negotiating the nuclear deal. Neither President Obama nor Vice President Biden invoked the 9/11 analogy when discussing Iranian proliferation, which was a departure from President Bush and Vice President Cheney’s frequent reference of the September 11th attacks to frame the Iraq threat. Secondly, the Obama administration avoided the double-coded speeches and Biblical references employed by the Bush administration to frame Middle East threats as a universal struggle between good and evil. According to Professors Bruce Lincoln and David Domke, the Bush White House used Biblical allusions in some of President Bush’s speeches so faithful evangelical Christians would respond favorably to his message. Thus, in using key phrases such as “liberty and freedom” and “good versus evil,” Lincoln and Domke argued, Bush made himself a bridge between politics and religion for his evangelical base. This political base of evangelical Christians viewed events in the Middle East through a lens of Biblical prophecy and impending Armageddon.207 Israeli Prime Ministers Olmert and Netanyahu pursued a similar route and frequently referenced the Holocaust, and equated Iran with Nazi Germany and former Iranian President Ahmadinejad with Adolf Hitler. Former Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. David Ivry was the Israeli Air Force Commander when Israel attacked the Osirak reactor. During the planning phase of 206 Cordesman 207 Phillips,

and Toukan, “GCC—Iran: Operational Analysis of Air, SAM and TBM Forces,” 9. American Theocracy, 252.

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the operation, Ivry stated that he played on Prime Minister Begin’s Holocaust memories to encourage him to keep the pressure on Israeli ministers who were reluctant to strike Iraq. “I came up with the big image of the Holocaust and the children of Israel, and this was, in his [Begin] mind, the most critical issue—that Saddam Hussein is a guy who can use a bomb against Israel.”208 This analogical reasoning and use of mapping provides critical insight into the mindset of American and Israeli leaders, and provides indicators of possible future actions against Iran. The United States was able to take a more moderate and patient approach to nuclear proliferation because it was negotiating from a position of power and influence. With over 330 million citizens spread across a large geographical area and separated from its adversaries by two oceans, the United States is not as sensitive to potential threats or shifts in the regional power structure, as is Israel, with its small geographical size and highly concentrated population centers that are within range of its enemies’ ballistic missiles. In the study, Israel took a divergent approach from the United States in three of the four cases. The Israelis view regional nuclear weapons as existential threats and are less inclined and able to use coercive diplomacy as a proliferation policy because they are limited in doing so, plus these mechanisms take time to have an effect. In the Iran case, Prime Minister Netanyahu frequently argued the Iranians were buying time to enrich uranium, while pretending to negotiate, as they race toward a zone of immunity in which their nuclear quest would be irreversible. Netanyahu’s forboding position is partially due to the opening of the Fordow nuclear facility near the ancient city of Qom. The Fordow facility was designed for the higher-level uranium enrichment. Despite these facts, Israeli leaders’ vociferous statements about its enemies decrease the Jewish State’s political maneuverability because these statements evoke memories and images of the evils of the Holocaust. Once Prime Minister Netanyahu labeled President Ahmadinejad as Hitler, he limited his ability to negotiate with Iran while Ahmadinejad remained in office because he could never convince the Israeli public that they could trust a man its leaders had once equated with evil incarnate. Israel’s genocidal threat perceptions were also reflected in cabinet secretary Arie Naor’s statement, “the State of Israel would never allow an enemy country that aspires to destroy it to develop, manufacture or purchase weapons of mass destruction.”209 As a result of the intensity of Israel’s statements, it is extremely difficult to treat its rivals’ proliferation efforts as anything but a high threat. The United States and its leaders have traditionally avoided bellicosity in their strategic messaging. The Bush administration is the contemporary exception to this rule. Israeli rhetoric has shared similarities with that of its enemies with regard to posturing and warning of the destruction it will bring if its conditions are not met. The use of threatening language has cultural dimensions, particularly in a region in which there is suspicion of global powers and international institutions like the United Nations. American political rhetoric has more stoic and reserved undertones because, until the September 11th attacks, U.S. leaders did not have a significant national tragedy with which to incite nationalist fervor to rally the population against 208 Patrick Tyler, Fortress Israel: The Inside Story of the Military Elite Who Run the Country and Why They Can’t Make Peace (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012), 288. 209 Nili, “The Nuclear (and the) Holocaust,” 41.

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an external threat to the degree the Israelis have used the fears generated by use of the Holocaust analogy. Several stimuli influence a powerful state’s threat perceptions and contribute to the determination of a rival state as a low threat. States that do not have a recent history of direct military conflict or threatening rhetoric are less inclined to perceive a rival state’s actions as threatening. In the Syria case study, the United States and Syria engaged in limited scope hostilities prior to discovery of the Al-Kibar reactor. Consequently, the Bush administration was less inclined to perceive the reactor as a direct threat to the United States or its national security interests. Additionally, the Syrians had neither a credible delivery system nor a robust air defense system to defend its nuclear reactor. Essentially, the Syrians were attempting to build a bullet without having a gun to fire it, therefore the threat was negligible. President Bush also faced few military options because his ability to justify another preventive war in the shadow of the failed search for Iraq’s WMD was non-existent. Second, if the powerful state perceives the weaker state’s proliferation actions are not a direct threat to its national security it is also likely to perceive the actions as a low threat. In the 1981 Iraq case, the United States estimated it would take the Iraqis 10–30 years to construct a nuclear weapon using the Osirak test design reactors. The amount of time it would take Iraq to develop a nuclear breakout capability lessened the perceived threat to the United States. Furthermore, as with Syria, Iraq did not have a nuclear warhead design nor a reliable delivery system to present a credible threat to the United States homeland. Israel’s position was different in that it falls within range of Iraqi, Syrian, and Iranian ballistic missiles. Israel has also expressed concerns that Iran, Iraq and Syria could provide a terrorist organization with a nuclear device and that these groups could then infiltrate the device into Israel by land or sea. This scenario is highly unlikely because none of the three case study countries had a nuclear weapon to give to a terrorist group, nor would it be logical for a state to transfer a nuclear weapon to a group over which it has little to no ability to control. Furthermore, any use of a nuclear weapon would ultimately be traced back to its country of origin, which would face devastating retaliation. The powerful state is likely to choose coercive diplomacy if its national security policies advocate the use of sanctions to alter a rival state’s behavior. The United States wields considerable power and relies on UN Security Council resolutions to address Iranian proliferation rather than seeking a military solution. The United States’ intelligence collection apparatus also allows it to collect intelligence on rival nuclear programs therefore; it is better able to discern facts from the biases inherent in human perceptions. Coercive diplomacy is also the mechanism of choice when the military option is not feasible in dismantling a nuclear program as in the cases of North Korea and Pakistan. Israel lacks the political influence within the United Nations to target its rivals with UN Security Council resolutions without American sponsorship. Furthermore, Israel lacks the economic clout to impose crippling economic sanctions against its Arab and Iranian rivals since there is little to no trade between Israel and the rival proliferating states. Powerful states that have the military capability to destroy a proliferating state’s nuclear facilities use military force when the nuclear program is perceived to be a

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high threat. Several interrelated factors influence this determination. If the power projecting state possesses the capability to project enough force to destroy the rival state’s nuclear infrastructure and has a successful history of using preventive war, it is more inclined to attack the rival state. Israel has used airpower as a counterproliferation instrument to disrupt nuclear programs in Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007. The 1981 Iraq case was a successful preventive airstrike to destroy a nuclear complex. This success contributed to Israel’s ability to conduct a second attack against Syria nearly 26 years later. This history of success may compel Israel to push forward with prudent planning for an attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities, with or without U.S. assistance. The U.S.’ preventive war experience is markedly different and demonstrates how success and failure can influence a powerful state’s counterproliferation strategy. The Bush administration’s failure to locate weapons of mass destruction in Iraq influenced its decision to deny the Israeli request for it to bomb Syria’s nuclear reactor in 2007. It also influenced the Obama administration’s continuance of P5+1 negotiations coupled with sanctions in the 2015 Iran case, particularly since President Obama was elected while campaigning on a platform of opposing the Iraq War from the onset. The power-projecting state’s national security policies also determine whether the state will use force against emerging nuclear threats. Israel’s defense policy stipulates that it reserves the right to use force to prevent any rival state from acquiring a nuclear weapon. In the four case studies, Israel has twice used preventive attacks and lobbied to use force against Iran, in the third case. In the single case that it did not take action against a suspected proliferating state, there is indication the Israelis knew that Iraq (2003) did not possess weapons of mass destruction, therefore Iraq posed a low threat to Israel. In the three cases in which the United States did not use or recommend force, its National Security Strategy promoted a multilateral approach and coercive diplomacy to address nuclear proliferation. The Iraq 2003 case is the sole occasion in which the United States used military force to halt a suspected nuclear program. In this instance, the 2002 National Security Strategy advocated the use of unilateral preventive war against emerging threats. The 2006 National Security Strategy returned the United States to multilateralism and coercive diplomacy, and this contributed to the Bush administration’s decision not to bomb Syria’s Al-Kibar reactor in 2007, because preventive war was not supported by national policy nor would it have been supported by the American public and Congress. A power projecting state may also attack a proliferating state when it feels the rival has crossed an established redline. Israel’s long-established redline is that it reserves the right to attack all regional nuclear programs because they are perceived as existential threats. The United States has avoided establishing redlines because of the difficulty of convincing Congress and the American public of the necessity of preventive war, particularly if the United States has not been attacked or does not face an immediate and direct threat to its national security interests. Powerful states turn to military force to prevent nuclear proliferation when they perceive their interests are at risk. Small and closely situated states perceive a higher degree of threat than distant and larger states because of their concentrated population centers and the proximity to the threat means decreased warning times, which puts their existence at risk. This physical and geographical disparity also accounts for the variations in United States and Israeli threat perceptions.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

This book explored the role of threat perceptions and their influence on state responses to nuclear proliferation by conducting a comparative analysis of the United States and Israel’s proliferation responses to four case studies of suspected nuclear proliferation by Middle East countries: Iraq (1981 and 2003), Syria (2007), and Iran (2015). The study found cognitive psychological influences, to include national tragedies like the September 11th attacks and the Holocaust, and a history of armed conflict increased the threat perceptions of a powerful state’s foreign policy decision-makers when they confronted a state seeking to challenge the existing power structure by acquiring a nuclear weapon. The powerful state’s degree of perceived threat, national security policies, and military power projection capabilities then influenced the subsequent response to nuclear proliferation. The significant findings of this study highlight the importance of incorporating state- and individual-level analysis into existing nuclear proliferation literature to provide a more robust understanding of proliferation’s effects on similarly situated states and their foreign policy decision-makers. The study used its Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory to determine that the intensity level of a state’s threat perceptions, combined with its national security policies, airpower projection capabilities, and the degree of public support, were the determining factors that contributed to similiarly situated states having divergent responses to the same cases of nuclear proliferation. Chapter 1 introduced the study’s focus to determine when and why do states that have the military capability to use force to disrupt or destroy a proliferating state’s nuclear facilities choose to take no action, use military force, or purse coercive diplomacy. The chapter’s initial discussion addressed contemporary fears of rogue state proliferation and nuclear terrorism by providing a synopsis of current proliferation challenges in North Korea, India-Pakistan, and Iran, and the illicit trafficking in nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology. The chapter then outlined how powerful states have been inconsistent in their responses to attempted proliferation by non-nuclear-weapons states. The current literature provides an inadequate explanation for these variations. The study then discussed how the United States and Israel © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 B. K. Chappell, State Responses to Nuclear Proliferation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59801-3_8

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are the two most vocal opponents of further nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, yet have responded differently to the same cases of proliferation by Iraq in 1981, Iraq in 2003, Syria in 2007, and Iran in 2015. In the three cases of Iraq and Syria, either the United States or Israel attacked the proliferating country, while the other state either took no action or used coercive diplomacy as a proliferation response. In the case of Iran, the United States brokered an international nuclear agreement, while Israel criticized the deal and continued to threaten unilateral military action against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. The chapter outlined how the study improved on Matthew Kroenig’s Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory by adjusting the level of analysis and modifying his definition of power projection. Kroenig’s theory posits proliferation has differing effects on states depending on their previous ability to project power over the proliferating state. He divides the world into three types of states: Global Powers, Local Powers, and Non-Power-Projecting states. The study’s Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory enhanced Kroenig’s approach by incorporating state- and individual-level variables to complement his power-based system-level analysis, and modified his power projection definition to include airpower, which also allowed the study to account for the power projection disparities between global and local powers and their ability to disrupt the proliferation efforts of an opposing state. Kroenig’s power projection definition was scoped to the “ability to fight a full-scale, conventional, military, ground war on the territory of a potential target state,” and the “ability to bomb a state alone without a corresponding ability to put boots on the ground in that state’s territory is not a sufficient power projection capability.” When examining the causal effects of proliferation, using Kroenig’s theory of power projection, Israel should not have been affected by Iranian and Iraqi proliferation because it cannot fight a conventional ground war inside either state’s territory and the United States should have been effected by all cases of proliferation because it can conduct a conventional ground war inside the territory of all the case study countries. The actual outcomes of the case studies illustrate that a state can be affected by nuclear proliferation even if it cannot conduct large-scale ground operations inside the state. Conversely, a state may not be affected by an opposing state’s proliferation efforts even if it can conduct ground operations inside the state’s territory. The study then examined the impact of cognitive psychological influences, national security policies, and power projection capabilities on a powerful state’s perception of proliferation. These influences contributed to the state’s threat perceptions and influenced their proliferation responses to nuclear proliferation by the case study countries. Chapter 2 surveyed the nuclear proliferation literature and discussed Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Motivations, the Proliferation Management debates, Kroenig’s Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory, and Political Psychology literature. Early proliferation literature focused on the utility of nuclear weapons, the consequences of their possession, and whether they contributed to stability during the Cold War. The discussion shifted to Albert Wohlstetter’s “Balance of Terror” concept in which the United States and Soviet Union had the ability to inflict unimaginable destruction on one another; however, nuclear weapons were not effective at preventing limited wars, the accidental outbreak of wars, or protecting major

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population centers. Instead, Wohlstetter argued deterrence could be maintained by having enough nuclear weapons survive an adversary’s first strike to have a reliable second-strike capability to retaliate. The discussion shifted to nuclear parity and the efficacy of nuclear deterrence theories and policies, such as Assured Destruction, Damage Limitation, Mutual Assured Destruction, Massive Retaliation, and Flexible Response, before focusing on arsenal size and arms control agreements. The chapter next discussed nuclear motivations to examine why states pursue nuclear weapons, with reasons ranging from security against foreign threats, to aggressive intentions, to gaining an important status symbol of a state’s modernity and importance on the world stage. The literature review next examined the spread of nuclear weapons and the Proliferation Management debates—Optimists (Waltz) versus Pessimists (Sagan)— and discussed their strengths and weaknesses. The study found the proliferation management debates’ system-level analysis to be insufficient for determining the reasons for the divergent responses of two powerful states who share similar proliferation policy end-states to disrupt the nuclear proliferation efforts of adversarial states. The study found Matthew Kroenig’s Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory to be effective in identifying proliferation’s varying effects on individual states, which is the focus of the study, as opposed to the proliferation literature’s traditional approach that aggregates proliferation’s effects on states. For Kroenig, the threat posed by nuclear proliferation depends on a threatened state’s ability to project military power over the target state, and he surmises this is the reason for proliferation’s differing effects. Kroenig’s theory addressed proliferation’s varying effects on his three categories of states; however, his theory was hindered by its adherence to power as the sole determinant of how a state is affected by proliferation. His approach falters because he attempts to use a system-level variable to diagnose a state-level issue. Kroenig’s theory utilizes a very strict interpretation of power projection and limits it to the ability to conduct a ground war inside a target country. Therefore, Kroenig’s theory has limited applicability due to the number of cases it can handle. The study enhanced his theory of the Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation to create its own theory by expanding his definition of power to include airpower and incorporating state-and individual-level of analyses by adding the critical variable of cognitive psychological influences on a state’s national psyche and its decision-makers. The study suggests its Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory is better situated to explain why similarly aligned states have divergent responses to the same case of nuclear proliferation. In examining the cognitive psychological influences, the literature review also discussed political psychology’s argument that decision-makers’ beliefs about the world and images of others influence the state’s decisions and policies. Political psychology emphasizes how psychological reactions to external threats differ, and that threats motivate protective behaviors and support for aggressive foreign policies. Similarly, nations that have experienced significant national tragedies are predisposed to perceiving an adversary’s actions as a threat to their security. These findings were crucial to understanding the influence the Holocaust has on Israel’s threat perceptions and its foreign policy decision-making process, though it is not the only influence. Israel’s physical geography and proximity to its adversaries, its adverary’s rhetoric

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and actions, its clustered population centers, history of anti-Semitic religious persecution, and geographical ambitions also play a significant role in its foreign policy decision-making and how it perceives and responds to threats. Israel is a geographically small country with several population centers, so it cannot conduct in-depth defense fighting inside its territory. A majority of its population could hypothetically be destroyed by several nuclear weapon strikes. Israel is also in a region in which it has engaged in combat operations against a majority of its neighbors over the past seven decades. It is also suggested that Israel’s continued expansion and annexation of Palestinian and Syrian territories play a role in its foreign policy decisions. Similarly, the United States used the September 11th analogy to inflate threaten perceptions and justify its invasion of Iraq even though there was no intelligence corroborating the Bush administration’s veiled suggestion of a potential Iraq-al-Qaida connection. Unlike Israel, the United States is a geographically large nation with numerous population centers and two oceans separating it from its adversaries, allowing it to have early warning of any conventional or impending nuclear attack against it. As a physically large power, the United States is more able to absorb a limited nuclear attack than is Israel. The study also illustrated how national leaders use analogies and rhetoric to frame an adversary and the perceived threat they pose, thereby limiting political maneuverability and inadvertently pushing a state toward war. As an example, the study illustrated the point that it is much more difficult to negotiate with a state or a leader one has labeled “Nazi Germany,” “The Butcher of Baghdad,” “The Great Satan,” or “Hitler,” than it is with a state or leader with whom one shares diplomatic relations. The literature review illuminated the importance of historical relations and perceptions of a rival state. States that have a history of conflict may continue the ethos of hostile relations and this can influence current attitudes toward a rival state. The study’s Chapter 3 outlined the cognitive psychological influences that affect decision-makers, and shape the dominant state’s threat perceptions and their proliferation responses. The research examined decision-makers’ perceptions of whether cognitive processes contribute to misperceptions of an adversary, resulting in threat inflation and overreach by the dominant state. Research suggests cognitive processes such as distorted perceptions and selective inattention contribute to misperceptions, and these sources of misperception can further the understanding of the policymaking process.1 The study argued that in portraying adversaries as impossible to deter or irrevocably hostile, cognitive psychological influences prejudice how possible changes to the status quo are perceived and processed by the state. In the international system, horizontal proliferation is perceived as more threatening to the existing power structure than vertical proliferation because in horizontal proliferation non-nuclear states acquire a new nuclear capability that allows them to deter and potentially challenge existing nuclear powers. In contrast, vertical proliferation refers to states that already possess nuclear weapons increasing their arsenals or developing new types of weapons.2 The chapter discussed how the use of historical 1 Kaplowitz, 2 Sidel

“National Self-Images, Perception of Enemies, and Conflict Strategies,” 56. and Levy, “Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” 1589.

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analogies by some Israeli leaders is often rigid, and that it requires flexibility because new issues are often mapped using the same memories, thus locking the state into a cyclical psychological construct that prevents acknowledgment of the need for a more adaptive response, which may in turn drive a different threat perception and proliferation response. The chapter also discussed how variations in a state’s threat perception and responses are attributable to cognitive psychological influences on the state’s national actors and decision-makers. The research suggests Israel continues to link the Holocaust to emerging threats as justification for an aggressive foreign policy, and the September 11th attacks impacted the United States’ traditional use of multilateralism and coercive diplomacy because of the Bush administration’s linkage of the national tragedy to a perceived, but nonexistent threat from Iraq. In both cases, the two power-projecting states used analogies to illustrate a perceived nexus between past and current threats to justify the use of force against the target countries. Chapter 4 discussed U.S. and Israeli national security policy and how it provides the structural framework for protecting their citizens and national security interests. The chapter also discussed U.S. nuclear policy and the governing strategy under which nuclear weapons could be employed. The chapter examined each state’s commitment to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and noted that the United States is a signatory to the agreement, while Israel is not a signatory. The chapter highlighted the regional perceptions of a double standard that Israel, though it is not a signature to the NPT, it is a vocal critical of any Middle Eastern state that has nuclear ambitions and has employed both covert and overt means to disrupt the nuclear ambitions of its neighboring states. The purpose of this chapter was to provide insight into how each state’s policies contribute to their proliferation responses by illustrating the frameworks each state uses to respond to and address challenges to their security. The study’s Chapter 5 examined the military doctrine and power projection capabilities of the United States and Israel. The study noted Matthew Kroenig’s Differential Effects of Proliferation theory defines power projection as a state’s “ability to fight a full-scale, conventional, military, ground war on the territory of a potential target state,” and argues the “ability to bomb a state alone without a corresponding ability to put boots on the ground in that state’s territory is not a sufficient power projection capability.”3 This study argued Kroenig’s definition of power projection is outdated and overly restrictive. Airpower has become the more dominant power projection instrument, particularly as a counterproliferation instrument, because of its flexibility and ability to strike deep inside enemy territory without the need for extensive logistical coordination or warning. This is particularly relevant if the targets are a dispersed groups of hardened and buried nuclear facilities across a large swath of territory. Chapter 6 sought to provide balance to the study by examining the target states’ threat perceptions and how these perceptions may have influenced their decisions to seek a nuclear weapon. The study argues adversarial rhetoric has a cognitive influence on the power-projecting state and the target state’s decision-makers’ threat 3 Kroenig,

“Beyond Optimism and Pessimism,” 5.

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perceptions. These adversaries exchange bellicose rhetoric that can contribute to inflated threat perceptions, especially if the two states have a prior history of conflict or if the rising state’s acquisition of a nuclear deterrent will allow it to challenge the existing regional power structure. When a state already in possession of nuclear weapons threatens a non-nuclear state with attack or regime change, it can elevate threat perceptions and may compel the target state to seek a nuclear deterrent against the threatening state to forestall its military defeat or a change in its system of governance. This chapter examined how the foreign policy decisions and rhetoric of powerful states contributed to the heightened threat perceptions of Iran, Iraq, and Syria to balance the study’s approach to understanding the influences that contribute to threat perceptions by examining the motivations of the proliferating state, thereby providing a more robust understanding of the differential effects of threat perceptions. The study also examined the U.S. and Israeli relationship and discussed the strong relationship between the two countries, including: strategic geography, support for a westernized democracy, and the influences of lobby groups and Evangelical Christians. The study’s Chapter 7 outlined the research design and methodology by explaining the study’s enhanced Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory and its application to the four case studies. The chapter discussed the two decision-tree heuristics used to examine eight interrelated questions to demonstrate how the additional state-and individual-level variables accounted for the United States and Israel’s differing perceptions and responses. The decision-tree heuristics allow for the integration of system-level (power), state-level (national security policy and military power projection capability), and individual-level variables (cognitive psychological influences). In turn, heuristics illustrated the logical path of how a powerful state perceives a weaker state’s proliferation as either a high or a low threat. The heuristic also illuminated influences that determine whether the powerful state will take no action, use coercive diplomacy or military force as a response to proliferation. The study illustrated how the Holocaust and the historical persecution of the Jewish people, Israel’s small geographic size, and the hostility of its neighbors predispose Israel toward a more aggressive foreign policy when dealing with perceived threats. The weakness of this approach is that Israel’s unilateral use of force further isolates it from the international community, thereby minimizing its ability to form international coalitions and take a multilateral approach to address violations of the international rule of law. Furthermore, the fact that Israel has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has a deleterious effect on its ability to use diplomatic channels, outside of U.S. sponsorship, to enforce Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty compliance. Historically, the United States has used multilateralism to address perceived nuclear threats. Although military leaders discussed preventive war against the Soviet Union and China during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, the United States traditionally uses the carrot and stick approach of coercive diplomacy combined with the threat of force to address states deemed not to be in compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. After the September 11th attacks, the United States experienced a surge of nationalism and instituted a more aggressive

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foreign policy, as illuminated by political psychologists. The trauma created by the 9/11 attacks heightened U.S. threat perceptions and triggered the transition from twelve years of coercive diplomacy directed at Iraq to a preventive war in 2003. The nation was hurting and America’s leaders felt the need to strike back to demonstrate to the world that the United States possessed unmatched power and would not retreat in the face of tragedy. The study also examined the national security policies of the United States and Israel. It revealed that states that have policies advocating preventive war would likely exercise this option when it perceives an existential threat. Israel has a standing policy that it will not allow a Middle Eastern state to acquire a nuclear weapon. Consequently, it unilaterally attacked Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007, to destroy their nuclear reactors. Israel has threatened to do the same with Iran’s more dispersed and advanced nuclear program, though Iran can inflict asymmetric pain on Israel through its proxies and ballistic missile arsenal. The United States has traditionally eschewed preventive war, as articulated by President Truman; however, the George W. Bush administration asserted its right to wage preventive war in its 2002 National Security Strategy. Less than a year after its promulgation, the United States attacked Iraq to destroy its suspected weapons of mass destruction program. After the failed WMD search, the Bush administration released its 2006 National Security Strategy, which returned the United States to its traditional preference for multilateralism and diplomacy. Consequently, in the latter cases of Syria 2007 and Iran 2015, the United States resisted Israeli requests for U.S. military action, and instead promoted the use of coercive diplomacy, backed by the threat of force, as a proliferation policy. This study concludes that threat perceptions play a significant role in state responses to nuclear proliferation, and cognitive psychological influences and a history of armed conflict influence these perceptions and shape the powerful state’s and the target state’s foreign policy calculus and how each responds to the perceived threat. The findings of this study highlight the importance of incorporating different levels of analysis across the spectrum to provide a thorough understanding of proliferation’s effects on the international system and regional power structure. The study found that differing degrees of threat perceptions account for why states that have the ability to disrupt or destroy a proliferating state’s nuclear facilities choose to take no action, use military force, or pursue diplomacy. The study also found the powerprojecting state’s national security policy, power projection capability, and degree of public support influenced its proliferation response.

