State of the Nation: Philippines 9789814380355

Table of contents :
CONTENTS
Foreword
1. Introduction
2. The Intractable Civil Society
3. The Weak State Tradition
4. The Authoritarian Intervention: Marcos' Failed Project
5. The EDSA Uprising and the Aquino Administration
6. The Post-Marcos Era: Signs of the Times
7. Rebuilding the Economy
8. The Overseas Contract Workers (OCW) Phenomenon
9. Political Stability and the Armed Movements
10. Relations with the Region and the World
11. The Longer View: Conclusions
Notes
Bibliography
Index
The Author

Citation preview

STATE OF THE NATION

philippines

The Ins titute of Southeast Asian Studles (ISEAS) was establis hed as an a utonomous organization in 1968. It is a regional research ce ntre fo r schola rs and other specialists conce rn ed with modern So uth eas t Asia. pa rti cularl y th e many- faceted problems of sta bility and security. econo mi c development. and political a nd social change. The Institute 's research progr amm es are the Regional Economic St udi es Progra mm e (RES). Regional Strategic and Political Studi es Program me (RSPSl. Regional Social an d Cultural tudi es Programme (RSCS) . and th e Ind ochin a Programme (lf.PI . T he Institute is govern ed by a twenty-two-m ember 13uard of Trustees comp rising nomin ees from th e ingapore Governm ent. th e National Uni versity of Singapo re , th e vari ous Chambers of Commerce. and professional and civic organ izatio ns . A ten-man Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations: it is chaired by th e Director. th e Institute's chi ef acad emi c and adm inistrative offi ce r.

STATE OF THE NATION

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Published by Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Road Singapore 119596 Internet e-mait. [email protected] WVtW: http:/ /merlion.iseas.ac.sg/pub.html All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

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dyn mlr rommunit of p and lt•vt>loprnt·ntal non -gov rnm (~{;{)sJ b Houtt·d in a long tr ditJon a nd rt• urgt•lll nation li ·m th fi t p s tru ggl• ag in~t tht lurcu_ di t l itt

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inH·rPsts . B th · for l' >f tlwlr hi ·t ri ltr diu · and politir11l practi : •. tht · • org ni.tati n nd Ul ( r u rti r ul a tin g u lt Prnativc vi ion · . pr gr mme •. nd ontin u to r h lltm ' th • for the long-wrm

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Animat d by their own internal differ n s, th e e organizations continu to tap a constituency of support that enabl s them to intervene and shap policy debate at various levels with varying degr ees of success . Predictably, th ir initiatives for poll y reform and intervention in decision-making proc sses have been most effective when allied with other key playe rs i11 civil soci ty and the more reform-mind ed agencie and personalities of government.

philippines 9

thre ······· ·· ·· ····· ······ ······· ····· ··· ····················· ···· ··············· ··· ···· ··

The Weak State Tradition

wea k sta te e mbedd ed in a robust and often intractable civil soc iety has bee n a n e nduring feature of Philippine political life . This wea kn ess of th e state is refl ected by its lack of autonomy from dorrtinant social classes and powerful political famili es and clans; its weak and inefficie nt bureaucracy. particularly such agencies as the customs bureau an d inte rnal r evenue; and its politiciz d military and unprofessional police . Rather than a state "autonomously embedd ed" in civil society, the Philip pin state is a captive of powerful particularistic bloc . bown by t h e e xp e ri e n ce of the late STATE~

THE MAnoN

10

industrializing economies in East and Southeast Asia, an autonomous developmentalist state served as a key factor for directing economic growth and development. This pattern of development has been most notable in the cases of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. However, drawing lessons from these countries becomes problematic for the Philippines because these strong developmentalist states emerged in authoritarian regimes. It is of course true that autonomous developmentalist states can flourish in either authoritarian or democratic regimes. With the disastrous experience under martial rule by Marcos, however, any attempt to build a more autonomous developmentalist state will have to be forged under a democratic regime to elicit the strongest political support. The need for a relatively autonomous developmentalist state in the Philippines becomes urgent in light not only of the fractiousness of the key actors of civil society but also of the immense challenges of interacting with the rapidly changing global environment. Key reforms and changes for the necessary political, administrative, and infrastructural support for any sustained project of socio-economic growth and development require the initiative and determination of the state leadership. With the restoration of the formal underpinnings of a democratic regime, the challenge then in the Philippines becomes the reinvention of a system of governance that is not only transparent and publicly accountable but capable of providing strategic direction for political stability and economic growth. In the absence of a strong party system in the philippines 11

untry. mu h of th initiaU

t m Cr m th p ri d. h w r. with th

will ha pro

t r r inv nting the state x uUv . In the post-

in pia

dece ntralization

. this r in ntion will hav to ac tively at arying I cal gove rnm nt n titution was cra fted to ibl abus of pre ide ntial

pow r . th Philippin ex cutiv c ntinues to exercise a wid r nge of pow r m r than uffici nt to initiate ru i 1 r form .7 Marco on titutional authority t

onv ni ntly invoked his x r is martial powe rs but

in r a ingly atienat d the key s with th in ptn

tors of civil socie ty

regim ' political ins nsitivity and economic s . Aquino initia1ly

p lili al

njoy d an outpouring of

upport but la ck d th

ski ll s a nd th e

dPt rrnination to transform thisfortuna into a movement for hang until sh

was ov rtak n and paralyzed by

mutinous haU ng s from factions of the military. Elected as a minority pre id nt in 1992, Ramos during his first tbr

y ar

spurring Hi

focu

d his pr sid ntial initiatives on

onomi growth by lib ralizing th economy.

admini tration pur u d this project. however.

with ut

trat gi

planning for k y industrial and

agri uJturaJ

tors of th

th

of a

ba kb n

conomy that would form

u tainable industrialization

pr gramm . M r ov r, th administration has grossly und r tima d tb n nsus for this proj c In a formal d m

d to build a broad political t. rati ord r wb r civil society is

r bu and animated but at tb am tim fractious and nt ntiou a in tb Pbilippin . building the STATt 0* 1HE

TIOff

12

autonomous developmentalist state requires political skills and determination. First, the political leadership. in pushing for r eforms, needs to consciously cultivate a broad base of support from among key players and build stable policy coalitions for key reform issues. This is the challenge of bujlding support from civil society. Secondly, it must reform and professionalize its key bureaucratic agencies for the reliable impl ementation of laws and rul es. This is the challenge of structural reforms from within the state. Confronted by a massive mass move me nt and elite opposition. th e Marcos authoritarian r eg im e pr es id e d over th e rapid politicization of its milHary and police. Fail ing to manage the politicized military. Aquino re bound ed from one coup attempt to another, accomplishing Littl e in the process. Finally, by successfully negotiating the challe nge from the r ebellious factions of its own military but neglecting the professionalization of its own police for ce. the Ramos administration continues to grapple with the problem of political stability and publi c order.

philippines

13

four

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The Authoritarian Intervention: Marcos' Failed Project

In 1972. Marcos broke the traditional social compact and terms of engagement between the state and civil socie ty by declarin g martial law. He justified the use of extrao rdinary constitutional powers in the face of an inte nsifyin g intra- elite confli ct be for e the 1973 presidential elections (under which Marcos was barred by the constitution from running for a third term) and the growing challenge from a popular-based movement. Fourteen years later in 1986, his authoritarian rule met an ignominious end , yielding to a combined military mutiny and an urban popular uprising and finally losing the support of his American patrons. 8 STATE OF THE NATION

