Speedbird: The Complete History of BOAC 9780755621385, 9781780764627

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1. BOAC coat of arms.

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In the manner of British official histories, the author was given free access to the British Overseas Airways Corporation’s files. He alone is responsible for the statements made and the views expressed.

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2. Sir Basil Smallpeice, BOAC Managing Director, 1956–1963.

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Boxes, Charts, and Illustrations

Boxes and Charts 4.1 Line organization in 1947 92 8.1 Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation organization chart, headquarters 176 9.1 VC-10 orders 213 10.1 Structure of Air Holdings Ltd., early 1962 222 10.2 Employers and Trade Unions: membership of National Joint Council for Civil Air Transport, 1958 239 10.3 National Joint Council: national sectional panels 240 12.1 BOAC organization, 1971 298 12.2 British Airways Board: initial Group arrangement 299

Illustrations

1 BOAC coat of arms ii 2 Sir Basil Smallpeice, BOAC Managing Director, 1956–1963 vi 3 Lord (Sir John) Reith, BOAC Chairman, 24 August 1939–January 1940 2 4 The Armstrong Whitworth Atalanta Class landplane 7 5 The C-Class Short Empire flying-boat Cleopatra, 1945 8 6 The interior of a C-Class Empire flying-boat 9 7 The four-engined Armstrong Whitworth Ensign 10 8 The venerable Handley Page HP-42s flew from Cairo to India until 1940 11 9 The Boeing 314 trans-oceanic flying-boat 13 10 The interior of the DH-91 Albatross Class “Frobisher” aircraft 14 11 The interior of the Boeing 747 of 1970 14 12 BOAC routes (in the year ending 31 March 1943) operated by flying-boats and landplanes 16 13 An Armstrong Whitworth twin-engined Whitley 17 14 Lord Knollys, BOAC Chairman, May 1943–1947 22 15 Air Commodore Critchley 22 16 The twin-engined Vickers Warwick 24 17 The Avro Lancastrian 27 18 The interior of the Avro Lancastrian 27 19 The Lockheed L-18 Lodestar 30 20 The De Havilland DH-98 Mosquito bomber 30

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xii S p e e d b i r d 21 A Consolidated B-24 Liberator of the North Atlantic Return Ferry Service, ca. 1944 32 22 The Douglas DC-3/C-47/Dakota, 1947 38 23 BOAC routes, 31 March 1944 43 24 The very long-ranged American Consolidated Catalina 47 25 Sir Harold Hartley, BOAC Chairman, 1947–1949 50 26 BOAC female traffic worker at Nairobi in 1946 51 27 BOAC routes, 31 March 1945 52 28 BOAC routes, 31 March 1946 56 29 One of the Sunderland flying-boat variants, the 1946 Hythe Class 68 30 The four-engined Lockheed Constellation 69 31 The four-engined Canadair Argonaut 72 32 A “traffic lady” at London Airport, North Side, 1946 72 33 The Solent, a Short Sunderland flying-boat 78 34 The four-engined Avro Tudor 79 35 The Handley Page Halton 81 36 London Airport North Side check-in, in tents, 1946 83 37 Constellation Baltimore, 1950 97 38 The four-engined Avro York 99 39 A Constellation cockpit 102 40 The four-engined Boeing Stratocruiser 104 41 The Boeing Stratocruiser with sleeper accommodations 107 42 Sir Miles Thomas, DFC, BOAC Chairman, 1949–1956 118 43 Whitney Straight, BOAC Managing Director, 1947–1949, and Deputy Chairman, 1949–1955 121 44 The Handley Page HP-81 Hermes Hero 136 45 Mr. Shenstone with the famous former Imperial Airways Captain O. P. Jones, in front of Constellation Bristol II 137 46 The De Havilland Comet 1 139 47 Turbine-powered aircraft lacked the vibrations and noise of pistonengined machines 140 48 A York arrives at London Airport with a shipment of baby elephants, ca. 1956 146 49 The Comet 1 cockpit 147 50 The Comet 1 cabin, early 1950s 148 51 The view from my 1961–1962 office at BOAC 150 52 Cartoon celebrating the Kangaroo route’s twenty-first birthday 163 53 The ex-Imperial Airways Victoria Station terminal, London 178 54 Sir Gerard d’Erlanger, BOAC Chairman, 1956–1960 194 55 The Bristol Britannia 102 for Empire routes (1955–1966) 196 56 The Britannia cockpit 199 57 Her Majesty the Queen is welcomed by Sir Miles Thomas 201 58 Servicing a Britannia during a routine fuelling stop at Khartoum, Sudan 202

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B o x e s , C h a r t s , a n d I l l u s t r at i o n s

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59 A Douglas DC-7C of the Seven Seas Class, 1956–1964 205 60 Captain Messenger at the controls of Constellation Bangor II 206 61 An engine test stand of the BOAC repair depot at Treforest in South Wales 207 62 Veteran Captain Messenger in the course of the then customary visit to the passengers on a long-haul flight 209 63 The long-range turbo-prop Bristol Britannia 312 for North Atlantic and eventually Pacific services, 1957–1964 216 64 BOAC prided itself and was, indeed, known for the excellence of its First-Class cabin service 233 65 Sir Matthew Slattery, BOAC Chairman, 1960–1963 244 66 Gilbert Lee, Chairman of Associated Companies, 1967–1971 244 67 The Vickers Super VC-10 with speed-brakes extended 251 68 The redesigned and virtually indestructible De Havilland Comet 4 253 69 The inaugural trans-Atlantic flight of the De Havilland Comet 4 255 70 The original 707 for BOAC was refused its Certificate of Airworthiness by the British Air Registration Board until modified 256 71 Boeing 707 fitted with extended fin/ventral tail skid 258 72 The Canadian-built CL-44 259 73 A Comet 4 seen from below in takeoff configuration 261 74 Pilots’ manuals for the C-Class Empire flying-boat of 1934 and the Boeing 707 of 1960 261 75 A poster touting the diversity of BOAC cabin staff in the 1960s 267 76 International trainee stewardesses in their native costumes at the training facility, London Airport 270 77 Freight scheduling at London Airport-Heathrow in the early 1960s 271 78 A pallet being loaded 273 79 A BOAC Boeing 707-336C freighter loaded with cargo at London Airport 273 80 Apprentice training 274 81 A 1934 Empire flying-boat and a 1960 Boeing 707 to the same scale 276 82 BOAC-Cunard Cargo 707-336C 279 83 The Boeing 707 cockpit 283 84 BOAC world routes, 1965 285 85 The Vickers VC-10 cockpit 287 86 The new BOAC Board chaired by Sir Giles Guthrie, 1964 289 87 Sir Giles Guthrie, BOAC Chairman, 1964–1969 290 88 Sir Charles Hardie, BOAC Deputy Chairman, 1966, and Chairman, 1969 290 89 Catering staff preparing salad meals for Economy-Class passengers, ca. 1970 295 90 Sir Charles Abell, BOAC Engineering Director 300

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xiv S p e e d b i r d 91 An airframe engineer adjusting the leading-edge slat of a Vickers Super VC-10 300 92 Two specialists working on the brakes of a VC-10 at London Airport 306 93 Peter Hermon, the computer genius of BOAC 318 94 Two BOAC captains from the first Boeing 707-436 flight over the USSR to Japan 323 95 Charts of the approaches to Boston, 1974 330 96 Trans-Pacific routes 337 97 Sir Ross Stainton, Chief Executive of British Airways, 1977–1981 340 98 Quality control of 40,000 spare parts was a top priority 343 99 The supply and immediate availability of spares was vital 345 100 A maintenance hall in “the Kremlin”, ca. 1965 347 101 In the late 1960s it took a team of 103 men and a young woman to do the first “full-life extension” of a Boeing 707-436 348 102 The Concorde coming 352 103 The Concorde cabin 353 104 Sir Charles Hardie, BOAC Deputy Chairman, 1966, and Chairman, 1969, and Keith Granville, BOAC Chairman, 1971–1974 357 105 The Concorde cruise profile 362 106 Sir Keith Granville, BOAC Chairman, 1971–1974 368 107 A Boeing 747-100 372 108 A Boeing 747 cockpit 373 109 The interior of a 1947 Avro York 375 110 The interior of a 1970 Boeing 747-100 375 111 A joint advertisement for BOAC and BEA 376 Unless otherwise credited, all photographs are from BOAC’s own collection with rights granted to the author.

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Author’s Note (1976) Toward the end of 1960 Sir Basil Smallpeice, then the Managing Director of BOAC, accepted the idea that BOAC should sponsor this volume as a continuation of my Britain’s Imperial Air Routes, which had carried the story of the development of Britain’s overseas airlines to the passage of the British Overseas Airways Act of 1939. It was intended that the first ten chapters of the present work would be BOAC’s twenty-fifth anniversary history. But events late in 1963 seemed to make it advisable to postpone publication. And so the manuscript lay in storage until some time after the Board’s decision in January 1974 that there should be a history of BOAC. From the minutes of the 18 January 1974 Meeting of the Board of the British Overseas Airways Corporation: #7825 History of BOAC Agreed that a suitable record should be made of the history of BOAC from its inception to its dissolution and authorized the Chief Executive to commission this work (possibly in combination with a history of BEA) in consultation with publishers and with other persons as he considered appropriate.

At first it was intended that Winston Bray, then just retired as Deputy Chairman and the former Planning Director, should undertake the task. But when it was pointed out that I had already done much of the work, he graciously stepped aside and most generously agreed to help me complete this book. Thanks must also be given to the surviving former Chairmen who were kind enough to read parts of the manuscript and to offer their comments, criticisms, and corrections—Lord Thomas of Remenham, Sir Matthew Slattery, Sir Giles Guthrie, Sir Charles Hardie, and Sir Keith Granville—as well as to sometime Chief Executive Sir Basil Smallpeice, who read over much or all of the entire manuscript, as well as to Bernard Wood, then the Solicitor, and to his Chief Legal Clerk, Don Pool, who made arrangements for my second research trip, not to mention Alan Ponsford, Martin Roundell, T. E. Scott Chard, and Freddie Gillman who helped in the first stay in 1962. Above all, I am most grateful to Winston Bray, John Winstead, and Bernard Wood for their time, patient criticism, and inside knowledge so freely given to help make sure the final manuscript was as accurate as possible, as also to R. E. G. Davies, who read and commented upon the whole. Thanks are also due to Mrs. Abigail T. Siddall for her comments and criticisms, and to my two typists, Mrs. Joan Shull and Mrs. Pauline Norby, and to Mrs. Carol A. Williams, who in 2010 provided editorial oversight and put the manuscript on a disk.

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xvi S p e e d b i r d The book is a biography of a company. As such it has, perhaps, some of the defects which sympathy may create. Naturally, the requirements of space have caused some areas to be neglected more than I wished, especially in the laterstage operations, and overseas stations have had to be omitted to stay within the assigned limit of 150,000 words. An attempt to remedy this defect will be made in specialized articles. R. H. Manhattan, Kansas, USA 7 December 1976 7 November 2010

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Author’s Note (2012) When this manuscript goes to press in early 2013, it will be exactly fifty-three years from when I received a handwritten letter from Sir Basil Smallpeice, the then Managing Director of BOAC. He had been impelled to write because Lord Godber, Chairman of Shell, the supplier of fuel to Imperial Airways and BOAC, had sent him a copy of my brand-new Britain’s Imperial Air Routes. Sir Basil asked me, a Second World War RAFVR pilot, to do a second volume on BOAC and to fly to Heathrow to discuss it. Agreement was reached and I was placed in the experienced care of R. E. Gillman, the Public Relations Manager. In due course I was installed in an office in “the Kremlin,” as the Headquarters at London Airport (Heathrow) was known, which looked into one of the hangars where the 707s were overhauled. I ate in the Senior Mess and got to talk to some of the Management principals. Unfortunately, Smallpeice and the Chairman, Sir Matthew Slattery, left at the end of 1963 as a result of the Corbett Report, which the Minister of Aviation, Julian Amery, had commissioned. I made a hasty post-Thanksgiving trip to London to see the latest papers. Sir Matthew retired, Sir Basil went to Cunard, and the former Fleet Air Arm pilot and banker, Sir Giles Guthrie, came in as Chairman and Chief Executive. He drafted and Julian Amery signed a new Direction, known as the “Magna Carta,” in part based upon a paper I had supplied noting all the times the BOAC Board had acted in the public interest and not the Corporation’s best commercial judgment and desires. Starting in 1964, Guthrie was authorized to act commercially. Because Guthrie wanted and needed time to put BOAC on a sounder footing, he informed me that the book was to be suspended indefinitely. I concurred. In 1974, as BOAC was about to be melded into British Airways (BA) the Board voted to have a history. When Sir Basil heard of it, he pointed out that there already was a draft manuscript by an American professional historian. Thus I was given a new contract and returned to a smaller ground-floor office to carry the story to 1974. My guardian now was the Solicitor, Peter Wood. This made writing much more difficult as he revised the work as a contract whereas Gillman saw it as a literary effort. Nevertheless, I finished an acceptable manuscript in 1978. But then, however, the Chairman of British Airways, the former Imperial Airways premium apprentice, Sir Ross Stainton, wished to delay publication until (1) the financing of Concorde was agreed with the Government and (2) the privatization of British Airways was achieved. Concorde was settled in 1979 and British Airways went private in 1985. But for twenty-six years, from 1978, the Legal Department refused publication of my manuscript or to grant me the rights. Finally, in May 2000 BA appointed the Australian Rod Eddington as Chairman and Chief Executive. I wrote to him right away, appealing against the

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xviii S p e e d b i r d sequestration of my work while at the same time pointing out that other authors had had access to it. He agreed, and Martin George, then Commercial Director, was told to release the rights to me, provided the work was vetted to see that it would not harm British Airways. It still took another two years for the vetting process, legal niceties, etc., finally to get the work and the illustrations released to me in 2003. By then, of course, publication—which could have been by Routledge and Kegan Paul in 1978—had changed to a complete lack of interest by publishers. Until 2010, my time was otherwise occupied, in spite of retirement. Going to press has also been delayed by the necessity of computerized scanning and downloading to a disk of the typewriter-produced 1978 draft. Speedbird: The Complete History of BOAC joins a select few! As far as I know, this is the only history of a nationalized airline and especially one written with full access to the records. It should, lastly, be noted that Ian Lloyd’s multi-volume history of Rolls-Royce was embargoed for many years until it appeared at last in 1978. Even longer delayed was Captain John Taylor’s The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States, ready for publication in 1906. For personal and political reasons, it did not appear until 1971, more than twenty years after the author’s death. Because the manuscript is going to press almost a half century after it was written, and because the notes are no longer in my possession, those interested in pursuing a point or a reference should start with the introduction to the bibliography or should contact the British Airways Archives at www.ba.com/heritage. R. H. Manhattan, Kansas June 2012

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Preface The pressures of space have prevented me not only telling the whole story of the British Overseas Airways Corporation, but also integrating its development into the flow of British history in general. Melding the pattern of any organization into that of the whole of a national or typological history leads to consideration of comparative patterns. In this respect it seems to me, as I noted in a lecture to the Royal Swedish Staff College in January 1977, that perhaps the most useful parallel between BOAC and another historical phenomenon may be that between the Corporation’s struggles and the pattern of British history in the Second World War. In BOAC’s case it opens with the phoney airline wherein the new Corporation was a captive of the wartime Government, as described in Part One. The second stage, 1946–1956, was one in which there were struggles against adversity, followed by the euphoria of the Comet victory and the depression of its loss. Part Two concludes with the third phase, from 1956 to 1964, during which the battle was both against outside competition and against domestic blindness while profitable new equipment was being brought into service, a new organization being developed, and financial and political uncertainties brought to a showdown. Part Three takes up the story from 1 January 1964’s so-called “Magna Carta.” BOAC marched steadily to victory despite domestic setbacks and the erosion of its network as colonies became independent. Thus, in a way, the dissolution date of 1 April 1974 was the equivalent of VJ-Day in 1945 for the British war effort, only the merger of BOAC and BEA into British Airways provided both strength and weakness. In the late Seventies it was the European and Regional Sectors which were facing the re-equipment problems and renewed political pressure to “fly British.” This book originally was called ‘BOAC, 1939–1974: The Inside Story of a Nationalized Airline’ because it starts with the British Overseas Airways Act of 1939 and concludes with the creation of the second British Airways. It is the inside story because it has been written from the Headquarters vantage point, a perspective less and less distorted as the whole airline became based in London. The BOAC story reflects both technological change and the decline of Empire. It shows how the inhuman march of technology created both efficiency and job loss. Perhaps one of the most amusing yet historically interesting developments of the early wartime days was the controversy over the name of the Corporation. This in itself helped strengthen the belief that there was a constant internal struggle between the Imperial Airways “old-timers” and the British Airways (1936) newcomers within BOAC. It was recognized that the Imperial Airways staff, who had an intensely loyal esprit de corps, would object to the title “British Airways.” So Mr. Lee-Elliot, who had designed the Speedbird in 1932 for Imperial Airways, was commissioned to do a special design in which “British Airways” were the salient

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xx S p e e d b i r d words with “Overseas” and “Corporation” being deletable at will without spoiling the composition. This design appeared on the Corporation’s first advertisement. When the Rt. Hon. Clive Pearson, formerly Chairman of British Airways, became Chairman of BOAC he decreed on 22 April 1940 that the title would be “British Airways,” since the General Post Office had ruled that no code name, such as BOAC, could be used in wartime cables. Moreover, Pearson said it was a cardinal sin to call the Corporation “BOAC,” although the Air Ministry did. Thus, wartime photographs show the words British Airways with the old Imperial Airways Speedbird on the noses of aircraft up until 1943. The change came on 3  January 1943 when the Under-Secretary of State for Air, Harold Balfour, was on a visit to Short Brothers at Rochester to see the new Sunderlands which had just been allocated to BOAC. He took one angry look at the insignia on the nose of the aircraft and snorted, “That is not the name of the Corporation! It is the British Overseas Airways Corporation.” As the then-current regulations required only the name of the owner to be written in lettering 3 inches high, the full name was placed under the tailplane, where it remained on all BOAC aircraft. As each aircraft came in during 1943 for its annual Certificate of Airworthiness (CofA) inspection, it was repainted correctly. But the controversy rambled on into 1944 and was revived every time there was talk of a merger between BEA and BOAC. The classic story in this connection is that when in 1943 the Director-General, Alfred Cecil Critchley, visited Kampala, he noticed that the station bell still bore the Imperial Airways insignia. He ordered it changed. Later he received the following signal from the Station Superintendent: “With regard to the bell at this station, the IA insignia has been replaced by that of BOAC. I have to report that the tone of the bell has been lowered.” The BOAC coat of arms was granted by Letters Patent of the College of Heralds on 24 January 1941. The history of BOAC should provide some thoughtful guidance for those charged with the task of continuing to keep British Airways able to take good care of its passengers and shippers world-wide.

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PART ONE Airline in Wartime, 1939–1945

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3. Lord (Sir John) Reith, BOAC Chairman, 24 August 1939–January 1940.

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Chapter I The Corporation at War Introduction Even before the First World War ended, British air transport companies had been formed. By 1924, the competing, subsidized operators had been merged into one financially viable company, Imperial Airways. Under the management of George Woods Humphery and his team, it pioneered British air services to South Africa, India, Australia, Hong Kong, and experimentally across the Atlantic. When war came again in 1939 the company had yet to complete the ambitious plans sketched out for a round-the-world operation. In the meantime, European air services had become the target of a group of internal airlines merged in 1936 to form British Airways (1936). This company was soon sharing Imperial Airways’ previous monopoly of United Kingdom subsidies, while—unlike the older company—it was allowed by the Government to purchase German and American aircraft. The general division in effect from 1936 of British overseas operations into Empire routes served by Imperial Airways and into European routes served by both Imperial and British Airways was upset by difficulties with the pilots of Imperial Airways, which resulted in the Cadman Inquiry of 1937–1938. After it reported, what had started as a labour-relations problem, accentuated by the ambitions and modern aircraft of British Airways, was made into a political football, which in the end caused changes both in the airlines and at the Air Ministry. The most important of these was the expulsion of the able Managing Director Woods Humphery and the political appointment on 24 August 1939 of the then Director-General of the BBC, Sir John Reith, as Chairman. This cost Britain the public services of a commercially minded airman of unrivalled experience whose peers, men like Sir Hudson Fysh of Qantas and Juan Trippe of Pan American, remained in successful control of their airlines into the 1960s. At the same time, the Conservative Government of the day accepted Reith’s public service idea that the existing private stockholders should be eased out and that the two major British airlines should be merged into one public corporation upon whose Board would sit representatives of the various Commonwealth countries and in which outside investors could hold stock. The story of the planning and passage of the British Overseas Airways Act has already been told in my Britain’s Imperial Air Routes (1960). The Act, which nationalized the external airlines, received the Royal Assent on 4 August 1939. On 3 September the Second World War broke out. The airlines were at once placed under an Air Ministry organization, National Air Communications (NAC). This

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4 S p e e d b i r d was really the Civil Aviation Department in khaki. NAC lasted only until early 1940 because no long-term plan for the use of air transport in war existed and so, when it had finished its original emergency work, it was abolished. Cooperation between Imperial Airways and British Airways had been brought about by the Munich crisis of September 1938. A War Book was sketched out and came into being in February 1939. It covered plans for war starting on any day of the week, because of schedules, and for moving RAF squadrons from Basra to Aden, Nairobi to Khartoum, and India to Malaya. On 17 February a joint Imperial Airways–British Airways Planning Committee was established to map National Air Communications operation of external air services as these would be the personal responsibility of the Secretary of State for Air. At the first meeting the Chairman, Group Captain Gordon Dean, accurately predicted the course of the war, including Japanese intervention in the Far East. He called for the setting up of alternative routes so that essential air communications throughout the Empire would be guaranteed. One immediate result of these meetings was the dispatch of Imperial Airways’ former Air Superintendent, H. G. Brackley, to survey a new route to Cairo via French North and West Africa, and another to survey the trans-Indian Ocean passage from Australia to East Africa. At the same time it was agreed that the bases west of the “bomb-line,” Exeter and Whitchurch, set up at the time of Munich, would be the wartime homes of the two companies. Flying-boats were to go to Pembroke Dock, Falmouth, or Poole. It was in these discussions that the fundamental difference in outlook between commercial companies and the Royal Air Force (RAF) emerged. The Air Ministry said that the RAF had no specific plans for using civil aircraft, but intended in wartime to take all it could get. The airlines pointed to the short-sightedness of this attitude and protested vigorously against the Air Ministry proposal simply to hand over such routes as Kisumu– Durban to South African Airways (SAA) without regard to the commercial future. The operators also asked that their requirements for fuel, wireless facilities, and permits be included in the then current Anglo-French staff talks. On 27 March 1939 war priorities were agreed: first, provision of transport for the RAF; second, carriage of VIPs; and third, the operation of a surcharged Empire Air Mail Scheme, cancelling the aerial transmission of all First-Class mail at surface rates, begun in 1936. Other meetings agreed that all flying-boats would assemble in Egypt on the outbreak, and that Durban would be their overseas base. Camouflage, spares, replacement of aircraft, fuel supplies, screening of aircrew and ground crew to exempt them from conscription, and financial arrangements with National Air Communications were also considered. By June 1939 two major problems which were never satisfactorily solved had arisen: the supply of spares for engines used also by the RAF, and the purchase of foreign aircraft to augment the fleet. Rearmament, accidents, and other delaying factors, combined with the technological revolution in aircraft construction, were already leaving Imperial Airways and British Airways short of machines. Just at this time the Brown Committee Report (Cmd.6038 [1939]), which assumed that BOAC would be largely

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autonomous in business matters though mostly financed by the Government, was at pains to point out that British aircraft would obtain a prominent place in the world market only if they were of outstanding merit and developed according to a wellconsidered plan. It called upon the Government to spend large sums to develop suitable aircraft, despite the gamble involved, while at the same time urging that the Air Ministry be barred from tinkering with designs. Finally, it recommended the establishment of a Civil Aviation Development Committee (the original Chairman was to have been Sir Henry Tizard) outside the Air Ministry, but with direct access to the Secretary of State. Not until the Brabazon Committee of 1942 was something started, though no satisfactory arrangement existed for many years, as the Estimates Committee was at pains to point out in its Report of 19 December 1963. Reith hoped to overcome his difficulties with RAF aircraft, but he was strongly opposed by Harold Balfour (formerly of British Airways [1936] and later Lord Balfour of Inchrye), the Under-Secretary who was generally responsible for civil aviation. However, after two days of hard bargaining early in August 1939, Reith was given permission to order nine Douglas DC-5s and two more Lockheed 14s. Additional flying-boats were agreed to in principle, but all orders were delayed until it was decided whether or not the RAF would let the airlines have obsolete Harrows and the newer Wellingtons. However, as soon as war broke out, all orders were cancelled. War was declared on 3 September 1939, but since by the 5th nothing had happened, Area Managers were told that certain parts of the War Book were suspended. After this anticlimax, it was possible for Management to settle down again to its three main tasks: maintaining services to the requirements of the Director-General of Civil Aviation, winding up the two older companies, and establishing the new Corporation with a view to restarting commercial operations as soon as hostilities ceased. From the moment war was declared and National Air Communications started to function, Imperial Airways and British Airways came to be thought of as the Corporation and were managed by one group.

The Formation of BOAC The most immediate problem was the shortage of able men twenty-eight to thirty-five years old to handle each department and every region. At the start of the war British Airways lost 139 employees out of its staff of 420 to the Services. By 31 March 1940 the Corporation had lost 800 persons, but still had in its employment 368 flying, 1,364 administrative, 2,897 engineering, technical, stores, and marine, 83 overseas commercial contract, and 204 overseas engineering and maintenance staff, totalling 4,916 personnel, most of whom were ex-Imperial Airways. (It had seventy-seven useful aircraft, of which some half-dozen Ensigns were not operational.) The shortage of suitable personnel remained a problem throughout the war. Frequently, station managers were young men who had been Imperial Airways trainees a few months before.

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6 S p e e d b i r d The moment war was declared, the Under-Secretary, Harold Balfour, a former pilot and a Director of British Airways, took the view that air transport was strictly an auxiliary of the RAF; all aircraft were to be pooled and allocated to the Services on demand. On 14 September he met with the Permanent Under-Secretary (Sir Arthur Street), Chairman Sir John Reith, the Hon. Clive Pearson of British Airways, and Walter Leslie Runciman, Managing Director designate of BOAC. Balfour announced that eleven new types had been cancelled, the American because of high dollar policy, the British because Fairey could not be spared from Admiralty contracts and because Shorts were the only builder of Sunderland flying-boats. A few flying-boats on the stocks might be completed, but as for certain older types in service, they would have to die when cannibalization yielded no more spares. The emphasis was on operations, he said, and commercial specialists were not to be screened from conscription. The Corporation was not to consider peace at all, only the immediate future, which was concerned with the successful prosecution of the war. If there was nothing left after the war, that was too bad. Runciman commented that this was graceful hari-kari. Reith made a strong protest, which was omitted from the minutes of the meeting. He called for the end of National Air Communications and said that he could not believe that it was in the best interests of the war effort that BOAC take no interest in postwar planning. The most interesting suggestion made was that, when he retired, the Director-General of Civil Aviation, Sir Francis Shelmerdine, should join the Board so as to provide better liaison between the Ministry and the Corporation. A similar proposal in 1936 had cost the Secretary of the Air Ministry his post. It was agreed that to stop ad hoc requisitioning of the Corporation’s aircraft they could be taken only with the Secretary of State’s permission. The general responsibility for civil aviation policy had been delegated by the Secretary of State to the Under-Secretary. Dayto-day administration was carried out by the Permanent Under-Secretary, while the execution of policy was the duty of the Director-General of Civil Aviation, who had direct access to the Secretary of State but was not on the Air Council at the Air Ministry. The autumn of 1939 was full of the usual airline and wartime distractions. Added to these were new arrangements which had to be made with old partners and with Pan American. Then there was the problem of executives. Gerard d’Erlanger of British Airways became head of the Air Transport Auxiliary, which with civilian pilots made more than 300,000 trips with aircraft to RAF units until its disbandment on 30 November 1945. Major J. R. McCrindle, Managing Director of British Airways, was eventually made Deputy Director-General of BOAC. It was not, however, until 17 November 1939 that an Order-in-Council reduced the size of the Board to Chairman, Deputy Chairman, and one to three additional members. On 24 August Reith had been named BOAC Chairman with Clive Pearson as his Deputy and Runciman as Director-General. The new Board met every two weeks until it resigned in March 1943. The delay in naming “the Appointed Day,” when BOAC would officially come into being, created difficulties, especially

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4. The Armstrong Whitworth Atalanta Class landplane was acquired in 1930 for the trans-India route. Note the two-bladed wooden propellers and the civil air ensign flying above the cockpit.

for British Airways, which continued to have to borrow money from its parent, Whitehall Securities. Reith had been chafing at the unimportant part which he had been playing in the war effort and in January 1940 left to become Minister of Information. Pearson succeeded him as Chairman. Upon its formation, BOAC had accepted the sales agreements negotiated in early 1939 with Imperial Airways and British Airways for the transfer of their undertakings to the new Corporation. But the Treasury refused to allow the issue of Airways stock under Section 42 of the British Overseas Airways Act (BOA Act) for fear that it would hurt the sales of war bonds. Instead, after considering promissory notes, it assigned the whole of the loan capital to the Commissioners for the National Debt. Thus, one of the intentions of the Act was defeated. It was never possible for outside investors to take a share in the Corporation, while BOAC itself was until 1964 placed in the commercially impossible position of being financed solely by bonds (loan capital) upon which it had to pay a fixed rate of interest whether it had the wherewithal to do so or not. The result was suicidal until the 1966 capital reconstruction, when it was put right. In the end “the Appointed Day” of the start of BOAC was fixed for 1 April 1940, the beginning of the British fiscal year. On that day Imperial Airways received a cheque for £2,805,335.3s.10d., and British Airways one for £585,065.13s.1d. On the

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8 S p e e d b i r d

5. The C-Class Short Empire flying-boat Cleopatra on a refuelling stop at Laropi, Uganda, 1945.

2nd the Treasury agreed to an issue of £4,500,000 of Airways stock at 3 per cent and to guarantee the principal and interest of banker’s loans of up to £2,250,000. Thus, sixteen years after Imperial Airways came into being as a monopoly company, BOAC emerged as a national corporation. And whereas Imperial Airways had been formed to create a national airline, BOAC was born into a war and had to devise an emergency communications network. Because of this, in April 1940 BOAC’s organization was already reverting to the old Imperial Airways area system with only No. 5 Line, operating flying-boats to the East, remaining until France fell in June.

The End of the Tranquil Period By the time BOAC officially came into being, business had risen from the 1938–1939 £1,405,000 annual rate enjoyed by Imperial Airways and the £240,000 of British Airways to a combined total rate of £2,774,000 per year. And this was despite the fact that services in Europe had been curtailed. Daily services to Paris had been

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6. This view of the interior of a C-Class Empire flying-boat shows the roominess and passenger appeal, not the least of which was flying at 120 mph at low altitude.

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10 S p e e d b i r d

7. The four-engined Armstrong Whitworth Ensigns were not very successful in Europe and so were ferried to Cairo to operate from there. Their size is seen by the men in shorts and topees. Note the Second World War civil markings.

revived on 10 October 1939. On 1 March 1940 National Air Communications charter flights had been taken over by No. 24 Squadron, RAF, which acquired most of the relics—Horsa, Helena, Scylla, Syrinx, and the Fokker XII—in addition to the three Lockheed 10As it had already received. In return, BOAC took over the aircrews of the disbanding internal airlines, with the exception of those of Railway Air Services, Jersey Airways, and Allied Airways. Except for the loss to a German aircraft of the requisitioned boats, Cabot and Caribou, BOAC took no part in the Norwegian campaign. But when Hitler invaded France, BOAC aircraft shuttled ammunition across and brought personnel home. The rapid advance of the Germans made operating conditions difficult. Of the Ensigns, Ettrick was abandoned at Le Bourget after a time-bomb raid and Euryalus was destroyed in England. On 25 June, M. Monteux, long Imperial Airways’ Manager in France, reported: I got in touch with the staff at S. [sic] Nazaire and instructed the British Station Superintendent to evacuate to England as soon as possible. The British staff at Lezignan were also recalled and left Bordeaux by boat on the morning of 20 June. It was obvious that the activities of the Corporation in that part of the world had come to an end . . .

And so, except for the Stockholm, Eire, and Lisbon services, BOAC services into Europe ended until after D-Day, four years later.

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Action at Headquarters, 1940–1943 The 10 May attack on France and the closing of the Mediterranean left Britain in an isolated position. For the next three years the problem for BOAC under Clive Pearson as Chairman was how to re-establish air communications with British forces and possessions overseas. A great deal of Management’s time throughout the war was taken up with the difficulties of operating a mixed fleet, which by 1943 consisted of 117 machines of 23 types fitted with 25 kinds of engines and innumerable different propellers. Moreover, the engines of the day had a time between overhauls (TBO) of only 400 to 500 hours, or about three months. Many of the aircraft used were unsuitable for the operations demanded after June 1940 as they lacked range and tropical or Arctic gear. In addition, the Air Ministry, which had always looked upon transport as the last job of the obsolete bomber, tended to assign to BOAC any individual aircraft for which it could find no use. The Corporation was better served by the Allies: the Dutch brought with them DC-3s, the Norwegians and Poles Lockheed 14s—even a Danish Fw-200 Condor. These aircraft were, for legal simplicity, generally chartered to BOAC. An additional problem was that not only had the RAF lost two of the long-range boats in Norway, but it had also requisitioned two others as well as the three G-Class—the larger and longer-ranged version of the C-Class—for Coastal Command, leaving BOAC woefully short of these types. In May 1940 the new Ministry of Aircraft Production asked the Corporation to help repair airframes and engines at Croydon and Hythe, a means of increasing aircraft output significantly. On 18 June a BOAC party took over the unemployment-

8. Removed from the London–Paris route, the venerable Handley Page HP-42s flew from Cairo to India until Hannibal disappeared in March 1940.

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12 S p e e d b i r d relief factory at Treforest in South Wales. Staff also were sent to Liverpool to help assemble aircraft from the United States. In addition, a propeller repair organization was established at Bristol. The whole, which employed over 35 per cent of the BOAC staff in Britain during the war, was united into the Propeller and Engine Repair Auxiliary (PERA) on 1 September 1942. By 31 March 1945 PERA had turned out 8,250 reconditioned engines, not to mention salvaging parts from thousands more, and 22,430 propellers. After the war, to prevent unemployment and to conserve dollars, Treforest was kept as BOAC’s engine overhaul base. Management meetings reflected the general way in which the life of every Englishman was being changed during the war. Local defence volunteers and firewatchers were organized, record-keeping was cut by the abolition of 200 different forms, etc. Despite economies, however, the staff crept up by 7,000 to 12,000 between 1940 and 1943. The Post Office stopped all air mail except to Lisbon on 12 June 1940, but BOAC was still able to ship 72 pounds weekly in its own aircraft. Two days earlier the BOAC Horseshoe service with flying-boats between Durban and Sydney had started when the Mediterranean closed. The Post Office at once urged BOAC to develop a new connecting link. This it did with a service via Lisbon and West Africa and the introduction of airgraphs, followed later by the light blue airletters. A million airgraphed letters weighed only one-sixtieth of that of many ordinary letters; so, in addition, BOAC began microfilming its own mail to Durban in November 1940. These were the days of ad hoc decisions, of action, of counteraction, of indecision. A new overseas headquarters was established at Durban in August 1941 and abolished in December; the staff taken from Cairo were returned there, only to be withdrawn when Rommel advanced in 1942, some to Khartoum and others back to Durban, and yet back again to Cairo after El Alamein, an anabasis more frustrating than heroic! At home, operations were complicated by the fact that the main base was at Whitchurch, but there had been Exeter and remained Bramcote, to which was added Leuchars (“Lukers”) and Prestwick. Attempts to get St. Eval or St. Mawgan in Cornwall so as to increase the payload on the Lisbon–West Africa services failed. For a while, flights started in Whitchurch and refuelled at Colerne, while KLM used Chivenor. Poole remained the flying-boat base throughout the war and eventually landplanes operating to the south and east were based on nearby Hurn. It was at Whitchurch in October 1940 that a disgruntled worker successfully set fire to Frobisher and Faraday. In midsummer 1940 Runciman asked Sir Francis Shelmerdine, Director-General of Civil Aviation (DGCA), to buy for BOAC’s long-range flights five American flying-boats, five landplanes, and also nine Lockheed 18s or six DC-3s. This was given such high priority that Balfour flew to the United States and obtained three Boeing 314 boats, some Consolidated Liberators, and the Lockheeds. But it was not until 1943 that DC-3s (as Dakotas) came to BOAC, though the Secretary of State, Sir Archibald Sinclair (Lord Thurso), suggested in October 1940 that Britain accept Douglas’s offer of ten DC-3s at $100,000 apiece along with a Liberator

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9. The Boeing 314 trans-oceanic flying-boat was a second-generation machine developed for Pan American Airways (PAA). It was large, comfortable, and reliable.

(B-24) from a US Army order. He reckoned that these machines would enable BOAC to open a flying-boat service to Lagos, operate Aden–Egypt–the Balkans, and resume Central African landplane operations as well as running trans-Atlantic and Scandinavian services. A few days later the Cabinet discussed the matter. The Under-Secretary, however, told the DGCA that he regarded civil operations as at best only an indirect help to the war effort. He therefore proposed that priority be given to the Takoradi–Khartoum, England–West Africa, Durban–Sydney, and England–Lisbon services. The Balkan route, he maintained, was the Foreign Office’s affair, while the Scandinavian, because it crossed enemy territory, was not one civilians should be asked to fly; as the Air Staff wanted Aden–Egypt, then the RAF should run it as well as the Hong Kong line, whose DH-86s needed replacement. As for the route to South America, he stressed that only the Ministry of Economic Warfare wanted it and no aircraft were available anyway. In general, he took the view that if the Air Ministry asked only for the services it wanted, the other Departments would have to support it to get the services they desired. On 19 December 1940 Pearson wrote to Sinclair that the Corporation needed directions so that it could get the necessary priorities with which to open the North Atlantic and re-start Scandinavian routes, maintain the existing ones, and start the Central African and Balkan lines. For this he needed ten or more DC-3s over and above the other aircraft already on order. Sinclair replied on the 22nd that no directions were needed and that the War Cabinet had approved of five Liberators

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10. The interior of the DH-91 Albatross Class “Frobisher” aircraft in 1938 was clean and comfortable.

11. The interior of the Boeing 747 of 1970; compare this with the interior of the DH-91 in Fig. 10 (see also Figs 109 and 110).

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and two other aircraft, which would shortly arrive. And as the Cabinet had also decided on the services suggested, including that to the Balkans, the Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) would supply twenty-eight new aircraft, mostly American. BOAC was also to be able to recover its aircrew from the RAF, the Air Transport Auxiliary, and the Atlantic Ferry Organization (Atfero, then engaged in flying aircraft over from American factories), in that order. But many thunderclouds developed along the way. On 17 January 1941 Balfour told Pearson confidentially that the Ministry of Aircraft Production had once again raised the question of the role of BOAC in view of the Atlantic Ferry Organization’s own difficulties and was making every effort to have BOAC’s services suspended so as to divert all pilots, including a large number from the RAF, to ferrying. This attack seems to have changed Balfour’s views, for he now took the stand that as BOAC personnel would be only a drop in the bucket, they should stick to their own duties, though the Horseshoe route crews might have to be sacrificed to keep the Corporation alive. BOAC was told, however, to go along with the new Canadian plan. In 1937 the Canadian Government had founded Trans Canada Airlines (TCA). In 1940 C. D. Howe, the Canadian Minister of Transport, developed a plan to oust the pioneer, Atfero, run by Woods Humphery and the Canadian Pacific Railway, and to substitute TCA operation of the North Atlantic route. He was successful. Woods Humphery was eased out and an RAF Return Ferry Service (RFS) started. On 20 July 1941 RAF Ferry Command came into being; in March 1943 it became No. 45 Group, RAF Transport Command. BOAC, however, was given the Return Ferry Service on 24 September 1941 and continued to operate it until 27 September 1949. Apart from this change, most of 1941 was devoted to establishing the new routes, described later. Not until the end of the year was there excitement again at Headquarters. Then department heads were asked how the Corporation could be expanded without drawing on new resources. However, the Secretary of State decreed that all BOAC pilots in the RAF were to be returned, other classes of staff were to be recruited, and the Minister of Labour was persuaded to sign an Essential Works Order screening the staff for the first six months of 1942. In February 1942 Runciman, the Director-General, returned from a five-month tour of the routes, during the course of which he had had to escape from a Bangkok suddenly occupied by the Japanese. As soon as he returned, he fired off a letter to Balfour. With wastage of pilots averaging twenty a year, BOAC could no longer break even simply by recalling those in the RAF. It had to have new crews either from, as in the Middle East, operationally tired squadrons, or, preferably, direct from training schools where BOAC techniques were taught from the start. Moreover, many of BOAC’s own crews were fatigued and needed at least a change of route, as they could not be rested in the Service manner. The only reason, he said, that crews in the Middle East had survived was that the shortage of spares had kept them grounded. Equally acute, both for the present and for future expansion, was the dearth of administrators and technical officers, a shortage aggravated by the

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12. BOAC routes (in the year ending 31 March 1943) operated by flying-boats and landplanes.

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13. An RAF cast-off flown in the years 1940–1943 when BOAC was barely in existence and had no priorities. While this Armstrong Whitworth twin-engined Whitley carries the Speedbird logo, it is also mis-labelled “British Airways.”

variety of aircraft operated and the constant need to modify military types for civil use. The shortage of traffic staff, caused by the unsound, but understandable, policy of unscreening early in the war, was leading to alarming medical wastage, while conscription had stopped recruiting. RAF Wing-Commanders with control-room experience were badly needed to establish operations rooms. The Air Ministry staff had helped all they could but, said Runciman, the time had come for a major policy decision. Balfour replied that he would like to know what specifically BOAC would need if the fleet was augmented by another ten Liberators and by ten Whitley bombers. (First suggested for use by Imperial Airways in 1936, the Whitley lacked the cubic capacity and general reliability needed for civil operations.) Runciman responded that he already needed 10 pilots, 5 radio officers, 100 engineers, and 32 ground and 13 development staff at once and would want an additional 30 five-man long-range crews plus 438 engineers and ground staff. If work for the Ministry of Aircraft Production could be abandoned, then he would have the ground staff to deal with the multiplicity of types he was then operating, each one of which needed 750 airframe spares, 500 maintenance and 1,200 overhaul engine spares, and 200 parts for each propeller type. (In the 1960s a Boeing 707 needed an inventory of 40,000 spare parts.) What Runciman wanted was at least a three-month plan so that types could be grouped on routes and at bases, with the scrapping of the older, low-capacity machines. The real solution was not the addition of more ad hoc military discards, but a fleet of real long-range transports, such as the York, whose

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18 S p e e d b i r d blueprints had just reached BOAC on 24 January 1942. Twenty of this adaptation of the Lancaster would, the Director-General reckoned, provide three times the capacity of the 100-odd aircraft in the current fleet in one year. At this point one of BOAC’s main problems was highlighted in the course of discussion of the Tedder Plan for RAF–BOAC operations in the Middle East. This was that BOAC was a careful, safety-conscious, economy-minded civilian organization. But much of its work was for the fighting, expendable, risk-taking, short-term-sighted RAF. Naturally this led to altercations. These were resolved when on 12 April 1942 the Secretary of State sent BOAC an agreed letter stating that the Ministry would take the responsibility for a lowering of operating standards in wartime. The remainder of 1942 saw a slow change in the status of the Corporation. Partly because Pearson himself shunned publicity and partly because the UnderSecretary was determined not to allow BOAC to usurp any of the RAF’s glory, BOAC was virtually barred from undertaking any publicity. Even many of the aircraft it used were camouflaged in RAF markings, while they bore the name “British Airways.” The Corporation was beginning to be attacked in Parliament both for alleged internal conditions and for its failure to indicate any postwar plans.1 Yet a great deal was being done. Reith had asked the Air Ministry for postwar planning in October 1939, but Pearson and R. H. Mayo were only allowed to start on this in mid-1942. The Brabazon Committee on postwar types was secretly set up. RAF crews began to appear on one-year loans. It was agreed to establish a central landplane base at Hurn as well as at Prestwick for the Return Ferry Service. Liberators and Whitleys were delivered as well as such single headaches, to be tried and rejected, as the original C-46 St. Louis (yet the type was the backbone of the India–China “Hump” operation) and an Albermarle. An operations room was started along with coordination of accident investigation with the RAF and the Air Transport Auxiliary. A real blow, however, was the destruction of the prototype York in a taxying accident at Lyneham. Meanwhile, operations into the United States had raised legal questions in America, so on 23 August 1942 the Air Ministry sent a letter to the US Government and to the Ministry of Labour, stating that BOAC was wholly owned by the British Government and under the direction of the Secretary of State; it was “in no sense a commercial undertaking.” However, the Treasury Solicitor claimed that it was a taxpaying firm; BOAC kept the ruling secret for diplomatic reasons.

The Board Resigns But if 1942 looked as if BOAC’s fortunes would parallel those of the Allied war effort, 1943 opened with a rude shock. The Board, with one exception, resigned. On 18 December 1942 The Aeroplane magazine had suggested editorially that one way to get British postwar aircraft flying would be to form an RAF Transport Command to do the development flying, as was the case in America. Scarcely

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two weeks later the Director-General of Civil Aviation, William Hildred, told BOAC “off the record” that he hoped it would shortly receive twenty-two Yorks, five C-46s, twelve Sunderlands, and thirty-nine DC-3s. On the same day the Air Member for Personnel on the Air Council said that BOAC could keep RAF crews for more than twelve months at a time if the men themselves agreed, though this was subsequently limited to ex-Flying Training School pilots. (By July 1943 RAF Transport Command was having the same trouble; the fear was that long secondment would give some an undue advantage in postwar employment.) In mid-January 1943 the BOAC Executive Committee, which had been established on 24 June 1942, urged that Hildred be apprised of the urgent need for twenty more crews monthly. The next day a manpower committee was established to study the problem, though the Ministry thought it was carrying out the Government’s directive to cut manpower in all departments. Part of the difficulties stemmed from the fact that BOAC Headquarters were in the Grand Spa Hotel, Bristol, with the Director-General of Civil Aviation nearby on Julian Road. But the Chairman was at 47 Parliament Street, London, close to the Air Ministry on King Charles Street. An additional problem, as Hudson Fysh has noted in Qantas at War (175–180), was that Churchill had at this time no interest in anything but winning the war. Yet within BOAC and the Air Ministry there was constant bickering and intrigue. It was hoped on several occasions to move back to Airways Terminal at Victoria Station, London, but it was leased and twice bombed. On 16 February 1943 the Executive debated relations with the Ministry. On the 20th the Board met and agreed to send a letter to the Secretary of State on the present and future status of the Corporation (in view of the impending announcement of the formation of RAF Transport Command). In this it said that it found itself in “an anomalous situation,” responsible to the Minister but at the same time not relieved of its obligations under Section 32 of the BOA Act to further the development of British civil aviation. It suggested that the Board be strengthened, that Members be given free access to the Ministers with whom it had to deal, that, except for the sections handling finances and regulations, the Civil Aviation Department be incorporated in BOAC as it was merely a bottleneck between BOAC and the RAF, and that relations with the Ministry of Labour be adjusted to stop the purloining of BOAC specialists. Moreover, the Board felt that postwar planning could be undertaken without hindering the war effort. “Can we be informed whether it is intended that the Corporation should remain the sole British instrument for overseas air transport, or, if not, then what limitations are intended?” Having thus referred to rumours of the formation of Transport Command, the Board went on to ask why, although BOAC had given evidence before the Brabazon Committee, it had not been informed of its recommendations. And, lastly, it wanted to know, was BOAC part of the Air Ministry or not? If it was not, then it was free to discuss postwar plans.2 The nature of the issue was put concisely by the Regional Director, Near East, Robert (later Sir Robert) Maxwell, who wondered whether BOAC was to be militarized or if that was an easy way out.

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20 S p e e d b i r d The formation of RAF Transport Command was announced to the Commons on 11 March 1943. BOAC received the official memorandum the next day. Whether intentional or not, nothing could have been better calculated to arouse suspicions and distrust than the way the Corporation was informed about this creation of a rival which appeared likely to take over BOAC’s routes. The letter to the UnderSecretary of the 10th had not been answered. The Board met secretly on the 15th, 18th, 19th, 22nd, and 24th. When its objections—to what years later seems a rather harmless action—were not accepted, the Members sent in their resignations, with the exception of Gerard d’Erlanger, who remained to command the Air Transport Auxiliary. Under the policy directive BOAC was to operate as before, using new equipment and opening new services as the Ministry desired. RAF Transport Command was not to operate trunk routes, but would handle strictly RAF loads and fly into battle areas. The Corporation felt, however, that BOAC should have exclusive rights on all trunk and regular services, while at the same time closely cooperating with Transport Command in all matters of mutual concern. But the Air Council decided that for both military and political reasons this could not be, though it offered to insert a face-saving clause in the agreement, which the Board rejected on the 19th, saying: The proposed arrangements, however, result in a situation which is indefinite for the Corporation and which does little to improve the difficult conditions in which the Corporation has operated throughout its existence. We feel consequently that as members we should be at fault if we should agree to these arrangements. . . . We feel that our position has become unreal and our usefulness therefore limited.

On 20 March Sinclair accepted their resignations, though this was not announced until the 24th. The Board published a final statement that day, in which it laid stress upon the Secretary of State’s failure to make any provision for the vital long-term postwar considerations. There had been considerable agitation in the Press and Parliament in 1942 for evidence that postwar planning was being undertaken. The Board was under an obligation to do something constructive in this direction. It was well aware that Pan American and other United States companies were operating under the guise of the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) Transport Command.3 The ex-Imperial Airways men within Management knew how serious the competition could be. At the same time, there was the problem that Britain had never shown any interest in military transport and had not undertaken the manufacture of suitable aircraft. John Longhurst, sometime Air Transport Editor of The Aeroplane, put forward the thesis (an allegation denied in 1977 by Sir Keith Granville) in 1950 that Transport Command was the reincarnation of Imperial Airways fighting the control of BOAC by British Airways personnel and imbued with the vision of creating another Empire airline.4 This aside, the creation of RAF Transport Command can be considered a matter of politics and psychology. As in other cases,

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officials expected BOAC suddenly to transform itself from a much-neglected, illequipped, safety-conscious civilian operation into a multi-aircraft, world-girdling super airline capable of doing anything some chair-bound official desired merely at the click of a telephone receiver. When it proved unable to do so, eyes were cast elsewhere. And they lighted upon RAF Ferry Command, which enjoyed all the backing of both the Air Council and of the Ministry of Aircraft Production. As it was an integral part of the RAF, it was easy enough to turn it into a world-wide organization able to fly into battle-zones without red tape. But as a military outfit it could not operate into certain neutral countries, notably Sweden, so for these routes BOAC had to be retained. The BOAC Board was able to make the potent point that trunk routes were politically too hot to be usurped by RAF Transport Command, for BOAC was already established on most of them. In retrospect, it seems a pity that the Board did resign. It had the advantage of experience and of being appointed without limit in time. BOAC was, in fact, just emerging from the clouds into the sunshine once again, and public pressure for the future might well have replaced power in Pearson’s hands. Resignations are not usually effective unless the responsible authority cannot afford to accept them. Once it had gone, the Pearson Board was no longer in a position of influence. If it had remained, Sinclair could not have afforded to fire it. Hereafter, Ministers never made the mistake again of appointing Board Members without limiting their tenure.

The New War Management, 1943–1945 On 25 March 1943 the nucleus of an expanded Board met in the Air Ministry room of William Hildred, who had succeeded Shelmerdine as Director-General of Civil Aviation in November 1941.5 He supervised until 29 April. The new temporary Chairman was Sir Harold Howitt, Finance Member of the Air Council, assisted by Simon Marks of Marks and Spencer, and John Marchbank, late General-Secretary of the National Union of Railwaymen. But, as Fysh has noted in Qantas at War (177), Howitt was terribly eager to help, yet knew nothing about aviation. By 6  April the Board had accepted the Transport Command memorandum, placed Deputy Director-General McCrindle on postwar planning, and delegated running the Corporation to the Executive Committee. A. C. Campbell Orde was sent as Liaison Officer with Transport Command, while everyone in the top echelons spent a good deal of time arguing the pros and cons of a merger. In the end the Board won and BOAC remained independent. BOAC also kept control of traffic. At the same time, however, the Cabinet approved and the Air Ministry set up an Integration Policy Committee, which the Chairman attended. The appointment of a new Director-General was handled politically and not commercially. Air Commodore “Critch” Critchley, one of the founders of the Greyhound Racing Association, but then in command of 54 Group, RAF Training Command, was asked by Lord Beaverbrook if he would like the post. When

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14. Lord Knollys, BOAC Chairman, May 1943–1947.

15. Air Commodore Critchley, shortly after he was announced as the new Directory-General of BOAC, courtesy of the Air Historical Branch (RAF).

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Critchley said, “Why not?” Churchill appointed him. As he himself put it, he was a passenger suddenly appointed to run the railways. In some respects a brilliant man, he disliked administration and hated paperwork. He had an Initial Training Wing mind and was not popular with aircrew, whom he reprimanded for looking wilted after long tropical flights. Equally political was the appointment of Lord Knollys, the Governor of Bermuda, to the Chairmanship on 26 May, though he did not actually return from Bermuda, via BOAC stations in America and Canada, until 23 July. On 21 May Critchley attended his first BOAC Executive Committee meeting in time to hear A. F. (later Sir Aubrey) Burke, recently returned to BOAC from the Ministry of Aircraft Production, report that the Ministry had agreed that BOAC might enjoy the same equipment priorities as Transport Command. Thereafter a mutual waiver system operated until 1946. With the opening of North Africa, a new trans-Mediterranean route was organized which was in itself partly responsible for the establishment of Transport Command. So as not to start a commercial race with the Americans, for which the British were ill-equipped, it had been agreed that no airlines would be allowed to operate through North Africa. The Americans protected their preserve by declaring it a war zone and making it difficult for even BOAC’s West African service to refuel in the area. The British handled it by granting “c.c.” (civilian courtesy) commissions to BOAC crews. The British were cautious because in the spring of 1943 the allocation of Lend-Lease aircraft was being discussed in Washington. Though the York was just going into production, BOAC did not have even one until early in 1944. Remember that all this time, beginning in September 1941, Churchill had agreed with Pan American’s Juan Trippe to reinforce the BOAC Khartoum–West Africa route, upgrading it to supply Montgomery, using DC-3s, etc. Part of the delay in their delivery was because of the Under-Secretary’s view that BOAC’s serviceability rates were so low that the aircraft would not be fully utilized. To this Burke was quick to retort that this was because, until May 1943, BOAC had not been granted a sufficient priority for spares, one brand-new Dakota already having been cannibalized to provide for the others. The “c.c.” commissions became tied to a revived controversy between the Board and the Ministry over the definite allocation of trunk routes. Finally, on 21 September 1943 a new directive drafted by the Chairman was sent to BOAC by the Minister, requiring BOAC to operate the trunk route through the Mediterranean. Thus, BOAC crews were militarized and flew Sunderlands in RAF markings. In the meantime, to avoid the American war zone, services were shifted from Algiers to Castel Benito airfield, Tripoli, in Libya. During 1943 it was decided to defer the setting up of the new regional organization until February 1944, but an Air Safety Board, joint medical facilities with RAF Transport Command, and a training school for RAF non-commissioned traffic staff were established. A Commercial and a Traffic Director were appointed, a Central Chairman’s Planning Committee created, and a Board Development Policy Committee set up. All through the year the Board called for a publicity

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24 S p e e d b i r d

16. The twin-engined Vickers Warwick, a development of the basket-like geodeticconstruction Wellington bomber, came briefly into BOAC service late in the war.

campaign, but until May 1944 the Under-Secretary refused to allow one on grounds of security and because such information would have no relationship to peacetime operations. However, the Air Ministry had 371 persons engaged in public relations, the War Office 350, and the Admiralty 115. The real reason was that Balfour did not care for BOAC. The end result, however, was two official accounts by John Pudney: Atlantic Bridge (1945) and Merchant Airmen (1946). In 1944 many of the same problems still plagued the Corporation. In March negotiations were still continuing with the Ministry of Labour and the Air Ministry to obtain a priority for staff at least equal to that of the Merchant Navy, though by now BOAC had 18,000 employees, 7,000 of whom were in PERA (the repair organization, Propeller and Engine Repair Auxiliary) at home and 4,000 in a similar operation in Cairo. Crews were still a problem, for Transport Command was recalling its seconded personnel before BOAC could train replacements from the Fleet Air Arm. The absence of a central base in Britain itself was still a headache, with Liberators to the East at Lyneham, the Return Ferry Service at Prestwick, the Foynes shuttle at Whitchurch, and flying-boats at Poole. In September it was finally agreed that the main landplane base would be Hurn, near Bournemouth, and close to Poole. It opened on 1 November, but was described by a Board Member as “an organized pigsty.” Working conditions were governed by the Factory Acts. The Air Ministry demanded high priority services while the Ministry of Labour’s National Service Department regarded BOAC’s work there as unessential. There was a shortage of electricity and of heat, while the Liberators had only 18 inches to

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spare over their wingtips when being eased into the hangars. Yet, despite all these things, the rationalization of the fleets, the advent of modern aircraft, and more crews enabled BOAC to improve its 1943 performance by 50 per cent, passengers carried alone rising from 66,565 to 100,852 (about double that carried by Imperial Airways in 1938). With D-Day (6 June 1944), operations into Europe became a very real possibility. The Superintendent of Home Stations had already been rechristened Manager, European Area. In June, 110 Wing, RAF Transport Command, revived 1918 traditions by being established to operate services into Europe. It had a strong nucleus of BOAC personnel in conformity with the Board’s reluctant agreement with Lord Beaverbrook’s suggestion that at the end of the war a separate European Corporation be established. Again the problem was one of airlines and war zones, but the precedent had been established in North Africa. On 6 October 1944 the Ministry sent a new directive: in future the Ministry would notify BOAC of the services it was to operate and the aircraft it was to use; BOAC was to undertake local services in his area for the Air Officer Commanding and to obey the Middle East Air Transport Board. The year also saw an attack on the Director-General of BOAC launched in the Commons in May and based on allegations of irregularities in 54 Group by the same men he had imported into BOAC. Rumblings went on into 1945 until the Prime Minister refused an inquiry. By the spring of 1945 it was becoming obvious that the war in Europe was about over, and Headquarters began, therefore, to concern itself more and more with the redevelopment of civil flights. Already fare-paying passengers had been accepted to fill surplus capacity. Women traffic staff were being recruited, more attention was being paid to the development of passenger insurance and less to demands for the names of their next-of-kin. On 28 October office hours were reduced from fifty-one to the prewar forty per week, and alternate weekends on duty were replaced by a standard five-day week. In September 1945 when the war in the East ended, BOAC had 120 aircraft served by 22,000 personnel, less 11,500 in PERA-type operations, a true average of seventynine employees per aircraft, but was still forty-two crews short. Before shifting our view from Headquarters to the individual routes, some general problems of aircraft procurement must be touched upon.

Aircraft Procurement and Modification From birth BOAC was hampered by the fact that British commercial aircraft design lagged behind that of the United States. With the exception of De Havilland, the principal companies had tied themselves to the Air Ministry’s apron strings. Just when the Empire Air Mail Scheme enabled Imperial Airways to place orders for more than eight aircraft at a time, rearmament and the Technological Revolution threw the industry off-balance. So serious was the shortage of suitable aircraft that British Airways (1936) was allowed to buy German and American types. Then

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26 S p e e d b i r d came the war, and the new British prototypes, the Short 14/38 and Fairey 15/38 (FC-1) pressurized landplanes, were cancelled because transports were considered unimportant. From a military point of view, they were. Britain had to concentrate almost exclusively, backs-to-the-wall, on defence against the Luftwaffe. Fears of a dollar shortage long delayed purchases of Consolidated, Lockheed, and Douglas products, causing a great deal of time to be wasted in attempting to make do with machines which it would have been more economical to scrap in favour of a homogeneous fleet of three or four types. Indicative of the fallacy of such a pennywise, pound-foolish programme are the tales of a few types. The Armstrong Whitworth Ensigns were ordered by Imperial Airways in 1935, partly for European and partly for the political Cairo–Karachi Eastern route. For various reasons the design was delayed and in 1938 the prototype failed its takeoff tests at Martlesham Heath and was refused a Certificate of Airworthiness. It was also refused by Imperial Airways. However, it was agreed, owing to a general shortage of aircraft, to use them on the London–Paris service until they could be re-engined. Wright Cyclones ordered from America were delayed until January 1940. By this time the machines were already halfway through their five-year “life.” In December 1939 it was decided to fit them with long-range tanks so they could operate London–Calcutta without touching Italian territory. In May 1940 two aircraft were taken to Hamble to have Cyclones fitted, but it was decided instead to use more powerful Bristol Tigers, which could be installed in mountings already in the aircraft. In August, nothing having been done, the installation of Cyclones began on a four- to five-month schedule. By 31 March 1941 three of the fourteen had been lost and the nine available had averaged only seventy-two hours apiece in the previous twelve months. In July 1941 Everest was finally accepted by BOAC. By now it was decided that, as there were only two sets of long-range tanks, the first two aircraft ready should fly out via West Africa and the next two transit the Mediterranean while the tanks were shipped back from Cairo. Everest was damaged by bombing before she could get away. During the course of repairs, de-icing gear was fitted and then, because she might go on the Scandinavian service, flamedampers. Rescheduled again for direct delivery through the Mediterranean, she finally left for West Africa in mid-April 1942. In the meantime, Enterprise had got away, only to make a forced landing near Bathurst and to be abandoned to the French. In February 1943 Egeria, the last of the nine accepted by BOAC, left for Cairo, where she joined her sisters in rendering useful service until in September 1945 they ran out of spares as well as needing 20,000 to 70,000 hours of maintenance each. None had flown more than 3,720 hours. All of them were broken up by early 1946. The story of De Havilland’s K-Class Flamingo, a twin-engined high-wing monoplane, is depressingly similar. Designed as a replacement for the slow, fabric-skinned DH-86s, they were intended for the Rangoon–Yunnanfu and Kisumu–Johannesburg routes, but never operated either. Owing to various troubles, only eight were delivered to BOAC. Eventually they all went to the Middle East,

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17. The civil version of the four-engined Avro Lancaster bomber was the Lancastrian.

18. The interior of the Avro Lancastrian was cramped, cold, and noisy.

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28 S p e e d b i r d where two of them crashed. The rest were withdrawn from service in 1944 for lack of spares. For some strange reason, four were shipped back to Croydon to be stored. Not until September 1942 was a more rational policy initiated. From then on the general intention was to dispose of ancient and odd types, even though this was not always possible, and to re-equip with a more homogeneous fleet. Thus, the Empire flying-boats were bolstered with Sunderlands, with whom they shared much in common. Liberators provided the bulk of the long-range landplane services and Dakotas the short. An attempt was made to obtain some Lancasters, but not until February 1945 was the first Lancastrian delivered, though in the meantime Trans Canada had acquired Canadian-built ones for its North Atlantic service. More suitable was the boxcar-fuselaged Lancaster conversion, the York. BOAC received the blueprints with enthusiasm in January 1942, but the Air Ministry only cautiously accepted Roy Chadwick’s design, owing to the fact that concurrently the Aircraft Board of the Joint War Production Board had just agreed in Washington that only America would produce transport aircraft.6 By mid-July the prototype had flown to Boscombe Down. Though helping with the internal layout, BOAC was doubtful if it would receive any of them. However, at the end of July, five were promised. Just at that point the prototype was run into on the ground by a Liberator and destroyed. Nevertheless, Avro still expected to be able to produce twenty a month by June 1943 without interfering with Lancaster deliveries. But by early 1944 BOAC had but one, Mildenhall. By the end of the year there were five on charge. In retrospect it seems a pity that the Ministry did not order a fleet of Yorks off the drawing board for BOAC early in 1942. After all, there was little need for a prototype as the wings, engines, and tail units had all been thoroughly tested on the Lancaster. Moreover, this would have given BOAC a British aircraft with British engines and United Kingdom parts service. Neither dollars nor Lend-Lease would have been involved. They would have given BOAC the advantage of a homogeneous postwar fleet capable of operating on all its world-wide routes. A BOAC–Transport Command–Civil Aviation Department conference on 19 July 1943 agreed that the York could even do the North Atlantic with a 500-pound payload, as BOAC had requested in December 1942. In view of the fact that Yorks remained with BOAC until 1957, their wholesale employment would have eliminated the need for the costly and disastrous Tudor programme of 1945–1950. Alternatively, the Tudor could have been viable if it had been available on schedule in 1945 and been free of the fatigue problems related best in Nevil Shute’s novel No Highway (1948).

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Chapter II Wartime Routes and Services Introduction It had been the intention of Imperial Airways, once it possessed a uniform fleet of aircraft, to use a divisional line organization anchored on Britain with only feeders being based overseas. The war not only multiplied once more the types in service, but also caused geographical segregation of services. The Scandinavian needed secrecy and speed; the Atlantic and African endurance; the Middle Eastern and Horseshoe versatility, overseas bases, and cooperation with the Forces. This is their story.1

The Stockholm Run When war broke out the weekly British Airways service to Stockholm was switched to a trans-North Sea route via Perth and Stavanger and direct to Helsinki. Trimotor Ju-52s operated—at 150 feet—until 30 October when the Perth–Stavanger sector was taken over by Lockheed 14s. Ju-52 Jason was lost at Oslo in the German invasion. Thereafter, a direct Perth–Stockholm Lockheed service was run by British, Polish, and Norwegian crews until mid-October 1940, when the service ended. However, for intelligence, propaganda, and supplies of Swedish precision-built ball-bearing needs, the service was reopened in March 1941. Hudson IIIs from the RAF were converted and went on service in July, and by the end of the year eighty services had been completed. Leuchars became the Scottish terminal, but maintenance difficulties were caused for some time by the Air Ministry’s refusal to allow the Swedish airline ABA to use it when its service started in April 1942. The ponderous Whitleys were put on during the summer but proved unsatisfactory, and only made twenty-five flights during the year as compared to 249 by the Lockheeds. Both types were withdrawn on occasion from this exciting service to run the equally vulnerable Gibraltar–Malta shuttle. Meanwhile in August an RAF Mosquito had made a daylight flight to Stockholm to fetch diplomatic bags. On 16 December 1942 BOAC’s first Mosquito was delivered to Lyneham. In February 1943 five Dakotas arrived and went on to the run until May, when the short night endangered their use and they were sent to the Gibraltar–Fez shuttle. By then the Germans were beginning to resent the service and five machines, two of them Mosquitos, were picked off during the year. In 1944 two more Mosquitos and a Dakota were lost, bringing the grand total of casualties for the route to ten. But, nevertheless, during the war the service, on which a number of gallant aircrew lost

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19. Lockheed L-18 Lodestars inherited from British Airways (1936) Ltd. were flown to the Middle East and used on local service there from 1941.

20. The opposite of the Boeing 314 in Fig. 9 was the De Havilland DH-98 Mosquito bomber employed by BOAC as a transport solely on the hazardous night route to Sweden. It carried one passenger in the bomb-bay. This “Mossie” is seen preparing for takeoff.

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their lives, carried 6,000 passengers and 500,000 pounds of freight, of outstanding value to the war effort.

The North Atlantic and the Return Ferry Service Operations across the Atlantic reflected many of the problems that plagued BOAC during these years. The short-sighted requisitioning of the long-range flying-boats deprived Britain of a trans-Atlantic service just when it would have been most valuable. As a result, a whole new organization had to be created. More than this, the operation of the route was complicated by neutrality considerations in Portugal, Eire, and the United States, not to mention rivalries with Pan American, Canadian Pacific, Trans Canada Airlines, and American Export Airlines, all of which were to have future significance. Aviation author and historian R. E. G. Davies, in a communication to the author, notes that a Bristol man who had been at Lisbon said they used to find their tyres let down, and they retaliated by putting water in the Ju-52/3m tanks. With Air Ministry backing, an experimental service, using flight-refuelling, was flown in the summer of 1939. But flying-boat services via Newfoundland were hampered by ice in winter; so the route via the Azores was selected for the abortive after-hours mail service due to start in 1940, unless landplanes were used. Steps were taken, in fact, to use landplane versions of Mercury launched from Ensigns, which could have operated all year round from Newfoundland. A further cause of delay was Management’s refusal to operate any aircraft across the North Atlantic in winter without their having de-icing equipment and hydromatic airscrews. Meanwhile, Pan American Airlines (PAA) had shifted its flights from Foynes to Lisbon after war was declared in September. Pressure from Government sources finally on 4 June got a British service to Portugal started from Heston via Bordeaux, but it was stopped on the 17th when France capitulated. The fall of France and the creation of the Ministry of Aircraft Production changed everything. Extra tankage was fitted at once into two of the smaller C-Class (Empire boats designed to carry mail and passengers), and on 3 August 1940 Clare made the first of five round trips to New York carrying newspapers and VIPs to show that Britain was still alive. MAP not only revived the Atlantic service; it also pioneered a whole new landplane airline which laid the foundations for the most hotly competitive, though not at all lucrative, of all the postwar world-wide routes. In June 1940 the Air Attaché in Washington telephoned Woods Humphery, then working for Shell and Flight Refueling in Montreal, and asked him to manage the delivery by air of fifty Hudsons to Britain starting on 15 July. With the aid of Morris Wilson of MAP, Woods Humphery made arrangements with Sir Edward Beatty of the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) to handle the operation. It had been understood that no winter flights would be attempted, but politics and delays intervened to such an extent that the first flight, led by BOAC Captain D. C. T. “Pathfinder” Bennett, did not leave until 15 November. When this proved to be a

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21. A Consolidated B-24 Liberator of the North Atlantic Return Ferry Service taxying out in typical Canadian winter conditions, ca. 1944.

success, individual deliveries followed at an ever-increasing rate. But not until early January 1941 did anyone raise the question of speeding up the work by returning the civilian ferry crews by air to Canada. Meanwhile, MAP had decided to accept an offer of B-24 Liberators. The first one was to be flown to Britain for the fitting of power turrets, while the next five were intended for operations to neutral countries. At the end of 1940, BOAC had been asked to supply some four-engined crews to man these aircraft as the RAF had none, except those on Sunderlands—who could not be spared by Coastal Command. Behind this demand was a CPRinspired design to run a North Atlantic air service under MAP guise. But Beatty evidently overplayed his hand or failed fully to consider the views of C. D. Howe, the Canadian Minister of Transport responsible for Trans Canada Airlines. In May 1941 CPR was told that its contract would be terminated on 15 July. On the 20th, RAF Ferry Command replaced the Atlantic Ferry Organization, generally known as Atfero. In April six Liberators were delivered to Montreal for the Return Ferry Service and on 4 May the first scheduled “Tramline” service left for Britain. Using these new long-range aircraft, the 3,150-mile, Montreal–Prestwick route was flown non-stop regularly in both directions.

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On 11 September 1941 BOAC was directed to take over the RFS and did so on the 24th. But conditions remained so unsatisfactory that the Corporation announced that it would not operate in wintertime without modifications to the aircraft. In this they were following the lead of the American “Arnold Service,” which switched its aircraft to the Miami–Cairo route for the winter. The biggest need was for heat, as at 25,000 feet the outside air temperature was minus 20° F. The first system, using petrol, had to be discarded as the engines suffered from fuel starvation above 16,000 feet, already nearly twice as high as British civil aircraft had operated before the war. The final solution was an exhaust-heated hot-air system, but even then the use of oxygen masks made the trip rather unpleasant. On the ground maintenance problems were a plague. Particularly bad were the Mark III Liberators fitted with “self-leaking” tanks2 which began to ooze anywhere from twenty minutes to 120 hours after factory installation, in addition to their already restricted fuel capacity. Only when the Under-Secretary threatened to give them a direction to do so did BOAC agree to operate this model at all. Shortages of staff resulted in most of the Return Ferry Service engineers being Americans. Early in 1942 it became evident to BOAC that it would need to make 750 round trips a year to handle all the ferry crews. When the Director-General of Civil Aviation pointed this out to the Air Ministry, additional aircraft were allotted, but it was also decided to make use of crews fresh from the Commonwealth Air Training Scheme to fly some machines over. In May it became necessary to allocate some of BOAC’s Liberators to the direct service to Cairo and so RFS crews operated out of Lyneham for a short while, as detailed later. In May, Pan American started a direct twice-weekly Boeing 314 service from New York to Foynes, followed in August by an American Export Airlines one with VS-44s. Trans Canada, with Canadian Pacific discarded from the action, now decided also to get in on the act, agreeing to operate two Liberators. However, this did not start until 22 July 1943, and then with the first Lancastrian, a Canadian-modified Lancaster bomber. By mid-1942 BOAC and Ferry Command had reached a point of “inherent animosity.” Air Marshal Sir Frederick Bowhill commanding RAF Ferry Command had made the point in 1941 that the sole reason BOAC was in Montreal was “to be the servant of Ferry Command.” True, but tactless. Runciman replied to charges of inefficiency that the trouble stemmed from poor work by RAF ground crews, which meant that BOAC had to do it all over again when they took over the aircraft. At the Air Ministry, the Air Member for Supply and Organization admitted that BOAC was being asked to run long-range services with medium-range aircraft, but said that politically he could not defend the failure to make use of American equipment, meaning specifically at that moment the “self-leaking” Liberator IIIs. After consulting Bowhill, in a few days he withdrew all of Ferry Command’s criticisms of BOAC and said that he would do all in his power to meet BOAC’s needs. In return, BOAC agreed to look into operating the Liberator II, another less satisfactory model than the I, via Iceland and Greenland. In the meantime, DGCA Hildred told BOAC that it would not be for want of trying that BOAC did not receive C-46s or C-54s,

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34 S p e e d b i r d but unfortunately, the better an aircraft the more people wanted it. (They were to become the true workhorses of the famous India–China “Hump” operation.) By November BOAC was contemplating putting the Return Ferry Service on a daily basis to handle the courier traffic to and from Washington. The year 1943 was a routine one, except for the bad-weather loss of AL591, the only wartime fatality on the RFS. Apart from the formation of Transport Command in March, of which Ferry Command then became No. 45 Group, RFS simply carried on an unobtrusive, efficient service. Various plans were proposed. The one adopted was to have Canadian Car and Foundry take over maintenance at Dorval, Montreal. On 7 September 1944 BOAC made its 1,000th trans-Atlantic flight, by which time it had carried 332 tons of mail, 528 tons of freight, and 11,378 passengers. On 26 November Captain W. L. Stewart became the first BOAC captain to have made 100 crossings. In October 1945 the northern circuit via Iceland was finally abandoned, but the RFS itself continued to 27 September 1949.

The Russian Route As early as 13 August 1941 the suggestion was made that BOAC should operate to Moscow by extending the Scandinavian route. Delays ensued while political questions were settled. It was then agreed that a direct service to Russia was up to the RAF as it would have to cross enemy-held territory and the fighting front. At the same time a BOAC Cairo–Moscow service was also considered. Nothing much happened until July 1942, when it was suggested that a RFS aircraft should operate Prestwick–Moscow, but a shortage of machines prevented this. Suddenly in September BOAC found that a survey flight was scheduled. After weather delays, AM259 finally got away on 21 October and returned early in November after the Russians had fitted a new starter shaft to one engine. In all, nine flights, all with the same aircraft, were made north to the Arctic Circle, then east, south to the Gulf of Finland, and east again to Moscow. One side effect was the discovery that the RAF’s black underside camouflage was too visible and it was changed. In 1943, with the clearing of North Africa, the Arctic route was abandoned in favour of one via Cairo, Habbaniyeh, Pahlevi, Astrakhan, and Kuibyshev, which took three and a half days versus thirteen hours north-about. It was operated on an ad hoc basis. Though further north-about flights were considered for the winter of 1943, none was made, and not until 1959 did British European Airways (BEA) begin a regular British service to Moscow.

United Kingdom–Portugal–West Africa A British air route to West Africa was started just before the war via Cairo and Khartoum with De Havilland DH-86s from Khartoum to Lagos and Accra. It was also intended that the British Airways (1936) planned main line from London to South America should pass through Bathurst, but the war stopped its development.

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In March 1939 a survey had been made of the trans-Sahara route to the Middle East as insurance against Italian belligerency. But no one thought that France would be knocked out of the war and her territory closed to BOAC. On 27 April 1940 BOAC agreed with the Ministry and the General Post Office (GPO) that if the Mediterranean was closed, a West African route would be opened, for which it was hoped same Wellingtons would be loaned. France effectively fell on 17 June and by the 26th the Government at home was pressing for a fast mail steamer to West Africa with an air service from there to Cairo. At first KLM was to augment BOAC’s DH-86s on the service, with engines overhauled in Britain and shipped out as needed. But it soon became obvious that a more practical solution was necessary and so repair bases were set up at Cairo, Asmara, Takoradi, and elsewhere. Lockheed 10, 14, and 18 aircraft were shipped both from Britain and the United States to create the L-Class in the Middle East. At the same time, negotiations were begun with SABENA, the exiled Belgian airline, to operate services, connecting at first with the main trunk route at Juba, starting in October 1940, and radiating from Lagos as the war progressed, to Cairo, Accra, and Leopoldville. By 17 July 1940 the Air Ministry and the Admiralty were pressing for an air link with Britain. BOAC said that this could be done with Clare and Clyde, the remaining long-range boats, as long as Lisbon remained open, while, if Las Palmas in the Canaries could be used, Cathay and Champion could also be put on. But if neither was available, then no service at all was possible. For various reasons, the UK–Lagos service was controlled from London, while the Cairo–Lagos sector came under the Middle East and was extended to Freetown to meet the fast Union Castle Line mail ships to the Cape. On 5 August Clyde was switched from the North Atlantic to open the West African service. On the 19th she went up to Brazzaville and, as a symbol of British vitality, helped bring French Equatorial Africa into the de Gaulle camp. This opened up Fort Lamy again—one of the vital steppingstone fields for short-ranged aircraft being ferried to the Middle East—and also permitted a payload of 30,000 pounds a week to be carried to Egypt in BOAC machines. By October Clare and Clyde were making intermittent flights from Britain while additional tankage was being fitted to Cathay and Champion. But the demands of PAA’s service into Lisbon caused them for some time to be used on a Poole–Lisbon shuttle alone. Likewise, in December the RAF handled loads between El Geneina and Khartoum. At the end of the year the Catalina Guba was added to the fleet, to be joined a year later by two more of the same type of long-range flying-boats. Concurrently, the Air Ministry opened negotiations with the Irish Government for the use of Foynes to enable a saving in range to increase payload. Poole was vulnerable, though only on 11 May 1941 were aircraft destroyed there, Maia being sunk and Guba flooded. By March 1941 Irish permission had been obtained. A year later a shuttle to Foynes had to be set up to handle loads from American flyingboats, once again permitted to enter the war zone, and from BOAC’s 314s. During mid-August Poole had to be evacuated for a few weeks during the Dieppe Raid.

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36 S p e e d b i r d Then the loss by fire of Golden Horn on 9 January 1943 created another shortage of capacity so that landplanes had to be placed on the Foynes shuttle to keep Poole– Lisbon going. Fortunately, this had been anticipated and Rineanna Airport, now Shannon, was under construction. On 16 July the new Board went over to have a look and saw more than intended when a flap came off Frobisher Fortuna on the approach and they all ended in the mudflats. Foynes enjoyed increased business from February to 12 September 1944 when Poole was closed because of the D-Day operations. The shuttle continued until November 1945. In 1941 the demands made upon the trans-African service, normally operated by the Ensigns, increased severely when the RAF set up an erection centre for LendLease planes at Takoradi and asked for a return ferry service from the Middle East. This caused the creation on 25 June of the Congo flying-boat route based on Durban. Just as it started in July 1941 the British Government accepted Roosevelt’s offer of American help on the route, and Pan American made a contract directly with the British Government. In fact, Winston Churchill had asked Juan Trippe for help.3 This led to a general belief in British aeronautical circles that it was the first step in a Pan American invasion of traditionally British routes. As aid to Britain it was short-lived, as Marshal of the RAF Lord Tedder noted in With Prejudice (158, 218–224, 281–283). With American entry into the war in December, it was militarized and restricted to American loads. This left BOAC once again short of capacity and additional services had to be improvised. These difficulties were not helped by the increase in Boeing services from Britain during the summer, though it was not until higher Met’ (Meteorological) standards in 1944 that these aircraft finally worked up to 2,471 hours a year apiece. Between June 1941 and March 1942 they flew only eighteen services. Their main problem was that they could go only 120 hours between overhauls and that they flew a circular route so as to be back in Baltimore each time they had to be serviced.4 On 14 April 1941 BOAC’s Overseas Headquarters assumed responsibility for Cairo–Takoradi, operating some services through to Freetown to connect with flying-boats carrying troop mail from England, but this was changed to Lagos when the Boeing 314s came on. The general operation of the West African service, improved by the release of additional Dutch crews to handle the Lisbon shuttle, was disrupted in October 1941 by the critical situation at Malta. Flying-boats and landplanes were diverted for a shuttle from Gibraltar. At the same time, the opportunity was taken to stage aircraft through the Mediterranean to the Middle East, including some Ensigns and the DH-95 K-Class. The start of the Far Eastern war in December also hampered development. But in spring 1942 “self-leaking” Liberator IIIs were delivered for use on the route. The Operations Director considered them hopeless as MAP recommended that they should not be flown above 5,000 feet, while headwinds on the Gibraltar–Bathurst sector required them to fly either above 8,000 or on the deck. While this controversy was raging, BOAC took up the study of fuel consumption where Imperial Airways had left off. Fuel flow-meters were gradually installed and the manuals rewritten to provide the pilots with data for

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optimum performance over any particular route. Tests showed that savings of up to 15 per cent could be made and that for a Liberator the rate of consumption could be reduced from 170 to 135 gallons per hour simply by fitting proper filler caps on the tanks so that fuel did not slosh out on takeoff, and by the adjustment of carburettors. Dipstick checking of the actual fuel aboard was also recommended. At the same time, the Air Ministry hoped that the loads lifted to Cairo could be increased from 6,600 pounds weekly to 22,900 by the addition of twelve Whitleys as well as the five Liberator IIIs. Also, the RAF’s direct Lyneham–Cairo Liberators were expected to carry 2,100 pounds every ten days. The Whitleys proved unsuitable here, as elsewhere. The critical sector was Lisbon–Bathurst. What saved the situation was the invasion of North Africa and the addition of Sunderlands to the fleet. By April 1942 BOAC actually had surplus capacity on the UK–Lisbon sector and was carrying fare-paying passengers. On 14 September 1942 capacity on the West African route was cut when Clare was lost by fire in the air and all the C-Class were taken off this run. Meanwhile, those Ensigns which had reached Cairo were operating Cairo–Lagos to lift supplies to the Western Desert for Montgomery’s campaign, which was about to open. With the clearing of North Africa completed in May 1943, the West African route declined in importance and most of its later difficulties centred on obtaining French and American permission to make refuelling stops so as to be able to increase payloads and thus use fewer aircraft. The Portuguese refused the use of Bolama, while the Americans made access to Roberts Field in Liberia most awkward, despite permission having been given by the Liberian Government, so in the end the Minister of State was brought in to end the difficulties. By early 1943 sixteen Dakotas were operating the trans-African service and were expected to handle sixty-seven tons of freight and 150 to 200 passengers a month until the Mediterranean was open to shipping. By the end of the year this was on a sixflights-a-week basis. There was also a daily Dakota service from Gibraltar to Fez and a twice-weekly one from Gibraltar to Britain. Once Tunisia was cleared, Dakotas were also expected to operate a London–Cairo route. Under the circumstances it was urgent to decide who was running the route. In the end it was agreed that the UK–Gibraltar sector would fall under the United Kingdom Region and the Gibraltar–Cairo sector under the Regional Director, Near East. Sunderlands began operating to West Africa and by mid-1943 were on a three-a-week schedule. For six weeks starting in October they were taken off to carry Christmas mail to the troops in Cairo, but their operation through the war zone in civil markings was a special concession, and when on 25 December a thrice-weekly UK–India service via the Mediterranean began, it was a military operation. By the end of 1943 the signs of coming victory were apparent. SABENA was allowed to operate a weekly service to Britain from Leopoldville. At the same time Transport Command was refusing BOAC the use of Port Lyautey. Early in 1944 KLM received three new Dakotas and a new contract for the Lisbon service, and their old prewar DC-3s were retired. On 24 October 1944 BOAC, to show the

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22. One of the great revolutions in air transport was the Douglas DC-3/C-47/Dakota. Introduced in 1936 in the USA, this truly commercial aircraft did not reach BOAC until 1943. The scene in this photograph is India, 1947.

flag, began the first British air service to Spain with a weekly flight to Madrid. At the beginning of 1945 the route through the Mediterranean was switched from Jerba on the African coast to Augusta in Sicily and the Empire flying-boats on the Congo service withdrawn and used instead to bolster the Cairo–Karachi service as the campaign in the Far East began to pick up. For a while the Lisbon service was operated at night after a number of aircraft were shot down over the Bay of Biscay by Luftwaffe defenders of the U-boats, but daylight flights by Dakotas were resumed on 9 October 1944 after the Germans were cleared from western France. On 12 May 1945 a circular UK–West Africa–Cairo service was instituted. Thereafter, its operation became involved in postwar reorganizations. Intimately linked with these services were certain trans-Mediterranean ones operated intermittently during the war. On 15 September 1939 a weekly service by Frobishers supplemented the resumed flying-boat flights made possible by Treasury sanction of sterling payments for fuel uplifted in Italy. The Frobishers were withdrawn after two services owing to the persistence of undercarriage troubles— their pet weakness—and to deterioration brought on by exposure. In May 1940 tension with Italy caused precautions to be taken, and evacuation followed on 9 June with the loss of only one engine. For the next three years only intermittent services operated through the area.

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On 15 June a Lockheed reached Cairo via Oran and Fort Lamy, but on the 28th French colonial territory was closed to British aircraft. Imperia, the flying-boat tender in Crete, withdrew to Port Said on 12 June, but the Greek Government, then neutral, refused to allow the withdrawal of stores, claiming they were war materials. In August 1940 there was some talk of ferrying out aircraft via Lisbon and Malta, and this was done from time to time. With the fall of Crete in May 1941 and an increasingly anxious situation in the Near East as the desert war waxed and waned, London became most desirous of a quick connection with that area. This led to the creation of 1425 Flight, RAF, charged with operating a direct Lyneham–Cairo service, an idea proposed in 1938 by Imperial Airways. Mercury had demonstrated its feasibility, but the Air Ministry had refused to buy the idea. On 18 August 1941, Runciman, then in Cairo, cabled home the suggestion that RFS Liberators be used, but not until December was action taken, for in the interim C-Class were running the gauntlet through Malta, starting with Clare on 12 October. They continued until March 1942, though under protest for the last few months after Clare was hit by an incendiary at Malta. The beginning of the RFS flights to Egypt was not auspicious. The first aircraft, AM263, was damaged by fire and Ferry Command had to loan another. AM918 went unserviceable with fuelsystem troubles. On 20 January 1942 the first RAF aircraft got away from Hurn, followed on the 25th by AM918 (G-AGDR), which made the flight out in eleven and a half hours, but on his return on 15 February, Captain Page was shot down off the Eddystone Light by friendly forces. The resultant investigation caused future flights to be routed via Gibraltar (Landing Ground 224) starting in July. Strangely, however, for some time BOAC operated a direct service, though it suspected that the RAF flights were actually going via West Africa—an interesting commentary on the lack of coordination between the groups. In April AM263 and AM914 were lent to 1425 Flight with BOAC crews, and their civil registrations cancelled, which made it easier to use them. At the same time, target (or fixed) loads came into being and BOAC found itself called upon to lift 6,600 pounds a week in April, rising to 11,900 in June. In July three extra Liberators were supplied to carry urgent freight, 43,000 pounds being moved by the 21st, of which a high proportion was ferrous metal necessitating compass-swinging after the aircraft was loaded. BOAC aircraft remained on this run until the end of the year. In 1943 BOAC Liberators operated fifty-six more services via Lisbon or Gibraltar and Tripoli to Cairo.

The Middle East The Regional Director, Near East, R. H. Maxwell, controlled a fan of routes running at various times to Athens, Ankara, Teheran, Karachi, Madagascar, Durban, Lagos, and Malta. The foundations were the two Imperial Airways trunk routes which branched at Cairo, one to the Far East and Australia and the other to South Africa. Commercially important in peace, the area was politically vital in war. Thus, Maxwell was constantly involved with the RAF after Italy entered the

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40 S p e e d b i r d war, but relations were none too harmonious until the air was cleared about a year after the Tedder Plan started in June 1941. As usual, the blame could be laid on the difficulties under which BOAC operated, but also partly upon the Air Ministry representatives, who seemed to many observers simply to be meddling to justify their existence. Some of the trouble was because nobody had envisaged a “phoney war” and so had not prepared for the worst possible eventuality. In June 1940 this proved to be only too true. Thus, the early part of that year was spent in organizing for peace, the next three months in reducing the organization to a minimum as long as the Italians were successful in East Africa, followed in October by their attack on Greece, and thereafter in struggling to recreate a link with England. By early 1941 a PERA-type organization for the repair of RAF aircraft had been established at Heliopolis. This continued until March 1944, when the campaigns had moved out of the area. It repaired 3,998 machines with a staff that eventually reached 4,700. But, in general, 1941 brought a sense of failure and a feeling of frustration. Shortage of aircraft and spares prevented BOAC from carrying out its obligations and gave it the reputation of being defeatist. Some of this came, too, from resentment that the RAF would not take experienced advice before starting a route, but came running when it got into difficulties, especially on the trans-African ferry route, where precious aircraft were wasted through navigational and other deficiencies. Things finally came to a head on 24 March 1942 when Headquarters was informed of a secret signal from Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief (AOC-in-C) in the Middle East, Lord Tedder, saying that BOAC was defeatist and that if it could not carry out the RAF–BOAC plan he had initiated the previous June, he would take back the new Asmara maintenance base, his ninety-seven pilots, their Italian Savoia-Marchettis, and his promised forty Hudsons, and set up his own airline. The basis of the Tedder Plan was that BOAC should pool its technical know-how with the RAF’s crews and equipment through the Middle East Aircraft Board with BOAC’s Maxwell running the whole as a joint wartime airline. The issue in March 1942 in the Middle East was the same as that on the Atlantic—lack of spares and the difference in outlook between a military and a civilian organization. In Cairo there was the additional factor that BOAC had simply run out of senior administrative staff. Lacking them, no expansion could take place without a lowering of standards and efficiency. Specifically, the reason why BOAC flew only 40 per cent of the hours that the Tedder Plan had envisaged was that Asmara had only one-third of the engines it needed. Once the Civil Aviation Department was banned from interfering in the area and the impact of American war production began to be felt, things went much better. By June 1942 the Tedder Plan had 40 BOAC and 108 RAF aircraft at work. It was generally agreed that Tedder really was the RAF’s friend; with the Street–Runciman-drafted directive of 12 April 1942 freeing BOAC from peacetime operating standards and with the successful offensive at El Alamein the following November, the air cleared. Once Tripoli was taken, the Middle East became both a staging post for services to the Far East and the

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hub of postwar operations in its own region. Before the war the Air Ministry had wanted to give the Imperial Airways Kisumu–Durban sector to the South Africans, who fortunately showed no interest; though after war broke out the southbound services were terminated at Kisumu until 3 April 1940. Once the link with England was broken, Durban became the overseas flying-boat base. Services to Karachi by landplane were also suspended in May 1940 because the Ensigns had not appeared and the Hannibals had been withdrawn after the disappearance of Hannibal, perhaps because of metal fatigue, on 1 March. Shortage of staff prevented the Lockheeds being used, though with the collapse of Poland in 1939 there had been a windfall of Lockheed 14s flown out by escaping crews. However, the purchase of those in Rumania was complicated by a Rumanian demand to be allowed to run into Alexandria. In addition, the British Foreign Office wanted a Balkan service. Late in 1939 plans were worked out for a Lockheed 14 to operate London–Bordeaux–Marseilles–Tunis–Malta–Athens–Istanbul–Athens– Alexandria–Sollum–Malta–Britain. These ideas supplemented some prepared in October for Polish aircraft to make a Balkan circuit from Lydda, but nothing came of them. In his report for 1940, the Regional Director, Near East, described London’s apologetic “sorry indecision” cable as a fitting comment on the failure to establish this route. Not until 3 September 1941 was a service started to Adana as a matter of urgency when the Turks let Lufthansa in. After Italy entered the war the Ensigns and K-Class Flamingos were ferried out and gradually joined by Lockheeds shipped from England and the United States, but services with these aircraft were delayed owing to Treasury refusal to sanction purchases of spares until the end of April 1941, three weeks after the first Lockheed 18 arrived at Cairo. Demands made upon the Near East Region constantly increased. As the Ensigns became available, crews had to be taken off the South Africa–Australia Horseshoe route to man them (see below). On 22 April RAF Headquarters asked that an air evacuation of Crete be laid on. Within ninety minutes Coorong was on her way. As each Horseshoe boat landed at Cairo for the next thirteen days, its crew was rushed by car to Alexandria to take over Coorong or Cambria for a daily flight to Crete. In all 469 Tommies were brought off. Before this ceased, on 30 April the Iraqis laid siege to Habbaniyeh. On 3 May the BOAC Airways House there was surrounded and the staff taken into captivity for the next month. To prevent the disruption of services, Imperia was stationed at Aqaba, the Sea of Galilee was abandoned in favour of Kallia on the Dead Sea, and some C-Class fitted with extra tanks so that they could shuttle Cairo–Bahrain, which in turn delayed the opening of the Cairo–Congo–Lagos service. At the same time, a new landplane route along the Hadramaut Coast via Aden to Karachi was surveyed but not operated until Lockheed 18 Llandaff started a monthly service on 11 May 1942. It soon increased to weekly but was cancelled from March to June 1943. In October 1941 a survey to Teheran and Baku was made and this found Teheran to be unsuitable. But permission was obtained for the British Minister there to pay for improvements, and a service started on 3 November. In May 1942 a night service to

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42 S p e e d b i r d Malta operated for a short time via forward airstrips until Rommel’s last advance made it impossible. On 6 November BOAC was asked to stand by to run services into the desert. All trans-African Lockheed and Wellington services were cancelled. On the 10th ad hoc shuttles to the West were begun, and on 23 January 1943 the first BOAC aircraft landed at Tripoli’s Castel Benito aerodrome. By the time the war in North Africa ended in May 1943, the shuttle had made 529 round trips to forward areas on a ratio of seven by Lockheeds for each one by a Wellington. Meanwhile, the Air Officer Commanding (AOC) had approved the “Strawson-Dawson” plan to move the main repair depot back from Asmara to Cairo. This was done between January 1943 and January 1944 when the last aircraft to be repaired at Asmara flew away; Almaza, Cairo, then became the main Middle East base. At the same time it was possible to undertake a rationalization of the fleet. The four remaining K-Class were shipped back to England, and Wellingtons and Hudsons returned to the RAF in exchange for Lodestars. At last the fleet was reduced to two types of Lockheeds with only two types of engine, nine Ensigns, and five Dakotas. With these changes and the easing of tensions, it was possible to help RAF Transport Command on the Arabian route to India, which was tangential to the Horseshoe.

