St Bonaventure's Disputed Questions on Knowledge of Christ

Citation preview

WORKS OF SAINT BONAVENTURE Edited by GEORGE MARCIL, O.F.M

Saint Bonaventure's

DISPUTED QUESTIONS ON THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST Introduction and Translation

by ZACHARY HAYES, O.F.M., D. TH.

THE FRANCISCAN INSTITUTE SAINT BONAVENTURE UNIVERSITY SAINT BONAVENTURE, NEW YORK 14778 1992

Copyright © 1 992 by The Franciscan Institute of St. Bonaventure University

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Editor,s Foreword Ubrary of Congress Catalog Card Number:

91-78042

e PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies Binghamton, N. Y.

Translator's Fo-rewprd Introduction

7 15

CHAPfER ONE: Historical Context I. From Monastery to University II. From Reading to Question Ill. Question and Disputation

21 22 25 28

CHAPTER TWO: The Knowledge of Christ: The History of.the Problem I. Dogma and the Question of Christ's Knowledge 11. Historical Reflections

30 30 32

CHAPTER THREE: The Context of Bonaventure's Disputed Questions I. Ufe and Work of Bonaventure II. The Disputed Questions and Related Writings

40 40 41

CHAPTER FOUR: The Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ I. General Structure of the Questions II. The Content of the Questions Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Question 5 Question 6 Question 7

45 45 47 47 50 54 55 59 62 64

The Text of St. Bonaventure,s Disputed Questions in Translation QUESTION I: Whether the knowledge of Christ, in as far as He is the Word, actually extends to an infinite number of objects.

71

QUESTION II: Whether God knows things by means of their likenesses or by means of their proper essence.

83

QUESTION Ill: Whether God knows creatures by means of likenesses that are really distinct. ·

96

QUESTION IV: Whether that which is known by us with certitude is known in the eternal reasons themselves.

115

EDITOR'S FOREWORD

QUESTION V: Whether the soul of Christ possessed only uncreated wisdom, or whether it possessed also a created wisdom together with the uncreated wisdom.

145

QUESTION VI: Whether the soul of Christ comprehends the uncreated wisdom itself.

161

QUESTION Vil: Whether the soul of Christ comprehends all those things which the uncreated wisdom comprehends. 178

Epilogue

195

Indices INDEX OF BIBUCAL CITATIONS

199

INDEX OF AUTHORS AND WORKS

200

The Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ has recently been published in Italian and in French, 1 and the work has existed for some time in a Spanish bilingual publication. 2 But this transla­ tion by Fr. Zachary Hayes, 0. F. M., represents the first time that the work appears in English form. The Franciscan Institute takes pride in publishing it as the fourth volume of its series Works of St. 3 Bonaventure. A new translation of a Bonaventurian treatise is an event. The new treatise adds something to the widening picture of the great Franciscan scholar-theologian. This work on Christ, along with the work on the Trinity, both done in the medieval scholastic style of disputed questions, shows how Bonaventure, as scholar, was at the cent.er of what Christianity is about. Here we witness him probing part of the basic meaning of the Christian faith and of his own piety. Bonaventure is very much the Franciscan, in tune with what St. Francis was concerned about. The topic of a set of disputed ques­ tions was a matter of choice, and Bonaventure made his choice in a manner consistent with his Franciscanism. The university curricu­ lum in its general content was quite fixed. The disputed questions, an exercise for students, had to be organized by the professor; the · ____________________________ 1 The Italian version is. La conoscenza in Crisio, with ini:roduction, i:ranslation and commentary by Letterio Mauro (Vicenza, 1987). The French is Questions disputees sur le savoir chez le Christ, with translation by E. H. Weber, 0. P. (Paris: 0. E. I. L, 1985). 2 The Spanish translation is found in vol. 2 of the series, Obras de San Buenavencurn in Bib!ioteca de Auto res Cristianos (Madrid, 1946), 95-2 77. 3 Vol. 1 is a translation of the De reductione artium ad theo!ogiam; vol. 2 presents the Itinerarium mentis in Deum, with a translation by Fr. Philotheus Boehner; and vol. 3 contains the Disputed Questions on the Mystery of the Trinity, along with a very lengthy introduction by Fr. Zachary Hayes, 0. F. M.

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EDITOR'S FOREWORD

EDITOR'S FOREWORD

topic especially, to be worked on in medieval pedagogical style, was something the professor had to select. Relevancy came into play, but some topics are always relevant. A study of the Trinity and of the question of knowledge in Christ was particularly worth looking at, and in depth, in the new sic et non methodology of the university. This is a scholar's work. Even more, this is a classroom kind of exercise in which everyone in the lecture hall took an active part. Despite its multiple participants, however, the text was reviewed later, after the class's work, and it was prepared for publication by the professor, who had the last word just as he normally had the controlling word in the lecture hall itself. Reading such a scholarly kind of publication is not easy. Perusing any one of its seven questions from beginning to end makes very little sense. This editor recommends the following as a technique: a) read first the question and the complete reply; b) re-enforce that by reading the arguments that favor the position of the writer; and c) once Bonaventure's position has been clearly understood, along with the sources he favors, then begin to study the opponents' argu­ ments, one at a time, with their appropriate replies. Having studied Bonaventure's views, one will not be surprised by the replies he gives to the objections; in fact, the replies often restate the position and arguments that have already been formulated in the body of the text.

This sometime-reader of modern Christology sees the modern · historicizing everything. The modem historicizes the scriptures. First, he supposes the live, oral preaching of Jesus. Second, he looks for signs of the developing postresurrection oral traditions, as the early Church takes shape and organizes its catechetical efforts. He then tries to put in proper context each of the New Testament writings as they appear on the scene, each writing taking the previous one into some account In that same context, the modern historicizes the developing faith. There is a faith of James, of Peter, of Paul and of John. The things_ they wrote relate much more to the experience of each than to what they read, though they did read. Each one is affected also by the context in which he wrote, and the contexts, too, have historical characteristics. To follow some of what is being said, one need only glance at such books as the monumental study of Schillebeeckx entitled Jesus Christ (in fact, volume I is Jesus and volume II is Christ), and the scriptural work of Sabourin.5 In a modern study of Jesus, 6 one should not be surprised to see the narrative of the life begin with the preaching of Jesus, just like one reads it in the Gospel of Mark. The story of Jesus continues with his death and resurrection. Then come reflections on the faith of the Apostles, marked heavily by the experience of the death scene and the resurrection. Only in a late chapter will one find a study of the birth of Jesus-almost like an afterthought. Furthermore, such a

The medieval theologian and Christologist was also very much a philosopher and metaphysician. This is by strong contrast to the modern Christologist who tends far more to be a historian and scripture scholar. The medieval was not much of a historian, nor did he have much of a historical perspective; as to scripture, he tended to take it ad litteram4• The modem, allowing for some exceptions, does not generally favor metaphysical and epistemologi­ cal enquiry. ____________________________

◄ Medieval exegesis is actually quite complex. le begins with a literal sense, but moves into a whole array of spiritual meanings (allegorical, moral, anagogical). However, no matter how complex the interpretations might become, for the medieval the literal meaning was still the starting point, the foundation on which all spiritual applications were built.

___________________________ 5

ln fact, volume one of the Schillebeeckx study is subtitled An Experience in Chri5tology, and volume two is subtitled The Experience of Jesus as Lord (New York: Crossroads, 1979 and 1981). The Leopold Sabourin, S. J., study is Christology: Basic Texts in Focus (New York: Alba House, 1984). In the same context see Paula Fredriksen, From Jes� lo Christ. The Origins of the New Testament Images of Jesus (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1988); and on a broader scale Jaroslav Pelikan, Jesus Through the Ceniuries. His Place in the History of Culture (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1985). And more recently, see John Meier, A Marginal Jew: Rethinking the Historical Jesus, vol. 1, The Roots of the Problem and the Person (New York: Doubleday, 1991). 6 There are a number of models that one might choose. I have selected the excellent study by Gerald O'Collins, S. J., Interpreting Jesus (Ramsey, N. J.: Paulist Press, 1983).

10

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EDITOR'S FOREWORD

EDITOR'S FOREWORD

study, especially by a Catholic author, will contain a reflection on the christological statement of the Council of Chalcedon. 7 This conciliar statement declared what the faith of the Church was and is l:o be, i.e., that Christ is both fully divine and fully human in one person. In this historidzing context it is difficult and different to ask a question about knowledge in Jesus. In fact, the question will even have some ambiguity about it.6 Surely it will lean heavily in the direction that Jesus, though very gifted, was an ordinary man living an ordinary life in his own historical setting. Consequently, the question will lead to reflections on education, both informal and formal, and on other cultural matters.9 Why, for instance, was Jesus referred to as " rabbi" ? Is it that he acted as if he had as much education as any rabbi, or is it that he had in fact the same formal training as a rabbi? How do ideas like messianism and redemption fit into the life and preaching of Jesus? 1 0 Are these ideas part of Jesus' preaching or are they developments in the faith and under­ standing of the Apostles after the resurrection? Furthermore, how does the idea of the divinity of Jesus fit into the story of his life? When does the notion first appear? Certainly, the thaumaturgic activity of Jesus and his prophetic utterings, though suggestive, do not immediately and necessarily lead to the idea of his divinity. All of these reflections are made in the general atmosphere of writers who see the historical Jesus becoming in time the Christ of the faith of the Church. They give a very humanistic twist to the Lucan text, "And Jesus increased in wisdom, in stature, and in favor with God and men" (2:52).

In a study by Gerald O'Collins , the above descriptions fit into a Christology that he calls "from below." 1 1 Such a Christology be­ gins with whatever human evidence is available; it begins with the work of the best modern scriptural exegesis, which is itself done from a historical, textually critical starting point. Using the categories of O'Collins, the Christology of Bonaven­ ture, like that of most medievals, would appear to be " from above." It begins with the clear conception of the Council of Chalcedon , which is that Jesus, from the very first moment of his conception, is both God and man, the two natures being distinct and whole but united in the person of the Word . All the scriptural texts will be interpreted with that faith in mind. Consequently, there will be very little stress on the idea of development. This is so because the power, wisdom, and will of the divine Word that attaches to Jesus' humanity enriches it with so many gifts, right from the start, that there is very little room to allow for improvements . Jesus's humanity is thus described far more like that of a saint fully glorified in heaven or of an Adam in the garden than like that of our own quite fallible narure.1 2 Very few scriptural quotes make up the body of Bonavenrure's argument in the Disputed Questions. Some of the scriptural texts that appeared in Bonaventure's early reflections on the question of the knowledge of Christ are the following: "In his body lives the full­ ness of divinity" (Col 2:9); " He who comes from heaven bears witness to the things he has seen and heard . . . God gives him the

___________________________________ 7 O'Collins , Interpreting Jesus, 1 72-83. 8 By ambigu ity I mean that the question has several possible meanings. Are we asking, "What did Jesus know?" or, "What did Jesus show that he knew?" or still, "What impression did the apostles leave us as to what J esus knew?" 9 O'Colhns, lnrerpreting ]e5Us, 1 83-90. 10 Spe aking here almost in medieval terms , does Jesus know that he is the messiah or that he is the appointed redeemer? Or are these ideas all pan of the posrresurrection reflection? It certainly appears that much of the theology of redem ption comes out of the writings of St. Paul, and this comes decades after the death and resurrection of J esus.

1 1 Gerald O'Collins, S. J., What are IM)' sa)'ing about Jesus?, 2nd ed. (New York: Paulist Press, 1 977). There is a lon g history to the pr.;blem of doin g Christology. One way to err in presenting an image of Jesus is to overaccenruate his divinity; another is to exaggerate his humanity. In his short but very incisive study, Fr. O'Collins, a noted contem porary Christologist, refers to early Christolo­ gies as being "from above" ; these begin with the divinity and have a hard time describing a humanity that is like our own. Contemporary Christologies lean far more toward being "from below"; these begin with human and historical data, established with the best historical method, and work to tell the sto ry of how faith in Jesus' divinity occurred. 12 In Bonaventure's Breviloq uium IV, 6, 3, when s peakin g about innate and infused knowledge, there is an explicit reference to Adam, the saints, anci" the angels as explanatory models.

EDITO R'S FOREWORD

EDITOR'S FOREWORD

Spirit without reserve" On 3:32-34); and " He lived among us and we saw his glory, the glory that is his as the only Son of the Father, full of g race and truth" (Jn 1 : 1 4). 13 There are three important problems in Bonaventure's Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ. The first, studied in questions 1 -3, is what can we say, in this context, about knowledge in God. What does God know and how doe� he know it? Bonaventure re­ flects, like a good neoplatonist, that God knows all because he is be­ fore all. He knows the world that he creates, but he also knows about an infinity of other possible worlds . Furthermore, God has all of this knowledge, has all of these ideas, without disrupting his great unity. Therefore, these ideas are not really distinct one from the other; they are like one giant, all inclusive idea which is identical to God himself. The second problem , studied in question 4, is about human knowledge in general. To Bonaventure, as an Augu stinian, the human mind is touched with fallibility, and he is particularly con­ cerned about the very possibility of certitude. What is the ground of our certitude, when we feel certain about anything? It cannot be, according to him, the evidence in things ; and it cannot be the ques­ tionable force of our minds . So, we all must be aided by the wisdom of God on high. This is, in essence, Bonaventure's theory of illumi­ nation. When we really know and are sure that we know it is because our human efforts are supported by the divine infallibility. The third problem, questions 5- 7, centers on knowledge in the human mind of Jesus. If all human minds are illumined by God, then much more so is the mind of Jesus. His mind is completely open to the influence of the Word with whom he is identified . But somehow this holds the possibility of saying too much. The human mind of Jesus must remain precisely that, a human and finite thing. Consequently, it is too much to say that Christ, in his humanity, knows everyth ing that God does. This would imply that the mind of J esus is not only open to the infinite but comprehends that infinity

as well. To preserve the note of humanness and limitation, Bona­ venture falls back on a notion of mystical openness to the infinite. Jesus in his humanity is open to all the knowledge that is contained in the Word, yet being finite he cannot take it all in at once. Conse­ quently, J esus remains in a kind of ecstatic tension, constantly trying to take in as much as he can. The discussion, as it is found, in these disputed questions, never reaches for particulars : such as , does Jesus know this or that detail or fact. Nor does Bonaventure historicize any particular question: such as , when or how does Jesus become aware of this or that. To him, it appears that Jesus knows all that is relevant to his life, in fact, all that relates to the world he lives in.

12

_______________________________ l J These texts are quoted in Ill Sent., d. 1 3- 1 4. They, along with similar ones, are found in Alexander of Ha!es' study of the Sentences . Some are found as well in the original Peter Lombard Sentences and in Hugh of St. Victor's De sapientia animae ChYis1i, all works that Zachary Hayes refers to in his excellent introduction.

13

The point of these reflections is to invite the contemporary reader to study Bonaventure. It may be all too obvious that Bonaventure is not a man of the twentieth century. He does not study scripture in the same way a modern theologian does . His Christology may be very different from that of an O'Collins or a Schillebeeckx. But his thoughts may still cause some to think along new lines and bring them to gain new perspectives. Bonaventure begins with the faith of Chalcedon. He begins in the heavens and imagines a divinity coming to earth. This is not surprising. He is a man of his time and a son of the St. Francis of Greccio. But even the declared faith of Chalcedon claims that in some very real way the divinity that invades the humanity of Jesus leaves that humanity whole and intact, and that humanity must be understood as a finite and limited being, even in its knowledge. Furthermore, even if the aspect of learning is not dealt with so distinctly in the Bonaventurian text translated here, the humanity of Jesus must "learn" in some way. It is certainly assumed that Jesus must learn about the beauty of the world through his eyes , ears , and sense of touch; his senses are for something. In fact, the humanity of Jesus must be such that it can learn through experience, as the Epistle to the Hebrews says all too dearly, "Although he was Son, he learned to obey through suffering'' (5:8). In this context it is interesting to note the title Bonaventure chose for these questions-de scientia Christi-and I mean to draw attention only to the word "scientia." The word has been translated simply, and quite aptly, as knowledge. However, in medieval Aristotelian

14

ED ITOR'S FOREWORD

language the word scientia also has a technical meaning; the word can thus be used in opposition to inte llectus and sapientia. In this more technical sense, scientia relates more specifically to reasoning, going from premises to a conclusion, or more pointedly, going from the known to the unknown. We could then think of Bonaventure as deliberately choos ing the word to suggest both the knowing and the learning activity that is present in the mens Christi, " the mind of Christ. " According to Fr. Zachary Hayes in his introduction, Bonaventure treated the question of knowledge in Jesus formally three times . 14 He also points out that there are differences in each of Bonaven­ ture's three studies ; they are not reducible to one single and com· pletely clear position. But I would say more . Bonaventure was a complex character and writer. He was the abstract, formal theolo­ gian, as in these three studies . But he was also the exegete and the preacher. There might, therefore, be even more sides to the question than what is found in these treatises . In the more narrative and spiritual writings of Bonaventure, 1 5 his wording might suggest even more aspects to the knowledge question and give new insights into the drama of the human life and sayings of Jesus. Fr. Zachary Hayes , 0. F. M . , has done a great service to the English reader by translating this important work. We can hope that students of Christology will gain from it. We can also hope that a renewed enthusiasm will be born for a more general study of the writings of Bonaventure, the great Doctor of the Church. George Marcil, 0. F. M. , Ph.D. The Franciscan Institute November, 1 991

11 The three are: The Commenrary on the Sentences III, d. 1 4; these Disputed Que��ons on the Knowledge of Chris t; and the Breviloquium V, chap. 6. The Commentary on the Gospel of Luke, the Questions and Collations on the Gospel of John, the Lignum vitae, and many of his sermons. See What Manner of Man? Sermons on Christ lry St. Bonavemure, trans. Zachary Hayes (Chicago: Francis-

can Herald Press, 1 974).

T RA N S LAT O R' S F O R E W O R D The task of making usable translations of important texts from the theological and philosophical tradition of the West is more pressing now than in the recent past. If we can speak of a certain urgency in this regard, this concern arises from the problematic ways in which the very meaning of a tradition is approached. It is not sufficient to know the past only through second and third hand .• accounts of what past authors have allegedly thought. Nor is it acceptable to view the past as a treasure trove of proof texts which may be used to clothe personal viewpoints with the aura of respect­ ability and historical legitimation. It is no longer possible to repre­ sent a tradition seriously and with intellectual honesty without acquiring a firsthand acquaintance with at least the major monu· ments and literary documents of that tradition. Therein lies a major pedagogical problem since the monuments and documents from many centuries of the Western tradition were written in Latin. The language skills demanded by the pedagogical process of engaging twentieth-century ininds with the insights and claims of our own cultural past are difficult to acquire and not often found even among advanced students of the history of Western thought. Therefore, even though the use of translations is always a compromise, transla­ tion is virtually the only way in which · students today can have anything that even approaches a firsthand experience of classical texts of the tradition. The present volume is a part of a series, the most recent number of which contained Bonaventure's Disputed Questions on the Trinity (1 9 79) . ·While the translation of the Questions on the Knowledge of Christ appears with a later series number, these questions were written by Bonaventure before the Questions on the Trinity. The fact that the translation of these two sets of Questions appears in reverse order has no significant bearing on their content. As a pair, the two volumes represent highly sophisticated, speculative discussions on metaphysical and epistemological issues involved in two interrelated

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TRANSIATOR.' S FOREWORD

TRANSIATOR' S FOREWORD

doctrines of the Christian faith: that of the trinity and that of Chris­ tology. If these are viewed from the perspective of the eternal back­ ground of faith, then the mystery of the trinity appears foundational. If, on the other hand, they are viewed in terms of what Christians claim to be the historical manifestation of the divinity, then the mystery of Christ is foundational. We are, in fact, looking at one and the same mystery from two different perspectives . Hence, these two volumes can be seen as integrally related in terms of their content. However, we can begin from either perspective in the systematic working out of the Christian mystery once the historical revelation has been communicated to us. Bonaventure himself first composed the Questions on the Knowledge of Christ, and then the

take account of the most recent discussion concerning the chronolo­ gy of his life and works. Finally, we have looked at the Questions directly, from two per• spectives. We have first given a general statement of the argument of the Questions so that, from the start, the reader will have a broad overview of the work as a whole; for it is, indeed, a whole and not just seven questions in juxtaposition. This general statement is followed by a more detailed account of the argument of the individu­ al questions, with indications of its relation to other writings of Bonaventure where this seemed appropriate. In preparing .th is first complete English translation, we ha,,;e consulted other recent translations into Spanish, French, and Italian. This consultation has been both helpful and enriching for the translator. It is our hope that it has also helped to avoid any major mistakes in our own work.

16

Questions on the Trini ty.

The desire to make this translation as usable as possible has led to the decision to treat the translation and its introduction in such a way that this volume can be used independently of other works in the series of which it is a part. This has led to a lengthy introduc­ tion which attempts to do a number of things . First, we have broadly outlined the historical circumstances that led to a significant change in theological locale and style for the period in which Bonaventure worked and which, among other things, created the specific form in which this particular theological discussion is cast. Since the forms of the question and disputation are crucial to an intelligent reading of the present text, we have offered some reflections on the historical origin of these forms. But the christological question itself has a history. Therefore, we felt it useful to sketch in broad strokes the nature of the problem as a theological issue and at least some of the important moments in the historical development of this problem. Here we have given particular emphasis to the Augustinian background of the formula­ tion and to the level of awareness reached in discussing the issue by Bonaventure' s theological mentor, Alexander of Hales. Between these, we have pointed out some of the important moments along the way. Against this background, we have situated a sketch of Bonaven­ ture's own life and career as a theologian and a brief account of the place of these particular Questions in the context of his other writ­ ings. Our intent was to provide a summary statement that would

Zachary Hayes , 0. F. M., D. Th. Catholic Theological Union Chicago, Illinois March, 1 99 1

INTRODUCTION

CHAPT E R O N E

Historical Context The development of historical consciousness in the ' modern Western world has led ever more dearly to the awareness that theol­ Og{ is always situated in particular cultural contexts and interacts with culture in a variety of ways. At times the relation between theol­ Og{ and culture is one of antagonism and rivalry. Theolog{ then appears as a critic of the social order. At other times, the two seem so intimately intertwined that they are scarcely distinguishable. Re­ ligion and theology then seem to provide the sacred underpinnings of the social order. In yet other circumstances, theology and culture have existed in a sort of symbiotic relationship of mutual criticis m and enrichment Whatever may be th e particular relationship in a specific instance, the implication is inescapable. Theology has never existed in a cultural vacuum. It has always been deeply conditioned by the cultural circumstances in which it developed. From this it becomes clear that to understand a particular style of theology more deeply means to come to a fuller understanding of its relationship with the cultural situation in which it was developed. As the student of Western thought acquires a more detailed knowledge of the problems and viewpoints of the great medieval theologians and philosophers, it becomes difficult to maintain the common image of the High Middle Ages as a time of almost self-evi• dent harmony between faith and reason . In fact, it seems clear that the period from the middle of the twelfth to the end of the thir­ teenth century was a time of cultural and intellectual upheaval that seriously unsettled the Christian West. For our purposes in this introduction, it is sufficient to single out three factors of the socio-cultural context that were of particular importance in shaping the intellectual world of thirteenth-century theology. The first was the development of larger cities . The second

22

INTRODUCTION

was the impact of Greek and Arab scholarship on the thought of Western Christianity. The third and final factor was the rise of the mendicant Orders, a powerful movement of reform within the church. Since it is the conj unction of these three factors that provid­ ed essential ingredients in sh aping the context in which Bona­ venture entered the Order of Friars Minor and received his training as a scholar, a brief discussion of the combined im pact of these will help set the stage for the discussion of the text offered here in translation. I . FRO M MONASTERY TO UN IVERSITY With the flowering of Western monasticism in the early Middle Ages , the primary locale of theology had been the monastery. To a great extent, theology performed a ser:vice to the monastic way of life, which was structured around the celebration of the daily liturgi­ cal hours and the annual cycle of liturgical feasts. This monastic ori­ entation is . clearly reflected in the methodology and style of early medieval theology. From a methodological viewpoint, the basis from which monastic theology flowed was the practice called lectio , or the reading of a text. S pecifically, this was the text of the Scriptures; that is , a sacred text. The reading was complemented by commentary. Together , these were understood as preliminary stages of a process aimed at medi­ tatio and contemplatio. In the words of Hugh of St. Victor: "There are two things by which a person is instructed in the way of knowl­ edge: namely, reading and meditation." 1 Thus , in broad terms the monastic s tyle of theology was intimately associated with the appro­ priation of a sacred text for the purpose of contemplation. Among the resources available for mastering the meaning of the text was a long-standing tradition of allegorical interpretations of the Scriptures going back to the earliest Christian Fathers. This, together with an awareness of classical grammar and a tradition of theological insights shaped by nee-Platonic philosophy since the time of Augustine, 1 Hugh of St Victor, Didascalion, praef. (PL 1 76, 741 a).

CHAPTER ONE

23

imparted to monastic theology a strongly liturgical and contemplative character. During the course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries , as the cities of Western Europe began to increase in size and importance, they became not only centers of commerce but centers of learning as well. This socio-cultural development would have far-reaching signifi­ cance, not only for the process of education in general but for the development of theology in particular. The first stage in this develop­ ment was marked by the gradual shift from the monastic schools to schools associated with the cathedrals in the cities. From these cathe­ dral schools eventually came the universities of the larger urban cen­ ters. For theology, this meant a move from the rural , monastic setting to a more urban, secular setting. And if there were profes, sional scholars in other disciplines such as the arts, medicine , and law, there would eventually be professional scholars in the discipline of theology. Thus, the twelfth and thirteenth centuries brought a significant change both in the personnel engaged in theology and in the locale in which theology was carried out. The growth of the universities was nurtured by another factor, namely, the awareness of the complete corpus of Aristotelian philo­ sophical writings, together with important Arabic interpretations of the Greek intellectual tradition. Much of this material had been pre­ viously unknown in the West. While scholars of the monastic peri­ od had known elements of Aristotelian logic that served as tools in the grammatical analysis of texts, by the thirteenth century they had access to the dialectics of syllogistic reasoning as well as to the world of Aristotle's phy sics , metaphysics, psychology , and ethics . The im pact of this Aristotelian material was felt at two levels . First, at the level of method , questioning and dialectical develop­ ment of thought would become foundational to the method of the great Scholastics of the Middle Ages . Second, at the level of content , it could be argued that the introduction of the Aristotelian library into the schools of Western Europe presented not only a collection of � but a vision of human life. This was a vision that made an appeal not to the authority of the biblical texts but to human insights gained through no particularly religious means. One might therefore call it a humanistic vision and it was commonly recogi;i.ized in the , thirteenth century as the best that the human mind had produced.

24

INTRODUCTION

It was a vision, however, that differed on sign ificant points from the Christian religious vision as well as from the neo-Platonic philos­ ophy which had for many centuries seived the Christian community well as a means of developing its theology . The content of this new philosophy , therefore, presented a difficult challenge for the world of Christian faith. In a sense, the distinctive medieval problem of the relation between faith and reason is highlighted here. What does the believer do with the best of human knowledge about reality when that knowledge seems to conflict with the claims of faith in sign ifi­ cant way s? 2 Some empathy for this sort of problem p rovides helpful insight into the p rogr am of the great Scholastics, who were unwill­ ing to let go of either horn of the . apparent dilemma. It was their attempt to maintain a healthy tension between the two realities that created so much of what has come to be known as the Scholastic s tyle of theology. The final factor in our consideration of the historical context of Bonaventure's work is the rise of the mendicant Orders, one of which was to become the spiritual home of Bonaventure himself. The history of the mendicant movement and its relation to the development of the universities of Europe is complex. Suffice it to say that much of the impulse of the mendicant movement came from the need for a reformation of the church �t all levels, and from the felt need to defend the faith against a variety of heresies as well as against the impact of Islamic religion and scholarship . While it could hardly be argued that St. Francis of Assisi intended to establish an Order of students or scholars, at least some of the Franciscan friars were already enga ged in theological studies during 2

On the develo p ment of the universities and the question of Aristotle, cfr. M. De Wulf, History of Mediaeval Philosophy, vol. 2 , er. E. Messenger (London, New York, Toronto: l.ongmans, Green and Co. , 1 938 , 3rd Eng. edition) , pp. 1 -29 ; H. Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages, vol. 1 , ed. F. M. Powicke and A B. Emden (Oxford University Press, 1 936, new ed. ) pp. 1 -74 ; J . Leclercq , The Love of Learning and ihe Desire for God, tr. C. Misrahi (New York: Fordham University Press, 1 961 ) ; F. van Steenberghen , la Philosophie au XIIIe Siecle ( Louvain/Paris, 1 966) ; idem, Aristotle in the West. The Origins of Latin Aris1ote!ianism, tr. L. J ohnston (I.ouvain, 1955 ) ; idem, The Philosophical Movement in the Thirteenth Cenniry (Nelson, 1 955 ).

CHAPTER ONE

25

th e lifetime of Francis. 3 like the Dominicans, the Franciscans would become major participants . in the development of intellectual life in the High Middle Ages. The experience of Franciscan lite in the context of the university gave rise to an int.ellecrual tradition inspired by a spiritu­ al legacy reaching to the figu re of Francis of Assisi. And it was at the University of Paris that this spiritual and intellectual tradition would make its influence felt in the development of Bonaventure.

I I . FROM READING TO QUESTION The change oflocale that situated theology in the context of the emerging universities was reflected in a change in s tyle. The s tyle of reading and co m mentary on the sacred text familiar from the mo­ nastic tradition remained basic to Scholastic educational procedures , but the emergi ng university s tyle tended to move quickly from this traditional level to a more dialectical form known as the quaestio. In the period of High Scholasticism the quaestio would become one of the most significant forms for the develop ment of theological though t. Since the work of Bonaventure under consideration here is cast in this form, it seems appropriate to offer some brief remarks on the place of the quaestio in the context of Scholastic theology . Medieval pedagogy, with its roots in the earlier monastic disci­ pline, would always be based on the reading of texts . This practice , both in the monastic setting and in the university , was known simply as !ectio. Reading in the medieval context referred not only to the work of the students. The same term was used to describe the activity of the instructor, first in the monastic context and later in ___________________________ J The familiar point of de parture for discussing the movement of Franciscans into studies is the relation between St. Anthony of Padua and St. Francis. In the time of St. Anthony, there was a felt need for the friars to be theologically educated if they were to be effective in dealing with the current heretical sects. The matter was referred to Francis. In a letter datin g to 1 223 or 1 22 4 , Francis expressed his approval of the study of theology by the friars, p rovided this did not "extingu ish the spirit of holy prayer and devotion." Anthony hence set up a course of studies at Bologna. Cfr. L Hardick, He Came to You so that You Might Come to Him, tr. Z. Hayes (Chicago, Franciscan Herald Press, 1 989) pp. 53-57 .

26

CHAPTER ONE

I NTRODUCTION

the university setting. A univers ity professor was a lector who read a course. The material he gave was called a lectio. Thus, as the uni­ versities developed, the usage of lectio , which had its roots in the monastic way of life, took on a new meaning and flourished as the foundational element in university education. One of the principal tasks of the professor was " to read.'' And as the university disci­ plines developed, the practice of lectio applied not only to the Bible, but to the works of the ancient philosophers and, for theology, to the Sentences of Peter Lombard as well. 4 The practice of lectio sheds· light, in turn, on the origin of the quaestio. To the thoughtful reader, any text will raise questions that call for more than an analys is of grammar or a clarification of par­ ticular words. At first the reading of Scripture was accompanied by a running commentary on the text. But even the biblical texts gave rise to more difficult questions that seemed to merit a fuller treat­ ment. This is already the case with some patristic commentaries and is especially obvious in medieval commentaries such as Bonaven­ ture's. Running commentaries are frequently punctuated with ex­ tended discussions of problems generated by the text. These discus­ sions are carried out under the rubric of quaestio. Not only did the text itself give rise to questions, but the exist­ ence of conflicting interpretations of the same text in the writings of the Fathers gave rise to a different level of problem. How could one account for such differences? How could one give some sort of harmonious resolution to the diverse views of the Fathers? This problem found a dramatic statement in the twelfth century in the Sic 5 et Non of Peter Abelard . At the time that this awareness of dis­ cordances in the exegetical tradition was emerging more sharply, western scholars were coming into possession of a new set of tools for dealing with such issues . They were now acquiring a fuller knowledge of Aristotle's logic. The possibility of a truly dialectical manner of treating the problem of discordant interpretations emerged out of the conjunction of these factors and paved the way in the twelfth century for the dialectical development of the quaestio ____________________________

; Cfr. Sememiae in IV Libris Distinc1ae (Grottaferrata, 1 97 1 & 1981 ). Abelard, Sic e1 Non, pro!. (PL l 78, 1 349a).

27

which flowered in the thirteenth century and later. From this it is clear that the quaestio represents first of aU a form for developing thought. It was born out of the confusion created by conflicting positions and represents the attempt to find reasons for proceed to favoring one position over another . " By doubting, we 6 inquiry; by inquiry , we come to recognize the truth.'' Yet beyond the mere fact of its form, the quaestio represents a level of intellectu­ al outlook tha t would become foundational to High Scholasticism: that is, the willingness to call things into questio n and to seek reasons for the acceptance of propositions that are intrinsic to the matter at hand and not simply imposed from outside by authority. The development of theological doctrine in this form was one of the characteristic features of the great theological masters of the high medieval period. When approached in this way, theology was no longer merely the expression of a piety as it tended to be in the monastic setting. It was now becoming a religious outlook in search of a more adequate selfunderstanding; a "fides quaerens intellectum." The dialectical confrontation of differing viewpoin ts is reflected structurally in the positions pro and contra of the quaestio. (Note the parallel even with the title of Abelard 's Sic et Non.) The arguments for the two dialectically opposed sides are generally based on some appeal to authority other than that of the master who is expounding the question. This may be the authority of the Scripture s, or that of the Fathers, or that of philosophy. Since all three may be found on both sides of an issue, the pro and contra does not represent a conflict between faith and reason, but between diverse views , all of which may appeal either to the authority of faith or to that of

reason. The resolution of the question, also known as the determinatio, was the task of the master. When the question was put down in literary form, the determination was found in the body of the question and was commonly the longest section. Having offered his own resolution, the master then made his response to the argu­ ments that stood opposed to his view. This entire process indicates a new understanding of the task of the master. No longer was his __________________________ 6

Op. cit. (PL 1 78, 1 349b).

28

29

I NTROD UCTION

CHAPTER ONE

function simply the reading and exegesis of a text. After the task of " reading," he was to teach by "disputing. " And disputing was com­ monly carried out in the form of questions. In the context of dispu­ tation, the task of the master was to "determine" the question ; that is , to solve the problem by a convincing appeal to his own skill rather than by an appeal to external authorities.

i n which th e top ics were chosen. The ordinary disputation was a regular and frequent p art of the universi ty schedule. The topics for such dis putations were chosen and prepared carefully beforehand by · the master conducting the disputation. The procedure was regu lated in great detail and was geared principally to develop and test the dialectical skills of the student partici p ants who took part under the su peivision of a master. 9 Quodlibetal disputations , on the other hand, were not as fre­ quent nor as integrated in their presentation. They were conducted by a regent master and were held twice a year, shortly before Christ­ mas (in the second or third week of Advent) and before Easter ( in the fourth week of Lent) . They were conducted with greater solemni­ ty and commonly drew larger audiences than did the ordinary dis putations. In quodlibetal disputations, anyone in the audience could raise any issue he wished. Thus, such disputations dealt not only with ma ny questions about a particular to p ic , but with many top ics as well. As a result, the written records of such quodlibetal disputations reflect not an extended and consistent treatment of a particular problem but a wide range of problems which may be treated with very diverse levels of competence. Despite this , the written records that remain from such dis p utations are interesting sources of information about current issues of the time. From this sketch of the origins of the form in which the present work is developed , we shall now tum our attention to the s p ecific problem t.o be dis puted in the questions that make u p the p resent volume: the theological issue of the knowledge of Christ. This issue itself has a com plex histo ry which we can sketch here only in broad terms.

I I I . Q U ESTI ON AN D DISPUTATION Obviously question and disputation are not identical. The question may be seen as the dialectical structure th·rough which a particular issue could be debated and resolved. The disputation may be seen as a larger exercise of the Scholastic academic discipline carried out in the form of questions. M. de Wulf describes the disputation as " a co-operative form of teaching, or a living lesson , to which all contrib­ uted." 7 It is from the practice of medieval disputations carried out in the form of questions that we hav� the term disputed questions. The litera ry form we know as disputed questions is , in essence , the litera ry residue of what had been a living part of medieval pedagogi­ cal techniques . 8 While questions at first emerged directly from a text and thus were closely related to the text, as the question-form evolved over time , questions became detached from the text and began to take on a life of their own. Indeed, questions could be asked with no explic­ it textual basis at all. And as the questioning process began t.o take on this new life, the range of questions widened remarkably. This might help explain the existence of two different forms of questions in medieval practice: the ordinary and the quodlibetal q uestions. Whether disputations were conducted in ordinary or quodlibetal form , the internal , logical structure of the questio was identical. The maj or differences between the two forms of disputation consisted in the frequen cy with which dis putations were scheduled and the way ____________________________ 7 01,l . cit. , p . 9. 8 Cfr. P. Mandonn t, e "Chronologie des q uestions disputees de saint Thomas d'Aquin , " in Retiue Thomiste XXlll ( 1 928) : 26 7 -69.

_______________________________ 9 De Wulf, o/,) . cii. , pp. 9-1 0: P. Glorieux, "Ou en est la q uestion du Q uodli­ bet?" in Revue du Moyen Age Latin II ( 1 946) : 41 2ff: idem , " Quodlibed , " in Encicwpedia Cattolica (Vatican, 1 953 ) X , col. 4 37; idem, "Le Quodlibet et ses procedes redactionnels , " in Divus Thomas ( Series tertia} XVI ( 1 939} , 61 ; M . D. Chenu, 0. P. , Toward Understanding SL Thomas, tr. A Land ry , 0. P. and D. Hughes, 0. P. (Chicago: Regnery , 1 96 4) , pp . 91 ff; J ohn Duns Scotus , God and Creatures: the Quod!ibeial Q uestions. Translation with Introduction , Notes , and Glossary by F. Alluntis, 0. F. M. and A. Wolter, 0. F. M. (Princeton, 1 975), pp. xxiv-xxvii.

CHAPTER TWO

C H A PT E R TW O

The Knowledge of Christ: The History of the Problem I. DOGMA AN D THE Q U ESTI ON OF CHRI ST' S KNOWLEDGE Questions about the knowledge of Jesus already appear to the at­ tentive reader in the ScripUnes. Regardless of one's fundamental exegetical principles , there seems to be a startling difference between the image of Jesus presented in the Gospel of Mark and that which dominates the Gospel of John. The Gospel of Mark seems to sug­ gest that there are at least some limits to the knowledge of Jesus (1 3:32), while the Jesus of John' s Gospel seems to possess a fullness of knowledge that transcends any normal human experience {1 : 1 7 1 8, 8:55). And, in a text that has tantalized theologians over the ages, Luke states unambiguously: "And Jesus increased in wisdom and in stature, and in favor with God and man" (2:52). The scriptural tradition itself is neither clear nor uniform. Neither is the subsequent theological tradition. That the gospel tradition re­ flects significantly different images of Jesus is not a discovery of con­ temporary biblical studies . It is a fact that has long been recognized. How one deals with this fact is where contemporary studies differ dramatically from the views of earlier generations . From earliest Christian history, christological reflection had been pulled in two directions. On the one hand, the dogma of the church affirms that Jesus possessed a genuine . human nature in the fullest sense of the word. But human nature is, by definition, a created reality, and a created reality is, without question, finite and limited. On the other hand, the mystery of the hypostatic union seems to imply an unprecedented level of perfection in Jesus. As a result, Jesus stands in closest intimacy with God. This fact, when translated

31

into psychological and cognitive categories , leads frequently to the conviction that Jesus enjoyed a unique degree of knowledge: certain­ ly a most intimate knowledge of God, but perhaps also a knowledge of created realities in his knowledge of God. At times, the theological concern for the perfection of Jesus has lead to excessive claims. Jesus is simply equated with God and is therefore thought to know all things with the very knowledge of God. Clearly this is contrary to the dogma of Chalcedon. For, no matter how exalted the human knowledge of Jesus may be, his human nature always remains precisely that: a human nature and . not a divine one. In no way can it be equal to God. It is one thing to speak of the divine knowledge of God; it is quite another to speak of the human way in which Jesus knew God, and in God, the world. As Aquinas writes with unambiguous clarity, "There are cer­ tain heretics who claim that in Christ there is only the divine knowl­ edge."1 The implication · of this is that there must be some form of human knowledge in Christ.2 The question then is, how are we to understand this created, human knowledge? What is its source? Are there any limits to it? And how is it related to the divine knowledge? . For earlier generations of theologians , the question about the human knowledge of Jesus was not the same as the modern prob­ lem of rediscovering the historical Jesus in the hope of finding an inspiring personality or a powerful ethical example. It was · rather a question of trying to understand the genuinely human reality of one whose entire existence was rooted in the mystery of the divine Word. What sort of impact would such an intimate relationship with God have on the typical human functions of Jesus? Would the presence of God be so overwhelming as to simply suppress the human? If the human was not suppressed, were there, nonetheless , some aspects o f Jesus' experience that were characteristic of him ________________________________

1 Aquinas, De 1Jeritate, q. 20, a. 1 , resp. 2 The mediaeval authors we shall be discussing did not know the distinction between Jesus and the Christ common in contemporaiy Christology. Hence, they did not hesitate to exchange the two terms indiscriminately. Rather than attempt to "correct" them in light of contemporaty viewpoints, we shall maintain their usage in their own texts and shall regularly adopt the same usage in our comments on their viewpoints.