Implications The initial assumption while gathering research material was that Israel would be more likely to attack proliferating states than the United States because they are differently situated states with differing security challenges. Israel is small in size and is in close proximity to adversarial neighbors who harbor mixed emotions about its existence, dating to its founding. Israel has a very special relationship with the

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United States, and currently possesses an unrivaled conventional military advantage over its adversaries and the acquisition of a nuclear weapon by any of these states would dramatically alter the regional power structure. Though there are perceptions that Israel is under a constant threat of attack from hostile neighbors, these neighbors currently lack the capacity to inflict serious damage on Israel. It is questionable that they pose an existential threat to Israel because they lack nuclear weapons to destroy or inflict serious damage on it, and cannot challenge Israel at a conventional military level. With the notable exception of Hezbollah, during the 2006 Second Lebanon War, Israeli forces have soundly defeated every Arab army they have faced over the past seventy years. The United States was expected to be less likely to attack proliferating states because it is geographically separated from its adversaries and retains a large nuclear deterrent force with a secure second-strike capability, which dissuades many of its adversaries from challenging it with conventional forces. This conventional dominance has not prevented insurgent and asymmetric threats in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Vietnam, and non-state actors such as al Qaeda from challenging traditional U.S. military dominance. It was assumed that Matthew Kroenig’s theory would provide an accurate illustration of the United States and Israel’s differing responses to the same proliferation cases. This assumption was proven in only two—Iraq 2003 and Syria 2007—of the four cases. The study illustrated that the determinants for the differing responses were not found at the international system level, which indicated a need to utilize a different analysis level to determine when and why a state chooses to attack a state that has not directly attacked it, but is pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. This book provides state- and individual-level indicators that political scientists should incorporate into future research. This is not meant to exclude international system-level analysis, but rather to complement it with a full-spectrum analysis that is designed to explain differing responses by individual states. The implication of this study is that the use of state-and invidual-level analysis provides additional insight into foreign policy decision-making by including the human factor and their biases. These indicators will allow scholars to forecast how a state perceives a threat and whether it interprets it as a low or high threat to its national security. The use of these additional levels of analysis also provides insight into when a powerful state will likely transition from coercive diplomacy to war. The importance of this determination may provide differing conflict resolution avenues and prevent a spiraling of hostilities due to decisions made in an emotionally charged environment, mainly when perceived threats are linked to a national tragedy such as the Holocaust and the September 11th attacks. Traditional power-based theories do not account for changes in a state’s leadership, political dynamics, popular sentiment nor do they account for similar changes in the target state. The study’s Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory provides a more rigorous examination of the influences that contribute to a state’s threat perceptions and Foreign Policy Decision-Making process.

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Recommendations for Further Study This book listed two contemporary fears of the international community, rogue state proliferation, and nuclear terrorism, and harnessed these concerns to explore why similarly aligned powerful states have responded differently to the same proliferation cases. The case studies chosen are countries that many consider to be states of concern—Iran, Iraq, and Syria. In determining explanations for the differing responses to the same cases of proliferation, the study found threat perceptions played a significant role in how a state’s proliferation efforts are interpreted and perceived by a more powerful state. A recommendation for further study would be to apply the Differential Effects of Threat Perception Theory to the same proliferation case, such as Iran, but apply it across two different administrations of the power-projecting country to determine if there are drastic changes within the same state’s threat perceptions in relation to a change in leadership and decision-makers. An additional area of study is the idea of nuclear terrorism. Policymakers, worldwide, have warned of the dangers of nuclear terrorism and the possibility of a custody transfer of a nuclear weapon from a rogue state to a terrorist organization. A future study could examine the feasibility of this transfer and assess whether a loose nuke scenario is more plausible. A direct state to terrorist transer of custody would place the originating state at high risk of a nuclear counterstrike or a devastating conventional attack with crippling sanctions imposed, at a minimum. Nuclear weapons are extremely expensive to develop and are a risky venture to undertake due to the potential for economic sanctions, political isolation, or a preventive strike by a power-projecting state, which are reasons why there are fewer than ten nuclear states. Nuclear weapons provide a layer of safety against regime change or the destruction of a state by external forces, but their usability is arguable. The use of just one nuclear weapon during a conflict places that state at risk of complete destruction in a nuclear counterattack. It is not clear why a state would forfeit its nucler deterrent by providing a nuclear device to a terrorist organization, which would then open the state up to a nuclear retaliatory strike. The author also recommends proliferation scholars explore the consequences of a cyberattack against a nuclear weapon launch facility that has the potential for either an unauthorized launch or a denial of service during a nuclear crisis. The more immediate area of study to be pursued would be to examine the potential response options of a state to an inadvertent nuclear detonation or accidental nuclear yield within its territory. Because some states lack an adequate early warning capability and Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS), it would be difficult for the state to discern if the nuclear detonation within its territory was from its own stockpile or if it originated from an adversary’s territory. The speed and accuracy at which this is determined and then passed to decision-makers is paramount. In states without a second-strike capability, their nuclear option is primarily limited to a use it or lose it situation. Simply put, the state has the option to either immediately use its nuclear arsenal in an attempt to destroy its enemy, or it risk being destroyed through inaction or delay, if the enemy launches a decapitating strike. This presents an extreme danger with neighboring nuclear rivals, who already distrust one another,

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because the missile flight and response times are minimal, leaving little time for leaders to discuss the origin of the attack and de-escalate tensions. The contemporary concerns with nuclear terrorism share importance with the continued viability of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. As additional countries skirt the nuclear nonproliferation regime and pursue nuclear weapons, become nuclear hedgers, develop a nuclear breakout capability, or maintain a lack of nuclear transparency, the global community must decide if it can and will reinforce the tenets of the nonproliferation regime. There are flaws within the nonproliferation regime that need to be addressed. In an article for U.S. News & World Report, Thomas Omestad discusses the potential breakdown of the regime and how it could affect world safety.4 The study of the potential breakdown of the nuclear non-proliferation regime is worthy of additional research.

4 Thomas

Omestad, “Nuclear Weapons for All? The Risks of a New Scramble for the Bomb,” U.S. News & World Report, January 15, 2009, accessed June 1, 2020, https://www.usnews.com/news/ world/articles/2009/01/15/nuclear-weapons-for-all-the-risks-of-a-new-scramble-for-the-bomb.

Appendices

Appendix A: Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)1 The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Parties to the Treaty. Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples. Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war. In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities. Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points. Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclearweapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States. Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to

1 United

Nations, “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.”

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 B. K. Chappell, State Responses to Nuclear Proliferation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59801-3

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contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament. Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective. Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end. Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources. Have agreed as follows:

Article I Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

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Article III 1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere. 2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article. 3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty. 4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations. Article IV 1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

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2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. Article V Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a nondiscriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

Article VI Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Article VII Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

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Article VIII 1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment. 2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment. 3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty. Article IX 1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time. 2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments. 3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.

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4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession. 5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices. 6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Article X 1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. 2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty 1. Article XI This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish, and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty. DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.

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Appendix B: United Nations Security Council Resolutions Iraq2 2002 RESOLUTION 1441: Finding Iraq in material breach of UN resolutions. 1999 RESOLUTION 1284: Created the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspections Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace previous weapon inspection team (UNSCOM). Iraq must allow UNMOVIC “immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access” to Iraqi officials and facilities.3 1998 RESOLUTION 1205: “Condemns the decision by Iraq of October 31, 1998 to cease cooperation” with UN inspectors as “a flagrant violation” of UNSCR 687 and other resolutions. Iraq must provide “immediate, complete and unconditional cooperation” with UN and IAEA inspectors.4 RESOLUTION 1194: Condemns Iraq decision to suspend cooperation with UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency. RESOLUTION 1154: Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access, and notes that any violation would have the “severest consequences for Iraq.”5 1997 RESOLUTION 1137: Condemns Iraqi restrictions on access by UNSCOM. RESOLUTION 1134: Condemns refusal of Iraq to allow access to certain sites specified by UNSCOM, decides this constitutes a flagrant violation of UNSC Resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991), 715 (1991), and 1060 (1996). RESOLUTION 1115: Condemns refusal of Iraq to allow access to certain sites specified by UNSCOM, decides this constitutes a flagrant violation of UNSC Resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991), 715 (1991), and 1060 (1996). 1996 RESOLUTION 1060: Condemns refusal of Iraq to allow access to certain sites specified by UNSCOM, decides this constitutes a flagrant violation of UNSC Resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991), and 715 (1991). RESOLUTION 1051: Approves provisions for the mechanism for monitoring Iraqi imports and exports, pursuant to UNSC Resolution 715. 1994 RESOLUTION 949: Iraq must fully comply with UN weapons inspectors.6 1991 RESOLUTION 715: Approves the plan of the UN Secretary General and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for future ongoing monitoring and verification.

2 “Security

Council Resolutions on Iraq,” Federation of American Scientists, last modified June 9, 2003, accessed December 19, 2013, http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres. 3 George W. Bush, “Saddam’s Defiance of United Nations Resolutions,” The White House, accessed December 19, 2013, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/iraq/decade/sect2.html. 4 Bush, “Saddam’s Defiance of United Nations Resolutions.” 5 Bush, “Saddam’s Defiance of United Nations Resolutions.” 6 Bush, “Saddam’s Defiance of United Nations Resolutions.”

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RESOLUTION 707: Demands Iraq provide full, final and complete disclosure, as required by UNSCR 687, of all aspects of its WMD programs and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers. RESOLUTION 699: Confirms that the Special Commission and the IAEA have the authority to conduct activities under UNSCR 687, for the purpose of the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of the items specified in UNSCR 687. RESOLUTION 687: Decides that as a condition of a cease-fire, Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of all nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities, as well as all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers and related major parts, and repair and production facilities, and that a Special Commission (UNSCOM) shall carry out on-site inspection of any location in Iraq. Iran7 2015 RESOLUTION 2231: Endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. This resolution provides for the termination of the provisions of previous Security Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issues and establishes specific restrictions that apply to all States without exception.8 2012 RESOLUTION 2049: Extends until July 9, 2013 the mandate of the Panel of Experts, as specified in paragraph 29 of UNSC Resolution 1929 (2010), expresses its intent to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding further extension, and requests the Secretary General to take the necessary administrative measures to this effect. 2011 RESOLUTION 1984: Extends the mandate of the Panel of Experts (set forth by UNSC Resolution 1929) for one year. The body is responsible for assisting in monitoring state adherence to sanctions against Iran due to its nuclear activities.9 2010 RESOLUTION 1929: Restates the Security Council’s longstanding demand that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment program and other proscribed 7 “Nuclear

Iran: United Nations Security Council Resolutions,” Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), accessed December 19, 2013, http://www.isisnucleariran.org/ documents/unscr/. 8 United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 2231 (2015) on Iran Nuclear Issue Background,” United Nations, accessed July 12, 2020, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/2231/backgr ound. 9 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “United Nations Security Council,” NTI, accessed December 19, 2013, http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/un-security-council/.

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nuclear activities.10 Required U.N. member states to prevent the transfer of missile-related technology to Iran. It prohibited Iran from acquiring commercial interest in uranium mining or producing nuclear materials in other countries. It enhanced previous travel sanctions by requiring states to prevent designated individuals from entering their territories, and calls on states to inspect ships bound to or from Iran if they suspect banned cargo is aboard. The resolution especially targeted the Revolutionary Guards and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), a state-owned shipping conglomerate that was allegedly involved in transporting items related to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile development. It called on the international community to refuse financial and insurance services to both the IRGC and IRISL. Finally, it urged member states to ban new branches of all Iranian banks in their countries and prevent financial institutions operating in their territories from doing business in Iran.11 2008 RESOLUTION 1835: Reaffirms the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of March 29, 2006, and UNSC Resolution 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008). Calls upon Iran to comply fully and immediately with its obligations under the above-mentioned resolutions of the Security Council, and to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors. RESOLUTION 1803: Reaffirms resolutions 1747, 1737, and 1696 in calling for a suspension of Iran’s uranium enrichment. Also acting under Article 41, it calls for “vigilance and restraint” regarding the transit of individuals associated with Iran’s nuclear program and other designated entities. Calls for vigilance in entering into new commitments for trade with Iran, export credits, guarantees, insurance, etc. Calls upon states to exercise vigilance over the activities of banks domiciled in Iran, in particular Bank Melli and Bank Saderat. Calls for cargo inspections of aircraft and vessels, traveling to and from Iran, owned by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line, provided there are reasonable grounds to believe it is carrying goods prohibited under this or previous resolutions. Reiterates the willingness of the Perm-5 to engage in diplomatic discussions aimed at ending the issue provided Iran suspends enrichment. Expands the number of individuals subject to travel restrictions and asset bans to a total of 30. 2007 RESOLUTION 1747: Acting under Article 41 of the UN Charter’s Chapter VII, adds incrementally to the provisions of UNSCR 1737. UNSC 1747 imposes a ban on military exports by Iran. Calls on states to exercise “vigilance and restraint” in exporting military equipment to Iran. Calls on states not to enter into “new commitments for grants, financial assistance, and concessional 10 “Fact Sheet on the New UN Security Council Sanctions on Iran,” The White House, June 9, 2010,

accessed December 19, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/fact-sheet-new-un-sec urity-council-sanctionssanctions-iran. 11 Jason Starr, “The UN Resolutions,” The Iran Primer, accessed December 19, 2013, http://iranpr imer.usip.org/resource/un-resolutions.

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loans” to the government of Iran. Expands the entities and people named in the Annex to include an additional 10 entities and eight individuals involved in nuclear and/or ballistic missile work; and designates three Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps entities and seven IRGC individuals. It also names Bank Sepah, reportedly Iran’s fourth largest, as an entity affiliated to the IRGC and thereby subject to the financial restrictions outlined in the resolution. 2006 RESOLUTION 1737: Demands that Iran suspend uranium enrichment. It also bans exports to Iran of items on Part B of the Nuclear Suppliers Group trigger list (with the exception of equipment for the light water reactor at Bushehr), bans technical cooperation related to its nuclear program (except where the IAEA deems such cooperation necessary for humanitarian or medical purposes), calls on states to deny transit (“exercise vigilance regarding the entry into or transit through…”) to people associated with the nuclear or missile programs. It freezes the funds of people and entities designated by the UNSC as involved in “proliferation sensitive activity.” An Annex attached to the resolution names 12 individuals said to be associated with Iran’s nuclear and/or ballistic missile programs and 10 entities involved with the nuclear/missile program. RESOLUTION 1696: Acting under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, calls on Iran to resolve outstanding issues with the IAEA, demands that it suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, and urges the international community to reach a “diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran’s nuclear program is for exclusively peaceful purposes.” It contains no sanctions but notes that subsequent resolutions would be adopted under Article 41 of Chapter VII. Syria There were no UN Security Council resolutions relating to Syria’s nuclear weapons program during the timeframe of the study. Several UN Security Council resolutions passed in 2013, called for the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons in the aftermath of an August 21, 2013 chemical weapons attack outside Damascus that killed an estimated 1000 civilians during the Syrian Civil War (2011–Present).

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Appendix C: Select U.S. Nuclear Proliferation-Related Legislation Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA) Provides the authority to control the export of defense articles and services, and charges the President to exercise this authority. Executive Order 11958, as amended, delegated this statutory authority to the Secretary of State.12 Glenn Amendment Authorizes sanctions on non-nuclear weapons states that detonate a nuclear weapon. Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act (IIANA) (P.L. 102-484) Imposes sanctions on foreign entities that supply Iran with WMD technology or “destabilizing numbers and types of conventional weapons.” Sanctions imposed on violating entities include a ban, for two years, on U.S. government procurement from that entity, and a two-year ban on licensing U.S. exports to that entity.13 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) Tightened US sanctions on Iran during the Clinton Administration’s first term. In response to Iran’s nuclear program and its support of terrorist organizations (Hezbollah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad), President Clinton issued Executive Order 12957, which banned U.S. investment in Iran’s energy sector, and Executive Order 12959, which banned U.S. trade with and investment in Iran. ILSA required the President to impose at least two out of a menu of six sanctions on foreign companies (entities, persons) that make an investment of more than $20 million in one year in Iran’s energy sector.14 Iran-North Korea-Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) (P.L. 106-178) Authorizes sanctions on foreign persons (individuals or corporations, not countries or governments) that are determined by the Administration to have assisted Iran’s WMD programs. Sanctions imposed include (1) prohibition on U.S. export of arms and dual-use items to the sanctioned entity; and, under Executive Order 12938, a ban on U.S. government procurement and of imports to the United States from the sanctioned entity.15

12 U.S. Department of State, “The Arms Export Control Act,” Directorate of Defense Trade Controls,

November 21, 2013, accessed January 16, 2014, https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/regulations_laws/ aeca.html. 13 Katzman, “Iran Sanctions,” 25. 14 Kenneth Katzman, “The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA),” CRS Report for Congress (April 26, 2006): 1. 15 Katzman, “Iran Sanctions,” 26.

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Executive Order 13338 Prohibits certain transactions with and suspends entry into the United States of foreign sanctions evaders with respect to Iran and Syria.16 Executive Order 13382 Allows the President to block the assets of proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their supporters under the authority granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the National Emergencies Act, and Section 301 of Title 3, United States Code.17 Foreign Operations Appropriations (P.L. 109-102) Repeats previous bans on aid to Syria, and contains a provision requiring that not less than $6,550,000 be made available for programs supporting democracy in Syria and Iran, as well as unspecified amounts of additional funds under this act to support democracy, governance, human rights, and rule of law programs for the two countries.18 Symington Amendment Prohibits military and economic assistance to any country that delivers and/or receives nuclear assistance. Syria Accountability Act (P.L. 108-175) The act requires the President to impose penalties on Syria unless it ceases support for international terrorist groups, ends its occupation of Lebanon, ceases the development of weapons of mass destruction, and ceases support of the facilitation of terrorist activity in Iraq. Sanctions include bans on the export of military and of dual-use items.19

16 Barack

H. Obama, “Executive Order—Prohibiting Certain Transactions with and Suspending Entry into the United States of Foreign Sanctions Evaders with Respect to Iran and Syria,” The White House, May 1, 2012, accessed January 23, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-off ice/2012/05/01/executive-order-prohibiting-certain-transactions-and-suspending-entry-un. 17 Katzman, “Iran Sanctions,” 26. 18 Prados, “Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues,” 14. 19 Prados, “Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues,” 15.

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Appendix D: Chronology of Significant Middle East Events20 1776 1777 1785 1801 1805 1815 1863

1865 1881 1891 1896 1897 1902 1912 1916

1917

1918

20 Oren,

The United States declares its independence. Morocco is the first country to recognize American independence. John Lamb conducts the first U.S. diplomatic mission to the Middle East. Tripoli declares war on the United States. U.S. Marines and mercenaries attack Darna, Libya. President Madison dispatches American fleet to force Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunis to cease attacks against American ships. President Abraham Lincoln protests the presence of Egyptian troops in Mexico. President Lincoln issues the Emancipation Proclamation, which freed all persons held as slaves within the rebellious states. U.S. Civil War ends in defeat for the Confederates. All formerly enslaved people are freed. Start of the first mass migration of Jews to the Holy Land. William Blackstone submits his memorial calling for American support for Jewish statehood in Palestine to President Benjamin Harrison. Theodor Herzl, founder of the Zionist movement, publishes The Jewish State.21 The First Zionist Congress is held in Basel, Switzerland; four Americans attend. American naval theorist Alfred Mahan coins the term “Middle East.” Henrietta Szold establishes the women’s Zionist organization, Hadassah. Britain and France enter into the Sykes–Picot Agreement, which carves former Ottoman Empire’s Arab provinces into British and French zones of influence. Britain talks Iraq, and France is given Syria. Palestine is to become an international zone. Pancho Villa attacks Columbus, NM, and is later pursued into Mexico by Brigadier General John “Black Jack” Pershing and members of the Buffalo Soldiers’ 10th Cavalry, and 24th and 25th Infrantry Regiments, which included Sergeant Linold Chappell. British issue the Balfour Declaration, which proclaims a Jewish State in Palestine. Louis Brandeis helps persuade President Woodrow Wilson to endorse the Balfour Declaration, the British pledge for a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Arabs supported by United Kingdom capture Damascus, ending 400 years of Ottoman rule.22 World War I ends with France and Britain the victors. They begin colonizing Arab lands.

Power, Faith and Fantasy, xv–xxii.

21 Derek Brown, “Israel and the Middle East: Key Events,” The Guardian, January 2, 2002, accessed

January 6, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jan/02/israel1. 22 “Syria Profile,” BBC News, December 12, 2013, accessed January 6, 2014, http://www.bbc.co. uk/news/world-middle-east-14703995.

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1919 Emir Faisal ibn al-Hussein along with President of the World Zionist Organization Chaim Weizmann, accepts the border separation between Arab states and Palestine, Balfour Declaration, and Zionist immigration to Palestine.23 First Palestinian National Congress: rejects Balfour Declaration and Zionist immigration to Palestine. Demands full Palestinian independence.24 Emir Faisal is proclaimed King of Syria. 1920 French forces occupy Damascus and declare the new state of greater Lebanon. Under the Versailles agreement, Britain is mandated to govern Israel, the Occupied Territories, and Jordan.25 1921 Reza Khan names himself Shah of Persia after staging a coup against the government of the Qajar Dynasty.26 Britain appoints Faisal, son of Hussein bin Ali, the Sherif of Mecca, as King of Iraq.27 1922 France divides Syria into three autonomous regions with Alawites on the coast, Druze in the South.28 1925 Ahmad Shah, the final ruler of the Qajar Dynasty, is deposed and Reza Khan becomes Persia’s new Shah.29 Syrian nationalists begin an uprising against French rule and France bombs Damascus. 1926 Reza Khan Pahlavi is crowned, marking the beginning of the Pahlavi Dynasty. His son Mohammad Reza is named Crown Prince.30 Abdul Aziz ibn Saud conquers Mecca and Medina. The Arabian kingdoms of Najd and Hijaz are unified into modern Saudi Arabia, ending the rule of the Hashemite family. Wahhabism becomes the official Islamic trend in Saudi Arabia.31 1928 Hassan al-Banna creates the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. 1929 Alarmed by the rapid expansion of Jewish settlers, Arabs riot in Palestine.32 1932 British Mandate ends and Iraq gains independence. Britain keeps military bases in Iraq. 1935 Persia officially changes its name to Iran. 23 Nader Abuljebain, “Important Dates in Palestinian Arab History,” Al-Awda, accessed January 7, 2014, http://www.al-awda.org/until-return/important_dates.html. 24 Abuljebain, “Important Dates in Palestinian Arab History.” 25 Brown, “Israel and the Middle East.” 26 “Timeline: A Modern History of Iran,” PBS News Hour, February 11, 2010, accessed May 14, 2020, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/middle_east-jan-june10-timeline. 27 “Iraq Profile—Timeline,” BBC News, October 3, 2018, accessed May 14, 2020, https://www.bbc. com/news/world-middle-east-14546763. 28 BBC News, “Syria Profile.” 29 PBS News Hour, “Timeline: A Modern History of Iran.” 30 PBS News Hour, “Timeline: A Modern History of Iran.” 31 “Timeline of the Middle East in the 20th Century,” Teach Mideast, accessed May 14, 2020, http:// teachmideast.org/articles/timeline-of-the-middle-east-in-the-20th-century/. 32 Brown, “Israel and the Middle East.”

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1936 Jewish and Arab paramilitary groups begin to clash.33 1937 In the midst of the Palestinian uprising, the Peel Commission suggests the Holy Land be partitioned into Jewish and Arab zones.34 1938 American engineers discover oil in Damman, Saudi Arabia. Nazi Germany begins Kristallnacht, state-sanctioned anti-Jewish riots in Germany, Austria, and Sudentland. Kristallnacht is translated into “Night of the Broken Glass” and symbols the broken windows of Jewish shops, synagogues.35 1939 World War II begins. Hitler initiates his Final Solution of the Jewish issue, beginning the Holocaust. British “White Paper” seeks to limit Jewish migration to 10,000 per year. The Nazi Holocaust prompts mass Jewish migration to Palestine. Jewish armed groups fight British authorities.36 1941 Reza Khan declares Iran a neutral power during World War II, however, Iran’s British-controlled oil interests are maintained by German engineers and technicians. Khan refuses to expel German citizens despite a British request. In September 1941, following British and Soviet occupation of western Iran, Reza Shah is forced from power, and his son, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, the former Crown Prince, succeeds him on the throne.37 Britain reoccupies Iraq after a pro-Axis coup during World War II.38 French General Charles De Gaulle pledges to end the French Mandate in Syria. The Japanese Imperial Navy attacks the U.S. Navy at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Precipitating the United States’ entry into World War II. The first class of Tuskegee Airmen graduate from flight school, among them is Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., who later commanded the 332nd Fighter Group and the 477th Composite Group, which included 2nd Lt Roy M. Chappell. 1943 Nationalist Shukri al-Kuwaiti is elected the first president of Syria. 1944 Militant Jewish group Irgun Zvai’ Le’umi declares war on British in Palestine.39 1945 Allied Powers defeat the Axis Powers and Nazi concentration camps liberated. The United States tests the world’s first nuclear device, known as “The Gadget,” at the Trinity Site near Alamogordo, New Mexico.

33 Brown,

“Israel and the Middle East.” “Israel and the Middle East.” 35 “Kristallnacht: The 1938 Pogroms,” The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed January 6, 2014, http://www.ushmm.org/information/exhibitions/online-features/special-focus/kri stallnacht. 36 “Israel Profile—Timeline,” BBC News, April 8, 2019, accessed May 14, 2020, https://www.bbc. com/news/world-middle-east-29123668. 37 PBS News Hour, “Timeline: A Modern History of Iran.” 38 BBC News, “Iraq Profile—Timeline.” 39 Brown, “Israel and the Middle East.” 34 Brown,

314

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1947

1948

1949

1950

1951

1952 1953 1955

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The United States drops atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan. It is estimated that at least six million Jews were murdered by the Nazis during the Holocaust. The United States, through the United Nations, pressures the SovietUnion to withdraw from Iran. French troops leave Syria. Syria declares its independence. Irgun bombs the King David Hotel in Jerusalem.40 The UN votes to partition Palestine into Jewish and Arab controlled areas. Jewish leaders accept the plan, but the Palestinians and neighboring Arabs reject it.41 Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar found the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party.42 Eleven minutes after its creation, Israel is recognized by the United States. The Arab states attack Israel but are defeated in the War of Independence/Nakba. In aftermath of the 1948 Arab–Israeli War 700,000 Palestinians become internationally recognized refugees.43 Many settled in the West Bank, Gaza Strip or Arab states. Palestinians remaining in Israel became Israeli citizens.44 Israel’s first national election, David Ben-Gurion is elected Prime Minister.45 Muslim Brotherhood founder, Hassan al-Banna is assassinated. Israel declares Jerusalem its capital in defiance of the United Nations.46 Operation Ali Baba transports 113,000 Iraqi Jews to Israel; and Operation Magic Carpet transports 47,000 Yemeni Jews to Israel.47 Assassination of King Abdullah of Jordan. Nationalist Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq attempts to nationalize the British-owned oil industry, but is opposed by the Shah, who removes Mossadeq from power. Mossadeq regains power and the Shah flees Iran.48 CIA assists Egyptian military officers, including Colonel Gamal Nasser, in seizing power. A CIA-sponsored coup by General Fazlollah Zahedi ousts Iranian Prime Minister Mossadegh from power, and the Shah returns to Iran. The Baghdad Pact, an American-backed anti-communist coalition is formed.

