Spices in the Indian Ocean World 9780860785101, 9781138274075, 9781351898645, 1351898647, 9781315242637, 131524263X

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Contents
Acknowledgements
General Editor's Preface
Introduction
1 Colloquies on the Simples and Drugs of India: Cinnamon, Cloves, Mace and Nutmeg, Pepper
2 The Spice Trade in Mamluk Egypt
3 Spice Prices in the Near East in the 15th Century
4 Pepper Prices Before da Gama
5 Le repli vénitien et égyptien et la route du Cap, 1496-1533
6 The Mediterranean Spice Trade: Further Evidence of its Revival in the Sixteenth Century
7 The Return Cargoes of the Carreira in the 16th and Early 17th Century
8 The Changing Pattern of Europe's Pepper and Spice Imports, ca. 1400-1700
9 The Portuguese Factory and Trade in Pepper in Malabar During the 16th Century
10 Pepper Gardens and Market in Precolonial Malabar
11 The Portuguese Impact on the Production and Trade in Sri Lanka Cinnamon in Asia in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries
12 The Portuguese and the Trade in Cloves in Asia During the Sixteenth Century
13 A Note on Portuguese Reactions to the Revival of the Red Sea Spice Trade and the Rise of Atjeh, 1540-1600
14 The Changing Balance of the Southeast Asian Pepper Trade
15 Restrictive Trading Regimes: VOC and the Asian Spice Trade in the Seventeenth Century
16 The Economics of Uncertainty: The Structural Revolution in the Spice Trade, 1480-1640
Index

Citation preview

An Expanding World Volume 11

Spices in the Indian Ocean World

AN EXPANDING WORLD The European Impact on World History, 1450-1800 General Editor: AJ.R. Russell-Wood EXPANSION, INTERACTION, ENCOUNTERS

1 2 3 4 5

The Global Opportunity Felipe Ferndndez-Armesto The European Opportunity Felipe Ferndndez-Armesto The Globe Encircled and the World Revealed Ursula Lamb Europeans in Africa and Asia Anthony Disney The Colonial Americas Amy Turner Bushnell

TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE

6 Scientific Aspects of European Expansion William Storey I Technology and European Overseas Enterprise Michael Adas

TRADE AND COMMODITIES

8 9 10 II 12 13

Merchant Networks in the Early Modern World Sanjay Subrahmanyam The Atlantic Staple Trade (Parts I & II) Susan Socolow European Commercial Expansion in Early Modern Asia Om Prakash Spices in the Indian Ocean World M.N. Pearson Textiles: Production, Trade and Demand Maureen Mazzaoui Interoceanic Trade in European Expansion Pieter Emmer and Femme Gaastra

14 Metals and Monies in a Global Economy

15 Slave Trades Patrick Manning

Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giraldez

EXPLOITATION

16 17 18 19

From Indentured Servitude to Slavery Colin Palmer Agriculture, Resource Exploitation, and Environmental Change Helen Wheatley Plantation Societies Judy Bieber Mines of Silver and Gold in the Americas Peter Bakewell

GOVERNMENT AND EMPIRE

20 21 22 23 24

Theories of Empire David Armitage Government and Governance of Empires AJ.R. Russell-Wood Imperial Administrators Mark Burkholder Local Government in European Empires AJ.R. Russell-Wood Warfare and Empires Douglas M. Peers

SOCIETY AND CULTURE

25 26 27 28 29 30

Settlement Patterns in Early Modern Colonization Joyce Lorimer Biological Consequences of the European Expansion Kenneth Kiple, with Steve Beck European and non-European Societies (Parts I & II) Robert Forster Christianity and Missions J.S. Cummins Families in the Expansion of Europe Maria Beatriz Nizza da Silva Changes in Africa, America and Asia Murdo MacLeod and Evelyn Rawski

THE WORLD AND EUROPE

31 Europe and Europe's Perception of the World (Parts I & II) Anthony Pagden

An Expanding World The European Impact on World History 1450-1800 Volume 11

Spices in the Indian Ocean World edited by M.N. Pearson

| J Routledge

Taylor & Francis Group

LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 1996 by Ashgate Publishing Published 2016 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition copyright © 1996 by Variorum, Taylor & Francis, and Introduction by M.N. Pearson. For copyright of individual articles refer to the Acknowledgements. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library CIP data Spices in the Indian Ocean World. (An Expanding World: The European Impact on World History, 1450-1800: Vol. 11). 1. Spice trade-Indian Ocean Region-History. 2. Indian Ocean Region-Commerce-History. I. Pearson, M.N. (Michael Naylor), 1941380 .1' 41383' 091824 US Library of Congress CIP data Spices in the Indian Ocean World / edited by M.N. Pearson, p. cm. - (An Expanding World: Vol. 11). Includes bibliographical references and index (cloth: alk. paper). 1. Spice trade-Indian Ocean Region-History. 2. SpicesIndian Ocean Region-History. I. Pearson, M.N. (Michael Naylor), 1941- . III. Series. HD9210. I55P47 96-238 382' .41383' 091824-dc20 CIP ISBN 9780860785101 (hbk) ISBN 9781138274075 (pbk)

AN EXPANDING WORLD 11 Publisher’s Note The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this book but points out that some imperfections from the original may be apparent.

Contents Acknowledgements

vii-ix

General Editor's Preface

xi-xiii

Introduction 1

2 3 4 5 6

7

8

9

Colloquies on the Simples and Drugs of India: Cinnamon, Cloves, Mace and Nutmeg, Pepper Garcia da Orta

xv-xxxvii

1

The Spice Trade in Mamluk Egypt Walter J. Fischel

51

Spice Prices in the Near East in the 15th Century E. Ashtor

69

Pepper Prices Before da Gama Frederic C. Lane

85

Le repli venitien et egyptien et la route du Cap, 1496-1533 Vitorino Magalhdes Godinho

93

The Mediterranean Spice Trade: Further Evidence of its Revival in the Sixteenth Century Frederic C. Lane

111

The Return Cargoes of the Carreira in the 16th and Early 17th Century Niels Steensgaard

121

The Changing Pattern of Europe's Pepper and Spice Imports, ca. 1400-1700 C.H.H. Wake

141

The Portuguese Factory and Trade in Pepper in Malabar During the 16th Century Jan Kieniewicz

185

10 Pepper Gardens and Market in Precolonial Malabar Jan Kieniewicz

209

vi

CONTENTS

11 The Portuguese Impact on the Production and Trade in Sri Lanka Cinnamon in Asia in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries C.R. de Silva

245

12 The Portuguese and the Trade in Cloves in Asia During the Sixteenth Century C.R. de Silva

259

13 A Note on Portuguese Reactions to the Revival of the Red Sea Spice Trade and the Rise of Atjeh, 1540-1600 C.R. Boxer

269

14 The Changing Balance of the Southeast Asian Pepper Trade John Bastin

283

15 Restrictive Trading Regimes: VOC and the Asian Spice Trade in the Seventeenth Century Om Prakash

317

16 The Economics of Uncertainty: The Structural Revolution in the Spice Trade, 1480-1640 Peter Musgrave

337

Index

351

Acknowledgements The chapters in this volume are taken from the sources listed below, for which the editor and publishers wish to thank their authors, original publishers or other copyright holders for permission to use their material as follows: Chapter 1: Garcia da Orta, Colloquies on the Simples and Drugs of India, new edition (Lisbon, 1895), edited and annotated by the Conde de Ficalho, translated with an introduction and index by Sir Clements Markham (London: Henry Sotheran and Co., 1913), pp. 118-136, 213-221, 272-277, 367-376 (respectively colloquies 15, 25, 32 and 46). Chapter 2: Walter J. Fischel, "The Spice Trade in Mamluk Egypt', Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient Vol. I (Leiden, 1958), pp. 157174. Copyright © 1958 by EJ. Brill. Chapter 3: E. Ashtor, 'Spice Prices in the Near East in the 15th Century', Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society issue I (London, 1976), pp. 26-41. Copyright © 1976 by The Royal Asiatic Society and Cambridge University Press. Chapter 4: Frederic C. Lane, 'Pepper Prices before da Gama', Journal of Economic History Vol. XXVIII (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 590-597. Copyright © 1968 by The Economic History Association and Cambridge University Press. Chapter 5: Vitorino Magalhaes Godinho, 'Le repli venitien et egyptien et la route du Cap, 1496-1533', in Eventail de Vhistoire vivante: hommage a Lucien Febvre Vol. I (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1953), pp. 283-300. Copyright © 1953 by Librairie Armand Colin. Chapter 6: Frederic C, Lane, 'The Mediterranean Spice Trade: Further Evidence of its Revival in the Sixteenth Century', American Historical Review Vol. XLV (Washington, D.C., 1939-40), pp. 581-590. Copyright © 1939-40 by the American Historical Association. Chapter 7: Niels Steensgaard 'The Return Cargoes of the Carreira in the 16th and Early 17th Century', in ed. Teotonio R. de Souza, Indo-Portuguese History: Old Issues, New Questions (New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 1985), pp. 13-31. Copyright © 1985 by the Xavier Centre of Historical Research.

viii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Chapter 8: C.H.H. Wake, 'The Changing Pattern of Europe's Pepper and Spice Imports, ca. 1400-1700', Journal of European Economic History Vol. VIII (Rome, 1979), pp. 361-403. Copyright © 1979 by the Banca di Roma. Chapter 9: Jan Kieniewicz, The Portuguese Factory and Trade in Pepper in Malabar during the 16th Century', The Indian Economic and Social History Review Vol. VI (New Delhi, 1969), pp. 61-84. Copyright © 1969 by The Indian Economic and Social History Review. Chapter 10: Jan Kieniewicz, 'Pepper Gardens and Market in Precolonial Malabar', Moyen Orient and Ocean Indien Vol. Ill (Paris, 1986), pp. 1-36. Copyright © 1986 by the Societe d'Histoire de 1'Orient. Chapter 11: C.R. de Silva, The Portuguese Impact on the Production and Trade in Sri Lanka Cinnamon in Asia in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries', Indica Vol. XXVI (Bombay, 1989), pp. 25-38. Copyright © 1989 by the Heras Institute of Indian History and Culture. Chapter 12: C.R. de Silva, 'The Portuguese and the Trade in Cloves in Asia During the Sixteenth Century', in ed. Mohd Amin Hassan and Nik Hassan Shuhaimi Nik Abd Rahman, The Eighth Conference: International Association of Historians of Asia. Selected Papers (Selangor: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1988), pp. 251-260. Copyright © 1988 by the Organising Committee, Eighth International Conference IAHA. Chapter 13: C.R. Boxer, *A Note on Portuguese Reactions to the Revival of the Red Sea Spice Trade and the Rise of Atjeh, 1540-1600', Journal of Southeast Asian History Vol. X (Singapore, 1969), pp. 415-428. Copyright © 1969 by the Journal of Southeast Asian History. Chapter 14: John Bastin, The Changing Balance of the Southeast Asian Pepper Trade', in Essays on Indonesian and Malay History (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 1961). Copyright © 1961 by John Bastin. Chapter 15: Om Prakash, 'Restrictive Trading Regimes: VOC and the Asian Spice Trade in the Seventeenth Century', in eds, R, Ptak and D. Rothermund, Emporia, Commodities and Entrepreneurs in Asian Maritime Trade, ca. 14001750 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, 1991), pp. 107-126. Copyright © 1991 by Om Prakash. Chapter 16: Peter Musgrave, 'The Economics of Uncertainty: The Structural Revolution in the Spice Trade, 1480-1640', in eds. RL. Cottrell and D.H.

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Aldcroft, Shipping, Trade and Commerce: Essays in Memory of Ralph Davis (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1981), pp. 9-21. Copyright © 1981 by Leicester University Press. Reprinted by permission of Cassell Academic. Every effort has been made to trace all the copyright holders, but if any have been inadvertently overlooked the publishers will be pleased to make the necessary arrangement at the first opportunity.

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General Editor's Preface A.J.R. Russell-Wood An Expanding World: The European Impact on World History, 1450-1800 is designed to meet two objectives: first, each volume covers a specific aspect of the European initiative and reaction across time and space; second, the series represents a superb overview and compendium of knowledge and is an invaluable reference source on the European presence beyond Europe in the early modern period, interaction with non-Europeans, and experiences of peoples of other continents, religions, and races in relation to Europe and Europeans. The series reflects revisionist interpretations and new approaches to what has been called 'the expansion of Europe' and whose historiography traditionally bore the hallmarks of a narrowly Eurocentric perspective, focus on the achievements of individual nations, and characterization of the European presence as one of dominance, conquest, and control. Fragmentation characterized much of this literature: fragmentation by national groups, by geography, and by chronology. The volumes of An Expanding World seek to transcend nationalist histories and to examine on the global stage rather than in discrete regions important selected facets of the European presence overseas. One result has been to bring to the fore the multicontinental, multi-oceanic and multinational dimension of the European activities. A further outcome is compensatory in the emphasis placed on the cross-cultural context of European activities and on how collaboration and cooperation between peoples transcended real or perceived boundaries of religion, nationality, race, and language and were no less important aspects of the European experience in Africa, Asia, the Americas, and Australia than the highly publicized confrontational, bellicose, and exploitative dimensions. Recent scholarship has not only led to greater understanding of peoples, cultures, and institutions of Africa, Asia, the Americas, and Australasia with whom Europeans interacted and the complexity of such interactions and transactions, but also of relations between Europeans of different nationalities and religious persuasions. The initial five volumes reflect the changing historiography and set the stage for volumes encompassing the broad themes of technology and science, trade and commerce, exploitation as reflected in agriculture and the extractive industries and through systems of forced and coerced labour, government of empire, and society and culture in European colonies and settlements overseas. Final volumes examine the image of Europe and Europeans as 'the other' and the impact of the wider world on European mentalites and moresi An international team of editors was selected to reflect a diversity of educational backgrounds, nationalities, and scholars at different stages of their professional careers. Few would claim to be 'world historians', but each is a

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recognized authority in his or her field and has the demonstrated capacity to ask the significant questions and provide a conceptual framework for the selection of articles which combine analysis with interpretation. Editors were exhorted to place their specific subjects within a global context and over the longue duree. I have been delighted by the enthusiasm with which they took up this intellectual challenge, their courage in venturing beyond their immediate research fields to look over the fences into the gardens of their academic neighbours, and the collegiality which has led to a generous informal exchange of information. Editors were posed the daunting task of surveying a rich historical literature and selecting those essays which they regarded as significant contributions to an understanding of the specific field or representative of the historiography. They were asked to give priority to articles in scholarly journals; essays from conference volumes and Festschriften were acceptable; excluded (with some few exceptions) were excerpts from recent monographs or paperback volumes. After much discussion and agonizing, the decision was taken to incorporate essays only in English, French, and Spanish. This has led to the exclusion of the extensive scholarly literature in Danish, Dutch, German and Portuguese. The ramifications of these decisions and how these have had an impact on the representative quality of selections of articles have varied, depending on the theme, and have been addressed by editors in their introductions. The introduction to each volume enables readers to assess the importance of the topic per se and place this in the broader context of European activities overseas. It acquaints readers with broad trends in the historiography and alerts them to controversies and conflicting interpretations. Editors clarify the conceptual framework for each volume and explain the rationale for the selection of articles and how they relate to each other. Introductions permit volume editors to assess the impact on their treatments of discrete topics of constraints of language, format, and chronology, assess the completeness of the journal literature, and address lacunae. A further charge to editors was to describe and evaluate the importance of change over time, explain differences attributable to differing geographical, cultural, institutional, and economic circumstances and suggest the potential for cross-cultural, comparative, and interdisciplinary approaches. The addition of notes and bibliographies enhances the scholarly value of the introductions and suggests avenues for further enquiry. I should like to express my thanks to the volume editors for their willing participation, enthusiasm, sage counsel, invaluable suggestions, and good judgment. Evidence of the timeliness and importance of the series was illustrated by the decision, based on extensive consultation with the scholarly community, to expand a series, which had originally been projected not to exceed eight volumes, to more than thirty volumes. It was John Smedley's initiative which gave rise to discussions as to the viability and need for such a series and he has overseen the publishing, publicity, and marketing of An Expanding World. As

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General Editor, my task was greatly facilitated by the tireless assistance of Dr Mark Steele who was initially responsible for the 'operations' component of the series as it got under way, latterly this assistance has been provided by staff at Variorum. The Department of History, The Johns Hopkins University

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Introduction MM Pearson Spices today are a mundane accessory in any well equipped kitchen. I have just counted a total of 56 in my own modest pantry. Supermarkets have a vast array, to be supplemented by more specialised products in a range of different 'Asian' grocery shops. It is difficult then for a modern consumer of these necessities to appreciate their mystique, their aura, in earlier times. Yet, as we will see, the spice trade from the Indian Ocean to markets all over the world was, in our period, not only a major economic enterprise, but also the pre-eminent 'glamour' trade of the time. The many uses of spices in the pre-modern period are well attested to in literature. Milton, for example, mentions them frequently. There are numerous references in the Bible, such as Proverbs 7: 17-18 I have perfumed my bed with myrrh, aloes and cinnamon. Come let us take our fill of love until the morning; let us solace ourselves with loves.

or this humble doggerel from a 'Commonplace Book' of the early fifteenth century: Snow is white and lieth in the dike, And every man lets it lie; Pepper is black and has a good smack, And every man doth it buy.

The biblical passage reminds us that spices were not only of culinary use in medieval and early modern Europe. As Robertson noted, 'We find it difficult, nowadays, to imagine the importance of spices in the sixteenth century .... when neither refrigeration nor winter stock-feed was available to provide anything but spiced or salted meat in winter, when there were few vegetables to add vitamins and variety to the diet, and when spices or other Eastern drugs formed the main rnateria medica, they held a really important place in Europe's commerce'.1 The biblical quote notwithstanding, spices were mostly used for two purposes: as medicine, and to flavour food. Every apothecary had a range of spices available, used for a vast range of illnesses. Different spices were considered to cure disorders of the stomach, the intestines, the head and the chest, and were also used to aid digestion. Arnald of Villanova recommended that ginger and cinnamon 1

H.M. Robertson 'European Economic Developments in the Sixteenth Century', South African Journal of Economics XVIII, no. 1 (March 1950), p. 42, quoted in Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, 3 vols., (New York, 1974-89), I, 333, f.n.

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INTRODUCTION

bark be put into wine, and then be distilled. The resulting distillate could cure paralysis, was good for cold complexions and ailments, and beautified women, giving them white, subtle and pleasant complexions. The extracts from Garcia da Orta's Colloquies which open this volume (See Chapter 1 below) show us a European savant in the sixteenth century in India evaluating carefully the use of various spices. Da Orta, perhaps because he was a healer, has much more to say about the medicinal use of spices than about their use in cooking. The use of spices in cooking goes back far into antiquity, but their use expanded in an increasingly prosperous Europe in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The elite used the 'fine' spices (nutmeg, cloves, cinnamon and mace especially) as we do today, to produce more flavoursome meals. A fifteenthcentury cookbook said to cook rabbit with ground almonds, saffron, ginger, cypress root, cinnamon, sugar, cloves and nutmeg; and pork with cloves, mace, dried currants, almonds and sugar. In fifteenth-century Europe spices were used in everything: meat, fish, jam, soup and drinks. A 1393 recipe for black pudding said to take ginger, clove and a little pepper and crush them together. Spices were used to make mulled wine and saffron milk, a beverage made of saffron, cloves, cinnamon and mace mixed with sugar and cooked in milk. This use of spices is clearly a optional and luxury one, designed for display as much as for necessity. Nor was this sort of ostentation found only in Europe, for it seems that the demand for these fine spices among the elite of the great Mughal empire in India in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries knew no bounds: in other words, these grandees would pay more or less whatever was asked. Spices also had a more mundane, but necessary role in European cooking. This is the case especially for the only spice which had the status of being a bulk trade item, namely pepper. The 'Commonplace Book' claimed 'every man doth it buy', and certainly when the Tudor warship the 'Mary Rose', which sank in 1545 in the Solent, was recently raised it was found that nearly every sailor had a little bag of peppercorns with him. Yet even with pepper there was a mystique involved, for spices came from remote and, to Europeans, unknown parts of the world. They added a touch of the cosmopolitan to everyday life in medieval Europe. This being the case, it is perhaps fitting that the authors collected in this volume are as cosmopolitan as are the spices, for the aura of this trade has always attracted the attention of notable historians. Our authors hail from Australia, Poland, Sri Lanka, the United States, England, Portugal, Israel, Denmark and India. Spices were needed because most cattle in Europe were slaughtered in the autumn, there being no feed available during the winter. Their meat was then salted or smoked to preserve it, but even so it deteriorated rapidly. Spices, and especially pepper, were widely used to disguise the semi-putrid smell and keep the meat palatable through the winter. As meat consumption increased in a more prosperous Europe so too did the demand for pepper. Analogous to this was the

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use of spices in wine. At this time most European wine was not matured, but was drunk within a year. These wines could not last for long before they went sour. This meant that the poor drank old and rough wines, with which they mixed spices to make them palatable. The elite of course could use a variety of fine spices to produce, for example, mulled wine. This said, it is a sad fact that few of the articles collected in this book adequately reflect the mystique of the spice trade, its glamour, its aura. Most of them are sober economic history in which spices are dealt with as a product like any other. Some of the works listed in the bibliography that follows this introduction do however provide accessible introductions to a vast variety of spices, usually with attractive illustrations. One of the best is that by Sheldon Greenberg and Elisabeth Lambert Ortiz, based on a thirteen-part television program from the UK's channel 4.2 It boasts excellent colour photographs, and some history, botany and recipes. Delaveau's book3 is a very readable survey of all sorts of spices, their history, distribution, and so on. It includes a host of information, for example recipes for various liqueurs and, apart from real spices, it deals also with such products as mustard, sugar and salt. The hundred pages of history at the start are not to be taken too seriously. More detailed and more scholarly are the books by Rosengarten and Westland.4 Among the best historical accounts, on which I have drawn extensively for this essay, are standard works on the role of Europeans in the early modern period in the Indian Ocean area, such as those by Lach, Glamman, Boxer, Das Gupta, Prakash and K.N. Chaudhuri.5 Disney is excellent for the Portuguese in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century.6 Two agreeable, short, and copiously illustrated surveys of the Dutch in Asia are by Boxer and 2

Sheldon Greenberg, and Elisabeth Lambert Ortiz, The Spice of Life (London, 1983). Pierre Delaveau, Les fcpices: Histoire, description el usage des differents epices, aromates et condiments (Paris, 1987). 4 F. Rosengarten, The Book of Spices (London, 1969); Pamela Westland, The Encyclopedia of Spices (London, 1979). 5 See, as examples, Donald F. Lach, Asia in the Making of Europe, vol. I, The Century of Discovery (Chicago, 1965); Kristof Glamman, Dutch-Asiatic Trade. 1620-1740 (Copenhagen, 1958); C.R. Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire (London, 1965); C.R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire (London, 1969); Ashin Das Gupta and M.N. Pearson, eds., India and the Indian Ocean, 1500-1800 (Calcutta, 1987); Om Prakash, The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal, 1630-1720 (Princeton, 1985); K.N. Chaudhuri, Asia before Europe: Economy and Civilisation of the Indian Ocean from the Rise of Islam to 1750 (Cambridge, 1990); K.N. Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean: An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750 (Cambridge, 1985); K.N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company 1660-1760 (Cambridge, 1978); Sanjay Subrahmanyam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500-1700 (London, 1993). 6 A.R. Disney, Twilight of the Pepper Empire: Portuguese Trade in Southwest India in the Early Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, MA, 1978). 3

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Jacobs.7 Perhaps still the best account of the spice trade in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is Godinho's Economia, unfortunately available only in Portuguese.8 For English-language readers an accessible survey is to be found in Donald Lach's large on-going work9 while Wake, in this volume, provides an excellent and in some respects revisionist overview (see Chapter 8 below). Braudel with his flourishes and graces is in a class by himself.10 The spice trade and the European impact on it can be a confusing and technical area of study, due to very scattered runs of statistics and also particularly to the very complex different weights and measures used, including currencies. Translating to a common coin and weight is very difficult, and indeed I have chosen to not even try to do this; the figures I quote are designed merely to show relative movements in prices and volumes. The authors I have selected for this compilation are well aware of these problems, and indeed sometimes become quite bogged down because of them. See, for example, the very elaborate tables in the articles by Ashtor, Lane and Wake (Chapters 3, 4, 6 and 8 below). To rise beyond this to look at the more general implications is not done by all of our authors, but some do. In this collection I have tried to mix the detailed with the more synoptic and interpretative. It is the received wisdom in the historiography of the last few decades that Europeans had little effect on trade, society, religion or politics in the Indian Ocean area until later in the eighteenth century.11 Spices are different however, for here there was an impact, especially once the more efficient Dutch arrived late in the sixteenth century. Many of the articles printed here investigate these changes. Nevertheless, there are gaps in the topics covered by my selection, many of them a result not of scholarly lack of interest as of lacunae in the sources. Two important examples are the extensive trade in spices within Asia, and the actual production, and financing of this production, even that controlled by Europeans, let alone the vast amount accomplished outside European control. In my selection of articles for this collection I have not always followed all the long-running controversies and additions of minute new information, for some 7

C.R. Boxer, Jan Compagnie in War and Peace. 1602-1799 (Hong Kong, 1979); Els M. Jacobs, In Pursuit of Pepper and Tea: the Story of the Dutch East India Company (Amsterdam, 1991). 8 Vitorino Magalhaes Godinho, Os descobrimentos e a economia mundial, 2nd edn. (Lisbon, 1981-83), 4 vols, II, 145-220; HI, 7-214. 9 Lach, Asia in the Making of Europe, vol. I. (Chicago, 1965), pp. 91-147. 10 Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, 15th to 18th Centuries (London, 1981-84), 3 vols; Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (London, 1972), 2 vols. 11 S. Arasaratnam, Maritime India in the 17th Century (Delhi, 1994); S. Arasaratnam, Merchants, Companies and Commerce on the Coromandel Coast, 1650-1740 (Delhi, 1986); Holden Furber, Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient, 1600-1800 (Minneapolis, 1976) and the various books cited in footnote 5.

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of them are tedious in the extreme. For example, as regards the Karimi merchants in Egypt, a very detailed article by Wiet12 in fact follows on from one by Fischel in German.13 I have not included either of them, as both are really superseded by Fischel's article which is included here (see Chapter 2 below), and which is a much more synoptic view. Similarly, some extremely detailed articles by Ashtor and Wake about the spice trade in the fifteenth century are very technical efforts and so have not been reprinted here.14 This important topic is however covered in a more accessible way in the articles by Ashtor, Lane and Wake included in this volume (Chapters 3, 4 and 8 below). My aim, then, in this introduction is to provide a broad overview, a context, within which the detailed articles which follow can be located. And I will try to fill in some gaps to take account of important topics which for one reason or another are not covered in any available articles, although they may be adequately dealt with in monographs. This applies particularly to the role of the Dutch, their policies in the 'Spice Islands', and their failure in the eighteenth century. Equally important, I have been unable to find any article which covers the trade in malaguetta pepper from West Africa. I will provide some detail on this partly as this was for a time an important trade, and more important because a discussion of trade from this area demonstrates very clearly how international was the trade in spices. True, the major trade goes from Asian production areas to a host of markets, including Europe, but there was an African dimension, and indeed also an American one, for as we will see flows of silver from the New World affected the spice trade, and also the Portuguese attempted to transplant spices to the Americas. Their success, however, was very limited, and stands no comparison with a later and very successful similar attempt, that of the English transplantation of rubber to Malaya from Brazil in the nineteenth century. We need first to define clearly what we mean by 'spices', describe the major types, and locate their production areas. It is in fact difficult to distinguish very clearly between spices, aromatics and condiments. The sources often refer to spices, drugs and herbs. There is an added confusion in the word pepper, for to an American audience at least peppers are chilis, that is plants of the genus capsicum which originated in the Americas, as compared with Asian pepper, that 12

Gaston Wiet, 'Les marchands d'epices sous les soultans Mamelouks', Cahiers d'Histoire Egyptienne VIII (Cairo, 1955), pp. 81-147. 13 Walter Fischel, 'Uber die Gruppe der Karimi-Kaufleute', Studia Arabica (Rome, 1937), pp. 67-82. 14 Eliyahu Ashtor, 'La decouverte de la voie maritime aux Indes et les prix des epices', Melanges en I'honneur de Fernand Braudel vol. I (Toulouse, 1973); Eliyahu Ashtor, 'The Volume of Levantine Trade in the Later Middle Ages (1370-1498)', Journal of European Economic History IV, no. 3 (winter 1975); C.H.H. Wake, 'The Volume of European Spice Imports at the Beginning and End of the Fifteenth Century', Journal of European Economic History XV, no 3 (1986).

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is piper nigrum (black pepper) and also piper longum.15 The best distinction is that provided by C.H.H. Wake in his article in this collection where he notes inter alia 'pepper', as distinct from 'spices', the latter being subdivided into ginger, cinnamon, and the Malukun spices, that is clove, nutmeg and mace. In a separate category are drugs, dyes, aromatics and precious woods.16 For the purposes of this introduction, I will use the term 'spices' to refer to pepper, cloves, cinnamon, nutmeg and its derivative mace, and 'fine spices' to refer to all of these except pepper. I have included at the start of this book extracts from sixteenth-century descriptions of all of these spices written by the great Portuguese savant Garcia da Orta, whose book Colloquies was one of the first books published in Goa. The very rare first edition is dated 1563, and only some 24 copies survive. The extracts are from an English translation, by Clements Markham, of the standard modern edition of 1891-95 by the Portuguese scholar the Conde de Ficalho. The illustrations are also contemporary, for they come not from da Orta's work but from his contemporary, and in some respects imitator, Cristovao da Costa, whose Tratado das drogas e medicinas das Indias Orientals was published later in the sixteenth century.17 Pepper far outranked all other spices as a trade item, and a product in everyday use. As noted above, there are in fact two kinds of pepper. Long pepper is piper longum, but the main pepper then and now is piper nigrum, black pepper. White pepper comes from the same plant, but is processed differently. It will be noted that da Orta makes this distinction clearly. Kieniewicz's article (see Chapter 10 below) has good data on production in Malabar, and on actual production, landownership and marketing.18 Turning to the fine spices, the extract from da Orta provides a contemporary description by an informed observer of cinnamon. De Silva (see Chapter 11 below) gives us a useful account of the production of this spice in Sri Lanka, whence came the only true and valued cinnamon. There are various varieties, and it is related to and often confused with cassia. Sri Lanka cinnamon, true cinnamon, is called cinnamomum verum or cinnamomum zeylancium. De Silva also (see Chapter 12 below) provides a useful account of the clove tree and the 15

Jean Andrews, Peppers: The Domesticated Capsicums (Austin, TX, 1984). Chilis were introduced to Europe and Asia by the Iberians in the sixteenth century, so successfully that today we often think of chilis when we think of Indian food, yet in fact they arrived there comparatively recently. 16 Chapter 8, p. 364, f.n. 7; see also the distinctions in Godinho, Economia II (1981-83), p. 145. 17 The best recent edition of Costa is Jaime Walter, ed., Tratado das drogas e medicinas das Indias Orientals, por Christovao da Costa (Lisbon, 1964). 18 For an excellent account of pepper, its cultivation and trade, in Malabar, where it is indigenous, see Disney, Twilight of the Pepper Empire (Cambridge, 1978), pp. 32-49.

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clove trade. Cloves belong to the myrtle family, and botanically are variously called syzgium aromaticum or eugenia caryophyllus. The clove as we know it is the dried, unopened flower sof the tropical evergreen tree. Cultivated trees grow 12-15 metres. Again da Orta gives a contemporary depiction, which may be supplemented by another brief sixteenth-century, account by a Jesuit: 'The tree that supplies the clove is tall. They call it the clove tree. Its foliage has the same savour as its fruit. He who would like to see it should look at the laurel tree when it blossoms, gets colour, and ripens; when full grown it resembles it perfectly'.19 The nutmeg tree, as noted by da Orta, provides two products. The tree is called Myristica fragrens Houtt or just Myristica fragrens. Its fruit has an outer fleshy layer, then a bright red lace-like covering which is mace, then a hard shell, and inside this is the' kernel, which is the nutmeg. The trees are usually 4-10 metres high. Our Jesuit contemporary noted briefly that The tree supplying nutmeg and mace is like a pear tree in both trunk and foliage. In these [Maluku] islands its fruit is sparse and wild; they eat it with the betel leaf and make no other use of it'.20 The location of the production areas of these spices is a matter of particular importance, for the areas growing the fine spices were extremely localised and hence, easier for Europeans to control, whereas pepper production was more widely dispersed and so more difficult to oversee. Around 1500 the main production area for pepper was Malabar, which produced perhaps some two-thirds of the Asian total, while other areas were in Siam (now Thailand), the great island of Sumatra and the Sunda Islands (for Malabar see Kieniewicz's articles, Chapters 9 and 10 in this collection). Cinnamon came only from Sri Lanka, growing in a strip 20-50 miles wide and 200 miles long from Chilaw to Walawe on the west coast of the island. In the sixteenth century cloves grew on several small islands along the west coast of the larger Maluku island of,Halmahera, namely on Ternate, Tidore, Makian, Motir and Bacan. Nutmeg and its derivative mace came only from the six small Banda islands. However, Asian growers reacted readily to changed circumstances, especially attempts at monopoly by Europeans, so that production areas changed noticeably in our period. For example, clove production extended to other islands, notably Ceram, Ambon (Amboina), and Halmahera. Portuguese control over Malabar resulted in the rise of pepper production in other areas, notably to the north in Kanara, and also in western Sumatra. Indeed, Godinho claims that pepper production in the Malabar and Kanara areas rose over four times during the 19

Hubert Jacobs, ed., A Treatise on the Moluccas (c. 1544), probably the preliminary version of Antonio Galvdo's lost Historia das Molucas (Rome, 1971), p. 41. For botanical matters I have relied mostly on Greenberg and Ortiz, Spice of Life. 20 Jacobs, ed., A Treatise on the Moluccas (Rome, 1971), p. 43.

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sixteenth century.21 There were also attempts, described by de Silva (see Chapter 11 below) to move cinnamon production out of Sri Lanka. Late in the seventeenth century, the Portuguese, having lost nearly all their share of the spice trade to the Dutch, tried to cultivate spices in Brazil instead; in 1678 the king told the viceroy in Goa to send plants such as pepper, clove, cinnamon, nutmeg and ginger from India to other Portuguese areas, especially Brazil. These efforts continued through the eighteenth century but met with little success.22 Before the arrival of the Portuguese at Calicut in 1498 the trade in spices in the Indian Ocean area was extensive, profitable, well integrated and free from political control. We will investigate each of these matters in turn. There were several major focal points for the spice trade before 1500. The production of the Maluku islands was taken by local traders to the great entrepot of Melaka. This was noted by the Portuguese governor Afonso de Albuquerque (1509-15): 'if there were another world, and another navigable route, yet all would resort to the city [of Melaka], for in her they would find every different sort of drugs and spices which can be mentioned in the world ,..' 23 Merchants from all over the Indian Ocean area and even further afield came to Melaka to buy spices and other products. The extensive trade to China was handled by Chinese merchants, and that to the west by a host of traders, many of them Muslims from a wide range of homelands. The dominant group may well have been those from Gujarat, of whom it was noted that 'Melaka could not have existed without Cambay, because of the wealth of its traders and the demand for the goods they brought with them, nor could Cambay without Melaka'.24 A famous contemporary description, by the apothecary Tome Pires, pointed to the route the spices took after Melaka, for he noted that 'Cambay [sc. Gujarat] chiefly stretches out two arms, with her right arm she reaches out towards Aden and with the other toward Malacca, as the most important places to sail to ...'25 The usual route was for the spices and other products to travel to Calicut, from where they were taken either north to Gujarat and the great markets of northern India, or across the Arabian Sea to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, from where they were distributed all over the Middle East. Some of these spices in turn went through Egypt to Alexandria, where Italian merchants, especially Venetians, bought them for sale in Europe. Fischel's article (see Chapter 2 below) provides a good account of the organization of this trade in Mamluk Egypt. 21

Godinho, Economia II (1981-83), pp. 187-8. A.J.R. Russell-Wood, A World on the Move: The Portuguese in Africa, Asia and America, 1415-1808 (New York, 1992), pp. 152-6. 23 Quoted in B. Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies, vol. I (The Hague, 1955), p. 18. 24 Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies I (1955), p. 12. 25 Tome* Pires, The Suma Oriental of Tome Pires, ed. A. Cortesao (London, 1944), 2 vols, I, p. 42. 22

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In the fifteenth century, and later, most Asian spices were consumed by Asians. India consumed twice as many fine spices as Europe. Of total Asian spice production in 1500, Europe took at most one quarter. China was a huge consumer of pepper, taking around 75% of total southeast Asian production. Asian trade in spices was a well integrated one. For example, the great trade centre of Melaka and the great production centres in the Malukus both lived on imported food. Many other products, notably cloths from India, were woven in to the woof and warp of this trade. The profits could be very high, despite taxes in some transhipment areas and frequent losses from storm and ship wreck. In the fifteenth century a kilo of pepper cost 1-2 grammes of silver at the production point, 10-14 in Alexandria, 14-18 in Venice, and 20-30 for the European consumer. But costs and taxes were high, so the Venetians, the main traders, made a profit of only about 40%. There were indeed huge margins: early in the sixteenth century, traders made 400% profit taking pepper from Melaka to China. In Calicut mace cost twelve or fifteen times the cost of production in the Banda Islands, and nutmeg thirty times. This trade was free from political control. The controllers of the great entrepots, Melaka, Calicut, Hormuz, Aden, encouraged the trade. They made large profits from taxes and other charges, but they made no attempt to control it. The arrival of the Europeans changed all this. A tolerant and open trading system was ruined in some areas by the Portuguese in the sixteenth century, and definitely by the Dutch in the seventeenth. Conditions before the arrival of the Europeans are clearly revealed in the responses of local rulers to European attempts at control and monopoly. Thus the Portuguese in 1502 tried to get the ruler of Calicut to expel his 'foreign' Muslim traders, but he responded that he could not do this, 'for it was unthinkable that he expel 4 000 households of them, who lived in Calicut as natives, not foreigners, and who had contributed great profits to his Kingdom'. Similarly, a century later the ruler of Surabaya, in eastern Java, was asked by the Dutch not to trade with the Portuguese as they were enemies, and he replied 'that he could not help it that we were in enmity with the Portuguese and that he did not wish to be in enmity with anyone; also that he could not forbid his people to trade, as they had to support themselves by it'. Later in this century the port of Macassar greatly increased its trade, and the Dutch noted that local merchants flocked there because the ruler 'treats those same foreigners very civilly' and allowed all to trade 'freely and openly, with good treatment, and small demands of tolls'. Unimpressed, the Dutch conquered the port city in 1669.26 Yet it would be a mistake to present the spice trade before the Europeans as some halcyon trade, an Asian Utopia where all could do well. There is evidence 26

See respectively M.N. Pearson, Coastal Western India (New Delhi, 1981), p. 27; and Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies I (1955), pp. 26, 70.

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of merchant combines who tried to keep out competitors, including the Portuguese. Piracy was endemic in many areas, and some coastal rulers did use naval force at times to interfere unjustly in trade. Nevertheless, it was the Portuguese who introduced politics in a thorough and articulated way into Indian Ocean sea trade, and we must now turn to their activities. When the Portuguese arrived in Asia at the end of the fifteenth century they already of course knew of spices, for these glamorous and costly luxuries had been widely available in Europe for some centuries, thanks to the trade in the eastern Mediterranean controlled by the various Italian city states, amongst whom Venice was dominant. Indeed, the Portuguese had already got a share of the spice trade, albeit in a non-Asian one, that is malaguetta pepper. Historians have paid little attention to this product. Those who deal with West Africa are more interested in slaves and gold, while historians of the spice trade concentrate on those found in the Indian Ocean area. This product is also known as grains of paradise, or Guinea, red, Cayenne, pepper. It came from the area the Portuguese called 'the costa da Malagueta', the 'grain coast' of modern Liberia, so called from grains of paradise. Malaguetta was also found in upper Gambia, upper Niger, and Sierra Leone. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries this spice had reached Europe by way of the Sudan and the Maghreb, but late in the fifteenth century the Portuguese, who had been voyaging down the West African coast since early in the century, succeeded in taking over this trade and taking the pepper to Europe by sea. Malaguetta pepper was different from the Asian black pepper we have already described, and so even though Asian pepper was readily enough available in Europe in the fifteenth century, malaguetta still found a niche market. It was a low cost but quite high volume trade. Godinho27 notes that early in the sixteenth century the Portuguese sold more malaguetta than ginger or cinnamon, and ten times more than cloves or nutmeg. However, they sold ten times more Asian pepper than they did malaguetta. Malaguetta was also sometimes known as fool's pepper, and indeed it sold very cheaply, so that despite quite high volumes the Portuguese cannot have made vast profits from it. In 1506 a quintal of malaguetta cost 8 cruzados, but Asian pepper cost 22, cinnamon 32, and ginger 18. Later in the sixteenth century the Portuguese lost this trade to other Europeans, but in any case it became, once Asian pepper became very widely available, really only a rarity and of little economic importance. The Portuguese take over of this trade in West Africa prefigures, and maybe provided a model for, their more famous attempt in the sixteenth century to monopolise all trade in Asian spices. It can be argued that the cornerstone of Portuguese efforts in the Indian Ocean in the sixteenth century was their attempt to achieve this control. From early on they unilaterally declared that all trade in 27

His account in Economia II (1981-83), pp. 148-57 is the fullest we have.

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spices was to be done only by themselves, or by people licensed by them. Offenders against this, that is the traders who had previously handled this trade, were to be severely punished, and their goods confiscated. To achieve this aim they captured a series of strategically located port cities, and patrolled the waters of the Indian Ocean searching for 'illicit' traders. Spices were the main and most valuable product the Portuguese took back to Europe, and amongst them pepper was always overwhelmingly dominant. We have details of a cargo of 1518. The total weight of all products on board was 2 242 000 kgs: 2 129 000 kgs of pepper, 1 342 of cinnamon, 986 of mace, 5 584 of cloves.28 On average over the sixteenth century Godinho finds that each year they sent back via the Cape to Europe between 2 000 and 4 000 quintals of fine spices, and 20 000-30 000 quintals of peppers (note however that Steensgaard, Chapter 7 below, questions this). By monopolising Asian trade in spices the Portuguese hoped to achieve two, related goals (de Silva's two articles in this collection, Chapters 11 and 12, are basic for the Portuguese attempts to control the trade in cinnamon and cloves). When they arrived they found that most of the trade was done by Muslims. AntiMuslim feeling was visceral, almost innate, amongst the Portuguese as a result of their own experience of being ruled by Muslims until the thirteenth century, and of their battles with Muslims in North Africa. Thus to dispossess these traders was to strike a blow for the True Faith, that being of course Christianity. Perhaps more important, a monopoly would mean that the Portuguese could buy cheap in Asia and sell dear in Europe, a happy conjunction indeed. In the first few decades of the sixteenth century the Portuguese got close to achieving this aim. The profits could be enormous. Historians have produced many estimates. One finds that the Portuguese paid six cruzados for a quintal of pepper in Malabar, including the cost of freight. The minimum price in Lisbon was 22 cruzados, producing them a profit of 260%. Another costing adds in an estimate for wastage and still finds profits of 150%. Even if the cost of the forts in Malabar which made possible the Portuguese monopoly are deducted, we are still left with profits of 90%.29 In 1505 prices were fixed in India and in Lisbon. Pepper cost 3 ducats per hundredweight in India, and sold for 22 in Lisbon. Other ratios are: for cinnamon, 0.75 to 19; cloves, 7.50 to 60-65; nutmeg, 4 to 300.30 Later in the century the Portuguese bought cinnamon in Sri Lanka for as little as 15 cruzados per quintal, and sold it for at least 75, and sometimes 100. Godinho has tried to put the spice trade into a more comparative perspective. 28

Sanjay Subrahmanyam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia,. 1500-1700 (London, 1993), p. 63, quoting the work of Genevieve Bouchon, 'L'inventaire de la cargaison raportee en Inde en 1505', Mare Luso-lndicum III (1976) Ibid., Navires et Cargaisons retour de L'Inde en 1518 (Paris, 1977). 29 M.N. Pearson, The Portuguese in India (Cambridge, 1987), p. 41. 30 Lach, Asia in the Making of Europe, vol. I (Chicago, 1965), p. 110.

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Around 1515 the spice trade made profits for Portugal of about 1 000000 cruzados. This was equal to all ecclesiastical revenues, and was double the value of trade in gold and metals.31 Portuguese success marked, for a while, a reorientation of European access to spices. In short, Lisbon replaced Venice, at least temporarily. Godinho's article in this collection (see Chapter 5 below) provides detail on the effects on Venice and Egypt.32 These were clear to see early on. In 1502-3, 24% of Hungarian copper exported by the great Central European bankers the Fuggers went to Antwerp, but in 1508-9 this had increased to 49%, and this was used to pay Lisbon for spices. In 1501 the Portuguese captain Cabral came back to Lisbon with a good cargo of spices, and the king, Manuel, told a Venetian envoy he should tell Venice 'that from now on you should send your ships to carry spices from here'. Venetian authorities predicted gloomily that There is no doubt that the Hungarians, Germans, Flemish and French, and those beyond the mountains, who formerly came to Venice to buy spices with their money, will all turn towards Lisbon ,..'33 Many historians find a direct cause and effect here: Lisbon rose and Venice fell as a result. But it was not quite this simple. It is clear that there were a series of problems in the Mediterranean trade in the late fifteenth century, before the Portuguese entered the Indian Ocean, so that the trade via the Levant was in crisis already. This was exacerbated by a steep fall in spice prices. The details can be followed in the articles printed in this collection by Ashtor, Lane, Godinho and Wake (Chapter 3, 4, 5 and 8 below), and also in a very technical exchange between Wake and Ashtor.34 The essential point is that the trade in spices via the Levant to the Mediterranean and so to Europe was in at least temporary decline. Once the Portuguese began to send large quantities of spices to Europe via the Cape of Good Hope, Venice entered a period of crisis. The fortunes of this great entrepot port city, the Queen of the Adriatic, had been intricately tied in with spices. As a contemporary said in 1501, the loss of spice trade for Venice 'would be like the loss of milk to a new-born baby'. As Wake shows, in 1496-8 the Venetians got an annual average of between 1 060 and 1 200 tonnes of pepper and spices from Alexandria, but in 1501-6 only 335 tonnes. Between 1505 and 1515 over four times as much spices entered Lisbon 31 Vitorino Magalhaes Godinho, Mito e mercadoria, Utopia e prdtica de navegar, seculos XIII-XVIII (Lisbon, 1990), p. 331. 32 This study has been selected here because of its seminal influence in this field and its enduring value. It can also be consulted, in revised form, in the publication of Godinho's these d'Etat of 1958; L'economic de Vempire portugais aux XVe et XVIe siecles (Paris, 1969), part II, chapter 5; and his Descobriementos e economia mondial (Lisbon, 1965-71), vol. II, part II, chapter 6, where further discussion and additional material can be found. 33 Lach, Asia in the making of Europe, vol. I (Chicago, 1965), p. 105. 34 See articles cited in f.n. 14.