32

INTRODUCTION

alone because of the nature of the hypostatic union? Obviously, at some point the metaphysical understanding of the union between divinity and humanity will be translated into psycho­ logical, cognitive terms . However, such a translation always remains one level removed from the strictly dogmatic concern-the reality of the union of God and humanity in one concrete being. Therefore, it should not be surprising to discover that the question about the human knowledge of Jesus should have evolved only gradually over the course of time. It is dear that when the question of Christ's human knowledge is asked as a specific question in the context of medieval theology, it cannot be dealt with in any meaningful way without an appeal to some sort of philosophical epistemology. The present text is an outstanding example of precisely that. It offers a sustained development of a theological problem through the skillful use of precisely such philosophical tools.

I I . HI STORICAL REFLECTIONS The history of the theological issues that play a role in treating the problem of Christ's knowledge did not begin directly in Chris­ tology. Strange as it may seem, some of the theological ideas that contributed to the development of this issue appear first in the doc­ trine about the angels. Under the tutelage of Augustine, Western theology had developed an understanding of the knowledge of the angels-and later of the first human beings-which would eventually 3 enter into the discussion of Christ' s knowledge. In his commentary on the creation-account of Genesis , Augustine was impressed with the recurrent movement from evening to morn­ ing, from twilight to light. He saw in this movement a symbol of two different forms of knowled ge : cognitio vespertina and cognitio matutina. 4 These two forms of knowledge were found in the angels 3 J. Ernst, Die Lehre der hochmittelalterlichen Theologen von der vo!!kommenen Erkenntnfa Christi (Freiburg: Herder, 1 97 1 ). The following historical remarks are based largely on this study. 4 De Genesi ad liueram (PL 34, 3 1 1 - 1 2).

CHAPTER TWO

33

from the dawn of creation. The cognitio matutiM indicates that the angels are turned toward God and the divine light as their first object of knowledge. The cognitio vespertina, on the other hand, designates their orientation toward the world of created things to which, as intelligent creatures, they are inextricably related. Not only do they know God, but they know created reality as well. Never­ theless , their knowledge of created things is a special gift of God a nd is independent of any actual experience of creatures in their concrete existence. It is clear that, in the mind of Augustine, the cognitio matutina is always the more noble of the two. In this thesis, Augustine laid out some of the basic premises of a mystical tradition that would shape western theology for centuries: God is the primary object of the created intellect In light of this, all knowledge dependent on empirical, sense experience is of secondary significance. The echoes of this position will be heard in various forms over the centuries and are dearly present in the second of Bonaven­ ture's Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ. The seeds of a christological development were planted in this Augustinian thesis and the way in which it was developed in the treatment of the creation accounts of Genesis . What Augustine had first said concerning the angels would eventually be applied not only to the angels but to the first human beings as well. The seminal insight of Augustine lay hidden in the suggestion that there was a form of knowledge that was a perfection of the created intellect and yet independent of sense experience. This contained within itself the possibility of the thesis of an infused knowledge; · that is , a knowl­ edge given by God independently of any empirical experience and that was, in fact, superior to any sense-based knowledge. The concept of an infused knowledge would be developed further in the twelfth century by William of Auvergne5 in the context of creation theology, where it was seen not as a Christological matter but as a special gift given to the first human beings. This idea would eventually make its influence felt in Christology in two ways. First, it was a clear source for the christological thesis of some form of _____________________________ 5 William of Auvergne, Opera omnia (Paris, 1 674; Frankfurt, 1 963) De . 11irtmibus, 1 24a ff.

35

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER TWO

divinely infused knowledge independent of empirical experience. Second, it was a source for the tradition that would attribute all the types of knowledge found in the angels and in the history of the human race to that most perfect realization of human nature which is found in Christ. This would naturally include the infused knowl­ edge characteristic of the state of innocence. It was in the twelfth century that the question about the human 6 knowledge of Christ was first treated explicitly as a theme in itself. Viewpoints on the question were by no means uniform. The devel­ opment of the discussion revolved around at least four interrelated themes. 1 ) If the hypostatic union necessarily involves the affirma­ tion of the fullness of divine knowledge in Christ as the Word, is it necessary or even appropriate to attribute to him any form of hu­ man knowledge? 2) If theology attributes to Christ the fullness of divine · knowledge, what meaning can be given to the text of Luke 2:5 2 concerning his progress in "wisdom and in stature and in favor with God and man?" 3) If the incarnation involves the as­ sumption of a human nature in its fullest perfection, what would this mean concerning the various forms of knowledge whereby created, intelligent beings are brought to fulfillment? Specifically, this raises the question of infused knowledge as the Augustinian thesis had seen it in the angels , and as later tradition came to think of it in the first human beings . 4) In light of the above, is there any way in which Christ can be said to have a knowledge that is dependent on sense experience? If the answer is negative, what does this imply concerning his human nature? If the answer is positive, what possi­ ble significance can this have with respect to the knowledge that Christ already possessed as the divine Word, and by virtue of the infused knowledge given as a special gift by God? A number of important authors of this period hesitate to attribute any form of human knowledge to Christ. Hugh of St. Victor is a well-known case. 7 His view is formulated in terms of wisdom. Si rice Christ is the very embodiment of the divine wisdom, it is inappro-

priate to attribute to him any created wisdom o r to wish to compare such a created wisdom with the infinite divine wisdom. The Summa Senrentiarnm, which comes from circles dose to Hugh, makes the following claim: "It is important to state without any hesitation that in Christ there was not any wisdom other than the divine wisdom. " 8 Here the very possibility of some form of human knowl­ edge in Christ appears to be problematic. And, even when there is a breakthrough leading to the affirmation of human knowledge in Christ, the exalted nature of this human knowledge is emphasized. At times it is even compared with the divine knowledge, and it can be asked whether his human knowledge was as comprehens ive as · his divine knowledge. While the School of Laon tended to move in the latter direction, Peter Abelard and his followers tended to avoid . such comparisons and concentrated their attention on the fully human nature of this knowledge. In retrospect it can be said that the position of Hugh of St. Victor and of the Summa Sententiamm indicates a defective under­ standing of the communicatio idiomatum , since it affirms only the divine wisdom and attributes that wisdom to the human nature of Jesus. Such a position therefore "mixes the natures , " but the weight of authority made it a position that needed to be discussed. It appears in the arguments of a great number of thirteenth-century theologians, including Alexander of Hales , Bonaventure' s early theological mentor. And Bonaventure himself seems to have penned a direct answer to Hugh of St. Victor's thesis in the fifth question of his own questions _ On the Knowledge of Christ. Roughly contemporaneous with Hugh of St. Victor was the work of Peter Lombard, whose Sententiae in IV libris distincrae would become a major text for medieval theological education second only to the Bible. Relative to the question under discussion, Lombard

34

6 Ernst, op. cit., p. 53. 1 Cfr. De sapientia (PL 1 76 , 847-56). For the context of Hugh's text, see also Walter of Mauritania, Epistle to Hugh (Pl 1 86, 1 052B-54).

8

Summa Sententiarum I, 1 6 (PL 1 76, 74). The authorship of the Summa is de­ bated. It has been closely associated with Hugh of Sr. Victor. At times it is even attrib­ uted to him. Cfr. D. van den Eynde, "Nouvelles precisions chronologiques sur quel­ ques oeuvres theologiques du Xlle siecle," in Franciscan Studies XIII (1 953), 7 1 - 1 1 8; idem, Essai sur la succession el la date des Ecrits de Hugues de Saint-VicloT (Rome, . 1 960); R. Baron, "Note sur l'enigmatique Summa Sentemiarum," in Recherches de Tlu!ologie Ancienne et Medie11ale XXV (1 958), 26-41 .

36

INTRODUCTEON

clearly distinguishes two types of wisdom and knowledge in Christ that corres pond to the two natures united in him. 9 His discussion is characterized by a tendency to identi fy the content of J esus' human knowledge with the d ivine knowled ge on the one hand , and yet to claim , on the other hand, that the human soul of J esus did not see eve rything as clearly as God did. God's knowledge is " more noble" (dign ior) than that of any creature , including the human soul of J esus. In his explanation of Luke 2:52 , which speaks of the increase of wisdom in J esus , Lombard argues that this was an increase not in J esus himself but in his disci p les. It was an increase that became possible as J esus , with the advance of his age , revealed to them ever more deep ly the gift of wisdom and grace that dwelt within him. 10 Even the witnes s of the venerable St. Ambrose was not enough to convince Lombard that Christ underwent a real development in his human experience , and that at first he did not even know his human parents. Of this Lombard says that the church has not ac­ cepted such a view, and the writings of the Fathers can hardly be understood to mean this. The p rogress to which the Lucan text refers can only be a progress in the sight of human persons. 1 1 Of more immediate interest from the perspective of Bonaven­ ture's treatment is the work of his earliest theologi cal mentor , Alex­ ander of Hales . Working in the first half of the thirteenth century, Alexander discussed the problem of Christ's knowledge several times and in different contexts. With him the question reaches a new degree of sophistication. At one level , much of Alexander's dis­ cussion is a reorganization of the traditional material.1 2 At another level, he seems to give much greater care to the question of Christ's human knowledge. Alexander clearly rej ects the position of Hugh of St. Victor and seems comfortable in s peaking explicitly of a habitus of human knowledge in Christ. ____________________________ 9

III Sent., d. 1 3 & 1 4 . Ill Sent., d. 1 3. 11 Ill Seni., d. 1 3, cap. un. (38) , #9. 1 2 Alexander of Hales , Glossa in q uatuor Libros Sententiarum, in Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Med ii Aevi , vols. XU-XV (Quaracchi , 1 951 -57 ). The christological material is found in vol. XIV. 10

CHAPTER TWO

37

While he bows to tradition in attributing a perfect human knowl­ edge to J esus, Alexander moves in a new direction by discussing the place of empirical knowledge in Christology . 1 3 He thus opens up the theological possibility of maintaining a genuinely human, cogni­ tive experience of the world in the case of Christ. The argument of Alexander leaves us with an uneasy relation be­ tween that habitus of knowledge which is perfect from the beginning_ of J esus' history and the scientia sensus which somehow increases from day to day in proportion to his historical experience. This tension will remain in all formulations of the problem that have been ins pired by Scholastic principles down to our own time. Alexander introduced the distinction between the habit of knowl­ edge and the act of knowledge. This seems to be an anticip,ation of Bonaventure's discussion of habitual and actual knowledge. 14 How­ ever the question is a p proached in Scholastic terms , it seems that Christ never learned any genuinely new content; and this p roblem is never resolved within the context of Scholastic presu ppositions about God and the nature of the hypo static union. In Alexander's argument, the issue of exp erimental knowledge or sense experience seems to be related p rincipally to the Fall of Adam and to the mystery of Christ's suffering. With historical roots in Augu stine' s angelology and William of Auvergne's protology , the concept of a perfect knowledge of created things independent of sense experience now leads to the conclusion, startling as it may be to the twentieth-century reader, that our factual dependence on sen­ sation comes as a result of sin. Indeed, it is a p art of the punish­ ment of our fallen condition. Therefore, in taking on a human nature in its fallen condition, Christ assumed the relationship of that nature to sense experience. This should not be taken to mean that Christ drew new obj ective content of knowledge from sense experience, for, by virtue of the hypostatic union, Christ knew from 13 Glossa in Ill Sent., d. 1 3, n. 1 0, 1 31 ; Q uaestiones disputatae 'anteq uam essec [rater,' in Bib!iotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aetof, vol. XX (Quaracchi , 1 960 ) q . 42: De scientia Christi; Summa fratris Alexandri III , lnq. un. , tract III , q . 2 , c. 2 (#1 1 7 ) . 14 Q D de scientia Christi , pp. 714ff. , esp. 718 and 726; Bonaventure , III Sem. , d. 1 4 , a. 2 , q. 2 ( lll , 310ff. ) on habitual and actual knowledge.

38

I NTRODUCTION

the start all that pertained to his redemptive work. Hence, the ex­ periential knowledge of suffering that would be drawn from sense experience is really secondary in nature, at least from a cognitive per­ spective. This penal character of sense experience in Alexander's formulation is heightened in the Summa fratris Alexandri, where sense knowledge is seen to have a directly salvific significance, for it 15 is necessary to make the suffering of Christ possible. In summary, with Alexander it is clear that the question of the knowledge of Christ has become an issue to be discussed in its own right and with cons iderable sophistication. Alexander held that Christ had a perfect knowledge of God and a perfect knowledge of created things by virtue of the impact that the presence of God had on his human soul. The latter position obviously offers the basis for the thesis of an " infused" knowledge that is independent of any em­ pirical experience. When this claim of an infused knowledge enters into the christological issue, it will become difficult to attribute cog­ nitive significance to the empirical experience of Jesus as an histor­ ical agent. Alexander makes a limited attempt to deal with this prob­ lem by arguing that sense experience was a necessary condition for the suffering involved in Christ' s redemptive work. These historical reflections help to clarify the extent to wh ich the christological discussion was influenced by the changing philosophi­ cal orientation of Western Europe, which was moving from a more Platonic, contemplative tradition to an emphatically Aristotelian, em­ pirical viewpoint. In the Christian-Platonic tradition, God was seen to be the first object of the human intellect and the primary source of all human knowledge. It was this conviction that led to the understanding of Adam's special gift of knowledge and to the con­ viction that, had Adam not sinned, the human race would not have experienced any real growth in knowledge. Like Adam, his progeny would have known all things in the knowledge of God. Such knowl­ edge would have been a pure gift, but it would also have been the normal situation of humanity. Given that starting point, it is under­ standable how theology could arrive at the position that the need to gain knowledge from sense experience is a result of the Fall and has 15

Summa II I , pars I, l nq. u n . , tract. terr. , q . 2 (#1 1 7 ).

CHAPTER TWO

39

a certain penal character. The christological implication of this is seen in the tendency to associate sense knowledge with Christ's suffering, as is dear in the argument of Alexander of Hales. By way of contrast, the Aristotelian epistemology is more empiri­ cal in orientation. "There is nothing in the mind that is not first in the senses." Here, all human knowledge is dependent on sense ex­ perience, and this is the normal human situation. This epistemology was never completely accepted by those who were inclined to con­ templation and mysticism, for it fails to account for many dimen­ sions of consciousness and knowledge that are important to the world of contemplation. But the issue raised by the Aristotelian phil­ osophy seemed more in line with common-sense observation and could not be ignored. In Christology the issue would revolve around the attempt to relate this earth-bound empiricism to the idea that knowledge as a gift of God is somehow intrinsic to the hypostatic union. With this the historical , doctrinal context for Bonaventu re' s dis­ cussion is set up. It is clear that his work is by no means an isolated phenomenon. The question of Christ's knowledge had been emerg­ ing more and more as a question in its own right since the late twelfth century. And in the context of the early Franciscan school, which was the intellectual seed-bed of the young Bonaventure's work, Alexander of Hales had brought the articulation of the ques­ tion to a new level of insight.

CHAPTER THREE

CHAPTER TH REE

The Context of Bonaventure' s Disputed Questions I . LIFE AN D WORK OF BO NAVENTURE Llttle information concerning the early life of Bonaventure is available. Born in Bagnoregio in Tuscany, he was baptized Giovanni di Fidanza and later received the name Bonaventure upon his en­ trance into the Franciscan Order. Virtually eve ry date in his life is debated, with the exception of the year of his election as minister general (1 2 5 7) and the year of his death (1 2 7 4 ). 1 His birth is dated by some to 1 2 1 7 and by others to 1 22 1 . Similarly, there are early dates (1 238) and late dates (1 24 3 or 1 244) for his entrance into the Order. It is assumed by most scholars that he would have studied for the master's degree in the arts at Paris prior to his entrance into the Or­ der, probably beginning these studies around 1 235. After entering the Order, he would have studied theology first under Alexander of Hales and later under J ohn of La Rochelle , Odo Rigaldi, and Wil­ liam of Meliton. If his inception as master of theology is placed early ( 1 248 as T. Crowley argu es ) , the period of his magisterium would have extended 1 The chronology of Bonaventure's life has been the object of considerable study. A combination of factors in the sources lead co a variety of views. For two recent reviews of the question, cfr. J . F. Q uinn, "Chronology of St.. Bonaventure ( 1 2 1 7- 1 274 ) ," in Franciscan Studies XXXII ( 1 972 ) , 1 68-86; T. Crowley, "St.. Bonaventure Chronology Rea ppraisal" in Fran t iskanische Studien LVI ( 197 4) : 31022. Since both of these articles include bibliographical information on the most influential studies reaching back co the first decade of the twentieth century, we shall not re peat the information here.

41

over nine years. The late dating for his incep tion ( 1 254 according to J. Quinn) leaves no more than three years for his activi ty as regent master of the Franciscan school at Paris . With his election as min­ ister general of the Order in the winter of 1 257 , Bonaventure left behind his direct involvement in the academic arena , though not his connection with the friars of Paris nor his concern for developments among the students and masters gathered there. In 1 273 Bonaventure was named cardinal bishop of Albano by p Po e Gregory X. Shortly thereafter he left Paris to aid with the prep­ arations for the Council of Lyons which convened in May 1 274. He took an active part in the proceedings of the Council until his unex­ pected death on J uly 1 5 , 1 27 4 . He was canonized in 1 482 by Pope Sixtus IV and was decla red a doctor of the church with the tide " Sera phic Doctor" in 1 588 by Pope Sixtus V.

I I . THE DISPUTED QU ESTIO N S AN D RELATED WRITINGS Bonaventure has left no quodlibetal questions. The three sets of questions contained in the Q uaracchi edition of his works reflect the characteristics associated with. ordinary questions. Each set treats carefully chosen topics at great length . The individual q uestions of each set are closely interrelated because of their common subj ect matter. The opposing positions are lined up with elaborate care, and the discu·s sion of the master is carried out skillfully . As indicated above, the date of Bonaventure's inception as a mas­ .ter in theology is debated. The Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ are dated to 1 254. If one follows the chronology su ggested by Crowley , this would place the Questions six years after Bonaven­ ture's inception. If, on the other hand, one were to follow Q uinn's chronology , the Questions would be dated from the same year as his ince ption as master. H. Weber describes the Questions as the work 2 of the " recently promoted" master. Q uinn associates the Questions 2

Saint Bonaventure, Q uescions disp ucees sur le savoir che .: le Christ, Weber, 0. P. ( Paris, 1 985 ) , p. 1 0.

tT.

H.

42

CHAPTER THREE

INTRODUCTION

with the process of inception itself, as do J. Bougerol3 and L Mauro. 4 It is clear that, whatever chronology one chooses , Bonaventure would have written his Comme ntary on the Sentences before any of the three sets of Disputed Questions contained in the Quaracchi edition of his works . In the third book of his Commentary on the Sentences he presents his first discussion of the problem of Christ's knowledge in his treatment of Distinction 1 4 of Lombard's text. This is a lengthy and careful discussion, dependent in many ways on tradition but also reflecting levels of new and personal insight. It is in this discussion that Bonaventure seems to give some room for a development of the human knowledge of Christ by distinguishing between habitual knowledge and actual knowledge. This should not be taken to mean a movement from total ignorance to knowledge of new objective content, for the habit of knowledge is an intrinsic factor in the hypostatic union and is present in Christ from the moment of conception. This habit is the ground for a readiness to know specific things on the occasion of actual sense experience. There is no growth at the level of habit, but solely at the level of sense experience. 5 The influence of Alexander of Hales on this treatment seems clear. One might expect that this discussion would provide the platform for the solution offered in the Disputed Questions, which constitute his second major discussion of the same question. In fact, the J Cfr. Quinn, oj), ci1., pp. 1 80-8 1 ; J. G. Bougerol, "Saint BonavenDJte et saint Anselme," in Antonianum XLVII ( 1 9 7 2): 333-61 , esp. 339 and 348. Both Bougerol and Quinn argue that the first four questions On the Knowledge of Christ derive from the inception ceremonies of Bonaventure which took place in the spring of 1 254. Quinn argues more specifically that the fourth question would have been the principal question disputed on that occasion, and the sermon Christus unus omnium magister was most likely the principium delivered by Bonaventure during the morning ceremon ies of the second day of the disputation. For details of the inception ceremonies, cfr. Rashdall, op. ci1., pp. 484ff.; J. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas D'Aquino: His Life, Thought and Works (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1 974), pp. 96ff. ◄ San Bonaventura , La conoscenta in Cristo. lntroduzione, traduzione, commento di Letterio Mauro (Vicema, 1 987), p. 5. 5 Cfr. Z. Hayes , The Hidden Center (Paulist Press, 1 981 ), pp. 1 07 - 1 7 .

43

seem to move in quite a different direction and offer a type of solution that seems to have no clear parallel in the literature up to this point. For at the decisive moment in the argument of the Questions, Bonaventure appeals to the mystical tradition of Pseudo-Dionysius in a way that lends a distinctive color to the christological question. 6 Bonaventure would give the christological issue a third formula­ tion in his Breviloquium. This attempt seems different in some ways from both of the earlier treatments. In the discussion of the doctrine of creation in the second book of his Sentence Commentary, Bonaventure discusses the types of knowledge that are associated with the various historical states of human nature, including the special gift of knowledge given to the first hu.man beings in Para­ dise. 7 In the Breviloquium this protological ·material is situated squarely in the context of the christological discussion, thus reveal­ ing a certain parallel with the work of Alexander of Hales . The Breviloquium attributes to Christ all the forms of knowledge that the theological tradition had associated with the perfection of created, intelligent beings at all . stages of history, including the state of in­ nocence. Therefore, Christ is said to possess the forms of knowledge given to the angels and those given to the first human beings as spe­ cial gifts of God, as well as that form of knowledge given to the prophets. Thus, the created habitus which Bonaventure had affirmed in the Questions is expanded to the distinction between an " infused habit" and an " innate habit." 8 This material does not appear in the Disputed Questions. Furthermore, the Sentence Commentary had distinguished between habitual and actual knowledge, and had allowed for a certain form of progress in terms of actual knowledge. The Disputed Questions had replaced this distinction with a distinction between apprehen­ sion and comprehension, explaining Christ's relation to the infinite by means of an ecstatic mode of knowledge that is never compre­ hensive of the infinite. The Breviloquium speaks of both an habitual

Questions

6

Ibid. 1 11 Sent., d. 23, a. 2, q. 3 (11, 542-4 7). 8 Brevil. IV, 6 (V, 246-47).

44

INTRO D UCTION

form of knowledge and an ecstatic mode without precisely clarifying the relation between them. 9 All three of Bonaventure's discussions are dominated by the Au­ gustinian conviction that the primary object of the created mind is God, and that in a profound knowledge of God, the created intellect is somehow drawn to a knowledge of created reality. And while, in such a framework, theology might affirm in principle the reality of Christ's human nature, it will always be difficult to work out the implications of that affirmation at the level of knowledge; for in such a context, it will always be difficult to give empirical knowledge anything more than a secondary significance. As we have seen, Bonaventure took up the question three times in the course of his academic career. It is possible to see the differ­ ences in his treatments as indications of a development in his own thought. And it is possible to read the Breviloquium to mean that Bona_venture found no solution with which he himself was finally satisfied.

9

Ibid.

CHAPT E R F O U R

The Disputed Questions on the Knowledge of Christ I . GENERAL STRU CTURE OF THE QU ESTI O N S The Disputed Questions offer the most extensive discussion of Christ' s knowledge in the Bonaventurean corpus and provide an ex­ cellent example of the intricate relations that existed between phi­ losophy and theology in the medieval period . The careful reader can follow in great detail the development of a complex theological issue by means of the best available philosophical tools . In Bonaventure's treatment, the issue of Christ' s knowledge is situated against the wider problem of the relation between meta­ physics and epistemology. For Bonaventure, this entails a lengthy discussion of God as supreme spirit, an analysis of the meaning of the divine Word, and a careful reformulation of the Platonic tradi­ tion of the eternal archetypes (Qq. 1 -3). As a theological discussion, this material is an analysis of the meaning of divine infinity and of the nature and extent of God' s knowledge. From a metaphysical per­ spective, this is a discussion about the grounding of ontological truth and its relation to ultimate reality. Viewed from a specifically christological perspective, the same material a ppears as a discussion of the knowledge of Christ precisely in as far as Christ is the Word of God. The final three questions (Qq. 5- 7) view the christological issue from the other side of the hypostatic union; that is , from the per­ spective of Christ' s created soul and human intellect. Strictly speak­ ing, it is here that we find the discussion of the human knowledge of Jesus as the incarnate Word. The question is worked out in light of the philosophical-theological matters discussed in the opening questions. If Christ's human soul is a genuinely created reality, the

44

INTRODUCTION

form of knowledge and an ecstatic mode without precisely clarifying 9 the relation between them. All three of Bonavel}ture's discussions are dominated by the Au­ gustinian conviction that the primary object of the created mind is God, and that in a profound knowledge of God, the created intellect is somehow drawn to a knowledge of created reality. And while, in such a framework, theology might affirm in principle the reality of Christ's human nature, it will always be difficult to work out the implications of that affirmation at the level of knowledge; for in such a context, it will always be difficult to give empirical knowledge anything more than a secondary significance. As we have seen, Bonaventure took up the question three times in the course of his academic career. It is possible to see the differ• ences in his treatments as indications of a development in his own thought. And it is possible to read the Breviloquium to mean that Bonaventure found no solution with which he himself was finally satisfied.

9 Ibid.

CHAPTER F O U R

The Disputed Questio"ns on the Knowledge of Christ I. GENERAL STRUCTURE OF THE Q U ESTIO N S The Disputed Questions offer th e most extensive discussion of Christ's knowled ge in the Bonaventurean corpus and provide an ex­ cellent example of the intricate relations that existed between phi­ losophy and theology in the medieval period . The careful reader can follow in great detaa the development of a complex theological issue by means of the best available philosophical tools. In Bonaventure's treatment, the issue of Christ's knowledge is situated against the wider problem of the relation between meta­ physics and epistemology. For Bonaventure, this entails a lengthy discussion of God as supreme spirit, an analysis of the meaning of the divine Word, and a careful reformulation of the Platonic tradi­ tion of the eternal archetypes (Qq. 1 - 3). As a theological discussion, this material is an analysis of the meaning of divine infinity and of the nature and extent of God's knowledge. From a metap hysical per­ spective, this is a discussion about the grounding of ontological truth and its ,elation to ultimate reality. Viewed from a specifically christologicai perspective, the same material appears as a discussion of the knowledge of Christ precisely in as far as Christ is the Word of God. The final three questions (Qq. 5 -7) view the christological issue from the other side of the hypostatic union; that is , from the per­ spective of Christ' s created soul and human intellect. Strictly speak­ ing, it is here that we find the discussion of the human knowledge of Jesus as the incarnate Word. The question is worked out in light of the philosophical-theological m atters discussed in the opening questions. If Christ's human soul is a genuinely created reality, the

46

INTR◊DUCTl ON

question of the disproportion between the infinity of God and the finitude of the creature must inevitably arise. ls it poss ible, and per­ haps even necessary, to affirm some sort of limit to the knowledge of the human intellect of Christ? ls Christ's human knowledge of the infinite God in some way finite? The relation between metaphys­ ics and epistemology laid out in the previous questions is clearly the key to understanding Bonaventure's treatment of this christological issue. ,,-··· --· - ··13��een these two blocks of questions Bonaventure situates what 1 can best be described as a classical statement of the epistemological theory of illumination (Q. 4). Here the question concerns the role of the divine Word in the genes is of human knowledge and certi­ tude. This is not specifically a christological matter but a broader philosophical problem. It is a question about the conditions for any human knowledge that involves certitude. Uke Augustine in his dis­ cussion with the sceptics of his time, Bonaventure is convinced that we do have certitude in certain areas of knowledge. How can we ac­ count for this fact! The theory of illumination is an attempt to give an account of the metaphysical conditions for th is fact of experience. In as far as the theory involves some attempt to describe generally the role of the divine archetypes in human knowledge, what is said here serves to illumine the christological issue which involves the particular and unique case of one human soul operating under the influence of the divine Word. While the discussion throughout reflects the influence of both the Platonic and the Aristotelian traditions of epistemology in discussing the role of the Ideas (the a priori factor) and the role of empirical ex­ perience (the a pos teriori factor) in human knowledge, the final ques­ tion of the series {Q. 7) moves beyond these two traditions . It draws on the mystical insights of Pseudo-Dionysius in attributing to the human soul of Christ an "ecstatic" knowledge whereby that soul is always d:rawn beyond itself in the direction of the infinite without ever comprehending the infinite. ln summary, these Questions are a clear example of the way in which theological thought could be de­ veloped through the mediation of philosophy in the medieval period to produce a high level of speculative theology.

CHAPTER FOUR

47

I I . THE CONTENT OF THE QU ESTIONS Question 1 The first question deals with the infinity of God and the nature and extent of God's knowledge. The specific issues raised in this question had been discussed earlier by Bonaventure in the first book of his Sentence Commentary. 1 He had discussed the problem of in­ finity in terms of the philosophical tradition and explored the pos­ sible relation of this metaphysical category to the theological under­ standing of divine reality. 2 The present question explores the relation between infinite and divine knowledge. Bonaventure's discussion begins with a lengthy citation from Augustine's Cit:y of God concerni�g the infinity of numbers. Thus, he brings to bear the tradition of the Fathers as rep­ resented in Augustine, who clearly affirms that God has an actual, comprehensive knowledge of an infinity of objects . To clarify this issue - more precisely, Bonaventure employs distinc­ tions that he describes as " more recent." It is necessary in the dis­ cussion of God' s knowledge to distinguish between the knowledge of approbation, the knowledge of vision, and the knowledge of in­ telligence. The knowledge of a pprobation refers only to those good things that actually come to be at some time in the course of history, and the knowledge of vision relates only to all real things-both good and evil-in the past, the present, and the future. Thus, these describe God's knowledge in terms of a finite number of objects , since both types of knowledge are limited to temporal realities and time itself is limited in extent. If such knowledge is finite in its ob­ jects, it is consistent to say that such knowledge could, in principle , be greater than · it is. In the case of the knowledge of intelligence, however, God is viewed as the radical source of all possibilities, both those which at some point are actualized and those which will never

1 I Sent., d. 35, q. 5 (I, 61 1 - 1 2); l Sent., d. 39, a. 1 , q. 1 -3 (I, 684-9 1 ); l Sem., d. 43, q. 1 -4 (I, 764-75). 2 Cfr. L. Sweeney, "Infinity," in New Catholic Encyclopedia {McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1 96 7), 7, 504-8 for the history of the problem in philosophy and theology.

48

INTRODUCTION

be actualized. From this perspective, Bonaventure argues that God's knowledge comprehends an infinite number of things; it is in terms of this knowledge that God knows the infinite divine being, both in itself and in its nature as the ground of an infinity of possibilities­ even of possibilities which may never come into actual being. Such knowledge is infinite in its objects and cannot be more extensive than it is. Thus, Bonaventure concludes that, when viewed in terms of the knowledge of intelligence, God's knowledge of the divine being in itself is an actual, comprehensive knowledge of the infinite number of all real and all purely possible beings. 3 This knowledge of intelligence is, in Bonaventure's analysis, ac­ tual and intrinsic to the divine being. Bonaventure's formulation re­ flects his acceptance of the Aristotelian understanding of the radical identity of being and knowing which was the common property of the Scholastics of the thirteenth century. As pure act of being, God is the pure act of self-knowledge, and in this perfect correspondence of pure being and pure self-knowledge is found what Scholastic thought meant by "ontological truth" in the fullest sense of the word. Since the pure being of God is the ground of any other being, God's vision of divine being as ultimate truth includes a knowledge of all other being and truth. In this sense, God's knowl­ edge of creatures is intrinsic to the divine b�ing itself and is inde­ pendent of the existence of creatures as well as of the circumstances of place and time in which particular creatures exist. The extended quote from Augustine with which Bonaven�re be­ gins his discussion introduces the reader into the fascinating prob­ lem of the nature of number and the puzzle of " infinite" numbers which, in fact, turns out to be an infinity of infinities. For this, Bonaventure is dependent on Augustine and , through Augustine, on the ancient Greek tradition of numbers and mathematics. The discussion of number provides the context for discussing the " infi­ nite possibilities," which God knows as distinct from the limited number of actualized poss ibilities that constitute the reality of cre­ ation and history in the present world order. The connection between this analysis of God's knowledge and _________________________________ 3 Cfr. also l Sent. d. 39, a. l , q. 3 (1, 690-9 1 ) . ,

CHAPTER FOUR

49

Christology i s not made explicit i n th e present question, but it i s al­ luded ID when Bonaventure refers to God's knowledge as a knowl­ edge by means of eternal Ideas. This will be discussed at greater length in the next two questions . For the present, it is sufficient to say that the christological connection is contained in the implicit trinitarian context of the discussion. Since the time of Augustine, Western theology had made extensive use of the metaphor of the Word to express the self-awareness of God in trinitarian terms. Word, drawn from the experience of human knowledge and self-con­ sciousness, became a widely-used metaphor for the self-expressive · character of God. In the context of trinitarian life, the Word is the subsistent act of divine self-awareness. As a trinitarian metaphor, the Word provided a point at which the world of Platonic Ideas could be introduced ID express the relation between God' s immanent self­ awareness and His knowledge of creation. The christological implication of this becomes clear immediately. When theology says that Jesus is the Word incarnate, it is saying that the created humanity of Jesus of Nazareth exists in such an in­ timate relation with the divine Word that the subsistent act of divine self-awareness and all contained within it im:pinges in some mys­ terious way on the human soul of Jesus . This relation between the divine Word and human nature is described by theology as a " hypo-­ static union." The union is understood to be so intimate that there is, in fact, only one subject ID whom are attributed both the human and the divine qualities and acts, when such predications are made in the concrete and not in the abstract (communication of idioms). And the subject of all such predications is the eternal Word of God. It will be recalled that the Word. is the subsistent self-knowledge of God. Therefore, the present question as Bonaventure formulates it is not yet a question about the human consciousness of Jesus. Rath.er, it is a question about the Word precisely in as far as the Word is the subsistent self-expression of divine truth. Does the divine act of knowl­ edge which subsists in the Word comprehend an infinite number of things? The question is first and foremost a question about the nature and extent of God's self-knowledge. What impact this might have on the human intellect of Jesus is a matter that will be taken up in the final three questions of this series.

50

I NTRODUCTION

Question 2 In this question Bonavenrure exp ressly introduces the doctrine of the divine Ideas to which he had referred only briefly in the previ­ ous question. Certainly God knows created things. The question here is about the way in which theology is to understand His knowl­ ed ge. Or , if human knowledge means that in some way one being is p resent to and in another , does God's knowledge of creatures mean that, in some way , crearures exist in God? If that question is answered in . the affirmative , what manner of presence is involved? In Bonavenrure's formulation the question is: Does God know crea­ tures by means of some contact with their created essence or does God know them by means of some likeness of the creature that can­ not be identified with their created essence? Since the first choice would involve some form of dependence on creatures and some form of potentiali ty in God , it is unacceptable. In Bonaventure's view , it is clear that only the second choice is possible , and his answer to the question draws on the Platonic tradition of exem­ plari ty . First, a few words about terminology seem to be in order. The text of the present question does not use the term Idea at any point _ in the discussion. Instead , it s p eaks of similitudo, species, ratio , or exemplar. The most common term used here by Bonavenrure is s imilitudo. While th.is word can have other meanings , when used in reference to the divine knowledge it is for all practical pur poses sy nony mous with the term Idea . As technical , e p istemological terms , both words are used to designate some sort of mental representation of a known obj ect in the knowing subj ect. There is a way in which the known obj ect is said to be in the human knower. Similarly , there is a way in which crearures-if they are known by God-are . said to be in God. In what sense can th.is be said with.out falling into some form of pantheism? For Bonaventure, God's knowledge of creatures cannot be depe nd­ ent on the creatures in their empirical existence , nor can it come from outside God in any way . As we have already seen in the p re­ ceding question , the divine knowled ge of created things is in some way contained in the act of divine self-knowled ge . God is truth in the fullest sense of the word , and as such , the divine truth is expres-

CHAPTER .FOUR

51

sive of all the ways in which th.at primal truth can be shared by beings other than God. The knowledge of God can be said to. re­ semble created things . This is not because God imitates creatures in any way, but sim ply because God exp resses creatures in the divine act of self-expression that is intrinsic ID the divine nature. In the Sentence Commentary, the doctrine of ldeas is used to clar, ify the relation between God and world as it is understood in the Christian doctrine of creation. 4 According to the theological tra­ dition, God is to be understood as creating with knowledge and freedom. God might, therefore, be thought of as an artist. Bonaven­ ture discusses the issue by distinguishing between natural agents and mtional agents. The concept of rational agent, which will be used analogously to speak of God as creator, refers to an a gent who produces "by means of forms which are not part of the obj ect p ro­ duced but are Ideas in the mind." When used in reference to God , this will suggest Ideas in the divine mind that serve as the models (formae rerum aeternae) for the obj ects that the divine creativi ty p roduces. Bonaventure expresses his approval of Plato over Aristotle on this issue. In fact, one of the problems he will later have with 5 Aristotle is the Philosopher's rej ection of the doctrine of Ideas . In develop ing · his own view, Bonaventure appeals to the Christian , nee-Platonic tradition in both its Augu stinian and Dionysian forms. Bonaventure attemp ts to define the concept of a rational agent more precisely. 6 A rational agent is one that operates neither by ne­ cessity nor by chance. lt knows its effect before it p roduces it. But, every subj ect that knows something possesses that thing either by possessing the very reality of the other or by possessing some like­ ness of the other. Yet God cannot possess things in their own reality before they exist. Therefore , God possesses them in their like­ ness: "But the likeness of a .thing, by which the thing is known and produced , is its Idea." This seems to be identical with the issue dis­ cussed in the present question. Does God know things through their Ideas or through their own p ro p er essence? ______________________________

4 II Sent. , d. 1 , p. I , a. 1 , q . 1 (11, 1 7). 5 Coll. in Hex., Vl , 2. 3 'N, 360-61 ). 6 I Sent., d. 35, a. un., q. 1 (1, 600).

52

CHAPTER FOUR

I NTRODUCTION

The doctrine of Ideas is developed more fully in the Sentence 7 Commentary. In this instance, the term Idea is used directly in the formulation of the question. Bonaventure virtually equates the terms idea, ratio, and similitudo. He traces his Christian theological ances­ try back explicitly to Augustine, who made extensive use of the Platonic tradition. Bonaventure writes that God knows things per ideas and that the divinity possesses within itself the rationes et similitudines rerum. Augustine, says Bonaventure, calls .these rationes the ideae, and they are the primordial causes of things . But in what sense are they causes� Certainly not in the sense of forms intrinsic to the essence of creatures. It is in this sense that Aristotle will use the term form. But what other possibility is there except to speak of the Ideas as exemplary causes? In this sense, the Ideas are the original models or divine archetypes of all the possible ways in which God can be imitated. Similitude , writes Bonaventure in the present question, can be of two different types. The first he calls a " likeness of univocation or of participation"; the other is a "likeness of imitation or expres­ sion." The first plays only a minor role in the Questions on the Knowledge of Christ. Technically, it refers simply to the fact that two beings · may share a common third quality. Thus, a cow can be white, and a house can be white. In terms of "whiteness," each of these is like the other. This likeness is described as a kind of harmo­ ny. Since no creature possesses anything that pertains to God in the same way, this sort of likeness does not obtain between God and creation. It is principally the second type of similitude that is involved in the discussion at hand. In this case, the likeness is found in the fact that the characteristics of one being are reproduced in another being. The first is a model; the second is a copy. The creature is said in some way to be modeled after something in God; or, vice versa, something in God is said to be the Idea (or similitude) of the creature. The resemblance of the copy to the original is called a like­ ness of imitation. The resemblance of the original to the copy is called a likeness of exemplarity. In this case, the terms idea, simili-

tudo, and ratio cogn.oscendi (principle of knowledge) refer to the same reality, though each of these terms looks at that reality from a different perspective. This second type of similitude is different in God and in us. In our case, the " principle of knowledge" is the similitude th.at is t is ceived and impres sed upon us from outside. Hence, our intellec not pure act with respect to the object known. Rather, it is " in po­ tency" or " possible" with respect to the object; it is capable of being a acted on by the object. Mental similitude, at least in the case of on sense-object, is dependent on the connected process es of sensati and abstraction. In this way our knowledge is dependent on some· n thing outside ourselves. In the case of God, howeve r, the situatio is endi) cognosc is different Here the " principle of knowledge" (ra tio the divine truth itself. The object known is a " likenes s of the truth" in as far as that truth can be imitated in a creature. Instead of being dependent on the external object for knowledge of creation God, th rough the divine Idea, is the primal, creative source of the creature by reason of which the · creature itself is "knowable" and, therefor e,

re­

can be said to be " true." If we refer back to the argument of the first question, it becomes clear at this point why, in Bonaventure's view, language about the divine Ideas is simply a way of highlighting the expressive character of divine truth. And if divine truth is essentially identical with the full selt-knowledge of divine being, then the divine Ideas are not something distinct from the divine essence. They are identical with that essence. They are nothing other than the divine essence viewed precisely from the perspective of its expressive character. Since this is the case, it follows clearly that the divine Ideas must be in God from eternity. They are, in fact, creature s p recisely as they exist eter• real than nally in God. And this mode of existence in God is more 8 Thus , in his reality. l empirica own their in the existence they have own way Bonaventure a ppropriates the Christian , nee-Platonic understanding of John's Gospel: "All that came to be had life in Him" (1 :3).

_____________________________

7 I Sen1., d. 35, a. u., q. 1 -6 (I, 600-61 3).

53

8

I Sent., d. 36, a. 2, q. 1 -2 (I, 622-26).

