Spirit’s Actuality 9783957431325, 3957431328

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Michael Quante Spirit’s Actuality

Michael Quante

Spirit’s Actuality

mentis

Einbandabbildung: Franz Marc, Kämpfende Formen (1914, Öl auf Leinwand) Titel der Originalausgabe: Die Wirklichkeit des Geistes Studien zu Hegel © Suhrkamp Verlag Berlin 2011 All rights reserved by and controlled through Suhrkamp Verlag Berlin

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar. Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Dieses Werk sowie einzelne Teile desselben sind urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung in anderen als den gesetzlich zulässigen Fällen ist ohne vorherige Zustimmung des Verlages nicht zulässig. © 2018 mentis Verlag, ein Imprint der Brill-Gruppe (Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, Niederlande; Brill USA Inc., Boston MA, USA; Brill Asia Pte Ltd, Singapore; Brill Deutschland GmbH, Paderborn, Deutschland) Internet: www.mentis.de Einbandgestaltung: Anna Braungart, Tübingen Wissenschaftlicher Satz: satz&sonders GmbH, Dülmen Herstellung: Brill Deutschland GmbH, Paderborn ISBN 978-3-95743-132-5 (print) ISBN 978-3-95743-777-8 (e-book)

Inhalt

Notes on citations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . List of abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9 9

Preface by Robert Pippin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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1.

Introduction

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2. 2.1 2.1.1 2.1.2 2.2 2.3

Metaphysics and Common Sense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Three Positions of Thought with Respect to Objectivity §§ 19–25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . §§ 26–27 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Structure of Idea: Nature and Spirit . . . . . . . . . A Question of Method? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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27 30 30 33 38 43

3. 3.1 3.2 3.2.1 3.2.1.1 3.2.1.2 3.2.2 3.2.2.1 3.2.2.2 3.2.2.3 3.2.2.4 3.3 3.3.1

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47 47 50 50 50 50 51 52 52 52 53 53

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3.3.3 3.3.4 3.4 3.4.1 3.4.2

Speculative Philosophy as Therapy? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Standpoint of Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Forms of Therapeutic and Constructive Philosophy . . . . . . . Two Senses of Therapeutic Philosophy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Philosophy as Therapy in the Narrow Sense . . . . . . . . . . . . . Philosophy as Therapy in the Broad Sense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Forms of Constructive Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Constructive Philosophy in the Pejorative Sense . . . . . . . . . . Constructive Philosophy in the Narrow Sense . . . . . . . . . . . . Constructive Philosophy in the Broad Sense. . . . . . . . . . . . . Constructive Philosophy in a Revisionary Sense . . . . . . . . . . Speculative Philosophy as Therapy? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Philosophical Therapy in the Narrow Sense and Constructive Philosophy in the Pejorative Sense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Philosophical Therapy in the Broad Sense and Constructive Philosophy in the Narrow Sense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Constructive Philosophy in the Broad Sense? . . . . . . . . . . . . Constructive Philosophy in the Revisionary Sense? . . . . . . . No Way out of Hegel’s System? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ancient Skepticism and Descartes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A Way out of the System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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55 56 58 59 60 63

4. 4.1 4.1.1

Hegel’s Critique of Observing Reason . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Place of Observing Reason in the Phenomenology . . . . . . . . . . . . Two Kinds of Difficulties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

65 66 67

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6 4.1.2 4.2

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71 71 72 73 75 75 77 79

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82

5.

Nature as Spirit’s Posit and Presupposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

85

5.1 5.2 5.2.1 5.2.2 5.2.2.1 5.2.2.2

For whom is Nature a Presupposition of Spirit? . . . . . . . . . Spirit as the Truth of Nature and what is Absolutely Primary Has Nature Vanished? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Idea as the Truth of Nature and Spirit . . . . . . . . . . . . . »Science as a whole presents the idea« (E § 18) . . . . . . . . . . Answers Internal to Hegel’s System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

87 89 91 92 92 96

6.

Layering versus Positing Accounts of the Mental

6.1 6.1.1 6.1.2 6.1.3 6.2 6.2.1 6.2.2 6.2.3 6.3

Characteristics of the Layered Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Negative Contrasting Foil: A Bifurcated World . . . . . . »The« Alternative: Ontological Strata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . General Features of Substance Dualist Models and Layered Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Characteristics of the Model of Logical Reflection . . . Three Attractive Features of the Hegelian Alternative . . . Hegel’s Reflection-Logical Alternative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Three Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Indefensible Metaphysics? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7.

Self-Consciousness and Individuation

7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4

Universality, Particularity, Individuality . . . . . . . . . . The I as a Concept that has come into ExistenceD . . . The Logical Category of the in-and-for-itself Free Will The in-and-for-itself Free Will in its Abstract Concept

8.

The Personality of the Will . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

8.1 8.2 8.2.1

The Organization of the Introduction to Abstract Right . . . . . . . . . . 131 The Logical Structure of the Introduction to Abstract Right . . . . . . . 134 The Will’s Stage of Development in Abstract Right (§ 34) . . . . . . . . . 134

4.2.1 4.2.2 4.2.3 4.3 4.3.1 4.3.2 4.3.3 4.4

The Basic Structure of Observing Reason . . . . . . . . . . . Observational Psychology and Hegel’s Conception of the Mental . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Logical Laws? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Psychological Laws? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hegel’s Conception of the Mental . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Physiognomy and Phrenology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Variations on »inner« and »outer:« Five Oppositions . . The »inverted relationships« of Physiognomy . . . . . . . Phrenology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Contemporary Relevance of Hegel’s Discussion of observing Reason . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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116 119 122 124

Inhalt 8.2.2 8.2.3

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The Moments of the Free Will and their Significance for the Philosophy of Right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 The Conceptual Development of Abstract Personality within Abstract Right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

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Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

9.1

Hegel’s Critique of Scientistic Action Theory in the Phenomenology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hegel’s Theory of Action: The Morality Chapter of the Philosophy of Right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Structure of Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Structure of Intention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Structure of the Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Essential Intersubjectivity of Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hegel’s Theory in the Context of Contemporary Systematic Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9.2 9.2.1 9.2.2 9.2.3 9.2.4 9.3

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147 148 149 150 151

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Responsibility

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10.1 10.2.1 10.2.2 10.2.3 10.2.4 10.3 10.3.1 10.3.2 10.3.3

A Methodological Remark . . . . . . . Hegel’s General Strategy . . . . . . . . . Three Kinds of Sanity . . . . . . . . . . . Hegel’s Conception of Exemption . Hegel’s Critique of Exculpation . . . Systematic Questions . . . . . . . . . . . Causality and Responsibility . . . . . Hegel’s Cognitivist Ascriptivism . . . The Problem of Evaluative Standards

11.

The Grammar of Recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

11.1 11.2 11.3 11.3.1 11.3.2

The Concept of Spirit . . . . . . . . . . The Concept of Self-Consciousness The Pure Concept of Recognition . Hegel’s Analysis of the We . . . . . . Two Sorts of Recognition Relations

12.

Individual, Community and State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

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12.1 The Structure of the Current Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.1.1 The holism-totalitarianism reproach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.1.2 Individualism and Holism: The Methodological-Ontological Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.1.3 Liberalism and Communitarianism: the Normative Level . . 12.2 The Will as a Basic Principle in Hegelian Social Philosophy 12.2.1 The Will as the Basic Principle of Objective Spirit . . . . . . . .

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155 157 158 160 162 166 166 167 168

173 175 179 180 182

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189 193 194 195

8

Inhalt

12.2.2 Dependence Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 12.2.3 Hegel’s Liberal Communitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201 12.3 The Appeal of Hegel’s Social Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202 13. 13.1 13.2 13.2.1 13.2.2 13.2.3 13.3 13.3.1

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13.4.1 13.4.2

Hegel’s Ethical Pragmatism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Some Central Features of Pragmatism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Connections and Challenges: Hegel as a Pragmatist? . . . Clear Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Problematic Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Absurd Connections? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Fragility of Objective Spirit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Place of Objective Spirit in the Process of the SelfRealization of the Idea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Fragility of Objective Spirit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A Justification of Ethics? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The »Sublation of Morality in Ethical Life« as a Pragmatist Strategy of Justification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hegel’s Critique of Morality and Conscience . . . . . . . . . . Hegel’s Pragmatist Insight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14. 14.1 14.1.1 14.1.2 14.2 14.2.1 14.2.2 14.3

Personal Autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Personal Autonomy in Contemporary Philosophy The First Step Towards Naturalization . . . . . . . . The Second Step Towards Naturalization . . . . . . Hegel’s Conception of Personal Autonomy . . . . . Hegel’s Three-Tiered Analysis of the Will . . . . . . Personal Autonomy as Part of the Will’s Structure Problems with Hegel’s View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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13.3.2 13.3.3 13.4

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15. 15.1 15.1.1

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219 220 221 227 228 229 232 237

Prospects for a Hegelian Biomedical Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . Nature, Naturalness and Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Constitutive and Normative Aspects of Hegel’s Theory of Subjective Spirit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.1.2 Consequences for Bioethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.2 Individual Self-Determination and Social Identity . . . . . . 15.2.1 Autonomy as a Foundation for Biomedical Ethics . . . . . . . 15.2.2 The Significance of Hegel’s Social Ontology for Biomedical Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.3 Holism as a Method in Biomedical Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . Notes on the text . . . . . . . . . . Translation notes and glossary Index of names . . . . . . . . . . .

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Notes on citations Hegel’s writings have been cited using the historical-critical edition where possible. In other cases the citation given is for the twenty-volume Suhrkamp Werkausgabe. A reference is also provided for any existing English translation used. Terry Pinkard’s translation of the Phenomenology of Spirit, which is unpublished but freely available, is the best currently available and has therefore been cited. Since Hegel divides his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences and Basic Outlines for a Philosophy of Right into paragraphs, the corresponding two references are not given in these cases. Instead, the relevant location is indicated by an abbreviation of the work and a paragraph number. Hegel’s remarks on the paragraphs, which are marked in the original text by indentation, are cited using an abbreviation and a paragraph number followed by »R«. His handwritten marginal notes are indicated with an »M«.

List of abbreviations (D) The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy. Translated by H. S. Harris and Walter Cerf. Albany 1977. (E) Hegel’s Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline. Part I: The Science of Logic. Edited and Translated by Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom. Cambridge 2010. (=EL) Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature. Edited and translated with an introduction and explanatory notes by M. J. Petry. London 1970. Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind. Translated by W. Wallace and A. V. Miller. Revised with an introduction and commentary by Michael Inwood. Oxford 2007. (GW) Gesammelte Werke. Redacted by the Nordrhein-Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften with support from the Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (parts of this critical edition are also available as the Felix Meiner Philosophische Bibliothek series), Hamburg 1968 ff. (HE) Enzyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (first edition), Heidelberg 1817. (MM) Works. Redacted by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl M. Michel as the Werkausgabe in 20 Bänden, Frunkfurt / M. 1968 ff.

10

List of abbreviations

(PS) System of Science by Ge. Wilh. Fr. Hegel. First Part. The Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by Terry Pinkard. Updated Wednesday, October 20, 2013. http://terrypinkard . weebly . com / phenomenology - of - spirit - page . html. (PR) Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Edited by Allen Wood. Translated by H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge 1991. (SL) The Science of Logic. Translated and edited by George Di Giovanni. Cambridge 2010.

Preface by Robert Pippin Like Caesar’s Gaul, all contemporary Hegel scholarship is divided into three parts. There is the party of the pious. Textual fidelity in interpretation is the main norm for those in this group, and in practice this amounts in effect to continuous paraphrase. The attempt is to say again, in ways as close to Hegel’s own formulations as possible, what Hegel said, but to say it more clearly, in some way that illuminates Hegel’s own formulations, with paraphrases that do full justice to the oddness of Hegel’s prose but which, it is hoped, through numerous reformulations, make things clearer. Since Hegel was a systematic philosopher and since the system has many parts, one important goal for those committed to such an approach is to render more explicit the exact relation among the parts of such a system, where »more explicit« means trying to say what the historical Hegel would have said himself, if various questions were posed to him about the exact relation, say, between the Wissenschaft der Logik and the Realphilosophie. The most vexing problem for those interested in this question has always been the relation between the 1807 Phänomenologie des Geistes and the rest of Hegel’s system. Another important goal is to give the correct story of Hegel’s development, especially during the tumultuous Jena years and immediately thereafter. The question of whether the older Hegel became more »conservative« and reconciliationist is a major issue for these scholars. The strictly philological question of the integrity of Hegel’s texts themselves, especially the lecture courses, is also a major issue, and here the lectures on aesthetics occupy a good deal of attention. In the postwar period, scholars who number themselves among this group have produced impressive results, including a new critical edition of Hegel’s works and a number of important commentaries and histories of the period. But philosophers also want to know first, why Hegel thought he was entitled to the claims he makes, and second and most important, whether what Hegel claimed is true. But if one asks, for example, why Hegel thought the basic structure of all intelligibility required a Seinslogik, a Wesenslogik and a Begriffslogik, and one is told that the only way to answer such a question is to return to the supposedly presuppositionless beginning of the Logik and retrace the self-generating conceptual structure of the book as a whole, one is not much helped. One doesn’t want a repetition of Hegel’s answer but an assessment of it. An interest in this question has led to a second school of interpreters who, despite Hegel’s frequent insistence that his system could only properly be understood as a whole, understandably want to find in Hegel positions and arguments that can contribute to philosophical discussions today. So commentators try to focus on one, isolated aspect of Hegel’s philosophy, an aspect they find compelling as a philosophical argument all on its own. Attention to his political and ethical philosophy is particularly well represented among this group, and there

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Preface by Robert Pippin

are valuable studies of his »critique of liberalism,« or of his »criticism of contractarianism,« or his defense of a »my station, my duties« ethics, or his narrative of the history of fine art. And partisans in this group especially want to reject Hegel’s claim for a dependence between such themes and his more controversial speculative theses. This approach is understandable, especially in Anglophone philosophy. The last German philosopher to be taken seriously in major American and British departments as a philosopher of continuing interest is Kant. The »translation« problems, getting Hegel into a recognizable contemporary philosophical form, have proven quite difficult, leading to this less ambitious, more piecemeal approach. But there are obvious problems with such an approach. Too much »reconstruction« of Hegel’s position in a contemporary terminology, too hasty a rejection of Hegel’s speculative philosophy, and one loses touch with the historical Hegel altogether and so loses the opportunity to learn something from him that might not be available in contemporary options. »Textfrei« interpretation looms on the horizon as a danger. But obviously, the first and second approaches need not be thought of as necessarily excluding each other. In perfect Hegelian fashion, one would hope that dualisms could be overcome, aufgehoben, and an interpretation seriously informed by the complicated details of Hegel’s own mode of arguing, but just as seriously inspired by the demands of philosophical clarity, analysis and assessment, should be possible. Moreover, it ought also to be possible, without anachronism, to ask Hegel questions animated by contemporary issues in philosophy and to determine, not what the historical Hegel would say (since that mythical figure would likely not recognize the contemporary terms of the problem), but what an idealized Hegel ought to say in such a different, new context, given what commitments the historical Hegel actually professed. Adherents to this third approach fully accept the rigors of textual fidelity and thorough scholarly preparation (knowledge of Hegel’s interlocutors, the context of the time, the developmental history, the problems with textual variations and so forth), fully accept the task of interpreting Hegel in the light of his own systematic ambitions, but they also argue that there is much of contemporary philosophical value in Hegel that can be addressed and assessed even while accepting such obligations. There have been many impressive examples of this approach in the last sixty years or so, but none exceeds in clarity, depth, scholarly faithfulness and philosophically impressive results the work of Michael Quante over the last two decades. Quante is a widely published moral and political philosopher, with serious credentials as a Marx scholar, but his most important work on Hegel to this point was his influential and much discussed 1993 book, Hegels Begriff der Handlung (English translation 2004). This book is an ideal example of the approach listed above as the third party of Hegel interpreters. Quante is fully aware of the importance of Hegel’s most ambitious systematic concerns and his work is a model of erudition, but he

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was equally sensitive to the need to interpret Hegel in a way that would respond to central questions in what is now known as »action theory«; just as sensitive too to the way in which Hegel’s approach did not fit easily into some dimensions of that controversy and could count as a critique of it. There has been a growing interest in what in Anglophone philosophy would count as Hegel’s philosophy of mind, as well as in his positions on freedom, the will, the nature and status of normativity, and the logical structure of action, and Quante’s book has been a highly respected and important part of that new discussion. This collection of his papers continues his interests in Hegel on mindedness and agency, but broadens his spheres of interest to include several of the most sweeping and difficult of Hegel’s theses (the nature of speculative philosophy, the Natur-Geist relation, Hegel’s notion of freedom, his account of the will, responsibility and individuality) and brings the results of what Quante finds in Hegel to bear on some of the most important issues in ethics and political philosophy. All of the essays represent the very best of current Hegel scholarship and all of them make especially clear that Quante’s Hegel deserves to play a significant role in discussions of the most important contemporary issue in philosophy: the nature and importance of human freedom. Robert Pippin University of Chicago

1. Introduction Debates in social and political philosophy over the last century have in large part been shaped by the opposition between individualism (liberalism) and communitarianism. Individualism is the dominant social and political philosophy of modernity. Its central thesis is that the individual person must, as a rational subject, be viewed as primary, both from an ontological and an evaluative perspective. On this view, the worth of social institutions derives from the ethically acceptable demands of rational subjects. No value is ascribed to social formations over and above their satisfaction of individual interests and needs. Social formations are not even taken to exist except where they are reducible to individuals and their actions. For the last three hundred years, proponents of communitarianism have been attempting to develop a rival position to individualism. Communitarians take as a starting point the increasing »alienation« from social and political formations experienced by »atomic« individuals striving only for their own well-being. Communitarianism emphasizes the ontological independence of social institutions and ascribes independent ethical value to them. In contrast to individualism, social formations are viewed neither as mere instruments for the fulfillment of individual interests, nor as ontologically reducible to individual persons or their actions. Positions, therefore, range from relatively weak assumptions of irreducibility to strong claims regarding the evaluative priority of social institutions (such as the family, religious organizations or the state) over the individual. This animosity and the alternatives developed within it mean that contemporary philosophy faces the same questions and problems which Hegel wished to solve in his practical philosophy more than two hundred years ago. The central goal of his practical philosophy as a whole was to employ philosophical methods so as to understand the alienation of individuals from their religion, their ethical traditions and their social reality, and to alleviate this alienation via a suitable theory of social institutions. His philosophical system as a whole is aimed at overcoming skepticism, of both an everyday and a philosophical kind, as regards the possibility of justifying claims to knowledge in both the practical and the theoretical realm. Hegel’s basic assumption is that it is necessary to overcome the fundamental dualisms which have ossified into dichotomies in both the social life and the philosophy of the modern period. For social and political philosophy, this means using philosophical methods to allow us to apprehend the rationality of existing or developing social institutions. It, furthermore, requires philosophically analyzing the unavoidable tension between individual interests and ethical communities, as well as coming to understand and dissolve the normative tensions and conflicts which arise from them. The questions which Hegel raises in his practical philosophy could, therefore, also be posed to contemporary social and political philosophy. Furthermore, the

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historical figures in the liberal and individualist philosophical traditions who serve as points of orientation for Hegel (such as Hobbes, Locke and Kant) continue to do so for the contemporary discussion. The same can be said of Aristotle, who has been a central inspiration for many contemporary communitarians (such as Alasdair MacIntyre) as he was for Hegel too. It is doubtless a goal of Hegel’s practical philosophy to develop an Aristotelian conception of ethics for modern social conditions. To put the point somewhat more plainly, Hegel’s mature practical philosophy, which he elaborates in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right, represents an attempt to mediate Aristotle by way of Kant and Rousseau, that is, to connect the Aristotelian thesis that man is a zoon politikon with the modern conception of autonomy. A quick look at the historical backdrop against which Hegel developed his philosophy of right over a period of more than thirty years makes further parallels with the contemporary situation apparent. The Enlightenment brought with it an impulse towards secularization alongside the growing significance of the natural sciences. The resulting conflict between the modern way of explaining reality, on the one hand, and the religious understanding of the world on the other, continues to persist today. At the same time, the capitalist market economy is beginning to develop and display its superior economic efficiency over alternative forms of production. In the course of this development, political powers are shuffled and the areas of life directly connected with the exchange of goods undergo changes. In the end, these processes yield effects on the structure and the legitimation of political authority. The French Revolution, with its irreversible accomplishments as well as its failures, was a crucial historical and political experience for the people living at the time, which Hegel attempted to understand and philosophically adjudicate using the framework of his practical philosophy. During Hegel’s own lifetime, these processes led, in interconnected ways, to an atomization of forms of life and to the necessity of secular forms of justification for political authority. They also made the idea of autonomy central to normativity. All of these processes continue to this day, both in their basic tendencies and their internal tensions, and continue to induce multi-faceted social fractures. 1 It is no wonder, then, that Hegel’s practical philosophy is still relevant. In it, Hegel works through these experiences and attempts to develop a structure which is philosophically adequate to the complex predicament of modern society. The primary goal of this book is turn Hegel’s philosophy of mind into fertile terrain for addressing central problems of the present. To this end, the individual chapters attempt to bring Hegel’s systematic views into dialogue with philosophical positions which have proponents today. This is generally achieved by means of a detailed interpretation which engages intensively with Hegel’s text. Owing to his decided anti-scientism (which entails no rejection of the natural sciences as such), as well as his equally consistent rejection of philosophical skepticism (which includes 1

On this, see the extended discussion in Quante and Schweikard (2010).

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a critique of Descartes’s theory of subjectivity and dualistic views in the philosophy of mind), mainstream contemporary philosophy has viewed Hegel’s thought either as an obscure and hermetic fortress, or else as a philosophical provocation. The studies in central aspects of Hegel’s philosophy of mind which are collected in this book aim to bring out what is attractive about Hegel’s thought. In my view, Hegel’s philosophy is attractive because it is in fact quite close to pragmatism. This can be seen in three features of his outlook: First, in Hegel’s refusal to take natural scientific theories as a model for philosophical questions and methods, second, in his social-externalist conception of the mind (or Geist, »spirit«), which locates the essence of mental episodes in social practices of recognition of autonomy and the ascription of responsibility; and third, in the specific form taken by Hegel’s anti-skepticism, which seeks to secure philosophical justification not by means of individual principles that are justified once and for all, but rather via the coherence of the system as a whole. As we will see, this allows Hegel to take our discursive practices and our epistemic projects seriously in all of their diversity and plurality, and as having their own internal grammars, instead of needing to reduce them to a single principle given from without. I realize that this way of reading Hegel, although it may be prima facie attractive to many readers, faces two sources of difficulty. On the one hand, this sort of interpretation relies in part on resolving tensions and ambiguities in Hegel’s philosophy in one direction, even where these give grounds for alternative interpretations. On the other hand, Hegel’s works are cramped with detail, and only give up their insights to someone willing to deal with their minutiae. Just because some of the interpretations suggested here deviate from the standard reading, they need, in my opinion, to be secured to a greater extent than usual via a detailed close-textual analysis. This oftentimes laborious process of zooming in and engaging with Hegel will be carried out in the chapters to follow. By way of introduction, however, I wish at this point to briefly sketch the traits of Hegel’s philosophy of mind which are in my view attractive and relevant. (a) Hegel’s philosophical system proceeds from the metaphysical premise that the rationality of reality can only be grasped as the process of internal self-differentiation and self-determination of the unitary substance which realizes and recognizes its character as a subject in this process. Thus Hegel’s thought is firstly characterized by a thoroughgoing holism, since the meaning of every category (and hence all phenomena) is determined by its place in this process. Secondly, Hegel rejects any and every separation of thought from the object of thought (or of scheme and content). His method is thus characterized by a form of coherentism, since truth for him consists in the way that all categories and phenomena fit together in this process. Three substantive points are closely tied to these two methodological aspects: First, Hegel’s philosophy is radically monistic; ontologically, there is only one sub-

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stance (the absolute or the idea), and methodologically, with absolute subjectivity there is only one principle (self-knowledge and self-realization). Secondly, Hegel propounds a thoroughgoing rationalism, which assumes the fundamental intelligibility and rationality of what is actual. This must not be misunderstood as a mentalistic ontology, but rather needs to be understood as an ontology of propositional structures, which, however, are not to be thought of statically, but rather – following the philosophy of subjectivity of Kant and Fichte – are conceived as a process and, in part, as a social practice. Both of these are, thirdly, inserted into an essentialistteleological ontology. Hegel does not dispute the existence of individual spatio temporal things, events, or phenomena, but for philosophical cognition he requires the rationality of this reality, and hence its actuality, to be demonstrated. Two steps are needed for this in turn: At the first stage, it must be asked whether an individual entity corresponds to the concept of its kind, that is, whether it is a »true« manifestation of its specific concept (for example an animal, a state, or a work of art). At the second stage, the respective essence must then be placed into the process of development of absolute substance as well as being demonstrated to be a necessary and at the same time limited concept, determined by its specific position. Thus finite things, because their essence consists in limited concepts, do not completely achieve their goal thereby manifest their incompleteness (or finitude). So, if Hegel talks about more real or higher entities in his philosophical ontology, he does not thereby intend to dispute the existence of the lower ones, but rather to express that they stand on a lower level by philosophical standards. For Hegel, the philosophical standard consists in grasping an entity as a moment of the absolute, a moment which develops the absolute’s structure and subjectivity. The goal of this process of self-determination and self-constitution is the generation of moments and parts in which the basic structure of subjectivity manifests itself, and is at the same time represented. (b) Subjectivity, as the basic principle of the Hegelian system as a whole, goes through a process of development whose main stages are formed by specific principles. These in turn function as local principles for the individual parts of the system. Such a regional principle is the result of a categorical development which has taken place on the previous levels of the system. At the same time, according to Hegel, a specific domain of objects can be understood in a philosophically adequate way via the explication and development of the ground-level principle relevant to it. The basic principle of Hegel’s practical philosophy is the »free will [freie Wille]«, which, by the end of the part of the system called »Subjective Spirit«, has shown itself to be the »unity of theoretical and practical spirit [Geist]« (E § 481). This pedigree means, above all, that willing is understood by Hegel as a form of thought whose content is further determined, and hence also as a form of cognition. As Hegel remarks in his marginal notes on § 4 of the Philosophy of Right, the practical

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19

and theoretical »are not two capacities«. 2 Rather, the will consists in propositional attitudes which Hegel calls »practical representation[s]«. 3 For Hegel’s practical philosophy, this is of decisive importance in two respects. On the one hand, this implies that the basic structure of social reality is of a rational nature, since it is the manifestation of a rational will. On the other hand, Hegel can defend a cognitivist position in practical philosophy on the basis of the following: Utterances which express ethical claims are propositionally structured expressions of the will and as such both susceptible to justification and truth-apt. By »right« Hegel understands justified claims of this sort generally, for which reason his philosophy of right encompasses all practical philosophy and is not restricted to the philosophy of right in the more narrow sense. Hegel emphasizes his thesis that the free will is the fundamental principle of practical philosophy by using the introduction to the Philosophy of Right to elaborate upon his conception of the will. His pregnant way of putting it there runs as follows: The basis [Boden] of right is the realm of spirit in general and its precise location and point of departure is the will; the will is free, so that freedom constitutes its substance and destiny [Bestimmung] and the system of right is the realm of actualized freedom, the world of spirit produced from within itself as a second nature. (PR § 4)

Apart from the explicit statement that the free will is the basic principle (the »basis«) of right, we find here two statements which are fundamental to Hegel’s practical philosophy. First, there is the claim that »freedom« must be seen as the »substance and destiny [Bestimmung]« of the will; and second, Hegel characterizes the »system of right« as the »realm of actualized freedom«. With the first statement, Hegel makes the claim that »freedom« belongs analytically to the concept of the will and thus »constitutes the concept or substantiality of the will, its gravity, just as gravity constitutes the substantiality of a body« (PR § 7). Being free is the essence of the will, its specific concept and hence what gives it its standing as a regional principle allowing it to fulfill its ontological function. At the same time, freedom is the »destiny [Bestimmung]« of the will (PR § 4) insofar as it is an essential characteristic which the will must realize. Given the concept of the will has this normative connotation for Hegel, it can be drawn on as a criterion of evaluation for existing social structures, ethical claims and actions or norms. With the second statement, Hegel formulates a thesis which, on the one hand, follows from his special metaphysics, and yet gives expression to something specific to his practical philosophy. On the basis of its internal structure, the concept of will is among the most philosophically demanding and valuable, because in it the 2 3

»überhaupt nicht 2 Vermögen« (PR § 4 M). »praktische Vorstellung[en]« (PR § 4 M).

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opposition between subject and object, between thought and spirit, is thought of as an active production of a previously contemplated and desired reality. In the will, according to Hegel, the active aspect of rational self-determination expresses itself, an aspect which belongs to the absolute as an essential characteristic. Even though the will is not yet the adequate realization of the idea (as the perfect and highest structure of the absolute) – the idea only »appears« in the will because, as objective spirit, it must provide »actuality« (ibid.) in a world already existing outside it – its conceptual structure, nevertheless, displays the form of the idea. This means that it belongs to its concept to create a reality adequate to it. The thesis specific to practical philosophy is that this tendency toward self-realization results in all of the forms and constituents of the system of right in the broadest sense, and ultimately all of the basic elements of the social world. Hegel characterizes these as a »second nature« (PR § 4) because they are at once natural determinations which follow from the essence of the will and yet can also take the form of natural conditions which are not brought about by the explicit decisions of individuals. With this observation, Hegel wishes to rebuke what is in his view the mistaken assumption that social institutions must be grounded in the rational decisions of individual subjects in order to count as rational and normatively binding (this is how he explicitly criticizes contractual theories of legitimation of social or political institutions; cf. e. g. PR § 75). In this self-realization, the will itself simultaneously undergoes a substantial determination. The best way to think about this is that people, in their attempt to develop social systems of right which adequately manifest and represent the freedom of the will, experience the success and failure of these various institutions, and these experiences form a part of the content of the concept of a free will. It is, therefore, central to Hegel’s practical philosophy that the freedom of the will realizes itself in a system of right, meaning a comprehensive social order. The will is in this way ontologically determined as the »substance« of each social institution, which has its place in a »rational« practical philosophy. At the same time, freedom, as the »destiny« of this will, is the normative standard for the evaluation of its various realizations and manifestations. But what does Hegel mean by »freedom«? Usually, when philosophers talk about free will, they are asking whether or not the freedom necessary for our ethical self-understanding is compatible with determinism. In the context of this debate, in which compatibilists defend the compatibility of freedom with determinism while incompatibilists try to demonstrate their incompatibility, a distinction is drawn between freedom of action and freedom of the will. The former refers to a subject’s capacity to realize its intentions in action; freedom of the will, on the other hand, goes beyond this and denotes a capacity by which a subject is able to give its will a particular content. This form of freedom is usually referred to as freedom to decide or to choose – and it is this sense of freedom whose compatibility with determinism is investigated. So, if Hegel talks about free will, we might expect his discussion to take place within this framework. This expectation would be disappointed, however, in two

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respects. First, Hegel is not at all interested in the classical problem of the compatibility of freedom and determinacy. Second, his theory of the will contains a pointed criticism of the concepts of free choice and free decision, and yet Hegel does not endorse a concept of freedom which one would find among the classical compatibilists. It is, therefore, difficult to place Hegel’s theory of the free will into the classical mold of compatibilism and incompatibilism (this philosophical debate is only mentioned in the Philosophy of Right once, at PR § 15). Hegel ignores the classical problem because he rejects two presuppositions on which it is based. On the one hand he takes causal explanations to be less basic than final explanations, including explanations in terms of action-theoretical concepts. This is because he holds that the category of causality presupposes that of an end (he claims to show this in the Science of Logic). On the other hand, Hegel does not think that we need a concept of freedom in the sense of free choice according to which the decision of the agent is interpreted as a genuine cause (on the model of a causa efficiens). For him, freedom does not consist in being able to set into motion a causal chain. As one can see from his critique of free choice (Wahl- oder Willkürfreiheit, PR §§ 5 and 6), the decisive moment of freedom consists in the will generating its rational content in the form of social institutions and normative claims of subjects recognized within them, that is, generating its content as a normatively structured social world. On the free choice model, it is assumed that a free subject is confronted by a set of options which she is at liberty to choose from. Hegel criticizes two shortcomings of this model: On the one hand, if all of the content lies on the side of the options to choose from, there would be no binding content left for the decision itself. Ethics would then be left to rest on a dangerous formalism and subjectivism. On the other hand, existing contents (like the norms, rules and claims accepted in a society) are bereaved of their validity since they only attain normative bindingness via the decision of the subject (otherwise, the subject is not free in relation to them). Hegel’s agreement with the determinist (PR § 15) concerns just this point, that the aforementioned contents are introduced by him as determining conditions against the formal freedom of free choice. Hegel’s specific application of this argument shows, however, that he is not here thinking of causal determinations but rather of preconditions in the form of normative rules established in the social world. One can understand Hegel’s train of thought as follows. A subject always makes a decision in the context of a world that is always already rational and normatively structured, within the social space of reasons and justified claims; a subject acts in relation to preestablished customs, expectations and social institutions which are not to be conceived of as limitations of the subject’s freedom but rather as the context necessary for the development of individual autonomy. Since Hegel attempts to show in his theory of objective spirit that the social world can (and must) be conceived according to the structure of a free will which autonomously supplies itself with content: An individual subject does not relate to an essentially

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foreign reality when it acts in relation to normative claims which it is confronted with, in its society. It is rather that the social realm is a space of autonomous, selfimposed rules and reasons, organized according to the structure of the will, in which particular subjects realize their individual freedom when the justified claims of subjects are recognized. In the context of Hegel’s teleological-essentialist ontology, social institutions (such as the family or the state) are ontologically primary because they represent a higher form of realization of the will qua concept. This is because individual subjects in such social institutions, which, as subjects, are already manifestations of the will, stand in social relations which in turn realize the structure of the will qua concept a second time. Social institutions, therefore, fulfill Hegel’s condition: They are not only realizations of the will themselves, their constitutive parts, i. e. free subjects, are as well. The dependence of individuals which, without social institutions, are not capable of laying claim to their autonomy and developing it, is for Hegel both a sign of the ontological preeminence of social institutions as well as an expression of their capacity to outlast particular individuals. On the whole, social institutions do not exist independently of free subjects for Hegel, but rather have their reality within the normative self-understanding of their members (there is no thinking or willing »mega-subject« beyond the individuals). Social institutions nevertheless possess greater philosophical dignity, because they are more adequate manifestations of the structure of absolute subjectivity. Hegel’s concept of freedom is characterized by three central claims: (i) The essence of freedom consists in giving oneself normative rules on rational grounds, which are at the same time adequate manifestations of the conceptual structure of the will. (ii) Freedom is thus to be understood as the basic structure of social phenomena in general and is not to be reduced to a quality of the decisions of individual subjects. (iii) The dualism of an autonomous subject and a social reality is to be overcome in favor of an alternative model. In this model, the facilitation of an individual leading his or her life turns out, on the one hand, to be an immanent goal of social institutions. On the other hand, it is shown that an individual subject leading an autonomous, rational life consists in understanding and recognizing norms and demands of a rational and just society as the fulfillment of his or her own essence as a free subject. Now, what contribution does this will-theoretical foundation for social philosophy make to how the relationship of social institutions and individual freedom is conceived in Hegel’s practical philosophy? First, the basic structural identity of individual and general will allows him to avoid portraying the relationship of individual freedom and ethical community as one of alienation from the outset, viz. as a relation of instrumental reason or thoroughgoing mistrust. For Hegel, it is one of the necessary conditions of a functioning polity that individuals be able to adopt an attitude of basic trust in and loyalty toward the communities with which they identify (such as the family or the state).

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If a society fails to bring about this positive predisposition, this is an indication that it has failed to fulfill its philosophical task of enabling individuals to have an autonomous and good life. In that case it is permissible, indeed it is philosophically required, to ascertain the defects of this society’s structures and, where necessary, reform them. Secondly, it follows from the ontological interdependence of autonomous individuals and social institutions that individuals cannot be sacrificed for the good of the state (although Hegel does take it to follow from the ontological priority and greater dignity of the state that individuals can be obliged to perform military service). At the same time, it is not possible to reduce the state to an instrument for the realization of individuals and their interests, as occurs, in Hegel’s view, in contractarian theories of the state’s legitimacy. Rather, it belongs to the essence of autonomous subjects to realize their freedom as active citizens of a state. The third aspect of Hegel’s social philosophy to be emphasized is its irreducible normativity. The ontology of social formations is only intelligible if one grasps the structures of the social world as requirements, norms and rules, whose legitimacy one can demonstrate by grounding them philosophically. A reconstruction of social formations whose language abstains from such normative descriptions could never – at least in Hegel’s eyes – capture the essence of social institutions. And because it is part of the essence of social formations to create free individuals and make room for them to lead their lives freely, Hegel’s social philosophy is, owing to its basis, not vulnerable to the objection that it would have individuals sacrificed to an idolized state. The question, however, as to how institutions, the recognition of entitlements or even laws concretely shape the relationship between individual freedom and ethical community needs to be continually answered anew in the face of ever-changing historical conditions. Hegel’s theoretical assumptions, therefore, leave room for forms of autonomous life in the rational social world beyond those that Hegel himself envisaged. (c) In the Science of Logic, Hegel attempts to show that subjectivity is a network of categories which proceed from one another and contribute to a complete system with no alternative, for which reason this system is ultimately well-founded. He thus undertakes to meet Kant’s challenge to derive the basic and universally valid categories of thought form pure self-consciousness, taking Fichte’s lead in doing so. Nevertheless, Hegel goes further than either Kant or Fichte, because he engages in logic also as a form of ontology. This means that the categories thus obtained are not only determinations of thought, but rather also constitute thinkable structures of reality, or »reason [Vernunft]« itself. In place of the assumption that, in thinking, we relate to some unknowable thing in itself whose structure is impossible to grasp, Hegel defends the thesis that there is a structural identity between the knowing subject and the object of knowledge. The process of development through which the categories develop from one another is the underlying unity from which proceed

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the opposition of spirit and world, of knowing subject and knowable reality. At the same time, this process of development is a self-referential process of selfdifferentiation, self-development and self-determination, proceeding purely internally, because this one substance, which Hegel also calls »the absolute«, leaves room for nothing different from it, but instead generates all differences from within itself. For substance to be essentially constituted in this way, differentiating itself in self-referential processes and thereby realizing its own essence, is the end goal of the development of the basic structure of reality as a whole. For Hegel, reality is »actual« insofar as it is rational, that is, insofar as it can be grasped as a manifestation of this one process of self-determination. Showing this is the task of philosophy, which must express the structure of this process in its own system, so that it simultaneously manifest adequate self-recognition and the goal of the development of absolute substance. This process of development and self-recognition is described by Hegel not only as a cognitive process, rather it is also, in his view, the key to the understanding historical changes in social institutions like art, religion and philosophy. This book is divided into four parts, which are intended to enable the reader to approach step-wise what is living and relevant in Hegel’s conception of mind, or spirit (Geist). It is beyond dispute that Hegel’s philosophical system lays claim to a standard of justification for philosophy and a level of faith in the power of philosophical argument which we can no longer endorse, nor would we want to. In the chapters belonging to the first part, our aim is to show that we need to take seriously this metaphysical aspect of Hegel’s philosophy if we are not to sell short his arguments or inadvertently falsify his ideas by leaving out some of their key aspects. At the same time, I will endeavor to show that, and how, we can reveal pragmatist insights Hegel develops within this metaphysical context and engage with them in a productive, systematic way. In the second part of the book, Hegel’s critique of scientistic philosophy of mind and his reflection-logical determination of the relationship of nature and spirit will be developed by engaging with his Phenomenology of Spirit and Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline. The four chapters of the third part, which deal mainly with Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of Right, develop his theory of the will, which is the organizing principle of his entire practical philosophy. Aspects of Hegel’s theory of subjectivity, as well as his interpretation of our social practice of attributing action and moral responsibility, will be discussed, with the aim of showing ascriptivism and social externalism to be central features of his theory. The fourth part consists of chapters on Hegel’s theory of recognition and personal autonomy that can make important contributions to contemporary pragmatist practical philosophy. The chapters of this book are elaborations on discussions that I have published over the last fifteen years. In one case (chapter 12), the original essay was coauthored; I thank David Schweikard for allowing our text to be used for this book.

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During this time, I had the opportunity to discuss Hegel and my interpretation of his philosophy with friends and colleagues. Even though in many cases I no doubt did not take the criticism as it was presumably intended, I have benefited greatly from the philosophical objections of my colleagues. For these I thank Simon Derpmann, Klaus Düsing, Kristina Engelhard, Christoph Halbig, Heikki Ikäheimo, Attila Karakus, Jussi Kotkavirta, Arto Laitinen, Barbara Merker, Georg Mohr, Dean Moyar, Robert Pippin, Erzsébet Rózsa, Christoph Schmidt am Busch, David Schweikard, Katja Stoppenbrink, Andreas Vieth, Manfred Wetzel and Marcus Willaschek. Without a great deal of technical support, this book would not exist: Therefore I thank Christian Blum, Anna Blundell and Caterina Quante for their assistance. But foremost I wish to thank Amir Mohseni for his dedication and his many helpful suggestions, which have benefited this book and hopefully also its readers. There is one person whose very special role and place could hardly be expressed by a mere statement of thanks. Ludwig Siep has accompanied me on my philosophical journeys for more than twenty-five years, critically, but above all wellwishing and constantly encouraging. These studies in Hegel’s philosophy are not the only thing which would not exist were it not for him. For this reason, I dedicate this book to him.

2. Metaphysics and Common Sense John McDowell’s description of his own project as a sort of »prolegomenon to a reading of the Phenomenology« 1 motivates comparing his philosophy with the system that Hegel sets out in his Outlines for an Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. McDowell’s statement is the expression of a welcome trend in contemporary (post-)analytical philosophy to take Hegel’s philosophical system seriously. 2 A rehabilitation of this sort requires us to ensure that we do not approach Hegel with preconceptions that will preclude us from learning anything or gaining any insight from him. The discussion I provide in this chapter is intended to help ensure that the rehabilitation of Hegel in (post-)analytic philosophy is not constricted from the outset by undue assumptions. Comparing Hegel’s philosophy to McDowell’s and attempting to cast Hegel’s arguments and terms at least partially into the conceptual system of Mind and World can, furthermore, help us to understand Hegel’s systematic considerations and arguments. For we thereby treat Hegel not as a »past thinker«, but rather as a partner in a dialog that will put his philosophical credentials to the test. A comparison of this sort can also help us understand McDowell’s position. 3 We find in Hegel’s philosophy a coherent answer to the philosophical questions and issues that McDowell wrestles with. Even if we find that Hegel’s answer is one that McDowell would prefer not to hear, this will be no insignificant result. In this way, we can test whether the parts of McDowell’s argumentation dealing with the history of philosophy can withstand critical examination. 4

1 2

3

4

McDowell (1994, p. ix). Bowie (1996, p. 515) refers to McDowell’s readiness, alongside Putnam’s, to locate Hegel among those philosophers worth taking seriously as a »further sign of a welcome change in the international philosophical climate«. It is surely easier and more natural to make this connection if we take Kant as our starting point, since McDowell’s reference to Kant is considerably more developed, and at the same time there is a great deal more agreement in Kant research about the fundamental character of Kant’s philosophy (cf. Willaschek 1997). This test is important for McDowell’s thesis if the historical part of his argument is to be anything more than mere illustration. If the historical diagnosis bears the brunt of the argument in Mind and World, much depends on its being correct. There are three possibilities. First, it might be the case that the historical elements have no function. Second, we might consider it important for McDowell’s arguments that there is a historical development, even if it is not important for his purposes whether the story begins with Kant or – as Friedman (1996) assumes – only with Quine. Third, in principle it may also be relevant to McDowell’s argument that his diagnosis of the history of philosophy be correct. Only in this third case does Friedman’s critique really get at the heart of McDowell’s theory. In my view, only the first two options are plausible, as far as the systematic relevance of McDowell’s reflections is concerned.

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As a general rule, any comparison between two philosophical positions or systems will only be interesting if their central elements are brought into contact with one another. In the case of Hegel, there are two more things which must be considered if a fruitful comparison is not to be made impossible from the outset. First, we must take into account the historical development of Hegel’s philosophical thought. We must resist the temptation to throw together theoretical elements from his early writings (before the Science of Logic) with the later system. It is often difficult to say how Hegel’s individual statements cohere with one another and with his systematic outlook. Furthermore, care must always be taken to keep track of which level of the system we are on – in which »logical« position. 5 There is no general rule to tell us, for instance, how to combine the categorical scheme of Hegel’s logic with that of the Philosophy of Right. Ultimately, our analysis must rely on the details of the particular case at hand. In Mind and World, McDowell undertakes to show that the relationship between mind and world has taken on the status of an unsolvable problem, leading to an oscillation between the myth of the given and a »frictionless« coherentism. 6 In order to escape this oscillation, we must, according to McDowell, conceive of both experiences and the world as each having a conceptual structure – that is, as »thinkable.« According to McDowell, this option will only be available to us if we undertake a partial re-enchantment of nature (but not first nature!) and combine an Aristotelian conception of second nature with common sense realism. 7 A re-appropriation of this realist and moderately naturalist position, according to McDowell’s Wittgensteinian credo, is only possible if we first remedy the philosophical ills of skepticism. For skepticism not only makes it impossible to resolve the question as to the relationship of mind and world, but rather raises this question in the first instance. McDowell’s methodological suggestion is, therefore, to give up on »constructive« philosophy and solve the problem by analyzing the conditions under which it arose, so as to be able to relinquish the problematic assumptions underlying it. 8

5

6 7 8

The conclusions that Sedgwick (1997) arrives at suffer in large part form her indifference to these conditions. In this book, when »logical« is used without any further specification, this always means »speculative-logical« in Hegel’s sense. On these three elements, see McDowell (1994, pp. 8, 9 and 14). McDowell (1994, p. 78). In the introduction to the second edition, McDowell explains the negative sense which he intends to be associated with the expression »constructive philosophy« and makes his considerations more precise (2000b, p. xxiii). The problem of the relationship of mind and world relation is of such a sort that only therapy and the avoidance of constructive philosophy can be of any help (1994, p. 95). This is because the preconditions required for the formulation of the problem include premises that make a solution to the problem impossible (2000b, p. xxi). At first glance, McDowell seems to accept, in the introduction to the second edition, that another kind of philosophical problem might exist. But his concluding remark to the effect

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29

Likewise, Hegel’s method is the fundamental theoretical basis of his system: Hegel never tires of stressing that only a speculative-dialectical approach can possibly rise to the demands of philosophy. Even those who have only a passing familiarity with Hegel’s system know that he accords a central status to his conception of the idea. According to Hegel, methodology, ontology, and epistemology all converge in the idea. In the end, Hegel’s conception of the idea, at least as he sees it, provides the solution to all fundamental questions of philosophy. There could hardly be any doubt, therefore, as to the relevance of the idea to our comparison. On the other hand, a question might arise regarding our consideration of the »Preliminary Conception [Vorbegriff ]« in the Encyclopedia, since the Preliminary Conception does not even belong to the exposition of the system. Hegel uses the Preliminary Conception as a sort of introduction, first to give the reader a clear understanding of the singularity of his approach (E §§ 19–25) and then to outline, in a sort of condensed edition of his History of Philosophy, the various positions he discusses regarding the relationship of mind and world. Three Positions of Thought with Respect to Objectivity can be understood as a diagnosis and description of the historical genesis of a philosophical problem to which Hegel’s system is to provide the solution. 9 Consequently I will also expound and draw on this text for comparison, since it gives expression to Hegel’s own understanding of these problems and what he takes to be novel about his proposed solution. In what follows, I will compare Hegel’s and McDowell’s positions in three ways. First (in 2.1), I shall attempt to show that the construction of the Preliminary Conception in the Encyclopedia (E §§ 19–78) in many ways mirrors the underlying argumentative structure of Mind and World. Second (in 2.2), I shall undertake to show that McDowell’s conception of nature agrees in many respects with Hegel’s conception of the »idea« (E §§ 213–44), as well as his view of »nature« (§§ 245–

9

that his »exorcism of the questions« (2000b, p. xxiv) is constructive philosophy in a positive sense suggest that he considers Wittgenstein’s proposed method of philosophy as therapy or cure to be the only sensible one, and sees all philosophical problems as self-created pseudoproblems. Even given these clarificatory remarks in the introduction to the second edition of Mind and World, the question, therefore remains, open whether McDowell takes there also to be philosophical problems that are not constructive philosophy in the bad sense but, nevertheless, do call for Wittgensteinian therapy. But his understanding of philosophy probably rules this out (cf. McDowell 2000a). Hegel himself ascribes a merely propaedeutic value to his reflections in the Preliminary Conception, since the proof of his claims there can only be given within the system itself (E §§ 19 R, 25 R). Consequently, examinations of the history of philosophy in Hegel have an ambiguous status much like they do in McDowell. On the one hand, Hegel claims: »The same development of thinking that is portrayed in the history of philosophy is also portrayed in philosophy itself, only freed from its historical externality, purely in the element of thinking« (E § 14). On the other hand, the history of philosophy as it unfolds and becomes concrete is part of the meaning of the categories, so that for Hegel the evolution of the history of philosophy is more than just evidence for his own system.

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52) and »spirit« (§§ 377–86). 10 My claim is that there is a deep-running parallel between Hegel’s triadic constellation of idea, nature and spirit, and McDowell’s triadic constellation of nature, first nature and second nature. Thirdly (in 2.3) I will make some concluding remarks on philosophical method. In this I am guided by the question of the extent to which Hegel’s and McDowell’s different ways of understanding philosophy, and consequently their different philosophical methodologies, are the reason for divergences in their views. I will take up these issues once more in the following chapter.

2.1 Three Positions of Thought with Respect to Objectivity As Hegel himself understands it, the Preliminary Conception contains only »the concepts prefacing the philosophy«, which is to say »determinations drawn from and subsequent to the survey of the whole« (E § 19). 11 These expositions consequently lack the argumentative power which, in Hegel’s eyes, can only be attained within the system itself. Consequently, the only function of the Preliminary Conception can be to give the reader a preliminary idea of the distinctive character of Hegel’s argumentation. The Preliminary Conception can be divided into two parts: In the opening sections (E §§ 19–25), Hegel attempts to convey what is specific about his approach and to link his philosophy directly to everyday thinking (E §§ 20, 25). Subsequently, Hegel presents and analyzes the three positions of thought with respect to objectivity (E §§ 26–78), following his presentation in the History of Philosophy, »in order to explicate the importance and the standpoint here given to logic« (E § 25).

2.1.1 §§ 19–25 The central task of the opening sections is to distinguish between subjective and objective aspects of thought and to reject the idea that thought has a merely subjective status (E § 24). Like Kant, Hegel views thought as a free and spontaneous activity of the subject (E § 23). At the same, he resists defining thought in such a 10 11

See also ch. 5 of this book. The following analysis of the basic structure of the Preliminary Conception ignores the essentialist and teleological dimension that Hegel links with his discussion of objective thoughts and truth. The ontological standard by which Hegel is able to distinguish more and less true objects applies, on the one hand, to the degree to which an object realizes its essence and, on the other, to the complexity of the essential structure itself. The central point where Hegel and McDowell’s reflections meet remains untouched by these additional assumptions which Hegel makes (for a more detailed analysis which agrees with my main claims, cf. Halbig (2002, ch. 6–8) and Siep et al. (2001)).

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way that it only includes »forms of conscious thought« (§ 24). Rather, Hegel wishes to also include what he calls »objective thoughts« (E § 24). Hegel formulates this by saying that »reason and understanding are in the world« (E § 24 R) 12 and complains of the inadequacy of the term »thought [Gedanke]« because »thought is habitually used for something belonging to the mind [Geist], i. e. to consciousness, and what is objective is for the most part attributed to what is not mental« (E § 24 R). For Hegel, philosophy had hitherto made the mistake of seeing thought in both its senses as finite or merely subjective. It was hence presumed that the meanings of individual concepts or categories were atomistically fixed, delimited from one another and »finite«. On the other hand, they were compared to a thought-independent »objective« world and in this way seemed to be merely »subjective« entities belonging to the understanding, and, therefore, to be assigned an unknowable reference. Hegel does not abandon the distinction between »subjective and objective« entirely, but he questions the validity of both dichotomies. In the process, he rejects the separation of »conceptual scheme and content« and the strict opposition between »analytic and synthetic«. Two assumptions are involved in the distinction between scheme and content. Fundamental to this »third dogma of empiricism« 13 is the thesis that it is possible to isolate a conceptual scheme, considered as an underlying system of categories, from the content to which it can be applied. On this basis, the thesis is put forward that incommensurable conceptual schemes coexist, yielding an irreducible conceptual relativism. Like McDowell, who follows Davidson on this point, Hegel considers both theses to be false. For him, they are the product of a conception of categories which is finite, in both senses of the word. Because categories are viewed as belonging merely to the understanding (and in this sense finite), it seems that they must be applied to a realm of objects independent of those categories. To this Hegel objects that the realm of objects itself has the same categorical structure as thought. The concepts of thought are at once subjective and objective, and for that reason a dualism of conceptual scheme and content is impossible. And to the thesis that several mutually translatable conceptual schemata might coexist, one can follow Hegel in objecting that this impression derives from a conception of categories rooted in the understanding (Verstand). Alternative sets of categories only seem to be conceivable when categories are viewed as isolated semantic atoms (and hence as finite in the second sense). Hegel attempts to show in his Science of Logic that the meaning of a category is constituted by its position in the overall system of all concepts of thought. Any substitution of a particular category is

12 13

Translator’s note: Translation modified. Davidson identifies the »dualism of conceptual scheme and empirical content« in his famous essay, »On the very idea of a conceptual scheme«, referring to Quine in connection with »the third dogma« of empiricism (Davidson 1984, p. 189). A detailed analysis of Davidson’s argument can be found in Quante (1998c).

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consequently impossible. And since Hegel also defends the thesis that subjectivity requires precisely those categories which are developed in the Science of Logic, his ultimate philosophical explanation rules out the existence of alternative overall sets of categories tout court. Hegel’s premises also make it impossible to maintain a strict analytic-synthetic distinction. Such a distinction requires either a strict opposition between analytic content belonging to the conceptual scheme and empirical content arising from the realm of objects, or else it assumes that individual categories can be isolated from one another in order to determine what is analytically contained in their respective meanings. Both of these possibilities are excluded by the overall structure of Hegel’s philosophy. The nature of the categories as both subjective and objective, as well as their holistic constitution, does however make it possible to draw a merely contextual distinction between conceptual scheme and content, or analytic and synthetic relations. The distinction, however, then has no claim to general validity or even to any ontological status in relation to reality as a whole. Hegel’s speculative philosophy thus accepts both the principle that »there is nothing in the understanding that has not been in sensation, in experience« as well as its converse, »nihil est in sensu quod non fuerit in intellectu« (E § 8 R). 14 Now it is easy to see that this aspect of Hegel’s view coincides with McDowell’s thesis that the world itself is thinkable, 15 that thinking directly grasps the »layout« of the world and that in an authentic experience the world as such is experienced. 16 In the tradition of Quine’s critique of the two dogmas of empiricism (strict separation between analytic and synthetic, on the one hand, and the atomism of meaning, on the other), McDowell borrows Davidson’s critique of the rigid distinction between conceptual scheme and content, which McDowell describes as a »scheme-world dualism«. 17 Like Hegel, McDowell views conceptual schemata as »perspectives« that are a constitutive part of the world itself. 18 Thus, regarding the question of realism or idealism, both McDowell and Hegel reach the conclusion that a rigid »either / or« is misplaced. Since conceptual schemata are neither eliminated nor completely separated from the world as such, the traditional dichotomy loses its force. Unlike McDowell, who seems at this point to stop at a merely negative result, Hegel, with his conception of mind, develops a philosophical answer that can be 14

15 16 17 18

Hegel explains this second sentence by saying that »nous, or, in its deeper determination, spirit, is the cause of the world« (E § 8 R). It should also be borne in mind that for Hegel, cause, on the level of infinite objects, is »a cause of itself [causa sui]« (§ 153 R), made manifest and determined in its effect. Event causation, which Davidson, amongst others, sees as fundamental, then becomes merely finite »in the common sense of the causal relationship« (E § 153 R). McDowell (1994, p. 26). Ibid. (p. 143). Ibid. (p. 147 f.). McDowell (1994, p. 155).

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interpreted as a sublation of the dichotomy of idealism and realism (cf. chapters 5 and 6). By developing spirit from both an ontological and an epistemological point of view, and conceiving of this development as self-generation and self-knowledge, Hegel imparts an idealistic moment to his philosophy. Nevertheless, in virtue of the fact that this self-constitution is viewed as both the fundamental structure of the realm of objects and as a necessary self-explanation, with no alternative available, there is no trace of subjectivism or constructivism in Hegel’s idealism.

2.1.2 §§ 26–27 One part of the philosophical argumentation we find in Mind and World is a philosophical-historical diagnosis by means of which McDowell seeks, on the one hand, to show how it was that the mind-world relationship turned into an insoluble problem for contemporary philosophy, while at the same time wishing to reveal the hidden premises that are responsible both for giving rise to the problem in the first place and obscuring the solution which McDowell suggests. The backdrop of this saga is the »bald naturalism« of the modern era, according to which nature is no more than a disenchanted causal system, with no room for either meaning or normativity. Bald naturalist theories have no option but to attempt to reduce intentionality and spontaneity to nature thus conceived or else to try to eliminate them altogether. 19 In either case, spontaneous knowledge and the normativity associated with the use of concepts are ultimately made to seem impossible. In the latter case, intentionality simply goes missing, while in the former normativity is reduced to causality. The duality of conceptual scheme and world thereby collapses into a homogeneous, unidimensional world of causes without normativity or meaning. If we think the strategy of elimination is misguided and the program of naturalization, in the sense of a reduction of intentionality, is impossible in principle, then the only remaining option is to postulate an autonomous realm of intentionality. This autonomy, however, causes the world itself to go missing, and hence ultimately leads to a dualism of conceptual scheme and world. Against this background, the issue of how empirical knowledge of the world is possible becomes pressing. According to McDowell, these background assumptions make it impossible to find a solution, since normativity is indispensable for knowledge but at the same time impossible to reconcile with naturalistic ontology. The consequence is an oscillation between a »myth of the given« and a internal coherentism. But neither enables us to conceive of experiences as true and justified. The entities postulated by the myth of the given are impossible: As McDowell shows in his analyses of Evans and Quine, these entities are purported to be at once part of

19

Hegel sees this as the more consistent variant of empiricism, as against Kant’s coherentist dualism (E § 60 R).

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nature and still play a normative-justificatory role. Following Davidson, McDowell concludes that this is a contradiction, regardless of whether these entities are taken to be non-conceptual contents (Evans) or purely causal stimuli (Quine). If we take this thought to its logical conclusion, justification remains bound to the sphere of the intentional and the normative, leaving the world to interact with justification in a merely causal way. A causal relation of intentionality to the world cannot, however, as McDowell demonstrates, serve to provide justification. At best it provides exculpation. 20 Justified knowledge of the world becomes impossible to attain. Consequently, at the end of the non-reductive path stands the image of a »frictionless spinning in the void.« The world has gone missing. McDowell’s response to this dilemma is well known: He proposes a return to the lost innocence of everyday realism, according to which cognitive access to the world is both possible and unproblematic. In order to make that return possible, according to McDowell, two things are necessary: The conceptual must no longer be restricted to the sphere of thought and the world must be seen as conceptually structured. At the same time, the borderline between normativity and reality must not be treated as settled. Taking his lead from Aristotle, McDowell, therefore, argues for a partial re-enchantment of nature in such a way that spontaneity and normativity are acknowledged and given their place as natural components of human life (cf. part 2). 21 Hegel, too, supports his own philosophical reflections with a philosophical-historical diagnosis that he sets out in the Preliminary Conception. Unlike McDowell, he is interested in skeptical conclusions concerning infinite objects. However, since, for Hegel, these are given in experience and are real, and since Hegel thinks the philosophy of his day lost knowledge not only of God but also of reality as such, parallels arise even if one leaves aside Hegel’s distinction between finite and infinite objects of experience. This simplification is justified not only on the basis of the problems set out in this chapter, but also for immanent reasons: Infinite objects make up, for Hegel, a part of experience (E § 8), that is, they are experienced by consciousness as independent, real objects. McDowell, however, shows that, for those who hold the positions which he criticizes, finite objects are just as far removed from thought as infinite objects. Even though Hegel was primarily concerned with knowledge of the absolute, his reflections are in principle just as applicable to the relationship of mind and world overall, as is apparent from his assessment of Humean skepticism (E § 39 R). On this reading, Hegel is seeking to present the position of a subjective and idealistic coherentism in the second part of the Preliminary Conception. Under this assumption, it makes sense that Hegel would invoke Hume’s empiricism in the case of finite cognition, and Kant’s critique of reason in the case of infinite cognition. Regarding the possibility of cognizing reality and the relationship between 20 21

Cf. McDowell (1994, p. 8, fn. 7). Cf. Quante (2000b).

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the definition of thought and the definition of its object, Hume’s conception of finite knowledge and Kant’s conception of infinite knowledge coincide. By means of this juxtaposition, Hegel reveals a tension immanent in the Kantian conception of finite experience. For, unlike the sphere of finite experience, for which Kant develops theoretical machinery which is compatible with a realistic outlook of the sort which McDowell endorses, Kant offers no way to get beyond coherentism in the case of infinite objects. Consequently, in his attempts to build on Kant’s philosophy, McDowell leaves aside this dimension of Kant’s thought. In other words, Hegel and McDowell are in agreement about Kant’s transcendental philosophy. 22 It should, therefore, be borne in mind below that Hegel discusses Kant’s philosophy from the very perspective that McDowell leaves out of his own constructive engagement with Kant’s concept of experience, namely that of the transcendental subject. The three attitudes of thought that are distinguished by Hegel and that correspond to those developed by McDowell are: (a) direct knowledge, (b) empiricism or critical philosophy, and (c) metaphysics. (a) Jacobi’s theory of our direct knowledge of God represents a version of the myth of the given. In faith, human reason has direct access to God that is not conceptually structured. The core of Hegel’s critique is that the ultimate basis of this position can only be individual, subjective givenness: »the basis for what is alleged be true is subjective knowing [Wissen] and the assurance that I find a certain content in my consciousness« (E § 71). Jacobi’s conception is based on supplying a given content with a justificatory function; this function is conferred upon it not because of any intersubjectively demonstrable cognitive dimension but precisely because of its subjective status. In Jacobi’s philosophy, this private basis, which is supposed to underpin intersubjective justification, is »inflated to mean what is found in everyone’s consciousness and alleged to be the nature of consciousness itself« (ibid). Thus, as Hegel complains, the factual and contingent harmonization of different pieces of subjective evidence is made into the basis of intersubjective justification. Because the immediacy of knowledge (E § 72) at the same time constitutes the basis of its justification, reflexive examination of this content becomes impossible (E § 71 R). At the same time, contingent and culturally or individually varying content is to be accepted as an unexamined basis of all knowledge. For Hegel, though, something of this sort cannot serve as a basis for knowledge (E § 75) because knowledge essentially consists in justification and thus mediation, and there are no »facts of consciousness« in the sense of isolated immediate givens (E § 66). In the end, it is precisely the »general nature of the form of immediacy« (E § 74) that excludes there being knowledge in this case, since »it is this very form which, because it is one22

Cf. McDowell (1994, p. 97). This is at least true of McDowell’s position in Mind and World. In the 1997 Woodbridge Lectures, he distances himself somewhat from this line of critique (McDowell 1998a, p. 446 fn. 23).

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sided, renders its content one-sided as well and thus finite« (ibid). But if philosophical justification, as Hegel assumes, consists in a coherentistic, holistic process, then, Hegel concludes, immediacy and justification are of necessity mutually exclusive (E § 75). (b) It is rather more difficult to understand how the second attitude towards objectivity corresponds to the position of pure coherentism. This is because Hegel subdivides the second position into empiricism and critical philosophy and discusses the Kantian position primarily with regard to its strictures on absolute knowledge. 23 In empiricism, contact with the world is brought about by individual perceptions, which do not themselves possess any justifying power (E § 38), while the »form« that constitutes experience (E § 39), the conceptual scheme, cannot be justified according to empirical standards but is rather independent of experience (E § 39 R). Unlike Hume’s skeptical philosophy, Kant’s philosophy undertakes to transcendentally justify the constitutive conditions present in the conceptual scheme. Hegel takes up Kant’s suggestion that we can overcome skepticism regarding the fundamental definitions of thought. In Hegel’s view, however, this is possible for Kant only because he at the same time limits its sphere of philosophical application and validity to the realm of phenomena (E § 40). In order to accomplish this, he must introduce the dualism of conceptual scheme and the thing-in-itself (E § 44 R), or the transcendental self and the world (E § 42), both dualisms which Hegel rejects. When human reason attempts to refer to things-in-themselves, according to Kant, it lands in aporia, and knowledge becomes impossible. The world as such remains unknowable, and skepticism thus undefeated (E § 52). In relation to phenomena, however, thought merely rediscovers its own constitutive contributions in the form of basic assumptions (E §§ 41, 43, 52). This corresponds to the frictionless orbit of thought around itself that McDowell identifies with pure coherentism. Hegel takes the self-determination and normativity of spontaneity to be at work in Kant’s theory of practical reason (E §§ 53 ff.), but at the same time he laments that Kant is unable to bring the practical sphere together with the realm of phenomena. Consequently, if we follow Hegel’s critique, »nothing is available but the same abstract identity of the understanding« in the realm of practical reason (E § 54). Hence even »practical reason does not advance beyond the formalism that is supposed to be the ultimate standpoint of theoretical reason« (ibid.). 24

23

24

Since the fact of religious, aesthetic, and ethical experience is indisputable, it seems natural at this point to ask what conclusions might be drawn from this regarding McDowell’s common sense realism. In his metaethical works, McDowell seems to draw realist conclusions – in parallel to Hegel – at least for the sphere of ethics. It is not possible here to elaborate the ethical and metaethical assumptions which lie behind these remarks. For my present purposes only the structural equivalence with formalism is relevant.

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The price to be paid for Kant’s solution is, in Hegel’s view, too high. On the basis of his all-encompassing metaphysics, Hegel attempts to overcome the restrictions imposed by Kant. It is of course beyond dispute that Hegel thereby draws on central elements of Kant’s philosophy. He acknowledges – as do, in our own time, Sellars, Davidson and McDowell among others – the notion of »thinking that grasps itself« (E § 60 R), understood as »spontaneity« (E § 40) and as »the principle of freedom« (E § 60 R), and as the ground of the irreducibility and normativity of intentionality. It is, in addition, beyond dispute that self-consciousness and spontaneity form an indivisible whole for Hegel (E § 23). 25 (c) The first position of thought towards objectivity is characterized by the conviction that »thinking engages the objects directly« (E § 26); it »regarded the thoughtdeterminations as the fundamental determinations of things« (E § 28). For Hegel, »all philosophy in its beginnings, all the sciences, even the daily doings and dealings of consciousness, live in this belief« (E § 26) of naive realism. In Hegel’s view, this Aristotelian metaphysics was based on the realist assumption »that what is, by being thought, is known in itself « (E § 28), and to this extent »occupied a higher place than later critical philosophizing« (ibid.). 26 Because this metaphysical thinking is never made aware of the opposition between thinking and that which is thought, it risks becoming an inadequate and dogmatic philosophy. It is this negative element that Hegel proceeds to examine: »Here in the introduction the concern can only be to consider this position of thinking with respect to its limitation [Grenze]« (E § 27), that is, to examine it in its extreme form. This extremity, however, consists merely in an atomistic conception of meanings (»finite thought-determinations«, E § 27) and the structure of propositions (»the form of judgment«, E § 28 R). This leaves another important component of ancient metaphysics untouched, one which Hegel takes to be a part of common sense and wishes to preserve in his own philosophical system. In a certain sense, Hegel might in fact agree whole-heartedly with McDowell’s suggestion that we must regain our innocence. He would only stress that this innocence is by no means unphilosophical and that the innocence to be regained cannot be equated with the pre-philosophical attitude of »immediacy«. Instead, this innocence must be regained in the form of a »mediated immediacy« (cf. the next chapter). While 25

26

On the development of the idea of the system in German Idealism with self-consciousness as an underlying principle, cf. Halbig and Quante (2000). Hegel assumes that philosophy shares with common sense not only this realism regarding the knowability or thinkability of the world. He attributes to common sense the idea that this thinkability at the same time constitutes the essence of things. Since the essentialist and teleological dimension of Hegel’s ontology is not being considered in this chapter, I am ignoring these further premises. It is the other assumption that Hegel’s and McDowell’s philosophical interpretations of common sense realism have in common, and which forms a central assumption for both of their philosophical outlooks. On common sense realism, cf. Willaschek (2003).