14

Now best remembered for his world-class "patrimonial plunder" 9 and massive violation of human rights, Marcos sought to restructure the bases of political and economic power by reconstituting the base of support for his authoritarian regime. Striking at one faction of the oligarchy, such as the Lopezes, Jacintos and Aquinos who also happened to be his political opponents, Marcos then tried to consolidate his economic base around the ruling family (Marcos-Romualdez) and its coterie of "crony-capitalists" .10 To further strengthen his economic base , Marcos surrounded himself with some of the best technocrats in the country to enhance his regime's linkages with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) and other multilateral financing institutions. Marcos also put the major agri-based export industries, such as sugar and coconut oil, the traditional base of wealth of the exporting landed elites, under government control through the cronies. 11 Finally, to undermine competing centres of local power and to concentrate more power at the central organs of government, Marcos started to dismantle the private armies of selected political warlords. All of these measures failed to consolidate the authoritarian regime. The regime's pillars of supportthe cronies, the technocrats, and the military - all proved to be unreliable. As the economy unravelled and human rights violations escalated in the context of the counter-insurgency war, the popular opposition together with its armed components grew stronger. The ruling family and its cronies proved to be particularly philippines

15

inept in running the economy and squandered enormous public and private resources, provoking the disgust and opposition of the business sector. Furthermore, the cronies and the regime's technocrats often took opposing sides on policy debates. The latter were identified with IMF-WR policies which sought the liberalization and deregulation of the economy, programmes that were resisted by the cronies and the protected importsubstituting business sector. While it is true that the technocrats facilitated the regime's access to foreign loans, much of external borrowing simply financed capital flight rather than productive investment, or served as a base for "patrimonial plunder". 12 In another important sense, the easy access to low interest loans during the mid-seventies provided Marcos with a financial resource base that enabled the regime to avoid mounting any serious challenge to the oligarchy and the entrenched industrial oligopolies. During the waning years of authoritarian rule, the remaining base of support for the regime, the military was transformed into a highly politicized institution. 13 With the authoritarian regime's legitimacy and credibility undermined by the worsening economic crisis and the massive political opposition, the military experienced a parallel process of disintegration from within. Out of this disenchantment with the regime's leadership would emerge the core of military rebels who would later mount the armed challenges from within the state. With the politicization of its own military, the regime finally lost its last internal base of support.

STATE OF lltE NAnON

16

five

The EDSA Uprising and the Aquino Administration

In February 1986, a combined military mutiny and an urban people's uprising of four days ousted Marcos from power. 14 With the intervention of the United States, Marcos and his family and his inner circle of advisers were forced into exile in Hawaii. Relatively bloodless (more people are killed in an ordh1ary election day), this military mutiny and people's uprising mobilized millions into the streets of EDSA (a main highway fronting two major military camps in Metropolitan Manila), effectively paralyzing the military's will to mount any resistance. Running against Marcos in a snap presidential philippines 17

I tion h ld lift n days artier, Corazon Aquino's traordinary a c nt to ac tual power via the successful mutiny urn uprising wa underpinned by a fractious oal.ition r pre enting diver interests and political t nd n ie : the military rebels led by the RAM (originally, th e R form the Armed Forces Movement). the Catholic Chur h hi e rarchy, the a nti -c rony segment of big busine s. th e anti -Marcos tradHional political opposition with it conservative and libe ral factions, and a loose grouping of l ft of ce ntre movements, NGOs and people's organizations . Apart from Aquino, the leading lights of thi s un easy grou ping brought together by the extraordinary forc e of circumstances included then Def n e Minister Juan Ponce Enrile: General Fidel V. Ramos. th n chi ef of the national co nstabulary; Cardinal in of the Catholic hierarchy; and Colonel Gregorio Honasan of RAM . Thi fragile coalition was torn asunder by a series of oup attempts agains t the Aquino administration. Fundamental policy differences within the Cabinet, u h as the handling of th e communist-led armed cha lJ nge and p rce ption by anti-Aquino military and political I ments that the administration had neither legitim a y nor d ecis iveness, provoked major realignments within the ruling coalition . In light of the coup attempts against the government, Enrile, who was th n rving as Defence Minister, was ousted. The official identified with the libe ral faction, such as Labour Minister ugusto San chez, Local Government Minister quilino Pimentel, Jr. and , subsequently, the pr id ntial Ex utive cretary {Joker Arroyo) were STATE Of THE NATION

18

also fore d out of th abin t. For much of Aquino · term. th conservative big busin s and th atholic Chur h faction . togeth r with th traditional politi al p rsonaliti alli d with th Aquino-Cojuangco clan gained political asc ndan cy. It wa thi s politi cal leadership and constituency that d e fin d and constrained the initiatives as well as th e limits of economic and politi al re form during th e Aquino administration . Aquino presided over a difficult period of transition marked by th birth pains of a n w order struggling to be born . But the em rging regim was so encru ted with the detritus of the past that a succes ful birthing requir d a skilled and decisive midwife . Th coun try's first woman President had a surfeit of popuJar upport. particuJarly during her first two years in office. but Ia ked th political kiUs and will to seize opportuniti for r forms and hang . For instanc . as shovm b surv ys conducted by the o ial Weather tation . Aquino enjoy d a net public satisfaction a erag rating of +64 during her fir t 21 month in office . Thi performan rating deteriorat d as th y ar p d by and when h was about to step down as Pr id nt in 1992. h r last r cord d public performan rating (April 1992) plumm t d to a low of +7 .15 This pr ion of popular upport oin id d with th p riod wh n Aquino njoy d traordinary 1 gi. lativ and utiv pow rs for a tittl nv ning of th first post-ED ongr in Jul. 19 7. In retrospe t. this was the tim uld hav tra.nslat d h r popuJar upport wh nAquin philpplles 19

into executive initiatives for social reform benefiting the large majority of the people. Among the key issues begging for decisive action were a comprehensive agrarian r e form initiativ e; nego tiat e d political settlements with the armed move ments led by the National Democratic Front (NDF) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) ; and a re negotiation of the huge for eign debt left by Marcos. Had these reform measures bee n pursued decisively. a political base of support primarily among the popular forc es could have been consolidated. In retrospect, this cementing of a coalition between a popular President and an organized popular force could have unleashed a movement of further political support formidable enough to have undercut the co up attempts and for ced a reorientation of strategic options by the armed political movements. EDSA dramatized a unique conjuncture of events where massive popular intervention at a particularly opportune time when the state was structurally vulnerable succeeded in for cing a regime change. In EDSA, one can speak of a political revolution but certainly not a social revolution. An authoritarian regime gave way to a democratic regime but the rules of engagement and governance of this formally democratic order continue to favour the few in a society suffering from gross economic and social inequalities. This is the continuing challenge of EDSA: to ensure the enjoyment of a truly substantive democracy that is both publicly accountable and socially emancipatory.