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as Venice, and two-thirds of these were pepper. As the final humiliation, in 1515 Venice had to buy spices in Lisbon. The somewhat sterile debate over prices in the later fifteenth century is an example of one of the major controversies in our topic area. A more important one is the revival of the Levant trade, and of Venice, in the second half of the sixteenth century. Several of our authors have contributed importantly to this debate, notably Lane, Steensgaard, Wake and Boxer (see Chapter 6, 7, 8 and 13 below). What they show is that the Levant trade did revive later in the century, only to be finally destroyed by the arrival of the much more efficient Dutch in the seventeenth century. Braudel notes that many used to claim that the Mediterranean trade was ended by the Portuguese in the early sixteenth century. One Dutch historian claimed that as a result of the Portuguese voyages *the route of world trade had been shifted. From then on the earth's history was determined elsewhere: for Egypt, as for the Italian commercial towns ... it was the beginning of a dead age'.35 To the contrary, Braudel, basing himself especially on Lane's article reprinted here (see Chapter 6 below), finds 'a hundred years after the date usually suggested as that of the death of the old queen of the world, the Mediterranean, dethroned by the new king, the Atlantic'.36 Thus it was after 1600 that the overland trade was definitively replaced by the Cape route, whose dominance was then unchallenged until the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. What had gone wrong with the Portuguese effort, that the Levant was able to revive, in Braudel's words again that by the mid-sixteenth century The Mediterranean was recapturing the treasures of the Indian Ocean?'37 The main broad reason is that the spice trade, itself so long distance, was in fact influenced by even more distant parts of a now global economy, in this case America. The revival in the Mediterranean was stimulated by the arrival, from the mid sixteenth century, of vast amounts of New World silver, and this was used to buy spices. The policies of the great Ottoman sultan Suleiman the Lawgiver (known to Europeans as the Magnificent) also helped. From 1520 to 1566 he ruled over a vast empire which included the whole of the Arab world, including Egypt. As one sign of the success of his efforts, in 1558 the Fuggers closed up shop in Lisbon and moved to Alexandria. In 1560 the Portuguese were told that 40 000 cwt of spices, mostly pepper, was coming to Alexandria each year, thus roughly equalling Lisbon's imports. There is no doubt that the Portuguese suffered a slump in the middle of the sixteenth century. Lane's article reprinted here shows this clearly. Thus the 35

Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies I (1955), p. 10. Braudel, Mediterranean (London, 1972), p. 568; this is the theme of Niels Steensgaard's important book: The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century: The East Indian Companies and the Decline of the Caravan Trade (Chicago, 1974). 37 Braudel, Mediterranean (London, 1972), p. 549. 36

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Portuguese took only about one tenth of total clove production back to Europe, and even if we add in their clove trade in Asia they still controlled only one third of the total. Boxer has shown that the Portuguese in the earlier sixteenth century took some 20 000 to 30 000 quintals of pepper to Europe each year. By the end of the century this had fallen to about 10 000 quintals, while Aceh in 1585 was sending 40000 to 50000 quintals of spices a year, mostly pepper, to the Red Sea, and so to markets in the Middle East and the Mediterranean.38 (See Boxer in this collection, Chapter 13 for Aceh and the Portuguese). We noted earlier how the vast bulk of the cargoes bound for Portugal in the early sixteenth century were spices. This dominance fell later in the century. Over the whole period 1580-1640, of the total value of the cargoes, spices and drugs made up 22%. More specifically, pepper was 10% of the total value of all cargoes; cloves nutmeg and mace together 2%; indigo 6%; and cinnamon 2%. Cotton cloths however made up no less than 62%.39 In the very important west coast production area of India, from Onor to Travancore, it is estimated that total pepper production early in the seventeenth century was some 258 000 quintals. Of this total, the Portuguese got only between 20 000 and 30 000; the rest was traded outside their control all over Asia and also to the Middle East and so to Europe. Similarly, as Kieniewicz shows (see Chapter 9 below), in 1515 the Portuguese took 30% of Malabar production, but by the end of the century retained only 3 or 4%. In all this, it is important to take account of changes in production and consumption. Briefly, in the sixteenth century, European consumption rose, and so did Asian production. Godinho claims that total production of pepper, ginger, cinnamon, nutmeg, mace, and cloves around 1500 was 9500-10500 metric tonnes. Two thirds of this was pepper. By 1600 total production was 1800019 000 tonnes;40 production had almost doubled, so that we can claim that the spice trade, and especially that in pepper, was getting to be a mass trade, not merely one in a discretionary luxury. Europe took about one-quarter of this total production. In the sixteenth century European consumption underwent a similar expansion, and prices also rose sharply. We need to keep this in mind as we evaluate the decline of the Portuguese. There is much debate over the sizes of their cargoes in the sixteenth century, as is shown in the articles by Lane, Steensgaard and Wake (see Chapter 6, 7 and 8 below). The most general point is simply that even if Portuguese cargoes did not decline very much, this still meant they were losing market share in Europe, and any control over Asian production, for they were taking proportionally less and less round the Cape. 38

Boxer, Portuguese Seaborne Empire (London, 1969), p. 59. James C. Boyajian, Portuguese Trade in Asia Under the Habsburgs, 1580-1640 (Baltimore, 1993), p. 44. 40 Godinho, Mito (Lisbon, 1990), p. 325. 39

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Wake's article (see Chapter 8 below) marks an important contribution to the debate, for he claims that Portuguese trade revived in the 1570s and 1580s. Lane (see Chapter 6 below), of course, wrote only of a revival for the Levant in the 1560s. Wake shows that the Portuguese were able to recover for a while, only to be totally eclipsed by the Dutch early in the seventeenth century. He is here in fact merely fleshing out observations made earlier by Braudel and Lach.41 Despite the recovery the Portuguese share of total trade declined relatively, and this is the important point Why did the Portuguese fail to achieve their aims? The answer is complex. It must be remembered that while they had some success in controlling Europe's access to spices for a time, this made up only one quarter of total trade in spices, and over the three-quarters consumed in Asia they held very little sway. Thus the vast Chinese market was supplied by spices from great entrepots in Aceh and Bantam over which the Portuguese had almost no control. Kieniewicz's articles (see Chapters 9 and 10 below) have excellent detail on the vast Asian demand for spices. Nor indeed did the Portuguese ever have much control over the trade in fine spices from the Malukus; their greatest, even if only partial, success was over pepper and cinnamon. One reason for their failure was simply the skill and determination of Asian traders to continue their trade, such as Gujaratis trading all over the Bay of Bengal and from Aceh (as Boxer notes in his article, Chapter 13 below), or Malabaris defying the Portuguese and continuing to trade even on the west coast of India, the area where the Portuguese had most control. Changing production areas also sometimes caught the Portuguese napping. It took them a long time to realise how large production was in the Kanara area, despite this.being located immediately south of their capital of Goa. Clove production spread to new areas in the Malukus during the century, and the Portuguese were stretched to keep up with this. We need to distinguish three main routes by which spices got from the Indian Ocean to Europe. One was via the Cape of Good Hope, in Portuguese ships via the Atlantic. Second was the (to the Portuguese) illegal trade up the Red Sea to Egypt. Third was the trade through the Persian Gulf. With this in mind, we can identify various gaps in the Portuguese system. Some were military: they never controlled the mouth of the Red Sea and it was always possible then to elude Portuguese sea patrols and enter this gateway to the Middle East. Other gaps were political. The Portuguese often had to conciliate local rulers by allowing them some trade in pepper and other spices. This applied to the ruler of Hormuz and the Shah of Iran; to avoid alienating the Shah, whom the Portuguese saw as a bulwark against their most feared enemy, the Ottoman Turks, 41

Braudel, Mediterranean (London, 1972), pp. 554-6; Lach, Asia in the Making of Europe, vol. I (Chicago, 1965), pp. 130-1.

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a considerable trade in spices was allowed into the Persian Gulf. West coast Indian rulers also perforce were allowed to send spices to the Red Sea. At times Portuguese officials and sailors were paid by being allowed to participate in the spice trade. Many Portuguese also flagrantly joined in the "illegal9 trade on their own account. Finally, there were problems with finance. Portugal consumed small amounts of spices internally: its role was a conveyor belt to the major markets in northern and central Europe. An estimate for 1579-80 finds that Portugal consumed 1 500 cwt of spices a year, only one-fifteenth of the total it imported. Spain and Great Britain took 300 cwt each, Italy 6 000, France 2 500, and thus about 12 000 was left for the Low Countries, the German states, and central Europe including Poland.42 Portugal took little part in this distribution of spices in Europe: this profitable task was contracted out to mostly non-Portuguese European merchants, for much of the time based in Antwerp, and later Amsterdam.43 At the Asian end, too often the Portuguese officials did not have the funds to buy at the best time, or simply lacked funds at all. It was for this reason that the Portuguese kings in the last quarter of the sixteenth century experimented with contracting out the spice trade, instead of doing it on their own account. But the contractors did badly, and late in the century the crown was forced to re-enter this trade. However, nothing could save the Portuguese. The arrival of northern Europeans, the English and the Dutch, from the late sixteenth century spelt the end of the Portuguese effort to monopolise the spice trade. In this onslaught, it was the Dutch rather than the English who dominated. It is true that the English procured some spices from the area now called Indonesia for much of the seventeenth century (See Bastin, Chapter 14 below),44 but it was the Dutch, organized in their Dutch East India Company [VOC] who possessed most of the capital, determination, ruthlessness and force. Their effective policies meant the end not only of the Portuguese trade via the Cape but also of the overland trade to the Levant. It was a sign of the times when as early as 1600 the Portuguese unloaded six carracks in Lisbon carrying a large pepper cargo. They found it hard to sell, for their traditional markets in northern Europe were already well supplied by large Dutch shipments.45

42

Lach, Asia in the Making of Europe, vol. I (Chicago, 1965), p. 137. For detail on distribution in Europe see Rene Gascon, 'Un siecle du commerce des epices & Lyon. Fin XVe-XVIe siecles', Annales XV (1960), pp. 638-66; Hermann Kellenbenz, 'Autour de 1600: le commerce du poivre des Fugger et le marche international du poivre', Annales XI (1956), pp. 1-28, 44 See also on this D.K. Bassett, 'The "Amboyna Massacre" of 1623', Journal of Southeast Asian History I, no. 2 (1960), pp. 1-19; D.K. Bassett, 'English Trade in the Celebes, 1613-1667', Journal of the Malay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society XXXI, no. 1 (1958), pp. 1-39. 45 Boyajian, Portuguese Trade in Asia (Baltimore, 1993), p. 88. 43

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The articles by Prakash and Musgrave (See Chapters 15 and 16 below) explain clearly the superiority of the Dutch. They were able to reduce the element of uncertainty in the spice trade by controlling more production areas, taking larger volumes back to Europe, and being able, thanks to adequate capital resources, to hold back their spices when markets were low. In other words, the spice market became a little less opaque in the seventeenth century. Like the Portuguese a century earlier, the Dutch concentrated on spices as soon as they reached the Indian ocean (Prakash, Chapter 15 below, is a basic source for the Dutch in the seventeenth century). Over the three years 1619-21, of the total value of their cargoes taken back to Europe, pepper made up 57%, and other spices 18%. By weight, pepper and spices constituted over 90% of Dutch cargoes at this time. Again like the Portuguese, pepper was by far the main import, from Sumatra at first and then once they had driven the Portuguese out in the 1660s, from Malabar also. The Dutch did very well here. In the first half of the seventeenth century European demand for pepper was about 7 million Ibs. On average the Portuguese imported 1.4 million pounds, while the Dutch aimed to import at least 3 million, meaning that they had to keep the English down to 2.6 million. By 1650 the Dutch had in fact done much better than this: they were bringing in 4-4.5 million Ibs a year, and the English only about 500 000 Ibs. And once the Portuguese were driven out of Malabar the Dutch did even better. In the excellent year of 1670 they brought to Europe 9.2 million Ibs [4.2 million kgs] of black pepper; and 134 000 Ibs of white, the largest amount ever to reach Europe in any one year in the seventeenth century.46 Over this century European prices for pepper, and also demand, appeared to be static, the latter being about seven million pounds right through. The Dutch sometimes supplied as much as six million pounds of this total. Over the century about half the value of cargoes of Dutch ships bound for home was pepper.47 (See Bastin, Chapter 14 below). Apart from this trade to Europe, they also sold about 3 million pounds a year in Asia. These data point to considerable success for the Dutch, but in fact their achievement in controlling the pepper trade was less than that for the fine spices, where they finally secured something close to a total monopoly. As we noted, the fine spices grew in very localised areas. In Sri Lanka the Dutch obtained their first cargo of cinnamon in 1638, and the sale price in Amsterdam was nearly double the purchase price. After the Portuguese had been driven out of this island, by 1658, the Dutch, now having a complete monopoly, thought they could charge what they liked. They raised the price from 15 stuivers to 36 in 1658, and later 50.48 46

Furber, Rival Empires (Minneapolis, 1976), p. 236. For detail see Glamman, Dutch-Asiatic Trade (Copenhagen, 1958), pp. 73-90. 48 Arasaratnam, Merchants, Companies and Commerce (Delhi, 1986), p. 137. 47

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For the Dutch cinnamon, cloves, nutmeg and mace made up their 'famous four' spices, and as a Frenchman wrote in 1697 'No lover is as jealous of his mistress as the Dutch are of their trade in Spices'. In the Maluku islands, home of the other three fine spices, the Dutch behaved with great ruthlessness (note, however, that Musgrave, Chapter 16 below, stresses economic reasons for the Dutch success rather than military and naval matters). Under their governor Jan Pieterszoon Coen (1619-23, 1627-29), pursuing his 'policy of frightfulness', they deported much of the population of the Bandas, and then moved in Dutch settlers supported by a vast slave population drawn from scattered areas such as East Africa, Persia, Bengal and Japan.49 In 1636 on one of these islands, as a result of Dutch severity, there were only 560 natives left, together with 539 Dutch and 834 free foreigners. To overcome the labour shortage they had to import 2 000 slaves from Arakan and Bengal. On other Banda islands all nutmeg trees were cut down so as to avoid the possibility of smuggling. Their policy in the clove producing areas was equally bloody, indeed was too successful, for so well did they limit production that in 1665 there was a shortage of cloves. Production was closely controlled. In 1710 the directors of the VOC noted 'with grief that the most recent harvest of cloves on Amboyna was likely to be 1.85 million pounds. They did massive extirpations in order to get production down to an 'acceptable' level of about 500 000 pounds.50 Competition from other Europeans was slowly overcome. As Bastin shows (see Chapter 14 below), the English held on in Bantam until 1682, and after this in Benkulen in southwest Sumatra, thus retaining some access to pepper. The Spanish left Tidore only in 1663, while the end of the Portuguese was symbolised by their loss of Melaka in 1641. The end of any competition for cloves, nutmeg and mace was achieved in 1669 when Macassar was conquered, and from then on the Dutch made vast monopolistic profits from these spices: several hundred percent, and even up to 4 000%. Their control of the clove trade is shown by the way they were able to charge one fixed price for this product in Europe from 1677 to 1744. Better still, the Dutch were able to overcome the common problem faced by Europeans trading in Asia. Few European products found any market in the Indian Ocean area, but in a bullionist age the export of precious metals was seen as undesirable. But for the Dutch, sales of spices in Asia produced vast profits, which were used to buy goods to send back to Europe. Yet this rosy picture, for the Dutch, contained its own problems. There were difficulties both in Asia and Europe, and these combined to reduce profits in the eighteenth century, as most dramatically shown by the bankruptcy of the VOC 49

Willard A. Hanna, Indonesian Banda: Colonialism and its Aftermath in the Nutmeg Islands (Philadelphia, 1978), p. 63, and generally for the Dutch in the Bandas. 50 Glamman, Dutch-Asiatic Trade (Copenhagen, 1958), p. 109.

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in the 1790s. First, we need to remember that pepper was always the main product. In Europe demand for pepper in the seventeenth century was some 7 million Ibs a year, while for the f 'famous four' together it was only 1 000 000. But the Dutch never completely controlled pepper. The reason was that pepper was produced in several different areas, not all of them controlled by the Dutch. For example, in the very large producing area on India's southwest coast Dutch power was restricted to the seashore; much pepper escaped inland. As we noted, the English continued to get pepper from Benkulen. Even their control over the Malukus was achieved only at an ultimately too high price. One problem was that about one third of the production of these fine spices was sold in Asia, as also was pepper, and so the VOC had to make delicate calculations of prices in Asian markets: if their prices were too high then Asian purchases declined, but if they were too low then other Europeans would buy in India and ship to Europe. There was also the whole matter of the cost of enforcement, and of preventing new production areas. Smuggling was a particular problem and even some of the VOC's own servants indulged in this, just as had the Portuguese a century earlier. Slaves on the Banda islands and their Dutch masters, the perkeniers (concessionaires licensed by VOC who had local mothers), were .adroit smugglers, so the cost of enforcing the monopoly was huge, especially as slightly inferior long nutmeg grew on other islands and could be substituted. More generally, Dutch success, at its height from about 1680 to 1720, meant that they did not get into ultimately more profitable trades in cotton piece goods and tea and opium. Piece goods especially had a much wider market than spices both in Asia and, after mid century, in Europe also. There were also other problems in Europe. It seems that European consumption of spices was more or less static throughout the seventeenth century, or possibly even declined a little. The problem was that the huge increase, at least a doubling, in European consumption of spices in the sixteenth century meant that as they became cheaper and more available they were no longer a symbol of wealth and luxury. Their prestige declined and relatively they were less used. New luxuries and stimulants competed with or even replaced spices: coffee, chocolate, cocoa, alcohol and tobacco. New vegetables (asparagus, spinach, artichokes, tomatoes, pimentos, melons) varied the European diet, so spices were less needed to enliven the palate. Finally, it seems that meat consumption in Europe declined, and also simpler cooking styles were more in vogue. Thus, ironically, the VOC monopoly turned out to be a Trojan horse; they controlled products whose value was falling, and ignored humbler but ultimately more productive goods. The Dutch failure, as we have seen, was caused in large part by a change in the European attitude to spices, and this attitude largely persists today. Easy and cheap availability has by and large ended their mystique, and they have become more routine and humble culinary accessories. Yet their story in the early

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modern period has a drama all its own. Control of their trade, and even of their production, was the main goal of the Europeans in Asia over this period. A study of the spice trade in many ways encapsulates the early modern European presence in Asia. This trade, both before and after the Cape route was travelled, made up one of the longest routes in the world, with spices literally travelling from one end of the earth to the other. Their role was intricately tied in with silver from the Americas; thus in the sixteenth century the world economy became truly global. Spices played a crucial role in this fateful event. Select Bibliography Andrews, Jean, Peppers: the Domesticated Capsicums (Austin, TX, 1984). Arasaratnam, S., Maritime India in the 17th Century (Delhi, 1994). Arasaratnam, S., Merchants, Companies and Commerce on the Coromandel Coast, 1650-1740 (Delhi, 1986). Ashtor, Eliyahu, 'Spice Prices in the Near East in the Fifteenth Century', Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1976), pp. 26^1. Ashtor, Eliyahu, 'La decouverte de la voie maritime aux Indes et les prix des epices', Melanges en Vhonneur de Fernand Braudel vol. I (Toulouse, 1973), pp. 31-47. Ashtor, Eliyahu, 'The Volume of Levantine Trade in the Later Middle Ages (1370-1498), 'Journal of European Economic History IV, no. 3 (winter 1975), pp. 573-612. Ashtor, Eliyahu, 'The Venetian Supremacy in Levantine Trade: Monopoly or PreColonialism?', Journal of European Economic History III, no. 1 (1974), pp. 5-53. Ashtor, Eliyahu, The Volume of Mediaeval Spice Trade', Journal of European Economic History IX, no. 3 (winter 1980), pp. 753-63. Bassett, D.K., 'The "Amboyna Massacre" of 1623', Journal of Southeast Asian History I, no. 2 (1960), pp. 1-19. Bassett, O.K., 'English Trade in the Celebes, 1613-1667', Journal of the Malay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society XXXI, no. 1 (1958), pp. 1-39. Bastin, John, 'The Changing Balance of the Southeast Asian Pepper Trade', Essays on Indonesian and Malay History (Singapore, 1961). Bouchon, G., 'L'Inventaire de la cargaison rapportee de 1'Inde en 1505', Mare Luso-Indicum III (1976), pp. 101-36. Boxer, C.R., 'A Note on Portuguese Reactions to the Revival of the Red Sea Spice Trade and the Rise of Atjeh', Journal of Southeast Asian History X (1969), pp. 415-28. Boxer, C.R., Jan Compagnie in War and Peace 1602-1799 (Hong Kong, 1979). Boxer, C.R., The Dutch Seaborne Empire (London, 1965).

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Boxer, C.R., The Portuguese Seaborne Empire (London, 1969). Boyajian, James C., Portuguese Trade in Asia Under the Habsburgs, 1580-1640 (Baltimore, 1993). Braudel, Fernand, Civilization and Capitalism, 15th to 18th Centuries (London, 1981-84), 3 vols. Braudel, Fernand, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (London, 1972), 2 vols. Bruijn, J.R., and Gaastra, F.S., eds., Ships, Sailors and Spices (Amsterdam, 1993), Chaudhuri, K.N., Asia Before Europe: Economy and Civilisation of the Indian Ocean from the Rise of Islam to 1750 (Cambridge, 1990). Chaudhuri, K.N., Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean: an Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750 (Cambridge, 1985). Chaudhuri, K.N., The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company 1660-1760 (Cambridge, 1978). Das Gupta, Ashin, and Pearson, M.N., eds., India and the Indian Ocean, 15001800 (Calcutta, 1987). Delaveau, Pierre, Les Epices: Histoire, description et usage des differents epices, aromates et condiments (Paris, 1987). Disney, A.R., Twilight of the Pepper Empire: Portuguese Trade in Southwest India in the Early Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, MA, 1978). Fischel, Walter, 'Uber die Gruppe der Karimi-Kaufleute', Studia Arabica I (Rome, 1937), pp. 67-82. Fischel, Walter, 'The Spice Trade in Mamluk Egypt', Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient I (1958), pp. 157-74. Furber, Holden, Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient, 1600-1800 (Minneapolis, 1976). Gascon, Rene, 'Un siecle du commerce des epices a Lyon. Fin XVe^-XVIe siecles', Annales XV (1960), pp. 638-66. Glamman, Kristof, Dutch-Asiatic Trade, 1620-1740 (Copenhagen, 1958). Godinho, Vitorino Magalhaes, 'Le repli venitien et egyptien et la route du Cap, 1496-1533', fiventail de Vhistoire vivante: hommage a Lucien Febvre II (Paris, 1953), pp. 283-300. Godinho, Vitorino Magalhaes, Mito e mercadoria, Utopia e prdctica de navegar, seculos XIII-XVIII (Lisbon, 1990). Godinho, Vitorino Magalhaes, Os descobrimentos e a economia mundial 2nd edn., (Lisbon, 1981-83), 4 vols. Greenberg, Sheldon, and Ortiz, Elisabeth Lambert, The Spice of Life (London, 1983) Hanna, Willard A., Indonesian Banda: Colonialism and its Aftermath in the Nutmeg Islands (Philadelphia, 1978). Hobhouse, Henry, Seeds of Change: Five Plants that Transformed Mankind (London, 1985).

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Jacobs, Els M., In Pursuit of Pepper and Tea: The Story of the Dutch East India Company (Amsterdam, 1991). Jacobs, Hubert, ed., A Treatise on the Moluccas (c. 1544), probably the preliminary version of Antonio Galvdo's lost Historia das Molucas (Rome, 1971). Kanapathypillai, V., 'Helen or Costly Bride: The VOC and the Cinnamon Trade of Sri Lanka, 1766-1796', Modern Ceylon Studies II (1987), pp. 133-46. Kellenbenz, Hermann, 'Autour de 1600: le commerce du poivre des Fugger et le marche international du poivre', Annales XI (1956), 1-28. Kieniewicz, Jan, 'Pepper Gardens and Market in Precolonial Malabar', Moyen Orient et Ocean Indien III (1986), pp. 1-36. Kieniewicz, Jan, The Portuguese Factory and Trade in Pepper in Malabar During the Sixteenth Century', Indian Economic and Social History Review VI (March 1969). Lach, Donald F., Asia in the Making of Europe vol. I, The Century of Discovery (Chicago, 1965). Lane, F.C., 'Pepper Prices Before da Gama', Journal of Economic History XXVIII (Dec. 1968), pp. 590-7. Lane, F.C., 'The Mediterranean Spice Trade: Further Evidence of its Revival in the Sixteenth Century', American Historical Review XLV (1939-40), pp. 581-90. Leirissa, Richard Z., 'Local Potentates and the Competition for Cloves in Early Seventeenth Century Ternate (North Moluccas)', Proceedings of the Seventh International Association of the Historians of Asia Conference, Bangkok, 2226 August, 1977 (Bangkok, 1979). Mathew, K.S., Portuguese Trade with India in the Sixteenth Century (New Delhi, 1983). Musgrave, Peter, The Economics of Uncertainty: the Structural Revolution in the Spice Trade, 1480-1640', in eds., PL. Cottrell and D.H. Aldcroft, Shipping, Trade and Commerce: Essays in Memory of Ralph Davis (Leicester, 1981), pp. 9-21. Orta, Garcia da, Colloquies on the Simples and Drugs of India, new edn. (Lisbon 1895), edited and annotated by the Conde de Ficalho, translated with an introduction and index by Sir Clements Markham (London, 1913). Pearson, M.N., Coastal Western India (New Delhi, 1981). Pearson, M.N., The Portuguese in India (Cambridge, 1987). Pires, Tome, The Suma Oriental of Tome Pires, ed. A. Cortesao (London, 1944), 2 vols. Prakash, Om, 'Restrictive Trading Regimes: VOC and the Asian Spice Trade in the Seventeenth Century', in eds., R. Ptak and D. Rothermund, Emporia, Commodities and Entrepreneurs in Asian Maritime Trade, c. 1400-1750 (Stuttgart, 1991), pp. 107-26.

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Prakash, Om, The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal, 16301720 (Princeton, 1985). Rosengarten, R, The Book of Spices (London, 1969). Russell-Wood, A.J.R., A World on the Move: The Portuguese in Africa, Asia and America, 1415-1808 (New York, 1992). Schivelbusch, Wolfgang, Tastes of Paradise: A Social History of Spices, Stimulants, and Intoxicants (New York, 1992). Schrieke, B., 'The Shifts in Political and Economic Power in the Indonesian Archipelago in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century', Indonesian Sociological Studies (The Hague, 1955), pp. 7-82. Silva, C.R. de, The Portuguese Impact on the Production and Trade in Sri Lanka Cinnamon in Asia in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries', Indica XXVI (1989), pp. 25-38. Silva, C.R. de, The Portuguese and the Trade in Cloves in Asia During the Sixteenth Century', The Eighth Conference: International Association of Historians of Asia: Selected papers, ed. Mohd. Amin Hassan and Nik Hassan Shuhaimi Nik A. Rahmann (Selangor, 1988), pp. 251-260. Silva, C.R. de, Trade in Ceylon Cinnamon in the Sixteenth Century', Ceylon Journal of Historical Studies NS. Ill, no. 2 (1973), pp. 14-27. Steensgaard, Niels, The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century: The East India Companies and the Decline of the Caravan Trade (Chicago, 1974). Steensgaard, Niels, The Return Cargoes of the Carreira in the 16th and Early 17th Century', in ed., Teotonio R. de Souza, Indo-Portuguese History: Old Issues, New Questions (New Delhi, 1985), pp. 13-31. Subrahmanyam, Sanjay, The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500-1700 (London, 1993). Wake, C.H.H., 'The Changing Pattern of Europe's Pepper and Spice Imports, ca. 1400-1700', Journal of European Economic History VIII (1979), pp. 361403. Wake, C.H.H., The Volume of European Spice Imports at the Beginning and End of the Fifteenth Century', Journal of European Economic History XV, no. 3 (1986). Wallerstein, Immanuel, The Modern World-System, 3 vols (New York, 1974-89). Walter, Jaime, ed., Tratado das drogas e medicinas das Indias Orientals, por Christovdo da Costa (Lisbon, 1964). Westland, Pamela, The Encylopedia of Spices (London, 1979). Wiet, Gaston, 'Les marchands d'epices sous les soultans Mamelouks', Cahiers, d'Histoire Egyptienne VIII (1955), pp. 81-147. Wright, H.R.C., The Moluccan Spice Monopoly, 1770-1824', Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society XXXI, no. 4, (1958), pp. 1127.

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1

Colloquies on the Simples and Drugs of India: Cinnamon, Cloves, Mace and Nutmeg, Pepper Garcia da Orta FIFTEENTH COLLOQUY CINNAMON RUANO

|NE cannot eat any spice with pleasure except cinnamon. It is true that the Germans and Flemings eat pepper, and here our negresses eat cloves, but Spaniards do not eat any of the spices except cinnamon. I bear it in memory that the food smelt strongly of it, and not of any other spice. I asked the cook whether he used it, and he said no, but that many dishes were seasoned with cinnamon water. In place of what we call cassia Kgnea,1 the word canela is often used. It will be as well that we should discuss it now. OUT A

CANELA, and what we call CASSIA LIGNEA, are one and the 1

"Canella," or " Wild Cinnamon/' is in modern Pharmacy the bark of Canella alba, Murray, a Bixad of the West Indies. Here it is "Cassia" or teChinese Cinnamon/' the bark of Cinnamomum Cassia, a Laurel of Cochin China and Southern China. True Cinnamon is obtained from C. zeylanicum of Ceylon. " Cassiae Pulpa" is, as stated in a footnote, p. 114, the pulp of the pod of Cathartocarpm Fistula.

SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD CINNAMON same thing; but the ancient writers saw this spice after it had come from such a distance that they could not have had a correct notice of it, and as the price was very high there arose a thousand fables which Pliny and Herodotus repeat. They relate them as true, when in reality they are quite fabulous. I do not propose to speak of them here, because every one now knows the truth. The price being so high, and the avarice of men still higher, the drug was often falsified. As the false kind could never be exactly like the real spice in every respect, they made two kinds, one the true cinnamon and the other the falsified one, both being usually of the same species. RUANO Tell me what you know, and at the end I will mention any doubts which occur to me, for I do not wish to remain with them. I wish to hear from you the names in all languages, in the lands where cinnamon grows, and in Arabia and Persia, for by these names we shall be able to obtain a knowledge of cassia lignea and of cinnamon. For my present view, with others who have written on the subject, is that the true cassia is not the true cinnamon. OUT A

I will satisfy you on all these points. Neither the Greeks nor the Arabs knew the cassia, and this was on account of the great distance and the little communication with the region where it grew. Those who brought it for sale to Ormuz and Arabia were Chinese, as I will explain to you presently. From Ormuz it was taken to Aleppo, a principal city of Syria. Those who brought it thence to the Greeks said that they had it in their country and in Ethiopia. It was taken with superstitious rights. The priest divided what remained into shares for the devil, for his worshippers, for the king, and for the priests. 119

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How is this ? Do you mean to say that neither the cassia nor the cinnamon are in Ethiopia or Arabia ? OUT A Yes! and I am astonished that you did not know it; for Ethiopia has been reached by our ships and great part of it explored by our people, and in it there is neither canela nor cinamomo nor cassia lignea ; and the Arabs themselves come to buy it and take it to their country, and at the time when they come the price is very high.

RUANO Is this that you allude to the real canela ? For they may not get the true cinnamon or cassia, but that other, and being a rude people they would not know the difference. ORTA The physicians of Arabia, Turkey, and Cora^on are very learned men, and all call this thick canela, which they use, cassia lignea. RUANO What proof can you give me that it does not grow in Ethiopia ? OUT A I say that both the Ethiopias are very well known to the Portuguese; for the coast of Guinea, which is the Ethiopia below Egypt, is known to us, not only the sea-shore, but also the interior; and as I have told you, a priest explored from the island of San Tom£ to Solala1 and Mozambique, and came thence to Goa, and 1 knew him very well. From the Cape of Good Hope to Mozambique and Melinde many persons have 1

That this priest went from San Tome overland to Sofala is doubtful.

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SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD CINNAMON been along the coast, and these have come here, and none have ever seen the canela. So that we know that the canela does not grow in either of the Ethiopias, either above or below Egypt. RUANO Is this because they are few who have the curiosity to enquire ? OUT A It is not so altogether. For the natives of the island of San Loure^o, who are very barbarous, showed some men who came to trade with a fruit of the size of a filbert without a head, and as it smelt like a clove * they wished to be shown the tree in case it should be cinnamon or cassia lignea. They were shown what appeared to be a medicine quite as odoriferous. The medicines were never better known than at present, especially by the Portuguese, so you must not suppose that such precious drugs are wanting with us, for the plants and fruits are now better known than ever. Of course the grafting makes diversity, as well as the transplanting them from one land to another.2 For the love of me, do not suppose that we are deficient in cinnamon. We have as much as we require. I will now tell you the names. RUANO I say that I claim, my right, as the lawyers have it. OUT A The cassia lignea is called by the Arabs SALIHACHA, and the Persians give it the same name. The Indians who do not know physic through the Arabian books, give it the same name as they give to cinnamon, because in all this country 1 Ravensara aromatica or Agathophyllum aromaticum, Lauraceae, of Madagascar. Ravensara is its native name. 2 Orta here recognises the variability of species.

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FIFTEENTH COLLOQUY they make no difference between the names of cinnamon and cassia lignea. In truth, no person can see any difference between them, whether physician or druggist. RUANO I rejoice much to know this.

OUT A The Chinese have navigated to this land from a very remote period, and as the people were barbarous and unlearned they adopted laws and customs from them. The Chinese went in such large vessels and in such a way that, if it will not bore you, I will tell you many things which do not directly belong to the subject of our colloquy, but which may interest you. HUANG I shall be very much obliged if you will, and we have time to devote to it. OUT A I know the number of Chinese ships that navigated, having counted those which went to Ormuz as recorded in their books, and there were 400 junks which entered the port of the island Jeru, now called Ormuz. They also say that 200 junks have been lost on the rocks of Chilam. Junks are long vessels, which have their bows and sterns alike. In Calicut they had a fortified factory, which still exists, and is called China Cota, or the fort of the Chinese. In Cochin they left a stone as a mark, in memory of their having been there. When the King of Calicut (called Zamorin or Emperor) besieged Cochin because the Portuguese held it who were then engaged in the discovery of India, he destroyed the place and carried off this stone as a trophy, which cost him very dear. On this stone the King of Repelin was crowned, the Zamorin placing the crown on his head, who received homage from him ; and the 122

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CINNAMON stone was left at Repelin by order of the Zamorin. Repelin is four leagues from Cochin, and there the stone remained until 1536. Then Martin Affonso de Sousa, the not less invincible than fortunate captain, burnt, sacked, and destroyed Repelin. The king fled and many with him, and many of those were slain who did not escape, as I can testify, being an eye-witness. The stone was taken back to Cochin, and the king ordered great festivities to be made over it, and thanks to be given to those who brought it. He remained deeply obliged to the Captain, Martin Affonso de Sousa, who twice drove the King of Calicut out of his territory, and sent him the sombreiro, which he took with the praits in Beadalla (there were 57), where 15,000 men were killed, remaining with him no more than 300. He also took 600 pieces of artillery, and more than 1000 muskets. As the deeds of this great captain are many, I will not tell you more. These that I have mentioned are not told in praise, for he has acquired more praise than any one else of his time, but I tell you of them to make clear what I said about the Chinese. RUANO But I want to know about the cinnamon, for, in discussing the plants, you always give me some history of them. OUT A These merchants bring from their country gold and silk, porcelain, musk, copper, seed - pearls, alum, and many other things. They sell some in Malacca and bring thence sandal, nutmegs and mace, cloves, and aloes. Proceeding on their voyage they trade in Ceylon and Malabar. From Ceylon they bring a great deal of good cinnamon, which costs them very little money, while the sailors without any money collect wild and bad cinnamon in the woods. They also go to Java, and obtain pepper, cardamoms, and other drugs on this Malabar 123

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FIFTEENTH COLLOQUY coast. They carry all to Ormuz or to the coast of Arabia, where merchants come to buy, and convey the merchandize to Alexandria, Aleppo, and Damascus. Asking these Chinese what sort of thing is this cinnamon which has such a smell and taste, they tell the fables which Herodotus and other ancient writers relate, to make a better sale for their goods. As the cinnamon from Ceylon was different from that of Malabar and Java they gave two names for the plant, but only one for the skin or bark. As a fruit is better in one country than in another, so the cinnamon of Ceylon is better than all others, all being cinnamon. They do not send any other cinnamon than that of Ceylon to Portugal. In Ormuz, because it is the bark brought for sale from China, they call it DARCHINI, which in Persian means Chinese skin. They send the same to Alexandria and the other places mentioned above, changing the name so as to get a better price from the Greeks, and calling it cinamomo, which means odoriferous skin, like amomo brought from China. To the bad kind from Malabar and Java they put another name, which is what it is known by in Java, CAISMANIS, which means sweet skin in Malay. Though it is one species they put two names, calling the good DARCHINI or Chinese skin, and CINAMOMO, which is amomo of China, and the other CAISMANIS or sweet skin. RUANO DARCHINI is not an Arabic word, then how is it that it is used by Avicenna and Rasis and all the Arabian writers ? ORTA No, it is Persian; for many words in the Kanun of Avicenna are Persian. The name for cinnamon in Arabic is QUERFA. As it is said by Andreas Belunensis that it was the name for thick cinnamon, I communicated with the Arabs, who assured me that QUERFA or QUERF£ was the name for any kind 124

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CINNAMON of cinnamon. The Greeks corrupted the word to CASSIA, and it was CAISMANIS that they called CASSIA. These are all the names that the Arabs have written to designate it, and those that are written differently are corrupt, such as DARSIIIAHAM and others. Well, this is the truth ; and I call God to witness that the druggists cannot deny it, for cassia lignea, bad cinnamon, is mixed with very fine cinnamon, of which there is such abundance, and they excuse the doubling of the,weight of the cassia lignea for cinnamon. HUANG This that you say about the weight of cassia lignea being doubled in place of cinnamon does not want for authority, for Dioscorides and all the others say the same. ORTA For me the testimony of an eye-witness is worth more than that of all the physicians, and all the fathers of medicine who wrote on false information. So that what the Greeks and Latins called cinnamon, the Arabs call QUERFE or QUERFA, the Persians DARCHINI, those of Ceylon CUURDO, the Malays CAISMAO, and the people of Malabar CAMEA. It is found that Serapio adopts DARCHINI, which is a tree of China, giving a derivation that for you is false, which was increased by the translator, and which to me is the truth. RUANO It may be remembered that you have said that the cassia lignea was first called caismanis, meaning sweet stick, and if this is so, cinnamon may be bitter stick, as Menardo explains the Greek verb, which signifies that at least it may be corrosive. ORTA This verb, interpreted by Menardo, means to furnish with 125

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FIFTEENTH COLLOQUY a bite soft and fragrant; and he further says that bitterness is outside things that are fragrant, but that it gives them a sweet smell and sharp taste. I also say of this, replying to Menardo, that the people of this country have not more than three kinds of tastes—sweet, acid and bitter, and what is known well and is not bitter they call sweet. So that the things they know well they call sweet, and so give it the name of sweet stick. RUANO A modern writer says that our cassia lignea is not that of the ancients, for he says that it is black and without smell, and that there was some cassia which is called pseudo cassia by Dioscorides, or false cassia. OUT A It is likely enough that in ancient times the cinnamon was falsified. Its great abundance makes it unnecessary to do that now; but one of the drugs that deteriorates most in the land is the cinnamon, owing to its being brought after such long voyages. It may be that good cinnamon is mixed with some that is damaged and is without smell and is not vermilion, and it may be held that it is not cinnamon at all, just as a dead man is not a man. RUANO What did those learned Persian and Arabian physicians use instead of cassia to cure that king who was your friend ? OUT A The thick cinnamon of Malabar. I argued with them that nothing except fine cinnamon should be used, but they were obstinate and would not listen to reason ; though the king was convinced and was on my side. Returning to the cassia, it is impossible to understand these modern writers, for some say that there is no true cassia lignea, and Menardo says that there is, and that it is sold under the name of canela and cassia, and 126

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CINNAMON this same Menardo says that it is not the true canela. Valerio Cordo says that he would not go so far as to say that we have not got the true canela, and that we must have some species of it. Laguna, quoting Galen, says that cassia lignea is converted into cinnamon, or it would be better to say that cinnamon is converted into cassia lignea, for one species cannot be turned into another more perfect species by lapse of time, but into another less perfect. So much for these authors. I say that one species can never turn into another, but that the good cinnamon may at times deteriorate and be called cassia lignea, not because the cassia lignea and cinnamon are different species, but one species grown in different countries. Afterwards, Amato Lusitano held that he had all the species, and he is followed by Mateolo Senense and some others. After these Laguna says that he who goes from India to Lisbon will find all the species of cinnamon. But, speaking the truth with you, I could never see more than two kinds or three, all of one species, the canela of Java, of Ceylon, and of Malabar. When Laguna says that in going from India to Lisbon a man will find all the species of cinnamon, I say that what he means is that he will find good and damaged cinnamon, some better, some much better, but not five distinct species as he says. RUANO Well, I know that he says further that, in the time of the Roman Emperors, if a stick of true cinnamon was obtained it was considered a great treasure, so no wonder if it was so hard to get. It is said that in the time of Pope Paul a piece was found which had been kept since the time of the Emperor Arcadius, and after 1400 years there was great rejoicing over it. ORTA I will answer all this. I say that you can get more 127

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FIFTEENTH COLLOQUY knowledge now from the Portuguese in one day than was known to the Romans after a hundred years. The stick which was given may have been brought from Lisbon, and would not have deteriorated. The piece belonging to the Emperor Arcadius may have been preserved by the will of God, or it may have been an imposture. RUANO

Ruelio says that the cinnamon smells like the origanum. OUT A The stick does not smell otherwise than as the bark smells, but not so strongly or intensely, and there is no origanum in the whole island of Ceylon, nor in Malabar, nor in any other part of India unless it is brought from Ormuz.

RUANO Some say that we have cinnamon, but not that which was highly praised, called mosselitico. They say that the better cinnamon is, the longer it lasts. Others say that it lasts thirty days, and that it lasts longer when it is powdered. What is your answer to this ? ORTA The first I will answer when I tell you where the canela comes from. As to the last, the drug of which we are treating, lasts for a very short time before it begins to deteriorate. As to what you say that it lasts longer if it is powder, this is wrong, for the proper stick lasts longest. In houses where they eat cinnamon powdered over their dishes, they do not keep it more than from one day to another, because it deteriorates here in India. The bark as well as the stick can be conserved better in some countries than in others, lasting longer where the humidity is least. In other lands the 128

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CANELA physicians reckon with the climate and are guided by experience ; so that they know very well that it will not keep for thirty years. As for the other canela which had been kept since the time of the Emperor Arcadius, my answer is that I should like to see it before I believe it. RUANO Another statement of Antonio Musa, given on the authority of Theophrastus, is that the ancient cinnamon had many knots, while this of our time has not. OUT A Theophrastus is wrong, for he was not a man of this country to know what the tree is like. When the bark is taken off neatly, you will clearly see the truth.

RUANO I say that I shall see at the end how my doubts have been solved. ORTA The trees are about the size of olives or rather smaller, the branches are numerous and not crooked, but somewhat straight. The flowers are white, the fruit black and round, larger than a myrtle, or between that and a nut.1 The canela is the second bark 2 of the tree : for it has two barks like the cork tree, which has bark and shell. The canela is the same, except that the two layers are not so thick and distinct as in the cork tree. First, they take off the outer bark and clean the other. The outer bark, cut in squares, is then thrown 1 Jt is a small evergreen tree richly clothed with heautiful shining leaves. The panicles of greenish-white flowers are not sweet. 2 The Cauella of modern pharmacy is the bark of Canella alba, Murray, "the Wild Cinnamon-tree."

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FIFTEENTH COLLOQUY on the ground. When on the ground it rolls itself up in a round form, so as to look like the bark of a stick which it is not. For the poles or sticks are the size of a man's thigh. The thickest of the bark is the thickness of a finger. It takes a vermilion colour, or that which is given when burnt by the sun ; or more like ashes mixed with red wine, very little of the cinder and a great deal of the wine. The trees are not so small as is stated by Dioscorides and Pliny,1 and they are numerous, so that the price is very low in Ceylon. For more than thirty years it has not been possible to buy any, except from the agent of the king. This year's bark is taken, and leaving the tree for three years it renews its bark.2 There are many trees, the leaves like a laurel. The trees that yield bad canela in Malabar and Goa are much smaller than those of Ceylon, and are all wild, growing of themselves. The root gives a water the colour of camphor, and is considered to be cold. The king forbids the roots to be pulled up, so as not to destroy the trees. RUANO Is this canela white or vermilion or black ? ORTA That which has not been well dried remains white or grey, when very dry it is black. When well dried it is vermilion, as I said before. The root is almost without taste, and smells like camphor. The fruit is not pleasant to the taste. They also distil the flower, but it has not so good a smell as the water distilled from the bark. Laguna says that they only 1 The drug name "Canella" does not occur in Pliny or Dioscorides. It is the French cannelle, diminutive of canne, a " cane," from the Latin canna, a reed*. 2 Ficalho characterises this as an unpardonable error, which is also adopted by Gaspar Correa; a result, he supposes, of some vague reminiscence of what occurs with the cork tree. But in the cinnamon tree to strip the bark causes the death of the branch.—LENDAS, i. 652.

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CANELA distil from the flowers, but it is true that they distil more from the bark before it is dried. It is a very mild medicine for the stomach, or to remove the pain of the colic, from its cooling quality. For it draws off the pain as I have often seen. It improves the complexion, removes a bad smell from the mouth ; and for Portugal it is certainly a very good article of commerce. It is sent there in sufficient quantity, for besides being a good medicine, it is useful in seasoning dishes, as is the practice in India. RUANO Is Ceylon the only place for the best cinnamon ? OUTA I have not heard of any other place.

RUANO Well, Francisco de Tamara,1 in his book on Customs, says that in the strait of the Red Sea cinnamons and laurels cover the water when the sea rises. Also our Castilians, who write about the West Indies, say that there is cinnamon in many parts of those Indies, especially in a land called Zumaco. They also say, speaking of China, that there is much cinnamon and spices there. Answer me all this. ORTA As for what Francisco de Tamara says you can reply that he repeats what others have falsely written, and that the Portuguese who navigate the Red Sea have never seen anything of the sort, sailing over it every year. The other chronicler who says that there is canela in the West Indies also does not tell the truth, for they say that the fruit is like 1

A professor in Cadiz. (Antwerp, 1556).

He wrote Juan Bohemo de las costumbres de todas las gentes

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FIFTEENTH COLLOQUY acorns of the cork tree, whereas the fruit of the canela in Ceylon is like an olive, but smaller and more round. It would be well if some of this canela could be seen in Spain, when it would become known that it is another tree that yields this fruit and bark, and that the trees are different,1 as the pear tree of engooca differs from other pear trees. What is said about China is well known to be false, for this drug is brought there from Malacca, and it is known that they have it not in China. RUANO What use do they make of the fruit of the canela ? OllTA

They extract oil from it, as we do from the olive. It looks like French soap, and has no smell unless it is warmed, when it gives out an odour something like cinnamoft. It is used to warm the stomach and nerves. RUANO Is all the cinnamon of Ceylon very fine ? OllTA

No! some is very bad, which has not. rolled up well or was very thick from not being of that year, and being old is not good. I speak of Ceylon, for that of Malabar and other countries is all very bad. The quintal of Ceylon canela is worth ten cruzados, and that of Malabar one bor, which would make four quintals to the cruzado. The Malabar people take their canela to Cambaya, Chaul, and Dabul for sale, and thence it is taken to Balaguate. 1

The South American Cinnamon tree, of which Gonzalo Fizarro went in search, is the Nectandra cinnamomoides, a Laurel bloom of British Guiana. In modern pharmacy the " Bark " [Bibiru bark] is referred to N. Rodiaei, Hooker.

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CANELA RUANO

Tell me the names of the kinds given by Pliny, to see if we can identify them in any parts of India. OUT A We must do what we can, for what I said is true, and the names give themselves to it. As for zegir it may be that all the land of the Cingalese is so called, that is the people of Ceylon. For the Persians and Arabs call the blacks zangues, and all the people of Malabar and Ceylon are of that colour. Also, those rocks which are between Ceylon and India are called Chilam, whence we may derive the name zegir.

RUANO And the cinamomo musilitico, so highly praised, where is that? OUT A The island of Ceylon, a mountainous country, which is opposite Mount Cory, which is the Cape of Comorin, is where the seed is, on the scent of which Dioscorides puts his faith. And Pliny says that he traces that canela to the port of Genalabitas, as he calls Ceylon.1 See how clearly he wants to speak of the port of Chingualas, which is Ceylon. For he says that by a direct road from the promontory of Cory one comes to a port of Genalabitas called Ocila. If you are not satisfied with these derivations I can give you no better. RUANO These derivations appear better, but those who say that the canela leaf is like lyrio espadanal say well. 1

" Taprobane" and its productions are noticed by Pliny, vi. 22 (24), vii. 1 (2), ix. 36 (54), and xxxii. 11 (53).