40 “Key Dates in Israel’s History,” Anti-Defamation League, accessed May 14, 2020, https://www. adl.org/education/resources/fact-sheets/key-dates-in-israels-history. 41 Brown, “Israel and the Middle East.” 42 “Syria Profile—Timeline,” BBC News, January 14, 2019, accessed May 14, 2020, https://www. bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14703995. 43 Brown, “Israel and the Middle East.” 44 Zanotti, “Israel: Background and U.S. Relations,” 2. 45 Anti-Defamation League, “Key Dates in Israel’s History.” 46 Abuljebain, “Important Dates in Palestinian Arab History.” 47 Anti-Defamation League, “Key Dates in Israel’s History.” 48 PBS News Hour, “Timeline: A Modern History of Iran.”

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1956 The Suez Crisis. The U.S. and USSR compel Britain, France and Israel to withdraw their forces from Egyptian territory and uphold Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal. 1957 President Eisenhower issues his doctrine for the defense of the Middle East against communism. The United States and Iran sign a civil nuclear cooperation agreement as part of the U.S. Atoms for Peace program. The agreement calls for U.S. technical assistance and the lease of enriched uranium to Iran.49 The Shah establishes SAVAK, the intelligence agency accused of wide scale torture and execution of thousands of Iranian political prisoners.50 1958 American troops land in Lebanon in support of the pro-Western government. Syria and Egypt join to form the United Arab Republic (UAR), with Egyptian President Nasser as head of state. Egypt dissolves Syrian political parties.51 The Iraqi monarchy is overthrown in a military coup led by Abd al-Karim Qasim. Iraq leaves the pro-British Baghdad Pact. 1960 Iran’s nuclear ambitions begin as a civilian program with the U.S.-sponsored Atoms for Peace program. Prime Minister Begin notifies Knesset that Israel is building a nuclear reactor. 1961 Syrian army officers seize power and dissolve the UAR merger with Egypt. 1962 The thirteen day Cuban Missile Crisis nearly leads to a U.S. and USSR war. The film Lawrence of Arabia is released. Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann tried and executed in Israel for his role in the Holocaust. 1963 Iraq’s Prime Minister Qasim is overthrown in a coup by the pan-Arab Ba’ath Party. The Shah implements “The White Revolution,” which is a campaign of social and economic Westernization that is met with popular opposition.52 Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini is arrested in a crackdown on the Shah’s opponents. Syrian Ba’athists army officers stage a coup and seize power. 1964 Ayatollah Khomeini begins his 14 years of exile in Iraq and France. French engineers and scientists complete construction of the Dimona reactor. The Arab League founds the Palestine Liberation Organization.53 Malcolm X performs the hajj to Mecca and is renamed El-Hajj Malik ElShabazz. 1965 Malcolm X (El-Hajj Malik El-Shabazz) is assassinated in Harlem, New York. 49 Semira

N. Nikou, “Timeline of Iran’s Nuclear Activities,” The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), 243. 50 BBC News, “Israel Profile—Timeline.” 51 BBC News, “Syria Profile.” 52 PBS News Hour, “Timeline: A Modern History of Iran.” 53 “Ten Key Dates on the Path Towards Palestinian Statehood,” France 24, last modified November 27, 2011, accessed January 7, 2014, http://www.france24.com/en/20110915-ten-key-dates-pathtoward-palestinian-statehood-un-abbas/.

316

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1966 Sayyid Qutb is executed in Egypt. 1967 The Six-Day War between Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq begins. The United States supports Israel in the Six-Day War, and its conquest of the West Bank, Gaza, Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and Sinai Peninsula. Israeli Air Force and Navy attack the American signals intelligence ship, the USS Liberty in international waters, killing 9 U.S. service members and wounding 60.54 The United States supplies Iran with a 5-megawatt nuclear research reactor. 1968 Iran signs Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Palestine Liberation Organization adopts its charter insisting Palestinians have a right to their own homeland. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. is assassinated in Memphis, Tennessee. 1969 Secretary of State Rogers briefs plan for Arab–Israel peace based on UNSCR 242. Moammar Qaddafi leads a military coup that toppled the Libyan monarchy. President Richard Nixon and Prime Minister Golda Meir reach U.S.-Israeli understanding on the Dimona nuclear reactor. Yasser Arafat becomes Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization 1970 PLO attempts to seize power in Jordan in a conflict known as Black September. Former Defense Minister, Hafez al-Assad, overthrows President Nur al-Din al-Atasi and becomes President of Syria. Egypt’s President Nasser dies of a heart attack, and Anwar Sadat is elected President. 1971 PLO members hijack three airliners and land in Jordan. Jordan’s King Hussein orders his army to destroy the PLO. PLO leadership relocates to Lebanon.55 1972 11 Israeli athletes murdered at Munich Olympics by Black September terrorists. 1973 Egypt and Syria launch a surprise attack against Israel on Yom Kippur. The U.S. conducts a massive airlift to Israel after Egypt and Syria launch a surprise attack to begin the Yom Kippur/Ramadan War. Saudi Arabia spearheads oil boycott against the U.S. because of its support for Israel. Israel issues a nuclear alert at the beginning of the Yom Kippur War. 1974 PLO recognized as the sole legitimate representative of Palestinians. UN grants PLO observer status and recognizes the Palestinians’ right to independence.56 U.S. President Richard Nixon resigns. Saudi King Faisal is assassinated by a member of the royal family. Khalid becomes king. 54 The

History Channel, “This Day in History: June 8, 1967: Israel Attacks USS Liberty,” History Channel, accessed January 4, 2014, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/israel-attacks-ussilibertyi. 55 Brown, “Israel and the Middle East.” 56 France 24, “Ten Key Dates on the Path Towards Palestinian Statehood.”

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1975 Lebanese Civil War begins. “Zionism is Racism” resolution passed by the United Nations.57 The United States withdraws from Vietnam, ending its involvement in the Vietnam War. 1976 Syria intervenes in the Lebanese Civil War to assist its Maronite Christian allies. Israeli special operators carry out Raid on Entebbe Airport in Uganda to free more than 100 Israeli and Jewish hostages held by German and Palestinian gunmen. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s brother, Yonatan “Yoni” Netanyahu, was killed during the raid. 1977 Egyptian President Anwar Sadat flies to Israel and addresses the Knesset. 1978 Iranians begin mass riots and demonstrations to protest the Shah’s authoritarian rule. In response, the Shah declares martial law.58 President Jimmy Carter recognizes Palestinians right to a homeland.59 1979 The Siege of Mecca: The Grand Mosque in Mecca, Islam’s holiest site, was seized and held by several hundred gunmen for two weeks.60 The Shah flees Iran in the face of mass protests, and he and his family go into exile. The Shah enters the United States for medical treatment, and Iran demands he return to Iran.61 Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returns to Iran after a 14-year exile in Iraq and France. The Iranian monarchy is overthrown during the Iranian Revolution and Iran becomes an Islamic Republic. Iranian students seize 52 American hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Iran. Iran cuts diplomatic relations with Israel. The SovietUnion invades Afghanistan. Saddam Hussein becomes President of Iraq. Israel and Egypt sign the Camp David Accords, bringing peace to the two countries. Prime Minister Menachem Begin and President Anwar Sadat awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. 1980 The United States cuts diplomatic relations with Iran. Iraq invades Iran to begin the 8-year long Iran–Iraq War. The U.S. attempt to rescue Embassy Hostages (Operation Eagle Claw) fails. The Shah dies in exile, in Egypt.

57 Anti-Defamation

League, “Key Dates in Israel’s History.” News Hour, “Timeline: A Modern History of Iran.” 59 Abuljebain, “Important Dates in Palestinian Arab History.” 60 Yaroslav Trofimov, The Siege of Mecca: The Forgotten Uprising in Islam’s Holiest Shrine and the Birth of Al Qaeda (New York: Doubleday, 2007), 68. 61 Semira N. Nikou, “Timeline of Iran’s Foreign Relations,” The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), 231. 58 PBS

318

1981

1982

1983

1984

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The Muslim Brotherhood instigates uprisings in Aleppo, Homs, and Hama, Syria. The 52 U.S. Embassy hostages are released minutes after President Reagan’s inauguration. American jets shoot down two Libyan fighter jets in the Gulf of Sidra. The Israeli Air Force destroys the larger of Iraq’s two nuclear reactors at Osirak. The Reagan administration condemns Israel’s Raid on Iraq’s Osirakreactor. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat is assassinated and is succeeded by Hosni Mubarak. Iranian President Mohammad Ali Raja’i and Prime Minister Mohammad Javad Bahonar are assassinated in a bombing.62 The Gulf Cooperation Council is formed by Gulf States to confront security challenges posed by Iran–Iraq War and the perceived threat of Iran’s revolution.63 In violation of international law, Israel annexes Syria’s Golan Heights. Israel invades Lebanon to attack the PalestineLiberation Organization (PLO). Iran sends 1000 Revolutionary Guards to Lebanon after Israel’s invasion. The Iranians support the formation of Hezbollah. Iran and Syria ties strengthened.64 Phalange militiamen storm the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in West Beirut and massacred between 460 and 3500 Palestinians, Lebanese, and Kurdish refugees. The killings were in response to the assassination of Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel. Assad suppresses the Muslim Brotherhood uprising in Hama, killing up to 25,000 people. A suicide bombing ordered by Hezbollah kills 241 U.S. Marines sent to maintain the peace during the Lebanon Civil War. The U.S. Navy bombs Syrian antiaircraft batteries outside Beirut, Lebanon. Lebanon and Syria end of hostilities. Syrian forces remain in Lebanon. The U.S. withdraws its forces from Lebanon. William Buckley, CIA station chief in Beirut, is kidnapped, and tortured to death. Iraq attacks Iran’s Bushehr nuclear reactor. Hezbollah leader Sheikh Ragheb Harb assassinated in southern Lebanon.65

62 Semira

N. Nikou, “Timeline of Iran’s Political Events,” The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), 227. 63 Nikou, “Timeline of Iran’s Foreign Relations,” 231. 64 Nikou, “Timeline of Iran’s Foreign Relations,” 231. 65 Zeina Karam, “Hezbollah Commander Gunned Down Outside Home; Israel Denies Role in Killing,” NBC News, December 4, 2013, http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/12/04/217 49468-hezbollah-commander-gunned-down-outside-home-israel-denies-role-in-killing?lite.

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1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

The Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances provides security guarantees to Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine as they give up their nuclear weapons and join the NPT. Operation Moses airlifts 7000 Ethiopian Jews to Israel.66 China supplies Iran with a “training reactor.” The U.S. passes the Pressler Amendment to ban military and economic assistance to Pakistan until a presidential determination stated Pakistan did not have a nuclear weapon. The U.S. covertly seeks to sell arms to Iran in exchange for the release of seven American hostages held by Iran-backed militiamen in Lebanon, prompting the Iran-Contra scandal.67 Israel withdraws from most of Lebanon, but maintains a security zone along the border. Israel bombs PLO headquarters in Tunis, Tunisia. In response to a terror attack on U.S. servicemen at a Berlin nightclub, President Reagan bombs Libya in retaliation (Operation El Dorado Canyon). The Iran-Contra scandal breaks, exposing illegal arms deals between the Reagan White House and Iran. The U.S. sold weapons to Iran, in return for Iranian influence to free Western hostages in Lebanon. The proceeds of the weapons sales were funneled to the Contras fighting Nicaragua’s communist government. The first Palestinian uprising, or Intifada, begins in Gaza and the West Bank. The U.S. Navy escorts Kuwaiti oil tankers to deter attacks from Iran. The Iraqi Air Force attacks the USS Stark, killing 37 U.S. sailors. Hafez Assad sends Syrian troops into Lebanon to enforce a cease-fire in Beirut. USS Vincennes shoots down a civilian Iran Air Flight 665, killing 290 Iranians. The Iran–Iraq War ends in a stalemate after 8 years of war. Pan Am Flight 103 is blown up over Lockerbie, Scotland, Libya is blamed. Yasser Arafat declares Palestinian statehood in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Iraq attacks Kurdish town, Halabja, with chemical weapons, killing thousands. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) is founded and tasked with IRGC’s overseas operations. The Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) is founded in Gaza to support the Intifada.68 The SovietUnion withdraws all combat forces from Afghanistan. Ayatollah Khomeini issues a fatwa ordering Muslims to kill Salman Rushdie. Ayatollah Khomeini dies and Ayatollah Khamenei becomes Iran’s Supreme Leader. The Berlin Wall comes down.

66 Anti-Defamation

League, “Key Dates in Israel’s History.” News Hour, “Timeline: A Modern History of Iran.” 68 TeachMideast, “Timeline of the Middle East in the 20th Century.” 67 PBS

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1990 Iraq invades and annexes Kuwait. Syria joins U.S.-led coalition against Iraq. Nelson Mandela is freed from prison in South Africa. 1991 American-led coalition expels Iraq forces from Kuwait (Desert Storm). Israel hit by 39 Iraqi Scud missiles during the Gulf War. Southern Shia and Northern Kurds rebel against Saddam and are crushed. Madrid Peace Conference to attempt an Arab–Israeli settlement fail. SovietUnion dissolves into sixteen independent countries. Operation Solomon transports 14,000 Ethiopian Jews to Israel.69 Operation Northern Watch instituted in northern Iraq to protect the Kurds. The UN repeals “Zionism is Racism” resolution.70 The UN begins inspecting Iraq for weapons of mass destruction. 1992 Operation Southern Watch instituted in southern Iraq to protect the Shia. Bill Clinton is elected the 42nd President of the United States. Civil War begins in Yugoslavia. Israeli helicopter gunships assassinate Hezbollah leader Sheikh Abbas Musawi, also killing his wife, 5-year old son, and four bodyguards.71 1993 Oslo Accords (Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations) signed at the White House. The World Trade Center is bombed by terrorists. Eighteen U.S. servicemen are killed in Mogadishu, Somalia during the Battle of Mogadishu. 1994 Iran and South Africa reestablish diplomatic relations after the end of apartheid. The Shah and South Africa had good relations, which ended after the 1979 revolution when Iran imposed a trade and oil boycott against South Africa.72 Israel and Jordan sign peace treaty. Israel withdraws from Gaza and Jericho, and transfers administrative control to the Palestinians. Israeli mass murderer Baruch Goldstein kills 29 and wounds 125 Palestinian worshippers in Hebron. Afula suicide bomb kills 8, ushering in a series of suicide attacks across Israel, against buses, restaurants, and malls. Hamas kidnaps and kills Israeli soldier Nachshon Wachsman.73 Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and Yasser Arafat are awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty. Hafez Assad’s son, and likely successor, Basil is killed in a car accident. Nelson Mandela is elected President of South Africa. 1995 Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin is assassinated by Jewish terrorist, Yigal Amir. Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, OK destroyed in a terrorist attack conducted by Timothy McVeigh.

69 Anti-Defamation

League, “Key Dates in Israel’s History.” League, “Key Dates in Israel’s History.” 71 Karam, “Hezbollah Commander Gunned Down Outside Home; Israel Denies Role in Killing.” 72 Nikou, “Timeline of Iran’s Foreign Relations,” 233. 73 Anti-Defamation League, “Key Dates in Israel’s History.” 70 Anti-Defamation

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1996

1998

1999

2000

2001

321

IAEA reports Libya has reinvigorated nuclear activities—uranium enrichment.74 19 U.S. servicemen are killed in a terror attack on Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) becomes law. President Clinton brokers an interim Palestinian-Israeli agreement at Wye River. In response to Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, the United States bombs presumed terror targets in Sudan. U.S. imposes additional sanctions on Pakistan after a nuclear test in May 1998. Iraq ends cooperation with UNSCOM, which oversaw destruction of its WMD. Coalition Forces begin Operation Desert Fox to destroy Iraq’s WMD program. Qassem Soleimani appoint as head of the IRGC-Quds Force. Death of King Hussein of Jordan, succeeded by his son Abdullah II.75 U.S. imposes sanctions on Pakistan for its military coup and for defaulting on U.S. loans. Section 508 of the Foreign Assistance Act prohibited all U.S. economic and military aid to Pakistan. A suicide bomber kills 17 sailors aboard the USS Cole near Yemen. Death of Syrian President Hafiz Assad, who is then succeeded by his son Bashar. Camp David II talks fail, marking end of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.76 Points of contention are the status of Jerusalem and Palestinian right of return. Second Palestinian Intifada begins after Ariel Sharon visits disputed religious site in Jerusalem. Two Israeli soldiers lynched by Palestinians in Ramallah. Israel withdraws from southern Lebanon. Pope John Paul II visits the Holy Land. Al-Qaeda operatives assassinate Ahmad Shah Massoud in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda terrorists hijack four U.S. airlines in an attack on the United States and crash them into the World Trade Center’s twin towers, the Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania, killing nearly 3000 people in a terrorist attack. The United States invades Afghanistan and topples the Taliban. The U.S. waives the Glenn, Pressler, and Symington sanctions against Pakistan.

74 Kelsey Davenport, “Chronology of Libya’s Disarmament and Relations with the United States,” Arms Control Association, September 2013, accessed January 5, 2014, http://www.armscontrol.org/ factsheets/LibyaChronology. 75 Fawcett, International Relations of the Middle East, 77. 76 Fawcett, International Relations of the Middle East, 77.

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Israeli Tourism Minister Rehavam Ze’evi assassinated by the PFLP in a Jerusalem hotel. 2002 President Bush makes State of the Union address, refers to Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as the “Axis of Evil.” Iran Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi calls the comments “arrogant.” UNSC 1397 calls for a two state solution to the Arab-Palestinian conflict. UN weapons inspectors return to Iraq and threatens serious consequences if Iraq is in “material breach” of UN resolutions.77 2003 IAEA’s Mohammed ElBaradei reports there is no indication Iraq has WMD. Hans Blix states Iraq is cooperating with inspectors, but the inspectors need more time to verify Iraq’s compliance with UN Security Council resolutions. The United States invades Iraq and topples Saddam Hussein. IAEA inspectors find traces of highly-enriched uranium at site near Tehran.78 Moammar Qaddafi renounces Libya’s weapons of mass destruction program. Israeli Air Force attacks Palestinian training camp near Damascus. Publication of the “Road Map” by the Mideast Quartet (U.S., EU, UN, Russia) calling for creation of a Palestinian state by 2005. The Palestinian Authority accepts the plan, but Israel announces 14 additional conditions.79 Saddam Hussein is captured by U.S. forces in his hometown of Tikrit. September 11th mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed captured in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. The International Atomic Energy Agency states Iran admits to Plutonium production, but the agency says there is no evidence Iran is developing nuclear weapons. Iran agrees to more rigorous UN inspections of its nuclear facilities.80 2004 Israel assassinates Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the founder of Hamas. Israel assassinates Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi, cofounder of Hamas. Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat dies in Paris. Libya reports it received nuclear weapon designs from the A.Q. Khan network.81 A.Q. Khan reveals that he supplied North Korea, Iran, and Libya with technical and military assistance for making nuclear weapons.82 Photos emerge of U.S. troops abusing Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghreib prison in Baghdad. U.S. imposes sanctions against Syria for its support of terrorism and militants in Iraq. U.S. hands over sovereignty to Iraqi government, led by Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. 77 BBC

News, “Iraq Profile—Timeline.” “Timeline of Iran’s Nuclear Activities,” 245. 79 France 24, “Ten Key Dates on the Path Towards Palestinian Statehood.” 80 PBS News Hour, “Timeline: A Modern History of Iran.” 81 Davenport, “Chronology of Libya’s Disarmament and Relations with the United States.” 82 Davenport, “Chronology of Libya’s Disarmament and Relations with the United States.” 78 Nikou,

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2005 Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri is assassinated. Iran resumes uranium enrichment at Isfahan facility, says it is peaceful. IAEA finds Iran in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Israel withdraws its forces from the Gaza Strip. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is elected President of Iran. Iraqis vote for the first time since the U.S. ousted Saddam Hussein. The Cedar Revolution in Lebanon prompts Syria’s withdrawal from the country. 2006 Saddam Hussein is hanged for crimes against humanity. Hamas wins in Palestinian elections.83 Israel and Hezbollah begin the Second Lebanon War. The U.S. kills Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in an airstrike. President Ahmadinejad states the Holocaust was exaggerated.84 Iranbreaks IAEA seals at Natanz nuclear facility. IAEA reports Iran to the UN Security Council due to its nuclear activities.85 Iraq and Syria restore diplomatic ties after nearly a quarter century.86 2007 The Israeli Air Force destroys the Al-Kibar nuclear reactor in eastern Syria. U.S. National Intelligence Estimate concludes Iran halted nuclear program in 2003. Former Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto is assassinated while campaigning. Blackwater private security guards open fire on Iraqi civilians, killing 17 people. Annapolis Conference establishes “Two State Solution” as the basis for future talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.87 2008 Senior Hezbollah commander Imad Mughniyah assassinated in Damascus, Syria. Hezbollah releases the bodies of Israeli soldiers Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser, whose kidnapping sparked the Second Lebanon War.88 Barack Hussein Obama is elected the 44th President of the United States, becoming the first Black President of the United States of America. President Ahmadinejad congratulates President Obama on his election to the presidency.

83 Fawcett,

International Relations of theMiddle East, 78. “Timeline of Iran’s Foreign Relations,” 236. 85 “Iran Profile,” BBC News, November 24, 2013, accessed January 6, 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/world-middle-east-14542438. 86 “Iraq Profile,” BBC News, December 18, 2013, accessed January 6, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/world-middle-east-14546763. 87 “Israel Profile—Timeline,” BBC News, April 9, 2019, accessed May 14, 2020, https://www.bbc. com/news/world-middle-east-29123668. 88 Anti-Defamation League, “Key Dates in Israel’s History.” 84 Nikou,

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U.S. accuses North Korea of helping Syria build the reactor attacked by Israel.89 An IAEA report states Iran’s suspected research into the development of nuclear weapons was a serious concern. The European Union imposes new sanctions against Iran. Israel conducts large-scale military exercise as perceived warning to Iran. Iraq Parliament approves security plan with the United States, under which all U.S. troops will leave Iraq by the end of 2011.90 Israel launches Operation Cast Lead against Hamas in Gaza to halt rocket attacks. Syria establishes diplomatic relations with Lebanon for the first time since their independence in the 1940s. 2009 President Obama sends a Nowruz (Iranian New Year) message to the Iranian people and government, calling for better relations.91 The U.S., United Kingdom, and France reveal existence of secret Iranian underground uranium enrichment facility at the Fordow complex, outside the holy city of Qom. P5+1 countries offer Iran a proposal of enriching uranium abroad. Iran refuses. IAEA finds traces of manmade uranium at Syria’s Al-Kibar nuclear site.92 Prime Minister Netanyahu endorses a demilitarized Palestinian state under strict conditions, including Palestinian recognition of Israel as the Jewish homeland and Israel’s retaining of Jerusalem and certain West Banksettlements.93 The U.S. begins a troop surge in Afghanistan. Iranians protest the 2009 election results that saw President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad re-elected after defeating Mir-Hossein Mousavi in a contested election protestors argue was rigged. The protests launched the Green Movement, which saw mass demonstrations and civilian disobedience rallies that demanded Ahmadinejad be removed from office. The Green Movement’s slogan was “Where Is My Vote?” 2010 The Arab Spring begins after Tunisian fruit vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, sets himself on fire to protest police corruption after he was slapped by a female police officer who had earlier seized his fruit-weighing scales.94 President Obama sends second Nowruz letter to Iran, encouraging dialogue. The Stuxnet computer worm discovered after attacking Iranian nuclear facilities and destroying uranium enrichment centrifuges.

89 BBC

News, “Syria Profile.” News, “Iraq Profile—Timeline.” 91 Nikou, “Timeline of Iran’s Foreign Relations,” 236. 92 BBC News, “Syria Profile.” 93 France 24. “Ten Key Dates on the Path Towards Palestinian Statehood.” 94 Ivan Watson and Jomana Karadsheh, “The Tunisian Fruit Seller Who Kickstarted Arab Uprising,” CNN, March 22, 2011, accessed January 4, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/03/ 22/tunisia.bouazizi.arab.unrest/. 90 BBC

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325

Iranian nuclear scientist Massoud Ali Mohammadi is killed in a car bomb attack. Iranian nuclear scientist Majid Shahriari is assassinated. Iranian nuclear scientist Fereydoon Abbassi survives an assassination attempt. U.S. imposes sanctions against Syria for its support of terrorism. 2011 Arab Spring protests spread to Egypt, Lebanon, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, Iran and Jordan. The protests lead to the resignations of the Tunisian and Egyptian presidents, the death of Libyan leader Moammar Qaddafi, and the Syrian Civil War. Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali resigns. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak resigns. President Obama announces U.S. Navy SEALs killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Ayman al Zawahiri succeeds Osama bin Laden as leader of Al Qaeda. NATO air campaign helps topple Libyan leader Moammar Qaddafi. Moammar Qaddafi is assassinated in his hometown of Sirte, Libya. Syrian Civil War begins after Bashar Assad orders a crack down on peaceful protestors. IAEA reports Syria to the UNSC due to its covert nuclear reactor.95 Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas applies for UN recognition of Palestinian statehood. Submission dropped due to lack of support.96 President Obama calls for Syria’s President Assad to resign, and freezes Syrian assets. The U.S. completes withdrawal of all troops from Iraq; 4486 U.S. troops died in the war. Iranian nuclear scientist Darioush Rezaeinejad is assassinated 2012 Mohamed Morsi, of the Muslim Brotherhood, becomes the President of Egypt. U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya is attacked, and Ambassador Chris Stevens is killed. Iraq’s Shiite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki issues arrest warrant for his Sunni Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi for charges he ran a death squad. Barack Obama is re-elected President of the United States. President Obama establishes a “red line” and warns Syria that its use of chemical weapons may trigger a U.S. intervention.97 Syrian opposition forms with the goal of toppling Bashar Assad. The U.S., Britain, France, Turkey, and the Gulf States recognize the opposition National Coalition as the “legitimate representative” of the Syrian people.98 Iranian nuclear scientist Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan is assassinated, he worked at Natanz.