54

55

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER FOUR

Q uestion 3

example mal unity of the Idea and the multi plicity of the ideata. One possible is the geometrical point. Though it is one in itself, it is the point h su If . lines of r _ : ·a point of departure for an infinite numb� ty thou otent1ah p , �h were though t of as conscio� s of itself in its full potential it is one in itself it would know an infinite number of and . lines. A similar example may be seen in the light which is one directi a�l in te emana that ty ��s yet radiate s in a multiplici of beams gh 1s 1t one, 1s j t li and light up a multiplicity of ob ects . While the a es identical with the multiplici ty of beams with which it illumin

The argument of the previous question may be reduced to the fol­ lowing: the Christian doct rine of creation demands the existence of divine Ideas in God , for as creator , God is seen to be an intelligent and free agent. To speak of the divine Ideas is a particular way of speaking of d ivine knowledge. And divine knowledge is in reali ty identical with the divine being itself. From this perspective, the issue under discussion in the third question has already been antici p ated in the previous discussion. The issue is whether there is really a plurali ty of Ideas in God , or whether there is onl y one Idea. The an­ swer to this seems inevitable once it has been made dear that the langu age about Ideas is langu age about God's knowledge, and that God's knowledge is one sim ple act intrinsic to the divine essence, in which all of reali ty , real and po tential, is known. Basically, there can be but one Idea because that Idea is identical with the divine es­ sence precisely in its act of self-expression. Yet one speaks of Ideas in the plural. What meaning can that have? In Bonaventure's view , it is necessary to distinguish between what an Idea is in itself and what an Idea is in relation to creation. In terms of the first perspective , there can be only one Idea ; and there can be no real distinction between the divine essence and the Idea , nor among the Ideas themselves. At th is level, all is one. The Ideas are many only in relation to the things known by God through the Ideas , namely, the ideata. That is , the plurali ty of Ideas is simply the exp ression of the multiplici ty of creatures through which the wealth of divine truth and goodness is brought to expres­ sion outside of God. No one of these, nor even all of them to ge ther , can give adeq uate exp ression to the richness of divine reali ty . Bonaventure s p eaks of this plurali ty of Ideas only in terms of that which the Ideas connote , namely , the creatures . In the divini ty itself all is one , bu t when that p rimal, fecu nd uni ty of being reaches out­ ward and expresses itself in the medium of materiali ty , plurali ty emerges . Creatures , then , can be said to be virtually multi p le in God as possibilities and actually multiple in as far as they exist concretely . The plurality of Ideas in God , therefore , is not real but only logical or mental . Bonaventure takes exam p les from Pseudo-Diony­ sius (On the Divine Names) to explain the relation between the pri-

multiplici ty of things. gs that One might argue that it is the multiplicity of created thin fies diversi sense, reflects back on the primal unity of God a nd , in a y onl that unity . But since the number of creatures embraces not those which at some point achieve a.ctual existence but also all the res­ infinite possibilities expressed in the primal act of divine self-exp God. in Ideas of r sion, it follows that there are an infinite numbe Here the relation to the first question of this series becom es clear. pp A parallel argument concern ing the plurali ty of Ideas a ears g the when the question is raised whether there is any order amon an g of speakin in point Ideas . From God's perspective, there is no anoth­ order, for all is one. One Idea is not prior to or posterior to er. No Idea can be said to be more noble than any other . Yet from the perspective of the creatures connoted by the Ideas, there is an order in their connotation. That is to say , there is an order among creature s. A horse is not a human being, and a human being is a t, more noble creature than a horse.9 Summing up his viewpoin Bona­ venture writes: "Habent quippe ordinem ideae ad ideata , sed ad , nee est invicem non , quoniam nee un a prior nee altera , nee posterior n!O o. . 1'b'1 ord una ab alia , nee nobilior es t; et 1'deo non pomtur Question 4 This question is a detailed discussion of the theory of illumina­ tion. The same material is discussed in the sermon Chriscus unus ______________________________ 9 10

I Sem., d. 35, a. u., q. 6 (I, 61 3). I Sent., d. 35, a. u., q. 3 (I, 608).

56

INTRODU CTION

s

. · 1 1 an ommum M agister d in ermo 1 on the twenty-second Sunday after Pentecost. 1 2 J. Quinn has argued that the former may have been the Principium on the occasion of Bonavenn.ire's magisterial disputati on, and I. Brady has suggested that the latter may be a less perfect version of the former. 1 3 These, together wi th chapters 3 and 5 of the Itinerariu m, 14 are the major texts for the development of Bonavenn.ire' s thought on the problems of human knowled , ge certin.ide, and illumination. Brady suggests that none of Bonaven­ n.ire' s writings prior to this question provide any extended treatment of the issue. The Sentence Commentary treats isolated elements of the theory, but reveals only an occasional hint of the theory of illumina­ tion � s such. 15 It would have been in the present question , on the occasion of his magisterial disputation, that Bonaven ture would have developed his position in a systematic way. While the issue under discussion is first of all a matter of philo­ sophical epistemology, the que stion about the role of the eternal Ideas in human knowledge in general cannot be without christologi­ . _ cal s1gmfica nce when one turns to the discussio n of the human knowledge of Christ. For; in Bonaventure's thought, as in Schola sti­ cism generally, Christ is the pre-eminent instance of the relationship between God and creation . Therefore, in Christ one can expect to find at least some parallels with common human experience. And if the hypostatic union is understood to be the pre-eminent relation between God and conscious creation , through which a created hu­ ma n nature is brough t to its full actualiz ation, it becomes inevitable �at, at some point, one must ask what sort of impact this uniquely intimate relation with God would have on the human consciousness of Christ. Stripped to its essence, the theory of illumination is an analysis of the metaphysical conditions for the fact of human certitude. (V, 567- 74). n (IX, 441 -44). 13 I. Brady, "The Authenticity of Two Sermons of St. Bonaventure " in Fran' ciscan Studies XXVIII (1 968): 4-26. 14 (V, 295-31 3). 15 I. Brady, "St. Bonaventure's Doctrine of Illumination, Reactions Mediaeval and Moder� ," in Southwestern Journal of Philosophy V, 2 (1 9 74 ): 27 -3 7. II

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Against the background of the previous questions, the issue can be formulated in the following terms: Presuming that the " eternal rea­ sons" in God's knowledge are not really distinct from one another, is it the case that these " eternal reasons" are the ground of knowl­ edge for any human knowledge that claims to be certain? Or, is it true that everything that we know with certitude is known by us " in the eternal reasons?" Bonaventure is convinced that human beings possess certitude in at least some areas of knowledge, and that it is impossible to ac­ count for this fact either by an appeal to the objects of empirical experience or by an appeal to the knowing subject; for all concrete objects of knowledge are changeable, and the mind of the human subject is fallible. How is it then possible to have certitude if neither the subject nor the object of knowledge provides adequate grounds for such a claim? Is such certitude merely an illusion, or is it ade­ quately grounded in some reality other than the fallible subject or the changeable object? It is important to emphasize that this theory is not a description of some psychological experience. It is, rather, a statement of the metaphysical conditions for a fact of experience; namely, that human bein gs do possess certitude. Here Bonaventure follows the lead of Augustine who, in response to the sceptics of his time, had developed a theoretical explanation to account for the fact of human certitude. In the Augustinian-Bona­ venturean epistemology, the fact of certain knowledge can be ac­ counted for only if the eternal truth is in some way involved in the cognitive processes. When truth is viewed through the metaphor of light, the source of the language of illumination becomes obvious. The eternal truth, or light, must be present and must exercise some sort of influence on the human subject. This does not mean that the human intellect sees the naked reality of God, nor that the eter­ nal truth is the sole ground of human knowledge. If such were the case, there would be no distinction between historical experience and the beatific vision in heaven. The influence of the eternal rea­ sons must be present together with the empirical experience of the object in its own created existence. The theory of illumination, there­ fore, is an attempt to articulate the mode of this divine presence and influence as the light and norm by means of which the human mind can know with certitude.

58

INTRODUCTION

In attempting to clarify the nature of this influence more precise­ ly, Bonaventure regards several poss ible understandings as unaccept• able. The influence of illumination is not to be identified with the general influence of God as creator, nor is it to be · identified with the special influence of grace. In the first instance, God is equally re­ lated to all things in the world, and wisdom has no more to do with God than money. In the second instance, all knowledge would k come a form of infused knowledge, and the significance of empirical experience would disappear. Having excluded these two extremes, Bonaventure attempts to de-­ scribe a middle view. Even though he rejects the idea that God is the sole basis for certain knowledge, Bonaventure attempts to delin­ eate a very special form of divine influence in human knowledge. Together with empirical experience, the eternal reasons operate as a rule or norm , and as a motive power. The intellect does not see the eternal reasons directly, but "contuits" them as it looks directly at the created object. This might be formulated as follows: Even as the human . mind is directly aware of the created basis for its knowledge, it is obliquely touched by the eternal model after which the created copy is formed. That is, when we know the true reality of a created thing, we know it not simply as it stands in itself, but more deeply in its relation to the archetype of which it is a symbolic representa• tion in s pace a nd time. O ne does not see light; one sees the objects of experience in the medium of light. So here, one does not see the eternal reasons; one sees the objects of experience in the light shed on them by the eternal reasons. Bonaventure situa tes th is u ndersta nd ing within his vision of a hierarchically structured world. Creatures stand at different levels of the hierarchy, a nd thus in different relations with God. Creatures at the lowest level of the hierarchy are called vestiges and have God only as their creative source. At the top of the hierarchy stand those creatures who reflect God in terms of tl1e most perfect " likeness. " In these, God operates in terms of an infu sed gift. This is the area of grace. But between these two extremes there is human nature which, especially in its s piritual powers, is created as an " image" of God. The implication of this might be best expressed by saying that the human soul a nd God are not neutral with respect to each other,

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we can say that God but are dyna mically related. From God ' s side, the spiritual faculties or operates as the motive power toward which . The imp act of this di­ the human person are dynamically orientated an spirit poss esses a pr� vine power is seen in the fact that the hum truth and goodness . It is found desire for the mystery of ultimate ve power, that moves the this desire, responding to the divine moti that truth and goodness created image out of itself in search of In this sens e, the divine e. which constitute the mystery of the divin a magnetic force that pro­ archetypes operate like a spring board or and toward the mystery pels or draws the human spirit out of itself of the eternal. stinian langu age to distinBonaventure employs traditional Augu ior and the ratio super ior. guish two levels of the soul: the ratio infer looking at the world of The former designates the hum an power of ability to turn toward the sen se reality. The latter designates the our knowledge resides eternal archetype s. While the ce_r titude of there independently exist principally in the ratio superior, it does not venture brings togeth­ of the ratio inferior. Through this duality, Bona dimension of hum an er -the Aristotelian concern for the empirical transcendent dimension knowledge and the Platonic concern for the an person stands in a of reality. While recognizing that the hum venture gives a stron• cognitive relation to the empirical world, Bona would be the case in a ger emphasis to the influence of God than in the Bonaventurea n strictly Aristotelian epistemology; for God is, . view, the prim ary object of human knowledge Question 5 In the beginning of this question Bonaventure states that, while Questions 1 -4 deal with the knowledge of Christ precisely as Word, Question 5 begins the discussion of the hypcistati.c union' s imp act on the human soul of Christ. The issue is whether, in view of the hypostatic union and its impact, Christ is endowed solely with �e divine wisdom, or whether his human soul possesses a created wis­ dom as well. Here, as in the Sentence Commentary, Bonaventure emphasizes the necessity in Jesus of a created habitus by means of which he could recognize the uncreated wisdom.

60

INTRODUCTION

Bougerol points out1 6 that in the first questions, where Bona­ venture discusses the knowledge of Christ as the Word, he speaks consistently of scient ia . In the final three questions, by way of con­ trast, he speaks of the wisdom (sapientia) of Christ If this is inter­ preted in light of the beginning of the Sentence Commentary, it - would emphasize that Bonaventure has shifted his concern from a purely intellectual view of knowledge to a knowledge derived from both intelligence and love. 1 7 The editors of the Spanish edition in­ terpret the language of the present question to represent a form of 18 sapiential knowledge. The burden of the argument is to show that and why there must be a habit of created wisdom in the human soul of Christ distinct from the uncreated wisdom that is his by virtue of his identity as the Word. In essence, the argument can be seen as a discussion of grace. It is carried out here parallel to the discussion of the divine illumina­ tion involved in natural knowledge, which we have seen in the pre­ ceding question. The attainment of certitude in natural knowledge involves two things: the influence of the eternal light and the pres­ ence of that light in the cognitive operations of the soul. Similarly, in the gift of wisdom (sapiential knowledge) rooted in the mystery of the hypostatic union, the eternal light has a deeper impact which al­ so involves the presence and influence of the eternal light on the soul. From the perspective of the soul, we can speak of the soul's need to become adapted to the mystery of the divine with which it is united. Scholastic epistemology provides important dues to under­ standing what is intimated here. In any act of human knowledge, the human soul becomes, as it were, " informed" by the object known. In this sense, the soul becomes "like" the object known; it becomes adapted to its object. If we think of God as the "object" of the human soul of Christ, it becomes clear in what sense the soul must become "like" God in its cognitive and affective relation with

:: Introduction to The Work, of Bonaventure, p. 1 1 4. I Sent., d. l : a. 1 , q. 1 -a . 3, q. 2 (I, 30-42). 18 Bibliot eca de Auiores Cristianos: Obras de San Bonavemura, tomo secundo.

Ed. Amoros, Aperribay, Oromi (Madrid, 1 946) pp. 1 09ff.

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God. Typically, Bonaventure uses the language of dei-fonnity to ex­ press the reality of created grace. The human per so � �ecomes . God-like through its response tD the divine presence w1thm it. Thus, when Bonaventure speaks of a "created wisdom" in the soul of Christ he wishes to designate that quality through which the soul is made �omewhat proportionate to the mystery of the divine Word with which it is united. It is this created wisdom which inheres as an accident in the essence of the soul. It renders the soul more deeply God-like and elevates it to make it capable of a mor� p�o-­ found contact with the divine than is possible for the soul m its purely natural condition. This description of created wisdom may be seen as an attempt to describe the impact of the uncreated wisdom of God on the human soul of Christ by reason of the hypostatic union. If the language of created grace is a way of naming the profound transformation of the human soul that takes place in its encounter with God, the language of uncreated grace expresses the conviction that it is the very mystery of God that gives itself to humanity as a personal presence in the mystery of grace. The mystery of this divine self-gift has reached a unique depth in the case of the hypostatic union. No creature can daim the self-gift of God for itself. This gift can only be freely given from above and freely received by that creature which is interiorly transformed in its response. It becomes more deeply like the gift it has received. All grace involves the gift of God from above, prior by nature to human freedom. Hence, the grace of the hypostatic union involves the divine self-gift from above to the human soul of Christ. Here Bonaventure speaks of the presence and the influence of the eternal, divine light operating in the soul of Christ with a unique depth and power. As the illumination of the soul in natural knowledge involved an influence of the divine Ideas which "move, orient, and bring the mind to rest," so here the uncreated wis­ dom is described in similar terms. In the deepest and most personal sense, it is that mystery from which the soul of Christ is moved and directed in its historical experience, and in which it finally comes to rest This three-fold operation of the divine light in the soul of Christ is what Bonaventure sees as the impact of the uncreated wisdom. It is this divine mystery in which Christ's human life is rooted, and in which that human life finds its ultimate goal and repose.

62

63

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER FOUR

Question 6

come to their end i n the heavenly dimension. The constant princi­ ple lying behind all these levels of relationship is Bonaventure's con­ viction that the human soul, finite though it is in itself, is always drawn in the direction of infinite truth and goodness. lt is only in . a mystery greater than itself that the soul will find its ultimate ful­ fillment. Since the object toward which the soul is drawn is the mys­ tery of the infinite God, the soul is never fully proportionate to the object in which it finds its final fulfillment. Therefore, at every level of its relation to God, the soul is being drawn beyond itself in an ecstatic movement toward the infinite, which it never comprehends in the strict sense of the term. This remains true not only in the stages of our earthly journey, but in the final, heavenly stage as well. Here the discussion anticipates the point of Question 7 . The mys­ tical tone is reflected in the language by which the earthly and heav­ enly stages are contrasted. While the stages of the earthly j ourney move from faith through discursive reason to contemplative wonder , the heavenly condition is characterized by a contuition of the divine that brings the soul to· the highest state of conformity with God, drawing it to a state of ecstatic intoxication. In reference to the historical experience of Jesus, this means that there must be some limiting factor. The human nature of Jesus can never be equated with the divine nature. The finite never becomes infinite. But the infinite works like a magnetic force, exercising a drawing power on the spiritual powers of the human soul. Follow­ ing the lead of Anselm (Proslogion), Bonaventure applies these mys­ tical categories to Jesus . Because of the depth of the hypostatic union, the grace of Jesus is described not simply as sufficient but as superexceUent. Despite this, the perfection of Jesus never crosses the line distinguishing the finite from the infinite. His perfection is the sort of perfection appropriate to a creature; that is , it is always lim­ ited when viewed in relation to God. Jesus' knowledge of the uncre­ ated wisdom is described here as a form of ecstatic contuition. While never comprehending the infinite, his human soul is drawn into the mystery of the infinite by the magnetic power of the uncre­ ated wisdom, which draws the soul beyond itself and in the direc­ tion of the divine in an intoxicating, ecstatic movement. That which c.onstitutes the heavenly condition of all other human beings is here somehow anticipated in the historical experience of Jesus Christ.

If, in the preceding question, Bonaventure has argued that the human soul of Christ has contact with the uncreated wisdom pro­ portionate to the depth of grace of the hypostatic union, it remains to be said that the soul of Christ is not a divine principle, but a created reality. The principal argument here is that the human soul of Christ, precisely in as far as it is a creature, is not capable of com­ prehending the infinite wisdom of God expressed in the Word, de­ spite the closeness of the union between the Word and the human nature of Jesus. The object of Christ's created knowledge is not God in general but, specifically, the uncreated wisdom with whom his hu­ man nature is united. If, as Bonaventure has just argued, the soul of Christ approaches uncreated wisdom through created wisdom, does this mean that the human soul attains to some sort of comprehension of the divine? Does the grace of the hypostatic union so elevate the human nature of Christ that the chasm between the finite and infinite disappears? The entire discussion that has been carried out to this point makes it clear that there cannot be any simple and unqualified sense in which the human soul of Christ can be said to comprehend the di­ vine. Good Scholastic that he is , Bonaventure begins his discussion by attempting to give a more technical definition to the word com­ prehend, drawing insights from the work of Augustine. In the strict sense of the word, comprehend designates a knowl­ edge of an object in which nothing of the object remains hidden to the knowing subject. Such a knowledge implies that the subject is either equal to or greater than the object known. Obviously this can­ not be the case in any creature's knowledge of God, for God is infi­ nite while every creature, by definition, is finite. With refe�ence to Christ, there is no way in which the human soul can be made equal to the infinite nature of the divine. The inner word of Christ's human knowledge can never be equal to the inner, divine word of God's self-expression. In the body of his response, Bonaventure describes diverse levels of relation between the created soul and God in a way suggestive of the contemplative tradition. These levels of relationship are distrib­ uted across the entire historical dimension of human existence and

64

INTRODUCTlON

Does the soul of Christ, then, attain to the uncreated wisdom by an act of comprehension? Bonaventure's answer is clear and deci­ sive. Such a thi�g is simply impossible. But the Seraphic Doctor is just as clear in his claim that the knowledge of the human soul of Jesus is not simply like that of every other human being. Because of the nature of the hypostatic union, the relation of the human nature of Jesus to the divine nature of the Word is distinctive. And because of this distinctive relation, Jesus' human knowledge of God is dis­ tinctive. Even in his earthly condition, Jesus apprehends the mystery of the divine wisdom clearly and plainly even though he does not comprehend that wisdom in its totality. Question 7 Granted, it is impossible for the finite, human soul of Christ to have a comprehensive knowledge (Qq. 5-6) of the infinite divine wisdom. Yet, because of the hypostatic union, the soul of Christ has a privileged access to that wisdom. In a manner parallel to the open­ ing question, Bonaventure brings this series to a close by asking whether the human soul of Christ comprehends the infinite number of Ideas contained in the uncreated wisdom of God. The previous question already suggests the distinctive approach taken by Bonaventure in these questions when it alludes to certain aspects of the mystical tradition. In this final question, that mystical perspective is developed in more detail. The most important element in Bonaventure's response is the distinction between COjllprehensive knowledge and ecstatic knowledge. The latter term is drawn from the Dionysian tradition and is characteristic of the contemplative­ mystical understanding of the relation between God and the soul. On this point, as we have already seen, the Questions differ from the Sentence Commentary. The earlier text had employed the distinction between habitual and actual knowledge. Habitual knowled ge is understood not as an actual knowledge but as a readiness to know. In ordinary human beings it is dependent on empirical experience, but in the case of Christ it is intrinsic to the understanding of the hypostatic union. Because of the infinity of the Word with which his human nature is united, the human intellect of Christ possesses an orientation to the infinite but not an actual knowledge of the

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infinite a s such. The movement from habitual to actual knowledge in Christ is dependent on the course of his empirical experience. In th.is sense, he comes to have an actual knowledge of what he already knows habitually. In the present question, Bonavenlllre replaces this distinction with a distinction between comprehensive knowledge and ecstatic knowledge drawn from Pseudo-Dionysius. Comprehensive knowl­ edge is here referred to the realm of actual reality. In its contact with the Word, the human soul of Christ has comprehensive knowledge of all that has been , is, and will be. But, as we have already seen, this knowledge is finite in scope. Therefore, there is no particular metaphysical problem in . attributing this sort of comprehensive knowledge to Christ' s human soul. Ecstatic knowledge, on the other hand, Tefers to the never-re­ solved difference between the infinite and the finite and the magnet­ ic relation between them. If God's self-expression in the eternal Word involves an infinity of possibilities , this can never be compre­ hended by the human intellect of Christ. His intellect is, however, constantly drawn in . the direction of the mystery of the infinite which is its proper goal. This epistemological viewpoint is related, by Bonaventure, to two ways of viewing the divine wisdom or the exemplar. From one per­ spective, the exemplar is the model and creative principle of the world. From another perspective, it is the expressive and representa­ tional principle of all actual and possible reality. The first relates to what in fact God will do or permit in the actual order of creation and history. The second includes all the possibilities that will never be brought into acn.tality. The first is obviously limited and finite, since the created order and all in it is by definition finite. The sec­ ond is infinite, since it is identical with the infinite power of God, which is identical with the infinite nature of the divinity (cfr. Q. 1 ). When these two dimensions , the metaphysical and the epistemo­ logical, are brought together, it is possible for Bonaventure to argue that-because of the hypostatic union-the human soul of Christ en­ joys the most intimate relationship possible with the eternal Word of God. However, in principle, the human mind of Jesus is created and hence finite. Therefore, it cannot comprehend the infinite if comprehend is understood in the strict sense. But if we ask about

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INTRODUCTION

Jesus' knowledge in terms of the divine exemplar, the answer to the question differs depending on the two meanings of the term exem­ plar. In the case of the first meaning, Jesus can be said to have a comprehensive knowledge of this, for the object comprehended is 'not infinite. There is no logical problem in thinking that his human intellect could grasp such an object Yet when we turn to the second meaning of exemplar, we discover that Bonaventure uses the notion of ecstatic knowledge (per modum excessus). The cognitive power is drawn as by a magnet to an object that it will never completely comprehend , but which captivates and grasps the intellect and the will and constantly draws the finite human spirit beyond itself into the infinite abyss. Bonaventure sees this ecstatic openness to the divine as the "ultimate and most noble form of knowledge." In this ecstatic ex­ perience, the divine wisdom unites itself with the human spirit in a union that is both cognitive and affective. In a sort of epilogue to the Questions, Bonaventure summarizes his understanding of this form of knowledge . It might be described not as a theoretical, con­ ceptual knowledge, but as a form of "experiential wisdom." Only those who have experienced it can understand it; and only those who are grounded in love are capable of experiencing it. Yet, as B onaventure writes , such knowledge constitutes the truest wisdom, accessible partially in this life, and more perfectly in the next. Attempts to express such wisdom stretch the outer limits of hu­ man language. In line with the Dionysian tradition, this suggests the importance of negative over positive statements, and of superlative statements over mere positive affirmations. · And, in the final analy­ sis, the road to such wisdom leads to contemplative silence in the presence of a mystery that the finite spirit can never comprehend in its fullness. Thus, the argument has come full circle. It began with the affir­ mation of the infinity of God's nature, power, and knowledge. It comes to an end with the analysis of this same infinite mystery as the ultimate goal of the human spiritual journey. The human spirit is dynamically orientated to a mystery of infinite goodness and truth that it can never comprehend, but into which it is constantly drawn. The human soul of Christ is the unique and privileged instance of this relation between the infinite and the finite. In dealing with

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the genesis of Christ's human knowledge, Bonaventure draws on the empiricism of the Aristotelian tradition to devel�p the a Po:· teriori dimension of human knowledge. In dealing with the condi­ tions for certitude, he draws on the Platonic tradition to develop what modern philosophy calls the a priori dimension of human knowledge. But in developing his vision of the end or goal of the . journey as it is realized in Christ, Bonaventure draws on the res�ur­ ces of Pseudo-Dionysius to present a decisively mystical conception of the final relation between God and creation.

THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS ON THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST The Text of

St. Bonaventure' s Disputed Questions in Translation

QUESTION I Whether the knowledge of Christ, in as far as He is the

Word1

actually extends to an

infinite number of objects. 1

The question is whether the knowledge of Christ, in as far as He is the Word, actually extends to an infinite number of objects . That it does is shown in the following ways:

ARGUMENTS FOR THE AFFIRMATIVE POSITION: 1 . First, on the authority of Augustine, in The City of God XII, chapter 1 8: "The infmity of number is not incomprehensible to the One whose intelligence 'has no number' even though no particular . number.,,2 . flmte number can express an m 2. Again, the same writer, in The City of God XI, chapter 1 0, speaking about the wisdom of God, says: "There are riot many wis­ doms, but only one. And in this one Wisdom there is an infinity of intelligible realities which, however, constitute a finite treasury for Wisdom herself," etc. 3. Again, it is shown by means of reason in the following way. The simpler a substance is, the greater number of things it can know. 3 Therefore, that substance which is infinitely more simple than any created substance can know infinitely more than any crea­ ture. Therefore, etc. _________________________________ 1 Cfr. Ul Sent., d. 1 4; I Sent., d. 35, q. 5; d. 39, a. 1 , q. 1 -3; d. 43, q. 1 -4; and QD de trin., q. 6, a. 1 . 2 This is actually found in chapter 1 9. 3 Inspired by the Uber de causis X & XVU; also Aristotle, Ill De anima, text. 3 seqq. (c. 4).

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4. Again, God comprehends in act both the divine essence and the divine power. But God's power can produce an infinite number of things . Therefore, if God knows the divine power actually and in its fullness , then God actually comprehends an infinite number of objects, etc. 5. Again, it pertains to the nobility of a creature to know many things . 4 And the more noble the creature, the more it will know. Therefore, that knowledge which is proper to a being of infinite no­ bility extends to an infinite number of objects. Therefore, etc. 6. Again, the divine knowledge is more extensive than the divine power because God knows the evils of sin which the divine being cannot commit. But God's power is infinite. Therefore, the divine knowledge extends beyond the infinite. 7. Again, anyone who knows a point in terms of its substance and its potentiality knows not only the point itself but also thos e things th a t can emanate from it. But a n infinite number o f lines can emanate from a single point. Therefore, if the number of points in a particular line is infinite, and an infinite number of lines can em­ anate from each point, and if the divine knowledge comprehends the power of every creature, then God knows not only an infinite number of objects but an infinite number of infinities. 8 . Again, since a created being can be equal to the uncreated neither in potency nor in act, whatever the human intellect knows or possesses in potency, the divine intellect p ossesses all the more so in act. But the human intellect is in potency with respect to an infinite number of objects because it is always capable of knowi ng more than it actually does know. Therefore, if the divine intellect knows more than the hum a n intellect, it actually extends to more than an infinite number of objects . 9. Again, the same point can be argued by means of a reduction __________________________________

4 Aristotle, I Metaph., c. 2.

DISPUTED QUESTION l

73

to the impossible. Since it is possible to conceive of something great­ er than any finite object, if God knows only a finite number o: �b­ jects, something can be conceived of that is greater than the d1vme knowledge. But this is impossible. Therefore, etc. 1 O. Again, if the number of objects known by the divine mind is finite, God either can or cannot come to know more. If one says no, then the divine knowledge would be limited. But if one says yes, then one must deal with the fact that anyone who can know some­ thing not previously known is capable of learning something new. But to affirm this of God would be blasphemous; therefore, etc. 1 1 . Again, since a created artist knows many things which he or she could do but, in fact, will never carry out, then a human being would know something that is unknown to God if God's knowledge included only the real and not also the possible. But this is false and impossible; therefore, etc.

ARGUMENTS FOR THE NEGATIVE POSITION: 1 . Whatever is known is true, and whatever is true is a being. Therefore, if an infinite number of things are known, then an infi­ nite number of beings exist. But the consequent is impossible. Therefore, the antecedent is impossible as well. 2. Again, God j udges whatever the divine mind knows . But what­ ever God judges exists in the quality and quantity which the divine judgment attributes to it. But whatever God judges is accepted as finite. Therefore, whatever God knows is finite. If you say that this does not establish the conclusion that whatever is finite to God is fi­ nite in itself, it can be said in response to this that each being is in itself precisely what it is according to the judgment of truth. There­ fore, whatever is finite to God is necessarily finite in an unqualified sense. 3. Again, it is impossible that the infinite be traversed either by

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THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST 5

an infinite being or by a finite being, because this would place a limit on the infinite by that which traversed it. Therefore, the in­ finite would be finite. But, whatever the divine intellect knows , it comprehends and traverses. Therefore, if the infinite cannot be tra­ versed, the infinite remains unknowable. 4. Again, whatever God knows is known distinctly. But whatever God knows distinctly is numbered. Moreover, whatever is numbered 6 is measured, and all such things are finite. Therefore, everything known by God is finite. 5. Again, every number is either even or odd. Therefore, whatev­ er is numbered by God is designated either with an even number or with an odd number. But every even number can be divided into two equal numbers. Similarly, the same can be done with an odd number provided we subtract one from it But every such number is finite. Therefore, if God numbers whatever the divine mind knows, it follows that God necessarily numbers all things with a fi­ nite number. Therefore, they are finite. Therefore, etc. 6 . Again , whatever God knows is known in an orderly way. But wherever there is order, there is a first and a last/ for that is the nature of the finite. Therefore, if fmitude is found wherever order is found, and if God knows nothing without order because the divine mind knows nothing in a disorderly way, it is impossible for God to know an infinite number of objects. 7. Again, if God knows an infinite number of things, these things are infinite either for God, or for us, or in themselves. It is no great thing to say that they are infinite for us, since they remain finite in an absolute sense. If they are infinite for God, those things ________________________

5 Aristotle, I Pos1. 1 c. 18 (c. 22), XI Meraph., c. 9 (X, c. 1 0) and many other places where the original text has pertraru ire for pertmnsiri. : Ar�stotle, V Physic., .text. � 4 (c. 3) and X Meraph., text. 2 .-5 (IX, c. 1 ). With respect to th1S, Philo Judaeus says .in De mundi opificio: " Ordo est consequentia et series rerum praecedentium et sequentium."

DISPUTED QUESTION I

75

which are infinite to a particular subject cannot be known or com­ prehended by that subject. Therefore, even if God knows an infinite number of things, the divine mind does not comprehend them. But what if they are infinite in themselves? Any being other than God, by the fact that it is distinct from God, is a creature. And by virtue of the fact that it is a creature, it is limited. Therefore, to know an infinite number of beings distinct from God is to know a finite in­ finity. But this is false and unintelligible since it involves a contradiction. 8. Again, if God knows an infmite number of things , either those things are infinite in their cause or they are infinite in their categori­ cal reality. If it is argued that they are infinite in their cause, it must 8 be said that everything is one in its cause. Therefore, whatever God knows in its cause is known as one and not as an infinite number of beings. But if it is argued that they are infinite actually and in their own categorical reality, it must be said in rep ly that it is false and impossible for them to exist actually as infinite in their cat­ egorical reality. Therefore, it is false and impossible that God should know an infinite number of things . 9. Again, let us designate everything knowable to God as A. Then I ask: A is either God or something other than God. If it is God ' then whatever God knows is God. Therefore, an ass is God. If it is something other than God, every such being is finite in act. Therefore, A is finite in act; and A designates everything that can be known. Therefore, the number of knowable objects is finite. Therefore, etc. 1 0. Again, A is either equal to God, or less than God , or greater than Gcxl. If it is less than God, then it is finite. If it is equal to or greater than God, then it is identical with God. Therefore, if God knows the infinite, the divine mind knows nothing other than the divinity itself. And if God knows nothing other than the divinity it­ self, then God' s knowledge is not a knowledge of an infinite num______________________________ 8

Cfr. Uber de causis, prop. 1 2.

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TH E KNOWLEDGE OF C H RIST

ber of objects. Therefore, if God knows the infinite, this is not the same as knowing an infinite number of objects. 1 1 . Again, since both the power of doing and the power of know­ ing are present in God, and both are infinite, yet what the power of doing produces is always finite, it seems that the divine mind always knows a finite number of actual beings. Or if this is not the case, why is it notr Since God who wills, knows , and produces, and since that which God wills and produces, does not ext.end to an infinite number of things, this is equivalent to asking how the divine knowl­ edge can extend to an infinite number of things, since the middle term does not exceed the extremes.

Conclusion God knows and comprehends an infinite number of things with the knowledge of simple intelligence. Response: In order to understand what has been said, it is necessary to be aware of the fact that we are compelled by the authority of an­ cient Doctors to say that God knows an infinite number of objects. In one of the psalms David says: " Our Lord is great and all power­ ful; and to His wisdom there is no lim it." 9 And Augustine not only asserts this, but proves it as well in The City of God XII, chapter 10 1 8, where he writes: " Concerning the view of certain philoso­ phers who say that God's knowledge cannot comprehend infini� objects; they have no other choice but ID dare to say, from their abys­ mal impiety, that God does not know all numbers. Now it is certain that numbers are infinite, for no matter which number you may think represents the end, it •is possible, I say, not only to increase this number by adding one to it, but, regardless of how large this number may be and regardless of the multiplicity contained within 9

DISPUTED QUESTION I

it, it · pertains to the very nature and science of mathematics that such a number not only can be doubled but even can be multiplied. Thus, each number has properties that limit it, and no number can be equal to any other. Therefore, they are unequal and diverse with respect to each other. And even though when taken individually, each number is finite, yet when all are taken together, they are infinite. Now, does it follow from this that God does not know all numbers because they are infinite, and that God's knowledge ex-­ tends to a certain sum of numbers but is ignorant of others? Now, who would be foolish enough to say this?" And a little later he writes: "Therefore, although there is no defi., nite number that corres ponds to an infinite number, an infinity of numbers is, nevertheless, not incomprehensible to that Being to whose intelligence 'there is no limit.'1 1 It follows, then, that since whatever is comprehended in knowledge is limited by the compre­ hension of the knower, all infinity is rendered finite by God in some ineffable �y because in God's knowledge it is not incompre­ hensible. Therefore, if the infinity of numbers cannot be infinite t9 the knowledge of God by which it is comprehended, who are we lit­ tle human · beings that we should presume to place limits on the divine knowledge?" Therefore, because of these most certain testimo­ nies, we are compelled to affirm and to say that God knows an infi, nite number of objects. This line of argument is developed by more recent doctors who maintain that there are three modes of divine knowledge, not be� cause of a difference in the divine knowledge itself but because of a difference in the connotation. In God there is a knowledge of ap­ probation, a knowledge of vision, and a knowledge of intelligence. The knowledge of approbation refers only to things that are good and finite. The knowledge of vision is a knowledge of both good and evil, and of finite things in as far as th ey are realized in time. Therefore, it is a knowledge only of those things which have existed, or do exist, or will exist. But the knowledge of intelligence is a knowledge of infinite objects in as far as, by this knowledge, God knows not only future realities, but possibilities as well. But for

Ps 1 46, 5.

10 Actually

this is found in chapter 1 9 .

77

11

Ps 146, 5.

· 78

DISPUTED QUESTION l

TH E KNOWLEDGE OF CH R[ST

God, possibilities are not finite but infinite. 12 The reason for the claim that God knows an infinite number of objects but does not, for that reason, produce or will or dispose them resides in the fact that when the divine knowledge is taken in the third sense, it is an act intrinsic to God. I call it intrinsic not only because it emerges from within, but also because it has an in­ trinsic object, an intrinsic principle , and an intrinsic mode. I say it has an intrinsic object because, in the act of knowing, the divine vi­ sion does not look at objects outside the divinity itself. Rather, it knows all truth in as far as it gazes upon the divinity itself precisely as truth. This knowledge has an intrinsic principle, because whatev­ er God knows is known through the eternal reasons which are iden­ tical with the divine reality itself.1 3 This knowledge has an intrinsic mode because the divine knowledge not only abstracts from actual causes, but from causes as such. For God knows evil of which the divine power is not the cause; and God knows future beings which have not yet been produced; and God knows those possibilities which will never be produced. And therefore, since the divine knowledge in itself does not concern or connote something real out­ side of God , it is said to be an act after the manner of a habit; an act, I say, which is fully equal to the very p ower of knowing-for God knows whatever is knowable to the divine mind-an act which is limited in no way, neither in itself nor in reference to what it con­ notes. Therefore, it is an act that is universal with res pect to place, time, and objects. For whatever God knows at a particular place is known at all places , and whatever God knows at a particular time is known at all times; and while God knows but one object, everything that is knowable is contained in that object. 1 4 And since that which is knowable is not limited to actual beings, but includes po­ tential beings as weU, and since it is not improper to affirm an infin­ ity of potential beings , neither is it improper to say that God actually knows an infinite number of objects. This is our response to the question and to the objections . ______________________________

n Cfr. l Sent., cl. 39, a. 1 , q. 3 and llI Sent., cl. 1 4, a. 2, q. 3, corp. u Cfr. Q. 2 below; also I Sent., cl. 35, q. 1 . l ◄ Cfr. l Sent., cl. 41 , a. 2, q. 2; and cl. 45, a. 1 , q. 2.

79

REPLIES TO THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE NEGATIVE POSITION: 1 . TO the objection that whatever is known is true, etc. , i t must be said that there are two types of knowledge; namely, one that causes things , and one that is caused by things. An object known by means of knowledge caused by things is true both in itself and in its effect. An object known by means of that knowledge which causes things is true in its cause and in potency. Such a truth does not in­ fer actual existence but only existence in the power of the cause. Therefore, it does not follow that if God knows an infinite number of objects, there must be an infinite number of actual beings, but only that for God there are infinite poss ibilities. 2. TO the objection that God judges whatever is known by the di­ vine mind, etc. , it must be said that in knowing an infinity of ob­ jects, God judges it as infinite in an absolute sense but as finite with res pect to the divine reality. And this is not illogical. Just as it does not follow that something which is infinite to a finite being is therefore infinite in an absolute sense, so it does not follow that something which is finite to the infinite being must be finite in an absolute sense. This is what Augustine says in the text cited above. 1 5 3. To th e objection that th e infinite cannot b e traversed, etc. , it must be said that the possibility of being traversed can be under­ stood in two different ways. ln the first sense, something can be tra­ versed by discurs ive reasoning which moves from one point to another. And , in this sense, the statement is true. It is in this sense that the Philosopher understands it in the sixth book of the Phys­ ics.16 In the second sense, something can be traversed by means of a full and universal vision of an obj ect known by [simple] intelli­ gence. And in this sense, since the infinite is not incom p rehens ible to an infinite subject, it is not impossible for an infinite being to tra­ verse the infinite, but only for the finite. _____________________________

I Sent., In the response above. Cfr. also.Augustine, 83 Questions, q. 1 5; and cl. 35, q . 5 , ad 1 . 16 Text 1 9 seqq. et text. 60 seqq. (c. 2 & 7 ) . 15

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THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

DISPUTED QUESTION 1

4 . To the obj ection that whatever God knows is known distinctly, etc. , it must be said that the conclusion is false in as far as it affirms that whatever God knows distinctly is therefore numbered. But, to know distinctly means more than to designate by number. 1 7 Or another response to the obj ection would be to say that whate�er God knows distinctly is designated with a number that is either fi­ nite or infinite. But then it would . not follow that God measures, be­ cause measure im plies something that is merely finite.

yet are ordered, for they have a potential order j ust as they are po­ tentially infinite.

80

5. To the obj ection that if God numbers things , this is done either with an even or with an odd number, etc., it must be said that the conclusion does not hold because an infinite number in­ cludes both. J ust as we cannot conclude that because a man and an ass are animals , therefore both must be either rational or irrational, so we cannot draw the conclusion that is made above. 6. To the obj ection that all that God knows is known in an or­ derly way, etc., it must be said that the divine knowledge ought to be viewed both in terms of the subj ect knowing and in terms of the obj ect known. With regard to the subj ect knowing , every thing that God knows is known simultaneously , j ust as whenever God speaks, the divine speech is simultaneous and only once. 1 6 But with regard to the obj ect known, I say that God knows in an orderly manner. But as the obj ects known by God are not only realities presently ex­ isting but future and possible realities as well , so the order is not only the actual order, but also the potential order, for God's orderly knowledge extends not only to the order by which things have been made, hut also to the order by which they can be made. The state­ ment that every order has a first and a last is true concerning the ac­ tual order , but not concerning a potential order. This can be clearly seen in the case of numbers which can be extended infinitely and 17 Arisootle, De praedicamemis , c. De denominativis at the end, "When one thing is predicated of another , all that which is predicable of the predicate will be predicable also of the subj ect." This proposition suggests the principle of an affirmative syllogism , which is exp ressed in the phrase "dici de omni." Cfr. also Arisootle , l Prior. , c. l seqq. , and II Post. , c. 14 {c. 1 2) . 18 Ps 61 (62 ) , 1 2.

j 7. To the objection which claims that either God knows ob ects that are infinite to us, [or] et.c. , it must be said that God knows an infinite number of things in the divinity itself. However, they are not actually but only po tentially infinite. This is the case, since God has actual knowledge of potential beings. Therefore, the potential in­ finity of knowable obj ects is sufficient for s peaking of the actual in­ finity of God's comp rehension . Therefore, as a potential infinity does not conflict with an actual finiteness in creation, neither does the actual infini ty of God' s knowledge conflict with the finiteness of creation.