STATE OF THE NATION

20

six

The Post-Marcos Era: Signs of the Times

Rebuilding the economy and strengthening the democratic process are the prime concerns of the postMarcos era, starting with the Aquino administration. In understanding the dynamics of this period, the following major concerns and developments need to be stressed. first, the passage from an authoritarian to a democratic regime has opened up new possibilities for the various players of civil society in contesting and negotiating the political and economic terms of engagement of the postMarcos order. At the same time, this greater vibrancy of civil society necessitates a state and a political leadership that is far more politically skilled in cultivating broad philippines 21

political consensus for reform projects . If this synergy is lackjng, there is danger that the renewed vibrancy of civil society could simply be dismissed as intractable be haviour that needs to be subjugated by the state; or that the decisiveness of political leaders be mistaken for authoritarian practice. Secondly, reflecting the increased globalization of the economic and social life of the co untry and its impact on local decision-makers , there has developed a more competitive eco nomic environment leading to a vastly expanded role of international economic forces in the local economy. Thirdly, among both policy-makers and the people, there has emerged a heightened sense of awareness of th e importance of Asia, particularly of Southeast and East Asia to the economic and political future of the country. This has been brought about not only by the incr easing economic activity among members of the region but also by the significant numbers of overseas co ntract workers in the neighbouring countries. Fourthly. the emergence of economic growth centres outside of Metro Manila, such as in the Calabarzon area, Subic. Cebu, Davao, and General Santos. and the institutionalization of a Local Government Code have introduced a new dimension into the democratic transition process. With these forces at work, the degree and quality of decentralization of both political and economic activities become important indicators for the democratization process. Finally, the restoration of legal arenas for the STATE OF THE NATION

22

de mocratic cont ta ti on of powe r has e nco urag d various so laJ m ve me nts a nd people ' organi za ti on to r -examine their ta tical and tra tegi opti ons on the sharing r capture f political pow r. Thi could II' ad to m r inn o ativ form of organ izing a nd culti va tin g p Liti aJ con titu ncie r form In

for progr

ivc cha ng£'

a nd

i ty.

philippines 23

v n ·· ··· ·············· ···································· ·········· ···· ··· ····· ··· ······

Rebuilding the Economy

Economic reform in the Philippines has been a particularly contentious and protracted process. 16 In the 1950s and up to the early sixties, economic growth took place under a protectionist regime of exchange controls and import-substitution. However, after this initial spurt or manufacturing activity. industrial growth began to stagnate . Between 1961 and 1987, the proportion of total employment in manufacturing dropped from 12 to 10 per cent. In addition, between 1972 and 1988, the manufacturing sector's share in gr dom tic product (GDP) barely moved: 24 per nt in 1972 and 25 per cent in 1988. STAll OIM

iliON 24

nd r th

authoritarian r egi m (' of Marco ( 19 72-

6) , tb admin· trati n tri d to pursu a poli cy of gr('ater xp rt- ri ntati n and lib raliz.ati on und r prr'. sur(' (rom th Fund .

W rid Ba nk and th f.> In

rnatinn a l Monrtary

h

f h a p ~ r .lgn loans in

. whi h Ma r o u pow r d - Lrat gy of gr wth . tor t

uJd n t be pur ue d ·g r

intrrnationaJ

d lO fu I a Mdr bt -

V£' r. th

gr • te r lib raJ izall n a nd

ward

Ul ('

(' poli if's

p rt -o ri nt atio n

I during th a utJwrl t ria11

f th

o ntinu ing r s i ta n c•

.a l indu ·trl I m unopo lls l! a nd . Ma n of th f' m r gim

~ rvl n g th

f pa m n

\!

f• r r r on i .

lo aJ m ar k t. 17 By I '

f Marco w h o 3. a bulan r

r ·is I d to th • suspc:m ·ion of th r tr d"

lib raUu u Jon pr gramm

Initial d b Mar o ·.

With th d ·Hn and tn gnati o n of industrial Jfro" tJ1 that ~ Uo

d th

• ·

ph · • of import -sub ·tituU n .

taining and dt p ning indwotriuliz.utJon

b '1' 11 u r •distribution of prlmarU thro ug h ugrarlu.n n · furm

to build a d yna.mi internal mark •t to ·us taln growth and d

lopm nt. Th '

ptio n was •It · tJ cl for •do Pd .

r, by tll • pow r of th

land •d ·a pitulis t ·luss

ntJnu •d to ontrol th I gislatun In th

s ond option for industrial d nav b

·uuntry.

p · ning would

n a ar fully manag d in tegration of u prot ctud

h m mark t with vigorous t xport ori ntution in sol ·t• d lndu tri es along th

mod I of th

Eas t Asian

11

wly

industrializing conoml s (NIEs). This strategy. how

r.

phtllppmes 2

requires a strong, autonomous developmentalist state, which was absent in the Philippine case. In the post-Marcos era starting with the Aquino administration, industrial reform has focused on liberalizing, deregulating and privatizing the economy. Through its finance department, the Aquino administration espoused a radical tariff reform package (Executive Order 413) that sought to simplify the tariff code and ultimately lower the overall tariff rate. After strong resistance in Congress and by business groups identified with protected manufacturing sectors, this reform package was later replaced by a watered-down version (Executive Order 470). This new arrangement enabled major manufacturers dependent upon protection either to retain their existing tariffs or enjoy a five-year adjustment period to the new tariff rates. 18 The other initiatives of the Aquino administration on liberalizing the economy were hobbled by the chronic political instability that hounded its regime, as dramatized by the series of coup attempts by rebellious military rebels. President Ramos assumed office in 1992 and committed himself to a more aggressive and comprehensive programme of deregulation and privatization of the economy. The Ramos leadership has put out an overall plan for economic growth and development packaged under the slogan of "Philippines 2000". This project seeks to transform the country into a newly industrializing economy by the end of the decade. By mid-1992, the Ramos agenda was launched amidst the revival of long-stalled peace negotiations STATE OF THE NATION

26

with thr ee arm e d mov e m e nts c hall e ng ing th e government: th e communist movement. the Muslim separatist movement, and the military rebels. Since then, the military rebels have surfaced fr om their underground lairs , and formali zed in 1995 a negotiated political settlement with the government. In the May 1995 elections , the best known lead er of the military rebels. form er Colonel Gregorio Honasan ran for the Senate and won . Negotiations with the Moro National Liberation Front have reached an advanced stage while the administration continues to explore the possibility of a negotiated _political se ttl ement with th e local communist movement. 19 In the post-Marcos era, one major economic policy focus ed on the privatization of several governmentowned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) as well as so-call e d non-p e rforming ass e ts (NPAs) und e r gov e rnment control. Originall y s e t up by th e government or taken over by the gove rnment fr om the private sector, these GOCCs and NPAs have been put on sale to the private sector under both the Aquino and Ramos administrations to generate funds and shift the initiative for entrepreneurial growth to the private business community. A number of these GOCCs were bankrupt firms originally set up by th_e business cronies of Marcos and we r e be nefi ciari es of huge loan s guaranteed by government finan cial institutions. Under the Ramos administration , three other areas of the economy have been the subject of liberalization and der egulation : the banking sector, ene rgy and telecommunications. A law passed in 1948 restricted philippines 27

th op ration of foreign banks in the local economy, and up to 1994, only four foreign banks were allowed to op rat deposit-taking branches in the country: Citibank, Bank of America, Hongkong and Shanghai Banking orporati n, and Stand ard Charter ed Bank. Other for ign banks were limited to owning 30 per cent of the voting stocks of local banks, and in rare instances up to 40 per nt, subject to the authorization of the President. In 1994, Congress passed a landmark law allowing th operation of ten new foreign banks and in 1995 the following for ign banks were a uthorized to set up branches in the country: Bank of Tokyo and Fuji Bank of Japan, ANZ Bank of Australia, the Korean Exchange Bank, the International Commer cial Bank of China (Taiwan), Bangkok Bank, Developm ent Bank of ingapore, Chemical Bank of the USA, the Netherlandsbased lNG Bank, and the Deutsche Bank of Germany. This liberalization and deregulation of the banking sector is expected to spur competition and break what critics refer to a a "banking cartel", resulting in better rates and services for both businesses and consumers . A confluence of local and int ernational de lopm ents have come to gether to mak e the environment for industrial reforms under the Ramos administration less intractable than that faced by its predece sor . First, there is greater r ealization by the private business s ctor of the need for industrial reforms to make the economy more competitive. Even producers in th traditionally highly protected industrial sectors ha e come to realize that the more viable option is not to re ist trade liberalization but to negotiate a more STATE Of Tl£ NATION