95 BBC

News, “Syria Profile.” 24. “Ten Key Dates on the Path Towards Palestinian Statehood.” 97 BBC News, “Syria Profile.” 98 BBC News, “Syria Profile.” 96 France

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2013 President Morsi removed from power by Egyptian military and put on trial. Syria uses chemical weapons against insurgents during Syrian Civil War. P5+1 talks with Iran yields interim agreement to curb uranium enrichment above 5 percent in exchange for $7B in sanctions relief. Sunni insurgency violence intensifies in Iraq. 2014 Narendra Modi is elected Prime Minister of India. The P5+1 negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program falter. ISIS declares an Islamic Caliphate in both Iraqi and Syrian territory. Russia annexes Crimea. Sunni fighters, led by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, push out of Anbar Province and seize Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city. The U.S., Iran, and the Kurds aid the Iraqi government in fighting ISIS forces.99 The U.S. launches an air campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Yemen’s capital, Sana’a falls to the Houthis, who are supported by Iran. 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between the Islamic Republic of Iran and The P5+1 states signed (Known as the Iran Nuclear Deal). Saudi Arabia Intervenes in Yemen and launches airstrike against Houthi rebels who drove Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi into exile in Saudi Arabia. Russia Intervenes in Syrian Civil War and begins airstrikes against anti-Assad rebel groups. In November 2015, Turkish F-16s shot down a Russian fighter plane. Amir Pasha is born. Syrian refugees begin arriving in Europe en masse and some governments move to block refugee emigration.100 ISIS destroys Assyrian archaeological sites of Nimrud and Hatra in Iraq.101 ISIS fighters seize the ancient city of Palmyra, Syria and destroy pre-Islamic monuments. The first U.S. troops enter Syria to train, advise, and assist Syrian Democratic Forces, and to push ISIS fighters from their strongholds. 2016 The U.S. agrees to $38 billion military aid package over the next 10 years for Israel. Syrian forces, backed by Russian airpower and pro-Iran militias, capture Aleppo, Syria’s largest city.102 2017 Israel retroactively legalizes dozens of Jewish settlements built on private Palestinian land in the West Bank, and begins work on the first Jewish settlement in the West Bank in 25 years.103 UNESCO declares the Old City of Hebron a Palestinian World Heritage site. 99 BBC

News, “Iraq Profile—Timeline.”

100 James M. Lindsay, “Ten Most Significant World Events in 2015,” Council on Foreign Relations,

December 15, 2015, accessed April 15, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/blog/ten-most-significant-worldevents-2015. 101 BBC News, “Iraq Profile—Timeline.” 102 BBC News, “Syria Profile.” 103 BBC News, “Israel Profile—Timeline.”

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The United States recognizes Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, upsetting the Arab world and Western allies.104 The United States launches a missile strike against a Syrian airbase that was used by aircraft to stage a chemical weapons attack on rebel territory in Khan Sheikoun. The United States shoots down a Syrian fighter plane near Raqqa, after it dropped bombs near the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).105 The Islamic State is ousted from Raqqa and Deir al-Zour, Syria. 2018 The United States withdraws from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal. The United States recognizes Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, which Israel seized and later annexed from Syria in the 1967 war. The international community does not recognize Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights.106 Turkey launches an attack on northern Syria to dislodge Kurdish rebels controlling Afrin. The Syrian army recaptures nearly all of the south of Syria. The U.S. imposes sanctions targeting Iranian oil and banking sectors, and issues a list of twelve demands for Iran. 2019 The U.S. says it no longer considers Israeli settlements in the West Bank to be illegal.107 The U.S. withdraws troops from northern Syria, paving the way for Turkey to attack the United States’ Kurdish allies in the area.108 Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is killed in a U.S. raid in Idlib Province, Syria. The U.S. designates the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) a foreign terrorist organization. This is the first time the U.S. designated a country’s military a terrorist group. Yemen’s Houthi rebels claim a large-scale drone attacks on two Saudi oil facilities—Abqaiq and Khurais oilfield—knocking out half of Saudi Arabia’s oil output. The U.S. blames Iran for the attack, but Tehran denies responsibility. Iran resumes uranium enrichment after the U.S. withdraws from the Iran Nuclear Deal. The U.S. imposes sanctionsagainst Ayatollah Khameneiand Foreign Minister Javad Zarif. The U.S. deploys an aircraft carrier strike group, F-22 Raptors, and additional troops to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. 2020 Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Quds Force Commander, Major General Qassem Soleimani is killed in a U.S. drone strike, in Baghdad, Iraq. 104 BBC

News, “Israel Profile—Timeline.” News, “Syria Profile.” 106 BBC News, “Israel Profile—Timeline.” 107 BBC News, “Israel Profile—Timeline.” 108 BBC News, “Syria Profile.” 105 BBC

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The World Health Organization is notified of the novel coronavirus (COVID19) in China. The COVID-19 death toll at the end of 2020 is nearly 1.7 million deaths worldwide and over 314,000 deaths in the United States. The 5th anniversary of Amir Pasha. Iran launches ballistic missile attacks against U.S. forces in neighboring Iraq, in response to the U.S. targeted killing of Qassem Soleimani. Nearly 100 U.S. troops are later diagnosed with traumatic brain injuries and receive the Purple Heart. Donald Trump is impeached for abuse of power and obstruction of Congress, after a whistleblower complaint that centered on him withholding aid to Ukraine, becoming the third U.S. president in history to be impeached. He is later acquitted in the Senate, but is defeated by Joe Biden in his re-election bid. An explosion occurred near Iran’s Parchin military and weapons development base. It is believed Iran carried out tests relevant to nuclear bomb detonations at the site a decade ago. Former Vice President Joe Biden is elected the 46th President of the United States. Senator Kamala Harris becomes the first Black woman and woman of Indian descent elected Vice President of the United States. Dr. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the head of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, is assassinated outside Tehran. An unexplained fire broke out at Iran’s Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), which is Iran’s main uranium enrichment facility in Isfahan Province. The fire affected a building identified as a centrifuge assembly building. Sabotage has not been ruled out for the Parchin explosion and the Natanz fire.109

109 Parisa

Hafezi, “Update 8-Fire Breaks Out at Iran’s Natanz Nuclear Facility but Operations Unaffected, Officials Say,” Reuters, July 2, 2020, accessed July 4, 2020, https://www.msn.com/ en-us/news/world/update-8-fire-breaks-out-at-irans-natanz-nuclear-facility-but-operations-unaffe cted-officials-say/ar-BB16f8Y1.

Glossary110

Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): The Additional Protocol gives the IAEA authority by mandating that signatories allow inspectors access to any suspected nuclear site on demand111 Airpower: To project military power or influence through the control and exploitation of air, space, and cyberspace to achieve strategic, operational, or tactical objectives112 Alawi or Alawite: A sect of Shi’a Islam, primarily in Turkey and Syria, where they are also known as Nusayri. The Alawites are regarded as religious deviants by mainstream Shi’a, the Ismailis, and by the Sunnis. Syria’s ruling Assad family is Alawite113 Amir: A military commander, prince, or ruler Analogy: A decision-making heuristic, or shorthand, in which policymakers see a current event or situation as similar to a previous historical event114 Anti-Semitism: The belief or behavior hostile toward Jews just because they are Jewish. It may take the form of religious teachings that proclaim the inferiority of Jews, or political efforts to isolate, oppress, or otherwise injure them. It may also include prejudiced or stereotyped views about Jews115 Artesh: Iran’s conventional army 110 Simon

Henderson and Olli Heinonen, “Nuclear Iran: A Glossary of Terms,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus 121 (May 2013): 1–50. 111 Scott D. Sagan, “Armed and Dangerous: When Dictators Get the Bomb,” Foreign Affairs, October 15, 2018, accessed March 13, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2018-1015/armed-and-dangerous. 112 Donley and Schwartz, United States Air Force Posture Statement 2012, 2. 113 Bernard Lewis and Buntzie Ellis Churchill, Islam: The Religion and the People (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Wharton School Publishing, 2009), 180. 114 Cottam, et al., Introduction to Political Psychology, 333. 115 “Anti-Semitism,” Anti-Defamation League, accessed May 18, 2020, https://www.adl.org/antisemitism. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 B. K. Chappell, State Responses to Nuclear Proliferation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59801-3

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Ashkenazi: The term used to describe Jews of European origin, specifically from north-central Europe116 Atom: Smallest particle of an element that still retains the characteristics of that element. Every atom consists of a positively charged central nucleus, which carries nearly all the mass of the atom, surrounded by a number of negatively charged electrons, so that the whole system is electrically neutral117 Atomic Bomb: A nuclear bomb using either plutonium or highly-enriched uranium, and relying on the principle of fission Ayatollah: The highest clerical authority in Shi’a Islam. An Ayatollah is regarded as a person of reference and worthy of imitation in religious matters. Since 1979, the Ayatollahs in Iran have attempted to expand their authority into political matters.118 Shia clerics—mullahs—are organized in a hierarchical structure and advancement up this structure requires years of religious education, publications on religious topics, and interpretation of Islamic texts. The most important theological universities are located in Qom and Mashhad, Iran, and Najaf, Iraq. The structure, beginning with the highest, include: Grand Ayatollah (Ayatollah al-uzma), Ayatollah, Hojat (Hojjat) al Islam, Mubellegh al risala, Mujtahid, and Talib ilm119 Baath: The Arab Socialist Resurrection Party, a political party dedicated to Arab nationalism and socialism. Founded in Lebanon in the 1940s, the Baath Party controls Syria and controlled Iraq until Saddam Hussein was overthrown in 2003120 Balance of Power: A dominant idea within the realist school of thought. For classical realists, the balance of power was something that was contrived (i.e. actors had to cooperate to maintain the balance) whereas for neorealists the balance of power is akin to a natural equilibrium. For neorealists, states within the international system will automatically balance against any dominant state power121 Balancing: A diplomatic strategy of allying with the weaker side during a conflict to form a blocking coalition that could prevent the strongest states from becoming too powerful122 Ballistic Missile: A delivery vehicle powered by a liquid or solid fueled rocket that primarily travels in a ballistic (free-fall) trajectory. The flight of a ballistic 116 Roy R. Andersen, Robert F. Seibert, and Jon G. Wagner, Politics and Change in the Middle East:

Sources of Conflict and Accommodation, Eighth Edition (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2007), 343. 117 Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020, Office of the Secretary of Defense (2020), 324. 118 Roshandel, Iran,Israeland the United States, xi. 119 Amanda Roraback, Iran in a Nutshell (Santa Monica, CA: Enisen Publishing, 2006), 42. 120 Andersen, Seibert, and Wagner, Politics and Change in the Middle East, 343. 121 Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, second edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 342. 122 Alan C. Lamborn and Joseph Lepgold, World Politics into the Twenty-First Century: Unique Contexts, Enduring Patterns (Upper Saddle, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), 537.

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missile includes three phases: (1) boost phase, where the rocket generates thrust to launch the missile into flight; (2) midcourse phase, where the missile coasts in an arc under the influence of gravity; and (3) terminal phase, in which the missile descends towards its target. Ballistic missiles can be characterized by three key parameters—range, payload, and Circular Error Probable (CEP), or targeting precision. Ballistic missiles are primarily intended for use against ground targets123 Bandwagon: A strategy of allying with the stronger side during a conflict124 Basij: Volunteer Iranian paramilitary force thought to operate under the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The Basij are often used to enforce and suppress domestic dissent Bazaari: A member of Iran’s traditional merchant class Beliefs: A causal or factual assumption about politics or social life125 Biological Weapons: Weapons made of microorganisms that cause lethal or disabling diseases126 Bipolarity: A system in which there are only two great powers127 Brinksmanship: A strategy in which actors threaten shared disaster in an effort to force other actors to capitulate128 Caliph: Term for the successor to the Prophet Muhammad and political leader of the Muslim community (umma). Islam’s division into Sunni and Shia branches concerned the proper succession of the Prophet Muhammad after his death Cascade: Series of enrichment stages, with each stage consisting of an apparatus to enrich uranium by isotope separation129 Centrifuge: Machine used to enrich uranium by separating the isotope Uranium-235 from Uranium-238. Separation is achieved by spinning at high speeds Chemical Weapons: Gaseous, liquid, or solid chemicals used to poison, asphyxiate, or disable large numbers of people130 Clash of Civilizations Thesis: A phrase coined by political scientist Samuel Huntington who argued that the end of the Cold War had created conditions for a new form of international conflict based on ethnic and religious allegiances; civilizations were, he argued the highest level of shared identity. In particular, Huntington focused on possible conflict between the West and Islam, a claim that was widely cited by journalists and political leaders after the 9/11 attacks131 123 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Glossary,” NTI, accessed December 19, 2013, http://www.nti.org/glo ssary/#unsc-resolution-1887. 124 Lamborn and Lepgold, World Politics into the Twenty-First Century, 537. 125 Lamborn and Lepgold, World Politics into the Twenty-First Century, 537. 126 Lamborn and Lepgold, World Politics into the Twenty-First Century, 537. 127 Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, International Relations Theories, 342. 128 Lamborn and Lepgold, World Politics into the Twenty-First Century, 537. 129 Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020, 324. 130 Lamborn and Lepgold, World Politics into the Twenty-First Century, 537. 131 Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, International Relations Theories, 342.

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Classical Realism: A worldview based on the assumption that the principal sources of conflict in politics lie in human nature because people are self-interested, competitive, and power hungry132 Coercion: The use of threats to influence the behavior of another. It aims to induce another party to comply with a demand, rather than make them comply. Coercive threats can take two forms: deterrent threats, which aim to uphold the status quo; and compellent threats, which are intended to persuade the target to halt an action already underway or even undo something already done133 Coercive Diplomacy: Is an attempt to get a state, groups within a state or a nonstate actor to change its behavior through the threat to use force or through the actual use of limited force134 Cognitive Limits: Variations in people’s ability to process and evaluate all the information potentially available to them135 Cognitive Processes: What happens in the mind while people move from observation of a stimulus to a response to that stimulus136 Cognitive Style: The way a person gathers and processes information from his environment137 Colonial Image: A country or group perceived as inferior in culture and capability, benign in intentions, monolithic in decision-making and associated with opportunity138 Concealment Methods: The actions taken to reduce the probability of a state, international entity, or the IAEA detecting a country’s nuclear activities or material Containment: A term originally used to refer to the U.S. policy of preventing Soviet territorial expansion during the Cold War; term has increasingly been used to refer to any strategy designed to keep a threat isolated (contained) within its current territory139 Counter Force Targeting: War planning that envisions strikes on an enemy’s military and industrial targets, including nuclear weapons140 Counter Proliferation: The full range of military activities that will deter, identify, deny, and counter adversary development, acquisition, possession, proliferation and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Ballistic Missiles141 132 Lamborn

and Lepgold, World Politics into the Twenty-First Century, 537. Bratton and Wallace Thies, “When Governments Collide in the South Atlantic: Britain Coerces Argentina During the Falklands War,” Comparative Strategy, vol. 30, no. 1 (2011): 1. 134 Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, “The United States and Coercive Diplomacy,” America’s Grand Strategy and World Politics (New York: Routledge, 2009), 40. 135 Lamborn and Lepgold, World Politics into the Twenty-First Century, 537. 136 Cottam et al., Introduction to Political Psychology, 334. 137 Cottam, et al., Introduction to Political Psychology, 334. 138 Cottam, et al., Introduction to Political Psychology, 334. 139 Lamborn and Lepgold, World Politics into the Twenty-First Century, 538. 140 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Glossary.” 141 Cordesman and Toukan, “The Iranian Nuclear Challenge.” 133 Patrick

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Counter Value Targeting: War planning that envisions strikes on an enemy’s civilian population centers, i.e., cities142 Critical Mass: Minimum amount of fissionable material capable of supporting a chain reaction under precisely specified conditions143 Cyberterrorism: The destruction of computer-based information and communication systems144 Degenerate Image: A country or group perceived as superior or equal in culture and capability, but lacking resolve and will. Associated with perceptions of opportunity145 Deterrence: The actions of a state or group of states to dissuade a potential adversary from initiating an attack or conflict through the credible threat of retaliation. To be effective, a deterrence strategy should demonstrate to an adversary that the costs of an attack would outweigh any potential gains146 Dirty Bomb: A term for a radiological dispersal device (RDD), a device pairing conventional explosives with radiological materials. Once detonated, the conventional explosives disperse the radioactive material, contaminating the target area147 Disarmament: Efforts to eliminate a particular type of weapon148 Dual-Use Technology: Items that can be used in the production of nuclear weapons but also have legitimate uses either in peaceful nuclear or non-nuclear industries149 Earth Penetrating Weapon (EPW): A weapon designed to strike the earth at high speed and penetrate into the ground before exploding. They are intended to attack underground targets. The two largest U.S. conventional EPWs are the GBU-28 (laser guided) and the GBU-37 (GPS guided).150 Economic Interdependence: When two or more people, organizations, or societies depend on each other’s goods, services, natural resources, or capital for their continued prosperity151

142 Nuclear

Threat Initiative, “Glossary.” of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020, 325. 144 Lamborn and Lepgold, World Politics into the Twenty-First Century, 538. 145 Cottam, et al., Introduction to Political Psychology, 335. 146 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Glossary.” 147 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Glossary.” 148 Lamborn and Lepgold, World Politics into the Twenty-First Century, 538. 149 Joshua Masters, “Nuclear Proliferation: The Role and Regulation of Corporations,” Nonproliferation Review, vol. 16, no. 3 (November 2009): 348. 150 “Earth-Penetrating Weapons,” Union of Concerned Scientists, June 6, 2005, accessed July 5, 2020, https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/earth-penetrating-weapons. 151 Lamborn and Lepgold, World Politics into the Twenty-First Century, 539. 143 Office

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Economic Sanctions: Import or export barriers, or restrictions imposed on one state or international actor by another state or group of states to obtain political or economic concessions152 Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP): A sharp pulse of radio-frequency radiation produced when an explosion occurs in an asymmetrical environment, especially at or near the earth’s surface or at high altitudes. The intense electric and magnetic fields can damage unprotected electrical and electronic equipment, “knocking out” electronic devices153 Enriched Uranium: Uranium in which the proportion of U-235 (to U-238) has been increased above the natural 0.7 percent. Reactor-grade uranium is usually enriched to approximately 3.5 percent U-235, and weapons-grade uranium is enriched to more than 90 percent U-235154 Enrichment: The process of increasing the amount of the fissile isotope Uranium235 within nuclear material. Natural uranium contains 0.7 percent U-235, but enrichment can increase it to 3.5 percent (level used for nuclear reactors) or over 90 percent (level used in nuclear weapons). Enrichment is a progressively easier process, for example, if the aim is to produce 90 percent enriched uranium (weapons grade), reaching the 3.5 percent level requires 75 percent of the work. By the time 20 percent enrichment is reached—a level Iran currently achieves— 90 percent of the work has been completed Eretz: Hebrew word for “the Land of Israel”155 Faghih: Islamic scholar Fatwa: A ruling given in answer to a question on a point of Islamic law. It is issued by a qualified religious authority known as a mufti. In 1989, Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa sentencing Salman Rushdie, the author of The Satanic Verses, to death. Osama bin Laden issued a fatwa in 1998, authorizing the killing of Americans and their allies156 First Strike: The launch of a surprise attack intended to considerably weaken or destroy an adversary’s military infrastructure or nuclear forces, and thus severely reduce the adversary’s ability to attack or retaliate157 First Use: The introduction of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction into a conflict. In agreeing to a “no-first-use” policy, a country states that it will not use nuclear weapons first, but will use them under retaliatory circumstances158 Fissile Material: Fissile material contains elements whose nuclei are able to undergo fission, or be split by neutrons. Uranium-233, Uranium-235, and 152 Dunne,

Kurki, and Smith, International Relations Theories, 344. Threat Initiative, “Glossary.” 154 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Glossary,” accessed July 12, 2020, https://www.world-nuc lear.org/information-library/facts-and-figures/nuclear-glossary.aspx 155 Roshandel, Iran, Israeland the United States, xi. 156 Lewis and Churchill, Islam: The Religion and the People, 191. 157 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Glossary.” 158 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Glossary.” 153 Nuclear

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Plutonium-239 are all fissile materials. Uranium-235 and Plutonium-239 are used in nuclear weapons159 Fission: A nuclear reaction or radioactive decay process that results in the splitting of an atom, which releases a considerable amount of energy (usually in the form of heat) that can be used to produce electricity. Fission may be spontaneous, but is usually caused by the nucleus of an atom becoming unstable (or “heavy”) after capturing or absorbing a neutron. During fission, the heavy nucleus splits into roughly equal parts, producing the nuclei of at least two lighter elements. In addition to energy, this reaction usually releases gamma radiation and two or more daughter neutrons. Fissionable nuclides are U-235, U-233, and Pu-239160 Force Execution/Battle Damage Assessment: Entails measuring the physical and functional effects of target engagement, assessing the extent of collateral damage, and examining the overall impact on adversary military activities161 Foreign Policy Decision-Making (FPDM): The choices individuals, groups, and coalitions make that affect a state’s actions on the international stage. Foreign Policy Decision-Making consists of four components: (1) identifying the decision problem, (2) searching for alternatives, (3) choosing an alternative, and (4) executing the alternative162 Forward Arming and Refueling Points (FARP): Fuel operations used to hot refuel aircraft in areas where fuel is not available. Fuel is transferred from a source aircraft’s (C-130, C-17, or C-5) internal tanks to receiver aircraft163 Fuel Cycle: A term for the full spectrum of processes associated with utilizing nuclear fission reactions for peaceful or military purposes. The “front-end” of the uranium-plutonium nuclear fuel cycle includes uranium mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication. The fuel is used in a nuclear reactor to produce neutrons that can, for example, produce thermal reactions to generate electricity or propulsion, or produce fissile materials for weapons. The “backend” of the nuclear fuel cycle refers to spent fuel being stored in spent fuel pools, possible reprocessing of the spent fuel, and ultimately long-term storage in a geological or other repository164 Fundamental Attribution Error: Occurs when people attribute other people’s behavior to internal, dispositional causes, rather than to situational causes165 159 Alicia

Sanders-Zakre and Kelsey Davenport, “Assessing Progress on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament: Updated Report Card: 2016–2019,” Arms Control Association (July 2019), 71. 160 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S. NRC). “Glossary: Fission (Fissioning),” March 19, 2019, accessed March 8, 2020, https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/fis sion-fissioning.html. 161 Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020, 328. 162 Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen Jr., Understanding Foreign Policy Decision-Making (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 3. 163 Davis, “Forward Arming and Refueling Points for Fighter Aircraft: Power Projection in an Antiaccess Environment.” 164 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Glossary.” 165 Cottam, et al., Introduction to Political Psychology, 337.

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Fundamentalism: An approach to religious observance that favors a literalist or extreme interpretation of, and strict adherence to, a religion’s core texts. A common theme is the attempt to return to the simplicity of belief and interpretation, which is believed to reflect the original character of the religion’s founder or founders. This approach is often combined with religiously justified political agendas, which because they are divinely inspired, are not subject to negotiation or discussion. Fundamentalism is not specific to a single religion, and fundamentalist movements can be found within Islam, Hinduism, Christianity, and Judaism among other religions166 Fusion: Process where two or more atomic nuclei are combined into heavier nuclei, accompanied by the release of energy, and the principle of the hydrogen bomb, which is considerably more powerful than an atomic bomb Genocide: Actions designed to eliminate a group of people from the face of the earth167 Gharbzadeh: A pejorative for a Westernized Iranian. A term used to negatively describe an Iranian who has shed his cultural identity in order to assimilate into Western society Green Movement: An Iranian movement that protested the 2009 presidential elections, and later evolved into a nation-wide movement that demanded democratic rights originally sought in the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which many argue were hijacked by radical clerics. The protests began after the government claimed that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won the 2009 election in a landslide. The group’s slogan became, “Where is my vote?” The movement was crushed by the IRGC, Basij paramilitary forces, and plain-clothed forces called Lebas Shakhsi in 2010, and its leaders arrested. The vivid cell phone video of 26-year old protestor, Neda Agha Soltan, dying on the street after being shot in the chest, was circulated around the world. The Green Movement took its name from a green sash given to Mir-Hossein Mousavi by former two-term president and reformist Mohammad Khatami. Its leaders included: Mir-Hossein Mousavi, his wife Zahra Rahnavard, and Mehdi Karroubi. Former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani has alternately supported the movement and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei168 Gun-Assembly Weapon Design: The weapon design assembles a supercritical mass of fissile material and uses a tamper to hold the core together long enough to produce a nuclear explosion. The uranium-235 is machined into two sub-critical masses, one of which is placed at one end of a tube in front of a propellant, and the other is placed at the other end of the tube. When the propellant is detonated,

166 Nuclear

Threat Initiative, “Glossary.” et al., Introduction to Political Psychology, 337. 168 Abbas Milani, “The Green Movement,” The Iran Primer, accessed March 9, 2020, https://iranpr imer.usip.org/resource/green-movement. 167 Cottam,

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it shoots the first mass down the tube at a high speed where they collide to create a supercritical mass, which produces a fission chain reaction169 Hamas: Harakat al-Muqawamat al-Islamiyyah (Hamas) is the Islamic Resistance Movement. It is an armed militia, based in Gaza, and is opposed to Israel170 Hasbara: Hebrew for public diplomacy171 Hashemites: The direct descendants of the Prophet Muhammad through his daughter Fatima and her husband Ali bin Abi Talib, who was also the Prophet’s paternal first cousin and the fourth caliph of Islam. Hashemites are members of the larger Quraysh tribe that ruled the Holy City of Mecca in the late fifth Century172 Heavy Water Reactor: A reactor using heavy water (deuterium) as the moderator. Spent fuel rods from these reactors contain significant quantities of plutonium Hegemony: A situation in which one state is so strong that it can dominate others173 Height of Burst: Vertical angle between the base of a target and the point of burst174 Heuristics: Mental shortcuts in processing information about others175 Hezbollah: Literally, “The Party of God,” specifically the armed Shia militia based in Lebanon, and politically supported by Iran and armed by both Iran and Syria. It is headed by Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, and has fought Israel in numerous skirmishes Hibakusha: The term widely used in Japan to refer to survivors of the World War II atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Japanese word translates literally to “explosion-affected people.”176 High Enriched Uranium (HEU): Uranium containing 20 percent or more of the fissile isotope U-235. Weapons-grade uranium is usually 90 percent or higher levels of U-235177 Horizontal Proliferation: Refers to states or non-state actors that do not have, but are acquiring nuclear weapons or developing the capability and materials to produce them178

169 Wisconsin

Project on Nuclear Arms Control, “Nuclear Weapons Primer,” accessed March 9, 2020, https://www.wisconsinproject.org/nuclear-weapons/. 170 Roshandel, Iran, Israeland the United States, xi. 171 Paul Danahar, The New Middle East: The World After the Arab Spring (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 227. 172 The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, “The Hashemites,” The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, accessed January 4, 2014, http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/hash_intro.html. 173 Lamborn and Lepgold, World Politics into the Twenty-First Century, 542. 174 Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020, 329. 175 Cottam et al., Introduction to Political Psychology, 39. 176 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Glossary.” 177 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Glossary.” 178 Victor W. Sidel and Barry S. Levy, “Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Opportunities for Control and Abolition,” American Journal of Public Health, vol. 97, no. 9 (September 2007): 1589.