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FIFTEENTH COLLOQUY ORTA No; because the leaf of the canela is like an orange or a laurel leaf, that is, the shape is that of the orange and the colour of the laurel. RUANO Is oil made from the canela also ? ORTA I have told you that it is only made from the fruit of the tree, and that it is made, as we make the olive oil, and that is the truth. RUANO I found in the receipts of a doctor of credit " take cinamomo allipitinio." Does that place happen to be anywhere in Ceylon, or where is it ? ORTA It is Aleppo, a principal city of Syria, whither the canela comes by Ormuz and Gida, where they sell it. They take horses and many kinds of silks and brocades to Ormuz. As that canela was good and new they kept that name for it; and that is the reason. RUANO I am satisfied, and it seems to me well that we have the true cinnamon and the true cassia lignea? and that it does not fail us. When cassia lignea is found in the receipts, or cinnamon, we shall always know that it is the best cinnamon, for all are one, and the things written by the doctors touching their qualities apply to one as well as to the other. If God spares me to return to Spain, I will explain this error to many physicians and apothecaries. I will also tell that famous 1 " Cassia lignea/' or Chinese Cinnamon, is the bark of Cinnamomum Cassia, Blume, and Cinnamomum Loureirii, Nees, of Cochin China, and both also yield the "Cassia-buds" of modern pharmacy.

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CANELA doctor Thomas Rodriguezl how the exhortation which Mateolo made to the physicians of the King of Portugal is all answered, and that you present it to him from your heart, complying with the request that he had made to you. Now tell me what you know of that celebrated island of Ceylon. OUT A The island of Ceylon is rather more than 80 leagues in circumference, and its length is 30 leagues by six to eight broad. It is the most fruit bearing and best island in the world. Some have said that it is Trapobana or Sumatra.2 In front of its coast is the promontory they call Cape Comorin. It is very populous, though mountainous in many parts. The people are called Cingalese. It belongs to the King our Lord, and the native kings are subject to him. It is certain that this island is the most noble in the world. It belonged to one king who was killed by his grandsons, and they divided it amongst themselves. When the Portuguese came to this land they took counsel to cut and sterilize many trees, such as nutmegs, cloves, and pepper. In this island there are all kinds of precious stones, including diamonds; and many pearls, as we shall state farther on. They have gold and silver, and do not wish to bring it to the kings, but to keep it for treasure. They say that they combine sometimes to withdraw it secretly. The woods are full of all the birds in the world, many peacocks, fowls, and pigeons of many kinds, stags and deer, and pigs in great quantities. There are many fruits and orange groves in this land, which is all mountainous, and the 1

Wrote Commentaries on Dioscorides (Venice, 1553 and 1557). Rodriguez was a famous Portuguese doctor of medicine. He seems to have been piqued by the exhortation of Matthioli to the Portuguese doctors and to have written to Orta on the suhject; and Orta now redeems the obligation that was imposed upon him, to publish the results of his observations in India. 2 No one ever said that Ceylon was Sumatra. It has been contended whether Taprobane was Ceylon or Sumatra.

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FIFTEENTH COLLOQUY oranges are the best fruit in the world for taste and sweetness. The land also yields all our fruits, such as figs and grapes. Certainly very good profit might be made of the oranges, for they are the best fruit in the world. They have flax and iron. The natives say that it is the terrestrial paradise. They have a fable that Adam stopped on the top of a very high mountain which they call Adam's Peak. They have other fables much stronger. There are many palm groves, and the elephants are the best in the world and very intelligent, and they say that the others which they have are obedient.* 1

Orta visited Ceylon at least twice. He was with Martin Alfonso de Sousa at the taking of Repelin, and when that captain landed at Colomho soon afterwards, Orta probably accompanied him. This was early in 1537. On the 15th of February 1538 the battle of Beadala was fought, and Orta seems to have been present. Beadala was in the Gulf of Manaar.

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PLATE VI.—CANELA.

SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD

TWENTY-FIFTH COLLOQUY CLOVES' RUANO

E will talk of GAHIOFILO, for it comes from the same region as GALANGA. ORTA You make a mistake in not using the letter C, because in good Latin it is CARIOFILO, and in bad Latin GARIOFILO, as you may see in the modem authors who have written on it. RUANO I cannot agree, for so I have been taught all my life. ORTA If I show you in Pliny that it is called so, what will you say ? RUANO I confess it to be better Latin, but usage excuses me. OKTA The Greeks did not speak of this GARIOFILO, only Paulo 1

tivgenia Caryophyllata, Myrtaceae.

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TWENTY-FIFTH COLLOQUY Egineta, who says it is the leaf of a nut, because GAKIOFILO is supposed to have that meaning, but this does not appear to be known. And so Serapio says that in the Greek definitions the name is not to be found. Afterwards he refers to Galen and Paolo, and says that he translated it literally. I do not find it in Dioscorides. RUANO Well, I can give you the place where Galen speaks of it. OUT A

In books which are properly of Galen you will not find it HUANG In the second book of Dinamedis mention is made of GARIOFILO, and also in the third, and many Arabian writers say that Galen said it. Perhaps they translated some books of Galen which are now wanting, having been lost through the lapse of time. OUT A These books you refer to, in which Galen speaks of CAIUOFILO, are not coveted by Galen. It is enough for me that Ruelio, such a diligent and laborious writer, says that it is not to be found in Galen. RUANO Well, this that you say is supported by Paulo, and Aecjio, and Pliny. It is said that in India it is very like pepper, except that it is larger and longer, and this is called CAIUOFILO. OKTA I do not deny that these men talk of it, but I deny that Galen does. I further tell you that this medicine was found quite recently, first as medicine and for the scent, and then for culinary purposes. It is used a thousand parts to one as 214

SPIGES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD CLOVES medicine, and the rest for cooking. You will now like to know the name in Arabia and in this country. RUANO I wish you to tell me all, very clearly. ORTA The Latin name is CAKIOFILUM, others calling it GARIOFILUM as you did just now. The Arabs, Persians, Turks and most of the people of India call it CALAFUU. In Maluco, where alone it is found, and in all that region, the name is CHANQUE. The names given in Pandetario, such as AKMAFUL, are wrong, and the name written in Arabic CAIUIUMFEL is an error of the Arabian writer, a corruption caused by the lapse of time. The tree of this cravo (clove) grows in Maluco on some islands subject to the king of Portugal, taken in a just war some time ago. The right to these islands was disputed between Spain and Portugal for a long time, and you, being devoted to your king, will acknowledge the justice of our tenure of the islands. RUANO I owe so little either to the king of Castille or to the king of Portugal that I am able to say that I have as many mills here as there. Speaking confidentially to you, I owe more to the king of Portugal, for it is him who has granted the great part of what my brother-in-law possesses ; and these advantages I owe to the king of Portugal, while the king of Castille has never given me anything, nor have I any expectation from him. OllTA

You must know that Maluco is within the line of Portuguese conquest, which extends 200 leagues further, as has been proved by observing eclipses. But the devil entered into a 215

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TWENTY-FIFTH COLLOQUY Portuguese,1 who, because the king would not grant him an unjust favour for which he asked, went over to Castille, fitted out armed ships, and discovered a strait, before unknown, which led by another route to Maluco. He died with the greater part of the people who went with him ; so that they were unable to return by the way they came. Another 2 bachelor, Faleiro, who went with him and against his king, went mad and also died in his work of discovery. Then Castillians came to Maluco on other occasions, but were obliged to go back, and most of those who attacked the Portuguese were killed. Those who surrendered were given the means of returning to Castille. Such is the clemency of the King our Lord to vanquished Christians. The king of one of the islands, called Ternate, when it was proposed to him that he should help the Spaniards, said that the clove was given by God to the Portuguese, because each clove contains the five quinas of the Kings of Portugal. It may be that he said this by the will of God, though he was an infidel. In the same way Balaam and his ass prophesied, not being a rational animal. I say this subject to correction from the Holy Mother Church. Afterwards this king became a Christian. He received his kingdom from the king of Portugal, and I knew him at Goa. Returning) to the cloves, I say that they are only found in these islands of Maluco, which are five in number, and from there they are distributed over all parts of the world. If you ask whether there are trees of this spice in Ceylon, I reply that there are, but they do not give fruit there, nor in any other part except Maluco. The trees are of the height and shape of a laurel. They have many flowers which are made into cloves. The plant grows like a myrtle. The flower is first white, then green, and finally vermilion and hard, which is the clove. I have been told by those who have seen it, and are worthy of credit, that when the flower is green it gives 1

Magellan.

2

Ruy Faleiro did not sail with Magellan.

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CLOVES out the most delicious scent in the world. Those who gather or dry this clove find it to take the colour that you see now. They grow from buds, like the myrtles, and some say that the clove comes from within; but that is not so, only the bunches do not come to perfection. They collect them because the branches that form a great cup give out cords with which to collect the cloves, and this is the reason why the trees are beaten and flogged, and they do not give so good a harvest for a year. The cloves are dried for three or four days, and thus they sell them, and keep them to send to Malacca and other parts. The clove which is left on the tree becomes larger, and they like it, in this way, in Java. We, with the others, call it the head. You must know further that nothing whatever grows under or round the clove tree, because the clove draws up all the juice out of the earth. RUANO Where is the plant which the Castillians cdlfuste and the Portuguese bastom ? OKTA Without the twigs whence these cloves hang as the flowers hang from the small twigs^ and the great clove, which I mentioned to you, is what we call " the mother of the clove," and not because it is so, nor is it male, as Avicenna and Serapiam say, for all is one, but because it is older than the others. For what we call "the mother of the cloves'* is not of the same year, but the year before. This was told to me by persons who know. One was a factor from Maluco, who said that from the clove there is much ripe fruit which falls down. RUANO Do they make any profit from these trees of the clove, either by planting, or cleaning, or pruning ? 217

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TWENTY-FIFTH COLLOQUY OKTA No more than cleaning the ground where they collect the cloves; and the trees grow without seed being sown, only from cuttings. They do not grow very near the sea, but a cannon shot distant from it, though on islands surrounded by the sea. These islands where the cloves grow are five in number 1 as I have said, and the principal island is called Geloulo,J and for this reason they call the clove in Spain CHAVO GiROFK, 3 because it is from Geloulo. It is also called CHAVO because it resembles a nail in form. Some say that when it is young there are more cloves than leaves, and that the leaves have not so strong a scent as the cloves. These trees grow from cloves which fall on the ground, like chestnuts in our country, though it is not necessary, for the earth always yields these cloves, and rain is never wanting for them to grow and produce fruit. The trees of the cloves come to maturity in eight years, according to information from the natives, and they last for a hundred years. The harvest is from the middle of September to January and February. HUANG Do the natives use the cloves in their food or for medicine ? OHTA According to my information the people of Maluco do not use these trees themselves. The Chinese came in their ships to this land, and took the cloves to their country and to India, Persia, and Arabia. They relate this from memories preserved among themselves. The clove is easily preserved with salt water, and in another way by making it into powder. 1

Ternate, Tidore, Motil, Makiair, Bachein. Gilolo. Barros calls it Batechina. The word GJROFE has nothing to do with Gilolo. The Garyophylton of Pliny is certainly our "Cloves/' the dried flower-buds of the Myrtle hloom Eugenia Caryophylfata'. 2

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SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD CLOVES RlJANO

You say that the natives of Maluco do not use the cloves; do the other Indian races and the Portuguese use them much ? OUT A When the cloves are green the Portuguese who live in Maluco make a conserve of them with vinegar and salt, which they call acliar; and they also preserve them in sugar. I have eaten them and they are good. The people of Malacca use the vinegar conserve when they can get it, and the Portuguese women, living in Maluco, distil water with the green cloves, which is very fragrant and a good cordial. It would be a good thing to introduce it into Portugal. Many Indian physicians make a sudorific with cloves, nutmeg, mace, and long black pepper, and they say it draws out the Castillian itch. 1 have also seen Portuguese physicians use it, but I do not think it is a good medicine. Some people apply pounded cloves to the head, and say that they find it good for headaches. Women are much addicted to chewing cloves to make the mouth smell sweet, and not only Indian women but also Portuguese. HUANG Serapiam, quoting Galen, says that it is the leaf of the nutmeg. Is the tree of the clove and nutmeg all one ?

OKTA They are from entirely different countries, one from Banda, the other from Maluco, The tree of the nutmeg has round leaves and is like those of a pear tree, and those of the clove tree are like a laurel. RUANO Avicenna and some others say that the tree is like sambacus but more black. 219

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TWENTY-FIFTH COLLOQUY OUT A It is not like sambacus, a plant which we call jasmine, nor like sambucMs which we call an elder tree. You will see the difference between the one and the other.

RUANO It is said that it has been taken to some islands of India, and that the gum or resin from it is like treweutina in virtue. OUT A

The statement that it has been taken to some islands of India is true, but there is no such gum in Maluco. I have spoken to several people who have been in Maluco, and they all say there is no such gum. I do not deny that many trees yield gum, especially when they are cut, but up to the present time this has not been tried. Nor with your pardon can I allow the truth of what has been written in New Spain, that the gum of the clove is gum mastic. For trees are of different natures and do not yield gums contrary to their natures. The leaves of the clove do not come to India, so I do not write about them. The scent of the clove is said to be the most fragrant in the world. I experienced this coming from Cochin to Goa, with the wind from the shore, and at night it was calm when we were a league from the land. The scent was so strong and so delicious that I thought there must be forests of flowers. On enquiry I found that we were near a ship coming from Maluco with cloves, and then I understood the truth. Afterwards, men from Maluco told me that when the clove is dry it gives out a strong scent extending far from where it is. RUANO In Serapio and Avicenna 1 find many names which must be corrupt, such as the names of authors. I should be much pleased if you would tell me what you know about this. 220

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I do not know except that some words are wrong. call Rasis Benzacaria, and Mesue Menscus.

They

HUANG Serapio seems not to read without an aspirate ; Hachim, it seems to me, should be Aly. OKTA No; it is Hachim which means a philosopher, and, as among them, some are called philosophers specially, it may be that they use it as a name. RUANO Is the herb which we call cravos (pinks) in Maluco or in India ? ORTA It is not in Maluco. I have seen it in these parts coming from China ; but it has not the same scent as that of Portugal. The cause may be that it is very superficial, or that the heat of this country works out the scent. I will not say more, as you know more about these pinks than I do. I may tell you that in a certain part of the island of San Louren9o there is a very round fruit, larger than a filbert with the husk, which smells very like cloves, but is not a clove nor like one.1 1

'Ravensora aromatica.

221

30

SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD —

PLATE XI.—CLAVOS.

SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD

THIRTY-SECOND COLLOQUY MACE AND N U T M E G 1 llUANO

E know the names of mace and nutmeg, the country whence they come, namely Banda, and also the names in Arabic and Latin. According to the order, as WQ cannot first spe^k of the nut, which is fruit, we will talk of the appearance of the tree, of the leaves and flowers, and of any medicinal qualities connected with them. OUT A These names I can tell you. I asked for them in Malay, Malayalim, Persian, Arabic, Turkish; but for you is only necessary the Arabic and Latin, and that of the land where it grows, which is Malay. Well, I say that the -tree of the nutmeg is the size of a pear tree, and the leaves are round like some pear leaves. Banda, the native place of the nutmeg, belongs to the King our Lord. Some writers on Peru say that it is in Maluco, but this is not so ; for the tree there does not bear fruit, and it is the same in Ceylon. It is like a pear 1

Ma,ce,jatrij is the "aril/' and nutmeg, jaiphal, the "albumen" or kernel of the fruit of the Myrtle-bloom, Myristica qfficinalia, Lirin., the M. fragrans of Houtt.

272

31

32

SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD

MACE AND NUTMEG tree, or, to be more exact, like a small peach tree. The rind is hard, the outer skin being harder than green pears. Removing the thick rind, there is a very fine rind like that which encircles our chesnuts. This goes round the nut. The nut is like a small gall nut. The delicate skin which encircles it is the mace. We need not refer further to the thick outside rind except that it is very good made into a conserve with sugar, and it has a pleasant scent. This conserve is very good for the brain and for nervous complaints. It comes from Banda in jars of vinegar, and some people eat it as a salad; but all that comes to this land is in the form of conserve with sugar, a very beautiful fruit, leaving an agreeable scent in the mouth. You must know that when the nutmeg begins to swell, it breaks the first rind, as our chesnuts burst their prickly covering, and the mace becomes very red, appearing like fine gram. It is the most beautiful sight in the world when the trees are loaded.1 Sometimes the mace splits, and that is why the nutmeg sometimes comes without the mace. When the nutmeg is dried it does without the mace, which changes in colour from red to a pale orange. The mace is worth three times as much as the nutmeg, and this is the truth, well known to those who come from Banda. This Banda is very unhealthy. Many go there and few come back ; yet people are always eager to go there because there is much profit. RUANO Galen knew this mace and nutmeg, and Dioscorides, and some other Greeks, and Pliny. OUT A Galen makes a chapter in Book VII. of the simples, and says it comes from India. As for the others, it appears to me that they did not know the mace for several reasons, 1

"Few cultivated plants are more beautiful than nutmeg trees."—WALLACE.

273

- SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD -

THIRTY-SECOND COLLOQUY though they have the word MACIR.l One is because the temperature is said to be between warm and cold, being warm and dry at the end of the second or between it and the third. And it is said that it is ggod for dysenteries and for those who have issues of blood, which is not a thing that Galen would have said or have known. Avenrrois says that it is one of the medicines that Galen did not know. Many modern writers believe that the MA^IR of the Greeks and the MA^A of the Arabs are different medicines. This is why Avicenna makes two chapters, 456 for MAC^A 2 and 694 for TALICIFAK, and he did this imitating the Greeks whom he always held in much respect and veneration, thinking that they could not be wrong. Yet Dioscorides says it is the bark of a root, not the rind of fruit. Pliny says he does not know the MA^IR. Much less could these Greeks have known the MA? A when they are silent about the nut, because the one could not be without the other. They knew so little of MA^IR that Galen would trace it to India, and Dioscorides to Barbary, where it seems no one knew the MA^A. About* this there ought not to be any doubt. RUANO Well, there are not wanting modern writers who say that the CHRISOBALANUS 8 of which Galen writes is the nutmeg of the Arabs. ORTA They have not reason, and there are many things against them in the description both as regards colour and taste. 2 Avicenna knew of the Mace and Nutmeg. He called the former besbasah) i?**» UM^V^. Its common Arabic name is shajrati-jauzut-tib, i.e. " tree of nut-fragrant." Avicenna's besbasah looks like some corruption of the Persian burjaah, .

Annee

Poivre

Clou de girofle

GingemXoix bre « Belledi » muscade

Mads

Cannelle

Bresil

50

—

60

10

\ i i

1496

60-68

52

12-13

19-20

1497

74-75

60

14-15

28-29

— 60

1498

Gl 78 in contanti. 81 in bazar o. _

11

28

58

~

13

36-87

65-70

—

1500 1501

1502

*

80-86 90-95

90-102

68

100

80

140

80

12

__

—

—

32

—

65

9-10

12

—

__

—

—

12-13

40

80

75

—

—

—

—

—

—

33

—

—

90-100

—

nad ha

280-300

-f de 150 -f- de 120 160-170

— — —

9-10 1/2

—

1503

105

66

11

28

1505

192

80

17-19

40

1513

120

75

35

48

— 85 |

1514 1518

—

—

28-30

1520

90

380-400

38-40

1524

98

150

72

1525

90

130

40

130

200

150

63

180

52

130

300

150

1530

95

—

—

—

—

1531

130 100 et +

55-60 46

110

1527

(Acontanti.)

240

250

44. D'apres Priuli et Sanudo. 45. Le poivre la sporta, les autres epices le cento.

294

—

__

280-300

— —

SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD

105

Lc repli venitien et egyptien et la route du Cap II est hasardeux de vouloir degager de ce tableau quelques conclusions fermes. Tout de meme, a son propos on risquerait volontiers deux ou trois hypotheses. Le prix du poivre ne semble pas solidaire des prix des autres epices, il n'y a pas concomitance. En effet, lorsqu'on parle des epices comme des denrees de luxe, et de son commerce comme d'un commerce de qualite" et non pas de masse, on masque une difference fondamentale : ces affirmations sont vraies surtout du clou de girofle, de la cannelle, du mac is, de la noix inuscade, et meme du gingembre belledi dont les prix sont beaucoup plus hauts que ceux du poivre et du gingembre mequin; les epices cheres arrivent en Europe et se debitent en petites quantites — 2.000 a 4.000 quintaux par la route du Cap, quelques centaines de colli par les routes du Levant; le poivre, au rebours, se vend meilleur marche et pour des quantites beaucoup plus fortes, on en debarque a Lisbonne plus de 20.000 et meme plus de 30.000 quintaux, on en dSbarquait a Venise, au xve siecle, quatre a cinq mille colli. Done, le commerce du poivre est, d'un certain point de vue, un commerce de masse, au moins par rapport a celui des autres epices. II est plus difficile de faire la contrebande de celui-la que de celles-ci. C'est pour cela — du moins le croyonsnous — que le commerce du poivre a ete plus tot et plus durement frappe que le commerce des autres epices. Les prix du clou de girofle, de la noix muscade et de la cannelle out monte surtout apros 1514 (plafond de 1520), ensuite ils baissent mais. restent encore tres eleves en 1527; la gingembre belledi, qui ava'it deja beaucoup augmente entre 1504 et 1513, reprend son mouvement ascendant en 1520 pour redescendre apres 1524; le macis atteint son prix le plus haut quand les autres epices sont deja en baisse. C'est le poivre, pourtant, dont la hausse a debute le plus tot, embrassant les annees 1501 a 1513, pour retrouver, en 1527, son niveau du xve siecle, tandis que les autres epices restaient au triple de leur prix ancien. Decalages aisement explicables en tenant compte de 'la chronologic de 1'expansion portugaise en Orient et de la geographic de la production. Car le poivre vient du Malabar, ou Faction portugaise se fait sentir des 1500 tandis que le girofle, le macis et la noix muscade viennent des iles de Malaisie, et la prise de Malacca n'a eu lieu qu'en 1511. Ay ant a subir la concurrence du nouveau marche de Lisbonne. mieux fourni et a moindres frais, et celle, sur les Echelles du Levant, des autres Italiens, des Ragusains, Frangais et autres marchands Chretiens, ayant en outre a faire face a la disette d'epices et de poivre au Caire et a Damas et a la montee de leur prix d'achat, Yenise, pour surmonter ces obstacles, a deploye des efforts qui, a eux seuls, nous devoilent la profondeur de la crise. Le 3 mai 1514, sur proposition des Cinque Savii a la mercatantia et des Savii ai ordeni, a 6te accordee a tous les Venitiens, la liberte du commerce des epices a Beyrouth et Alexandrie; jusque-la les galees, dont la ferme etait mise aux enchererj annuellement par la Seigneurie, avaient joui du monopole du transport des epices entre les ports egyptien ou syricn et Venise, les autres batiments ne pouvant le 295

106

SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD Vitorino Magalhaes-Grodiriho faire qu'en payant aux fermiers des galees le fret que les balles auraient eu a payer si elles avaient £te* chargees sur les galees, plus un droit d'entree a la douane; dorenavant, les naves, navires et autres legni venitiens n'auraient plus rien a payer aux fermiers des galees ni a la douane46. En meme temps, on demandait au Sultan d'abolir les droits de sortie sur les epices47. Quatre ans plus tard, on constatait amerement Finefficacite des mesures : du Levant on n'obtenait aucun poivre, tout le poivre debarque a Venise venant du Ponant, done par contrebande, car il etait defendu de 1'amener de cette provenance-la. Sur proposition des cinq Sapientes super mercatura, le ler mars, tout en maintenant la liberte de commerce et de transport pour les bailments venitiens chargeant au Levant et I'exemption de tous droits pour le poivre qu'ils debarqueraient, on accordait la libre entree aux epices de toute provenance, amenes par terre ou par mer, par des nationaux ou des etrangers; elles ne seraierit soumises qu'a un droit de 3 pour cent 48 . Craignant a juste titre que cette resolution ne flit aussi vaine que les precedentes, on ecrivit cette annee meme. au Roi de Portugal, en demandant Pautorisation pour les galees de Barbarie de mouiller dans 1'estuaire du Tage et de commercer a Lisbonne, et, de plus, un sauf-conduit pour les Juifs et Musulmans qui se trouveraient a bord 49. En juin 1520, le Hoi marchand repondit a la Seigneurie pour lui accorder ce qivelle demandait 50. Pourtant, a Venise, la discussion etait apre entre marchands interesses dans les galees du Levant qui ne voulaient pas de voyages a Lisbonne, et les autres qui les defendaient. Ce n'est qu'en 1521 que les galees de Barbaric sont allees pour la premiere fois jusqu'au Tage; tres bien accueillies, elles reussirent a obtenir des privileges substantieLs : les Portugais avaient tout interet a s'ouvrir de nouveaux debouches. Mais pendant la duree du voyage, les luttes faisaient rage a Yenise : Tor que les galees avait fait a Tunis, fallait-il lui laisser suivre le chemin de Lisbonne pour y acheter les epices. ou, au oontraire, e*tait-il preferable de 1'envoyer plutot a Corfou ? En 1530, les querelles n'etaient point apaisees. Centre Tescale de Lisbonne, tous les Savii del Conseio e Terra-fcrma, unanimes. rappelerent 1'effet defavorable qu'elle aurait en Turquie sur les affaires venitiennes 51... Trois ans plus tot, le roi de Portugal avait e*te saisi d'une proposition du Senat : les Venitiens voulaient affermer le monopole de Tachat de la totalite du poivre a la Casa de India. La negociation fut sans lendemain. Ainsi, entre 1519 et 1530, Venise se voyait contrainte a se rendre a la merci du Portugal, d;ou d'ailleurs des 1515, il lui arrivait du poivre en contrebande. 46. Diarii di Marino Sanubo, XVIII, 177-178. Les discussions ne s'apaiserom pas, et encore en 1524 on prendra successivement des mesures contradictoire^, sou> la pression d'inte're'ts et forces sociales opposees (Ibid., XXXVI, 30-31, 71 79-80, 382). 47. Diarii di Marino Sanudo, id. 48. Ibid., XXVII, p. 10 et 14. 49. Ibid., XXIX, p. 332-333. 50. Ibid., XXIX, p. 337-338. 51. Ibid., LIV, p. 86. 296

SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD -

107

Le repli venitien et egyptien et la route du Cap Les debouches de 1'Europe atlantique sont alors complement perdus pour Venise. A la Saint-BarthSlemy 1501, on debarquait en Flandre pour la premiere fois, des Spices de Calicut venues par le relais de Lisbonnej « Le margrave et les compagnies d'arbaletriers allerent a la rencontre du vaisseau (alias, des vaisseaux) et honorerent les marchands d'une reception solennelle » 52 . C'etaient deux caravelles portugaises qui apportaient du poivre et de la canelle; d'apres des lettres de Bruges et d'Anvers parvenues a Venise en septembre, ces Spices commengaient dej& a etre debitees dans les deux villes flamandes; on trouvait le poivre assez bon, quoiqu'un peu vert et petit, et la cannelle un peu grosse53. Et Priuli d'ajouter « siche, dove prima tute quelle spetie si solevanno comprar a Venetia et condurle in Fiandra, ahora le capitavanno da Portugal, sich£ se pol considerer da questo principio il danno poteva rizevere 54 le Stato Venetto di questo viazo trovato per il Ee de Portogallo » . Deux ans plus tard, le f acteur du Hoi de Portugal signait avec un marchand d'Anvers le premier contrat pour la vente des epices portugaises55. L'annee suivante, d'apres une Chronique, la ville d'Anvers admirait, & la fete de Tous les Apotres 1'arrivee 56 de navires portugais avec 1.000 tonnes de poivre et d'autres epices . Le commerce vSnitien avait, de plus, a souffrir, a Anvers, de la concurrence des marchands fiamands eux-memes. L'un d'eux n'at-il pas fait venir, en 1510, une nave chargSe d'Spices, directement d'Alexandrie57 ? Bientot les Venitiens arriverent a suspendre les voyages de Flandre; ce ne sera qu'au debut de 1518, apres 8 ans d'interruption, que les galees reprcndront le chemin d'Anvers58. II ne faut pas croire que les epices venitiennes aient absolument disparu du marche .anversois : en 1527, le facteur portugais informait le Roi que les Venitiens avaient hausse leurs Spices, mais il ne voyait aucun danger serieux dans leur concurrence69. De meme sur le marche anglais, depuis 1504 au plus tard, et encore en 1531. Cette annee-ci, Tambassadeur venitien a Londres, ser Carlo Capello, rapportait a la Seigneurie les doleances des conseillers royaux : les galees ne portaient plus d'Spices comme elles le faisaient autrefois fallait-il done maintenir leurs voyages d'Angleterre ? Et tous les Savii, unanimes, de repondre « con optime raxon che la colpa non a nostra, ma dil mondo mudado, che la specie che venivano a Venezia vanno in Portogallo, et che li mandemo di vini, cargano le galie lane, stagni e panni, con utile di Soa Maesta, le qual galie vanno con tanto pericolo » 60. Au lieu 52. GORIS, Colonies marchandes meridionales a Anvers, p. 195 (d;apr6s une Chronique ms. aux archives d'Etat a Auvers, f. 188). 53. PRIULI, t. II, p. 175-176. 54. Ibid., t. II, p. 176. 55. GORIS, p. 19o. 56. Ibid. (Chronique, f. 189). 57. Lettre de Joao Brandao, facteur en Flandre, au Koi, le 28 fevrier 1511 (BRAMCAMP, Feitoria de Flandres, doc. n° 25). 58. SANUDO, XXV, p. 242-243; XXVI, p. 47. 59. Ibid., LV, p. 191. 60. SANUDO, Lv, p. 191.

297

108

SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD Vitorino Magalhaes-Grodinho

du fructueux trafic des Apices, 1'echange des vins contre les laines et Tetain; et pour cela, on maintenait ce voyage si plein de perils... Car les epices avaient desert^ Venise pour Lisbonne. Les temps Staient bien changes. * *

Les efforts d'adaptation commerciale ayant echoue, jusqu'en 1533 tout au moins, Venise va essayer de sortir de cette grave depression en changeant elle aussi, ses activites economiques. Des 1516, au plus tard, jusqu'en 1569. la quantite de draps de haute laine fabriqu£s & Venise ne cesse d'augmenter, et assez rapidement61 : la moyenne triennale, qui etait de 1.879 pour la periode 1516-1518, saute a 5.646 pour les annees 1531-1533, et atteint 10.297 pour 1547-1549 : accroissement de plus de 200 % en 15 ans, au debut, et de plus de 85 % au eours d'une seconde quinzaine. Aucun doute n'est possible; Venise installe de nouvelles industries et s'efforce de devenir puissance industrielle pour remedier a sa dSfaillance mercantile — c'est a la suite de la crise qui Pa secouee rudement a la fin du Quatrocentto et a Faube du Cinquecentto, et en plein creux des affaires (lequel se prolonge jusqu'a la jointure du second tiers tout au moins) que les capitaux venitiens delaissent les impossibles trafics pour s'investir dans les metiers. L'essor artisanal et manufacturier constitue une reponse aux difficultes marchandes — et il permettra a son tour un redressement- commercial. Ainsi se trouve confirme, par 1 'analyse du cas venitien au xvie siecle, un rythme f ondamental du capitalisme d'ancien regime — de ce qu'on appelle le capitalismc commercial et que Ton pourrait plutot appeler le mercantilisme 62. Vers le milieu du xvie siecle, en effet, les trafics entre Venise et le Levant vont reprendre, et cette reprise marquera de tout son 6clat le dernier tiers du siecle. L'unification politique du Proche et du Moyen Orient sous la puissance turque y a ete pour beaucoup, quoique la formation de cet empire gigantesque ait porte de rudes coups a la prosperite venitienne quand les liaisons avec Alexandrie et Beyrouth Staient fondamentales, et ces deux ports encore en dehors de Torbite turque. Mais c'est surtout du cot6 de TOcean Indien qu'il faut regarder. Vasco da G-ama etait arrive a Calicut dans la ferme intention de fie faire une place au soleil, c'est-a-dire d'obtenir un acces direct aux marches des epices. Les vieilles routes et les vieux intSrets. doubles d'opposition religieuse, se dSfendirent aprement,-et les Portugrais se virent entraines dans une epreuve de force; il ne leur suffisait pas de garantir la securite de leurs convois, ils avaient encore a s'emparer des points strategiques pour obliger les marchands a leur vendre les marchandises souhaitSes et pour defendre les factoreries portugaises. Ils en sont venus a vouloir supprimer 61. Statistique publi£e par P SARDELLA dans les Annales (Economies, Societ€s, Civilisations), t. II, p. 195-196. 62. Voir notre etude Prix et monnaies au Portugal (1750-1850}.

298

SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD

109

Le repli venitien et egyptien et la route du Cap toute navigation et tout commerce musulman, et aneantir la puissance 6gyptienne par la guerre £conomique. Albuquerque s'empare d'Ormuz, Goa, Malacca, et tente de s'emparer d'Aden, ou il echoue. Et jamais les Portugais ne reussiront a s'etablir aux portes de la Mer Rouge. Presque tous les ans, des escadres utilisant comme bases de rafraichissement Melinde, sur la cote orientale d'Afrique, Pile de Socotora et Mascat, BUT la cote arabe, ou Ormuz, essayeront d'empecher les naves et navires de Calicut et d'autres ports du Malabar et du Goujrate de parvenir au Detroit de La Mecque. Un tel blocus naval n'a pas eu I'efficacite* escomptee, faute d'avoir mis la main sur Aden : les musulmans abandonnerent les gros batiments pour les tout petits vaisseaux qui se faufilaient facilement. Bien plus. Assez souvent les Portugais ont du fermer les yeux, quand ils ne sont pas arrives a encourager en sous main ce trafic. II y avait trop d'interets en jeu que Ton ne pouvait pas bousculer. La route du Cap n'aurait jamais pu remplacer les trafics interr6gionaux a travers TOcean Indien, m&ne si elle etait parvenue & absorber tout le nSgoce au long cours des Apices et de la soie. Car 1'Inde ne pouvait guere se passer de Popium egyptien, des chevaux arabes, du corail et du safran mediterraneens. C'est de propos d&ibere* que la politique portugaise favorisa Pessor du commerce entre les ports indiens et le golfe Persique. Deux ordres de raisons contribufcrent & ce resultat. D'un cote, les besoins de la strategic implriale : pour contrecarrer la puissance mamelouk d'abord, et surtout la puissance turque, ensuite, toujours sollicitee a intervenir dans P0ce"an Indien, le Portugal a cherche a dresser centre elle la Perse entreprenante des Sef £vy. Comme le Grand Turc remportait des victoires sur les armees persanes grace & son artillerie et autres armes a feu qu'elles ne poss^daient pas, les Portugais non settlement f ournirent des canons, des arquebuses et des scopettes, mais envoyerent des artilleurs et des teehniciens qui installerent en Perse des manufactures d^rmement moderne, et ceci d^s 1514-1515; le Chah Ismayl a pu ainsi Stablir un 4quilibre de forces prfcieux pour Pempire portugais, et meme infliger de cuisantes defaites aux Turcs. Les Portugais etaient ainsi tout int6resse*s a developper les relations commerciales avec la Perse afin de renforcer leur alliee. Mais, de plus, des leur installation a Ormuz (1509), ce trafic remplissait surtout leurs bourses, et quand ils mettront la main sur la donane, Tappat pour 1'Etat portugais d'encaisser les revenus qu'elle rapporte, la poussera ^, soutenir 1'essor des ^changes. De Perse viennent les chevaux et les monnaies d'argent — et si les rajahs ne se passent guere des premiers, les blanches pieces commandent le negoce des Spices. Les hauts prix sur les Echelles du Levant attirent naturellement les marchandises debarquees a Ormuz. Et, malgre les guerres tureopersanes, les earavanes de la soie circulent presque toujours et d'autres earavanes remontent de Bassorah a Alep chargees de poi\Te, cannelle, clou de girofle... Nous avons vu que le trafic des epices a Beyrouth se ranime un peu bien avant que le trafic a Alexandrie donne les moindres signes de reprise (des 1514 environ). 299

110

SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD Vitorino Magalhdes-Godinho Cette date correspond a la decision de la politique portugaise de miser sur la Perse contre 1'Egypte, d'abord, contre Tempire ture ensuite — orientation qui ne changera point pendant un siecle. Ainsi les Portugais provoquerent la revanche de la route du Golf e Persique, sur la route de la Mer Rouge : avant leur presence dans 1'OcSan Indien, la presque totalite des Spices etait conduite a Aden et a Djedda, et de ces deux relais, soit au Caire, soit a Damas; maintenant, la caravane de La Mecque perd beaucoup de son importance commerciale, vaincue par la liaison Basssorah-Alep. Un autre grand changement de geographic economique en Orient a contribue a la reprise des trafics du Levant par la route du Cap, plus tardivement. Les marchands musulmans du Malabar, evinces par la victorieuse concurrence portugaise, se replierent a Sumatra et ils d&ournerent une partie de la production de Tile, qui, jusque la, s'ecoulait exclusivement en Chine, au Bengale et au Goujrate, a destination du Caire et de Damas. Question de gout aidant, les Europeens et les Turcs en arriverent a preferer le poivre de Sumatra au poivre de Malabar. C'est a Achen, dans cette ile-la, que sera etabli au xvnc siecle, le principal facteur du Sultan turc, ayant en caisse un million d'or pour les achats de la precieuse Spice. Le voyage en droiture d'Achen a Aden, a travers Timmensite de 1'ocean, sans escale obligatoire en un point bien determine, ne peut etre controle qu'en tenant un des deux bouts; mais, pr&isement, les Portugais n'y reussirent jamais. Grace au jeu convergent de ees drfferentes lignes de forces, vers le milieu du Cinquecentto, les marches du Levant se trouvent assez bien fournis en marchandises orientales, et Venise retrouve la prosperite commerciale de jadis. Mais la depression avait ete bien profonde pendant la premiere moitie du siecle. Comme PScrivait Priuli en 1509 : le voyage du Portugal aux Indes Orientales « veramente ha factor magior damno ala citade veneta cha questa ruina et perdicta dela terra ferma. Et questo he certissimo, perche ha restrecto le spetie, che piui non capitanno a Venetia, 63 quale heran lo alimento et fermo nutrimento dela citate veneta,.. > .

63. IV, 52.

300

The Mediterranean Spice Trade: Further Evidence of its Revival in the Sixteenth Century Frederic C. Lane FURTHER EVIDENCE OF ITS REVIVAL IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

THE Portuguese did not reduce the Levantine spice trade to permanent insignificance. Although the flow of spices through the traditional routes of the Levant was severely checked during the first decades of the sixteenth century, it later found its way through the obstacles raised by the Portuguese. Even pepper again came through the Red Sea in approximately the volume of the years before the Portuguese opened their new route to India. This thesis was suggested by the following figures for the Venetian pepper exports from Alexandria, which were presented in the American Historical Review of January, 1933: Yearly average before Portuguese interference was felt Yearly average, 1560-64 inclusive

about 1,150,000 lb$. Eng. 1,310,454 Ibs. Eng.1

The source of the figures for 156064 and their isolated character make it desirable to present corroboratory evidence of the revival of the Levantine spice trade. The travel diary of a young Venetian nobleman, Alessandro Magno, furnishes a picture of the trade in Egypt in the middle of the century.2 On April 4, 1561, Alessandro sailed for Alexandria in the "Crose", a round ship of about 540 tons.3 Such ships had very largely taken the place of the merchant galleys which in the previous century monopolized the shipping of the more precious types of merchandise.4 Copper 1 Frederic C. Lane, "Venetian Shipping during the Commercial Revolution", Am. Hist. Rev., XXXVTII, 228-29. The source for the later figure is an isolated sheet in the Dona delta Rosa family papers, Busta 217, Museo Civico, Venice. The figures given are there said to be copied from the records of the Venetian consulate in Alexandria. 2 Folger Shakespeare Library, Washington, D. C., MS. 1317.1, no paging, third voyage. I am indebted to Professor Kent Roberts Greenfield for calling this manuscript to my attention and to Dr. J. Q. Adams, the director of the library, for permission to quote from it 8 The description of this ship in Magno's diary agrees with that in the ship lists from the Dona della Rosa papers (Lane, Am. Hist. Rev., XXXVIII, 238). 4 Ibid., p. 229. The galleys auctioned for the voyage to Alexandria after 1536 were as follows: 2 in 1549. * i° *550» 2 in 1554, 2 in 1555, 2 in 1557, 3 in 1563, 3 in 1564— Archivio di Suto di Vcnezia (cited hereinafter as A.S.V.), Senate, Tenninazione, Incand Galere, Reg. 2, lib. 4 and 5.

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Notes and Suggestions

and woolen cloth, which had been among the chief items in the cargo lists of the galleys, bulked large among the wares carried by the "Crose".3 As his own venture, Magno took along some silk cloth and two thousand ducats. As soon as he reached Alexandria, on May 2, he presented his letters of recommendation to the resident Venetian merchants and was assigned a room in one of the houses or fondachi belonging to the Venetian colony. The Venetians had two such fondachi at Alexandria, the other "nations", the Genoese, Ragusans, and French, who were less numerous, each having one. Venetians were settled at Cairo also, for in 1552 they had obtained permission to trade in that city.6 Young Alessandro soon moved there and spent a good part of his time there seeing the sights and taking a trip to the pyramids. When at Alexandria he had bartered some of his silk cloth for pepper and had used some of his cash to buy more pepper. Before making the rest of his purchases he meant to await the arrival of a caravan which was expected from Tor, the Red Sea terminus of the ships bringing wares from India. After about a month of sight-seeing around Cairo he returned to Alexandria and then wrote instructing a relative in Cairo to invest the rest of his funds in pepper as soon as the new merchandise arrived from Tor. These plans were upset by the decision of the captain of the "Crose" not to wait any longer. As soon as it was known that the 5 Alessandro Magno gives the complete cargo of the "Crose" as follows: Kami lavoradi (manufactured copper), balle 250; Kami in verga (copper in bars), cassette 85; Pani de lana (woolen cloth), balle 129; Pani de seda (silk cloth), cassette 21; Carisee (kerseys), balle 28; Barette (caps), casse 35; CoralH (coral), casse 23; Ambre (amber), casse i; Cora Hi c ambre (coral and amber), casse 12; Sbiacche (white lead), barili 100; Jrios (Florentine iris. A dye ?), caratelli 15; Banda raspa (tin plate, filed down), barili 22; Pater nostri de vedro (glass rosaries), casse 7; Pater nostri e barrette (rosaries and caps), casse 3; Mcrce (merchandise), cai n; Carta (paper), balle 30; Assafetida (assafetida), fagoti 2; Tabini (a kind of fine cloth ?), ligacetto x; Contadi (cash), ducati —. Alessandro gives also the cargo for Zante and says the total freight paid by shippers was eighteen hundred ducats. Cargo lists of galleys may be found for comparison in Marino Sanuto, / Diarii (Venice, 1879-1903), III, 1187-88 (for 1500); IX, 536 (for 1510); XII, 77-78 (for 1511): and XXXX, 175-76 (for 1525). * [Fricdrich] Wilken, Cber die Vcnetianischen Consuln zu Alcxandrien im i5ten und i6ten Jahrhundcrte", K. Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Abhandlungcn aus dem ]ahre 1831 (Berlin, 1832), Historisch-philologische Klasse, p. 44. The restriction of Venetian traders to Alexandria had become galling to Venetians in the middle of the sixteenth century because Jews and others interjected themselves between the Arabs in Cairo and the Venetians in Alexandria. These intermediaries not only took a middleman's profit in the trade in grain and spices but even succeeded in loading their own spices and other wares on Venetian ships. To meet this competition the Venetians requested that they be allowed to trade at Cairo. A.S.V., Senato Mar, Reg. 32, f. 35-36.

SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD Lane: The Mediterranean Spice Trade

113 583

ship was leaving, "everyone began to buy furiously. Pepper, which before had been worth twenty ducats a cantar went to twenty-two, and could not be had, and everything else similarly." Alarmed by the sudden rise in prices, Alessandro canceled his orders to buy pepper in Cairo and put the rest of his money into cloves and ginger which he bought in Alexandria. The "Grose" weighed anchor on October 19, before the arrival of the autumn caravan from Tor,7 yet it carried more than a half million pounds of spices including a little more than 400,000 Ibs. Eng. of pepper.8 Alessandro was back in Venice on November 18 and soon sold at 97 ducats a cargo the pepper he had bought at the equivalent of a fraction more than 56 ducats a cargo. He figured his profits as 266 ducats, 18 denarii, and 22 piccoli. Syria as well as Egypt had been a center for spice exports to the West 7 Because of the monsoons, wares from India reached Egypt mainly in the fall. Wilhelm von Heyd, Histoire du commerce dti Levant an moyen age (Leipzig, 1885-86), II, 44^-47, 500. 8 In his travel diary Magno gives two lists of the cargo of the ship, one from the record of the Venetian consulate, one from the ship's manifest. The largest items among the spices were entered on the ship's manifest in colli, and the total number of colli is 478, which, at 1120 Ibs. Eng. per colli, is 525,360 Ibs. Other items are given in nichesse, fardi, casse, etc., the weights of which are unknown to me. Besides spices and drugs the ship carried a few bales of cotton, linen, and carpets, some hides, and 800 ribebe of broadbeans. The following cargo of spices and drugs is given from the records of the consulate in cantara (presumably cantara of different weights since the units used in measuring were different for diflcrcnt spices), except in the case of indigo: Piper (pepper), cantara 4452; Zcnzcri buli (dressed or coated [?] ginger), 266; Belledi (ginger native to west coast of India), 828; Sorati (ginger from Surat), 554; Mordassi (ginger with biting taste ( ? | ) , 96; Mcchini (ginger from near Mecca), 45'/£; Zcdoaria (zcdoary), 35 !4; Cancllc (cinnamon), 32^; Nose (nutmeg), 61; Garoffoli afTusde (cloves), 26; Spigo nardo (spikenard), 6!4; Macis (mace), 32!4; Galanga (galingale), i8J4; Boraso pate (borax cakes), 4; Zucari (sugar), 66; Sandoli rossi (red sanderswood), 24; Nose conditc pate (candied nutmeg cakes), 4; Porcelctte (purslane or pursley [?]), 4; Assafctida (assafetida), 2; Aloe patico (hepatic aloes), 138; Salarmoniago (salammoniac), 3*/i; Turbiti (turpcth), 7 % ; Cocole (kermes dye), 72; Mira (myrrh), 50; Incenso (frankincense), 178; Penacchi (plumes), 34; Goma arabica (gum Arabic), 97; Endcghi (indigo) . . . zurli (bundles wrapped in cowhide), 43; Mirabolani (myrobalans), 50; Tamarindi (tamarind), 91; Cassia (cassia), 47; Curcuma (turmeric), 20; Piper longo salvadego (long pepper, wild), 23; Siena (senna), 100; Zcnzeri verdi (green ginger), 4. Cargo lists of galleys may be found for comparison in / Diarii di Girolamo Prittli (published in Kerttm Italicanmi scriptorcs, 2d ed., Vol. XXIV, pt. 3), Vol. I (Castello, 1911), p. 73 (for 1497), and in Sanuto, XIV, 25-26 (for 1512). The equivalence, i collo =1120 Ibs. Eng. is based on Sanuto, XVII, 191, and is presumably a rough general average. Copies of invoices giving individually the weights of fifty-nine colli shipped from Alexandria in 1497 show that their weights varied between 968 Ibs. Eng. and 1222 Ibs. Eng. The average for the fifty-nine bales or colli was 1083 Ibs. Eng. per collo. A.S.V., Misc. Gregolin, Busta 10, Lettere commercial!, fragment of a letter book of Michiele da Lezze.