The South African–Australian Horseshoe Service Before the war two branches were contemplated to augment the main route to Australia, one to Tokyo via Shanghai and an extension to New Zealand. A Penang–Hong Kong line was started in 1936 with DH-86s. It was intended in 1940 to replace these with K-Class aircraft operating also Rangoon–Kunming, but National Air Communications decided against it and instead called for a goodwill flight to Tokyo. This could not be flown as the Ensign was the only type which could do it with more than three passengers and none was available. Incidents with the Japanese and withdrawal of permission to cross French Indo-China closed the service to Hong Kong on 15 October 1940 and the staff was withdrawn on 19  March 1941, the delay caused by plans to use Clifton and Cleopatra on a Singapore–Kuching–Manila–Hong Kong run. Plans had been made as early as 1935 for an extension of the Empire Air Mail Scheme to New Zealand, an enthusiastic supporter. Two boats were ordered and a joint company formed. After vacillation in the autumn of 1939, Awaru and Aotearoa flew out, but not until 22 February 1940 did the Air Ministry give the necessary sanction for the formation of Tasman Empire Airways Ltd., usually known as TEAL. Credit for these developments goes to Colonel N. S. Falla of the Union Steamship Company, who pushed the GPO and the Air Ministry until he was able to see Aotearoa leave Auckland for Sydney on the first service. Soon on a thrice-a-fortnight schedule, the two boats had a 74 per cent load factor with fifteen seats, and in the year 1942–1943 carried 2,259 passengers, 33,990 pounds of freight, 101,737 pounds of mail, and flew 1,265 hours on 144 nine-and-one-half-hour trips.

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23. BOAC routes as of 31 March 1944 with the Mediterranean open and Ceylon–Australia service.

44 S p e e d b i r d The original flying-boats were withdrawn on 29 October 1947 when Aotearoa completed her 442nd crossing. Other flying-boats carried on until June 1954. In the heyday of Imperial Airways, the trunk routes split at the south-eastern corner of the Mediterranean. One route went up the Nile to South Africa and the other to India and Australia, while a connecting service was made between Cairo and the Sea of Galilee for those wishing to go east from Cairo or south from Palestine. The hope and intention was to operate flying-boats both to the east and the south when the Empire Air Mail Scheme (EAMS) started, but for political reasons Ensigns had to be ordered as the Government at home decreed that a landplane service was to be operated. These were not delivered on schedule and, when Italy entered the war, only the flying-boats were doing Egypt–India. On 19 June 1940 Chairman Pearson of BOAC approved the name Horseshoe route, linking the two trunk lines after Italy cut off the stem. Cairo–Karachi had been operating as a weekly service since war broke out, but on 21 May was made twice-weekly. Early in 1940 the Regional Director, India and Burma, J. W. S. Brancker, had moved his headquarters from Calcutta to Karachi so as to be in better touch. He was at this time still running the Karachi–Cairo service with Atalantas and Hannibals, but after Hannibal ’s disappearance they were terminated on 3 May. Headquarters pointed out the need to keep operating across India for future commercial reasons and so the Atalantas continued the Karachi–Jodhpur– Delhi–Cawnpore–Allahabad–Calcutta run until 10 June 1940, when the Indian Government said it was unnecessary, and a shortage of pilots brought about its demise on 21 July. Two weeks later Indian National Airways extended its Karachi–Delhi run to Calcutta. But shortly thereafter the Indian Government asked that the 1,300 hours remaining on their Certificates of Airworthiness be used on a Karachi–Delhi service, which was flown until 1 February 1941, when all five remaining aircraft were sold to India for £11,250. Following the Iraqi revolt in May 1941, the Iraq and Persian Gulf area was broken up and from Basra east incorporated in India and Burma. In May 1942 J. W. S. Brancker, who with Runciman had escaped from the Japanese at Bangkok in December 1941 and then from Singapore, put all his staff in uniform. With the loss of Burma, BOAC landplane services were restricted and flying-boats terminated at Calcutta. Much of the intra-Indian traffic was taken over by the RAF. Not until after the war receded did new services grow, apart from the Hadramaut Coast route. Then BOAC followed in the slipstream of RAF Transport Command. With the disruption of services in June 1940, cables clicked back and forth between Durban and London to see if there were enough engines to allow the boats to maintain a regular service between Durban and Singapore. Sir Alan Cobham was approached for information on the Congo and arrangements made for a survey of the Mombasa–Seychelles–Ceylon route so as to avoid Italian East Africa. Eleven boats would be needed to maintain a weekly Horseshoe service. To keep them going, the Pegasus engine overhaul base had to be moved from Hythe to Durban, which in the shipping conditions of 1940 was a considerable feat. On

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1 August Overseas Headquarters was opened at Durban. A few months later Corinthian, Cassiopeia, and QANTAS’s Cooee were flown out from England. On the outbreak of war all aircraft had started flying with full tanks. In March 1941 the Operations Director suggested that if extra tankage was fitted, ten stops could be eliminated, yet the aircraft could still carry a 50 per cent reserve over their still-air range, consumption being 120 gallons an hour for all four engines together. This was agreed. Concurrently, the service was reduced to once weekly and schedules were altered to omit the night-stop at Bangkok. This was based on an Air Ministry proposal to operate Cairo–Singapore with KLM landplanes, but with long-standing hardheadedness on this, the Australian Government rejected the plan, which also included KLM flights to Australia disguised as a troop mail service. Nevertheless, frequencies were reduced to allow additional tankage to be fitted, modifications to be made, and overhauls to be undertaken. Surplus crews were sent to other African services. In June 1941 Durban suggested that the boats be partially stripped of their interior fittings to lighten them. QANTAS agreed. At the same time, the carburettor de-icing gear was also removed, as it was regarded as a nuisance to maintain. In August reserve routes through the Far East were surveyed. They ran from Rangoon via Mergui to Singapore, from Rangoon to Singapore via the Andamans, and from the Andamans to Sabang and Padang in Sumatra and on to Batavia. Like the Mediterranean ones via Corfu and Athens, they very soon proved entirely inadequate. The Japanese took everyone by surprise, as Hudson Fysh of QANTAS notes in his autobiographical Qantas at War, and the reserve routes soon became untenable. Casseopeia sank on takeoff at Sabang; Corio was shot down by Japanese fighters; Coogee was lost at Townsville and Corinna and Centaurus at Broome; Circe disappeared over the Timor Sea; and Corinthian crashed at Darwin. QANTAS was left with only two boats, one of which, Camilla, vanished at sea a year later. QANTAS’s last, Coriolanus, was retired in 1947 after flying more than 20,000 hours since 1937. BOAC gained Carpentaria and Cooee as they happened to be north and west of the break, but nearly half of the flying-boat fleet had been on the Australian side. The last service out of Singapore left on 4 February 1942, just eleven days before the surrender. Even before the route was snapped, London and Sydney were considering how to re-establish contact. Catalinas were suggested, but were unavailable. The Australian Government favoured handing the problem to Pan American, and on 26 February 1942 took over QANTAS. This, coupled with the lack of moorings in the Cocos Islands, a precaution urged before the war, ended any chances of getting back Camilla and Coriolanus or of starting a linking service, for the time being. Instead, the remainder of the Horseshoe was to have been extended from Karachi to Ceylon, but the Air Ministry cancelled the idea. In October 1941 RAF crews had begun to be trained at Lake Vaaldam near Johannesburg, and this eased the crew situation, for by 1942 the veteran Horseshoe

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46 S p e e d b i r d men needed a break as they were averaging 1,380 hours of concentrated flying a year.5 By April 1942 additional boats had been flown out from Britain and eleven were again available. Apart from the disruption of schedules caused by the transAfrican airlift before El Alamein, the situation eased also because by the end of 1942 a trickle of Sunderlands onto the West African route allowed Champion and Cathay to be switched to the Horseshoe. But then, just as a service to newly conquered Diego Suarez in Madagascar had to be considered, Ceres burned at her moorings. At the end of 1942 the Cabinet ordered the Chief of the Air Staff to consider the replacement of the Horseshoe fleet. BOAC’s Technical Director felt that the C-Class would last through 1943, but that Sunderlands would be needed as replacements at the rate of one a month until twelve, in addition to the six already allocated, were on service. To this the Chief Engineer added a plea for more ground staff as well as aircrew, a fact publicized by The Aeroplane in an article on the Durban base on 13 November 1942. The survey from Kisumu to Madagascar was finally made by Champion on 19 January 1943 and was the first of a weekly service. It was to have been extended to Mauritius, but the service itself was terminated at the end of August 1945. In spring 1944 Golden Hind was sent out to operate the Seychelles route, but did not start until 24 September, with an extension to Ceylon as of 28 November. As the build-up in the Far East progressed for the return to Burma, traffic increased toward the end of 1943 and complaints of holdups began to trickle back to London. The Cairo–Karachi sector was now strengthened by sixteen Sunderlands, in addition to a weekly Wellington and the Hadramaut Lodestars, supplemented in February 1944 by Ensigns withdrawn from the trans-African route. By the end of 1944 a four-day service from England was in being and this was gradually merged into postwar operations. The need for an air link with Australia without going around the world through the United States remained a top-level wish. QANTAS realized that, unless it could operate some long-distance route, it would have little claim to stay in business. So it set about trying to recreate a link across the Indian Ocean. With BOAC Catalina G-AGFL Vega Star the RAF began the first of seven flights on 3 November 1942. By mid-1943 two more West African Catalinas were surplus, and the RAF handed over operations. QANTAS made its first flight on 10–11 July and BOAC started, using QANTAS crews, on the 18th with a twenty-seven-hour, fifty-minute hop from Colombo to Perth. Because of the extreme range, only three passengers and mail totalling in all 2,800 pounds, could be carried on this “double sunrise” service. No stop could be made at the Cocos Islands for fear of attracting Japanese attention to the secret British wireless station there. The efficiency of the Catalina service was rudely challenged in the autumn of 1943 when an American Liberator with five US Senators and a 3,500-pound payload flew Ceylon–Australia in fifteen and a half hours. The Air Ministry wanted to know what BOAC could do about it. The Corporation replied that a Liberator II could do it as the headwind component was only 20 mph. Then an American C-54,

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24. The very long-ranged American Consolidated Catalina was used on the up-to30-hour “double sunrise” route some 3,600 nautical miles across the Indian Ocean from Ceylon to Australia. The flight, usually at night to avoid the Japanese, took a combination of two nights—and thus two sunrises. It had to be airborne for eleven hours before it could maintain altitude on one engine if the other failed.

a type denied Britain except for the Prime Minister’s own aircraft, flew Australia– Ceylon with twenty-two persons in seventeen hours. In the meantime, BOAC had run afoul of the Air Registration Board (ARB), which was most reluctant to allow a Liberator III to take off at 64,000 pounds, but there were not enough spares for a Mark II to be used. By March 1944 the proposal had become enmeshed in another argument between RAF Transport Command and BOAC as to who should do it. In the meantime, the Catalina service had been extended northward to Karachi. Finally, on 3 June 1944, BOAC was able to start a Karachi–Perth service with five Liberators. In May 1945 Lancastrians began operating all the way from London to Sydney, hopping the Indian Ocean from Ceylon to Learmouth, until 6 April 1946 when, as a result of one disappearing and the war being over, the route was changed to go via Singapore. The 271st and last Catalina flight was completed on 18 July 1945. As the five Liberators used were Lend-Lease, and as no one wanted them after the war, they were taken to sea in the first half of 1946 and sunk. The last Horseshoe service was flown by Castor from Karachi to Cairo on 15 January 1947. After she passed through, Kallia on the Dead Sea was closed and local services turned over to regional companies.

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48 S p e e d b i r d

Forecast All the time that crews and staff had been maintaining these various services, Headquarters had been thinking about postwar routes. The basic work for the re-establishment of British civil air services on overseas routes was largely the work of a small core of planners led by J. B. Scott, John Douglas, and Len Rashbrook, who constantly bore in mind the needs of postwar operations when advising on the wartime ones, and who continued in these roles for BOAC through the 1960s.

Conclusion During the Second World War BOAC had to establish itself against the opposition of the Under-Secretary of State (formerly of British Airways [1936]) and of RAF Transport Command, in the face of the failure of the Treasury and the Air Ministry, as well as the Ministry of Aircraft Production, to understand the airline’s need for crews, aircraft, and—above all—spares. At the same time, it faced constant changes of route and, until mid-1943, shortage of suitable aircraft.

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Chapter III Planning the Return to Commercial Operation The Preliminaries, 1939–1942 Some thought as to planning the return to peacetime operations started almost from the moment when war was declared in September 1939, but not much was done until a small Board Development Committee was formed in early 1942. And it was only after the resignation of the original Board in March 1943 that peacetime planning was given a high priority, both within and without the Corporation. Nevertheless, BOAC continued to operate in an abnormal manner, unduly hedged about by political, financial, and technical restrictions until 1950– 1951. In the years from 1943 to 1951 it was still plagued with the same problems already noted in previous chapters: its own and Ministry Management and accountants as well as the Treasury’s, shortages of aircraft and spares, temporary accommodations and scattered bases. Added to these by 1945 were international complications and competition. Despite the cancellation of all transports on order in late 1939, Management tried to keep plans for the resumption of commercial operations up-to-date in case the “phoney war” ended in peace. At the same time, attempts were made to develop specifications for postwar aircraft. In January 1940 a small committee was set up to consider what services the public was likely to want if there were no technical and financial limitations. On 27 April representatives of BOAC, the Civil Aviation Department, and the Post Office met at Bristol to discuss postwar plans. It was agreed that both trans-Atlantic and South American services would have to be postponed until the end of the war, but that other routes could be operated as they were then in 1940. However, within a few weeks events had, as we have seen, overrun all conceptions of the future. The Corporation could not get back to postwar planning until early 1942.

Taxying Out In August 1941 the Government appointed the recently retired Director-General of Civil Aviation, Sir Francis Shelmerdine, to head a small interdepartmental committee on postwar civil aviation. It held a number of meetings until January 1942, when its interim report coincided with the turmoil caused by the opening of war in the Far East. The major questions raised in this paper were never answered, and the committee died a quiet death. But its existence was public knowledge and in the annual Debate on the Air Estimates on 4 March 1942 critics of the Air

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50 S p e e d b i r d 25. Sir Harold Hartley, BOAC Chairman, 1947–1949.

Ministry urged that a small independent body be established to make plans for the future, in conjunction with Imperial and Allied interests. They also pointed out that BOAC would never be a significant organization as long as the BOA Act allowed the Minister to appoint “tractable and unimportant men” to the Board. In the same debate, MPs called for airliners capable of 300 mph at 30,000 feet with a range of 5,000 miles. The Under-Secretary said little in reply.1 This attack was followed up by another from C. G. Grey, the volcanic Irish editor of The Aeroplane (1911–1939), who said that he had urged the Air Ministry, without effect, to develop the best troop-carrying aircraft in the world so as to start the postwar period with the best civil fleet.2 Already there were rumours from the United States that Pan American was going to use the new Lockheed Constellations for oceanic flights. Yet on 30 September 1942 the suggestion that some design staff be put onto postwar types was rejected, the Ministry saying none could be spared.3 By the autumn of 1942 there were definite signs that American airlines, operating either in the open as was Pan American or through the USAAF Air Transport Command, were intent on furthering their postwar ends through wartime channels. The Station Manager at Stockholm reported that American authorities were requesting permission to operate there, while at the same time the President of the Swedish ABA company was in England seeking to establish a joint

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26. BOAC female traffic worker at Nairobi in 1946. Both the forage cap and the bushjacket tunic top were adapted from prewar Army issue.

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27. BOAC routes, 31 March 1945. Speedbird.indb 52

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Anglo-Swedish company to run a trans-Atlantic service with American aircraft. Hudson Fysh wrote from Australia of American ambitions, as he so astutely saw them. Early in November Chatham House (the Royal Institute of International Affairs) discussed postwar air transport. A few days later BOAC opened an office in Washington, D.C. Late in the month there was a further debate in Parliament in which it was officially stated that there was no need to develop civil engines as military ones would do.4 This, like many other statements of the day, indicates only too clearly that official spokesmen, at least, had little idea of the needs of commercial operations. Military engines were designed for peak performance rather than for economy of operation, endurance, and maintenance, as postwar operations were to show only too clearly. A week after the debate, a former director of British Airways called for the establishment of a committee of aircraft designers to work on postwar types.5 Sir Roy Fedden might have been available to head such a body, having just been forced out of the Bristol company, but he was persona non grata in certain quarters. However, his advice was made available through the Ministry of Aircraft Production. December also saw other developments in the appointment of a joint Ministry of Aircraft Production–Air Ministry committee on postwar navigation aids and the development within BOAC of a sixty-three-page document outlining BOAC’s plans for the future. The Operations Director, Campbell Orde, considered the routes to the Empire, North America, South America, Europe, and across the Pacific. For the first five years BOAC wanted the most cohesive fleet possible. Thus, he envisaged services to Durban and Auckland by Sunderlands, to Sydney and Cape Town by Yorks, with other long-distance services handled by a 60,000pound, tricycle-undercarriage landplane or an 80,000-pound flying-boat cruising at about 180 mph at 10,000 feet, carrying a spare engine, and operating around the clock with slip crews. A tricycle undercarriage, of which British designers had virtually no experience, was regarded as essential for Pullman services so passengers could sleep uninterruptedly at refuelling stops. For shorter-range work the DC-3 (Dakota) was considered adequate. For the North Atlantic, experience with the Return Ferry Service had shown that a pressurized aircraft capable of flying at 25,000 feet in temperatures ranging from 40 above to 40 below zero centigrade was needed. Pressurization was again, unfortunately, another area in which the British aircraft industry was lacking in experience. The Operations Director pointed out that the York could do the North Atlantic, but with only a 500-pound payload; the DC-4 (C-54) was, however, a practical proposition. Finally becoming aware of all these problems, the Government set up a secret committee under Lord Brabazon, Britain’s first licensed pilot, to make recommendations on postwar types.

The Brabazon Committee Aircraft production in Britain up to rearmament in 1935 had very largely been an ad hoc operation dependent upon Air Ministry orders. As a result, there was little knowledge of or interest in the problems of airliner design and production. The

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54 S p e e d b i r d new types needed by 1945 weighed about twice as much as their 1939 equivalents and were almost twice as complicated. For instance, by 1945 their cruising speed needed to be about that of a fighter of 1939. Moreover, not until the Ministry of Aircraft Production came into being in 1940 were studies begun of design-lead and production times. Like many other progressive innovations during the air war, the Brabazon Committee was a Ministry of Aircraft Production operation.6 Its terms of reference were to prepare outline specifications for the several types of aircraft needed as postwar transports and to suggest the firms which, as soon as war work permitted, should be asked to tender designs. In addition, it was to consider what military types could be usefully converted to civil use and to make plans for the immediate postwar utilization of spare manufacturing capacity during the transition to peace. The Committee was joined at its second meeting on 30 December 1942 by Campbell-Orde, the Operations Director of BOAC. Work was hampered from the first by the fact that the industry was not to be consulted, the Under-Secretary of State for Air having ruled that it would be sufficient to ask the Chairman of the Society of British Aircraft Constructors to reply to a questionnaire. The unofficial attendance of BOAC’s Operations Director helped, with the Chairman’s connivance, to circumvent the official obstacle. CampbellOrde testified that BOAC would not be able to become commercially viable until five years after the war. In that period he was all in favour of operating Yorks and for leaving the Halifaxes (later called Haltons) strictly alone. As for new aircraft, BOAC needed pressurized machines equipped with air-cooled radial engines capable of operating through the entire temperature range which civil aircraft might encounter on any trip, tricycle undercarriages, and the range to fly London–New York non-stop. On the whole, he favoured the kind of aircraft which the Liberator was proving itself to be—fast, safe, and reliable over long distances. In many of his detailed comments, he noted the backwardness of the British aircraft industry from the civil operator’s point of view. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Chairman said that the Committee was considering a civil version of a six-engine bomber design then being worked up. There were other meetings. The First Brabazon Committee Report was delivered to the Minister on 9 February 1943. It said that there would be no work for the aircraft industry in the immediate postwar years unless plans were put in hand. Therefore, the Committee recommended that design work be started at once on the following types in order of priority: (I) a multi-engined landplane of about 100,000 pounds able to do the trans-Atlantic run with a refueling stop at Newfoundland; (II) a medium-range, twin-engined feeder aircraft for use in Europe and overseas; (III) a four-engined aircraft for the Empire trunk routes; (IV) a jet-propelled mailplane for the North Atlantic; and (V) a small, twin-engined machine for internal and colonial routes.7 As Type I would conflict with the secret Bristol six-engine bomber, the Cabinet would have to decide what it wanted flying in 1948, but, the Committee warned, the new transport should not be merely the derivative of the bomber. It also recommended that jigs for civil versions of the York, the Halifax, and the Shetland

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flying-boat be constructed at once, so as to prevent the industry from shrinking to a fifth of its 1942 size when the war ended. The Committee hoped that its proposals would keep the industry at about half of its wartime size, but for this to happen, the industry had in 1943 to design aircraft which would capture markets in the first postwar years in which American manufacturers were already firmly entrenched, while at the same time it would have to develop advanced aircraft which would be going into service from 1948 onward. To capture the markets of 1949, revolutionary new aircraft would be needed. In one respect, the Committee was led astray by Campbell-Orde. American manufacturers and foreign operators have proved since the war that the same type could operate both over the North Atlantic and on the Empire routes. But partly because the Brabazon Committee designated the Empire type as separate from the Atlantic, BOAC was until the 1970s plagued with a multiplicity of types instead of getting down to a one- or two-type fleet, which would have been much more economical. BOAC attempted to achieve this ideal in the mid-Fifties with the Comet–Britannia combination, but disasters and late deliveries, requiring “insurance” aircraft, spoiled the plans. The ideal of a two-type fleet would not be realized even partially until 1965 with the 707–VC-10/Super VC-10 combination. During the spring of 1943 the Government parcelled out design tasks to those firms which it regarded as having surplus design capacity. This meant that the super-trans-Atlantic type went to Bristol, which had virtually no experience of civil needs. Neither Shorts, who had long built Imperial Airways’ aircraft, nor the very bright Miles firm were allowed to see the specifications, but each wrote its own and submitted designs.8 Those unwelcome tenders by Shorts and Miles made it difficult for the Ministry of Aircraft Production to justify awarding the contract for what became the Brabazon I to Bristol. To do this, it was arbitrarily decided that no aircraft of less than 190,000 pounds could do London–New York, and when, even with this specification, it was found a year later in mid-1944 that the Brabazon still could not make it, the Ministry reduced the headwind component for the westbound Atlantic crossing from 80 knots to 43! The range requirement was also cut down from 5,000 to 3,000 miles (though London is 3,438 miles from New York). So who says that Ministry officials cannot get things done! Meanwhile, in February 1943 the BOAC Director-General, Walter Runciman, had met with the civil aviation sub-committee of the Society of British Aircraft Constructors and had objected strenuously to its belief that 200 mph was quite adequate for airliners, pointing out that the very essence of air travel was speed. At the same time, the Operations Director, Alan Campbell-Orde, was complaining that, although the Director-General of Civil Aviation, Hildred, was always using his papers as the basis for specifications for postwar aircraft, he himself was not invited to the meetings of the Brabazon Committee. However, the second Brabazon Committee did not hold its first meeting until 2 June 1943.9 Between then and 3 October 1945 it held sixty-one meetings. It was required to draw up design

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28. The first year of peace, after the Second World War, with routes re-established across the world by 31 March 1946.

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specifications for each of the types laid down in the first Brabazon Committee’s Report. The first action taken was to appeal, through the Director-General of Civil Aviation, for the removal of the secrecy which so hampered its work. The second move was to send out questionnaires asking for traffic and operational information. As soon as this was settled, the BOAC representatives formally protested against the Corporation’s being compelled to use converted military aircraft in the face of foreign competition equipped with modern commercial American types. The Air Ministry representative said that there was a prestige value to using British aircraft, while the Chairman tabled the issue with the comment that the use of American equipment would not ease the problem of finding productive employment for the British aircraft industry. If BOAC objected, then it should take its case to the Air Ministry (though its link with the Minister was the Director-General of Civil Aviation, who was himself a member of the Committee). BOAC then said that it needed far more than the Brabazon I, which had now become the Type I. It specified the Type III, hereafter known as the MediumRange Empire (MRE), for this could be flown on all routes, including the North Atlantic by using the Azores–Bermuda crossing in the winter. Before the meeting adjourned, BOAC was asked to make an objective report on American types. This, together with BOAC’s specifications for the Type I, was discussed by both the Board and the Committee on 23 June and formally accepted, though the Corporation had doubts about Bristol’s ability to handle the Brabazon I. When Aubrey Burke returned to BOAC as Technical Director, he undertook to enquire at the Ministry of Aircraft Production to see if they thought Bristol could do it. Though the Ministry had to alter the specifications, it never admitted that the Brabazon I idea was a failure. There were other signs. The new Director-General (Critchley) and Board Member Sir Simon Marks proposed that, as “upon the success of these types the operations of our services will depend during a period which will determine the future position of this country in international air transport” and “the cost of the aircraft of these types required for our operations will run into millions of pounds,” a technical consultative committee be established. It never was, but if it had been, it would have been a very distinguished group.10 In August 1943 the second Brabazon Committee issued its First Interim Report, in which it urged that no time be lost in getting on with the Type I and that, as operational conditions were so exacting, financial considerations should be secondary; that a policy decision was needed on the carriage of mail by air as the Empire Air Mail Scheme had been suspended since the start of the war and the Post Office had not made up its mind whether or not it favoured highspeed-mails-only operations. In addition, work needed to be done on radio aids and on blind landing devices, as well as on the development of engines for civil use. This last was of prime importance as the Americans had a great advantage in their long experience with radial engines in airline operation. In September BOAC agreed to oversee the construction of the new aircraft, provided that the Corporation was given the necessary skilled staff. In October the Chairman wrote

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58 S p e e d b i r d to the Ministry, reaffirming support for the Brabazon I as “a valuable experiment,” a phrase to which the Ministry objected. At the same time, the Chairman told the Board that he was calling the new large Lancaster transport (actually based on the Avro Lancaster IV, renamed the Lincoln) the Tudor. It was a pressurized design competitive with the DC-4 (C-54) and with the Constellation, incorporating the basic features of the Liberator, then so popular on the Return Ferry Service, but able to carry twenty-five to thirty passengers. Gerard d’Erlanger, the one aeronautically experienced Member of the Board, said that it would be wise not to reckon on this aircraft being available for five years. This meant that the design would be at least eight years behind that of the DC-4. In the end, the Tudor failed and BOAC acquired the Canadian-built Rolls-Royce-engined DC-4s in 1948 and was forced to use them for the next decade, thus putting it substantially behind operators able to buy the most suitable types available. At this Board meeting it was evident that the general feeling was that flying-boats would be a very doubtful proposition for the future. In January 1944, Campbell-Orde, who was then BOAC Liaison Officer with RAF Transport Command, summarized the work of the Brabazon Committee to the end of 1943. Type I, the Brabazon I, was being handled by Bristol which was unable to obtain the 270 mph cruising speed wanted by the Corporation (though the Miles X-11, using the same engines, was designed to do London–New York non-stop at 350 mph with fifty passengers versus the Brabazon I’s 230 mph with twenty-five).11 The Empire type was in suspension because the Air Minister said that there was no design capacity available. Type IV, the jet mail plane proposed by Geoffrey de Havilland, had been allocated to Handley Page, which had no experience of this type of aircraft and so it was in abeyance (though eventually it was given to De Havilland, the only firm with both jet and commercial aircraft experience, and from it came the Comet). Yorks were in production and BOAC was expected to receive its first one in March 1944; the Halifax conversion, later called the Hermes, was in mock-up but was expected to be available in January 1945. The Tudor was two and a half years away from its prototype, according to its designer. Campbell-Orde went on to say that no one wanted the Bristol Brabazon, while only Hudson Fysh, and not the Australians in general, was interested in the flying-boat. Canadian Pacific wanted a 120,000-pound, 100-passenger aircraft, while Trans Canada Airlines was interested in a machine which could be operated either as a mixed passenger and freight or as an all-freight type. There was considerable demand from the Dutch, the South Africans, the Australians, and others for a DC-4 type. But one of the greatest British difficulties would be to overcome the very long lead that American constructors had established in after-sales service. As to mails, the Post Office favoured the retention of surcharges and would keep the air letter, but airgraphs would probably (as they did) come to an end. The Post Office favoured the operation of high-speed mail planes (such as Mosquitos) on postal schedules but wanted unsurcharged night mails within Europe. However, when pressed by the Secretary of State for Air for

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more specific proposals, the Postmaster General had withdrawn, saying he would wait to see what postwar conditions would be like. As for engine development, as a result of BOAC’s outspoken remarks about the high state of development of American radial engines for civil use, BOAC was being given a Lancaster for development purposes to work up the Merlin engine for commercial use. It had also been agreed that some new system for rating civil engines would be worked out to replace the military one then in use. At the end of 1943, as Sir Robert Watson-Watt said, little could be done on radio aids, for these were all still secret. Though representatives of Rolls-Royce, Avro, and the Ministry of Aircraft Production said that jets would not be in use for at least ten years, De Havilland (which then had the Vampire jet fighter under development) was much more optimistic. Sir Geoffrey believed that an airliner with a 500-mile range could be in service much earlier, predicting that such a high-flying machine would be able to do 450 miles an hour on the same sectors upon which the DC-3 did 174 with the same payload. De Havilland was supported by Dr. Roxbee Cox, administrator of the Whittle jet-engine programme. For the future, most of BOAC’s aircraft would be pressurized to allow for higher rates of ascent and descent, in addition to high-altitude cruising. The Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) recommended a differential of 5 pounds per square inch, but Avro’s Chadwick, who was doing the Tudor, was reluctant to make use of industrial knowledge on the subject and on air conditioning, which the RAE did not yet regard as important, to which Campbell-Orde added the comment that Britain was in this, as in many other things, backward and, as a consequence, a great deal needed to be done. (Shortly after this, Frank Whittle, the inventor of the British jet engine, submitted a proposal for a long-range trans-Atlantic airliner which would have flown at 470 mph at 40,000 feet, but was told by the Ministry of Aircraft Production that neither the speed nor the height was feasible12—the Ministry’s sights then being glued to the 230 mph Brabazon I.) In conclusion, Campbell-Orde noted that the Brabazon Committee had also been made aware of the bevy of American challengers already flying, such as the Constellation (which was to become a mainstay of international operators, including BOAC, for the next decade). By the time it submitted its Third Interim Report in July 1944, the Brabazon Committee said that, unless action was taken immediately on its recommendations, it would reserve the right to declare its list of requirements obsolete. On 5 September the Under-Secretary of State for Air wrote to Lord Brabazon to say that the War Cabinet had now considered the allocation of design staff to the Brabazon types, but that because BOAC and others had expressed certain doubts, the Cabinet wished the Committee to reconsider its recommendations. Balfour said that he thought real progress could now be made, but asked what arrangements had been made about obsolescence (a subject which was to be of great future import). If things were finally moving ahead in Britain, they were going very much faster in America. BOAC was considering carrying twelve passengers in regal comfort on the Tudors, whereas Pan American was ordering 108-seat Douglas C-74

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60 S p e e d b i r d Globemasters. BOAC was just beginning to get Lancastrians, with deliveries of Yorks only due to start in January 1945, whereas Pan American and other American operators were already using DC-4s and expecting to receive Constellations soon. On 22 November 1944 the Fourth Interim Brabazon Report noted that, in the light of the Under-Secretary’s letter of 4 September, of revised BOAC requirements, and of the latest British and American knowledge, it had been decided that the whole idea of London–New York non-stop and of variable sizes of fuselage for the Type I should be reconsidered; that the Empire type should be dropped and the Tudor I (the “fat Tudor”) substituted for it, while a new Type III should be planned about design capacity available in 1946–1947; the Type IV jet “should be proceeded with as a matter of greatest urgency,” but whether as a ducted fan or as a turbo-prop would have to await developments. The Report concluded by saying that on the suggestion of the Secretary of State (28 August 1944) it was now going to look into helicopters, freighters, flying-boats, and private aircraft.

The Formation of Public Policy, 1943–1945 During the period in which the Brabazon Committee was drawing up the plans which would guide British civil aircraft manufacturing in the postwar years, the formation of postwar policy on both the national and the corporate levels was taking place, the whole being linked to operational problems by the rate of delivery of aircraft. By early 1943 it was becoming quite obvious that there would be serious American competition on the postwar air routes in many parts of the world which had hitherto been British preserves. The evidence was to be found in preliminary license applications, in talks between Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and in the establishment of an American interdepartmental committee on the subject. At home in England people were beginning to advocate the breaking up of BOAC, or at least its restriction to Empire routes, the creation of new companies to operate to South America and across the North Atlantic, and the formation of a Ministry of Civil Aviation (MCA). A Joint Air Transport Committee was established by the British Chambers of Commerce, the Federation of British Industries, and the London Chamber of Commerce. Headed by Captain A. G. Lamplugh, long the dean of British aviation insurers, it took evidence and issued a report in May 1943 calling for freedom of the air, meaning freedom of passage, facilities, and trade. A more elaborate sequel was issued in September 1944. Late in March 1943 the Board of BOAC resigned and was replaced with a new one more willing to cooperate with the newly established RAF Transport Command. In the Commons, E. L. Granville, a former Director of British Airways, greeted this change with a call for a Commonwealth airline and the regulation of international competition through the United Nations, to which the Secretary of State responded by saying that the idea of a Commonwealth airline was an interesting one.13 Within BOAC itself the Deputy Chairman, Sir Simon Marks, in spite of a certain difference,

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agreed to take development as his special interest and in this connection he conferred with Major Mayo, long the Imperial Airways specialist on technical development, who had been working on this with J. B. Scott since early 1942. As the spring of 1943 wore on, the tempo of the public outcry increased. Lord Bennett, Prime Minister of Canada from 1930 to 1935, called for an Empire Conference, as did a delegation of Members of Parliament, while Maj. R. H. Thornton, of the Liverpool shipping company, Alfred Holt, and a charter member of the Air Registration Board, demanded that ship owners be allowed to run air transport companies. On 1 June the Deputy Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, announced that orders had been placed for four Brabazon Committee prototypes and for the conversion of certain military types.14 Nevertheless, 140 Members of both parties supported the motions critical of the Government’s attitude to aviation. A few days later the Director-General of Civil Aviation, Sir William Hildred, was present at a BOAC Board meeting at which it was agreed that the Corporation would supply him with notes as to the order in which it wanted to open postwar routes, the types of aircraft preferred, and engine and other technical considerations. In August the Board agreed to accept a BOAC-drafted Direction on postwar operations from the Secretary of State if it was understood that uneconomic competition would be controlled. This then led to BOAC Chairman Knollys circulating a directive asking for consideration of the organization of BOAC if all overseas activities were allocated to the Corporation and alternatively if only the trunk routes were. He supposed that the latter would mean that European routes would be separate. If no international civil aeronautics board was created, then an Empire Air Board should be established. He thought it was unlikely that the Air Ministry would retain control over civil aviation or that the Government would accept Imperial members of the Corporation, as the latter might embarrass it in the House of Commons. For the internal organization of the Corporation, he favoured the return to a regional system with policy dictated by the Board and carried out by a Chief Executive through regional heads under whom would be technical, commercial, administrative, and financial groups. Operations would be from three bases in Britain, each one of which would be the headquarters of a subsidiary company controlled by BOAC as the holding company. As to relations with shipping companies, he felt that these could be either cooperative or exclusive but favoured the development of the cooperation which had begun before the war. He noted that the 1937 US Maritime Commission paper presented to Congress, The Economic Survey of the American Merchant Marine, claimed the right of shipping companies to control overseas airlines and suggested that, if this was likely to be the case, BOAC should attempt to head it off by taking the wind out of their sails. The general outlines of this paper were sent to the Air Ministry on 15 September 1943 and a full discussion of the case for a single versus several chosen instruments followed on 6 January 1944. The latter called for a holding company with subsidiaries running services to Europe, the Empire, and the Americas.

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62 S p e e d b i r d During the latter part of 1943 there were other developments, too. Juan Trippe, the head of Pan American who had cooperated with Imperial Airways in the development of the trans-Atlantic routes before the war, publicly urged that Britain should be given transport aircraft to restore BOAC to a fully competitive position. There were meetings in London between British and American officials. A group of Members of Parliament published A Policy for Air Transport. The Society of British Aircraft Constructors sent a memorandum to the Prime Minister and the three Ministers concerned with air transport, calling for the abolition of national companies and for State aid through direct payments rather than through subsidies. It included the startling suggestion that by 1955 jet-propelled flying wings would be operating on all the world’s air routes. Meanwhile, in May 1942 the Chairman of Cunard-White Star had urged his company to get into air transport. In the summer of 1943 Cunard, Furness-Withy, and twenty-seven other shipping companies changed their articles of association to permit them to engage in air transport. Early in February 1944 a group of them registered British Latin American Air Lines Ltd., which ultimately became British South American Airways. The Government said that it had no objections to these developments as no assurances had been given and no postwar plans formalized.15 Within the Government itself, committees had been formed to consider: Internal and Overseas Services, Aircraft and Aeronautical Research, Air Navigation Regulations, Private Flying, and Aerodromes and Technical Services. They were responsible for much of the preparatory work for the Empire Air Conference which opened in London on 11 October 1943 under the Chairmanship of Lord Beaverbrook. This followed a pattern begun in 1922 and 1926, though the 1943 meetings were held in camera. The delegates agreed to the principles under which greater freedom of the air might be regulated by international authority, though there was considerable dispute as to their application. Of all the British representatives, only the Under-Secretary, Balfour, had had any practical experience of airline operations. During the meetings Lord Beaverbrook laid the blame for the lack of suitable British aircraft on Imperial Airways, which was hardly fair as the Air Ministry had consistently obstructed its proposals and Balfour had cancelled the modern civil types on order in 1939. In general, the London meeting was regarded as preliminary to a full Imperial Air Conference and to a meeting with Russia and the United States. In its reply to a BOAC paper on the operation of the trunk routes to India, the Air Ministry warned BOAC on 3 November 1943 to be ready, in case the war ended abruptly in Europe, to go in as a compact civil organization prepared to operate intensively with civil versions of the Halifax,16 Yorks being delegated for South American and the main Empire routes and the Lancaster IV (Tudor) for the North Atlantic. Otherwise, continued the Director-General of Civil Aviation, BOAC’s requirements would be met by the Brabazon types. None of the American types desired by BOAC was considered to be competitive with the Brabazon I except the Boeing C-97 (later the Stratocruiser) and it was not thought likely to be available.

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The Brabazon Committee’s recommendations on aircraft for European services were discussed in January 1944 and shortly thereafter talks between BOAC and the Director-General were started on the formation of “a United European Airways” in connection with the use of Shannon, then likely to become the gateway to Europe. The Chairman held talks with other European operators, but nothing came of the proposals until 1959, when Air Union negotiations began without BOAC. By early 1944 certain other moves were coming to light. In January 1944, Lord Beaverbrook, who as Lord Privy Seal had a general oversight of civil aviation, said that BOAC was not a monopoly and other companies could establish themselves if they could do so without subsidy. At the same time he announced the design of the twelve-passenger Tudor;17 upon which The Aeroplane commented that, as this was no better than the Liberators then in use, why waste time on it? In February Critchley, the Director-General of BOAC, told the Board that he understood the Cabinet was deciding whether or not BOAC or a shipping company was to be allowed to have the South American service. In March BOAC underwent a reorganization at the top while at the same time Air Commodore H. G. Brackley, then Senior Air Staff Officer, RAF Transport Command, was consulted about routes. In April BOAC sent a York to survey the West African route to South America as well as to check the aircraft’s tropical performance. Concurrently Lord Beaverbrook held confidential talks with Adolf Berle, the US Assistant Secretary of State, and with Dr. Edward Warner of the US Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). During these discussions Berle agreed to supply Britain with American aircraft for postwar services. Just after the Americans left, BOAC’s Chairman, Knollys, returned from a three-month round-the-world tour and promptly fired off a letter to the Secretary of State complaining that, although postwar air transport had been discussed with Dominion and American authorities, “the single chosen instrument for civil air transport overseas from the United Kingdom” had not been consulted except for inquiries on specific points. That being so, he enclosed BOAC’s views, including memoranda on feeder lines, the route to and through India, the place of Ceylon on Empire routes, and on Egyptian Airways. On 26 April he received a letter from Lord Beaverbrook, asking for the Corporation’s views on a single British chosen instrument to operate in parallel or in pool with the Dominion’s chosen instruments, on the participation of shipping and other interests in overseas air services, on an international operating agency for European services (excluding Axis territory), and on a joint Commonwealth corporation to operate a round-the-world service, stopping if possible only on British territory, assuming British and Commonwealth instruments operating to foreign countries. Knollys replied on 5 May, calling for unity of view and on the 8th sent in a memorandum in which the Board favoured the suggestions put forward and recommended the formation of what came to be British European Airways, but as a subsidiary of the BOAC holding company. In October the railways submitted their plan for European services. On 8 May 1944 BOAC’s own private Blue Book on Post-War Planning appeared. In it, Campbell-Orde complained that the Air Ministry’s committee on

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64 S p e e d b i r d aerodromes was so secret that he could find out nothing about it, while both an airborne radar (position-finding device) and the blind-landing system were also denied to BOAC. In October he was finally asked to join the committee, which was, after all, deciding matters of considerable commercial importance. In early June 1944 the Chairman talked with Elder Dempster about the future of the former Imperial Airways—Elder Colonial Airways’ West African airline. In the course of these discussions the BOAC Board laid down the general lines of thought for such operations, which it passed on to the Lord Privy Seal, Lord Beaverbrook; namely, that in any such joint company there was the advantage of an outlet for shipping money, though the State should retain 51 per cent of the shares so as to have control, but independent management on commercial lines within governmental policy was to be assured with air-mindedness paramount in the direction of policy and development. BOAC felt that all major air routes out of Britain had to be looked upon as one system, with the profitable routes making a fair contribution to those which did not pay. At the same time, it was felt that the Corporation would benefit from financial and directorial participation from other transport concerns. The Board proposed that BOAC become a holding company with up to 49 per cent of the stock in the hands of private shareholders who would appoint a minority of the Board. Dividends would be distributed after the suitable allocation of reserve and development funds, while capital stock would be in the form of bonds with a guaranteed 3 per cent interest. The key, the Board felt, to BOAC’s financial results both politically and economically lay in whether or not the Post Office and the Treasury allowed the Corporation to charge properly for the services it rendered without these being labelled a subsidy. Between the time when a proposed South African aviation conference was cancelled in September and the international conferences which were to take place in North America in November and December, an important additional aspect of Government policy became known. It was that BOAC was to “Fly British” and was, therefore, to accept an allocation not only of Lancasters but also to order twelve Mark I “thin” and thirty Mark II “fat” Tudors as part of an eventual fleet of eighty. Like the political decision taken by Churchill when he was Secretary of State for Air in 1920, that British airlines would have to fly by themselves, the “Fly British” decision seriously hampered BOAC over the next twenty years, leaving it unable to make commercial decisions on the extremely important matter of equipment. In this respect it became the major customer and supporter of the aircraft industry from which it rarely had the support it deserved, with the correct aircraft ready for operations at the proper time.

International Developments The International Convention for Aerial Navigation drafted in 1919 had by 1939 been ratified by thirty-three nations, excluding Russia, China, and the United States. Its focus was largely technical, though it was based upon sovereignty of the

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air which required airlines to obtain the permission of each country they wished to cross, whether or not traffic rights were wanted. In 1928 the United States, Chile, and eight Central American republics ratified the similar Havana Convention, which did not, however, provide for uniformity in technical matters. Neither of the Conventions made any provision for international economic regulation, leaving airline development at the mercy of political considerations. The British Government regarded this and high subsidies as unsatisfactory and called instead for enlightened international direction which would provide plentiful, efficient, cheap services while maintaining an equitable division of capacity offered and traffic available between the various countries, the elimination of wasteful practices and large subsidies, standardization in technical matters to ensure safety, and in general a contribution to world security. Thus, the Government proposed in Cmd.6561 of October 1944 a new world-wide Convention which would provide the four freedoms of innocent passage—technical transit stops, deposit of passengers, mail, and freight from the country of origin, and the embarkation of traffic for the homeland. The latter two, being traffic rights, were, together with cabotage, to be the subject of negotiations, while the now famous “Fifth Freedom” was the right to carry traffic between two points, both of which were outside the airline’s national territory. International air routes were to be defined and uneconomic competition to be eliminated by the determination of the frequencies over any sector. Additional safeguards were provided in both the regulatory and technical fields, the whole to be under the International Civil Aviation Organization of the United Nations. On 12 October 1944 the Government announced the appointment of Viscount Swinton, Secretary of State for Air, 1935–1938, as Minister of Civil Aviation. Balfour, the Under-Secretary for Air, was sent to West Africa to replace him as Minister of State. Swinton arrived home just in time to leave at once for the Commonwealth Air Transport Conference in Montreal, accompanied by Lord Knollys of BOAC, Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick Bowhill of Transport Command, and others. In general, the Commonwealth position was hammered out at Montreal and the Commonwealth Air Transport Council established with regional councils for South Africa and the South Pacific. It was agreed that except for Eire and in the Pacific, parallel operations and pooling would be the rule. Commonwealth Committees on Air Navigation and Ground Organization and for Air Transport Operators were also set up. The various groups then moved to the all-important meetings in Chicago (4 November to 7 December 1944), where the fundamental differences between the British and American stands became evident. Though well-regulated domestically, the American overseas operators, led in absentia by the confident Trippe of Pan American, wanted a free enterprise system while the more cautious British were for regulated competition. The disagreements amongst the fifty-four nations present centred on Fifth Freedom traffic rights, for most parties agreed beforehand to the technical proposals. After bitter wrangling, the Fifth Freedom proposal was

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66 S p e e d b i r d given to the International Air Transport Association, the operators’ society, which officially came into being in April 1945, for further study and was not resolved until the Bermuda meeting in 1946. The governments present established their own organization in the (Provisional) International Civil Aviation Organization (PICAO), also with headquarters in Montreal. The Chicago meetings at the Blackstone Hotel were successful in creating two world-wide organizations to replace the older regional ones, but were a failure where traffic rights were concerned. Nations wishing to operate air services had to negotiate traffic rights, and a whole host of bilateral treaties came into being under Article VI of the Chicago Convention. As soon as the Chicago meetings were concluded, British delegations, includ­ ing the UK one of Viscount Swinton, Peter Masefield (Civil Air Attaché in Washington), Hildreth, and McCrindle, retired to Montreal to decide on their world air route policy in the face of a major expansion programme by Pan American. At the same time, Australia announced that it was nationalizing its air services but leaving Hudson Fysh in charge of QANTAS. Early in 1945 the Coalition Government in London, heavily dominated by the Conservatives, issued its White Paper on Civil Aviation, Cmd.6605. Essentially, the Beaverbrook Plan called for three corporations to run British overseas air services. A single chosen instrument was considered to be unsuited to handle future expansion, though the truth was that railway and shipping interests had to be conciliated. As BOAC had itself suggested, the Beaverbook Plan was for BOAC, with shipping interests, to have the Commonwealth, North Atlantic, and Far Eastern routes, for a new corporation to handle internal and European services, and for a third company to run the South American. Although the idea of BOAC as a holding company was abandoned, BOAC was expected to have a majority holding in each of the two new companies as compensation for handling certain “uncommercial” services. The European company was to have exclusive rights to run the maximum number of services, while at the same time being required to operate some unprofitable routes “in the public interest.” The South American route was to be the sphere of the shipping companies already associated in British Latin American Air Lines Ltd. For maximum efficiency the three Corporations were to set up a combined overhaul base and a mutual training school, to hire RAF officers and men as limitations allowed, and to be “model employers.” The new Minister of Civil Aviation (a new Ministry had been created, separate from the Air Ministry) was to appoint the Board of BOAC and to approve the appointment of BOAC representatives to the Boards of the other two Corporations as well as giving his consent to the nomination of the Directors of the two new companies and of their subsidiaries and to their Memoranda and Articles of Association. Once he had done that, said the White Paper, then it was a cardinal principle of the plan that the Corporations should be left to manage their own affairs, but the Minister was to have broad control of aviation policy. It was the general intention of the Government that no subsidy would be paid, but on certain Commonwealth routes BOAC

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would be paid to maintain lines of communication. Once the postwar schedule of routes was established, new routes would be allocated to the most suitable operator, even to new companies. If the Government was compelled to require one of the Corporations to operate a new route in the national interest, then it was prepared to grant a temporary subsidy for it. The White Paper concluded by saying that on Commonwealth and other routes it expected that parallel operations would become joint services. The immediate criticisms were that the Government was handing over civil aviation to political and official control. Woods Humphery viewed the White Paper as containing a number of major flaws, including the failure to lay down a postal policy; the political nomination of Directors as opposed to their selection by, say, a fifteen-man Parliamentary Committee; and the failure to recognize the North Atlantic as a complete operation in itself. It could well be added that the proposals took British overseas airlines back at least to 1936, if not to 1924, while at the same time introducing an element of political control, and on occasions interference, which severely handicapped the development of the Corporations (BOAC and BEA). One of the immediate consequences of the advent of the Labour Government in July 1945 was the suspension of the semi-public holdingcompany concept and even of interlocking Boards until 1964. With the White Paper before him, the Chairman opened negotiations with Cunard and the Canadian Pacific Railway for a joint North Atlantic company. The CPR was most eager and wanted up to 33 per cent of the shares, but Cunard wished to limit its holding to no more than 7.5 per cent. The Anchor and Donaldson Lines also showed some interest. For BOAC the incentive to bring in Cunard was to be able to make use of its widespread sales organization. But the whole scheme came to nought when Labour came in. In the meantime, the Ministry of Civil Aviation had come into being on 25 April 1945, the war in Europe ended in May, and the war in the Far East stopped in August. Labour was elected in July and issued its own White Paper, Cmd.6712, in December 1945. This doctrinaire document called for the nationalization of the three airlines, as was to be expected,18 and was duly enacted in the Civil Aviation Act on 1 August 1946. BOAC faced the future with a hodgepodge fleet which at the end of 1944 consisted of fifty-two Dakotas, twenty-two Sunderlands, seventeen Liberators, five Yorks, thirteen C-Class flying-boats and one G-Class, twenty-two Lockheeds, nine Ensigns, three Boeing 314s, three KLM Dakotas and two DC-3s, five Mosquitos, and eleven miscellaneous machines. It had expected that by February 1945 it would have had thirty-two of the sixty Lancastrians it needed at once, seven of them for the North Atlantic alone. Five Yorks were to have been allotted to the South American service, but the delivery dates on the other sixteen were unknown, while the day when the Tudor Is would be on the North Atlantic was also uncertain. The Corporation’s hope was to be able to put together a uniform fleet. But this was not to be. The White Paper of February 1945 stated pregnantly that:

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68 S p e e d b i r d It is the intention of His Majesty’s Government, as it is the desire of the Corporations, that the Corporations shall use British aircraft as soon as they can be made available.

And it added that, because of the war, the Ministry of Aircraft Production would place the orders for new types, though there would have to be in the future close cooperation between the Corporations, the manufacturers, and Government departments. Until the new aircraft were available, the next paragraph (42) noted, the Government would lease aircraft to the Corporations. The actual development of British overseas air transport in the years 1945 to 1951 was to be much as predicted and not much as planned.

Conclusion The first three chapters reflect the confusing milieu in which the Corporation began life. Its future was uncertain because the Government had no clear idea as to the role an airline should play in wartime because it had never had one before. It could have looked at passenger shipping. More than this, the Government had a rather hazy view of the postwar world and little idea of the amount of lead time needed to establish a commercially viable airline when the fighting stopped. In contrast, a small nucleus of Imperial Airways and British Airways personnel struggled both to deal with the conflicting current demands of wartime operations with a mixed bag of inefficient aircraft and to think ahead to the future. The Imperial Airways people, especially, knew of the long hard work which had gone into building the airline before the war and were loath to see it thrown away because of political dogma. But

29. One of the Sunderland flying-boat variants, the 1946 Hythe Class, with the gunturret in the bow, replaced with a movable nosepiece for mooring. Flying-boats soldiered on until 1950.

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30. The four-engined Lockheed Constellation was a mid-war American development. BOAC could have had thirty of these aircraft, but the Treasury, not understanding commerce, limited the purchase to six.

airline managers also had to contend with the rival transport organization which had arisen out of Ferry and then RAF Transport Commands, largely flying new aircraft. On top of this, all wartime thinking had tended to disregard money and manpower and become insidiously extravagant. Moving into the postwar era, all these things, together with the legacy of the mixed bag of aircraft and the motley collection of routes, have to be borne in mind as the metaphoric runway from which in a peacetime world BOAC would have to take off as a commercial airline. The Government no more understood the running of an airline in peacetime than it had in wartime, yet it insisted on directing and restricting its Management and thus its profits and success in the national interest.

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Part Two Highs and Lows, 1946–1964

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31. The four-engined Canadair Argonaut was a Douglas DC-4 built in Canada with Rolls-Royce Merlin engines and was thus deemed to be a “British” aircraft. But at a time of four-year amortization, the aircraft were already obsolescent when BOAC acquired them (1949–1960).

32. A “traffic lady” at London Airport, North Side, 1946.

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Chapter IV Re-Establishing a Commercial Airline Introduction Postwar problems were in many cases still the same as those encountered during the conflict. Peace merely added to the freedom enjoyed by opponents and competitors. BOAC was kept, however, on a tight leash. Not only was it saddled with the “Fly British” policy, but it continued to have dual Management—by its own executives and those of the Ministry, not to mention a third financial comptroller in the Treasury. Moreover, its Board Members along with those of other nationalized industries were prohibited by a well-meaning Labour directive from discussing the Corporation in public. Perhaps most difficult of all, apart from the instability of Management until 1949, was the short-sighted view of dollar loans taken by the governments of the day. The stage for postwar operations had been set by the Chicago Convention of 1944, modified by the Bermuda Agreement (Cmd.6747) of early 1946.1 The AngloAmerican agreement provided in principle that capacity should be related to traffic requirements between the countries of origin and destination, to the needs of through-airline operation, and to the wants of the region through which the route passed, after taking into account local and regional services. It was agreed that the situation would be reviewed after British airlines had fully recovered from the war, while annexes listed the routes both countries expected to fly in the future and these were regarded as being granted. The main trouble with the Bermuda Agreement was that, while it encouraged the world-wide development of civil aviation, it set the precedent of equal opportunity for all countries. This has encouraged the development of prestige airlines, most of whom have sought reciprocal access to the lucrative American market with consequent over-capacity and insufficient revenues (low-load factors). The Air Corporations had the misfortune to become the first, after the BBC, of all nationalized corporations. Like the RAF before them, they were considered glamour companies and as such were natural political targets. But unlike other nationalized industries, they had to compete in an international market. Politically, BOAC in particular was decidedly unfortunate in that its postwar British aircraft were uncompetitive, forcing it to use some American models.2 The 1945 agreement that BOAC should “Fly British” and sustain losses was generally forgotten by those responsible. Moreover, Management itself did not like being uncommercial and sought the aircraft for the job so that it could take pride in making a profit. Corporate morale was, on and off over the years, a matter of concern.

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General Management Although the Ministry of Civil Aviation took over from the Air Ministry on 25 April 1945, not until 31 March 1946 did the reciprocal waiver of financial adjustments cease. And even for the year after that, BOAC was still in an abnormal state with a large staff and a wartime irresponsible attitude toward costs. At the same time, it was compelled to expand its activities to take over from Transport Command, then heavily bedevilled by demobilization. Some relief was afforded on 1 August, when BEA took over all European services. But operations elsewhere were expensive because of the lack of night-flying facilities and the consequent heavy cost of night-stops. Not that the Corporation did not recognize what was needed: Sir Harold Hartley, who succeeded Lord Knollys as Chairman in 1947, wrote that the requirements for efficient and economical operation were a standard fleet of two or three competitive types, a well-organized route network which would provide adequate traffic and high utilization of aircraft, and a high standard of air and ground crew training, maintenance, and well-equipped bases. Administrative economies alone could not solve the Corporation’s problems. In the 1946–1947 Annual Report he noted that: In judging the ultimate effect of the Corporation’s operations upon national expenditure, account must be taken of its primary responsibility for providing Commonwealth and Imperial communications under circumstances in which the commercial character of the service must often be subordinated to the national interest.

Uncertainty as to the types of aircraft to be operated meant a heavy expense in the training of crews. At the same time, a revolution in aircraft design and equipment, similar to that of a decade earlier, was causing a vast increase in costs. Yet fares remained stable, forcing the airlines into a desperate battle to keep efficiency ahead of prices and thus make a profit. Even the Ministry recognized the facts of life in the Civil Aviation Report, 1946 & 1947 (1948, 5–7). Though the public focus was on aircraft, ground facilities were equally important and just as costly. At the end of the war there was a severe drop on Eastern routes of 11,500,000 capacity ton miles (ctm)—about 20 per cent of the whole 1946–1947 BOAC ctm—which was only partly balanced by the revival of the Kangaroo service to Australia and the Springbok to South Africa. Passenger revenues rose to 56 per cent of the total and mail to 30, but freight dropped to 5. Full development was severely restricted by Government priority controls, which varied from 25 per cent of the North Atlantic space to 100 per cent on the Hong Kong run. However, these did keep load factors at 76 to 87 per cent. Unfortunately, the break-even was about 115 per cent. Priority controls were not removed until July 1948. Late release of space in 1947–1948 alone was reckoned to have cost BOAC £122,000. Reopening services all over the world plus hiving off BEA all cost money. It was agreed by

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the Government that the losses incurred in the first ten years should be covered by Treasury grants up to a total of £10,000,000 for the three Corporations in any year. It was considered better to pay large sums to the Corporations to operate inefficient aircraft than to pay development subsidies to the aircraft industry so that it could produce world-beaters for the 1950s. As things turned out, BOAC had little to show for the subsidies. Things were not made easier by the constant shifting of Ministers, the first three averaging but eleven months apiece, and by the complications of the aircraft ordering system, which involved the Corporation, the Ministry of Civil Aviation, the Ministry of Supply, the Treasury, and the manufacturer, not to mention the subcontractors. The comforting plans to use Tudors on the North Atlantic were shattered in September 1945 with the news that 20 surplus DC-4s had been allotted to Pan American, Trans World Airlines (TWA), and American Export (Overseas) Airlines. By the end of October they were operating into Hurn and Pan American was engaged in cutting fares for the round trip to £124 ($496) versus BOAC’s £234. Meanwhile, at home Labour won the General Election. On 1 November 1945 the new Labour Government announced its policy (Cmd.6712). There would be public ownership without private participation with the airlines, integrated with surface transport. British South American Airways Corporation (BSAA) and British European Airways would be established, Prestwick was designated an international airport to satisfy the Scots, while the Brabazon Committee would be kept in being to see that the necessary aircraft appeared. Critics in the Lords, largely ex-Ministers, decried the plan.3 Most opponents agreed, however, that a single maintenance base for all the Corporations would be a good idea. Outside critics were more concerned with the large powers given to the Minister, which included rate-making and the appointment of Board Members. The fear was expressed that these positions would become sinecures for time-expired civil servants.4

The Formation of British European Airways At the time when BOAC was considering the Cabinet proposals for a European company, Critchley outlined to the Board on 20 April 1944 a proposal to form a BOAC group within RAF Transport Command. Just after D-Day, plans were altered and BOAC staff were seconded to 110 Wing. The entire Wing was handed back intact to BOAC on 1 February 1946 when Gerald d’Erlanger took charge of it, the Air Transport Auxiliary he had run having by then faded away. Even after BEA became independent on 1 August 1946, it continued to use BOAC’s Airways Terminal and to borrow money from BOAC. Critchley had, in the meantime, tried to establish a central London air terminal. A lease on Earl’s Court fell through and ever after the two Corporations went their separate ways, though not without trying to find a mutual solution to the London terminal, a problem still plaguing British Airways in 1978. BOAC had also originally wanted to take a financial

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76 S p e e d b i r d interest in BEA, but the Ministry advised against it. However, both took shares in Aer Lingus, the Irish company, and BEA in Alitalia. BOAC sold its 10 per cent interest in Aer Lingus to BEA in 1952.

Aircraft Procurement BOAC’s competitive position immediately after the war was made the more difficult by the dearth of suitable aircraft. In May 1945 Avro told the Minister that twenty Tudor Is would be delivered by May 1946 and eighty Tudor IIs by the following December. BOAC was not impressed and called the machines “economic makeshifts,” not comparable to the Constellations then just coming into use. On 3 September 1945 the Chairman wrote to the Minister, saying that BOAC needed more positive dates for the Tudors. Five weeks later he stressed the fact that in 1946 BOAC would be able to operate only three Boeing 314 flying-boats of prewar vintage on the North Atlantic and that from then until 1950 reliance would have to be placed on the Tudor I. In the circumstances, the Chairman said that the Board felt it should consider the purchase of American aircraft. Late in January 1946 this led to BOAC’s being given permission to buy five surplus Constellation Ia’s from the USAAF. By then, however, American competition was not the only spur. QANTAS had decided to purchase Constellations for the Kangaroo route to meet threats from Australian National Airways. South African Airways, which was to have operated Yorks until the Tudors appeared, also decided to go American and ordered Skymasters (DC-4s). Naturally there were critics of the abandonment of the “Fly British” policy. BOAC was accused of “letting down the side.” But the harsh truth was that, compared to the Constellations, on Empire routes the Hythe flying-boat cost 234 per cent more to operate, the York 190 per cent, and the Lancastrian 60 per cent, with utilization at only about 1,000 hours a year. As Maj. R. H. Thornton of the Air Registration Board pointed out, it was like trying to run a shipping company with corvettes and frigates, and for this very reason ship owners were being allowed to buy American vessels.5 In retrospect from the standpoint of BOAC and of the national Exchequer it was a penny-wise-pound-foolish move to allow BOAC only five aircraft with which it could garner only a small percentage of the North Atlantic market, while adding yet another type to be maintained. If the idea was to preserve Britain’s stake in the route that Imperial Airways and Pan American Airways had jointly pioneered, then surely the sensible thing would have been to have obtained thirty to forty Constellations with American commercial loans, as other European airlines did. These would have allowed BOAC to have taken half the traffic and to have brought in a handsome dollar revenue. Moreover, by the summer of 1946 Air France and KLM were both on the North Atlantic, using aircraft purchased with selfliquidating American loans. Of the $120,000,000 brought in by visitors to Britain at this time, essentially a “hidden” export, one-third was by air travellers, 45 per

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cent of whom were businessmen. Not until the 1960s did the Treasury abandon its provincialism and not only allow, but indeed compel BOAC to finance American aircraft purchases in the USA. The 049 Constellations began to be delivered on 29 May 1946, went into service on 1 July, were grounded briefly from 10 July to 30 August (which cost BOAC £121,600) because of accidents to other airlines’ aircraft in America, but otherwise remained on the North Atlantic until early 1950, when they were switched to the mid-Atlantic route. The 049 Constellation fleet was increased with additional Model 749 aircraft bought from the Irish in June 1948 and put on the Kangaroo route. However, these cost £315,000 apiece versus the £250,000 of a new one; the Government justified the price on the grounds that they were available a year earlier.6 But even the purchase of the Constellations left BOAC in jeopardy as other lines were ordering the Boeing Stratocruiser and the Republic Rainbow (although the latter never went into service). So in September 1946 the Corporation was permitted to order six Stratocruisers. Pan American had ordered twenty and the Swedish airlines four. These aircraft filled a neglected spot and their performance far exceeded that of the experimental Brabazon I, still then dependent upon untried engines. Strikes at Boeing delayed deliveries, but in the meantime the four Swedish aircraft were acquired by BOAC for sterling, but at £687,000 apiece whereas Pan American paid only £375,000 for theirs. At the same time the French Government lent Air France $12,000,000 with which to buy sixteen American aircraft.

Flying-Boat Policy Flying-boats had always played an important part in the development of British air routes. During the war almost no new design work was done on them, although air routes and airfields were opened up all over the world and the design of landplanes made vast strides. In BOAC there remained a strong group devoted to flying-boats, whose roominess had great passenger appeal. The main problem in Britain was to find a base close to London, a search for which had been going on since before the war. Critchley made the brilliant proposal that, as it stood on the gravel strata of the Staines reservoirs, a lagoon be dredged at Heathrow, the fill to be used for the landplane runways. But the adoption of Hurn near Hythe and the fact that Heathrow was then an Air Ministry project prevented his idea from being accepted. Apart from this, as early as 12 July 1945 the Board had had some doubts about the future of flying-boats, while the Brabazon Committee had not reported on them at all. Apart from the military Shetland and converted Sunderlands, Shorts had nothing to offer, while the Saro Princess was, like the Brabazon, a gigantic new venture whose eventual cost came to £9,600,000, but which never went into service. BOAC itself never asked for the Princess and never operated it. Hythe was expanded in 1946 for Boeing 314 North Atlantic operations. At the same time Knollys agreed to take the two Shetlands for an experimental service to India if this was treated as a separate financial operation. It was not and so never occurred. The

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33. Yet another derivative of the Short Sunderland flying-boat was the Solent. BOAC, at the time, was not yet willing to abandon the leisurely water routes on which the Air Ministry paid for facilities (1948–1950).

Ministry built a new marine terminal at Berth 50, Southampton, and flying-boats operated from there until 7 November 1950, when all such services were stopped at a great savings. Because of the lack of adequate airfields on Eastern routes, flying-boats had to be operated. This meant that BOAC had to recruit fifty ex-Royal Australian Air Force men as there were not enough RAF pilots with 500 hours in command of flyingboats. A Sunderland/Hythe service was started to Singapore and then extended to Australia to parallel the QANTAS Lancastrian service to London. But this was regarded as a temporary measure, and on 25 April 1946 the Ministry told Shorts that it could not encourage the design of a new flying-boat as BOAC intended to use boats only for the next two to three years. The Corporation also issued a statement to this effect, adding that a nucleus of flying-boat personnel would be kept until the Saro Princess project reached a decisive point. Nevertheless, there was continued vacillation and politicking. The prewar Langstone Harbour scheme7 was raised again and a committee under Lord Pakenham appointed to investigate. Though it reported in September 1946, its findings were not made public until 6 May 1947 (in Ministry of Civil Aviation Publication 13). Investigations were kept going even after comparative studies showed the Boeing Stratocruiser to be a more useful aircraft than either the Princess or the Brabazon I. Not until 3 January 1948 was Management told that the policy was to operate flying-boats on Eastern and Southern routes until the Handley Page Hermes became available in four to

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34. The postwar British South American Corporation (BSAA) flew the new four-engined Avro Tudors. But after several disappeared, the aircraft was withdrawn and BSAA folded into BOAC. The Tudor is the Reindeer in Nevil Shute’s No Highway (1948).

five years. By then the failure to obtain the eighty Tudor IIs had involved BOAC in replacing the Sunderland III (Hythe) Class with Solents, themselves a much delayed aircraft. In May 1948 the prospect of additional Constellations being made available from Ireland led to the idea of cancelling the Solents, though this could not be done as the Hermes were further delayed. But with the advent of the Canadair Argonauts, hopes were raised again that flying-boats could be abandoned and Hythe reduced to a care-and-maintenance basis. Chairman Hartley pointed out to the Minister that if BOAC could abandon flying-boats, it would save £828,000 a year by not operating Hythes (modified versions of which were called Plymouths) and £1,375,000 by withdrawing the Solents. Under these circumstances it was scarcely surprising that the Minister told the House of Commons in March 1950 that he could see no overriding national interest which would justify his requesting BOAC to keep flying-boats in operation.8 The flying-boat era was dead.

Public Policy, 1946–1947 The beginning of 1946 saw a number of changes in the Board. Mrs. Pauline Gower Fahie, formerly of the Air Transport Auxiliary (ATA) ferry service, resigned, as did John Marchbank. They were replaced by Sir Harold Hartley of the railways and H. L. Newlands of the Transport and General Workers’ Union (TGWU). On 17  January, Critchley resigned as Director-General. In May young Baron

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80 S p e e d b i r d Rothschild, a Cambridge Ph.D., was added; he and Major Thornton proved to be the two most astute and provocative, but certainly valuable Members of the Board. In April the Labour Government introduced the Civil Aviation Bill designed to create two additional nationalized Airways Corporations (BEA and BSAA). It broadened the British Overseas Airways Act of 1939 by allowing the Corporations to run feeder as well as trunk services. It tidied up the wartime financial arrangements and gave the Ministry, raised to First-Class status on 1 April, considerable powers. However, what the critics feared has proved true: the Minister used his power to meddle in operational and commercial matters through subtle pressure and through the appointment of Members of the Board. The importance of the Bill, the first Labour attempt to nationalize a major industry, may be judged by the fact that the formal motion to decline it a second reading was moved by Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, and Harold Macmillan. One hundred and forty-one amendments were proposed by 21 May. The clause which drew the most attention was that establishing an Air Transport Advisory Council (ATAC) as the protector of passengers. It proved to be an absolute flop until Lord Pakenham, a Labour Minister, had the bright idea of turning it into a device to grant rights to the Independents in 1948.9 The bill became law on 1 August 1946, almost exactly seven years after the Conservatives created a nationalized BOAC. The most important sections of the Act were those which gave the Minister power to restrict the activities of the Corporations (I.2, subsection 6), to give them a Direction to act in the national interest (I.4), and the power to refuse to allow them to print such a Direction in their Annual Reports (I.22, subsection 3). In addition, the Corporations were required to submit their plans for the coming year in advance and to present triennial forecasts of revenues and expenditures, while the Minister was given access to all their records (I.22, subsection 4). Shortly after the Act passed, rumours circulated that Lord Winster, the Minister, would resign. Early in October he left to be Governor of Cyprus, and the Under-Secretary was translated to the Colonial Office, meaning that the Ministry would once again have a new team. This was composed of Lord Nathan and G. S. Lindgren. Almost immediately, aircraft once again became a problem. The delay of the Tudors left BOAC with nine different types of aircraft. (In contrast, its arch-rival, Pan American, had already restored almost all its prewar routes, doubled services, and begun operating a new service to India.) Because of the commercial inefficiency of all but the Constellations, the Corporation was, economically speaking, badly overstaffed, suffering from planning problems, and from the multiple training and retraining involved when aircraft failed to appear for service. Handley Page Haltons, for instance, were on service only six weeks before they all had to be returned to the manufacturer for the installation of de-icing gear and rectification of hydraulic faults. As a result, for a whole year BOAC had to maintain a base with a staff of 400 at a cost of £193,120 from which it obtained only 1,000 on-service hours from the aircraft. Operation of flying-boats with their expensive night-stops was reckoned to cost another £1,150,000 a year. Several routes were closed down

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35. BOAC used the Handley Page Halton after the Second World War: a civil conversion of the Halifax bomber with bulged cargo compartment and limited passenger capacity.

or operated on limited frequencies because of the withdrawal of RAF personnel and the closing down of radio and weather facilities. Spares were hard to obtain on both sides of the Atlantic, causing additional delays. Despite all this, the Estimates Committee happily reported that BOAC had slimmed down its staff overseas, cut the cost of maintenance and overhaul, reduced the number of aircraft from 207 to 175, established an Economic Research section, and attempted to integrate some of its maintenance with British South American Airways.10 In April 1947 Lord Knollys came to the end of his four-year term and his resignation was announced. Rumours flew. It was expected that Air Marshal Sir Ralph Cochrane of RAF Transport Command would be nominated, but an attack on the general flow of officers to civilian positions made this politically risky. So Sir Harold Hartley, sixty-eight years old, was switched from the Chairmanship of British European Airways, essentially his creation, to that of BOAC. He was succeeded at BEA by d’Erlanger, promoted from Managing Director. Cochrane was offered the post of Chief Executive, but it went to Air Commodore Whitney Straight, thirty-four years old, who also moved over from BEA as Managing Director (Chief Executive). The Corporation thus had once more a Managing Director, a post hitherto filled by Lord Knollys since Critchley’s resignation. McCrindle, formerly Managing Director of British Airways (1936), was moved to the new post of Managing Director (External Affairs). Thus in the middle of 1947 a new top team took over whose leaders had considerable experience of air transport. Hartley had long been associated with Railway Air Services, while Straight had operated a collection of small lines before the war and commanded Nos. 216 and 46 Groups, RAF Transport Command, during the conflict. Changes at once became apparent.

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82 S p e e d b i r d BOAC had for some time been criticized for its large staff. Only in early 1947, however, was it discovered that the Ministry of Labour had in 1945 surveyed it and that this secret study was being used within the Ministry. BOAC finally obtained a copy. The staff on 31 March 1947 stood at 24,464. It was too large, but some of this was because of scattered bases. One of the new team’s first actions was, therefore, to prune. By 31 March 1949, before the merger with British South American Airways, the number had already dropped to 18,871, but the saving was only £1,310,000 a year, even though 6,400 had been discharged. At the same time, the Ministry had grown from the 273 persons of 1939 to 4,950 in May 1947 with an admitted goal of 11,000.11 A number of questions were bothering the Ministry in 1947. Group Captain C. A. B. Wilcock headed a committee looking into the licensing, recruiting, and training of air transport personnel. It reported that there would be a shortage (Cmd.7746 [1949]). The Government took no action and there was a dearth. Air Commodore W. Helmore headed another group, studying the certification of civil aircraft, navigational and other equipment. It called for the strengthening of the Air Registration Board rather than abolishing it and for independent status for Accident Investigation as its work necessarily criticized that of the Board (Cmd.7705 [1949]). In addition, there was the Newton Committee on accident investigation (Cmd.7564 [1948]) and eighty other committees. All of these tended to strain the staff of the Ministry, always short of qualified personnel. On 1 October 1947 BOAC was struck unexpectedly by the Government’s imposition of travel restrictions because of the shortage of foreign currency (the ban was raised in March 1948). This blow coincided with one of the worst winters on record, which also cut deeply into potential revenue in terms of cancelled flights. The coal shortage was costly because of the need to buy extra equipment to supply power to ground installations. Also in 1947 the first of many self-inspired investigations of the Corporation’s Management was undertaken. This one was aimed at overcoming the arrears in accounting and at achieving some form of budgetary control. Accounts was still operating on a wartime basis, while, like many British businesses, BOAC was much less aware of the usefulness of meaningful statistics and accounting controls than comparable US firms of the day. During the war BOAC had used many government services for free, but received no revenue for official traffic, so this made it hard to know on what to base forecasts. Yet budgetary control was vitally important when Deficiency Grants were being received. These Grants were a mixed blessing. In 1947 BOAC had been required to submit three plans to the Ministry for the coming year’s operations. Which was to be used depended upon the Government’s decision as to additional purchases of American aircraft. This choice was not made by the Cabinet until 21 April, three weeks after the new financial year had begun. BOAC had then to redraw completely its operational plans for the year in the light of the decision as well as the non-delivery of aircraft and the lack of airfields. Lord Knollys reckoned the Cabinet’s decision cost BOAC

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36. London Airport North Side check-in, in tents, immediately postwar, 1946

£2,500,000 a year.12 More than this, there was a general failure of all concerned to agree upon a formula for estimating the Grants.13 Further complications came from the difficulty of obtaining prices of spares from the Ministry of Supply and in the hang-over of wartime accounts, some of which were not wound up until 1949–1950. Considering all these uncertainties and the late start, the Corporation submitted a new estimate for the current year which indicated a deficit of £7,150,000 without allowing for the redemption of capital, a task eventually recognized as unrealistic. Later in the year the Corporation attempted to draw up a list of those services which it wished to operate commercially and those for which it felt the Ministry should pay a subsidy. While the Ministry eventually acknowledged that services in the Middle East and the operation of associated companies fell within the sphere of the national interest, it declined to make any payments, as these would have weakened its political position. During the year, economies were effected through modifications to improve payloads and through the redistribution of aircraft, through the reorganization and elimination of maintenance bases, and through the use of frozen food aloft. But with seventy night-stop rest houses, all-year-round hotel reservations, and nine major maintenance bases (versus KLM’s one),14 the necessity to operate communications, flying control, and navigation systems evacuated by the RAF until these could

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84 S p e e d b i r d be passed to International Aeradio Ltd., plus the disruption caused by cholera in Egypt, all added up to an expensive operation. The actual revenue for 1947–1948 was £12,292,403, but operating expenditure was £19,049,601. Though the deficit was lower than the £8,076,844 of 1946-1947, the causes were much the same: aircraft and facilities which were not financially self-supporting. With its scattered bases, the Corporation was compelled to undertake much dead flying. For the Constellations and Liberators based on Montreal, this meant a 680mile round trip from New York, between trans-Atlantic services. The long delay in centralizing BOAC’s maintenance, not accomplished until late 1954, did much to hide the fact that maintenance costs were high. Not that they were not noticed. Both Major Thornton and Whitney Straight drew attention to them. But not until after the departure of Sir Miles Thomas in 1956 was the real assault on the problem begun. Long before that, however, politics forced the move of the Montreal base.

The Evacuation of Montreal Just after the end of the war, the ground crews for the Return Ferry Service Liberators were joined at Montreal by those who had been maintaining the Boeing flying-boats at Baltimore. When the first Constellations were acquired in 1946 the question arose as to whether they should be maintained at New York, Prestwick, or Montreal. New York was most logical, but cost dollars. Prestwick was off the route and had only a skeleton crew. Montreal supplied the crews, and though off the routes, seemed the logical place. The situation at Montreal might have been ideal but for the Canadians. In the Commonwealth Conference of July 1945 they had declined to pool with BOAC, preferring instead to continue their independent Lancastrian operations. Therefore, they refused to allow BOAC to operate into Canada until they had their new DC-4Ms (North Stars, or in BOAC, Argonauts). This involved BOAC in £150,000 worth of dead flying a year, but the Montreal hangars were the only ones big enough to take Constellations. Critics pointed to the £500,000 a year cost of the base and argued that if it had been moved to England in 1945, BOAC could have bought six Constellations a year with the savings.15 This was not true, as by no means could the whole cost of the operation have been saved by moving the base to England. Some dollars might have been earned, however, by chartering the dead flights to Trans Canada. On 14 May 1947 Lord Knollys and Sir Harold Hartley testified that housing did not exist for either the Constellations or their personnel in England.16 Very shortly, political pressure forced the Ministry and the Corporation to set up a working committee. But the issue was complicated by plans to extend the Atlantic service eastward and westward and by Plymouth flying-boat operations out of Bermuda, and operations of all of these services was until 1949 made more difficult by the necessity to make a daily inspection of the aircraft.17 Eventually it was decided that BOAC would use the Brabazon hangars at Filton, Bristol, as these would be available in June 1948. However, there were further complications. BOAC wanted to

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move before the Stratocruisers were delivered. The Ministry wanted to grant only a four-year lease, because the space was reserved for the assembly of the forthcoming Britannias, but would give no positive assurance that hangars at London Airport would be ready by then. BOAC, therefore, asked for an indemnity to cover the double move from Montreal to Filton and from there to London. Not only was this refused, but the Ministry compelled the Corporation to pay for the installation of the necessary flying aids at Filton. Though BOAC moved on the grounds that the national interest required it to do so to save the country £2,000,000 worth of dollars annually, the cost to it of the move was £361,583 in moving expenses, plus £350,000 in non-recoverable investment, including 350 houses built for the staff. Moreover, the Corporation believed it cost more in sterling than in dollars for the same establishment, though the dollar-paid staff was reduced from 1,634 to 695. Elements remained at Filton until the autumn of 1955.

The Canadair Purchase For parochial economic reasons and for national policy, BOAC had been refused permission to buy additional American aircraft. Yet in the spring of 1947 none of the stop-gap British aircraft due in 1945 was yet available. Lockheed suggested “Project X.” This hush-hush proposal was to re-engine five new Constellations with Bristol Centaurus engines, which would give a lower dollar outlay with the advantage of spares obtainable in sterling. The Government turned it down on the grounds that it would damage the prestige of the British aircraft industry. But the only aircraft, apart from the Tudors, expected from British stables was the Handley Page Hermes, then being modified to make it an even better copy of the DC-4, already a five-year-old design. The new Hartley–Straight Management decided at once that if BOAC was to be profitable, something drastic had to be done. If it was not possible to get an American aircraft, then perhaps a Canadian one with British engines could be bought. Trans Canada was enthusiastic about its DC-4M North Stars, regular DC-4s built in Canada. BOAC planners were delighted. Canadairs could be in service eighteen months ahead of the Hermes (it turned out to be nearer three years), would be a proven aircraft, and would earn revenue at a higher annual utilization much earlier. The original BOAC estimates showed that fortythree aircraft with the famed Rolls-Royce Merlins would bring in a $4,514,000 surplus in five years. In capacity they exceeded the Tudors and at forty passengers equalled the Hermes. Though BOAC was actively interested in the Canadairs as early as the autumn of 1947, Parliament was told on 21 January 1948 that no orders had been discussed between the Ministry and Canadair. A month later the Ministry of Supply, which ordered the Corporation’s aircraft, said that Canadairs could not be considered because of the dollar outlay, even though it was pointed out that the Canadians would allow payments to be made from earnings. However, the Under-Secretary for Civil Aviation at once rose to say that if that was so, then the Ministry of Civil

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86 S p e e d b i r d Aviation would look into the idea.18 What caused the Government to change its mind was the failure of the Tudor and the arguments of Whitney Straight. In 1947 Air Marshal Sir Christopher Courtney was appointed to head a committee to look into the Tudor. His interim report (Cmd.7307) appeared at the end of 1947 and blamed Avro and BOAC for the delays but largely exonerated the two Ministries concerned. In January 1948 a Tudor belonging to British South American Airways mysteriously disappeared in the Atlantic, to be followed by two more the following year. Operational reports on the tropical trials were disappointing, while the final Courtney Report (Cmd.7478) showed that the aircraft had serious problems, though how serious in terms of fatigue was never made public.19 The tragedy is that, had the 1951 Courtney Report on fatigue failures in the Tudors been published, the Comet 1 story might have been different.20 Early in June Lord Pakenham came into office at the Ministry of Civil Aviation. He shortly received the Tudor tropical trials report, took his courage in his hands, and announced on 21 July 1948 that the Tudor II had been abandoned and that BOAC was buying twenty-two Canadairs as the Hermes would not now be available until 1953. Arrangements had been made with the Canadian Government to enable these aircraft to be bought with dollars which normally should have gone to pay off British war debts to Canada. The savings over alternative British makeshifts was reckoned at £5,000,000 in the first five years.21 Lord Knollys pointed out that BOAC had first wanted to buy these aircraft in 1944 and that the matter had been considered successively since then by five different Ministers. By the time BOAC received theirs in 1949, the DC-4 had been flying, including war service as the C-54, for seven years, and other FirstClass operators were replacing it with the next generation. But for all their declining years, the Argonauts served BOAC well, and they remained in useful service for more than twelve years. Meanwhile, early in July 1946 BOAC had announced a new organization which was a return to the prewar Imperial Airways Line system, with each route being handled by one type from a single home base, a variant of which had been used in the Second World War, though range limitations had tended to create regional organizations.

Obsolescence The other important policy decision taken during the Hartley regime was on obsolescence. Under Whitney Straight’s influence it was accepted that obsolescence should be related to the likely life of each type. Thus the Board agreed in December 1948 to extend the seven-year life of the Constellations and Stratocruisers to ten years, while the Argonauts and Hermes should be increased from five to seven years. It was assumed in each case that the aircraft would have a residual value of only 30 per cent of its purchase price at the end of five years, which would make it easily resalable at more than book value at any time after that date. It was also

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decided that Comets and Britannias, two anticipated types, should have a ten-year life. British South American Airways and British European Airways were both at this time using five years, though BSAA put the Tudor V on a two-year basis. These decisions, which were based on purely financial grounds, conformed with American practice; BOAC’s rules continued to be in line with those in America, where the big jets were amortized on a twelve-year basis, both because of their cost and the expected time of arrival of their replacements. In February 1951 the Board decided that the Comet looked so promising that the unwanted Hermes should be rapidly retired by setting aside the surplus from the Exchequer Grant as a fund for this purpose. In November Hermes spares were added to the write-off of the type. In January 1952 the Ministry suggested that the then Comet I should be amortized on a seven- instead of a ten-year basis on the grounds that it was likely to be replaced at an early date by a more advanced model. A financial appreciation showed that BOAC would continue to have a use for the machines for a full decade, and so no change was made. No technical considerations entered the argument. The Minister accepted BOAC’s views without comment, as did the Commons.22 In January 1954 the Financial Comptroller, Basil Smallpeice, pointed out that European rivals with financial costs equal to or lower than BOAC’s were putting 50 to 100 per cent more into their obsolescence funds, thus enabling them to replace their equipment at a rapid rate. Regarding this as unhealthy for BOAC, he suggested that BOAC’s engines and maintenance were not as good as those of its rivals—the rate of failure being more than double theirs (though the former Chief Engineer Charles Abell in 1976 denied this was so). The new Chairman, Sir Miles Thomas, was unwilling, however, to make changes on obsolescence as these would adversely affect the small profit BOAC was showing. And in this he was sticking to British practice of the day, which only allowed historic cost to be used for two purposes—amortization and taxes. The loss of the Comets in 1954 once more raised the whole question as replacement aircraft had to be depreciated at the same rate as those in the fleet already. The Minister, now John Boyd-Carpenter, felt, however, in December 1954 that slow depreciation mortgaged the future and drew heavily on capital for new aircraft. The Corporation took the stand that untried British aircraft should be charged against capital, which was raised from Government sources. In July 1955 the Board decided that the additional Constellations and Stratocruisers should be amortized in five years (their expected useful life), but after the Minister, BoydCarpenter, changed his mind and again objected, eight years was agreed upon. The seeds of trouble were being sown. This was especially so when the advent of the big jets suddenly caused a major drop in the market for used piston-engined planes like the DC-7Cs which BOAC received in 1956, just two years before the big jets appeared on the North Atlantic. This, plus the costs of testing and proving new British aircraft, plus BOAC’s bonded indebtedness, led to Sir Matthew Slattery’s famous “bloody crazy” remark regarding BOAC’s finances, delivered to a Press conference when he was Chairman of BOAC in 1962.

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88 S p e e d b i r d The first Argonaut arrived at London on 29 March 1949, two months ahead of schedule, and went into service on 23 August. At the same time, BOAC was receiving the four Stratocruisers surplus to Scandinavian needs. The need for all these aircraft had become drastic with the loss of another Tudor on a BSAA service. In January 1949 the Minister had decided that, among other reasons, as BSAA had fired its first Chief Executive, D. C. T. Bennett, and had lost its second, Brackley, by drowning, it should be merged into BOAC.23 This meant that BOAC had to use some of its precious new Argonauts to run services to South America at a time when competitors were just accepting the far more economical and advanced DC-6. Training of Stratocruiser crews started in September and the aircraft went on service on 6 December 1949 on the Atlantic. In addition, BOAC had other difficulties. Deliveries of Stratocruisers and Solents were delayed, increased competition, rising costs, uncertain world conditions, the Berlin Airlift, animosity between India and Pakistan, and uncertainties in the Far East created problems, many of which other airlines also faced. BOAC’s principal economic trouble was still that its costs were too high as the reaction to its attempt to raise its charges for handling other airlines’ services showed. There followed, therefore, a purge of the stations to bring these down in 1948 and 1949. But there was another cloud on the horizon of serious import.

Breaching the Dyke with the Independents Lord Nathan, Minister of Civil Aviation, announced on 19 May 1948 that the private companies were to be allowed to run scheduled services as “associates” of the Corporations under terms of the Civil Aviation Act of 1946. The intention of Section 14, paragraph 4, was to cover the use of subsidiaries operating feeder services. Lords Nathan and Pakenham allowed agreements defined by the law “as being calculated to further the efficient discharge of the functions of the Corporations” to be the opening wedge, made a veritable breach under the Conservatives, which allowed the establishment of private rivals to the State Corporations. In 1948 the latter were just coming to the end of the under-capacity problem and were beginning to think in terms of further employment for their older aircraft. Their attention was particularly directed to services which they had so far been unable to develop. On the other hand, BEA found itself burdened with a number of social services which it felt were uneconomic and which it was happy to hand over to private associates. But the intention was always that these should be limited subsidiary operations. Nearly all BOAC’s overseas associates were or became the chosen instruments of their local governments, and eventually pool partners with BOAC. Two reasons motivated the Ministers: the alliance of the Independents and the aircraft industry, both through interlocking directorships and lobbying in Parliament, and the economic situation after the Berlin Airlift, which brought a cutback in RAF Transport Command. Because of reduced funds, the Air Ministry decided to follow American precedent and place civil airlines under Air Ministry

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control in wartime. Obviously the Corporations had to be kept intact. Therefore, the only alternative was to make the Independent companies into self-sufficient reserve squadrons. At the same time both BOAC and Airwork, an Independent, had been working on the War Office and the Air Ministry to send troops by air and not by sea, arguing that the economic saving in manpower more than compensated for the cost. In November 1949 Airwork was given the first six-month contract. In March 1950 the Air Estimates severely pruned Transport Command. Contracts for the Hastings, the military Hermes, were cancelled and, overnight, unemployment reared its ugly head. This was to have an immediate effect on the Corporation’s aircraft policy, as we shall see. Not until November 1950, however, did the Air Ministry announce the formation of Royal Auxiliary Air Force squadrons composed of Independent companies. In the end only Airwork complied. The main impact of the Independents’ new associate position did not hit the Corporation until after Sir Miles Thomas took over.

The Corporation in 1949 During 1949 the Corporation was once more in a state of flux. On 15 March the Minister, Lord Pakenham, announced that an Act would be introduced to merge the British South American Airways Corporation into BOAC. The BSAA staff protested, as did certain Members of Parliament, but BSAA’s entire fleet was Avro types (Lancasters, Yorks, Tudors) and its accident rate was appalling. The immediate effect on BOAC was that the Minister requested that J. W. Booth, Chairman of BSAA, be made Deputy Chairman of BOAC. BOAC thus acquired two Deputy Chairmen, with Booth in charge of commercial matters and Whitney Straight (appointed Managing Director, Chief Executive from 3 July 1947) limited to operational affairs. Already on 1 April 1948 Sir Miles Thomas, a Director of the Colonial Development Corporation and a First World War pilot, had been added to top Management and had taken over much of the work of reorganization. The Government announced on 17 January 1949 that Sir Harold Hartley would be seventy and that his place would be taken at the end of his two-year term by Sir Miles. Sir Harold was not mentally over age (in 1963 at eighty-four he was Chairman of the Central Electricity Generating Board), but was persona non grata at the Ministry for refusing to operate the Tudors. Hartley had selected Thomas as Deputy Chairman, but he was not consulted about the Chairmanship. Hartley learned he had been terminated on returning from a long inspection of BOAC overseas and opening the mail. (Sir Miles’s version of the affair is in his autobiographical Out on a Wing [1964, 254]. Hartley had left a £20,000-a-year post with Nuffield to join BOAC at £3,500.) It was also announced that BOAC would take over BSAA’s interest and commitment to operate the Princess flying-boats. The Air Corporations Bill, 1949, received its First Reading on 11 May. The main Debates came in July. Lord Pakenham said that as soon as he came into office he had looked into a merger of

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90 S p e e d b i r d BEA and BOAC as well as BSAA, but had decided against it. Instead he dropped d’Erlanger as Chairman of BEA in February 1949, replacing him with Marshal of the RAF Lord Douglas of Kirtleside, formerly Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief of Fighter Command. Already in January the Ministry of Civil Aviation’s expert on long-range planning, Peter Masefield, who had just been seconded to BEA as Assistant to the Chairman, had been made Chief Executive when the illness of J. V. Wood caused the latter’s retirement. This was to set an important precedent for BOAC in 1956. Lord Pakenham said that the loss of Star Ariel on a South American service on 17 January 1949 convinced him that with the grounding of the Tudors BSAA would have to be liquidated. BSAA was not scheduled to re-equip until 1953, when it was to have obtained Comets and Princesses. Moreover, Pakenham felt that the Americas should be treated as an entity.24 The Conservatives did not like the Bill. But then, as Alan Lennox-Boyd, later himself the Minister, said, his party did not believe in State air monopolies and would restore a wide measure of freedom when it returned to power.25 The Act came into force on 30 July 1949. It brought about the merger of BSAA and BOAC by, in effect, abolishing the former. But the joker in the pack was subsection 5, which gave the Minister power to issue an order limiting the powers of the Corporations in the national interest. Though it was provided that in the usual way Parliament should be able to reject such an Order-in-Council, in practice this section gave the Minister absolute powers. Section 24 provided that scheduled air services in and out of Britain were reserved to the Corporations and their associates, except as otherwise governed by bilateral agreements. Also passed in 1949 was an Airways Corporations Act, which merely provided for the issuance of stock (bonds or loan capital), and a Civil Aviation Act which consolidated previous legislation with the exception of the Carriage by Air Act of 1932. In terms of general policy and developments, BOAC was now at a turning point when Sir Miles Thomas became Chairman on 1 July 1949. To understand fully the progress made in the next five years, it is necessary to look at other developments since 1945.