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the former risks collapse into a positivistic metaphysics of the understanding, the latter is distinguished by the fact that it preserves those aspects within immediacy that are philosophically justified, while avoiding those philosophical shortcomings that owe to its immediate form (E § 74). The three positions of thought towards objectivity to a large extent correspond to the systematic positions that McDowell also puts forward. In Hegel’s eyes Jacobi and Kant speak the truth to one another about the possibility of immediate knowledge, or rather the indispensability of immediate components of experience (E §§ 62 ff.), just like Evans and Davidson do in McDowell’s account. Hegel and McDowell see in the third position, that of common sense, a dilemma that is either already resolved or else has not arisen. It would be worth investigating the extent to which Hegel’s answer differs from his first position of thought towards objectivity, and to what extent McDowell’s philosophical attitude corresponds to common sense at all. A full answer to this would at the same time be an answer to the question of how close to one another McDowell’s and Hegel’s proposed philosophical answers really are. But this answer can only be given once we have addressed some issues about philosophical method (2.3). Before this can happen, however, we must compare Hegel’s and McDowell’s underlying ontologies (2.2).

2.2 The Structure of Idea: Nature and Spirit 27 McDowell lays the conceptual foundations for his solution of the problem of how cognition of the world is possible by staging a critique of »bald naturalism« and the ontological assumption which this theory is based on. This ontological premise consists in the reduction of nature to so-called first nature. As an ontological model, first nature is the object of scientific investigation, the result of the process of disenchantment that gradually emerged and finally took over with rise of science. Contemporary Philosophy of Mind attempts to extend the explanatory method of the natural sciences to everything in existence, to make scientific explanation into a universal standard for ontology. This assumes that the entities and regularities we take to exist may all be fully apprehended through the explanatory method of the natural sciences. Meaning and normativity are consequently deprived of their standing as genuine components of reality. Transferred to the realm of the mental, this either leads to an attempt to explain away the normativity of spontaneity and intentionality or else to eliminate it entirely. The third option is to acknowledge that mental entities belong to a realm of their own, which is seen either as a non-natural second substance or as ontologically

27

On the systematic significance of the idea, see part two of this book.

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39

secondary, in the sense of instrumental and not really real. 28 McDowell resists the equation of nature with disenchanted first nature by means of his concept of re-enchanted nature, which contains both first nature (the nature of the natural sciences) and second nature (the nature of the cultural realm). 29 The two are constituted by different principles and correspondingly require different principles for their cognition. Constitutive of first nature (the so-called »real of law«) are space, time, and causality, so that explanation from the perspective of an observer (»the sideways-on picture«) is appropriate. 30 Second nature, however, is constituted by rationality in the broad sense, so that the hermeneutic method of the participant perspective, that is, the method of understanding, is the appropriate one. Following Aristotle, McDowell seeks to re-establish a broad concept of nature that accounts both for the natural capacity of humans to participate in a meaning-filled social world as well as the unarguable fact that humans, qua biological beings, belong to first nature. 31 McDowell’s idea is not to overcome the gulf between normativity, spontaneity, and meaning, on the one hand, and first nature, on the other, but rather to »naturalize second nature« so that this gulf never opens up in the first place. 32 McDowell hints in Mind and World that there is a tension between an ontological and an epistemological way of understanding »first nature« and »second nature«. McDowell seems to view both first and second nature as models for the cognition of nature that have arisen within a culture. However, there is also an ontological dimension to his discussions of first and second nature: McDowell seems to start from the idea that nature has (at least) two realms of properties that can be apprehended through the two models. 33 As a realist and a methodological pluralist, McDowell must admit that both the description of the world by natural science and the hermeneutic interpretation of the world can appropriately apprehend reality in certain areas, or under certain aspects. His appropriation of Davidson’s anomalous monism and his respect for »cognitive science« is evidence that he defends a sort of multi-aspect theory of the world, although we learn nothing more of this. 34

28 29

30 31 32 33 34

For more details, see Quante (2000a). When McDowell speaks of re-enchanting nature, he never means re-equipping first nature with meaning or normativity. A further tension arises from the fact that apart from his allencompassing concept of nature he also speaks of the world as such, while it is never quite clear whether nature and world coincide for him or not. In some places McDowell seems to want to keep open the option that non-natural entities might exist as well. McDowell (1994, p. 35). McDowell (1994, p. 78). On the naturalness of second nature, see also Quante (2000b). McDowell (1994, p. 78). Cf. McDowell (1994, p. 121). It becomes clear that McDowell has a token identity theory in mind if we consider his conception of the body and action and his rejection of the instrumentalist aspects of Davidson’s philosophy of mind.

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It would be no distortion to construe McDowell’s conception of »nature« in such a way that it stands beyond the opposition of realism and idealism because being and knowledge are also parts of it. It is constitutive of second nature that it is at once a real fact and at the same time constituted by social processes. McDowell’s insistence on the notion that conceptual schemata are part of the world, and that consequently the world is always at the same time »our world,« does not fall into a (cultural relativist) idealism if the world and our image of the world are not ontologically separated in a dichotomous model of conceptual scheme versus content. The second problem arises due to McDowell’s avoidance of constructive philosophy. McDowell tells us that first and second nature should be understood as two species of a common genus (nature). 35 If we are not to understand the genus »nature« merely as a nominal kind, we must show why first and second nature are species of a common genus. Here a Platonic or Cartesian dualist would object that the only basis for this specific distinction is that man is a »citizen of two worlds.« If McDowell is to have an argument against this sort of ontological dualism, he needs to have philosophical reasons at his disposal. McDowell seems to ignore this: His rejection of constructive philosophy is meant as a critique of the attempt to close a gulf, seen as unbridgeable, between first and second nature. 36 His thesis that nature is an original unity is an answer to this objection only in the sense of an alternative approach. In order to make this model plausible, a more extensive philosophical theory is required. McDowell cannot hold out in dismissing this simply as constructive philosophy, i. e., bad philosophy, especially not if we acknowledge that common sense also contains dualistic intuitions. 37 Hegel’s theory of the idea is clearly an attempt to make the unity of first and second nature (for Hegel, nature and spirit) philosophically tractable. In what follows, the complex structure of Hegel’s idea cannot be analyzed in detail, let alone made plausible. The purpose of my interpretation is more modest: I would like to reveal some fundamental common ground, or at least similarities, in McDowell’s and Hegel’s respective outlooks. Hegel repeatedly stresses that in his system the idea is at once conceptual scheme and reality (E § 213), and must not be understood »as an idea of something or other« (E § 213 R). The opposition of subjective conceptual 35

36 37

In his discussion of Evans, McDowell criticizes the idea that animal (first nature) and human (second nature) perception share a common foundation, with humans having an additional factor added. Rather, he sees human perception as different in form (1994, p. 64). Cf. McDowell (1994, p. 75 f.). Within the history of philosophy it is indisputable that dualistic conceptions of human nature developed even before the rise of »bald naturalism.« Plato’s theory of the soul is a clear example, and, even in Aristotle, one finds traces of a dichotomy between natural and supernatural or divine parts of the soul. One reason for this lies in ethical and religious ideas that are also a part of common sense and that shape human self-understanding. Consequently, the unity of (human) nature is something that must be argued for.

2.2 The Structure of Idea: Nature and Spirit

41

scheme and objective reality is sublated in the idea. The idea is simply that which exists, understood in its rational context. It is what makes the unity of reality comprehensible as such. 38 As the absolute, the idea can have nothing outside itself; it is the conceptual structure of the world as such. In the concluding part of his Logic, Hegel elaborates the conceptual structure of the idea, as he proceeds to supply the philosophical proof that (first) nature and spirit (McDowell’s second nature) can be understood as the forms of the idea’s being and self-knowledge. The fundamental ontological constitution of the idea is »process« (E § 215) and »life« (E § 216) – the unity of »soul and body« (E § 216). Thus Hegel, in line with McDowell’s conception of nature, takes as his starting point the unity of first and second nature which is immediately present in human life and action. 39 For Hegel, this unity is what is primary, and »those two sides 40 of the idea are diverse component parts [Bestandstücke] only insofar as it [i. e., the individual in question, M. Q.] is dead.« (E § 216). The outwardness of first nature and the inwardness of the soul cannot be understood as two separate »ingredients« that need to be combined. Rather, we must begin from their fundamental unity if we are to understand their difference. 41 The process of life is, furthermore, characterized by the teleological attunement (Einstellung) of cognition (E §§ 226 ff.) and volition (E §§ 233 ff.). These form the basis of Hegel’s account of intentionality as attunement in general, and also play a foundational role in his explications of the fundamental structure of science, social reality, truth and normativity. The Logic ends with Hegel’s conception of the idea in the guise of the absolute idea, the idea that thinks itself – which is to say, the logical idea (E § 236). This refers to the self-knowledge of the idea within the cultural manifestations of art, religion and finally philosophy, which can be seen, according to Hegel, as a process of self-knowledge and a reflective apprehension of rational unity. However, the idea is not only the self-thinking and in this way logical idea (E § 236); by reflecting on itself, it also comes to exist in the form of nature. First nature is, in Hegel’s system, »the idea in the form of otherness« (E § 247). If we wanted to put the point in McDowellean terms, we might say that according to Hegel first nature is the »sideways-on picture« of the absolute idea. For Hegel, the natural sciences are the appropriate means of cognition of this aspect of the idea (E § 248 R): Nature is without immanent meaning (»contingency«, E § 248) and is causally ordered (»necessity«, E § 248) – »nature therefore shows no freedom in its 38

39 40 41

Hegel’s proximity to McDowell’s program is apparent in the fact that he sees the unity of soul and body as the essence of the idea (E § 214). As in McDowell (1994, p. 78). Hegel’s choice of words here is careless – he means aspects. The individual conceptual developments by means of which Hegel seeks to provide an insight into organic and inorganic nature as ontological spheres cannot be pursued further here (E § 218). What is crucial is that Hegel is attempting to make intelligible the fundamental unity of, and differentiation into, first and second nature; cf. ch. 4 and 5.

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existence« (E § 248). From a philosophical point of view, we must consider the various layers of nature as a »system of stages« (E § 249) whose rationality is revealed by philosophical contemplation. Only in the living individual, the human being, does spirit emerge, and with it freedom, cognition, and volition. 42 As spirit, the idea realizes the structures of cognition and volition through the intentionality of concrete human 43 individuals. It is in the intentional attitudes and social activities of individual humans that the idea knows and realizes itself as an underlying unity. Like McDowell, Hegel eschews attempts to reduce mind, or spirit (Geist), to (first) nature. First, Hegel does not think of matter as »something true« (E § 389 R) that could serve as a philosophical principle. Secondly, he thinks that the mind should not be thought of on the ontological model of first nature as »a thing« (ibid.). 44 If we accept these moves, then the question of »the communion of the soul and the physical body« (ibid.) ceases to be an issue. Like McDowell, Hegel considers the body-soul problem in this form, given the premises described above, to be insoluble: »What can be regarded as the usual answer, was that it is an incomprehensible mystery. For, in fact, if we presuppose them to be absolutely independent of each other, they are as impenetrable to each other as any piece of matter is to another« (ibid.). Consequently, the philosophy of mind, when it aims at bald naturalism, is bad, constructive philosophy by Hegel’s lights as well as McDowell’s. The proper approach to it is philosophical therapy, pointing out the flaws in the premises that the problem relies on. Ultimately, Hegel’s idea has the same structure as McDowell’s nature: A fundamental unity that is ontologically organized into a first and second nature (spirit), which, in the epistemic and volitional structures of social reality, constructs models of itself as first nature (science), as second nature (social community, culture, history) and as encompassing idea (art, religion, philosophy), a process by which it seeks itself and comes to know itself. In this broad sense, meaning, goals, truth, 42

43

44

At this point Hegel resists the notion that the individual stages of nature are »naturally produced« (§ 249). In the transition from first to second nature, the notion of such an evolutionary progression would repeat the category mistake of »bald naturalism.« Here Hegel seems to draw the conclusion that evolutionary theories of mind are impossible, if the theory of evolution is seen as scientific. One way out of this lies in Dennett’s suggestion that the theory of evolution should be considered not as a model of scientific explanation but as a hermeneutic and instrumental interpretation (cf. Dennett 1987, ch. 7). Although Hegel is not entirely unambiguous on this point, his philosophy of mind deals only with the fundamental levels of the human mind. Like McDowell, Hegel considers spontaneity and self-consciousness to be essential aspects of all human mental phenomena. Consequently, the status of the nonhuman soul remains a problem for both Hegel and McDowell. Hegel’s pronouncements about »the true« refer to an essentialist, normative and teleological standard of value deriving from his broader philosophical considerations. It would be a mistake to see Hegel’s thesis that first nature is not »true« as meaning that this sphere of being was not »real.« Nevertheless, Hegel is of the opinion that physical reality has less value and significance than mental, or spiritual, reality.

2.3 A Question of Method?

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normativity, and freedom are real components of the world no less than space, time and causality. Unlike McDowell, Hegel tries to demonstrate that this unity is rational and contains its own justification within itself. To this end, Hegel makes use of the perspective of common sense and its naive realism in relation to physical reality and meaning, but he also assumes the perspective of an absolute, selfknowing and self-willing subject. The necessity and closure of the system is secured by the necessity and adequacy of the conditions for the self-knowledge and selfrealization which Hegel places on this absolute subject. 45 This second perspective is, for Hegel, not identical with common sense. Nevertheless, it is still not a »view from nowhere« in Thomas Nagel’s sense, 46 but rather a self-understanding that is manifested in the cultural achievements of second nature and in this way still at least capable of connecting with common sense. The fundamental structure that Hegel’s theory of the idea and McDowell’s model of nature have in common is, in Hegel, embedded within a comprehensive philosophical theory. Apart from the demonstrable qualities that they have in common, we can, therefore, also see clear differences between the two philosophers, differences which can be traced back to their different stances towards metaphysics. 47

2.3 A Question of Method? To conclude, let us compare Hegel’s and McDowell’s philosophical methods. This will not be a discussion of method in the sense in which Hegel considers questions of philosophical method. The difficulties Hegel experiences in reconciling his idea of a holistic system with a linear representation are well known. Hegel’s discussions of philosophical method take place in connection with the issue of how philosophy is to begin. He generally does so outside the system, since he holds that there can be no method which is separate from its execution. The only place within the system where Hegel is able to treat his theory of method is his conception of the idea itself (E § 243). What I am interested in is rather what Hegel and McDowell each expect from philosophy. Following Wittgenstein, McDowell sees the chief task of philosophy as being in therapy. Philosophy must solve of philosophical problems created by 45 46 47

For a more detailed analysis, see Halbig and Quante (2000). On this, cf. also ch. 8. Because of the incomplete nature of McDowell’s theory, we cannot say with any certainty whether this ultimately represents a deep difference. McDowell stresses that every actual conceptual scheme might be false or incomplete (1994, p. 40), but he does not rule out the possibility of a closed and complete system. In fact, his reflections even tend to show that there is no reason in principle for excluding the existence of such a system. This aspect of McDowell’s reflections, however, stands in tension with his realism, since the latter implies a principal difference between conceptual scheme and world.

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philosophy itself, and avoid constructive philosophy. 48 McDowell gives no clear answer as to whether there can be other kinds of problems which are specifically philosophical but that might be solved by philosophical means. Good candidates for such problems might be conceptual conflicts within common sense itself and the question of how the perspectives of the participant and the observer are related, or should relate to one another, or the problem of how everyday realism can be brought into harmony with a scientific ontology. 49 McDowell seems not only to accept the classical natural sciences, but also to find in cognitive science an important and pregnant branch of psychology. But Mind and World offers no means for resolving the tensions that exist here. The demands that Hegel places on philosophy, and that he thinks he has satisfied with his system, could hardly be any higher. The goal of philosophy is, for him, an all-encompassing, complete and grounded system, equally embracing all disciplines and objects of philosophy and grounding them on the basis of a single principle. 50 Hegel shares with the other German Idealists not only the idea of a system, but also the premise that its underlying principle must be subjectivity. The latter premise forms the very basis of German Idealism. From Schelling onwards, but above all in Hegel, that same subjectivity is also thought of as substance, so that the dualisms of mind and world and the global dichotomy of idealism and realism are dissolved once and for all. In the end, subjectivity has primacy for Hegel only because, like selfconsciousness, it enables an internal and complete self-explanation. Ultimately, then, the foundations of German Idealism are of an explanatory rather than an ontological nature. Hegel requires of his philosophy that it completely absorb the point of view of common sense and integrate it as one perspective within the overall system of an absolute process of self-knowledge and self-realization. In order to achieve this, he makes use of two representational perspectives, which show up in the reciprocal relationship between nature and spirit. From our point of view, or »for us«, nature is the precondition of spirit. From a philosophical point of view, spirit is »the truth of nature, and is thus absolutely primary with respect to it« (E § 381). Hegel grounds this twofold perspective, which he views as both an ontological and an epistemic relationship, by attempting to demonstrate that it is the constitutive structure of subjectivity as such: A free »positing« which, owing to its reflexive nature, is »at the same time the presupposition of the world as independent nature« (E § 384). The ontological robustness of first and second nature in the human individual, and its perspectival and epistemic restriction in the cultural models of first and second

48

49 50

McDowell’s project of re-enchanting nature by reintegrating an Aristotelian notion of second nature into it seems to require good constructive philosophy; cf. Quante (2000b). For a more detailed discussion of this problem, cf. Quante (2000b). A more detailed and qualified attempt to take the systematic aspect of Hegel’s philosophy seriously can be found in Siep et al. (2001).

2.3 A Question of Method?

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nature, and of art, religion, and philosophy, are, according to Hegel, the necessary and internally complete structure of the absolute idea, which is, as a subject-object, at once concept and being. While McDowell risks seeing the sole achievement of philosophy as a kind of self-administered remedy leading to philosophy’s own nullification, Hegel risks the opposite, namely exaggerating his claims to philosophical justification. For both philosophers, their selected method leads to an unresolved tension between philosophical thinking and common sense. Concerning McDowell, we might object that a return to naive realism is in fact neither naive nor commonsensical in the original sense. 51 And with regard to Hegel’s claim, we might worry that his »absolute« philosophical perspective radically reinterprets our everyday thinking to such an extent that our everyday realism takes on a content that amounts to a complete revision of its meaning. We might even venture the idea that Hegel’s and McDowell’s methods represent two extreme poles of an oscillation between an everyday and a philosophical view of the world.

51

On McDowell’s own understanding of philosophy and the ambivalence of Hegel’s philosophy, see McDowell (2000); for a detailed analysis of the relationship between common sense and philosophy in Hegel, see Halbig (2002, ch. 4).

3. Speculative Philosophy as Therapy? 3.1 The Standpoint of Philosophy Hegel’s philosophy has met with a highly polarized reception. As argued in the Introduction, the reason for this lies in the nature of the subject matter itself, since Hegel’s philosophical thought is in fact ambivalent. This results, on the one hand, from his demand that we overcome customary oppositions of the understanding and their attendant philosophies. A sublation of these oppositions will, however, appear ambivalent to any thought that still moves within these oppositions. On the other hand, Hegel’s philosophy forces the recipient to adopt an ambivalent posture – at least if we wish to approach his edifice systematically. Hegel’s philosophy is a closed system, and the first question is how to get in. If we solve this problem, then the next, perhaps more decisive question, is: How do we get back out? Hegel does not offer any help with the second question, since he viewed his own system as the endpoint of all philosophical development. 1 The first question, on the other hand, was one he took very seriously and grappled with in many ways. On the one hand, parts of his exoteric works, that is, the prefaces and introductions, are devoted to the question of how we are to begin philosophy. This problem of beginning arises directly from the foundation and self-imposed requirements of Hegel’s system, since it is supposed to contain no immediate or »dogmatic« presuppositions and the justification of particular theorems is supposed to arise from the system as a whole. On the other hand, Hegel requires his philosophy to be the necessary end of thought, both in everyday and philosophical consciousness. At the same time he knows that the average reader has a long way to go before acquiring the standpoint of speculative thought. Hegel, therefore, goes to some length in the »Preliminary Conception [Vorbegriff ]« of the Encyclopedia Logic to clarify in advance what is special about speculative thought. His Phenomenology of Spirit, furthermore, attempts to provide a »science of the experience of consciousness«. This was to serve as a demonstration that there is a necessary path through the various forms of knowledge and their demands, as well as through their implicit and explicit epistemologies, leading to the standpoint of »absolute knowledge« which underlies Hegel’s system. Here Hegel undertakes to establish his claim that all the various forms of everyday knowledge and everyday claims to knowledge, which manifest themselves both in social practices and scientific or philosophical theories, can be made intelligible as a path of development in which the absolute ascends to adequate knowledge of itself. Despite the deflationary interpretations that Hegel’s philosophy has consistently provoked, it is difficult to dispute that Hegel takes his own system to be necessary, 1

Decisive evidence for this is to be found in the overall construction of Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy (MM 18–20).

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complete in itself, as permitting no alternatives. This is an extremely bold claim, and anyone with a systematic interest in his philosophy will feel some ambivalence towards it. There is first the well-known difficulty that the individual parts of Hegel’s system always receive their justification from the whole. This seems to lead to the consequence that anyone who wishes to engage with Hegel systematically must do so either entirely or not at all. Anyone who approached Hegel as a convinced Hegelian will find themselves with nothing to do, since the work of the concept has already been done. If on the other hand we do not accept Hegel’s philosophy, then the allor-nothing alternative only allows us to engage with Hegel’s work from a historical perspective. 2 Such a purely historical interest falls short – and this is a second difficulty – not only of Hegel’s self-conception. It must also either abandon the ambitions of systematic philosophy, or else operate on a systematic basis incompatible with Hegel’s project. At this point the third difficulty arises: We are once again led back to Hegel’s philosophy, because all alternative thinkable standpoints are supposed to be sublated within it. If we are to take this seriously, it is imperative that we check whether Hegel has already discussed the basic assumptions of our own standpoint and criticised them with good arguments. Taking up Hegel’s challenge requires us always to be aware of our own presuppositions. If it turns out that Hegel’s system lacks the resources needed to criticize or integrate this alternative standpoint, then his project will have to be counted as a failure. If on the other hand it turns out that Hegel is successful, then this alternative standpoint will need to be relinquished. It is doubtful that anyone today still accepts the lofty claims of Hegel’s project. The question is then how one ought to deal with these claims. The strategy of ignoring them, which Schopenhauer recommends for solipsism, is foreclosed in the case of Hegel’s system. If Hegel’s philosophy really is an unassailable fortress (as Schopenhauer claims of solipsism) from which no one can get out, then Hegel is right, because, as rational beings, we are all, in his opinion, parts of this system. We are thus left with the former option of verifying whether the presuppositions of our own thought represent a genuine alternative to Hegel’s system. This means at the same time asking whether the course of Hegel’s philosophy is really necessary and complete, and whether there really is no alternative. A second option relies on the strategy of disputing whether Hegel makes such bold claims regarding justification at all. Couldn’t we, as an alternative, understand his system merely as therapeutic philosophy, serving only for the critique of philo-

2

This standpoint is perhaps most resolutely defended by Rolf-Peter Horstmann, whose reconstructions of Hegel’s philosophy consistently reach the conclusion that such a position can no longer be defended. The consequence of this finding is that Hegel’s system, owing to its holistic character, can only be of historical interest today. For a discussion of Horstmann’s position, see Siep et al. (2001).

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sophical misunderstandings and the reconstitution of an everyday consciousness that accords both with itself and with the real world? Incredible as it may at first seem, this way of reading Hegel can in fact claim to capture some essential components of Hegel’s philosophy. Whether it really captures what is central to Hegel’s self-conception, however, seems to me dubious. If we are to resist simply equating Hegel’s speculative thought with therapy, then this strategy leads back to the first option, since the suggestion to read Hegel as a therapeutic philosopher is motivated by a need to escape Hegel’s grand claims to philosophical justification while avoiding a wholesale rejection of his philosophical insights. If this interpretative strategy fails, then the question remains: What arguments can be made against Hegel’s thesis that philosophy necessarily must make such strong claims? Hegel himself saw the possibility of alternative conceptions of philosophy and attempted to integrate them as moments of his system, as his engagement with Jacobi, for example, demonstrates. If there is an alternative understanding of philosophy that Hegel does not succeed in sublating, then this will represent a truly external philosophical standpoint. Having secured such an external standpoint, we can then ask, which aspects of Hegel’s thought are not affected by the breakdown of his system. This modified understanding of philosophy could even offer a way out of the difficulties we have been discussing, namely that the individual elements of Hegel’s system have no justification whatsoever outside the holistic context in which they receive their ultimate justification. Since the difference between these two standpoints bears on the standards of philosophical justification, the loss of the specifically speculative justification that Hegel promises to deliver might be less problematic and consequential than it would seem on Hegel’s own premises. Perhaps it may even be possible to subject the exaggerated claims of speculative thought themselves to therapy from this alternative philosophical standpoint, that is, to show them to be misguided philosophical reactions stemming from erroneous philosophical premises. In this way we would finally obtain a strategy which allowed us to treat the edifice of Hegel’s thought not merely as a historical artifact, but also to engage with some of his central ideas (on this, see the chapters that make up the fourth part of this book). In this chapter I will content myself with the first step. Since no therapy can be applied without a corresponding diagnosis, there are two questions which must guide our discussion. Question 1: In what sense is Hegel’s speculative philosophy therapeutic and in what sense is it constructive? Question 2: Can Hegel show that his own claim to philosophical justification is really unavoidable? In order to answer these questions, we need first to introduce some terminological distinctions.

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3.2 Forms of Therapeutic and Constructive Philosophy Even though the borders between forms of therapeutic and constructive philosophy are fluid, it is useful to make the following distinctions. On the one hand, we can distinguish between philosophy as therapy in a narrow and a broad sense. On the other hand, we can distinguish four different conceptions of constructive philosophy.

3.2.1 Two Senses of Therapeutic Philosophy. 3.2.1.1 Philosophy as Therapy in the Narrow Sense Philosophy is understood as therapy in the narrow sense if the only task of philosophy consists in curing people of misunderstandings brought about by philosophical mistakes. The effects of these mistakes can either be restricted to the philosophical community, or they can have infected other domains of knowledge such as the natural sciences or even common sense. It is a distinctive assumption of philosophy as therapy in the narrow sense that, apart from philosophical misunderstandings, there are no problems which stand in need of philosophical treatment. Once liberated from the contagion of philosophical mistakes, other systems of belief will be in order insofar as they need no further philosophical therapy. The later Wittgenstein can be read as a proponent of this conception of therapeutic philosophy, which today is represented foremost by John McDowell and Peter Hacker. 3

3.2.1.2 Philosophy as Therapy in the Broad Sense If one views philosophy as therapy in the broad sense, then one delegates to philosophy the task of performing therapy on common sense beliefs (as well as those of other belief systems) which are pernicious for those who believe them. The goal of philosophy is thought of in analogy to medicine. It consists in making a contribution to the good life. Its specific function is to dislodge harmful beliefs by philosophical argumentation or, failing this, to silence them by inducing sceptical equipollence. This conception differs from that of philosophy as therapy in the narrow sense in the assumption that there are problems which are not based on philosophical misunderstandings, but which can, nevertheless, be treated by philosophy. There are numerous examples of this sort of philosophy, above all in the classical world; Epicurus’s attempt to free people from the fear of death by philosophical argumentation stands out as a prominent example. Both conceptions of philosophy as therapy share the idea that philosophy is primarily directed toward the practical goal of making the good life possible. A 3

On this, cf. Hacker (1997 and 2007) and McDowell (1994), as well as my discussion in Quante (2000b).

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proponent of therapeutic philosophy in the broad sense can thereby treat, inter alia, all of the cases which are encompassed by therapeutic philosophy in the narrow sense. The difference consists in the fact that the strict conception supposes that the only problems capable of a philosophical treatment are those which arise form philosophical misunderstandings. By contrast, the broad conception starts from the assumption that there are problems which are not caused by philosophy, but which, nevertheless, can be treated effectively with philosophical therapy. 4 This difference in content between the two metaphilosophical positions shows up in the stances each takes to different forms of constructive philosophy. I turn to this now.

3.2.2 Forms of Constructive Philosophy Something can be »constructive« if it presents a sensible or helpful contribution to a problem’s solution. Proposed solutions and interpretations are »constructed«, on the other hand, if they do not provide a natural fit to the problem at hand or they in reality have nothing to do with it. In a further step, such constructs can then, if their constructedness ceases to be evident, themselves become sources of new problems and difficulties which would not have arisen at all if not for the original construction. 5 In light of these two senses it will not be surprising that »constructive philosophy« can denote both something positive and something negative. As a rule, common sense is taken as the relevant standard, but nothing prevents expanding this standard so as to include other well-established forms of knowledge such as the natural sciences or forms of interpretation with long cultural traditions in art and

4

5

Talk of »philosophical problems« is ambiguous. If one were to understand by this the assumption that the problems which can be treated philosophically are, without exception, generated by philosophy, then philosophical problems coincide with philosophical misunderstandings. In consequence, the metaphorical position of philosophy as therapy in the narrow sense would be trivial. For this reason, »philosophical problems« must be understood as »problems which can be treated using philosophical methods«. It is uncontroversial that philosophical problems are only a subclass of all possible problems. What is in dispute between the metaphilosophical positions of philosophy as therapy in the narrow sense and in the broad sense is whether the set of philosophical problems is identical with that of philosophical misunderstandings – or »homemade« philosophical problems. And this seems to me a substantial philosophical question: In fact, a philosophical problem. I thank John McDowell for objections raised in discussion which caused me to clarify this point. This phenomenon can be illustrated using the branch of contemporary Philosophy of Mind which is oriented towards the cognitive sciences. If the conceptual nature of the mental was originally employed as a metaphorical description of the capabilities of computers, this metaphorical character has since been lost entirely. In this way, an ontology of pseudo-mental entities is generated whose existence owes entirely to the fact that the philosophers working within this paradigm employ metaphors which they no longer recognize as such; cf. chapter 4.

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religion. In what follows, I will, however, assume that common sense is both the point of reference for and the locus of the problems to be solved.

3.2.2.1 Constructive Philosophy in the Pejorative Sense The first of four conceptions of constructive philosophy which I now wish to distinguish relies on the understanding of therapeutic philosophy in the narrow sense. On the basis of this, »constructive philosophy« can only be a term of derision for the error of taking philosophical misunderstandings to be real problems and then trying to find philosophical solutions for them. Constructive philosophy in the pejorative sense is thus, firstly, a description which would not be accepted by the philosophers denoted by it themselves. Secondly, it is the philosophical solutions of constructive philosophy in the negative sense which form the object of philosophical therapy in the narrow sense. The »flies« which Wittgenstein wanted to show out of the bottle are »constructive« philosophers in this pejorative sense.

3.2.2.2 Constructive Philosophy in the Narrow Sense The conception of constructive philosophy in the narrow sense, on the other hand, relies on a conception of philosophical therapy in the broad sense. This second conception tries to find constructive solutions for genuine common sense problems as a contribution to the good life. These problems can either be located directly in specific beliefs, or alternatively in implicit presuppositions which lead to contradictions when they are left unclarified. If one identifies the ambition and object of philosophy with therapeutic philosophy in the broad sense, then therapeutic philosophy in the broad sense corresponds to constructive philosophy in the narrow sense. At the same time it is to be noted that therapeutic philosophy in the narrow sense is as such a constituent of a conception of philosophical therapy in the broad sense. Therefore, it is natural, given a conception of philosophy as therapy in the broad sense, to use the term »constructive philosophy« in both a pejorative and a narrow sense.

3.2.2.3 Constructive Philosophy in the Broad Sense. The conception of constructive philosophy in the broad sense goes a step further than the narrow conception of constructive philosophy. We now give up the equation of philosophy with therapeutic philosophy in the broad sense. The leading idea instead becomes that common sense implicitly makes assumptions and presumes its own validity, but cannot itself justify these presumptions and this claim. The goal is to give a philosophical context to the implicit presumptions and claims of our everyday consciousness, one in which they can be in some way justified and systematised, and brought into accordance with philosophical standards. Constructive philosophy in the broad sense pursues this goal regardless of whether the implicit

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assumptions and claims lead to problems within common sense or not. Therefore, according to its self-conception, they cannot be restricted to the model of therapy and the removal of problems. Apart from this, philosophy which is constructive in this sense takes common sense seriously as a starting point and a condition of adequacy, although it no longer restricts itself to it.

3.2.2.4 Constructive Philosophy in a Revisionary Sense The final sense we consider is constructive philosophy in a revisionary sense. This conception is revisionary because it proceeds from an attitude of scepticism towards common sense assumptions and aims to replace these by beliefs that are philosophically justified. In an extreme form, this revisionary type of constructive philosophy can even be seen as a limit case of therapeutic philosophy, namely when common sense as such is explained as a problem for the good life and its replacement by a philosophical system is viewed as a form of therapy. 6 This form of constructive philosophy also frequently shows up as a radicalization of constructive philosophy in the broad sense. It then shares with it the renunciation of the view that the task of philosophy ultimately consists in therapy and has its goal in facilitating the good life. The difference is that revisionary constructive philosophy no longer accepts common sense as a point of departure or as a condition of adequacy. These distinctions, which could no doubt be further refined, allow us to approach the question whether Hegel’s speculative philosophy can be viewed as therapy from a new angle.

3.3 Speculative Philosophy as Therapy? First, I will point to Hegel’s statements and argumentative strategies which can be classed into the various forms of therapeutic and constructive philosophy. This will not only demonstrate the heuristic value of the above distinctions (at least for the interpretation of Hegel), but rather it will also explain the polarized reception that Hegel’s philosophy has received and put us in a position to answer the first of the two leading questions of this chapter: In what sense is Hegel’s speculative philosophy therapeutic or constructive?

6

Parfit’s reflections regarding the diachronic identity of persons are a prime example of this. In his opinion, our everyday view rests of massive errors which not only introduce errors into philosophical theory building but also make our lives worse (or less successful) than it would be if we were freed from these faulty assumptions. On this, see Parfit (1989, ch. 13–15, esp. p. 281).

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3.3.1 Philosophical Therapy in the Narrow Sense and Constructive Philosophy in the Pejorative Sense There are numerous examples of Hegel understanding his own strategy of argumentation as therapeutic philosophy in the narrow sense. Since traditional philosophical categories undergo a radical critique and partial interpretation in Hegel’s system, he is able to take a therapeutic approach (in the narrow sense) to a range of philosophical problematics, presenting them as expressions of false dichotomies, i. e., as the result of bad philosophical assumptions. A prominent example of this strategy is Hegel’s rejection of the question whether the soul is immaterial. In § 389 of the Encyclopedia he writes: »The question of the immateriality of the soul is no longer of interest unless matter, on the one hand, is represented as something true and mind, on the other, is represented as a thing« (E § 389). Hegel also takes the classical mind-body problem to be insoluble if we presuppose body and soul »to be absolutely independent of each other« (ibid.). Classical metaphysics takes this »communion of the soul and the physical body« as a »fact« (E § 389 R). Given the premises of the problem this amounts to »the usual answer«, that this communion »is an incomprehensible mystery« (ibid.). Hegel’s inference from this is: »It is just this way of posing it that must be recognized as inadmissible« (E § 389 R). The worry about the possibility of a communion of the body and the soul is for him nothing other than the result of bad philosophical premises. 7 Much the same can be said about the diagnosis he gives in the Philosophy of Right of the »controversy which arose principally in the time of Wolff’s metaphysics as to whether the will is actually free or whether our knowledge of its freedom is merely a delusion« (PR § 15 R). This problem of the freedom of the will is, as his discussion shows, impossible to solve given the concept of freedom that is presupposed. If we liberate ourselves from the assumption that freedom of the will can be equated with freedom of choice (Wahl- or Willkürfreiheit), then one pulls the rug out from under this philosophical dispute. 8 This is not the place to dwell on whether Hegel’s proposed solutions are in fact adequate. Both examples clearly show – and this is what is important here – that Hegel employs argumentative strategies which correspond to philosophy as therapy in the strict sense. His own term for this is »metaphysics of the understanding [Verstandesmetaphysik]« or, with some qualifications, »philosophy of reflection [Reflexionsphilosophie]«.

7 8

On this, cf. Wolff (1992), Merker (2004) as well as ch. 5 and 6 of this book. On this, see Pippin (1997a, 1999, 2004) as well as Quante (2003 and 2011, ch. 10).

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3.3.2 Philosophical Therapy in the Broad Sense and Constructive Philosophy in the Narrow Sense We can also point to many instances where Hegel engages in philosophy as therapy understood in the broad sense. From the beginning of his philosophical thought, Hegel is concerned to diagnose and remedy the oppositions, dichotomies and strife which he thought characterized not only the philosophy of his time but rather also the ethical and cultural outlooks of his contemporaries. 9 Thus we can already find in the Difference Essay of 1801: »When the might of union vanishes from the life of men and the antitheses lose their living connection and reciprocity and gain independence, the need of philosophy arises« (D 90/GW 4, 14). This »dichotomy is the source of the need of philosophy« (D 89/GW 4, 12). The goal of philosophy is, as Hegel formulates it in his later works, the reconciliation of the individual with reality, whereby »reality« he does not simply mean the affirmation of what exists. Hegel still describes »reconciliation [Versöhnung]« as the goal of absolute spirit in the Encyclopedia of 1830; in the 1818 draft of his commencement speech for his academic office at the University of Berlin, we find a characterization of the goal of philosophy which is almost identical to the one given in the Difference Essay (GW 18, 20 f.). As the last and probably most prominent example of Hegel understanding his overall philosophical system as therapy in the broad sense, we should call to mind the following passage from the preface to his Philosophy of Right, in which we again find the keyword »reconciliation [Versöhnung]«: »To recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the present and thereby to delight in the present – this rational insight is the reconciliation with actuality which philosophy grants« (PR preface, 22). Insofar as Hegel is engaged in philosophy as therapy in the broad sense, he is also, in my terminology, engaged in constructive philosophy in the narrow sense. Experiences of disorientation and alienation which modern individuals undergo in Hegel’s view and which he describes in their various forms in the Phenomenology of Spirit can and must be sublated by speculative philosophy. His philosophy of right, too, can be understood as an effort to restore people’s trust in the rationality of society’s ethical foundations and social institutions. 10 Since these phenomena of bifurcation stand in the way of the goal of the good life, both universally and for the individual, the philosophical sublation of these experiences undoubtedly represents constructive philosophy in the narrow sense. 11

9 10 11

On this, see Siep (1992a and 2000), Rósza (2005) as well as Pippin (1997b) and Pinkard (2000). Cf. Rósza (1997) and (2004). For Hegel, an uninterrupted reconciliation of man with nature, society and history is not to be expected, or at least not for a long time, owing to the fragility of objective spirit. For this reason, a large part of his strategy of reconciliation consists in dampening overly optimistic hopes regarding the good life. In relation to this basic stoic move in Hegel’s practical philosophy, it

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3.3.3 Constructive Philosophy in the Broad Sense? Philosophy is conducted in a broadly constructive sense if it presumes to depart from the realm of common sense in the assumptions it makes and the claims which it defends. Common sense may still serve as a point of departure and a condition of adequacy, but no longer as the sole point of reference and the standard by which philosophical claims are to be judged. Hegel himself surely would have had no problem with ascribing the goals of constructive philosophy in the broad sense to his own philosophy. Firstly, he claims in his inaugural lecture mentioned above that »in general, that which underlies the actual need of philosophy is to be presupposed in every (thinking) person« (GW 18, 20). 12 Secondly, at the beginning of the Phenomenology he describes his own project as the »path of natural consciousness which presses forwards towards true knowledge« and as the path of the soul as it wanders through the series of the ways it takes shape, as if those shapes were stations laid out for it by its own nature so that it both might purify itself into spirit and, through a complete experience of itself, achieve a cognitive acquaintance of what it is in itself. (PS § 77/GW 9, 55)

And in the pre-concept of the Encyclopedia, Hegel declares that »the metaphysics of the past« (E § 27), science and common sense coincide: »All philosophy in its beginnings, all the sciences, even the daily doings and dealings of consciousness, live in this belief« (E § 26). Hegel is implicitly addressing the thesis that things are knowable and thinkable, a conviction which pertains to common sense no less than science and philosophy. Thanks to this basic assumption, this thinking can be both »genuine speculative philosophizing« (E § 27) and a metaphysics of the understanding. Hegel’s description implies that speculative philosophy shares a fundamental assumption with the outlook of common sense, and thus that the former is continuous with the latter. It, furthermore, implies that the correct interpretation and justification of this basic assumption is not to be found within common sense but rather must be given by speculative philosophy. Hegel gives the same characterization of the relationship of natural consciousness and absolute knowing in the Phenomenology of Spirit: »Natural consciousness will prove to be merely the concept of knowledge, that is, prove to be not real knowledge« (PS § 78/GW 9, 56). Constructive philosophy in the broad sense is this concept, because the standard is not brought to natural consciousness or common sense from without: Because

12

is difficult to see clearly how Hegel differs from Wittgenstein’s quietism and metaphilosophical conception of philosophy as therapy in the narrow sense. The German reads: »im Allgemeinen [. . . ] [ist] das, was dem eigentlichen Bedürfniß der Philosophie zugrunde liegt, bey jedem (denkenden) Menschen vorauszusetzen«.

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»concept and object, the standard and what is to be examined, are present in consciousness itself,« (PS § 85/GW 9, 59) »it would be superfluous for us to add anything« (ibid.). At the same time, speculative philosophy transforms the underlying assumptions of common sense and natural consciousness. Because the latter, although it is only the concept and not the reality of knowledge, »takes itself to be real knowledge, this path has a negative meaning for it, and in its eyes the realization of the concept will count to an even greater degree as the loss of itself« (PS § 78/GW 9, 56). In other words, it is not until absolute knowing, when consciousness has fully matured, that the implicit presumptions and claims of natural consciousness can be interpreted in a satisfying way. One can understand Hegel to mean that the implicit claims of common sense and the real meaning of its basic assumptions are first developed within speculative philosophy. It is, therefore, clear that Hegel ascribed the goals of constructive philosophy in the broad sense to his own philosophy. He shares the aspiration of being continuous with common sense that is characteristic of this conception of philosophy, as well as the understanding that the interpretation of common sense within constructive philosophy goes beyond common sense’s immediate self-conception and thereby modifies it. The goal is to depart from common sense and the natural consciousness, and yet to render the needed changes comprehensible to them. For this reason, Hegel’s speculative philosophy remains constructive philosophy in the broad sense without becoming revisionary constructive philosophy. If this is successful then common sense is in fact correct in presuming itself to be valid and need not be rejected as incorrect. Showing this, however, is not possible on the basis of common sense alone, rather it requires speculative philosophy. Hegel would presumably not agree with the characterization between the relationship of therapeutic philosophy and constructive philosophy in the broad sense which is implicitly contained in what has been argued so far. His way of carving up the conceptual terrain goes beyond what we established above, because our schema recognizes genuine problems of philosophy which cannot be tied back to the possibility of a good life. Hegel himself was of the opinion that the gulf between the implicit presumption that common sense is valid and the possibility of justifying it must necessarily lead to skepticism and generate false philosophical theories that pursue the goal of sublating this basic duality. He thought this also about the discrepancy between the concept and the reality of knowledge. To accept such dualities is to give up on the truth expressed in the implicit presumption that they are valid. At the same time, these interpretations are also the ultimate source of forms of alienation that cause the good life to recede into the distance and make it seem inaccessible to the modern individual. 13 Accordingly Hegel writes in the preface to the second edition of the Encyclopedia: 13

On this, see the studies in Rósza (2007).

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3. Speculative Philosophy as Therapy? Philosophy itself, meanwhile, experiences its worst fate at the hands of those same individuals when they make it their business to meddle in philosophy, construing it and judging it [on their own terms]. The fact [Faktum] of physical or spiritual, in particular also religious vitality, is distorted by a reflection incapable of grasping it. (EL 10/MM 8, 17)

Making good on the implicit presumption that common sense is legitimate, Hegel thinks, is a necessary component of the project of philosophical therapy in the broad sense. If Hegel succeeds in justifying both theses, then therapeutic philosophy in the broad sense and constructive philosophy in the narrow sense will coincide. Our second leading question, which we will take up in a moment, concerns this connection. First, however, we must briefly outline Hegel’s relationship to constructive philosophy in the revisionary sense.

3.3.4 Constructive Philosophy in the Revisionary Sense? Hegel himself takes revisionary constructive philosophy to be both contradictory and pernicious. It is contradictory as a theoretical discipline because, according to Hegel, there can be no form of knowledge which does not take common sense or some other form of knowledge as its point of departure. If Hegel is correct that there is a necessary and complete course of development of consciousness through all forms of knowledge, and that his Science of Logic is closed, complete and permits of no alternative, and finally that philosophical development ends with his system, then there can be no revisionary philosophy which is independent of his system. From a practical point of view as well, that is with respect to facilitating the good life by means of ethical institutions, Hegel takes revisionary constructive philosophy to be contradictory in the sense that it destroys its own goal, the realization of the good, by its very own activity. His criticism of the moral »should«, as well as his refusal to oppose real social institutions with abstract philosophical constructs in the Philosophy of Right, are expressions of this estimation of the reach of philosophy, which seamlessly dovetail into his famous image of philosophy as an »owl of Minerva« (PR Preface). And yet even though Hegel is at pains to dispel the impression that his own system represents revisionary constructive philosophy, his speculative thought is again and again confronted with just this charge. Commentators from Schelling, Feuerbach and Marx to contemporary readers such as Rolf Peter Horstmann, each working from more or less developed metaphilosophical preconceptions, all charge Hegel with having turned common sense on its head, or, to draw on an image which Hegel himself uses in the preface to his Phenomenology of Spirit, having fundamentally contorted the head of natural consciousness. As these interpreters see it, it is pointless to try to make good on Hegel’s claim to provide a systematic reconstruction of the implicit assumptions of common sense and to redeem its presumption of legitimacy. As a list of philosophers who have

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criticized Hegel in this way shows, this is, however, not an objection which one could make on the metaphilosophical basis of therapeutic philosophy in the narrow sense. Its factual content can only be evaluated if one poses the second of the two questions formulated above: Can Hegel show that his philosophical ambition is unavoidable?

3.4 No Way out of Hegel’s System? In order to dispel the impression that speculative thought is constructive philosophy in the revisionary sense – an impression which Hegel himself would find objectionable – Hegel would need to show (1) that all the central assumptions and implicit presumptions of common sense and of natural consciousness are preserved in his system and not merely reinterpreted and then (2) that his system is the only one which is able to bring about this »sublation« of common sense. If Hegel succeeds in showing these two things, then the question would arise whether, to use the terminology defined above, (3) the epistemological and metaphysical assumptions of his speculative philosophy are necessary for conducting therapeutic philosophy in the broad sense If this too could be shown, then the distinction between constructive philosophy in the narrow and in the broad sense which I have been urging will have been sublated in Hegel’s system and hence will become superfluous. If this cannot be demonstrated, on the other hand, then Hegel’s philosophy will have turned out to be constructive in the broad sense and we will need to conclude that in the last instance he did not have a therapeutic conception of philosophy. In my opinion, what lies at the base of Hegel’s philosophy is the belief that therapeutic and constructive philosophy in the broad sense do indeed coincide. This explains why his system can be interpreted from both perspectives. 14 Given the argumentation so far it will probably not be surprising at this point that my thesis is that Hegel succeeds in establishing none of these three claims, because he is not in a position to show that common sense or natural consciousness implicitly contain the assumptions and presumptions of authority which are developed and 14

In addition it gives us for example the key to describing the complex relationship between thought and will as well as the structure of the relationship of the Idea of Cognition and the Idea of the Will to the Absolute Idea; on this see also Siep (2004).

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made explicit in his system. If Hegel fails in this first goal then the other two are obviously no longer attainable. In what follows, I will justify my diagnosis by showing where Hegel attempts to demonstrate these three things. Finally I will give some reasons why Hegel does not, in my view, succeed in lifting this burden of proof.

3.4.1 Ancient Skepticism and Descartes The key to clarifying the specific constellation into which Hegel brings therapeutic and constructive philosophy lies in his reception of ancient skepticism, on the one hand, and the philosophy of subjectivity of Descartes on the other. As his Lectures on the History of Philosophy make clear, Hegel does not take Descartes to be a proponent of philosophical scepticism, because the goal of Descartes’ philosophy is to gain a solid foundation for knowledge. According to Hegel, Descartes only employs skepticism as a method of inquiry (MM 20, 128). At the same time, Hegel is one of the first to recognize that ancient scepticism was more radical than its modern counterpart, as found in Hume or Schulze, for example. According to Hegel, the modern sceptic only doubts the possibility of particular pieces of knowledge and justification by disputing, say, the existence of innate ideas or the possibility of synthetic judgements a priori. At the same time, this form of scepticism proceeds by way of specific basic assumptions which it takes for granted, and which are placed beyond doubt: Either the certainty of sense experience or, as in the case of Descartes, the certainty of one’s own mental states. Even in his early essay, On the Relationship of Scepticism to Philosophy (GW 5, 197–239) Hegel comes to the conclusion that modern scepticism is really no such thing, but rather a veiled form of dogmatism. Hegel takes two things to be essential to ancient scepticism: First, this sort of sceptic makes no claims which he takes to be true without qualification. Rather, the ancient sceptic exercises doubt by opposing every possible assumption p with an incompatible assumption q which one cannot show to be necessarily false. This argumentative manoeuvre does not commit the sceptic to the truth of q, but rather only, according to Hegel, undermines one’s certainty in p. At the same time, this kind of »thinking scepticism« (MM 20, 359) that engages in rational argumentation is to be distinguished from the sort of scepticism which is, again on Hegel’s view, irrefutable, because it simply refuses to engage with rationality in the first place. Hegel compares the latter condition with »paralysis« (ibid.), by which he means that this form of scepticism should not be treated as a form of thought. If the sceptic does behave as a »thinker«, then – and this is the second thing essential to ancient scepticism – the sceptic offers speculative philosophy a starting point. Skeptical philosophy can not in fact proclaim its particular assumptions dogmatically. The method of equipollence is, according to Hegel, the true principle

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of skepticism and, therefore,must be integrated into speculative philosophy. If, however, it can be shown that there is a principle for which no alternative can be thought and which skepsis contains as a genuine moment, then the sceptic’s strategy will have has been defeated. As is well known, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit serves to deliver just this result. The thesis that there is nothing outside reason can be understood as a way of indicating that the thinking skeptic is also a part of reason and will show up as an integral moment of absolute knowledge, in the form of »self-consummating skepticism« (PS § 78/GW 9, 56). 15 It is also one of Hegel’s most central methodological assumptions that philosophy cannot begin with particular assumptions, but rather that each finite or onesided principle can be opposed with another of equal worth. His attempt at an all encompassing holistic justification encourages the skeptic in relation to each particular principle, but at the same time ultimately defeats the sceptic, since Hegel uses skeptical movement for the dialectical generation of new categories. His interpretation of ancient skepticism is the first building block of his thesis that it is only possible to make good on the knowledge claims of common sense or natural consciousness within speculative philosophy. To this end, Hegel looks back to the central elements of the theory of subjectivity. On this conception of philosophy, first formulated by Descartes, »education« had managed »to grasp the principle of its higher spirit in thought« (MM 20, 126). The I, as the principle of all being and all certainty (and not the certainty of particular ideas and beliefs) is what is to provide philosophy with a new foundation. For Hegel, self-consciousness as pure thought of itself becomes the ontological prototype for the relationship of concept and object, as well as the first epistemological model of certainty. 16 The first two basic postulates of Cartesian philosophy are, therefore, according to Hegel, that nothing is to be presupposed (MM 20, 128) and that the certainty of self-consciousness must be taken as a point of departure (MM 20, 130). 17 This is Hegel’s second building block. There are two points at which the Cartesian model and skepticism make contact in Hegel’s view: On the one hand, skepticism 15

16

17

See also the thorough discussion in Heidemann (2007), which provides an extensive treatment of the historical aspects. As against the epistemological conception of self-consciousness found in Descartes, whose method is bound to solipsism, in Hegel we find the alternative of social externalism, foremost in his Phenomenology of Spirit; cf. Pinkard (1994) and ch. 11 of this book. Buoyed by Hegel’s conceptual holism in the Science of Logic, Robert Brandon’s reconstruction of the broad strokes of Hegel’s philosophy as an »inferentialist semantics« of social practices gains its plausibility through Hegel social externalism of the mental; on this cf. Brandom (2002, ch. 6 and 7). However, both Pinkard’s and Brandom’s reconstructions fail to take account of just how radical Hegel’s sublation of scheme-content dualism is; on this, see ch. 2. For this reason, the reconstruction recommended by Brandom threatens to become a form of social constructivism, which fails to do justice to Hegel’s ontology. Certainty is thereby the starting point of the argumentation of Descartes from a systematic point of view, if not in the order of presentation.

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is a form of thinking, insofar as it indicates not the mere feeling of doubt but rather the sceptical thought employed by philosophy which conceives of itself as therapy. As such it is a part of reason and not external to it. On the other hand the Cartesian paradigm contains the fundaments of skepticism because it works from the assumption »that one can doubt everything, as if that were to mean that one must give up all presuppositions [daß man an allem zweifeln, das heißt alle Voraussetzungen aufgeben müsse]« (MM 20, 127). The third building block by means of which Hegel connects common sense with speculative philosophy is to be found in the following considerations. Both ancient skepticism and Descartes’s theory of subjectivity presuppose a fundamental cleft between thought and being, between concept and object. Ancient skepticism applies this only to statements about external objects, since it takes statements about one’s own mental episodes to be capable of being true. Statements about external reality, on the other hand, are considered by ancient skepticism to be problematic, on account of the difference between thinking and being. Likewise, according to Hegel, Descartes’s method of doubt relies on the assumption that there is a gap between concept and object. This is only disputed for the case of pure selfconsciousness in which thinking and being are identical: »Being is then,« Hegel goes on, »nothing but simple immediacy, which thinking is also« (MM 20, 134). The assumption that there is a fundamental gap between thinking and being is, therefore, not valid for all cases, but rather represents an assumption which can only be justified contextually, one whose domain of applicability can and must be delimited by speculative philosophy. 18 It must be delimited because Hegel ascribes to common sense, as he does to former metaphysics, the assumption that there is no unbridgeable gulf between thinking and being (E § 26 ff.). It can be delimited because this assumption cannot be applied to the case of self-consciousness. A concept of being is thus developed via the theory of subjectivity which is immune to sceptical doubt. The standpoint of absolute knowledge is achieved if thinking refers to itself in its reference to an object, if – as the Phenomenology puts it – substance is at the same time grasped as subject. Each subject which makes a claim to knowledge is an instance of this selfconsciousness and thus implicitly has the standard of truth (the identity of thinking and being) within itself. Since, however, this is still an immediate assumption and this immediacy is incompatible with the conception of the I as pure thinking completely transparent to itself, then scepticism has its proper station in the development of consciousness from the concept of knowledge to knowledge’s reality. This necessary and completely closed course of development is described by the 18

On this point, the parallel which McDowell draws between his considerations in Mind and World and Hegel’s philosophy seems to me to be legitimate; on this, cf. ch. 2. Nevertheless, Wetzel (2004) is right that the social mediation of our reference to the world, which becomes visible in the reconstructions of Brandom and Pinkard, is paid too little heed.

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Phenomenology of Spirit; it leads to an epistemological and ontological perspective within which the difference between thinking and being as well as that between concept and object is sublated. 19

3.4.2 A Way out of the System We have been considering the question whether Hegel succeeded in his systematic ambitions. We have answered mostly in the negative, and I do not want to pursue this question any further here. Instead I wish to ask whether Hegel did succeed in anchoring the claim of his system to natural consciousness and showing it to be a necessary element of common sense. I think Hegel fails for three connected reasons. First, he takes the sceptic’s general challenge seriously and makes an effort to develop an epistemological foundation which satisfies the implicit demands of the skeptic and the principle of equipollence. Hegel also shares with the skeptic a special need for justification; it is, however, questionable whether this is the sort of justification which we need in everyday life (on this, see also my third objection). 20 The certainty of a belief is not undermined by merely thinking up possible alternatives, but rather only by relevant and well-justified alternatives. Hegel himself accepts this pragmatic principle in his practical philosophy (on this see chapter 13). On the level of the system itself, however, he strives for a context-free and pre-emptive ultimate justification, even if this must, due to his methodological assumptions, take on a holistic form. His assumption that philosophy can only achieve its therapeutic goal if, in its final justification, it clears away the philosophically motivated doubts as to the rationality of what is actual and of ethical institutions in particular, rests on a twofold overestimation of philosophy, both as it concerns the genesis of experiences of alienation as well as the justificatory reach of philosophy. 21

19

20

21

On this see Siep et al. (2001); in contrast to Fichte, for example, this »I« yields however no material principle of deduction for Hegel, but rather can best be understood as a negative constraint on what may count as a deduction. In conversation Ludwig Siep has raised the objection that in religious beliefs, which are without doubt an essential part of common sense, a model of final justification is implicitly contained. Two things are to be said in response to this: First, the figure of final justification seems to be a theological interpretation of religious opinions rather than an implication of these opinions themselves. Religious beliefs are characterised by their »character of existential obligation«, that is, by constituting the practical identity of a person and the way that person leads his or her life. In this sense, they are undoubtedly fundamental. It would, however, be a philosophical misunderstanding (and as such stand in need of therapy) if one were to interpret this existential immediacy as in the sense of a fundamental demant to ultimate justification; on this, see Quante (2002a). On this, see also my reconstruction in Quante (2011).

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Second, Hegel thinks he is capable of adducing this justification because the philosophy of subjectivity of Descartes, Kant and Fichte had seemed to make available a philosophical model of self-consciousness which brings together infallible knowledge and ultimate justification in the sense of a necessary, complete and selftransparent system of categories of thought and being. This has however turned out to be too optimistic. Hegel himself does in fact succeed in developing an externalist conception of self-consciousness, both in the Phenomenology of Spirit and in the Encyclopedia (see chapter 11). On the level of the overall construction of the system, however, he still remains bound to Cartesian internalism. Third, Hegel manages to show that we as finite subjects make implicit claims to certainty and justification. This could only be the case if finite subjects were instances of this philosophical model of self-consciousness and philosophical arguments could bring them to explicitly recognize these implicit structures, assumptions and claims as their own. But whether Hegel succeeds in laying out a plausible and indispensable model of the subject, one that is capable of making good on such claims to knowledge, is to be doubted. If he fails to do this, then Hegel saddles everyday consciousness and common sense with a complex of implicit assumptions and needs for justification which, from its perspective, is already the outcome of philosophical construction. The task for a philosophy which shares Hegel’s ambition of being based on good reasons and not merely ignorance, therefore, consists in developing an alternative answer to scepticism and laying out an alternative philosophical interpretation of human self-consciousness. Then we can remain at the level of common sense, whose rational insights, as Hegel says, are »points of light« which »lift themselves out of the night of the totality for themselves and help a person through the course of a rational life«. We need not follow Hegel in his judgement that a person only has confidence in these rational insights »because they have a feeling of the Absolute attending these points; and it is this feeling alone that gives them their significance« (D 99/GW 4, 20).

4. Hegel’s Critique of Observing Reason Observing Reason is one of the most extensive sections of the Phenomenology of Spirit. It is, for example, twice as long as the famous fourth chapter on selfconsciousness. Yet it is among the passages of Hegel’s seminal work which are least often taken up by commentators, interpreters, and those wishing to find philosophical insights in Hegel’s texts. There are two clusters of reasons which can explain this relative disregard: First, in this section Hegel considers natural-scientific theories of his own day. 1 These are, at least on first glance, remote from both the overarching topic of the Phenomenology and from the socio-historical theory of mind which might remain attractive today. The problems which Hegel is here concerned with lie largely outside what most interpreters of the Phenomenology are interested in or familiar with. It can seem as if Hegel’s overall philosophical programme in the Phenomenology can only be tied loosely to the subject matter investigated in this section. Interpreters interested in the systematic sustainability of Hegel’s work as a whole, therefore, tend to look to other parts of the book for arguments in favor of Hegel’s attempt to place all of our epistemic projects into a necessary sequence culminating in absolute knowledge. Second, in dealing with the scientific views and notions in the nature philosophy of his time, Hegel is discussing a subject which many today would consider outdated. This applies not only to the specific disciplines like physiognomy and phrenology, to which Hegel devotes great attention, but also to the very idea of a philosophy of nature, which has fallen into disrepute in the course of the intervening two-hundred years. 2 Anyone who turns to the Phenomenology hoping to draw philosophical gains from Hegel’s discussion of particular topics (and not from the composition of the work as a whole) has good prima facie reasons not to look to the Observing Reason section for systematically valuable insights. Since I intend to investigate Hegel’s discussion of psychology, physiognomy and phrenology with an eye to its systematic relevance in what follows, I must first dispense with these difficulties. In my discussion, I will not consider the various conceptions of Observation of Nature (PS § 244/GW 9, 139) which Hegel engages with, but rather restrict myself to his discussion of those »sciences [Wissenschaften]« that deal with the mental. Since I am here only interested in the import of Hegel’s objections against observing reason concerning the mental, I will not make any attempt to reconstruct the conceptual-logical structure which Hegel employs in ordering these various models into a sequence of development, nor will I consider 1

2

A detailed exposition of the historical background to the topos of »observing reason« can be found in Moravia (1973). Cf. Quante (2006).

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how plausible they in fact are. This chapter is not about the argumentative goal of the Phenomenology as a whole, but rather about Hegel’s critique of psychology, physiognomy and phrenology. My goal is to inquire into the systematic utility of these types of arguments and explanatory strategies. Even such a restricted study cannot forgo some information on the systematic significance of the section under scrutiny within the overall framework of the Phenomenology. For this reason, I will analyse the passages that open the »Certainty and Truth of Reason« subsection of the Observing Reason section, so as to identify any premises of Hegel’s argumentation that may be relevant to his subsequent discussion (4.1). The following sections will then deal with Hegel’s treatment of psychology (4.2), and physiognomy and phrenology (4.3), in turn. Finally, I will formulate some questions which will serve to connect our findings with Hegel’s philosophy of mind more broadly (4.4).

4.1 The Place of Observing Reason in the Phenomenology Observing Reason makes up the first section of the fifth part of the Phenomenology. Hegel’s analysis of self-consciousness as a philosophical principle and an empirical phenomenon in the fourth part unearthed the »truth of self-certainty« (PS § 166/GW 9, 114). This truth consisted in the basic structure of first-personal selfreference from the unhappy consciousness having been made an object of its epistemic attitude. The basic structure of reason was thereby ascertained, which, according to Hegel, consists in self-consciousness being »certain of itself as being reality« (PS § 232/GW 9, 132). As reason, it assumes that »all actuality is nothing but itself« (ibid.). The basic ontological stance of reason is, according to Hegel, »Idealism« (ibid.), but it is better to classify this position as »Rationalism«, since the basic ontological thesis of reason states the structural identity of thinking and being. Hegel means neither a merely epistemic or subjective idealism, which assumes a duality of thinking and being, nor does he have in mind a mentalism which takes the basic ontological substance to be mental (e. g. sense-data or the like). 3 Rather, a fundamental transformation in the attitude of self-consciousness toward actuality accompanies this certainty. In its previous guises, it was concerned exclusively to assert itself and »to save and preserve itself for itself at the cost of the world or its own actuality« (ibid.). Now, on the other hand, »what had so far been its negative relation to otherness is [. . . ] converted into a positive relation«. As reason, selfconsciousness can »sustain« (ibid.) the self-sufficiency of reality and approach it with a cognitive stance of theoretical curiosity: Reason »discovers« the world as

3

Cf. Brandom (2002), Halbig (2002), Jaeschke (2004) as well as the discussion in ch. 2.

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»its newly actual world«, a world which interests it »[i]n its continuing existence« (ibid.). This rationalistic conception of theoretical curiosity, which is thus characteristic of reason, is at first available only as certainty, but not as truth. This is because reason has at the beginning of its development as a new shape of consciousness, »forgotten« its own course of becoming (PS § 233/GW 9, 133). It lacks the experience of self-consciousness which alone could supply reason with a justification for its ontological and epistemological premises. This new shape, which »immediately comes on the scene as reason« in the form of observing reason, is only »the certainty of that truth« (ibid.) of self-consciousness. It will require the full passage through the three »shapes« of reason before this certainty will be able to also become the »truth of reason« (PS § 231/GW 9, 132). As an observer, reason does participate in the ontological and epistemological foundation, but only in the form of an evident presupposition, one not able to be thematized for it (cf. PS §§ 240–243/GW 9, 137 f.). Within the Hegelian model of a self-explicating subjectivity, such an immediate certainty represents a lack of mediation and thereby is a partial ground for reason standing opposed to a world that is assumed to be an independent reality. On the other hand, this insufficiency drives reason to secure its certainty and to verify for itself the assumption of the structural identity of thought and world.

4.1.1 Two Kinds of Difficulties Unlike the other two shapes of reason that Hegel deals with in the second and third section, observing reason remains on the epistemic level of certainty and maintains a purely passive methodological stance. The course of argumentation which Hegel lays out in the Observing Reason section is, for various reasons, not easy to comprehend. Hegel himself gives the following terse overview: The activity of observing reason is to be examined in the moments of its movement as it incorporates nature, spirit and, finally, the relation of both as sensuous being, and when as an existing actuality, it seeks itself. (PS § 243/GW 9, 138)

This delineates the three parts of the section: »Observation of nature« (ibid.), »Observation of self-consciousness in its purity and in its relation to external actuality: Logical and psychological laws« (PS § 298/GW 9, 167), and »Observation of the relation of self-consciousness to its immediate actuality: Physiognomy and phrenology« (PS § 309/GW 9, 171). With his remark that observing reason seeks its object »as an existing actuality« (PS § 243/GW 9, 138), Hegel, moreover, points to an important structural feature by means of which observing reason distinguishes itself from the other two shapes of reason. There are two sorts of difficulties which stand in the way of our efforts to interpret Hegel’s text. On the one hand, we must keep apart three dimensions of Hegel’s

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argument if we are to understand it. First, we must separate those compositional aspects which relate to the overall aim of the Phenomenology from the arguments that relate specifically to the mental. Secondly, we must keep apart Hegel’s analysis observing reason’s self-conception from his remarks on this self-conception. Third, we must distinguish between Hegel’s characterization of the mental as it is for observing reason (that is, within the framework of observing reason’s own assumptions) and Hegel’s own assumptions regarding the essence of the mental. For it is clear that Hegel’s characterization of the limits and extent of the analysis provided by observing reason depends on his own premises regarding the nature of the mental. The argumentative structure of Hegel’s analysis of observing reason presents a second sort of difficulty. One problem consists in the fact that Hegel describes the basic structure of observing reason in the introduction to the Observing Reason section (PS § 240/GW 9, 137), but does not fully explain it until his discussion of theories of »Observation of Nature« (PS § 244/GW 9, 139). Since I do not wish to go into Hegel’s treatment of these conceptions here, I will integrate the claims he makes there into the following discussion of the basic structure of observing reason. The other complication, which I mentioned briefly above, is that, owing to the overall intention of the Phenomenology, Hegel presents the conceptions of the mental discussed in the second and third sections of »Observing reason« as successively more degenerate stages. Within the broad argumentative trajectory of the Phenomenology, the Reason chapter represents an advance over the shapes of consciousness and self-consciousness. The ontologically higher principle of rationalism however has two defects: The epistemological immediacy of its certainty, on the one hand, and the pure passivity of its methodology, on the other. Both of these defects will be overcome in the second and third section of the Phenomenology. Observing reason, however, never manages to free itself of these afflictions. Now, there is a conceptual-logical development in the Observing Reason chapter as well. Hegel divides this chapter into sections by subject matter: »Nature,« »Spirit« and »The relation between the two«. At the same time, the chapter that we are interested in gives a fine-grained sequence of conceptions of the mental. These do not mark progress, however, but rather a course of degeneration. Hegel wants to show that observing reason, due to its own requirements, is driven ever further from the mental (and must so be driven) until finally a basic conception of the mental crystallizes that requires it to fundamentally rethink its approach. Hegel describes this with reference to Phrenology: However, it also seems that observing reason has thereby in fact reached its pinnacle, the point where it must abandon itself and upend itself, for only what is entirely bad in itself has the immediate necessity to reverse itself (PS § 340/GW 9, 188).