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Hydrogen Bomb: Also known as a thermonuclear bomb, it relies on the concept of hydrogen fusion. It is much more powerful than a fission-based atomic bomb. A fission explosion is used to trigger a fusion bomb Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV): Hypersonic weapons incorporate the speed of a ballistic missile with the maneuvering capabilities of a cruise missile. Hypersonic weapons refer to weapons that travel faster than Mach 5 (~3800mph) and have the capability to maneuver during the entire flight. Hypersonic weapons are specifically designed for increased survivability against modern ballistic missile defense systems. These missiles are capable of delivering conventional or nuclear payloads at ultra-high velocities over long ranges. Hypersonic missiles are delivered in two ways: (1) they can be fired from the last stages of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) or Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) and skip along the top of the atmosphere using specialized jet engines to accelerate to hypersonic speeds; or (2) they can be launched independently or released from a bomber—similar to cruise missiles—before accelerating to ultra-high speeds179 Hypocenter: The point on the Earth directly below the center of the explosion180 Imam: In Shi’ism, the divinely inspired leader of the community181 Implosion Device: In an implosion weapon, which is the most common design used today, the weapon is armed with detonators that fire simultaneously to set off a charge of high explosives that ring the outer surface of the tamper. The shock waves compress the fissile core of uranium or plutonium into a supercritical state. The resultant fission event releases a large amount of energy in the form of light, heat, and radiation, to create a chain reaction of increasing amounts of explosive energy182 Improvised Nuclear Device: Crude nuclear device built from the components of a stolen or bought nuclear weapon, or built from scratch using nuclear material (plutonium or HEU)183 Individual-Level Analysis: Individual-level analysis involves understanding how the human decision-making process leads to policymaking. It can be approached from three different perspectives. One is to examine fundamental human nature, including the cognitive, psychological, emotional and biological factors that influence decision-making. The second studies how people act in organizations

179 Missile

Defense Advocacy Alliance, “Hypersonic Weapons Basics,” accessed March 9, 2020, https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/missile-basics/hypers onic-missiles/. 180 Atomic Heritage Foundation, “Japan,” accessed March 9, 2020, https://www.atomicheritage.org/ location/japan. 181 Reza Aslan, No God but God: The Origins, Evolution, and Future of Islam (New York: Random House, 2011), 295. 182 Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, “Nuclear Weapons Primer,” accessed March 9, 2020, https://www.wisconsinproject.org/nuclear-weapons/. 183 Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020, 330.

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and their group decision-making behavior, such as groupthink. The third examines the factors that determine a leader’s motivations, actions, perceptions, and ambitions184 Interdependence: Is a relationship of mutual dependence in which actions and interests are intertwined. This relationship may produce unintended, undesirable, and reciprocal consequences, however, actors also receive important benefits from this relationship185 International Actor: Any individual, faction or coalition that attempts to achieve objectives across the boundaries of two or more countries186 International System: A term used to describe the totality of state actors in global politics187 Intifada: The uprising of Palestinians against Israeli occupation and rule in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. The first rebellion began in December 1987, followed by a second intifada in 2000188 Jihad: “Striving” on behalf of Islam. Theologians often refer to two forms of jihad: the Greater Jihad and the Lesser Jihad. The greater jihad refers to the spiritual struggle within oneself to live one’s life in a way that pleases God. The lesser jihad is sometimes called the “Holy War,” and refers to the obligation of the faithful to extend the umma and protect it from its enemies, either by warfare or by spiritual struggle189 Just War Theory: The heart of Just War Theory is the question of what is morally right in terms of whether the use of force can be justified (jus ad bellum) and how it can be used (jus in bello)190 Kiloton: A term used to quantify the energy of a nuclear explosion that is equivalent to the explosion of 1000 tons of trinitrotoluene (TNT) conventional explosive191 Levels of Analysis: Different points on a scale of social or natural aggregation at which behavior can be observed and assessed192 Liberalism: A worldview that emphasizes finding ways to promote individual liberty and to identify and achieve common objectives that create joint gains193 Light Water Reactor (LWR): A nuclear reactor that is both moderated and cooled by ordinary (light) water Loose Nukes Problem: Fears that nuclear material and weapons developed by states will fall into the hands of terrorists194 184 Rourke,

International Politics on the World Stage, 65. Kurki, and Smith, International Relations Theories, 346. 186 Lamborn and Lepgold, World Politics into the Twenty-First Century, 539. 187 Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, International Relations Theories, 346. 188 Andersen, Seibert, and Wagner, Politics and Change in the Middle East, 343. 189 Andersen, Seibert, and Wagner, Politics and Change in the Middle East, 344. 190 Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, International Relations Theories, 347. 191 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Glossary.” 192 Lamborn and Lepgold, World Politics into the Twenty-First Century, 540. 193 Lamborn and Lepgold, World Politics into the Twenty-First Century, 540. 194 Lamborn and Lepgold, World Politics into the Twenty-First Century, 540. 185 Dunne,

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Low Enriched Uranium (LEU): Uranium containing between 0.7 and 20 percent of the isotope U-235 found in the natural metal. At 20 percent, the material becomes known as high-enriched uranium Mahdi: The “Hidden Imam,” who is in occultation until the Last Days, when he will return to usher in a time of justice195 Marja taghlid: Source of emulation. Shia faithful traditionally choose a pious and knowledgeable mullah to be their spiritual guide and source of emulation or Marja taghlid196 Megaton: The energy equivalent released by 1000 kilotons (1,000,000 tons) of trinitrotoluene (TNT) explosive. Typically used as the unit of measurement to express the amount of energy released by a nuclear bomb197 Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons: The concept of an NWFZ in the Middle East was first introduced by Iran and Egypt in 1974. In April 1990, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak proposed the establishment of a zone free of all types of weapons of mass destruction. In the “Resolution on the Middle East” adopted at the 1995 NPT Review Conference, the concept of a Middle East Zone Free of WMD was endorsed by all NPT state parties. The resolution calls on all regional states to join the NPT, place their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, and to work towards the establishment of a Middle East WMD-free zone. At the 2010 NPT Review Conference, in light of the minimal progress made since 1995, Arab states pushed for tangible steps toward the WMD-free zone. The result was a resolution calling for a meeting on the establishment of a Middle East WMD-free zone in 2012, to be attended by all states of the region. The meeting was subsequently postponed due to the parties’ failure to convene in 2012198 Misperception: Error caused by the failure to notice something that is present or by an incorrect inference about something that is accurately noticed199 Motivated Misperception: An error created by an individual’s emotions or the desire to make the world fit preconceived notions200 Motivation: The reasons why individuals look for alternatives to their present life situations201 Mujahedeen: Muslim fighters, literally, “those who wage jihad.”202 Mullah: Shia clerics who have studied the Quran and the Hadith, and are considered experts on religious matters. Mullahs who wear a black turban or head covering are called Sayyid and are descendants of the Prophet Muhammad203 195 Aslan,

No God but God, 295. Iran in a Nutshell (Santa Monica, CA: Enisen Publishing, 2006), 43. 197 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Glossary.” 198 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Glossary.” 199 Lamborn and Lepgold, World Politics into the Twenty-First Century, 541. 200 Lamborn and Lepgold, World Politics into the Twenty-First Century, 541. 201 Cottam, et al., Introduction to Political Psychology, 339. 202 Aslan, No God but God, 296. 203 Roraback, Iran in a Nutshell (Santa Monica, CA: Enisen Publishing, 2006), 43. 196 Roraback,

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Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV): A ballistic missile carrying two or more warheads that can be aimed at different targets204 Munich Analogy: The belief that if you do not stand up to an aggressor, and instead seek to appease them or make concessions to them in hopes of keeping the peace, the end result will be to only encourage them to be even more aggressive and probably to bring on the very war you sought to avoid205 Muslim Brotherhood: Islamic socialist organization founded by Hassan alBanna206 Mutually Assured Destruction: A Cold War term, which described the deterrence relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union beginning in the 1950s. MAD assumed that both sides possessed an assured second-strike capability such that a nuclear first-strike by either side would provide no strategic advantage—because both states would suffer unacceptably high damage in the ensuing nuclear war207 Nakba: Arabic for “Catastrophe.” Palestinian term to describe the land dispossession, ethnic cleansing and mass killings they suffered during Israel’s creation in 1948. Palestinian refugees expelled from their homes are not allowed the right of return208 National Security: Collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States. Specifically, the condition provided by: (a) a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations; (b) a favorable foreign relations position; or (c) a defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert209 Nationalism: The belief that a group of people, or a community, belong together in an independent country, and a willingness to grant that community primary loyalty210 Neoconservatives (Neocons): Neoconservatism is a political ideology with distinct views on both domestic and foreign policy. Most neoconservatives extol the virtues of American hegemony—and sometimes the idea of an American Empire—and they believe U.S. power should be used to encourage the spread of democracy and discourage potential rivals from trying to compete with the United States. In their view, spreading democracy and preserving U.S. dominance is the best route to peace. They tend to be skeptical of international institutions (especially the United Nations, which they regard as both anti-Israel and 204 Eric

Schlosser, Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety (New York: Penguin Press, 2013), xxi. 205 Cottam, et al., Introduction to Political Psychology, 339. 206 Aslan, No God but God, 296. 207 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Glossary.” 208 Josh Ruebner, Shattered Hopes: Obama’s Failure to Broker Israeli-Palestinian Peace (New York: Verso, 2013), 34. 209 Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020, 332. 210 Cottam, et al., Introduction to Political Psychology, 339.

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as a constraint on American freedom of action) and are wary of many allies (especially the Europeans, whom they see as idealistic pacifists free-riding on the Pax Americana)211 Neorealism (also called Structural Realism): A world view based on the assumption that the anarchic nature of the interstate system is the principal source of conflict in world politics212 Neutron Bomb: A fission-fusion thermonuclear weapon (hydrogen bomb) in which the burst of neutrons is generated by a fusion reaction. The neutron radiation kills by penetrating through thick, protective materials such as armor rather than relying on destructive explosive force Non-Compliance: When a state is found to be in violation of its IAEA Safeguards Agreement, such as by diverting nuclear material from declared nuclear activities, failing to declare nuclear material, violating agreed recording and reporting systems, obstructing IAEA inspectors, interfering with safeguards equipment, or preventing the IAEA from carrying out verification activities Non-Nuclear Weapons States: Under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), NNWS are states that had not detonated a nuclear device prior to January 1, 1967, and who agree in joining the NPT to refrain from pursuing nuclear weapons (that is, all state parties to the NPT other than the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China)213 Non-Proliferation: Political, Economic, and Diplomatic actions taken to prevent proliferation by dissuading or impeding access to or distribution of WMD and ballistic missile technology, material and expertise214 Non-Proliferation Regime: Refers to the entire array of international agreements, multilateral organizations, national laws, regulations and policies to prevent the spread of dangerous weapons and technologies215 Nuclear Breakout Capability: Circumstances in which an aspiring nuclear weapons state can break its commitments to the NPT, achieving nuclear weapons capability as a fait accompli before it can be stopped by diplomatic pressure or military action Nuclear Command and Control (NC2): Exercise of authority and direction by the President, as commander in chief through established command lines over nuclear weapon operations of military forces, as chief executive over all government activities that support those operations, and as head of state over required multinational actions that support those operations216

211 John

Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, 128. and Lepgold, World Politics into the Twenty-First Century, 541. 213 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Glossary.” 214 Cordesman and Toukan, “The Iranian Nuclear Challenge.” 215 Mary Beth Nikitin, Paul K. Kerr and Steven A. Hildreth, “Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status,” Congressional Research Service (October 25, 2012): 1. 216 Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020, 332. 212 Lamborn

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Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS): Collection of activities, processes, and procedures performed by appropriate commanders and support personnel who, through the chain of command, allow for senior-level decisions on nuclear weapons employment to be made based on relevant information and subsequently allow for those decisions to be communicated to forces for execution.217 Nuclear Deterrent: A desired strategic effect of a state’s nuclear offensive and defensive capability seeking to assure allies and dissuade adversaries regarding nuclear and strategic attack endeavors218 Nuclear Device: Term to describe both atomic and more powerful hydrogen bombs Nuclear Material: Uranium, plutonium, or thorium Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): A global treaty designed to halt the spread of nuclear weapons, promote the spread of peaceful nuclear technology and further the goal of disarmament. The NPT went into force in 1970 and divides its signatories into two categories: nuclear weapons states (United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China) and non-nuclear weapons states. The non-nuclear weapons states agree to not pursue nuclear weapons in exchange for access to peaceful nuclear technologies. The nuclear weapons states are obligated to assist in developing nuclear energy while working toward nuclear disarmament Nuclear Proliferation: The acquisition or transfer of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction capabilities by states or non-state actors Nuclear Radiation: The nuclear radiation resulting from a nuclear explosion can be divided into two categories: initial and residual. The initial radiation consists of neutrons and gamma rays, which can travel great distances, penetrate considerable thicknesses of material, and inflict fatal damage on human tissue. Initial radiation can be intense but has a limited range. For large nuclear weapons, the range of initial radiation is less than the range of lethal blast and thermal effects. For small weapons, direct radiation may be the lethal effect with the greatest range219 Nuclear Weapon: A device that releases nuclear energy in an explosive manner as the result of nuclear chain reactions involving fission, or fission and fusion, of atomic nuclei. Such weapons are also sometimes referred to as atomic bombs (a fission-based weapon); or boosted fission weapons (a fission-based weapon deriving a slightly higher yield from a small fusion reaction); or hydrogen bombs/thermonuclear weapons (a weapon deriving a significant portion of its energy from fusion reactions)220

217 Office

of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020, 332. 218 Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020, 333. 219 Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, “Nuclear Weapons Primer,” accessed March 9, 2020, https://www.wisconsinproject.org/nuclear-weapons/. 220 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Glossary.”

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Nuclear Yield: Energy released in the detonation of a nuclear weapon, measured in terms of the kilotons or megatons of TNT required to produce the same energy release. Yields are categorized as follows: very low: less than 1 kiloton; low: 1–10 kilotons; medium: over 10–50 kilotons; high: over 50–500 kilotons; and very high: over 500 kilotons221 Offense-Defense Balance: Indicates how easy or difficult it is to conquer territory or defeat a defender in battle. If the balance favors the defender, conquest is difficult and war is unlikely. If the balance favor the offense, conquest is easy and war is likely222 Operational Codes: Constructs representing the overall belief systems of leaders about the world (i.e., how it works, what it is like, what actions are likely to be successful)223 Operational Environment: Setting in which an actor’s choice is actually taking place224 Operational Milieu: The world in which the policy will be carried out P5+1: The group that led international nuclear negotiations with Iran. It included the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany Pan-Arabism: Principle of racial and political unity among the world’s Arab population225 Pasha: The highest Ottoman official title, granted to both civilian administrators and military commanders. It is used as a term of respect in Turkish and Arab society226 Perception: The process of noticing and evaluating incoming information227 Plutonium (Pu): A radioactive element that occurs only in trace amounts in nature. It is produced by irradiating uranium fuels. Plutonium-239 is a fissionable material, and the IAEA defines 8kg of Pu-239 as the amount sufficient for a nuclear bomb Power Projection: The ability of a nation to apply all or some of its elements of national power—political, economic, informational, or military—to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability228 Preemptive Strike: Preemption refers to the first use of military force when an enemy attack is underway or is very credibly imminent. To preempt is to launch 221 Office

of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020, 334. 222 Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, International Relations Theories, 348. 223 Cottam, et al., Introduction to Political Psychology, 340. 224 Lamborn and Lepgold, World Politics into the Twenty-First Century, 541. 225 Aslan, No God but God, 296. 226 William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, A History of The Modern Middle East, sixth edition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2016), 561. 227 Lamborn and Lepgold, World Politics into the Twenty-First Century, 542. 228 Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” Joint Publication 1-02 (November 8, 2010), 254.

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an attack against an enemy when one has incontrovertible evidence an enemy attack is either underway or has been ordered229 Preventive Strike: A preventive strike is when a state attacks in order to control the dangers in its external security environment. The strike expresses a guess that war, or at least a major negative power shift, is probable in the future. The preventer state can elect to tolerate the predicted adverse power shift or it can utilize diplomatic, economic, subversive, as well as military force, to lessen the growing peril230 Proliferation: The spread of biological, chemical, and/or nuclear weapons, and their delivery systems. Horizontal proliferation refers to the spread of WMD to states that have not previously possessed them. Vertical proliferation refers to an increase in the quantity or capabilities of existing WMD arsenals within a state231 Psychological Environment: Actors’ mental image of the world around them, sometimes quite different from their operational environment232 Psychological Milieu: The world as the actor sees it Qualitative Military Edge (QME): The U.S. commitment to Israel that was written into U.S. law in 2008. Israel’s QME is its ability to counter and defeat credible military threats from any individual state, coalition of states, or nonstate actor, while sustaining minimal damages or casualties. This means that as a matter of policy, the United States will not sell any military equipment or services to an Arab state that may pose a risk to Israel or contribute to regional insecurity in the Middle East233 Quraysh: An important and powerful Arab tribe, which controlled Mecca at the time of the Prophet Muhammad. As descendants of the Prophet’s tribe, the Quraysh are accorded special respect in Islam234 Rashidun: The first four “Rightly Guided” Caliphs or successors to the Prophet Muhammad: Abu Bakr (632–634), Umar (634–644), Uthman (644–656), Ali (656–661)235 Realism: A worldview that assumes incompatible goals and conflict are the defining features of politics and therefore argues that actors must focus on relative gains, relative power and security236 229 Colin S. Gray, The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration,

Strategic Studies Institute (July 2007): 8, accessed May 16, 2013. http://www.strategicstudiesinsti tute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub789.pdf. 230 Gray, The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines, 13. 231 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Glossary,” NTI, accessed December 19, 2013, http://www.nti.org/glo ssary/#unsc-resolution-1887. 232 Lamborn and Lepgold, World Politics into the Twenty-First Century, 542. 233 Shapiro, “The Obama Administration’s Approach to U.S.-Israel Security Cooperation: Preserving Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge.” 234 Andersen, Seibert, and Wagner, Politics and Change in the Middle East, 344. 235 Aslan, No God but God, 296. 236 Lamborn and Lepgold, World Politics into the Twenty-First Century, 542.

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Reentry Vehicle (RV): The nose cone of a missile containing its warhead237 Retribution: The principle that wrongdoers should suffer in proportion to the suffering they have caused others238 Rogue States: Countries whose leaders appear to be trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction to aid terrorists or challenge existing international norms and institutions239 Safeguards Agreement: Each non-nuclear weapons state that is party to the NPT must conclude a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA). Under a CSA, a member state must accept IAEA safeguards on all source or fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction, or control Salafism: A reforming verion of Islam that is austere in practice and theology. Salafism relies only on the Qur’an and the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad and his earliest followers. Salafism’s Sunni adherents recognize the first three caliphs (Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman)240 Sanctions: A coercive measure, usually by several nations in concert, for forcing a nation violating international law to desist or yield to adjudication, as by withholding loans or limiting trade relations or by military force or blockade241 Schema: A cognitive structure that represents knowledge about a concept or type of stimulus, including its attributes and the relations among those attributes242 Second-Strike Nuclear Forces: Nuclear weapons designed and deployed in ways that make it possible for them to survive a surprise nuclear attack243 Security Dilemmas: Conflicts in which the efforts made by one state to defend itself are simultaneously seen as threatening by its opponents, even if those actions were not intended to be threatening244 Sephardim: The “Oriental” Jews of Spanish, African, Asian, or Middle Eastern origin245 Shah: Persian term for king246 Shi’a, Shi’ite: The group of Muslims who regard Ali ibn Abi Talib and his descendants as the only legitimate successors to the Prophet Muhammad. Derived from the term “Shi’at Ali,” or the “Party of Ali.” In the Shi’a view, Ali and 237 Schlosser,

Command and Control, xxiii. and Lepgold, World Politics into the Twenty-First Century, 543. 239 Lamborn and Lepgold, World Politics into the Twenty-First Century, 543. 240 Michael W.S. Ryan, Decoding Al-Qaeda’s Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 17. 241 Richard H. Speier, Brian G. Chow and S. Rae Starr, Nonproliferation Sanctions (Arlington: RAND, 2001), 5. 242 Cottam, et al., Introduction to Political Psychology, 341. 243 Lamborn and Lepgold, World Politics into the Twenty-First Century, 543. 244 Cottam, et al., Introduction to Political Psychology, 342. 245 Andersen, Seibert, and Wagner, Politics and Change in the Middle East, 343. 246 Alim Ansari, ConfrontingIran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Next Great Conflict in the Middle East (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 277. 238 Lamborn

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his descendants are the divinely guided Imams. 247 Shi’a are the second largest denomination in Islam, after the Sunni majority. Iran has the largest Shia population in the world, with Iraq and Bahrain also being Shia majority countries. There are large Shia communities in Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Shoah: The Hebrew word meaning “catastrophe,” denoting the catastrophic destruction of European Jewry during World War II. The term is used in Israel, and the Knesset (Israeli Parliament) has designated an official day, called Yom ha-Shoah, as a day of commemorating the Shoah or Holocaust248 Signals Intelligence (SIGINT): Intelligence derived from electronic signals and systems used by foreign targets, such as communications systems, radars and weapons systems. SIGINT provides insight into foreign adversaries’ capabilities, actions, and intentions249 Significant Quantity: The approximate minimum quantity of nuclear material required for the manufacture of a nuclear explosive device. The IAEA defined the following quantities of radioactive material as a significant quantity: 25kg of U-235 for HEU, 75kg of U-235 for LEU, and 8kg of Pu-239 or U-233 Smart Proliferation: A term used to describe a situation where a state remains in the NPT until it has sufficient fissile material to make 10–15 nuclear devices and then gives its mandatory 90-day notice of withdrawal from the Treaty250 Spiral Conflicts: Conflicts in which each side matches and one-ups the actions taken by the other side. This can produce arms races and other types of aggression that result from misunderstanding each other’s motives251 State-Level Analysis: Emphasizes how states formulate and implement foreign policy decisions. Of importance is how a country’s political structure, political forces and sub-national actors cause its government to adopt a particular foreign policy. Foreign policy decision-making changes according to a number of variables, including the type of political system, type of situation, and internal factors such as a state’s political culture, its political leaders, and special interest groups252 States of Concern: The term used to denote states perceived as hostile to the United States and its allies, and which are developing or possess WMD. The term “states of concern” has replaced the term “rogue states” due to political sensitivities.

247 Cleveland

and Bunton, A History of The Modern Middle East, 561.

