Sports Mega-Events in Asia 9819900107, 9789819900107

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PALGRAVE SERIES OF SPORT IN ASIA

Sports Mega-Events in Asia Edited by Koji Kobayashi · John Horne Younghan Cho · Jung Woo Lee

Palgrave Series of Sport in Asia

Series Editors Younghan Cho, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul, Korea (Republic of) William Wright Kelly, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA

This cross-disciplinary series publishes the works of leading scholars who critically engage with the complexity of Asian sport from global and comparative perspectives. By exploring historic and contemporary Asian sports alike, it provides both a theoretical and empirical understanding of Asian sports, examining aspects that include, but are certainly not limited to: mega-events (the Olympics, Football World Cup, Asian Games); media (broadcasting, journalism, representation), fandom (celebrity athletes), body practices (exercise, training), cultural industry (leagues, publicity, sponsorship), and diplomacy (transnational institutes, governments and NGOs). The series welcomes cutting-edge contributions in the fields of anthropology, cultural geography, cultural studies, gender studies, history, media studies, performance studies, and sociology. As the first of its kind, the series provides critical assessments of the practical implications of sport in Asia for the international community of English-speaking scholars, academies and institutes, helping to foster a constructive dialogue and collaboration.

Koji Kobayashi · John Horne · Younghan Cho · Jung Woo Lee Editors

Sports Mega-Events in Asia

Editors Koji Kobayashi Otaru University of Commerce Otaru, Hokkaido, Japan Lincoln University Lincoln, New Zealand Younghan Cho Hankuk University of Foreign Studies Seoul, Korea (Republic of)

John Horne Formerly Faculty of Sport Sciences Waseda University Tokyo, Japan Jung Woo Lee Moray House School of Education and Sport University of Edinburgh Edinburgh, Midlothian, UK

ISSN 2662-9348 ISSN 2662-9356 (electronic) Palgrave Series of Sport in Asia ISBN 978-981-99-0010-7 ISBN 978-981-99-0011-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0011-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Contributor: yao chung hsu/Alamy Stock Photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Acknowledgments

As the idea of publishing a book on sports mega-events in Asia came out of discussions in our roles as members of the Editorial Collective for The Palgrave Sport in Asia Series, we would like to express our gratitude to the Book Series Editors, William W. Kelly and Younghan Cho—the latter is also a co-editor of this book—for their guidance and support. We appreciate all the chapter contributors for taking the journey of this book project with us and providing highly original and valuable accounts on a variety of contexts, approaches, and views. Indeed, we are confident that such diverse coverage of events (e.g., the Olympic Games, Asian Games, and World Cups) and regions (e.g., East Asia and West Asia) make this collection truly unique and one of a kind within the field. Our appreciation is extended to the expert commentators, Alan Bairner, Rick Gruneau, and Barbara Holthus, for agreeing to support and endorse this book. We thank Naveen Das and Coral Zhou at Springer Nature for their assistance with publication. Lastly, it is acknowledged that the book project was in part supported by JSPS Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research C (21K11412) and the 2022 Korean Studies Grant Program of the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS-2022-C-004).

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Contents

1

Introduction—Sports Mega-Events in Asia: Past, Present and Future John Horne, Koji Kobayashi, Younghan Cho, and Jung Woo Lee

1

Part I The Olympic Games 2

3

4

5

How China’s Two Olympic Games Changed China and the Olympics Susan Brownell

23

Environment Eclipsed: Tokyo 2020 Sustainability Initiatives and the Pandemic Postponement Robin Kietlinski

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Networking Voices of Dissent: Korea-Japan Civic Alliance and Transnational Solidarity for Anti-Olympic Movement Kyoung-yim Kim, Satoko Itani, and Gyeongryeol Lee From the Winter Olympic Games in PyeongChang to the Summer Asian Games in Jakarta-Palembang: Inter-Korean Connections in 2018 at Sport Mega-Events in Asia Jung Woo Lee and Younghan Cho

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CONTENTS

Part II The Asian Games 6

7

8

Better, Bigger, Bitter—The Rise of the Asian Games in a Toxic Political Environment Jörg Krieger

123

Policy of Nostalgia: The 2018 Indonesian Asian Games’ “Spirit of 1962” Friederike Trotier

143

Politics of the Asian Games and the East Asian Games in China Marcus P. Chu

169

Part III World Cups and Other Sports Mega-Events 9

10

11

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FIFA 2022 World Cup in Qatar: Under the Gaze of Western Media Kamilla Swart and Umer Hussain Sport Mega-Events and the Contested Terrain of Space, Bodies and Commodities: The Politics and Complexities of 2019 Rugby World Cup Steven J. Jackson and Koji Kobayashi The Local Politics of Rugby World Cup 2019 Through the Disaster Recovery Process in Kamaishi, Japan Masatoshi Mukoyama and Masayuki Takao Political Ideologies, the ‘Two Chinas’ Issue and Mega-Events in Taiwan Yu-Wen Chen and Tien-Chin Tan

Index

199

223

245

269

293

Notes on Contributors

Susan Brownell is Professor of Anthropology at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. Her first book, Training the Body for China: Sports in the Moral Order of the People’s Republic (1995), drew on her experience as a national champion collegiate athlete in China. Surrounding both the 2008 summer Olympics and 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing, she gave interviews to nearly 100 journalists from over 20 countries. She is the author of Beijing’s Games: What the Olympics Mean to China (2008) and co-author of The Anthropology of Sport: Bodies, Borders, Biopolitics (2018), and has published multiple works and commentaries about China and sports. Yu-Wen Chen is an Assistant Professor at the China Medical University in Taiwan. He received his Ph.D. in Sport Sociology and Policy from the National Taiwan Normal University in 2018. In addition to sport policy, his research interests include the sociology of sport as well as the sociology of education. Among his areas of expertise are sports development, sports and politics, and the socialization of student-athletes. Younghan Cho is Professor of Korean Studies at the Graduate School of International and Area Studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. He has published widely on global sports, fans, and celebrity, the Korean Wave and East Asian pop culture, and nationalism and modernity in modern Korea and East Asian society. His monographs include Global Sports Fandom in South Korea: American Major League Baseball and its

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Fans in the Online Community (Palgrave, 2020) and The Yellow Pacific: Multiple Modernities and East Asia (SNU Press, 2020, in Korean). He is a founding editor of the Palgrave Series of Sport in Asia. Marcus P. Chu obtained his Ph.D. from the University of Auckland and is currently an Assistant Professor in the Department of Government and International Affairs at Lingnan University, Hong Kong. He has published extensively on the history and politics of sports in the Greater China region. His recent books include China’s Quest for Sporting MegaEvents: The Politics of International Bids (Routledge, 2020), Sporting Events in China as Economic Development, National Image, and Political Ambition (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), and China, Taiwan, and International Sporting Events: Face-Off in Cross-Strait Relations (Routledge, 2022). John Horne has taught at the universities of Edinburgh, Central Lancashire, and most recently Waseda University, Tokyo. He is the author, co-author, editor, and co-editor of many publications including: Understanding the Olympics (3rd edition, 2020), Mega-Events and Globalization (2016), and Sports Mega-Events (2006). He is Past Chair of the executive board of British Sociological Association and is currently Treasurer and Vice President of the International Sociology of Sport Association. Umer Hussain is an Assistant Professor of Business and Sport Management at Ripon College, Wisconsin, USA. His areas of research include exploring the intersection of race, religion, and gender in the sport and digital environment. He has more than nine years of experience in academia and practice. He has published more than 11 scholarly journal articles and presented his research at numerous scholarly conferences globally. He has also been a regular contributor to numerous newspapers and scholarly blogs. Recently, his Ph.D. dissertation was awarded as the Distinguished Dissertation in Social Sciences category for 2021–2022 by Texas A&M University, USA. Satoko Itani is an Associate Professor at Kansai University, Japan. Her research focuses on gender and sexuality studies and sport studies, and her current research projects focus on transnational feminist and queer activism against sport mega-events and the experiences and exclusion of transgender athletes. Her publications include: Itani, S. (2021).

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no politikusu: Shintai, gendâ, sekushuarithi (The politics of the “Athletic Women”: Body, Gender, and Sexuality). Kansai University Press: Osaka, Japan. Steven J. Jackson is a Professor specializing in the sociology of sport. He completed his B.A. (Honours) at Western University (Canada) and his M.Sc. and Ph.D. at the University of Illinois (USA). His research focuses on Globalisation & Sport, Sport Media, and Sport & Alcohol. Beyond his post at the University of Otago, he has served as a Visiting Professor at the University of Jyvaskyla (Finland), the University of British Columbia (Canada), the Federal University of Parana (Brazil), Shanghai University (China), and the University of Johannesburg (South Africa). He is a past-President of the International Sociology of Sport Association (ISSA). Robin Kietlinski is Professor of History at LaGuardia Community College of the City University of New York. Her research focuses on historical intersections between Japanese society and sport, with a focus on the Olympic Games. Her book, Japanese Women and Sport: Beyond Baseball and Sumo (Bloomsbury Academic Press), examines the history of Japanese women’s sport from the nineteenth century to the present. She was a 2019–2020 Fulbright Research Scholar at the University of Tsukuba, carrying out research on Olympic sustainability initiatives. She holds a BA from the University of Chicago and a Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania. Kyoung-yim Kim is an Associate Professor at Boston College, USA, where she is cross-appointed in the Departments of Sociology, Communications and Women’s and Gender Studies. Kim’s research focuses on transnational power relations in sport and environmentalism, civil activism, labor migration, and media. Her recent book chapters are published in Sport, Development and Environmental Sustainability, and Sport and the Environment: Politics and Preferred Futures. Her work resulted in several prizes including the Sociology of Sport Journal ’s outstanding article award. Koji Kobayashi is Associate Professor in the Center for Glocal Strategy at Otaru University of Commerce, Japan, and Adjunct Senior Lecturer at Lincoln University, New Zealand. His research interests include globalization, media, and nationalism as they relate to sport and recreation. His work appeared in journals such as Sociology of Sport Journal, International

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Review for the Sociology of Sport, Leisure Studies and Managing Sport and Leisure. He edited (with Younghan Cho) the special issue on Asian Sport Celebrity in the International Journal of the History of Sport, which was then turned into a book published by Routledge in 2021. Jörg Krieger is Associate Professor at Aarhus University, Denmark, and Invited Associate Professor at Seoul National University, South Korea. He holds a Ph.D. from the German Sport University Cologne. He is the Chair of the Sport & Society Research Network and co-leader of the International Network for Doping Research. His main research interest is the history and politics of international sport organizations, and he recently published a book on the history of World Athletics (Power and Politics in World Athletics. A Critical History) and a book on athletes’ activism in modern pentathlon (Athletes Pressing Charges). Gyeongryeol Lee is an activist. For the past 10 years, he participated in the Civic Network for Justice in Sport and Cultural Action. Recently, he started working at the civic organization, International Waters31 (gonghae 31), which advocates for the rights of refugees and undocumented foreigners. The organization’s focus is to abolish detention centers for foreigners operated by the Korean government. He focuses on promoting public debates on abuses of human rights at the detention centers and providing daily medical and legal assistance to refugees and foreigners. Jung Woo Lee is the Director of the Postgraduate Sport Management, Policy and International Development program at the University of Edinburgh. His research interests lie in sport, diplomacy, and international relations. He edits the Asia Pacific Sport and Social Science special issue of Sport in Society. He serves the Asian Journal of Sport History and Culture and the Journal of Global Sport Management as an editorial board member. He is a recipient of the Taiwan Fellowship from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China and the Korean Studies Fellowship from the Academy of Korean Studies. Masatoshi Mukoyama is an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Health & Sports Sciences at Ryutsu Keizai University (Japan) and was a member of the Japan national rugby team. His teaching and research focus on sports and social development, especially the impact of sports mega-events on the host community’s daily life. He has published journal articles on the relationship between Rugby World Cup 2019 and reconstruction projects after the Great East Japan earthquake in 2011.

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Kamilla Swart is Associate Professor in the College of Science and Engineering, Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Qatar Foundation. She also serves as a Senior Research Associate, School of Tourism and Hospitality, University of Johannesburg, South Africa. Her work focuses on contributing to sport, tourism, and event knowledge in the developing context, and in the Global South in particular. She is currently driving the 2022 FIFA World Cup Research Agenda, working closely with the Qatar Foundation 2022 FIFA World Cup Master Program and the Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy. She has been recently appointed to the Steering Committee of the UNESCO Chair on Governance & Social Responsibility in Sport. Masayuki Takao is an Associate Professor in the Department of Physical Education at Tokai University. His research interests include sports mega-events and its impacts on local communities or urban spaces. He has published on Tokyo Summer Olympics (1964), Nagano Winter Olympics (1998), and 2019 Rugby World Cup. He is especially interested in symbolic influences of media discourses about mega-event on local people and their identities. Tien-Chin Tan is a distinguished Professor of Sport Policy and Sociology at National Taiwan Normal University. As a researcher, he is primarily interested in public policy issues in the area of sport, particularly in the areas of sport development, the sport industry, and e-sport in Taiwan and China. He currently serves on the editorial board of the International Review for the Sociology of Sport (IRSS) and the Asian Journal of Sport History & Culture (AJSH&C). Furthermore, he is the editor-in-chief of Journal of Sport Culture (JSC) and serves as a guest editor for Sport in Society (SiC) each year. Friederike Trotier is Assistant Professor (Akademischer Rat) in Critical Development Studies, Southeast Asia at the University of Passau, and holds a Ph.D. in Southeast Asian Studies. Her research interest concentrates on sports and urban geography in Southeast Asia. She published her monograph Nation, City, Arena: Sports Events, Nation Building and City Politics in Indonesia with NIAS Press. Her work appeared in journals such as European Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, TRaNS: Trans–Regional and–National Studies of Southeast Asia and International Journal of the History of Sport. She published a chapter in The Routledge Handbook of Sport in Asia.

List of Figures

Fig. 4.1 Fig. 4.2 Fig. 4.3 Fig. 4.4 Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig.

4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 9.1

PyeongChang field visit (December 23–24, 2016) Report on field visit in HGK’s Olympics Kill the Poor (December 2016) Symposium on the social movement against Olympic Games: Rio de Janeiro-PyeongChang-Tokyo Anti-Olympic International Solidarity demo and party in Tokyo (2017) Poster for the forum (2018) Flier: Anti-Olympic statement (2018) Mianhae Peurojekteu in PyeongChang (2018) Anti-Olympic Torch made from toilet rubber cup The poster of Anti-Olympics Torch handover event Nationals versus foreigners: The Qatari population (Source http://priyadsouza.com/population-of-qatar-by-nation ality-in-2017/)

79 80 81 83 85 86 87 88 89

210

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List of Tables

Table 1.1 Table 1.2 Table 1.3 Table 8.1 Table 8.2 Table 10.1

World Expos, 2000–2030 Tier 1, 2 and 3 multi-sports mega-events, 2000–2034 Tier 1, 2 and 3 men’s football and rugby mega-events, 2000–2031 Sports mega-events in China 1990–2022 Total expenditure of the East Asian Games 1993–2013 Rugby World Cup event statistics (1987–2011–2015–2019)

7 9 10 181 183 224

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction—Sports Mega-Events in Asia: Past, Present and Future John Horne, Koji Kobayashi, Younghan Cho, and Jung Woo Lee

Introduction The study of events in general has taken off in the past 30 years. It is a multi-disciplinary field of research. The study of sports mega-events has its origins in tourism and business academics becoming interested in

J. Horne Formerly Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan Independent Scholar, Edinburgh, UK K. Kobayashi (B) Otaru University of Commerce, Otaru, Japan e-mail: [email protected] Lincoln University, Lincoln, New Zealand Y. Cho Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul, South Korea

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. Kobayashi et al. (eds.), Sports Mega-Events in Asia, Palgrave Series of Sport in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0011-4_1

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what were called ‘hallmark events’. Recognizing the importance of the topic across a variety of disciplines, researchers in sociology, history, geography and political science fueled inquiries (Roche, 2000). Today, research involves multi- and transdisciplinary approaches sometimes involving multinational teams of researchers (Hanakata et al., 2022). When discussing sport and sports mega-events in Asia, it is important to recall the words of Edward Said (1978, p. 3) about ‘Orientalism’: that it is a “Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient”. The understanding the English-speaking world has about Asia, the Orient, is filtered through a discourse that manages, and also, Said (1978, p. 3) argued, produces “the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively”. The development of sports mega-events reflects the historical dominance and continued centrality of the West in governing, organizing and managing these events globally. The number of events preceding the first-time hosting of the largest kinds of sports mega-events in Asia confirms the status of Asian nations as ‘late comers’; for instance, 18th for the Summer Olympic Games in 1964 (Tokyo), 11th for the Winter Olympic Games in 1972 (Sapporo), 17th for the Men’s FIFA World Cup in 2002 (Korea and Japan) and 9th for Men’s Rugby World Cup in 2019 (Japan). Also, it is notable that East Asian nations were the early entrants and have played a key role in the hosting business within the region. In terms of sport in Asia more generally, there has been until recently an imbalance of focus on East Asia (Asia–Pacific) rather than West Asia (known more often as the Middle East in Anglophone circles, in contrast to either the Near or Far East). While not dismissing the importance of such geographic concepts as North Asia and South Asia (and more frequently used Southeast Asia), this volume focuses on the distinction between East Asia and West Asia as the most relevant heuristic means to understand the political, economic, social and cultural dynamics of sports mega-events in Asia.1 Orientalism and Occidentalism (the ‘othering’ of the West) are concerns briefly taken up in the chapter by Swart and

J. W. Lee University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK e-mail: [email protected]

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Hussain in this volume. Here we will briefly outline the growth of interest in hosting and staging sports and other mega-events in both sub-regions of Asia. East Asia and Sports Mega-Events The prominence of East Asia within the landscape of sports mega-events can be easily recognized, for instance, by recalling the number of the Olympic Games—the world’s largest multi-sports events—hosted within the region: Tokyo 1964, Sapporo 1972, Seoul 1988, Nagano 1998, Beijing 2008, PyeongChang 2018, Tokyo 2020 and Beijing 2022. In particular, the latter period of the series is marked by an “East Asian Era” which has been unfolding in the hosting of the Olympic and Paralympic Games and other sports and non-sports mega-events2,3 In 2022 Beijing acted as host for the Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games, following PyeongChang’s hosting of the Winter Games in 2018, Japan’s staging of the 2019 Rugby World Cup, and the postponed 2020 Summer Olympics and Paralympics held in 2021 (hereafter Tokyo 2020) due to the COVID19 pandemic. In addition, the Winter Youth Olympic and Paralympic Games will be held in Gangwon, South Korea, in 2024, Taipei, Taiwan, will host the 2025 World Masters Games, and in Japan again the Kansai region (including the cities of Osaka, Kyoto and Kobe) hopes to host the twice postponed World Masters Games in 2027, Osaka is scheduled to host a World Expo in 2025 and Nagoya the 2026 Asian Games. The spatial concentration of mega-events in East Asia is historically unique and interesting in itself, particularly as it occurs at a time when hosting sport mega-events seems to have lost much of its glamor and appeal among publics in other parts of the world (Boykoff, 2020). Arguably the seemingly unbroken zealousness for hosting sport spectaculars among East Asian governments partly relates to continuing ideas about branding the host city or nation-state as world class (Horne, 2011). In the case of China, it is perhaps only a small part of the massive increase in building mega-projects, or even “tera-projects”, such as the “Belt and Road Initiative” costing trillions of US Dollars and affecting a billion people or more (Flyvbjerg et al., 2018; Roche, 2017; Chapter 7). For Japan hosting such events can be seen as an attempt to re-establish its place as the leading country for business and innovation in East Asia. On the other hand, South Korea, being located geopolitically in between the second and third largest economies in the world, remains eager to display

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its relatively undervalued cultural merits and industrial prowess to a world audience by hosting sports mega-events (Joo et al., 2017). In reflecting the prominence of East Asia in the hosting business, this volume features accounts on China (by Brownell; and Chu), Japan (by Kietlinski; Jackson and Kobayashi; and Mukoyama and Takao), South Korea (by Lee and Cho), Japan and South Korea (by Kim, Itani and Lee), Indonesia (by Trotier) and Taiwan (by Chen and Tan). West Asia and Sports Mega-Events As Reiche and Brannagan (2022, p. 1) note, writing about the Middle East, sport in the region is marked by “stark contrasts” between those nations that are beset by war and civil strife (Syria and Yemen for example) and those oil rich states that have been actively pursuing an eventled development strategy. Bahrain began hosting Formula 1 Grand Prix motor racing, and from 2023 three other West Asian nations will host Formula 1. The small state of Qatar has developed a hosting strategy which started small but established itself as an emerging player. The capital of Qatar, Doha, for instance, hosted the 2006 Asian Games and took advantage of its legacy to attract a range of international sports events including the Pan Arab Games (2011), World Men’s Handball Championship (2015), IAAF World Athletics Championships (2019), FINA World Aquatics Championships (planned in 2024) and its second Asian Games (planned in 2030). Most notably in 2022, Qatar hosted the men’s FIFA World Cup, one of the tier 1 sports mega-events as we note later in this introduction. Riyadh in Saudi Arabia is set to host the Asian Games in 2034, which marks two consecutive occurrences of the event within the sub-region. In addition to staging major sports events, as well as World Expos, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have led the way in developing ownership of lucrative sports brands, especially in association football (owning Newcastle United, Paris St Germain and Manchester City, respectively). The Asian Football Confederation (AFC), consisting of 47 Football associations, while having its headquarters in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, routinely operates with an East Asia-West Asia split when it comes to its premier competition, the AFC Champions League to ensure a final between representative teams from East and West (Weinberg, 2015). Likewise, the AFC Asian Cup, continental championships of men’s national teams, has been hosted predominantly

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by West Asian nations including Iran (1968, 1976), Kuwait (1980), Qatar (1988, 2011), UAE (1996, 2019) and Lebanon (2000). Finally, the financial benefits of relocating sports headquarters to West Asia have not been ignored, and since 2005 the International Cricket Council (ICC) has been located in Dubai in the UAE. In this volume, the emerging economic and political power of West Asia in hosting sports mega-events is highlighted by the accounts on the influential role of Arab nations within the Olympic Council of Asia (by Krieger) and Qatar’s hosting of the FIFA Men’s World Cup (by Swart and Hussain). There has been other recent academic interest in mega-events in Asia more broadly understood (for example see Besnier et al., 2018; Brannagan & Giulianotti, 2015; Hong & Zhouxiang, 2021; Huebner, 2016) and this collection also attempts to add to and demonstrate the richness of multi-disciplinary, multinational research at different scales. In particular it contains accounts approached from the perspectives of cultural studies, political studies, sociological and historical research. In this introduction, before briefly outlining the contents, we consider two further issues. Firstly, we sketch the emergence of discussions of mega-events, and note the “state of play” with respect to studies of sports mega-events. Secondly, we outline the context in which the growth of sports megaevent in the past four decades, as well as interest in researching them, has occurred. We view this as a result of the recognition that acting as sports hubs or hosts can offer an alternative development model as well as a global shift “eastwards” in economic and political power. After we introduce the chapters in this volume, we indicate where further research is heading and may be required.

Exploring and Explaining Sports Mega-Events: The State of Play In the age of global television and social media, the capacity of sports mega-events to shape and project images of the host city and nation made them a highly attractive instrument for political and economic elites. It was in this context that the pursuit of hosting sports mega-events, such as the Summer Olympic Games and the FIFA Men’s Football World Cup, became an increasingly popular strategy of governments, corporations and civic ‘boosters’ worldwide. Compared with this conventional—or previously dominant—view the exploding costs and marginal returns in host cities over the past fifteen years have nurtured studies with a much more

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critical outlook and have themselves informed the growth of anti-megaevent protest and activism (Boykoff, 2014; Gruneau & Horne, 2016; Hayes & Karamichas, 2012). The hosting of a mega-event skews all other economic and social priorities, implies significant opportunity costs, and places an undue financial burden on host city populations that fund the global ‘party’ (Flyvbjerg et al., 2016). As such we may have reached “peak event” (Müller et al., 2023). Critical sports journalists such as Zirin (2014) write about debt, displacement, privatization and militarization as the main legacies of sports mega-events. Project management experts can point to the massive cost overruns of the Olympics (Flyvbjerg et al., 2016). Gruneau (2017) has outlined how mega-events became an aspect of the staging of modernity in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Initially World Expos and industrial exhibitions and then international multi-sport/Olympic formulas developed as a result (Gruneau, 2017, p. 128). Two features of contemporary sports mega-events are first, that they are deemed to have highly significant social, political, economic and ideological consequences for the host city, region or nation in which they occur, and second, that they will attract considerable media coverage. By this definition, therefore, an unmediated mega-event would be a contradiction in terms, and for this reason the globally mediated sports genre of mega-event, as a television spectacle, has tended to supplant other forms of ‘mega’, such as World’s Fairs or Expos, although these latter do continue to be enthusiastically hosted and attract substantial numbers of visitors (Roche, 2017). In fact the appetite for hosting World Expos or World’s Fairs has shown little sign of abating (see Table 1.1). Held every five years World Expos have been staged in Japan, China and the UAE since 2000 (bie-paris.org). The 2025 Expo in Osaka will be the second in 20 years in Japan and two of the contenders for hosting the 2030 Expo are Busan in South Korea and Riyadh in Saudi Arabia. Yet the Olympic Games, especially the Summer edition, could never have attained global impact without television. The Olympics today are a product of television’s power to produce and distribute live global spectacle (Kellner, 2003; Chapter 3). Indeed, it can be argued that the Games are perhaps better understood as a television event than as a sporting one. The Olympics do not appear to be popular because of the regular following of its major sports either as spectators or as participants. Rather, it is because it has become a spectacularized television show, with the

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Table 1.1 World Expos, 2000–2030

INTRODUCTION—SPORTS MEGA-EVENTS IN ASIA: PAST …

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Year

City/Region

Country

2000 2005 2010 2015 2020/2021–2022*

Hanover Aichi Shanghai Milan Dubai

2025 2030

Osaka TBD**

Germany Japan China Italy United Arab Emirates (UAE) Japan

Source Bie-paris.org (accessed 6 October 2022) * The World Expo 2020 in Dubai, delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, was staged in 2021–2022 ** To be decided November 2023, with Busan, Riyadh, Rome and Odessa the main contenders at the time of writing

badge of being the ‘world’s best’. It is the convergence of star, narrative, national identity, ‘live-ness’ and uncertainty that give the Olympic Games this unique power as a cultural event and why so much effort and expense go into the production of both the Opening and Closing Ceremonies (Horne & Whannel, 2020; Chapter 10; Sugden & Tomlinson, 2012). So, what are the key issues involved in the study of sports mega-events? The issues that have developed with respect to the study of sports megaevents include defining mega-events, urban developments, the politics of rights and labor, legacies and impacts, and resistances to hosting. These are discussed in more detail elsewhere, for example see Horne (2021). It is worth noting that definitions of mega-events vary across different theoretical understandings and disciplines. For example, geographer Martin Müller (2015) asked when do we know a mega is a mega? Is it size alone or what are the other constituent parts that enable us to say an event is a mega-event? He reviewed other authors’ attempts to define them and identified four features that were common to them: audience (tourism), mediation (reach), cost and impact (transformation). Müller (2015, p. 638) thus constructed a consolidated definition: ‘Mega-events are ambulatory occasions of a fixed duration that attract a large number of visitors, have a large, mediated reach, come with large costs and have large impacts on the built environment and the population’. Sociologist Maurice Roche (2000) provided one of the definitions Müller looked at and has not altered his view even while recognizing that

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changes have taken place in terms of the scale, reach and impact of megaevents (Roche, 2017). He approached mega-events as phenomena that provide a vivid illustration of the balance between agency and structure in the development of modernity. Roche (2000) offered a way to understand the features of mega-events sociologically that has been adopted by many others—‘large-scale cultural (including commercial and sporting) events, which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance’ (Roche, 2000, p. 1). These characteristics go some way toward explaining the allure or attraction of sports mega-events to potential host cities or nations. For individuals, sports mega-events offer the promise of a festival of sport, with emotional moments, shaping personal (life-)time horizons. Additionally, we need to consider the existence of first, second and even lower tiers of (sports) mega-events according to their reach and range, cost and size (Black, 2014). Despite Müller’s words of caution about discussing different levels of sports mega-events, Roche (2017) also identifies tier 1, 2 and 3 “megas”. In this chapter, therefore, we will refer to the following as among the most significant sports mega-events: Tier 1—Summer Olympic Games; Tier 2—Winter Olympic Games, and the Asian Games; Tier 3—Commonwealth Games, and Pan American Games (see Tables 1.2 and 1.3). Not all mega-events are of equal scale and Table 1.2 illustrates this with reference to five of the multinational and multi-sport events that can rightly claim the title of a “mega”. Table 1.2 lists the main sports mega-events taking place between 2000 and 2034 and demonstrates in particular the way in which Asian nation hosts continue to feature strongly in recent Olympic and Paralympic history (2008, 2018, 2020, and 2022) as well as in staging the Asian Games every 4 years. When it comes to an academic debate on sports mega-events in Asia, the Asian Games deserves particular attention. This regional multi-sporting competition may not be routinely categorized as a top-tier global sport mega-event. Yet, as a regular sporting occasion held in the largest continent in the world in terms of landmass and population, the Asian Games is a significant event in terms of representing Asian cultural identities and diversifying the profile of event hosts. It is true that some elements of Orientalism can be found in the delivery of the Asian Games as it largely benchmarks the Olympics in the context of Asia (Hong, 2005). However, its disciplines include forms of uniquely Asian physical culture such as kurash, sepak takraw and dragon boat races, and inter-Asian cultural connections

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Table 1.2 Tier 1, 2 and 3 multi-sports mega-events, 2000–2034 Tier 1 Summer Olympics & Paralympics

Tier 2 Winter Olympics & Paralympics

Tier 2 Asian Games

2000 Sydney, Australia

2002 Salt Lake City, USA

2002 Busan, SK

2004 Athens, Greece

2006 Torino, Italy

2008 Beijing, China 2012 London, UK

2010 Vancouver, Canada

2016 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 2020/2021* Tokyo, Japan 2024 Paris, France

2018 PyeongChang, SK

2014 Sochi, Russia

2022 Beijing-Zhangjiakou, China 2026 Milan-Cortina d’Ampezzo, Italy 2028 2030 Los Angeles, TBD*** USA 2032 Brisbane, Australia

Tier 3 PAN AM Games

Tier 3 Commonwealth Games

2003 Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic 2006 2007 Doha, Qatar Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 2010 2011 Guangzhou, China Guadalajara, Mexico 2014 2015 Incheon, SK Toronto, Canada 2018 2019 Jakarta-Palembang, Lima, Peru Indonesia

2002 Manchester, UK

2022** Hangzhou, China

2022 Birmingham, UK 2026 Victoria, Australia 2030 TBD*****

2026 Aichi-Nagoya, Japan 2030 Doha, Qatar

2023 Santiago, Chile 2027 Barranquilla, Colombia 2031 TBD****

2006 Melbourne, Australia 2010 Delhi, India 2014 Glasgow, UK 2018 Gold Coast, Australia

2034 Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

* In March 2020 due to the impact of the novel coronavirus, COVID-19, it was announced that both mega-events would be postponed until 2021 but would retain the same names, Tokyo Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games 2020 ** Due to the continuing concerns over COVID-19, the Hangzhou 2022 Asian Games were postponed to September – October 2023 *** At the time of writing, with previous favourite Sapporo withdrawing, with a possible bid for 2034, cities from three countries are in contention, with a decision due by the IOC in 2024 **** At the time of writing Winnipeg, Canada, is the sole contender ***** Hamilton, Canada, had been the sole contender but withdrew its bid in 2023. At the time of writing the Commonwealth Games Federation is still looking for a viable host city

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Table 1.3 Tier 1, 2 and 3 men’s football and rugby mega-events, 2000–2031 Tier 1 FIFA World Cup

Tier 2 UEFA EURO

Tier 3 Rugby Union World Cup

2002 Japan & South Korea 2006 Germany 2010 South Africa 2014 Brazil 2018 Russia 2022 Qatar

2000 Belgium & Netherlands 2004 Portugal 2008 Austria & Switzerland 2012 Poland & Ukraine 2016 France 2020/2021* ‘Pan-Europe’: final at Wembley Stadium, London, England 2024 Germany 2028 TBD***

2003 Australia 2007 France 2011 New Zealand 2015 England 2019 Japan 2023 France

2026 Canada, Mexico & USA 2030 TBD**

2027 Australia 2031 USA

* In March 2020 due to the impact of the novel coronavirus, COVID-19, it was announced that this mega-event would be postponed until 2021 but would retain the same name, EURO 2020 ** Several multination bids are expected after the successful 2026 bid by Canada, Mexico and the USA, with a decision to be made by FIFA in 2024 *** At the time of writing the two contenders are Turkey and a combined United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland bid. UEFA will announce the 2028 hosts in late 2023

are also highlighted in the ceremonies and cultural events associated with it (Hong, 2005). At the same time, many developing countries in Asia also have had the chance to host this major sporting competition (Lutan, 2005). Given that Tier 1 sporting events tend to be awarded to rich developed nations which are largely grouped as the “Global North”, the sense of a major sporting event for the Global South can be detected in several Asian Games. Additionally, emerging nations in Asia also exploit this regional event as either a practice run when they are preparing for bidding to host a global event such as the Olympic Games or proof of their capacity to stage a large-scale sporting spectacle before they bid for the games (Koh, 2005). Therefore, the cultural spectrum and political mechanism of the Asian Games deserve more serious academic attention and are discussed in this volume by Krieger, Trotier and Chu.

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Table 1.3 provides examples of men’s football and rugby world cups according to the same categorization into tier 1, 2 and 3 mega-events. While suggesting less involvement in these competitions, South Korea and Japan co-hosted the men’s FIFA World Cup finals in 2002, Qatar staged them in 2022 and Japan became the first Asian host of the Rugby World Cup in 2019. It is worth pointing out that even tier 3 events can generate vast impacts economically, politically and socially to the host city and nation. For instance, the 2019 men’s Rugby World Cup constituted a significant moment for Japan and the sport of rugby union (Jackson, 2019). This ninth edition of the event, which commenced in New Zealand in 1987, was the first to be held in Asia, the first to be held consecutively in the same (northern) hemisphere, and the first to be hosted by a nation other than one of the traditional rugby heartlands: Australia, England, France, Ireland, Scotland, South Africa, Wales, as well as New Zealand (Jackson, 2013, 2014). The decision to hold the Rugby World Cup in Japan was driven both by strategic moves by World Rugby to tap into potentially lucrative Japanese and other Asian markets, as well as by the Japan Rugby Union to use the event as a means to raise the profile of rugby union, which has remained a relatively minor sport within the Japanese sporting landscape. While the number of foreigners living in Japan has been growing in recent years, and the actual number of naturalized citizens is very low, the number of foreign-born players who became citizens or played long enough in Japan in order to qualify for the national rugby team, nicknamed the ‘Brave Blossoms’, grew considerably so that in 2019 just over half of the 31-man squad were foreign-born players (McKirdy, 2019). After the event concluded in November 2019, it was widely regarded as one of the best Rugby World Cup ever to be staged, despite the fact that two matches were canceled due to a natural disaster, Typhoon Hagibis. Certainly, from a financial and broadcasting point of view it broke new ground, for example achieving a domestic broadcast record with 54.8 million viewers for the Japan versus Scotland match (Rugby World Cup, 2020). More detailed analyses of the event are offered in this volume by Jackson and Kobayashi and Mukoyama and Takao.

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Contents---Sports Mega-Events in Asia In the past two decades, Roche (2017, p. 9) suggests that there is now a mega-event ‘paradox’. The proliferation of mega-events has also been accompanied by increasing public antipathy toward hosting them, at least in democratic locations. An interest in how long the hosting of sports mega-events in Asia—East and West—will continue and, if it does, who will be involved in the production of these events underpins the questions explored in this collection. The chapters are arranged in three parts, dealing in turn with ‘the Olympic Games’, ‘the Asian Games’ and ‘World Cups and Other Sports Mega-Events’. In the first chapter of Part I, Susan Brownell reflects on political and sporting developments before and since the Beijing 2008 Summer Olympics. Focusing on the calls to boycott the 2008 and 2022 Olympics in protest against China’s human rights record, she analyzes the similarities and differences between the political contexts in 2008 and 2022 to reveal what has changed and what has stayed the same after China’s initial “coming-out party”. Next, Robin Kietlinski switches focus to the question of environmental sustainability, especially as taken up as a central component to planning Tokyo’s 2020 Summer Olympics. She demonstrates that while sustainability was present both rhetorically and in practice throughout the bidding and planning processes, from the beginning the event was also fraught with environmental controversies. Such controversies, and the eventual postponement of Tokyo 2020 she argues exposed in a stark and unprecedented fashion the many excesses of the Olympics and called into question broader environmental concerns posed by sports mega-events. Chapter 4 takes up the issue of critique of both Tokyo 2020 and the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics. Kyoung-yim Kim, Satoko Itani and Gyeongryeol Lee examine the way in which Asian civic activists’ alliances have grown through Olympic events. This chapter discusses the development of Japan and South Korean cooperation networks for Olympic resistance and anti-Olympic movements. It examines and highlights previously neglected non-Western Olympic resistance, the alliance networks’ diverse forms of public opposition, protest, criticism and their discursive strategies in Korea and Japan about the staging of the sport mega-events. The final chapter in the first section, by Jung Woo Lee and Younghan Cho, deals with the connections between sport mega-events and international politics in Asia. For this purpose, it explores the political legacies of the various sporting events in 2018 on inter-Korean connection with a

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focus on the 2018 Olympic Winter Games in PyeongChang. This event marked a watershed in North and South Korean relations where the two sides were reconciled in the stadium after more than two years of a diplomatic stalemate. While this breakthrough at the sporting occasion garnered journalistic and academic interest internationally, relatively little attention was paid to the inter-Korean connection at the post-event settings. Using theories of international relations and nationalism, they critically examine the nexus among sport, diplomacy and national identity politics being made from the Winter Olympic Games in PyeongChang to the Summer Asian Games in Jakarta-Palembang. They argue that sport mega-events in Asia provide meaningful and effective momentum for illuminating changing relations between two Koreas and their impacts on national identities despite their extensive but limited influences. Part II begins with a chapter by Jörg Krieger which provides an overview of the Asian Games, the second largest multi-sport event in the world and the largest on the Asian continent. Based on historical sources collected from the IOC’s Olympic Studies Centre and archives in Asia, his chapter outlines the development of the Asian Games in a continent characterized by extreme forms of cultural diversity and political tensions. The broader challenges of staging a “united” sports event in such a vast region as Asia, including consideration of the strategic decisions behind the recently awarded 2030 and 2034 Asian Games to Doha and Riyadh respectively, concludes the chapter. In her chapter, Friederike Trotier draws on ethnographic research during the 2018 Asian Games in Jakarta and Palembang and examines the infrastructure of nostalgia that shaped the event. In 1962, Indonesia hosted the Asian Games for the first time and this event had a long legacy, in particular in the urban infrastructure and sports venues it left behind in the host city Jakarta. These urban changes shaped the Indonesian capital and ideas of urbanism in the Sukarno era. When the Asian Games returned to Indonesia in 2018, nostalgic memories of the 1962 event were revived in the form of the ‘spirit of 1962’. This study explores the tangible and intangible components of the ‘spirit of 1962’ paying specific attention to infrastructure of nostalgia, Indonesian historiography and ideas of leadership. In the next chapter, Marcus P. Chu reflects on the keenness of China to host sports events and mega-events, including the Asian Games and other regional events. Between 1990 and 2020, for example, Beijing, Shanghai, Macao, Hong Kong, Guangzhou and Tianjin, staged two Asian Games and four East Asian Games. Chu argues that the hosting of so many Asian Games

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and East Asian Games since the 1990s aims not only to demonstrate Chinese elite athletes’ superior competitiveness in front of their fellow compatriots and boost nationalistic sentiment among the Chinese public, but also to enable Chinese political leaders to realize their ambitious goals. Part III focuses on football and rugby world cups and other smaller mega-events staged in Asia. First, Kamilla Swart and Umer Hussain explore emerging scholarship about the Qatar FIFA World Cup 2022 through the lens of Orientalism. In doing so they endeavor to untangle racial bias against the Arab world in the Western media. They also try to highlight how FIFA 2022 World Cup has influenced the Qatari government to take various steps to change the cultural norms of Qatar and how those steps are perceived within the Muslim world. This chapter thus seeks to contribute to the limited scholarship detailing how a mega-sporting event in the Global South can create counter-narratives embedded in the Western understanding of sports. Then, Steven J. Jackson and Koji Kobayashi examine the contested terrain of Rugby World Cup 2019 on the first time the event was held in Asia. Broadly, their analysis illustrates how one sporting event offers insights into the role of sport as part of a wider set of relations of globalization, politics, economics and cultural identity. It discusses the social and cultural significance of sport megaevents as strategic sites of cultural analysis, the politics and complexities of Japan as the first Asian nation to host a Rugby World Cup, and the multidimensional nature of the contested terrain of the event with respect to space, bodies and commodities. In a related, though more detailed analysis of the local impact of hosting the Rugby World Cup in 2019 on one location, Masatoshi Mukoyama and Masayuki Takao explore how a small regional city, Kamaishi, devastated by a historic earthquake and tsunami in 2011, accepted the idea to host a sports mega-event. In doing so, the chapter traces the process leading up to the event and identify the reasons and conditions behind hosting the event from the viewpoints of the host city government and the local citizens. The final chapter in the collection is by Yu-Wen Chen and Tien-Chin Tan and borrows from international relations theory to shed light on the relationships among political ideologies, the “Two Chinas” issue and mega-events in Taiwan. From a realist angle, they argue that with China’s rise and growing international influence, the ideological clash between Taiwan’s two major political parties and the Two Chinas dispute will only intensify and impact Taiwan’s prospects as a bidder and host for sports mega-events.

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Futures---Sports Mega-Events and Sports Mega-Event Research in Asia Further research will need to be undertaken to gain insights about wider changes in Asian societies, their involvement in sport and the region’s place in the world, especially the post-pandemic implications for staging sports mega-events. Hosting sports mega-events opens host societies’ cultural, economic, ideological, political and business practices to great critical scrutiny, especially by investigative journalists and academics. Taking up Kietlinski’s theme, it is almost impossible to consider the environment and global heating will be ignored or not central to discussions in future research. Additionally, as several of the contributions indicate, the geo-politics of the regions—whether Asia as a whole or East or West Asia—remain salient features for understanding the position of sport and sports mega-events in Asia. In many ways, sports mega-events represent ‘contested terrains’—to use the concept from the chapter by Jackson and Kobayashi—of political and cultural power through which host cities and nations jockey for position on a world stage. As such, the regional superpowers of China, Japan and South Korea continue to provide indispensable materials for future scholarly inquiries, and, as highlighted by several chapters in this volume, there is also an increasing need to attend to emerging players such as Indonesia, Taiwan and, perhaps especially, West Asian nations. Further research will also be needed to explore the involvement of mega-event expertise in mega-events, possibly through longitudinal and multi-local case studies, participant observation and embedded ethnographies. As anthropologist Gillian Evans (2016, p. 47) has noted: the steady increase in the staging around the world of mega-event urban transformation projects has produced an elite international cadre of planning, design, and many other kinds of specialists who travel the world, circulating from one event to the other, lending their expertise in the build-up to bids and the preparations for events.

From a limited number of East Asian interviewees, as well as foreign respondents, Horne and Takahashi (2022) gained an understanding that western expertise in organizing sports mega-events is regarded as invaluable, especially as so much global sport business is conducted in the English language and work in the sport events industry in East Asia

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has been seen as a temporary break from more stable employment opportunities elsewhere. We would suggest that rather than enhancing new connections, hosting an Olympics or other mega-events at present tends to bolster arrangements that maintain established connections, can create competitiveness and even foster rivalries. Additionally, when an event is not proceeding as fast or in the direction that a sporting non-governmental organization (Allison & Tomlinson, 2017) such as the IOC, FIFA or World Rugby believes it should, mega-event experts can be called in to turn the event around or make faster decisions. This happened both in the buildup to the Rugby World Cup in Japan and led to the recruitment of some of the people Horne and Takahashi (2022) interviewed, and in October 2019 when the IOC decided that the marathon and other road races scheduled for the Tokyo Olympics the following year should be held 830 kilometers north of the capital city in Sapporo to avoid the summer heat. Speaking of Sapporo, the city was the frontrunner in the bidding for the 2030 Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games until 2022 but has encountered a growing public backlash due to a range of scandals, especially bribery allegations against a former organizing committee member, in connection with the hosting of Tokyo 2020. According to a poll conducted in April 2022 by Hokkaido Shimbun (2022), a local newspaper, 57% of residents in Sapporo ‘objected’ or ‘somewhat objected’ to the hosting, which marked a stark contrast to the pre-Tokyo-2020 poll conducted two years earlier that indicated 55% ‘supported’ or ‘somewhat supported’. It is clear that the postponement, the lack of transparency in governance and the scandals of organizers through Tokyo 2020 enticed the residents in Sapporo to re-evaluate the costs and the benefits of hosting another sports mega-event in the near future. At the time of writing, no one is certain about which city or cities will eventually host the 2030 (or 2034) event, yet what is clear is that the bidding and hosting of the sports mega-event will be ‘contested’ and continue to offer a strategic site through which to understand political and social struggles—and changes—in particular places at particular times. With the rise of China and the emerging power of regional cities in both East and West Asia, it is likely that Asia will continue to attract mega-events and global spectacles of all kinds. As demonstrated by Kim, Itani and Lee in this volume, as well as the example of Sapporo’s bidding above, the Asian region as a whole is not immune to, but rather part of, the global

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movement calling for drastic changes to the status quo of how sports mega-events are governed, organized and managed. In sum, we hope that our collection helps to shed light on these issues and their relationship to a vital—yet under-researched—region for sports mega-events and be of help to future researchers and thus help in some way to redress the structural problem that Said theorized as Orientalism 40 years ago.

Notes 1. For instance, while not necessarily following their categorization, the Olympic Council of Asia is represented by the five sub-regional zones including West Asia, Central Asia, South Asia, East Asia and Southeast Asia. Among these zones, the economic and political power of hosting sports mega-events has been concentrated in East and West Asia. For more on the multifaceted meanings associated with Asia as a social construct, see Kobayashi and Cho (2019). 2. For definitions of mega-event, see Roche (2017, pp. 3–6) and Müller (2015, p. 638), and Horne and Whannel (2020, p. 29) for a brief discussion of the ‘East Asian Era’.

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Flyvbjerg, B., Stewart, A., & Budzier, A. (2016). The Oxford Olympics Study 2016: Cost and cost overrun at the Games. University of Oxford: Said Business School Working Paper 2016–2020 (July). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pap ers.cfm?abstract_id=2804554 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2804554. Accessed 27 September 2021. Gruneau, R. (2017). Sport and modernity. Polity Press. Gruneau, R., & Horne, J. (Eds.). (2016). Mega-events and globalization: Capital and spectacle in a changing world order. Routledge. Hanakata, N. C., Bignami, F., & Cuppini, N. (Eds.). (2022). Mega-events, urban transformations and social citizenship. Routledge. Hayes, G., & Karamichas, J. (Eds.). (2012). Olympic games, mega-events and civil societies: Globalization, environment, resistance. Palgrave Macmillan. Hokkaido Shimbun. (2022, April 13). Gorin sh¯ ochi, sapporo shimin hantai ‘57%’, zendo wa ‘sansei’ 51%, honshi yoron ch¯ osa [Our survey: The bidding for the Olympics objected by 57% of Sapporo residents and supported by 51% of Hokkaido residents]. https://www.hokkaido-np.co.jp/article/668690 Hong, F. (2005). Prologue: The origin of the Asian Games: Power and politics. Sport in Society, 8(3), 392–403. Hong, F., & Zhouxiang, L. (Eds.). (2021). The Routledge handbook of sport in Asia. Routledge. Horne, J. (2011). Sports mega-events and the shaping of urban modernity in East Asia. In W. Tsutsui & M. Baskett (Eds.), The East Asian Olympiads 1934–2008 (pp. 183–198). Brill. Horne, J. (2021). Sports mega-events. In E. C. J. Pike (Ed.), Research handbook on sports and society (pp. 128–142). Edward Elgar. Horne, J., & Takahashi, Y. (2022). Mobile mega-event expertise in an “East Asian Era”. Sociology of Sport Journal, published online 23 February 2022. Horne, J., & Whannel, G. (2020). Understanding the Olympics (3rd ed.). Routledge. Huebner, S. (2016). Pan-Asian sports and the emergence of modern Asia, 1913– 1974. National University of Singapore (NUS) Press. Jackson, S. J. (2013). Rugby World Cup 2011: Sport mega-events between the global and the local. Sport in Society, 16(7), 847–852. Jackson, S. J. (Ed.). (2014). The other sport mega-event: Rugby World Cup 2011. Routledge. Jackson, S. J. (2019). Rugby World Cup 2019 nitsuiteno kosatsu - Globalka no jidai niokeru All Blacks to Global Rugby [English translation: ‘Reflections on the 2019 Rugby World Cup: The state of the All Blacks and Global Rugby in the age of globalisation’]. Japanese Journal of Sport Sociology, 27 (1), 1–20. Joo, Y., Bae, Y., & Kassens-Noor, E. (2017). Mega-events and mega-ambitions: South Korea’s rise and the strategic use of the big four events. Palgrave Macmillan.

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Kellner, D. (2003). Media spectacle. Routledge. Kobayashi, K., & Cho, Y. (2019). Asian sport celebrity: The nexus of race, ethnicity, and regionality. The International Journal of the History of Sport, 36(7–8), 611–625. Koh, E. (2005). South Korea and the Asian Games: The first step to the world. Sport in Society, 8(3), 468–478. Lutan, R. (2005). Indonesia and the Asian Games: Sport, nationalism and the ‘new order.’ Sport in Society, 8(3), 414–424. McKirdy, A. (2019, August 29). Brave Blossoms coach Jamie Joseph hails contributions of team’s foreign-born players. The Japan Times. https://www. japantimes.co.jp/sports/2019/08/29/rugby/brave-blossoms-coach-jamiejoseph-hails-contributions-teams-foreign-born-players/. Last accessed 20 May 2021. Müller, M. (2015). What makes an event a mega-event? Definitions and sizes. Leisure Studies, 34(6), 627–642. Müller, M., Gogishvili, D., Wolfe, S. D., Gaffney, C., & Hug, M. (2023). Peak event: The rise, crisis and potential decline of the Olympic Games and the World Cup. Tourism Management, 95, 104657. Reiche, D., & Brannagan, P. M. (Eds.). (2022). Routledge handbook of sport in the Middle East. Routledge. Roche, M. (2000). Mega-events and modernity. Routledge. Roche, M. (2017). Mega-events and social change: Spectacle, legacy and public culture. Manchester University Press. Rugby World Cup. (2020). RWC 2019 delivers record economic, social and sporting outcomes for Japan. https://www.rugbyworldcup.com/news/ 572269. Last accessed 20 May 2021. Said, E. (1978). Orientalism. Routledge. Sugden, J., & Tomlinson, A. (Eds.). (2012). Watching the Olympics: Politics, power and representation. Routledge. Weinberg, B. (2015). Asia and the future of football. Routledge. Zirin, D. (2014). Brazil’s dance with the devil: The World Cup, The Olympics, and the fight for democracy. Haymarket Books.

PART I

The Olympic Games

CHAPTER 2

How China’s Two Olympic Games Changed China and the Olympics Susan Brownell

Introduction In 2002, I first asked the question, “Will the Olympics change China, or will China change the Olympics?” In the previous year, China had been elected to host the 2008 Summer Olympics by the Session of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), setting a record with its 34-vote advantage in the second round over the next-closest bid city, Toronto. Advocacy groups and politicians in the developed West had attempted to drum up opposition to the bid so as to pressure China to improve its human rights record in numerous areas, and they also pressured the IOC to require commitments from the Chinese government with their accusation that awarding the games to China would be tantamount to supporting authoritarian dictators. I raised my question in my presentation at the international seminar on “Post-Olympism? Questioning Sport

S. Brownell (B) University of Missouri-St. Louis, St. Louis, MO, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. Kobayashi et al. (eds.), Sports Mega-Events in Asia, Palgrave Series of Sport in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0011-4_2

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in the Twenty-First Century,” organized by sport geographer John Bale at the University of Aarhus (Denmark). It was later published in the conference volume (Brownell, 2004). I explained that during a trip to Beijing I had met with He Zhenliang, the IOC member in China and an elder statesman of sports diplomacy. I translated “post-Olympism” into Chinese as hou Aolinpike zhuyi, and asked him how he saw China’s role in it. He replied that although he had not used the label, he had devoted much thought to an issue that might fit the description. He believed that the future of the Olympic Movement lies in cultural diversification. If the Olympic Movement is to remain a vital force, then it must become truly multicultural by embracing the ethnic cultures (minzu wenhua) of the world outside of the West, and more non-Western and developing nations must host the Olympic Games. If I had not had this conversation with “Elder He” (He Lao, the fond title by which he was known), I probably would have followed the mission statement of the seminar, which focused on the moral crises that, in the view of the West, have continuously threatened the Games and Olympism as an ideal. I might have focused on the topic that was receiving so much political attention: Will the Olympic Games change China? But then I realized that He Zhenliang viewed the Olympic Movement from a standpoint different from mine, and for him the central question was: Will China change the Olympic Games? At the conference, I pointed out that it is modernist and colonialist for the Western critics to fixate on whether the Olympic Games will propel China toward a more Westernstyle democracy. The unspoken assumption is that change must be a one-way process that is pressed upon non-Western nations, leaving the developed West unchanged. I went on to translate He Zhenliang’s biography into English (Liang, 2007). He passed away in 2015 at the age of 86, having lived to see China host its first Olympic Games, fulfilling his dream of a half century. Half a year after his death, Beijing won the bid to host its first winter Olympics. With the Beijing 2022 Olympics now behind us, I want to look back at the two decades from the bid for the first games to the closing ceremony of the second, to examine how the Olympics changed China, and how China changed the Olympics. It is not really possible to answer the question as posed because China is such a big, complicated country, and mega-events are such a vast, multifaceted “total social phenomenon,” with tentacles reaching into multiple sectors of social, economic, and political life. I will focus on narrower developments that could be “leading

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indicators” of deeper underlying changes. First, I will discuss how the 2008 Olympics changed the Olympics by attracting an “NGO swarm” that tilted the balance of power between non-governmental organizations (NGOs), governments, and the IOC in the direction of NGOs. Second, I will discuss the Chinese government’s response to the human rights controversies surrounding the 2001 bid and the 2008 Olympics, which occurred not in the realm of on-the-ground human rights as advocates hoped, but in the realm of communications and media. Third, I will discuss the IOC’s response, which involved adopting the corporate model of “social responsibility.” Fourth, I will discuss the human rights controversies surrounding the 2022 Olympics. Finally, I will use a completely different topic—the Chinese recruitment of foreign-born athletes to represent China at the 2022 Olympics—to demonstrate that, in the realm of sport at least, China has been changing, becoming more fully integrated into the international order, more open, and less xenophobic—even while the approach to domestic human rights seems to have hardly changed, and perhaps gotten worse.

Researching Olympic Games Through Ethnographic Fieldwork and Interviews I have tried to investigate the Olympic Games as a social phenomenon by conducting ethnographic fieldwork and interviews with key figures. I was in China for the year leading up to the Beijing 2008 Olympics funded by a Fulbright Senior Research award, when I traversed the city taking part in Olympics-related events and, when the Olympics arrived, I attended sports events and “hung out” in central gathering places. Then and in the years afterward, I interviewed Chinese Olympic organizers, IOC members and staff, and staff at human rights organizations. I was given special permission by then-IOC President, Jacques Rogge, to review all of the relevant IOC documents dating from 2001 to 2008. After the 2008 games I conducted more than 30 hours of interviews with the Chairman of the IOC’s Coordination Commission for Beijing, Hein Verbruggen. I also had extensive contact with the media, since I was interviewed by about one hundred journalists from more than twenty countries. I was unable to attend the 2022 Olympics because of the strict visa restrictions, but from the comfort of my dining room I gave nearly a hundred interviews to print, television, and online journalists, many of whom were

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in China. I was able to supplement their observations though internet research and WeChat discussions with colleagues in China.

The End of the Cold War To begin, it is important to understand that the “politics” that surround twenty-first century Olympic Games are very different from those of the Cold War era. Before the end of the Cold War, Olympic boycotts were led by national governments protesting against other national governments. Civil actors and a few athletes sometimes called for boycotts (most notably of the Berlin 1936 Olympics), but their calls never initiated actions by governments. The twin boycotts of 1980 and 1984 became one of the symbols of the Cold War. More than 60 nations followed President Jimmy Carter’s lead and kept their athletes home from Moscow in 1980; China was one of them. China and Romania actually broke the socialist ranks and attended the Los Angeles 1984 Olympics, which the Soviet bloc boycotted in retaliation for the Moscow boycott. I am a member of the generation of athletes that was shaped by the US and Soviet-led Olympic boycotts in 1980 and 1984. I placed seventh in the 1980 US Olympic Trials in track and field, in the pentathlon (in 1981, it became the heptathlon), while the top three made the Olympic team. But we knew before the trials started that none of us would actually be going to the Summer Olympics in Moscow. That was the closest I would ever come to realizing my Olympic dream. In the end, the 1980 Olympic boycott, which killed the dreams of so many athletes across the world, did not achieve any of its goals—the Soviet Union did not pull its troops out of Afghanistan for another nine years, and despite all this posturing, Carter went down in history as a weak president. Juan Antonio Samaranch, who became IOC president just after the 1980 Summer Olympics, worked throughout his 21-year tenure to persuade governments that boycotts are not politically effective, and only harm athletes. Some twenty years after the boycott, the US itself invaded Afghanistan and launched a military occupation that lasted twice as long as the Soviet Union’s, making the US position in 1980 seem somewhat ludicrous. As a result, since the end of the Cold War, there has been a broad consensus among national governments and Olympic committees that boycotts don’t accomplish political goals, and only punish the athletes. The first post-Cold War Olympics, the Winter Olympics in Albertville in 1992, had universal participation, and since then the only voices calling

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for nations to keep their athletes home, or the IOC to move the games to another country, have been advocacy groups and a few politicians. In all the years since then, no nation has kept its athletes home while declaring that it is doing so as political protest. North Korea did not send athletes to Tokyo in summer 2021, but it gave the COVID-19 pandemic as the reason. Nevertheless, the IOC banned North Korea from the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, demonstrating that in the twenty-first century, it would not hesitate to punish boycotting nations.

The NGO Swarm in 2008 Since 1992 the loudest calls for boycotts have come from NGOs, many of which did not exist until the very end of the Cold War (e.g., Human Rights Watch, Reporters without Borders, Free Tibet; Amnesty International is an exception, having been founded in 1961). In 1990, there were approximately 6,000 registered international NGOs worldwide (The Economist, 1999). When China hosted its first Olympic Games in 2008, the number of active organizations had reached 40,000, where it still stands today (Union of International Associations, 2009, 2010). The growing political influence of NGOs has led some scholars to assert that NGOs have become “the third force” in global politics after governments and corporations (Florini & Simmons, 2000, pp. 7–12). The IOC itself is a non-governmental, non-profit organization, as are the entities comprising the international sport system, including local Olympic organizing committees, national Olympic committees, and international sport federations like the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). They have benefited from the “NGO-ization” of global society, as their revenues and political influence have increased along with those of other international NGOs. But the relationship between sportsrelated NGOs and social-issue NGOs, along with their respective United Nations ties, is an uneasy one that vacillates between collaboration and antagonism. The internet revolutionized the ability of NGOs to unify across national boundaries in order to descend on a target in sync—labeled an “NGO swarm” in a 2002 Rand Corporation report that asserted that NGOs were gaining strength at the cost of governments (Ronfeldt, 2002). The 2008 Beijing Olympics were the first Olympic Games to be targeted by an “NGO swarm.” By linking their campaigns with Olympic Games, NGOs can garner international media coverage and

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attract donors. For example, in late March 2008, the International Secretariat of Amnesty International in London had membership revenues totaling £34.7 million; by March 2009, the year encompassing the Beijing Olympics, its revenues jumped by 26 percent, to £43.8 million (Amnesty International Limited, 2010, p. 36). At least fifty organizations drew attention to a wide array of human rights issues in China. The main controversy concerned the suppression of the separatist movement in Tibet, which had sparked riots inside Tibet, as well as protests by pro-Tibet groups that disrupted legs of the international torch relay in major North American and European cities. But the issues went far beyond this, including the oppression of ethnic minorities and dissidents, mass evictions, application of the death penalty, prison labor, and more. Most of these organizations were based in the West, although the Tibetan “government-in-exile” in India had a hand in coordinating the pro-Tibet organizations. The number of issues was a new phenomenon, too, because previous government-led boycotts had typically focused on one political issue, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The Boycott of the Opening Ceremony in 2008 Actually, no national Olympic committee, head of state, or active athlete called for nations to boycott the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games and keep athletes home. Nancy Pelosi, the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, called on President George Bush to “boycott the opening ceremony” as a protest against China’s human rights record, particularly the oppression of Tibetan Buddhists in Tibet (Hulse, 2008). President George W. Bush did not heed her call, but human rights groups took up the idea and pressured heads of state worldwide to do the same, with the Western media amplifying their voices. About thirteen heads of state, plus the UN Secretary-General, did not attend the ceremony (Reuters, 2008; Traynor & Watts, 2008). Most stated openly that they skipped the ceremony as an act of protest, but others offered different excuses. All these countries, however, sent other government representatives. This incipient group protest action did not fully materialize because no single head of state initiated it, the US did not support it, and there was no catchy label for it such as the “diplomatic boycott” label that seized headlines in 2022. Ultimately the NGOs were no more effective than governments had been in 1980—the Chinese leadership did not change its policies in Tibet.

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A law guaranteeing more media freedom to foreign journalists was one of the few visible successes. The judicial procedures surrounding the death penalty were also enhanced, perhaps a result of pressure from the IOC (Kingsbury, 2007). The Chinese public was largely unaware of the debates because censorship prevented the media from covering them. Thus, the media furor mostly involved Westerners talking to themselves about the problems in China. In a diary entry just before the IOC awarded the 2008 games to Beijing, He Zhenliang cited a line by the famous poet Li Bai to describe the political attacks: “The monkeys scream nonstop from the banks while the light boat has already passed by countless mountains” (He, 2001). I personally experienced the security crackdown that resulted when the riots in Tibet and the chaos around the torch relay in Europe and North America made the Chinese government feel that the outside world was more hostile than it had realized. In my opinion, the turmoil in 2008 helped the Chinese leadership to correctly recognize the depth of antagonism toward the Chinese Communist Party that exists in the West, so it has been protecting its survival since that time. I have been left with the suspicion that the human rights situation in China might be better today if China’s first Olympics could have occurred in an atmosphere of friendly international relations. It is frequently the case, in China and elsewhere, that a perceived threat from external enemies further entrenches authoritarianism. In the years after the Olympics, and particularly after Xi Jinping became president in 2013, China became more assertive in military affairs. Whether the furor surrounding the Beijing Olympics played a role is difficult to say. However, it can be said that the Beijing Olympics were an important catalyst of the effort to build up China’s “soft power” (persuasion and attraction), if not its hard power (military actions and economic sanctions) (Brownell, 2013, 2019a).

Increased Utilization of Communications in the Olympic Games The negative media coverage sparked by the NGO swarm in 2001 forced the IOC and China to change the way they did business, as they turned to prestigious international public relations firms for help much more so than they had in the past. Top communications firms provided advice to the Chinese organizers (Brownell, 2013, p. 12).