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The failure of observing reason’s attempt to develop a satisfying conception of the mental leads it, Hegel claims, to give up its passive methodology, to make way for the »actualization of rational self-consciousness by way of itself« (PS § 347/GW 9, 193) as the next conceptual formation. The conceptual-logical deep structure which underlies Hegel’s analysis of observing reason will not figure in the following analysis. While I will deal with psychology, physiognomy and phrenology in turn, I will not consider whether an illuminating conceptual development can be made out between these conceptions.

4.1.2 The Basic Structure of Observing Reason Hegel highlights two characteristics of observing reason. First, it initiates its observation itself in a controlled manner by proceeding methodologically and systematizing experience (PS § 137/GW 9, 137). Observing reason requires of its data that its meaning »should at least be that of a universal, not a sensuous this« (PS § 244/GW 9, 139). Observing reason assumes this universal is an independent being to be discovered and »to be found« (PS § 245/GW 9, 139). In this fundamental sense, observing reason remains passive as a theoretical outlook, because it ascribes to itself a purely receptive role. According to Hegel, observing reason is, nevertheless, active, insofar as it perceives things and »transforms their sensuousness into concepts«, or distinguishes between »the essential and the unessential« (PS § 246/GW 9, 140). Because observing reason is out to discover the rationality of things in their being as objects, it misapprehends not only its active, constitutive function. Rather it also fails to grasp that the structure which it discovers in reality is in principal its own (cf. PS §§ 166–167/GW 9, 103 f.). 4 Reason’s goal of discovering its own essential constitution in externally existing things drives it to transform the being of objects into a universal whose elements are necessarily related to one another. Observing reason searches »for the law and the concept of law« (PS § 248/GW 9, 142), and searches for them »as existing actuality« (PS § 248/GW 9, 138). This is the second defining trait of observing reason. In coming to know lawlike relations, observing reason takes itself to have »received something alien« (PS § 250/GW 9, 142). Laws are, according to observing reason, the general, rational structure ordering appearances. They are general, because it is not the concrete occurrence that is relevant to them, but rather the type of occurrence. In laws it is general properties which stand in relationships and not particular things. Hegel expresses this in the following way: Reason »frees the predicates from their subjects« (PS § 251/GW 9, 144). At the same time, these relationships must be necessary so as for it to be possible to speak of laws at all (cf. PS §§ 178–185/GW 9, 109 f.).

4

Hegel also traces the »wavering« (PS § 386/GW 9, 140) of observing reason regarding the ontological status of modal properties back to this misapprehension of itself.

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Consequently, observing reason’s concept of law displays an internal tension. On the one hand, the constituents of laws are entities existing independently of one another, and yet at the same time they stand in necessary relationships to one another, thereby partially negating their independence. 5 This internal deficiency grounds, in Hegel’s system, the limits of causal concepts and thereby also limits the scope of nomological explanations. 6 There are two more shortcomings of this mode of explanation that result from observing reason’s specific presuppositions: »To observing consciousness, the truth of the law is in experience in the way that sensuous being is for it« (PS § 249/GW 9, 142). Laws are thereby on the one hand hypostatized into objects, whose necessity is derived from things and not traced back to the conceptual nature of reason. This leads to the problem of induction, since finitely many observed instances do not suffice to justify the intended generality of a law (PS § 250/GW 9, 143). The validity of laws is thereby reduced to »probability« (ibid.), so that the claim to generality and necessity as »truth« (ibid.) must be given up. 7 On the other hand, laws always represent a process of abstraction, since they aim at the universal underlying appearances. For this reason it is the task of observing reason to find the »pure conditions of the law« (PS § 251/GW 9, 143). Since it does not recognize its own activity, but rather takes itself to be purely receptive, a gulf opens between the concrete event in its particularity and the universal expressed in the law: In its experiments, the instinct of reason sets itself to finding out what follows in such and such circumstances. The law seems thereby merely to be immersed even more in sensuous being, yet in all this, this sensuous being is lost to an even greater degree. (PS § 251/GW 9, 143)

In line with the epistemological and ontological presuppositions of observing reason, this leads to the question whether such laws can be interpreted realistically at all, or whether, to use a formulation of Nancy Cartwright, laws »lie«. 8

5

6

7

8

Hegel’s concept of law is not restricted to causal laws; these are rather introduced on a specific level of the internal development of observing reason as particular presuppositions. Besides these, Hegel recognizes modal relationships between properties (and between universals) whose modality is neither that of causal nor analytic necessity (cf. PS §§ 255–259/GW 9, 146). When I speak of the limits of nomological explanations, it must be kept in mind that, for Hegel, teleological explanations are both real explanations to be esteemed more highly than efficient causal explanations, since the concept of an end is more internally complex than observing reason’s concept of cause or law. On the concept of a law in Hegel, see Bogdany (1989). Hegel’s criticism of scientism in connection with his discussion of the concept of a law in the »Force and the Understanding« chapter (GW 9, 107–137/PS §§ 132–166) are discussed in Redding (1996, pp. 88–98). Here Hegel is also criticizing the idea that we could get closer to the truth by means of higher probability. For him, there is a categorical distinction between the two (cf. PS § 250/GW 9, 142 f.). Cf. Cartwright (1983).

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Reason eventually comes to the conclusion that reality as an external thing to be observed is only »the expression of the inner« (PS § 262/GW 9, 149). It thereby grasps the concept of a law which, according to Hegel, refers to the most essential, »inner« relation of appearances (namely those of the »outer«). At the same time, the inner and the outer must, even if they are necessarily related to one another, remain independent and »must have an outer being and a shape« (PS § 264/GW 9, 150). This is because the inner, too, is posited by observing reason as »object, that is, is itself posited as existing and as available for observation.« (ibid.). These are the general assumptions observing reason employs when it considers the mental.

4.2 Observational Psychology and Hegel’s Conception of the Mental Hegel begins his discussion of observing reason’s treatment of the mental by observing that only self-consciousness can be an appropriate object for the implicit epistemic goals of observing reason, since it finds »[t]his free concept, whose universality has [. . . ] developed individuality equally absolutely within itself, [. . . ] only in the concept existing as the concept itself« (PS § 298/GW 9, 167). In line with its methodological stipulations, observing reason seeks laws for the mental. On the one hand it tries to take self-consciousness »in its purity« (PS § 298/GW 9, 167) as its object and hence looks for laws of a logical nature. On the other hand, it considers the relationship of self-consciousness to its environment so as to formulate psychological laws. Hegel’s treatment of these two epistemological projects undertaken by observing reason is, in comparison with his discussion of physiognomy and phrenology, relatively brief. The main reason why it is important is because his critique reveals some of his central assumptions about the mental.

4.2.1 Logical Laws? Hegel does not go into detail regarding the concrete attempts of observing reason to discover laws of thought or of logic. He simply notes that it tries to portray these laws as a »motionless being of relations« (PS § 300/GW 9, 167) as opposed to the active exercise of these laws in thought. This misses the active character of selfconsciousness: »In their truth, as vanishing moments in the unity of thought, they would have to be taken to be knowledge, that is, to be the thinking movement, but not taken to be laws of knowledge« (PS § 300/GW 9, 168). Hegel, therefore, opposes the reification of laws and the error of conceiving selfconsciousness as a thing. Knowledge and thinking are, according to his consideration, to be understood in terms of practical fulfilment, not as static, observable

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being. 9 He, furthermore, criticises observing reason’s need to postulate basic elements of thought, that is, »a set of detached necessities, which, as a rigidly fixed content in and for themselves, are supposed to have truth in their determinateness« (PS § 300/GW 9, 167 f.). The holistic nature of self-consciousness, which for Hegel consists in the various elements or aspects of the mental being constituted by their connection with one another, hence goes missing. The content, meaning or function of such mental elements can only be grasped if one understands them as moments of self-consciousness. Such holistic connections can only be inferred hermeneutically and, therefore, remain closed off from the methodological and ontological presuppositions of observing reason. Hegel’s objection against the possibility of logical laws is of a »universal nature« (PS § 300/GW 9, 168), much like Davidson’s argument against psychophysical laws. 10 A detailed analysis of the various models of observing reason thereby becomes available in Hegel’s view, because they all rely on a category mistake, one which manifests itself in the form of an epistemologicalmethodological incommensurability. 11

4.2.2 Psychological Laws? Since it is one of Hegel’s premises that self-consciousness is »the principle of individuality« (PS § 301/GW 9, 168), observing reason’s explanatory target must be an individual self-consciousness in its specifically individualized condition (cf. PS §§ 300–301/GW 9, 168). And because, according to Hegel’s second premise, »within reality it is an active consciousness« (PS § 301/GW 9, 168), its active condition must be explained. Observing reason therefore, having failed to gain hold of self-consciousness in its purity using the means available to it, attempts to explain self-conscious individuals via their interaction with their environment. These psychological laws take the form of two opposite directions of causation: On the one hand, selfconsciousness is taken to be something passive that must »receive« (PS § 302/GW 9, 169) the causal influence of its environment and »comes to be in conformity with« (ibid.) its environment. On the other hand, self-consciousness is conceived as something active that attempts to bring its environment »in[to] conformity with

9

10 11

This fundamental objection is also a central element of Hegel’s later critique of inadequate theories of the mental in his theory of subjective spirit in the Encyclopedia of 1830 (especially § 389); on this, see Halbig (2002), Wolff (1992) and ch. 2 and 5 of this book. Cf. Davidson (1980, especially ch. 11). Ludwig Siep (2000, p. 135) has suggested understanding Hegel’s critique as expressing antipsychologism regarding logic, in the sense in which this is later formulated by Frege or Husserl. My analysis is compatible with this, but has the advantage that it is not burdened with the task of clarifying the ontological status of the entities posited by anti-psychologism.

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itself « (ibid.). 12 In accordance with its methodological presuppositions, observational psychology (PS § 303/GW 9, 169) is led to modularize self-consciousness by ›discovering‹ »all sorts of faculties, inclinations and passions« (cf. PS § 303/GW 9, 169). Owing to its effort to explain self-consciousness in its activity, observational psychology itself, however, notices »in its recounting of this collection« (ibid.) that the unity of self-consciousness is not satisfactorily accounted for in this way. Furthermore, it encounters dissonance when it realizes that these modules of the mental have been conceived as »dead things at rest« (ibid.), while these are at the same time »restless movements« (ibid.) for it.

4.2.3 Hegel’s Conception of the Mental Hegel’s objection to the possibility of psychological laws is of a foundational sort, and so he takes it to be unnecessary to go into the details of observational psychology: »What is supposed to have an influence on individuality and which influence it is supposed to have – which really means the same thing – depends for that reason entirely on individuality itself« (PS § 306/GW 9, 170). On the one hand, the individual, with its particular constitution, is thought of as the result of environmental effects. On the other hand, the individual acts on, interprets and transforms its environment. In this activity, Hegel objects, the specific individuality of self-consciousness is already taking effect. The concrete impact of the environment on the individual self-consciousness results from the specific constitution of that individual self-consciousness, making it impossible to explain the individual makeup of self-consciousness as an effect of its environment. Observational psychology, Hegel concludes, gets no further than general statements which only capture »the indeterminate essence of individuality« (PS § 306/GW 9, 170) and not »this determinate individuality« (PS § 306/GW 9, 170). 13 Hegel draws an important methodological conclusion from this diagnosis: The determinate individuality of self-consciousness has as its basis »the individual herself« (PS § 307/GW 9, 171). An adequate strategy of explanation must comprehend this, and, therefore, must take the form of an interpretation geared towards the way that meanings are related, taking account of the active and holistic constitution of self-consciousness and its »freedom« (ibid.). 14 Further, Hegel’s objections are important for his own 12

13

14

By the »environment [Umwelt]« Hegel means the social world of »merely found habits, mores, and ways of thinking« (PS § 302/GW 9, 168 f.). His objections can, nevertheless, also be applied to teleo-semantic attempts which try to explain the mental as the adaptation and taking shape of an environment conceived in evolutionary-biological terms; on this, see Millikan (1984). The fate of the attempt to formulate causal laws of action within a causal theory of action can be viewed as a contemporary example of these difficulties. Here it is pivotal to consider that Hegel’s concept of freedom is not meant in the sense of agent causality, but rather as openness to the rational structures of the (social) environment; on this, see Pippin (1999, 2004b and 2008).

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conception of the mental, because he views the function of the social environment as a constitutive element of individual self-consciousness: However much these circumstances, this style of thought, those mores, or the whole state of the world itself were not to have existed, still the individual would not have become what he is, for all individuals which find themselves in this state of the world are this universal substance. (PS § 306/GW 9, 170) 15

If one pays attention to the context in which Hegel’s conception of the mental is developed, two looming misinterpretations can be avoided. On the one hand, Hegel’s requirement that the individual self-consciousness be understood »only [. . . ] on the basis of the individual himself« (PS § 307/GW 9, 171) is not to be taken as a recommendation that we understand the mental in terms of individual firstpersonal access. That sort of methodologically solipsistic conception of introspective psychology only extends the defects of observational psychology, since it fails to take into account the social constitution of the mental and thereby blindly takes on the essential presuppositions of observing reason. On the other hand, Hegel’s critique of the methodological solipsism of introspective psychology cannot be understood an advocation of behaviourism, since Hegel also criticizes the methodological and epistemological presuppositions that behaviourism and introspective psychology share in common. 16 Our analysis, on the other hand, brings to light Hegel’s own social-externalist conception of the mental. 17

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17

Pinkard’s discussion (1994, p. 89) relies principally on this aspect of the social constitution of the mental. A more exact characterization of Hegel’s thesis that the mental is socially constituted can be found in ch. 11 and 12 of this book. In this respect, there is a kinship between Hegel’s and Wittgenstein’s conception of the mental. On the latter, see Ter Hark (1995). Three clarifications will help to elucidate my argument: First, I do not claim in what follows that Hegel’s social-externalist conception of the mental is meant as an argument against scientism. There are independent objections to this conception of the mental, and Hegel’s conception only gains its ultimate contours in the course of what comes later. Second, Hegel’s social externalism with regard to the mental cannot be identified with Davidson’s model of the mind, oriented as it is towards behaviouristic requirements. Hegel’s social externalism is rather genuinely social in the sense that it is developed from the perspective of a participant in some »we« (or »spirit«); on this, see chapter 12. Third, Hegel subscribes to an ontological externalism regarding the mental, quite aside from his social externalism, rejecting the dualism of mind and world; on this, see chapter 2 and Halbig (2002). For this reason, Hegel’s view also does not run the risk of becoming a frictionless void in space in which thought merely circles around within itself or the social sphere and gains no traction with the world.

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4.3 Physiognomy and Phrenology Observational psychology must therefore fail for categorical reasons, so that observing reason is set back to the physical immediacy of individual self-consciousness in its attempt to explain the mental, which »contains the opposition of being-for-itself and being-in-itself as abolished in their absolute mediation«. Under the heading of »Physiognomy and Phrenology«, Hegel discusses two research projects of this type which were active in his day. Although we now consider both to be obsolete, Hegel’s objections are of lasting systematic relevance. This is because his critique aims at fundamental presuppositions of these conceptions which remain influential even today. First and foremost, Hegel tries to bring the differing variants of this physiognomy into a series of conceptual equivalences, at the end of which stands phrenology. Since I do not wish to pursue this dimension of Hegel’s argumentation, which is indebted to what the Phenomenology aims to prove, I will be brief in laying out the main five stages with respect to one another. After this I will analyse Hegel’s critique of physiognomy, which he thinks of as observing reason’s theory of action. I will draw together the elements of Hegel’s own theory which can be extracted from his critique of physiognomy in order to complete Hegel’s social-externalist conception of the mental (on this see also chapters 9 and 10). Finally, I will complete the picture by analyzing Hegel’s critique of phrenology.

4.3.1 Variations on »inner« and »outer:« Five Oppositions The fundamental idea that Hegel goes so far as to call the concept of spirit as such consists in the thought that an external sequence obtains its meaning through something internal. On the basis of the further methodological and epistemological stipulations supplied by observing reason, the outer and the inner must both be independent in relation to one another and yet at the same time bear a necessary relation to one another. Over and above this, they must also both be grasped as belonging to the sphere of Being. This is the backdrop against which Hegel distinguishes five oppositions between inner and outer that physiognomy establishes. Each of these contrastive pairs has the goal of explaining a self-consciousness in its concrete individuality starting from something external that is observed. In its first four passes, physiognomy assigns the activity of the subject by means of an organ to the position of the inner (paradigmatically the hand or the mouth). The outer, on the other hand, is modified in accord with the inadequacies of each of these preliminary stages (cf. PS §§ 311–312/GW 9, 172 f.). 18 18

Hegel’s complex depiction of this further development of the model of physiognomy (PS §§ 309–312/GW 9, 171 ff.) is here simplified. Hegel understands the inner and the outer as concepts of reflection. A shift in the meaning of the one therefore always effects a shift in the

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In the first opposition, the outer is determined as the »the deed, in the sense of an actuality cut off from the individual« (PS § 312/GW 9, 173). The inner, expressing itself in action, shows up on this conception as a result of the individual which is separate from it. Hegel criticises this model of explanation for violating the presuppositions of physiognomy in two ways. On the one hand, the inner which is objectified in the outer gains some measure of independence in the deed, which is divorced from the individual, while the individual itself ceases to be able to lay claim to such individuality. In this respect, the inner loses the stipulated independence in relation to the outer. It is precisely because of this shortcoming that the individual can, on the other hand, adopt a critical stance towards her deed, by withdrawing to its intention and distancing itself from the objective meaning it has in action: Thus the act as an accomplished piece of work has the double and opposite significance of being either the inner individuality and not its expression; or, as external, to be an actuality free-standing from the inner, which is something entirely different from the inner. (ibid.)

In order to remedy this shortcoming, an inner must be found »as it is visible, that is, external, and yet still in the individual himself« (PS § 312/GW 9, 175 f.). If one now tries – and this is the second opposition – to place the form of the individual qua »whole at rest« (PS § 313/GW 9, 175 f.) in place of the act, the relation between inner and outer becomes one of mere convention, not a »sign« (ibid.) anchored in these things themselves, and thus the relation between inner and outer becomes too weak. By the standards of physiognomy itself, this sort of »arbitrary combination« can form the basis of »no law« (PS § 314), for which reason Hegel concludes that the need to be scientific is not to be fulfilled in this way (cf. §§ 311–312/GW 9, 172 f.). To prognose the fate of the individual from the makeup of his or her hand remains likewise an accidental connection and the physiognomy retains the status of one of those »spurious arts and hopeless studies« (PS § 314/GW 9, 174). Therefore, the construction of the third opposition, in which the external constitution of the putative organ of action is explained as the appearance of the inner, that is of the particular individuality, is not satisfying. Neither the traits of the hand, nor the »tone and range of the voice« (PS § 316/GW 9, 138), nor »handwriting« (ibid.) can be viewed as an expression of individuality because the individual can behave reflexively in relation to such characteristics and even consciously work to change them. This capacity for self-interpretation – Hegel calls it »outer expression as reflection upon the actual expression [Äußerung als Reflexion über die wirkliche Äußerung]«, PS § 317, – explains why the external characteristics which are drawn on by phys-

meaning of the other. If my reading is correct, then Hegel is not thematizing the development of the inner in the first four oppositions, but rather restricts attention to the side of the outer.

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iognomy cannot be properly understood from its own perspective. As an expression of intentional action, they are only comprehensible to an interpretation of the understanding, not to the perspective of observing reason. 19 With the ability for »inner« reflexive commentary on one’s own action, a characteristic of intentional action comes to light, which the fourth opposition makes use of. The inner reflection on one’s own act as »actual expression« (ibid.) must have an external, observable facet. Someone’s gestures and expression ought to show (to use Hegel’s example) whether a statement is meant seriously or not. This too is, however, inadequate by the standards of observing reason: Because gestures and expressions »subside [. . . ] into the determination of being« (PS § 318/GW 9, 176), they stand in a merely conventional relation to that person’s specific individuality and can be modified by the individual at will. For the particular individual, this expression of its interiority is therefore »as much its face as it is its mask« (ibid.). The difference between intention and will on the one hand and the act on the other is presupposed in this possibility (cf. ibid.). By generating its fifth opposition in this way, physiognomy becomes a theory of action, as Hegel discusses in what follows.

4.3.2 The »inverted relationships« of Physiognomy According to Hegel, the following consequence is to be drawn from the fourth opposition: »Individuality gives up that being-reflected-into-self which is expressed in various traits and instead places its essence in the work [das Werk]« (PS § 319/GW 9, 176). The refinements of the model of physiognomy make it possible to see that this »science« falters when faced with a basic problem in the theory of action: The opposition which this observing activity stumbles into is, in terms of the form, that of the practical versus the theoretical, and it posits that both of them lie within the bounds of the practical itself – that is, it is the opposition of individuality actualizing itself in action (taken in its most general sense) versus individuality actualizing itself at the same time as reflecting itself into itself from out of this action and making this action into its object. (PS § 319/GW 9, 176 f.)

The solution that Hegel points to is, however, incompatible with the presuppositions of observing reason. Instead, it contradicts the relationships which have taken root through the instinct of reason, which descends into observations of self-conscious individuality in terms of what is supposed to be its inner and its outer. (ibid.)

While Hegel is able to accept this consequence within its theoretical context, observing reason has no choice but to comprehend the basic structure of intentional action »in terms of the same topsy-turvy relationships in which the opposition 19

This is the systematic payoff that MacIntyre (1998) draws from interpreting this passage.

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takes its determination in appearance« (ibid.). The claim is, therefore, that a theory of action that remains within the paradigm of observing reason takes over the structure of an appearance and is, therefore, not capable of describing action in a way that is conceptually adequate. This »topsy-turvy« theory of action is then sketched by Hegel in the following way: For observation, the deed itself and the work, whether it be that of speech or a stabilized actuality, counts as the non-essential outer, – However, the inwardlyturned-being of individuality counts as the essential inner. Between the two components, which practical consciousness has in it, intention and deed – that is, what the action is meant to be and the action itself – observation selects the former component as the true inner (PS § 319/GW 9, 176 f.).

Due to its premises, this theory of action can only bring into view the outer. From this vantage point, the inner, that the observable event first makes into an action, is oscured. The consequent unavailability of the distinction between internal intention and external action leads to the characteristic mark of intention, the mark by which an action is distinguished from a mere natural occurrence, being conceived as a separate magnitude. It can, and indeed must, be concluded from this that for Hegel actions are objects in an intersubjectively accessible space. In this sense they are external to the individual in its private interiority (cf. chapters 9 and 10). Observing reason, however, conceives of »the visible as the visibility of the invisible« (PS § 320/GW 9, 177). And since, for observing reason, the inner is what counts as essential and what is responsible for its outer expression, the intention of the agent becomes the distinguishing mark of action. Since the intention, separated from the realized action, does not necessarily harmonize with the act as determined by its social context, intention represents a theoretical quantity which is epistemologically inaccessible and in this sense is »a putative being [gemeintes Sein]« (PS § 320/GW 9, 177). 20 Action, too, becomes an »existence which it fancies« (PS § 319/GW 9, 177), since it is, according to this theory, constituted by the selfconception of the individual, but not by the space of social meaning. For this reason, there can also be no laws in which intentions and the actions necessarily constituted by these intentions stand in the conditioning relationships required for laws. 21 Since intentions presuppose epistemically inaccessible inferences to something in principle not observable, they cannot be thought of as sensuous, but rather only as arbitrary constructs. And since action is constituted first and foremost by such constructs, as opposed to being constituted by its interpretation in a social context, actions too become unobservable entities. The action theory that takes actions to be observable events fails to properly apprehend the outcome of its own 20 21

Translator’s note: Translation modified. This only rules out a relationship between types required by laws. The question of how concrete mental episodes are related to observable events is not thereby answered.

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interpretation, and it also fails to understand that its conception of inner and outer is what causes it to turn intentions into entities of a purely private nature that can only be known by inference. Hegel leaves us in no doubt that, in his opinion, the act in its social context is the »true being of a person«, in which »individuality is actual« because the acting individual in this way »sublates what is merely meant there in both components« (PS § 322/GW 9, 178). Against the attempts of physiognomy to draw conclusions about the intention of the acting subject by observing the event of the action, Hegel posits that an individual can deceive herself regarding the true significance of her action, and that only its realization in the social sphere shows »what constitutes the character of the deed« (ibid.). Unlike the notion of inner and outer employed by observing reason, therefore, the objectification of intention in action does not represent an unbridgeable gap: »Objectivity does not alter the deed itself; rather, it merely shows what the deed is« (PS § 322/GW 9, 178). The identity conditions for actions are settled by social standards and contexts, not by the private perspective of the acting subject on her own action. The proper place of action theory is, therefore, Objective Spirit, since the context of an ethical and legal practice is required to determine the descriptions under which acts may be ascribed to the agent, under which descriptions she is responsible for them, and when, owing to her subjective perspective, it may be appropriate to excuse or exculpate her. 22 Observing reason’s premises, however blind it to this social dimension of reality, with the result that its explanation of action fails to achieve its goal of explaining the individual subject in its particularity.

4.3.3 Phrenology Since observing reason is not able lay hold of the particular individual by way of action, Hegel claims that there is still a need to verify the thesis »that individuality expresses its essence in its immediate, fixed, purely existing actuality« (PS § 323/GW 9, 179). Now it is no longer the external side of action that ought to inform the constitution of an individual subject, but rather the individual’s immediate physical existence. Under the heading of phrenology (Schädellehre), Hegel discusses the now obsolete science that attempted to infer mental characteristics of the subject from characteristics of the skull. Nevertheless, the way Hegel engages with it remains relevant, since he reveals fundamental presuppositions of this conception that still exert an influence in the philosophy of the mental today. On the basis of its presuppositions, phrenology must view the relationship between the mental and the physical as a »relationship of causal connection« (PS § 324/GW 9, 180). Hegel notes that since »spiritual individuality is now to have 22

On this, see Pippin (2004a), Quante (1993a) and ch. 10 of this book.

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an effect on the body, then as a cause, it must be itself bodily« (PS § 325/GW 9, 181). Observing reason locates the bodily seat of mental individuality in the brain and spinal cord. Phrenology, therefore, locates the sought relation in the causal interaction of the brain and the spinal cord, which is thought of as the »bodily beingfor-itself of spirit« (PS § 328/GW 9, 181), and the skull and spinal column, which are taken to be »the fixed thing at rest« (ibid.). 23 At this point, Hegel draws our attention to what is one of the most important points in his critique of phrenology. The brain in phrenology is ascribed a double role, resulting in a fundamental ambivalence. On the one hand, the brain is thought of as just another object – »a being for others, an existence« (PS § 327/GW 9, 181). As such, it is »a dead being« (ibid.) and can no longer be the »presence of selfconsciousness« (ibid.) that it is supposed to be. Hegel points out that we must distinguish between the functional activities of the brain and the brain as a physical body. In the first sense, the active character of the mental is regained, but there ceases to be any difference between phrenology and observational psychology. In the second sense, phrenology does offer a genuine alternative to the psychological conception of the mental. However, as Hegel emphasizes, the brain as a »dead being« in no way illuminates the mental phenomena which it is supposed to explain. This ambivalence manifests the incompatibility of the goals of phrenology in seeking for the mental »a being which is not for all intents and purposes itself objective« (PS § 325/GW 9, 180). In his critique of causal laws connecting the brain and the skull, Hegel points to a further ambivalence in the project of phrenology. The brain occupies a second double role, this time as »an animal part« and as »the being of self-conscious individuality« (PS § 331/GW 9, 183). This double role can make it seem that when we assign the brain properties or capacities by means of mental predicates, we are using these merely in a transferred sense. The danger then arises that one later no longer sees through this metaphorical use and fallaciously infers that biological and mental properties are ascribed to one and the same object. This in turn can make one suspect that these are just two ways of describing one and the same domain of objects (be they activities, properties or states of the brain). These ideas lose their plausibility once we get clear on the ambivalence in the role which the brain is assigned in this context. 24 The analysis of the first ambivalence is important because Hegel’s objections are now no longer to be read only as a critique of causal relations between the brain and the skull, but rather can be carried over to other conceptions which presuppose a causal relationship between functional and physical states of the brain and which identify the former with the mental. Hegel’s analysis is thereby relevant to 23 24

Hegel restricts himself, as I do in my presentation, to the role of the brain. Hegel himself suggests such a misuse of predicates with reference to the skull (PS §§ 328– 329/GW 9, 182).

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contemporary work in the Philosophy of Mind on the relationship between mind and brain. Due to this internal tension, Hegel takes it to be impossible to establish informative relationships between the functional level encompassing the mental and the physical level of the brain. He takes the brain to lack the intensional dimension of meaning, characteristic of the mental: Physical constitution does not have »the value of a sign« (PS § 333/GW 9, 184). »What remains left over and necessary« is therefore, in the last analysis, »a conceptless and free-standing pre-established harmony« (PS § 335/GW 9, 185), which fails to explain anything. 25 In this connection Hegel brings up a point which also plays an important role in contemporary philosophy of the mental. Since the brain, in its double role, must mirror the internal structuredness of the mind, the idea of a functional modularization of the brain (qua functional unity) suggests an »existing articulation [seiende Gliederung]« (PS § 327/GW 9, 181). On the level of the brain (qua physical object), this would then correspond to the idea of a localization of particular types of mental events in particular brain regions (cf. PS §§ 328–329/GW 9, 182). The type of modularization chosen – and this is Hegel’s point, that is so important for contemporary debates – will depend on the psychological theory that is presupposed. We can understand Hegel’s remark (ibid.) to mean that the semblance of a successful explanation of the mental in the context of Observing Reason is generated by the corroboration of observational psychology and phrenology because these two inadequate conceptions of the mental go and in hand and support one another. A genuine explanation of the essential attributes of the mental, Hegel concludes, cannot be achieved within the framework of Observing Reason. 26 Phrenology is not ultimately satisfied with an uninformative claim of identity between the mental and the physical, which must seem unsatisfying even to the »the raw instinct of selfconscious reason« (PS § 340/GW 9, 188). Reason, therefore, abandons the paradigm of observing reason and tries to grasp the essence of the mental, and hence of itself, in a different way.

25

26

Hegel’s characterization applies to the relation of global supervenience, for example, which claims there is a necessary, but explanatorily uninformative relationship of dependence between the totality of mental properties and the totality of physical properties. It is, nevertheless, important to keep in mind that Hegel rules out neither a localization theory nor the existence of causal relations between mental and physical on conceptual grounds (cf. PS § 332/GW 9, 184). He is, however, of the opinion that no secure knowledge can be gained within this framework nor can important aspects of the mental come into view (PS § 331/GW 9, 183). I discuss how mental causation can be integrated into Hegel’s theory of action in Quante (1993, p. 236 ff.).

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4.4 The Contemporary Relevance of Hegel’s Discussion of observing Reason There is no doubt that the scientific-philosophical theories of the mental that Hegel discusses in the Phenomenology have been historically superseded. Nevertheless, we have seen that Hegel’s critique of them retains systematic relevance because central presuppositions of observing reason still exert an influence in today’s scientifically oriented Philosophy of Mind. Furthermore, the main features of Hegel’s own conception of the mental come out in this critique. These are developed later in his theory of subjective and objective spirit (cf. the following chapter). Even though the perspective of observing reason may allow us to grasp many aspects of our existence as subjects of mental episodes, the scientific (»observing«) study of the mental, conducted by cognitive science and brain research today, cannot, if Hegel is right, grasp what is essential to the mental. Hegel’s critique should first and foremost be understood as a warning against unduly constraining ourselves in our study of the mental by imitating or adopting the ontology, epistemology or methodology of observing reason. Such an imitation of scientific theories of the mental not only fails to lead to scientific rigor, it also obscures the social-externalist character of the mental as an activity and as a form of life, which is only to be captured from the perspective of a cognoscent participant. Hegel’s own reconstruction of the relationship of the mental and the physical using the logic of reflection has the potential to make some progress on this problem. This relationship is not amenable to the modern metaphors of a »space of laws« and »space of reasons.« These metaphors are closer to the basic ideas of observing reason (cf. chapter 6). Hegel firmly rejects the idea that philosophy generally and philosophy of the mental in particular must be subordinate to the demands of the sciences. He thereby insists on the autonomy and dignity of a philosophical analysis of the mental. 27 Nevertheless, Hegel was permanently engaged with scientific theories and empirical findings and positioned his own theory of the mental in relation to them. The question is, then, how one should think of the relationship of everyday, scientific and philosophical perspectives in Hegel’s system. Hegel’s own conception of the mental is no doubt developed more rigorously in his later system than in the Phenomenology. In one respect, however, the early theory of the Phenomenology seems to me to be in a better position to give an answer to this question. In the later system, »Nature« and »Spirit« are indeed introduced as concepts of reflection, but the semantic back-and-forth only takes place between the philosophy and nature and the philosophy of spirit (on this see the next chapter). Not much light is shed on our question, since the relation of the empirical sciences to both parts of the system remains unclear. In the Phenomenology, on the other hand, all epistemolog27

For a general discussion of the relationship of everyday, scientific and philosophical interpretations of the mental, see also Quante (2000a).

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ical projects have to make a contribution to consciousness’s progression towards absolute knowledge. Therefore, the experiences which we have of ourselves within a natural-scientific analysis of the mental form a constitutive component of a philosophically adequate conception of ourself as minded subjects. To engage with this question would mean retracing the path traversed by observing reason on its way to a conceptually adequate philosophy of the mental. This, however, is a topic for another book.

5. Nature as Spirit’s Posit and Presupposition The transition from the Logic into the Philosophy of Nature, a resolution which Hegel portrays as the idea proving its »absolute freedom« (E § 244) by »releas[ing] freely from itself [. . . ] as nature [sich aus Natur frei aus sich zu entlassen]« (E § 224), is not only one of the most difficult passages of Hegel’s system. It is also among those for which Hegel is most often repudiated. Even in Hegel’s time, his contemporaries judged this figure of thought to be unjustified and unintelligible, or even to be a symptom of his philosophy’s fundamental failure. 1 By contrast, the transition from the Philosophy of Nature to the Philosophy of Spirit has met with a far less critical reception. This can be seen, on the one hand, as an expression of the prevailing opinion that Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit has more systematic resources that we might build upon as compared with his Philosophy of Nature. On the other hand, this has the consequence that Hegel’s program of philosophically articulating the distinction between nature and spirit without opening a gulf of irreconcilable dualism is often met with sympathy even today. 2 Hegel’s employment of theological models and metaphors to characterize the transition from the logical idea to nature may seem obsolete to us, and his Philosophy of Nature can easily appear obscure. 3 Even so, it is implausible that a thinker as holistic and systematic as Hegel would gloss over how such large parts of his system fit together. As the following analysis of the sections of the Encyclopedia devoted to the »Concept of Spirit« (E § 381) will show, neither the concept of spirit itself nor the transition from the Philosophy of Nature to the Philosophy of Spirit can be understood without recourse to Hegel’s Doctrine of the Idea. A productive connection with Hegel’s concept of spirit or his conception of the relationship of nature and spirit can therefore, from an interpretative point of view, only be successful if the interpreter pays attention to its place in the context of Hegel’s entire system. 4 After a brief introduction to the Philosophy of Spirit (E §§ 377–380), Hegel begins to explicate the concept of spirit in § 381. Since this passage will be the focus of my discussion below, I reproduce this passage here in full:

1 2

3 4

See Burkhardt (1993). See Siep (2000, p. 258). A third possible reason is the misconception, still prevalent in Hegel scholarship, that the logic stands opposed to the other two parts of the system, which are then grouped together under the heading of Realphilosophie. A twofold division of this sort, however, misconstrues the structure of the Idea, which is what organizes Hegel’s system as a whole. See for example Bonsiepen (1997, p. 482 ff. and p. 557 ff.), who exemplifies this tendency. See Peperzak (1987) for an exposition of this sort.

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5. Nature as Spirit’s Posit and Presupposition For us spirit has nature as its presupposition, though spirit is the truth of nature, and is thus absolutely primary with respect to it. In this truth nature has vanished, and spirit has emerged as the idea that has reached its being-for-self. The object of the idea as well as the subject is the concept. This identity is absolute negativity, since in nature the concept has its complete, external objectivity, but this externalization [Entäußerung] of the concept has been sublated and the concept has, in this externalization, become identical with itself. And so the concept is this identity only so far as it is at the same time a return from nature. (E § 381) 5

Like all central passages in the Encyclopedia, which make up the hinges of Hegel’s system, this text too is saturated with the fundamental concepts of Hegel’s philosophy, and these serve to connect the passage with the system as a whole. This paragraph therefore raises a difficulty of a general nature, one which the interpreter of Hegel’s Encyclopedia constantly must face. In the following I would like to try to explain the content of this paragraph by interpreting the five sentences that constitute it. In doing so I will make reference to other passages from Hegel’s system whenever necessary for the interpretation of our text. First sentence: For us spirit has nature as its presupposition, though spirit is the truth of nature, and is thus absolutely primary with respect to it. Over and above the general problems just mentioned, this first statement raises a special problem with its use of the expression »for us«, which Hegel himself emphasizes. This formulation, which Hegel also employs in the first edition, is initially perplexing. 6 We cannot assume that this expression is being used in the same way as in Hegel’s Jena Phenomenology of Spirit. As is well known, »for us« refers to a perspective which is available only to the philosophical observer, i. e. the reader, but not to the subject participating in the conceptual development. This

5

6

Translator’s note: Since this passage is so central to this and the following chapter, I provide the German: Der Geist hat für uns die Natur zu seiner Voraussetzung, deren Wahrheit und damit deren absolut Erstes er ist. In dieser Wahrheit ist die Natur verschwunden, und der Geist hat sich als die zu ihrem Fürsichseyn gelangte Idee ergeben, deren Object ebensowohl als das Subject der Begriff ist. Diese Identität ist absolute Negativität, weil in der Natur der Begriff seine vollkommene äußerliche Objectivität hat, diese seine Entäußerung aber aufgehoben und er in dieser identisch mit sich geworden ist. Er ist diese Identität somit zugleich nur als Zurückkommen aus der Natur. Hegel adapts the wording of § 381, which is identical in the second and third editions, from the phrase which corresponds to it in the first two sentences of § 300 in the first edition. The expression »and is thus absolutely primary with respect to it [und damit deren absolut Erstes]« is, therefore, omitted in the first edition, and the second sentence there reads: »In this truth, its concept, nature has vanished, and it has turned out to be the idea whose object and whose subject is the concept.« (»In dieser Wahrheit, seinem Begriffe ist die Natur verschwunden, und er hat sich als die Idee ergeben, deren Object ebensowohl als das Subject der Begriff ist«, HE § 299). It would be interesting to consider the extent to which Hegel intended to take into account criticisms of his original formulation by making these modifications. I will return to the substantial meaning of these modifications in what follows.

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difference between the »consciousness« involved at the level of the narrative on the one hand, and the consciousness of the »authorial« narrator on the other, is a structural characteristic that is specific to the mode of conceptual development in the Phenomenology. It has no place in the systematic of the Encyclopedia. What, then, does »for us« express here? Who are the subjects for whom spirit has nature as a »presupposition«, even though it is their »truth« and »absolutely primary« to them? This is the first question. And how can Hegel integrate this perspective »for us« into the process of conceptual development? This is the second question.

5.1 For whom is Nature a Presupposition of Spirit? If we take Hegel at his word when he says that his philosophical system presents the course of each thing’s own development from a speculatively point of view, then one can view Hegel’s analysis of the concept of spirit as a collection of philosophical theses formulated from an adequate – i. e., a Hegelian – standpoint. The first sentence of § 381 would then serve to characterize spirit as an entity which, on the one hand, constitutes the »truth« of nature and what is »absolutely primary« with respect to it, while on the other hand being constituted in such a way that it – from the perspective characterized by »for us« – has nature as a presupposition. 7 Some help in interpreting this sentence is provided by Hegel’s unpublished Fragments of the Philosophy of Spirit, which he is thought to have worked on from 1822 until 1825. There, in the twelfth paragraph, Hegel writes that: In order to settle the concept of spirit, it is necessary to specify the determinacy by which it is the idea as spirit. All determinacy is however determinacy only in relation to another determinacy; that of spirit initially stands simply opposed to nature, and yet the latter is at the same time only to be grasped with the former. Since this difference between nature and spirit is initially for us, for subjective reflection, it will be revealed within spirit that and how nature and spirit relate to each other. 8

7

8

A third possibility, namely that Hegel is talking about an inadequate philosophy, is ruled out for two reasons. First, Hegel would hardly refer to such a perspective by using the phrase »for us«. Second, spirit’s philosophical misinterpretations have their place not in the Encyclopedia but rather in the Phenomenology. Den Begriff des Geistes festzusetzen, dazu ist nöthig, die Bestimmtheit anzugeben, wodurch er die Idee als Geist ist. Alle Bestimmtheit ist aber Bestimmtheit nur gegen eine andere Bestimmtheit; der des Geistes überhaupt steht zunächst die der Natur gegenüber, und jene ist daher nur zugleich mit dieser zu fassen. Indem dieser Unterschied des Geistes und der Natur zunächst für uns, für die subjective Reflexion ist, so wird sich dann an ihm selbst zeigen, daß und wie Natur und Geist sich durch sich selbst aufeinander beziehen (GW 15, 218). My translation [J. M.].

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This passage is revealing for many reasons. First, Hegel advances the thesis that »nature« and »spirit« are determinations of reflection which only have their meaning by reciprocally referring to each other. It is thus impossible, according to Hegel, to have an adequate concept of nature without having a concept of spirit, and viceversa. 9 Second, Hegel maintains that an adequate philosophical presentation must show how this implicit reciprocal relation is developed out of the subject matter itself. Third, Hegel at least implicitly claims in this passage that it is not irrelevant to the relationship of nature and spirit that its reflection-logical status obtains »at first« only for us. Since the spatio-temporal order can as such have no philosophical significance in the context of the Encyclopedia, Hegel must explain how the relation expressed by »at first« and »then« could be a constitutive relation in the context of speculative logic. Both in the Fragment just cited and in the Encyclopedia, Hegel employs categories from the Science of Logic, and more specifically from the »Reflection« section in his 1813 Doctrine of Essence. While Hegel’s talk of »supposition« picks out a central concept from the Logic of Essence, the expression »subjective reflection«, which comes up in this fragment, is present in the Logic of Essence only indirectly. In his remark on external reflection, Hegel describes how reflection has been understood in general as »external« and thereby »in a subjective sense« (SL 354/GW 11, 254). It is, therefore, permissible to consider the subjective reflection which Hegel speaks of in the Fragment as a sort of external reflection, since, firstly, this brings about a substantial agreement between the Fragment and the Encyclopedia, and secondly, this makes sense of Hegel’s claim that, »for us«, spirit »has nature as a presupposition.« The concept of presupposition was already employed in the analysis of reflection, namely in that of positing reflection. Only in the analysis of external reflection, however, does it take on the specific meaning at play in Hegel’s characterization of the relationship of nature and spirit, as it is given »for us«. This is because external reflection thus presupposes a being, at first not in the sense that its immediacy is only positedness or moment, but in the sense rather that this immediacy refers to itself and the determinateness is only as moment. (SL 349/GW 11, 253)

It is not until we get to external reflection that what is presupposed gains the status of a being independent of reflection. External reflection thus has, Hegel goes on to say, »an immediate presupposition« and »finds this presupposition before it as something from which it starts« (ibid.). Whereas in positing reflection the »presupposition« (SL 347/GW 11, 251) remains an internal moment of the reflective selfrelation of essence, which ultimately derives from the structure of self-consciousness as a self-relation mediated by an act of self-objectification, external reflection

9

Compare Brandom (1979) for this sort of view today.

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is distinguished by having its presupposition as something external, conceived as an independent object separate from itself qua reflected being. If we assume that Hegel’s Logic of Essence succeeds in showing the forms of reflection to be necessary moments of self-consciousness, or, to put it differently, as necessary forms of realization of essence qua »absolute negativity« (SL 342/GW 11, 245), then it will have been shown generally that there must be a basic realist conviction specific to self-consciousness qua external reflection. As the subjects referred to by the »for us«, we relate to nature as a given being independent of our subjective contributions. One could summarize Hegel’s position by saying that we are, as self-consciousnesses capable of absolute negativity, at the same time always already realists regarding whatever is separate from our subjective experiences. This is what the difference between spirit and nature means for Hegel (as does, in contemporary philosophy, the difference between the mental and the physical).

5.2 Spirit as the Truth of Nature and what is Absolutely Primary Since overcoming dualisms in all areas of philosophy is one of Hegel’s central concerns, the result just discussed cannot be Hegel’s last word, philosophically speaking. As we would therefore expect, Hegel goes on to explain that nature, which from »our« perspective is a presupposition of spirit, still needs to be comprehended from a philosophical point of view. From this perspective, spirit is »truth« and »absolutely primary«. What does Hegel mean by this? First, a glance into the original edition of the Encyclopedia reveals that the passage »thus absolutely primary with respect to it [und damit deren absolut Erstes]« is missing. On this basis we may suppose that Hegel added this formulation as a clarification, in order to elucidate his use of the concept of truth in this passage. This usage is indeed neither self-explanatory nor simple, and it is not possible to go into it in detail here. The expression »absolutely primary«, however, makes it sufficiently clear that »truth« is not meant here in the sense of a true statement, which corresponds to an independent state of affairs. Hegel rather has in mind the idea that truth is a correspondence between the essence and the appearance of a thing. He presupposes, in other words, an essentialistic-teleological conception of truth. On this basis, his statement is to be understood in such a way that spirit is the adequate form of realization for that essence which nature constitutes. This reading fits with the end of the Philosophy of Nature (cf. E § 376), since Hegel attempts there to show that the telos which, from a philosophical perspective, is immanent to nature, is achieved when it comes to encompass organisms capable of sensation, in which »[t]he last self-externality of nature is sublated, so that

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the concept, which in nature merely has implicit being, has become for itself« (ibid.). 10 The talk of what is »absolutely primary«, by means of which Hegel explicates his use of the concept of truth, does not refer to temporal primacy, but rather to a being which underlies appearance. It is »absolute« because – at least in relation to spirit and nature – it is already available independently of development in nature and independently from the difference between spirit and nature, for which reason spirit is the essence and, therefore, the truth of nature. There must be a philosophical grounding for this thesis, which takes the considerations of the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit as logical starting points. In Hegel’s system, this can only be the course of development followed in the Science of Logic itself. This consideration thus refers us back to two assumptions which equally underlie both Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit. The first is a determination of nature and spirit as modes of the absolute idea, on whose dual grounds these two spheres attain their philosophical determination. The second is Hegel’s thesis that the essence of this absolute idea is brought to fruition not in the mode of nature but in the mode of spirit. Before outlining these foundations for Hegel’s characterization of the nature-spirit relationship, I would like to formulate four questions here, which until now have remained open even though we have presupposed the machinery of Hegel’s speculative philosophy: 1. Why is spirit the truth of nature and thereby the appropriate manifestation of the idea? 2. Can spirit, in all of its various forms, be seen as this appropriate manifestation, or does Hegel’s claim rather only apply to absolute spirit? 3. How is taking into account the perspective »for us« permissible at all in the context of this philosophical idea? 4. On what grounds can the relation of »first-then« be constitutive of the adequate characterization of the relation between Nature and Spirit? Second and third sentence: In this truth nature has vanished, and spirit has emerged as the idea that has reached its being-for-self. The object of the idea as well as the subject is the concept. By the lights of the interpretation so far, Hegel is being consistent here when he makes explicit the reference to his conception of the idea, since it is only on this basis that his way of speaking about spirit as the truth of nature is at all intelligible. The statement above however contains a further claim: That nature has »vanished« in this truth. This statement comes as a surprise, since Hegel seemingly is not

10

Translator’s note: Translation modified.

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employing his concept of sublation as we would expect, but rather refers only to one of its meanings with »vanished«, namely to negation. 11

5.2.1 Has Nature Vanished? At first sight, one might be led to conclude that this turn of phrase expresses Hegel’s absolute idealism by denying nature any existence whatever, and asserting that all reality is rather only spirit in the sense of the mental. Apart from its factual implausibility, however, such a position would be difficult to reconcile with the results of the interpretation so far. For one, the assumption that nature is real would have to be an outright mistake, so that the perspective »for us« would be in no position to make a constitutive contribution to the course of the idea’s development. In that case, the perspective ought not to be brought into play at all by Hegel. Second, this claim is incompatible with Hegel’s thesis that »nature« and »spirit« are categories of reflection (Reflexionsbestimmungen), since, as such, both would have to retain some independence existence. It is characteristic of relations of reflection, however, that if one relatum disappears, the other goes with it. And third, it would also become impossible to understand the subsequent course of the argument in the Philosophy of Subjective and Objective Spirit, since there reference to a nature assumed to be independent persists as an important moment of spirit. 12 These unhappy consequences can, however, be avoided if one understands the statement above not as asserting that nature as such has disappeared. Instead, one can take Hegel to be emphasizing that the idea, which represents the truth of both nature and spirit, has developed into the mode of being-for-itself from the mode of »self-externality [Außersichseyn]« (E § 376). It is only this characterization of the idea that has disappeared, as a result of the immanent development of nature itself, and only in the sense that nature, with advent of the phenomenon of life, rises to the level of subjectivity, i. e. to the existence of spiritual phenomena. It is characteristic of spiritual phenomena that they cannot be grasped in the mode of externality to one another and themselves. 13 If, as the course of subjective spirit indicates, nature is still to play a role in the context of spirit, then it will no longer do so in the mode characteristic of the philosophy of nature, but rather as a moment internal to spirit, to which it bears a different sort of relation. Hegel’s problematic statement

11

12 13

Two things speak against the hypothesis that this was a mere oversight on Hegel’s part. First, the very next sentence makes use of the concept of sublation. Second, the term »vanished [verschwunden]« occurs consistently in all three editions of the Encyclopedia. On this, see Siep (1992a, pp. 195–216) and ch. 15 of this book. Hegel refers to this change of mode in the introduction to the philosophy of spirit with the keyword »self-feeling [Selbstgefühl]« (E § 379) and by referring to the holistic constitution of spirit (see E § 379), which makes a »sundering [Zersplitterung] of it« (ibid.) impossible.

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can, therefore, be understood as registering that the mode of self-external being has disappeared insofar as the idea has developed from nature into spirit.

5.2.2 The Idea as the Truth of Nature and Spirit Hegel conceives of the transition from nature to spirit is as a development of them both in accordance with the idea, which underlies both of them alike. In contrast to the first edition of the Encyclopedia, where this additional characterization does not yet appear, spirit is described here as the »idea that has reached its being-for-self«. This transition thus refers back to Hegel’s conception of the idea, which makes up the foundation of the entire Encyclopedia. In what follows, this will be demonstrated to the extent that serves the purpose of interpreting the passages we are interested in (2.1). Following on from this, our task will be to examine whether Hegel is in a position to solve the four problems immanent to his system that were raised above.

5.2.2.1 »Science as a whole presents the idea« (E § 18) In the final sections of the introduction to the encyclopedia, Hegel distinguishes three parts of his system, with the caveat that this is only a »preliminary, general representation« (ibid.) that can ultimately only be »comprehended« (ibid.) in the context of the entire system and its execution. These three parts therefore correspond to the different basic modes that apply to the idea overall. The Logic is thus »the idea in-and-for-itself«, while the Philosophy of Nature is »the science of the idea in its otherness« and the Philosophy of Spirit the depiction of »the idea returning back to itself from its otherness« (ibid). The essence of this idea, which unfolds in its development by way of these three modes, is »the thinking that is utterly identical with itself. At the same time, it is the activity of opposing itself to itself in order to be for itself and solely by itself in this other« (ibid.). This statement leaves us in no doubt that we are now in the heartland of Hegel’s metaphysics. Neither a complete exposition nor a factual justification independent of Hegel’s system will be attempted in what follows. 14 Rather, here I will clear things up only insofar as necessary to decide whether Hegel can overcome the four difficulties which we have raised. (a) The idea in the »in the abstract element of thinking« (E § 19): As Hegel discusses in the Preliminary Conception, his Science of Logic concerns the »pure idea« (ibid.). »Thinking« here denotes neither a psychic or mental activity, nor only the merely subjective side of, for example, a transcendental activity. »Thinking« here rather denotes the objective side of such an activity, and it is in this sense that Hegel speaks 14

The essentials of my interpretation here follow that of Düsing (1984).

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of »objective thought« (E § 25). The categories of thought that are developed in the Science of Logic are, therefore, no mere conceptual schemata, which a thinking subject brings to a thought-independent object; instead, they are at once the basic determinations of this domain of objects itself (on this, see chapter 2). In order for thinking to become the idea, it does not suffice to give up a subjective or instrumental interpretation of the categories, so that thought qua subject in its relation to objects remains »by itself« (E § 18). Rather, the subject-object duality must be overcome on the side of the categories themselves. This takes place by absolute thought being grasped as »the self-developing totality of its distinctive determinations and laws, which it gives itself and does not already have and find within itself« (E § 19). As the idea, thought hence begins by generating those basic categories which manifest both its own essence as well as that of the object. Hegel’s Science of Logic »thus coincides with metaphysics, i. e. the science of things captured in thoughts that have counted as expressing the essentialities of things« (E § 24). This thinking, which Hegel characterizes as activity, is free in a threefold sense: First, as a pure self-determination, it is a »relating to oneself« (E § 23). Second, it overcomes the »particularity [Particularität]« (ibid.) of concrete individual subjectivity because it relates purely to the object, free from epistemic distortions. Third, it overcomes the subject-object dichotomy by grasping its own categories of thought as at once manifestations of its »relating to itself« as well as of the essence of objects. Being this »activity of the universal« (E § 23) and the overcoming of the subjectobject dichotomy is what the first mode of the idea consists in, the mode which Hegel refers to with the characterization »idea in-and-for-itself« (E § 18). 15 (b) »Nature [. . . ] in the form of otherness« (E § 274): In this paragraph, Hegel refers back to the end of his encyclopedia Logic, where the »intuiting [. . . ] idea« is said to be »nature« (E § 244). Hegel thus assures us, on the one hand, that the idea and nature are not two different entities. Rather, according to Hegel, nature is to be grasped as a specific way of being the idea. This particular mode, which assumes the idea qua nature, results from the self-knowing and willing idea first being »for itself « in the form of intuition (ibid.). The »absolute freedom of the 15

In the third part of his Science of Logic, the »Doctrine of the Concept«, Hegel not only argues that the self-consciousness (transcendental apperception) is the model which this conception is based on (cf. SL 529 f./GW 12, 32 ff.). He also considers to what extent the idea must be life in his development of the conception of the idea, because the unity of subject and object can only be made intelligible in this way (cf. SL 674 f./GW 12, 177 ff.). In addition to this, he further specifies the moment of activity by showing both knowledge and willing to be equally legitimate and necessary expressions of thought (cf. ibid.). The idea becomes »absolute knowledge of itself« only when »cognizing and doing are equalized [Erkennen und Thun sich ausgeglichen hat]«. This absolute knowledge, the self-recognition of the idea, is hence characterized not only as theoretical knowledge but also as practical knowledge.

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idea« consists in the fact, Hegel goes on, that it »resolves to release freely from itself the moment of its particularity or the first determining and otherness, the immediate idea, as its reflection [Widerschein], itself as nature« (ibid.). 16 On the other hand, the immediacy of this intuitive self-relation makes the idea »external to itself « (E § 247) in its very self-relation. This externality, which determines nature as »immediate idea« (E § 244) is therefore not something that pertains to nature only »externally«, »merely [. . . ] relative to this idea (and to the subjective existence of the same, spirit)« (E § 247): »Externality constitutes the determination in which the idea exists as nature« (ibid.). 17 Hegel fills the content of this determination, which is constitutive of the idea qua nature in what follows. Although they in fact make up a self-determining and cohesive system of categories, these determinations have in externality »the appearance of an indifferent subsistence and isolation with regard to one another« (E § 248). Neither natural phenomena nor the basic determinations which constitute them refer to each other internally. This implies, for example, that lawful systems are in a certain sense external to the phenomena which they subsume, since they neither know them nor do they make any contact with them as they are internally constituted. Within nature itself, »necessity and contingency« (ibid.; cf. also E § 250) reign supreme; a systematicity that goes beyond causality in accordance with laws, that attaches to nature qua idea, is not explicitly present in nature. 18 The highest form of nature, the animal organism, indeed delivers an intuition of the idea in its relationship to the species, but the cognitive recognition of this relationship falls on the side of the knowing subject standing opposed to nature. 19 Hegel, however, is wary of viewing the levels of a teleological order of nature, of the sort might be expressed in the image of a scala naturae, as a »natural engendering« (E § 249). These do not result from natural processes evolutionarily conceived, but rather need to be philosophically justified and elucidated as the expression of the inherent ideality of nature. 20 Hegel’s conclusion is, therefore, that »nature is implicitly a living whole« (E § 251), that it is in itself the idea. But because it is the idea only in the form of

16

17 18

19 20

While »intuition« brings the knowing subject to expression, »self-encompassing« refers to the desiderative self-reference, which is not to be interpreted in the sense of a psychic process. I cannot go into the religious and religio-philosophical imagery of creation that Hegel is implicit invoking here. die Äußerlichkeit macht die Bestimmung aus, in welcher sie als Natur ist. My translation [J. M.]. Causality in accordance with laws, therefore, encompass those causes which Kant claimed were final or teleological causes, insofar as they are thought of as a special case of causality. Hegel’s conception makes it possible to think of biology as a self-standing form of explanation without excluding it from the realm of natural science. For details see the illuminating discussion in Siep (2000, pp. 118–143). A demonstration of the compatibility of Hegel’s position with evolutionary theory was provided as early as Ritchie (1893, pp. 38–78).

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externality and immediacy, there results from this an »inability of nature to hold fast to the realization of the concept« (E § 250). This discrepancy can be traced to an ontological and epistemological principle which leads the »movement« through the »series of stages« of nature to self-development and self-realization as a path traced by the idea (E § 251). This path then culminates in the »existence of spirit, which constitutes the truth and ultimate purpose of nature, and the true actuality of the idea« (ibid.). (c) Spirit as »a return from nature« (E § 381): With this final characterization in the passage we are interested in, Hegel employs a mode of expression which he had also made use of in the introduction to the Encyclopedia. There, spirit is characterized as the idea »returning back to itself from otherness« (E § 18). The image of a return targets the structure of reflection that runs through the idea in all three of its modes. Spirit in this third mode is, as Hegel adds in a clarification in the second edition of his Encyclopedia, »the idea that has reached its being-for-self« (E § 381). He thereby forestalls the misunderstanding that the logical idea is itself already to be understood as a spiritual subject. Moreover, he at the same time registers the fact that it belongs to the essence of spirit to be a »being for itself«. Three things are meant by this: First, »formally« the »essence of mind [Geist] is freedom, the concept’s absolute negativity as identity with itself« (E § 382). The freedom contained in this structure of subjectivity is formal because it still requires realization in an appropriate bodily and social organization, which Hegel goes on to lay out in the subsequent course of the Encyclopedia. Second, the idea qua spirit is transparent to itself, and spirit is the realization of essence which is adequate to the idea: Spirit is »not some one determinacy or content whose expression or externality is only a form distinct« from spirit itself (E § 383). The form and content of the idea, as well as its essence and its appearance, collapse in the mode of spirit; its realization is a known and intended »manifestation« (ibid.). Hegel distinguishes this manifestation thirdly from the way that the idea is revealed in nature. What turns out in the »becoming of nature« to be only the external, knowing subject exists »as the revelation of spirit, which is free, it is the positing of nature as its world« (E § 384). Corporeality and the social world are informed nature in the sense that spirit appropriates nature as a body and a social environment, so that it can actually exist in it as a free subject (on this, see chapter 2). In sum, the idea qua spirit resides in the mode of knowing and desiring selfrelation, so that the characteristics which define it and the expressions it produces are a part of its essence and are no longer external to it. This production or positing is, however, as Hegel goes on to argue, a form of reflection which depends on a presupposition: »because this positing is reflection, it is at the same time the presupposition of the world as independent nature« (E § 348). This arises directly from Hegel’s selected image of a »return« as well as his thought that the idea must manifest its own essence in order to fulfill it. Why Hegel can or even must assume

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this about the absolute idea cannot be explained here. As far as the connection between spirit and nature is concerned, two things arise from this structure of reflection: First, it belongs to the constitutive condition of spirit to presuppose a »self-standing nature« and to have this as a presupposition. Second, »spirit« and »nature« in the Hegelian sense are determinations of reflection: As modes of the idea, they are only epistemically distinguished and ontologically distinguishable in their internal reflection-logical network of relations.

5.2.2.2 Answers Internal to Hegel’s System Thanks to the resources of his doctrine of spirit and his logic of reflection, Hegel is in a position to provide answers to the four questions which have, until now, remained open from the perspective immanent to Hegel’s system. If someone asks why the relation given through »first . . . then« can be constitutive of the relationship between spirit and nature in the Fragment on the Philosophy of Spirit (the fourth question posed above), the following answer is now available. If this relationship is determined in advance, as occurs in both § 12 of the Fragment and § 381 in the Encyclopedia, then we are dealing with a characterization given from an external philosophical standpoint. Since spirit is, however, constituted in such a way that its essential determination does not apply to it externally but rather can be known by it and produced by it, it consequently must, as in the Fragment, show »that and how nature and spirit relate to one another« (GW 15, 218) in the process of spirit’s own development. And in fact, Hegel’s remarks regarding subjective spirit can be understood as a depiction of the way that spirit’s relationship to its own natural presupposition is made explicit for it. 21 This process of self-realization, which at the same time – form the perspective of the Doctrine of the Idea – can be described as a return of the idea from being another, is constitutive of the essence of spirit, since these are not permitted to apply to it only externally, but rather must themselves become thematic. This occurs, according to Hegel, precisely through the experience that spirit thereby undergoes with itself and with nature. In other words: The various ways of making nature one’s own belong just as much to the essence of spirit as do the differing conceptions of the nature-spirit relationship. These manifests themselves in cultural technologies, pictures and theories. This allows us to answer the question as to why the perspective »for us« which Hegel takes up in the Encyclopedia is permissible (our third question). Since the finite subject’s internal perspective on nature, which includes both its theoretical and practical dealings, belongs to the ways in which the idea qua spirit encompasses its own essence, this perspective also belongs to the essence of spirit. The essence

21

What follows is, therefore, concerned primarily with the depiction of spirit’s own perspective on nature. In this way, Hegel gives expression to the primacy of the participant-perspective (cf. the previous chapter).

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of spirit is, on the basis of its essential being-for-itself and its reflection-logical structure, dynamic in two respects. On the one hand, it modifies itself in the process of its production, while on the other hand, differing conceptions of its essence make up its parts. Accordingly, Hegel cannot conceive the truth of spirit as a static being whose determinations are merely to be read off it. As a being-for-itself, spirit’s determinations apply to it precisely in the process of its self-recognition and selfproduction. These are its »absolute actuality« (E § 383). Hegel’s claim that spirit is the adequate manifestation of the idea can, on this basis, be understood in such a way that the objection that this applies only to absolute spirit (our second question) is disarmed. As opposed to the mode of nature, the mode of spirit is the adequate manifestation of the idea, because it is a mode of being-for-itself. Spirit is, therefore, wholly adequate to the idea. Nevertheless, spirit itself traverses a teleological course of development in which it comes to recognize this adequacy for itself and realises it in social institutions like art, religion and philosophy. It is not until this last form of recognition and activity that it achieves an adequate mode of being and representation, one in which its relationships to nature and to the idea are rendered transparent to it. In one respect, we have already answered our far-reaching initial question: Why is spirit the truth of nature and the adequate manifestation of the idea? We have said that this is because the idea knows and wills itself, because it appropriates and knows nature, and because it returns to its being-for-itself from nature as from being another and being external to itself. It thereby realises the essence of the idea, which Hegel characterizes as subjectivity in the Science of Logic. However, the problem is ultimately only pushed up a level by this answer, since the question now arises: On what grounds does Hegel characterize the idea as subjectivity? Since I am here, however, only concerned with Hegel’s characterization of the relationship between nature and spirit, I will not take up this question. The fact remains that Hegel must offer an answer within his own system to the four questions which arose in the interpretation of § 381 of the Encyclopedia. As I will now show, the last two sentences of this paragraph can be understood as Hegel’s attempt to make explicit how the concept and spirit are related. Fourth sentence: This identity is absolute negativity, since in nature the concept has its complete, external objectivity, but this externalization of the concept has been sublated and the concept has, in this externalization, become identical with itself.

(a) Identity as »absolute negativity«. If we ask what »identity« Hegel is referring to by »this«, we are led back to the third sentence of our focal passage, which we have so far still not discussed. There »the idea that has reached its being-for-self« is characterized as that whose »object [. . . ] as well as the subject is the concept.« (E § 381). The identity sought is, therefore, visible in that both the intentional object and the intending subject are equally »the concept« in spirit as the idea existing for itself. By

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»concept«, Hegel does not mean just any speculative concepts of particular objects that are developed in the framework of Hegelian Realphilosophie, but rather in an emphatic sense that one substance which – as he famously says – is at once to be thought of as a subject. »The concept« in this elevated sense, which Hegel associates with the unity of self-consciousness, thereby denotes the one object, the absolute, as it is in truth. And this one object is spirit. Objects, like concepts, have for Hegel essentially the structure of subjectivity; and spirit as the »idea which has achieved being-for-itself« is the point of convergence in which subjectivity as a knowing and wanting intentional subject refers to objects understood as subjectivity. Nature’s being another has »disappeared« in spirit. Hence the essence of the idea can be realized, since this essence is for it to be the concept which has overcome the difference between subject and object for itself. 22 This identity is characterised by Hegel as »absolute negativity«, a characterization which he attempts to justify by further argument in the fourth sentence of this paragraph (beginning with »since«). Hegel draws the characterization itself from his Logic of Reflection, as he does with those which he has already used to specify the relationship between spirit and nature. It is, however, not found there in the section entitled »Reflection«, but rather in the first section, which bears the title »The Essential and the Inessential.« There Hegel characterises the relationship of being and essence bear to each other, saying: But essence is the absolute negativity of being; it is being itself, but not being determined only as an other: It is being rather that has sublated itself both as immediate being and as immediate negation, as the negation which is affected by an otherness. (SL 342/GW 11, 245 f.)

Just as being does not stand in relation to essence simply as another sphere, so too does spirit, as the idea of nature which exists for itself, not simply stand in relation to nature »as an other«. If this were the case, then nature would merely be immediately negated by spirit, and then spirit itself would have the character of an immediate existent due to this unmediated external reference. In this way, one would only arrive at a characterization of the relationship between nature and spirit, for example through spatio-temporal metaphors or by giving relations of causal dependence, in which nature and spirit were treated like things and placed in opposition to one another. 23 As a philosophical alternative, Hegel opposes his reflection-logical analysis of the relationship between nature and spirit to his conception of the idea (I will take up this theme again in the next chapter). 22

23

On this special use of »the concept« see Fulda (1989, p. 129 ff.) and Horstmann (1990, p. 45 ff and p. 75 ff). Both of these models for thinking about the relationship between mind and nature are still dominant in contemporary Philosophy of Mind. By contrast, Hegel saw that it was a basic error to view »spirit as a thing« (E § 389) in developing his solution to the mind-body problem. For a detailed analysis of this paragraph, see Wolff (1992).