248 University of South Florida, “A Teacher’s Guide to the Holocaust,” accessed November 27, 2013,

http://fcit.usf.edu/holocaust/. 249 National Security Agency, “Signals Intelligence,” National Security Agency, accessed December

2, 2013, www.nsa.gov/sigint/. Simpson, “Iran’s Nuclear Capability and Potential to Develop Atomic Weapons,” Iran’s Nuclear Program: Realities and Repercussions (Abu Dhabi, UAE: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2006), 22. 251 Cottam, et al., Introduction to Political Psychology, 342. 252 Rourke, International Politics on the World Stage, 78. 250 John

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The term rogue state is still used by some officials in reference to North Korea, Syria and Iran253 Stuxnet: A computer virus reportedly developed by the U.S. and Israel, designed to interfere with centrifuges. The Thunderstruck and Flame viruses also targeted Iran Sunni: One who follows the Sunna, the practice of the Prophet Muhammad and the early leaders of Islam. The majority of Muslims are Sunni254 Superpowers: A term coined in the late 1940s to characterize the military capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union, which dwarfed those of any other state255 System-Level Analysis: System-level analysis examines how the realities of the international system influence foreign policy. Systemic factors include a state’s structural characteristics, power relationships, economic realities, and norms of behavior. This level of analysis focuses on power relationships and how the pattern of international relations varies depending on how many power centers exist256 Taqiyya: A Shia practice of concealing or denying their faith to avoid religious persecution Technical Nuclear Forensics (TNF): Refers to the analysis and characteristics of pre- and post-detonation radiological or nuclear materials, devices, and debris as well as prompt effects from a nuclear detonation. Used in conjunction with law enforcement and intelligence information to identify those responsible for the planned or actual attack257 Terrorism: Deliberate and systematic violence performed by small numbers of people, whereas communal violence is spontaneous, sporadic, and requires mass participation. The purpose of terrorism is to intimidate a watching popular audience by harming only a few, whereas, genocide is the elimination of entire communities. Terrorism is meant to hurt, not destroy. Terrorism is preeminently political and symbolic, whereas, guerilla warfare is a military activity. Repressive terror from above is the action of those in power, whereas terrorism is a clandestine resistance to authority258 Terrorists: Individuals or groups who use violence or the threat of violence against innocent bystanders to achieve political purposes259 Thermal Radiation: The intense heat from a nuclear explosion causes burns to human skin and a temporary condition called “flashblindness.” The maximum temperature achieved by a fission weapon is several tens of million degrees. 253 Nuclear

Threat Initiative, “Glossary.” and Churchill, Islam: The Religion and the People, 219. 255 Lamborn and Lepgold, World Politics into the Twenty-First Century, 543. 256 Rourke, International Politics on the World Stage, 91. 257 Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020, 338. 258 Cottam, et al., Introduction to Political Psychology, 342. 259 Lamborn and Lepgold, World Politics into the Twenty-First Century, 544. 254 Lewis

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A standard chemical high explosive produces 9000 degrees Fahrenheit. A one megaton explosion can produce third degree burns (which destroy skin tissue) at a distance of five miles. The heat from the explosion can ignite fires and under some conditions produce a “firestorm.” Thermal effects dominate in weapons in the megaton range260 Thermonuclear Weapon: A thermonuclear weapon employs both fusion and fission. The most common fusion reaction derives from two isotopes of hydrogen - tritium and deuterium - thus the term hydrogen bomb. Similar to fission, the goal is to create a self-sustaining chain reaction that releases exponentially increasing amounts of energy. Fusion is not limited by the requirement of a critical mass, so these weapons can reach theoretically limitless power. Often they are on the order of a few megatons (1 megaton = 1,000,000 tons of TNT). Fusion requires higher temperatures and densities than can be achieved by chemical high explosives, so a nuclear fission explosion is used to create the necessary temperature and density. The result is a two-stage reaction in which a fission bomb explodes first and sets off the secondary, fusion part of the weapon261 Threat: A situation of impending danger when an actor has both the capability or power and the intent (expressed or implied) to harm another262 Threat Inflation: Is an attempt by elites to create concern for a threat that goes beyond the scope and urgency that a disinterested analysis would justify263 Unilateralism: When a state conducts its actions and reaches its foreign policy decisions without consulting or cooperating with other international actors264 Unmotivated Misperception: An error created by cognitive (mental) limits on an individual’s ability to process information265 Uranium (U): A naturally occurring radioactive element Uranium Enrichment: Process of isotope separation increasing the percentage of uranium-235 atoms in any given amount of uranium266 Use of Military Force: The state-sanctioned use of force against materials, commodities, or infrastructure related to a nuclear weapons program that has the intention of delaying or impeding a country’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon267 Vali Faghih: The supreme jurist

260 Wisconsin

Project on Nuclear Arms Control, “Nuclear Weapons Primer,” accessed March 9, 2020, https://www.wisconsinproject.org/nuclear-weapons/. 261 Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, “Nuclear Weapons Primer,” accessed March 9, 2020, https://www.wisconsinproject.org/nuclear-weapons/. 262 Lamborn and Lepgold, World Politics into the Twenty-First Century, 544. 263 Cramer and Thrall, “Understanding Threat Inflation,” 1. 264 Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, International Relations Theories, 351. 265 Lamborn and Lepgold, World Politics into the Twenty-First Century, 545. 266 Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020, 339. 267 Fuhrmann and Kreps, “Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace,” 6.

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Values: Deeply held beliefs about what should be true, even if it is not currently true268 Velyat-e Faghih: A system of absolute rule by a “Faghih,” or Islamic scholar, in a particular Islamic jurisprudence. Iran’s Supreme Leader, also known as the Rahbar-e Moazzam, is an example of this system269 Vertical Proliferation: Refers to states that already possess nuclear weapons and are increasing their nuclear arsenals, improving the technical sophistication or reliability of their weapons, or developing new weapons270 Vietnam Analogy: This analogy suggests that any U.S. military intervention will likely result in the same outcome as did American intervention in Vietnam during the 1960s and 1970s; an open-ended commitment to a losing cause that will result in tremendous bloodshed for American troops and political unrest at home271 Wahhabi: Puritanical sect of Islam founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab272 Warhead: The part of the missile, projectile, torpedo, rocket, or other munition that contains either the nuclear or thermonuclear system, high explosive system, chemical or biological agents, or inert materials intended to inflict damage273 Weaponization: The process of moving from an initial design of a nuclear explosion device to a warhead which is safe to handle, can be stockpiled for long periods of time and can survive the journey from its storage area to a target274 Weapons Grade Material: Nuclear materials that are most suitable for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, e.g., uranium (U) enriched to 90 percent U-235 or plutonium (Pu) that is primarily composed of Pu-239 that is at least 93 percent or higher, and contains less than 7 percent Pu-240. Crude nuclear weapons could be fabricated from lower-grade materials275 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): Nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons capable of killing enormous amounts of people276 Worldview: A distinctive way of understanding political life that includes a set of central concerns that its advocates believe are defining aspects of political life as well as a set of cause-and-effect assumptions about how the political world works277 Yellowcake: Semi-processed ore containing oxides of uranium and triuranium octoxide 268 Cottam,

et al., Introduction to Political Psychology, 343. Iran, Israel and the United States, xii. 270 Sidel and Levy, “Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Opportunities for Control and Abolition,” 1589. 271 Cottam, et al., Introduction to Political Psychology, 343. 272 Aslan, No God but God, 298. 273 Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020, 339. 274 Simpson, “Iran’s Nuclear Capability and Potential to Develop Atomic Weapons,” 24. 275 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Glossary.” 276 Lamborn and Lepgold, World Politics into the Twenty-First Century, 545. 277 Lamborn and Lepgold, World Politics into the Twenty-First Century, 545. 269 Roshandel,

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Yishuv: The name of the Jewish community in Palestine prior to the recognition of the modern state of Israel in 1948278 Zionism: Zionism is a nationalist Jewish political movement that supports the selfdetermination of the Jewish people and the sovereignty of the Jewish national homeland and has sought to address threats to Israel’s continued existence, political legitimacy in the Middle East, and its security. Its goal is to channel the world’s Jewish population from the Diaspora (Jews living outside Israel) to Zion (the land of Israel)279 Zionist Entity/Regime: A pejorative used by individuals and groups who refuse to recognize the legality or existence of the State of Israel

278 Cleveland

and Bunton. A History of the Modern Middle East, 562. Iran, Israel and the United States, 33.

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Index

0–9 9/11 analogy, 285 9/11 attackers, 54 9/11 attacks, 55, 57, 62, 104, 105, 135, 152, 173, 190, 235, 242, 248, 251, 264, 285, 295, 331 1967 Six-Day War Evangelical Christians strengthened views since, 184 Iraq contributed troops during, 187 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) Assessed Iran halted its nuclear program, 100 Assessment of Iran’s nuclear program, 99 Controversy over status of Iran’s nuclear program, 99 Key Judgments, 99 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community. See Pakistan-India rivalry

A Abbas, Hassan Why states seek nuclear weapons, 40 Abbas, Mahmoud, 78, 325 Abd al-Salem Faraj, Muhammad Al-Qaeda’s ideology influenced by, 84 Abdullah, King (Saudi) Urged U.S. to attack Iran, 280 Abu Nidal, 105 advance anti-access and area denial, 155 Afghanistan, 43, 62, 83–85, 104, 105, 110, 129–131, 136, 141, 142, 154, 160,

164, 168, 170, 206, 212, 263, 264, 277, 278, 317, 319, 321, 324 Osama bin Laden goes into exile, 84 Reagan confronts spread of Communism, 149 Soviet invasion of, 129 Soviet occupation of, 211 Soviet withdrawal, 195 U.S. war in, 55 Afghanistan, Tora Bora September 11th attack planning, 83 African National Congress (ANC) Concerns about possession of nuclear weapons, 35 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 61, 63, 71, 74, 81, 89, 173, 208, 214, 265, 273, 280, 285, 286, 323 Anti-Semitism of, 269 Incites nationalism, 214 Iran’s nuclear program used to incite nationalism, 43 Mocks moderate Iranians who negotiated for peaceful nuclear energy, 43 Netanyahu compares to Hitler, 270 Promotion of nationalism, 41 Questioning of Israel’s existence, 269 U.S. interfence in Iran’s domestic affairs, 70 AIPAC. See American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) airborne early warning and control (AEW&C), 163 Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), 143 Air Line of Communication (ALOC), 208 airpower, 12, 17, 18, 64, 93, 101, 145, 146, 154–160, 162, 166, 190, 213, 218,

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 B. K. Chappell, State Responses to Nuclear Proliferation, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59801-3

391

392 220, 226, 230, 232, 234, 239, 247, 255, 256, 259, 272, 276, 277, 282, 288, 291, 293, 326, 329 as a counterproliferation instrument, 52 benefits of, 146 Iran compensates for lack of, 213 Russian, 193 air superiority, 157–160 al-Adel, Saif, 112 al-Assad, Bashar, 193, 254, 257, 261, 325 Bolstered by Iran and Hezbollah, 213 al-Assad, Hafez Assassination attempt, 197 Palestinian recognition, 194 al-Assad, Rifaat Assault on Hama, 197 al-Awlaki, Abdulrahman killed by U.S. drone, 136 al-Awlaki, Anwar killed by U.S. drone, 136 al-Din, Adnan Saad Muslim Brotherhood leader, 196 Alexandre Debs and Nuno Monteiro, 10 al Farisi, Salman Companion of the Prophet Muhammed, 195 Alfoneh, Ali Iranian protests, 210 Algiers Accords, 275 Ali ibn Abi Talib venerated by the Alawite Community, 195 Ali Jafari, Mohammad, 201 Alimohammadi, Masoud Assassinated Iranian nuclear scientist, 96 Al-Kibar nuclear reactor, 110, 252, 255, 256, 260, 287, 288. See also Syria al-Mabhouh, Mahmoud killing of, 93 al-Majeed, General Hussein Kamel Supervised Iraq’s weapons development, 188 al-Nimr, Sheikh Nimr Execution of, 211 al Otaiba, Yousef Iran nuclear threat, 209 al-Qaeda, 4, 55, 62, 84, 85, 104, 105, 112, 133, 167, 170, 190, 235, 251 Attacks on U.S. soil, 82 Attempts to link to Iraq, 190 Bush notes war on terror begins with, 58 September 11th attacks, 83 al-Zahra, Fatima, 204

Index American Exceptionalism, 44 American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), 176 American POWs, 29 American Prisoners of War (POWs) Held prisoner in Hiroshima, 29 American Slavery, 22 analogical reasoning, 22, 62, 63, 69, 286 anti-Americanism, 178 Anti-Semitism, 89, 180, 189, 268 Adolf Hitler, 73 Joseph Goebbels, 73 Mearsheimer and Walt accused of, 179 Saddam Hussein, 189 A.Q. Khan Network, xiii, 3, 36, 80 Arab–Israeli conflict, 15, 129, 131, 172, 175, 257 Arab–Israeli wars, 12, 147, 170 Arab nationalism, 192, 228, 330 Arafat, Yasser Ariel Sharon’s Osama bin Laden, 71 Arens, Moshe, 237, 238 Arms Export Control Act, 5, 309 Arnold, General Henry “Hap”, 28 Ashkenazi Jews, 78 Ashura, 204 Assad government, 194, 262 assassinated, 188, 222, 314, 316–318, 320, 322, 323, 325 Iranian nuclear scientists, 207 Assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists Assessed to be too dangerous, 97 Three lasting impacts, 98 White defections, 98 Assured Destruction, 32, 341 Atomic Bomb Fat Man, 29 Little Boy, 29 Atoms for Peace program, 38, 41, 262, 315 Audacity of Hope, The, 112 Auschwitz Concentration Camp Israel Air Force fly over, 75 Netanyahu speech at, 75 Ayalon, Danny, 100

B B-29 bombers, 30 B-29 Superfortress bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 29 B-52 bomber, 139, 143 Baathists Syria, 196

Index Bacevich, Andrew, 164 Baghdad Pact, 186, 314, 315 Baktiari, Bahman, 214 States seek nuclear weapons for international legitimacy, 40 balance, 174 balance of power, 33 Balance of Terror. See India-Pakistan rivalry Bandwagon, 174 weaker state supposed to bandwagon, xiv bandwagoning, 212 Bangladesh Pakistan’s loss of, 44 Barak, Ehud, 63, 74, 76, 118, 253 Critical of Benjamin Netanyahu, 270 Ordered preparations for a strike against Iran, 97 battle damage assessment (BDA), 164 Battle of Karbala, 205 Bavar-373 long-range air defense system, 162 Begin, Menachem Israeli attack on Iraq’s nuclear reactor, 151 behaviors, 8, 12, 13, 21, 54, 57, 64, 291 beliefs, 13–15, 20–22, 44, 45, 54, 56, 57, 59, 60, 64, 71, 81, 84, 106, 118, 122, 190, 220, 224, 243, 280, 285, 291, 350 Ben-Gurion, David, 271, 314 Bhagavad-Gita Recited by Oppenheimer, 28 Bilad Al-Sham, 192 Bill Clinton Preventive Strike Against North Korea, 4 bin al-Shibh, Ramzi Coordinator of September 11th attacks, 84 bin Salman, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed, 174, 186 bin Zayed, Mohammed Compared Ahmadinejad to Hitler, 280 Black Bomb Concerns about South Africa’s nuclear weapons, 35 Bojinka KSM airline attack planning, 83 Bolton, John (National Security Advisor) Sparks outrage in North Korea, 49 Boots on the ground (BOG), 18 Boswell, Rosalind, ix Brendan Rittenhouse Green, 10 British Foreign Office memorandum, 205 Brodie, Bernard, 31

393 Buckley, William CIA Station Chief murdered, 93 Buffalo Soldiers, 82 Bull, Gerald V., 188 Bundy, McGeorge, 125 Bunker-busting bombs Israel request for, 207 Bush administration, xv, 21, 52, 55–60, 62, 63, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 112, 114, 116, 131, 133–137, 152, 160, 190– 192, 235, 237, 240, 242–244, 246– 249, 251, 252, 254, 259, 260, 264, 278, 279, 285–288, 292, 293, 295 2002 National Security Strategy, 134, 249, 259, 288, 295 2004 National Military Strategy, 152 2006 National Security Strategy, 110, 135, 259, 288, 295 Bushehr nuclear reactor, 17, 318 Bush, George H.W., 74, 104, 106, 131 Bush, George W., 5, 21, 54–57, 60, 62, 69, 104–107, 109, 110, 123, 133–136, 152, 153, 190, 191, 206, 215, 235, 238, 242, 243, 246, 249, 250, 252, 254, 257, 261, 274, 275, 285, 287, 295, 305, 322 Criticized by Nelson Mandela, 56 Declassified 2007 Iran NIE Key Judgments, 99 Declined to attack Al-Kibar reactor, 109 Denies Israeli request for bunk-busting bombs, 99 Memorializes the September 11th attacks, 84 Saddam Hussein and worst-case scenario, 81 September 11th attackers hate our freedoms, 85 Syria’s nuclear ambitions, 153

C Cairo Conference, 185 Caliph, 204, 331 Camp David Accords, 91 Carpenter, Ted Galen, 49, 168 Carter, Jimmy, 129 Israel request to halt Iraq’s uranium enrichment, 150 Response to Israel’s request to bomb Iraq, 151 case study countries, 9, 25, 68, 72, 103, 156, 168, 184, 221

394 Casey, William, 131 causal mechanisms, 22, 65 Center for the Study of Intelligence White paper on 2007 NIE - Iran nuclear intentions and capabilities, 99 Central Asia, 78 Central Intelligence Agency, 83, 109, 110, 131, 133, 228, 238, 243, 244, 274, 279, 314, 318 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 248 Gen Colin L. Powell, 151 Military Advisor to the President, 148 Chaldean Church in Michigan, 228 Chappell, Amir Pasha, ix Chappell, Jan, ix Chappell, Linold Sgt, 82 Chappell, Olivia, ix Chappell, Roy M., xii Chappell, William, xii Cheney, Dick, 106, 134 Referencing September 11th attacks, 285 China, 1, 33, 85, 86, 133, 142, 156, 164, 189, 294, 319, 328, 342, 343 Chinese embassy in Belgrade, 133 Dongfeng-41 ballistic missiles, 142 Joined the nuclear club, 34 Nuclear test, 35 chosen trauma, 225 Christian evangelicals. See Evangelical Christians Churchill, Winston, 185 Clarke, Richard, 104 Clinton administration, 5, 132, 228 Club of Five, 33 CNN effect, 160 Coalition Forces, 242, 321 coercive diplomacy, xiii–xv, 7, 8, 16, 23, 25, 27, 38, 51, 55, 57, 60, 70, 75, 102, 114, 116, 136, 146, 153, 171, 220, 231, 232, 257, 259, 275, 277, 278, 282, 285–288, 290, 293–296 Iran’s nuclear ambitions, 266 cognitive biases, 59, 221 cognitive complexity, 44 cognitive limitations, 13, 22, 61 cognitive processes, 13, 15, 19, 21, 67, 292 cognitive processing, 21, 54 cognitive psychological influences, xv, 8, 19, 23, 24, 56, 65, 67–69, 72, 106, 115, 217, 219, 220, 225, 282, 289–295 Cognitive psychologists, 71 Cognitive thought, 57

Index Cold War, 30, 31, 33, 35, 85–87, 103, 113, 125, 131, 132, 136, 139–142, 150, 173, 229, 230, 331, 332, 341 concept of operations (CONOPS), 162 Conditional threats, 23 Confirmation Biases, 243 Congress, 21, 74, 84, 110, 122–125, 136, 138, 157, 220, 251, 257, 268, 274, 278, 288, 309, 311, 312, 328 Netanyahu appears before to criticize the Iran nuclear deal, 267 Separation of powers, 122 Congressional Research Service, 127, 130, 143, 172, 173, 201, 212, 228, 267, 342 Contras U.S. support, 149 Cordesman, Anthony, 157 counterattack, 224, 237 counterproliferation, 17, 18, 25, 52, 155, 190 crises, 22, 53, 132, 344 Crusades Bush describes war in Afghanistan as, 85 cyberattacks, 16, 207 Cyrus, 210

D Dagan, Meir Critical of Israeli plans to strike Iran, 98 Iranian nuclear ambitions, 96 Israel’s plan to attack Iran is insane, 97 Stopping Iran’s nuclear program, 95 Warns against attacking Iran, 207 Dahiya Doctrine, 147 Darius, 210 “Death to America”, 268 decision-makers, xv, 8, 9, 13, 14, 19, 21, 22, 27, 49, 53, 56, 57, 59, 61, 64, 67, 69, 72, 116, 167, 174, 217, 221, 289, 291–293 decision-making process, 9, 13, 55, 59, 60, 122, 217, 338 decision-tree heuristics, 23, 25, 217, 281, 294 Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holiest Sites Osama bin Laden declaration, 83 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 244 defensively minded status quo leaders, 21 Deir ez-Zor Syrian nuclear reactor near, 192

Index Delta Force, 111 demagoguery, 20 Dershowitz, Alan Criticism of The Israel Lobby book, 179 Desert Fox, 191 Desert Storm, 49, 81, 191, 237, 241, 320 Deterrence Theory, 31 Detroit, Michigan, 228 Deutch, John U.S. nuclear security schema, 37 Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation, 12, 13, 18, 51, 53, 220, 222, 225, 227, 231, 234, 236, 247, 251, 252, 255, 258, 268, 282, 290, 291, 296 Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation Theory, 11, 12, 27, 51, 64, 219, 221, 222, 230, 240, 249, 256, 259, 273, 277, 282, 290, 294 distorted perceptions, 15, 67, 292 Dobbins, James, U.S. Ambassador Iran’s security dilemma, 206 Druze Syrian influence over, 109

E Earth Penetrating Weapons (EPW), 7 East–West competition, 172 Ebadi, Shirin, 215 Egypt, 12, 60, 77, 80, 91, 127, 128, 130, 131, 136, 138, 158, 171, 172, 174, 193, 254, 312, 315–318, 325, 340 Peace treaty with Israel, 194 Sinai Peninsula, 91 Einstein, Albert, 28 Eisenhower administration, 128 emotional biases, 59 emotions, 13, 15, 19, 205, 280, 340 End Times. See Rapture Enola Gay, 29 European Union, 267, 281, 324 Evangelical Christians Ardent supporters of Israel, 180 George W. Bush, 182 Opposed to the Iran Nuclear Deal, 183 Support for Israel, 176 Support for Israel and American foreign policy, 183 White evangelical influence on Republican Party, 182 Evangelical Christian theology Driver of support for Israel, 182 excess defense articles (EDA), 101

395 existential threat, 12, 61, 76, 85, 87, 92, 132, 167, 184, 190, 209, 226, 227, 233, 252, 264, 266, 270–273, 278, 295 Israeli perceptions, 80 Israeli threat to Syria, 197 Explosively formed penetrators (EFPs), 206 Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons Book by Matthew Kroenig, 37 Extended Deterrence, 32 Ezzat-e melli Iranian national pride, 214

F F-14 Tomcats Iranian, 270 F-22 Raptor, 159 F-35 Lightning II, 156, 159 Fakhrizadeh, Mohsen Leader of Iran’s nuclear program, 97 Fat Man Dropped on Nagasaki, 29 fear, 3, 23, 38, 39, 44, 49, 55, 57, 80, 85, 90, 102, 105, 107, 135, 173, 192, 197, 205, 226, 233, 235, 249, 250, 270, 271 Further nuclear proliferation, 37 Israeli fear of annihilation, 79 Fission Energy produced by, 28 fixed analogy, 75, 78, 81, 106 Flexible Response, 33, 139 Fordow uranium enrichment facility, 266 foreign assistance, 172 foreign policy, xiv, xv, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 16, 21, 27, 32, 33, 37, 48, 49, 53, 56, 57, 60, 64, 72, 84, 86, 101, 103, 106, 110, 112, 114, 116–118, 121– 125, 131, 133, 135, 137, 138, 144, 167, 168, 186, 187, 192, 217, 220, 228, 231, 246, 250, 276, 279, 281, 289, 291, 293–295, 341, 347–349 foreign policy decision-making (FPDM), xv, 8 Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) IRGC-QF designated as, 206 forward arming and refueling points (FARP), 161 The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse, 37 Foxman, Abraham, 179 France Joined the nuclear club, 34

396 Franco-Syrian War, 185 Free Syrian Army Israel support to, 193 G Gates, Robert, 261, 285 Argued against Saudi request to attack Iran, 280 Downplays Iran’s hostile intent, 265 Gaza, 77, 91, 92, 137, 314, 316, 319, 320, 323, 324, 337, 339 Gemayel, Bashir, 253, 318 Genesis 13:14-17 God gives Abraham land, 181 George Washington’s Proclamation of Neutrality, 123 Gerges, Fawas Iran and Saudi Arabia, 280 Glasnost, 150 global powers, 27, 286 Global War on Terrorism, 5, 55, 58, 105, 110, 142, 251 Goebbels, Joseph Anti-Semitic rhetoric, 73 Goheen, Robert F., 43, 92 Golan Heights, 91, 137, 192, 197, 252, 253, 260, 261, 316, 318, 327 Golan,Yair, 76 Goodman, Robert LT Freed by Syrian, 109 Gorbachev, Mikhail Becomes new Soviet leader, 150 Great Power Competition China, 175 Green Movement, 281 Lebas Shakhsi, 336 Ground-Based Midcourse Defense antiballistic missile system, 142 Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), 143 Ground Line of Communication (GLOC), 209 Gulf Arabs, 210 Iranians view with disdain, 210 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 213 Gulf War, 21, 36, 61, 63, 74, 103, 104, 151, 154, 160, 169, 191, 195, 234–237, 239–243, 248, 251, 257, 320 H Hafez, 257, 316, 319, 320 Haig, Alexander

Index Secretary of State, 150 Haman Persian Viceroy, 267 Hamas, 89, 91, 92, 171, 200, 213, 269, 275, 309, 320, 322–324, 337 Effects of Israel’s policies, 178 Hama, Syria Massacre of Muslim Brotherhood, 197 Muslim Brotherhood stronghold, 197 Hardman, Willard, x Hariri, Rafik, 254, 257, 323 Hayden, CIA Director, General Michael, 98 Hayden, Michael CIA Director, 109 Henderson, Phillip, ix Groupthink in George W. Bush adminstration, 59 Iraq War costs, 106 Hersh, Seymour, 275 Heuristic for the Proliferation Response, 217, 218, 220, 227, 249, 250, 256, 259, 260, 273, 277, 282 Heuristic for Threat Assessment Privileging Identity, 217–220, 225, 230, 247, 259, 281 Hezbollah, 91, 93, 101, 146, 155, 158, 169, 171, 195, 198, 200, 209, 213, 254, 257, 260, 261, 269, 275, 309, 318, 320, 323, 337 Iranian weapons transfers, 159 Iran resupply of, 214 Support during Syria’s Civil War, 193 Syria used to resupply, 199 hibakusha, 30 higher threat. See threat perceptions Hiroshima, 29, 30, 154, 224, 225, 314, 337 historical tragedy, 19, 22, 68, 70, 71, 267 History of armed conflict, xv Hitler, Adolf, 62, 63, 71, 74, 134, 208, 270, 280, 285, 286, 292, 313 Anti-Semitism of, 73 Dangers posed by possesion of an atomic weapon, 28 Goebbels description of meeting that discussed Jewish destruction, 73 Used as a stock character, 71 Hobbes, Thomas, 13 struggle for power, 38 view of the world, 49 Holbrooke, Richard, 134 Holocaust, xv, 8, 22, 44, 61, 63, 64, 70–72, 76–79, 87, 89, 90, 134, 208, 224, 225,

Index 227, 233, 255, 269, 271–273, 285– 287, 289, 291, 293, 294, 296, 313, 315, 323, 347 Israel’s fear of a second, 57 Israel links to emerging threats, 116 Holocaust analogy, 63, 73, 74, 76, 79, 87, 134, 208, 233, 271, 287 Framing of threats, 73 Used to warn of threats to Israel, 176 horizontal proliferation, 35, 48, 53, 67, 68, 72, 231, 292 Hosseinpour, Ardeshir Assassinated Iranian nuclear scientist, 96 human behavior, 13 Hussein, Saddam Analyzed by Jerrold Post, 61 Anti-Semitism of, 226, 236 Appeal to Gulf States, 104 Army promotion nepotism, 187 Axis of Evil, 105 Bellicose rhetoric and Israel, 92 Bush 2003 State of the Union address, 242 Bush’s goal of overthrowing, 52 Bush and 9/11 attacks, 135 Bush assertion of WMD, 63 Bush garners support to overthrow, 251 Bush warning about WMD, 235 Butcher of Baghdad, 292 Colin Powell UN speech, 245 Condi Rice and Smoking Gun, 133 Conservative desire to overthrow, 104 Danger of a nuclear Iraq, 190 Death, 192 Desire to stay in power, 108 Dispute over Kuwait and weak economy, 104 Evil incarnate, 105 George H.W. Bush compared to Adolph Hitler, 74 Invasion of Kuwait, 187 Iran–Iraq War, 184 Iran’s concerns about threats, 264 Iraqi nuclear program, 188 Israeli desire to overthrow, 238 Key to the City of Detroit, 228 Kuwait invasion justification, 241 Menachem Begin’s view of, 286 Munich analogy, 105 Negative image of America, 54 Neocons call for the overthrow of, 242 Nuclear ambitions of, 188 Nuclear crash course after Osirak, 18