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Hein Verbruggen, chair of the IOC’s Coordination Commission for Beijing, anticipated that “communications” would be the central issue for the games, by which he meant the attacks from China critics and the negative media coverage. He hired Hill and Knowlton to write a reputational risk guide, believing it to be the first time that the IOC had conducted this kind of risk assessment. Such assessments, along with a “risk management plan,” had become increasingly common in the corporate world with the rise of the concept of the “risk society” in the 1990s. As the games neared, and feeling that their response to the NGOs had been ineffective to that date, the IOC hired Public Strategies, a subsidiary of the WPP Group, one of the top four advertising and marketing agencies in the world (Brownell, 2019a, p. 275). The Coordination Commission used a quarterly “dashboard” to evaluate the progress of the preparatory work from 2001 to 2008. Since the 2008 Olympics were generally considered to be the best-organized Olympics ever, almost every line item was coded green, indicating no problem, and almost nothing was coded red, indicating a warning. The “communications” effort of the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games was one of the few aspects of the preparatory work that was frequently criticized and marked with a “yellow card” in the progress dashboard (Brownell, 2013, p. 15). Verbruggen requested and was granted a meeting with the head of the Propaganda Bureau at which he diplomatically brought up the ineffectiveness of the response to the public attacks. In 2006 he also brought up the “perception problem” with Premier Wen Jiabao, observing that organizing perfect games is one thing, but having a good perception is another. He pointed out that in 1936 the Germans without any doubt organized good games, but today we only talk about the fact that they were the “Nazi Games” (Brownell, 2019a, p. 276). Verbruggen saw no real change in the Chinese approach before the Olympic Games, but a few months after the games, the central government announced an investment of US$6 billion into state-controlled international media. The goal, as outlined by the Politburo member responsible for propaganda and ideological work, was “to strengthen our communication capacity domestically and internationally” because, among other reasons, “it is of vital importance to the rise of China’s soft power, it is of vital importance to the standing and influence of China’s media in international public opinion” (Li, 2008). The amount of content and the international reach of state-owned newspapers (China

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Daily, Global Times), television, and radio were expanded; an online platform was created (branded as China Global Television Network, or CGTN, in 2010); government officials nationwide received training in communications; and many more efforts were initiated.

The IOC’s Response to the Human Rights Controversies Social Responsibility In 2008, the IOC was still mainly focused on signs of momentum toward national boycotts and so was ill-prepared to deal with the NGO swarm. The experience changed their perspective and IOC leadership began to consider that the main threat to the future viability of the Games no longer came from national politics, but from potential negative media coverage that could damage the Olympic “brand” and discourage cities from bidding for the games. After 2008 the IOC engaged in extensive reflections over how to respond to this new threat. Meanwhile, in the previous decade, the corporate world had developed social responsibility in response to the ever-louder criticism from the NGOs that they were also attracting. Some major sport organizations followed suit, but the IOC lagged. The new approach narrowly defined human rights as a “management problem” by focusing on specific and potentially manageable issues such as fair labor in the supply chain, non-discrimination in the workplace, or following legal procedures in evictions. Other influential international organizations adopted policies, too, such as the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP, endorsed in 2011), and the International Standards Organization (ISO) Standard 20121 for “event sustainability management systems” (confirmed in 2012). Starting with the 2018 Olympics, the IOC required every Olympic organizing committee to obtain ISO 20121 certification. When German lawyer Thomas Bach was elected IOC President in 2013, it marked an important generational change between the old Cold War model and the new corporate-legalistic model. The Host City Contract between the IOC and Beijing, signed when Beijing won the bid in 2015, was the first to include a clause on freedom of the press, which had been a topic of much contention for the NGOs (including

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Reporters without Borders and Committee for the Protection of Journalists) in the context of the 2008 Olympics. Bach spearheaded Agenda 2020 for Reform, adopted by the IOC Session in December 2014. However, there was not enough time to fully implement reforms in the Host City Contract for Beijing because the Candidature Procedure had been published before the adoption of Agenda 2020. The IOC finally joined the corporate trend in 2017 when Paris signed the Host City Contract in force for the 2024 games (International Olympic Committee, 2017). It included a clause on human rights stipulating that gamesrelated activities should be conducted in alignment with the UNGP. This not only had the effect of giving the IOC greater leverage over host cities, but it also provided leverage over Olympic sponsor and supplier corporations who were now required by the UNGP to ensure fair labor practices throughout their supply chain. This provided a way of indirectly pressuring host governments via corporations, which might have more potential than the failed strategy of threatening boycotts. The Operational Requirements addendum to the contract listed specific issues that had been most controversial in the Olympic context: migrant workers, labor conditions, displacement of local population, discrimination, child safeguarding, peaceful assembly, and media freedom (International Olympic Committee, 2018, p. 127). However, it was not clear that the IOC could use the contract to pressure a city or country about human rights violations beyond this list—such as the maltreatment of Tibetans or Uyghurs in distant provinces. Revision of the Bid Process When Oslo, Norway, withdrew its bid for the 2022 Winter Olympic Games, for the first time in the history of the modern Olympics there was no Western contender. Furthermore, the two remaining bid countries, Kazakhstan and China, were both in Asia. Beijing was selected at the general meeting of the IOC in July 2015. An irrational hysteria about “giving the Games to ‘dictatorships’” followed (e.g., Clarey, 2014) that seemed less about sports and more about maintaining the supremacy of the liberal West and its political ideology. It was irrational because, in fact, the number of bids being put forward by countries generally labeled in the West as “authoritarian” or “dictatorships” was not increasing. These labels were applied to China and Russia (which had just hosted the 2014 winter Olympics in Sochi);

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sometimes Turkey was called “authoritarian,” while Kazakhstan had more recently come onto the scene. From the total of 55 Olympic bids spanning the bid contests for the 2008 to 2022 Games, China and Russia put forward a total of five bids between them (nine percent of the total). Counting Turkey’s two bids and Kazakhstan’s one, the total was eight (fifteen percent of the total), and the numbers did not increase over time. There were not actually increasing numbers of dictatorships bidding for Olympic Games; the problem was really China and Russia. Reactions from Western politicians and sport bureaucrats revealed a belief that the Olympic Games should go only to countries that conformed to the Western ideals of democracy and human rights. Before withdrawing support for Oslo’s bid, Norway’s leading political parties asserted, “It is critical that democratic countries that respect human rights still want to arrange the Olympic and Paralympic games” (Berglund, 2014). Together with Austria, the national Olympic committees of Germany, Switzerland, and Sweden (where public opposition had scuttled bids), presented a report on The Bid Experience to the IOC. They argued that “democracies” are at a disadvantage in bidding for Olympics because governments accountable to public opinion are reluctant to take on the financial and political risks. They proposed that the IOC should establish a monitoring agency with power to sanction host cities that do not meet social responsibility standards “including not only environmental but also social, ethical and economical sustainability and thereby also human rights” (Mennel et al., 2014, p. 13). I do not think it is a coincidence that two years later, the IOC added a clause about human rights to the Host City Contract, and the candidature process was modified in successive steps, first by awarding two bids at one time in 2017 (to Paris 2024 and Los Angeles 2028), and then by eliminating the open bidding process in 2019. In the new procedures, a Future Host Commission was to engage in a “permanent dialogue” with prospective candidate cities until a city was ready to move to the candidature phase, which would be approved by the Executive Board before it was forwarded to the IOC Session for a vote. The result of the revised process was that four Olympics through 2032 will all take place in conventional Western powers that have hosted multiple Olympics: France, Italy, the US, and Australia. Among the six cities that had expressed interest in the 2030 Winter Olympics, not yet awarded, only Sapporo was non-Western.

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The world of international sports is still Western-dominated. There are certainly non-Western Olympic officials who would like to see Western influence reduced; I have heard complaints in China. Even a member of the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee, who was educated in the US and friendly toward the West, told me that the West will not remain dominant for long, and they know it. He thought that the purpose of the new Olympic bid process was to return control over the Olympic Games to the West, because it was threatened by the three consecutive games in East Asia (PyeongChang 2018, Tokyo 2020, Beijing 2022).

Diplomatic Boycott in 2022 By 2022, the oppression of the Tibetan Buddhists had taken a back seat to the oppression of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. As had been the case in 2008, no national government, Olympic committee, or famous active athlete called for a complete national boycott of the Games. In the lead-up to both the 2008 and 2022 Olympics, a proposed US House of Representatives resolution calling for a complete national boycott did not pass. However, something that was different was that the number of human rights organizations involved in Olympic protests increased exponentially. A year before the games, over 180 organizations, mostly regional associations in support of Tibet, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Uyghurs in Xinjiang, formed a coalition to call for a boycott (McKeown, 2021), and these were just the NGOs that focus on issues of self-determination. This compared to my count of fifty organizations covering all issues in 2008. US House Speaker Pelosi, who had led the calls for the “opening ceremony boycott” in 2008, used the phrase “diplomatic boycott” for the first time in summer 2021 when she called on the US Congress to keep official government representatives home, while sending athletes to the games (Pelosi, 2021). The label of “diplomatic boycott” was new in the Olympic context, and so the Biden administration should get credit for inventing a new diplomatic tool. As they had in 2008, human rights groups picked up the call and started pressuring governments across the world to do the same. Eventually, in December, the US and seven other countries announced their decision not to send government officials to the games “because of concerns about China’s human rights record.” A handful of other countries, meanwhile, did not send government officials, but did not explicitly frame this move as a boycott (Westendarp, 2022). As had happened with the “boycott the opening ceremony” movement

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of 2008, media coverage of the diplomatic boycott faded once the games started because there was no story to report—China did not modify its domestic policies, and the media couldn’t very well cover government representatives who were not in China, but were at home watching on television. If we look for social change in China resulting from Olympic boycott threats, then, we are probably doomed to failure. The seven years of intensive international engagement required to organize the Olympic Games did force China to adjust many of the practices that had been criticized, such as protecting intellectual property, enforcing fair labor practices, following the relevant legal process in mass evictions, mitigating air pollution, and ensuring press freedom (at least, for the international press). However, the treatment of Tibetans, Uyghurs in Tibet, and political dissidents did not change visibly. The leadership was more accommodating in 2008—in particular, the media law gave more freedom to international journalists in 2008, but even though it was extended indefinitely after the games, it seemed to have quietly disappeared by 2022. By 2022, however, China’s official political rhetoric had become much more defiant and hostile. One interpretation might be that this indicated greater confidence in China’s position in the world order. But also, the leadership believed that the criticism of China’s human rights was merely a pretext, because the fundamental problem was that the developed West was threatened by China’s rise, so the criticism would continue no matter what China did (Brownell, 2012, 2019b). Since this had been the experience in 2008, they were already more cynical heading into 2022.

China’s Recruitment of Foreign-Born Athletes to Represent China at the 2022 Winter Olympics However, I would now like to return to the point that I made at the start of this essay: Olympic Games are a vast, multifaceted “total social phenomenon” that is more than just a media platform for NGOs and politicians. Examining a different facet shows that the hosting of the Olympic Games had pushed China toward more openness and greater integration with the international sports system. When Eileen Gu, born in the US to a single mother who immigrated from China, won three medals representing China in the freeski events at the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics, she was one among thirty-two foreign-born athletes who represented China—more than half of them

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American. She won a silver in slopestyle and golds in big air and halfpipe, and her total of two golds resulted in China’s lead over the US in the gold medal count, nine to eight, at the end of the games. American-born athletes had been representing other countries in Olympic Games for decades, but American media had largely ignored citizenship swapping in previous games. Although there was a public perception that increasing numbers of Olympic athletes have been switching citizenship, in actuality, the overall proportion of Olympic athletes representing a different country from their country of birth has increased only slightly in the last seventy years. Statistical analysis of 45,000 athletes from eleven countries known for in- and out-migration (not including China) found that the proportion fluctuated between roughly four and nine percent in summer Olympics from 1948 to 2016. While the percentage had reached new highs in 2012 and 2016, there was no overall pattern of increase, since the next-highest percentages were found in 1948 and 1956, respectively (Jansen, 2020). Calculations for the PyeongChang 2018 Winter Olympics found a similar proportion–178 athletes represented non-native nations, six percent of the total. The US was the biggest sender of athletes at thirtyseven, while South Korea was the biggest receiver at eighteen (Hodgetts, 2018), a result of a strategy to maximize medals at its own Olympics. Korea tied with Russia for sixth in the total medal count, surpassing Japan (twelfth) and China (fourteenth). The rivalry with Japan and Korea was one factor that pushed China to start recruiting foreign-born athletes for its own Olympics four years later. If nothing new was happening in terms of the quantity of citizenship swapping in 2022, why did Eileen Gu attract so much attention? Further analysis of 167 athletes who had competed for one country in the Olympic Games and then represented another country—a better measure of nationality-switching than just looking at place of birth— contradicted expectations. Such cases were rare until 1996, peaked at 33 at the Athens 2004 Olympics, and hovered between 12 and 21 after that. Although the proportions did not vary much, the migration patterns did change. Before the 1990s, most foreign-born athletes were either Europeans competing for other European/American nations, or colonial subjects competing for their metropole. As citizenship laws were loosened worldwide starting in the 1980s, foreign-born athletes came from more diverse backgrounds, with more of them from Asia and Africa, and fewer athletes following the old colonial lines. The migration patterns

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of Olympians reflect broader patterns of international migration (Jansen, 2020). It is hard not to conclude that public consternation over citizenship swapping is provoked by the perception that the old lines of global power are being upended. It is no longer just the traditional sports powers in the West that have the ability to attract gold medal winners. The “brawn drain” is flowing to emerging nations, too, particularly in Asia. In 2022, China finally opened its doors. China’s foreign-born Olympians, too, reflect China’s immigration history. Most members of the 1936 Olympic soccer team, competing for the Republic of China, were born in Hong Kong or Southeast Asia, and were playing professionally in Hong Kong (then a British territory) (The Paper, 2021). Howard Wing (He Haohua), the son of a Chinese father and an Irish mother who was introduced to track cycling while growing up in Rotterdam, had never been to China, but was invited to join the team (Olympics.com, n.d.). After two Olympics were canceled due to the World War, Howard Wing and swimmer Wu Chuanyu paid their own way to the next Olympics in London in 1948. Wu, a second-generation descendant of Chinese immigrants, was born and raised in Indonesia, whose independence was not recognized by the Dutch until 1949 (Swimming World, n.d.). After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Wu joined tens of thousands of ethnic Chinese who moved from Indonesia to China when offered citizenship by virtue of their Chinese descent, choosing to escape the rising anti-Chinese sentiment in their newly independent homeland. The People’s Republic of China was invited to the Helsinki Olympics in 1952 at the last moment and was not able to get there until just before the closing ceremony. Because Wu’s event was at the end of the games, he was the only athlete who actually competed. Thus he became the first athlete to represent the “New China,” a fact that is much repeated in mainland sport histories, which often overlook that he was the only athlete to represent both the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China. He was also the last athlete to represent China until 1980, since it did not take part in the Olympic Games in protest over the presence of the “Republic of China” (now located on Taiwan). Half a million overseas Chinese arrived in China by the early 1960s to aid the establishment of New China. Among them were at least a dozen sportspeople who represented China in international competitions in the 1960s and 70 s, and then became coaches and leaders in their sports.

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Most of them were from Indonesia and played badminton or tennis, while a few came from Japan, India, and the UK (Wang, 2018). Then catastrophe struck. The Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) broke out, and xenophobia raged as Red Guards attacked and persecuted everyone with foreign connections, including the “returned” overseas Chinese. When the policy of “reform and opening up to the outside world” was launched in 1978, China was no longer the immigration destination that it had once been. The restrictive Chinese citizenship law, enacted in 1980 and still in force, prohibits dual citizenship and grants automatic citizenship to children of Chinese nationals. Although the law permits naturalization, citizenship has rarely been granted to people lacking Chinese ancestry, and is difficult to obtain even for those who are of Chinese descent. There is no official waiver of the requirements for top athletes. In 2008, equestrian Alex Hua Tian’s naturalization, possibly the first of an athlete since the sixties, was likely facilitated by the fact that his mother was Chinese, and he became a Chinese citizen one month before he turned eighteen. He represented China in three-day eventing at the 2008 Olympics. But he was unique: China wanted to have an athlete in every event in its first Olympics, and there were no equestrians on the mainland at the time. Tian went on to represent China at the Olympics in 2016 and 2020, too. China’s restrictive citizenship law became increasingly untenable as its immigrant population grew larger, drawn by the rapid growth of the economy, particularly after the 2009 financial crisis ravaged Western economies. The sports world mirrored the trend when foreign stars were hired by the Chinese soccer Super League at astronomical salaries, leading to calls to naturalize foreign athletes so they could help China qualify for the finals of the FIFA World Cup. Three clubs were selected as pilot programs for naturalizing foreign-born athletes of Chinese and non-Chinese descent (Ross, 2021). After China won the bid to host the 2022 Winter Olympics in 2015, the combined pressure on soccer and winter Olympic sports began to produce new policies. In 2016 the Kunlun Red Star professional ice hockey team was established to compete in the Russia-based Kontinental Hockey League, as part of a broad plan to build up ice hockey across China, and recruited a number of foreign-born players with no Chinese ancestry. A year later, an open invitation was issued to overseas Chinese to take part in trials for the national men’s and women’s hockey teams,

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provided they were willing to become Chinese citizens and represent China in international competitions. Behind the scenes, non-Chinese players on the Kunlun team were offered the chance to join the national team. Chinese officials attended the 2018 U.S. Figure Skating Championships and recruited three Chinese American women to take part in trials to fill the slot in China’s weakest figure skating event, women’s singles, with the objective of improving the medal chances in the Olympic team competition. Ultimately Beverly Zhu (Zhu Yi) was selected. Two-time Olympic bronze medalist Chen Lu, head of the program, justified it by stating that Japan and Korea had been recruiting foreign-born athletes (Sohu, 2018a). Indeed, at the 2022 Olympics, the male in the Japanese ice dance pair was an American-born athlete who was able to obtain Japanese citizenship after the couple married in 2017, for which purpose he legally assumed her family name; their performance helped Japan to the bronze medal in the team event in which China had sought a medal, but finished fifth. In August 2018, the Winter Sports Management Center, which oversees the snow and ice sports that make up the winter Olympics, issued a global solicitation to recruit “talents” possessing skills in management, science, sport medicine, and international exchange in winter sports. The solicitation stated: This global call for applications is an “invitation to the talented and a call to the worthy” extended by the Winter Sports Management Center across the world and to all walks of life, no matter your work experience, no matter your professional background, no matter where you are from. If only you have a heart that loves snow and ice sports and possess a specialized skill, we will all open our arms and welcome you to join us. (Sohu, 2018b, original in Chinese)

In November 2018, the Management Center revised the rules of eligibility to allow overseas Chinese and foreign athletes to enter competitions “in order to further implement the concept of ‘openness and sharing.’” This was an epochal shift that eliminated the monopoly of the statesupported sport system over access to qualifying competitions for the national teams, opening them to athletes training in private academies and training centers outside the provincial teams.

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In February 2019 the first professional soccer player gained Chinese citizenship, John Hou Saeter, a Norwegian citizen born to a Norwegian father and Chinese mother. He was followed by a dozen more, including five Brazilians. The Secretary-General of the Chinese Football Association explained, “We were a little worried… But fortunately in China the fans are happy to see a few naturalized players join the Chinese team, as long as they can help strengthen the team” (Xinhuanet, 2020). The first naturalized Olympian to emerge from the new policies competed in the Tokyo Olympics under the Chinese name Zheng Ninali. Nina Schultz, a former Canadian citizen, finished tenth in the heptathlon event in track and field. She was the granddaughter of Zheng Fengrong, who was legendary in Chinese sport history because she broke the world record in the high jump in 1957, but the record was not recognized since China was not a member of the IAAF, the international federation for athletics. Schultz described her participation in the Olympics as the realization of her grandmother’s unfulfilled dream (White, 2021). All of this happened with no changes to immigration and naturalization laws. In 2020, a draft law to create permanent residency (“green card”) was posted for public comment, in which athletes were explicitly listed as one of the categories eligible on account of “outstanding accomplishments.” But the law was shelved due to the negative response from the public. Days before the opening ceremony of the winter Olympics, the Chinese soccer team was eliminated in the Asia qualifier for the 2022 FIFA World Cup, despite fielding three naturalized Brazilians. A few days later, Beverly Zhu fell and stumbled in her segment of the Olympic team event. Both failures sparked vitriol on Chinese social media, leading some commentators to fear for the future of the naturalization policy. In addition to Gu and Zhu, there were eighteen foreign-born male hockey players (one of whom was Nina Schultz’s brother Ty), and twelve foreign-born female hockey players. Some of them told journalists that they had been allowed to retain their original passports and did not renounce their American, Canadian, and Russian citizenship as required by the Chinese citizenship law. American Jeremy Smith stated, “I told them I can’t renounce my U.S. citizenship. They were like, ‘Do not worry. We will not ask you. This is not what this whole process is about. It’s about getting you qualified for the Olympics’” (Wyshynski, 2022). When the status of their citizenship became a hot media topic, athletes and spokespersons started answering “no comment,” and

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websites removed the word “renounced.” While the reaction to Eileen Gu inside China was mostly positive, several social media posts critical of her privileged life went viral, one of which pointed out the lack of evidence that she had renounced her citizenship. After the games, the balance of the public attitude toward Gu in both China and the US seemed to be mainly positive, although extreme nationalist criticism remained (and was censored in China). That Gu was sponsored by thirty corporations, including premier luxury brands based in the US—such as Estee Lauder, Victoria’s Secret, Tiffany & Co, and Cadillac—suggested that the corporate world was confident that her image was positive in both countries and would remain so. The lack of an official change in immigration and naturalization policies, and the seeming violation of the prohibition against dual citizenship, suggested that the naturalization of athletes was an experiment limited to the sports world that could be canceled if deemed necessary, even while there were forces propelling China toward more openness. Exactly one month before the opening ceremony, the website of the Chinese embassy in the US laid out the importance of openness in an article in Chinese entitled “Prepare for the Olympic Games with an Open Attitude, Contribute Chinese Wisdom to World Sport.” It portrayed the naturalization of foreign-born athletes and the recruitment of foreign expertise for the 2022 winter Olympics as a natural result of China’s changing role in the world, referencing the newly revised official Olympic motto (now “Swifter, Higher, Stronger Together”): A “more together” world Olympism requires exchanges and mutual learning with Chinese sports people, it requires that an open China offers its experience in developing relevant concepts, systems, structures, and so on. Further, in the course of progressing from a sports power to a sports superpower, China has gradually established and improved the credibility of its national sports, and contributed greater Chinese wisdom to a broader vision that is about more than just sports. (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, 2022)

Through the lens of sports, we can see that in only five short years, China’s openness to the outside world changed in ways that might have seemed trivial for a superpower, but were remarkable by contrast with the xenophobia of the previous half century. The example of the recruitment of foreign-born athletes continued the practice, dating back to the days

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of Ping Pong Diplomacy, of using sports to tentatively extend China’s connections with the outside world.

Did the Olympics Change China, or Did China Change the Olympics? The answer is: Both. Hosting two Olympic Games accelerated China’s internationalization and integration into the global community. The intense scrutiny from media, advocacy groups, and politicians stimulated self-reflection and helped Chinese leaders to better understand how China is perceived, and they responded by launching a massive effort in international communications to try to improve that perception. The desire to win medals, enter the FIFA World Cup Finals, keep up with Japan and Korea, and do what other nations were doing, forced small steps toward greater openness to immigration. But the Chinese government made no visible moves toward improving human rights in the two areas that received the most attention from politicians and NGOs—self-determination by Tibetans (in 2008) and Uyghurs (in 2022). There was a great deal of change in the IOC’s policies and philosophical position with respect to human rights. Human rights were originally conceived of as controlled by national governments; now sport organizations were publicly assigned some authority over them. Under the label of “social responsibility,” the network of the UN, NGOs, sport organizations, and corporations re-defined specific human rights issues as technical or managerial problems. The addition of a clause into the Host City Contract requiring host cities to follow the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights made it seem that the IOC was now backed by legal force, but the Host City Contract itself is a weak legal document that almost never results in lawsuits. The new policies did gain some strength from the way in which they were woven into an entire web of policies put forth by powerful international actors such as the IOC, the UN, the ISO, and others. The contract for the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics pre-dated the new human rights clause, which came into force with the 2024 Olympics, so we did not get to see whether it would have changed the balance of power between the IOC and Chinese government. At the same time, the IOC seemed reluctant to walk through the hot coals of public criticism again. The revised bid process and awarding of

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four Olympic Games to conventional Western powers appeared to signal that the IOC had lost its enthusiasm for allowing emerging non-Western nations to host the Olympic Games. That did not give hope for a more egalitarian and inclusive world order. Amidst the tensions in the US-China relations leading up to the 2022 Olympics, some commentators asked whether we were entering a “New Cold War,” forgetting that by the end of the old Cold War, China was on the US’s side. I want to contest that oversimplification by looking back over China’s two Olympic Games to demonstrate the ways in which the twenty-first century is different. The Cold War world was a truly divided world: divided by ideology, culture, boycotts, embargoes, the absence of official diplomatic relations, and other divisive tactics. That is simply not the case today. Sports are now one of the most transnational realms of global society: the organization of mega-events requires the hiring of foreign experts and long years of engagement with international organizations and the international media; athletes from many different countries train abroad with foreign coaches; many national teams are coached by foreign coaches; athletes switch citizenship to represent countries other than their homeland; and more. Such practices are now necessary for athletes to contend at the top world level. In order to keep up, China had no choice but to engage in these practices. Sports are helping to pull a reluctant China toward ever-greater integration into the international order.

References Amnesty International Limited. (2010, February 14). Report and financial statements for the year ended 31 March 2009, Index Number: FIN 40/002/2010. Retrieved from https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/fin40/002/201 0/en/ Berglund, N. (2014, March 7). Government MPs make OL demands. NewsinEnglish.no: Views and News from Norway. Retrieved from https://www.new sinenglish.no/2014/03/07/government-mps-make-ol-demands/ Brownell, S. (2004). China and Olympism. In J. Bale & M. K. Christenson (Eds.), Post-Olympism? Questioning sport in the twenty-first century (pp. 51– 64). Berg Press. Brownell, S. (2012). Human rights and the Beijing Olympics: Imagined global community and the transnational public sphere. British Journal of Sociology, 63(2), 306–327.

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Brownell, S. (2013). “Brand China” in the Olympic Context: Communications Challenges of China’s Soft Power Initiative. Javnost – The Public, Journal of the European Institute for Communication and Culture, 20(4), 65–82. Brownell, S. (2019a). The Beijing Olympics: Retrospective: Reflection on the impact of the global media. In K. Ikeda, T. Ren, & C. W. Woo (Eds.), Media, sport, nationalism: East Asia: Soft power projection via the Modern Olympic Games (pp. 269–292). Logos. Brownell, S. (2019b). The view from China: Accepting Olympism, rejecting human rights. In B. J. Keys (Ed.), The ideals of global sport: From peace to human rights (pp. 178–199). University of Pennsylvania Press. Clarey, C. (2014, October 2). A winter games few care to host. New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/03/sports/olympics/a-winter-games-few-care-to-host-.html Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America. (2022, January 5). Yi kaifangde zitai beizhan Aoyun, wei shijie tiyu gongxian Zhongguo zhihui [Prepare for the Olympic Games with an Open Attitude, Contribute Chinese Wisdom to World Sport], online posting. Retrieved from http://www.china-embassy.org/zggs/202201/t20220125_10633054.htm Florini, A. M., & Simmons, P. J. (2000). What the world needs now? In A. M. Florini (Ed.), Third force: The rise of transnational civil society (pp. 1–15). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He, Z. (2001, July 7). He Zhenliang Mosike riji [He Zhenliang’s Moscow Diary]. Beijing Youth Daily, reprinted by Sina.com. Retrieved from http://news.sina. com.cn/c/2003-07-12/0933366235s.shtml Hodgetts, R. (2018, February 14). Does switching nations make you less of an Olympian? CNN . Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/08/ sport/winter-olympics-athletes-switching-nations-pyeongchang/index.html Hulse, C. (2008, April 1). Pelosi suggests Bush skip Olympics opening. New York Times. Retrieved from https://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asi apcf/04/01/pelosi.olympics/index.html International Olympic Committee. (2017). Host city contract – Principles – Games of the XXXIII Olympiad in 2024, September. International Olympic Committee. https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/Oly mpicOrg/Documents/Host-City-Elections/XXXIII-Olympiad-2024/HostCity-Contract-2024-Principles.pdf International Olympic Committee. (2018). Host City Contract – Operational Requirements, June. International Olympic Committee. https://stillmed. olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/Documents/HostCity-Elections/XXXIII-Olympiad-2024/Host-City-Contract-2024-Operat ional-Requirements.pdf

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Jansen, J. (2020). Who can represent the nation? Migration, citizenship, and nationhood in the Olympic Games. Ph.D. Dissertation, Erasmus University Rotterdam. https://repub.eur.nl/pub/127634/binnenwerk-Joost-oms lag.pdf Kingsbury, K. (2007, June 11). An Olympic reprieve for China’s convicts. Time online. Retrieved from https://web.archive.org/web/20071031053345/ www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1631399,00.html Li, C. (2008, December 12). Zai jinian zhongguo dianshi shiye dansheng ji Zhongyang Dianshitai jiantai 50 zhounian dahuishangde jianghua [Speech commemorating the birth of Chinese television at the Congress on the 50th anniversary of the founding of China Central Television]. Guangming Daily. Liang, L. (2007). He Zhenliang and China’s Olympic Dream (S. Brownell, Trans.). Foreign Languages Press. https://digital.la84.org/digital/collec tion/p17103coll16/id/1829/rec/1 McKeown, M. (2021). Open letter to governments: Urgently commit to a government boycott of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing. Retrieved from https://docs.google.com/document/d/1sJNP6SSeJdxNPK tnEkdUTYHT5JdAYPSBsQo9R_68nFo/edit Mennel, P., Vesper, M., Lindeberg, S., & Schild J. (2014, June). Olympic agenda 2020: The bid experience. PROPROJEKT/AS&P. Retrieved from https://www.eventhosts.org/wp-content/themes/iaeh/lib/cpt/resour ces/download.php?id=820 Olympics.com. (n.d.). Howard Wing. Official athlete biography, website of the International Olympic Committee. Retrieved from https://olympics.com/ en/athletes/howard-wing Pelosi, N. (2021, May 18). Opening Statement by Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House, at the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Hearing on China, Genocide and the Olympics. https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house. gov/files/documents/Statement_ChinaOlympics_Pelosi.pdf Reuters. (2008, August 7). FACTBOX: World leaders to attend opening ceremony. Retrieved from www.reuters.com/article/idUST30089220080807 Ronfeldt, D. (2002). A long look ahead: NGOs, networks, and future social evolution. Pardee Center, RAND Corporation. Retrieved from https://www. rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1169.html Ross, T. (2021, May 28). Can naturalized athletes save China’s sporting dreams? Sixth tone: Fresh voices from Today’s China. Retrieved from https://www.six thtone.com/news/1007602/can-naturalized-athletes-save-chinas-sportingdreams%3F Sohu. (2018a, September 22). Chen Lude Chen Lu Jihua [Chen Lu’s Morning Road Plan]. Retrieved from https://www.sohu.com/a/255487 689_100180451

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Sohu. (2018b, August 16). Dongji Yundong Guanli Zhongxin 2018nian quanqiu zhaopin: Sange weishemme [Winter Sports Management Center 2018b Global Recruitment: Three Whys]. Retrieved from https://www.sohu.com/a/247 539658_503567 Swimming World. (n.d.). Wu Chuanyu – Hall of Fame Pioneer. Official website of Swimming World magazine. Retrieved from https://www.swimmingworl dmagazine.com/hall-of-fame/bio/pioneer/wu-chuanyu The Economist. (1999, December 9). The non-governmental order. Retrieved from http://www.economist.com/node/266250 The Paper [Pengpai xinwen]. (2021, March 29). Dianfeng shike: 1936 nian Bolin Aoyunhuishangde Zhongguo zuqiu [Peak moment: Chinese football at the 1936 Berlin Olympics]. http://m.thepaper.cn/kuaibao_detail.jsp?contid= 11928849f&from=kuaibao Traynor, I., & Watts, J. (2008, March 28). Merkel says she will not attend opening of Beijing Olympics. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www. theguardian.com/world/2008/mar/29/germany.olympicgames2008 Union of International Associations. (2009–2010). Yearbook of International Organizations – Guide to Global and Civil Society Networks 2009/2010. Wang, K. (2018, August 14). Returning Chinese athletes honored. China Daily. Retrieved from http://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201808/14/WS5b721ba 7a310add14f3858b7.html Westendarp, L. (2022, January 20). Who’s boycotting the Winter Olympics? Politico. Retrieved from https://www.politico.eu/article/boycott-winter-oly mpics-beijing-2022/ White, J. (2021, August 4). Profile – Tokyo Olympics: Zheng Ninali makes history as China’s first naturalised Olympian. South China Morning Post. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/sport/china/article/3143732/ tokyo-olympics-zheng-ninali-makes-history-chinas-first-naturalised Wyshynski, G. (2022, February 9). Winter Olympics 2022: Inside the odd Olympic journey of China’s men’s hockey team. ESPN online. Retrieved from https://www.espn.com/olympics/story/_/id/33246445/ winter-olympics-2022-odd-olympic-journey-china-men-hockey-team Xinhuanet. (2020, July 29). Zhongghuo zuxie: Guihua zhengce bushi yixiang changqi zhanlüe [Chinese Football Association: Naturalization policy is not a long-term strategy]. Retrieved from http://sports.xinhuanet.com/c/202007/29/c_1126301502.htm

CHAPTER 3

Environment Eclipsed: Tokyo 2020 Sustainability Initiatives and the Pandemic Postponement Robin Kietlinski

Introduction “From the hydrogen-powered cauldron to medals made from recycled mobile phones, […] the Olympic and Paralympic Games Tokyo 2020 are blazing a trail for the future” (IOC, 2021). So reads the headline of a July 2021 summary by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) titled “All you need to know about Tokyo 2020 sustainability.” The article purports to explain “everything you need to know about how Tokyo 2020 is helping build a better, more sustainable world through sport,” and like other IOC literature on sustainability emphasizes the ways in

R. Kietlinski (B) LaGuardia Community College, City University of New York, New York City, NY, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. Kobayashi et al. (eds.), Sports Mega-Events in Asia, Palgrave Series of Sport in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0011-4_3

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which these Olympic Games will leave a lasting, positive legacy on both the host city and on the world. Reading through this July 2021 list of sustainability initiatives causes a distinct sense of cognitive dissonance. When the piece was published days before the opening ceremony, most of the initiatives discussed were simply no longer relevant. For example, while “only eight new competition venues [were] built from scratch,” pre-existing venues were “retrofitted with advanced building technologies to reduce energy consumption,” and another ten venues were “temporary structures designed to minimize construction costs and energy use,” it was known at this time that all these venues would sit empty at the Olympics, void of spectators. Many of those temporary venues built to host an influx of Olympic fans would soon be torn down, their tens of thousands of seats having never been sat upon. While the “t-shirts and trousers worn by torchbearers were made from recycled plastic bottles collected by CocaCola,” large portions of the Olympic torch relay (including its initial leg in Greece in March 2020) had been suddenly halted or cancelled due to pandemic concerns. Moreover, boatloads of materials that had been manufactured for a global event, from Tokyo 2020 branded merchandise to over 100,000 volunteer uniforms sat unused in warehouses collecting dust. Ultimately many volunteers would quit both because they were no longer needed for the much scaled-down event, or because they were mostly still unvaccinated in July 2021 and did not want to take on the risk that volunteering would entail (Wang, 2021). The pristine new National Stadium, fraught with controversy from the beginning, was designed to “use natural wind instead of air conditioning” (ibid.), yet this brand-new expanded stadium was indeed not necessary at all. The 1964 stadium that had been razed and rebuilt in that spot at a tremendous economic and environmental cost also used natural wind instead of air conditioning, and certainly could have accommodated the spectatorless event. The emphasis that Olympic organizers placed on sustainability initiatives, even when these measures had proven unnecessary, was part of an ongoing and uneasy relationship between the Olympic Games and an increasingly imperilled planet Earth. Tokyo would not have won the right to be the 2020 host city had it not laid out a detailed sustainability plan for an eco-conscious event. Since the environment was officially incorporated into the Olympic Charter in the mid-1990s, each host city has aimed to hold a “greener” event than the host city before them. From the bidding process through the closing ceremony, cities must highlight the

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multifaceted ways in which they have embedded sustainability principles and practices into their event (De Kepper, 2017). While the Olympics have followed in step with other international organizations expressing concern over the environment in recent decades, the Olympic Movement is exceptional in its growing gap between rhetorical concern and the reality of its impact. That is to say, the Olympics is increasingly guilty of “greenwashing,” and the postponed Tokyo 2020 Olympics were the most glaring example yet of stated environmental concern being misaligned with environmental reality. Moreover, the overall discontent and dissent surrounding the “pandemic Olympics” led to an increased level of scrutiny of the event, and a year-long postponement resulted in a longer-than-normal period for critical reflection and debate. This chapter takes a close look at the ways in which environmental sustainability became a core element of the Olympic Movement, with a focus on the significant role Japan played in the process. Not only did Japan shape Olympic policies towards the environment, but the hosting of the event also shaped environmental initiatives within Japan. The history of how Japan, the Olympics, and sustainability initiatives became so interconnected will be outlined in detail in the first part of this chapter. I then highlight how some of the sustainability plans developed by the organizers of the Tokyo 2020 Olympics met with environmentalist dissent within Japan in the years following Tokyo’s winning bid to host the event. The 2019 decision taken by the IOC to move the Olympic marathon event from Tokyo to Sapporo on the grounds of dangerous climate conditions for athletes raised eyebrows over the wisdom of holding an Olympics in the notoriously hot and humid Tokyo the following July. Dissent over the Olympics took on an entirely new tenor when it was announced in March 2020 that, for the first time ever, the event would be postponed by one year due to the global pandemic—no longer was it just a small, mostly local group of activists protesting the event, but the chorus of opposition became loud, international, and potentially more impactful. This transnational Olympic resistance movement will be looked at, and the chapter will conclude with a consideration of whether or not the tarnished legacy of the Tokyo 2020 Olympics might have any lasting impact on the Olympics’ relationship with the natural environment.

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Japan, the Olympic Games, and Environmental Sustainability Perhaps more than any other nation, Japan has used its involvement in the Olympic Movement to assert its significance on the global stage. The modern Olympics began as a European and North American event in 1896, and Japan was the first nation from Asia to have a member on the IOC (1909), to send male (1912) and female (1928) athletes to the Olympics, to win the right to host the Olympics (1940-cancelled) and to actually host both Summer (1964) and Winter (1972) Olympic Games. Japan also played a critical role in the incorporation of the environment into Olympics, and the 2020 Olympics were to be an epic showcase of Japanese sustainable development technologies. Japan’s deep historical involvement with the Olympic Movement and its sustainability initiatives offer key contextual background for understanding the current inflection point in the Olympics, as a nuanced awareness of the past is crucial for assessing the present situation and the path forward. Although the IOC did not officially modify the Olympic Charter to include mention of the environment until 1995, the Olympics have been impacting the environment from the moment ground broke in Athens to construct facilities for the first modern Olympics in 1896. As the event grew bigger and more ecologically destructive, and as people grappled with the long-lasting environmental impacts of industrialization, the ecological costs of hosting the Olympics became topics of greater public debate and discourse. Scholars have pointed to Sapporo’s 1972 Winter Olympics as being the first time the Olympics officially acknowledged its own detrimental impact, as the IOC report following the event was the first to discuss public objection on environmental grounds.1 While this was indeed the first time the IOC recognized environmental concerns in its report, the environment has played a conspicuous role in Japan’s hosting of the Olympic Games prior to (and especially after) the Sapporo Winter Olympics.2

The First Tokyo Olympics Although the 1940 Tokyo Olympics never ultimately took place, a legacy in the public imagination and in the physical landscape of Tokyo remains. The Japanese military, government, and Olympic Organizing Committee all agreed in July 1938 to forfeit the 1940 Olympics, yet there had

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already been years’ worth of planning on the ground in Tokyo.3 This included changes to Tokyo’s infrastructure and environment, importantly including the location chosen for the main Olympic stadium. The decision was between the Meiji Shrine Outer Gardens in central Tokyo or Komazawa in western Tokyo (Collins, 2007). The Meiji Shrine Outer Gardens had already been established as a sports hub—in 1924, the Meiji Shrine Games (Meiji Jing¯ u ky¯ ogi taikai) were inaugurated by the Japanese government (Guttmann & Thompson, 2001), and in 1926 the Meiji Jingu Stadium (home to the Yakult Swallows today) opened and was used for numerous high-profile international sporting events prior to the Olympic bid.4 Japan at the turn of the twentieth century was facing myriad environmental crises resulting from the rapid pace of Meiji-era industrialization. Indiscriminate deforestation was an issue of heightened concern, exemplified by the Ashio Copper Mine Pollution case.5 Public outcry over the severe damages of this case led to court cases resulting in the creation of flood control (that is, anti-deforestation) and anti-pollution programmes by the government in 1903 (Pyle, 1975). By the 1910s and 20s, a groundswell of anti-pollution movements by farmers led corporations and government entities to develop pollution control measures and laws like the 1919 Historic Sites, Places of Scenic Beauty, and Natural Monuments Preservation Law (shiseki meish¯ o tennenkinenbutsu hozonh¯ o ) (Miller et al., 2013). Historic shrines and temples were designated as protected scenic and touristic zones under these new laws, and it was into this climate that Meiji Shrine was completed and dedicated to the memory of the Meiji Emperor in central Tokyo in 1920. There was considerable controversy among Japanese Olympic Organizing Committee members tasked with selecting the main site for the 1940 Olympic stadium, particularly over the possible expansion of the existing Meiji Shrine Outer Gardens stadium. The Shrine Bureau of the Ministry of Home Affairs opposed the expansion of the stadium, with the Chief of the Ministry stating that “any reconstruction of the original stadium in the Outer Gardens will destroy its scenic beauty” (Collins, 2007, p. 120). Because of this, a Komazawa Olympic Complex Plan was approved in May 1938, but just six weeks later the Japanese government announced the cancellation of the Games (ibid.). Other venues constructed for the cancelled 1940 Olympics, such as Baji Koen Equestrian Park in Setagaya and the Toda Rowing Course in Saitama, were used

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for the 1964 Olympics, and in the case of the equestrian park, again for the 2020 Games. During World War II, the bombing of Japanese cities “resulted in the destruction of the built environment and the ecosystem alike. Not only did Japan suffer terrible loss of human life, it also lost historical and natural landscapes” (Miller et al., 2013, p. 225). While the Tokyo Olympics of 1964 is often remembered and presented as an important moment of political, social, and technological re-emergence for Japan after World War II, it was also a pivotal moment in the ecological history of Japan. After the war ended in 1945, Japan abandoned most of the environmental policies it had put in place in the pre-war period in the name of promoting high-speed economic growth (Miller et al., 2013). The result was severe environmental degradation, with several high-profile industrial runoff-related cases drawing national and international attention to the severity of the problem from the 1950s to the 1970s.6 At the same time, from 1959 when Tokyo won the bid to host the 1964 Olympics, organizers knew that it would be important to present the image of a clean and modern Japan to the world when the world’s collective camera lenses were pointed at Tokyo. Many of the measures carried out in Tokyo in the early 1960s thus quickly “cleaned up” the city from an aesthetic (and olfactory) standpoint while not necessarily taking the long-term environmental future of Tokyo into consideration. In the early 1960s, The Tokyo Olympic Organizing Committee (OOC) published a detailed booklet titled “Tokyo Welcomes the Olympics” (Orinpikku wo mukaeru Tokyo) to inform the Japanese public of initiatives the OOC considered necessary for carrying out a successful global event.7 Prominently featured in the booklet are photographs and charts showing the deteriorated state of Tokyo’s environment in the early 1960s. Topics discussed at length in the “Environmental Clean-up” section include “Mosquitoes and Flies” (ka to hae), “Noise Pollution” (s¯ o on), “Smoke” (bai kemuri), “Garbage Incineration/Cleaning,” (seis¯ o jigy¯ o ), and “River Purification” (kasen j¯ oka) (Tokyo Olympic Organizing Committee, n.d.). In each of these sections, the OOC outlines both official ordinances by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government and OOC initiatives that were being carried out in the name of making Tokyo “bright, enjoyable, and clean,” (“Tokyo wo akaruku tanoshiku seiketsu ni”), a slogan that the OOC also placed on a 1961 pamphlet about sanitizing Tokyo for the Games.

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Waste disposal both before and during the Games became an issue of major concern. A newspaper advertisement in July 1962 titled “Olympics in a Clean Tokyo” discussed Tokyo’s “garbage problem,” which it said could be helped by replacing traditional wooden garbage boxes with plastic trash cans and bags to contain the smells (Siniawer, 2018). Covered sewers were also constructed in the years leading up to the Olympics to improve the smell and appearance of the city. At this time, Japan’s sewage infrastructure was severely lacking, with only ten per cent of Japan’s urban areas serviced by sewage infrastructure—by the end of 1963, half of all human waste was still dumped directly into Tokyo Bay (ibid.). For this reason, the centres of Olympic construction and activities were far from the foul-smelling waters of Tokyo Bay. The main Olympic complex for 1964 was placed in the Meiji Shrine Outer Gardens, and Kenzo Tange’s Yoyogi Sports Center was built adjacent to Meiji Shrine. Another Olympic Park was built on the site of the former Komazawa Golf Course, and rowing and equestrian events were held at venues that had already been built for the cancelled 1940 Olympics (Collins, 2007). No open-water events took place in or around Tokyo Bay—rowing events took place north of Tokyo and sailing and canoeing took place in Kanagawa prefecture southwest of Tokyo. In the intervening years between 1964 and the 2020 Olympic Bid, the waters of Tokyo Bay were cleaned up through dredging and adding clean sand, installing underwater screens, and even using hundreds of thousands of clams to help improve water quality (Sato, 2020). The 2020 Olympics were meant to be a showcase of how successfully the Tokyo Metropolitan Government and Port Authority had revitalized Tokyo Bay—the water was used for openwater swim events, and reclaimed islands such as Yumenoshima, which had been putrid landfills in the 1960s, were developed into recreational areas on which many new Olympic venues were built. While the issue of deforestation is typically tied to the Winter Olympics, when trees must be felled to make way for winter sport venues, the organizers of the 1964 Summer Olympics also understood that deforestation was and would continue to be a pressing ecological issue in Japan’s future. Delegates from 44 different countries were asked to bring 272 different types of tree seeds to plant in Japan in a symbolic gesture coordinated by the National Land Afforestation Committee (Kokudo ryokka suishin iinkai). The seeds were planted in different parts of the country, but only a small handful ever took root—one grove in the northern Hokkaido town of Engaru remains to this day and is marked by

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a small rusty plaque (Asahi Shimbun, 2017). In 2017, some of the trees that had been brought by international athletes fifty-three years earlier were cut down and sent to Tokyo to be used to create furniture and wood ceiling panelling in a new Japanese Olympic Museum, as well as in the Olympic rings used as a centrepiece in the Opening Ceremonies in July 2021 (Sabin, 2021).

Japan’s Winter Olympics: Sapporo 1972 and Nagano 1998 The issue of deforestation continued to be one of the enduring ecological concerns of the Olympic Games, in Japan as in other host countries. The next two Olympics Japan won the right to host were in the winters of 1972 and 1998, and questions over deforestation arose in the process of creating Olympic-calibre ski runs, luge and bobsled tracks and other mountain venues and supporting infrastructure. One key difference between the Olympics in Sapporo and Nagano was the rhetorical focus on environmental issues that was added to the Olympic Charter in the intervening years. While the International Olympic Committee (IOC) had not officially recognized the destruction of ecosystems in the name of Olympic development as a pressing concern in 1972, the organizers of the Sapporo Olympics are considered pioneers in the global narrative of sustainability and the Olympic Movement. Boykoff points out that, “The Olympic Movement’s concern with ecological issues stretches back at least as far as the Sapporo 1972 Winter Games in Japan. The official report from those Olympics mentioned that organizers afforded special consideration to ‘environmental conditions’ and ‘environmental development’” (Boykoff, 2017, p. 180). Chappelet’s article on the history of environmental concerns in the Winter Olympics also points to Sapporo 1972 as a pivotal moment, stating, “The first edition of the winter games to take the environment into account in a serious way was that of Sapporo in 1972” (Chappelet, 2008, p. 1889). Sapporo Olympic organizers’ concern for the natural environment did not stem from an outsized Japanese concern over ecological issues resulting from cultural or religious connections to nature. Indeed, the rationale was quite the opposite; Japan in the late-1960s and early 70s was dealing with severe environmental problems because of lax regulations during the period of high-speed growth. The four major pollution cases of the 1950s and 60s had exposed a level of government complicity in

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covering up the responsibility of industry polluters. As legal actions were increasingly filed against these companies and as the media focused more on widespread contamination of fish, rice, and air, a shift in popular attitudes towards economic growth began to take place. Some of the strictest pollution control laws in the world were introduced in Japan by the early 1970s, and the Environmental Agency was established in 1971 (Tipton, 2008). The 1972 Winter Games in Sapporo were a success by most accounts, including in organizers’ attempts to minimize environmental damage. Sports venues were placed within a maximum 30-kilometre radius of the Olympic Village, which was designed to minimize the need for extensive new transport systems (nonetheless, the city developed an entire new metro system, many new roads, and improved sewage treatment facilities in preparation for the Olympics) (IOC, 1972). The compact nature of the event was also meant to ensure that venues could and would be reused by city residents and visitors after the Olympics, and many of these venues are indeed still in use 50 years later. The key environmental legacy to emerge from the Sapporo 1972 Olympics was an emphasis on not permanently changing or damaging the natural environment, exemplified by the reforestation of ski runs on Mt. Eniwa after the event concluded. The final IOC report of the 1972 Sapporo Olympics noted, “Since the downhill courses were to be located on the slopes of Mt. Eniwa […], the clearing of virgin forest and the alteration of the original geographical features came into question, a matter which also gave rise to not a little objection from the public. It was recognized, however, that Mt. Eniwa was the only mountain within easy access of Sapporo that could meet the conditions required for the downhill courses. Consequently, the government offices concerned, with the consent of the Natural Park Council, granted their permission for the course on the condition that all the related course facilities be removed and that the terrain in the affected area be permanently restored to its original state” (IOC, 1972, p. 246). The environmental themes that arose domestically and internationally in the planning and aftermath of the 1972 Olympics would reappear and inform the planning of the 1998 Nagano Winter Olympics. In 1995, then-IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch declared the environment to be “the third dimension of Olympism, alongside sport and culture” (Hayes & Karamichas, 2012, p. 8). In 1996, the Olympic Charter was amended so that the IOC’s position was codified: “…the

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IOC sees that the Olympic Games are held in conditions which demonstrate a responsible concern for environmental issues and encourages the Olympic Movement to demonstrate a responsible concern for environmental issues, takes measures to reflect such concern in its activities and educates all those connected with the Olympic Movement as to the importance of sustainable development” (ibid.). This change was in direct response to the extensive environmental damage to the Savoy region of France after the 1992 Winter Olympics in Albertville. It was also in response to global trends in policy agendas that were increasingly focused on sustainable development and environmental protection. Thus, when Nagano was selected in 1991 as the host city for the 1998 Winter Olympics, environmental issues were at the forefront of the international conversations about sports mega-events. In March 1995, the Organizing Committee for the XVIII Olympic Winter Games started circulating a newsletter called Nagano Olympic News. The very first line of the first volume of this newsletter reads “Giving Precedence to the Environment,” and the entire newsletter is dedicated to how the planners are working with numerous national agencies to ensure the most environmentally friendly event. “Every possible step is being taken to ensure that construction methods and other factors are in harmony with nature,” the organizers stated (Nagano Organizing Committee, 1995, p. 1). At an October 1997 press conference in New York City, Ko Yamaguchi, Head of Media for the Nagano Olympic Committee, spoke extensively about the environmental efforts that organizers were taking in their preparations for the Games. He gives several examples of “our efforts to achieve coexistence with nature in the construction of facilities for the Nagano Games” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1997). These efforts included the use of existing courses and venues in order to keep development to a minimum, minimizing changes to natural vegetation and landscapes, keeping topsoil at construction sites and restoring it to the land after construction, limiting development in consideration of existing habitats for protected birds and other species, creating holding ponds to prevent the pollution of streams from dangerous runoff, and planting new saplings that would be used to restore the areas used in bobsleigh, luge, and skiing venues after the Olympics. Moreover, new policies regarding waste during the Olympics were developed—Olympic merchandise was not to be wrapped (even though “Japan is very famous for wrapping”), and the plates used at Olympic cafeterias and restaurants were made from recycled materials including apple by-products (ibid.).

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The “Apple Tableware” used during the Nagano Olympics represents another trend becoming part of the Olympic Movement in the 1990s, that of “greenwashing.” This process, with which the Olympic Movement would increasingly be associated, is the public conveyance of concern for the environment and the claiming of credit for providing solutions while actually doing little or nothing to help the environment (Boykoff, 2017). The apple plate, or “Applate,” was a widely advertised gimmick to highlight Japan’s innovation and apparent concern for the natural environment. These paper plates were made from the apple pulp leftover from apple juice production (a product for which Nagano is famous). While the initiative drew attention to Nagano’s agricultural industry, Japanese innovation, and the OOC’s slogan of “Giving Precedence to the Environment,” it was a superficial effort that did little to remediate the significant environmental costs of hosting the Olympics.8 If the initiative had spurred a change in consumer behaviour after the Olympics, perhaps it could be considered a success; however, the Applate was not produced after 1998, and the only place you are likely to find one today is on display in a glass case at the Japan Olympic Museum in Tokyo. The moment the closing ceremonies ended in Nagano in 1998, Japan again set forth to try to hold another larger Summer Olympics. The 2000 and 2004 events had already been awarded to Sydney and Athens, so the Japanese Olympic Committee set its sights on hosting in Osaka in 2008. Osaka would lose the bid to Beijing, but the JOC would try again a few years later for the 2016 Games in Tokyo, which it would also lose to Rio de Janeiro. Finally, after Japan endured natural and man-made disasters in 2011, Tokyo submitted a revised bid and won the right to host the 2020 Summer “Recovery” Olympics.

The Tokyo 2020 Olympics, Sustainability, and Early Dissent The Japan Olympic Museum opened in September 2019 in the Meiji Shrine Outer Gardens, adjacent to a brand-new National Stadium designed by famed architect Kengo Kuma. This stadium was built in the exact location the 1964 National Stadium had stood, in a green space that was opposed by certain groups just as it had been when it was proposed as the central Olympic venue for the 1940 Games. However, concern over the potential pressures that a new stadium would put on the ecosystem

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in one of Tokyo’s few remaining green spaces was not the central environmental concern of the 2020 Tokyo Olympics. Rather, critical issues of climate change and of nuclear fallout in Fukushima were the two most pressing environmental concerns when preparations for the 2020 Tokyo Olympics initially began. In the two summers prior to the start of the Games, over a thousand citizens died and tens of thousands were hospitalized from heat-related causes in Japan’s increasingly brutal summer heat (Branch & Rich, 2021). Though the 1964 Olympics had taken place in October on account of Tokyo’s summer heat and humidity, the 2020 Olympics were scheduled for the hottest part of the summer in late July and August. This was primarily due to the outsized influence that television broadcasters now have on dictating the scheduling of the Olympics (ibid.). Although event organizers tried to ensure athletes and the public that there were mitigating measures such as misting stations and shade to protect from the worst of the summer heat, many athletes and the IOC expressed concern in the years leading up to the event (Lee, 2021). The most drastic measure taken out of concern over the heat was the sudden shift of venue for the marathon, from Tokyo 800 kilometres north to Sapporo (much to the chagrin of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government and local organizers, who had already invested heavily in laying miles of expensive yet ultimately ineffective heat-reflecting pavement over the course in Tokyo) (Gronewold, 2019). With respect to the Fukushima triple disaster and the Olympics, the wisdom of holding a global event in a region actively recovering from a nuclear meltdown was questioned from the start. Though Prime Minister Abe had convinced the IOC that the situation was “under control” when Tokyo won the bid to host the 2020 Games in 2013 just two years after the disaster, this statement was later deemed “a lie” (Reuters Staff, 2016). From the moment Tokyo was named the host city, anti-nuclear activists mobilized against the event, asking “Orinpikku yatte iru ba’ai kai?” (“Is this really the time to hold the Olympics?”) These activists were concerned not only with the ongoing and ever-present impacts of nuclear fallout in and around Fukushima, but they criticized development policies that disproportionally allocated money and materials to Tokyo for the Olympics when north-eastern Japan was in dire need of these resources (Ganseforth, 2020). Despite constant concerns over the heat and Fukushima, the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Organizing Committee (OOC) worked to divert focus

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away from these issues and onto the various ways they were committed to making the games “sustainable.” Working under the sustainability concept of “Be better, together: For the planet and the people,” organizers laid out detailed plans on how they intended to minimize waste and carbon emissions, use sustainable sourcing codes, reuse and recycle, and contribute to the United Nations’ seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the preparations and delivery of the Olympics (Gerretsen, 2021). These efforts were laudable in that they raised awareness among both the public and corporations about ways that environmental responsibility and economic progress can co-exist (that is, sustainable development and corporate social responsibility). Japanese corporations sought to use the global spotlight of the Olympics to showcase cutting-edge sustainable technologies, and it was hoped that consumers in other countries might buy more environmentally friendly Japanese products and emulate sustainable trends on display before and during the Olympics. However, the intense preparations for the event also placed tremendous strain on the Tokyo’s fragile environment, and the OOC did little to improve critical overarching environmental issues facing Japan today. Even before the Olympics were postponed and focus shifted dramatically away from the OOC’s sustainability messages, there was significant dissent over environmental concerns. One issue that gained attention was the construction of a brand-new National Stadium. The 54,000-capacity stadium that had been built for the 1964 Olympics in the centrally located Meiji Jingu Outer Gardens was still in very regular use and in good working condition when it was demolished to make way for a much larger stadium. Moreover, it was located in the “Heritage Zone,” one of two thematic zones organizers established as part of their sustainability plan— the zone “houses several iconic venues used at the Tokyo 1964 Games and further sustains the enduring legacy” of that event by re-using these venues (Bureau of Olympic and Paralympic Games Tokyo 2020 Preparation, n.d.). From the start, environmentalists and architects spoke out against the proposed new 80,000-capacity stadium designed by BritishIraqi architect Zaha Hadid, which was not only deemed an eyesore and environmentally damaging due to the large shadow it would cast over the park, but heavily criticized for being the most expensive stadium ever built at over US$ 2 billion (Kietlinski, 2016). Amid mounting disapproval, then-Prime Minister Abe announced suddenly in 2015 that the Hadid

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stadium project would be scrapped, and ultimately a scaled-back stadium by Japanese architect Kengo Kuma was selected. Controversy over the stadium project did not end there—although Kuma’s wooden-exterior design appeared naturalistic and more in harmony with its surroundings than had Hadid’s futuristic stadium, a coalition of charities including the Rainforest Action Network and Global Witness revealed that that the stadium was constructed using unethically sourced timber. The company that provided the timber, Shin Yang, is one of the “big six” logging companies on Malaysian Borneo that has systematically cleared the island’s pristine rainforest and its inhabitants (Ponsford, 2017). This revelation added to a steady stream of both domestic and international accusations of Olympic organizers “greenwashing,” and the sustainability plans that had helped Tokyo land the 2020 bid were beginning to be viewed in a more sceptical light. This scepticism towards the Olympics had manifested into a significant movement prior to the postponement of the event due to the pandemic. In July 2019, one year before the originally scheduled Opening Ceremony, anti-Olympics activists from past and future host cities (London, Rio de Janeiro, Pyeongchang, Paris, and Los Angeles) gathered for a week in Tokyo for the first transnational gathering of its type. These activists had shared concerns not only over the environmental impact of the Olympics (including nuclear fallout from Fukushima), but also pressing issues of gentrification, displacement, and militarization exacerbated by the Olympics (Ganseforth, 2020). This broad coalition of activists, who had already declared in 2019 that the Tokyo Olympics were “likely to be a disaster” signalled a growing movement of anti-Olympic sentiment that would gain significant traction after the 2020 Olympics were derailed by the COVID-19 pandemic (Zirin & Boykoff, 2019).

Olympics Postponed and Focus Diverted The world’s attention turned towards East Asia in early 2020, as COVID19 emerged as a threat in China and aboard the Diamond Princess cruise ship docked in Yokohama Harbour. Though seemingly far removed from many observers in the West, people all over the world watched with some trepidation at how China and Japan handled outbreaks of this novel virus in January and February 2020. Amid growing global fears about the virus and its relatively small but early impact on Japan, on March 3, Mark Adams, a spokesman for the IOC, said that the Tokyo Games

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would go on as planned. When asked whether there was a deadline for deciding whether they might postpone or cancel the event, he replied “No, we’ve made a decision. And the decision is that the Games go ahead” (Zielonka, 2020). A week later, on March 11 the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 to be a global pandemic. The impact of the virus on the world of sports became dramatically apparent the same day, when nearly all professional and college leagues in the US suddenly shut down after National Basketball Association player Rudy Gobert tested positive (Kilgore et al., 2020). Amidst this chaos in the world at large and the world of sport, the Olympic flame lighting ceremony was held the next day on March 12 in Olympia, Greece. IOC President Thomas Bach attended the event and said: this ceremony demonstrates once more our commitment to the success of the Olympic Games Tokyo 2020. Nineteen weeks before the Opening Ceremony, we are strengthened in this commitment by the many authorities and sports organizations around the world which are taking so many significant measures to contain the spread of the coronavirus. (Olympic.org, 2020)

The planned six-day torch relay through Greece was cancelled one day later as the virus caused growing illness and death in Greece (Reuters Staff, 2020). A Kyodo News poll released a few days later showed that 69.9% of Japanese citizens said they expected the Olympics to be postponed (Kilgore et al., 2020). On March 19, Japanese Olympic Committee (JOC) member Kaori Yamaguchi became the first and only Japanese official to publicly state that Tokyo’s Olympics should be postponed, saying athletes were at risk by continuing to train, and that she intended to argue her position to the JOC at their meeting scheduled for March 27 (Kietlinski, 2021b). Yet before that meeting was held, on March 24th IOC President Thomas Bach made the announcement that the 2020 Olympics would be postponed. As the threat of the virus grew and dominated headlines in Japan and across the globe, public enthusiasm towards the Olympics dwindled.