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Hegel uses the idea of »negativity« to emphasize the dynamic aspect of selfrealization, which encompasses both the recognition and the realization of the essence of the idea. This process of self-determination is »absolute« because it has no exterior, no other, but instead is to be thought of as autonomous self-realization. (b) »since«. Hegel now offers the following as a justification for the fact that the identity produced in the idea that has achieved its being-for-itself can be viewed as absolute negativity. First, the concept in nature has »its complete, external objectivity«; second, »this externalization of the concept has been sublated«. At the end of the Science of Logic, Hegel undertakes to show that nature is a selfexpression of the logical idea, and that, in this sense, it is an activity of the concept. At the same time, he claims that this revelation must be grasped philosophically as »externalization [Entäußerung]«. The two points which Hegel now gives as reasons can be viewed as necessary and sufficient conditions for being able to characterize the transition of the idea from the mode of nature to the mode of spirit being able to be characterized in terms of autonomous negativity. First, nature has to be the »complete« external objectivity of spirit. This means on the one hand that the concept does not have other external moments »in itself« that lie, as it were, beyond nature. 24 On the other hand, this means that nature contains no elements which cannot be grasped as the concept’s »external objectivity«. If there were such elements, then there would be something external to spirit and thereby to the idea in its mode of being for itself, so that the absoluteness of the idea would no longer be a given. This condition is fulfilled thanks to the Hegelian premise that nature is a mode of the idea, a premise that has to prove its muster in the course of his Philosophy of Nature. 25 Secondly, the transition from nature to the mode of spirit must be understood as an activity, as the immanent teleological development of the idea in its being other. This, too, Hegel can take himself to have proven in his Philosophy of Nature by the time he gets to his Philosophy of Spirit. The subjectivity that has been invested into the idea of life comes to expression in the »inborn germ of death« (E § 375), so that the death of the individual organism is grasped by Hegel as the »achieved identity with the universal« (E § 376) and as the »death of the natural« (ibid.), 26 through which the »immediacy of individuality« is sublated and the stage of »concrete universality« (ibid.) is realized: »Spirit« (ibid.). 24

25

26

These sorts of natural aspects of mental states and events are for example postulated in contemporary naturalistic Philosophy of Mind. In these models there are properties of the mental which cannot be grasped from the perspectives of the subjects of these states; on this cf. Quante (1998a and 1998b). In opposition to this, Hegel must defend the essential subjectivity and transparency of mental phenomena (cf. E § 379). For the fact that Hegel makes this claim, and for the difficulties which its execution has in the context of his philosophy of nature, see E § 250. See also the ultimately sceptical judgement of Horstmann (1986). Translations modified.

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Where Hegel earlier had talked about the »disappearance of nature«, here he uses the term »sublation [Aufhebung]«, which famously covers three aspects in his usage, namely negation, refinement and preservation. These three aspects must each occur on two levels, since Hegel conceives of the transition of nature to spirit as, on the one hand, a further development of the idea and, on the other hand, as the self-determination of spirit. The first two aspects have already been discussed and raise no further problems. It is the mode of nature as the self-externality of the idea which is negated – on the level of the development of the idea – in the transition from nature to spirit; on the level of spirit this negation is to be found in the externality of natural determinations having transformed into the living unity of spirit, into self-feeling and free agency (cf. E § 379). The refinement consists in the fact that the idea has achieved being-for-itself in the mode of spirit and thereby come to have a reality which is adequate to its essence, a process in which spirit is also identified as the »truth of nature« (E § 388). But in what sense is nature preserved in this transition? As we will see, the last sentence of this paragraph can be understood as offering the preservative moment of this sublation. Fifth sentence: And so the concept is this identity only so far as it is at the same time a return from nature. Whenever Hegel characterises spirit as the truth or the higher and further development of the idea, he emphasizes its character as a process and a result: The absolute negativity of the idea which is for itself can only be grasped as the »return from nature« (E § 381), and spirit has »come into being as the truth of nature« (E § 388). Spirit can know itself and bring itself forth only in the process of the self-sublation of nature, which is made visible by the Philosophy of Nature (and thus by a mental artifact, a representation produced by spirit). It can do so only insofar as it makes its natural conditions its own in the forms of corporeality and external nature. Insofar as it is a form of subjectivity, the basic structure of the idea is essentially that of reflection, and thereby a »return« from another. On the other hand, as absolute subjectivity, its essence is constantly directed towards itself. This requires that the positing of nature as a mode of the idea’s being another and being self-external remains preserved as an immanent presupposition in the return to being-for-itself that becomes explicit for the idea in spirit itself. On the level of the development of the idea, this means that nature belongs to a real and self-standing part of reality which is to be grasped philosophically, even if Hegel claims to show by philosophical means that this reality and the presuppositional character of nature themselves can be conceptualized as aspects of an absolute subjectivity. Within spirit, the preservation of nature shows up in a number of ways. First, it is to be seen in the fact that free subjects can only exist as natural living creatures, creatures that, secondly, actively take possession of their natural conditions and

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their environment and thereby, thirdly, must presuppose that they are independent from these. This shows up fourthly in our inability, as finite rational beings, to secure our spiritual nature in any other way than differentiating ourselves from ourselves as natural beings. 27 The fact that finite consciousnesses are realists about nature and that the concepts of »nature« and »spirit« are determinations of reflection is, just like the constitutive contribution of our finite perspective to the selfunderstanding of spirit, ultimately explained philosophically and justified by the structure of absolute subjectivity, which Hegel has determined to be the idea as being-for-itself. Hegel’s way of determining the relationship between nature and spirit has, therefore, turned out to be, on the one hand, inherently connected with the transition from the Logical Idea to Nature; on the other hand it has turned out that the philosophical justification of this determination depends on the conception of the idea as Hegel presents it in his Science of Logic. With the corrections to the Concept of Spirit that he undertook in the second edition of the Encyclopedia, Hegel succeeded in clearing up the misconception that the »logical idea« (SL 736/GW 12, 237) refers to a subject, a concrete person. 28 For his philosophically motivated conception of the idea, however, which is the organizing and justifying principle of his entire system, there can be no external justification. Its plausibility depends entirely on its capacity to form a basis for philosophical analyses. It seems to me that both Hegel’s concepts of spirit and nature as well as his reflection-logical analysis of the relationship of spirit and nature are formidable alternatives to today’s prevalent ontologies, which are largely tailored to a scientistic conception of nature and oriented towards the natural sciences. For Hegel, our concept of nature is not exhausted in the requirements of the natural sciences. Rather, religious and artistic forms of interpretation form a part of it, as do practical ways of going about and experiencing the world. 29 Hegel’s concept of spirit, too, which anticipates many of the later Wittgenstein’s ideas, proves to be a promising alternative to the concept of mind which is prevalent in the scientistically constricted discussion today. Contemporary Philosophy of Mind remains bogged down in relationships of dependence and causal laws, which are tailored to a metaphysics of thing and property and a spatially governed idea of layers. 30 It would, however, be a misunderstanding to 27 28

29

30

On this, see the detailed analysis in Siep (1992a, pp. 195–216). Harris (1895, p. xiv and p. 390 ff), for example suffers from this error; Hegel himself, however, only speaks of »personality [Persönlichkeit]« (SL 735/GW 12, 236) in connection with the logical idea. The person is one of the spiritual manifestations of the idea and, therefore, no part of the logic. Siep (1996a, 1997b, 1999 and 2004) has shown the systematic importance of having a rich concept of nature such as Hegel’s for the development of a system of ethics that is able to confront the problems of the present. For more details, see the next ch. and also the recent attempts to dislodge this scientistic naturalism in McDowell (1994) and my critique of McDowell in Quante (2000b).

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interpret Hegel’s adoption of religious imagery as a form of covert theology, since the idea of religion can, in his view, be translated into philosophical concepts. For him, it is far more important to utilize the resources available for an understanding of nature and spirit to the greatest extent possible. Thus the absolute idea is, for him, the sole subject matter and content of philosophy. Since it contains all determinateness within it, and its essence consists in returning through its self-determination and particularization back to itself, it has various shapes, and the business of philosophy is to recognize it in these. Nature and spirit are in general different modes of exhibiting its existence, art and religion its different modes of apprehending itself and giving itself appropriate existence. Philosophy has the same content and the same purpose as art and religion, but it is the highest mode of apprehending the absolute idea, because its mode, that of the concept, is the highest. Hence it seizes those shapes of real and ideal finitude, as well of infinity and holiness, and comprehends them and itself. (SL 735/GW 12, 236)

Hegel’s general rejection of a scientistic narrowing of the concepts of nature and actuality and his correspondingly autonomous conception of philosophical justification alongside the natural scientific kind are what make this metaphysical point of departure available for him. 31 Whether this is sufficient to make his philosophical thesis of the absolute idea in the last instance plausible must remain an open question here. It remains attractive, in any case, in light of the many dilemmas that modern naturalistic philosophy has fallen into.

31

This is not to say that Hegel leaves no room for a natural-scientific conception of nature. My consideration of this issue in the previous chapter instead showed that (and why) Hegel must not dispute this possibility. In contrast to the natural scientists of his day, Hegel does however insist on a methodological distinction between natural science and the philosophy of nature (on this, see his critique of Schelling in the preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit). Furthermore, he accords different methodological and ontological resources to the philosophy of nature and to natural science respectively. Insofar as nature is the idea in its self-externality, it is philosophically adequate to conceive of it from the finite perspective of the natural sciences and the finite goals that these sciences have. Hegel does not intend, therefore, to »give wings« to »physics« in the sense of reforming natural science so that it is conducted philosophically, but rather to pay the differing perspectives of the natural sciences and the philosophy of nature both their dues. It remains for Hegel scholars to determine, in my opinion, how scientific, naturalphilosophical and general philosophical claims about nature and reality relate to one another in general. For some broad systematic background considerations regarding this issue, see Quante (2000a).

6. Layering versus Positing Accounts of the Mental

In this chapter I wish to show that Hegel’s characterization of the relationship between nature and spirit represents an attractive alternative to the paradigms which are most prominent in contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Contemporary Philosophy of Spirit, id est mainstream Analytic Philosophy of Mind today, is marked by tendencies towards naturalism, reductionism and scientism. Despite the variety of highly specialised branches within this sub-discipline of analytic philosophy, this tendency boils down to a few characteristic features of the proposed models and strategies for solving problems. These are what I refer to using the term »layering« in the title above. In opposition to this, Hegel develops a systematic, differentiated and at the same time empirically well-informed theory which resists the temptations of naturalism, reductionism or scientism. 1 This also, in my judgement, boils down to his treatment of the relationship of nature and mind, whose distinguishing feature is referred to by the term »positing«. I wish to make an attempt to sketch the main features of Hegel’s model of mind and nature, and to render it plausible as a systematically relevant alternative theory. I will proceed in two stages. In the first part I will present the defining characteristics of the »layered model« (6.1). In the second part I will develop Hegel’s reflectionlogical alternative model by way of an analysis of a central piece of text from Hegel’s Encyclopaedia (6.2). In closing, I will then briefly consider one principal objection to the attempt to build on Hegel’s metaphysics constructively (6.3).

6.1 Characteristics of the Layered Model Jaegwon Kim, one of the paradigmatic and most important representatives of contemporary Philosophy of Mind, begins an essay about the difficulties of nonreductive physicalism by juxtaposing two basic models. On the side stands the model of the classical cartesian »bifurcated« world, on the other, the model of a »layered« world. 2 The initial juxtaposition Kim chooses for his piece is typical for 1

2

The critique of concepts and models constructed scientistically is one of the central motives of Hegel’s philosophy as a whole and is one of the central features which makes it relevant and attractive. Even in the Oldest System Program of German Idealism, an alternative to the scientific way of viewing nature is broached with reference to issues in the philosophy of mind. See Kim (1993, here p. 189 f.).

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two reasons: On the one hand, the substance dualism marked as a cartesian position serves as a negative point of departure; on the other, the layered model is introduced as the only systematic alternative to the cartesian option.

6.1.1 The Negative Contrasting Foil: A Bifurcated World In Analytic Philosophy of Mind, cartesian mind-body dualism classically serves as a counterpoint, a device for demarcating one’s own position. 3 This »Cartesianism«, which is only loosely connected with the historical Descartes, reduces to the following three basic assumptions: i. There are two independent realms of entities (substances), and these are ontologically on a par. ii. Mental entities have an essence distinct from that of physical entities. iii. The content of each domain is exhausted by the set of properties which exclusively pertain to those respective entities, and each domain can be characterised independently. According to Kim, this model presents us with a bifurcated image of reality: »The world consists of two metaphysically independent spheres existing side by side.« 4 The problem for this sort of conception of the world consists in coming up with a satisfying model of the interaction of these two realms. Descartes himself was occupied by the challenge of coming up with an account of the interaction between the mental and the physical realms that would be plausible given his own commitments. In his own time, this difficulty led to proposed solutions in the form of causal interaction models and Leibnitzean parallelism theses. Besides the charge that substance dualism is ontologically extravagant, it is first and foremost these problems with developing a satisfying conception of mental causation that are consistently brought forward as the central objections to the »cartesian« model.

6.1.2 »The« Alternative: Ontological Strata The second feature of Kim’s opening that is characteristic of contemporary Philosophy of Mind is that he contrasts this bifurcated image of the world with exactly one alternative. This model of a stratified or layered world can also be characterised by three assumptions: 3

4

Cf. Kim (1993, p. 188). Usually, no attempt is made to draw this model into contact with the theory of its namesake in a historically adequate manner at all, and when they are undertaken, such attempts generally remain unsatisfying. For the purposes of my argument, this will present no further problems, since a historically adequate interpretation of Descartes is not my concern here. My interest is rather in a purely systematic point. Cf. Kim (1993, p. 189).

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i. The world consists of a set of layers. Each layer is characterised by the specific entities and properties which belong to it. ii. There is an ontologically basic layer (generally taken to be the structure of reality described by physics). iii. The remaining layers of the world form a hierarchical structure with internal relations of dependence, in which the respectively more complex layers depend on the more basic ones. In the layered model, too, the question of the relation between the individual layers is of central importance. Just like in »cartesian« substance dualism, there is a fundamental problem concerning the possibility of bidirectional causal interaction, as well as the possibility of the higher levels having a causal effect on the lower ones. In this respect, as the discussion in the last decade has shown, the layered model fares a great deal better than substance-dualist positions. 5 In the context of the mind-body problem, the connection between the physical layer, which, depending on the theory, may include chemical and biological entities and properties, and the mental layer is of particular interest. The latter can be further divided into the layers of individual psychological entities, social phenomena and aesthetic, ethical or religious aspects of reality. But even leaving aside this differentiation, which can be found even in the works of earlier emergence theorists such as Samuel Alexander or Charles D. Broad, the principal problem lies in the transition from the physical to the mental. 6 Jaegwon Kim would surely agree that this layered model is »dominant« in Analytic Philosophy of Mind. 7 If one sets aside eliminative physicalism, which disputes the existence of mental entities and properties, the remaining theories on offer can be divided between reductive and non-reductive forms of physicalism. All such theories, however, including emergentism, anomalous monism, the various forms of functionalism at play in cognitive science and the diverse research programs pursued within neuroscience, adhere to the basic model of a layered world. 8

6.1.3 General Features of Substance Dualist Models and Layered Models I do not want to consider the variety among layered models any further here. Instead, I would like to point out four traits which are characteristic of both the bifurcated model and the layered models: 5 6

7 8

On this, cf. Quante (1993b) and the literature cited there. On this, see Alexander (1920) and Broad (1925); a helpful portrayal of theories of emergence from their origin in John Stuart Mill until the present can be found in Stephan (1999). Cf. Kim (1993, p. 190). For an overview of the literature, see Quante (1998a and 1989b).

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i. First, these models take nature to be restricted to the natural sciences. This is what we might call the implicit or explicit scientism of contemporary Philosophy of Mind. 9 ii. Secondly, as a result of their scientism, both models take a de-anthropomorphized epistemic perspective, the kind which Thomas Nagel has described as a »view from nowhere«. 10 We can also describe this, following John McDowell, as a »sideways-on picture« of the relationship of the physical and the mental, i. e. a view in which our self-conception as agents and as subjects of mental events plays no role. 11 iii. This scientistic orientation and the epistemological stance which accompanies it shows up once again when quantitative models and spacial metaphors are thirdly used to characterize the relationship of the physical and the mental. We read of »the space of laws«, »the space of reasons«, »layers« and functions of substances and their properties. 12 iv. Fourthly, all of these models assume some degree of ontological independence between mental and the physical. This is true of both the bifurcated and the layered models. The cartesian takes the mental and the physical each to be fully determinate, independently of one another. For the proponent of the layered model, this only holds in one direction: The realm of the physical is determined entirely independently from that of the mental, but the mental is dependent on and constrained by the physical. 13 On the face of it, it is incredible to find that, despite all the conceptual precision and concern with detail in contemporary Philosophy of Mind, the two fundamental concepts of the mental and the physical tend to remain unanalyzed. Kim’s paper is a good example; he tells us that »nothing in the discussion to follow will depend on precise general definitions of ›physical‹ and ›mental‹.« 14 Working through the scholasticism of contemporary Analytic Philosophy of Mind, one gets

9

10 11 12

13

14

At any rate, I will use the concept of scientism in this broad sense in what follows. On the narrowing of the concept of nature to the conception associated with natural science and the problems which result from this, see McDowell (1994 and 1998b) and Quante (2000b). As in the title of Nagel (1986). On this, cf. McDowell (1994, p. 34 ff. and p. 82 f.). Even John McDowell, who attempts to rid himself of scientism, still frequently employs spatial metaphors reminiscent of the layered model in his own presentation of the relationship of mind and world. On the difficulties which arise from this, see Quante (2000b). This goes to show just how easy it is to slip into spatial metaphors to characterize the relationship of mind and nature. The model of a one-sided dependence of the mental on the physical is expressed today first and foremost in the prominent idea of a supervenience relation. The asymmetry which this relation is claimed to have is supposed to give expression to an underlying physicalism. At the same time, this gives rise to all of the difficulties of mental causation which the layered model shares with substance dualism; on this, cf. Quante (1993b). Kim (1993, p. 193).

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the impression that, leaving aside whatever advantages the models discussed may have for empirical disciplines such as brain research, neuroscience or the cognitive sciences, the discussion has long since come to a philosophical standstill. All of the options for the layered model seem to have been exhausted, and ultimately remain philosophically unsatisfying. The reason for this, I argue, is the following: The answers given by Philosophy of Mind are not able to capture the pre-philosophical conception we have of ourselves in the lifeworld as a unity of body and soul. There is, therefore, ample reason to take Hegel’s complaints about the psychology of his day to apply also to the present: Psychology, like logic, is one of those sciences which in recent times have still derived least profit from the more general cultivation of the mind and the deeper concept of reason. It is still in an extremely poor condition. (E § 444) 15

The main reason for this, according to Hegel, was the application of faulty models, the assumption of the »conventional intellectual metaphysics [Verstandesmetaphysik] of forces, various activities, etc.,« for which reason Hegel himself took the view that Aristotle’s treatise on the soul was »the sole [. . . ] work of speculative interest on this topic« (E § 378). Rather than looking back to Aristotle, I will show in the second part of what follows that Hegel offers an alternative to the models of the relationship of physical and mental sketched in the first section.

6.2 The Characteristics of the Model of Logical Reflection Before I go into the main textual passages which support what I want to argue for, I would like to point out the reasons why I think Hegel offers an attractive alternative to the contemporary models of Analytic Philosophy of Mind. For the purposes of this chapter, I will simplify things by equating the opposition between »the physical and the mental« in Analytic Philosophy of Mind with Hegel’s opposition between »nature and spirit [Geist]« and attend exclusively to the differences between the relata of this pair of concepts, leaving aside the complex philosophical analysis of the structure of nature and spirit themselves that we find in Hegel.

15

See also his remark: »it is all the more necessary for me to contribute in this way to what I hope will be a more thorough cognition of the nature of spirit, because [. . . ] it is hard to imagine that any philosophical science can be in so bad and neglected a condition as that doctrine of spirit which is usually called ›psychology‹.« (PR § 4 R)

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6.2.1 Three Attractive Features of the Hegelian Alternative Hegel’s philosophy promises an attractive alternative to the contemporary paradigm of the Philosophy of Mind in three respects: (i) Hegel’s anti-scientism It goes without saying that Hegel was no friend of scientism. Nevertheless, he was deeply engaged with the science of his day and offered it the respect one would expect from a well-informed person of his time. As the records of his lectures on Philosophy of Nature and Spirit testify, Hegel was constantly striving to integrate the latest discoveries of all of the relevant disciplines into his philosophical treatment of nature and spirit. Nevertheless, Hegel makes two philosophical claims which render his system incompatible with scientism (but not with science): First, he insists that it is possible, and indeed necessary, to undertake an independent investigation and observation of nature and spirit alongside the scientific one. Second, he assumes that this independence will require philosophy to depart from the basic ontological models, concepts and explanatory strategies of the natural sciences. (ii) Hegel’s »idea-logical« monism As a result of philosophy’s independent way of observing nature and spirit, we find in Hegel, secondly, a conception of the relationship of nature and spirit which can be subsumed neither under the layered model nor under the model of substancedualism. According to Hegel, nature and spirit are determinations of reflection. This means that we only come to an adequate grasp of the content of each concept if we think of them as moments of a relation, that is, as the relata of the relationship of nature and spirit. And given that the difference between concept and object is not an absolute one in the context of Hegel’s absolute idealism, this also means that the phenomena of nature and spirit are not ontologically independent, but rather need to be understood as moments of an internal movement of differentiation. 16 The distinction between nature and spirit is, therefore, not only the epistemic product of reason as a theoretical observer, but rather also an internal ontological differentiation of the idea – or, as Hegel might have said, der Sache selbst. (iii) Hegel’s epistemological pluralism Hegel’s reflection-logical approach not only challenges the supposed ontological independence of the two domains. Owing to its reflection-logical structure, his model is bound to the hermeneutical participant perspective, and not to the »sidewayson« picture of observing reason. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel does allow the latter as an adequate epistemic orientation for the natural sciences, but he 16

On this, see the »Preliminary conception« in the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (E §§ 19–27) and my analysis in ch. 2, as well as Halbig (2002) and Siep et al. (2001).

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simultaneously indicates that observing reason is inadequate as a philosophical epistemology, especially as regards mental phenomena. This basic epistemological move is attractive not only because Hegel thereby makes contact with our everyday pre-theoretical understanding and self-conception, which takes place primarily in the mode of the understanding. In my view, this aspect of his theory of spirit is most promising because it need not bottom out in projectivism or cultural relativism. This is because the foundation of Hegel’s system is not made up of empirical psychological categories, but rather, anticipating Frege or Husserl, basic determinations of pure thought. 17 On the other hand, Hegel avoids the danger of abstract apriorism thanks to his absolute idealism. On this view, both empirical reality and mental phenomena feature among these basic categories, the latter in the form of historical developments. This implies that the sort of cultural experiences we have when, for example, we interact with nature or attempt to draw a boundary between the two domains in various disciplines, belong themselves to the content of the categories of »nature« and »spirit«. 18

6.2.2 Hegel’s Reflection-Logical Alternative Fully developing these attractive aspects would require demonstrating the strength of Hegel’s system as a whole, a task which cannot be accomplished in this book. Following on from the detailed analysis of Hegel’s concepts of nature and spirit offered in the previous chapter, I will, for the purposes of this chapter, instead focus on some of Hegel’s basic moves. Recall what was there our focal paragraph of the Encyclopedia: For us spirit has nature as its presupposition, though spirit is the truth of nature, and is thus absolutely primary with respect to it. In this truth nature has vanished, and spirit has emerged as the idea that has reached its being-for-self. The object of the idea as well as the subject is the concept. This identity is absolute negativity, since in nature the concept has its complete, external objectivity, but this externalization [Entäußerung] of the concept has been sublated and the concept has, in this externalization, become identical with itself. And so the concept is this identity only so far as it is at the same time a return from nature. (E § 381)

17

18

On this, see in turn the »Preliminary conception« in the Encyclopedia, as well as Hegel’s frequently rehearsed critique of Fries’s idea of basing logic on anthropology. In my opinion, these aspects of Hegel’s conception of the significance of categories are best understood as a use-theory of meaning according to which the use of these categories in our practices of arguing, knowing and acting is constitutive of their meaning. On resolving the tension between the a priori and the historical in Hegel’s system, see Halbig (2001).

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I analyzed this passage in detail in the previous chapter. The object of my exposition here will only be to lay out those features which make Hegel’s »concept of spirit« attractive for the present discussion. It is clear that Hegel is relying on a philosophical concept of nature rather than a scientistic one. This is clear, on the one hand, from the fact that he calls spirit the truth of nature and hence, in a sense that will be made precise, he challenges the claim that nature is fully independent of spirit. The last sentence, however, also disputes the thesis that spirit is independent of nature, which even an idealist might still hold. The complete content of spirit can be described philosophically only as a »return from nature«. This is incompatible with the independence of either of the two domains. In accordance with this, when Hegel writes about the concept of spirit in the Fragments on the Philosophy of Spirit from 1882, tells us that it will »become evident from the subject matter itself, that and how nature and spirit relate to one another through themselves« 19 Hegel’s non-scientistic concept of nature is also expressed in his interpretation of nature as a mode of the idea. Hence the concept is said to have its »complete external objectivity« in nature, and at the beginning of the Encyclopedia, the Philosophy of Nature is described as the »science of the idea in its otherness [Wissenschaft der Idee in ihrem Anderssein]«, thereby implicitly describing nature as the »idea in its otherness« (E § 18). This makes it clear that Hegel is working with a categorically independent and non-scientistic philosophy of nature. But what about the reflection-logical structure we have now mentioned a number of times, which Hegel ascribes to his conception of the relationship of nature and spirit? It is the first two of the five sentences from the Encyclopedia cited above that talk about this reflection-logical relationship. The following three sentences of § 381 then explain what Hegel means by saying that spirit is the »truth« of nature and »absolutely primary« with respect to it. This first sentence of § 381 is not only complicated, it is also in a certain respect very surprising for a reader of Hegel. The expression »for us« occurs in a very prominent place in it, yet this expression is normally assumed to have no place within the conceptual development of the Encyclopedia system. 20 On the basis of the interpretation developed in the previous chapter, I suggest that »for us« refers to the reader’s self-conception, and more generally, the self-

19

20

»[sich] an ihm selbst zeigen, daß und wie Natur und Geist sich durch sich selbst aufeinander beziehen« (GW 15, 218). In contrast to my interpretation, Perpezak’s analysis of »for us«, which is oriented towards the first edition of the Encyclopedia, flatly asserts without argument that Hegel is referring to the readers who have up until this point followed Hegel’s conceptual development (his »progressive reconstruction«, as Peperzak (2001, p. 123) calls it). He thereby ignores the difficulties with understanding this reference to be a genuine constituent of Hegel’s train of thought or the development of the concept.

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conception of any empirical subject that finds itself in the condition of having a body and a soul. If one considers the first sentence (»For us spirit has nature as its presupposition, though spirit is the truth of nature, and is thus absolutely primary with respect to it.«) more closely, then one can draw a structural distinction between three levels: (E1) Between spirit and nature there is the reflection-logical relation of »presupposition«. (E2) This relation pertains between nature and spirit because it is an object of experience »for us«. (E3) From a philosophical point of view, the relation between spirit and nature is to be characterized in such a way that spirit is the truth of nature and absolutely primary with respect to it.

6.2.3 Three Questions On the basis of this distinction between levels, three interpretative questions arise: (Question 1) What is meant by the relation of »presupposition«? (Question 2) What is meant by »truth« and »absolutely primary«? (Question 3) How can the relation of presupposition belong constitutively to the relation between nature and spirit if it has its place merely in our perspective (»for us«)? Addressing these three questions will indicate the complexity and the richness of Hegel’s conception of the relationship of nature and mind (or »spirit«). (i) Question 1 Hegel explicates what he is here calling »presupposition« in the »External Reflection« section of his Science of Logic. This form of reflection, which is itself an unavoidable moment of the entire essence-logical structure, has, as he puts it there, »an immediate presupposition« and »presupposes a being«; it »therefore finds this presupposition before it as something from which it starts« (SL 349/GW 11, 253). If nature is given for us finite subjects as a presupposition, then this refers to nothing other than the fact that we as finite subjects cannot explain our mindedness, either ontologically or epistemically, except by presupposing a nature independent of spirit. The same figure of thought, by means of which Hegel attempts to philosophically analyze our everyday awareness of reality, is to be found in in the analysis of the will that he gives in the Introduction to his Philosophy of Right. There, the argument is that a will can only be thought of as the consciousness of acting: The further determination of particularization (see § 6 above) constitutes the difference between the forms of the will: (a) in so far as determinacy is the

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formal [formelle] opposition between the subjective on the one hand and the objective as external immediate existence [Existenz] on the other, this is the formal [formale] will as self-consciousness, which finds an external world outside itself. As individuality [Einzelheit] returning in determinacy into itself, it is the process of translating the subjective end into objectivity through the mediation of activity and a[n external] means (PR § 8). 21

Consciousness of action presupposes the existence of a subject-independent reality in which goals can and must be realized in action. For Hegel, consciousness of reality, therefore, follows necessarily from the concept of subjectivity. Since his system, however, analyses not only the content of the beliefs of empirical subjects, but also at the same time the basic categorical structure of reality itself, subjectivity also necessarily entails the existence of nature, whose otherness Hegel identifies with spatio-temporal and causal structure, in contradistinction to the idea. Hegel’s idealistic premises thereby also integrate those aspects of reality which are presupposed and grasped from the standpoint of empirical subjects and observing reason, and thus also by the natural sciences. This realism receives its complete justification only in the context of these two stances toward the world, even though it is demoted to a moment of the development of the idea from the standpoint of speculative philosophy. (ii) Question 2 In § 381 of the Encyclopedia, spirit appears in two different capacities. It occurs in the logic in an embryonic form – »in itself« – before it proceeds through nature and finally returns to itself, and in thus reappropriating itself, it sublates itself to the level of »for itself«, that is, it achieves a concept adequate to itself. Hegel undergirds his Philosophy of Nature with a teleological structure that is motivated philosophically by his doctrine of the idea, the latter being an attempt to order and analyse natural phenomena in such a way that their conceptual structure becomes recognizable as the development of the basic categories of subjectivity. This is entirely compatible with the modern theory of evolution, but it represents a strictly distinct program of explanation. In contrast to proponents of contemporary Philosophy of Mind, Hegel does not take the task of a Philosophy of Nature and a Philosophy of Spirit to consist in supplying causal explanations or some surrogate thereof. Nature is therefore, on the one hand, a result of the development of the idea, that is, of spirit as it exists in itself, so that it can be viewed as what is prior to nature (hence »absolutely primary«). On the other hand, in its mode of existence for itself (that is, as empirical subjects in social phenomena and cultural achievements),

21

For an analysis of these passages and of Hegel’s concept of action in the Philosophy of Right, see Quante (1993a).

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spirit is the end which nature itself is directed towards. Spirit is the truth of nature, which nature can only achieve by passing over into spirit. On this level of the development of the logic of the idea, the reflection-logical structure of positing and presupposing seems prima facie to play no role. Yet this appearance is misleading, as the answer to the third question shows. (iii) Question 3 If we ask why the self-understanding (indicated by »for us«) of empirical subjects, social communities and cultural conglomerations belongs to the topic of the Philosophy of Spirit, Hegel’s answer would be that it belongs to the concept of spirit that its essence, or its »in-itself«, is simultaneously »for it«. In other words: Spirit’s self-conception as well as its development within history is a constitutive part of its essence. This is what Hegel is getting at when, interpreting the identity of spirit as »absolute negativity« and internal self-determination, he says that spirit can only have this identity as a »return from nature«. Hegel’s suggestion is hence the following: The essence of mental properties cannot be settled independently of the pre-theoretical (self-)conceptions of knowing subjects displaying such properties. The reflection-logical relation of positing and presupposing, in which nature functions simultaneously as a basis and a counterpoint is, therefore, integral to understanding the mental. This is because we as empirical subjects can only make the mental intelligible to ourselves as a limit of nature and because the mental and cultural properties characteristic of humans only come into existence via a process of differentiation and appropriation (what Hegel calls maturation, or Bildung). In this process, nature is not eliminated but rather – as § 381 of the Encyclopedia tells us – »sublated«.

6.3 Indefensible Metaphysics? In his final view, Hegel, therefore, restricts the reflection-logical structure of the relationship between nature and spirit to the perspective of »us« empirical subjects. At the same time, however, the overall composition of his system, that is, the structure of his Doctrine of the Idea, shows that this dimension forms an essential component of spirit. In contrast to the bifurcated or layered models, this Hegelian model is, therefore, intended to capture our pre-theoretical self-conception. It does this in, if you will, an ontologically objective hermeneutic movement. In this way, Hegel is able to account for the essentially social and cultural aspects of mind and escape the tacit (or open) positivism of contemporary philosophy. At this point, it would be easy to make the objection that this attractive move relies on an indefensible metaphysical foundation, namely Hegel’s Doctrine of the Idea. But this, the objection goes, is nothing but theology cast into philosophical

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pseudocategories that Hegel applies, perhaps ingeniously, to a completely unrelated problem. This objection must be taken seriously, but I do not think that it is ultimately convincing. On the one hand, it is not sustainable, because Hegel’s philosophy requires the central conceptual elements and ideas of religion to brought under the Concept. More centrally, however, there is no room in Hegel’s system for a method which one could justify independently of the problems to which it is eventually to be applied. One consequence of this is the following: The content of the doctrine of the idea is itself nothing other than that capacity which is developed in the exercise of structuring philosophical problems. The only justification which this core of Hegel’s philosophy is able to receive is precisely the confirmation from its power to solve philosophical problems. A justification independent of this capability is surely nowhere to be found; it is, however, neither possible nor necessary. The power of Hegel’s systematic architectonic to solve philosophical problems does, however, seem to me to be considerable (see ch. 2). The question as to how the brain produces the mind is – if it has any sense at all – at least not a question which requires a philosophical answer. Things stand differently in the case of the following question: How can it be that one and the same being understands itself, on the one hand, as a subject of body and soul, and, on the other, as an object of the natural sciences? And how can it be that such a subject thereby experiences what is most essential to what it is? Hegel’s reflection-logical model seems to me to be a promising paradigm for getting this question into view. In the context of his model, it might be possible to lead the Philosophy of Mind away from the dumbfounded mimicry of scientific explanation that gets called functionalism or neurophilosophy.

7. Self-Consciousness and Individuation In order to understand Hegel’s use of the term »personality«, one has to analyze his logical category of the »in-and-for-itself free will«. 1 Hegel elaborates this category in his introduction to the Philosophy of Right using the logical categories of universality, particularity and individuality, categories which apply to the will on the basis of its conceptual nature. The category of »personality« also arises at a prominent point in the Science of Logic (SL 514/GW 12, 17): Hegel’s example of the »concept, when it has progressed to [. . . ] existenceD« 2 is the »I or pure self-consciousness« (ibid.). As will be shown below, Hegel’s choice of example bears on his use of »personality« in the Philosophy of Right. To characterize Hegel’s theory of personality, then, we need also to take into account the stage of the will’s logical development at the beginning of Abstract Right. This will allow us to better understand the relationship of »personality« and »person«. In this way it will be possible to show that Hegel offers a powerful model of selfconsciousness and the consciousness of freedom via his category of personality. At the same time, a systematic difficulty will become apparent: What is the principium individuationes in Hegel’s theory of self-consciousness? 3 In what follows I will attempt to make some headway on this problem. To this end, I will begin with some general remarks about the categories of »universality«, »particularity« and »individuality« (7.1). Next, I will explicate the above mentioned example of the pure concept that has progressed to existenceD (7.2). After this, I will interpret Hegel’s characterization of the will as he develops it in the introduction to the Philosophy of Right (7.3). Throughout this analysis I will, as Hegel suggests,

1

2

3

Since the Philosophy of Right, belonging to the sphere of objective spirit, is concerned with the in-and-for-itself free will throughout, I will omit this qualification in what follows. The Philosophy of Right, however, contains a second ordering of the characterizations »in itself«, »for itself« and »in-and-for-itself« by means of which Hegel depicts the development of the in-and-for-itself free will. According to this ordering, the exact logical category of the will at the beginning of Abstract Right is the in itself in-and-for-itself free will. My use of the characterizations »in itself«, »for itself« and »in-and-for-itself« always refers to this second ordering; see Quante (1993a, p. 21 ff.) for a more detailed discussion of this point. Translator’s note: In this chapter, »existenceD« is used for »Dasein«, and »existenceE« for »Existenz«. For further discussion of the meaning of these terms, see the notes in the glossary. Since self-consciousness is the principle of Hegel’s system (cf. Halbig / Quante 2000), this question addresses a central problem in Hegelian philosophy. Associated with it are the difficulties with the transition from the Logic to the Philosophy of Nature, and also the tension running through Hegel’s system between a conception of self-consciousness to be found inside the system, which is externalist in both senses of the term, and a method of depiction at the level of the system, which is indebted to an internalistic conception of self-consciousness (total transparency, reflectively secured completeness, and closure).

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be aided by »consulting the self-consciousness of any individual« (PR § 4). Furthermore, I will place Hegel’s terminology into contact with another philosophical idiom, namely that of Analytic Philosophy of Mind. In the final, concluding section (7.4) I will sketch the relationship between »personality« and the stage of development of the will at the beginning of Abstract Right, which Hegel demarcates with the attributes of »abstract concept« and »immediacy« (PR § 34). In the introduction to the Philosophy of Right, Hegel makes use of two expository perspectives in his characterization of the will. From the external perspective, he assumes that the will, in just the same way as the pure self-consciousness of transcendental apperception, has the structure of a concept. At this level the determinations of the pure concept as such are employed, these being »universality«, »particularity«, and »individuality«. From within this perspective one is not to conceive of the will as an individual entity, rather one has to understand it as a universal whose attributes are to be specified by the philosopher. This universal (das Allgemeine in Hegel’s terminology) individuates itself on the basis of a logical process of self-determination: »By resolving, the will posits itself as the will of a specific individual« (PR § 13). This process underlies the rules of the self-determination of the concept developed in the Science of Logic. The first two sections of the following analysis will be restricted to this perspective and thus – even in Hegel’s sense – will be abstract. From the internal perspective Hegel proceeds from the individuated will of a particular individual, from that individual’s self-consciousness and consciousness of freedom. The last two sections, which aim to analyze Hegel’s characterization of the will, take up this perspective and also place his philosophical reconstruction or revision of the internal perspective into contact with other philosophical models.

7.1 Universality, Particularity, Individuality Hegel claims that his Science of Logic depicts »categories, logical forms, determinations of reflection and basic concepts of science as a system of implications of meanings,« 4 one which gives itself content and generates itself by means of the categories of identity and difference. 5 This holistic network of categories of thought, each of whose content is fixed by its place in the entire framework of meanings, generates itself according to an increasingly complex algorithm which, nevertheless, rests on an unchanging structure. 6 This underlying structure, which is at once self-generation and self-determination, Hegel calls »subjectivity« and also »the 4 5 6

Siep (1992a, p. 109). My translation [J.M]. On this, see Rohs (1982). On this see Siep (1991). Here I offer three clarifications in order to avoid being misinterpreted. First, the remarks above are not meant to imply that Hegel’s philosophical argumentation can

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pure concept«. 7 In the third part of his Science of Logic, which contains the actual Doctrine of the Concept, Hegel identifies the concept with Kant’s transcendental apperception. The concept shares transcendental apperception’s moments of selfreference and synthesis, that is, generation of new determinations. In contrast to the Kantian dualism of form and content, Hegel, in agreement with Fichte and Schelling, interprets the »pure concept« as a unity of formal and contentful determinations. 8 Hence the pure concept does not synthesize, as it did for Kant, a content given to it in advance from without, but rather synthesizes the moments of its own meaning, previously analyzed in the course of self-explication. 9 The structure of subjectivity’s self-movement is thus analytic and synthetic at the same time – the explication of its own moments leads at once to the generation of new, materially richer and thus in Hegel’s sense more concrete concepts and determinations. In the process, this movement of self-determination and self-explication develops over a course of stages of mediation which grow increasingly complex. The »pure concept« is thus, in Hegel’s speculative logic, a necessary and sufficient principle of development for all categories of thought and basic ontological determinations.

7 8 9

be reduced to some basic operation; on this see Henrich (1976). Second, this interpretation is not a constructive exposition of the Science of Logic in the manner suggested by e. g. StekelerWeithofer (1992); for a critique of constructive exposition see Quante (1996). According to Hegel, spirit not only creates itself in its self-development, but also at the same time comes to know itself in this process, i. e. grasps its true nature. For this reason the interpretation which Pippin (1999, p. 203) correctly proposes does not require a constructive reading. Furthermore, the complete development of the determinations of spirit in time and history also belong to these categories. A historical and in this sense constructive interpretation thus does not go far enough in any case. The determinations of spirit do not change in time; according to Hegel, temporal development is rather one of these determinations. Finally, Hegel emphasizes (E §§ 19 ff.) that determinations of thought are objective and apply to objects themselves. The explication of determinations of thought is thus always also to be grasped as a development of objects themselves. A constructivism which presupposes a dualism of scheme and content and thereby thinks of the realm of objects as constituted through the scheme chosen is thus incompatible with Hegel’s view (see ch. 2). Thirdly, Hegel recognizes three forms of holism that are related in complex ways and need to be distinguished. The first states that a philosophical claim or a determination of thought can only be shown to be true on the basis of its place in the entire system. Ontological holism states that individual entities can only be individuated in relation to all other entities. Owing to Hegel’s thesis that determinations of thought are both subjective and objective, i. e. because they sublate scheme-content dualism, holism of justification and ontological holism coincide for him. And since, as already mentioned, the development or unfolding of a determination of thought is for Hegel always to be understood as an explication of itself, he also sublates the analytic-synthetic distinction. He succeeds in doing so only because his conceptual-realist ontology is essentialistically and teleologically conceived (on this, see ch. 2 and 3). On this, see Düsing (1984) and Horstmann (1990). On this, see Halbig / Quante (2000). See Siep (1992a, p. 109).

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In this process, »universality«, »particularity« and »individuality« form three methodological and material determinations of this pure concept, by means of which Hegel makes good on his claim to formally and materially explicate and generate all of the categories. Following Kant, Hegel thinks of the pure concept as universality, a rule for the connection of the manifold in the constitution of objects, which is as such conceptual in nature. Furthermore, Hegel interprets selfexplication and self-determination as »self-consciousness« in the sense of the »I think« of Kantian transcendental apperception (see SL 515/GW 12, 18). As a universal, this self-consciousness of the pure concept is totality (that is, the unity in a manifold of which it is at the same time its organizing principle) and thus sets itself in opposition to »particularizations« (that is, specific categories and concepts). A universal in this sense is a generality that itself develops the principles of its material determinations. Hegel’s justification for this thesis of the self-explication and self-determination of the universal is the following: The universal must, in order to determine itself, posit its own negation (that is, its particularities), from which it in turn differentiates itself in its self-determination. In its capacity as a self-negating principle generating new meanings from itself, the pure concept is thought of as particularity. Hegel claims that, through the generation of its own negation qua particularity, this movement of self-determination of the concept qua universality (»negativity« in Hegel’s sense) constitutes the self-conscious, self-generated character of the pure concept, knowing itself as general principle in a manifold of meanings. Since this movement of negation counts as the concept’s own nature, the mutually exclusive determinations of »universality« and »particularity« are equally determinations of the concept. The negativity contained in this process of self-determination, which at the same time represents a process of self-negation, must, according to Hegel’s speculative logic, be negated in its negativity. 10 The sublation of the opposites of universality and particularity consists in the pure concept being thought as a unity of universality and particularity. If one thinks of it under this aspect, one grasps it under the category of »individuality«. This is not a third category beside those of universality and particularity, but rather the speculatively interpreted unity of the productive activity of the pure concept, which knows and preserves itself as a universality in 10

The relationship of the self-determining substance and individual determinations as a result of the first negation (self-determination as determinatio) represents, for Hegel, a contradiction between infinite substance and finite determination. The negativity of this contradiction is, in a second step, negated thought substance itself. As a process this second negation of the first negation is the sublation of the contradiction between substance and attribute, a movement in which the self-determination of substance is differentiated and becomes to a greater extent »true«. In this negation of the negation, substance consequently turns out to be a unity of selfdetermining negation and negation of the negativity of the contradiction between substance and attribute which resides in it.

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its other, that is, in the particularity of its particularization. Hegel’s category of »individuality«, therefore, refers to the following: The immanent self-determination of subjectivity, which sublates self-imposed limits in a self-determining way and organizes itself into a unity. The concept qua individuality is the subject which, in a self-posited manifold of particularities, manifests itself as a concrete universality (that is, as a materially and formally autonomous generality). In general, Hegel understands subjectivity as individualization and the involvement of a universal in an individual. In the following I will attempt to render Hegel’s theory of the pure concept plausible by providing an analysis of the Hegelian conception of the will. Before I turn to this, I will discuss a passage from Hegel’s Logic of the Concept in the second section, which Hegel characterizes as an illustration of the structure he takes the pure concept to possess.

7.2 The I as a Concept that has come into ExistenceD In the Science of Logic, the following passage occurs in the context of Hegel’s treatment of the pure concept: 11 The concept, when it has progressed to a existenceE [1] which is itself free, is none other than the »I« [2] or pure self-consciousness. True, I [3] have concepts, that is, determinate concepts; but the »I« is the pure concept itself, the concept that has come into existenceD [4]. It is fair to suppose, therefore, when we think of the fundamental determinations which constitute the nature of the »I,« that we are referring to something familiar, that is, a commonplace of ordinary thinking. But the »I« is in the first place purely self-referring unity [5], and is this not immediately but by abstracting from all determinateness and content [6] and withdrawing into the freedom of unrestricted equality with itself [7]. As such it is universality, a unity that is unity with itself only by virtue of its negative relating, which appears as abstraction, and because of it contains all determinateness within itself as dissolved [8]. In the second place, the »I« is just as immediately self-referring negativity, individuality, absolute determinateness that stands opposed to anything other and excludes it – individual personality [9]. This absolute universality which is just as immediately absolute individualization – a being-in-and-for-itself which is absolute positedness and being-in-and-for-itself only by virtue of its unity with the positedness – this universality constitutes the nature of the »I« and of the concept; neither the one nor the other can be comprehended unless these two just given moments are grasped at the same time, both in their abstraction and in their perfect unity [10]. (SL 514/GW 12, 17)

11

The brackets and the boldfacing of »I« are added by me. The references in [ ] below refer to the corresponding parts of this quotation. M. Q.

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As we know, interpreting Hegel’s logic is not easy. Here I only aim to bring out those elements that provide evidence for what I have said so far, and those which may be helpful for the subsequent discussion. (a) First it is important to distinguish two uses of »I« in this passage: On the one hand, Hegel uses »I« to refer to pure self-consciousness, the Kantian »I think« or transcendental apperception (cf. [2]). In this usage, »I« denotes a universal with specifiable attributes. In the Kantian and Fichtean tradition, this »I« is spontaneity, synthesis and fact-act (Tathandlung), but not substance in the sense of classical substanceattribute ontology, for which Hegel mainly uses the term »thing [Ding]«. When Hegel distances himself from the »commonplace of ordinary thinking« (ibid.) that interprets the relation between the I and the understanding as the relation between a thing and its property, it is this distinction that Hegel has in mind (an analogous point holds for the analysis of the will in the Philosophy of Right, see PR § 7). On the other hand, in addition to this specifically philosophical usage of the term »I«, Hegel employs it with its regular meaning (cf. [3]). By using this expression, a speaker or a thinker refers to him- or herself in a uniquely first-personal way. In this indexical usage »I« denotes a spatio-temporally individuated entity. 12 Thus, in this passage of the Science of Logic we note the same double-perspective that is to be found in Hegel’s analysis of the will in his introduction to the Philosophy of Right. (b) Second, Hegel identifies this I (in the sense of a universal) with the concept (likewise a universal) in the stage of ontological development of for-itself free existenceE (cf. [1]), that is, a stage in which the concept achieves »essential being« (GW 11, 323/MM 6, 124/SL 418) marked by an internal structure of reflection which Hegel calls »reflection-in-itself« (cf. E § 123). In this reflective manner, essence achieves the first form of self-determination. At the same time, for Hegel it is connected with the status of existenceE that essence becomes an »existent or a thing« (GW 11, 323/MM 6,124/SL 418), a property which necessarily applies to the being that has emerged from essence (cf. SL 419 f./GW 11, 324). Determined as such, essence at once makes up an »indeterminate collection of existing things«, which form »a world of mutual dependence« (E § 123). For this reason it is clear that this I-universal – and here Hegel is an Aristotelian – can only exist if it is concretely instantiated. This also fits with his further specifying that the concept has in this way »come into existenceD« (cf. [4]), where, besides referring to the determinacy of the concept as against other concepts, »existenceD« primarily denotes the instantiation or exemplification of something universal (cf. GW 11, 59/MM 5,15). (c) Third: The characterizations of pure unity Hegel goes on to offer (cf. [5]), which arise through abstraction (cf. [6]) and return to this pure unity’s limitless identity 12

On this, see Lewis (1979), Perry (1979), Castañeda (1987) or Kaplan (1989).

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with itself (cf. [7]), were considered above as the movements of self-explication and self-determination. The I has this movement as its essence. It is on the one hand a universal which negates its own negation (its determinations) and consequently thereby comes to contain all determinateness resolved within itself (cf. [8]). On the other hand, each individual I is also individuality in the sense of opposing itself to an other and excluding that other (cf. [9]). For this relation, Hegel chooses the term »individual personality«. It is important to keep in mind that he is not only talking about the universal attribute »personality« but also about »individual« personality. Therefore, individuation into a concrete existing person is already involved here. (d) Fourth: Hegel’s last observation can be read as a critique of the Fichtean theory of self-consciousness, in which pure self-consciousness is taken as an independently existing first principle (cf. also his critique in PR § 6). Against this, Hegel repeatedly emphasizes that this pure self-consciousness can only exist in a movement of abstraction from its determinacy. According to Hegel, it is just this unity of the concrete universal, its speculative determination of individuality, through which both moments of self-consciousness, viz. the universal I and individual I, can be understood as moments of one structure, as a unity (cf. [10]). We must not let it escape our notice here that Hegel is allowing an »individual« existenceE to enter into the structure of pure self-consciousness, albeit one whose individuation is derived directly from the structure of pure self-consciousness. Due to the abstract level on which the Science of Logic operates, we cannot be sure – due to the different meanings of existenceD and existenceE – whether this individuation also involves spatio-temporal existenceE. In contrast to the analysis of the will in the introduction to the Philosophy of Right, the argumentation of the Logic exhibits a certain degree of unclarity. The category of »particularity« is only mentioned in passing, in the movement of repulsion of the universal from all determinacy in the absolute determinacy of the individual personality. In the Philosophy of Right, on the other hand, the positive function of »particularity« in the structure of the will as a whole is also elaborated (cf. PR § 6). This difference between the two analyses presumably owes to the fact that Hegel is attempting, in the Science of Logic, to depict pure self-consciousness and the pure concept in terms of their speculative unity, so that universality is immediately understood as self-negation of self-negation and thus over-emphasized at the expense of particularity. This discrepancy may, however, also bear witness to a difference between theoretical and practical intentionality lurking beneath the surface of the Hegelian structure of self-consciousness, but this is a conjecture that cannot be explored here. 13 13

It is wise to separate two critical theses at this point. First, one can mount the objection against Hegel’s entire system that the idea of the pure concept only makes sense as a model

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7.3 The Logical Category of the in-and-for-itself Free Will Paragraphs §§ 5–7 of the Philosophy of Right contain Hegel’s interpretation of the conceptual structure of the will. Here it becomes evident that Hegel is arguing at the level of the structure of the will, but at the same time draws into the analysis the »appearances« of this structure in the individual will, and so in a willing subject. 14 In this way the moments of the will presented in §§ 5–6 are introduced by way of the »individuality« described in § 7, an individuality which – in analogy to the passage about pure self-consciousness – is also designated as a (true or concrete) »universality [Allgemeinheit]« and as »subjectivity [Subjektivität]« (cf. Hegel’s handwritten notes on this paragraph). Hegel is guarding against two faulty conceptions in this analysis: First, thinking and willing should not be thought of as two separate forms of intentionality; willing is rather a further logical determination of pure self-consciousness. Second, one should not think of the will as a capacity possessed by the I. This corresponds to the argumentation introduced in the Science of Logic. It is rather that, as Hegel expressly notes in § 7, the will is nothing other than the movement of the moments of the concept given in §§ 5–7. The will exists only in the willing of a subject that is free »for itself«, that is, one which has consciousness of freedom –, however, this is to be further specified. At the same time, the I is posited as a universal in each act of will, where this universality is that of »absolute abstraction« or the »pure thinking of itself« (PR § 5). In the following paragraph (§ 6), Hegel introduces the »particularization of the I« as an equally primordial moment. Whereas the first moment of abstract universality refers to pure self-consciousness, the second moment concerns individuation into a singular, materially determined I, where this determination is formally derived from the structure of the will. Hegel deduces the necessity of determinacy as such from the fact that this second moment is only the abstractness of the first moment negated. This argument evidently only goes through if one interprets both determinations as moments from the outset, that is, as relata of the unity of the will introduced in § 7.

14

of intentionality and cannot be generalized to a complete ontological model. Secondly, one can take Hegel’s conception of the »pure concept« to be a productive model of intentionality, unsurpassed by any philosophical alternative, but ask whether it applies equally to both theoretical and practical intentionality. By »intentionality«, I mean any form of theoretical and practical reference of a subject to the world. This concerns so-called propositional attitudes, which are only possible together with self-consciousness. Under »self-consciousness« I understand propositional self-reference in the mode of the first person. Intentionality in this sense presupposes self-consciousness and propositionality and thus forms a subclass of the mental; on this see Rohs (1996). I have developed a defense of Hegel’s justification for proceeding this way in ch. 5 and 6.

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If we relate Hegel’s conclusions to the phenomenon of being conscious of free choice, which Hegel himself mentions, and to the propositional structure of the will, then his claims can be shown to be plausible. The will as a universal exists only in the individual acts of will. These have the propositional form »I will that something be the case« – or more precisely, as Hegel shows in his analysis of the concept of action: »I will that I do-F«. The »I« here expresses the self-reference contained in this propositional form; any willing is first-personal. At the same time each willing is always a propositional willing of »something«. 15 Hegel rightly classifies the self-consciousness manifesting itself in self-reference with the pronoun »I« as »pure«, »immediate« and »actuality«. This can be supported by drawing on the following resources of Analytic Philosophy of Language: This self-reference is »pure« because a subject refers to itself directly, i. e. without mediation by a Fregean sense. It is »immediate« because it cannot be understood as an identifying expression. And adopting Aristotle’s concept of energeia, Hegel calls this self-reference »actual« because the act of reference is at the same time its object: An I is nothing other than an act of referring to itself in the first-personal mode. 16 In the analysis of the self-determination of the will, i. e. where the issue is that the will gives itself a »content«, Hegel uses the consciousness of freedom of choice to clarify his point: I behave towards the different determinations of the will as possibilities (cf. PR § 6 M). This consciousness of free choice at once implies an abstraction from all content whereby the »pure I« itself becomes thematized and thus turns »into the object« of thought. At the same time, this »pure self-consciousness«, whose logical characterization allows many parallels to be drawn between Hegel and contemporary Analytic Philosophy of Language, is only to be grasped as the outcome of an abstraction. The will as such exists only in its complete structure, that is, the structure of a propositional attitude: »I will that something be the case«. As a result of free choice, the will is thus self-determined and also individualized; I will just this rather than something else. Hence Hegel also says that reason first determines itself »as infinity« in the will. If this is so, then the question arises why »individual personality« comes up at all in this context. What place does it have in the context of Hegel’s discussion of »pure self-consciousness«?

15

16

This issue regarding intentionality is exclusively one of terminology: Phenomena like love show that there are also de re attitudes that relate directly to objects. One can nevertheless ask, first, whether these are not still caught up in propositional structures, and second, whether selfconsciousness and willing in the above sense do not belong to these attitudes de re. One can desire or love a person, but not will a person. This translation of terminology is not supposed to represent an exhaustive analysis of the phenomenon Hegel is referring to, but rather merely to show that parallels are to be found between his theory and the paradigms of analytic philosophy, and that these might be able to shed light on one another; on this, see Quante (1993a).

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Hegel makes clear in the marginal notes to § 6 that the particularization of the will is not to be understood in terms of reference to external objects, but rather as an internal accusative: The »pure I« relates to the various propositional contents as its »internal« objects. From this form of particularization, however, Hegel derives not only the individuation of the universal »will« into individual wills, but rather also the structure of consciousness implicit in willing, i. e., that a willing agent is conscious of an independent external world or, as Hegel puts it, »finds an external world outside himself« (PR § 8). The self-chosen end only has the formal structure of individuality, it is not yet executed, but rather must, via a corresponding action, first be translated »into objectivity«. 17 In contrast to the derivation of »pure self-consciousness« from the »I think«, the structure of willing gives rise to two more particular features. On the one hand, it is in willing that reason becomes for the first time »finite« (PR § 13). On the other hand, reason first becomes aware of the limits of its own activity in the mode of willing. The former could mean that, at the level of theoretical reason, there cannot yet be any individual departure from the pure I among singular instances of its individuation: Qua theoretical reason, all self-conscious beings are identical, even if, as Hegel seems to assume, they are already thoroughly individuated. The latter could explain why it is not until willing that »self-determination«, i. e. particularization in its positive content, becomes manifest, since this is an activity of an individual subject, which is given for the subject itself qua consciousness of freedom. In other words: Qua theoretical reason there is no consciousness of the spontaneity of selfconsciousness. This is achieved only in willing. So far it has turned out that the moment of »pure self-consciousness« is contained in both in the »I think« and in the will. Furthermore, we have seen that Hegel claims that even the pure »I think« is individuated (SL), but at the same time assumes that the finitude of reason is first achieved in the structure of the will (PR).

7.4 The in-and-for-itself Free Will in its Abstract Concept If one considers the will only in itself, that is, set apart from its manifestation in an objective sphere, then one considers it »abstractly«. In this abstractness it is »in contrast with reality, its own negative actuality, whose reference to itself is purely abstract – the inherently individual [in sich einzelner] will of a subject« (PR § 34). In the following paragraph (§ 35) Hegel says that universality, which applies to this

17

On this, see Quante (1993a) as well as ch. 9 and 10.

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for itself, in-and-for-itself free will, 18 lies in its self-consciousness, which means, according to the analysis above, in its first-personal self-reference. In § 34, Hegel considers further characteristics of the will. In addition to the universality characterized more precisely in § 35, it also possesses particularity and individuality. The possible »somethings«, the individual contents of acts of willing, constitute its particularity. Its individuality here consists in its deficient form of exclusion, i. e., that its content takes on the form of the »external world immediately confronting it« (PR § 34). From this it follows, on the one hand, that the universal in § 35 can only refer to self-reference with »I«, since possible material determinations are particularities. On the other hand one has to interpret the form of this material content in such a way that the content seems »external« to the individual I, as something given by nature (qua inclination or drive) or as socially determined (cf. the introduction to the Philosophy of Right, §§ 14 ff). Even in the structure of the will, the »I« is thus the sole principium individuationes. But the »I« here does not refer to original, pure self-consciousness, which was dealt with in the Science Of Logic, but is rather the result of an »absolute abstraction« (PR § 5), the result of a movement to distance itself from everything particular. The »personality« of the will is thereby not the pure self-consciousness of the »I think« but rather the »I« which has itself become object on the basis of a movement of abstraction in self-consciousness (cf. PR § 5). When Hegel talks about the will being a »person« and thus an I »as this person« (PR § 35), a complete determinate individual, this can only be understood if the »personality of the will« (PR § 35) refers to pure self-consciousness, understood as the result of an abstraction from all determinacy. The attributes on the basis of which the I first becomes individuated and materially determined are contained as a negation. 19 »Personality« is thus the moment of pure self-consciousness abstracting from all content, while the »person« is a materially determinate set of possible contents of willing, and thus a materially determined »this«. Nevertheless, two fundamental difficulties remain for this interpretation: First, on this interpretation it is difficult to understand why Hegel is able to talk about »individual personality« in the Science of Logic. On this speculative level, there is clearly no materially determinate and individual set of possible determinations of the kind that individuate a personality. In addition to this it is also not at all clear how the I can become an object for self-consciousness in pure thought. According to the analysis in the Philosophy of Right, it first achieves this in the will. Moreover,

18

19

For a detailed justification of this reading see the next chapter. Here I am concerned only with the problem of individuation. In the same way that negation is a moment of Hegel’s concept of sublation, one can maintain that negation also always already contains the moment of preservation or »recollection« (cf. SL 337/GW 11, 241) in the reflective structure of universality, particularity and individuality.

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»knowledge of the self as an object [Gegenstand]« belongs to the »personality« of the subject (PR § 35 R). But this is not attained in pure thought. Second, there is the systematic problem that the »person« itself remains only merely »abstract object«. Its »being this person« would consist only in that it has a contentful set of possible determinations of the will, which it manifests its personality by abstracting from them. This result is, however, unsatisfying in two respects. On the one hand, the assumption that spatio-temporal existenceE is a necessary component of the principium individuationes for a spatio-temporally existing being is thoroughly plausible. Setting aside difficulties with abstract objects (such as numbers), this applies to mental events and, therefore, also to self-consciousness. »I« always implies a »here« and »now« – and being a »this« likewise implies being spatio-temporally individuated. »This« is – from a purely linguistic perspective – a demonstrative and implies an act of demonstration. Different mental entities A and B can indeed be distinguished. In Hegel’s terminology, they have both existenceD and existenceE. Two occurrences of the same determination A, however, cannot be distinguished without spatio-temporal instantiation. This applies also to the contentful sets which allow a »this« to arise from personality. It is true in general that, on the level of the purely mental, there is no difference between type and token. 20 On the other hand, Hegel himself requires that the person also be a spatiotemporally determinate individual: A »this« (PR § 35), an »immediate individual [Einzelner]« (PR § 47), a »natural existenceE« (PR § 43). Hegel does not develop this spatio-temporal individuation out of the structure of pure self-consciousness. It is also not contained in personality as the »abstracting« of pure self-consciousness. The I which grasps itself as pure object distances itself only from the possible contents of the will given in its consciousness of its freedom. These are themselves, however, already mentally represented, meaning that there is no way back to spatio-temporal individuation from there. Hegel takes up the fact of spatio-temporal individuation of people in his theory of Spirit, without being able to make visible as a necessary moment the structure of subjectivity developed in the Science of Logic. Since we are, however, not aware of our natural existenceE in self-consciousness, the internal perspective of thinking and of willing is in the end not sufficient for a complete determination of individual personality. How such a complete determi20

My assumption in the formulation of this systematic problem consists of a principle of individuation which Hegel himself may not accept. As I see it, this is because Hegel does not yet, in the Science of Logic, bring into consideration the conditions of individuation which prevail in our practice (as he does in the Philosophy of Right). In his analysis of the person-body relationship, he uses the asymmetry of first-personal and inter-subjective participant perspectives in order to show the spatio-temporal individuality of human persons to be an essential element of our ascriptive practice of attributing claims in social space. But this is not something which it is open for him to do at the level of argumentation and analysis in the Logic.

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nation is to be attained from Hegel’s interplay of internal and external perspectives remains an open question. It is evident that Hegel takes himself to have formulated a solution to this problem with his dialectic of universality, particularity and individuality. 21 I am, however, yet to find a philosophically satisfying reconstruction of this solution.

21

As far as I can see, Schelling’s critique of Hegel’s »negative philosophy« ultimately stems from the point that Hegel does not achieve this; on this see Halbig / Quante (2000).

8. The Personality of the Will This chapter is principally concerned with Hegel’s categories of »personality« and »person«, both of which assume a central role in the Philosophy of Right. Hegel explicitly defines personality as the moment of freedom’s self-consciousness: »The personality of the will« (PR § 39 R) thus represents a necessary condition for »rights of every kind« (PR § 40). Rights can be ascribed »only to a person« (ibid.). Hegel distinguishes between the concept of right in the narrower sense (»abstract right«) and the broader concept of a moral or ethical right or claim. He interprets the moment of personality as the sufficient condition for ascribing rights in the abstract sense to an individual (the right to acquire property, the right to enter into a contract, or the right to appropriate punishment in the case of illegal and criminal acts). In addition, Hegel also provides an explicit analysis of self-consciousness as the consciousness of freedom in terms of a logical characterization of the moment of personality. In the tradition of Kant and Fichte, Hegel thus attempts to provide a philosophical explication of the foundations of rightful claims by reference to the concept of personality. The following remarks will interpret Hegel’s logical characterizations of the principle of »personality« and the analysis of self-conscious freedom that this entails. The philosophical aspects of right in the narrower sense, as treated in §§ 34–40, will receive only brief mention because these introductory paragraphs merely contain the »fundamental determinations« (PR § 40 M) of abstract right. The general »fruitfulness« (ibid.) of any philosophical analysis of personality can reveal itself, as Hegel himself says, only in »what is to follow« (ibid.), that is, only in the further development and exposition of the Philosophy of Right itself. Before I begin to analyze the relevant passages, I first wish to clarify the twofold role played by the categories of »personality« and »person«. These two categories have a twofold function in the Philosophy of Right. In the first instance they can be said to represent the universal principle of Hegel’s entire philosophy of right in the sense that »personality« is the necessary condition of all legitimate rights and claims. The conceptual development of the argument in the Philosophy of Right can thus be understood precisely as the unfolding of the concept of personality, beginning with the concept of the person that characterizes Abstract Right and culminating in the role of the monarch in the context of Ethical Life (PR § 279). What drives this development is Hegel’s teleological analysis of the forms of the will, which is the organizing principle of the Philosophy of Right as a whole. This teleological analysis depends for its part on the results of Hegel’s speculative logic that must in turn be regarded as the ultimate source of justification for the progressive conceptual and systematic explication of the various forms of right and the legitimate claims associated with them. But in addition to the resources which

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Hegel’s system itself provides for justifying this idea, we must also examine the general plausibility of Hegel’s analysis and his exposition of the phenomenon. This will provide an equally important source of confirmation for our reading. The personality of the will represents the universal principle of the Philosophy of Right in the sense that it cannot be relinquished at any of the subsequent and more developed stages of the exposition. On the one hand, as the moment of »universality« (PR § 35), the concept of personality remains an indispensable component at every level of the will that is free in-and-for-itself; on the other hand, this moment of universality itself becomes increasingly »concrete« as the teleological exposition of the will unfolds. As a result, the categories of personality themselves undergo a process of differentiation and enrichment. Whereas universality is understood at the level of Abstract Right as the self-consciousness of freedom or as the »inherently individual [in sich einzelner] will of a subject« (PR § 34), this consciousness of freedom is further developed at the level of imorality. There it becomes a universality reflected into itself, one in which a subject knows itself as a unity of the universal rule-governedness of willing (the demands of morality) and the concreteness of individual willing. 1 And finally, at the level of ethical life, it becomes the concrete universality 2 in which the particular expressions of the will are grasped and recognized as realizations of this self-determining universal (cf. PR § 142). Secondly, the concepts of personality and person also play a role as subsidiary principles. 3 In this sense, they represent sufficient principles for the complete exposition of one particular sphere of the Philosophy of Right, namely, that of Abstract Right. Hegel claims to find in these categories the principle which structures the various forms and contents of abstract right, as well as the basis of its justification. This much is already clear from the fact that §§ 34–40 constitute the introduction to the first part of the Philosophy of Right as a whole. 4 These introductory parts, where the final paragraph contains a systematic conceptual outline of the part immediately following, perform two roles: First, the subsidiary principles logically sufficient for the relevant part of the Philosophy of Right are here introduced terminologically, and second, they are explicated in terms of the conceptual structure that the will has assumed at this particular stage of the overall development. In the case of Abstract Right, the relevant principles are the conceptual determinations of personality and person that are here interpreted as logical moments of the will that is free in-and-for-itself at a particular stage of development (cf. PR § 34). In distinction from its role as a universal principle, personality as a subsidiary principle therefore remains tied to a specific constellation of the moments of the will (of universality, 1 2 3 4

Cf. Quante (1993a, p. 51–55). Cf. Siep (1989, p. 97). Cf. Siep (1992, p. 100). Cf. Siep (1989, p. 97 f). An introduction of this sort is provided for all three parts of the Philosophy of Right (PR §§ 105–14 for Morality, §§ 142–57 for Ethical Life).