8. To the obj ection that God knows obj ects which are either infi­ nite in their cause, etc., this must be affirmed in two ways. If you obj ect that all things are one in their cause, the obj ection does not pertain , since even though there is but one art and one power, still 19 the reasons of knowable obj ects are multiple. If you obj ect that these things are finite in themselves , this is true with res pect to their actual being. But with respect to their potential being, they are at least potentially infinite and are known as infinite by God since, as we have often stated, God has actual knowledge of potential beings ; 9. To the obj ection that A is either God or something other than God, etc. , it must be said that the phrase " an obj ect known by God" sometimes refers to the cause of knowledge and sometimes to the external obj ect which is known. In the first case, it is the divinity itself, as Anselm says in his Monologion: "The creature existing in· the · 20 · essence ·1tself. " I n the second case , 1t 1s · the creative Creator 1s something other than God. But in this case it does not follow that it is infinite in act, for the fact that God has actual knowledge of an infinite number of obj ects does not require that they exist in act It is sufficient that they should be potentially infinite in themselves. 19

Cfr. q. 3 below. zo Ch. 34 & 36.

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T H E KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

1 0. To the objection that either A is equal to God, [or] etc. , in accordance with the distinction just made, it must be said that, in the first case, that which is known is identical with God. In the sec­ ond case, it is something other than God by reason of the fact that it possesses not actual but only potential infinity while God possess­ es actual infinity. 1 1 . To the final objection concerning the power of doing and the power of knowing, and concerning willing and producing, our re­ sponse is clear from what has been said in the body of the ques­ tion. 21

QUESTION II Whether God knows things by means of their likenesses or by means of their proper essence. Presuming that God knows an infinite number of things, we now ask whether all the things God knows are known by means of their likenesses or by means of their essence. 1 It seems that God knows them by means of their likenesses. ARGUMENTS FOR THE AFFIRMATIVE POSITION: 2 1 . First, on the authority of Scripture, John, chapter 1 : "All that came to be had life in Him." Therefore, all created beings existed in God's knowledge prior to their actual existence. Therefore, they were in the divine knowledge either by means of a likeness or by means of their true essence. But they did not exist there in their true es­ sence since no created things existed as yet. Therefore, they were in God in a likeness .

2. Again, Augustine, in On the Trinity VI,3 writes that "the Son is the full art of all the living and unchanging reasons of things." But, in art the reasons are nothing other than the likenesses of the objects that are to be produced as they are known by the artist. Therefore, the same conclusion follows as above. 3. Again, Augustine, in On the Trinity IX, chapter 1 1 , 4 says: "All

21 Cfr. I Sem., d. 45, a. 1 , q. 2 at the end.

1 I Sem., d. 35, q. 1 . 2 Verse 3ff. 3 Ch. 1 0, n. 1 1 . 4 n. 1 6.

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THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRI ST

knowledge which is had by means of a species is similar to the ob­ ject known." Since God's knowledge is not realized by means of a privation, it must be realized by means of a species. Therefore, there must be some similarity to the object known. But there would be no similarity unless that knowledge involved a likeness of the object. Therefore, etc. 4. Again, the Philosopher5 says that " in a certain way, the intel­ lect is all things . " But the reason for saying this is simply that in the act of knowing, the knower is assimilated to the object known. Therefore, if this is true of knowledge in general, it follows that, if God understands and knows something, the divine mind necessarily possesses the likenesses of the obj ects which are known. Therefore, etc. 5. Again, perfect knowledge of anything requires the adequation 6 of the intellect to the object known. But because of the very nature of a created being, there can be no adequation between it and the creative intellect, since the latter is simple while the former is com­ posed. Therefore, the adequation must be by means of some like­ ness which is both simple and distinct from all matter. Therefore, etc. 6. Again, since God's knowledge does not change, God knows things in the same way before and after they happen. But it is im­ possible for God to know them by their proper essences before they exist. But the d ivine mind knows them either by means of their like-

5 Ill De anima, text. 37 (c. 8). Cfr. I Seni., d. 40, a. 2, q. 1 , ad 1 . z. 3., n. 5 ((, 707). Here Bonaventure explicitly suggests the definition of truth as the "adaequatio rei et intellecrus." The Scholastics commonly attribute this definition of truth either to Aristotle or to a certain Isaac, the author of a book entitled De defi11i1ionibus. This precise formula­ tion is found in neither. But the point of the definition is expressed in many places by Aristotle, who describes true speech as "speech that expresses the object as it is" and false speech as "speech that expresses the object as it is not." Cfr. De praedicamemb, c. De substantia; I Periherm., c. 7 (c. 9); Ill De anima, text. 21 seqq. (c. 6); IV Metaph., rext. 27 (lII, c. 7); and V Mecaph., text. 34 (IV, c. 29). 6

DISPUTED QUESTlON II

85

nesses or by means of their essences. Since this cannot be by means of their essences, God knows them by means of their likenesses. And they are known in the same way at any point of time. Therefore, etc. 7 . Again , God is a voluntary agent. 7 But every voluntary agent has a concept of the object it wishes to produce prior to its actual production. But anyone who conceives of an object before produc­ ing it has that obj ect in mind either in its true essence or in its like­ ness. Therefore, if the divine reality does not possess the essences of creatures in itself prior to their actual existence, it follows that the di­ vine mind must possess the likenesses of creatures in itself. 8. Again, God is the exemplar in a true and proper sense j ust as the divine mystery is truly and properly the efficient and final prin­ ciple. But God would not be an exemplar in the true a nd proper sense without possessing the likenesses of all those beings by which the divine reality would be reflected. It is through these likenesses that God knows and produces these beings. Therefore, as it is fitting that exemplarity be found in God, so also it is fitting that the 8 · likenesses of creatures be found in there. 9. Again, God is truly the eternal mirror which makes possible the knowledge of every intelligible being. But a mirror does not lead to the knowledge of another being unless it contains the likeness of the other. Therefore , the same conclusion as above. ___________________________

7 For th.is expression, cfr. I Sent., d. 40, a. 3, q. 1 , fund. 3 , n. 3 (I , 7 1 4). Also Aristotle, Ill Ethic., c. 2 and I Magnor. Moralium, c. 1 6, which deals with the Greek word prohaere5i, which was at times translated in the ancient Latin translations as e!ectio (cfr. the reference to Ethic) and at times as propositum (cfr. the reference to Magnor. Moralium). In the more recent Paris edition (Firmin-Didot), prohaeresi is consistently given as consilium. 8 Cfr. I Sent., d. 35, a. un., q. 1 , fund. 4, n. 7 (I, 600). The definition of an "Idea" as something necessary for directing the knowledge and regulating the operation of an agent is found in Seneca, Epist. 65 ad Lucilium, "ldea est exemplar ad quod respiciens artifex in quod destinabat, efficit." The following Platonic definition is found in the same place: "Idea est eorum quae naturaliter fiunt exemplar aetemum."

86

87

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

DISPUTED QUESTION II

1 0. Again, in a true and proper sense, God is Word. But a word is the likeness of that which is spoken. Therefore, if the Son of God is the Word in whom all things are spoken,9 it is necessary that the likenesses of all things that are expressed be present in that Word.

4 . Again, a s equality is caused by a unity o f quantity, so similarity is caused by a unity of quality. 1 3 But there can be no equality be­ tween the Creator and the creature, neither in the true sense of the word nor in any metaphorical sense. For the same reason, there can be no similarity. Or, if there is similarity but not equality, the ques­ tion arises as to why this is the case.

1 1 . Again, in perfect knowledge two elements concur, namely, light and a likeness . But the most perfect light is present in the di­ vine knowledge. Therefore, for the same reason the expressive like­ ness is found there.

ARGUMENTS FOR IBE NEGATIVE POSITION: 1 . Anselm writes in the Mono logion, chapter 3 1 : " It is dear that in the Word through whom all things are made1 0 there is foU:nd not the likeness of creatures but their true and simple essence." Therefore, if God does not know by means of something outside the divine nature, such knowledge of things is had not by means of a likeness but by means of the essence of things. 2. Again, wherever a likeness exists among things, there is har­ mony; and wherever there is harmony, there is sharing of one reality by several beings. But God and creation do not share anything in common, because if they did, that which they shared would be more simple 1 1 than the Creator. Therefore, it is impossible that there should be some likeness of the creature in God, and vice versa.

5. Again, if there is any likeness between the Creator and the creature, it is minimal. Therefore, if the likeness is the cause of knowledge, then-properly speaking-where the likeness is greater, the cause of knowledge is greater. And where the likeness is mini­ mal, the cause of knowledge is minimal. Therefore, if God knows creatures through their likenesses; it follows that He has a minimal knowledge of them. But it is blasphemous to say this. 6. Again, one creature bears a stronger resemblance to God than another. Such is the case with a creature which exists, lives, and has sense experience in comparison with one which only exists. There­ fore, if there is a greater likeness, the cause of knowledge is greater. Therefore, God knows one creature better than another. 7 . Again, if our intellect were fully in act, it would have no need of a likeness. Therefore, since the divine intellect is fully in act, and since it is the light with respect to everything that can be known, it seems that no likeness is necessary in the case of God's knowledge.

12 3 , Again, a likeness implies a relation of equivalence. But there can be no relation of equivalence between the Creator and the creature. Therefore, there can be no likeness .

8. Again, a likeness is something that points to a being other than itself, namely, to that of which it is a likeness . And where there is such a relation, there is also discµrsive knowledge and logical ar­ gumentation. But this is in no way appropriate to God's knowledge. Therefore, neither is a likeness appropriate.

9 Cfr. I Sent., d . 2 7 , p . I l , a . un., q. 2 (I, 484-86). 10 An allusion to Jn 1 , 3: "All things were made through him." 11 "Q . . u1a umversa J·ms, s1cut ' genus simpI icius est spec:iebus." Cfr. Aristotle, XI Metaph., c. 1 (X, c. 1 ). 1 2 A relation of equivalence is frequently defined as follows: It is a relation whose· extremes participate in the same nature, or are designated by the same name. Cfr. l Sent., d. 1 9 , p. I, a. un., q. 3 (I, 346, n. 5).

9. Again, truth is the principle of knowledge. Therefore, where knowledge is realized to the most perfect degree, the most perfect ap­ proximation to truth is realized as well. But truth is found more _____________________________ lJ As Aristotle teaches in V Metaph., text. 20 (IV, c. 1 5) . .

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DISPUTED QUESTION II

fully in the thing itself than in its likeness. Therefore, if God's knowledge is the most perfect knowledge, such knowledge of crea­ tures must be had, not by means of their likenesses, but by means of their essences.

Conclusion

1 0. Again, the Philosopher writes in the third book of De anima: "In immaterial substances, the obj ect and the medium of knowledge are identical." 14 But God is entirely immaterial. Therefore, for God the obj ect and medium of knowledge are identical. But God knows objects external to the divine nature. Therefore , such knowledge is had by means of the essences of things and not by means of any likenesses . 1 1 . Again , when the union of the knower and the object known is immediate and undivided , there is no need for any representation. But God is intimately present to each creature. Therefore, there is no need of any likeness in God's knowledge of them. 1 2. Again, knowledge by means of the essence is more perfect than knowledge by means of a likeness. This is clear from the fact that this mode of knowledge refers to the third heaven , as Augustine says in book XII of A Literal Commentary on Genesis. 1 5 Therefore, if the more noble q ualities are to be attributed to God , it seems more a p propriate to affirm that God knows things by means of their essences rather than by means of likenesses . 1 3 . Again, the more perfect the knowledge , the more immediate is the conj unction and the union between subject and object. But God's knowledge possesses the fullness of perfection. Therefore , the union with the obj ect is most perfect. But the conj unction · and union is more immediate when the subj ect and the obj ect are united at the level of essence than when they are united by means of a like­ ness. Therefore , etc.

H Text. 1 5 (c. 4 ) . 15 Ch. 6 , n. l 5ff. Augustine distin guishes three types of sight: corp oreal , s p irirual , and inrellecrual. The final of these corres ponds to the "third heaven" to which Paul was taken u p ( H Cor 1 2 , 2 ).

89

God knows creatures by means of eternal reasons which are the exemplary likenesses of creatures. They are most perfectly representative and expressive, and they are essen­ tially identical with the divine mystery itself. Res po nse: According to what both the blessed Dionysius and the blessed Augu stine have written in many places , it must be affirmed that God knows creatures by means of the eternal reasons . In chapter 5 of the book On the Divine Names, 16 Diony s ius writes: "We say that the exemplars of existing beings pre-exist in God in a singular way as substantial reasons which theology calls predefini­ tions. They are the good and divine acts of the will which determine and create existing beings. It is in accordance with these that the supersubstantial existence p redefines and produces all things." And 1 Augu stine, near the beginning of the first book of his Confessions 7 s peaks to God in the following way: "God and Lord of all that you have created, in you are the causes of all unstable beings. And the unchanging origins of all changing things are in you. And the eternal reasons of all irrational and temporal beings live in you." And he says the same thing in book XI, chapter 10 of the City of 18 God: "There are not many wisdoms , but only one. And in this one Wisdom there is an infinity of intelligible realities-for Wisdom her-self, a finite treasury-containing all the invisible and unchanging ideas of the visible and changeable realities which are made by this Wisdom. For God has created nothing without knowledge, " etc. But since these eternal Ideas are not distinct from the Creator , they are not the true essences or quiddities of created things . But the creature and the Creator differ necessarily in essence. Therefore , the Ideas must be the exemplary forms and hence the rep resentative likenesses of created beings. Therefore , they are the p rinciples of

___________________________ 16

Par. 8. Ch. 6, n. 9. is n . 3. 17

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THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

knowledge since knowledge, precisely as knowledge, involves expres­ sion and assimilation between the subj ect and the object known. Therefore, in accord with the testimony ofthe Saints and the proofs of reason, we must say that God knows created beings through their Ideas. To gain a better understanding of this question and of the objec­ tions, it must be noted that a likeness may be of two different types. The first type is found when two beings participate in a third reality in such a way that we can say " a likeness is the same quality present 19 in different beings." But there is a likeness in another sense when one being resembles another. And this can be of two types. One is a likeness of imitation. This is seen in the way in which a creature is a likeness of the Creator. Then there is an exemplary likeness. This is found in the way in which the exemplary Idea in the Creator is a likeness of the creature. In both ways, both as imitation and as exemplary Idea, the likeness of which we speak is both expressing and expressive.20 And it is this sort of likeness that is required for any knowledge of reality. Now, there is a knowledge that causes things to be and a knowl­ edge that is caused by things. That knowledge which is caused by things requires a likeness of imitation. Such a likeness is received from outside and therefore involves a sort of composition or addi­ tion in the knowing intellect. Hence, it involves some degree of im­ perfection. But that knowledge which causes things to be requires an exemplary likeness. Such a likeness does not come from outside. Hence, it implies neither composition nor any imperfection, but � nly absolute perfection. But the divine intellect is the supreme light, the full truth, and pure act. So, as the divine power to pro­ �uce things is sufficient in itself to produce everything, so the divine hght and truth is sufficient in itself to express all things. And since this expression is an intrinsic act, it is eternal. Because an expres1 9 Boethius, III De differentiis !opic. On these two types of likeness, cfr. I Sent., d. 35, q. 1, resp. and ad 2 (1, 601 ). Here they are called similitudo univocationis, (of two realities in a third) and simi!itudo imitationis et expressionis. �o In as far as it makes objects known co the intellect. Cfr. I Sent., d. 35, q. 1 , resp. (I, 60 1 ); also Hex., coll. 1 2 0/, 384-87). See also the response ad 9 in the present question .

DISPUTED QUESTION II

91

sion is a form of assimilation, the divine intellect-expressing all things eternally in its supreme truth-possesses from eternity the ex­ emplary Ideas of all creatures. And these are not something distinct from God but are essentially identical with the divine nature. Indeed, because the divine intellect is expressive precisely as the supreme light and _as pure act, it is expressive in a way that is su­ premely brilliant, most express, and most perfect, and therefore with a full equality and according to a full intentional likeness . Hence, the divine intellect knows all things most perfectly, distinctly, and completely. In view of this, it is not difficult to reply to the objec­ tions.

REPLIES TO THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE NEGATIVE POSITION: 1 . To the objection based on Anselm, it must be said that in this instance Anselm is speaking about a likeness which is caused by the truth of the obj ect. Hence he is using the term likeness in the sense of an imitation rather than in the sense of exemplarity. In this way, it is used to designate an object that has been produced in terms of its relation to the principle that produced it, and not vice versa, as is 2 dear in what follows . 1 In the other sense, nothing stands in the way of it being posited in the producer with respect to the object produced. 2 . To the objection that harmony is found wherever there is a likeness, etc. , it must be said that the type of likeness which consists in the fact that two beings share a third reality in common is not to be affirmed of God with respect to creation. But that sort of likeness by which one being is said to imitate another is aptly posited in the creature with respect to the Creator, and that sort of likeness by _____________________________________

21 Loe, cit.: "In factis vero non esse simplicem absolucamque essentiam, sed verae illius essentiae vix aliquam imicationem. Uncle necesse est, non idem Verbum secundum rerum creatarum similii:udinem magis vel minus esse verum, sed omnem creatam naruram eo alciori gradu essemiae dign iracisque cons iscere, quo magis illi propinquare viderur."

92

93

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

DISPUTED QUESTION II

which one being is said to be the exemplar of another is posited in the Creator with respect to creation. Such a likeness does not re­ quire that the two beings agree by participation in a common third. It is sufficient that there be a harmony of order whereby they are related as cause and effect, or as expressive principle and object ex­ pressed.

7. To the objection that if our intellect were fully i n act, it would need no likeness t etc. , it must be said that it is true that the intellect would have no need of a likeness accepted or received from outside. But it would use itself as a likeness for knowing beings other than itsel( In this sense, and not in the other sense, we affirm a likeness in the case of God's knowledge.

3 -4. To the objection that a likeness involves a relation of equiva­ lence, etc.t it must be said that this is true of that sort of likeness which arises from sharing in a common third. But we do not affirm this sort of likeness here. From this, the response to the objection concerning equality becomes clear. Nevertheless, the question arises: Why is not some sort of equality involved if there is a likeness? In reply to this we say that equality includes in itself a certain commen­ surability which cannot exist between the finite and the infinite, whereas likeness implies expression. And this can well exist between the Creator and the creature. Hence, it does not follow that because one being is not equal to another, therefore there can be no relation of imitation or of exemplarity between them. This is the meaning of the view proposed here.

8. To the objection that a likeness points to another, etc., it must be said that this is true of a likeness which depends on an external object. However, it is not true of the other sort of likeness, which does not involve discursive knowledge but arises only from that light which expresses [truth] perfectly and which brings the knower to re­ pose.

5 . To the objection that if there is a likeness between the Creator and the creature, it is minimal, etc. , our response is clear already. A likeness by participation is not only minimal. Indeed, it is not a real likeness at all. A likeness of imitation, on the other hand, is greater or less in as far as it approximates the divine goodness to a greater or lesser degree. A likeness of exemplarity and expression is found in its supreme form in the Creator with respect to the whole of cre­ ation, because that which is truth itself, being the supreme light, ex­ presses all things in the most perfect way. From this , it does not fol­ low that God knows one being more than another. 6. To the objection that one creature has a greater similarity to God than another, etc., our response can be seen easily. The objec­ tion is true in reference to the likeness of imitation in the creature. However, it is not this sort of likeness that is the ground of knowl­ edge but the other sort, namely, the likeness of exemplarity which expresses all things equally and in a pre-eminent manner.

9. To the' objection that truth is the principle of knowledge, etc. , it must be said that truth can b e understood i n two ways. I n one way, truth is identical with the entity of a being. To this, Augustine . . " I n ano ther · wh atever exists · 22 th at " tru th ts · h'ts So 1l·1o quits · m wntes sense, truth is the expressive light in intellectual knowledge. Anselm writes about this in his book, Concerning Truth: 23 "Truth is a rightness perceptible only to the mind." In the first instance, truth is the remote principle of knowledge. In the second instance, it is the proximate and immediate principle of knowledge. Therefore, when it is said that truth is found more fully in the real existence of a being than in its likeness, this is true if truth is taken in the first sense, but not if it is taken in the second sense. But that truth which is the proximate and immediate princi­ ple of knowledge is found more fully in that likeness which resides in the intellect. It is found particularly and in the supreme degree in that likeness which is the. exemplar of creation. Such a likeness ex­ presses the creature more perfectly than the created being itself can. For this reason, God knows creatures more perfectly by knowing them through their likenesses than would be the case if they were known through their essences. And the angels know created things ________________________

22 Bk. II, c. 5, n. 8. 2:i Dialo on T,-u th, c. 1 1 . gue

95

TH E KNOWLEDGE OF CH RIST

DISPUTED QUESTION Il

more perfectly in the Word than in their own reality. For this rea­ son, Augustine says frequently2 4 that knowledge in the Word i; like the light of day, while knowledge of the acrual reality of things is like evening because every creature is dark in comparison with the divine light

and caused by the essence of the object known. This is the sort of likeness that is required in the case of knowledge that is caused by an object. But it is not true of that likeness which is identical with the essence of the knowing subject. This sort of knowledge, in which the subject makes use of itself as a likeness in knowing an­ other object, is more perfect than knowledge in which the subject re­ ceives something from the object known. 25

94

1 0 . To the objection that in immaterial substances there is no dif­ ference, etc., it must be said that this statement should be under­ stood not only of immaterial substances which are subjects of knowl­ edge, but of those which are objects of knowledge as well. For ex­ ample, when one immaterial being knows another immaterial being, the subject knowing and the medium of knowledge are identical. However, this is not always the case. It is so only when the intellect reflects back on itself. And this is the case in God's self-knowledge but not in the case of the divine knowledge of creatures; for while God is immaterial, the object known is not.

1 3. To the objection that the more perfect knowledge is, the more immediate is the conjunction between the subject and the object, etc., our response has already become clear. A likeness which is nothing other than the subject itself involves no distance, neither real nor logical, because the subject precisely as subject has the na­ ture of a likeness. Therefore, as the principle of knowledge, such a likeness is in no way extrinsic to the union of the subject and the object.

1 1 . To the objection that when the object known is immediately present to the knower, etc. , it must be said that the union between the subject and the object can be of two types . This may refer either to the order of being, conserving, . and causing, or to the order of knowledge. Now, in the order of causality there is an immediate conjunction when the cause produces, causes, and sustains its effect immediately. In the order of knowledge, the union is immediate when the subject knows the object either through the subject's own essence or through the essence of the object known. For in such a case there is no need of an intermediate likeness distinct from both of the extremes. Nonetheless, the essence itself, in as far as it is the principle of knowledge, possesses the nature of a l ikeness. It is in this sense, in the case of the divine knowledge, that we posit a like­ ness which is nothing other thari the very essence of the knower. 1 2 . To the objection that knowledge by means of the essence is more perfect than knowledge by means of a likeness, etc., it must be said that this is true of that sort of likeness that is abstracted from ___________________________________________ 24

Cfr. II Sent., d. 4, a. 3, q. 2, n. 5 (II, 1 4 1 ).

25

Cfr. I Sent., d. 35, q. 1 , ad 3 (I, 602).

DISPUTED QUESTION III

QUESTION III Whether God knows creatures by means of likenesses that are really distinct. Supposing that God knows creatures by means of exemplary likenesses , it is asked whether these likenesses are really distinct. It seems that this is so.

ARGUMENTS FOR THE AFFIRMATIVE POSITION: 1 . From authority. Augustine writes in 83 Questions, in the ques­ tion about Ideas: 1 "One cannot rightly believe or say that God has created all things irrationally. It remains to say, therefore, that all things are created in accordance with reasons. But a human being is not created according to the same reason as a horse. It would be absurd to think otherwise. Therefore, individual beings are created each in accordance with its own proper reason." 2. Again, in the same place: 2 "The Ideas are immutable forms contained in the divine intellect." But each form is a reality. There­ fore, if there are many forms, there are also many realities. There­ fore, if the Ideas are many , they are really distinct of necessity.

97

that the exemplars of existing things pre-exist in God in a singular way as substantial Ideas which theology calls predefinitions ." But the substantial Ideas of distinct beings must also be distinct. There­ fore, since created beings are really distinct from each other, it fol­ lows that their substantial Ideas are really distinct. 4. Again, the Philosopher, in VII Metaphysics: 1 "Every agent act­ ing according to an exemplar is itself, at the end of its operation, the form of the object produced." But God acts according to an exem­ plary model. Therefore, if the perfecting forms of creatures are really distinct, it is necessary that their exemplary causes be really distinct. 5. Again, the same thing is evident from reason. God is a volun­ tary agent. 5 But a voluntary agent does not produce things unles s they are somehow found within the agent. Therefore, if God produc­ es a diversity of beings, it is necessary that these be present within God as diverse. But God does not possess them except in their Ideas. Therefore, the Ideas of things, of necessity, must be really di­ verse. 6. Again, whatever creatures possess they receive from God. Therefore, since they are diverse among themselves, they receive this diversity from the most perfect art. But if they receive diversi ty from this source, it . is n:ecessary that diversity be found in the same source. But there is no diversity there except in the exempla ry Ideas. Therefore, it is necessary that these be really distinct.

3 . Again, Dionysius, On the Divine Names, chapter 5: 3 "We say

7. Again, proximate, immediate, and uniformly acting causes of opposite effects are themselves opposite in nature. 6 But the exem­ plary Ideas are proximate causes that operate immediately and uni-

1 Q. 46, n. 2. Cfr. I Sent., d. 35, a. u., q. 2ff. {I, 605ff.), which treats the same issue. 2 The original text: "Sunt namque ideae principales formae quaedam vel rationes stabiles acque incommucabiles, quae ipsae formatae non sunt, ac per hoc aetemae ac semper eodem modo sese habentes , quae in divina intelligentia continenrur." 3 Par. 8.

4 Text. 23 (VI, c. 7) deals with how things come to be through art. Any such coming-to-be involves an exemplar, or model, which is the original form of the object produced. Since this is in the mind of the agent, Aristotle concludes that, "from art proceed things the form of which is in the soul of the artist." 5 Cfr. Q. 2, pro 7, and its corresponding note, above. 6 Aristotle, II De genera!. et corrupt., text. 56 (c. 1 0), and IV Meteor., text. 41 (c. 7): Contrariae contrariorum causae.

98

99

TH E KNOWLEDGE OF CH RIST

DISPUTED QUESTION lil

formly. Therefore, since they cause things that are not only diverse but opposite as well, there must, of necessity, be not only real distinction but even opposition among them.

This is self-evident, since Augustine says in the ninth book of On 9 the Trinity: "All knowledge that is had by means of an intelligible species bears a similarity to the object known." Therefore, the op­ posite can be argued, n amely, that dissimilar objects are known by means of something that is dissimilar. But dissimilar objects are known as really dissimilar. 1 0 Therefore, the principles of knowl­ edge for dissimilar objects are really dissimilar. Therefore, they are really distinct

8. Again, as Boethius says : 7 "Number is the principal exemplar in the mind of the Creator." And Augustine says in the second book On Free WiH8 that number and wisdom are identical. But it is certain that in God there is no exemplary number except in rela­ tion to the exemplary Ideas. But, if number implies genuine plurali­ ty, and if the cause of number is truly to be found among the Ideas, then there must be real diversity there in a true and proper sense. 9. Again, to know distinctly pertains to the perfection of knowl­ edge. Therefore, the most perfect knowledge is that which knows with the greatest degree of distinction. But God knows creatures ac­ cording to the mode of their presence within the divine life. There­ fore, it is necessary that they be present in God with the greatest dis­ tinction. But they are not present to God except in their Ideas. Therefore, the Ideas must be distinct to the greatest degree. There­ fore, they are not only logically but really distinct. 1 0. Again, things within the divinity are known by God in a manner that does not differ from the way in which God knows things external to the divine. Indeed, God knows all things uniform­ ly. But external beings are known as really distinct. Therefore, God knows things within the divinity in the same way. But the way in which God knows things is the same as the way in which the divine being contains them. Therefore, God contains them as really dis­ tinct. 1 1 . Again, similar objects are known through something similar. 1

Libr. I. Arithmet., c. 2 : Hoc enim fuit prindpale in animo Conditoris exemplar. 8 Augustine's position is found in II De lib arb., c. 1 1 , n. }Off. Cfr. also the . G!ossa ordinaria (ex Rabano) in Sap 1 1 , 21 : Omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti.

1 2. Again, something that is similar to one of a pair of opposites by that simple fact is dissimilar to the other member of the pair. Therefore, if the Idea of white is similar to a white object, it is' un­ like a black object. Similarly, the Idea of black is unlike a white ob­ ject. Therefore, it is necessary that the Ideas of white and black are unlike each other. Therefore, they are really distinct. 1 3 . Again, an Idea is a likeness either totally or in part. If it is such only in part, then the object is never completely known by means of it. If it is such totally, beings that resemble each other completely and in every respect are in no way unlike each other. Therefore, if there were in reality only one Idea for creatures, it would be impossible for really different creatures to exist. But there certainly are really different creatures. Therefore, it is necessary that there exists a real difference of exemplary Ideas corresponding to this fact. 1 4 . Again, an exemplary cause is the likeness of a known object. It is, therefore, either a common likeness or a proper likeness . If it is a common likeness, then the properties of things are not known by means of it. If it is a pro per likeness , p roper likenesses are as nu­ merous as the objects. Therefore , if there are really distinct created beings, it is necessary that their likenesses be really distinct from each other. _______________________________________________________

9

Ch. 1 1 , n. 1 6: "Sed omnis . . . ei rei, quam novit." to Supply: "dissimilia."

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

DISPUTED QUESTION llI

1 5 . Again, let A stand for the Idea according to which humanity is created. And let B stand for the Idea according to which the ass is created. It is certain that A is not identical with B. Therefore, if those things which differ really and not only conceptually in God are not predicated of one another, it seems that they are really distinct from one another. The minor is evident, for although good­ ness, wisdom, and power are logically different, they are, nonethe­ less, predicated mutually of each other.

that this would be a reason for saying that there is a plurality of words spoken in God. But this is certainly false. Therefore, a dif.. ference of connotation is not sufficient reason to speak of a plurality of Ideas.

1 00

1 6. Again, A is not the likeness of an ass; and B is not the like­ ness of a human being. Therefore, in some way A is more like a hu­ man being than it is like an ass. But this would not be the case un­ less in some way A were more in harmony with a human being than B is . But this would not be possible unless there were some sort of real difference. Therefore, etc. 1 7 . Again, if these exemplary Ideas are conceptually many, either there is some reality that corresponds to the conceptual order or there is not. If there is nothing that corresponds to this conceptual order, then the plurality of Ideas is without meaning. If there is something that corresponds to the conceptual order, then it is neces­ sary that in some way there be a real difference among the Ideas. 1 8 . Again, the Ideas differ either because of their connotation or because of themselves . If it is by reason of their connotation, then temporal reality would be the cause of something eternal. If it is be­ cause of themselves , those things that are distinguished by virtue of themselves are really distinct. Therefore, the Ideas are really diverse. 1 9. Again, let us suppose that they differ by reason of their con­ notation. Now, since it is the term "word" that connotes the effect rather than the terms " reason" or " idea"-because, as it is stated in 1 1 u word d es1gnates . · 83 Q ues t ions, · th e efficac1ous power "-1t· seems

11 Quaest. 63: " Sed hoc loco melius verbum interpretamur, ut significetur non solum ad Patrem res pectus , sed ad ilia etiam, quae per Verbum facta sunt op erativa potentia; ratio autem, ecsi nihil per illam fl.at, recte ratio dicitur ."

1 01

20. Again, created beings are produced by means of the Ideas, and not vice versa. Therefore, the plurality of Ideas is prior to the plurality of beings connoted. Therefore, if there is a plurality of Ideas, this is not because of the difference among the beings connot­ ed. It is necessary, therefore, that the Ideas be really distinct in themselves. 21 . Again, a plurality of persons is greater than a plurality of spe• 12 cies or Ideas. But a real distinction of persons does not contra­ dict the simplicity of God. Therefore, neither does a real plurality of Ideal reasons. Therefore, if the Saints say that there are many Ideas, it seems that it must be admitted that they are really different. ARGUMENTS FOR THE NEGATIVE POSITION: 13

1 . Speaking about God in On the Divine Names, chapter 5, Dionysius says: "Indeed, prior to time, the divine contains all things within itself in one perfect simplicity with no plurality." Therefore, if-prior to time-the divine contains creatures within itself in their Ideas and these lack all plurality, then there is no real diversity among them. 1

_ 2. Again, in the same place: 4 "In advance and in a unified manner, the one sun contains within itself the causes of the many things that share in its being. Even more so must we concede that in the cause of the sun the exemplary causes of all beings pre-exist in a supersubstantial unity." But this would not be the case if those Ideas were really distinct Therefore, there is no real diversity among them. 1 ' Cfr. Qq. de Trin., q. 3, a. 2 (V, 7 3ff.). 13 Par. 9. 14 Par. 8.

1 02

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

DISPUTED QUESTION lll

Again, Augustine says in the sixth book of On the Trini ty , 15 chapter 1 0: "The Son is the art of the omnipotent God, full of

way really multiple, because if such things were really multiple, there

3.

all the living Ideas, and all things a re one in this art." But this

would not be the case if the Ideas were really diverse. Therefore,

they are of necessity really indistinct.

4. Again, Dionysius shows the same thing in chapter 5 of On the

Divine Names in the following argument: 1 6 All lines originate in a

point. And all numbers arise from unity. Nevertheless, we do not for this reason posit a real diversity in the point or in the unit in

the case of the creature. Therefore, neither should we do so in the supreme cause.

5. Again, no point of rest is found except in unity. But, it is nec­ essary to affirm a point where things come to rest for every category 17 of cause. Therefore, if God is the exemplary cause in which all formal causes find their point of rest, it is necessary that the divine possess within itself a total, real unity.

6. Again, that which is more perfect mus t be attributed to God. But it is more perfect to know many by means of one principle than

by means of many principles . Therefore, etc.

7. Again , God's knowledge is infinite. Therefore, it is in no way

constricted or limited. Therefore, the principle of knowledge in God

is limited in no way. But it would be limited and constricted in a certain way if a plurality of really different Ideas were required to

know a mul tiplicity of beings . But if it is impossible to say this, then it is impossible that the Ideas be really diverse.

8 . Again, the principle of knowledge in God designates some­ thing that pertains to the divine essence since it is common to the 15 n. 1 1 : "Ars quaedam omnipotentis atque sapientis Dei plena omnium rationum viventium incommuta bilium, et omnes unum in ea, sicut ipsa unum de uno, cum quo unum." 16 Par . 6. 17 Aristotle, II Meiaph., text. 5 seqq. (I brevior, c. 2).

1 03

three persons . But whatever pertains to the divine essence is in no

would be a multiplicity of divine essences. But this is impossible. Therefore, it is impossible for the Ideas to be really different. 9. Again, as Richard says ,

18

those things that are really distinct

are distinguished either by reason of origin or by reason of quality.

But the Ideas cannot be distinguished by virtue of quality, since no such distinction is found in God. Neither are they distinguished by reason of origin, since they do not proceed from another. Therefore , it is impossible for them to be really diverse.

1 0. Again, the eternal Ideas are the productive principles of all things . N ow, either they are productive only, or they are both pro­ ductive and produced. Now if they are both productive and pro­ duced, then the Ideas would be really distinct from God, since the productive principle and the object produced are really distinct, and

there is no other being by which the Ideas could be produced. Therefore, they would not be identical with God, nor would the di­ vine nature know creatures in itself. But this is impossible. If they are only productive, then they are by nature the only principle of things. But such a principle is the first principle, and the first prin­

ciple is only one. Therefore, it is impossible for the Ideas to_ be really distinct.

1 1 . Again, the exemplary cause designates that by which a being

is known. But that by which a being is known is nothing other than its form. Therefore, if God knows creatures by means of really dis­

tinct exemplary causes , it is necessary that the divine being itself be multiform. But this is completely impossible. Therefore, the anteced­

ent is impossible as well.

1 2. Again, let us suppose that they are really distinct. Since they are objects that are to be enjoyed, and s ince objects that are to be 19 enjoyed make us blessed, it would follow that no one could be _________________________________ 18 19

Richard of Sr. Victor, IV De trin., c. 1 3ff. According to Augustine, I De doctr. chrfatiana, c. 31 , n. 34.

1 04

1 05

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

DISPUTED QUESTION Ul

blessed without knowing all the exemplary Ideas , just as no one could be blessed while lacking the knowledge of one of the three persons . But this is false and absurd. Therefore, the antecedent is false.

1 6. Again, every real distinction exists either between two distinct substances, or between two distinct persons, or between t:wo distinct accidental qualities. 22 But none of these can be affirmed in the case of the eternal Ideas because there is neither essential difference among· them, nor · personal difference, nor accidental difference. Therefore, there is neither distinction nor real difference.

1 3. Again, the ideal cause in God is not something accidental but something that pertains to the substance just as the Word does. Therefore, if there were a multiplicity of really distinct Ideas. there would be as many individual substances as there are Ideas. There­ fore, there would be as many divine persons or essences as there are Ideas. But this is false and contrary to the faith. Therefore, it is wrong to say that the Ideas are really different. 1 4 . Again, if they are really different, then they differ either as absolute realities or as relative realities . But they do not differ as rela­ tive realities since no relation is constituted by the name of the object referred to, especially in the case of a relationship of superiori­ ty. 20 But the ideal cause of a human being is said to be the human being itself. Therefore, in God the ideal form does not signify a real relation. Consequently, if there is a real multiplicity of beings, at the level of form, this multiplicity is absolute. But if this is impossible, then it is impossible for the Ideas to be really different. 1 5 . Again, since the terms of real relations are simultaneous by nature, 21 if the Ideas are really distinguished as diverse, real rela­ tions, it follows that the Idea and that of which it is the Idea would be simultaneous by nature. Therefore, the Creator and the creature would by simultaneous by nature. But this is totally absurd. There­ fore, it is impossible that the Ideas be distinct as diverse, real rela­ tions. Neither can they be distinct as diverse, absolute realities. Since this is certain, it follows that there is no real diversity among them.

zo Pred icamental relation is divided into the " relatio aequiparantiae" (e.g.,

likeness) and the " relatio d isquiparantiae." The latter contains the " relatio superpo­ s itionis" (e.g. , a father, a lord , a cause, a productive principle, etc.), and the " relatio su ppos ition is" (e.g., a son, a servant, an effect, a product, etc.}. 21 Arisrotle, De praedica. , c. De his quae ad al iquid.

· Conclusion God has a knowledge of all things within the divinity itself as in a likeness that expresses all things, so that in God the ideal causes of things are multiplied not really but only logically. Response: In order to understand what has been said, it is necessary to note the following. Without any doubt, God knows creatures; and God knows them within the divinity; and God knows them within the divinity as in a likeness; and the likeness by which God knows things is not received from anything external to the divine, nor is it a likeness that arises from sharing in a common third na­ ture. But as a likeness, it is nothing other than the expres sive truth, as was shown in the previous question. Therefore, when we say that God knows creatures in a manner internal to the divinity as in a likeness , we are saying nothing other than the fact that God knows creatures in a manner internal to the divine nature in their truth, or in that supreme light which expresses other things. And since the divine truth is supremely powerful in expressing all things in their totality, just as the divine power is capable of producing all things in their totality, so God knows creatures in a way internal to the divin­ ity totally and in their multiplicity in the divinity itself, as in that truth which expresses ail reality. Moreover, even though the divine truth is one, it is capable of expressing all things in their proper ex­ emplary likenesses because that truth is beyond all categories and all _______________________________ 21, Cfr. Porphyr., De praedico.b., c. De differentia.

1 07

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRI ST

DISPUTED QUESTION Ill

limitations . Indeed , it is pure act. And in relation to it everything

else is material and potential being. Therefore, since something

light would be identical with its own illumination and diffusion, we could say that there are many rays of the same light because the dif.

many-as is dear in the case of whiteness in a man and in a stone­

angles to the light itself. In such a case, there are as many rays as

being like matter with respect to it, it follows that, as pure act, the

one source. Our proposition ought to be understood in this way

1 06

which is one in form can be assimilated by beings that are materially and since [divine] truth is related identically to all things, creatures divine truth can be the expressive likeness of all creatures.

In this expressive act it is necessary to distinguish three elements : namely, the truth, the expression, and the object. The expressive truth is simply one, both logically and in reality. But the objects that are expressed are many, either potentially or actually. And the ex­ pression, considered in itself, is identical with the truth . But, when considered in terms of the object to which it refers , it must be thought of in terms of the beings that are expressed through it.

Therefore, the expression of diverse objects in or by the divine truth

is not diverse in itself. But it is said to be diverse from the perspec­

tive of the object to which it refers since to express a human being is not the same as to express an a s s , just as to predestine Peter is not the same as to predestine Paul, and to create a human being is

fusion of light moves in a direction that is diametric or at right there are objects illuminated, even though there is but one light and

since it is the divine truth itself that is the light; and its expressions in creatures are, as it were, the luminous rays which, though intrin­ sic to God, yet lead to and are directed to that which they express in

a determinate manner. And this is what Dionysius says in the sev­ 24 "The divine intellect enth chapter of On the Divine Names: knows creatures, not from any causality on. the part of the creature, but of itself and in itself since, as the cause of all things , God con­ tains the substance of all things within the divine reality prior to

their real existence, together with an awareness and knowledge of them . The divine mind does not need a diversity of Ideas in order

to know individual beings . Rather, the divinity turns itself to created beings as their one perfect cause who knows and contains all things just as light, in as far as it is a cause, contains a prior knowledge of

one. Therefore, because the exemplary causes designate those expres­ sions of divine truth viewed from the perspective of creatures , they

darkness in itself, and knows that darkness is nothing else but the absence of light. Therefore, in knowing itself, the divine wisdom knows all material things in an immaterial way, and divisible things

but in terms of that to which they refer or to which they are related.

us clearly shows that there is not a real plurality in the cause of

not the. same as to create an angel, even though the divine act is

are said to be many not in terms of what they signify but in terms of what they connote; not in terms of what they are in themselves

But they relate to creatures not by virtue of a real .relation existing in God-for God is not really related to anything external to the divini­ ty-but only as the principle of understanding, to which there corre­

s ponds a real relation on the part of creatures , which may be either 23 actual or virtual. Therefore, it must be said that the exemplary

causes in God are many, not really but only conceptually and by vir­

tue of something found not only in the subject knowing but also in the obj ect known. It is imp0ssible to flnd any perfect analogy for this among crea­ tures. But if we were to imagine the impossible situation in which 23 Cfr. I Sent., d. 30, a. u., q. 3 {I, 524-26).

in an indivisible way, and plurality in a single act, knowing and pro­ ducing all things while remaining one in itself." In this text Dionysi­

knowledge, since this would diminish the perfection of the divine

knowledge. And he has shown this more adequately in the fifth 25 chapter, as we indicated earlier. Therefore, the arguments for this position should be conceded.