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Environment Eclipsed and the Future of Sports Mega-Events By the time the postponement announcement was made, Japan had invested so much into Olympic planning that cancellation was a virtually unthinkable option. Yet the postponement came at a huge cost not only economically but in an existential sense to the Olympic Movement. In late spring of 2021, just weeks before the Opening Ceremonies would take place, less than five per cent of the Japanese public was vaccinated and the health care system was under stress. Calls to cancel the Olympics were no longer coming from a small group of activists, but from many people around the globe. As Jules Boykoff wrote in a May 2021 New York Times essay calling for the cancellation of the event, “Pressing ahead with the Olympics risks drinking poison to quench our thirst for sport” (Boykoff, 2021). In the comments section, a physician in Japan named Kazu S. agreed, asking, “How many more people have to be injured and killed by Covid-19 because we went ahead with humanity’s first ‘virus variant exchange festival?’” (ibid.). Even the editors of the Asahi Shimbun, one of Japan’s largest newspapers and a major sponsor of the Olympics, called for the Olympics to be cancelled in May 2021 (Wade & Komiya, 2021). The cognitive dissonance of a celebratory event pushing forward during a global disaster was palpable. Of course, the Tokyo Olympics were not cancelled and although a number of athletes and officials tested positive for the virus, fears that it might be a dangerous super spreader event apparently did not come to pass. Yet holding the event in these conditions was undeniably damaging to the Olympic “brand.” A veil was lifted and the true driving factors behind the Games (namely money) were laid bare like never before. Moreover, carefully curated messaging surrounding Olympic sustainability initiatives were vulnerable to harsh criticism and perhaps irreparably damaged. Most strikingly, so many infrastructure projects throughout Tokyo were unused and unnecessary, so discussions about the sustainable choice to reuse some 1964 venues and construct temporary venues were suddenly gratuitous. There was no need to expand airport terminals and transportation hubs to accommodate an influx of international visitors—indeed Japan was one of the most restrictive nations in the world when it came to opening its borders during the pandemic and it barely had a trickle of outsiders enter the nation for over two years (including

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during the Olympics when international spectators were banned). Thus, the grand scale of Olympic infrastructure projects (and their accompanying environmental impacts) was called into question. Given that the subsequent Beijing Winter Olympics were also primarily a television event with very few international visitors, perhaps this is an obvious moment for reconsideration of the scale of new development necessary for hosting the event. Other sustainability initiatives that had been promoted for Tokyo 2020 quietly faded away when the focus turned to how to hold an Olympics that was not a major risk to public health. For example, while the Tokyo Olympic Organizing Committee sought to put on a “zero-waste” event, safety measures would make this virtually impossible as every entrant into Japan was required to quarantine, be tested daily, and eat take-out, prepackaged meals for a period of days or weeks (depending on the country of origin and outcome of an initial test). Disposable masks were globally mass-produced and ubiquitous in Tokyo during the Olympic Games. Rather than utilizing Tokyo’s outstanding public transit (which had been upgraded for the Olympics) or the autonomous electric vehicles Toyota built to showcase at the Games, almost all visitors before, during, and after the Olympics were required to use private vehicles to get from place to place. While all these measures were deemed necessary for holding a safe event, they derailed and deemphasized the sustainability measures that were meant to be highlighted at the event, which was also the least-viewed Olympics to date outside of Japan (Battaglio, 2021). Although environmental responsibility has been one of the pillars of the Olympic movement for nearly three decades and has been increasingly emphasized rhetorically, a new study shows that sustainability in all dimensions has decreased over time from 1992 to 2020. Researchers systematically measured sustainable Olympic Games as those that “have a limited ecological and material footprint, enhance social justice and demonstrate long-term economic efficiency” (Müller et al., 2021).9 Their conclusion is that the increased promotion of the environment and sustainability in Olympic policy has not stopped or reversed the decline of sustainability over time—that is to say, the gap between the rhetoric and the reality has grown larger and more glaring over time. Sustainability initiatives are quantifiably and increasingly secondary to corporate profits and to host cities trying to outdo each other to put on more and more impressive spectacles (Kuhn, 2021).

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Perhaps the lasting environmental legacy of the postponed Tokyo 2020 Olympics will be a global shift in attitudes towards this excess that has gone unchecked for decades. The pause afforded by the postponement resulted in crucial discussions over the long-lasting impacts of the Olympics on a host city, and the dramatically scaled-down event showed that a smaller ecological footprint is both achievable and attractive. With the climate crisis and extreme weather events becoming less abstract and more common fixtures in individuals’ lives, sustainability initiatives have come under more scrutiny. Superficial “green” measures that have no positive impact (or indeed are environmentally detrimental) are more likely to be called out as “greenwashing” on a multitude of social media platforms that allow more voices to be amplified. While not always presenting a fair and balanced picture, these media are nonetheless consumed by a generation more disapproving of corporate excess and more concerned over the future of their planet. The incredible costs and risks of hosting an Olympic Games have also become more evident to citizens of potential host cities, and the IOC must make major changes if it hopes to have any city willing to take on such risks in the future. An obvious start would be to hold the event in just a handful of rotating cities and to establish an independent body to monitor environmental damage (and impose penalties when promises are not kept), yet these ideas have repeatedly been proposed to and shot down by the IOC (Zimbalist, 2015). The best possible environmental outcome of Tokyo’s postponed 2020 Olympics would be a genuine recognition by the IOC that the public’s dwindling interest and growing antipathy towards the event necessitates deep structural change.

Notes 1. See Boykoff (2017), Chappelet (2008), and Kietlinski (2021a). 2. For a more detailed treatment of how environmental policies in Japan have both shaped and been shaped by the Olympic Games, see Kietlinski’s chapter in Niehaus and Yabu (2021) titled “The Olympics and Japan’s Environment: 1940–2020.” 3. Official discussion about hosting the 1940 Olympics began in Tokyo in 1931, and Japan officially applied for candidature in 1932. Tokyo won the right to host the 1940 Olympics through a vote of IOC delegates in Berlin in 1963 (Collins, 2007). For a detailed discussion about the decision to cancel the 1940 Olympics, see Collins’ chapter titled “The Rise of Japanese Militarism,” pp. 143–176.

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4. For example, in 1928 it hosted US major league baseball players came to play twelve games at the Jingu Stadium and Koshien Stadium. A complete timeline of major events related to the Jingu Stadium is compiled on the stadium’s website: http://www.jingu-stadium.com/about_kyujo/history/. 5. Copper was one of Japan’s largest exports, and the company owning the Ashio mine near Nikk¯o had cleared away roughly forty square miles of forest and destroyed the Watarase River watershed in the process. When heavy rains led to severe flooding and the inundation of over 13,000 households in 1896, the issue of deforestation in the name of industrialization gained the attention of the national media. 6. The four major postwar pollution cases were: (1) Minamata Disease; (2) Niigata Minamata Disease; (3) Itai-Itai Disease; and (4) Yokkaichi Air Pollution (Miller et al., pp. 225–227). 7. This undated booklet, currently archived at the Tokyo Metropolitan Library, was published sometime between the winning of the bid in 1959 and the Olympics in 1964. Most likely it was circulating in the public between 1960 and 1964. 8. Wildlife biologist Dr. To Kimiharu outlined some of the environmental costs of the Nagano 1998 Olympics in a phone conversation with me in July 2017. He has written some of the detrimental effects of the event on the website of environmental watchdog group, “Planet Drum,” where he discusses the ways the Olympics adversely affected Nagano’s air, water, soil, and ecosystems, calling the 1998 Olympics, “the greatest ecological disaster in Nagano’s bioregional history” (http://www.planetdrum.org/ guard_fox_watch.htm). 9. The authors of this study created a useful graphic visualization of this conceptual model of Olympic sustainability—see Figure 1 in their article available online: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41893-021-00696-5.

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Pyle, K. (1975). Symposium: The Ashio Copper mine pollution case: Introduction: Japan faces her future. Journal of Japanese Studies, 1(2), 347–350. Reuters Staff. (2020, March 19). Tokyo 2020 organizers receive Olympic flame for troubled games. Reuters. Retrieved February 4, 2022, from https://www.reu ters.com/article/us-olympics-2020-flame-handover/tokyo-2020organizersreceive-olympic-flame-for-troubled-games-idUSKBN2161F9 Reuters Staff. (2016, September 7). Abe’s Fukushima ‘under control’ pledge to secure Olympics was a lie: Former PM . Reuters. Retrieved February 4, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-nuclear/abes-fukushimafrom under-control-pledge-to-secure-olympics-was-a-lie-former-pm-idUSKCN11 D0UF Sabin, L. (2021, July 23). Seeds sown by Tokyo 1964 athletes grew wood used in 2021 Olympic rings. The Independent. Retrieved February 4, 2022, from https://www.independent.co.uk/climate-change/tokyo-oly mpics-1964-rings-wood-b1889407.html Sato, K. (2020, September 25). Clams working 24/7 to clean up Tokyo Bay before Summer Games. Asahi Shimbun. Retrieved February 4, 2022, from https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/13717569#:~:text=Clams%20working% 2024%2F7%20to%20clean%20up%20Tokyo%20Bay%20before%20Summer% 20Games,-By%20KEIKO%20SATO&text=Under%20%E2%80%9Coperation% 20clams%2C%E2%80%9D%20Tokyo,of%20sand%20into%20the%20water Siniawer, E. (2018). Waste: Consuming postwar Japan. Cornell University Press. Tipton, E. (2008). Modern Japan: A social and political history (2nd ed.). Routledge. Tokyo Olympic Organizing Committee. (n.d., published between 1959–1964). Orinpikku wo mukaeru Tokyo, Tokyo-to Orinpikku Junbikyoku. (“Tokyo Welcomes the Olympics”). Wade, S., & Komiya, K. (2021, May 26). Major Japan newspaper Asahi calls for Olympic cancellation. AP News. Retrieved February 4, 2022, from https://apnews.com/article/japan-newspapers-olympic-games-entertain ment-health-3e0cccf19bc042f4f58e39ac753306ff Wang, S. (2021, June 15). Olympic volunteers wanted to help at the Games. They did not sign up for Covid. CNN News. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/15/asia/japan-olympic-volunt eers-intl-hnk-dst/index.html Zielonka, A. (2020, March 3). IOC spokesman says Tokyo Olympics will begin on schedule despite Coronavirus. The Washington Times. Retrieved February 4, 2022, from https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/mar/3/iocspokesman-says-tokyo-olympics-will-begin-sched/

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Zimbalist, A. (2015). Circus maximus: The economic gamble behind hosting the Olympics and the World Cup. Brookings Institution Press. Zirin, D., & Boykoff, J. (2019, July 22). The 2020 Olympics are likely to be a disaster. The Nation. Retrieved February 4, 2022, from https://www.thenat ion.com/article/archive/tokyo-okotowari-olympics-protest/

CHAPTER 4

Networking Voices of Dissent: Korea-Japan Civic Alliance and Transnational Solidarity for Anti-Olympic Movement Kyoung-yim Kim, Satoko Itani, and Gyeongryeol Lee

Introduction Transnational Olympic protests and the diffusion of anti-Olympic social movements have substantially grown over the years. Activists in relatively disconnected social and geographical locations have formed and developed their own solidarity networks. Such is the case with non-state organizations and individuals in Korea and Japan: they built networks

K.-y. Kim (B) Boston College, Newton, MA, USA e-mail: [email protected] S. Itani Kansai University, Suita, Japan G. Lee International Waters31, Seoul, South Korea

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. Kobayashi et al. (eds.), Sports Mega-Events in Asia, Palgrave Series of Sport in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0011-4_4

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and forged allied Olympic resistance activities around the PyeongChang 2018 and Tokyo 2020 Games. In this chapter, we focus on the alliance between Korean and Japanese groups while situating it within the wider international solidarity network of activists. First, we illustrate how civic organizations within the two countries created an alliance and exchanged strategies and practices for Olympic criticisms. Further, we show how the two Asian countries’ civic coalitions are part of the existing international networks united under the hashtag, #NOlympicsAnywhere. The following sections discuss the two countries’ civic exchanges and activities in detail: their struggles and negotiations in the processes of movementbuilding; impacts of their consolidations on the local, regional, national, and transnational activism around Olympic resistance. In here, we offer our interpretation of the Korea-Japan civic alliance around the Olympic events and discuss the significance of their solidarity to the two countries’ civil societies and to the transnational networks of anti-Olympic movements. For our analysis, we modified and applied Juris and colleague’s (2014) five dimensions of movement-building. They defined movement-building as “the creation of movement infrastructures required for sustained organizing and mobilization, including social relationships, organizational networks and capacity, affective solidarity, as well as movement-related identities, frames, strategies, skills, and leadership” (Juris et al., 2014, p. 329). The five dimensions they presented for evaluating movementbuilding are: personal, organizational, cross-organizational, interscalar, and cross-sectoral. First, the individual/personal dimension of movementbuilding engages emotions and feelings of solidarity that lead to individuals’ involvement in activist groups and organizations. Second, the organizational dimension of movement-building entails a group’s involvement in organization building, strengthening intergroup solidarity (cohesion and community), and the development of organizational capacity and resources. In this dimension, we focused on internal cohesion building and organizational exchanges at the local, regional, and national level. Third, the cross-organizational dimension encompasses the engagement of interorganizational networks and coalitions and establishing organizational levels of solidarity. For wider movement-building, crossorganizational networks and solidarities are essential. However, Juris and colleagues (2014) are also concerned about the fact that trans-local networking can take internal energy and resources away from local-level organizations. Fourth, interscalar dimension refers to the expansion of

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organizational networks beyond geographic scales and the building of multiple scales of organizing to strengthen movement infrastructures. Fifth, cross-sectoral movement-building entails sharing knowledge and skills across sectors and including wider groups to expand organizational capacity. The fifth dimension also includes “symbolic displays of solidarity…that generate feelings of belonging and commitment to a wider movement” (p. 341). Data for this chapter is heavily relied on media archives from civic organizations along with field notes, observations, reports (personal and organizational), and interviews with organizers and activists. Regarding Olympic resistance, scholars argue that mainstream media is important to understand activists’ communications with the public (Lenskyj, 2008), or how mainstream media interprets, frames, and communicates antiOlympic activism with the general public (Boykoff, 2014). Sykes (2016), on the other hand, provides the compelling argument that alternative and activists’ media would provide a better understanding of Olympic resistance movements than mainstream media. Similarly, Wilson (2007) suggests that a fieldwork-based ethnographic approach would account for resistance activism in a more nuanced way. Furthermore, this study and its findings emerged mainly from the main actors’ experiences and reflections as long-term members of Olympic resistance groups in Korea and Japan. Gyeongryeol Lee, a Korean activist and an author of this chapter, attended various network meetings between Korea and Japan, helped conceptualize and organize protests, and contributed to the production of dossiers, press releases, and other content.

Regional Movement-Building in Korea and Japan The nation-state is an active agent in forming public opinion around the Olympic Games, especially when a nation considers the Olympic Games a national project. Thus, when Korea bid to host the 2018 Olympic Games, there was widespread support at city, provincial, and national levels. According to the bid books of the PyeongChang Organizing Committee for the Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games (POCOG), 98% of PyeongChang residents supported the Olympic bid (2010 bid book, p. 3); furthermore, it is emphasized in the bid book that “there has been no organized opposition whatsoever to PyeongChang’s bid” (2010 bid book, p. 9). Likewise, when the IOC awarded the Games to Tokyo in 2013, the IOC’s evaluation commission released a survey showing that

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70% of Tokyo residents and 67% of Japanese citizens supported Tokyo 2020. Representations of pro-Olympic voices in host cities presented by the government and organizing committee are, however, often contested. Hangorin no Kai (hereafter HGK), one of the first Tokyo-based antiOlympic groups formed against the bidding for Tokyo 2020, criticized the bidding committee’s claim of public support: “The [candidacy] file is bragging that there is no anti-Olympic movement in Japan. But there are many people who don’t welcome it” (HGK website). Public opinion on Tokyo 2020 drastically changed when the SARS 2-COVID-19 global pandemic struck Japan in early 2020. According to an Asahi Shinbun report on May 17, 2021, after a one-year postponement, 83% of people in Japan opposed holding the event that year (43% wanted it canceled, 40% wanted it postponed again).1 Regarding the voices of dissent to the Olympic Games, diverse regional and national non-state groups and organizations in Korea used the Olympic event as a site of political contention and formed interorganizational networks and forged cross-sectoral solidarity. They include: NoxSaekYeonHap (녹색연합. Trans. Green Korea United) and UyiRyung SaramDeul (우이령 사람들. Trans. Good Friends of Nature Korea) which have historically focused on environmental issues; Sports MunWha YeonGuSo (스포츠 문화연구소. Trans. The Center for Sport Culture) and ChaeYook Simin YeonDae (체육시민연대. Trans. Sports Civic Movement) which have traditionally engaged with sports-related issues; and MunWha YeonDae (문화연대. Trans. Cultural Action) and Simin Sawhoi DanChae YeonDae WhoiEui (시민사회단체 연대회의. Trans. Civic Society Organizations Network in Korea) which largely focus on socio-economic disparities and inequalities. Other active groups that joined the movement were Pyeongchang Donggye Ollimpik Bandae Simin Moniteoringdan (평창 동계 올림픽 반대 시민 모니터링단. Trans. Monitoring Team against the PyeongChang Olympics [hereafter MTPO]) and Riseun Tudeo Siti (리슨 투더 시티. Trans. Listen To The City, hereafter LTTC). Despite these organizations’ different foci, the coalitional ties connected across movement sectors and facilitated the forwarding of campaigns and the exchange of skills, information, strategies, resources, and networks, resulting in the development of a larger movement. Among numerous issues raised by these groups regarding the development for PyeongChang Games, environmental concerns became a focal point of opposition which strengthened intergroup solidarity.

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Korean activists’ anti-Olympic movement to the PyeongChang Games initiated multiple forms of civic engagement such as: raising questions and providing alternative discourse and practice. Raising Questions included activities, such as press conferences, public debates/forums, newspaper and magazine articles/columns, and appearances on TV news and talk shows. Providing Alternatives consisted of organizing marches/performances and campaigns/petitions, documentary film screenings/photo exhibitions, and visiting/meeting with POCOG practitioners/executives. Most of these public engagements were held in Seoul rather than PyeongChang because it was easier to gain media attention in the nation’s capital and because it was home to most of the NGO offices and members. The fact that dissent was divided into urban and rural voices weakened the activists of Olympic criticisms. For instance, the urban residents were unable to effectively protest the financial burden of mega-events compared to local communities. Furthermore, local communities in PyeongChang often viewed the civic criticism of the Olympics as coming from outsiders. However, urban-based Korean activist groups and organizations were focused and efficient in continuing their intergroup and crossorganizational movements to address relevant and urgent issues around the preparation for the PyeongChang Games by the government and the POCOG. While their earlier criticism addressed the economic, social, and cultural costs of hosting Olympic events, activists refocused their movement on fighting the development of Mt. Gariwang with their “500 years vs. 3 days” media campaign in 2014. They also offered an alternative way to protect the mountain’s ecosystem while also protesting on the street with the phrase “2Run is Enough. Stop logging.” In 2015 and 2016, these key actors aimed to pressure the Korean government and the POCOG to co-host Olympic events either in multiple cities or multiple countries (e.g., North and South Korea, or Korea and Japan). Their concerns included: financial costs of the Games; environmental destruction due to new construction; and peacebuilding relations between North and South Korea. Japan has a long history of anti-Olympic activism that began when it hosted the Games for the first time in 1964. The most prominent group to protest the 1972 Sapporo Olympics was the Hokkaido Nature Conservation Society, which negotiated the afforestation of Mt. Eniwatake after the Games were over.2 This was the first time in Olympic history that the host city took environmental countermeasures. Activists formed a strong

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opposition against Nagoya City’s bid for the 1988 Games. There was also significant activism against the Nagano 1998 Olympic Games, mainly due to environmental concerns. Activists against the Nagano Games made their anti-Olympic stances clearer3 than their Sapporo 1972 counterparts, who sought to reform the development plan rather than opposing the Games itself. In January 2013, a small group of activists that had focused on issues of poverty and the human rights of unhoused people in Tokyo formed Hangorin no Kai (反五輪の会. Trans. Association Against the Olympics) to oppose the bidding for the 2020 Games in Tokyo. They were concerned that the most vulnerable members of society—such as single mothers and people who were unhoused, low-income, or disabled—would be the most directly and significantly affected by the redevelopment of the area around the Olympic Village and other venues. As initial fears of forced evictions and undemocratic procedures on the part of the government and the organizing committee in preparation for the Games become a reality, diverse groups of activists began to reach out and connect with one another, leading to the formation of OkotowaLink, or “2020 Orinpikku Saigai” Okotowari Renrakukai (2020 「オリンピッ ク災害」おことわり連絡会. Trans. No Thanks to Olympic Disaster). As its name suggests, the group views the Olympics as an event that brings disaster-level hardship to local people—particularly society’s most vulnerable. The group called for the cancellation of Tokyo 2020 as well as the permanent abolition of the Olympics as a whole, rather than asking for reform. The activist groups that joined OkotowaLink before 2020 include: HGK, Tokyo ni Orinpikku wa iranai netto (東京にオリンピッ クはいらないネット. Trans. No Olympics in Tokyo Net), Kasumigaoka ap¯ ato wo kangaeru kai (霞ヶ丘アパートを考える会. Trans. Association Concerning Kasumigaoka Apartment), Asia-Japan Women’s Resource Center (AJWRC), and Network Against Japan Arms Trade. The network grew in 2020, when the public began to witness that the IOC, TOCOG, and the Japanese government ignored public concerns over the global pandemic and forced the event to take place against overwhelming public opposition. By the summer of 2021, the groups involved in OkotowaLink had become very diverse in terms of the social issues they focused on: negative economic impacts and corruption; gentrification and displacement of poor and unhoused people; the degradation of urban environment and community; the negative impacts of the Great East Japan Earthquake

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of 2011 on the recovery of the Tohoku region, including Fukushima; the inclusion of “Olympic Education” to public education curriculum; the health and rights of athletes and spectators due to the pandemic and summer heat; environmental destruction; exploitation of construction workers and volunteers; eugenics in the Olympics and Paralympics; and gendered impacts of Olympic development as well as sexism within the Olympics. Even with these diverse concerns, the OkotowaLink network was united in the call for the cancellation of Tokyo 2020 and the abolition of the Olympics since its formation. Together, these groups aimed: to say “no” to the Olympics; to increase the social awareness of the abovementioned issues related to Tokyo 2020; to prevent direct and collateral damages caused by Tokyo 2020; and to create a space for community support and information exchange.

Transnational Movement-Building with Brazil, Japan, Korea Regional anti-Olympic groups in Korea and Japan met through Brazilian activist groups and organizations. This section chronologically illustrates and summarizes Korean and Japanese activists’ collaboration in Olympic resistance. Transnational Networking Korea-Japan alliance and movement-building initiated at the interscalar level that transcends local and national ties and activities. It involves shifting geographic scales, expanding network, and building multiple scales of organizing strategies to strengthening infrastructures for social activism. A transnational (rather than international) mobilization of the NOlympics movement started in the late 1980s in Toronto, Canada and connected activists from past host cities. The international Planetary No Olympics Network sponsored a field visit to the Rio Olympics for Misako Ichimura, a Tokyo-based artist and activist. She visited Rio de Janeiro in July 2016 and participated in the Olympic resistance event RIO 2016 JOGOS EXCLUSAO (Rio 2016 Exclusion Games). After Ichimura’s visit, Rio activists sent messages of solidarity to Tokyo, offering strategies and advice for their shared anti-Olympic activism: “Seeing the community divided is very difficult, but don’t give up. Have conversations and keep

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trying to understand each other”; “It’s important to criticize the IOC through the media”; and “Let us know if there is anything we can do for the struggle in Tokyo. Let’s connect.” Ichimura recalls her visit to Rio as “very very kokorozuyoi (assuring/encouraging).” The conversations between Ichimura and activists in Brazil were documented and shared with HGK and through the Hangorin Report, published in September 2016. Through networking and exchange, HGK strengthened internal goals and movement-building by learning how to build a stronger and better anti-Olympic movement from the activists in Rio. In one of HGK’s zines4 titled “2016 RIO Anti-Olympics Report,” Ichimura recalled her meeting with Inalva, a member of the World Cup and Olympics Popular Committee of Rio de Janeiro (Comite Popula), who is considered “one of the most important organizers of RIO 2016 JOGOS EXCLUSAO.”5 According to Ichimura, Inalva raised the five most important aspects of effective movement-building: creating horizontal networks for information exchange; connecting with women; making actions with impact; finding or creating media allies; and creating networks that go beyond a single positionality.6 Along with these five points, Ichimura also highlighted Inalva’s key concerns on social activism such as the importance of raising funds, studying, having no leader, resisting exclusion to ensure equality, and making the activism continuous.7 Shortly after Ichimura’s visit to Rio, HGK reached out to a Korean civic organization, the Center for Sport and Culture (Seupocheu Munhwa Yeonguso, hereafter CSC) in December 3, 2016. Gyeongryeol Lee, then a secretary of CSC, corresponded with HGK via email, which resulted in the first Korea-Japan civic alliance for social activism in sports. The CSC and the cross-organizational networks in Korea enthusiastically planned Ichimura’s field visit (see Fig. 4.1) to the Olympic preparation sites in PyeongChang (December 23–24, 2016) and a round-table discussion (December 30, 2016). The Korean civil societies’ activity log documented that the purpose of Ichimura’s visit was “to lay the foundation for solidarity with civic groups and movement-building at a Northeast Asian-level considering the Olympics to be held in this region from 2018 to 2022” (CSC activity log, December 22, 2016). The field visits included the tunnel construction sites of the access road to the Alpine ski venue, Mt. Gariwang in Jeongseon County, and other Olympic venues under construction. Ichimura’s field visit highlighted the impacts of Olympic Game’s on the

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Fig. 4.1 PyeongChang field visit (December 23–24, 2016)

poor, and details were reported in the book published by HGK (see Fig. 4.2). In the first round-table discussion between Korean and Japanese civic groups, Ichimura shared her activist trajectories: she had belonged to an anti-Olympic group since 2013 and was involved with OkotowaLink, then scheduled to launch in 2017. She identified her main organization—the network of unhoused people—and their focus on the issue of displacement due to the construction of Olympic venues. She shared her experiences in Rio and how the local anti-Rio Olympic movement and activism grew. She summarized Brazilian activists’ Olympic critiques: namely, that hosting Olympic events caused violence and oppression against social minorities. She contended that “We do not stand out, but we want to organize work to raise [awareness] and remind people who do not know that the Olympics have various social problems... it is important to provide information so people can become aware of the problem” (CSC Log, 2016, 12.30. p. 29). Lee recollected that Ichimura’s discussion was informative and inspiring to Korean organizations and activists. Organizational Exchange From February 18 to March 5, 2017, a year before the PyeongChang Olympics, HGK organized the “Hangorin (anti-Olympics) Solidarity Tour” in Japan with the allied Japanese anti-Olympics groups. Transnational organizations and activists from Brazil, Korea, and Japan were invited on the tour. The tour consisted of fieldwork, a symposium, a press conference, a street protest, a public talk, and a social event. The organization of these events reflects Tokyo activists’ understanding of previous

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Fig. 4.2 Report on field visit in HGK’s Olympics Kill the Poor (December 2016)

anti-Olympic struggles. While the obvious goal of a street demonstration and protest is to show the public, the government, and the organizing committee that there are people who oppose the Games, it also becomes a way to build affective community by sharing the experience of direct action for a common cause. The kick-off event of the tour was a symposium titled “Social Movement against Olympic Games: Rio de Janeiro-PyeongChang-Tokyo” at

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the Global Concern Research Institute in Jochi University on February 18 (see Fig. 4.3, symposium flier). Speakers invited to the symposium were Misako Ichimura from HGK; Takashi Machimura, a Japanese urban sociologist; Giselle Tanaka, an antiOlympic activist and scholar from Rio de Janeiro; and Gyeongryeol Lee. In an interview with Kim, Mr. Lee shared his impression and lessons learned as an activist:

Fig. 4.3 Symposium on the social movement against Olympic Games: Rio de Janeiro-PyeongChang-Tokyo

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The Brazilians’ active civil movement and the strategies to visualize their messages, especially the placards, were overwhelmingly impressive. In our (Korean) cases, we use placards as a banner for public discussion, rallies, or press conferences; so those are mostly one-time use only. On the other hand, Brazil’s placards conveyed the message of problems or opposition to the Olympics sensibly and clearly, even at a glance. I thought they were impressive activism strategies that are rarely seen in Korea. (Interview with Kim. January 29, 2018)

A day after the symposium, HGK hosted the first fieldwork trip of the tour, “Anti-Olympics Exchange Fieldwork in Jingugaien & Sendagaya.” Over the following two days, the tour visited Nagano, Japan’s previous winter Olympic host prefecture. The co-host of the fieldwork and allied group to HGK was the Orinpikku iranaihitotachi nettowâku ( オリンピックいらない人ネット. Trans. Network of People Who Don’t Want Olympics), represented by Masao Ezawa, a Nagano local and a long-term anti-Olympic activist. This group began their anti-Olympics activism in 1988 to challenge the prefectural assembly’s decision to bid for the winter Olympics. During the trip, participants visited some of the infrastructure built for the 1998 Nagano Games that continued to damage the surrounding environment and financially harm the municipality. After the second day of fieldwork in Nagano on February 21, the participants held a press conference at Nagano City Hall. Tanaka, Lee, Ezawa, and Ichimura detailed the damaging impacts of the Olympics on their communities. The tour returned to Tokyo and continued their fieldwork on February 23, this time in the bay area of Tokyo. The organizers explained why they chose this area for fieldwork: Real estate development, including redevelopment, has been taking place from central Tokyo to the bay area, resulting in the concentration of wealth and the re-housing of the wealthy. In the bay area … which used to be a mixed residential, commercial, and industrial area for self-employment and small- and medium-sized manufacturing companies, we see a forest of tower condominiums and high-rise buildings… The main purpose of the visit is to understand the close relationship between the wealthy and the business community and the Olympics while inspecting the Olympic venues. The Olympics has served as a catalyst and a cover for active redevelopment … We would also like to take this opportunity to enjoy

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the shitamachi 8 atmosphere, which is being destroyed [by the Olympic induced redevelopment].

The organizer describes the mood inside the tour bus as “lively,” with participants conversing in Japanese, Korean, Portuguese, and English— reflecting the international nature of the coalition. Tanaka praised the visit: The visit was very well-prepared and guided by people who provided the historical context of the areas, as well as the recent changes, the information on the Olympic facilities planned, and possible impacts. This gave me an insider’s view, and critical analysis … The visit also gave me a view of how Hangorin no Kai, despite being formed by a few people, connect so many histories and struggles. This certainty gives the movement great potential. I believe that all this information and all these local struggles can have an important impact on the course of the fight against the Olympics. (HGK, 2021, pp. 155–156)

February 24 was the day of the Anti-Olympics International Solidarity Warm Welcome Demo!, and the Rio-PyeongChang-Tokyo Solidarity Party at Café✩Lavandería, a popular gathering spot for social activists in Tokyo (see Fig. 4.4).

Fig. 4.4 Anti-Olympic International Solidarity demo and party in Tokyo (2017)

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The international solidarity events continued the following day. OkotowaLink hosted an International Okotowari Convention (IOC) at People’s Plan Research Institute, Sophia University, at which a group of activists reported on International anti-Olympics activism and concerns for Tokyo 2020. They included: Gyeongryeol Lee; Gentaro Taniguchi, a Japanese sports journalist; Giselle Tanaka; and Satoshi Ukai, then a professor at Hitotsubashi. University and a member of OkotowaLink. During this week-long solidarity event, a diverse group of activists learned about the commonalities of the violence and oppression the Olympic Games brings to host cities. This is an important aspect of the transnational coalition against the Olympics. In the anti-Olympics struggle, violence and oppression are brought about by the common actor (the IOC and organizing committee) and event (the Olympic Games), which makes it easier for activists to identify “similar experiences,” unlike when dealing with issues such as neoliberalism, free trade, and environmental destruction, where it is difficult to see the “faces” of the oppressive institutions. In addition, the members of the anti-Olympics movement tend to have a first-hand experience of oppression that motivated them to join the movement in the first place, such as forced evictions and police brutality. For them, anti-Olympic activism is not an opportunity to gain more public attention to their causes, but a struggle for their own survival, human rights, and dignity. Even those who did not share the first-hand experience of oppression can bear witness to the violence and see the “faces” of both the oppressors and oppressed by visiting the communities that are impacted, listening to others’ experiences, and participating in anti-Olympic action, during which participants often gain the first-hand experience of police brutality. Reflecting on the tour, HGK noted, “Although the event itself was small, it was very encouraging to see that there are people on the other side of the world, in apartment complexes in Tokyo and in favelas in Rio de Janeiro, who can fight together” (HGK, 2021, p. 160). Cross-Sectoral Sharing of Knowledge and Experience The PyeongChang Olympics opened on February 5, 2018. Korean civic groups and multiple organizations9 planned allied actions with Japanese activists in Seoul and PyeongChang. They organized multiple events,

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including an anti-Olympics forum (see Fig. 4.5), rallies, and press conferences. The transnational alliance also released an anti-Olympic statement (see Fig. 4.6), “Seven reasons to oppose the PyeongChang Olympics.”10 Prioritizing the concerns over the environmental destruction of Mt. Gariwang, the statement noted that Japanese activists “deeply empathized” with the Korean activists’ words and their pain of having to witness the sacrifice of the “pristine forests of Mt. Gariwang for just a few days of a sporting event” (HGK, 2021, p. 173). The last paragraph of the statement reads: “I strongly hope to build an anti-Olympic Paralympic Japan-Korea alliance to protect people’s lives and dignity” (HGK, 2021, p. 176).

Fig. 4.5 Poster for the forum (2018)

Fig. 4.6 Flier: Anti-Olympic statement (2018)

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On the eve of the opening ceremony, HGK members visited Korea to take part in the protest while interacting with the locals who opposed the Games. The activist organizations’ focal points for collective action transcended social and political territories. One such example is the “Mianhae Peurojekteu” (미안해 프로젝트. Trans. Sorry Project). On February 10, 2018, the citizens’ association of Gangneung City hosted the Gariwangsan Memorial Ceremony, and representatives of MTPO and HGK marched from the city’s train station to the Gangneung Ice Arena (see Fig. 4.7). The planners of this memorial ceremony introduced the Elm Dance11 to the gathered activists and crowds, and people danced together. The elm dance and their collective rituals were meant to comfort both Mt. Gariwang and the pine trees sacrificed in Korea. Korean and Japanese groups also marched together in protest through the streets of Seoul. Perhaps one of the most symbolic icons of the transnational antiOlympic movement is the “anti-Olympic torch,” which was first created by Vancouver activists who opposed the 2010 Games. The torch is made from a toilet plunger and ribbons, reflecting the activists’ critical view of the Olympic torch and what it symbolizes (see Fig. 4.8). The antiOlympic activists of past host cities have added their own messages on the ribbons, carried it across borders, and handed it over to the next city as a symbol of continuous and transnational anti-Olympic struggle and solidarity. On the ribbons, the messages of “No Olympics” and “END POVERTY” are visible, representing the common experience of oppression and the goal of the transnational anti-Olympic movement. After the conclusion of the PyeongChang Games, Korean and Japanese activists maintained close contact from 2018 to 2021. In November 2018, a Korean activist carried the anti-Olympic torch to Tokyo by hand. The torch handover ceremony in Tokyo was a four-day event that revealed

Fig. 4.7 Mianhae Peurojekteu in PyeongChang (2018)

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Fig. 4.8 Anti-Olympic Torch made from toilet rubber cup

the movement’s increasingly transnational connections (see Fig. 4.9). An event titled, “What happens at Olympic sites? From PyeongChang 2018 to Paris 2024” was attended by delegates not only from Korea, but also Paris who were fighting against the Paris 2024 Games. What started as a transpacific coalition among Korean, Japanese, and Brazilian activists had grown into a more global network of activists by 2019, when the first international anti-Olympic summit, “AntiOlympics One Year to Go International Get-Together” was held in Tokyo from July 20 to 26. This week-long event was co-organized by HGK, OkotowaLink, NOlympics LA, NON aux JO 2024 à Paris, and AntiPyeongChang Olympic Alliance and attended by activists and scholars involved in anti-Olympic activism from around the world. There were delegates not only from past and future Olympic host countries like Brazil, Canada, France, Japan, Korea, the U.K., and the U.S., but also from other countries and regions, such as Malaysia and Hong Kong. There was a notable absence of delegates from China and Russia. This international summit incorporated numerous events and activities designed not only for effective information exchange, but also democratic participation and affective community building. The event started with a fieldwork bus tour around Tokyo, followed by an academic symposium with prominent critical Olympic scholars such as Jules Boykoff. OkotowaLink organized the fieldwork bus tour to Fukushima, where participants had the first-hand experience of seeing a Geiger counter (an

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Fig. 4.9 The poster of Anti-Olympics Torch handover event

instrument used to measure radiation) with a dangerously high reading, and seeing many villages still not recovered from the disaster. The day of Fukushima fieldwork ended with the “Rio-PyeongChang-Tokyo-Paris-LA Night Picnic” in which participants visited the park from which unhoused people were threatened to be evicted due to Tokyo 2020. The summit also included a press conference, teach-ins for researchers and journalists, panel discussions, seminars, and “the Hottest Shinjuku Street Protest.” Documenting the street protest, OkotowaLink, the host of the protest, wrote:

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(…) One year before the opening of the Olympics, people from all over the world gathered to counter the Olympics, and their enthusiasm rose up in front of Shinjuku ALTA as if it were breaking the government and the media’s creation of a celebratory mood. 230 people gathered … We were thrilled at the historic moment of a transnational anti-Olympic movement. (HGK, 2021, p. 221)

The chants and slogans used in the protest demonstrated both the transnational and community nature of the anti-Olympic movement: “NOlympics Anywhere”; “Democracy dies with the Olympics”; and “We refuse to allow the Olympics to continue playing games with our community.” The international solidarity among anti-Olympic activists continued to grow after the historic summit in 2019. Since the start of the SARS 2COVID-19 global pandemic, an increasing amount of media and public attention was directed at anti-Olympic activists. Activists took advantage of this unprecedented opportunity and emphasized how the IOC, the organizing committee, and the Japanese government are reckless, undemocratic, and playing games with people’s lives for their own profit. But Tokyo activists also strongly emphasized that they were not only calling for the cancellation of Tokyo 2020, but for the abolition of the Olympics, using the hashtag “#NOlympics Anywhere.” Shortly after the one-year postponement of Tokyo 2020 was announced, Anti-PyeongChang Olympic Alliance, HGK, OkotowaLink, NOlympics LA, and Non aux JO 2024 à Paris published the joint statement “Stop Playing Games” in Japanese, Korean, French, and English. On March 24, a day before the Olympic torch relay was slated to start from J-Village in Fukushima, the transnational anti-Olympic coalition released yet another joint statement, “Extinguish the Olympic Torch.” The statement concludes: “We, anti-Olympics, anti-gentrification and anti-surveillance groups from all over the world, demand the extinction of the Olympic flame of Tokyo and beyond. We believe that many other things including public health deserve our attention more than such an ephemeral and mercantile spectacle.”12

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Anti-Olympic Activism in Asia: Transnational Alliance and Affective Solidarity The civil societies’ alliance for anti-Olympic movements in Korea and Japan took place in spatially rooted but transnationally networked coalition in sports. The Japan-Korea-Brazil activists were “rooted” in local conditions and concerns; they were the “rooted cosmopolitan” (Tarrow, 2005, pp. 40–44) in Asia. The coalition building between Korean and Japanese activists is unique and significant in that it was achieved despite the ongoing conflict over the history of Japanese imperialism and colonization of Korea. The conservative media represent Japanese and Korean interlocutors within a nationalist framework and portray them as national enemies, thereby either silencing the intent of the protests or disassembling the protestors’ key messages. This media portrayal, in fact, weakens the delivery of the allied voices from both countries. From the beginning, Japanese activists have criticized the revisionist Abe administration and its bid to host the Olympics and have also taken a critical stance against racism in Japan. Further, at the organizational level, the alliance maintained its ongoing local issues in their transnational movement; thus, the Korea-Japan solidarity mobilized a diverse and spontaneous agenda. These are enough to consider the alliance a form of ‘weak civil societies’ (Leontidou, 2010); however, the rebellious atmosphere solidified the civil societies. HGK and OkotowaLink, for instance, constantly criticized Japanese nationalism based on the Emperor System, which was reinforced and celebrated in Tokyo 2020. The groups also understood the significance of the deforestation of Mt. Gariwang not only in the context of environmental conservation, but in the context of Japanese colonial history, as it was one of the few mountains that escaped serious deforestation during Japan’s occupation of Korea. Without these reflections and ongoing efforts to address Japan’s violent history of colonialism, it may have been difficult to achieve a sustained joint struggle against the Olympics. Furthermore, transnational civil coalitions also tend to be weak. Schissel (2012) argues that anti-Olympic movements have not become cohesively transnational because the movements are largely specific to their city, they have difficulty separating general anti-Olympic protests from local issues, and there is a time limit on these protests. The protests tend to end once the Games leave the host city. But as we have examined above, the recent development of transnational anti-Olympic activism suggests that it is not

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just about the political opportunity presented by the mega-events, but also about highlighting local and international struggles rooted in the common experiences of oppression and violence. A crucial aspect of the Korea-Japan anti-Olympic movement-building is embodied in affective feelings. Studies on social movement report that social activism relies highly on individuals’ emotions (see Goodwin et al., 2000; Hochschild, 1979; Juris et al., 2014). Emotions generate an individual’s commitment and uphold ongoing participation. Disastrous Olympic re/developments have generated feelings of anger, sadness, loss (of homes, parks, communities, jobs, etc.); and fear (increased military and police brutality and violence, the spread of viruses, etc.). However, civil solidarity and transnational alliances engendered a positive affectation of hope and a sense of empowerment. Reflecting on the week-long Anti-Olympics One Year to Go International Get-Together in July 2019, Kumiko Sudo, a member of Hangorin no Kai wrote, “The week was more powerful and empowering than I could have imagined” (HGK, 2021, p. 235). For the members of HGK and others, changes to their communities and society brought by the Olympics are experienced as oppressive and disempowering, even debilitating for those who are already marginalized and discriminated against within the society. For them, the struggle against the Olympics also means a struggle to restore their dignity and sense of control over their own destiny; thus, meeting the members of other anti-Olympic movements from different countries means finding comrades connected not only by common political goals, but also by very personal, local struggles. Through transnational coalitions, the activists felt that they were not alone in the fight, and there are people around the world who have won small yet important victories, thus generating a sense of hope, connection, and self-worth. Mr. Lee also recalled that he developed respect and trust to Tokyo organizers when he witnessed the adverse effects on the lives of these activists by Tokyo 2020 and how they did not give up fighting to protect their lives and dignity against not only their government and organizing committee, but also the IOC, perhaps one of the most powerful international NGOs. In that sense, we argue that the transnational alliance not only functions as a political opportunity but also creates the possibility for an affective community. Scholarly debate on democratic political opportunity is divided in the studies on sporting mega-events like the Olympic Games. One camp argues that sporting events open a unique political opportunity for actors to exercise power in pursuit of their goals (e.g.,

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Cottrell & Nelson, 2010). Boykoff (2014) calls it an event coalition among actor networks. The other argues that these mega-events empower the state to engage in a top-down decision-making process, which blocks citizen participation and lacks democratic accountability; thus, citizens are distanced from decision-making (e.g., Burbank et al., 2000; Hiller & Wanner, 2011). In the case of the Korea-Japan civic alliance, we understand that the Olympic Games not only generate political opportunities, but also bring otherwise disparate movements and activists together in a community that fosters the growth of a new movement. The two nations’ alliance around the PyeongChang and Tokyo Games developed a transnational space for learning, ongoing transformation, and the opportunity to share affective emotions; thus, the actors created an affective community. Hutchison (2018) contends that emotions are “…important social forces that help to constitute individual and collective ways of knowing, being and acting in the global political realm.” In the Korea-Japan alliance, activists reveal their struggles with Olympic structures, criticize the capitalist violence and exploitation, and seek to transform or eliminate the institutionalized mega-event. In that sense, the transnational activists’ “critiques” can be understood with Ahmed’s (2021, 2022) concept of “complaints.” In her book titled “Complaint!” Ahmed examined academics and students’ complaints about systemic problems of power (i.e., harassment and unequal working conditions, etc.) in universities and argued that we can learn about power from those who choose to fight against the abuses of power. AntiOlympic activists uncovered abuses of power, chose to fight against the powerful, and shared their strategies and tactics of complaints. Ahmed asserts that a way of thinking about complaint is by seeing it as communicative labor. “Complaints can bring a world into focus; you come to see more… complaint provides a lens, a way of seeing, noticing, attending to a problem in the effort to redress that problem” (Kindle, p. 23). Rio, PyeongChang, and Tokyo activists revealed the secrets and concealed problems around hosting Olympic events—including corruption, more economic costs than benefits, displacement of the poor, gentrification, environmental degradation, exploitation of workers and poor labor conditions, heteropatriarchy, and ableism. The systemic problems are challenging to notice and hard to criticize for the general public, especially when the nation-state sponsors Olympic projects, and the masses support the government. Therefore, societal perceptions of complaints are constructed as unfavorable or out of line, and voices of

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objection are often systematically blocked from being heard. However, objectors don’t feel like they are “talking to a wall” when they have allies or can complain collectively. The transnational alliance of antiOlympic activism between Korea and Japan was a support system that kept complaints going and growing. Within a collective community, complaining becomes a positive duty. It follows that bearing witness to others’ stories of oppression creates a moral commitment to collaborate for systemic change. Another significant aspect of the Korea-Japan alliance formed from the anti-Olympic movement was the promotion of egalitarian dialogue that the state government could not and did not engage in. Activist groups in Japan highlighted issues that are sensitive both in terms of diplomacy and public sentiment between the two countries. Ichimura criticized the Abe government’s opportunistic use of the PyeongChang Olympics as an occasion to demonstrate that Korea and Japan had finally overcome the “historical conflicts” without providing full acknowledgment, apology, and sufficient compensation to the victims of wartime sex slavery and forced labor under the Japanese occupation and colonization of Korea. Japanese activists also vocally criticized how the Tokyo Olympics have been historically tied to the Japanese emperor system since before World War II and how the celebration of Tokyo 2020 as a “festival of peace” was used to advertise to the world that the history of the Japanese invasion of Asia had been “overcome.” Activists made connections between the Japanese colonization of Asia, Japanese nationalism based on the racist and sexist emperor system, the ongoing historical revisionist movement in Japan, and the celebration of both PyeongChang and Tokyo Olympic Games. They also emphasized that the ancient forests of Mt. Gariwang, the central concern to Korean activists, has particular importance to Japanese activists since it is one of the few remaining forests that were not cut down and destroyed under Japanese occupation. We argue that this critical reflection by Japanese activists played an important role in building a long-lasting coalition with Korean activists based on trust and affection with the understanding that their common struggle, the Olympic Games, is deeply tied to their “normal activism” (Boykoff, 2014, p. 26) and the wider social issues that might be beyond the scope of their activism but nonetheless affect their everyday lives. Boykoff (2014) pointed out that anti-Olympic resistance tends to be an “event coalition” rather than a social movement since the activism “is only scarcely sustained through time” (p. 25). Yet, even after the Olympics

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have left their cities, these groups are continuing their dialogue and solidarity actions throughout 2021 and 2022, exchanging information and analysis on redevelopments, gentrification, and environmental degradation in host cities after the Olympics, as well as financial irresponsibility of the organizers and the nationalistic and celebratory narrative of the Olympics put forth by the local and national governments, the media, and the organizing committees. Since its initial formation in 2016, the Korea-Japan coalition has developed from other local Olympic resistance activism into an important part of an international anti-Olympic movement tied with affective solidarity beyond an emergency short-term event coalition based on merit.

Concluding Remarks Transnational activism…is more like a series of waves that lap on an international beach, retreating repeatedly into domestic seas but leaving incremental changes on the shore. (Tarrow, 2005, p. 219)

Tarrow’s (1998) definition of “social movement” involves four characteristics: collective challenge, common purpose, social solidarity, and sustained interaction (pp. 3–5). Sports, and in particular, the Olympics, have political potential: they provide a unique political opportunity for diverse transnational actors’ communication and networking. Since the Olympics moves its host city every two years across different countries, the activisms against the Games had proven difficult to develop and sustain to the level of international movement. This chapter drew on the history of collaboration over anti-Olympic activism within Korean and Japanese civil societies, including Japan’s earlier transpacific alliance with Rio activists, and discussed the initiation, the building of the movement’s infrastructure, and the mobilization of collective action and experience. These two countries were uniquely situated in the history of anti-Olympics activism: they were scheduled to host the Games two years apart; and they are in geographical proximity to each other, which made the sustained in-person interaction more feasible; and they have ongoing emotionally charged conflicts over colonial history, which makes it more challenging to develop affective solidarity without clear acknowledgment of oppressive and violent past. In the initial stage of international movement, their frequent online communication, and their

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ability to visit each other’s city for shared action and teach-ins because of geographical proximity made possible the fast accumulation of knowledge and strategies and formation of affective solidarity to resist Olympics together despite the differences of language, history, and local specific issues the Games bring to a city. Today we are witnessing what could be called international antiOlympic movement, which gained momentum and continuity through the networking of Rio-PyeongChang-Tokyo activists. The 2019 international Olympics summit which emerged out of this network has become a successful precedent that activists from other host countries are learning its strategies. The anti-Olympic torch was handed from Tokyo activists to Paris activists in the second international anti-Olympic summit held in Saint-Denis, a commune in the suburbs of Paris in May 2022. Through Olympic resistance as a social movement, the Korea-Japan civic activists have linked local and regional problems to transnational struggles, and collectively posed significant challenges to government practices and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) with articulated demands to change and eliminate violence and exploitation caused by the Olympics. What is left for academics and activists is systematically analyzing the civic initiatives’ impacts and movement outcomes that the transnational alliance brought into domestic seas.

Notes 1. Asahi Shinbun (2021, May 17). “Survey: 83% against holding Tokyo Olympics this summer.” Retrieved from https://www.asahi.com. 2. The research after 20 years of afforestation (Yajima et al., 1995) demonstrates that the tree growth especially at the higher altitude is weak, and the balance and the number of tree species in the afforested area remain significantly different from the surrounding natural forests. 3. For the details of the activism against the Nagano 1998 Games, see: Ezawa, M. (1999). Olympic wa kanemamire: Nagano Olympics no uragawa. Tokyo: Kirarashobo. 4. A “zine” is a small circulation, self-published, noncommercial print-work or booklet with a small circulation among specific communities. 5. Hangorin No Kai (2016). “2016 RIO Anti-Olympics Report”. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. Shitamachi is an urban commercial and industrial district developed on low alluvial land due to the convenience of land and water transportation.

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It is distinguished from the Yamanote, an expensive residential district on higher ground. Some of those are: Pyeongchang Ollimpik BandaeYeondae [평창 올림픽 반대연대. Trans. Anti- PyeongChang Olympics Alliance], Pyeongchang Donggye Ollimpik Bandae Simin Moniteoringdan [평창 동계 올림픽 반대 시민 모니터링단. Trans. PyeongChang Olympic Monitoring], Uiryeong Saramdeul [우이령 사람들. Trans. Good Friends of Nature], and Riseun Tudeo Siti [리슨 투더 시티. Trans. ListenToTheCity]. HGK (2018, February 5). “Seven reasons to oppose the PyeongChang Olympics”. Retrieved from: https://hangorin.tumblr.com. The elm dance was first designed to comfort the elm forest destroyed during the Chernobyl disaster. The dance evolved a distinctive form with the raising and swaying of arms, evoking their connection with the trees they loved. Since then, many environmental groups have adopted the dance as an action. NOlympics LA. (2021, March 23). “Extinguish the Olympic Torch! Transnational Anti-Olympics Joint Statement”. Retrieved from https:// nolympicsla.com/2021/03/23/extinguish-the-olympic-torch-transnati onal-anti-olympics-joint-statement/.

References Ahmed, S. (2021). Complaint! Duke University Press. Ahmed, S. (2022, March 22). Complaint as queer method. https://feministkill joys.com Boykoff, J. (2014). Activism and the Olympics: Dissent at the games in Vancouver and London. Rutgers University Press. Burbank, M., Heying, C., & Andranovich, G. (2000). Antigrowth politics or piecemeal resistance?: Citizen opposition to Olympic-related economic growth. Urban Affairs Review, 35(3), 334–357. Cottrell, M. P., & Nelson, T. (2010). Not just the Games? Power, protest and politics at the Olympics. European Journal of International Relations, 17 (4), 729–753. Goodwin, J., Jasper, J., & Polletta, F. (2000). The return of the repressed. Mobilization, 5(1), 65–84. HanGorin no Kai. (2021). Olympics kill the poor: No Olympics 2020. Impact Shuppankai. Hiller, H., & Wanner, R. (2011). Public opinion in host Olympic cities: The case of the 2010 Vancouver Winter Games. Sociology, 45(5), 883–899. Hochschild, A. (1979). Emotion work, feeling rules, and social structure. American Journal of Sociology, 85, 551–575.

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Hutchison, E. (2018, March 8). Affective communities and world politics. E-International Relations. https://www.e-ir.info/2018/03/08/affective-com munities-and-world-politics/ Juris, J., Bushell, E., Doran, M., Judge, M., Lubitow, A., Maccormack, B., & Prener, C. (2014). Movement building and the United States social forum. Social Movement Studies: Journal of Social, Cultural and Political Protest, 13(3), 328–348. Kim, K. Y., & Chung, H. (2018). Eco-modernist environmental politics and counter-activism around the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Games. Sociology of Sport Journal, 35(1), 17–28. Lenskyj, H. J. (2008). Olympic industry resistance: Challenging Olympic power and propaganda. State University of New York Press. Leontidou, L. (2010). Urban social movements in ‘weak’ civil societies: The right to the city and cosmopolitan activism in Southern Europe. Urban Studies, 47 (6), 1179–1203. Schissel, L. (2012). Rio 2016: Mega-event urban planning and imagining the anti-Olympics: Scale-shift process (Master’s thesis). Retrieved from University of Miami Repository (Paper 389). Sykes, H. (2016). The sexual and gender politics of sport mega-events: Roving colonialism. Routledge. Tarrow, S. (1998). Power in movement: Social movements and contentious politics. Cambridge University Press. Tarrow, S. (2005). The new transnational activism. Cambridge University Press. Wilson, B. (2007). New media, social movements and global sport studies: A revolutionary moment and the sociology of sport. Sociology of Sport Journal, 24(4), 457–477. Yajima, T., Kikuchi, T., Uchiumi, Y., Masaka, K., & Kumagai, Y. (1995). Jusosohiki to kasoshokusei kara mita Eniwadake kakko kyogijo atochi no syokuseikaifuku. Journal of Forest Research, 4, 50–57.

CHAPTER 5

From the Winter Olympic Games in PyeongChang to the Summer Asian Games in Jakarta-Palembang: Inter-Korean Connections in 2018 at Sport Mega-Events in Asia Jung Woo Lee and Younghan Cho

Introduction This chapter concerns North and South Korean relations at the two major sporting occasions held in Asia in 2018, namely the Winter Olympic Games in PyeongChang and the Summer Asian Games in Jakarta-Palembang. The link between the global and regional events

J. W. Lee (B) University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK e-mail: [email protected] Y. Cho Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul, Republic of Korea

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. Kobayashi et al. (eds.), Sports Mega-Events in Asia, Palgrave Series of Sport in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0011-4_5

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appears remote in terms of the characteristics of athletic contests and the geographical coverage of the games. When it comes to the political and diplomatic values of sport, however, an intersection begins to form. This intersection is the demonstration of the importance of sports in inter-Korean connections via their sporting collaborations at these competitions. A sports mega-event does not take place in a social and political vacuum. Rather, a range of domestic, regional, and global political forces affects and even characterises the hosting of an international athletic championship (Horne & Whannel, 2020). The diplomatic breakthrough in the Korean Peninsula in early 2018 certainly influenced the organisation of the Winter Olympics in the South Korean town of PyeongChang and the delivery of the Asian Games in the two Indonesian cities of Jakarta and Palembang (Cho, 2022). Thanks to an emerging mood of reconciliation between North and South Korea at the time, peace became a mutual theme of the two multi-sport events (Lee, 2021a). With respect to this, it is appropriate to delve into the interface between sport, politics, and diplomacy. In particular, this study considers specific conditions or contexts in which a major sporting event simply mirrors a changing political circumstance, and how it functions substantially for the purpose of mitigating tensions and promoting peaceful relations between nations in conflict. The relations between North and South Korea often fluctuate. A recurrent pattern of confrontation and cooperation has dominated the political environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula since its ideological partition in 1948 (Park, 2000). Sport was by no means immune to this volatile circumstance. During the zenith of the East Asian Cold War from the 1960s to the 1980s, the two sides were actively vying for international recognition, and these then developing countries exploited sport as one of the most effective means to materialise such a diplomatic purpose (Ha & Mangan, 2002). Thus, it is no surprise that the two Koreas initiated a state-funded elite sport development project in order to increase their visibility at major sporting contests such as the Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cups (Bridge, 2012). Additionally, sporting success at international competitions often translated into a signal of the superiority of one over its sibling state when the political rivalry between them was fierce (Merkel, 2008). At the same time, North and South Korea also utilised sport as a vehicle for demonstrating a unified Korean identity and their willingness to reunify the nation (Lee, 2010). They have held a series of inter-Korean

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dialogues to discuss the formation of a united Korea team for an international sporting competition since the 1960s. Despite this effort, the inter-Korean talks only confirmed the differences between them and a breakthrough has been hard to reach (Min & Choi, 2019). Nevertheless, the dialogues have not been completely futile because the two parties at least agreed on the use of a particular flag and anthem when they have participated at an international championship as a single entity (Merkel, 2008). With regard to inter-Korean sporting relations in particular and the intersection between sport and foreign affairs in general, the year 2018 deserves close academic attention. The Winter Olympic Games in PyeongChang marked an important turning point where the two Koreas resumed their communication and collaboration after nearly two years of a diplomatic impasse (Rowe, 2019). This mood of reconciliation remained lively at the Asian Games in Jakarta and Palembang (Jensen, 2018). In between these two major events, an inter-Korean summit took place in April and May of 2018. Moreover, a historic U.S. and North Korea summit meeting was also held in June of 2018. This was clearly a significant development given the worsening geopolitical tensions surrounding the Korean Peninsula until the end of 2017 (Cho, 2022). It appears that major sporting events in Asia created a political opportunity for the two Koreas to activate and maintain a momentum of peace and inter-Korean dialogue. Furthermore, the re-establishment of inter-Korean connections through sport, which subsequently alleviated the conflicts in regional geopolitics, also built an environment where political leaders from the U.S. and North Korea met in person for the first time in history (Lee, 2020). In consideration of this political shift, the two sporting events seem not to be merely an athletic contest but also a diplomatic conduit. In this chapter, we will assess the way in which the Winter Olympics and the Asian Games in 2018 influenced inter-Korean politics. This examination draws upon theoretical concepts from nationalism studies and international relations. These include the argument between primordialist and modernist perspectives on nationalism and the debate between realist and liberal internationalist views on world order. By utilising these notions, we hope to offer a reliable theoretical review of the politics and diplomacy at the two sport mega-events. With this in mind, our focus will be on political contexts, diplomatic episodes, and inter-Korean sporting exchanges associated with PyeongChang (2018) and JakartaPalembang (2018). Then, we will theoretically and critically consider

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the inter-Korean entente at these competitions. We anticipate that such an analysis can enrich academic discussion on the interconnectedness between nationalism and diplomacy via a sport mega-event in Asia.

Theoretical Backdrop In order to draw a picture of the relationship between North and South Korea more accurately, it is necessary to investigate the Korean problem from the viewpoint of both nationalism and international relations. On one level, inter-Korean relations are often charged with nationalist politics whose aim is to reunify the nation, which is arguably divided by external forces against its will (Seth, 2011). On another level, because the two Koreas are now de facto two separate states, their bilateral talks frequently involve diplomatic protocols which are at times mediated or assisted by a third party such as other states or international organisations (Kim S., 2006). This dual perspective approach can be particularly relevant when inter-Korean relations are investigated in the context of international sport. Not only does a sporting contest including a sport mega-event frequently work as a cultural theatre in which a specific form of nationalism is being represented and reproduced, but it also often functions as a pseudo-diplomatic forum in which several state actors interact and stand up for their national interests (Bowes & Bairner, 2019; Grix & Houlihan, 2014). As will be discussed further later in this chapter, the inter-Korean connection inside and outside the stadium exemplifies this amalgamation of sporting nationalism and sport diplomacy. Nationalism According to Gellner (1983, p. 1), “nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent”. He further notes that when this principle is violated, the surge of nationalism within a particular territory or amongst a specific ethnic group is prone to occur in order to reclaim the integrity between polity and the national community (Gellner, 1983). The origins and definitions of the nation are highly contested concepts as shown most notably in the debate between modernist and primordialist schools (Özkirimli, 2017). Put simply, the former scholars see the nation as a single political, social, and economic community which is a relatively modern invention

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that is closely related to industrialisation and the development of capitalism since the eighteenth century (Anderson, 1991; Hobsbawm, 1990). By contrast, the latter academics claim that the nation refers to an ethnic group with an ancient origin that shares a sense of historical tradition and cultural convention such as language, religion, and ways of life (Hastings, 1997; Smith, 1986). In that sense, the primordialists seemingly present a more exclusive, organic sense of the nation whose members might display a common ethnicity. On the other hand, modernists tend to embrace a more inclusive, civic sense of the nation whose members might respect their legal responsibilities and accept the established political and economic system regardless of their ethnic origin. Despite this difference, the two parties broadly agree that nationalism as a political movement, the nation as a strong source of collective identity, and the delineation of the border between nations and their exclusive sovereignty in the occupied territory are relatively modern phenomena which largely began to emerge in the late eighteenth century (Özkirimli, 2017). Despite its contribution to understanding characteristics of nationalism in modern times, such a typology of nationalism can be limited or even problematic by positing the Western historical experience as universal, and then, by treating Eastern experience as particular. Rather than following either the modernist or primordial views or simply refusing both, it is imperative and useful to approach Korean nationalism as “a universal and modern phenomenon in terms of being particular and specific, just as Western nationalism is” (Cho, 2020, p. 11). In this rationale, several ideas of existing studies on nationalism can be used as a useful reference for thinking about the universal and particular characteristics of Korean nationalism, which in turn are applied for explicating European experiences. On conceptualising the reunification movement as nationalist politics in Korea, therefore, several notions of existing studies are useful for identifying three distinctive features. First, Korea is a nation in which the integrity of national and political units was interrupted by colonisation and by division during the Cold War. Immediately after liberation from Japanese occupation in 1945, Korea entered a period of UN Trusteeship. The involvement of the U.S. and the Soviet Union in governing the southern and northern sides of the peninsula led to the partition of the nation when the East Asian Cold War conflicts deepened (Seth, 2011). The division was against the desire of Korean nationalist groups who wanted to see the foundation of modern sovereign Korea in a post-colonial setting. Their frustration subsequently induced the rise of a

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unified Korean nationalism, the main aims of which include the amelioration of the ideological tensions and the re-establishment of the connection between the two Koreas (Lee, 2015). Second, such historic obstacles for building a modern nation-state contributed to making the primordialist view popular amongst the Korean populace. In so doing, the myth of ethnic homogeneity of Korean people in terms of race, language, and cultural tradition was accepted as the essential reason for unification. This myth led people to regard the Korean Peninsula as the ultimate fatherland of the nation, and which inherited the more than 500-years-long legacies of a united “hermit kingdom” (Shin G., 2006). This ethnic sense of nationalism provides the principal justification for the Korean reunification movement. Third, despite this assertion about common ethnicity, the political system on the two sides eventually evolved into substantially different forms. Since the division, North and South Korea underwent dissimilar processes of modernisation and industrialisation, and these parallel paths of development resulted in the separate construction of political, legal, and fiscal structures on each side (Armstrong, 2014). This bifurcation of national institutions produces a contrasting civic identity in communist and capitalist Koreas, respectively. The incompatibility of the two systems and civic identities renders the reunification of the peninsula very hard to realise if not impossible, in spite of the close cultural and historical ties between the two Koreas. The combination of these three features engenders the situation where a strong desire for national reunification and a fierce political antipathy amongst the populations of the two Koreas co-exist. While both Koreas buttress the idea of ethnic homogeneity and the necessity of national unification, North and South Korea relentlessly and fiercely compete against each other insofar as inter-Korean relations are concerned. Nonetheless, North and South Korea also relay a discourse of a unified Korea via cultural events and practices (Choong, 2005). Amongst others, sport is arguably the most effective means of disseminating nationalist sentiments, continuously reminding people of the view that the two Koreas should reunify (Lee, 2015). International Relations The relationship between North and South Korea also needs to be viewed through the lens of international relations because, despite their common ethnicity, they are two sovereign states (Kim S., 2006). In this respect,

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realism and liberal internationalism offer useful theoretical perspectives through which we can evaluate inter-Korean relations, collaborations during a major sporting event, and the roles of global sport governing bodies. Let us briefly explain some of the key aspects of these two theories that are relevant to this study. In relation to realism, the maximisation of self-interest is the first principle of this theory (Donnelly, 2013). This means that the nature of international relations is fundamentally a competitive zero-sum game and that the prospect of international collaboration is largely determined by the number of gains that the participant nations can acquire through the communal enterprise. Second, while proponents of realism acknowledge the role of international organisations in setting norms and protocols concerning the management of world affairs, they also argue that many of their declarations are largely comprised of recommendations which are not legally binding (Walt, 1998). Subsequently, most international organisations exert only limited influence on the behaviour of member states. Furthermore, realists highlight that international organisations tend to serve the political interests of major powers (Mearsheimer, 1995). In fact, the most powerful countries actually set many of the principal agendas and practically lead major committees within international institutions. Hence, if any decision made by these organisations conflicts with the intentions of these superpowers, they can simply ignore it. In effect, realism depicts international relations as a place where selfish nations steadily preserve and constantly pursue their national interests. Liberal internationalism, by contrast, states that international bodies have a capacity to promote peace through facilitating collaboration between nations (Dunne, 2020). This theory assumes the welfare and prosperity of nations as a primary objective of post-Cold War international relations (Jahn, 2013). Because nations can increase, albeit disproportionally, their wealth in absolute terms through foreign trade and the international division of labour, they are prone to reach mutual consensus, at times after long negotiations, on their exchanges and cooperation under the guidance of international organisations. These transnational institutions introduce a rule-based system in a world economic order and supervise international trade and exchanges in accordance with international norms and regulations (Ikenberry, 2009). This inter-state connection eventually establishes trust amongst governments which is an essential ingredient for international peace (Walt, 1998). An outlier nation can still disrespect the mandate of global bodies in order to pursue

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its short-term interests, but such unreliable behaviour soon dissipates its trust, which subsequently tarnishes its international reputation in the long term (Dunne, 2020). Hence, a state as a rational actor tends to behave self-reflexively and is likely to respect transnational protocols voluntarily. As to the asymmetrical power ratio within these global bodies, the expansion of their member states, particularly via many new entrants from developing worlds, makes the governing principle within international organisations more accountable and their policy less Western-centric (Ikenberry, 2009). This shift subsequently enables global bodies to check the behaviour of powerful states more confidently and gives transnational institutes more diplomatic leverage to obtain a consensus from major powers. This permeation of international practices consequently builds a more peaceful world order, according to liberal internationalism. International sport often mirrors diplomatic issues and geopolitical problems. Sport and inter-Korean relations are no exception. As mentioned earlier, the relationship between the two Koreas often fluctuates, and sport offers a space where North and South Korea communicate, collaborate, or contest diplomatically depending on the geopolitical circumstance surrounding the Korean Peninsula (Lee, 2021a). With reference to realism and liberal internationalism, we intend to examine inter-Korean connections at the Winter Olympics and the Summer Asiad of 2018. The role of the governing bodies of the two major sporting events in mediating the two sides will also be considered. In conjunction with concepts from nationalism studies, the application of the two perspectives on international relations allows us to construct a more credible analytical account of the relationship between North and South Korea at these two major sporting events.