28

realistic adjustment period for the reduction of tariff rates. The Ramos administration is set to start a major tariff reduction programme on all imports until the rates reach a uniform level of 5 per cent by the year 2004. Under this plan {Executive Order 264), the tariff structure will be brought down from the current levels of 30 per cent and above to 10 per cent over the next eight years, and eventually to 5 per cent by the year 2004. Given the track record of past negotiations on this issue and the continuing clout of the big business sector, the government would most likely work out a longer time frame for the reduction of tariff rates on imported products. However, it is also important to note that the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industries (PCCI), a key business organization, has long conceded the necessity of meeting the challenges of a more competitive globalized economic environment. Moreover, the reality of more liberalized trading arrangements in both the region, through the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), and the world (GATT/WTO) is also pushing local producers to adjust to this new environment. A second factor that has contributed to a better environment for industrial reforms has been the country's improved level of political .stability. Together with the country's supply of skilled and semi-skilled work-force, this relative political stability has made the Philippines, once again, a viable destination for foreign investment. This comes at a time when the magnitude of foreign investment, particularly from Japan and the NIEs, has significantly increased. Thus, total investments philippines 29

In I 9 gr w

r gi tor d with ariou go c rnm nt uni

b 344 p r e nt to P4 0 . 16 bill! n p sos fr om Pt billion In 19 3.20 In th r p rt proc (b th go rnm nt and prl v tt ). in tm nts in 1 4 w r , mor than thre tim th t of J9< 3. in r ·ing from P2.7 billi n p

in

os to P9 .6 bi ll io n p

o ·. wi th

ap n ,

tm nl acco untin g fo r 4 .4 p r

1994.2 1 It ran b

·e n th a t th f' in r

of fore ibrn a ·tor · to in slac k in th

t in th

d pa rti lp ti

o unt ry t k

o r nt of a low I

up th p nsP to

I of lo a l r

omp till r vt> ntur : . In a dditl n . th a ail bllity f fore ign a pita l a l ·o . Pr e · a a r ur ba o th a t uld b ace.;

· d b Ioral produ c r ·. third fa ·tor with imp rt nt impli a ti o n

indus tri a l r form ha cont , t of r

-P

Pm rg d in th

a minin g th

na ti o nalis t groups a nd mo h a e tr a diti o n a ll

go

ripti

f

rnm nt. Th

m nt in th c untry th t

e po u e d inward-looking and

prot ec ti o ni s t s tr a t g i deve lopm e nt ar

of th

of

co n o mi

n w r a

s in

th

growth and principl

and

progr a mmatic co nte nt of nationali m. partj ularl eco nomic ubstance in th globali z d ro nomy. In light of th

r

th

rth do, pr

th l' na ti onali l progra mm

r

its

ont xt of an in r a ingl

failur e or

ri is of th

traditional

mod e ls of inward-orie nted and highly prot

Uonist

economies. the local nationalist movement has become more open to studying alt rnative models of economic growth. These alternative strategies re-examine policies towards foreign investment and the global market and the possibilities of inter-class "growth coalitions" under

STATE OF THE NATION

30

a democratic regime where the workers and producers participate in shaping industrial policy. Moreover. some of the more successful reform campaigns of the current administration, such as the dismantling of monopolies. have struck populist chords by targetting firms (such as the Philippine Long Distance Company) that had been notoriously inefficient in the past. In short, there is an emerging political bloc within civil society. traditionally antagonistic to official government policy but which, in conjunction with local and international events, could be more open to supporting national proj ects of industrial transformation.

philippines 31

eight ··· ···· ······· ··· ···· ········· ···· ··· ······ ······ ·· ········ ··· ··· ····· ·· ·········· ····

The Overseas Contract Workers (OCW) Phenomenon

Together with the collective struggle against the Marcos dictatorship , no other phenomenon has so deeply touched the Filipino psyche and consciousness as the Filipino labour diaspora of the last three decades. 22 This same phenomenon has forced the authorities to rethink its long-term implication on the survival of the Philippines as a nation and people. During the first decades of the American colonial era, the migration of Filipino labour took shape with the recruitment of workers into the plantations of Hawaii and California and the canneries of Alaska. This was the first large-scale wave of labour migration out of the STATE OF THE NATION

32

country. The second wave took place after World War II. during the fifties and sixties wh e n Filipino professionals, mostly doctors and nurses , constituted the core of this labour export. During this period , the Philippines served as the biggest exporter of nurses to the United States and was the second biggest sow·ce of foreign doctors after India. The first and second wave of labour migration stood out for two reasons : first, the destination was almost exclusively the United States; and secondly, after decades of struggle for citizenship, those who went to the United States almost always ended up as American citizens or permanent residents . The significance of this Filipino migration is dramatized by the fact that by the start of the twenty-first century, the Filipinos will have become the biggest Asian community in the United States, replacing the Chinese as the most num erous Asian grouping. This current third wave of Filipino migration is distinguished by the fact that most of the individuals are contract workers whose destinations span lite rally the whole world, although the overwhelming majority hav e e nd ed up working in the Middl e Eas t. A combination of push and pull factors have provided the basis for this massive labour export. Jn the Philippines, the economic crisis particularly during the decade of the eighties pushed both skilled and semi-skilled workers to look for jobs abroad. On th e other hand , the oilbased afflue nce of the Middle East and the robust economies of the NIEs necessitated workers for certain jobs and services which could not be supplied locally philippines 33

fllth r b au of lab ur hortag or This m an. that rtaln jobs ar no long r to the I I p pul lion or tr m t I caUy wouJd r quJ mu h high r ts . In a t n-y ar p rl d from 1985 to I 4. a t taJ or 5.254.000 or a yearly av rag or mor than half a mUUon Fllipln w r d ploy d nv•~~IHLta as contract work rs) w

Mor ov r. for th Ia t nln t n y 19 bllli n t that the CW hav ontrlbut d bout r I to a th Philippine onomy. r n av rag 3 billion d llar each year.2 Debate and di cu ions about th 0 W phenomenon hav b en fram d largely in cooomic terms. seriously negl ling lh Impact or lhi5 peri oc on tho whole Filipino psycho and ba ic In lituti ns uch as the family. Very few sy t mali tudi have been done to investigate the impact or this xperlenc on such problems a : is thi experi nee mpow ring for women OCWs and how do it affi t g nder r lations especiaUy within the family; do s th OCW e peri n e enhance fe ling and valu s of national consciousne and identity; do returning OCW assum significantly different social, economic, and political rol s in their communities; and can they be consciou Jy tapped as a specific constituency for some reform programme? Given the magnitude and significance of the OCW experience not only in the Philippines but in oth r developing societies as well. it is almost inevitable that it should provoke tlashpoints between the source and STAll OF THE NATION 34

recipient countries. The cases of Flor Contemplacion in Singapore and Sarah Balabagan in the United Arab Emirates, to name just two well-publicized events, are just the tip of the iceberg of an enormous social problem begging to explode , particularly in the absence of bilateral or multilateral agreements on this phenomenon. Clearly, the OCW phenomenon concentrates volatile issues of race, class, gender, nationality, religion, culture, and human rights, whose rational resolution would require the co-operation of all partners involved. In the Philippines , sustained economic growth and political stability, hopefully, would increasingly undermine the material basis of this phenomenon.