REPLIES TO THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE AFFIRMATIVE POSITION: 1 . To the first objection based on Augustine which argued that a _____________________________________

24 Par. 2. Cfr. I Sent., cl. 35, a . un., q. 1 , n. 5 (1, 600). · 25 Cfr. Fundament. 1 . 2. 4., and the response of the previous question.

1 08

1 09

THE KNOWLE DGE OF CH RIST

DISPUTED QUESTION Ill

human being is created by one Idea and the horse by another Idea,

etc. , it must be said that such a difference does not imply a real dis­

5 . To the objection that a voluntary agent does not produce things unless it possesses them within itself, it must be said that it

2. To the objection that the Idea is both a form and an object,

their reality, but in their likeness. And the likeness is not necessarily fully conformed to the being of which it is the likeness , as is clear

tinction but only a logical one.

etc. , it must be said that the Idea signifies not only a thing but also a modality of a thing. It signifies the form in relation to that which · is expressed . And it is not multiple in as far as it signifies the thing, but in as far as it signifies the modalicy of the thing. And therefore, as

the argument moves from a plurality of Ideas to a plurality of things in God, it moves from a plurality of modes to a plurality of objects. And 26 therefore, it " sins" accidentally, or figu ratively speaking. 3 . To the objection that, according to Dionysius, the Ideas are sub­

stantial causes, it must be said that they are called substantial either because they subsist in themselves, or because they cause the sub­

stances of creatures, or because they express the substances of crea­ tures, but not because they are themselves the substances or essences

of creatures. Even though the essences of creatures are multiple in the

creatures themselves, since they are intrinsic to the creatures, this is not necessary in the case of the exemplary reasons, since they do not enter into the constitution of the creature. 4. To the objection that an agent acting according to an exemplar

is itself the form of the object produced, it must be said that this

should be understood of an agent who, when acting according to an exemplar, is d irected and regulated by the exemplar, as is the case

with created agents . And even in the case of such agents , it is not to

be taken in the proper sense that the agent becomes the form of the

object produced, but in the sense that the agent possesses something

within itself that is the likeness of the object produced, as a doctor, in his work of curing, first possesses health in his mind or in his art, and afterwards produces it in his work. Thus , the argument of the objection fails on two scores .

is not necess ary that such an agent possess its effects within itself in

from the fact that the reason or Idea of material beings is immateri­ al, and that of corruptible things is incorruptible; and hence, the

Idea of the many can be in the form of one, and that of different things can be undivided. Therefore, it does not follow that, if a plur­ ality is represented by the exemplary reasons, that the Ideas are really many in themselves, just as it does not follow that the Ideas of material beings are themselves material.

6. To the objection that whatever creanues possess, they receive

from God, it must be said that they receive from God as from one

who is able to create something from · nothing, and not in the sense

that they receive something of the divine substance. And conse­ quently, it does not follow that anything which the creature possess­

es in its own right must be found in actuality in the Giver. It is suf­

ficient that it be found there in terms of efficient power or represent• ative exemplarity. 7. To the objection that contrary effects are caused by contrary,

proximate causes acting immediately, etc. , it must be said that this is true in the case of limited causes which cannot produce a multi­

plicity of effects except through multiple means , and hence cannot produce opposite effects except through opposite means. But it is

not true in the case of the cause of all causes, which is not limited ·

or restricted but is completely free with respect to the effects it pro­ 27 duces however different they may be.

8. To the objection that number was the principal exemplar in the mind of the Creator, it must be said that this does not imply that number is in God in the proper sense .of the word. For, in this 28 sense, number is an aggregation of diverse units . But God knows _________________________________

26

Cfr. Aristotle, l Elench., c. 3 (c. 4). Also l Sent., p. 58, n. 5; p. 375, n. 9.; p. 740, n. 6.

21 28

Cfr. I Sent., d. 45, a. 2, q. 2, resp. ([, 806-7). Averroes, Epitom. metaph., tr. 1 , discussing one, says: "Number is the

111

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

DISPUTED QUESTION Ill

number as that by which the proportions of all created things are

I 0. To the objection that God knows things within the divinity and things external to the divinity in the same way, etc., it must be

in God, this does not refer to number in the proper sense of the word. Such is the case also with the number of the persons [in God],

God's knowledge has no principle external to the divinity but comes

1 10

regulated. Or if it is said somewhere that the number of the Ideas is

which does not involve a multiplication of units, but the representation of one and the same unity in diverse hypostases. In the same way, the number of Ideas or reasons does not imply any multiplication of eternal unities , since the eternal unity is but one. But it implies the relation of the eternal unity to the plurality of beings expressed.

9. To the objection that distinction pertains to the perfection of

knowledge, etc. , it must be said that the act of knowing is related both to the subj ect knowing and to the object known. Therefore,

distinct knowledge can be viewed in two ways , either in terms of the

subject knowing or in terms of the object known. While distinct knowledge is more perfect when it is viewed in terms of the object known, this is not the case when the matter is viewed from the per­ spective of the subject; for it is more perfect to know many objects

in one Idea th an to know them in many Ideas . Another sort of re­ sponse can be made in the following way: To know distinctly can be taken in two ways. Either it indicates distinction in the order of essential difference, or it indicates distinction in the order of exem­ plary or cognitive expres s ion. In the first way, it pertains to the per­

fection of knowledge from the perspective of the object. In the

second way, it pertains to the subject knowing. And it is in this way

that God has the most distinct knowledge since the eternal truth, while one in itself, expresses various creatures with great distinction even though no distinction is found in the truth itself.

aggregation of unities." Cfr. I Sent., d. 1 4 , p . II, a. un. , q. 4 , n. 1 1 (I, 363 ) . Also , Augustine in his Dialogue of 65 Q ue5tions with Orosius writes: "Number and measure and weight is the divine reality itself. God is number without number, from whom all number arises," etc. ( PL 4 0 , 7 4 6) . The common definition of number is taken from Arisrotle , IV Phys., text. 1 33 (c. ult. ) ; V Metap h. , text. 1 1 & 20 ; and X Meta p h., text. 2 1 ( IV , c. 6 & 1 5 and IX, c. 6 ). This definition is as follows: "Numerus est multirudo mensurata per unum." Another definition is given by Boethius, I De arithmetica , c. 3: "Numerus est unitarum collectio, vel quantitatis ac:ervus ex unitatibus p rofusus."

said that this statement is true if it is understood to mean that

entirely from an internal principle. But if it is understood to mean that God knows things in the same way whether they are internal or external to the divinity, it is false, because all things are contained

within God in their total and real lack of distinction. And it is this

way that God knows what is internal to the divinity. But in the case

of external realities, He knows them in terms of their multiform dif.. ference.

1 1 . To the objection that each being is known by means of its

likeness, it must be said that this conclusion is true in the case of a limited likeness within its own proper genus. Hence, it has no place

. in the matter under discussion . Or , it can be said that this is not a likeness of harmony but a likenes s of exemplary expression. And a

similarity or dissimilarity of this sort does not imply a difference among the Ideas or among the likenesses, but only among the ob­

jects connoted and expressed external to the Ideas.

1 2. To the objection that a being similar to one of two opposites is dissimilar to the other member of the opposites , it must be said

that this is true in the case of a likeness which arises from participa­ tion in a common nature, or in the cas e of a limited expres sion such as one received from an external object.

1 3 . To the objection that such a likeness is either total or partial,

it must be said that it is total because it is called a likeness in as far

as it is expressive, and in as far as it expresses the entire reality . If it is objected that diverse beings cannot be totally similar to one and the same reality, we respond that this is true of a likeness of shar­ ing, but it is not true of a likeness of expression. And if it is asked 29 how this is to be understood, we reply, as was said above , that

29

Cfr. Qq. de trin. , q. 2, a. 2, ad 16 for the position of Boethius. Also I Sent. , d. 1 9, p. II, q. 4, ad lff. (I, 364).

112

DISPUTED QUESTION III

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

this is true because such a likenes s is beyond every genus , . and is

113

as plural even though they do not actually exist in their own proper

pure act. And other beings are material in relation to it.

nature.

1 4. To the objection that a likeness is either common or proper, it must be said that we ought to attribute to God whatever pertains to the perfection of creatures . Therefore, in a certain way, the like­

1 8 . To the objection that if they differ by reason of their connota• tion, then temporal reality would be the cause of something eternal ,

And in a certain way, it is proper because it expresses each individu­

connoted . It is true that the connoted being is temporal in terms of its own being. Yet it is connoted from eternity because that which is

ness is common because it expresses all things in a common way.

al being wholly and perfectly.

1 5 . To the objection that A is not B, it must be said that, with respect to God, in order that one thing may be denied of another in

a true sense, it is not necessary for them to be really distinct in themselves but only in that which they connote. This is clear from

the fact that predestination is not reprobation. And this is true be­ cause, even though the sign ificate for both is identical-namely, the

divine essence or will-yet in each instance the connotation is dif­ 30 ferent; namely, glory a nd punishment. 1 6 . To the objection that the likeness of a human being is not

the likeness of an ass, etc. , the response is clear. This difference

it must b e said th a t th e object connoted can b e viewed from two

perspectives: either in terms of its own being or in as far as it is

temporal in its own being is known eternally by God.

1 9. To the objection that the Word ought to be multiplied in the

same way that the Ideas are multiplied by reason of the object con­ noted, it must be said that there is no parallel, because the term 31

"Word" signifies that power in God which is expressive and effi­ cacious and which, viewed both in terms of its own being and as a principle of knowledge, refers to the reality of God . But an Idea, or a reason, s ignifies the expression or likeness. Now, even though in itself this refers more to God as knower, when it is viewed from the

perspective of our way of knowing, it pertains more to the object

rests not in the divine truth , which is equal with respect to the ex­

known. Therefore, even though they possess a unity in terms of their reality, so that many Ideas can be said to be one truth and one

create an angel.

fore, the multiplicity of Ideas or reasons can be s aid to be one Idea or one reason.

pression of a human being and an ass , but in the object connoted, j ust as we say that to create a human being is not the same as to

1 7 . To the obj ection that if there is a plurality of Ideas, either

there is something in reality that corresponds to this , or there is not, it must be said that there is something that corresponds to this.

And if it is asked what this is , I say that on the part of the divine

truth, there is only one principle, and this one principle is more

powerful in representing multiplicity than is any created multitude, because even though truth is simple, yet it is infinite. And on the part of the objects connoted, there is either an actual or a potential

plurality. For the many things that are possible are actually known

30

Word, yet they do not possess a unity at the logical order. There­

20. To the objection that creatures are caused by their Ideas , and that therefore there must be a plurality, etc. , it must be said that the

plurality of creatures in their own existence comes from the plurality

of Ideas . But the plurality of Ideas is nothing other than the crea­ tures themselves as they exist in their cause. Therefore, however

much it might be said that a plurality of Ideas or reasons in some way corresponds to the plurality of creatures, yet the plurality of Ideas is not caused by the creatures, since the fact that a plurality

31

Cfr. response in previous question.

The reason for attributing "virws" to the Word is discussed in I Sent., d. 32, a. 2, q. 2, ad 4 (I, 564) and d. 34, dub. 7 (I, 596).

1 14

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

will exist is not the reason why God knows a plurality or why divine

truth expresses a plurality. Quite the reverse, the fact that God knows a plurality of things is the reason why a plurality comes to

QU ESTION IV

32

be, as Augustine says in book XI of On the City of God: "This world could not be known by us unless it first existed; but it could not have existed unless it had first been known to God."

2 1 . To the objection that a plurality of persons is greater than a plurality of species , it must be said that there is no similarity here,

since the plurality of persons exists because of origin a nd because of the mutual, intrinsic relations a mong the persons. But the Ideas or reasons do not arise from one a nother, nor do they have any intrin­ sic, mutual relation to one another. Neither can they have any real relation to anything external because such a real relation to an exter­ nal reality implies dependence. Hence, such a being could not be supremely simple and absolute. Therefore, a real plurality of Ideas

is in no way appropriate to the divine being which is supremely simple and absolute. Therefore, if a plurality is to be posited there,

it must be with reference to our mode of knowing, as was said above, and as the ancient Doctors commonly held. And with this

the solution of the objections is clear.

Whether that which is known by us with certitude is known in the eternal reasons themselves. Presupposing that the eternal reasons are really indistinct in the divine art or knowledge, the question arises as to whether they are

the principles of knowing in all certain knowledge. This is equiva­ lent to asking whether everyth ing that we know with certitude is

known in the eternal reasons themselves. That this is the case is evi­ dent from many authorities .

ARGUMENTS FOR THE AFFIRMATIVE POSITION: 1 . In

1 On the Teacher, Augustine says: " I n every instan �e where

we understand something, we are listening not to someone who

utters external words , but to that truth which guides us from within the mind itself. And the truth to which we listen does indeed teach

us; for that truth is Christ, who is said to dwell in the inner person

as the everlas ting wisdom and uncha nging power of God . And every rational soul does indeed listen to this. " 2. Again, the same author says in

On the True Religion/ "It is

clear that above our minds there is a law which is called truth. And

it cannot be debated that this immutable nature, which is above the human mind, is God. For this is that unchanging truth which is

rightly called the norm of all the arts and the art of the all powerful Artisan." ____________________________________

32 C. 1 0, n. 3 .

1 C. 1 1 , n. 38 . After 11eriuuem, the original text adds 11erbis Jonasse ut con­ sulamus admoniti and id est after Christu:;. 2 C. 30ff., n. 56ff.: "Satis apparet . . . naruram, quae supra rationalem animam sit, Deum esse, et ibi esse primam vitam et primam essentiam, ubi est prima sapientia. Nam haec," etc.

116

DISPUTED QUESTION IV

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

3. Again , in the second book of On Free Will,3 Augustine writes : "That beauty of wisdom and truth does not pass with time nor move from place to place. It is not interrupted at night nor shut off by shadows , nor is it subject to the bodily senses . To all those from the entire world who love it and turn to it, it is near. It is ever­ lasting to all, It is in no place, yet is absent nowhere. It admonishes froII). without and teaches within. No one judges it, and without it no one judges well . Thus , without any doubt it is clear that it is greater than our minds , since by it alone each mind is made wise and judges not concerning it, but through it concerning other things." Now, if you say that from this it follows that we do not see in truth or in the reasons, but by the reasons, Augustine writes to the contrary in the twelfth book of The Confessions:4 "If both of us see that what you say is true, and if both of us see that what I say is true, where, I ask, do we see this? Certainly, I do not see it in you, and you do not see it in me. But both of us see it in that unchange­ able truth which is above our minds . " 4. Again, i n th e eighth book of The City of God,5 speaking of the philosophers , he says : "Those whom we rightly prefer to all others have said that the very God by whom all things were made is the light of our minds by which we learn all things ." 5 . Again, in the eighth book of On the Trinity, chapter 3: 6 "When our soul so pleases us that we prefer it to all corporeal light, it is not the soul itself that pleases us but that art by which it was 3 C. 14: "At illa veriratis et sapientiae pulchritudo, rantum adsit perseverans volunras fruendi, nee multitudine audientium constipara secludit venienres nee peragitur , . . intus docec, cernentes se commutat ornnes in melius, a nullo in deterius commutatur. Nullus de ilia . . . de ceteris iudices, sine dubitatione esse potiorem." ,i C. 25, n. 35. 5 C. 7: "Hi vero, quos merito ceteris anteponimus, discreverum ea quae meme conspiciuntur ab iis quae sensibus attinguntur, nee sensibus adimences quod possum, nee eis dances ultra quam possum. Lumen autem mentium," etc. 6 n. 5, "Cum [animusl ita nobis placer, ut eum omni etiam luci corporeae, cum bene incelligimus, praeferamus. . . . Incle enim approbatur factus, uc videtur," etc.

117

created. For a created thing is worthy of approval in reference to that source where it is seen to have been present before it was cre­ ated. Now this is the truth and pure goodness." 6. Again, in the ninth book of On du Trinity, chapter 6: 7 "When we approve or disapprove of something rightly, we are shown to approve or to disapprove by virtue of other rules which re­ main altogether unchangeable and above our mind." 8 7 . Aga in, in the same book, chapter 7 : "With the eye of our mind we behold in that eternal truth , from which all temporal things have been made, the form according to which we exist and according to which we operate whenever we do something either in ourselves or in bodily beings for a true and right reason." 9

8. Again, in the fourteenth book of On the Trinity, chapter 1 5 : "When the unj ust person sees the rules according to which every­ one ought to live, where does he see them? Not in his own nature, since it is certain that his mind is changeable while these rules are unchangeable. And not in any habit of his mind, since these are rules of justice. Where does he perceive that he ought to possess something which he does not possess? Where, then, are they written but in the book of that light which is called the truth, from which every j ust law is copied?" If you say that he retracted this , note what Augustine himself said to the contrary in Retractations, 10 book I: . "It is credible that even those who are unskilled in certain disci­ plines c:an give correct answers when they are able to receive the eternal light of reason in which they perceive these immutable truths. This is true, but not because they once knew them and have 1 forgotten them, as it seemed to Plato." Again: 1 "The intellectual 7

n. 1 0. 8 n. 1 2. 9 n. 21 , but with many things omitted by Bonaventure. 1 ° C. 4, n. 4: "Credibilius est enim, propterea vera respondere de quibusdam disciplinis etiam imperitos earum, quando bene imerrogantur, quia praesens est eis, quantum id capere possum, lumen rationis aetemae, ubi haec," etc. ll Lib. I Retract., c. 8, n. 2: "Fieri enim potest . . . uc hoc [ad incerrogara

118

119

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

DISPUTED QUESTION JV

nature is linked not only to intelligible things , but also to immutable

teaches certain ones in a particular way concerning the meaning of the voice?" But if our intellect were sufficient in itself for under­

things. This nature is made in such a way that when it moves to

those things with which it is connected, or when it moves to itself, it may give correct answers about such things as it is capable of

. ,, seemg.

From these authoritative arguments of Augustine it is manifestly

clear that everything is known in the eternal reasons.

9. Again, Ambrose: " By myself I see nothing but what is vain, changing, and perishable." Therefore, if I see anything with certi­ tude, I see it through something that is above me.

light of created truth, it would have no need

clear, etc.

1 2.

stand in need of one, it is

Again, Anselm, in the Proslogion, chapter

1 4:

"How great is

the rational mind! How rich is that truth in which is found every­ thing that is true and outside of which is only emptiness and false­

hood!" Therefore, if no truth can be seen except where this truth resides, no truth is seen except in the eternal truth.

1 0. Again, Gregory, writing about John, chapter 14: " He will 13 . · · 1s · present to teac h you a ll th mgs , " says: "U nless th e same S pint

the heart of the listener, the discourse of the teacher is pointless . let no one ascribe to the human teacher that which is understood to

come from the teacher' s mouth because, unless there is someone

who teaches from within, the tongue of the teacher labors outwardly to no end." Again, the same autl-wr writes in the same place:

the

a higher teacher. But, since it does

that light from which shines forth all truth that manifests itself to

12

11.

standing through

of

14

" All of

you alike hear the one voice of the speaker, but you do not all alike perceive the meaning of the voice which you hear. But if the voice itself is not different, why is the understanding of the voice in your hearts different unless for this reason, that while the voice of the speaker admonishes all together, there is an interior teacher who

1 3.

Again, Origen writes :

15

" Even if there had been no sin, hu­

man nature would not be _able to shine by reason of its own pow­ ers." But to understand is , in a cert.ain sense, to shine. Therefore, even if it had not sinned, it would not have been able to understand by virtue of its own powers. Therefore, it is in need of a superior agent.

1 4.

Again, concerning the psalm verse:

16

"Your hands have made me and have formed me; give me understanding," the Gloss

writes: " God alone grants understanding; for God illumines pious minds through the divine being itself, which is the light."

1 5.

Again, commenting on the psalm verse: " In your light we

shall s ee light," Isaac writes:

17

"Just as the light by which the sun

__________________________________ respondere vera] ideo possit, quia narura intelligibilis est et connectirur . . . ut, cum se ad eas res rnovet . . . in tantum de his vera respondeaL" 1 2 These words are found not in the works of Ambrose but in those of Augustine, sc. in So!iloq. , in the final chapter, which was brought to light by I. Trornbelli (ed. Migne, PL 4 7, 1 1 58): "Per me enim non video nisi vana, fluxa et caduca, nee video nisi falsa et corporea plasmata; per me nihil sum nisi mors et abyssus tenebrosa et imperfecta." 13 Lib. Il Homil. in E\!ang., homil. 30, n. 3. The Scriptural citation is from v. 26. 14 In the place cited in the previous note, "Ecce unam . . . audistis, nee tamen pariter sensum auditae vods percipitis. Cum ergo," etc.

15 In older editions of the works of Origen (e. g. the Paris edition printed by loan. Patvo ca. 1 5 1 2), vol. Ill contains nine Homiliae in diversos. In the Patrology texts edited by M igne, these are attributed to Scotus Eriugena under the title Homilia in Prolog. S. faang. Ioannis (PL 1 22, 283ff.). In the Origen edition just mentioned, the text is found in homilia 2 (fol. 1 1 8), and in the Eriugena edition, it is found in the homily on the Pro!og. S. loannis (I, 3 , col. 290): "Physica vero horum verborum [lux in tenebris lucet] theoria talis est: humana narura, ecsi non peccaret, suis propriis viribus lucere non posset. Non enim naruraliter lux est, sed particeps lucis," etc. 16 Ps. 1 1 8, 73, G!ossa ordinaria apud Strabum et Lyranum. The Gl�ss is from Augustine's Enarrat. on this text, serm. 1 8, n. 4. 17 Isaac was abbot of a small Cistercian house at Stella in the diocese of

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

DISPUTED QUESTION IV

is made visible goes out from the sun, and yet that which makes the

1 7 . Everything that is immutable is superior to that which is mu­ table. But that by which we have certain knowledge is the immu­

1 20

sun visible is not absent from the s un, so with God the light which

1 21

goes forth from God floods the mind in such a way that the mind first sees that very shining without which it could see nothing, and

table because it is neces s ary truth. But our mind is mutable. There­

things are seen in the divine light.

Therefore, the divine truth and the eternal reason is that by which knowledge comes to be.

in this light it sees other things ." Therefore, according to this, all

1 6 . Again, the Philosopher writes in the sixth book of Ethics, 18 chapter 3 , according to the new translation: "We all suppose that

fore, that by which we know is superior to our mind. But there is

nothing above our mind other than God and the eternal truth.

what we know by means of science cannot possibly be other than it

1 8 . Again, whatever is not subject to judgment is superior to that which is subject to judgment. But the law by which we judge is not

yond the range of our observation, we do not know whether they ex­

Therefore, that by which we know and judge is superior to our

no such thing as certain knowledge unless the very nature of eternal

1 9 . Again, everything that is infallible is superior to the fallible. But that light and truth by which we know with certitude is infalli­

is . But, when those things that could

be other

than they are pass

be­

ist or not. Therefore, the object of scientific knowledge is necessarily eternal, for all absolutely necessary beings are eternal. And eternal things are ungenerated and incorruptible." Therefore, there can be

truth is involved. But this is found only in the eternal reasons . Therefore, etc.

Again, the same point is shown by means of rational arguments, first by arguments drawn from the words of Augustine, and second

by other arguments . Augustine suggests arguments of this sort in the 19 second book of On Free Will, in On the True Religion, in On the

Teacher, in the On the Trinity.

sixth book of

On

Music, and in the eighth book of

Poitiers, hence his name "Isaac of Stella." He flourished in the years 1 1 47 - 1 1 69. In the Migne edition of his letter D e anima (PL 1 94, 1 888) he wrires: "In lumine, inquit Prophetes (Ps. 35, 1 0) , 1uo 11idebimus lumen. Quare, sicut de sole exit, unde videri possit, nee tamen solem deserit, sed in illo manet quod de ipso exiens ilium ostendit; ita manens in Deo lux, quae exit ab eo, mentem irradiat, ut primum ipsam coruscationem lucis, sine qua nihil videtur, videat et in ipsa cetera videat" 18 For the most part, the translation found in the works of S. Thomas (Parma, 1 866 , t 2 1 , p. 1 99) agrees with this new translation: "Omnes enim suspicamur . . . latent, vel si sunt, vel non sunt Ex necessitate ergo scibile, aetemum ergo. Ex • • necessttate emm, 1-:t etc. 19 Especially c. 9 - 1 5 , n. 25-39. De \lera relig., c. 30ff., n. 54-59; De magistro, c. 1 1 ff., n. 38; De musica, VI, c. 1 2 , n. 35ff.; and De 1ri nit., VIII , c. 3, n. 4ff. and

c. 6, n. 9.

subject to judgment. Our mind, however, is subject to judgment.

mind. But this is noth ing other than the eternal truth and reason. Therefore, etc.

ble while our mind is capable of being deceived. Therefore, that light and truth is above our mind. But this is the eternal light and truth. Therefore, etc.

20. Again, every light that gives certitude is unlimited, for it

shows itself to all and reveals the object of knowledge with the same

certitude for all. But a light that is not limited is necess arily not a created light but an uncreated one, since whatever is created is limit­ ed and finite and multiplied in different individuals . Therefore, of necessity this light must be uncreated. But it is with this light that

we know with certitude. Therefore, etc.

2 1 . Again, whatever is necessary is unending, since it cannot exist in any other way now or in the future. But that by which we know

with certitude is necess ary truth. Therefore, it is without end. But everything of this sort is above everything that is created, since every creature moves from non-being to being, and of itself, it can be turned back to non-being. Therefore, that by which we know excels

every created truth. Therefore , it is uncreated truth .

2 2 . Again, every created thing is, in itself, comprehensible. But,

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

1 22

according to the Philosopher, 20 since the laws of numbers, figures, and demonstrations can be increased to infinity, they are incomprn­ hensible to the human intellect. Therefore, since laws of this sort are seen by the human intellect, it is necessary that they be seen in something that exceeds every created being. But this can be nothing other than God and the eternal reason. Therefore, etc. 23. Again, when an unjust person knows justice, this knowledge is had either by virtue of presence of justice, or by virtue of a like­ ness received from outside, or by virtue of something that is above. But this cannot be because of its presence, because justice is not present to him. And it cannot be by virtue of a likeness received from outside, because j ustice does not have a likeness that can be abstracted through sense experience. Therefore, it is necessary that he knows it because of something else which is superior to his own intellect. The same is true of all those spiritual objects which he knows. Therefore, if the unjust person knows in the eternal reasons, all the more so is this the case with others. If you say that he knows justice through its effects, it can be objected against this 2 1 that if something is not known in any way, then its effects are not known. For if I do not know what humanity is , I can never know what is done by human beings . If, therefore, we do not have some knowl­ edge of justice first of all, we will never know that this or that is a work of justice. It remains , therefore, that it is known in the eternal reason. A similar argument can be made for any intelligible, sub20

Lib. I Ph;is., text. 35 ( c. 4 ) . Aristotle holds that the infinite, in as far as it ls infinite , is u nknown. Ibid., Ill , text. 68 (c. 7 ) affirms that number can be increased to the infinite. Lib. De sensu et sensato, c. 4 asserts that figures are innumerable. Lib. E!enchorum, c. 8 (c. 9 ) intimates that, just as it is possible that the sciences are infinite in nu mber, so it is p os s ible that demonstrationes are infinite in number. Cfr. Augustine , II De libero arbitrio, c. 8 , n. Z0ff.; De vera religi one , c. 30, n. 56; XI De trinitate, c. 8 , n. l 2 ff.; also Question I above. 21 Some of the manuscripts add the name Augus1ine here. He proposes this argument in VIII De trin. , c. 6 , n. 9 and offers a solu tion to the present obj ection:

" Ubi ergo novit, quid s it iusrus , qui nondum est, atque ut sit, diligit iusrum? An signa quaedam l s ive effecrus ] per morum corporis emican t, qu ibus ille au t ille homo esse iusrus a pparet? Sed uncle novit, ilia signa esse anirni iusti , nesciens , quid omnino sit iustus? Novit ergo."

DISPUTED QUESTION IV

1 23

stantial form, and hence for every case of certain knowledge. 24. Again, as God is the cause of being, so the divine reality is 22 the principle of knowing and the order of living. But God is the cause of being in such a way that nothing can be done by any cause unless God moves that cause in its action by means of the divinity itself and by the eternal, divine power. Therefore, nothing can be understood at all unless God immediately illumines the subject of knowledge by means of the eternal, divine truth. 25. Again, no defective being is known in itself except through a perfect being. 23 But every created truth is , in itself, dark and defec­ tive. Therefore, nothing enters the intellect except by means of the supreme truth. 26. Again, nothing is known correctly and wid1 certitude unless it relates to a rule that is incapable of being bent in any way whatso­ ever. But this rule is nothing other than that which is the very es­ sence of rectitude itself. And this is nothing other than the eternal truth and reason. Therefore, nothing is known with certitude unless it is related to an eternal rule. 2 7 . Again, in the twofold division of the soul into a higher and a lower part, the lower reason has its origin in the higher reason, and not the reverse. But reason is called higher in as far as it turns to the eternal laws. It is called lower in as far as it is concerned with temporal things. 24 Therefore, naturally and with priority, there is

________________________________________

22 Cfr. Augu stine VII I De civ. Dei., c. 4 - Plato establishes that in God is found , the " causa subsistendi et ratio intelligendi et ordo vivendi. Quorum triu m unu m ad naruralem , alterum ad rationalem , tertium ad moralem partem intelligirur pertinere." Concerning the minor , Cfr. II Sent. , d. 3 7, a. 1 , q . 1 (II, 86l ff.) . 23 Cfr. II Sent., ( II, p. 1 4, n. 4 ) for the following citation from Boethius , Ill De consolatione, prosa 1 0: "Omne en im, quod im perfecrum esse dicirur , id imminutione perfect[ imperfecrum esse perhiberur. Quo fit, ut si in quolibet genere imperfecrum quid esse videarur, in eo p erfecrum quoque aliquod esse necesse sit. Etenim perfectione sublata, uncle illud , quod imperfecrum perhiberur , exsiterit, ne fingi quidem potes t, " etc. l◄ According to Au gu stine. Cfr. P. Lombard , ll Sem., d . 24, c. 5, for citation

1 25

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRI ST

DISPUTED QUESTION IV

a knowledge of eternal things in the soul before there is any knowl­ edge of temporal things. Therefore , it is impossible for something to be known by the soul with certitude unless it is aided by the eternal reasons themselves .

and not by virtue of any truth whatsoever, but by virtue of truth which is known , and especially through that truth which is known to the highest degree. But this is that truth which cannot be though t not to be. And this is not created but uncreated truth. Therefore, whatever is known with certitude is known in the eternal truth and reason.

1 24

All these foregoing arguments are drawn from the words of Au­ gustine in various volumes . But the same conclusion can be drawn from other arguments. 28. Different people cannot know one and the same sensible ob­ j ect together and at the same time except by means of some com­ mon element. 25 And a similar argu ment can be made with respect to knowledge of the same intelligible obj ect. But an individual truth , even though it is multiplied in no way , can be understood by different people j ust as it can be expressed in words. Therefore , it is necessary that it be understood through some single factor which is in no way multiplied. But, such a single reality that is in no way multiplied in diverse beings can be nothing other than God. There­ fore , the principle of our knowledge of any particular being is truth itself, and this is God. 29. Again, j ust as love is related to the good, so understanding is related to the true , and as every good comes from the highest good , so every truth comes from the highest truth. But it is impossible for our love to be drawn directly to any good thing without in some way coming into contact with the highest good. Therefore, it is im­ possible for our intellect to know any truth with certitude without in some way coming into contact with the highes t truth. 26 30. Again, the true is recognized only by virtue of the truth , 2 7 of Augustine and comments. 25 Cfr. Augustine, 11 D e libero arbitrio, c. 7, n. l Sff. 26 On this argument concerning the good, cfr. Augustine, VIII De trin., c. 3 , n. 4ff. Concerning the argument about truth, cfr. Anselm, Dialog. de veritate, c . 1 O and 1 3. 27 For, as Augustine says in 83 Questions, q. 1 : "Ornne verum a veritate verum est." Cfr. also q. 23.

3 1 . Again, it is the nature of the soul to be capable of turning to the intelligible outside itself and to the intelligible within itself, and to the intelligible above itself. Now, turning to the intelligible out­ side itself is the least simple matter. Turning to the intelligible with­ in itself is more simple. And turning to the intelligible above itself is the most simple matter because that is closer to the soul than the soul is to itself. But the more simple a thing is, the greater priority it possesses. 28 Therefore , it is natural that the turning of the soul to that truth which is closest to it is prior to its turning either to it­ self or to some external truth. Therefore , it is impossibie for the soul to know anything unless that highest truth is known first. 32. Again, every potential being is reduced to act through some 29 being of the same genus which exists in actuali ty. But our intel­ lect is in potency, like the intellect of a boy. Therefore , if it is to be­ come intelligent in act, this must be brought about through some­ one who has an actual knowled ge of all things. But this is none other than the eternal wisdom. Therefore , etc. If you say that this is the agent intellect, then I ask: either the agent intellect actually knew that which the soul came to learn , or .it did not. If it did not, then the intellect could not be made knowledgeable in act by means of it. But if it did , then either the intellect which learns both knows and is ignorant of the same thing at the same time, or else the agent in­ tellect is not something that belongs to the soul, but is something above the soul. It remains, therefore , that whatever the intelligent soul apprehends through something else, it ap p rehends through ____________________________________________________

Cfr. Aristotle, XI Mernph . , c. I (X , c. I ) . 29 Cfr. Aristotle, IX Mernph., text. 1 3 (Vlll, c. 8 ) ; and ibidem II, text. 4 ( I brevior, c. I). 28

1 27

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

DISPUTED QUESTION IV

something that is above the soul. But God alone is above the soul.

31 In the last chapter of First Timothy, it is said of God: "Who alone has immortali ty and dwells in inaccessible ligh t, whom no

1 26

If you say that the agent intellect is called " agent" 30 not because it actually knows but because it causes knowledge, I say to the contra ry that every intelligent being is superior to the non­ intelligent Therefore, if the agent intellect is not intelligent, it can never make itself or any other being intelligent in act because it can­ not produce something better than or more noble than itself. There­ fore, if it becomes intelligent in act, it is necessa ry that this be done through something that is su perior to itself. But this can only mean

Therefore, et.c.

the eternal reason and truth. Therefore, etc.

3 3 . Aga in , assume that all creatures have been destroyed and only

the rational s pirit remains . With that rational spirit would remain the knowledge of the disciplines such as the knowledge of numbers

and figures. But this cannot be because of any true existence that these things have in the spirit or in the universe. Therefore, this is

necessarily so because of the existence which they have in the su­ preme Artisan. 34. Again, according to all the Saints, God is said to be the mas­

ter of all knowledge. This is the case either because God cooperates in general with eve ry intellect, or because God infuses the gift of grace, or because-in the act of knowing-the intellect attains to the divine. If God cooperates in general, then we would be led to say that the divine being teaches the senses as well as the intellect. But

this is absurd. If it is because God infuses the gift of grace, then all knowledge would be gratuitous or infused, and none would be in­ nate or acquired. But this is most absurd . N othing remains , there­

fore , except to say that our intellect attains to the divine as to the light of our minds and the cause of the knowledge of all truth.

1.

human person has seen or can see . " But everything by which or in which we know is accessible to the knower. Therefore, that by which or in which we know cannot be the light of the eternal reason or truth.

2. Aga in, Augustine, in the first book of On the Trinicy,

32

writes :

"The eye of the human mind is too weak to be fixed on such a dazzling light unless it has been purified by the justice of faith." If,

then, the light of eternal truth were the principle of knowledge for all truths, only a purified and holy soul would know any truth. But this is false. Therefore, the principle from which it flows is false. 33

3. Aga in, in the ninth book of On the Trinity: "As the mind itself gathers the knowledge of corporeal things through the bodily senses , so it gains the knowledge of incorporeal things through it­ self." Therefore it seems that, when it knows , it does not have to know the objects of its knowledge by means of the eternal reasons . 31 4. Again, Augustine, in the twelfth book of On the Trinity: '

"It ought

to be believed that the nature of the intellectual mind is

so formed according to the design of the Creator that, in the natural

order, it sees everything related to intelligible things by means of a sort of incorporeal light of its own kind, just as the eye of the fles h

sees the things that lie about it in th is corporeal light." Therefore, just as the created light of a corporeal nature is s ufficient for know,

ing objects of sense, so it seems that, together with our cognitive

power, a created spiritual light of the same natu re would be suffi, dent for knowing intelligible realities .

ARGUMENTS FOR THE NEGATIVE POSITION: But obj ections are raised against this , first on the basis of authori­ ty, and then on the basis of reason. The argu ments from authority are the following.

3

° Cfr. II Sent., d. 24 , p. l, a. 2 , q . 4 (II , 567ff.).

31

Verse 1 6.

n C. 2, n. 4, where the original teXt has nutrita vegetetur inscead of emundetur.

Cfr. also P. Lombard's citation of Augustine in I Sent., d. 2 , c. 1 . 33 C. 3, n. 3. 31 C. 1 5, n. 24, where the original texr has subiuncta for subiecca and circum­ adiacem for cirCKmiacem.

1 29

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

DISPUTED QUESTION IV

5 . Again, Gregory writes in the Morals: 35 "When the mind is drawn aloft in contemplation, whatever it is that it sees perfectly is not God." But the principle of our knowledge is perceived perfectly in knowledge that involves certitude. Therefore, the cause of such knowledge is neither God nor anything within God. Therefore, etc.

ceptions comes one memory; out of many memories comes one ex­ perience; out of many experiences comes one universal which is the principle of art and knowledge," 39 since when we lose one of our senses, we lose the knowledge of those things related to that sense. Therefore, certain knowledge comes from below in this wayfaring state while knowledge in the eternal reasons comes from above. . Therefore, as long as we are in the condition of wayfarers , knowl­ edge through the light of the eternal reasons is not fitting for us.

1 28

6. Again, Dionysius , in the Epistle to Gaius: 36 "If someone sees God and understands the obj ect seen, that person has not actually seen the divine mystery in itself, but one of those beings which exist and are knowable. But the divine reality itself remains beyond understanding and substance." Therefore, in the act of knowledge our mind does not attain to uncreated truth in our present life. 37 7. Again, the Philosopher in the third book of On the Soul, says that uour understanding operates in the context of space and time." But those eternal reasons are completely beyond time. There­ fore, our intellect in no way attains to these reasons in the act of knowing.

8. Again, in the same work38 he says: "As with every nature there is one element by virtue of which it can produce all things and another element by virtue of which it can become all things, so in case of the intellect we must understand that there is an agent intel­ lect and a possible intellect." But these are sufficient for perfect knowledge. Therefore, there is no need for the aid of an eternal reason. 9. Again, experience teaches us that " out of the many sense-per35 Lib. V, c. 36 {alias 26), n. 66: "Mens cum in contemplationis sublimitare suspendirur, quidquid perfecte conspicere praevalet Deus non est." 36 Epist I. The citation here is close to the translation of Scorus Eriugena: "Er si quis . . . non ipsum contemplatus est, sed quid eorum ab ipso exisrentium et cognitorum. lpse autem super animum et essentiam supercollocatus." 37 Text. 22-24 (c. 6) suggests this. But the actual words are found rather in the book De memoria et reminiscemia, c. 1 : "Non contingit intelligere aliquid sine continuo neque sine tempore," etc. 38 Text. 1 ?ff. (c. 5).

1 0. Aga in, knowledge of the imagination has no need of a higher light. Indeed, the strength of the imaginative faculty alone is suffi­ cient to imagine something.Therefore, if the intellect is more power­ ful than the imagination, all the more so should it be sufficient of itself for knowing with certitude without any other light. 1 1 . Again, certain knowledge is possible for the senses without the certitude of an eternal reason. Therefore, if the intellect is more powerful than the senses, it. should be all the more capable of know­ ing and understanding with certitude without that light. 1 2. Again, nothing is required for complete knowledge other than the knower, the abstract object of knowledge, and the turning of the former to the latter. But all of this is possible by means of the power of our intellect without an eternal reason. Therefore, etc. 1 3. Again, any power that is able to act freely has no need of ex­ ternal assistance in the things it does . . But "we make use of our in­ tellect when we wish to do so. " 40 Therefore, we do not need the light of the eternal reasons in order to know somethin g with certitude. 14. Again, the p rinciples of being and knowing are identical. 41 ___________________________ 39

According to Aristotle, II Poster., c. 1 8 (c. 1 5), and I Mecaph., c. 1 . The . reason given here (quia, amittemes, etc.) is from the same author, I Po.Her., 1 4 (c. 1 8). 40 Aristotle, De anlma, text. 60 (c. 5). 41 Arisrotle, II Metaph., text. 4 (I brevior, c. 1 ), "Quare ut secundum esse

1 31

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

DISPUTED QUESTION IV

Therefore, if the principles of being that are proper and intrinsic to

thing with certitude would be a wise person. But this is false. There­

1 30

the crea tures themselves are nothing other than created principles ,

then whatever is known is known through created reasons and not; therefore, through eternal reasons and lights. 1 5 . Again, for each knowable object there is a proper correspond­

ing principle of knowledge so that it may be known with certitude.

But those principles of knowledge are not perceived distinctly by the

intellect of any wayfarer. Therefore, nothing is known in them prop­ erly and in a determinate sense. 1 6. Again, suppose that everything that is known with certitude

is known in its eternal reason. But " that by means of which another 42 thing is known is itself better known. " Therefore, the eternal rea­ sons are better known to us. But this is obviously false, since they are hidden from us in a supreme degree.

1 7 . Again, it is impossible to see something in a mirror without seeing the mirror itself. Therefore, if that which is known with certi­

tude is seen in those eternal reasons , it is necessary that the first light and eternal reason should be seen. But this is false and ab­ surd. Therefore, the premise is false and absurd as well.