PyeongChang 2018 This section explores the roles of the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics in international relations and politics. Here, we examine the capacities and background in which the PyeongChang Olympics could serve as both a breakthrough for maintaining the inter-Korean connection for some time and a catalyst for facilitating various levels of international relations. Furthermore, as sport mega-events such as the Olympics function critically and widely in international relations, this section discusses the relevant historical background and discursive realm, including nationalism as mediated elements with the influence of sports.

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The impacts of the PyeongChang Olympics on international relations were made possible both by the capacity of the Winter Olympics as a global mega-event and by changes in the domestic political landscape. On the one hand, the PyeongChang Olympics were able to attract national, regional, and global attention due to its sport mega-event characteristics. The PyeongChang Olympics were the first East Asian Olympics that would be followed by the 2020 Tokyo Summer Olympics and the 2022 Beijing-Zhangjiakou Winter Olympics. The hosting of three consecutive Olympics in East Asia symbolised the emergence of Asian power in the realm of global sports. Previously, several sports events including the Olympics marked a major turning point in changes of international relations: in the case of inter-Korean relations, the 2000 Olympics, for instance, served as the global stage to demonstrate the national connectedness of the two Koreas and emphasise their Korean-ness by presenting a unified national flag and marching together during the opening ceremony (Cho, 2009; Lee & Maguire, 2009). However, this global capacity of the PyeongChang Olympics was not enough to provide a critical momentum for transforming international relations not only because the military tensions over North Korea’s missile tests and nuclear bombs reached their peak in 2017 but also because domestic expectations for the PyeongChang Olympics were also low due to the political scandals of the previous administration in preparing for the events. On the other hand, the transformation of international relations through the PyeongChang Olympics was a consequence of the domestic politics and the inter-Korean specificities of the previous years. Originally, the PyeongChang Olympics had been planned to be held during the Park Geun-hye administration, but President Park was impeached in 2016 for corruption and abuse of power. For the past two administrations of Lee Myungbak (2008–2013) and Park Geun-hye (2013–2017), the relations between the two Koreas had been consistently exacerbated. These two presidents were from the same conservative party, which was also relatively negative or even hostile towards inter-Korean projects. However, the sudden impeachment of President Park led to the election of the new President Moon Jae-in in 2017, who was a candidate from a relatively progressive party that was also active in its dialogue with North Korea. The start of the Moon administration in 2017 raised public expectations of changes in inter-Korean relations, and of course, the upcoming Olympics were seen as a major opportunity for resuming the inter-Korean

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conversation and alleviating the escalated tensions over the Korean Peninsula. Also, Kim Jong Un, who seized power in North Korea following his father in 2011, responded to the changing circumstances by mentioning the possibility of North Korea joining the PyeongChang Olympics during his 2018 New Year’s Day address. While Kim’s address attracted global media attention, high-level talks between government officials of the two Koreas were resumed, and North Korean special guests and performance groups visited South Korea in January 2018. Both the global capacity of the sport mega-event and the domestic political landscape on the Korean Peninsula functioned as crucial conditions for enabling the PyeongChang Olympics to work as a game changer in inter-Korean relations. In preparing the Olympics, the governmental officials of the Moon administration offered North Korea several options for joining the PyeongChang Olympics or even for holding events together. Due to limited time and practical reasons, the inter-Korean joint event failed, but the two Koreas agreed to participate in the Olympics together in several ways. For the opening ceremony, the inter-Korean teams marched together and wore unified uniforms while holding the unification flag, called the “Hanbando-flag”, which pictured the geography of the entire Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, a North and South Korea joint team was organised for the women’s ice hockey event: 12 North Korean players were added to the original squad of the Korean team, and a total of 35 players trained together to prepare for the competitions. The IOC assisted this process by allowing the participation of North Korean athletes in the joint team and by increasing the number of players in the joint team. Along with the sudden participation of North Korea and the entailing inter-Korean collaborations, the PyeongChang Olympics succeeded in eliciting national, regional, and global attention as well as initiating a peaceful and reconciliatory mood between North and South Korea. However, the inter-Korean collaboration did not receive the same nationalistic response from people as before. Compared to the 2000 Sydney Olympics in particular, public opinion was largely bifurcated: one side welcomed the participation of North Korea and inter-Korean collaboration as a symbol of national harmony and peace, and the other was opposed to North Korea by treating it as a free rider that was taking profit without making any effort to stage the Olympics (Cho, 2022). In particular, the joint women’s ice hockey team caused heated debates over the issue of nationalism versus fairness: some put more emphasis on the joint

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team and its role over each player, but others prioritised the best interest of the South Korean players over the nationalist purpose and goal for the joint team. The latter severely criticised the joint team because it would shorten the participation time for some players and because the decision was made without any consent from the players and the manager. Such diverse and even contradictory responses by South Koreans suggested that ethnic nationalism, which had been popular or even hegemonic in sporting events and even in public opinion, seems no longer to be taken for granted in South Korea. As discussed, the PyeongChang Olympics demonstrate that a sports mega-event functioned as a diplomatic device that brought North and South Korea closer as well as a rapprochement to inter-Korean relations. We highlight the global capacity of the Winter Olympics and the domestic political landscape as two important conditions for initiating diplomatic changes. At the same time, the PyeongChang Olympics became another battleground for nationalist discourses and even symbolised the emergence of changing structures of nationalism in South Korea.

Jakarta-Palembang 2018 This section examines the Jakarta-Palembang Asian Games as the second sporting event in Asia in 2018 that impacted and was impacted by international relations. Propelled by the two summit meetings between North and South Korea and between North Korea and the U.S., the 2018 Asian Games became another venue for inter-Korean sports exchanges. Furthermore, the 2018 Asian Games also became another strategic space in which local and regional political leaders made special efforts to elevate the significance of the sporting event as well as its hosting country in the political realm. This section demonstrates that sport mega-events and international relations have reciprocal relations, and that, in the 2018 Asian Games, the regional scale and characteristics of the event functioned positively in the role and efficacy of sporting diplomacy. First of all, the 2018 Asian Games showed that the relation between sporting events and international relations is not a one-way flow, but a reciprocal one. In many cases of sporting diplomacy, sporting events are often discussed as the initial impetus for breaking through or ameliorating international and political relations amongst states (Murray, 2018), which was also true for sporting diplomacy in the 2018 PyeongChang

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Olympics. In the 2018 Asian Games, however, it was clear that the political events as well as the inter-Korean relations stimulated more diverse and active exchanges in sports between North and South Korea. After the PyeongChang Olympics, two inter-Korea summit meetings were successfully held respectively on April 27 and May 26, followed by the first North Korea-U.S. summit meeting on June 12 in Singapore, and the conciliatory mood in inter-Korean relations continued. Under such a peaceful environment in international relations, the 2018 Asian Games became the first Asian Games in which a unified team of North and South Korea and the joint march at the opening ceremony were made possible. As a result, the unified Korean team played in three sports events at the 18th Asian Games: women’s basketball, rowing, and dragon boat racing. These teams played under the symbol of “COR” and the unification flag, which was called the “flag of the Korean Peninsula”. The unified Korean team ended up winning one gold medal, one silver medal, and two bronze medals: it was a historic first gold medal won by the unified Korean 500 m women’s dragon boat racing team. This sporting success symbolically and emphatically displayed the harmony and unity of the two Koreas. Additionally, their collaboration in sport and their outstanding achievement at this competition represented a useful metaphor for the power of a unified Korea, whose meaning can be extended to other political and industrial domains. Hence, the demonstration of a unified Korea and the materialisation of inter-Korean cooperation are some of the main features of this sporting occasion. Secondly, the exchanges at the 2018 Asian Games indicated a possible contribution and efficacy of regional sports events to sporting diplomacy. As described, the 2018 Asian Games became a very active and effective space for inter-Korean sports exchanges. Compared to the Olympics or even to national events, not as many political and ideological controversies were involved in preparing and organising the unified Korean teams for the Asian Games, and the outcomes of the joint teams were welcomed both domestically and even globally. Moreover, the following two facts also allowed North and South Korea to collaborate at this Asiad without much political cost and risk: (1) the status of South Korea as a leading economy in Asia that enabled it to exert more influence on a continental diplomatic community and (2) the absence of Western democracies, especially the U.S., which often intervene in inter-Korean politics. Such successful processes and outcomes were made possible not only by the changing inter-Korean and international relations, but also the

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mid-level scale of and attention on the Asian Games as one of the best examples of regional sporting events. Compared to sport mega-events, regional sporting events are relatively less emphasised not only in relation to other sports events but also in terms of economic and political influence. With the exception of a few events, such as the European Football Champions League, the most notable events are national or global matches. As such, the Asian Games are not the same in intensity and scale as the truly global sporting events such as the Olympics and the Football World Cup. Due to its mid-level capacity, which attracts enough but as much interest both in intensity and in geography, regional events such as the Asian Games may be more compatible for sporting diplomacy. Thirdly, the 2018 Asian Games demonstrated that international relations can be a strategic tool for elevating the significance of the hosting country in regional politics. Hosting an international sporting event provides its host country and city with an opportunity to become a global showcase to regional and global audiences, which also contributes to enhancing its national pride and unity of the hosting country. As suggested, however, the Asian Games are not a typical mega-event where competition to hold the event is fierce or which attracts truly global attention. As a matter of fact, Indonesia was given the right to host the event because the original hosting city, Hanoi in Vietnam, withdrew due to economic reasons. While the unified Korean team contributed to increasing the significance and popularity of the event, its host country and its political leaders also made efforts to make the Asian Games special by inviting the summits of the two Koreas to the opening ceremony. Thus, it is no surprise to see that local media in Indonesia featured this inter-Korean connection as one of the key historical moments at the Asian Games (Indonesia Tourism, 2018). As to the more specific inter-state diplomacy at this continental competition, Joko Widodo, the president of Indonesia, invited North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to attend the opening ceremony, with a similar invitation to Moon Jae-in, the president of South Korea. By hosting another summit meeting in Jakarta, Indonesian political leaders attempted to make Jakarta a global city again and to globally prove the stability of its security. Unfortunately, these invitations did not lead to an actual summit meeting, but the invitation itself appeared to utilise inter-Korean relations and their political issues for elevating the fame of regional sporting events and their hosting cities. However, this development does not mean that inter-Korean state diplomacy was omitted from this sporting event.

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South Korean Prime Minster Lee Nak Yon and Deputy Premier of North Korean Cabinet Ri Ryong Nam travelled to Jakarta to celebrate the commencement of the Asian Games. Not only did the two high-level Korean delegates demonstrate their amicability at the opening ceremony, but they also held a trilateral meeting with the Indonesian President during the Asian Games. This indicates that the Asian Games could function as an important diplomatic channel where the two Korean visitors, with the help of the Indonesian host, could maintain the momentum of peace and collaboration on the Korean Peninsula.

Discussion At the Winter Olympics in PyeongChang and the Summer Asiad in Jakarta-Palembang in 2018, Korean nationalist politics and inter-Korean diplomacy intersected. The Winter Olympic Games offered a diplomatic stage on which symbolic collaborations between North and South Korea were displaced to international audiences, while diverse and even opposite nationalistic discourses competed and collided domestically in South Korea. Understandably, the then President Moon Jae In sought ways to engage with North Korea at the Winter Olympics despite escalating military tensions surrounding the Korean Peninsula. The ruling regime in South Korea at the time embraced this ethnic and cultural nationalism as a dominant discourse of its nationalist politics (Lee, 2021b). In this vein, an official and governmental discourse of nationalism reproduced and reinforced ethnic nationalism with a focus on the symbolic reunification of North and South Korea in the stadium (Lee, 2015). The key principle of the governmental discourse of nationalism is that Koreans are an ethnically homogeneous nation who share a single culture, history, and language and, therefore, the divided Korean Peninsula should be reunified. To some extent, the North Korean propaganda linked to this Winter Olympics also included elements of this ethnic nationalism. For instance, in his 2018 New Year’s speech, the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un described people from the two Koreas as “compatriots” with “the same blood” and noted that the Winter Olympics would display “our nation’s prestige” (Kim J., 2018). The use of these terminologies clearly indicates the homogeneity of the Korean people. It is particularly noteworthy that he regarded the Olympics as “our nation’s prestige”, which

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emotively emphasised the unity of the Korean nation despite its political division. When North Korea finally confirmed its participation in the Winter Games, South Korea’s governmental discourse of nationalism also seemed to regain its momentum in South Korea (Lee, 2021b). As the two Koreas maintained such a peaceful mood in the post-Winter Olympic settings, sports diplomacy, which heavily depends on the symbolic unification of North and South Korea, extended to the two Indonesian cities where the Asian Games took place. A joint march at the opening ceremonies, the display of the unification flag, and the formation of a unified Korean team in some disciplines such as women’s ice hockey, women’s basketball, rowing, and dragon boat racing were all sporting symbols and rituals that discursively underpinned this ethnic and cultural sense of Korean nationalism. Yet, it should be noted that an ethnic and cultural sense of nationalism was actively deployed by both governments of North and South Korea for their own political goals, which are not necessarily identical, but instead, often are conflicted in rivalling and even hostile manners. Since their division, furthermore, North and South Korea have not only established different socio-cultural structures, including opposite regimes of communism and capitalism, but have also become each other’s most dangerous enemy. In South Korea, therefore, there exists anti-communism, which is not limited to the Cold War era, but still continues as an anti-North Korean ideology and negative sentiments (Cho & Kobayashi, 2019). As shown, such anti-North Korean sentiments and discourses were easily and saliently witnessed in the Winter Olympics. For instance, those who claimed themselves to be nationalists found the ad hoc arrangements for a unified team in women’s ice hockey unfair and even unnationalistic because this decision took away the opportunities and rights of South Korean athletes to play in the Olympics and to represent their country, i.e. South Korea (Lee, 2021b). Such nationalistic sentiments in South Korea led to protests against the use of the unification flag on these two sporting occasions (Chung & Bendeich, 2018). For them, the Taegukgi, the official flag of South Korea, should be raised and waved at any and all international sporting competitions, including the Winter Olympics and the Asian Games. In South Korea, therefore, the 2018 Winter Olympic Games exhibited the rupture of ethnic nationalism and also hinted at the emergence of a new hegemonic nationalism. For heuristic purposes, this new nationalism can be referred to as patriotic nationalism, in which a state, i.e.

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South Korea, rather than a nation, is prioritised and cherished because the state is necessary and indispensable for maximising the interests of its people, i.e. South Koreans. As a new hegemonic sentiment, therefore, patriotic nationalism in South Korea redefines the notion of national interests which exclusively refers to the state’s interests being meant for South Korea and its people with no room for North Korea and its people. In terms of inter-Korean diplomacy, the two Korean states intimately collaborated for their Winter Olympics and the Asian Games campaigns. At PyeongChang, international media featured the reconciliation of the two Koreas as a diplomatic breakthrough because of the escalating political and military tensions just a few weeks before the opening of the competition (Rowe, 2019). At Jakarta and Palembang, a unified Korean team won medals which emphatically symbolised harmony between the divided sides of one nation (BBC, 2018). Not only that, political leaders from North and South Korea held a series of meetings during the two events, and a gesture of goodwill and fraternity was also shown between the two Koreas in the stadium (Jensen, 2018). Clearly, the two sporting occasions provided a diplomatic space where the communist and capitalist Koreas discussed the possibility of peaceful coexistence. The fact that two inter-Korean summit meetings took place in the interim period between the Winter Olympics and the Asian Games demonstrates the function of the major sporting events as a catalyst for inter-Korean dialogue. To a degree, this interface between sport and inter-Korean diplomacy is indicative of liberal internationalism at work. The IOC as a nongovernmental supranational organisation supported the reconciliation and collaboration between North and South Korea. For instance, the IOC invited the delegations from the two Koreas to its headquarters where inter-Korean Olympic talks were held under the guidance of the sport governing body (IOC, 2018). At this meeting, the four parties—the IOC, NOCs of the two Koreas, and the PyeongChang (2018) Organising Committee—signed the Olympic Korean Peninsula Declaration, which permitted the formation of a unified Korean team at the Olympics and granted places for North Korean athletes at the competitions without preliminary, qualifying, contests (Lee, 2020). The IOC also liaised with the International Ice Hockey Federation so that the two Koreas could field a unified women’s ice hockey team. With regard to the Asian Games, the Olympic Council of Asia (OCA) chaired a meeting where the delegations of the two Olympic Committees attended, and the three parties agreed that the two Koreas would form a unified team in basketball,

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dragon boat racing, and rowing (IOC, 2021a, 2021b). Clearly, the IOC and the OCA as transnational bodies assisted the two separated countries to cooperate in sport, with the hope that they would build mutual trust through sport. The inter-Korean entente at the Winter Olympic Games and the Asian Games seemingly represented the materialisation of the core ethos of the sport governing bodies, which is to promote and facilitate international friendship by taking part in their flagship sporting competitions (IOC, 2021a, 2021b). This motto also reinforces a liberalist international relations theory. Yet, a critical evaluation of the inter-Korean sporting collaboration from a realist perspective can lead to a different interpretation. It should be noted that this rather dramatic period of reconciliation between the two Koreas only lasted 18 months. From January 2018 to June 2019, two sport mega-events were held in Asia in which North and South Korea collaborated, three inter-Korean summit meetings took place, and three U.S.-North Korean summits occurred. These encounters were a sign of improving inter-Korean relations and of mitigating the tensions in regional geopolitics. Nonetheless, after the failure to reach an agreement at the second summit meeting between the U.S. and North Korea, the political circumstance surrounding the Korean Peninsula grew cold once again, and the communication channel between the two Koreas was deactivated (Shin & Smith, 2020). Inter-Korean sporting exchanges were also halted. North Korea even skipped the 2020 Summer Olympics in Tokyo despite the IOC’s formal invitation sent to their NOCs. Realism also acknowledges the value of international organisations in presenting a certain order in world politics but states that a nation-state tends to collaborate with supranational bodies and other diplomatic partners only when it can earn some political gains from such cooperation and partnership (Mearsheimer, 1995). Put simply, national interests take precedence over international harmony and peace. When this logic is applied to the inter-Korean connection at the two sporting events in 2018, the two Korean states, particularly North Korea, attempted to maximise their benefits by collaborating in PyeongChang and JakartaPalembang. One of the major diplomatic goals of the South Korean regime at the time was to ratify a peace treaty, including the U.S. and North Korea as signatories (McCurry, 2021). This formal agreement would technically end the Korean War, and the settlement of this security issue would subsequently confer the status of regional power in East Asian geopolitics. The Winter Olympics enabled the ruling party in the

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South to set this peace agenda, which would remove the North as a risk factor from the forefront of its foreign policy programme (Lee, 2020). In that sense, the promotion of peace is directly related to the diplomatic interests of the South Korean regime. Hence, this peace campaign was arguably motivated by its realist ambition rather than by its liberal desire. As for North Korea, the communist state was under severe international sanctions imposed by the UN and the U.S., and its main motivation was understandably to change this diplomatic situation because it suffered from serious economic hardship. As the South Korean government was willing to mediate between the U.S. and North Korea, the communist state exploited the Winter Olympic Games as a diplomatic opportunity to re-open dialogues with the South. It should be noted that the U.S. maintained a sceptical view of the presence of the North Korean delegation at the 2018 Winter Olympics, devaluing the sporting union as communist Korea’s charm offensive (Kim & Jin, 2018). This also shows a realist stance from the U.S. diplomatic circle. Yet, inter-Korean summits after the Winter Olympics augmented a diplomatic window for North Korea, and the first historic U.S.-North Korean Summit was held in Singapore in June of 2018. When the Asian Games commenced in August, the two Koreas collaborated again. This could be seen as a genuine improvement in the relationship between North and South Korea. Equally, such a sporting connection might be read as North Korea’s effort to keep its diplomatic channel open with the South and more importantly with the U.S. Having realised the U.S.’s stubborn stance on North Korea’s nuclear programme, the communist state then returned to its reclusive and secretive modus operandi with occasional demonstrations of its military might. It appears that the North Korean regime found nothing valuable from this period of rapprochement and engagement, after all. This indicates that when examining the Winter Olympics and the Asian Games from a short-term perspective without making a connection to a wider political context, liberal internationalism looks convincing. However, when the two events are analysed with reference to comprehensive geopolitical issues from a longer-term perspective, a critical reading of inter-Korean entente at PyeongChang and Jakarta-Palembang seemingly makes realism a more plausible theory.

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Conclusion When it comes to the relationship between North and South Korea, the year 2018 marked an important turning point. The pervasive antagonistic attitude suddenly disappeared in the region and a reconciliatory mood rapidly filled the political atmosphere surrounding the Korean Peninsula. The Winter Olympic Games in PyeongChang and the Summer Asian Games in Jakarta-Palembang played a significant role in facilitating this rather dramatic political transformation. The Winter Olympics initiated this political shift by offering a diplomatic stage where the two Koreas could reconcile, and the Summer Asiad sustained the momentum of this inter-Korean fraternity. Not only did the two major sporting events stimulate sporting exchanges between North and South Korea, but these occasions also promoted inter-Korean dialogues. Through collaboration in sport, the governments of the two Koreas were able to emphasise ethnic and cultural nationalism and simultaneously attempted to elevate their reputations and influences both domestically and internationally. However, the Winter Olympic Games also provided South Korea with a crucial arena in which patriotic nationalism emerged as a new hegemonic discourse. In that sense, these sporting events epitomise the nexus between sport, nationalism, and diplomacy. With regard to the nature of international relations, we argue that a realist theory, rather than liberal internationalism, more accurately explains the inter-Korean collaboration at the two sport mega-events in question. Concerning this theoretical evaluation, it is important to consider whether an international sport competition and its governing bodies can function as an autonomous force for political change. Our view is that they can be, at least, a catalyst for such a transformation. However, in order for this to happen, an event should be held under a specific situation where the leaders of the host country must have a desire for a political shift. In other words, when the ruling regime of the event host has something to gain from the reformation, a major event can create a diplomatic chance to help realise such a political aim. Hence, our argument is that a major sporting event does not merely mirror geopolitical and diplomatic issues related to the host nation. Rather, it can ignite the engine of a political movement for various causes under certain conditions. In this respect, a sport mega-event can be seen as a semi-autonomous agent for a political transition.

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PART II

The Asian Games

CHAPTER 6

Better, Bigger, Bitter—The Rise of the Asian Games in a Toxic Political Environment Jörg Krieger

Introduction The Asian Games, first held in New Delhi (India) in 1951, are the most prestigious multi-sport mega-event on the Asian continent. The Asian Games’ most recent edition, held in Jakarta-Palembang (Indonesia) in 2018, saw a record 11,300 competitors participating in forty sports. The athletes compete in the core sports of the Olympic programme as well as in traditional sports of the Asian continent such as kabaddi or wushu. With such a diverse sports programme, the Asian Games display a proximity to the Olympic Movement whilst also putting on display the rich variety of traditional Asian sports. The Olympic Council of Asia (OCA), the continental governing body of sports in Asia and the largest of the

J. Krieger (B) Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark e-mail: [email protected] Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences, Lillehammer, Norway

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. Kobayashi et al. (eds.), Sports Mega-Events in Asia, Palgrave Series of Sport in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0011-4_6

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continental sport organizations within the Olympic Movement, oversees the hosting of the Asian Games since its foundation in 1982. Previously, the Asian Games had been organized under the auspices of the Asian Games Federation (AGF) that was dissolved to better represent the Asian nations within the Olympic Movement (Krieger, 2021). The Asian Games have, however, a troubled history, shaped by political disputes that spilled over on the organization of the event. Originally intended to promote pan-Asianism, national conflicts pushed pan-Asian ideas and internationalism further and further in the background despite the event’s organizers relying on a rhetoric of continental unity. This chapter contrasts the vision of the event with its politicization. Based on archival sources from the IOC’s Olympic Studies Centre and secondary literature on the Asian Games, this chapter identifies five phases of the Asian Games’ transformation, with a focus on the 1970s and 1980s. First, prior to the First World War, the precedent of the Asian Games had been staged in form of the Far Eastern Championship Games (FECG) strongly influenced by Western desire to civilize Asian nations. Second, following the end of the Second World War , the Asian Games were founded with the aim to demonstrate and strive for Asian unity. Third, this underlying vision was effectively put aside with the 1974 Asian Games in Teheran that laid the seeds for a new power structure in the Asian sport movement through the inclusion of the communist China and the rise of Gulf Arab nations. Fourth, the foundation of the OCA institutionalized the new power relations and granted the members the possibility to pursue varying national interests. Finally, the existing power structures are still evident within the expanded Asian sports movement today and internationalist efforts on the continent further diluted.

The Origins of Continental Multi-Sport Events in Asia The foundation of the modern Olympic Movement through French Baron Pierre de Coubertin strongly influenced the establishment of multi-sport mega-events on the Asian continent at the beginning of the twentieth century. Reconciliation, mutual assistance, and peace efforts stood at the centre of Coubertin’s internationalist thinking that led to his global aspirations for the Olympic Movement. Whilst the organization of and participation in the Olympic Games was at first solely a Western affair, Coubertin attempted to expand his project to Asia by the beginning of

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the twentieth century. For example, in 1909, Coubertin co-opted Kano Jigoro from Japan to become the first Asian member of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) (Stevens, 2013). Some scholars argue that Coubertin believed Westerners should provide paternalistic guidance to the Asian “race”, so Asians could compete with the “superior” people of the more civilized West (Seo et al., 2019). If true, Coubertin shared such notions with the missionaries who brought modern sport to Asia during the nineteenth century. The Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) was particularly influential in this regard. The general secretary of the YMCA in the Philippines, the American Elwood S. Brown became the key figure in the foundation of the first major international sports meeting in Asia, the Far Eastern Olympiad in 1913, which two years later changed its name to the FECG (Hong & He, 2020). The FECG became the first regional offspring of the Olympic Games and marked the beginning of mega-sport events on the Asian continent that are closely linked to the Olympic Movement. At the inaugural event in 1913, competitors from the Philippines, Japan, and China participated. The competing countries demonstrated that political tensions could also be overcome for the purpose of a sporting event on the Asian continent—at least to a certain degree (Hübner, 2015). After all, Japan had occupied parts of mainland China and Korea, the United States had colonized the Philippines, and China was internally divided into South and North China during the time of the first FECG. Thus, from the beginning of the FECG, there was a strong belief in the success of the YMCA’s and Coubertin’s (Christian-) internationalist project. Motivated by a desire to lift East Asian societies to the perceived higher standards of Western civilization, strongly influenced by American values and norms, the FECG was seen as a tool to bring Asian people together through and overcome political tensions caused by Japanese and Western imperialism (ibid.). The internationalistic objectives of Asian multi-sport events therefore existed from the origins of competitive sporting events in Asia and spoke directly to the internationalist period after the War marked by the idea of the League of Nations. Until its disbandment in 1934, the FECG had an impact on the spread of Western sport in East Asia and influenced the establishment of physical education as a school subject (Yan, 2020). However, we can not only find the origins of internationalism in the FECG, but also the interlinked emergence of nationalistic and pan-Asiatic sentiments that later strongly impacted the Asian Games. The FECG

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contributed to the nation-building processes in China, Japan, and the Philippines and paradoxically steered anti-colonial nationalism against the West and their internationalist ambitions. By the late 1920s, Asian sport officials increasingly took control over the organization of the FECG to promote the early emergence of Pan-Asianism through the sport event. Thus, the development and modernization of the FECG were heavily influenced by what historian Stephan Hübner called “national awakenings” and “Asian awakenings” (Hübner, 2016a, p. 99). The Western Asiatic Games (WAG) held for the first and only time in Delhi (India) in 1934 must be seen in the same light, as the event was created by Indian sport officials who had increasingly taken over the organization of sport from the colonists (ibid., p. 74). Yet, it is important to attest that it was individual nations that participated in the FECG and the WAG that by no means spoke with one voice. Rather, the political landscape and particularly Japan’s imperial interests challenged the internationalist ambitions with mega-sport events on the Asian continent. In fact, it was Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 that eventually led to the cancellation of the FECG after 1934. Disputes on the representation of athletes from that region between China and Japan caused controversy and ended the vision of a peaceful coexistence for the time being. Already earlier versions of the FECG had seen the emergence of national rivalries and the building of national identities. For example, sport historian Fan Hong argues that national sentiments ran high at the FECG in 1921 in Shanghai (Hong, 2005a). This section has highlighted that the origins of early mega-sport events in Asia can be traced to Western influences. In parallel, the tensions between Western colonizers and (East) Asian societies, continental conflicts, and the appearance of pan-Asiatic sentiments shaped the Asian sport landscape long before the Asian Games were even created. It should therefore not come as a surprise that in the period of decolonialization after the Second World War those themes emerged instantly and forcefully again.

The First Asian Games Editions: Balancing the Pan-Asiatic Vision with National Interests Knowledge on the Western origins of competitive sport is important when considering the further development of multi-sport events on the Asian continent. The political landscape had changed significantly after the end

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of the Second World War. Japan had been defeated and the potsdam declaration from 1945 effectively ended the countries’ colonial claims on the Asian continent. Following the end of the Japanese colonial rule over Korea, the country was divided and found itself in a civil war between 1950 and 1953. Similarly, the Chinese Civil War led to the emergence of two Chinas. Many Asian nations from the Middle East to the Strait of Malacca gained independence and began to emerge on the continental political scene. Asian politicians made efforts to preserve Asian unity and achieve peaceful coexistence between all Asian nations at the Asian Relations Conference in 1947. Many leaders from newly independent countries who had fought against colonialism participated in the Conference in the hope that a united Asia could be created. They listened, amongst many others, to Guru Dutt Sondhi, a national sports leader in India and IOC member who had played a leading role in the organization of the 1934 WAG. Sondhi presented the idea of Asian Games for the entire continent at the Conference (Singh Sisodia, 2005). Many participants perceived Sondhi’s idea favourably and he moved on to promote his idea with regional sport leaders and at the 1948 Olympic Games. A year later, in 1949, Sondhi initiated the foundation of the Asian Games Federation (AGF) to oversee the organization of future Asian Games and it was decided to stage the event every four years from 1951 onwards (Krieger, 2021). The AGF did not have permanent offices and the leadership of the organization changed from one host nation of the Asian Games to the next. This feature highlights the importance of the event for the international sport movement in Asia. At the same time, the link between the Asian Relations Conference and Asian Games is noteworthy because it hints towards the event because of political, rather than sport-related, aspirations. India took the lead in the establishment of the Asian Games and the AGF as an extension of the vision of the Asian Relations Conference to achieve Asian solidarity. It therewith took the internationalist model of the FECG but opened it for the entire Asian continent in a much-changed political landscape. The first edition of the Asian Games in New Delhi (India) in 1951 was perceived a success in demonstrating Asian unity with the AGF because Japan was admitted to the Games despite the country’s role in the Second World War. Japanese athletes competed peacefully in the event, coming out ahead of the other ten participating nations in the medal table. The second and third editions of the Asian Games, held in

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the Philippines (1954) and Japan (1958), respectively, also had the display of peaceful internationalism as an important goal for the organizers. This is even though both nations, like India before, had national political goals with the staging of the event. Japan, for example, saw the Asian Games as a means to convince the IOC to award it with the Olympic Games in 1964. They were successful with their goal and Tokyo became the first ever Asian city to host the Olympic Games in that year. The revival of an Asian multi-sport event after the Second World War thus was an effective means to promote regional identity and cooperation on the Asian continent by upholding Pan-Asianism (Hong & He, 2005). That said, the political tensions between Asian nations witnessed already during the time period of the FECG, reappeared with the foundation of the Asian Games albeit for the first two decades in a comparably nuanced way. Sondhi’s vision to integrate the entire Asian continent into the Asian Games brought with it the challenge of intercultural differences. Had the FECG and the WAG only addressed a small group of nations, already eleven nations from different parts of Asia came together to establish the AGF in 1949. Hübner reports about regional bias against Muslim countries that had intended to host their own Muslim Games which would have counteracted the idea of a united Asia (Hübner, 2016a, p. 107). Vietnam and Pakistan both rejected to participate at the inaugural Asian Games due to political conflicts with India (Singh Sisodia, 2005). China did not trust the Indians to organize the Games, and a potential affiliation of Japan to the AGF was subject to several political debates at AGF meetings between 1949 and 1951. Finally, and most importantly for the understanding of future political disputes surrounding the Asian Games, bilateral conflicts shaped the political landscape in Asia after the Second World War. The division of China into two states, the communist People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China in Taiwan (ROC) more than any other conflict stands as an example for such political differences (Hong & He, 2020). The ROC joined the AGF as the existing members continued to promote peaceful international and coexistence. This decision de facto led to the absence of the PRC at the 1954 and 1958 Asian Games as the PRC government pursued a one-China policy and did not recognize the ROC. This attitude also caused China to abstain from participating in the Olympic Games until the early 1980s. Ironically, the absence of the PRC and other communist nations from the second Asian Games in 1954 allowed the Filipino organizers to portray those nations as little interested

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in peace and therewith in effect strengthen the Games as a peace symbol (Hübner, 2016a, p. 145). At the 1962 Asian Games, held in Jakarta (Indonesia), the politics of a united movement coupled with nationalistic aspirations culminated. Indonesian President Sukarno saw the Asian Games as a means to initiate a new world order by breaking down the established forces and advance the non-aligned movement (Lutan, 2005). Thus, rather than the promotion of a pan-Asianism as in previous versions of the Asian Games, Indonesia attempted to put forward the emergence of the formerly colonized world beyond the borders of the Asian continent through the staging of the Games (Trotier, 2020). Aggressive, nonWestern rhetoric and policies strongly shaped the organization of the event, mainly addressed at those Asian countries that were allies of the United States. As a result, the Indonesian organizers refuted the AGF’s stance to promote peaceful coexistence and did not invite the ROC and Israel to the Asian Games in Jakarta. Sondhi protested vehemently against the move, but without success (Hübner, 2016b). The 1962 Asian Games went ahead but led to the exclusion of Indonesia from the IOC. In response, Indonesia established the Games of the Newly Emerging Forces (GANEFO) in 1963 (Connolly, 2012). GANEFO vanished in 1966 and the lack of success for such an “alternative” inevitably demonstrated that the future of Asian elite sport lay within the Olympic Movement and its continental offspring, the Asian Games. Following the strong politicization of the 1962 Asian Games, the exclusion of communist nations at the 1966 and 1970 Asian Games meant that anti-Western Pan-Asiatic sentiments were again largely absent from the staging of the events (Hübner, 2016a, p. 271). Instead, the focus switched back to peaceful coexistence amongst the nations of the Asian continent. Thus, despite the outlier in 1962—clearly a sign of what was to come—the organizers of five of the first six Asian Games editions maintained the internationalist visions of the early multi-sport sporting events on the continent. This changed significantly from the staging of the seventh Asian Games in Teheran (Iran) in 1974, the first edition held in Western Asia. That event marked the entry of the region in the sport politics on the continent and rattled the existing power structures due to the (re)-appearance of communist-led and Arab countries.

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The Seventh Asian Games’ Lasting Impact The AGF awarded the seventh Asian Games to Teheran (Iran) at its council meeting in 1968 (Hao, 2021). Following what became known as the “White Revolution” in the country, Iran’s autocratic leader Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi had modernized Iranian society and strongly pushed for political independence from the West. A major objective at the beginning of the 1970s had been the establishment of a unified Indian Ocean region. The Asian Games played an important role in this strategy as they aimed to further solidify the shah’s political national and regional ambitions (Hübner, 2016a, p. 234). Thus, just like in 1962, the Asian Games’ original internationalist ambitions remained largely absent. However, rather than the anti-Westernism on display in Indonesia twelve years prior, the 1974 Asian Games fuelled the growing East–West conflict on the Asian continent itself. The event therewith ushered in a new era of power relations within the Asian sport movement and had in the long view the most significant impact on the political dimension of the Asian Games (ibid., p. 230). For Iran’s domestic goals, the Asian Games were a success: they were bigger in size (for the first time over 3,000 athletes and over 200 events), well organized, and Iranian athletes competed successfully (though many Iranian officials were accused of cheating). The real impact of the event on the sport movement in Asia came on the international level, however, and changed the political landscape of the Asian Games in the long term. Amongst the record number of twenty-five participating nations were socialist countries Mongolia, North Korea, and the PRC. Kuwait and Iraq also participated for the first time (Amirtash, 2005). Without question, communist China’s debut at the 1974 Asian Games had the most lasting impact on the sport political landscape in Asia in the following decades. Andrew Hao demonstrates that the Iranian hosts played a crucial and much underestimated role in securing the PCR’s participation in the Games (Hao, 2021). During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Shah wanted to strengthen Iran’s political position and cooperate with the PRC to leverage the country with the Soviet Union and the United States. The PRC had similar interests as it hoped to create a political alliance with Iran. Moreover, Iran considered support to solve the “China question” a potential boost to its ambitions to hold future Olympic Games. Thus, Iranian officials who presided over the AGF between 1970 and 1974 pushed for the PRC’s inclusion into the federation. In November 1973,

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the AGF de facto transferred the Chinese membership from the ROC to the PRC. Iranian and Chinese sport officials argued that without the PRC one could not talk about an Asian sport movement and Western-led organizations such as the IOC or the international federations should not dictate the decisions in an Asian sport organization. The same rhetoric was adopted when presenting the decision at an IOC meeting in early 1974. The IOC followed the argumentation and did not withdraw its patronage. Iran also lobbied for a recognition of China with international federations (IFs), as only IF recognition allowed Chinese athletes to participate in individual sports at the Asian Games. As a result, many IFs rescinded their support for the ROC and accommodated the PRC’s demands (Hao, 2020). Therewith, a strong sport political bond between Iran and the PRC was created that shaped Asian Games politics over the coming years. The PRC’s affiliation with the AGF and participation at the 1974 Asian Games impacted the second major political conflict with lasting consequences. Together with the rising number of Gulf Arab countries, the PRC opposed Israel’s participation in the Asian Games. China sided with the Arab states and their animosities against Israel due to the support the communists had received in gaining recognition from international sport organization. In 1974, this conflict reflected mainly on the sporting level at the Asian Games. Arab nations as well as Pakistan, the PRC, and communist North Korea did not compete with Israel in football, basketball, and tennis at the Asian Games. Athletes from those countries also refused to shake hands with Israeli competitors and engage with them during their stay at the Games (Amirtash, 2005). In 1976, however, the AGF went a step further and moved to exclude Israel from the 1978 Asian Games to be held in Bangkok (Thailand). The AGF’s resolution read that Israel should voluntarily refrain from participating, officially due to high security costs following the terror attack on Israelian athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games. If Israel failed to comply, the AGF would temporarily suspend Israel’s membership (Reuters, 1976). The AGF’s decision ended Israel’s participation in the Asian Games; Israel did not compete at the event after 1974. With the refusal to let Israel compete at the 1978 Asian Games, the event’s original ambition to demonstrate a unified Asia effectively ended. The enforcement of regional politics was put ahead of Asian solidarity. The decision against Israel was a result of the changing power structure of the Asian Games that has its origins in the running up to the

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1974 Asian Games. Iran’s political interests in collaborating with the PRC allowed the latter to become a central player in Asian sport politics. The PRC sided with the emerging Arab nations in the Israel question and in doing so influenced the AGF’s distortion of a pan-Asian vision. Importantly, both developments, the PRC’s inclusion and Israel’s exclusion, were also a consequence of a rejection of Western exertion of influence within Asian sport politics. During the discussions on the PRC’s inclusion into the AGF, Hassan Rassouli, general secretary of the 1974 Asian Games Organizing Committee, claimed: “Who are these self-imposed great personalities sitting and dictating us what and how we should conduct the affairs of our own destiny (…). We, gentlemen, are the masters of our destiny, and we have to decide what our destiny is going to be as far as sports in Asia is concerned without being dictated to by International Federations nor the International Olympic Committee” (AGF, 1973). The IOC’s decision to leave the AGF unpunished after the ROC’s removal from the Asian Games from 1974 onwards and Israel’s removal from 1976 onwards, much in contrast to its ban of Indonesia in 1962, demonstrates that the AGF had successfully reached more independence. The trigger was, however, not the aim for peaceful coexistence but deep political tensions on the continent that were to be institutionalized at the start of the 1980s.

A New Organization Marks the Beginning of a New Era Finding a host for the 1978 Asian Games was a complex process that took various twists. Originally, the AGF had awarded the event to Singapore, but the country run into financial problems and was replaced with Islamabad (Pakistan). But the lack of sporting infrastructure in the country caused Pakistan to hand back the hosting rights. In 1976, Thailand proposed the city of Bangkok, that had already stepped in as a substitute host in 1970, as host for the 1978 Asian Games. The Thai sport officials attached a condition to its proposal, however. They demanded that the nations in the AGF contributed to the financing of the event as the country had already hosted the 1966 and 1970 event and could not ask its government for more financial support. Fourteen nations agreed to make a financial contribution, donating around 2.5 million USD to the organization of the event. As a result, the Thai government did not have to make financial investments (Karnjanakit & Samahito, 2005). This

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allowed the 1978 Asian Games to take place, and the PRC for the first time challenged Japan for the most medals, demonstrating its role as an emerging sporting power on the continent. In fact, in all Asian Games after 1978, the PRC came out on top of the medal tables. The successful attempt to rescue the staging of the 1978 Asian Games had two major effects on the sport political landscape in Asia and further highlighted the changing power balances. First, more than half of the total financial contribution from AGF member states came from Saudi Arabia (close to 850, 000 USD) and Kuwait (500,000 USD) (ibid.). Qatar, Iran, and Iraq also donated. The financial concept of the 1978 Asian Games therefore allowed some Gulf Arab nations to demonstrate its economic power and willingness to invest into sport. Second, the difficulties to find a host in an increasingly professional environment of organizing megasport events highlighted that the AGF’s model of solely focusing on the organization of the Asian Games with a rotating leadership and no permanent offices was long outdated (OCA n.d.). Japan, South Korea, and the PRC further had ambitions to become global sporting players and wanted to be represented more adequately on the continental level. Smaller nations demanded a better organization to secure Olympic Solidarity funds (Hong & He, 2020). These two effects culminated in the foundation of the Olympic Council of Asia (OCA) in 1982 that replaced the AGF as the continental governing body of sport in Asia. Representatives from Arab nations took the lead in this development, and they found their way to power in the new organization almost unopposed. India, who was the host of the 1982 Asian Games in New Delhi and therefore presided over the AGF, steered the change-over to the new organization. The country had profited from a 15 million USD donation from Kuwaiti Sheikh Fahd Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah to finance the stadium for the 1982 Asian Games in New Delhi and were therefore content with Al-Sabah’s quest to chair the new OCA (Hong & Zhouxiang, 2012). Al-Sabah further promised to sponsor the OCA’s headquarters if they came to Kuwait, which satisfied the Eastern Asian countries’ demands for a stronger representation in the Olympic Movement. The PRC’s support came on the back of earlier Arab support for its affiliation with the AGF, and the other Gulf Arab states naturally sided with Al-Sabah. Eventually, Al-Sabah was voted the first OCA President during the formal establishment of the OCA in November 1982. The OCA’s permanent headquarters were installed in Kuwait (Krieger, 2021).

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However, what looks on first view as a return of a pan-Asiatic vision and was certainly portrayed as such in communications to the public and the IOC was indeed a further politicization of the Asian Games and the continental sport movement. The OCA’s permanent exclusion of Israel from the organization and the Asian Games stands as the prime example for this development (Israel Olympic Committee, 1982). The Arab nations successfully lobbied for Israel’s removal and their previous support for the OCA’s establishment supported their mission. Then, in 1986, the OCA accepted Palestine as a full member, continuing its Arabled Middle East policy. Palestinian athletes participated at the 1990 Asian Games for the first time, and since then, the country has appeared at all Asian Games editions. The 1986 Asian Games had been awarded to South Korea’s capital Seoul already prior to the OCA’s foundation, but the selection of the next hosts was again influenced by the political developments from the 1970s. Japan (with the city of Hiroshima) and the PRC (with the city of Beijing) bid for the 1990 Asian Games. Representatives from the two bidding committees could not agree on a compromise, and therefore, the PRC heavily lobbied OCA members for their support. Middle Eastern countries were specifically targeted, building on the previous collaboration between the region and the PRC that dated back to the 1974 Asian Games in Teheran. Beijing’s efforts proved successful as the OCA members voted for the PRC, with Hiroshima eventually becoming the host for the 1994 Asian Games (Hong, 2005b). Importantly, the PRC considered the bid and the hosting of the 1990 Asian Games mainly to reach national revival during a period that was politically marked by reform and opening to the outside world (Wei et al., 2021). In this way, the OCA strengthened national and regional interests rather than supported an Asian unity. The OCA was the way into the Olympic Movement for influential sport leaders from Gulf Arab nations. Al-Sabah became an IOC member in 1981; others followed swiftly. Importantly, the region was at this point not yet in a position to host mega-sport events and it took until 2006 when Doha (Qatar) became the first city in the Gulf region to host Asian Games and only the second in West Asia (after Teheran in 1974) (Amara, 2005). In the two decades after the OCA’s foundation, the Gulf Arab nations were content to leave the hosting of the Asian Games to the Asian sporting powers of South Korea (1986 and 2002), Japan (1994), and PRC (1990). Thailand hosted the 1998 Asian Games. As a result, the

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Asian Games turned into an event that was aimed to demonstrate to an international audience and the IOC that those nations were prepared to host Olympic Games. The relative success of hosting the events triggered in all three East Asian countries economic growth and socio-cultural development within their national societies (Koh, 2005). Indeed, all three countries held the Olympics one time between 1988 and 2008, and again in 2018 (South Korea), 2020 (Japan), and 2022 (PRC). National political ambitions infested not only the sport political level, however, but continued to influence the staging of the event. The dominant challenge for South Korea in hosting the 1986 Asian Games was a potential violent disruption through communist North Korea (Ok & Ha, 2011). Seven communist-led nations boycotted the Games, joined by Brunei, Burma, and Syria. Days before the opening ceremony of the 1986 Asian Games, North Korean agents triggered a bomb explosion at Gimpo International Airport in Seoul (Lee, 2010). Similarly, politics were on display at the 1990 Asian Games, held only a year after the political uproar on Tiananmen Square in 1989. The Games provided the Chinese regime with the opportunity to demonstrate its political stability (Hong, 2005a). Moreover, the Iraqi invasion into Kuwait caused the Kuwaiti-led OCA to expel Iraq from the Games (Parker, 1990). Thus, by that time, the goal of peaceful coexistence was only an effectively meaningless slogan on paper. In summary, the period of the foundation of the OCA as the new umbrella organization for Olympic sport in Asia and the Asian Games is difficult to grasp due to the exploitation of the organization and indeed the event for national (and in part individual) interests. However, the Asian Games itself became a continental mega-event during this period in terms of size. The 1986, 1990, and 1994 Asian Games saw a significant increase in participation numbers. The three events in Seoul, Hiroshima, and Beijing had more participants than all previous Asian Games editions together. But the growth in size and attention was less a result of the OCA’s own initiatives. On the contrary, many OCA members complained about the lack of strategic vision and activities in the first decade of the organization’s existence (Krieger, 2020). Rather, the professionalization and commercialization of international sport also reflected on the organization of the Asian Games. In parallel, the internationalist aims of the Asian Games further diminished and were overtaken by national interests. To be clear, the internationalism ideal had been previously undermined by Asian Games hosts and the AGF. However, the permanent ban of Israel

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from the event effectively institutionalized the Asian sport movement’s departure from Asian solidarity. The OCA’s decision laid the foundation for the still existing power structures within the Asian sport movement to which we will turn next.

Expansion and Current Issues On the institutional level, the political turf wars continued at the start of the 1990s. OCA President Al-Sabah died during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the Arab nations aimed to replace him with his son Sheikh Ahmad Al-Fahd Al-Sabah Jr.. South and Eastern Asian nations opposed this political move and the PRC put forward sport official and IOC member He Zhengliang. Zhengliang was favourite to win the election but eventually withdrew from the presidential race to gather Arab support for the PRC’s Olympic bid for the 2000 Olympic Games (Hong, 2006). The PRC eventually lost out on both goals, with the Olympic Games awarded to Sydney. However, Al-Sabah’s election had a wide-ranging effect for the sport event landscape in Asia as in late 1991, the PRC, Japan, South Korea, Mongolia, Taiwan, and Hong Kong joined forces and initiated the foundation of the East Asian Games Association to organize East Asian Games. The first East Asian Games were held in Shanghai in 1993 (Trotier & Bairner, 2017). Clearly, the aim of a united Asian sport movement further vanished. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 further expanded the Olympic Movement in Asia. At the 1994 Asian Games, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan participated for the first time (OCA, 1996), resulting in athletes from more than forty nations competing. Since then, the number of participants at the event has steadily increased. At the 2018 Asian Games in Jakarta and Palembang (Indonesia), 11,300 athletes competed. Therewith this edition of the Asian Games featured more competitors than any Olympic Games. Whilst earlier versions of the event would have not qualified to popular definitions of mega-events, the current characteristics certainly fall within those parameters (Müller, 2015). With the increasing cultural diversity and rise size, the original intention to present Asian unity became even more difficult to pursue over time. Nations that have had difficulties to act as hosts in recent decades are positioning themselves to host Asian Games. Coupled with rising

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economic and political significance, the country might increase its aspirations as Asian Games host in preparation for an Olympic bid. India has not hosted the event since 1982. However, it is also possible to witness political differences between culturally closely linked states. As mentioned above, the 2006 Asian Games are significant because the event returned to West Asia for the first time since the 1974. The organizers in Doha used the Asian Games stage to promote Arab traditions and to establish Qatar as a hub for sporting excellence as well as an important political player on the continental and world stages (Amara, 2005). The event will return to Doha in 2030 after a deal was struck with the organizers of a rival bid from Riyadh (Saudi Arabia) following an intense bidding war. The two countries are in a political dispute since 2017, leading to a trade and travel boycott on Qatar. The episode highlighted that even within civilizations—to follow Huntington’s categorization (Huntington, 1996)—there are significant political differences that spill over into international sport. The dispute was solved by Al-Sabah Jr., who proposed that Riyadh receive the 2034 Asian Games. Ironically, he thanked the OCA member states by highlighting a perceived unity on the continent with the words: “Thank you, Asia, for solidarity and coordination” (AP, 2020). Starting with his OCA presidency and the lead over the Asian Games, Al-Sabah Jr. had risen to become one of the most powerful figures in global sport during his almost thirty years at the helm. He had become an IOC member in 1992 to replace his father, was elected president of the Association of National Olympic Committees (ANOC) in 2012, and became chair of the IOC’s Olympic Solidarity Commission in the same year (IOC, n.d.). Al-Sabah Jr. was considered by commentators as a key figure in the presidential campaign of current IOC President Thomas Bach (Weinreich, 2021). However, in late 2012, Al-Sabah Jr. was found guilty of forgery in his native Kuwait and sentenced to prison in a criminal court. He has self-suspended himself from all IOC and OCA activities but, as can be seen in the future Asian Games hosts announcement was still very active during the investigations into his corruptive activities. In line with the speculation that India increasingly positions itself as a future Asian Games host, the Indian sports official Raja Randhir Singh is substituting for Al-Sabah Jr. at the helm of the OCA. In the Western world, the 2018 Asian Games received wide-ranging attention because they featured esports as a medal event, becoming the

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first mega-sport event to include esports on its programme as a demonstration sport (Graham, 2017). The decision stirred academic and public discussions on whether esports are indeed a sport, with commentators providing very contrasting views (see, for example: Llorens, 2017; Parry, 2019). Regardless of such discussions, the OCA with the decision responded to the rise of the esports industry in Asia. At the 2022 Asian Games in Hangzhou (China), esports will debut as an official medal event with eight contests in eight different games (OCA, 2021). The OCA’s move to embrace esports appears reasonable in the light of the boom of the activity on the continent. However, it is also a sign for a willingness to react to ongoing developments without waiting for an “official” decision of the IOC on the matter.

Conclusion The Asian Games are Asia’s showpiece mega-sport event. Without doubt, the event has gained major cultural and economic significance over the past decades. In this chapter, I demonstrated that with increasing independence and relevance, the event became a playball for political decisions. The Asian Games thereby moved progressively away from the Western logic that a sport event could change national policies and that government should not try to influence sport. The history of the Asian Games demonstrates the opposite viewpoint and a development in the opposite direction throughout time. This is even though the OCA through the Asian Games continuously promotes Asian unity. This history has also shown that despite a move away from Western influences, the Asian Games have been, and still are, also considered a “practice ground” for nations planning an Olympic bid. Japan in the late 1950s, Iran in the 1970s, South Korea in the 1980s, and China in the 1990s all saw the Asian Games as an opportunity to demonstrate to the IOC that they could pull of a mega-sport event. Except for Iran, which had to pull back its bid due to the revolution, these attempts all proved to be successful. If the Asian Games continue to herald where Olympic Games might take place in the next two decades, West Asia or Indonesia might therefore be reasonable guesses. Finally, the two key turning points in the event’s history were the inclusion of China from the 1974 Asian Games onwards and the foundation of the OCA in 1982. The current power structures on- and off-the-field at the Asian Games were established during this time. Today, Asian sport

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politics is very much a convergence of East Asia’s, and here especially China’s, political and athletic prowess, and West Asia’s financial and institutional power. Within the environment of the Asian Games, both powers found fertile ground on which they could grow their influence.

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CHAPTER 7

Policy of Nostalgia: The 2018 Indonesian Asian Games’ “Spirit of 1962” Friederike Trotier

Introduction “[The 2018 Asian Games] will be a repeat of the last time we hosted the Asian Games in 1962, full of nostalgia, emotion and passion” (Subowo, former President of the Indonesian Olympic Committee, as cited in Palmer, 2018). On September 3, 1962, emotions and passion ran high in the streets of Jakarta. Several thousands of Indonesians gathered were determined to demonstrate their patriotic feelings. Their target destination, however, was not a sports venue to cheer their athletes on in competition during the 4th Asian Games but the Indian embassy to find the vice-president of the Asian Games Federation (AGF), Guru Dutt Sondhi. The Indian sports official had openly voiced strong criticism of Indonesia’s politically motivated decision to exclude the AGF members Taiwan and Israel from F. Trotier (B) University of Passau, Passau, Germany e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. Kobayashi et al. (eds.), Sports Mega-Events in Asia, Palgrave Series of Sport in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0011-4_7

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participating in the sports event. Indonesia’s action was in line with the foreign policy of the Sukarno presidency but violated the Olympic ideal of not mixing sport and politics. The controversies following the barring of Taiwanese and Israeli participants encouraged citizens of Jakarta to take to the streets and “defend” the honor of their nation and President Sukarno. They were not able to find Sondhi, so they demolished parts of the Indian embassy (Hübner, 2012). This short glimpse into events of the 1962 Asian Games in Jakarta gives rise to the question about the nature of the “repetition” that Subowo— and with him the Indonesian President Joko Widodo (known as Jokowi), other Indonesian politicians and organizers of the 18th Asian Games— envisioned for the sports mega-event in 2018. What was the motivation to refer back to such a politically controversial event and why were the 1962 Asian Games still attractive as a reference point for stakeholders of the 2018 games? Considering the conflict between Indonesia and the AGF, there would have been good reasons to maintain silence about the 1962 event or leave it as a footnote to the 2018 Asian Games. Instead, a policy of nostalgia shaped the Indonesian hosting. In this paper, I argue that the strategic use—policy—of nostalgia in form of the “spirit of 1962” helped the organizers to evoke selective remembering and to portray Indonesia and Jakarta as places of significant geopolitical and sports history and at the same time to foster what I call organized forgetting about inconvenient elements of the 1962 Asian Games and the time period of the 1960s. The analysis sheds light on different forms and on different levels with changing target groups of the policy of nostalgia. First, the nationalist remembering of Indonesia’s “youth” and “coming of age” evoked ideas of great ambitions, imaginations and successes on the international political and sporting stages. Second, the nostalgic memory of President Sukarno as key component of the “spirit of 1962” revealed ideas of leadership and ambitions of current political actors. Third, the notion of urban nostalgia included images of Jakarta as a modern metropolis at its outset, with promising ideas of modernity combined with elements of the past and less devastating urban problems than current-day Jakarta. It further covered the symbolic attachment and enactment of specific urban infrastructure with the most prominent example of the Bung Karno Stadium. The final part of the paper scrutinizes the political intention behind the organized forgetting of the politicization of the 1962 Asian Games and sheds light on the

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simplistic and unambiguous nature of the narratives and images which renders the selective remembering of official nostalgias as problematic. According to Nauright (2003, pp. 35–36), modern sport is considered a highly nostalgic practice, and the production of nostalgia lies at the heart of sport’s cultural role in twenty-first-century societies. Sport museums, hall of fames or sports films exemplify this appeal of nostalgic remembering in the context of sport (Phillips, 2012; Snyder, 1991). Olympic Games of the more distant past, for instance, have an identifiable nostalgic glow (Vettenniemi, 2012) because the perception of these events is that they had a more noble, honest and original quality (Fairley & Gammon, 2005, p. 185) detached from vices such as commercialization. In addition, past sports events can function as salient life-markers for individuals and nations to help to identify and strengthen meaning, identity and stability (Fairley & Gammon, 2005, pp. 184–185). This article seeks to widen the discussions on sports events and nostalgia with the analysis of the Indonesian Asian Games as so far literature often focusses on Western societies (except for Japan, see Abe, 2016; Weber, 2020) and on issues related to fandom, tourism or specific sports (Fairley & Gammon, 2005). The aim is to understand the components and interests behind the “spirit of 1962”, to contextualize the selective remembering and organized forgetting through what I call policy of nostalgia and to expand (sport) nostalgia with urban issues.

Policy of Nostalgia In this article, I treat nostalgia as a longing for a romanticized and idealized past through place(s) (Adams & Larkham, 2016, pp. 2004– 2005; Gupta & Medappa, 2020, p. 1700) and as a mode of selective remembering of time, place, events and people (Davis, 1977). Whilst it is controversial whether individuals can experience feelings of nostalgia if they have not personally been part of the time period referred to, I follow those scholars who argue that nostalgic recollection can be learned through socialization or media coverage (Fairley, 2003; Fairley & Gammon, 2005). In the discussed case of the Indonesian Asian Games, it is even more significant that important stakeholders believed that people can develop nostalgic feelings toward a time they have not lived through. This belief encouraged decision makers to use policy of nostalgia in their pursuit of political interests.

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The policy of nostalgia as understood and applied in this context means the strategic conjuring up of nostalgia through selective remembering of certain aspects of a nation’s past while ignoring other aspects that are politically inconvenient for those in power. Narratives and images often related to (national) heroes and specific places help to mobilize mass sentiments about an idealized past. Nostalgia is closely connected with memory and remembering. This intertwined relationship between memory and nostalgia means that remembering includes elements of longing for and comforting in elements of bygone times (Adams & Larkham, 2016, p. 2005). Although nostalgia and remembering are experienced very personally, they can shape and unite collectives such as nations in their specific culture of remembrance (Assmann, 1988). Similar to the differentiation between personal and group memories, nostalgias can be distinguished as official—introduced and supported by governments, members of the elite or enterprises in the attempt to construct the past—or as unofficial, as, for example, experienced by marginalized groups. The interplay and confrontation between official and unofficial nostalgias (Adams & Larkham, 2016, p. 2005) can lead to different and contradicting imaginaries related to the same time period or specific event. In this discussion, the focus lies on official nostalgias with a nationalist nature as displayed before and during the 2018 Asian Games. The conjuring up of official nationalist nostalgia happens in the context of constructing and controlling the past of a nation, and its effectiveness depends on the capacity of national leaders to ensure acceptance of the narratives and their channels (Coakley, 2004, p. 534). State agencies, in particular, offer a powerful infrastructure to promote a specific version of the national history (ibid, p. 537). In postcolonial countries such as Indonesia, the notion of history as a source for nation-building has been prevalent since independence (McGregor, 2007, p. 20). Consequently, it is in the interest of national leaders to establish and use certain events, such as sports games, to ensure the service of history to nation-building and a nationalist agenda in general. Thus, in Indonesia, official nostalgias have an overtly nationalist nature. To look at nostalgia as a mode of selective remembering of time, place, events and people means to pay specific attention to the aspect of forgetting (Connerton, 2008; Legg, 2007). Forgetting “involves active embodied, material and spatial practices of producing absences” (Muzaini, 2015, p. 102) and its discussion helps to reveal the complexity

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of nostalgia and remembering. I interpret the selectiveness of the narrative of the “spirit of 1962” as an organized forgetting, which means that the exclusion of certain aspects is on purpose and serves political interest. The possibility to orchestrate memory and nostalgia provides power over people and their remembering. In addition, to tap into emotions and feelings of longing can help to influence, direct and even manipulate people and their decisions. Thus, powerful actors such as governments can turn the past—including traditions, heritage and images of specific events— into exploitable commodities, which may serve political or economic purposes (Bélanger, 2000, p. 387). What renders official nostalgias problematic is the possibility to create simplistic and unambiguous narratives and images. Discourses shaped by official nostalgias around a nation’s or a city’s past often refuse any sense of ambivalence concerning cultural and historical legacies and even contribute to “sucking any political controversy out of them”, as Bélanger (2000, p. 388) describes it vividly. Besides nationalist nostalgia, the discussion of the policy of nostalgia also pays attention to the importance of place, in particular in urban settings. Here, urban nostalgia entails the idea of associations of nostalgia with the built environment as well as processes of selected remembering of the nation in a transient urban space. Cities are always in motion; they are constantly changing and their infrastructure, buildings and sites are often transient and provisional in shape, function and use. At first sight, this seems to entail a future-orientation of the city and its residents. However, the aspect of urban nostalgia shows that the past can be very present in a city by linking urbanism with specific forms of memory. Decisions about maintaining or demolishing certain infrastructure, for instance, influences memories and creates a hierarchy of elements worth remembering or not. Thus, urban nostalgia can be interpreted as an elite attempt to selectively manipulate aspects of the urban environment (Adams & Larkham, 2016, p. 2008). The urban character of sports events and their legacies visible in the urban landscape direct the attention to urban nostalgia related to specific places and infrastructures. Urban nostalgia seems to contradict the prototypical longing for tradition and pre-modern modes of living, which is often associated with rurality and pastoral idyll (Katz, 2010, p. 813); rather, it includes the longing for authenticity (ibid, p. 814), which is not specific to an urban or rural setting but also crucial for the notion of nostalgia.