114

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Notes and Suggestions

in the fifteenth century, and Syria shared the revival in the midsixteenth century. Here also the Venetians moved their chief colony farther into the interior and transferred their consulate from Damascus to Aleppo, which was nearer to the route to Bagdad and Basra. This route gave access to the wares of India, whence, says a relazione of 1553, "come all the spices, which are one of the primary foundations of the trade of our colony".9 The arrivals at both Aleppo and Damascus of caravans with spices are described in the dispatches of the Venetian consuls, Giovanni Battista Basadona (1556-57) and Andrea Malipiero (1563-64) .10 From 1560 to 1563, however, during the Turkish-Portuguese hostilities, the caravans from Basra were very small, and while the Venetian trade at Alexandria prospered, that at Aleppo languished.11 On the volume of the spices moving through the Levant in the midsixteenth century considerable can be learned from Portuguese sources. The Portuguese embassy in Rome assembled what news they could collect from the Levant in order to warn their royal master of the preparation of Turkish war fleets in the Red Sea or Persian Gulf.12 In 1559 Louren^o Pires de Tavora became Portuguese ambassador to the papal court,13 and he at once set to work to improve the Portuguese news service in the Levant. He engaged the services of two Jews, Isaac Becudo and Mathew Becudo, who possessed the friendships or connections necessary for gathering information and for sending secret dispatches to the Portuguese consul in Venice. Isaac posted himself at Aleppo, Mathew at Cairo,14 and their letters were forwarded from Venice to Rome and from Rome to Lisbon.15 Those of Mathew, at least, described not only the naval activity but also the spice trade, and 9 Eugenio Alberi, Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato, III (Florence, 1840), 223, "Relazione anonima della guerra di Persia". See also the relazione of Marino Cavalli in 1560 (ibid., Ill, 283-84), that of Daniele Barbarigo in 1564 (ibid., VI, 3-10), and Guglielmo Berchet, Relazioni dei consoli veneti nella Stria (Turin, 1866), introduction. 10 A.S.V., Relazioni (Collegio, Secreta), Consoli, Busta 31. I am indebted to the Social Science Research Council for a grant-in-aid which made it possible to consult these and the later cited reports of Venetian consuls. 11 Ibid., letter from Lorenzo Tiepolo, May. 1563; Museo Civico Correr, Venice, Cod. Cicogna, Busta 3154, relazione of Lorenzo Tiepolo, published by Sacerdote Daniele Canal, Per Nozze Passi-Valier Tiepolo (Venice, 1857), p. 40; A.S.V., Senato Mar, Reg. 35, f. 29, 164. 12 Corpo Diplomatico Portuguez, published by the Academia Real das' Sciencias de Lisboa, ed. by L. A. Rebello da Silva and others (Lisbon, 1862-1910), III, 396-97; IV, 14155 VII, 35, 153, 201, 434; VIII, 115, 364. **l bid., VIII, 148. 14 Ibid., pp. 171-75, 396; IX, 13, 108, 489. i*Ibid.. VIII, 236, 250, 354; IX, 108, 251.

SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD Lane: The Mediterranean Spice Trade

115 585

Pires interested himself in this trade. His career before coming to Rome had given him occasion to be informed about it. He had sailed to India as admiral of a spice fleet in 1546.™ Later, when he was the Portuguese ambassador to the Emperor Charles V, King John III acted on his advice in closing the royal spice selling agency in Antwerp.17 At Rome Pires supplemented the information furnished by the Jews already mentioned with reports from Venetians, Genoese, and Ragusans,18 and above all from Antonio Pinto, a Portuguese, who became Pires's secretary. Pinto had been at Cairo as a captive of the Moslems and after his release returned there to negotiate the ransom of other prisoners.19 After Pinto's return from the latter trip, Pires wrote in November, 1560, as follows: "From this Antonio Pinto of Cairo and also from important persons of Venice and Ragusa with whom I have spoken, I understand that there come to Alexandria each year 40,000 quintals [4,480,000 ibs.] of spices, being pepper for the principal part". Pires then described in detail the routes by which the spices came from India and concluded, "there being so much which comes to the dominion of the Turks, it is no wonder that so little comes to Lisbon".20 So seriously did Pires consider the competition of the routes through the Red Sea and Persian Gulf that he advised arranging a contract to have the spices for the king of Portugal brought through the Levant in case peace could be arranged with the Turks. The chances of peace seemed to him slight in 1560 because of the "insolence" of the Turks,21 but the possibility of such an arrangement between the Portuguese and the sultan was worrying Venetian statesmen four years later.22 Large quantities of spices continued to reach Alexandria for some years after 1560. In 1561 spices were so abundant in Egypt as to encourage a rumor at Venice and Florence that the Portuguese viceroy of India was in revolt and therefore had sent the spices to Alexandria instead of to Lisbon. Not crediting this wild rumor, Pires sought some other explanation of the "disorder in the guarding of pepper". For that year, at least, it seemed that the Levantine supply of spices would dominate the European market, for the Portuguese fleet to India had 16

Fortunate de Almeida, Historia de Portugal (Coimbra, 1922-29), III, 435 n. Fr. Luiz de Sousa, Annaes de elrci Dom foao Tcrcciro, ed. by A. Herculano (Lisbon, 1844), PP- 420-23. 18 Corpo Dipl. Port., IX, no, 134-35, 303. ™lbid., VIII, 154, 174, 295, 415; IX, 89-90, 109, 485. 20 Ibid., IX, iio-ii. This passage is mentioned by Almeida, III, 562. 21 Corpo Dipl. Port., IX, 134-36, 251-52. 22 Alberi, VI, p. 6, rclazione of Daniele Barbarigo. 17

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Notes and Suggestions

missed the monsoons. The Venetians and Germans were counting on the scarcity of spices in Lisbon and were pushing up the price in Venice. The whole situation, said Pires, was a clear demonstration of how much damage the Portuguese king suffered from the competition of the Red Sea route.23 Since Lourenfo Pires left the Portuguese embassy in Rome early in the spring of 1562, we have no more of his illuminating reports.24 The spy in Cairo, Mathew Becudo, was caught, imprisoned, and sentenced to death. His friends and his money secured his release, however, and he was able to send further reports, at least on spices, to the Portuguese consul in Venice. In October, 1564, Mathew recorded the capture by the Portuguese fleet of four Moslem merchant ships near Mecca, yet, in the same letter, he estimated that 30,000 quintals of pepper would enter the Red Sea that year and said that Venetian sources estimated the pepper available at 25,000 quintals (2,800,000 Ibs. Eng.).25 Large quantities arrived during the next two years also, according to the letters from the Venetian consul at Cairo. In August, 1565, he wrote that messengers from Mecca reported the arrival at Jiddah with spices of the following ships: one from Daibul, four from Gujarat, two from Surat, eight from Baticala, three from Calicut, two from Mordassi (?), and three from Assi (a kingdom in the island of Sumatra). Two others from Assi were expected. Next year, in May, 1566, he reported that five ships from Assi and three from Baticala had already reached Jiddah with 15,000 boara, about 24,000 cantara of pepper (2,256,000 Ibs. Eng.). Even if the additional ships expected from Gujarat, Calicut, and elsewhere did not arrive, he wrote, an excellent supply of spices was assured for that fall.26 These figures, from both Portuguese and Venetian sources, indicate that the importation of spices from Alexandria to Europe about 1560 was as large or larger than it had been in the late fifteenth century. They suggest that shipments from the India Ocean to the Red Sea roughly equaled or occasionally exceeded the Portuguese imports.27 23

Corpo Dipl. Port., IX, 251, 261, 271, 277, 303-304. Ibid., IX, 508. 25 /£/ 1602, and 1615, *n *he same busta, make no mention of the Dutch. For relazioni from Syria in these years see Berchet.

7 The Return Cargoes of the Carreira in the 16th and Early 17th Century Niels Steensgaard

IN SPITE of the historical importance of the carreira, our knowledge of the volume of commodities imported by the Portuguese carracks into Europe rests on a slender basis. Documentary sources such as bills of lading, invoices, cargoregisters and so on have with few exceptions disappeared, and the representativity and completeness of contemporary reports is disputable. On this background it is hardly surprising that historians, have reached different conclusions regarding the volume of the return cargoes. The figures quoted most frequently are the estimates made by Frederic C. Lane and V. MagalhaesGodinho. Lane's primary aim was to determine Jthe relative importance of the revived spice trade through the Levant after the middle of the 16th century. He based his estimate on various evidence, especially four entries in the famous Sanudo diaries from 1518, 1519, 1530 and 1531, reporting annual imports from 18.164 to 48.097 cantaras of pepper and spice.1 He assumed that there was a falling off in Portuguese imports from the middle of the century, and with some reservations he quoted Bal Krishna's estimate of Portuguese imports by the end of the 16th century, a maximum of 30—40.000 quintals a year.2 Magalhaes-Godinho made a much more thorough study of

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Indo-Portuguese History : Old Issues, New Questions

the problem. He concluded that the return cargoes in the first third of the 16th century were not less than 40.000 quintals a year and possibly more than 50.000. Later in the century these figures increased by 50 percent, i.e., 60.000-75.000 quintals.3 The evidence he builds upon is, besides the Sanudo diaries, a number of similar reports concerning the cargoes on returning fleets, six fleets from the years 1501-1506 and eleven Jieets comprising 51 vessels from the years 1513-1548. Only two or perhaps three of the documented cargoes are above 40.000 quintals,4 but Magalhaes-Godinho made two important assumptions, which made it necessary to increase the recorded figures, one that the volumes reported should be inflated by at least 25 per cent in order to compensate for unregistered commodities, the other that the average capacity of the car racks of the carreira increased by 50 per cent during the century.5 Neither of these assumptions is entirely convincing. The registration Obviously, the problem of unregistered trade is crucial, because, as pointed out by C.H.H. Wake, the ultimate sources of the contemporary figures must be the cargo lists of the escriv&o da nao or similar documents.6 The question is, did the registers include all commodities brought on board or did all or part of the commodities carried according to the several liberties and privileges of the sailors, the officers and the merchants go unrecorded ? At our present state of knowledge the arguments are in favour of the former view. Firstly, because several travellers emphasize the strictness of registration. Linschoten gives a very detailed description of the procedure in stowing the ships in Goa or Cochin, and states that nothing could be brought on board the ships, before it was registered with the veador de fazenda; and that the stevedore did not let any chest on bale on board without having seen a certificate from the veador, specifying the contents.7 The same meticulous control with everything brought on board ship is emphasized by Pyrard de Laval, who, however, indicates that the escrivdo da nao was the key figure.8 Perhaps an analysis of the escrivao's instructions located by C.R.Boxer might reveal the procedure prescribed for the writer.9 A third

SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD JReturn Cargoes of the Carreira

123 15

traveller, Mocquet, supplements the evidence concerning registration before departure in a most valuable way by his complaints over the trouble he had to get his chest after his arrival in Lisbon. Everything was brought to the Casa da India, he says, and nobody could get his chest, before it had been controlled and all dues were settled. Mocquet had to wait a month.10 The evidence of the travellers covering the 1580's and the iirst decade of the 17th century is conclusive as far as the principle is concerned : A complete registration including the liberty chests of the sailors and passengers was supposed to take place. But this does not prove that it always took place. Bribes and influence may have shielded the rich and the powerful against the strict control observed by the humble travellers. Corruption was, so to speak, a matter of routine in the Estado11 and according to Linschoten the stevedores were not above receiving a bribe for finding a safe place for a bale or a chest. Mocquet tells us, that deplorable mistakes occurred in the Casa, some people had their chests returned neatly locked—-but empty.12 Neither of them intimates, however, that it should be possible to bribe one's way round the registration. But in all probability smuggling did take place. According to Magalhaes-Godinho a petition from the farmers of the customs—a biased source admittedly—indicates more than 25 per cent fraud on private imports before 1590. In 1601 the king ordered that the unloading of the carracks in Lisbon should be supervised by Castilian guards.13 Still, I find it hard to believe that extensive smuggling in voluminous commodities took place. Control was easy, after all this was a matter of 3-5 ships a year, not the scores of vessels dodging the control of the Casa da Contratacion in Seville. Several bribes would have to be paid, in India, on board ship and in Lisbon. And finally, anyone smuggling on a ship of the carreira would have been very clumsy to choose voluminous goods, when pearls and precious stones were so much easier to hide and brought a profit of 2-300 per cent.14 So my conclusion is that the registers drawn up before the departure of the ships were fairly reliable and comprehensive so far as voluminous goods were concerned. So far we know

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16

Indo-Portuguese History : Old Issues, New Questions-

of only two registers, from 1505 and 1518, published by Genevi&ve Bouchon. Both these registers have full details on the consignments carried in the name of officials and sailors.15 Possibly more registers may be uncovered in the archives, but our main source of information remains at present second hand, summaries of the registers dispersed in various European archives and collections like the Sanudo diaries. Though it is impossible to give definite proof, the probability is that a summary of the register was prepared already in the port of embarkation and forwarded to the home authorities. At least one summary has been preserved with correspondence from Goa in the Provincial Secretaries' archive in Simancas. (SeeTable 2.1). There is also evidence indicating that the registers were amended after the unloading of the ship in Lisbon. These summaries were of enormous interest to several parties. To the Portuguese and later to the Spanish authorities they would serve to indicate the resources available after the safe arrival of the fleet To merchants dealing in spices and d r ugs they would reveal the probable development of the market. This was not a matter of idle curiosity, the recipients wanted complete and correct information. A sharp distinction should, therefore, be made between mere rumours and speculations and genuine summaries like those uncovered by Lane and Magalhaes-Godinho in the Venetian diaries. If the above line of reasoning is correct, the figures in the genuine summaries should not be inflated in order to account for unregistered goods. The registers and, therefore, the summaries would be minimal, but as far as voluminous commodities are concerned they may be expected to record fairly accurately the commodities carried by the carreira In support of this might be added, that complete information was what the recipients were looking for. and in no case, that I know of, has the informant offered any conjectures concerning unregistered goods. The Fleet of 1587 The fleet which left India in 1587 is of special interest, because we are informed of its return cargo from several sides. The fleet originally consisted of four ships, but one of them.

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125 17

the Great Gonzo of the carreira, the Reliquias, capsized on leaving Cochin.16 The SZo Salvador was damaged off the East African coast, part of the cargo had to be jettisoned, but she finally reached safely in Hormuz, where the remnant of the cargo was unloaded. The last two ships of the fleet, the S&o Thoml and the ConceicQo, arrived in Lisbon in August 1587. In the Provincial Secretary's archive in Simancas a summary of the cargo of the Sfo Salvador, the SZo Thome and the Conceif&o is preserved bound with original correspondence from India. In all probability, therefore, this summary was prepared in India after the foundering of the Reliquias but before the fate of the SZ? Salvador was known.17 This official summary may be compared to a report from an agent of the English crown, Hector Nunez, preserved in the Public Record Office. "The ladings of the ship called the Ste Thomas which came this year 1587 from Callacowth" and "The ladinge of the shipp called oure Ladie".18 By and large this report corroborates the official summary, but some minor discrepancies together with the fact that only the cargoes of the Sfto Thomi and the Conceiffto are registered indicate that Hector Nunez's informer had access to a list that was revised after the preparation of the first summary. The figures concerning pepper, cinnamon, and nutmeg are the same in the two lists but Hector Nunez' figures for indigo, cloves, nutmeg and mace are 2-5 quintals higher than the corresponding figures in the official summary. The assumption that Hector Nunez' informer had access to a later version of the register is supported by the fact that his list includes ebony, aloes socotrina and hard wax, presumably taken on board in Mozambique. Two further sources offer information as far as the pepper cargo of 1587 is concerned. The Fuggers' representatives in Goa reported in 1587 that the pepper cargo of the Reliquias was 1,637 quintals; the S&o Salvador carried 2,586 quintals and the 55o Thome and the ConceffSo together 10,368 quintals.1* These are the same figures (except for the Reliquias which is only mentioned in the Fugger report) as in the two summaries referred to above. Figueiredo Falcao reports a cargo of 10,378 quintals of pepper on the SHo Thome and the Conceigao%

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Indo-Portuguese History : Old Issues, New Questions

the discrepancy of 10 quintals is probably only a copyist's error.20 The fifth source of information concerning the fleet of 1587 is rather a special case, the report of the Italian traveller Balbi, who watched the unloading of the damaged Sao Salvador in Hormuz and whose report often has been quoted as an example of the volume and value of the Portuguese return cargoes. A comparison between Balbi's estimate and the official summary referred to above is revealing. TABLE 2.1 : The cargo of the Sao Salvador according to Balbi compared to the official summary of the register.

Pepper Indigo Cinnamon Ginger Chinese silk Various textiles Nutmeg Cloves Mace Drugs etc. Jettisoned

Balbi11

Off. Summary

4-5,000 cantaras 1,500 bales 500 cantaras 100-150 cantaras 40 chests 80 small chests 200 cantaras

2,586 quintals 1,223 658 401 141 caixas 188 fardos 137 quintals 137 50 — 87 -

Goods to the value of 300.000 ducats.

Balbi's estimate of the pepper cargo must be totally discarded, the 2,586 quintals of the official summary is confirmed by the fact that the same figure was quoted by the owners of the pepper when they claimed the insurance.22 We cannot possibly imagine the smuggling of 2-3,000 quintals of the most closely supervised commodity in the India trade. Balbi may, however, have estimated the quantity of pepper to the best of his ability, pepper was stowed loosely, so that even for an eyewitness it would be difficult to determine the exact quantity. The figures concerning indigo cannot be compared, as we do not know the weight of the bales. Normally, however, indigo was packed in bales of c. 2 quintals,23 so the possibility that Balbi witnessed the unloading of contraband indigo cannot be excluded. All Balbi's other estimates are below the

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127 19

officially recorded quantities, his list is short by some 150 quintals cinnamon, 260-310 quintals ginger, 188 bales and 21 chests of textiles and more than 200 quintals of spices and drugs, in all c. 600-650 quintals, 200 bales and 20 chests. Balbi's lower figures regarding quantities are accounted for by the fact that part of the cargo was jettisoned. He estimates the value of the jettisoned goods at 300.000 ducats. This figure should hardly be taken too seriously, a tendency among the individual owners to exaggerate the enormity of their losses is only to be expected. As we do not know the qualities of the textiles it is not possible to make an estimate of the value of the jettisoned goods, but the European sales value of 600 quintals of spices and drugs and 220 packs of textiles might easily be 100.000 ducats or more. The character of the missing commodities is in harmony with our information concerning stowage of the carracks. The pepper was stowed on the two lower decks, it was poured in loosely from above in compartments which were sealed, when the stowing was completed. Only around the main mast a space was kept for water, provisions and firewood. On the third deck the ships' officials had their cabins, which they usually hired out to merchants, if they did not want to use them for transport themselves. On the fourth deck and in the superstructure the privately owned chests, bales and packs were stowed. Finally the ships, when departing from India, carried a considerable desek cargo, 7-8 chests on top of each other according to one informant, half-way up the main mast according to another.24 Part of the deck cargo consisted in privately owned provisions for the voyage, including hen coops. The king provided the returning sailors and soldiers with water and biscuit only, so that they had to bring their own provisions, if they felt they needed a more varied fare.25 But probably the deck cargo also included the liberty chests of the more humble crew members and passengers. Pyrard de Laval tells us that the men started fighting among thejnselves and that several had to be clapped in iron, when part of the deck cargo had to be jettisoned during a storm off the Cape.26 Linschoten adds another valuable piece of information: It was the apprentice sailors, the

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SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD 20

Info-Portuguese History : Old Issues, New Questions*

"grumetes", who were the first to lose, when part of the deck cargo had to be thrown overboard, because they could not afford to bribe the stevedores in order to secure a safe place for their chests.27 The last part of the cargo to go was the pepper, not only because of the strict rulings, but also because of its inaccessibility. An anecdote from the loss of the Aguia gives us a. glimpse of the criteria that might be applied when goods were selected for jettisoning. When the crew were bringing out commodities to be thrown overboard, they came across a, quantity of indigo, which the king had given to the monastery of Nossa Senhora da Gra9a in Lisbon. The captain was asked if it was to be jettisoned, but he refused "He added that if matters reached the stage that the only hope of salvation lay in jettisoning his own merchandise, then that should be thrown overboard, but that he himself was prepared to carry ashore on his shoulders the merchandise belonging to Our Lady, in whose favour he trusted for the salvation and preservation of that ship.28 So taking Balbi's figures at face value they rather confirm than invalidate the reliability of the official summary. The 61)0-1,000 quintals of spices, drugs and textiles missing in hislist represent liberty chests and other easily accessible merchandise thrown overboard during the storm. The varied information concerning the fleet of 1587 serves* to strengthen the impression that a fairly complete registration of the cargoes took place before departure and that the genuine summaries in all essentials reflect the composition of the. cargoes. Register summaries 1588-1610 The cargo'of 1588 is known through a summary sent to the Fugger consortium which held the pepper contract in these years by its representatives in India.29 It may be considered a. genuine summary, not only because the Fuggers certainly did not pay their factors to supply them with unreliable information, but also because the figures concerning pepper are confirmed by Falcao, who registers exactly the same quantity for the fleet of 1588 : 22963 quintals.80

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129 21

The next preserved summary concerns the return fleet of 1600 and is located in a bundle of miscellaneous business papers of the Dandolo family, which was involved in the pepper import from Alexandria.31 The two lists are headed : "Portata delle 5 nave d'India di Portogallo en« a Lisbona a 23 agosto 1600" and "Portata della nave che resta a dietro". These ships can be identified as the Sao Rocque, the Conceicao, the Paz, the Sao Simao and the Sao Matheus, which according to Falcao arrived in Lisbon on the 23rd of August 1600, and the Sao Martinho, which arrived in Brazil the same year.32 Similar summaries have been preserved in the Public Records Office bound with correspondence from Portugal and concerning 1602 and 1603. The two lists are headed respectively : "A .nott of al shuch marchandises and comoditis which cain from the Easte India in these 2 shippes and now unladen hier in Lisbourne this august of a. 1602—the on of them caled the Sant Salvador and the other caled the sent Jhon" and "the lading of 4 shipps of the East India for Lisbone 1603".23 The six ships may by means of Falcao be identified as the Sao Salvador and the Sao Joao, which arrived in Lisbon on 16th of August 1602, the Sao Jacinto and the Nossa Senhora da Pdz arriving in Lisbon in June-July 1603 and the Sao Rocque and the Conceifao, which .made their port in Vigo, probably the same year.34 From the fleet of 1608 we know the summary of the cargo of one ship from a note appended to a letter from the Portugal council to the king and headed : "folha das fazendas que vao~ embarcadas nesta nao Jesus que desta barra de Goa parte este presente anno de 608 em 2 desenre delle".35 As the letter to~ which the note is appended is dated the 23rd of September 1608 and the Nossa Senhora de Jesus according to Falcao arrived in Lisbon the 12th of September 1608C6 a slip in the dating of the note is most likely. Finally two summaries from the Medici archive published by Braudel and Romano and placed by them among "problemes sans solution"37 may be identified as referring to Portuguese ships of the carreira. *'Na S* de Pieta venuta della India Orientaleadi 14 di agosto 1610" can by means of Falcao be identified as the Nossa Senhora de Piedade arriving in Lisbon the 14th of August 1610, and "N*a Sa do monte del carmine",

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Indo-Portuguese History : Old Issuss, New Question?

undated, can be identified as Nossa Senhora do Monte do Carmo, launched in 1608 and returning to Lisbon in 1610, in 1613 or 1614 and again in 1617.38 Average cargoes : Six samples This survey has presented summaries of the cargoes of 23 ships returned between 1587 and 1610, which may be compared to the summaries concerning 51 ships returned between 1513 and 1548 published by Magalhaes-Godinho and Wake. TABLE 2.2 : Average cargo per ship distributed in samples 15131610 (bales and chests estimated at 2cw., small chests and bales at 1 cw.) Number of ships

1 1513-19 1523-31 1547-48 1587-88 1600-03 1608-10 TABLE 2.3

Average pepper cargo

2

3

4

4973 quint. 3635 6023 — 4490 — 5519 4220 —

80 84 89 68 65 69

6223 quint. 4345 — 6789 — 6638 7891 — 6110 -

24 17 10 8 12 3

3 in %of2

: Average distribution of cargoes, sample as Table 2.2. 1513-19

Pepper Ginger Cinnamon Moluccan spices Textiles Sundries Indigo

Average cargo

80%

1523-31

84%

1547-48

89%

1587-88

68%

1600-03

65%

1608-10

69%

7,3% 2,19,0-

6,1% 3,36,2 —

4,2% 0,94,5-

3,7% 6,31,6-

2,5% 8,75,0 —

1,6% 9,30,03 —

0,2 — 1,4 — 0— 100%

0— 0,4-

0— 1,4 —

10,5 — 1,5 — 8,4 — 100%

12,22,24,4 — 100%

7,84,6 — 7,7100%

0 —100%

0

100%

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131 23

The tables do not permit very definite conclusions concerning trends in the volume and composition of the return cargoes, the samples are very unevenly distributed and some of them, especially the last one, are too small to be considered representative. Nevertheless, some interesting features do emerge. The decline in the relative importance of the pepper which Glamann documented in the Dutch East India trade in the 17th century, apparently started already in the 16th century. The most important new commodities were textiles and indigo. It is remarkable that four of the samples show an average cargo between 6,110 quintals and 6,789 quintals, this might suggest a very stable level of average cargoes. But the harmony is destroyed by the very high average of 1600-03-7891 quintals, the arbitrary composition of the samples may in fact hide a steady rise in the volume of average cargoes. Even so, the lower figures of Lane's estimate must be preferred to the higher figures advocated by Magalhaes-Godinho and Wake. Excepting the first 10-15 years the annual fleets send from India to Lisbon very rarely exceeded 5 ships. A shipment of 40.000 quintals must be a maximum rarely attained, the long term average must be between 25.000 and 30.000 quintals. The volume of goods safely arriving in Lisbon was further reduced by losses at sea, of course, an unpredictable factor but calculated by Magalhaes-Godinho at 15 percent or more over the long term.39 Portuguese and English cargoes compared The figures obtained may be compared to the scattered evidence concerning the return cargoes on North-West European company ships in the early 17th century. The Palsgrave and the Reformation departed from Bantam in January 1635 with the following cargo .40 In quintals of the peso novo the figures would be c. 7000 and 3400. The Reformation was a medium sized vessel, estimated at 4-500 tons in the English sources and at 200 lasts by the Dutch, while the Palsgrave was one of the largest English ships, estimated at 1000 or, with unusual precision, at 1083 tons by the English and at 400 lasts by the Dutch.41

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SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD 24

Indo-Portuguese History: Old Issues, New Questions TABPE 2.4 : Cargo of the Palsgrave and the Reformation at Bantam 31st of January 1635.

Palsgrave

Reformation

Pepper Cloves Shells Sugar Ginger Textiles and silk

613541 Ib. s 225388 4143 — 9702

357540 Ib. s 68330 —

Total

896,006 Ib. s

4476 —

193 bales*

430,346 Ib. s

*Bales estimated at 2 cw. each.

Other company ships carried cargoes of the same magnitude. The Charles brought back in 1618 more than 8100 quintals of pepper, in 1621 more than 6400 quintals and in 1625 nearly 8000 quintals. Several other English East Indiamen carried cargoes of 6000-8000 quintals in the 1620's: The James, the Exchange, the Elizabeth, the Anne, the Mary, the Moon and the London.42 The trouble is that the tonnage of these ships by contemporaries was estimated at 700-1000 tons, while their cargoes exceeded the highest Portuguese averages and approached th£ largest single Portuguese cargo on record, the Sao Thome (1587) : 8675 quintals. The Portuguese carracks were by the end of the 16th century considered the largest ships in the world. The travellers are unanimous on this point. According to Linschoten all the ships in the fleet on which he went out in 15a3 were 7-800 lasts, corresponding to 14-1600 English shipping tons.43. Mocquet gives the tonnage of his ship the Nossa Senhora do Monte do Carmo, as 2000 tons and adds that it was one of the

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133 25

the largest naos.'14 Pyrard de Laval tells us that the Portuguese East India men were the largest ships in the world with a tonnage of 1500-2000 tons.15 We might discard these estimates as travellers' tales, if we did not have the evidence of the survey made of the Madre de Deus after it was brought into English harbour in 1592 and rated at 1600 tons.46 How can we explain the discrepancy between the capacity and the registered cargo of the naos ? The mystery of the missing monsters Magalhaes-Godinho considered the problem and reached the conclusion that the tonnage of the "normal" nao towards the end of the century was c. 600 tons, while the monsters, les mastodontes tardifs", "les monstrueuses de 1500 a 2000 tonneaux" were exceptions, with a capacity of 23000-30000 quintals besides contraband and liberty goods.47 But this conclusion is hardly tenable in view oF the fact that several of the notorious "monsters" are included in the samples presented above. Wake argued that the "increase in the size of the carriers is a sure indication of the growth of the private trade of officials and mariners in the service of the Crown".48 But, as I have shown above, an unregistered trade of such proportions is most unlikely. In my opinion the key to the mystery is to be found in the description of the Madre de Deus : "The caracke being in burden by the estimation of the wise and experienced no lesse than 1600 tonnes, had full 900 of these stowed with the grosse bulke of merchandise, the rest of the tunnage being allowed, partly to the ordinance which were 32 pieces of brasse of all sorts, partly to the passengers and victuals, which could not be any small quantity, considering the number of persons betwixt 600 and 700, and the length of the navigation...49. A ton of shipping allowed for each person sounds probable, L. Denoix has computed the weight of necessary provisions for an eight months overseas voyage at 850 kgs. or/nearly 15 quintals.50

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SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD 26

Indo-Portugutse History: Old Issues. New Questions

This means that an ordinary crew of 120 men reduced the available hold capacity with c. H 1800 quintals. But the Portuguese carracks carried passengers as well as crew members. Several sources document the huge number of passengers on the outward voyage. In 1568 the Chagas left Lisbon with 830 persons on board.51 A Jesuit report of 1579 gives the figure of 500 plus 400 slaves taken aboard in Mozambique, he adds that mortality normally was low unless the ship was overcrowded, and refers to two cases where 500 out of 1140 and 300 out of 800 died during the voyage.52 500 is also the figure given by the Fugger employee Gabriel Holzschuher on his departure in 1579.5) Sassetti allows 8-900 per ship as standard in the early 1580's.54 Linschoten informs us that there were 4-500 persons on board each of the ships on departure from Lisbon.5* The S&o Jago, which foundered on the outward voyage 1585/86 is said to have had 500 men on board.56 Mocquet left Lisbon in 1608 on board the Nossa Senhora do Monte do Carmo,. he states that the escrivao made a roll call after the departure and that they were 900 on board.57 Pyrard de Laval tells us that outward bound ships often carried 7-800 soldiers besides sailors and passengers,58 and about the fleet arriving in 1609 he tells us, that it consisted of four ships, each of 2000 tons, there had been 1000 men on board each on departure, but only 300 were alive on each ship when they arrived in Goa,59 An English report from Lisbon about this particular fleet draws an even more sombre picture, there is said to have been 1500, mostly boys, on board each of the departing ships.60 The implications of these figures are obvious. 500 passengers would claim the hold capacity of a very large ship. Only a giant could carry 1000 passengers. The monsters were real. We are less well-informed as far as the number of passengers on the homeward bound ships is concerned. Undoubtedly it was much below the figure for the outward bound sailings, when practically no cargo was carried. One Jesuit father informs us that the return voyage was the most comfortable, because those who travelled were richer and fewer, perhaps 20 Portuguese

SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD Return Cargoes of the CarreIra

135 27

besides the sailors.61 Nearly the same figure is repeated by Linschoten : 20-30 soldiers with their slaves.62 But the actual figures we have for the number of passengers on the return ships suggest, that these estimates are too canservative. The lowest figure on record concerns the ship on which Linschoten returned, the Indian built Santa Owr, 200 persons in all, soldiers, sailors and slaves.6' From the Tragic History of the Sea we know figures that are considerably higher. On the Gar^a and Aguia (1559) the total number of soldiers, sailors, slaves, women and children was 1037.61 On the Sao Alberto (1593) 153 Portuguese and 194 slaves, 347 in all.65 On the Sao Joao Baptista (1622) 279 persons survived on shore a month after the shipwreck. 66 Slaves were carried in large numbers. The Sao Pel pe and the Madre de Dens carried 400 each.67 In the ship on which Mocquet returned to Europe 300 slaves assisted by the pump. 63 The total- number of crew and passengers on the Madre de Dens was 6-700, presumably including slaves.69 Another carrack taken by the English, the Sao Valentin, had 600 persons on board.70 Pyrard de Laval gives the total number of persons on board the Nossa Senhora de Jesus on departure from India as 800, including slaves and women 7I It was difficult for a soldier to obtain permission to return to Europe and he had to travel on his own cost. But the high officials of the Estado, the viceroy, the captain of the important captaincies, the members of the council and the archbishop were, of course, free to return and to return in state with family, slaves and retainers. "It must be noted that R. H. BAUTIER, * Points de vue', in M. MOLLAT, Socittes et Compagnies, Paris 1970, p. 298.

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(l.s.) of Venice whether loaded in Egypt, Syria or Romania.10 There are, however, a number of objections to this view. It is Pegolotti who gives 300 l.s. as the standard weight of the pondo, and it is clear that he is referring to the common bale of the Syrian ports, two of which made up the Damascus cantar of 600 l.s. which was then in use for pepper and spices.11 Pegolotti leaves little room for doubt that the common bale of Alexandria was larger and related to a different standard: it represented the full ' load' (carica, sporta) of Alexandria, which was reckoned at 750 l.s.12 If there was a common unit based on the Beirut bale then a calculation was required to reduce the larger bales of Alexandria to this standard. While this is not in itself impossible, we have clear evidence that such was not the case at the end of the fifteenth century. The cargoes of the Beirut and Alexandria galleys are noted in terms o f ' bales' which were clearly understood to be the actual bales of different weight, the common bales of the different ports. 13 That this was also the practice in earlier times, and specifically around 1400, is supported not only by what Pegolotti has to say (much earlier) but also by the contemporary evidence relating to the auction of voyages.14 In the fifteenth century both the Beirut and Alexandria bales increased in size, partly, perhaps, for convenience of handling, i° HEERS, * II commercio ' pp. 183 ff.; J. HEERS, ed., Le Livre de cotnptes de Giovanni Piccamiglio, hotnme d'affaires genois, 1456-1459, Paris 1959, pp. 24-25. 11 F. DI BALDUCCI PEGOLOTTI, La Pratica della Mercatura, ed. A. Evans, Cambridge, Mass., 1936, pp. 67, 69, 90-91, 97, 307. The Syrian pondo was 300 l.s. gross, for pepper and ginger notionally 286.88 and 284.4 l.s. nett before and after garbling, according to Pegolotti. On occasion bales equal to the Damascus cantar of 600 l.s. gross (573 and 560 l.s. nett before and after garbling) were loaded on Venetian galleys. See HEERS, 'II commercio', p. 185 and note 19, and pp. 205-6, note 26; F. C. LANE, 'Merchant Galleys, 1300-34: Private and Communal Operations', in LANE, Venice and History, p. 205. 12 PEGOLOTTI, pp. 71, 307-8. 13 See F. C. LANE, Venetian Ships and Shipbuilders of the Renaissance, Baltimore 1934, p. 250, note 20. i* See note 19 below. 366

SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD

147

The Changing Pattern of Europe's Pepper and Spice Imports, ca. 1400-1700

and partly also, we may surmise, in order to minimize import duty charged per bale. The latter consideration appears to have become predominant, for in 1450 the Venetian Senate heard complaints that the Alexandria bales had grown to as much as 1000 and 1500 l.s. and were becoming difficult to manoeuvre.15 Nevertheless, the increase in size continued until a new standard eventually emerged which stabilized the Alexandria bale at around 1680 l.s. gross weight, representing a notional nett weight of around 1600 l.s.,16 i.e. four carica of Venice, and which put the Beirut bale at around 420 l.s. gross, or 400 Ls. nett.17 A different picture of the European pepper and spice .trade emerges when the data presented by Heers are re-examined in the light of these conclusions and collated with information from other sources.18 Table 1 shows Venetian imports from Egypt, 15

LANE, Venetian Ships, p. 250; and his Navires et constructors a Venise pendant la Renaissance, Paris 1965, p. 238. 16 Almost exactly right for pepper and ginger, the major items, and for nutmeg and lakka, according to Pegolotti's tares. 17 According to Sanuto (/ Diarii di Marino Sanuto, ed. R. Fulin and others, Venice 1879- , vol. 17, col. 191) the Alexandria bale was then reckoned at 10 Portuguese quintals. Ca' Masser (' Relazione de LUNARDO DA CHA' MASSER', Archivid storico italiano, vol. 10, Appendix, vol. 2, Florence 1845, p. 29) and Affaitada (Sanuto, vol. 5: 133) both give the Portuguese quintal as 168 libbre. These statements suggest 1680 l.s. (1116 Ibs English) for the Alexandria bale, the value adopted here, equal to 9.84 Portuguese quintals. (Lane has 1120 Ibs. See his Venetian Ships, p. 250, and Navires, p. 238, for a consideration of the problem). The ratio of four Beirut bales to one of Alexandria is deduced by Lane from the Venetian, duty rates: two ducats on the Alexandria bale, half a ducat on the Beirut bale. There was also a collo serice, " of Syria " according to Lane, but probably " silk ", for which the rate was also two ducats (LANE, Venetian Ships, p. 251, Navires, pp. 238-39. See also his evidence for sachi of cotton and silk of around 400 l.s.). E. ASHTOR, ' Volume of Levantine Trade', pp. 574-78, also doubts that the Alexandrian and Syrian bales were the same, but the equivalences which he tentatively proposes for the Alexandrian bale at the beginning and end of the fifteenth century, two and four Syrian colli of 300 l.s. (180 and 360 KG), are too low. The former equates the Alexandria bale with the Damascus cantar rather than the local sporta. The latter overlooks the increase in size of the Syrian bale and other evidence relating to the Alexandrian bale of around 1680 l.s. i* It will be apparent that the following discussion is much indebted to Heers's work on the Datini papers and also the recent publications of E. Ashtor.

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Syria, and Romania in a number of years from 1394 to 1405 and annual averages for the period. While these figures cannot pretend to defmitiveness, they suffice to indicate the general pattern and orders of magnitude of the Venetian trade at the end of the fourteenth century. Pepper was normally the cheapest of the Eastern spices and enjoyed a large and more steady market in Europe. For these reasons it was of prime importance in the commercial strategy of the muda voyages. Along with ginger, to a lesser extent, it provided the secure base of a trade in bulk which underpinned the more speculative investments in highprofit spices. Over four-fifths of the return cargoes from Alexandria consisted of pepper. The Beirut trade, on the other hand, was more diversified, with a higher proportion (and generally larger absolute quantities) of the expensive spices, and with the bulk of the trade roughly divided between pepper and ginger. Leaving aside the trade in * associated goods ' (mainly sugar and textiles) which were also brought home on the galleys from Syria, the Alexandria trade was considerably larger — nearly double in terms of weight on average (see Table 1) — though the fluctuations from year to year were large.19 In terms of value the difference was much less. The averages for the years 1395, 1399 and 1404 were approximately 253,000 and 229,000 ducats for Alexandria and Beirut respectively (see Table 2). If 4 associated goods' (not counting pearls and precious stones) are included, the Beirut average reaches 290,000 ducats. Moreover, because of the high proportion of spices, the rate of return on investment in the Beirut voyages was high.20 Though smaller in volume, 19 These conclusions, based on weight estimates, are supported by figures "for the auction of voyages (incanti), although the latter are not an exact index of the size (or value) of homeward cargoes. In the period 1400-12 the averages for the Alexandria trade were 70% higher per muda and 86% higher per galley. See F. THIRIET, * Quelques observations sur le trafic des gaiees ve*nitiennes d'apres les chifFres des incanti', in Studi in onore di Amintore Fanfani, vol. 3, Milan 1962, p. 511. Cf. Sanuto, vol. 3: 123; vol. 4: 49, 289, for the auction of voyages in 1500, 1501, 1502, in which again the figures per muda and per galley are much higher for the Alexandria trade. 20 For a discussion of rates of profit see E. ASHTOR, ' Profits from trade with the Levant

368

SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD

149

The Changing Pattern of Europe's Pepper and Spice Imports, ca. 1400-1700

the regulated galley trade with Syria was certainly not less important than the comparable trade with Alexandria. The main rivals of the Venetians in this period were the Genoese and the Catalans. Information on the volume of their trade is sparse. Table 3 presents data on the Catalan trade with Beirut and Alexandria. The Catalan trade was at its height in the last years of the fourteenth century, when from three to five galleys of Barcelona usually voyaged to Syria each year.21 Averaging the cargoes of 1391, 1397, 1399 and 1400, and assuming an average of four galleys to Beirut a year, we may estimate the Catalan imports from Beirut at around 290,000 l.s. of pepper and 490,000 l.s. of spices.22 In 1388 the loading of one Catalan vessel at Alexandria was 93,700 l.s. of pepper and 248,000 l.s. of spices (including a very large amount of lakka). Catalan spice imports from Alexandria may have been considerably less a decade later. All the same, the total Catalan trade at this time can hardly have been less than 800,000 to 900,000 l.s. Table 4 presents data on the Genoan trade with Beirut and Alexandria in the same period. In August 1395 Beltramo Mignanelli, writing from Damascus to the Datini firm in Barcelona, estimated the cargo of the two Genoan galleys at Beirut at 1500 to 1800 pondi.2* This refers to the total of pepper, spices and associated goods. Mignaiielli also estimated the cargo of the five Venetian galleys at 3500 to 4000 pondi — somewhat short of the 4312 pondi units (weighing 1.32 million l.s.) actually brought to Venice in that year. Assuming that for the Genoan galleys in the fifteenth century ', Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, vol. 38 (1975) pp. 250-75. 2 « C. CARRERE, Barcelone, centre tconomique a I'tpoque des difficult^, 1380-1462, Paris 1967, vol. 2, pp. 644-45. 22 Ashtor gives the value in dinars of Catalan pepper and spice cargoes: 3 galleys in 1395: 40,000 dinars; 5 in 1396: 175,000; 4 in 1397: 74,000 (a cargo weighing 773,000 1. s.). See ASHTOR, * Volume of Levantine Trade', pp. 587-88. 23 F. MELIS, Documents per la storia economica dei secoli XIII-XVI\ con una nota di paleografia commercial a cura di Elena Cecchi, Florence 1972, p. 184.

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SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD C. H. H. Wake

the ratio of pepper and spices to associated goods was about the same as for the cargo of a Genoan galley from Beirut in an unknown year in the same period — i.e., about 65% of the total pondi units, 66% by weight (which is close to the proportion in the Venetian imports in 1395, 68% of the total, 64% by weight) — then we may tentatively put the Genoan consignment of pepper and spices at about 351,000 l.s. out of a total of 1800 pondi. Pepper made up only a small part of the Genoan imports from Beirut. In the cargo of the galley of unknown year (which included an unusually large amount of cinnamon) pepper comprised 15% of the total of pepper and spices. In the cargoes of four navi (one of 1382 and three of unknown years) pepper made up about 35% of the total. The ratio of pepper to spices probably decreased as imports grew in size through the 1390s. Mignanelli implies that ginger made up about half of the total of pepper and spices in the galleys of 1395, so that the pepper component is unlikely to have been more than 25 % of the total. On this latter assumption we may estimate the cargo of the Genoan galleys at about 88,000 l.s. of pepper and 263,000 l.s. of spices. In the same year one Genoan nave imported 282,750 l.s. of pepper and 33,000 l.s. of spices from Alexandria. Ashtor estimates the value of pepper and spices on two navi from Alexandria in this year at 33,000 and 25,000 dinars..24 In this one year total Genoan imports from Beirut and Alexandria could easily have exceeded 500,000 l.s. of pepper and 300,000 l.s. of spices. Ashtor puts the total value of Genoan pepper and spice imports in 1395 at 163,300 dinars. 25 In the following year two Genoan galleys and three navi imported pepper and spices to the value of 152,000 dinars from Alexandria alone.26 (Possibly Genoan imports from 24

ASHTOR, * Volume of Levantine Trade', p. 587.

" Ibid. ™ Ibid., p. 588.

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The Changing Pattern of Europe's Pepper and Spice Imports, ca. 1400-1700

Beirut, like Venice's, were down in 1396. Catalan imports, at 175,000 dinars, were considerably up.) Obviously these estimates should be treated with reservations. The data are insufficient for a solidly grounded view of the full character and extent of Catalan and Genoan trade in the changing circumstances of the 1390s. But bearing in mind that it is at least as likely that they under-rate the size of the trade as that they over-rate it, and that they omit both the direct trade of the Genoese from Alexandria to Northern Europe and the minor trade of the French and others,27 these estimates nevertheless do have their use. They indicate quite clearly that the level of European pepper and spice imports was very much higher than Bautier's estimate of 600 to 700 tonnes. On the basis of these estimates we should put the sum of European imports at upwards of 750 tonnes (probably around 830 to 900 tonnes) for pepper and above 450 tonnes for spices. The Venetian share of this trade was probably about 60% to 70% for pepper and under 45 % for spices. The Portuguese Intrusion

The diaries of Sanuto and Priuli throw light on the Venetian pepper and spice trade on the eve of the Portuguese discovery of the Cape route to India. The figures for imports in the years 1495/96 to 1497/98 show an average of 2,511,264 1. s. of pepper and 2,722,166 1. s. of spices (see Table 5). The pattern is quite different from what is observed for a century earlier. The Alexandria trade is now nearly three times the size of the Beirut trade (excluding * associated goods') and has diversified through the 27

For the direct trade by Genoese from Alexandria to England and Flanders see ASHTOR, ' Volume of Levantine Trade', pp. 587- 590, and Bautier, ' Points du vue', in MOLLAT, Soci&th et Compagnies, p. 297. Bautier's figure for pepper consigned in 1394 appears too large — by a factor of ten, judging from the erroneous equivalence of 1500 Genoese can tars of cotton to ' over 700 tonnes'.

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whole range of spices. Pepper imports are only about 20% higher than at the beginning of the fifteenth century, whereas the trade in spices has grown nearly thirteen-fold. The evolution of the Beirut trade has been in the opposite direction. Pepper imports have nearly doubled and the spice trade has grown by about 40%. In the over-all pattern of the Venetian trade the ratios of pepper, ginger, and the rest of the spices have changed markedly. Pepper is relatively less important, both ginger and the rest of the spices relatively more important. For the different commodities the rates of growth over the century vary:.approximately 257% by weight for ginger, 395% for cinnamon, 292% for Moluccan spices, 561% for * other spices' — over-all an average of 321 % for spices, as against 31% for pepper.28 Do these rates of increase reflect primarily growth in European consumption or changes in Venice's share of the market? What was the approximate size of this market at the end of the fifteenth century? How serious were the consequences of the discovery of the Cape route for the trade of Venice and other Mediterranean importers in the sixteenth century? A comparison of statistics relating to Venetian imports in the years 1495/96 to 1497/98 and 1501/02 to 1505/06 and to Portuguese imports in the years 1503 to 1506 provides an initial approach to these questions. In 1500, after the interruption to Venice's trade caused by the Turco-Venetian war in 1498/99 and 1499/1500, the Venetians sent five galleys to Alexandria and five to Beirut. The return cargo of pepper and spices totalled 5,661,600 1. s. — only about 7% more than the annual average in the years 1495/96 to 1497 / 98.29 For the Venetians this was the last season of good 2« Estimates based on Tables 1 and 5, using the 1495/96-96/97 figures in Table 5 for individual spices and the 1495/96-97/98 figures for pepper and all spices. 29 Venice's troubles provided an opening for rivals. For the activity of Genoese, Catalans and others in 1499 and 1500 see, e. g., Sanuto, vol. 3: 68, 476, 737, 1030, 1123, 1571, and for German purchases in Genoa, ibid. vol. 4: 28.

372

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The Changing Pattern of Europe's Pepper and Spice Imports, ca. 1400-1700

trade which clearly belongs to the pattern of the preceding century. In the following year the Mediterranean felt the full impact of Portuguese activity in the East. There are only a few indications of the ratio of pepper to spices in the Venetian trade for 1501/02 to 1505/06. For Alexandria these are noted for the first two years. For Beirut there are itemised cargoes for 1501/02 and 1504/06. These provide a basis for an approximate estimate of Venetian trade in the years 1501/02 to 1505/06 (see Fig. 2 and Tables 6 and 7).30 Fig. 2 Average Annual Imports of Venice, in l.s., ca. 1502-06 Pepper Alexandria Beirut Total

445,200 47,800 493,000

Spices

90% 10% 100%

659,200 133,100 792,300

Total

83% 17% 100%

1,104,400 180,900 1,285,300

85% 15% 100%

In the year 1501 /02 the Beirut and Alexandria galleys returned with 1,617,000 1. s. of spices and 379,680 1. s. of pepper. For Beirut this represented 45% of the average spice import and less than 1% of the average pepper import in 1495/96 to 1497/98. For Alexandria the figures are 63% and 21% respectively. Overall the Venetian spice and pepper imports were down to 58% and 15% respectively of the averages in the earlier period. In the following decade Venice's position declined further. The pepper trade with Alexandria was practically extinguished and the Portuguese — and perhaps also Venice's Mediterranean rivals — made further inroads into the spice trade. For a decade after 1514 the Venetian galleys' state monopoly of the carriage of pepper and spices was discontinued and voyages were irregular. Sanuto notes cargoes of Venetian galleys and 30 For imports from Alexandria see Table 6. Pepper imports from Beirut were 4 and 460 colli in 1501/02 and 1504/05 respectively. The average for Alexandria is obtained by allowing for 1504/05 the same pepper/spices ratio as the average for 1501/02 and 1502/03, and for Beirut by allowing for 1502/03 the same as for 1501/02 and 1504/05.