The Growth of the Organization Like most large commercial and military bodies, BOAC grew by a series of ad hoc decisions spiced with major reorganizations. Because it was a public company, more attention has been focused on its actions than on many a private company which grew in just as unseemly a manner. The complexity of modern commercial operations, the technical development of modern airliners, and the simple increase in capacity offered for sale had all caused an increase in personnel and money invested in capital facilities, despite the fact that the fleet had been reduced from the 200-odd of nine different types in 1945 to some sixty-odd of three types in 1964. In 1945, however, a new four-engined airliner could be bought for around

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£50,000 and weighed about 70,000 pounds. In 1964 it cost about £2,500,000 or more and weighed 300,000 pounds. In 1945 an airliner cost £0.66 per pound; in 1964 £9.30, without allowance for the decline in the value of the pound. Speeds tripled, from 200 mph to 600 mph. The engines used to achieve this rose in cost from the £4,000 of the 1,675 hp Bristol Hercules piston-engine to the £114,000 of the 20,000-pound thrust (7,500 hp) of the Rolls-Royce Conway; at the same time reliability went from the 250 to 1,800 hours between overhauls of the Hercules to the 4,000-plus, or once a year, of the Conways. Other factors also made for growth. The public became air-minded in the Second World War. Whereas in 1938–1939, the last peacetime year, Imperial Airways carried 51,287 passengers, in 1946–1947, the first postwar year, BOAC carried 129,928, and in 1964–1965 this rose to 1,229,170, while in 1973–1974, the last BOAC year, it was 2,975,172. Not only were great number of passengers carried, but, from prewar days, there was a considerable shipment of valuable goods by air. Because of this, BOAC started a security section during the war, decided to abandon it on VE-Day, but hastily re-established it when there were complaints in Parliament about slit mailbags and the loss of diamonds. Donald Fish describes its work in his autobiographical Airline Detective (1962). It was under his leadership that the great bullion raid on the London Airport warehouse was foiled in July 1948. BOAC’s organization was complicated from late 1942 until August 1946 by the presence of the nucleus of BEA. During the war there were a number of shuffles of departments so that at the end the Corporation emerged with an Operations Department which controlled service engineering, technical development, and operations. Meanwhile, for various reasons, the implementation of the 1943 regional plan had lain over. In 1944 the South and West African regions were combined as the war had passed them by. Early in 1945 the regional areas began to be fractured into divisions. Records also began to be kept at this time as to decisions on future policy. In March 1945, with the prospect of many new aircraft being added, the Technical Development Branch became the Technical Development Project Branch under a Chief Project Engineer reporting directly to the Operations Director, Campbell-Orde, but contained within a Project Branch and Operational Development Unit directly responsible to the Chairman and Director-General. Not only did this lead to confusion, but manufacturers complained to the Corporation that they discovered that they were dealing with several offices in BOAC on the same item, none knowing what the others were doing. It was only too true, but was partly because of a desperate shortage of qualified personnel—so desperate, that it was seriously suggested that services should be curtailed to make more experts available. The rise of regional expenditure after the war caused arbitrary limits to be set, pending the centralization of the whole organization in London. With Critchley’s resignation, the Chairman, Lord Knollys, also became the Director-General. He at once reorganized the Board and created the new posts of General Manager, Eastern Routes, and General Manager, Western Routes. In May 1946 the Board approved the new divisional (line) organization, and this superseded the regional

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92 S p e e d b i r d one in early 1947. Improved communications and centralization of maintenance in England enabled the Atlantic, African, and Eastern Divisions to come into being. In addition, there was a Middle Eastern Division under Keith Granville based at Cairo and a non-operational Repair Division at home. At the end of 1946 it was agreed to call in an expert to look at staffing. Urwick, Orr, and Partners started their investigations in 1947. They began with one man in the Supply Department, but, like John Corbett in 1962, soon found the whole much more complicated than they had expected. Soon a task force was at work. Their investigations continued until well into the Fifties and they were called in again from time to time.

4.1. Line organization in 1947 Line Division Routes 1 African and African Middle Eastern 2 Eastern Australian 3 4 5 6

Types Dakotas Haltons Lancastrians Yorks Atlantic Trans-Atlantic Liberators Constellations African and African and Sunderlands Hythes Middle Eastern Eastern (flying-boats) African and Middle Plymouths Middle Eastern Eastern Dakotas Training Constellations

Bases Headquarters Whitchurch London Hurn

London

Montreal

London

Hythe

London

Almaza

Cairo

Shannon

London

The formation of the International Air Transport Association (IATA) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) created a special need for BOAC to have a contract with them, so McCrindle was put in charge of this. An Operational Research Section was provided to relieve the Technical Development Department of this side of its work. At the same time, the gradual increase in the number of competent junior administrators allowed overworked and overage staff to be retired more rapidly. The availability of quarters overseas also eased Management problems. By mid-1947 the Medical Department, set up to replace RAF services, had been reorganized and its temporary Director retired. In January 1948 the Board authorized the establishment of a Commercial Intelligence Section to collate information on what other airlines were doing, but not until 1962 was a marketing research unit established, and then first in the United States. Also in 1948 Whitney Straight, then Chief Executive, set up an Organization and Methods Section directly responsible to himself. He had been impressed on a visit to Air France with the fact that with a staff half the size of BOAC’s 20,000, the French company produced about the same revenue. He also noted that Air France

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ran training schools as an agency of the French Government, which paid all the costs, as it paid for all the deficits on the Air France-operated internal mail service. In June 1948 Whitney Straight proposed a further reorganization. It was approved in July. Under it Air Vice-Marshal Sir Victor Tait, formerly Director of Signals at the Air Ministry, became Deputy Chief Executive. In September Sir Miles Thomas, then Deputy Chairman, took over responsibility for the reorganization so as to leave Whitney Straight free to handle new aircraft, then consisting of Stratocruisers, Argonauts, Hermes, Comets, and Britannias. There followed a further period of internal disturbances, ending in the famous Miles Thomas purge of seventeen top executives. Board committees were also chopped to size. Though by early 1949 there had been a drop of 1,500 staff caused by closing flying-boat stations east of Cairo, the Accounts Department was showing a sharp rise. Urwick, Orr, and Partners were, therefore, asked to move in as their work in the Supply Department was saving £109,000 a year. Basil Smallpeice of Hoover, later Managing Director, 1956–1963, was brought in to head the financial side, and slowly Accounts began to become a vital department. Meanwhile, the merger with British South American Airways had created new problems. Plans were approved by the Trade Unions and submitted to the Minister in May 1949. On 6 September Booth became Deputy Chairman and on 1  November he and Whitney Straight began the merger-reorganization necessitated by having to run aircraft out of their normal Lines. Though the plans reduced the staff by about 15 per cent and the numbers to about 200 per aircraft, they did not bring the cost of producing a capacity ton mile down to anything like Pan American’s 28.2 pence. In 1948–1949 BOAC’s cost was 70.6 pence; it dropped to 59 in 1949–1950, then to 39.5, and remained steady at between 38 and 42 until after the centralization of maintenance at London Airport in 1954–1955 and the reorganization of the Engineering and Maintenance (E&M) Department began in 1956. By 1950, then, the Corporation was operating aircraft along the full length of four Lines. Coupled with these were commercial groups, the whole supported by Central Services, with policy-making at Headquarters.

Labour Relations Starting in 1943 there was a slow growth of unionism within BOAC. The Air Corporations Act of 1946 enjoined the Corporations to be “model employers.” BOAC took this perhaps too literally, with the result that even into the Sixties it was still trying to sort out this aspect of its operations. Yet many of its problems were complicated by the political side of all its work. In 1945 the Board agreed that all employees should have a two-week paid holiday a year. A watch was placed upon appointments to see that returning staff who had achieved high rank in the Services did not obtain new posts to the prejudice of those who had served BOAC all through the war. Staff were reminded that adequate grievance machinery existed

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94 S p e e d b i r d within the Corporation, in hopes that they would not run to the unions or to their Members of Parliament. There were, of course, some grounds for complaint, especially at Hurn, where most facilities were woefully inadequate. Questions in Parliament forced the Minister to consult the Chairman. This led late in May to the Corporation’s receiving the secret Ministry of Labour report on BOAC mentioned earlier. The Board at once set up an emergency committee to consider the whole problem of long-term plans and reported to the Minister on 20 June 1946. Thereafter, things calmed down. In October 1946 it was decided to create a pool of specialized staff for seconding to associated companies or for special use within BOAC itself. Overseas pay and allowances were reviewed and explained to the staff, cost-of-living bonuses instituted, and adoption of BEA’s incentive-bonus programme considered. An apprenticeship scheme was started in January 1948, rewards for suggestions were raised from a £2 limit to a £50, and it was agreed to loan capital to clubs founded for the employees. The closeness of staff affairs to the national interest was emphasized during the worsening national economic crisis of 1948 when the Minister drew the Board’s attention to the significance of the Government’s White Paper (Cmd.7321) on personal incomes, costs, and prices and its bearing on demands then pending. Upon asking for advice, the Chairman was told by the Minister that any increases BOAC gave would be taken into consideration before the next Deficiency Grant was made. BOAC toed the line. However, dealing with fourteen unions was not easy, especially as there was a jurisdictional dispute between two engineering unions which continued until 1962. Under Section 19 of the Civil Aviation Act of 1946 a National Joint Council for Civil Air Transport was set up, with a constitution approved by the Ministry of Labour. Originally it contained ten unions and the three Corporations. Gradually the private operators were granted membership, but neither the BOAC Staff Association nor the Aeronautical Engineers Association achieved it. Local panels were set up to handle routine matters. By 1962 there were more than sixty of these with whom BOAC had to deal at London Airport alone; one Corporation secretary, in fact, spent her entire time typing the minutes of their meetings! Despite Ministerial urging, the National Joint Council remained in a flaccid state until after the strike of 1958 (see Chapter VIII). Part of the reason for this lay in the ability of Line managers to avert trouble, especially while bases were dispersed. In part, also, it was because the unions demanded a say in making policy at all levels and were refused. In Sir Miles Thomas’s day, he kept the unions informed by monthly talks. It might be noted in passing that in the mid-1960s the National Coal Board believed that it was able to lay off 170,000 miners because it had to deal with only one union. Relations with the British Airline Pilots Association, commonly known as BALPA, were always important since the formation of that union broke up Imperial Airways.26 A pilots’ pension scheme came into being on 1 December

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1944. (At the same time staff overseas obtained the benefits of provident funds.) Early in 1946 BALPA said that the basis of pay should be changed and asked for a 50 per cent increase. The Board agreed and overseas pay was limited to those based abroad, while trans-oceanic pay was restricted to trans-Atlantic flights. Negotiations, however, dragged on. From August to December they waited on Ministerial approval of the Airways Pension Scheme. In February 1947 it was finally agreed that North Atlantic pay would be granted when the law required a navigator be carried, but only on the North Atlantic nevertheless. At the same time BOAC stressed to all the unions that it could grant increases only as long as it had the ability to pay. The matter was referred to the Industrial Court in June 1947. In November it ruled in BALPA’s favour. Early in 1948 BALPA asked to be consulted about new schedules and fresh negotiations started. As it had in the case of the pilots, the National Joint Council also agreed to separate negotiations between BOAC and the Radio Officers Union. In July 1947 these officers, together with the navigators, also put in for a large pay increase as until 1948 the carriage of both types of aircrew was mandatory. The radio officers of No. 2 Line threatened to strike in December, but a settlement was reached in time. In the spring of 1948 the Operations Director persuaded the Lines to do away with navigators. Because it was deemed unwise to sack them, the navigators received the unprecedented guarantee of ground employment with BOAC until retirement. They were, in fact, still flying in the early Sixties, many having been retrained as pilots, but radio officers had been phased out. Cabin staff were traditionally men until 1943. Not until late 1945 were women fully accepted. Recruiting began in earnest early in 1946 and those between twentythree and thirty years of age received £6.10s.0d. a week after training. In June 1948, in conjunction with BEA, the pay of cabin staff was raised, and it was proposed that Chinese staff should be employed on Eastern routes. In March 1949 the age for stewardesses was lowered to twenty-one and they were granted the same pay as stewards, Second-Class. Accepting gratuities, however, was always forbidden. Relations with engineering unions also dated basically from 1943, when Sir Robert Perkins, one of the founders of BALPA, was assured that BOAC had set up bargaining machinery at its factories.27 Discussions were started with the Transport and General Workers’ Union and with the Association of Supervisory Staffs and Engineering Technicians (ASSET), and agreement was reached by August 1945. On 29 July 1945 the Essential Work Order was withdrawn and BOAC found itself faced with the possibility that the staff would demand a forty-hour week. It was agreed to reduce from fifty-four to forty-seven hours and concede engineering staff a 6s. a week increase. Works managers were warned to understand that the new shop stewards were to deal only with union matters. The Aeronautical Engineers Association (AEA) was formed during 1943 by a group of tradesmen who felt that the skills they had learned in the RAF had put them higher up the ladder than any union would place them. To obtain recognition, the AEA went out on strike against BOAC in September 1946, when the latter took refuge in Clause 19 of

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96 S p e e d b i r d the Civil Aviation Act of 1946, a clause which had been heavily supported by the Trades Union Congress.28 The strike was broken as the National Union of General and Municipal Workers sent its members to help keep the Corporations flying. The AEA failed to get recognition from the National Joint Council when the latter started. Its case was raised again during the Debates on the Air Corporations Bill of 1949, but all attempts to insert a protective clause similar to that in the Coal Industry Nationalization Act failed.29 After the merger of BOAC and BSAA, in which the AEA asserted that it represented 90 per cent of the BSAA engineering staff, it was claimed that those who became redundant were generally AEA men.30 Some of the men remained with the Corporation, periodically becoming a problem which no one, for political reasons, wished to solve. In other areas of labour relations there were minor issues. For instance, the drivers were granted an increase in pay in 1947 because the Road Haulage Wages Board recommended it. In general, BOAC was, like most firms, faced with accepting national standards on wages and hours. So far, the impression has been given that all BOAC’s problems in the years 1945–1949 were political or economic. This is not so. They were also operational.

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Chapter V Postwar Operations, 1945–1949 Introduction In the immediate postwar years the impetus of war research and development carried the solution of operational problems forward at a much more rapid rate than had been maintained before the war, both in connection with aircraft and with air routes. Included in the first category were propellers, de-icing equipment, radio and radar, fuel loads, crew baggage allowances, British and International Civil Airworthiness Requirements, and the like. Into the second were placed radio ranges, radar navigational facilities (Gee and Loran), and other navigation aids (generally known as navaids), aerodromes (from 1943 airfields), airways, ground handling facilities, fuels, and the like. In 1945 BOAC was just acquiring many of the items upon which Imperial Airways had started work in 1939, such as hydromatic propellers, fuel-flow meters, etc. American spares, which had been hard to obtain during the war, continued to be so after it, a situation exacerbated by Britain’s dollar shortage and a black market at New York in which BOAC discovered that it was buying again its own spare

37. In March 1950 BOAC was carrying out experiments to relieve the heat in aircraft cabins at tropical stops. White paint was found to reduce heat by 15 to 17 degrees. Both Argonauts and Constellations were soon converted. This is Constellation Baltimore.

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98 S p e e d b i r d parts. Moreover, not only crew training, but also the time it took to place spares along the routes determined when new aircraft could be put on service. The more diverse the Corporation’s fleet in terms of engine and airframe types, the more inflexible the whole operational structure became. It took three to five months to stock a route for each new type. And when aircraft were withdrawn, all these parts had to be shipped home again. In 1946 BOAC was operating forty-one flying boats, sixteen Lancastrians, thirty Yorks, six Haltons, five Constellations, forty-two Dakotas, sixteen Lodestars, and fifty-four other aircraft of miscellaneous types. Effective use of this conglomeration of aircraft depended upon efficient scheduling, upon maintenance, and upon weather and other factors beyond BOAC’s control. For some years after the war, maintenance claimed it was doing the best it could. But in December 1948 the Board Technical Committee called for a discussion of BOAC’s maintenance standards and for terms of reference for senior technical executives which would insure constant review and improvement of the system. At the same time, the 1945 Air Registration Board standards had been modified on 1 January 1948 to include in the British Civil Airworthiness Requirements those of the International Civil Aviation Organization. By demanding that all new multi-engined transport aircraft had sufficient power to be able to climb away if one engine failed immediately after takeoff, these rendered many aircraft then in use obsolete. BOAC had already established at Hurn a Development Flight which worked closely with the Air Registration Board on the testing of new types and the preparation of crew Flight Manuals, which with the aircraft’s own type manual became part of the Certificate of Airworthiness. The Development Flight also route-proved aircraft, and its Members went on manufacturers’ tests of new types, such as the Tudor tropical trials at Nairobi in 1948. The original willingness of the Corporation to do this both in its own and in the national interest was severely curtailed by the general feeling that it had to pay for work which should have been done by the aircraft industry itself. Unfortunately, BOAC did not take a strong stand against the Society of British Aircraft Constructors, with the result that it cost the Corporation £900,000 to develop the Tudors, £2,500,000 for the Hermes, £3,000,000 for the Comet 1, and £4,700,000 for the Comet 4, and also £22,400,000 for the Britannias.1 The cost of putting the VC-10s on service alone was estimated to be £5,000,000. In contrast, the cost of putting the DC-7Cs on service was £813,426. This was because, in the case of British aircraft, BOAC was the first operator and often the only one to take them new. To determine the feasibility of operating any route with a particular type, the Flight Operations Planning Department undertook special studies, taking into account the number of aircraft to be used, the facilities en route (runways and navaids), the weather to be encountered, the route segment with the longest nonstop range requirement (called the limiting segment), etc. If the service was then decided upon, the Operations Department guaranteed to the Traffic Department a definite payload based upon the fuel requirement as determined by an average

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of the headwinds recorded on that route for the previous six years, with a note that on 10 per cent of the summer flights and 30 per cent of the winter this might be exceeded. The fuel needed was determined by the Operations Department, which added to the amount for a normal flight against the average headwind sufficient fuel to enable the aircraft to reach the farther of two alternative airfields, plus enough to be able to hold for an hour at that destination plus allowances for weather forecasting and navigational errors. For some years westbound Atlantic flights were made via Iceland and Gander in Newfoundland when flight-time estimates exceeded the calculated fuel endurance.2 Moreover, once it had been decided to run a service, permission had to be obtained from the Ministry, which might have had even to negotiate a new bilateral treaty before flights could be started. Permission was usually needed even for slight route variations. Scheduling and routeing were complicated also by a curfew in Rangoon (1949), restrictions on night flying over Egypt and Iraq (1949), cholera in Egypt (1948), actual hostilities such as at Suez (1956, 1967, 1973), civil war (Lebanon, 1958), or fighting between India and Pakistan (1947–1948 and 1965), not to mention recurrent nationalism in Ceylon and Zionism in Israel, diplomatic impasses with Holland in 1946 and the United States in 1959, and lack of aircraft. Inadequate weather radio facilities and communications systems, lack of runway length and airfield controllers—all hampered efficient operation. Not until the Comets were almost on operations and the advent of pressure refuelling did BOAC crack down on the time spent at transit stops, cutting it from ninety to forty-five minutes. But a shorter time than that was hard to achieve because of required paperwork and the non-technical factors affecting airline operation.

38. The four-engined Avro York was a 1942 design using Lancaster wings, engines, and empennage. Both BSAA and BOAC employed them, the latter keeping them in revenue service until 1956.

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100 S p e e d b i r d BOAC, whose food and service became its pride and biggest selling point, was slow to respond to advances made by competitors in the immediate postwar years. Food and furnishings on many services reflected the austerity of the rationing in Britain itself, which continued until 1954. BOAC began using frozen foods, J. C. Lyons’s “Frood,” in January 1946. It joined the lead of others with night-stop bags (1949); but for a while it stuck to fruit juices when it offered alcoholic beverages. Yet it thought luxuriously, though often with an economic motive. In 1949 a study was made to see if bunks could be installed as a means of eliminating night-stops on Eastern routes. Bunks were installed on Atlantic Stratocruisers from early 1950, with a surcharge for their use. Slumberette seats were first installed on Stratocruisers on Atlantic services in 1956. Meanwhile, to try to increase payload on Atlantic services, it was suggested that catering be reduced, and this led in 1949 to a complete study of the Corporation’s food services. In particular, it brought on the sale of the Guildford Frozen Food plant, bought late in 1947 for £109,000. It began production in the spring of 1949, was closed down in midsummer and sold off, J. Lyons and Company taking over catering until 1957, when the Corporation set up its own organization at London Airport. During the war, training had been on an ad hoc basis. In July 1944, with peace in prospect, a draft scheme for apprentices was circulated. For air and ground crews there already existed Air Service Training at Hamble, founded at the urging of the Air Ministry in 1930, and used before the war by Imperial Airways. But not until after it had been put out of business in the Fifties did the Corporation and the Ministry decide to establish on its old premises a national College of Air Training in 1959. Its first products began to reach BOAC in 1962. In 1945, however, staff were being trained at nine different locations, not to mention those seconded from the RAF who were having on-the-job instruction. Badly needed was one central base with a Director of Training. The latter was appointed in 1946, and in February 1947 agreement was reached with BEA for the formation of a subsidiary company at which staffs would be jointly trained. Such a base was set up at Aldermaston in March 1946, but in July Management decided that it would be cheaper to train home staff at the various bases and use Aldermaston only for overseas personnel. For this reason BOAC left BEA there. So their joint company, Airways Training Ltd., ceased in September 1948. Meanwhile BOAC had set up an engineering training school at the old Air Transport Auxiliary base at White Waltham. Where pilots were concerned, training was not so difficult since most of the RAF men seconded had been rapidly trained to large modern aircraft. Starting in 1948, BOAC trained pilots at the line bases, with the exception of Argonaut crews, who were handled at Hurn. But as the new aircraft became more complex and filled with more electronic gear, it became increasingly urgent to establish a centralized training base. Potential North Atlantic captains were required to do a year on the route as second pilots. In 1949 this involved double training, as senior captains were being converted to Stratocruisers, while juniors had to be passed for command of Constellations. Pan American helped by allowing BOAC crews to use its new

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Stratocruiser simulator at LaGuardia Field, New York. This was so successful that BOAC bought one. Nevertheless, the cost of training and development in 1949– 1950 came to £1,483,818. In 1963–1964 this rose to £5,000,000 for the introduction of the VC-10 alone. In 1950 it cost about £2,000 to convert a crew from one four-engined type to another. But by 1963, to train a crew for the Boeing 707 cost £80,000. In 1950 it involved two weeks of ground training and twenty hours of flying instruction at £57 an hour in the air; in 1963 it involved three months of ground training and fifteen hours of air work at a cost of £281 per flying hour outof-pocket costs alone (i.e., without overhead), though much of the work was soon done in a simulator at £50 per hour.

North Atlantic Operations By the end of the war BOAC was running six Liberator flights weekly across the North Atlantic and on 30 November 1945 these became daily. Liberator AL528 was lost in February 1946, but the other five original aircraft continued until withdrawn in October 1949. One of the first proposals for this service was that it should be taken over by Lancastrians when the Lend-Lease Liberators were returned. But when that danger was removed in June 1945, it was decided that they should remain on service until the Tudors took over. Based on London from October 1946, the Liberators continued to carry staff passengers so as to save seats on westbound Constellations. A major problem was that until May 1948 the Post Office refused to allow pooling of mail loads with other operators so that BOAC was overloaded with mail out of Britain but came back empty. At the same time it was realized that the Liberators would have to stay on service beyond March 1949 because of the delay in the delivery of the Stratocruisers; otherwise, pooled mail would all be carried in foreign aircraft. This was complicated by the pending move of the Montreal base to Filton. The solution was to contract Liberator maintenance to Scottish Aviation at Prestwick, which from 1 April 1949 also supplied the aircrews for them. This allowed ten experienced BOAC crews to be transferred at once to Stratocruisers. The other wartime service across the Atlantic was that with the Boeing 314s. They had plied with much greater regularity toward the end of the war as weather forecasting and other facilities increased. But flying-boat operations were limited by ice at Botwood, Newfoundland, from October to May. During the summer of 1945 plans were made to shift them onto a winter Baltimore–Bermuda shuttle in addition to their trans-Atlantic flights via the Azores. Other plans—to move the Baltimore base to Britain—did not materialize and the weekly shuttle started on 18 October, being increased to twice-weekly on 30 November. But the competition was intense since Pan American was using much faster landplanes and operating from New York. This, coupled with other factors, caused the announcement in March 1946 that the Boeings were being withdrawn from trans-Atlantic service. (The last flight left Baltimore on 4 March 1946 and Poole on the 7th.) This enabled the Bermuda

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39. A Constellation cockpit showing the small tricycle undercarriage steering wheel to the captain’s left; above and to the right of the yoke the standard RAF blind-flying panel of six essential instruments, duplicated for the co-pilot with engine dials and controls in the centre of the panel. Trim wheels flank the central quadrant.

service to be increased to thrice weekly, with sixteen services during Easter. In April the Ministry asked BOAC to extend the service beyond the October deadline, but the Corporation said that the ground crews were needed for the new Constellation service. However, the service was so successful, having carried 12,126 passengers in the year ending 30 September 1946, that it was extended until 17 January 1948. The Boeings were to have been replaced by Short Bermudas, a special version of the Plymouth, but nothing was done about it, and in the end services were temporarily taken over by extension of the London–New York Constellation services. At that time three flights a week operated both to Baltimore and to New York. In May through-bookings from London to Bermuda ware allowed as space became available, and in December it was decided to drop Baltimore and concentrate the six-weekly services at New York. In March 1949 these were made daily, but in May it was obvious that there was a serious over-capacity on the New York–Bermuda route, the result not only of competition but also of the revival of the Furness-

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Withy liners. By July BOAC was exploring the idea of pooling with Pan American and the use of its own surplus capacity elsewhere. The biggest obstacles were the American Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 and the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. The situation improved somewhat when the Ministry was able to force Colonial Airways, a US trunk airline, to charge IATA rates. By September BOAC’s service was covering direct operating costs, but generally running at a loss. Nevertheless, despite irregularity and low-load factors, it was decided to hang on because Bermuda was considered part of the Caribbean network just taken over in August 1949 from British South American Airways, and vital to the revival of the midAtlantic service. But in December 1953, when Stratocruisers went on the North Atlantic and Constellations were transferred elsewhere, the New York–Bermuda line was closed and efforts were concentrated on the new Constellation service across the mid-Atlantic, which started on 2 March 1950. Some time before the end of the war, the Port of New York Authority began construction of a new field to replace LaGuardia. BOAC signed a lease for space at Idlewild (now John F. Kennedy) Airport in October 1945 and from 1948 enjoyed passenger-handling facilities there superior to those it had at London Airport. The real problem facing BOAC on the North Atlantic operation was competition of aircraft. In October 1945 the Board Development Committee was told that the Constellation and the Stratocruiser were surpassing the Tudor I as the aircraft of the 1945–1950 period, while Britain would have nothing to offer after that as the Brabazon I was to be cancelled, and that under the circumstances the most sensible thing was to forget the interim British types, order Constellations, and concentrate on getting the aircraft of the Fifties into service on time. The Government approved in part, and the first Model 049 Constellation was delivered in May 1946. Using the nucleus of seventeen captains with 100 or more trans-Atlantic crossings on their logbooks, training began at once and revenue flights started on 1 July. (There had been no British Atlantic services except the RFS Liberators since the flying-boats had been withdrawn on 7 March.) Constellation services took nineteen to twenty hours westbound and sixteen to seventeen eastbound. On regular services a crew of five with three cabin staff were carried, along with forty passengers who paid £168 round trip. (In 1983 fares were £164 propeller Economy-Class and £322 First-Class, and in the 1977 peak season the Economy round trip was £485.) Elation at the prompt beginning of Constellation operations was short-lived. From 10 July to 30 August Constellations of all airlines were grounded after a series of fatal accidents in the United States caused by the fracture of the split pins locking the reduction gear assemblies of the engines. The position, while it lasted, was very serious for BOAC as it did not have the DC-4s that its American competitors were able to fall back upon. The Board, therefore, decided to buy some as insurance both against a long grounding of the Constellations and against the non-appearance of the Tudors. It considered $500,000 for five would be the limit, but the Treasury approved $700,000. Within days the US Army Air Force offered C-54s (military

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104 S p e e d b i r d DC-4s), but before action could be taken, the American authorities located the trouble in the Constellations and the necessary thirty-seven modifications were completed by the end of the month. Shortly after flights were resumed, one service a week was run via Prestwick. In November the number of passengers carried was reduced to twenty to allow an additional 1,200 pounds of fuel to be uplifted on flights against the western gales. As BOAC was carrying all the westbound British airmails, it was feared that the passenger load might have to be reduced to fifteen. In April 1947 the service was increased from four to five weekly and on 14 June to daily in the face of competition from six other companies. The refusal of the Government to allow BOAC to buy more than five Constellations was beginning to have serious consequences. In the first six months of the year Pan American made 471 flights with 10,023 passengers; TWA 285 with 7,360; American Overseas Airlines 434 with 6,272; and BOAC, the leading European operator, only 100 with 2,045. On its mail-less eastbound flights, though, BOAC averaged 39.6 passengers per flight in June 1947. A sixth Constellation, costing £34,725 in America (but £114,725 when modified), was obtained in November 1947 under the urgings of the route manager and the pressure to do something about the Bermuda service. Even so, BOAC could make only 312 flights a year versus its competitors’ total of 4,116: hardly enough to allow it to obtain even a reasonable share of the business in spite of the highest load factors on the route. Added to this handicap was the disruption caused by the 1948 move to Filton, where hangarage was so limited that part of the work on

40. Contemporary and successor to the Constellation was the four-engined Boeing Stratocruiser, derived from the B-29 Superfortress bomber. This double-decker was very popular with passengers.

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the Constellations had to be done at London. Balmoral was the first of the fleet to land at Filton, on 17 December 1948. In April 1948 services were increased to nine weekly with four via Prestwick and four to Bermuda in addition to those already operating. By now the Constellations were each averaging 2,500 hours a year. Baltimore made the 1,000th crossing by the type on 4 April 1948. But the effect of the move from Dorval to Filton had been to lower the daily utilization rate from eight hours, twenty-six minutes to six hours. In June 1949 daily trans-Atlantic services began. But at the same time Pan American started Stratocruiser services carrying sixty-one passengers eastbound and fifty-six westbound with a stop at Gander, and once a week, a twenty-eightberth, seventeen-slumberette-seat surcharged service. In August BOAC opened its Stratocruiser school at Filton with an initial intake of 35 aircrews and 170 ground personnel. On 17 October Cathay, the first of the Swedish order taken over by BOAC, arrived. On 6 December the first flight left for New York, five days after BOAC moved from LaGuardia to Idlewild. On 14 September 1946 BOAC began the first British commercial service to Canada, using the fifth Constellation for a weekly service from London to Montreal via Prestwick and Gander. Because of the backlog of passengers, it was heavily booked in both directions despite the fact that Trans Canada Airlines switched from Lancastrians to North Stars (DC-4Ms) at that moment. Because of the disagreement between BOAC and TCA at this time, BOAC was unable to take any part in the Ontario Immigration Scheme, but it did manage, with Ministry approval, to run one weekly New York service via Montreal starting on 15 April 1947. On 1 June 1948 TCA began pressurized North Star services and a year later increased these to a daily frequency both direct to London and via Prestwick. In the meantime, on 1 April 1949 BOAC had been able to increase its operations only to twice-weekly. As usual at this stage, shortage of aircraft was the problem.

South American Services Before the war British Airways (1936) had planned to pioneer a new route via Lisbon and Bathurst to South America to meet the urgent demands of British businessmen and the Franco-German competition. However, shortage of aircraft (the Fairey FC-1 was cancelled), the war, conservatism, and diplomatic difficulties all prevented its operation. During the war a group of ship owners decided to run air services over this route and registered British Latin American Airlines Ltd., early in 1944. They received encouragement from the Coalition Government, even though BOAC was at the same time planning to start such a service as soon as it received Government permission. Air Vice-Marshal D. C. T. “Pathfinder” Bennett was appointed the first Managing Director. The Labour Government changed the company into a State Corporation, British South American Airways. BOAC had had an interest in British Latin American Airways, but gave this up when it

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106 S p e e d b i r d was nationalized. Survey flights with Lancastrians started from London Airport on 1 January 1946 and services opened on 31 March. By 1 August British South American Airways was operating twice-weekly over the route London–Lisbon– Bathurst–Natal–Rio de Janeiro–Buenos Aires–Santiago de Chile. The stop at Bathurst was changed to Dakar after two aircraft crashed there, while São Paulo took the place of Rio. On 9 September 1946 a London–Lisbon–Azores–Bermuda route was opened and extended on 18 January 1947 to Jamaica, Lima, and Santiago de Chile, while at the same time a branch ran from Jamaica to Caracas and Trinidad. Alternate services called at Nassau in the Bahamas. All these were operated with either thirteen-passenger Lancastrians or twelve-passenger Yorks, giving BSAA the inestimable advantage of a nearly uniform fleet as both types used Merlin engines. Moreover, the Lancastrians were on hire from the Ministry so that the Corporation’s capital investment was low. Though based at Langley and operating from London, in its first four months of operations, BSAA had a net operating surplus of £56,729, while the profit for 1946–1947 was £72,736, but this was largely because of the lack of competition. In 1947–1948 it made a net loss of £161,481, even after Exchequer Grants totalling £260,000 were taken into the accounts. This was blamed on the late delivery of the Tudors, the first of which was accepted on 29 September 1947 and disappeared near Bermuda on the following 30 January. All Tudor IVs were then withdrawn from service until 19 August 1948, while reduced services were operated with Yorks, now competing with modern American aircraft carrying twice the payload. In addition to one Tudor, three Lancastrians and a Lancaster either disappeared or were written off during the year. An intensive review of operating procedures was followed by the termination of Bennett’s employment on 10 February 1948. At the Minister’s insistence, he was replaced by Air Commodore H. G. Brackley, formerly of Imperial Airways, Transport Command, and at that time with BOAC. He took over on 1 April. At the same time, the Ministry lifted restrictions against the use of the Tudors as freighters, while keeping them off passenger services, and banning them from the Azores–Bermuda sector until range and fuel consumption tests were completed. By May they were returned to passenger operations. In June surveys were made of the Shannon–Gander–Bermuda route and in July they were allowed back on the Azores–Bermuda sector, the difference, surprisingly, being only 136 miles in favour of the southern route. But a further calamity followed. Brackley drowned at Rio de Janeiro in November. The Management was reorganized with Ministerial approval, J. W. Booth becoming both Chairman and Managing Director, with two General Managers handling non-technical and operational matters, respectively. On 15 January 1949 another Tudor IV disappeared between Bermuda and Jamaica. BSAA at once gave up London–Bermuda operations and sent their passengers via BOAC. The Minister promptly asked the Chairman of BOAC, Sir Harold Hartley, to explore the best means of amalgamating BSAA and BOAC, and by 22 February he and Booth had drawn up the heads of agreement. The BOAC Board approved on the

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41. The Boeing Stratocruiser had sleeper accommodations, which helped alleviate boredom on long sectors.

25th, at which time, however, Whitney Straight, the Chief Executive, was away ill with jaundice. The merger was announced on 15 March and became effective on 30  July 1949, a month after Sir Miles Thomas became the new Chairman of BOAC. As a result of all these calamities, BSAA wound up 1948–1949 with a net deficit, after a £500,000 Grant, of £633,082, reckoning that at least a half a million pounds of the loss was the fault of the Tudors. Including its market research unit, BSAA had a total staff of 2,088 on 31 March 1949. For the next year services were curtailed. As far as BOAC was concerned, the only logical aircraft in 1950 for the mid-Atlantic and South American services was the Stratocruiser, but the dollar shortage precluded its acquisition.3 This shortsighted policy had the same effect as the refusal to allow the purchase of additional Constellations had upon the Atlantic in 1946. For some time BOAC Argonauts, badly needed elsewhere, were placed on the route after proving flights in December and route-stocking with spares in January and February 1950. An Order-in-Council finally wound up British South American Airways as of 1 July 1952, the delay being due to the need to settle certain affairs in Mexico and other areas into which BSAA had hoped to penetrate.

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West African Routes By 30 November 1945 the West African route was being operated on a thriceweekly basis. Meanwhile discussions had opened in the previous February with Elder Dempster on the subject of a new regional company to replace Elder Colo­ nial Airways. This led to an Order-in-Council of 15 May 1946, establishing the West African Airways Corporation (WAAC), which took over on 1 November. Meanwhile, in November and December 1945 the link with England had been shortened by the establishment of a thrice-weekly freight service from Hurn to Accra with Handley Page Halifax VIIIs (Haltons) instead of the Tudors, which were not yet available. The service was sporadic because of aircraft troubles and the withdrawal of RAF meteorological facilities on 8 June 1946. Dakota services resumed in July from the American base at Bovingdon, while flights in Nigeria were under the flag name Nigerian Air Services. Haltons began a regular London–Casablanca–Dakar–Accra–Lagos service on 2 July 1947. It had been agreed in June that a six-day-a-week service would be operated around the coast but that by the end of August the trans-Sahara would be surveyed and used for all services in October. BOAC was reluctant to use Haltons on the direct route as on the limiting Algiers–Kano sector their load was reduced to five passengers (1,000 pounds) versus a payload on the coastal service of 4,000 pounds, which allowed the service to break even. This decision was abruptly upset by the Governor of Nigeria only two weeks after the coastal service, to which he had agreed, had begun. In meetings in London he applied pressure, and BOAC had to agree to operate without freight so as to carry ten passengers on the direct route. On 2 September the twenty-four-hour direct service replaced the twentynine-hour coastal one. Over the objections of the Middle East Division, whose service it was, the sixth service was run at a deficit. In December the Ministry was informed that the Haltons would be withdrawn; they were replaced by Yorks early in May 1948, but not before a race had ensued between getting York pilots and exhausting Halton spares. West African Airways had meanwhile taken over the responsibility for all regional internal services on 31 March 1948,4 when the Dakotas were withdrawn. Yorks continued to operate West African services until replaced by Hermes on 7 August 1950.

The Springbok Route The BOAC route to South Africa was operated by flying-boats from May 1948 until November 1950 in addition to Yorks. The South African Air Conference had agreed on 1 July 1945 that BOAC and SAA would operate parallel pooled services on a forty-five-hour schedule on the route London–Malta–Cairo–Khartoum– Kisumu–Nairobi–Kasama–Johannesburg. It was correctly expected that Rome would replace Malta and Salisbury, Kasama, and that Yorks would be replaced by Tudors and the flying-boats withdrawn altogether.5 Inauguration of the new

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services was delayed until 10 November as the airfields along the route were not ready and the positioning of spares was slow. In July 1946 the service was increased from three to four weekly, but half the seats remained priority reserved. Toward the end of 1946 BOAC decided that the C-Class flying-boats—most of them ten years old—would have to be withdrawn, and they were when the Horseshoe was closed on 2 March 1947. There was a howl of protest up and down the line as their roominess and easy stage-lengths made them comfortable and popular. But as for BOAC, the Springbok service was cutting into its revenues and the South African Agreement required the use of landplanes on the pooled service. Nevertheless, the Chairman, Lord Knollys, persuaded the Minister to agree in December 1946 to the replacement of the C-Class with Solents, as the Tudors were still not certificated for tropical operations. What prompted the change was that South African Airways, somewhat characteristically, had decided to obtain DC-4s for the London–Johannesburg route while allowing BOAC to run flying-boats from Hythe to Durban. For some reason it was decided that the new flying-boats could not go on service without a route survey, and this was delayed by the Ministry’s involvement in Constellation “Project X.” In June 1947 the straw that broke the Tudor’s back appeared in the decision that the Tudor IIs would be able to operate only as far south as Nairobi, where passengers and cargo would have to be transferred to Tudor Is. So the Solents became, then, the only modern British aircraft available. The proving flight finally got off on 2 December, but broke down at Port Bell. In March 1948 it was decided that a night-stop would have to be made at Luxor, as, with the Sudan Government Leave Scheme bringing people in from the outposts, there was inadequate hotel space in Khartoum. The Solents, fortunately on hire from the Ministry,6 were delayed by engines overheating and only finally went on service on 4 May 1948. Within two months the propeller hubs began to give trouble, and by 25 June the Engineering Department warned Management that the aircraft had only four weeks’ life left. This caused new worries, equalled only by the threat that KLM, the Dutch line, would obtain a West Coast service to South Africa in pool with SAA. BOAC told the Ministry that the West Coast route was intimately linked with the Nile service and that a KLM–SAA partnership would violate the 1945 Agreement. The South Africans appreciated these arguments and desisted, but did keep their rights at Amsterdam and did eventually open a West Coast service of their own to Britain as it was the quicker route. In March 1949 the Southern Rhodesian Government asked BOAC to undertake an examination of the Central African Airways Corporation (CAAC), which had been set up in 1946. BOAC’s report was unfavourable and the Corporation was asked by the Rhodesian Government to modify it before it was published. Competition between BOAC and the British Independents existed here, too, as all parties hoped to manage CAAC. Despite denials of the charges made in the report, a new Board was installed and a member of BOAC’s engineering staff appointed General Manager. But other troubles were looming.

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110 S p e e d b i r d In May 1949 South African Airways announced that it was taking delivery in 1950 of four Model 749 Constellations for the Springbok route. In addition, the services between the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and Egypt were Egyptian cabotage. BOAC claimed that this cost £20,000 a year and was not compensated for by granting it exclusive London–Khartoum cabotage rights. In the meantime, there had been further trouble with the Solents, resulting in their withdrawal from 22 July to 17 October 1948. When they returned to service, the Yorks were withdrawn. On 24 October Solents were re-routed via Lake Mariut, the new Egyptian marine airport at Alexandria, instead of Cairo. In 1949 the schedule was changed so that one flight went via Lake Nyasa while the other two weekly services were by Victoria Falls. Though fitted with thirty-four to thirty-nine seats, they rarely carried more than twenty-two passengers because of heavy mail loads. All these services down the centre of Africa were connected from the beginning with those to East Africa.

East African Services Here, as elsewhere, the airline system had been taken over by the local governments during the war, and so in 1945 it was decided to set up the East African Airways Corporation (EAAC). This came into being on 1 January 1946 with Kenya holding 67.7 per cent, Uganda 22.6, Tanganyika 9.0, and Zanzibar 0.7. The fleet consisted of six DH-89As hired from the Ministry of Civil Aviation. Late in 1946 the General Manager, seconded from BOAC, had to be recalled. But the awkwardness caused by this was counterbalanced by the sale of BOAC’s five remaining Lodestars to EAAC for £30,000, delivery being made in 1948. Both Skyways and Airwork, British Independents, were at this time actively attempting to set themselves up in East Africa, but to little avail. With the opening of Labour’s ambitious ground-nuts scheme in East Africa, BOAC began a twice-weekly service in February 1948 to Dar-es-Salaam to cater for travellers on official Overseas Food Corporation business. Competition for this traffic led to further Parliamentary questions, many of them simply partisan, especially when BOAC was given the contract formerly held by Hunting-Clan. To obtain this, BOAC had started a weekly Solent to East Africa on 23 February 1949. By offering the Overseas Food Corporation rates on fill-up loads, the Corporation was able to increase services so that on 15 May Solents began a thriceweekly service to Lake Naivasha, the Nairobi base. The Overseas Food Corporation bulk contract was finally obtained in September, thus ensuring a steady annual load factor, though the fare was reduced from £150 to £70. But East Africa was a British cabotage area for traffic rights in which political pressure by Independents could be exerted through Parliament and this was thus to be a constant thorn in BOAC’s side, despite the seeming advantage of cabotage, which in the past had been synonymous with a BOAC monopoly.

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Middle Eastern and Indian Routes Similar to the services down through Africa, those to the Middle and Far East had been operated before the war. By 1945 some sectors were duplicated while others still awaited reopening after the surrender of Japan. Political considerations made planning difficult and sometimes called for abrupt changes. The principal troublespots were India and Palestine, where the national movements placed the chosen British airline in the awkward position of either helping both parties or neither, if it could justify either policy without letting the Dutch or the Americans in. In BOAC, as it existed from the end of the war to the start of the Straight Reorganization Plan, the Middle East Division occupied a central position. It controlled operations radiating from Cairo to West, Central, and East Africa, to Palestine, Iraq, Iran, and India, and included the regional service from Aden. Inevitably, it was much influenced by political demands and affected by their repercussions. In 1944 the Board foresaw greater Indian participation as part of a Commonwealth airline such as that envisaged by Lord Reith. In May 1944 five Yorks had begun a Lyneham–Rabat–Castel Benito (Tripoli)– Cairo service which was extended to Shaibah and Karachi in the following February and made twice-weekly on 30 November 1945. This paralleled the Sunderland service to India. Dakotas from London were by the end of 1944 on a twice-daily basis between London and Cairo. By December 1945 there were four through flying-boat services weekly from London to Rangoon. On 31 March 1945 BOAC’s Cairo-based fleet consisted of nine Ensigns and nineteen Lodestars, with five Dakotas operated locally but overhauled in Britain. The Ensigns ran thrice-weekly to Calcutta until September, when the man-hours needed for their overhaul were considered excessive. The Lodestars flew a weekly service to Karachi via Aden and the Hadramaut Coast until 29 January 1947. Shortly after the Dakota service to Basra started in February 1945, the Lodestars took this over in addition to running also to Gwelo. Dakotas operated under military demand to Teheran until 29 September 1945 when, with the agreement of the Ambassador, they were rescheduled to meet a Foreign Office requirement for an Athens–Ankara–Teheran run. By 1946 the Hythes (Sunderland III) were flying twice-weekly to Calcutta and thrice-weekly to Singapore, extended on 12 May to Sydney. This was reduced to once-weekly on 24 August so that a weekly direct service to Hong Kong and a Hong Kong–Singapore shuttle could be operated. Meanwhile, on 31 May 1945 an express, sixty-three-hour Lancastrian service through to Sydney had started with, in addition, a twice-weekly York flight to Calcutta. Both these services were doubled on 15 July. When the Kangaroo route was reopened on a partnership basis in May 1946, QANTAS crews took over the Lancastrians at Karachi and the Hythes at Singapore. The Mediterranean, Middle, and Far Eastern areas were all plagued by poor weather and radio facilities, none of which made planning services any easier, especially for crews used to European radar coverage.

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112 S p e e d b i r d For operational reasons, Mariut, Kasfareit, and Lydda were kept as “funk holes,” as Whitney Straight called them. It had been expected that Bahrain would be used by Tudor IIs, and a hotel was built to accommodate the passengers off the anticipated twenty-four services a week, but the Tudor proved unable to operate over this route. However, Bahrain was expanded and became the centre of a lucrative ($440,000 a year in 1948) oil-field traffic, especially after the loss of the Abadan refineries in 1951. In the meantime, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which was then chartering Skyways services, urged BOAC to start services into Basra. This resulted in a Plymouth service from 2 May 1947. In the autumn of 1946 Haltons were expected to take over the London– Khartoum Dakota services, but they were seriously delayed. At the same time the partition of India began to loom on the horizon, while, with the withdrawal of the C-Class from the Horseshoe route, the ruler of Bahrain put pressure on BOAC via the Political Resident, the India Office, and the Ministry. He feared for his lucrative pearl business because all the flying-boats transiting Bahrain were so full of mail that they could take on no additional loads. The Manager of No. 4 Line said that he could easily lay on a Plymouth, but that this would delay the opening of the Japanese service by a month. Karachi said it could handle the westbound but not the eastbound boat. The whole question thus became thoroughly embroiled in the scheduling and equipment of the services to Karachi, Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Japan as well as in the Bahrain–Karachi double-shuttle arrangements. It was finally decided that flights would start with a terminating service to Bahrain on 1 May 1947. In March of that year the future of Lodestar operations was seriously jeopard­ ized by the RAF’s decision to stop overhauling their engines for BOAC. So Management decided to sell them, as noted above, and to replace them with Dakotas. Shortly thereafter, operation of four-engined aircraft was, with Ministry approval, shifted from the unsatisfactory airfield on Malta to Castel Benito (Tripoli). At the same time, a weekly London–Lydda Dakota service was started. At the end of the summer H. G. Brackley, then assistant to the Chairman, was sent to manage the mutual airlift of refugees between India and Pakistan. This involved the organization and supervision of a large number of charter aircraft and a few of BOAC’s own. Some 43,500 civilians and their baggage were shuttled between India and Pakistan. In these operations from Karachi and then from Delhi, 1,100,000 miles were flown without accident, much to the credit of all concerned. The partition of the vast subcontinent compelled BOAC to consider reorganizing services to the East. Flying-boats did not have the range to make the direct hop across the Indian Ocean to Bombay without touching Pakistan. Consideration was given to operating a York service via Masirah on the Hadramaut Coast, but the Ministry was reluctant (in January 1948) to improve sufficiently the airfield there. A further complication was the need for new bilateral agreements with the emerging nations; so joint BOAC–Ministry teams were agreed to in October with one for India and Burma and the other for Pakistan and Ceylon. BOAC found

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itself not only having to take over the handling of its own services out there, but also possibly to supply technical staff to both Pakistan’s Orient Airways and Indian National Airways and to invest in them as well in order to keep out others, such as TWA, not to mention the British Independents. At the same time, the situation in Palestine, already politically hot, was complicated for BOAC by rumours at Lydda that an Israeli company was to be formed. Just as in India, BOAC’s concern as a commercial company was to maintain a neutral position which offended neither Jews nor Arabs. On top of these problems, the airlift in India caused a shortage of fuel, and this meant that the Haltons had to be kept in service until after the Christmas 1947 mail rush. When BOAC went to return them to the Ministry, from which they were on hire, it refused to take them and insisted instead that BOAC pay £104,000 for the twelve (all of which BOAC sold between May and September 1948). Mail loads also caused, over QANTAS’s objections, the removal of seats from Lancastrians. By the end of November 1947 a York had operated a proving flight on the 2,600mile limiting Ceylon–Singapore sector, and services on this new route started on 19 February 1948. Before they did so, the Indian Government approved the establishment of Air India International, which began services to Europe in June 1948. On the other hand, late in 1947 British European Airways agreed to BOAC’s operating Dakotas to Beirut via Athens, which allowed a considerable increase in payload compared to the route to Lebanon via Cairo. The year 1948 was a difficult one operationally. Cholera in Egypt and disturb­ ances in Palestine caused re-routeings at short notice, with consequent passenger displeasure, staff disruption, and additional expense, just when BOAC was beginning to settle into a peacetime routine. Operations into Lydda stopped on 28 April. At this time, Nicosia, Cyprus, suddenly came into importance, along with Masirah, which by now the Indian High Commissioner wanted as an emergency field. Much still depended on the Tudors which, until June 1948, the Corporation still expected to be using on Eastern services. With them in mind, BOAC had moved from Almaza to Farouk Airport at Cairo, and on the closing of Lydda the Lancastrians were routed through there. At the same time, No. 5 Line at Cairo was closed. It had lost £609,729 in 1946–1947, but had been maintained for strategic reasons. On the other hand, there was some good news. On 1 May 1948, at Skyways’ own request, BOAC took over for one year all their charters in the Persian Gulf area, which gave BOAC the use of Skyways’ DC-4s and its landing rights at Damascus and Abadan. But almost at once there were strikes at Basra, Calcutta, and four other stations, and no sooner were these ended than Egypt, Iraq, and Syria banned night-flying. The pressure was eased somewhat by the opening of Rome to four-engined aircraft. The oil companies at once pressed for their services to stop in that romantic city and for them to make sensible connections with trans-Atlantic flights, to which BOAC had to accede because of the competition offered by KLM, Pan American, and TWA. Due to the importance of the area, thought was also given at this time to opening Kuwait.

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114 S p e e d b i r d By 1949 Middle Eastern and Indian services were carrying special shipments of animals for British and American laboratories, especially monkeys. BOAC was preparing to replace Yorks, Lancastrians, Dakotas, Plymouths, Hythes, and Solents with the Tudor-substitute Constellations, Argonauts, and later Hermes. To do this efficiently the Corporation needed hangars at London Airport, which were not yet available. For a while Solents took over from Plymouths but were withdrawn for three months and Yorks had to take their places. In August 1949 Lydda reopened and Argonauts came in on the 23rd but had to be withdrawn on 6 September and did not go back on service with modified inter-cooler pumps until 11 October. On 5 November Yorks began a new freighter service to the Persian Gulf and two days later Argonauts took over the Skyways service to Abadan, as well as to Bahrain and Bagdad. The Ministry, meanwhile, was not satisfied with a weekly Dakota service to Teheran and in November 1947 asked for a second one. But it backed down in February 1948 when BOAC said that the loss would be £64,000 a year and that it would operate such a flight only under a Direction from the Ministry. Nevertheless, BOAC was pressed by other sources to invest in the Iranian Eagle Airlines. Yorks took over Teheran services via Lydda on 21 August 1949 but were replaced by Argonauts on 3 June 1950. The latter type had already replaced Yorks in November on the London–Cairo–Lydda and Lancastrians on the London–Colombo services, cutting the schedule to Ceylon by eighteen hours and to London by thirty-one. The only fly in the ointment was the breakdown of the Anglo-Indian bilateral talks, leaving BOAC without a Bombay-terminating service.

The Kangaroo Route On 31 May 1945 a joint BOAC–QANTAS Lancastrian service began between Hurn and Sydney. These aircraft carried three pilots, two navigators, two radio officers, two passengers, and five tons of mail and spent twenty-four of the eighty-fivehour schedule on the ground. Six weeks later, the time was reduced to sixty-three hours, BOAC handing over to QANTAS at Karachi. By the end of the year six flights a week were being flown. Japan surrendered on 15 August and on 9 October Sunderland (Hythe) services were extended to Rangoon. In November Hudson Fysh of QANTAS and Knollys of BOAC agreed to a thrice-weekly flying-boat operation to parallel the Lancastrians until Tudor IIs could be on service. On 7 February 1946 Sunderlands began regular operations into Singapore. Then on 24 March Lancastrian G-ALGX went into the sea somewhere between Ceylon and Australia on the very long oceanic hop. The route was at once altered to Ceylon–Pegu–Singapore when Tengah airfield at Singapore was opened to four-engined aircraft. In May QANTAS withdrew the two Liberators which had been connecting with the flying-boats at Singapore and the boats were flown all the way through to Sydney as in prewar days. By August 1946 the Australian Government was pressing for a decision as to aircraft for the Kangaroo route. QANTAS had no confidence in the Tudor II and wanted Constellations, especially in view of the lack of aerodromes along the route.

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In September QANTAS ordered Constellations and thus placed BOAC in a quandary. The Ministry supported BOAC’s view that either it had to have Constellations for the route or it would have to operate uneconomic British aircraft at a loss. But the Treasury refused to allow dollars to be used or a commercial loan to be sought for this purpose. At the end of 1946 the Australian Government took over BOAC’s holding in QANTAS and thus owned 50 per cent of the company. QANTAS was nationalized in June 1947, for its ambitious plans required recapitalization, but the Australian Government with sound sense retained the Hudson Fysh team. In June talks in London led to agreement that QANTAS would run the fast services with Constellations, while BOAC would handle the slow with flying-boats until the Tudors were available. By 3 December QANTAS Constellations were on service. In January 1947 BOAC took over a reduced Lancastrian service, while QANTAS increased its Constellation flights to six a month to London via Cairo and Karachi whereas BOAC flew London–Tripoli–Lydda–Karachi. In June 1948 BOAC received the ex-Aer Linte (Irish) Constellations and No. 5 Line, in the Middle East Division, was created to handle them. This allowed the June 1947 agreement to be rewritten as at last BOAC was on a par with QANTAS, both using Model 749s. While BOAC crews were training, one Constellation was lent to QANTAS so that the flights could be increased to twice-weekly. When, on 1 December, the five BOAC Constellations began services, they replaced twenty-one Hythe flying-boats. In March BOAC began running via Basra. But shortage of spares and the loan of the fifth aircraft to QANTAS for a full year prevented an increase in services until November 1949. By that time, with load factors on Indian services at 60 per cent, the Board suggested that some of the fifty-three monthly services to India be cancelled. Low-load factors were blamed on the revival of shipping and upon the development of the west-about service via Canada.7 Nevertheless, the Kangaroo route was by 1950 firmly re-established on a competitive basis. While it would suffer from political and technical interruptions over the next decade, it had become a routine service. An appendage to it, however, was the trans-Tasman leg, which started only after the war had begun. Until the late summer of 1946 Tasman Empire Airways (TEA) used two C-Class boats. These were replaced by Sandringhams, which had to be grounded early in 1948 because of the excessive number of engine failures they suffered. So BOAC had to send out three Lancastrians, crewed by QANTAS, to keep the service going. In June 1948 TEA asked urgently for two Solents. They did not receive the first of four until September 1949. The fate of these was linked directly to that of British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines (BCPA), discussed in Chapter VIII.

To China and Japan BOAC’s postwar Blue Book of 1944 had envisaged a London–Calcutta–Kunming– Chungking–Tokyo service and one via Calcutta, Hanoi, Hong Kong, and Shanghai to Japan. It decided to take the southern one as it was the faster and the route

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116 S p e e d b i r d most favoured by the Americans. There was also a circular Hong Kong–Manila– Sarawak–Singapore–Bangkok–Udorn–Hanoi–Fort Bayard–Hong Kong proposal. Though placed on the Air Ministry’s wanted list on 14 October 1944, the disturbed state of the Far East delayed the inception of these routes. Not until 15 July 1946 did a flying-boat leave to re-survey the Bangkok–Hong Kong branch. Dragon services, as those to Hong Kong were called, started on 24 August with the expectation that they would shortly be extended to Tokyo. Before this could happen there was trouble with Critchley’s Skyways, which began flying Singapore–Hong Kong in six and a half hours for the same fare that BOAC charged for its two-day service. Both the Director of Civil Aviation at Hong Kong and BOAC’s Manager there suggested that the only practical scheme as long as BOAC was required to “Fly British,” while Skyways could use DC-4s, was to charter the Skyways flights. The solution adopted by BOAC was an additional flying-boat service. In March and April 1947 a joint BOAC–Ministry team surveyed the flyingboat route to Japan, but the start of the service was delayed until 19 March 1948 because Constellations had to be deployed onto the New York–Bermuda service before the Bermuda Plymouths could be shifted to the Far Eastern Line, and also BOAC had to meet the Skyways challenge with an additional Dragon service, using a Plymouth, starting on 23 June 1947. Thus, the first proving flight to Japan did not leave until 24 November 1947. The base chosen was Iwakuni and, although it was said that lack of equipment caused the use of this RAF base, the American occupation of Japan also played its part. BOAC did, however, obtain permission to operate into Tokyo on 19 March 1948, the day when the first service left London. Flights were extended to Tokyo on 20 November. Shortly thereafter, on 30 December, services into Shanghai also began but were terminated the following May when the political situation in China reached crisis levels.

Conclusion to Chapters IV and V While it is generally true that policy-making individuals have a vital impact upon developments, it is also true that this is not at once apparent. Thus, to divide history into chapters is often to make an arbitrary cleavage in a continuous story. Strangely, however, the natural valleys in BOAC’s development have also come in cycle with a change in Chairmanship. This was most true in the case of Sir Miles Thomas in 1949. When he entered BOAC it was completing its postwar readjustment. For the first time it was equipped with something like a fleet of modern competitive aircraft, operating over a settled route structure. The merger with British South American Airways marked the end of a period just as much as did the arrival of the Argonauts and Stratocruisers. Sir Miles assumed power when BOAC was on the rise. He relinquished it after the Comets had been withdrawn and losses were once more on the horizon—a shrewd man.

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Chapter VI Apex and Aftermath: The Miles Thomas Era, 1949–1956 High Policy At the beginning of the era when Sir Miles Thomas was Chairman at £7,500 per annum, there were many problems. Blocked currency in South America and in Israel created a demand that new bilateral agreements provide for the free remittance of funds. There was yet time to make the change, for, although 238 of them were in existence world-wide, another 125 were being negotiated by 1951. Particularly after the failure of the Indian talks in 1949, BOAC had made strong representations to the Ministry that, as the chosen overseas airline, it should have a greater say in these vital negotiations—a view that the Board reiterated in 1956. The difficulties were ones of principle. Gradually they created a hardening of relations at the top, stemming from problems with postwar British aircraft and increasingly becoming entangled in the political pressures associated with the resurgence of the Independents, with mail payments, and, after the Comet 1 failures, with the purchase of future aircraft. Over and above these disagreements there was the problem of BEA, whose Management, led by doughty Marshal of the RAF Lord Douglas for fifteen years (1949–1964), succeeded in taking a hard-headed commercial view of life, partly because with the availability of the successful British Viscount and Trident it could afford to do so. Arguments between the two Corporations concerned direct services from America into Europe to compete with American operators and segment traffic on the London–Rome and London–Lisbon routes. BOAC did for a while decide that Rome was too well served and used Zurich. On the Lisbon route the difficulties were tied to the fate of the South American service and to the operations of the Portuguese state airline, Transportes Aereos Portugueses (TAP). In the end, because of the withdrawal of the Comets, in mid-April 1954 BOAC handed over the Lisbon route to BEA in exchange for greater rights at Rome. But this still left the matter of rights at Cyprus, and this in its turn led to serious proposals, which Thomas strongly supported, of a BEA–BOAC merger, but this was blocked by Treasury officials, though the then Chancellor of the Exchequer was in favour of it. These conflicts developed because of the increased non-stop range of new airliners such as the Vickers Viscount. Late in 1953 a settlement was reached in which BEA was granted a service to Ankara, which BOAC did not want, and agreed to stay out of Beirut, Cairo, and points east and south. Nevertheless, through Cyprus Airways,

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118 S p e e d b i r d 42. Sir Miles Thomas, DFC, BOAC Chairman, 1949–1956.

in which both Corporations then had a share, BEA had by 1964 pushed east into the lucrative Persian Gulf area.1 Friction on interlining remained a problem until 1974’s merger, for BEA claimed with some justice that its arrangements with other operators, especially Americans, brought in a large sum in dollars every year. BOAC always held that the objective for the two British airlines was to provide through services from New York with the least possible disturbance to the passenger. In the Miles Thomas era the immediate effect of these disagreements was the opening in Europe of BOAC sales offices as part of a world-wide movement in this direction by the Corporation. In April 1950 John Booth had resigned as Deputy Chairman and his duties were assumed by Sir Miles. At the same time, a study showed that the Corporation was not getting its fair share of the Scottish traffic. The Board decided that the best way to increase BOAC’s share was to expand the sales force in Scotland and to put on an intensive drive. The need for this was emphasized when Pan American took over American Overseas Airlines. In September 1950 the Ministry of Civil Aviation and the Air Ministry laid before the Corporations their plans for using airlines in war should the Korean conflict spread. Toyed with since the Berlin Airlift, the idea was based upon the US Army Air Transport Command as operated by General Harold L. George during the Second World War. Thus, the militarized Corporations would operate the trunk routes under their own executives. For BOAC this would mean the return of the long-range base to Montreal, with the rest of the fleet at Hurn and

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Filton. The Independents2 were to form Auxiliary Air Force squadrons, complete with their own maintenance staffs, for use as tactical support units. Only Airwork actually went through with the plan, becoming No. 622 Squadron on 15 December 1950. The Korean War brought awareness of another weak link in British defences, especially after the Persians nationalized the Abadan refineries in mid-1951. So a refinery programme was begun in Britain which increased the production of highoctane petrol from 2,900,000 tons in 1952 to 4,900,000 a year later, just when both civil and military aircraft were going over to kerosene. But for BOAC the fuel crisis of 1951–1952 meant £130,000 in a blackmail premium to American oil companies and £270,000 in increased tanker charges resulting from the shortage of shipping during the Korean War. In addition, revenue fell below expectations because Britain, India, Australia, and others limited the amount of fuel which could be uplifted. In the middle of June 1951, after exactly three years in office, Lord Pakenham was replaced as Minister by Lord Ogmore, an expert on company law. But at the end of October, Labour was ousted at the polls and a Conservative Government took office, much to Thomas’s delight (as he was a Conservative). The new Minister, shipping magnate J. S. Maclay, was given both the Ministry of Transport and that of Civil Aviation, though the formal merger of the two did not take place until late in 1953. Among the fourteen new committees of backbenchers formed to help the Government make policy was one on Civil Aviation headed by George Ward, assisted by Air Commodore A. V. Harvey, Deputy Chairman of Handley Page and owner of an Independent airline, and Sir Robert Perkins. All the while, the Corporation was making steady progress toward solvency. The Exchequer Grant for 1950–1951 of £6,000,000 yielded a surplus of £1,434,572, which together with a capital profit was used to establish a £2,000,000 reserve fund against the premature obsolescence of the Hermes. Under the circumstances, there was reason to hope for the future and, in fact, in the next year an over-all profit was recorded, just four years after the Deficiency Grants of the wartime years had stopped on 31 March 1948. In consequence, in the spring of 1952 the Corporation told the Ministry it would not need an Exchequer Grant for 1952– 1953 unless there was a substantial change in the basis upon which its predictions were made. But with a £462,000 drop in mail revenue, a £250,000 decrease in charter revenues, the additional costs in putting the Comet on service, and a £650,000 loss blamed on the American fuel strike, the Corporation told the Ministry in January 1953 that it would like £1,000,000. The Ministry replied that BOAC might receive about £650,000, but this was whittled down to £500,000. In the end, as the anticipated loss came to less than £1,000,000, the Grant was declined and the sum carried over onto the 1953–1954 accounts. Sir Miles rightly believed that BOAC should be run commercially. Meanwhile, in 1952 the Conservatives had converted the Air Transport Advisory Council into a licensing authority. BOAC found that the requirement to submit every route change for approval was irksome and in March the Board made a

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120 S p e e d b i r d point of calling to the Minister’s attention this reason for the delayed start of the London–Beirut service. The full impact of the change in character of the Council will be treated later in connection with the Independents. In the autumn of 1953 Sir Miles was reappointed for a new five-year term running until 30 June 1959, while on 30 September the Financial Comptroller, Basil Smallpeice, was made a Member of the Board. This was the beginning of the addition to the Board of members of the executive, until by 1963 the elevenman Board was and remained about equally divided between BOAC executives and outsiders, with a consequent lessening of the weight of disinterested advice. However, the benefits of the more rapid conduct of business in consonance with Management’s desires was believed to outweigh other considerations. Sir Miles had already streamlined the Board committee system left over from the Knollys days so that each member had an area of responsibility. Thus the full Board got a balanced picture, not a rehash of the previous day’s committee meetings. In 1964 the outsiders again assumed a majority. In the Air Corporations Act of 1953, which increased borrowing powers to £80,000,000, pensions were provided for Board Members for the first time, bringing them into line with those of other nationalized industries. In June 1954 Smallpeice was raised to Deputy Chief Executive and made responsible for business and forward planning, while the position of the Deputy Chairman occupied by Whitney Straight was redefined. At the beginning of August 1954 Ministerial musical chairs began, with a consequent period of readjustment of relationships and outlooks. Alan LennoxBoyd (later Lord Boyd of Merton) was transferred from the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation, to which he had been appointed in May 1952, to the Colonial Office and his place was taken by John (later Lord) Boyd-Carpenter, previously Financial Secretary to the Treasury. In October, Duncan Sandys was replaced as Minister of Supply by Selwyn Lloyd. In April 1955, Reginald Maulding succeeded Lloyd as Anthony Eden, the new Prime Minister, reshuffled the Churchillian Cabinet which he had just taken over. And, in May 1955, Chairman Thomas saw the Minister, Boyd-Carpenter, about Board appointments in view of the Minister’s unexpected acceptance of the pro-forma resignation of Major Thornton. (Thornton, of the Liverpool Holt shipping company, was a self-proclaimed gadfly who irritated Ministers by shooting holes in their proposals.) The Board itself so missed and respected its devil’s advocate that they made him a consultant. He was replaced by John Buchan’s son, Lord Tweedsmuir, sometime Chairman of the Joint East and Central Africa Board. At the same time, at the Air League of the British Empire Air Chief Marshal Sir George Pirie succeeded Sir Guy Garrod as Chairman and called for a coordinated national air transport policy, especially long-term trooping contracts so that the Independents could acquire more modern aircraft. All that he said had been said in an Air League memorandum of 1954. But it still remained true that the country never had a coordinated air policy embracing the Services, the air transport industry, and the manufacturers, as the Edwards Committee noted again in its 1969 Report (Cmnd.4018).

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43. Whitney Straight, BOAC Managing Director, 1947–1949, and Deputy Chairman, 1949–1955.

By late 1955, the winds of change were blowing down the runway. In October, Whitney Straight, the advocate of the big jet, after being offered the Deputy Chairmanship at BEA, moved to Rolls-Royce as Executive Vice-Chairman. Lord Rennell of Rodd succeeded him in November. Another innovation was that Thomas was allowed by the Minister to take an unpaid interest in Ferguson Motors and in British Glues. In December, Harold Watkinson, a technical and engineering journalist, succeeded Boyd-Carpenter as Minister. Watkinson’s tantrum over the Thomas memo on the Rolls-Royce Conway Comet helped Sir Miles decide to leave. Early in March 1956, Sir Miles told the Minister that he would like to resign. He and Lord Burghley, whose term had expired, did so on 30 April. Lord Rennell then resigned, though his term was not up, in protest over the appointment of Sir George Cribbett, a senior civil servant (as will be noted in Chapter VIII), but was retained. Toward the end of his Chairmanship Sir Miles had come to believe that the large turbo-prop (advocated by Peter Masefield, who had left BEA to go to the Bristol Aeroplane Company) was the aircraft for the long hauls, and under his influence the Corporation had inclined toward buying the Britannia 420, sponsored by the Bristol–Canadair–Convair consortium, and the Douglas DC-7D turboprop. But this was ignoring the writing on the wall, and in typical British fashion underestimating the rapidity with which the American industry works when convinced that it is on the right line. Thomas’s faith in the Bristol Britannia—the Whispering Giant—was undermined by the slowness of production. The Aeroplane had warned (29 August 1952) that the big American jets were coming. In October

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122 S p e e d b i r d 1955, Pan American followed the lead of American domestic operators and ordered both the 707 and the DC-8. On the 24th TIME pointed out that because of the Comet crashes BOAC would have to buy Boeing 707s or Douglas DC-8s, but BOAC did not follow through during Sir Miles’s time. While stressing that he resigned because of “irksome political interference,” though in fact he consulted the Ministry himself on many occasions, Sir Miles well said at the time: You can either have a competitive airline using the best available equipment, or you can have a shop-window for British aircraft. But if you choose the second alternative, you must not expect to make a profit.3

The British aircraft industry, he continued, pursued stars and ignored bread-andbutter aircraft and business at its feet.4 Actually, he had persuaded the Ministers to agree to a Conway Comet when Watkinson came in as the new Minister and wanted to re-examine everything. This is not as silly as it seems as by custom a new Minister may not see the papers of his predecessors, who in the olden days, at least, used to take them home upon leaving office. However, Watkinson was furious that Thomas sent a copy of his letter requesting ten Comet 4s to Maudling, the Minister of Supply, who had been in on the earlier discussions and who had to approve the workload in the aircraft industry. Sir Miles resigned to accept the Chairmanship of Monsanto Chemicals Ltd. at a much higher salary. He left because he felt the loss of the first Comets plus the reluctance of the latest Minister, Watkinson, to allow the ordering of a small fleet of trans-Atlantic Conway Comets had left him disillusioned—he had wanted to see British jets lead the world on the old Blue Riband shipping route. Now, he would have to buy US aircraft. He had served the Corporation loyally and he left for financial (£20,000) among other reasons. For until the appointment of Sir Giles Guthrie at the end of 1963, the Managing Director was receiving £5,000 plus £1,000 expenses in 1959, £2,500 less than Managing Director George Woods Humphery was paid twenty-five years before when he left Imperial Airways in 1938. The Chairman received £7,500 plus £1,000 expenses from 1949 to 1956, though the Index of Prices had gone up at least threefold! And in the Fifties there were many more irritants with which he had to deal, such as the Independents.

Trooping, Charters, Freighting, the Independents, and the Minister BOAC’s relations with the Independent charter companies began immediately after the war, when a variety of people for a diversity of reasons decided to buy a few surplus aircraft and start air services. Their problems would have been much the same whether they had been “chosen instruments” or not, for they had generally started on a shoestring and did not have the capital resources with which to buy modern airliners. The story of their relationships with BOAC is important for it shows how they were perpetuated through muddled policy and complex political influences.

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At the same time, a certain amount of trooping by air was being handled by RAF Transport Command squadrons; there was an acute shortage of shipping; and airline seats were priority controlled. The eighty-five new charter companies had a field day, sometimes at the expense of the Corporations, until after the Berlin Airlift. They were saved from complete doom by the Korean War. At the same time, BOAC was hampered by its lack of modern American aircraft, statutory obligations, national duty, and expensive organization. Up to 1950, it could excuse itself by pointing to Ministerial pressure disbarring it from both freighting and trooping. The needs of the Services, the political influence of the charter companies, and the national and commercial roles of the Corporation were all ingredients in the making of policy. The one charter company which tried to work with BOAC was Skyways, owned by Eric Rylands. Up to 1950 BOAC handled all Government chartering, but was under orders to parcel it out to charter operators. It made money on its commissions for this activity until the Air Ministry, by the threat of setting up its own charter organization in 1950, caused the Corporation to agree to do it for nothing so as to retain the business. It also made some money handling charter services at overseas stations, though inflated charges, stemming from high station costs, added to well-aired conflicts caused by charter operators wanting services when BOAC flights had to be handled. All this did not make a happy arrangement, especially as at the same time BOAC was actually using some charter flights as its own services. On 2 April 1947 the three Corporations and the new British Air Charter Association met with the Ministry to discuss future air-charter policy, which was agreed in November. In general, BOAC was to act as agent, handing the service over to one of twenty-two approved firms to fly. Late in 1947 Hudson Fysh suggested that a joint BOAC–QANTAS freight service be started to keep the charter “buccaneers” from cutting in, increasing BOAC’s deficit, and bringing upon it additional criticism. To do this, a Lancastrian freighter service was initiated. But BOAC was forced to tolerate the interlopers until it could handle all the business itself. How those eighty Tudors would have helped! Another problem was that BOAC’s freight rate of twenty-one shillings a mile included eleven for overheads on a Constellation 049, whereas the Independents charged but ten shillings total. The Independents undercut BOAC, but they also went bankrupt. Moreover, on some operations, such as the Persian Gulf oil company charters, BOAC felt it was wiser to use Skyways’ DC-4s than inferior British aircraft. Then on 21 July 1948 Lord Douglas was appointed to the BOAC Board, before being made Chairman of BEA in March 1949. He was charged specifically to investigate the agents and associates appointed to the Corporation under the Civil Aviation Act of 1946. This was part of Lord Pakenham’s move to do something for the charter companies, which the Air Ministry wanted to keep in being in the face of threats to cut Transport Command. In January 1949 the Minister issued a directive to the Air Transport Advisory Council, ordering it to allow private companies to become associates of the Corporations so that the former could operate scheduled

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124 S p e e d b i r d services. Intended as a means of creating feeder services in the United Kingdom, this was the opening wedge which led a decade later to the setting up of British United Airways (BUA) as virtually a third Corporation. At the same time, the Ministry suggested to BOAC that the Corporation should allow Skyways under contract to continue to handle certain services to the Near East so that the new Canadairs could be placed on South American services. BOAC refused, stressing its desire to remove all charter operators from its routes and to have pressurized aircraft to compete with its rivals’ DC-6s. Shortly thereafter, all Tudors were grounded and a flying-boat had to be put on to the Bahrain route. Skyways was at the time overextended and the contract was terminated painlessly, though there was some thought early in 1949 that BOAC might buy the company. In May 1949 the Minister, Lord Pakenham, said he regarded the associate agreements merely as a temporary phase for the charter companies.5 At the same time, regular airlines all over the world, especially in the United States, prepared to give the coup de grâce to the interlopers. Yet the problem was that the public wanted cheaper service with fewer frills. With the notable exception of Pan American (which, with its superior aircraft fleet and well-organized and coordinated worldwide system, was prepared to beat the charter companies at their own game, as it did with freight flights) the bulk of the airlines, supported by BOAC, closed ranks in the International Air Transport Association meetings to forbid drastic lowering of passenger fares. By the end of 1949, BOAC had acquired both the oil company contracts held by Skyways and the Overseas Food Corporation business out of East Africa held by Huntings. The British Air Charter Association blasted this as a monopolistic grab which would deprive the country of its trained reserves, failing to mention that foreign IATA carriers were already quoting rates considerably below those of British charter operators. Nevertheless, charges were made in Parliament. BOAC denied these. The Corporation began a freight service to the Persian Gulf, but the Board agreed in February 1950 that an all-freight division was not justified. This was unfortunate, as, when the Conservatives came to power, they took the view that the Corporation should be protected only on the routes it had already established. Thus, although the charter companies viewed the Labour victory of 1950 as spelling their doom, the Conservative success in 1951 opened the pearly gates once again, particularly as the licensing authority they had been demanding was established. In the spring of 1950 another development seemed likely to do something for the Independents. This was the decision to cut back RAF Transport Command. Rumours circulated that the charter companies would be asked to do air trooping. The Independents claimed to have started the idea, but credit must also go to Whitney Straight of BOAC. The argument was, and has since been borne out by facts, that when all factors, including the pay and maintenance of men in transit and the larger forces needed to cover their temporary absence, were considered, air transport was cheaper than sea. In fact, by 1953 it cost only £22 to fly a man to the Middle East versus £30 by sea. By May 1950 the Prime Minister had set up a

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working party to consider trooping and the Independents. In June, at the request of the Air Ministry, BOAC submitted tenders for trooping to the Middle East and Malaya. For three-year contracts starting in 1951 the Corporation proposed to use eleven Handley Page Hermes, a brand-new pressurized aircraft, on a strict high-utilization schedule. At the same time, at the Minister’s request, BOAC prepared a memorandum showing why it should get the work. For BOAC the revenue involved was about £4,000,000 a year, which would have gone a long way towards justifying its pioneering of these routes and its use of the Hermes, not to mention enabling it to keep in employment aircrew and engineers it expected to be redundant when jets came on. In addition to the Hermes, a far more modern aircraft than the Independents could offer, BOAC said it would be able to use the Brabazons and Princesses for trooping as well as the Britannias at a later date. Late in June, however, the Minister, Lord Pakenham, asked BOAC for its route plans for the next five years, so that he could give the Independents any others. Sir Miles pointed out that this would unduly fetter the Corporation and so Lord Pakenham agreed to consult on an ad hoc basis instead. Equally significant was the directive issued to the Air Transport Advisory Council on 20 September. This called for a further extension of associate status under Section 15 (3) of the Air Corporations Act of 1949 and the inclusion of licenses to operate on any route up until the time one of the Corporations planned to start services on it.6 Human nature being what it is, this document was open to many interpretations, and once the charter companies had gained an ounce, they could be expected to try to make off with a few pounds. But, at the same time, BOAC’s freight uplift was improving and in 1949–1950 provided 8.6 per cent of the operating revenues. By November the impact of the Korean War was being felt and chartering was picking up, but few of the companies had large modern aircraft. BOAC also benefitted from the economic boom. Besides a York to Australia, it used Stratocruisers and Argonauts to carry service families to the Middle East and Singapore for Christmas 1950. Yet, despite the improvement, many charter companies were driven to the wall and out of business. In January 1951 BOAC was told that its Exchequer Grant for 1951–1952 had been approved at £5,000,000, but that this would be reduced if it received the trooping contracts, as the Ministry hoped it would. Though BOAC did not receive the contracts, the Treasury subsequently reduced the amount by £750,000. BOAC was now most anxious about trooping as it already expected to have eight Hermes surplus to requirements, though these aircraft had only became available in 1950. In spite of this, it would not tender for trooping except with a bid which would cover costs. At the same time, BOAC had thirty-three Yorks for sale, twenty-four of which were bought in May 1951 by the new Eric Rylands-owned Skyways. Besides hoping for trooping contracts, the Independents were also aware of the four-fold increase in Coach-Class travel in the United States in the twelve months 1949–1950. The subject of trooping was strangely muted. All that was admitted was that thirteen companies had tendered.7 Then in July BOAC learned from the Secretary

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126 S p e e d b i r d of State for War that a committee had been set up, composed of representatives from the Ministry, the Air Ministry, the War Office, and the charter companies to discuss trooping policy, the ordering of suitable aircraft, and who would crew them. Asked by BOAC why it was not represented, the Ministry’s trooping expert said he knew nothing about the Committee. At the same time, BOAC was negotiating the sale of five of the surplus Hermes to Airwork, provided it received the Suez job. The first trooping contract was announced in August by the Air Ministry, which had now taken over the business. Later in the autumn Airwork received one and hired four BOAC Hermes with which to do it. By November BOAC had disposed of all its surplus aircraft. Then came a financial and rearmament crisis, the fall of the Labour Government, and the accession of a new Conservative one under Churchill. On 5 December 1951 Lord Leathers, Minister for the Coordination of Transport and of Fuel and Power, laid down the new political philosophy: a combination of public and private enterprise in the best interests of British civil aviation, aimed only at serving the national interest.8 Lord Leathers repeated election promises to give more scope to the Indep­ endents. At the same time, the British Independent Air Transport Association (BIATA), formerly the British Air Charter Association, expelled the Corporations from their honorary memberships. At once, the Minister, J. S. Maclay, assured Sir Miles that the policy of giving more to the Independents would not undermine BOAC’s existing international networks and that before any final decisions were taken there would be full consultation with all concerned. At the end of January 1952 he indicated that he was moving towards a licensing board to adjudicate between those wishing to start new routes, the criterion being that development should be at the lowest cost to the taxpayer; that chartering was politically a hot potato and that BOAC should get out of it; and that he wanted to get the Independents into freighting, but that they would not take the risk of investing in new equipment until promised that BOAC would not compete. Sir Miles assured him that the Independents were welcome to invest in local companies overseas as these cost BOAC too much in sterling and in executive time. On the other hand, Sir Miles pointed out that it would be bad for the morale of the Corporation for it to be restricted just at the time when it was at last becoming profitable. At a later meeting Sir Miles noted that BOAC needed to be able to even out its loads between the seasonal peaks, but he weakened his case by saying that he thought there was room for both the Corporations and the Independents. The Minister, however, continued to accuse BOAC of having illegitimate charter aircraft because it had three Yorks as spares, not apparently understanding the need for standby equipment. He also failed to appreciate that BOAC’s main competitors were not the British Independents, but the other major airlines who were free to operate freight and other services with their older aircraft. But before Maclay could give coach services to the Independents, he resigned because of ill health. His successor was Alan Lennox-Boyd, who in November 1947 had become Chairman of the Conservative Party Civil Aviation Committee in the House of Commons.

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As Minister of Transport Lennox-Boyd was charged with the task of de-nationalizing road haulage. As Minister of Civil Aviation, his other portfolio, he announced on 27 May that the development of overseas scheduled air services was to be open both to the Corporations and to the Independents, who should apply to the Air Transport Advisory Council, which would then grant them sevento ten-year licenses as associates. He said that he hoped to let the Independents develop all-freight and Colonial Coach services not directly in competition with the Corporations, while the Corporations would be prohibited from keeping aircraft for charter services. The policy was aimed, he noted, to give the private companies the long-term security they needed to buy modern aircraft. Herbert Morrison for Labour charged that this was throwing a spanner in the works just when the Corporations were becoming profitable.9 It was. The Independents hailed the announcement but regretted that the Corporations had not been broken up. A subtle semantic change was evident: the Corporation ceased to be protected on its overseas routes—only on its scheduled international services, which were governed by bilateral treaties, thus allowing the Government room in which to license charter operations. Sir Miles began discussions with the Minister in June 1952. Both he and Lord Douglas of BEA were put under considerable pressure to allow the Independents a free hand. On 15 July, Lennox-Boyd persuaded them to agree not to apply for freight licenses for a year. After they had consented he showed them the directive which was then issued to the Air Transport Advisory Council on the 30th. In it, they read the pregnant statement that no license was to be issued for a new service which would materially divert traffic from an existing service.10 This provision, designed to protect the Corporations’ own routes, or so they thought at the time, was quickly twisted so that they were unable to open new services, such as trans-Atlantic freight, which went by default to foreign competitors since the Independents, when they tried them, could not sustain such operations. Feeling that it had been tricked, BOAC decided to oppose all applications to the Council which put the Independents as associates into direct competition with the Corporation in defiance of Section 15 (3) of the Air Corporations Act of 1949, which clearly stated that the associates were to further the efficiency of the Corporation’s operations. BOAC objected, too, to having to go to the Council for minor route changes and for yet another confirmation of long-range planning. Moreover, the prohibition of freight services destroyed the possibility of getting a share of the Atlantic market in cooperation with an American line. The arrangements for a trans-Atlantic Britannia freighter service, which might have been made in 1952 and which would have required at least five Britannia freighters, were not completed until July 1963, when CL-44s, modified Canadian-built Britannias, were chartered from the American company Seaboard and Western. Instead of BOAC getting the service, on 12 September 1952 Airwork applied for a license for all-freight operations to America. This was granted in February 1953 and American permission received in April 1954. Operations with DC-4s hired from American firms, Trans-Ocean

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128 S p e e d b i r d and Slick, began on 1 March 1955. Airwork itself failed to support the British aircraft industry and ordered American Douglas DC-6s! This was because there was no suitable British aircraft, though work on a Britannia freighter had been started for BOAC. Airwork’s appearance in the United States had led to threats by US airlines to stop interlining with BOAC. However, Airwork could not make a go of it and withdrew its services across the Atlantic on 18 December 1955 and ceased operating into Europe on 8 March 1956. The Corporation itself, feeling tricked as it did, applied on 9 October 1952 for a similar license, but the Minister made it withdraw its request. The Corporation made no further attempts, for Lennox-Boyd pointed out the desirability of its cooperating with Airwork. Nevertheless, shortly thereafter, BOAC applied to the Minister for permission to purchase five Britannia freighters for use on North Atlantic and Eastern routes to replace Yorks which were being withdrawn and replaced by charters from Skyways. Lennox-Boyd agreed, subject to there being a real commercial need for the Britannias, and approval by the Council of the necessary licenses. Then on 2 March 1954 he told Sir Miles that BOAC would have to show that its proposed service would not hurt Airwork, which had not yet started. As this was impossible, BOAC withdrew its request. Under the Minister’s urging, attempts were made to come to a modus vivendi with the Independents. In January 1953, the Independents proposed that a joint company with BOAC should be established to acquire BOAC’s surplus aircraft and the operating assets of the Independents. This would undertake trooping, Colonial Coach, and freighting work, and would, in addition, hire surplus BOAC aircraft hours. The Board decided against it on the grounds that it might produce conflicts of interest and be at variance with the Corporation’s statutory obligations. The proposed company would have been in the traditions of business in which competitors have usually been bought out, if they could not be bankrupted, and would have been in line with the Minister’s policy. Yet in early 1954, the Ministry told BOAC that it could not invest in the Independents, although the latter were “associates.” By early 1953, the Independents were having their troubles. For their trooping contracts they had begun to charge full charter rates, which lost them much marginal business. At the same time, their war-surplus aircraft were flying nearer to the scrap heap. Their basic problem, apart from staying alive, was how to acquire modern aircraft. By this time BOAC had some surplus Hermes which it proposed to sell to Spain and Turkey, with Ministry of Defence approval. Sir Miles told the Minister that BOAC wanted £198,000 apiece for them as they had cost £275,000 new.11 He said he would sell them to the Independents at £110,000 apiece if the latter were barred from using them on scheduled or Colonial Coach services. At least this is what was supposed to have been said. In fact, Sir Miles wrote to the Minister on 3 February protesting strongly that the minutes of the meeting prepared by the Ministry were completely untrue.12 Shortly after this, both Corporations again raised the question of trooping as nearly half of all overseas troop movements were

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by air. They argued that amongst the advantages to them, as well as to the nation, of their doing trooping would be partial reimbursement for the heavy expenses incurred in bringing new British aircraft up to operational standards. The Minister refused on the grounds that politically he could allow them to have trooping contracts only if they would open some of their preserves to the Independents. Once it was known that BOAC was not to be allowed to do trooping, the market price fell and BOAC was forced to sell the no-good Hermes for £90,000 apiece. With the enforced sale of the Yorks, this amounted to a public subsidy to the Independents of £5,500,000. Before the sales were completed, the Air Ministry awarded the new trooping contracts to York operators, leaving BOAC again holding the baby because the sales to Independents of Hermes were contingent upon their getting trooping work. As the Corporation noted in its Annual Report for 1953–1954, all of this was “tantamount to a waste of public money.” What happened when an Independent was given a trooping contract was well demonstrated with the airlift to the West Indies. On 2 February 1953 one lost a York on the Azores–Gander sector. The War Office stopped further flights and chartered BOAC Argonauts on an ad hoc basis. So BOAC had to do trooping anyway! In the spring of 1953 Airwork approached BOAC about a cooperative associate agreement for services to Aden. Both had applications before the Air Transport Advisory Council. The Minister, Lennox-Boyd, attempted to deprive BOAC of its right to operate to Aden, where it had an associated local airline, Aden Airways, but he relented to the extent of granting licenses to both, thus establishing competition between the British national corporation and a British private company. There was a summer lull, and then in September a move toward conciliation was hastened by a dinner on 29 October at Lennox-Boyd’s private house in Chapel Street, Belgravia, London. The Minister was most anxious that agreement should be reached on services to Aden and also on freighting on the North Atlantic. At the same time, he strongly impressed upon Sir Miles the Government’s considered policy—that the Independents were to have international freight services and that it would be useless for BOAC to apply for them. Under these circumstances the Board agreed to a modus vivendi in which Airwork would not fly to Aden nor oppose BOAC’s new tourist fares, while the Corporation would pass to Airwork all the freight it could not carry on its own scheduled services. To hasten the matter, the Minister gave Sir Miles what the Chairman considered a “virtual Direction” to make an agreement with Airwork. A month later the Minister told the House of Commons that he was surprised that the Chairmen of BOAC and BEA did not understand that the Government had always considered trooping as part of charter work, as was freight, the Corporations being responsible only for passenger and mail services.13 Such a statement showed considerable ignorance not only of the facts but of basic airline economics. In view of the trend of civil aviation policy and in the light of what it considered outrageous demands made by Airwork in connection with an associate agreement,

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130 S p e e d b i r d the BOAC Board decided in February 1954 that it would call upon the Minister, the first case of the Board of a nationalized industry doing so, which it did on 3 March. Word of this quickly got abroad and on 8 March the whole matter was aired in the House. Lennox-Boyd was forced to admit that it had not been the policy of the Labour Government to reserve trooping to the Independents.14 As far as the Board was concerned, there was a long, unsatisfactory pause after the confrontation of 3 March. It was October before an answer was received, but the intervening months were filled with correspondence on the minutes, ending finally with a tart letter from the Secretary of BOAC, saying that he had always understood that the purpose of minutes was to record what had been said, not what the Minister and his advisers wished they had said! In the meantime, the big shipping companies had begun another round of buying into the Independents: the Clan Line into Hunting, Furness-Withy into Airwork, and the Peninsular and Oriental (P&O) into Britavia. And all of this just at the time when the Comets were grounded, and Hunting-Clan was applying to run Colonial Coach services to the Far East with Viscounts. The sale of Hermes to Britavia was expedited by Ministerial order of April 1954, when the Minister argued that the Corporation had never succeeded in Labour’s day in getting a trooping contract and had regarded charter work only as incidental. Shortly before this, in March, he had first approved, then compelled BOAC to break an agreement with Skyways, long the Corporation’s associate, on the grounds that it would discriminate against other British operators. So BOAC was forced to retain the four Hermes intended for a Skyways East African service. But an agreement with Airwork was politically acceptable. The Corporation did win one victory. The Air Transport Advisory Council rejected Airwork’s and Hunting-Clan’s applications for services to Hong Kong on the grounds that these would mean a “material diversion” of traffic from BOAC. Nevertheless, the Independents had doubled their traffic between 1951 and the end of 1953. The failure of the Air Ministry to award long-distance trooping contracts to Hermes operators caused both BOAC and BEA to tell the Minister on 19 July 1954 that they could undertake trooping without keeping aircraft specifically for it. Lennox-Boyd replied that it had long been known that there would not be enough trooping for all Hermes operators, while war planning required that the Independents be kept separate from the Corporations as their roles would be different. Under further pressure BOAC agreed to Skyways flying the Singapore freighter, which suited the Corporation, and to Hunting-Clan being made an associate for “tramp” services in Africa. In May 1955 the Board considered a proposal to establish a western Atlantic company owned and operated by BOAC, British West Indian Airways, Airwork, and Furness-Withy. But this came to nought as Furness-Withy wanted to wait until after the General Election before committing itself. In June the world’s airlines found themselves in the middle of what Sir William Hildred

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of IATA described as “an economic shockwave.” The immediate impact upon the Independents could be seen in the new Minister, Boyd-Carpenter’s, response to Airwork’s appeal for aid: he told it to ask BOAC to help it out on its North Atlantic freight line, which was losing £400,000 annually. He suggested that passengers who could not be accommodated on BOAC should be sent by freighter. As a long-term policy he suggested that BOAC should agree to share its routes with selected Independents in which BOAC would have a limited share. The Board rejected these ideas in a strongly worded six-point minute, saying that what British civil aviation needed was a period of organizational stability. At the same time, various backbenchers in the House of Commons were calling for the breaking of the Corporations’ monopolies. This put the Cabinet in a difficult position from which it hoped BOAC would extricate it. The Board, for once, decided to let the Government clean up its own mess. By early 1956 the outlook for the Independents was gloomy. They felt that the conditions were too restrictive. But for BOAC things were looking up. Yet the Independents had made a gain of 45 per cent in a year and had carried 9,900 passengers on Colonial Coach services, while the Corporations were in 1955–1956 carrying only 94.3 per cent of the passengers on British scheduled services, compared to nearly 100 per cent a few years earlier.