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Indonesian History and Urbanism Indonesia is the largest archipelago state in the world with more than 250 million citizens. Politically, the Republic of Indonesia lived through three periods of different rules and government structures: the two long-lasting presidencies of Sukarno (1945–1966/1967) and Suharto (1966/1967– 1998) and the post-Suharto era (since 1998). The hosting of the 2018 Asian Games happened twenty years after the fall of President Suharto and the beginning of the so-called Reform era. This period has been shaped by democratization and decentralization as the two main developments, which sharply contrasted with the previous structures. In the late 1950s, President Sukarno began to establish Guided Democracy as a political concept, which increased his powers and effectively turned the country into a semi-dictatorship. This limited the freedom of the press, integrated traditional, pre-colonial ways of power and government and targeted to establish a specifically Indonesian socialism with a revolutionary doctrine to combine nationalism, religion (Islam) and communism. The ousting of President Sukarno and rise to power of President Suharto happened in a Cold War setting and a period of civil unrest and large-scale killings of alleged communists between 1965 and 1967. Suharto’s New Order regime focused on a shift in foreign policy toward an alignment with the Western bloc, a strong role of the military in the country, economic development and a highly centralized structure of the state. National history and remembering served the promotion of nationalism and conformity (McGregor, 2007, p. 20). After decades of a stable but paternalistic and repressive developmentalist state, the vices of the New Order regime—corruption, collusion and nepotism—led to widespread protests, Suharto’s stepping down and the beginning of the Reform era. Despite several shortcomings and challenges, Indonesia developed into a democracy with free and fair elections and a vibrant civil society. After several short presidencies between 1998 and 2004, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono won the first direct presidential election in 2004 and was followed by Joko Widodo in 2014. In Indonesia, rapid urbanization has been a phenomenon of rather recent years as after independence, most Indonesians still lived in rural areas (Rimmer & Dick, 2009). Since the Suharto era, continuous and accelerating urbanization with urban migration as its main engine shaped the country. Today, urban life plays a significant role in Indonesia and is their daily reality for at least half of the Indonesian population. In

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the Reform era, the implementation of regional autonomy changed the archipelago state into one of the most decentralized countries, thus breaking from its Jakarta-centric past (Firman, 2009). Popular discourse about urbanity in Indonesia spread, bringing forward ideas about “green” and “smart” cities and urban mega-projects (Kusno, 2013) and making “the urban a present political site for the rethinking of historiography” (Kusno, 2010, pp. 12–13). Jakarta as Center of National Urbanity In the metropolitan region of Jakarta, Indonesia has one of the largest urban agglomerations in the world. Jakarta has a long history as an economic center of the archipelago and it became the capital of the Republic of Indonesia after the Dutch accepted Indonesian independence in 1949. Great symbolic meaning was attached to Jakarta since independence as President Sukarno saw the city as a manifestation of Indonesia: the state, city and nation coming together (Kusno, 2000, p. 62). Based on this rich symbolic meaning attached to the capital, it remained a powerful place in Indonesian imagination throughout the decades (Kusno, 2004, p. 2377). Due to Suharto’s developmentalist agenda for the country, a “nationalist urbanism” (Kusno, 2010, p. 25) was prevalent in Jakarta during the New Order as the claim to further development of the nation justified any kinds of changes in the city. As the center of the nation, Jakarta had to represent Indonesia and embody a unifying image as well as to exercise authority. Thus, in Jakarta’s urbanism, the discourses of economic development and nationalist power converged (Kusno, 2004). In the years of New Order industrialization policy, Jakarta developed into a mega-urban region and was well established as the role model in terms of urbanization (Bunnell et al., 2018). The collapse of the New Order regime, however, put an end to nationalist urbanism in Jakarta as the city witnessed the decline of its political and economic power. New negotiations about the role of Jakarta for the nation and its citizens were needed in the post-Suharto era. On the one hand, more democracy and participation seemed possible in the capital. On the other hand, new urban politics of an egoistic and violent nature could emerge (Kusno, 2004). Although the implementation of regional autonomy decreased Jakarta’s dominance over discourses on the nation, the capital remained the economic center and entered the globalized

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neo-liberal market in the 2000s. This has nourished ambitions to declare Jakarta as a truly global city (Bunnell & Miller, 2011). However, in recent years, new controversies about Jakarta emerged due to lively discussions and concrete plans about establishing a new capital in Kalimantan. The main reasons for moving the capital are related to Jakarta’s urban problems, which include overpopulation, congestion, pollution and floods due to the sinking of the city and rising sea water level (Hunt, 2020) and to the increased relevance of the regions and urban centers other than Jakarta after decentralization. Over decades, Jakarta’s dominant role in terms of national politics, economy, urban and social trends was reflected in the sports arena. Already under Sukarno but even more so during the highly centralized New Order under Suharto, Jakarta was the undisputed host city for sports events. The 1962 Asian Games and the 1963 Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO)1 were staged in Jakarta as the first large-scale international sports events taking place in the country. Under the Suharto administration, Jakarta hosted all Southeast Asian Games assigned to Indonesia and, in addition, all editions of the Indonesian Sports Week (Pekan Olahraga Nasional ) between 1973 and 1996 (Trotier, 2021b). New political agendas of the post-Suharto era stopped Jakarta’s overwhelming dominance as host city as new forms of co-hosted and circulation of events were established for national and international events (Trotier, 2021b). Nevertheless, Jakarta continues to be a salient player on the Indonesian sports stage.

Indonesia’s Asian Games and the “Spirit of 1962” The Asian Games and its organizational institutions (since 1949 the Asian Games Federation, AGF, and since 1982 the Olympic Council of Asia, OCA) have a long history of linking sports events with Asian interactions, national representation and political controversies (Krieger, 2021; Trotier, 2021b). Since the first Asian Games in India in 1951, the event has taken place every four years with an ever-increasing number of participating countries and athletes as well as selected sports including Olympic and Asian disciplines. Indonesia was a founding member of the AGF and fourth host country of the event. The Jakarta Asian Games were held between 24 August and 4 September 1962. The agenda of the Indonesian organizers—with President Sukarno as the patron of the event—was to advance Indonesian nation-building and modernization, to promote

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the ideas of the Non-Aligned Movement and to emphasize the role of Indonesia as a key actor and as an ideal place to implement new policies for international relations related to geopolitics and sport (Hübner, 2012, 2016; Trotier, 2021b). In 2018, the Asian Games returned to Indonesia after 56 years. In the initial bidding process, the Indonesian candidate, Surabaya, lost against Hanoi in the final round. In April 2014, the Vietnamese capital relinquished its rights to host the Asian Games, and Indonesia as the runner-up stepped in. Instead of Surabaya, the Indonesian Olympic Committee named Jakarta as the main host city and, later, Palembang, the capital of South Sumatra, as the co-host. The Asian Games were held from 18 August to 2 September, and the opening ceremony took place on the recognizable and auspicious date 18 August 2018. The host, participating countries and the media celebrated the event as a success of the host country. The Indonesian medal haul (fourth position, 98 medals) came as a surprise and was greatly celebrated among Indonesians. The relatively smooth implementation of the games was seen throughout the world and especially in Asia, and led to recognition for Indonesia as a capable host country. One can distinguish several important political actors involved in preparing and staging the event. A central figure was Jokowi, first as governor of Jakarta and later as Indonesia’s president. The highly ambitious governor of South Sumatra, Alex Noerdin, was the driving force behind Palembang’s rising to the status of a host city. Other important stakeholders were the governors of Jakarta, the head and his deputy of the organizing committee and the sports minister. The policy of nostalgia that characterized the event relied on the narratives and images of the “spirit of 1962”, which combined components of nationalist and urban nostalgia. “We will relive the same spirit we had in 1962”, announced the Indonesian Youth and Sports Minister Imam Nahrawi (as cited in Prathivi, 2015) in 2015 stressing the “spirit of 1962” as a central theme of the 2018 Asian Games. Referencing this spirit became a connecting element between different actors of the sports event. Even more important, the strategic use of the “spirit of 1962” conjured up memories of an idealized past of the Indonesian nation and filled specific urban places with a nostalgic life.

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Nationalist Nostalgia One of the celebrated moments of the opening ceremony of the JakartaPalembang Asian Games was when the Indonesian president declared the Asian Games open. Instead of the president in office, Jokowi, this particular scene on screen, however, displayed President Sukarno when he made the opening speech in 1962. In black-and-white and in an old-fashioned recording style, the film clip took the audience on a voyage to a carefully chosen moment back in time. The desired feeling of nostalgia had a close connection to place because the opening ceremony 56 years later was staged exactly in the same stadium. Clearly, the screening of the old recording emphasized several core elements of Indonesian remembering and national nostalgia: Indonesia’s visibility on the international stage and active contribution to shaping a new decolonized Asia (and world) as well as the claim to modernity through architecture, modern technologies and of a long sports history. In the light of nationalist nostalgia, the presidency of Sukarno stands for the success of independence from the Netherlands, for gaining recognition as a young nation and for Indonesia’s “youth” in the way that the future was still open and full of opportunities. The aspects of recently gained independence and national youth featured prominently in the “spirit of 1962”. In the run-up to the 2018 Asian Games, a chairman of the Pancasila University Education Foundation referred to Indonesia’s youth when hosting the 1962 Asian Games as the country “was moving ahead from a colony into a free and modern state” (Husodo, 2016). Considering that less than 15 years had passed since the Dutch finally accepted Indonesia’s independence, the Indonesian nation was still young in 1962. Boym (2002, p. 24) describes nostalgia as a yearning for the time of one’s childhood. Figuratively, this is also possible to observe for a nation. The Indonesian revolution has a prominent place in Indonesian collective memory as the birth of the nation. The years between 1955 and 1965 can be interpreted as a period of national youth and coming of age. Nation- and character-building were in full process and Indonesian nationalists perceived sport as a key part of it. Sukarno used the opportunity of hosting the Asian Games as a coming of age moment for the young nation. In conjuring up this moment of Indonesian history, the organizers of the 2018 Asian Games revived images of the young Indonesia with its recent success of independence and an open future, which the Indonesian

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people themselves seemed to be able to shape. In addition, the “spirit of 1962” encouraged a nostalgic longing for the Sukarno era viewing this period idealistically as a time of Indonesian visibility and active role on the international stage. At this time, Indonesia was able to move world—or at least Third World—politics. This nostalgic memory of international significance is closely related to the image of “spirit”, which has a long history in Indonesian remembering. During the preparations to the 1962 Asian Games, the Indonesian organizers drew on the “Bandung spirit” to move the Asian Games closer to the Non-Aligned Movement and Asian-African solidarity (Hübner, 2016, p. 185). The Bandung Conference of 1955 had been a milestone for Indonesian foreign policy and helped to strengthen the country’s claim to lead the newly independent Asian and African nations. As an epoch-making event for the Third World (Lewis & Stolte, 2019, p. 4), the Bandung Conference had an impact far beyond Indonesia. It stood for the end of imperialism, decolonization and the beginning of a new era of international politics, with Asian and African countries becoming new and powerful allies (Shimazu, 2014). The experience of hosting the Bandung Conference helped Indonesia to convince the AGF to be able to host another big international event. Conjuring up the “Bandung spirit” for the Asian Games stressed Sukarno’s ambition to turn the sports event into a beacon of lived Afro-Asianism (Hübner, 2016). Consequently, the strategy of linking “Bandung” with the Asian Games marked a belief in Indonesian relevance in (Third) world politics. Already in the early 1960s, the memory of the Bandung Conference entailed idealized ideas of unity, solidarity and influence. In post-Suharto Indonesia, the long legacy of the Bandung Conference with a clear nostalgic notion became visible with two components. On the one hand, the legacy lies with the romanticizing of an idealized emotional unity of the participants from diverse Asian and African countries (Shimazu, 2014, p. 228). On the other hand, the nostalgic memory focusses on Indonesia’s leading role as initiator and host of the event. In 2005 and 2015, the Indonesian presidents, Yudhoyono and Jokowi, respectively, hosted special anniversary celebrations of the Bandung Conference to revive the memory of the event and Indonesia’s role as advocate for Asian-African solidarity and increased south-south cooperation (Mackie, 2010, p. 25; Parameswaran, 2015).

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Given the attention paid to the Bandung Conference during the Jokowi administration, the revived link to the Asian Games seemed natural. The narrative about the history of the 1962 Asian Games showcased at an exhibition in the National Museum in Jakarta in August 2018, for instance, included several visual and textualized references to the Bandung Conference. Indonesia’s role as host of the important conference was stressed and interpreted as a mandate to stage the prestigious sports event a few years later. Consequently, connecting the Bandung Conference and the Asian Games in the “spirit of 1962” conjured up feelings of pride in the international relevance of Indonesia in the past and a belief in the still existing capabilities of acting and succeeding on the international stage. Indonesia’s diplomatic efforts in the context of the 2018 Asian Games followed also the narrative of the Bandung spirit stressing the notion of solidarity and peace. In the run-up to the event, the Indonesian government invited both the South and North Korean presidents to attend the event (Kuwado, 2018) and supported the rapprochement of the two countries in form of combined teams and a unifying flag. Thus, the government used the Asian Games to demonstrate its position as a mediator in Asian political affairs in reference to the Bandung Conference. The “spirit of 1962” drew strongly on “the spirit of Sukarno as the father of the nation” (Sasongko, 2016) thus portraying Sukarno as a role model and shaping ideas of ideal and charismatic leadership. In Indonesia, patrimonialism as a system of strong leadership has a long history as one factor to hold the nation’s many contradictory forces together. Indonesia under the Sukarno administration was a society which perceived itself in need for strong leadership that unites various sociopolitical streams and differences (Wiryomartono, 2020, p. 146). Already in the time in office, Sukarno played the role as the father of the nation who could strive for honor and glory (Brooks, 1995, p. 97) as he was not in charge for the day-to-day government business. The 1962 Asian Games served as an ideal platform for Sukarno to display his charismatic leadership and his ambitious goals to establishing Indonesia as the representative of a new—and modern—Asia and himself at the forefront of the revolution of mankind (Trotier, 2021b). The conjured up nostalgia of the “spirit of 1962” thus revived the long existing myth of Sukarno and the glory and grandeur he not only envisioned for Indonesia but also personalized himself. Sukarno’s significance for the 2018 Asian Games was made manifest, for instance, in iconic

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images showing him during the 1962 opening ceremony and in a life-size statue that was erected on the Senayan sports complex in Jakarta about two months before the event was opened to honor him as president and underline his pivotal role in the country’s (sports) history. This prominent revival of Sukarno images in public politics contrasted deeply with the official memory during the New Order regime. Throughout his rule, Suharto tried to contain or coopt the memory and mythological stature of the first president (Brooks, 1995: 97), to limit his role as central figure of the proclamation of independence and to put himself in Sukarno’s place in the public sphere (Strassler, 2019, p. 42). Despite—or perhaps because of—continuous attempts to smother the memory of Sukarno, he remained popular, in particular among Indonesians who were discontent with the New Order politics. Sukarno was associated with national pride, the “good old days” and charismatic leadership in contrast to Suharto’s rigid regime (Vickers, 2013, pp. 207–208). The forced disappearance of Sukarno in the Indonesian public between 1966 and 1998 led to a personalized form of memory where Indonesians treated Sukarno images as signs of a lost political authenticity (Strassler, 2019, p. 43). The “spirit of Sukarno” associated with the 2018 Asian Games was part of a recent trend because only after the fall of Suharto did Sukarno play a new role as hero in the national memory as the designation as a national hero in 2012 shows (Liauw, 2012). Openly, Sukarno came to be regarded not only as the unifier of the Indonesian nation but also as a good, strong and charismatic leader. His immense popularity was reflected in his daughter’s rise to power (Mietzner, 2016, p. 356). The celebration of Sukarno in the Asian Games’ policy of nostalgia manifested his return to nationalist historiography and iconography. The reference to Sukarno was highly attractive for prominent politicians. President Jokowi stated the target for the 2018 Asian Games to “show that Indonesia is ready to become a leader in advancing the position of Asia in the world”2 (Jokowi, as cited in Mustami, 2018). This display of confidence and ambition in claiming a leading position for Indonesia lined him up with Sukarno, who was also not willing to be overshadowed by other heavyweights in Asia. Likewise, the Governor of South Sumatra, Alex Noerdin, tried to elicit an association between himself and Sukarno, by stressing his admiration for the first president as an ideal, charismatic leader and his inclination toward big dreams and big projects (Trotier, 2021b). Thus, the nostalgic memory of Sukarno’s powerful

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charisma and Third World leadership served political strategies. President Jokowi, Alex Noerdin and other politicians intended to align with Sukarno as the “ultimate source of political authenticity” (Strassler, 2019, p. 56) and to claim the same authenticity for themselves. For Jokowi, this was of particular relevance considering his goal to be reelected in the 2019 presidential elections (Trotier, 2021a). Displaying a long sports history was another salient element of the nationalist nostalgia. Although Indonesia cannot boast to be a great sporting nation, it can still claim a sports history with reference to hosting the 1962 Asian Games. This opens the possibility to put the country across as a modern nation (Brownell, 2008, p. 40) and to evoke nostalgic memories of early successes on the sporting stage. Constant reminders of the second position on the medal board of the 1962 Asian Games, for example in newspaper articles discussing the 2018 event, stressed the fact that Indonesian athletes had a strong presence on the sports fields in the past. For Indonesians, this recollection evoked a longing for this bygone time considering that such a success was never repeated again. In contrast, Indonesian athletes have performed rather poorly at international sports events such as the Olympic, Asian or Southeast Asian Games in recent years before the Jakarta-Palembang Asian Games (Trotier, 2021b). The unexpected medal haul of Indonesian athletes during the 2018 event strengthened the narrative of connecting past and present Indonesian sporting glory. Urban Nostalgia Jakarta as the host of the 1962 Asian Games and co-host of the 2018 event is central to understand the longing for a romanticized and idealized past through place in the context of the Asian Games. In the period after the fall of Suharto, Jakarta engaged in an unprecedented politics of memory (Kusno, 2004) as the dominant discourses of national history and nationalist urbanism were questioned and vanished. Urban nostalgic memory was mainly directed toward the Sukarno era, which facilitated the conjuring up of the “spirit of 1962” in relation to Jakarta as diverse modernist buildings and monuments erected under Sukarno’s presidency for the 4th Asian Games developed a nostalgic life of their own. They continuously tell the story of a young nation and a city on the upswing and are still somewhat removed from the current urban problems of the capital, which are very significant. There are various

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sites that elicit memories celebrating Sukarno and his commitment to Indonesian nation-building and successful hosting of the 1962 Asian Games, most prominently the Bung Karno Stadium, the Hotel Indonesia and the Welcome Monument. In nostalgic re-telling of this period, the emphasis lies on the new urban features established in the preparations of the Jakarta Asian Games, which were “starting to outshine colonial-era buildings in Jakarta’s urban landscape” (Husodo, 2016). The Bung Karno Stadium as the venue for the opening and closing ceremony and several major competitions of the 2018 Asian Games embodied the “spirit of 1962” and its urban nostalgia the most strongly. This was prominently underlined by the design of the event’s official logo which featured an abstract version of the stadium. The logo conveyed a message about re-living the 1962 event, with the desire of inspiring a positive spirit in the people of the country. It both demonstrates to the outside world that Indonesia has a sports history and reminds the Indonesian people that the 1962 Asian Games were worth of nostalgic remembering. The omnipresence of the logo multiplied the visibility of the Bung Karno Stadium as a site of Indonesian heritage, (sporting) glory and memory of President Sukarno. The Utama Senayan Main Stadium, as the stadium was first named, has been the central venue of the Senayan sports complex since its erection in 1960. The monumental scale of the stadium and its capacity of 100,000 underlined the ambition of Indonesia to play a role in international politics in this time. From the start of the building process, Sukarno demonstrated a significant commitment to the project and pride in it. He claimed that Indonesia had the “most impressive stadium in the world” (Sukarno, as cited in Pour, 2004, p. 17), emphasizing a leadership role for Indonesia in its construction, and downplaying Soviet financial support. In order to honor the president, a week after the Asian Games the stadium was re-named, after President Sukarno, the Bung Karno Stadium. The long legacy of the Bung Karno Stadium makes it a natural place through which the nostalgic longing for a romanticized and idealized past can be experienced and celebrated. In 1962, the re-naming of the stadium after Sukarno marked the apex of his power. At the same time did the successfully staged and organized ceremonies and competitions in the stadium underline Indonesia’s claim to strong position in an emerging Asia. The stadium also served as a setting for important political gatherings and speeches in the Sukarno era (McIntyre, 2005, pp. 272–273). In 2018, the newly renovated Bung Karno Stadium breathed the “spirit

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of 1962” and thus conjured up precisely this idea of Indonesian power and recognition. Photographs at exhibitions, publications and recordings illustrated the significance of the stadium for the history of Jakarta and the Indonesian nation. The Senayan area that encircles the sports complex had potential for nostalgic feelings in two different ways. On the one hand, it has a long history as a symbolic space of the Indonesian nation providing public and recreational space for the urbanite (Kusno, 2010, pp. 84–85) and conveying an image of highly modern and successful urbanism. Senayan City, for instance, which has been developed into a commercial superblock with a high-class shopping mall, office buildings, a hotel and an apartment complex, stands for national economic revival after the Asian Crisis (ibid). Therefore, Senayan can symbolize the longing for an urban space that unites the (economic successful) nation. On the other hand, the display of luxury bespeaks the yearning for a past when Jakarta was less threatened by natural hazards and urban problems, which are already more visible in other parts of the capital. The Senayan sports complex was not the only new construction for the 1962 Asian Games. Rather, the prospect of hosting the prestigious event triggered a building boom in Jakarta. Important monuments and infrastructure projects that were built for the sports event included the Hotel Indonesia, the Welcome Monument, the Sarinah department store, the Semanggi Interchange and the state-owned television station TVRI. These newly established modernized areas of Sukarno’s “monumental” Jakarta (Kooy & Bakker, 2015, p. 77) brightened the beacon of Jakarta as they projected Indonesia upon the world stage. Considering the transient nature of Jakarta with its constant changes in infrastructure, buildings and sites, the longevity of Sukarno’s Asian Games-related urban projects is remarkable. In the time of origin, they stood for ideas of a modern metropolis, and about 60 years later, they are still recognized as characterizing the center of Jakarta. In the narrative of the “spirit of 1962”, images of these landmarks helped to conjure up nostalgic memories of Jakarta at the turn into a modern metropolis. In order to retell these narratives, the Jakarta Creative Tourism community organized walking tours to Asian Games monuments (Ulung, 2018). All the Asian Games landmarks conveyed messages of Sukarno’s visions and Jakarta’s urban development. One example was the Hotel Indonesia, a prominent building that is celebrated as a part of the national heritage, combining modern aspects

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of Indonesia and Indonesian culture, and linking Sukarno’s time to the present day. The five-star hotel still displays art work from Sukarno’s own collection and souvenirs from the opening festivities. The Welcome Monument in the vicinity of the Hotel Indonesia once again served to welcome athletes and visitors for the 2018 Asian Games. Although the Sarinah department store is not Jakarta’s tallest building anymore, it links to the nostalgic remembering of Sukarno as the name derives from his childhood nanny (ibid). Other sites could also successfully be linked to the 4th Asian Games to strengthen the emotion of nostalgia and connection to the Sukarno era. The Director General of the Olympic Council of Asia pointed out that “the old airport that served those Games is now the site of the new Athletes’ Village for next year’s Asian Games. (…) Furthermore, the President of Indonesia in 1962 was Soekarno—and the new airport serving Jakarta and next year’s Asian Games is named after him” (Husain Al Musallam, as cited in OCA, 2017). In Palembang, the government compared the newly built light monorail with Sukarno’s monumental projects in preparation for the 1962 Asian Games (Trotier, 2021b). The different sites and landmarks of Jakarta that can be linked to the 1962 Asian Games form a landscape of urban nostalgia. They conjure up idealized images of past urban life including the Javanese community concept gotong royong and fewer urban problems such as environmental issues and traffic. Gotong royong is a core value in Javanese communities and means to be mutually cooperative (Rahmi et al., 2001, p. 130). It is usually associated with the culture of helping each other in a village context (Kusno, 2020, p. 963) but can also be used to describe community life in Jakarta before Suharto’s nationalist urbanism became prevalent with its focus on developing and formalizing the city. In spite of the ascription of being backward, village life (also in an urban context) can evoke nostalgic longing for a communitarian and cooperative way of living in contrast to current urban experiences of Jakarta’s middle class of modernity and individualism. The nostalgic longing for bygone times can also be interpreted as a reaction to the devastating urban challenges Jakarta is currently facing. In the idealized memory, Jakarta during the Sukarno era did not suffer from overpopulation, congestion, pollution and floods and was therefore a safer and more livable place. Furthermore, hosting the Asian Games manifested Jakarta’s position as Indonesia’s capital in the 1960s. The memory of Sukarno’s Jakarta as impressive gateway to the country (Silver, 2011,

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p. 99) contrasted with discussions and government plans to move the capital, which accompanied the 2018 Asian Games. In summary, urban nostalgia was prevalent because of the legacy of important landmarks that could divert the attention from the city’s many challenges. Organized Forgetting The nationalist and urban nostalgias were only one part of the policy of nostalgia. There was also a political agenda of what I call an organized forgetting emphasizing the political act of excluding the politicization of the 1962 Asian Games and its consequences from official memory. The political dimension of the 1962 Asian Games included Indonesia’s attempt to transform the games into an event of the Non-Aligned Movement, to take a clear position with regard to the “One-China” policy (pro communist China) and to the role of Israel (pro Arab countries) and to challenge international sports organizations such as the IOC. The evident mixing of sport and politics before and during the 1962 event makes the intended exclusion of this aspect from the official memory also a political act. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the simplistic and unambiguous nature of the narratives and images of the “spirit of 1962”, which renders the selective remembering of the official nostalgia as problematic. The 2018 sports event with its ceremonies, brochures, banners and exhibitions invoked authority about the memory of the 1962 Asian Games without emphasizing the author behind the narrative. Through the organizing committee, the Jokowi government and to some degree the governments of Jakarta and South Sumatra could shape the “spirit of 1962” and consequently construct images of the Indonesian past without being in the spotlight. This disguise of authorship and hidden interests also contributed to the general acceptance of the official nostalgia as given and authorized. In the light of the 2019 presidential elections in Indonesia, conjuring up strong nostalgic feelings related to the Sukarno era seemed to be promising as part of Jokowi’s campaign. He could claim Sukarno’s heritage and profit from his popularity. This connection, however, needed a simplistic remembering of the 1960s because of Sukarno’s controversial politics, his leaning to the left and the devastating regime change between 1965 and 1967. An example for the simplistic narrative of the “spirit of 1962” is the association of the Asian Games with the Bandung Conference. The line

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drawn between the “Bandung spirit” and the “spirit of 1962” was rather superficial. The resistance Indonesia met on its way to strengthen the Non-Aligned Movement within the Asian Games Federation led Sukarno to the conclusion that the Asian Games did not truly reflect the spirit of Bandung, and he claimed that only the newly established Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO) expressed the “true Bandung spirit” (Trotier, 2021b). Consequently, the narrative of the “spirit of 1962” should have addressed Indonesia’s role in the Non-Aligned Movement, the challenge of the IOC and the establishment of GANEFO in the context of the “Bandung spirit”. The nostalgic narrative about Indonesia’s relevance on the international stage in the 1960s has also problematic dimensions. First, Sukarno’s lofty visions for Indonesia’s role in world politics, which were also displayed at the 1962 Asian Games, were rather detached from daily experiences of many Indonesians and did not help to solve domestic problems. Second, under the Jokowi administration, the creation of the “spirit of 1962” and the celebration of past glory diverted the attention away from the lack of a clear positioning of Indonesia in Asian or world politics and from missed chances to increase the country’s soft power through hosting the Asian Games. The nostalgic memory of Jakarta in the Sukarno era ignored not only already existing problems in the city but also limited discussions about solutions for Jakarta’s current challenges. The slogan of the event “Energy of Asia”, for instance, would have provided the opportunity to shape the debate about renewable, green and sustainable energy with concrete considerations for Jakarta (Trotier, 2021a). The narrative of Jakarta’s turning into a metropolis could have encouraged more discussions about Indonesian urbanism and urban infrastructure projects with a long and positive legacy for the citizens. Even the history of the Bung Karno Stadium, which featured so prominently in the “spirit of 1962”, included a problematic episode. After Suharto’s seizure of power in 1965, the stadium served, until 1970, as a mass prison in which to detain opponents of the military regime (Colombijn, 2000, p. 186). The organized forgetting of this problematic use of the stadium continues the silence of Indonesian governments about the atrocities of the New Order regime and ignores the victims. The main intention of the selective narratives of the official nostalgia was to construct and control the Indonesian remembering of the 1962 Asian Games and to take advantage of nationalist and urban nostalgias

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for strategic political purposes, such as election campaign and gaining popularity. In addition, the simplistic version of the “spirit of 1962” included a message to the Asian community about Indonesia as a distinguished modern country with a considerable sports history and convincing hosting capabilities without producing political turmoil.

Conclusion The analysis underlined both the continuing relevance and nostalgic remembering of the Sukarno era for sports, politics, representation and urban development in present-day Indonesia and the organized forgetting of the political dimension of the 1962 Asian Games. Behind the conjuring up of nationalist and urban nostalgias in form of the “spirit of 1962” were certain political interests to produce a selective memory. The official memory of the 1962 Asian Games as produced and encouraged during the 2018 event was characterized by a strong nostalgic vision of Indonesia in the Sukarno era. Although the Indonesia of 1962 was in many ways profoundly at odds with the Indonesia of today, that nostalgia was nevertheless drawn on by current Indonesian politicians, obscuring deep-rooted conflicts within the nation. The policy of nostalgia around Indonesia’s and Jakarta’s past clearly refused any sense of ambivalence concerning historical legacies of the 1962 Asian Games and contributed to a process of selectively memorizing useful aspects of the sports event while ignoring those controversial aspects of Sukarno’s action as were found politically inconvenient. The 1962 Asian Games became an exploitable commodity for the Indonesian government and for President Jokowi’s election campaign. The organized forgetting of inconvenient and complex issues related to Cold War politics and Sukarno’s tendency to left-wing politics prevented a multifaceted view of the past and political controversies about the Sukarno era in general and Indonesia’s first hosting of the Asian Games more specifically. Although the heroization of Sukarno is an emancipation from the historiography of the New Order, the conveyed idea of a strong and charismatic leader is a backward-looking policy. The example of the policy of nostalgia in the context of the 2018 Asian Games shows the relevance of understanding connections between sports events, urban space, nostalgia, remembering and forgetting. Considering that sports events in Asia have been particularly political in nature, further research on these topics is needed. Questions about historiography and

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nostalgia in Japan and China with regard to the recent Olympic Games and upcoming Asian Games, for example, could be addressed. For the Indonesian case, further discussions could go beyond the official nostalgia of the Asian Games contributing to the understanding of individual and unofficial memories of the Indonesian past, which is particularly relevant for the late Sukarno era and Suharto’s seizure of power.

Notes 1. Sukarno established the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFO) as a challenge to the Olympic Games. Indonesia hosted the first GANEFO in 1963. The event discontinued due to its political nature and major transformations in Indonesia and the People’s Republic of China (Trotier 2021c). 2. Original Indonesian: “Kita tunjukkan bahwa Indonesia siap menjadi yang terdepan dalam mengangkat posisi Asia di dunia.” Author’s own translation.

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Colombijn, F. (2000). The politics of Indonesian football: An introduction to a new field. Archipel, 59, 171–200. Connerton, P. (2008). Seven types of forgetting. Memory Studies, 1(1), 59–71. Davis, F. (1977). Nostalgia, identity and the current nostalgia wave. Journal of Popular Culture, 11(2), 414–424. Fairley, S. (2003). In search of relived social experience: Group-based nostalgia sport tourism. Journal of Sport Management, 17 (3), 284–304. Fairley, S., & Gammon, S. (2005). Something lived, something learned: Nostalgia’s expanding role in sport tourism. Sport in Society, 8(2), 182–197. Firman, T. (2009). Decentralization reform and local-government proliferation in Indonesia: Towards a fragmentation of regional development. Review of Urban and Regional Development Studies, 21(2/3), 143–157. Gupta, H., & Medappa, K. (2020). Nostalgia as affective landscape: Negotiating displacement in the “World City.” Antipode, 52(6), 1688–1709. Hübner, S. (2012). The fourth Asian Games (Jakarta 1962) in a transnational perspective: Japanese and Indian reactions to Indonesia’s political instrumentalisation of the Games. International Journal of the History of Sport, 29(9), 1295–1310. Hübner, S. (2016). Pan-Asian Sports and the emergence of modern Asia, 1913– 1974. NUS Press. Hunt, L. (2020, January 10). Jakarta floods: Yet another reminder of Indonesia’s capital woes? The Diplomat. Retrieved March 10, 2020, from https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/jakarta-floods-yet-anotherreminder-of-indonesias-capital-woes/ Husodo, S. Y. (2016, February 29). Indonesia and the 2018 Asian Games. Kompas. Retrieved March 4, 2016, from http://print.kompas.com/baca/ 2016/02/29/Indonesia-and-the-2018-Asian-Games Katz, T. (2010). City memory, city history: Urban nostalgia, “The Colossus of New York”, and late-twentieth-century historical fiction. Contemporary Literature, 51(4), 810–851. Kooy, M., & Bakker, K. (2015). Technologies of government: Constituting subjectivities, spaces, and infrastructures in colonial and contemporary Jakarta. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 32(2), 375–391. Krieger, J. (2021). The foundation and early years of the Olympic Council of Asia: A controversial body making controversial politics. In F. Hong & Z. Lu (Eds.), Routledge handbook of sport in Asia (pp. 107–117). Routledge. Kusno, A. (2000). Behind the postcolonial: Architecture, urban space and political cultures in Indonesia. Routledge. Kusno, A. (2004). Whither nationalist urbanism? Public life in Governor Sutiyoso’s Jakarta. Urban Studies, 41(12), 2377–2394. Kusno, A. (2010). The appearances of memory: Mnemonic practices of architecture and urban form in Indonesia. Duke University Press.

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Kusno, A. (2013). After the new order: Space, politics, and Jakarta. University of Hawai’i Press. Kusno, A. (2020). Middling urbanism: The megacity and the kampung. Urban Geography, 41(7), 954–970. Kuwado, F. J. (2018, June 28). Pembukaan Asian Games, Istana benarkan Jokowi Undang Kim Jong Un dan Moon Jae In. Kompas. Retrieved July, 24, 2018, from https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/06/28/21051401/pembuk aan-asian-games-istana-benarkan-jokowi-undang-kim-jong-un-dan-moon-jae Legg, S. (2007). Reviewing geographies of memory/forgetting. Environment and Planning a: Economy and Space, 39(2), 456–466. Lewis, S. L., & Stolte, C. (2019). Other Bandungs: Afro-Asian internationalisms in the early Cold War. Journal of World History, 30(1–2), 1–19. Liauw, H. (2012, November 7). Soekarno jadi pahlawan nasional, Mega ke Istana. Kompas. Retrieved August 10, 2021, from https://amp.kompas. com/ekonomi/read/2012/11/07/08305184/soekarno-jadi-pahlawan-nas ional-mega-ke-istana Mackie, J. (2010). The Bandung conference and Afro–Asian solidarity: Indonesian aspects. In A. Finnane & D. McDougall (Eds.), Bandung 1955: Little histories (pp. 9–25). Monash University Press. McGregor, K. (2007). History in uniform: Military ideology and the construction of Indonesia’s past. University of Hawai’i Press. McIntyre, A. (2005). The Indonesian presidency: The shift from personal toward constitutional rule. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Mietzner, M. (2016). The Sukarno dynasty in Indonesia: Between institutionalisation, ideological continuity and crises of succession. South East Asia Research, 24(3), 355–368. Mustami, A. A. (2018, August 18). Jokowi: Indonesia akan memukau dunia lewat olahraga. Kontan. Retrieved March 24, 2020, from https://nasional. kontan.co.id/news/jokowi-indonesia-akan-memukau-dunia-lewat-olahraga Muzaini, H. (2015). On the matter of forgetting and “memory returns.” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 40(1), 102–112. Nauright, J. (2003). Nostalgia, culture and modern sport. In V. Møller, J. Nauright, & J. Bale (Eds.), The essence of sport (pp. 35–50). University Press of Southern Denmark. OCA. (2017, August 18). OCA press release: Asian Games legacy: 1962–2018. Aroundtherings. Retrieved September 10, 2018, from http://aroundthe rings.com/site/A__61287/Title__OCA-Press-Release-Asian-Games-Legacy1962-2018/292/Articles Palmer, D. (2018, July 2). Subowo says Indonesian public will get behind Asian Games. Insidethegames. Retrieved July 5, 2018, from https://www.inside thegames.biz/articles/1066978/subowo-says-indonesian-public-will-get-beh ind-asian-games

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Parameswaran, P. (2015, April 24). Did Indonesia revive the Asia-Africa strategic partnership? A look at what the 60th Asian-African Conference actually achieved. The Diplomat. Retrieved August 10, 2021, from http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/did-indonesia-revive-the-asia-africastrategic-partnership/ Phillips, M. G. (Ed.). (2012). Representing the sporting past in museums and halls of fame. Routledge. Pour, J. (2004). Dari Gelora Bung Karno ke Gelora Bung Karno. Grasindo Prathivi, N. (2015, September 10). Asian Games logo expected to inspire high performance. Jakarta Post. Retrieved February 7, 2017, from http://www. thejakartapost.com/news/2015/09/10/asian-games-logo-expected-inspirehigh-performance.html Rahmi, D. H., Wibisono, B. H., & Setiawan, B. (2001). Rukun and gotong royong: Managing public places in an Indonesian kampung. In P. Miao (Ed.), Public places in Asia Pacific cities: Current issues and strategies (pp. 119–134). Springer. Rimmer, P. J., & Dick, H. (2009). The city in Southeast Asia: Patterns, processes and policy. NUS Press. Sasongko, T. (2016, July 28). Logo dan maskot baru Asian Games diresmikan. Kompas. Retrieved February 7, 2017, from http://olahraga.kompas.com/ read/2016/07/28/14505301/logo.dan.maskot.baru.asian.games.diresm ikan Shimazu, N. (2014). Diplomacy as theatre: Staging the Bandung Conference of 1955. Modern Asian Studies, 48(1), 225–252. Silver, C. (2011). Planning the megacity. Routledge. Snyder, S. (1991). Sociology of nostalgia: Sport halls of fame and museums in America. Sociology of Sport Journal, 8(3), 228–238. Strassler, K. (2019). Demanding images: Democracy, mediation, and the imageevent in Indonesia. Duke University Press. Trotier, F. (2021a). Indonesia’s position in Asia: Increasing soft power and connectivity through the 2018 Asian Games. TRaNS: Trans -Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia, 9(1), 81–97. Trotier, F. (2021b). Nation, city, arena: Sports events, nation-building and city politics in Indonesia. NIAS Press. Trotier, F. (2021c). The games of the new emerging forces. In F. Hong & Z. Lu (Eds.), Routledge handbook of sport in Asia (pp. 509–514). Routledge. Ulung, A. K. (2018, August 28). Remembering Sukarno’s legacy in 2018 Asian Games. Jakarta Post. Retrieved September 20, 2018, from https://www. thejakartapost.com/travel/2018/08/28/remembering-sukarnos-legacy-in2018-asian-games.html

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Vettenniemi, E. (2012, October 31). Notes on Nordic nostalgia: Stockholm 1912 and Helsinki 1952 revisited. Retrieved August 10, 2021, from https://idrott sforum.org/vettenniemi121031/ Vickers, A. (2013). A history of modern Indonesia (2nd edition). Cambridge University Press. Weber, T. (2020). Tokyo’s 1940 “Phantom Olympics” in public memory: When Japan chose war over the Olympics. In B. Holthus, I. Gagné, M. Manzenreiter, & F. Waldenberger (Eds.), Japan through the lens of the Tokyo Olympics (pp. 66–72). Routledge.

CHAPTER 8

Politics of the Asian Games and the East Asian Games in China Marcus P. Chu

Introduction Since the status and influence of the Summer Olympics are higher within the international sports community than those of the Asian Games and the East Asian Games, the Chinese authorities have been keen to promote the former and less enthusiastic about the latter. As a result, the Chinese public are thrilled when their compatriots win gold medals at the Summer Olympics, whereas they remain largely indifferent to the Chinese athletes’ success at the Asian Games or the East Asian Games. Despite this, the Chinese authorities keenly endorsed Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Tianjin, and Hangzhou when the cities launched bids for the 1990, 2010, and 2022 Asian Games and the 1993 and 2013 East Asian Games and handled the hosting duties. This article investigates the

M. P. Chu (B) Lingnan University, Hong Kong, China e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. Kobayashi et al. (eds.), Sports Mega-Events in Asia, Palgrave Series of Sport in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0011-4_8

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reasons behind this phenomenon by reviewing journalistic reports, keyplayers’ memoirs, scholarly works, and official documents of the Chinese central and local governments and international sports organizations. The findings shed light on how the five regional multi-sports events were leveraged to achieve the ambitious goals of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping, such as the pursuit of the Summer and Winter Olympics. They also explained why the central government provided generous monetary backing for the staging of the 1990 Asian Games and did not do so for those of the other four sports mega-events.

Beijing and the 1990 Asian Games After the ending of the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping, with the backing of the political veterans in the Communist regime, became the paramount leader of China by re-joining the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee, assuming control of the Chinese military, and marginalizing Mao Zedong’s hand-picked successor, Hua Guofeng. The Chinese authorities abolished class struggle at home, ceased ideological confrontation with Western states, and launched the Reform and Opening Up initiative, which aimed to push forward with economic development, market liberalization, national unification, and international participation. Between 1978 and 1980, the country normalized official ties with the US, began engaging with Taiwan, made moves to re-establish control over Hong Kong and Macau, and joined the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the International Olympic Committee (IOC). Deng endorsed Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, both of whom were diehard reformists, to direct the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese executive, respectively.1 Deng also regularly informed his compatriots and foreign guests that China was determined to quadruple its 1980 GDP by 2000 and host the Olympics (He, 2008, p. 2). In the autumn of 1981, Seoul won successive bids for the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Summer Olympics. This achievement inspired the Chinese authorities to bring the 2000 Summer Olympics to Beijing. It also led them to believe that if Beijing could stage the 1990 Asian Games successfully, its chances of winning the rights to host the 2000 Summer Olympics would be much improved. Therefore, in 1983, the Chinese Olympic Committee (COC) put forward Beijing’s application to host the 1990 Asian Games to the Olympic Council of Asia (OCA) with Hu

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Yaobang’s blessing (Liang, 2007, p. 244). Hiroshima of Japan meanwhile activated a counter bid. The golden age of the relations between China and Japan started in 1984. This was largely because the government of Japan had announced a donation of JPY 470 billion to China in support of its Reform and Opening Up (Dreyer, 2016, pp. 171–173; Wan, 2006, p. 23). Under this situation, the COC, with the Chinese authorities’ endorsement, suggested the OCA make a deal over the ongoing bidding contest—letting Beijing host the 1990 Asian Games and Hiroshima stage the 1994 Asian Games. This suggestion was then accepted by President Fahad Al-Sabah, a Kuwait Sheikh, and his colleagues in the OCA (Chu, 2021, pp. 86–87; Liang, 2007, pp. 245–247). Premier Zhao Ziyang subsequently informed the IOC President Juan Samaranch that the Chinese government would support Beijing’s organization of the 1990 Asian Games and pursue the 2000 Summer Olympics (“Premier Zhao,” 1984). While the Chinese authorities sought funding to support Beijing’s organization of the Asian Games, Deng and other political veterans were furious with Hu Yaobang, because he had expressed sympathy for thousands of university students demanding political reforms in peaceful demonstrations at Shanghai, Guangzhou, and several other Chinese metropolises. Hu was removed from office in early 1987 (Baum, 1994, p. 207). Several months later, Zhao Ziyang became the CCP General Secretary. Li Peng, a Soviet-trained hydroelectric engineer, was nominated as Premier and took charge of the national economic affairs of China with the conservative veterans’ endorsement. Deng withdrew from the CCP Central Committee, but he retained his power over the Chinese military. Zhao Ziyang’s working relations with Li Peng were not smooth as Li was reluctant to formulate policies to accelerate economic development. Rupture between Zhao and Deng Xiaoping also emerged, because the former had sympathized with the massive protests organized by university students in Beijing which aimed at mourning Hu Yaobang, who had died in March 1989, and calling for more democratic reforms, but the latter suspected that the real purpose of the university students was the overthrow of the Communist regime (Deng, 1993, pp. 302–308). Thus, the unarmed protestors were brutally suppressed by troops in the early hours of June 4 and Zhao was removed from the Chinese political stage. Jiang Zemin became the new CCP General Secretary. He later succeeded Deng as chair of the Chinese military. In addition, since excessive market

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liberalization was viewed as a cause of the students’ demand for democratization, Jiang, Li Peng, and other Chinese senior officials decided to deal with economic affairs more conservatively and shelved several of Deng’s signature projects, like the pursuit of the 2000 Summer Olympics (Chu, 2021, p. 8; Vogel, 2011, p. 660). The popularity of the Chinese authorities slumped both at home and abroad after the June 4 Incident. The US and other Western states even imposed sanctions on China in response to the brutality of the troops on the streets of Beijing. To improve the international image of the Communist regime and restore the confidence of the Chinese public in their government, Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, and other Chinese senior officials decided to make the 1990 Asian Games a tremendous occasion for unity (“General Secretary,” 1989; “Premier Li,” 1989). While the central and local executives intensified efforts to mobilize public participation in the relevant publicity activities, China’s pursuit of the 2000 Summer Olympics was absent in the official rhetoric of the Communist regime (Chu, 2021, p. 8). Deng was angry with Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, and other Chinese leaders, because the conservative handling of economic affairs and the deliberate shelving of the Olympic pursuit undermined Reform and Opening Up and threatened to ruin his political legacy. In 1990, Deng frequently emphasized the importance of accelerating economic development and reminded the Chinese central and Beijing municipal officials of the necessity to bid for the 2000 Summer Olympics (“Hosting Olympics,” 1993). After digesting Deng’s words, Premier Li Peng and his colleagues agreed that Beijing hosting the Olympics would bolster the pride of the Chinese public in the Communist regime and trigger the Western powers to forgo their sanctions. The Chinese authorities thus extensively promoted Beijing’s determination to host the 2000 Summer Olympics while the 1990 Asian Games were taking place (Wu et al., 1994, pp. 4–7). The brand-new stadiums of Beijing, the kind hospitality and cordial reception of the local people, and the joyful participation of over 6000 athletes led IOC President Juan Samaranch to praise the Chinese central and local authorities for their outstanding organization of the 15-day 1990 Asian Games, which cost over CNY 1.25 billion (Basic Information, 1990, p. 36). He also noted that Beijing would be a competent host of the 2000 Summer Olympics (“Successfully hosting,” 1990). Accordingly, the Beijing municipal government, with the endorsement of Premier Li Peng, activated an Olympic bid in March 1991. Deng was pleased with

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this move. Meanwhile, the Party and state leaders’ reluctance to push forward with economic development and market liberalization remained.

Shanghai and the 1993 East Asian Games In August 1990, the OCA President Fahad Al-Sabah was killed during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Iraqi athletes were subsequently banned from participating in the Asian Games and other international competitions. The COC President He Zhenliang, the National Olympic Committee of Sri Lanka President Roy de Silver, and Indonesia’s delegate to the IOC Bob Hasan all put forward their applications to take up the OCA Presidency. With the assistance of the national Olympic committees of seven Gulf nations, Fahad Al-Sabah’s son, Ahmad Al-Sabah, also expressed an interest in chairing Asian sports affairs. In exchange for the Gulf countries’ support of Beijing’s bid for the 2000 Summer Olympics, He Zhenliang discontinued his application. Ahmad Al-Sabah later became his father’s successor in the OCA by defeating the Sri Lankan and Indonesian rivals (Chu, 2021, p. 36; Liang, 2007, pp. 230–231 & 280). The success of Ahmad Al-Sabah led the national Olympic committees of China, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, Macau, Mongolia, North Korea, and South Korea to realize the unity of their West Asian counterparts in dealing with international sports affairs. They also agreed to adopt measures to strengthen the solidarity of East Asian nations and regions within the international sports community. After several rounds of discussions, the East Asian Games was founded and Shanghai was assigned to stage the first iteration of this multi-sports event in 1993. Given the small scale of the East Asian Games and its limited influence in the international sports community, the Shanghai municipal government did not handle the hosting duty by itself, instead delegate it to the subordinate district governments (Chu, 2021, p. 37). In December 1991, the transfer of power from Mikhail Gorbachev to Boris Yeltsin was completed and the Soviet Union dissolved. This unexpected political event caused Deng Xiaoping to believe that if Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, and their colleagues continued with conservative economic policies, the Communist regime of China would repeat the Soviet Union’s experience. Therefore, during his southern tour of January and February 1992, Deng repeatedly emphasized that anyone who was reluctant to push forward with Reform and Opening Up must step down immediately. These words were supported by senior members

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in the Chinese military (Vogel, 2011, p. 677). Jiang Zemin realized that if he did not forgo conservatism, he would follow in the footsteps of Zhao Ziyang. Jiang therefore promptly criticized himself for not proactively bolstering Reform and Opening Up in a meeting with other Chinese leaders (Baum, 1994, p. 247; Fewsmith, 2008, p. 66). He and Premier Li Peng also promised to accelerate market liberalization and economic growth and included the support for Beijing’s bid for the 2000 Summer Olympics in the working agenda of the CCP Politburo and the State Council.2 After Beijing forwarded its application documents to the IOC, Samaranch and his colleagues received similar documents from Sydney, Manchester, Berlin, Istanbul, Tashkent, Milan, and Brasilia. To ensure that Beijing could successfully defeat the other applicant cities in this fierce competition, the Chinese central and Beijing municipal executives enthusiastically entertained the inspectors of the IOC and its affiliated sports federations, proactively undertook lobbying and publicity both at home and abroad, and sophisticatedly drafted a Candidature File which detailed Beijing’s hosting plan. The Chinese central executives also invited President Juan Samaranch and his colleagues in the IOC to visit the opening ceremony of the Shanghai 1993 East Asian Games, to demonstrate China’s competence in staging sports mega-events and boost Beijing’s odds of success in the bidding contest (Chu, 2021, pp. 36–37). Since the East Asian Games was associated with Beijing’s Olympic bid, the hosting tasks were placed at the top of the Shanghai municipal government’s working agenda. The budget devoted to renovating stadiums, improving hotels and other hospitality venues, and upgrading urban facilities was increased. Hundreds of thousands of local residents were mobilized to support the event.3 In the meanwhile, since Tashkent, Milan, and Brasilia discontinued their applications to host the 2000 Summer Olympics, Beijing, Sydney, Manchester, Berlin, and Istanbul were left as the candidates. Beijing’s odds of success rated by the international bookmakers were slightly lower than those of Sydney. This was partly because the collapse of the Soviet Union had caused the international society to worry whether China might follow suit, leaving Beijing unable to complete the hosting duties, and partly because China’s dismal human rights records led Western politicians and social activists to be bitterly opposed to Beijing’s holding of the Summer Olympics. While the Chinese authorities were formulating strategies to boost Beijing’s chances of victory, newly incumbent US President

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Bill Clinton linked China’s Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to its human rights performance.4 US congressmen also made clear their intent to oppose Beijing’s Olympic pursuit. In response, Jiang Zemin decided to lobby Samaranch and his colleagues personally during the 1993 East Asian Games. The Chinese central government subsequently sent senior members to Shanghai to supervise local executives preparing for the East Asian Games opening ceremony and competitions. It also arranged for elite athletes, including those who had won gold medals at the Barcelona 1992 Summer Olympics, to participate in the Chinese team to enhance the viewership and influence of this regional sports event. The municipal government meanwhile intensified efforts to monitor stadium renovations, inspect hotels and other hospitality facilities, enhance security measures, and mobilize Shanghai residents to take part in activities promoting the East Asian Games and Beijing’s Olympic bid (Chu, 2021, p. 38). After witnessing the grand opening ceremony, world-class stadiums, and enthusiastic hospitality of local residents, Samaranch and his IOC colleagues praised Shanghai for its meticulous organization of the East Asian Games, which ended up costing over CNY 300 million. They were also impressed by President Jiang’s words of backing Beijing’s Olympic pursuit (“Jiang Zemin,” 1993). Some promised that they would cast their votes for the Chinese capital city in preference to the other candidates. The Chinese authorities concluded that Shanghai’s hosting of the East Asian Games had been an utter success (“Review of,” 1993). One month later, US congressmen passed a resolution that condemned the Communist regime of China for its violation of human rights and pressed the IOC not to award the 2000 Summer Olympics hosting rights to Beijing. Some even lobbied IOC members to oppose Beijing’s bid in person. Meanwhile, Sydney’s odds improved significantly because a report drafted by IOC inspectors showed that its environmental conditions, sports facilities, and internationalization standards were all superior to Beijing’s (Report IOC, 1993). To turn the tables, the Chinese authorities released a few political dissidents and informed the IOC that over 98 percent of Beijing residents supported their hometown’s hosting of the 2000 Games (“Beijing released,” 1993; “Student leader,” 1993; “98.7 percent,” 1993). In the last stages of this neck-and-neck bidding race, the Sydney 2000 Summer Olympics bidding committee offered generous cash rewards to IOC members in exchange for their support (“World Olympic,” 1999).

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It also promised that it would cover the flight ticket and accommodation costs of participant athletes’ relatives if Sydney won the 2000 Summer Olympics (“Offering free,” 1993). On the other hand, since Western politicians continued criticizing China for its poor human rights records and calling upon the IOC members to vote for the opposing candidate cities instead of Beijing, Vice Mayor Zhang Baifa announced in a media interview that if Beijing failed to obtain the 2000 Summer Olympics hosting rights, China would boycott the 1996 Atlanta Summer Olympics (“Zhang Baifa,” 1993). These contrasting contexts eventually led the Chinese city to be defeated by its Australian competitor. Chinese central and Beijing municipal officials concluded that the ruthless obstruction of the Western democracies had resulted in Beijing’s defeat (He, 2008, p. 282). They also believed that pushing forward with economic growth was the key to a future successful Olympic bid. Samaranch meanwhile suggested Beijing should apply to host the 2004 Summer Olympics (He, 2008, p. 277).

Guangzhou and the 2010 Asian Games Several months after Beijing’s failure, Bill Clinton delinked the records of China’s human rights and the renewal of its MFN status. Economic ties between China and the Western world therefore were tightened. In view of this, Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, and their colleagues were confident that Deng Xiaoping’s goal—quadrupling the GDP of 1980 by 2000—could be achieved. They were even determined to double China’s GDP of 2000 by 2010 (Li, 2006). However, the image of the Chinese authorities within world society remained poor because of the missile tests in the Taiwan Strait, the interference in the selection of Panchen Lama in Tibet, and the underground nuclear tests in Xinjiang. In this context, the Chinese central government failed to become a founding member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and disapproved of Beijing bidding for the 2004 Summer Olympics (Chu, 2021, pp. 134–138). In 1997, Deng Xiaoping passed away. The CCP agreed that Zhu Rongji should succeed Li Peng as the Premier. Other central and local executives who had supported the 1989 suppression had either retired or been removed from office. In addition, after he had emphasized the importance of furthering market liberalization and economic development at the 15th CCP National Congress, Jiang Zemin, the new paramount leader of China, signed an agreement with Bill Clinton about

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the formation of Sino-US strategic partnership in Washington. The European powers and Japan also intensified their economic engagement with China, to further secure benefits in its emerging market. Furthermore, following the selection of Athens in Greece as host of the 2004 Summer Olympics, the chances of an Asian city winning the 2008 Summer Olympics seemed much improved. Therefore, Jiang did not decline when Samaranch suggested China apply to host the 2008 Summer Olympics. In November 1998, he and his colleagues in the CCP Politburo Standing Committee approved Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Summer Olympics (He, 2008, pp. 289 & 298). They were also confident that China’s ongoing application to join the WTO would be a plain sailing. Despite a fluctuating Sino-US political relationship in 1999 and 2000, Clinton and his administration gave a green light to China’s accession to the WTO and granted China the status of Permanent Normal Economic Relations (Suettinger, 2003, pp. 363–399). Clinton’s successor, George Bush, in 2001, remained neutral toward Beijing’s bid for the 2008 Summer Olympics, although US congressmen introduced a resolution condemning China’s dismal human rights performance and opposing Beijing’s plans to host the sports mega-event (“US government,” 2001). In addition, IOC inspectors concluded that Beijing’s plan to host the 2008 Summer Olympics was superior to those of its competitors—Paris, Toronto, Osaka, and Istanbul (Report of , 2001). Not surprisingly, Beijing won the contest by a landslide in July 2001. Five months later, China obtained membership of the WTO. From the perspective of the Chinese authorities, national pride among the public and their allegiance to the Communist regime would be boosted if Beijing could host the 2008 Summer Olympics successfully. Jiang Zemin thus asked all Chinese nationals to support the Beijing municipal government in the relevant organizing tasks (“The capital,” 2001). Additionally, since they were confident that China’s economic growth would skyrocket after the accession to the WTO, Jiang and his colleagues stressed that China should quadruple its 2000 GDP by 2020 (Jiang, 2006, pp. 528–575). While the ambitious economic plan of the Chinese authorities was extensively reported by the local and overseas media, Jiang passed the duty of chairing the CCP and Chinese state to Hu Jintao but remained in charge of the Chinese military. Given this arrangement, Hu, Premier Wen Jiabao, and their newly incumbent colleagues

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still needed to strictly follow Jiang’s instructions when formulating policies. They also attached great attention to Beijing’s organization of the 2008 Summer Olympics and other Jiang’s signature projects. The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) emerged in Guangdong, China’s wealthiest province, in November 2002. Several months later, the Chinese authorities confirmed that the epidemic had caused the death of over 300 people and decelerated GDP growth. In view of this, international society began to question whether China could continue the rapid economic development and complete the hosting duty of the 2008 Summer Olympics and other mega-events. Hu Jintao subsequently promised the IOC President Jacques Rogge that Beijing, with the allout support of the Chinese government, would successfully stage the Olympics in summer 2008 (“Hu Jintao,” 2003). He and his colleagues also adopted measures to boost the national economy. At that time, they learned that Guangzhou, the capital city of Guangdong Province, was planning to bid for the 2010 Asian Games. The Guangzhou municipal authorities’ intention to host 2010 Asian Games was motivated by three events. First, to make the 2001 National Games of China a successful gathering, the Guangdong provincial and Guangzhou municipal governments had spent tens of billions of dollars. Participant athletes gave thumbs-up to the brand-new stadiums and hospitality facilities of Guangzhou. Both the Chinese state officials and international athletic celebrities also praised the city for its meticulous organization (Chu, 2016c, p. 1624). Second, after Beijing won the hosting rights of the 2008 Summer Olympics, Harbin, Changchun, and Shanghai activated bids for the 2010 Winter Olympics, the 2007 Asian Winter Games, and the 2007 Special Olympics Summer Games. It meant that the pursuit of international sports mega-events had become a nationwide trend in China. Third, the Guangzhou municipal government was determined to undertake a massive urban renovation in the remaining years of the 2000s, to make its jurisdiction the most influential city in Southeast Asia (Zhang, 2003). Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and their colleagues decided that obtaining the hosting rights of the 2010 Asian Games would not only mitigate the overseas apprehension about China’s holding of the Summer Olympics and other mega-events, but also boost China’s international profile in the post-SARS era and led Guangdong Province to push forward with socioeconomic development and quadruple its GDP of 2000 by 2020. Therefore, the Chinese central government, in December 2003, approved

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the bidding plan (“Guangzhou is,” 2003). Six months later, Guangzhou was awarded the hosting rights by the OCA. The Chinese leaders were pleased with the success. They, however, did not deliver words of support for Guangzhou’s organization of the Asian Games or ask the central government to offer monetary backing. This was to avoid distracting the central government from its ongoing collaboration with the Beijing municipal government in the preparations for the 2008 Summer Olympics. Guangzhou therefore only obtained backing of the Guangdong provincial government (Chu, 2016c, pp. 1625–1626). In addition, Jiang Zemin passed the power of chairing the Chinese military to Hu in late 2004. His authority on the Chinese political stage, nevertheless, remained. Given Jiang Zemin’s blessing, Xi Jinping, the son of former Vice Premier Xi Zhongxun, joined the CCP Politburo Standing Committee in 2007. This arrangement meant that he would succeed Hu as the Chinese leader five years later. Xi was also appointed to oversee Beijing’s organization of the Summer Olympics on behalf of the CCP. To make the event a total success, the Chinese central and Beijing municipal authorities, with Xi’s endorsement, increased expenditure. The 16-day 2008 Games eventually cost over USD 44 billion (“Beijing spends,” 2008). After witnessing the extravagant opening ceremony, extraordinary stadiums, and outstanding hospitality, the IOC President Jacques Rogge remarked that the event was truly exceptional (“IOC President’s,” 2008). Since both Chinese authorities and public were very proud of Beijing’s hosting performance, Hu Jintao (2016, pp. 101–114) emphasized the importance of transforming China into a strong sports power, so as to boost patriotic sentiment among his compatriots.5 A few months after the end of the Summer Olympics, the economy of the Western powers was severely hit by a global financial crisis. Under this situation, the Chinese authorities decisively injected CNY 4 trillion into the market as an economic stimulus (“China announces,” 2008). While this measure enabled China to maintain a rapid GDP growth, a number of intellectuals called upon Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, and their colleagues to activate political reform, so that China could embrace the democratic system and liberal value (Bristow, 2010). Hu and his colleagues believed that the authoritarian rule of the Communist regime was the key to Beijing’s completion of a truly exceptional 2008 Olympics. They also thought a democratic China could not have minimized the impact of the global financial crisis on the national economy. Therefore, they ignored

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the demand of the intellectuals and extensively promoted the autocratic value of China and its CCP-led economic development model across the world. Both the Guangdong provincial and Guangzhou municipal executives realized that making the 2010 Asian Games another grand, splendid, and extravagant gathering helped the state authorities transform China into a strong sports power and demonstrate that Chinese authoritarian rule was superior to Western democratic rule in terms of economic development, social stability, and crisis management. Therefore, they put the organizing tasks on the top of their working agenda in 2009 and 2010 and expended over CNY 122 billion on the holding of this 15-day sports mega-event (“Guangzhou invested,” 2010). After witnessing the worldclass stadiums, the innovative opening ceremony, and the cheerfulness of the participant athletes, the IOC and the OCA Presidents gave thumbsup and admitted that Guangzhou would be a competent host of the Summer Olympics (“Guangzhou not,” 2010; Ye, 2010). In addition, the state authorities, which did not offer generous financial support for the holding of the 2010 Asian Games, praised the Guangdong provincial and Guangzhou municipal governments for their excellent achievement in the event organization (“Guangzhou Asian,” 2011).