1 8 . Again, suppose that everything that is known with certitude , is known in those eternal reasons. But those reasons are equally cer­ tain whether they relate to contingent things or to necessary things , and whether they relate to future events or to present events. There­

fore, we would have certain knowledge of the contingent just as well as of the' necessary, and of the future just as well as of the present. But this is false. Therefore, the premise is false.

1 9 . Again, assume that we know in the eternal reasons. But the

eternal reasons are the highest causes . And wisdom is the knowl­ 43 edge of the highest causes . Therefore , anyone who knows some-

uhumquodque se habet, ita eciam secundum veritatem." 42 Aristotle, l Poster., c. 2. 43 Cfr. Aristotle, l Metaph., c. l ff.

fore, etc.

20. Again, if knowledge in heaven is knowledge through the eter­

nal reasons in which the Blessed behold whatever they see, and

if

all certain knowledge comes through those eternal reasons , then all those who have certain knowledge about anything would be Blessed,

and only the Blessed would know with certitude. But this is false.

2 1 . Again, if everything that is known is seen in the eternal rea­

sons, then, since the mirror of the eternal reasons includes the will

and since whatever is known in such a voluntary mirror is known by means of revelation; it follows that whatever is known in this way is known in the manner of prophecy or of revelation.

22. Again, if everything that is known is known in the eternal

reasons, this takes place either through a veil or without a veil. If it t.akes place through a veil, then nothing is known clearly. If it takes place without a veil, then everyone would see God and the eternal

exemplar with no obscurity. But for the state of wayfarers, this is 44 false. Therefore, etc.

Again, objections are raised against the arguments of Augustine

in the following way:

23 . If every unchangeable truth is above the soul and in this

sense is eternal and identical with God, then since the truth of every 45 principle of demons tration is unchangeable, every such truth would be identical with God. Therefore, nothing could be known except God.

24 . Again, if every unchangeable truth is the truth of the eternal

art, and if that is only one, then all unchangeable truth will be but

one. But it is possible to discover some unchangeable truth with re­

gard to any being. This is obvious, for it is an unchangeable truth that: If Socrates is running, Socrates is moving. Therefore; according

H I Cor 1 3, 1 2: "Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmace," etc. 45 Cfr. Aristotle, l Poster., c. 4.

1 32

DISPUTED QUESTION IV

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

to this , all beings would be but one. 2 5 . Again, if everything that is God is to be adored with the wor­

ship of !atria, and the truth of every unchangeable truth is God,

then every such truth is to be adored. Therefore, the truth of the proposition " two plus three equals five" is" to be adored. 26. Again , if every unchangeable truth is God, then anyone who

clearly sees some unchangeable truth clearly sees God. But the de­

mons and the damned dearly see some unchangeable truths. Th�re­

fore, they clearly see God . But this is what it means to be blessed. Therefore, the damned are blessed. But nothing is more absurd than this. Therefore, the most absurd thing of all is to claim that everything that is known , if it is known with certitude, is known by means of the eternal reasons.

Conclusion For knowledge with certitude, even in the state of wayfar­ ers, the intellect must attain to the eternal reason as that reason which regulates and motivates. It is not the sole principle of knowledge, nor is it attained in its clarity; but together with the proper created reason it is known obscurely and as in a mirror. Response: In order to understand what has been said above , it must be noted that the claim that everything known with certitude is known in the li gh t of the eternal reasons can be understood in three

ways. In one way it is understood to mean th at, in the case of cer­ tain knowledge , the evidence of the eternal light concurs as the total

and sole cause of that knowledge. This understanding is the least ac­ ceptable, for it allows for no knowledge of reality except in the

Word. In this case, there would be no difference between knowl­

edge in the wayfaring state and heavenly knowledge, between knowl­ edge in the Word and knowledge of things in themselves , between the knowledge of science and the knowledge of wisdom , between

•

1 33

the knowledge of nature and the knowledge of grace, or between the knowledge of reason and the knowledge of revelation. Since all these

· are false, this interpretation certainly is not to be maintained. According to this opinion, which is put forward by some , nothing is known with certitude except in the intelligible and archetypal world. This was the view of those who made up the first Academy. And , as Augustine says in the second book of Against the Academics,

46

from this arose the error of the new Academy , which held that no knowled ge was possible at all since that intelligible world was hid­ den from human minds . And therefore, wishing to maintain the

first opinion together with their own , they fell into an obvious error, since "a little error in the beginning leads to a great one in the end." 47

Another interpretation maintains that certain knowledge requires the influence of the eternal reason to concur in such a way that- in the act of knowing, the subj ect attains not the eternal reason itself 48 but only its influence. But this way of expressing it is inadequate according to the word of the blessed Au gu stine, who shows in ex­ press words a nd argu ments that in the ca�e of certain knowled ge the mind mus t be regulated by unchangeable and eternal rules which operate not by means of a habit of the mind but by means of them­

selves as realities which are above the mind in the eternal truth. And therefore, to claim that our mind, in knowing, does not · rise above the influence of uncreated light is to say that Augustine was de­ ceived, since it is not easy, in expla.ining his argu ments, to interpret them in harmony with this viewpoint. Now, it would be ve ry absurd

to say this about one who is such a great Father and who is the most authoritative Doctor among the interp reters of the sacred Scri ptures. Furthermore, that influence of light is either an instance of the

46

C. 5ff, n. l l ff. Cfr. ibfd. III, c. 1 7ff., n . 37ff. , and XV De trin. , c. 1 2 , n. 2 1 . Cfr. Aristotle, I De caelo e t mundo , text. 3 3 (c. 5 ) . I t is found in almost the same words in the commentary of Averroes on the Aristotelian text. 48 In the active sense , influemia is understood by the scholastics to refer to a passing- action of God. Here Bonaventure s peaks not of the active influence in itself, but of its created effect, that is , a habit of the mind. Below, beginning with furthermore , he is clearly speakin g of God's coo peration with the act of the creature. Cfr. the res ponse in the following question. 47

1 34

1 35

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

DISPUTED QUESTION IV

general influence through which God operates in all creatures, or it is a special influence such as that which God exercises by means of grace. If it is general, then we should no more call God the giver of wisdom than we should say that God is the giver of earthly fertility. It means no more to say that knowledge comes from the divine than · to say that wealth comes from God. If it is a special influence such as would be involved in the case of grace, then, according to this view, all knowledge would be infused and none would be acquired or innate. But all these positions are absurd. And therefore there is a third interpretation, a middle position, as it were, between the first two ways. For certain knowledge, the eternal reason is necessarily involved as the regulative and motivat­ ing principle, but certainly not as the sole principle nor in its full . clarity. But along with the created reason, it is contuited by us in part49 as is fitting in th is life. And this is what Augustine suggests in book XIV of On the Trin­ ity, chapter 1 5: 50 "The unjust person is reminded that it is nec­ essary to turn to the Lord as to that light by which the human p er­ son is somehow touched even when that person has turned away from God. This is the reason why unjust people think of eternity, and correctly condemn and praise many things in human behavior." And he adds5 1 here that they do this according to rules which " are written in the book of that light which is called truth." Furthermore, the nobility of knowledge and the dignity of the knower necessarily require that, in the case of certain knowled ge , our mind must in some way attain to those rules and unchangeable reasons. 52

The nobility of knowledge requires it, I say, because there can be no certain knowledge except where there is immutability on the part of the object known and infallibility on the part of the knower. Now created truth is not immutable in an absolute sense but only condi­ tionally. Similarly, the light of the creature is not completely infalli­ ble by virtue of its own power, since each such light is created moving from non-being to being. But, if full knowledge requires re­ course to a truth that is fully immutable and stable, and to a light that is c�mpletely infallible, it is necessary for this sort of knowledge to have recourse to the heavenly art as to light and truth: a light, I say, which gives infallibility to the knower, and a truth which gives immutability to the object of knowledge. Therefore, since things have an existence in the mind, in themselves, and in the eternal art, the truth which they possess in the mind or in themselves is not sufficient to give the soul certain knowledge, since both of these are mutable, · unless-in some way-the soul attains to these things as they exist in the eternal art. The dignity of the knower requires the same thing. For the ra­ tional spirit has a higher . and a lower part. As the lower part with­ out the higher is inadequate for a fully deliberative judgment of reason in matters of a practical nature, so it is inadequate for a full judgment of reason in speculative matters. 53 But it is in the higher part that the image of God is found. And it is this higher part that adheres to the eternal rules, and by them it judges and defines with certitude whatever it defines. And this it is capable of doing in as far as it is the image of God. For a creature is related to God as . a vestige, as an image, and as a likeness. In as far as it is a vestige, it is related to God as to its princi� ple. In as far as it is an image, it is related to God as to its object. But in as far as it is a likeness, it is related to God as to an infused gifi:. And,· therefore, every creature th.at proceeds from God is a vestige. Every creature that knows God is an image. And every creature in whom God dwells, 54 and only such a creature, is a likeness. There

49 I Car 1 3, 1 2 : " N ow we know in part." This man ner of speaking shows that, according to the principles of the Seraphic Doctor, this intution is not immediate since he teaches that through immediate vis ion , God is seen "totum, licet non rotaliter." Cfi-. II Sent., d. 23, a. 2, q. 3 (II, 542ff.), and Ill Sent . , cl. 1 4, a. 1 , q. 2ff. {III , 298ff.) . so n . 21 . 51 Ibid. Cfr. above, fundam. 8 . 52 What i s given here i s found i n almost the same words i n a sermon o f Bonaventure for the twenty-second Sunday after Pentecost. Cfr. the Quaracchi G. Bougerol, Sancti edition, IX, p. 44l ff. ; and the more recent edition of Bona11en1urae Sermones Dominica/es. Bibliotheca Franci;cana Scholastica Medii Ae11i, Tom. XXVII (Grottaferrata, 1 9 77) p. 465ff.

J.

53 That is, when it knows first principles and universals. 51 Cfi-. I Sem., cl. 3 , p. 1 , q. 2 at the end (1, 7 1 ff.), and Brevil., p. 2 , c. 12 {V, 230).

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRI ST

1 36

are three levels of divine cooperation corresponding to these three degrees of relationship. In any work accomplished by a creature in as far as it is a vestige, God cooperates as the creative principle. In any work accomplished by a creature in as far as it is a likeness-such as a work that is meri­ torious and pleasing to God-God cooperates in the manner of an infused gift. But in a work that proceeds from a creature in as far as it is an image, God cooperates as the moving cause. Now, certain knowledge, which is not the work of lower reason independent of higher reason, is this sort of activity. Since certain knowledge pertains to the rational spirit in as far as it is an image of God, it is in this sort of knowledge that the soul at­ tains to the eternal reasons. But because it is never fully conformed to God in this life, it does not attain to the reasons clearly, fully, and distinctly, but only to a greater or lesser degree according to the degree of its conformity to God. However, since the nature of the image is never absent from the rational spirit, it always attains to the reasons in some way. Since, in the state of innocence, the image ex­ isted without the deformity of guilt but did not yet have the full deiformity of glory, it attained to them "in part" but not " obscure­ ly."55 In the state of fallen nature, the image is both deformed and lacking in deiformity. Therefore, it attains to them " in part'' and " obscurely." In the state of glory it lacks every deformity and it pos­ sesses its full conformity to God. Here, therefore , it attains to them in their fullness and clarity. Again, since the soul is not an image in its entirety, together with these eternal reasons it attains to the likenesses of things abstracted from the sense image. These are proper and distinct principles of knowledge, and without them the light of the eternal reason is insuf­ ficient of itself to produce knowledge as long as the soul is in this wayfaring state unless, perhaps because of a special revelation, it transcends this state. This happens in the case of those who are drawn up into ecstasy and in the case of the revelations of certain prophets. Therefore it should be granted, as the arguments show and as the 55

Cfr. II Sent. , d. 23 , a. 2 , q . 3 ( II , 542ff.).

DISPUTED QUESTION IV

1 37

authoritative statements of Augustine expressly say, that in all certain , knowledge those principles of knowledge are attained by the knower. They are reached in one way by people in this life and in another way by the blessed, in one way by the person of science and in an­ other way by the person of wisdom, in one way by the prophet and in another way by a person who understands things in the ordinary way. This has been made clear already, and it will become evident in the solutions to the objections .

REPLIES TO THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE NEGATIVE POSITION: 1 . To the first objection that God dwells in light inaccessible, it must be said that this text speaks of access to that light in the full­ ness and splendor of its brightness. In this sense there is no access to it through the power proper to a creature but only through the deiformity of glory. 2. To the objection that the eye of the human mind is too weak to be fixed on such an excellent light, etc. , it mus t be sa id that for knowledge through the eternal reasons , it is not necessary for the mind to be focused on them except in the case of sapiential knowl­ edge. The person of wisdom attains to the reasons in one way and the person of knowledge in another. The person of science attains to them as to the principles that move the mind. The person of wis­ dom attains to them as to that in which the human spirit finds rest. And no one arrives at this wisdom " except those who are first puri­ fied by the justice of faith."56 3. To the objection that the mind has a knowledge of in�orporeal things through itself, it must be said that, just as the cooperation of the Creator is not excluded from the works of the creature, so the uncreated principle of knowledge is not excluded by the created principle of knowledge but is included in it. 56 As Au gu stine says in the objection above. Cfr. I Sent. d. 2 dub. 2 ( I 59). , , ,

13

THE KNOW LEDGE

8

4. T o t he objectio n th at it se es i

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a "light of i ts ow

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T o th e objection s from Grego

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ry a n d Dio n s i u s , it mu st b e " nlig h ttr u e ligh t w h i c e th t tha s sai d tha t neithe r o f them denie h e · d . · th ' s worl " 5 7 t· s r eache d b 1 en s everyon e co m m g mt o r s d m m , y o u e lif s h t n i y n full l see . b u t on y tha t t s n o t ye t i i i y

tha t we th e Phil o p he o s r n t n a ge w e h av e a understan d i n relatio n t o spa c e a n d t i m e , a n d tha t tio fu th t u o b a on n o f c an d a p os sibl e intellec t, an d t o th e objecti n e t e s aid th t thi a f fi r m experienc e in human knowledge , i t mu s b a s s l t co u o u r in tha the ligh t and reason o f cre ated truth n c r w it h li ­ te nd h s o t a xc lu d e the lig g enc e . But , a w a s s aid already , thi s d oe s n t e hil e the s re ason o f th e et e rna l tr ut h ; fo r i t i s po s sibl e th at , w o ul a t­ r t he ­ i t eve r a p w l t its f o t , o tain s tha which i s below i t by mea n s n e r t hig he a rt . le s s attain s th a which i s abo ve i by me a n s o f its r p t . 7-8 - 9

T o th e objecti on

s

dr a w n fro m

abou the kno w ledg e o f the i m ag i a t i n , o t n l dg f k so r t n ow mu s t be said that there is no s i mila r i ty , s i nc e this e o fo o n i re the ur s eco r a n e s does no t i n volve c e rtitude . The refore , o r r s

10 .

To

the

objectio n

to the im mutable .

11 .

To the ob j ection co ncern i ng sense kno

that there

is

w l dg e ,

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o f th e

the c ertitude of the intellect . For the certitude of th e r d d from the restriction proper to a po wer that is o e re h tell in e t of e ec t a determinate object But the certitud from such a source; for, as an unres tricted p o

57

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1 4.

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t h e objecti on t ha t w e ex er cise o ur und e stand ng when w e r i o s o, t h e re fo re we have n o ne ed of help from another, d it m u s t be s a i d t ha t h el p f ro m a no t h er can be of two sor t s one which : is a wa ys p r es e nt, an d one whic h s ab sen t a n d di s ta nt . Th e co nclu ­ l i n o f th e a o r gum e nt re fers not t o the f i rs t s ort of s i he lp but to th e n d. T h i s s c lea r b ec aus e , if th e co rporeal light s e co we i r e alwa ys pre s ­ n e nt the eye a s t h e s p ir itua l li alw a y s p res ent in the mind , i gh t is t h e n w e w o ul d s ee. w he nev er we will to , j u s t a s we e x e r c is e o u r d r s ed n ta u n g w h d n w e w ill o s o . to d n e e i

fo

d s e n e s s i s e n s e s a r s es by n a tu re to t

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w

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T o t h e o b e cto i n that nothin g more · is req uir e d for k n ow ledg e j a k no w er an a k n o wab e o b ect, t oget her wit h the turn n g of th e d l j i fo rm er t o th e latt er, t m ust be sai d that t his turnin g incl ude s a jud ­ i g m e n t. ut a ju dgme nt is no t c er t a in exc e pt b y r e ason o f a law that s B i c e rta n and n ot its elf su bject to j udgmen t I n i t h e b ook O n th e True el igion a nd in the book On F re e W i ll, 5 9 Au gusti n e sta R tes . that " n o o ne j u d g es a bout tru th. B u wit hout truth , no one . judg t e s co r ec tl y " , e a e re . e e s o n a n Th a r e i n cl u d e d h n re ter d tru th refo th l rea

con trar y t o th e positio n s tate d abov e . .

DI

a ll th n gs. Th e r ef ore, i ts cer titu de must co me not fr om som ethin g t h a t s r e st ric ted b ut from some t h ing th at is free and yet does n o i t h av e t h e defect of m u tabili ty and fallibility. An d the ligh t an d r e aso n n r e o f h eav enl y tr u th i s t h is s ort of r eali ty. The re fore , ec ­ t h a s th e i te ll a r s e ce t o th e s s s e i a . t co u o r i tu d ur ce to o f ll i ts th

i gh t-wh e t he r i t be be sa d tha t , i n a broa d s ens e, ev e r y in c o r p o r e al l i ht c reate d o r un created- is s a d to b e a " lig of i ts o wn ki nd . " Bu i t i f l d e th o t exc o a crea te d ligh t , it doe r e n f re o i d oo nderst u s s i th u · t e t s w th at i n th e ow uncr eate d ligh t. An d it doe s not foll o kn ot n d we o bu t t kn o w i n tha t li ght a lo n e e t e rn al tru th , but simp ly tha t w e d o no it d u tr s d th s n is n o t i i i n th e ligh t of create d trut h a s wel l. Indee , e , a

5- 6

58

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,

our k n

f kno wi p le

rin

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o t he o b jec tio n that t h e prin ci ples of being and knowing are l , it mus t be sai d that as t he i nt rinsic pr i nc i ples of be ing are ffi c ien t f o r e xiste n c e witho ut t hat fi r s t ext rin sic principle which n eit h e r ar e t hey sufficient f or th e f ull ness of kn o w ledg e. Th ere­ n t h o u g h t he s e pri nciple s are, in a certa in way , the cause of ow l e dge, t hey do not, for t h at r e as on, e xcl ude tl1at f i rst prin ci ple n g f rom our k now e dg e, ust as the y do n ot ex e r s t } l ctu j exi o f te n cl u d o a l fr the fi r e ti be i n g ce a l o m o n . th e s f c a

C fr. Aris to tl e , I X M e ta p . , t ext. a n h 3 d 1 0 ( VI 3 ff. (c. 4 ). 59 C fr. fu n d a em n ts 2 a n d 3 a b ov e . 58

text.

ca

II . c . 2 a nd 5 ) ; III

D

e

a ni m a ,

9

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

DISPUTED QU ESTION IV

1 5 . To the obj ection that to each knowable obj ect there is a cor­ responding, proper principle of knowledge, it must be said that since we do not see those principles in themselves with full distinct­ ness , they are not the entire cause of our knowledge. But together with them we need the created light of principles and the likenesses of the obj ects known. From these we draw the proper cause of our knowledge with respect to each obj ect that we know.

res pect to contingent things and necessa ry things , it must be said that the conclusion would be correct if those reasons were the total cause of our knowledge , and if things were seen fully in them. But this is not the case in the conditions of our present life because , to­ ge ther with them, we need the proper likenesses and principles of things which are received separately. And these conditions are not verified in contingent matters but only in necessary matters . 62

1 6. To the obj ection that "that by means of which another thing is known is itself better known, " it must be said that, as is already clear, the eternal reason does not move us to knowledge by itself alone but together with the truth of principles , and it does so not in a special way but in a general way in this wayfaring state. Therefore , it does not follow that it is known to us in itself. Rather, it is known to us in as far as it shines forth in its princi ples 60 and in its general character. And thus, in a certain way , it is most certain to us , because our intellect can in no way think that it does not exist. And this certainly cannot be said of any created truth.

1 9. To the obj ection that if we have knowledge in these reasons , then anyone who knew anything would be wise , it must be said that this does not follow because attaining to these reasons does not make anyone wise unless that person is aware of attaining to them and finds repose in them. This is, indeed, the mark of the wise per­ son. For the intellects of peo ple of science attain these reasons as principles that move the mind, while the intellects of the wise attain these reasons as principles by which they are lead back to a point of repose. And since there are few who attain to the reasons in this way, there are few wise people even thou gh there are many people who possess knowledge. Indeed , there are few people who know that they attain to these reasons. And even more so , there are few who wish to believe this; for the intellect that has not yet been ele­ vated to the contemplation of eternal things finds it difficult to understand that God is so present and near _ to it , despite the fact that Paul says in the seventeenth chapter63 of Acts: "God is not far from each one of us."

1 40

1 7 . To the obj ection about the mirror, it must be said that this is true in the case of a mirror whose nature it is to represent some­ thing properly and distinctly , and in the act of representing is itself the obj ect of our vision. This is obvious with a material mirror which represents a vis ible ima ge distinctly and properly and which is itself an obj ect that we see. Now these conditions a pply to the eternal mirror in the case of those who enj oy the vision of God , as is clear from what was said above. 61 1 8 . To the obj ection that these reasons are equally certain with 60 The term suis is used in as far as the immurable principles of the intellect "are rooted in the eternal light and lead to it." Cfr. Hex., coll. 2 (V, 336ff.). 61 An example to help understand the meaning of knowledge per speculum is suggested by the Quaracchi editors. It is like looking in a mirror and seeing the face of a person who srands behind the viewer. This manner of seein g is very different from seeing the person face to face. Cfr. the Quaracchi edition , V, p. 25 , n. 9.

141

20. To the obj ection concerning heavenly knowledge , the res po nse is already clear because there is a great difference between that knowl­ edge which is "in part" and "obscure , " and that knowledge which is perfect and distinct This has already been touched on above. 21 . To the obj ection that the mirror of the eternal reasons is vol­ untary in nature, etc. , we respond in accord with what the Apostle ___________________________________________________

62

Cfr. Aristotle, 1 Poster., c. 6ff. and 24 (c. 30ff. ) . 63 Verse 27.

T H E KNOWLEDGE O F CH RIST

DISPUTED QUESTION IV

wrote in the first chapter6 4 of Romans: "That which is known of God is manifest in them." Even though God is simple and one in form, nonetheless that eternal light and that exemplar represents some things, as it were, explicitly and openly while it represents other things implicitly and obscurely. The first are those things that happen according to a necessary ordering of the divine art The lat­ ter things are those which take place according to the disposition of God' s hidden will. And when the mirror is said to be of a voluntary nature, this is with respect to those things that have their exemplar in God in the second way rather than in the first Therefore, natural things are known in the eternal reasons by the power of judgment that is natural to reason, while supernatural and future things are known only by means of the gift of revelation from above. And, therefore, this argument does not contradict the position that was stated previously.

thing above the mind and that it is God, this is understood of truth that is absolutely immutable. But when it is said that the truth of the principles of demonstration is immutable, if that truth refers to something created it certainly is not immutable in an absolute sense but in a conditional sense, because every creature comes from non­ being and can return to non-being. And if it is objected that such a truth is absolutely certain to the soul itself, it must be said that since a principle of demonstration expresses something complex, it is cre­ ated. Nevertheless, the truth signified here can be signified either as it is in matter, or in the soul, or in the divine art, or, indeed, in all of these ways simultaneously. For the truth in the external sign is a sign of the truth which is in the soul, because " spoken words are symbols of the experiences of the soul." 66 Now, since the soul oc­ cupies a middle place between God and created things , it is related to higher things according to its superior part just as it is related to lower things according to its inferior part. Therefore, truth in the soul is related to this twofold truth just as a medium is related to two extremes . Therefore, as i.t receives a relative certitude from be­ low, so it receives an absolute certitude from above. And so ' as Au. • gustme s arguments show, 67 . that sort of truth which is absolutely immutable is above the soul. The arguments against this view are re­ lated to that sort of truth which is immutable in a relative sense. This sort of truth, which is multiplied in diverse beings, is properly the concern of demonstration. Such a truth, which can be seen both by the demons and by tl1e damned, is not worthy of adoration. But

142

22. To the objection that whatever is known in them is known either through a veil or without a veil, it must be said that in this wayfaring state, the knowledge which we have in those reasons is never without a veil and never without obscurity because the divine image has been obscured. 65 From this it does not follow that noth­ ing is known with clarity and certitude, since the created principles,. which are in some way a means of knowledge, even though not in­ dependently of those reasons, can be seen by our mind clearly and without a veil. Nevertheless, if it were claimed that nothing were known fully in this life, this would involve no great problem. 23-24 -25-26. To the objections against Augustine' s arguments that if immutable truth is identical with God, then the truth of the principles of demonstration would be God; and that all truths would be one and ought to be adored; and that the demons would see God: to all these it must be said that a truth can be said to be immutable in two ways, namely, in an absolute sense and in a con­ ditional sense. Now, when it is said that immutable truth is some• 64 Verse 1 9 . 65 Cfr. II Sent., d. 2 3 , a. 2, q. 3 (II, 542ff.).

1 43

66 Aristotle, I Periherm., c. 1 . 67 This doctrine concerning the manner of reducing the supreme cause of human knowledge to the divine truth was widely accepted at the time of Bonaven­ ture, and was sincerely thought to be the view of Augustine. The Quaracchi editors presented abundant documentation on d1is matter in an earlier edition · of the present question (De humanae cognitionis ratione anecdota quaedam, Quaracchi, 1 883). In a letter written on June 1, 1 285, John Pecham, the Franciscan Archbish­ op of Canterbury, provides evidence of the siruation in the late thirteenth cenrury when he speaks of a certain " new doctrine," which was opposed to the teaching of Augustine "de regulis aetemis et Luce incommutabili, de potentiis animae, de rationibus seminalibus inditis materiae et consimilibus innumeri," etc. For the text of this letter, cfr. Zeitschrifr fur katholische Theologie, Innsbruck, 1 889, fasc. I, p. 1 86. .

1 44

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

that truth which is absolutely immut.able can be seen only by those who are able to enter into that innermost silence of the soul , and to this no sinner is able to come, but only one who is supremely a lover of eternity.

QUESTION V Whether the soul of Christ possessed only uncreated wisdom, or whether it possessed also a created wisdom together with the uncreated wisdom. After discussing the wisdom of Christ in as far as he is the Word, we now ask about the wisdom of the soul of Christ. The first question is whether the soul of Christ possessed only uncreated wis­ dom, or whether it possessed a created wisdom together with the uncreated wisdom. It seems that it possessed only uncreated wis­ dom.

ARGUMENTS FOR THE AFFIRMATIVE POSITION: 1 . In the first chapter of Ecclesiasticus: 1 "All wisdom comes from the lord God, and with God it is and has always been before the ages ." But anything that has existed before the ages is eternal. Therefore, all wisdom is eternal. Therefore, if the soul of Christ is wise by virtue of one form of wisdom, it can be so only by virtue of the eternal wisdom . If you affirm that wisdom is said to have been in God a:s in a cause, the same thing can be said of any creature. This is not to give much praise to wisdom. If you say that all wis­ dom means Perfect wisdom , this does not correspond with the text,2 which speaks of a wisdom that we are invited to acquire. This can cleady be gathered from what follows.

1 Verse L Cfr. III Sent. , d. 1 4, a. 1 , q. 1 , and a. 3, q. 1 ( HI , 29 5-98, 3 1 8-20), where the same question is created. 2 Verse 1 Off.

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

DISPUTED Q UESTION V

2 . Again , in the second book of On Free Will ,3 Au gustine writes: "All wise people become such by virtue of that truth and wisdom

5. Again , Hugh argues as follows: If wisdom is an accident, then since wisdom is that by which the wise attain to beatitude , our

1 46

which is one for all. No one is made happy by virtue of the happi­ ness of another, nor is one made j ust by the j u stice of another. Rather one becomes such by conforming the soul to those unchang­ ing rules and lights of the virtues which live unchangeably in truth

1 47

6

beatitude consists in something that is accidental. But accidental be­ ings are changeable. Therefore, our beatitude would be extremely

changeable.

itself and in th.at wisdom which is one for all." If there is one wis­ dom for all the wise, but not one h appiness for all the blessed­ granted that from the viewpoint of causality , there ought be a unity

6. Again, any being that confers something on another in some 7 way possesses that which it gives. But wisdom confers discernment

th.is cannot be a created wisdom. Therefore, if the soul of Christ is

through itself. But such wisdom can be none other th.an uncreated

in both cases-it is necessary to affirm th.at in a formal and proper sense , there is but one wisdom in virtue of which all are wise. And

wise , it is wise by virtue of uncreated wisdom.

3. Aga in, in the book 83 Questions, Augustine writes in the question concerning typ es of habit:4 "When wisdom is added to a person, it is not wisdom that is chan ged but the person, who is transformed from a fool into a wise person." But, if wisdom were understood to be a created habit, then it would indeed undergo change; for it would be brought from non-being to being. Therefore, it refers only to something uncreated. Therefore , the same conclu­ sion as above. 4 . Again , in the tract On the Wisdom of the Soul of Christ,5 Hu gh writes : "That wisdom is one by which all are wise, but not all share it in the same way. For a soul th.at is united to wisdom itself shares more fully in that wisdom . Such a soul flourishes not by reason of p artici pation in [wisdom ] , but because of the fullness [of wisdom ] which it possesses by reason of its privileged union." But if the fullness of wisdom can be found only in uncreated wisdom , it seems , etc.

on the wise. Therefore wisdom discerns. But if it discerns , it does so not through something else but through itself. Therefore , all wisdom by which a wise person discerns is a wisdom which discerns

wisdom. Therefore , if the soul of Christ is wise with such wisdom , it is clear, etc.

7 . Again , a p erfection is more noble than that which is capable of becoming perfect. But a wise person is more noble than the fool, and an intelligent person is more noble than the ignorant person. Therefore, since wisdom is the perfection of the wise p erson , the wise person both knows and discerns by means of wisdom. It is necessa ry , therefore , that wisdom both discerns and understands. But it can discern only through itself. And wisdom of this sort is the uncreated wisdom. Therefore , etc.

Through these arguments and authoritative statements it is shown that the soul of Christ is wise by reason of uncreated wisdom alone.

And this is true not only of the soul- of Christ, but of every other soul that possesses wisdom as well. That it is particularly true in the

case of Christ's soul, however, is shown in the following ways . 8 . Wisdom makes anyone who is united with it to be a wise per•

son. But uncreated wisdom is united to the soul of Christ. There­ fore , the soul of Christ is wise by virtue of uncreated wisdom. If you say that it is united only through the mediation of created wisdom ,

3 Ch. 1 9 n. 52. , � Q . 7 3 , n . 1, "Wisdom , when added to a man , does not itself change , but it does change the man, making a wise man out of a fool." 5 Hugh of St Victor, De sapientia animae Christi (PL 1 7 6, 851 ) .

___________________________________

22).

6 Loe. cit. Many of the following argu ments are su ggested here as well. 7 "Nothing gives what it does not possess." Cfr. Aristotle, II E!ench., c. 3 (c.

1 49

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

DISPUTED QUESTION V

which disposes the soul for the union, I reply to the contrary that the intermediary disposition is prior to and is more immediate and more essential than that for which it disposes, because it has the nature of an introductory medium. But the soul of Christ is related to the hypostasis in a way that is prior to as well as more immediate and more essential than anything accidental found within itself. Therefore, if the eternal Word and wisdom of God is the hypostasis and person with respect to both the divine and the human natures, then the soul of Christ has a relation that is prior, more immediate, and more essential to uncreated wisdom than to created wisdom. Therefore, etc.

the divinity, that knowledge would lose something of its value because the cause of knowledge would be either more perfect or less perfect. In either case this would imply a depreciation of God's knowledge. Therefore, if the soul of Christ knows through some­ thing created and distinct from itself, Christ's knowledge would lose something of its value. For if this other reality is something less noble, then Christ's knowledge would be brought about th rough something less noble. But if this other reali ty is something more noble, then the soul of Christ would not be the most noble of all created things. But if it is the most noble creature standing at the summit of all created excellence,9 then it is impossible that it should know things through anything other than itself or the uncreated wisdom.

1 48

9. Again, the greater a wisdom is, the more knowable it is, and the more it makes one capable of knowing. But created wisdom is inferior to uncreated wisdom. Yet the soul to whom it is present is made capable of knowing. Therefore, all the more so is this the case with uncreated wisdom. But such wisdom was supremely present in the soul of Christ. Therefore, etc. 1 0. Again, nothing else is required for knowledge but a knowing subject, a knowable object, and the presence of a cause of knowl­ edge. But all this was fully given in that soul in as far as it was united with the eternal Word. Therefore His soul was wise by virtue of uncreated wisdom to the exclusion of all created wisdom. 1 1 . Again, "as the soul is the life of the body, so God is the life of the soul," 8 but in an even greater sense. But the soul is capable of enlivening the body by virtue of itself. Therefore, all the more so is God capable of enlivening the soul through the very divinity. And this is possible to the greatest degree in the case of that soul with which God is supremely united. But such was the soul of Christ. Therefore, etc. 1 2 . Again, if God knew things through something distinct from 8

As A:ugu stine reaches In loan. Evang. , tract. 1 9 , n. 1 2; tract. 23 , n. ? ; tract. 4? , n. 8 ; Serm. 62 , c. 1 , n. 2; and XIII De ci11. Dei, c. 2.

1 3 . Again, the more immediately a particular intellect comes to the fount of wisdom, the greater is its wisdom. But the soul of Christ is supremely wise. Therefore, it has the most immediate access to uncreated wisdom. Therefore, it is wise by virtue of that eternal wisdom to the exclusion of all other wisdom. 1 4. Again, the soul of Christ is so united to the eternal majesty that it ought to be honored with the same honor with which the eternal majes ty is honored. 10 Therefore, for the same reason, it is so united to the-eternal light that it is wise by virtue of the same wis­ dom with which the eternal light is wise. But this is the uncreated wisdom alone. Therefore, the soul of Christ is wise by virtue of un­ created wisdom alone. 1 5. Again, where the fullness of wisdom is present, it is super­ fluous to posit any partial wisdom. But in Christ the fullness of wisdom is found because, according to the first chapter of Colos­ sians, 1 1 "it has pleased [God] to have all fullness dwell in Him." ____________________________________ 9

266) .

Cfr. the gloss o f Augustine cited i n Ill Sent. , cl. 1 2 , a . 2 , q . 1 , fundam. 1 ( III ,

10

11

That is , !atria. Cfr. IU Sent. , d. 9 , a. 1 , q . 1 ( lII , 1 99-202). Verse 1 9. I Cor 1 3, 9: " Ex parte enim cognoscimus," etc.

1 50

1 51

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRI ST

DISPUTED QUESTION V

Therefore , if all created wisdom is p artial , it is superfluous to posit

2 . Again, Damascene says that because of the two natures in Christ it is necessary to affirm that there were two wills in him. Therefore, for the same reason , it is necess a ry to affirm two kinds of knowledge, and hence two kinds of science, a nd consequently two

created wisdom in Christ or in His soul .

1 6. Again, nan.ire does not employ many means when it can 12 accomplish something with fewer. And this is to the credit of created nature. Therefore , if something p raiseworthy is attributed to

a created nature, it can also be attributed to an uncreated nature.

Since uncreated wisdom-being complete and full in every way-is fully sufficient in itself, therefore it seems that created wisdom in

Christ would be superfluous . But nothing superfluous is to be posited in Christ. Therefore , etc. 1 7 . Again, when different material lights shine to gether in the same medium and one is more powerful than the others , it obscures

the others , not because they are opposed but because one is more powerful. Therefore , if uncreated wisdom excels created wisdom to a much greater degree than the minimal way in which one material

15

kinds of wisdom.

3. Again , no one is good excep t by reason of a goodness which informs such a person. Therefore, no one is wise except by virtue of an informing wisdom. But uncreated wisdom cannot be the form of

any creature. It can only have an exempla ry function. Therefore , if the soul of Christ is wise by virtue of some informing wisdom , it is necessary that, beyond the uncreated wisdom , it must also have a created wisdom informing it. 4. Again, wisdom is an accidental quali ty in a created person who is wise, but not by reason of nature. But, since uncreated wisdom is identical with God , it cannot be an accidental quality in another

light excels another material light, then uncreated wisdom obscures any other wisdom. But no obscure wisdom is to be posited in

being. Therefore , in the soul of Christ, beyond the uncreated wis­ dom , it is necessary to affirm the presence of some created wisdom , since wisdom pertains to his soul not essentially but accidentally.

1 8 . Again, created knowledge is further removed from uncreated

5 . Again, perfection can refer both to being and to being-in-grace. But God cannot be perfecting form for any creature with respect to its being. Therefore, neither can God be the perfecting form for the graced-being of any creature. But wisdom is the p erfecting form of the very soul of the wise Christ with res p ect to His being-in-grace.

Christ. Therefore , etc.

knowledge than opinion is from knowledge , or faith from direct vision. But it is not possible to have o p inion and knowled ge about 13 the same obj ect, nor faith and direct vision. Therefore, it is not possible to have created wisdom together with uncreated wisdom.

ARGUMENTS FOR THE NEGATIVE POSITION: 14 "J esus grew in wisdom, age , and grace before God and men." But this is not possible in terms of uncreated wisdom. Therefore , He

1.

must have had created wisdom together with uncreated wisdom.

1 2 Aristotle, Ylll Top ic. , c. 4 , (c. 9) : " Est autem . . . peccatum , quando ostendirur per longiora q uod contin g it per breviora." Cfr. Physic., text. 41 (c. 6 ) . 13 Cfr. I Cor 1 3, 9 ff.; and Aristotle , I Poster. , c. 26 {c. 33). Ii Lk 2 , 52.

the

Therefore , wisdom of this sort cannot be the uncreated wisdom. Therefore, etc.

6. Aga in , since the soul of Christ is not wise by virtue of its essence, it is wise by reason of somethin g other than itself. There­ fore , if it is wise , it is so by virtue of participation. But it does not receive a part of the essence of the divine wisdom since that is sim ple. Therefore , it must receive its influence . But such influence __________________________________ 65).

15 Lib. Ill De fide orthodoxa,c. 1 3ff. Cfr. III Sent. cl. 1 7 a. 1 q. 1 (Ill 363 , , , ,

1 52

1 53

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRI ST

DISPUTED QUESTION V

is created . Therefore, it is necessary that the soul of Christ be wise

Therefore, it is necessary that a created, s piritual quality be conferred

by virtue of created wisdom.

7. Again, the soul of Christ is of the same nature as other souls. But no soul attains fully to the fount of eternal wisdom unless it is conformed to God. But it cannot be conformed to God except by reason of some gift given to it which informs it and by which it

becomes conformed to God. But such a gift is created grace and wis­ dom. Therefore, it is necessary that the soul of Christ be wise by

virtue of created wisdom .

8 . Again, being both light and wisdom , the divine being is

known differently by different subjects . And God is known by the

soul of Christ in a more excellent manner than by others. This is either because of the divine being itself as the object known, or because of the cognitive power, or because of some disposing factor. It is not because of the d ivine being itself, because in God there is

no variation. It is not simply because of the cognitive power, be­

upon the soul by which it is brought into harmony with the object known . But we call this created wisdom. Therefore, etc.

Conclusion As a created being the soul of Christ possessed two kinds of wisdom1 namely1 created and uncreated. Res ponse: In order to understand what has been said we must note

the following. It is clear from the previous question that the influ­ ence of the eternal light without its presence is not sufficient for cer­

tain knowledge, for nothing created can confirm the soul in perfect

certitude until it arrives at an immutable truth and an infallible

light. And in parallel terms, we must recognize that for the knowl­ edge of wisdom the presence of that eternal light is not sufficient

cause then those who are intellectually better endowed by nature would be wiser and better people. But this is false. Therefore, it

without its influence. This is not becaus e of some defect in the

a habit is nothing other than created wisdom. Therefore, etc.

gence does not attain to that fount of wisdom unless it has been made conformed to God and thus is elevated and made suitable; ele­

must be by reason of some intermediate, disposing habit. But such

eternal light but because of a deficiency in us , for the created intelli­

9. Again, the uncreated wisdom of God, by reason of its very

vated above itself and made suitable in itself. Therefore , it is neces­

of wisdom , the influence of wisdom is necessarily required. There­

the eternal light. And because it makes the soul suitable for receiv­ ing wisdom, it is called created wisdom. However, since this influ­

essence, is present to all intellects in an eminent degree. Therefore, if the presence of wisdom alone made one wise, all intellects would be wise. But this is obviously false. Therefore, beyond the presence fore, if the soul of Christ is wise, it is clear, etc.

1 0. Again, the Word of God , which is wisdom, is united with

the eye, and yet the eye is not wise. Therefore, in order for the soul

to be wise, a hypostatic union with the Word is not sufficient. Therefore, it is necessary that it be united as a knower is united with

the object of kno',1/ledge. Every such union is realized through assim­ ilation.1 6 But all assimilation is realized in terms of some quality.

17

sary that something be given to it from above which is propor­ tionate to it and inheres within it. But this we call the influence of

ence of itself neither qualifies nor elevates unless it is in contact with the eternal light which is the moving principle, the guiding reason,

and the end that brings it to rest, therefore it does not possess the nature of wisdom by virtue of itself but by virtue of that from which it flows , according to which it directs, and to which it' leads . And

this is uncreated wisdom. And therefore, according to those wise

people who have received the gift of being elevated above them___________________________________________

16

Aristotle, VI Ethic., c. 1 , "Si quidem ex similirudine quadam atque affinitate cognitio existit ipsis {potentiis animae)."

1 7 James, 1 , 1 7 : "Omne datum optimun;i . . . desursum est, descendens a Parre luminum," etc.