Airmail Rates In dealing with the Post Office, BOAC was up against the one Department which at that time prided itself on making a profit; almost every gain that BOAC made against it was cancelled by the Treasury. Until December 1944 wartime airmail loads remained relatively stable because of the introduction of microfilm airgraphs and lightweight air letters. But after that date all troop mail went by air, especially to the Far East. Late in 1946 a change was forced by unilateral American action on rates on the North Atlantic which, as in most cases, governed all rates. The British Post Office agreed to six gold francs per tonne kilometre but pressed for three and a half on Empire routes. The Minister approved these rates without consulting BOAC, but the Board refused to accept them unless the airline was included in future discussions. On 1 April 1947 the 1935 Empire Air Mail Scheme formally came to an end, but it was not completely discontinued until mid-1953. In 1947 the Postmaster-General said that, given the cargo space, he would fill it with mails, but he refused to consider issuing airmail stamps, on the grounds that the work was not worth it.15 Late in the year the Ministry told BOAC that it wanted to start air parcel post and the flying of newspaper mail; BOAC agreed to consider it. Then the International Air Transport Association tried to set a world rate so that each government did not regulate its own carriers. The British Post Office, for one, insisted that mail rates should contain no subsidy. A modus vivendi between BOAC and the Post Office was agreed in 1949 with the Empire rate being increased to four and a half gold francs for two years, which was reckoned to benefit BOAC by an additional £1,000,000.

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132 S p e e d b i r d When mail talks restarted in January 1950, BOAC stressed that the rates should be related to services rendered to the public and not to basic freight tariffs, especially if postal rates were held at an arbitrary level as a matter of public policy. In the meantime, the expected increase in BOAC’s revenues had been seriously affected by the devaluation of the pound sterling in September 1949. Even then, BOAC was paid only $2.29 per mail-ton-mile versus Pan American’s $3.38. If BOAC had been paid at Pan American’s rate, The Aeroplane reckoned that in the first nine months of 1949 it would have received an additional £3,400,000.16 BOAC itself pointed out that although the Universal Postal Union rate was six gold francs, the Post Office paid it only 3.27. BOAC believed that, if the Post Office paid it the full rate, it could do without Exchequer Grants. After summer-long arguments, in September 1951, under Ministry pressure, the Post Office agreed to pay BOAC 27.5 per cent more, retroactive to January 1951. But as the additional revenue would amount to £1,250,000 more in a full year, BOAC’s Exchequer Grant was cut accordingly. However, BOAC then tried to take mail rates to the Cabinet as a matter of national policy, arguing that, just as much as passengers, mail-users should pay properly. Before the issue could be resolved, the Universal Postal Union decided to create a dual system of three gold francs for European and four for overseas First-Class mail, effective for five years from July 1953. This amounted to a 33 per cent drop, but was better than the 50 per cent cut proposed by the Russians. The effect on BOAC was critical, for in 1952–1953 mail revenue had shown its first decline, from £8,700,000 to £8,400,000, because of the rise of air parcel post which filled space at a lower revenue rate. On the other hand, on 1 April 1953, the former participants in the Empire Air Mail Scheme were no longer allowed the bargain 2.43 gold franc rate, being forced instead to pay the standard four. Toward the end of 1955 BEA, which had disagreed with BOAC over the dual rate, changed its mind, and both Corporations stood together in agreement that mail revenue was too important to be allowed to decline.

Buying British The Brabazon Committee’s hope that by 1950 BOAC would be flying modern British aircraft was not fully realized until 1952 when the world’s first operational jet airliners, the Comets, went on service. In the first half of the Fifties the backbone of BOAC’s fleet was still North American aircraft—Constellations, Stratocruisers, and Argonauts. The early Fifties, too, was a time when a great many important purchasing decisions had to be made. In the case of British aircraft, the Corporation was often faced with the fact that a Minister dictated whose machine BOAC should buy. For the years 1940–1964 the average tenure of office of the responsible Ministers was eighteen months.17 Yet the decisions they made stayed with BOAC as long, in the case of the Comet, as twenty-two years. Where American aircraft were concerned, the lead time was cut because BOAC generally bought proven machines “off the shelf ” for a fixed price and was able to put them

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into service promptly. The only American aircraft on which BOAC lost money on resale was the DC-7C, taken as insurance against the late delivery of the Britannia and overtaken by the big jets already on order when BOAC bought it. If BOAC could have used it for trooping or freighting, it just might have been retained at a profit, though being maintained as an “extra type” would have been expensive. The same could be said for the Britannia, phased out in 1964. This was an aircraft of which mention must be made in this chapter, but whose general story is reserved to the d’Erlanger period, when it finally came on service. At the end of 1949 a working party from BOAC, the Ministries of Supply and Civil Aviation, and De Havilland agreed that the nascent Britannia should be cancelled in favour of the Avon-engined Comet 2 and of the long-range Mark 3. But these sensible plans were upset by the cutback in defence spending which caused unemployment at Handley Page and Bristol and the reinstatement of the unwanted Hermes (discussed below). In view of this and of the Ministry of Supply’s and BOAC’s interest, announced by Bristol, in the Proteus gas-turbinepowered version of the Britannia, in February 1950 the Prime Minister ordered that the Britannia should be continued. Then came the Korean War, which found British defences in such bad repair that, although £170,000,000 was allocated for new aircraft, American B-29s had to be ordered to bring the RAF up to strength. Unfortunately the crash rearmament programme interfered with airliner production, especially because of the shortage of light alloy forgings, even though employment in the industry itself, which had had 2,000,000 workers in 1945, rose from 100,000 in 1950 to 250,000 in 1958. Under each Chairman, BOAC had to face the problem of “flying British.” Sir Miles’s view was that the Corporation should regard itself as a projection of the British aircraft industry, developing aircraft which would command world-wide sales. He said that BOAC did not expect to be rewarded for this work.18 However, doing just this had cost BOAC £38,700,000 by the end of 1962–1963, a sum that no other competitor had been forced to spend. Moreover, in addition, BOAC had generally had to pay in full the Ministry of Supply (later Ministry of Aviation) development levy by which means the Ministry generally recovered all of the sum advanced to the manufacturers by the Government. BOAC was contractually unsuccessful in trying to protect itself from other purchasers receiving a more favourable price because the levy had been paid off; the Ministry refused to allow it. In the early Fifties the Princess flying-boat project was still in being, but after BOAC told the Minister that it would not operate the aircraft even under special trooping contracts, the £9,000,000 enterprise became redundant. Basically BOAC was thinking in terms of an all-jet fleet. It investigated the Avro Vulcan conversion (the Atlantic), the Handley Page Victor variant (the HP 97), the De Havilland “X,” and a Vickers Valiant development (the V.1000). Of these the Vickers Valiant had first flown on 18 May 1951. Early in 1953, BOAC considered its re-equipment programme for the period 1953–1957, placing particular emphasis upon the need for cooperation between all concerned in the post-delivery stages of aircraft

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134 S p e e d b i r d development. This was a sore point taken up with the Ministry and channelled through the Ministry of Supply to the industry. Sir Miles told the Minister that the trouble lay in the fact that the manufacturers were so used to dealing with the RAF, to whom time meant little, that they could not recast their thinking to the needs of airlines, where every minute lost cost money. Three months later Lennox-Boyd replied that he sympathized and felt the Corporation should be reimbursed for this development work, but regretted that, as BOAC had declined an Exchequer Grant, there was no way in which it could be repaid for work in connection with putting the Comet on service. So in 1954 the Chairmen of both Corporations told the Minister that the industry would soon have no overseas customers if they were treated as badly as the Corporations were by the manufacturers. They pointed out that, whereas BEA was being required to pay the entire costs of fatigue-testing their Elizabethans, Boeing had not charged BOAC for the additional tests which had become necessary for the Stratocruiser. Sir Miles said that BOAC would take late delivery of the Britannias rather than undergo all the expense and inconvenience of testing the aircraft after they were delivered for service. BOAC also felt compelled to call the Minister to task for his failure to support the Corporation against attacks by members of the aircraft industry led in the House of Commons by the Deputy Chairman of Handley Page. Sir Miles pointed out in September 1952 that if Britain was to have a jet rival to the Douglas DC-8, then just announced, it would have to start at once. In fact, the V.1000 was already underway. In December 1948 Alan Christopher CampbellOrde, the Development Director, had been asked by George Edwards, the Vickers Chief Designer, to see the then-secret Valiant. In March 1951 Campbell-Orde again visited Weybridge. Sir Miles lunched there on 27 September 1951 and was told that, if Vickers received orders right away for the military transport version of the Valiant, it could have the civil version flying in 1957. Already during 1951 both the Air Staff and a group at BOAC led by Whitney Straight had called for the design of a large jet which would be useful to both BOAC and the RAF. In October 1952 the Ministry of Supply ordered a prototype. In 1953 BOAC decided that, on a comparison of costs, turbo-props were more economical for long-range operations and that, therefore, it would wait until after the Britannias were in service in 1954 to order a big jet. In September 1954, by which time the RAF had ordered four production aircraft, BOAC was comparing the V.1000 with the Comet 3. On 30 March 1955 the Secretary of State for Air said that enough V.1000s had been ordered “to get economic production going.” The first prototype was expected to fly in 1956.19 At the same time, BOAC decided that a fleet of thirty-three Britannias and nineteen Comet 4s would fill its needs for some time to come. Already on 25 March Sir Miles had been told that the RAF was getting restless and had definitely decided to escape from the V.1000 contract, realizing that it was of questionable utility. BOAC considered that it could go for it only if it was both technically and commercially a gilt-edged proposition. Indeed, it was already being outstripped in performance by new American jets such as the

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707, the prototype of which had started test-flying on 15 July 1954, the decision to build the 707 having been taken in August 1952. The prototype V.1000 would not have flown until 1956.20 In June the Transport Aircraft Requirements Committee studied the V.1000/ VC-7 and decided that it had neither the trans-Atlantic potential of the American jets nor was it faster than the Britannia on the Australian route. Moreover, it was overweight. Though Vickers was the first British firm to allow for a “weightgrowth factor,” its estimate of 2 per cent per annum was well below the 3 to 5 per cent of contemporary aircraft. When, in August, Vickers heard of impending doom, it pointed out that 800,000 man hours had already gone into the design. In September, pressure appeared likely to be put upon BOAC by both Vickers and the Ministry of Supply, but fortunately the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation itself decided that any scheme to make the Corporation use the aircraft was likely to backfire and the project was cancelled in November 1955. The total cost was estimated as £4,000,000. The fact that BOAC then turned around and ordered the Boeing 707 let it in for a lot of criticism despite the fact that in 1955 it had invested £85,000,000 in orders for British aircraft.21 Perhaps relevant was an editorial in The Aeroplane, a source generally hostile to BOAC, that said on 2 September 1955 that these myths needed to be forgotten: (1) that the war cost British aircraft manufacturers their chance in the world air transport market; and (2) that American predominance in airliner manufacture was the direct result of military aid. Under Sir Miles, BOAC might have taken fifteen V.1000s if the RAF had taken thirty and shared the development costs. But cancellation also reflected lessons learned from ordering the Britannias. Of the aircraft added to the BOAC fleet during the Miles Thomas era, only the secondhand ones bought to replace the Comet were not British. Two widely contrasting new British types went onto scheduled services—the Hermes and the Comet.

The Hermes The Hermes grew out of Handley Page’s experience with the 1936-design Halifax bomber. Powered by Bristol Hercules engines, the first three Marks had tail-wheel undercarriages, but the fourth was fitted with tricycle gear and a pressurized fuselage. The first prototype crashed on 3 December 1945 and in October 1946 BOAC came to the conclusion that the unpressurized version had so little to offer in comparison to the York that it was not worth pursuing. However, the (Sir Henry) Self, or Civil Aircraft Requirements Committee, refused for reasons of national policy to cancel the Hermes, a military version of which was on order as the Hastings for RAF Transport Command. What really caused a change was that late in 1946 Handley Page submitted figures on a severely reworked design, the Mark IV. BOAC, therefore, decided to give the company six months in which to provide firm proposals and delivery dates. At the same time the Corporation told

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44. The Handley Page HP-81 Hermes Hero off the landmark Needles on the northwest tip of the Isle of Wight. The Hermes were the subject of much controversy as to longevity and cost.

the Ministry that, unless the aircraft was in quantity production by January 1949, it would not be interested. On 18 April 1947 the Ministry of Supply announced that BOAC would receive twenty-five Hermes IVs, at the rate of four per month, starting in midsummer 1948. In August the Board approved £3,700,000 for the order. However, the first Hermes IV did not fly until 5 September 1948, by which date the price of the order had increased by £2,196,000. In December BOAC learned that necessary modifications would delay delivery a further nine months. In March 1949 the then Chairman, Sir Harold Hartley, raised with the Minister the fact that the Ministry of Supply (which at that time was responsible for aircraft orders by the state Corporations) had not yet signed a contract with Handley Page for BOAC. This led to complications as BOAC had no safeguard regarding testing of the aircraft and no manufacturer’s guarantees of performance. The result was that BOAC insisted that the aircraft should be tested by Boscombe Down, the Government’s own establishment. By June 1949 new defects were revealed that would keep the aircraft off service for at least another year. So BOAC did not receive a Hermes with a full Certificate of Airworthiness until 22 February 1950 and was not able to place them on service until 6 August. Within less than a year they were being considered surplus as they had already been replaced with the Argonauts that had been ordered in 1948 and put into service on 23 August 1949. With lower fares,

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45. Mr. Shenstone with the famous former Imperial Airways Captain O. P. Jones, in front of Constellation Bristol II.

the Hermes soon began to prove uneconomic, and coupled to this was the fact that during 1951 those machines with 4,000 hours’ flying time had, by Air Registration Board order, to be returned to the manufacturers to have new inner-wing spars fitted. This cost BOAC a further £250,000. Beginning in November 1952 they were replaced by the first Comets on the Springbok service and converted for tourist operations. By October 1953, because of a lack of trooping contracts, the aircraft were cocooned, it being estimated that the Corporation would save £500,000 in the last six months of 1953–1954 by their complete withdrawal from service. Sale of the aircraft was hampered by a Ministry instruction not to sell the whole fleet to any one Independent as it might then corner the trooping market. Put back into service briefly after the loss of the Comets, the fleet was finally disposed of in mid1954 for a loss of £2,700,000. In Sir Miles Thomas’s view in January 1977, the Hermes had every fault except that it never blew up in flight!

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The Comets The most startling proposal to come before the Brabazon Committee in 1943 was one from Sir Geoffrey de Havilland which showed that a 500-mph jet airliner would be an economic proposition. After a false start with Handley Page, the Brabazon IV was assigned to De Havilland, the only firm with both jet-engine and airframe experience. Work on the DH 106 design began in October 1944, Wilfred Nixon of De Havilland insisting on a twenty-four-passenger aircraft as opposed to BOAC’s desire for a six-passenger version. Studies showed, however, that forty seats would be necessary to meet the economic target. Estimates were that the operating cost would be 30 per cent below that of conventional aircraft and the Comet 1 did, in fact, achieve a direct operating cost of 13.5 pence per capacity ton mile, better than that of its contemporary, the Handley Page pistonengined Hermes. From the very beginning it was intended that there should be a trans-Atlantic version. De Havilland also pointed out that in high-speed aircraft with shorter sector times, some passenger amenities could be cut, including bunks. Originally a small tailless tri-engined design, the well-known conventional Comet layout had been adopted by September 1946 when the Ministry of Supply ordered two prototypes. There was still the problem of attaining North Atlantic range with an aircraft that would also be able to operate from the limited runways on the Empire routes. To solve this problem De Havilland at first decided to use takeoff rockets. Ordering Comets was handicapped both by the system then employed of going through two Ministries and by the fact that British South American Airways also wanted them. Thus, BOAC was originally limited to taking options on production numbers 1–8 and 13–20. At the time (August 1946), BOAC pressed for the further development of the Avon axial-flow-engined version, later the Comet 2. By March 1947 BOAC had decided on twenty-five Comets of both Marks for use as follows: four for a thrice-weekly service to Australia, three for a similar one to South Africa, two for a twice-weekly run to East Africa, three for a similar schedule to the Far East, five for daily service to India, four for daily London–New York operation, and four for a reserve and maintenance replacement pool. The first crisis came when the RAF withdrew its support for the Ghost jet engine; this cost both airlines an additional £50,000. In January 1948 the Board informed the Minister that BOAC saw no need for any other long-range Empire type than the Comet and its developments.22 The prototype (G-ALVG) first flew on 27 July 1949 and on proving and survey flights was soon turning in average speeds of 450 mph. The Corporation felt increasing elation as the figures on performance rolled in and it began to look as if BOAC would be able in one stroke to place itself at the forefront of the airline industry, thus conquering the handicaps of wartime drought and postwar deficiencies. At the same time, encouraging reports began to trickle in about the Avonpowered Comet 2, which looked capable of flying to Gander on 80 per cent

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46. The De Havilland Comet 1, the world’s first commercial jet liner, a product of the 1942 Brabazon Committee.

of the scheduled occasions. But, as later investigation showed, some errors had crept into the figuring. How this happened provides a useful elementary lesson. BOAC found that its Technical Requirements Branch was investigating too many problems at once, that the staff had saved up to take their annual leave at Christmas, that pressure to complete the study had caused a number of points to be overlooked, that there had been errors in the manufacturer’s brochure upon which the studies had been based, and that in addition De Havilland had failed to consider certain takeoff problems until after its charts had been made. The magnitude of all the errors had remained unresolved by 19 December 1949. BOAC had added errors as the runway data supplied by its South American staff was out-of-date. To top it all off, Sir Frank Whittle, the Corporation’s adviser on jets, had a talk with Francis E. N. St. Barbe of De Havilland on 21 June 1950 during which (no doubt loyal to the Ghost engine) St. Barbe said that his company had no such aircraft as the Comet 2 and had no intentions of making one! But in November the Ministry asked, as a matter of urgency, that one of BOAC’s aircraft be fitted with Avons and transferred to the Ministry of Supply. At last in December 1950 BOAC and De Havilland got together and in January 1951 a specification for the Comet 2 was drawn up. In March the sixth fuselage, G-ALYT, became the Comet 2 prototype. By this time the Treasury was limiting

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47. Turbine-powered aircraft lacked the vibrations and noise of piston-engined machines.

capital investments and BOAC was warned that it might not be able to buy the aircraft. However, in September a contract was agreed for eleven, the first of which flew on 27 August 1953. But because of the grounding of all Comets in 1954, the Comet 2 never went into airline service with either BOAC or the two other airlines that had ordered them. Ten were supplied to No. 216 Squadron, RAF, which flew them unpressurized until 1966–1967. Two experimental models (the Comet 2E) were flown by BOAC to test the Rolls-Royce Avons. Meanwhile, De Havilland worked forward also on the Comet 3, a much longerranged machine. This was ordered by KLM and Pan American, as well as by BOAC, and its scarcity caused other airlines to ask for the Comet 2 instead. In the end, the only Comet 3 was the prototype for the Comet 4. Production of that Mark was delayed because priority was given to modifications to the RAF’s Comet 2s. As a result, the Comet 4 only came into service a few weeks before the larger, faster, and more economical Boeing 707. Concurrently with the development of the aircraft, BOAC was also working on the new installations and techniques needed for jet operations. These included airfield lengths, takeoff, climb and clearance procedures, let-down techniques and approach controls, high-altitude weather and its forecasting, and the effects of tropical temperatures on jet-engine operations and on takeoff performance. In

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September 1950 a Comet unit under Captain A. M. A. Majendie was established to coordinate all this work. At the same time, attempts were made to persuade governments to bring their communications equipment up to the speed required by the Comet. Though Sir Miles talked of operating Comet 1s on the New York– Nassau route and on the Atlantic in 1952, the Board decided that they had to go on the Southern and Eastern routes first so as to release Constellations for North Atlantic tourist work. The world’s first scheduled jet services started on 2 May 1952 to Johannesburg. It had been estimated that the break-even load factor was 72 per cent. With an 89 per cent load factor flying five round trips to Johannesburg, the Comets made a profit of £3,000. It looked as if BOAC had a winner, and even the sceptical Hudson Fysh of QANTAS was converted, though he went with Juan Trippe of Pan American for the Comet 3, saying that the big jets would make this type the mainstay of world fleets and that until then the Constellation 1049 and the DC-7 would hold the field. Whether or not this would have remained true had the Comets stayed on service, no one can know, but the way KLM, Pan American, and QANTAS were then thinking was a good guide to the road to success. The first bad news came when G-ALYZ (BOAC gave up naming aircraft with the Comets) failed to take off at Rome on 26 October 1952. Subsequent investigations showed that it was possible for the pilot to raise the nose high enough to stall the wing while accelerating for takeoff. (The pilot’s notes said only to raise the nose until the nose-wheel stopped rumbling—the level of technology then.) On the Comet 2 the leading edge was drooped to prevent takeoff stalls, actually increasing the payload by 2,000 pounds, and on the Comet 4 and on the Boeing 707 a tail skid was added to make it impossible for the pilot to make the same rotational error. Then on 2 May 1953 G-ALYV broke up in the air after takeoff from Calcutta. At this time the aircraft were being utilized at the rate of 2,370 hours a year apiece. The accident was attributed with some doubt to a severe storm. For BOAC itself the situation was serious as it had now lost two of its nine aircraft and this affected crew training. Treasury permission was obtained to buy the remaining Canadian Pacific Comet. So far the accidents had been blamed either on the pilots or upon weather. But then on 10 January 1954, G-ALYP climbed away from Rome and disappeared. With the loss of “Yoke Peter,” the Elba Comet, all Comets were grounded and minutely inspected. The Abell Committee found that cracks had began to appear in the wings at 6,700 hours on the first prototype. This was highly alarming, for it meant that aircraft which BOAC was amortizing on a ten-year basis were, in fact, wearing themselves out in less than three.23 Some sixty modifications were made and the aircraft returned to service with ARB approval on 23 March. On 8 April G-ALYY disintegrated near Naples after takeoff from Rome. It was some time before the basic reason, cracks in the square cabin windows, came to light as the real culprit. With the accident to “Yoke Yoke,” the Minister, who had agreed to the Comets’ return to service, withdrew certification, with Sir Miles’s full agreement. At one

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142 S p e e d b i r d blow nearly a quarter of BOAC’s fleet capacity was irrevocably grounded.24 There followed a long and searching inquiry at the orders of the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill. The investigation included water-tank pressure-cycles. The result was a great stride forward in British aeronautical technology and a general service to the world. It is only to be regretted that the similar disappearance of the Tudors in 1948 and 1949 had not been so thoroughly investigated as to help make the Comet disasters avoidable. Before leaving the Comet 1, tribute must be paid to the BOAC Engineering and Maintenance staff who worked on the Comet. A great deal of their experience was made available to Pan American, which was shown that low-freezing-point kerosene, for example, could be used in jets flying at high altitudes. In general, operating experience was also passed over to those who were going to fly jets, and in this field BOAC as the pioneer had a great deal to contribute as much military experience was inapplicable to airline requirements. The term “the brotherhood of the air” may be old-fashioned, but BOAC nobly fulfilled the spirit by sharing its Comet experience with others that the future of commercial aviation might be safer. Tribute must also be paid to the work of Sir Arnold Hall and his team at the Royal Aircraft Establishment in Farnborough, who dissected the Comet accidents and thus created the basis for future “fail-safe” designs. In the wake of the grounding of its jets, BOAC at once faced three problems: the legal and financial one involving settlement with De Havilland, resulting in the end in a capital loss of £7,800,000; the operational one of obtaining aircraft with which to keep services going; and the planning one to re-equip the Corporation, all of whose needs to 1958 had been taken care of with Comets and Britannias. There was some talk as late as January 1955 of taking delivery of rebuilt Comet 2s starting in June 1956; however, the full results of the Farnborough tests put paid to this idea. But the sheer time consumed in getting the Corporation back on its feet delayed re-equipment decisions until both Sir Miles Thomas and Whitney Straight had left the Corporation. No sooner were the Comets grounded than BOAC began talks with its affected partners, South African Airways and QANTAS, about the mutual use of aircraft. The immediate prospect was the unpalatable one of having to buy used American aircraft in a market well aware of BOAC’s plight. The ultimate solution was the purchase for sterling of six older Constellations from QANTAS, which was itself just re-equipping with newer models, of one from Howard Hughes, and of six Stratocruisers from United Air Lines and of two from Pan American. In September 1954 a deal was made with Capital Airlines. In exchange for seven old 049 Constellations and $550,000 BOAC received seven 749s, thus giving it a uniform fleet. In agreeing to this swap, the Treasury specified that BOAC was to sell four of the 749s as soon as it received them, but the Minister fortunately used his powers to have this nonsensical proviso set aside. Thus, BOAC was able to work with seventeen Constellations and seventeen Stratocruisers.25

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In November 1954 the Minister said that it was a matter of national importance that BOAC take two Comet 2Es. The Board refused to accept them until it was given permission to order the DC-7D, a long-range Douglas fitted with RollsRoyce RB-109 turbo-props. BOAC was turned down on the grounds, presumably, that the DC-7D would be too closely competitive to the Britannia. The DC-7 itself was a modification of the highly successful DC-6. It first flew in May 1953, and long-range versions became available in mid-1954 when Pan American ordered fifteen. BOAC decided on DC-7Cs in October. At this juncture there was a change of Ministers, and when Boyd-Carpenter came in he welcomed BOAC’s interest and asked for plans to use American aircraft, starting in 1956. Whitney Straight went at once to America and reported back that until the 707 became available, the DC-7 was the only aircraft that could make the non-stop Atlantic crossing in both directions. Moreover, the Rolls-Royce-engined version would be 50 mph faster than its rivals and a better economic proposition than the Britannia 312. The Board requested permission to order nineteen (a prime number was a Sir Miles favourite because he felt it made it look as though the calculations were very precise!), though the standard DC-7C was chosen because it offered earlier delivery. The Treasury cut the order to ten, which turned out to be a blessing in disguise considering what the advent of the big jets did to the large propeller-driven aircraft market. It agreed that no customs duty would be payable as long as the aircraft were sold abroad for dollars as soon as the Britannias were on scheduled North Atlantic service. The order was placed on 18 March 1955 and the aircraft delivered on schedule between October 1956 and April 1957. With this resolved, the Board agreed to place an order for twenty Comet 4s. At the same time, in part in its own interest, it took, as one executive described it, that “political aeroplane” the Comet 3. Sir Miles also went on to say what many in BOAC felt then: We have now the reputation of being the experimental department of the British Aircraft Industry, with all that implies . . . . What we need, and now lack, is a reputation for reliability.

The Move to London Airport In the midst of the disorganization caused by the Comet disaster, BOAC found itself involved in one of its most significant steps, the move from various temporary postwar offices and maintenance installations into the new Headquarters hangars building at London Airport, later called Technical Block A, or “the Kremlin.” The last to come in were the Constellations and Stratocruisers and their crews from Filton. Forced out there by the demands of Britannia production, they found that the housing was more easily obtained for their aircraft than for themselves in the western suburbs of London around Heathrow.

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144 S p e e d b i r d This consolidation of the airline was of immense technical and psychological significance. It began a process of streamlining that was still going on two decades later. It created a sense of unity in the Corporation and permitted easy access between departments and branches. It was, too, in many ways, a most fitting tribute to Sir Miles Thomas, who had firmly believed that his widely scattered airline staff should be concentrated at the airport as far as possible so that, in a psychological sense, they were more aware of the Corporation’s reason for existence—to operate safe, economical, and punctual air service for paying passengers and cargo.

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Chapter VII Organization and Operations, 1949–1956 Within BOAC, 1949–1956 The Miles Thomas era began and ended with reorganizations. Fourteen senior executives resigned in November 1949, followed by twenty others in early 1950. Two thousand left the staff in 1949 and another 1,000, mostly in administration, in 1950 as the full impact of the merger with British South American Airways was felt. With the additional loss of some 490 engineers, the staff at 17,340 in May 1950 was 695 smaller than when the merger took place, while the cost of operating the head office had been reduced from £240,000 per month to £197,000. BOAC was ceasing to be an RAF refuge and was becoming a cost-conscious airline. For the first time in its life, in July 1950, the Corporation made an over-all profit for the month because Sir Miles had the bright idea of selling seats in aircraft lounges, but the competition on a world-wide basis was extremely stiff. In November, a sales meeting was held in Britain, yet the real trouble was not sales, but that the break-even load factor was still far too high. In 1948–1949 it was 115 per cent. In 1950–1951 it was 75 per cent, but loads were closer to 60. The solution was very simple: to lower costs and to increase revenue. Yet the staff, which hit a low of 16,400, had to be increased as the Comets came into service. With their advent in 1952, the transit time at the fifty-seven route stations was cut drastically from an average ninety minutes to forty-five, partly through the use of high-speed refuelling bowsers developed by Shell. Other improvements and economies were effected in 1951 simply because the Corporation’s fleet now consisted of only four types of four-engined aircraft and because the western South American service was terminated in Jamaica. In May 1951 serious study was started of the effect of Tourist-Class services on the North Atlantic and their probable spread. It was decided that the cardinal principle should be that low-fare traffic should be carried in separate aircraft in which they should pay a substantial part of the overheads.1 BOAC’s concern was that cheaper fares should not lead to an increased amount of overhead on Tourist-Class services having to be charged against profitable FirstClass flights or revenues. All of these factors were considered at the International Air Transport Association Traffic Conference at Bermuda in May 1951 at which it was agreed that Tourist-Class services on the North Atlantic and to South Africa would start in October 1952 with a one-way fare London–New York of £80 versus the newly increased First-Class fare of £134. It became evident, however, that Pan American, which had been advocating lower fares since 1948, intended to introduce tourist flights in April 1952 to enjoy the summer seasonal traffic. Sir Miles thus

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48. The airlines vied to carry special freight, from art exhibits to exotic animals. Here a York arrives at London Airport with a shipment of baby elephants, ca. 1956.

at once suggested within the Corporation that, as soon as the 049 Constellations became surplus, they should be converted to high-density seating to meet the American challenge. In view of the heavy losses being made in the first half (April to September) of 1951, the Board attempted to fulfil its responsibilities by suggesting that Management should rearrange services so that over-capacity was reduced on the North Atlantic, better services given to Rio de Janeiro, and the Argonauts released so that they could be converted to tourist layout for the East African run. The Board also vetoed the idea of running a single Comet to Lisbon and to Bahrain in favour of a through service to Australia with QANTAS handling the Singapore– Sydney sector. It also demurred at Sir Miles’s plan to put Comets on Caribbean services before Eastern and African routes were satisfied and Comet 2s available. Because of the obvious tourist-oriented action of Pan American and others, the International Air Transport Association met again at Nice in November 1951, and the airlines agreed that Tourist-Class services would start on 1 May 1952 with fares

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49. The Comet 1 cockpit on a demonstration flight with the De Havilland chief test pilot, “Cats’ Eyes” Cunningham at the controls. How simple compared to the Constellation!

to New York finally set at $270 (£96.9s.0d.) single and $486 (£173.13s.0d.) return. But BOAC’s hopes for new business were dashed when in February 1952 the British Government imposed a travel ban and limited overseas allowances to £25. On 20 March 1952, the Chairman commented at the Board meeting that it was the first time that the Board of BOAC had ever sat down with a complete and detailed budget for the coming financial year before it, though this was an essential instrument of financial control. The credit belonged to Smallpeice, the Financial Comptroller. The budget itself was gloomy. The curve of continuous improvement was flattening; new fuel taxes in Britain, increased national insurance benefit payments, and operational and commercial difficulties were forecast. Shortly afterward, the Ministry raised landing fees and imposed a tax on all departing passengers, not, however, without considerable wrangling with the airlines, public and private. This tax was not removed until April 1964. In July 1952 the Board decided that Tourist-Class fares should be instituted on the cabotage routes to the East, and IATA agreed to their starting to Pakistan, India,

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148 S p e e d b i r d and Ceylon on 1 October 1953, and to the rest of the world, except South America, on 1 April 1954. (BOAC’s suggestion that traffic conferences would be faster and cheaper if held at the IATA Headquarters in Montreal was not accepted.) But by September 1953 BOAC had begun to feel that Tourist-Class fares had been set too low. Others agreed, and in November it was suggested to IATA that “Tourist” become “standard.” The Association’s unhelpful response, however, was to lay down precise accommodation standards for the twenty-seven types of aircraft in use on Tourist-Class services. If BOAC had then looked a little further, it would have found that the fault lay not so much with Tourist-Class fares as with the falling off of mail and freight revenue. The root of the trouble lay even deeper, in the slow rate of work and consequent excessive engineering costs and the necessity for a high spares inventory. The latter reached 110 per cent of spare engines and compared very unfavourably with the 50 per cent holdings of competitors. Also, some people in the Corporation were not in favour of Tourist-Class services at all, while the Middle East was in its usual state of turmoil. In March 1953 the Chairman talked of complacency about economy within the Corporation and initiated a drive

50. The Comet 1 cabin, early 1950s. Notice the absence of carry-on baggage, at a time when the weight limit of all baggage was 44 pounds.

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against it. But the preoccupation was still with external affairs. The Board cut the number of Comet services to Tokyo, with the comment that financial results had to take precedence over prestige. There was also the problem of the under-utilization of Stratocruisers, and as no rapport with BEA for the extension of Atlantic services into Europe seemed possible, the Corporation decided to try to push its services westward to Chicago, while at the same time the Ministry was persuaded to allow a Stratocruiser to operate through Manchester. In the latter case, BOAC was beaten to the post, much to its chagrin, by SABENA, and in the former by Pan American’s direct Chicago– and Detroit–Europe services. BOAC was heavily hit early in 1954 by the grounding of the Comets from 10 January to 23 March and their complete withdrawal from 8 April. This came at an extremely bad time as other airlines were re-equipping with DC-7s, while their older aircraft were fully employed on the expanding Tourist-Class and CoachClass services. So BOAC had to buy on a tight market with everyone knowing its desperate position. The first Comet grounding cost £1,000,000 in revenue, offset by savings of £500,000 in operating costs. The rapid growth of Tourist-Class traffic also helped make ends meet, rising from 13.5 per cent in 1952–1953 to 32.5 per cent of the passengers carried in 1953–1954, though they paid only 80 per cent of the First-Class fare. The final withdrawal of the Comets removed 21 per cent of BOAC’s planned capacity for 1954–1955 just as the year started. Sir Victor Tait, Operations Director, said: Overnight four years’ work on planning, training and operational development (through no fault of that work) fell in shambles and the planning for at least two years was rendered abortive. We were left, among other major problems, with 400 flying staff sitting on the ground with no job to give them for months ahead. During this time they could not be told their future as we ourselves did not know it.

Despite all the delays in purchasing, modifying, and readying new aircraft, spares, crews, and timetables, BOAC kept going and even made a profit in the last two Thomas years. To bridge the gap to the new Comets, the Government gave permission, as noted earlier, to order DC-7Cs, on the condition that they would be sold when the Britannias were available. The South American route was abandoned. During 1954 BOAC became one of seventy of the world’s airlines to allow instalment-buying of tickets. In the spring of 1955 it considered with BEA and Aer Lingus a new London Terminal venture at Cromwell Road with Ministry blessing. And late in 1955 the British Transport Commission studied, at the airlines’ expense, the possibility of a direct rail connection to the airport. But, though the original plans for London’s Heathrow included a rail link, this study—like others before and after it—led nowhere until 1970, when it was agreed to extend the Underground from Hounslow West into Heathrow, a task not completed until late in 1977. Nor

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51. The view from my 1961–1962 office at BOAC into the hangar shows Constellations on arrival to be overhauled to BOAC standard.

did the Cromwell Road Terminal enter the BOAC picture as more than a plan. In the end BOAC enlarged its Airways Terminal at Victoria, which at last received a much-needed refurbishment. The Board was also troubled by the fact that British diplomatic couriers were flying on foreign airlines. It was decided that schedules were at fault, and the Foreign Office was asked to indicate the hours which suited it best.

Organizational Changes BOAC’s sales organization had to be created after the war as there had been no use for those of the prewar companies after September 1939, so they had died, and BOAC had not itself had one (a commentary, R. E. G. Davies noted to the author, on the exclusiveness of prewar air travellers). In 1945 a new sales force was hastily put together. Like everything else, it grew like Topsy. It had always been intended, however, that BEA’s sales organization in Europe would handle BOAC’s needs, but this was never entirely satisfactory because of BEA’s interlining commitments with BOAC’s rivals. Overseas, BOAC built only slowly, especially in America. Attempts

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were made to use shipping companies as agents, notably in South America, but in the United States this failed as Cunard refused to cooperate. When Sir Miles came in, he asked the business consultants Urwick, Orr to examine sales. The result was a shake-up which by early 1951 gave the Corporation for the first time a forwardplanning section and coordination between sales and operations. A general sale-and-record system was adopted. Responsibility for commercial planning was passed from the General Manager, Commercial, to the Sales Director. In December 1952 the Board was still not satisfied with results and, as they remained poor, Sir Miles shook up the Department in mid-1953. In 1955 an incentive scheme was instituted in which all staff could earn holiday credits by increasing sales. The loss of the Comets and the need for a fierce sales effort at last caused courses to be instituted in salesmanship. An equally important parallel development was that of high-speed communications between sales offices and reservations centres. In 1953 Airways Terminal received a new telephone reservations system, and in 1955 teletype lines went into use, linking with London all the main sales offices in the United States and Canada, along with those in Nairobi, Karachi, Singapore, and Hong Kong. In addition, sales offices were opened in Chicago in 1954, in Bombay and Winnipeg in 1955, and in Bangkok early in 1956. As well as Sales, the Operations Department also felt the winds of change. Both Supplies and the Financial Comptroller’s office were revamped. The technical side was also reorganized. By the end of 1951 all but No. 3 Line aircraft were maintained at London Airport. Charles Abell was made Deputy Operations Director (Engineering) and, in 1955, Chief Engineer with the former incumbent, A.  C.  Campbell-Orde, moved sideways into the new post of Operations Development Director. The Chief Engineer (Development), Christopher Dykes, left BOAC, as did its jet adviser, Sir Frank Whittle.2 The post of Administration Director reappeared. Captain V. Wolfson was appointed adviser on BOAC policy in Europe and early in 1952 placed in charge of the nine associated companies. Late in the year Management courses for junior executives started. Early in 1953 a Central Technical Unit came into being because of the troubles maintenance experienced in getting the Hermes and the Comets on services; it supplied manufacturers with airline experience and maintained liaison with each manufacturer from which BOAC acquired aircraft. Nevertheless, inadequate component life remained one of BOAC’s principal operating headaches. When at the end of the year Smallpeice was appointed to the Board, he became, as Financial Comptroller, in effect chief planner, charged particularly with getting the best financial results out of the application of the right types of aircraft to each route. This involved scheduling for maintenance, aircraft and crews, utilization, traffic handling, commercial problems, and forecasts of the numbers of aircraft likely to be needed. In the Board’s view, for the previous three years, the planning machinery had lacked direction, official status, and terms of reference; those concerned had been too involved in routine affairs, and the result had been too many ad hoc decisions. A Policy Committee under the Chairmanship of the

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152 S p e e d b i r d Financial Comptroller now came into being, the members of which included the Chairman, Deputy Chairman, Operations Director, and Sales Director. The whole organization was patterned on that at United Air Lines, but with the addition of the Assistant to the Adviser on International Affairs as Secretary and a deputy from the stations-and-traffic staff. Perhaps most important of all was the October 1955 Select Committee appointed by the Board to investigate the Corporations’ safety standards and methods of operation. The Air Safety Committee was the outcome of increasing concern with irregularity and with the lack of liaison between aircraft captains and the heavily overworked maintenance staff. The Committee reported on 23 December that, of the seventy-seven persons interviewed, most agreed that a series of accidents was undermining passenger confidence. What was lacking was dynamic leadership, good morale, and esprit de corps; men had to be put before machines. The pilots were irritated by minor problems, but had failed to use the British Air Line Pilots Association to make their views known to Management. The Operations Department had been centralized by imposition rather than evolution, many people did not have proper terms of reference, and the managers lacked authority. Some logical divisions were unwieldy, such as that in which eight Management personnel were trying to deal with 650 Stratocruiser aircrew. Moreover, it was bad management to place the Operations Director at the head of BOAC’s Air Safety Committee as this body frequently was called upon to evaluate his work. Further trouble came from the decision to make grounded Comet captains into Line managers without ensuring that they had an adequate industrial-management background, even though they themselves were eager to do the right thing. Other captains were placed in a difficult position as the result of the introduction of route checks and their inherent problem of possible failure and consequent revocation of license, thus jeopardizing a pilot’s livelihood. In other words, said the Committee, pilots not only had to have their status and authority restored, but also had to be able to see their route clear, all the way to retirement. The Committee felt that when pilots were made captains they should have terms of reference as to their rights and duties. An additional problem was that boredom led to fatigue and in combating fatigue the Corporation had failed to take a lead, despite its large medical staff. In the seven years from May 1948 to April 1955, excluding the Comets, half of BOAC’s accidents were caused by pilot error, and of these 54 per cent were on approach or landing. Of the latter only eighteen accidents caused severe structural damage to the aircraft or death or injury to the occupants. Six serious accidents were through faulty equipment and in each of these cases, the Committee reported with pride, the Corporation’s reputation had been saved by the superb flying skill of the crews. Yet training left much to be desired in that the Ministry tended to use the light (13,000-pound) Heron for checks for crews flying the 140,000-pound Stratocruiser. Heathrow was not a suitable place for training, and route checks were long overdue. It was a rudimentary safety precaution that all captains should allow their first officers to do some takeoffs and landings; while to stop pilots touching

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down early (out of professional pride and fear of overrunning the runway) with the newer, larger, heavier, and faster aircraft, a false threshold should be painted on the downwind end of all runways. (This point in particular was emphasized by the March 1954 crash of G-ALAM into the seawall at Singapore, in part due to the pilot’s suffering at that time from insidious fatigue.) With Maxaret antiskid brakes and reversible propellers fitted to all aircraft, the Committee felt that there was no excuse for undershooting. The Inspector of Accidents was criticized for not calling attention to the rising rate of accidents, plainly evident in 1953, and the Air Safety Committee was called to account for failing to investigate factors contributing to accidents and failing to give adequate direction to accident investigations, too much paper and too little on-the-spot work, and for not using a specialist statistician such as had been employed by the Board Committee. Despite assurances to the contrary, the Operations Director, Campbell-Orde, felt slighted and left the Corporation shortly thereafter. Nevertheless, the whole Report was an honest and long-overdue investigation whose principal aim was efficiency and safety. Much that had to be said could be blamed on the disorganization caused by the catastrophic withdrawal of the Comets. This had particularly hit Engineering, which, the Report recognized, had almost broken down while replanning after the Comets, expanding the Stratocruiser and Constellation fleets, and recruiting after the loss of staff when Filton closed and housing could not be found near Heathrow. There were also other legacies which the clumsiness of the organization had obscured. As critical as it was, the Report opened the way for vast improvements which the Corporation was fortunate to have initiated before the advent of the Comet 4 in 1958 and the big jets in 1960.

Labour Relations During the years 1949–1956 BOAC suffered from one strike but largely avoided others by being, as the Act had specified, a “good employer.” The Air Safety Report had stressed the fact that discipline had become lax because Management was wary of BALPA. While BEA had taken a tough line, BOAC had not. The result was that the Board could point out to the Minister in mid-1955 that, apart from the pilots, while the National Index figure stood at 100 in 1947 and at 151 in June 1955, the salaries of senior staff in BOAC had reached only 117, while those of skilled and unskilled engineering workers had risen to 146. (Not until after the Industrial Court awards of 1958 were the pilots paid anything like their counterparts in Pan American.) Government control of pay scales was not consistent. What irked the Board at this particular time was that the Chief Personnel Officer, J. O. Blair-Cunynghame, had just moved to the National Coal Board for a sum 50 per cent greater than he could receive in BOAC. The Board might have added that, although Imperial Airways had a capital of £1,600,000 in 1938 and BOAC one of £46,700,000 in 1955, the Chief Executive was still paid less than in 1938.

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154 S p e e d b i r d The pilots were in the perfect position to negotiate from strength. Not only were they the key operational personnel, but as the 1947 Wilcock and Helmore Reports had predicted, they were also in very short supply, a fact accentuated by the Korean War and the sharp rise in RAF pay scales and conditions of service. Thus, when pilots asked for an increase in 1951, BOAC gave its negotiators carte blanche and the pilots received a 33 per cent increase over the 1947 award. At the same time, BOAC sought to persuade the flight radio officers, who were becoming redundant, to take ground jobs but failed to make an effective settlement with them until 1958. In June 1953 the pilots asked for a bonus for flying through the Far East and over Mau-Mau-troubled Kenya. This was refused, as was a demand for “stink money” for the carriage of animals. In September they asked for another increase. But this demand became entangled in the Ministry in a dispute over the carriage of navigators and the question of flight-time limitations. In addition to the fatal crashes of Constellation G-ALAM at Singapore on 13 March and of Stratocruiser G-ALSA at Prestwick on 25 December 1954, there was coming to be a general recognition that modern aircraft needed to be watched all the time, while recruitment of unsuitable personnel, the length of time on duty (though not necessarily flying), and increasing amounts of night-flying all contributed to pilot fatigue. By November 1955 the whole matter had to be sent to arbitration. At the same time, the Corporation proposed that pilots should receive different rates of pay for flying different types. The solution of this and of flight-time limitations carried over into the d’Erlanger regime, where, in March 1957, the Ministry suddenly laid an Order-in-Council containing its new rules.3 For all staff, the question of redundancy floated easily to the surface whenever rumours started that the Corporation was going to make a change. Early in 1950, supervisory and other staff were upset by the decision to close down No. 4 Line, at Hythe, and No. 5, the freighters to South America. The situation was not eased by attacks in Parliament accusing the Corporation of discrimination against ex-British South American Airways personnel. Fears circulated also when No. 2 Line at Hurn was moved to London. Political attacks were often made by Ian Mikardo, the only Member of Parliament who was also a Member of the National Joint Council for Civil Air Transport.4 BOAC attempted to counter this uncertainty, which contributed to inefficiency and accidents, by consulting the union side of the National Joint Council (NJC), by informal meetings between Sir Miles and union leaders, and by concentrating the non-Amalgamated Engineering Union tradesmen at London. The one large group disposed of were the 673 flying-boat staff at Hythe, while there was a general reduction in staff numbers after the merger with British South American Airways, and of some staff overseas. Yet, on the whole, redundancy arrangements worked well until the supervisory staff at Heathrow raised objections to the very downgrading to which they had agreed in April. On 5 October 1950, 2,450 engineers began a “work-to-rule” protest against the dismissal of fifty-two redundant ex-BSAA engineers and a request that others accept lower-paying positions. On the 12th Sir Miles chaired a successful settlement meeting. Then on

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22 November the Electrical Trades Union (ETU) went on a wildcat strike over a refusal to allow them to hold a protest meeting about two electricians who had refused to join the ETU. BOAC promptly suspended the first twenty-five to stop work. The Ministry of Labour and the National Joint Council refused to touch the case as non-unionists were involved. BOAC regarded it as a breach of contract. By the 30th, 130 out of 150 ETU men were on strike and services were seriously affected. But on 5 December the Chief Personnel Officer negotiated a settlement with union leaders whereby the one remaining non-union man would work in No. 1 Line, which BOAC would consider 100 per cent unionized. The electricians went back on the 9th, and services were back to normal by the 13th. The seventeenday stoppage was estimated to have cost BOAC £350,000 in lost revenue plus a lot of goodwill so close to Christmas. Thereafter Sir Miles met monthly on the Friday before the Wednesday Board meeting with the union side of the National Joint Council, and it was this direct contact between Management and labour which did so much to earn him a high reputation within BOAC. Like every employer, BOAC faced constant demands for increased pay. In commenting upon these to the Board in November 1950, for instance, the Financial Comptroller noted that the demands of some 5,400 men would, if granted, cost BOAC an additional £240,000 a year, including pension contributions. The pres­ sure was unremitting and in early 1951, considering that wages were 27.5 per cent of its costs, BOAC refused to accede to the Ministry request that the Corporation do nothing without its advice. In general, BOAC’s policy was to agree with BEA if possible; if not, to go it alone, and only as a last resort to go to the Industrial Court. BEA was much more willing to go to the Court, for its Chairman was not quite so concerned with the public image, a policy which paid better dividends in the long run. In April the Corporation again brushed off a Ministry request for advanced information of the way BOAC was going to meet pay claims. Trouble brewed once more in June 1952 when the hourly rated engineers decided to go slow and refused to work overtime, despite the fact that neither their own officials nor the Ministry of Labour thought they had a case. This came, fortunately, to nought, but in October Administration Director B. G. Porter’s proposal that a two-shift system (BEA remained on a three-shift) be adopted was accepted and the layout of the new shops in the “Kremlin” was accordingly altered. No further troubles arose until 1958.

Operational Developments The early Fifties was a period of technological change in operating techniques as much as in aircraft themselves. The Comets on takeoff lifted 50 per cent of their weight in fuel. In thirty-five minutes they climbed to more than 30,000 feet and continued to rise gently thereafter to 40,000 as fuel burned off. They needed distance-measuring equipment (DME) because they started their descents 180 miles from their destination, while, if they were held off for thirty minutes, they

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156 S p e e d b i r d burned away 23 per cent of their earning power as fuel consumption was three times as high as at operating altitudes. Both to cope with the new jets and with the 60 per cent increase in traffic in the London area alone during the first few years after the war, airways were established over Britain in 1950. But facilities overseas remained the bugbear of operations and not until 1955 did the Ministry start a special directorate to deal with them. In contrast, by 1950 Pan American had set up a world-wide network of high-frequency radio stations which broadcast weather information and provided ordinary voice communication links. By 1956 storm-warning radar was becoming a basic item of aircraft equipment and costs. The arrival of the jets demanded much faster, greater, and more complex knowledge of all concerned. In the older piston-engined aircraft a loss of cabin pressure merely involved continuing the flight at a lower altitude; in a jet it meant not only an immediate drop to a safe altitude while using oxygen but also a landing as soon as possible because of the high fuel consumption at lower levels. For ground crews, whole new techniques had to be learned; no longer could aircraft be repaired with a riveted patch. More and more, all aircrew had to be trained in simulators, which the Ministry came to accept as sufficiently realistic to allow statutory personnel checks to be carried out on them. All these developments were more rapid than many realized. Not until 1954 did BOAC set up a Flight Advisory Committee under Campbell-Orde to keep flying and engineering staff abreast of the latest developments. In addition, behind all these problems were the human ones. Serious investigation of one set of these started after the crash of a BEA Viscount at London Airport on 31 October 1950. The flight minimums for landing in bad weather were found to be confusing in the BEA manual. This led to a report by yet another Brabazon Committee and to a Ministry requirement that operators state their bad weather minimums in terms of visibility along the runway and of critical cloud-base heights. Other closely associated problems were not brought to light until 1954, when aircrew fatigue, as noted in connection with the BOAC Board’s Flight Safety Report, was discussed. As undershooting was found, in consultation with the Technical Committee of the International Air Transport Association, to be a major problem for all concerned, better lighting and clearer threshold markings rapidly made their appearance. But a number of these problems were not really accentuated until after the big jets arrived and runway length itself became a critical factor, when ground effect was found to affect stalling speed of an aircraft close to the runway, and when it was realized that the visibility on the runway a mile or two from the control tower might be quite different from that from the tower itself. Other sorts of problems were reflected in route operations.

The North Atlantic Increasingly, the North Atlantic became the precedent-setting route. New equipment, fare scales, standards of comfort, operational procedures, and the success or failure of the Corporation’s financial year all came to be determined here.

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Even the Comet 1 was really not a complete exception as the Comet 3 should have been on the Atlantic well ahead of the big American jets. Here in early 1950, BOAC was plagued by irregularity, partly because of unscheduled engine changes and partly because of technical problems in general and the competition. The Bermuda–New York service was suspended from 31 March 1950 to 1 June 1951, the Constellations being used instead on a London–Lisbon– Azores–Bermuda–Nassau service connecting with Yorks to Jamaica, Panama, Lima, and Santiago. By 28 February 1950 Stratocruisers had taken over thriceweekly London–Shannon–New York services and the four via Prestwick. A year later Monarch services, offering sleeping berths, were added. The Monarchs greatly helped BOAC’s image in the United States and sold well. With the arrival of the tenth Stratocruiser on 2 April 1950, Stratocruisers began to operate two of the four weekly services to Montreal. But over-capacity hurt and no rationalization with Trans Canada was agreed until 1959. In May all the Constellations were withdrawn from North Atlantic services and sent to be converted to Tourist-Class layout. But, though a wonderfully comfortable aircraft, they were not ideally suited for use at Prestwick, Britain’s No. 2 airfield. The length and direction of the main runway caused 10 to 30 per cent of all BOAC-scheduled flights into Scotland to be aborted or diverted, at a cost of about £400,000 a year. This expensive problem was not solved, despite much talk about the attractiveness of Scotland to visitors, until the main runway was lengthened to 6,000 feet and a new subsidiary runway completed on 30 September 1955. By this time a committee had reported that a 7,000-foot runway was adequate, except for fully loaded Stratocruisers (Cmd.9296 [1954]). An extension to 9,800 feet was announced in December 1958 and completed in March 1960, by which time the big jets had arrived—and these needed 11,500 feet. Such belated action in Scotland could hardly be called canny. All trans-Atlantic services came to an end on 30 November 1950 for several days as a result of an electricians’ strike. The Corporation was genuinely pleased, on the other hand, by the award by the Guild of Air Pilots and Air Navigators of the Cumberbatch Trophy for four years of accident-free operation, including some 3,850 crossings of the North Atlantic. In 1951 the full use of Stratocruisers was felt in rapidly rising revenues and in a large share of the market, services being increased to nineteen weekly in each direction. But the great gains made then were whittled down in 1952 as competition increased and Tourist-Class services came on. At the same time, Pan American began direct flights between New York, Paris, and Rome. On 1 June 1952 a new weekend service to Bermuda from New York was opened, with aircraft hours saved by the abandonment of the “hopelessly uneconomic” service down the west coast of South America. With the coming of Tourist-Class services, Constellations were withdrawn from the midAtlantic route and converted to high-density seating. By various actions, including greater rationalization of aircraft to services due to the new planning set up under Smallpeice, the loss on Western routes, which now included the South American area, was reduced from the £2,603,293 of the year before to £202,125.

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158 S p e e d b i r d With the coming of Tourist-Class services, the North Atlantic airlines showed their individuality. Pan American continued to push for yet lower fares. Trans Canada concentrated entirely on tourists. KLM talked of mixed-class aircraft, while BOAC clung to First-Class in one aircraft and Tourist-Class in older planes, which took the longer and slower route via Iceland and Newfoundland. The opening of Mayflower (to the USA) and Beaver (to Canada) Tourist-Class services on 1 May 1952 was heralded by an unprecedented advanced booking—117 per cent above the same month in 1951. For June the increase was 197 per cent (120 per cent in dollars). At the same time, to stimulate tourism, the number of services through Scotland was increased to fourteen weekly in each direction. But the cream of the traffic went to Pan American, which was not, unlike most European operators, short of aircraft and had already been using high-density aircraft on its cabotage routes. Moreover, it had thirty-nine DC-6Bs on order, of which seven were in service when the summer season opened. BOAC was hit by the limitation of fuel uplifted to 65 per cent of normal as a result of the strike of American oil company employees. So, to preserve the summer capacity on the North Atlantic, services to the Caribbean were curtailed. The one criticism of BOAC’s early Tourist-Class services was that passengers had to pay for their own food until 1 April 1953, when it was served free, but the price of the ticket increased by 35s.9d. to compensate for the fact that to do so the seating capacity was reduced from sixty-eight to sixty-five on the Constellations. At the same time, Sir Miles began to wonder if BOAC would receive its Britannias in time to cash in on the tourist boom. For insurance BOAC bought two surplus 049 Constellations from Pan American and had them converted to Tourist-Class layout at a total coast of £995,000. At the beginning of 1953 the Stratocruisers had to be withdrawn for modifications to the engines, which cost £140,000 in lost revenue. Otherwise, with the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth II, the year was a good one. It was slightly spoiled by a squabble over traffic rights at Bermuda for the new politically inspired Trinidad service. Passengers on the first flight were allowed to disembark on 7 October, but thereafter the service was held up. Bermuda demanded additional services to New York, and BOAC participation in a shipping company airline was rejected for legal qualms in February 1954. Services were restarted in November 1953. The net results of the year showed BOAC hanging on to the 40 per cent share of North Atlantic traffic which it had first achieved in 1951. By 1954 the North Atlantic was becoming a routine operation with, by July 1955, thirty aircraft an hour passing the Gander control point. On the other hand, BOAC’s fleet was rapidly ageing and the Britannias were badly needed in the face of increasing competition from operators equipped with DC-6s and greatly improved Constellations, against which BOAC was pitting the 1946model Constellations and the somewhat newer Stratocruisers. In addition, BOAC had insufficient aircraft to operate to Trinidad and at the same time to maintain sufficient frequencies on the new New York–Jamaica service which was begun to cater to the growing popularity of that West Indian winter haven. In March, with

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the Comets grounded, the shortage of aircraft was intensified when Stratocruiser G-ALSA crashed at Keflavik and was out of action until August. And though Ringway, the Manchester Airport, had had its runways lengthened in 1951 to 5,900 feet, BOAC could not operate out of there until May 1954 because modifications had not yet been made to the aircraft. In addition, this service had been delayed by formalities in the United States. On 1 September a New York–London–Frankfurt–Cairo Monarch service started. On 12 November Tourist-Class services from New York to Bermuda recommenced, But then G-ALSA, back on service for less than six months, was written off in a fatal accident at Prestwick on 25 December 1954 in which diamonds spewed from the wreckage. Fortunately, BOAC recovered them all from the mud. The shortage of aircraft thus became so acute that the weekly Manchester–Prestwick–New York service had to be cancelled, as was the New York–Cairo Monarch. One Stratocruiser had to be used to retrain Comet crews, and the shortage was further accentuated because Lockheed Aircraft Services was ten weeks behind schedule in modifying the other newly acquired Stratocruisers to BOAC standards. An additional result was that Constellations had to be hired from Seaboard and Western to run the Bermuda service, beginning on 1 April 1955. Though BOAC was forced to sign initially a twelve-month contract, the Treasury would sanction an agreement for only four, and that only three days before services started, precluding pre-inaugural advertising, which adversely affected loads. Sanction was finally obtained for thirteen months. The Seaboard contract for Bermuda operations tapered off in January 1956 when British West Indian Airways Viscounts were chartered to replace them. At the same time, the diversity of Constellation types in service hampered efficiency and no improvement was achieved until after a swap of 049 for 749 Constellations with Capital Airlines in May 1955, which allowed all the Stratocruisers to be concentrated on the Atlantic. But the later Stratocruisers did not become available until July 1955, which cost BOAC half the summer season, though Seaboard and Western Constellations were hired to fill the gap from May to July. At the same time, a fundamental change was made to mixed-class aircraft. By the time Sir Miles left, the North Atlantic was facing another major equipment change and new fare scales, both highly competitive and which, for various reasons, BOAC was not in a strong position to meet.

South American Routes On the demise of British South American Airways, BOAC had no alternative but to operate Argonauts to South America, starting in February 1950. With the opening of the central Atlantic route by Constellations, Yorks were withdrawn from the Nassau–Miami and South American runs except for the Nassau–Buenos Aires service. Concurrently, BOAC was beset by surplus capacities south of Lisbon, overcompetition, frequency restrictions by Brazil and Argentina, blocked currency in

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160 S p e e d b i r d Chile and Argentina, and more. Attempts to operate into Caracas were frustrated by the failure of bilateral negotiations which denied BOAC Fifth-Freedom traffic, about half of all loads in and out of Venezuela. In general, the situation did not improve in South America, so that by November 1950 the Board was considering withdrawing services altogether. To avoid this two out of the three weekly services were switched to Madrid, Constellations and Argonauts used to replace Yorks, and in February 1951 Sir Miles ordered the West Coast service to be terminated at Jamaica and the East Coast at Buenos Aires on 1 May. At the same time, efforts were redoubled to persuade European operators to rationalize their services. Nevertheless, load factors remained low, in the thirties, and BOAC’s South American loss for 1950–1951 of £2,088,434 accounted for twothirds of the whole of that year’s deficit. Services to Lima, Peru, were not resumed until April 1961, when 707s began a short-lived eighteen-hour schedule via New York. One result of the withdrawal was the decision in September 1952 that priority should be given to using Comets, starting early in 1954, with their South Atlantic crossings being part of the preparation for later North Atlantic flights. Until then, further attempts were made to cut losses by agreements with Air France, Panair do Brasil, and Aerovias Brasil, by better briefing of captains on commercial matters, improvements in advertising, closer scrutiny of station costs, etc. Comet proving flights to South America began on 13 September 1953, but the fleet was grounded before services could start. As a result, South American services were reduced to two twice-weekly and then abandoned on 15 April 1954 as by then they carried only 1.2 per cent of BOAC’s passengers.

Eastern Routes As on the route to South America, that to the East had political and financial problems, and here also the competition grew fiercer as, in addition to KLM, Pan American, TWA, and Air France, new national airlines came onto the route. The formation of Israel left a legacy of transit difficulties and soon created blocked currency problems. Bilateral difficulties with India were not settled until 1 December 1951 and relations with Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) remained strained. In 1950 utilization of the Argonauts was low, while on Persian and Middle Eastern services load factors were about 50 per cent. Business picked up after the start of the Korean War on 25 June and disturbances in Malaya helped, but the trade embargo against China hurt. Moreover, the last flying-boat had not come off Eastern services until August 1949. In March 1951 BOAC had begun to call at Zurich but it had never been able to obtain traffic rights at Paris, though these were granted to Air India and QANTAS. Then in June came the Iranian Abadan crisis and BOAC laid on seventy flights to bring out 3,500 British employees of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and a further series in October to rescue the technicians. This affair brought on a fuel crisis in India, which obtained 74 per

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cent of its oil from Abadan. The result was limited fuel uplifts, which caused the cancellation of the freighter service to Singapore. Otherwise, BOAC was largely saved by the precautions taken by Shell, its principal supplier. Things began to look up in September 1951 when the first Comet route-proving flight to Karachi cut the time from the thirty-one hours fifteen minutes of the Constellation to ten hours fifty-seven minutes elapsed. The Constellation actually spent as much time on the ground at Cairo as the Comet used for the whole trip. In October, Captain Majendie covered the 7,809 statute miles from London to Singapore in an elapsed time of twenty-four hours forty-seven minutes at an average speed of 426 mph. In November 1951 the fuel allotment in India was increased by 5 per cent and a new Singapore–London service was added and the twice-weekly freighter revived on a fortnightly basis. In January 1952, rioting destroyed BOAC’s offices in Cairo, and increasingly services were re-routed via Beirut and an interest taken in Nicosia, though accord on its use was not reached with BEA until March 1953. The discovery of new oilfields on the south side of the Persian Gulf led to intense competition for the lucrative oilfield traffic. To further its ends in this direction, BOAC acquired Gulf Aviation (the model for Nevil Shute’s novel Round the Bend). To widen their potential, BOAC and QANTAS agreed that their services should stop at different places in Europe. Some of this effort was dissipated by the persistent Post Office practice of specifying on which services the mail should travel. This conflicted with BOAC’s desire to place it on other flights so as to be able to have the greatest space for passengers on certain routes. Malayan services, in particular, suffered also both from small mail loads and a large number of reduced-rate official passengers. Services through Israel were effectively denuded of passengers when the Israeli pound was devalued, airlines trebled fares, and the Israeli Government imposed a 30 per cent tax. But BOAC still flew on. Despite some questions as to the frequencies allowed through Bombay and Calcutta, in April 1952 BOAC started a weekly Argonaut to Hong Kong via Frankfurt. This was to take advantage of the West German export drive, which in its turn caused pressure to be brought by the Colonial Office for BOAC participation in a Far Eastern company, discussed in Chapter VIII. The greatest change on Eastern routes came with the departure from London on 11 August 1952 of the first Comet service to Colombo, followed by one to Singapore on 14 October 1952 and to Tokyo on 3 April 1953. For scheduling reasons Comets had to leave Colombo on the same day as an Air Ceylon flight so as not to depart Bombay on the same day as the Comet from Singapore. Because of bilaterals, this meant that BOAC had to fly empty from Colombo to Bombay. In spite of this, BOAC Comets still achieved a load factor of 71.8 per cent. On the unrestricted Singapore service, load factors were a remarkable 81.4 per cent. Operations to the Far East also posed problems with QANTAS, which balked at pooling a Tourist-Class service with BOAC’s jets. BOAC expected this to be only a temporary difficulty which would be solved by the use of Britannias early in 1954,

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162 S p e e d b i r d thus enabling a round-the-world service to be operated in pool with QANTAS, British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, and Trans Canada. This would stop the siphoning off of United Kingdom–Australia traffic along Pan American’s route across the United States. Though differences between BOAC and QANTAS were settled in favour of the Comets, the trans-Pacific link was not agreed to until 1963, and this was later abandoned in 1975. Further vexations were caused by Ministry pressure to allow Airwork to have the Iraq Petroleum Company contract and to sell BOAC interests in Kuwait to another British company. Moreover, all along Eastern routes there remained the problem of airfields. Most runways were less than 7,000 feet in length, and though they were being lengthened, within six years 707s would be coming along which demanded 11,000 feet. In 1953 BOAC reduced services to Frankfurt, the headquarters of US services in Europe, and operated instead through Dusseldorf, Geneva, and Zurich. Economics and lack of traffic rights at Manila (Hong Kong not being able to take Comets) caused the Tokyo service to be reduced from twice- to once-weekly by Comet and increased from twice- to thrice-weekly by Argonaut. At the time, when the Comets were withdrawn, they operated four services a week to Singapore. It was difficult enough to fill this void without the loss of Constellation G-ALAM, together with maintenance delays all along the route as a result of the elimination of costly night-stops. Direct London–Beirut flights were started by Ceylonbound Constellations in December 1954, and these aircraft gradually took over all services east of Karachi from the Argonauts. To counter the DC-6 and late-model Constellations on other airlines, slumberette seats were fitted in Constellations from 1 March 1956, while Asian stewardesses were employed eastward from India. Nevertheless, in the post-Comet void, Eastern routes lost heavily, though the Corporation made an almost super-human effort to hold on, an effort that certainly deserved to succeed and took great courage to mount. BOAC survived, mainly because of increased utilization of its Argonauts, and greatly aided by its partner QANTAS. The twenty-first anniversary of this partnership was celebrated in December 1955.

Southern Routes The impact of rival British cabotage services was felt on Southern routes earlier than elsewhere. If the colonies had not achieved independence as rapidly as they did, the potential damage to BOAC could have been very high indeed. It is, however, probably proper to recognize the boast of the Independents that they forced BOAC to think of lower fares on these services. As a result of their pressure, by 1950 BOAC was already converting the Hermes IV to high-density seating at the same time that it was contracting for the Overseas Food Corporation (“the ground-nuts” scheme) charters. As South African Airways new Constellations and BOAC Hermes came on service, the routes were changed. Starting on 7 November 1950, Hermes operated

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52. On 8 December 1955 the Kangaroo route, United Kingdom–Australia, had its twenty-first birthday. Chris Wrenn, the noted aviation cartoonist, depicts the men and aircrew around.

164 S p e e d b i r d London–Tripoli–Kano–Leopoldville (changed to Brazzaville because of lack of night-flying facilities)–Livingstone–Johannesburg, while the Constellations used the old Nile Valley route and stopped at Rome. Some SAA services overflew Cairo so as to carry Jewish traffic from Lydda to South Africa. Meanwhile, on 24 September, Hermes replaced Solents on East African services; the last flying-boat was withdrawn when Somerset completed the round trip started on 10 November 1950. In 1951 revenue increased as cheaper fares, designed to knock out the Independ­ ents, took effect. In midsummer Comets began proving the route, knocking down the London–Johannesburg time to seventeen hours thirty-three minutes. In July BOAC handed operations at Malta over to BEA, and all East African services were routed through Rome instead. In September, at the request of the South African Air Transport Council, the partners agreed to admit Central African Airways and to help it to run a Coach-Class service from Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, to London. But the Air Transport Advisory Council in England delayed this until March 1953. The opening months of 1952 found services disrupted by riots in Cairo from January to May in connection with the Neguib’s takeover of Egypt, just when the new Queen had to be flown home and the Comets introduced. The Comets were diverted to Beirut, but all other services staged through Tripoli. On 2 May regular Comet service to South Africa started, and the Hermes Springbok service via West Africa, though 800 miles shorter, was withdrawn. Comet schedules were built up rapidly to thrice-weekly, covering in a scheduled twenty-one hours the same route which, only twenty years earlier, had taken Imperial Airways eleven days. On 14 June Hunting and Airwork began Colonial Coach multi-stop services to Nairobi with Vikings at a fare of £180 versus BOAC’s £252 return, and extended these on the 26th to Salisbury. By November, 25 per cent of BOAC’s traffic to East Africa was travelling Tourist-Class. In 1953 the West African route was split at Kano, with West African Airways handling the Kano–Accra–Lagos sector, but at the same time the Government there persuaded BOAC to put Argonauts on the route in place of Hermes, and these started in October. Meanwhile, on 6 April 1953 BOAC began fifty-six-seat Hermes tourist services to Salisbury, delayed since early December 1952 by Air Transport Advisory Council hearings. On 1 October South African Airways began a four-a-week pooled Comet operation with BOAC, while Argonauts took over from Hermes on all East African services. South African Airways replaced the weekly Hermes to Lusaka with a Constellation as part of the whole reorientation involved in the new pool. The withdrawal of the Comets necessitated Argonauts being reconverted to First-Class use. Despite the fact that Central African Airways doubled its Colonial Coach services in May 1954, there was still a shortage of capacity and the gap had to be filled with the reintroduction of the Hermes for two services a week. Despite gloomy forecasts of what tourist fares would do on the West African route, services there had to be increased from eight to nine weekly. A further increase in East African traffic came from a revised leave scheme put

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in by the authorities in October, after direct BOAC negotiation with the colonial governments, which aimed at eliminating the manpower pool needed to offset long leaves by slow transport. In 1955 the African routes ran much as rearranged in 1954, except that BOAC’s additional Constellations operated the First-Class services to Johannesburg and East Africa, while Argonauts handled most of the others. Gradually, the Constellations, which had a better world market, were sold off, followed later by sales of the Argonauts to friendly companies.

Conclusion The year 1956 saw the end of the Miles Thomas regime. Sir Miles had inspired the Corporation and created a new image to the public. He had given back to BOAC the commercial sense that it had lost during the war. He had seen it into profitability and had kept it there. He had led it with great hopes into the jet era and he had stayed to see it back on its feet after disaster struck. Because of his interest, labour relations were good. But Sir Miles had a number of weak or blind spots, as most people do. Though he was both Chairman and Chief Executive, and though he brought in good men, he was not strong on finances and he rejected the early approaches made by both Major R. H. Thornton and by the Financial Comptroller, Basil Smallpeice, in which they attempted to call attention to the unusually high level of BOAC’s engineering costs, partially because of the high cost of Bristol’s spares. In retrospect it is fair to rule that he did not stand up to the Ministers of the day in regard to the erosion of trooping, freighting, and traffic in general in favour of the Independents, and that he failed to believe that a turboprop rather than a big, probably American, jet would be the aircraft of the future. Battling these shortcomings was to be the task of the next two Chairmen. Meanwhile, on 12 January 1956 the Board Commercial and Economics Committee noted that it took a very serious view of the financial state of the Corporation and intended to make suggestions for remedial action. In many ways this signified the end of the Sir Miles Thomas regime.

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Chapter VIII The d’Erlanger Regime, 1956–1960 Introduction The Chairmanship of Sir Gerard d’Erlanger covered the decisive years in which far-reaching political and equipment moves were made at the behest of ambitious Ministers. The resignation of Sir Miles Thomas, as profitability came to an end, posed a considerable problem for the new Minister, Harold Watkinson. No one who knew BOAC’s position was anxious to take over. Indeed, following the air transport recession of 1955, even the Chairman of the British Independent Transport Association resigned. The Aeroplane (6 April 1956) called for the appointment of a man who would be fighting fit in the Sixties when the big jet battle would be fought, one who would have a well-considered plan and be able to push it through in the face of all opposition, including the political. The Financial Times (24 April) warned Watkinson that he must get his priorities right: BOAC was not a testing ground for British aircraft but an international airline which must have the best aircraft for the job, even if this meant hybrids with British engines in American airframes. There was much scurrying behind the scenes. At the end of the month it was announced that Gerard d’Erlanger was being appointed Chairman for five years on a part-time, unpaid basis. Later, after he was knighted in 1958, he was also paid. This was because the unions suggested to the Minister, who controlled Board salaries, that a man should be paid what he was worth. The original Press release also stated that Sir George Cribbett, the Ministry’s Deputy Secretary, would be Chief Executive. According to a letter written several years later by the then Minister and included in the Corbett Report (see Chapter X), the appointment was at d’Erlanger’s request. It was quickly brought to the attention of individual Board Members that the Air Corporations Act of 1949 limited the Minister to making appointments to the Board; the Board alone could approve the Chief Executive. The Board at once met and made the Deputy Chief Executive and Financial Comptroller, Smallpeice, Managing Director. The Ministry “black-pencilled” its announcement. Sir George was appointed instead full-time Deputy Chairman, the position which Lord Rennell of Rodd, the part-timer, had just resigned in protest against Cribbett’s appointment as Chief Executive. The Minister immediately reappointed Lord Rennell to the Board. In 1963 when John Corbett reported on the top Management of BOAC, he regarded the d’Erlanger, Cribbett, and Smallpeice triumvirate to have been

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168 S p e e d b i r d responsible for some of the subsequent troubles, but he believed that their Management structure would have been weak no matter how the responsibilities were divided. The Board, moreover, he concluded, acquiesced in the Minister’s wishes because this was what they thought they were supposed to do—act in the national interest as he might indicate. The appointment of d’Erlanger was a matter of speculation. Though he had been a member of the Air Transport Advisory Council since 1952, he had, early in 1949, also been summarily dropped as Chairman of BEA. At the same time, a precedent existed for Sir George Cribbett’s appointment—that of Sir Arnold Overton to the Board of BEA in 1953. The actual arrangements were most unhappy. For the first nine months of the new Chairman’s tenure, the Board never met at Headquarters but held a large number of emergency sessions in London. Meetings between the Chairman and the Minister were often informal, and the Managing Director, who was the Chief Executive, was usually left in ignorance of what had transpired. D’Erlanger’s one great contribution was to get the Boeing 707s for BOAC. He can also be commended for deciding to try, when forced to over-buy VC-10s for BOAC, to obtain a 50 per cent share of the Atlantic traffic, though this led to overcapacity in the slump of the early Sixties. When the Board met on 1 May 1956 the new Chairman assured it that the Minister had no intention of denationalizing BOAC and BEA nor of merging them. The Board then defined duties. The Chairman was to take policy, planning, and over-all financial control; the Deputy Chairman was to be his understudy and to be responsible for liaison with Government Departments, associated and subsidiary companies, and relations with the Independents, while the Managing Director was to be responsible for efficiency, safety, and economy of current operations with complete executive authority over all departments. As Sir Miles had been both Chairman and Chief Executive, this was a change for the better. However, the Minister, Watkinson, made it quite clear to the Commons that he regarded the Chairman as directly responsible to himself and that he, the Minister, would decide in the national interest whether BOAC would buy British or American aircraft.1 One of the new Chairman’s first public statements was to announce that BOAC would sustain a loss of about £1,500,000 in 1956–1957, which caused, as noted earlier, the Minister to ask that obsolescence rates be reconsidered. The new Chairman’s statement that BOAC should attempt to obtain half of the Atlantic traffic came ten years too late, and was unrealistic. Yet it can be argued that the attempt had a certain realism in it for, with the accelerating rate of independence of British colonies, how else would BOAC use all the jets which it was shortly to order? As each of the former colonies became independent,2 BOAC’s monopoly was automatically destroyed. Moreover, each of these new states wanted an airline of its own and negotiated with other countries for additional routes. The problem with d’Erlanger’s approach was that none of the new aircraft could be in service until 1960. On the other hand, the loss of the colonial monopoly did get cabotage

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Colonial Coach operations by the Independents out of BOAC’s hair, but did not solve the basic problem. Before the all-important decisions could be taken, the International Air Transport Association Traffic Conference met in Cannes and it became obvious that a three-tiered fare structure was likely. For BOAC the danger of this lay in the fact that the Minister had reserved to it only First-Class and Tourist-Class operations, so that Third-Class would be wide open as far as the Air Transport Advisory Council was concerned, and any British operator could apply for services over the Corporation’s routes. At the same time, the Minister wrote to the Chairman of the British Independent Air Transport Association that it was up to the Independents to take the initiative in cooperation with the Corporations; he would approve any scheme put to him by an Independent and a Corporation. Fortunately for BOAC, though economy fares were agreed to at Cannes, TouristClass died a natural death under “Gresham’s Law” of prices that lower fares drive out higher, not least when seventy-three airlines and fifty-five governments have to make unanimous decisions. The results for the first post-Miles Thomas year showed a profit of £117,731 after wiping out the accumulated deficit of £861,974. What was not shown was that by lengthening the obsolescence period a saving of £890,000 had been achieved. Though a profit was realized, the planned introduction of the Britannias and of the DC-7Cs in 1956–1957 would adversely affect results not only because of development costs but also because it would mean that the Corporation would have five different types of aircraft in operation. Yet the whole fleet was still too small and uncompetitive. Because of far-sighted management, however, options had already been taken on the big American jets, the Douglas DC-8 and the Boeing 707. It was hoped that BOAC would have only one season in which it would not have competitive aircraft on the North Atlantic. But perhaps even more important was the Corporation’s general inability to accumulate enough working capital without borrowing constantly from Barclay’s Bank and, after 17 September 1956, from the Exchequer. By 31 March 1957 it had outstanding £60,086,730 in Airways Stock (bonds), £10,842,646 in bank loans, and £9,900,000 in Exchequer advances from the Ministry. Of these sums, 27.9 per cent had been disbursed in progress payments for future aircraft, 64.9 per cent was employed on current operations, and 7.2 per cent was committed to associated and subsidiary companies. Surprisingly, the anticipated deficit for 1956–1957 turned out to be a £303,352 profit, despite the Suez affair. This was achieved by an improvement in revenue greater than costs, and by redoing the current operating plans. On 24 October 1956 Parliament had been told that BOAC was to be allowed to buy fifteen Boeing 707s with their initial spares for £44,000,0003 as part of the plan to enable BOAC to obtain a growing share of the expanding world passenger market. The purchase of American aircraft was stated to be an exceptional measure to permit BOAC to bridge the gap until a new British type was available. BOAC was, in fact, already under instructions to discuss with

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170 S p e e d b i r d De Havilland the DH 118, a swept-wing Comet. However, the latter refused to build it unless it had firm orders for fifty. The Board balked here, for on asking the Minister to raise its borrowing powers from £80,000,000 to double that sum it had presumed it would not have to order more than twenty British aircraft in addition to the 707s. In fact, on 2 November, before the DH 118 fell through, Frank Beswick, the former Labour Under-Secretary, pointed out that this was an unnecessary aircraft as the Minister had just stated that fifteen aircraft was all BOAC wanted.4 BOAC entered 1957 with a plan to increase its capacity four-fold, to match the expected increase in tourist traffic. But it faced limitations on such expansion: lack of hotel accommodations world-wide (especially in London); excessive official documentation in complicated health, immigration, and customs procedures, which cumulatively delayed services, especially in the US; intensified competition over former cabotage routes; uncompetitive aircraft stemming from the Comet disasters; and the “Fly British” policy. Yet, in its eagerness to regain what it regarded as its rightful share of the market, BOAC, and indeed most of the world’s airlines, overlooked the fact that in 1953 ICAO had warned that the peak growth rate for air transport had been reached in 1950–1951.5 Moreover, BOAC’s projections were based on a 60 per cent load factor in 1960, whereas the tidal wave of capacity produced by the big jets, especially on the US domestic routes, lowered this into the forties. Overcapacity remained a problem until Pan American Airways and TWA cut back in the 1970s as a result of British pressure. Ironically, the man who so well presented the case against ever-increasing size, which the capacity ton mile formula appeared to demand, was Basil Smallpeice. He noted at Geneva in 1955 that over-capacity would simply raise fares and reduce frequencies, which would be fundamentally bad for the industry. What was needed, he said, was a reduction of costs through better engines and airframes.6 But the big problem for the industry was that it was operating on too small a margin of profit. As Peter Masefield pointed out in 1955, the margin of revenue over expenditure needed to be 15 per cent just to pay interest on capital and remain technically progressive.7 In fact, it was generally about 2 per cent. With its large loan indebtedness, upon which it had to pay interest regardless of results, BOAC was also vulnerable to vagaries of the world economic system and passenger habits. A single 1 per cent difference in load factor meant a £900,000 change in revenue; one passenger more or less per flight could make results vary by £1,000,000 up or down. And, starting in October 1957, an American business recession caused load factors to drop from 64.4 per cent to 60.5. The position was worsened by the Independents operating Viscounts on Colonial Coach services in competition with BOAC’s elderly Argonauts. There were serious delays in the introduction of the Britannia. However, the DC-7Cs, delivered on time, earned enough dollars so that they could be paid for without recourse to Treasury advances.

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Early in 1957 the Minister announced that the DH 118 had been dropped as BOAC was the only potential customer but that the Corporation was discussing with various manufacturers an aircraft of greater world appeal.8 In March he asked the Corporation for its re-equipment plans for the Eastern routes for 1962 onward, the assumption then being that 707s could not be used along the route because of airfield limitations. He asked for an answer by the end of the month. BOAC’s Aircraft Requirements Committee had reached certain conclusions which the Chairman decided to review, in the absence of the Managing Director, who was ill. The end result was the Ministerial announcement on 22 May that BOAC had told him it intended to order thirty-five Vickers VC-10s and that the Government had approved an expenditure of £86,000,000 for this purpose.9 The nature of this order is discussed later (see Chapter XI). It is sufficient here to note that, for the aircraft industry, Government orders were rapidly dropping from 60 per cent of its revenue to 30 per cent; the slack was expected to be taken up by civil orders, the Minister, Watkinson, saying that BOAC and BEA “have to provide the shop window in which we display this most valuable export product [new British civil aircraft].”10 In the meantime, the Air League of the British Empire, to give an example of thinking outside BOAC and the Government, had received a report on an over-all plan for British aviation from a committee headed by Sir Miles Thomas. It argued: the Independents (currently enjoying 9 per cent of British traffic) with the backing of ship owners should be allowed to share in the expected four-fold increase in traffic in the next decade; the Corporations should merge as many of their operations as was feasible (a favourite Thomas theme); the aircraft industry should be consolidated and should concentrate on a vertical-takeoff-and-landing (VTOL) trans-Atlantic supersonic transport (SST) and upon a freighter; the Government should create an over-all policy for British aviation while keeping up research and development; and help should be given to provide adequate personnel for the Corporations as RAF and Fleet Air Arm sources dried up. Already the Minister had announced a fresh deal for the Independents in terms of new Colonial Coach services to Africa.11 This was aimed at countering the new quadripartite pool of nationalized airlines: BOAC, South African Airways, Central African Airways, and East African Airways. The official policy allowed Hunting-Clan and Airwork 30 per cent of the cabotage Tourist-Class traffic without regard to type of aircraft. These so-called T-34 (because of the thirtyfour-inch seat pitch used) services were designed to prepare also for the coming independence of the African states as cabotage would disappear. Adjustment of the ratio which gave BOAC only 70 per cent of this business was up to the Air Transport Advisory Council.12 It was claimed in Parliament at this time that the aim of the Independents was investment in BOAC. Concurrently, IATA heeded BOAC’s plea for the extension of Economy-Class fares to the East. Having pressed BOAC earlier in the year into a mammoth aircraft procurement programme, Watkinson asked it in October to limit its capital expenditure. The

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172 S p e e d b i r d Board replied with a request that the Minister should stop the Post Office diverting mail from BOAC’s services, as mail revenues had already dropped £241,000 in the first half of the year. These financial problems were emphasized when the results for 1957–1958 revealed a loss of £2,750,000 despite record revenues. Apart from the published reasons for this, connected with the aftermath of the Suez crisis, rising fuel prices and an increase of traffic of only 9.1 per cent versus the 14.3 forecast, the delayed delivery of the Britannias, and the continuing American recession, there was still difficulty with the Treasury concerning borrowing. The trouble lay in the use of Civil Service accounting methods since the start of Exchequer advances in late 1956. BOAC, BEA, the Ministry, and the auditors all agreed that a reserve fund needed to be established and that the Exchequer advances should be treated as compensation for having to “Fly British.” The Treasury’s policy of making the Corporation obtain bank loans, while good for the banks, forced BOAC to borrow at a higher rate than the official 4.75 per cent. In July the Board noted with concern that the Treasury was, as the 1964 and 1968 Nationalized Industries Reports made clear, apparently using the Exchequer advances as a means of gaining detailed control over BOAC’s capital expenditure. Moreover, the Minister had indicated that, for political reasons, he would not approach the Treasury for the money needed for East African Airways’ purchase of Comets. Though the Board did not say so, the Treasury’s attitude was no doubt being dictated by the comments of both the Comptroller and Auditor-General and of Select Committees with regard to the complete lack of accounting and other controls in the Ministry of Supply development contracts. Losses ran into the millions. One project was estimated to cost £60,000, but within five years £1,900,000 had been committed to it.13 But, as d’Erlanger pointed out in the 1958–1959 Annual Report, the financing of BOAC was, to use Sir Matthew Slattery’s later phrase, “bloody crazy” anyway. In the seven years since it had first made a profit, BOAC had paid the State £16,000,000 in interest; in the past year this had amounted to £5,258,372 and had forced the Corporation to borrow commercially in order to service the loan obligations. He asked once again that development costs for British aircraft be met out of governmental research and development funds, especially as these costs were excessive compared to those for American types. BOAC had had abnormal outlays on the Britannia and Comet alone of £5,000,000, which the auditors agreed should be written off as lost capital. Though the Select Committee on Nationalized Industries agreed,14 the Minister, as we shall see, refused. Though half-yearly budgets were introduced in 1958 and a new understanding reached with BEA on services between Cyprus and the Persian Gulf and to Cairo, none of these minor adjustments really helped the immediate situation. Some of the loss of revenue was because of the introduction of Economy-Class fares on the North Atlantic on 1 April 1958. Load factors continued to drop badly in that year, and there was some talk of withdrawing Monarch services altogether. There were two arguments against reducing the number of services operated: first,

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that this would upset passengers already booked; second, that whether or not the aircraft were flown, overheads (including administration, station costs, sales, publicity, etc.), obsolescence, engineering, and direct operating costs (DOC)— maintenance, fuel, flight operations, and staff and crew salaries—still had to be taken into account. Thus, with the DC-7Cs in the first half of 1960–1961, the direct costs amounted to £1,011,000; but with revenue of £800,000, the actual loss was reduced to £211,000. BOAC was also hurt in 1958–1959 by the fact that it could not share much in the increased traffic on the direct routes between America and Europe; the air traffic growth rate dropped from the 15 per cent average of the years 1945–1957 to 5 per cent for 1958; and shortly after Comets went on the Atlantic, a strike cost the Corporation £1,250,000. At the same time, the Minister announced that BOAC could keep its DC-7Cs, due to have been sold when the Britannias were on trans-Atlantic service, until the 707s were operational. While this did tide the Corporation over one difficulty, it brought on another, because the market for large piston-engined aircraft dropped drastically after the long-range jets came on, and the DC-7s were only slowly sold off in 1963 and 1964. On the other hand, almost all the Constellations, Argonauts, and Stratocruisers were off operations by the end of 1958–1959. Nevertheless, there was a net capital loss of £1,123,069 for the year on the disposal of assets largely connected with the aftermath of the Comet 1 and the rapid drop in prices for the older piston-engined machines. In the broad realm of general policy, the re-election of the Conservatives in the autumn of 1959 posed serious new problems. The Queen’s Speech from the Throne indicated that an Air Transport Licensing Board (ATLB) would be established. The BOAC Board wrote at once to the Minister, pointing out that the grant of wide powers to the Independents would prejudice the public investment in BOAC, the Commonwealth pool partnerships, and future aircraft purchases.

The Independents Despite the concessions made to them by Labour and Conservative governments, the Independents were not satisfied. Complicating the picture up to the Defence White Paper of 1957 (Cmnd.124) was the lack of policy with regard to RAF Trans­port Command. Thereafter it was assumed that world-wide emergencies would be met with airlifted troops, but, as relatively little was done to equip Transport Command for the job, the Independents were left with a role to play. At the beginning of 1956 Transport Command was so small that Coastal Command Shackletons had to be used to help carry 1,200 men to Cyprus, because the Independents could not move them all. Some Independents then had Hermes and Yorks, but the few that owned Viscounts were selling or leasing them abroad. The result was that the former wartime Under-Secretary for Air accused the Government of being so nuclear-minded that it had overlooked the needs of local wars, the kind Britain has so often fought. As was often the case,

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174 S p e e d b i r d policy and practice did not mesh.15 At the same time, BOAC itself decided that simple lack of capacity would prevent it from tendering for even ad hoc trooping contracts for at least a year. Concurrently the British Independent Air Transport Association wrote to the Minister, reiterating its stand of 6 April 1955 that there should be several financially viable companies, but at the same time it asked for subsidies and for restrictions upon the Corporations. Apart from demanding that the Corporations be denied as many scheduled services as possible, BIATA called for the reallocation to the Independents not only of scheduled services but also of all internal services, opportunities for new services, and the establishment of a licensing authority. The lone dissenter was Eric Rylands of Skyways, but in July 1956 there were rumours that Skyways, Airwork, and Britavia were forming a consortium to work with BOAC. Early in 1957, while the Chairman was in the Far East, Watkinson called BOAC’s Deputy Chairman (his former Deputy Secretary), Sir George Cribbett, to meet him to discuss BOAC’s future policy. Cribbett was not told in advance what aspect was to be considered, but when he saw the Minister he was informed that on 20 February Lord Terrington of the Air Transport Advisory Council had been asked as a matter of urgency to help the Minister solve the problem of the future of Colonial Coach services, especially those to territories about to become independent. BOAC was, therefore, to give evidence to the Council in a few days. Considerable Board discussion ensued, ending with a decision that BOAC would merely answer questions but would not make proposals. At the hearing on 20 March it became evident that the Council had not been asked to consider whether these services should be continued but only how to keep them functioning. Therefore, the BOAC Board took the view that it would await a Ministerial policy decision before seeking a Direction requiring BOAC to cooperate. Before action was taken, the Council ruled that the Independents should operate to West Africa as associates of BOAC. To this the Board strongly objected on the grounds that this was not furthering the interests of British civil aviation. The proposed 70:30 traffic split with the Independents was considered unacceptable, as was the lack of assurance that the new policy would be confined to the routes upon which the Independents had already established themselves. From BOAC’s standpoint it looked as if the new Economy-Class traffic, which would bring in lower revenues per passenger carried, was compromised from the start. Nor was the Corporation enthusiastic about the proposed ten-year licenses for Independent services to Nairobi, Salisbury, and Accra. The Minister’s reply to BOAC was contained in a letter dispatched on the same day that his acceptance of the Council’s recommendations was made known to Parliament. He assured the Corporation that the Independents would not be allowed on any new routes. But at the same time he asked BOAC to accept any associate arrangements which might be made. The Chairman replied that he would discuss it with the Board on 11 July. However, a Parliamentary Question was put down for the 10th, so the Board had to be hastily convened on the 8th. It expressed grave misgivings as to the soundness of two British companies competing on the same route (a reversion to the 1923

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state of affairs). Moreover, as the Minister’s public assurances were far less explicit than his private letter, the Board urged him to make a full statement to Parliament, while saying that it was not in a position to do what he had asked. The Minister, however, told Parliament on the 10th that the Independents would operate their African services as Ministerially approved associates of BOAC. Two days later Chairman d’Erlanger told Ian Mikardo, the Chairman of the Trades Union side of the National Joint Council, that the Minister had demanded its acquiescence by that evening and that the Board intended to accept this policy. The Board feared that any refusal would bring on amending legislation. The Trade Unions rightly called for a Direction. On 24 July the Minister, Watkinson, told Parliament that everyone was happy with the arrangements, and he read out his 20 February letter to Lord Terrington.16 On the 31st, however, under Trade Union pressure, Watkinson said that it was not his intention to allow the Independents to introduce T-34 services on routes other than those on which they already operated Colonial Coaches.17 On 17 and 18  October, Hunting-Clan/Airwork Viscounts began Safari services to Nairobi and Central Africa, respectively. At its December 1957 meeting the Board reminded itself that as it had accepted these services only under duress, it was under no obligation to see that they succeeded, especially as these associate agreements were likely to embarrass BOAC with the Corporation’s pool partners. Therefore, the Board decided on competition with the Independents. As The Aeroplane pointed out, in the years since 1951 the Independents had expanded 430 per cent, the world’s airlines in general 93 per cent, and BOAC only 43 per cent.18 Nevertheless, the familiar call was heard again in April 1958. The Independents were suffering as trooping shrank under the 1957 White Paper Defence Plan, Colonial Coach vanished, and the Corporations retained the scheduled services. The outcry was partly aimed at securing election promises. Moreover, though the Independents always argued that they would buy British aircraft, they rarely bought them new, thus providing virtually no market for the industry. In November 1958 the Chairman of BIATA, T. W. Morton, claimed that the Independents had never asked for anything but the right of access to air transport markets. But, at the same time, he called for limitations on BOAC and greater cooperation between his Members and the Corporations.19 As the Election of 1959 approached, the Society of British Aircraft Constructors (SBAC), the manufacturing industry’s mouthpiece, called for a “Focus of Authority” programme, whose six points included testing of new aircraft by the Corporations and government financial support for the aircraft industry. Then on 21 October a most significant change occurred when the civil aviation side of the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation was transferred to the Ministry of Supply, renamed the Ministry of Aviation. Many had doubts about the wisdom of a change which placed the Corporations under a Ministry whose role had long been to see that aircraft were produced and whose record in financial matters was

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8.1. Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation organization chart, headquarters

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From: Sir Gilmour Jenkins, The Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation (London, 1959), 218–219. Note: Legal advice was provided by the Treasury Solicitor and/or the Lord Advocate. There is also a Chief Aeronautical Adviser to the Minister, and honorary advisers on scientific matters, finance, business, shipping in port, and marine insurance.