397 Osirak nuclear reactors, 221 Ousted from power, 9 Overthrown, 168, 184, 186, 191 Potential nexus with al-Qaeda, 107 Psychological Profile, 108 Reconstituted nuclear program, 107 Response to Israel’s attack on the Osirak nuclear reactor, 190 Saving face, 107 Sought a nuclear deterrent, 188 Support for Lebanon, 195 Support for MEK, 112 Toppled, 57 Transfer WMD to terrorist scenario, 81 tried to kill my George H.W. Bush, 106 Urges Arabs to help him get a nuclear weapon, 43 U.S. concerns about WMD, 177 Used as a stock character, 71 Use of chemical weapons against Kurds, 187 U.S. intent to overthrow, 250 U.S. predisposition of guilt, 60 Hymans, Jacques E.C., 38 national identity conceptions, 44 The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, 44

I ibn Ali, Husayn Son of Ali, 204 Ikhwan. See Muslim Brotherhood Imam Ali Brigades, 185 Imam Husayn, 203, 204, 215 Commemoration of his martyrdom, 205 Fled to Kufa, 204 Women mourn during Ashura, 204 Imam Hussein University, 97 Imperial Japan Continues to fight, 28 inadvertent nuclear detonation, 297 India–Pakistan rivalry, 1 individual-level, 8, 11, 13, 25, 45, 105, 217, 232, 247, 250, 282, 289, 290, 294, 296 intelligence collection, 16, 109, 156 Intelligence Community (IC), 244 Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) Used to conduct battle damage assessment, 18 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), 1

398 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 2, 36, 47, 92, 115, 136, 206, 254, 258, 261, 262, 275, 305–308, 321–325, 329, 332, 340, 342, 344, 346, 347 Iran’s failure to cooperate, 266 Iran refuses to answer questions, 266 international military education and training (IMET), 169 international nonproliferation regime, 36 international protocols, 19, 276 international symbols of modernity, 42 international system, xiii, 4, 8, 10, 11, 22, 39, 41, 45, 47, 52, 57, 67, 195, 292, 295, 296, 330, 348 Intifada, 79, 319, 321, 339 Iran, xiii–xv, 2, 3, 5–7, 9, 12, 16–18, 36, 38, 40–44, 46–48, 53, 61–63, 68, 72, 74, 76, 80, 81, 89, 90, 101, 103–105, 108–115, 118, 119, 123, 124, 127, 128, 130, 131, 135, 136, 138, 140, 141, 153–156, 160–162, 164, 165, 168, 169, 171–174, 184–188, 190, 191, 193–195, 199, 201, 202, 205, 206, 208, 209, 212–215, 221, 222, 228, 233, 237, 238, 240, 241, 246, 250, 257, 260, 262–281, 285–289, 294, 295, 306–310, 312–328, 330, 334, 337, 340, 344, 346–348, 350, 351 1979 Iranian Revolution, 103, 129, 186, 202, 228, 270 Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb, 211 Allegations it would attack Israel or the United States, 265 A.Q. Khan Network, 80 Assymetric capability, 213 Ballistic missile inventory, 200 Ballistic missile program, 200 Ballistic missile range, 201 British and American overthrow of Mossadegh, 202 Case Study, 7 Conspiracy theories, 203 “Death to America”, 130 Disdain for Gulf States, 210 Distrust of the United States, 205 Domestic military industry, 200 economic sanctions, 136 Economy stagnated, 210 Enemy of Saddam Hussein, 188 Existential threat discussion, 209

Index explosively formed projectiles (EFPs), 212 ezzat-e melli, 40 foreign influence, 201 Foreign policy and past glory, 199 Green Movement, 138 Hostilities with Iraq, 107 Iran’s leaders, 40, 268 Iranian Air Force, 187 Iranian economy grew, 115 Iran is a challenging and implacable theocratic enemy, 68 Iran with U.S. combat forces, 43 Iraq attempts to seize Khuzestan Province, 187 Islamic Republic of, 3, 103, 108, 110, 111, 113, 114, 203, 205, 208, 264, 268, 279, 281, 307, 326 Israel’s limited diplomatic options, 79 Israeli strike against, 207 Israel option for preemptive attack against, 147 Israel threatens to attack the nuclear infrastructure of, 207 “Maximum Pressure” campaign, 206 Military commanders warn of retaliation if attacked, 100 Military coups, 201 Military forces inside Syria, 214 National psyche, 202 National security policy, 199 Nuclear Iran challenges the regional power balance, 101 Nuclear Iran intimidates other states, 174 Nuclear Program is for peaceful purposes, 2 Nuclear scientists assassinated, 96 Nuclear weapons will increase its strategic position, 40 Operation Ajax, 202 People proud of their history and culture, 215 Perceptions of its physical environment, 201 Prestige and national honor, 40 Qajar Dynasty, 312 Reagan’s support for Iraq during IranIraq War, 151 Restarted uranium enrichment centrifuges, 50 Saved Syria from defeat, 214 Sees itself as a technologically advanced state, 41

Index six-point discussion, 112 Solitary power surrounded by enemies, 214 Stresses nonproliferation regime, 36 surrounded by hostile states, 211 Tudeh Party, 202 Tzipi Livni opposition to diplomacy with U.S., 79 Undeclared uranium enrichment facility, 265 Uranium enrichment, 201 U.S. viewed as the Great Satan, 71 Views itself as a regional power, 211 Western calls for negotiations, 147 Western oil interests, 202 Iran-Contra Affair, 112, 131 Iran–Iraq War, xv, 43, 61, 103, 104, 111, 130, 131, 187, 195, 222, 228, 233, 241, 263, 274 Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), 3 Nuclear umbrella for activities, xvi Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards CropsQuds Force (IRGC-QF), 169, 212, 213, 263, 275, 327 Death of Qassem Soleimani, 206 Iran’s Military Artesh, 208 Iran’s Nuclear Program Iran’s nuclear ambitions, 315 Iran’s nuclear program, 3, 5, 17, 40, 42, 63, 76, 102, 112, 118, 147, 153, 154, 214, 262, 267, 268, 272–279, 281, 285, 307, 309, 326 Iran’s nuclear ambitions, 3, 7, 36, 41, 44, 174, 262, 266, 275 Supply chain, 96 Iran Freedom Support Act, 274 Iranian poets Dehkhoda, 203 Hedayat, Sadegh, 203 Mirza, Iraz, 203 Moghadam, Hossein, 203 Zakani, Obeyd, 203 Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps-Quds Force. See Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) Iranian threat, 63, 74, 119, 208, 209, 285 Iran-Iraq War, 317–319 Iran Nuclear Deal. See also Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) U.S. withdrawal, 201

399 Iraq, xiv, xv, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 16, 18, 21, 43, 46, 47, 49, 51–53, 55–57, 59–62, 64, 69, 81, 83–85, 91, 92, 94, 102–108, 110–114, 116, 123, 127, 128, 130, 131, 133–136, 138, 141, 142, 151– 154, 158, 160, 161, 164, 165, 168– 171, 184–191, 193–195, 200, 206, 211, 212, 215, 221–251, 254, 257– 261, 263–265, 274–278, 280, 282, 285–290, 292–295, 305, 306, 309– 313, 315–328, 330 al-Anfal campaign, 222 Ba’athists, 187, 315 Ba’ath Party, 57, 228, 314, 315 Deaths from U.S.-led war, 108 Invasion of Kuwait, 190 Iraqi Republican Guard, 169 no-fly zones, 104, 105, 190, 191, 234, 241, 242 Nuclear program, 188 Saudis invite foreign forces to defend against, 84 U.S. desire for regime change, 18 WMD program, 36 Iraq Survey Group (ISG), 243 Iron Dome short-range missile defense system Additional funding, 101 Islam Evangelical Christians’ negative views of, 183 Osama bin Laden believed the West intent on destroying, 83 Story of Imam Husayn, 203 Islamic Bomb. See also Pakistan Pakistan, 35 Islamic Jihad Organization, 93 Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 67, 170, 268, 306, 326 Iran’s fight against, 268 Iraq lost land to, 185 Ismailis, 195 Israel, xiv, xv, 2, 7, 9, 10, 12, 16, 17, 19, 24, 33, 42, 44, 51, 52, 57, 60–63, 68, 70, 72, 75–80, 84–87, 89–95, 101– 103, 108–110, 112, 114, 117–119, 121, 122, 127, 128, 130, 132, 134, 135, 137–140, 144, 146, 153, 155– 162, 165, 166, 168–174, 176, 184, 187–191, 193–195, 197, 198, 205, 207–209, 214, 215, 221–229, 231– 234, 236–240, 246, 249, 251–257, 260–265, 268–274, 278–280, 282,

400 283, 285–289, 291, 293–295, 311– 324, 326, 327, 330, 334, 337, 341, 342, 345, 347, 348, 351 Access to U.S. war reserve stockpiles, 101 Airpower for counterproliferation, 18 Attack against Syria’s nuclear reactor, 198 Attack on Osirak reactor and Reagan, 151 Dahiya Doctrine, 147 Disproportionate military capability, 79 Emphasis on rhetoric, 73 Encourages U.S. to launch preventive airstrikes against Iran, 266 Enemy of Saddam Hussein, 188 Exaggeration of Iraqi WMD, 238 Existence fulfills Bible prophecy, 182 Governing the Occupied Territories, 77 Inadvertent escalation of hostilities, 147 independence on May 14, 1948, 171 Informal military doctrine, 148 Israeli foreign policy decision-making model, 122 Israeli security policy, 73 Links Holocaust to emerging threats, 116 military doctrine, 147 Military Influence on leaders, 120 Military threat to Iran, 41 national security doctrine, 118 National Security Policy, 117 Netanyahu equates Iran with Nazi Germany, 74 Preventive strike against Iraq, 190 Preventive strike discussions, 100 Quality of its military and intelligence apparatus, 148 Regional power projection, 18 Regional power structure in the Middle East, 199 Rigid mindset and use of force, 80 Saddam’s response to attack on Osirak, 43 settlements, 77, 137, 138, 175, 324, 326, 327 Syrians accused of aggressive foreign policy, 197 target killings, 91 Tel Aviv, 61, 150, 214, 237, 254 Threatens to attack Iran, 207 U.S. Ambassador meets with Prime Minister Begin over Iraq, 150

Index U.S. relationship fuels Arab anger and resentment, 177 U.S. support justification is circular, 177 View of JCPOA, 115 Westernized Democracy, 175 Yitzhak Shamir’s belief Arabs want to conquer, 147 Israel Defense Force (IDF), 92, 121 Israel Lobby Domestic Influences, 176 Influence of, 176 Influence on U.S. foreign policy, 178 Iran threat inflated, 177 Mearsheimer and Walt Book, 176 Power of, 178 Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, 93

J Jabhat al-Nusra, 170 Jackson, Reverend Jesse Freed LT Goodman, 109 Jackson, Tiana, xi Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM), 2 James, Fred Sr., xii Jammu and Kashmir. See India-Pakistan rivalry Japan, 29, 30, 85, 280, 314, 337, 338 North Korea threatens with nuclear strikes, 1 U.S. defeat of, 82 Jerusalem Given to Jewish people by God, 181 Return of the Messiah, 181 U.S. Embassy moved to, 183 Jervis, Robert, 14, 33, 81, 89, 135 Perception and Misperception in International Politics, 53 Study of foreign policy decision-making, 53 Jewish lobby groups. See Israel Lobby Jewish people, 72, 74, 114, 294, 351 Netanyahu highlights the suffering of, 267 Jewish settlements, 180 Jewish State. See Israel Jewish voters, 180 Jim Crow segregation, 87 Johnson, Brian, xi Johnson, Kahlil, x Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), 169

Index Joint

Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), 3, 5, 16, 47, 115, 206, 276, 326, 327 Benefits to Iran’s economy, 115 Criticized by Israel, xiv P5+1 successfully negotiated, 267 U.S. bought time while negotiating, 101 U.S. Withdrawal, 6, 50, 138, 267, 269, 275, 277, 281 Jong Il, Kim, 54 Jordan, 12, 77, 80, 91, 127, 130, 158, 171, 187, 193, 254, 260, 312, 314, 316, 320, 321, 325, 337 Judea, and Samaria, 77

K Kahan Commission, 253 Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, xxi Kargil Crisis. See India-Pakistan rivalry Kataeb Hezbollah, 185 Kay, David Head of the Iraq Survey Group, 107 Kennan, George Containment Strategy, 128 Kennedy administration, 128 Khamenei, Ayatollah Ali, 41, 81, 113, 114, 136, 280, 319, 327 Anti-Semitic views, 69 Critical of Israel, 273 Eliminating Israel, 114 Letter from Qassem Soleimani on ISIS, 165 Mohammed bin Salman’s view of, 71 Netanyahu compares to Hitler, 208 Netanyahu views as spewing antiSemitism, 268 Reflects on Iran’s security dilemma, 264 Tweet on Eliminating Israel, 114 View of nuclear weapons, 201 Khan, Saira Relationship between weak and powerful states, xiv Khan, Samir killed by U.S. drone, 136 Khartoum Declaration, 77 Khatam-al Anbiya Construction Headquarters, 200 Khatami, Mohammad Support of Iran’s peaceful nuclear program, 40 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah, 42, 71, 114, 203, 205, 263, 315, 317, 319, 334

401 Questioning of Israel’s existence, 269 Khong, Yuen Foong, 62 Vietnam syndrome, 82 Killing Fields, 22 Kim Jong Un, 5 King Faisal I of Iraq, 185 King Faisal II of Iraq, 185 King Ghazi of Iraq, 185 King Hussein of Jordan Request for Iraq troops in 1958, 185 King of Greater Syria. See King Faisal I Kirkpatrick, Jeane protested Israeli attack on Iraq’s nuclear reactor, 151 Kissinger, Henry A., 91, 125 Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse, 37 Timing of Iran suspending its nuclear program, 100 Korean War, 82 Kosovo ethnic Albanians, 160 Krepinevich, Andrew, 164 Kreps and Fuhrmann, 7, 9, 18, 53, 90 Kroenig. See Kroenig, Matthew Kroenig, Matthew Proliferation’s varying effects, 27 The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation, 11 Kurdish rebellion. See Kurds Kurds, Iraqi, 104, 108, 128, 184, 186, 187, 190, 222, 318, 319, 327 abandoned, 128 gassed in Halabja, Iraq, 187 Kuwait invasion of, 54, 84, 92, 104, 105, 131, 184, 187, 190, 195, 213, 238, 240, 241, 320

L Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), 1 League of Nations British Mandate, 185 Lebanon, 12, 91, 92, 102, 108, 109, 134, 155, 158, 165, 169–171, 185, 194, 195, 197, 198, 200, 209, 214, 253, 254, 257, 258, 310, 312, 315, 316, 318, 319, 323–325, 330, 337 Bekaa Valley, 158 Bekaa Valley air campaign, 158 Second Lebanon War, 146, 159 LeMay, Curtis, Major General, 28

130, 174, 206, 263, 321,

402 Levant Israel and Syria compete for influence in, 192 Levy, Jack, 12 Libya, 3, 10, 49, 127, 138, 141, 154, 165, 168, 194, 250, 309, 311, 319, 321, 322, 325 Christopher Stevens killed in Benghazi, 138 Libya Model John Bolton sparks outrage in North Korea, 50 Line of Control. See India-Pakistan rivalry Little Boy Dropped on Hiroshima, 29 Livni, Tzipi Opposition to U.S.–Iran diplomacy, 79 local powers, 27 Long Range Stand Off Weapon (LRSO), 143 Lotfian, Saideh Iran’s distrust of the United States, 205

M Machiavelli, 38 magnetic “sticky bombs” Used to execute Iranian nuclear scientists, 98 Mandela, Nelson Criticized George W. Bush, 56 Nuclear weapons, 35 Manhattan Project Established, 28 Man, the State and War, 31 Maoz, Zeev, 121, 146 mapping, 22, 69, 74, 106, 226, 245, 272, 286 Definition, 22 Marr, Phebe, 186 Massive Retaliation, 33 Matthew Kroenig, 11, 17, 24, 27, 64, 145, 282, 290, 293, 296 Expands Waltz–Sagan debates, 51 Supply-side nuclear assistance, 37 Systemic focus on nuclear proliferation and international stability, 51 Mattis, Secretary of Defense Jim “The Enemy Gets a Vote”, 100 Mazrui, Ali Politics of race and nuclear proliferation, 35 McCain, John Criticism of President Obama, 67, 279 McCarthy, Joseph, 85

Index McDermott, Rose Worst-case scenarios, 59 Mearsheimer and Walt Accused of Anti-Semitism, 179 Deny accusations of Anti-Semitism, 180 Influence of the Israel Lobby, 176 Iran threat is overblown, 177 Iran threat overblown, 177 Israel falsely portrayed as weak, 177 U.S. justification for helping Israel, 177 U.S. support for Israel’s existence, 178 Mearsheimer, John, 39 Meir, Golda, 316 Mengiste, Maaza, xi Mesbahi, Mohiaddin Iran’s strategic loneliness, 212 States engage in “Bullshitting”, 69 Middle East, xiv, 7, 9, 17, 19, 25, 39, 60, 71, 85, 88, 102, 103, 108, 112, 113, 127– 133, 137, 139, 150, 155, 157, 158, 165, 169, 172, 173, 186–188, 190, 193, 194, 197, 206, 215, 229, 246, 254, 255, 264, 278, 280, 285, 289, 311–316, 319, 321, 323, 330, 337, 339, 340, 344–347, 351 military doctrine, 8, 19, 25, 146, 147, 166, 293 U.S. doctrine evolution, 148 military force, xiv, xv, 7–9, 13, 16, 18, 23, 25, 27, 51, 57, 58, 68, 80, 82, 101, 110, 118, 121, 129, 153, 168, 184, 187, 220, 227, 231, 246, 247, 249, 257, 260, 274, 280, 282, 287, 288, 294, 344–346 Miller, Nicholas, 13, 45 miniaturized a nuclear warhead. See North Korea Minuteman III ICBM, 143 misperceptions, 14, 15, 21, 22, 44, 67, 118, 292 Moammar Qaddafi Need for an Arab nuclear bomb, 184 Mohammed, Khalid Sheikh (KSM), 83 September 11th attack planning, 83 Morgenthau, Hans, 39 Mossad Infiltrates room of Syrian nuclear director, 109 List of 15 Iranian researchers marked for assassination, 96 Mossadegh, Mohammad, 110, 128, 131, 202, 205, 314 Coup against, 202

Index Iran views U.S. role as hypocritical, 202 overthrown, 110, 202 Motivational goals, 57 motivations, xv, 7, 8, 13, 15, 16, 19, 23, 27, 41, 43–45, 47, 53, 56, 59, 64, 69, 83, 85, 108, 111, 167, 185, 191, 203, 205, 215, 221, 339 Mousavian, Seyed Hossein, 201, 281 Mousavi, Mir-Hossein 2009 Iranian Presidential election, 281 Interview in 2009, 215 Muawiya, 204 Mueller, Jim, 33 Mughniyeh, Imad killing of, 93 Muhammad, Jude Kenan killed by U.S. drone, 136 Muharram, 204, 205 Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), 112 Mujahideen Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 149 Mullah Omar. See Taliban Munich agreement, 1938, 62 Munich analogy, 62–64, 71, 74, 105 Muslim Brotherhood, 78, 312, 314, 318, 325, 341 Assassination campaign, 197 Considers Alawaites infidels and heretics, 196 Prison massacre, 197 Rebellion against Syria’s Baathists, 196 Muslims Al-Qaeda belief that U.S. policies unfairly attack, 85 Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), 32, 139 My Uncle Napoleon, 203

N Nafisi, Azar Conspiracy theories and satire in Iran, 203 Nagasaki, 29, 30, 154, 314, 337 Narang, Vipin, 120 Nasr, Vali, 204 Nasser, President Gamal Abdel Unified Egypt and Syria, 193 Natanz, 207 Natanz uranium enrichment facility, 17 Bush denied Israeli request to overfly Iraq to bomb, 99 Iran’s stockpile of fissile material, 98

403 Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan assassinated, 98 National Defense Strategy (NDS), 148 National Emergencies Act in 1976, 123 National Intelligence Council Update of the Iran Nuclear Program NIE, 99 National Intelligence Estimate, 243, 244, 323 nationalist sentiment post-9/11, 112 National Military Strategy (NMS), 148 national pride, 38, 41, 43, 214 Iranian, 202 national security, 4, 8, 9, 13, 16, 19, 21, 23, 24, 31, 36, 42, 45, 49, 50, 56, 59, 70, 79, 88, 90, 103, 104, 107, 117, 118, 120, 121, 127, 129, 132, 141, 142, 144–146, 148, 153, 156, 159, 161, 169, 172, 184, 185, 195, 197, 217, 220, 224–230, 232, 235, 237– 241, 244, 247, 251, 254, 256–260, 263, 270, 272–278, 282, 287–290, 293–295 Sagan’s view of, 42 National Security Advisor Function of, 126 National Security Agency (NSA), 244 National Security Council Bush’s first meeting and groupthink, 59 Creation, 125 Gates and Panetta concerns with size and role, 126 Presidents principal forum, 126 Staffing level under George H.W. Bush, 126 Staffing level under Obama, 126 National Security Decision Directive 75 (NSDD-75), 130 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 111, 109 National Security Decision Directive Number 6 (NSDD-6), 231 national security policy, 8, 9, 21, 24, 107, 117, 127, 144, 217, 226, 230, 232, 239, 247, 256, 259, 272, 276, 293, 294 U.S. protection of, 148 national security strategy, 31, 70, 141, 220, 260, 277, 278 National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) U.S. support, 149

404 Native Americans America’s treatment of, 87 Nazi’s atomic experiments. See Nazi Germany Nazi concentration camps, 76, 225, 313 Nazi Germany, 28, 63, 73, 76, 208, 233, 280, 285, 313 Atomic weapon research, 28 Israel compares Iran to, 270 Nazi Party, 73 Netanyahu compares Iran to, 268 Netanyahu comparison with Iran, 74 Surrender, 28 U.S. defeat of, 82 neorealism, 57 neorealists, 12, 39, 42, 330 Netanyahu, Benjamin, 19, 48, 62, 63, 71, 74– 76, 89, 90, 118, 121, 137, 138, 208, 267–270, 273, 280, 285, 286, 317, 324 Attack on Syrian nuclear reactor, 198 Calls out suffering of the Jewish people, 267 Created nexus between Iran and ISIS, 268 Critics of his use of the Holocaust analogy, 76 Dismissal of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s authority and legitimacy, 81 Embrace of Evangelical Christians, 183 Opposed to the Iran nuclear deal, 267 Opposition to negotiating with Iran, 147 Ordered preparations for a strike against Iran, 97 Preventive strikes against Iran, 207 Reminds U.S. Congress of Iran’s support to terrorist groups, 268 Tyrants of Tehran, 70 U.S. and Israel engaged in a struggle of civilizations, 183 Use of the Holocaust analogy, 208 Use of the Holocaust analogy and Iran, 271 U.S. should seek a better deal, 268 Warns of a nuclear armed Iran, 72 West Bank Annexation, 175 New START Treaty, 142 Nili, Shmulik, 73 Nixon Doctrine, 128 Nixon, Richard, 125 non-power-projecting state, 12, 23, 27, 51, 217, 221, 281 Noor-1

Index Iranian military satellite, 3 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 31, 50, 86, 87, 133, 155, 160, 212, 325 North Korea, xiii, 1, 3, 4, 6, 36, 49, 86, 135, 140–142, 153, 168, 192, 250, 251, 254, 258, 260, 287, 289, 309, 322, 324, 348 Agreed Framework, 4 A.Q. Khan assisted nuclear program of, 36 Hwasong-15 ballistic missiles, 142 Pyongyang, 4, 50 Six Party Talks, 4 Stresses nonproliferation regime, 36 Threatens nuclear strikes against Japan, South Korea, and the U.S., 1 Yongbyon reactor, 4 Nowruz [Persian New Year], 114 NPT’s Additional Protocol Iran implements, 266 Nuclear Armageddon Fear of, 35 nuclear arsenals, 2, 31, 32, 35, 48, 49, 350 nuclear deterrent, 43, 46, 49, 81, 140, 167, 168, 171, 188, 189, 191, 264, 294 nuclearization, 39 Nuclear Motivations, 38 nuclear non-proliferation regime, xiii, 117, 144, 293, 298 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 1, 2, 19, 34–36, 39, 115, 117, 140, 228, 230, 234, 254, 258, 262, 275, 276, 294, 316, 323, 329, 343 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), 140 Agenda, 141 nuclear proliferation, xiii–xv, 6–13, 15, 19, 24, 27, 32, 33, 36, 37, 46, 47, 51–53, 65, 68, 80, 92, 139–141, 148, 153, 160, 164, 178, 190, 197, 215, 230, 231, 252, 254, 264, 277, 281–283, 286, 288, 289, 295 Nuclear proliferation scholars, 8 nuclear-related infrastructure, 184 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), 36 nuclear terrorism, xiii, 1, 9, 35, 37, 80, 139, 141, 153, 178, 289, 297, 298 Nuclear Threat Initiative, 36 nuclear threats, 24, 56, 86, 217, 228, 256, 288, 294 nuclear weapon acquiring, xiv, xv, 6–8, 16, 18, 25, 37, 38, 41, 44–47, 49, 60, 80, 87, 88, 90–92, 102, 143, 147, 153, 166–168, 174, 188,

Index 189, 191, 208, 216, 219, 221, 224, 226– 228, 230, 231, 233, 239, 243, 244, 249, 255, 256, 259, 263, 267, 278, 287–289, 293, 295, 303, 309, 319, 322, 349 Iran unable to produce, 80 Iraq did not possess, 81 Israel preventing adversaries from acquiring, 147 Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) NPT Hypocricy, 35