DISPUTED QUESTION V

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

1 54

selves , the term "wisdom" is attributed princi pally and properly to the fontal and uncreated wisdom alone. 1 8 But in our ordinary way of understanding and speaking, the name is attributed not only to this but also to its influence , which renders the human mind fit for perfect knowledge. And accordin gly , it should be granted that the soul of Christ, since it is a creature , was wise by virtue of both forms of wisdom, namely created and uncreated. The uncreated is involved as that which principally moves , directs , and brings it to rest. The created is involved as that which informs, qualifies , and elevates it so that it is capable of fully attaining to the uncreated wisdom . That both concur simultaneously is clear from what Augu stine y sa s in the ninth book of On the Trinity, chapter 7 : 1 9 "Therefore with the eye of the mind we perceive in the eternal truth-from which all temporal things have been made-the form according to which we are and by which, with a true and right reason , we bring about something either in ourselves or in bodily beings. The true knowledge of things , conceived from this perspective, we carry with­ in us as a word , and we beget it by speaking from within. And it does not depart from us when it is born." From this it is clear that in the case of wisdom, eternal truth concurs with that knowledge of the truth which we conceive within ourselves , and which, indeed , is the principle that informs our soul itself. 20

REPLIES TO THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE AFFIRMATIVE POSITION: 1 . To the first obj ection that all wisdom is from the Lord God, it must be said that in this instance wisdom is not understood in the sense of a habit by which the soul of the wise person is informed and by which it is made capable of knowing, but rather it is under­ stood to signi fy the immutable cause of knowledge. But every such

cause , in as far as it is eternal , is in the divine art. And without it, 21 no created wisdom is possible, as has been sh.own above. There­ fore, we cannot conclude from this authority that it is im p ossible to affirm a created wisdom. 2-3. To the obj ections based on the two citations from Augustine it must be said that both of these should be understood in relation to uncreated wisdom. But, as the preceding makes clear , this does not exclude created wisdom. Nevertheless , when Augu stine s peaks about wisdom, always , or at least in many instances , he refers to uncreated wisdom , in comparison with which created wisdom is not worthy to be called wisdom. Or again , because it exists as an influ, ence that depends totally on the uncreated wisdom , it is more appropriately called an accident than a substance, 22 and is more correctly called the effect and irradiation of wisdom than wisdom itself. And if you ask why the same thing cannot be said about beatitude , since it flows entirely from the eternal beatitude, we reply that eternal beatitude refers to an affection that adheres to the supreme good while wisdom refers to a knowledge which contem­ plates the supreme good. But affection signifies a movement that arises from within the soul while knowledge refers to something that 23 comes to the soul. And because the sources of different affections are different, th!:!refore we must affirm different forms of beatitude formally and in terms · of the origin of each. But this is not the case with wisdom which , when viewed in itself, has but one origin , namely , the eternal light from which and in accordance with which all certain knowledge exists. 4-5. To the obj ection from Hugh it must be said that the words of Hu gh a gree with those of Augu stine. That p erson is wise who, _________________________________________

21

In the res ponse of this question , and in the p receding question . According to Aristotle , VII Metaph., text. 2 (Vl , c. 1 ) , "accidentia non tam sunt entia , quam quid entis ! substantiae] ." 23 Cfr. Aristotle , III De anima, text. 38 , 46 and 54 (c. 8-1 0) . Also Metaph., text. 8 N, c. 4). With respect to the object of these acts, he says that good and evil lie in things, while the true and the false lie in the mind. 22

18

Cfr. below, in the solutions to 2-5. n. 1 2. 2 ° Cfr. I Sent. , d. 3 , p . 1 , q . 1 , ad 5 ; and d. 1 7 , p . 1 , q . 4 (I , 69-70; 300302. ) 19

1 55

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

DISPUTED Q UESTION V

when lifted out of himself, 24 turns with all the power of the mind to the ve ry fount of wisdom. Therefore t the obj ection that our beati• tude is not found in accidental realities does not mean that we are not dis p osed for beatitude through some sort of accidental reality. Rather, it means that whatever is accidental has the nature of a prin­ ci ple that directs us rather than that of a principle hi which we find rest and consummation. And in this sense we posit created wisdom in the soul of Christ and in every other soul, not as that in which the soul finds repose, but as that by which it is led to its end and by which it is dis posed to receive that uncreated wisdom through which it is brought to beatitude p rincipally and most properly.

making it conformed to God and ca pable of contuitin g the li ght of uncreated wisdom. 25

6- 7 . To the obj ection that wisdom confers the ability to discern, and that wisdom is more noble than the person who possesses wis­ dom, it must be said that, properly speaking, created wisdom in ir,. self is not said to confer the ability to discern. Rather, by dis p osing us th rough that created wisdom, it is uncreated wisdom itself that confers on us the ability to discern. Therefore, it does not follow that created wisdom itself possesses either the ability to discern or the act of discernment, for it does not have the nature of a complete being. Rather t it has the nature of an intermedia ry principle that paves the way and dis poses , as is clear from the above.

1 0. To the obj ection that knowledge requires nothing more than a knowing subj ect, an obj ect, and a cause of knowing, it must be said that the "knowing subj ect" can mean either the cognitive facul­ ty or the cognitive facul ty together with its habit. If it is taken to mean the cognitive facul ty with its habit, then it is true. And then it includes created knowledge which is a habit in the soul. But if it designates only the cognitive faculty , then · it is false, and our re­ sponse would be to rej ect the argu ment completely. 26

1 56

8 . To the obj ection that wisdom makes anyone united with it to be a wise p erson, it must be said that wisdom can be united with someone in several ways, either as a hyp ostasis is united with that nature in which it subsists , o� as the cause and light of knowledge is united to the knower enlightened by it. Wisdom does not make a p erson wise in the first sense, for in this sense the body of Christ would be wise by virtue of its union with wisdom. It is in the sec­ ond sense th.at a person is made wise. But in th.is sense, wisdom is united with the soul of Christ only through the mediation of the gift of created wisdom, which is like an informing ligh t for the soul,

24 The meaning of this expression is explained below, in the res ponse where the meaning _ of "cognitio excessiva" is discussed.

1 57

9. To the obj ection that the greater a wisdom is , the more know­ able it is and the more it enables one to know, it must be said that this is true when wisdom is viewed as a kind of influence. But it is not true when wisdom is viewed as an informing cause unless it is that sort of wisdom whose nature it is to inform and to perfect and to be united to another as a form. But th.is is not the nature of uncreated wisdom but only of created wisdom. And therefore, the conclusion of the argument does not hold.

1 1 . To the obj ection that God is the life of the soul as the soul is the life of the body , it must be said that the soul is called the life of the body in two senses ; either in as far as it informs the body or in as far as it influences the body, because the soul is related to the body in two ways, namely, as the perfecting form or as the principle of movement. 27 Therefore, when the argu ment shows that, as a principle of life, the soul is like God, it must be said that this is understood of the soul in as far as it is a motor, not in as far as it is a perfection. Moreover, the soul moves the body by means of its power and by disposing the body in such a way that it is ca p able of being influenced by the soul. It is in this way that the divine li ght 25 Cfr. III Sent., d. 2, a. 3, q . 2 ad 3, and 4 (Ill, 53). 26 The Latin word here is equivalent to "negation." Cfr. Aristotle, II De anima, text. 55ff. (c. 5), where a similar distinction is implied. 27 Cfr. Aristotle, II De anima, text. Sff., text. 1 3ff., and text. 36ff. (c. 1 , 2 and 4).

1 58

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

and love move and enliven the soul by means of the grace and wis­ dom infused into it. 1 2 . To the objection that if God knew through something other than the divinity itself, then the divine knowledge would be inferior, it must be said that there is no comparison. Since God is the most exalted being, there can be nothing more noble than the divine being, neither in an absolute sense nor in a relative sense, neither in terms of being nor in terms of perfect being; for God's being is itself perfect being. And even though the soul of Christ is more noble than all other creatures by virtue of the grace of union, still in that soul there is a difference between being and perfect being and between substance and accidental disposition. And since, by reason of that disposition, it acquires some completion, it is not contrary to its nobility as a creature to have something that is more noble than itself, at least in a relative sense. For the ultimate completion and perfection to which the desire of that soul is directed is uncreated wisdom, and it is disposed toward this by means of a created influ­ ence. This is is clear from what was said above. 1 3 . To the objection about the intellect approaching immediately to the fount of wisdom, it must be said that there is a medium that disposes and a medium that leads away. 28 The first is intrinsic; the second is extrinsic. The first creates greater closeness; the second, greater distance. The proposition is true if it is taken to refer to a medium that leads away. But the created wisdom that is posited in Christ has the nature of a medium that disposes his soul to drink perfectly and immediately from the fount of eternal wisdom. Thus it is clear that the argument proves nothing. 1 4 . To the objection that the soul of Christ should be adored with latTia because of its union with the majesty, etc. , it must be said that there is no comparison, for adoration is an act which is owed to the nature because of the person. The honor which is shown to Christ is shown neither to the soul itself nor to the body, 28 See II Sent., d. 23, a. 2, q. 3 ad 7 (U, 546).

DISPUTED QUESTION V

1 59

but to the person in which both subsist. But, knowledge is an act that proceeds from the power of the soul itself. Now as the divine and human natures are distinct in Christ, so they have different powers and operations and hence different forms of wisdom and knowledge, but not different forms of honor. And therefore, there is no comparison. 1 5 . To the objection that wherever the fullness of wisdom is given, it is superfluous to posit partial wisdom, it must be said that this is true when it refers to the same thing and in the same sense. But when it is said that Christ has the fullness of wisdom, this holds in reference to His uncreated nature when fullness is under� stood in an absolute sense and as something beyond all created cate­ gories . But if fullness is understood only in terms of created catego­ ries, it can refer to his created nature. And then, when viewed in relation to absolute fullness , such created fullness is partial in a cer­ tain way. This is not superfluous , but rather proportionate to the soul itself which, in its naked reality, is not capable of receiving the immensity of uncreated wisdom in itself. 1 6. To the objection that nature does not employ many means , etc., it must be said that this is true if the effect can be attained as perfectly and in as orderly a way by means of one as by means of _ _ many. But that i s not the case here, not because o f any defect in the wisdom that illumines, but because of the nature of the soul itself 29 that is the recipient, as is clear from the above. 1 7 . To the objection concerning the material lights , it mus t be said that there is no similarity, since it is not the case that any of those lights is a disposing cause for another. Rather, each has its own proper and distinct being. Therefore, the power of one light appears to be less than that of another which shows its superiority by means of its intens ity. But this is not the case in the argument, because created wisdom disposes for uncreated wisdom. But the ___________________________________ 29 Cfr. also lII Sent., d. 1 4, a. 3, q. 1 , ad 3 (Ill, 320). On the same page, ad 4 and ad 5 suggest the following and the preceding solutions.

1 60

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

created wisdom does not shine except by virtue of the uncreated.

And one does not attain to uncreated wisdom except by virtue of a created disposing cause.

1 8 . To the objection concerning the distance between created and uncreated knowledge, and between opinion and knowledge, it must

QU ESTION VI

in the same subject, are concerned with the same object, and view

Whether the soul of Christ comprehends the uncreated wisdom itself.

conditions. But created and uncreated wisdom, though they differ in nature, a re not concerned with the same viewpoint, and they do not involve opposite and contradictory conditions . Indeed, they are nee•

Supposing that the soul of Christ possessed both uncreated wis­ dom and created wisdom, the question then arises whether his soul

be said that there is no similarity since opinion and knowledge exist that object from the same viewpoint but in diverse and opposite

essarily correlative, because nothing created subsists except by virtue

of the uncreated . And thus the a n swer to all the objections is clear.

comprehends uncreated wisdom. It seems that this is so.

ARGUMENTS FOR THE AFFIRMATIVE POSITION: 1

1 . The third chapter of John says : " It is not by measure that

God gives the Spirit" ; and the Glossa says: "While God measures for human beings , there is no measure in God with respect to the Son. But, as God generates the Son totally from th e totality of the divine being, so God gives the whole of the Spirit to the incarnate

Son, not partially and in pieces but completely and universally." But

the measure of the gif rof the Spirit is the measure of the kno�ledge

of truth. Therefore, if the soul of Christ receives the Spirit without measure, it knows God without measure. But this means nothing other than to comprehend the divine wisdom itself. Therefore, etc. 2. Again, Augustine writes in the thirteenth book of On

Trinit-y, chapter

1 9:

2

the

" In the Word I recognize the true Son of God,

________________________________________ 1 Verse 34. Cfr. The biblical gloss known to twelfth and thirteen th-century masters simply as the "Glossa" later came to be called the "Glossa ordinaria." Its

authorship has long been debated. It is commonly associated with W. Srrabo and Nicholas of Lyra, hence the references along this line in the Qu aracchi edition of Bonaventure. For a more recent discussion on the matter, cfr. B. Smalley, The Stud:, of the Bible in the Middle Ages (Notre Dame Press, 1 964), p. 46ff. For the biblical text involved here, see also Augustine, In loan. Evang., tract. 1 4, n. 1 Off. The same question is discussed in III Sent., d. 1 4, a. 1 , q. 2 (lll , 298 -302). 2 n. 24: "In Verbo . . . et utrumque simul in u nam personam Dei et hominis ineffabili gratiae largitate coniunctum."

1 63

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

DISPUTED QUESTION VI

and in the flesh I recognize the true Son of man, both joined in the one person of the God-incarnate by the gift of an ineffable grace." Since the grace of union is ineffable, it is immense and incom­ prehensible. But the measure of grace is the measure of knowledge. Therefore, if the infinite can be comprehended in a knowledge that exceeds comprehension, however great may be its immensity, it is comprehended by the soul united with it.

But this is the sort of unity that exists between the soul of Christ and the uncreated wisdom. Therefore, etc.

1 62

3. Again, Hugh says in On the Wisdom of Christ: 3 "The soul of Christ possesses by grace everything that God possesses by nature." But, by nature, God comprehends the divine wisdom. Therefore, the soul of Christ has this by reason of grace. 4. Again, to be God is as much as or even more than to compre­ hend God . But the grace of union brings it about that a creature is God. Therefore, all the more so can that grace make it happen that the creature com prehends God. But this creature is none other than the soul of Christ. Therefore, etc. 5. Again, in To Eugene 4 Bernard distinguishes a natural unity, a unity of dignity, and a unity of superdignity. The unity of dignity is not as great as the unity of the trinity, which is one of superdignity; but it is greater than a natural unity. But, both in a natural unity and in a unity of super-dignity, one of the extremes is included by the other, and vice versa. Therefore, for the same reason and even more so would this seem to be the case with the unity of dignity.

J In a more com plete form , De sapiemia animae Christi. Toward the end of this work, these words are attributed to Ambrose. Furthermore, the followin g argu ment is sugges ted in the same place. 4 Or book V De coruideratione , c. 8 and 9 , · n. 1 8- 2 1 . There, amon g the nine types of union , he names the "unitas nativa , " namely, that union by which our earthly reality was assumed by the Word of God into a unity of person; and a " unitas su perdignativa," chat is, the unity of the trinity by which three persons are one substance and which is the highest of all unities. In n. 20 he shows that this unity of two {unities) (sc. the uni ty of the trinity and the natural unity) cons ists in a mediu m of unities , one of which is known to be less than the other, and one of which is known to excel the other.

6. Again, lsidore5 writes : "The trinity is known to itself alone and to the man that was assumed." This is certainly not to be understood as any sort of knowledge whatsoever, but only that sort of knowledge which the trinity does not share with a mere creature. But this is nothing other than comprehensive knowledge. Therefore, the creature united [with God] has this sort of knowledge. 7. Again, Cassiodorus 6 writes: "A healthy mind understands that inaccessible light which is above all other lights." But the soul united with the Word was healthy in the highest degree. Therefore, it understood that light which is above all other lights. Therefore, either it comprehended no light, or if it comprehended some light, it was precisely this one that it comprehended. 8 . Again, the grace of union surpasses any grace of comprehen­ sion beyond all proportion. Therefore, it causes God to be known with a clarity beyond all measure. But this is nothing other than a comprehension of the divine wisdom. Therefore, etc. For only the infinite exceeds everything finite beyond all proportions . 7 9. Aga in, Augustine says in the ninth book of On the Trinity8 that the soul is simple. Therefore, when it knows itself, it knows it­ self totally and not in part. Therefore, since the eternal wisdom is simple, if it is known by the soul of Christ, it is known totally. But to know a reality totally is the same as to comprehend it. Therefore, etc. 1 0. Again, the truth of the following proposition is self-evident: 9 _________________________________________ 5 I Sent., c. 3, n. 1 . 6 De anima, c. 3 . 7 Aristotle, I De caelo et mundo, text. 52 and 64 proportion between th e infinite and the finite." 8 C. 4 , n. 7. le is CJ(.pressed with grearer clarity in 3, n. 6. Cfr. VII De Genesi ad llcceram , c. 2 1 , n. 28. 9 Cfr. III Sent., d. 1 4, a. 1 , q. 2, arg. o pp. 4 , (Ill,

(c. 6 & 7 ) : "There i s n o the same work, Book X, c. 299). There the Quaracchi

1 64

1 65

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CH RIST

DISPUTED QUESTION VI

When a simple object is known , it is known in its fullness. There­ fore, that which is more simple is known more fully. And that which is most simple is known most fully. But the uncreated Word is supremely simple. Therefore, it is known in the fullest degree. But this is the same as to comprehend most perfectly. Therefore, it is comprehended most perfectly by the soul of Christ.

who understands a point totally in terms of its essence understands it totally in terms of its power as well. But with God, essence and power are identical, and whatever pertains to the divine essence is one and the same and supremely simple. Therefore, either nothing of God is known or, if something about God is known, the mystery of God is known totally and in its fullness. Therefore, God is com­ prehended totally and in the fullness of the divine being. Therefore, not only does the soul of Christ comprehend the Word, but so does every soul that knows God in whatever way.

1 1 . Again, when the soul of Christ knows the Word, either the Word is fully evident to it, or something of the Word is evident and something is hidden. If the Word is entirely evident to it, then the soul comprehends the Word in its fullness. But if something is evi­ dent and something is hidden, then there would be diverse parts in the Word. But this is not possible because then the Word would not be supremely simple. Therefore, etc. 1 2 . Again, if something remains hidden, either that reality is God or it is not. If it is not God, then the fact that it remains hidden does not stand in the way of comprehending God . But if it is God, then God is hidden from the soul of Christ. But no soul to whom God remains hidden is beatified. Therefore, according to this propo­ sition, the soul of Christ is not beatified. But this is absurd. There­ fore, the premiss from which it follows is absurd also. 1 3 . Again, as the reality of God is truly immense, so it is truly s imple. But, as it is proper to immensity that it is never totally grasped, so it is proper to simplicity that, if it is grasped by anyone, it is grasped in its totality. Therefore, for the very same reason that God is said to be incomprehensible by virtue of the divine immensi­ ty, the same divine being is said to be comprehensible by virtue of its simplicity. 1 4. Again, if in a point essence and power are identical, anyone

1

1 5 . Again, Bede 0 says that " Nothing less than God can bring fulfillment to the soul." But if the capacity of the soul could be filled with some finite thing, then something less than God would fill tl1e soul. Therefore, the capacity of the soul reaches to the infinite as infinite. But, since the soul of Christ is fully perfect, it comprehends everything to which its capacity extends . Therefore, it comprehends the infinite. 1 6. Again, the soul of Christ loves God to the degree that God ought to be loved. But God ought to be loved without limit or meas­ ure.1 1 Therefore, since his soul must know to the same degree that it loves, it knows without measure. Therefore, etc. 1 7 . Again, the intellect is of such a nature that it finds strength in the knowledge of that which is supremely knowable. 1 2 There­ fore, the more the soul of Christ knows with clarity, the more cap­ able it becomes of knowing with even greater clarity. Therefore, either his soul will never arrive at repose, or it totally comprehends the Word united with it. 1 8. Again, if there were a being whose receptive capacity was increased by the fact that it grasped an object, either it would never _________________________________________________

editors refer to Aristotle, De lineis insecab. for the following: " Res , quae partibus caret, tangit rem panibus carencem, tota totam , ergo eundem locum possidebum (duo puncta sese tangentia) ." Also, Augu stine, VU De Gen. ad litt. , c. 21 , n. 28 for the argu ment concerning the simplicity of the soul.

10 11

Expos. in Act., 5, 3. Bernard , De diligendo Deo, c. 1 , n. l : "Causa diligendi Deum Deus est;

modus , sine modo diligere." 1 2 I Senr. , d. 1 , a. 3, q. l , ad 2 (I, 39).

1 66

1 67

TH E KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

DISPUTED QUESTION VI

be filled by its object or it would grasp the infinite. But the capacity of the soul of Christ is of such a sort. Therefore, either it remains partially empty or it comprehends infinite wisdom.

writes: "Whatever is known is limited in the comprehension of the knower." But the infinite can in no way be limited by the finite. Therefore, in no way is it comprehended by the finite. But since the soul of Christ is a creature, it is finite. Therefore, etc.

1 9 . Again, the finite is as dista nt from the infinite as the created is from the uncreated. But the distance between the created and the uncreated does not stand in the way of the intellect elevating itself to know the uncreated precisely as uncreated. For the same reason , therefore, the finite can be elevated to a knowledge of the infinite as infinite. But this is not found anywhere but in the soul of Christ. Therefore, etc. 20. Again, to the degree that the finite is distant from the infinite, so the simple is from the composite. But the knowledge of the soul of Christ, even though it implies a certain composition, nonetheless grasps and knows the Word itself in its supremely simple nature. Therefore, the same can be said concerning its supreme infinity. But this is the same as comprehending the wisdom of the Word in its totality. Therefore, the soul of Christ comprehends the uncreated wisdom.

ARGUMENTS FOR THE NEGATIVE POSITION: 1 . In the first book, chapter 4 , 1 3 Damascene writes : "God is infinite and incomprehens ible. And there is one thing about the divine essence that can be comprehended: namely, that the divine is infinite and incomprehens ible." Therefore, if the divinity is said to be incomprehensible, this is so not by reason of itself but with respect to created nature. If, therefore, the soul of Christ is a created reality, the uncreated wisdom is incomprehensible to it. 2 . Again, in the twelfth book of On the City of God, 1 4 Augustine

13 The reference is to De fide orthodoxa . The M igne edition has, "lnfinitus igitur est Deus et incomprehensibilis, atque hoc unum est, quod de eo percipi possit et comprehendi."

14 Ch. 1 8.

3. Again, every knowing subject knows in accordance with its own proper faculty. 15 But the cognitive faculty of Christ's soul is finite. Therefore, whatever that faculty knows, it knows as finite and in a finite mode. Therefore, in no way does it comprehend the infinite . 4. Again, in the case of the comprehensive knowledge of an object, the object is grasped totally within the subject. Therefore, the subject is either equal to or greater than the object grasped. But the soul of Christ is neither equal to nor greater than tp.e eternal Word. Therefore, in no way does it comprehend the Word. 5 . Again, the soul can think of something greater than any object that it comprehends, because when the soul approaches its limits , its thought can be extended still further. But nothing can be thought to be greater than the wisdom of God. Therefore, it is necessary that the soul of Christ apprehend the wisdom of God in a way that is not comprehensive. 6. Again, even though· the soul of Christ is supremely united with the Word, still it does not enclose the Word within itself in terms of its existence; for the Word exists outside the soul. And the soul . of Christ united with the Word is not present in all the places in which the Word is present. For the same reason, the intellect of the soul of Christ does not grasp the divine wisdom within itself in its totality. Therefore, it does not comprehend it. 7 . Again, to comprehend something is to grasp it fully. But the infinite can be fully grasped only by virtue of an infinite act. But an infinite act can proceed only from an infinite power. But no power __________________________________________ 15

According to Boethius, V De con;olatione , prosa 4: "Omne enim quod cognoscitur, non secundum sui vim, sed secundum cognoscentium potius compre, henditur faculcatem."

1 68

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

DISPUTED QUESTION VI

can be infinite unless it rests in a substance that is likewise infinite. But if the soul of Christ were to comprehend the divine wisdom, since that wisdom is infinite, the soul would be infinite in substance, power, and o peration. But this is false and im possible. Therefore, etc.

Conclusion

8. Again, a subj ect that comprehends another being in terms of the other's dimensive quanti ty is coextensive with the other to the point of being equal in extension. Therefore, any subj ect that com­ prehends an obj ect in the intensi ty of its clari ty is equal to that obj ect in clari ty . But it is im p ossible for the soul of Christ to be equal to the clari ty of the divine wisdom since that wisdom is pure li ght, and the soul, in as far as it is a creature, is darkness. 16 Therefore, it is im pos sible for the eternal wisdom of God to be com­ prehended by the soul of Christ. 9. Aga in, eterni ty is related to aevitemity as a larger circle is related to a smaller circle. But it is impossible for the larger circle to be comprehended by the smaller. Therefore , it is impossible for an eternal substance to be comprehended by an aevitemal substance. But the wisdom of God is eternal while the soul of Christ is not eternal but aeviternal. 1 7 Therefore, etc. 1 0. Again, a subj ect that comprehends something knows that j ob ect most perfectly. Therefore , if the soul of Christ comprehends eternal wisdom , it would necessarily be wise in the highest degree. Therefore, it would also be beatified in the highest degree. There­ fore , it would be equal to God in beatitude and in goodness , and it would have neither a beginning nor an end. Therefore , it would be neither a soul nor a creature. Therefore , if these conclusions are impos sible , together with many other things that could be concluded from this , it is impossible that the divine wisdom be comprehended by the soul of Christ. 16 Accordin g to Au gu stine, Xlll Confess. , c. 2, n. 3; c. 8 , n. 9; De Gen. ad lit. I , c. 4 , n. 9ff. and IV , c. 22, n. 39 and c. 26, n. 4 3; and Serm. 67 de Verbis Evang. Matth., c. 5, n. 8ff. 17 11 Sent., d. 2, p . 1 , a. I , q . l (II, 55-57).

1 69

The soul of Christ cannot comprehend the uncreated wisdom if "comprehend " is understood . in the proper sense of the word. Res ponse: In order to understand what has been said above , it is necessary to note-in accordance with the discussion in the p revious question-that p erfect and certain knowledge in any creature requires the concurrence of the eternal light, not only through its presence but throu gh its influence as well. It requires not only the uncreated Word, but the word conceived within us as well ; not only the eternal wisdom, but the awareness impressed on our soul as well ; not only that truth which causes, but that truth which informs as well. Therefore, since the soul of Christ, and any other soul that knows God, knows according to the measure of the influence of the Wo rd together with that awareness which informs the mind from within , this sort of word and knowledge is by nature created and hence Hmit�d. -Th���f�;�·:· tt·-�����t--b�- -�q��l --t� t h e divine wisdom wni.ch--is- inf'fnite from every pers p ective. It must be admitted that un­ created wisdom can be comprehended neither by a soul united with it, nor by a ny other creature as long as " to be comprehended" means that there is a subj ect who, in the act of comprehending, grasps the obj ect fully and completely within itself, from eve ry per­ s pective, in accordance with what Augu stine said to Paulinus in On 18 Seeing God: "No one ever com p rehends the fullness of God. Not only is this im possible for the bodily eyes , but even for the mind . It is one thing to see; it is another to comprehend fully what is seen. Something is seen when its presence is sensed in some way , where­ as something is comprehended fully when it is seen in such a way that nothing remains hidden to the person who sees it, and its limits can be observed." For this sort of vision, however , it is neces­ sarily required that the subj ect comprehending be either eq ual to or Ep isro!a 1 47 (or 1 1 2 ) , c. 9 , n. 2 1 : "Non quia Dei p lenitudinem q uis quam non solum oculis corporis , sed vel i psa mente aliquando com prehendi c, " etc. 18

1 70

TH E KNOWLEDGE OF CH RIST

greater than that which it comprehends , in act, habit, and power. But neither the soul of Christ nor any other creature can be related in this way to the eternal wisdom, since this wisdom is infinite while these souls are finite. Therefore, this wisdom exceeds these souls beyond any proportion. And · this is what Augustine says in the ninth book of On the Trinity, chapter 1 1 / 9 "We are like God in as much as we know God. But, since we do not know the divine being as it knows its elf, we are not like God to th e extent of being equal with the divine. " And later: "When we know God, although we become better than we were before we had such knowledge, especially when this knowledge, pleas ing and worthily loved as it is , becomes a word and thereby produces a certain likeness to God, yet that knowledge is less than God , because it exists in a lower nature; for the mind is a creature, and God is the Creator." Therefore, if " comprehension" is taken in its proper sense, it is dear tha't in knowing the eternal Word, the soul of Christ does not comprehend that Word, for it is incapable of generating a word equal to it. Therefore, the arguments in favor of this should be conceded . The contrary arguments proceed from three points of view: namely, from the immensity of the grace of union , from the simplic­ ity of the Word and of the wisdom of God, and from the capacity of the soul and its desire for rest. In order to better grasp these, we must understand that, even though the divine and human natures are distant from each other as the infinite is from the finite, yet they can be united in a hypostatic union in a way that preserves the . properties of each nature. But the divine nature itself never becomes finite, nor the human nature infinite. Therefore, though God is a man and a man is God because of the union of person and hypos­ tasis, nonetheless the operations of each nature are to be maintained unconfused, even though they are predicated mutually because of the 20 communication of idioms. 19 n. 1 6.

zo Damascene explains the communication of idioms in Ill De fide orihodoxa, c. 3 as follows: "Verbum porro, quia ipsius sunt quae sanctae eius carnis sunt, ea quae humanitati convenium sibi vindicac, et vicissim cami quae sua sunt impertit; illo nlrpirurn altemae communicationis modo, ob muruam inter se panium commeationem unionemve hyposraticam, . . . Eo porro nomine Dominus ipsae

DISPUTED QUESTION VI

1 71

Furthermore, even though the divine Word is simple, it is none­ theless infinite, not in material quantity but in the quantity of its power, because the more simple a thing is, the more unified is its power. "A power that is more unified is more infinite than a power that is multiplied. "21 Therefore, since the divine Word is supreme­ ly simple, it is also supremely infinite. Therefore, since it is totally present wherever it is , it is not circumscribed, and it is not compre­ hended by any creature. Finally, although the intellect and affective power of the rational soul are never brought to rest except in God and in the infinite good , this is not because the soul comprehends God , but because nothing is sufficient for the soul unles s it exceeds the soul' s capacity. Therefore, it is true that the intellect and affectivity of the rational soul are directed to the infinite good and truth2 2 precisely in as far as these are infinite. But it can be directed to these in six different ways : namely, in terms of faith, reasoning, wonder, viewing, ecstasy, and comprehension. The first way is imperfect and is proper to the wayfaring state. The last way is the most perfect and is proper to the eternal and infinite trinity. The second and third ways pertain to the progress of the historical journey. The fourth and fifth pertain to the consummation of heaven. For, in the wayfaring state, we can con­ template the divine immensity by reasoning and by wonder. And in heaven, we can do so through viewing when we will be made con­ formed to God and by ecstasy when we will be totally intoxicated. It is because of this intoxication that Anselm says at the end of the Proslogion23 that it is more true to say that we shall enter more fully into the joy of the lord than that the joy of the lord shall enter into our hearts . And since that soul which is united with the Word is made more God-like and is more intoxicated because of a grace that is not only sufficient but superexcellent, therefore it beholds the ___________________________________ gloriae crucifixus dicitur, quamvis alioqui divina ipsius natura minime passa sit," etc. (ed. Migne). 21 Uber de causis, propos. l 7. See Augustine, De quantitate animae, c. 3 , n . 4 on the quantity of weight and power. 22 Cfr. lV Sent., d. 49, p. 1 , q. lff. (IV, 1 000- 1 01 1 ). 23 Ch. 26: "Non ergo torum illud gaudium inttabit in gaudentes, sed toti gaudentes incrabunt in gaudium." (Cfr. Matt. 25, 2 1 , and 23).

1 72

1 73

THE K.NOWLEDGE OF C H RIST

DISPUTED QUESTION VI

divine wisdom, and in this beholding it is drawn to that wisdom in ecstasy even though it does not comprehend that wisdom. For this

union is solely one of condescension and grace. Therefore, in this case it is not necessary that the comprehension be reciprocal.

reason, wonder has a place not only in historical existence but in heaven as well, a nd not only in the case of the angels but in that soul which was assumed by God, as it is said: " Such knowledge is 24 too wonderful for me; it is high, and I cannot attain it." As the

Glossa explains

in reference to the man assumed by the Word: "No one can be equal to him in wisdom or in any other way." In view of these reflections, we can easily respond to the objections.

REPLIES TO THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE AFFIRMATIVE POSITION:

1 -2-3 -4.

To the objection from the Glossa that grace is given to Christ without measure, and from the arguments of Augustine that that grace is ineffable, a nd from the authority of Hugh as well as

from the argument he gives that this grace makes the man to be

God; to all these we must respond that all of them are true and they are to be understood in _terms of the coming together of the two

natures in one person. It is from this perspective, because of the immensity of that person, that the grace of union is said to be immense and •ineffable, and because of the unity of person that he

can be God and that divine attributes can be predicated of the man. But, from this it does not follow that this soul, or its power, or its

habit, or its act ceases to be created a nd hence finite and limited. And therefore, it does not follow that this soul is capable of an act that comprehends the eternal wisdom since such an act would be

infinite and from an infinite power.

5. To the objection from the words of Bernard concerning the

three types of union or unity, it must be said that there is no com, parison. In the case of a natural unity and a unity of superdignity,

the extremes are proportional. Each of these is a connatural unity.

But it is different in the case of the unity of dignity, because that

Zi Ps 1 38, 6. The Gloss on this is from Cassiodorus and is given by Peter Lombard in Ill Sent., cl. XIV, c.. l .

6. To the objection from Isidore that the trinity is known only to

itself, etc. , it must be said that this is affirmed only because of the communication of idioms , or because of the most intimate mode of revelation of its own secrets communicated to that soul that is

united to itself. This will be made more clear in the following • 25 question. 7. To the objection from Cassiodorus about the inaccessible light which the healthy mind perceives above all other lights , it must be said that this is true if " healthy" is understood to refer to perfect

deiformity. But from this it does not follow that it is comprehended, but only that the other lights, being les s brilliant, are comprehensi­

ble while this one is greater. Therefore, although it is more clearly

known by the soul than are the other lights, still it does not follow that it is comprehended.

8. To the objection that the grace of union exceeds any grace of

comprehension, it must be said that this is true. But this does not mean that the grace of union confers an infinite power on the soul

of Christ-since it does not abolish its created existence-but it

means that this grace places the soul in an infinite hypostasis . An operation emanating from a power must be viewed in terms of the greater or lesser efficacy of that power. Therefore, the grace of union and the grace of comprehension do not belong to the same cl as s .

Because o f the lack of proportion between them, it does not follow

that the grace of union elicits an infinite act from the soul, just as it does not follow that a line is infinite in act even though it excels the

point beyond all proportions.

9. To the objection from Augustine that, because the soul is simple, when it knows itself, it knows itself totally, etc. , it must be

said that this is the case because the soul has a limited s implicity,

from which come its finitude and indivisibility. Therefore, when it ______________________________________ 25

Cfr. also lil Sem., cl. 1 4, a. 1 , q. 2, ad 3 (Ill, 301 ).

1 74

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

DISPUTED QUESTION VI

knows itself, it knows itself totally and in its wholeness. But the

s ide it, so it is grasped by a particular intellect and yet is not com­

d ivine wisdom, as was previously shown, is connected with infinity.

Therefore, while it can be approached and apprehended by a cr�a­ ture, it can never be circumscribed or comprehended by a creature.

1 0. To the objection that the truth of this proposition is self-evi­

1 75

prehended by it, for it exceeds that intellect. And from this , the ans­

wer becomes clear to the following objection that, if something [of the Word] remained hidden, the intellect [of Christ] would not be beatified. As has already been said, [the Word] is said to be incom­ prehensible not because some part of it remains hidden but because

dent-"When a simple object is attained, it is attained in its whole­ u ness -it must be said that this is true in the case of a finite, simple

of its immense simplicity.

in one sense, it is untrue in another sense. If "to attain in its whole­ ness" is understood to mean without distinguishing one part from

simplicity, it must be said that this is true. When it is argued further that incomprehensibility is related to the infinite as comprehensibili­

object. But with respect to an infinite, simple object, while it is true

1 3 . To the objection that where there is true infinity, there is true

another, it is true. But if " to attain in its wholeness" is understood . to mean that it is known in all its fullness and perfection so that it is not superior to the one who comprehends it, it is false. Therefore, in the past it was commonly said that, even though something was known as a whole, yet it was not known from every perspective. As

does not imply equality or limitation, neither absolutely in itself nor in relation to something else, because, as has already been shown,

in the object itself. But " from every perspective" is adverbial and 26 qualifies the verb. Thus , it affirms in the act of knowing a perfec­

necessarily infinite. There are two sorts of quantity, namely, m aterial quantity and quantity of power. In the case of mat.erial quantity,

hending and the object comprehended. But this cannot be the case

of the quantity of power, they rest on the same foundation, because the intens ity of unity contributes to the unification and magnifica­

a noun, " the whole" refers to a disposition either in the subject or

tion and equality from every perspective between the subject compre­ in a finite being with respect to the infinite.

1 1 -1 2 .

To the objection that lthe Word] is either totally hidden or totally evident, etc. , the response is dear already since the Word is both totally hidden and totally evident. It is evident as a whole to the subject who apprehends it, since the subject does not aj)prehend it in separate parts. But it remains totally hidden in terms of com­ prehension, since nothing of the Word can be comprehended by a

created intellect. For the Word in its wholeness is infinite, and it is

simultaneously simple. Therefore, that very reality that is apprehend­

ed is not comprehended. As the same eternal Word, totally and in

the same respect, is present in a particular creature but is also out-

26

Priscianus , XI Grammaticae, c. 2: "Adverbium (dicirur), quod verbo adiungi­ rur" ( cfr. ibid. XV, c. 1 ) . For the solution itself, cfr. III Sent., d. 1 4 , a. 1 , q . 2 , ad 4 {lll, 301 ) . ln the same place, in " ad 5," the following solution is intimated.

ty is to the simple, it must be said that this is false because the infi­ nite, precisely as infinite, means a transcendence beyond all propor­

tion with respect to the finite. But the s imple, precisely as simple,

that which is most simple-precisely in as far as it is most simple-is

s implicity and infinity rest on different foundations. But in the case

tion of power. And therefore, the highest degree of simplicity does

not confer comprehensibility, but rather an immense power and incomprehensibility. 1 4. To the objection about the point that its essence and power

are identical, etc. , it must be said that the eternal Word is not com­ prehended by any creature, neither in terms of essence nor in terms

of power, for both the divine power and the divine essence have an

immensity that surpasses every created faculty to an infinite degree . Hence there is no parallel with the point whose essence is circum­ scribed.

1 5 . To the objection that nothing less than God can fill the soul , · it must be said that this is true, as has already been said, because

the soul is not satisfied with any good which it grasps and compre­

hends, since no such good is the highest.

It

is satisfied only

by

a

1 76

1 77

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

DlSPUTED QUESTION VI

good of such a sort that, in grasping and apprehending it, the soul

posed , the soul of Christ attains to the uncreated and to the su­ premely simple; and that, for the same reason, even though it is finite, it attains to the infinite as infinite, it must be said that we can

is taken captive by its greatness and superexcellence.

To the objection that the soul of Christ loves as much as it

grant the conclusion that it attains to the infinite just as it attains to

follow from this that it loves God to the same degree that the divine

attain to the infinite by comprehension , but by apprehension and by

16.

ought to, it must he said that this is true. Nevertheless, it does not mystery loves itself, for the love by which God loves the divine real­ ity is eternal, immense, and coequal with the beloved. But th at love which proceeds from the will of Christ can only be finite. And

when it is said that the measure of loving God is beyond measure, this does not mean that such love is without limit and measure, since these qualities are coequal with the status of every creature; it means that in the act of loving, . affectivity should create neither a limit nor a restricting object for itself. Rather, it ought to be extend­ ed in an ecstatic way to that supremely infinite goodness with every 27 effort of the s pirit.

1 7 - 1 8 . To the objection that the intellect is strengthened by knowing that which is supremely intelligible, and that its capacity is increased by grasping a greater object, it must be said that this can be unders tood in two ways . In one way, from the fact of knowing and grasping that which is supremely intelligible, it is strengthened and made more powerful with res pect to things that are below it; 28 In a second way, it may be under­ a nd in this sense it is true. stood to mean that it is capable of a still greater light and truth than what it has received. And this is false, because the capacity of the

soul is determined by the capacity of its power, which is rooted in

a finite substance. Therefore, it is finite in act and can find sufficient

fullness in a finite degree of deiformity which, by assimilating the soul to God according to the fullness of its potential, makes the soul reach toward the infinite good. And in this way it confers perfection and repose on the soul.

1 9 - 20. To the objection that, 21

even though it is created and com-

Cfr. III Senr., d. 27, a. 2, q. 5, ad I (Ill, 61 2).

28 Aristotle

teaches the same thing in Ill De anima, text. 7 (c. 4}.

that which is uncreated and supremely simple. For as it does not

ecstasy, so it attains to the uncreated and the supremely simple in the same way. Yet it could be said that the situation is not the same

in both cases because to know the simple as simple and the un­

created as uncreated involves nothing more than the assimilation of the subject with the object known. But to know the infinite as infinite involves not only an assimilation but a certain equality as well, for the infinite in as far as it is infinite designates a quantity- · and therefore, the conclus ion does not follow, just as it does not fol­

low that if a creature can be assimilated to God, it can likewise by

equated with God. Now we admit that, while the soul of Christ is conformed to God, yet it is not equal to God. And therefore we

concede and we hold that, even though it apprehends clearly and plainly that very wisdom which is united with itself, yet it does not comprehend this wisdom totally.

1 79

DISPUTED QUESTION VII

"The knowledg� of all things , as the Word is united to it." But the it comprehends whatever it knows . Therefore, also Word united

te

the soul of Christ.