178 S p e e d b i r d

53. The ex-Imperial Airways Victoria Station terminal, London, in which BOAC had for many years principal offices.

still being excoriated by Select Committees in 1964. Watkinson was translated to the Ministry of Defence but resigned within months. Duncan Sandys became the new Minister of Aviation. The latter part of 1959 was notable also for the revelation that BOAC had lost £19,000,000 over the past decade, of which £12,000,000 had gone for remuneration of capital and interest payments to the Government, which had to be paid whether BOAC could afford it or not, and £6,000,000 on aircraft development or upon replacements for the Comet. This was followed by the International Air Transport Association squabble over fares, which did not end until early 1960 with the introduction of Economy-Class on most world routes. The next tactic of the Independents was to persuade colonial licensing bodies to grant them route rights. At the same time, BOAC balked at following BEA’s lead and actually buying into its associates. In January 1959 the Minister refused to allow BOAC to apply for low-fare operations comparable to those of the

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Independents. So in June the two Corporations told him that they would not in the future make any associate agreements without a Direction. To this the Minister made no reply. After the Conservative victory in the autumn, Duncan Sandys told the annual BIATA dinner that he was in favour of a new Licensing Board. A few days later BOAC learned that Hunting-Clan was to be allowed to run a freight and passenger service to Africa, in return for which favour it would relinquish its Colonial Coach traffic to BOAC. The Board rejected this idea, which would give Hunting-Clan exclusive rights to low-fare traffic. Within a month the Ministry proposed that BOAC should negotiate with the Airwork/ Hunting-Clan group about direct services to Bermuda and the Caribbean. No assurance was given that BOAC would indeed retain its rights under Section 24 of the 1949 Act. Under this pressure, BOAC agreed to allow Hunting-Clan to operate freighter services to Africa. This at once affected BOAC’s order for the VC-10. At the same time, legislation was introduced which replaced the Air Transport Advisory Council with an Air Transport Licensing Board from which the Corporation would in the future have to obtain its licenses to fly, as would all other British operators. A major merger of Airwork and Hunting-Clan and others resulted in the appearance of British United Airways and in the reduction of the number of members of BIATA from eighteen to twelve. In its Annual Report for 1960–1961, BIATA claimed that its members produced 22 per cent of the British capacity ton miles offered, only 1 per cent behind BEA.

General Policy, 1959–1960 During the summer leading up to the election of 1959, BOAC faced increasing difficulties both from an unexpected doubling of Pan American Atlantic jet services and from the continued refusal of the United States to honour its obligations (under the 1946 Bermuda Agreement) to license BOAC’s San Francisco–Tokyo sector of the round-the-world service, though the route had been stocked and staffed on assurance from the Ministry that permission was a routine matter. BOAC and QANTAS had become partners in 1934. Increasingly, by the Fifties it became urgent that the Commonwealth airlines should consolidate themselves in the face not only of American but also of rising national airlines operating all over the world. So, in parallel with the growth of the Independents and their invasion of BOAC routes, there was the counter-move, which internal politics in Britain jeopardized, of creating an interlocking world-wide Commonwealth system. As early as 1937 Imperial Airways had planned to span the Pacific. In 1945 RAF Transport Command operated such a service. It was agreed at the Commonwealth Pacific Conference in March 1946 that British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines would be started by Britain, New Zealand, and Australia in parallel partnership with a Canadian-designated airline. The British Government participated through

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180 S p e e d b i r d BOAC’s investment of £200,000, raised in 1949 to £800,000, upon which the Ministry refused to allow BOAC interest. BCPA began operations in December 1946 but because of disputes between the United States and Australia, revenue operations were delayed until 25 April 1947. On 17 June 1947 Pan American started its round-the-world services with the San Francisco–Hong Kong line. On 1 November 1948 Pan American began both eastbound and westbound services from Australia to London at the same fares as BOAC and QANTAS charged, the route via America being very popular. Both BOAC and Canadian Pacific hoped to overcome this competition by using Comets in conjunction, in BOAC’s case, with Trans Canada domestically, to provide a comparable service from Sydney via Vancouver to London. Various factors, however, entered into the decision in October 1953 to break up BCPA, and its last flights took place on 12 and 13 May 1954. The major outcome was that British participation in Tasman Empire Airways was withdrawn and that the trans-Pacific route was turned over to QANTAS with agreement that BOAC would connect with its services at San Francisco. However, the refusal of Australia to grant Canadian Pacific operating rights at Sydney caused the Canadian Government to refuse BOAC a route via Montreal and Vancouver and on across the Pacific. By 1955, therefore, BOAC was forced to abandon the “all-red” route west-about to Australia in favour of one across the United States in partnership with QANTAS, which depended upon Australia getting route rights for the San Francisco–New York sector. BOAC had hoped to charter QANTAS aircraft, starting on 1 January 1956, but the unexpectedly high rate quoted led to a serious reappraisal of the partnership. (R. E. G. Davies later commented to the author: “What a great chance was missed by bickering within the Commonwealth. Pan Am just sat back and reaped the dividends.”) The negotiation of a UK–Australia bilateral of the Bermuda type was regarded by BOAC as likely to end the partnership, and an appeal against it was made to the Ministry. The protest was part of general BOAC dissatisfaction with the way in which the Ministry had taken to making these agreements without consulting the operators involved. In this objection BOAC was successful, and a meeting in San Francisco with QANTAS to settle participation in Malayan Airways was used as the means of revitalizing the partnership. After the meeting the Australian Government announced it was prepared to grant rights to Pan American for a Sydney–South Africa service in return for permission for QANTAS to fly round the world via San Francisco and New York. This was agreed in August. At the same time, Australia and South Africa settled their two-year dispute over the Indian Ocean crossing and shortly thereafter the new UK–Australia bilateral was concluded in which BOAC and QANTAS agreed to cooperate on Arctic (Polar), trans-Pacific, South American, and Antarctic routes. But, out of this, only the Southern Cross Pool came into being, through the good work of Smallpeice of BOAC and Hudson Fysh and C. O. Turner of QANTAS.

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In January 1958 Smallpeice announced in San Francisco that BOAC would start a round-the-world service via Tokyo in 1959. He also pointed out to the Board at home that BOAC could only operate the San Francisco–Sydney route if it used rights New Zealand already possessed because American permission was likely to be unobtainable. On the 14th QANTAS began London–San Francisco services, introducing Economy-Class fares on them in May. In the meantime, BOAC had begun operating to Chicago on 18 May 1954, at which time the Minister, Alan Lennox-Boyd, had assured Parliament that BOAC had operating rights through to San Francisco.20 But BOAC operations into San Francisco with their own DC-7Cs did not begin until 10 March 1957. In May 1958 Britannia 312s took over. In November, Smallpeice, the Managing Director, decided to extend the service westward to Tokyo to link up with the Comets from London on 31 March 1959. In early March it became known in London that the US Civil Aeronautics Board might delay issuing a permit as Northwest Airlines had filed an objection, even though traffic rights procedures under the UK–USA Bermuda Agreement permitted the British airline’s extension to Tokyo. Both BOAC and the Ministry had assumed that the Americans would, therefore, raise no objections, and BOAC services commenced. Difficulties with the Civil Aeronautics Board in the United States continued, and it was not until pressure was brought to bear on President Eisenhower that his approval of the Tokyo route was obtained and regular BOAC services became possible. All this took until August 1959, and in the meantime BOAC had had a very expensive wait with a route, staff, spares, and aircraft idle.21 Even before Management decided to open the Pacific service, it had become worried by Air India’s operations. The Ministry was sympathetic to a revision of the Anglo-Indian bilateral, but the suggestion made to QANTAS for a Tripartite Pool on the Kangaroo met with hostility. Thus it was decided to go ahead on a pool with Air India. This threat brought QANTAS to change its mind and the Tripartite Kangaroo Pool came into being in December 1959. At the same time, agreement was reached with Trans Canada. The history of the Canadian pool goes back to the war and immediate postwar years, when the pressures were far less severe and most airlines presumed they could fly by themselves. As late as September 1958 the Canadians refused to let BOAC have traffic rights at Toronto until a new bilateral was negotiated. This was delayed and not until 1 March 1960 was BOAC given full rights to Toronto, while Trans Canada Airlines was given access from London to Brussels, Dusseldorf, Zurich, and Vienna. The exchange also provided that BOAC should have rights on the Vancouver–Fiji sector and on the route Britain–Canada–Alaska–Japan–Hong Kong in exchange for cabotage rights between points in the West Indies for Canada. The bilateral was formally signed on 19 August 1960, and shortly thereafter Trans Canada initiated new discussions for a North Atlantic pool, in view of the threat posed by a European consortium called Air Union. By 10 December, Smallpeice for BOAC had brought the TCA–BOAC pool discussions to a successful conclusion.

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182 S p e e d b i r d At the end of 1960 the New Zealand Government decided to acquire the Australian half-share in Tasman Empire Airways and so BOAC at once proposed pooling across the Pacific, using New Zealand’s rights, a connection with BOAC’s services to be made at Los Angeles. (This was realized with Air New Zealand DC-10s in 1974.) In the next few years BOAC also proposed to open a service across the southern Pacific to South America, a route provided for in the 1946 Bermuda Agreement. At the same time, in 1962 the BOAC plans to open a Sydney–Auckland service with Comets caused QANTAS to complain about pooled revenues on this route. Nevertheless, BOAC opened the London–Auckland route on 2 April 1963.

Associated Companies In addition to pooling, BOAC long sought to meet competition and to provide itself with feeder services from outlying areas through the use of associated companies. Many of these had been set up by Imperial Airways as regional operations. The use of the term “associates” was never intended in nationalizing legislation in 1939 and 1946 to be used as a means of setting up the British Independents as rivals to the Corporations who were already well supplied with competition by foreign operators and States. The reasons why Imperial Airways (and British Airways [1936]) established subsidiary or associated companies varied, but usually included the type of operation, local tax, legal, and other requirements. During the Second World War, some of these companies ceased operations. On 28 April 1944, the Chairman of BOAC laid down general principles which looked upon local and feeder services as being of vital importance to the efficiency of the Corporation’s trunk routes and, therefore, that all practicable steps should be taken to see that these were operated efficiently by supplying them with aircraft and through the exercise of as large a measure of control as possible. BOAC’s objectives can be summarized as obtaining feeder-line traffic for the Corporation’s trunk routes while preventing siphoning off onto rivals’ services, exerting influence beneficial to BOAC’s interests, assisting in the strategies for long-term development, trying to make a profit for BOAC in a field not directly open to it, and when requested or urged by the British Government, undertaking activities in the national interest. It was then contemplated that there would be a shortage of hotel accommodations world-wide and that BOAC should also be involved in this field, but it was in fact twenty years before the policy was activated. Then, in 1946, the withdrawal of RAF radio and meteorological installations made it essential that civilian services be provided. For this reason the most successful of BOAC’s subsidiaries, International Aeradio Ltd., was created. By 1948, to foster the development of air travel, the policy was to take a financial interest in local airlines to secure adequate feeder services, to assist in British colonial development, and to preserve markets against competitors. But the full benefits of this policy were slow to

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appear because of the lack of a suitable twin-engined feeder liner with which to replace the Dakota, and the failure to solve the overhaul problem other than by flying the aircraft back to Britain. By 1948, then, the general policy was one of expansion and investment. But unfortunately, like so many policies, it became an axiom which tended to be applied without realism or re-examination as the characteristics of long-range aircraft and of colonial development altered. Moreover, hard facts were obscured by the bilateral smog which had been generated as an aftermath of the Bermuda Agreement. Yet, at least until 1957–1958, BOAC could well argue that the losses on these companies were more than offset by the business they generated, the routes rights they preserved, the competition they restricted, and the British aircraft they bought (though this last was of no direct benefit to BOAC). Not until their consolidated annual losses suddenly shot from £439,228 to £2,532,207 did the Board begin to be alarmed. And not until after the d’Erlanger regime was drastic action taken and the situation once more brought in balance. In the meantime, in the Fifties the Board had begun to exercise tighter control and to place the Corporation’s interests over those of subsidiaries. In September 1952 the ugly head of national policy was once again raised and the Board agreed and told the Minister that if BOAC was to invest in local companies in the national interest, it should be reimbursed for doing so. In November, Captain V.  Wolfson was appointed General Manager of Subsidiaries, and K. W. Bevan, Chief Accountant, BOAC. All of which had the effect of reducing the losses for 1952–1953 to £30,612, most of it because of the poor showing of British West Indian Airways and of Bahamas Airways, while the 10 per cent holding in Aer Lingus was sold off to BEA. Losses of this order were certainly tolerable, especially as there was hope that the delinquent companies could be made profitable. Unfortunately, Wolfson was killed in one of the Comets in 1954; it was decided to abolish his post and a liaison officer, whose position would be less powerful within BOAC, was appointed instead. This was Gilbert Lee, as London Manager Subsidiaries. The result was not disastrous, despite the fact that losses fluctuated from £179,484 in 1953–1954 to £43,192 the next year and £401,224 in 1955–1956. This was the situation when Sir George Cribbett, for reasons noted at the beginning of this chapter, was put in charge of the Associated Companies, with Board instructions to make them profitable. In mid-June 1957 the Board accepted the idea of establishing an umbrella holding company, BOAC Associated Companies Ltd., a decision influenced by the growing capital needs of the subsidiaries and the complexity of their operations, and by the time spent by senior Corporation executives on their affairs. The previous arrangement under which Sir Duncan Cumming as Director (Associated Companies) was responsible simply for the interpretation of BOAC policy to the subordinate companies and for lines of communication was deemed a failure. Under that sort of loose direction, the loss, including interest, for 1956–1957 had reached £767,895.

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184 S p e e d b i r d When BOAC Associated Companies took over on 30 November 1957 it became responsible for the activities of seventeen companies with assets valued at £12,590,538 plus route rights, which were most important at a time when the former colonies were becoming independent. The situation had by now become burdensome due to the need to re-equip many of these companies with modern aircraft priced at ten times or more what Dakotas had cost them. There was also the impact of voluntary and compulsory investment in Middle Eastern area airlines, resulting in a loss of £590,748 for 1957–1958 (including interest because of civil war and the landing of US Marines in Lebanon), £3,094,769 for 1958– 1959, £1,111,608 for 1959–1960 (of which £472,420 was interest), and £2,071,354 for 1960–1961. By November 1958 predicted losses had alarmed the Board and it began to call for a reconsideration of the role and place of associated companies. Returning to its views of June 1952, the Board decided that the policy ought to be to keep the minimum investment which would fulfil the needs of roundthe-world service. The new arrangements then being worked out for the sale of Bahamas Airways and Hong Kong Airways, in which the Corporation retained the right to repurchase, appeared to offer hope. The question was, then, whether or not to extend the policy to the larger companies which were chiefly responsible for the loss: Bahamas Airways, British West Indian Airways (BWIA), and Middle East Airlines (MEA). Sir Francis Brake was appointed by the Board to devote his full energies, though not his full time, to repairing the damage. He left the BOAC Associated Companies (AC) Board at the end of 1958. A year later— and entirely unrelated to Brake’s part-time activities—Sir Duncan Cumming resigned in February 1959 (and in August 1960 was made part-time adviser on African affairs). He was replaced by John Linstead as General Manager. Losses for 1959–1960 lay mainly with Kuwait Airways and British West Indian Airways. The former had been acquired under political duress, while sale of the latter was complicated by the questionable future of the West Indian Federation. By the end of 1959, the fate of Associated Companies was also tied to the Ministerial instruction, “not to be interpreted as a Direction,” that BOAC was to continue to cooperate with the shipping companies. The Ministry proposed that the British Independents be allowed to form a new West Indian airline. The Board agreed that this might be part of the rationalization between BOAC and the Independents. Then in April 1960 discussions took place between the Minister, Duncan Sandys, and the Chairman, d’Erlanger, about a replacement of Sir George Cribbett, by then a sick man. For two weeks Lord Rennell was acting Chairman of the Associated Companies, until it was sensibly decided to give the post to Keith Granville, who had joined Imperial Airways in 1929 and the Board of BOAC on 13 January 1959, having been made Deputy Managing Director of BOAC in 1958. He took over control just before Sir Matthew Slattery became Chairman of BOAC in 1960. With the appointment of Sir Matthew, major changes were undertaken in a determined effort to eliminate the towering deficits. Top members of

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Management were put on the Boards of the Associated Companies; steps were taken, though delayed by politics, to sever connections with the heaviest losers without forfeiting their goodwill. An analysis of the associated companies was made which showed that, in terms of the interline value of their feeder traffic, as of April 1962 this could be worth to the Corporation anywhere from £500 to £225,000 a year for Aden, Bahamas, Cathay Pacific, Fiji, Kuwait, Malayan, and Borneo Airways, Gulf Aviation, and Türk Hava Yolları (THY, the Turkish national airline). In the meantime, losses for 1961–1962 hit £4,403,811 (including £1,468,000 attributable to the sale of BWIA and MEA, and £1,000,000 put in a reserve), but in the following year they were drastically reduced to £866,225. A continuous review of these ancillary companies was undertaken throughout 1962 and, as a result, by May 1963 Granville could tell the Board that the difficulties of the three previous years had been successfully overcome. In 1963–1964 the position was reversed, with a profit of £158,000, for which much credit must go to Keith Granville and his team. The reasons why the associated companies tended to be a headache for BOAC were the diversity of their locales, political and commercial operating problems, the rising cost of new aircraft, and the shortage of qualified executives with which to manage them within the over-all framework of BOAC’s operations. At the same time, as the following brief account indicates, their value to the Corporation fluctuated. While such likely places as the West Indies became a growing source of losses as the former colonies approached independence, such unlikely ones as the Persian Gulf proved by careful management and resistance to local expansionist ideas to be profitable. The greater range of modern airliners has eliminated many intermediate stopping places, if indeed the cost of jet airfields has not eliminated all but the most wealthy, making the value of some subsidiaries doubtful.

BOAC and the Associated Companies The idea of a BOAC–West Indian connection developed during the wartime flights of the Boeing 314s and was included in 1944 planning proposals. British West Indian Airways, founded in 1939 and a BOAC investment from 1943, was based in Trinidad. But in 1946 BOAC was told that services from Bermuda south would be in the British South American Airways sphere of influence. When BSAA was merged into BOAC, the latter obtained a wholly owned subsidiary operating Dakotas (DC-3s). BOAC wanted to order twelve Viscounts for BWIA, which demurred, then changed its mind, so they did not enter service until December 1955. Though the general Board principle was that once a subsidiary had been placed on a sound basis, it should be left to get on with the job, an investigation of BWIA soon revealed that, while excellent operationally, it was commercially in need of a thorough overhaul. The trouble was that government departments pressed for uneconomic services for which they were unwilling to pay. What happened to BWIA after the introduction of the Viscounts could in

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186 S p e e d b i r d part be explained by the fact that Viscounts cost £346,000 each vs. the £18,000 of a refurbished Dakota. But it was much more through extravagance and inefficiency at the local Management level, together with political backing without financial responsibility. Only when the policy from London became more determined was a remedy found. On the other hand, with its new Viscounts, BWIA spread its wings to Bermuda and New York. Almost at once the Miles Thomas blind spot, engineering costs, reflected in delayed departures, came to the surface. Forecast at 40d. per capacity ton mile, they were actually 62d. (versus Middle East Airlines’ actual 38d.). In two years the loss had shot up from the £11,931 of 1954–1955 to £304,678 in 1956–1957. Though losses were pruned by an expert BOAC manager, Derek Glover, seconded to BWIA, independence was looming and Trans Canada, which had started services to the Caribbean in 1948, refused to enter a pool. Nor were results, which grew still worse, helped by the Ministry’s granting direct Trinidad–New York rights to Varig of Brasil. In anticipation of independence, BOAC suggested that the Government should lend the new Federation money so that it could invest in BWIA, but the Colonial Office refused. At the same time, Parliamentary pressure at home forced BOAC to withdraw its subsidy (under the agreement of 17 October 1952) and four Viscounts. Trans Canada suggested joining BOAC in BWIA, but these negotiations were still incomplete in 1960 when Sir Matthew Slattery became Chairman of BOAC and laid down that the Corporation could not carry the burdens of uncommercial services desired by local governments. He suggested that the home Government buyout BOAC’s share and make it a gift to the Federation. Again, London refused. BOAC threatened liquidation, and finally the Government of Trinidad, before a local election, bought the airline to save 3,000 jobs. Eventually, in August 1962, the British Government agreed to buy four Viscounts from BOAC for £630,000 and gave them to BWIA, but Trinidad refused them, so BOAC was not paid by the Colonial Office. Concurrently, Air Jamaica was created, largely with BWIA and BOAC capital.22 Bahamas Airways Ltd. (BAL) was another case of a feeder line which suffered from a variety of problems. The causes of the company’s financial problems were three. First, on the Miami–Nassau run it had to compete with Pan Am, whose southern maintenance base was at Miami and who could thus use short hours before overhauls on first-line aircraft to serve the Miami–Nassau route and charge fares into which no overheads had to be figured. Second, the Bahamas Government actively sought tourism, and to encourage it allowed services by US airlines from anywhere in the United States to any airstrip in the islands, thus by-passing Miami, Bahamas Airways’ only port of call in the United States. Third, the Bahamas Government was solidly opposed to fare increases on domestic routes. Under these circumstances, BOAC was happy to divest itself of BAL to Cunard-Eagle, which could not make a profit out of it either. By the end of the Slattery regime in December 1963, BOAC had lost about £5,500,000 in BWIA and another £1,000,000 in Bahamas and had had enough. In the

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future it would make, as Slattery had suggested, commercial judgments about investments in feeders. In Africa BOAC’s role gradually shifted from partnership in subsidiary companies to Commonwealth pool partner, with added complications, already related, of the enforced participation with the British Independents in the traffic generated. The associations had existed before the Second World War, when Imperial Airways had been involved both with Wilson Airways and with Rhodesia and Nyasaland Airways in East Africa, and with the Elder Dempster Lines in West Africa as a link from Khartoum to the proposed British Airways (1936) service to South America. Plans to revive Elder were scuppered by the Labour Order-in-Council of 1946 which established the West African Airways Corporation. In 1947 the Ministry tried to make BOAC financially responsible for WAAC’s Lagos-based Dakota services, but the Corporation refused, though BOAC did run services until 31 March 1948. After that, WAAC ran feeder services with seconded BOAC crews. In 1950 it decided to recruit its own pilots and in 1963 the first local service with an all-Nigerian crew started. In June 1954 Hunting-Clan/Airwork began Colonial Coach services around the coast to Accra. As independence started to emerge in 1956, BOAC faced the possibility of Pan Am or KLM running the new national airlines. But energetic BOAC work resulted in a 40 per cent investment in Ghana Airways. BOAC provided Stratocruiser services to London at a loss until Britannias could be introduced, starting on 16 July 1958. The creation of Ghana Airways caused the dissolution of the older WAAC and the formation of Nigerian Airways, in which BOAC and Elder Dempster both had minority investments. Ghana then got ambitious, obtained Ilyushin 18s from Russia, and entered into a pool with Alitalia to Rome. BOAC cancelled the London–Accra pool, and British United and Cunard-Eagle moved into the picture. But Ghana’s independence was shortlived for it had bought two VC-10s but made no provision to maintain them. BOAC, anxious to protect the VC-10’s reputation, was, therefore, more than willing to work with Ghana once again, an arrangement on which more will be said later. Meanwhile, in 1958 the new Nigerian Airways had entered into a fifteen-year agreement with BOAC, but in the spring of 1961 this was reduced to ten with the assumption that at the end of that period Nigerian crews would be ready for overseas operations. Pressure was then brought on BOAC to introduce Comet 4s on the West African route. As the Slattery review of Associated Companies found that this would pay off, a new agreement for a pool was signed in April 1963 reducing the fifteen-year agreement to eight. At the end of the Second World War the nationalized Central African airlines became Central African Airways Corporation. In 1949 BOAC was asked to make what turned out to be a politically hot investigation of CAAC and, as a result, a BOAC manager was put in. The improvements allowed CAAC to start on 3 April 1953 a Colonial Coach service from Salisbury to London in parallel with BOAC’s

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188 S p e e d b i r d Hermes tourist services. In June 1956 the Vikings were changed to Viscounts and CAAC joined the BOAC–South African Airways pool partnership. But then the British Independents began Colonial Coach services with the idea of getting into CAAC and the pressure was put on BOAC to start a Britannia service. BOAC wanted to include East African Airways too, but the competition was such that BOAC was forced to pay CAAC £500,000 for the privilege of operating its longrange services. The new pool preserved the Central African market for BOAC but was bitterly attacked by Conservative critics at home who claimed that it was aimed to destroy the Independents. Yet a year later BOAC helped Airwork preserve Sudan Airways against competition, though in the end BOAC itself had to charter Comets to Sudan. The whole BOAC building operation in Central Africa was capped in mid-1960 by D. H. Glover’s successful negotiation of the Quadripartite Pool in which East African Airways joined. It was one of the capstones of the Slattery–Smallpeice regime, but one which was not due to last because of commercial and political complexities. Services to East Africa had long been part of the Corporation’s operations when civil status returned in 1946. East African Airways was created by an Order-in-Council for Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, and Zanzibar. Through services to London were restarted by Yorks on 4 December 1947. Traffic increased considerably when the governments agreed to a new leave policy and on 2 April 1957 East African Airways Corporation entered a pool with BOAC. In September it took over BOAC’s Dar-es-Salaam services and then started a Nairobi–Aden– Bombay service. In 1958 BOAC arranged financing for EAAC Comets, hiring engines to EAAC to bring the borrowings within EAAC’s capacity so as not to have to guarantee the British loan. EAAC talked of not using Comets, so BOAC purchased two for them on condition that it operated all EAAC’s long-range services and that the governments entered into a leave-traffic agreement. But the governments decided EAAC should own its own aircraft, so BOAC got only the leave contract. By 1961 EAAC was doing so well that it bought a third Comet, BOAC again buying the engines, and entered into a pool with another BOAC subsidiary, Aden Airways. The black African boycott of South Africa ended the Quadripartite Springbok Pool on 12 October 1963 with EAAC’s withdrawal. With British United in the area and things unsettled politically by the granting of independence, at the end of the Slattery regime the future was unclear. In the Far East the growing non-stop range of modern aircraft caused ambi­ tious local companies backed by nationalistic governments to seek ever-widening route networks. Thus the feeder companies in Malaya and Hong Kong eventually came into conflict, both with each other and with that powerful independent, Cathay Pacific. Malayan Airways had been founded in 1938 by Imperial Airways and two shipping companies with Far Eastern interest and Hong Kong Airways in 1947. Both operated in part until BOAC could get the necessary aircraft, and in both it was BOAC policy to have local shareholding. The Governor of Hong Kong decided that the way to deal with competition was to allocate all routes

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south to Cathay Pacific and all to the north to Hong Kong Airways. As the latter, except for Tokyo, were useless when Mao’s China emerged the victor of the civil war in 1949, BOAC sold out to Jardine, Matheson. In 1951 the London Government proposed that everyone join a regional company, but as BOAC wanted the Singapore–Hong Kong sector for a round-the-world service, it demurred. In 1953 the Corporation changed its mind, but the Minister decided to wait. After further negotiations, BOAC agreed to invest £900,000 in two Viscounts for Hong Kong Airways to get it back again. At about the same time, Mansfield & Co. of Singapore and its shipping allies decided to get out of running Malayan Airways under political pressure for public participation, and so BOAC agreed in principle in April 1956 to invest £625,000, or more if needed. In May 1957 the new governments of Malaysia and Singapore agreed to join BOAC and QANTAS in the company, and BOAC was then forced also to invest in the new Borneo Airways to prevent that going under. At last by 1960 the situation had stabilized. In the meantime, the Hong Kong problem had gone through complicated manoeuvres to establish a British regional airline at least as far back as 1951, which ended with Butterfield & Swire controlling both Cathay Pacific and Hong Kong Airways, with BOAC and Jardine, Matheson each having one seat on the Board. This in turn led to a rapprochement with QANTAS regarding Malayan Airways. By mid-1959 BOAC and Cathay Pacific had worked out a pooling arrangement for the Tokyo service, with Cathay operating Lockheed Electras from Hong Kong to Tokyo. In 1961 BOAC agreed to help Cathay finance a 707 and at the same time decided to open a parallel Hong Kong–Sydney service with both QANTAS and Cathay Pacific. The next year things became even more pacific when Cathay and Malayan were persuaded to pool with Thai International. This enabled Malayan to expand to the point where it could use Comets no longer needed by Kuwait and to buy additional surplus BOAC aircraft just as it became Malaysian Airways in November 1963. The one other Asian associate was Air Ceylon, whose story is taken up later (see Chapter XIII). The remaining complexity in associated companies was that in the Middle East—that amorphous area between the Balkans and India, including Egypt and Aden. Both politically and commercially it was and remains one of shifting sands. For these reasons BOAC had to establish more subsidiary companies there than in any other area, and more than it wanted because of the conflicting views of Arabs and Jews, Turks and Greeks, BEA and BOAC. In 1938 Imperial Airways had invested in Palestine Air Transport and during the Second World War BOAC had operated all over the Middle East and was involved eventually with Misr Airwork, Palestine Airways, Iraqi Airways, Middle East Airlines of Lebanon, Eagle Airlines of Iran, Malta Airways, and the idea of Aden Airways. It was not until 1947 that an attempt was made to rationalize all these Topsy-like commitments, including withdrawal from MEA and Misr.

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190 S p e e d b i r d In the very complex developments of those days BOAC had to keep Arab goodwill, guard the oil-rich Persian Gulf against Pan Am and TWA (especially since Pan Am had taken an interest in MEA), and be prepared to shift with the winds of the Arab–Israeli conflict. This all took expert intelligence. (In one case all the notes of conversations and the correspondence between a Gulf sheikh and an American airline executive were in BOAC Headquarters in London within four days of the meeting.) Then in 1950 a man named Frederick Bosworth (the model for Nevil Shute’s hero in Round the Bend) appeared in the Gulf. He started a small company, refused Ministry pressure to amalgamate with Skyways, and proceeded to establish his own Gulf Aviation. Bosworth began to expand, but was unfortunately killed in a crash in England, and so BOAC bought his company to keep it out of hostile hands. It was always a good investment. Meanwhile Aden Airways had begun to develop in the usual pattern, with feeder operations to Khartoum, Nairobi, Addis Ababa, Riyadh, Jeddah, Suakin, Asmara, and Cairo. In 1951 BOAC had it restricted to local services, taking over Cairo–Aden–Nairobi itself. Various schemes were tried, but no clear solution emerged in the Fifties. Cyprus Airways, in which BEA had investments, poached into the Gulf. The one cloud on the horizon was Kuwait as oil finds transformed the Trucial Coast and the southern side of the Gulf. Relations with Kuwait remained touchy and finally resulted in an investment in Kuwait National Airlines in 1958, which cost £100,000 in the first year. The Minister, Watkinson, told BOAC to do this as the matter was of urgent concern to the Foreign Secretary. When BOAC asked for the money which the Minister had—the Board thought—pledged, it was told that there was no prospect of getting it, but that this exceptional case could be mentioned in the Annual Report. The Board felt it had been gulled into an expensive agreement by false promises. The losses, too, proved much larger than anticipated.23 No wonder that one of Slattery’s first acts was to divest BOAC of what was then regarded as this albatross, a feat he accomplished in 1963. Ironically, rapid changes then occurred and by 1977 Kuwait Airways was a valued British Airways pool partner. To help the British aircraft industry, to prevent the Turks from buying Convair 440s, and to be assured of transit rights if necessary, in 1957 BOAC invested in THY, the Turkish national airlines, and loaned it £1,500,000 to enable it to buy Viscounts, and invested £500,000, which by 1977 had been recovered. But the biggest, and sometimes most controversial BOAC involvement was in Middle East Airlines, in the Middle East Aircraft Service Company (MASCO), and in Associated British Airlines (Middle East) Ltd. (ABAMEL). In mid-1954 BOAC appointed Sheikh Najib Alamuddin its Middle Eastern adviser. Shortly thereafter, when Pan Am decided to get out of MEA, BOAC saw it as the key to the area and to security at Beirut. By May 1955 BOAC owned 74.5 per cent of MEA.

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The Corporation was encouraged by the Government to establish ABAMEL as a means to consolidate the interests of BOAC, BEA, and the Independents in the Middle East. It was also agreed to set up MASCO as a central servicing depot. In these adventures the Independents only briefly participated due to a lack of capital. Slattery also sold off most of this operation as the threat of an American servicing base had never materialized. The combination of the 1956 Suez crisis, the costs of re-equipping MEA with Viscounts, the over-involvement in MASCO, and the 1958 agreement to let BEA run a London–Cyprus–Beirut–Bahrain service for a year with the ultimate objective of a BEA–MEA–Cyprus pool (which soon became a straight BEA–MEA–BOAC pool), when coupled with the Lebanese Government’s rationalization to eliminate Lebanese competition and the US Marines landing, created a crisis. MEA became very short of working capital. The MASCO overdraft, which BOAC had guaranteed, was called in. BOAC, with the approval of the Ministry and the Treasury, paid off the MASCO indebtedness and thereby also saved MEA, which was wholly dependent on MASCO for its engineers. During the summer, when the BOAC Board traditionally did not meet, MEA was loaned £100,000 a month. In September 1958, studies showed that although MEA was losing money, it still brought BOAC £250,000 a year and was worth keeping both as a toehold in the Middle East and because of its value to the British aircraft industry. But in 1958–1959 MEA lost £2,000,000, double the prediction. At this stage the Ministry and BOAC wanted to make severe changes; instead, after negotiations, they sold out 51 per cent to Sheikh Alamuddin and Lebanese associates and obtained Treasury support for the sale of four Comet 4Cs to MEA, but not until after the shrewd Sheikh had threatened to buy American. In November 1961 an agreement was made to sell MASCO to MEA. Thus, by the time Slattery came in, MEA was well on the road to financial independence and soon bought BOAC out on 16 August 1961. While the Minister, Thorneycroft, agreed with BOAC’s policy, the problem of MASCO remained. In the end, BOAC had to repurchase it and write it off as part of the lost capital. When Slattery proposed, as a further part of the clean-up, that BOAC get out of Kuwait and the Ministry surprisingly agreed, it was arranged that MEA should step in, which suited everyone. But this happy arrangement was long denied consummation by the Treasury, so BOAC continued to lose £300,000 a year on Kuwait until the agreement expired in May 1963. By then the oil business was gaining momentum and BOAC was not so anxious to leave the area as to get out of Kuwait Airways. BOAC then found itself embroiled in getting a Comet from Mexicana for Kuwait, only to have in due course the airline nationalized and decide to run international services itself. In all of the Kuwait operation BOAC acted in the national interest, but without the financial support it had expected from the Government.24 It was only at the very end of the period that something of commercial value to the Corporation appeared.

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192 S p e e d b i r d

Conclusion In general, in the Slattery years, BOAC’s policy was to disengage its capital and to run down or reduce its involvement in associated companies. With this in mind, in the latter years of the Slattery regime, and later, BOAC got out of BWIA, MEA, and Kuwait, as well as Bahamas Airways, and reduced its holding in Gulf Aviation. The Select Committee on Nationalized Industries was critical in its 1962 Report (xxvii) of the Government’s handling of BOAC and its associated companies. Moreover, it was sceptical of the correctness of Ministry statements that, with the exception of Kuwait, all BOAC’s investments in subsidiary and associated companies had been taken in the end upon the Corporation’s own commercial judgment. In his secret report, Mr. John Corbett was critical of the management of associated companies’ affairs in the late 1950s and cited specifically the vagueness of the proposal presented to the Board as the basis for investment in the Turkish airline THY and the weakness of a Board that agreed on such flimsy evidence in 1957.25 In the White Paper of November 1963, the Ministry went back to 1947 to prove that BOAC losses in these companies totalled £15,300,000, and noted that for four of the last seven years in which the greatest losses, £12,300,000, had accrued, Sir George Cribbett, sometime Deputy Secretary of the Ministry, had been guiding BOAC Associated Companies. In judging the involvement with associated companies, it must be remembered that strong views were held among Management; and the Board tried to act not only in the national interest and at variance with BOAC’s commercial desires, but also in ways that it felt would be best for the future of British interests in areas in which nationalism of various sorts was a constantly growing factor. Many associated companies were also contact points in which seconded BOAC personnel made valuable friends for future liaisons in pooling and other matters in the years ahead. The vicissitudes of the associated companies were related, as was the history of BOAC itself, to the turnover in its Chairmen and the even more frequent changing of Ministers. But, whereas the Corporation’s results could be measured in its Annual Reports, the benefits accruing for the associated companies could not be so precisely determined. Moreover, in BOAC itself, no serious attempt was ever made to explain to staff that associated companies’ interests were a vital part of the Corporation’s own. This resulted in John Linstead, former General Manager, BOAC AC, feeling in 1978 that many in BOAC regarded the associated companies as expensive appendages and had treated them accordingly. There was also a failure in London to understand that the more than 100 local Directors often faced a conflict between the interests of their own companies and BOAC. In certain BOAC circles it was felt that BOAC’s mistake was to be too influenced by politics, by the fear of the competition getting in, and by inadequate assessment of the commercial benefits to BOAC of feeder traffic. This was partly because of

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the lack of administrative machinery and managerial techniques until the Sixties to quantify these assessments, and partly due to the weakness of the Board. Slattery and Granville took the steps needed to rationalize the holdings in the associated companies which the losses of the late Fifties compelled. Slattery recommended strengthening the Board. After Granville had completed the job of making BOAC Associated Companies Ltd. profitable, this was done, under Guthrie in 1964.

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54. Sir Gerard d’Erlanger, BOAC Chairman, 1956–1960.

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Chapter IX Aircraft Procurement: Turbo-Prop and Big Jet Introduction With 80 per cent of the Corporation’s capital involved in aeroplanes, aircraft procurement must once again be examined. By 1956 the rearmament boom was fading away. American firms were grabbing an increasingly large share of the international aircraft market. Then in 1957 the White Paper on Defence (Cmnd.124) in its reliance on missiles and reduced professional Services implied a vast change in the aircraft industry. While it was being drafted, the Transport Aircraft Requirements Committee was revived. A year later the Minister told the industry that in future orders would go only to the strong, viable units.1 It was also stressed that from then on civil airliners would have to be private ventures and the De Havilland Trident was used as a stick to beat this into the industry’s head. Yet, a Gallup poll showed that 78 per cent of the public thought it the Government’s duty to see that aircraft were available for the Corporations.2 In May 1958 the Ministry of Supply said it would consider aiding certain civil projects, the supersonic transport being a case in point.3 In November, in the face of increasing American competition, Air Commodore F. R. Banks, an engines expert, called for the formation of a Ministry of Aviation to provide a cohesive policy. At the same time, there was a very sharp drop in the proportion of military orders. These fell from 79 per cent of the aircraft industry’s business in 1954–1955 to 54 per cent in 1959–1960 (and would go on down to 30 per cent by 1962–1963). Under these circumstances the Air Registration Board began to worry about the effect on civil airworthiness of the cutback in military research. In September 1959 the Society of British Aircraft Constructors issued a six-point programme calling, among other things, for a “Focus of Authority” and for operational development and proving of new aircraft by the Services and the Corporations. Parliamentary attacks on the Ministry of Supply helped cause the creation of the Ministry of Aviation in which were merged the civil aviation side of the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation and the personnel of the Ministry of Supply. Pressure on the industry produced a series of mergers, resulting in the emergence of two conglomerates, the British Aircraft Corporation and the Hawker-Siddeley Group, which all but dominated the scene. Early in 1960 the new Ministry of Aviation announced it would, in return for financial safeguards, help in the development of certain approved civil aeroplanes and engines. But in May the Blue Streak stand-off weapon was scratched from the missile race (though it survived as

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55. The Bristol Britannia 102 for Empire routes (1955–1966). The vibration-less turboprops were very popular but had flame-out problems that led to a Cabinet discussion.

a scientific project), just one of the many multi-million-pound projects handled by the Ministry of Supply which came to nothing, and over which financial control was virtually nonexistent, as a whole series of Estimates Committee Reports indicated.4 The purchase by BOAC of the Britannias, the Comet 4s, the 707s, the VC-10s, and of the Concorde were all affected by these conditions.

The Bristol Britannia As early as 1940 BOAC began to explore the idea of an aircraft using four Bristol Centaurus engines. The first such eventually became the Hermes, the second the Britannia.5 In February 1947 the Ministry invited several firms to tender for the design. The specification leaked out in October and was heavily criticized in The Aeroplane (17 October 1947, 535) which pointed out that it was inferior to the Constellations then in use. In private, Peter Masefield, then in the Ministry, told Whitney Straight that the Bristol 175 (later called the Britannia) was 23,000 pounds heavier than the Argonaut, which already came very close to BOAC’s Medium-Range Empire specification and was shortly thereafter purchased as such. The Corporation, Straight replied, was not at all anxious to take an inferior version of the same thing five years later.6 Nevertheless, BOAC decided to go ahead with the aircraft because it was a non-dollar hedge against trouble with the Comet and against buying American aircraft in 1954. However, it was recognized that a great deal had to be done if the 175 was to be in service in 1954 and if it was to

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be made so that turbo-prop engines could be installed in two to three years. On 4 February 1948 BOAC was told that it would have the second production aircraft by late 1951, eighteen by January 1954 and the complete order of twenty-five by July. Early development was complicated by the fact that the Ministry of Supply was an intermediary and regarded the Britannia as “our aircraft.” In September 1948 BOAC proposed internally that the aircraft be redesigned to give greater potential for the period after 1955 in view of the fact that the orders for Hermes and Argonauts filled the interim period. It was also suggested that the redesign should be the best possible one and not tied to any preconceived stage lengths. Masefield replied from the Ministry that BOAC had to decide what was the operational objective and what was the 175’s relationship to the Comet and to the Argonaut and the Hermes. At the same time, he stressed that it would be fatal to try to stretch the 175 into an Atlantic type when it was designed for short-range flights from tropical airfields. However, to forestall an unwanted BBC story about the aircraft, on 12 November the Corporation, the Ministries, and Bristol agreed to announce approval of the Britannia. Six days later the Ministry was told that BOAC had no time for a long-range Empire type and that the 175 would fulfil its Atlantic needs, along with Stratocruisers. In the meantime, the Board had in June 1948 approved an order for twenty-five Centaurus-powered Britannias, but placing of the order was delayed by the Hanbury-Williams investigation into ordering procedures. The actual contract, therefore, was not placed until mid-1949, when the Ministry of Supply ordered the prototypes and BOAC the production models. But before BOAC and Bristol finally agreed, there was a dispute over the £450,000 price, which BOAC felt was high enough to make it uneconomic to “fly British.” Late delivery dates and a slow rate of production also worried the Board, which foresaw an increasingly expensive aircraft and a BOAC fleet composed in 1954 of eight aircraft types with six different kinds of engines. The contract was barely two months old when Sir Miles Thomas told an official meeting that BOAC wanted to cancel the 175 in view of the fact that the Comet was two years ahead of schedule, because the 175 as promised for 1955 delivery was a Centaurus-powered, piston-engined aircraft rather than a turbo-prop, and because BOAC was being pressed by the Government to conform with the policy of capital retrenchment. The Ministry of Supply replied that this would leave Bristol unemployed, which was unacceptable in the national interest, unless BOAC would order Brabazons. Nevertheless, it was decided that if the Minister, Lord Pakenham, agreed, BOAC could cancel its order. Unfortunately for BOAC, the Cabinet had decided to cut back RAF Transport Command and this meant cancelling the order for the Handley Page Hastings (the military Hermes), which had Bristol Centaurus engines. This in January 1950 put paid to any hope BOAC had of cancelling the aircraft. But the almost concurrent success of the Viscount suddenly made the turbo-prop look like the economic hope of the future. Thus by early 1950 the Centaurus Britannia had been cancelled and the Proteus turbo-prop version substituted. Then the Korean War intervened to

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198 S p e e d b i r d slow production, but when it ended in 1953 the Britannia was given top priority. By May BOAC had decided to ask for a stretched version for the North Atlantic, despite the fact that the price had now risen to £775,000 per aircraft. The Ministry of Supply was asked for a development contract to cover the 5,000 hours flying which BOAC believed was necessary so that the Britannia would not enter service without being fully modified. This was refused. The alternative of a mail-andfreight contract also met with sympathy at the lower levels of the Ministry of Civil Aviation, but was viewed with disfavour elsewhere. The first Britannia prototype flew on 16 August 1952 and was not retired from duty by Bristol until 30 November 1960. The second caught fire in the air and was written off. The subsequent need to modify the reduction gear in all Proteus engines caused a delay of a year and another rise in price. It was by then 1954. The problems causing the withdrawal of the Comets made it necessary for the Britannia to have a water-tank pressure test. The first production aircraft, promised for late 1951, rolled out in September 1954 and was promptly sent on manufacturer’s flying trials. Bristol now agreed to new delivery dates which, while allowing nothing for contingencies, promised all twenty-five aircraft by the end of 1956, including the modified long-range machines ordered in early 1954. BOAC began to plan on services starting in April 1956. Apart from the normal development from the model 102 to the 312, BOAC had not asked for any major airframe changes. In fact, by the mid-Fifties 80 per cent of all modifications made to BOAC aircraft came from the manufacturers. By March 1955 a new difficulty appeared. Despite some £6,500,000 in progress payments and increases in price which raised the cost of the 312s to £950,000 apiece, Bristol was in serious financial difficulties. To help it out, BOAC agreed—after the Ministry of Supply assured the Ministry of Civil Aviation that no technical setbacks in the programme were likely—to pay half the difference between the cost of the 102s and 312s on order. Nevertheless, to be on the safe side, BOAC ordered ten Douglas DC-7Cs. Then in August 1955 it signed a contract for an additional eight Britannias, a commitment which had been delayed so as to give Bristol a chance to sell the aircraft to airlines in North America. BOAC began route-proving flights on 9 September. By mid-October it was obvious that serious difficulties had been encountered in the engines. It was then thought this would delay the introduction of the 102s by three months. And, though the first two certificated aircraft were accepted in December 1955, the Air Registration Board stopped flying in February 1956 when low air temperatures resulted in controls freezing. This was only the beginning of very serious troubles. On 4 April one of the Britannias flew into a tropical front in Central Africa and all four engines flamed out in succession, and on another flight to Copenhagen a compressor failed and an engine seized. By the time Sir Miles Thomas left the Corporation, it was becoming apparent that very serious problems had been encountered. He asked that the new Chairman be fully informed about these. BOAC seriously debated cancelling its order, but decided instead on 10 May

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56. The Britannia cockpit. Note the extra windows over the captain so that he could see the runway on approach. The cockpit was so quiet that it was said you could hear the fuses popping.

1956 to go ahead. Its five 300 series aircraft were given up to Northeast Airlines (which, however, reneged on its order) for the Boston–Miami service and further 312s ordered to replace them. BOAC increased the retention fund per aircraft from £100,000 to £250,000. By mid-June intensive trials at Entebbe were thought to have discovered the cause of the flame-outs. The date for scheduled services was put off indefinitely, for modifications had to be made and another series of trials conducted. The installation of automatic relighting did not solve the problem. Therefore, work was undertaken to find the basic cause as well as the cure for the problem. At the same time, despite strong protests from Bristol, BOAC cancelled the order for sixty Orion engines with which the Britannias were ultimately to have been repowered. This proved wise as Bristol later discovered that they could not have been installed without rebuilding the wings.7 It now became possible that the Air Registration Board would give the aircraft only a limited Certificate of Airworthiness, so BOAC, regarding such as useless, stood strongly on its contractual

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200 S p e e d b i r d rights. On 13 September the Board, having had a phone call from Captain J. N. Weir, Chief of Flight Operations, that the aircraft in which he had been flying over Malaya on trials had had all four engines flame out, decided to refuse to accept any more Britannias until their troubles were cured. At Bristol it was agreed to call in the Royal Aircraft Establishment and National Gas Turbine Establishment (NGTE) to help. Unfortunately for BOAC, its rivals had in the interim not only re-equipped with DC-6s and Super Constellations but also with DC-7Cs, and so BOAC believed that after March 1957 it would be in great trouble. The Board, therefore, decided to insist that, rather than abandon the contract, it should receive fully certificated Britannias as the Corporation could not operate without them. Thus, it would have to accede to Bristol’s request for additional payments to keep the production line going, because any further holdups would have serious consequences for the Corporation itself. But the Air Registration Board then decided to modify the flight manual of the 102s and BOAC at once informed Bristol that it regarded the Certificate of Airworthiness as having been withdrawn. New trials with glowplugs solved the relighting problem, but did not prevent flame-outs caused by large pieces of dry ice breaking off in the intakes and extinguishing individual chambers. The manufacturers at once asked BOAC to accept more aircraft so they could get more money, rather than resorting to bank credits. On 16 November 1956, therefore, with adequate safeguards, BOAC agreed to take four more of the thirty-three aircraft, dropped the retention fund to £25,000 per aircraft delivered, and signed a contract for 120 engines and thirty power plants. A month later, after the Chief Engineer reported that glowplugs were satisfactory, if expensive (£180,000 a year for replacements), it was agreed to start services on 1 February 1957 to South Africa and to Australia a month later. This could not be done sooner because crews had to be reallocated to Britannias. By the time services started with 102s they had accumulated 7,860 hours. But this was not enough. There were such bad delays that Sydney–London services were over twenty-four hours late more than 25 per cent of the time. At one point every spare Proteus was either at Bristol under repair or on an aircraft, leaving none to cover emergencies. Moreover, flame-outs were still common, one aircraft experiencing eleven in eight minutes! It was decided to maintain services by operating below 16,000 feet, even though this cost £5,180 a week in lost payload on the Tokyo service alone. Since these troubles were still occurring in October 1957, the Minister raised the matter with the Cabinet, at which level it became enmeshed in the difficulties over the 312 and in the even more crucial matter of Bristol’s financial survival. The latter in itself served to emphasize the need to consolidate the British aircraft industry into units that had the resources with which to cope with all the ramifications of highly complex, extremely costly, new aircraft. In the meantime, the first 312, with a lengthened fuselage and a long-range wing, flew at the end of 1956. In February 1957 the Board agreed to change BOAC’s order from seven 300s with the old wing and eleven 312s with the new to eighteen of

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57. Pomp and circumstance. Her Majesty the Queen is welcomed by Sir Miles Thomas, among other officers in 1956 on her return from an overseas trip.

the latter. Plans were rushed to get them on service on the North Atlantic in the face of competition from Israel’s El Al Britannias. But, when in May 1957 the first 312 was delivered to BOAC, it was down 9 per cent on its range. Modifications were delayed by Bristol’s efforts to meet American certification requirements for Northeast Airlines, which they were unable to do for a year. Because of these delays, the Board voted not to make any more payments to Bristol. The manufacturer not only demanded payments, it asked BOAC to give up seven of its production places so that sales could be made to TWA.8 BOAC refused for operational reasons. It is understood that Bristol took the matter to the Cabinet but lost, for even if Bristol could have accelerated its production rate from one and a half aircraft a month (versus Douglas’s sixteen a month for the DC-7) to meet the TWA demand for thirty machines by mid-1958, BOAC had a good case for compensatory payments and for buying more American DC-7Cs. Nevertheless, BOAC had to spend a month planning how to do without the Britannias, which also involved delaying the sale of the Constellations. The crisis came on 7 August 1957, when the Board was asked to agree to the TWA proposal by the next day. It responded by saying it would do what was desired in the national interest, but that this would cost

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202 S p e e d b i r d BOAC £3,021,000 in 1958–1959 alone unless reimbursed by Bristol. It also pointed out that, as the engines in the Britannia were not flame-out proof and nor did the aircraft at that time have trans-Atlantic range, subsequent results might be disastrous to British prestige, especially if the American authorities refused to certificate the aircraft. In the event, TWA did not order anyway. BOAC had also to keep Stratocruisers going, even though they were nearly ten years old in the summer of 1958. Bristol was given an ultimatum that BOAC would cancel its order if the aircraft was not certificated by December 1957. This produced the Certificate of Airworthiness in two weeks, even though the machine was still 7 per cent down on range and could only fly London–New York non-stop 60 per cent of the time. It was only at this time, in the wake of the loss of the TWA order, that the Gardner Committee (composed of Bristol, BOAC, the RAF, and the NGTE), set up to solve the flame-out problem, got full Government backing as part of a national effort. Even so, this did not avoid the unfortunate seizure of two of the four engines on 312 G-AOVB, forcing it to land at Miami, Florida, to await engine changes. It was then discovered that the Air Registration Board had prohibited the Britannias from flying for any length of time in icing conditions. While this could be accepted on Eastern and Southern routes, it was impossible on the North Atlantic, where rigid air traffic control existed. As far as BOAC was concerned, the certification of the 312s was invalid. Once again the Britannias came before the Cabinet. At the Minister’s request, the Chairman provided him with a paper which showed that the loss to BOAC

58. Servicing a Britannia during a routine fuelling stop at Khartoum, Sudan.

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due to delays with the aircraft had and would amount to £18,000,000 a year on the Atlantic alone, 65 per cent of it in dollars. Moreover, though BOAC had been subsidized to “fly British” after the war, it had not expected that a dozen years later it would still be faced with the sort of imperfect, unproved aircraft which the industry had produced in the Britannia. As d’Erlanger wrote to the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation in October 1957, “If we had had a free commercial hand, we would have rejected the 312s and claimed damages from Bristol.” Despite having paid Bristol some £12,000,000 by October 1957, BOAC was still being asked to bail out the aircraft industry at a time when it no longer had the resources to do so. Moreover, the pilots disliked having their professional competence challenged by Ministerial statements declaring that all was well. The Chairman concluded by saying that BOAC wanted either a subsidy or permission to cancel the Britannia and replace it with ten more DC-7Cs. The story of the Britannia was not unique, however, for other airliners had problems as well, notably the engine fires in the Constellations and, of course, the fatal failures of the Comet 1s. On 29 October the Board was called once again into emergency session, the Chairman noting that his letter had caused a flurry of meetings with Ministers (for none of which minutes exist) and that a Cabinet Committee under Lord Mills had been set up to look into the Britannia problem in detail. Assured by the Royal Aircraft Establishment that a solution to the flame-outs had been found, the Committee had turned its attention to keeping Bristol alive. Under Cabinet pressure and in the national interest, therefore, BOAC agreed to accept four more aircraft, to halve the retention fund, and to pay half the £1,000,000 cost of the flame-out trials, for which it actually received a rebate from the Ministry of Supply. It also held onto Stratocruisers being traded in to Boeing for 707s, though this cost BOAC £352,000. Then, at this point, the prototype 301 crashed and the first of BOAC’s 312s was taken over for further flight trials. On 20 November the Minister said that he could give no specific assurances, but that, whatever happened, the Corporation’s problems would be sympathetically considered by the Government. But sympathy was all that BOAC ever received.9 By mid-December 1957 trials near Singapore had proved the Proteus reliable at last. On the 19th, 312 services across the Atlantic started. In April 1958 Bristol finally produced the first standard (modified) 312, G-AOVK, which was found to be 1 per cent below its guaranteed performance, but which cost £1,250,000. The Board, therefore, agreed on the 10th to a general settlement with Bristol. A few days later the Britannia also received full American certification. The 312s began services to Johannesburg in July 1958 and their Proteus engines were declared by BOAC to be flame-out proof in January 1959. But in October 1958 BOAC with the Comet 4 and Pan American with the 707 had begun jet services across the Atlantic. In November 1961 the withdrawal of the 102s starting in December 1962 was announced. As they came off service they were put up for sale at £150,000 apiece, which was far below the over £800,000 they had cost. The last 312 came off a scheduled service, Bermuda–New York, on 26 April 1965. The tragedy of

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204 S p e e d b i r d the Britannias was that not only were they four years too late, but also they were produced too slowly to allow wide sales. If they had been delivered to BOAC in 1952 instead of the Hermes, the Corporation would have had an aircraft which would still have left it superior to its competitors even after the Comets were withdrawn. As R. E. G. Davies has noted to the author, BOAC could have concentrated on a Britannia–Comet–VC-10 programme instead of a DC-7C–707, and the British airliner manufacturing industry might still be active today (for example, more than just making Airbus wings at Chester). The leisurely way10 in which Bristol approached the Britannia was contrasted sharply with the dynamic drive with which De Havilland developed the Comet 4.

The Comet 4 With the easing of rearmament in January 1953, work was pushed ahead on the Comet 3, designed for a 2,800-mile stage length. At the same time, customers were told that they could have aircraft tailored to their own needs. BOAC’s plan at this time was for the Comet 2s to go on the mid-Atlantic in 1954 with the 3s following on the North Atlantic in 1956–1957. But another Government drive against capital expenditure caused the order for 3s to be reduced to five at £715,000 each; this was coupled with the view that the Britannia would prove the more economical aircraft for the future. BOAC began simulated shadow operation of Comets across the North Atlantic in March 1954, while the prototype 3 was rolled out just after the Comet 1s were grounded. The resultant modifications made the Comet 3 no longer a trans-Atlantic aircraft, but it did look attractive for Eastern routes. Sir Miles Thomas, Whitney Straight, Basil Smallpeice, Sir Victor Tait, and Sir Arnold Hall (of the RAE) all decided that the Comet was still a good aircraft. In February 1955, therefore, BOAC gave De Havilland an Instruction to Proceed for nineteen (Sir Miles would not go to twenty) Comet 4s for delivery in 1958–1959. In the meantime, the Ministry of Supply had invested £2,360,000 in the development of the Avon engines for the Comet 2, 3, and 4 series and £1,800,000 toward the further development of the aircraft, all of which it expected to recover from sales. In addition, it agreed to pay half the estimated £960,000 cost of the development flying on the Avons, with BOAC to pay the remainder. In December 1956 the Ministry of Supply had to ask the Treasury to approve an expenditure of £7,600,000 for development which did not include taking the Rolls-Royce Avon RA29 beyond the point which it had then reached, though the Ministry was under contract to De Havilland to supply that company with fully developed engines and liable to damages if it did not. In November 1957 the Treasury approved the negotiation of a new contract with Rolls-Royce, limiting expenditures to £8,800,000.11 Meanwhile, in 1955 the Ministry had raised the question of flight refuelling the Comet 4 on the North Atlantic. BOAC replied as it had in 1950 that landings at Gander were more economical. The Ministry then proposed that De Havilland be asked to produce a Conway-engined Comet with a still-air range of 5,500 miles,

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sufficient for a non-stop London–New York service in competition with the big American jets. (BOAC resisted another suggestion that all Comet 4s be re-engined with Conways as this would have delayed their entry into service until 1961.) Eventually this Comet 5 (DH 118) was replaced by the Vickers VC-10 design. Production of the Comet 4 rolled steadily ahead and the first BOAC aircraft flew on 27 April 1958. The Corporation, despite its ill-luck with the Comet 1, had in January 1958 bravely begun seriously to study putting the Comet 4 on the North Atlantic, instead of waiting for its 707s, which were not due until the end of 1959. In April it was learned that Pan American would have its 707s in service in the autumn. In May, training flights via Keflavik and Gander began with the Comet 2Es, which the Corporation had been using to develop the Avons. The new Comet 4 passed all its trials with flying colours and on 29 September the Minister presented BOAC with its Certificate of Airworthiness, while De Havilland handed over not one, but two aircraft more than six months ahead of schedule. But the Port of New York Authority was still withholding permission on noise grounds for both the Comet 4 and the 707 to operate scheduled services in and out of Idlewild Airport at New York. Only on the afternoon of 3 October was permission eventually received. Smallpeice was in New York at the time with one of the Comets. On 4 October a Press flight was turned into the first regularly scheduled trans-Atlantic jet service, with Comets starting from London and New York simultaneously. The result was almost spoiled by a strike of ground engineers (supervisory staff handled the flight instead), but when the weekly service was resumed on 13 November, sufficient aircraft had been delivered for daily flights to be possible. For their work in getting the Comets back into the air, Rolls-Royce, De Havilland, and BOAC were given, in 1959, the coveted Hulton Award for the most outstanding contribution to British prestige.

59. A Douglas DC-7C of the Seven Seas Class, 1956–1964.

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206 S p e e d b i r d 60. Captain Messenger at the controls of Constellation Bangor II, in which he made his 200th crossing of the Atlantic in 1947.

This was not the end of the story. In its contracts with De Havilland, BOAC had carefully sought to safeguard its commercial position by securing “mostfavoured customer” clauses, which would allow it a rebate on the purchase price of £1,200,000 per aircraft. This was designed to spread the Ministry of Supply development levy, all of which fell on BOAC’s nineteen aircraft, and to reward BOAC for its pioneering work, which benefitted De Havilland in terms of future sales. But the Corporation was restrained from pressing its case by legal and the more potent considerations that to do so might put De Havilland out of business and jeopardize the delivery of the remainder of the fleet. Ironically, because of Ministerial insistence on this, BEA was able to buy its Comet 4s at a much better price. By the end of 1962, De Havilland had delivered seventy Comet 4s, with the Government receiving a £100,000 royalty per aircraft, except in cases where it was waived in the national interest. By 1963 BOAC was beginning to have enough surplus Comet hours to start leasing aircraft to its subsidiary companies. By 1965 Comets had been replaced in BOAC services by VC-10s (the last scheduled Comet 4 arriving at Heathrow on 24 November 1965). All were disposed of by late 1966.

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61. An engine test stand of the BOAC repair depot at Treforest in South Wales.

Two most important things should be remembered about the Comet. First, decisions taken in 1943 affected the Corporation for nearly a quarter of a century— and that is a very long time in the airline world. Second, with this aircraft, as with all others in the “Fly British” category, when BOAC was involved with them, it was an expensive, pump-priming operation, for which it was never allowed

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208 S p e e d b i r d adequate compensation, and for which it was required over many years to pay the Government interest upon lost capital.

The VC-10 and the Boeing 707 The demise of the V.1000 allowed new pressure to be brought for the development of a big British jet. On 20 December 1955 the then Minister of Supply, Reginald Maudling, said that Britain should not look at an aircraft as a mystical symbol of national prestige but as a means of transport. At the same time he admitted that he had de facto control over the manufacture of large aircraft.12 Shortly thereafter the Chairman of the Air Registration Board, Lord Brabazon, declared that no design work on a large aircraft should be undertaken until the various users, including the Ministries, the Services, the Corporations, and the Independents, agreed to fly it, with the whole programme under the supervision of a committee composed of a Cabinet Minister, a member of the Opposition, and a leading aeronautical expert.13 At the same time, Sir Miles Thomas said that BOAC was actively consulting with Government and industry for an aircraft in the 1964–1966 category, but, he added significantly, such a machine would have to show a very considerable aerodynamic and performance increase, especially in range, over the new American jets (the 707 and the DC-8). The Ministry was setting its sights on a machine which was already out-matched, and behind in time. This was the climate of opinion when fresh discussions took place. When d’Erlanger became Chairman in May 1956 he was given one month by the Minister in which to have ready a report on BOAC’s aircraft requirements. The Board received the report on 22 June and approved its recommendations, saying that it was its duty to recommend to the Minister, without regard to the country of manufacture, those aircraft considered essential to the future of the Corporation. The Board agreed to the immediate dispatch of missions to Douglas and Boeing. By 1953 Boeing had already polled thirty-two possible customers and had in May 1954 rolled out the prototype of the 707. In May 1953 Douglas had announced the beginning of work on the DC-8. The big jets were obviously coming, for Pan American had by early 1955 an option for twenty 707s and twenty-five DC-8s, which it confirmed in the following October. KLM and Air France had also ordered. (R. E. G. Davies has noted to the author that Air France, however, did not bother to evaluate the 707; it simply had to match Pan Am on the North Atlantic and ordered only enough aircraft for that route.) By mid-1956 Parliament was getting restless. BOAC obtained options on both the 707 and the DC-8 before the Board meeting on 28 June 1956, the Minister having been told that morning that no suitable British aircraft was available for trans-Atlantic operation from 1960 onward. On 10 July 1956 the Ministry set up a working group to study the 707, the DC-8, the Comet 5, and the Britannia 430, with instructions to report on the 23rd. In the limited time available, judgments were made which it was admitted were subject

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62. Veteran Captain Messenger in the course of the then customary visit to the passengers on a long-haul flight, explaining the route.

to reconsideration because of the lack of data. The conclusions of the group, which included representatives from BOAC, De Havilland, and Bristol, were that there was almost nothing to choose between the American and British types unless the former had appreciably better takeoff characteristics. BOAC was reluctant to consider the turbo-prop 430 unless its economics were 30 per cent better than those of the big jets and unless a propeller-fare differential could be obtained from IATA. The group challenged the Ministry of Supply’s disparaging view of American manufacturers on the grounds that these were based on the performance of British manufacturers and allowed nothing for American commercial incentives.14 The working group’s report concluded that the 707, DC-8, and Comet 5 were about equal, though the latter was a paper aircraft that De Havilland decided not to build. Despite BOAC assurances to the contrary, the rest of the group did not believe that the American jets would reach their guaranteed performances. However, in August BOAC would clearly have to have 707s, and the accounts payable ranking figures in the report were rearranged so as to move the Britannia from top to bottom—data can always be adjusted to support a decision which has already been taken. Meanwhile, faced with the development of a drastic situation on the North Atlantic, BOAC requested permission on 26 July 1956 to order seventeen 707s.

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210 S p e e d b i r d The Ministry was reluctant to proceed because the American figures showed up the British designs so badly. But the Ministry’s key failing was its ignoring of delivery dates and development programmes, not to mention the implications of contractual obligations, which explained why BOAC was fully incapable of enforcing its contractual rights against delinquent manufacturers. Thus, for BOAC, the Comet 5 was out for trans-Atlantic operation because it was at least two years behind the 707. Moreover, in contrast to British practice, the Boeing contract contained an escalation clause only on the British engines and this was limited to 12.5 per cent.15 In all other respects it was commercial, including insurance against the aircraft being grounded after delivery and in allowances for trading in the old Stratocruisers in part payment for the new 707s. At the time of the decision to purchase Boeing 707s, airport problems on Eastern and Southern routes loomed large and made it seem as though the 707 could not be used on them. With the Comets expected to be phased out in 1962, BOAC saw the need for an aircraft to replace them, and this was the genesis of the VC-10. But others were not convinced of the runway problem, and both QANTAS and Pan American ordered 707s for Eastern routes. In fact, on 22 June 1956 BOAC itself had agreed that seventeen 707s would allow it to replace Comet 4s on Eastern routes; the Comet 5, being 70 per cent more expensive than the 707, was not considered an economic proposition. Fortunately, the Minister, Harold Watkinson, as a member of the Cabinet was himself able to argue the case against the Comet 5. Finally, on 24 October he announced approval for fifteen Rolls-Royce Conway-engined 707s as an exceptional measure. The Board had, however, been told on the 20th that this was conditional upon BOAC’s buying twenty British machines for the so-called Empire routes. BOAC was instructed to discuss the Comet 5 (DH 118) with its designers. But De Havilland was more interested in the DH 121 Trident for BEA and refused to start the Comet 5 without an order for fifty. The point was then reached, as Sir Matthew Slattery later told a Parliamentary Committee, at which BOAC could buy any aircraft it liked, as long as it came from Vickers.16 In 1956 Vickers was facing a problem as the Valiant, the first of the V-bombers, was going out of production. The V.1000 had been cancelled. The Vanguard for BEA was in only limited production. Yet, as one of Vickers’s own public relations men wrote at the time, everyone knew that the world’s airlines had bought all the big jets they needed from Douglas and Boeing; therefore, “Britain cannot now enter this class of aircraft manufacture—we are too late.” The best aircraft for Britain, he thought, was the turbo-prop.17 With both BEA and Trans Canada apprehensive of the coming jet competition, Vickers produced the Vanjet design, a Vanguard fuselage with a clean-swept wing and three rear-mounted engines. BEA was not enthusiastic, so the design was stretched and offered to BOAC, the short-field performance being touted, but BOAC was not interested. By this time The Aeroplane had already pointed out that with BOAC getting 707s the Comet 5 was superfluous, leaving only the medium-haul market open.18 Unfortunately, the Minister would neither let BOAC out of its obligation to buy

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more British aircraft, nor would he press the industry to concentrate its energies on filling the medium-range gap into which both the Trident and the BAC OneEleven would eventually fall. In January 1957 the Chairman told the Minister that BOAC wanted either a high-speed turbo-prop or a jet with which to replace the Comet 4. During the next two months BOAC evaluated eleven British designs ranging from the Britannia 102 and its variants through the Handley Page 97 (civil Victor bomber) to the DH 120, a swept-winged Comet 4. None found favour. On 1 April BOAC told Vickers that its VC-10 Vanjet did not meet the Corporation’s needs. Two days later the Minister chaired a meeting of his experts, Vickers, Rolls-Royce, and BOAC. BOAC outlined its requirements for an aircraft for Eastern routes (it was not yet thinking of a single world-wide type), but stressed that the prime cost of the fully equipped machine could not exceed £1,500,000 and that there should be no escalation clause. It was generally agreed that BOAC’s and BEA’s needs were incompatible, and that BOAC needed only fifteen to twenty-five aircraft. On 12 April Vickers said it could build a suitable aircraft for BOAC at £1,750,000, but a week later added that BOAC would have to order thirty-five to get production started, a figure shortly increased to forty-two when an Atlantic version was also envisaged, based on the integral fuel capacity of the new wing. This would give BOAC close to the two-type fleet of sixty-two aircraft, of which nineteen would be 707s, which it estimated it required. Vickers was now talking of breaking even on forty-five aircraft at £1,750,000 apiece. At the same time, the Minister made it plain to all concerned that the Government would not underwrite the project. The Board met on 26 April 1957, the Minister having demanded a decision by 1 May. It was decided that a new look at Eastern, Southern, and South American routes would justify an order for thirty-two VC-10s. That afternoon BOAC and Vickers met at the Ministry of Supply and it was agreed that BOAC would take twenty. But Vickers refused to enter into a contract which did not allow escalation. Two more meetings followed. On the 30th the Board agreed to order thirty-five and to give Vickers the various other advantageous conditions it asked. The price quoted to the Minister was £1,380,000 to £1,750,000, each with escalation after 1 January 1960. The total order was then worth £68,000,000, but by 1963 had risen to £128,000,000 for aircraft, plus £23,000,000 in spares. Before the Minister was told that BOAC would order, however, people within the Corporation were pointing out that the VC-10 would be 10 to 16 per cent more expensive to operate on Eastern routes than the 707. Shortly after this, when the decision was taken to abandon the Vanguard fuselage in favour of six-abreast seating, BOAC estimates showed that, despite Vickers’s claims, the aircraft would be 30 per cent more expensive to operate on the North Atlantic than a 707. In the interim, before the contract for thirty-five was hastily signed on 14 January 1958,19 studies were produced which showed that the Mark II VC-10, as the six-abreast model was called, could not do the North Atlantic. Basically, however, the crucial commitment had been made in April 1957.

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212 S p e e d b i r d Owing to the haste with which the whole deal was put together, there were naturally some oversights and underestimates. Vickers had guessed that development costs would amount to £6,250,000. By mid-1959 it was telling BOAC that it was the Corporation’s job to raise any additional funds which would be needed for this work. Early in 1957, however, BOAC had come to accept that it was not going to be allowed any more dollars to buy more 707s for the North Atlantic or anywhere else. Vickers was reluctant to produce a podded-engined aircraft which would look like a copy of the American designs, and in this they were supported by Watkinson and the Gov­ ernment. This reluctance made the aircraft unnecessarily heavy and foreshortened the fuselage cabin by placing the engine at the tail. On the other hand, Vickers was very optimistic about the clean wing and in 1957 operational experience with the 707 was still unavailable, but by the time the 707 was modified and certificated for BOAC early in 1960 it was a very good aircraft, as BOAC had expected it would be. Meanwhile, Vickers was in serious financial difficulties and pressure was brought on to BOAC, directly through intimations that Vickers might not be able to carry out its contracts for VC-10s, and indirectly through the Government. The suggested solution in 1959–1960 was that BOAC should order ten Super VC-10s at £2,700,000 apiece or, better still, twenty at £2,400,000 each. But BOAC was now most unwilling to move as it was quite unsure of the effects of the shotgun wedding with Airwork and Hunting-Clan on African routes. The Minister, Duncan Sandys, replied to an inquiry that it would be most helpful if BOAC would order ten additional aircraft; he was then in the midst of reorganizing the aircraft industry and setting up the new British Aircraft Corporation (BAC). On 15 February 1960 the Minister told Parliament that it was essential that Britain maintain a strong aircraft industry not only for defence, but also for world-wide civil aviation.20 But by this time BOAC was getting the 707s and finding them not nearly so inflexible as to runway lengths as they had been led to believe by Ministry reports. Then, too, BOAC had also to wrestle with the dilemma that if it bankrupted Vickers (BAC) by refusing to order more aircraft, it would lose the £6,000,000 already paid in progress payments as well as capacity from 1964 onward. Before the final decision was made, Sir Matthew Slattery became Chairman-designate and he rightly asked that no action be taken until he assumed power. But Sir Gerard’s last service was to sign the contract for ten Super VC-10s. He died not long afterward. At the same time, Vickers convinced the Government that it needed help, and on 11 July Sandys announced a return to the old Ministry of Supply development-levy subsidy system.21 The Corbett Report of 1963 noted that BOAC should have scuttled the VC-10 when it had the chance, and the 1964 Select Committee on BOAC more or less agreed. As soon as he took over, Slattery worked to do what he could to retrieve the situation. The Super was modified from what was then considered to be a 225-seat trans-Atlantic monster to an aircraft more capable of use on all routes and the whole order was rearranged from thirty-five standard VC-10s and ten Supers to the opposite. Concurrently, in June 1961 BOAC’s traffic forecasts of 1956 began to be realized and the Corporation asked for three additional 707s. At the time

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the Minister approved this 707 order, he was told that while BOAC lauded the VC-10 in public, it was convinced that the aircraft would cost it £7,000,000 a year more to operate than would a similar fleet of 707s. As the Treasury refused to allow the cost of the VC-10 programme to increase, BOAC had to cancel three VC-10s, paying Vickers £89,148 for the privilege of taking only thirty-two. The total cost of cancellation to BOAC was £600,000, all of which could have been saved if BOAC had known that the RAF was about to order eleven, which it then

9.1. VC-10 orders Date

BOAC VC-10 Super VC-10 Vickers Wanted Firm Option Firm Option

(October 1956, Ministry required BOAC to buy 20 British aircraft)

23 April 1957 25 April 1957

(25 (35

10) 20)

(45)

(BOAC Requirements Study: 35+27 local West Atlantic=62)

January 1958 June 1960 August 1960 June 1961

April, September 1963 22 May 1964 20 July 1964 19 March 1965 18 June 1965 7 February 1966

35

15 12 (and penalties paid on 3 cancelled) (BOAC wished to cancel 13) (BOAC wished to cancel all 30) (BOAC wished to cancel the last 17) (BOAC wanted to cancel the last 10) BOAC cancelled the 10 held in suspense with Vickers’ [now BAC] approval

10 stretched 30 modified

BOAC

17 (with 10 more in suspense)

Vickers agreed to suspend 10 (and 3 to RAF with penalty)

Source: Compiled from BOAC and Report of the Select Committee on Nationalized Industries: BOAC, 9 June 1964, xi, para. 36–64. Items in ( ) indicate wishes rather than actions.

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214 S p e e d b i r d did, and in addition added the three ex-BOAC aircraft for a total of fourteen. The financial guesstimates of VC-10 profitability became critically involved with the Government’s desire to make all the national Corporations profitable. Sir Matthew said that BOAC might be able to achieve a 6 per cent return if (a) the £54,000,000 in capital lost up to 1961-1962 were written off and (b) BOAC received a subsidy for operating the VC-10. As a result of further conversations with the Ministry in which BOAC was urged to take a purely commercial view of its affairs, the Chairman told the Board that he felt the whole VC-10 contract ought to be cancelled and additional 707s bought in their stead. News of this leaked out and The Aeroplane accused the Corporation of damaging the aircraft industry, which seems a little crude in view of the constant exposure of the failures of the Ministry and of the industry in Parliamentary reports.22 The first VC-10 began flying on 29 June 1962. Almost at once troubles occurred because of high drag. The Board had asked that guarantees of performance be forthcoming by 1 November 1962. They were not delivered until later. By February 1963 BOAC was convinced that it could do without the further ten Super VC-10s and made moves to cancel them, especially as Vickers showed great reluctance to bring the aircraft up to scratch and insisted upon BOAC paying high fees for all modifications. By April, further study had shown that thirteen could be cancelled. Vickers and its subsidiary, the newly formed British Aircraft Corporation, were now very worried and agreed to make the necessary modifications at their own expense. Not unnaturally, the Minister was not happy with the idea of cancellations, and so he proposed that BOAC take the last ten aircraft with Ministry financing, only paying interest if the aircraft were put to profitable use. In June 1963 BOAC announced the start of services in April 1964 and launched in the autumn, after a delay due to doubts about certification, a large and very loyal advertising campaign on behalf of the VC-10, which did, after all, have passenger appeal and safe flying characteristics. Training of 2,000 staff, including 210 pilots, 84 engineering officers, 160 engineering superintendents, 100 overseas engineers, and 850 hourly rated engineers was begun. By the end of 1963 BOAC was committed to a £5,000,000 programme to get the VC-10 on service. The first aircraft was delivered to the airline on 22 April and started to Ghana promptly on 29 April 1964. R. E. G. Davies has commented to the author regarding the VC-10: “Note that little account was taken of the Super VC-10’s superior earning power over the 707s. It consistently attracted 10 percent higher load factors, more than compensating for the higher seat-mile costs. . . . A cost-per-seat-mile advantage was only effective if the seats were filled. The 707 offered more seats, but the VC-10 customarily filled more per flight, often by a large margin.”

The Boeing 707 In sharp contrast to all the worries that BOAC had over the Vickers VC-10 was the story of the Boeing 707. As already noted, this aircraft was not ordered until after the

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prototype had flown and large orders had been placed by the US Air Force for a tanker version and by BOAC’s competitors. With the 707 came not only the benefits of a carefully prepared and carried-through manufacturing and development programme but also the many advantages accruing from the world-wide use of this aircraft by many operators. According to R. E. G. Davies, Boeing alone could produce more aircraft in a week than the entire British industry in a month and had a guaranteed huge market from the financial power of US domestic airlines. Thus, a spares pooling system became available, while BOAC’s own 707 fleet headquarters was connected by teletype directly to Boeing in Seattle, allowing immediate availability of parts that BOAC did not usually stock. Only two things lessened BOAC’s joy. First, in 1958, Boeing produced a new turbo-fan version—the -400 series, with greatly increased range, of the 320 series. (Rolls-Royce would not modify the VC-10 Conways for the 707-320s, so BOAC eventually bought them with American engines.) BOAC finally decided that the cost of the change made it impractical at the time, though QANTAS, KLM, and American Airlines decided to have their aircraft re-engined in 1961. The other problem was that late in the summer of 1959 the Air Registration Board, on BOAC initiative, ruled that additional tests would be needed before it would certificate the aircraft. The 707 was known to have a tendency to roll because of its sweptback planform, while both BOAC and the ARB had memories of the Comet takeoff stalls and were determined to prevent any such mishaps recurring. As a result of thorough ARB tests in California, which benefitted all 707 operators, a ventral fin-cum-tail skid was fitted to all BOAC 707-436s, but not to the later -336s. The ventral fin prevented over-rotation on takeoff and thus stalling of the wing. The addition of an extra 35 inches onto the top of the fin,23 together with the ventral fin, gave the aircraft greater stability and helped counter the tendency to drop a wing and do a Dutch roll at high altitude. Tests and modifications delayed the opening of BOAC 707 services from April to late May at a cost of £250,000 a week. Seeing at once the benefits from the ARB’s work, Boeing not only made all the modifications for BOAC free of charge, but also offered modification kits free to all operators who wanted to fit them. The 707s began trans-Atlantic service for BOAC on 27 May 1960, and by 16 October the last Comet 4 was withdrawn from that route. All fifteen 707s were delivered in 1960. In 1962–1963 two additional 707s were acquired through an agreement with Cunard (see Chapter X); three were added in 1962, bringing the fleet to twenty. Had it been allowed to use its commercial judgment, BOAC would have ordered three long-range, turbo-fan 707s in mid-1962 as on what was then considered the vital London–Los Angeles sector they could do the journey non-stop with twenty more passengers than the Super VC-10. Such aircraft (the 707-336C) were in fact purchased subsequently. They had long-range capability and were fitted with very large cargo doors, advantages that were not available on the Super VC-10s. The hope of the Corporation at that time was that by 1966 it would have at last returned to the two-type ideal which Imperial Airways had been in the process of establishing when war and nationalization came in 1939.

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63. The long-range turbo-prop Bristol Britannia 312 for North Atlantic and eventually Pacific services, 1957–1964

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Chapter X The Slattery Regime and the Crisis Introduction In many ways the Slattery regime is inseparable from that of d’Erlanger. Previous Chairmen had sowed; Sir Matthew Slattery reaped and helped to destroy the VC-10. The long-delayed reorganization of the Engineering Department was only just beginning to give solid results when d’Erlanger stepped down. The question of whether BOAC was a commercial concern or an instrument of national policy had yet to be answered. The role of the Corporation vis-à-vis the aircraft industry was still in limbo. And the reconsideration of BOAC’s financial structure was still tabled. All the while, the deficit mounted, and issues which had to be faced stirred just beneath the surface.1 The d’Erlanger period represented the changing over from an era of profits to one of problems, but the acuteness of these was not brought to the forefront until Slattery took over. At the end of July 1960 BOAC acquired a salty leader who had, like Lord Douglas of BEA, spent his life in aviation. Moreover, Sir Matthew had the inestimable advantage of having been connected with aircraft procurement, both as Chief of Naval Air Equipment during the war and later as Managing Director of Short Brothers and Harland and of the Bristol Aircraft Corporation and a member of the Board of the Bristol Aeroplane Company. With more than three-quarters of BOAC’s capital tied to aircraft, he was an excellent choice to complement the able financial work of Sir Basil Smallpeice, who was a member of the Council of the Institute of Chartered Accountants until 1957. But Slattery’s hands were tied and his team faced many problems, including a renewed onslaught by the Independents. One solution to this particular threat was the creation of BOAC-Cunard.

The Cunard-Eagle Case Cunard, the prestigious shipping company, had at the end of the war been approached about joint operations, but declined, refusing to consider an air–sea interchange of tickets until 1960.2 Meanwhile, in December 1957 Harold Bamberg’s Eagle Airways (Bermuda) Ltd., had been granted permission by the Bermuda Government to compete with BOAC on the Bermuda–New York–Montreal route. By February 1958 both British and American permits had been obtained and services started in June with Viscounts. Eagle then tried to have itself recognized as the Bermudan national airline to fly from Britain to the West Indies via Bermuda. At the same time, in December 1959, BOAC was told by the Government that it

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218 S p e e d b i r d should continue to make arrangements with the shipping companies. In January 1960 BOAC protested against low-fare flights which the parent Eagle Airways was making between Britain and Bermuda and to the Far East. In March, in a surprise deal, Cunard acquired 60 per cent of the stock of Eagle Airways. Because the route Britain–British West Indies was a cabotage one, the Government gave Cunard-Eagle permission to operate Skycoach services to the Caribbean, starting on 1 October, so a pool was concluded with BOAC by April 1961, each party doing six flights a week with Britannias. On 15 October 1960 Cunard-Eagle had also started regular IATA-fare services from London to Nassau. But the big change came in January 1961, when Cunard-Eagle applied to the Air Transport Licensing Board for scheduled trans-Atlantic services to New York. This, together with a host of applications from British United, was regarded as the test case for the survival of the Independents. BUA said that, if its application was accepted, then it would buy four VC-10s and five Tridents so as to share in the general growth of air traffic without affecting the existing scale of operations of the Corporations. As any inroads into the traffic carried by the Corporations tended to put them into the red, the statement sent to Members of Parliament was not only misleading but also a distortion in that it expected the Corporations, which had long pioneered the routes and had carefully planned for this growth, to remain static. Moreover, the IATA airlines had failed to follow historical precedents from the steamship conferences by lowering fares to drive out “pirates.” Too often they had been afraid of the short-term loss and consequently did not reap the longterm gain. The result was a multiplication of operators, over-capacity, and increased indebtedness, coupled with unsound economics. Before the Air Transport Licensing Board could hear the Cunard-Eagle case, Lord Terrington, long head of the Air Transport Advisory Council, died and was replaced by Prof. D. T. Jack, who had made his aviation reputation in the 1958 Inquiry into labour troubles at London Airport. Under the new procedures, instead of a quiet discussion of the case, an open hearing was held, at which BOAC had to appear as “the objector.” Just before the hearings began, Cunard-Eagle announced that it had ordered two 707s and taken an option on a third and that it intended to use them on the London–Miami services for which it already held licenses. This contrasted strangely both with earlier professions of loyalty to the British aircraft industry and with the announcement a month later that the Government was lending Cunard £18,000,000—three-fifths of the price of a new Queen, while allowing its subsidiary to buy American. BOAC testified that to grant a license for a daily service to Cunard-Eagle would cost BOAC 25 per cent of its traffic to the East Coast of America and 29 per cent on the Canadian route, as well as jeopardizing its Commonwealth pools. Moreover, as BOAC pointed out, Cunard-Eagle was under no obligation to run services if licensed, while BOAC was. BOAC obtained 53 per cent of its traffic on this sector, thus enabling it to carry less profitable services during the rest of the year. The point was also made that, were the license granted, the precedent would be set for the destruction of the Corporations—which seemed

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to be, ironically, the undeclared aim of the Conservative governments whose ancestor had formed BOAC. The Corporation reckoned that its loss, if the license were granted, would amount to £7,500,000 a year, or more than twice the interest payable in 1966–1967 on the £71,000,000 capital employed on this sector. Despite these objections, within three weeks the Board ruled in favour of a daily CunardEagle service to New York, saying that the predicted Cunard-Eagle traffic growth of 15 per cent per year (BOAC’s figure was 7 per cent) meant that there would be no “material diversion” from BOAC. The Corporation regarded the finding as contrary to the 1961 Licensing Act and promptly appealed it to the Minister to bring the status and duties of the Corporation into the open. It was agreed not to cancel the order for VC-10s until after the appeal was decided, to tell Cunard that ruthless competition would be the rule, and to inform the Minister that BOAC could not discuss its profitability target until after these issues were settled. Yet BOAC did cancel the VC-10s. The new hearings were held in the summer and the Special Commissioner, Sir Fred E. Pritchard, ruled in November for BOAC. The Eagle license was revoked. The Minister, Peter Thorneycroft, said he was influenced by BOAC’s capacity and aircraft on order, by the obvious gross over-capacity on the Atlantic, the weakening market, and the poor trading position of the operators. Under the circumstances, BUA withdrew its applications for African services, but this was by no means the end of the fight. Cunard still wanted a share of the traffic without having to shoulder losses from other BOAC routes. By early 1962 it was obvious that Cunard-Eagle, using aircraft registered in Bermuda, was going ahead with plans to operate to New York and to make use of the Airwork freight license, which it had in the meantime acquired. In April, Cunard and Cunard-Eagle made a joint approach to BOAC in which they offered one of Cunard-Eagle’s 707s as bait, knowing that the Treasury had curtailed BOAC’s orders. Discussions proceeded for a number of reasons. First, BOAC reckoned it could save Western routes £1,000,000 a year if it could keep Cunard-Eagle from poaching. Second, a settlement would allow 707s to be switched onto West African services and make it possible to transfer the shorter-ranged Comets to the Kuwait run. And, third and most important, the Minister, by then Thorneycroft, indicated that he would very much appreciate BOAC coming to a modus vivendi with Cunard. A settlement was helped by the falling out between Harold Bamberg, the founder of Eagle Airways, and Cunard. The major problem for BOAC was not so much a rationalization of services as how to knock all the Independents off the North Atlantic, for Cunard and British United had agreed upon spheres of influence. The only way seemed to be, as Smallpeice suggested, the formation of a BOAC subsidiary company, and to this the Board agreed on 12 April 1962. By the end of the first week in May the outline proposals had been blessed by Lord Mills’s Cabinet sub-committee, which, however, suggested that Cunard’s share be raised from 20 to 25 per cent. The Cabinet approved. On the day the agreement was actually signed, 6 June, the Minister

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220 S p e e d b i r d insisted that it be raised to 30 per cent. Despite this, from BOAC’s standpoint the arrangement had three particular advantages: first, it prevented the siphoning-off of traffic worth some £5,000,000 a year; second, there were inestimable gains from not having to fight Cunard-Eagle as well as foreign competitors; and third, it was assumed to open Cunard’s large network of sales offices to BOAC. The subsidiary company formally came into being on 24 June 1962, but it did not begin to operate aircraft in BOAC-Cunard livery until after the American authorities had approved the changes in April 1964. In the Debate on the merger in the Commons, nearly everybody except the Government attacked it.3 In mid-1963 the remnant of Cunard-Eagle was sold back to Bamberg, on condition that the company should stay out of the North Atlantic area, and on 1 October it became British Eagle International Airlines, having by then served Cunard’s purpose.

BOAC and the Other Independents After the creation of Cunard-Eagle, relations with the Independents became more intimate as the number of cabotage routes dwindled and both parties realized that it was to be Britain against the world. Discussions between Sir Matthew Slattery of BOAC and Sir Miles Wyatt of British United on the African pool, thrust on both parties in the late Fifties, proceeded. At the same time, BOAC learned that the Ministry had agreed that BOAC would make increased payments to the BEA–Alitalia pool so that BUA could have rights at Genoa. The Board decided that the Chairman should refuse to make these without a written Direction. The readjustment of the BOAC–BUA African pool was then delayed because of the departure of the Slattery–Smallpeice team in November–December 1963. In two other areas, trooping and freighting, the struggle with the Independents continued. In April 1963 BEA and BOAC, having been rebuffed by the Minister, Julian Amery, in January, once again filed applications for trooping contracts, offering rebates of up to 66 per cent for the carriage of servicemen on duty on regularly scheduled flights. This was coupled with a general stand-by-fares scheme in which BOAC hoped to participate on the London–Prestwick sector for a start. The Minister asked the Air Transport Licensing Board to make a decision on principle, especially as the scheme, if approved, was likely to end planeload trooping by Independents. But no Direction was given to the ATLB. The hearings took place on 16–17 July. On 16 September the Board announced that it had refused the request, but the reasons it gave were based on minutiae so that it could claim that the matter of principle had not been settled because of lack of evidence. The ATLB said it had had no advice from the Minister that the Corporations had been told by him to apply, though this was common knowledge,4 and recommended that they appeal to him on the matter of principle. Stephen Wheatcroft, the noted aviation consultant, told the Royal Aeronautical Society in November that the whole trouble was that the 1960 Licensing Act had not placed policy-making squarely on the Minister’s plate.5

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Where freighting was concerned, BOAC had long been in an invidious position. It had been refused the right to do the work because others had been granted licenses which they did not exploit. Meanwhile, British business went into the hands of competitors, notably the consistently aggressive Pan American. As late as 1959 BOAC had withdrawn an application for a freight license because the Minister had told it to appease the Independents. But then Seaboard and Western, Pan American, and others began to convert their DC-7C and other older aircraft to freighters. This led BOAC to consider once again taking a large share in Skyways, but the need for this was eliminated by the establishment of BOAC-Cunard. BOAC was then free to apply to take over Airwork’s license, and this was granted. BOAC placed two converted DC-7Cs on a trans-Atlantic service in December 1960. It then made a study which eventually convinced the Board that a temporary solution was to lease Canadair CL-44s, a swingtail version of the Britannia freighter which Sir Miles Thomas had tried to order in 1952. Negotiations began in May 1962. Contracts with the Canadian Government were ready for signature in August. The Minister, Amery, approved on 2 September, but shortly thereafter Ministry officials made it clear that they thought BOAC had not obtained sufficiently advantageous terms and that the seven-year lease should be reduced to five. BOAC had to completely recalculate the whole scheme, and the Canadians refused to accept the new proposal; so BOAC had to look elsewhere. In May 1963 BOAC finally agreed, therefore, to charter an American Seaboard World Canadair CL-44 for three years; the rest of the freight was to be carried on leased space in Trans Canada’s DC-8s. Eventually BOAC, having considered and abandoned the idea of the convertible Super VC-10s, bought 707-336Cs.