Tianjin and the 2013 East Asian Games After Guangzhou’s success in the pursuit of the 2010 Asian Games, Harbin and Shenzhen activated bids for the 2009 Winter Universiade and the 2011 Summer Universiade. Following in the footsteps of these Chinese metropolises, the Tianjin municipal authorities decided to bring the 2013 East Asian Games to their jurisdiction. This decision was approved by the Chinese central government in 2006 (“China General,” 2007). Meanwhile, Cheongju of South Korea and Ulaanbaatar of Mongolia also expressed an interest in staging this sports mega-event. While the East Asian Games Association obtained the bidding documents of Tianjin, the Korean Sport and Olympic Committee decided that, if no South Korean city competed with Tianjin for the 2013 East Asian Games, PyeongChang’s chance of obtaining China’s backing in the ongoing 2014 Winter Olympics bidding contest would be high. They therefore disapproved of Cheongju’s application. The Mongolian National Olympic Committee realized that Ulaanbaatar’s odds of success were lower than those of Tianjin, but it still gave green light to its capital

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city. As expected, Tianjin was awarded the hosting rights in June 2017 by defeating its Mongolian contester (Chu, 2017, p. 27). From 2009 until 2011, Harbin, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen presented the Winter Universiade, the Asian Games, and the Summer Universiade in lavish manners (Table 8.1). Nanjing, the capital city of Jiangsu Province, also decided to complete the hosting duties in a similarly extravagant way after it won the bids for the 2013 Asian Youth Olympics and the 2014 Summer Youth Olympics (Chu, 2016b, p. 207). Considering this, the Tianjin municipal government thought that it was essential to make the East Asian Games a luxurious event in the autumn of 2013, thereby boosting the local economy, accelerating China’s transformation into a strong sports power, and promoting the superiority of the Communist regime’s autocratic value and authoritarian rule. In the meanwhile, by investigating a series of mysterious events, Hu Jintao learned that some CCP Politburo members, namely Bo Xilai, Ling Jihua, Zhou Yongkang, Xu Caihou, and Guo Boxiong, not only had accepted bribery and shielded family members who had committed crime, but also had planned to prevent Xi Jinping from becoming China’s new Table 8.1

Sports mega-events in China 1990–2022

Year

City

Sports mega-event

1990 1993 1996 2001 2007 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2011 2013 2013 2014 2015 2019 2022

Beijing Shanghai Harbin Beijing Changchun Shanghai Beijing Harbin Guangzhou Shanghai Shenzhen Nanjing Tianjin Nanjing Beijing Wuhan Beijing

Asian Games East Asian Games Asian Winter Games Summer Universiade Asian Winter Games Special Olympics World Summer Games Summer Olympics Winter Universiade Asian Games FINA World Aquatics Championships Summer Universiade Asian Youth Games East Asian Games Summer Youth Olympics IAAF World Athletics Championships Military World Games Winter Olympics

Source Author’s database

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leader by staging a coup (Wu & Choi, 2017). He subsequently thwarted the conspiracy together with Wen Jiabao and other colleagues and handed over his power to Xi in the 18th CCP National Congress in autumn 2012. With the national rejuvenation of China as his ultimate political goal, Xi was reluctant to abide by the status quo.6 Therefore, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao constantly pushed forward with the market liberalization, whereas Xi planned to tighten the CCP’s grip on the national economy. Deng, Jiang, and Hu firmly supported authoritarian rule in China, whereas Xi favored a totalitarian system.7 Deng, Jiang, and Hu refused to handle diplomatic affairs in a high-profile manner and seek the revision of the US-led international order, whereas Xi thought assertively expanding China’s influence on the global stage was an imperative of his administration. In addition, to eliminate political enemies in the CCP and consolidate confidence among the public in his leadership, Xi, in 2013, activated a nationwide anti-corruption and anti-extravagance campaign and announced a desire to bring the 2022 Winter Olympics to Beijing and Zhangjiakou. It needs to be noted that Almaty of Kazakhstan, Kraków of Poland, Lviv of Ukraine, Oslo of Norway, and Stockholm of Sweden also informed the IOC of their intentions to host the sports mega-event. The officials managing the sports affairs of China deemed that Tianjin should not stick to its lavish hosting plan. Instead, it must be thrifty when presenting the 2013 East Asian Games. This revision was an echo of Xi’s anti-extravagance stance. It also helped Beijing and Zhangjiakou to improve its chance of success in the 2022 Winter Olympics bidding contest. In the 2013 IOC presidential election, the German Olympic Sports Confederation President Tomas Bach’ odds of success were much higher than those of other candidates, including Sergey Bubka of Sweden, Richard Carrión of Puerto Rico, Ng Ser Miang of Singapore, Denis Oswald of Switzerland, and Wu Ching-kuo of Chinese Taipei. This was because Bach promised that, if he became the new IOC leader, he would introduce changes to make the Olympics fit for the future. Since presenting future Olympics in a simple and economical way would be one of the changes (Gibson, 2013), it was believed that Tianjin’s thriftiness enabled Bach to be impressed and led the IOC executives and members to conclude that Chinese cities were able to complete the celebration of sports mega-events frugally. Subsequently, the Tianjin municipal government cut staff in the organizing committee, canceled the torch relay, and scaled down the opening

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Table 8.2 Total expenditure of the East Asian Games 1993–2013

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Total expenditure Shanghai 1993 Pusan 1997 Osaka 2001 Macau 2005 Hong Kong 2009 Tianjin 2013

CNY 300 million/USD 37.5 million KRW 25.2 billion/USD 21.1 million JPY 8.4 billion/USD 73.6 million MOP 4.4 billion/USD 550 million HKD 290 million/USD 37.7 million CNY 186 million/USD 30.2 million

Source (Chu, 2019, pp. 103–104)

and closing ceremonies. It also abolished the arrangements of giving souvenirs to the athletes, coaches, and referees and housing them in luxury hotels (Chu, 2017, pp. 27–28). These cost-saving measures eventually won acclaim of the international sports community. They also meant the total expenditure of the 2013 East Asian Games was under budget and lower than that of the previous four East Asian Games (Table 8.2). While Xi Jinping was excited by Tianjin’s successful staging of this 10-day regional sports event, Tomas Bach, as expected, won the IOC presidential election. Beijing and Zhangjiakou later put forward its application for the 2022 Winter Olympics to the IOC with the endorsement of Xi and his colleagues in the Politburo Standing Committee (“Big events,” 2015).

Hangzhou and the 2022 Asian Games The OCA announced in 2010 that to avoid clashing with the FIFA World Cup, the Winter Olympics, and the Commonwealth Games, the celebration of each Asian Games would be switched from even numbered years to odd numbered years after 2014 (Himmer & Ransom, 2010; Linden & Ganguly, 2015). Hong Kong, Taipei, Kuala Lumpur, Dubai, Hanoi, Surabaya, and New Delhi subsequently declared their interest in hosting the 18th Asian Games scheduled in 2019. After a nearly two-year selection, Hanoi was awarded the hosting rights. Meanwhile, Li Qiang,

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a protégé of the newly incumbent CCP General Secretary and Chinese President Xi Jinping, became the Governor of Zhejiang Province. Xi thought that aside from eliminating political rivals, improving the working performance of Li and other protégés and transferring them to important positions of the CCP and state would consolidate his supreme authority. He thus ordered the state officials who were managing the sports affairs to work with the Zhejiang provincial and Hangzhou municipal governments in pursuit of the 19th Asian Games scheduled in 2023, a project with the aim of polishing the CV of Li. While the central and local executives were discussing this ambitious project, the capital city of Vietnam pulled out of hosting the 18th Asian Games due to the concerns of financial viability (“Vietnam backs,” 2014). Once the OCA started looking for a replacement of Hanoi, the Nanjing municipal authorities, which had completed the holding of the 2013 Asian Youth Games and were preparing for the celebration of the 2014 Summer Youth Olympics, informed the media of their willingness to take up the hosting duty. The Chinese central government deemed that, if Nanjing was assigned to stage the 18th Asian Games, Hangzhou’s chance of hosting the 19th Asian Games would be very slim. The Nanjing municipal authorities stopped the pursuit of the Asian Games after they realized that the central government would not give support (“Is Nanjing,” 2014). A few months later, the Indonesian Olympic Committee informed the OCA that, to avoid clashing with the 2019 Indonesian general election, Jakarta wished to host the 18th Asian Games in 2018. The OCA President, Ahmad Al-Sabah, and his colleagues had no choice but to accept this proposal. They also decided to switch the presentation of the Asian Games back to even numbered years (Rutherford, 2014). This meant that the 19th Asian Games would be presented in 2022 instead of 2023. Ahmad Al-Sabah and his colleagues preferred to pass the hosting rights of the 19th Asian Games to China, the largest economy in Asia, so as to ensure that the subsequent organization and presentation would be completed competently (“Inside stories,” 2021). Both Xi Jinping and Li Qiang favored Hangzhou’s application, even though the Games had been brought forward by one year. Yet, to avoid distracting the Chinese central and Beijing municipal governments from pursuit of the 2022 Winter Olympics, Hangzhou did not immediately activate the bid. Since Beijing was not viewed as the frontrunner in the bidding contest of the 2022 Winter Olympics, its municipal government, with the full

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support of the Chinese central government, adopted a series of measures to turn the table. They included spending USD 130 billion for the improvement of air quality, building an express rail between Beijing and Zhangjiakou, supplying sufficient water for the making of artificial snow, and organizing the sports mega-event with a budget of only USD 3.2 billion. While these efforts impressed President Tomas Bach and his IOC colleagues favorably, Kraków, Lviv, Oslo, and Stockholm, respectively, discontinued their applications for financial and security reasons. Xi Jinping subsequently stressed that his administration would mobilize over 300 million people to take part in winter sports if Beijing became the first city to host both the Summer and Winter Olympics. The state leaders of Kazakhstan did not deliver a similar pledge to increase Almaty’s odds of success. Eventually, most of the IOC members cast their votes to the Chinese capital city in preference to the Kazakh metropolis (Chu, 2016a, pp. 124–127). Hangzhou’s application to host the 2022 Asian Games commenced a few weeks after Beijing’s success. Over the following two months, the Hangzhou municipal officials closely worked with the Chinese central and Zhenjiang provincial executives to draft the Candidature File, which outlined the organization of a frugal 2022 Asian Games, despite the absence of a counter bid from any other Asian city. In the meantime, since a series of explosions in Tianjin caused the deaths of over 170 civilians, the OCA members expressed concerns about the safety of Chinese cities. Some of them were even reluctant to support Hangzhou to stage the 2022 Asian Games. Xi Jinping subsequently promised Ahmad AlSabah and his colleagues that, with the full support of the Chinese central government, Hangzhou would present a very successful Asian Games in 2022 (“Xi Jinping,” 2015). His words allayed the apprehension of the OCA members. Hangzhou was awarded the hosting rights in September 2015 (Chu, 2021, p. 94). To avoid shifting attention away from the central and local authorities’ high-key preparation for the 2022 Winter Olympics, Xi Jinping seldom mentioned the 2022 Asian Games over the following two years and the Zhejiang provincial and Hangzhou municipal governments handled the organizing tasks in a low-profile manner. In addition, with the approval of Xi, Li Qiang was transferred to chair the CCP affairs in Jiangsu and Shanghai. He then joined the CCP Politburo in the 19th CCP National Congress in October 2017. At the same occasion, Xi emphasized the importance of accelerating China’s transformation into a strong sports

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power in a key-note speech, which aimed to guide Chinese authorities seeking to achieve national rejuvenation (Xi, 2017). He later gained control over the state affairs of China for life by amending the constitution (Hancock, 2018). Meanwhile, the central and local authorities’ grip on the Chinese border regions that were deemed to likely affect the consolidation of Xi’s political power, like Xinjiang and Hong Kong, was tightened (Lockett & Liu, 2018; Ramzy & Buckley, 2019). The Hangzhou municipal government realized that flawlessly completing its hosting duties was a key part of transforming China into a strong sports power. It therefore not only economically renovated its local stadiums and other sports venues, but also meticulously prepared for the opening and closing ceremonies as well as sports competitions—particularly those which had been newly featured in the 2022 Asian Games, like baseball, cricket, breakdance, and E-sports. While these efforts were extensively reported by the state media, some Western politicians and international organizations condemned the Chinese authorities for their severe violation of human rights in Xinjiang and Hong Kong and called for a boycott of the 2022 Winter Olympics (Dimond, 2018; “Sen. Rick,” 2019). Beijing’s relations with Washington also tensed up due to the ongoing trade war, in which Xi Jinping and his US counterpart, Donald Trump, respectively imposed tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of goods (“Timeline: Key,” 2019). In 2020, the entire world was severely hit by COVID-19, a coronavirus which had been firstly found in the Chinese city of Wuhan. The Chinese central and local governments, under Xi’s instructions, promptly imposed mandatory lockdowns and adopted a COVID-zero strategy. The Western democracies, considering principles of liberty and human rights, did not follow suit. As a result, the infection rate of China was much lower than that in the Western democracies (Graham-Harrison & Kuo, 2020), and the economic performance of the former was better than that of the latter (Cheng, 2021). Additionally, the controversial words of deeds of Donald Trump deepened the social and political divisions in the US and undermined its influence on the global stage. The issues above consolidated Xi’s belief that the Chinese autocratic system was superior to the Western democratic system in terms of public governance, economic development, and crisis management. He even deemed that the East was rising while the West was declining (Buckley, 2021). While the local authorities were instructed to flawlessly present

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the 2022 Winter Olympics, the 2022 Asian Games, and other international sports mega-events so as to demonstrate China’s prosperity and stability amidst the global pandemic (Liu, 2020; “Xi Jinping,” 2020), the central government and Chinese military, under Xi’s endorsement, deepened the political grip on Hong Kong and Xinjiang, deployed troops in the Taiwan Strait, the Himalayan regions, the South China Sea, and other areas claimed by the Communist regime as China’s territory, and undertook the warrior-wolf diplomacy in response to the overseas view that China had been site of COVID-19 origin (Yew, 2021). These controversial measures inevitably damaged the international image of Xi and his administration. It also caused the US and other Western democracies to diplomatically boycott the 2022 Winter Olympics (Mather, 2022). Nevertheless, none of the Asian state officials were asked to be absent from the opening ceremony and other programs of the 2022 Asian Games.

Conclusion Although the public have displayed only a limited enthusiasm about the regional sports mega-events, the Chinese authorities have keenly endorsed Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Tianjin, and Hangzhou to bid for, and/or hosting of, the Asian Games and the East Asian Games since the 1980s. This article sought to demystify this phenomenon. It noted that the support given to Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin in holding the 1990 Asian Games, the 1993 East Asian Games, and the 2013 East Asian Games was to facilitate China’s bids for the Summer and Winter Olympics—the signature projects of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Xi Jinping. It also noted that the support given to Guangzhou and Hangzhou in staging the 2010 Asian Games and the 2022 Asian Games was to: (1) accelerate China’s transformation into a strong sports power—a crucial part in the working agenda of both Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping; (2) demonstrate the superiority of China’s autocratic system to the world—a common stance of Hu and Xi; and (3) strengthen the power of Xi and his protégés—an essential key to rejuvenate the Chinese nation. The findings reveal that, from the perspective of the Chinese authorities, the presentation of the five Asian Games and East Asian Games was conducive to the achievement of the paramount leaders’ ambitious goals. It needs to be noted that while the Chinese central government provided generous financial support to Beijing’s organization of the 1990

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Asian Games, it did not offer monetary backing to Shanghai’s organization of the 1993 East Asian Games, Guangzhou’s organization of the 2010 Asian Games, Tianjin’s organization of the 2013 East Asian Games, and Hangzhou’s organization of the 2022 Asian Games. The possible reason behind the above inconstancy was twofold. First, although Reform and Opening Up had commenced, the local governments of China were unable to cover expenditures for the holding of sports mega-events in the 1980s. The generous financial support of the central government became essential to make the 1990 Asian Games a success. In the following three decades, China enjoyed a rapid GDP growth and the income of the local governments soared. This enabled the municipal authorities of Chinese cities to complete the duty of hosting sports mega-events on their own. Second, between the early 1990s and the early 2020s, the Chinese central government allocated most of its financial resources on sports to Beijing for the pursuit of the Summer and Winter Olympics. It thus was reluctant to offer monetary backing for the organization of the 1993 East Asian Games, the 2010 Asian Games, the 2013 East Asian Games, the 2022 Asian Games, and other sports mega-events. In late 2021, former Grand Slam women’s doubles winner Peng Shuai mysteriously disappeared for weeks after her encounter of sexual abuse by a senior Chinese official was uncovered (Fan, 2021; Keh, 2022; Wang & Song, 2022). This incident severely damaged the image of China in the international sports community. It, together with the Westers powers’ diplomatic boycott of the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics, had inevitably obstructed China’s pursuit of being recognized as a strong sports power. In addition, the US and its allies expressed their strong dissatisfaction with a series of Xi’s policy measures. Their think tanks unveiled the intention to oppose Xi’s permanent leadership of the Communist regime (“The longer,” n.d.). Furthermore, while the other parts of world had started to live with COVID-19, Xi insisted that his motherland should continue adopting a COVID-zero strategy—which eventually led to a monthslong lockdown of Shanghai and other cities as well as the postponement of presenting the 2022 Asian Games to 2023 (Chakraborty, 2022). It was widely believed that this insistence would hamper not only economic development and international engagement of China (“China’s Covidzero,” 2021), but also its national rejuvenation. Will the Hangzhou 2023 Asian Games be leveraged by Xi and his protégés to reverse the tough situation? The answer is awaited.

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Notes 1. Under Deng’s endorsement, Hu succeeded Hua Guofeng as the CCP Chairman in 1981. One year later, the position of the CCP Chairman was abolished. Hu subsequently was nominated as the General Secretary of the CCP, China’s highest ranking official. Zhao, in 1980, became the Premier, whose duty was to chair the daily business of the State Council—the central government of China. 2. The Politburo is composed of 20–30 members. Its duty is to make important political decisions on behalf of the CCP. The decisions are guidelines of the central government to formulate policies on economy, diplomacy, national defense, health, education, urban and rural developments, and other areas. 3. The central government did not provide financial support for the budget increase. Nor was it involved in mobilizing the local residents. It meant that all of these tasks were completed by the Shanghai municipal government solely. 4. The MFN is an international trade status accorded by the US. Under this status, any country is entitled to enjoy low tariffs, high import quotas, or other trade advantage measures, in the trade with the US. 5. Boosting patriotic sentiment is a key to consolidate the centripetal force among the Chinese public toward the CCP and its regime. After the Cultural Revolution ended in 1976, Deng Xiaoping and his successors abolished the class struggle and other orthodox Marxist doctrines upheld by Mao Zedong. They proactively adopted measures to develop economy of their motherland, raise its international status, and revitalize the Chinese nation, thereby justifying the ruling legitimacy of the CCP. The hosting of the Summer Olympics, the largest and most prestigious sports event on the planet, was one of the useful measures to those ends. In fact, the years-long organization—which cost tens of billions of dollars—improved urban infrastructure, brought business opportunities, and pushed forward with the GDP growth. The presence of foreign political leaders, particularly those from the Western powers, in the extravagant opening and closing ceremonies, the participation of over 10,000 athletes across the world, and the record-breaking medal haul of the Chinese athletes—all of which were extensively propagandized by the state media as a sign of the return of the Middle Kingdom—led the Chinese public to be further allegiant to the Communist regime (Barmé, 2009; Brady, 2009; Brownell, 2008). 6. Xi planned to actualize the national rejuvenation by two steps. The first step was to complete China’s transformation into a moderately well-off society by 2021. The second step was to forge China as a developed strong power by 2049 (Kuhn, 2013; Leng, 2014).

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7. Authoritarianism and totalitarianism are two non-democratic political systems. The former means that the power of ruling a country is in the hands of a few political elites. The latter means that the power of ruling a country is in the hands of one man. Although Deng, Jiang, and Hu were paramount leaders of China, they still upheld the principle of collective leadership and made decisions with their colleagues in the CCP Politburo and its standing committee. Xi, however, was unwilling to follow suit (Li, 2016; Shambaugh, 2021).

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PART III

World Cups and Other Sports Mega-Events

CHAPTER 9

FIFA 2022 World Cup in Qatar: Under the Gaze of Western Media Kamilla Swart and Umer Hussain

Introduction It is also the job of Westerners not to be on the side of the slave owners. Who, in conscience, could enjoy the spectacle of a 2022 World Cup built on this modern slavery? (The New York Times, 2014) Holding the 2022 World Cup in Qatar is akin to staging it in apartheid South Africa. (Chief executive of Kick It Out: The Independent, 2021)

K. Swart (B) Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Ar-Rayyan, Qatar e-mail: [email protected] U. Hussain Ripon College, Ripon, WI, USA

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. Kobayashi et al. (eds.), Sports Mega-Events in Asia, Palgrave Series of Sport in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0011-4_9

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Let’s be honest, Qatar getting the 2022 World Cup is bullshit. (Steve Rabinowitz; a Washington-based publicist, The Guardian, 2018)

The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) men’s World Cup 2022 in Qatar is the first FIFA World Cup to be held in the Arab and, overall, in the Muslim world. The announcement of this sporting mega-event in the Arab world has brought immense excitement among Qataris and across the region (Randall, 2010). However, from the day the FIFA administration announced to organize the FIFA 2022 World Cup in a prosperous tiny Arab Muslim state, many sport media gurus and Western human rights activists have raised their concerns about having a sporting event within an Arab country (Charlton, 2015; Hussain, 2021a). Western media discourse has been profoundly focused on elucidating corruption allegations, immigrant laws, women’s rights, LGBTQ community issues, and climate change concerns (Conway, 2013; Reimer, 2021) while obfuscating likely beneficial outcomes of the first Muslim country to hold a major sporting event in the region. For instance, an opinion piece published in the Bleacher Report (Miller, 2017) started with apprehensions about boiling heat in Qatar. The author of the opinion piece also claimed that the Qatari FIFA bid had all ‘sorts of harebrained schemes’ (Miller, 2017). In addition, the same article discussed how the FIFA World Cup in Qatar would be a significant disruption to the European League events (Miller, 2017). Likewise, The New York Times (2014) published an article with the title, “Qatar’s Showcase of Shame,” the article focused on immigrants’ mistreatment and the FIFA 2022 World Cup in Qatar. Similarly, numerous other newspaper opinion articles have focused on the Qatari royal family, sports washing, and corrupt practices in the tiny Arab country. Hence, the image of Qatar is shaped by the various Western media platforms as a corrupt wealthy Muslim state. The allegation about Qatar being a corrupt country or taking part in corrupt practices is historically incorrect with respect to international indexes (Stephenson, 2022). For example, when Qatar was awarded the hosting of the FIFA World Cup in 2010, it was ranked 19 out of 178 countries by the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) as the least corrupt (Transparency International, 2010). On the other hand, countries such as Japan were ranked 17th, and the United States of America stood at 22nd position (Transparency International, 2010). Nevertheless, from the Western sport media corruption allegations, it is difficult to comprehend

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that Qatar had approximately the same amount perceived corruption index in 2010 as compared to Japan and the USA (Stephenson, 2022). Nevertheless, many Western media gurus have called for boycotting FIFA 2022 World Cup in Qatar (Deutsche Welle, 2021). Although the status of human rights remains a significant issue in the region, however, politicizing and calling for banning the FIFA World Cup 2022 might have more adverse outcomes for not only Qatar but for the entire Muslim world. For example, racialized reporting of the biggest major sporting event in the Muslim world casts doubt on the Muslim world’s global acceptability of holding a major sporting event. Moreover, banning major sporting events in Muslim countries restrict an opportunity for millions of Muslims who have nothing to do with their oppressive governments to be part of a major sporting event. In fact, many Muslim human rights activists (both men and women) within their own countries are fighting against oppressive state policies and for human rights (Kang, 2015; Rinaldo, 2014). Additionally, homogenizing all Arab countries’ governments to be oppressive and fundamentally dangerous for the world is an epistemologically incorrect position (Said, 1978). For instance, historically oppressive human rights policies of more conservative countries, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran or the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, cannot be compared with the current status of human rights within Qatar. In the recent past, the Qatari government has also taken some significant steps for human rights compared to many countries in the region (Abraham, 2018). For example, the Qatari government has formally recognized the harsh immigrant policies, and the government is trying to develop new policies for immigrants (Reuters, 2021). Similarly, in Qatar’s inaugural Formula One Grand Prix in 2021, Lewis Hamilton used a Rainbow livery on his helmet (Walsh, 2021). Al-Bawaba (2020) also reported that a Rainbow flag showing solidarity with the LGBTQ community would be allowed in a sporting event for the first time in a Muslim country during the 2022 FIFA World Cup. In addition, it has been observed that many sport for development (SFD) organizations and governmental initiatives (e.g., Generation Amazing: https:// www.qatar2022.qa/en/opportunities/generation-amazing) are focused on enhancing women’s sport participation as a part of the FIFA World Cup 2022 legacy project. These initiatives show how a major international sporting event could be a flame of change in historically conservative societies. Therefore, rather than focusing on Western media outlets’ outcry

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for banning Muslim countries’ sport inclusion, it might be beneficial to encourage a growing sporting culture within the Muslim world. Scholars have previously underscored that the Western media discourse about sports in the Global South is not only about sport but is also intertwined in a complex historical relationship between the Global North and the Global South (Hayhurst et al.2021; Hussain, 2021b). In the wider scholarship, the expression ‘Global South’ signifies the regions outside Europe and North America having politically or culturally marginalized relations with Europe and North America (Dados & Connell, 2012). In the post-colonial scholarly discourse, definition of the Global South recounts the historical relationship of power differences between the East and the West (Dados & Connell, 2012). This power difference can also be observed in the broader media discourse. For instance, Hayhurst et al. (2021) argued that the visual representation of girls participating in sports from the Global South by the Sport for Development and Peace (SDP) organizations has a problematic power dynamic involved between the West and the East. Likewise, Hussain (2021b) emphasized that the Western media has an inherent Orientalist view against Muslim men athletes participating in the Western sporting phenomenon. The theoretical understanding of Orientalism stems from Said’s (1978) seminal work on how the West perceives the East. Hussain (2021b) further underscored that Muslim men athletes are vilified by the Western media as bizarre, retrograde, and women oppressors. Thereby, Western athletes’ Islamophobic acts against Muslim athletes are not only justified but glorified by the Western media. Similarly, Malcolm et al. (2010) have reported that representations of Islam and Muslims in sport-related coverage are underpinned by the negative and hostile views of the Muslim world. Hence, in this chapter, we aim to shed light upon the negative Western media discourse construction about the men’s FIFA 2022 World Cup in Qatar through the lens of Orientalism/neo-Orientalism. To achieve this, we conducted a content analysis of leading Western newspapers’ coverage (i.e., The Independent, The Guardian, The New York Times, and The Times- London) in the past eight years related to the FIFA 2022 World Cup in Qatar. The results unveil a deep inherent bias blended in an Orientalist and neo-Orientalist framework against the Qatari state.

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Orientalism/Neo-Orientalism: ‘Sport’ as a Phenomenon In the early European discourse, the word Orient denoted the East, which included “Arabs, Turks, and Indians” (Lewis & Wigen, 1997, p. 54). The early nineteenth-century scholars, historians, and thinkers, such as Kedourie (1956) and Sinor (1954), tried to ponder upon an understanding of the Orient habits and ways of living. While exploring the Orient, a special focus was on the religious beliefs of Muslims living in the East (Kedourie, 1956). Nevertheless, the extant scholarship about the Muslim world, especially Arab countries’ representation in the West, has been profoundly influenced by Edward Said’s (1978, 1997) groundbreaking critical work on ‘Orientalism’ (Alahmed, 2020; Hussain, 2021a, b; Ranji, 2021). Burney (2012) underscored that Orientalism remains a cornerstone of post-colonial theory. Said (1978, 1997) highlighted that Orientalism is a systematic way by which colonizers have historically produced and managed the image of the East to advance their control on the non-American/European populations. Taking a post-colonial critical perspective, Said (1978) unveiled that a specific vocabulary is used whenever the Orient is discussed within the realms of humanities and social sciences. The binary opposition, such as defining the Orient as ‘them’ and the Europeans as ‘us,’ is commonly used to describe the difference between the familiar (the West, “us”) and the primitive, out-of-place, and strange (the Orient, “them”) (Ranji, 2021). Hence, from an Orientalist view, the earth is divided into two unequal halves, the Orient (the inferior, the East, ‘them’) and the Occident (the superior, the West, ‘us’) (Said, 1978). The geographical dissimilarity between the East and the West then becomes the starting and the endpoint of theoretical understanding (Said, 1978). Therefore, the imagined ‘East’ is actually a fictional ‘Orient’ for an Orientalist, which is far away from scientific reality (Ranji, 2021). Drawing from Michel Foucault’s (1972, 1980) and Antonio Gramsci’s (1971) scholarship, Said (1978, 1997, 2000) argued that ‘Orientalism,’ is a discourse rather than only a theoretical lens. Foucault’s (1972, 1980) work provided a theoretical framework to Said (1978, 1997, 2000) in describing the relationship between the knowledge and power of the European colonizers over the ‘Orient.’ On the other hand, Gramsci’s (1971) scholarship offered Said (1978) a framework to explore a way of explaining how specific ideas of the ‘Orient’ prevailed over others in

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the discourse. Following the Marxist understanding of the world, Gramsci (1971) explored how the capitalist maintains ‘cultural hegemony’ over the historically marginalized classes via the media, universities, and religious institutions. Said (1978) further argued that historically these institutions (e.g., media) created a manufactured consent of understanding the Orient, especially Muslims, as primitive, bizarre, conservative, and uncultured. However, numerous contemporary scholars have challenged Said’s (1978, 2000) work by calling it reductionist, outdated, and dichotomous (Owen, 2009). It should be noted that Said’s (1978) critical work was based on how the Western world constructs and shapes the ‘imagined East’ in the wake of the Palestine-Israeli conflict (Brisson, 2008; Said, 2000). The aftermath of the 1967 war and Israeli victory triumphalism in the Western media made Said (1978) ponder upon how the Western world views the Muslim world as primitive and bizarre (Kerboua, 2016). Thereby, Said’s (1978) understanding of the Western discourse to be fully biased against the East might not be fully relevant in today’s globalized world. Nevertheless, researchers have recently highlighted that events such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks and globalization have added a new dimension to the Orientalist imagination (Kerboua, 2016; Samiei, 2010). For instance, in contemporary times, Orientalism has become more entrenched and harmful (Bayat, 2015), as the Muslim world image in the West is changed from strange and uncultured to a threatening and violent community (Kerboua, 2016). Consequently, recent international global events in relation to the Muslim world have led scholars to expand the idea of Orientalism into neo-Orientalism (Kerboua, 2016; Samiei, 2010).

Neo-Orientalism and Islamophobic Media Discourse While exploring the changing Orientalist lens in the West, scholars such as Altwaiji (2014), Douai and Lauricella (2014), Merskin (2004), and Kerboua (2016) have argued that the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the American and NATO forces combined military retribution, and the war against terrorism has led to the reevaluation of the classic Orient in the Western world. Thus, there is a paradigm shift in the Western discourse from homogenizing and stereotyping the Muslim world as strange to considering the Muslim world as a real threat to the cultural values, civilizational

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existence, and the physical security of the West (Bayat, 2015; Kerboua, 2016). The Muslim community is framed in the media as a terrorist rather than old classical Orientalist thought of being considered irrational and outdated. Therefore, there is an injection of “neo” dynamism in the classical Orientalist academia by framing Muslims as a threat (Altwaiji, 2014) rather than being different from the West. The old understanding of the Orient (i.e., East comprising of India, Turks, and Arabs) thereby has shifted to seeing Orient as a homogenous religious group (e.g., Muslims) having malevolent ideological beliefs and ways of living (Altwaiji, 2014). These ideological beliefs are considered to be contrary to Western world views. Further, it is believed that the Western world needs to fight the Muslim world’s ideological beliefs to civilize the Islamic world. The most dangerous manifestation of neo-orientalism is gendered and cultural racism in the form of ‘Islamophobia’ (Kerboua, 2016). For instance, in January 2022, the French Senate voted to ban the Hijab in sports competitions (Hussain & Cunningham, 2022). The advocates of banning the Hijab in sport argue that it is a symbol of growing Islamic radicalism in France and is a direct threat to French cultural civilization (Hussain & Cunningham, 2022; Woodyat et al., 2022). However, numerous human rights activists and scholars are calling for the ban of the Hijab in sport as a way to police Muslim women’s bodies (Ahmed, 2022). Further, scholars have previously argued that the debate about the Hijab in Western countries has an implicit undertone of gendered Islamophobia (Perry, 2013). Gendered Islamophobia is defined as Western states and communities using various policies to oppress, monitor, and control Muslim women and girls’ bodies because of their religious beliefs (Asian Pacific Institute on Gender Based Violence, 2021). At the same time, cultural Islamophobia is more related to how individual Muslim identities are shaped to be a threat to the Western civilization based upon the intersectionality of race and Islam (Considine, 2017) with the terrorist activities across the globe. Scholars have also previously accentuated that Islamophobia as a construct could be understood via the neo-Orientalism framework (Ullah & Rahman, 2020). The 9/11 terrorist activities have led to stereotyping of Muslims as a religious threat, leading to an Islamophobic attitude toward Muslims who are even peaceful. This threat is further exacerbated by many right-wing groups on issues such as immigrants and refugees coming to Western countries. Hence, in today’s

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world, the ‘otherness’ of the Orientalist discourse has shifted to a neoOrientalist Islamophobic discourse based upon stereotyping Muslims as a violent and dangerous community (Kerboua, 2016; Samiei, 2010). Considine (2017) further reported that Islamophobia is exacerbated systematically by the Islamophobic industry. Right-wing political parties in the West are using Islamophobic media discourse to gain popular votes by stereotyping Muslims within and outside the Western borders. Large media houses are working in collaboration with right-wing parties to promote further hate and fear against the Muslim community (Considine, 2017). Historically, sport media has been severely criticized for promoting racism and xenophobia (Zenquis & Mwaniki, 2019). Nevertheless, there remains a paucity of scholarship concerning how Western media portrays a mega-sporting event held in the Arab world. Hence, drawing from Said’s (1978, 1997) and recent work on neo-Orientalism (Kerboua, 2016; Samiei, 2010), we endeavor to explore in this chapter how the FIFA men’s World Cup in Qatar has offered ‘Orientalists’ a way to target the Muslim world by creating an understanding of Qatar as a part of ‘imagined violent, dangerous, and strange East.’ We argue that this imagined understanding of the East is developing a new form of Islamophobia in sport media grounded in neo-Orientalism.

Sport Media and Orientalism/Neo-Orientalism In the realm of sport, numerous scholars have adopted Said’s (1978) work on Orientalism as a framework to understand the bias against people of the East and religious communities in the popular media (see Darnell, 2013; Ehsan Ali & King, 2021; Ferrucci & Perreault, 2018; Hussain, 2021b). For instance, Darnell (2013) investigated how the cultural knowledge concerning Sport for Development and Peace (SDP) is historically constructed by the popular magazine Sports Illustrated by employing the lens of Orientalism. The author claimed that SDP discourse in the popular media is grounded in Western imperialism; thereby, the sport political economy of unequal development is solidified with the Western imperialistic bias (Darnell, 2013). Likewise, Ferrucci and Perreault (2018) conducted a textual analysis to explore how the popular sporting magazine Sports Illustrated discussed religion from 1994 to 2014 by employing the Orientalism framework. The authors reported that Sports Illustrated depicted religious groups as abnormal, exotic, and incongruent with the sporting culture. Hussain (2021b), using Said’s

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(1978) work, also argued that after the famous Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC) clash between Khabib Nurmagomedov versus Conor McGregor, the Western media vilified Khabib’s Islamic identity. Ehsan Ali and King (2021) also claimed that TSN (The Sports Network), one of Canada’s leading broadcasting networks, aired a documentary (i.e., Radical Play) having an Orientalist bias against the Muslim community. Regarding mega-events media portrayal of Muslim communities, Samie and Sehlikoglu (2014) conducted a critical analysis of several online media platforms to explore how the Western media portrayed Muslim women from 28 different countries during the 2012 London Summer Olympic Games. The authors unearth that various Western media platforms were focused on exploring the experiences of Muslim women with Hijab (headscarves), while many other Muslim women participated in the event without Hijab. Similarly, Samie and Sehlikoglu (2014) argued that Western media represented Muslim women athletes as outof-place, inept, in need of Western men’s help, and exotic Hijabi objects. Nevertheless, there remains a scarcity of scholarship concerning how mega-events hosted by a Muslim country are being portrayed in the Western popular media discourse, primarily through the lens of Orientalism/Neo-Orientalism. Therefore, the next section aims to explore the neo-Orientalist and Orientalist bias within the Western media concerning the FIFA 2022 World Cup.

Western Sport Media and Neo-Orientalism: FIFA 2022 World Cup in Qatar To unveil the bias concerning FIFA 2022 World Cup in Qatar, we analyzed four Western newspapers publications: The Independent (United Kingdom) (n = 413), The Guardian (London) (n = 400), The New York Times (n = 341), and The Times (London) (n = 291). These four newspapers were selected based on their overall popularity, prestige, and widespread readership within Western countries. For instance, a study conducted by Pew (an independent research think-tank) in 2018 claimed that The Guardian is the most trusted newspaper brand in the United Kingdom among people aged 18–29 (Waterson, 2018). Likewise, The Independent became the largest digital news brand in the UK in 2019 after reaching approximately 24.5 million readerships (The Independent, 2019). On the other hand, The New York Times, founded in 1851, has won 132 Pulitzers awards, more than any newspaper. While The Times

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(London), founded in 1785, is known as the most prestigious oldest surviving newspaper in the world (The Times, 2022). However, analyzing only four major Western news brands have certain limitations. First, researching only traditional news brands limits understanding other means of communication, such as social media’s role in developing a broader narrative about the sport mega-events hosted in Muslim-dominated countries. In the future, a study is needed to untangle the role of social media in shaping the discourse concerning the FIFA 2022 World Cup in Qatar. Second, we have analyzed only Western main news brands; thereby, a bias was predicted beforehand. Though, in recent times, numerous Western media avenues have been claiming openness toward diverse ideas and thoughts. Therefore, a longitudinal study is needed in the future concerning how media bias against the Muslim world has been shaped in the past seventy years, especially after the events such as the Palestinian crisis, the fall of the Soviet Union, the rise of Saddam Hussein, the Iran-Iraq war, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Lastly, our analysis is based on Western media reports; there might be an opposite bias (e.g., Occidentalism) against the Western world in the Eastern media. Therefore, in the future, a study is warranted to compare both the Western and Eastern media reporting about sport mega-events’ hosting. We used Lexis Nexis academic database to find the newspaper publications. The following keywords were searched: FIFA World Cup 2022*, and FIFA World Cup Qatar*, and World Cup Qatar*. After sorting the initial data, we analyzed n = 200 articles most relevant to the FIFA 2022 World Cup in Qatar. The search timeline was constrained from January 1, 2014, to April 23, 2022. This time period was selected because overall database research showed that most newspaper publications about FIFA World Cup in Qatar after its initial announcement in 2010 happened in this time period. Further, in 2014, former U.S. Attorney Michael J. Garcia submitted his report on allegations involving corruption in FIFA’s 2018/2022 bidding process. In addition, in 2014, Sunday Times leaked bribery documents related to the FIFA World Cup in Qatar. While in 2015, Sepp Blatter, former chairman of FIFA, resigned from his position after a corruption investigation by various international organizations (e.g., FBI) was initiated. These events led to wider popular media attention and speculations about corruption involving the FIFA World Cup in Qatar.

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To analyze data, we used Elo and Kyngäs’s (2008) three-phase content analysis process (preparation, organization, and reporting). In the preparation stage, we first went through all the headlines. Next, we organized all the content of the articles with the dates. After that, in the organization stage, we employed an open coding method (Creswell, 1998). Then, we combined open codes to develop themes by employing the axial coding process (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Lastly, in the reporting stage, we report the three main themes below using the selective coding method (Creswell, 1998).

FIFA World Cup in Qatar, Human Rights, and Corruption The results overall revealed that 78% of opinion pieces had a negative slant related to the FIFA 2022 World Cup in Qatar. We also found a scarcity of articles discussing the positive outcomes of this mega-sporting event in the region. Therefore, the only one-sided story is being proliferated within the popular media concerning FIFA 2022 World Cup in Qatar. The results also showed that the primary focus of Western media on the FIFA 2022 World Cup in Qatar has been on human rights and corruption. However, within human rights discourse, Qataris have been presented by various media outlets as frauds and supporters of terrorist activities. For example, The Independent (Hastings, 2014) reported, “The country has faced increasing accusations of fostering links to ISIS and other Islamic militants… The controversy surrounding the 2022 World Cup is not going away either. Despite numerous allegations that corruption and bribes helped Qatar’s bid win, there are few indications FIFA will reconsider its choice for the tournament.” Likewise, The Times (2015) reported, Visiting clerics still use the country’s mosques to plead for money for jihad. The U.S. Treasury has designated Qatar and Kuwait as “permissive jurisdictions” for terrorist fundraising. Money from Qatar has gone towards the Afghan Taliban, Hamas, and the Islamist militias of Libya. Qatar presents itself as a master of soft power not only in its pursuit of high-profile sporting events but in its financing of Al-Jazeera television, its well-branded airline, and in its investment strategies.

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Further, The Times (2017) stated, “It has, however, invested a great deal of prestige and lobbying effort in hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup. Preparations have begun. If it does not quickly remove itself from the hub of terror funding, it must reckon with international pressure to strip it of the privilege of being the World Cup venue.” The above quotes show innate bias against Qatari people being supporters of terrorist activities rather than separating the state policies from the everyday Qatari. Further, linking a sporting mega-event with terrorism shows the inherent fear of the Western world toward Muslims. Qatar is also misplaced as a region having terrorist affiliation and unsafe for the Westerners. Factually, Qatar remains the most diverse country in the region (see Fig. 9.1). Snoj (2021) reported that the Qatari population has substantially decreased, and around 89% of Qatar’s current population is based on foreigners. Qatar also remains an active participant in the Global consortium to defeat ISIS (United States Department of State, 2020). Also, various reports suggest that Qatar hosts around 10,000 U.S. service members (United States Department of State, 2020). Nonetheless, Western media sources have been trying to depict one side-story of Qatar based on fear and threat. Therefore, the extant discourse produced by The Independent (United Kingdom), The Guardian (London), The New York Times, and The Times (London) cements previous claims by the scholars concerning the growing neo-Orientalist trend in the Western media of painting Muslim world as a threat to the Western civilization.

Fig. 9.1 Nationals versus foreigners: The Qatari population (Source http://pri yadsouza.com/population-of-qatar-by-nationality-in-2017/)

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Scorching Heat and the Timeline of the FIFA World Cup 2022 The results also unearth; various media outlets have criticized the scorching heat in the region and the timeline of the FIFA World Cup 2022. For instance, The Guardian (Jenkins, 2014) reported, “Qatar will have footballers dying of heat and stadiums left decaying in the desert like Ozymandias’s ruins.” Similarly, The Independent (Rich, 2014) reported, “Hearing the stories of the heat and the death toll of those who built the stadiums - a number that would have shamed a pharaoh - might boycott either tournament?” The Qatari official has addressed the criticism of heat and weather many times by highlighting how they are scheduling the event and changes in the stadium. Nevertheless, the derogatory language (e.g., Pharaoh) used in many Western media outlets highlights a bias against the Arab world rather than discussing how the heat will impact the players and fans. Moreover, numerous articles have highlighted how the FIFA World Cup 2022 will have an impact on the European Leagues. For example, The Independent (2021) reported, “Fans will be traveling months later than usual for the World Cup. Opening on Nov. 21, 2022, with the final on Dec. 18, remains contentious as the major European leagues finalize the starting dates for a season so significantly disrupted for the first time by the World Cup.” Likewise, The Times (Ziegler, 2021) wrote, “Qatar’s victory created another huge problem for football in that the intense heat of June and July would make playing the World Cup then almost impossible. The inevitable decision to move it to the winter took place in 2015, and it will create an enormous upheaval for the 2022–23 domestic season, with a six-week gap right in the middle.” The concerns related to European Leagues being disrupted by the FIFA World Cup 2022 show an element of greed and profitability being an issue for many groups rather than only human rights or concern for the Weather in Qatar. Though, some newspapers have highlighted that heat is a major cause of the increase in deaths of laborers. But there remains a lack of scientific research which can validate various newspapers’ claims. Overall, the results show that whenever the FIFA 2022 World Cup is discussed in the Western media, it is pictured as a sporting event held outside the norm of a regular sporting event. Hence, an element of ‘Otherness’ is created by the media discourse to define Qatar as being incompatible with the

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sporting culture. This ‘Otherness’ cements Said’s (1978) view about how Orientalists have developed the discourse based on the racist view of the world.

FIFA World Cup Qatar’s Sports Washing/Soft Power Motivation and Geo-Political Disputes Another important theme that emerged from the data analysis was popular media focus on ‘why’ Qatar wants to hold the FIFA World Cup 2022. Numerous media reports suggest that Qatar wants to develop or attain a soft power image globally and regionally. Another pervasive view was that Qatar is using FIFA World Cup 2022 as a means to sports washing their bad deeds. For instance, The Guardian (Zidan, 2022) stated, “As state-run political projects and soft power propaganda outfits take center stage over the coming year, 2022 is shaping up to be one of the most politically charged sporting years in recent memory.” Previously, many social science researchers have claimed that countries have used sport mega-events as a strategy to promote their positive soft power image (Grix & Lee, 2013; Samuel-Azran et al., 2016). For instance, the United Kingdom devoted tremendous efforts to winning the bid to host the 2012 Olympic Games (Samuel-Azran et al., 2016). Grix and Houlihan (2013) stated that the 2012 London Olympics helped the United Kingdom to dissipate many negative stereotypes to some extent. In addition, the United Kingdom was able to frame itself as a vibrant and dynamic nation in the broader discourse (Grix & Houlihan, 2013). Researchers have claimed that Germany was presented as a force for good after the 2006 FIFA World Cup (Grix & Houlihan, 2013). Scholars have also argued that Qatar is using FIFA 2022 World Cup to reshape its image regarding human rights and immigrant workers (Al-Thani, 2022; Katyal, 2021). Scholars such as Griffin (2019) and Grix and Brannagan (2014) have argued that Qatar seeks to achieve the following objectives from the FIFA World Cup 2022: (a) distancing Qatar from the Middle East, (b) putting the Qatari state on the international map, and (c) asserting new national identity to challenge the Orientalist stereotyping against Qatar. However, this leads to a question, is Qatar successfully able to reshape its global image? The current state of media focus and condemnation from various Western human rights groups displays that Qatar, rather than attaining soft power, has been heavily scrutinized and blamed by the various

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Western groups for hosting the FIFA 2022 World Cup. Furthermore, Qatar has faced geopolitical backlash due to hosting the FIFA 2022 World Cup. In 2017, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt detached diplomatic relations with Qatar. They also banned Qatar-registered planes and ships from using their territories. During the blockade period, Qatar has alleged fake reporting done by their Arab neighbors about the FIFA 2022 World Cup. Hence, the extant scholarship about Qatar attaining a soft image via the FIFA 2022 World Cup is questionable. Researchers have previously argued that countries sometimes, rather than achieving soft power via sporting events, are at risk of attaining soft disempowerment (Brannagan & Giulianotti, 2014b; Brannagan & Reiche, 2022). Soft disempowerment is conceptualized as the binary opposition of soft power and is defined as occasions that may hurt, offend, or provoke others, leading to a loss of power and influence (Brannagan & Giulianotti, 2014b). Nevertheless, there remains a paucity of scholarship concerning how soft disempowerment can be rooted in fears of other cultures. In the future, a more comprehensive theoretical understanding is warranted to dismantle the benefits and disadvantages Qatar has attained from hosting the FIFA 2022 World Cup-related to soft power/disempowerment.

Why the FIFA 2022 World Cup in Qatar Is Important for The Muslim and Arab World In the last decade, the Qatari state has taken some serious steps concerning human rights, which might not have been possible without FIFA 2022 World Cup happening in Qatar. For instance, since 2017, the Qatari government has passed numerous new legislation to protect labor, such as setting up new labor dispute committees and establishing workers’ support and insurance fund plans (Amnesty International, 2021). Additionally, Qatar has ended the exit permit obligation for most workers, meaning laborers can leave the country without their employer’s consent (Amnesty International, 2021). Similarly, Qatar has mandated organizations to pay their workers electronically, thus helping the Qatari government to monitor employees’ salaries. This will aid the Qatari government in noticing irregularities and mediate to stop wage theft (Amnesty International, 2021). Numerous of these changes are still considered taboo in the other countries neighboring Qatar.

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Nevertheless, the Western media has not reported or highlighted numerous positive changes in Qatar due to the FIFA 2022 World Cup. While some changes which are reported are sometimes taken as a source of suspicion in Western media. For instance, when Qatar decided to allow rainbow flags in the stadiums or change immigration laws, numerous media outlets considered it eye-washing rather than praising Qatar for becoming the first Arab country to take bold steps related to sexuality and labor laws. Though Qatar still has a long way to go in addressing the human rights violations, FIFA World Cup 2022 has become a pinnacle event of a change, which has forced the Qatari government to change various laws. This has also led other Arab countries to think about human rights violations in their countries. Moreover, it is estimated that the FIFA World Cup in Qatar will create more than 1.5 million new jobs (Allison et al., 2017). Due to Qatari’s overall population being low, most of these jobs will be distributed among immigrants and refugees coming from South Asia. This will again lead to a change in demographics and overall diversity outlook of Qatar, which might further force the Qatari government to change its draconian legislations. Nonetheless, there is a paucity of academic and media discourse discussing how the FIFA 2022 World Cup in Qatar is changing the Arab and Muslim world dynamics. Besides, after the FIFA World Cup announcement, the Qatari government have taken a keen interest in enhancing women’s sport participation in the region. Researchers have previously claimed that Muslim women have the lowest sport participation as compared to many other marginalized groups at both the elite and community levels (Hussain & Cunningham, 2021). For instance, only eight Muslim women athletes from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have taken part in the Summer Olympic Games. Similarly, only nine women from Qatar have participated in the Summer Olympics Games till now. Thereby, a sporting event, such as FIFA World Cup, might be helpful in changing the current trends of Muslim women’s sport participation. Therefore, only painting one side of the story regarding the FIFA 2022 World Cup is an incorrect and biased approach.

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A Final Thought Researchers have claimed that one of the goals of hosting the FIFA World Cup 2022 in a tiny Arab state (i.e., Qatar) was to change its global selfimage (Brannagan & Giulianotti, 2014a; Grix & Houlihan, 2013; Grix & Lee, 2013). However, the Western sport media discourse related to Qatar has been mainly negative (Brannagan & Giulianotti, 2014b). Thereby, in this chapter, we tried to unveil the current biases against the FIFA 2022 World Cup in Qatar. We observed a neo-Orientalist bias of highlighting Qatar as a dangerous and a threat to global peace by the Western media. On the other hand, we also found an Orientalist bias of painting Qatar as an incompatible and corrupt state, which the Western world needs to boycott. We argue that current biases present against Qatar are mostly developed based upon the historical imagined fictional understanding of the East (Said, 1978) rather than on facts. Further, the current discourse regarding FIFA 2022 World Cup in Qatar obfuscates the positive outcomes of the first major sporting event in the Muslim world. For instance, there is a lack of discourse regarding how the FIFA 2022 World Cup can aid in enhancing Muslim women’s sport inclusion. There is also little Western media focus on positive changes (e.g., immigration laws, openness to the LGBTQ community, and development of sporting culture) in Qatar due to the FIFA 2022 World Cup. Similarly, there is a paucity of scholarly and media discourse concerning how various biases and prejudices could be decreased with the interaction of the Muslim world with the Western world due to the FIFA 2022 World Cup in Qatar. Hussain (2021a, b), Malcolm et al. (2010), Ratna and Samie (2019), and Samie and Sehlikoglu (2014) have previously claimed that in the broader discourse, the Muslim world is being portrayed as retrograde, conservative, and strange. In line with the previous scholarship, in this chapter, we have argued that the current Western media discourse stereotypes Qatar as an Islamic terrorist paradise and an incompatible destination for the FIFA 2022 men’s World Cup. Therefore, while discussing the FIFA 2022 World Cup in Qatar, scholars, media experts, students, and thinkers should look into both sides of the story to develop a balanced approach to understanding the importance of the FIFA 2022 World Cup in Qatar.

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Waterson, J. (2018, November 5). Guardian named UK’s most trusted newspaper. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/media/2018/oct/31/ guardian-rated-most-trusted-newspaper-brand-in-uk-study Woodyatt, A., Bashir, N., & Mawad, D. (2022, February 1). French lawmakers have proposed a hijab ban in competitive sports. The impact on women could be devastating. CNN . Retrieved February 1, 2022, from https://edition.cnn. com/2022/02/01/sport/france-hijab-ban-intl-spt/index.html Zenquis, M. R., & Mwaniki, M. F. (2019). The intersection of race, gender, and nationality in sport: Media representation of the Ogwumike sisters. Journal of Sport and Social Issues, 43(1), 23–43. https://doi.org/10.1177/019372351 8823338 Zidan, K. (2022, January 5). Could 2022 be sportswashing’s biggest year? The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2022/jan/05/sports washing-winter-olympics-world-cup Ziegler, M. (2021, March 31). FA caught in dilemma over Qatar. The Times (London). https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news& id=urn:contentItem:62B8-MJD1-DYTY-C045-00000-00&context=1516831

CHAPTER 10

Sport Mega-Events and the Contested Terrain of Space, Bodies and Commodities: The Politics and Complexities of 2019 Rugby World Cup Steven J. Jackson and Koji Kobayashi

Introduction Debates about what constitutes a legitimate sport mega-event (Horne, 2007; Horne & Manzenreiter, 2006; Maennig & Zimbalist, 2012) and their overall economic, social and other impacts or “legacies” endure

S. J. Jackson (B) University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand e-mail: [email protected] K. Kobayashi Otaru University of Commerce, Otaru, Japan e-mail: [email protected] Lincoln University, Lincoln, New Zealand

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. Kobayashi et al. (eds.), Sports Mega-Events in Asia, Palgrave Series of Sport in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0011-4_10

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(Flyvbjerg & Stewart, 2016; Groothuis & Rotthoff, 2016; Lin, 2013; Preuss, 2007, 2022). With respect to the issue of defining sport megaevents, based on Roche’s (2000, p. 1) criteria that they are “large-scale cultural….events, which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance” there is little doubt that the Rugby World Cup (RWC) has emerged as an internationally recognised sport megaevent. Indeed, even a cursory comparison of the growth of the event in relation to the number of participating nations, live attendance and media audience size, and revenue generated, between the inaugural RWC in 1987 to the 2019 RWC hosted by Japan confirms the global popularity of the Rugby World Cup (see Table 10.1). With respect to the second issue regarding impacts and legacies, it is worth noting that preceding the 2019 RWC many expressed concerns about awarding the hosting rights to Japan largely due to rugby being regarded domestically as a minor sport posing a risk of having a low number of spectators and viewers. However, as World Rugby CEO, Brett Gosper noted (in hindsight): “World Rugby made a bold decision and as it turned out one of its soundest and great decisions” (‘Gamble on Japan hosting World Cup proved a winner: Gosper’, 2019). As we will suggest later, and as documented in a key official report (The Economic Impact of Rugby World Cup 2019, 2020), the event achieved success across a wide range of indicators including those commonly associated with what are generally referred to as social impacts or legacies. Yet, not everyone agrees and care must be taken in terms of who is producing the narrative of success and their motivation. For example, over the past five decades evidence has emerged regarding the excessive public cost of Table 10.1 Rugby World Cup event statistics (1987–2011–2015–2019) Year-Nation

# Rugby Nations

Total attendance

Cumulative TV audience

Net Surplus ($USA)

1987 New Zealand & Australia 2011 New Zealand 2015 United Kingdom 2019 Japan

16

600,000

230m

1.0m

(>100)

1.35m

3.9b

90m

(>100)

2.4m

4b

80m

(>100)

1.7m

4b

65m

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hosting major sporting events and that has resulted in many international sport organisations, including the IOC, FIFA and World Rugby, putting in place clear objectives regarding economic, social and other impacts. Nevertheless, despite all of the state and corporate rhetoric about legacies, most sport mega-events report substantial budget deficits (Flyvbjerg & Stewart, 2016) and fail to deliver on many of the most taken for granted legacies such as increased national participation rates (Lin, 2013). These contrasting perspectives represent part of the wider contested terrain of sport mega-events (Jackson & Scherer, 2013) as they are located between the global and the local and the public and the private realms. This chapter examines the contested terrain of the 2019 RWC on the occasion of the inaugural hosting of the event in Asia. The event attracted extraordinary attention domestically and internationally with the host nation, Japan, recording a historic upset victory over the world’s Number 2 ranked team, Ireland, becoming the first Asian team to ever advance to the quarter-finals. The success story of the Japanese team was accompanied by a celebration and representation of diversity and multiculturalism highlighting the fact that about half of its roster consisted of foreign-born players. The discourse of ‘One Team’ helped reinforce an image of ‘unity through difference’ within the Japanese team also known as the ‘Brave Blossoms’. In turn, this representation was mobilised by the mass media and business leaders as a desirable future outlook of Japan in the twentyfirst century. Yet, Japan’s hosting of RWC 2019 also faced challenges, including natural disasters. For example, Typhoon Hagibis forced the cancellation of some matches which was the first time this had happened in the history of the RWC. In addition, a wide array of latent issues and debates ranging from budget deficits to tattoos to gender equity emerged around the event, which is the focus of this paper. Overall, this analysis illustrates how one particular event offers insights into the role of sport as part of a wider set of relations of globalisation, politics, economics and cultural identity. The paper is divided into two main parts: (1) the social and cultural significance of sport mega-events as strategic sites of cultural analysis; and (2) the multidimensional nature of the contested terrain of RWC 2019 with respect to space, bodies and commodities. The paper concludes by contemplating the potential legacies of 2019 RWC, both positive and negative.

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Sport Mega-Events as Strategic Sites of Analysis The very definition of sport mega-events highlights the multidimensional impacts they have across a range of sectors including: economics, tourism, politics, health and education, both locally and globally. The premier sport mega-events including the Olympic Games, FIFA World Cup and, to a lesser extent, the RWC, have become strategic instruments or vehicles within circuits of promotion for both state and corporate interests. For example, host nation-states seek to use events to achieve a range of objectives including: attracting global trade and tourism, developing domestic infrastructure, engaging in diplomatic relations, and nation branding, that is, using the global platform of sport to signal their arrival on the world stage. Corporations also leverage sport mega-events in order to expand global markets, seek new sources of investment and increasingly to tap into the potential benefits of the new knowledge economy. For all these and other reasons, sport mega-events provide a strong rationale for scholarly analysis and public scrutiny. Moreover, the history and structure of the events themselves offer unique opportunities for critical exploration. For example, the quantified nature of sport, both in terms of athletic performance but also public investment in hosting mega-events enables for comparisons between nation-states and across historical periods. In addition, the globally mediated and increasingly digitally recorded nature of the events provides opportunities for analysis of a range of issues (human rights, doping, sustainability) and identities including: gender, race, sexuality, (dis)ability and nationality. With respect to the latter, and gender in particular, the Olympics provide an ideal site of research analysis given that data or evidence in the form of the number of events for men and women, the number of competitors by gender and the amount and nature of media representation is readily available. For example, Olympic gender equality audits are now regularly conducted (c.f. Donnelly & Donnelly, 2013) which not only provide scholars and the public information about the true state of gender politics but this information can be used to hold the IOC and its state and corporate partners accountable. To this extent, sport mega-events are strategic sites of analysis as they provide focused moments within which the promises of legacies can be critically examined with respect to tangible evidence of transformation. Furthermore, the economic power shift from the West to the East (and in particular Asia) directs more attention to the need for studying contexts, conditions and experience of hosting sport mega-events outside

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traditional economic centres in Western countries. In this context, Japan emerged as the first Asian nation to host the Olympic Games for both summer (Tokyo 1964) and winter (Sapporo 1972) editions, and the Japanese government has continued to invest in attracting a range of major international sports events to be hosted in the country. While the politics, legacies and issues have been widely documented and discussed for the largest events such as the Olympic Games (e.g. Kelly & Brownell, 2011) and FIFA World Cup (e.g. Horne & Manzenreiter, 2002), much less attention has focused on other sport mega-events hosted in Japan. With this in mind, we turn our attention to the key and contrasting discourses and themes, or stated another way, the contested terrain of the 2019 Rugby World Cup.

The 2019 RWC as a Contested Terrain The concept of contested terrain prompts images of conflict between competing groups over territory and land. However, broadening the concept expands its utility with respect to understanding the scope, complexity and contradictions associated with many contemporary phenomena. Thus, according to Jackson and Scherer (2013, p. 889) we can conceptualise a contested terrain as: a site of struggle not unlike a battlefield, involving key interest groups with varying resources and material interests, and competing ideas and beliefs. Sometimes, these struggles appear to encompass only small differences of opinions and perspectives but, as innumerable examples throughout the course of history attest, they can also descend into conflict, violence and even war. Ultimately, though, within advanced capitalist democracies, contested terrains are about power struggles over resources (financial, material and human) and ideological and moral/ethical beliefs.

For all of the reasons noted in the previous section sport mega-events lend themselves to analysis through the conceptual lens of a contested terrain. Here, we discuss RWC 2019 as a contested terrain of global/local power relations in three interrelated ways: (1) space/territory, (2) bodies and (3) commodities.