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particularity, and individuality) and stands opposed to other subsidiary principles (such as the »subject« in the domain of morality, for example). In distinction from a universal principle, a subsidiary principle suffices for the conceptual explication of the sphere which it governs. In addition, the universal principle of personality itself – as the logically necessary condition for all forms of right – must be sublated within the other subsidiary principles. These other forms of development play no role within the context of Abstract Right, although it is worth pointing out that the moment of freedom’s self-consciousness is preserved and retained throughout the progressive development of the Philosophy of Right, and also at the same time substantively enriched as it takes on the forms of morality and ethical life, and is thus rendered more »concrete« in Hegel’s sense. In the following, however, I will simply analyze the categories of personality and person according to the scheme of the Logic of the Concept, which articulates them as belonging to the free will »as it is in its abstract concept« (PR § 34). Accordingly I now turn to an analysis of §§ 34–40 of the Philosophy of Right.

8.1 The Organization of the Introduction to Abstract Right As an introduction to the first part of the Philosophy of Right, sections §§ 34–40 have three functions. First, they indicate the logical structure of Abstract Right as one stage »in the development of the idea of the will that is free in-and-for-itself« (PR § 33). Thus, § 34 defines the logical status and position of the first part in the context of the Philosophy of Right as a whole. Hegel then explicates the moments of this particular developmental stage, articulates the subsidiary principle that underlies the treatment of abstract right and flags its most important philosophical features. Second, in §§ 35–40 Hegel attempts, by explicating the moments of universality, particularity, and individuality, to both to systematize these moments logically and to provide a substantive exposition of abstract right in terms of the concepts of personality and person. Third, he provides an outline of the overall logical development within the sphere of Abstract Right and of the various »shapes« (PR § 32) that are contained within that sphere. Hegel accomplishes the latter in § 40. The structure of the conceptual development in §§ 35–39 directly reflects Hegel’s goal of providing a systematic logical articulation and a fundamental substantive definition of abstract right on the basis of the subsidiary principle of personality, as well as the way in which he approaches the logical determination of abstract right in terms of the three moments of the concept. We are thus presented, as we would expect, with three sections, each of which provides both a logical and a substantive characterization of abstract right. After specifying the three moments in relation to the particular stage of the development of the will (PR § 34), Hegel points

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out in his marginal comments that in »what follows« (PR § 34 M) we shall be primarily concerned with the further explication of these »moments« (ibid.). He therefore proceeds to discuss the moments of universality (in § 35 and § 35 R), particularity (in § 37), and individuality (in § 39). Hegel’s enumeration of the specific stages here points to the overall structure of the argument (which however only begins at § 36). § 36 and § 38 serve as an auxiliary discussion to provide a substantive articulation of abstract right that, according to Hegel, can also be derived from the logical structure of the will as personality. This sketch of the general structure of §§ 34–40 will prove to be helpful in the analysis to follow. For one of the principal interpretative problems we face with Hegel’s text is that he provides a logical characterization of the subject matter on two different levels. Thus the categories of personality and person are interpreted as the universal moment of the will (PR § 35) that, in accordance with its very conceptual structure, also involves the moments of particularity and individuality (PR § 34). But the explication of these two moments themselves is then pursued from the perspective of the universal moment of the personality or that of the person. Hegel derives the relationship between the three moments from the character of the will »in its abstract concept« (ibid.). The three moments are therefore »still empty of specific determination and intrinsically without internal opposition« (PR § 34 M). At this level the relationship to the moments of particularity and individuality has not yet been integrated into the moment of universality. This integration, which will be carried through in the »Morality« and »Ethical Life« chapters, presents the development of personality as the universal principle of the Philosophy of Right as a whole, and does not yet take place at the level of Abstract Right. That is why Hegel can say that although the »totality« (PR § 37 M) of the determinations of universality, particularity, and individuality is certainly »present« (ibid.) in the sphere of Abstract Right, it has »not yet been taken up« (ibid.) as such into the moments themselves. Considered from the perspective of personality, the moments of individuality and particularity are still only supplied externally, even though they effectively belong to the overall structure of the will. As a subsidiary principle, therefore, this determination of the will remains confined to the form of »abstract personality« (PR § 37). Thus, while Hegel presents all three determinations as moments of the will, he also emphasizes that no relationship to the other two determinations can be established »immanently« simply on the basis of personality as universality itself. By virtue of its direct connection with the will, the universality of personality is certainly »mediated« along with the two other determinations (PR § 37 M), but the mediation in question still remains »abstract« (ibid.) owing to a lack of internal relatedness. According to Hegel, the latter results from the particular stage of the will’s development that here, at the beginning of its teleological exposition, is still grasped only »as it is in its abstract concept« (PR § 34). »This abstractness is the determinacy of the present standpoint« (§ 34 M) and it is from this determinacy

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that Hegel derives, as will become clear in the following, the substantive features of abstract right itself. In order to grasp the sense of this »derivation,« we must keep in mind the broad meaning of the concept of »subjectivity« that underlies Hegel’s remarks. By subjectivity, Hegel means, quite generally, the individualization and realization of a universal in a particular. In the Science of Logic, Hegel describes this moment of the pure concept as »personality« by reference to the »I« of transcendental apperception, a substantial feature that Hegel also employs in the context of the Philosophy of Right. Since this passage, which was discussed in chapter 7, is central to the meaning of the principle of personality, it is worth repeating it here for emphasis: But the »I« is in the first place purely self-referring unity, and is this not immediately but by abstracting from all determinateness and content and withdrawing into the freedom of unrestricted equality with itself. As such it is universality, a unity that is unity with itself only by virtue of its negative relating, which appears as abstraction, and because of it contains all determinateness within itself as dissolved. In the second place, the »I« is just as immediately self-referring negativity, individuality, absolute determinateness that stands opposed to anything other and excludes it – individual personality (SL 514/GW 12, 17).

In the context of the Science of Logic, according to Hegel, this shows that the pure concept itself possesses the structure of self-consciousness and that »the absolute« is thus to be characterized in terms of personality. These claims can be fruitfully applied to the analysis of the concepts of personality and person in the context of the Philosophy of Right. The first determination of the I, which is characterized as universality, possesses the distinctive structure of positing itself as unity with itself precisely through abstraction (through distancing itself) from something else (from all determinateness). The freedom of unrestricted equality with itself (pure self-consciousness) that is implied in this structure thus remains abstract, and the negated determinateness is present only as »dissolved« in this freedom. The second moment of the I does not, as one might initially expect, correspond to the category of individuality. Rather, Hegel employs the term »individuality [Einzelheit]«, which also occurs in §§ 34–40 of the Philosophy of Right, to characterize a spatially individuated singular thing that, as a concrete individual entity, »stands opposed to anything other« and thereby »excludes« it. Hegel is here bringing together the two logical moments of the I, abstract self-consciousness (universality) and individuality as »absolute determinacy« in the category of »individual personality.« In the context of Abstract Right, on the other hand, Hegel distinguishes these two moments as the categories of personality and person, respectively. As discussed in the previous chapter, he thereby attempts to derive a speculative argument for the necessity of spatio-temporal, that is, corporeal individualization of persons, from the very abstractness which the conceptual moment of pure universality (personality) has at the level of Abstract Right. To be an individual and to possess personality

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constitute the two moments of the determination of universality, which is for its part a moment of the concept. The concept itself is also characterized, as we pointed out above, by the conceptual moments of particularity and individuality. On the abstract and immediate level, however, the latter moments are still external to the I, just as they are to the universality of the concept and thus also to personality. In the Philosophy of Right, the will that is free in-and-for-itself is what possesses the structure of the concept as such, and is characterized by the three determinations of universality, particularity, and individuality. The personality of the will, as we shall see in what follows, merely designates the conceptual moment of universality in the Philosophy of Right, although it also implicitly contains the two other logical moments that Hegel distinguished in the Science of Logic.

8.2 The Logical Structure of the Introduction to Abstract Right 8.2.1 The Will’s Stage of Development in Abstract Right (§ 34) »The will which is free in-and-for-itself, as it is in its abstract concept, is in the determinate condition of immediacy.« (PR § 34) This is how Hegel opens his treatment of abstract right. Hegel begins by elaborating the logical structure of the will, which is generally presupposed throughout the Philosophy of Right to be free in-and-for-itself. The will is free in-and-for-itself in the Philosophy of Right in so far as it is the self-conscious goal directed activity, but as such, the will undergoes a secondary development through the modalities of »in itself« (abstract right), »for itself« (morality) and »in-and-for-itself« (ethical life). Hegel’s remark that the in-and-for-itself free will is present in its abstract concept indicates that this will is initially free in-and-for-itself only in itself, or potentially and that the determinacy of freedom in-and-for-itself still belongs to it in an immediate way. According to Hegel, two specific consequences follow from the fact that the will is considered here only »in accordance with its abstract concept« and thus exhibits the »determinacy of immediacy«. (a) The three moments of universality, particularity and individuality are not yet internally mediated by one another, but are still related only abstractly to one another on the basis of the conceptual nature of the will in general. The moment of universality, which Hegel does not explicitly mention here, is interpreted as the determination of »negative actuality, whose reference to itself is purely abstract« (ibid.). Qua this universality, and existing as the »inherently individual [in sich einzelner] will of a subject« (ibid.), the will relates »negatively« to the reality of existing things and determinations. The latter are here understood as external to the free subject, rather than as determinations that have been developed internally

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from the subject itself, and cannot therefore properly belong to the substantive content of the self-conscious freedom of the willing individual. This self-conscious freedom is »actuality [Wirklichkeit]« in the sense that there must be a unity within the individual self-conscious will that connects the I as the ground of self-consciousness and the immediate existence of self-conscious willing (cf. SL 500–503/GW 11, 405–407). At the same time, this self-conscious and thus essentially self-relating universality remains »abstract« in its self-relation precisely because it »negatively« delimits the moment of particularity from this self-relation and thus categorizes itself as the »exclusive individuality [ausschließende Einzelheit]« (PR § 34) of a single subject, as an individuality that must »externally« assume »in addition a content consisting of determinate ends« (ibid.) that are involved in any individual act of willing. According to Hegel, this »external« relationship reveals itself in the fact that subjective motivations such as »needs [Bedürfnisse]« (PR § 34 M) and certain conditions of the external »world« (ibid.) must be taken up as content into the attitude of any individual will that knows itself as free in its willing in this abstract sense. This self-consciousness of freedom, as it »manifests« itself in the abstract freedom of the I as actuality (SL 478/GW 11, 381), implies an »external world immediately confronting it« (PR § 34), but one to which the subject’s own corporeal nature also belongs. This »confronting« of a world external to self-consciousness is not interpreted by Hegel as a causal process of generation. Rather, Hegel is attempting to show that the self-consciousness of the abstract universality of the will, involved as it is in the consciousness of the I, necessarily implies a content that can be found only outside self-consciousness. This self-consciousness of freedom, that is, »still has no content of its own that would be determined on the basis of itself« (§ 34 M). (b) The second consequence that Hegel derives from the will’s universal status, that is, its status as immediate and merely abstract self-consciousness, is that this will exists in the form of a concrete willing by a human individual. This means it exists not only as a self-consciousness that is individuated for itself, but also as something with spatio-temporal existence (PR § 43). According to Hegel’s speculative logic, the immediacy of the self-relation involved in the I’s consciousness of freedom also grounds the fact that this expression of willing exists as the determinate willing of an individual. This individual enjoys the status of personality, as the following analysis will show, on the basis of its universality as the self-consciousness of freedom. At the same time, the abstractness and the immediacy of this universality of self-conscious freedom requires it also to be a concrete individual: A person. In what follows, it should be borne in mind that the universal moment of the will designates for Hegel the self-consciousness that is (1) a necessary and sufficient condition of freedom and (2) is a thinking and willing form of self-relation. At the same time we must remember that universality is only one moment in the overall structure of the will. On the level of Abstract Right, this moment assumes the role of a subsidiary principle by virtue of the immediacy of the will precisely in its abstract

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isolation from the other logical moments. Thus it should already be quite clear that the freedom manifested in the domain of Abstract Right cannot exhaust the whole sphere of the free will that wills itself.

8.2.2 The Moments of the Free Will and their Significance for the Philosophy of Right Since, for Hegel, the will has the form of a concept, he takes the constitutive categories of universality, particularity and individuality to apply to it. At the same time, these speculative-logical categories always also have, for Hegel, a contextspecific meaning. Here I will elaborate the specific meaning that these categories have in the context of the Philosophy of Right. (a) Universality (PR §§ 35 f.): Following the order of his speculative logic, Hegel begins by specifying more closely the »universality of this will which is free inand-for-itself« (PR § 35). The fact that Hegel here characterizes the will that is free in-and-for-itself in the determinacy of immediacy (cf. PR § 34) as »free for itself« (PR § 35) does not mean that the fundamental logical determination of the will has already been subjected to any sort of modification. With this expression, Hegel rather intends to emphasize that self-conscious freedom is an attribute of this will and that the following discussion will be primarily concerned likewise with a closer analysis of this consciousness of freedom. According to Hegel, the self-consciousness of freedom here, identified with the will’s moment of the universality, is »formal universality, i. e. the will’s self-conscious (but otherwise contentless) and simple reference to itself in its individuality [Einzelheit]« (ibid.). The individual that possesses a will in this form is »to this extent [. . . ] a person« (ibid.). 5 The category of »person« that Hegel introduces at this point refers to a specific status of an individual, one that expressly belongs to the individual insofar as the latter is capable of self-consciousness. At the same time, Hegel’s term is intended to capture the fact that the expression »person« is not merely employed as a sortal concept (that of being a person), but also serves to designate the individual as such in his or her spatio-temporal individuality. We say not merely that an individual

5

There is an ambiguity here which we must clarify. Like the passage we have analyzed from the Science of Logic, Hegel is not here using the terms »subject [Subjekt]« and »individuality [Einzelheit]« in a strict terminological sense. »Subject« here signifies not the subsidiary principle of the sphere of morality, but rather the spatio-temporal »individual« as such (§ 35 M). Correspondingly, »individuality« here does not have the emphatic meaning it does in the Logic of the Concept but rather simply refers to the individuation that marks an »independent individual« in general (ibid.). Hegel attempts to avoid such ambiguity by italicizing the terms when they are being used in the technical sense of his Logic (although this practice is not always strictly observed in the marginalia or even in the main text).

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belongs to the class or set of persons in general (the sortal use of the concept), but also that this person (referring to an individual) possesses other specific and determinate properties (e. g. »This person is not in the room at the moment«). An individual enjoys the status of being a person »to [the] extent« (PR § 35) that that individual possesses self-consciousness, which can be defined, according to Hegel, as formal and contentless simple relatedness to oneself. 6 This characterization holds in the case of direct first-personal self-reference, including, for Hegel, any utterance of the form »I want so-and-so to be the case.« The self-relation entailed by the self-referring character of the I is »simple« in the sense that it does not have to be realized with reference to any particular given state of affairs: First-personal self-reference requires no specific description in order to accomplish this selfreference. 7 This particular form of self-referentiality, which is the fundamental form of all freedom, according to Hegel, is also defined as »the pure thinking of oneself« (PR § 5) and as »the element [. . . ] of the ›I’‹s pure reflection into itself.« This selfconsciousness is »formal« since it abstracts from every substantive determination and is therefore »contentless.« This process in which the I distances itself from the what it wills transforms the I that is conscious of its freedom into the »completely abstract ›I‹ in which all concrete limitation and validity is negated and invalidated« (PR § 35 R). It is by virtue of this capacity for distanciation, which presupposes a capacity for pure self-relation, that an individual belongs to the class of persons in general. Hegel calls this »personality« and distinguishes two aspects of this concept: It is inherent in personality that, as this person, I am completely determined in all respects (in my inner arbitrary will, drive, and desire as well as in relation to my immediate external existence [Dasein], and that I am finite, yet totally pure self-reference, and thus know myself in my finitude as infinite, universal and free. (PR § 35)

This twofold character of self-consciousness thus contains the aforementioned possibility of distanciation and abstraction from all concrete determinacy and all characteristics that belong to me as »this« spatio-temporally individuated self. At the same time, Hegel defines this self-consciousness as knowing one’s own identity, the immediate form of which takes place »in relation to my immediate external existence [Dasein]« (ibid.). In my pure self-relation I do not relate to myself as a particular corporeal being, and this is why all natural characteristics belong, from the perspective of the I to the external world. 8 The fact that it is characteristic of individuals to possess a personality has, according to Hegel, two consequences: First, it entails »the capacity for right« in general, and second, it entails »the concept and the (itself abstract) basis of 6 7 8

Cf. Quante (2010a, ch. IV). Cf. the extended discussion in Quante (2007a, ch. 4). Cf. Nagel (1983) for a similar contemporary analysis.

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abstract and hence formal right« (PR § 36). Hegel’s first substantive interpretation of the category of personality shows up in his thesis that the self-consciousness of freedom is a necessary and sufficient condition for the concrete contents of willing to represent a rightful and legitimate claim. In general, Hegel understands »right« as the sphere of the realization of freedom in the specific sense that I can rightfully claim that my willing be respected by others. In order for this to happen, a number of conditions must be in place. First, the participants concerned must be able to distance themselves from their own concrete willing when appropriate. Otherwise, it would never be possible to rationally and willingly relinquish a particular entitlement so as to bring about a just resolution to a conflict. Second, the content of willing must assume an intelligible, rational and thus universal form if it is ever to become the object of intersubjective agreement. And third, as the further development of Abstract Right will show, the rightful character of this willing extends indefinitely so long as the willed content does not clash with the status of personality and the rightful claims of other individuals. In Hegel’s view, therefore, the universality of the will provides the necessary initial condition for the existence of right in general as the »external existence of freedom« (PR § 35 M). He regards this universality as »the absolute justification, upon which everything else depends« (ibid.). The »commandment of right« (PR § 36) (in the sense of a constitutive condition) »is therefore: be a person and respect others as persons« (ibid.). This is a commandment of right because the teleology of the will itself requires it to procure its own sphere of freedom for itself, its own existence in the outer world. And this can only come about in the form of the existence of the institutions that constitute right. In addition to this, the logic of the concept of the person implies that one is a person oneself only if and as long as one is able to respect the rightful claims of other subjects. And this necessarily implies, according to Hegel, that one recognizes one’s fellows likewise as persons. This thesis that personality generally implies the capacity to recognize others as persons, which originates with Fichte, is essential in the context of a philosophy of right, insofar as it is impossible to even assert one’s right without implicitly assuming other persons as the addressees of such an assertion. 9 In calling this self-consciousness »personality,« Hegel places himself in an intellectual tradition that runs from Locke through Kant to Fichte. 10 But unlike Locke, 9

10

For a similar problem in the context of action theory, cf. Quante (1993a, pp. 111–124). Quite apart from considerations which pertain specifically to the Philosophy of Right, it is plausible to assume that one’s understanding of oneself as a person and one’s capacity for self-conscious willing can be developed only within the context of a social form of life in which individuals are able to ascribe intentional attitudes to one another. See ch. 11 for an analysis of Hegel’s concept of recognition, as well as Quante (1995 and 2007b) for a general systematic overview. Siep (1979, p. 294 ff.) gives a comprehensive presentation of Hegel’s notion of recognition as a principle of practical philosophy. Cf. Siep (1992), pp. 81–115.

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Hegel is not primarily interested in the necessary conditions for the identity of persons over time, and in contrast to Kant, he also does not accept the separation of the formal aspect of self-consciousness (the »I think« of transcendental apperception) from the concept of the person as a category of practical philosophy. 11 On the contrary, Hegel believes that substantive foundations for the philosophy of right can be derived precisely from the I’s »consciousness of itself as a completely abstract ›I‹« (PR § 35). (b) Particularity (PR §§ 37 f.): In characterizing the moment of particularity, Hegel reveals the double-perspective which, as discussed above, he adopts in this part of the Philosophy of Right: The particularity of the will is indeed a moment within the entire consciousness of the will (see § 34), but it is not yet contained in the abstract personality as such. Thus, although it is present – as desire, need, drives, contingent preference, etc. – it is still different from personality, from the determination of freedom.

This reference to the consciousness of the will should be understood to mean that the particularizations of the will are objects for the I (the universal moment of the will) that at the same time belong to the structure of the will as such. Consciousness is a content of just this sort, since self-consciousness, which always accompanies it, distinguishes it from the I. If the self-consciously willing and personal will withdraws into its consciousness of freedom, then all the specific contents »different« from the self, which are taken up from without in the manner of specific determinations that are merely »found« to be there, now come to stand over against this »abstract personality« (ibid.). I find myself to be someone who wishes to eat something in particular, who has a particular professional ambition and so on. This abstractness, which is due to the immediacy of the will that is free inand-for-itself, is why right is able to remain purely formal and devoid of content. The self-consciousness of abstract personality does provide the foundation for right in general, but cannot further distinguish individuals from one another because it lacks substantive content. As a result, the legitimation of willing in terms of »formal« right (PR § 37) extends neither to any »particular interest« (ibid.) nor to the »particular ground by which my will is determined« (ibid.) in any given case. Since the subsidiary principle of personality excludes all content, this principle is also not able to exercise the capacity of personality to confer legitimacy on these contents. Instead, the purely formal determinacy of self-consciousness bestows on right a correspondingly formal character. In order to introduce the second substantive interpretation of the principle of personality, Hegel concludes on the basis of this formal and pure relation that the content of abstract right can only be the

11

Cf. Quante (2007a) for a discussion of these issues in the context of contemporary debates.

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form of right and the possibility of the these wills consistently coexisting with the personality of other individuals. Hegel develops this substantive interpretation of the formal and empty character of abstract personality as the principle of abstract right in the following paragraph (PR § 38) by expressly contrasting the latter with the substantively richer and more concrete principles of morality and ethical life. The determinate willing of a free will expresses itself in actions that are themselves »concrete« events in Hegel’s sense (PR § 38) and thus characterized by an abundance of determinations, all of which lie outside the realm of the principle of personality. The »moral and ethical relations« (ibid.) within which our actions always transpire, constitute the proper context for these more developed determinations of the free will. The »abstract« right derived from the principle of personality relates to these determinations, to »the rest of their content« – that is, to concrete actions 12 and to moral and ethical attitudes – merely in terms of »possibility« (ibid.). The ontological category of »possibility« in Hegel signifies that abstract right is incapable of generating any content out of itself, but can only provide limiting and restricting criteria for the rightfulness of particular actions and determining grounds of the will. Abstract right does not of itself allow us to determine that an individual should will anything in particular: »the determination of right is therefore only a permission [Erlaubniß] or warrant [Befugniß]« (PR § 38). Whereas in the context of ethical life, the willing subject can be required to have certain »insight[s] and intention[s]« (PR § 37), the »necessity« (PR § 38) involved in abstract right restricts itself »to the negative – not to violate personality and what ensues from personality« (ibid.). Hegel derives this substantive restriction from the »abstractness« (ibid.) that belongs to the principle of personality on the level of the will that is free in-and-for-itself determined in accordance with its immediacy. Abstract right thus contains »only prohibition of right, and the positive form of commandments of right is, in its ultimate content, based on prohibition« (ibid.). An abstract right that contains an assertion whose form is positive (e. g., »the property of a person must be respected«) depends in the final analysis on a prohibition (here, the prohibition against disrespecting the personhood of others). Hegel’s marginal notes explain why abstract right is only capable of grounding prohibitions, on the one hand, and permissions or warrants, on the other. The specific determinacy from which self-conscious freedom (abstract universality) is capable of distancing itself is itself an »external matter [eine äusserliche Sache]« from the perspective of the I (PR § 38 M). The right to acquire property in general does not force me to attempt to acquire anything in particular, but merely permits such acquisition. This is why Hegel says that the permission to pursue this determinate act of will can not be »identical« (ibid.) with the claim to right in general. For the individual free will, any and every concrete content remains a mere possibility, 12

On the concept of action at play here, see the next chapter.

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to which the free will possesses an »entitlement« as long as it is consistent with the acknowledged personality of other free wills. The free will that thinks and wills itself as such can only have the general »capacity for right [Rechtsfähigkeit]« (ibid.) as its content (cf. PR § 36). In this passage, Hegel recognizes an asymmetry between the internal relation of will (the universal moment of self-consciousness against particular contents), on the one hand, and the perspective of another independent free will, on the other. Whereas the self as an I can in principle always withdraw itself from any given substantive determination of its free will, my rightful claim to something in particular is »no mere possibility« (PR § 38 M) from the perspective of another free will: »As far as the other is concerned I myself am there in the thing in question [in der Sache]« (ibid.). This asymmetry, which any theory that derives rights from the self-consciousness of freedom must explicitly acknowledge, has a further consequence. For it follows from the essence of the will, as something that necessarily strives to procure external existence for its freedom in the form of right, that this will must express and manifest itself as such: This »positive action is itself the production of an objectivity and a content« (ibid.). I cannot simply will in general, rather I must will something in particular. And I cannot simply give myself a certain content in my own selfconsciousness, but must also translate this content into an objective and intersubjectively accessible form. Hegel derives this internal »ontological compulsion« on the part of the will to give itself an external existence and therefore »reality« (PR § 39) from the teleological constitution of the will as articulated within the context of his system. In accordance with this constitution, the will strives to procure an »existence of freedom« for itself. The private character of the I’s capacity for selfdistantiation with respect to any concrete content of the will produces a disparity between this potential distantiation of the individual will and its real presence, from the perspective of another will, embodied in a thing. And this allows Hegel to provide a plausible argument, quite independent of its place within the context of his own system, to show that the free will must create for itself an intersubjective sphere for the realization of its freedom. (c) Singularity [Einzelheit] (PR § 39): The unity of universality and particularity, as developed at the level of the will that is free in-and-for-itself in its »abstract concept« (PR § 34), itself displays the logical moments of this immediacy and abstractness. This is why Hegel also characterizes the moment of individuality attaching the will as »exclusive« in character (ibid.). Hegel understands this exclusiveness in a twofold manner: On the one hand, it denotes the inner conviction of the subject that he or she is capable of distinguishing him- or herself from an external and immediately encountered world, while on the other hand, it grounds the fact that this will exists as a person, that is, as a specific and spatio-temporally determinate individual. In his exposition of the third moment of the will (PR § 39), Hegel returns

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to this point explicitly: »The resolving and immediate individuality [Einzelheit] of the person relates itself to a nature which it encounters before it« (PR § 39). The terminological ambivalence we noted above applies here as well, since the »immediate individuality of the person« here does not refer to the category of individuality in the speculative sense. Nevertheless, there are two senses in which the moment of individuality is implicitly present here (and necessarily so, according to Hegel, given the conceptual character of the will itself). On the one hand, from the perspective of the »entire consciousness of the will« (PR § 37), the opposition of the »individuality of the person« versus »found nature« presents individuality as a whole in its immediate form, or in accordance with its abstract concept. On the other hand, from the perspective of the moment of personality (universality), the determination of the person as »resolving« (PR § 39) equally implies the structure of individuality. 13 The act of decision, as the freely chosen determination on the part of an individual, implies the unity of universality qua freedom and particularity qua particular content in a certain form, albeit one that is still deficient. The deficiency of this unity reveals itself under two aspects. On the level of the will, the deficiency lies in the opposition between its form, as an identity that includes subject and object within itself in so far as it is a (self-conscious) concept, and its substantive determinacy in relation to a »nature which it encounters before it« (ibid.) immediately. On the level of personality, the deficiency manifests itself in the fact that its contents need to be taken over externally rather than generated out of self-consciousness itself. Consequently, the will has yet to adequately realize its own conceptual nature, either internally or externally. This latter deficiency manifests itself in the fact that »the personality of the will stands in opposition to nature as subjective« (ibid.). But this relationship is still inadequate to the concept of the will, which requires a structural correspondence between form and content: »the limitation of being merely subjective is in contradiction with« the will that is free for itself, and hence »null and void« (ibid.). Drawing on the results of the Logic of Reflection, Hegel derives the essentially active character of the will precisely from this inadequacy (cf. SL 381 ff./GW 11, 286 ff.). The free will’s decision leads to the realization of a determinate content. The will thus sublates the limitation of mere subjectivity and attempts to »give itself reality« (PR § 39). But, according to Hegel, the free will thereby attempts to »posit« (ibid.) this independently given nature as its own, to make this nature into its own property. The will’s propensity to appropriate the »nature which it encounters« (PR § 39) is explained with recourse to the concept-logical structure of the will. The logic of the concept shows the will to be deficient in two senses, first because of the abstractness of its own concept and second because of the asymmetry between the perspective of self-consciousness, on the one hand, and that of other free wills, 13

An interpretation of this connection which avoids any reference to Hegel’s speculative conceptual categories is to be found in Siep (1982; cf. especially p. 261 ff.).

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on the other. Since in this analysis external nature is itself a »moment within the entire consciousness of the will« (PR § 37), it is unable to put up any resistance to this teleological self-realization: The free will is »master over everything in nature« (PR § 39 M), while nature itself »only has existence through it« in so far as it belongs »to the sphere of freedom« (ibid.). Nature insofar as it is external to the will »possesses no soul in its own right, is not an end in itself [Selbstzweck] – and this is even true of animate nature« (ibid.). What Hegel understands by »will« in this connection is not the particular will of a specific individual, but rather the universal structure of the will that is instantiated in every free being. It is the personality and the free will of another person that thus sets the limits of personal freedom in the sphere of abstract right. This follows from Hegel’s claim that self-consciousness is the necessary and sufficient condition for »rights of every kind« (§ 40 R). That »my body and my life« (ibid.) also belong to nature as we encounter it is a further consequence of basing right on the self-consciousness of freedom. In Hegel’s view, this is just another sign of the dominion of spirit over nature, and a manifestation of the former’s greater dignity.

8.2.3 The Conceptual Development of Abstract Personality within Abstract Right The discussion in §§ 35–39 provides a substantive characterization of the personality of the will in its immediate determinacy. In the following paragraphs, Hegel uses this as a basis to elaborate the conceptual structure of the first part of the Philosophy of Right. The will first gives itself determinate existence by regarding something or other as a »thing [Sache]« in the legal sense (PR § 40 R). The freedom of this »abstract will« (PR § 40) exists in the institution of property. This configuration, in which a free will regards a thing as its property, represents the kind of freedom that is realized by a »an individual person who relates only to himself« (ibid.). A natural object that I encounter immediately takes on a rational form precisely insofar as I regard it as my own property. I do not simply will the object for the sake of its particular qualities, but rather lay claim to it as a manifestation of my own will. This is evident from the fact that property involves a claim of right that is binding on other free wills regarding their own right to appropriation. In accordance with the Science of Logic, this level is categorized in terms of »being« and »immediacy« with the result that the determinations of »universality« and »particularity« here collapse into one another. The second level on which the principle of personality brings its freedom into existence presupposes intersubjectivity. »The person« as a principle is instantiated in multiple persons (it »distinguishes itself from itself«) and hence it »relates itself to another person« (ibid.). On the level of abstract right, »it is only as owners of property that the two have existence [Dasein] for each other« (ibid.). According to

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Hegel, this reflection of the principle of personality into itself (that is, the existence of several distinct persons) gains concrete freedom in the institution of the contract. A contract allows someone to legally alienate one of his or her possessions, so that it never ceases to be an item of property at any point during the transaction. The thing here merely changes its owner without ever exiting the sphere of right. On this level, corresponding to the level of reflection in the Science of Logic, the abstractness and empty formality of personality produces a shared community of the will (since both parties will the maintenance of the institution of property) and the »due respect of the rights of both« (ibid.). In accordance with the Logic of Reflection, the determinations of universality and particularity are distinguished from one another as two moments (the particular content of the will in the case of contract and the legal form of the contract as the universal moment) and thus are isolated and held apart from one another. The legal character of contracts here extends merely to the formal moment of their technical legality. The third level, finally, explicitly reveals the internally contradictory nature of the will that was immobilized, as it were, at the level of the Logic of Reflection. With the legal institutionalization of »injustice« and »crime,« the distinction between the universal legal form of the will and its contingent particular content is brought into sharper relief, as it passes through opposition (injustice) to contradiction (crime). The moments of universality and particularity belonging to the free will are thus mediated into individuality. But due to the abstractness of the will on the preceding level of development, this individuality merely sublates the immediacy of the will’s personality into the reflection-logical mediation of subjective willing. 14 With this concept-logical systematic development, Hegel claims to have depicted all the »shapes« (PR § 32) of abstract right in »the series of concepts which results« (ibid.) from the »immanent progression« (PR § 31) of the concept of the will in its rationality. Whether this philosophical presentation is in fact plausible can only be determined via an examination of the relevant sections alongside the phenomena they discuss. The systematic justification for this concept-logical development is, as always in Hegel’s system, »assumed to be familiar from the Logic« (PR § 31). 15

14 15

Cf. Quante 1993a, p. 51 ff. Hegel’s critique of the divisions that make up Kant’s Philosophy of Right, as expressed in the remark to § 40, focuses on the lack of internal systematicity between Kant’s divisions. Kant does attempt to »impose an external order upon the mass of disorganized material before us« (PR § 40 R), but he is unable to find a principle of organization that will allow this material to be presented in its »rational« form. Apart from this methodological criticism, Hegel’s principal objection is that the distinction between the law of persons [Personenrecht] and property law [Sachenrecht] is essentially a superficial one: »The lop-sidedness and conceptual poverty« (ibid.) of this distinction shows up, Hegel thinks, in the fact that both property law and the law of persons need to be derived from and developed out of the principle of personality itself. This is precisely what Hegel claims to have accomplished in the Introduction to Abstract Right that we have analyzed above.

9. Action The model of action as the objectivization of a goal is one of the foundations of Hegel’s thought, but it is reason, the most fundamental principle of his philosophical system, which he deems to be »purposive activity« (PS § 22/GW 9, 20). Yet although the concept of action and the fundamentals of a Hegelian theory of action are introduced and elaborated in systematically central passages of the Phenomenology of Spirit or the Elements of the Philosophy of Right, the secondary literature has engaged remarkably little with this aspect of Hegelian philosophy. In contrast to his theory of the will and his conception of work, his concept of action only rarely occupies a prominent position in interpretations; it is also only sporadically brought into contact with contemporary action theory. 1 One explanation for this state of affairs is that the propositions of Hegel’s mature system are enmeshed within his forbidding Science of Logic and subject to its aims and standards for justification. Hegel’s concept and theory of action are therefore locked within a system of categories that is in a number of ways inaccessible to the contemporary reader. It is therefore essential, if we wish to show what Hegel has to offer to contemporary action theory, to proceed inductively and to resist following his speculative-dialectical strategy in our presentation. If we restrict our attention to texts written by Hegel himself, disregarding his lecture notes (despite their important role in Hegel’s reception), then the central elements of Hegel’s theory of action will be found in his Phenomenology of Spirit and in his Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Because these two works are, however, out to establish significantly different things and since there is no scholarly consensus on their exact relationship, I will discuss the two contexts in which Hegel’s theory of action is developed in two separate sections here. This approach suggests itself given that Hegel’s critique of a conception of the mental that one would today classify as scientistic or naturalistic is a prominent topic in the Phenomenology, as we have seen, but only plays an implicit role in the Philosophy of Right. On the other hand, the two conceptions of human action that Hegel develops in these two works are not only compatible, they complete and condition one another in central respects. 2 This is most of all true of Hegel’s thesis that human actions are constituted via intersubjective relations of recognition and are, therefore, genuinely social entities. If this aspect of Hegel’s theory of action can be illuminated using the Philosophy of Right in what follows, then it should not be contested that the thesis of the social constitution of action plays a central role even in the Phenomenology

1 2

Exceptions are Pippin (2008) and Quante (1993a). On this, see Pippin (2008, ch. 6).

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of Spirit. 3 Since the arguments for this thesis given in the Philosophy of Right, in the context of the theory of the will, are easier to understand than the materially richer, but conceptually looser discussion in the Phenomenology, this aspect of Hegel’s philosophy of action will be sketched using the Philosophy of Right.

9.1 Hegel’s Critique of Scientistic Action Theory in the Phenomenology »Observing reason« is Hegel’s label in the Phenomenology for the basic orientation that the natural scientist takes up in interpreting the world. Along the way to its rational telos of immanent self-knowledge, observing reason turns inward and attempts to give an account of the essence of human reason (which, according to Hegel, is autonomous individuality) within its epistemic and methodological parameters (cf. chapter 4 for more details). Its manifold attempts to make human individuality into an object of observation lead to the phenomenon of action, where individual subjectivity manifests itself. This manifestation is conceived by it as the opposite of the private, non-observable internality of intention and also of the observable externality of action. Observing reason, which tries to account for not only behavior, but also individual action in its totality, needs therefore to take into account this reflexive self-thematization of observable, external action through private intention as a constitutive element. Unaware of its own practical constitution, it thus runs into the opposition as well as the interdependence of practical and theoretical reason, which distinguishes human action from mere behavior: The opposition which this observing activity stumbles into is, in terms of the form, that of the practical versus the theoretical, and it posits that both of them lie within the bounds of the practical itself – that is, it is the opposition of individuality actualizing itself in action (taken in its most general sense) versus individuality actualizing itself at the same time as reflecting itself into itself from out of this action and making this action into its object. Observation takes up this opposition in terms of the same topsy-turvy [verkehrte] relationships in which the opposition takes its determination in appearance. For observation, the deed itself and the work, whether it be that of speech or a stabilized actuality, counts as the nonessential outer, – However, the inwardly-turned-being of individuality counts as the essential inner. (PS § 319/GW 9, 176 f.)

This action-theoretic model of observing reason, which we analyzed in detail in chapter 4, relies on the assumption that the internal is what is essential for action, the observable deed being only an inessential, external sign of what is internal. This 3

On this, see Pippin (2008, part II and III) as well as ch. 11.

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presupposes that the internal and the external are two ontologically independent realms, whose relationship can be explicated by observing reason in terms of lawlike causal relationships. In complicated series of developments, Hegel shows that this basic model cannot be reconciled with the essence of human action for two principal reasons. First, the opposition of internal and external, which this model countenances, represents an unsustainable hypostatization of two aspects of the human mind that do not in fact stand in any causal relationship; their relationship is, according to Hegel, to be understood in a categorically different way, namely expressively. 4 Secondly, their relationship is not to be understood on the model of a causal law, but rather, as I will discuss in detail in the next chapter, as a social practice of rule following, as action attribution and interpretation in the context of justifications, excuses, explanations, etc. In fact, Hegel does not rule out the existence of causal relations between the mental and physical, nor does he rule out the possibility of a research program that seeks to find them. He does however defend the view that the perspective of observing reason, oriented as it is toward nomological causal explanations, renders the crux of human action invisible. For this reason, Hegel turns, both in the Phenomenology and in the Philosophy of Right, to the social practice of action attribution as the proper locus for the explication of human action.

9.2 Hegel’s Theory of Action: The Morality Chapter of the Philosophy of Right Hegel’s comprehensive theory of the will in the Philosophy of Right, which encompasses not only individual mental episodes but, as we will see in more detail in the twelfth chapter, introduces the concept of action in the chapter entitled »Morality«. Karl Ludwig Michelet was the first to try to reconstruct the structure of the theory of action in the morality chapter. 5 The context for Hegel’s theory of action here is our multi-faceted practice of ascriptions of responsibility, within which questions of ethics and right occur. In this way, Hegel approaches human action post festum and consequently some of the »classical« issues of contemporary action theory, such as mental causation and the mind-body problem, are treated only secondarily. Likewise, the classical problems of the freedom of the will, determinism and agent-causation do not, for Hegel, present an appropriate point of entry into the philosophical explication of action. 6

4 5 6

For this interpretation, see Taylor (1975) and Pippin (2008). Michelet (1828); on this, see also Quante (1993a). On these issues, see the analyses of Pippin (2008, ch. 4–6) and Wolf (1992).

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The perspective of the individual on her own action, which is not to the point in abstract right, becomes central in the context of moral evaluation. In the justification, exoneration or criticism of an action, morality is concerned with whether the specific perspective of the agent on her own action can (or should) be acknowledged. This is an issue which cannot generally be answered at the level of causal explanation, but must refer to a complex of pre-existing rules and social institutions. 7 In contrast to mere behavior, action involves a claim to rationality or legitimacy that can be called into question and is subject to justification. Accordingly, Hegel lists the following three characteristics as specific features of human action: The expression of the will as subjective or moral is action. Action contains the following determinations: (α) it must be known by me in its externality as mine; (β) its essential relation [Beziehung] to the concept is one of obligation; and (γ) it has an essential relation [Beziehung] to the will of others. (PR § 113)

It must not be overlooked that our concepts of responsibility and action contains causal elements and accordingly these aspects also play a role in Hegel’s explication of the structure of action. However, he foregrounds the structure of intention, which differentiates actions from mere behavior; intentions are of central importance for accountability. Furthermore, presuppositions regarding the structure of agents can be extracted from the structure of our action and our practices of attribution. First and foremost, however, these contexts show, according to Hegel, that human action is constituted in a genuinely social way, because the specific structure of action can only be realized in social contexts that are presupposed to already exist. These four central characteristics of Hegel’s theory of action, which are implicit in his three »determinations« of action, are developed beginning from § 113 of the Philosophy of Right.

9.2.1 The Structure of Action In the first section of the Morality chapter of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel distinguishes between action (Handlung) and deed (Tat) (§§ 115–118). This distinction is difficult to understand, since on the one hand, he seems to be drawing a distinction between the event and the description of an action, while on the other hand, he

7

This does not mean that causal relationships play no role at all in these practices. Hegel explicitly discusses the relationship between responsibility and causation in §§ 115–119 of the Philosophy of Right, which in the context of our practice of giving and asking for reasons plays a decisive role.; for a detailed and illuminating discussion of these problems see also Moore (1997 and 2009).

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seems to use »action« and »deed« to mean two different ways of describing an action. According to the first distinction, a deed reveals features and stands in causal relations that need not be either known or intended by the agent. An action is only attributed as an action, on the other hand, if the specific intention of the agent forms part of the action description. This is what is specific to the perspective of morality. According to the second distinction, »action« and »deed« refer to two interpretations of an action, whereby the first takes the knowledge and intentions of the agent as its basis for evaluation, while the other evaluates actions on a basis that includes both social standards and such things as the agent’s character and the action’s consequences.

9.2.2 The Structure of Intention Hegel’s first »determination« of action emphasizes that my action »must be known [. . . ] as mine«. Hegel has by this stage already analyzed this in detail (PR § 110). Since it is goal directed, and thus to be understood in teleological terms rather than as merely caused behavior, it must have a processual content that allows its implicit, inner or subjective form to issue in an external, developed realization. In contrast to a purely biological process, however, an end is realized in the specific form of an action only if the process is known to the agent herself in a first-personal, propositional way. This is what accounts for the specific structure of intention: »The content is determined for me as mine in such a way that, in its identity, it contains my subjectivity for me not only as my inner end, but also in so far as this end has achieved external objectivity.« (PR § 110) At least in the normal course of events, someone can only understand her behavior as an action if the result of what she does can be interpreted such that it counts as the execution and realization of the end which she herself was attempting to realize by so acting. Likewise, an action can only be justified or exculpated in the face of questions or criticism under these conditions. Thus, the process of action, which Hegel conceives as the »translation [Übersetzung]« of the internal end into external objectivity, is accompanied by intention, that is to say, by specific knowledge and desires. The agent’s seeing what she does as a process of realization in this way represents a claim to legitimacy which has its standing in the social space of reasons and potentially competing interpretations. This objectivization (Objektivierung) is to be distinguished from the realization of an intention in a material action-event, which Hegel conceives of as a process of objectification (Vergegenständlichung). The »external objectivity« which Hegel speaks of here primarily denotes the acceptance of the intentionality which the agent claims for her action. This claim is intersubjectivley graspable. It is subject to criticism and acknowledgement, but may also be overruled. Hegel is an unwavering proponent of the view that action, in the sense of an externally objectivized end, is not an

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incorrigible product of private, internal intentions, but rather is fundamentally bound up with questions of legitimacy, and as such is essentially constituted in social space. 8

9.2.3 The Structure of the Agent The second characteristic of action (cf. PR § 113, [β]) relegates the concept of action to the sphere of the Essence Logic. This sphere is distinguished by categories whose semantic content presupposes the possibility of failure and thus implies success as a prerogative. As self-imposed realizations of goals, actions are at once objectivizations of reason and thus are generally subject to rational appraisal. The concept of action is, according to Hegel, also constituted in such a way that action cannot remain confined to particular intentions. Rather, it is temporally extended beings which have access to a complex structure of needs, drives, and wishes that stand in need of plans of action. Such plans allow the agent to bring order to her potentially conflicting preferences and allow the agent to stabilize the structure of her preferences over time. This is, as Hegel argues, important not only from the perspective of the agent, since in this way her own well-being can be realized over temporally extended phases. Rather, this trans-temporal stabilizing function of plans of action is also important for the possibility of long-term cooperation, which requires the agent to be a reliable participant in the social sphere (see the previous chapter on this). Hegel brings out this aspect of our concept of action in two ways: On the one hand he applies the theory of judgement developed in the Science of Logic to show that self-determining reason can only be realized in complex judgements and actions; in the Philosophy of Right, this development of the concept of action is tracked by the development from »purpose [Vorsatz]« (an intention which is punctual in its semantic content) to »intention [Absicht]« (a complex purpose whose semantic content subsumes particular actions as instances of action-types or as applications of general rules). On the other hand, Hegel shows ex negitivo that our concept of action necessitates a transition from individual, isolated actions to actions in a network of plans and in the web of systematic preferences of agents. In the third part of the Morality chapter he discusses various strategies of exculpation; he thereby rejects a general paradigm of exculpation, according to which the agent is reduced to a singular momentary impulse that is to constitute the content of her intention all on its own. He does so by making the observation that our concept of action and our understanding of a responsible person does not permit of a conception of this sort, since that would be

8

Cf. Pippin (2004a).

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once again [. . . ] to deny the criminal the right and dignity [Ehre] of a human being; for the nature of a human being consists precisely in the fact that he is essentially universal in character, not an abstraction of the moment and a single fragment of knowledge. (PR § 132 R)

Hegel here anticipates central insights of the planning theory of action, defended today first and foremost by Michael Bratman. 9 Hegel does not merely deduce this dimension of human action from his metaphysics of subjectivity on which his theory of judgement in the Science of Logic is based, he also grounds this aspect of his theory of action in our practices of action criticism and exculpation (for which reason this aspect of his view does not ultimately depend on his metaphysics of subjectivity).

9.2.4 The Essential Intersubjectivity of Action Perhaps the most systematically relevant aspect of Hegel’s theory of action is his thesis of the social constitution of action, which is implicit in his three characteristics and which states that action manifests an essential connection to the wills of other agents. In the context of a scientistic theory of action oriented toward causal relationships, one which is held captive by the picture of an inner and an outer, this thesis is bound to seem absurd or at least extremely implausible. What Hegel explicitly brings out with this third characterization is however nothing other than his insight that actions are not simply processes of bodily movements with specific mental causes, but rather realizations of ends interpreted in social space and equipped by the agent with a specific claim to legitimacy. As such, they are referred to the recognition of others, since the arbitrariness of individual claims can only be overcome by objectivizing them in the social realm. The arguments which Hegel advances for the indispensability of this social dimension stem from the thought that action, as an expression of a self-determining reason, can only be understood in terms of rule following. According to Hegel’s critique of »conscience« and of the Kantian and Fichtean ways of grounding morality, however, this cannot be represented as an achievement of an individual’s rational faculty. In this way, the distinction between justified obedience to a rule and an authorized or exonerated exception is destabilized, since, according to Hegel, the autonomous individual subject might modify the rule governing her action at any time. Hegel criticises this as vanity or as the evil of subjectivity made absolute. He holds that this form of moral solipsism can only be avoided or overcome if action

9

Cf. Bratman (1987, 1999 und 2007). One of the central differences between Bratman’s approach and Hegel’s theory of the will is that Hegel does not burden his conception of the will with a Lockean theory of personal identity; on this, see Siep (1992a, pp. 81–115) und Quante (2007a, ch. 3).

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is understood from the outset as a social practice of attribution and justification. A more detailed analysis of the arguments which Hegel offers in the Philosophy of Right in support of his concept of action shows, however, that these exhaust Hegel’s grounds for this thesis. 10 In order to sketch a full picture of Hegel’s theory of action one must draw on the theory of recognition of the Phenomenology. Ultimately, this depends on Hegel’s thesis that self-knowledge is intersubjectively constituted, a thesis expressed with his motto of »an I that is we, and a we that is I« (PS § 177). 11

9.3 Hegel’s Theory in the Context of Contemporary Systematic Philosophy Hegel’s concept of action stands at the center of his practical philosophy. His comprehensive theory of action furthermore stands at the center of his whole Philosophy of Spirit and forms the basis for his philosophical system. As becomes visible first and foremost in the context of a critique of a scientistically geared Philosophy of Mind that Hegel explores in the Phenomenology, basic tenets of his theory of action rest on a social-externalist conception of the mental, which, although it does not eliminate the phenomenal distinction between inner and outer, avoids rigidifying it and making it into a strict dichotomy of a private inner realm of mental episodes and a publicly accessible realm of external behavior. Hegel’s analysis of the structure of philosophical explanation, which he develops in his Science of Logic, allows him to declare the independence of teleological explanations from causal ones without thereby being committed to the thesis that there are no relations of cause and effect between the agent, her mental episodes and her actions. Hegel thereby overcomes (or undercuts) the sterile dispute between internalists and causalists in the theory of action. For him it is rather of central importance that the concept of causation need neither to be scientically construed nor overlooked, and that causal explanations generally do not get at the heart of human action, whose real home is in our normative practices. Within the larger edifice of his philosophy, this decision allows Hegel to develop a theory of action that is unconstrained by scientism while also not rejecting scientistic limitations for the wrong reasons. At the same time, Hegel is able to understand human action through a reconstruction of our practices of normative ascription in his complex practical philosophy, where deontological, consequentialist and virtue-ethical aspects each play an integral role in Hegel’s theory of the will. It is this which accounts for the contemporary relevance of Hegel’s theory of action: 10 11

Cf. the detailed analysis in Quante (1993a, pp. 111–124). See ch. 11 for a reconstruction and defense of this thesis.

9.3 Hegel’s Theory in the Context of Contemporary Systematic Philosophy 153 Hegel is neither prey to scientifically oriented philosophizing nor to a one-sided metaethical perspective on our ethical practice. In the context of his conceptions of social institutions and practices, Hegel is able to develop the basic outlines of an integrative theory of action that does justice to the complexities of the phenomenon of human action.

10. Responsibility In an earlier analysis of Hegel’s concept of action I reached the conclusion that Hegel anticipated »insights from Anscombe and Goldman« as well as sketching the basis for a planning theory of agency similar to the present-day philosophy of action Michael Bratman has proposed. 1 In that study I did not pursue this latter aspect for two reasons: On the one hand, I limited my analysis of Hegel’s concept of action as it is developed in the Philosophy of Right, on the other hand, I explicitly restricted myself to the questions Hegel’s philosophy of action raises as a discipline of theoretical philosophy. 2 Since the basis of Hegel’s planning theory of action is primarily to be sought in his conception of autonomy and his analysis of our practice of ascribing responsibility, I did not want to trace this aspect of his philosophy of action within the framework I had chosen at that time. This chapter is an attempt to at least partially fill the gap that was left by my earlier study. Hegel’s arguments for the thesis that our understanding of actions and intentions requires us to take into account that individual actions are embedded in broader plans are easier to understand in the context of the theory of the will that he develops in the his philosophy of right. For this reason, in addition to those reasons given in the previous chapter, I will focus on his 1820 Philosophy of Right in what follows.

10.1 A Methodological Remark The holism of Hegel’s system presents well-known problems for the interpreter. In this chapter, I will aim to point out where Hegel’s planning theory of action makes contact with his apparatus of speculative-logical categories. I will however

1

2

See Quante (1993a, p. 3, p. 77, fn. 25 and p. 154, fn. 64). In the notes on lectures Hegel gave in 1821/22, the year directly following the first publication of the Philosophy of Right, we find: »Because man is rational, he must have care for the future [Weil der Mensch vernünftig ist, muß er Vorsorge haben für die Zukunft]« (Hegel 2005, 228). The author of these notes, which were edited by Hansgeorg Hoppe, has not been determined; the quote is to be found on p. 228 of that edition. In his marginal notes to § 120 of the published version of the Philosophy of Right, one finds the following formulation by Hegel: »Man must have an intention in acting, not just a purpose – for he is a thinking being [Mensch muß eine Absicht haben im Handeln, nicht nur Vorsatz – weil Denkendes]« (PR § 120 M). In doing so I granted that Hegel would not without reservation have consented to this restriction (see Quante, 1993a, p. 4, fn. 4), since he holds that a comprehensive philosophy of action must be developed within practical philosophy. Some critics of my interpretation have ignored this twofold restriction of the interpretive approach I explicitly adopted at the time.

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try to avoid relying on this category-theoretic framework insofar as possible when it comes to justifying Hegel’s claims. The burden of justification will rather be borne by the fact that Hegel is able to do justice both to our everyday conception of ourselves as agents and to our social practice of ascribing responsibility. After all, Hegel himself makes the point at the beginning of the Philosophy of Right that our everyday experience of agency can take the place of this speculative-logical justification. 3 The fact that Hegel developed his philosophy of action within a philosophy of right also has consequences for his overall conception of action. As a proponent of the retribution theory of justice, Hegel assumes that the primary function of legal institutions is not prevention but retribution, that is, the retribution of damage and the penalization of legal infringements. 4 Hegel’s perspective on human agency is retrospective in the sense that he considers actions and agents from the point of view of their outcomes and consequences. Accordingly, he starts from our practice of ascribing responsibility, since the Philosophy of Right does not treat law in a narrow sense but rather our practices of recognizing one another’s normative claims, broadly conceived. As such, questions as to the (causal) antecedents of actions or their causal sequence are considered only peripherally. 5 These sorts of questions generally arise at the level of action types in philosophy of action conceived as a branch of theoretical philosophy. Within our ascriptive practice, however, they arise only on the level of concrete past actions – for example, when looking for reasons to excuse someone. In what follows, I will interpret the notion of everyday self-consciousness that Hegel employs here to include both the self-understanding of our practice of ascribing and assuming responsibility and the giving and accepting of excuses. This will allow us to take our bearing from the speculative-logical level of justification as well as from the level of our self-understanding as members of a shared social practice as we interpret Hegel’s planning theory of agency. 6 Hegel himself holds

3

4

5

6

According to Hegel, our everyday experience of agency is only suitable, as he puts it in § 4 of the Philosophy of Right, »for helping along our ideas [zum Behuf des Vorstellens]« (PR § 4 R) and not for their philosophical justification which, he holds, must be carried out in speculativelogical terms. He claims, however, that every acting subject must »have examples of the further determinations [of the will] within his self-consciousness« (ibid.). This is not to be misunderstood as saying that the philosophical significance of the institution of law is exhausted by this function, since Hegel holds that this significance lies in the fact that law is the manifestation of freedom in the sphere of objective spirit, that is in the social sphere. But the institution of law can only be this manifestation by rationally fulfilling the aforementioned function. This marks the central difference between Hegel’s view and the planning theory of agency developed by Brand (1984). In this way the individual experience of agency is subsumed under the self-understanding of a shared social practice. Since Hegel is committed to the claim that self-consciousness is

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that philosophical justification can only be attained by employing speculativelogical categories. Consequently, the explication of his conception on the basis of our self-understanding of the practice of ascribing responsibility does not count as justification in Hegel’s sense. 7 But if our goal is to render Hegel’s planning theory of agency plausible, there is no problem with taking our practice of ascribing responsibility or of giving and accepting exculpations as a justificatory basis. 8

10.2.1 Hegel’s General Strategy Hegel stresses that our practices of evaluating actions and of ascribing responsibility involve insight and knowledge, and that one consequently should not treat willing as a contrast to thinking or knowing. He makes this point particularly emphatically with regard to our moral practices: The good is in general the essence of the will in its substantiality and universality – the will in its truth; the good therefore exists without exception only in thought and through thought. Consequently, the assertion that human beings cannot know [erkennen] the truth, but have to do only with appearances, or that thought is harmful to the good will, and other similar notions [Vorstellungen], deprive the spirit both of intellectual and of all ethical worth and dignity. (PR § 132 R)

Hegel integrates this (metaethical) cognitivism into his theory of the will, according to which the fundamental guises of right, morality and ethical life are practical relationships of subjectivity to itself. These relationships manifest themselves in the actions and attitudes of empirical subjects. He views the reality of objective spirit ascriptivistically, a point witnessed by his derivation of the imperative »be a person and respect others as persons« (PR § 36) from the personality of the will. 9 Being an agent, a person or a moral or ethical subject is a normative status that is constituted through intersubjective recognition and consists in being treated in accordance with »the right and dignity [Ehre] of a human being« (PR § 132 R). This status, however, not only grounds the agent’s right to have her actions evaluated in accordance with her purpose (PR § 117), her intention (PR § 120) and her understanding of the moral quality of the action (PR § 132). It also

7

8

9

constituted by social recognitive processes, I think this is systematically adequate; for this aspect of Hegel’s theory of self-consciousness, see ch. 11. In the third chapter, I give a detailed argument for thinking that speculative-logical justificatory claims can be bracketed without thereby ignoring Hegel’s justification of them. Hegel himself justifies this form of reasoning that relies on our actual practices for parts of our ethical practices on the systematic level of speculative-logical justification by pointing out that this structure of default- and-challenge is a moment of the structure of the will; for a detailed analysis, see Quante (2005). For a detailed analysis of this part of the Philosophy of Right, see the next chapter.

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imposes on the agent the duty to justify her actions when faced with critique by offering excuses for her actions if necessary, or, if she has no way to refute the criticism, assuming the (legal or moral) responsibility ascribed to her. We know from Hegel’s theory of punishment that he holds it to be a serious maltreatment of the offender to withhold punishment, since the offender is »honoured as a rational being« (PR § 100 R) through the recognition implied in the punishment administered to him as subject who is in principle capable of bearing responsibility. 10 In his philosophy of action, which in this respect coincides with the Morality chapter of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel contrasts the right of the agent with the right of objectivity in such a way that the latter is not undermined by the former in principle, as it would be, for instance, if one adopted a non-cognitivist position or a version of subjective decisionism that excludes intersubjective justification and criticism. At the same time, by distinguishing between various rights of subjectivity and respective kinds of ascription, Hegel points out that our practice of ascribing responsibility represents a complex nexus of claims and cannot be reduced to an irreconcilable pair of opposites.

10.2.2 Three Kinds of Sanity Hegel divides the Morality chapter of the Philosophy of Right into three parts. In each of these parts he contrasts a right of subjectivity with a corresponding right of objectivity. Correspondingly, he distinguishes between three kinds of »sanity« (Zurechnungsfähigkeit). From an action-theoretic standpoint, it is the transition from purpose to intention that is essential for sanity, since this transition marks the difference between an isolated intentional action and an action in the fullblown sense of practical reasoning. In contrast, the transition from intention to the good marks the difference between selfish goals pursued in a universal way, which Hegel treats under the heading »welfare [Wohl]« and the properly moral dimension of agency, which Hegel treats under the headings of the »good« and »conscience [Gewissen].« The latter transition is not relevant to the question whether Hegel’s philosophy of action contains elements of a planning theory of agency. 11 This is supported by the fact that Hegel treats the kinds of sanity and exemptions

10

11

By contrast, punishment with the sole purpose of »deterring and reforming« (PR § 100 R) is a grave violation of the criminal’s honor, since in that case the criminal is »regarded simply as a harmful animal« (ibid.). Hegel repeatedly points out in this context that exemptions should not go against the agent’s honor; see PR § 118 M, § 119 R, § 120 M, § 132 R, and § 137 M; for more on Hegel’s theory of punishment, see Mohr (1997) and Willaschek (2004). Hegel’s and Bratman’s planning theories of action coincide on this point; both distinguish between the generalization contained in the transition from purpose to intention and the specific demand of universality characterizing moral intentions.

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that correspond to the second and third rights in parallel. I now begin by briefly pointing out these three kinds of right and the kinds of sanity that correspond to them. Subsequently I discuss Hegel’s remarks on insanity as a ground for exculpation. 12 Hegel’s category of purpose (Vorsätzlichkeit) covers the intentionality of actions, that is, the first-personal constitution of intention (Anscombe’s »intention in action«). He provides a thorough analysis of the structure of intention in §§ 110–112. According to Hegel, it is the first-personal constitution of purpose that distinguishes our actions from what merely happens to us. This shows up in the irreducible use of »I« connected with action. Although purpose instantiates subjectivity, purpose is characterized in such a way that the agent herself views this intentional action as an isolated occurrence and intends it as such. The »purpose asserts the particular, [it asserts] that which connects with it as an other, [which is] not contained in the purpose« (PR § 118 M). The corresponding right of knowledge (PR § 117) accordingly concerns only the question whether the relevant event was an intentional action in the first place. When one rejects an ascription of responsibility by pointing out that the event criticized was not intentional, then this is a case of the strategy of exculpation which we might call »categorical exemption.« For it involves claiming that the event in question does not fall in the category of action at all. Hegel accordingly adds that the first kind of attribution relies on the assumption that the event in question was accompanied by a first-personal intention. The »right of knowledge« (PR § 117) thus dictates that something which happens can only be attributed as an intentional action: »I can be made accountable for a deed only if my will was responsible for it« (ibid.). Because of the first-personal constitution of purpose, each person engages in action »as something thinking, and this general being [denkendes, und diss Allgemeine]« (PR § 118 M). This is what makes human agency more than just the having of isolated purposes: »Man must have an intention in acting, not just a purpose – for he is a thinking being« (ibid.). 13 It is this intentional structure which allows the agent to devise more complex actions and plans in which single actions are employed as »means to some fur12

13

For reasons that will become clear shortly, I distinguish exemptions, which refer to the agent, from excuses, which refer to single events or actions. For Hegel, this ›must‹ represents, on the one hand, a requirement of rationality and a moral requirement we mutually appeal to and enforce; on the other hand, this points to the speculativelogical development that, on Hegel’s view, can be shown to be implied by the forms of judgment on which purpose and intention as well as moral attitudes are based (cf. his talk of »immediate judgment [unmittelbares Urteil]«, »judgment of reflection [Reflexionsurteil]« and »judgment of the concept [Begriffsurteil]« (§ 114 M) or of the »predicate of reflection [Reflexionsprädikat]« (§ 119 M); for an analysis of this level of Hegel’s concept of action, which is bracketed here, see Quante (1993a).

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ther intention« (PR § 122). Immediate impulses (in Hegel’s language, »inclinations [Neigungen]« and »drives [Trieben]«) are organized in this structure in such a way that they yield a »whole,« »not contradicting itself« (PR § 123 M). The agent has the right to have »known« the »universal quality of the action« (PR § 120), which Hegel takes to be a »judgment of the action; – determination thereof as something universal; order, class« (PR § 119 M). If I am accused of lying, I can counter the accusation by saying that it was my intention to comfort someone or to shelter them. The »intention belongs to the completeness of the action« (PR § 120 M), because humans, as rational beings, are generally aware of the way their doings hang together, and they are able to make this an object of their planning. Accordingly, in so far as each person is an agent, she must put herself under this standard and recognize the »right of the objectivity of the action« (PR § 120) as an instance of an act-type that can be evaluated intersubjectively. On Hegel’s account, this is the »other form of sanity« (PR § 120 M). At the same time, Hegel immediately restricts the scope of this standard of evaluation by writing that »its universal nature [is], however, only the nearest species« (ibid.). 14 In this way Hegel distinguishes sharply between the standard of evaluation for an intention and the moral evaluation of an action, which at this stage he mentions as a »third« (PR § 120 M) sort of attribution that he will return to later. To this third kind of attribution there corresponds the »right of insight into the good« (PR § 132 R) as well as the duty to conform to the moral and legal standards of social reality, since this dimension of our agency is based on »recognition« (PR § 132 M). Like the previous two, this »third sanity« (PR § 132 R) targets the agent’s knowledge and insight. Unlike those, however, it thereby also supports norms of rationality and social norms to which the agent must conform, since these are implied in the agent’s claim to be recognized as a rational agent capable of moral self-determination. Since this second transition is not relevant to the issue at hand, I will confine myself to this brief sketch and move on to Hegel’s account of general strategies of exemption.

10.2.3 Hegel’s Conception of Exemption Hegel first discusses the strategies of exemption we apply when we partially or completely exculpate an agent from the responsibility for his or her action in his remark on § 120. 15 In contrast to the rejection of an ascription of responsibility 14

15

We should understand the »nearest species [nächste Gattung]« as the genus proximum, as Hegel emphasizes in an elaboration that, however, is only preserved in an addition to § 229 of his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830). This logical category is obviously not sufficient for dealing with questions concerning the evaluation of actions in ethical and legal contexts. The second remark refers to the capacity for moral insight regarding which »the right of the subject [. . . ] has the effect, in the case of children, imbeciles, and lunatics, of diminishing

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of the kind that I called a categorical exemption, which retreats to saying that the event in question was no action at all, here Hegel takes for granted that the cases in question constitute actions. His discussion makes reference to the »right of intention«: »This right to such insight implies that the responsibility of children, imbeciles, lunatics, etc. for their actions is either totally absent or diminished˙rqq (PR § 120 R) Whenever we recognize somebody as an agent by making him or her an addressee of our ascription of responsibility, we treat the agent according to »the right and dignity [Ehre] of a human being« (PR § 132 R). A categorical exemption does not undermine this dignity if it refers only to a singular case, that is, to a concrete event. But if such excuses imply that some individual is incapable of forming the first-personal volitional attitudes necessary for intentional action, then we exclude the individual from this recognitive relation altogether, even if only for a certain stretch of time. Since Hegel assumes in this passage that we are dealing with agents, we must distinguish between the cases of »complete« insanity and of »diminished« sanity. The former would mean that we exclude someone from the sphere of agents altogether, the latter would mean that we suppose the agent’s sanity is diminished owing to some lack in the normal adult capacities we expect intentional agents to have. Thus, the general case of categorical exemption and the first case of this exemption converge, since both refer to the agent and not to singular actions. Regarding deteriorations of sanity more generally, that is, regarding individuals whose sanity is diminished overall, Hegel is very reserved. He ultimately takes it to be an empirical question whether such a deficit is to be judged as an attenuating circumstance: »It is impossible to impose a definite limit [bestimmte Grenze] on these conditions and the level of responsibility associated with them« (PR § 132 R). This is why Hegel wants to let this »indeterminacy« of empirical subjectivity »be taken into account only in connection with imbecility, lunacy, etc., and with childhood« (PR § 120 R). For, he argues, only obvious, »pronounced conditions« can »annul [aufheben] the character of thought and free will and allow us to deny the agent the dignity [Ehre] of being a thinking individual and a will« (ibid.). This assessment is in line with Hegel’s overall strategy of regarding the exclusion of a person from the circle of addressees of attributions of responsibility as a more severe sanction than the punishment or critique of that person’s actions. In sum, we have to distinguish these cases with respect to a variety of aspects if we want to understand Hegel’s considerations: While exemptions aim at passing judgement on an agent, excuses and exculpations aim at evaluating single events. This can lead to a general or gradual limitation of the agent’s dignity. We can give the following tabular illustration: or annulling [aufzuheben] their responsibility in this respect, too« (PR § 132 R). Both of these statements describe the same structure, so I will focus on the variant quoted above.

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Excuse

Exemption

Applicability of the strategy

Purpose (intentionality)

Single event (no action)

Agent as a whole

Only possible generally

Intention The good

Single action

Agent as a whole

Possible generally or gradually

Status

No harm to dignity

Harm to dignity

General, temporary or gradual harm to dignity

Table 1: Strategies for rejecting responsibility

Hegel’s reserved stance on this strategy of exemption is intuitively plausible; but it is just as evident that in our everyday practice we submit and oftentimes accept excuses when they are offered to us. It would be extremely surprising if Hegel, whose philosophy is characterized by its realism, had overlooked this basic feature of our ascriptive practice. We shall see in the next section that this is not the case.