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navi for a number of years in this period. The average for spice imports which he records from Beirut in 1517/18 and 1521/22 and from Alexandria from 1518 to 1522 are 268,170 1. s. and 566,370 1. s. respectively. For pepper the figures are 24,360 1. s. and 36,960 1. s. respectively. These figures do not, of course, include all imports in these years. A better indication of the size of the trade is provided by Sanuto's notes of cargo in the years after the galleys' monopoly was restored. Average imports of pepper and spices from Alexandria in the years 1529/30 and 1531/32 and from Beirut in the years 1527/28 and 1529/30 and 1531 /32 were roughly 550,000 1. s. in each case. Very little of this was pepper. Venice's pepper trade virtually vanished after 1510. The impression conveyed by the figures for individual years (see Tables 6 and 7) is that the spice trade was sporadic, subject to large fluctuations, and probably not much above the level of the first few years after 1501. The trade of Venice's Mediterranean competitors remains almost completely in the shadows, though from Sanuto's occasional references it is apparent that they were often able to secure fully as much, vessel for vessel, as the Venetians. In June 1510 three French vessels left Alexandria with cargoes which included 600 colli of spices. In September 1518 a single French vessel left Alexandria for Marseilles with 160 colli of spices. At the same time a Venetian vessel left with 180 colli of spices. In December 1519, when the Venetian galleys had collected only about 40 colli (it was still early in the season), a Genoan vessel carried off 80 colli of ginger, cloves and cinnamon. In October 1531 one French vessel left with a large consignment amounting to over 1500 colli; again, the Venetian galleys had loaded only 40 colli. A year later another French vessel took off 124 colli, comprising 900 cantars of ginger, 300 of incense, and over 190 of clove, nutmeg, mace and cinnamon.31 The impression which these figures " Sanuto, vol. 11: 76, 105, 268; vol. 26: 145, 163; vol. 28: 133-34, 355; vol. 55: 145, 406; vol. 57: 503; CARRERE, Barce/one, vol. 2, p. 645. 374

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The Changing Pattern of Europe's Pepper and Spice Imports, ca. 1400-1700

convey is that non-Venetians accounted for a substantial part of Europe's imports from the Levant in this period. In order to estimate the total European market for pepper and spices we need to form some notion of the ratio of Venetian to non-Venetian imports in the 1490s. The sum of pepper imports of the Venetians and Portuguese in the years 1502-03 to 1506 comes to around 3.7 million l.s., which is some 1.16 million l.s. more than Venetian imports in the years 1495/96 to 1497/98. If the general level of European imports remained about the same over this decade — and there is no reason to suppose otherwise 32 — then Venice's share of the market in the 1490s must have been less than 68% — less by whatever amount was imported by other Mediterranean traders from the Levant in the years 1502-03 to 1506. How large, then, was this amount? In the absence of statistical evidence of the kind pertaining to Venetian and Portuguese imports any assessment of this trade must include an element of conjecture. It cannot have been large, however, for there is nothing to show that Venice's competitors were more successful than the Venetians themselves in procuring pepper in the Levant in the period up to the rupture of relations between Venice and Egypt in 1505. It is also likely that the French, Spanish and Genoese soon turned to Lisbon for supplies once the price of pepper began to rise in the Levant. Tentatively we may put their Levantine imports after 1501 at around 100,000 to 500,000 l.s., i.e., at most, about the same 3

2 The Portuguese could generally secure all they wanted in the East and had no intention of allowing the European market to become flooded. The flow of pepper from the Levant was reduced to a trickle and imports were kept to a level which maintained the price on the European market. As Lisbon changed from a subsidiary to a primary market prices dropped from around 80 ducats a quintal (1499) through 40 ducats (1502) to under 20 ducats (1504), i. e. to about the level obtaining at Venice before the TurcoVenetian war. (The price at Venice was about 42 to 49 ducats a carica, or 18 to 21 ducats a Portuguese quintal, in 1495-97). At this point prices stabilised. The Crown set the price to wholesalers at 22 ducats, later raised to 36 ducats. See J. L. AZEVEDO, £pocas de Portugal econ6mico', esbo$as de historia, 2nd ed., Lisbon 1947, p. 99; D. LACK, Asia in the Making of Europe. Volume One: The Century of Discovery, Chicago 1965, pp. 143-47. 375

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SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD C. H. H. Wake

as Venice's. This would put the total European market at around 1140 to 1270 tonnes and Venice's share in the 1490s at 60% to 65%, which is about the same as at the end of the fourteenth century. The growth of European imports in this case would have been within the range 30% to 55% over the century. The growth of Venetian pepper imports was about 30% between 1400 and 1500. The very much greater increases in the growth rates of the different spice categories is partly a reflection of the more rapid rise in demand for spices and partly due to the fact that the Venetians greatly enlarged their share of the market in the fifteenth century. Assuming that Venice's share of the spice market increased from under 45 % at the beginning of the fifteenth century to about 80% at the end, then the total European market should have been approximately 3.5 million l.s. by 1500. But it is doubtful that the Venetians could have engrossed the major item, ginger, to the extent that this would have entailed. Assuming that Venice held no more than 65% of the ginger trade and 70% to 80% of the trade in other spices (i.e. about 67% to 72% of the total spice trade), then the total European trade should have been approximately 3.9 to 4.1 million l.s. The sum of average Venetian (estimated) and Portuguese (recorded) imports in the years 1502-03 to 1506 is only about 1.22 million l.s. — less than half the lowest (and least probable) of the figures mentioned above for the total market. Comparison with the figures for Venetian imports in the 1490s shows that the explanation of this very large discrepancy cannot simply be that these figures for the European market are all too high. Even if the total market were no more than 3.5 million l.s. — it could scarcely have been less — a large amount would still have to be accounted for on the improbable hypothesis that the effect of the Portuguese action was to cause nearly half of Venice's spice trade to fall into the hands of rival Mediterranean importers while the Portuguese themselves secured less than one-eighth 376

SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD

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The Changing Pattern of Europe's Pepper and Spice Imports, ca. 1400-1700

of the total; or alternatively, and no less improbably, that European imports dropped by about 50% in these years and remained down for the rest of the century. 33 At this point we should turn to examine the Portuguese trade more closely. The most striking feature of the Portuguese trade, as it appears from the figures in contemporary reports, is that whereas a near monopoly of pepper was quickly established, imports of spices remained quite small, not only in the early years, before Portuguese power was consolidated in the East and extended to the sources of the major spices, but throughout the whole of the ' Portuguese Century' (see Fig. 3 34 and Table 8). Fig. 3 Average Annual Portuguese Imports, in quintals

1503-06 1513-19 1526-31 1547-48 1571-80 1581-90 1591-1600

Pepper

Spices

Total

18,825 29,866 18,102 30,119 20,768 19,819 11,018

2,543 7,627 2,498 3,831 6,174 5,887 3,302

21,368 37,493 20,600 33,950 26,942 25,706 14,320

But are the contemporary figures for Portuguese spice imports all-inclusive? Steensgaard's view, upon which his assessment of the relative importance of the Portuguese and Levantine trades is to a considerable extent based, is that they are, at 33

Portuguese harassment of the Indian Ocean trade may have reduced the supply available in the Levant for export to Europe, but if failing supplies from this quarter had not been off-set by Portuguese imports we should expect substantial price rises in the Levant. None occurred until after 1511, when the main cause will have been unsatisfied demand within the Muslim world resulting from Portuguese pressure on the Indian Ocean trade. For prices at Cairo see V. M AGALHAES-GODINHO, L'Econotnie de I*empire portugais aux XVe et XVIe siecles, Paris 1969,.p. 725. 34 Figures for 1547-48 are based on Magalhaes-Godinho, p. 704, and those for 15711600 (but not totals) are from Steensgaard, p. 168.

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SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD C. H. H. Wake

least for the post-1570 period.35 The weight of evidence, however, is on the side of V. Magalhaes-Godinho, who takes a contrary view.36 The ultimate sources of the contemporary figures were the cargo lists of the escrivao da nao or similar documents. As Ca' Masser notes of the 1506 fleet,37 the registers of the escrivao' did not include the * boxes' of the mariners. These lists should in fact be taken as referring with certainty only to cargo carried in the holds on behalf of the Crown and certain Crown licencees,38 and not to merchandise imported by mariners and royal officials as perquisites of office.39 Although the royal monopoly extended formally over pepper and all the major spices, thus affirming the principle that none but the king had rights in this trade, it was only in the case of pepper that the monopoly was actually enforced. The Crown dominated the spice trade in Asia and took some part in the trade to Europe, but in general the latter was conceded as a perquisite of office to the Crown's servants in the East, for whom, indeed, this was a major source of income and the principal inducement to service in the Estado da India.*® 35

Steengsgaard, p. 164. 3 Magalhaes-Godinho, p. 701. See also his extended discussion of the Portuguese trade round the Cape, pp. 665-709 (to which the following is indebted), especially his discussion of contraband (pp. 697-98). 37 CA' MASSER, ' Relazione ', p. 23. 38 These were (1) entrepreneurs who fitted out ships in the early years and paid duty or a share of the cargo to the Crown, and (2) the ' Asian Contractors * who took the place of the Crown in importing pepper (for a while some spices, also) from the 1570s, and who sold to the Crown in Lisbon. This was all official trade and was noted in the official cargo registers. A different class of Crown licencees comprised nobles and officials, in Portugal and in the East, who made private importations by royal permit. 3 Possibly also included in the official cargo lists were the pepper imports (quintaladas) allowed to mariners and officials as part of their salary (and officially abolished in 1517). These were managed by the Crown in the early years (for some details see The Voyage of Pedro Alvarts Cabral to Brazil and India, transl. & introd. by W. B. Greenlee, Hakluyt Society, second series, no. 81, London 1937, pp. 192-93). 40 The Crown benefitted by being able to reduce its payments to remunerate officials and buy spices. Private funds were tapped for the spice trade, but the Crown still profited by obliging private- traders to obtain supplies from the royal factors, and then by buying 378

SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD

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The Changing Pattern of Europe's Pepper and Spice Imports, ca. 1400-1700

Some indication of the extent of the trade can be gained from a comparison of cargo lists and the carrying capacity of vessels in the carrewa da India. In October 1512 Albuquerque proposed to send the king 38,000 quintals of pepper and spices in five newly built vessels, each with a rated capacity for the freight of pepper and spices of 7,500 to 8,000 quintals. In fact, about 42,000 quintals was despatched in seven vessels.41 Even assuming that two of these were older vessels which could carry only about 6,000 to 6,500 quintals, it appears that the hold capacity of the fleet exceeded the stated cargo by some 7,000 to 10,000 quintals, so that some 15% to 20% of the hold space was available for the private imports of officials. Private trade in addition took up room in living quarters and above deck areas, to an extent which Magalhaes-Godinho estimates as equal to as much as a quarter of hold capacity.42 In Albuquerque's day the naos dc carrcira were commonly of around 400 to 500 toneladas. By mid-century they had grown to 600 toneladas and over, representing a hold capacity for pepper and spices of some 9,000 to 9,600 quintals.43 The cargo lists fail to shown a corresponding increase in the size of consignments over this period. Yet these vessels were notoriously overladen back or taxing imports on arrival in Lisbon, though not all these devices were necessarily in use at all times. (For an illustration of how the Crown profited from the grant of quintaladas to high officials see Azevedo, p. 104, note 2. For the organisation of the Moluccan spice trade see Magalhaes-Godinho, pp. 794-812). 41 Magalhaes-Godinho, p. 702; R. A. DE BULHAO PRATO, ,ed., Cartas de Affonso de Albuquerque, Lisbon 1884, vol. 1, p. 83. 42 Magalhaes-Godinho, p. 677. 43 I follow Magalhaes-Godinho on the size of vessels in toneladas (pp. 674, 677). The estimate of carrying capacity, a conservative one, is on the assumption that Albuquerque's figures of 7500 to 8000 quintals refer to a 500 tonelada vessel. The value of the tonelada as a measure of ship's capacity is unknown. Magalhaes-Godinho (p. 676) cites evidence to suggest that it weighed 131/2 new quintals (i. e. the same as the tonelada of 1728 arrateis used for weighing heavy goods) and estimates carrying capacity on the assumption that this was the weight of the tonelada (measure of volume) of pepper and spices. But the weight of a tonelada of pepper or spices cannot be gauged if the volumetric value of the tonelada is unknown. The problem of the Portuguese ton of ship's measure remains unsolved.

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on the homeward journey. The increase in the size of the carriers is a sure indication of the growth of the private trade of officials and mariners in the service of the Crown.44 In assessing the size and significance of the Portuguese spice trade in the sixteenth century we have to reckon with a private trade which went unrecorded in the official cargo lists, which flourished throughout the century and which was practically confined to spices and associated goods, since the pepper monopoly was effectively enforced. 45 The private trade probably accounted for at least 30 % of total imports in the early part of the century and more in the later period. For 1503-06 the average annual spice import, official and private, may have amounted to 12,000 to 15,000 quintals, approximately 2.0 to 2.5 million l.s.46 In 1513-14, at a fairly conservative estimate, it may have been as much as 21,900 to 25,000 quintals, about 3.7 to 4.2 million Is.47 A wide margin of uncertainty must be allowed for in any estimate of the European spice market at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Assuming that the Venetians held close to 70% of the total (excluding pepper) in the 1490s, and bearing in mind that the trade of other Mediterranean importers may have suffered proportionately less than Venice's and that the dislocation of established trading patterns may have resulted in a small' and temporary drop in total imports in the early years of Portuguese activity, the probability is that the European spice 44

A contemporary observer explicitly attributes the increased size of the vessels to the demands of private trade of officials and mariners. See Magalhaes-Godinho,. pp. 675-76. 45 For the trade in goods other than pepper and spices see MagalhSes-Godinho, pp. 707-09. 46 Allowing fo£ a private trade amounting to 15% to 20% of hold space and space equal to 25% of hold outside the hold. 47 10 vessels imported annual averages of 20,200 quintals of pepper and 11,500 *of spices (see Table 8). Assuming only half were new vessels, average annual cargo capacity should be around 33,700 to 36,200 quintals, with cargo outside the hold amounting perhaps to 8,400 to 9,000 quintals. Average annual cargo for these years is computed to be 42,100 to 45,200 quintals. Cf. the estimates of return cargoes in the sixteenth century in Magalhaes-Godinho, pp. 700-709.

380

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161

The Changing Pattern of Europe s Pepper and Spice Imports, ca. 1400-1700

market was between 1200 and 1350 or possibly 1500 tonnes at this time. About half the market was probably being supplied by the Portuguese in the years 1503-06, and much more a decade later, and this mainly through the private trade which went unrecorded in the official cargo lists. A great part of this trade must have been in ginger, which figures insignificantly in the recorded imports and could not have been imported through the Levant in sufficient quantities to satisfy European demand.48 Later in the century, as Europe came to be supplied from the West Indies and Portugal's Atlantic Islands, ginger was gradually displaced in the Portuguese private trade by a growing volume of the more expensive spices and associated goods. The Portuguese trade was always of major importance, even at the times when the Levantine revival was at its height. Around 1560-64 imports via the Cape still probably accounted for more than half the spices which found their way into Europe from the East.49 The Cape Route and the Levant Trade Between 1531 and 1587 there are only a scattering of figures for Portuguese pepper imports. It is possible, however, to estimate general levels of imports from the statistics of Portuguese shipping. For the period 1587 to 1609 Steensgaard shows that, so far as 48

Ginger remained the major item in the much reduced Levantine trade. The total Venetian intake in 1522 was 311,600 out of 745,900 1. s. — 42% of the total, as against 51% in 1496-98 (see Sanuto, vol. 32: 297, 438-39). Relatively stable ginger prices at Venice early in the sixteenth century (see Magalhaes-Godinho, pp. 719-20), when local supplies were low, suggest that European demand was being met from other markets. 49 Assuming that the pepper/spice ratio of the cargo of the " Grose " (59% to 65% pepper) is typical of Venice's Alexandria imports in 1560-64 (see Lane, * Mediterranean Spice Trade *, p. 583, note 8) the spice imports from Alexandria may tentatively be estimated at around 1.3 million 1. s. Imports from Syria were small. Total Marseilles imports may have been around 150,000 to 300,000 1. s. Portuguese imports of spices and associated goods may have been as much as 3.0 million 1. s. (since the average annual Portuguese pepper consignment was 18,800 quintals in 3.2 X 6Qfo-tonelada vessels with a total hold capacity of about 29,800 quintals, leaving space for 11,000 quintals of spices in the hold and about 7,400 quintals, i. e. 25% of hold capacity, outside the hold).

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as can be ascertained, pepper consignments averaged about 4,834 quintals per vessel.50 For 1547-48.the figure is 6,024.51 6,000 quintals was the notional norm in the 1580s, when, in theory, 30,000 quintals of pepper should have been dispatched to Lisbon in five vessels each year. 52 To estimate levels of imports we shall use a figure of 6,000 quintals per vessel for the 1540s, 5,872 for the 1550s and 1560s, and 5,000 to 5,353 for the 1570s and 1580s.53 On this basis the average annual consignment of pepper in the 1540s, and probably also in the 1530s, is estimated at around 24,000 quintals. Allowing for shrinkage, spoilage and losses, the Casa da India may have received around 22,000 quintals of pepper in marketable condition.54 Imports dropped considerably in the 1550s. In 1558 the annual consignments were reckoned at 26,423 quintals, 55 representing, theoretically, four and five ship's loadings of 5872 quintals in alternate years. A remarkably high proportion of this was lost to the Crown through spoilage, peculation, shipwreck and other misadventure. Out of 45 ships which set out from India between 1551 and 1560, as many as 12 to 14 were lost. 56 In the following decade losses at sea were 50

Steensgaard, pp. 164-65. Magalhaes-Godinho, p. 704. 52 Ibid.t pp. 680-81, 692-93. 53 5,000 is the average for 12 vessels in 1587-89, excluding one of the 1586 fleet carrying 2,586 quintals of pepper, which Kellenbenz has returning in 1589 and Steengsaard in 1587 (Magalhaes-Godinho, p. 705; Steensgaard, p. 166: H. KELLENBENZ, ' Autour de 1600: Le commerce du poivre des Fugger et le marche international du poivre ', Annales: Economies, scribe's, civilisations, vol. 11 (1956), p. 3). 5,353 is the average of the 1558 figure and 4,834, Steensgaard's average for 1587-1609. 54 On the basis that an average of four vessels, each carrying 6,000 quintals, reached Lisbon each year and that the spoilage rate was 7.5%, i. e. about the same as for 1587-98 (see note 58 below). Cf. the figures for Portuguese pepper consignments to Antwerp in F. EDLER DE ROOVER, * The Market for Spices in Antwerp. 1538-1544', in Revue beige de philologie et d'histoire, vol. 17 (1938), pp. 212-21. Consignments included 22,913 quintals in June 1538 and 14,000 in December 1539. These are probably near enough to the total annual consignment, though Edler de Roover's view is that they represent only about half the annual import. 55 Magalhaes-Godinho, pp. 635-37. 56 These and following shipping statistics are from data in Magalhaes-Godinho, p. 673. 51

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SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD

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The Changing Pattern of Europe's Pepper and Spice Imports, ca. 1400-1700

much reduced, but since the annual fleets were also reduced in size the number of vessels to reach Lisbon scarcely altered — an average of 3.2, as against 3.1 in the 1550s. In these decades Portugal may have received on average no more than about 17,100 quintals of pepper a year in good condition.57 Reforms in the organisation of the trade produced a substantial recovery in the 1570s and 1580s, when an average of 4.2 vessels a year arrived at Lisbon with around 19,500 to 20,800 quintals of pepper in good condition.58 Shipwreck again took a heavy toll in the following decade — 16 out of 39 vessels between 1591 and 1600 were lost — and the average annual import of marketable pepper dropped to around 9,300 quintals.59 What proportion of the European market do these imports represent? Lane has shown that there was a strong revival of the Levantine trade in mid-century.60 Steensgaard argues that the Levantine trade,'continued in full strength until after the Northern European nations made their appearance in the East. In his view European consumption of both pepper and spices rose considerably between 1500 and 1570 and the Levantine revival kept pace with this rise while Portugal's trade stagnated.61 Having estimated Portuguese pepper imports at roughly 2.0 million Ibs (about 20,000 quintals) in the 1570s and 1580s and 1.0 million Ibs (about 11,000 quintals) in the 1590s, Steensgaard suggests 57 See Magalhaes-Godinho, pp. 637, 706, for a contemporary under-estimate: 14,797 quintals, the residue of 26,423 quintals after deductions for 30% spoilage and the loss of one ship in five. Actual losses were 1.4 out of 4.5 ships (30%) and probably about 7.5% spoilage. 58 In this case assuming a spoilage of 7.23%, the average for 1587-98 (see the figures in Magalhaes-Godinho, p. 705). 59 This estimate is derived from figures in Magalhaes-Godinho, p. 705 (1591^99), and Steensgaard, p. 166 (1600), with a spoilage factor of 6.34% (the 1592-98 average). Cf also Steensgaard's slightly higher figures (pp. 163, 168) which make no allowance for spoilage. 6 LANE, ' Venetian Shipping ' and ' Mediterranean Spice Trade '. 61 Steensgaard, p. 154.

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that the total European market was around 5.0 million Ibs at this time and that the Levantine trade must have accounted for about 3.0 million Ibs in the 1570s and 1580s and 4.0 million Ibs in the 1590s.62 The figure of 5.0 million is, however, derived from contemporary estimates relating to the 1620s.63 To support the view that this was also the level of imports throughout the preceding half century Steensgaard cites contemporary references to quantities of pepper and spices reaching the Middle East — a Portuguese estimate of 40,000 to 50,000 quintals of pepper and spices coming into Jeddah each year, made in 1585, and references to 30,000 kantara and 40,000 quintals arriving in Cairo in 1593 and 1601 respectively.64 These figures, however, must be understood to relate to a trade which supplied the Muslim world as well as Europe, and the Muslim world first of all. They cannot be equated with imports into Europe. In so far as they suggest anything about the size of the Levantine trade to Europe it is to cast doubt on Steensgaard's estimate.65 Konrad Rott, holder of the * European contract' for Portuguese pepper in the years 1575-80, estimated the European market at 28,000 quintals. A later estimate, prepared for the Spanish king in 1611, put the total at no more than 30,000 quintals.66 These figures surely refer to Europe as a whole, for, as 62 Ibid., p. 163. 63 Ibid., pp. 155-56. 64 Ibid., pp. 163-64. If cantar forfori, the latter two estimates equal 2.82 and 3.76 million Ibs English. Cf the contemporary estimate of 40,000 Portuguese quintals (4.5 million Ibs) of pepper and spices reaching Alexandria ca 1560 (LANE, ' Mediterranean Spice Trade ', p. 585). Both Lane, ibid., pp. 583-86, and Kellenbenz, * Autour de 1600', p. 3, also imply that these quantities may be equated with imports into Europe. 65 The Datini papers give figures which Heers interprets as referring to a caravan reaching Alexandria from Tor shortly after 1400: 4800 pondi of pepper and 2844 pondi of spices — a total of about 5.7 million 1. s. at a time when Europe's imports from Alexandria were not more than about 2.5 million 1. s. (HEERS, ' II commercio ', p. 176. Cf. E. ASHTOR, Les mttaux predeux et la balance des payements du Proche-Orient a la basse tpoque, Paris 1971, p. 120, for the view that the figures relate to a Venetian galley voyage). 66 H. KELLENBENZ, ' Autour de 1600 ', pp. 7-8. The estimates provide a breakdown by countries. Their chief discrepancy is in the amounts shown for Italy (Rott: 6000;

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165

The Changing Pattern of Europe's Pepper and Spice Imports, ca. 1400-1700

Braudel demonstrates, Europe already formed a single unified market for the sale of pepper.67 The size of Portuguese consignments was set in a pattern of bureaucratic activity which was slow to change. In the 1550s the Portuguese Crown aimed to buy 27,240 quintals of pepper in India each year; in the 1580s the figures was 30,000 quintals.68 When allowance is made for a normal rate of losses, it appears that the Portuguese pursued a cautious policy of slightly under-supplying the market. The object was to maintain firm prices and ensure ease of sale for the Crown and its contractors. It was left to the Venetians and others to take the risk of filling in the margins with imports from the Levant. The Levantine trade ebbed and flowed with the changing fortunes of Portuguese enterprise. The Portuguese could always procure as much pepper in the East as they were ready to pay for, and they could generally count on their own imports taking precedence on the European market. More than anything else, it was the size of this importation, arriving usually between June and September,69 which influenced the scale of Levantine purchases by Venetians and others later in the year.70 It is clear from Magalaes-Godinho's study that the prime determinant of how much Portuguese pepper actually reached the European market from year to year was the efficiency of Portuguese shipping*. The Levantine trade accordingly flourished in periods of Por1611 report: 2000) and northern and central Europe (Rott: 12,000; 1611 report: 20,000). The likely explanation is that since Rott's figure for the latter explicitly refers to the section of the market supplied from the Netherlands, his estimate for italy should be taken to include re-exports to central Europe. Rott's figure also excludes the British Isles, included in the 1611 estimate for Germany * and the other northern countries'. 6

? BRAUDEL, The Mediterranean, vol. 1, pp. 547-48. * Magalhaes-Godinho, pp. 635-36, 652; KELLENBENZ, * Autour de 1600', p. 2. That 30,000 quintals was the limit of the market is implicit in Philip II's plan to centre the trade at Venice and in Venice's response to the plan. See Braudel, pp. 558-60. 6 ' Magalhaes-Godinho, p. 668. 70 For evidence of this in the years 1587-90 see Steensgaard, pp. 53-55. 6

385

166

SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD C. H. H. Wake

tuguese inefficiency and waned when the Portuguese were able to overcome their problems of organisation and transport. 71 In the early 1560s, when Portuguese pepper imports were down to around 17,100 quintals (2.9 million l.s.), the Venetians were importing as much as 2.0 million l.s. a year from Alexandria. 72 Europe's imports through Marseilles may have been about 300,000 to 500,000 l.s. in 1560 (as against Venice's 1.4 million l.s.) and 200,000 to 350,000 Is. in 1563 (as against Venice's 2.3 million l.s.) — an average of 250,000 to 420,000 l.s. for the two years.73 The sum of average imports of Venice and Marseilles for the years 1560 and 1563 and the twenty-year average for Portuguese imports comes to 4.9 to 5.17 million l.s., equivalent to 28,700 to 30,000 quintals, or 3.25 to 3.43 million Ibs, figures which should be compared with the figure for Portugal's purchases in the East (27,240 quintals) and Lane's tentative estimate of upwards of three million Ibs for the total European market. 74 The Venetian revival was cut short by the Cyprus war of 1570-73, which coincided with the recovery in the Portuguese trade. Marseilles for a time supplanted Venice as the major Mediterranean importer, but in the face of renewed Portuguese competition the Levantine trade rapidly declined. J. Billioud estimates 71

Cf, for example, Lach, pp. 127-31, for the contrary view that the Levantine trade revived because of a decline in Portuguese power in the East. 72 LANE, ' Venetian Shipping ', pp. 228-29, and ' Mediterranean Spice Trade', p. 581. The trade with Syria was then insignificant. See A. STELLA, ' La crisi economica veneziana della seconda meta del secolo XVI', Archivio veneto, series 5, vol. 58, no. 93 (1956), pp. 39-43. 73 J. Billioud estimates value of Marseilles pepper and spice imports in 1560 and 1563 at about 200,000 and 133,333 ecus respectively (in G. RAMBERT, ed., Histoire du commerce de Marseille, Paris 1949, vol. 3, p. 555). His statistics for imports in 1586 and 1589-92 show pepper comprising about 60% by value (64% by weight) and 74% by value (over 77% by weight), respectively, of the totals (ibid. pp. 448, 450). He estimates pepper was 66% by value of the total in 1571-77 (ibid. pp. 443, 446, 555). Compare the cargo of the " Crose ", in which pepper was 59% to 65% by weight (see note 49 above). Billioud gives prices equal to two livres of pepper to the icu in the 1540s, an average of 2.4 (range of 2.00 to 3.33) to the ecu in 1589-92, and about the same for the 1570s (ibid. pp. 440-41, 446-47, 450). 74 LANE, * Mediterranean Spice Trade ', p. 587, note 28.

386

SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD

167

The Changing Pattern of Europe's Pepper and Spice Imports, ca. 1400-1 JOG

Marseilles imports at around 1.0 million livres — 1.29 million l.s. — in the years 1571-77.75 The sum of estimates of Portuguese and Marseilles imports at this time comes to 27,500 quintals —just under Rott's figure for the total European market. Marseilles could hold so large a share of the Levantine trade only so long as the Italians were in difficulties. In the 1580s the traffic flowed back to Venice. Billioud's estimates suggest that Marseilles imports were around 550,000 to 920,000 Is. in 1583 and down to about 180,000 to 230,000 l.s. by 1589-92.76 By this time Portugal's trade had entered its final, irremediable period of decline. In 1591 the whole of the annual pepper consignment — some 34,459 quintals in five vessels — was lost eh route; in 1592-94 an average of only 6,700 quintals reached Lisbon in saleable condition.77 It was for this reason that such a keen interest was shown at Venice (and by the Fugger) in the state of the Egyptian market in 1592 and 1593.78 As Portugal's trade foundered in a welter of maritime disaster the Venetian trade enjoyed a revival which lasted through the first decade of the new century, and ended when the Dutch and English re-established the supremacy of the Cape route.79 The seventeenth century

Throughout the sixteenth century Portugal aimed to maintain a high price for pepper on the European market. Compe75

Billioud, in RAMBERT, Histoire du commerce, p. 446. The 1583 estimate is based on Billioud's figures in ecus (ibid. p. 443), assuming pepper comprised 60% to 65% by value and a price of 2.4 livres to the ecu. The 1589-92 estimate is from Billioud's figures in livres and ecus (ibid. pp. 444, 450), assuming pepper comprised 74% by value and a price of 2.4 livres to the ecu (see note 73 above). For the Marseilles trade see also R. GASCON, ' Un siecle du commerce des Apices a Lyon, fin XVe fin XVIe sitclcs', Annales, 15, 4 (1960), pp. 638-66. 77 Magalhaes-Godinho, p. 705; KELLENBENZ, ' Autour de 1600', p. 3. 78 See KELLENBENZ, * Autour de 1600', pp. 4-5. 79 Venetian imports were at least 905,184 1. s. in 1605 and reached 5.76 million 1. s. in 1606, according to STELLA, ' la crisi economica', p. 64. 76

387

168

SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD C. H. H. Wake

tition from the Levant was met by action in the East to diminish the flow of traffic and raise the cost of transport along the Indian Ocean and Red Sea sections of the Asian trade route which were vulnerable to Portuguese interference. It was not necessary for the Portuguese to undercut the Levantine market so long as supplies reaching Levant could be prevented from rising appreciably above the level of the requirements of the Muslim regions served by the major marts in Egypt and Syria. The effectiveness of the strategy adopted by the Portuguese had its limits, however; beyond a certain point the cost of raising their competitor's costs began to outweigh the benefits.80 The Portuguese reached the point of equilibrium in their contest with the Asian trade route in the second decade of the sixteenth century, when the Crown succeeded in raising the import price of pepper from 22 ducats to around 35-38 ducats a quintal. This set the rate for the rest of the century, not only for supplies reaching Europe through the Casa da India but also for the Levantine imports. The Portuguese could push the price higher only at the risk of losing their dominant position on the European market. (In real terms the price obtained by the Portuguese Crown declined in the period of monetary inflation, though the general trend of prices to consumers was upwards.) 81 Conversely, at any price much below the level of 35-38 ducats a quintal Levantine imports were no longer competitive. A hundred years after the Portuguese pioneered the Cape route the old fear of the Venetians that their trade would be ruined by cheaper imports was finally realised. The flood of pepper which poured into Europe in the early years of the seventeenth century caused both the import price and the price to consumers to fall. The Levantine trade was destroyed and the 80

See LANE, ' The Cost of Protection', in Venice and History, pp. 373-428. J. E. THOROLD ROGERS, A History of Agriculture and Prices in England, Oxford, 1866, vol. 3, pp. 521-22, vol. 5, p. 476. 81

388

SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD

169

The Changing Pattern of Europe's Pepper and Spice Imports, ca. 1400-1700

European market, now dominated from Amsterdam, expanded with a rush. The Portuguese import price of 36-38 ducats a quintal represented, in the early 1590s, about 1.00 gulden per pond Amsterdam (about 22d sterling per Ib English). At this time retail prices in Antwerp were around 1.50 to 1.70 gulden a pond (33d to 37d a Ib), and according to Thomas Mun the price in England was " seldom or never " less than 42d a Ib.82 When the Dutch and English began importing in large quantities the Amsterdam and London prices quickly fell below the Portuguese import price. Between 1609 and 1624 the annual average at Amsterdam stood at around 0.80 gulden a pond.83 In 1625-27 it dropped to 0.58 gulden. The importations of the English East India Company (EIC) in 1616 to 1618 sold for an average of 24y 2 d a Ib. In the 1620s the London price was around 18d.84 Between 1626 and 1648 the Amsterdam annual average was usually between 0.58 and 0.70 gulden a pond (12V2d to 15d a Ib). A new level of prices now ruled on the European market. In terms of silver prices this was approximately 30% to 40% below the import price maintained by the Portuguese in the preceding century. This was sufficient to end the Levantine trade of the Venetians and other Mediterranean importers. Equally significant was the drop in the price to consumers. In England the price on the domestic market fell from around 46d a Ib in the decade 1593-1602 to 28d in 1603-12.85 A similar decline is apparent in figures for retail prices in Bruges between 82 From data in C. VERLINDEN, ed., Dokumenten voor de Geschiedenis van Prijzen en Lonen in Vlaanden en Brabant (XVe-XVlIle eeuw), Bruges 1959, p. 333, and T. MUN, * A Discourse of Trade from England unto the East Indies', in J. R. McCuLLOCH, ed., Early English Tracts on Commerce, London 1856, reprinted Cambridge 1952, p. 35. « 3 This and following Dutch prices are from N. W. POSTHUMUS, Inquiry into the History of prices in Holland, vol. 1, Leiden 1946, pp. 174-75. «4 BAL KRISHNA, Commercial Relations between India and England (1601 to 1751), London 1924, p. 295; K. N. CHAUDHURI, The English East India Company. The Study of an Early Joint-Stock Company 1600-1640, London 1965, pp. 160-64. 85 Thorold Rogers, vol. 5, p. 476.

389

170

SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD C. H. H. Wake

1602-05 and 1609-1286 and in Pibram's series for Vienna in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.87 The fall in the price to consumers was accompanied by a dramatic surge in European consumption. As late as 1611 the market was judged to be no more than 30,000 quintals (3.4 million Ibs).88 By 1615 and through the following years the Dutch East India Company (VOC) was ordering 70,000 to 80,000 and as much as 100,000 Bantam bags of pepper a year from the East 89 — the equivalent of around 3.9 to 5.5 million pond (4.2 to 6.0 million Ibs).90 At the beginning of 1621 the VOC put the European market at around 20,000 bales (7.2 million Ibs).91 Portugal's imports were estimated at 4,000 bales (1.4 million Ibs) but were probably less — according to Magalhaes-Godinho approximately 9,000 quintals (1.0 million Ibs) in the period 1611-26.92 The EIC imported about 896,000 Ibs on average in the years 1615-21.93 If the Dutch achieved their annual order of around 80,000 bags the Europe's total import must have averaged at least 6.7 million Ibs at this time. Even if we have some reservations about the 86

Verlinden, p. 114. 87 Cited in Lach, p. 146. 88 KELLENBENZ, ' Autour dc 1600', pp. 7-8. »9 See H. T. COLENBRANDER, ed., Jan Pietersz. Coo//, Beschciden onitrent zijn bedrijf in Indie, vol. 4, s'-Gravenhage 1922, pp. 321-22, 333, 357, 368, and ' Aanwysinge en particuliere memorie van de gocderen, die, uyt Oost-Indie'n komcnde, hier te lande jaarlijcx konnen vertiert en verkoght werden ', in PIETER VAN DAM, Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Cotnpagnie, le Boek, deel II, ed. F. W. Stapel, 's-Gravenhage'1929, pp. 138-39. 90 Six Bantam bags of 60 pond gross made one bahar (' load ') of 360 pond Troy of Holland. Pepper was consigned in these bags or in bales of 360 pond gross which, allowing 7%% weight loss for drying on the voyage, weighed about 333 pond on arrival in Europe. On sale the bales had a nominal nett weight (allowing a total of 15% for Mosses', a conventional tare of 4 pond, and 2 pond.for good weight) of 300 pond. Between 1640 and 1690 the bale weighed a bahar of 480 pond on consignment, about 444 pond on arrival, and nominally 400 pond nett on sale. The figures used for comparison with Venetian and Portuguese imports are for gross weight on arrival. 91 See Van Dam, le Boek, deel II, p. 167, and COLENBRANDER, Coen, vol. 4, p. 482. Though stated to be 350 pond in Van Dam, the bale is here taken to be 360 pond on consignment and 333 pond on arrival (see note 90 above). 121,500

72,750

> 905 > 678,250

(1) (2) (3) W (5) (2)

l.s.

187 93

1391

1394

1395

p

p

1 nave

2 navi

1 nave

1 nave

1 nave

380 112 44

884 5 109

—

377 44

26 51 45

238 91

•1

—

some

67,750

91 68,250

> 66,690

495

280

329

> 122

371,250

208,000

246,750

> 86,190

some

6

>44 > 33,000

>96

>421 > 315,750

156

120

111,808

77,138

536

1,004

396,808

740,138

SOME GENOAN IMPORTS FROM BEIRUT (by bales and in l.s.) Year Vessels

(1) (2) (3) (16 > 4,800

1395

P

P

?

2 galleys

1 nave

2 navi

1 galley

p

85 162 9 some

p p p

600

>600 > 180,000

>173 > 51,975

57

122 255 215 >55 122

193

>647

60,000

> 210,225

122 108

28

>22

>600

>258

315

> 769

> 6,600

> 351,000

> 77,745

96,600

> 246,825

For the 1395 Beirut total sec pp. 103-4 above.

3 r*

f

ol'

S sr 5 4,570 ^ 3,050

2,726

1,716

§

sx»

4? s' 48,062

37,373

> 12,070 ^ 23,050

18,164

20,586

5* 1 $*

Sources: Sanuto, vol. 5: 132, and see col. 133, CA' MASSBR, ' Relazione', p. 17, Priuli, vol. 2, p. 305 (1503); Ca' Masser, p. 19 (1504); ibid. p. 20, Priuli, vol. 2, p. 389 (1505); Ca' Masser, p. 23, Sanuto, vol. 6: 373 (1506). The table follows Ca' Masser for pepper and ginger totals, Sanuto for other items. Cf. Priuli, vol. 2, pp. 423-24, 427; Sanuto, vol. 17: 191, vol. 18: 143 (1513. Two of the five vessels arrived early in 1514). The figure for Moluccan spices should possibly be emended to 4697. See Sanuto, vol. 17: 191; Sanuto, vol. 18: 409, as emended by Magalhaes-Godinho, p. 702 (1514); Sanuto, vol. 25: 594-95 (1518); vol. 27: 641 (1519); Magalhaes-Godinho, p. 703 (1523); Sanuto, vol. 42: 453-54 (1526). The figure for ginger is an estimate from one vessel; vol. 54: 131 (1530); vol. 55: 63 (1531).

I

GO

g 3

M

2 o HH

t*4*

I

6,000

I 00

8m > z o ^

g

3

H-k (X) U)

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9 The Portuguese Factory and Trade in Pepper in Malabar During the 16th Century Jan Kieniewicz A new phenomenon—the Portuguese factory—appeared on the Arabian sea coast at the beginning of the 16th century. Trade conducted by the factory was the chief medium of European influence on the economic life of the regions under the Portuguese colonial control. The Portuguese factories, like the Portuguese trade in Asia, were different in nature from other factories established in that time in territories colonized by Europeans. The aim of this paper is only to explore one field of their activity—the trade in pepper—and to identify the specific character of the factories in Malabar and their role in the 16th century trade in Asia. The 16th century was marked in Malabar by a rapid development of the cultivation of pepper. This was connected with the growing demand for pepper in India, China, Persia and the countries ruled by the Ottoman Empire. According to reliable estimates the production of pepper increased between about 1515 and 1607 by 200 to 275 per cent1. In all probability this increase started before 1515, the date mentioned by Pires and Barbosa, and probably before the 1. The assessment is based on the figures of Pires, The5uma Oriemale, HS IIs nos 89-90. London 1944, esp. p. 362: The Book ofDuarte Barbosa, HS Us, DOS 44, 49, London 1918, 1921 ; Relaziono delle Indie Orientali di V. Quirini (1506) apud Albert, Relaziono degli ambasciatori veneriani al senato ... vol. XV, p. 10; Relazione di Leonardo da Ca Masser alia serenissima Republica di Venezia sopra il commerch del Portoghesi nel India dopo la scopera del Capo di Buona Speranza 1499-1506 Archivo Stroico Italiano App. II, Firenze 1845, p. 32; D. Pacheco Pereira, Esmeraldo do Situ Orbis Hs IIs, no 79, London 1937, p. 168; a letter of Andrea Corsali to Lorenzo Medici, Cochin 17 IX 1517, apud Ramusio G. B., Navigaziono e viaggi, Venezia 1563, vol. 1, ISSvo and many other sources as well as letters published in Cartasdo Affonso de Albuquerque seguidas de documentos que as elucldam. Collecao de Monumentos ineditos para a hist oria das conquistas dos Portugueses em Africa Asia, America, I serie, ed. R. A. de Bulhao Pato, Lisboa 1884-1935, vol. I, p. 133, 409, III p. 258, VII p. ^75-76. For early 17th century there is a memoir of F. da Costa in Documentacao Ultramarlna Portuguesa, vol. Ill, p. 351 cf. J. G. da Silva, Aiguns elementos para a hlstoria do Comerch da India de Portugal existentes no Bibltoteca Nacional de Madrid, Lisboa 1951, p. 42. V. M. Godinho came to a diftV

186

SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD 62

JAN K1BNIBWICZ

Portuguese came there. But the question arises as to how did the Portuguese presence in Cochin, Cannanore, Quilon and other parts of Malabar help to increase the cultivation and export of pepper. There is also the problem as to how the consumption of pepper in Europe induced an increase in production. Research on the transport of pepper to Europe, both on the Levantine route and on board ships of the Carreira da India, shows that these quantities fluctuated in the course of the 16th century. Fluctuations are noted from year to year as well as over longer periods of time. The table below is illustrative of the situation with regard to the export both to Lisbon and via the Levant. TABLE P THE EXPORT OF PEPPER TO LISBON AND THE LEVANT (in millions of kg) Years

To Lisbon

Through the Levant

1501-03

0.4

1.1

1504-09

1.0 0.7

1514-22

1.2 0.8 1.6

1510-13

0.9

1523-36

0.78

1.0

1537-49

1.3

1.1

1550-56

1.0

1557-71

1.0 1.4 1.0 1.0 1.4

1572-S5

1.2 1.0

1586-90

0.9

1591-1600

0.7(»)

Total

1.5 2.2 1.5 2.5 1.8 2.4 2.0 2.6 2.0 1.9 2.1(*)

(•) Data include ships which did not reach Lisbon. rent conclusion in V Economic de V Empire Portugalse aux XVe et XVIe siecle V or et U poivrc, route de Guinee el route du Cap. Paris, 1958, (Unpublished), pp. 740, 748, 753. He ascertained the increase within bounds of 260% to 330%. These figures are due, in my opinion, to the underestimation of the range of pepper production at the beginning of the 16th century. I have discussed the problem at length in the first chapter of my book, "The Pepper Trade in the Indian Ocean and Portuguese expansion in the 16th Century" (in Polish), Warsaw. 2. The table comes from Chapter II of the woric quoted above in which I analyse data concerning the export of pepper to Europe. The data on the ten year periods •how a considerable uniformity of supplies to the European market, which contrasts

SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD

187

PORTUGUESE FACTORY AND TRADE IN PEPPER

63

Calculations show that the Portuguese shipped to Lisbon, around ISIS, more than 30 percent of the Malabar production. By the end of the century however the shipments accounted for only 3 to 4 per cent. It is worth stressing that pepper was supplied to Europe through the Levant not only from Malabar. Taking even this into consideration it must be stated that the share of Europe in the consumption of pepper produced in Asia decreased. The question is whether the role of the Portuguese factories in the export trade of Malabar also decreased. x

x

x

x

One of the main aims of Portugal was to seize control over Malabar's trade in pepper, and this task conditioned the policy of the first years of expansion. The growing export of pepper to Asian countries in the beginning of the century, and a general activization of exchange in the Indian Ocean created opportunities for getting rich for all those who managed to control shipping. The control over Asian trade which the Estado da India intended to seize was not only to be a source of income. This control was to assure advantageous conditions for the factories of the Estado da India, representing at least formally the interests of the king. This was especially important in the purchases of pepper to be shipped to Lisbon, in view of the fierce competition and an evident gap between supply and demand. It was the interest of the king to with big fluctuations of export from Asia to be seeo in Table I (the differentiation of exporting centres is impossible). This can be presented in the following manner: TABLE II Period 1501-10

Import to Europe mln kg.

Period

Import to Europe mln kg.

1551-60

2.2 2.4 2.0 2.0 1.9

1511-20

1.95 1.9-2.4

1561-70

1521-30

1.75

1571-80

1531-40

2.0 2.0

1581-90

1541-50

1591-1600

188

SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD 64

JAN KIBN1EWICZ

obtain cheap purchases of pepper on convenient terms for the Casa da India and at the same time to maintain a high level of prices in Europe8. The profit could be entirely used for the needs of the sovereign, which was not always possible in the case of other sources of income from Asia. Thus, not only the material circumstances but also the policy of the Casa da India contributed to a relative shortage of purchasing power at the disposal of the factories. Though in Malabar the factories appeared to transact business on advantageous terms, the reality was somewhat different. From the very beginning a wide use of military force was envisaged.4 It would seem that the Portuguese used force entirely or mainly to gain a position of advantage in the trade of the Indian Ocean. This was achieved by occupying Goa, Malacca and Or muz, and not by the actions of the corsairs. From the point of view of the Malabar factories this commercial domination had only one advantage: it helped secure the money needed for the purchase of pepper. The factory also needed force to assure supplies of pepper in required quantities. Thus, the participation in Asian trade was only a secondary factor. This means that the need for a wider trade arose from the needs of the factory, from the character of its activity. The use of force for the needs of the factories in Malabar could be applied in two directions. Military superiority could be extended on land or on sea5. The idea of political domination in Malabar was abandoned in a few years, as the undertaking proved too much for the resources of Portugal. There were also different ideas on 3. See J. G. da Silva, "L* appel aux capitaux etrangers et le processus de la formation du capital merchant au Portugal du XIVc au X Vile siede" in : Les Aspects internationaux de ia decouvene oceanicque aux XVe et XVle siecles. Actes du Ve collogue Internationale d' Historic Maritime, Paris 1966, p. 359, 361. J. Kieniewicz, "Droga morska do Indii i handel korzenny w latach 1498-1522** ("Sea Route to India and the Spice Trade in 1498-1522"), PrzegladHistorycznyLV, 4. Warsaw 1964, pp. 591-2, 599-2, 599-600. Cf. F. Edler de Roover, 'The Market for Spices in Antewerp 1538-1544," RfiPHfi XVII, 1938, passim. Cartas II, pp. 301, 317 4. Cf. Sanudo opinions I Diarii, IV p. 200 and a letter of Albuquerque to D. Manuel April I, 1512 in Cartas I, p. 40-41. 5. Albuquerque represented the first point of view, the other one was formulated in 1508 by Francisco de Almeida, cf. G. Correa, Lendas da India, Collecao de Monumentos, op. c//., Lisboa, 1862-1923, 1, pp. 906-7. Cf. also D. Fernandes's opinion on {his subject in a letter dated December 25, 1506, Cartas III, p. 211.

SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD PORTUGUESE FACTORY AND TRADE IN PEPPER

189 65

the form of domination on the sea. The factory at Cochin and the people connected with it were afraid of establishing a strong colony in Malabar, but they did not want the centre of government to be moved to the north to Goa, Thus, they tried to prove that the superiority of the fleet would assure the factory satisfactory conditions of existence. Albuquerque mapping out the material bases of the activities of the Estado da India also took into consideration the possibilities of the factories9 purchases. His opponents, however, laying stress on the development of the fleet, in practice abandoned the possibilities of implementing the tasks, which were mapped out by the policy of the Casa da India. This conflict was not only based on a struggle for power. There was a genuine colonial problem—whether the factory would in the future forward the economic purposes of the Estado da India, directed by Lisbon and Goa, or whether the Estado would be subordinated to the interests of the factory. Though the centre of the Estado was moved to Goa, the opponents of Albuquerque won. In this way the Estado da India became superior though it had been created to act as an organ to facilitate the activity of the factory. The victory of Albuquerque's opponents was expressed in the changed objectives of the Estado's policy and the eventual consensus between the mutually antagonistic groups6. Portugal's failure in her struggle with Calicut had a decisive influence on such an outcome of events. The existence of another centre, hostile to and independent of the Portuguese authority, was an advantage for merchants coming for pepper and made really impossible any monopoly by the factory over the export and purchase of pepper. As long as Calicut was independent, Portugal could not fully control the hinterland of Malabar and the roads which led to areas where pepper was cultivated. Of great importance was the fact that the competition with the Zamorin (Samudri Raja) and the fleets of the Kunjali (Kunhi Ali) consolidated contacts between the factory and the raja of Cochin. The alliance was in the interest of both sides, but the way it developed was not advantageous to the Casa da India. The Portuguese actually domi6. Documentacao para a historic* das missoes do padroado Portugues do Orlente, ed. A. da Silva Rego, Lisboa 1947, vol. I, p. 404.

190

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nated the policy of the raja, but in time the interests of the factory proved quite coincident with the economic and political interest of its ally. A first sign of cooperation and rapproachment was a negative attitude towards the establishment of the territorial bases of the Estado da India in Malabar and to the new policy towards Calicut initiated by Albuquerque. This policy was disadvantageous for those connected with the factory at Cochin, as it limited their independent moves and the possibilities of additional profits. The raja considered it a threat to independent political existence7. Hostility between the Portuguese and the Zamorin was advantageous for the raja of Cochin, as it increased traffic in the port. Cochin before the Portuguese expansion was a secondary centre. With their arrival emerged a chance to disorganize the trade of Calicut, and direct to Cochin at least some of the ships. The Portuguese did not introduce in Cochin any additional charges or customs. This was left to the raja, as were the duties charged for pepper brought to be weighed from inland areas. This could undoubtedly contribute to a rapproachment between the raja and the factory, on condition however that the activity of the Portuguese aimed against the Zamorin would enliven Cochin. This move proved very advantageous for the private trade of the Portuguese; it however deprived the king of profits from such an important port. Ships calling at Cochin avoided the severe control exercised at Goa and also the high customs charged there8. This fact established a strong link between the Portuguese from the factory and the raja. Another factor contributing to even closer ties was illegal export of pepper—illegal from the points of view of Lisbon as well as the Estado da India. The factory at Cochin had to cope throughout the entire 16th century with difficulties in purchasing pepper. This was partly because the increase in the production of pepper in response to the rapidly growing demand was rather slow and partly a result of fluctuations of the harvest. The main reason was however a constant shortage of purchasing power which caused difficulties in estab7. Cartas, III, pp. 39-40. 8. 'Tombode Estado da India," Subsidies para a historia da India Portuguese, p. 17.

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lishing trade contacts between the Portuguese and the local suppliers. Moreover, the Portuguese could not even offer any attractive goods (such as luxury fabrics) which were sought after in Malabar0. During the first years, before a clear pattern of the factory's participation in Asian trade was established, military force was used to make up for this weakness. It is characteristic that though the main obstacles in reaching the producers of pepper were merchants from Calicut (Mapilla and Pardeshis) the repressions were aimed mainly against the rulers. The Portuguese wanted to force the rulers to grant them a privileged position in trade10. This method failed in Calicut, but it does not mean that it failed altogether. On the contrary, it must be stated that this method served to compensate for the numerous inconveniences of those taking part in the expansion. In Cochin the Portuguese expected to make the factory a pepper delivery centre and established a monopoly with the aid of a dependent ruler. Cochin was certainly a good base for such undertakings; the idea failed however due to an inefficacious blockade. Furthermore, the Portuguese very soon found that the local rulers controlled neither the areas where pepper was cultivated nor the main inland routes. The elimination of the previous customers did not assure the newcomers advantageous terms of purchase. Thus the efforts of the factory in Cochin were directed already from the first decade to gain control over rulers of inland territories. Its plans concerning the imposition of a control over the producers of pepper were never carried out. More attention was paid to ideas concerning terrorist activities against rulers controlling the transport of pepper down the rivers. In the years after Albuquerque's death this was replaced by attempts to win the favour of allies and grant subsidies. The Portuguese also supported the expansion of the raja of Cochin in this direction. A major problem was to secure some form of control over the territories of Tekkum-

9. Barros, Asia I/IV/8 ; Ramusio, I, p. 120. With the passing of time, especially in the second half of the 16th century when the European price of silver went down* the export of cash from Lisbon increased. However, this accounted for only a small increase in the quantity of pepper purchase in the factories. 10. Ch. Rohr, Neue Quellen zur Zweite Indienfahrt Vasco da Gamas, Leipzig, 1939, pp. 18, 20. Cf. Algunx Documentos do Tore do Tombo, pp. 99-105; Barros. Da Asia I/1V/10.

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kur, Vadakurakur, Indappalli and Mangate" as the Portuguese were specially anxious to keep the rulers of Calicut from controlling those territories. The involvement of the Estado da India in control over shipping, and the impossibility of concluding the competition with the Zamorin by using military force made it difficult to concentrate all the deliveries of pepper from inland districts at the Cochin factory. This was very advantageous for the raja of Cochin who, exploiting his merchants, also took advantage of the difficulties of the Portuguese to influence other rulers of Malabar. Of importance for the factory in Malabar in the 16th century was the fact that the raja managed quite quickly to gain the position of a necessary intermediary between the merchants and the factory at Cochin as also between the suppliers of pepper and rulers of the inland territories. The force of the Estado da India assured the factory the cooperation of the raja and the merchants but was not big enough to guarantee a full control. Thus, in course of time, among the duties of the raja of Cochin was the safeguarding of riverboats—the fleet bringing pepper to be weighed at Cochin and the payment of subsidies to rulers and magnates of neighbouring territories11. This was for the raja of Cochin an additional reason for opposing any possibilities of rapproachment between the Portuguese and the Zamorin. Any agreement or even a peace treaty would enable the Portuguese to undertake more decisive steps to assume control over the routes of pepper deliveries. Plans connected with territorial penetration were of small importance for those handling the business of the factory, owing to their participation in the illegal export of pepper to the Red Sea ports. Their interest however grew when for some reasons the supplies of pepper to the coast were reduced 11. Canas, I, p. 329; II, p. 258. 12. The charges appeared when the attempt was given up to control the interior of Malabar. These charges were meant to induce the ruler to facilitate and encourage the export of pepper to Cochin ; the export bore, however, no proportion to the actual supply in Cochin : Botelho. Tombo do Estado da India, pp. 25-26; Documentacao Ultramariana Portuguesa II, p. 145, III, pp. 310, 312. Cf. Panikkar, Malabar and the Portuguese, Bombay, 1929, p. 167. This procedure was not effective. Besides the rulers of Mangatti and Vadakkumkar, the rajas of Porakkad, Diampar. Nambiyadiri of Parur, Karutta Tavali, Tekkumkutti of Canharapelin and Tekkumkur (Teque Cute) were also paid. As the import from Paliacare was considerably large its rulers received the bonus of 1 fanam for every bahar catered by merchants. Documentacao Ultramarina Portugesa III, p. 333.

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due to an increased export by land through the Ghat in the direction of Madura and Coimbatore. It is doubtless that the increasing freedom of activities and influence of the raja of Cochin in Malabar, as also his later territorial expansion, were not in the interest of the Estado da India and the policy of Lisbon. These developments were however made possible by the activities of the factory and people connected with it18.

The first and main task of the factory at Cochin was to gain allies to supply the Portuguese fleet with pepper. For many reasons the raja of Cochin was a suitable partner for the Portuguese. He was not strong enough to resist their demands and, threatened by the expansion of the Zamorin's power, inclined to accept the infringement of his sovereignty. The raja though aware of the risks involved in his policy, had no choice. The only thing was to take advantage of the weak points of his new allies. The successive rulers tried to make use of the growing tendencies within the factory to omit the regulations and restrictions issued by the Casa da India14. Unni Rama Varma and Unni Rama both followed this policy, though not in quite the same way.16 In 1505 the Portuguese managed to break the opposition of Cochin, but as a result of internal struggle, such people as A. Real, G. Pereira and L. Moreno influenced the government and activities of the factory, the form of which in later years changed only slightly. The loyalty of the raja to the factory, and the coincidence of their interests defended him well against the actual danger of subordinating his country to the interests of the Estado central authorities. The factory was often ready for concessions to the raja mainly owing to shortage of the funds for the purchase of pepper. The raja and his officials helped organise the purchases and facilitated the contacts with the suppliers. The latter however had enough 13. 14. others 15.

Ibid., pp. 313-15. D. Peres, Regimento das Casas das Indias e Mina, Coimbra 1947 and many published in Cart as, passim. Panikkar. op. eft., pp. 65,112.

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influence and money to maintain their independence and demand a reasonable price. Thus the raja was not only an intermediary and organizer but also granted credit to the factory. He was also a guarantor of loans granted to the factory by private persons16. The next task of the factory was to assure means for the purchase of pepper delivered at Cochin. Money was sent from Lisbon always in too small quantities, especially in the first decades, when the price of metal in Europe was still considerably high. Casa da India thus recommended the factories to buy pepper for goods, or at least with a big share of European goods.17 This however failed in Malabar, especially when the Portuguese established contacts with producers who arrived at Cochin. They always insisted upon payment in specified amounts of cash, and had no interest in European goods. Even if they were paid partly in copper they tried to get rid of it at once, by offering it to merchants for a lower price than the one which had been fixed by the factory.18 Another reason for the factory to seek ready means of payment in Asian trade was the rapidly increasing costs of maintaining the Estado da India.19 They exhausted increasingly greater portions of the resources sent from Europe and also of the profits from the activity in Asia. Such a state was the result of the economic weakness of the Portuguese expansion, of its feudal character. A lack of means made it impossible for Portugal to compete with the Asian merchants. The weaker the position of the Portuguese, the stronger had to be the force they used. The above mentioned reasons made a constant use of military force in Malabar a necessity. The same could be said about the control of shipping in the Arabian Sea. The indispensable support that the Estado da India had to provide for the factory tended to increase, and in my opinion the results were not proportionate to the effort. This was connected with the resistance of Calicut and the merchants interested in a free export of pepper. The increase was however most closely connected with 16. Cart as, III, p. 258 ; Documentacao Ultramarina Port aguesa III, pp. 319-21, 337-8 of Cartas III, p. 397. 17. Cartas III, pp. 202, 395 ; VI, p. 409 ; VII, p. 175 ; Godinho, op. cit., p. 805. 18. Cartas I, p. 325. 19. Cartas do Simao Botelho, Subsidies . ..op. cit., p. 13; Cartas III, pp. 381-2. Cf. Boxer, "The Portuguese in the East 1500-1800'* in Portugal and Brazil. An Introduction, ed. H. V. Livermore, Oxford, 1953, pp. 143-5.

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the character of the Estado da India itself. Though often contrasted with each other, both the factory and the Estado da India were products of the same community and served the same aims. A real aim of expansion was to assure income and employment for certain groups of the Portuguese community, in Cochin, Goa and Lisbon. The Portuguse kings differed in their views from those who were entrusted with responsible and very profitable posts in managing the Asian enterprise.20 A still different view was held by those who made money on the existence of the Estado da India but were not willing to pay. Quite different was the opinion of those numerous participants in the expansion who, according to the opinion of the authorities, were not to have a share in the profits. They rarely made big fortunes, but nevertheless concentrated their interest on their own fortunes, without any consideration for the interest of the far away metropolis. Thus sums coming from various sources to the Estado da India were not sufficient to cover the cost of the purchase of pepper, though the factory was expected not only to supply the fleet returning to Lisbon with pepper, and the officials there with a living, but also to hand over money to the treasury of the viceroy at Goa. In this situation the aims of the factory and the private interest of the participants in the expansion made the factory not only participants in the Asian trade but also give up the original aim of total control of the purchase and distribution of pepper. This created the necessity of cooperation with the raja of Cochin and dependence on Asian merchants.

The Portuguese, with their military strength brutally forcing their way into the Asian trade, were never welcome customers for Malabar pepper. However, for the merchants who procured pepper from the producers both in the inland and the coastal districts, the newcomers, though not rich, could increase the demand. This enlivening of trade was only illusory as no new markets were gained after the arrival of the Portuguese. From the point of view of the traditional exporters this was not advantageous, as the arrival of a 20. Cartas I, p. 278.

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new competitor for the existing pool of pepper export could only increase the procurement prices. This situation was welcomed by the producers but certainly was not intended by the Portuguese. The presence of the Portuguese did not have a special influence on the increase of the production of pepper, and they had to use force to get their share in the export.21 Competition in the European market did not influence to a big extent the relations between the factory and the merchants. In my opinion the struggle of the Portuguese with Arab merchants did not really concern deliveries to Europe. The Portuguese arrived in Malabar in a period of growing demand for pepper in Asia and the European market was already much less attractive than it used to be. The export to Lisbon limited to a certain extent the possibilities of delivery to the attractive markets of China, India and Persia. It did not however have a direct influence on the supply to Alexandria and the ports of Syria. The Portuguese export of pepper to Lisbon caused difficulties in supplies to all other outlets. Supplies to the Levant were considerably limited, not because of the Portuguese exports to Europe, but due to the fact that the countries of the Near and Middle East used for their own needs, most of the deliveries brought to the region of the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. This long lasting situation indicates a constantly increasing demand in Asia, which was also a cause of the lasting difficulties of the factory. Throughout the entire 16th century the quota of deliveries to Lisbon was constantly reduced when the crop was smaller or other purchasers had a bigger influence. This increase of demand for pepper in Asia, though disadvantageous for Portuguese interests, assured Lisbon a market for the product. If we accept the opinion that the arrival of the Portuguese had a decisive influence on the development of the cultivation of pepper in the earlier or later period, the causes of the reduction of the Levantine export should then be considered.22 In such a case the development of production would enable a considerably quick compensation of losses suffered by the traditional routes of 21. A letter of Petro Strozzi, December 20, 1510, Cart as VI, p. 409. 22. Yet it was oot so disastrous as it is frequently made out to be. The complaints of Priuli and Sanud's Chronicles are not confirmed by the correspondence of the merchants. The loss suffered by Venice was compensated mostly by the trade with Raguza, Ancooa, Marseilles, Barcelona and other cities.

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export to Europe. As a result of this, one should expect fierce competition, fall in prices, or a considerable increase in the consumption of pepper in Europe.28 Also, in Malabar the competition between the Portuguese and other exporters would have adopted a completely different form. There are no indications, however, of such developments. On the contrary, everything seems to prove that the Portuguese export of pepper to Lisbon was in such quantities mainly owing to a considerable increase in production. x

The pepper was supplied to be weighed at Cochin both by the producers themselves and merchants24. Among the producers were those who either came individually or implemented contracts concluded with merchants granting advances. It is difficult however to state anything about the proportion of the two groups in the 16th century. In my opinion the increase in demand for pepper did not facilitate control of merchant capital over production. This developed in Malabar only in the next century, a period as it seems not favourable for the growing of pepper. Still, at the end of the 18th century the group of independent tenants in north

23. There was no such fall in prices on the question of consumption see R. Fascon, "Un siecle du commerce des epices a Lyon. Fin XVe-fin XVIe, s.," AESC XV% 1960 ; Godinho V. M., "Le repli venetien et egyptien et la route du Cap 14961533, L'Eventail de 1'historie vivante". Hommage a L. Febvre, vol. Ill, Paris 1954 ; Horst W. A., "Antwerpen als specerijenmarkt" Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis, II, 1936; Luzzatto, Q., "La decadenza di Venezia dopp la scoperte geografiche nella tradizione e nelle realta," Archivio Veneto, Ve Serie, v. 54-5, Venezia, 1954; Romano R., Tenenti, A., Tucci, U., "Venise et la route du Cap 1499-1517", (copie doctylo); F. Edler de Hoover, "The market for spices in Antwerp 1538-44", RBPhH XVII, 1938 ; Sardella, R., "Nouvelles et speculatio a Venise au debut de XVIe, s". Cahiers de Annales no. 1; J. Gentil da Silva, Aabertura de uma rota para o Oriente pelo Cabo da Boa Esperanca nao arruinou Veneza, Lisboa, 1950 and Les Decouvertes Portugueses: raisons particulieres et problemes generaux, Actas IV, Lisboa 1961 : esp. pp. 488-9; Kieniewicz op. cit. 24. Merchants buying pepper passed from one garden to another to secure their supplies when the harvest came, Cart as. I, p. 330 ; Barros, Da Asia I/V/5, p. 198. Some of them were Muslim (Moplah), but there were also some Syrian Christians and Biabares (Vyabari Nayars)—Hindu merchants living at the foot of mountains. The Book of D. Barbosa II, pp. 3344, 56, 71 ; Brit. Museum, MSS Add 28461, pp. 57 v, 59 v ; Schurhammer G., Franz Xaver II, 1, p. 427; Barros, Da Asia, I/VI/4.

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Malabar was quite numerous". These independent, as a rule small scale, producers could give the Portuguese a chance to establish contacts with the hinterland, by-passing the merchants. But this did not work out. Probably the high prices demanded by those suppliers were not the only cause of the failure26. They were mainly independent producers, most of them it seems were of the Mapilla and Syrian Christian communities. The factory had lively contacts with them, especially till the 1520's27. These contacts were reduced when the producers consolidated their position. This contributed not only to fierce competition between the customers for pepper on the coast, but also to the constantly increasing export of pepper to Vijayanagar, Bijapur, Golconda, the territories of the Mughal empire. There was a land route not only to Bengal but also to the much farther regions of "great and lower Tartaria"28. In such a state of affairs, the acceptance of merchants as middlemen by the factory was unavoidable. This was impossible without the influence of the rulers available only if certain concessions were granted by the Portuguese to the raja who had to act as a mediator. However, a situation which fitted in with the aspirations of the rulers did not seem to be in the interest of the merchants and the factory29. At Cochin the process of taking over the tasks connected with the organization of the transport of pepper for Lisbon by the raja made very slow progress. 25. Buchanan F., A Journey from Madras through the Countries of Mysore, Canara and Malabar, London 1807, v, II, p. 455, 467, 523. Alaev is of a different opinion, Southern India, The Social and Economic History of XlVth-XVlllth c. (in Russian), Moscow 1964, p. 293. Barbosa's information (op. cit. II, p. 56) concerns most clearly the connections of the merchants with rich land owners and not with the farmers, who could be made dependent by advances. 26. Cartas III, p. 381 of I., pp. 126, 200 and VII, pp. 175-6. 27. Ibidem I, p. 133. II, p. 394. 28. Grunaeus, S., Novus orbis regionum ac insularum, Basileae 1555, p. 207 ; Barbosa, O Livro p. 302 ; Sassetti F., Lettere edite e inedite ..., Firenze 1855, p. 423; Pelsart apud Thevenet H., Relations de diverses voyages curieux,..., Paris 1696, v. I, p. 12 ; Moreland, India at the death of Akbar, London 1920, pp. 219-20 ; Cartas VII, p. 175; Documentacao Ultramarina PortuguesaW9pp. 315,350. The export was organised similarly to that by sea, i.e.. by the system of advances. Francisco da Costa wrote: "Esta pimenta se leva pera o sertao, e vem nestas meses quo digo boidas a leva la trazendo a troco aquelas cousa que na terra nao ha, como panos de vestir e arroz", Documentacao Ultramarina Portuguesa III, p. 350. 29. Barros, Da Asia, I/V/9 ; I/VII/3 ; Biker J., Colleccao de t rat ados e concertos de pazes que o Estado da India Portuguza fez ..., Lisboa 1881, v. I, p. 91 : Cartas II, pp. 200-3 :1, p. 85 : Ramusio C. B.. op. cit., I. p. 137 v.

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Merchants from Malabar, at least those within the influence of the factory, could not avoid selling pepper to the Portuguese. At Cochin there were generally a few agents supplying pepper for the factory. Among them were, as a rule, the Mapilla and later also Syrian Christians and the Khoja.30 In exchange they generally got several trade facilities. Among those cooperating with the factory were also new Christians, who were however, as a rule, retail merchants. These merchants dealt with advances to the producers, and the shipment of pepper to Cochin. They also organized the purchase of pepper already brought to be weighed at Cochin.81 The delivery of pepper at Cochin was no doubt a facility for the Protuguese, though it did not save them from problems connected with its purchase. Due to the troubles in the factory large quantities of pepper were stored by merchants and the raja, especially the latter, thus strengthening their position in competing with the European customers.82 This increased the financial dependence of the factory on its middlemen—the merchants. The merchants also rendered the factory other valuable services38—granted credits, exchanged money, and transported it, served as guarantors and what was most important lent aid in establishing contacts beyond the territories under the direct influence of the Estado da India. This was also connected with the necessity of selling goods brought from Europe, such as copper, quicksilver, alum, coral, as also spices from Malabar and Indonesia (cloves, nutmeg and mace). The Portuguese factories in a short time became accustomed to sell these goods in the ports of Gujarat. In exchange they bought local fabrics in demand in Malabar and necessary in the trade with Ethiopia, East 30. The Christians (such as Matyas of Kainkoilan and Bragaida Tequietome), though employed as caterers of spices for the factory much earlier, gained their importance only in the twenties. Cf. Cartas I, p. 58, III, pp. 30,41: Barros, Da Asia l/IX/4, p. 381; Ramusio, op. cit.t I. p. 137 v ; Panikkar op. c/r. pp. 100-1, 108. 31. In 1520 Nune de Castro wrote about seven or ten most important merchants working for the factory. He names Khoja Amapola, Abram Mapola Cunheviray and Matepula, all of them from Idappalli (Repolim), purveying about 3 thousand bahar of pepper. Ite Couna Nair played the name role in Cranganor, Cartas VII, p. 154. Till their leaving Cochin the main partners of the factory were the family of Marakkar, Cartas I, pp. 49, 320; II, p. 361; III, pp. 257, 401. 32. Laval, Pyrard, De voyage ..., Paris 1615,1, pp. 470. 33. Cartas V, p. 480 ; VI, no DCLXXXIIL These services could be expected only on the part of great merchants, who had a trade organization, capital and could grant credit. Cartas I, pp. 306-7 ; 1,273 ; III, p. 323. Ramusio op. cit.91, p. 136; Barros, Da Asia 1111X14.

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Africa and the Spice Islands.84 Trade with Gujarat aroused the interest of the Portuguese also, because of the quick and large profits it brought.16 Though the Protuguese settled in Diu, Daman and Bassein, and could rely on Chaul, the control imposed by the Portuguese over this trade was not strong enough to meet the competition of the merchants and goods brought ftom the West.86 Merchants from Gujarat were also dangerous competitors, as they took an active part in the export of pepper from Malabar.87 The aid of the Malabar merchants was thus absolute necessary to supply the factory with the badly needed cash. Owing to this the factory participated in Asian trade, the base of its existence, often under the name of Malabar merchants. In such a situation the factory had to agree to exchange between the North and the South. The extent of this trade and its significance for Malabar's food supply were so large that the factory could neither replace nor stop it. The aid of the merchants, especially the credits they granted, enabled the factory to carry on a more buoyant policy in purchases. If money received for goods brought from Europe was the only 34. The Suma Oriental of T. Pires, pp. 497-98, Carlos I, pp. 225, 300 ; V, p. 168 ; VII, pp. 41-2, Cartas do quitacao do Rei dom Manuel, ed. B Freire, Archivo Historico Portuguese DOS. 64, 166, 239, 256, 289, 300 ; Lembraca das cousas da India in: Subsidies, op. cit., passim ; A. Nunes, Livre des pesos ..., ibidem, p. 41. Cf. MeilinkRoelofsz M. A. P., Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and 1630. 'S-Gravenhage 1962, p. 12, 157 ff.; Van Leur, "On early Asian Trade" in : Indonesian Trade and society, Essays in Asian Social and Economic History, The Hague-Bandung 1955, pp. 127, 133 and "The World of Southeast Asia", ibidem pp. ill ; Raychaudhuri, T., Jan Company in Coromondel 1605-1690, *S. Gravenhage 1962, pp. 1-2. 35. Reaching 150% on the route Goa-Cambay-Goa. Cartas HI, p. 69, 99,195. Other directions, except the trade with China (300%), allowed the profit of about 100%, (Cambay-Aden, Malacca-Bengal and Coromandel) ; Trade between islands of the Indonesian Archipelago-brought about 30-50%, The Suma Oriental, pp. 507-8. 36. Cartas I, pp. 222, 224, 267, 272, 357 ; III, pp. 69, 84,258, 327. On the preference of ready money from Cambay see Cartas I, p. 180. Cf. Ibidem VII, p. 175 ; Corpo Diplomatico Portuguesa ... Relacoes com a curia romana, ed. Redbello da Silva, v. IX, p. 114; Gavetas de Torre do Tombo, III, p. 215 ; I. p. 776 (a letter of Manuel de Sousa for John HI, Goa, Oct. 18,1545). 37. Khoja Sofar of Surat played the leading role here in the forties. Gavetas do Torre do Tombo III, p. 215 ; Cartas de S. Botelho in Subsidio, op. cit., p. 2. The Portuguese had here their partners like Khoja Shansi ed-din (? Kanacadim ?), yet the price of their service was extremely high and the profit frequently doubtful. The demand for copper in North India is explained by its usage as currency too. The merchants from Gujarat were highly valued partners because of their developed methods of turnover and accounting. The Portuguese were quite primitive in this respect. See Ramusio, I, pp. 119, 162. The Suma Oriental, pp.317, 366-9 ; Pyrard de Laval, op. cit. II, pp. 187-9; Barbosa, Livro, p, 283.

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means of payment, the time needed to complete the transaction and purchase came to about a year and a half from the arrival of the fleet, and in course of time even longer. This is not however a proof of the failure of the above mentioned activities aimed at assuring the factory the supply of the ordered quantities of pepper. The Portuguese gained a chance of carrying out more effective trade operations by applying force and by a gradual grant of concessions. Reducing the threat of military force and securing the necessary cooperation with the merchants, the Portuguese undermined the bases of their presence in the East. Several factors, as we have seen, contributed to such a state of affairs; the most important of them seems to have been the absorption by the Estado of resources gained by the factories in the Asian trade. The needs of the Estado and the greed of the participants in the expansion were such that there were not enough means for the equipment of the fleet envisaged by the Casa da India (that is 1.5 million kg annually). Such a state was an absolute necessity, as the maintenance of the fleet, and investments in trade contributed to the consolidation of the already occupied positions. Even from the point of view of the trade in pepper, the maintenance of the river fleets for the security of transport, attacked by Corsairs, fortresses on the coast (Cranganore, Chaliyam) and in the hinterland (e.g. at Vadakkumkur), and the fleet for patrolling the coast were sheer necessities.38 In this situation it is not surprising that a big portion of the pepper handled by the factories went either legally or illegally to the Asian markets. This assured the factory cooperation and profits which would have been impossible if they only implemented duties mapped out by the king.89 The export of pepper to Lisbon was becoming a burden for the factory, a probable result of the system described above. To make 38. Cartas de S. Botelho, p. 38. Cf. his remarks on the expenses of Bstado in Tombo de Estado da India, and J. Aubin, Le Orcamento de Estado da India de A. de Arbeu, Studia IV. 39. The profit was quite clear to Albuquerque as he pointed out (on Nov. 4, 1510) that the factory was able to purchase more spices than could be absorbed by Portugual, Carlos I, p. 425. The main question was who would control this export and derive profit from it. Despite, however, the royal intention, it enriched mainly the factory's and Estado da India's administrative personnel. Cf. Cartas III, pp. 69: 72, 325, 349 : IV. p. 72.

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the purchase and shipments to Lisbon possible, a situation was created in which this originally primary task was becoming a secondary activity. In the course of time the primary aim of the factory receded into the background, just as changes took place in the relations between the factory and the Estado, and there was no longer any relationship between the quota of deliveries shipped to India and the quantities of pepper shipped to Lisbon. It is worth remembering that competition was a major factor in the pepper trade. The most dangerous competitors of the factory at Cochin were merchants coming from beyond Malabar. The Arabs coming from ports ranging from Cairo to Maghreb were always very active in pepper purchases. In the course of time, the most dangerous competitors proved to be Muslims from the north of India, Chaul, Surat, Dabul and other ports of Gujarat and Konkan. Their ships arrived in Malabar in July and August, that is before the arrival of the fleet from Lisbon and before the ships responsible for the blokcade of the coast left Goa.40 The export of pepper to the north was against the interest of the factory. The struggle to avoid this was however very difficult not only due to the resistance of the opponents and the corrupted officers of the Estado da India but also due to the factory's own policy. A detailed differentiation between the forms of competition and cooperation is not always possible. The armed intervention on the Arabian Sea and the compulsory use of safe conduct letters were means aimed at pursuading the merchants to cooperate. They were however not very effective ways of facing competition. It is worth stressing that the activity of the Portuguese aimed against the merchants of Northen India served two contradictory and at the same time closely connected aims—competition and cooperation. The situation was however different in the beginning of the expansion, when the main opponents were merchants exporting pepper to the Red Sea coast. The main task was then to deal a blow to the Zamorin through its alliance and crush the resistance of Calicut, and not to persuade the merchants to co40.

Cavetas do Torre do Tombo III, p. 215.

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operate.41 It is clear that actions undertaken against the merchan ts were connected with competition in purchasing pepper, but it was not the major issue. The Portuguese had to agree to exports independent of the factory for they were not able to stop them as long as they did not manage to subdue the coast. It is thus evident that both in the beginning of the century and also later, pepper was shipped by-passing Cochin and the Portuguese control. This was facilitated by an indentation of the coast and a well developed fleet of ships adapted to river and coastal shipping. This gave bigger ships the possibility of quick transshipments without entering river estuaries and bays. A common practice was trans-shipment during the night,42 Small ships sailed not only along the coast but also to Or muz and the Red Sea. As a rule they did not come from Calicut but from various small ports of Kerala and Kanara.48 The long survival of such shipping and export of pepper indicates in my opinion the ineffectivenes s of repressiveness in trade competition. It was however an effective way of persuading the merchants to accept the existence of factories in the Asian trade.44 To make the merchants cooperate with the factory was for the latter a mere necessity, connected with the factory's existence. The opponents and competitors of the factory came from 41. The Portuguese attacked the merchants for supporting Zamorin and pot because of their Red Sea navigation. They were of course Arabs coming primarily from Cairo, Jeddah and Aden, Barros, Da Asia, HIV 19 J/VJ/2, Boxer, "Portuguese in the East 1500-1800", Portugal and Brazil, An Introduction, Oxford 1953 passim. These interventions did not reduce the trade of Calicuit. The Muslims arrived with cash and Gujarat cloth in September, made purchases, built new ships and sailed away. The Portuguese threat still raised the profits of this enterprise, Cartas I, p. 126. For Arab navigation on the Arabian Sea, see Cartas I, pp. 95, 98-99 ; II, p. 397 ; HI, pp. 40, 50. 195, 335 ; Barros, Das Asia, I/VII/11 ; Cessi R., U Itinerario Indiana de F. Boccher del storiche Rtndiconti della classe di scienze morali e fildogiche dell academia Nazionale dei 1518, Linzei, Serie VIII, v. VI, Roma 1951, p. 240 ; Civico Museo Correr (Venezia) Me Dandolo, P. D. c. 975 ; Info rmazioni al senate et lettere del Console di Alessandria, de Damasco in Siria... 1508-11, a letter of June 13, 1509. 42. Cartas I, pp. 127-8 Comp. Ill, pp. 323, 325 and Gavetas HI, p. 212. 43. Civico Museo Correr, he. cit. Nov. 17, 1508 ; Archivio di State di Venezia, Cpnsoli Alessandria, f. 1, Jan. 11, 1554, May 15, 1555 ; June 12, 1555 (Letters of Tiepolo) and others. Tucci, U. Lettres d'un Marchand Venitien. Andrea Berengo 1553-56 Paris, 1957, p. 282; Lane J. C., "The Mediterranean Spice Trade." The AmHR SLV, 3 April 1940, p. 586 ; Braudel, P., La Mediteteraneen et le monde mediterraneen a Vepoque de Philippe //, Paris 1949, p. 433 gives information on pepper trade in the middle of the XVIth century. The role of smaller ports in the pepper export was considerable, Cartas I, o. 127 ; II, pp. 185, 361, 391 ; III, pp. 39-40; VII, p. 174; Barros, Da Asia \\I\I6. 44. Cartas I, pp. 40-41.

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the same group as its cooperators. The richer they were and the bigger was their business the more valuable was their assistance, and the more difficult was it to secure it. This caused the necessity of increasing pressure, covering increasing expenses and making more and more concessions. In this context the factory intended to regulate the activity of the merchants according to its own interests. The efforts made for the sake of cooperation and necessary concessions undermined however the attempts at domination. We are then dealing with a quite different situation. Groups of merchants from Cochin, Quilon, Cannanore and other localities cooperated with the factory to take advantage of its presence for their own interests. It was also important to reduce the danger of Portuguese military intervention in Malabar by creating connections between the newcomers and the existing set up. The position of the rich merchants was very advantageous, and they could always evade the Estado da India's sphere of influence. Thus, many merchants left Calicut in the first decade, moving to Vijayanagar, Aden and Ormuz. Also a group of merchants moved from Cochin to Calicut in 1524.46 Cooperation with the factory and the raja of Cochin was to assure the merchants better possibilities of evading the control the Portuguese tried to impose on the export of pepper from Malabar. To some extent cooperation was a necessity for both sides. The forms of this cooperation were shaped by the relations and needs of both sides. Relations between the factory and the merchants were facilitated by the passion for making money common among the Portuguese.46

The fidalgos going to India not only wanted high posts and promotion but also income from land granted to them and from plunder. Apart from that, all of them intended to make money on 45. Zanadim, To/hut al Mujahiden, Histora dos Portugueses no Malabar, ed. D. Lopes, Lisboa 1898, p. 52 ; Cartas I, p. 126 ; The Book ofD. Barbose II, p. 71. 46. Cartas I, pp. 45-6, 296 ; III, p 299; IV, p. 39 ; Barros, Da Asia I/VI/1 ; Couto D., O. Soldado pratico, Lisboa 1954, pp. 27-8, 38-9,49, 81, 84, 88, 101 ; Sansom G.B., The Western World and Japan, London 1950, p. 83 ; Boxer, op. cit. p. 212.

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trade.47 Everything was to serve this aim. Both senior and junior officers took into consideration trade which would bring big profits. Less attention was paid to the contraband trade to Lisbon than to the export of attractive goods from Europe, ostensibly a royal monopoly. Their lack of interest in trade with Europe made possible the establishment of the monopoly of the Casa da India. Private capital was invested in Asian trade, advantage was taken of the royal naos do trato granting people with important connections the right of free transport.48 Contacts with Asian merchants was established through the factory. For those private dealers these contacts were an important base of their activity. The fidalgos did not have much cash and were inclined to spend it on consumption. They therefore readily took advantage of local credit. Concessions granted to partners were a price paid for the possibility of a quick and easy profit. They granted these readily as the possible losses did not concern the private resources of the royal officers. In the course of time, the factory became first of all a shield for the private trade of the factors and the Estado do India's officers. A long time passed before the Portuguese private trade in Asia could do without the aid of the Estado. Even in Pegu and Bengal where the supremacy of Goa was not recognized in the 16th century, they took advantage of the protection of Goa. Wherever the influence of the Estado was not strong and possibilities of repressions small, the structure of private trade was different. The magnitude of the Portuguese private trade in the Malabar was even bigger because it took place de facto in the factory. Private trade in pepper was considered especially profitable, but bad to be done secretly as it was a royal privilege. This only speeded up the process of bringing nearer the interests of the officers of the factory and the merchants. Trade northward created complicated problems, but to 47. The problem was best described by D. Barbarigo in 1554: "Ma detti Portoghes volendole expedire con sui ayantagio de lisenza saputa del suo Re, le vendono a mori, le comportano che le navigheno per il mar Rosso, e questo precede perche li capitani ct soldati Portoghesi che custo discono quelle forteze ... sia poco tempo sone diventati mercanti", Poma C., // consolato veneto in Egitto ..., Bolletmo del ministerio degli affari esieri, Oct. 1897, n. 109, p. 24. 48. Cartas I, pp. 142-3, 160; Kammerer A., La Mer Rouge et VArabic dtpuis rantiquite. V. II, Les guerres du poivre, Les Portuguals dans I'Ocean Indien et la Mer Rouge au XVle s.9 Cairo 1935, p. 292. J, Gentil da Silva, Contratos da Trazida de drogas no Seculo XVL Lisboa 1949, p. 7, passim.

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Ormuz and Jeddah it was quite easy. Export in this direction bypassing the factory's warehouses was facilitated for the Portuguese by the merchants from Cochin and other ports. The purchases of pepper for this purpose were done not only using the system created by the factory and its suppliers but often ostensibly on behalf of the factory and by using the cash at its disposal.49 The factory, as already mentioned, exported considerable quantities of pepper to the Asian markets, especially to China and Gujarat. Even more shipments were sent belonging to private persons.50 They were sent direct to the Red Sea, and handled by the Asian merchants. The shipments were carried by local ships and the participation of people from the factory in the business assured them a considerable security during the voyage. It is no wonder that in such circumstances the blockade of the coast was a fiction. Apart from that, the blockade was really aimed against this shipping, and at weakening Calicut, especially in the second half of the century. It was the last attempt undertaken to secure Cochin, a monopoly for the export of pepper, and subjugating Calicut.51 The existing balance of power however made it impossible both for the factory and the Estado to conduct a different policy based on the superiority of the newcomers. The policy conducted by the factory in Cochin was the only possible and logical policy one could conduct in such conditions. This does not however change the fact that this policy was against the recommendations of the Casa da India and the interest of the monarch. The factory also played a role in organizing private trade which was important in connection with the increasing prices. The prices of pepper increased not only because of the increasing demand ; a rapid growth of the interest of the Portuguese in cotton fabrics from Gujarat increased their supply to the Malabar market, reduc49. Car/as I, pp. 268, 330, II, p. 75 ; Carlos do s. Betelhe, p. 16; Gavetas do Torre do Tombo III, p. 212 ; Archivio di State di Venezia, Coosolio Aless., f. 1, June 19, 1556. 50. Cartas I, pp. 154, 159.323, 329, 330 ; II, pp. 69-70 ; Corpo Diplomatic*) Portugues IX, p. 136; Strapling, The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs 1511-1574, Urbana 1942, p. 93. Export to China was the most attractive, but only for those occupy ing the highest positions. This did not at all concern the export to Ormuz. Cf. British Mos. Add. 28461, p. 227. 51. Canas I, p. 122, U, p. 112.

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ing their price, which had the effect of pushing up the price of pepper purchased in exchange for these fabrics.68 A similar effect was produced by the trade of the necomers from Europe. They tried to get rid of the goods they brought from Europe, selling them through the local dealers. As these were mostly brought illegally the newcomers really accepted relatively lower prices. Most often this resulted in a general fall in the prices of the goods brought, among them metals, and in turn, an increase in the price of pepper purchased for a long time, at least partly for copper.58

Thus the factory was absorbed and assimilated into the Asian trade. Consequently the destructive results of the factory's activity were considerably reduced ; it was transformed and adapted. This took place through the necessity for cooperation between the factory and the merchants. The illegal pepper trade was then a component part of the system created to assure the best conditions for those taking part in the expansion. The role of the factory in the pepper trade was rather small and its influence on the production of pepper only indirect. As in many other cases here also the Portuguese factory sponged on the local economy and trade. The increase in the volume of the trade in pepper in Asia, and possibly in the production of the commodity took place in the 16th century in spite of the European expansion, but not owing to it. The Estado gave the Malabar factories and the Portuguese an opportunity for exploitation ; the forms of this exploitation were in the course of time shaped by the factory's practices. It is evident that the factory developed within itself elements of self-destruction, from the first moment it "started to fall into pieces", i.e., departed from the norms set by the Estado and the Royal Government. Paradoxically enough, in this speficic sense, the only factory that ever existed was one that was falling into pieces. When the power 52. Cartas I, pp. 24,273. 53. Cartas I, p. 329.

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of the Estado became purely nominal, the role of the factory came to an end. The Portuguese merchants remained rich as a result of their century long activity, ready to start individual trade and face the competitors coming from Northern Europe.

10 Pepper Gardens and Market in Precolonial Malabar Jan Kieniewicz

Up to the end of the 18th century, pepper was exclusively grown in gardens. Malayali houses stood apart. They were surrounded with gardens, in which apart from coconut, the betel and areca palm, the jack tree, plane tree and mango, pepper vines were cultivated . The pimenteiras were planted around taller trees, so that they were able to wind themselves around1 their stems. As early as the 16th century, the presence of pepper vines could be observed in coastal areas, where sandy and salinated soils did not offer suitable conditions for pepper-growing. Neither in the 16th century, nor at any time in the following centuries did pepper-growing in the area have any commercial significance2. Pepper marketed in coastal areas was transported from inland regions. Pepper was an indispensable element of the malayali daily diet. It was predominantly grown by each household for its own consumption. At the same time, it could always be sold, no matter where it was grown. In fact, pepper seeds were treated as a currency3. This was closely related with the fact that in Malabar there existed a common need to purchase foodstuffs. Pepper-growing areas It is very difficult to point to definite areas where peppergrowing was concentrated in Malabar. It is known that the Europeans were for a considerable length of time satisfied with a vague statement that pepper originated from inland regions. It is beyond doubt that in the 16th century, specialized regions had already existed. In subsequent years, changes in location, size, organization or ownership relations did not cause the abandoning of the garden form of cultivation in favour of plantations. Therefore, I shall use the term "garden" to denote all forms of traditional growing in which the dissipation of slave or hired labour force was maintained. Plantations were formed as late as the 19th century. Essentially, pepper was a paramba crop, meaning situated on high ground. However, it required fine soil and sufficient irrigation. Therefore, it could be an alternative to some varieties of rice. On paddum ground, the growing of rice seems to have been more attractive, in a sense that pepper there yielded smaller crops anyway. Up to the 19th century, plots were alternately used for garden crops and rice-growing. Such changes, however, were not

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dramatic. There were enough potential growing areas at the foot of mountain ranges and it was always possible to import sufficient amounts of rice4. There were three areas, where gardens were geared to pepper-growing on a mass scale. The reason was not only rich and properly irrigated soil, but also proximity of transport routes. Between the 15th and 19th century, the greatest importance was that of lands in the central part of the country. The area was demarcated by the river Periyar to the north, a plane on lake Vembanad to the west and the Anchekoil river to the south. It is, however, difficult to determine how far into the eastern slopes of the Ghats pepper-growing was advanced. The felling of tropical forests and the planting of gardens on terraces was apparently the fundamental prospect for development all of the time, but the rate of this process is unknown. The proper "Pepper Kingdom" included the lands of Paliakar, Kotamangalam, Vadakkumkur and Tekkumkur 5 . The latter two, played a crucial role in the 16th century 8 . Another area of intensive pepper-growing was situated in the south, in the regions of Atingal and Peritaly. It is not clear whether it was already developed in the 16th century, or whether it was developed at some later date 7 . Finally, the third area existed in the north, in the Cherikkal and Kottayam regions. In the 16th century, it did not yet have any major significance, but in the next centuries, pepper-growfng there grew at a rapid pace8. However, until the 19th century, the crops there were less effective 9 . It also seems that forms of plantations appeared there at the earliest date, accompanied by modern growing methods. From deep inland areas, goods could only be transported to the coast by river. Prior to the 19th century proper roads existed in Malabar only locally. Overland transport was based on caravans of oxen and donkeys, as well as on porters. Transport along straight routes was made difficult by the existence of steep inclines, tropical forests, rivers and irrigation systems10. On the other hand, in the central region, there existed an extensive system of waterways, which enabled transports of pepper to be directed to various directions11. What was more, highly significant exports routes bound for the east led through a small number of mountain passes. The connection between the location of pepper-growing areas with transport conditions accounts for the reasons of a number of issues connected with the initial phase of the Portuguese expansion. Similarly to the Samorin of Calicut, they strove to secure control over supplies. It is interesting to note that the situation remained basically unchanged during the following centuries. It is still a matter of dispute whether pepper was grown on a large scale in the north of the country under the direct rule of the Samorin 1 ? At the time of the Mysorean invasion, its existence is well documented1? On the other hand, pepper sold in Calicut in the 16th century came primarily from the central region14. Turning to Cochin, the Portuguese had to try to block supplies and to direct them to their own factories. As it is known, they achieved only

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partial results15. The directions of mutual attacks in the early decades of the struggle clearly point to the fact that of particular significance to both sides was the control of waterways leading inland. The scope of production For a dozen initial years or so, the Portuguese were unable to learn much about pepper-growing figures. The only clues they had were the amounts of pepper offered for sale in ports. After some time, however, they gained the possibilities more precisely to investigate the matter, and thus they were able to estimate the scope of production. This notwithstanding, up to the 19th century, European sources of information were almost solely based on the amount of pepper offered for sale. This was connected with the lack of statistics concerning the production and reflected the state of the merchants knowledge. To them, the amounts of pepper that found their way to the ports were only real basis of calculation. Naturally, merchants were aware whether crops were good or bad18. This considerable differences in crops forced them to store large amounts of pepper17. The Europeans did not have any way of controlling producers. In fact, they had no reason to be interested in the actual amounts of pepper grown. Their fundamental problem was to acquire the means to purchase pepper. Having realized that pepper available for sale on the coast accounted only for a fraction of the total production, the Europeans tried to cause an increase in the volume of offer. These efforts do not seem to have succeeded. Considering that pepper is a condiment, one could equate the market offer with production. However, the growers' own consumption should also be taken into account. I once estimated it at half a million kilograms a year in the early 16th century18. The figure may be too low, but it seems that a large proportion of local consumption did not pass through the market. Twenty years ago, I accepted that pepper production in Malabar in the early 16th century was about four million kilograms a year. I am still of the same opinion, although V.M. Godinho and more recently K.S. Mathew, quoted other, lower figures1^ The matter is equally important for the analysis of internal relations in Malabar and for the understanding of the nature of the Portuguese expansion. Therefore, I deem it necessary to repeat my argumentation. Presenting- in 1504 a programme of acquiring pepper for factories, Alvaro Vaz clearly stated that once definite conditions had been fulfilled, 30 000 quintals, or one and a half million kilograms of pepper could be purchased in the area between Cochin and Quilon. The crucial point was the conditions: the control of river estuaries and a supply of money. Out of the total amount in Cochin alone and further to the north, 20 000 quintals or more could be purchased*? It is clear from the letter that the author meant the possibilities of purchases for the factory and not entire amount of supplies. During the whole century, Portuguese supplies

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to Lisbon only sporadically reached that level. Therefore, the total figure of pepper available for sale in Malabar should be set at a high level. However, it does not seem to be correct to think that the 12 000 quintals was the amount of pepper purchased in ports north of Cochin. Accepting such an interpretation, Mathew estimated the total production at about 2.6 million kilograms21. In effect, he concluded that over a period of two decades, a radical increase in pepper-growing took place. This however, does not seem to have been the case. To offer an interpretation, two further records are of particular significance. Tome Pires reported that between Chettuvay and Kaiankollam, up to 20 000 bahars or 3.5 million kilograms of Cochin weight could be collected This probably refers to the 1513-1515 period.22 It is astonishingly similar to reports by Nuno de Castro of 1520. He estimated that up to 20 000 bahars of pepper could be grown annually between VUinjam and Chettuvay. The actual annual crop is between 15 000 and 16 000 bahars.23 In both cases, pepper that could be purchased on the coast north of the Chettuvay, irrespective of its origins, was not taken into account? In the area, particularly large sales were conducted in Calicut. Trying to estimate the amount of pepper available for sale in the region, one should not avail himself of doubtful proportions approximately defined on the basis of Alvaro Vaz's statement. What is more, apparently independent data supplied by Tom6 Pires and Nuno de Castro refer to the same area. Therefore, one may not estimate additional data for the year 1520 alone2? V.M. Godinho accepted Pires' data, which on the whole seems correct. Could not one try to provide a more precise estimate? Only descriptive and indirect data are available. In a report from Lisbon in 1506, V. Quirini estimated pepper production in Vijayanagar at 30 000 to 35 000 cantars^l.S to 1.8 million kilograms). We encounter a fairly similar estimate of export capabilities in Ca' iMasser's report2? Duarte Pacheco Pereira assessed export to Lisbon possibilities at 40 000 quintals27. In 1513, Afonso de Albuquerque concluded a treaty with the Samorin guaranteeing the supplies of 10 000 bahars to Portuguese in Calicut every year2*. The pepper came primarily from the central region. Therefore, can one simply add quantities offer for sale by two competing centers that sought supplies in the same source? One is undoubtedly tempted to do so, especially when other estimates of Malabar exports are considered: Corsali in 1517, 50 000 quintals: dal Bocchier in 1518, 60 000 cantars, or 2.5 to 3 million kilograms. In the early 16th century, pepper was also bought from Cannanore and Quilon. At that time and in the following years, it was available for purchase in dozens of ports along the coast. It seemed to me that one could possibly verify the data on the basis of exports figures. An attempt to do so was presented in my doctoral thesis in 1966. I hereby give the reasoning without changes.30 "Let us assume that export from Cochin really amounted to 10 000 bahars, or half the total production (if we accept Pires