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Space/Territory As any sport mega-event is located and hosted in a particular geographical space, distribution of its economic resources and social benefits within that space is of utmost concern for politicians, organisers and residents of the host city, region or nation. The hosting of the 2019 RWC was regarded as one of the most successful sport mega-events as indicated by a range of economic assessments. According to a report from the Rugby World Cup 2019 Organising Committee (2020), the event recorded 1,704,443 match attendees across the venues (1.5 million more than recorded by the 2011 RWC in New Zealand) and ticket sales of 38.9 billion yen ($US3.3 billion) with 99 per cent of available tickets sold. Fan Zones for public viewing were set up in 12 cities across the country attracting a total of 1.1 million visitors over the duration of the event (Rugby World Cup 2019 Organising Committee, 2020). In terms of media exposure, the pool match between Japan and Scotland broke the domestic broadcast record with 54.8 million viewers while match and non-match videos of the event on digital media were watched 2.1 billion times across the globe. With respect to the economic impact of eventrelated tourism, the Rugby World Cup 2019 Organising Committee (2020) estimated that the number of foreign visitors at 242,000 with an estimated average spend of 686,000 yen ($US6,000) over 17 days. From the tourism and hospitality industry’s point of view, RWC-related visitors were a lucrative market with higher spending and longer stays than the average foreign tourists to Japan. Politically, the 2019 RWC was viewed as a springboard to hosting the much larger multi-sport event, the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games, which was eventually postponed to 2021 due to the global COVID-19 pandemic. The hosting of both events, which were originally scheduled back to back, was justified and linked by the narrative of the disaster recovery from the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami in 2011 which devastated the northeastern coast of the country and caused a nuclear crisis at one of the power plants in Fukushima. For the Japanese government, the hosting of these sport mega-events provided an opportunity to demonstrate its accomplishment of recovery from the national tragedy and re-establish an image of Japan as a desirable tourist destination to the international community. As signified by the exchanges of national jerseys between then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and New Zealand’s Prime Minister Jacinda

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Ardern prior to the event’s opening (Mainichi Shimbun, 2019, September 19), RWC 2019 offered Japan a unique space to engage in sport diplomacy and international exchange with Commonwealth countries such as New Zealand. However, unlike sports such as baseball or football, rugby union has minimal connection to two of Japan’s largest trading partners, China and the United States (although the latter qualified for the 2019 RWC and is increasingly more successful and visible in Rugby Sevens). In addition to the absence of China, other neighbouring countries such as South Korea and North Korea, that often feature tense rivalries with Japan in football for instance, were also not represented at the event. This unique political context of RWC 2019 enabled the Japanese government and media to promote a sense of nationalism based on cosmopolitan aspirations and participation in the international community rather than the more common confrontation with its regional sporting rivals (see Cho & Kobayashi, 2019, for the manifestation of political tensions through football in East Asia). While World Rugby’s handling of Typhoon Hagibis drew a great deal of criticism and eventually forced some matches to be cancelled, the Japanese government was nonetheless able to portray an image of disaster recovery and resilience through the event. For example, the Rugby World Cup 2019 Organising Committee worked collaboratively with World Rugby in responding to the disaster and even prepared a backup plan to hold the pool match between Scotland and Japan at an alternative venue if the original venue was affected by the typhoon (Asahi Shimbun, 2019, November 13). Along with the surprise success of the Japanese team, the organisers’ efforts in hosting the event enhanced Japan’s political capital in the world of rugby and in particular earned the trust of World Rugby Chief Operating Officer and Tournament Director, Alan Gilpin, who was quoted in the media saying “The 2019 Rugby World Cup was a success in every level… (It was) ground-breaking, record-breaking, and game-changing” (The Japan Times, 2020, June 25). However, despite the aforementioned successes, the benefits from 2019 RWC were not shared equally. Indeed, the unequal distribution of benefits reflects—and reproduces—the general economic inequality across regions and the overconcentration of people and wealth in Tokyo, and the Kanto region more generally. To put this more concretely, Tokyo, the capital of Japan, is home to approximately 13.5 million residents (10.6% of the national population) and its regional economic production of 106 trillion yen ($US915 billion) equates to 19.4% of the gross national product (Tokyo Metropolitan Government, 2022). Although

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the RWC matches were held in 12 cities across the country, 18 out of the 48 matches (37.5%) were held in the Kanto region including Tokyo, Saitama and Kanagawa prefectures. In particular, the two venues in the Kanto region, Tokyo Stadium and International Stadium Yokohama, hosted 6 out of the 8 matches in the knockout stage including the final and semi-finals. Although the distribution of match hosts was notably more widespread than the Olympic and Paralympic Games, the economic activity and distribution flows generally remained concentrated in urban centres in the Kanto region, and, more specifically, Tokyo and Yokohama. In terms of inbound tourists, Tokyo was the most visited destination followed by other metropolitan and tourist cities such as Kyoto and Osaka and then the regional host cities of matches (Rugby World Cup 2019 Organising Committee, 2020). Thus, it is not surprising that the economic impact of the event was largely concentrated within the urban areas of the Kanto region, and to a lesser degree major regional cities, thereby contributing to the widening inequality between Tokyo/Kanto and the rest of Japan. The most illustrative case of this economic inequality is highlighted by one of the regional host cities, Kamaishi in Iwate prefecture. Despite the government’s rhetoric about hosting the RWC, in part, in order to support disaster recovery suffered from the Great East Japan Earthquake and the Tsunami in 2011, Kamaishi was the only city from north-eastern Japan to host matches. However, it is important to note that Kamaishi, a small city with a population of 33,000, was also burdened with the construction of a new stadium, the ‘Kamaishi Recovery Memorial Stadium’, which was originally estimated to cost 3.2 billion yen ($US275 million) but ended up costing 4.9 billion yen ($US423 million) (Asahi Shimbun, 2019, December 23). Moreover, the debt to the city from the stadium’s construction is expected to accumulate given estimated future running costs of around 50 million yen ($US423,000) per annum. Significantly, all of this expense was made to host one pool match during the event (with another match being cancelled due to the typhoon). While Kamaishi is home to its local rugby union football club, the Kamaishi Seawaves, and was featured in news across the globe when Canadian players volunteered to help out local residents as part of the recovery from damages caused by Typhoon Hagibis, the economic cost of the construction and maintenance of the stadium was clearly out of proportion economically for a city of its size. The case of Kamaishi is reminiscent of the construction of Dunedin’s stadium for the 2011 RWC in New Zealand which was subjected to public criticism

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and protest given budget blowouts and long-term debt servicing for a small city (Porter & Sam, 2013; Scherer & Sam, 2008). Ultimately, while RWC 2019 was successful in some respects it also contributed to the widening inequality between Tokyo/Kanto and the rest of Japan. Moreover, while the construction of new stadia was promoted as providing new community assets for the future and while it was the temporary site of tremendous national celebration, it also left a legacy of debt for already struggling regional cities/prefectures.

Bodies One of the RWC-related topics that attracted the most attention from the media in Japan was the ethnic diversity and its associated ‘foreignness’ in the Japanese national team. Unlike the Olympic and Paralympic Games and other single sport World Cups, the RWC maintains a unique eligibility rule to allow foreigners to play for the nation through residency in addition to citizenship. For the 2019 RWC, this rule allowed the Japanese team to have 16 foreign-born players out of the 31registered players on its roster. Moreover, the head and assistant coaches, Jamie Joseph and Tony Brown, were both born and raised citizens of New Zealand. Given the presumed and relative ethnic homogeneity of the Japanese population, the racial composition of the team drew immediate attention from the media, and internet users were quick to point out that it was not representative of Japan (Bunshun Online, 2019 September 6). However, as the Japanese team went on to record the historic win against world No. 2 ranked Ireland and eventually advance to the knockout stage by winning all of the four pool matches, the ethnic diversity of the team shifted to become a narrative about how Japan could embrace ethnic diversity and multiculturalism to be successful on the world stage beyond the field of sport. The ‘One Team’, slogan, was repeatedly referenced in media interviews and commentaries to emphasise the unity in diversity of the Japanese team and promoted within the public discourse to signify the need to bring together people from diverse backgrounds for a more prosperous Japanese economy. Notably, the slogan was selected as one of the 2019 winners of the annual Buzzword Awards (Ry¯ uk¯ ogo Taish¯ o ). While the public engagement with multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism through the celebration of the Japanese team’s success was viewed positively by many, it did not automatically translate into the improvement of the everyday realities facing many foreign migrants and ethnically

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diverse populations in Japan. For instance, Michael Leitch, the captain of the Japanese team, was born and raised in New Zealand. He moved to Japan to play for a high school team, developed his professional career with Toshiba Brave Lupus and has represented Japan since 2008. Following what is popularly known as the Brighton Miracle—Japan’s historic upset against South Africa in the 2015 RWC, Leitch became a celebrity figure who featured in corporate advertisements, television talk shows and was widely visible across a variety of print and digital media. Given his legal status as a naturalised citizen of Japan, combined with marriage to his Japanese wife and his remarkable competency in Japanese, whenever he appears in the Japanese media, Leitch is often represented as “more Japanese than the Japanese” (Chiba et al., 2001, p. 215). Arguably, the Japanese media’s framing of Leitch reproduces the ways in which nationalism is signified through the narratives of Japan’s embracement of ethnic diversity and the successful assimilation of the ethnic and cultural ‘Other’ into the imagined community. Nevertheless, as a foreign-born Japanese citizen, Leitch is acutely aware of racial discrimination and intolerance within Japan and has been open and candid in speaking about his experience to the non-Japanese, English-speaking media. Consider the following quote from an interview with Reuters (2019, April 25): “Japan is a really closed-off country… So to have me as the face and at the front of the national team, I think I can connect with a lot of people that live in Japan, and there are a lot of people that struggle here”. This statement offers insights into several aspects of the role of sport in racial/ethnic relations within Japan. On the one hand, it acknowledges the reality of racial inequality and injustice that many foreign migrants and minority ethnic groups face on a daily basis. At the same time, Leitch recognises that as a prominent public figure he might be able to help galvanise both minority communities and wider Japanese society. However, whether or not he was conscious of the fact, there is little doubt that Leitch and other foreign-born players within the Japanese rugby team were used, at least temporarily, to celebrate the mantra of unity in diversity. This could be viewed optimistically as a sign of social change, but it could equally be viewed cynically as masking the genuine cultural divide within a nation that is increasingly confronting the reality that its long held self-vision of a homogenous, perhaps even ethnically pure, population is changing. Another notable aspect of the contested terrain of body politics emerged in relation to the issue of tattoos. While tattooing and piercing have become commonplace, indeed often a rite of passage, among young

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people globally, in Japan, a tattoo is commonly associated with social outcasts, and in particular Japanese mafia or yakuza. For this reason, visible tattoos are not accepted in some public spaces such as hot springs, swimming pools and gyms. The issue was particularly pertinent for New Zealand as its team includes many M¯aori and Pacific players who display tattoos or moko as a representation of their ancestry and cultural heritage. Highlighting the contested nature of cultural tattoos in 2013 a female M¯aori academic attracted national attention in both nations when she was denied entry to a hot spring in Japan due to her facial tattoo or ‘moko kauae’ (New Zealand Herald, 2013, September 15). To avoid similar controversies during the 2019 RWC, World Rugby issued advice for participating teams to cover up their tattoos in public spaces during their stay in Japan. Accordingly, most players followed this advice. For instance, Asahi Shimbun (2019, October 24) picked up stories of foreign players with tattoos conforming to the Japanese culture: A. Smith of New Zealand who has a M¯aori bloodline wears traditional tattoo known as t¯ a moko in M¯aori from his left shoulder to hand. “It tells a story of my family”. He says that each one of patterns based on ferns has certain meanings including parents, brothers, partner, himself and hometown. “I can always be with my family through the curving on my body. It represents that I am M¯aori”… The World Cup was held in Japan where tattoo is perceived as a symbol of anti-social groups. The Samoan national team discussed the issue with an expert of Japanese culture prior to the event and made the decision to cover the tattoo with long sleeves in public. Nanai-Williams from the team says “Tattoo is a way of self-expression for a Samoan, but it is also important to respect another culture” (translated by the authors).

The same news article reported that in Beppu, Oita, one of the most popular destinations for hot springs in Japan, there were only a few facilities that relaxed their rules to allow entries of foreigners with tattoos during the RWC: “According to their survey of about 2,000 Japanese customers, 32% answered ‘not acceptable’ while only 12% answered ‘acceptable’. [The Hotel Association] made the decision ‘not to relax the rule even for the event period at this stage’. The same survey indicated that 56% said ‘acceptable with conditions’ which required patrons to sign documents confirming that they are not a member of organised crime syndicates and marked bracelets were to be worn” (Asahi Shimbun, 2019, October 24, translated by the authors). As such, this aspect of

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Japanese culture was defended against foreign influence, and rules were implemented for foreign visitors to follow and respect. Thus, although Japan may have signalled a new and extended engagement with multiculturalism and ethnic diversity through RWC 2019’s success, the event also highlighted the enduring stronghold of nationalism through preservation of national traditions and customs as manifested in the contested terrain of tattoos.

Commodities Rugby has long been viewed as a site in which hegemonic masculinity is constructed, performed and negotiated (Light, 2008; Phillips, 1996; Pringle & Markula, 2005; Scherer & Jackson, 2013) and this extends to the consumption of particular commodities associated with the sport. At the 2019 RWC, the relationship between rugby and masculinity was reinforced by two popular commodities—beer and energy drinks. Unlike the Olympic and Paralympic Games, the RWC, and the sport of rugby more generally, welcomes both a cultural and commercial association with alcohol-related products and brands across all levels of sponsorship arrangement from the global to the local. This has been increasingly criticised for naturalising and enhancing the association among rugby/sport, alcoholic consumption and hegemonic masculinity, which is considered as a major contributor to a range of health and social problems including alcohol abuse, harassment and depression in many societies (Gee & Jackson, 2017; Wenner & Jackson, 2009). Heineken, a Dutch-originated global beer brand, has been a Worldwide Partner for the RWC from 2007 to 2019 (notably Japanese beer brand Asahi Breweries replaces Heineken for the 2023 RWC in France). For the Japanese market, Heineken partnered with another major Japanese beer brand Kirin to form a joint venture, Heineken Kirin. In 2019, Heineken Kirin took advantage of the RWC and increased distribution channels for the brand to more than 4,000 locations, increasing its sales by 70% in comparison to the previous year (Toyo Keizai Online, 2019, November 2). Heineken reaped the benefits of its exclusive sponsorship as it was the only beer sold at the match stadiums and Fan Zones set up in 12 cities across the country. It was also heavily promoted through its collaboration with the tourism and hospitality industry and was ultimately recognised by the Shokuhin Sangyo’s (Food Industry)

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Technical Merit Awards for its marketing success (Shokuhin Sangyo Shimbunsha, 2019, December 25). Generally speaking, Japan has been more relaxed about the issue of beer and alcohol sponsorship of sport compared to other countries as exemplified by Asahi Breweries being named as an official sponsor for Japan’s national teams and as a Gold Partner for the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games. In addition, Kirin Breweries is an official sponsor for Japan’s national football, futsal and beach football teams and is the signature sponsor for international football events such as the Kirin Cup and Kirin Challenge Cup. Finally, Suntory brand is a signature sponsor of the Suntory Ladies Open (Japan Ladies Professional Golfers’ Association) and is an owner of professional rugby and volleyball teams. However, similar to other countries, there is mounting global pressure to decouple sports mega-events and ‘unhealthy’ sponsors (Crompton, 2014; Piggin et al., 2017), and it is likely that rugby organisations and events supported by alcohol sponsorships will increasingly face greater scrutiny. Another commodity that played a part in reproducing the ideology of Japanese masculinity at the 2019 RWC was Lipovitan-D, the energy drink manufactured by Taisho Pharmaceutical. Lipovitan-D was the first energy drink, which contains taurine as its primary ingredient, to be sold in Japan during the 1960’s and has been the market’s most recognised product ever since. The product is best known for its brand slogan ‘Fight! One shot!’ (Faito! Ippatsu!) and its long-running series of television commercials that feature athletic or muscular male actors overcoming crisis moments in adventure activities in the wilderness. As Roberson (2005) points out, the brand image of Lipovitan-D has been constructed by “the association of their energy- and strength-providing products with the strength of the men in their commercials” (p. 377). In the context of post-war Japan when the workaholic and masculine culture of Japanese ‘salaryman’ was discursively constructed, the advertising messages and representations of energy drinks including Lipovitan-D were “predominantly male in orientation and masculinist and middle-class in composition” (Roberson, 2005, p. 369). While these overtly masculine and patriarchal representations have changed over time, Lipovitan-D, in particular, has maintained its ties with sport through advertising that uses male athlete celebrities (e.g. Michael Leitch from rugby, Kazuyoshi Miura from football and Rui Hachimura from basketball) and the sponsorship of the Japanese national rugby team since 2001. As one of RWC 2019’s official sponsors, Lipovitan-D was promoted through product giveaways

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to match attendees at stadiums and through the sale of limited edition, specially designed, bottles featuring pictures of the players from the Brave Blossoms. Highlighting how corporations leverage sport mega-events to globalise their brands, Taisho Pharmaceutical and its iconic product— Lipovitan-D—were recently named as an official sponsor for the 2023 RWC as well as the most iconic brand in the world of rugby, the New Zealand All Blacks. However, the growth and popularity of the brand is not without resistance. Similar to concerns about alcohol sponsorship there are emerging expectations on the fast-food and beverage industries to demonstrate greater social responsibility in relation to their promotional initiatives. For example, public health officials are putting sports mega-event organisers on notice with respect to products containing high sugar, fat, sodium and other unhealthy ingredients (Crompton, 2014). Given its global ambitions, it is likely that Lipovitan-D will be increasingly scrutinised in relation to its impact on health, particularly children and adolescents. According to the Rugby World Cup 2019 Organising Committee (2020), when analysing match ticket purchases by spectator category and gender the results revealed a clear gender imbalance of those classified as domestic ‘core fans’ (79% were Male versus 21% Female); of those classified as domestic ‘non-core fans’ (69% were Male versus 31% Female); and with respect to ‘overseas fans’ (78% were Male versus 22% Female). This data further confirmed that the event was overwhelmingly organised by men, played by men, watched by men and sponsored by the brands that target men. As such, the 2019 RWC served to reproduce and reinforce the relationship between rugby and commodities that have long been associated with hegemonic masculinity. Perhaps we should not be surprised given that it is common knowledge that Japan lags far behind most of the other advanced economies with respect to achieving gender equity. According to the World Economic Forum’s (2021) Global Gender Gap Report, Japan ranked 120th out of 156 countries for gender equality mostly due to significantly lower rates of representation of women in senior managerial positions (14.7%) and parliament (9.9%). In February 2021, just six months prior to the opening ceremony, the relationship between sport and gender inequality in Japan was brought to the world’s attention when Yoshiro Mori, the president of the Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games Organising Committee, resigned over offensive sexist remarks. In an effort to turn this negative publicity around, a female politician, Seiko Hashimoto, was appointed to replace Mori and female

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tennis star, Naomi Osaka, was selected to light the cauldron at the opening ceremony. The resignation of Mori—a former Prime Minister, a former rugby player, and a former President of the Japan Rugby Football Union—brought into sharp relief the unquestioned and naturalised relationship between the politics of sport mega-events and hegemonic masculinity in Japan. To this extent, it is likely that sport, including megaevents, and the wider network of sponsorship and promotional culture that reproduces aspects of hegemonic masculinity will be increasingly under the public microscope in the years ahead.

Conclusion Sport mega-events such as the Olympic Games, the FIFA World Cup and the Rugby World Cup are extraordinarily popular global media spectacles that are steeped in passion, politics and nationalism. Moreover, beyond their role as arenas of elite sport performances these events have become strategic instruments and vehicles within the promotional projects of nations, regions and urban centres all of which are competing for investment and tourists within the competitive global economy. Yet, sport mega-events are also complex, contradictory and costly undertakings that benefit some individuals, groups and organisations while disempowering others. Thus, they are also important sites of scholarly analysis given their strategic location at the intersection of key sectors of society and amidst pressing contemporary political-economic and sociocultural debates related to inequality, human rights and environmental sustainability. This chapter examined the contested terrain of RWC 2019 on the occasion of the events’ inaugural hosting within Asia. Despite myriad critiques and concerns, the event attracted enormous attention both locally and globally. With respect to the host nation’s sporting performance, it was an unquestionable success. Moreover, based on a range of standard sport mega-event evaluative criteria including: media and live attendance figures, local and global profile and reported financial surplus, the event had some positive outcomes. Yet, similar to all contemporary sport mega-events RWC 2019 revealed a number of controversies, complexities and contradictions that collectively constitute a contested terrain. Our analysis focused on three aspects of the contested terrain of the 2019 RWC including: space/territory, bodies and commodities.

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With respect to the contested terrain of space/territory, Japan’s hosting of 2019 RWC revealed challenges familiar to most host countries. For example, increasingly sport mega-event bid proposals require evidence that the entire country versus just the main metropolitan centres will benefit. Notably, this aligns well with the promotional appeals of local organising committees who know that a key determinant of gaining public support is by convincing all citizens, but particularly those on the periphery, that their city or region will share in the success of the event. In the case of 2019, RWC the Japanese local organising committee certainly tried to ensure that all regions were represented. However, the reality is that the main cities hosted more matches including the premier games which certainly attracted more fans, tourists, media exposure and revenue. Moreover, in hindsight the government’s promises to award games to regions recovering from the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and the Tsunami seemed rather hollow given that Kamaishi was the only city from north-eastern Japan to host matches. Sadly, Kamaishi’s elation in hosting RWC games came at great expense given the costs associated with building and running a new stadium that will likely require substantial public funding well into the future. With respect to the contested terrain of bodies, RWC 2019 presented Japan with both a challenge and an opportunity amidst the Brave Blossom’s emerging face of multiculturalism. On the one hand, Japan faced the challenge of presenting a national team consisting of a majority of players from foreign countries. In fact, 16 out of 31 eligible players for Japan were foreign-born and while this no doubt bolstered the strength of their team, the foreignness of these multi-ethnic players was particularly conspicuous within a nation that continues to see itself, however mythically, as racially and ethnically homogeneous (Lie, 2001; Narzary, 2004). However, the strategic creation and promotion of the ‘One Team’ campaign that celebrated the Brave Blossom’s racial/ethnic diversity certainly seemed to encourage public engagement with the ideas of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism. Only, time will tell whether or not Japan’s 2019 RWC success both on and off the field will serve as a turning point in terms of developing a new self-vision of the nation, diversity and citizenship or whether the celebration simply represents a form of superficial multiculturalism that masks entrenched social anxieties about racial/ethnic others (Oh & Han, 2022).

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Finally, with respect to commodities, RWC 2019 offers insights into a particular emerging contested terrain at the intersection of the globallocal nexus. On the one hand, sport mega-events serve as important occasions for the development of international trade and the promotion of brands. In the case of RWC 2019, we witnessed consolidation and promotion of two particular commodities and brands: Heineken beer and energy drink Lipovitan-D. In 2019 Heineken, a global company with over 300 beer brands, partnered with one of Japan’s largest beverage companies Kirin to increase their sales in association with the event. However, as previously noted even such a powerful alliance never guarantees future success as evidenced by the fact that a rival Japanese beer company, Asahi Breweries, secured sponsorship rights for the 2023 RWC in France. Further evidence of the leveraging potential of sport mega-events such as RWC 2019 appears in the case of Lipovitan-D. A popular beverage in its own right within Japan, Lipovitan-D has not only secured a sponsorship deal with the New Zealand All Blacks, like Asahi Breweries, it is also an official sponsor of RWC 2023. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to explore the complexities of corporate partnerships but what is clear is that sport mega-events serve as strategic moments through which both local and global brands seek to maximise exposure and pursue new opportunities while this is inherently linked to the complex relations among sport, commodities and the reproduction of hegemonic masculinity (Gee & Jackson, 2017). Over the past three decades, “Asia” has emerged as a major regional player in hosting sport mega-events. And, given a combination of major geo-political power shifts from West to East and particular nation-state ambitions there are signs that sport mega-events will remain important vehicles to achieve multiple objectives within the region. However, challenges remain. For example, while World Rugby continues to develop its plan to expand the sport in Asia it must balance this with a show of loyalty to traditional rugby nations and with investment in other strategic regions, such as North America. This may explain why Australia and the USA were awarded hosting rights for Rugby World Cups 2027 and 2031, respectively. Moreover, beyond the internal strategic planning challenges facing World Rugby there are other, perhaps more concerning issues for those responsible for organising sport mega-events. For example, within the context of current global diplomatic crises, sport has again emerged as a powerful and tactical form of sanction and this could impact on hosting

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aspirations of nations who violate the rules of the international community. And, we should not overlook the fact that these global tensions are occurring at a time when there is also increasing scrutiny of the legacy failures of previous sport mega-events, and the international sport organisations such as the IOC, FIFA and World Rugby that oversee them. Only, time will tell whether or not such failures will threaten and disrupt their privileged position.

References Asahi Shimbun. (2019a, October 24). Tatwo bunka, nayamu onsen: Ragub¯ı Whai meguri wakareta tai¯ o (Hot springs in trouble: Polarised responses to the Rugby World Cup). Retrieved from https://digital.asahi.com/articles/DA3 S14230423.html Asahi Shimbun. (2019b, November 13). Zenya ni susumerareta maboroshi no puran: taih¯ u de ayabumareta W-hai nippon-sukottorando sen (Unrealised plan that was prepared the night before: The typhoon threatened the match between Japan and Scotland). Retrieved from https://digital.asahi.com/art icles/DA3S14254212.html?iref=pc_photo_gallery_breadcrumb Asahi Shimbun. (2019c, December 23). Ragub¯ı W-hai no nekky¯ o 15 (Frenzy of Rugby World Cup No. 15). Retrieved from http://digital.asahi.com/area/ iwate/articles/MTW20191223031420001.html?ref=comkiji_txt_end Bunshun Online. (2019, September 6). Ragub¯ı W-hai nihon daihy¯ o no hans¯ u 15 nin ga kaigai shusshin: ‘iwakan arisugi’ to omottahito e tsutaetaikoto (15 players, a half of the RWC Japanese team, are foreign-born: What I want to say to those who felt ‘too uncomfortable’). Retrieved from https://bunshun. jp/articles/-/13761 Chiba, N., Ebihara, O., & Morino, S. (2001). Globalization, naturalization and identity: The case of borderless elite athletes in Japan. International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 36(2), 203–221. Cho, Y., & Kobayashi, K. (2019). Disrupting the nation-ness in postcolonial East Asia: Discourses of Jong Tae-Se as a Zainichi Korean sport celebrity. The International Journal of the History of Sport, 36(7–8), 681–697. Crompton, J. L. (2014). Potential negative outcomes from sponsorship for a sport property. Managing Leisure, 19(6), 420–441. Donnelly, P., & Donnelly, M. K. (2013). The London 2012 olympics: A gender equality audit. Centre for Sport Policy Studies Research Report. Toronto: Centre for Sport Policy Studies, Faculty of Kinesiology and Physical Education, University of Toronto.

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Flyvbjerg, B., & Stewart, A. (2016, July). The Oxford Olympics Study 2016: Cost and cost overrun at the games. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi. org/10.2139/ssrn.280455 Gamble on Japan Hosting World Cup Proved a Winner: Gosper. (2019, August 3). France24 Network. https://www.france24.com/en/20190803-gamblejapan-hosting-world-cup-proved-winner-gosper Gee, S., & Jackson, S. (2017). Sport, promotional culture and the crisis of masculinity. Palgrave Macmillan. Groothuis, P. A., & Rotthoff, K. W. (2016). The economic impact and civic pride effects of sports teams and mega-events: Do the public and the professionals agree? Economic Affairs, 36(1), 21–32. Horne, J. (2007). The four “knowns” of sports mega-events. Leisure Studies, 26(1), 81–96. Horne, J., & Manzenreiter, W. (Eds.). (2002). Japan, Korea and the 2002 World Cup. Routledge. Horne, J., & Manzenreiter, W. (2006). An introduction to the sociology of sports mega-events. The Sociological Review, 54(2), 1–24. Jackson, S. J., & Scherer, J. (2013). Rugby World Cup 2011: Sport mega-events and the contested terrain of space, bodies and commodities. Sport in Society, 16(7), 883–898. Kelly, W. W., & Brownell, S. (Eds.). (2011). The Olympics in East Asia: Nationalism, regionalism, and globalism on the center stage of the world sports. CEAS Occasional Publication Series. Book. 3. http://elischolar.library.yale. edu/ceas_publication_series/3 Lie, J. (2001). Multiethnic Japan. Harvard University Press. Light, R. (2008). Learning masculinities in a Japanese high school rugby club. Sport, Education and Society, 13(2), 163–179. Lin, Y. (2013). A critical review of social impacts of mega-events. The International Journal of Sport and Society: Annual Review, 3(3), 57–64. Maennig, W., & Zimbalist, A. (2012). What is a mega sporting event? In W. Maennig & A. Zimbalist (Eds.), International handbook on the economics of mega sporting event (pp. 9–14). Edward Elgar. Mainichi Shimbun. (2019d, September 19). Naze? Abe Shush¯ o, ragub¯ı j¯ aji no sebang¯ o ni kush¯ o: NZ shush¯ o to kaidan (Why? Prime Minister Abe gives a wry smile at the number on the rugby jersey: Meeting with NZ Prime Minister). Retrieved from https://mainichi.jp/articles/20190919/k00/00m/010/232 000c Narzary, D. C. (2004). The myths of Japanese ‘homogeneity.’ China Report, 40(3), 311–319. New Zealand Herald. (2013, September 15). Kiwi woman barred over ta moko. Retrieved from https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/kiwi-woman-barred-over-tamoko/JCQ5TAJNEBQ7O6LSJKT6TQAFTU/

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Oh, D., & Han, M. W. (2022). Globalization from above and below: Rejecting superficial multiculturalism and igniting anti-Korean sentiment in Japan. International Journal of Cultural, 25(1), 51–67. Phillips, J. (1996). A man’s country? The image of the pakeha male: A history (2nd ed.). Penguin Books. Piggin, J., Tlili, H., & Louzada, B. H. (2017). How does health policy affect practice at a sport mega event? A study of policy, food and drink at Euro 2016. International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics, 9(4), 739–751. Porter, D. R., & Sam, M. P. (2013). Playing the shell game: The Faustian bargain for Dunedin’s stadium. Sport in Society, 16(7), 931–942. Preuss, H. (2007). The conceptualisation and measurement of mega sport event legacies. Journal of Sport and Tourism, 12(3–4), 207–228. Preuss, (2022). Re-analysis, measurement and misperceptions of cost, overruns at Olympic Games. International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics. https:// doi.org/10.1080/19406940.2022.2037685 Pringle, R., & Markula, P. (2005). No pain is sane after all: A Foucauldian analysis of masculinities and men’s rugby experiences of fear, pain, and pleasure. Sociology of Sport Journal, 22(4), 472–497. Reuters. (2019, April 25). Leitch: From ‘the foreign kid’ to captain of Japan’s national rugby team. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/japanimmigration-rugby-union-leitch-idINKCN1S10ZL Roberson, J. (2005). Fight!! Ippatsu!!: “Genki” Energy drinks and the marketing of masculine ideology in Japan. Men and Masculinities, 7 (4), 365–384. Roche, M. (2000). Mega-events and modernity. Routledge. Rugby World Cup 2019 Organising Committee. (2020). Rugby World Cup 2019: Review of outcomes. Retrieved from https://rugby-japan.s3.ap-northe ast-1.amazonaws.com/file/html/142194_5ef159914fe37.pdf Scherer, J., & Jackson, S. (2013). The contested terrain of the New Zealand All Blacks: Rugby, commerce, and cultural politics in the age of globalization. Peter Lang. Scherer, J., & Sam, M. P. (2008). Public consultation and stadium developments: Coercion and the polarization of debate. Sociology of Sport Journal, 25(4), 443–461. Shokuhin Sangyo Shimbunsha. (2019 December 25). Haineken Kirin to Kirin B¯ıru, ragub¯ı w¯ arudokappu nihontaikai no seik¯ o ni ¯ okiku k¯ oken (Heineken Kirin and Kirin Beer contributed to the success of the Rugby World Cup in Japan). Retrieved from https://www.ssnp.co.jp/news/liquor/2019/12/2019-12251725-16.html The Economic Impact of Rugby World Cup 2019. (2020). EY Consulting, Tokyo, Japan.

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Tokyo Metropolitan Government. (2022). Statistics. Appendices. About Our City. Retrieved from https://www.metro.tokyo.lg.jp/english/about/app endix/appendix02.html Toyo Keizai Online. (2019, November 2). Ragub¯ı W-hai ‘b¯ıru kessen’: sh¯ osha wa darenanoka (‘Beer war’ at the Rugby World Cup: What was the winner?). Retrieved from https://toyokeizai.net/articles/-/312174?page=2 The Japan Times. (2020, June 25). Japan praised for hosting successful Rugby World Cup. Retrieved from https://www.japantimes.co.jp/sports/2020/06/ 25/rugby/japan-praised-hosting-successful-rugby-world-cup/ Wenner, L. A., & Jackson, S. J. (Eds.). (2009). Sport, beer, and gender: Promotional culture and contemporary social life. Peter Lang. World Economic Forum. (2021). Global Gender Gap Report 2021. Retrieved from https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2021.pdf

CHAPTER 11

The Local Politics of Rugby World Cup 2019 Through the Disaster Recovery Process in Kamaishi, Japan Masatoshi Mukoyama and Masayuki Takao

Introduction What does hosting a sports mega-event (hereinafter “SME”) mean for a city that suffered serious damage from a natural disaster? After the Great East Japan Earthquake (hereinafter “GEJE”) occurred on 11 March 2011, questions raised about the justification of hosting an SME created a sticky situation in Japan. This was because not only was Japan set to host the Rugby World Cup in 2019 (hereinafter “RWC2019”) eight years after the disaster, but Tokyo also intended to bid as the host city for the

M. Mukoyama (B) Faculty of Letters, Chuo University, Tokyo, Japan e-mail: [email protected] M. Takao Department of Physical Education, Tokai University, Hiratsuka, Japan e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. Kobayashi et al. (eds.), Sports Mega-Events in Asia, Palgrave Series of Sport in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0011-4_11

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Olympic and Paralympic Games to be held in 2020.2 The GEJE that gave rise to these questions was a major earthquake with a magnitude of 9.0, the largest recorded in Japan, triggering huge tsunamis resulting in a catastrophe.3 Tsunamis reaching up to 40 metres hit the Pacific coast of northeast Japan, causing damage in an area covering over 400 kilometres. The huge tsunamis completely destroyed more than 120,000 houses, leaving more than 20,000 people dead or missing. This also caused the accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, and the unprecedented disaster forced 470,000 people during peak periods to live in evacuation shelters. As shown by the fact that the central government requested local governments to formulate a 10-year reconstruction plan immediately after the disaster, the damage caused by the major disaster was so extraordinary that it would undoubtedly require a decade to complete the reconstruction. As people dealt with this critical post-disaster situation, the rhetoric to advance preparations for the event “promoting reconstruction by hosting an SME” emerged. This was backed by mainly two arguments. Firstly, the SME could foster positive emotions such as dreams and hope and encourage the distressed people who had lost so much. Secondly, preparations for the event would involve urban development that promotes building infrastructure in life-related areas such as housing, transportation, commerce and education, and as a result push reconstruction projects forward. In short, the “organizing side” including sports-related agencies and the central government used such rhetoric to link two seemingly unrelated concepts of “hosting an SME” with “disaster reconstruction.” Similar rhetoric to host an SME to improve the difficult living conditions of host city residents has been used besides reconstruction from a natural disaster, not only for the RWC2019 and the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games but also for other SMEs. The London 2012 Olympic Games were positioned as an opportunity to break the poverty cycle in the Stratford District of East London (Jarvie, 2012), and the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil and the Rio de Janeiro 2016 Olympic Games were considered opportunities to solve the livelihood issues of people facing difficult situations by leveraging private funds injected for the events (McKinsey & Company, 2015). As seen in these cases, the rhetoric to improve the livelihood of urban residents by hosting an SME has primarily been used by the “organizing side” of the event.

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Meanwhile, there have been some criticism (Watt, 2013; Williamson, 2017) in response to such rhetoric to use hosting of an SME as an opportunity to promote the resolution of social issues. Such examples include the research by Watt (2013) that highlighted the realities of the London 2012 Olympic Games that displaced local low-income residents who lived there before the event in order to achieve poverty reduction in the event area, and Williamson (2017) shed light on the realities of how the Rio de Janeiro 2016 Olympic Games provided a suitable excuse for the eviction of favela residents and contributed to channelling of profits to particular private businesses. The common factor among these criticisms is the deception practiced by the “organizing side” to use SMEs to push forward with urban development associated with gentrification and segregation in the socioeconomic history of the area where the event is held. In other words, previous research has exposed the realities of the “side affected by the organizers (host city residents)” shaped by neoliberal urban development, which does not result in fulfilling the rhetoric of “resolution of social issues” used by the “organizing side.” On the one hand, the consequences of the rhetoric “promoting reconstruction by hosting an SME” used to host SMEs in Japan has not been fully examined. In discussing the vague connection between “hosting an SME” and “disaster reconstruction,” the focus of criticism has been on the intentions of the “organizing side” such as the Government of Japan, Tokyo Metropolitan Government, and the Japanese Olympic Committee based in Tokyo far away from the north-eastern area of Japan that suffered extensive damage from the tsunami (Ishizaka, 2020; Saeki, 2015; Tsukahara, 2016). However, almost none of these studies considered views of those in the specific livelihoods of the disaster-affected area (Mukoyama, 2019). Considering that the disaster-affected local governments and urban residents are the main parties of disaster reconstruction, previous studies are one-sided portrayals that left out the feelings and acts of people on the “side affected by the organizers.” This chapter, therefore, will describe the negotiation process between the local government and host city residents in relation to the RWC2019 Kamaishi matches (hereinafter, “Kamaishi matches”) held in Kamaishi City, Iwate Prefecture, a city affected by the GEJE and clarify the reasons for requesting to host RWC2019 matches at a time immediately after the disaster and its consequences. The reason for taking up the Kamaishi matches as a case is because Kamaishi is the only Pacific coastal city hit by the GEJE that has hosted an SME. The process leading up

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to the Kamaishi matches will be traced based on interview comments of local government officials (16 persons) and community leaders (3 persons) obtained during a field work conducted between June 2014 and November 2021.4 The results of a questionnaire conducted by the authors in October 2018 will also be used as supplement.5 This chapter focuses on the disaster reconstruction process through an SME in the Unosumai area that suffered the most damage in Kamaishi City and is also the location of the new stadium.6

Kamaishi City, Iwate Prefecture Kamaishi City that prospered as the “city of steel” in the 1960s is a small-scale city located in northeast Japan and in direct distance of approximately 450 kilometres from Tokyo. The city is situated around a narrow, low-lying area surrounded on three sides by mountains along the Pacific coast. This geographical feature of the area historically prone to tsunami damage was also the source of development for the city. In fact, abundant marine products from the Pacific Ocean supported the development of its fishing industry. The mountains surrounding the city also had rich deposits of iron ore, which led to the construction of Japan’s first western-style blast furnace in 1857. Since then, the city developed as the “city of steel” with a steel manufacturer and its affiliated companies at its core. The population of Kamaishi City reached nearly 90,000 at its height as a leading industrial city in Japan during the 1960s, with the steel manufacturer and affiliated company employees and their families accounting for more than 30% (Seki, 2013). However, starting in 1964, as management streamlining policies were taken by the steel manufacturer’s headquarters in response to the changing business environment in Japan and abroad, the plant facilities were reduced and the employees were reassigned to other business locations (Nippon Steel Corporation Kamaishi Works, 1986). Continued streamlining policies resulted in an outflow of the middle-aged population who supported local industries as well as their wives and children, which led to accelerating the aging of the population of Kamaishi. In addition, the city fell behind other inland industrial cities in developing transportation infrastructure and also began to lose its characteristic as the “city of steel” (Niibari, 2013). As the characteristic of Kamaishi as the “city of steel” weakened, what instilled pride as a Kamaishi citizen was the success of the rugby team

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at the steel plant. The team won the All-Japan Rugby Football Championship seven consecutive times from 1979 to 1985. This feat stirred enthusiasm among the citizens who had been experiencing first-hand the decline of the city. Many citizens took overnight buses to see the finals of the All-Japan Rugby Football Championship at the National Stadium in Tokyo, and eagerly supported the rugby team by waving traditional fisherman’s “big catch” flags. This great achievement and the image of supportive citizens made Kamaishi City known throughout the nation as the “city of rugby.” However, the “memories of the seven straight wins” by Kamaishi faded with time, as the steel plant rugby team struggled in the years that followed. One of the reasons for the rugby team’s slump was the decline of the key industry, and this led to a drop in population and an increase in the aging rate or percentage of the population aged 65 or older, which became a major social issue in the history of Kamaishi City. This was coupled with the national trend of rural areas suffering from depopulation as people relocated to metropolitan areas. The population of Kamaishi City was 92,123 people at its peak in 1963 right before the management streamlining policies were implemented and dropped to 39,574 people in 2010, the year before the GEJE.7 The aging rate increased sharply over the 50 years between 1960 and 2010 from 3.4% to 34.8%.8 The population of Unosumai area, the focus of this chapter, saw a similar but delayed trend compared with the city as a whole, with a peak of 9,825 people in 1981 dropping to 6,630 people right before the disaster (Feb, 2011).9 The aging rate in this area was 30.8% as of March 2011.10 The industrial trend in the city centre had an impact on the population of the area because it served as a bed town for company workers commuting to the city centre. As a measure to counter this social issue of depopulation that spread throughout the city due to industrial decline, for many years the local government strived to reduce its reliance on the steel industry and broaden the range of supporting industries to become a “complex industrial city” (Niibari, 2013).11 On 11 March 2011, the GEJE occurred that caused a major loss to the coastal area of Kamaishi City. The large tsunami triggered by the earthquake destroyed the breakwaters at the bay mouth, which was supposed to protect the residents, swept away 4,700 houses (approximately 29% of all buildings in Kamaishi City) and took the lives of 1,062 residents. The devastating damage forced more than 10,000 residents to evacuate from their homes (Kamaishi City, 2021). The coastal roads and railways

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essential to living were also destroyed, making coming and going even within the city difficult. Quite a few public sports facilities were also damaged. Even the facilities that were not totally destroyed did not serve their original purpose, as they were turned into emergency shelters or had temporary housing built on the premises (Mukoyama, 2014). The Unosumai area that was located in the low-lying area also suffered enormous damage, and many of the community residents were forced to consider relocation. The huge tsunami that hit the area had in fact destroyed as many as 1,690 houses and claimed the lives of 583 residents (Kamaishi City, 2012). This means that the disaster brought devastating damage to the Unosumai area, with two out of three people losing their homes, and almost one out of ten people losing their lives. In addition, the earthquake and tsunami caused major damage to the land due to subsidence and inundation. Although flat land to reconstruct houses could be recovered by removing the debris after the natural disasters in the past, major construction for levelling was required this time. Therefore, residents had to consider whether to wait for many years until the land is restored or to quickly move out of the area to rebuild their lives (Hirayama, 2013). Many of those who had lost their homes and lived in temporary housing in the Unosumai area did not seek to relocate to other areas but decided to rebuild their lives in the same area that retained the memory of the tsunami. This meant that these residents hoped to relocate from temporary to permanent housing, either a stand-alone house or housing complex, in the area where they lived before the disaster. One of the reasons these residents sought so-called sumi-modori, or return to live in the same area with memories of the huge tsunami, was that their residence was based on the house and land that they owned before the disaster.12 In other words, although fear of tsunami had not been removed, circumstances did not allow them to easily part with the property that they owned. However, there still was a remained concern that the residents must endure many years of wait and would eventually give up “sumi-modori.” Because Kamaishi City suffered devastating damage due to the GEJE as described, the local government needed to respond not only to chronic social issues that existed before the disaster, but also to new social issues that emerged after the disaster. In particular, the following three areas needed to be addressed. Firstly, emergency disaster response was required. This included restoring the minimum quality of life through

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debris removal, temporary housing construction and compensation of living expenses, which needed to be resolved within a short timeline of a few days to a few weeks. The second was medium-term response. This included support for disaster-affected residents to rebuild their lives through securing permanent housing and employment and rebuilding the community destroyed by the disaster, which needed to be resolved on a medium-term timeline of a few months to a few years. The third was longterm response. This included issues that existed before the disaster, such as declines in the industry and population, which needed to be addressed on the long term of a few years to ten or more years. The local government had to respond simultaneously to these social issues that needed to be resolved in different time spans. It was amid the state of emergency requiring response to multitiered social issues when Kamaishi City first heard about the initiative to host RWC2019 matches locally.

Process Related to Hosting the Rugby World Cup 2019 Kamaishi Matches Creation of the Initiative to Host the RWC The initiative to host the Kamaishi matches was brought in from a party outside the city, and it caused a discord with the city that still faced a critical situation at the time. In July 2011, just four months after the disaster, an NPO from the Tokyo area proposed the initiative to host the RWC to the mayor. Although this initiative aimed to promote disaster reconstruction, it deviated significantly from the essential needs of Kamaishi City to recover their livelihoods. In fact, the initiative was inappropriate at a time when search for missing persons still continued, the city had piles of debris, and many residents were living in evacuation shelters set up at gymnasiums. As an official from the local government mentioned: We first received the proposal on the initiative to host the RWC when the local citizens were still enduring harsh living conditions. We were still removing debris and taking measures to secure the living conditions of those who survived. At a time like that, how could we discuss hosting the World Cup [with the citizens]? The most important issue at hand was to rebuild people’s lives. (Local government high official Mr. A, interview on September 7, 2016)

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Meanwhile, the local government also needed to respond to mediumto long-term issues and prepared the “Kamaishi City Reconstruction Basic Plan (hereinafter, “Reconstruction Plan”)” into which the initiative to host the RWC2019 was incorporated. This plan outlined the basic policy for the 10 years following the disaster, as requested by the central government only a few months after the disaster. According to the Reconstruction Plan announced in December 2011, “community building through sports” was set forth as one of the basic goals, and “RWC2019 to boost reconstruction” was incorporated as one of the specific projects for community building. Although the initiative to host the RWC was certainly far removed from the city’s immediate needs, it was sought as one of the options to expand the city’s medium- to long-term development potential. This was how the initiative to host the RWC came to be incorporated in the Reconstruction Plan by the local government. How did this situation evolve when the disaster reconstruction efforts shift from emergency response to a medium-term response? The next section traces the process of how Kamaishi City reviewed the initiative to host the RWC. Deliberation of the Initiative to Host the RWC As delays occurred in reconstruction projects caused by a nationwide shortage of resources, the “sumi-modori” timing and securing the safety of residents became difficult to forecast. In fact, these delays in civil construction forced many residents to postpone their plans to return to the “sumi-modori” area many times. Moreover, the completion of the tide embankment and floodgate essential to guarantee the safety of the area was postponed from the initial schedule in March 2016 to March 2018. These delays in reconstruction projects were due to the following situation. Due to the extensive damage of the GEJE, domestic demand for resources required for reconstruction surged. The resources were then aggressively acquired by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government preparing to host the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games and by major inland cities with a high concentration of the automotive industry. In other words, these large cities leveraged their strong nationwide presence and financial power to gather up resources including materials and engineers.

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Under such frustrating circumstances, the residents who came to know about the initiative to host the RWC strongly opposed it. For instance, the following is how a resident felt when he first heard about the initiative. At first, I couldn’t believe what I was hearing. It was hardly the time to think about those things [like hosting the RWC]. I couldn’t have such discussions when I didn’t even know where I could build my own house. (Community leader Mr. B, interview on September 23, 2019)

This comment describes the state of the residents who were stunned by the intentions of the local government to propose a rugby event that was irrelevant to their lives, at a time when the residents sought more than anything to rebuild their lives. Meanwhile, the local government needed to address medium- to longterm issues. In order to curb the long-standing issue of population decline, the local government recognized the need to put in place conditions to promote a shift toward a complex industrial city by utilizing the RWC2019 event. A city officer engaged in formulating a comprehensive policy at the time recalls the intentions of the local government side as follows. It was important to think about “how we would reconstruct.” Simply returning the city to the state before the disaster would revert us back to the same social issues. We needed some kind of mechanism to create impact. We needed to sow seeds that would lead to future development. (Former local government official Mr. C, interview on August 19, 2016)

As described by this comment, the local government side had a strong sense of crisis that simply returning to the pre-disaster state would result in the same pre-disaster social issues. The RWC2019 initiative surfaced just as they were agonizing over this difficult problem, so the local government came to expect the initiative as an opportunity to expand the city’s development potential. For example, there were expectations that a newly-built stadium would serve as the “seed” for sports tourism to bloom. Also, it was expected that the RWC2019 would be the “mechanism” to not only compensate for the delay in transportation infrastructure development that had created the economic disparity with the inland area, but perhaps allow the city to be successful in becoming a complex industrial city (Mukoyama, 2019).

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Subsequently, while understanding the resident’s frustration toward the initiative to host the RWC, the local government began to have some sort of an expectation toward the RWC2019, despite not necessarily having a clear strategy. The next section will focus on the ways in which the intentions of the local government and residents were aligned to support the initiative to host the RWC. How the Intentions of the Local Government and the Residents Aligned While the local government could not take the next step to officially bid as a host city, activities to support Kamaishi’s candidacy spread inside and outside the city. In the city, for example, volunteer residents mainly living in the inland area undamaged by the tsunami established the “Committee to Bring RWC2019 to Kamaishi” in May 2014 and promoted a grassroots campaign to enhance the momentum towards the bid. And on 30 June 2014, endorsement letters to bid as a host city collected from around 50 organizations in Kamaishi City were handed to the mayor of Kamaishi City.13 In addition, key organizations related to Kamaishi’s industries, including the association of commerce and industry, the local tourism and products association and the shopping centre association, requested the mayor to submit an official bid.14 This move to support Kamaishi’s bid was also seen outside the city. In fact, the NPO that had proposed the initiative to host the RWC organized related events in Tokyo, and a parliamentary association offered special support to realize the matches at Kamaishi.15 Pressed by stakeholders in and out of the city to make a decision, the mayor officially decided on the candidacy on 4 July 2014—around three years after the disaster. At the announcement to bid to host the matches, while reconfirming that rebuilding the lives of the citizens remained the top priority for the city, the mayor explained the following three reasons behind the candidacy. First, it was because many people requested that Kamaishi City host the matches as the “city of rugby.” Second, it was because hosting the event would bring dreams and hope to the children affected by the disaster. And third, it was because hosting the RWC would show the world how Kamaishi City has reconstructed and offer a chance to express appreciation for the post-disaster assistance received from around the world. Furthermore, the documents distributed to the

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media at the candidacy announcement stipulated that, should the city win the bid, not only would a new stadium vital to hosting the matches be built, but also highways and railways connecting Kamaishi City with major cities in the area, and the tide embankment and floodgate essential to guarantee the safety of the event would be built by the opening day of RWC2019. In other words, the local government positioned the Kamaishi matches as an opportunity not only to simply build a new stadium but also to “boost reconstruction” by developing infrastructure for transportation and safety and enhancing the quality of life of Kamaishi City. Efforts to realize hosting the event went into full gear after the mayor’s candidacy announcement, and the Kamaishi matches gradually took shape as an event with an anticipation that it would strongly support the residents to rebuild their lives. In August 2014, the month following the announcement, a meeting gathering parties concerned was convened at Unosumai area to explain the candidacy as a host city. At the meeting, concerns that reconstruction budget would be diverted to prepare for the event were initially voiced. However, the residents’ interests eventually focused on one point. That was whether the Kamaishi matches could stop the delay in building the tide embankment and floodgate, which was causing the delay in realizing a safe “sumi-modori.” When asked by residents whether the Kamaishi matches would advance the disaster reconstruction that had been delayed, the mayor answered as follows. Asked whether or not it will push reconstruction forward, I think it will (. . . .) Having a goal like this will send a clear message to people in Tokyo. Requests to “accelerate reconstruction” become clearer by having specific requests to “build roads and tide embankments by a certain date”. (Mayor, Summary of the minutes of the “Town Reconstruction Council” on August 10, 2014)

As such, the mayor first declared that the Kamaishi matches would push reconstruction forward. Moreover, he presented his opinion that if Kamaishi were to host the RWC2019, politicians and bureaucrats or the “people in Tokyo” would not be able to neglect the issue of delays in infrastructure development that was essential to securing the safety of “sumi-modori.” The residents who heard this comment took the local government’s claim that the “RWC2019 will boost reconstruction” not

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simply as a rhetoric but as the mayor’s pledge. The residents who anticipated that the Kamaishi matches would in fact promote “sumi-modori” submitted a “Request to promote the bid for the Rugby World Cup” to the mayor through a community organization at a later date, and officially declared to support the initiative to host the RWC2019.16 On 2 March 2015, Kamaishi City was chosen as one of the 12 host cities at the Rugby World Cup Limited board meeting in Dublin, Ireland.17 Thus, Kamaishi hosting the RWC was positioned as an initiative comparable to a national project, and various preparations got underway to meet the opening day deadline.18 Rugby World Cup 2019 Kamaishi Matches and After-Effects Conditions to rebuild the livelihoods of the people of Unosumai area were gradually met as infrastructure development progressed with opening day of the Kamaishi matches as the deadline, just as the local government and residents expected. From the middle of 2018, one year before the event, the stadium, highway and railways, as well as the tide embankment and floodgate near the stadium that the residents had longed for were completed. Reconstruction projects that had been promoted apart from the event preparations were also in their final stages, and facilities required for day-to-day life including public housing complexes, community centres, elementary and junior high schools and commercial facilities, and a memorial site for the tsunami victims were completed one after another. By the end of March 2019, six months before the RWC, transfers for all land lots were completed, and most residents had relocated to permanent housing that they had longed for.19 Seeing infrastructure development progress at a high pace, the residents softened their critical attitude toward the Kamaishi matches. For example, interesting results were obtained in a questionnaire of the residents that the authors conducted in October 2018 about a year before the Kamaishi matches.20 When the residents were asked to evaluate the Kamaishi matches, the results showed “positive” at 25.6%, “somewhat positive” at 37.0%, “somewhat negative” at 29.0%, and “negative” at 8.4%. This shows that 62.6% of respondents were either positive or somewhat positive about hosting the Kamaishi matches. Next, when asked about the impact of the Kamaishi matches on reconstruction projects, 22.0% chose it would “promote,” 41.1% “somewhat promote,” 23.9% “somewhat delay” and 8.2% “delay” the projects (Takao et al., 2020).21

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This shows that 63.1% of respondents thought that the Kamaishi matches would either promote or somewhat promote reconstruction projects. These results indicate that the residents’ critical attitude changed for the better because they expected the event would push forward infrastructure development. As the event approached, the common topic among residents, such as going to see the matches at the stadium and how to purchase tickets online, further increased their interest in the Kamaishi matches. On 25 September 2019, eight years after the disaster, the Kamaishi matches opened as the symbol of reconstruction. More than 14,000 people came from Japan and abroad for the Kamaishi matches, including official RWC volunteers, residents who wished to enliven the event and media people. Several programmes were held at the stadium before kickoff to highlight the fact that this was a special match hosted by a post-disaster area. All elementary and junior high school students from the city who were invited to the see the match sang “Thank You from Kamaishi” in chorus, and the spectators and players all offered a silent prayer for the disaster victims before kick-off.22 At the opening match that reminded us of the experience of the disaster, Uruguay pulled off an upset over higher-ranked Fiji, and the stadium was filled with excitement and enthusiasm. The stunning victory of the Uruguay national team was featured in media around the world in conjunction with the path followed by Kamaishi from the disaster to hosting the event. The second match was unfortunately cancelled due to a large typhoon hitting the area, but Kamaishi the “city of rugby” received high recognition for its endeavour to reconstruct from an unprecedented disaster to hosting RWC2019 matches.23 The local government positively evaluated how the Kamaishi matches were communicated globally as a symbol of reconstruction. A local government official who belonged to the main department in charge of the Kamaishi matches recalled the results of the event as follows. It was great how the children were able to express their appreciation to the world. The Japanese government also put in an effort to complete the transportation infrastructure before the event. With railways and floodgate in place, I think hosting the event had an effect on promoting infrastructure development. I feel it sped up development. (Local government official Mr. D, interview on November 9, 2021)

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As seen here, the local government official commented that through the event Kamaishi was able to “express appreciation” for the post-disaster assistance from around the world, and that hosting the event comparable to a national project sped up construction of infrastructure that had been repeatedly delayed.24 This view of the local government side matched that of the residents. In particular, the following comment by a resident articulates the role the event played in infrastructure development. It would take around 20 years to build a floodgate [of this size] if we did it in the normal way. This was completed in only five years [with the Kamaishi matches]. That’s amazing. (Community leader Mr. E, interview on September 23, 2019)

By comparing it with a floodgate built in the vicinity long before the GEJE, the resident thought that although there were delays initially in safety infrastructure, the floodgate was completed within a shorter period than he had expected. And in the background of this infrastructure development, he saw the opening day of the Kamaishi matches having a strong impact as the absolute deadline that had to be met. Meanwhile, the resident who praised the event for promoting infrastructure development also spoke about the difficult reality of how such development did not result in bringing the residents back. Our town was built, but it’s deserted here because there are very few people. (Community leader Mr. E, interview on September 23, 2019)

These few words express how the Kamaishi matches led to completing the area’s infrastructure development before opening day, but “sumimodori” has not progressed, and population decline in the area is alarming. In fact, “sumi-modori” to the central part of the area did not increase in line with the residents’ expectations, and the number of households is half of pre-disaster figures.25 Furthermore, the aging rate increased from 30.8% in March 2011 before the disaster to 37.7% in March 2020 over the period of nine years. As per the initial concern, having to wait eight years in temporary housing for a safe “sumi-modori” was much too long for the residents. Even if they strongly wished for “sumi-modori,” it would be no surprise that they gave it up due to life events such as seeking higher education, employment, retirement,

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marriage, birth of a child or death. Especially for the younger generations who prioritize the growth and education of their children, it was not easy to choose “sumi-modori” and give up the tentative but stable life they obtained in the location where they had evacuated for several years. If they had a choice to relocate to another area, it would probably have been difficult to wait eight long years for “sumi-modori.” Thus, the area surrounding the new stadium that provided the stage for excitement and enthusiasm has been deserted with vacant lots dotted with newly-built houses. An increase in the area’s population is not expected, as neither “sumi-modori” nor new residents relocating from other areas are expected. This situation represents the existence of a social issue left behind by the Kamaishi matches, which were shared with the world as the symbol of reconstruction.

Rugby World Cup 2019 in the Context of Disaster Reconstruction Expectations of Kamaishi Matches of Parties Concerned As described above, the local government placed expectations on the “deadline effect” (Mitsubishi Research Institute, 2016, p. 3) of the SME and strongly requested to host the RWC2019. The local government at first was persuaded by the fact that hosting the event would allow the repeatedly delayed infrastructure to be built before opening day despite the lack of resources. The local government, in fact, sought to host the event by pushing “city of rugby,” “inspiring dreams and hope” and “expressing appreciation” to the fore. However, what lay behind this was the assumption by the local government that the conditions to shift to a complex industrial city would be created with the large-scale, sophisticated infrastructure developed for the event (Mukoyama, 2019). In other words, they thought that creating the conditions for industrial development as quickly as possible and accumulating businesses ahead of other disaster affected cities were important to realize a complex industrial city. On the other hand, the residents that faced delays in building safety infrastructure such as the tide embankment and floodgate also placed expectations on the “deadline effect” of RWC2019 and requested to host the event. The residents who had lost many things due to the huge tsunami could not accept “sumi-modori” without the guarantee of safety. Due to these circumstances, they sought to host the Kamaishi matches

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that would lead to a safe “sumi-modori.” In other words, the residents thought that infrastructure being built to ensure the safety of players and spectators would naturally guarantee the safety of the area. Consequently, both the local government and residents placed expectations on the “deadline effect” and sought to host the Kamaishi matches. They aimed to achieve their respective goals of promoting a shift to a complex industrial city and realizing a safe “sumi-modori.” But what lay beyond the goals set by the local government and residents was a common stance toward disaster reconstruction, to recover their lives to pre-disaster conditions, although they were overwhelmed by multitiered social issues. It seems that at the core of this stance was their strong determination not to give up on the recovery of Kamaishi City or Unosumai area but to “continue living” there. Negotiations Related to the Kamaishi Matches For the residents who placed priority on overcoming critical living conditions right after the disaster, positioning the event on a medium- to long-term timeline was extremely difficult. In the post-disaster context, residents were living with painful memories of losing not only jobs and homes but also families and friends, and they were swamped with dealing with various issues to make ends meet. Under such difficult circumstances, the residents strongly opposed the idea of the Kamaishi matches that suddenly emerged. To begin with, the residents had no interest in a rugby event positioned to “further boost reconstruction” in the Reconstruction Plan, and moreover, they were concerned that reconstruction resources would be diverted to prepare for the event. This tension between the local government and the residents concerning the Kamaishi matches gradually eased due to the following two factors. First, with the passing of time after the disaster, the residents were more composed mentally and were able to think about their future and the future of the community on a longer time span. In other words, they were able to sort out their painful memories and saw light in resolving daily life issues, which had to be dealt before considering the Kamaishi matches that would contribute to resolving medium- to longterm issues. Second, as issues surfaced such as delays in infrastructure development of the tide embankment and floodgate, they thought that hosting the Kamaishi matches with a “deadline effect” would be effective to overcome the adverse situation. Therefore, the Kamaishi matches

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that were once considered an event that would deprive them of resources for reconstruction turned into an event that would attract resources. The relationship between the local government and the residents was in no way static but went through a seesawing process to reconcile conflicts of interest and opinions. The Consequences of the Kamaishi Matches The images of Kamaishi City, reconstructed to reach a sufficient level to host the RWC2019, were communicated to the world as a symbol of reconstruction. The images of children singing in appreciation, who grew up during the years from experiencing unprecedented damage to hosting the event, together with the stunning victory of the Uruguay team were used as motifs to vividly illustrate the reconstruction of the “city of rugby.” These messages sent by Kamaishi City during the event were very important for the local government and residents as a way to express their appreciation for the post-disaster assistance received from around the world. And as the local government and residents had hoped for, sports, transportation and safety infrastructure were completed by the opening day. Unosumai area had not only a newly-built stadium for international competitions, but also new commercial facilities and a memorial site for the tsunami victims which were built around the station. And the safety of these facilities as well as houses was secured thanks to the tide embankment and floodgate. As a result of all of this infrastructure development, the area transformed into a safe area with more modern buildings than before the disaster. Moreover, with the completion of the highway, travel time to the nearest major city of Sendai with a population of over one million was shortened by approximately 70 minutes (from 250 to 180 minutes), and the “quality of life” of not only Unosumai area but Kamaishi City as a whole seemed to have greatly improved. However, overcoming social issues that the local government and residents anticipated beyond the infrastructure development was not achieved. The sports tourism using the stadium and convenient highway network is not generating business at a satisfactory level, despite the local government’s expectations that it would assume a role in building a complex industrial city. This is because business could not be promoted

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fully due to unavoidable natural disasters such as the railway being washed away by the large typhoon that led to the cancellation of the second match and the COVID-19 pandemic since the end of 2019. Also, “sumimodori” strongly desired by the residents has not been progressing as expected, and a quiet and deserted townscape with very few children was created in the area. Therefore, while the modern urban space along with the extraordinary atmosphere of the Kamaishi matches were communicated as the symbol of reconstruction, challenges such as shifting to a complex industrial city and promoting “sumi-modori” still remain after the matches.

Conclusion The purpose of this chapter was to clarify the reasons for hosting an SME and its consequences for a city that suffered serious damage in a natural disaster. In order to serve this purpose, the Kamaishi matches held at a city hit by the GEJE in March 2011 was taken up as an example to trace the process leading up to the matches through examination of comments obtained from local government officials and community leaders. The findings revealed a strategy taken by the local government and residents to use the “deadline effect” of the SME to overcome the delays in reconstruction projects caused by shortage of resources. What seemed at a glance to be an irrational decision made by the disaster-affected city immediately after the disaster to host an SME was actually a rational act to secure resources for reconstruction. However, the Kamaishi matches that were communicated as the symbol of reconstruction did not resolve all social issues. The post-event reality of Kamaishi City is described in the following comment made by the mayor in March 2021, “Unfortunately, we were not able to complete all of the reconstruction projects in the 10 years following the disaster” (Kamaishi City, 2021, back side of front cover). In short, disaster reconstruction is still ongoing, and Kamaishi City continues to face challenges after the event. As sport sociologists, our challenge going forward is not only to describe in detail the issues faced by Kamaishi City, but also to search for a way to contribute to address their challenges based on the insights of research. This chapter that adopted an ethnographic approach was able to describe the complex local negotiations regarding the SME that suddenly surfaced in a unique social structure in the midst of disaster reconstruction. This reality of hosting an SME described in this chapter

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offered a point of contrast to the reality described by previous research, in which the “organizing side” unilaterally pushed forward a neoliberal urban development accompanied by segregation in the socioeconomic history of the host community. In this respect, such a situation of binary opposition of the “organizing side” and the “side affected by the organizer” used in previous research is thought to be an overly simplified framework for research. Previous research have, in fact, considerable significance for clearly describing the aggressiveness of the “organizing side” that pushed forward urban development by justifying it with “solving social issues,” and for seeking a fairer manner to resolve social issues by criticizing this situation. However, in the picture illustrated by previous research to “solve social issues” by using the SME, the underlying strengths of the parties directly concerned in the social issue were regarded much too lightly. We couldn’t be more pleased if our ethnography could provide material to generate a rich discussion on the topic about “resolving social issues using the SME as an opportunity” in this research area. Acknowledgements This work was supported by KAKENHI 19K11555

Notes 2. Tokyo won the bid to host the Olympic and Paralympic Games on September 8, 2013, over two years after the GEJE. 3. For the overview of the GEJE, refer to the Reconstruction Agency (2020). 4. The names of the interviewees have all been anonymized. Community leaders are members of the community organization, “Town Reconstruction Council” of Kamaishi City’s Unosumai area, that forms a consensus among the residents regarding disaster reconstruction and holds talks with the administration as representatives of the area. 5. “Survey on hosting the Rugby World Cup 2019” aimed to study the attitude of Kamaishi City residents toward the Kamaishi matches. 1,000 people randomly selected from among the city’s eligible voters were surveyed, with a 37.7% response rate. 6. Kamaishi City was the only city among the RWC2019 venues to have built a new stadium. 7. Based on figures from the 1963 Basic Resident Register and 2010 Population Census. 8. Based on figures from Population Census for the respective years. 9. Based on the documents provided by the local government: Civic Section, Civic Life Department.