philippines 35

nin ···················· ······················ ··· ··· ·········· ········ ····· ····· ··········

Political Stability and the Armed Movements

Two of the most resilient and intractable armed political movements in the region continue to challenge the political authority and legitimacy of the Philippine state. The first, a communist-led revolutionary movement is rooted in several decades of peasant-based struggle for agrarian reform and committed to a strategy of protracted war by building bases in the countryside as a primary condition for seizing political power.24 In the mid-sixties, a resurgent nationalist movement led by young intellectuals and college-educated student activists reinvigorated the mass movement and founded a new communist party in 1968 and a new guerrilla STATE Of Tl£ NATION 36

army in 1969. Under the leadership of the new party, the mass movement gained its peak political and military strength during the last five years of the struggle against the authoritarian rule of Marcos. The ouster of the dictatorship in 1986 created an opening for political negotiations between the Aquino administration and the National Democratic Front (NDF}, the political coalition representing the revolutionary movement. From the start, however, the two parties approached the negotiations with fundamentally different perspectives, leading to the failure of the talks. For the NDF, any discussion of ending the armed conflict including the question of a ceasefire must be pursued within the context of a "comprehensive political settlement" that commits the government to implementing fundamental social and political reforms . For its part, the government was primarily interested in concluding an immediate cessation of armed hostilities without being tied down to the details of any comprehensive political settlement leading to wideranging reforms in society. 25 Since much of the discussion got bogged down by questions about implementing and monitoring the preliminary ceasefire, the military also commanded an inordinately dominant role in the negotiations. By the time the new administration under Ramos decided to resume negotiations with the NDF in 1992, a new conjuncture of events was in place. A political settlement with the NDF continued to be sought by the Ramos administration since political stability is crucial to the success of its developmental strategy of opening philippines 37

up to the world market and attracting new investors. Moreover, as a pillar of the military establishment, Ramos, unlike Aquino, was in an enviable position to assure th e military that no se ll-out was possible in any political settlem ent with th e NDF. By this time , on the other hand . the NDF was experiencing its worst internal crisis and disunity and had s uiTe red serious declines in its political and military strength .26 Forced to negotiate from a pos ition of weakn ess , th e NDF lead ership approached the seri es of peace talks with far greater circumspection to avoid proj ecting any impression of weakness that co uld furth er und ermine its position visa-vis the government and its own rank and fil e. Both the formal talks and informal consultations betwee n th e Ram os adm inistration and the NDF have turn ed out to be mainly e xploratory and thus inconclusive. In th e face of th e internal split that has divid ed th e NDF forces. its official leadership has reaffirmed the basic strategy of protracted people's war by building its main force in the countryside preparatory to seizing powe r in the city centres. Because of its present weakness. it is unlikely that the official NDF leadership will actively see k a political settlement of the armed co nflict. At the same time, it cannot ignore the peace talks because this provides the NDF with a continuing forum for articulating its alternative vision and agenda of government. Meanwhile , the government also has little choice but to pursue a negotiated political settlement with the NDF in the interest of political stability. By opening lines of negotiations, the government expects to keep a moral and political edge STAT£ OF THE NATION

38

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the substantive talks that followed the Jeddah Accord, the MNLF demanded that the government, through an executive order, provide for the outright grant of autonomy to the thirteen provinces originally covered by the Tripoli Agreement. Predictably, the administration rejected the MNLF's demand and negotiations stopped in May 1987. In August 1989, the administration approved a law (Republic Act 6734} creating the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM}. A plebiscite was held on 17 November 1989 to ratify the ARMM but only four of the thirteen provinces covered by the Act voted in its favour. These four Muslim-dominated provinces - Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi- have become the core members of ARMM. The first election of officials of the ARMM was held in February 1990 and this new politico-administrative body was formally inaugurated in November 1990. A confluence of favourable events made possible the resumption of talks between the Ramos administration and the MNLF. The administration's strong initiative to reopen talks was matched by a renewed willingness of the MNLF to negotiate, a process greatly enhanced by the mediation of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC} and Indonesia. 27 In the talks that took place in Jakarta in 1993 and 1995, the government and the MNLF signed an agreement on Muslim autonomy and concluded a ceasefire formalizing the cessation of hostilities between the warring parties. However, the negotiations fell short of reaching a mutually STATE OF THE NATION

40

acceptable formula for the implementation of the grant of autonomy. While the continuing negotiation between the government and the MNLF indicates the emergence of a new environment more conducive to the political settlement of the armed conflict, it has also provoked and intensified a process of polarization within the Muslim movements . Reflecting political and ideological differences in addressing the autonomy problem, there has emerged at least three armed Muslim political formations active in Mindanao. Apart from the dominant MNLF, which represents the most secular orientation among the Muslim movements, there exists two other armed movements, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front {MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf. The latter two articulate variations of a resurgent Islam, with the Abu Sayyaf calling for jihad and the establishment of an Islamic state. 28 In a more immediate sense, however, these latter two movements reflect the severe frustrations of the Muslim community in their quest for a homeland and a just peace. In light of the extreme volatility of the Mindanao situation, the successful negotiation of a political settlement with the MNLF is the immediate linchpin for political stability in the area. Learni!lg from the lessons of past negotiations, a political solution worth pursuing lies in the expansion of the present ARMM to include other areas with significant Muslim populations, such as Basilan. With an expanded ARMM, the government and the MNLF could then explore the setting up a provisional transitory government where the Muslim philippines 41

movements, primarily the MNLF and the MILF. could play more active roles. This initial co-operation in the transitory government could then set the stage for working out the details of a new plebiscite to legitimize the expanded autonomous regional government. Finally, the third challenge to the political stability of the country, the rebel factions of the military, had been effectively undercut by the successful conclusion of negotiated political settlements in 1995. As a result, the leadership and rank and file of these various rebel factions have not only come out in the open, but more importantly, have shifted the terrain of their struggle to the electoral arena. In the 1995 elections, no less than the leader of the most potent rebel military faction, cashiered Colonel Gregorio Honasan of the RAM. ran for the Senate and won. A significant number of other politicized military officers also tested the electoral waters by contesting congressional seats and local government positions. In the aftermath of its intense politicization during the Marcos and Aquino years, the military as an institution faces the challenge of acknowledging and practising the principle of civilian supremacy. In working out the requisites of political stability in a democratic order, the country needs to cultivate a professional and competent military insulated from vested power blocs and yet embedded enough in civil society to be responsibly attuned to social issues while respecting legitimate civilian rule.