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assessment). Out of the total figure, 4 000 to 5 000 bahars were exported to Cambay and Coromandel 3 ? Let us assume a barely probable case, of exports of pepper from Cochin to Mecca and Ormuz constituting an insignificant margin, and pepper bound for Bengal reaching Coromandel ports overland. We would thus be left with exports to China, whose existence at the same time can hardly be doubted3? Coromandel ports could play the role of intermediaries, but direct exports existed as well, amounting perhaps to 5 000 or even 6 000 bahars. Let us assume that this hypothesis is true, and that half the exports passed through Cochin. If that should be the case, a mere 2 000 to 3 000 bahars, or 6 500 to 9 500 quintals would be left for the purposes of Portuguese trading-posts. To obtain the required 30 000 quintals which were planned to be exported to Lisbon, some 6 300 to 7 300 bahars of pepper would have to be bought in Quilon and Cannanore, in fact much more than the Portuguese actually purchased there at the time. Let us attempt to make a summary. From a global production of 20 000 bahars, a mere 3 000 bahars would be exported from Calicut, not enough even to cover exports to China. Such proportions of the scope of pepper exports from particular ports of Malabar are totally impossible to accept. If we alter the proportions in favour of Calicut, it appears that the purchasing of 30 000 quintals, or even smaller loads, was bound to encounter difficulties". "...The offer of Samorin of supplying 10 000 bahars to the Portuguese did not thus entail a substantial lessening of Cochin resources. Even if it is risky to sum up probable export capabilities of both ports, the assumption that their total exports exceeded 15 000 bahars seems very probable. Hence, the sums given by Pires could about 1515 define the amounts of pepper exported from the coast of Malabar, but not the entire production. To be able to imagine the scope of pepper-growing in that period, one would have to add those figures all overland exports from Malabar and local consumption. Under these conditions, it would be justifiable to estimate the level of production before 1515 at not less than 25 000 bahars". The increase of the volume of the offer does not run contrary to evidence of its substantial growth due to the development of pepper-growing destined for sale. The point is merely to show the internal limitations of Malabar's reaction to the new demand, and to correlate the process to the real impact of the Portuguese feitorias and fortresses. Accepting 4 million kilograms as a level from the beginning of the century, I allowed for growth to the range of 4.5 million kilograms in the second decade. Data quoted by Nuno de Castro seem to echo the same estimates upon which Pires drew his assumptions. Nevertheless, I am led to conclude that the early twenties witnessed a further steady growth of the offer. Whereas in the second decade feitorias seemed to have benefitted from that, in the following decades stagnation seemed to have set in. Any attempt to verify the data quoted by de Castro

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is based solely on conjecture. If the author put overland exports at 3 000 bahars 33 (about 0.5 million kilograms) and supplies to Cambay at the same level, by summing up Portuguese and "Arab" purchases, the requirements of Coromandel, Bengal, Pegu or China, we shall definitely exceed the quoted 15 000 to 16 000 bahars. Let us assume that exports passing through Coromandel, which served also other countries of the Bay of Bengal, were the same as to Gujarat and that China still consumes twice as much, while Portuguese purchases reach the planned level of 1.5 million kilograms. Considering scant data on exports to the Middle East, it should be remembered that Sumatran pepper was already gaining importance. Even the most conservative estimates show that this direction of exports matched the Cape route. Thus, with the exclusion of local consumption, we may put the Malabar offer at 5.5 million kilograms. The figure closely corresponds to Mathew's calculations, who based his assumptions on inaccurate premises. Our identical estimates do not prove much. The difference lies in the definite rate of growth. For the period between 1503 and 1513, I put the growth of the offer at 12.5 per cent whereas Mathew quotes a figure of 26.9 per cent. For the period up to 1520, corresponding figures are 12 and 63.5 per cent3* I failed to discover evidence of such a rapid reaction. On the contrary, a steady growth appears to be more probable. Anyway, it is impossible to imagine an annual growth rate of 1.5 per cent over a period of a century. Over the next couple of dozens of years, Portuguese purchases were subject to substantial fluctuations, while supplies to the European market were fairly stable. As a result, the participation of European consumption in Asian pepper production was on the way down3? Portuguese sources lack estimates of the Malabar offer of the period. All that was known was that it is changeable and there is no chance of calculating it. Difficulties in the implementation of the planned quota of purchases point to something more than a chronic lack of cash3? In my opinion, this is evidence of demand still outstripping supply. There is more evidence of the offer increasing irrespective of Portuguese activities. In 1584, 6 000 quintals of pepper (about 300 000 kilograms) were weighed in Cochin while caravans exported about 19 000 bahars or more than 3.5 million kilograms through the Ghats3? These exports apparently reflected difficulties encountered by maritime transport bound for Coromandel. Pepper carried by caravans was sold in all countries adjoining the Bay of Bengal and even in more remote areas. That is not to say that exports by sea had diminished There is ample evidence of the ease with which pepper by-passed Portuguese outposts. Authors explaining that their failures were due to overland transport slipping out of control, should not be treated as credible. After all, these exports concerned pepper from the central region, whereas increased growing apparently meant its popularization in the north of the country and in Kanarau

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The supposition that the growth of cultivation was steady, which means that the area used for pepper growing was expanding, is based on information given in a report by Francisco da Costa. His twenty five years of experience in Malabar leads one to accept his opinion, according to which every year about 100 000 bahars of pepper, or 258 000 quintals, were collected between Honavar and Travancore, whereas exports to Portugal stood at a meagre 20 000 to 30 000 quintals. The rest was carried overland and by sea into India, to Red Sea ports, through Coromandel ports to Bengal, Pegu and China. The figure calculated with the use of the old weight is almost 295 000 quintals or 15 million kilograms'3! Having accepted that in the beginning of the century, the data may have been underestimated for the lack of precise knowledge, and overestimated a hundred years later, to highlight the scale of decline, I accepted that over ninety to one hundred years, the Malabar offer increased between 200 and 275 per cent3? The former figure seems to be more probable in the light of the reasoning contained in the present study. However, if at the beginning of the century the increase of pepper-growing amounted to 1.5 per cent a year, it must have decreased further still. During the following century and a half, the purchases of pepper for European customers, became somewhat less burning. The Dutch and English in turn experienced similar and identical problems as the Portuguese had. Since only sporadic Dutch estimates from the 16th century are available, it is impossible to state whether pepper-growing remained on the level reached in previous periods, or whether it decreased. Between the mid-17th and mid18th century, export capabilities of Cochin seemed to be stable and averaged abcur 3 "million kilograms40. The expansion of pepper, growing in the 16th and early 17th centuries must have been connected with the spreading of gardens in areas, which had been previously regarded as unsuitable. In the traditional central region,- this was possible only on higher slopes, which apparently required higher outlays. In other regions of southern Malabar, land was necessary for the cultivation of rice and other plants that were not used for food, e.g. tobacco. I am thus unable to specify when and how the maximum capability was attained. It cannot be excluded, after all, that after a period of growth, recession set in, be it due to the impoverishment of the soil or because of labour shortages. Information from the late 18th century concerning the south and centre is scant, but it unequivocally shows that the scope of pepper-growing had diminished. Was the reason the introduction of a state purchasing monopoly in Travancore? Estimates concerning that particular state range from 2 to 3.25 million kilograms4! If that figure were to include Cochin exports, it would amount to 4 million kilograms 4 ? It is known that an uncontrolled export of pepper continued along overland trails. Its scope was differently assessed on the coast. As a result of these considerations, it seems

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that by the middle of the 18th century, the figure for the central and southern regions could be put at 3 to 4 million kilograms. Then, the situation appears to have deteriorated. Dutch and British reports estimated crops in the range of 2.5 million kilograms 4 ? The Dutch were of the opinion that oppression applied by Travancore rulers forced farmers to abandon their work. This was because they were unable to cover their expenses. In the central region, the situation may have been worsened by wars, destruction caused by fighting, the increase of financial burdens and the departure of farmers. One could venture a question whether the traditionally most important central region was at all able to react to changes of demand4* Comparing data from the early 16th century and late 18th century, one could conclude that no changes had occured. Information on 16th and 17th centuries overland exports would seem to belie this. Did therefore political unification and the restructuring of fiscal relations lead to a catastrophe? To what extent do European reports reflect frustration? In the middle of the 18th century, the European trade monopoly and the setting of prices were an illusion. However, did the existing market situation continue? In the north of Malabar, the situation in the 18th century only seemingly appeared to be clear. A relatively rich British documentation originated after 1792 in connection with plans of taxation. In the records, one may find both the traces of the past being idealized, and cases of real area under cultivation being lowered due to fiscal insecurity. It is beyond doubt that over the thirty years of Mysorean wars, a dramatic decline of pepper-growing occured in Malabar. It is, however, unclear what the scope had been prior to the wars. According to a well-known estimate of the Joint Commission of 1792, prior to 1764, 20 000 candies had been collected between Kavai and Chetua, which apparently equals 6 million kilograms4? The entire coast with Kanara would thus yield between 9 and 10 million kilograms, significantly less than da Costa had estimated 4 ? Information is also available from a very reliable source: Murdoch Brown-4? In his report to the East India Company of July 25, 1794, he used fairly vague words. Noting that exports from Malabar could amount to more or less 4 000 candies, he wrote: "It was reckoned that, between the Rivers of Cata and the Promontory of Mt Dilly there were exports of 22 000 candies of pepper, which, allowing for the difference in weight would make upwards of 25 000 candies English weight of 640 Ibs to each candy'14* The basic controversy revolves around the placement of an area where exports would originate. From the context, it seems that the rivers of Cata may be understood to mean the Chettuvay or Kotta. In any case, the assessment refers to northern Malabar, which was passing into the hands of the Company. Brown was strongly connected with the region and differenciated its exports with those of the lands of Travancore. Also R. Torin was of an opinion that

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the main pepper-growing centres lay between the rivers Kavai and Kotta 4 ? The term "export" does not explain much in this case. It is unclear, however, whether in his estimate, the author took account of overland exports. Last but not the least, it is not clear what manner of conversion was applied. In effect, all this would mean that Malabar exports in the middle of the 18th century could amount to 8 million kilograms. One should be led to ask v /-,ether Malabar pepper was locally grown or whether just like in the 16th century was brought in from the central region. The question is justifiable until the year 1744 that is until the introduction of a monopoly on pepper trading in Travancore5? Soon afterwards, the entire central region was covered by the monopoly. However, if things had turned out differently, the total production of Travancore, Cochin, Malabar and Kanara would amount to at least 12 million kilograms prior to 1766. Such prospects, however, seem not very probable. Firstly, despite the obvious flourishing of pepper-growing in northern Malabar, where little or no pepper was grown in the early 16th century, one may not eliminate the traditional routes of transport along the north-south axis. There is at present no reason to believe that the traditional centre of pepper-growing lost its capabilities. It seems that overland eastbound exports, originating mainly in the centre, must have solely availed itself of own production. In a nutshell, in the late 18th century, the best oriented observers were unable to possess precise data as to the scope of plantations, or even as to the origins of pepper available in ports of this oh that part of the coast. In this part of the country, the situation was only partially altered by the new political organization of the country in the late 18th century. The estimate given by Brown is at variance with opinions gathered by the Commission in 1792, but even lower estimates can be encountered (4 million kilograms for the 1764 to 1765 period)5! At play were also considerable variations in crops, which did not necessarily have to affect exports. Interests of people offered information also have to be taken into consideration. Local growers apparently preferred intentionally to present lower figures for periods before the wars, since they were aware of the fact that ways of taxing gardens were sought. Those who compiled estimates may have been interested in presenting as bleak a picture as possible, since this allowed for chances of fraud in future. Brown and those like him wished to maintain their positions and thus they may have been led to paint a too bright picture, and it is beyond doubt that Mysorean raids and rule caused a considerable decline of growing in the northern part of the country. According to a number of convergent opinions, in 1784, pepper production "the flood of doves to Macassar died away to a trickle and the Dutch monopoly was never seriously challenged again" was somewhat premature.50 Cloves were again reported to have been smuggled into Macassar in 1651 when a large number of Asian and other ships reportedly visited it. These had included five junks from Cambodia, an unspecified number of vessels from Borneo, Java and Bima besides two English and six Portuguese ships. Of the last-mentioned, two had come from Solor and one each from Macao, Manila, Bengal and Negapattinam. Since the quantity .of cloves available was rather modest, the vigorous competition amongst the buyers made the price go up to 300, 350 and even 400 reals per bahar.51 This, in turn, gave further boost to the smuggling efforts, and the following year as many as 200 bahars of cloves were reported to have been smuggled in.52 By offering textiles one-third cheaper, the ten Muslim ships that had travelled from Macassar to the Moluccas that year had also helped spoil the Company's textile market there, and the cloves had increasingly to be paid for in cash.53 Clearly, Macassar was again becoming a nuisance and Batavia even toyed with the idea of a military conquest of the place, though the time 49 50 51 52 53

GM, II, 10 December 1650, pp. 410-411. Bassett, "Amboyna Massacre", p. 12; Knaap, Kruidnagelen, p. 22. GM, H, 19 December 1651, p. 498. GM, H, 24 December 1652, p. 590. Ibid.

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was reported to be not yet ripe for that.54 In January 1652, by an agreement between the Company and the sultan of Ternate, the office of the kimelaha of Hoamoal was abolished and control over the sultan's territories in Ambon transferred to the governor of the Dutch fort at Victoria. It was also agreed that all clove trees in the territories of the erstwhile rebels would be extirpated. The resultant loss of revenue to the sultan was to be made up by the payment of an annual sum of money to him.55 Similar agreements were made with the two other sultanates in the northern Moluccas, Bacan in 1653 and Tidore in 1657.56 The cultivation of cloves was now confined to the islands of Ambon, Haraku, Saparua and Nusulaut.57 The problem of smuggling into Macassar, however, continued. In 1655, for example, the Company's Resident at Bantam reported that a good quantity of cloves had been brought there that year from Macassar with several ships.58 A treaty with Macassar in 1660 stipulated the expulsion of all foreign traders, but a small group of Portuguese traders remained there until its conquest by the Company.59 Though Cornelis Speelman had obtained the surrender of Macassar in November 1667, the war had been prolonged until 1669. It was only then that the chronic problem of smuggling came to a final end and the Dutch Company's monopoly of all Indonesian spices, except pepper, became an absolute one. There is no evidence to suggest that as of then, anybody other than the Dutch Company was engaged in the trade in cloves, nutmeg and mace from Southeast Asia to any other part of Asia. This conclusion finds support in the so-called Asian merchants' shipping-lists in the records of the Dutch Company. For the Bengal region, for example, where a fairly large number of these lists are available for the last quarter of the seventeenth and the early part of the eighteenth century, not a single ship arriving at either Hugli or Balasore from any of the Southeast Asian ports, is recorded as having carried any of the spices other than pepper.60

n Long before the Company had attained the position of a monopolist in spices in Asia and Europe, it had engaged in an extensive trade in spices not only between the two continents but also within Asia. Indeed, extensive and 54 55 56 57 58 5

?

60

Ibid., pp. 590-591. Knaap, Kruidnagelen, p. 23. Ibid. Ibid. GM, III, 24 December 1655, p. 43. Souza, The Survival of Empire, p. 111. Om Prakash, The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal, 1630-1720 (Princeton, 1985), p. 28, table 2.1.

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highly remunerative participation in intra-Asian trade was what had put the Dutch East India Company in a category by itself amongst all the European trading enterprises that operated in Asia between 1500 and 1800.1 have argued elsewhere that of the two key factors that had enabled the Dutch to create for themselves a niche in virtually each one of the important segments along the Great Arc of Asian trade stretching from Persia at one end to Japan at the other, one was the spice monopoly it had muscled its way into.61 The assured and extraordinarily inexpensive availability of spices had provided the Company with a stable and highly remunerative item of trade which was in good demand all over Asia. An average margin of profit running into several hundred percent was quite common; in particular cases, it could go up to as much as 4,000 percent.62 This was extremely useful when the critical component behind the ability to get into a particular branch of trade was the generation of a certain minimum amount of purchasing power locally by the sale of goods. The Company got into intra-Asian trade basically in an attempt to facilitate and enhance the procurement of spices for the European market. As already noted, the spice growers had traditionally been used to exchanging their wares for Indian textiles, rice and other necessities. The Company could have obtained the Indian textiles at Acheh and other places in the archipelago, but its acute business instinct drove it to their source, the Coromandel coast, where a factory was established at Petapuli in 1606, and Gujarat, where regular trade was started around 1618 at the port of Surat. Soon one link led to another and before very long, the Dutch had become major participants in intra-Asian trade. Throughout the seventeenth century, the trade in spices was a major constituent of the Company's intra-Asian trade. Indeed, such was the importance the Company attached to the Asian market that the spice requirements of this market always took precedence over those of Holland.63 By far the most important of the Asian consuming markets for spices was the Indian sub-continent, which throughout accounted for the bulk of the total sales in Asia. Within the sub-continent, the most important outlet the Company had was the factory at Surat which was the chief factory of the re61 6

^

63

The other key element in this regard was the exclusive access to the crucial Japan trade during the Sakoku era. Note that the average gross profit on cloves, nutmeg and mace sold by the Company in Bengal during the 1670s-1680s and again in the 1710s was respectively as follows: cloves 837 and 1,306 percent nutmeg 1,940 and 4,289 percent mace 694 and 1,214 percent (Om Prakash, The Dutch East India Company, pp. 157-158). See, for example, GM, 1,9 December 1637, p. 613; 31 December 1649, p. 371.

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gion comprising Gujarat as well as upper India. This was followed by sales on the Coromandel coast, Bengal and the Malabar coast respectively.64 In 1623, the director of the Company's factories in Gujarat, Pieter van den Broecke, wrote to Batavia that in his opinion, a large enough quantity of spices could be sold in India, Persia and Arabia to generate sufficient purchasing power to finance the procurement of the export cargo in the region for both Europe as well as the rest of Asia.65 While at the level of the Indian sub-continent as a whole, this goal proved quite unattainable, it is remarkable that in the region Van den Broecke was writing from, namely Gujarat, the dream of financing the procurement of export goods exclusively from the sale proceeds of spices and, to a smaller extent, of other goods such as copper was indeed realized from about the 1660s on. In fact, from this time on, not only did the factories in Gujarat not need any precious metals from Holland or Batavia, they even provided considerable amounts of cash for use in other Indian factories, such as Bengal.66 The shift from the "bullion for goods" to the "goods for goods" and eventually to the "goods for goods and cash" model in the case of Gujarat was unique in the whole of Asia.67 This was made possible mainly by the large sale of Indonesian spices together with copper in the region. The relatively large size of the spice market encountered by the Company in Gujarat was partly related to the fact that the large North Indian market was supplied from this region. The Company's factory at Agra, which was under the administrative control of the Gujarat chief fac64

65

™

67

Comparative information on the relative position of the four Indian outlets of the Company is available for the years 1714-1715 to 1716-1717. The percentage share of the Gujarat, Coromandel, Bengal and the Malabar coast factories in the total sales over these three years was as follows: Gujarat Coromandel Bengal Malabar cloves 58.05 30.44 9.28 2.21 nutmeg 46.92 42.84 7.32 2.90 mace 22.54 55.93 5.13 16.38 (Om Prakash, The Dutch East India Company, p. 159, note 55). Om Prakash, The Dutch Factories in India, p. 285. The funds were ordinarily routed via Batavia, but there were cases when the amount was remitted directly from Surat to the relevant factory. Sometimes, the services of Indian merchants and money-dealers were also used for the purpose. In 1659, for example, a sum of /. 120,000 was sent from Surat to Hugli with the ship of a Muslim merchant-cunvmoney-dealer of Bengal (GM, III, 16 December 1659, p. 273). The quantitative profile of the Dutch establishments in Gujarat with reference to the total Dutch imports into and exports from the region, including the silver rupees made available for investment in Dutch factories elsewhere in India, particularly in Bengal, will be found in V. B. Gupta's forthcoming Delhi School of Economics, Delhi University Ph.D. dissertation, entitled The Dutch East India Company in the Trade of Gujarat, 1660-1700.

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tory at Surat, with its concentration of the Mughal court and the aristocracy, was a major outlet for the spices. Being a luxury consumption good, one would ordinarily expect the price elasticity of demand in respect of spices to have been reasonably high. But in fact the demand for spices in India was inelastic over a very broad price range. The reason evidently was that while the rich Muslim aristocracy with its fondness for spiced food, as well as other well-off sections were willing to pay extremely high prices for the coveted spices, most other sections of the community found them beyond their reach even if there was to be a sharp decline in the price. Initially, this was something the directors found hard to believe. As we noted above, given the extraordinarily cheap procurement price of spices, the profit margin was very good and the directors were not at all averse to a reduction in price in the interest of promoting sales and generating a larger purchasing power. In their desperation to increase sales, they even put forth the argument that a reduction in price should at least promote the sale of spices for medicinal use! In course of time, however, the directors accepted the special nature of the demand for spices in India. There were other complicating circumstances as well. The Company was concerned that the Asian prices of the spices should not be allowed to fall to a level that would make it worth their while for the English and others to buy spices in India or elsewhere in Asia and take them to Europe, thus compromising the crucial European monopoly of the Company. This was by no means ah imaginary fear and there were cases of this actually happening.68 Taking all these facts into account in conjunction with the monopoly position of the Company, the natural thing for the Company to do was to keep the sale prices in India pegged at a high level and maximize the monopoly revenue. But as we shall see presently, the identification of the optimal price for each of the major spices was not an easy matter at all. The suspicious conduct of the factors of the Company at the Surat factory did not help matters either. As we noted earlier, the first Indian establishments of the Company were on the Corbmandel coast, and that is where the sale of spices began. The Surat market was at this time supplied from Masulipatnam, but already in 1618 even before a regular factory was established there, Coen was contemplating on concentrating the Indian spice sales at Surat.69 In 1619, the price of cloves and nutmeg in Surat was reported to be higher than even in 68

69

In 1680, for example, several English captains had bought spices sold by the Dutch at Surat. They were reported to have sold them in England at a profit of more than 100 percent. The English Directors advised their factors at Hugli to follow aj similar course of action (English Court of Directors to factors in Hugli, 30.12.1681, Letter Book 6, p. 437). Also see Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic Trade, pp. 104-108. Om Prakash, The Dutch Factories in India, pp. 52, 75.

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Amsterdam.70 The Company also began sending spices to Agra around this time. The position was quite satisfactory on the Coromandel coast as well. The factors there estimated that on an average, they could expect to sell annually 70 to 80 bahars of cloves, 100 bahars of nutmeg and 50 bahars of mace.71 The lot of spices worth /. 40,000 sent there in 1622 had afforded a net profit of /. 180,000.72 This was notwithstanding the fact that the price in Coromandel was usually substantially lower than in North India. Early in 1627, Francisco Pelsaert wrote that the Coromandel price of cloves was only /. 1.80 per pond against the price of/. 3.84 at Agra.73 This encouraged a large scale overland trade between the two regions which, in turn, threatened to spoil the Agra market. In 1628, at the suggestion of the Agra factors, Batavia agreed to increase the share of Surat/Agra in the spice shipments to India at the cost of that of the Coromandel coast.74 In view of Shahjahan's campaign against Ahmadnagar, the routes from the Deccan had also become rather unsafe at this time. The result was a spectacular rise in the Agra price from /. 3.00 in 1627 to /. 6.60 per pond in 1630.75 It was pointed out earlier that the 1630s witnessed a significant increase in the volume of cloves procured at Macassar by the English, the Danes as well as by the Asian merchants. The result was a pressure on spice prices both in Europe as well as in Asia. The Surat price of cloves, for example, came down from /. 4.76 in 1630 to /. 3.07 in 1633 and further to /. 2.35 per pond in 1635.76 The Coromandel price around this time was only/. 1.50 per pond.77 The response of the Company was to try and compete the rivals out of the market by a further marked reduction in price, usually referred to as the strategy of dumping. As a result, the Surat price was brought down in 1636 to an unprecedentedly low level of /. 1.22 per pond.78 The following year, of the total of 269,000 ponds of cloves sent to the various Asian factories, Batavia sent as much as 167,000 ponds or 62 percent to India.79 The Company's strategy might very well have worked but for the collusion between the Company's servants at Surat and a few leading merchants of the city. Evidently in return for a consideration, the factors confined the sale of the cheap cloves to a very small number of merchants, at whose request 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79

Ibid., p. 129. T. Raychaudhuri, Jan Company in Coromandel (The Hague, 1962), p. 193. Om Prakash, The Dutch Factories in India, p. 260. Van Santen, De VOC in Gujarat, p. 44. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 44, 217. Ibid., p. 217. Raychaudhuri, Jan Company in Coromandel, p. 194. Van Santen, De VOC in Gujarat, pp. 44-45, 217. GM, 1,9 December 1637, p. 613.

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the price was not publicly disclosed. In the few dases where information regarding both the wholesale price paid by these merchants as well as the price at which they retailed the cloves is available, the margin of profit earned by them is uniformly high and probably considerably in excess of the usual. In 1637, this figure was 46 percent in Surat and 150 percent in Agra, though from the latter the cost of transportation to Agra would have to be deducted. In 1648, the Surat figure was reported to be between 49 and 57 percent and in 1649, 34 percent.80 A leading member of this small group of merchants, the wealthy Virji Vohra, had even offered in 1646 to buy up the quantity of cloves the Company had intended to send to Persia. The proposal fell through only because the governor-general refused permission.81 It was only in the second half of the seventeenth century, and particularly from the 1660s on when the Company had finally managed to control the problem of smuggling, that the price of cloves recovered both at Surat and on the Coromandel coast.82 The increasingly strong position of the Company in the spice market, as also the desire to ensure that the European monopoly was not compromised by unusually low sale prices in Asia, were both reflected in the announcement by the directors in 1653 of minimum sale prices for each of the major spices for Asia. These were /. 2.40 per pond for cloves,/. 1.65 for the whole kernels of nutmeg called noten and/. 1.20 for the broken variety called rompen, and /. 3.50 per pond for mace.83 The actual sale price in any given Asian factory could, of course, exceed these figures. From 1654 on, the Surat price of cloves was only marginally in excess of the prescribed minimum, except in particularly good years such as 1658 when it touched /. 3.65 per pond.84 In the early 1660s, the Amsterdam price was /. 4.85 per pond and the directors believed that if they could fetch anywhere between /. 3.50 and/. 4.00 per pond in India, it would be relatively more profitable to sell in India.85 The Surat market did better than that and the price was reported to have gone up to /. 4.18 per pond in 1663.86 The sale of cloves at Surat picked up considerably in the 1670s and the 1680s. Thus, against an annual average of 46,000 ponds during the 1660s, the figure went up to 75,000 ponds in the 1670s, and further to 85,000 ponds in 80 81 82 83 84 85 86

Van Santen, De VOC in Gujarat, p. 45. Ibid., p. 46. Ibidv pp. 217-218; GM, III, 21 December 1663, p. 459; Raychaudhuri, Jan Company in Coromandel, p. 194. Pieter van Dam, Beschryvinge van de Oost-Indische Compagnie, ed. by F. W. Stapel, Book II, Part 3 (The Hague, 1939), pp. 118-125. Van Santen, De VOC in Gujarat, pp. 217-219. Van Dam, Beschryvinge, 11.3, p. 118. GM, III, 21 December 1663, p. 459.

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the 1680s.87 The directors believed that an increase in the minimum Asian price would not have an adverse effect on the total amount sold. In 1687, therefore, these prices were revised upward to /. 4.35 per pond for cloves, /. 2.50 for the rompen variety of nutmeg, and /. 4.75 per pond for mace.88 These prices were only marginally lower than the prices in Europe. At Surat, things proceeded relatively smoothly until 1692, when the average sale of cloves was reported to have fallen to an unprecedentedly low level of 12,687 ponds.®* On enquiry, it was established that this was not because the effect of the minimum prices had now begun to be felt, but because Pieter van Helsdingen - one of the two acting directors of the Dutch factory at Surat - had rejected offers of prices higher than the minimum.90 It was pointed out that the factory could have sold 96,500 ponds of cloves at /. 4.50 and made a profit of /. 420,000.91 Van Helsdingen was dismissed from the service of the Company, and the Surat factors instructed to sell at /. 4.35 per pond.92 A new set of minimum prices was announced by Batavia in 1696. The price of cloves was maintained at the 1687 level, but those of the other spices were increased.93 In the meantime, Van Helsdingen had succeeded in convincing the directors that the 1687 prices were far too low, and that the sales would not suffer if the minimum prices for Asia were further revised upward. Yet another set of minimum prices was, therefore, announced by the directors in 1697.94 The new price of doves was /. 5.00 per pond, which was about 6.7 percent higher than the European price.95 It also happened to be considerably higher than the current market price in a number of Asian factories, with the result that the total sales dropped for a while. In Bengal, 87

88 89 90

91 9

2

93

94

95

Van Dam, Beschryvinge, II.3, Appendix He "Nagelen, in 28 jaren in Suratte ter quantiteyt en pryse als volght verkoft", p. 131; Van Santen, De VOC in Gujarat, pp. 47, 217219. Van Dam, Beschryvinge, II.3, p. 125. Ibid., pp. 120,123. In addition to providing a great deal of qualitative and quantitative information on the Company's spice trade at Surat, Pieter van Dam also discusses the Van Helsdingen affair in great detail in five appendices running into 71 pages (Van Dam, Beschryvinge, II.3, Appendices Xlla - Xlld, pp. 133-203). Van Dam, Beschryvinge, 11.3, p. 121. Ibid. The new prices were /. 4.35 per pond for cloves, /. 3.00 for the noten variety and /. 2.75 per pond for the rompen variety of nutmeg, and /. 6.00 per pond for mace (Van Dam, Beschryvinge, 11.3, p. 125). ARA, Hugli to Batavia, 19.9.1697, K.A. 1484, f. 94; Batavia to Hugh (secret letter) 23.4.1699, K.A. 836, ff. 212-213; Van Dam, Beschryvinge, II.3, p. 125). The new price of the noten variety of nutmeg was /. 3.60 and of the rompen variety/. 3.40 per pond. Mace was henceforth to be sold at the extraordinarily high minimum price of /.8.00 per pond (Van Dam, Beschryvinge, 11.3, p. 125).

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while. In Bengal, for example, in view of the ban on the Dutch trade during 1693-94 occasioned by the European piracies on Indian ships, followed by the rebellion of Zamindar Sobha Singh that lasted until 1697, the sale and prices of spices in the region had been particularly low during the few years preceding the price revision of 1697.96 The new minimum prices were, therefore, found to be too high and the Hugli factors wrote to Batavia asking for their permission to ignore them. Although the Batavia Council acceded to this request with respect to cloves, it did not do so for nutmeg and mace where the differential between the current Hugli prices and the new Asian minimum prices was very large. As a result, the Bengal factors found themselves unable to sell either of these two spices.97 As for Surat, by their secret letter of 12 August 1698, the Batavia Council had authorized the factors there to sell cloves, if necessary, at a price lower than the 1697 minimum but not lower than the 1687 minimum of /. 4.35 per pond.98 In March 1701, Director van Zwardecroon wrote to Batavia that they had not been able to sell more than 40,000 ponds at about 4.70 per pond." Doubts were also expressed in Holland regarding the wisdom of fixing the Asian minimum prices at a level higher than the current European prices. A commission was, therefore, appointed late in 1702 to go into the question. Pieter van Dam, the celebrated historian of the Company, who served on the commission, advocated a reduction in the Asian prices.100 The principal advocate of keeping the prices at a high level was Pieter de Witt who justified the policy on considerations of preventing illegal private trade in spices in Asia as well as safeguarcling the Company's monopoly in Europe. The latter view prevailed and the commission recommended no reduction in prices.101 What were the long-term implications of the price policy of the Directors on the sale of spices in Asia? Evidence from several Indian factories for the early part of the eighteenth century shows that after a brief period of adjustment, sales were in fact resumed at the new prices with no long-term adverse effects. Indeed, by 1712 matters had come to such a pass in 96

97

98 99

100 101

The Hugli price of cloves, for example, had come down from Rs. 338 in the early 1680s to Ks. 309 per 100 ponds by 1697. ARA, Statement of goods sold in Bengal, 1697-1698, K.A. 1516, ff.24-31. ARA, Hugli to Batavia, 19.9.1697, K.A. 1484, f. 94; Hugli to Batavia, 31.1.1699, K.A. 1516, f. 15; Batavia to Hugli, (secret letter) 23.4.1699, K.A. 836, ff. 212-213; Hugli to Batavia, 9.3.1701, K.A. 1540, f. 23. Van Dam, Beschryvinge, II.3, p. 124. Van Dam, Beschryvinge, 113, p. 125. This would roughly be the equivalent of Ks. 1/4 per Surat maund. Van Dam, Beschryvinge, II.3, pp. 120-125. ARA, Hugli to Batavia, 19.9.1697, K.A. 1484, f. 94; Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic Trade, pp. 104-108.

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Bengal that the Hugli factors regretted that the Batavia Council had not approved their suggestion to let them further increase the prices of all the three spices, an action that the factors thought would have had no injurious effect whatever on the total amount sold.102 Also, the sale price of cloves at Surat actually exceeded the minimum prescribed.103 This would indeed seem to vindicate the position taken by the factors in Bengal and elsewhere in India that over a very broad price range the demand for spices in India was price inelastic.

102 103

ARA, Hugli to Batiavia, 17.8.1712, K.A. 1710, f. 82. Glamann, Dutch-Asiatic Trade, p. 108, table 20.

16 The Economics of Uncertainty: The Structural Revolution in the Spice Trade, 1480-1640 Peter Musgrave

Should I .go to church And see the holy edifice of stone, And not bethink me straight of dangerous rocks, Which touching but my gentle vessel's side Would scatter all her spices on the stream, Enrobe the roaring waters with my silks, And, in a word, but even now worth this, And now worth nothing ? (The Merchant of Venice, I, i, 29-37)

1

The codification of the laws of economics and the reduction of economic activity to a process of scientific precision was an appropriate procedure for the eighteenth century and its successors. The physics of Newton had produced - for Newton's successors at least - a near-mechanistic universe, a cosmic machine, well-oiled, self-acting and, above all, predictable; the laws of economics promised to provide the operating manual for a machine as efficient and as predictable. At the same period the development of new technologies and new techniques made possible a relatively smoothly-operating economic system, a. system in which events were at least theoretically predictable. Life, in general, became more certain; perhaps this, rather than revolutionary social change, or self-sustained growth, should be the epitaph of the age of the industrial revolution. It may appear paradoxical to insist upon the stability of the industrial economy and to contrast it with the instability of the pre-industrial world. Of course, the industrial period was one of rapid change and of spectacular growth; indeed it can be argued that the most stable feature of industrial society is the expectation of growth and change: the expectation of progress. It would not be excessive to suggest that the disappearance of subsistence crises and of sudden interruptions of the flow of commerce and manufacture has conditioned the whole outlook of the developed world in the last 150 years. Economics, and in its wake, economic history, has become a science of optimism, the new Whiggism, a whiggism potentially as distorting, in particular for economic history, as the whiggism of Macaulay or Acton was for political and constitutional history.

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SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD 10 PETER MUSGRAVE The prevailing optimism, with its deep concern - well-nigh its obsession - with growth and the roots of growth may have been justifiable in the field of modern economic history; for the pre-modern world and the medieval world, it has involved a distortion not merely of the facts, but also of attitudes. Recent work in the history of this period has clearly indicated the importance of 'destabilizing' factors, of events and situations which, for long periods - centuries, even - could halt or reverse the 'process of growth'. There is, indeed, a more fundamental objection to the transference of'growth economies' to a world in which the expectation of continued growth did not exist. The study of 'mentalites', of attitudes and unspoken assumptions in the past, must suggest to us that men in history had (along with their differing attitudes to matters such as death, marriage and sex) very different attitudes to the operations of the economy, attitudes which may amount to a differing concept of 'economic rationality', to an approach to economic life, profits and the dangers of commerce dominated by the general uncertainty of life and the economy rather than by some expectation based on a long-term pattern of growth. As Chayanov and his successors have sought to demonstrate in the case of peasant societies, so too in the pre-modern world an essentially precarious economic system (a system without the apparent predictability of the post-industrial one), produced an economic rationality, and hence a series of economic behaviours, widely different from that of the world of modern economics. Two related, but largely unregarded, features are central to this pre-modern rationality, or rather rationalities: unpredictability and risk. Where the results of any decision or action are unpredictable, obviously undertaking such action is a risky business, and this random element has to be taken into account in any economic - or indeed, social or political - decision. The factor of uncertainty is so obviously and so deeply involved in this system and yet so difficult to isolate or to analyse that it is easy to ignore it, or to dismiss it as incapable of study. To apply 'modern economic principles' to the pre-modern world in a crude form - without any allowance for uncertainty - is to dismiss perhaps the key factor in the economic system, and to devalue by implication the development of a more certain and predictable economic system which can be seen as the most significant achievement of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Uncertainty is not just an inconvenient random variable in an equation; its existence and high value makes the equation itself widely different and hence produces apparently odd economic behaviour. Without uncertainty and its consequences, much of the economic and social history of the pre-modern world is, if not completely inexplicable, at least deeply mysterious. Uncertainty pervaded the whole of the pre-modern world and its mental systems and it would obviously be difficult or impossible to seek to analyse the whole of its influence. However, in certain areas risk and uncertainty were particularly evident and their effects on attitudes particularly deep. One of these areas was trade and especially the long-distance trade with Asia, the spice trade. As will be indicated in the second section of this paper, the trade was one particularly subject to all sorts of risks and uncertainties; it is significant, too, in that its history in the period between 1500 and 1650 poses a major 'economic' problem, or more correctly a historiographical problem: that of the replacement of the ancient routes via the ports of the eastern Mediterranean by the new Cape route and, even

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more, of the date of that replacement, not in the 1500s with the arrival of the Portuguese in India, but in the 1610s and 1620s with the establishment of the Dutch and English East India Companies in the East. Traditionally - if that is the right word to use - this replacement has been seen as the result of superior ^technology and the inherent superiority of the Cape route. For Seeley1 and the school of historians of the 'expansion of Europe' who followed him, for whom the problem was simply one of explaining the replacement of the Levantine trade by the Portuguese around 1500, the explanation lay simply in the inherent advantages of the Cape route and, perhaps chiefly, in the general movement of the centre, of things from the landlocked Mediterranean to the maritime civilizations of the Atlantic, a movement which was to culminate in the British (or English) domination of world trade. The work of a number of scholars in the 1940s and afterwards, chief amongst them Fernand Braudel2 and Frederic C. Lane,3 shattered this elegant and simple structure. It became clear that the apparent replacement of the Levantine traders by the Portuguese was no more than an episode; by the 1530s the Portuguese tide was rolling back and in the middle decades of the sixteenth century, the Levantine traders and their Italian terminus, Venice, were enjoying a 'Golden Age', the age in Venice of Palladio and Tintoretto, a Martinmas summer perhaps, but undoubtedly a summer. It was only in the decades following 1600 that this summer ended and, although the Cape of Good Hope captured the trade, it was the Dutch and English chartered companies rather than the Estado da India who were the beneficiaries. Recent work on the change, most noticeably that of Steensgaard4 and Ralph Davis5, has sought to isolate the causes of this very late changeover and, by implication, the earlier failure of the Portuguese. It is not here possible to attempt an evaluation of all the explanations which have been offered, and indeed such a review would lie outside the scope of the present paper. It will be feasible only to hint at the nature of risk and uncertainty in the trade, and their implications. Furthermore, in analysing their changing role, it will be possible to link the history of the spice trade and the changing nature and importance of uncertainty within it to another and wider question, that of the relationships between Europe and the non-European world and of the development of dependent relationships and of 'under-development' itself.6 2

In the period before the seventeenth century, the spice trade with Asia was one of the riskiest and one of the longest trades in which Europeans engaged. From their areas of production in Indonesia or the Malabar coast of India, the valuable spices had to be transported the whole length of the known world to European markets. Fpr much of the time, even on the so-called 'overland route', they were carried by sea; in many cases they were trans-shipped, and frequently sold en route. As valuable goods they attracted the attention of tax-collectors and pirates: the two could not, in many cases, be distinguished. The risks and uncertainties involved in the trade are at least partly obvious. Before the navigational revolution of the seventeeth century, perhaps indeed before the age of the steamship, maritime transport was a very risky business, particularly

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SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD 12 PETER MUSGRAVE in the great oceans; ships easily became lost or wrecked-even the Dutch lost large amounts of shipping on the reefs of the western coast of Australia. The transport of spices, too, was always liable to risk of complete or partial loss as a result of damage, frequently irreparable, by swamping or damp. Obviously, insurance could and did mitigate to some extent the seriousness of such losses, but in general, the loss of a year's trade and a year's profit spelled almost inevitable ruin, especially for the individual trader of the Indian Ocean, who was typically a relatively small-scale operator, venturing most or all of his capital in each voyage. Again, the risk of loss to pirates and tax gatherers is a clear one. 'Formal' piracy, such as the raids of the Uskoks of Senj,7 was an obvious, if fluctuating threat; from time to time the intervention of Venetian or Ottoman fleets in the Adriatic and the Ottoman fleet in the Red Sea and Arabian Gulf restrained the activities of pirates, but as soon as the fleets left the piracy flared up anew. However, as Steensgaard has pointed out, not all the pirates were on the seas, and indeed some of them were - in name at least - the agents of governments. Protection money, the bribes needed to buy off raiders, as much or more than the costs of maintaining soldiers to defend caravans or convoys, was an ever-present necessity in any trader's calculations, but it must be remembered that the claims of pirates, official or otherwise, were arbitrary and ultimately unpredictable. It is pretty clear that a well-armed Dutch fleet, sailing the oceanic route from Dutch settlement to Dutch settlement in the relatively empty southern waters, would be less liable to the uncertainty of protection than would a poorly-armed dhow coasting to Basra or Jeddah; and it is tempting to see in this a clear and simple explanation for the supremacy of the Dutch. In fact, it would seem that this is too simple an explanation; above all, protection costs do not seem to have been so large a proportion of actual costs to explain so great a change. The normal risks and uncertainties of long-distance trade were only a part of the story, however. The history of the spice trade, certainly since the early Middle Ages,8 had been a history smattered with frequent severe crises, crises which were usually partly political rather than directly economic. The trade passed, both in Asia and in Europe, through areas of great political instability and it is a commonplace worthy of repetition that this instability, especially the breakdown of law and order, could and did play havoc with a trade such as the spice trade. Indeed, the history of the 'transitional' period, the period from the late fifteenth century to the early seventeenth century, is complicated by crises which are only indirectly related to the structural changes which may or may not have been occurring during this period. One of the major difficulties in isolating these structural changes is simply that they and their effects are deeply interwoven with the crises which lie around them. The late fifteenth-century crisis was not started by the arrival of da Gama in Calicut, or even the arrival of the news in Italy; the trade had been in crisis for some time and it can be argued that the panic which seems to have been created in Venice by news of the arrival of the Portuguese in India was symptomatic of the weakened state of the city caused by the pre-existing crisis rather than by the intrinsic importance of a Portuguese presence in Malabar. The crisis was ultimately not one of the spice trade, but part of a larger crisis generated by the French invasion of Italy in 1494 and by the destabilizing effects of warfare both there and

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on the vital trade routes into southern Germany. The news of da Gama came to a Venice already threatened by French conquest, a Venice whose land empire was in the process of occupation and whose trade routes were blocked. The reasons for Venice's failure as a spice trader and, by default, for Portugal's success, surely lie in the League of Cambrai and the War of Agnadello, rather than in any deeply significant economic advantage of Lisbon and its Cape route. It was not only in Italy and Germany that problems and crises had arisen; in the eastern Mediterranean, the trade faced further difficulties. The perennial warfare between the Turks and Venice again posed a threat, but perhaps most significantly the combination of Mamluk decline and Ottoman expansion into the Levant, and ultimately Egypt, destabilized the most critical areas for the trade, the entrepots from which the Italian cities and their competitors drew their supplies; it was not until the early 1520s that Ottoman rule was firmly established in Egypt, and not until the mid-1530s that the Hedjaz and Iraq, with the crucial ports of Jeddah and Basra, were effectively and permanently under Turkish rule. The late sixteenth century also saw a prime crisis, not merely in the spice trade but in the whole of Mediterranean trade. The causes of this crisis are, perhaps, less clear than those of the crisis of the late fifteenth century. From the 1570s onwards the relative peace of the mid-century began to disappear; new outbreaks of piracy and of warfare between Venice and the Turks occurred, and the Fertile Crescent was disrupted firstly by revolts and finally by war between the Turks and Shah Abbas.9 Again, the costs of war forced the Turks to increase taxation in the ports of the Levant. However, the sixteenth-century crisis may, perhaps, be seen far more as a part of the general crisis - political as well as economic - which affected most of Mediterranean Europe in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, a crisis above all of over-population and subsistence. From about 1570 onwards, northern Italy's major concern became the supply of food, which came increasingly from northern Europe rather than from the Black Sea or Anatolia. Furthermore, the disruptive effects of warfare in the Netherlands and the disastrous consequences of frequent Spanish bankruptcies on Italian finance, irreparably weakened - as it turned out - the ability and indeed the will of Venetian merchants to resist the mounting onslaught of Dutch, French and English competition in the ports of the Levant. What is important here is not the precise nature of these crises nor of their causes; it is the very fact of their existence. The spice trade was not a neat, predictable, risk-free trade but one in which the threat of catastrophe was everpresent. It must be remembered, too, that the crises of the late fifteenth century and of the years around 1600 were not caused by 'Cape competition' - arguably the problems of the Levant trade helped to generate this - nor were they of a unique type or form; crises had occurred in the years around 1400 as a consequence of the expansion of Timur Leng and the destruction of the 'Via Tartarica', and earlier in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.10 It should also be emphasized that these crises were only the most spectacular of a much longer series: although great crises might only occur once in a century, smaller and mote localized ones occurred much more frequently. Local rebellions, or a local 'strike' of suppliers, might well create a catastrophe as serious for an individual trader as the great general crises.

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The 'normal' risks of navigation and piracy and the risks related to political instability may, perhaps, be regarded as the most obvious sorts of uncertainty in the spice trade; they are also by their nature exogenous, affecting the structure of the trade from the outside, and so it might be possible to ignore them in the overall organization of the trade as random shocks which could be smoothed out over time and in global terms. It is, of course, worth indicating that even if, over a long enough time, such shocks could be smoothed out, for the individual trader and his commercial decisions the possibility of such a shock and its likely disastrous effects on him are certain to be active and important considerations. However, the uncertainties and risks of the spice trade in the pre-modern world were not limited to this kind of exogenous random shock; the structure of the trade and of trade itself-was such that economic randomness and uncertainty were built into economic 'laws'. Perhaps the central economic feature of the spice trade was the huge distances involved. Distance is perhaps the most devalued of all currencies in the modern world. The telegraph and the telephone have, in some senses, reduced the world to the dimensions of a single room; the flow of information, economic as well as political, is to all intents and purposes instantaneous. For the pre-nineteenthcentury world, distance was a very real and significant matter. As Braudel has suggested,11 distances should be measured in time, not in miles or kilometres; in these terms, London is today no more than seconds from Sydney, and the same from Paris, Washington or Birmingham. In the sixteenth century, Venice was about 12 days from Paris, 27 days from London or 65 days from Alexandria.12 The distance from Venice to the Malabar coast of India or the Moluccas might well be measured in months and the return journey could easily take a year. The devaluation of distance can very easily blind us to its vital importance but, it must be insisted, its implications for the economics of the spice trade - and all premodern long-distance trades - are profound. The laws of price, of supply and demand and of the market itself- and the logic which sees commercial decisions as being related to them - are based above all on the commodity of accurate information; without a situation in which supply and demand are both, at least in approximate aggregate, known - that is, in a 'transparent' market - the setting of prices, volumes of purchase and so forth can be no more than a gamble. In a world of the telephone and relatively rapid and sure transport and transfer of funds, such a system will obviously work. In the pre-telegraph, pre-steamship age, commerce, in particular in goods as liable to fluctuations of fashion and to political interference as spices, the 'laws of commerce' can easily be reduced by an imperfect 'opaque' information system to little more than the throw of the dice. Information - about circumstances in the Red Sea, the level of demand in Alexandria, peace or war in the Adriatic, a cool or hot summer in Germany - was a commodity almost as valuable as the spices themselves, as the high prices for information cited by Braudel and others bear witness. In the absence of true information, rumour, too, had an apparently disproportionate significance; the gadarene panics which seem to have swept the trading communities of Venice and later Amsterdam and London, are not some Hogarthian grotesque, a clear sign of the eccentricity of the past, but an inevitable part of a commercial system operating without clear, regular and up-to-date information.