Other Policy Problems During 1960 QANTAS became dissatisfied with the division of revenues in the Tripartite Pool with Air India. Relations moved from bad to critical by February 1961. Then BOAC agreed to pay £200,000 compensation in settlement along the old partnership principles and to make further representations to Air India International.6 Air India agreed, therefore, to a limitation on its pool revenues in 1961–1962, while QANTAS was warned that if it broke up the pool its rights in India would be severely curtailed. Additional problems arose during 1962 over capacities, load factors, and the diversion of revenues, which led to a further understanding in which BOAC agreed to QANTAS coming on the Sydney– London–Hong Kong services in return for BOAC getting into the South Pacific. Not until October 1963 did the British Government give its official consent to this arrangement, which had, however, started in 1962. It served to plug a leakage of traffic to Swissair and Alitalia. The central problem which BOAC continued to face during the Slattery regime was connected with the status and commercial position of the Corporation. Early in 1961, the Government issued Cmnd.1457 on a London Airport Authority, in which

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222 S p e e d b i r d

10.1. Structure of Air Holdings Ltd., early 1962 In 1960 British United Airways was formed by a merger of Airwork Ltd., founded in 1928, and Hunting-Clan Air Transport, established in 1945. In early 1962 further reorganizations created Air Holdings Ltd., which had the structure illustrated here. Furness Withy and Co. Ltd.

Blue Star Line Ltd.

Broadminister Nominees Ltd.

Guiness Mahon Nominees Ltd.

British and Hunting Peninsular and Oriental Commonwealth Aviation Steam Navigation Co. Shipping Co. Management (Aviation) Ltd. Ltd. Eagle Star Insurance Ltd. Cable & Wireless Holdings Ltd.

Air Holdings Ltd.

ritish United Airways B Airwork International Channel Air Bridge Airwork Services Manx Airlines Aviation Traders (Engineering) Morton Air Services Dishley Engineering Silver City Airways

S.A.F.E., Ltd.

Source: The Aeroplane, 8 February 1962, 143–144. it declared that the airline industry should be fully self-supporting and able to pay for all the services it received. This was in addition to the statements in Cmnd.1337 about a payability index and a profitability target for the nationalized industries. Yet, at the same time, BOAC faced another struggle with the Independents. British United Airways applied to the Air Transport Licensing Board for permission to use jet aircraft. BOAC pointed out that the granting of this would jeopardize its relations with its partners without increasing the British share of the traffic. However, the ATLB, then under Professor Jack, took the questionable view that, although there was adequate international competition, British airlines could compete against each other in standards of service (fares being set by IATA) and thus bring additional business into British hands. In the ATLB’s Annual Report, 1961/62, Professor Jack declared that the Board interpreted the 1960 Act as it stood and paid no attention to statements by Ministers regarding the Act’s intention and probable effects. On the question of “material diversion,” the Board

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took the view that their criteria should be whether the granting of an additional license would actually reduce the existing operator’s traffic or merely slow its rate of growth. But, as J. W. S. Brancker, an aviation consultant, pointed out, how could material diversion be defined when it was based on estimated rather than actual results?7 The trend of these actions was to compel BOAC to withdraw the Britannia 102s and to begin leasing 312s to other operators. In the United States the Civil Aeronautics Board, facing the realities of a periodic traffic slump, had already come to the conclusion that over-competition was wasteful and it condoned any mergers that might eliminate it. The CAB itself could not seek mergers; it could only react, not initiate. A slight recession in America in 1961 caused a drastic drop in traffic figures just when BOAC was offering 50 per cent more capacity than in the previous year. As other airlines were facing the same problems, the British Independent Air Transport Association, which had a few years earlier so joyfully cast the Corporations out as honorary members, now began to campaign for closer cooperation. But BEA pointed out that much of the traffic which the Independents were telling the ATLB the Corporations had never developed had been denied to the Corporations by Ministers who refused to let them keep aircraft to exploit these fields. The position of the Independents, other than British United, was becoming more precarious by the end of 1961. Five of them were either in difficulties or closing down as a result of the Ministry requiring an Air Operator’s Certificate under the Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act of 1961, and of the ATLB demanding one of financial standing. Yet, though the Minister indicated that he had no objection, now, to the Corporations engaging in charter operations, provided they did not go for the main trooping contracts, the Air Ministry told BOAC that for political reasons it could not hire the idle DC-7Cs on a long-term charter. However, it would negotiate a charter with an Independent, which would acquire the aircraft from BOAC to fulfil its commitments. In addition, BOAC found itself selling its Britannias to British United so that the latter could operate them in a pool, which was seriously to BOAC’s disadvantage. By mid-1962 the situation had become very depressing. In July there was another change of Ministers, Julian Amery replacing Peter Thorneycroft. Just at this time Sir Basil Smallpeice produced, at the Minister’s request, a paper showing that costs could not be cut further without a drastic reduction in the size of the Corporation.8 He pointed out that if only the profitable routes were retained, BOAC would need only the twenty 707s on hand to operate to Montreal and Toronto, New York, Hong Kong, or Sydney, Lagos, East Africa, Aden, and Johannesburg. On these routes a 51 per cent load factor would give a profit of £10,000,000 before interest. The actual break-even figure would be as low as 29 per cent on Eastern routes. However, he noted, were such a pruning done, BOAC would lop off services to twenty countries, involving thirty-eight foreign cities and Manchester, and cease to bring in £21,000,000 in foreign currency. In addition, BOAC would have to cut the staff by 10,000 employees and close down its repair

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224 S p e e d b i r d factories in Treforest, which would result in a strike likely to cost £10,000,000 plus £6,000,000 in compensatory severance pay; the VC-10s would be cancelled, at a cost of some £35,000,000, and the Comet fleet would be written off. However, he continued, BOAC now expected to break even after paying interest in 1964–1965, while to cut back drastically in 1962 would be to go against world trends. At the same time, with BEA beginning to think seriously of cooperation on services direct from America into Europe, the advantages of this without an actual merger were likely to be gained. Moreover, BEA was only too happy to point out that it did not want a merger, for a variety of reasons, including its large interline revenues. In its edition of 3 December 1963 The Times noted that, more than a year earlier, Sir Matthew Slattery had submitted a seven-point programme to the Minister in which he had urged that BOAC should be clearly told (as it was not in the Air Corporations Act of 1949) whether or not it was to be wholly commercial in outlook, noting that the BOAC Board had, over the years, regarded it their duty to further national and Commonwealth interests. He had asked that the lost capital be written off and the Corporation be refinanced so that half of the remainder was in equity capital. He called for continuity in Management and higher salaries for top personnel. He favoured continuing at the present level of operations, pointing out, on the basis of Smallpeice’s paper, the very considerable problems, including cancellation of aircraft and unemployment, of slashing operations to produce immediate solvency; he believed that the economy drive then in progress could make the necessary improvements for the long run.9 And lastly, said The Times, he had called for closer liaison with BEA, suggesting that their cargo operations be linked with those of BOAC. The Times, in fact, was quite correct, as the 1964 Select Committee Report confirmed. The tragedy was that the new Minister was not prepared to take action on Slattery’s recommendations. Instead he apparently held the customary opinion that BOAC was fat, over-manned, and inefficient. Any solution was further delayed by the decision taken in September 1962 to have John Corbett, of the accountants Peat Marwick & Mitchell, make a private assessment. This, as we shall see, was not completed until May 1963 nor acted upon until the autumn of that year. As planning for the new year started in the autumn of 1962, things looked gloomy. There was no increase in business out of the United Kingdom, and results, which needed to be 6 per cent above those for 1961–1962, were 2.5 per cent below, because of losses on Eastern and Southern routes. Yet in the previous five years, BOAC had increased its revenue from £48,000,000 to £93,000,000 against competition totalling some ninety airlines, while at the same time investing £122,000,000 in British aircraft and equipment and being committed to another £133,000,000 worth. To do this, by 1962 BOAC was making 2,500,000 bookings annually to get 850,000 passengers who might use any one of 2,000,000 fares in the 1,400-page tariff schedule to travel an average 2,770 miles. When the Annual Report became available, one reason for the Corbett investigation became apparent.

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Not only was it shown that BOAC had lost £14,378,000 during the year but also that the accumulated loss totalled about £65,000,000. The announcement of these figures, coupled with Sir Matthew’s statement at a Press conference on the Annual Report of 1961–1962 that “. . . the financial structure of the Corporation, and the way in which it is expected to operate, is just bloody crazy,” set the stage for a Press attack on the Corporation, led by The Economist ’s Mary Goldring. It called for a profit first, damned Management as incompetent, labelled the Corporation as the tool of pilots and labour, and the victim of administrative inefficiency, while calling the Board to task for not having stood up to the Government over either prestige routes or keeping the aircraft industry alive. Nor had BOAC, as far as The Economist was concerned, written down its aircraft quickly enough.10 Luckily, by no means all the papers were hostile. The Sunday Telegraph, for instance, on 21 October, ran the full text of Chapter III of the Annual Report, which had been deleted on the Minister’s orders. At about the same time, the Minister told Sir Matthew that in his view BOAC had gone through two phases: from 1946 to 1952, when it was subsidized, and the following decade, in which it was not subsidized but was still an instrument of national policy. Mr. Amery’s own plan was for BOAC to be strictly economic and commercial without regard to national considerations. Upon this The Aeroplane commented: BOAC’s day of reckoning has arrived. The responsibility must be shared by the governments which have made it clear in the past that one of the duties of our state airlines is to pioneer new aircraft for the British industry.

And it went on to suggest that Sir Matthew needed to do a “Beeching” (as had just downsized the railways) on BOAC.11 But what BOAC needed was not so much a tremendous trimming in size as real commercial freedom to buy and operate the best equipment available, to obtain trooping contracts, and to have the benefit of a realistic, stable, long-term policy for the whole of British aviation as opposed to ad hoc interference by transient Ministers with too much control over finance. Even more than this, BOAC needed to be refinanced on a commercial basis instead of having its entire capital in the form of loans upon which it paid the Government a perpetual interest, profit or not. By early 1963 it was becoming evident that the realities of policy-making were causing difficulties for the Minister, who was also awaiting the Corbett Report before setting the profitability target for BOAC required by Cmnd.1337. In the meantime, a sharp letter from Sir Matthew to the Minister was mysteriously quoted in the Press on 10 February. Though a row was denied, the letter pointed out that when Harold Watkinson was the Minister (December 1955–October 1959) he had refused to allow BOAC to write down the DC-7Cs on a realistic basis, and that this was one of the reasons why the accounts for 1961–1962 showed such a sudden loss. And

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226 S p e e d b i r d Sir Matthew again pressed for a statement on the commercial status of BOAC. At the Board meeting in December 1962 the relationship between the Minister and the Corporation had been discussed and the letter approved. The Board also wanted to know why the rate on Exchequer advances to BOAC had been raised to 4.875 per cent, making it cheaper for BOAC to borrow on the commercial market. The Ministry declined to say why. BOAC had, in consequence, to enlarge its bank loan facilities from £4,000,000 to £8,000,000. In March 1963 the Ministry of Defence was reorganized, and there was some talk of abolishing the Ministry of Aviation. There was also a conference on the reorganization of the aerospace industry at the Prime Minister’s residence, “Chequers,” which Sir Matthew attended, but after that nothing more was said. In the meantime, within BOAC the general cost-reduction programme initiated in the summer of 1962 was taking effect, and continued emphasis was being placed upon it. There was also talk of the need to cut back the VC-10 order owing to the rapidity with which the colonies were becoming independent. Sir Basil pointed out to the Board in March that it was difficult to calculate accurately BOAC’s aircraft needs, for each variation of 1 per cent above or below the assumed traffic-growth rate of 7 per cent meant over a five-year period a difference of two aircraft. The Chairman added that the Minister had already been warned that a cutback might come from a total fleet of sixty-two to one of fifty-two. Yet, at the same time, BOAC was beginning to see the sun rising once more. By April 1963 it began to look as though the year ahead would be profitable, with four additional 707s in service, new runs to New Zealand and on the Hong Kong–Sydney sector, and increased fares. In addition, some 900 staff were leaving. The Corbett Report, the first draft of which Slattery had called outrageous, was delivered to the Minister in June, while concurrently Sir Matthew was reappointed for only a one-year extension of his term as Chairman, the Minister not wanting to have his hands tied until he decided what to do about the Corbett Report. (At the same time, Lord Douglas of BEA was also reappointed to 31 March 1964 so that he could fill out a full fifteen years as Chairman of BEA, even though he reached seventy on 23 December 1963.) Three other BOAC Directors, Sir Wilfred Neden, Lionel Poole, and Sir Walter Worboys, were extended merely to June 1964. In July 1963 the Government promised a White Paper on the Corbett Report in which proposals for increasing the Corporations’ competitive efficiency would be given. This Paper was not published until October, and the Corbett Report itself was never made public, although sections of it appeared in the Manchester Guardian on 2 October 1964, and the new Minister, Roy Jenkins, announced at the same time that it was being made available to the BOAC Management affected by its conclusions.12 As the Corbett Report was a private appraisal for the Minister, it was felt that it should not be made public. It had been preceded in 1962 by the Swash Report, made for the Ministry by S. V. Swash, the Chairman of Woolworth’s. This investigation of BOAC’s investment in MEA and MASCO was similarly never shown to BOAC.

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A great deal of the Corbett Report was historical and economic. While it pointed out that staff had not been cut as quickly as it should have been, on the other hand BOAC’s budget for 1962–1963 had been made realistically and had suffered from an unforeseeable shortfall in traffic in the latter part of the year. The 1963–1964 budget was realistic, except that Corbett felt that an additional £12,000,000 should have been included to write off the nineteen Comet 4s and the seventeen Britannia 312s for the good of the Corporation’s morale. BOAC needed to be able to show a profit and to cover its interest payments. He then noted that there were thirteen more VC-10s on order than the Corporation needed and that they were much more expensive than the 707s, as Slattery had already told the Minister. Corbett’s charge was to put BOAC on a sound financial basis within five years, but the VC-10s presented an unusual problem for which he could see no solution. The Board should never have allowed BOAC to arrive at its present position (an opinion with which the 1964 Select Committee later strongly agreed), but two-thirds of the losses, which totalled £81,000,000 to date, were because of the introduction of five new types in six years, a matter over which d’Erlanger had had no control. More than this, just as this history has shown, Corbett noted that the Board had had bad luck in the accelerated loss of cabotage routes, the increasing competition from the Independents, the relative decline of London as a traffic centre, and the unexpected pause in traffic growth in 1961–1962. Nevertheless, Corbett felt that sound management working to a wise and clearly defined plan could have avoided some of the losses. Further conclusions in the Report were that the accounts were misleading because of the failure to charge adequate obsolescence (which the 1964 Select Committee blamed on a failure to resolve the 1959 difference of opinion between BOAC and the Ministry), and because the 1962–1963 budget was based upon too optimistic a forecast and too much capacity. Including the additional writing down of the Comets and Britannias, BOAC would have the enormous loss of £93,000,000. As there was no chance of BOAC ever paying either the interest or the principal, the debt should be written off. (Actually, Corbett was much too pessimistic: one of BOAC’s great achievements, after the debt was written off in 1966, was to make sufficient profit that by 1969–1970 it had earned enough to pay off both the whole of the interest and the principal and had in effect done so, in dividends to the Government.) Corbett further commented that he thought Cmnd.1337 should not be applied to the Air Corporations, as it was inconsistent to require them both to operate commercially and to give due regard to interests of a national and noncommercial kind. It was this imposing of a dual role, he said, that had led the Board into confusion, particularly in regard to the VC-10 and the Associated Companies. Looking after the national interest should be up to the Ministry; a Direction to cover uncommercial action should be issued and published; and the Corporation should be reimbursed for the costs, which would not be passed through the balance sheet.

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228 S p e e d b i r d As to personnel, he felt he could say nothing about d’Erlanger because he was dead, or about Cribbett because he was dying. (He passed away on 23 May 1964.) He believed that Slattery should be kept as Chairman because he had now learned the job, although since September 1962 his hands had been tied as everyone awaited the Corbett Report. As for Managing Director, he had no recommendations to make, though he suggested that Smallpeice had failed to delegate adequately (Slattery told the Minister that he could not sack Smallpeice as he had done a very good job). However, Corbett felt that the Chairman needed a top administrator as deputy, and he suggested that one of the oil companies be asked to second someone, as the Minister of Transport had borrowed Lord Beeching from Imperial Chemical Industries. Such a man would only come if he could see profits, and that would require a solution to the VC-10 problem. Moreover, this fifty- to fifty-fiveyear-old person should expect to succeed to the Chairmanship. (Sir Giles Guthrie was originally thought of in this light; he was then on the Board of BEA.) As for labour, Corbett felt the advent of Sir Wilfred Neden had considerably improved the situation, but that some of the gains had been bought. Nevertheless, he believed that Neden should be retained as part-time Deputy Chairman. Concerning a Technical Director—a colleague whom Slattery told the Minister on 6 November 1962 he wanted—Corbett agreed that the suggestion was a good one (Guthrie eventually brought in B. S. Shenstone for this post in 1964). As for the Board, he felt that the number should be increased and better outsiders found, as Slattery had already asked. Further, he felt that there was nothing wrong with the senior executives, who were loyal and efficient, and that the new (October 1962) Financial Comptroller, Derek Glover, would be a strong addition to the management of an airline that should increasingly portray itself as international rather than British. (The 1964 Select Committee noted that one of BOAC’s problems was that since 1946 it had had six Chairmen, twelve Deputy Chairmen, and seven Chief Executives: “The comparison with BEA, who have had the same Chairman for the last fifteen years, is striking.” And one result was that not only were Chairmen forced to work with Boards not of their own selection, but also in a number of cases Ministers had made appointments without consulting incumbent or incoming Chairmen.) Concerning a merger with BEA, which the Minister had discussed with Corbett without requiring his opinion on this point, the Report suggested that 1963–1964 was not the time, as BOAC still had much streamlining to do. However, greater use should be made of the Airline Chairmen’s Committee, and ultimately there would be substantial advantages in a merger. For the future, Corbett foresaw three years of strong Board control and of cost-cutting, with at least £2,500,000 placed into reserves each year before any demand for profits was made. Some subsidiary studies were made for Corbett, but these were only spot checks, and much of what they had to say—for example, that an additional £4,000,000 savings a year were possible in Engineering and Maintenance—was based upon BOAC’s own evidence.13 The Corbett consultant’s report on financial control in BOAC was labelled superficial and inadequate in the 1964 Select Committee Report.

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The Corbett Report and the subsequent White Paper mark the turning point in BOAC’s history. In many respects it was far less sinister than was suspected at the time. Its immediate consequence was the expulsion of the Slattery–Smallpeice team, which might well have continued to lead BOAC successfully as Corbett suggested, particularly as economic recovery and reform coincided to produce remarkable profits over the next decade. But the real importance of the Corbett Report was that it was basically the blueprint for Sir Giles Guthrie’s regime.14 As the 1964 Select Committee noted, relations between BOAC and the Ministry deteriorated from 1959 because of the three-year misunderstanding over the handling of the amortization of the aircraft (which, after all, involved 80 per cent of BOAC’s capital). The Minister could regulate the form of the accounts, but not the substance. Then came the dispute over Engineering and Maintenance statistics and results, and finally the Corbett Inquiry, which delayed discussion of Slattery’s August and November 1962 proposals to reorganize the Corporation. Thus the atmosphere was not particularly cordial in mid-1963, and the Ministry’s refusal to allow access to the Corbett Report tried Sir Matthew’s sharp, southern Irish temper. It should also be borne in mind that only in 1962 had the Treasury been reorganized along functional lines and that it suffered from a high turnover in staff. Much of its work, as noted in Cmnd.1432 of 1962, H.C.228 of 1964, and Cmnd.6225 of 1976, was ad hoc or retrospective. In fact, Treasury spokesmen admitted to the 1964 Select Committee that they were not very proud of its lack of effectiveness in the amortization dispute of 1959–1962. In the summer of 1963 the Minister established a working group with the Treasury to which Financial Comptroller Derek Glover, an experienced and astute manager, was attached, with the aim of forecasting the Corporation’s likely financial results over the next five years. Talk of merger with BEA percolated once more and was countered by a circular letter from Lord Douglas to Members of Parliament. The Government announced BEA’s financial target as a 6 per cent per annum return on net assets after depreciation, but before allowing for interest. BOAC said it was going to show a profit for the year, but its Annual Report, issued in October, showed a further loss in 1962–1963 and, because of the interest charges on lost capital, another increase in the accumulated deficit. Concurrently, Prime Minister Macmillan resigned, and the anticipated appearance of the Corbett Report was further delayed while a new Government was formed. On 20 November the Government issued its White Paper and on the 21st the Chairman, Sir Matthew Slattery, the Deputy Chairman, Sir Wilfred Neden, and the Managing Director, Sir Basil Smallpeice, all resigned. Slattery and Smallpeice had been told accidentally at the IATA meeting at the Hassler Hotel in Rome earlier in the autumn that they were being replaced, rumour of the Amery–Guthrie luncheon at the Connaught Hotel in August having leaked out. At that repast, the Minister and Sir Giles Guthrie, then a member of the BEA Board, had discussed what Guthrie thought needed to be done to put BOAC right.

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230 S p e e d b i r d The Minister, Amery, claimed in the White Paper, The Financial Problems of the British Overseas Airways Corporation, that there was a lack of financial control in BOAC. In view of the fact that Sir Basil was an accountant and a past member of the Council of the Institute of Chartered Accountants, the charge sounded odd (and it was repudiated by the 1964 Select Committee on BOAC). Press releases revealed that Sir Matthew, paid £8,500 a year as Chairman, refused to be both Chairman and Managing Director because the two posts were, in the view of many, incompatible. So it was at once announced in the House of Commons on 21 November that Sir Giles Guthrie, a merchant banker, former British Airways (1936) trainee, Fleet Air Arm pilot, and member of the Board of BEA, would become Chairman and Chief Executive at a salary of £15,000 plus £1,000 in allowances. The White Paper was cleverly written and apparently designed, like the Cadman Report of 1938 (Cmnd.5685), to get rid of a Managing Director who was persona non grata to the Ministry. After giving a concise history of the Corporation, in paragraph 19 the Paper stated that BOAC had made no change in its rates of amortization, without, however, pointing out that permission for it to do so had been refused in 1959. Paragraph 21 then implied it was BOAC’s duty to pioneer new aircraft and ended with one of Mr. Amery’s favourite judgments that it is a considerable advantage for an airline to have an aircraft designed especially for its own needs. This assumption appears to have cost BOAC £63,000,000 plus interest to 30 March 1963. In paragraph 24 the losses in associated companies were correctly blamed on the Management of the Corporation. In criticizing BOAC’s operating results, the Paper said nothing about the way in which the Corporation’s traffic had been eroded by concessions to the Independents made under political pressure. Moreover, to charge, as in paragraph 29, that BOAC’s expansion was overly optimistic without mentioning the pressure put on the Corporation to buy twice as many VC-10s as it wanted completely ignored the whole complex issue of BOAC’s commercial goals and its special relation to the British aircraft industry. (The 1964 Select Committee was highly critical of this charge, calling it unsubstantiated, and noting that once BOAC had been locked into a commitment to order thirty-five British VC-10s it had no other available policy than expansion. It could not react easily and quickly to a changing market because it had a seven-year forward commitment, while, if it had been able to buy 707s off the shelf, it would have had only a two-and-a-half-year commitment. Its ability to do just this from 1964 helps explain its rocketing commercial success after that date.) Paragraph 33 said that the Corbett Report found the Corporation’s financial control weak, and that this had been accorded insufficient importance within BOAC. Yet, according to the Corporation’s own records, Sir Basil Smallpeice had throughout his career insisted upon the importance of financial accountability and costing. His replies to Corbett’s detailed questions lie well within the normal reactions of airlines to the problems as they saw them at the time decisions were made. Moreover, Sir Basil early in November had himself explained to Amery how the accumulated deficit of £75,000,000 had arisen. The figures quoted in the

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White Paper were his: £15, 000,000 lost on Associated Companies, £40,000,000 in abnormal introductory costs and write-offs on Comets and Britannias, and £20,000,000 from the excess costs of Comet and Britannia aircraft (only useful for three years) versus 707s in 1961–1963 as opposed to the costs of rivals’ operations, an important point when IATA sets fares to suit the most efficient.15 Slattery had, in fact, taken private advice and in the face of the auditors ordered a change in the write-off, which resulted in the firing of the then Financial Comptroller when he refused to comply. The White Paper went on to deal with the future: paragraph 51 said that the Government thought “it necessary to reaffirm that the Corporation must operate as a commercial undertaking.” Bearing in mind that Sir Matthew had been pressing for just such a statement, the use of the word reaffirm did not accord with historical evidence. Moreover, the rest of the paragraph was hedged in such a way that the Minister was not committed to giving a written Direction when he did interfere. Reaction to the White Paper was generally along the lines that changing Management would not solve BOAC’s basic financial problems unless the new Chairman obtained drastic powers. There remained a steady pressure for publication of the Corbett Report itself. What from Sir Matthew’s position was politically most unfortunate was the much-regretted assassination on 22 November 1963 of President John F. Kennedy of the United States, for the BOAC affair was lost in the mass of news connected with that tragedy. The matter was revived briefly, though with little hope of accomplishing any further change, in the Debate on the Air Corporations Bill on 2 December 1963.16 Nevertheless, the new Chairman, Sir Giles Guthrie, was charged with presenting within twelve months a plan which would carry the problem past the pending General Election. The circumstances under which Sir Giles Guthrie produced this will be taken up in the next chapter. The case against the Minister, Amery, and in defence of Slattery and Smallpeice has never been argued. The power of the Minister to fire as well as to hire the Directors of a nationalized industry in Britain was accepted without question. As to the merits of the case, however, the record speaks for itself. It may therefore be useful to quote here some statistics showing what had been achieved in the seven and a half years of the d’Erlanger and Slattery regimes—a period throughout which Sir Basil Smallpeice had been Managing Director and responsible for the efficiency, safety, and economy of the current operations of BOAC itself (but not, he claims, of BOAC Associated Companies due to a Board division of duties on 1 May 1956, which in turn had been made because of the antipathies between Smallpeice and Cribbett). No incoming Chief Executive can significantly affect the efficiency of a large business until after he has been in it for at least a year. Smallpeice was appointed to the Chief Executive post in May 1956 and handed it in at the end of 1963, so the years that illustrate what was achieved are 1957 and 1964—and the impartiality of the statistics cannot be questioned because they are taken from Sir Giles Guthrie’s Annual Report for 1966–1967.

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232 S p e e d b i r d The size of BOAC, measured in capacity ton miles, produced in 1957–1958 was 317,000,000; in spite of all the difficulties in obtaining suitable aircraft, in 1963– 1964 its size was 1,017,000,000—three times larger. During this period aircraft maintenance costs at base and overseas had been brought down by 66 per cent; flying and passenger service costs had gone down 45 per cent; traffic, sales, and administration costs were reduced by 30 per cent; and total overall costs per capacity ton mile (including aircraft obsolescence) had been cut from 36s.42d. in 1957–1958 to 22s.91d. in 1963–1964. Because of this consistent drive over seven and a half years, BOAC had succeeded in reducing its break-even load factor—the proportion of its aircraft it needed to fill in order to start making profits—from 60 per cent in 1957–1958 to 47.6 per cent in 1963–1964. This was partly the result of the use of the new larger and more efficient jets, a sound commercial decision, and partly from increased employee productivity—from 16,424 ctm per employee in 1957–1958 to 50,004 in 1963–1964. During the d’Erlanger and Slattery regimes, therefore, BOAC’s economic position and competitive potential had been dramatically changed for the better. But in 1961 and 1962 BOAC’s ability to make profits was thwarted by a world-wide check in the rate of growth of air traffic. In 1961, BOAC’s aircraft were only 45.8 per cent full, and in 1962 only 44.9 per cent—an experience shared by all major airlines. By 1964, after internal reorganization had taken place, its break-even load factor had been brought down to 40 per cent and BOAC was in a position in which it could not fail to make profits, and substantial profits at that. The facts quoted above do not support in any material respect the contention in the Ministry’s infamous White Paper that there was a lack of financial control in BOAC. This period of seven and a half years was one in which BOAC worked for and achieved a greater proportionate reduction in operating costs than at any other time before or since. Productivity per employee was raised by more than 250 per cent. All this was accomplished at a time when, significantly, there was a great improvement in personnel and industrial relations. In addition, in an effort to counter the world-wide slowdown in the rate of traffic growth, a start was made in the United States in 1961 to convert the mere selling of aircraft space into a thorough-going process of whole-hearted marketing—a process extended in later years to the whole route network of the Corporation. Overall, this period was, despite all BOAC’s problems in dealing with the Ministry and successive Ministers over aircraft procurement and other matters, a period of great dynamic growth for BOAC. The reasons for the White Paper of November 1962 and for the subsequent forced resignations of the BOAC leadership were political. The Cabinet evidently felt, whether this was recorded or not, that before the accumulated deficit was written off there had to be scapegoats for the supposed mismanagement of BOAC. Obviously, with an election imminent, it would not do to name Ministers or to admit that the Government had been at fault. Nor would it be wise to blame the aircraft industry because of its effective lobby.

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64. BOAC prided itself and was, indeed, known for the excellence of its First-Class cabin service.

BOAC Organization In the 1950s by far the most important development within BOAC was the reorganization of the Operations Department, with the subsequent assault upon engineering costs. But it was a long time before the effects of the new organization began to be apparent in the accounts. Apart from the feeling on the technical side that the highest Management appointments were not open to them because they were unacceptable to the Board (a shortage of other candidates was partly because the Air Registration Board license requirements of a seven-year apprenticeship had no appeal to university graduates), there was the matter of a twenty-month delay running into 1958 before seven key posts were vacated and new men appointed. More than this, for some time no one in the Engineering and Maintenance Department was aware how far BOAC’s costs were above those of its competitors. In September 1956, after the Chief Engineer recovered from his long illness, the Engineering Costs Committee was set up. Even when its work was done, the Committee had to convince the next tier down the ladder that costs were out of line. Then they had to convince the Trade Unions. Not until early in 1958 was BOAC able to start mending its methods. At that time, the Department

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234 S p e e d b i r d had barely recovered from the aftermath of the Comet 1 and the Britannias, and was just facing the arrival of the Comet 4 and the 707s. Nevertheless, aircraft utilization was pushed from just over eight hours a day to eleven, or 4,000 hours per year, versus the four and a quarter hours a day of 1950, partly by eliminating night-stops and speeding up check times, and partly by better planning. Apart from the creation of a methods branch within the E&M Department and some new appointments, the most significant change was a restructuring from a fleet maintenance organization into major inspections and minor ones with modern methods of quality and production control, reorganization, and centralization of buying and storing. An attack on the two-shift system had actually started in 1955, but the problem continued until 1961, through fear of unemployment, despite the fact that normal wastage (about 11 per cent per annum) took care of redundancies. Where the aircraft themselves were concerned, the system of spreading major check work over several inspection periods allowed greater flexibility with less time in the hangar. As the Chief Engineer noted in lectures in 1956, one of the general troubles BOAC faced was the fact that British components had only about half the life of their American equivalents. This was because neither the airline nor the manufacturer had specified a component life equal to that of the airframe or the engines. To overcome this with ARB approval, therefore, BOAC adopted an RAFtype system of scheduled maintenance. It was embarrassing for BOAC to find that, despite the skill of British workmen, BOAC had 1.6 engine failures per 1,000 hours in 1954 compared to 0.7 for its European competitors; the engines out of action were away for seven weeks rather than four. BOAC managed only 600 hours between overhauls, while its competitors achieved 900; BOAC carried 110 per cent spare engines to others’ 50 per cent. BOAC reckoned in 1958 that if it could achieve the same regularity with the Bristol Proteus that rivals achieved with their American engines, it could save £1,600,000 a year. This last point was particularly vital because it cost £10,000 ($20,400) to overhaul a Proteus vs. $4,300 for the radials in a Constellation. The Select Committee on Nationalized Industries commented on these costs in its Report (The Air Corporations) in 1958–1959.17 But just at that time, BOAC set up the 707 Standing Committee and one of its first actions was to tackle the spares problem, as that part of the budget had just gone £1,000,000 into the red. Reconsideration of the spare engine policy had been urged in 1954 and had resulted in a proposal for much reduced inventories of Avons and Proteuses. But pressure was brought to bear to have Bristol repair the Proteus, and though in the end the work was done at Treforest, the weak state of Bristol’s finances required BOAC to take over Bristol’s float of spare engines. In the end, this was just as well, for the engine proved less reliable than predicted. In the meantime, the price of jet engines had risen astronomically from the £21,000 of April 1952 for an Avon to about £100,000 apiece for the 707’s Conways. Recognition of this led to the creation of an inter-airline, world-wide spares pool in May 1959. Since then this has been enlarged to include airframe spares and radio

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and ground equipment. This, along with greater time between overhauls, as well as other improvements, allowed BOAC to reduce its float for the 707 to 56 per cent of those installed. Between November 1959 and July 1962 the capital savings for the Comet 4 and the 707 were reckoned at £806,000 plus a yearly saving of £142,000 in obsolescence, etc. The 1959 Select Committee had not been fair, for it had failed to mention that the changes were already then saving BOAC £463,000 a year, and by April 1960 BOAC’s costs had dropped from 39d. per capacity ton mile to 29d. Further, in October 1961 a revised programme of aircraft maintenance, in which the expensive Check III was spread over seven Check IVs, was started: only three instead of four of the nineteen Comet 4s were now in the hangar at the same time. This allowed the fleet utilization to rise by 5,000 hours a year, which at £500 an hour in revenues raised the potential by £2,500,000 a year. A further reorganization early in 1962 resulted in the appointment of a Works Manager and in an ultimate expectation of an additional savings of about £4,000,000 (this was noted to the Corbett consultants). At that time, BOAC was criticized for not having the equivalent of an American airline’s Vice President for Engineering, a real power in top Management. (But in fact the Chief Engineer was part of the top Management, though not on the Board.) It was also criticized because it did not then have the mechanical equipment used by companies such as United Air Lines (which in 1957 had 25.9 engineering staff per aircraft versus BOAC’s 111.8), the three-shift system employed by BEA, or the freedom to remove the Treforest repair centre to London Airport. (The latter constraint was tied to the unemployment problem in South Wales—a legacy of the Second World War when on 18 June 1940 BOAC had been directed to establish its engine repair facilities there.)

Management Training Being in competition with American airlines, BOAC, like many others, was much aware of the need for better management because costs, especially in the late Fifties, began to escalate dramatically. While it was not until 1965 that anything like the equivalent of the Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration (1908) was founded in the United Kingdom, BOAC and BEA were among the leaders in the Fifties in developing practical rather than academic courses for Management personnel. BOAC started residential Management training courses at Dormey House, Sunningdale, Berkshire, in 1957 in a former aircrew rest house. These residential courses were intermittent and run only when needed, though one attraction was Asian stewardess trainees in their national costumes, who were also housed there. Starting in 1961 Dormey House began regular six-week courses, for it had become clear that, as the airline expanded, it needed to train more managers and not just to assign anyone to manage a route or other activity without the expertise to handle both the job and relationships with those above and below.

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236 S p e e d b i r d When Sir Giles Guthrie came in, he was concerned at the uneconomic drain of the Dormey House establishment, while at the same time observing that BEA’s staff college at East Burnham in Buckinghamshire, set up in 1961, was only used for half the year. He proposed a Joint Staff College, but BEA preferred to rent its premises to BOAC for six months each year. So in April 1966 BOAC Management training was established there and soon showed that one team of instructional staff and a combined programme would, as Guthrie had suggested, prove more beneficial. In July 1967 Guthrie and Anthony Milward agreed in the Airline Chairmen’s Committee to a joint Air Transport Staff College. Starting in 1968, this developed annual programmes for junior and middle Management, with special seminars for BOAC senior executives at which speakers from Harvard, the Massachussetts Institute of Technology, and the British business schools at Manchester and London, started in 1965, made presentations. Most of the courses lasted from one to three weeks and covered such topics as airline business, planning, communications skills, management statistics, handling people, financial planning and control, and industrial relations. On 1 September 1972 the Staff College came under the direct control of the new Group Personnel Director of the British Airways Board. In July 1973 the new Advisory Board decided that the freshly merged Corporations would need more professionally trained managers, and a new programme of longer courses was designed, which did not, however, go into effect during the life of BOAC. In the years 1968–1972 alone, the Joint Staff College trained about 1,000 BOAC personnel. No doubt some of the increase in productivity of the 24,000-man BOAC staff between the 2,100 ctm per employee of 1947 and the 121,000 ctm of 1974 must be attributed to the excellence of Management training, which enabled the Corporation to handle more and more passengers and freight with a staff that for a while even dropped below 20,000.

Labour Relations, 1956–1963 The d’Erlanger regime saw the rise of the pilots to a status closer to those of their American counterparts, while it also saw the first moves in the attempts to trim off the fat in the Engineering and Maintenance Department. The pilots started the ball rolling late in the Miles Thomas era, and under the crew-complement scheme they agreed, for an extra £480 a year, to do without radio officers. At the same time, flying pay was based on the weight of the aircraft flown, thus raising the pay of senior captains from £2,359 a year to between £2,926 and £3,160, at a cost to BOAC of £400,000 a year. But late in 1956 the crew-complement scheme ran into trouble from the navigators, who objected to the long-term policy of having all-pilot crews, though the immediate cause was actually the hiring of additional navigators. This was settled by the Corporation agreeing not to hire any navigators who were not potential pilots. Just when the aircrew seemed settled, the engineer officers in January 1957 dropped their bombshell. They refused to fly in Britannias. The trouble here went

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back to the design days of the aircraft, when it had been decided that it would be operated by a two-pilot crew. Next, Northeast Airlines (which later cancelled its order) insisted on having an engineer’s position. And when BOAC Britannias were on route-proving trials it was discovered that the aircraft was too complex for twopilot operation. Only in 1956 did the Air Registration Board require an engineer to be carried but did not define his duties. BOAC was unconvinced and in a Fleet Order of August 1956 merely made the engineer “adviser to the captain.” The problem came to a head on 22 January 1957 when Management admitted to the Board that it had made a mess of the situation by losing sight of the human relations problem involved. A working party was at once set up, but the matter had to go to the National Joint Council for Civil Air Transport. The Board felt that because BOAC had been in on the design from the start, the engineers had acted inexcusably in making their complaint so late, but that their action was quite understandable. The flight deck of the 312s was at once redesigned, but it was too late to do this for the 102s. Seven days, however, was too short a time to settle the matter, which went to Sir Wilfred Neden, then Chief Industrial Commissioner of the Ministry of Labour. It was then passed to a Court of Inquiry headed by Prof. D. T. Jack, which reported in March (Cmnd.105) that it felt that the engineers were to blame but suggested that BOAC set up a new working party, with the pilots included. This was done, and the new group reported in November 1957 that the whole matter was settled. By then the navigators and engineers were demanding a salary increase, which the Minister said he would not approve for more than the percentages BOAC was offering because of the national wage-freezing policy then in force. It was agreed that the additional amount asked would be added after the freeze was lifted. To avoid a future problem, in September 1959 the Board reaffirmed that BOAC intended to use engineers in both current and future aircraft. The pilots asked for a further pay increase in 1960, and this request went to the Industrial Court, which gave them a £965 boost, raising senior captains to £5,000 a year, or to the same salary then as the Managing Director. Elsewhere in the Corporation, labour troubles largely centred about the reorganization of the Engineering and Maintenance Department. In May 1956 the hourly rated engineering staff demanded a forty-hour week and a three-week annual paid holiday. This was the spearhead of a national union drive. The Board resisted, on the basis of national policy and because with a deficit looming ahead it felt no change could be made which did not increase productivity. With the wage freeze in October 1957, the matter ran over into 1958. It then became entangled not only in actions of the International Labour Office but also in the continuing problem of what to do with the Aeronautical Engineers Association. Not until April 1958 did the Board agree to Management proposals, after the Trades Union side of the National Joint Council had refused to help in studies designed to remedy the conditions revealed by the Engineering Costs Committee. The general redundancy in the Engineering Department was aggravated by the presence of the Aeronautical Engineers Association (men who could not be

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238 S p e e d b i r d employed in any hangar where other unions worked). The problem was raised again with the Ministers of Labour and of Transport and Civil Aviation, but no solution was reached. In October 1958, just as the Comets started trans-Atlantic services, the unions banned overtime and insisted on settlement of their wage claim. The Corporation replied that its ability to pay depended upon financial results, especially upon economies in the Engineering Department; therefore, any BOAC offer would have to be linked to union cooperation in the reorganization of the Department. The Board and Management had decided to make this a test case, as there had been seventy-six unconstitutional union actions since 1953, and the frequency of these was increasing. The shop stewards in particular were regarded as having overstepped their function of handling grievances on the hangar floor. For their part, the unions maintained that the appointment of a part-time unpaid Chairman (d’Erlanger) and the setting up of the Engineering Costs Committee were detrimental to their interests, especially as the Committee reported that other airlines did the same amount of work with 50 per cent less manpower. Overtime was a vital issue with BOAC, which, unlike BEA, worked only two rather than three shifts. When the men refused to work overtime, they were dismissed and a strike began. Blame for this was laid on a Communist cell at London Airport, where the Chairman of the Joint Shop Stewards Committee was described by the Court of Inquiry (Cmnd.608) as an admitted Communist. The fundamental problem, as BOAC correctly pointed out, was that the traditional British method of aircraft maintenance had been outmoded by developments elsewhere; although they might have helped, neither monthly newsletters to the staff nor chatty visits could have overcome this. By the time the strike was settled, BOAC had come to the reluctant conclusion that the AEA men would have to go, for though 1,260-strong in 1946, there were only forty-four of them in 1958. The Court in its Report spread the blame about fairly evenly, though admitting that BOAC had a good case. Nevertheless, the strike cost BOAC £1,250,000 in lost revenue. It did clear the air, however, and a steady improvement in labour relations started, which reached satisfactory levels in the Slattery regime. Working time lost through individual strike action in 1962–1963 amounted to only three minutes per employee. This was partly because of a strengthening and reactivation of the National Joint Council, of which Smallpeice was Chairman in 1960–1961, and also to action within BOAC. Yet, despite all this, there was a wildcat electricians’ strike in July 1961, in which it was generally felt that the shop stewards were fighting a last-ditch battle against the engineering reorganization. Only in September did the Board come to realize that, although top Management read clippings circulated from the dailies in London, they did not see the articles about London Airport in the local papers that printed all the latest rumours. Once this information gap had been bridged, it became possible to tackle labour problems with advanced knowledge, which sometimes was not obtained from any of the sixty National Joint Council consultative panels.

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10.2. Employers and Trade Unions: membership of National Joint Council for Civil Air Transport, 1958 Employers Corporations: British European Airways British Overseas Airways

Trade Unions

Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) Amalgamated Society of Wood Workers (ASW) Association of Engineering & Shipbuilding Draughtsmen (AESD) Independent Operators: Association of Supervisory Staffs, Executives Airwork Ltd. and Technicians (ASSET) Air Charter Ltd. British Air Line Pilots Association (BALPA) Airways Union Ltd. Clerical & Administrative Workers’ Union BKS Air Transport Ltd. (C&AWU) Cambrian Airways Ltd. Electrical Trades Union (ETU) Eagle Aviation Ltd. Merchant Navy & Air Line Officers Hunting-Clan Air Transport Ltd. Association (MN&AOA) Morton Air Services Ltd. National Association of Clerical & Supervisory Olley Air Services Ltd. Staffs (NACSS) Scottish Aviation Ltd. National Society of Coppersmiths, Braziers, Silver City Airways Ltd. and Metal Workers (NSCBMW) Skyways Ltd. National Society of Painters (NSP) Transair Ltd. National Union of Furniture Trade Operatives Air Terminals Ltd. (NUFTO) International Aeradio Ltd. National Union of General & Municipal Workers (NUGMW) National Union of Sheet Metal Workers and Braziers (NUSMWB) National Union of Vehicle Builders (NUVB) Radio Officers’ Union (ROU) Transport and General Workers’ Union (TGWU)

Source: Cmnd.608 (1958), 6 and 39.

When the next round of wage claims came due in 1962, the Chairmen of both BEA and BOAC discussed them with the Minister and acted in accordance with the policy he laid down; but upon Thorneycroft’s refusal to give a written Direction, further claims were settled by BOAC in its own best commercial interests.

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10.3. National Joint Council: national sectional panels Trade Union Side

Panel

BALPA

Pilots

MNAOA

Navigating and engineer officers

ROU

Radio

ASSET AEU ETU AESD ASSET AEU ASW ETU NUSMWB TGWU NUGMW NUFTO NUVB NSP NSCBMW

BOAC BEA

Draughtsmen, planners and tracers

BOAC BEA

Engineering and maintenance

BOAC BEA Independent operators IAL

Surface transport and goods handling

TGWU NUGMW

General service workers

TGWU NUGMW

Catering

C&AWU NACSS

Clerical and clerical administrative

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BOAC BEA Independent operators BOAC BEA Independent operators BOAC BEA Independent operators IAL

Supervisory engineering and technical

TGWU

AEU AESD BALPA C&AWU ROU

Employers’ Side

M.1–M.4

BOAC BEA ATL BOAC BEA ATL BOAC BEA BOAC BEA Independent operators IAL ATL BOAC BEA

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Operations In the years after 1956, route operations increasingly fitted into regular patterns, which the introduction of larger, faster, and much more expensive jet airliners changed, but did not disrupt. As the ranges of aircraft increased, intermediate stops were dropped where there was enough traffic to warrant through services. The problem that still raised its head was the matter of replacement of pilots as they reached retirement. A national college for training airline pilots had been suggested as early as 1944. The College of Air Training at Hamble only became a reality in 1959 and in 1964 began to feed new pilots into BOAC. The Hamilton Committee (CAP.194) of 1963 agreed that about 200 new pilots would be needed each year and that they would not come from the RAF. But in the next decade the estimated size of the necessary pilot force oscillated as the airlines planners tried to keep up with union demands and new government regulations.

Last Comments Though the Board was criticized for its actions and its ambivalence by Parliamentary Committees and the Ministry, BOAC itself was one of the leaders in British business methodology. Not until 1964 was a British Business School mooted. Though not yet apparent, BOAC was engaged in market analysis and in the introduction of computers, and it had a stable and flexible senior Management. Derek Glover, the Financial Comptroller (Director after 1 June 1964) from 1962, had been Personal Assistant to the Managing Director, then General Manager, Southern Routes, before bringing his experience both within Headquarters and on the route system to the post of Financial Comptroller. When the British Airways Board was formed in 1971, he became the Group Financial Director. Winston Bray of the prewar British Airways (1936) rose to be Deputy Chairman of BOAC in 1972. Ross Stainton, an Imperial Airways trainee in 1933, also illustrated the excellence and long experience of top Management. General Manager, Western Routes, in the early 1960s, he became Managing Director of BOAC in January 1971 and went on to be Chief Executive of British Airways in 1977. All this modernization and the continuity at the top were in sharp contrast to what was happening in the Government. In the Treasury, people only stayed from one to four years in a post, while no one in the Ministry had been there longer than nine years. At the time of the 1964 Select Committee, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Aviation had only been in the Ministry six months, while Ministers came and went at such a rate that from 1944 to 1964 BOAC was involved with no fewer than twelve, as Appendix B shows. Moreover, according to the Annual Reports, though BOAC’s aircraft had become more complex and far more expensive, the capacity ton miles generated per employee went from 2,422 in 1946–1947, to 50,004 in 1963–1964, to 121,156 in 1973–1974. The staff was 24,464 in March 1947, 20,345 in March 1964, and 24,646

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242 S p e e d b i r d in March 1974; total production, on the other hand, was 65,635,000 ctm in 1947– 1948, 1,017,341,000 in 1963–1964, and 3,033,360,000 in 1973–1974. The increase in productivity invalidates the long-standing accusations of over-staffing. The 1964 Select Committee concluded that BOAC’s three overriding weaknesses had been the relationship with the subsidiary and Associated Companies (which was clarified before the Corbett Report was commissioned), the slowness in cost reduction in Engineering and Maintenance (a debatable assessment), and the indecisiveness of a Board with too many part-time members, whose Chairman believed that he was obligated to support the British aircraft industry. The Select Committee stressed above all else that once (for a variety of reasons which the Committee felt were uncommercial and which a strong Board would not have allowed the Minister to impose) BOAC had become committed to purchase more aircraft than it needed to be delivered further in the future than was wise, it had no recourse but to expand and make losses. Yet, in spite of these flaws and the massive impact of the loss of the Comets, the Management of BOAC had a lot of which to be proud. The years 1956 to 1963 can now be regarded as one of the troughs into which BOAC slid from time to time. The parallels with the war years are strong. A change of Management coincided with a lack of suitable aircraft, and once again American machines were brought in.18 In both periods the higher direction of the Corporation sought to do what was best for BOAC and at the same time what was best for the nation. The two were not always compatible in the eyes of the responsible Minister of the day, and divergent views arose. As a final parallel, both the end of the Pearson–Runciman regime in March 1943 and the resignation of Slattery and Smallpeice in December 1963 seem in retrospect to have taken place just when the whole climate of opinion was changing. Like Lord Knollys in 1943, Sir Giles Guthrie in 1964 would still have to fight for BOAC’s rights, but the tide had turned in his favour.

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Part Three “Magna Carta” to Dissolution, 1964–1974

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65. Sir Matthew Slattery, BOAC Chairman, 1960–1963.

66. Gilbert Lee, Chairman of Associated Companies, 1967–1971.

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Chapter XI Beginning the Last Decade Sir Giles Guthrie and the Commercial “Magna Carta” Sir Giles Guthrie came into BOAC on 1 January 1964 with reasons to smile. For the first time, a Chairman had asked for and had obtained an absolutely clear mandate. The one received was as follows—a letter that became known in BOAC as the “Magna Carta”: Letter from the Minister of Aviation, Julian Amery, to the Chairman, BOAC, dated 1 January 1964 I have sometimes been told that there is uncertainty on the part of the British Overseas Airways Corporation as to how far its role is commercial and how far it should take account of considerations such as public services and national prestige which might conflict with a purely commercial interest. The Government does not consider that there is any solid justification for such uncertainty. Nevertheless, it may help to remove any misunderstanding if I give you more specific guidance on this issue. It has all along been understood that it was the duty of the Air Corporations to make themselves self-supporting as soon as possible. The Chairman of BOAC in 1952 made this clear in a direction to his staff with which I find myself in complete agreement. He said, in the annual report of the Corporation for 1952, that it should be imprinted on the minds of all staff that the Corporation was essentially a commercial undertaking; that the financial aspect of every single activity mattered; and that the ultimate test of the Corporation’s success was not only the standard of public service provided but also the normal business criterion of whether it could be made to pay its way. The White Paper on “The Financial and Economic Obligations of the Nationalised Industries” (Cmnd.1337) explains what is meant by a nationalized Corporation paying its way. The minimum requirement is that the revenues should be enough to meet all items properly chargeable to revenue, including interest, depreciation and also to provide for reserves. It is accordingly the Government’s aim to agree with the nationalized Corporations on financial targets with the object of achieving as soon as possible yields approximating more closely to industrial yields, allowance being made for obligations which are undertaken by nationalized Boards for reasons other than their strict commercial interest. I hope that it will be possible eventually to agree on some such financial target for BOAC as I have been able to do with BEA.

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246 S p e e d b i r d The immediate task, however, is for BOAC to achieve the break even point after meeting interest and depreciation. How this can be done is a matter for you, but for my part I am also much concerned in view of my responsibility for financing the accumulated and continuing deficit. After consulting you I have informed Parliament in the course of the second reading Debate on the Air Corporations Bill 1963 that a plan for achieving break even will be produced by the Corporation within a year. This plan may well raise major questions of policy, including questions about the size of the fleet and the route network operated by the Corporation, and you will no doubt wish to discuss its implications with me. There are many points where national policy and the aims and activities of the Corporation interact. It is highly desirable that a close relationship between the Ministry and the Corporation should continue and, with it, the constant interchange of ideas on matters of common interest. There is already established machinery under which the Corporations seek the Ministry’s approval for the ordering of new aircraft. There is also the Transport Aircraft Requirements Committee where the points of view of all the interests concerned are brought together. But the choice of aircraft is a matter for the Corporation’s judgment. It has been the aim of the Corporations to buy their aircraft as far as possible from British sources and I trust that this policy will continue. There may, of course, sometimes be occasions (as when the Boeing 707s were purchased in 1956) when the choice of foreign aircraft is unavoidable. It is important that the interchange of views between the Government and the Corporations should not blur the fundamental responsibility of the Corporations to act in accordance with their commercial judgment. If the national interest should appear, whether to the Corporations or to the Government, to require some departure from the strict commercial interests of the Corporation, this should be done only with the express agreement or at the express request of the Minister. How losses, if any, resulting from such a political decision should be presented in the accounts will depend on circumstances in each case.1

Guthrie could also smile because he had got the appointments to the Board he needed and the promise of financial reconstruction. For these Slattery had laid the groundwork. Though it took some time, Sir Giles proceeded to carry out the recommendations made in the 1962 Slattery proposals, in the Corbett Report, and in the subsequent 1964 Select Committee Report. Freed of many of the depressing problems which the previous leadership had faced and buoyed by rising revenues and profitability, he enjoyed an impressive five years. As he soon discovered, BOAC was run by a fine professional team headed by Keith Granville, Ross Stainton, Charles Abell, and others with long experience;2 costs were declining as the efficiency of the new jets rose; labour relations were reasonable, and politics was quiet. Though a profitability target had to be worked out, on the whole the Ministry and the Treasury had bigger problems to worry about, and BOAC, with its Cabinet-sanctioned Magna Carta, was to act commercially. It was free to buy and finance its aircraft abroad,

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as it should have been able to do in 1946 (because those aircraft earned dollars), and there were no awkward British competitors to be taken on and nursed to operational respectability. Pools were working well and arrangements were agreed with the new national airlines in most cases as the colonies became independent. The British Independent airlines faced increasingly aggressive competition from the commercialized BOAC, and now it was their turn to lose freighting and trooping licenses and contracts. In fact, as early as late 1965 the first feeler about selling out to BOAC had reached Guthrie from British United Airways, and highly secret talks started then. BOAC Associated Companies was profitable and the international scene, though occasionally punctuated by an Indo-Pakistan War or an Arab–Israeli conflict, was rarely cause for concern. The first whiff of a fuel price increase was in the wind, but it was scarcely significant. And, though there was much talk about the Concorde and the US SST, BOAC had to do no more than take options on delivery places. BOAC had flown out of the clouds and for the next five years was in the clear and was set to ride out the next storm. From late 1964 onward, this bred high morale and confidence, even though the G Plans (for “Guthrie”) indicated clear air turbulence and more clouds ahead in the 1970s. Guthrie came in as Chairman and Chief Executive, combining the previous posts and salaries. He brought with him, as Senior General Manager, David Craig from BEA, a man of ideas and an accomplished linguist who was regarded with a great deal of suspicion by BOAC Management as a potential hatchet man. In fact, once the Chairman discovered that he really had a fine team already in BOAC, by late January 1964 Guthrie was decreeing that Granville should always be consulted and on 3 April made him a Deputy Chairman and Deputy Chief Executive. Also, he noted that the Corbett Report and the White Paper were a couple of years out of date, so Senior General Manager Craig was shifted to the task of providing a weekly report called Facts for Management, chairing the daily operational committee, and acting as a trouble-shooter and modernizer. Later, he chaired the 747 Committee and in 1969 went as Managing Director to Malaysia-Singapore Airlines. Guthrie was by career a merchant banker, but he came to BOAC as the first airline (British Airways [1936]) trainee to reach the top. He had been a test pilot in the Fleet Air Arm, and on the BEA Board since 1959. He won respect by asking questions, making decisions, and standing up to the Government, and Management came to like him. Guthrie was a consensus man, the public-relations-conscious captain of the team. Interestingly, he had been on the board of a company run by Keith Granville’s father. He and Granville met at a house on Park Lane early in 1964 and Guthrie was persuaded not to act hastily in appointing Craig to a position. Interviewed in January 1977, Granville said that he was unaware of Guthrie’s January 1964 order to Management to consult him when the Chairman was away, and as Chairman of Associated Companies he rarely saw Sir Giles (whom he regards as BOAC’s best Chairman) until he was brought into the mainstream as Deputy Chairman. On 1 January 1964, Guthrie called in Winston Bray, the Planning Director, and demanded a route and aircraft plan by the end of February; thus G-l (Guthrie One)

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248 S p e e d b i r d was delivered as promised on 28 February. Guthrie also shrewdly held Board dinners the night before formal meetings so that there could be free discussions and informal education before serious discussions and their conclusions had to be recorded. That morale was bad for several months after Guthrie joined BOAC has been attributed by some to his golden-handshake drive to get staff down in size and up in productivity. Others claim it was the general uncertainty of new leadership and loss of the old. Having originally come in with the idea that the staff was some 3,500 too large, once he began pruning, he found that it was not really very much over what was needed,3 especially with a show-the-flag mentality that required the staff to be spread all over the world. The original intention was that the reduction of staff should follow upon the promised financial reconstruction and the re-evaluation of the route structure, which also involved the whole question of the Super VC-10 order. All three elements were expected to be harmonized by mid-1964, and the Guthrie Plan was to be ready for the Minister by the end of the year. The Personnel Director drew up a severance scheme which included secondment of temporarily surplus Comet pilots to BEA and a Joint Staff College. But by August it was apparent that drastic staff cuts were unlikely; cargo billing, for instance, was behind, a situation that led to bad customer relations. The smooth planning Sir Giles had expected was disrupted on 21 August, when the Ministry (which always thought BOAC to be over-staffed) sent the BOAC severance plan to the other Ministries in charge of nationalized industries. The Coal Board and British Railways reacted sharply. On 10 September the plan was the subject of Cabinet discussion. The Government’s reaction was that the scheme was too generous, and it called for clarification. On the 18th, the Board carefully reviewed the whole scheme and reaffirmed its stand. The air cleared. In October, Guthrie announced the terms for the 3,700 employees who were considered redundant and who would be let go by 1966. He expected to see by December 1967 an 18 per cent cut, including 1,830 from Engineering and Maintenance, 608 in Flight Operations, 822 in the Commercial side, and 440 in service. The scheme was essentially a voluntary incentive one aimed to appeal to the forty-five- to fifty-five-year-olds, but with the provision that BOAC could refuse to let valuable people leave. The Treasury had agreed to the whole £4,750,000 plan. On 31 March 1962 the staff had stood at 21,889; a year later it was 21,686; in 1964 20,626; and on 31 March 1966 it hit its low of 18,845, a drop under Guthrie of 1,781. The plan was then suspended because of unexpected traffic growth. Not only did the scheme promise a 10 per cent wage increase to keep the unions happy (provided they gave greater productivity, as they did), but it was predicated on a steady traffic growth over four years. Nevertheless, the new BOAC organization, which was implanted by the Chairman’s Directive No. 5 on 1 November, coupled with the new programme of monthly meetings of managers and their staffs, lifted morale and led to the greater productivity so much in evidence in the last ten years of the Corporation’s independent life.

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In the meantime, Guthrie had been working on his plan for BOAC, as required in the letter of 1 January 1964. Dated 31 December 1964, in a page and three-quarters, it covered route network, aircraft fleet, organization and staffing arrangements, and financial structure. In many ways it refuted the Corbett and White Paper strictures. Guthrie noted that the route network had been built up on sound commercial grounds that were firmly based on the traffic flows between the English-speaking world; its only weak spots were South America with its restrictionist policies, the need for rationalization with the United States, and calls in Europe. New routes that looked attractive were London–Tokyo, India and Australia across the USSR, via the South Pacific to Australia, and Hong Kong–Peking. The aircraft fleet, fixed by Ministerial request (as noted later) in regard to twenty-nine VC-10s, would be those aircraft and twenty-two 707s. Apart from over-staffing, Guthrie noted that the major problem was to write off the £80,000,000 in lost capital, which consumed interest at £4,000,000 a year. If that was lifted off its back by 31 March 1965, BOAC could be profitable, provided it was recognized that it operated in an international market, was supported by the Government on traffic rights, and was allowed to operate commercially. After the Board had approved the Guthrie Plan, it was sent to the new Labour Minister of Aviation on 19 February 1965. Roy Jenkins did not reply until after he had announced in the House on 1 March that there would be a financial reconstruction. In his letter of 1 April he noted that he had yet to discuss with BOAC the profitability target required by Cmnd.1337. He did reaffirm the Magna Carta. During these weeks, work was under way on a plan carrying forecasts of BOAC’s development to 1971–1972. Proposals were set forth to shut down the London–Santiago (east coast of South America) route and the trans-Pacific service through Honolulu in favour of the South Pacific, and a number of stop-overs were eliminated as expensive and wasteful. On 22 May 1964 the Board concluded that as the route system could use only seven Super VC-10s, it made no sense to purchase any at all, and that they should be cancelled in favour of 707s to give BOAC the advantages of a two-type fleet composed only of twenty 707s and twelve standard VC-10s, plus two 707-320 freighters and seven other aircraft. Management was urged to proceed without delay.

Cancelling the VC-10 When Sir Giles became Chairman and Chief Executive in 1964, BOAC had not yet received a single VC-10. There were still strong doubts that it would meet the manufacturer’s performance guarantees, and everyone except the pilots, who liked its handling characteristics, felt that it was not what BOAC needed commercially. For a variety of reasons, the Corporation would have preferred to operate a homogeneous fleet of 707s with all the economies of world-wide pooling of spares than to take on a British aircraft which almost no one else seemed likely to fly.

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250 S p e e d b i r d The first problem was whether or not the VC-10 would get its Certificate of Airworthiness in time for services to start on 1 April 1964. A second worry was noise; as that had not been a problem at the time the contract was signed, the aircraft was not guaranteed to meet current standards. It proved in fact to be only slightly less noisy than the Concorde.4 A third problem was whether or not a VC-10 freighter would be available; the British Aircraft Corporation inquiry into that question cost BOAC £650,000 for an aircraft it never had. The money was probably well spent, nevertheless, as the unavailability of a comparable British aircraft allowed the Corporation to import 707-336Cs duty free. On 18 February 1964, the start of services was put back to 29 April. On 17 April the date of delivery was still in doubt, as were guarantees and the aircraft’s livery (Guthrie had decreed a new one; BOAC found it could repaint a VC-10 in four days for £200, in contrast with BAC’s seven days and £2,000). The Certificate of Airworthiness was finally delivered on 27 April.5 In May it was agreed that BAC would pay BOAC £20,000 per aircraft because it did not meet their minimum guarantees. On 29 April BOAC started services with G-ARVJ in the new blue-and-gold livery, taking off for West Africa. As more aircraft became available, VC-10s with plenty of publicity fanned out from London to the south and east. Though the VC-10, like many other new types, never had to be grounded, it did have a rash of irritating minor problems and for nearly two years there was a shortage of spares and manuals as well as engineering delays which caused friction between BOAC and BAC. On the other hand, it proved most popular with passengers because of its cabin quietness, pilots liked its handling qualities, and its high load factors enabled it to earn much more money than had been predicted. Yet it was much less flexible than the 707 in range and when fuel costs rose dramatically in the Seventies, it was very quickly out of service. The Super VC-10, with its trans-Atlantic range, was a much better proposition, but was no real match except in passenger appeal for the developed 707, which was its contemporary. In the opinion of R. E. G. Davies: BOAC, Vickers, and Amery should have “gone for broke.” BOAC could have had an all-Super VC-10 fleet on the Atlantic; Vickers could have obtained more export orders; and Amery could have waved the “Buy British” flag. Campbell-Orde had a lot to answer for. What a contrast in the attitude towards the VC-10—which was, at worst, a good gamble, and the Concorde, which was a dead loss.6

Thus, as early as June 1964 the Guthrie regime was actively investigating the idea of cancelling the Super VC-10 order or leasing all of them to other operators. On the 19th, the Board went on record as strenuously objecting to having to take any Super VC-10s. The Chairman therefore told the Minister that BOAC wished—on the basis of its commercial judgment—to cancel the entire order and buy 707s. There were then a number of meetings, culminating in one between the Chairman and the Minister on 7 July in which it was explained that the Cabinet could not

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67. The Vickers Super VC-10 with speed-brakes extended. This type was the subject of a long economic dispute, with eventually the cancelled aircraft going to the RAF.

accept the cancellation of the order for thirty Super VC-10s. A further exchange of letters resulted in one from the Permanent Secretary received on the morning of 13 July just before the Board met. This was regarded as adequately covering the position, and the Board agreed that in the national interest BOAC would reluctantly agree to take some Super VC-10s, with the matter of financial compensation to be worked out in due course. Amery announced on 20 July 1964 that work on the Supers would go on, and on 31 July and 12 August he and Guthrie exchanged letters, subsequently printed in the Annual Report of 1963–1964. BOAC agreed that it would take seventeen Super VC-10s, though delaying until the end of 1965 the decision on ten of them (upon which work had already been suspended), while the last three of the order would go to the RAF. In return, the Government agreed to reconstruct BOAC’s capital so that the Corporation would be able to operate as a fully commercial concern with the fleet of aircraft then envisaged. At issue were the jobs of 20,000 in BOAC or 200,000 in the aircraft industry. On the other hand, BOAC envisaged a fleet in 1967 of thirty-nine aircraft of two types rather than sixty-two of four. It was anticipated that the Britannias would be phased out at once and the Comets by October 1965, but that no 707s would become surplus until 1968. In the meantime, as part of the settlement reached on

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252 S p e e d b i r d 31 July 1964, the Minister allowed BOAC to order two 707-320s, which were about the same price as the Super VC-10 (£3,500,000 each with spares and import duty of £850,000) because they would be needed by October 1965; the earliest a VC-10 freighter could be available was mid- to late 1966. (In the end, the Boeings were delayed because of cockpit modification and Air Registration Board requirements.) As far as the Super VC-10s were concerned, the contractual relationship became more strained as the aircraft remained down on performance and noise guarantees, and deliveries appeared to be going to be late. On 15 October, at a meeting with BAC, it was confirmed that the aircraft would not meet its minimum range guarantee by 3 per cent; the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Aviation agreed that this would necessitate a complete review of the situation. At the same time, BOAC was considering the CPF (convertible passenger/freighter) version, and progress payments on eight aircraft were made with the idea that BOAC might adopt the British United Airways version with a large cargo door. Additionally, there was talk of letting BAC finish manufacturing the aircraft and then of “garaging” them until needed, but this, of course, would have been much too expensive. The first Super VC-10 was delivered to BOAC on 1 February 1965, for training only. Governmental approval of the stretched-out Super VC-10 delivery programme did not come until late February 1965. It did include the proviso that BOAC would take the first five aircraft, which were to be brought up to standard once the sixth aircraft achieved that performance level. Meanwhile, on 8 February the last VC-10, G-ARVB, arrived at Shannon for crew training. With governmental approval in hand, BOAC then came to terms with BAC. In reviewing the situation on 19  March, the Board noted that the ten standard VC-10s had not yet met the noise requirements and that of the Super VC-10s only seven were needed to 1967–1968 and only three more in 1968 because of the Buy Boeing policy. There was no point in bringing into service after 1968 an aircraft designed before 1961 (like the Boeing), particularly as it would have to remain in service for at least ten years; but there was room for another subsonic aircraft before the SSTs. The Board then agreed to a proposal which in effect would cancel the seventeen remaining Supers and allow BAC to keep the progress payments unless BOAC bought seven BAC One-Elevens for its associated companies. BOAC also heard that Vickers would develop or manufacture under license a more advanced subsonic aircraft, perhaps a developed Super VC-10. At the same meeting on 19 March 1965, the Board approved a reply to the Plowden Inquiry into the aircraft industry,7 which summarized neatly BOAC’s complaints about the British aircraft industry: too long from contract to delivery; excusable delays always avoided penalties; competitors got newer, modified aircraft (such as the Comet 4C); aircraft as delivered were below performance guarantees; progress payments were too large a proportion of the price (90 per cent for the VC-10, in contrast to 30 for the 707); spares costs were too high; BOAC was forced to order larger numbers than it wanted to get long-haul aircraft manufacture started; the financial weakness of British manufacturers had had to be shouldered by

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68. The redesigned and virtually indestructible De Havilland Comet 4, which in 1958 opened trans-Atlantic jet service (see Fig. 69).

BOAC (Britannia, Comet, VC-10); British long-haul aircraft were not competitive with their US counterparts; Commonwealth partners preferred American aircraft, thus excluding BOAC from spares pools. The response then went on to note that the Corporation did not need the seventeen extra Super VC-10s forced on it on 31 July 1964. Finally, the Board noted that its experience compelled it to believe that the British aircraft industry was unlikely to produce a competitive long-haul aircraft which BOAC could use. Too often BOAC had been asked for its forward requirements and these had been inexorably developed into an order, making the Corporation a captive customer of the British aircraft industry. What BOAC wanted and needed was aircraft it could order no more than two-and-a-half years ahead, as it could in the United States. The Transport Aircraft Requirements Committee was adequate to do its job, but the industry should know that BOAC would never again be in a position to order enough aircraft at any one time to justify production of a type that was not likely to be sold to other operators. On the same date, 19 March 1965, the Super VC-10 received its full and unrestricted Certificate of Airworthiness.8 On 1 April the Super VC-10s began London–New York services and soon achieved an impressive 90 per cent load factor, although they lost money on Eastern routes. On 18 June 1965, the Board authorized the Chairman to advise the Minister of BOAC’s future aircraft requirements. The last ten Supers suspended in 1963 should

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254 S p e e d b i r d be stopped, with the cancellation charges defrayed by the Government. There was a need for five 250-seater developed aircraft with improved economics. (That BOAC was hinting it would like to buy American should have came as no surprise to the Ministry, for not only had it often expressed this wish, but the RAF, also unable to obtain suitable British aircraft, was at this time ordering McDonnell F-4K and F-4M Phantoms, together with Lockheed C-130 Hercules transports.) In September the Financial Director pointed out that BOAC’s profits were made by the 707s while the VC-10s and Super VC-10s merely broke even. R. E. G. Davies has commented to the author: “.  .  . Seems to me that BOAC had to bend over backwards to excuse all kinds of 707 problems, but never failed to condemn the VC-10s, often for the same shortcomings that were evident in Boeing’s product.” On 19 November the Board agreed to wrap up negotiations with BAC over the VC-10s by remaining committed to the purchase of thirty Supers, though the three it had been agreed the RAF would take now turned out to be an additional order by the Ministry of Defence for three Standards and not Supers, leaving BOAC £282,000 out of pocket for interest on the progress payments. BOAC had already agreed to take seven and would take ten more aircraft, starting with one in December 1965 and ending with four in 1968 and three in 1969 at an additional £3,600,000 for the stretch-out, while the last ten would be cancelled at a penalty of £750,000 each. On 1 January 1966 Management agreed that BAC should be told that BOAC had no interest in the CPF version, in the all-freight, or in the highgross-weight passenger variants of the VC-10. One reason was that the first of the 707-336s had just been delivered; another was a look at the world aircraft market, which showed that 82.8 per cent of all new aircraft sales of fixed-wing turbineengined transports outside the Communist bloc went to US manufacturers;9 a further reason was that the last ten Supers would lock BOAC once again into commitments for ten years ahead. The Board concurred on 21 January 1966, while agreeing to pay the £7,500,000 cancellation charges less £1,300,000 in progress payments already made. The Chairman met with the Minister on 7 February and the Government accepted BOAC’s views, partly because on 8 March Vickers said it wanted a settlement; approval was announced in the House of Commons on 9 March (725 H.C. Deb. 5s, 2110–2116). The Corporation felt that at last it was free to order exactly the aircraft it wanted. In June 1966 the Board agreed to buy seven 707-336Cs; the only problem with this order was related to borrowing in the United States on a rising interest rate, as the Vietnam War inflation began to affect the money market. With the prime rate passing 6 per cent, the Board was concerned that BOAC had £40,000,000 in spare funds in Britain but was not allowed to use them for aircraft purchases. In March 1967 the Board of Trade (BOT) asked if BOAC wanted any more VC-10s, as the manufacturer had to decide on the production line. The answer was clearly “No,” as 747s were on order. Apart from relations with the few other VC-10 operators, for most of whom BOAC carried out maintenance with some headaches about payments, the one

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69. The inaugural trans-Atlantic flight of the De Havilland Comet 4.

other problem associated with the VC-10s was the continual delay over the certification of the auto-land equipment that BOAC required for the foggy morning hours when most of its flights landed at London. It was needed to stop diversions to other airports, but at that time only Heathrow had the ground equipment. The first certificated aircraft was not delivered until late May 1968 and the retrofit of all Supers went on into the Seventies. In May 1968 BAC asked BOAC if it would be interested in a stretched Super VC-10-200 with 191 seats to do the same sectors as the Super. BAC wanted an answer in two weeks, and after comparing it to the Douglas DC-10 and the

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256 S p e e d b i r d Lockheed 1011 (never a trans-Atlantic aircraft, except severely restricted on payload), BOAC declined the offer. Then in 1968, the world-wide concern with noise began to hit BOAC when first the Zurich authorities and then West Germany began to impose not only night noise restrictions, which had affected both the VC-10s and the 707-336Cs at London, but also daytime restrictions calling for revised takeoff procedures. The VC-10 was finally banned at Zurich.

The 707-336s At least a part of BOAC’s success in the last decade was due to the acquisition of the much improved Boeing 707-336, which, in spite of its number, follows after the original -436s. These -336s were an advanced model fitted with by-pass fan engines which gave superior range and economy. They gave BOAC long-range cargo capacity until after the Corporation was merged into British Airways. Externally, the -336Cs could be distinguished easily from the standard -436s by their fanned engines with the larger forward cowling, the wide cargo door forward on the portside, and the lack of a ventral fin under the tail.

70. The original 707 for BOAC was refused its Certificate of Airworthiness by the British Air Registration Board until modified as above with an extended fin and ventral tail skid. Boeing then supplied such kits free to other customer airlines.

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Shortly after Slattery rose to Chairman he became most interested in the development of the cargo side of the airline. A group was formed under the guidance of an outside consultant who was much in favour of BOAC acquiring seven Canadair CL-44s, the Canadian swing-tail variant of the Bristol Britannia, in place of the Corporation’s DC-7s, then being used on the North Atlantic. The planners within BOAC believed, however, that the right aircraft for the future was the 707-320C, the long-range development of the standard 707. But, when in 1956 the Minister, Watkinson, had approved the purchase of fifteen Boeings, he had made it clear that this was an exceptional case. BOAC had, therefore, to show the Minister and the Treasury that there was no suitable British aircraft for competitive North Atlantic freighter service. The case was successfully made, as the planners had envisioned in May 1964, and two 707-336s were ordered. BOAC realized that a small fleet of convertible 707-336s (the BOAC model designation of the -320) would provide flexibility as the peak periods for passengers and cargo tended to be complementary. Early in 1965, the need for more 707s became apparent as business started to grow and corrosion checks slowed the progress of the -436s through their B7 checks, a process that took 360 men ten days, or 6,000 man hours. On 22 January 1965, the Board decided that though the 707s would probably have a useful life of from fourteen and a half to seventeen years, with the SSTs delayed, it would be more economical to replace the 707s with another subsonic jet, not the VC-10. However, as the used aircraft might well have no resale value, the Board opted for the cautious approach of amortization in eight and a half years. Then in February QANTAS started operating the first of its six -338Cs into London, carrying 104 passengers and 20 tons of cargo. By then, BOAC had its -336s on order, but found that they would be delayed two weeks by having to have ARB-mandated flight recorders fitted. A further delay was caused by the inability to train crews in anyone else’s aircraft and by the ARB not being able to conduct its flight tests until BOAC received its first aircraft. Then there was a strike at Boeing and the aircraft were further delayed. Seaboard could not continue to charter its CL-44s to BOAC beyond 31 October 1965 and Management was desperate because BOAC could not afford to drop off the North Atlantic cargo route. Fortunately, the Ministry agreed to allow the retrofitting of flight recorders in April 1966 and BOAC was able to charter interim CL-44 capacity from Flying Tiger. At the same time, with the predicted cargo growth rate rising sharply from 12–15 per cent per annum to an estimated 30–40 per cent, BOAC was anxious to get in on the act with the profit-making 707 freighter. But then the ARB insisted that the oil-pressure warning lights be changed to red, that a stick-shaker be fitted for the co-pilot, and that other modifications be made so that the aircraft was fully compatible with the -436s with which crews would be interchanged.10 The first two aircraft were delivered on 21 and 22 December 1965, one with its flight recorders fitted, but still not cleared by the ARB. On the other hand, the BOAC aircraft came in duty free as they were pure freighters and there

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258 S p e e d b i r d was no comparable British aircraft (British Eagle was not so lucky as its aircraft were for passenger use and it had to pay the 14 per cent duty). The ARB objections were then quickly settled, the Certificate of Airworthiness granted, and Flying Tiger given the contractual fifteen days’ notice and its CL-44s phased out. General Manager Cargo talked to the pilots about the importance of punctuality and BOAC’s attitude to cargo, and trans-Atlantic cargo service started with 707-336s in January 1966. The service across the Atlantic and a Ministry of Defence contract to Singapore so quickly consumed all the -336Cs’ time that by April 1965 Management was again talking about the need for another aircraft, but the earliest that Boeing could deliver was September 1967, though it would be a machine with windows and thus greater flexibility. As business was booming, the General Manager Engineering signed a contract with Boeing for seven -336Cs and the Board confirmed it in June. Financing then proved something of a problem, with the Bank of America withdrawing, but its place being taken at once by the First National City Bank of New York, with a fluctuating interest rate 0.25 per cent above the New York prime rate (then rising past 6 per cent) for the $9,500,000 needed per aircraft, or with equipment, $10,450,000. In the meantime, major checks of the 707-436 fleet, reworking for a life of more than 25,000 hours, showed a hairline crack problem in the fins, resulting effectively in the loss of the use of one aircraft for fourteen months while all the -436s and -336s went through various inspections and modifications. This was, then, an incentive to have the fourth -336 delivered as soon as possible, while bearing in mind that the conversion of an option into a reality needed a twentyfour-month lead time. With Boeing supplying the kits, the rework programme was

71. The Air Registration Board required the 707 to be fitted with additional fin area, but the height of the hangar doors at London Airport precluded extending the fins sufficiently, so the solution was the extended fin and ventral tail skid, which also prevented over-rotation with wing stalling on takeoff.

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72. When restriction of trooping and freighting ended, BOAC needed cargo capacity. Ironically, the solution was the Canadian-built CL-44, a Britannia, with a swing tail.

pushed, but, nevertheless, the last -436 did not come out of the hangar until April 1970. Meanwhile, the 8 April 1968 crash of G-APWE, a -436 at Heathrow, further accentuated the shortage of 707 capacity as no new -336C with BOAC’s unique flight deck could be obtained until July 1969. So in April a Saturn Airways aircraft was purchased off the production line as the insurers paid up within seventy-two hours of the loss. However, when this aircraft, G-ARWU, was delivered on 1 July, H. M. Customs insisted on payment of £358,000 duty, even though no comparable British aircraft was available, but the Treasury remitted that in August. In the meantime, BOAC agonized over whether or not to cooperate with Rolls-Royce on a contract to fly engines for the new Lockheed 1011 to California. The problem was that it was on the one hand an excellent commercial opportunity and would help British exports and that on the other, the fully built-up engines and power plants could not be accommodated in the -336. Then in November a Kleinwort-Benson 707-320C impounded at Frankfurt was offered to BOAC largely for sterling, of which BOAC at that time had plenty. Though it was a sound bargain, the modification to BOAC standard done in California took longer than expected.

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260 S p e e d b i r d By the summer of 1968 BOAC was operating one of the convertible -336s “bought off the shelf ” in passenger configuration. In 1969, agreement was reached, as related later, to operate across Russia to Tokyo. But for this service to be profitable, a higher payload was needed than the 707-336C, with its cargo door and strengthened floor, could offer and so Treasury permission was obtained to buy two -336B aircraft in full passenger layout. With these aircraft and with its single stop at Moscow, the route became feasible. When the merger into British Airways took place in 1974, BOAC had nine 707336Cs and two -336Bs to contribute to the pooled fleet. This provided a great deal of flexibility and the fleet itself was a tribute to the vision of the planners and to Boeing, while at the same time realizing the importance of cargo, a dream denied the Miles Thomas regime in the 1950s. On the whole, however, the great advantage of the -336s was that they could be purchased off the shelf with a lead time of between thirteen and twenty-four months and were delivered to full BOAC flight-deck and ARB standards. In addition, they were flexible, long-range aircraft that could be used on the Polar route to the US West Coast or on the trans-Siberian route to Japan. As economical freighters, they were great money-makers and another factor in the ability of BOAC, after the Magna Carta of 1 January 1964, to make money.

Closing the East Coast of South America Route One of the earliest steps that Guthrie had to take as Chairman and Chief Executive was to ratify the conclusions already being reached by Management that the East Coast of South America route had to be closed down as a perennial money-loser. It had not been profitable since 1946, the first year of BSAA operations and was unlikely to be for the next five years. The problem was associated with restricted uplifts on Fifth Freedom (local) segments and diplomatic delays in renegotiating bilaterals. In addition, in December 1963, the route was losing £60,000 because of prestige preference for large jets over the Comet 4 that BOAC was using. The load factor was 56 per cent, and breakeven for the Comets on that route was 91 per cent. Substituting a VC-10 would mean a 56 per cent increase in capacity and a break-even load factor of 70 per cent; the route would be shifted to drop Lisbon, where BOAC had no traffic rights, and Dakar, used for Comet operational reasons, to Accra, which would tie in with the pool with Ghana Airways. Meanwhile the Ministry would not allow a subvention, or subsidy. Brazil had put off bilateral discussions until March 1964, and then a short fuellers’ strike at Recife, Brazil, exhausted the supplies there. Altitude restrictions on Comets with consequent higher fuel consumption prevented their doing Dakar–Rio de Janiero direct, so they were having to be diverted as much as 2,000 miles out of their way on a round trip. As individual Comets were cleared for full altitude, the Chief Engineer tried to see that those aircraft were assigned to the route.

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73. A Comet 4 (1958–1967) seen from below in takeoff configuration. It incorporated the lessons of the earlier Comet 1.

74. The changing size and complexity of aircraft in roughly thirty years is demonstrated by the pilots’ manuals for the C-Class Empire flying-boat of 1934 and the Boeing 707 of 1960. Empire pilots had also to be First-Class aeronautical engineers, while 707 skippers needed to know, but not be able to fix, systems.

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262 S p e e d b i r d Sir Walter Worboys, a Board Member, had toured the area late in January 1964 and reported back that economies, rather than complete withdrawal, should be made. The basic problem was that to meet the competition offered by rival airlines’ 707s, BOAC wished to introduce VC-10s, but the Brazilians would only agree to this if frequencies were reduced from two to one weekly. The British bilateral negotiating team failed and so the economic facts upon which BOAC had to base its calculations were gloomy. However, after Labour won the October 1964 election, a new team went out and British United received a much better economic base from which to work. The Chairman told the Board that he would advise the Minister that the best solution was to run VC-10s via Africa, as there was no hope of profit on the route at least until 1972. In March it was decided that BOAC should give up the route unless the Minister was willing to provide a subvention of £1,235,000 for 1964–1965 as a start; the total loss on the route since 1946 amounted to £5,378,000, mainly because of disasters with the Tudors and the Comets. It was hoped that the Minister would make up his mind by August, as it would take BOAC three months to shut down the route and, moreover, as Malaysian Airways was short of Comets, the aircraft reserved for the South American route could usefully be sold to them. Until the Minister decided, BOAC was hung on the horns of a dilemma: as long as the service was to continue, bookings had to be taken, and by June these extended into September. Amery was aghast, but had signed the Magna Carta. BUA for its part thought the Conservatives would be returned in the elections and pay off. On 21 July the Chairman decided that unless the Minister made a decision by the end of the month BOAC would plan to close down by 1 November. On 31 July the Minister made proposals to extend the service, which Management felt were unacceptable. On 1 September, as the Minister had again refused a subvention, it was agreed to close the East Coast service on 1 October, but to keep open the West Coast to Bogotá, Caracas, and Lima. Slattery, then an Editorial Consultant to The Aeroplane, correctly blamed the closing on the refusal of the Brazilians and others to allow BOAC to compete for a larger share of the market or to allow the VC-10 to replace the Comets. None of these actions, he noted, would help the British aircraft industry.11 The Ministry was upset that the Press had found out about the decisions so soon. Almost at once, BUA (on whose Board sat Lord Poole, Chairman of the Conservative Party) offered to take over the abandoned routes, as it was just getting new, modified VC-10s, and immediately political capital was made of this. On 23 September the Minister announced that BUA would have the route, would be exempted temporarily from ATLB licensing requirements, and would expect to make money after the first year by carrying cargo in its convertible VC-10s. BUA also benefitted from the willingness of the Latin American governments at this point to renegotiate bilaterals. BUA chose a new route via the Azores and expected to be able to break even on a 42 per cent load factor by using shipping company booking offices and contracting maintenance. The new services, which started

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on 5 November, were seven and a half hours shorter than BOAC’s, but omitted Dakar, Recife, and São Paulo. By December, BUA had been granted a fifteen-year unrestricted license and BOAC’s was revoked. BOAC sold off its assets, realizing about its only profit on the route. BUA’s first-year loss was £500,000, depending upon the allocation of overheads.12 By 1969, the owners of BUA wanted to sell out to BOAC.

Financial Reconstruction Even with the problems surrounding the acquisition of the VC-10s, 1964– 1965 proved to be a most successful year, with a group profit before interest of £17,800,000. The next fiscal year, 1965–1966, went even better, and by July 1966 the Board was considering as a reasonable target a 10 per cent dividend on Exchequer Dividend Capital. In fact, in 1966–1967 BOAC could afford to pay 15 per cent and followed that with 20, 25, and 20 again in 1969–1970. That these returns were achieved was partly because of the financial reconstruction, the greater efficiency of the newer aircraft, the increasing mechanization and automation of services, and the excellence of the Planning Department. The big underlying concern throughout the period was that BOAC be allowed to retain enough reserves (Ministers had a bad habit of raiding them by demanding larger dividends than results justified to guard against future needs, both for cash in times of little or no growth and for more expensive new aircraft). A constant eye was kept on costs, and economy drives were launched in the autumn of 1967 and again after the Guthrie regime. Though the matter of writing off lost capital had been raised by Sir Matthew Slattery with the Minister in 1962, this was not undertaken until 1966. It was delayed, first by the whole question of the Super VC-10s and a change of governments, and then by normal parliamentary procedure. While these events were taking place, the Ministry was still conscious that it needed to set a financial goal as laid down in Cmnd.1337. Inside the Corporation, the new Top Secret commercial code, instituted in fear of spying, covered the document upon which Deputy Chairman Hardie and Financial Director Glover worked. This was based upon the Minister’s statement in the House of Commons on 20 July 1964 as well on a letter from the Permanent Secretary five days earlier. On 31 March 1965 BOAC had £176,000,000 in outstanding capital, of which £52,000,000 was in Airways stock at 3.62 per cent and £124,000,000 in Exchequer Advances at 5.295 per cent. The Government agreed to cancel £110,000,000 of the Exchequer Advances, dropping the interest £5,800,000 per year to £2,200,000. This would write off the deficit of £81,000,000 and leave £19,000,000, after commitments for accelerated retirement and the stretched delivery programme for the Super VC-10s, for credit to the profit-and-loss account. In BOAC’s view this did not cover the transfer of three Super VC-10s to the RAF, for which it expected reimbursement with interest on its progress payments, nor any costs in connection

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264 S p e e d b i r d with the “final tranche” (slicing) of ten Supers from cancellation penalties or from unrealized progress payments, calculated in February 1965 at £1,600,000 plus interest. Furthermore, the settlement proposed did not cover monies claimed in relation to the VC-10 programme, namely: the higher costs compared to the 707320B, the introductory costs, and the uncommitted balance of £19,000,000 for the Supers. Apart from this, although the Ministry was sympathetic to the conversion of some of the borrowings into equity capital, such a policy was not likely to be included in the settlement because it was a principle which would have to be applied to the nationalized industries as a whole. As this would not be a matter of importance until BOAC reached the stage early in the Seventies when analysts foresaw that it would not be paying profits because it was expected just to break even, the Board now felt that this could lie over for later discussions. The Government was adamant that no part of the new Special Reserve should be used to augment the revenues of BOAC-Cunard, and that the published accounts should show this to be true. At the same time, a Cabinet committee under George Brown was attempting, as The Aeroplane put it,13 to create a clearly defined civil aviation policy in place of the recent well-intentioned uncertainties. Strangely, the Labour Government held British United Airways, the Independent, in high regard. The decision to wipe BOAC’s slate clean was viewed with great interest abroad (and by the other nationalized industries), as only Irish International had a wholly share capital; Pan Am, in contrast to the general 2:1 ratio of bonds to stock of most European international airlines, had a $185,000,000 to $5,000,000 ratio. Most airlines were subsidized, and BOAC only got into difficulties, said The Aeroplane, because in 1956 Parliament had relinquished the power to help it.14 KLM in the 1960s had accumulated a far greater debt, though no BOAC Board or Management materials mention it. Each time the Ministry agreed to two steps forward, it also tended to ensure one step backward. Having given BOAC the authority to operate commercially and agreed to reconstruct its capital, in February 1966 Parliament passed the Air Corporations Act, of which clause 3(2) provided for Ministerial control over BOAC’s major capital expenditures. The Act was considered an experimental reconstruction of capital in which not only was the £110,000,000 written off, but the remainder was divided into £31,000,000 in loan capital, on which normal interest would be due, and £35,000,000 of Exchequer Dividend Capital, upon which a variable dividend was to be paid, depending upon trading results. But the Minister also took wide financial powers to set goals, to determine reserves and dividends, and to regulate capital outlay, though BOAC had protested against these. Almost immediately, the Minister began to call for details of various BOAC (and BEA) activities. The Chairman resisted, but by late 1966 there was a steady stream of inquiries from the Board of Trade, which took over all civil aviation on 18 August and established in July 1967 the Edwards Committee to consider future aviation policy. By 1968 BOAC was irritated enough with these constant inquiries, which probably stemmed from the rapid turnover in many posts in the Board of

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Trade and the Treasury and resulted in time spent in educating new people, to suggest internally that it be raised before the Edwards Committee. Part of the Board of Trade inquiries related to the problem of a financial target, which was still being debated well into 1967, when BOAC was riding the crest of a boom and doing extremely well. As the BOAC Board was at pains to point out, the Board of Trade needed to look at the whole picture and to set as a target something that lay within the normal oscillations of airline profits and losses, rather than to think of BOAC in the same terms as other nationalized industries with their relatively constant consumer receipts. The arguments reverted again, as they had in 1959, to how the accounts should handle the reserves (the Board of Trade wanting the sums passed through the profit-and-loss accounts and the Board refusing), and the amount of the dividend to be paid (the Board of Trade pressing for more than the Board felt was, in the long run, justified). Thus not until 23 June 1967 did the BOAC Board reluctantly agree to accept a financial target of 12.5 per cent on net assets to March 1970. Special attention was called to the requirement to tell the Board of Trade in advance if the target was unlikely to be achieved. On 28 June the Board agreed to a dividend on public development capital of £5,250,000, or 15 per cent. And so the precedent was established which, as the Board noted, was a challenge to BOAC for the remainder of its independent life. Additional areas of friction with the Board of Trade developed over the desire of the Ministry to treat BOAC and certain other nationalized industries on the same basis as local governments in restricting their capital expenditure. Even though the Board of Trade claimed that the £2,800,000 cutback demanded in 1968–1969 and the £3,000,000 in 1969–1970 were only tokens, they were nevertheless interventions into BOAC’s commercial management, and they inhibited its development while at the same time creating time-wasting irritants that required constant justification and revision to suit the criticisms of Government departments not responsible for, and sometimes not competent to judge, these matters. This mothering under the 1966 Act affected the BOAC Board’s attitude to the financing of Concordes, which it felt should be by Exchequer risk capital, and compelled it by Treasury order to finance all but the first 747s entirely abroad. What was particularly irritating about this, apart from the fact that the Treasury figures were a year out of date, was that if BOAC had been left to its own devices, it could have saved £1,000,000 on two of its first 707-336s by paying for them directly out of its own resources before devaluation occurred in December 1967. After that, the Treasury’s attitude changed and it was content to allow BOAC to borrow money anywhere outside the sterling area. Devaluation made additional loans necessary, for with six more 747s and six Boeing SSTs then anticipated, BOAC’s capital needs for these aircraft alone had jumped by £39,000,000 to £274,000,000. And in February 1968 the Treasury announced that it would soon be starting an investigation of BOAC’s productivity and efficiency in connection with its investment programme. By then BOAC was one of the 100 largest companies in the United Kingdom in terms of capital in use.