STATE OF THE NATION

42

ten

Relations with the Region and the World

Two decisive developments underpin the main thrust of the Philippines' relations with the region and the world in the current order: the end of the long history of special bilateral ties with the United States; and the emergence of a heightened sense of awareness of the importance of Asia, and Southeast Asia in particular, to the country's economic and political future . A confluence of internal and global factors explain this significant reorientation. The Philippines' colonial past and long years of dependency on the United States marginalized its ties with Asia and its Southeast Asian neighbours. During philippines 43

the height of the Cold War, the country served as America's closest ally in the region, an explosive role at a time when much of Asia seethed with militant nationalist movements and popular armed challenges to official government rule. The end of the Cold War and the relative decline of the United States as an economic power coincided with the birthing of the post-Marcos period. In the Philippines, a defining moment in the country's relations with the United States took place in September 1991 when the Philippine Senate voted to end American occupation of two huge military bases in the country (Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base) and a host of complementary military installations. 29 With this historic decision, Philippine-American relations came to be viewed from a fresh perspective, thus allowing a better appreciation of the importance of Asia and the region in the shaping of contemporary events. Undoubtedly, the compelling model of economic growth and development presented by the late industrializers of East and Southeast Asia has contributed to this new importance of the region in the country's consciousness. More concretely, the conscious moves on the part of the ASEAN members to strengthen their own economic and political linkages in response to both regional and global developments have provided the firm basis for this reorientation by the Philippines. For instance, the formal establishment of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992 was a major step in strengthening an ASEAN bloc of nation-states. Finally, an acute sense of having lagged far behind its neighbours STATE OF THE NATION

44

in economic growth and development has made the Philippines more sensitive to the reality that late industrializers need to position themselves aggressively in the rapidly globalizing environment. In another major way, the heightened sense of awareness of Asia's importance to the Philippines has been nurtured further by the OCW phenomenon. Through the millions of Filipino workers who have lived and relived significant aspects of the life and culture of countries such as Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, the foreign lifestyle and temperament have become less mysterious and incomprehensible to the average Filipino family. A revealing indicator of how the Philippines has reexamined its policy moorings on sensitive problems involving its national interests has been its approach to the South China Sea problem. As the anchor of its negotiations with China, the Philippines has been actively relying and soliciting an ASEAN consensus and support on the matter. While this ASEAN consensus is yet to be forged, the Philippines' reliance on this mechanism dramatizes the extent to which its policy options and initiatives have been increasingly shaped by an ASEAN consciousness.

philippines 45

eleven ·· ···· ··· ··········· ····· ··· ····· ··· ··· ········· ·· ·· ··· ···· ········ ·· ·················

The Longer View: Conclusions

As the Philippines negotiates the threshold of the twentyfirst century, it struggles to join the ranks of late industrializing eco n omies in the r egio n while strengthening the foun dations of a stable democratic political order. The terms of this transition , however, remain difficult. In the aftermath of the plunder of the nation's resources under Marcos and the lost opportunities for decisive reforms under the Aquino administration, the political leadership under Ramos has become acutely aware of the need to make up for lost time and catch up with the rest of East and Southeast Asia. This compelling STATE OF THE NATION 46

realization comes at a time when the mainstream global strategy for economic growth r evo lv es around liberalization. privatization and deregulation of markets to aggressively find one's niches in the highly competitive world market. Having committed itself to these preferred strategies of development, the Ramos administration must address the daunting task of providing the appropriate political and economic terms for successfully negotiating this transition. First, the administration needs to build and consolidate the political consensus for a project that is seen to be socially destabilizing by many institutions and organized sectors of civil society. For instance, many groups of organized labour and agricultural workers continue to oppose the administration's vision and programme of NIC-hood , as arti culated in "Philippines 2000". Secondly, this cultivation of political support for the economic agenda of growth and development needs to be fleshed out in a democratic process where consultation, negotiations, and coalitionbuilding are the order of the day. Thirdly, in negotiating this transition, the need for a state leadership that can provide strategic planning and direction beco mes increasingly urgent. By necessity, this effective political leadership must actively intervene in initiating reforms that will activate and harness the enthusiasm and energies of the actors that count in civil society. The social and institutional infirmities of the people as they are called upon to respond to this grand project cannot be glossed over. In 1994, the country continued to show one of the most highly skewed income philippines 4 7

distributions in the region . Th riche :t 20 p r cent of the population earned 52 .4 p r cent of the national income whit the poorest 40 per cent arned only 13.5 per cent. 30 Using even th most optimi tic stimates of poverty incidence in the ountry. the comparable data in th region suggests that the poverty situation in the Philippines is wors compared to its neighbours. Thus. in 1991. about 41 per cent of famiUes in the country wore estimated to be living below the poverty threshold. In Indonesia and Thailand. the comparable data show that only 36 per ent of families were below the poverty line in 1990 and only 31 per cent in Malaysia. 31 The data on educational performance in the country also send danger signals. While the Philippines continues to maintain the highest literacy rate in Southeast Asia (94 per cent in 1992). its functional literacy of only 77 per cent (1989) is way below its basic Literacy level. More disturbing is the data that 31 per cent of elementary pupils had dropped out of school by the time they reached their fourth grade.32 In pursuing its agenda of making the Philippines more competitive in the world market, the Ramos administration has also relied increasingly on the impact of globalization to pry open hitherto highly protected and oligopolized economic sectors. While this has brought about a more competitive environment in economic activities, such as telecommunications, banking and shipping, it has been pursued with little planning about key industries that need to be strategically assisted so that they could form the core and spearhead of a sustainable industrialization programme. STATE OF THE NATION

48

The economic and democratization agenda will certainly be enhanced by the emergence of new players in both the economic and political arenas . In politics. great expectations are focused on the new dynamics of political contestation and governance that th e decentralization process wouJd activate at the local government units. With more powers enjoyed at the local levels, including greater fiscal autonomy, more non-traditional politicians are expected to actively contest these positions . However, to br e ak th e stranglehold of long established political clans in many areas, the decentralization momentum needs to be complemented by wide-ranging socio-economic and electoral reforms that would broadly democratize the voting process. Along the same lines, the liberalization of the economy and the emergence of growth areas outside the established centres of economic a ctivity are expected to produce new, more entrepreneurial players in the economy. However, the government must be alert to the danger that the privatization and deregulation processes do not simply produce new monopolists and oligopolists in preferred areas of the economy. Finally, at the core of the vibrancy and at the same time restiveness of the civil society in the country is the enduring struggle for the empowerment of sectors long marginalized by the political and economic inequities of the system. Failing to resolve this decisively, the country's political leadership faces the daunting prospect of protracted challenges to its legitimacy and authority, at times erupting in military confrontations, at times in philippines 49

debilitating political stand-offs. Yet, at the same time, this dynamism of civil society is the very same resource which if activated and directed by a farseeing and decisive political leadership can be the key to sustaining economic growth and development and strengthening the democratic process.

STATE OF THE NATION

50

Notes

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

For an extended discussion of this state of affairs. see Tern a rio C. Rivera, Landlords and Capitalists: Class. Family. and State in Philippine Manufacturing (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1994). This phenomenon is systematicaUy examined by Alfred W. McCoy. ed .. An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines (WISconsin: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin , 1993); and Boss: 5 Case Studies of Local Politics in th e Philippines (Pasig. Metro Manila: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism and Institute for Popular Democracy, 1995). For an analysis of the results of a survey conducted by the Social Weather Stations (SWS) in 1991 on religious beliefs. attitudes and practices . see Ricardo G. Abad. "Filipino Religiosity: Some International Comparisons". Social Weather Bulletin 94, no. 1/2 (January 1994). The July 1991 National Survey conducted by the Social Weather Stations shows that 65 per cent of respondents believe that the Church should not interfere in elections , while 63 per cent indicated that the Church should not interfere in government. The relation between the churches and the Marcos authoritarian regime is analysed by Robert L. Youngblood, Marcos Against the Church: Economic Development and Political Repression in the Philippines (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 1990). See also Wilfredo Fabros, The Church and its Social Involvement in the Philippines. 1930-1972 (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1988). A useful framework for situating non-governmental organizations and Philippine politics is provided by Gerard Clarke in "Participation and Protest: Non-governmental Organisations and Philippine Politics" (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political. Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies. University of London, 30 June 1995). An institutional analysis of the Philippine presidency is offered by Alex B. Brillantes, Jr. and Bienvenida M. Amarles-llago, in 18981992: The Philippine Presidency (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1994). For the rise and fall of the Marcos dictatorship, see Aurora Javate De Dios, Petronilo Bn. Daroy. and Lorna Kalaw Tirol. eds., Dictatorship and Revolution: Roots of People's Power (Metro Manila: Conspectus Foundation. Inc., 1988).