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10. Based on the documents provided by the local government: Civic Section, Civic Life Department. 11. The term ‘complex industrial city’ was first used to describe the future image of the city’s industry when Kamaishi City began its decline around 1985. It does not mean to break away completely from the steel industry, but rather a state of harmony among various industries including the steel industry (Kawasaki & Hoshino, 2007). 12. “Sumi” means “to live” or “housing,” and “Modori” means “to go back” in Japanese. 13. Front page of Fukko Kamaishi Shimbun (Reconstruction Kamaishi Newspaper) of July 2, 2014. 14. Front page of Fukko Kamaishi Shimbun (Reconstruction Kamaishi Newspaper) of July 2, 2014. 15. Based on the documents provided by the local government: Rugby World Cup 2019 Promotion Office, General Affairs and Planning Department. 16. The community organization was called the Town Reconstruction Council of Kamaishi City’s Unosumai area. 17. Rugby World Cup Limited is the organization consigned by World Rugby, the international governing body for rugby, to prepare and manage the Rugby World Cup. 18. Although the Rugby World Cup was not an official national project, it was held as an event comparable to a national project based on the following law and policy: “Act on Special Measures for the 2019 Rugby World Cup (Law No. 34, 2015)” (enacted on Oct. 1, 2015) and “Basic policy on advancing preparation and management of the 2019 Rugby World Cup” (agreed by relevant ministries on Feb. 24, 2016). 19. According to an interview with the local government, 568 households had moved to permanent housing in the central Unosumai area as of end of March 2019. Considering that 630 households from the area were living in temporary housing right after the disaster, around 90% had secured permanent housing. 20. A questionnaire survey was conducted from October 2 to 21, 2018, by the authors’ research group (disaster and mega-event study group). Survey subjects were 1,000 people randomly selected from Kamaishi City’s eligible voters, and 377 responses were received (response rate of 37.7%). The population of Kamaishi City was 33,946 people as of end of October 2018 based on the documents provided by the local government: Civic Section, Civic Life Department. 21. The damage Kamaishi City suffered varied greatly between the coastal and inland areas, with and without tsunami damage, respectively. Correlation between the extent of damage and awareness about staging the event was statistically insignificant. Rather, interest in rugby was in correlation with

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awareness about staging the event. Therefore, people with higher interest in rugby tended to approve of hosting the event. The song was written by students, representing elementary and junior high schools in Kamaishi City, to convey their appreciation to the world for supporting the disaster reconstruction. An example is that World Rugby, the international governing body for rugby, presented the Award for Character to the Kamaishi matches because the spirit and resilience shown by Kamaishi City embodied rugby’s core values (World Rugby, 2019). Studying the feelings expressed in reports written by elementary and junior high school students who saw the match will be a theme for future research. According to an interview with the local government, 616 households had moved to permanent housing in the central Unosumai area as of end of March 2020. Considering that 630 households from the area were living in temporary housing right after the disaster, around 98% had secured permanent housing. However, only 289 households had realized “sumimodori,” which means only around 47% of the households that secured permanent housing were “sumi-modori.”

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Kamaishi city. (2021). Fukkyu-fukkouno-ayumi (History of reconstruction and recovery). [PDF file]. https://www.city.kamaishi.iwate.jp/docs/201906040 0109/file_contents/ayumi202103.pdf Kawasaki, Y. & Hoshino, K. (2007). Kamaishishino-sougoukeikakutogyouzaisei (Comprehensive plan, administration and finance of Kamaishi City). In Institute of Social Sciences, Chuo University. (ed.), Chiikisyakainohendoutosyakaikeikakukamaishisyakaitokamaishiseitetsujo (Changes in local society and social planning: Kamaishi society and Kamaishi Steel Works ) (pp. 36–57). Chuo University Press. McKinsey & Company. (2015, February 10). Mayor Eduardo Paes: Update from Rio [Video]. Youtube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-EQklVyr5YY Mitsubishi Research Institute. (2016). Kokusaimegasupoutsuibentowochiikisouseiniikasu-jizokukanouna-jigyoumoderuwokyousousiyou (Utilizing international sports mega-events for regional revitalization: Co-creating a sustainable business model). MRI Monthly Review June 2016. [PDF file]. https://www.mri.co.jp/knowledge/mreview/back-number/dia6ou000001 8qcp-att/mr201606.pdf Mukoyama, M. (2014). The disaster stricken city bids to host the mega sports event: Case study of Rugby World Cup 2019. Bulletin of Biwako-Gakuin University, Biwako-Gakuin College, 6, 93–102. Mukoyama, M. (2019). Bidding to host a sports mega-event during post-disaster reconstruction: The challenge of the small provincial city of Kamaishi. Japan Journal of Sport Sociology, 27 (1), 41–58. Niibari, H. (2013). Kamaishinohisaito-fukkou fukkoumachidukurikihonkeikakusakuteitantousyano-houkoku (Kamaishi’s disaster damage and reconstruction: Report by person in charge of formulating the Kamaishi City Reconstruction Plan). In Seki, M. (Ed.), Shinsaifukkouto-chiikisangyou 2/ sangyousouzounimukau-“kamaishi moderu” (Disaster reconstruction and local industry 2: the Kamaishi Model towards industry creation) (pp. 36–57). Shinpyousha. Nippon Steel Corporation Kamaishi Works. (1986). Tetsutotomoni-100nen (100 years together with steel). Reconstruction Agency. (2020). Status of reconstruction from the great East Japan earthquake and reconstruction Efforts. [PDF file]. https://www.rec onstruction.go.jp/english/topics/Progress_to_date/202009_Pamphlet_fuk konojokyototorikumi_English.pdf Saeki, T. (2015). The Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games: “Fact and Fiction” of their legacy strategy. Japan Journal of Sport Sociology, 23(2), 25–44. Seki, M. (2013). Tsunamihisaikarano-chiikisangyoufukkou (Reconstruction of local industry after tsunami damage). In Seki, M. (ed.), Shinsaifukkouto-

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chiikisangyou 2/ sangyousouzounimukau-“kamaishi moderu” (Disaster reconstruction and local industry 2: the Kamaishi Model towards industry creation) (pp. 14–35). Shinpyousha. Takao, M., Matsubayashi, H., Mukoyama, M., & Nakajima, N. (2020). Sport mega-event and local identity: Rugby World Cup 2019 in Kamaishi city. The Annuals of Sociology, 61, 39–53. Tsukahara, T. (2016). Saigaishihonsyugino-tadanakadenoboukyakuenoatsuryoku: hijoujitaiseijito-heijouseibaiasu (Pressure to forget in the midst of disaster capitalism: Politics in an emergency and normalcy bias). In Ogasawara, H. & Yamamoto, A. (Eds.), Hantoukyouorinpikkusengen (The anti-Olympic manifesto: Against Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic) (pp. 26–38). Koshisha. Watt, P. (2013). ‘It’s not for us’ Regeneration, the 2012 Olympics and the gentrification of East London. City, 17 (1), 99–118. Williamson, T. (2017). Not everyone has a price: How the small Favela of Vila Autódromo’s fight opened a path to Olympic resistance. In A. Zimbalist (Ed.), Rio 2016: Olympic myths, hard realities (pp. 57–96). Brookings Institution Press. World Rugby. (2019, November 3). Kamaishi wins award for character at World Rugby awards [Video]. Youtube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UZY nXZgGyyg&ab_channel=WorldRugby

CHAPTER 12

Political Ideologies, the ‘Two Chinas’ Issue and Mega-Events in Taiwan Yu-Wen Chen and Tien-Chin Tan

Introduction For the government of the Republic of China (ROC, commonly known as “Taiwan”),1 commitment to sports development has been mainly driven by two objectives: diplomacy and modernization. On the diplomatic front, Taiwan’s efforts in sport have been closely linked to its relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC, also simply referred to as “China”) (Bairner et al., 2016). By contrast, the island’s push for modernization through sports has been influenced by its domestic party politics (Tan et al., 2009). Among the goals of sports development, bidding for international sporting events has been a key component in

Y.-W. Chen China Medical University, Taichung, Taiwan T.-C. Tan (B) National Taiwan Normal University, Taipei, Taiwan e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. Kobayashi et al. (eds.), Sports Mega-Events in Asia, Palgrave Series of Sport in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0011-4_12

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Taiwan’s sports policy. Since Taiwan’s first bid for the Asian Games in the 1990s, the ROC government, regardless of which party was in power, has shown a great interest in international multi-sport events. In fact, by October 2021, Taiwan had made a total of five bids for the FISU World University Games (also known as the Universiade), two attempts to host the Asian Games and one pursuit for each of the East Asian Games, the Asian Youth Games and the East Asian Youth Games. However, there have been only two successful bids—the Taipei 2017 Universiade and the 2019 East Asian Youth Games (EAYG) in Taichung. As Ludvigsen et al. (2022) pointed out, all mega-events require complex and long-term bidding, planning and venue construction and also involve urban renewal and tourism development. More importantly, mega-events have inevitably been used as a political tool and to showcase the host country’s soft power. These factors were all at play during Taiwan’s two successful bids. This chapter focuses on the political dynamics behind the 2017 Universiade and the 2019 EAYG. Since political ideologies and the Two Chinas issue were very much at play during the lead-up to the two events, our discussion is divided into three sections. The first is a background introduction on the unique political relations between Taiwan and China and how the circumstances across the Taiwan Strait have impacted the formation of Taiwan’s political parties and their ideological tendencies. We will then explain the political process of how Taipei became a successful bidder and the host for the 2017 Universiade. The final section illustrates the reasons for Taichung’s initial success in the 2019 EAYG bid and the event’s forced cancellation. Finally, against the special political backdrop in East Asia, the Two Chinas issue and the political ideologies concerning independence/reunification that Taiwan has seen internally have continued to influence China’s attitude towards Taiwan and played a decisive role in Taiwan’s mega event endeavours.

State, Parties and Political Ideologies In 1949, the Nationalist or Kuomintang (KMT) regime led by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek retreated to Taiwan after its defeat by the Chinese Communists in the Chinese Civil War. Chiang continued his rule as the President of the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan while the triumphant Chairman Mao Zedong’s Chinese Communist Party (CCP) declared the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Celebrating the birth of a “New China”, the PRC was eager to separate

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itself from the “Old China” under Chiang’s rule. That peculiar juxtaposition gave rise to the Two Chinas problem, a unique political scene that is still present today. Following the overthrow of the Manchu-led Qing dynasty in 1911, the Republic of China was founded. The Constitution of the Republic of China was then promulgated and enacted and has been in effect despite the ROC’s relocation to Taiwan. Up until now, the Constitution of the ROC still claims that both mainland China and Taiwan are part of the ROC. To meet the political realities, seven revisions to the constitution have been made, with additional articles included to define ROC-administered Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu as the “Free area” and the PRC-controlled territories as the “Chinese mainland area” (Kao, 2012; Laws & Regulations Database of the Republic of China (Taiwan), 2005). Regardless of those amendments, the country name and national flag have not been changed due to the international political status, and the “Republic of China” has retained its name for over a century. As a general rule, this article uses the official name the “Republic of China” or the “ROC” to address the ROC government while opting for the commonly used geographical name “Taiwan” in most other descriptions. In 1971, the ROC was officially replaced by the PRC at the United Nations and forced to exit the organization, despite being a founding member and one of UNSC’s five permanent members. Since then, the ROC regime in Taiwan has faced diplomatic isolation and declining international status. On the contrary, the PRC has continued to grow its global influence and begun demanding that international sports bodies abide by the One-China principle2 to remove the ROC’s representation (Lee & Li, 2015). Many ROC’s sports associations have been discontinued due to China’s efforts to isolate Taiwan. As a compromise, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) signed an agreement with the ROC in Lausanne, Switzerland in 1981, allowing Taiwan to compete under “Chinese Taipei” with a new flag and an alternative anthem. The arrangements came to be known as the Olympic protocol (CTOC, 2021), which has since then been adopted and made it possible for athletes from the two sides to compete in the same arena. In the evolution of party politics, the year 1987 was a turning point for democracy in Taiwan. In July 1987, the KMT government lifted the martial law that it had imposed in 1949 and ended the ban on political parties. The move heralded a shift to a multiparty system in which opposition parties were allowed to compete for government power (Chen, 1997). Unlike the KMT which was seen by some as a “foreign” regime,

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the newly formed Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) stressed local identity and Taiwanese independence and quickly rose to become the second largest political party in Taiwan. In 1991, the DPP included the idea of Taiwanese independence in its platform, stating its goal in Article 1 of “establishing an independent Taiwanese republic” (DPP, 2021). Although in academic terms “Taiwan” can be viewed as a geographic name, the DPP and other ideologically anti-China and pro-independence parties have been hoping to replace “the Republic of China” with “Taiwan” as the nation’s official name and even envision the establishment of a new nation. However, Taiwan’s current constitution is officially called the “Constitution of the Republic of China”. Internationally, the existence of the “ROC” is still recognized by 14 countries. Despite the obvious obstacle to formal independence and nation-building at the current stage, the DPP government (2000–2008 and 2016-present) has been seeking breakthroughs. The DPP intends to draw a line with both “Chinas”— the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China. For example, the word “Taiwan” was added to the ROC passport in 2003 during DPP’s first term in power and has been put in larger font sizes ever since. Simply put, “Taiwan” has transformed from a geographical designation to a name embracing the symbolism of independence and nation-building. The People’s Republic of China, which upholds the One-China Principle, has relentlessly boycotted everything related to Taiwanese independence and ideologies, including the Name Rectification Referendum for the 2020 Tokyo Olympics. The KMT, which was founded on mainland China over a hundred years ago, has kept many of its pro-unification phrases in its manifesto, including the “pursuit of a strong and unified nation”, “achieving a free, democratic and unified state” and “opposing to secession of the national territory” (KMT, 2020). Judging by the political discourse regarding cross-Strait policies, the two parties differ substantially on both national identity and central ideologies (Schubert, 2004). Given the unique sovereign status of the ROC and its historical links with the PRC, two camps of political parties have emerged in Taiwan: the KMT-led pro-unification camp and the DPP-led independence-leaning side. Politically, the KMT, which favours the eventual unification with China and opposes territorial secession, has found it less difficult to gain the trust of the Chinese leadership. The ideological stance of island’s ruling party has influenced the ROC’s3 bidding and hosting process of international sports events.

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The Political Backdrop to Taiwan’s Successful Bid for the 2017 Universiade In the late 1990s, Taiwan was in an active quest for the hosting rights of the Universiade. Following four failed attempts, Taiwan eventually won the rights to host the FISU Games in 2011. In this section, we discuss the key factors for Taipei City’s successful bid for the 2017 Universiade, the controversies at the time of the games and subsequent developments. Key Factors for Taipei’s Successful 2017 Bid Given China’s influence on the world stage, the government of Taiwan has strived to increase its international visibility and constantly pushed for diplomatic breakthrough. Regardless of their ideologies, political parties in Taiwan have all declared “bids for international sporting events” as the main component of their sports policy (Ministry of Education, 2013) and actively played their part in trying to win hosting rights. Taiwan selected Taipei and Kaohsiung, its two major cities, as the bidders for the 2001, 2007, 2011 and 2015 editions of the Universiade but failed at all four attempts. In two of those bids, China threw Beijing and Shenzhen into the competition. For the other two bids, China supported Taiwan’s competitors Bangkok (Thailand) and Gwangju (South Korea) in securing the Universiade hosting rights (Sports Administration, MOE, 2014b). Why then did Taipei City make a successful for the Universiade on Taiwan’s fifth bidding attempt? We have identified three key factors. Support and Pledges from the National Leadership In 2009, when the City of Taipei was preparing its bid for the 2015 Universiade, then KMT President Ma Ying-jeou was actively supportive of the process. As a team of inspectors from the International University Sports Federation (FISU) arrived in Taipei, President Ma invited the team along with the Minister of Education and the Chief of the Sports Council, among other leading officials, to the Presidential Office for a meeting and stressed his ambition for hosting mega-events (Office of the President, ROC, 2009). Despite Taipei’s failure to win the bid over Gwangju, Taiwanese leadership’s resolve to compete for hosting Universiade was not dampened. Two years later, when Taipei once again joined the Universiade bidding process, President Ma again leveraged his

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support by personally meeting the visiting members of the FISU Executive Committee (FISU Exec Com) and even instructed Premier Wu Den-yih to host a welcoming banquet—a full display of desire to host the Universiade by the island (Sports Council, 2012b). In addition, in Taipei’s promotional video, President Ma promised to FISU that the central government of Taiwan would render full support in funding for Taipei to host the Universiade. These acts of support and pledges offered a huge helping hand for Taipei. For examples, China Airlines and Eva Air, Taiwan’s two major airlines provided more concrete incentives by offering a whopping 80% discount on air tickets for visiting delegations (Chen & Chen, 2013). On top of that, the government also announced waivers of the visa application charge, a 10-euro reduction per day in board and lodging expenses and an additional EasyCard (a contactless smartcard mainly used for payment on public transport and in designated retailers) for visiting athletes along with a credit of 70 euros. During the preparation for the Games, as pledged, the central government of Taiwan shouldered around 9 billion NT dollars, nearly half of the total cost, for Taipei, reaching the budget limitation for central government subsidies for a local government to host the Universiade (Ministry of Education, 2019). In addition to the 9 billion NT dollars, the central government also picked up the bill for the construction of the Universiade Village through earmarked funds, saving Taipei another 14 billion NT dollars (Wu, 2013). These figures show how much importance the Taiwanese leadership attached to the Universiade. Taiwan’s Diplomatic Truce and Beijing’s Acquiescence Ma Ying-jeou won the 2008 Taiwanese presidential election when he was chairman of the KMT and was re-elected in 2012. As a departure from his predecessor DPP Chairman Chen Shui-bian, who defined cross-Strait ties as “One Country on Each Side”, President Ma adhered to his party’s policy of “One China, Different Interpretations” and embarked on an era of diplomatic truce with Beijing. Ma’s direction for cross-Strait relations was one that chose not to compete with mainland China on the diplomatic front and avoided touching upon the One-China principle in exchange for greater international participation for Taiwan (Chang, 2015). For the Chinese government, Ma’s diplomatic stance seemed relatively friendly. Cross-Strait relations improved as China became more willing to allow Taiwan to participate in international affairs, including bidding for mega sporting events. It was under such an atmosphere that

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Taipei outbid Brasilia, the capital of Brazil, in 2011 for the right to host the 2017 Universiade. It is worth noticing that President Ma and Hau Lung-pin, who later succeeded him as mayor of Taipei, were Chairman and Vice Chairman of the KMT, respectively, and are both second-generation “mainlanders” 4 —a word used to describe the Han Chinese relocating to Taiwan during or following Chiang Kai-shek’s retreat and their descendants. Compared to “locally-born” Taiwanese (those who arrived prior to 1949 and their descendants), the mainlander community has a stronger inclination to identify themselves with China. Typically, mainlander politicians are also better at gaining trust from the Chinese authorities. Mayor Hau, who went to Belgium himself during the bidding process, eventually did not shy away from the fact that China’s goodwill and support contributed to Taipei’s successful bid. In fact, not only did the Chinese delegation express their support verbally to Mayor Hau, FISU Vice President, a Chinese national, even lobbied for Taipei by influencing other members of the FISU Exec Com, showing unprecedented support for Taiwan (Lin, 2011). Chen Tai-cheng, the Taiwanese representative at the Executive Committee at the time, later confirmed to the press that the three members from China, Hong Kong and Mongolia all voted for Taipei (Taiwan News, 2011). President Ma’s diplomatic truce helped to ensure that the platform and mechanism for cross-Strait high-level dialogue remained unimpeded and was considered a key factor behind Taipei’s success at the Universiade bid (Sports Administration, 2012b). Full Support for Taiwanese Candidacy and Re-Election at FISU Exec Com After two consecutive failures in 1990 and 1995 to win the Asian Games hosting rights, Taiwan remained ambitious to host mega sporting events. In the late 1990s, it came to the attention of the officials at the Chinese Taipei University Sports Federation (CTUSF) that none of the 23 FISU Exec Com Members was Chinese. It was their assessment that China had yet to expand its influence to FISU and that Taiwan should set its sights on the Universiade and use the games as a “point of breakthrough” to go after other mega-events (Tsai, 1997). Taiwan’s Sports Council (now Sports Administration) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs first endorsed then CTUSF President Chen Tai-cheng to run for FISU Exec Com Member in 1999, when he won and went on to serve five terms (ETtoday, 2019).

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Chen’s presence at FISU not only secured a vote for Taiwan in every Universiade bid, but also provided Taiwan access to FISU’s decisionmaking body as well as internal documents recording the inspection results for other candidate cities (Ministry of Education, 2013). China has had a seat at FISU Exec Com since as early as 2003 and has even controlled the post of Vice President, which has been held by a Chinese national for five consecutive terms5 (Sun, 2019). More importantly, with significantly improved cross-Strait relations, China’s strategy towards Taiwan at FISU shifted from boycott to acquiescence. As mentioned, the Vice President of FISU Exec Com from China even helped to secure votes for Taiwan in the bidding process. That, along with Chen Taicheng’s manoeuvres, allowed Taiwanese officials to interact closely with FISU Exec Com, creating a conducive environment for Taiwan to become the host for the 2017 Universiade. The Impact of Hosting the 2017 Universiade on Taiwan The election of DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen to the Taiwanese Presidency in 2016 brought about subtle changes to cross-Strait relations. As the hosting of a mega-event usually helps the host country gain recognition as an independent state and increase its international presence (Houlihan, 1994), the DPP government had similarly high hopes when it came to power. Under President Tsai, “bidding for mega sporting events” remained the core focus of Taiwan’s sports policy (Ministry of Education, 2017). To ensure a smooth 2017 Universiade in Taipei, President Tsai refrained from mentioning Taiwanese independence early in her office, instead stressing “seeking common ground while setting aside differences” and “mutual understanding” across the Strait (Office of the President, 2016). Dr. Ko Wen-je, who won the 2014 Taipei mayoral race as an independent, continued the China-friendly stance of his two predecessors Ma Ying-jeou and Hau Lung-pin. At the annual Taipei-Shanghai forum which features reciprocal visits by the mayors of the two cities, Mayor Ko expressed his views that “the two sides of the Strait are one family” in a political rhetoric similar to that of the Pro-China KMT (Apple Daily, 2015). It was evident that prior to the 2017 Universiade, the political messages delivered by President Tsai and Mayor Ko were met with softened reaction from the Chinese leadership, leading to the successful hosting of the Universiade in Taipei. Although the 2017 edition

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concluded without much political drama, it left a considerable impact on Taiwan on various fronts, including the development of competitive sports, the applicability of the Olympic protocol and controversies surrounding national identity. A Solid Foundation for Taiwan’s Medal Quest at Tokyo 2020 As China approached the 2017 Universiade in a “soft boycott”—signing up only for individual events and sending second-tier athletes, Taiwan was in a better position to shine in the medals table. The island finished its medal tally with 26 gold, 34 silver and 30 bronze medals, ranking third among 134 participating federations. It remains Taiwan’s best medal count at the Universiade since its first participation in 1987 and significantly outperformed the prediction of its Sports Administration in the gold column where it had been expected to grab between 11 to 17 golds (Executive Yuan, 2017). It was an athletic achievement that ignited an island-wide passion for competitive sports and a stronger incentive for the Taiwanese government to invest in sports. At the time, President Tsai touted an ambitious plan to invest an additional 10 billion NT dollars in sports over four years and double that amount within eight years (Office of the President, 2017). Since it was Taiwan’s turn to play host for the 2017 Universiade, the central government invested even more than it had in sports development. It was rewarded with a surprisingly superb medal performance, which helped to lay a solid foundation for the country’s outing at Tokyo 2020. In the pandemic-delayed Summer Olympics, Taiwan went home with a record medal haul of 2 golds, 4 silvers and 6 bronzes. The first-time medalists were from gymnastics, badminton and judo—sports that had been identified as “priority sports” following the 2017 Universiade. Controversies Surrounding the Olympic Protocol Taiwanese audience in Republic of China afro wigs cheer the arrival of team Chinese Taipei. (Horton, 2017)

As pointed out by New York Times reporter Chris Horton, there was a level of awkwardness for Taiwan hosting a mega sporting event such as the Universiade. Since FISU adopted the Olympic protocol, it demanded that the host city Taipei must follow what had been agreed on in the Lausanne agreement. This applies to all the official promotional material

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submitted by Taiwan to FISU for approval. Any mentioning of “Taiwan” was corrected and replaced with “Chinese Taipei” (Song, 2017). It was an international sports event for which Taiwan pooled resources up at the national level yet could not, at least technically, allow its national flag to be displayed in venues or draped on its winning athletes. In cases where spectators carried the ROC national flag into Universiade venues, the City of Taipei’s attitude was somewhat in a grey area, imposing only a size limit on those flags.6 The relatively loose enforcement of the organizer still triggered large amounts of discontent from the Taiwanese public and several independence-leaning Taiwanese politicians (The News Lens, 2017). There was also the tricky issue of how the President of the Republic of China would “declare” the games open at the opening ceremony. It has been a tradition for the head of state of the host country to declare a mega event open, including at the Asian Games and the Olympics (Wang & Lin, 2016). In the end, the Chinese delegation opted to skip the opening ceremony of the Taipei Universiade. By being ceremonially absent, the Chinese cleverly avoided face-to-face awkwardness with President Tsai, who took the stage as the head of state of the ROC (RFI, 2017). However, in their participation, China chose to forfeit its chance to grab medals in all the team events and compete in individual events with a downsized delegation of 100 athletes, almost all of whom were to debut in an international competition and not from China’s first-tier rosters (Li, 2017). In seems that under the Olympic protocol, any major sporting event, including the Universiade, hosted by Taiwan can hardly bring satisfactory results for the regimes on both sides. This sowed the seeds of heightened nationalism and even confrontation across the Strait in the years to come. Rising Nationalism Fresh into her office, President Tsai was cautious not to publicly mention her party’s advocacy for Taiwanese independence in the build-up to the 2017 Universiade. The subsequent preparation and hosting of the games did not encounter interference or obstruction from Beijing, with the exception of the soft-boycott measures discussed above. In the post-Universiade years, however, Taiwanese nationalism became prevalent largely due to the encouragement by the Taiwanese media and the DPP government. The Taiwanese press did not hesitate to dramatize the unprecedented performance by the home team at the Taipei Universiade. Several gold

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medalists, including javelin thrower Cheng Chao-tsun, sprinter Yang Chun-han, gymnast Lee Chih-kai and badminton player Tai Tzu-ying, all ended with gold in sports that Taiwan had been historically weak in international competitions. They were dubbed “Taiwan’s glory”, “Taiwanese hero” or “Taiwanese heroine”. Mainstream media have also largely used “Team Taiwan” instead of the customary phrase “Chinese Taipei Team” (See Chen, 2017; Zhuo, 2017). The government even made a snap decision to hold a victory parade during which Universiade “heroes” were cheered on across Taipei City. While honouring the athletes, President Tsai connected their athletic achievement with Taiwanese nationalist sentiments several times in her brief remarks, saying, for example, that “this is uniting Taiwan”, “Taiwan can unite”, “[your] competitive spirit moved the people of Taiwan” and “[y]our success has united the people of Taiwan” (Office of the President, 2017). It was evident that the leader of the DPP government wanted to strengthen the Taiwanese national identity with the hype of hosting an international sporting event. However, these actions aimed at elevating Taiwanese consciousness led to a referendum calling for a name rectification at the 2020 Tokyo Olympics and eventually brought repercussions for the 2019 East Asian Youth Games, which would have been Taiwan’s first experience of hosting a multi-sport event in the Olympics series.

EAYG in taichung---From Successful Bid to Forced Cancellation In addition to the Universiade, the Olympics, Asian Games and East Asian Games are all mega-events in the Olympic series that often benefit the host country with increased global influence and extensive news coverage but also come with clashes of nationalist sentiments. Taiwan has always aimed at hosting such events (Sports Administration, 2013). The 2019 East Asian Youth Games (EAYG) was formerly known as the East Asian Games. In as early as 1991, the East Asian members of the Olympic Council of Asia—one of the five continental associations recognized by the IOC—including Taiwan (Chinese Taipei), China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Hong Kong, Macau and Mongolia7 , proposed the concept of having a “multi-sport event in the East Asian region modelled on the Olympics”. That led to the hosting of the inaugural East Asian Games (EAG) in 1993 by Shanghai, China. In 2003, Taiwan selected Taipei City to compete for the hosting rights of the fifth EAG in 2009 but was

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knocked out by Hong Kong, which had the full support of China (Chen, 2003). When bidding for the next edition of the EAG scheduled for 2013, Taiwan again threw Taipei City into the campaign, originally hoping to outbid the only candidate city from Mongolia. However, upon the abrupt announcement that China intended to join the bid with the city of Tianjin, Taiwan’s Sports Council saw little chance of success and decided not to deliver its letter of interest (Sports Council, 2012c). 2013 saw the last edition of the EAG. Following the sixth edition in Tianjin, the East Asian Olympic Committees (EAOC)8 passed a resolution in May 2013 initiating a transition from the EAG to the EAYG, providing a platform for young athletes. China hosted four of the six EAGs9 . It should also be noted that the EAOC has been headquartered at the Chinese Olympic Committee since 2010. Clearly, China plays a dominant role in the EAOC and has had a distinct advantage in the awarding of mega-events in the region. Why then did Taichung successfully win the 2019 bid on its first bidding attempt for an international sporting event? In the following section, we will discuss several possible factors behind Taichung’s initial bidding success and recapitulate the process of it being stripped of the hosting rights for the 2019 EAYG. Factors Contributing to Taichung’s Successful Bid As mentioned, the EAG was a priority goal in Taiwan’s endeavour to become a mega event host. Despite a series of failures, the island was still persistent in its bidding attempts. The original plan was for Taichung to bid for the 2017 EAG in 2011, with a task force launched to mobilize lobbying efforts (Sports Council, 2012c). As the EAG had been rebranded the EAYG in 2013 to focus on teenage athletes, Taichung was still determined to join the bid and came out as the eventual bid winner. The leading factor is the fact that Taichung mostly built on and copied the experience of the 2017 Universiade in Taipei. The difference with the EAYG was that votes were cast by representatives of participating Olympic committees, with each committee possessing one vote. Hence, there was no urge among the countries to run for seats at the Executive Committee. Other factors that may have helped Taichung win the bid are as follows:

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Hiring a Professional Bidding Team Following Taipei’s election as the host city for the 2017 Universiade, Taichung city authorities borrowed from the successful experience of the capital to hire a group of professionals to form a bidding team. Along with the deputy mayor of Taichung, executive secretary of the Sports Administration, president and secretary-general of the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee, the team also included Huane Yu-jen, gold medalist in Taekwondo at the 2014 Nanjing Summer Youth Olympics and Chen Nien-chin, who had won a gold medal at the 2013 AIBA Women’s Junior/Youth World Boxing Championships. With the participation of these teenage athletes, the intention was to emphasize the athletic aspect of the candidate city (Yang, 2017). Additionally, Delicacy Integrated Marketing Inc., Ltd, a specialized sports marketing company, was commissioned to prepare the bidding portfolio. In a similar fashion as the Taipei Universiade, the Taichung team hired well-known news anchor Lin Po-yu to act as the presenter (Delicacy Integrated Marketing Inc., Ltd, 2021). Taichung copied Taipei throughout almost the entirety of the bidding process. Support from National/Municipal Leaders and a Gift Before the KMT-CPP Talks As it had been during the 2017 Taipei Universiade bidding process, Taichung’s quest for the 2019 EAYG hosting rights also took place against a political backdrop where both the national and municipal leaders were affiliated with the KMT. Having earned his second consecutive term, President Ma in 2014 was still maintaining a diplomatic truce with the PRC and wished to further expand cross-Strait trade and tourism. The period saw the height of cross-Strait trust (Liu, 2012). Then Taichung Mayor, Jason Hu, who initiated the city’s bid for the EAYG, also held the post as Vice Chairman of the KMT. That the KMT leadership controlled both the central government and the municipal government of the candidate city created a China-friendly combination similar to that during the Universiade bid in 2011. In the case of Taichung, the friendly relations between the two sides were even warmer, contributing to Taichung’s success at the 2019 EAYG bid. Managing a comfortable relationship with the PRC is a key element to winning bids for mega sporting events—a lesson Taiwan had learned through several bidding failures. From as early as 2010, the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee has approached China with goodwill for several times on behalf of the Taiwanese government

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and even sought Beijing’s support in future EAG bids (Sports Council, 2010). The thawing of cross-Strait relations facilitated greater exchange between the two sides, and cross-Strait sports exchange even reached its peak. In addition to the PRC’s support for Taipei Universiade in 2011, the Olympic committees on the two sides agreed in 2013 to expand their “three rounds of reciprocal visits” to “six rounds”, completing a total of 12 intensive visits across the Strait in that year alone. For the first time, China invited Taiwan’s highest-ranking sports official, Sports Administration Director-General Ho Jow-fei, to China for a meeting with the Chinese Olympic Committee (Sports Administration, 2013). Taichung, which had originally been in contention for the hosting rights for the 2017 EAG, did not give up its bid after the restructuring of the games. With Taichung’s eyes still set on the 2019 EAYG, the Executive Yuan of the ROC approved its plan to submit its application to the Beijing-based EAOC in 2014 (Sports Administration, 2014a). For a time, it was widely expected that Hangzhou (China) and Ulaanbaatar (Mongolia) would compete along with Taichung (Lee, 2014). Hangzhou did not file its submission in the end, which was seen as an obvious move by Beijing to greenlight Taiwan’s application. On 24 May 2014, at the 32nd East Asian Games Association (EAGA, now EAOC) Council Meeting in Beijing, the Taichung delegation gave its candidate city presentation and was eventually elected host city for the 2019 EAYG. Two years later, copying the format of the two Inter-Korean Summits held in 2000 and 2007, President Ma officially met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Singapore. It marked the first meeting between the leaders of the two sides since Taiwan and China came under separate rule—a clear indication of the warm relations and interaction across the Strait at the time. Forced Cancellation of the 2019 EAYG: Why and How It Happened Announced as the winning bidder for the 2019 EAYG in 2014, the central government of Taiwan and the city government of Taichung provided a significant amount of funding and manpower to prepare for the inaugural edition of the EAYG. The high expectations were quickly dampened as cross-Strait relations turned sour. On 24 July 2018, the China-dominated EAOC called an Extraordinary Council Meeting in Beijing. Attended by Chinese Taipei Olympic

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Committee president Lin Hong-dow and secretary-general Shen Yi-ting, the meeting stripped Taichung of its right to host the 2019 EAYG (Lee, 2018). Liu Peng, the president of the EAOC who concurrently served as the director of China’s General Administration of Sport and president of the China Olympic Committee, did not specify the reason for the cancellation in his notification (Liu, 2018). However, Song Luzeng, secretary-general of the EAOC, told the media after the meeting, “[s]ince last year, some political forces in Taiwan have been pushing for the socalled ‘Name Rectification Referendum for the 2020 Tokyo Olympics’, flagrantly challenging the ‘Olympic model’ and bringing huge political risks and disturbances to the 2019 EAYG in Taichung…For the unity, stability and harmony of the East Asian sports circle and the healthy development of the Olympics, the East Asian Olympic Committees reviewed the aforementioned situation and decided by vote on the cancellation of the 2019 EAYG” (Xinhua News Agency, 2018). At the same time, China’s State Council Taiwan Affairs Office—the organ responsible for China’s Taiwan policies—also issued a press release, pointing out that the reason for the games’ cancellation was related to the name rectification referendum for which Taiwanese civic groups had been petitioning. The Chinese authorities believed that Taiwan’s real intention with its challenge to the Olympic model was to substantially push for Taiwanese independence (Chen, 2018). Considering the above-mentioned circumstances, we identify two main drivers leading to Taichung’s loss of its hosting rights: Confrontation Due to Dissatisfaction on Both Side with the Olympic Model Every edition of the PRC’s Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development includes the latest sports policy guidelines formulated by the General Administration of Sport. During President Ma’s tenure, China’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan mentioned that sports exchange and cooperation with Taiwan must be conducted under the “Olympic protocol”10 (General Administration of Sport, 2011). Five years later in 2016, as Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen from the independence-leaning DPP had taken office, China’s Thirteenth Five-Year Plan not only retained the part about the Olympic model, but also added a stronger phrase in “One Country, Two Systems” and stressed the importance of “protecting core national interests” (General Administration of Sport, 2016).

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Following the transition of power in Taiwan, China became noticeably sceptical of the DPP government and was determined to draw the line on its Taiwan policy. For Taiwan, the KMT administration had been in a disadvantageous position to in its contention with the CCP regime for being the “legitimate China”. Additionally, it was a time when competing under the name of “Taiwan” would appear as being downgraded to a provincial-level delegation or athlete and represent a diplomatic failure and concession. “Chinese Taipei” retains a Chinese element and was, at least for a time, the more acceptable choice of name. However, since the lifting of the martial law, the Taiwanese consciousness has been on the rise. As the islanders identify more and more strongly with being “Taiwanese”, “Chinese Taipei” has gradually turned into a symbol of Chinese oppression while “Taiwan” into a mainstream icon of patriotism. Adopting “Team Taiwan” is even seen as the first step towards Taiwanese independence (Chiang & Chen, 2021). Since the signing of the Lausanne Agreement in 1981, there has been discussion about whether Taiwan should continue to adhere to the Olympic protocol both as a participant and potential host. In the era of Tsai, there have been attempts to liberate Taiwan from the shackle of the Olympic protocol. Those endeavours were also aimed to demonstrate that the argument for Taiwanese nationalism has intensified. The experience with the 2017 Universiade was particularly demoralizing as the host nation itself was unable to raise its national flag and have its national anthem sung on its home venues. Such disgruntlement has slowly been redirected to fuel the rectification campaign, which hopes to replace the misleading and belittling name of “Chinese Taipei” with “Taiwan”. These efforts on the Taiwanese side have also changed China’s course of action. Not only did Beijing put cross-Strait sports exchange under the One-Country-Two-Systems framework, the acquiescence and support it displayed during Ma’s presidency has turned into mistrust, which has even led to hostile practices of obstruction and opposition. Close Association Between the DPP and the Rectification Referendum Following Rio 2016, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), which is more radically pro-independence than the DPP, began raising banners and shouting slogans, “Taiwan is Taiwan, not Chinese Taipei”. The party even made it clear that “[n]ext year at the Taipei Universiade and at the 2020 Tokyo Olympics, we shall be able to go out to the world stage heads up high using the name “Team Taiwan” (Liberty Times, 2016).

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Independence-minded politicians capitalized on the high media coverage at the 2017 Universiade Closing Ceremony to promote their political ideology. They even came up with the assessment that Japan-Taiwan friendship and the presence of pro-Taiwan figures in Japan would greatly increase Taiwan’s chance of success to participate in the Tokyo Games under “Taiwan” (Tokumitsu, 2017). Led by Chi Cheng—a retired Taiwanese athlete and a bronze medalist at the 1968 Mexico City Olympics, the Action Alliance for Taiwan Rectification at the 2020 Tokyo Olympics, was formed in January 2018 and immediately began its push for a referendum on the rectification. As the campaign leader, Chi Cheng also served as a national policy advisor to President Tsai. Lin Chia-lung, mayor of the 2019 EAYG candidate host city Taichung, even invited her to serve as the honorary principal advisor for the 2019 games (Tseng, 2018). Another key figure in the campaign was Chen Chuan-show, who had led the Sports Council (now Sports Administration) under President Chen Shui-bian and, as a DPP member, was later also hired by Lin to be a principal advisor for the EAYG (Sports Bureau, Taichung City Government, 2017). At the time, Lin was not only a member of the DPP Central Standing Committee—the party’s top decision-making body, he was also a key figure in the DPP’s independence-promoting faction Taiwan Normal Country Promotion Association. As the president of the Taichung 2019 EAYG Organizing Committee, Lin filled his team of advisors with iconic figures from the rectification campaign. Intentionally or unintentionally, Lin expressed a pro-independence stance or at least a form of support for the rectification referendum while implying an intention to advance towards Taiwanese independence. The referendum called for the abandonment of “Chinese Taipei” and the adoption of “Taiwan” at the 2020 Tokyo Olympics but also aimed to formalize the use of “Team Taiwan” in all international competitions (Central Election Commission, 2018). With the approval of the name change through the referendum, the first event to be directly affected would be Taiwan’s—the 2019 EAYG, during which Taiwanese athletes would compete under the name “Taiwan”. This, of course, would directly contradict China’s principle of “One Country, Two Systems” and China naturally would not be silent. Eventually, China used its leverage in the EAOC11 , which convened an Extraordinary Council meeting in Beijing in July 2018—right before Taiwan’s name rectification referendum that was scheduled for 24 November 2018. The cancellation of Taichung’s hosting rights was put to a vote. Only, the

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Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee, which represented Taiwan, voted against the motion while Japan abstained. The remaining seven seats, including that of EAOC President Liu Peng, all voted in favour and the motion was carried—leading to the cancellation of the Taichung EAYG (Lee, 2018).

Conclusions As shown from the above discussion, the level of attention that Taiwan has paid to mega sporting events is self-evident. As a bidder and a host of such events, Taiwan’s commitment has been on par with any other candidate country. The only difference is that Taiwan has had to deal with the Two Chinas issue. The political dilemma that has existed since 1949 happens to be the most dominant factor in Taiwan’s bidding and hosting efforts. As the two examples discussed above have shown, Taiwan’s only successful bids for mega sporting events all came during KMT President Ma’s tenure. Ma’s pursuit of diplomatic truce reduced Beijing’s impulse to obstruct Taiwan in international sports and even led to its acquiescence in Taiwan hosting its first mega event. Further improvement of ties with China during Ma’s second term created favourable conditions for Taiwan to win the EAYG hosting rights. Meanwhile, the ideologies of Taiwan’s political parties, especially those of the KMT and the DPP in relation to pro-unification and pro-independence stances, are closely associated with the Two Chinas controversy. Not only does the view of Taiwan’s national leader matter, even the party affiliation of local officials can influence China’s attitude towards Taiwan’s bidding and hosting endeavours. In general, there have always been suspicious eyes on the bidding and hosting of mega sporting events, which have prompted speculation about political manoeuvring and infighting both within and outside the host nation. For Taiwan, the decades-long Two Chinas problem has been at the core of every bidding and hosting process for mega-events. Following the successful hosting of the Taipei Universiade and the abrupt cancellation of the 2019 Taichung EAYG, Taiwanese nationalism has been aroused. The awakening of the Taiwanese consciousness, coupled with the rise of China and the intensified clashes between the pro-unification and proindependence ideologies, has made it difficult for Taiwan to recreate the Ma-era fanfare as a mega-event host.

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Notes 1. The Republic of China: an official, yet mostly erased, name of the country; Taiwan: The neutral geographical name (Chiang & Chen, 2021). 2. Definition by the PRC government: The PRC maintains and insists that there is only one China in the world and that Taiwan is part of China. The Government of the People’s Republic of China is the only legitimate government of all China (Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, State Council Information Office, 2000). 3. For greater readability, “Taiwan” and “China” will be used more frequently hereinafter to refer to the “ROC” and the “PRC”, respectively. 4. It refers to the Han Chinese relocating to Taiwan during or following Chiang Kai-shek’s retreat. Children of mainlander-local are sometimes known as “half-mountains” (Chu & Lin, 2001). 5. Zhang Xinsheng for three terms, Yang Liguo for one term and Shen Zhenxin for one term. 6. Flags exceeding two meters in length and one meter in width were not allowed in all venues (Liang, 2017). 7. Kazakhstan was represented for two years before being grouped into the Central Asian Olympic Committee. Current participating member also include Guam, which is an Associate Member that does not enjoy Official Member’s voting rights. 8. Formerly the East Asian Games Association (EAGA). 9. 1993 at Shanghai, 2005 at Macau, 2009 at Hong Kong and 2013 at Tianjin. 10. Same as the Olympic model. 11. With the EAOC headquartered at China’s General Administration of Sport in Beijing, China effectively controls the votes of both Hong Kong and Macau. Considering its close relations with North Korean and Mongolia and the extra vote possessed by the Chinese-national EAOC President, China literally secures six votes for every motion.

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Index

A Abu Dhabi, 4 Activist, 12, 49, 58, 60, 62, 72, 73, 75–79, 81–85, 87, 88, 90–96, 174, 200, 201, 205 AFC/Asian Football Confederation, 4 Africa, 36 Agenda 2020, 32 AGF/Asian Games Federation, 124, 127, 143, 150, 161 All-Japan Rugby Football Championship, 249 Anti-Olympics anti-Olympics activism, 82, 84, 95 anti-Olympics movement, 84 anti-Olympics social movement, 71 Anti-West anti-Westernism, 130 Arab, 5, 14, 129, 131–134, 136, 137, 160, 200, 201, 203, 205, 206, 211, 213–215 Asia, 2, 3, 5, 8, 10–15, 36, 40, 50, 91, 94, 101, 102, 109, 110, 115,

123–128, 130–133, 135, 136, 138, 151, 152, 154, 155, 157, 162, 184, 225, 237, 239 Asian Games, 4, 8, 10, 12, 13, 101, 109–117, 123–139, 143–146, 148, 150–163, 169–173, 178–181, 183–188, 270, 275, 278, 279 Far Eastern Championship Games, 124 Australia, 11, 33, 239 B Bach, Thomas, 31, 61, 137 Bandung Conference, 153, 154, 160 Bandung spirit, 153, 154, 161 Beijing Beijing 2008, 3 Beijing 2008 Olympics, 12, 25, 28 Beijing 2022, 3 Beijing 2022 Olympics, 24, 35, 42, 188

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023 K. Kobayashi et al. (eds.), Sports Mega-Events in Asia, Palgrave Series of Sport in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0011-4

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294

INDEX

Bid, 15, 23, 24, 31–34, 38, 42, 49, 51, 52, 57, 58, 60, 73, 76, 82, 91, 134, 136–138, 169, 170, 172–178, 180, 181, 184, 185, 187, 200, 209, 212, 238, 245, 254, 255, 270, 273, 275, 276, 280–282 bidding, 10, 12, 16, 31, 33, 48, 74, 76, 134, 137, 151, 171, 175, 176, 179, 180, 182, 184, 208, 269, 270, 272–276, 280, 281, 286 Body, 64, 114, 123, 133, 232, 276, 285 Boycott diplomatic boycott, 28, 34, 35, 188 “Brave Blossoms”, 11, 225, 236 Brazil, 78, 79, 88, 91, 246, 275 Busan/Pusan, 6, 7

C Capitalism, 103, 113 capitalist, 93, 104, 114, 204, 227 CCP/Chinese Communist Party, 29, 170, 270 China, 4, 6, 12–16, 23–30, 32–43, 60, 88, 124–126, 128, 131, 138, 139, 163, 170–182, 184–188, 229, 269–286 PRC/People’s Republic of China, 37, 41, 128, 269, 270, 272 Chinese Civil War, 127, 270 Citizenship, 36–41, 43, 231, 238 City, 3, 5, 6, 11, 13, 14, 16, 23, 25, 32, 33, 48, 52, 53, 55, 56, 58, 64, 73, 75, 87, 91, 95, 96, 111, 128, 132, 134, 147, 149–151, 156, 159–161, 170, 175–178, 180, 181, 184–186, 228, 230, 231, 238, 245–255, 257, 259–262, 277, 280–282, 285

COC/Chinese Olympic Committee, 170, 280, 282 Cold War, 26, 27, 31, 43, 103, 113, 148, 162 Colonialism colonization, 91, 94, 103 decolonization, 153 postcolonial, 146 Commercialization, 135, 145 Commodity, 162, 235 Commonwealth Games, 8, 183 Communism, 113, 148 communist, 104, 114, 116, 124, 128–131, 135, 148, 170–173, 175, 177, 179, 181, 187, 188 Complaints, 34, 93 Corruption, 76, 93, 107, 148, 200, 201, 208, 209 Cosmopolitanism, 231, 238 COVID-19/Covid pandemic, 3, 60–62, 74, 90, 187, 188, 228, 262 coronavirus, 9, 10, 61, 186 D Democracy democratic, 12, 33, 88, 92, 93, 171, 179, 180, 186, 272 democratization, 148, 172 Dictatorship, 32, 33, 148 Diplomacy, 13, 94, 100–102, 109–112, 114, 117, 187, 229, 269 diplomatic, 13, 34, 43, 100–102, 106, 109, 110, 112, 114–117, 154, 182, 213, 226, 239, 269, 271, 273–275, 281, 284, 286 sports diplomacy, 24, 113 (Dis)ability, 226 Disaster, 11, 57, 58, 62, 89, 225, 228–230, 246, 249–251, 254, 257, 259–262

INDEX

disaster reconstruction, 246–248, 251, 252, 255, 259, 260, 262 post-disaster, 246, 254, 257, 258, 260, 261 Discourse, 2, 50, 104, 109, 112, 113, 117, 147, 149, 156, 200, 202–204, 206–212, 214, 215, 225, 227, 231, 272 Diversity, 13, 136, 214, 225, 231, 232, 234, 238 Doha, 4, 13, 134, 137 DPP/Democratic Progressive Party, 272, 274, 276, 278, 279, 283–286 E (The)East Eastern, 103, 134, 208 East Asia, 2–4, 15, 34, 60, 107, 125, 139, 229, 270 East Asian Games, 13, 14, 136, 169, 173–175, 180–183, 187, 188, 270, 279 East Asian Youth Games, 270, 279 Eileen Gu, 35, 36, 41 Environment environmental legacy, 55, 64 environmental responsibility, 59, 63 environmental sustainability, 12, 49, 50, 237 Ethnography, 263 ethnographic, 13, 25, 73, 262 Europe, 29, 202 European, 36, 50, 103, 177, 203, 211 F Far Eastern Championship Game, 124 FIFA (Men’s) World Cup, 2, 4, 5, 11, 14, 38, 40, 42, 100, 183,

295

200–202, 206–215, 226, 227, 237, 246 FINA World Aquatics Championships, 4 FISU/International University Sports Federation, 273 Foreign, 15, 29, 38, 39, 41, 43, 101, 105, 116, 144, 148, 153, 170, 228, 231–234, 238, 271 foreign-born, 11, 25, 35–41, 225, 231, 232, 238 Formula One Grand Prix, 201 Fukushima, 58, 60, 77, 88–90, 228 G GANEFO/Games of the Newly Emerging Forces, 129 Gangwon, 3 Gender, 205, 225, 226, 236 Gentrification, 60, 76, 93, 95, 247 Geo-Politics, 15 Globalisation/Globalization, 14, 204, 225 Global North, 10, 202 Global South, 10, 14, 202 Great East Japan Earthquake, 76, 228, 230, 238, 245 H Hanbando-flag, 108 Hijab, 205, 207 Hong Kong, 13, 34, 37, 88, 136, 170, 173, 183, 186, 187, 275, 279, 280 Host host city, 3, 5, 6, 11, 13, 14, 48, 56, 58, 64, 75, 91, 95, 150, 151, 228, 245–247, 254, 255, 277, 281, 282, 285 hosting, 2–7, 12–16, 35, 42, 49, 50, 57, 63, 64, 75, 79, 93,

296

INDEX

100, 107, 109, 111, 124, 132, 134, 135, 144, 148, 152, 153, 156–159, 161, 162, 169, 172–179, 181–188, 200, 208, 210, 213, 215, 224–226, 228–230, 237–239, 245–247, 251, 253–262, 272, 273, 275–283, 285, 286 Human rights, 12, 23, 25, 28, 29, 31–35, 42, 76, 84, 174–177, 186, 200, 201, 205, 209, 211–214, 226, 237 I IAAF World Athletics Championships, 4, 181 Identity cultural identity, 14, 225 national identity, 7, 13, 212, 272, 277, 279 Ideology, 32, 43, 113, 235, 285 ideological, 6, 14, 15, 30, 100, 104, 110, 170, 205, 227, 270, 272 India, 28, 38, 123, 126–128, 133, 137, 150, 205 Indonesia, 4, 13, 15, 37, 38, 111, 129, 130, 132, 138, 144, 146, 148–162, 173 2018 Indonesia Asian Games, 143, 144, 146, 148, 151, 152, 154, 155, 157, 159, 160, 162 Inter-Korea inter-Korean, 12, 13, 100–102, 104–112, 114–117 inter-Korean politics, 101, 110 International relations, 13, 14, 29, 101, 102, 104–107, 109–111, 115, 117, 151 IOC/International Olympic Committee, 16, 23, 25–27, 29–33, 42, 43, 47, 49, 50, 54,

55, 58, 60, 64, 73, 76, 78, 84, 90, 92, 96, 108, 114, 115, 125, 127–129, 131, 132, 134, 136–138, 160, 161, 170–175, 177–180, 182, 183, 225, 226, 240, 271, 279 Iran, 5, 129–133, 138, 201 Iraq, 130, 133, 135 Islam, 148, 202, 205 Islamophobia, 205, 206 Islamophobic, 202, 204–206 Israel, 129, 131, 132, 134, 135, 143, 160 J Jakarta 1962 Jakarta Asian Games, 129, 143, 144, 150, 152–154, 156–162 Jakarta-Palembang, 13, 99, 101, 109, 115–117, 123, 152, 156 Japan, 3, 4, 6, 11, 12, 14–16, 36, 38, 39, 42, 49–55, 57–63, 73–75, 77, 79, 82, 88, 91, 94, 95, 125–128, 133, 134, 136, 138, 145, 163, 171, 177, 200, 224, 225, 227–239, 245–248, 257, 279, 285, 286 Japanese Olympic Organizing Committee, 51 K Kamaishi City Kamaishi City Reconstruction Basic Plan, 252 Kamaishi match, 247, 248, 251, 255–262 Kansai region, 3 Kazakhstan, 32, 33, 136, 182, 185 KMT/Kuomintang, 270 Korea

INDEX

North Korea, 27, 100–102, 104, 106–110, 112–117, 130, 131, 135, 173, 229, 279 South Korea, 3, 4, 6, 11, 15, 36, 75, 100, 102, 104, 106, 108–117, 133–136, 138, 170, 173, 229, 279 Korea-Japan, 72, 77, 78, 92–96 Kuwait, 5, 130, 133, 135–137, 173, 209 L LGBTQ, 200, 201, 215 Liberal internationalism, 105, 106, 114, 116, 117 London, 28, 37 2012 London Olympics, 207, 212, 246 Los Angeles, 26, 33, 60 M Macau, 170, 173, 279 Malaysia, 4, 88 Masculinity, 234, 235 hegemonic masculinity, 234, 236, 237, 239 Mega-events, 1–9, 11–17, 24, 43, 56, 62, 75, 92, 93, 100–102, 106–109, 111, 115, 117, 123, 124, 135, 136, 144, 170, 177, 178, 180–182, 185, 187, 188, 200, 207, 208, 210, 212, 223–228, 235–240, 245, 273, 276, 286 (The)Middle East, 2, 4, 127, 212 Modern modernist, 24, 101–103, 156 modernity, 6, 8, 144, 152, 159 modernization, 126, 150, 269 Mongolia, 130, 136, 173, 180, 275, 279, 280

297

Mount. Eniwa, 55, 75 Multiculturalism, 225, 231, 234, 238 Muslim, 14, 128, 200–208, 210, 214, 215 N Nagano Nagano 1998 Winter Olympics, 3, 54, 76 Nagano Olympic Committee, 56 Narrative, 7, 54, 95, 145–147, 151, 154, 156, 158, 160, 161, 208, 224, 228, 231, 232 Nation nation-building, 146, 150, 157, 272 nation-state, 3, 73, 93, 104, 115, 226, 239 Nationalism ethnic nationalism, 109, 112, 113 nationalist, 41, 91, 102–104, 109, 112, 113, 144, 146, 147, 149, 151, 152, 155, 156, 159–162, 270, 279 patriotic nationalism, 113, 114, 117 New Delhi, 123, 127, 133, 183 New Zealand, 11, 228–233 NGO/non-governmental organization, 16, 25, 27–31, 34, 35, 42, 75, 92 North America, 29, 50, 202, 239 Nostalgia, 13, 143–147, 151, 152, 154–156, 159–163 nationalist nostalgia, 146, 152 urban nostalgia, 144, 147, 151, 156, 157, 159–162 O OCA/Olympic Council of Asia, 5, 114, 123, 133, 150, 159, 170, 279

298

INDEX

Olympic Charter, 48, 50, 54, 55 Olympic Games Olympics, 6, 8, 12, 16, 24–26, 29–41, 43, 48–51, 53–64, 75–77, 79, 82, 84, 90, 91, 94–96, 100, 106–108, 110–112, 114, 135, 170, 172, 178, 179, 182, 226, 278, 279, 283 Special Olympics, 178 Summer Olympic Games, 2, 5, 207, 214 Winter Olympic Games, 2, 13, 32, 99, 101, 112, 113, 115–117 Olympic Movement, 24, 49, 50, 54, 56, 57, 62, 63, 74, 123–125, 129, 133, 134, 136 Olympic Village, 55, 76 Olympism, 24, 55 Opening ceremony, 28, 34, 40, 41, 48, 60, 87, 107, 108, 110–112, 135, 151, 152, 155, 174, 175, 179, 180, 187, 236, 237, 278 Organizing side, 246, 247, 263 Orientalism, 2, 8, 14, 17, 202–204, 206, 207 neo-Orientalism, 202–207 Osaka, 3, 6, 57, 177, 230 P Pakistan, 128, 131, 132 Pan Am/Pan-American Games, 8 Pan-Asia Pan-Asianism, 124, 126, 128, 129 Pandemic, 27, 49, 60, 62, 76, 77, 90, 187, 228, 262 pandemic Olympics, 49 Paralympic Games, 3, 16, 33, 47, 59, 228, 230, 231, 234, 235, 246, 252 Paralympics, 3, 9, 77 Paris 2024, 33, 88

Peace, 100, 101, 105, 108, 112, 115, 116, 124, 129, 154, 215 Philippines, 125, 126, 128 Primordialist, 101–104 PyeongChang, 13, 73, 75, 84, 94, 99, 101, 112, 114–117, 180 PyeongChang 2018, 3, 34, 72, 88, 101, 106 PyeongChang 2018 Olympic Games, 36, 106, 110 Q Qatar, 4, 5, 11, 14, 133, 137, 199–202, 206, 210–215 Qatar FIFA 2022, 14, 201, 202, 207–209 R Race, 8, 104, 125, 136, 175, 205, 226, 276 racial, 14, 231, 232, 238 racism, 91, 205, 206 Realism, 105, 106, 115, 116 realist, 14, 101, 105, 115–117 Resistance, 7, 12, 49, 72, 73, 77, 94–96, 161, 236 Rio de Janeiro, 57, 77, 81, 84 Rio de Janeiro 2016 Olympic Games, 78, 246, 247 Riyadh, 4, 6, 7, 13, 137 Rogge, Jacques, 25, 178, 179 Russia, 32, 33, 36, 88 Soviet Union, 26, 103, 130, 136, 173, 174, 208 RWC/Rugby World Cup, 16, 224, 237 2019 Rugby World Cup, 2, 3, 11, 14, 227, 229, 245 S Samaranch, Juan Antonio, 26, 55

INDEX

Sapporo, 16, 33, 49, 54, 58 Sapporo 1972, 2, 3, 50, 54, 55, 76, 227 SARS/Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, 74, 90, 178 Saudi Arabia, 4, 6, 133, 201, 213, 214 Seoul, 75, 84, 87, 134, 135, 170 Seoul 1988, 3 Sexuality, 214, 226 Shanghai, 13, 126, 136, 169, 171, 173–175, 178, 185, 187, 188, 279 Singapore, 110, 116, 132, 282 Sino Sino-US, 177 Soft power, 29, 30, 161, 179, 209, 212, 213, 270 Solidarity, 72–74, 77, 78, 84, 87, 90, 92, 95, 96, 127, 131, 136, 153, 154, 173, 201 Southeast Asia, 37, 178 Southeast Asian Games, 150, 156 South Korean Olympic Committee, 180 Space, 14, 57, 77, 93, 106, 109, 110, 114, 147, 158, 162, 225, 227–229, 233, 237, 238, 262 Special Olympics, 178 Spectacle, 6, 10, 16, 63, 90, 237 Sponsorship, 234–237, 239 Sport for Development and Peace, 202, 206 Sports mega-events, 1–9, 12, 14, 15, 17, 56, 62, 178, 182, 187, 235 Stadium, 13, 48, 51, 57, 59, 60, 102, 112, 114, 133, 152, 157, 158, 161, 172, 174, 175, 178–180, 186, 211, 214, 230, 231, 234, 236, 238, 248, 253, 255–257, 259, 261 Stakeholders, 144, 145, 151, 254

299

Struggles, 16, 72, 80, 83, 92, 93 Sumi-modori, 250, 252, 255, 256, 258–260, 262 Sustainability, 12, 31, 33, 48–50, 54, 57, 59, 60, 62–64, 226, 237 Sustainable Development Goals, 59 Sydney, 57, 136, 174–176

T Taipei, 183, 270, 273–277, 280, 281 Chinese Taipei, 173, 182, 271, 278, 284, 285 Taiwan, 4, 14, 15, 34, 136, 143, 170, 269–287 ROC/Republic of China, 37, 269, 271, 272, 278 Taiwan Strait, 176, 187, 270 Tattoo, 225, 232–234 Territory, 102, 103, 187, 227, 237, 238, 272 Thailand, 132, 134 Third World, 153, 156 Tokyo Tokyo 1964, 3, 59, 227 Tokyo 2020, 3, 12, 16, 47, 48, 63, 72, 74, 76, 77, 84, 89–92, 94, 277 Tokyo 2020 Olympic Committee, 49, 57, 58, 64 Tokyo 2020 Summer Olympic, 3, 12, 107, 115, 228, 235, 246, 252, 272, 279, 283, 285 Tokyo Metropolitan Government, 52, 53, 58, 229, 247, 252 Torch relay, 28, 29, 48, 61, 90, 182 Tourism, 1, 7, 145, 226, 228, 234, 253, 254, 261, 270, 281

300

INDEX

U UAE/United Arab Emirates, 4–6 UK/United Kingdom, 207, 210, 212 Ultimate Fighting Championship, 207 UN/United Nations, 27, 59, 271 Universiade, 270, 273–279 2017 Universiade, 270, 273, 275–278, 280, 281, 284 Unosumai area, 248–250, 255, 256, 260, 261 Urbanism, 13, 147, 148, 158, 161 national urbanism, 149, 156, 159 urbanization, 148, 149 US/United States, 101, 129, 130, 229 USA, 125, 201, 239

V Vietnam, 111, 128, 184 Volunteers, 48, 77, 254, 257

W (The)West

non-Western, 12, 24, 33, 43, 129 Western, 14, 24, 28, 33, 38, 43, 103, 110, 124–126, 132, 138, 145, 170, 172, 174, 176, 179, 180, 186, 187, 200, 202, 204–212, 214, 215, 227 West Asia, 2, 4, 5, 15, 16, 134, 137–139 Western media, 200–202, 204, 207, 208, 214 World Expos/World’s Fairs, 4, 6, 7 World Masters Games, 3 World Rugby, 11, 16, 224, 225, 229, 233, 239, 240 World War II/Second World War, 52, 94, 124, 126–128 WTO/World Trade Organization, 176, 177 Y YMCA/Young Men’s Christian Association, 125 Youth, 144, 152 Youth Olympics, 181, 184, 281