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Sir Giles Guthrie Leaves In 1967–1968 for the first time revenues passed £150,000,000, a 50 per cent increase during Guthrie’s tenure, and Sir Giles was able to leave BOAC at the end of 1968 on a euphoric note, with payment for the past year of a 20 per cent dividend. He had said that he would only stay five years at BOAC. In May 1968 the President of the Board of Trade asked him to stay on for another term until Concorde entered service, but Guthrie declined to do so. He retired at the end of the year with a great send-off from all members of the Corporation, first to a still-born airline selfinsurance organization in Lausanne suggested by Knut Hammerskold of IATA and then to the Channel Islands. The Private Minute Book recorded in May 1968 that Guthrie felt that he had completed the task assigned him by Amery and had so organized BOAC that it could be run by a professional airline man. Sir Giles suggested, with Board approval, that Keith Granville should succeed him. The President of the Board of Trade was reluctant because Granville was an “in-house” man, but he said he wanted first to see the Report of the Edwards Committee that was due in March 1969. He suggested a temporary Chairman, an arrangement to which the Board was opposed because it had not worked in the past. A compromise suggested, therefore, was that Charles Hardie (later Sir Charles), who had been brought in by Guthrie as Deputy Chairman, would be appointed part-time Chairman, with Granville as Deputy Chairman and Managing Director. But the President of the Board of Trade talked further with both Hardie and Granville, proposing other arrangements that were not satisfactory to BOAC. After more discussion, Guthrie was instructed to inform the Board of Trade that, while the Board would serve under Hardie and Granville, it felt its professional advice was being ignored and that the actions being taken were not in the best interests of BOAC. And it further felt that the salaries of the Chief Executive and others should be raised.15 The Minister then agreed to Hardie as Chairman and Granville as Deputy Chairman and Managing Director. Shortly thereafter, Guthrie requested, and the President of the Board of Trade agreed, that Ross Stainton, the Commercial Director, should join the Board in September as preparation for becoming Deputy Managing Director, and that D. H. Glover, the Financial Director, should join the Board at the end of the year. It was certainly fitting that at his first Board meeting the highly qualified Stainton should be presented with his thirty-five-year pin.

The End of BOAC-Cunard The arrangements made in 1962 for a joint operating company to handle North Atlantic services had some advantages, but in the long term did not seem to offer great benefits. The general policy was for BOAC-Cunard to have the newest aircraft and to have all it needed, amounting in 1964 to eleven 707s. US Presidential approval was finally given to the name BOAC-Cunard in March 1964, and in

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75. A poster touting the diversity of BOAC cabin staff in the 1960s. Shown are stewardesses from Britain, China, Malaya, and India.

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268 S p e e d b i r d August the Board approved the additional purchase of two 707-320Cs (later called -336Cs), together with spares and spare engines, for £6,500,000, of which BOAC shouldered £4,550,000. Early one morning in November 1965 the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Aviation called to enquire whether or not BOAC still felt the arrangement with Cunard was worthwhile. The Board responded that there were no commercial reasons for discontinuance and that it did not wish to take the initiative to purchase Cunard’s interest. If there were non-commercial factors, then the Board asked to be consulted before any measures were taken. At the end of the year there was a Cabinet reshuffle, and Roy Jenkins was replaced by Fred Mulley, a Cantabrigian economist. In early February 1966, the Conservative Opposition tabled an amendment which would require BOAC to charge interest on all loans to subsidiaries at ruling commercial rates where the other sole shareholder was not a nationalized corporation (as by not doing so it was taking business from commercial banks). The Minister felt that he could only resist this motion if he had prior notice of such loans. Guthrie reminded him of the letter of 1 January 1964 (BOAC’s “Magna Carta”), and the Minister gave the Chairman the draft of a letter from Guthrie to read to the House. This letter of 3 February secured the withdrawal of the amendment. But the Minister had made a pledge to the House without consulting the Chairman that a full explanation of the circumstances of the £8,500,000 loan to BOAC-Cunard Ltd. (BCL) would be placed before the Commons, and he asked Guthrie to provide this. The Board took the view that this was wrong, as commercial transactions were sacrosanct, but on 17 February they agreed to send an amendment to the letter of the 3rd, which the Minister could show to any MP who asked for it specifically. The Minister also asked the Board to reconsider charging interest to BOAC-Cunard, with the implication that it should have been charged at the outset. The Board noted that at 6.75 per cent this would amount to £590,000 per annum, but that, as it would result in increased hiring charges from BCL to BOAC the net gain was zero. (Nevertheless, by July 1966 BCL loans were being granted at bank rate plus 0.5 per cent.) During the course of a meeting between BOAC and the Minister on all of this, the secretaries were ordered not to take notes while the Minister explained that there was nothing illegal about BOAC-Cunard, but that it was a constant embarrassment to him at Question Time in the House. Fortunately for the historian, one of the BOAC men present wrote up the incident as soon as he got back to Speedbird House. There followed then a discussion lasting into April of BCL’s re-equipment needs—notably on the 747. At the same time, the question of BCL’s participation in the payment of cancellation charges for the Super VC-10s was raised. The irony of this was that the man who as Managing Director of BOAC had been hard-headed about the excessive costs of the whole VC-10 programme was now the Chairman of Cunard. Sir Basil Smallpeice adamantly rejected a paper which

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the BOAC Board asked Cunard to accept, showing that one of the reasons for cancellation was the greater capacity from the high utilization of the 707s, then up from 3,000 to 3,900 hours a year, and the Super VC-10s’ increase from 2,850 to 4,000. BOAC consulted counsel, but was advised that a minority stockholder could not be compelled to contribute. So the matter was dropped. Then in June the matter of financing the new Boeing 747s arose at the BCL Board meeting. When this idea was relayed to the Cunard Management, it was in a quandary. Not only was it facing a seamen’s strike, which was to prove almost crippling, but it would also be faced with raising 30 per cent of some very large sums, enough to pay their share of at least six 747s at £6,600,000 each for the basic aircraft plus 20 per cent for spares. Smallpeice decided that Cunard had to reassess its position, and he concluded that it had not the resources to stay in the airline business. Discussions with the BOAC Deputy Chairmen, Granville and Hardie, resulted in agreements under which BOAC would buy out Cunard for £11,500,000 and Cunard would stay out of air transport until 30 June 1972 and for nine years thereafter. However, the two companies would cooperate on the Atlantic, as indeed they still were as late as in 1978 with combination air/sea fares. The BCL Board held its last meeting (except to declare solvency) on 29 September 1966, and thereafter as the aircraft came in for painting, the name Cunard was removed. It was a satisfactory conclusion for both partners.

Trooping Contracts at Last In 1952 BOAC had been denied trooping contracts in favour of the Independents, whom the governments of the day had envisaged as a reserve transport force. As part of the 1964 Magna Carta, BOAC took the view that it should be allowed to tender for trooping and that this was only fair if the Independents (BUA in particular) were to compete against the Corporations on the latter’s routes. The opening move in the new offensive began with an approach by Sir Giles to the Ministry of Defence, followed by a television interview in November 1964 in which he pointed out that in 1963 the ATLB had denied the BOAC application for fill-up trooping on scheduled services without allowing the airline to call Ministry of Defence witnesses. Shortly thereafter BOAC received military trooping and freight contracts, and the first fill-up flight left London for the Far East on 15  January 1965. Not until November was a military freight contract obtained, but with its guaranteed minimum of 12.5 tons weekly this was sufficient to allow the purchase of a 707-336C freighter for a Singapore–Hong Kong service. Then the Ministry of Defence wanted a thrice-weekly service, starting in April 1966; BOAC did not have the capacity for that, but managed to keep the once-weekly service. Concurrently, the Corporation had been looking into a weekly freighter to Hong Kong, to start on 1 October 1967. In the meantime, BOAC submitted to the Estimates Committee on Trooping evidence which the US Air Force had given the US Congress, and also made a strong case for better Ministry of Defence

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76. International trainee stewardesses in their native costumes at the training facility, London Airport.

understanding of what seats on scheduled services could mean. Though there was competition with RAF Transport Command, the Committee agreed with BOAC.16 In July 1967 BOAC’s Commercial Department was able to negotiate a fill-up contract to carry troops to North America and to the Far East. But Caledonian won the Gulf and Far East charters for troops and their families. From the moment that the Hermes became surplus in the early 1950s, BOAC should have been able to use its extra capacity to do trooping in the national interest, for both financial and military reasons. What it finally achieved in 1966 allowed it to compete commercially with the Independents on equal terms and thus fill empty seats. Ironically, the decision came when commercial trooping was in decline because of the formation of RAF Support Command as, in effect, another Independent airline equipped with fourteen VC-10s. Then the Edwards Report noted that trooping would be of little impact in the future.17

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BOADICEA and Software Leadership One of the revolutions that took place in the 1960s in the airline passenger reservations business was the switch from cards in wooden tracks, monitored by experts, to a sophisticated world-wide computer network that allowed instant information and confirmation. The impact of the computer in BOAC was very similar to that elsewhere, with the usual swing from first suspicion, then through grudging acceptance, and eventually to overuse. Capital investment soared, but the benefits skyrocketed. Mixed into these developments were the proliferation of other machines, notably paper copiers, and the development and adoption of new management techniques. By the time of the Guthrie regime, BOAC had already passed through the age of suspicion, and early computers were being used to make seat reservations. In February 1965, a new message-switching computer started work, which could handle 14,000 messages an hour and could store 35,000 at a time. This was part of the information handling system established by Peter Hermon,18 brought

77. The heart of efficiency and profitability was telephone reservations and the use of space. Seen here is freight scheduling at LAP (London Airport-Heathrow) in the early 1960s.

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272 S p e e d b i r d in from Dunlops in 1965. In July the Board had a long discussion of computer policy and agreed to £3,300,000 for two IBM 360 mainframe computer systems, to replace hard-to-get reservations staff in the face of rising passenger demand and competition and to obtain quicker responses on all matters. Real time was used at once for crew scheduling and spares control, as well as selected items for Management for the better control of the Corporation’s activities. This was a revolution in Management that was just developing in the United States. Although thirty companies had been asked to bid in 1960, the business went to IBM, as British firms were unwilling to tender for a system that had to be on-line in 1967 in a new building. Moreover, as American airlines had already worked out the system, IBM had practical knowledge. IBM made the 360s in Scotland and Europe, and BOAC was able to spend banked sterling capital on them. Before approving the deal, however, the Ministry of Aviation required consultation with the experts at the Ministry of Technology, who agreed that only IBM could handle it. For BOAC’s part, compatibility with the QANTAS, South African Airways, and British West Indian Airways systems was an important selling point. BEA went with its own BEACON system, but standard message forms allowed interlinking. In the meantime, more money had to be put into the European and American electronic reservations systems to keep them functioning until BOADICEA, as the BOAC computer was called, came on-line. In the next few years, Engineering Management worked to put its 120,000 spares inventory onto a computerized list, and the wonders and prices of the computer expanded rapidly. On 22 April 1966 the Board agreed to spend £33,500,000 for computer development to 1979–1980. The new programs were partly linked to the work-measurements staffs which had been created, with the unions’ consent, to assess productivity. In January 1967 Toronto was added to BOADICEA, and departure control in London and New York was considered as the model for other additions. No sooner had BOADICEA come on-line in 1967 than there were complaints that it was overloaded, and for the month of February 1968 no flight planning could be done on it. In January a rationalization and reduction in the amount of statistics demanded from it had been agreed upon, and yet obviously in the long run the system was saving money, reckoned at this time as £39,000,000 up to 1979–1980. It would save more, planners noted, when decimalization dawned on 15 February 1971. But things got worse before they got better. In the summer peak of 1968 there were complaints that data were late and inaccurate. On the other hand, BOAC’s success with the computer began to generate extra revenue. In July 1968 KLM, Swissair, and Japan Airlines ( JAL) all became interested in BOADICEA manuals, which Management agreed to sell at about £65,000 each on condition that BOAC got free feedback. Management cannily believed that it was to BOAC’s benefit to have others think its way. In March 1969 the capital approval was increased from £33,500,000 to £43,300,000 by 1979–1980, with the understanding that BOADICEA was now a

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78. A pallet has been pushed off the scissors lift. Another waits to be loaded.

79. A BOAC Boeing 707-336C freighter is loaded with cargo at London Airport.

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80. Apprentice training.

normal capital expenditure and was to be treated as such. At the same time, it was decided that the production of all statistics could be computerized and controlled by Information Handling. In May, the twin questions of duplicating the computer centre and expansion were considered, but with the tie-in with BEACON, duplication was considered unnecessary.

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In September BOAC made its first really big outside sale when American Express asked it to design the software for the AmEx hotel and airline reservations system. Again the commercial advantages were carefully considered and the mutual benefits were sufficient to make the idea attractive. At the same time, care was taken that no input from such an outside organization or its agents could tap BOAC’s databank. In June 1970, with the sale of departure-control software to KLM, the cost of putting departure control for BOAC on BOADICEA was recovered. Now Cunard wanted to come into the system, BEA asked for closer commercial links, and there was the real threat that ITT (International Telephone and Telegraph) would raid the staff for people to set up its hotels reservations system. BOAC decided that rather than lose the staff, it would hire the twenty or thirty more needed and take on the ITT project, with a no-poaching clause in the contract. BEA turned down a joint computer centre in mid-1970 and BOAC had, therefore, to consider another building as BOADICEA was bulging out of its first home. In June, Management also agreed that a Management Services Department should be created, headed by Peter Hermon, which would comprise an organization branch, work-study and measurement, and information handling. Its first task was to look into the coordination of departmental activity at Heathrow Central in connection with the punctuality problem, and this led to the creation of the Support Services Division. By August 1970 BOADICEA had indigestion and saturation from printing 3,500,000 lines a week, and broke down for as much as forty hours in one week. A third IBM 360 was, however, on its way. And in September BOAC became a founding member of the Airlines Common Automated Services Association. At the end of the year there was even talk of training Pan Am reservations staff on BOADICEA, and a contract with Cunard that gave BOAC a commercial advantage was finally negotiated. Another feather in the Corporation’s cap was an agreement that it would take over the maintenance of the Airline Cargo Control Computer Installation at Heathrow from Ferranti, and at half the price. In January 1971 Management by objectives was agreed to in principle and the initial pilot scheme began in both the Finance Department at Headquarters and in BOAC’s Australian organization. But attempts to expand BOADICEA House were handicapped by reluctance on the part of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), which had succeeded the Board of Trade on 1 May 1971, to do anything while the British Airways Board (discussed in the next chapter) was being established. While this decision was shuffled about, the battle of the copiers took place, with the elimination of individual machines in favour of a system of copy centres. A year after DTI was first approached nothing had happened, but Management was increasingly concerned for reasons of commercial secrecy to get all programs off outside computers and onto either BOADICEA or BEACON. At the end of 1972 it was decided to link major Australian cities to a computer so that they could then be directly connected to BOADICEA instead of through telegraph lines and QANTAS’s QANTAM. The reason for this was that BOAC and QANTAS had decided to do their own selling in each other’s countries.

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81. This photograph, made up for the author in 1962, shows a 1934 Empire flying-boat and a 1960 Boeing 707 to the same scale.

Finally, as far as the story of BOAC goes, the British Airways Board decided that BOAC’s system was more advanced than BEACON, and that British Airways would expand the IBM system. And coincidentally, BOADICEA had its first realtime failure. Yet, on the whole, the story is another one of remarkably perspicacious growth, here as in so many of BOAC’s activities, justifiably recognized by a Queen’s Award to Industry in 1971, and in April 1972 the Management Services Department received the Queen’s Award to Industry for BOADICEA’s real-time achievement.

Aircrew Problems The settlement that gave captains £5,000 per annum kept the pilots happy until 1963, when they suddenly realized that everyone else had been getting a 3 per cent per annum raise. Air France pilots had in 1949 had their pay tied to that of the Civil Service, while in the United States pilots’ pay went back to the 1932 Railroad Agreement No. 85, which tied pay to a weight-and-distance formula. British pilots were looked upon by both the public and Sir Giles as officers and gentlemen, and

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it was a shock to both when they went on strike. A 1968 study (Cmnd.3623, Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations) noted that British industrial relations generally were decentralized, if not chaotic, and that, as Management often had no plan, the shop stewards bulked large. This led to anomalies. The study went on to recommend six rules for handling labour–Management relations, which BOAC was using. Troubles with pilots did not again lead to a major dispute until five years later, 1968, when the 747s ordered during the Guthrie regime were looming on the horizon. The first problem in Guthrie’s days was the redundancy created by the withdrawal of the Comets. Early in 1964, BOAC proposed that BEA should take spare Comet pilots on secondment, but BEA’s pilots objected on seniority, and BEA solved the problem by hiring its own people. In February, the General Manager Industrial Relations was instructed to coordinate policies with BEA on all union matters. In July there was a problem over the 126 navigators whom BOAC wanted to declare redundant. The solution was to try to find other jobs for them. A more important step forward was the agreement of Management and labour to productivity and higher pay. At the same time, prospects that staff might more often transfer from one Corporation to the other led to agreement that their pensions in the Air Corporations Joint Pension Scheme, as well as their staff travel priorities, would go with them. A settlement without a strike was reached late in December 1964 with the Corporation’s 970 pilots, who received a 13.5 per cent increase over the next three years, in addition to the 3 per cent awarded in 1963. Perhaps rather strange on the surface was the fact that by mid-June 1965 BOAC had allowed fifty-three pilots to retire, then closed the scheme, based on gloomy forecasts; yet in no time at all it was advertising for new pilots for future 707 and VC-10 operations, partly because Hamble would not be turning out new pilots in sufficient quantities until 1969. But the fact was, of course, that senior pilots cost a lot more than younger ones and were in imbalance in numbers to first officers. In January 1966 the forecast indicated there would still not be enough pilots, and so it was proposed to place sixty students at the Oxford Flying School at Kidlington to make up for the shortage of ex-service pilots (expected to drop to only fifteen a year) in the face of a peak retirement of Second World War BOAC airmen in 1976 and 1977. Twenty students were also sent to Perth. (In 1966, a 707-336C freighter service to Hong Kong had to be delayed because there was a shortage of pilots.) Yet in 1968 the schemes were sharply curtailed in the face of predicted surpluses, which did not then materialize. Early in March 1966 an argument arose between BOAC and the British Airline Pilots Association over whether or not the Pilot Utilization Document was a part of the January 1965 settlement; the pilots said it was not and claimed that their workload was too great. This was probably true in some areas. The situation was further compounded by the Prices and Incomes Act of 1966, which demanded that wages be kept at a standstill. The Contracts of Employment required that all contract documents be sent to staff at their homes, and on top of this, new Ministry

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278 S p e e d b i r d flight-time limitation regulations cut further into aircrew availability by restricting duty hours. One solution to the shortage was to spend more on navaids to save the expense of training a third pilot as a navigator. On 23 September the President of the Board of Trade indicated that he expected all nationalized industries to observe the Prices and Incomes Act, but the employees’ side of the National Joint Council refused to endorse the policy. Moreover, the Act put BOAC in a dilemma as its pay and productivity agreements called for a planned increase in wages, as the Chairman pointed out to the Board of Trade. In regard to productivity, there was some suspicion that the high rate of sickness of VC-10 crews might have something to do with the short time allowed them between trips. Normal sickness in periods 8 and 9 (November and December) was 3.4 per cent for aircrew and 2.37 per cent for ground staff. To provide a better balance of workload on cabin staff, pooling of these staffs on VC-10 and 707 flights was pushed. But here the low union membership created a communications problem as elected representatives really did not know what most staff wanted. This led, then, to an attempt to improve the Cabin Staff Bulletin. As the dispute with the pilots dragged on, the pilots, as a University of Chicago attitude survey showed, lost faith in Management and its representatives,19 while BOAC felt that people who were normally gentlemen were being difficult because BALPA itself was suffering from internal problems. BOAC told the Pearson Inquiry (appointed in December 1967, as noted below) that all members of the National Joint Council agreed that there were nine causes of major disputes in British industrial relations: job security, bad communication, poor industrial relations, hours of work, working conditions and discipline, Trade Union status, frustration with negotiating machinery, pay, and external influences and strikes. In this case only pay and relations with the International Federation of Air Line Pilots Association (IFALPA) were at issue. Nevertheless, the pilots started a work-to-rule in November 1967 and went on strike in December and again in July 1968, all of which was estimated to have cost BOAC £17,000,000 in revenue, £12,000,000 in profits, and £11,000,000 in overseas earnings. Some observers believe that when the pilots saw that £20,000,000 “profit” in 1965–1966, they felt that they should get their share as they were, after all, probably the most important people in the airline. Relations with the pilots were difficult and caused constant problems. When BOAC did withhold promised increases under the pressure of the Prices and Incomes policy, it was sued unsuccessfully by two pilots for the back pay due. Then in July 1967 BALPA unilaterally withdrew from the National Joint Council. This led to the Stamp Inquiry in October and to non-cooperation by the pilots in November. BOAC kept in touch with the Ministry of Labour and kept hoping that it would take action, but the Ministry knew a hot potato when it saw one. So when on 1 December the threat of a strike became real, the Board was not expecting that the Government, whose policies had aggravated the situation, would support them. Meanwhile, Granville and the Personnel Director, John Gorman, had been meeting informally with the pilots’ leaders and had suggested to them that if the concerns

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82. The chief pilot said that the Boeing 707 was “a license to print your own money,” it was so efficient compared to past machines. The picture shows a BOAC-Cunard Cargo 707-336C.

could not be resolved within the NJC, perhaps an independent Ministry of Labour Inquiry would help. With heavy Christmas traffic on the horizon, BOAC expected to lose £170,000 a day with a strike, though those pilots who struck on the 9th and 10th were not paid for those days, as was normal practice. The Ministry of Labour then appointed an inquiry under Lord Pearson. By March 1968 BALPA was back in the NJC, but negotiations made no progress, despite the involvement of the Department of Employment Productivity, as the Ministry of Labour had now become. And in July, Professor J. Wood of Sheffield held fourteen meetings on the problem, without much result. BOAC, meanwhile, had appealed to the National Board for Prices and Incomes and expected its ruling in October to be used on an interim basis until a new salary proposal could be prepared by 1 April 1969. On 24 September the full BOAC/ BALPA negotiating team met under the Chairmanship of Professor Wood: eight items were ratified and a further sixteen only discussed, while another eight were talked about because Professor Wood thought progress on them might be made. The meeting was not a great success, partly because the new pilots’ group could not agree amongst themselves and partly because the secretary of BALPA was also new. At the end of October the Prices and Incomes Board Report (Cmnd.3789) became available and after many meetings a temporary settlement with BALPA was reached.

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280 S p e e d b i r d By the beginning of 1969 the dispute had veered to the hourly rated bid-line system (by which pilots chose specific routes) and the likelihood of redundancies. BALPA wanted the bid-line, but was reluctant to accept the consequential redundancy. (BEA had just noted it would need no new pilots for four years.) The patient Professor Wood was finally able to tell BOAC that BALPA wanted something other than what was in the 1 November 1968 agreement, and BOAC had by February developed some other solutions. Meanwhile, senior management staff had, it was hoped, been granted a 6 per cent Tier I (a Government wage and price controls edict) increase, effective 1 April. But one of the pay problems in BOAC, especially after high inflation began in 1968, was that senior salaries failed to keep pace with union wages. In the period 1970–1976 it was reckoned that senior salaried personnel in Britain in general lost 25 per cent of their purchasing power compared to the union workers’ 8 per cent loss.20 At the end of March, Professor Wood resigned as Independent Chairman of the BALPA–BOAC discussions. The next day, a Saturday, the BOAC Managing Director, Granville, told the Acting Chairman of BALPA and the Chairman of the BOAC Pilots’ Council that BOAC could not accept the pilots’ demand of a minimum of £7,500 and a top of £12,000 a year; BOAC was prepared to go to £7,700 top. BALPA issued a strike call. The Department of Employment and Productivity called both parties to a meeting. The BOAC Board met and agreed to increase their offer and to try to come to an agreement. And so a settlement was reached between BOAC and its pilots on a commercial basis of what business could stand. The strike was called off, but the pilots refused full cooperation because the Government could not decide whether to refer the settlement to the Prices and Incomes Board (PIB).21 This left in abeyance joint committees to work out bid-line procedures, the question of higher pay for flying the 747s, and the reduction of the crew on aircraft, and posed the likelihood of another strike. As it was, the six-day strike of April 1969 was reckoned to have cost BOAC £5,200,000, of which £2,200,000 was on Western routes. At the same time, there was a net savings of £1,000,000. In May the Government decided that the agreement could go ahead, but that the productivity issue would be forwarded to PIB for evaluation, together with the question of the reduction from three to two pilots on some sectors and the matter of crewing the 747. Within BOAC it was decided that there needed to be some education of captains, and Granville initiated monthly meetings with them. Studies showed that on the subject of the workings of the Corporation, engineers were the best informed members of the aircrew, while the pilots were the least. In September, as a result of the arbitration award, BOAC found itself forced to recruit more pilots again, and further training had to be undertaken. Sixty-two migrant flights to Australia had to be cancelled as well as some regular passenger and freight services, because aircraft had to be withdrawn in April and May 1970, and again in September 1970 through to March 1971, for training. By October 1969 the 747 was looming very close and the Board regarded it as essential to settle the terms of operation with BALPA. But at the same time it

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recognized that this might not be worked out in time for summer 1970 services, and Management was instructed to explore the idea of leasing BOAC’s aircraft to another operator. On 5 November the Prices and Incomes Board issued its report on pay for flying the 747, and on the 13th BOAC met with the pilots. The situation did not appear to be propitious for agreement, and it was further complicated by doubts about the bid-line system. Engineering officers wanted to retain their twonight stop-over privilege, while cabin staff also wanted 747 pay, strict seniority, and extra money for those passed over. The pilots refused to train until pay was settled. At the root of the matter was the fact that through various publications and through the international pilots’ union BOAC pilots were well aware of what their colleagues in other airlines were being paid; they were increasingly reluctant, as the pound fell against the dollar, and both their standard of living and their expectations also fell, to fly the same equipment at what they regarded as a substandard wage. It was a classic labour–Management confrontation at a time when others also were upset—on 20 January 1970 senior staff discussed the possibility of unionization with NJC union representatives. Early in 1970 the Managing Director was meeting monthly with the pilots to expose the workings of BOAC to them; Professor Wood was back, trying to explain the third-pilot question; and the Government was hearing BOAC’s latest proposals. By late February BOAC was hedging its bets on charters, laying off all the June 747 groups onto 707s and Super VC-10s and not making any bookings for such groups in the remaining summer months. April saw the pilots lift briefly and then reimpose the 747 ban. BOAC decided to announce publicly that it would not fly its 747s in the summer, because all agreements with pilots were to terminate in December and it chose to keep flying with the aircraft under contract rather than risk a strike. It seemed wiser to try for a single settlement of the whole pilot problem. As it turned out, this proved to be a doubly sensible decision as the 747s had engine-mounting problems, and while other airlines had to cope with modifications while operating, BOAC’s aircraft were modified before they went on service. The loss per day for not operating the 747s was £25,000; this was offset by a savings of £8,000 on the three aircraft then available, plus further savings from the non-recruitment of some 300 staff. In addition, the engines off the aircraft were rented and a nice profit made on that. In 1969 and 1970, 25 per cent of the space in the minutes of both Management and Board were devoted to labour relations; as a Management minute noted on 21 July 1970, “Industrial misconduct is becoming progressively more disruptive.” The BALPA negotiations were further delayed when all members of the local BALPA Council resigned over an internal dispute on how to conduct negotiations. New elections were not held until late in the summer and therefore not until 16 September were discussions resumed with a local Council of twenty. At this time BOAC felt it was under no governmental pressure to take an uncommercial position, though “the price of its product was limited by international agreement.” Meetings with BALPA soon showed that a new situation was emerging. BALPA wanted back increments to pensions in addition to substantial (33–78 per cent)

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282 S p e e d b i r d salary increases, three-pilot and one-engineer operation of 747s for the first twelve months, and then two-pilot and one-engineer operations with no redundancy. Pay for senior captains on Super VC-10s was to go up to £9,928 and on 747s to £14,320, well beyond the Managing Director’s salary of £9,500 in 1969, but well below the American 747 captain’s level. In addition there was to be pass-over pay for those over fifty-two, who would not be allowed to transfer to 747s, and the option of continuing to age fifty-five on current types or, for those passed over at age fifty-two, early retirement with a gratuity of £13,400. On 30 September the Board agreed that it would, if it had to in its own best commercial interests, meet the pilots’ demands, but on 1 October the Minister of State at the Board of Trade expressed very considerable Cabinet concern. On the 7th Granville was called to the Ministry and told “in no uncertain terms” that while BOAC’s proposals might be in its commercial interest, they were not in the national interest. Minister Corfield then also sent a letter to the Board, limiting the increase for flying 747s to BOAC’s June offer and for all other aircraft to 10 per cent, and including the proviso that Granville should see him before making any other offer. The Board responded that it could not regard the letter of the 7th as an order from the Government to depart from the strictly commercial approach laid down in the letter of 1 January 1964. The Permanent Secretary agreed that the Minister had only made a request. On 16 October Granville told the Board that the impetus in the BALPA negotiations had been lost “as a result of Government intervention.” BALPA had reverted to its earlier demands and the prospects of settlement were remote. By December 1969 the pilots were demanding not only their own settlement but also a share of any general union agreements. Surprisingly, however, Management’s tenacity was rewarded when the settlement came suddenly in January 1970 with a £9,000 senior rate and common pay on a flat-rate system. Some details remained to be settled. In the meantime, cabin staff had also been agitating for changes. Part of the trouble here was that stewards and stewardesses were by no means fully unionized, and BOAC was able to resist demands that non-union staff should not work with unionized staff, a matter of considerable difficulty when scheduling cabin crews with their relatively high rates of sickness, especially among young stewardesses and older stewards.22 Stewards and stewardesses ratified their agreement in March 1969. The new agreement made some recruited crews surplus, but owing to heavy charter business they were kept employed anyway. In November 1969 they threatened a strike, but when new slip charts developed, they gave way. In January 1970 BOAC at last agreed to let stewardesses stay on after marriage on a trial one-year basis (it eventually saved training and recruiting funds), but still retained the limit of ten years and age thirty-seven. In August 1973 the minimum age was lowered to nineteen. In February, chief stewards demanded 45 per cent of the pay of 747 senior captains and were offered an additional £450. In May the air cabin crews demanded pensions on the same basis as those for aircraft officers, threatening to strike on 1 July, at the height of the summer season.

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This proved to be a long and involved matter; it had started in 1961 and was thought to have been settled in 1965. In June 1967 the union had told BOAC and BEA that it was settled. But the Board of Trade objected and it took a year to convince it, and then an amending process had to be started. This ended abruptly when on 10 October 1968 the union said that it had decided instead to go for “aircraft officers’ pensions.” Nothing further happened until 1 July 1969, when the union asked for a working group, but by then the Government indicated that its proposals for Social Security invalidated any changes to statutory pension schemes. After more discussions, in January 1970 the Board of Trade made an exceptional case and approved the 1968 scheme, which the union then rejected. On 24 May the union started working to rule over duty time because BOAC would not assure a minimum three nights at base between trips. BOAC agreed that this was a reasonable objective, but that it was not always possible. In September cabin crew refused to work 747s on which passengers had more cabin baggage than International Air Transport Association rules allowed—but it

83. The Boeing 707 cockpit.

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284 S p e e d b i r d turned out there were no IATA rules! The problem was that carry-on luggage had been encouraged, especially on US domestics facing the realities of rising labour costs, to lessen baggage-handling delays, and because washable modern clothing allowed people to travel light. The cabin space problem was compounded by the rising number of tourists carrying shopping bags. In November 1970 the Board of Management accepted the Flight Operations Director’s proposal that stewardesses should be granted a ten-year contract. And this was the final step in getting cabin crews back on the aircraft, all nominated staff reporting for 747 training on 1 March 1971. Parallel with the problems with cabin staff was the much simpler case of flight engineers. In November 1969 they had not decided whether or not to accept the bid-line system. Like cabin staff, they also wanted 747 pay and appointments in strict order of seniority, with pass-over pay. By May 1970 (although arrangements were not settled until a vote in June 1973) they had agreed to follow the pilots’ bid-line system so as not to create scheduling problems, but in January 1973 the problem of their having to sign out aircraft at stations with no resident engineer still remained unsettled. In April 1971 the Department of Trade and Industry approved all pay schedules. It was thus possible to wind up the agreements with pilots, cabin staff, and engineers and get the 747s airborne on scheduled service for summer on Sunday 25 April 1971. Even so, in May BALPA declared a formal difference with BOAC. In 1971 the question of how many pilots BOAC needed again came to the fore. The schemes started in the late Sixties were producing, it seemed, more pilots than were needed. But then the DTI promulgated new flight-time limitations (which BOAC reckoned would cost £2,000,000 a year), and BALPA decided also to limit 747 duty periods. By October, Management meetings always had a BALPA topic, partly because the Industrial Relations Act created complications and BALPA decided to register as a Trade Union rather than continue to be a professional association. Then further violence in Northern Ireland caused a shift of training from Shannon to Prestwick, partly because Shell refused to refuel British aircraft at Shannon. By early 1972 there was a shortage of cabin staff, linked in part by the feminist movement to the question of equal pay for stewardesses, and in part because of the lengthening of the duty day by security checks. And in July, much to BOAC’s annoyance, the Department of Employment decided to hold an inquiry into relations between the NJC, the pilots, and the airlines. Then came a pay and prices standstill and devaluation, as well as changes in the income tax earlier in the year which made medical insurance taxable. All of these complicated the daily meetings between BOAC and BALPA, which were trying in November to meet an 8 December deadline. Next came the BEA Trident accident just after takeoff at Heathrow, Press stories of pilots falling asleep in the air, and the Bader Committee study of flight-time limitations.23 Nevertheless, by 22 December an interim agreement was reached with the pilots which allowed time for a long-term settlement.

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84. BOAC world routes, 1965. Speedbird.indb 285

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286 S p e e d b i r d The pilot shortage, much talked about at this time, was mystifying. On 12 December 1972 Management noted that some fifty junior pilots (Pilot IIIs) were surplus and would be employed on ground duties until the autumn of 1973. But a month later there was a shortage of 707-436 crew, which was causing the subcontracting of twenty-six charters to Independents in January alone. Part of the problem lay in the need to qualify pilots on one type at a time, which made switching of crews at short notice almost impossible. At the same time, many regulations were changing, and the impact of the Edwards Committee and the Second Force (to be discussed in the next chapter) had to be assessed. Against this background of uncertainty BOAC began to hold sessions to educate its pilots and to draft a lengthy agreement which for the first time contained a detailed explanation of the background upon which it was based, so that if changes were necessary in the future these would be seen against that backdrop and not be considered a suspicious plot. One problem was recruiting from the Services, which were themselves not sure whether or not they would have surpluses.24 Another was the bid-line system, which BALPA appeared to want to negotiate, but Management considered BALPA unpredictable and was cautious because the change would need 5 per cent more pilots. Another difficulty was the captains’ desire for inviolable rest periods, yet at the same time there was a great deal of deadheading, amounting to 30,000 journeys a year in and out of London. With business booming for the summer of 1965, and in spite of attempts to cut manpower, the stewardess’s union, British Airline Stewards and Stewardesses Association (BASSA), agreed to the hiring of sixty new young women, with the possibility of full-time employment if there were vacancies. In January 1966 a further ninety were added because a seventh cabin-staff member was needed on selected flights, and their minimum age was lowered to twenty. Most of these young women were Indians, Pakistanis, Chinese from Hong Kong, Japanese, and a few Chileans to cover language requirements and ethnic travellers. They were carried as supernumeraries because BASSA would not have it any other way and thus their job descriptions were carefully tailored so that they could never become chief stewardesses. By March 1973 pilots and cabin staff were threatening action for a variety of reasons, but engineers had settled for a 4.1 per cent pay increase. In April BOAC agreed that one of the problems was cabin staff rostering, and forty-three staff were added to this office, which had heretofore surprisingly been out of touch with cabin crews and their personal schedules. Another change adopted was, in the automobile age, to mail home notices to all members of the flying staff so that upon their return from a trip the roster schedule with twenty-eight days’ notice was at their fingertips and not in a box at Headquarters. These changes meant that 100 open slots in other parts of BOAC had to be found and eliminated so as to keep the Corporation within its 25,000 manpower budget. Even that was predicated on the withdrawal from service of four older aircraft and no further diminution of flying staff productivity. Then the question of flying charters into

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Belfast raised the problems of hostile area insurance and of the justice of using only volunteers. In July 1973 the Bader Report became available, and Management estimated it would require another 400 aircrew (and related administrative staff ) at a cost of £4,100,000 per annum. BOAC had until 31 August to make proposals for legislation which would take effect on the day (1 April 1974) it became the Overseas Division of British Airways. Also in July the Pay Board refused to approve the pilots’ pay agreement and so further discussions with BALPA were needed. Fortunately, these went rapidly for a change, the Pay Board approved, and by 24 July agreement had been reached, but there was still the problem of productivity pay. Counsel suggested it would be perfectly legal to bank the extra as long as it was not paid to the pilots during the Phase III pay period. The last serious problem to face BOAC before the merger with BEA was the question of BOAC crewing the Air New Zealand DC-10s between Los Angeles and London as a continuation of Air New Zealand’s own service between Auckland and Los Angeles, for which chartering arrangements were being negotiated late in 1973. Management wanted to avoid operational inflexibility. Cabin staff were the difficulty, and BOAC anticipated a shortage of 400 for the summer of 1974. The

85. The Vickers VC-10 cockpit during demonstration of a Category III automatic landing. The auto-pilot is flying the machine to touch-down, thus demonstrating the wonders of computer control.

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288 S p e e d b i r d pilots wanted the DC-10 to use as leverage against BEA on L-1011 crewing, while the cabin staff wanted higher pay for aircraft with ten-abreast seating. Eventually, everyone except the cabin staff accepted, before the whole matter of industrial relations became a British Airways problem. BOAC’s industrial relations may have appeared to have been an unduly complex and drawn-out subject. There were many reasons. It was complicated, especially in the last decade, by having to negotiate with sixteen unions; by the general ageing of the pilots, who were concerned about their pensions, as well as their lack of knowledge of BOAC; by changing world-wide attitudes in human relations; and by national economic realities and government paternalism.

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Chapter XII Edwards and the Second Force The Edwards Committee The Edwards Committee on British Air Transport in the Seventies1 was established by the Board of Trade in July 1967. Its effect on BOAC was doubly momentous: it recommended the establishment of a Second Force airline to have some of BOAC’s routes, and it led to the creation, perhaps from a Guthrie suggestion, of the British Airways Board as a holding company, which in its turn merged BOAC and BEA into British Airways, by 1977 the airline having the largest international network in the world. Certainly in 1969 a strong BOAC wanted to take over BEA. That the separate identity of BOAC would have been extinguished, it then being regarded as harmful to the British national effort as a result of the Edwards Committee, has been blamed by some insiders on the clash of personalities (of which Guthrie in 1977 denied the existence) between Sir Giles Guthrie as Chairman of BOAC and Professor (later Sir) Ronald Edwards, who was Chairman of the Committee of Inquiry into Civil Aviation and Professor of Economics and Industrial Organization at the University of London. However, that judgment

86. The new BOAC Board chaired by Sir Giles Guthrie, 1964.

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87. Sir Giles Guthrie, BOAC Chairman, 1964–1969.

88. Sir Charles Hardie, BOAC Deputy Chairman, 1966, and Chairman, 1969.

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stems from the intense loyalty of long-service BOAC men to the Corporation for which they laboured so long and so valiantly. The detached view must be that merger was in the long run inevitable for a variety of reasons: failure to merge medical services until 1965, motor transport, terminals, and other obviously common services such as printing and computers; the growing similarity and flexibility of aircraft, with the resulting friction in the Middle East between BOAC and BEA over services to Beirut, Cyprus, and the Gulf; not to mention a duplicate sales shop organization in Europe. But merger was also in the wind elsewhere in the business world, a situation which made the Edwards Second Force proposal the less rational. However, BEA feared it would be the junior partner, and so its top brass resisted the idea, as BOAC had earlier. The Board of BOAC tried from the beginning to influence the Report, as was their right. Naturally BOAC wanted to be ready both to propose its own ideas and to counter others it thought dangerous. On the whole, the approach was to be in harmony with BEA and to stress the need for continuity in policy. The ninety-ninepage submission by the Board used two-thirds of its space to show what BOAC was, for Edwards was not an aviation man, and the remainder to point out that the Corporation was planning for from five to twenty years ahead. The smallest lead time for change was in sales, which nevertheless required eighteen months. A good deal of the space was devoted to a discussion of the unsatisfactory nature of the Independents, to opposition to the policy of dual designation, with emphasis on the distraction to BOAC of having to fight competition both abroad and at home. When the submission was approved in October 1967 and submitted to Edwards, the Board understood that the long-haul part of the Edwards Report would be available in March 1968. BOAC continued to forward statements and recommendations to the Com­ mittee during the following months. Management was disturbed by the fact that the Deputy Chairman of Edwards’s Committee was also the Chairman of Esso, and thought to feel some pressure to put BOAC’s long-standing fuel contract with Shell out to bid. Why it should have felt pressure is strange as the fuel contracts had already, at Guthrie’s suggestion, gone out to bid—with a consequent savings. On 23 November the Edwards Committee visited BOAC and was at its request shown the whole G-7 Plan, including its financial implications. In January 1968, BOAC expressed its conviction that it should only stay out of air-taxi and cropspraying work and that the Independents should be limited to aircraft of twenty seats or fewer. Also in that case, BOAC and BEA should take over the aircraft and assets of the Independents in so far as they could use them. BOAC could use all the staff the Independents had because of its coming expansion, but it would only be willing to absorb the Independents if all parties agreed. This proved shortly to be prophetic. After he gave evidence on 5 February, Guthrie asked for papers setting out BOAC’s position vis-à-vis other nationalized industries and the effects on its partnerships of competition. An example of one of the problems BOAC always faced in explaining its position to outsiders came in early March when the

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292 S p e e d b i r d Edwards Committee complained that BOAC did not have as many First-Class seats on its Canadian services as did Air Canada in its DC-8s. BOAC replied that the problem was that Air Canada aircraft came directly off domestic services, but the pool recognized the imbalance and allowed BOAC more Economy-Class seats and a larger portion of that revenue. When the Committee decided to travel, BOAC warned its managers abroad of the issues and asked for reports after the Committee passed through. In June 1968 Management approved a paper for the Committee which, among other things, stressed the need for realistic salaries for Chairmen and senior staff, the value of private capital in nationalized industries as an incentive to Management, and the paramount need for a stable Government policy objective for BOAC and BEA, which might include an order to integrate physically sales organization and shops in Europe, but not their personnel. A merger was not necessary and would not resolve the problems of North Atlantic entry into Europe. Yet the paper also recognized that the main argument for a merger could be economic—increased flexibility of one large fleet of aircraft and a single large maintenance base. In July BOAC argued that a nationalized monopoly could achieve national objectives at the lowest cost and should be publicly controlled, and that any risks of apathy were more than countered by the nature of foreign competition. Domestic competition only affected the home market. The prime requirement was to get clear national objectives (and that took four White Papers to 1976,2 followed by a return again to the single-designation arguments which had created Imperial Airways in 1924 and BOAC in 1939). In September the Board received a purely advisory assessment from a leading merchant banking house (Morgan, Grenfell), which concluded that, while it was possible, no commercial Board of Directors could issue a prospectus given the forecasts in the G-7 Plan and the general record of the airline industry in Britain and the United States. So a business needed a ten-year record of profiles. In November Sir Richard Way, then Permanent Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Aviation, wrote that Press rumours that he had been appointed to the Board to become the “overlord” of a combined BOAC–BEA were unfounded, nor was it true that he was to be Chairman-designate of BOAC and to succeed when Sir Giles retired at the end of 1968. The Edwards Report finally appeared in May 1969. Its principal recommendations were brisk and to the point, if not to everyone’s satisfaction.3 From a BOAC view they were summarized as follows: First, the Government should from time to time make clear policy statements with priorities as to objectives. Second, there should be public, mixed, and private sectors of civil aviation. Third, the Corporations should be confirmed in their roles as the major operators of scheduled services with charter and inclusive tour rights, but under a National Air Holdings Board which would control policies and finances to ensure the most effective use of operating facilities, marketing

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strength, and traffic rights. BOAC and BEA should retain their individual identities and the Air Holdings Board should not over-centralize. In addition there would be British Air Services, also under the Board, to run feeder services with some continental connections. Fourth, the private sector should be encouraged to create “a Second Force” airline which would not only have long- and short-haul routes, but should be given a limited concession of Corporation territory, in return for which the Air Holdings Board should have a financial stake in the Second Force and one or more directors on the board. No one should be forced to sell out to the state, but the Second Force had to be managerially and financially strong. Fifth, the government statements of policy in a statutory instrument should be the terms of reference for a new Civil Aviation Authority responsible for all the functions currently spread between the Air Transport Licensing Board, the Board of Trade, and the Air Registration Board, including on the one hand domestic air traffic control and on the other the monitoring of the financial and managerial resources of the airlines for stability and safety. The CAA should both regulate competition and experiment to stimulate holiday travel.

The Edwards Report tried to have the best of both worlds, the socialist and the capitalist, the monopolist and the free enterprise. While it was correct in pushing the merger of BOAC and BEA as inevitable, as had been recognized in 1939 in the amalgamation of Imperial Airways and British Airways (1936), it was wrong in the creation of a Second Force airline when economic and financial exigencies were forcing BUA to seek a buyer; this became evident when traffic dropped, as Cmnd.6400 (1976) noted.4 Most basically, Edwards failed, as far as the airline side was concerned, to come to grips with the realities of international competition. Although Britain was far from able to afford three airlines, the Second Force was to be made viable, as Edwards noted, by hiving off part of the BEA and BOAC route system as a subsidized gift. Moreover, when the Force was actually created in 1970, the British Airways Board never made any investment in it nor had a seat on its Board. In fact, BOAC in 1971 and British Airways in 1976 were compelled to hand over routes to strengthen the Second Force, rather than to allow the realities of competition to operate.

The Hardie–Granville Era, 1969–1974 Sir Giles left while the Edwards Committee was still mulling over its recommen­ dations. The Board suggested Granville, but Sir Charles Hardie was appointed part-time Chairman, and Keith (later Sir Keith) Granville became full-time Managing Director as well as Deputy Chairman. This was a return to the sound concept that the day-to-day running of the airline should be in the hands of a longservice professional. The change of leadership coincided roughly with another plan in BOAC’s fortunes in that the Edwards Committee recommendations set new policy patterns, though it took a number of White Papers to make sense out of them.

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294 S p e e d b i r d The immediate internal effects of the new leadership were reflected in the running of the airline. The Chairman, because he was no longer Chief Executive, was replaced at the Board of Management weekly meetings by the Managing Director as Chief Executive. The Edwards Report appeared in May 1969 and copies were distributed to all members of Management. The instant reaction of the Board was that there was no reason for an Air Holdings Board; even more serious was the Report’s Recommendation No. 7, that a Second Force airline should be created. The Board described this as “an artificial creation/synthetic horror.” In no circumstances would BOAC be willing to withdraw in favour of a Second Force airline on any route. If the Government decided on dual designation of two British carriers on any route, as Edwards suggested for the Atlantic, then BOAC would compete with all its might against the other British airline. The Air Holdings Board was opposed because it would place another layer between BOAC and ultimate authority, because it was unnecessary where BEABOAC relationships were concerned—the Airline Chairmen’s Committee already served that function—and, lastly, because it would make the role of the Boards of the two Corporations very unclear. Sub-committees between the two Corporations might help. Finally, in its conclusions on 15 May, the Board of BOAC took the view that control of civil air transport should remain in the Board of Trade and not be moved to yet another new agency, the proposed Civil Aviation Authority. On 23 May the Board met again and heard that discussions with the Board of Trade officials left the impression that they had failed to consider the implications for BOAC of a Second Force. BOAC also thought that it was dangerous to put the Air Registration Board within the proposed Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) when one of the responsibilities of the ARB would be to criticize the CAA. During the summer of 1969 a good deal more effort was put into the idea of running trans-Atlantic aircraft through London and on into Europe to give oneplane service and thus compete with foreign airlines. The impulse for this came from a meeting with Board of Trade officials in June at which it was announced that the BOT’s Economic Services Division was doing a study of the integration or cooperation of BOAC and BEA. Shortly thereafter the BOT said that the group rejected the idea of a Holdings Board and opted instead for integration (the BOT did not want the word “merger” used). The study claimed that additional revenue of between £7,000,000 and £27,000,000 would result, especially from running aircraft through into Europe. BOAC’s response was a cautious suggestion of the need for more study. The BOT then set up a joint BOAC–BEA–BOT working group to resolve controversial issues, which BOAC felt might at least help in countering the US “points beyond” policy. BOAC’s Board felt that the BOT was arriving at the same ideas that BOAC had put forward in July 1968 for a nationalized monopoly. And, thus, on 22 August the Board concluded that the current study was going beyond cooperation to the possibility of full integration, amounting to merger. Certainly such a move was not out of line with business practice in America at the time, with its “urge to merge.” By September not only were more intense studies

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89. Catering staff preparing salad meals for Economy-Class passengers, ca. 1970.

with BEA under way, but also the Commercial Director was assessing the impact on revenue of a single brand name. However, the Government did not wait for the conclusion of these studies, for in November 1969 it published Cmnd.4213, promulgating the policy of establishing an Airways Board and of handing over part of BOAC’s route system to a Second Force airline. At its November meeting the Board hoped that it would be consulted before legislation was introduced. Thus there followed meetings with both the Conservative and Labour Air Transport Committees. On 19 December the Board was still unsure whether to react to the proposal for an Airways Board and its attitude was further complicated by the desire of the Roskill Committee to talk to both Corporations about a third London Airport, a topic raised in 1938 and still undecided in 1976.5 Early in 1970 BOAC was working along several lines. The Chairman was endeavouring to make points with the Board of Trade on legislation, while within BOAC Managing Director Granville had established the Strategic Planning Group to look at BOAC’s long-range plans. In the BOT a Civil Aviation Research and Development Programme Board was created in February, but did not meet until May, when the Engineering Director was BOAC’s representative.

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296 S p e e d b i r d On 20 July the BOAC Board met and agreed to oppose Minister Frederick Corfield’s brand-new plan of the 15th to hand over routes to the Second Force. A letter was dispatched, and by the time the Board met again on the 24th the Chairman, the Managing Director, and the Deputy Managing Director had met the President of the Board of Trade, the Minister of State for Civil Aviation, and their officials; the Chairman had taken the opportunity to express BOAC’s firm intention to proceed with the purchase of British United Airways, as had been agreed earlier in the year. The full story is given below. In a nutshell, having faced realities, the owners of BUA found that they could barely make a profit and late in 1969 asked BOAC to buy them out. There were ample precedents for such an inevitable move, and that the merger was not consummated in this case was entirely because of governmental interference. By the end of the summer BUA had been purchased by Caledonian Airways, which then became British Caledonian, soon to be known both as BCAL and as B-Cal. This time the Board of Trade decided to undertake an investigation of the whole field of investment in nationalized industries, and the general uncertainty made the framing of the G-10 Plan difficult. On another front BOAC and BEA hastily registered all names which they thought they might like to use and which would also be likely to be employed by the new Second Force; “British Airways” was already protected by the survival of the dormant British Airways (Iberia) Ltd. from the pre-BOAC days. “Air Britain” was also considered, although there already was an air history club of that name. In late November Management was still largely in the dark as to the whole Second Force issue. Not until the 18 December meeting was there evidence that the Government’s policy was to transfer BOAC’s West African routes to the Second Force on 1 April 1971; that there would be any financial compensation was doubted. A month later the Minister announced in the House that BOAC’s 12.5 per cent return on net assets for the period 1966–1970 had been extended as the target for the next six years, and that this was postulated in spite of the coming loss of the West African routes.6 Four days later the Board heard that the Board of Trade7 was considering giving the Second Force more BOAC routes, which might include the long-haul Air Ceylon scheduled services that BOAC ran as a charter. The confidential copy of the proposed Civil Aviation Bill, later to be enacted in 1971, which received the Royal Assent on 5 August, convinced the Board that the best course was one of constructive comment and not of opposition. BOAC now suggested that the proposed Airways Board should have on it more than one representative from each of the Corporations and that the Bill should specifically state that the airlines had an obligation to run commercially. The Board also wanted restraints placed on the powers of the Minister to direct the Corporations to divest themselves of assets. In March, the Board agreed that the Executive Board members should be responsible to Chairman and Chief Executive Granville in matters affecting the policy of the BOAC group for non-airline or Group matters, and to Managing Director Stainton for the daily running of the airline.

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On 29 March 1971 the Minister finally announced the arrangements for the Second Force.8 Two days later BOAC services to West Africa ceased. Apart from the major loss, BOAC could take some satisfaction from the fact that it sold its assets there for £117,000, about £3,000 more than it had paid for them and £92,000 more than book value. With some £27,000 in other sales and the right to buy back if BUA/Caledonian—as it was then known—failed, BOAC left West Africa with deep regrets, considering all the time, effort, and money which had gone into developing the market, going back to the days of Imperial Airways and Elder Colonial Airways. The loss of West African services was followed by an Order on 12 May to hand over the Tripoli route to Caledonian on 1 July 1971. The Board calculated that the combination of losses was either at the rate of £1,290,000 profit each year or an aggregate over five years of £29,000,000 in revenues. The loss in 1970–1971 was calculated at £9,000,000 in revenue. Though the Department of Trade and Industry, which replaced the Board of Trade in May 1971, would not promise compensation, it suggested that it might be possible to increase BOAC’s public dividend capital by £9,000,000 in 1972–1973. While the Board thought that anything in the uncertain airline business would be better than nothing, it was noted that every increase in capital made it more difficult for BOAC to show a satisfactory return. In May, the Board did what it had threatened to do if it lost a profitable route: it cancelled the mid-Pacific service. This enabled it to sell two 707-436s to BEA Air Tours. There were good commercial reasons for withdrawing, including a saving which would rise to £2,000,000 a year, compared to anticipated losses of perhaps as much as £3,550,000, but on the other hand there was the political apprehension that (as in the case of the 1964 South American East Coast service) a withdrawal would see the route awarded to British Caledonian for the San Francisco–Tokyo service. Further evidence of the short-term nature of Government policy was the Department of Trade and Industry and the Treasury attitude to increasing the dividend on 1970–1971 results. The Financial Director, D. H. Glover, had sug­ gested that as there was an extra million pounds available, perhaps the dividend should be raised from the targeted 6.5 per cent to 7.5. Government response was that 7.5 per cent was less than half the available profit and that BOAC should take a commercial approach to dividend policy. The Treasury did not consider BOAC having to borrow to finance an increased dividend to be an overriding objection—it was common commercial practice; nor that to reduce the reserves would save paying dividends on a larger capital. And if those were not cogent enough reasons, the Treasury stated that the problem would not be BOAC’s in the future but that of the new British Airways Board. The Board, acting in a properly commercial manner and having in mind the gloomy forecasts for 1971– 1972 through 1973–1974, stood upon 7.5 per cent.

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Flight Operations Director

Personnel Director

Chief Engineer

General Manager Support Services

Secretary and Solicitor

Chief of Security Services

Commercial Director

Public Relations Director

Financial Director

Management Services Director

Planning Director





Hotels and Aviation Engineering Director

Chairman and Chief Executive Chairman Deputy Chairman and Managing Director BOAC AC Deputy Managing Director

12.1. BOAC organization, 1971

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BOAC

BAS

BEA

BOAC BOAC BOA BEA BEA International Associated Engine Charter Airtours Helicopters Aeradio Companies Overhaul Ltd. Ltd. Ltd. Ltd. Ltd. Ltd.



Group Management Group Planning Group Group Group Services Director Director Personnel Financial Public Relations Director Director Director

Group Managing Director

Chairman Deputy Chairman Secretary to the Board

12.2. British Airways Board: initial Group arrangement

90. Sir Charles Abell, BOAC Engineering Director. To his right, Mr. Shenstone talks to engineers working on a Boeing 707’s jet engines in “the Kremlin,” as the Headquarters block at London Airport was known.

91. An airframe engineer adjusting the leading-edge slat of a Vickers Super VC-10. Note the scaffolding upon which he is standing.

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The Birth of British Airways On 11 October 1971 the shift of responsibility to the new British Airways Board (BAB) began with the first visit to the Board of Management of David Nicolson, BAB’s Chairman-designate as of 7 October. A consulting engineer, he had been approached in September by John Davies, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, and asked to become the first Chairman of BAB. He agreed on condition that he could keep one-third of his time for his other interests and that he would have a free hand in choosing the members of the Board and determining its balance and working methods. The British Airways Board first met in January 1972 and in September; Nicolson claimed in 1976 that he knew an eventual merger would result when he and the Chairmen of BEA and BOAC met and agreed in principle. After he was knighted and retired from British Airways, he commented that the position of Chairman was not easy because he received a lot of unwanted advice from politicians and civil servants, making resistance vital.9 Meanwhile, with the establishment of BAB, the reappointments to the BOAC Board were limited. Granville was appointed Deputy Chairman of BAB and Chairman of BOAC until 31 August 1972, and Ross Stainton became Deputy Chairman of BOAC (although he preferred, as Granville had also, the co-title of Managing Director). Also during January 1972 the Civil Aviation Authority was created under the Civil Aviation Act of 1971 and Lord Boyd-Carpenter became its head. As soon as BAB met, requests for consideration of the consolidation of the commercial, technical, and accounting sides of BOAC and BEA began to be sent down, immediately arousing fears of redundancy. The new Joint Managing Directors’ Committee from the two Corporations set up a series of task forces to investigate everything from group planning to engine overhaul. Many of these activities were both helped and hampered by the shifting of key personnel. Another change was that under the Civil Aviation Act all BOAC’s finances were now provided through BAB rather than going into the market on its own, and by which capital expenditures over £500,000 had to be approved. On the whole, the BOAC Board acquiesced to the close linkage, with respected personnel moving up to BAB. Perhaps it had also already concluded that, whether or not it was right, a merger was inevitable because the Ministry had preordained it, as it had previous mergers in the aircraft industry. The months that followed were filled with meetings and conversations, the results of which appeared in BAB’s First Report on Organization, laid before Parliament on 14 July 1972. In it Nicolson made recommendations concerning reappointments and new contracts for Board Members, anticipating the creation of a legally simpler corporation with less ambiguity over lines of controls and responsibility. In Section 12 he made it quite clear that the relationship between Government and BAB should be well defined. As the Ministry was responsible to Parliament for the efficiency of the airline, BAB would keep the Ministry informed. On the

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302 S p e e d b i r d other hand, “a distinction should be drawn between the machinery for consultation on policy and the monitoring of operational performance.” And that summed up neatly the basic source of conflict between the Government and BOAC from 1946 to 1974, throughout the airline’s commercial life. The Government accepted the Report, and the merger moved ahead. Changes in BOAC and BEA Board positions took effect in September, and the new Group (as the Management for BAB was called) Managing Director, Henry Marking, asked for the regular preparation of reports on financial, personnel, and operational matters. In October BOAC and BEA both criticized the idea of centralizing of traffic rights and licensing in BAB (and they remained separate); a new name, terms and conditions of service, worker representation on the Boards, and other matters were discussed. By late December 1972 it was not yet clear whether BOAC and BEA would continue as separate divisions, nor what their objectives were. In 1973 routes were designated, briefings continued, and there were more delays, as important decisions filtered up through BAB to the Government. No expenditures for aircraft could be made without Government approval. In February, the expression “British Airways” began to replace “BAB.” British Airways, in fact, began to be developed as a name, a common brand as decreed in the Board’s Second Report of 10 January 1973. Concern was expressed over the need to take the necessary legal steps before the 1 April 1974 vesting date for the common trading identity, and over the problem of assuring the unions that there would be no redundancies. The level of seniority was set at that of 1 September 1971. In April also it was learned that after 1 September the Corporations would be known as the Overseas Division and the European Division. The sales organization was divided so that the European Division would be responsible for Europe, the Mediterranean, Israel, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, while the Overseas Division would cover the rest of the world. At its 19 April meeting the Board decided that it would not be fulfilling its statutory duty unless it provided an Annual Report in the same form as in the past, to “complete the historical record of BOAC in a form that provided continuity with previous Reports.” And so the 1973–1974 British Airways Annual Report contained for the last time a complete BOAC Annual Report, concluding—except for the war years, 1939–1945—a complete series. The one exception was that comments about the licenses granted to British Caledonian were transferred to the BA section. In May the Board discussed the problem of the dividend and reserve accounts for 1972–1973. It was agreed to pay BAB a dividend of £6,000,000, but to point out that it was from the profits of the two Divisions. In June BAB was under pressure from the Department of Trade and Industry to increase the dividend, and the Board authorized the Chairman to go to £7,500,000. Manpower needs and livery for the aircraft were discussed. The Group tried to limit the increase in manpower to 300 for all of BA, while BOAC alone claimed it needed 600 more. In July the BOAC Board decreed a 2.6 per cent across-the-board

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cut. The cost and date of painting the aircraft, as well as new logos, were decided upon between May and September, and all BOAC signs were to be changed to British Airways by April 1974. On 24 March 1974 the BOAC Board had its last lunch together. The new Overseas Division Board would meet on the same schedule as the old BOAC Board, but on Wednesdays instead of Fridays. Minute No. 7859 recorded that the Chairman thanked the Board and the Financial Director thanked the Chairman; and on that quiet note, and with prospects of a dividend in spite of the latest reverses, BOAC officially went out of business on 31 March 1974. Before closing the story, however, we must take note of many developments over the years 1964–1974 which the Board either guided or considered. The history is one, in Toynbean terms, of challenge and successful response.

BOAC and the Independents, 1964–1974 The recommendations of the Edwards Committee put paid finally to any BOAC desire to buy out British United, and the creation of the Second Force airline can only fully be understood if seen against the backdrop of BOAC’s relationship with the Independents. Limitations of space forbid, however, exploring the full extent of the Independents’ lobbying operations. Though BOAC had various personal, technical, and working relationships with the Independents, commercially the Corporation regarded them as unnecessary rivals. A turning point in relationships was being reached as Guthrie came into office, and another came with the Edwards Report in 1969. In 1964 BOAC and BEA were getting into trooping and inclusive tours, in which air fares, hotels, and other items were bundled together under one price, while in 1969 Edwards decreed the need for the Second Force airline. On the whole, relationships with the Independents remained relatively quiet until 1970. BOAC developed a policy of not helping them in public, but was perfectly willing to sell them used aircraft, to meet with them on technical matters, and to oppose them vigorously if not always successfully in licensing cases. This, incidentally, R. E. G. Davies notes, was on the same principles that were customarily followed in the USA. Much of the trouble came from the enforced cooperation on the East and Central African routes, starting from 1960 when BUA operated Viscounts and then Britannias there, while BOAC had jets; that agreement ran until 31 March 1965. But in 1964 BUA wanted to put VC-10s on the service within weeks of BOAC’s doing so, planning to use them for trooping and inclusive tours. And so under ATLB pressure BOAC agreed to new pooling arrangements. The other headache was Caledonian (founded in 1962), which applied for trans-Atlantic inclusive tours services at a fare only £20 below IATA rates. In 1965 the ATLB granted Caledonian a three-year inclusive tour license in what was regarded as a precedent-setting case. BOAC decided to appeal, but undermined its own case by also promoting the idea of inclusive tours with IATA, and so in early June the appeal was rejected.

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304 S p e e d b i r d British Eagle, the Bamberg company, was reported to be looking into VC-10s for trans-Atlantic operations, but when BOAC-Cunard opposed the idea the ATLB revoked Eagle’s trans-Atlantic license. British Eagle was more successful on Eastern routes, obtaining in late 1964 a license to fly immigrants to Australia in conjunction with QANTAS for a limited period. Lloyd International then applied for licenses to carry mail and freight to Tokyo. Lloyd was tied in with Wheelock, Marden of Hong Kong and attempted to work out a license from both ends of the line. BOAC viewed the matter seriously and pointed out to the Minister the bilateral implications. The whole matter of dual designation was sensibly regarded by the new Labour Minister of Aviation, Roy Jenkins, as wasteful, and he refused to designate two British airlines on a single route.10 In May 1966 the ATLB turned Lloyd down, and again in August 1967. In July 1965 the British Independent Air Transport Association told the Plowden Committee11 that the Corporations would have no surplus aircraft for a long time to come, and the Independents needed better financial terms for new British aircraft, as their rivals were allowed to buy foreign aircraft. In the meantime BOAC, in order to be competitive with the Independents, had agreed to charters across the Atlantic for the summer, with Air Canada as part of their pooling arrangements. At the IATA meeting in Bermuda, BOAC, KLM, and Lufthansa pushed for a $250 inclusive tour-basing excursion (ITX) charter to get a total holiday package of $350, very similar to the $250 round trip on the North Atlantic which Pan Am had proposed and BOAC opposed in the late 1940s. Success at Bermuda led Guthrie to assert that BOAC would probably pick up 5,000 more passengers, while at the same time new rates to the Caribbean would draw off people from the Mediterranean.12 At the end of 1965 another foreshadowing move toward merger came with the consolidation of the Air Holdings share-owners; British and Commonwealth Shipping had 46 per cent, P&O had 20 per cent, and Furness-Withy the rest.13 Air Holdings, under Sir Miles Wyatt, controlled BUA. At the same time, Freddie Laker dropped out as Managing Director of BUA and was replaced by Max Stuart-Shaw, a former BOAC trainee. And then Sir Miles Wyatt opened talks with BOAC, which Milward of BEA opposed. Guthrie stalled because he felt that the merger with BEA needed to come first. Secluded talks were carried on until 1969. In 1966 it looked as if licensing denials by the ATLB would greatly help BOAC defeat the Independents. Then the US Civil Aeronautics Board decided to let six American Independents run inclusive tours on the North Atlantic, and this caused reconsideration of the overhaul of engines for British Independents at Treforest, especially for Caledonian’s new 707-336, for which BOAC might have a use. It was decided that these would only be done if they were on subcontract from RollsRoyce or if BOAC was entering into a long-term charter with an Independent. And at the end of the year it was learned that BUA was setting up a low-fare non-IATA subsidiary to run special flights to East Africa, where high fare yields

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made inclusive tour penetration particularly attractive. BOAC supported it before the ATLB to keep revenues inside the African pool. Much more serious was the Seventh Report of the Air Transport Licensing Board (1967), which expressed the belief that there should be parallel services, with the Independents picking up the growth from the Corporations’ services. In preparing its first submission to Edwards, the BOAC Board emphasized that dual designation was clearly against Ministerial policy as stated by Jenkins in 1965 and accepted by Mulley. If the ATLB was to file and forget policy declarations, then the Government might as well not have a policy. Faced with the sort of competition the Seventh Report suggested, BOAC for the first time early in 1968 took to television to drum up tour business. In 1968 IATA changed its statistical basis for inclusive tours and blocked space charters. And there was the perennial problem of British Eagle, now operating out of Bermuda, which was attempting to set up a round-the-world airline using its non-IATA subsidiary and associated companies. But at the end of the year British Eagle decided to discontinue trading, giving BOAC access to more staff, some spare engines, and four aircraft. Early in 1969 BOAC and BEA were talking of cooperation in the face of the likelihood of a third Corporation being set up to do inclusive tours. Then the ATLB granted Tunis to BUA instead of BEA; BOAC got stop-over and transit rights, but no traffic rights there. And BOAC for its part refused to handle BUA and Caledonian at its new terminal at John F. Kennedy International ( JFK) in New York, the policy being not to cooperate in public view. In the light of the Edwards Report favouring a competitive Second Force, this was extended to passenger handling at Boston also. Maintenance was done for BUA at New York’s JFK Airport, though any other British Independent would need Board of Management approval for this. Cooperation with BUA extended to letting Boeing show them BOAC’s specifications for the 747, but on condition that BUA tell BOAC of any change it wished to make for its 747B, to which BUA agreed. Next BUA applied to the ATLB for an extensive pattern of services to Africa and New York, including the revocation of all BOAC licenses to Africa. The Chairman of BUA made a tour of Africa to drum up support and BOAC decided that it had better follow suit. But at the end of December BUA was uncertain whether or not to pursue its ATLB applications; the reason became clear a few days later. In mid-December 1969 one of the Directors of BUA approached Sir Charles Hardie, then part-time Chairman of BOAC, and the Managing Director of BUA also talked to BOAC Managing Director Keith Granville. Both wanted to know if BOAC would buy BUA. Detailed discussions revealed that the asking price would be £10,000,000–£12,000,000, which Granville cannily guessed meant £8,000,000–£10,000,000. Stainton, Derek Glover, and Bray were brought in to get more information, and it became clear that BUA was barely making a consistent profit and that part of the sale would have to include wiping out debts owed by BUA.

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306 S p e e d b i r d

92. Two specialists working on the brakes of a VC-10 at London Airport.

Early in January 1970 the Chairman of BOAC wrote to the President of the Board of Trade telling him of the negotiations and reporting that, subject to the President’s approval, BOAC was willing to acquire the entire issued share capital of BUA from its owners. The letter went on to point out that the advantages to BOAC would be the re-establishment of BOAC’s operations to and from the East Coast of South America and to Chile; the opportunity to resume total responsibility for British air transport operations to and from Africa and to rationalize them for a potentially improved profit; and the acquisition by BOAC of a fully operational base at Gatwick as a hedge against over-congestion at Heathrow. Buying BUA would have helped BOAC in eliminating a thorn in the Corporation’s side while making it plain to competitors in the face of Edwards that the airline business was too expensive for any but very large or well-subsidized corporations to undertake. And so the BOAC Board agreed on 23 January 1970 to the purchase in principle, provided that Air Holdings was not left with any rump airline. After extensive discussions with the Board of Trade in which BOAC explained its projections, BOAC was told that the transaction was acceptable in principle. The secret was well kept until 6 March, when The Daily Express published information on what was afoot.

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By that time negotiations were well along, BEA had been informed and made no objection (BUA having some short-haul services), the unions had welcomed the move, and there remained only Government approval. Shortly thereafter Caledonian applied to the ATLB for the revocation in its favour of all BUA licenses. Though on the 9th the Minister for State Goronwy-Roberts had said it was an acceptable transaction as BUA had approached BOAC, on the 18th the Labour President of the Board of Trade, Roy Mason, told the House of Commons that he was withholding approval of the merger.14 He thought BOAC was going to pay too much and that after the election the price could be negotiated down to perhaps £6,000,000. What he did was, of course, to force BUA into discussions with other Independents in spite of the fact that a normal business transaction had been concluded between BOAC and British and Commonwealth Shipping, which owned 91 per cent of Air Holdings. Furthermore, it was an agreement which, if BOAC was a nationalized airline, was highly advantageous to the taxpayer. The BOT President’s action when coupled with Caledonian’s intervention meant at least a three- or four-week delay, it was assumed. In April, British and Commonwealth’s bankers gave Caledonian twenty-eight days in which to make an offer. BOAC confidently expected at the end of May that the formalities would be concluded at a modified price, as had happened in the BOAC-Cunard case. But by July nothing had happened; rumours were rife that the BOT was using its powers to control BOAC’s capital under the Air Corporations Act of 1967 to delay. It was in fact working on the creation of the Second Force airline Edwards had recommended. In the meantime, in November 1969, the Government had published Cmnd.4213, accepting what proved to be the highly optimistic Edwards Report conclusions on traffic growth and stating that the principal objective of a civil aviation policy “must be to encourage the provision of air services by British carriers . . . [with] an economic return on investment and stability and development of the industry,” to strengthen the balance of payments, and contribute to the overall growth of the economy. There should be minimum restraints on competition and therefore the Government favoured licensing a Second Force carrier on such scheduled routes where competition would be in the public interest and “where this might be expected to increase the British share of the market or bring other benefits,” but the designation of a second airline on a Corporation route “should not unduly impair the Corporation’s services, or their capacity to meet financial obligations laid on them by the Government.” Cmnd.4213 further encouraged the amalgamation of private airlines into a Second Force flag carrier on international flag routes: The Government cannot accept that the formation of such an airline should be made conditional upon the transfer to it of a significant part of the Air Corporations’ route networks, as distinct from double-designation in appropriate cases.

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308 S p e e d b i r d In spite of Edwards, the Civil Aviation Authority, which would shortly come into being, would be free to make some adjustment of territories. But the Corporations would not be allowed to invest in the Second Force, as that was an inappropriate use of public funds. Last, the White Paper declared that changes in policy should be infrequent and only by formal instruments, and that the Board of Trade should be the judge of economic necessity. That was the policy guidance. Then in June 1970 there was a change to a Conservative Government. On the morning of 15 July 1970 the Minister of State at the Board of Trade, Frederick Corfield, told Granville that it was Government policy to encourage Caledonian to buy BUA and to form a Second Force, but with a reduction in the transfer of routes and without public-sector financial participation. The Minister said that he wanted to transfer the minimum routes necessary on a once-and-forall-time basis. Either BOAC could do it voluntarily or the BOT would see that it was done by the ATLB’s granting of new licenses, which BOAC would not oppose. He had in mind about £4,000,000 per annum. Granville pointed out that it made more sense for BOAC to purchase BUA rather than give up routes. Nevertheless, BOAC would meet with the BOT (but not with Caledonian) to help it make a decision, even though he did not think the Government had the powers under existing legislation (let alone under the letter of 1 January 1964, which Corfield appeared not to know). The Minister ended the meeting by asking that action be taken at once so he could make a statement on the 24th before the House adjourned. On the 20th the Board agreed that the Government had, if it wanted to use it, absolute power over BOAC. The Board took the view that it should oppose the Minister’s demands as they were not in the Corporation’s commercial best interests, but it then reluctantly accepted on the same grounds that Granville had—that it would be better to try to salvage something than to let the Board of Trade take action alone. And so, in spite of the lessons of the past, once again the major longhaul operator was forced to subsidize an Independent as a matter of ill-informed policy made by people with little or no experience of the international, or even national, airline business, nor with a knowledge of history.15 As Granville had guessed, the Ministry had in mind that BOAC should give up its West African services; these were in fact turned over to the Second Force without compensation, effective on 31 March 1971. In the last year of operations West African services grossed £5,300,000 and contributed £1,600,000 to profits. Their loss also ended pools with Ghana Airways and Nigerian Airways. At a Press conference on 3 August 1970, the Conservative President of the Board of Trade, Michael Noble, admitted that he did not know if Caledonian was Britishowned; he also said that it would not be operating on the North Atlantic before 1972. Though there was over-capacity on the Atlantic in August 1971, the President said it would be gone by 1972. In spite of being assured that the stripping of its routes was a one-time affair, BOAC rightly remained suspicious and reminded the President that under the

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BOA Act of 1939 it was empowered to buy BUA. The President replied that the Government had the power to make “the best allocation of the nation’s resources” (i.e., BOAC). Having decided as a matter of policy that the “Second Force” created with the takeover of BUA in October 1970 by Caledonian Airways should be supported by the transfer of some BOAC routes, the question arose as to the Government’s power to bring this about. There was some doubt that the existing powers under the Air Corporations Act of 1967 were sufficient for this purpose and so the Government introduced, and Parliament passed in February 1971, the Civil Aviation (Declaratory Provisions) Act, one of the effects of which was to make it explicit that the Government could by an Order-in-Council limit BOAC’s activities by specifying that it should not operate on certain routes. So, in due course, in March 1971 an Order was made prohibiting BOAC from operating the route London–Kano–Lagos–Accra after 1 April. The Minister for Aerospace at the Board of Trade, Michael Heseltine, requested that, in addition to the West African routes, BOAC transfer to BUA/ Caledonian its services to Tripoli (worth £600,000 per annum) and that it discuss with BUA/Caledonian the abolition of the 70:30 agreement on FirstClass on the African routes (worth £270,000 per annum). The Board agreed to resist on both points as BOAC was already provisioned until 31 October and the Government was not entitled to abrogate contractual arrangements. But this was useless: the Minister simply made a formal Order transferring Tripoli to the Independents as of 1 July 1971. The Department of Trade and Industry continued to insist on a new agreement with British Caledonian (as BUA/Caledonian had become) on African flights by October 1971. This appeared to worsen BOAC’s position in East and Central Africa and the Seychelles, to which both companies had operating licenses. It gave BCAL £240,000 without increasing the British share of the market. At the beginning of 1972 BOAC was concerned that both the DTI and the ATLB were trying to obtain BOAC commercial planning information and past results as a means of expanding British Caledonian operations. Because nothing in the airline business ever seems to occur all by itself, it is necessary at this point to digress briefly to show how BOAC was attempting to protect itself in the charter market. In September 1971 BOAC moved further to widen its inclusive tours front by deciding to take a 51 per cent holding in ALTA Travel Ltd., a tour wholesaler, to obtain better-integrated tours. And on 18 December the Board decided that in view of the failure of IATA to deal with “non-sked” (i.e., non-scheduled) charter operators, and as the Second Force airline would be both scheduled and nonscheduled, BOAC needed to participate in the charter business and should set up a non-scheduled non-IATA company by 1 January 1972. The task force assigned to set this up agreed by 19 January that it should be called British Overseas Air Charter Ltd. (BOAC Ltd.), a change of name from the existing dormant company

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310 S p e e d b i r d BSAA Ltd., and the Board agreed. Though originally to do exempt charters, which was why it was it was set up so rapidly, later it was to oppose licensing. Along the same inclusive tours thrust, when in February 1971 Thomas Cook and Sons became available for purchase, BOAC was part of one large consortium which attempted to buy it. However, in June 1972 the Department of Trade and Industry ruled in favour of the other tender. By early April 1971 BOAC had the necessary Air Operator’s Certificate for BOAC Ltd., and application was made to the ATLB for an E-Class license, one which did not require two named points. In the meantime some more serious longrange problems arose, such as whether or not BOAC should keep the 707-436s for its own work or continue to sell them to BEA and, depending on that decision, how many crews would be needed in the future. The latter was becoming especially important in view of the impending retirement of the Second World War veterans. It was finally decided to let BEA Airtours have all thirteen 707-436s over a period of time, as BOAC would have spare Super VC-10s and later 707-336s. In February 1972, in conformity with the policy in Cmnd.4899 of dual designation, the ATLB granted BCAL scheduled North Atlantic services from Gatwick to New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles, and from Manchester and Prestwick to New York (the latter was soon dropped). It also obtained routes to Toronto, Houston, Atlanta, and London–Bahrain–Singapore. (Cmnd.4899 also suggested a future re-division of routes between British Airways Board airlines and BCAL). At the same time, the Department of Trade and Industry appeared to be settling on a policy of advance booking charters (ABC), which would be available to BCAL but not to BOAC Ltd. Challenged, the ATLB said that BOAC’s labour problems in connection with the 747 and inability to mount additional 707 services across the Atlantic justified the granting of licenses to BCAL. Curiously, BOAC could not appeal because all appeals were held up while the Civil Aviation Authority was being formed. BOAC threats to create an openrate situation were met by the Ministry with a granting of thirty-nine charters to the Far East to BCAL and twenty-six to BOAC, the grounds being that BCAL should have a three-to-two edge. This generated a strong reaction from QANTAS, and one-way fares were then mandated with QANTAS’s agreement at a conference in Singapore. The exempt travel charters (special low fares for emigrants on a scheduled charter basis) were continued to the end of June, and BCAL and BOAC received equal numbers. In June BOAC warned the Ministry that dual-designation was creating a traffic-rights problem abroad. Final minor relations with the Independents once again involved BOAC bailing them out. In July, Lloyd International collapsed and BOAC was asked by the Government in Britain to take the stranded very-low-fare passengers back to the United States. In August 1972 Uganda decided to expel all its Asians, and a joint BOAC– BCAL mission went to East Africa to handle that problem, which was complicated by General Idi Amin’s insistence that East African Airways carry all the traffic.

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BOAC and BCAL were naturally worried about the remittance of balances of the £70 fare they proposed, though Amin wanted full IATA rates. Before this could be settled, the new CAA granted Laker Airways a Skytrain trans-Atlantic license in September 1972. During the autumn European, Canadian, American, and British airlines met in Montreal and agreed to new group charter rates. BCAL applied for licenses to Singapore, Australia, Vancouver, and Dallas/Fort Worth, and picked off a number of key BOAC staff in the USA. The whole charter/advanced booking problem was further entangled in early 1973 in the question of swamping on the North Atlantic. This was the use of too many large aircraft by the US airlines, which created overcapacity; BOAC favoured restrictions on this, and part-charter arrangements to fill aircraft. BOAC was also having to explain to the unions why it had to be free to subcontract charters so as not to lose them when BOAC’s own commercial resources were fully occupied. The unions were not too upset until April, when forty-five charters had to be sub-contracted. Troubles had already arisen when a BOAC aircraft was catered by a BOAC crew while it was on charter to BEA. Because of the serious industrial relations problems that could arise from this inter-divisional squabbling, Stainton ruled in February 1973 that no services would be subcontracted to Air Tours with their 707-436s, and that all BOAC scheduled services would be with BOAC aircraft. In March BEA finally agreed on a joint intra-BAB approach to the unions on charters. In May the Deputy Chairman’s Committee of BAB considered the amalgamation of charter operations, an idea to which BEA had then become opposed. This affected the sale of 707s Nos. 10 and 11 to BEA Air Tours. There was concern that BCAL’s public relations effort was having much better effect on both Parliament and the CAA. In August the CAA granted BCAL licenses to New York, Boston, Atlanta, and Houston as well as to Toronto and Singapore, but denied it one to Australia. BOAC decided to appeal through BAB. Then BCAL applied to the CAA to change the African pool to 50:50. Early in 1974 Management decided there should be no more meetings with BCAL to discuss dual designation until after the Singapore bilateral discussions, especially as they had opposed the revival of BOAC’s London–Los Angeles service. Like many other factors involved during this complicated period of negotiations, the relationship with Air Tours and with BCAL was not settled before BOAC went out of business. They were to become part of British Airways’ legacy from BOAC.

Conclusion In one sense the Edwards Committee Report took BOAC back to 1948, when there was more than one British airline. While on the one hand it suggested an Air Holdings Corporation again, on the other it once more saved the Independent airline industry with its Second Force. Again, the normal and national economic

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312 S p e e d b i r d pattern was diverted by political activity and inaction. That the Second Force was not nationally viable was quietly demonstrated by the removal of West Africa and then Tripoli from BOAC’s and BEA’s licenses. Edwards was on sounder ground in calling for a consistent national civil aviation policy, but not necessarily in suggesting the creation of a Civil Aviation Authority, which included the much-respected Air Registration Board. Certainly, civil aviation needed a guardian overseer that was experienced and learned in its problems as well as trained in modern management techniques. The pity is that the Edwards Committee had the chance to make as significant and positive a contribution as the Cadman Committee had in 1938. Instead, it went against historical patterns and precedents. However, even if the politicians did not take care of BOAC, under Hardie and Granville the Corporation did take good care of itself and continued to make substantial profits in spite of the loss of more than 6 per cent of its revenues. In this respect the appointment of the British Airways Board and the influence of Nicolson led to a merger that in 1969 BOAC wanted. In aviation, at least, history has a tendency to repeat itself.

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Chapter XIII Challenges and Responses in the Final Decade, 1964–1974 Buying the 747 In contrast to the hassles and delays over the purchase of British aircraft, BOAC’s acquisition of Boeing 747s was a quiet affair.1 The one thing remarkable about it was the way in which the SST began to recede into the future in late 1965. The planners recognized that there would be another bigger subsonic aircraft. Into the vacuum suddenly swept the Jumbos. First came the Lockheed C-5A civil version with 900 seats, and then the more reasonable Boeing and Douglas ideas. In the course of its normal dealings with Boeing for more 707s BOAC had learned of and asked to be kept informed about the Type 820 because it appeared to fit in with the forecast growth of inclusive tours. At the time, BOAC was thinking of a 200–300-seater with operating costs 20 per cent below the 707-436. In May 1965 a Boeing team presented the 820 idea, and Douglas was to arrive in June to talk of the DC-8-80. In the time between those two presentations the Board of Management began to reconsider what it wanted, as apparently did other airline leaders. Vickers presented a number of ideas, one of which eventually became the Superb concept (which was ultimately eliminated in May 1966). On 1 July The Aeroplane, in one of its very rare editorials in support of BOAC, called for the Corporation to be allowed to choose either the 707 or DC-8 airbus, with the Minister’s only function being to see that the Super-Super VC-10 proposed was in fact a choice. On the 8th, drawings of the Super-Super were published, showing it in both the Conway and RB-178 versions. Like the American challengers, it was expected to be available in 1968–1969. In mid-summer the Minister, Roy Jenkins, asked The Economist Intelligence Unit, with BOAC cooperation, to do a market study of the Super-Super because of the investment of public funds involved. The eventual conclusion was that there was an insufficient market to justify proceeding.2 Meanwhile, Boeing withdrew the 820, and in September Guthrie set up within BOAC the Future Aircraft Committee (FAC). Then Boeing indicated that it was considering an economical aircraft in the 350-seat, 500,000-pound class and would submit proposals at the end of the year. On 4 November The Aeroplane, in a 3-inch item on page 23, first mentioned the 747, which was believed to be a C-5A variant significantly different from the earlier double-decked 707 proposal 820. A good deal depended upon whether the SST would be allowed to go supersonic overland— and there was beginning to be an inkling that it would not be permitted to do

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314 S p e e d b i r d so; otherwise it would have a clear sweep of the First-Class market. Meanwhile, Douglas was talking of a DC-10 (but not of the aircraft that emerged later with that familiar designation). At the time it was thought there would be only six operators of the 747 and that Boeing would refuse to proceed without orders for fifty. With a shortage of pilots looming, and given its economics, BOAC Management leaned toward the 400-seat 747 from the beginning. QANTAS, facing a pilot shortage and though it was a Boeing operator, took options on DC-8-63s because they carried twenty-five more passengers than 707s. Early in March 1966 it was known that Lufthansa was interested in the 747, and late in the month a Boeing team visited Rolls-Royce to consider the RB-178 engine for the 747. Then in mid-April came the announcement that Pan Am had ordered twenty-five of what The Wall Street Journal had nicknamed the Jumbo-Jet. On 26 April Boeing cabled that it could not offer BOAC the RB-178 version of the 747 as it would cost too much and there would be too few customers. The size of the aircraft was daunting (a single engine weighed 7,800 pounds), and the price at £6,600,000 each was about three times that of the early 707s, but a 747 would carry 370 passengers, in contrast to the 707’s 136; and, as Charles Abell, the Chief Engineer noted, passenger loads would double by 1973 so that airports were going to have to redo their passenger facilities anyway. Moreover, the 747 was quieter than current aircraft and needed less runway. On 26 April 1966 the Future Aircraft Committee recommended the purchase of 747s, and on 9 May the BOAC Board authorized the Chairman to proceed to obtain the concurrence of the Minister and complete negotiations with Boeing. Six aircraft were to be delivered, one each in February, April, and May 1970, and January, February, and March 1971, a commitment with spares of £53,000,000 plus hangars and other facilities. With direct operating costs estimated at 20 to 24 per cent below those of the 707-436, the Board recommended that options be taken on a further ten 747s for 1971, especially in view of the pending shortage of pilots. At first BOAC’s request for the 747 did not have smooth sailing in the Government. The Minister asked that urgent consideration be given to the submission on the DC-8-84, a double-bubble fuselage version, which Douglas presented to BOAC on 2 June. On the 17th, having looked, the Board reconfirmed its faith in the 747, and then found it was unnecessary to write to the Minister as Douglas had withdrawn the proposal that morning. On 19 August the Board resolved to conclude the agreement and expressed the intention to raise 80 per cent of the financing through the US Export–Import Bank and the rest on the American dollar market or use its own dollar earnings. The contract for aircraft and spares was signed on 2 September 1966 and it was reported to the Board at its first overseas meeting in Montreal on the 23rd. On 18 November the Treasury approved the financing proposals, and the options were confirmed in principle with Boeing. In the end, 72 per cent of the money was raised through the Export– Import Bank at 6 to 7 per cent, 8 per cent was financed by Boeing, and BOAC put up 20 per cent from dollar earnings.

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On the advice of David Craig, Guthrie at once set up—for the first time in BOAC—a Project Coordination Committee to process the aircraft from the airline side. During the rest of the Guthrie era the main concern revolved on the one hand around the question of nine-abreast or ten-abreast seating, and on the other hand around the escalating cost of the aircraft, which dropped the rate of return from 11.5 to 8 per cent. By June 1967 twenty-four airlines had ordered 106 Boeing 747s with options bringing the total to more than 200, Boeing’s break-even figure. After a visit to Seattle to see the engineering and passenger cabin mock-ups, Granville reported that he was highly impressed with the tremendous energy with which the project was being pushed. At about the same time, IATA concluded that there was no case for lower fares, which had been one of the original arguments for the 747 due to inflation. By late 1967 the concern was to raise money, as all the airlines were in the market for very large sums and even BOAC was having trouble financing 747s Nos. 7 to 12. These troubles were deepened by devaluation and increases in the aircraft’s weight and costs. The Export–Import Bank was under criticism for lending to developing countries as well as being out of funds, and banks were reluctant to lend because of devaluation. The Minister was insisting that all money be raised abroad, even though his Department benefitted from the dividend paid on BOAC’s earnings, and even though BOAC had millions in UK Local Government Funds. Yet twothirds of BOAC’s revenues came from outside the sterling area. What made the Board of Trade’s attitude so irritating was that the Independents were not placed under the same restrictions in borrowing as was BOAC. Early in 1968 when Douglas was about to present the DC-10 airbus concept, John Stonehouse, the Minister of State in the Ministry of Technology, pressed BOAC to order not fewer than ten, and preferably twenty-five, so as to gain important business for Rolls-Royce. Chairman Guthrie replied that BOAC only needed the 747, not the DC-10 nor the Lockheed 1011. British Airways Overseas Division finally took six of the long-range version of the 1011 in late 1976. Consideration was also given in May 1963 to a stretched VC-10 for 190–200 passengers. In the end, because the Treasury would not let BOAC borrow in the United Kingdom the 20 per cent needed over and above the 30 per cent which was to come from US sources for 747s Nos. 7 through 12J, BOAC obtained the other 20 per cent from the Bank of Nova Scotia, but at a higher 7.5 per cent. All in all, by the time Sir Giles left BOAC, the Corporation had £165,500,000 committed to 747s and their attendant needs. In contrast to the orders for the VC-10s, this carefully planned and well thought-out programme was launched from a sound, profitable economic base in which rational calculations were the guiding factors.

Insurance Every business has to weigh the risks it takes against the premiums it pays for insurance. For a major international airline such as BOAC, the risks in the decade from 1964 to 1974 arose not so much from flying operations per se or from failures

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316 S p e e d b i r d in aircraft as from war and political action. BOAC lost two aircraft to hijackers, one at Dawson’s Field in Jordan, and one at Amsterdam. In addition, its aircraft and crews found themselves on a number of occasions in war zones or forced to take long detours to avoid such areas, especially in the Middle East, India and Pakistan, and South-East Asia. One of Sir Giles Guthrie’s first actions in 1964 was to raise the question of a mutual insurance arrangement with BEA and other airlines. BOAC was at this time self-insuring its hulls and dealing with one broker for its other needs. In April the hull insurance was split 50:50 between self-insurance and the industry, because a fair reserve existed in spite of the arrival of the big jets. Only the 707s and VC-10s were insured at replacement value, on an escalating scale with premiums at 0.5 to 2.75 per cent, without ground risks, which were covered under a separate policy. As the airline mutual insurance idea fell through, Pan American Airways, like BOAC, also put its insurance back on the market. In July BOAC negotiated a five-year policy at 1.5 per cent on 50 per cent of the hull value of the 707s and VC-10s. This was shortly increased to 100 per cent on the VC-10s because of their fine performance. The Indo-Pakistan war necessitated quick acquisition of war risk, which cost $36,000 for thirty-one days. The BOAC Board debated the need for longer-term coverage owing to the hazards along BOAC’s routes. By May 1966 £101,000,000 in war risk was obtained for £30,000 annually, but subject to twenty-four hours’ cancellation if war broke out between any two major powers named, and a sevenday cancellation or a higher premium in other areas. As a result of a University of Chicago staff attitude survey, consideration was given to providing additional loss of license insurance for aircrew. In early 1966 a 707 (G-APFE) was lost in turbulence near Mount Fuji after takeoff from Tokyo, and that claim was promptly paid. A more curious case was that of 707-436 G-ARWE, lost in an accident at London in March 1968 when the aircraft was finally written off. As CAP.324 of 1969 noted, this aircraft appeared to be jinxed: it had been in a series of accidents at Darwin, then Honolulu, and finally at London. In the last case the captain received an award for airmanship, and one stewardess, Miss Harrison, who gave her life, was posthumously awarded the George Cross. In July 1968 hijacking reared its ugly head. BOAC Management noted that the insurance in effect covered everything but loss of profits. But as the premium was high, it was decided to bear the risk internally, though when the 747s came on service the decision would, Management decided, be reviewed. The idea of an IATA insurance company continued to develop; the head office was to be in Lausanne, Switzerland, with branches in New York, London, and Tokyo. Developments looked favourable, and on 18 October 1968 the Board was told that Sir Giles had accepted an invitation to manage the whole effort. However, though Guthrie left BOAC and moved to Lausanne to start it, airline mutual insurance never quite got off the ground. BOAC for one was unwilling to

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go into the pool until there were guarantees of sufficient partners and capital. No doubt the temper of the times, hijackings, and bomb scares did not make it seem a viable proposition. Its formation dragged on to October 1970, but it was never capitalized. The arrival of the 747s further complicated implementation because of the enormous market capacity needed to insure them against war risk; the outlook was not helped by the destruction of a Pan Am 747 at Cairo by terrorists. And this was followed by the destruction of VC-10 G-AGSN and other aircraft at Dawson’s Field in Jordan in September 1970, causing underwriters to give terminal notice on war risk. BOAC managed to obtain two-thirds coverage, but at a high premium. By February 1971 the premium was so high that BOAC withdrew from the market and carried its own risks to 1972. On the other hand, it was decided to carry the 747s at their $25,000,000 replacement value and hope that after the type had flown 1,000,000 miles the rate would be lowered. In 1972 war risk was again considered, this time with full assurance of passengers’ legal liability being covered—staff were already covered by BOAC’s own self-insurance. Difficulty in the market was partly solved by joining forces with BEA to achieve 100 per cent hull coverage. But war-risk premiums remained high owing to Middle Eastern tensions; BOAC was forced to carry its own war insurance. Ironically, satisfactory arrangements were at last made in 1973, the year when war did break out again in the Middle East.