10.2.4 Hegel’s Critique of Exculpation Hegel’s philosophy of action contains a critique of the ways that we seek to excuse ourselves. His critique takes three assumptions for granted. Firstly, he assumes a form of cognitivism concerning our evaluative and normative practices, which ensures that actions do admit of justification and criticism in principle. Hegel thinks that anyone who renounced this claim would thereby give up »his dignity« and »substantiality« (PR § 132 M). Secondly, Hegel assumes that the corresponding rights of subjectivity and objectivity are secured by »the public nature of the laws and the universality of customs« whose »cognizance [Kenntnis] in the sense of familiarity« (PR § 132 R) can be presumed in the case of a competent agent. Thirdly, Hegel presupposes the existence of universal, socially accepted standards that are common knowledge, to which we always already refer in our practice of ascribing responsibility and of criticizing and justifying particular actions. 16 After emphasizing that strategies of exemption are only justified under very specific conditions, Hegel turns to some forms of exculpation that refer to particular actions. He considers »momentary blindness«, the momentary condition of an »excitement of passion, intoxication, or in general what is described as the strength of sensuous motives [Triebfedern]« (ibid.) and rejects the view that this momentary condition of an agent can be regarded as »grounds for attributing responsibility or 16

Counterfactual critique, in particular, becomes conceivable only against such a background of shared social standards (Hegel mentions the formulations »could have known [hat wissen können]« and »you should have known that [du hättest dies wissen sollen]« (PR § 137 M)).

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determining the [nature of the] crime itself and its culpability« (ibid.). According to Hegel, such excuses, although they only aim at particular actions and not at the agent as such, nevertheless deny the agent’s dignity if they are intended to remove »the criminal’s guilt« (ibid.). Hegel’s rationale, which is also interesting from the viewpoint of philosophy of action, points to the rationality of the human being whose »nature [. . . ] consists precisely in the fact that he is essentially universal in character, not an abstraction of the moment and a single fragment of knowledge« (ibid.). 17 As a responsible agent, the human being exists »as a subject, not just the individual aspect of this moment or this isolated passion for revenge« (ibid.). The capacities in virtue of which people act responsibly do not always have to be actually exercised. The general disposition to do so, which Hegel calls the »inherent nature [of the rational human being] as an intelligent being« (ibid.) is sufficient. To bind the »right to moral subjectivity« (ibid.) to the actual exercise of these capacities would be precisely to deny, according to Hegel, this rational nature. It is only in »cases of madness« that the human psyche is »so deranged« that dispositional rationality is »divorced from the knowledge and performance of individual things [Dinge]« (ibid.). With these remarks, Hegel draws our attention to the fact that our practice of ascribing responsibility presupposes complex concepts of action and intention as well as a complex conception of the psychological structure of agents. Only by presupposing these things can our practice be conceived as rational; on the other hand, if they are presupposed, then certain exculpations become untenable, since they undermine precisely these presuppositions. Does this then mean that our practice cannot, or should not, involve excuses or so-called »mitigating circumstances«? A recommendation in favor of banning all excuses would be a deeply unsatisfactory and, given Hegel’s remarkable sense of reality, a very strange result. But for two reasons this is not in the least the case. On the one hand, Hegel allows for the possibility of exemption, although he points out that the loss of dignity this implies is a much greater harm than critique, blame or even punishment. And on the other hand, he obviously did not overlook the fact that excuses for particular actions and also the acceptance of such excuses are integral elements of our everyday practice. For this reason, at the end of § 132, in which this problem is considered explicitly, he explains to the reader why he does not, in the Philosophy of Right, further pursue the question of which excuses we should accept and what consequences this yields for the evaluation of particular actions: »The sphere in which the above circumstances come into consideration as grounds for relaxing the punishment is not the sphere of right, but the sphere of clemency« (PR § 132 R). 17

It is worth pointing out here that this finding does not exclude the possibility that our practice is itself a constitutive precondition of human beings’ development of these capacities; for further reflection on this issue, see Quante (forthcoming).

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My interpretation of Hegel’s analysis of our practice of ascribing responsibility and of making and accepting excuses shows that Hegel explicates this practice within the framework of his theory of the will employing his speculative-logical categories as a theory of rights. Under the heading of the »right of subjectivity« he contrasts the agent’s perspective with the »right of objectivity,« under which he subsumes both the objectivity of causal consequences and the objectivity of intersubjective interpretations and evaluations of actions (and of the agent) in social space. By means of this explication of our practice, which relies on a general philosophy of action, Hegel distinguishes between three kinds of sanity (or insanity) that are associated with different strategies of exculpation. Hegel’s proposal for conceiving of our ascriptive practice philosophically is illustrated in Table 2.

»contingency of consequences« (PR § 120 R) »Action in terms of individuality [Einzelheit] has a nature as such – external, immediate universality – possibility that lies therein – precisely the possibility that contingencies are connected with it« (PR § 120 M) »what we may call the right of the objectivity of the action is the right of the action to assert itself as known and willed by the subject as a thinking being« (PR § 120, translation modified) »the right of objectivity takes the following shape: since action is an alteration which must exist in an actual world and thus seeks recognition in it, it must in general conform to what is recognized as valid in that world« (PR § 132 R)

»the right of knowledge« (PR § 117) »the right of insight (§ 117) with respect to the action as such« (PR § 132 R)

»The right of intention is that the universal quality of the action shall have being not only in itself, but shall be known by the agent« (PR § 120)

»The right of the subjective will is that whatever it is to recognize as valid should be perceived by it as good, and that it should be held responsible for an action [. . . ] as right or wrong, as good or evil, legal or illegal, according to its cognizance [Kenntnis] of the value which that action has in this objectivity« (PR § 132 R) »right of insight into the good« (PR § 132 R)

Purpose and responsibility

Intention and welfare

The good and conscience

Table 2: The structure of our ascriptive practice

Right of Objectivity

Right of Subjectivity

»choice of good and evil – sanity in this respect« (PR § 139 M) »Third Sanity – everything depends on knowledge – like reality for me – in knowledge, consciousness is – theoretical – (otherwise merely animal) – not as I feel – rather as I know« (PR § 132 M)

»the other form of sanity is its universal nature yet only as nearest species« (PR § 120 M) »judgment of the action; – determination of it as something universal; order, class« (PR § 119 M)

»being responsible [Schuld sein]« versus »bearing responsibility [Schuld haben]« (PR § 115 R) »First-action-a concrete–altogether that is mine« (PR § 120 M)

Kind of Attribution

»The right of the subject to know [kennen] action in its determination of good or evil, legal or illegal, has the effect, in the case of children, imbeciles, and lunatics, of diminishing or annulling [aufzuheben] their responsibility in this respect, too« (PR § 132 R)

»The right to such insight implies that the responsibility of children, imbeciles, lunatics, etc. for their actions is either totally absent or diminished« (PR § 120 R)

Comes in grades (extending to a denial of the agent’s dignity)

General exemption or local excuse

Categorial exemption No excuse for the action, since that would be a category mistake (there is no action)

Strategy of Exculpation

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10.3 Systematic Questions Our discussion has already made clear that, from a systematic point of view, Hegel’s philosophical explication of our practice of ascribing responsibility and of giving or accepting exculpations leaves some questions unanswered and raises further problems. These can only be noted in this chapter, even in cases where Hegel deals with them explicitly, as he does partly in the Philosophy of Right and partly in the Phenomenology of Spirit and other parts of his system. Besides questions of exegesis regarding the connection between the part of Hegel’s theory of the will expounded here and the overall system, Hegel’s explanation touches on three systematic issues of interest beyond Hegel scholarship.

10.3.1 Causality and Responsibility Hegel was in fact one of the first legal philosophers to have pointed out (in PR § 116) that there are cases in which I can be accused of harming others due to some relationship to property even when I do not cause the harm or damage by my own action. But it is doubtful that Hegel thereby commits himself to the claim that these cases involve a kind of responsibility without a causal component. The opening phrase of the next paragraph, »the autonomously acting will [der selbst handelnde Wille]« (PR § 117), shows that the distinction between an action and a mere happening is what is fundamentally at issue for Hegel, rather than the distinction between causal and non-causal responsibility. This reading is also supported by the fact that Hegel mentions, as a second paradigm, cases in which a third party is harmed by me »as a mechanical body or living entity« (PR § 116). For instance, if I unintentionally fall down from a roof I am cleaning and fall on an other person who had accidentally been standing there, injuring them, this counts, according to Hegel, as harming someone without one’s own acting. It is still »more or less my fault« (ibid.), and licenses, according to § 116, the ascription of responsibility. With regard to this last case it is indisputable that there is a causal relation (which Hegel calls »Schuld sein« – roughly, »being responsible«), but the causation by one’s own action (which Hegel calls »Schuld haben« – »bearing responsibility«) is problematic. It is essential to keep in mind that Hegel has characterized the specific nature of acting in opposition to mere doing and our practice of ascribing responsibility by delimiting their causal consequences to a subset of them. The moral point of view is based precisely on this »fragmentation of consequences [Zersplitterung der Folgen]« (§ 118 R) 18 which, by contrast, the »heroic self-consciousness« does not claim for the evaluation of what it does, instead taking responsibility for all the causal consequences of what it does. It lacks, as Hegel puts it, the »reflection on the difference between deed [That] and action [Handlung]« (ibid.). The subset of 18

Translator’s note: Translation modified.

10.3 Systematic Questions

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consequences the moral consciousness allows to be attributed to it and is willing to take responsibility for is constituted by purpose and intention, that is, by the way the agent sets her ends. 19 It is indisputable that Hegel’s philosophy of action overall is, as a theory of the will, conceived in finalistic terms; his systematic position is based on the sublation of causal relations to teleological relations and not on the idea that the latter are acausal. 20 For this reason he can presuppose the causal relation that is the basis for a first relation of responsibility (»Schuld sein«) and introduce a second relation of responsibility (»Schuld haben«) as relevant to our ascriptions of responsibility. Hegel sees clearly, as his discussion under the heading of »Purpose and Responsibility« shows, that our practice of ascribing responsibility is based on ideas of causality and of a practice of causal explanation that must be integrated into a philosophical explication of intentional action and responsibility. But this does not yet settle whether Hegel in fact developed a satisfactory solution to this problem – either on the speculative-logical level of his system or as an explanation of our practice.

10.3.2 Hegel’s Cognitivist Ascriptivism In his Philosophy of Right, Hegel leaves us in no doubt that he favors a cognitivist analysis of our evaluative and normative practices. Practical reason rests on insight and knowledge, rather than needing to be reconstructed from feeling or opinion, as the non-cognitivist would have it. A cognitivism of this sort, which forms part of Hegel’s »right of objectivity«, fits well with a metaethical analysis that locates the basis of the evaluative and the normative in intersubjectively justifiable beliefs or even in facts. It is consistent with such a position that Hegel takes our practice of ascribing responsibility as the basis of his explication, for it could turn out that the deep structure of this practice is constituted by beliefs or facts. His critique of the contrasting of a theoretical and a practical capacity, which are for Hegel »not at all 2 capacities« (§ 4 M), provides the basis for such a cognitivist view. But closer scrutiny reveals that Hegel did not defend a view of these practices that is tied to the paradigm of theoretical reason. The reality of the evaluative and normative realms derives from our practices, including the ascriptions and the processes of recognition at play within them. Recognition involves cognition (and thus also insight and knowledge) and consequently critique and justification by 19

20

With his characterization of this relation (»consequences, as the [outward] shape whose soul is the end to which the action is directed,« PR § 118), Hegel points both to the relationship between causality and teleology in general and to the role of causal relationships within the context of organisms and, in particular, the mind-body relationship. Elsewhere I have shown why one should not infer from Hegel’s finalistic overall conception that explanations of action contain no causal component; cf. Quante (1993a, part III) and ch. 4 of this book.

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reasons can occur; but the fundamental guises of objective spirit are relationships of will and thus of a volitional nature. At this fundamental level, beliefs and facts are not what is at issue so much as one’s relationship to oneself and fact-acts (Tathandlungen). 21 These manifest themselves in our agency and in our evaluative or normative practices of attribution; thus, Hegel writes: »What the subject is, is the series of its actions« (PR § 124). This becomes clear, for instance, in Hegel’s imperatival formulation of the basic structure of the personality of the will as a legal command: »be a person and respect others as persons« (PR § 36). This derivation from the moment of the universality of the will is only valid if Hegel conceives of first-personal self-reference not as a belief but as ascription, not as a theoretical but as a practical attitude. Thus, any systematic reconstruction of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right faces the challenge of connecting the ascriptivist foundation of our evaluative and normative practices with a form of cognitivism. 22 If it is to do justice to Hegel’s ambitions, it must not only overcome the opposition of thinking and willing, it must also avoid undermining the possibility of justifying our evaluative and normative attitudes by collapsing into a form of subjective decisionism. In other words, it must connect Hegel’s critique of a psychology based on capacities (including its dualism of theoretical and practical capacities or attitudes) with his theory of the social constitution of self-consciousness. 23

10.3.3 The Problem of Evaluative Standards In the Morality chapter of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel defends two claims that pull in opposite directions: On the one hand, as an advocate of the autonomy of reason, he takes the development of the moral standpoint to represent an inevitable historical progression, as well as representing the development of the concept and the realization of freedom. This shows up in the need for a rational practice of ascribing responsibility to respect the right of subjectivity in its three forms, viz. (i) the right of insight in view of the action as such, (ii) the right of intention and (iii) the right of insight into the good. On the other hand, it is also clear in Hegel that this right of subjectivity does not entail any sort of subjectivism or a relativization of evaluative and normative standards to the beliefs and desires of particular subjects: But whatever I may require in order to satisfy my conviction that an action is good, permissible, or impermissible – and hence that the agent is in this respect responsible for it – in no way detracts from the right of objectivity. (PR § 132 R)

If one comes to the Philosophy of Right looking for concrete answers to questions as to what we are to do about the tension resulting from this opposition in a given 21 22 23

Translator’s note: See the glossary for what is meant here by »fact-act«. Quante (2007b and 2009a) are devoted to the analysis of this connection. On the last point, see the next chapter.

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case, one will come away disappointed. In this sense, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right is not an ethical treatise; 24 he rather confines himself to showing that this tension is not such as to sponsor a generalized scepticism and that no perpetual problem of justification stands in the way of his project. To show this he employs, on the one hand, his premise that self-consciousness is socially constituted, which also implies the social constitution of personal autonomy and personal responsibility. Under this assumption there can be no absolute gap between the autonomous individual and the social world, one whose absolute insurmountability might be an ontological reason for moral skepticism (on this, see chapters 1 and 14). On the other hand, Hegel rejects sceptical conclusions by pointing out that the right of subjectivity and the right of objectivity do not, thanks to the universality of reason, normally conflict with one other. For preserving the right of subjectivity it suffices that autonomous subjects be in principle able to critically assess given norms and values when these conflict. It is not, however, required for preserving their autonomy that they make such a critical assessment in every case. The right of objectivity can only be realized permanently in stable social institutions if the social world given to the individual is rational, so that the individual is able to identify with it. We can read Hegel as saying that under the conditions of modernity this will only be the case if there emerge social institutions in which we can realize our individual autonomy. 25 Hegel is known for his view that the task of philosophy is to grasp and demonstrate the rationality of what is the case. He was correspondingly mistrustful of philosophy’s prognostic power and its prescriptive function. One consequence of this attitude is that Hegel leaves it to our practice to determine how a conflict between the rights of subjectivity and objectivity is to be resolved in an ethically permissible way. His assertion that the right of subjectivity does not »detract« from the right of objectivity is justified on his assumptions only in the sense that the possibility and indeed actuality of such conflicts does not entail the absence of a right of objectivity and does not entail that our evaluative and normative practices have an irrational and subjective foundation. His assumptions in no way entail that there is no space for the right of subjectivity in specific cases. Either Hegel gives no answer to the questions as to how large this space should be or how its limits should be drawn; or he gives answers that we no longer find persuasive. The latter should not surprise us, given that almost two-hundred years stand between us and him. Maybe Hegel’s general reserve regarding the prescriptive scope of philosophy 24

25

What sort of structure such an ethical theory would need to have is a far-reaching systematic question. An answer would presumably need to include an explication of the evaluative practice Hegel summarizes under the heading of »clemency«. In any case, if I understand correctly, it follows from his treatment of exculpation that on Hegel’s account this cannot be a theory of rights. In ch. 13, I analyze the anti-sceptical model of justification Hegel employs here; for an interpretation of Hegel’s theory of the will as a theory of social institutions that overcomes the contraposition of liberalism and communitarianism, see ch. 12.

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can even stand as a lesson that many of our ethical problems cannot be solved by means of philosophical ethics, but rather only within social and political discourse. Even if we today do not share Hegel’s belief that reality is in principle rational, there is presumably no alternative to Hegel’s proposal of illustrating the rationality of our practices by philosophical means. Even so, our attempt to do so may end up showing that in certain cases or in certain spheres these practices do not satisfy the standards of reason. At least in this sense, Hegel’s is a critical philosophy of action.

11. The Grammar of Recognition The Phenomenology of Spirit is not only one of Hegel’s most influential works, it is without a doubt one of the most influential works in the history of philosophy altogether. Hegel’s masterpiece retains its thought-provoking allure to this day. 1 The section entitled »Self-sufficiency and non-self-sufficiency of self-consciousness; mastery and servitude« has commanded the attention of interpreters to a particularly great extent. Whether as the grammar of social conflicts, as the basic structure of self-consciousness or as a self-standing principle of practical philosophy, the conception of recognition Hegel develops in this section retains a special interest for philosophers who look to Hegel’s work for a systematic foundation for their own views. We find among them a broad spectrum of interpretations, ranging from the close-textual to the free-associative, emphasizing an equally broad range of aspects of this part of Hegel’s work. 2 It would be presumptuous to try to add a new strand to the venerable traditions of interpreting the dialectic of master and slave. It would be just as presumptuous to try to undertake a philosophical assessment of the various approaches to Hegel’s text with the aim of deciding which direction the right interpretation ought to take. The goal of this chapter is far more modest. Here I only want to get clear on the meaning and the scope of some central claims that Hegel makes concerning the connection between self-consciousness, spirit and recognition. My approach can be characterized by two limitations and one basic premise. The first limitation is that I will not try to engage with the entirety of Hegel’s theory of recognition. 3 In his Jena lectures, composed prior to the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel developed a theory of recognition that is both more comprehensive and in many respects more attractive than the corresponding passages in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel’s theory of Objective Spirit also offers an alternative to his earlier practical philosophy. The Elements of the Philosophy of Right contains a variety of what we might call recognitive relations, without making recognition itself into an organizing principle, a function reserved there for the concept of the will. Something similar can be said for the Phenomenology of Spirit: In the sections following those which we will study here, we find a number of relations that can be understood as relations of recognition, but Hegel makes no effort to bring these together into the systematic nexus to which I am going to restrict my attention in what follows.

1 2 3

See the contributions to Moyar / Quante (2008). On this, see Siep (2000). On this, see Siep (1979), Wildt (1982) and Honneth (1989).

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The second limitation of this study is that I will leave to one side the overall systematic context of the passage I am going to discuss. I will ignore Hegel’s argumentative aims in the Phenomenology of Spirit as a whole. 4 Methodologically speaking, this is of course not without problems. But I think it possible to abstract in this way, since the claims that interest me in the following are all placed on the same »narrative level« of the Phenomenology. As is well known, one has to distinguish within this work between those passages in which Hegel depicts natural consciousness’s experience of itself on its way to absolute knowing, and those passages in which philosophical consciousness, already with this standpoint at its disposal, stands back and gives directions to the reader for how to understand the structure of the conceptual development taking place in the Phenomenology of Spirit. The statements that occupy my reflections in this chapter are all of the second sort, so I can ignore the complication of the perspective occupied by natural consciousness. In addition, the claims that interest me all belong to the same stage of development, meaning that I also do not have to deal with the complicated issues which surround dialectical conceptual development. This twofold exclusion of the larger nexus and context of Hegel’s reflections has the advantage of eliminating methodological problems associated with focusing on a single problem. As anybody who has tried to understand Hegel’s arguments in detail knows, such a benefit is not to be underestimated. How fruitful a detailed study will turn out to be depends on the section chosen and on the systematic perspective from which one approaches this brick of the Hegelian edifice. The basic substantive premise that will guide my reflections in what follows is this: The »pure concept of recognition« (PS § 185/GW 9, 110) that Hegel elaborates at the beginning of the section »Self-sufficiency and non-selfsufficiency of self-consciousness; mastery and servitude« contains a central, socialontological insight: Individual self-consciousness is socially constituted. I will therefore deal neither with the ethical dimension of the principle of recognition, nor with the dialectic of recognition as a grammar of social conflicts in what follows. Rather, I wish to understand how Hegel conceives of the relationship between selfconsciousness and spirit, when he presents it as »the movement of recognition« (PS § 178/GW 9, 109). One might expect this aspect of Hegel’s philosophy to have been thoroughly explicated in the literature already, since any successful treatment of his concept of recognition presupposes a clarification of the underlying ontological relations. But this expectation is met with disappointment. For there continues to be, to use a Hegelian term, a »double« basic confusion about the status of this relation. Manfred Frank, for instance, charges Hegel with assimilating subjectivity to intersubjectivity, whereas Jürgen Habermas states in direct opposition to Frank that the interactive and intersubjective paradigm that Hegel pursues in his Jena years is reduced to a monological conception of spirit in Hegel’s thought from the 4

On this, see Siep (2000) and Pinkard (1994).

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Phenomenology of Spirit onwards.5 Besides this first discrepancy one finds a second solecism, first and foremost connected with the names of Karl Popper and Ernst Tugendhat: The conflation of ethical and ontological questions. 6 Hegel’s ontological thesis about the dependence of individual self-consciousness is interpreted as an ethical thesis about the normative primacy of the social over individual autonomy, thus as a totalitarianism that threatens the open society – a thesis which is, as Tugendhat puts it, the »height of perversion«. 7 In the following I would like, by way of a detailed analysis of Hegel’s claims, to clarify the confusions that give rise to the incompatible interpretations of Frank and Habermas. In so doing I will confine myself to the ontological dimension of the problem. I will refrain from engaging in an ethical evaluation of Hegel’s claim about the nexus between the I and the We, in order to arrive at a clearer understanding of Hegel’s conception of this nexus. I begin with the »concept of spirit« (PS § 177/GW 9, 109) which is, according to Hegel already »on hand for us« (ibid.) in the complete realization of the three moments of self-consciousness. I will then go on to analyze the »concept of self-consciousness« (PS § 176/GW 9, 108), in order then, in a third phase, to be able to give a social-ontological interpretation to Hegel’s equation of »the doubling of self-consciousness in its unity« with the »concept of recognition« (PS § 185/GW 9, 110).

11.1 The Concept of Spirit If one looks for a concise definition of the concept spirit at the beginning of the sixth part of the Phenomenology of Spirit, which is devoted to spirit, one will discover that Hegel makes little effort to explicitly define this concept that is so central for his philosophy explicitly. In the sentence that summarizes the first section, we do however find the following succinct characterization: »However, the essence existing-in-and-for-itself, which as consciousness is at the same time actual and which represents itself to itself, is spirit.« (PS § 437/GW 9, 238) One of the reasons why Hegel does not need to introduce the concept of spirit explicitly here, but rather can explain it with this statement (which, as we shall see, refers to the structure of self-consciousness), is that the concept of spirit has already been introduced in the context of the self-consciousness chapter. This expository procedure can be justified in view of the overall composition of the Phenomenology, since the concept of spirit is introduced on the narrative level of philosophical consciousness. But there remains the question about the systematic reasons that 5 6 7

See for example Frank (1991, p. 31 and p. 415) and Habermas (1968). For details, see ch. 12 and 14. »Gipfel der Perversion« Cf. Tugendhat (1979, p. 349). A critical response that can boast a thorough knowledge of the text is to be found in Siep (1981 and 1992a, p. 217–39).

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prompt Hegel to implicate the concept of spirit in the interplay of the concept of self-consciousness and the pure concept of recognition. In the passages that are relevant for us here, we find two occasions where Hegel looks ahead to the Spirit chapter. On both Hegel refers to his idea of spirit in order to characterize the intersubjective structure of self-consciousness that manifests itself in the relation of recognition. In this vein he refers to the concept of spirit almost in passing: »The elaboration of the concept of this spiritual unity in its doubling presents us with the movement of recognition« (PS § 178/GW 9, 109, my emphasis, M. Q.). A more precise interpretation of the content of this statement can only be given in the third stage of our discussion, when we turn to the »pure concept of recognition« (PS § 185/GW 9, 110). A second, more sustained reference to the conception of spirit occurs in the context of Hegel’s elaboration of the concept of self-consciousness. After having developed the idea, which we will consider in detail in the second phase of our analysis, that the structure of self-consciousness can only manifest itself in the interaction of two self-consciousnesses, Hegel writes: »The concept of spirit is thereby on hand for us. What will later come to be for consciousness will be the experience of what spirit is« (PS § 177/GW 9, 108, my emphasis, M. Q.). Here Hegel is distinguishing carefully, I want to point out, between the level of conceptual connections as they are present for the philosophical consciousness, and the experience of (natural) consciousness itself. The opening paragraphs of the section entitled »Self-sufficiency and non-self-sufficiency of self-consciousness; mastery and servitude« (PS §§ 178–84/GW 9, 109 f.) also operate at the level of philosophical consciousness. This becomes clear when Hegel later transitions over to the other level by saying that the »pure concept of recognition, that is, the pure concept of the doubling of self-consciousness in its unity«, which until now has been the object of the discussion, »is itself now up for examination in terms of how its process appears for self-consciousness« (PS § 185/GW 9, 110, my emphasis, M. Q.). Hegel’s presentation of the connections between self-consciousness, recognition and spirit as objects of experience of natural consciousness is, as I said, not my concern in this chapter. The following is focused instead on the connections Hegel describes from the standpoint of philosophical consciousness, which I will interpret as social-ontological connections. I now return to the quotation in which Hegel explicitly introduces the »concept of spirit« and defines spirit as absolute substance which constitutes the unity of its oppositions in their complete freedom and self-sufficiency, namely, in the oppositions of the various selfconsciousnesses existing for themselves: The I that is we and the we that is I. (PS § 177/GW 9, 108)

Here Hegel is putting forward an ontological thesis: Spirit is, like in the subsequent remarks in the Spirit chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit, characterized as ab-

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solute substance. This substance is characterised as the unity of two different selfconsciousnesses. Hegel describes this unity with the famous phrase »the I that is we and the we that is I«, a phrase whose fame, in my opinion, is inversely propositional to the clarity of its actual content. It is obvious that the individual self-consciousnesses are, as moments, ontologically dependent on spirit, which is absolute substance. At the same time these selfconsciousnesses are characterized as free and independent from the spirit. Furthermore, Hegel claims that individual self-consciousnesses are to be conceived in their freedom and independence as the opposite of spirit. And finally he holds that spirit is the unity of independent self-consciousnesses. This ontological constellation can, I think, neither be sufficiently captured on the model of a part-whole relationship, nor on the models of substance and accident or substance and moment. Hegel’s talk of an »I that is we and a we that is an I« is an attempt to make clear the precise structure of this ontological nexus. But what exactly does this phrase mean?

11.2 The Concept of Self-Consciousness In order to see what’s going on, we need to get clear on the concept of self-consciousness. In doing so, we will bracket two aspects of Hegel’s remarks which he introduces in a complicated way in the first paragraphs of the chapter entitled »The truth of self-certainty«. Neither Hegel’s justification for his claim that the concept of self-consciousness must manifest itself as »life« (PS § 168/GW 9, 104), nor the connection between self-consciousness and »desire« (PS § 174/GW 9, 107) can be reconstructed here. 8 We will thus accept the fact that empirical self-consciousness exist as living organisms without further thematizing Hegel’s efforts to make this fact philosophically intelligible. 9 In this way, we decouple the concept of »genus«, which will be relevant for the analysis of Hegel’s dialectic of recognition and his concept of spirit, from any connotations it may have in the philosophy of nature and interpret it solely according to the scheme of universal and instantiation. 10 Hegel’s thesis that self-consciousness is to be analysed in the first instance as a practical phenomenon, that is, as a volitional attitude, is assumed as a premise for his conclusion that self-consciousness is constituted as desire. 11 Hegel is here 8 9

10

11

On these, see Brandom (2004). An examination of Hegel’s argumentation could not avoid dealing with the question whether this connection is necessary or contingent, which in turn raises questions about the possibility of »artificial life« and self-conscious machines. In his later system, Hegel interprets the natural-philosophical relationship of particular organisms likewise as a preliminary stage of the process of recognition, cf. E § 367 and § 369. In the course of the Phenomenology overall, self-consciousness is introduced as an epistemological model. But this is compatible with the above statement because, according to Hegel, the

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following Fichte, both in the Foundations of Natural Right of 1796 and the System of Ethics in accordance with the Principles of the Wissenschaftslehre published two years later, in claiming that self-consciousness is only possible on the basis of volitional attitudes. Hegel’s Jena Philosophy of Spirit, written in 1805–6 but never published during his lifetime, contains an analysis of the will that agrees with the later theory of the will in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right. 12 On the basis of the practical orientation of self-consciousness qua will, it can be shown that the structure of consciousness remains an integral part of self-consciousness. In other words: Conceiving of oneself as a willing subject that realizes its intentions in action presupposes the assumption of a reality independent of the will. 13 This assumption is not only a precondition for action’s self-understanding, rather it retains the basic structure of consciousness that is characterised by the presupposition of an objective sphere independent of any subjective contribution. At the same time, Hegel follows Fichte in holding that the basic structure of self-consciousness can only be explicated with the help of this sort of consciousness of objects. I will take on board these characteristic assumptions of German Idealism, which one might call the primacy of the practical and its pragmatic roots, without further argument. 14 Hegel interprets self-consciousness on the model of subject and object and, as such, he needs to integrate an independent object as a constitutive moment of self-consciousness. He does this by assuming self-consciousness to be volitionally constituted. I will also avail myself of the subject-object model in what follows, and will not move to consider first-personal propositional attitudes until the third stage of the analysis. Any competent speaker who uses the word »I« correctly refers directly, that is, without employing identifying descriptions, to herself. 15 Furthermore, the speaker knows that she refers to herself by »I«. These two aspects of first-personal selfreference appear in Hegel’s characterization of the I when he writes: »The I is the content of the relation and the relating itself« (PS § 166/GW 9, 103). Somewhat later, Hegel further specifies the role of »I« as a content, clarifying that in the act of direct self-reference, one »is an object as the pure I« (PS § 173/GW

12 13

14

15

volitional structure proves to have a cognitive dimension. I am grateful to Rolf-Peter Horstmann for pressing me on this point. See Hegel (GW 8). Hegel develops this argument in detail in his later philosophy of right; on this, see Quante (1993a, ch. 1). This practical foundation is to be distinguished from the use of pragmatist modes of argument within the system; on this, see ch. 3 and 13. I am putting forward a systematic and interpretative thesis here that I cannot make good on in this chapter. From a systematic point of view, the thesis that »I« refers directly has not remained uncontroversial in contemporary analytic philosophy of language; for an overview, see Canstañeda (1987) as well as Quante (1993a, p. 86–90) (the latter discusses this with reference to Hegel’s mature theory of the will).

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9, 107). At the same time Hegel emphasizes that by »I« he means the act of one’s own reference to oneself. He goes on to explicate his use of the word »I« in the following way: »It is in confronting an other that the I is itself. At the same time, it reaches out over and beyond this other, which, for the I, is likewise merely itself.« (PS § 166/GW 9, 103) Since self-consciousness is conceived according to the subject-object model, self-reference must refer to something that, qua referential object, is distinguished from the act of referring. At the same time this object of reference is constituted by the self-referring act and the subject that performs this act knows it as an object so constituted. Therefore the referring I encompasses this other (= itself in the role of referential content) and knows itself as identical with the object (this is the additional condition guaranteed in the correct usage of »I«). Self-consciousness thus requires, as a structural precondition, that there be a difference between the referring role and the role of being the referential object (in this way the structure of consciousness is preserved in self-consciousness). This presupposed difference must at the same time be ontologically deflated in the structure of self-consciousness, or, as Hegel puts it, it must become a »moment« in self-consciousness’s overall structure (cf. PS § 167/GW 9, 103). 16 It is only on this condition or in this form that the subject can knowingly refer to itself as itself. The independence of the object and the sublation of this independence can, and here Hegel follows Fichte, only be reconciled if first-personal self-reference is understood as a volitional and not merely epistemic attitude. And since the I knows itself as the unity of these two tokens in the moment of referring and being the referential object, it is present to itself as a »genus«, that is, as a universal with instantiations. 17 In order to see why the structure of self-consciousness must be socially constituted, we need a further premise that Hegel also gets from Fichte. First-personal self-reference and the resulting self-conceptualization of a self-consciousness as an I is interpreted as an act of autonomy, that is, as an act of self-constitution of those characteristics that the I attributes to itself qua I. 18 In Hegel’s terms: An I is

16

17

18

»Ontological deflation« refers to the thesis that the entities in question are not wholly independent from one another but rather stand in a relationship of ontological dependence. Hegel’s analysis of self-consciousness makes use of the distinction between »I« as a general indexical expression (type) and as a concrete individual occurrence of an expression (token), the latter of which Hegel had already made use of in his critique of sense certainty at the beginning of the Phenomenology of Spirit. The subsequent development of the self-consciousness chapter takes up the challenge of showing how this difference can become an issue for an individual empirical self-consciousness. For this, Hegel suggests, both the spatio-temporal bodily individuality of a self-consciousness A and the material self-demarcation of A against another self-consciousness B are necessary. Even though the analysis of self-consciousness and the analysis of autonomy are closely interwoven for Hegel and Fichte, they represent two separate philosophical tasks, which must be distinguished in a systematic interpretation, even if they cannot be fully separated.

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»enclosed within itself, and there is nothing within it which is not there by way of itself« (PS § 182/GW 9, 110). 19 If we now ask what kind of act of reference could give rise to a structure that will count as an instantiation of this concept of self-consciousness, we can say, as Hegel does, that self-consciousness must negate its object of reference in its independence. It must conceive of itself as identical with the object for there to be self-consciousness in the first instance. At the same time, this sublation of the independence of the object of reference must be tied to the overcoming of a resistance in which the objectuality or independence of the object manifests itself. This is the why he treats the basic form of all volitional attitudes, namely desire, as a necessary implication of self-consciousness. This object is, at the same time, supposed to be nothing other than the pure I, and hence must be the content of autonomous selfreference. This is why the structure of self-consciousness can only be instantiated under the following two conditions: The object to be sublated must be of the same kind, that is, a self-consciousness (otherwise the requirement of identity, and the consequent assumption of generic identity, would not be secured). And secondly, since autonomy, in so far as it is a presupposition, belongs to the nature of firstpersonal self-reference, the desiderative negation of the independence of the object cannot take the form of an external interference or infringement. If the I qua willing subject conceived its object as externally determined, it would fail to properly conceive of itself as a self-determining being. But Hegel and Fichte are convinced that this is the essence of first-personal self-reference. An autonomous self that negates the presupposed independence of its object in the volitional mode like this can establish adequate self-reference in this sublation only if the referential object is, first, realized and recognized to be a self-consciousness, and if this referential object, second, performs the negation required within this structure autonomously, that is, on its own (cf. PS § 175/GW 9, 108). Under the assumptions that Hegel makes regarding the instantiation of the concept of self-consciousness, then, this concept can only be instantiated in the interaction of two self-consciousnesses. In other words, the concept of self-consciousness is only adequately instantiated if »a selfconsciousness exists for a self-consciousness« (PS § 177/GW 9, 108). This is what is meant by Hegel’s remark that self-consciousness »attains its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness« (PS § 175/GW 9, 108). This result puts us in a position to understand why the adequate instantiation of self-consciousness already displays the structure of spirit, of being with itself in another. But this leaves open the issue of how the I and the We are related. We will clarify this in the third phase of our analysis by considering the structure of the »movement of recognition [Bewegung des Anerkennens]«.

19

Translator’s note: Translation modified.

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11.3 The Pure Concept of Recognition Our results so far present us with the following situation: The concept of selfconsciousness, or self-consciousness as a universal, can only be instantiated in a situation in which two empirical self-consciousnesses interact in a certain way. The interdependence of the universal level of self-consciousness and concrete, empirical self-consciousnesses that are each free for themselves and yet interact in a specific way fulfills the characterization that Hegel has given of spirit as absolute substance. This allows us to give a preliminary interpretation to the formula of the I that is We and the We that is I. The instantiation of the concept of self-consciousness requires an overarching structure that can only be realized through the interaction of two self-consciousnesses. Understood in this way, the concept of self-consciousness, the I, can only be instantiated as a We. But if two self-consciousnesses each instantiate this required structure, then, within this structure, they together are an instantiation of the concept of self-consciousness: a We that is I. If one follows the analysis developed up to this point, then Hegel’s reflections show that not every interaction of a self-consciousness with another self-consciousness instantiates the concept of self-consciousness. A specific form of interaction is required. This specific form of interaction is what is signified by the »We« in Hegel’s famous slogan, but we do not yet know much about its makeup. If one does not want to reduce the talk of the »We« to the thesis that the concept of self-consciousness is instantiated by any kind of interaction between at least two self-consciousnesses, then one must ask, firstly, what kind of interaction Hegel envisages with the talk of »We.« This is where I propose Hegel’s analysis of the »movement of recognition« (PS § 178/GW 9, 109) comes into play. For in the fourth double meaning of the movement of recognition that Hegel identifies in the Phenomenology, we find the specific kind of interaction between two selfconsciousnesses that is necessary and sufficient for the instantiation of the concept of self-consciousness. This is my first thesis. We can put the point by saying that Hegel provides an analysis of group intentions in terms of his theory of recognition, an analysis that is of systematic interest for the contemporary social philosophical debate about we-intentions and collective action. 20 Beyond this there is a problem that has long been an issue of great controversy in the literature on Hegel’s practical philosophy. The second question to be answered is how Hegel envisages the dependence relations between individual self-consciousness and spirit. This much is indisputable: Hegel speaks of spirit as absolute substance and of single self-consciousnesses as mere moments of it. Some have interpreted this as an expression of the ethical devaluation of the individual subject in favor of some collective entity or as an expression of totalitarianism (this 20

On this, see Schweikard (2011) as well as the contributions in Schmid / Schweikard (2009).

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is discussed in more detail in the next chapter). I will not discuss the ethical aspects of this question here, but rather concentrate on clarifying the ontological relations as Hegel describes them in the Phenomenology of Spirit. For we find there, and this is my second thesis, an explicit statement about the two kinds of relations through which consciousnesses are constituted.

11.3.1 Hegel’s Analysis of the We The »multi-sided and multi-meaning intertwining« (PS § 178/GW 9, 109) of the interaction between the two empirical self-consciousnesses A and B, through which alone the concept of self-consciousness can be instantiated, must according to Hegel, be depicted as a »movement of recognition« (PS § 178/GW 9, 109). In this process the »pure concept of recognition« (PS § 185/GW 9, 110) manifests itself, that is, through recognition in the form that is perspicuous for philosophical consciousness. The perspectives of A and B, which later in the text will be the object of, for example, the dialectic of master and slave, are not yet relevant in the context of our discussion. Hegel identifies four »double meanings« associated with this movement of recognition. 21 The first three concern the basic dialectical structure of the selfconsciousness I as conceived within the subject-object model: First the need for an object, whose independence is to be, secondly, negated, and this negation is thirdly, to be performed autonomously on itself. We have come across this structure in the analysis of the pure concept of self consciousness already, so it does not help us any further here. But the fourth ambiguity Hegel describes (PS § 182–83/GW 9, 110) is of a different kind than the first three. Hegel emphasizes this by pointing out that until now (with respect to the first three ambiguities) we have been thinking of recognition as »the activity of one self-consciousness« (PS § 182/GW 9, 110). But since the third constitutive condition of self-consciousness requires the objectified selfconsciousness to perform its negation itself, it is conceptually necessary that this recognition on the part of A be »equally its own activity as well as the other’s activity« (PS § 182/GW 9, 110), that is, that it be also B’s doing. Hegel proceeds to take up the perspectives of A and B on what they and the other each do in order to explicate the interdependence of the two acts of recognition by A and B as »parts« of a process of recognition. I will return to the language of »parts« in my conclusion below. At this point I would like to consider the grammar of the We that, I think, can be found in the following statement: »Each sees the other do the same as what he himself does; each himself does what he demands of the other and for that reason also does what he does only insofar as the other does the same.« (Ibid.)

21

»Movement« here also has a double meaning. It refers to the development of the concept of recognition by means of a recognitive social interaction.

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So as not to make this structure any more complicated than it needs to be, and in order to be able to explicitly articulate the first-personal self-reference involved here, we will describe this process from A’s perspective only: (i) I see that B is acting towards me with a certain intention X, which, first, contains the judgement that I in fact act towards B with the same intention, and which, second, requires and presupposes that I have a specific attitude Y about B and that is, third, the motive for B’s action in which intention X is realized. (ii) I in fact have the intention X in treating B as I do and intentionally adopt attitude Y towards him because B does this and because B requires this specific action of me. When A and B encounter one another, each is disposed to conceive of herself and her partner in the interaction as an autonomous self-consciousnes. This interaction thus implies the recognition of the free determination of the other and thus a restriction of one’s self on the part of both sides. At the same time since A and B conceive of themselves as autonomous actors, this disposition also contains a challenge posed to the other to constrain oneself in order to allow for the other’s autonomy. This structural analysis of the intentions of A and B thematizes not the concrete contents of their intentional dispositions but rather the presuppositions of their mode of recognition and communication. Here it makes no difference, in the first instance, whether I demand that B open the door by appealing to her with reasons as a rational subject or if B makes a demand on me to respect her moral entitlements. What is important is that A and B each understand her influence on the other in such a way that the addressee recognizes that the requisite space is granted for her free self-determination as an autonomous subject. 22 In this structure, A and B each conceives of herself and the other likewise as autonomous self-consciousnesses in such a way that their first-personal intentions are interwoven. 23 In Hegel’s words, »they recognize themselves as mutually recognizing each other« (PS § 184/GW 9, 110). From the perspective of philosophical consciousness, but not from the perspective of A and B themselves, the structure of the We and thus also the basic structure of spirit is instantiated. 24 The success conditions for the instantiation of this structure are namely the symmetric interwovenness of the actions of A and B. As Hegel says: »A one-sided activity would be useless because what is supposed to

22

23

24

This is in fact closely connected to the Gricean and Megglian analysis of communicative intentions. See Meggle (1983). The first-personal intentions of A and B are interwoven with one another because the content of A’s first-personal intention occurs in the content of B’s first-personal intention and vice-versa. In this way Hegel goes beyond the individualistic analysis of communication and collective action just as he goes beyond Searle’s treatment of the We as an unanalyzable black box.

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happen can only be brought about by way of both of them bringing it about« (PS § 182/GW 9, 110). Here Hegel is talking about the specific form of action, which, as he says in the same place, »is inseparably the activity of one as well as the activity of the other« (PS § 183/GW 9, 110, my emphasis M. Q.). Hegel’s presentation of the way that this »process appears for self-consciousness« (PS § 185/GW 9, 110) will not be further discussed in this chapter. We know from the structure of the pure concept of recognition that this course of development leads to the structure of the We that is already instantiated for the philosophical consciousness becoming an object for both of the relata of this structure. In other words, the subsequent course of Hegel’s analysis must show in what way A and B are able to get from the interwovenness of their first-personal intentions to an explicit formulation of a group intention in which the presupposition of the structure that Hegel has revealed becomes an explicit matter of concern for the actors themselves. The other problem which remains open is: Does Hegel give us an answer to the question of the ontological relationships of the actions of A and B? This question will be the object of my closing remarks.

11.3.2 Two Sorts of Recognition Relations I would like to suggest interpreting the sentence which begins the section on the self-sufficiency and non-self-sufficiency of self-consciousness as Hegel’s answer to this problem. This sentence has the same function as the most important passages in the Philosophy of Right and the Encyclopedia: They express Hegel’s basic theses and goals: »Self-consciousness exists in-and-for-itself by and by means of its existing in-and-for-itself for another; i. e., it exists only as a recognized being« (PS § 178/GW 9, 109, my emphasis M. Q.). 25 In the part of the sentence after the semicolon, we find the thesis that selfconsciousness is constituted by relations of recognition. An entity is only a self-consciousness within a relation of recognition. As Fichte would say: Its being consists in its being recognized. The beginning of the statement poses an interpretive difficulty. We can read the sentence in such a way that Hegel is speaking about an empirical self-consciousness A that is recognized by another empirical self-consciousness B. But it is also possible to read the sentence in such a way that we look for a relationship of recognition between self-consciousness as a universal and something other than this universal.

25

Translator’s note: Translation modified. The German reads: »Das Selbstbewußtseyn ist an und für sich, indem, und dadurch, daß es für ein anderes an und für sich ist; d. h. es ist nur als ein Anerkanntes«.

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This interpretation however seems to me not to make sense in the context, since it refers to a development that does not take place until the Spirit chapter. 26 Let us therefore take Hegel’s statement in such a way that he is talking about a relationship of recognition between two empirical self-consciousness is A and B. What is most important for my purposes is that Hegel distinguishes two sorts of recognition relation in the sentence: The »by« and »by means of« relation. In this way we obtain two claims: (AR-1) A self-consciousness is in-and-for-itself by [indem] its being in-and-for-itself for another. (AR-2) A self-consciousness is in-and-for-itself by means of [dadurch, dass] its being in-and-for-itself for another. One could object to the thesis that Hegel is distinguishing here between two kinds of recognition relation if one thought that the second conjunct was only introduced for emphasis or was merely explicative of the first. This simple interpretation is supported by the fact that the semantic content of the term »by [indem]« is a subset of the semantic content of »by means of [dadurch, dass]«. 27 Against this objection I would like to make three points by way of rebuttal. First, as far as I know, there is no statement to be found in Hegel’s entire oeuvre where he uses the terms »by [indem]« and »by means of [dadurch, dass]« together. In light of the prominent position of our statement I take this not to be a coincidence. Second, the semantics of the two relations only partially overlap, so one may well ask why we should not take Hegel to be drawing on this semantic difference here. And finally there are good systematic and, from Hegel’s point of view, also natural reasons to make use of this semantic difference in order to express his specific thesis of the intersubjective constitution of self-consciousness through recognition. This is also how Miller saw the matter in his English translation of the Phenomenology of Spirit. He translates this sentence as follows: »Self-consciousness exists in-and-for-itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another.« 28 Even though, one must say, the English gestures towards the meaning of the German sentence rather than reproducing it, we may still maintain that Miller is hitting on something quite essential with his translation of »indem« as »when« and »dadurch, dass« as »by the fact that«. »Indem« expresses temporal simultaneity, which Miller captures with his »when«. This corresponds to the Latin roots interem and interea: 26

27

28

This does however fit with Hegel’s explication of the concept of spirit (cf. § 177), and in fact belongs in the context of an inquiry into how empirical self-consciousnesses behave towards their own social constitutedness, or, in the words of the last section: How empirical selfconsciousnesses get from the interwovenness of their first-personal intentions to an explicit formulation of we-intentions, in which the intersubjective presuppositions are given for them. On the following, see the entries in Grimm / Grimm (2004). For the Latin roots of the relational expression, see Georges (2002). Cf. Hegel (1977, § 178; my emphasis, M. Q.).

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The first refers to the falling of an event within the time of an action, the latter refers to one action happening during another. When Hegel writes »indem«, I conjecture, he has in mind interea, since he envisages a constitutive relation between two contemporaneous actions. Although it can be synonymous with »indem«, »dadurch, dass«, by contrast, can also have the meaning of a temporal succession and in particular it can describe a causal relation. Miller’s translation also expresses this well by using »by«, which, especially when it is explicitly distinguished from »when«, points to a causal relationship. It is also no argument against this that Miller uses the expression »by the fact« to render the German »dadurch, dass« construction, since in everyday speech we often give facts as causes. 29 I would therefore like to suggest that Hegel’s central thesis can be understood in the following way: A self-consciousness A is constituted by first being – presently, simultaneously – recognized by a self-consciousness B. A self-consciousness A furthermore requires the recognition from a self-consciousness B as a cause, or, as Fichte would say, as a check or a summons. This is necessary for it to constitute itself as a self-consciousness. With the »dadurch, dass« relation, Hegel is taking up Fichte’s theory of recognition. This is based, in the last instance, on a causal and therefore diachronic relation: An entity B, which has already grasped itself as a self-consciousness, »activates« what is until then merely an entity potentially or latently capable of self-consciousness by means of a summons (the self-conciousness B is thus temporally prior to the self-consciousness A). One can call this element of the theory of recognition the individual-genetic element. This initialization aspect however is not foregrounded, at least not on the level of the analysis of the pure concept of recognition, since this constellation is asymmetric and presupposes the existence of an actual selfconsciousness. This notwithstanding, as we established in Hegel’s analysis of A’s and B’s intentions, A »therefore« treats B in a particular way, since A perceives that B has the right intentions and beliefs. Because the interaction is causally mediated, this also means that it can be conceived as a causal relation, so that we, in any case, need to build a causal element into the process of recognition. 30 On the basis of the requirement for symmetry we thus obtain a synchronic structure of mutually conditioning elements, which, in their totality, instantiate the desired structure of 29 30

See the study by Bennett (1988, ch. III). If one assumes that Hegel (like Jaegwon Kim or Alvin Goldman today) defends a fine-grained ontology of events in which events are conceived as instantiations of essential attributes of spatio-temporal positions, then his distinction between »by« and »by means of« enables a causal theory of action to be combined with non-causal relationships of dependence between actions that explanations of action can rely on. On this, see part III of Quante (1993a) and the rebuttal of the thesis there that Hegel accepted the logical connection argument and for that reason could not have accepted a causal theory of action.

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recognition. 31 If I am right, then this causal dimension concerns the motivational facet of recognition: The causal interaction of A and B is necessary for A and B to develop the intentions and beliefs necessary for recognition. 32 In order to establish this thesis of social constitution of self-consciousness as a holistic conception, Hegel needs to go beyond the genetic and motivational causal relation that he expresses with »dadurch, dass«. This takes place, I surmise, by means of his invocation of the »indem« relation, which in the first instance is determined ex negativo by being cordoned off from the »dadurch, dass« relation. From our analysis of the structure of the We, we know that this structure contains two simultaneously existing actions, which are constitutive of one another in the sense that their identity conditions as single actions involve their being moments of the overall structure. In contemporary analytic philosophy of action and event ontology, Jaegwon Kim and Alvin Goldman have shown that there are such constitutive, acausal relationships of dependence between events. 33 When we, for example, greet a friend by raising our arm, we have executed two actions that stand in a constitutive relation to one another. Hegel has, I conjecture, stumbled upon just this ontological relationship of dependence in his analysis of the relationship between self-consciousness and spirit. This relationship presupposes a space of rules and conventions – that is, ethical life – in which an action of a given sort can only be executed by an action of a different kind being executed. 34 Alvin Goldman has rediscovered this and made it systematically relevant to the theory of action, which represents these relationships of dependence constituted by social contexts as tree diagrams. As far as I can tell, Hegel provides no further analysis of this constitutive form of relation in the Phenomenology. We find there, as I will show in the next chapter, also

31

32

33 34

Here we have both a logical-semantic relationship of conditioning (the interconnected firstpersonal intentions) and a causal relationship of conditioning of the particular moments of the interaction between A and B. For this reason, we also cannot analyse Hegel’s conception of recognition as causal generation in the sense of Goldman (1970). I suspect that a reconstruction of Hegel’s theory which assumes the contemporary event ontology would, assuming a finegrained criterion of individuation, have to allow the possibility that events can be genuine parts of events; on this, see Lombard (1986). For this reason, I have only spoken in this note about a fine-grained ontology of events of this kind leaving open the possibility of connecting causal with non-causal relationships of dependence. This assumes that Hegel’s theory of perception contains a causal component. I see in principle no obstacle to attributing to Hegel a complex theory about the acquisition of beliefs in which causal and non-causal relations are likewise called upon. Unfortunately I cannot discuss Hegel’s theory of perception and his ontology of events any further here; on the latter, see Halbig (2002) and de Vries (1988). See Kim (1974) and Goldman (1970). On this in general, see Pippin (2004a, 2004b and 2008); Hegel’s critique of observing reason’s theory of action clearly demonstrates that he conceives of actions as entities constituted by means of their social context; on this, see ch. 4 and 9.

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»vertical« relationships of recognition in which at least one of the two interacting, recognitive self-consciousnesses conceives of itself as a »We«. The movement of recognition in the Phenomenology of Spirit, however, remains confined to the level of horizontal recognition of the interlocking dispositions of I’s. But these offer, I conclude, a great social-ontological potential which Hegel systematically realizes in his later theory of objective spirit. 35

35

A detailed ontological reconstruction of the causal and non-causal conditioning relation would have to show which entities stand in a simultaneous (or atemporal) and non-causal relationship of dependence to one another. In doing so, it would doubtless be necessary to distinguish clearly between logical-semantic, non-causal and causal relationships of dependence, as Hegel himself does.

12. Individual, Community and State Some of the most important debates in modern social and political philosophy revolve around the positions associated with the pairs of terms individualism / holism and liberalism / communitarianism. In particular the dispute between liberalism and communitarianism, which has dominated much of the literature since Michael Sandel’s criticism of John Rawls’s Theory of Justice or earlier, is conditioned by the fact that the poles and antipodes defined by the two pairs of terms are bonded with each other in a way that is difficult to fathom. Even in the dispute, initiated chiefly by Karl Popper, about methodological individualism as a basic method and basic ontology of social philosophy, 1 an ethical dimension surfaces, manifesting itself in the reproach that there is of necessity a tie between political totalitarianism on the one hand and ontological holism on the other. In the liberalismcommunitarianism debate, there are also a number of arguments in which the methodological-ontological level is short-circuited by the normative dimension of ethics and social philosophy. The liberal camp, following the Popperian view, holds that communitarianism leads to ethically unacceptable claims to power over the individual. In the communitarian camp, an analogous criticism is made to the effect that as a consequence of its individualistic methodology and ontology, liberalism leads to the atomization of society and the destruction of social communities. Alongside the complex link between methodological-ontological and normative-ethical positions, there is a second feature that is characteristic of these discussions. The manner in which this discussion refers to Hegel’s practical philosophy, if it does, is striking. For Popper and other liberals who argue in his tradition, Hegel is a precursor to totalitarianism. 2 Communitarians, by contrast, view Hegel as a forerunner of their view, a thinker not to be understood as totalitarian at all, but rather one with a reasonable ethical view. There are, therefore, palpable differences in the way contemporary thinkers approach Hegel’s social philosophy. It also stands to reason that Hegel interpreters of a communitarian bent will be tempted to assign Hegel to their own camp, while interpreters of a liberal inclination will occupy themselves with proving that Hegel must be understood as a liberal rather than a communitarian. * This chapter derives from the following papers co-authored with David Schweikard: »›. . . die Bestimmung der Individuen ist, ein allgemeines Leben zu führen‹. La struttura metafisica della filosofia sociale di Hegel.« In: Quaderni Di Teoria Sociale 5 (2005), p. 221–250 and »’Leading a Universal life’: The systematic relevance of Hegel’s social philosophy«. In: History of the Human Sciences 22 (2009a), p. 58–78. 1 In what follows, whenever social philosophy is referred to, this should be understood to include political philosophy. 2 Cf. Popper (1971) and Lukács (1962).

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Leaving aside the undoubtedly problematic tendency of Hegel scholars to align Hegel with the position they themselves favor, and the limited legitimacy of many of the references to Hegel in current debates about liberalism and communitarianism, this difficulty in classifying Hegel unequivocally is nevertheless philosophically revealing. Ultimately, the problem comes down to the internal conceptual ambiguities within the debates themselves; more precisely, the vagueness of the relationship between the methodological-ontological and the normative dimensions. The thesis that will be defended in this chapter is the following: Hegel’s practical philosophy contains a constellation of methodological-ontological and normative assumptions which, first, falls through the grid of contemporary philosophy and, second, does not suffer from the unclarity of the current theories, and thus, third, represents a live alternative in social and political philosophy. In order to make this thesis plausible, I will first trace the main systematic features of the liberalism-communitarianism debate by specifying its key concepts and the core theses. By means of an explication of Hegel’s concept of the will, which should be regarded as the basic principle of his practical philosophy (at least in the mature system), I will show how Hegel evades the weaknesses of the current discussion and can offer an attractive alternative in political and social philosophy.

12.1 The Structure of the Current Debate 12.1.1 The holism-totalitarianism reproach Political thought in the twentieth century was influenced considerably by an assumption implicit in what was held to be the only tenable form of liberal thought. I will call this view the holism-totalitarianism reproach: (H-T) Anyone who represents holism in political or social philosophy is to be identified with totalitarianism. Anyone who wishes to justify (or safeguard) democracy must be a proponent of individualism. Here my sole concern is with the all too close alignment of totalitarianism and holism on the one hand and democracy and individualism on the other. If one assumes the plausible thesis that the meaning of ›totalitarianism‹ is a specific normative conception of the relationship between the individual and society or the state, then one must infer that ›individualism‹ in H-T and ›holism‹ are meant as methodological-ontological concepts (since otherwise H-T would be reduced to an empty terminological claim). If we furthermore accept that totalitarianism is to be understood as a position that either allows individuals no claim to ethical legitimacy, or else subordinates the claims of the individual to those of some hyperindividual body like the state, society and The People whenever the claims of the

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individual and the totality conflict, then we can regard every normative position in social philosophy as »democratic« or, as I will say in the following, »liberalistic« – so long as it denies this core thesis of totalitarianism. If it is granted that individuals have ethically valid claims that cannot, or at least cannot in every case, be legitimately subordinated to the demands of supra-individual social or political entities, then we are – in my sense – dealing with a liberalistic conception. Letting normative and methodological-ontological questions run together in this way has not only led to confusion in recent social philosophy, and to participants of discussions talking past one another on key issues. 3 It has had two further consequences, one of a general nature and the other relevant most of all in connection with Hegel’s social philosophy. The general effect is that attractive theoretical options are disregarded because it is assumed that there must be a close connection between the methodological-ontological and normative levels. With reference to Hegel, the specific upshot is that his social philosophy is consistently misconstrued, because Hegel in point of fact takes up one of the options subsumed by H-T and develops it in his theory of Objective Spirit. For this reason, in the following two sections I would like to introduce a more fine-grained terminology which distinguishes resolutely between the methodological-ontological and the normative levels. 4 Subsequently, a preliminary interpretation of Hegel’s social philosophy will be put forward on the basis of this conceptual framework.

12.1.2 Individualism and Holism: The Methodological-Ontological Level In this section, I offer more precise definitions of individualism and holism and of the concepts which underlie them, so as to be able to characterize the methodological and ontological underpinnings of these concepts in social philosophy. The aim is not to present the complete set of the concepts used in social philosophy here, but rather to examine more closely those terms that have been particularly prominent in the current debate emerging from H-T. For our purpose, the following four concepts are crucial: Individual: An individual human being with mental properties and capacities capable of rational agency (including decisions);

3 4

This is how Taylor (1989) diagnoses the situation. This is not to claim that there are no dependence relations between the methodologicalontological and the normative levels. But they are more indirect than suggested in H-T and they actually leave a lot more space for theoretical elaboration (cf. Taylor, 1989). Our first condition of adequacy for any social philosophy has it that the evaluative-normative and the methodological-ontological questions need to be dealt with separately. Only then can the question as to how these two levels are interrelated be posed meaningfully.

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Social entity: An entity which (1) consists of individual human beings as proper parts, as well as whatever consists of human actions, forms of action or exercised abilities and relations between individuals as parts, and which (2) is not reducible to individuals and their intrinsic properties; Intrinsic property: The property F is intrinsic if and only if an entity x can have F independently of what is the case as regards entities that are neither identical with x nor parts of x; Holistic property: The property H is holistic if and only if an entity x can only have H if (1) at least one entity y which is different from x and at least one property G which is different from H must exist in order for x to have H; and if (2) H is not reducible to intrinsic properties of x and y. At this point some explanations are in order. First, our definition of social entities embraces not only social groups (e. g. families and organizations), but also institutions such as the market, the law and the state. In addition, social entities can contain both individuals and social entities as proper parts, since complex social relations can only be understood on the basis of these concepts. Second, I use the term »property« here as a general term to cover both relations and properties in the narrow sense; additionally, capacities and defining characteristics should also be included. Third, at this point no decision has been made whether x or y have to be individuals, or whether they can also be social entities (in the next step, I will be introducing such distinctions in order to define different forms of holism). Fourth, it should be noted that a property is not holistic simply by virtue of the fact that it is the property of a social entity (in other words: This conceptual framework does not preclude the possibility of there being intrinsic properties of social entities). In order to avoid terminological confusion, I will refer to an irreducible property of social entities as an SE property in what follows, whereby »irreducible« means that the property cannot be reduced to the intrinsic or holistic properties of individuals that are parts of the bearer of the intrinsic SE property. Finally, I will not attempt here to further scrutinize the concept of reduction. Instead, I will take for granted that the only acceptable interpretations of the concept of reduction are those that are compatible with the established standards of the disciplines concerned with the relevant topics, and that do not allow individualism to be trivially true or trivially false (the same applies to the concept of irreducibility). (a) Individualism in social philosophy On this basis, the position of individualism in social philosophy can be characterized by the following three theses: 5

5

Here I give the material versions of these three theses. They can easily be translated into metalinguistic versions.

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(I-1) All social phenomena can be reduced to individuals, their intrinsic properties and their action, or to the causal interaction between individuals and their intrinsic properties or actions. (I-2) There are no social entities, no SE properties and no holistic properties. 6 (I-3) There are no irreducible social regularities; social regularities can be reduced to laws that apply to individuals and their properties. 7 These three theses in turn call for some elucidation. In I-1, causal interactions between individuals are accepted as genuine constituents. This is necessary so as to avoid holism being trivially true. For even individualism must recognize that human individuals can only develop their intellectual properties and abilities (speech, rationality) in processes that involve socialization. (b) Holism in social philosophy (a provisional definition) On the basis of what we have said so far, we can give the following provisional definition of holism in social philosophy: (H-1) Not all social phenomena can be reduced to individuals, their intrinsic properties, their actions and the causal interaction between individuals and their intrinsic properties or actions. (H-2) There are holistic properties or SE properties or social entities. (H-3) There are irreducible social regularities. Thus defined, holism denies the core theses of individualism from both an ontological and a methodological perspective. It is not committed to denying the existence of intrinsic properties of individuals, nor must it deny the explanatory relevance of the entities or regularities postulated by individualism. Furthermore, the mere assumption that holistic properties (or even: only the holistic properties) are fundamental properties of individuals is not one of the necessary elements of holism. Even so, the ontological commitments of holism exceed those of individualism. Through the inclusive »or« in (H-2), however, holism is not committed to the existence of social entities, so that it is not committed to the existence of SE properties either. 8 As a final comment on this provisional definition, it should be pointed out that through (H-1) the holist is committed to postulating dependence relations 6

7

8

At this point I depart from the strictly separate treatment of social entities and the properties of such entities as carried out by Ruben (1985). In contrast to Ruben, I do not discuss genuinely social, holistic properties in relation to individuals. Consequently, only a limited parallel emerges in terms of the two variants of socio-philosophical holism discussed in section (c) below. In order to avoid needlessly restricting the explanatory scope to causal explanations, the concept of a law employed here should be understood to encompasses more than just causal laws in the classical sense. In what follows, I will not consider positions that postulate social entities but deny the existence of SE properties, even though this is at least theoretically a live possibility.

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between individuals (or between individuals and social entities) which outstrip causal interdependences. The stronger relations will in the following generally be construed as constitutive relations, but the specific form these relations assume will be left open. 9 (c) Two kinds of holism in social philosophy In defining intrinsic and holistic properties, we did not stipulate whether the bearers of these properties are individuals or social entities. By deciding this question, we can distinguish two different forms of holism in social philosophy. Horizontal social-philosophical holism can be characterized by the following three basic assumptions: (H-1) Not all social phenomena can be reduced to individuals, their intrinsic properties, their actions and the causal interaction between individuals and their intrinsic properties or actions. (H-4) There are holistic properties, but no SE properties and no social entities. (H-3) There are irreducible social regularities. In contrast, vertical social-philosophical holism can be characterized by the following three basic assumptions: (H-1) Not all social phenomena can be reduced to individuals, their intrinsic properties, their actions and the causal interaction between individuals and their intrinsic properties or actions. (H-5) There are holistic properties, SE properties and social entities. (H-3) There are irreducible social regularities. Here again, two explanations are called for. First: Horizontal social-philosophical holism, as characterized here, presupposes only those holistic properties which are based on relations between individuals, whereas vertical holism also postulates independent supra-individual entities with genuine properties; the difference between the two is therefore to be found in (H-4) and (H-5). Second: (H-1) and (H-3) express the assumptions common to both of them that are usually taken to be adequate characterizations of holism by social-philosophical individualists.

9

The relation of constitution is used, for example, to describe the relation between material object and work of art (cf. Wollheim, 1980) or between human organism and person (Baker, 2000, ch. 4 and 5). With respect to issues of social philosophy, Hegel, as we will see, employs the relation of recognition as a constitutive one. For a general account of the relation of constitution see Baker (2000, ch. 2). For a discussion of various types of relations in social ontology cf. De George (1984).

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12.1.3 Liberalism and Communitarianism: the Normative Level The normative level of the debate refers to the ethically appropriate relationship between the individual and society, whereby special emphasis is placed on the role of the state and, at least in the anarchist and Marxist tradition, on the function of law. For our purpose it will be sufficient to distinguish four options: 10 Libertarianism gives absolute priority to the basic rights of individuals and regards the state as an evil to be minimized to the greatest extent possible and whose only function is to safeguard the conditions of individuals’ negative freedom. Moderate liberalism gives absolute priority to the basic rights of individuals and regards the state as a necessary instrument that should not only safeguard the conditions of individuals’ negative freedom, but should also provide the conditions of positive freedom necessary for the development and exercise of individual autonomy. Liberal communitarianism places a premium on the basic rights of individuals, but allows these rights to be weighed up against the ethical claims of social entities, whereby the state (or some other social entity) is regarded as possessing not only instrumental but also intrinsic value. Anti-liberal communitarianism recognizes only the ethical claims of social entities and either denies individuals any intrinsic worth or subordinates this worth to the legitimate ethical claims of social entities. Needless to say, the debate between liberals and communitarians takes place at the normative level and generally remains confined to the poles of moderate liberalism and liberal communitarianism (albeit with the exception of the neoliberal criticism of these two positions, which can be classed under libertarianism). In doing so, both sides try to drive their opponent to the respective extreme position. At the same time, each side points to the methodological and ontological presuppositions of the other in an effort to show the opponent’s normative position to be inadequate. In this way, the communitarians criticize the ontological conception of the »unencumbered self« on which liberalism is based, claiming that it leads to atomization, depoliticization and alienation. 11 Conversely, liberals bring into play the social entities and SE properties used by communitarians. True to H-T tradition, liberals warn against state paternalism and the subordination of individual autonomy to collective well-being. However, the responses of authors who have defended Rawls against Sandel’s criticism, including Rawls’s own, show that the connections between the method10

11

In contrast to most liberal theorists, I define the positions exclusively in terms of priority rules. Neither the role of traditions, nor the question as to whether communitarianism is necessarily committed to cultural relativism, figure in these distinctions (in contrast to, for example, Giusti, 2003). I focus solely on the functional definition of the relation between individual and community and on the normative consequences that it gives rise to. Cf. Sandel (1984).

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ological-ontological and normative levels are in fact of an indirect kind. On the one hand, certain ontological premises (such as those which claim there are constitutive social conditions for the existence of persons) suggest certain normative positions more than others, but do not force them. Conversely, communitarian ideas can be integrated in an individualistic ontology – as is clear from the development between Rawls’s Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism. The ontological level can clearly provide limited conditions for the (range) of norms and evaluations, but methodological and ontological positions do not yield answers to evaluative and normative questions about the proper relationship of the individual to society and the function and value of the state. Whereas it is clear that individualism and holism are incompatible, liberalism and liberal communitarianism represent the end points of a continuum given by weighing up various competing claims. Accordingly, Michael Walzer sees communitarianism not as a rival position, but rather as a necessarily recurrent critical corrective to liberalism. 12 This shows that the methodological-ontological and normative dimensions of the problems can be distinguished. It is now also clear that H-T is not mandatory, because, first, it makes no distinction between various forms of holism, and second, only one of many possible constellation of the two levels (vertical holism plus anti-liberal communitarianism) is equated with holism. In the second part of this chapter, I will show how the conceptual analyses undertaken in this section allow us to classify Hegel’s social philosophy in such a way as to elucidate why he does not fit into the classical grid of individualism / liberalism versus holism / communitarianism. This will allow us to show that there is an alternative to this schema implicit in his metaphysics of the will.