O Obama administration, xv, 5, 47, 113–115, 135–137, 140, 141, 153, 154, 174, 267, 275–277, 279, 281, 285 P5+1 Negotiations, 288 Obama, Barack, xv, 5, 19, 21, 47, 62, 63, 67, 90, 112–115, 118, 123, 135–138, 140, 141, 153, 154, 174, 206, 265, 275–277, 279–281, 285, 310, 323– 325, 341, 345 Acknowledges Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear power, 266 Affirms committment to Israel, 176 All options on the table against Iran, 266 America’s nuclear agenda, xiii Concern about the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories, 77 Criticized by Mitt Romney, 175 Critique of the Bush administration, 56 insistence on diplomacy, 267 JCPOA a keystone of his legacy, 115 Jewish voters, 180 New Beginning speech to the Middle East, 136 Nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism at the top of U.S. nuclear agenda, 37 Nuclear terrorism, 178 Opposed the Iraq War, 288 Opposition to the Iraq War, 56 Preference for international cooperation, 114 Son of a Muslim father, 113 Occupied Territories, 175, 312 Jewish settlements, 77 Octopus Doctrine, 101 Ofek-7 reconnaissance satellite, 252 offensively minded leaders, 21 Office of Special Plans, 244 Old Testament, 180 Olmert, Ehud, 207, 254

405 Invoking Adolf Hitler persona, 270 Olympic Games, 17, 206, 207 Cyberattacks, 17, 19 O’Neill, Paul (U.S. Treasury Secretary) Notes Groupthink in Bush administration, 59 Operation Desert Fox, 104, 190, 234, 242, 321 Operation Eagle Claw, 111, 129, 317 Operation Iraqi Freedom, 21, 108, 211, 212 Operations Northern and Southern Watch, 190 Oppenheimer, Dr. J. Robert Named Director of the Manhattan Project, 28 O’Reilly, Kelly P. Why states proliferate, 45 Osama bin Laden, 4, 55, 62, 71, 83, 85, 112, 138, 167, 168, 190, 191, 245, 325, 334 Expelled by the Saudi royal family, 84 Killed by U.S. Navy SEALs, 85 Michael Scheuer discusses motivations, 83 Rationale for attacking the United States, 83 Ultimate Goal, 83 withdrawal of U.S. troops, 84 Osirak nuclear reactor, 16, 43, 92, 102, 131, 151, 184, 187, 188, 190, 191, 221, 223–225, 227–234, 236, 285, 287, 318 Bombed by Israel, 150 Saddam’s response to Israel’s attack on the reactor, 92 U.S. did not perceive as an immediate threat, 151 Ottoman Empire Defeated in World War I, 185 Territory of Iraq, 185 Otunnu, Olara Criticism of Israel, 102

P P5 + 1 delegation. SeeJoint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Pahlavi, Reza Shah, 202, 313 Pahlavi, Shah Mohammad Reza, 110, 171, 202 Carter refuses to return him, 110 Pakistan Member of the Baghdad Pact, 186

406 Nuclear Test, 1 Pakistan’s nuclear program, 41, 86 Pakistani and Indian nuclear arsenals increases. See Pakistan-India rivalry Pakistan-India rivalry, 2 Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Islamic Bomb, 35 Palestine, 70, 72, 78, 84, 89–92, 112, 154, 158, 171, 175, 184, 192, 208, 253, 263, 311–316, 318, 351 Israeli settlements, 137 Palestine Liberation Operation (PLO), 171 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 72, 92, 318 Headquarters in Tunisia bombed by Israel, 18 Palestinians, 15, 69, 72, 76, 77, 80, 90, 91, 102, 120, 121, 130, 168, 171, 175, 177, 178, 180, 184, 237, 239, 253, 254, 314, 316–318, 320, 321, 339 Aspirations, 178 Leaders marginalized by Israel, 178 Recognition of rights, 194 Yitzhak Shamir hostility towards, 147 Palestinian Territories Israeli annexation of, 292 Palmyra, Syria Massacre of Muslim Brotherhood prisoners, 197 Paper on the Persian Social and Political Scene, 205 Pardo, Tamir Stopping Iran’s nuclear program, 95 Pashtun Hostile to Iran’s Shia population, 212 peacekeeping force, 257 Pearl Harbor, 82, 86, 133, 313 Pearl Harbor attack, 82 The Peloponnesian War, 10 perceived threat, xv, 8, 9, 19, 23, 44, 71, 91, 154, 208, 217, 219, 220, 224, 230, 236, 250, 252, 268, 269, 281, 282, 285, 287, 289, 292, 295, 318 higher levels, 15 lower levels, 15 Perceptions, 25, 70, 72 Perestroika, 150 Perry, William, 32 Pershing, John “Black Jack” Command of Buffalo Soldiers, 82 Persian Empire, 199 Iran’s historic importance, 210 Iran’s perception of historic greatness, 41

Index Persian Gulf oil, 103, 129, 131, 241 Persian Nationalism, 209 Persian poets Ferdowsi, 210 Ganjavi, Nizami, 210 Hafez, 210 Khayyam, Omar, 210 Rumi, 210 Saadi, 210 Peter Rosen, Stephen, 36 Phalange Party, 253 Phalangists, 253 PLO. See Palestine Liberation Organization political decisions, 13, 186 Political psychologists, 22, 57 Political psychology, 13, 19, 54, 59, 61, 291 Bush administration, 108 Why states have differing perceptions, 15 Pollack, Kenneth, 170, 187, 264 Iran as a rational actor, 48 Pollard, Jonathan Spying for Israel, 180 Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), 185, 200 Post, Jerrold, 54, 61, 71, 108 Powell, Colin L., 60, 61, 245–248 CJCS, 151 Notes Iraq pre-war intelligence was inaccurate, 59 Powell Doctrine, 246 Powell Doctrine, 151 power, xiii, xv, 4, 6, 8–13, 16–18, 20, 23, 24, 27, 30, 31, 33, 38–40, 42, 45– 47, 51–53, 55, 56, 59, 61, 62, 64, 68, 72, 86, 87, 90, 101, 104, 107, 108, 111, 116, 119, 122, 123, 125, 133, 134, 141, 145, 146, 153–155, 157– 159, 162, 164–167, 169, 172, 174, 184, 186, 190–192, 195, 197, 199, 209, 212–215, 217, 219–222, 225– 227, 229–231, 233, 236, 237, 239, 240, 247, 249–252, 256, 259–261, 263, 265, 268, 269, 272, 273, 277, 279–282, 285–295, 313–316, 326, 328–330, 332, 341, 344, 345, 348, 349 Israel negotiating strength, 147 Kroenig’s power-based theory, 151 U.S. military, 148 powerful states effects of nuclear proliferation, xv, 6–9, 13, 17, 18, 24, 25, 46, 51, 53, 70, 90, 143, 167, 187, 289, 291, 294

Index power-projecting instrument, 17 power projection, 8, 9, 11, 13, 17, 23, 25, 42, 52, 64, 145, 146, 154, 155, 159, 162, 164, 166, 170, 190, 209, 217, 220, 222, 268, 272, 282, 289, 290, 293, 294 definition, 12 power projection capability, 8, 9, 12, 146, 154, 159, 162, 166, 170, 222, 272, 294 precision guided munitions (PGMs), 160 preemptive attack Six-Day War, 101 Preventive Airstrikes Israel encourages the U.S. to launch strikes against Iran, 266 Preventive strikes, xiv, 4, 7, 49, 152, 159, 220, 226, 230, 232, 239, 247, 256, 259, 272, 276 Israel discussions of strikes against Iran, 184 Securing America’s nuclear monopoly, 149 Preventive war, 50 Iraq 2003, xv Prime Minister Sharif. See Pakistan Project Babylon, 188 proliferation debates, 30 proliferation divergence, 39 proliferation management framework, 47 Proliferation Optimists, 11 Proliferation Pessimist, 11, 291 Pessimmist Rubric, 48, 49 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), 36 Prophet Muhammad, 195, 203, 204 The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, 189, 227 ADL classifies as fraudulent and racist, 189 Mearsheimer and Walt’s book compared to, 179 Saddam Hussein’s views of, 189 Provincial Joint Coordination Center in Karbala IRGC-QF attack against, 212 psychological factors, 8, 90 psychological processes, 21, 57 psychological trauma, 22, 70 Purim Jewish holiday, 267 Putin, Vladimir, 142 Pyongyang. See North Korea

407 Q Qaddafi, Moammar overthrown, 50, 71, 160, 168, 316, 322, 325 Qaddafi regime, 49 Qajar Dynasty in Iran Ahmad Shah Qajar, 201 Rule of, 201 Weak government institutions, 201 Qassed space launch vehicle. See Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Qassim, Brigadier Abdul Kari Coup against King Faisal II, 185 Qatar Syrian rebels supplied by, 193 Qom, Iran, 279, 286, 324 Fordow uranium enrichment facility, 266 Natanz uranium enrichment facility, 265 qualitative military edge Israel, 61, 146, 157, 158, 174, 197 qualitative technological edge, 32 Queen Esther, 268 Quran, 203 Qutb, Sayyed Al-Qaeda’s ideology influenced by, 84

R Rabin, Yitzhak, 72, 79, 168, 320 Rafsanjani, Akbar, 263 Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar Hashemi Criticism of Israel, 73 Rapture Importance of Jerusalem, 181 Reagan, Ronald, 71, 103, 109, 111, 129–131, 149, 150, 229–232, 318, 319 Deference to the Department of State, 150 Delayed delivery of fighter aircraft to Israel, 151 Elected President, 150 Israel’s attack on Iraqi nuclear reactor, 151 Israel’s use of U.S. aircraft to bomb Iraq, 151 Military doctrine, 149 Request to bomb Iraq lost or ignored, 150 Response to Israel’s request to bomb Iraq, 151 Soviets cheating on SALT II treaty, 149 U.S. military buildup, 149 realist proliferation literature, 39 Realists, 10

408 regime change, 18, 41, 49, 52, 108, 111, 114, 141, 167, 168, 205, 209, 264, 275, 294 regime survival, 5, 38, 191, 198 regional hegemon, 118 regional power structure, 68, 167, 199, 209, 294, 295 religious fundamentalism George W. Bush influenced by, 54 Republican Party, 184 White evangelical constituency, 182 Resolute Support Mission (RSM), 212 Rezaeinejad, Darioush Assassinated Iranian nuclear scientist, 98 rhetoric, 19–21, 50, 55, 56, 73, 77–80, 85, 89, 92, 106, 108, 110, 134, 150, 167– 169, 173, 188, 191, 208, 212, 222, 223, 233, 236, 269, 273, 285–287, 292, 293 Anti-Semitism, 73 Indicator of enemy intent, 73 rhetorical presidency, 20 Rice, Condoleezza, 173 Mushrrom Cloud, 133 Rice, Susan E., 137 Ricks, Thomas Fiasco, 52 risk, 168 rival state, 10, 11, 15, 23, 50–52, 106, 154, 282, 287, 288, 292 rogue state, xiv, 6, 37, 45, 152, 153, 235, 250, 347 Powerful state label, xiv Transferring a nuclear weapon to terrorists, 178 U.S. concern about rogue states and WMD, 265 rogue state nuclear proliferation, xiii, 1. See also Nuclear Proliferation rogue state proliferation, 9, 35, 37, 289, 297 Romney, Mitt Critical of Barack Obama, 175 Roseh Iranian Passion Plays, 204 Roseh-khoon, 204 Roshan, Mostafa Ahmadi Assassinated Iranian chemical engineer, 98 Rouhani, Hassan Iran Nuclear Deal Negotiations, 273 Iran’s nuclear intentions, 266 Netanyahu’s dismissal of authority of, 81

Index Vows Iran will continue to resist the U.S., 207 Rumsfeld, Donald Al-Qaeda call from Iran, 112 Russia, 33–35, 142, 156, 165, 322, 326, 342, 343 Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), 142 Interference in Iran’s internal affairs, 201 R-28 Sarmat missile, 142 Saved Syria from defeat, 214 Rwandan Genocide, 22

S S-300 air defense system, 161 S-300P Air Defense System, 156 S-300V Air Defense System, 156 S-400 SAM system, 61 S-400 Triumf Air Defense System, 156 Sabra and Shatila refugee camps massacre, 253, 318 Sagan, Scott, 11, 24, 31, 42, 43, 47, 49–51, 143, 168, 188, 189, 233, 264, 291 Model of why states build nuclear weapons, 42 Why states pursue nuclear weapons, 41 Salafism Al-Qaeda’s ideology influenced by, 84 sanctions, xiii, 4–6, 8, 9, 12, 25, 45, 47, 50, 57, 84, 102, 111–115, 136, 146, 162, 166, 173, 201, 205, 210, 217, 220, 238, 241, 242, 257, 267, 273, 276, 278, 279, 281, 285, 287, 288, 306–310, 321, 322, 324–327 Part of U.S. foreign policy, 279 UNSC sanctions against Iran, 266 U.S. call for sanctions against Iran, 266 Saudi Arabia, 7, 112, 128, 131, 156, 165, 174, 187, 191, 213, 238, 263, 264, 280, 312, 313, 316, 321, 326, 327 Attack on its oil refineries, 209 Faisal ibn Hussein born in, 185 nuclear hedging, 7 Osama bin Laden demands foreign troops withdraw, 84 Regional power structure in the Middle East, 199 Syrian rebels supplied by, 193 Threatens to build a nuclear weapon, 210 View of JCPOA, 115 SAVAK Established with U.S. assistance, 202

Index Torture, 111, 202, 315 Sayed al-Shuhada, 185 Sayeret Matkal, 109 Scheuer, Michael, 55, 167, 168 Al-Qaeda belief that U.S. policies attack Muslims, 85 Mearsheimer and Walt, support of, 179 Need to understand Osama bin Laden’s motivations, 83 Through Our Enemies’ Eyes, 55 Understand your adversary, 215 Schlesinger, James, 32 Schneider, Barry, 37 scripting, 22, 69, 112 definition, 22 second-strike capability, 32, 48, 297, 341 security burden, 169 security cooperation, 47, 169 security dilemma, 15, 39, 81, 90, 263, 264 Robert Gates discusses Iran’s security dilemma, 265 security guarantees, xv, 42, 85, 125, 184, 251, 319 Security threats, 42 Select Committee on Intelligence Investigated Bush administration statements on Iraa, 21 selective inattention, 15, 67, 292 Sepah-e Pasdaran. See Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) September 11th attacks, xv, 4, 8, 22, 36, 37, 54, 57, 62, 64, 70, 83, 84, 86, 104, 105, 116, 133–135, 164, 191, 235, 236, 242, 247, 249, 250, 264, 286, 289, 293, 294, 296 Bush attempts to link to Iraq, 190 Bush speech, 106 Confirmed Evangelicals’ negative views of Muslims, 183 Framed by George W. Bush, 85 World Trade Center, 133 sequential nuclear tests. See India Serbia, 52, 133 Shadow Commander. See Soleimani, Qassem Shah. See Pahlavi, Shah Mohammad Reza Shahid Beheshti Un, 97 Shahlai, Abdul Reza Bounty for, 212 Shahriari, Majid Assassinated Iranian nuclear scientist, 97 Shamir, Yitzhak Fixed perceptions, 147

409 Shamkhani, Ali Range of Iran’s ballistic missiles, 201 Sharon, Ariel, 62, 71, 79, 253, 321 Shehada, Salah killing of, 92 Shia, 186, 190, 194, 204, 211, 212, 242, 320, 331, 337 Shia, Iraqi, 104 Saddam attacked, 108 Shiite, 206, 211, 325 Shinseki, Eric, 134 Shultz, George Secretary of State, 150 Simon Wiesenthal Center, 74 Situational threats, 23 Six-Day War, 1967, 77, 137, 172, 316 Israel claims Biblical ties to the Occupied territories, 77 Jewish settlements, 77 Six Party Talks, 4 Slavery U.S. chattel slavery, 87 Sneh, Ephraim Israeli Defense Minister, 74 Soleimani, Qassem, 49, 124, 206, 327, 328 Attacks orchestrated by, 206 Letter to Khamenei on liberating ISIS bastion, 165 The Shadow Commander, 206 targeted killing, 49, 206, 328 Solingen, Etel Nuclear Logics, 39 Soltan, Neda Agha Death of, 336 South Africa, 320 South Korea North Korea threatens with nuclear strikes, 1 Soviet, 342 Soviet Union, 30–33, 35, 85, 86, 103, 128– 132, 141, 151, 172, 188, 194, 212, 228–230, 234, 280, 294, 303, 313, 314, 317, 319, 320, 332, 341, 348 End of patronage, 198 Evil Empire, 150 Mikhail Gorbachev becomes new leader, 150 Nuclear parity with the United States, 149 Reagan administration’s confrontation with, 150 Reagan confronts, 149 Reagan’s anti-Soviet rhetoric, 150

410 Reduces financial assistance to client states, 195 Restructuring of the economy, 150 Weak economy, 150 speeches, 16, 19, 21, 22, 55, 64, 69, 106, 136, 190, 285 speech patterns, 20, 285 spread of nuclear weapons. See Nuclear Proliferation stability-instability paradox, 48 state-level analysis, 11–13 State Partnership Program (SPP), 169 State Sponsors of Terrorism, 9 Steinberg, James, 100 Strait of Hormuz, 111, 212, 213, 262, 264, 274 Strategic Deterrence, 32 Stuxnet, 17, 324, 348 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), 32 Suez Crisis, 1956, 91, 128, 315 suicide bomber, 237, 321 Sundarji, K. (India’s Chief of Staff of the Army) Lesson of Desert Storm, 49 superpowers, 32–34, 86, 230, 263 Syria, xiv, xv, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 18, 33, 52, 53, 60, 77, 80, 91, 94, 95, 101, 108– 110, 128, 130, 131, 135, 138, 153, 155–161, 165, 170, 171, 174, 187, 192–195, 197, 198, 200, 206, 208, 214, 215, 221, 238, 251–262, 269, 275, 282, 287–290, 294, 295, 308– 318, 320, 322–327, 329, 330, 337, 348 Alawite community, 195 Al-Kibar nuclear reactor, 94, 261, 323 Deir al-Zour Province, 198 Efforts to develop a nuclear weapon, 198 Idlib Province (Rebel Stronghold), 193, 327 Incapable of deterring Israel’s militayr power, 192 Invited Iranian forces, 214 Iranian military forces, Strikes against, 101 Iran landbridge to Syria, 214 Nationalism, 192 National security dominated by fear of Israel, 197 Stance against Israel, 192 Stresses nonproliferation regime, 36 Syrian Civil War, 101, 169

Index Szilard, Leo, 28 T Taliban, 4, 62, 104, 154, 160, 170, 212, 321 Tanker Wars U.S. and Iran, 212 Taqiyya, 195 Tel Aviv. See Israel Terrorist organizations U.S. concerns about acquiring WMD, 265 thermonuclear device, 1. See also North Korea thermonuclear weapons, 32, 343 Thies, Wallace, x Coercion and authoritarian regimes, 4 Definition of Coercion, 332 threat definition, 209 threat perception, xv, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 16, 19, 22–25, 27, 44, 53, 56, 57, 61, 67, 68, 70, 75, 78, 80, 88, 90, 105, 108, 115, 134, 166–168, 184, 186, 191, 199, 205, 209, 213, 215, 217, 221, 222, 226, 229, 232, 233, 247, 251, 255, 275, 282, 283, 285–289, 292, 293, 295 Gulf states add to Iran’s heightened threat perceptions, 209 High and low threat perceptions, 15 Predispositions, 14 Relationship with information processing, 15 U.S. triggered by Mossadegh relationship with the Tudeh Party, 202 Variations in, 12 Thucydides, 10, 38 Tinian Island, 29 Tower Commission, The, 131 Tower, John, 123 train and equip program, 170 transnational violent extremist organizations, 58 traumatic events, 57, 201 Trident SLBM submarines, 139 Trinity site Site of first atomic bomb detonation, 28 Tripartite Declaration of 1950, 193 Truman administration, 128 Truman Doctrine, 127 Truman, Harry S., 29 Turkey Member of the Baghdad Pact, 186 Syrian rebels supplied by, 193

Index U Umayyad Dynasty, 204 umma, 204, 264 umma, 331, 339 uneasy peace, 32, 36 United Arab Emirates Dubai, 210 United Arab Republic (UAR) Unification of, 193 United Kingdom Joined the nuclear club, 34 Member of the Baghdad Pact, 186 United Nations Security Council, 4, 19, 232, 234, 241, 267, 304, 306 United States, xiii–xv, 1, 4, 6, 7, 9–12, 16, 17, 19–21, 24, 28, 30–33, 35, 38, 43–45, 49, 50, 52–55, 58, 60–62, 68, 70–72, 81–87, 91, 93, 94, 103–114, 116, 117, 122, 124, 127–144, 146, 148, 151– 156, 158–161, 164–166, 168, 169, 171–173, 175, 184–188, 190–193, 195, 201, 202, 205–207, 209, 211, 213, 215, 221, 222, 228–238, 240– 242, 244, 246–252, 257–261, 263– 266, 268–270, 272, 274–280, 282, 283, 285–289, 292–295, 303, 309– 311, 313–318, 321–324, 327, 332, 334, 335, 337, 341–343, 345, 347, 348, 350, 351 Aid contributed to Israel, 180 Civilian control of the military, 148 Concerns of a unilateral Israeli attack against Iran, 99 Conditions to use military force, 148 Criteria for U.S. military involvement, 150 Discovery of Natanz uranium enrichment facility, 265 Global power projection, 18 Interference in Iran’s internal affairs, 201 invasion of Iraq, 2003, 191 Khatami argues of a nuclear doublestandard, 40 Military threat to Iran, 41 Non-proliferation regime increased urgency after 9/11, 37 Regional power structure in the Middle East, 199 Significant attacks on U.S. soil, 82 Strategic interests in the Middle East, 178 Support for the Shah of Iran, 202 Syrian rebels supplied by, 193 Syria’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, 198

411 United States and Israel Interdependence, 19 United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), 130 The United States Constitution ambiguity, 123 University of Michigan, ix unmanned aerial systems (UAS), 156, 163 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), 201 UN Resolution 181 two initial states, 171 uranium, xiii, xiv, 1, 4, 12, 17, 28, 29, 43, 92, 188, 215, 219, 220, 224, 243, 244, 250, 252, 255, 261, 262, 265, 267, 269, 270, 272, 274, 275, 278, 281, 286, 306–308, 315, 321–324, 326, 327, 330, 331, 334–338, 340, 344, 350 Iranian enrichment restricted under JCPOA, 115 Shipments to Iraq, 150 Uranium Enrichment Iranian arguments, 270 U.S. casualties, 62 IRGC-backed militias, 212 Vietnam War, 82 U.S. deaths in Iraq, 108 U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, 132 U.S. Embassy Hostage Crisis, 129, 173, 233 End of, 111 U.S. Embassy hostages Black American staff members freed, 111 U.S. Embassy staff hostages, 111 U.S. invasion of Iraq, 52 U.S.–Iran Military Conflict Operation Praying Mantis, 111 Operation Staunch, 130 Tanker Wars, 111 U.S.–Iran Negotiations diplomatic preconditions and Obama, 114 U.S.–Israeli bilateral relationship, 174 U.S.–Israeli military cooperation, 175 U.S.–Israeli relationship Contributes to Arab and Iranian insecurities, 184 U.S.–Israel relationship, 171, 172, 176, 180, 181 U.S.–Israel tensions with Iran, 209 U.S. Marines Withdrawal from Beirut, 109

412 U.S. national security policy, 127 U.S. National Security Strategy Reagan era, 131 U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, 264 U.S. Navy SEALs Kill Osama bin Laden, 85 U.S. nuclear strategy, 139 U.S. nuclear targets, 140 U.S. policymakers, 13, 172, 173 U.S. security assistance, 170 USS Liberty Attack by the Israeli Air Force, 180 U.S.S. Maddox, 124 U.S. sovereignty threatened, 132 USSR. See Soviet Union U.S. State Department, 9, 112 V Vertzberger, Yaacov, 14 Vietnam Syndrome, 54 Vietnam War, 124, 125, 159, 164, 317 Anti-war protests, 149 Khong notes two lessons learned from, 82 Polarizing U.S. presence, 149 W Walt and Mearsheimer Research supported by Michael Scheuer, 179 Walt, Stephen, 67 Waltz–Sagan debates, 24, 51 Waltz, Kenneth, 11, 31, 47 warning capability, 297 War Powers Act. See War Powers Resolution of 1973 War Powers Resolution of 1973, 124 Warsaw Pact, 31, 86 Weapons of Mass Destruction, 18, 50, 61, 63, 69, 104, 107, 123, 133, 135, 152–154, 160, 190, 191, 234–236, 238, 239, 242–244, 248, 249, 251, 254, 257, 258, 260, 276, 277, 287, 295, 306, 309, 321, 340, 342, 345, 347, 350 weapons sales, 157, 174, 213, 264, 319 Weinberger, Caspar, 150 Weinberger Doctrine, 150 West Bank, 77, 91, 137, 314, 316, 319, 324, 326, 327, 339

Index Jewish settlements, 77 Wiesel, Elie, 73 Winograd Commission, 93, 146, 159 Wohlstetter, Albert Balance of Terror, 32 Wolfowitz, Paul Iraq WMD, 69 World War II, 30, 31, 33, 63, 72, 82, 86, 87, 110, 111, 127, 132, 154, 171, 172, 186, 190, 193, 268, 313, 337, 347 Expansion of U.S. power, 148

X Xerxes, 210

Y Ya’alon, Moshe, 238 Warns of Iran’s apocalyptic messianic ambition, 48 Yad Vashem Netanyahu speech at, 70 Yazid, 204 Yazidis, 195 Yemen Houthi rebels, 209, 213, 326, 327 Yeo, Andrew, x Yom Kippur War, 1973, 60, 91, 128, 147, 223, 316 Yousef, Ramzi, 83

Z Zakaria, Fareed Iran as a rational actor, 48 Zanotti, Jim, 173 Zarif, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Iran Nuclear Deal Negotiations, 273 Soleimani killing, 206 U.S. Sanctions imposed against, 327 zero sum game, 118, 134 Ziabari, Kourosh IRGC money and training programs, 200 Zillgitt, Otto, xi Zionism, 118 Zionist ideology, 118 Zionist regime, 61, 114 Zone of immunity Iran’s nuclear program, 7, 97