philippines 51

9 For an interpretation of the Philippine state using the framework of the "politics of patrimonial plunder", see Paul D. Hutchcroft, "Oligarchs and Cronies in the Philippine State: The Politics of Patrimonial Plunder" , World Politics 43, no . 3 (April 1991): 414-50. See also Belinda A. Aquino, Politics of Plunder: The Philippines Under Marcos (Quezon City: Great Books Trading, 1987). 10 A well documented study of the crony capitalists of Marcos is the work by Ricardo Manapat. Some are Smarter than Others: Th e History of Marcos' Crony Capitalism (New York: Aletheia Publications, 1991). 11 A good resource material in this regard is Gary Hawes, The Philippine State and the Marcos Regime: The Politics of Export (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). 12 For a discussion of the impact of foreign borrowing on various aspects of social life, see Emmanuel S. de Dios and Joel Rocamora. eds. , Of Bonds and Bondage: A Reader on Philippine Debt (Transnationallnstitute, Philippine Center for Policy Studies, and Freedom from Debt Coalition, 1992); and James K. Boyce, The Political Economy of Growth and Impov erishment in the Marcos Era (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1993). 13 The various aspects of the politicization of the military are discussed in the following works: Kudeta: The Challenge to Philippine Democracy (Manila: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 1990); and Felipe B. Miranda, The Politicization of the Military (Quezon City: UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies, 1992). 14 An assessment of EDSA ten years after the event can be found in Lorna Kalaw Tirol, ed., Duet for EDSA 1996: Looking Back, Looking Forward (Manila: Foundation for Worldwide People Power, Inc., 1995). For the companion chronology of events, see Angela Stuart Santiago, Duet for EDSA: Chronology of a Revolution (Manila: Foundation for Worldwide People Power, Inc., 1995). 15 Based on Social Weather Stations Nationwide Surveys, 1986-92. 16 This section draws heavily from a revised version of an earlier research work, Temario C. Rivera and Kenji Koike, The ChineseFilipino Business Families Under the Ramos Government. Joint Research Program Series No. 114 (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1995). 17 For the political economy of policy-making during the authoritarian regin1e of Marcos, see Emmanuel S. de Dios, "A Political Economy of Philippine Policy-Making" , in Economic Policy-Making in the Asia Pacific Region , edited by John W. Langford and K. Lorne Brownsey (Halifax, Nova Scotia: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1990); and Manuel F. Montes, "Financing Development: The 'Democratic' versus the 'Corporatist' Approach in the Philippines", in The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy, edited by Miguel Urrutia, Shinichi lchimura, and Setsuko Yukawa (Tokyo: United Nations University, 1989). STATE OF THE NATION

52

18 For a discussion of the tariff reform initiative of the Aquino administration, see Manuel F. Montes. "The Politics of Liberalization: The Aquino Government's 1990 Tariff Reform Initiative", in The Politics of Economic Reform in Southeast Asia: The Experiences of Thailand. Indonesia and the Philippines, edited by David G. Timberman (Makati. Metro Manila: Asian Institute of Management, 1992), pp. 91-115. See also Joseph Y. Lim, "The Macro Aspects and the Political Economy of Liberalization and Deregulation". in Deregulation and Economic Development in the Philippines. edited by Joseph Lim and Katzumi Nozawa (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1991), pp. 1-23. 19 For a discussion of the political negotiations between the government and the armed movements, see Temario C. Rivera. "Armed Challenges to the Philippine Government: Protracted War or Political Settlement?" Southeast Asian Affairs 1994 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 1994). pp. 252-64. 20 "Total Investments in 1994 up by 344%", Philippine Daily Inquirer, 27 March 1995, p . Bl. 21 Data from the Export Processing Zone Authority, as cited in the "Inquirer Monitor", Philippine Daily Inquirer, 27 March 1995, p.Bl. 22 The following works analyse this phenomenon from various vantage points: Graziano Battistela and Anthony Paganoni, eds., Philippine Labor Migration: Impact and Policy (Quezon City: Scalabrini Migration Center, 1992); Aurora E. Perez and Maruja Milagros B. Asis, eds., "Understanding Filipino Migration", Philippine Social Sciences Review 51, nos. 1-4 (January-December 1993); and EIP.na Samonte et al.. Issues and Concerns of Overseas Filipinos: An Assessment of the Philippine Government's Response (Quezon City: U.P. CIDS and the University of the Philippines Press, 1995). 23 These data are from The Philippine Statistical Yearbook 1995. 24 For accounts of the historical roots and development of the Philippine communist movement, see Jose Maria Sison (with Hainer Werning), The Philippine Revolution: The Leader's View (New York: Crane Russak, 1989); and Francisco Nemenzo, "Rectification Process in the Philippine Communist Movement," Armed Communist Movements in Southeast Asia, edited by Lim Joo-Jock and S. Vani (Hampshire, England: Gower, 1984). 25 An assessment of this first stage of the peace process is seen in Maria Serena I. Dlokno, "An Assessment of the 1986-1987 Peace Process," Ending the Armed Conjlir.t: Peace Negotiations in the Philippines (Quezon City: U.P. Center for Integrative and Development Studies and University of the Philippines Press. 1992), pp. 22-32. 26 See Joel Rocamora, Breaking Through: The Struggle Within the Communist Party of the Philippines (Metro Manila: Anvil Publishing Inc. , 1994).

philippines 53

27 For the international linkages of the MNLF, see Samuel K. Tan,

28

29

30 31 32

Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle (Dillman. Quezon City: U.P. Center for Integrative and Development Studies and University of the Philippines Press, 1993). A recent analysis of Islamic resurgence and its implications on the Philippines is provided by Mehol K. Sadain, Global and Regional Trends in Islamic Resurgence: Their Implications on the Southern Philippines (Metro Manila: CIRSS Papers No. 2, Foreign Service Institute, 1994). The role of the Senate in this historic event is analysed by Jovito R. Salonga in The Senate that Said No (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1995). 1994 Family Income and Expenditure Surveys. UNDP, Human Development Report 1995. Department of Education, Culture and Sports. Elementary Education Enrolment Data. 199G-91 and 1994.

STATE OF THE NATION 54

Bibliography

BOOKS AQUINO, Belinda A. Politics of Plunder: The Philippines Under Marcos . Quezon City: Great Books Trading, 1987. AZURIN, Arnold M. Remventing the Filipmo Sense of Bemg and Becommg. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press. 1993. Boss : 5 Case Studies of Local Politics in the Phil1ppmes. Pas1g, Metro Manila : Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism and Institute for Popular Democracy, 1995.

BOYCE, James K. The Political Economy of Growth and Impoverishment m the Marcos Era. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1993. BRIL.1ANTES, Alex B., Jr., and Bienvenida M. Amarles~lago . 1898-1992: The Philippine Presidency. Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1994.