12.2 The Will as a Basic Principle in Hegelian Social Philosophy At the very beginning of his Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel explains that the will is the basis of social life (PR § 4). Furthermore, he leaves us in no doubt that this basic principle of objective spirit is intended to establish a connection with the tradition of the Enlightenment and the philosophy of autonomy of Rousseau, Kant and Fichte. But at the same time, his Philosophy of Right contains explicit criticism of liberal social philosophy, which is primarily manifested in Hegel’s conception of freedom, but also, for example, in his criticism of contractarianism. His social philosophy therefore weaves together motifs and traditions in a complex way, which has led to Hegel being championed by both liberal and the anti-liberal interpreters.

12

Cf. Walzer (1990).

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The ambivalence of this reception can be explained by two features of Hegel’s philosophy itself. On the one hand, Hegel aims to show us the ambiguities and deficiencies in the development of modern social philosophy’s concepts and theories. On the other hand, Hegel develops a complex social philosophy on the basis of his metaphysics of the will, one which does not fit the mould of any of the contemporary alternatives. The thesis I now wish to elaborate and substantiate is that Hegel, in his social philosophy, defends vertical holism combined with liberal communitarianism. In what follows, I will aim to make this interpretation plausible with reference to some of the central elements of Hegel’s theory.

12.2.1 The Will as the Basic Principle of Objective Spirit Why is the will suited to be the basic principle of a holistic social philosophy? Prima facie, the will may appear instead to be a principle of an atomistic sort. But if we examine the details of how Hegel defines the concept of the will on the basis of his Logic of the Concept (PR §§ 5–7), we see that Hegel in no way has in mind the will in the sense of an individual capacity. In fact, for Hegel the individual’s consciousness belongs equally as much to the capacity for free choice [Wahlfreiheit] as it does to the overall structure of the will (PR § 5). It only comes to expression in the structure of the will in the form of the first-personal self-reference that this structure implies (ibid.). As such, an individual subject conscious of her »own« freedom of choice faces a host of possible contents of the will from which she can make her choice. Reaching a decision regarding a concrete content is what Hegel refers to as the »particularization [Besonderung] of the ›I‹« (PR § 6), whereby a concretely willing subject comes into existence as a result of her own decision making. The basic structure of the will, by contrast, is described using the category of »individuality [Einzelheit]«, (PR § 7) which at this point, as Hegel clearly points out, is to be understood »not in its immediacy as a unit – such as the individuality of our common idea [Vorstellung] – but rather in accordance with the concept of individuality« (PR § 7 R). Hegel emphasizes that one should not conceive of the constellation of »universal-particular-individual [Allgemeines-Besonderes-Einzelnes]« in such a way that it seems possible to start from the general moment as a universal and formal basis that either generates contents out of itself or absorbs prescribed contents and brings them into a rational order of preference. Nor should one try to justify the moment of self-consciousness inductively, on the basis of natural instincts or inclinations. Both self-consciousness in general and the contents of concrete decisions are described by Hegel as moments abstracted from a complex structure. Since they only show up as a result of being isolated, they are characterized as »abstract negativity« (PR § 6 R). Both are, according to Hegel, ontologically dependent, but in no way unreal or normatively trivial, moments of the individuality that constitute the basic

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structure of the concept. Individuality, conversely, is not a third moment in addition to the moments of universality and particularity, but rather the internal connection between the other two moments. This relationship must itself be suitably structured. That is, it must at once represent the overall structure of the other two moments. This in turn requires the moments of universality and particularity themselves to exhibit a suitable internal structure. That is, they likewise must each contain suitable representations of this overall structure and their respective functions within it. Only when individuals conscious of their freedom of choice (the moment of universality) and with the ethical whole in view (the moment of individuality) make free decisions (the moment of particularity) in favor of contents that are both adequate and spontaneously generated by the will – that is, legal, moral and ethical claims – only then has the autonomy or freedom of the will been fully realized. 13 In order for this to succeed, a society must be suitably structured. This requires it to be differentiated into social subsystems, each with a specific form of claim that is recognized as legitimate. The social world needs to be organized in this way for autonomous individuals to understand themselves as at the same time freely existing moments of an ethical society. This overall structure of the will developed by Hegel is an attractive option for social philosophy, because the will, as the »substance« of social phenomena, is constitutive of them. Social phenomena are on the one hand connected with ethical claims in an irreducible way and thus also with that ability of subjects to achieve recognition. On the other hand, most social phenomena can be understood as contexts of interaction constituted through implicit or explicit rules and institutions, making the concepts of rule-following and action into central ontological elements. This ontological dimension of constitution through actions, rules and relationships of recognition comprises the core of Hegel’s concept of right. At the same time, the three spheres of right (Abstract Right, Morality and Ethical Life) and Hegel’s theory of action in the Philosophy of Right are developed as structural moments of the will. 14 In this way, Hegel’s ontology not only accounts for the intentional constitution of social phenomena. Over and above this, his concept-logical 15 and teleological conception of the will prevents one of the moments of will from being turned into the sole basis of social philosophy and hence the temptation to enter into onesided reduction. Hegel explains why his social philosophy is strongly opposed to this tendency with specific reference to the concept of the will:

13 14 15

Cf. ch. 14 and also the concept of social freedom in Neuhouser (2000). Cf. Quante (1993a). By ›concept-logical‹ I mean Hegel’s conception of the concept as expounded in the third part of his Science of Logic, the Logic of Concept.

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The only thing which remains to be noted here is that, when we say that the will is universal and that the will determines itself, we speak as if the will were already assumed to be a subject or substratum. But the will is not complete or universal until it is determined, and until this determination is superseded and idealized; it does not become will until it is this self-mediating activity and this return into itself. (PR § 7 R)

Social phenomena, in so far as they are tied to this teleological orientation and depend essentially on relationships of recognition, exhibit an irreducibly evaluative and normative dimension. In other words, they cannot be understood solely on the basis of concepts such as power, differentiation or stability. Moreover, the conceptlogical constitution of the will qua concept contains the idea that the whole and its parts exhibit a variety of dependency relations – Hegel speaks of »moments« to emphasize their reciprocal dependence. It is these dependencies among the parts and between the parts and the whole that make Hegel’s social philosophy holistic. Autonomy, constituted as it is by the basic structure of the will, is not primarily an intrinsic property that individuals possess in virtue of their rational nature. Rather, autonomy is the distinguishing mark of a rationally structured society in which various legitimate claims are classified into groups and differentiated and recognized according to their respective modes of validity and justification: (1) It is the role of society as a whole to realize and recognize the aspects of individual freedom (universality) and the natural aspect of the will (particularity), which both belong to the overall structure of will of necessity. This takes place both via the establishment of spaces for action (such as the market) and the implementation of basic rights, alongside institutions that guarantee them. (2) Meanwhile, the singular individual needs to be aware of these same social institutions and recognize their legitimacy. This is not to say that individuals cannot take a critical stance to the norms accepted in their social world. Hegel conceives of the sphere of morality as a space for such criticism, where individuals exercise their autonomy. (Civil society can also, according to Hegel, be understood in part as a space for individual autonomy and its legitimation). In addition, as a liberal thinker of the Enlightenment he insists that the autonomy of individuals within society must be recognized and protected by a guarantee of fundamental rights. At the same time, Hegel reveals the antiindividualist strand of his argument by emphasizing that such critical consciousness of one’s own social world must be selective and depends on a socially shared ethical life. 16 But above all, as his criticism of contractualist theories bears out,

16

For a detailed reconstruction of this default and challenge model, see the next chapter.

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he presupposes that the individual consent of individually autonomous subjects cannot be the sole basis for shared norms and ethical practices. On the contrary, Hegel maintains that the social world depends for its existence on the »rectitude [Rechtschaffenheit]« (PR § 150) and »virtue [Tugend]« (ibid.) of ethical individuals whose »self-consciousness« (PR § 146) is seated in a social world that does not appear »alien« to them (PR § 147). And the identification of the individual with his or her social world is a necessary precondition for actually perceiving oneself as an ethical subject entitled to demand reasons. 17 As we will see in the next chapter, this identification of the individual with his social world is mediated by »further reflection« and »insight grounded on reasons« (PR § 147 R) that comes down to a basic attitude of »faith« (PR § 147), a shared set of values, ideas and standards, and »trust« (ibid.) in the rationality and justice of the social world. (3) Thirdly, recognition is also anchored in the interaction of individuals, in which they regard themselves as persons and subjects, i. e. conceive themselves and treat one another as bearers of rights and initiators of actions. 18 Being a person or a moral subject is not, according to Hegel, a natural property, but rather one that is only possible within a social context. Such a context allows, for example, intended and unintended consequences to be distinguished in the ascription of an action and the value of an action’s result to be distinguished from its ethical qualities. If a person is to attain being and reality, the internal relation of will needed by a concrete individual to differentiate herself qua person from herself qua natural living creature must become part of the social world. According to Hegel, this requires socially recognized claims to possession and ownership. Since the will, as a basic structure, is not restricted to psychological or mental states for Hegel and in its essence is not constituted by individuals but by the social community as a whole, comprising the relations between its members, Hegel’s philosophy must ultimately be understood as holistic, in the specific sense that the social relations within the community provide its members with properties that are (and which they consider to be) essential to them. At the same time, this basic nature of the will exists only as a pattern of interaction between individuals and in so far as these individuals have an understanding of their roles. In other words, it is only conceivable as a framework consisting of actual social practices and the practical knowledge acquired by individuals through participation in them. For this reason, Hegel’s social-philosophical holism does not reduce to the thesis that there 17

18

It is for this reason that Hegel does not understand the sublation of morality in ethical life as a displacement of individual autonomy, but as an indication of the dependence of one’s understanding of oneself as a specifically moral subject on a basic and shared horizon of norms and values. This ontological dependence does not entail the negation of individual autonomy in Hegel’s view, since this autonomy is a necessary moment – but precisely just a moment (!) – of the will; cf. Siep (1992a). See ch. 9 and 10 of this book for details.

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is a supraindividual »mega-subject« of which real humans are merely dependent and normatively insignificant parts. His view is far more refined than this. 19

12.2.2 Dependence Relations If we shift to focus on their content, then the evaluative and normative dimensions of Hegel’s practical philosophy lie in the relations of reciprocal recognition between individuals specific social institutions or other entities, as well as those between individuals themselves. If we focus on the function of these recognition relations as constitutive rules, then their ontological dimension comes to light. From this point of view, recognitive relations can be divided into three types: individual to social entity, individual to individual, and social entity to social entity. In addition, three directions of these recognition relations can be distinguished: horizontal, top down and bottom up. 20 In all, we obtain a nine-cell matrix into which we can place Hegel’s examples from the Philosophy of Right according to the type of recognition relation they each exhibit. The entries in the individual fields should be understood as the Relation conceived as . . .

Individual to individual

Horizontal

Person Acting subject Ethical subject

Top down

Bottom up

Individual to social entity

Social entity to social entity State

Person Acting subject Ethical subject Right Ethical life Morality State

Family Market Religion Family Ethical life Morality Market State

Table 3: Recognition as a Constitutive Relation 19

20

In addition to these holistic aspects specific to social philosophy (such as his intersubjective conception of personality or and his action-theoretic ascriptivism), Hegel opts for holistic positions on other systematic levels. These include his claim that self-consciousness in general, i. e. the self-ascription of mental states, is constituted intersubjectively; cf. the analysis of the ›I-We‹ structure in the Phenomenology of Spirit in Schweikard (2007). Furthermore, he subscribes to a holistic philosophy of mind, as Halbig (2002) has shown, and, on the most general level, in the Science of Logic he argues for a holistic conception of fundamental categories, which acquire their meaning only via their positions in the entire »network« of concepts. Additionally, with regard to the normative dimension of the relation of recognition, symmetric and asymmetric relations have to be distinguished. I cannot explore this further ramification here.

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distinctions and circumstances on the basis of which individuals or social entities are recognized and through which a constitutive relation exists. 21 Explanation: As discussed above, being a person (or an agent or an ethical subject) are for Hegel holistic properties which assume their »form of existence [Dasein]« (PR § 32) on the one hand by means of intersubjective recognition relations between individuals (= horizontal) and on the other through the development of social spheres embracing these special »shapes [Gestaltungen]« of the will (ibid.) (top down). The institution of the state is an example of a horizontal constitutive relation: »[E]ach state is consequently a sovereign and independent entity in relation to others. The state has a primary and absolute entitlement to be a sovereign and independent power in the eyes of others, i. e. to be recognized by them« (PR § 331). Furthermore, a rational state, according to Hegel, recognizes not only the essential embodiments of will that are manifested in the individual subject, that is, in the social roles of persons, agents or ethical subjects (top down: individual to social entity). It must also recognize specific social institutions in which the claims based on these embodiments can develop freely and analogously to their status within the structure of the will as a whole (top down: social entity to social entity). If the family is understood as a place of refuge for religious communities and similar such substate social entities, then these can become an integral part of a good and just social state only when they are recognized by the state both in their own right and in their internal limitations. Hegel’s entire Philosophy of Right should be read as an attempt to defend the legitimacy of such specific spheres by describing their connate logics, identifying the forms of the will on which they are based and defining the specific claims that arise out of them. At the same time, this access makes it possible either to equalize rival claims by integrating them into the overall structure of will through assignment to different spheres of action or to domesticate them by formulating rules of precedence. The legitimation of individual social entities and the social world as a whole can, according to Hegel, only succeed when the parts of each overarching social entity identify with that overarching social entity and see themselves chiefly as its moments. The individual must perceive her citizenship in a state or membership within a family as an essential part of her own self. At the same time, she must be able to interpret her role as family member, member of civil society or religious subject in such a way that these are compatible with her role as a member of the state and with her active participation in it. This is why the state is, in reality, dependent for its continued existence on its success in instilling the right attitudes into its citizens, i. e. motivating and stabilizing an appropriate internal representation of their social roles and overall statuses. In order to be actual and authentic, social institutions within the state also need to be recognized by individuals prepared to fulfill the roles connected with these 21

By a »constitutive relation« I mean a relation in which or through which at least one of the relata acquires a holistic property.

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institutions and also to assume the duties these roles involve (Hegel’s explanation of the necessity of punishment for the validity of abstract right is a clear example of this). But, according to Hegel, recognition by the members of civil society that there are in fact social duties and claims that transcend the connate logic of the »state of necessity« and the »state of the understanding« (Not- und Verstandesstaat, cf. PR § 183) is also needed (otherwise a system of needs left to itself would destroy the overarching social structure to which it belongs).

12.2.3 Hegel’s Liberal Communitarianism So far, our discussion has been focused on finding support for the first claim of our interpretive hypothesis. I would now like to briefly argue for our second thesis: That, in his Philosophy of Right, Hegel defends a form of liberal communitarianism. Doing so will also bring to light additional holistic aspects of Hegel’s view. Contrary to the suggestion in H-T, Hegel does not infer from the ontological dependence of individuals on one another and on social bodies that, qua parts of this whole, lack intrinsic value. Although he assigns intrinsic SE properties to social entities, he does not subscribe to the view that the evaluative and normative claims of these supra-individual social entities permit, let alone compel, the categorical subordination of individual claims. Two kinds of argument speak for this interpretation, which places Hegel firmly within the tradition of thought that counts individual autonomy as a precious achievement of the modern age that we must hold on to. On a pragmatic level, Hegel holds that the stability and efficiency of social institutions depends on the degree to which they succeed in obtaining the recognition of their parts (i. e. the individuals). But on Hegel’s view this can in the end only succeed if the social entities in question are part of the identity of these individuals and can be viewed by them as such a part (this can range from simple emotional attitudes to complex philosophical reasoning). 22 According to Hegel’s central considerations, there must be a structural identity between the autonomous individual, social entities and the social world as a whole if this identity and the recognition resting on it are to be realized. This core idea is the main reason Hegel based his Philosophy of Right on the principle of will. For in this way there is a guarantee that, if the philosophical reconstruction is successful, all integral parts of the social world participate in the same structure of which they are diversely complex manifestations. Since the will has the basic structure of the concept and is orientated towards realizing its conceptual nature qua idea in the social world, Hegel’s overall conception aims at showing that the essence of the will as a self-determining and cognitively 22

On the practical identity of persons, see Quante (2007a, ch. 8 and 9).

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autonomous will must be realized in three ways: (1) through the existence of autonomous individuals, whose justified claims attain reality in safeguarded spheres of action; (2) through the establishment of a differentiated social world that puts all moments and embodiments of the will in their proper place (this is the representation of the overall structure on the level of the whole); and (3) through the internal representation of the overall structure within the self-conception of individuals via their various role-concepts (e. g. legal person, family member, member of a closed society or citizen). This metaphysical structure on the one hand prevents individual autonomy from being negated on the basis of the assumption that only the social whole is fully autonomous – an assumption Hegel himself shares. And on the other hand, it actually requires that the social whole aim to acknowledge as much autonomy as possible, since this is the only way in which it is feasible for the overall structure to be realized both in its moments and in their relationships to each other and their internal representations. It is thus true, pace some interpretations of Hegel, that the recognition of individual freedom and the justification of individual claims stand in harmony with Hegel’s overall metaphysics. This shows why Hegel can and must combine holistic social philosophy with a liberal position. But the question remains whether his favored institutional arrangement succeeds in adequately safeguarding these spheres of freedom. The problem of balancing the differing and sometimes rival claims within a society is, at any rate, not solved by the guidelines Hegel offers. However, in my opinion, this is not a shortcoming, but rather expresses an appropriate level of modesty on the part of (Hegelian) philosophy. For this is a problem to be solved not by philosophers, but by the individuals themselves. Concrete freedom, whose basic structure we find presented so impressively in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, must be filled out with content in both social and political everyday life. On this concrete level, the concept loses its constitutive strength and makes room for the experiences and power of judgement of finite subjects attempting to realize the good.

12.3 The Appeal of Hegel’s Social Philosophy One may well ask what the systematic payoff of a complex reconstruction of Hegel’s social philosophy like this is. The reader interested in the interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy will surely welcome my detailed rebuttal of the holism–totalitarianism reproach. But does contemporary social philosophy gain anything from this, beyond a more accurate historical understanding? My reconstruction has at least yielded the result that Hegel’s vertical holism cannot, just on conceptual grounds, rule out the possibility of paternalistically limiting individual self-determination. Furthermore, Hegel himself, in his time, supported constraints on individual freedom

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that are unacceptable by present-day standards. Although these may not follow conceptually from his theory, they are indeed compatible with it. Should we not then, in order to foreclose such a possibility once and for all, take the standpoint of individualism or, at most, of horizontal holism? What do we benefit systematically by further elaborating the conceptual resources of Hegel’s social philosophy that go beyond these two options? In my view, the Hegelian outlook has two important advantages that justify a systematic defence of his refined conception of social components. What is gained in this way outweighs the undeniable problem of avoiding the legal paternalism which Hegel’s systematic framework indeed allows. Rather than eliminating this by conceptual fiat, it seems to me a more promising approach to temper such paternalism via a delicate procedure of complex reflection and historical learning. The first advantage that distinguishes Hegel’s social philosophy is of an explanatory nature: As subjects living in complexly organized societies, we experience this social world as something independent and often even as something that exerts a decisive power on us. This phenomenal datum of the experience of reification and alienation is not only a crucial topic in critical social theories that traditionally go back to Marx, Lukács and the Frankfurt School. 23 It is also a fact of our modern self-consciousness and social consciousness that every social philosophy must seek to explain. It is another matter whether, like Bruno Bauer or the young Marx for example, one perceives every reification as an instance of alienation and hence as a symptom of an ethically unacceptable constraint on human freedom, or – more realistically and closer to later Hegel – whether one asks in a more differentiating fashion how the reification of human interaction that is unavoidable within complex socialization should be framed in institutions and systems so as to be ethically acceptable (or at least tolerable). 24 The first task of social philosophy must be to provide the analytic instruments to capture these phenomena fully and to make them available for a normative discussion. On my view, neither methodological individualism nor a holism that is confined to horizontal relations is ontologically robust enough to reconstruct the experience of reification and alienation satisfactorily. But without an adequate reconstruction of this sort, the normative question whether alienation is something to be abolished per se or whether some level of alienation is ethically permissible cannot properly be broached. Hegel’s social philosophy is a conceptually rich, internally differentiated and systematic social ontology that offers a suitable basis for the treatment of these normative questions. The second advantage is an ethical one: Hegel’s analysis of the concept of the will and his conception of autonomy are based on the assumption that neither individual agents (persons or moral subjects) nor their actions are able to completely realize their autonomy. His speculative philosophy of the self-explication and self23 24

Cf. Quante (2009b). Cf. Quante (2010b).

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development of the will qua concept (in accordance with his speculative understanding of the concept) enables him to conceive all social phenomena as graded manifestations of self-determination. Hegel can thereby avoid those alternatives according to which either the lone individual in its decisions, or supra-individual social entities (such as communities or, as for Hegel paradigmatically, the state) can be isolated bearers of autonomy. At the same time, within the framework of his speculative-logical analysis of the social, he can develop the thesis that fullblown autonomy is adequately realized only on the level of social entities. In virtue of his liberal communitarianism this does not lead to the elimination or to the principled subordination of individual autonomy (as, for example, Karl Popper or Ernst Tugendhat 25 claim). But this theoretical constellation enables one to avoid a dilemma that Hegel thinks is characteristic of modernity: Since the individual’s claim to autonomy can be fulfilled neither in single decisions nor in his or her biography, the attempt to orientate one’s life around the ideal of autonomy either amounts to an overly optimistic demand or it necessitates construing autonomy as something in principle unattainable. The first horn of this dilemma carries the risk that the ethical ideal loses its motivating power for individuals. In contrast, the second horn carries the risk that individual or socially institutionalized realizations of autonomy are devalued by an exaggerated normative critique. Both risks can lead to the corrosion of the identification of the individual with the universal that is necessary for self-understanding and the legitimation of democratically constituted societies. Against this, Hegel’s claim is that full-blown autonomy is only realized on the level of social entities and is attainable for the individual through active participation in and identification with his or her social world. This implies not only a considerable ethical unburdening of the individual, but also a corresponding protection of the motivational and legitimating foundations of modern societies that are realizations of freedom in Hegel’s sense.

25

Cf. Tugendhat (1979).

13. Hegel’s Ethical Pragmatism It is no doubt anachronistic to speak of a »pragmatist justification of ethics« in connection with Hegel’s practical philosophy (which, in what follows, will be equated with his 1820 Elements of the Philosophy of Right), since pragmatism only became a philosophical movement half a century after Hegel’s death. The claim that Hegel offers a pragmatist justification of ethics is likely to be met with blank stares and charges of absurdity. In order to dispel the impression that this thesis is absurd and to lend it credibility and meaning, I would like to proceed in the following steps: First, I will outline the aspects of pragmatism most central to my considerations (13.1) and subsequently bring these into connection with Hegel’s philosophy (13.2). After some brief reflections on this interpretative strategy and a cursory presentation of Hegel’s theory of Objective Spirit (13.3), I will investigate the extent to which Hegel’s »sublation of morality in ethical life [Sittlichkeit]« can be interpreted as a pragmatist strategy of justification (13.4).

13.1 Some Central Features of Pragmatism Before going on to delineate what are, for my purposes, the most important characteristics of pragmatism, I would like to make two preliminary remarks. In contrast to the interpretation of pragmatism principally argued for by the founders of critical theory, this type of philosophical theory is, firstly, neither an affirmation of capitalism, nor does it reduce rationality to instrumental thought. Since a defense of pragmatism is not the topic of this chapter, I assert here thetically (as a premise of my argumentation) that pragmatism directs its philosophical thought at the good in the capacious sense of an individually and communally successful life. This neither implies the thesis that the good is reducible and able to be determined in purely quantitative terms, as the utilitarian more or less claims, nor does it imply the thesis that the talk of the good must turn out, on closer inspection, to be too simple and that ethics requires a variegated interpretation of the good in the sense of a plurality of values. 1 Secondly, in this chapter I will continue to speak about pragmatism generally (rather than this or that pragmatism). I will use this term to include the theories of Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, John Dewey and Ferdinand Schiller, whom I take to be the central figures of pragmatism for my purposes here. Differences in their respective focuses and points of emphasis will not be further considered.

1

Cf. Quante (2011, ch. 6 and 9 as well as 2010a).

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Given the aim of this chapter, this simplification is defensible, since the characteristics that are relevant to the comparison I aim to make pertain to all four of these philosophers. For the same reason, I will permit myself to ignore the internal development in the works of each of these four philosophers. The attempt to reduce a multi-faceted philosophical movement to a limited number of characteristic attributes always carries with it risks and cannot but be controversial. Furthermore, such attempts are always undertaken in light of a particular set of questions and interests. This makes it easy to assume that no such characterization will be able to advance a claim to be the accurate one. This applies to my characterization too, which is in fact oriented toward the characterization of pragmatism suggested in the last few decades, first and foremost by Hilary Putnam. 2 For Putnam, the four central characteristics of pragmatism are the primacy of the practical, the denial of the dichotomy of facts and values, fallibilism and a fundamentally anti-sceptical stance. I wish to summarily explain these four characteristics now. Primacy of the practical: Pragmatism assumes that human thought is to be understood primarily as an activity, representing an essential part of our active engagement with the social and natural world around us. 3 For philosophical reflection, this means that we also need to assume the priority of the participant’s perspective when engaged in philosophical problem solving. Denial of the dichotomy of facts and values: From the primacy of the practical, it is a small step to denying the dichotomy of facts and values. Because cognition is to be conceived of as the confrontation of problems guided by one’s interests, there are, from the pragmatist perspective, no facts independent of values or interpretations. A piece of knowledge always stands in practical and social relations and always has consequences for our social practice. Fallibilism: Any one of our beliefs may turn out to be false in light of new discoveries, new experiences or as a consequence of social changes. The pragmatist holds that there are no beliefs whatsoever that metaphysical justification can render in principle immune from error. The pragmatist does not, however, draw from this a sceptical conclusion. Rather, the pragmatist stance is fundamentally anti-sceptical. Anti-scepticism: The pragmatist’s anti-scepticism is characterised by three features. First, the pragmatist avoids a certain erroneous overgeneralization. From the acknowledged fact that each of our beliefs could be wrong, it does not follow that our beliefs in their totality might all be wrong. Radical philosophical scepticism is thus not a consequence of fallibilism. Secondly, the pragmatist assumes that not only our beliefs, but also our doubts, stand in need of justification. One must, in other words, have good reasons for introducing doubts into the conversation. 2 3

On this, cf. Raters / Willaschek (2002) as well as the texts of Putnam provided there. For a helpful overview, see the discussion in Willaschek (2004).

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In this way, there arises the possibility of distinguishing justified doubts (those introduced into the discussion for good reasons) from merely hypothetical doubts. The latter derive from the fact, granted by the pragmatist in any individual case, that every belief is fallible. The pragmatist therefore draws a third distinction between a real live doubt, for which there are at least some conceivable reasons, and an artificial or merely philosophical doubt, one which has no practical relevance for the way that we live our lives. In short, pragmatist anti-scepticism entails the following: Our belief system has earned the presumption of reliability by surviving in practice, but any individual point in the system can be cast into doubt so long as this doubt can itself be rendered plausible. Doubt is only ever exercised relative to other beliefs, which are then for their part presupposed. A radical scepticism which places our entire belief system in doubt, in one fell swoop, is however not a sensible position. It cannot adequately justify itself and thus is not permitted to enter the discussion. Simply pointing to the fact that it is in principle possible to doubt a belief even though one has no wellfounded objections to it does not on its own suffice for setting into doubt a belief which is grounded in our practice.

13.2 Connections and Challenges: Hegel as a Pragmatist? We can now bring Hegel’s philosophy into connection with these characteristics of pragmatism. I will begin with those aspects for which there is a clear connection.

13.2.1 Clear Connections Like the pragmatists, Hegel denies the dichotomy of facts and values. Since his ontology needs as a whole to be understood as an essentialist-teleological rationalism, the real being of things, their essence, is for him to be understood at once as an internal norm of their intelligibility. According to Hegel, truth consists in an entity being an adequate manifestation of its concept. We are familiar with this sense of »true« in everyday expressions like »a true friend« or »a true philosopher«. In contemporary philosophy, this essentialist-ontological interpretation of truth is sidelined by a dominant conception of truth as a feature of statements or facts. For the latter notion, which is oriented towards the predicate »is true«, Hegel uses the concept of correctness. 4 For the realm of practical philosophy, Hegel defends the thesis that the phenomena of this realm, such as actions and ethical or religious institutions and also social institutions, are to be understood as progressively more complex manifestations of an autonomous will. This was shown in the previous 4

That is, Richtigkeit [J. M.]. Cf. Halbig (2002, ch. 5).

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chapter. The social world is the sphere for which the idea in the form of the will is the local principle. From this it follows, as Hegel attempts to show in his Philosophy of Right, that social institutions are to be understood as relationships of recognition and of the will. This constitutes both their ontological being and their normative validity. A dichotomy between facts and values is obviously incompatible with this.

13.2.2 Problematic Connections While it is plausible that Hegel and the pragmatists share a rejection of the dichotomy of facts and values, the claim that such a similarity is present with respect to the thesis of the primacy of the practical is problematic. This is because the thesis of the primacy of the practical can be understood in two ways. In his philosophical system, Hegel’s overall view of reason is as an activity. Hegel thinks he can bring the project of German Idealism to a close by systematically thinking through the claim that the standard which we must lay down for the determination and explanation of reality is the principle of self-determining and self-generating subjectivity. In his Science of Logic, Hegel calls this principle »the idea«. This subjectivity is thought of as autonomous activity, which shows that the basic principle of his philosophy assumes the primacy of the practical and accords this thesis fundamental importance. 5 In this basic sense, Hegel clearly assumes the primacy of the practical, following Fichte first and foremost. Let us leave aside the clearly mistaken view that the primacy of the practical amounts to the primacy of thought about what is most useful. There still remains a second way of reading this thesis. This way of reading it represents it as a metaphilosophical assumption about the goal of philosophy – or better, of philosophizing. On this way of understanding the claim, to assert the primacy of the practical is to assert that philosophy is ultimately directed at what is ethically good or morally right. On this second reading, the thesis of the »primacy of the practical« stands to Hegel’s overall philosophical project in a way that is full of tensions. From his earliest work onwards, Hegel does, indeed, view his philosophical project as a cognitive task of reconciliation with reality, primarily the social reality of modernity. 6 Seen in this way, his philosophy is directed toward the good. In order to achieve this goal, Hegel develops a system which relies on the principle of subjectivity, in which thought is both more basic and on a higher level than the will. His assumption, which could perhaps be characterised as stoic, is that the good is primarily to be realised by insight into the rationality of reality. The goal is doubtless the good, but as Hegel’s Doctrine of the Idea and his theories of Subjective and Absolute Spirit

5 6

Cf. Düsing (1984). On this, cf. Rózsa (2005).

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both demonstrate, it is by means of cognition that we must achieve this goal (on this, see chapter 3).

13.2.3 Absurd Connections? My attempt to bring Hegel into connection with the anti-scepticism of the pragmatists is bound to seem even more problematic, if not absurd. Here too we need to distinguish two readings of this claim before we can evaluate it. By »anti-scepticism«, one might mean an offensive and conclusive refutation of the sceptic. Using various kinds of philosophical argument, one attempts to show that there are certain states of affairs which cannot be doubted sensibly. We can leave open whether the demonstration concerns evident states of affairs, or those which one cannot doubt without falling into logical or pragmatic contradictions. If one argues in this way, then one takes radical philosophical scepticism seriously, admitting the sceptic’s philosophical doubt into the conversation and attempting to show that there are beliefs which cannot be doubted. This sort of ultimate justification is offered either for individual principles or assumptions (as in Fichte) or, in holistic-coherentist versions, for a totality of categories, a theory or even a philosophical system in its entirety. In his 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel claims to have given such an offensive philosophical refutation of »self-consummating scepticism«, which terminates in the standpoint of absolute knowing. 7 This standpoint, at least according to a view shared widely in the scholarship, is the basis for the coherentist and holistically justified network of categories of subjectivity that Hegel develops in his Science of Logic and published between 1812 and 1816. As Hegel discusses in his introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit, one has to take philosophical doubt seriously, at least as a philosopher, because the philosopher aims for the whole, that is, the totality of our knowledge; this claim to totality is, according to Hegel, constitutive of philosophy. He is thus optimistic that philosophy can successfully meet the radical sceptic’s challenge and ultimately be capable of discharging the immense claims to truth and justification that the radical sceptic implicitly supplies as a standard (on this, see chapter 3). The other sense of anti-scepticism, which one needs to distinguish from the offensive varieties just sketched, is the assumption we opened, by giving as a distinguishing feature of pragmatism: Namely, that radical philosophical scepticism does not need to be taken seriously because we can neither sensibly doubt all of our beliefs at the same time nor find good and practicable reasons for taking this sort of stance. Radical philosophical scepticism is denied entry into the philosophical

7

On this, see Siep (2000).

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conversation because it is not able to introduce its sceptical position into the discussion in a justified manner. Beneath the demand for ultimate justification given at the level of his system, we also find in Hegel this second anti-sceptical mode of argumentation. Thus in the Phenomenology he explicitly asks us to place mistrust in the mistrust of the sceptic who, with her radical doubt, means to suggest that a justification that satisfies her own demands is impossible. He says: Meanwhile, if the anxiety about falling into error sets up a mistrust of science, which itself is untroubled by those scruples and simply sets itself to its work and actually gets down to cognizing, then it is difficult to see why there should not be instead a mistrust of this mistrust, that is, why there should not be an anxiety over whether the fear of error is not already the error itself. In fact, this fear presupposes that there is something (namely, a great deal) which is the truth, [. . . ] which is itself in need of examination as to whether it is the truth. (PS § 74/GW 9, 54)

Furthermore, throughout all periods of his development, Hegel works with the idea that a fundamentally sceptical stance does not represent a sustainable form of life for man as a social animal. What in the theoretical realm turns into thoroughgoing doubt shows up in the social world as the »fury of disappearing« (PS § 589/GW 9), or, as he later puts it in the Elements of the Philosophy of Right, »in the realm of both politics and religion« as »the fanaticism of destruction, demolishing the whole existing social order« (PR § 5 R). The Science of Logic, too, with its holistic and coherentist structure of justification, is at base expressive of the pragmatist insight that we cannot set our categories or our beliefs all into doubt at once. In order to do this, we would need to possess a standpoint outside of this system of categories which, given Hegel’s analysis of the absolute, there simply cannot be. As a consequence of this, we need also to distinguish two levels with respect to Hegel’s fallibilism in order briefly to address this problematic thread of Hegel’s connection to pragmatism. On the level of the system as a whole, Hegel seeks a complete justification and is certainly no fallibilist. This is incompatible with pragmatism. In his practical philosophy, however, that is, within his system, or more precisely in the part of the system devoted to objective spirit which Hegel develops in his Elements of the Philosophy of Right, we find a mode of justification that is at once anti-sceptical and fallibilistic. It is the goal of the following discussion to make this clear. The analysis up to this point more or less dictates the strategy of interpretation which we now must pursue. After a final brief discussion of the system as a whole, I will, for the duration of what follows, put aside this broader context and concentrate on the internal structure of Hegel’s theory of Objective Spirit. 8 The conjecture 8

In light of the holistic character of Hegel’s system, such a procedure cannot avoid opening itself up to a pair of objections. First, someone might object that Hegel’s arguments lose their

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which leads me to do so is that a genuinely pragmatist mode of justification is to be found there. More precisely: Hegel’s thesis of the sublation of morality in ethical life is to be interpreted in terms of a theory of justification and not, as one usually does, in terms of a theory of legitimacy. In other words, Hegel is not primarily interested in showing that the claims ethical life makes as to its legitimacy dominate those of morality, but rather first and foremost wishes to show that all moral argumentation must rely on ethical premises that are presupposed. In order to make this interpretative hypothesis plausible, we first need to situate Hegel’s theory of Objective Spirit within Hegel’s encyclopaedic system as a whole. For this reason our next step must be to briefly consider Hegel’s system in its entirety.

13.3 The Fragility of Objective Spirit In this section, I will first briefly sketch the place Objective Spirit in occupies in Hegel’s system. This will show why unresolved conflicts of various kinds are, in Hegel’s view, unavoidable in the sphere of objective spirit. Second, I will point out what I take to be the three central conflicts which the fragility of objective spirit grows out of. Finally, I will clear up an ambiguity which I have allowed to remain unclarified in this chapter so far.

13.3.1 The Place of Objective Spirit in the Process of the SelfRealization of the Idea The broad strokes of Hegel’s whole system – I am referring here to his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline – were already settled in the first edition of his 1817 Encyclopaedia. Nevertheless, in his second edition published in 1827, Hegel expanded the text considerably and continued to develop its details. The gross threefold division of Logic, Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Spirit however remains in place, with the result that we are in the third and final part of his system by the time we get to Objective Spirit. Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit consists in three parts: Subjective Spirit as the first level (which corresponds to contemporary philosophy of mind in the broadest sense), Objective Spirit as the second level (corresponding to contemporary practical philosophy in the most encompassing intended justificatory status if one lifts them out of their systematic context. Second, someone might object that the interpreter who proceeds selectively in this way draws on premises which Hegel need not or cannot accept from the point of view of his system as a whole. Most of the time, Hegel problematizes these possible presuppositions himself and sublates them in the course of his argumentation. The second objection can be put by saying that the external standpoint fails to take Hegel seriously as a systematic philosopher if it does not defend its own assumptions against Hegel’s critique. On this, see ch. 3.

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sense) and absolute spirit as a third level (corresponding today to the philosophy of cultural phenomena in the most inclusive sense). It is characteristic of all »shapes« of spirit, according to Hegel, that within them the idea achieves a level of self-realization and self-knowledge which is progressively more complex, stable, rational and adequate in terms of its content. Thus for Hegel, all shapes of spirit are constituted by their internal normativity and multifaceted evaluative significance. Unlike what is assumed in projection theories prominent in contemporary metaethics, for example, or in Daniel Dennett’s antirealistic instrumentalism about propositional attitudes, Hegel takes this internal, evaluative, normative perspective to be irreducible. As a result, his overall conception can be understood as an alternative to antirealist interpretations of evaluative and normative aspects of reality. 9 As an intermediate level, objective spirit has not only a role in mediating between the individual person’s soul and the highest achievements of human culture, which Hegel locates in art, religion and philosophy. Objective spirit is also characterised by the fact that the task of the idea in giving itself an adequate form of self-realization and a normative self-understanding which measures up to this form cannot be accomplished without contradiction – and here this means for Hegel: Without conflicts. The speculative-logical reasons for this thesis, which Hegel derives from the concept of the will, cannot be elaborated here (instead see chapters 9 and 10). As far as its content goes, his assumption in any case means that in the social and political spheres we cannot expect institutions to be free from conflicts, insusceptible to interference and exempt from the cycle of generation and corruption. Rather than expecting that social institutions have the capacity to be »saved«, an attitude which underlies later Marxist critiques of civil society, Hegel’s insight can be regarded as an expression of his realism. Hegel’s denial of the »perennial should«, often interpreted as a denigration of the moral standpoint and critical consciousness in favor of obedience to authority and deification of the state, in fact makes good sense when understood in this way. Hegel warns against burdening social institutions with expectations that in principle cannot be met, since excessive optimism can, on the one hand, lead to a general scepticism regarding the possibility of justifying moral, ethical or social requirements, and on the other hand can result in the destruction of our existing ethical consensus. His position cannot be put down to a reactionary or resigned disposition.

9

On the metaethical options, see Quante (2011), and on Dennett’s theory of intentional attitudes, see Quante (1995).

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13.3.2 The Fragility of Objective Spirit The fragility of social and political institutions, among which Hegel counts right and morality alongside the state and civil society, can be understood on three levels. First, a social and political organization is, as a shape of objective spirit, rendered unstable by its relationship to nature. Natural catastrophes like earthquakes, crop failures or even epidemics can lead to a rational manifestation of objective spirit perishing or at least being extensively damaged and deformed. Echoing Hegel, we can say: Because objective spirit is not a complete form of realization of the idea, it is possible for nature, as an unmediated presupposition, to affect it adversely. On the level of subjective spirit, Hegel understands sickness and the death of the individual in an analogous way, as the necessary manifestation of the inadequacy of the individual organism in principle. As an exemplar of its kind, the individual can never be entirely adequate. Second, every political community is subject to the contingencies of historical development. Because the will must necessarily, in Hegel’s view, have individuality as one of its moments, he not only thinks that monarchical rule is a necessary element of a rational state. He also draws a much more plausible conclusion: That states must be thought of as individuals which stand in relations of recognition to other states and must preserve and develop their respective individual identities in doing so. This individuality at the same time constitutes their historical boundedness and opens up the possibility that the ground-level normative structure of a state might be destroyed by principles and norms which start out in other states. In this thesis of diachronic fragility, in which we can also no doubt see Hegel attempting to work through the French revolution, lies the real reason why the philosophy of history belongs for Hegel to practical philosophy, a subordination which one finds irritating from the point of view of his systematic architectonic. Third, and finally, the fragility of objective spirit shows up in the relationship between individuals and their social and political institutions. As a social entity, spirit essentially exists in the evaluative and normative attitudes of the members of a community or, as Hegel says, in their disposition (Gesinnung). If a state does not succeed in bringing about and keeping alive a basic feeling of trust and confidence in addition to a readiness to actively participate in it and jointly shape it, then such an organization will sooner or later lose its strength and stability on account of a deficiency in the identification of its parts with the whole. 10 In competition with other states, each with their own identities (in the sense of cultural self-understandings), such a state will lose the fight for recognition. This need not take the dramatic form of a military defeat owing to insufficient defense. It can also take the form of a creeping erosion of the essential components of a

10

Cf. Siep (1992a, ch. 14).

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society’s ethical self-understanding, which transforms gradually into a social form of life that originally constituted the cultural identity of a different state. The relationship between morality and ethical life is absolutely central to the principal characterization which Hegel gives of the relationship of the individual and the community in its modern form. As we will soon see, Hegel sees in the determination of the relationship of moral autonomy and ethical community not only the central task of his practical philosophy. He also makes use of a genuinely pragmatist form of justification in order to characterize this relationship. Before we discuss this in the final section, we first need to clear up an ambiguity which we have not yet resolved.

13.3.3 A Justification of Ethics? In one sense, a »justification of ethics« could denote a philosophical defense of ethics as a whole, for example against an ethical sceptic, which we would today call an amoralist. Such a justification of ethics can be classified as »external«, since it claims to proceed from presuppositions which do not themselves constitute a part of ethics. Such an external justification of ethics, for example by the principle of rational self-interest, is understood by many philosophers to be the central challenge of philosophical ethics, in so far as they seek to satisfy the standards of modern ethics. 11 There is at least a prima facie argument that this sort of derivation and philosophical justification of ethics is to be found implicitly in Hegel’s claim to have revealed the fundamental social institutions, and thus also the sphere of ethics, as necessary moments of the self-development of the Absolute Idea. Whether this really represents an external justification can only be decided on the basis of an analysis of Hegel’s Doctrine of the Idea which cannot be carried out here. 12 In any case, it is true that the idea of the good is one of the essential shapes of the idea. Since the systematic context will be set aside from here on in, we will also leave aside the possibility that a philosophical defense of ethics is to be had on the basis of Hegel’s Science of Logic. In a different sense, a »justification of ethics« could mean a justification of a particular ethical belief from within the ethical standpoint, hence an »internal« justification. One of the central theses of this chapter is that we find a justification of ethics which is in this sense internal to Hegel’s theory of Objective Spirit, and that this represents a genuinely pragmatist form of justification. More precisely, as I will now show in five stages, this is to be found in Hegel’s thesis of the sublation of morality in ethical life.

11 12

Cf. Siep (2004, ch. 2.2) as well as Quante (2011). On this, see ch. 2 and 3 as well as Siep (2010, ch. I.B).

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13.4 The »Sublation of Morality in Ethical Life« as a Pragmatist Strategy of Justification Hegel’s thesis of the »sublation of morality in ethical life« has attracted an enormous amount of criticism. Thus Ernst Tugendhat, in the closing chapters of his book Selbstbewußtsein und Selbstbestimmung, speaks of Hegel’s moral perversion on the grounds that Hegel apparently attempts a sly subordination of moral consciousness to a shared ethical life. On Tugendhat’s interpretation, Hegel is thus not only an apologist for reactionary Prussia and an idolizer of the state in general, as other going interpretations and estimations would have it. According to Tugendhat, Hegel also views the critical dimension of the individual moral consciousness as no more than a dead weight which threatens to destabilize ethical life and is finally »buried« in his version of ethical life as totalitarian unity. 13 I have laid out the arguments against this sort of reading of the relationship between morality and ethical life in some detail in the previous chapter. Hegel considers his practical philosophy as a whole to be an attempt to reconcile the Aristotelian conception of the zoon politikon with the achievement of individual self-consciousness. In closing, I now wish to fill out the content of Hegel’s critique of morality and conscience with an eye to the question of the justification of ethics. This will reveal Hegel’s genuinely pragmatist insight.

13.4.1 Hegel’s Critique of Morality and Conscience The Morality chapter of the Philosophy of Right is tasked with determining the justification and the limits of modern morality, Hegel takes to include all conceptions of moral autonomy stemming from Kant. The »right of the subjective will« (PR § 132) which Hegel speaks of there, manifests itself in actions and evaluations of actions and is thus developed by Hegel in the context of his theory of action. One of Hegel’s central action-theoretic insights is that actions are events under specific descriptions. A spatio-temporal event is only to be viewed as an action under a description under which a subject intends it. This »intensional« dimension of an event contained in the intention of the action can be criticised in our practice of judging actions. We do this by bringing to bear concepts like carelessness and negligence and saying that the agent ought to have seen that the action was actually to be described in a different way. Even in the case of social censure of this sort, the fact remains that the action itself is the event under the description of the action’s intention. 14

13 14

On this, cf. Tugendhat (1979), Siep (1981) as well as Quante (2004). On this, see Quante (1993a) and Pippin (2008).

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In ethics, too, it is for Hegel one of the irrevocable achievements of modernity that what an autonomous individual is to recognize as valid should be perceived by it as good, and that it should be held responsible for an action – as its aim translated into external objectivity – as right or wrong, good or evil, legal or illegal according to its cognizance [Kenntnis] of the value which that action has in this objectivity. (ibid.)

This »right of the subjective will«, as Hegel calls it, is always and everywhere to be protected. At the same time it needs to be constrained, as the proceeding paragraphs of the »Morality« chapter show, where Hegel mounts a sharp polemical attack on conscience as a basis for ethics (PR §§ 136–140). In Hegel’s view, morality is merely about the »formal conscience« (PR § 137) which stands opposed to all ethical content and attempts to develop the foundation of morality from itself alone. In contrast to this, we find in ethical life the »true« conscience, which is characterized by Hegel as the »disposition to will what is good in-and-for-itself « (PR § 137). Hegel’s critique of the impossibility of extracting a material ethics from the merely formal conscience is well known as the »formalism objection«. His alternative, that true conscience only exists when the objective duties which pertain to it in an ethical community are recognized as binding, seems to support the negative judgement of Tugendhat. If one however considers Hegel’s conception of modern ethical life more closely then one sees that this first impression is misleading. In contrast to Hegel’s conception of the ancient ethical life of the Greek polis, it is characteristic of modern communities that the right of the subjective will is preserved. The »objective sphere of ethics« (PR § 144) must be mediated »by subjectivity as infinite form«, where here this means: by individual autonomy. This objective sphere becomes an object of knowledge in individual self-consciousness (PR § 146). The »relationless identity« of the subject to his or her community and norms is, in Hegel’s view, already interrupted in the epistemological attitudes of »faith« and »trust«, since these belong, according to Hegel, to the »emergence of reflection« (PR § 147). In short, according to Hegel, »insight grounded on reasons« (ibid.) must enter the scene at this point of emerging reflection and stand in opposition to the norms, values and prescriptions of ethical life which an individual is raised with and constantly confronts. The pre-modern polis corresponds roughly to what Tugendhat takes to be Hegel’s own normative ideal. Its lack, according to Hegel’s handwritten notices on § 147, is that individuals of the polis cannot »hold themselves accountable [Rechenschaft geben]«, having available neither an individual moral conscience nor moral »beliefs [Überzeugungen]«, because their ethical attitudes are not generated »by reasons [durch Gründe]«.

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13.4.2 Hegel’s Pragmatist Insight If these considerations are correct, then Tugendhat’s critique cannot be sustained. The question now, however, is how Hegel can avoid what threatens to be a contradiction. On the one hand, he seems to require that ethical beliefs which are endorsed in the life of an ethical community can only apply legitimately to individuals if those individuals have insight into them and reasons for holding them to be satisfactory. On the other hand, Hegel expressly warns against the philosophical error of withholding legitimacy from ethical life by placing this before the formal jury of the subjective conscience or assuming the philosophical fiction that an ethics which survives in practice does not count as justified until it is philosophically justified. This contradiction can be shown to be merely apparent if we understand Hegel’s position as a genuinely pragmatist argumentative strategy. Against the moral standpoint, which here takes on the role of radical scepticism in opposition to ethical life, one objects that the ethical life of our lived practice and the ethics maintained within it stands in need of no philosophical justification by a principle of practical reason resting on external premises. Such a philosophical justification would, if it referred to our ethical beliefs as a whole, take up an external standpoint which Hegel takes to be unavailable to us when we argue ethically. 15 Hegel’s assumption that we, as modern and autonomous subjects, may demand a justification for each individual ethical belief – so long as we have good reasons to make such a demand – is thoroughly compatible with his indication that radical moral doubt is untenable. A demand for this sort of justification is, as Hegel’s remarks on faith and trust show, the exception and not the rule (and this holds as a matter of fact, too, as attention to our own practice will show). Such a demand is, however, possible and therefore must be admitted as well, relative to the normative self-understanding of modern society. Hegel’s entire edifice therefore rests on a structure which one today would call a »default and challenge model«. Norms contained in a practice are to be subjected to a critical examination when, and only when, their doubt is rationally defensible. If this sort of sceptical objection cannot be rendered plausible, then it cannot be brought into rational discourse. In this case, our ethical practice will count as defended and well founded (and likewise if an admitted doubt is countered with good reasons). This is so even if each of the elements of our practice are in principle fallible. Understood in this way, Hegel is no enemy of morality, in so far as this denotes our capacity to rationally scrutinize norms as well as prescriptions of value. On the 15

This explains why Hegel says here that »adequate cognition [adäquate Erkenntnis]« – that is, philosophical justification – in contrast to insight by reasons [Einsicht durch Gründe] only applies to the thinking concept, and so to speculative philosophy, and cannot be ascribed from the standpoint internal to a practice. Thus the question arises here again whether Hegel did not view his system as an external justification for objective spirit after all.

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contrary, he takes this to be an irrevocable and valuable achievement of modernity. He only denies the so-called standpoint of morality, where by this he means the philosophical demand to view an external justification as a necessary condition for a functioning and self-maintaining social practice to count as well founded. In light of the fact that our society is becoming aware of more and more areas in which we have no ethical self-understanding available (think of the field of biomedical ethics), Hegel’s pragmatist insight gains an increasing significance over and above issues regarding the theory of justification. It shows us that it is just what counts as self-explanatory in ethics that deserves our philosophical attention, since this is the intersubjectively shared foundation which alone makes it possible for us to develop humane perspectives on new problems. These are, after all, the perspectives which enable us to enjoy a shared life.

14. Personal Autonomy The publication forty years ago of »Acting Freely« by Gerald Dworkin and »Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person« by Harry G. Frankfurt made personal autonomy and free will into central topics in analytic philosophy. 1 Dworkin and Frankfurt developed independently similar theories by analyzing the autonomy of persons in – as Marina A. L. Oshana has characterized it – a naturalistic way. 2 The basic idea of Dworkin, Frankfurt and their followers is that free agency, autonomy of persons and freedom of the will have to be analyzed in terms of a hierarchical structure of desires or volitions, or, as it has since been called, in terms of the »split-level self«. 3 These new and powerful proposals have generated a broad and fruitful discussion: The new accounts have been confronted with – as is the practice in analytic philosophy – »puzzle cases«, which have enabled authors to make their concepts and definitions more precise. In this context some contributors like Thomas E. Hill, Christine Korsgaard or David Velleman have introduced models of autonomy which include a revival of some Kantian themes and theses. 4 This is not surprising, since Kant is one of the great champions of autonomy and such recourse to Kant is not unusual in analytic philosophy. It is equally unsurprising that there is little or no resort to the philosophy of Hegel in this discussion; this, too, accords with usual practice in analytic philosophy. One and a half centuries before Dworkin and Frankfurt developed their accounts, Hegel published his Elements of the Philosophy of Right, which included his theory of free agency and autonomy. Using his unique philosophical method and largely idiosyncratic terminology, Hegel developed a theory of the will that contains many elements of contemporary theories and at the same time solves some of the problems that confront split-level theories and Kantian theories today. For our purposes I will try to understand Hegel’s analysis of the will, as it appears in his Elements of the Philosophy of Right, as an answer to those problems which are discussed in contemporary debates about the nature of personal autonomy and its connection to free action and free will. In the first part, I will give a brief sketch of these contemporary debates. In the second part, I will outline Hegel’s theory of personal autonomy and the structure

1

2 3

4

Cf. Shatz (1985) as well as the collections Christman (1989), Fischer (1986) and Fischer / Ravizza (1993). John Martin Fischer’s contribution offers an excellent overview of the central themes of this debate. Cf. Oshana (1994). By »split-level self« I mean those conceptions according to which the self consists of multiple layers that stand in hierarchical relationships. Cf. Hill (1991), Korsgaard (1996a and 1996b) and Velleman (2006 and 2009).

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of the will. I will try to show how his theory deals with problems that crop up in modern approaches. My main interest here is to show that Hegel has dealt with problems that still concern us. My central thesis is that he has given some answers which remain today very much worth discussing in the context of our contemporary debates about freedom and autonomy. In the third and final part, some specific problems with Hegel’s account are briefly discussed.

14.1 Personal Autonomy in Contemporary Philosophy In her paper Autonomy Naturalized, Marina A. L. Oshana discusses three modern conceptions of personal autonomy which, according to her, offer well thoughtout, modern conceptions of personal autonomy that rid it of the »metaphysical baggage« attaching to traditional Kantian conceptions. 5 Naturalization, of course, is on everyone’s lips today. To naturalize something has come to be synonymous with showing it to be useful, substantial and true to life. But unfortunately, this label has many different meanings and can be part of very different philosophical strategies. For our purposes, Oshana’s »local« concept of naturalization will suffice. She formulates two necessary conditions on a naturalized conception of autonomy which, taken together, are sufficient for naturalization: (N1) The properties which constitute autonomy must be natural properties, knowable through the senses or by introspection (or must supervene on natural properties). (N2) The properties that constitute autonomy must not be restricted to phenomena »internal« to the agent. At least some of these properties must be external and objective. 6 According to Oshana, contemporary accounts of personal autonomy are naturalistic in so far as they satisfy condition (N1), but unfortunately most of them fail to satisfy condition (N2) because they analyze personal autonomy using only »internal« concepts. Anyone who has studied Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of Right and who has even a cursory knowledge of Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s moral philosophy will recognize that the second condition is met by his theory of autonomy. With regard to the first condition, much depends on the concepts of »natural property« »introspection«. As we will see, there is a sense in which Hegel’s theory satisfies the first condition as well. But Hegel would not understand this as naturalization if that is supposed to imply a rejection of metaphysics. And surely Hegel also wouldn’t accept

5 6

Cf. Oshana (1994, p. 77). Cf. Oshana (1994, p. 77).

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an analysis of »introspection« in terms of knowledge by the senses alone. Before turning to Hegel, let us consider some contemporary accounts. 7 Oshana distinguishes three partly naturalistic accounts, which are all variants of the split-level self analysis: The first group she terms »hierarchical theories« and includes, among others, the work of Frankfurt and Dworkin. The second group is labeled »Platonic theories«, of which Gary Watson is a prominent representative. She refers to the third group as »historical accounts« – a theory of this kind has been developed, for example, by Christman. 8 Watson formulates his theory in opposition to the accounts of Frankfurt and Dworkin, presenting their hierarchical theories with counterexamples and raising conceptual difficulties for them. Christman, who for his part criticizes both the Frankfurt-Dworkin account and the Platonic account of Watson, defends a version of the split-level self account, adding a biographical component to it. Oshana sympathizes with these split-level self accounts but criticizes them for failing to meet the second naturalistic condition. For this reason, she herself seeks to make what she sees as an essential contribution to this theory. In the following I give a very brief sketch of the basic ideas behind the four versions of the split-level self account, describing the difficulties which each version faces.

14.1.1 The First Step Towards Naturalization (a) Classical hierarchical theories (Frankfurt and Dworkin): An agent has the capacity to act freely if, and only if, the agent can do what she wants or desires. Such an agent might nevertheless lack an important element for being an autonomous person, viz., having a free will. This depends on whether the agent has the capacity to will what she wants. If we label as agents all those creatures who are able to do what they want or desire, this class will not only include children and other human beings like sex offenders or addicts usually not credited with personal autonomy, but even many animals which nobody would ever regard as free agents. It seems to me preferable to reserve the label »autonomous subject« for beings that have the capacity to be autonomous. Because there may be creatures who have a free will but lack the capacity to act freely – for example a completely paraplegic human being – we can define the class of autonomous persons as those who are agents and have free will. And we can say that personal autonomy is composed of the capacities (i) to act freely and (ii) to have a free will. Each of these components is necessary and together they are sufficient for personal autonomy. In what follows I will ignore the freedom

7

8

I will give only a broad overview of these theories. I will ignore the developments that have since taken place in Frankfurt’s, Watson’s and Dowrkins’s theories. Cf. here Watson (1989a) and Christman (1991).

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of action, thus taking it for granted that condition (i) is satisfied. The remaining question is then: How should we analyze the second condition? What does it mean to have a free will? In his paper »Freedom of the Will and the Concept of Person«, Harry G. Frankfurt gives an analysis of the freedom of the will. He begins by distinguishing between first-order and second-order desires. A statement of the form »I want to X« expresses a first-order desire if, and only if, X makes reference to actions. And it expresses a second-order desire just if X makes reference to first-order desires. A third-order desire is expressed just if X refers to second-order desires and so on. Although Frankfurt gives his analysis in the third-person, I have used the firstpersonal mode, because being autonomous requires a person to ascribe first- and second-order desires to herself. Following on from this, Frankfurt goes on to define the will of a person as that desire which is effective for action, which moves an agent »all the way to action«. 9 The will of an agent in this sense is not identical with what she intends, since it is possible for there to be a desire which overrules what the agent wants to do (as we all know from everyday life). Thus a statement »I want to X« expresses my will if, and only if, X refers to a desire that is effective for action. Frankfurt then goes on, thirdly, to add the element which – according to him – characterizes personal autonomy or the freedom of the will: I am autonomous if, and only if, I have a second-order volition, that is a second-order desire I want to be effective, i. e., which I want to be my will. Not every second-order desire is a second-order volition because it is possible for me to have a second-order desire while simultaneously not wanting this second-order desire to become effective (for example, a desire to take drugs). All I want in this case is to know what it is like to have such a desire. If I make a second-order desire my second-order volition I then identify myself with the desire which is referred to in the formula. This is how I make this first-order desire truly my own. Having the capacity to identify with a first-order desire by making the corresponding second-order desire my second-order volition is what makes my will free. If, over and above this, I am able to make my firstorder desires effective, I am an autonomous person. 10 According to Frankfurt, then, freedom of the will can be broken down into a hierarchical structure containing a second-order volition with a corresponding first-order desire. The person’s autonomy is then guaranteed, because we take the free-agency condition for granted just when the person is able to make her second-order volition effective.

9

10

See Frankfurt (1989, p. 65); I ignore the proviso »will or would move« that Frankfurt adds to his definition. For a discussion of this special problem, see Fisher’s analysis (1994, ch. 7) and the contributions in Fisher (1986). At this point, the »control« condition comes into play; see Fischer (1994, ch. 8). According to Frankfurt, control is what makes someone free and identification is what makes them responsible.

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Let’s look briefly at some of the examples Frankfurt gives to illustrate the adequacy of his account. An addict who wants to take drugs can act freely if, and only if, she is able to realize this desire. But her will isn’t free. Now if conflicting desires are added to the picture, we may distinguish different types of addicts. Addict A has different desires which can’t be realized simultaneously, but she has no secondorder desires. She isn’t concerned whether the desires that move her to act are those she wants to motivate her action. Her action simply realizes her effective desire. Frankfurt calls this type of addict »wanton«. Addict B is an »unwilling addict.« 11 She not only has conflicting desires but wants herself to be moved by the desire to drink water. But instead she drinks whiskey and so her desire for alcohol turns out to be the effective one. This is something the unwilling addict doesn’t like. This second type of addict evaluates her own conflicting first-order desires and forms secondorder desires. But her will isn’t free, because she is unable to transform one of her second order desires into a second-order volition that is effective in bringing about action. She fails, that is, to make her elected first-order desire the effective one. Having this second-order volition allows this addict to experience that her will is not free. She doesn’t identify with what she does, even though her action expresses a desire she surely has. For a person to be autonomous, that person must endorse her first-order desire by making it truly her own – and that means, according to Frankfurt, choosing to let the corresponding second-order desire be effective, to be her will. The union of an effective first-order desire and the corresponding secondorder volition make up the autonomy of a person if the second-order volition is a necessary causal condition for the first-order desire’s being effective. Frankfurt thus provides an account of personal autonomy that centers on the hierarchical structure of an individual’s psychology. Being an autonomous person means having the right internal psychology. There remain, however, some important questions unanswered. 12 The first difficulty is that in Frankfurt’s account more than two levels of desires or volitions are permitted. But, in that case, why shouldn’t we say that a second-order volition needs a corresponding third-order volition for autonomy to be secured? Why stop at any particular level? Let’s call this the regress problem. 13 The second difficulty is closely tied to the first. If the second-order level is decisive and its autonomy self-sufficient, i. e., guaranteed without a further foundation, then two questions arise: (i) How can these second-order volitions be justified? It seems that here a non-hierarchical alternative account has to be developed, if a simple decisionism is to be avoided. The second question (ii) is: Why shouldn’t the first-order desires be self-sufficient? Why shouldn’t we say that a person ought 11 12

13

Cf. Frankfurt (1989, p. 68). The following list of problems (as well as their names) are in part taken from Christman (1989); for more details, see Quante (2000c). In his Science of Logic, Hegel analyzes the general structure of this problem as »bad infinity«.

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rather to correct her second-order volitions to bring them in line with whatever first-order desire manifests itself as effective? We can label these interconnected problems as the ab initio problem. The third difficulty is caused by the internalism of Frankfurt’s account: What do we want to say about the willing addict who fully endorses her wanting a drug by choosing the corresponding second-order volition as truly her own? Let’s call this the formalism problem: It arises because Frankfurt has given a purely formal or structural account of autonomy. The fourth difficulty concerns the internalism of Frankfurt’s account per se: We are not born with many of our first- and second-order desires. Rather, we acquire them in the course of our socialization. Take, for example, a woman being educated to display absolute obedience to her father or her husband. Do we really think she is autonomous if she leads her life this way? One can surely imagine many more examples of this kind. This problem – we may call it the desire-formation problem – arises in the above account because of the purely synchronic and individualistic nature of its analysis. In contemporary debates many more specialized problems have been discussed which I cannot go into here. My main aim in the following is simply to outline the common structure of these accounts and to confront them with Hegel’s analysis of personal autonomy as it is developed in his Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Before moving on, I’d like to point out two further basic problems with Frankfurt’s account connected with his notion of »identification«. Frankfurt uses this notion for two reasons: Identification signals the capacity of a person to evaluate her own desires, to make herself an object of evaluative considerations. Identifying with a desire by forming a corresponding second-order volition makes this desire truly one’s own. Doing so integrates the desire into one’s self-conception. This is the first reason. Secondly, Frankfurt tries to use this notion to solve the regress problem. If a person identifies with a desire, there is no room for a discrepancy on any higher level. But this seems to be a solution only by fiat. We are immediately faced here with a dilemma: Either the ab initio problem arises or the process of evaluation collapses into something like an individual’s »radical choice«. 14 This dilemma is the primary difficulty with the notion of identification. The second difficulty is that identification is something a person can and must do intentionally. Hence the question arises whether identification itself is done autonomously. The regress problem or the ab initio problem thus re-enters through the back door. It also seems that we now need a separate analysis of the special kind of intentional action called identification. It looks then as if we have just used the very notion of free will – in employing this notion of identification – which we set out to analyze in the first place.

14

This expression stems from Charles Taylor, cf. (1976, p. 290).

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Gerald Dworkin develops a version of the hierarchical analysis in which the notion of identification is replaced by a capacity clause: For the ascription of autonomy, a person’s second-order capacity is needed in order to evaluate, and if necessary revise, her first-order desires. 15 In this way a person does not need a second-order volition in order to act autonomously. It is enough that she has the capacity to do so, should she want to. In my view this shift from identification to capacity doesn’t really help. First, we still need a structural analysis of this capacity. Furthermore, one can see that a person’s using this capacity is just the same process which Frankfurt described as identification. So the problem is simply hidden in a dispositional structure. 16 (b) A Platonic Alternative: Gary Watson’s Platonic alternative criticizes the hierarchical accounts of Frankfurt and Dworkin. In his view, autonomy must be understood as the property a person has when that person is able to act on reason-based value judgements. According to Watson, Frankfurt and Dworkin don’t adequately distinguish between different levels of a person’s psychology: The non-rational desire system and the rational value system. 17 In one sense this account is the truly hierarchical one because here the person’s psychology is divided into two separate levels. In Frankfurt’s and Dworkin’s hierarchical accounts we had only a logical or semantic hierarchy of more complex desires. Watson’s classical position seems to avoid the regress problem because autonomy is bound to the value system of the person in question directly. And he surely captures one intuitively plausible feature of autonomy: Autonomy and rational evaluation go hand in hand. An autonomous person acts on her rational evaluations and not on her »blind« desires. Here, I think we should keep Hegel’s critique of Kant in mind. It isn’t always the case that acting according to our rational capacities renders us more autonomous than acting according to our passions. A dualistic account of this sort, as Hegel well knew, is in danger of splitting the person and thereby alienating her from her desires. Such alienation, Hegel claimed from his earliest philosophical writings, cannot be regarded as true autonomy. 18

15 16

17

18

Cf. Dworkin (1988, p. 15 ff.). This dispositional component is necessary to block the natural objection that people in many cases act autonomously without making actual use of this reflexive capacity (as shown in the previous chapter, Hegel’s critique of morality targets precisely this point). But one does not thereby eliminate, I wish to point out, the reflexive self-relation of identification. So claims Watson (1989a); Thalberg (1989) criticizes this as too rationalistic and Watson (1989b), in a later essay, agrees with him. We do not have to follow Friedrich Schiller in his interpretation of Kant here. So long as our wishes and passions are in accordance with our reason and our values, we need not, according to Kant, suppress the former. Nevertheless, on Kant’s view, as on Plato’s, autonomy resides exclusively in the rational part of the soul.