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1. The economics of uncertainty, 1480-1640 15 The system of information (or rather the lack of it) was one which to a greater or lesser extent, largely proportional to distance, was common to all pre-modern trades. The spice trade had, however, a further complexity - a further weakness it might almost be called - which produced a new series of problems and uncertainties around the 'perfect market'. Although the spice trade can, globally, be seen as a steady concentrated movement of spices from Indonesia or India, through the Levant to Italy and on to consumers elsewhere in Europe* the reality was much more fragmentary than this. At no stage, before the 1620s, and despite Portuguese attempts to create a monopoly for their ports,13 did a single entrepot dominate the trade; geographically at least, no unified market existed. Spices from the independent producing sultanates in the Moluccas and Java passed through the hands of myriads of small-scale traders to the entrepots of the Straits of Malacca. Even at this crucial bottleneck in the trade, no single centre was dominant: indeed, the history of the trade and of the Malaya-Sumatran region dining this period might, rather than being seen as an extension in some way of LusoDutch or Cape-Levant competition, be written in terms of the competition and at times open conflict between the great entrepots of the Straits: Malacca itself, Johore Bahru on the Malayan shore, and Achin in Sumatra.14 This conflict, of course, was of much longer standing than the European presence in the Indies; the Europeans came into an already existing situation in the role not of deus ex machina, solving the conflicts of the region and imposing their own, but rather as additional players in a complex game, sometimes able to act decisively, sometimes no more than make-weights. It is, for instance, far too easy to see the decline of Malacca in the early seventeenth century as a function of the decline of Portugal; it is surely more realistic to see this decline as a further chapter in the endless fluctuations of the trade of the Straits. Even at the high point of its power in the mid-sixteenth century, Portuguese Malacca never held a monopoly of the trade of the Straits. Hence, even at the interchange point between Indonesia and the Indian Ocean, there was no single market, no single focus at which prices were set. The corollary of this, again, is clear: here once more is a situation in which the flow of information and of rumours will assume crucial importance and where, in view of the difficulties and costs - risks - of shifting goods from one Straits entrepot to another, the lack of information reduces the 'commercial logic' of choosing the best market to a gamble for both Indian Ocean and Indonesian traders. This 'doubly-opaque market system' - opaque for both the lack of real information and for the lack of a single, physically integrated market - was even more clearly the case at the succeeding interchange, the western Coast of India. The great centres - Calicut, Goa and Surat - combined the function of interchange with acting as supply centres for, for instance, pepper. In addition to the main centres, many of the smaller ports of the Malabar and Gujarat coasts acted as interchange points. As in the Malacca Straits, the conflict of petty states involved the ports and ultimately the European traders; the conflicts of Malabar were, simply, much more complex than those of Malaya. The role of the Malabar and Gujarat ports as centres of supply for spices and also textile's also further complicated their market situation. The supplies came from the interior;, either from the immediate hinterland in the case of Malabar, or from much further inland as in the case of

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SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD 16 PETER MUSGRAVE Surat. In the chaotic conditions of southern India, supplies were frequently interrupted by political disorder, disorder which, given the small scale of the units involved, was often unpredictable. A further complexity on the west coast of India, which made any forecast of demand even more difficult, was the existence of a bifurcation in the routes to Europe. The division into the Fertile Crescent route and the Red Sea route, with their differing traders and problems, made the decision regarding the appropriate time and price of a bargain - not to say its location - much more a matter of partially-informed guesswork: a risky business rather than an informed commercial judgment. Levels of supply and demand, even in small-scale individual markets, were so opaque, their fluctuations so predictably unpredictable, that the trader buying spices in Malacca or Johore for sale in Goa or Calicut to traders from Basra, Jeddah or Cairo can only have been conscious of the vastly high level of risk he was taking. The markets of the Levant were hardly more transparent and knowable than those of the Indian Ocean. A range of ports, with a range of rulers, trading into a sea which was notorious for its disorder, with increasing competition from the Mediterranean and northern Europe, provided the same pattern of confused markets which existed in western India. One of the well-known episodes of the early sixteenth-century crisis of the trade is the 'spice famine' in the market of Alexandria in 1504. It is usually explained by, or rather linked with, the arrival of the Portuguese in the East;15 but while the extreme severity of the crisis of 1504 may, in part at least, be related to the Portuguese presence in India, the dearth of spices in Alexandria was, in one sense, no more than a further illustration of the fluctuations of the trade. The spice trade was never stable, and the arrival of spices at Alexandria or Beirut was always a matter of anxious uncertainty for Venetian baili, the representatives of other nations and for the principals themselves back in Europe. This was no trade of international commercial magnates sitting comfortably in their offices managing and controlling the exchange of known volumes of goods between known suppliers and known purchasers; it was a much more risky and nerve-wracking business, an eternal speculation in a fog of uncertainty. All businessmen seek to reduce uncertainty and risk; the spice trade, even in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, offered some scope for doing so. Insurance could, of course, reduce the danger of ruin as a result of the physical loss of ships or goods; the payment of protection money or the employment of soldiers might reduce the threat from brigands or governments. In the more purely economic structure of the trade, too, some features reduced the risk for individual traders. The system of periodic trading fairs, although basically the result of the determination of the pattern of trade by the pattern of the monsoons in the Indian Ocean, by concentrating all trade into a relatively short period, reduced, to some extent, the lack of knowledge and the consequent risk. By establishing resident agents or, more usually, close friendly contacts with local resident traders, a surer source of relatively reliable information could be obtained. Again, traders could spread their risks by trading in more than a single commodity; if spices did not seem to offer a good profit, perhaps textiles or carpets might offer a better return. Although it seems certain that traders engaging in the relatively organized trade of the Indian Ocean were not able to shift as easily from textiles to furs to spices as was the Armenian merchant Hovhannes,16 who is virtually the sole trader of his

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type upon whom we have any real information and who, as a result, is usually cited as the prime example of the peddling trade, it was nonetheless possible to trade in other goods than spices. It must be remembered, of course, that if the trade in spices was unpredictable and risky, with opaque markets, the same also applies to all the other luxury trades of Asia; any decision to shift from commodity to commodity was as much a speculation as any decision as to the quantity of spices to buy, die prices to buy them at and so forth. The ability to change from commodity to commodity might be seen, indeed, as an extension of, rather than a decrease in, risk. The available techniques, then, for reducing risk were of only limited efficacity; the risk and uncertainty of trade was an inevitable and vital part of its economic structure. Above all, it must have had profound effects on the traders' perceptions of their interests and, in particular, of their concept of their long-term interests. To maintain profitability and indeed to guarantee the survival of their concerns, very different ideas of the role of profit and long-term profit maximization would have been necessary for traders in this uncertain system from those of a commodity trader in a modern market system. The overall aim, a satisfactory level of profitability in the long term, may have been the same - such evidence as there is for long-term profitability in pre-modern trade suggests that it was little different from profitability in modern commodity trade17 - but the strategy necessary to achieve that aim was very different. No pre-modern trader could rely on a determined level of profit from year to year; indeed, he could not rely on any profit in some years. Furthermore, since a very high proportion of his working capital might be involved in a single venture, the risk of total loss and bankruptcy was a real and ever-present threat. The only insurance there could be (virtually, too, the only reason for involvement and investment in such a high risk business) was the high profit which could be made in good years. In many senses, the structure of this trade must have been affected by its uncertainty. It is, for instance, rather difficult to see a trader in this system operating a strategy aimed at maximizing the capital involved in his ventures at risk rather than maximizing returns in the short and medium term; as an investment for future security, the spice trade was a poor one, and hence the constant leakage of capital and enterprise from trade to land and government debt (itself not a totally secure investment) must be seen as an inevitable part of the economic structure and one which effectively prevented any major change in it. The high level of risk and uncertainty built into the traditional structure also guaranteed its survival: European consumers, who had an apparently inexhaustible demand for spices, were made to pay prices for those spices which included the traders' only real insurance against high risk: high profit.

Fundamental change in this system, the sort of fundamental change which came with the crisis of the early seventeenth century, could only be structural change; above all, the nature and scale of the risks taken, and the profit strategies of traders, had to change. Shifts, albeit relatively large ones, in the importance of the component costs of the trade - carriage, protection and so forth - are not enough

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SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD 18 PETER MUSGRAVE to explain the apparently irreversible alteration in the pattern of trade; only changes in the way in which the 'economic rationality' of the trade operated can provide any convincing solution to the problem. In the rush to down-grade the role of the Portuguese in the East, as part of the attempt to explain their failure to supplant the Levantine trading system, it may well be that too much has been made of the traditional nature of their trade, and too little of the revolution (although this was ultimately minor) the nature and form of their presence caused in the relationship between Europe and Asia. Portugal was an imperial power; its presence and wealth in the East did not consist solely of the income from trade. Rather the Portuguese, and particularly the Portuguese Crown, drew a portion - smuggling and evasion make any real quantification impossible - of their income from sources such as the taxation of trade, the licensing of traders and tribute. This change marks the beginning of many larger changes since, in one sense at least, it marks a shift in the balance of trade,between Asia and Europe; the great flow of silver, following the sun from west to east, of which Braudel has spoken,18 was beginning, falteringly and very partially, to reverse. Any reversal of the balance of irade in the pre-modern world, however, raised immediately and critically the problem of remittances; how was this non-commercial wealth to be remitted to Europe? The obvious answer, bullion, in particular gold bullion, has its attractions; however, for the premodern trader and financier a remittance system which offered only a small additional return was hardly worth considering. The Portuguese, too, had the misfortune to have sited their major settlements, and hence their major sources of income, in areas of gold shortage rather than of gold surplus; this was particularly the case in southern India.19 To export silver from Goa to Europe would have been an earlier form of carrying coals to Newcastle. The spice trade, and the high profits it offered, presented a clearly preferable form of remittance; the profit now became not the sole aim of the system, but, in part, merely an additional increment to other income. Here then was a major structural shift: a large state, or quasi-state, operator was beginning to replace the small individual traders and furthermore, for that operator, the spice trade and its profits, or losses, were only a part of a larger operation. Hence, at least in theory, the Portuguese should have been able to accept lower levels of profit and to compete successfully with their Levantine competitors. To explain their failure to do so it is necessary to look at the other side of their structural revolution: Portugal was a state, but one with all the desperate financial problems of a traditional spice trader. In the last decades of the house of Aviz, and later following the Union of the Crowns in 1580, the Portuguese Crown was in serious financial difficulties; whatever else is in dispute about the nature and role of the Portuguese empire in this period, it is clear that it was being drained of men, armaments and, above all, money to stave off European bankruptcy. In such a situation, the role of the spice trade as remittance system took over. The Crown required income, and immediate income; no more than the overland trader could it afford to think in terms of 'medium-term profitability' or of the commercial strategy necessary to undercut and destroy competitors. The high prices and high profits of the Levantine trade, and of the high-risk system on which they were based, continued through the sixteenth century because the commercial and

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financial strategies of the old men and the new coincided: for both, high levels of income and immediate returns were vital. The true structural revolution came with the arrival of the Dutch; as the beginning of the 'Portuguese revolution' in the early sixteenth century had been, so too the seventeenth century structural revolution was complicated by a political and commercial crisis.20 While the political crisis, and the destruction of Ormuz, may serve as a symbol of the change, the revolution was a much more profound event. The organizational advantages of the Dutch United East India Company need little elaboration: a large, well-financed commercial structure (albeit with the disunity which stemmed from its continuing division between the Kamer, the successors of the original local East India Companies) with quite considerable navigational and military advantages over their competitors, and above all the ability, or the audacity, to sail the blue water route across the Indian Ocean. In fact, it may well be the case that, taken overall, these advantages were illusory; the additional costs and risks of the long sea route may have outweighed lower costs elsewhere. Certainly the balance of advantage does not seem to lie so clearly with the Dutch that it will explain the-scale and the nature of their success in replacing the older trading systems. It was not in organizational aspects, but rather in their structural consequences, that the success of the Dutch lay. Essentially, the Dutch began the lengthy process of the reduction of commercial risks in the trade. First, by cutting out not so much the middlemen as the middle markets they were able to reduce the uncertainty of the opaque markets; information and rumour were no longer the vitally important features they had been. Supply and demand were being brought together through a single agency, rather than being filtered through a huge range of intermediaries and intermediate risks. This reduction in the scale of commercial risk, as distinct from physical risk, played an important part in the structural revolution: but it was not the whole revolution, since, as has already been indicated, some of this shift had taken place in the sixteenth century in the Portuguese system. The Dutch company and, to a lesser extent, its English competitor, was by far the largest single unit involved in the trade, and was able simply by the volume of its purchases and sales to control prices and profits much more firmly and much more effectively than the traders of the sixteenth century. The scale of the Company's operations, too, reduced the risk of total loss and the need to provide against this by high profits. Perhaps in the very long term the most significant feature of this structural revolution was the developing habit and ability of the Company to act as a cartel, to manage supply in such a way as to maintain a price structure advantageous to itself and deleterious to its competitors. The policy of licensing and controlling production in Indonesia - the 'policy of frightfulness' which reached its apogee under Coen - can be seen as an attempt to establish a monopoly of supply; in economic terms, perhaps, it is better to see it as an attempt to control a large proportion of the supply of spices since, with such control, the Dutch could (and did) easily squeeze out their competitors. At the European end of the trade, too, the Company's capitalization was sufficiently large to allow it to hold back supplies, or to flood the market: to manage a market in third-world primary produce to the advantage of the trader and not the producer. Here, perhaps, begins the story of

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SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD 20 PETER MUSGRAVE the dependent relationship between Asian producers, European companies and world markets. For the first time, then, and that only haltingly, the Dutch East India Company was able to take a long-term view of profitability and of income rather than a very short-term one. By reducing the risks of the trade by reducing the uncertainties of its market structure, it was able to seek a return which, when grossed over a period of years, would be as high as the profits of the traditional traders over the same period, but which, in turn, would be more constant from year to year. In the good years, when the overland traders sought their high profits for 'insurance' purposes, the profit of the Dutch company could remain at average levels undercutting the position of the overland traders at its most critical point; the position of the traditional traders soon became untenable. The shift towards a Dutch nearmonopoly was basically an economic event, and only in small part the result of Dutch military and naval supremacy in Indonesia. 4

Monocausal explanations of complex and lengthy historical processes are rightly suspect. The 'structural revolution' in the trade and the commercial strategies which have been the subject of this paper did not occur in a vacuum; events around them, such as political crises, contributed to the process. For instance, the weakening of the position of the Mediterranean traders by political events in the first years of the seventeenth century undoubtedly speeded the triumph of the Dutch. Dutch-Spanish warfare in Europe, and the linking of Portugal to declining Habsburg Spain both played a part in the change. However, it is clear that the revolution in Europe's trade with Asia which occurred in the years between 1480 and 1630 was much more fundamental than simply a change in personnel or shipping construction. The whole economic nature of the trade shifted from greater to lesser uncertainty, from opaqueness to at least partial transparency, from venture to commodity trade; merchants and traders replaced speculators. With the dethroning of uncertainty from its dominating position in trade, trade moved from the economic rationality of the Middle Ages to at least an approximation to the rationality of modern economics. NOTES

1. J. R. Seeley, The Expansion of England (1895). 2. F. Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (1972), I, 543-68. 3. F. C. Lane, 'The Mediterranean spice trade: its revival in the sixteenth century', in Venice and History (Baltimore, 1966), 25-34. 4. N. Steensgaard, Carracks, Caravans and Companies: The structural crisis in EuropeanAsian trade in the early seventeenth century (Copenhagen, 1973). 5. Ralph Davis, 'Comparative advantage of the Levant and Cape Routes to India in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries', paper presented at 10a Settimana di Studio: Sviluppo e Sottosviluppo in Europa e Fuori d'Europa dal secolo XIII alia Rivoluzione Industrial; Prato, 10 April 1978. 6. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modem World-System: Capitalist agriculture and the origins of the European world economy in the sixteenth century (New York, 1974), has suggested that the arrival of the Portuguese in the East marks the beginning of the

SPICES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WORLD 1. The economics of uncertainty, 1480-1640

7. 8. 9. 10.

11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

349 21

process of 'under-development*; what follows suggests that this occurred perhaps a century later with the arrival of the Dutch and English Companies. Alberto Tenenti, Piracy and the Decline of Venice, 1580-1615(1967). See, for instance, H. Pirenne, Mahomet and Charlemagne (1954). Whatever the final judgment on the Tirenne thesis', Pirenne certainly establishes the existence of a major crisis in the spice trade in the early Middle Ages. Steensgaard, op. cit. See Benjamin Z. Kedar, Merchants in Crisis: Genoese and Venetian men of affairs and the fourteenth century depression (New Haven and London, 1976); A. H. Lybyer, 'The Ottoman Turks and the routes of oriental trade', English Historical Review, xxx, 120 (1915), 577-88. Braudel, op. cit., I,355. Ibid., 1,362 (after Pierre Sardella). M. N. Pearson, Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat: The response to the Portuguese in the sixteenth century (Berkeley, 1976). See M. A. P. Meilinck-Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1650 (The Hague, 1962). F. C. Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic (Baltimore, 1973), 290-3. L. Khachikan, 'Le registre d'un marchand Armenien en Perse, en Inde et au Tibet (1682-93)', in Annales ESC, XXII, 1967. Davis, op. cit. Braudel, op. cit., 1,462-542. J. F. Richards, Mughal Administration in Golconda (1975). Steensgaard, op. cit.

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Index Please note page numbers which appear in italics are references to tables or illustrations. Abbas, Shah, 341 Abeysinghe, Tikiri, historian, 248-9 Abreu, Ant6nio de, Portuguese captain, 260 Abreu, Francisco Serrao, Portuguese captain, 260 Achin (Aceh), 293-4, 306, 343; see also Atjeh Aden, 56-7, 88, 93, 269, 289 Afonso, Simao, Portuguese captain, 260 Aguia, ship, 128, 135 c Aidhab, 56 Albuquerque, Afonso de, Portuguese governor, 189, 191, 212, 260, 281, 289 Aleppo, 2, 17, 114, 119 Alexandria, see also Egypt pepper prices in, 112-13 spice prices in, 69, 77-8, 85-7, 97-98, 119 as trade center, 57-8, 101, 107, 115, 289, 344 trade with Catalonia, 178 trade with Genoa, 150-1, 779 trade with Venice, 69-70, 77, 85-7, 100, 112, 116-17, 146-7, 172; market forces in, 344; Portuguese sea trade and, 93-110, 141; volume of, 111, 116-17, 141, 145, 153, 154, 176 al-Kahhar, AlaD al-Din Ricayat shah, sultan, 270, 274, 276 al-Kharrubi, Nur ad-Din, Karimi merchant, 65 al-Kuwaik, Siraj ad-Din ibn, Karimi merchant, 65 al-Mahaii, Burhan ad-Din, Karimi merchant, 63, 66 al-Mahali, Nur ad-Din, Karimi merchant, 63 al-Malik al-Mu3ayyad, sultan of Yemen, 57 Almeida, Jorge Frolim de, Portuguese captaingeneral, 248, 256 al-Mujahid, al Malik, ruler of Yemen, 64 al-Ustadar, cAli, administrator in Cairo, 65 Amsterdam, 169 Anchekoil River, 210 Anne, ship, 132 Antwerp, 115, 119, 169 Arabia, cassia trade in, 2-3 Arabs, in spice trade, 196, 202, 214 Araujo, Ruy de, 263

Arcadius, emperor, 10-12 Ashtor, E., historian, 60 Asia cinnamon trade in, 254 cloves trade in, 321-7; effect of Portuguese on, 259-66 pepper trade in, 283-316; Europeans in, 293; Portuguese in, 289-90, 293; prices in, 301-2, 310; trends in, 31G15 spice trade in: communication and, 342; Dutch in, 318-36; economic aspects of, 339-48; effect of Portuguese on, 245-66, 339; political aspects of, 33941; supply and demand in, 344, 347 trade with Malabar, 187, 190, 194, 206, 213-14 Atjeh, 269-82; see also Sumatra conflict with Portugal, 269-82 pepper exports of, 280 at-Tur, 56 Augsburg, 118 Augustin, banker, 96 Augusto, Artur, historian, 94 Avenrrois, writer, 33-4 Avicenna (Ibn Sina), philosopher, 25, 27-8, 33-4, 41, 43, 47 Ayyubid dynasty, 52, 54 Azevedo, Jerdnimo, captain-general of Sri Lanka, 249, 254 Balbi, Italian traveler, 126, 128 Balbj, Andrea, merchant, 95 Balbj, Zacharia, merchant, 95 Balkans, trade routes in, 101 Banda, mace and nutmeg in, 27, 31-2, 260 banking, in Egypt, by Karimi merchants, 635 Bantam, 295, 298-9, 302-3 Barbarigo, Agostino, 96 Barbosa, Duarte, 248, 250 Barquq, sultan, 65 Barreto, Ant6nio Moniz, Portuguese governorgeneral, 276 Barreto, Francisco, Portuguese governor, 271, 275 Barros, Joao de, chronicler, 96 Barsbay, sultan of Egypt, 66-7, 88, 91

352

INDEX

Basadona, Giovanni Battista, Venetian consul in Levant, 114 Basra, 114 Battuta, Ibn, traveler, 63 Becker, C.H., historian, 64 Becudo, Isaac, correspondent, 114 Becudo, Mathew, correspondent, 114, 116 Beirut, spice trade in, 100, 103, 141, 145-54, 153, 176-8, 182 prices in, 97-8 Bengal, 214, 328, 334-6 pepper in, 41, 44, 289 Billioud, J., historian, 166-7 black pepper, see pepper Botelho, Simao, controller of revenue in India, 258, 263 Bouchon, Genevieve, historian, 124 Boxer, C.R., historian, 122, 246 Bragan^a, Constantino de, Portuguese viceroy, 271 Braudel, Fernand, historian, 94, 339, 342, 346 Britain in pepper trade, 285-95, 304-13 spice prices in, 103, 169, 171, 306, 310 trade with India, 169; comparison with Portugal, 131-3 British East India Company, see English East India Company Brito, Ant6nio de, 261 Brito, Diogo Mendes de, 256 Brito, Simao de, Portuguese captain, 253 Brown, Murdoch, 216-17, 225 Cairo, 64, 103; see also Egypt spice prices in, 104 as trade center, 57-8, 61, 100, 113-14, 119, 289 Calicut, 5-6, 88, 93, 102-4, 189-94, 202-6, 210, 212, 218, 289 canela, see cassia Capello, Carlo, Venetian ambassador to London, 107 Cape of Good Hope, Portuguese navigation of effect on spice trade, see Carreira da India, effect on spice trade historiographic considerations, 93-4, 339 cardamom (Elettaria cardamomum), in Java, 6 Carpentier, Pieter, Dutch governor-general, 321, 325 Carreira da India, 121, 124-8, 186 effect on spice trade, 67-9, 91-3, 111-20, 141, 144, 168, 284, 338-9; in Asia, 245-66; in Egypt, 93-110, 144; in

Europe, 94, 155; historiographic considerations, 93-4, 245, 259, 339; in Levant, 93-120, 141-75, 339; in Syria, 144; in Venice, 144, 155 passengers in, 134 caryophyllon, see cloves Casa da India, 46, 123, 162, 168, 188-94, 201 cassia (Cinnamomum cassia), 1-5, 8-10; see also cinnamon in antiquity, 2-3, 9 versus cinnamon, 1-10, 17, 246 medicinal uses of, 9-10 nomenclature, 4-5, 7-10 Castanheda, Fernao Lopes de, chronicler, 269 caste system, and Malabar pepper gardens, 220-5 Castro, Joao de, 271 Castro, Nuno de, 212-13 Catalonia, in spice trade, 178 Ceram, 325-6 Ceylon, 16, 18-19 cinnamon in, 7, 13, 15, 245-58; historiographic considerations, 245-6; price of, 256-8, 257-5; processing of, 247-50; socioeconomic aspects of, 247-9, 253-4; source material on, 257-5; trade with Asia, 254; volume of, 245, 255-8, 256 Portuguese in, 246, 250; cultivation of spices by, 18; effect on cinnamon trade, 245, 250 Ceylon cinnamon, see cinnamon Chagas, ship, 134 Charles, ship, 132 Charles V, king of Spain, 115 China cassia in, 1-2, 5; trade with Hormuz, 5 in clove trade, 26-7 in pepper trade, 289, 308, 310-15 trade with India, spices in, 6, 213-14 Chinese cinnamon, see cassia cinnamon (Cinnamomum zeylanicum), 1-19, 20; see also cassia adulteration of, 2, 8-9 in antiquity, 2-3, 10-12 versus cassia, 1-10, 17, 246 in Ceylon, see Ceylon, cinnamon in description of, 12-14 in Goa, 13, 252-3, 256 in Malabar, 13, 15, 250 in Malacca, 15, 44 medicinal uses of, 9, 14-15 nomenclature, 4-5, 7-10, 16

INDEX cinnamon trade continued oil of, 15, 17 Portuguese importation of, volume of, 125, 126, 127, 183 Portuguese monopoly on, 253-5 price of, 74-5, 77 processing of, 12-14, 247-50 smuggling and, 252 trade, 17; in Asia, 254; in Egypt, 74-5 volume of, 176-83 Clerget, M., historian, 60 cloves (Syzygium aromaticum), 21-9, 30 Asian trade in, 321-7 description of, 24-5, 259 Dutch trade in, 321-6, 332 geographic distribution of, 24, 26, 259 medicinal uses of, 27, 260 nomenclature, 21-3, 26 versus nutmeg, 27 Portuguese trade in: effect on Asian trade, 259-66; military aspects of, 259, 261, 263-5; volume of, 125, 126 preservation of, 26-7 price of, 78, 99, 265-6, 321-3, 332-4 processing of, 24-5, 260 uses of, 260 Cochin, 5-6, 122, 188-93, 289. see also Malabar merchants in, 199-200 Portuguese factory in, 185-208, 210-11, 223, 229; economic aspects of, 188, 190-9, 206-7; military aspects of, 188-9, 191-2, 195, 201, 204; political aspects of, 189-90, 193, 207-8; purchasing power of, 190-4 relations with Portugal, 190-3 coffee, 300 Colombo, 251 Columbus, Christopher, explorer, 102 communication, and long-distance trade, 3423 Confeicao, ship, 125, 129 Constantinople, 101, 274 Cordo, Valerio, 10 Coromandel, 213-14, 291-2, 329-32 Correa, Caspar, 247, 250 Corsali, Andrea, chronicler, 93 Costa, Francisco da, 215-16 Couto, Diogo do, chronicler, 272-3, 276-7, 279, 281 Cyprus War, 166 Daendels, Herman Willem, Dutch soldier and administrator, 303

353

Damascus, 103 spice prices in, 69-70, 77-8, 86 trade with Egypt, 54 trade with Venice, 114 Dandolo family, merchants, 129 Darchini, 1 Davis, Ralph, historian, 339 Dinamedis, 22 Dioscorides, Pedanius, Greek physician, 9, 13, 16, 22, 32-3, 41-2 Dourado, Fernao, cartographer, 27(5 Dutch in pepper trade, 285, 287, 290-9 in spice trade, 119, 169-71, 339-40 Dutch East India Company, 170-1, 174, 285, 287, 296, 299, 303, 317-36, 339 economic aspects of, 339-40, 347-8 military aspects of, 325-7 profits of, 321-3, 329, 333-5 economics and cinnamon production, in Ceylon, 2479, 253-4 and Malabar pepper gardens, 220-8, 232-3 and Portuguese pepper factories, 188, 1909, 206-7 and spice trade: in Asia, 339-48; historiographic considerations, 337-9; in Levant, 340-1, 344-6 Egineta, Paulo, 22 Egypt, see also Alexandria; Cairo banking in, 63-5 cinnamon prices in, 74-5 clove prices in, 76 ginger prices in, 75 Muslims in, see Karimi merchants pepper prices in, 71-3, 86-91, 112-13 political structure of, 95; Karimi merchants and, 61-2, 65-8; spice trade and, 61-2 spice trade in: effect of Portuguese shipping on, 93-110, 144; prices in, 69-70, 77-8; regulation of, 67 taxes in, 61 trade with Damascus, 54 trade with Venice, 144-5 Elizabeth, ship, 132 England, see Britain English East India Company, 169-71, 474, 216, 285-7, 291, 306-10, 323, 339 escrivao da nao, 122, 158 Estado da India, 158, 187, 189-202, 205-8, 317, 339 Ethiopia, 2 cassia and, 2-4

354

INDEX

Europe, spice trade in, 141-75, 776-53 Portuguese shipping and, 94, 155 prices in, 168-70 trends in, 151-7, 161-3, 169-75, 173 Exchange, ship, 132 factories, in Portuguese India, see Cochin, Portuguese factory in Falcao, Luiz de Figueiredo, historian, 125, 128-9 Faleiro, Ruy, sailor, 24 Faria, Pero de, captain of Malacca, 270 Ferrera, Nicolao de, 263 fidalgos, Portuguese nobility, in India, 204—5 Flanders, 102, 107 fondachi, warehouse compounds, 112 Fort Marlborough, 305-9 France, in Levantine spice trade, 101, 118, 154, 166-7 Freire, Antao Vaz, vedor da fazenda of Sri Lanka, 254 Frescobaldi, merchant family, 101 Fuggers, 118, 125, 128, 134 Gaio, Joao Ribeiro, bishop of Malacca, 279 Galen (Claudius Galenus), Greek physician, 10, 22, 32-4, 41, 43, 47 Galvao, Ant6nio, Portuguese captain, 262 Gama, Vasco da, explorer, 69, 85, 91, 94, 102, 254, 260, 284, 340-1 Garca, ship, 135 gariofilo, see cloves Garzoni, Andrea di, banker, 95 Genoa, 103 in spice trade, 101, 149 Germany in Levantine spice trade, 96, 101, 116-18 in silk trade, 100 Ghazan, Ilkhan ruler, 64 ginger (Zingiber officinale) Genoan importation of, 779 Portuguese importation of, volume of, 726, 127, 161, 183 price of, 75-6, 77-8, 99 Spanish importation of, 178 Venetian trade in, 748, 776-7, 780-2 Goa, 122, 125, 266, 343 cinnamon in, 13, 252-3, 256 Portuguese in, 188-9, 195, 205, 252 Godinho, Manuel, 270 Godinho, V. Magalhaes, historian, 121^1, 1303, 158, 165, 170, 211-12, 255, 261, 269 Gon9alves, Diogo, 223 Greece, 2

Grimani, Alvige, banker, 95, 100 Gujarat, 200, 281, 318, 324, 330-1 Hairun, sultan of Ternate, 264 Hamzah, sultan of Ternate, 326 Heeren XVII, 171; see also Dutch East India Company Heers, J., historian, 144-7 Herodotus, historian, 2, 7 Holzschuher, Gabriel, Fugger employee, 134 Homem, Manoel Mascarenhas, Portuguese captain-general, 256 Hormuz (Ormuz), 58 Portuguese in, 188 spice trade in, 2, 5, 7, 206, 324 Houtman, Cornells de, Dutch captain, 285 Hunter, William, 312 India, see also specific location caste system in, pepper gardens and, 220-5 European goods in, 199-201 Portuguese in, 186, 200, 340; see also Cochin, Portuguese factory in; effect on Karimi merchants, 67-8; and pepper trade, 45-6 Portuguese sea route to, see Carreira da India India House (Lisbon), see Casa da India indigo, Portuguese importation of, volume of, 125-6, 726 Indonesia, see also specific location pepper in, 283-316 Isidore, Saint, 41, 43 Islam, see Muslims James, ship, 132 Java cardamom in, 6 cloves in, 321 pepper in, 6, 44, 290, 295, 298-302 Jews, 106 among Karimi merchants, 60-1 Jiddah, 88, 116 Joao III, king of Portugal, 115 Johore, 295 Kamaluddin, Mir, Indian merchant, 324 Karimi, meaning of, 52-5 Karimi merchants, 52-68 banking by, 63-5 decline of, 66-8, 88 Jews among, 60-1 organizational aspects of, 58-60 political power of, 65-6

INDEX Karimi merchants continued wealth of, 62-3 Klerk, Reinier de, Dutch governor-general, 301 Kotte, 253, 255 Laguna, writer, 10, 14, 45 Lane, A., historian, 60 Lane, Frederic C, historian, 70, 78, 85-92, 94, 121, 124, 141, 163, 339 Lanzam, 101-2 Laval, Fran9ois Pyrard de, traveler, 122, 127, 133-4 • Lemos, Jorge de, writer and viceregal secretary, 277-80 Levant, see also Middle East commodities traded in, 94 consuls in, Venetian, 114, 116 pepper trade in, 283-4; Malabar exports in, 786 spice trade in: decline of, 168-9; economic aspects of, 340-1, 344-6; effect of Portuguese shipping on, 93-120, 14175, 339; Malaccan exports in, 318-19; Portuguese interference in, 95, 168-9; prices in, 69-70, 77-8, 96, 168; source material on, 114; volume of, 163-5 Lewis, W.T., 315 Linhares, Conde de, Portuguese viceroy, 254, 257 Linschoten, see van Linschoten, Jan Huygen Lipomani, chevalier, 93 Lippomano, banker, 95 Loaysa, Garcia de, Spanish captain, 261 Lodewijcks, Willem, Dutch pioneer, 280 London, ship, 132 Lopes, David, historian, 94 Luhu, Johu, 326 Lusitano, Amato, 10 Lybyer, A.H., historian, 85, 94 lyrio espadanal, 16 Macassar, 322-7 mace (Myristica fragrans), 31-6, 38\ see also nutmeg in antiquity, 32-3 description of, 31-2 nomenclature, 34 Portuguese importation of, volume of, 125, 726 price of, 9 Madre de Deus, ship, 133, 135 Magalhaes Godinho, V., see Godinho, V. Magalhaes

355

Maghreb, 96 Magno, Alessandro, Venetian traveler, 111-12 Mahalli, Burhan ad-Din, Karimi merchant, 65 Malabar, 102, 105, 339 caste system in, 220-5 cinnamon in, 13, 15, 250 merchants in, 199-200, 203 pepper production in, 39, 41, 44, 185-7, 786-7, 288-93, 299; see also Cochin, Portuguese factory in; pepper gardens, in Malabar Portuguese military in, 188-9, 191-2, 195, 201, 204 sociopolitical structure of, 189-94, 197-9, 216, 218 as trade center, 318, 343 trade with Asia, 187, 190, 194, 206, 213-14 trade with Levant, 786 Malacca Atjehnese attacks on, 276 cinnamon in, 15, 44 cloves in, 265 pepper in, 39, 289, 315 Portuguese in, 188, 260-4, 270-1, 278 spice trade in, 343 Malipiero, Andrea, Venetian consul in Levant, 114 Maluku, see Malacca Mamluk dynasty, 61 administrative aspects of, 100; Karimi merchants and, 61-2 spice trade and, 52, 54-68, 86-7, 341 taxes and, 61 Mansur, clzz ad-Din Abd u 1 cAziz b., Karimi merchant, 60 Maqrizi, chronicler, 64 Marconi, banker, 96 Marco Polo, explorer, 288 Marineo, Lucio Siculo, writer, 35 Mary, ship, 132 Mateolo, 18 Mathew, K.S., historian, 211, 214 measurement, systems of, in Middle Eastern spice trade, 70, 146 Mecca, 63, 88, 116, 289 medicine cassia as, 9-10 cinnamon as, 9, 14-15 cloves as, 27, 260 pepper as, 42, 44 Mediterranean, see Levant; Venice Meilink-Roelofsz, M.A.P., historian, 269, 273 Melaka, see Malacca

356

INDEX

Menardo, 8-10 Mendon£a, Andre Furtado de, Portuguese captain, 265 Middle East, see also Egypt; Levant; Syria pepper trade in, 289 spice trade in, 324; historiographic considerations, 69-70; prices in, 6979; source material on, 69-70; variation in, 77 military Dutch, 325-7 Portuguese: and cloves trade, 259, 261, 263-5; in Malabar, 188-9, 191-2, 195, 201, 204; and spice trade, 93, 188-9, 194, 202, 251, 269-82 Mocquet, Jean, chronicler, 123, 132, 134 Moluccas Chinese in, 26-7 cloves in, 23-6, 28-9, 259-66, 325-8 Dutch in, 325-8 imports and exports of, 260 Portuguese in, 23-4, 260-3 Spanish in, 23-4, 327 spice trade in, 172-3, 773, 176-83, 290, 292, 343 monopolies/monopsonies British, on pepper, 286 Dutch: on pepper, 292, 315, 319-20; on spices, 317-36, 348 Portuguese: on cinnamon, 253-5; on cloves, 259, 261, 263, 265; on pepper, 284; on spices, 158, 205, 246 Sri Lankan, on cinnamon, 250, 252, 254 Moon, ship, 132 Moreland, W.H., historian, 281 Moreno, Lourenco, 223, 250 Mundy, Peter, 282 Munro, Thomas, 290 Musa, Ant6nio, writer, 12, 41, 43 Musallam, Shihab ad-Din b., Karimi merchant, 65 Musa, Monsa, king of Taqrur, 65 Muslims in Moluccas, 264 in spice trade, 51-68, 106, 174, 202; see also Karimi merchants; in Ceylon, 251; historiographic considerations, 51; products traded by, 55; shipping and, 56-7; source material on, 52; trade routes of, 56-7 Myristica fragrans, see mace; nutmeg Napoleonic Wars, 297-8 Near East, see Middle East

Netherlands, see Dutch Newton, Sir Isaac, scientist, 337 Nicheta, Alvise, banker, 95 Nossa Senhora da Paz, ship, 129 Nossa Senhora de Jesus, ship, 129 Nossa Senhora de Piedade, ship, 129 Nossa Senhora do Monte do Carmo, ship, 130, 132, 134 Nunez, Hector, British shipping agent, 125 nutmeg (Myristica fragrans), 27, 31-6, 37', see also mace in antiquity, 32-3 description of, 31-2 nomenclature, 34 Portuguese importation of, volume of, 125, 126 price of, 9 Odoric, friar, 288 Ormuz, see Hormuz Orta, Garcia da, botanist, 1-48, 288 Ottoman empire, 94-6, 101, 118, 274, 276, 340-1; see also Levant; Middle East Pagnini, editor, 69 Palha, Francisco, 255, 263 Palsgrave, ship, 131, 132 Paulo, see Egineta, Paulo Pegolotti, F. di Balducci, chronicler, 146 pepper (Piper spp.), 39-48, 49 in Asian markets, 283-316; price of, 3012, 310; trends in, 310-15 description of, 41-2, 44-5 in European markets, 111-20, 141-83, 176-83', demand and, 284, 288; historiographic considerations, 142-3, 160; as percentage of total spice trade, 148-54; Portuguese sea trade and, 141, 283-4; price of, 69, 78, 78-9, 85-92, 105, 148, 168-71, 285, 306, 310; trends in, 151-7, 161-3, 172-4, 173, 214-16; volume of, 141-2, 143, 14850, 162-5 geographic distribution of, 39-40, 44, 20911, 288 in Java, 6 in Levantine trade, 111-20, 283 in Malabar, 39, 41, 44, 185-7, 288-93, 299; see also Cochin, Portuguese factory in; pepper gardens, in Malabar medicinal uses of, 42, 44 nomenclature, 40 Portuguese importation of, volume of, 1256, 126, 130, 131, 283

INDEX pepper (Piper spp.) continued shipping of, 127-8; in Red Sea, 275, 281 trade by Egyptian Muslims, 58 pepper gardens, in Malabar, 209-34 advance payments and, 228-9 geographic distribution of, 209-11 historiographic considerations, 212-13, 220, 222, 233-4 market structure and, 228-32 ownership of, 221 as production units, 218-20 productivity of, 211-18 size of, 218-20 socioeconomic aspects of, 220-$, 232-3 soil conditions in, 209-10 source material on, 212, 216, 222 Pereira, Duarte Pacheco, 212 Periyar River, 210 Persian Gulf, spice trade in, 115, 283 Pessoa, Ant6nio, 255 Philip II, king of Spain, 119 Philippines, 264 Pinto, Antonio, secretary, 115 piracy, 339, 341-2 Pires, Lourenfo, see Tdvora, Louren?o Pires de Pires, Tome, author, 212-13, 260-1 Pliny, Roman scholar, 2, 13, 16, 21-2, 32-3, 41-2, 44 Portugal imports of, 121-36; source material on, 121-2, 124, 158 monopoly powers of, see monopolies, Portuguese relations with Calicut, 189-90 shipping by, see Carreira da India in slave trade, 134-5 spice trade of, 91-2, 111-20, 141, 153, 156-75; see also Carreira da India', comparison with Britain, 131-3; economic aspects of, 346; historiographic considerations, 121-3, 174-5; and Malabar pepper factory. see Cochin, Portuguese factory in; military aspects of, 93, 188-9, 194, 202, 251, 269-82; prices in, 168-9; private capital in, 205; ship registration in, 122-5, 128-36; smuggling in, 123; supply and demand in, 190-4, 213-14; volume of, 121-36, 726, 130, 134, 159-65, 183 Priuli, diarist, 93, 100, 107, 151 Qala'un, Mamluk sultan, 64

357

Queyroz, Fernao, 250 Quilon, 211-12 Quirini, V., 212 Qus, 56-7 Qusair, 56 Raffles, Stamford, colonial administrator, 297, 303, 309-10 Ragusa, 117-18 Recanati, 102 Red Sea, 102 spice trade in, 91, 111, 115, 119, 168, 269-83, 340; historiographic considerations, 94, 269; Portuguese interference in, 269-82 Reformation, ship, 131, 132 registers, of Portuguese ships, 122-5, 128-36, 158-60 Reliquias, ship, 125 Repelin, 5-6 Rizo, Andra, banker, 95 Rizo, Jer6nimo, banker, 95 Rodriguez, Thomas, doctor, 18 Romania, 145-6, 176 Ronches, Thome de Souza, Portuguese captain, 253, 255 Ruano, 1-48 Ruelio, writer, 22 Saavedra, Alvaro de, captain, 262 Saint Barthelemy, ship, 107 Saladin, sultan of Egypt and Syria, 54 Sa", Leonardo de, bishop of China, 279-80 Salihacha, 4 Samarkand, 58 Samorin, see Zamorin of Calicut Samudri Raja, see Zamorin of Calicut Sande, Francisco de, governor, 279 Santa Cruz, ship, 135 Sanudo, diarist, 102, 121-2, 124, 151, 153-4 Sao Alberto, ship, 135 Sao Felipe, ship, 129 Sao Jacinto, ship, 129 Sao Jago, ship, 134 Sao Jodo Baptista, ship, 135 Sao Joao, ship, 129 Sao Martinho, ship, 129 Sao Matheus, ship, 129 Sao Paulo, ship, 271 Sao Rocque, ship, 129 Sao Salvador, ship, 125-6, 126, 129 Sao Sebastiao, ship, 273 Sao Simao, ship, 129 Sao Thome, ship, 125, 132

358

INDEX

Seeley, J. R., historian, 339 Segre, Arturo, historian, 96 Senense, Mateolo, 10 Sepulveda, writer, 43 Serapio, 22, 28-9, 34-5 Sergeant, R.B., historian, 60 Shah, Ali Mughayat, sultan, 269 shipping in Mediterranean, 111 Muslim, in spice trade, 56-7 of pepper, 127-8; in Red Sea, 275, 281 between Portugal and India, passengers in, 134 Portuguese, see Carreira da India registers of, 122-5, 128-36 risks in, 339-42 spice trade and, 91 stowage of cargo in, 127 Short, Henry, British merchant, 323 silk trade, in Levant, 94, 100 Silva, M. Pires da, historian, 94 Silvatico, Matheus, writer, 35, 43 Silveira, Diogo da, Portuguese commander, 270 Silveira, Francisco Rodrigues da, 274 Sina, Ibn, see Avicenna Singh, Sobha, 335 Sirrulah, Dayan, sultan, 260 Sitawaka, 255 slave trade, Portugal in, 134-5 smuggling and cinnamon trade, 252 of cloves, 325-7, 333 in Portugal, 123 Soranzo, Maphio, banker, 95 Sousa, Antonio de, Portuguese captain, 271 Sousa, Martin Affonso de, captain, 6 Spain, see also Catalonia ginger imports of, 178 in Portuguese naval conflicts, 261-2, 279 trade with Moluccas, 23-4, 327 Speelman, Cornelis, 328 Sri Lanka, see Ceylon Steensgaard, N., historian, 142, 157, 161, 163-4, 174, 339 Suez, 56 Suleyman I, Ottoman ruler, 275 Sulivan, Laurence, 305 Sumatra, 214, 269-82; see also Atjeh natural resources of, 278 pepper in, 289-91, 295, 304-10, 319 supply and demand in Asian spice trade, 344, 347 in Portuguese spice trade, 190-4, 213-14 Surat, 323-4, 331-3, 336, 343

Syria, 2, 64, 70, 95, 103, 149 Christians in, and Malabar pepper gardens, 225-6 clove prices in, 76 ginger prices in, 76, 78 pepper prices in, 73-4 spice trade in, 100; effect of Portuguese shipping on, 144 Syzygium aromaticum, see cloves Tamara, Francisco de, chronicler, 14 Tamerlane, conqueror, 65 TaVora, Lourengo Pires de, Portuguese ambassador, 114-16, 118 Temudo, Jorge, archbishop of Goa, 275-6 Ternate, 261-6, 320-2, 325-8 textiles Portuguese importation of, volume of, 726, 127 Venetian trade in, 148 Theophrastus, 12 Thirty Years War, 171, 174 Tor, 88, 112 Travancore, 292 Tron, chevalier, 93 Turks, 94-6, 101, 118, 274, 277, 340-1 war with Venice, 103, 341 units of measurement, in Middle Eastern spice trade, 70, 146 Unni Rama, raja of Cochin, 193 Unni Rama Varma, raja of Cochin, 193 Uzzano, Giovanni da, chronicler, 69-70 Valignano, Alexandre, S.J., 276-7 van Breugel, Rovere, 297 van Dam, Pieter, historian, 335 Van der Parra, Dutch governor-general, 301 van Helsdingen, Pieter, Dutch company official, 334 van Hogendorp, Dirk, 297, 303 van Linschoten, Jan Huygen, chronicler, 122, 127-8, 132, 134-5, 277 van Neck, Jacob, Dutch captain, 285 van Zwardecroon, director of Dutch East India Company, 335 Vaz, Alvaro, 211-12 Vembanad, Lake, 210 Venice, 69-70, 78-9, 95, 144, 340-1 pepper prices in, 85-6, 89-90, 91, 99 spice prices in, 99 trade with Alexandria, 69-70, 77, 85-7, 100, 112, 116-17, 146-7, 172; market forces in, 344; Portuguese sea trade

INDEX Venice continued and, 93-110, 141; volume of, 111, 116-17, 141, 145, 753, 154, 776 trade with Levant, 94, 144-51, 339; effect of Portuguese shipping on, 144, 155; trends in, 151-7, 166-7, 773 war with Turks, 103, 341 Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC), see Dutch East India Company

359

Wake, C.H.H., historian, 122, 130-1, 133, 141-83 Yemen, trade with Egypt, 54-7, 66 Zamorin of Calicut (Samudri Raja), 189-92, 202, 210, 212-13, 292 Zustignan, Marco, banker, 95