BROAD, Robin, and John Cavanagh. The Philippine Challenge: Sustainable and Equitable Development in the 1990s. Quezon City: Philippine Center for Policy Studies, 1991. DE DIOS, Aurora Javate, Petronilo Bn Daroy, and Lorna Kalaw Tirol, eds. Dictatorship and Revolution: Roots of People's Power. Metro Manila: Conspectus Foundation, Inc ., 1988. DE 0105, Emmanuel S., and Joel Rocamora, eds. Of Bonds and Bondage : A Reader on Philippine Debt. Transnational Institute, Philippine Center for Policy Studies, and Freedom from Debt Coalition, 1992. DE DIOS, Emmanuel S.; Manuel F. Montes, and Joseph Y. Lim. Three Essays on Nationalist Industrialization. Quezon City: Philippine Center for Policy Studies, 1991. GunERREZ, Eric. The Ties that Bind: A Guide to Family, Business and Other Interests in the Ninth House of Representatives. Metro Manila: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism and Institute for Popular Democracy, I 994 .

philippines 55

FABROS, Wilfredo. The Church and Its Social Involvement in the Philippines, 1930-1972. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1988.

HAWES, Gary. The Philippine State and the Marcos Regime: The Politics of Export. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.

KERKVLIET, Benedict J., and Resil B. Mojares, eds. From Marcos to Aquino: Local Perspectives on Political Transition in the Philippines. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1991. Kudeta: The Challenge to Philippine Democracy. Manila: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 1990. LIM, Joseph and Katzumi Nozawa, eds. Deregulation and Economic Development in the Philippines. Tokyo: lnstiMe of Developing Economies, 1991.

MANAPAT, Ricardo. Some are Smarter than Others: The History of Marcos' Crony Capitalism. New York: Aletheia Publications, 1991. McCOY, Alfred W., ed . An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines. Wisconsin : Center for Southeast Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin, 1993.

MEDALLA, Erlinda M., G. R. Tecson, R. M. Bautista, and J.H. Power. Catching Up With Asia 's Tigers, vol. 1. Philippine Institute for Development Studies, 1995. MONTES, Manuel F. Financing Development: The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy in the Philippines . Philippine Institute for Development Studies, 1991 .

PERTIERRA, Raul. Philippine Localities and Global Perspectives: Essays on Society and Culture. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1995. PERTIERRA, Raul and Eduardo F. Ugarte, eds. Cultures and Texts: Representations of Philippine Society. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1994. RIVERA, Temario C. Landlords and Capitalists: Class, Family and State in Philippine Manufacturing. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1994. ROCAMORA, Joel. Breaking Through: The Struggle Within the Communist Party of the Philippines. Metro Manila: Anvil Publishing Inc., 1994. SANTIAGO, Angela Stuart. Duet for EDSA: Chronology of a Revolution. Manila: Foundation for Worldwide People Power, Inc., 1995.

SISON, Jose Maria. The Philippine Revolution: The Leader's View. New York: Crane Russak, 1989.

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TAN, Samuel K. Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle . Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1993. TIMBERMAN, David G. The Politics of Economic Reform in Southeast Asia: The Experiences of Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. Makati. Metro Manila: Asian Institute of Management, 1992. TIROL, Lorna Kalaw, ed. Duet for EDSA: Looking Back, Looking Forward. Manila: Foundation for Worldwide People Power, Inc., 1995. VJTUG, Marites Danguilan. The Politics of Logging: Power from the Forest. Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 1993.

YOUNGBLOOD, Robert L. Marcos Against the Church : Economic Development and Political Repression in the Philippines. Ithaca and London : Cornell University Press, 1990.

JOURNALS, MONOGRAPHS, JOURNAL ARTICLES, BOOK CHAPTERS ABAD, Ricardo G. "Filipino Religiosity: Some lnternationaiComparisons". Social Weather Bulletin 94, no. 1/2 (January 1994). BATTISTELA, Graziano and Anthony Paganoni, eds. Philippine Labor Migration: Impact and Policy. Quezon City: Scalabrini Migration Center, 1992. DE DIOS, Emmanuel S. "A Political Economy of Philippine Policy-Making". In Economic Policy-Making in the Asia Pacific Region, edited by John W. Langford and K. Lome Brownsey. Halifax, Nova Scotia: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1990. DIOKNO, Maria Serena I. "An Assessment of the 1986-1987 Peace Process". In Ending the Armed Conflict: Peace Negotiations in the Philippines. Quezon City: U.P. Center for Integrative and Development Studies ,and University of the Philippines Press, 1992. HUTCHCROFT, Paul D. "Oligarchs and Cronies in the Philippine State: The Politics of Patrimonial Plunder". World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991):414-50. MIRANDA, Felipe B. The Politicization of the Military. Quezon City: U.P. Center for Integrative and Development Studies, 1992.

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NEMENZO, Francisco. "Rectification Process in the Philippine Communist Movement". In Armed Communist Movements In Southeast Asia, edited by Lim Joo-Jock and S. Vani. Hampshire, England: Gower, 1984.

PEREZ, Aurora and Maruja Milagros B. Asls, eds. "Understandina filipino Migration•. Philippine Social Sciences R~ 51 , no. 1-4 (January-Oecembef 1993). RIVERA. Temario C. "Armed Challenges to the Philippine Government Protracted War or Political Settlement". Southeast Asian Affairs 1994, pp. 252-64.

RIVERA, Temario C. and Kenji Koike.The Chinese-Filipino Business Families lklder the Ramos Government. Joint Research Program Series No. 114. Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1995. SADAIN, Mehol K. Global and Regional Trends in Islamic Resurgence: Their Implications on the Southern Philippines. CIRSS Papers No. 2. Metro Manila: Foreign Service Institute, 1994. SAMONTE. Elena et al. Issues and Concerns of Overseas Filipinos: An Assessment of the Philippine Government's Response. Quezon City: U.P. CIDS and the University of the Philippines Press, 1995.

PH.D. DISSERTATION CLARKE, Gerard. "Participation and Protest: Noo{;overnmental Ofganisations and Philippine Politics· . Ph.D. dissertation. School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1995.

OTHERS Family Income and Expenditure Surveys, 1994

UNDP. Human Development Report 1995. Philippine Statistical Yearbook, 1995 Social Weather Stations National Surveys (various years).

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Index

Abu Sayyaf, 41 Aquino-Cojuangco clan, 19 Aquino presidency, 12-13, 17- 20 Arroyo, Joker, 18 Asean Free Trade Agreement (AFTA),

29, 44 Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), 40

Marcos presidency, 1-2, 14-16 mass media, 7 military rebels, 16, 26-27, 42 Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), 41 Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF),

20, 27 , 39, 40-41 National Democratic Front (NDF) 20,

37-39 Cardinal Sin, 18 Catholic Church, 5-6, 18 civil society, 4, 9 Clark Air Base, 44 crony capitalists, 10 decentralization, 22, 49 developmentalist state, 11-13, 26 EDSA uprising, 17, 20 El Shaddai, 7 Enrile, Juan Ponce, 18 export-oriented industrialization, 25

GATT;WTO, 29 Honasan, Gregorio, 18, 27, 42 Iglesia ni Kristo, 7 IMF-WB, 15-16, 25 import substitution industrialization, 5,

25 landed oligarchy, 4-5 Local Government Code, 22

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 8-9 Overseas Contract Workers (OCWs),

32-35 patrimonial plunder, 15-16 people's organizations, 8-9 Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industries (PCCI), 29 Philippines 2000, 26, 47 Pimentel, Aquilino, 18 Ramos, Fidel, 12-13, 26 Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM), 18 Sanchez, Augusto, 18 Social Weather Stations, 19 South China Sea problem, 45 Subic Naval Base, 44 Tariff Reform, 26 Tripoli Agreement, 39 Weak state, 5, 10--13

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The Author

Temario C. Rivera is Maximo Kalaw Professor of Political Science and Head of the Department of Political Science at the University of the Philippines. He is author of the book, Landlords and Capitalists: Class, Family and State in Philippine Manufacturing (1994). He is also Executive Director of the Philippine Center for Policy Studies.

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