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Furthermore, Watson’s account, like Frankfurt’s and Dworkin’s, also faces the other three problems: The ab initio problem, the formalism problem and the desire formation problem. We require an argument justifying the claim that the rational part should be the bearer of autonomy and why rational evaluations should be regarded as truly autonomous. Without such an argument the ab initio problem still arises. Watson also – again just like Kant – faces the formalism objection, since he tries to define autonomy in purely formal or logical terms without giving any material criteria. Hegel discusses such an approach in his famous critique of Kant’s formalism in ethics. In Hegel’s view it is simply impossible to define autonomy without mentioning material conditions for being autonomous. And without including the non-rational part of our psychology in the structure of the will, we are, Hegel maintained, not in a position to give substance to our notion of autonomy. Finally, Watson also doesn’t consider the process of desire formation by socialization. Like Kant, he gives a purely internal and local analysis of autonomy. But as I noted, evaluations can be formed under conditions which make autonomy impossible. One can imagine examples of educational programmes which form individuals who then act in accordance with their values but are not autonomous because these values are utterly corrupt. 19 (c) Biographical Completion: The desire formation problem provides the central motivation behind John Christman’s biographical account of autonomy. He includes conditions of desire and value formation in his theory so as to deal with counter-examples concerning agents whose second-order volitions or value judgements upon which they act which are in various ways manipulated. On his model, a person is autonomous relative to some desire if it is the case that she would put up no resistance to the development of this desire when reflecting on this process of development, or she would not have resisted had she been attentive to it. A further condition is that this lack of resistance did not take place (or would not have taken place) under the influence of factors that inhibit self-reflection and that the selfreflection involved is (minimally) rational and involves no self-deception. 20 Without going into all the details, we can see that Christensen’s theory is based on the following idea: What is essential to autonomy is not the having of the desire or the actual identification with it, but rather the right process of desire formation. Ignoring, as before, certain counterfactual conditions, we can say that personal autonomy requires more than certain individual psychological capacities. Without the right social and natural conditions it is impossible for an individual to become an autonomous person. Besides the psychological conditions the individual needs, there must be a kind of transparency in its motivating desires – they must be accessible and adequate to the individual’s rationality. And the self-reflection 19 20

Cf. Quante (2007c). Cf. Christman (1991, p. 11).

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condition, too, poses some constraints on the social setting: They must allow individuals to become self-reflective. An analysis of social autonomy can’t stop at the rational conditions, the natural aspects of the individual must be transparent for the person and must be integrated into the concept of personal autonomy. And analysis can’t stop at the level of the individual. The social setting has to be considered too. There is no personal autonomy without the right social conditions. 21 Neither a purely formal nor a purely internal account can grasp personal autonomy completely.

14.1.2 The Second Step Towards Naturalization In an age marked by phobia of metaphysics, where the drive to naturalize is everpresent, the accounts discussed above are attractive because they promise to deliver a naturalistic analysis of personal autonomy. Oshana thinks that these accounts meet the first of her naturalization conditions: The conditions given for personal autonomy – that a person’s desires and values assume a certain hierarchical structure, or that one’s desires cohere with one’s values, or that the person has a certain psychological history – are amenable to methods of explanation employed in the natural sciences. 22 But, Oshana claims, none of them is in fact naturalistic, because they all fail to meet her second condition. According to this condition, a naturalized account of autonomy cannot be purely internalistic. Personal autonomy cannot depend only on the status of a person’s psychological states and dispositions, but rather must depend also on the social context within which a person acts. In opposition to the biographical approach of Christman, Oshana therefore defends the view that the influence of the external environment is not exhausted by the effect it has on a person’s desires. 23 I do not wish to get too deeply into the issue of naturalization here. There are, to be sure, very many different senses of that term and in any case I think Oshana’s conditions themselves don’t all properly belong to the same conception of naturalization. Whether central elements of the above accounts such as self-consciousness, identification or rationality really are notions that can be naturalized in line with her conception is a very tricky question and I have my doubts as to its feasibility. 24

21

22 23 24

Since the appropriate social environment is a condition for autonomy from the outset, this social reality must not be construed as consisting in autonomous persons. By recourse to Charles Taylor’s (1989, p. 181) illuminating contributions to the liberalism-communitarianism debate, Hegel can be seen as a holist in the ontological sense; on this, see ch. 12. Cf. Oshana (1994, p. 91). Cf. ibid. I discuss my reasons for this doubt in more detail in relation to the possibility of naturalizing our ethical practice in Quante (2011).

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More concretely, I do not agree that the above accounts include a naturalized theory of mind. 25 In regard to this aspect Oshana herself employs a common concept of naturalization, but her thesis that the above accounts are naturalistic seems wrong to me. Her second condition on naturalized autonomy says that the use of external properties, which she specifies as »objective«, is a desideratum for naturalization. Although I think that her thesis is right regarding the nature of personal autonomy, her use of the label »naturalization« is seriously misleading here: The contrast between »internal« and »external« properties does not correspond to the contrast between subjective and objective properties. Besides, as Hegel well knew, there are many different senses of »subjective« and »objective« which have to be distinguished carefully; Hegel himself does this in his Philosophy of Right (PR §§ 25 and 26). In regard to the individual, the social world is something external, but in regard to spirit it is internal. Oshana is right in claiming that the requirements of personal autonomy go beyond the psychology of the individual. It requires the right natural basis and a suitable social world. Thus Oshana is right when she says: Just as it is unnatural to think of persons as epistemically isolated entities, doubtful as to the reality of anything but the contents of their own minds, so, too, it is unnatural to view autonomy as a property that is true of persons in virtue of their inner psychological states, regardless of the circumstances they find themselves in. 26

But all this can’t simply be equated with naturalization. Hegel would agree with Oshana and would furthermore claim that his conception of spirit and his analysis of the structure of the will especially overcome these deficiencies by developing an account of spirit’s autonomy which includes personal autonomy as an essential element. In his conception, Hegel would claim, the opposition of internal and external, of subjective and objective is sublated and the problems discussed above are eliminated. In what follows, I will attempt to show that he is right about this.

14.2 Hegel’s Conception of Personal Autonomy In this section, I will first show how Hegel’s account can overcome the dualism of »being internal« and »being external« as well as the distinction of »subjective« and »objective«. I will do so by distinguishing three levels of analysis. I will then go on to look at Hegel’s analysis of a person’s knowledge of freedom. On the basis of this analysis I will argue that we can solve the problems discussed above by integrating

25

26

Opposing naturalism in this sense does not commit me to a dualistic solution to the mind-body problem; on this see Quante (2000a). Oshana (1994, p. 91).

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the individualistic perspective – this being the core of contemporary accounts – into Hegel’s richer conception of freedom and autonomy of the will.

14.2.1 Hegel’s Three-Tiered Analysis of the Will In his Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel takes the free will as his starting point. This notion of the will does not refer to purposeful behavior in general but rather purposeful behavior that is endowed with self-consciousness. This notion of the will is the result of the development of subjective spirit and is the basic principle of that part of the system called »Objective Spirit«. In starting this way Hegel takes two things for granted: Qua will or purposeful behavior in general we have overcome pure causality and are in the domain of teleology which – as the Science of Logic has shown – represents the truth of causality in so far as causality is sublated in teleological processes. I cannot discuss Hegel’s arguments for this claim here. 27 For present purposes, suffice it to say: Analyzing free will and autonomy presupposes that causality poses no further problems. In the first part of this chapter I took the competency of action for granted, and assumed that the agent could make her mental or psychological states effective. This problem, which is central in a theory of action, can be set aside when analyzing the concept of autonomy. It is a necessary element of personal autonomy, but according to Hegel, we have overcome this problem if we use the notion of the will because this notion implies a kind of teleology. 28 The second point which Hegel takes for granted is that we analyze the self-conscious or thinking will and not those forms of purposeful behavior which are found in animals and small children. In what follows I will therefore take the will always to mean the free will endowed with thinking and self-consciousness. 29 In the opening paragraphs of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel marks out three different but complexly interwoven levels that an investigation into the structure of the will must analyze. The first and most basic level is the will’s conceptual structure: Its »conceptual nature [Begriffsnatur]« in Hegel’s speculative sense of »concept«. On this level, the will has to be understood as a universal with a special structure which is »logical« in Hegels special sense of logic. The second level of analysis is the individual’s self-consciousness and its knowledge of being free. 30 This self-consciousness delivers the conceptual moments of the will as an »idea [Vorstellung]« (PR § 4). Analyzing the person’s knowledge of her freedom corresponds to analyzing the structure of the will in one of its stages of development. 27 28

29 30

But compare here the helpful analysis of de Vries (1991). I have said more about the relationship between causality and teleology in my analysis of Hegel’s concept of action (1993a, p. 237 ff.). For a detailed interpretation see ch. 8 as well as Quante (1993a, ch. 2). I have characterised these two levels of Hegel’s presentation as internal and external perspectives in ch. 7.

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The third level of Hegel’s analysis is characterized by a thesis that is central for his ethical, social and political philosophy as a whole. This thesis states that ethical, social and political institutions are »shapes [Gestaltungen]« (PR § 32) of the free will. At the first level, the free will’s conceptual nature is elaborated. This elaboration includes the will’s overcoming the subjective-objective divide. At the outset, though, this conceptual nature is not in place for the free will itself; it is rather, as Hegel puts it, only »in itself in-and-for-itself free will [an sich an und für sich freier Wille]« (PR §§ 34–39). 31 The second level, realized in the person’s »idea [Vorstellung]« of freedom and autonomy, marks the subjective side of the free will. Being subjective has three different aspects on this second level of analysis (PR § 25): (i) the absolute unity of self-consciousness, the individuality of the will, which is expressed in the reference of the indexical »I«, (ii) the particular will with its specific propositional content and (iii) the one-sided form of the will for which the content belongs to self-consciousness only and is not yet realised. Whereas the first aspect describes a universal that is instantiated in each self-conscious person, the second aspect represents its principle of individuation (cf. chapter 7). This principle belongs to the will necessarily, on account of its conceptual nature. The first aspect is the speculative universality which, according to Hegel, determines itself by giving itself a specific content. The third aspect signifies an internal deficiency of the will on this level of analysis – and in particular the »idea« that an individual has of her freedom. These three aspects characterize the subjective level of the will. The moments of universality (aspect a) and particularity (aspect b) belong together, since the structure of the will must be an individuality on all of its levels (aspect c). At the subjective level, this individuality belongs to the form of the will only. Within Hegel’s framework, this means that the subjective will of an individual is active and moves itself to objectivity, that is, realises the content of its will. The third level of Hegel’s analysis treats the objective aspect of the will’s structure. Because of the will’s »conceptual nature«, the will’s freedom must become objective. This objectivity can be seen, according to Hegel, in the structures of social or political institutions and in ethical life (PR § 4). These systems of right are the objective, realized freedom of the will. In them, objective spirit has unfolded its material content by developing objective structures through which the subjective will can realize its freedom. This objective and material side of the will also has three aspects (PR § 26). The first aspect (i) Hegel calls the »totally objective will [der schlechthin objektive Wille]« (ibid.). This aspect represents the will that has actualized itself in an ethical, social and political structure that is adequate to its conceptual nature. This aspect marks the telos of the will’s self-determination and self-explication. The second aspect (ii) Hegel names »objective will [objektiver 31

See the analysis of this logical category in ch. 8.

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Wille]« (ibid.). This historical form of the will lacks what is characteristic of selfconsciousness. An individual which has no distance from his or her desires or wants, deficient in what above was described as second-order volitions, has a will of this sort. As examples Hegel gives the will of a child, a slave, someone superstitious, and – remarkably – an ethical will. The third aspect (iii) of objectivity is the opposite of the purely formal self-consciousness that characterises the subjective will. In this sense, objectivity denotes »the immediacy of existence [die Unmittelbarkeit des Daseins]«, that is, one’s external existence in space and time as a natural being. The world in which I need to realize my will as well as my natural aspects as a human being are the complementary material aspects of the will that complete the conceptual nature which – as I have now explained – is the will’s essence (on the first level of Hegel’s analysis). Considered from Hegel’s speculative point of view, the three aspects of the subjective and the objective sides of the will that make up the second and the third levels of his analysis, complement each other. In Hegel’s view, the development of a person’s autonomy and the historical development of ethical, social and political institutions can be understood together as a single complex interwoven process of recognition. The telos of this process is then an ethical, social and political reality by means of which personal autonomy can be fully realized. The formal or subjective side of the will, which is analyzed on the second level, includes Hegel’s analysis of the internal structure of personal autonomy. The material or objective side of the will, which is analyzed on the third level, includes Hegel’s analysis of the ethical, social and political institutions as well as the natural aspect of the person’s will, its embodiment as a single person. This is the external side of the will. Of course it is Hegel’s primary, metaphysical level of analysis, his theory of the concept as it is developed in his Science of Logic, that allows him to show that the internal and external sides of the will cannot be understood in a dualistic manner but rather have to be regarded as two aspects of the universal structure of the will. This metaphysically basic level allows him to avoid the dualism that is found in other classical and contemporary approaches. Among others, these dualisms include: The opposition of personal autonomy and socialization, the opposition of the cognitive and the volitional aspects of rationality and the opposition between desires and rational evaluations, which itself is one form of the general opposition of self-consciousness and embodiment. This interpretation of the structure of free will in terms of the »speculative method« allows Hegel to show how the natural existence of a single organism and the pure self-consciousness of the »I« necessarily go together: Absolute reflection, the pure reflection of the »I«, is initially abstract, i. e. an immediacy, and as such forms a part of the structure of the concept (cf. chapter 7 and 8). Hegel identifies this absolute mediation with a person’s knowledge of her freedom. He makes the identification in such a way that this same logical relation shows up in both cases. At the second level, that is, from the perspective of the will’s completion, there is

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the opposition between pure self-consciousness on the one side, and the person’s being a natural being on the other – that is, between the internal and the external. 32 Understood in terms of the first level of analysis, i. e., Hegel’s speculative interpretation of the structure of the will, this dualism of the free internal dimension and the determined external dimension constitutive of the person can be seen as belonging to the will’s individual, uniquely »conceptual nature«, which is regarded as a universal structure. Hegel not only overcomes the dualism on the first, or metaphysical, level of analysis. He also shows what function the dualism has in developing an adequate account of personal autonomy. Overcoming this dualism requires overcoming yet another internal-external dualism: The schism between personal autonomy and ethical life. As we have seen, contemporary accounts identify the dualism of »being internal« – »being external« with the dualism of »being subjective« and »being objective«, and they furthermore regard this as an antagonistic opposition. Hegel disagrees with this view on two grounds: First, the distinction between »internal« and »external« must not be conflated with the subject-object divide. There are subjective structures – certain political and social institutions, for example – which are external to person’s autonomy understood as her psychological structure. 33 And there are objective structures – the universal structures of self-consciousness – that are internal to personal autonomy. Second: According to Hegel, the categories of »subjective« and »objective« or internal and external cannot be regarded as simply antagonistic to each other. They are concepts of reflection. This means that their meaning is constituted by a semantic or – in Hegel’s sense – logical relation to each other. It is impossible to define the one without reference to the other. And it is impossible to assume one side of the relation as given and then subsequently to try to deduce the other. This holds not only for concepts but also for phenomena since, on his view, meanings and their logical structure form the essence of phenomena. According to Hegel, these dualisms have to be understood as moments of an underlying speculative unity. A whole phenomenon – in the present context, the freedom of the will – can be understood adequately only if these dualisms are taken as elements of a complex but unified structure.

14.2.2 Personal Autonomy as Part of the Will’s Structure According to the basic idea that underlies hierarchical accounts, personal autonomy must be analyzed in terms of the logical or semantic structure of a person’s 32

33

On the relationship between the perspectives of the participant and the observer, see Quante (2009a). With regard to the current debate about the externalism of the mental, Hegel could be viewed as a »grandfather« of externalism because of his anti-representational and social analysis of the mind.

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psychology. The most important psychological structures are a person’s capacity to evaluate her own desires belonging to one level, from the point of view the level up, and her ability to identify with such desires on the one hand and be able to make these desires effective on the other. These higher-order desires or volitions mark the capacity of the person to distance herself from her lower-level desires. On Frankfurt’s and Dworkin’s account, this capacity is understood as a logical structure only. In Watson’s account, an ontological dichotomy between the rational and evaluative and the non-rational capacities replaces this logical structure. And all these theories, along with Christman’s account, try to analyze personal autonomy in terms of internal psychology alone. On top of that, these three approaches all try to give a purely formal account of personal autonomy. Hegel would have agreed with some of the philosophical theses of these contemporary approaches, but he would also have criticized some of their underlying premises. According to him, personal autonomy is a capacity they have because people are self-conscious. The notion of identification in various ways central to the account discussed has a theoretical and a practical dimension. In the process of self-determination, a person recognizes her true self and evaluates it in one and the same act. 34 Self-determination, then, is a cognitive and deliberative action in uno actu. In his own theory, Hegel avoids the dualism of thinking and willing: On his account, having particular contents, that is, intentionality, is understood as willing (PR § 6). And self-conscious willing is a propositional attitude that gives itself the content of a thought. In this way Hegel bypasses a central problem other accounts face: The practical and motivational force of rationality is guaranteed by its very own structure – that of intentionality. According to Hegel, an autonomous person’s will is characterized by three aspects: The first consists in the first-personal mode of thought (PR, § 5) – Hegel identifies this with the »conceptual moment of universality«. In thinking of herself as an »I«, a person distinguishes herself from any content that her thinking and willing might have. Being intentional, this self-consciousness is a kind of willing of oneself – and so the person also wills herself in it. Subjective freedom derives from this capacity of the will to refer to itself in pure self-consciousness and from the possibility of choosing something different, which this capacity entails. According to Hegel, this form of freedom must not be regarded as the sole aspect of freedom: In isolation from the complete structure of the will, this freedom degenerates to a destructive form which Hegel calls »negative will« (PR, § 5). The second aspect of the free will is that it is oriented towards self-determination (PR § 6). Because of the will’s conceptual nature, the universality of the first aspect must determine itself. On the personal level this means that the person has to give the will a special content. By doing so, she identifies with the chosen content 34

On this, see Quante (2007a, ch. 7–9).

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and makes it her will. In Hegel’s account this self-determining activity is not to be understood as a second step, in which the freedom of the first step vanishes. Only the one-sidedness of the first step disappears. The third aspect (PR § 7) brings to light the reason for this: The will’s structure must be analyzed as individuality, that is, as the unity of the first and second aspects. We can’t simply start from the first aspect and try to find criteria within pure self-consciousness alone for true self-determination, nor can we start from the state »being determined« as a natural and socialized being searching for a formal procedure to transform these given contents into a free form. Self-determination of the will has to be conceptualized as the logical interdependence of the first and second aspect, which belong together in every person’s free will. No person wills her I purely and without further content. And no person desires merely the content of her will. In willing something, a person always wills herself and the content as her content. Hegel warns us against thinking of self-determining autonomy as something done by the will or the I, »assumed to be a subject or a substratum« (PR § 7). This is precisely the failure involved in the notion of identification discussed above: The person is taken as given and an attempt is made to look for an autonomous mode of self-determination only. This model has to be replaced with Hegel’s analysis of the will’s »conceptual nature«. The regress-problem and the ab initio problem then do not arise. (a) The regress problem: The regress problem emerges because in contemporary accounts the first and the second aspect of the will are isolated from one another. The first aspect, the »universality [Allgemeinheit]« of the I, is posited as constant, while the second aspect, »determinacy [Bestimmtheit]«, is attributed an ever more complex logical structure. But while the content develops in this analysis, the will’s other moment, the I, does not itself develop – its capacity to reflect doesn’t change. Interpreted in this way, no unity can be attained – every attempt at mediation fails and we get a structure Hegel analyzes in the Science of Logic as »bad infinity«. The I and its content aren’t able to be unified in this structure. At a general level, in his Logic of the Concept Hegel develops a model to overcome difficulties of this type. In our present context his solution would be to regard the I and its contents as two dependent moments of the will’s underlying structure. Hierarchical theories correctly analyze the form of this underlying structure as it appears to the individual person reflecting on her freedom. But this appearance of freedom in its »psychological« form should then be understood as really being the appearance of the underlying unity of the will. (b) The ab initio problem: This problem arises for the same reasons as the regress problem. If we take the two aspects in isolation, either the first or the second might seem to be the source of autonomy: Either the capacity to form second-order

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volitions and to identify with first-order desires or the content’s logical structure itself could be considered the source of the person’s autonomy. But each alternative, taken by itself, is deficient: The person’s capacity to identify or form reflective contents cannot generate any contents without falling back into an empty decisionism. At the same time, there is no reason to assume that autonomy can be discerned in the logical structure of the content without implicitly referring to the I and its capacities. According to Hegel, we have to regard the will’s complete structure as the source of autonomy. There is no fixed starting point, no fixed content and no underlying I to be taken as a substratum (PR § 7). It is the complete self-determining movement of the concept which alone provides an absolute foundation. But this basis is actuality as a process, and not a fixed starting point. Again, Hegel would have claimed that Frankfurt or Dworkin have analyzed the appearance of this freedom only as it appears to the person explicitly reflecting upon her freedom. In this »idea«, 35 the will’s autonomy becomes »for itself«, meaning that the person can grasp the fact of her autonomy by allowing contents to be analyzed in the hierarchical manner described above. This is an essential moment in the will’s development, but it is not the source of autonomy itself. The freedom of the will makes itself known through our knowledge that it is free, and in this knowledge the structure of the will becomes explicit (this is the kernel of Hegel’s ascriptivism). Now although Hegel does not treat this process of becoming explicit as the sole source of autonomy, this process nevertheless does belong to the will’s self-explication and self-determination. Hegel takes this up in his thesis that an individual’s will that lacks this kind of selfconsciousness – the »merely objective will« – is not an adequate realization of the will’s autonomy. Not only the will of a child or of a superstitious person, but also the ethical will, given how Hegel understands the Greek form of ethical life, fails to amount to a full realization of the will’s structure. This structure not only demands a formal structure of personal autonomy but also an adequate material content which the will develops in and through itself. Thus, with the help of Hegel’s threetiered analysis of the will’s structure discussed above, we can find an account which overcomes the other two problems mentioned above: The formalism problem and the desire-formation problem. (c) The formalism problem: Not only Kant, but contemporary accounts too face the difficulty of not being able to deliver an adequate account of those contents that are appropriate for the autonomy of the will. Hegel’s critique of Kantian formalism in ethics and the dualism between the two faculties, rationality and the system of needs, is well known. In an analogous way this critique applies to Watson’s dualistic account as well as to the purely subjectivistic and formal accounts discussed above. 35

Translator’s note: The word here is Vorstellung. See the glossary for the difference between this term and Idee, also translated as »idea«.

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According to Hegel, »the concept« or »subjectivity« cannot be understood as autonomous if it is taken to be a purely formal capacity that merely appropriates given contents. Besides delineating this basic structure in his theory of Subjective Spirit, Hegel also shows that rationality and free will cannot exist as separate capacities apart from desires, the senses and activities of various kinds – in other words: Rationality and free will have to be embodied in an organism. 36 So the rational and the sensitive parts of a person’s psychology must be understood as aspects of a single structure. This explains why desires are transparent to self-consciousness and can be socialized in a rational way so as to make freedom and autonomy possible. As Hegel shows in the third part of his Elements of the Philosophy of Right, the basic forms of ethical life are the adequate realization of the will’s natural aspect. Ethical life transforms desires into a rational form and in this way allows human beings to be free. And if we now recall the third level of Hegel’s analysis, with its thesis that social and political institutions are themselves guises of the will, we can see that social and political reality is not external to the person. In fact just the opposite: For the adequate development of autonomy, social and political institutions are needed in so far as these are basically of the same structure as the person’s autonomy (see chapter 12). The relation between a person’s autonomy and the social and political world has to be understood as that internal self-determining activity of the will which gives it the materials to realize its absolute autonomy. (d) The desire formation problem: Finally, let us briefly consider the desire formation problem. A solution to this problem may be found in Hegel’s thesis that the main purpose of social and political institutions is to allow self-conscious persons to lead an autonomous life. Accordingly, a person can realize her autonomy only if she recognizes and acknowledges that the prima facie external reality of the social and political world in fact has the same basic structure as her own autonomy. So according to Hegel, there are three different criteria which qualify desires as suitable for personal autonomy: First, they must be acquired in a social process that itself is part of a political and social life which, in turn, makes the autonomy of persons possible. Second, the person must be able to acknowledge that the social world is something she can identify with. And third, it must be shown, from the philosopher’s perspective, that the basic structures of a person’s autonomy, on the one hand, and social and political institutions, on the other, can be taken to be interdependent moments of the self-determining will, itself understood as a universal structure. Because of the will’s absoluteness there is nothing »outside« it. The ultimate criterion then for the actuality of the realized structure of absolute self-determining freedom is encapsulated in the following condition: Persons can 36

For an explication of the argument that Hegel gives for the necessary corporeality and vitality of self-consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit, see ch. 4.

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lead their lives autonomously in the full sense of the term only if they identify with the social and political world in which they live. 37 This is indeed just what we would expect from Hegel’s holistic philosophy. But it is only fair to say that his holism contains some potentially dangerous tendencies as well as some open questions. I would like to close by discussing these briefly in the third part of the chapter.

14.3 Problems with Hegel’s View There is no philosopher whose thinking is more consistently holistic than Hegel’s. His holistic approach to personal autonomy and the structure of the will is just one aspect of his systematic holism. As we have seen above, holism in regard to autonomy and the will is an attractive option, but it is not without problematic consequences. In order to show this, I will distinguish a number of different levels in what follows. For our purposes it is essential to keep apart the ontological and the ethical aspects of Hegel’s thinking. Hegel’s ontological holism with regard to the mental has its difficulties, too, but as contemporary work in the Philosophy of Mind shows, the mental should indeed be regarded as external and holistic in its essence. Thus, Hegel’s ontological thesis, which says (i) the existence of social world is a precondition for an individual to have mental states of propositional selfconsciousness and (ii) that an individual’s having personal autonomy presupposes the existence of an appropriately structured social environment, is plausible and worth defending. But the question also arises whether, as Tugendhat thought (see chapter 12 and 13), there isn’t also a claim of ethical holism in Hegel’s philosophy. Isn’t there a line of thought which leads to unacceptable ethical consequences when it comes to the ethical relationship between the individual’s freedom and the community’s or state’s interests? Recalling for a moment the long-standing critique of Hegel’s political and ethical thought on the one hand and the problem of modern society stemming from the atomism of the individuals on the other, this question becomes pressing. Can Hegel offer us a live option or a convincing model of the relationship between personal autonomy and the social and political world, one which is still attractive today? Or is his holism an insurmountable obstacle to any attempt to find answers to our problems in his philosophy?

37

This criterion can be used as a critical standard also: If the philosopher can show that identifying with a given ethical, social and political structure doesn’t allow the realization of autonomy in the full sense, this would demonstrate that the given structure is not an adequate realization of the will’s freedom.

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To answer these questions, the problem Tugendhat raises first needs to be clarified and sharpened, as we did in chapter 12. 38 Four questions have to be distinguished. The first is whether an ontological holism must necessarily lead to an ethical holism. Tugendhat argues that, in Hegel’s philosophy, ethical holism – stating the priority of the social whole – is founded in his theoretical notions of selfconsciousness and truth. But even if his ethical and ontological thinking are in some ways interwoven, no strict deduction from one to the other is possible. And, indeed, in Hegel’s ontology, the whole is even on the ontological level characterised by its propensity to confer autonomy on its parts. Hegel’s theory of subjectivity, as it is developed in his Science of Logic, tries to show that a truly absolute whole cannot exist without giving freedom and autonomy to its parts, since it has actuality only in the free interaction of these moments of itself. 39 Thus, we cannot argue for the inadequacy of Hegel’s ethical theory on the basis of his ontological holism. And so a second question arises: Does Hegel really defend a version of the ethical holism which says that the individual’s moral or rational choices can be overruled by the imperatives of the social or political system? The answer to this question is: No. But not only that, Hegel also wants to make two important positive points: (i) There is no stable moral choice or moral autonomy without a given and partly accepted social world and (ii) a social or political system cannot be adequately analyzed or legitimized by philosophy if one starts with autonomous rational individuals and purely non-historical natural laws. These ideas surely do not suggest a subordination of the individual to the state. On the other hand, the thesis defended by Lübbe-Wolff that the Philosophy of Right includes all basic rights of the individual and that Hegel only avoided discussing them under that title out of historical and political expediency, goes too far. Indeed, most of them are included in what Hegel calls ethical life because morality is »sublated« and not simply negated there. 40 But there are some tendencies in Hegel’s political and ethical thought that skew things in favor of the whole over the individual. Some of these tendencies, at least, are explicable with regard to certain of Hegel’s motives that are not themselves essential to his system. In the context of an adequate theory of autonomy, these elements can legitimately be neglected. But we are now confronted with a third question: Aren’t there, as Tugendhat claimed, some systematical reasons for these tendencies in Hegel’s philosophy? Is it really possible to revise these features of his thought without giving up his most basic premises? I cannot discuss this difficult question here. 41 All I want to say is

38

39 40 41

In the following discussion I have benefited greatly from Ludwig Siep’s interpretations; cf. Siep (1979, pp. 285–294; 1981; 1992a, ch. 12, 13 and 14). Ludwig Siep (1981) offers a more detailed answer. Cf. Siep (1992, ch. 12). Sometimes the use of the concept of »organism« in Hegel’s political philosophy has been regarded as the source of these tendencies. But as Siep has shown (1992, ch. 13), this isn’t the

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that we have to distinguish these three questions carefully. It seems implausible to me that a single feature in Hegel’s philosophy can account for those tendencies, which today we cannot accept. Maybe teleology is one of the cluster of features, as Siep seems to believe. 42 Or perhaps particular theological motives, as I suspect. And, without being able to argue this point here, I would claim that the sources of these tendencies must be sought in some aspects of Hegel’s Logic. But they do not infect all parts of his thinking equally. And so this question essentially comes down to whether some aspects of Hegel’s system can be detached from his Science of Logic, or whether some elements of the Logic can be eliminated from the rest (cf. chapter 3). Anyone familiar with Hegel’s philosophy knows how difficult it is to answer these two distinct questions. In other words – and this is our fourth and final question – do we have an alternative account which solves these problems, the problems Hegel set out to solve? As far as I can see, there is no theory currently on offer which doesn’t itself face serious problems. Many of the going theories don’t even begin to approach to the depth of analysis we find in Hegel’s philosophy. Therefore I conclude: As long as we do not have an alternative theory which offers a more satisfying alternative, we should continue to view Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of Right as an important theory of personal autonomy and the freedom of the will in the context of contemporary debates.

42

case with respect to his political theory. Hegel develops a highly specific concept of »organism« which cannot be reduced to a biological notion; see Wolff (1984). Cf. Siep (1992a, p. 294 ff.).

15. Prospects for a Hegelian Biomedical Ethics In this prospective essay, I would like to consider whether Hegel’s theory of spirit can provide us with the rudiments for a conception of personal autonomy that is capable of addressing the ethical challenges we face today. 1 I will attempt this by considering two sets of questions which, I think, get at central and far-reaching problems of the present: First, I will discuss whether Hegel is able to derive ethical relevance from the concept of naturalness, in such a way as to allow us to put some limits on the tendency to transform human nature by means of technology. Second, I will consider whether, by following Hegel, we can place limits on the ability of persons to make decisions about their own existence, that is, whether we can formulate a Hegelian position in biomedical ethics that allows limits to be placed on individual self-determination without denying the primacy of autonomy. 2 The following discussion is therefore divided by topic into two parts: »Nature, naturalness and freedom« and »Individual self-determination and social identity«. In the concluding summary, I will then refer to general aspects of Hegel’s philosophy that are relevant to contemporary biomedical ethics and allow possibly implausible or even unacceptable positions in Hegel’s philosophy to be corrected without needing to depart altogether from the framework of his system.

15.1 Nature, Naturalness and Freedom 15.1.1 Constitutive and Normative Aspects of Hegel’s Theory of Subjective Spirit The part of Hegel’s system entitled »Subjective Spirit« develops Hegel’s theory of the relationship of mind and body and of the human psyche (E §§ 387–482). Foremost in his Anthropology, Hegel demonstrates the function that corporeality and naturalness perform in constituting the human soul. At the same time, the organizing principle here is the growth of explicit self-awareness and selfdetermination. In this process, the human soul relates to the natural basis of its existence in an increasingly conscious and rational form as it accepts, negates and transforms its natural basis. 3 Via intersubjective processes of recognition (the 1 2

3

Cf. also Siep (2010, ch. III.F). Since I will restrict myself to these two topics, I will leave out of consideration Hegel’s concept of sickness, even though this may be quite relevant to contemporary biomedical ethics, owing to its subtlety and its combination of descriptive and evaluative dimensions. Cf. Siep (1992a, p. 195–216).

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Phenomenology), the I constitutes itself as the unity of theoretical and practical reason, of intelligence and will (the Psychology). The unity of thinking and willing thus achieved, conceived as a matter of willing becoming subject to a system of intersubjectively justifiable and hence universal claims, lays the groundwork for the transition to Objective Spirit. In the form of his mature Philosophy of Right, Hegel attempts something which we have not in this book, namely to demonstrate the rationality of social reality by presenting it as the differentiated moments of the will’s structure. This structure of the will is instantiated in the actions of individual persons who know themselves to be free, in the interactions of subjects who identify with social groups, as well as in the institutions that social reality manifests. Aside from this constitutive or ontological moment, in which social reality is shown to be a necessary component of the individual self, there is a normative moment in Hegel’s presentation. Given Hegel’s ontological-teleological premises, these two moments are for him inseparable aspects of one and the same process. Nevertheless, one can distinguish them for the sake of philosophical analysis. If the principle of order and development in subjective spirit was the growth of the freedom of subjects in relation to their natural conditions and the conferral of intersubjective content on thinking and willing, in the Philosophy of Right the normative standard requires the establishment of a social reality that manifests the structure of the will and thus grants this structure actuality. 4 The growth of freedom from the dictates of nature, which even there is understood in a normative manner, is expanded and completed in the Philosophy of Right in order to show the justification for this normative standard of freedom and the requirements it generates. Hegel attempts this by developing each specific kind of right and claim as a moment of the self-generating structure of the will. Qua moments, this structure constitutes their justification, according to Hegel’s holistic conception of justification. Their respective scope of application is determined and constrained by their specific »logical« positions. By attending to this normative dimension of Hegel’s philosophy of right, we can ascertain two things. First, the development of self-consciousness in the form of distancing oneself and acting in relation to one’s own naturalness is a normative standard for Hegel by which the extent of a subject’s freedom is to be measured. On the other hand, self-consciousness, which Hegel takes to be the very essence of personality, becomes the exclusive principle capable of justifying the demands of self-conscious subjects (cf. chapter 8).

4

»Actuality [Wirklichkeit]« should be understood here in the sense of Hegel’s logic: »the unity, become immediate, of essence and existence, or of what is inner and what is outer« (E § 142), rather than in a merely spatio-temporal sense.

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15.1.2 Consequences for Bioethics These two basic decisions have far-reaching consequences for biomedical ethics. First, Hegel presents the relationship which people have to their own bodies as, from a normative perspective, one of possession (PR §§ 47 and 57). The standard of freedom as a distantiation from natural conditions allows for a thoroughgoing instrumentalization of one’s own nature for the sake of the freely chosen ends of the person. Even though this relationship remains restricted to the internal perspective of the person (PR § 48), meaning that rights to instrumentalize the body of a person from a third-personal perspective (such as the duty to donate organs or take part in medical experiments) cannot be derived directly from without. Hegel’s theory seems to offer no possibility of setting limits on one’s own instrumentalization of her body, so long as this happens of her own accord and not at the expense of what others are entitled to. If we call to mind issues like the sale of organs, doping in sport or the dream of using medicine to improve one’s natural constitution, then this result is bound to seem unsatisfying. If, on the other hand, we consider euthanasia, then we are likely to be left with a more positive impression, depending on our own standpoint on this issue. 5 Because Hegel explicitly assumes that a person can and must treat her own life as a thing, there seems to me to be little possibility of deriving from human nature any restrictions on how a person is allowed to set their ends. From this perspective, there can seem to be no limits on technologizing reproduction or the grand project of researching and improving the human genome (not to speak of non-human nature, which this perspective considers exclusively as an object for our appropriation – one may well worry what this means for xenotransplantation or the production of transgenic plants and animals). The second consequence which arises from Hegel’s ethics is what we might term the »marginalisation of non-personal human life«. 6 Since he reserves the ability to lay claim to something in a justified manner for self-conscious beings, Hegel attracts all of the problems in biomedical ethics that arise also for those who, for instance, associate the right to life with personal identity. Abortion, embryo research and the like thereby seems not – or at least not immediately on the basis of the rights of the people involved – to be ethically relevant: A counter-intuitive consequence. This would be a welcome consequence for someone who is exclusively concerned with the autonomy of the person, taking this to have absolute primacy, and wishing to take neither nature nor naturalness to be of direct ethical interest. But there are also elements in Hegel’s philosophy of subjective and subjective spirit which prevent us from appropriating Hegel’s philosophy in this way. These parts of Hegel’s philosophy thus offer a point of connection for those who wish to preserve a higher place for nature and naturalness.

5 6

Cf. Quante (2010a and 2002b, ch. 6). Cf. Siep (1992a, p. 112–115 and 2004).

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Here we must recall the constitutive moment of Hegel’s theory. If one takes the basic institutions of ethical life to be adequate manifestations of the natural will that have been developed and preserved throughout history, then Hegel’s theory might prompt the following consideration: The demonstration that the natural anthropological constitution of humans is manifest in certain social institutions and forms of life shows that interfering with human nature by means of biotechnology will have consequences for these social institutions. Even if Hegel’s philosophy does not allow this to be given directly as an ethically relevant objection, it at least makes available a theoretical basis on which these consequences can come into view as ethically relevant. The constitutive elements of bodiliness and natural constitution are ethically relevant, but indirectly, even though these elements are available for the use of human freedom. Hegel’s philosophy cannot, without doing some violence to it, be taken to endorse the thesis that nature and naturalness are exclusively »materials for our duties« and ethically neutral in every respect. 7 On the other hand, regarding the impression that Hegel marginalises non-human life, one must observe that personality, as the principle of abstract right, covers neither the whole domain of right nor does it represent the dominant principle in the spheres of morality or ethical life. Human »non-persons« embedded in ethical institutions, like the family for instance, are in no way ethically worthless or indefensible on Hegel’s view. Thanks to the social constitution of self-consciousness and personality, we can even – perhaps following Hegel’s theory of recognition – defend ethical claims on the grounds that they arise out of social relations in possibly non-personal human life, rather than being derived from the rights of individual persons. 8 Hegel’s social-anthropological foundations can be called upon to show that this life deserves ethical consideration. 9

15.2 Individual Self-Determination and Social Identity 15.2.1 Autonomy as a Foundation for Biomedical Ethics Biomedical ethics has been marked for more than forty years by a tendency to view the principle of respect for the patient’s autonomy as basic. 10 This can be seen, for instance, in the ethical and legal importance which has been accorded to the informed consent of the patient. The principle of respect for autonomy has supplanted the principles of beneficence and non-harm and hence also usurped the rather paternalistic orientation of medical ethics around the well-being of the 7 8 9 10

Cf. Vieth / Quante (2005). On Hegel’s conception of recognition as a basic principle of practical philosophy, see Siep (1979). Cf. Siep (1992b). Cf. Quante (2002b and 2010a).

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patient. The principle of autonomy allies with the legal rights of patients, which allow the prerogatives of multiple individuals based on their claims to autonomy to be brought together into an ethically and legally acceptable relationship. This shift is accompanied by a transformation in the understanding of the doctor-patient relationship. As with all reversals of fundamental principle, we see that this has not been without some cost in biomedical ethics. Without wanting to turn back the clock, one can maintain that the dominance of the principle of respect for autonomy has made many ethical quandaries difficult or even impossible to handle and has almost completely marginalised the principles of non-harm and beneficence. I have in mind here, firstly, the many cases in which one cannot apply the principle of autonomy at all, for example, conducting research on those not capable of consent, the treatment of severely disabled newborn infants or ethical questions in psychiatry. 11 In these cases, we must fall back on the subordinated principles of non-harm and beneficence. If we do not wish to be pushed into defending the implausible conclusion that these are not really ethical problems, then we cannot avoid accepting the following principle: Cases that are not covered by the autonomy principle, because the subjects involved display no autonomy, must be handled using different ethical principles. Secondly, there are cases in which people make autonomous decisions, but it is at least prima facie plausible to assume that the principle of autonomy does not deserve to be the dominant principle. Some admittedly quite different examples are the wish to forego treatment in rehabilitative therapy, the wish for active assistance in suicide and the wish for altruistic living donor transplantation with an incalculable risk for the donor and a minimal prospect of success. In these cases, many share the ethical intuition that formally autonomous decisions of this sort do not deserve our respect because there are other ethically relevant aspects encompassed by different principles that are in these cases more important. One does not want to defend the hopeless thesis that these cannot be a case of individual decision but must rather be cases of irrational and therefore unfree decisions. In that case we would either have to »bite the bullet« and follow the autonomy principle, or

11

Hegel’s discussions of »madness [Verrücktheit]« are notable in two respects. On the one hand, his analysis of mental illness as a self-relation of spirit anticipates the central role of the principle of charity in contemporary Philosophy of Mind, as a constitutive means of imputing rationality to states with propositional content; cf. Quante (1995). To understand a mental state as madness is to understand it as a mental state. This is only possible if the subject in question is still understood as in principle rational. As Hegel puts it: Madness is »only a contradiction within the reason that is still present« (E § 408). On the other hand, this comes to have consequences for the ethics of psychiatry when Hegel – ever mindful of the standards of his time – remarks that »humane treatment, i. e. a treatment that is both benevolent and rational [. . . ] presupposes the patient’s rationality« (ibid.). This remark occurs in Hegel’s argument that »[t]he genuine psychical treatment« of madness recognizes the ill patient as a subject of therapy.

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else admit that autonomy is neither the sole nor the central ethical principle in these cases. For the first alternative, the following argument could be offered: It is better to take on board the counter-intuitive consequences in these cases than to threaten the principle of autonomy, since this is the central accomplishment of modern medicine. We must allow no paternalistic exceptions because these will place us on a slippery slope. Ultimately, so the argument goes, more harm will be done by this, and so it is preferable to jettison some of our ethical intuitions. Against this argument, one can retort that this only really establishes the necessity of certain precautionary measures and a discerning approach to biomedical ethics. The shift to a biomedical ethics oriented exclusively or primarily around the principle of respect for the autonomy of the patient, in which the principle of legality functions as a supplementary principle to handle competition between claims of autonomous persons, has, thirdly, an influence on the understanding of medicine as a social institution. It is then difficult to justify how one can counter, for instance, the autonomous decision to sell an organ or how one could set limits to the desire to improve one’s own genetic makeup or that of one’s descendants. In other words: It is hard to see how one can, on the basis of a legalesque morality of individual rights, avoid reducing medicine to a service like any other. There are therefore indeed grounds for setting limits on the exceptionless reign of individual autonomy, limits which cannot be derived from the principle of legality. Falling back on our nature and naturalness, which was discussed in the previous chapter, can be understood in biomedical ethics as an attempt to find an ethically respectable basis on which to place limits on our autonomous use of our bodies that do not rely on the justified claims of other autonomous persons. 12 Another way of putting the point is this: One’s own corporeality should count as an ethically respectable limit to individual self-determination. Even the attempt to find a supplementary source of ethical justification for biomedical ethics via the relevance of social institutions which are not reducible to individual autonomy takes this approach. I take it that these attempts, which can be classed together under the heading of »communitarianism«, aim to demonstrate a possible ethical deficiency which shows up if individual autonomy becomes the sole or principal value within biomedical ethics.

15.2.2 The Significance of Hegel’s Social Ontology for Biomedical Ethics I have already discussed Hegel’s stance towards the first strategy of setting limits on individual self-determination by relying on nature and naturalness. In relation to the second strategy, the relevance of Hegel’s philosophy for contemporary biomed12

Cf. Siep (2004) for a highly developed account.

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ical ethics is much clearer. Standing in the tradition of Kant and Fichte, Hegel is a defender of individual autonomy. The basic structure of the will is that of a selfconscious self-relation, understood as a self-realization of freedom in individual consciousness of freedom as well as in social and political institutions. The person and the moral subject consequently have an ineluctable and historically irreversible right to lead their life by the exercise of their own will and personal choices. There is in Hegel no devaluation of individual autonomy for the sake of a »divine state« or »social community«. 13 As the preceding chapters have shown, Hegel’s theory of the will contains a model of autonomy which is supported by a holistic social ontology rather than an atomistic ontology or a methodological individualism. On Hegel’s view, individual autonomy can only be realized in the context of social institutions, as a moment of a social congregation or a state. It is one of the ontological conditions on the constitution of individual autonomy that this social reality is as ethically meaningful and valuable and recognized as such, rather than merely being viewed as an instrumental environment for the pursuit of egoistic goals that are »reconciled« with one another in the manner of contracts and only in this sense follow the principles of justice. Precisely because Hegel’s theory of the will develops a normative social ontology, Hegel is able to accord ethical value to social institutions themselves and thereby opens the possibility of setting limits on individual autonomy. 14 Hegels theory of the will, as a holistic social ontology, thereby proves to have the same double character as did the corporeality of the will and the naturalness of the person: From a constitutive point of view, individual autonomy is only possible as a moment of a free, self-determining and in this sense autonomous social community. This constitutive dependence allows limits to be set on individual autonomy. In the case of extreme conflicts, the ontological dependence of individual autonomy

13

14

Hegel’s assumption that the telos of the state consists in enabling and safeguarding the existence of individuals being autonomous in so far as possible bears ethical significance. It can help to fend off attempts to impose excessive social obligations on the basis of a supposedly communitarian model of society with regard to, for example, human experiments or the willingness to undergo genetic testing. The impression of Hegel’s theory being »double-edged« in this way is a necessary consequence of his assumption that neither the social whole nor the autonomous individual is able to be conceptualized independently of the other, and that the normative claims of each cannot be brought into a simple relation where one dominates the other but must rather be balanced against one another in concrete situations. Since, however, he does not reduce the ethical import of social institutions to the interests of autonomous individuals, Hegel can justify setting the limits on individual autonomy on the basis of these social institutions while simultaneously requiring that social institutions are not reduced purely to organizations driven by profit, but must fulfil a social function. This is important in the context of evaluating the science of the human genome if we think of, for example, health insurance and life insurance. We ought to argue, following Hegel, that these social institutions must do more than to manage the risks which threaten ultimately egoistic goals; cf Quante (2010a, ch. 7).

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even manifests in the individual being sacrificed for the self-preservation of the state. 15 Nevertheless, one must here consider that this is an extreme case in which the ontological primacy of the whole takes precedence over the individual will. Furthermore, we must bear in mind that Hegel’s social ontology, as opposed to say the Systemtheorie of Luhmann, is essentially normative: It is the telos of the state to safeguard and foster the existence of individuals who are as free and selfdetermining as possible. This constitutive dependence therefore stands alongside the ethical primacy of individual freedom, which sets limits on the ethical claims of the community and thereby on the social duties of the individual. The double character of constitutive function and normative standard, which we found to be characteristic of the corporeality and naturalness of persons, thus shows up here again in a more complex form under transformed conditions: In contrast to nature, objective spirit has being for itself and a normative essence, so that an ethical aspect comes into play alongside its constitutive dependence. For Hegel, the decisive question is how the ethical primacy of a free and self-determined social formation can be reconciled with the normative standard of individual freedom and self-determination. In the extreme case of a large-scale conflict, Hegel derives the justification for sacrificing the individual from the ontological primacy of the social. In the normal case, however, this constitutive framework of individual autonomy only sets limits within which self-determination is possible and necessary. And in the ideal case, which for Hegel is basically the everyday one, social and individual autonomy converge. Without going into the details, we can therefore claim that Hegel’s holistic and normative social ontology is able to provide an attractive basis for the justification and delimitation of individual autonomy in the context of normatively conceived social institutions. Even if it turns out to be necessary to install further safeguards on individual freedom, the basic model is nevertheless wellsuited to place limits on individual autonomy where autonomy’s own constitutive conditions threaten to undermine it.

15.3 Holism as a Method in Biomedical Ethics If one approaches biomedical ethics via the problem of how one can set limits on individual self-determination while granting the primacy of the autonomy principle, then Hegel’s theory of subjective spirit can be seen to be an attractive philosophical model of the naturalness of persons, while his theory of objective spirit can be seen as an attractive model for the ethical value of social institutions. Regarding our problem of the (self-)understanding of medicine as a social institution given 15

Hegel (PR §§ 323 and 324) even uses the categories of »substance« (= state) and »transient moment« (= the interests and rights of individuals) to characterize the relationship of the individual to the state in the context of the state’s self-preservation and self-defense.

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the primacy of autonomy, Hegel’s theory of the will is attractive because it does not presuppose an atomistically constrained notion of autonomy and nevertheless allows us to hold on to the primacy of individual freedom. Hegel’s philosophy does not force on us a counter-intuitive »either-or«, but rather demands that we balance various ethically relevant aspects in a way that is sensitive to context. This is possible because, unlike Kant, and also unlike contemporary biomedical ethics, Hegel does not make the assumption that all ethical claims can be derived from the principle of individual autonomy. Hegel does not have especially strong resources for making sense of the naturalness of humans as an ethically relevant dimension of personal life because he attributes no ethical worth to nature and naturalness in their own right. Nevertheless, his detailed considerations in his theory of the will provide important insights on this matter which are ripe for engagement. 16 Regarding the relationship of social community, state and autonomous individual, historical experiences and contemporary biotechnological developments make it necessary to accord greater protections to individual rights than Hegel did. This does not, however, require us to abandon the framework of Hegel’s theory of the will altogether. 17 Regarding the ethical relevance of human naturalness and human nature, and in fact non-human nature as well, we might hope to correct Hegel’s own self-understanding by means of genuinely Hegelian resources. The idea of life at the end of the philosophy of nature makes available an internal purposiveness with the rudimentary structure of recognition (E § 369). Furthermore, nature belongs necessarily to the idea, and the idea, as will and knowledge, also encompasses the good and the true. It would not be a big step to accord nature and naturalness their own normative worth on the basis of the constitutive contribution that Hegel recognizes these make to autonomy. 18 In any case, Hegel’s system is more antagonistic and dualistic regarding the relationship between nature and spirit than his own ontological model and his own method, as he understands them, require. The sublation of the opposition of scheme and content that we discussed in the second chapter, which allows Hegel’s Science of Logic to be both logic and ontology, in combination with his conceptual holism and coherentism regarding justification, in fact supports the supposition that all moments of the idea are of a descriptive and an evaluative sort. If nature is also the idea in the form of its otherness (E § 200), then it is still the idea, and even if it is only the idea as something »internal« (E § 248), the concept is nevertheless instantiated and realised in nature. This is actually incompatible with an absolute dichotomy of nature and spirit, which denies nature any evaluative dimension. Perhaps Hegel’s fallacy was to infer from the correct assumption that we as free beings must always be able to relate to nature and naturalness, to the overgeneralization that nature and naturalness therefore have 16 17 18

Cf. Siep (1992a, p. 307–328). Cf. ibid., p. 285–306. Cf. Siep (2004) as well as Vieth / Quante (2005).

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no ethical worth themselves. The monism of Hegel’s philosophy allows us to accord independent value to the aspects of nature and corporeality which are constitutive to subjectivity even if these only have their proper place in relation to the evaluative and normative perspectives of free subjects. 19 It is essential that we do not confuse this relational character with the completely different idea that the value of nature and naturalness is merely derivative and projected onto the world by subjects. The development of biotechnology, and the widespread experiences of frustration and loss which it has given rise to, lend support to the conjecture that the assumption that nature and naturalness are ethically neutral is too hasty and perhaps not appropriate. If one wishes to undertake a modification of Hegel’s philosophy as regards nature, naturalness and freedom in light of these social changes, then one can do so under Hegel’s own guidance. Since he subverts not only the dichotomy of concept and object but also that between »analytic and synthetic«, his philosophy implies that the significance of categories is not independent of real developments and changes. In light of historical experiences (including experiences of loss and frustration), as well as social changes, nature and naturalness can attract new ethical meaning. Hegel’s philosophy of spirit represents an alternative to purely a priori argumentation detached from historical developments. For this reason, too, Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit should be rehabilitated as an important conversational partner for contemporary biomedical ethics.

19

This reflection-logical constellation is developed at length in Vieth / Quante (2005).

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Notes on the text This book is a translation of Die Wirklichkeit des Geistes (Frankfurt / M.: Suhrkamp 2011). Exerpts or revised versions of the following publications appeared as chapters of that book: Chapter 1: Introduction Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel – Individuelle Freiheit und sittliche Gemeinschaft. In: A. Beckermann / D. Perler (ed.): Klassiker der Philosophie heute. Stuttgart: Reclam 2004, p. 419–438. Chapter 2: Metaphysics and common sense Common Sense-Realismi kohtaa Absoluuttisen Idealismin. In: niin & näin 22 (1999), p. 20–26. Reconciling Mind and World. In: Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (2002), p. 75–96. Chapter 3: Speculative philosophy as therapy? Spekulative Philosophie als Therapie? In: C. Halbig et al. (eds.): Hegels Erbe. Frankfurt / M.: Suhrkamp 2004, p. 324–350. Chapter 4: Hegel’s critique of observing reason »Die Vernunft unvernünftig aufgefaßt«. Hegels Kritik der beobachtenden Vernunft. In: Klaus Vieweg / Wolfgang Welsch (ed.): Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes. Frankfurt / M.: Suhrkamp 2008, p. 325–349. »Reason (. . . ) apprehended irrationally«: Hegel’s Critique of Observing Reason. In: Dean Moyar / Michael Quante (eds.): Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit: A Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008, p. 91–111. Chapter 5: Nature as spirit’s posit and presupposition Die Natur: Setzung und Voraussetzung des Geistes. In: B. Merker et al. (eds.): Subjektivität und Anerkennung. Paderborn: Mentis 2004, p. 81–101. Chapter 6: Layering versus positing accounts of the mental Schichtung oder Setzung? Hegels reflexionslogische Bestimmung des Natur-GeistVerhältnisses. In: Hegel-Studien 37 (2002), p. 107–121. Chapter 7: Self-consciousness and individuation »Die Persönlichkeit des Willens« und das »Ich als Dieser«. Bemerkungen zum Individuationsproblem in Hegels Konzeption des Selbstbewusstseins. In: M. Quante / E. Rózsa (eds.): Vermittlung und Versöhnung. Münster: Lit-Verlag 2001, p. 53–67. Chapter 8: The personality of the will »Die Personalität des Willens«. Eine Analyse der begriffslogischen Struktur der §§ 34–40 in Hegels Philosophie des Rechts. In: L. Siep (eds.): G. W. F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Berlin Verlag 1997, p. 73–94. »The personality of the will« as the Principle of Abstract Right: An Analysis of §§ 34–40 of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right in Terms of the Logical structure of the Concept. In: R. B. Pippin / O. Höffe (eds.): Hegel on Ethics and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004, p. 81–100.

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Chapter 9: Action Hegel. In: T. O’Connor / C. Sandis (ed.): Companion to the Philosophy of Action. London: Blackwell 2010, p. 537–545. Chapter 10: Responsibility Hegel’s Planning Theory of Action. In: A. Laitinen / C. Sandis (eds.) Hegel on Action. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan 2010, p. 212–231. Chapter 11: The grammar of recognition Die systematische Bedeutung der Anerkennungsrelation in Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes. In: Studien zu Hegels Philosophie, redacted by the Japanese Hegel Society, 13 (2007), p. 72–84 (in Japanese). Az elismeréz mint a szellem fenomenológiájának ontológiai principiuma. In: Kellék 33–34 (2007), p. 175–189. »Der reine Begriff des Anerkennens«. Überlegungen zur Grammatik der Anerkennungsrelation in Hegels »Phänomenologie des Geistes«. In: H.-C. Schmidt am Busch / C. F. Zurn (eds.): Anerkennung. Berlin: Akademie Verlag 2009, p. 91–106. »The Pure Notion of Recognition«: Reflections on the Grammar of the Relation of Recognition in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. In: H.-C. Schmidt am Busch / C. F. Zurn (eds.), The Philosophy of Recognition: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives. Lanham: Lexington Books, Rowman & Littlefield 2010, p. 89–106. El reconocimiento como principio ontológico en la Fenonmenologia del espiritu. In: V. Lemm / J. O. Karzulovic (eds.): Hegel: Pensador de la actualidad. Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Diego Portales 2010, p. 141–162. Chapter 12: Individual, community and state »[. . . ] die Bestimmung der Individuen ist, ein allgemeines Leben zu führen«. La struttura metafisica della filosofia sociale di Hegel. In: Quaderni Di Teoria Social 5 (2005), p. 221–250 (mit D. P. Schweikard). »Leading a Universal life«: the systematic relevance of Hegel’s social philosophy. In: History of the Human Sciences (22) 2009, p. 58–78 (with D. P. Schweikard). Chapter 13: Hegel’s ethical pragmatism Hegels pragmatistische Ethikbegründung. In: K. Engelhard / D. H. Heidemann (eds.): Ethikbegründungen zwischen Universalismus und Relativismus. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 2005, p. 231–250. Chapter 14: Personal autonomy Personal Autonomy and the Structure of the Will. In: J. Kotkavirta (ed.): Right, Morality, Ethical Life. Studies in G. W.F Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Jyväskylä 1997, p. 45–74. G. W. F. Hegel: La Autonomiá personal y la estructura de la voluntad. In: G. Leyva (ed.): La Filosofia de la Acción. Un análisis histórico-sistemático de la acción y la racionalidad práctica en los clásicos de la filosofía. Madrid: Editorial Síntesis de Madrid / Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana 2008, p. 413–435. Chapter 15: Prospects for a Hegelian biomedical ethics Hegel und die biomedizinische Ethik. In: O. Breidbach / D. v. Engelhardt (eds.): Hegel und die Lebenswissenschaften. Berlin: Verlag für Wissenschaft und Bildung (2001), p. 261–275.

Translation notes and glossary For a text that will be the object of philological scrutiny in its own right, it may be appropriate to adopt a policy of literal translation that aims to leave the interpretative work to the reader, as Wood and Guyer do in their translation of Kant’s First Critique. For a text like this one, aimed at assisting the reader’s comprehension of Hegel and bridging Hegel scholarship and analytic philosophy, the opposite approach seems more appropriate. I have aimed to produce a translation that stays out of the reader’s way as much as possible, and to produce a text that might be at home in either genre. My approach has meant that I have often broken up longer sentences, switched one part of speech for another and sometimes rearranged clauses so as to produce a more natural flow in English. It also has the result that some English words do not correspond to only one term in German, although I have tried to ensure correspondence for technical terms (concept, sublation, etc. – see below). In cases where there was the possibility of serious misunderstanding, I have provided the German. In one instance, I have resorted to the use of subscripts to disambiguate between two terms (existenceE and existenceD, again see below), but I have tried to avoid this sort of artificial maneuver wherever possible, instead trying to make the English text maximally self-contained. A few German terms presented special difficulties: Geist can mean »mind« in a fairly neutral way, but also »spirit« with a decidedly religious connotation. Hegel seems almost always to intend both meanings, and so it seemed safer to translate it as »spirit« even where the emphasis is on the mental. It is a major task of the book to show that Hegel’s Philosophy of Geist is relevant to Philosophy of Mind in the contemporary sense; it would be misleading to presuppose that it is by translating Geist as »mind«. Bestimmung and bestimmen are usually translated using the rather opaque »determination« and »determine«. Often something more mundane is meant, such as »characterize« or »description«, and I have then translated them in this way. Aufhebung, Begriff, an sich, für sich, an und für sich, etc. are technical terms used by Hegel in a singular way. Rather than attempt to make any contribution to Hegel translation here, it seemed more important to ensure that the German term being talked about was unambiguous, and so I have given the most standard translations of these terms in Hegel scholarship. There is no good standard translation scheme in Hegel scholarship for distinguishing Existenz and Dasein; those that try to usually end up choosing for Dasein a translation that makes this ordinary word into something much more obscure (Miller’s »determinate being«, Geraet and Suchting’s »thereness«). Both Dasein and Existenz mean »existence«, but Dasein (literally »being there«) suggests concrete,

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physical presence, while Existenz can be more abstract. In some contexts they are interchangeable, but in chapter seven the difference is at issue, so I have used »existenceE« for Existenz and »existenceD« for Dasein there. The term Anspruch, which comes up frequently in the book, admits of no uniform English translation. It can mean »claim« in the sense of laying claim to something, but this translation seldom works in context. I have used various translations: Claim, entitlement, demand, requirement, and prerogative. In many cases, »demand« was the best fit, but it should be borne in mind that the German word lacks the forceful connotation of the English. Rechte are rights, but no single English word covers the range of Recht used as the name of a topic. Some translators render Rechtsphilosophie as »legal and political philosophy«, but this gives the misleading impression that Hegel thought about law and politics as two separate topics grouped together for convenience. He, and others writing in his tradition, think of Recht as a unified topic concerning the legitimacy and justification of various legal, political and social phenomena. Since the problem here is not just in language but in the difference between English and German ways of dividing disciplines, I decided it best to translate Rechtsphilosophie simply as »Philosophy of Right« so as to mark that Hegel is indeed talking about a subject that we do not routinely treat as a single topic. Entschuldigung has been rendered as »excuse« when referring to a particular occasion of someone’s giving an excuse or being excused. Sometimes, it is used in the text to refer to this practice in the abstract. It is a strain to talk about »excuse in genereal« in English, so I have used exculpation when referring to excuses in the abstract. Vorstellung, Idee both mean »idea«, but only the second has a lofty philosophical meaning for Hegel. »Idea« in the text is Idee, unless otherwise marked. All translations in this volume are original; however, the previous translations cited in the notes on the text have been consulted. Occasionally sentences from these translations appear verbatim where no regularization was needed and it seemed that no improvement could be made. See the List of Abbreviations for translations of Hegel’s works used. Minor adaptations of these translations have been made freely throughout. More significant changes have been marked as such (with the exception that »mind« has silently been replaced with »spirit« as a translation for Geist throughout the revised Wallace / Miller translation of the Encyclopedia Philosophy of Spirit; see below for the rationale behind this choice). Translations of handwritten and marginal notes and other untranslated texts, are the translator’s own. Capitalized technical terms (the Idea, Absolute Spirit, etc.) refer to parts of Hegel’s system. Where the same terms are not being used to name a part of the system, they are left uncapitalized. Sometimes, the same term is used both as the name of a book (when italicized) and as the name of a part of the system (when not italicized), as with the Phenomenology, or the Philosophy of Right.

Translation notes and glossary

263

What follows below is a selective glossary of terms: ascription – Zuschreibung assumption – Voraussetzung attitude – Einstellung cognition – Erkenntnis concept – Begriff consciousness – Bewusstsein contractarianism – Kontraktualismus demand – Anspruch develop – entfalten, entwickeln doctrine – Lehre essence – Wesen exculpation – Entschuldigung existenceD – Dasein existenceE – Existenz fact-act – Tathandlung 1 for itself – für sich (social) formation – (soziales) Gebilde idea – Idee, Vorstellung (see above) ideality – Ideenhaftigkeit in itself – an sich in-and-for-itself – an und für sich individuality – Einzelheit, Individualität legitimacy – Geltung objectivization – Objektivierung particularity – Besonderheit posit – setzen (basic) principle – Grundprinzip realization – Realisierung reflection – Reflexion right – Recht, Anspruch self-conception – Selbstverständnis self-external being – Außersichsein shape (e. g. of consciousness) – Gestalt spirit – Geist stipulation – Vorgabe sublate, sublation – aufheben, Aufhebung technologies – Techniken universal – allgemein, Allgemeinheit

1

This is a Fichtean term of art used to describe the I’s self-positing. It is an amalgam of the words for »fact« (Tatsache) and »act« (Handlung). See J. G. Fichte: Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre I (1794). Akademie edition I / 2 (1965), pp. 250, 260.

Index of names Alexander, S. 105 Anscombe, E. 155, 159 Aristotle 16, 34, 39 f., 107, 123 Baker, L. R. 192 Bauer, B. 203 Bennett, J. 185 Bogdany, A. 70 Bonsiepen, W. 85 Bowie, A. 27 Brand, M. E. 156 Brandom, R. 61 f., 66, 88, 175 Bratman, M. 151, 155, 158 Broad, C. D. 105 Burkhardt, B. 85 Cartwright, N. 70 Castañeda, H.-N. 120 Christman, S. 219, 221, 223, 227, 233 Davidson, D. 31 f., 34, 37–39, 72, 74 De George, R. T. 192 Dennett, D. C. 42, 212 Descartes, R. 17, 60–62, 64, 104 de Vries, W. A. 185, 229 Dewey, J. 205 Düsing, K. 25, 92, 117, 208 Dworkin, G. 219, 221, 225 f., 233, 235 Evans, G. 33 f., 38, 40 Feuerbach, L. 58 Fichte, J. G. 9, 18, 23, 63 f., 117, 120 f., 129, 138, 151, 176–178 Fisher, J. M. 222 Frank, M. 172, 173 Frankfurt, H. G. 203, 219, 221–226, 233, 235 Frege, G. 72, 109, 123 Friedman, M. 27 Fulda, H. F. 98 Georges, K. E. 183 Giusti, M. 193 Goldman, A.I. 155, 184 f. Grimm, J. 183 Grimm, W. 183 Habermas, J. 172 f. Hacker, P. 50 Halbig, C. 25, 30, 37, 43, 45, 66, 72, 74, 108 f., 115, 117, 127, 185, 199, 207 Harris, W. T. 9, 101

Heidemann, D. 15 Henrich, D. 117 Hill, T. E. 205, 219, 225 Hobbes, T. 16 Honneth, A. 171 Hoppe, H. 155 Horstmann, R. P. 48, 58, 98 f., 117, 176 Hume, D. 34–36, 60 Husserl, E. 72, 109 Jacobi, F. H. 35, 49 Jaeschke, W. 66 James, W. 205 Kant, I. 12, 16, 18, 23, 27, 30, 33–38, 64, 94, 117 f., 120, 129, 138 f., 144, 151, 194, 218–220, 225 f., 235, 247, 249 Kaplan, D. 120 Kim, J. 103–106, 184 f. Korsgaard, C. 219 Lewis, D. 120 Locke, J. 16, 138, 145 Lombard, L. B. 185 Lübbe-Wolf, G. 238 Luhmann, N. 248 Lukács, G. 187, 203 MacIntyre, A. 16, 77 Marx, K. 12, 58, 193, 203, 212 McDowell, J. 27–45, 50 f., 62, 101, 106 Meggle, G. 181 Michelet, K. L. 147 Mill, J. S. 105 Miller, A. V. 9, 183 f., 261 f. Millikan, R. G. 73 Moore, M. S. 148 Moravia, S. 65 Moyar, D. 25, 171 Nagel, T. 43, 106, 137 Neuhouser, F. 196 Oshana, M. A. L. 219–221, 227 f. Parfit, D. 53 Peirce, C. S. 205 Peperzak, A. T. 85, 110 Petry, J. 9 Pinkard, T. 9 f., 55, 61 f., 74, 172 Pippin, R. B. 5, 11–13, 25, 54 f., 79, 117, 145–147, 150, 185, 215

266

Index of names

Plato 40, 221, 225 Popper, K. 173, 187, 204 Putnam, H. 27, 206 Quine, W. V. O. 27, 31–34 Raters, M. L. 206 Ravizza, M. 219 Rawls, J. 187, 193 f. Redding, P. 70 Rohs, P. 116, 122 Rousseau, J.-J. 16, 194 Rózsa, E. 25, 208 Ruben, D.-H. 191 Sandel, M. 187, 193 Schelling, F. W. J. 9, 44, 58, 102, 117, 127 Schiller, F. 225 Schiller, F. C. S. 205 Schmid, H. B. 179 Schopenhauer, A. 48 Schulze, G. E. 60 Schweikard, D. P. 16, 24 f., 179, 187, 199

Sellars, W. 37 Shatz, D. 219 Siep, L. 25, 30, 44, 48, 55, 59, 63, 72, 85, 91, 94, 101, 108, 116, 117, 130, 138, 142, 151, 171–173, 198, 209, 213–215, 238 f., 241, 243 f., 246, 249 Stekeler-Weithofer, P. 117 Stephan, A. 105 Taylor, C. 147, 189, 224, 227 Ter Hark, M. 74 Thalberg, I. 225 Tugendhat, E. 173, 204, 215–217, 237 f. Velleman, D. 219 Vieth, A. 25, 244, 249 Walzer, M. 194 Watson, G. 221, 225 f., 233, 235 Wildt, A. 171 Willaschek, M. 25, 27, 37, 158, 206 Wittgenstein, L. 28 f., 43, 50, 52, 56, 74, 101 Wolff, M. 54, 72, 98, 238 f., Wollheim, R. 192