QU ESTION VII

4

3 . Again, in the third book, Damascene

Whether the soul of C hrist comprehends all those things which the uncreated wisdom comprehends. It is as ked whether the soul of Christ comprehends all those

things which the uncreated wisdom comprehends . It seems that this lS SO.

ARGUMENTS FOR THE AFFIRMATIVE POSITION: 1

1 . In the eleventh chapter of Romans: "Oh, the depth of the richness of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How incomprehen­ sible are God's judgments, and how inscrutable the divine ways!"

From this it follows that those things which pertain to the divine

wisdom are more comprehensible than the divine judgments . But in 2 the fifth chapter of John it is said that " the Father has given over all judgment to the Son, because he is the Son of Man." From this it is concluded that the soul of Christ comprehends the divine judg­ ments. But if those matters pertaining to the divine judgments are more difficult to comprehend than those things pertaining to divine wisdom , then all the more does his soul comprehend all that per­ tains to the divine wisdom.

3

2. Again , in the fifth cha pter of Revelation it is written: "Wor­

thy is the lamb th at was slain to receive wisdom." The

Glossa says:

says: "We say that

Christ, the man , knows all things; in Christ are all the treasures of

wisdom."

If you

say !hat this mus t be understood to refer to the

divine natu re, it can be argued to the contrary that no person knows anything of which his soul is ignorant. Therefore, if Christ compre­ hends all th_ings, it is necessary that his soul should comprehend all things .

4. Again, in the Diaiogues,5 Gregory writes: " For the soul that

sees God, all creatures are insignificant." Therefore, if the soul of

Christ has perfect vision of the Word united with him, all of cre­ ation is ins ignificant to him. But beyond the whole of creation there

remains only the immensity of those things which are possible for

God. Therefore, the soul of Christ comprehends all those things .

5. Again, the soul of Christ is most perfectly united to the Word

both as Word and as exemplar. But if there were anything in the Word or in the eternal exemplar that remained hidden from the

soul of Christ, it would be possible to think of a more perfect union. Therefore, if they are united in the most perfect union, it is necessary that his soul comprehend all things.

6 . Aga in, the soul of Christ knows in the Word. And since it

knows many things in one act, it knows the many simultaneously even though, in terms of its natural knowledge, it can know only 6 one object. Therefore, since that one object refers not only to a multiplicity but to an infinity of things , it follows that if Christ' s

_____________________________________ 1 Verse 33 . 2 Verse 22 and 2 7 . The same question is discussed in III Sent., d. 1 4 , a. 2 , q. 3 OU, 3 1 2 - 1 7). ) Verse 1 2 : " Dignus . . . accipere virt1.1tem et diviniratem et sapientiam." The gloss of Haymo as found in Strabo and Nicholas of Lyra is "Cognitionem omnium reru m , sicut habet Verbum," etc.

4 De Fide orchod., c. 2 1 . The Scriptural reference i s Cot 2, 3 . 5 Libr. II, c . 3 5 . Cfr. also IV Dialog., c . 3 3 : "Quid est quod ibi nesciant, ubi scientem omnia sciunt?"; and II Mora!. c. 3, n. 3: "Quid enim de his quae scienda sum, nesciunt qui sdentem omnia sciunt?" 6 Aristotle, U Topic. c. 4 (c. 1 0): "Concingit enim plura scire, intelligere autem , non.

"

1 80

DISPUTED QUESTION VU

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

soul knows a multiplicity of th ings , for the same reason it also

knows an infinity of things.

7 . Again, the eternal Word represents equally whatever it repre­

sents , since it is one and uniform. Therefore, there is not one rea­ son that leads to one thing and another that leads to other things .

Therefore, either the soul of Christ sees nothing in the Word, or-if it sees anything-it sees an infinity of things .

8 . Again, th e soul o f Christ i s more capable o f knowledge by rea­

son of the Word united with it than any other soul would be by rea­ son of a habit conferred upon it. But a soul that has the habit of 7 wisdom comprehends everything to which that habit extends . For the same reason, the soul of Christ, by virtue of the eternal Word, comprehends everything to which the Word itself extends .

9. Again , th e soul of Christ knows th e Word itself i n its entirety

since the whole of the Word is united to it. But in the Word , es­ sence and power are identical. Therefore, his soul comprehends the 1 fullness of the Word's power. But the Word s power extends to an infinity of things . Therefore, the soul of Christ comprehends an infinity of things .

1 0 . Again, th e soul o f Christ i s closer to things a s they exist in

the Word than to things as they exist in themselves. But nothing

exists in itself without being known to the soul of Christ, for h is

soul knows everything that comes to be. Therefore, all the more so, his soul knows everything that is known by the eternal Word. 1 1 . Again, it is just as impossible to have certain knowledge of 8

contingent things as it is to comprehend the infinite. But, because

of its union with the Word, the soul of Christ has certain knowl­

181

1 2. Again, it is just as difficult to know secrets as it is to know a

multiplicity of things . But becaus e of its union with the Word, the soul of Christ knows the most secret concerns of hearts no matter

how intimate they may be. Therefore, for the same reason , h is soul

knows a multiplicity of things regardless of how great the number may be. Therefore, it knows things infinite in number. 1 3. Again, the soul of Christ comprehends everything that can be

comprehended by a creature. But every species of number is compre­ hensible to the creature. Therefore, his soul comprehends every

species of number. But the species of numbers are infinite, as the City of God. 9 There­

Augustine says in the twelfth book of On

fore, the soul of Christ comprehends an infinity of things .

1 4 . Again, th e soul of Christ comprehend s th e entire universe, and therefore it comprehends being and all the distinctions of be­ ing. Therefore, it knows not only generic distinctions but individual distinctions as well. And it knows not only being in act, but being

in potency as well. But each species has within itself a potential 10 .• infinity of individuals. Therefore, the soul of Christ comprehends an infinity of things .

1 5 . Again, the soul of Christ comprehends something finite such

as a line. Therefore, it knows the principle of the line. But the prin­ ciple of the line is a point. Therefore, it comprehends the point. But anyone who comprehends something knows th.at thing in all its potential. But, since . the potential of a point extends to an infinite

number of lines, and since the soul of Christ comprehends the entire potential of the point, it is necessary that it comprehend an infinity of things .

edge about future contingent things . Therefore, for the same reason it has knowledge of an infinity of things .

1 6. Again , the soul of Christ loves everything that is lovable . Therefore, in like manner, it knows everything that is knowable. But

7 According to Aristotle, I Mecap h. , c. 2 : "The wise man knows all thin gs as , far as possible." . 8 Cfr. Aristotle, I Periherm., c. 7 {c. 9 ) and I Poster. c. 24 (c. 30). , ,

9 Ch. 1 8. See the response in Question 1 above. 10 Porph , De praedicab., c. De specie: "lndividua, quae sum post specialis• YI)' sima [i.. e. ultimam spedeml, infinita sunt"

1 83

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

DISPUTED QUESTION VII

everything that is known by God is knowable. Therefore, the soul of Christ knows everything that is known by God.

If it knows some of those things which God can do but will not do, there is no reason why it should know some but not others. There­ fore, it seems that it knows all things that are possible for God. Therefore, it knows an infinity of things.

1 82

1 7 . Again , the soul of Christ is completely perfect. But in any­ thing that is completely perfect, all potential is reduced to act. But the intellect of Christ's soul is in potency with respect to an infinity of objects because it never knows so much that it could not know more. Therefore, since the objects of knowledge in the intellect do not limit each other,1 1 if the total potential of his soul were re­ duced to act, his soul would necessarily know an infinity of obj ects. 1 8 . Again, if the agent intellect were fully in act with respect to everything to which the possible intellect is in potency, then anyone 12 could know an infinite number of objects. Now, in the soul of Christ the Word united with the soul is fully in act with respect to all those things to which the intellect of Christ's soul is in potency. Therefore, the soul of Christ knows an infinite number of objects. 1 9. Again, either the soul of Christ can learn more things or it cannot. If it can learn more, then it is not fully perfect in knowl­ edge, and for the same reason, it is not perfect in grace. If it cannot acquire knowledge, then it knows so much that it cannot learn any­ thing more. Therefore, it is necessary that it know an infinity of things . 20. Again, either the soul of Christ knows certain things which God could do but will not do, or it does not. If it does not know such things , I ask what stands in the way. For, this is either because the soul cannot extend itself to these things, and this is manifestly false; or because God does not wish to reveal these things to that soul, and this is clearly inappropriate because it denies to the soul the most intimate familiarity with that Word to which it is united.

2 1 . Again, either the soul of Christ knows a finite number of things or it knows an infinite number of things. If it knows a finite number of things, it is always possible to think of more than all finite things. Therefore, some soul could think of more things than those which the soul of Christ knows. But it is inappropriate that some other soul should excel his soul in anything. Therefore, it is · necessary to posit that his soul knows an infinite number of objects.

ARGUMENTS FOR THE NEGATIVE POSITION: 1 1 . The Psalm: 3 "Your knowledge is wonderful," etc. ; the Glossa says: ''The man assumed cannot be equal to the divine substance in nature or in any other way." Therefore, the soul of Christ does not comprehend everything th�t is comprehended by the eternal wis­ dom.

2. Again, Augustine writes in the twelfth book of On the City of God: 1 4 "The infinity of numbers cannot be infinite for the knowl­ edge of God which comprehends it." Therefore, if the soul of Christ comprehends an infinite number of things, that infinity is finite to his soul. But if an infini ty of things is finite to his . soul, since his soul itself is finite, the objects are not infinite. Therefore, if his soul comprehends finite things, it does not comprehend an infinity of things. 3 . Again, Hugh writes in On the Wisdom of the Christ's Soul: 1 5

_______________________

Ps. 1 38, 6. The gloss on this is from Cassidorus. Ch. 18. The original text has "qua comprehendirur" instead of "quae com prehendit.'' 15 At the end: "Sed in rebus dubiis, si manifesra auctorirace non valeo, ab aliis quidem sic accipi volo, ut quaerentem me adiuvenc, invenient:em non refutent. Quicumque autem in eo persisrunt, ut hoc asserere concendant, quod alia fuerit ilia 13 14

11

Because they are present in the soul in a spirirual manner. Cfr. Aristotle, Ill De anima, text. 3ff. and 37ff. (c. 4 and 8); also I Sent., d. 35, q. 2, resp. (I, 605) and Ill Sent., d. 1 4, a. 2, q. 3 (lil, 3 1 2 - 1 7). 12 See II Senc., d. 24, p. 1 , a. 2, q. 4 (II, 567 - 7 1 ).

1 84

DISPUTED QUESTION VII

THE KNOWLE DGE OF CHRIST

"This one thing I affirm with no doubt, that there was no wisdom

other than the divine wisdom in the soul of Christ; or if there was some other wisdom, it was not equal to the divine wisdom." But it is certain that there was some other wisdom, as is dear from the preceding. Therefore, that wisdom which informs and perfects the soul and dwells within it can only be created. That sort of wisdom in Christ does not extend to the comprehension of all those things

which the uncreated wisdom comprehends .

4. Again, every creature is disposed in a certain "weight, number, 16 and measure." Therefore, the soul of Christ and its wisdom have a certain number and measure. Therefore, it does not extend itself to the i n fi n ite. 5 . Again, to comprehend the infinite is an act that totally surpass­

es the immensity of every object of knowledge. But every such act is infinite. But an infinite act can proceed only from an infinite power,

and there is no infinite power unles s it exists in an infinite sub­ stance. 1 7 Therefore, if the soul of Christ, since it is a creature, is

finite and limited, it is impossible for it to comprehend an infinity of objects.

6. Again, the more simple a substance is, the more objects it is 18 capable of knowing. But the soul of Christ is not elevated to the divine simplicity, neither by nature nor by grace. Therefore it is not

elevated to know as many things as the divine wisdom knows.

7.

Again, the wisdom of the Word is immense in its clarity and

1 85

in the number of things it contains . But the soul of Christ never comes to comprehend the immensity of the eternal light in its full clarity. Therefore, it never comes to know the full number of things which it contains .

8. Again, although the soul of Christ is united with the essence of the Word, still it is not present to as many things as i:he Word it­ self is. But, the same sort of relation that exists between the two essences is found between the two sorts of knowledge. Therefore,

the soul of Christ never knows all those things which the Word it­ self knows .

9. Again, knowledge includes power, because to be able to know 19 is to have a form of power. But the soul of Christ is not capable

of an infinite power such as the power of creating. For the same rea­ son, therefore, it is not capable of a knowledge that extends to an infinite number of objects .

1 0.

Again, among creatures infinity is a s ign of imperfection.

20

Therefore, if the wisdom of the soul of Christ is perfect to a su­ preme degree, then it admits infinity neither on the part of the sub­

ject, nor on the part of the object, nor in terms of the manner of knowing.

11.

Again, no creature can excel another creature to an infinite

degree. But if the soul of Christ knew the infinite, then, since other souls can know only the finite, the soul of Christ would excel other

souls infinitely. Therefore, it would transcend the created realm. But

this is manifestly false. Therefore, the principle from which the con­

sapientia, qua anima Christi sapiens exstitit, alia quae animae Christi unita fuit· ego nemini praeiudicium facere volo; videant ipsi, quo sensu hoc asseranc, ne forte carnalis sic, magis sua quam vera pronumians. Hoc unum ego indubitanter affirmo, quod aut alia sapientia praeter d ivinam in anima Christi non fuit, aut si alia fuit , qualis illi non fuit." Cfr. Ill Sent. , d. 1 4, a. 1 , q. 1 (Ill , 297). The minor premise was shown above in Question 5. 16 Wisdom, 1 1 , 2 1 : "Omnia in mensura et numero et pondere disposuisti." . . 17 For as 1t 1s common Iy sa1'd : "O perari sequitur esse." 16 Cfr. Liber de Causis, prop. 10 and 1 7, also Aristotle, lil De anima, text. 3ff. (c. 4}. )

clusion is drawn-that the soul of Christ has a comprehens ive knowledge of infinite obj ects-is likewise false.

__________________________________________

19

Richard of Sc. Victor, VI De trinit., c. 1 5: " Potest esse multiplex potentia, ubi [v. g. in insensatis et brutis] nulla potest esse sapientia; econtra autem ubi nulla potentia est, nulla sapientia inesse potest. Nam posse sapere absque dubio est aliquid posse; dat igitur esse posse non sapientia potentiae, sed potentia sapientiae." 20 As in materia according to Aristotle, lI1 Phys., text. 59- 72 (c. 6 and 7).

1 86

DISPUTED QUESTION VII

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

1 2 . Again, every object known is in the knower. 2 1 Therefore, if the soul of Christ has an actual comprehensive knowledge of an infinite number of.objects, that infinity would be present to the soul . of Christ in act. But it is impossible to posit an actual infinity with respect to a created being. Therefore, it is impossible for the soul of Christ to comprehend an infinity of objects .

Conclusion The sou l of Christ does not comprehend the infinity of objects in the Word in the proper sense of the

term . In as

far as the Word is the creative exemplar, the soul of Christ is drawn

to it by a comprehensive knowledge. But

in as far as the Word is the expressive exemplar, Christ's soul is drawn

to

it not by a comprehensive, but by an

ecstatic knowledge .

Response: ln order to understand the foregoing, it must be noted that uncreated wisdom is spoken of in two ways : either in as far as it is the exemplar that creates and disposes , or in as far as it is the exemplar that expresses and represe�ts. In the first sense, all those things which are, have been , or will be shine forth in the art of the divine wisdom. And these things are finite in number. In the sec­ ond sense, all those things which God can know and produce shine forth. And these, indeed, are infinite, as has been shown in the pre­ ceding, 22 and as Augustine states expressly in the twelfth book of ______________________________ 21 This is drawn from the fact that knowledge is an immanent activity. Cfr. Aristotle, Ill Metaph.., text. 16 (VIII, 8). le is assumed by Aristotle in Ill De anima, text. 6 and 37 -39 (c. 4 and 8). Here Aristotle calls the soul the "place of forms." He says also that the soul is "potentially whatever is thinkable." What is present in the soul is not the things themselves but their forms. Hence, as the hand is a tool of tools, the mind is "the form of forms." 21- Question 1 . In the response and in fundam. 1 of that question, reference is made to Augustine, XII De civitate Dei, c. 18; and in fundam. 2 reference is made to the same work: XI , c. 1 0, n. 3.

187

On the Cit:y of God. Therefore, in its knowledge the soul of Christ is drawn toward the divine wisdom-taken in both senses-but in dif­ ferent ways. In as far as [the divine wisdom] is the creative exemplar, the soul is drawn to it by comprehensive knowledge; for those things which are contained in ·and represented by the creative and disposing exemplar are finite. Therefore, they can be comprehended. But in as far as the exemplar is expressive arid representative, the soul is drawn to it not by comprehension but by ecstasy, since in this exemplar an infinite number of things are represented. There­ fore, these are incomprehensible for a finite substance. And there­ fore, despite the fact that it is united with the Word, the soul of Christ does not comprehend an infinite number of things since it is a creature and is therefore limited; for it is neither equal to nor greater than the Word. And therefore, the soul does not grasp these things in their totality. Rather, the soul is taken captive by them, and thus it is drawn not by comprehens ive knowledge but rather by an ecstatic knowledge. I call this an ecstatic mode of knowledge, not because the subject exceeds the object, but because the subject is drawn toward an object that exceeds it in a certain ecstatic mode that draws the soul beyond itself. Dionysius speaks of this form of knowledge in the book On Mystical Theology and in the seventh chapter of On the Divine NamesP "We ought to acknowledge that our intellect has a certain power to understand through which it contemplates the intelligible realities, and we ought to acknowledge a union that surpasses the nature of the intellect, through which it . is united to those things which are beyond it. Knowing divine things in this way, not according to our own capacity but in as far as we are drawn entirely beyond ourselves, we are totally deified; for it is better to belong to God than to belong to oneself. Thus , all the objects of faith will be available to those who are with God." But this mode of knowing by means of ecstasy exists both in the wayfar­ ing state and in heaven. For those in the wayfaring state, it is only partial, while in heaven it is realized perfectly in Christ and in some of the saints. But in others it is limited, both because of the measure ______________________________ 23 Par. l from which the present quotation is taken. De mystica th.eo!ogia, cfr. c. 1 , par. 1 .

1 88

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

of grace proper to each and because of the divine will which does not offer itself to all with the same degree of familiarity. But in the soul of Christ it is realized most generously, both because that soul possesses a grace which fills its capacity in every way and because the eternal mirror offers itself to that soul, manifesting itself with total familiarity. Now in Christ, comprehensive knowledge differs from ecstasy in many ways. First, because in the comprehensive mode of knowledge the subject grasps the object, while in the ecstatic mode the object takes the subject captive. Second, because comprehensive knowledge culminates in the gaze of the mind, while ecstatic knowledge finds its goal in a des ire of the mind. Third , because in comprehensive knowledge there is an actual knowl edge of all past, present, and future things , while in ecstatic knowledge the soul acquires a readi­ ness to know. Fourth, because once something is known with com­ 24 prehensive knowledge, it is impossible to learn it anew, while in the case of ecstatic knowledge, it is impossible to learn anything. Therefore, even though the knowledge of Christ's soul in the ecstatic mode can be said to relate to an infinite number of things in a certain way, yet his comprehensive knowledge can relate only to the finite. Hence, if in accordance with this it is said that the soul of Christ knows whatever the Word knows , this is understood with respect to past, present, and future things which in some way per­ tain to the integrity of the universe itself, and which were written fully and totally in the soul of Jesus Christ from the first instant of his conception. And to the extent that this soul is said to possess all knowledge, this is not because it comprehends everything that the divine wisdom knows, since that wisdom is infinite and cannot be 25 comprehended by a finite power, as was shown above. Therefore, the arguments proving this should be conceded. The conclusion is unquestionably true.

24 Cfr. below, ad 1 9, 20, 2 1 . 25 I n the previous question.

DISPUTED QU ESTION VII

1 89

REPLIES TO THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE AFFIRMATIVE POSITION: 1 - 2-3. To the first objection to the contrary, that the soul of Christ comprehends all the divine judgments, and that it has the same fullness of knowledge which is possessed by the Word that is united with it, it can be said that these things are said about the homo assumptus by reason of the communication of idioms. Or these claims can certainly be made about those things which are, have been, and will be, since these things can be comprehended by the soul of Christ. But the position is not true with respect to every­ ·thing that the divine wisdom knows , since the divine wisdom knows an infinite number of things , as is dear from wh at has be�n deter• mined above. Nevertheless, the objection that no person can know something that is unknown to his soul is true of a subject that knows only by means of its soul, as in the case of one who is simply a human being. But the proposition does not apply to the case of Christ, who knows not only by virtue of his soul but by virtue of the divine nature as well. And from this our response to the first three objections becomes dear. 4. To the objection that for the soul that sees God, all of creation is insignificant, it must be said that this is true in terms of the exist­ ence which creation has in itself. It is not true, however, in terms of that existence which creation has in (the divine] art; for that art is the most noble and the most perfect, having no limitation at all but only perfection. Therefore, if the soul were to know the entire uni­ verse in terms of that existence which it has in itself, it would still not have perfect and comprehensive knowledge unless it knew that art through which all things come to be. And because the soul of Christ comprehends all created things most perfectly in that art, therefore it is said to have perfect comprehension in and through that art. 5. To the objection that the soul of Christ is most perfectly united with the Word, it must be said that this is true, keeping in mind the limitation of a created nature which the soul of Christ does not lose, since it does not cease being a creature. And because

1 90

THE KNOWLED G E OF C H RIST

1t ts contrary to the limitations of a creature to comprehend an infinity of things, therefore this cannot be inferred from the union itself regardless of how perfect the union is thought to be. 6. To the objection that the soul of Christ knows many things simultaneously because it knows them in one act, and for the same reason, his soul ought to know an infinite number of things, it must be said that there is no similarity, since multiplicity and simultaneity are not incompatible with the limitation of a creature, whereas an actual and simultaneous infinity is totally incom patible with the limi­ tation of a creature. Therefore, no argument can be made from simi­ larity, but rather from dissimilarity. 7 . To the objection that the eternal Word represents all things equally, it can be said that this is false because " to represent" implies some action in relation to the other. Now even though the divine being is uniform in itself, still it illumines and manifests itself in a variety of ways . And while the divine being knows an infinite number of things , some of these it approves and others it con­ demns; some it determines to create while others it chooses not to; some it voluntarily discloses while others it keeps hidden. Even though , when viewed in terms of itself, the Word knows all things uniformly, still the argument proves nothing, because "whatever is received is present in the receiver after the manner of the subject re­ 26 ceiving and not after the manner of the object received." And therefore, when the receptive power is finite, even though the whole of reality is presented to it from beyond itself, it is impossible for that power to grasp and comprehend the whole except in accord with its own potential. This becomes clear from an example. Even if the entire river Seine were to offer itself to a person coming with a pitcher to draw water, the whole of the river could not be drawn up. The amount would be determined by the capacity of the pitcher. 8. To the objection that the soul of Christ is more capable of 26

This very common Scholastic axiom is taken from Aristotle, II De anima, text. 24 {c. 2) and given form by Boethius, hue in somewhat different words.

DISPUTED QUESTION V!I

191

knowledge because of the Word united with it than some other soul would be by virtue of a habit conferred upon it, it must be said that this is true. But it does not follow from this that, if a soul compre­ hends everything to which its habit refers , therefore the soul of Christ should know everything that the Word knows through itself, because a soul comprehends its habit as proportionate to itself and in no way exceeding its capacity. But the soul of Christ does not comprehend the Word united with itself in this way, since the Word infinitely exceeds the soul's capacity. · 9. To the objection that [his soul] knows the whole [of the Word], and therefore the whole [of the Word's] power, it must be said that the argument is not valid, for when "whole" is applied to the Word it signifies the absence of parts , or the· affirmation of total perfection. But when it is applied to "power," since power implies some relation to possibilities, it designates the distribution of that power in relation to all possibilities. Now since the meaning is dif­ ferent, the argument is not valid. 1 0. To the objection that the soul of Christ is closer to things as they exist in the Word than to things as they exist in themselves , it must be said that even though there is greater proximity, there is not, for that reason, a greater degree of proportion. But comprehen­ sive knowledge, in some way, includes proportionality within itself and supposes that the object known is finite in relation to the subject knowing it. And therefore, because things as they exist in themselves are finite and pro portionate to the soul, they are compre­ hensible. But they are not so in as far as they exist in the immensity of that divine art, unless this is understood to mean that they are in it in as far as it is the creative exemplar. And in this sense we can concede that these things are comprehended by the soul of Christ. But not in the other sense, because of their immensity and lack of proportion. 1 1 . To the objection that it is just as impossible to know the con­ tingent with certitude as it is to comprehend the infinite, it must be said that this is not true, for even though it is impossible to have certain knowledge of contingent things by means of natural knowl-

1 92

DISPUTED QUESTION Vll

T H E KNOW LEDG E OF CH RIST

1 93

De

edge , it is possible to have such knowledge by means of a supernatu­

an infinite active source, according to what is s aid in the book

eternal art in which both the contingent and the necessary are un­

ple, which is the power of powers. " In accordance with this, there are two ways of understanding an infinite power of knowing or com­ prehending in a creature. It can be understood either in relation to

ral illumination which elevates the soul to know things in the

changeably present. But to have an actual comprehension of an in­ finity of things is impossible not only for natural knowledge but also

for a knowledge given by grace, since both of these types of knowl­ edge are created and limited and therefore do not extend to the in­ finite in act.

1 2 . To the objection about the comparison of secret things and

things infinite in number, it must be said that there is no compari­ son, as is clear from what has been said; for the perception of a secret matter, in as far as the secret is hidden, does not imply any­

thing out of harmony with the nature of the created intellect. But this is not the case with the comprehension of the infinite which implies an actual infinity, and therefore, infinity in substance and in power. In no way can this be admitted in any creature, neither by reason of grace nor by reason of glory. 1 3 . To the objection that whatever is comprehended [by the soul of Christ] can be comprehended by a creature, it must be said that,

while it can be granted that each thing taken individually is compre�

hensible for a creature because each individual thing is finite, yet

causis:

21

"All infinite powers are dependent on one infinite princi­

what it is rooted in in the creature-and since this is finite in act, it

is

comprehensible-or it can be understood in relation to an active principle external to the creatur� and infinite in act. In the first way,

the soul of Christ comprehends all the d istinctions of being, both in general with respect to the species, and within the species with

respect to the individuals . In the second way, in as far as this refers

to an infinite, active power, his soul does indeed know; not, howev­

er, by virtue of comprehensive knowledge but by virtue of ecstatic knowledge, as was shown above. And this makes . our response clear.

1 5 - 1 6.

To the objection about the point, and the one about the

lovable and the knowable, it must be said that it is true that [the soul of Christ] comprehends everything that can be known and loved in terms of that existence which such things possess in them­ selves. But when viewed in terms of that existence which they pos­

sess in the first, infinite cause, such things are said to be knowable

and comprehensible only to an infinite power; for, although such a

manner of expression seems to denote the created reality, in fact, it

when all are taken together, they are infinite a nd therefore incom­ prehensible. And therefore, the argument is not valid since it moves from the parts taken separately to the same parts taken together as

denotes nothing other than the power of the efficient cause which, since it is infinite, cannot be comprehended by any finite being.

any individual human being; therefore, it is capable of holding all human beings. And so the other argument is not valid.

and that there remains no potentiality in it that is not reduced to

a whole. The following argument is invalid: that house can contain

1 4 . To the objection that the soul of Christ knows all the distinc­

tions of being, and that the potential of each species extends to an

1 7 . To the objection that the soul of Christ is absolutely perfect,

act, it must be said that this is true with respect to a power that is

capable of being fully reduced to act. However, a potency that is

open to the infinite can never be reduced to act totally, but only in

part. Hence, it is impossible that God would cause a continuum to

infinite number of individuals , it must be said that the capacity for the infinite can be understood in two ways ; namely, as an active potency and as a passive potency. The active potency for the infinite

be totally divided up into all the parts into which it is capable of being divided. For this is contrary to the perfection of the divine

a potential for the infinite is posited in the creature, it can only be

27 Propos. 1 6, "Omnes virtures, quibus non est finis, pendentes sunt per infinitum primum, quod est."

is found only in the creative essence which is infinite in act. But if a pass ive potency which is rooted in the finite but has a relation to

T H E KNOW LE DGE OF CH RI ST

1 94

agent as well as to the complete actualization of the creature which, by its very nature, is to exist in finitude. 28 And the potential of the possible intellect is of this sort. 1 8 . To the objection that if the agent intellect were in act with re­ spect to all those things to which the possible intellect is in potency, then the soul would know an infinite number of things , etc., it must be said that there is no similarity. For, if the agent intellect, as a power of the soul, were in act with respect to an infinite number of things , then by its own proper power the soul would be extended to the infinite. But such is not the case in the soul united to the eternal wisdom; for, even though that wisdom extends to the infi­ nite, it is not something that belongs to the very nature of the soul. Rather, it is something above the soul. Therefore, for this reason it is not fitting that the soul itself know an infinite number of things. Furthermore, the possible intellect is in proportion to the agent intellect while the uncreated wisdom is not in proportion to the intelligent soul . 1 9-20-2 1 . To the objections about the soul of Christ, whether it can acquire knowledge, and whether it knows some of those things which God can do but will not do, and whether it knows only finite things or infinite things as well, the response is dear from the distinc­ tion made above. And since the soul of Christ has comprehensive knowledge of all things that happen in the universe and ecstatic knowl­ edge of all things contained in the divine art, and since that ecstatic knowledge is rooted in the total power of the knowing subject and in the most intimate familiarity with that mirror which represents all things-even though Christ's soul does not have comprehensive knowl­ edge of all that the divine wisdom comprehends but is nonetheless drawn to all those things in ecstatic knowledge-its entire desire for knowledge finds satisfaction. Consequently, as nothing further can be added to his grace, so nothing can be added to his wisdom because he has been given as much as can be granted to any creature.

28

See l Sem. , d. 4 3, q. 3, ad 6 (I, 7 7 3).

E P I LO G U E Therefore, from what has been discussed and determined above concerning the wisdom of Christ both in terms of his divine nature and in terms of his human nature, it is possible to recognize the character of his knowledge both with respect to his knowledge as Creator and with respect to his knowledge as a creature, not only in heaven but in the wayfaring state as well. In brief, it must be admit­ ted that the divine being knows an infinite number of things . And these things �re known, I say, through the divine being itself and not through a likeness ; not through a likeness received from outside, but by means of truth itself which, as the exemplar of all, expresses all things. Now if created things are said to have a multiplicity of likenesses and expres sions, this is not because of any real multiplici­ ty among the likenesses i� themselves, but because of the way in which they come to be known. These likenesses or reasons are eter­ nal; and they are the prin�iples from which all certitude in created knowledge arises, whether in the soul of Christ or in other created spirits . But they are not the sole principle of knowledge since, to­ gether with them, there are likenesses received from outside. In our present life as well as in heaven it is not only the presence of the eternal light that is required, but the influence of the eternal light as well; and not only the uncreated Word, but the word conceived within us as well. And since the latter is finite, neither the soul of Christ nor any other soul can have comprehensive knowledge of the eternal Word or of the infinite number of knowable objects, even though the soul may be drawn to them in ecstasy. And , indeed, this ec_s tasy is that ultimate and most exalted form of knowledge which is praised by Dionysius in all his books , but especially in the book On Mystical Theology. Practically the whole of sacred Scripture speaks symbolically of this type of knowledge. And in reference to it, the second chapter of the Apocalypse 1 says: "I shall give him a white 1 Verse 1 7, "Vincenti dabo manna absconditum et dabo illi calculum candi-

1 96

THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST

stone, and on the stone will be written a new name which no one knows except the one who receives it" This type of knowledge can be understood only with great difficulty, and it cannot be understood at all except by one who has experienced it. And no one will experience it except one who is " rooted and grounded in love so as to compre­ hend with all the saints what is the length, and the breadth," et.c. It is in this that true, experiential wisdom consists. It begins on earth and is consummated in heaven. In trying to explain this, negations are more appropriate than affirmations, and superlatives are more appro­ priate than positive predications. And if it is to be experienced, interior silence is more helpful than external speech. Therefore, let us stop speaking, and let us pray to the Lord that we may be granted the 2 experience of that about which we have spoken.

INDICES

of Biblical Citations and of Authors and Works

du m et in calculo," etc. The other text is Eph 3, 1 7 : " I n caritate radicati et fundati, ut possitis comprehendere," etc. 2

Cfr. Dionysius, De mystica t�ologia, c. 1 ff.

I N D EX O F B I B LI C A L C I T AT I O N S The references are first to chapter and verse in italics and then to rhe pages of chis book in regular type. The order of rhe biblical books is chat which corresponds to the order of appearance in a modern bible. Genesis 1 -3, 32, 33

Psalms 35: 10, 1 20; 6 1 [62): 1 2, 80; 1 1 8:73, 1 1 9; 1 38:6, 1 72, 183; 1 46:5, 76, 77 Wisdom 1 1 : 21, 98, 184 Sirach (Ecclesiasticus) 1 : 1 , 145: 1 : 1 0-20, 145 Matthew 5:8, 1 68; 25:21-23, 1 71 Mark 1 3:32, 30 Luke 2:52, 10, 30, 34, 36, 1 50 John 1 :3, 53, 83, 86, 1 19; 1 :9, 1 38; 1 : 1 4, 1 2; 1 : 1 7- 1 8, 30; 3:32-34, 1 2; 3:34, 1 6 1 ; 5:22 & 27, 1 78; 8:55, 30; 1 4:26, 1 1 8 Acts of the Apostles 5:3, 1 65; 1 7:27, 141 Romans 1 : 1 9, 142; 1 1 :33, 1 78 1 Corinthians 13:9, 149, 1 50; 1 3: 1 2, 1 3 1 , 134 2 Corinthians 1 2:2, 88

Ephesians 3: 1 7, 1 96 Colossians 1 : 1 9, 1 49; 2:J, 1 79; 2:9, 1 1 1 Timothy 6: 1 6, 1 27 Heb 5:8, 1 3 James 1 : 1 7, 153 Apocalypse 2 : 1 7, 195; 5: 1 2, 1 78

201

AUTHORS AND WORKS

Itinerarium 7, 56i Ligllum t1itae l 4 i

I N D EX O F A U T H O RS A N D W O RK S Alexander of Hales 16, 36-40, 42, 43; Glo.ssa in quatuor libros sententiarum

1 2 , 36, 37; Quaestiones disputatae antequam es5et [racer 37; Summa theologica 3 7, 38. Ambrose 36, l l8, 1 62.

Anselm, De veritate 93, 1 24; Monolo­

gion 81, 86, 91; Proslogion 63, I 19, 1 71 . Anthony of Padua 25. Aristotle 1 3, 23, 26, 39, 48, 51, 59,

138; Anal. posterior 74, 80, 1 29-31 ,

1 4 1 , I 50, 180; Anal. Prior 80; De anima 7 1 , 84, 88, 1 28-29, 1 39, 1 55, 157, 1 76, 182, 1 84, 186, 190; De coelo et mundo 1 33 1 163; De gen. et corrupt. 97; De lineis insecabili.s (Pseudo Arist.) 164; De memoria et remin.

128;

De meteor. 97; De prae­

dicamenti.s 80, 84, 104; De sensu et

sensa10 122; De soph. elench. 108, 1 22, 147; De top. 1 50, 1 79; Ethica

85, 1 20, 1 52; Magnior moralium

85; Metaph. 72, 74, 84, 86-87, 97, 102, 1 1 0, 1 25, 1 29-30, 1 39, 155,

180, 186; Perihermeneias 84, 143, 180; Phys. 74, 79, 84, 1 1 0, 122, 150, 185. Augustine 16, 22, 32-33, 37, 46, 4849, 51-52, 57, 59, 62, 94, 1 37, 142-43, 149, 1 55, 172- 73; Confes­ sions 89, 1 1 6, 168; Contra Aca­ demicos 1 33; De civitate Dei 47, 7 1 , 76, 89, 1 1 4, 1 1 6 , 1 23, 148, 166, 1 8 1 , 183, 186-87; De doctrina chri.stiana 103; De Genesi ad lit. 32, 88, 163-64, 168; De libero arbitrio 98, l l 6, 1 20, 1 22, 124, 139, 146;

De magistro 1 1 5, 1 20; De musica 1 20; De quantitate animae 1 7 1 ; De

Trinitate 83, 99, 102, l l6-l 7, 120, 1 22, 1 24, 127, 133-34, 154, 1 6 1 ,

1 63, l 70i De vera religione 1 15,

1 20, 122, 1 39; Dialogus 65 Qq.

cum Oro.sio 1 10; Enarratione.s in Psalmos 1 1 9; Ep. ad Paulinum 1 69; In evang. loannis 1 48, 1 61 ; Lib. 83 quaestionum 79, 96, 1 00, 1 24, 146; Retractatione.s 1 1 7: Sermo 67 de Ver­

bis 168; Soliloquia 93, I 18.

Averroes, Epitome. metaph. 109; De coelo et mundo 1 33. Baron, R. 35. Bede, Ex.po.sicio in Acc. 165. Bernard 1 72; De con.sideratione ad Eugenium 162; De diligendo Deo 165. Biblioreca de Autore.s Chri.stiano.s 7, 60. Boehner, P. ltinerarium 7.

Boethius 1 1 1 , 190; De arithm. 98, 1 1 O; De consolatione philosophiae 1 23, 167; De diff. top. 90. Bonavenrure, Bret1iloquium 1 1 , 14, 4344, 1 35; Coll. in Evang. loan. 14; Coll. in Hex. 51, 90, 140; Com­ ment. in Lucam 14; Comment. in

Sent. 42-43, 56, 59, 64; in Senl. I 47-48, 51 -53, 55, 60, 71, 78, 8286, 90, 95-96, 106- 1 1 , 1 1 3, 135, 137, 1 54, 163, 165, 182, 194; in Sent. 11 43, 51, 94, 123, 1 26, 1 34, 1 36, 142, 1 58, 168, 182; in Sent. Ill 1 2, 14, 37-38, 71, 78, 134, 145, 149, 1 5 1 , 157, 159, 161, 163, 1 73-74, 1 76, 1 78, 182, 184; in Sent. lV 1 7 1; De reductione 7 ;

Q.D. de Mysi. Trin. 7, 15-16, 7 1 , 1 0 1 , l l l ; Sermo I: 2 2 posi Penl. 56,

134; Senno: Christu.s unu.s om. mag. 42, 55-56. Bougerol, J. G. 42, 60, 1 34. Brady, I. 56. Cassiadorus 163, 1 72-73, 183. Chenu, M. D. 29. Crowley, T. 40-41. DeWulf, M. 24, 28-29. Ernst, J. 32, 34. Francis of Assisi 1 3, 24-25. Fredriksen, P. From Jesus to Christ 9.

Leclerc, J. 24. Uber de cau.sis 7 1 , 75, 1 71 , 184, 193. Mandonet. P. 28.

Mauro, L 7, 42.

Meier, ]. A Marginal Jew 9.

Nicholas of Lyra 1 19, 1 6 1 , 1 78. O'Collins, G. 1 1 , 1 3; Imerpreting Jesus 9, 1 O; What are they saying about Jesus? 1 1 .

Odo Rigaldi 40.

Origen, Homiliae in diver.sos 1 1 9.

Pelikan, J. 9.

Giovanni de Fidanza (SL Bonaventure)

Perer Abelard 35; Sic ec non 8, 26-27. Peter Lombard 36; Sementiae in IV libri.s di.stinctae 1 2, 26, 35-36, 42,

Glorieux, P. 29.

Philo Judaeus, De mundi opificio 74.

40.

Glos.sa ordinaria (cf. also Strabum et

Nicholas of Lyra) 98, 1 6 1 , 1 72, 1 78.

Gregory I 138; II homilia in Et1ang. 1 1 8; Dialogus 1 79; Moralia in lob

1 28, 1 79. Gregory X (Pope) 41.

Hardich, L 25. Hayes, Z. 7, 1 2, 14, 1 7 , 25; Wha1 Manner of Man? 14; The Hidden Center 42. Hugh of St Victor 22, 34-36, 155, 1 72; Didascalion 22 i De saPientia animae Chrisii 1 2, 34, 146-47, 162, 183. Isaac of Stella, De anima 1 1 9-20; De definitionibu.s 84.

Isidore 163, 1 73.

John Duns Scotus, God and Creatures:

The Quodlibeial Quesiions 29.

John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa

1 5 1 , 166, 1 70, I 79. John of La Rochelle 40. John Pecham 143.

1 23, 1 27, 1 72.

Plato 38, 45-46, 50-5 1 , 53, 59, 85, 11 7. Porphyry, De praedicabilibus 105, 1 8 1 .

Priscianus, Grammaticae 1 74. Pseudo-Dionysius 43, 46, 5 1 , 64-67, 108, 138; De divinis nom. 54, 89,

96, 101-2, 107, 187; De_ mysiica iheologia 187, 195-96; Ep. ad Gaium 1 28.

Quaracchi Editors, De humanae cognitionis racione anecdota quaedam 1 43.

Quinn, J. 40-42, 56. Rabanus 98. Rashdal!, H. 24, 42.

Richard of St. Victor, De trinitate 103,

185.

Sabourin, L. 9.

Schil!ebeeckx, E. 9, 13; Jesus: An Ex­ perience of Chri.stology 9 i Christ: The Experience of Jesus as Lord

9.

Scorus Eriugena 1 28;. Homiliae in Pro!. S. Evang. Ioannis 1 1 9. Seneca, Ep. 65 ad Licilium 85.

Sixtus IV (Pope) 41 .

202

INDICES

Sixrus V (Pope) 4 1 . Smalley, B . 1 6 1 . Socrates 1 3 I . Strabum 1 1 9, 1 6 1 , 1 78. Summa sententiarum 35. Sweeney, L 47.

Thomas Aquinas 120; De veritate 31. Trombelli, I. 1 1 8.

van den Eynde, D. 35.

van Steenberghen, F. 24. Walter of Mauritania, Epist. ad Hugo-

nem 34. Weber, E. H. 7, 4 1 . Weisheipl, J. 42. William of Auvergne 37; De virtutibus 33. William of Meliton 40. Zeitschrif, fur ka,holi,che Theologie 143.