“Swamping” and Relations with US Airlines One of the major purposes of BOAC’s pooling agreements around the world was to avoid over-capacity while still providing adequate schedules. Such arrangements were not possible with the United States because the official American approach to competition was governed by the 1890 Sherman Act attitude that all monopolies are inherently dangerous and suspect. In addition, in the 1960s the Civil Aero­ nautics Board was infused with the idea that it was in everyone’s best interests to foster as much competition as possible. It proceeded both domestically and internationally to swamp the routes with dual and triple designation while remaining steadfastly against pooling. This regulatory thrust coincided with the shift in airline management from the long-lived pioneers like Juan Trippe of Pan American, Patterson of United, and C. R. Smith of American. Pan Am and TWA went into critical unprofitable slumps, Pan Am’s lasting from 1970 to 1977. The whole problem of swamping and reconsideration of the Bermuda Agreement came under discussion in the Guthrie years, but did not really begin to become a basic concern of Board and Management until 1969–1970. It remained unsettled until mid-1977, though the plight of Pan Am and of TWA should have made it obvious that the public would be better served by capacity-control arrangements than by over-competition with fixed fares on similar aircraft. At the Board meeting on 21 January 1966 note was made of the quite unreasonable American demands in the current bilateral negotiations, and the Board agreed to the suggestion that the British Government should denounce the

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318 S p e e d b i r d 93. Peter Hermon, the computer genius of BOAC, also brought the electronic manual to Britain and stressed productivity.

Bermuda Agreement (Cmd.6747) of 1946. BOAC’s objective was to gain the South Pacific route, not included in the 1946 Bermuda Agreement. The main problem for the February meetings was seen by The Aeroplane (24 February 1966, 42) as the need to enable BOAC and Northwest/TWA to join Pan Am in round-the-world services. However, as R. E. G. Davies has noted to the author, round-the-world services have never been successful taken in isolation, but they look good on the map. Apart from BOAC’s need for the US West Coast–Sydney sector and the American airlines’ need for their round-the-world services to meet at Hong Kong, the other area requiring reworking was the Caribbean, where independence had not been foreseen in 1946. Discussions in 1966 were more successful than they had been in 1960, and after two months it was agreed that TWA and BOAC would be able to fly around the world. In October 1967, while reviewing the G-7 Plan, the Board became concerned that it showed that from 1970 onward American operators would swamp the North Atlantic with their 747s. The tensions heated up in the ensuing months as G-7’s predictions of lack of British national productivity proved true and a chauvinistic advertising battle of the flags developed—BOAC’s short-lived theme was “Fly British There and Back.” By March 1968 Management was concerned about the

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unexploited parts of the UK–US bilaterals, notably concerning points-beyond in the United States and Europe, through cargo into Europe, and interchange in the United States. By February 1969 the Board was seriously becoming concerned with what it regarded as extreme over-capacity offered by Pan Am/TWA and was urging the British Government to stiffen its back, as Japan and Australia had done, to force a cutback. Then, in connection with the Edwards Report’s suggestion of dual designation on the North Atlantic, swamping became even more of a concern; but now the Foreign Office said that it was not the business of the proposed CAA. Talks took place in May and June 1970. BOAC began to be concerned that if the Americans were forced to cut back on the no-longer-rich Atlantic, they would put their excess capacity onto other routes, where it would be even more damaging. At this time, as part of its tactics, BOAC urged the British Airports Authority (BAA) to give preference in the use of stands at London so that the British national airlines had the advantage at their home base, an old sore point. In December 1970 renewed applications by US domestic airlines to the CAB to reduce frequencies helped to point out the problem of swamping both within and without the United States. By February 1971, though it was felt that not much progress was being made on swamping, the question of British entry to points-behind was developing. Chairman Granville had made several visits to the United States and had had successful talks with Najib Halaby of Pan Am, which was starting to have losses, and others. Interline talks were successful in limiting capacity out of Chicago, though the general issue was complicated by the denial of night slots to Seaboard World at London and its call for retaliation against BOAC in the United States. In May the Americans agreed to reduce capacity from both Washington and Chicago to one 747 and one 707 daily. The picture was then complicated by the arrival on the scene of National Airlines thrice-weekly direct Miami–London services, made possible by the greater range of the new DC-10-30 jets. After talks between the airlines, it became clear that National intended to go daily and thus aimed to swamp the route in 1972. On the other hand, at the end of the year as part of a TWA/Pan Am rationalization of routes, Pan Am agreed not to fly Chicago–London and TWA dropped its Washington service. On the basis that BOAC should have half of the London–Miami capacity, BOAC had to order another 747 in order to compete effectively with National, and by May 1972 the DTI was convinced that it had to act to protect BOAC against swamping in 1973. This led to a compromise in which National was allowed four 747s weekly, with the intention that it would be a 190-seat aircraft. National responded not only with a strong case for the 747, but decided to fly it blocked off to 190 seats because of its popularity. By July National was attacking through the State Department, claiming a violation of the Bermuda Agreement, and was actually operating DC-8s thrice-weekly in addition to its 747s. And as a result of National’s actions and Seaboard’s earlier complaints, the CAB asked BOAC

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320 S p e e d b i r d to file monthly reports on its traffic on the London–Miami, London–Chicago, Honolulu–Nandi, and New York–Montego Bay routes. This compelled the DTI to agree that National could operate daily services, which in the summer of 1973 would be completely with unrestricted 747s. In return, BOAC was not required to reveal its traffic figures. Then in October 1973 due to the Arab oil embargo the question of restricted fuel supplies arose. This led to a PAA–BOAC agreement on cancelled services, and was followed by others with TWA and BCAL as well to reduce trans-Atlantic frequencies. By late November the realities of ad hoc fuel restrictions around the world, coupled with prospects of a 25 per cent reduction for 1974, impelled the airlines to consider further rationalization of services. At this point BOAC was in danger that the Minister of Aerospace in the DTI would set fuel priorities based on load factors, so the Board agreed that only load factors out of the United Kingdom should be supplied to him to prevent BOAC’s being crippled by this outside management of its affairs by officials. The Board was also concerned in January 1974 that other airlines were not living up to their agreements to restrict frequencies. On the other hand, the fuel situation was regarded as helpful in the over-all pressure to limit frequencies and capacity to profit-making levels. Thus, when in March it was anticipated that fuel allocations would be abolished, Management was somewhat disappointed that this would happen before rationalization had taken place. And again, as in other matters, this was a BOAC legacy to British Airways. The main problem in swamping was not so much a matter of differing airline management philosophies, though that was part of it, but that American airlines were prevented by law from engaging in the sort of arrangements covering frequencies and capacities that had been established by the steamship conferences in the latter nineteenth century and by other airlines world-wide, often under BOAC leadership. Eventually, the US Civil Aeronautics Board changed its views and allowed some rationalization on domestic routes. Success was achieved by the British Government with the State Department, under which only one of each nation’s airlines would operate Washington–London and Chicago–London. This was a considerable easement for BOAC.

Route Developments After the Comets came on service in 1952, BOAC’s route developments were much less spectacular than in the formative years of British aviation. New routes opened after 1952 were largely possible either because of political or—more usually—technical advances. The critical sector by the late Fifties had come to be London–Los Angeles non-stop against the western headwinds. This led to the development of the very-long-range aircraft such as the Boeing 707-320 series in the mid-Sixties, and in the mid-Seventies the 747SP, capable of a non-stop New York–Tokyo westbound service. Increasingly the pattern was for the average segments to become longer and for the long-haul airlines to operate between major

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cities, while smaller airlines would ply the regional feeder role. The development of BOAC tended to conform to this pattern. More powerful engines and more efficient aircraft replaced the less useful, and the emphasis was not so much on payload as on range and profitability. The 747 provided payload for high-density routes as well as being more efficient. In terms of range and payload, Concorde embodied the ideas of the late Fifties rather than of the late Sixties. Closely tied to the whole problem of routes and utilization was the new rise of national airlines in the many ex-colonial states as well as the long-haul status of Alitalia, Lufthansa, and Japan Airlines. BOAC followed the pattern established by the old Imperial Airways’ management of pools. Thus, as each new Commonwealth national airline decided to run international services, BOAC lent staff, gave advice, and provided aircraft, and in London did ground and passenger handling and catering as well as maintenance. This was not merely good business; there was a certain altruism to it. And it was within this carefully structured, world-wide, interlocking system that the injection of British Independents into what were no longer cabotage routes was most threatening to sound and efficient management. Dual designation was likely to make a shambles of an unofficial Commonwealth structure. In the 1964–1974 period these international airline alliances and revenuesharing pools were carefully watched and adjusted, expanded, and readjusted to meet the needs of the many Commonwealth partners. In short, BOAC was partly a victim of an altruistic movement of which it was an active member. The discussion which follows of two new routes treats only three of at least six routes to Australia: London–India–Australia, London–New York–San Francisco– Sydney, London–San Francisco–Tokyo–Hong Kong–Sydney, London–Los Angeles–Auckland–Sydney, London–Jamaica–Mexico City–Tahiti–Auckland– Sydney, and London–Moscow–Tokyo–Sydney. As longer-ranged aircraft were developed, routes were shifted to arrange the best schedules for throughpassengers and cargo. Changes were also made for commercial reasons, usually to inaugurate a new route, but sometimes to close one for non-political factors such as a shortage of aircraft, crews, or passengers and cargo.

Across the USSR to the Far East In August 1955 Sir Miles Thomas wrote to the Minister that BOAC wanted to operate to the Far East and Australia via Moscow, while BEA wanted to terminate in Moscow and Leningrad. In September Smallpeice wrote that there would be no formal license application until talks were held in Moscow. In 1956 BEA had not yet decided on the equipment it wanted, but in 1959 it opened the route. In 1964 both Air India (AI) and Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) began to consider a route to London via Moscow, and at the same time a Pan Am–Aeroflot service between Moscow and New York was in the wind. BOAC offered to act as Aeroflot’s agents in New York, and it told the Ministry that it would not object to AI’s operating on a India–New York service via London if BOAC could operate

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322 S p e e d b i r d a parallel service London–Moscow–Delhi. BOAC also felt that PIA genuinely wanted to work with it on the Karachi–London route, for which BOAC thought PIA’s quid pro quo was traffic rights from Moscow to London via Frankfurt. For BOAC the incentive was Third and Fourth Freedom revenues of £200,000 to £500,000 a year on the London–Karachi route. In March it was agreed that the Ministry would grant PIA rights from Karachi to London via Moscow and that BOAC would explain this to its partners on Eastern routes, AI, and QANTAS. In July, Granville visited Moscow with Craig and Bray to sound out the Soviets on a route to the East via Moscow, but a delay of at least two years before a service could start was forecast. In October AI opened its London–Moscow–Delhi service and at the same time extended its Sydney terminator to Nandi, Fiji, as part of a pincer plan for a round-the-world service. A Soviet team visited London in September 1964 and a British team was in Mos­ cow in July 1965 to talk about services both into the Indian sub-continent and across Siberia to Tokyo. In August BOAC (considered by the Soviets to be a government corporation, like BEA) opposed BUA’s application for Leningrad because the Russians would allow only one airline per foreign country into the USSR. A Soviet team had lunch at BOAC and talked of the VC-10 in August 1966. Then, when Premier Kosygin was in London in February 1967, both the President of the Board of Trade and the Prime Minister raised the question of the transSiberian service. But again the answer was that this would take about two years, and that Aeroflot aircraft might have to be used at first for the Moscow–Tokyo sector. So in the discussion of the G-10 Plan in October 1967, the Polar route via Anchorage, Alaska, became the considered alternate. Whether or not this would be possible depended upon the outcome of bilaterals with Japan in which BOAC was seeking an increase to a daily service across the Pacific via Honolulu or a Polar or a trans-Siberian route, or all three. These talks concluded successfully in November, but then discussions between Japan Airlines and BOAC in Manila indicated that JAL was not interested in a BOAC–JAL–Aeroflot London–Moscow–Tokyo pool. On the other hand, in February 1968 close cooperation was suggested with JAL on the Polar service plans, and this eventually led to serious negotiations in February 1969, followed in March by Aeroflot asking what BOAC would offer for Moscow–Tokyo in 1970. On 26 March 1969 the first Polar flight left London and, except for catering delays at Anchorage and the usual air traffic delays in the Tokyo–Osaka area, it was an almost perfect inaugural. In December the USSR assented to BOAC starting the trans-Siberian Tokyo service in May 1970, and provided BOAC arranged that as a pool with Aeroflot, and on BOAC’s part that the technical facilities east of Moscow were acceptable. The protocol was signed on 13 April 1970. The ATLB added the route to BOAC’s Tokyo license, and days of the week for services were arranged with Aeroflot and JAL. But there were delays in getting most of these things done, and there were crew visa problems as the USSR was not a member of the International Civil Aviation

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94. Two BOAC captains on the first Boeing 707-436 flight over the USSR to Japan explain a document to Soviet police at Moscow, 1970.

Organization (ICAO). BALPA demanded a dual Doppler navigation installation. As spares were in position along “the silk route” via India, in case the weather was too bad, aircraft could return that way. Then BEA demanded what Management considered an exorbitant compensation for BOAC’s starting services to Moscow, which BEA had been serving since 1959. In May cabin staff had been detained by Russian border guards when on a positioning flight to Moscow as the guards

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324 S p e e d b i r d did not have their names on their list. BOAC reacted vigorously because such incidents were likely to trigger industrial unrest in London, where all sorts of labour negotiations were in train. Once the service started, the load factor was a disappointing 24.9 per cent, but for morale purposes the staff were told that even at this low level it made a small operating surplus. Actually, the pool with Aeroflot cost £650,000 the first year and had to be renegotiated, partly because the Soviets had imposed air navigation charges after the service began. It was reduced to £100,000 in 1970–1971. In April 1971 there was a further improvement when a blocked-space contract was agreed. By August 1972 Aeroflot loads had risen significantly and BOAC, which had already negotiated reduced pool payments, felt that the relationship was no longer onerous. But at the same time, concern was expressed by the Board that the Government should not concede traffic rights in the Far East to Aeroflot in return for permission to operate the Concorde across the USSR. The last discussion by BOAC Management of the trans-Siberian route came in November 1973, when agreement was reached at last on Aeroflot rights west of Britain and BOAC rights east of Moscow to Tokyo. But the Concorde problem was not solved and the availability of Norilsk as a refuelling stop remained doubtful. Arrangements for operating services into the Communist states moved slowly, as the story of the Russian route has demonstrated. BOAC had an equally frustrating time in China after 1949. In the autumn of 1964 Basil Bampfylde, then General Manager Far Eastern Routes, visited Peking, attended Mao’s State Banquet, and had long talks with Chinese aviation officials. The problem was that they were hostile to India because of the 1962 border incident. The only common meeting ground was Rangoon, but trans-shipment of passengers and cargo there was difficult. The result was that by then all BOAC had been able to provide was a charter for Foreign Minister Chou En Lai. Tourism was possible, though hotels were in short supply. Chen Tu, the leader of the Chinese airline, said that China was ready to allow BOAC to operate services into China (Bampfylde suggested an express service from London and from Australia to Tokyo via China), if four conditions were met: the country of the foreign airline had to be friendly to China and Laos and not to Taiwan, where at the time Britain had an official representative; second, there had to be some reciprocal benefit for the Civil Aviation Administration of China, the Chinese airline; third, the service was not to be started until traffic could support it because the Chinese did not want to lose face if it was withdrawn (and did not want to damage Pakistan International Airlines); and last, the foreign airline had to be willing to let the Civil Aviation Administration of China handle arrangements and be its sales agent in the five open cities, though resident liaison officers would be accepted. The Chinese wanted modern British aircraft, but could not buy machines with American components. The real problem, it appeared to Bampfylde, was that Britain had a consulate on Taiwan, though the United Kingdom had been a leader in the fight for the admission of China to the United Nations. Bampfylde

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concluded his report to the Board by suggesting that no quick results could be expected. In 1971 BOAC reminded the ATLB and the Minister that they had operated to China before and would like to do so again. After a year, it was agreed that a British delegation should go to Peking in May 1972. In September a Chinese delegation visited London. The Chinese had enquired about VC-10s in 1964; in 1973 when the noise retrofit programme was under discussion in February, before the rise of fuel costs made the aircraft unattractive, it was thought that Peking might buy thirteen, a move which would reduce the retrofit cost. At the same time, BOAC organized a number of charters to the Peking Trade Fair and was relieved in March to have the Chinese waive both crew visas and the necessity for a stop at Canton, just up-river from Hong Kong. How highly BOAC was regarded was shown in March 1975, when a British Airways aircraft was chartered to carry the Chinese Art Exhibit to Paris. There were two basic problems still—BOAC’s pool partner Cathay Pacific served Taiwan; and the Japanese remained adamantly opposed to a direct BOAC Peking–Tokyo service until they had one also for themselves. By July the difficulties appeared to have been resolved: BOAC was to be allowed to operate London– Frankfurt (or Rome)–Beirut (or Teheran)–Delhi (or Calcutta)–Rangoon–Hong Kong–Peking (by then Beijing). In July 1973 BOAC was expected to be able to start on 1 November with a reciprocal Chinese service late in 1974. But the Chinese delayed signing the bilateral and BOAC needed a minimum three months to start the service after that. No progress was made before BOAC became British Airways on 1 April 1974. The Russian and Chinese cases reveal that BOAC was willing and had the aircraft to operate services, but were delayed by delicate political considerations which often took years to resolve.

The Pacific The Pacific route had a long British history, starting from a prewar vision of an eventual round-the-world service. RAF operations late in the war gave way to British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, a company owned jointly by the Australian, New Zealand, and British governments. (It was absorbed into QANTAS on 14  May 1954 by governmental agreement after “a First-Class row” between Hudson Fysh and Sir Miles Thomas at Brentford where the Australian insisted BOAC get out of the Pacific.) BOAC started a London–San Francisco service in April 1957 as part of a planned joint operation with QANTAS to Sydney. Market research showed the mid-Pacific also to be commercially promising and under the pressure of finding routes for the large number of jets on order, a Britannia service via Honolulu and Hong Kong to Tokyo was agreed upon. But then BOAC became entangled in the fight with the US Civil Aeronautics Board for the Pacific routes, although these were in the Bermuda

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326 S p e e d b i r d Agreement of 1946. As a result, after an expensive delay, Britannias started only in August 1959, fourteen days before Pan Am introduced jets on the route. BOAC could not meet that competition for fifteen months, and in the meantime Pan Am and Japan Airlines so increased their capacity that BOAC became a minority operator. Revenues rose slowly from £1,000,000 a year to about £2,500,000 in 1964–1965, but still with a loss close to £300,000. Moreover, because of the high frequency of jets across the United States, BOAC was not really able to break into either the United Kingdom–San Francisco or the New York–Pacific markets. The original BOAC plan was to first run London–San Francisco–Tokyo and second over the Polar route to Los Angeles and Sydney, but the Polar market failed to develop and there seemed to be no reasonable prospect of obtaining Los Angeles–Sydney traffic rights, and in October 1963 that part of the plan was abandoned. Various attempts were made to improve the London–Tokyo westbound across the Pacific, but anything less than thrice-weekly wasted aircraft and crews. In 1964 QANTAS arranged with France for traffic rights at Tahiti and on 27 November 1965 began the Fiesta service to Europe via Tahiti and Mexico City. (Thus QANTAS flew round-the-world.) From BOAC’s viewpoint, the South Pacific/Arctic route was always the key object in its Pacific plan because it gave access to three of the world’s major expanding markets, it would offer an alternative to the old Kangaroo route, and it would be vital when the SSTs came into service. (Though R. E. G. Davies has noted to the author: “These optimistic visions were illusory—as I forecast at Douglas.”) Effort was now shifted to the South Pacific. In 1964 bilateral talks were held with the United States, and BOAC withdrew its services across the US, because they were uneconomical, allowing QANTAS to carry the traffic for them. In 1965 Air New Zealand (ANZ, TEAL’s successor) was to enter the route to Los Angeles with DC-8s. Then, in April 1964, BOAC received a surprise when the Japanese abrogated a 1952 agreement and BOAC rights on its Hong Kong–San Francisco flights to gain leverage for JAL to operate through Hong Kong to Sydney. In May, Air India was reported considering a round-the-world service via New Zealand. And in September, the Indo-Pakistan War highlighted the need for a west-about route to Asia and Australia. In October, there were discussions in Sydney between the Pacific pool partners. At the same time, BOAC received ATLB approval for Auckland–Fiji. In December 1965, BOAC began to consider the significance of the Fiesta route via Mexico City as a gateway to the South Pacific, using rights at Tahiti. This appeared less financially attractive than an American steppingstone, so a Bahamas terminator was extended to Mexico City in April 1966 to meet QANTAS, and the question of the South Pacific was left open until after US–UK bilaterals resumed in April 1966. Meanwhile, JAL had obtained White House approval to start a roundthe-world service across the United States. In March it appeared that the United States would grant the North Pacific service only if it were operated on the Polar route; this did not by then suit BOAC, as neither the Super VC-10 nor the 707-436

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had the range, and the Americans wanted considerable concessions in return. By late July the general outlines of trans-Pacific routes through San Francisco and Los Angeles had been worked out, in return for TWA rights at Hong Kong for their service across southern Europe. By October a new pool had been arranged, covering all Pacific services except across the Tasman Sea and the mid-Pacific route to Japan via Honolulu. BOAC took over QANTAS’s westbound services out of London to the West Coast with a limitation on pool revenues-transfers of 2.5 per cent. These arrangements were not expected to be in force, however, until April 1969. In the meantime, negotiations went ahead with QANTAS to allow BOAC full freedom to expand in the Pacific basin, and a new United Kingdom–Japan bilateral was negotiated: in return for BOAC’s use of either the trans-Siberian or the Polar route to Japan, the Japanese were granted trans-Atlantic rights through London. In 1968 the mid-Pacific route was not very attractive. A shortage of cargo was caused by US operators carrying loads on aircraft returning from Vietnam, and after the takeoff accident of 707 G-ARWE at Honolulu, BOAC’s service had to be reduced to twice-weekly. The picture dimmed again at the end of the year when the US Civil Aeronautics Board, in an expansionist mood, granted a South Pacific route to American Airlines and put United and Continental on the mid-Pacific. Meanwhile, BOAC, together with Air New Zealand and QANTAS, were helping Fiji Airways and taking an interest in a hotel at Nandi, both to provide proper crew accommodations and to ensure a friendly environment in that nation about to become independent. In 1969, to avoid offending QANTAS in its delicate negotiations with the Americans on the South Pacific, BOAC held off advertising its services due to start through Los Angeles in October. By April the general downturn in traffic caused the Board to raise the question of cutting off some services, but it was told that as these were so marginal the savings would not be worth the losses. Then in 1970, a shortage of capacity loomed, and BOAC found itself trying to charter capacity between Auckland and Nandi from Air New Zealand. In early 1971 withdrawal from the San Francisco–Honolulu–Tokyo route was under consideration, and it was put into effect when BOAC had to hand over its West African services to BCAL on 1 April 1971. The idea of reviving the London–Los Angeles service, dropped in 1963, was explored in 1971. It was postponed for re-evaluation by BAB, but was finally arranged to start in March 1973. Then BCAL was licensed on the route in April, but it eventually withdrew in November 1974. The new agreement with BALPA in 1972 led to a rise in crew costs, and the Auckland–Nandi shuttle was dropped in January 1973. QANTAS wanted BOAC off the South Pacific, and there was fear in London that a re-negotiation of the United Kingdom–Australia bilateral would lead to dual designation. In fact, there was strong Australian objection to letting British Caledonian into the area, and this helped bring about a re-negotiation of the round-the-world pools.

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328 S p e e d b i r d In June 1973 serious consideration was given to a BOAC proposal that it drylease ANZ DC-10s for the Los Angeles–London sectors. The Board was able to arrange a four-year interchange agreement in which DC-10-30s owned by Air New Zealand would be operated by BOAC non-stop between Los Angeles and the United Kingdom. The arrangement was ideal in that it did not require approval of governments or any BOAC capital, while it enabled ANZ to acquire two additional DC-10s four years earlier than planned. The arrangement also allowed BOAC to remain in the South Pacific without appearing to be there, in the face of QANTAS’s objection to BOAC’s role in the new United Kingdom–Australia bilateral. The contract was signed on 13 December 1973, with a clause that any Air Registration Board modifications must be acceptable to ANZ and the New Zealand Civil Aviation Department. British Caledonian at once asked the CAA— unsuccessfully—to require BOAC to make one stop on the new London–Los Angeles service, because a non-stop would compete with its own 707s. The route to the South Pacific was thus developed over a number of years despite diplomatic, commercial, interline, and equipment problems; many individuals had been involved in the multi-faceted negotiations which took place all across the world.

Partnerships and Pooling In the technical language of the airline world, partnerships are strategic arrangements that cover good and bad times and the sharing of aircraft, while revenue-sharing pools are tactical marriages of convenience sometimes linked to bilateral treaties. The origins of some of the famous partnerships, such as those with QANTAS and South African Airways, have been pointed out in my Britain’s Imperial Air Routes and in earlier chapters herein, especially in connection with the independence of the former colonies. In the last ten years of BOAC’s existence there were a number of developments in both partnerships and pooling that well illustrate the entwined nature of these actions where a lengthy international route, such as that from London to the Far East, was concerned as well as BOAC’s desire to maintain relationships with Commonwealth members. At the heart of these Far Eastern services was the partnership established with QANTAS in 1934, which varied from time to time because of politics, war, and new equipment. For example, in March 1964 a pool was agreed with Middle East Airlines and Kuwait Airways for services between the Gulf and London. In January 1966, it was agreed in principle to pool with Iran National Airlines (INA) to protect BOAC’s traffic when INA began Teheran–London services on 1 July, and this was expanded in October also into a revenue pool. In another development which eventually became a pool, BOAC arranged in 1964–1965 for the sale of Comet 4s to Malaysian Airways, while at the same time the Comets leased to Air Ceylon were offered for sale to that airline to continue the London–Colombo services. Eventually Malaysian agreed to take Comets at

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£150,000 apiece (asking had been £450,000), and as this was more than book value, the Board approved the sale. In 1965, Malaysian absorbed Borneo Airways, and BOAC sold its passenger-handling equipment to Air Ceylon after the Sri Lanka Government decreed that Air Ceylon should do all passenger handling. As far as the Corporation was concerned, this saved thirty-eight staff wages and $6,000, plus a nice profit was made on the ground-handling equipment. In September war broke out between India and Pakistan and flights were diverted, plans having been laid in advance for such a contingency. At the same time, it was learned that Malaysian would buy big jets in 1968, with BOAC providing technical-evaluation advice. At the start of 1966 Singapore announced that it would form its own airline in view of the imminent move of Malaysian’s main base from the island city to Kuala Lumpur. However, with the help of a BOAC study team in May, agreement was reached on a joint airline in which the BOAC–QANTAS share was reduced from 64 per cent to 13.20 per cent each. In the meantime, relationships with Pakistan International Airlines had become strained because in March 1964 PIA had decided to operate to London via Moscow and there was concern that this might overload the London–Moscow services. Another problem was the imbalance between PIA and BOAC of between £700,000 and £2,600,000 on London–Karachi services. However, here again, longstanding friendships and hard bargaining resolved the issues, and by early 1966 the pool had been readjusted so that the BOAC share had risen from 14 to 42 per cent. March 1966 brought concern over a new Air India–Japan Airlines pool, which raised questions about its impact on the tripartite partnership of BOAC, Air India, and QANTAS. The latter pool was re-examined and planning completed in October on the basis of load factors of 50 per cent for passengers and 60 for freight, which gave expected revenues of £90,500,000. In March 1966 an agreement known as the Area Far East Pool was reached with Air New Zealand and QANTAS (Air India abstained) on the pools between Sydney and London and between Hong Kong and Singapore, with a limitation on settlements of 2.5 per cent either way on a pooled revenue of £15,000,000. (The Area Far East Pool was extended in 1967 for four years and again in 1971.) With that out of the way, full-scale tripartite talks occupied a month late in the year, when a whole floor at Airways Terminal, London, was set aside for these important discussions. At the same time, it was decided that while Air India’s handling of BOAC’s flights elsewhere was quite satisfactory, BOAC would take over its own work at Bombay on 1 May 1967 as many of its flights coincided with Air India’s and this resulted in insufficient ground equipment and delayed handling. Traffic in and out of the vital entrepôt of Hong Kong was so important that in 1967 a new pool including Malaysia-Singapore Airlines (MSA), QANTAS, Air New Zealand, Air India, and BOAC was worked out for Hong Kong–Singapore, though an MSA suggestion to extend that north to Tokyo was rejected. On the other hand, BOAC did not have cargo rights between Singapore and Hong Kong

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330 S p e e d b i r d

95. A BOAC subsidiary was International Aeradio, which made charts as well, here of the approaches to Boston (1974).

and so had to use MSA’s. At the other end of the line, a trade-off was worked out with PIA that it could have a thrice-weekly London–New York service if the ban on BOAC over-flights on the India–Israel service was removed and the payment of a 20 per cent royalty on Freight Under Deck traffic London–New York was cancelled. But the resolution of this was complicated by the Pakistani Government’s insistence that its people fly PIA. In 1968 concerns were related to high landing charges at Teheran and the need to find a Chief Executive for MSA. In the former case an IATA Charges Working Group, in which the Accountant, Flight Operations, John Douglas, was very active, was influential, and in the latter BOAC successfully recommended the Senior

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General Manager, David Craig. At the same time, BOAC and QANTAS were asked to help Air Ceylon with executive talent, in spite of the fact that the Sri Lankan airline had in 1967 tied itself to the French company UTA—Union de Transportes Aériens. Because of the importance of maintaining good commercial relations, and because of a certain Commonwealth spirit, BOAC complied. In addition, the Board agreed to the investment of up to 1,000,000 rupees in Air Ceylon, provided it would buy a Trident 1E and that detailed studies showed that the company had a chance of viability. In August there were problems with what the Indian Government felt were imbalances in the Tripartite Pool, which forced Air India to use too much of its scarce foreign currency to pay what it owed. By early 1969 this was linked to concern in BOAC that Air India be helped to expand at the same rate as BOAC and QANTAS, despite a sluggish Indian economy. Concurrently, the Managing Director, Granville, visited Pakistan to try to forge better relations with PIA, But in this he was not successful and the dispute had to be referred to the governments concerned. In July, PIA felt strongly enough about Third and Fourth Freedoms traffic that it gave six months’ notice to terminate the pool, an action which BOAC feared might also affect over-flights and transit rights. The Board of Management at once ordered contingency plans prepared. This was not such a difficult exercise on routes to the East, for because of wars in the Middle East, South Asia, and Vietnam, not to mention cholera and other outbreaks, services to the East had to be diverted or sometimes cancelled on a number of occasions. PIA proposed in June that to earn more foreign currency it should be given access to Hong Kong and be allowed to return to the North Atlantic, which it had dropped in 1967. The Board of Management’s view was that Hong Kong was out and that there must be a better balance on the Karachi–London route than the 17:83 ratio between BOAC and PIA, respectively. General Manager Eastern Routes, Bampfylde, visited Karachi, and an agreement was worked out which continued the pool to June 1970 with BOAC receiving an additional £500,000 per year. Part of the reason for the successful settlement was British pressure in the parallel bilateral talks which indicated that PIA would be reduced from twelve weekly flights into Britain to two in summer and one in winter. Because this restriction would also have applied reciprocally to BOAC flights to Pakistan, Management noted the importance of keeping good relations with Iran, India, and Ceylon. No sooner had the PIA pool been settled than the Tripartite once again came to the fore with the need to adjust Air India’s capacity on the North Atlantic. Granville noted that, for the foreseeable future, pools were likely to remain very important, for the only alternatives were mergers, and he suggested to the Board on 24 October 1969 that studies should be undertaken to see which marriages might be attractive if the industry began to move in that direction. The first BOAC company to benefit by a new round of re-equipment in the later Sixties was Gulf Aviation, which in 1966 ordered a Fokker F-27-200. In 1968 the company ceased to be a BOAC subsidiary when BOAC’s shareholding was reduced from 55.54 to 29 per cent, but the Board of Management minutes noted

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332 S p e e d b i r d that “No publicity is to be given this item.” By 1969, it was feared that as Gulf was developing into a regional company more quickly than expected, it might well show a loss as it acquired BAC One-Elevens. So, early in 1969 the Board was gratified to learn that BOAC’s proposals to run services from the Gulf to London with payment of a royalty were appreciated by the local Board and the British Political Resident as that would preserve BOAC’s position there after the Trucial Coast became independent. Starting on 1 April 1970, BOAC began operating a service to London on charter to Gulf, at first just with a Gulf sticker over the “BOAC” but later with a VC-10 painted in Gulf colours, though this meant some loss of revenue by having to isolate one aircraft for these services alone. The Gulf states became independent in January 1972 when satisfactory bilaterals were worked out. By the end of that year BOAC was being pressed to consider selling two VC-10s to Gulf in 1974, and shortly afterward four. By August 1973 this had become two in 1974 and two in 1975, with long-term engineering and maintenance, as well as training assistance of all sorts. It was soon evident that the new Gulf Board would wish to buy out BOAC and the Bahraini merchants who had created the original Associated Company. In January 1974 BOAC was willing, provided it received a five-year advisory agreement, an arrangement that was not completed until after BOAC became British Airways. In November 1969, some concern was voiced over the threat to BOAC posed by the British Airports Authority’s insistence that the Turkish airline, THY, should use Gatwick rather than Heathrow as this might affect Turkish willingness to allow BOAC to transit Istanbul in the case of another Middle East War. Similarly, in December 1969 BOAC was prepared to argue the case for Malaysia-Singapore Airlines using Heathrow rather than Gatwick because it was a pool partner then about to develop services all the way through to London, at first with BOAC aircraft with an MSA prefix on the service number, then with BOAC aircraft on charter to MSA, and finally in about thirteen months with MSA operating its own services Singapore–London. BAA agreed and the only snag, apart from a somewhat delayed introduction, was that MSA wanted its own cabin staff on all flights from the start. By early 1970 it was becoming clear that just as with Associated Companies and with hotels, partnerships were becoming so important that their control, especially that of the Tripartite Pool, within BOAC had to be vested in a particular body. In these negotiations, as in nearly all others involving bilateral arrangements as well as airline pools, BOAC had an intimate working liaison with the British Government through Peter Jack, its Manager, International Relations. By July it was realized that Air India, with 747s coming onto the North Atlantic, was going to insist on operating over capacity and that if Air India persisted in that view, the pool might have to be broken up. Before the problem with Air India could be resolved, the Singapore bilateral talks broke down over Cathay Pacific and the formal twelvemonths’ notice for the termination of the agreement was given in August. Iran also denounced its bilaterals with seven countries, including Britain. The only sunlight

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that summer on Eastern routes seemed to be the renewal of the BOAC–Air Ceylon pool to 31 July 1971, followed by a satisfactory bilateral with Singapore in October, and in December useful talks with Iran Air, which appeared to mean that BOAC could expect to continue to operate through Teheran unmolested, at least until new bilateral talks took place in May 1971. However, BOAC Headquarters was completely surprised by the Air Ceylon– UTA agreement announced in late 1971, as no word that such an arrangement was likely had trickled back to London from BOAC staff, though Management had noted that on 28 September The Daily Telegraph had predicted Air Ceylon would go French rather than British. This was, nonetheless, one of the rare cases when BOAC was caught unaware. The beginning of 1971 saw changes in the Tripartite Pool which, in spite of shared services with MSA London–Singapore, under the G-10 Plan showed attractive increases for both the Tripartite and for the much older BOAC– QANTAS pool. With the Singapore bilateral on the books, the Board was prepared in January to consider a greater investment in Cathay Pacific so as to maintain its 15 per cent interest—a shrewd move as at the same time Malaysia and Singapore decided after all to have separate airlines. Moreover, one of the consequences of the increasingly long range of aircraft had been changing route patterns, which constantly affected pools. In this case, Cathay Pacific operating from Hong Kong was in a commanding position to develop a new direct service to Sydney and so BOAC pooled with it on that. In February 1971, MSA told BOAC’s Deputy Commercial Director that it would like BOAC to give up its small shareholding. The new Malaysian Airlines Ltd. (MAL) immediately made arrangements for BOAC to operate twenty-seven wet-lease charters for it, while for its part the old MSA purchased BOAC’s $10 shares for $20.77 each. But difficulties immediately arose because of Malaysian demand in the new bilateral talks for services beyond Hong Kong, and the threat of termination of all services on 31 March 1973 seemed likely. But, as usual, compromises were effected by the end of January 1972 and by July a 707-436 was being painted in MAL colours. But when MAL asked if BOAC could dry-lease MAL a 707-436 on two days’ notice, Management had to reply that it could not in any circumstances do that in less than fourteen days. Meanwhile, BOAC had entered into pooling discussions with the new Singapore International Airlines (SIA) for a tripartite pool with Air New Zealand, but had to tell SIA that it could not provide flight crews to test fly SIA’s two new 747s. Thus, by the end of 1973, the pools on the Eastern routes were complicated by the birth of yet another new national airline. In the meantime, differences with old partners continued to require attention. The question of Air India’s entitlements for its 747s on the London–New York route were placed in arbitration before a High Court Judge in May 1971. At the same time, Chairman Sir Charles Hardie met the Deputy Chairman of Air India and agreed to a formula that allowed Air India to start its North Atlantic schedule

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334 S p e e d b i r d on 26 May—BOAC received extra compensation for Fifth Freedom traffic taken out of the United Kingdom. At the heart of the problem was the general overcapacity on the route and a tense dispute between Britain and the United States over excessive Pan American 747s out of Chicago. Swamping was a problem to which BOAC was reluctant to see Air India contribute, but which it accepted where Air India was involved because of the long association of the two airlines, as Hardie explained to the Board on 21 May. This over-capacity was still not resolved in June 1972 when BOAC found pooling talks on a new United Kingdom–India bilateral stalled because the latter depended upon a BOAC–AI pool which did not exist. The impasse was such that the full partnership arrangements between BOAC, QANTAS, and Air India were suspended for 1972–1973—the first time ever with AI completely out of the pool. BOAC and AI later came to terms and a new pool took effect from 1 July 1973 after a year’s break; but QANTAS and AI ceased to be associates. Then in November troubles began to boil in East Pakistan; BOAC took out its contingency plans and early in December put them into action when war broke out. Operations through Karachi, Delhi, and Calcutta were suspended and re-routed through Bombay. As the new 747s had the range to over-fly India completely, at first it seemed that only safe corridors needed to be established,3 but in early January 1972 an extensive prohibited area existed in western India and both belligerents insisted that aircraft in transit had to land at Karachi and then at Bombay or viceversa. In the first month it was estimated that these diversions and lost revenues cost BOAC about £1,000,000. Further complications came from the fact that the 747s were at the same time plagued with engineering, catering, and other unpunctuality problems, while the amount of overtime required of aircrew began to build into an industrial relations problem not long after the expensive pilots’ strike had been settled. Not until 25 January was a corridor across the battle-zone agreed. By the time BOAC became British Airways on 1 April 1974, the last two traffic problems on the South Asian sector of Eastern routes were being resolved—renewal of the pool with Air India, though not without UK Government amendment, and agreement with PIA on flights to Islamabad to keep British Caledonian out of the area, though the Civil Aviation Authority in Britain seemed to be considering the latter. A bilateral and a pool were worked out by March 1974. The one new problem which was not so easily resolved was the Indian—and then the world-wide—fuel crisis. By 1 May 1973 it appeared as if uplift of fuel out of India would be limited by 50 per cent, and a few days later that it would be reduced to zero by the 16th. Again, however, the carefully preserved friendship between BOAC and Air India came to the rescue, but a world-wide Arab fuel crisis developed at the end of 1973 which saw BOAC eating into its forward allowances, but vexed to note that Cathay Pacific did not seem to be affected. The summer schedules were altered so that certain services terminated at Teheran to satisfy the needs of British and American passengers, yet it was also realized at Speedbird House that BOAC would have to pay some pool penalties for mounting fewer flights.

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While on the one hand the route was intimately connected with the trans-Pacific service, on the other hand that from Australia to England also developed rhomboid alternatives on either side of the original route through the Middle East, South Asia, and Singapore as longer-ranged aircraft became available. In November 1964 QANTAS began service eastbound through Tahiti and Mexico to London, and in 1974 westbound through the Seychelles, Mauritius, and Nairobi to London. Once the runway at Perth was lengthened so that 707s could take off with enough fuel for the 3,500-mile hop to Mauritius, QANTAS had a fast westbound route, but BOAC was at a disadvantage, having to serve Darwin. and so in November the Board of Management recommended looking into Singapore–Perth–Sydney. At this time the Southern Cross Pool (named after Sir Charles Kingsford-Smith’s famous trans-Pacific aircraft of 1928) covered BOAC and QANTAS services from London via San Francisco and via Mexico. In this pool QANTAS flew four services a week through California and BOAC three, with QANTAS also having one weekly through Mexico City. Each ran to an identical timetable and under an identical flight number, but BOAC bought space from QANTAS to bring its share of the seats up to 50 per cent. Then, in March 1967, BOAC joined a five-carrier pool with QANTAS, Air India, Malaysian Airlines Ltd., and Air New Zealand to operate through Perth, now a destination in its own right—not just an en route stop to Sydney or Melbourne. After those negotiations, BOAC decided that pool discussions had become so complex that the team, following QANTAS’s lead, had to be strengthened. For several years in the late 1960s and after, a constant theme, behind BOAC– QANTAS relations, was the immigrant charter business, which necessitated as many as 200 flights a year, some in BOAC Comets, some in QANTAS aircraft, and others in Eagle aircraft leased from BOAC. The number of passengers carried rose gradually from 20,000 to more than 30,000, especially when the P&O steamship line withdrew passenger services in 1971 and BOAC was allowed to change ABAMEL into a charter airline called Overseas Air Travel Ltd. In June 1970 Management was faced with the quandary of whether or not to use spare aircraft for the Australian charters, for if it did so it would earn more; but it would be nine crews short and that would involve training 229 aircrew plus 30 new pilots from May to August 1971, which would mean that there could be no immigrant flights until the latter month. On further thought, the Flight Operations Director, Captain Frank Walton, suggested that if London–Toronto was increased from four a week to daily and the trans-Pacific from five a week to daily, the nine needed crews could be made available. In August 1970 the Tripartite Pool was renewed for another three years and in July 1971, after a tour of Australia, Granville reported that it was in BOAC’s best interest to keep QANTAS strong. The emigrant charters came up again in November 1971, when BOAC reminded the Government that it was important to keep within the scheduled services agreement as they were vital both to pooling and bilateral arrangements. The great fear was that the UK Government would double-designate, as was its habit at that moment, to strengthen British

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336 S p e e d b i r d Caledonian and that would weaken QANTAS by also allowing a second Australian airline on the route. Then, in 1972, a fares war broke out and BOAC lowered its fares to QANTAS’s unauthorized Very Low Fare level, but the Civil Aviation Authority in London stopped BOAC and left it and Lufthansa the only airlines operating at a disadvantage. However, by May, BOAC was once more competitive in the Very Low Fare business. Moreover, it went a step further and decided to sell such space on all flights, which QANTAS then opposed. The resolution of this problem did not come until after the establishment of British Airways in 1974. In the last two years of BOAC membership in the pools with QANTAS several problems arose: over refuelling because of a strike in Australia; from dissatisfaction with QANTAS and Air New Zealand’s handling of BOAC flights; over the Southern Cross Pool; and with Trade Unions at London Airport over handling of Marriott catering for QANTAS aircraft. While irritating and sometimes heated discussions ensued, none of the parties could really afford to abandon the longstanding pools. Moreover, BOAC always felt that it was carrying out the true spirit of the Commonwealth, both in bringing into the pools the newly independent nations’ airlines and in its active pursuit of solid working arrangements with its old major partners such as QANTAS, Air India, and Pakistan International Airlines. BOAC also thought it was protecting its interests both there and in its arrangements with outsiders such as Iran National Airlines. Moreover, one of the factors in the creation of British Airways was that as the range of aircraft increased, BEA kept pushing to get into the Middle East and the Gulf, while BOAC needed to develop ports of call in Europe. On the routes to the East a balance of sorts was maintained both through the Airline Chairmen’s Committee and through swapping traffic rights and formal pools such as those passing through Rome, Athens, and Beirut and to Israel. But as other airlines sought rights in what were traditionally BOAC territories, new bilaterals gave BOAC extra rights in Europe. As an example, in 1971, a four-year agreement was made in which Alitalia received Rome–Hong Kong–Tokyo and BOAC got London–Rome–Hong Kong. The 1974 British Airways merger with BEA solved some problems, and it should be remembered, too, that in April 1974 British Airways inherited a solid partnership system in spite of the story of lengthy and sometimes difficult negotiations told here. The changing arrangements were generally of the marital sort, even to the likeness that in modern divorces the parties remained friends and sometimes even remarried. In the Far Eastern Area BOAC left a legacy of partnerships with Air India, Air New Zealand, and above all QANTAS. The story of shifting arrangements was repeated in the last decade on African routes, with the additional ingredient of racism as a factor. In 1960, following the pattern on Eastern routes, a quadripartite partnership with common planning and selling was set up with South African Airways, Central African Airways, and East African Airways. In 1961, South Africa became a republic and left the Commonwealth and became thereafter a target of increasing black African hostility.

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96. Trans-Pacific routes, westbound developments showing the Polar route via Anchorage to Tokyo, the central trans-Pacific service across the USA and on via Honolulu to Japan and eastbound from London to Singapore, Hong Kong, and Osaka.

338 S p e e d b i r d Because the East African governments refused landing rights, SAA had to operate through Portuguese territory and in October 1963 the pool broke up. BOAC and SAA reverted to the old bilateral pool of the Thirties and this was still in being when British Airways took over in 1974. As African feelings rose, so by January 1966 BOAC could no longer land at Salisbury, Rhodesia (now Harare, Zimbabwe), and the pool with Central African Airways was not renewed for political reasons. So EAA alone remained in partnership in 1974 and it went bankrupt in 1978. Nevertheless, as the former colonies became independent, BOAC concluded many commercial arrangements that still gave it immense connections, business, and goodwill, which were passed on to British Airways.

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Chapter XIV Further Challenges and Responses, 1964–1974 Punctuality Delays had always occurred, but they became ever more significant as air travel increased and the number of vacant spaces in the air traffic corridors shrank. Moreover, the costs of lateness mounted, and the cumulative effect led to still more complications and potential loss of passengers. A tardy departure from a central hub such as Heathrow not only overloaded the amenities in waiting rooms, but was also apt to affect night-time limitations upon crews further down the routes. Though BOAC worked on punctuality from 1962 onward, the real roots of the problem were not reached until the early 1970s. It turned out to be a classical case of a highly technological system being pursued at all its more sophisticated levels, with a lack of attention given to the relatively simple problems between BOAC’s Victoria Air Terminal and an airliner’s takeoff at the airport. The mundane, but essential, subject of punctuality is one that all transport systems have in common and the ingredients are therefore well worth reporting. Unpunctuality at London was mainly because of weather, the badly designed airport, the lack of priority for BOAC (unlike BEA, which had its own terminal building), problems of air traffic control (especially over France when the controllers were on strike), runway maintenance, and later hijacking and security problems. Additionally, British Airports Authority’s regulations forced the removal of aircraft during minor maintenance, and deteriorating industrial relations was also a factor. Because BOAC was the national long-haul airline, it tended to receive the complaints in Britain about lack of punctuality, although its record was not always worse than that of other airlines. Late departures were normally worse in the winter, when they were exacerbated by bad weather, especially snow, which delayed arriving aircraft and ground-support vehicles as well as passengers and cargo. Improvements came gradually from better air traffic control and eventually from the introduction of the 747s with their much greater capacity in the same air space. On the ground, Heathrow suffered from the same lack of governmental understanding of the need to accelerate developments to anticipate and match growth that were encountered elsewhere, the same pennywise, pound-foolish attitude to capital investment that had limited the buying of Constellations in 1946 and led to other hampering decisions. As a consequence, Heathrow was ill-served by road from central London until the M4 motorway opened. The rail link, which had been provided for in the original 1945 plans for

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340 S p e e d b i r d 97. Sir Ross Stainton rose from premium apprentice at Imperial Airways in 1933 to Chief Executive of British Airways, 1977–1981.

London Airport, was not authorized until 1970. And the Underground into the central part of the airport was not completed until 1977. Delays could occur for a multitude of reasons, such as when, for example, cargo doors on the new VC-10s jammed, pallets were stuck in aircraft (one caused a thirteen-hour delay), and labour disputes arose over minor matters. The Ministry of Aviation was unwilling to authorize work on runways except in normal working hours, and of course there were international complications and security requirements. The simple growth of aircraft weight created its own problems, particularly in the late Sixties, when the 747s arrived weighing 550,000 pounds and more. New tractors had to be ordered for moving aircraft from the terminal gates. The problems grew worse in 1965 when aircraft were departing in peak hours every ten minutes, rather than every fifteen. Early in 1965 Sir Giles Guthrie was so concerned about the image problem that he wrote a personal apology to all passengers on VC-10s that were long delayed; at the same time, he asked to be given the names of more Economy-Class passengers for the letters he regularly wrote, enquiring how clients liked BOAC. For a while Management refused to believe European Air Research Bureau figures that showed that BOAC had the worst punctuality record of any

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airline serving Prestwick: 75 per cent of the flights were reportedly late. Thus in February 1965 an investigative committee was appointed. It was becoming evident that many of the problems centred around loaders and drivers. Loaders needed time to ensure the maximum stowage possible, as volume was as great a problem as weight, and they were delayed by the fact that Customs insisted on examining 10 per cent of the outward-bound baggage. Delays by type showed the VC-10’s rate to be about three times that of the Super VC-10 and the 707. (R. E. G. Davies has observed that this could have been a symptom of the particular routes on which the VC-10s flew, and the customary loads which may have been difficult.) While labour leaders agreed that Sunday was a normal working day, loaders, drivers, and warehousemen did not, and here BEA made a separate settlement which resulted in a ban on overtime. Immigration had too few officers on duty, so that foreign and Commonwealth passengers were often delayed up to half an hour or more. At the same time, the catering service was becoming overworked; it was short of men, and it suffered from a lack of repaired ovens and from an explosion in the boiler room. When the loaders were given a lump-sum payment in August 1965, they no longer wanted to work the normal twenty hours a week overtime. This meant that BOAC needed another seventy loaders, not counting replacements for those who “went sick.” By early 1966 another 153 staff were being added, and in March a specialist from London Transport was asked to study the Motor Transport (MT) problem. He soon reported that BOAC needed an intense effort to add more buildings and more staff, as well as to institute programmes to reduce maintenance costs and stop the high damage to vehicles. A new Manager of Maintenance was appointed who considered his task, among other things, to be a standardization of vehicles, subcontracting of accident repairs, and continual maintenance. These efforts gradually eliminated some delays. On 31 January 1967 BOAC Management could note happily that 320 consec­ utive services had left without a delay. Nevertheless, when a “Q for Quality” contest was run later in the year, the topics in order of importance were reliability, on-time performance, initiative, pride in the job, courtesy, team spirit, unflappability, integrity, efficiency, and smartness. Punctuality again became an issue in January 1968, when the usual winter illnesses were taking their toll. Thirty-nine flights were delayed early in the month by weather conditions. An Engineering and Maintenance study of turn-around maintenance showed a need for more supervisory staff, more spares in the Central Area, better use of in-flight information, and a functional check of instruments and electronics before the crew boarded. In November 1968 work productivity agreements were negotiated and it was hoped that this would allow a reduction in the number of loaders. And, finally, the piers in Building No. 3, due to open in 1966, were completed in 1968. A separate but related problem was cargo-aircraft lateness. In June 1968 it was noted that during the month of May, compared to Seaboard World’s average of

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342 S p e e d b i r d three hours late and a worst delay of eleven hours, BOAC’s CL-44 freighters averaged eleven hours late and had had a worst delay of forty-seven hours. Some of the delay was because of a rapidly expanding cargo business, a 59 per cent increase in 1965 alone. But not until May 1966 could Management note that all freighters had left on time the previous week. Deplaning passengers was the other end of the problem. In the smaller planes it was possible to clear the baggage out of the aircraft and into the terminal by the time passengers had cleared immigration and Customs. But, ironically, just as these Government requirements were streamlined in 1969, the Jumbos came on-line and baggage handling deteriorated. Thus in 1969 when Customs instituted its Red and Green Channel system, allowing passengers with nothing to declare to walk right out of the terminal once they had their baggage, the 747s arrived with the baggage of up to 350 passengers, which had to be unloaded and transported to the baggage concourse, a task that could take forty-five minutes, while passengers stood around. The same problem applied to cargo, but in a different way. This growth was so rapid that shipments outran space and delays occurred, in spite of moving cargo first into Heathrow’s Central Area from the North Side in 1962, and then to a new specially designed cargo complex on the South Side in November 1969. Here again the chronic manpower shortage came to light; handling was delayed by a lack of loaders, whose employment formalities took seven weeks. Things improved early in October 1969 when BOADICEA, the Corporation’s computer system, came into operation for departure control; delays were cut from over 60 per cent to a mere 4 per cent. Another change was an agreement in early 1970 with the British Airports Authority that over 75 per cent of BOAC’s aircraft would be parked at jetty stands, rather than the less than 50 per cent heretofore. But, on the other hand, the rise of noise sensitivity and the banning of VC-10 night operations in Switzerland in the winter of 1969–1970 (and the further banning of all VC-10 operations there in 1970–1971) because of the noisiness of the aircraft cut into flexibility and increased lateness problems. Early in October 1970 it was discovered that, contrary to assumptions, as Guthrie had suggested, the public did not object to a five-minute delay; they would in fact tolerate a fifteen-minute one—as long as they were told the cause. So it was agreed to concentrate on departures with longer delays, to consider a statistical readjustment (to a fifteen-minute instead of a five-minute lateness), and to try to find out where the delays really did occur. Matters were not being made easier by the intensive security arrangements necessitated by hijackings. The Management Services Department undertook a series of studies of ground operations, Management attitudes and human relations, environmental problems, and Management by objectives, not all of which were solely concerned with punctuality. These studies soon revealed that there was a shortage of long-haul aircraft stands and that there were poor relations between motor transport users and their maintenance people. Delays, it was found, were because of the refusal to

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98. Quality control of 40,000 spare parts remained a top priority. It depended upon skilled workers.

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344 S p e e d b i r d board passengers until the aircraft was absolutely ready; and BOAC’s reputation was harmed whenever there was a failure to keep passengers informed. In January 1971 the situation deteriorated when industrial action required additional overtime to be worked. And though extra stands became available in the summer of 1971, BOAC at Heathrow was still at the mercy of BAA. The jetties that were being installed did not work, and a new contract had to be made, with extra costs to be charged to the airlines. Management stressed in a letter to BAA that BOAC believed that as the national airline it should have priority on workable jetties: boarding passengers, a great many of whom were foreigners, across the tarmac in inclement weather did nothing for their image of Great Britain. Weather and industrial troubles late in January 1972 caused the cancellation of forty services in one week, a very expensive business. And even though passengerreporting time was advanced to sixty-five minutes before scheduled push-back, security delays still accounted for 11 per cent of all late departures. This led to the thought that perhaps trickle boarding would help when combined with searches, a tactic that was eventually adopted. By March it was estimated that delays would require 186 extra staff to handle the summer traffic, but because of poor budget forecasts and the introduction of another Profit Improvement Programme (PIP), none was allowed to be recruited. Another aggravating problem was the rise of pilferage by staff at Heathrow; recruiting was delayed further by the need to obtain better checks on staff backgrounds. And in 1973 departures were delayed by a police investigation of the theft of catering stores. Meanwhile, in spite of the gloom that lack of punctuality seemed to be causing, BOAC was greatly heartened by winning the Queen’s Award to Industry for 1971 for its export achievements. At the same time, Management approved the idea of a Support Services Department which would group all those concerned with aircraft movements at Heathrow under one director. This idea did not keep catering workers in May from banning overtime as a tactic, in spite of productivity agreements. To counter this sort of activity and keep better tabs on individual workers and their obligations, overtime, shift payment, and sickness records were computerized. The Deputy Chief Engineer, E. R. Major, was nominated to head the new Support Services Department in May 1971, but it was not anticipated that it would start until October, and in fact the unions delayed it to 1 November. The arrival of the 350-ton 747s posed new scheduling problems. The British Airports Authority would not allow an aircraft to stay on a hardstand for more than three hours. So, if anything more than minor maintenance was required, BOAC had to take the aircraft out of service for nine hours while it was towed across the main runways to the base at Hatton Cross and back again. This once more brought to the fore the need to institute better priority procedures for hiring loaders and heavy-goods-vehicle drivers. The latter were not, it was found, in short supply nationally, but only scarce because of BOAC’s selection procedure, which eliminated 50 per cent of the applicants. Punctuality of 747s was found to

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99. Just as vital was the supply and immediate availability of spares under proper inventory control, to keep assets, such as the Boeing 747 in the background, on schedule.

be affected by the fact that the aircraft were often parked on distant stands, and staff then had large distances to go to release them after they were closed out. (One delay was caused by the need to off-load a passenger frightened by the very size of the 747.) And the average air traffic control delay for BA 561, for instance, scheduled to leave Heathrow at 11:30 every day, was fifty-two minutes. In January 1972 it was decided to emphasize that arriving aircraft should be moved as quickly as possible out of the Central Area to Engineering and Maintenance. Delays at this time were attributable to the fact that because of construction in Terminal 3, BOAC had only twenty-four instead of its usual forty-eight passenger check-in stands; the noise drowned out announcements, resulting in congestion everywhere; non-smoking seat assignments had been introduced, and poor baggage-handling arrangements and a great increase in the volume of cargo coincided with an increase in the number of big jets in key time slots. And, as if this was not enough, BAA asked for a 50 per cent reduction in

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346 S p e e d b i r d the consumption of electricity, caused by a national coal problem; BOAC had to appeal in some areas for enough electricity, while in others a 30 per cent saving was possible almost immediately. More cuts were made and some maintenance deferred, enabling BOAC to reduce its electricity consumption to less than half by 22 February. And Management, like that in other industries, saw the gleam of a permanent savings. In May 1972 the Department of Trade and Industry decided to have consultants look at the time it took passengers and their baggage to transit Heathrow. By July the problem was critical, as passengers were exceeding forecasts to such an extent that all flights were late. Work stoppages in August, despite the help of volunteers, caused 120 out of 121 departing flights to be late. And the congestion at Heathrow was not then helped by the decision to close one vehicle tunnel for repairs and the construction of a new Underground station in the Central Area. In September it was realized that cabin staff were on board fifty minutes before departure time, so that there was no reason why trickle loading could not begin at ETD—Estimated Time of Departure—minus forty. Having asked in June what other airlines were doing, Management finally found out in late September that Pan American (which only started to keep records in March 1972) and BOAC used fifteen minutes as a standard of lateness, but TWA, which was only late 30 per cent of the time, did not worry unless the flight was over ten minutes late. Air Canada had no records at all. In October, delays began to climb again above the 50 per cent mark as check-in staff fell sick from overwork; the Board decided that more staff had to be recruited, even if some others had to be let go to keep within manpower budgets. Lateness was such a concern that for some time at the end of 1972 two of the normal four pages of the minutes of Board of Management meetings were devoted to punctuality at Heathrow. At Airways Terminal, staff were upset because automatic ticketing machines were used without consulting the Trade Unions; they feared redundancies, but like much machinery these ended up making the workload tolerable. In February 1973 the question was: What incentives other than money would ensure punctual departures? Statistical target punctuality levels were introduced in the summer of 1973, with separate tabs kept on 747s. BAA agreed to put up directional signs in Terminal 3, and BOAC decided to try writing departure gate numbers on passenger tickets when they checked in (a practice long established on US domestic routes). In June there was again a shortage of personnel in key posts attributable to the slowness of the security check and bonding procedures for new employees. There was a shortage of personnel on weekends, and a severe national shortage of heavygoods-vehicle drivers generally. These shortages led to pressure for increased pay, to work-to-rule slowdowns, and other employee action. By early September the loaders and caterers were back to normal overtime workings, but in the meantime BAA was demanding that all baggage be off the aircraft within thirty minutes of chocks on, which meant more hiring or rescheduling flights so that they did not arrive in peak times.

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100. Maintenance halls such as this one in “the Kremlin” could handle everything from the spare jet engines on the right to the smallest parts and their drawings on the left. (Undated photo of the Central Repair and Overhaul Unit, Technical Block A, LHR (Heathrow)/LAP (London), ca. 1965).

One of the astonishing findings was that motor transport lacked scheduled maintenance and that staff on the airside at Heathrow simply “borrowed” an unattended vehicle when they needed one and abandoned it when it broke down. Once this was noticed, proper logging in and out of vehicles and scheduled maintenance eliminated the delays caused by widely scattered responsibilities. BOAC felt that much of the problem might have been solved if it could have, as it wanted to in 1973, built its own terminal either near its maintenance area at Hatton Cross or at Perry Oaks to the west of the main terminal; but BAA was against the former, and the cost of moving the Perry Oaks sewage farm was against the latter. In the meantime, of course, the Roskill Commission had reported in favour of a third airport at Maplin, which raised possibilities of moving to another airport, and that decision was first accepted and then—after BOAC’s time— rejected by the Government. BAA offered BOAC Terminal 2, but the airline viewed it as unsuitable.

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348 S p e e d b i r d Late in September 1973 the DTI announced a total ban on night operations at Heathrow for 17–30 October, and it appeared to BOAC Management to be moving to a ban for the whole of 1975. At the same time, some staff delayed flights by stopping work at midday to protest the poor food supplied for lunch, though the action was regarded also as symptomatic of deeper problems. In October, Support Services was allowed to increase staff by 400, to be found from surpluses in other divisions, but before action could be taken, there was a fire in Terminal 3 which caused a shortage of staff toilet facilities. Then, on 13 December, the Prime Minister once more imposed limitations on the use of electricity, as the fuel shortage hit again. BOAC appealed, on the grounds that it was a twenty-four-hour service, and quickly got its and Treforest’s cuts restored. But fuel allocations forced a cut in services—not so much because the DTI’s allocations called for a 10 per cent cut, but because BA Headquarters decided to make cuts all across the board instead of selectively; the cut for the Overseas Division amounted to 28 per cent.

101. In the late 1960s it took a team of 103 men and a young woman to do the first “full-life extension” of a Boeing 707-436. The young woman, the secretary to the superintendent of the overhaul, is in the intake of the starboard inner engine.

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To the credit of the BOAC staff as a whole, and despite various irritating crises, R. E. G. Davies has noted that there was always an underlying solid spirit in the Corporation that surfaced when troubles arose, and people gave their best. Fuel allocations resulted in rescheduling, and fifty-three cabin service volunteers worked in Terminal 3, without industrial action by the regular staff, helping to handle passengers in the wake of timetable changes. But at West London Air Terminal volunteers had to be taken off the telephone answering service because an uninvolved union objected. And at Heathrow, MT drivers threatened action over lack of overtime, and Engineering and Maintenance refused to accept engines brought in from Treforest in British Engine Overhaul, Ltd. lorries. The situation degenerated into a strike owing to feelings of insecurity, though perhaps it was really based on employees spending at rising prices on the assumption that overtime pay would always be part of the weekly wages. There was discussion of going back to full working hours in February, but an argument ensued concerning whether to use either staggered hours to ease traffic problems or to have a single schedule to save energy. In March 1974 the DTI announced that in effect Heathrow would be closed at night. And so, as BOAC became the Overseas Division of British Airways it was still struggling with punctuality; but the problem was much less severe than it had been in the peak period when the 747s were arriving in 1970. Analysis of punctuality dilemmas shows how seemingly minor events can cost money, and how long it can take Management to realize where the problems lie, to correct them, and to keep them from recurring.

Hotels With the vastly increased productivity of the big jets pouring passengers into London through Heathrow, the airlines obviously had to do something about hotel capacity. Relatively little damage had been done to hotels in London by the 1940– 1945 bombings, but there had been almost no new building since before the war. In September 1966, Management decided that the Board of Trade needed to be alerted to the problem, and the Chairman agreed that an internal decision had to be made as to how hotels should be handled, memories of Associated Companies making it plain that control had to be exercised from the start. By January 1967, investments began to move overseas. BOAC endorsed the decision of the subsidiary Gulf Aviation to build a hotel in Bahrain. In February, BOAC was willing to help build a hotel in Nandi, Fiji, to guarantee crew space, and had smaller investments in the Pan-Africa Hotel in Nairobi and in Kenya Safari Lodges. In most cases the Board voted for a cautious investment policy in construction, and leaving operations and management to specialists. In March a lease on land on which a hotel was later built in Georgetown, Guyana, was signed in a partnership with Trust Houses Forte. In April Forte—the big British catering chain with whom BOAC already had some connection—changed its policy. This

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350 S p e e d b i r d raised serious questions, but the Board took the view that the main criteria should be whether or not the enterprise would stimulate sufficient additional air traffic for BOAC services. In May, an investment was taken in a British Railways hotel at St. Andrews, as golf tours were popular in the United States, the Commonwealth, and Japan, and, as the minutes noted, “Britain is probably the best country in the world for golfers to visit.” At the same time it was decided that, if possible, BOAC hotels should carry the name Pegasus. By June it was becoming obvious that with large sums being invested, a specialized BOAC organization was needed, under Gilbert Lee, just to look after hotel interests, and this was entrusted to BOAC Associated Companies Ltd. The Senior General Manager, David Craig, was appointed to the Board of Associated Companies to advise on hotel policy generally, while Donald Erskine Crum, an old hand, was made Manager of Hotel Developments, reporting to the General Manager, Associated Companies; the Chairman of AC was required to report regularly to the BOAC Board. In June 1967, the Board approved the draft of an agreement with Pan American Airways’ subsidiary, the Inter-Continental Hotels Corporation (IHC), to put up hotels in London, and at other critical places, which would have beds for 5,000 airline passengers. This was an outgrowth of a direct contact between the President of Pan Am and Guthrie. The quid pro quo was that BOAC had sterling to invest and was willing to put in £3,000,000 right away, while Inter-Continental would provide not only management, but would also give BOAC preferential treatment at its other hotels world-wide. The only disagreement was over whether or not both First-Class and Economy hotels should be developed. In all its investments BOAC sought a guaranteed rate of return of 12 per cent, a rate chosen because of the profitability target set by the Government. Perhaps most instructive of the changing environment in which business has had to operate since the late Sixties is the story of BOAC’s attempt to build a hotel at Hamilton Place, London, close to the venerable Royal Aeronautical Society. The idea was first mooted some time before May 1968, when the Board approved it in principle. In January 1969 it was expected that the Board of Trade would agree and that planning consents, now required, would be obtained, and the investment for the site would not exceed £2,140,000. The owners agreed to await the planning consent before the purchase was finalized. Then, in October 1969, just when it appeared that everything was moving smoothly, the Ministry of Housing and Local Government issued an order relating to historic buildings on the site, and the Minister of Housing ordered a Planning Inquiry, which in April 1970 forced BOAC to renegotiate the lease-back arrangements with the Legal and General Assurance Society. In March 1971, however, though the proposition for a luxury hotel at Hamilton Place still looked attractive, it was realized that by the time the hotel could be built there would be sufficient First-Class rooms in London. At the same time, it was also decided to terminate the agreement with Inter-Continental Hotels Corporation for 5,000 rooms in London as these efforts had been unsuccessful, except for the Portman Hotel. In the light of that, the skyrocketing

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costs, and the need by spring 1971 to conserve capital, it was agreed not to proceed, a decision confirmed by the Chairman, Deputy Chairman, and Managing Director after special study. So at the time, as BOAC had been a prime mover in creating the European Hotels Corporation with Lufthansa, Swissair, Alitalia, BEA, and merchant bankers, the keystone was withdrawn. In the meantime, arrangements were being made in collaboration with the YMCA, and there had been consideration of using student rooms at Imperial College. In 1973 a further complication of the times arose, ironically over the question of BOAC using “public money” to finance a hostel at 199/203 Buckingham Palace Road, adjacent to Victoria Airways Terminal which BOAC owned, which would have been part of a redevelopment scheme for the area. Planning restraints, and the objection of the Under-Secretary of State for Aerospace and Shipping to allow this development, was ultimately to the long-term benefit of British Airways, for it stopped the building on space which might later have been used as the Head Office of British Airways. By the autumn of 1977 the Headquarters of British Airways was back in Speedbird House, within the sound of aeroplanes, so that Management could not forget that it was running an airline. Unlike Associated Companies in the 1956–1963 period, the hotel programme was never allowed to get out of hand. When the first signs in early 1967 appeared that investments were being placed in all directions, the Board of BOAC Associated Companies determined that the whole was brought under proper control even though the Corporation was making the sort of money that could have led to loosened purse strings.

Concorde The last major aircraft purchase in which BOAC was involved deserves a rather detailed examination for it reveals both the problems of nationalization and the difficulties of making rational decisions when those in power lack an understanding of the complexities of the subject in its commercial as well as its technological aspects. Like any well-run corporation, BOAC was forward-looking. As early as 1961 it began to keep a Supersonic Transport file. In 1955, when Farnborough scientists decided that an SST was technically feasible, BOAC was aware of it. And the next year, representatives of the Corporation joined a panel considering development of a passenger aircraft, all the more sober about advanced technology in the wake of the Comet 1 disasters. Twenty years later, in 1976, these efforts bore fruit in the first scheduled Concorde (SST) services to Bahrain and across the North Atlantic to Washington by BOAC and to Rio de Janeiro by Air France. In the meantime, the US SST had raised its head and been defeated by an environment-conscious Congress in a classic example of the plateau theory—political, economic, social, and ideological factors took precedence over the ability further to develop the technology. And Concorde itself became the centre of controversy on both sides of the Atlantic, as a number of works make plain.1

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102. The Concorde coming.

BOAC’s role in Concorde was always two-fold. On the one hand, BOAC worked with the Government and the manufacturers to provide operational data, and on the other, it quite properly took the position from d’Erlanger’s letter of 15 July 1960 that BOAC would be happy to support, buy, and operate the supersonic aircraft as long as it was a commercially viable proposition. In the first role there was no stinting, though BOAC properly guarded its commercial position and accounts. In the second, it equally properly devoted a great deal of effort and analysis to checking all the manufacturer’s claims and figures to be sure that the aircraft would be a viable commercial machine, as well as safe, compatible, and competitive. The reasons for its attitudes should be plain to anyone aware of BOAC’s experience with British aircraft in the 1950s and with the VC-10 series, which in Concorde’s early days was a contemporary development from the same company. In the non-technical field, up to 1 April 1963 there was an exchange of thirtytwo letters and minutes of meetings with the Ministry on Concorde. Then there was a long period in which there appear to be only three letters of importance and two meetings with the Ministry, in this case of Technology, until 1 October 1970, when a regular correspondence resumed. In the meantime, there was a long period when, as we have seen in connection with the 747 purchase, the SST faded into the background as a next-generation aircraft of little interest to BOAC.

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Formal discussions with the Government on Concorde began with a meeting between BOAC’s Chairman, Sir Matthew Slattery, and the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Aviation on 10 July 1962. This was followed by a proposal from the Ministry which attempted to involve BOAC directly on a contractual basis. This the Board declined to do on the grounds that it was premature to take a commercial decision that would be at variance with the responsibilities laid down for the nationalized industries in Cmnd.1337. The Minister then called the Chairman in because the Minister wanted to go ahead with the SST and wanted to be able to assure his Cabinet colleagues that BOAC was cooperating. The Board considered this approach on 20 September 1962, and agreed that BOAC would wish to be associated with the SST if the Government decided to proceed, but that the Corporation would not place any order for such an aircraft until it was clear beyond any doubt that the aircraft would meet certain internationally agreed requirements. A meeting with the Permanent Secretary was held that afternoon, but nothing additional developed until a further meeting on 25  October, again at the Ministry, after which a reply to BOAC’s letter of 20 September giving the Board’s position was dispatched. The Permanent Secretary sent along the draft of a proposed Memorandum of Understanding and of a Press release indicating BOAC’s interest. Essentially, these suggested that BOAC should express interest and then gradually work up to a preliminary production commitment, probably in 1964.

103. The Concorde cabin.

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354 S p e e d b i r d BOAC was also given the option of being fully reimbursed for its production expenses if, after December 1966, it decided that it could not sign a contract because it would not be in its commercial best interest to do so. The draft also included the three basic objectives laid down by IATA: 1. that the aircraft had to be at least as safe as subsonic aircraft operating at the time of its introduction into service; 2. that it had to be adaptable to air traffic control facilities existing at the time of its introduction and capable of integration with the subsonic aircraft then in service; and 3. that it had to be economically competitive with subsonic aircraft operating at the time it entered service. The implications of these IATA objectives were spelled out. Given these assurances, on 8 November 1962 the BOAC Board accepted the two drafts, with the caveat that: The Corporation’s support of this project was intended to be of assistance to the British aircraft manufacturing industry. If the Corporation could have regard only to its own commercial interests it would have preferred to be in a position to order an aircraft that had already been fully developed if and when necessary in connection with the planning of its operations.

The agreement (Cmnd.1916) to develop Concord (it was not spelled “Concorde” in Britain until June–July 1967) was signed by the British and French governments on 24 November 1962, on the assumption that the total cost would be £150,000,000, split two ways. There had previously been an agreement between BAC and Sud Aviation, which was signed on 29 October 1962. The project was re-examined by the Wilson Government in 1964, but the hard decision to discontinue development was not taken largely because of Anglo-French political considerations, yet perhaps also in defiance of American pressure,2 and because it was pointed out that the cancellation of the contract would entail heavy penalties. Instead, in April 1965, when it was decided to cancel the RAF’s TSR-2 bomber and other advanced projects, Concorde was kept in being, but—in normal fashion—the on-service date kept receding into the future. At any rate, by January 1964 BOAC had six Concorde “insurance” delivery positions, though Slattery had declared as long ago as August 1962, in relation to Cmnd.1337 ’s requirement that a rate of return on investment be set for BOAC, that he would be considered to have taken leave of his senses if he had placed an order for Concorde before BOAC’s purpose had been agreed. This was another piece of the jigsaw puzzle that was finally assembled on 1 January 1964. Sir Giles Guthrie did not put it as strongly, but he told the Ministry that BOAC had considerable doubts about Concorde’ s ability to operate across the North Atlantic, about its ability to fit into current air traffic control patterns, and

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about its high takeoff and landing speeds. In the meantime, BOAC wanted two years of computer studies of wide-bodied and cargo aircraft in the subsonic range to see whether or not an SST was really a viable proposition as opposed to other choices. At this point the in-service date was reckoned to be mid-1970. A total production of 150 was envisaged by the manufacturers with BOAC, Air France, and Pan American each taking six, though BOAC doubted Pan Am was really serious. In much of the ensuing period the Board kept closely in touch with the development of Concorde through a monthly report from the Chief Engineer on the progress of both the British and American SSTs, and through liaison with Air France and other airlines. Late in 1963, the Board noted that Pan Am was using a computer to analyse Concorde and thought BOAC should do the same. On 13 February 1964, the Board authorized taking delivery positions for eight Concordes and six US SSTs, but forbade anyone to make a contract to purchase aircraft without Board approval. In the meantime, the British Government would reimburse BOAC for any SST costs until 31 December 1966. In March 1964, contractual discussions started with the British Aircraft Corporation, but the contract was not signed until mid-1972. In late 1964, airline and airport noise complaints began to assume major proportions, and noise would become—along with economics and environmental considerations—one of the crucial arguments around which Concorde acceptability would revolve. Often in aeronautical history the writing has been on the wall but has been ignored in the hopes that it would fade away.3 In this instance, a Court decision in favour of apartment owners at Nice made Air France liable for noise damage. In February 1965, Management noted that Concorde’s narrow fuselage might be against it in the wide-bodied era beginning to open up. After a Concorde conference in June 1965, Technical Director Shenstone reported the feeling was that Concorde was still a marginal aircraft, with operating costs 40 per cent above those of the 707. (R. E. G. Davies has stated that such an estimate was vastly optimistic—and should have been a comparison with the 747.) BOAC’s own Concorde economic studies in the autumn were not so pessimistic, but they still put Concorde 32 per cent above the 707 at 1,250 miles, and 19 per cent at 3,750 miles, without any allowance for the 707’s advantage in having a cargo hold. The new free-baggage allowances just being proposed could also hurt Concorde. There was also concern that if the SST could not fly above the speed of sound over land, it would largely be a failure—which it was. In early 1966, the Board came closer to taking options on eight firm delivery positions, but they understood the Minister to have indicated that BOAC was still free to buy or not, regardless of the action the British Government might take to put Concorde into production.4 At the beginning of 1967, Management was feeling some pressure to order Concordes at the same time as the Ministry ordered materials for the first twenty aircraft, but the Chief Engineer advised waiting until the first

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356 S p e e d b i r d prototype had flown. In the meantime, BOAC had told the US Federal Aviation Administratrion (FAA) that the Boeing SST was not an economic proposition, but in July the Board decided to pay further royalty money for options on the US SST. It was noted that Concorde was still uneconomic compared to the 707; how it compared to the 747 had yet to be studied. In October, while considering the G-7 Plan, the Chairman noted that BOAC would at first expect to operate only three to six Concordes, and that the North Atlantic was the least important route for them. (R. E. G. Davies has commented to author: “It was the only route possible!”) BOAC was constantly keeping the cost of Concordes in mind and deferring their purchase decision as one means of keeping the forecast profitable and being able to cut capital expenditures in accord with Government demands. In April 1968, Japan Airlines said Concorde was not suitable for the Polar route across Canada to Japan, and Pan Am and TWA opposed the surcharged First-Class fare it would need. In May BOAC resisted a Board of Trade request to show provisions in the accounts to cover possible purchases of Concordes. In July the Port of New York Authority wrote to say that Concorde would have to meet noise limitations in force at the time it began operations into JFK. The in-service date was now estimated at 1974. But, in January 1969, the Ministry of Technology said not to expect Concordes until 1975, while at the same time it was commissioning the Floyd Report on the aircraft’s economics. BOAC was sceptical of this study, as by then its own forecasting system was regarded as being well ahead of other people’s. The Boeing SST was not expected to be available until 1978. BOAC was also trying to get data on the Russian Tu-144, which was then flying. In March BOAC cash forecasts showed that there would be no surplus capital for Concordes in 1973–1974. In April BOAC was in a tussle with the Ministry of Technology over being able to read the Floyd Report; a copy was finally made available in August, and BOAC gave its opinion that the rates used were too high and thus overstated the profits. The G-9 Plan presented in November suggested that each Concorde operated would decrease BOAC results by £1,000,000 per annum. Early in 1970, BOAC put it directly to both the Ministry of Technology and the Board of Trade that its studies showed that Concorde was not an economic proposition. Regular consultations with Air France were reinstated, and in May the Planning Director, Winston Bray, made a complete cost disclosure of Concorde figures to two Ministry representatives. On 12 August BOAC representatives were summoned to meet with John Davies, the Minister of Technology, and Fred Corfield, the Minister of State, Board of Trade, and their staffs, and the airline’s people told them that BOAC had been unable to persuade itself that it would be better off with Concorde. During the discussion it became evident that Ministry personnel had not taken into account that First-Class traffic was only 6 to 8 per cent of the whole (and declining), thus being a very limited market, and that only some of this would find Concorde’s time-saving any advantage. BOAC studies showed routeseat-mile costs of 75 to 100 per cent above those of the 747. The BOAC minutes

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of this conference on 12 August noted that BOAC had not been informed of the subject matter of the meeting until everyone was seated at the table. Later that month (21 August 1970), the Financial Director, Derek Glover, told the Board that the Government was prepared to add £80,000,000 to BOAC’s capital to cover Concorde financing, at the same time that it was demanding that BOAC cut its capital investment. The Board accepted the view that any purchase of Concordes would need to be under separate and special arrangements. On 14 September the Managing Director, Granville, told Sir George Edwards of BAC that BOAC wished to go supersonic and to support the British aircraft industry in the competitive long-haul field, but that the decision to buy Concordes had to be based on an economic case with due regard also to noise, sonic boom, and other technical matters. This was essentially the position stated on 15 July 1960 and repeated in the Annual Report for 1962–1963. So, late in September the Board authorized a letter to the President of the Board of Trade, reiterating its stand and making the point that none of the forecasts so far available to the Corporation

104. Sir Charles Hardie, BOAC Deputy Chairman, 1966, and Chairman, 1969, and Keith Granville, BOAC Chairman, 1971–1974.

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358 S p e e d b i r d made Concorde an economically attractive aircraft. (This letter was drafted on 22 September and sent on 1 October.) Michael Noble, the Minister for Trade, replied that he hoped that talks could go on, to which Chairman Sir Charles Hardie agreed. In early 1971, there was some pressure for a decision by March at a price per aircraft of £11,250,000, for a plane that seated between 100 and 125 passengers. At this time, the US SST appeared to be failing for lack of funding. Concorde was being studied with an amortized life of eight and a half years, because it was estimated that it would be superseded in 1983 by the US SST or by a more advanced Concorde II. The DTI asked BOAC to be prepared to state how many Concordes it wanted by the mid-March Ministerial review, in preparation for formal Anglo-French governmental talks. And, in February, BOAC produced its Blue Book, the most comprehensive of its studies on Concorde. Chart 13, for instance, showed that with five Concordes BOAC would need £60,000,000 more in capital and two fewer 747s than if it had an all subsonic fleet. The book produced little positive response. Then a few days later came the failure of Rolls-Royce.5 This created extremely serious concern as the noise problem with the Olympus engines was at that time regarded as intractable. So BOAC told the DTI that as far as it was concerned the situation remained as in Sir Charles Hardie’s letter of 10 October 1970: BOAC could not consider investing the required capital when the investment could not measure up to the standards the Government had set for judging such action. In mid-February 1971, Sir Charles Hardie, under pressure to state BOAC’s requirements for Concordes before the Ministerial review in March, wrote to Sir Max Brown, the Permanent Secretary of the DTI, that the situation had not changed from that in his letter of 1 October 1970, but noted: We do wish to become a supersonic carrier as soon as this is practicable and profitable. It is quite clear to my Board, however, that on the basis of current knowledge the financial return on the operation of these aircraft would be inadequate and their effect upon our overall profitability would be adverse. Nor, indeed, could an application for capital expenditure approval measure up to the standards required of us.

At the same time, BOAC told BAC that the obstacles were too great to be overcome, unless special arrangements were concluded. Moreover, the Board was told that detailed Concorde studies showed that with four aircraft operating to New York, Johannesburg, and Tokyo, the Concorde loss for the years 1975–1976 to 1980–1981 would be £38,000,000 to £44,000,000 compared to an all-subsonic profit of £170,000,000, nor was there enough traffic to justify a service to Sydney. In mid-March 1971 the situation had become of such concern to the Cabinet that the whole Concorde programme was under the scrutiny of the Central Policy Review Staff of the Cabinet Office. They sent Granville a list of thirty-two questions on the aircraft’s safety, to which he responded by marking all with an

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A, which meant, “Ask someone else.” BOAC had as yet had no experience with the aircraft, though the prototype had first flown on 2 March 1969. Granville replied to a second questionnaire that all the answers were, in fact, in the BOAC Concorde Blue Book, a copy of which had been sent to the Staff. He did provide information for a third, commercial questionnaire, but BOAC never saw any results or any rebuttal. In April the Board agreed that BOAC should not sign a purchase contract unless it was assured that Concorde would be allowed to operate in and out of New York and to fly supersonically over sparsely populated territories. On the 22nd, without consulting BOAC or Air France, the British and the French governments agreed to proceed with the production of Nos. 7 to 10 and to order materials for more Concordes. In September 1971, with summer leave over, the DTI called a meeting because it was anxious that BOAC order Concordes before Air France did, though it had no means to find out what was happening on the other side of the Channel. However, it suggested that BOAC might receive the same sort of lump-sum payment for a specific period that BEA was getting for buying Tridents instead of Boeing 727s. In October BOAC gathered that Air France’s economic analyses were much the same as its own, and BOAC also pointed out to Lord Rothschild and the Central Policy Review Staff that the high fares and load factors that they had assumed fell outside the realm of probability, especially when the real development was taking place in comfortable, low-fare aircraft. BOAC also reminded the Cabinet staff that, in response to a question in the House on 10 April 1972, Anthony Grant had replied for the DTI that as far as a BOAC service to China was concerned, “. . . the question of a subsidy is hypothetical; BOAC is expected to run its operations on a commercial basis.”6 BOAC wanted to talk to other airlines about an operating consortium, but was discouraged by the Government from doing so. In January 1972 it was becoming evident that not only were there many important world airfields at which Concorde could not operate, there were also a number of countries that were prohibiting supersonic over-flight. This was very much of concern to BOAC, and at the Board meeting on 21 January, the Chairman laid out a set of conditions which he felt the Government had to meet for BOAC to buy Concordes. These included assurances of operating rights at named airports and on the desired routes, and runway improvements at selected airfields and alternatives. Moreover, with memories of the Comet 1s, BOAC wanted limited liability and the write-off of capital without inquiry in case of losses. All of these concerns were relayed both to the DTI and to the newly created British Airways Board on 1 February. The letter was discussed at a meeting at the Department of Trade and Industry on the 4th, when BOAC was told that it was firm Government policy to go ahead with Concorde and that BOAC and Air France were expected to place orders. However, the Government would not issue a Direction as it did not want to prejudice foreign sales. By the Board meeting on 18 February it had become obvious to BOAC that an impasse had been reached. The Government

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360 S p e e d b i r d could not assure BOAC that the remaining technical problems would be overcome and was unwilling to issue any guidance to BOAC where purchase was concerned in terms of the letter of 1 January 1964—the Magna Carta. Nevertheless, BOAC felt it would be forced to make a decision in April. As a precaution, the Board asked for a comprehensive document to be prepared which would state BOAC’s case. A draft of this long work was discussed with the DTI on 15 March and approved by the Board on the 24th, accepted by the British Airways Board and sent by its Chairman on 28 April 1972. In it BOAC stressed that Concorde would have an adverse affect upon the Corporation’s finances to the extent of hindering its expansion in its normal markets, not to mention the fact that there would be a shortfall in cash flow. Based on the fact that even when all BOAC estimates had favoured Concorde where any doubts existed, the position appeared to be that in eight years the SST would cost BOAC £44,000,000 and would require between £175,000,000 and £220,000,000 in total financing. Moreover, the document went on to point out that: Historically, Public Dividend Capital has presumably only been granted when there has been a determined possibility that dividends are likely to be achieved. This Concorde case is different and it therefore follows that if all such monies are required to be in the form of Public Dividend Capital, as has been suggested to us, then satisfactory arrangements need to be made to enable BOAC to pay a commercial rate of return on its capital. Additionally, if this is not done BOAC will be liable to criticism on its achievements because the overall return on net assets which BOAC is likely to achieve with Concordes operating in the fleet will consistently be lower than is commercially desirable.

It was then further suggested that BOAC would have to be reimbursed for its lost capital while operating Concordes, as would normally be commercially prudent; and that at the end of eight and a half years, if not earlier, the aircraft should be taken over by RAF Support Command, with the price to be the full cost plus spares and the dividends paid on the capital in question. In the meantime, it was learned that BOAC would be unable to pool its aircraft with those of Air France as the so-called ATLAS group (Air France, TAP, Lufthansa, Alitalia, and SABENA) aircraft design had already been frozen and the flight decks would be incompatible. Then, in March, QANTAS, whose calculations had been similar to BOAC’s, appeared to be losing interest. On 23 April 1972 a meeting was held at the DTI at which the Secretary of State, John Davies, had accepted that Government support for BOAC purchase and operation of the Concorde was necessary, but still foresaw problems if the fact or extent of such help became known publicly. It was then agreed that work should be put in hand at once to find the appropriate formula, including a draft letter which the Chairman of the British Airways Board could send to the Secretary of State, welcoming such discussions and enclosing for the record a copy of the draft

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letter of 24 March, which would serve as a basis for such discussions. It was also noted that the DTI view was that the Government felt that BOAC’s entry into a full operating consortium would hurt sales, but a spares pool would be acceptable. On 27 April 1972 “E.G.J.” (Granville) of BOAC had a conversation with the Minister, Michael Heseltine, in which the Minister indicated that he thought 6 per cent on the £200,000,000 loan would be satisfactory and he wanted to set the pace with the announcement of the British order for Concorde before that of the French; if BOAC did not cooperate, it would be leaked that while Air France was pushing, BOAC was not. At any rate, he was going to make the decision before the end of May. The Board reacted that it was one thing to be enterprising, another to be reckless, especially when it involved £200,000,000 capital. On 3 May the Minister lunched at BOAC and told Granville that it was the duty of the British Airways Board and of BOAC to act in the national interest and take Concorde; when Granville reminded him that BOAC’s mandate was to act commercially, he declared that that was a totally out-of-date conception. Granville at once sent a record of the exchange to the Chairman of the British Airways Board, David Nicolson, with the comment that in view of the fact that another Minister had on 10 April reaffirmed the letter of 1 January 1964, the commercial “Magna Carta,” he thought the whole matter had better be cleared up.7 Nicolson agreed as the British Airways Board’s mandate said nothing about acting in the public or national interest. On 3 May (the record says the 5th, but there are reasons to suspect that this is not correct) at the Minister for Aerospace’s insistence, a “confrontation” was held in the old BOAC Board Room in Airways Terminal, Victoria, at which BOAC and BAC presented their irreconcilable figures. Mr. Heseltine and others from the DTI were present. The BOAC figures came from the February 1971 Blue Book as amended on 14 October 1971, and copies of the slides used were sent to the DTI for record on 10 May. Predictably, BAC’s figures were more favourable to BOAC’s operating results than were the Corporation’s own. This was nothing new, but the Minister ordered a detailed comparison. As a result of this exercise, the arrangements already referred to were confirmed, with the object of making a BOAC order for Concorde possible. On Friday 12 May there was a full meeting at the Ministry at which Granville stuck to BOAC’s guns for adequate compensation (£4,000,000 per aircraft per year) for pioneering; Geoffrey Knight of BAC said that that would not hurt, and that it had been done with the BAC One-Eleven; the Minister said that it would make potential buyers think Britain was dumping unwanted technology on them and it would make it harder to negotiate route rights. Then a deadlock ensued over the debt-to-equity capital ratio. The Minister thought that 40:60 public division capital (PDC) was about right, whereas BOAC and the British Airways Board wanted not only a 35:65 debt-to-equity ratio, but also up to £75,000,000 which could be drawn upon to cover BOAC’s worsening results. The meeting ended with the Minister asking BOAC to bring the draft of his “BOAC-buying-Concorde”

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105. The Concorde cruise profile.

statement for the Commons back on Monday 15 May, with answers to potential questions. On that day another meeting took place at the Commons with the British Airways Board present in force. The DTI admitted that noise problems remained. The British Airways Board had one of its Members, Sir Ronald Edwards, present a letter which the Minister could send to it, allowing the Government to reimburse BOAC for lost capital out of dividends with a subvention only if losses exceeded those amounts, the aircraft themselves being provided on free loan. The Minister accepted the letter “except for about thirty words”—and those embodied the principles. He further said that he would include in his statement to the House that BOAC would accept Concorde in the national interest; he would refer to BOAC’s forecasts, but would provide no figures so as not to denigrate the aircraft, though it was pointed out that Air France was getting sensible financing. He avoided the problem of route rights because the Ministry had not yet tackled that thorny subject, which frustrated services to Singapore in December 1977. The atmosphere at BOAC was gloomy on the afternoon of 15 May. BOAC was faced with a classic problem. It could either demand a subsidy and damage the sales prospects of the aircraft, or it could ruin the Corporation’s economic performance by accepting it. Or it could let Air France get all the glory of going supersonic first. At six o’clock on the evening of 16 May, Minister Heseltine read to BOAC’s representatives the statement he proposed to make to the House of Commons, and on the 18th he gave them a shortened version which essentially announced that BOAC would buy five Concordes for £115,000,000 at 1974 prices, and that there

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would be a new infusion of capital to cover this and the purchase of wide-bodied aircraft. On the basis of the assurances of the 16th, and a meeting between Chairman Granville and the Minister on the 18th, the Board agreed on Friday 19 May to accept Granville’s recommendation to purchase five Concordes and to proceed, believing that with all the exchange of correspondence, including the BOAC Concorde Blue Book of February 1971 and the presentation of 3 May 1972, “There was therefore no possibility of misunderstanding.” On 24 May, after the BOAC Board went on record as believing it had received satisfactory assurances, the Chairman of the British Airways Board, Nicolson, wrote to the Minister. The Minister, Heseltine, made his statement to the House on the 25th. It differed from the agreed text of the 18th in that he said that: For BOAC there is the need to expand its subsonic fleet and, of course, the great challenge of Concorde. The Government, having weighed all the relevant investment considerations, believe that an investment in Concorde is in the interests of the country and the travelling public and that BOAC should lead the world in the introduction of civil supersonic flight. This being so, I am glad to tell the House that BOAC is today announcing that it will shortly place an order for five Concordes for use on a major part of its route network. The investment in these aircraft with spares and associated equipment will be £115 million at estimated 1974 prices. This purchase has been endorsed by the British Airways Board and I have given my approval. The whole House is aware that in the pioneering of any radical departure in types of aircraft there are bound to be financial risks. With supersonic flying many of these uncertainties are at present quite unquantifiable, and, indeed, some are outside airlines’ control. The Government will, of course, do all they can at the appropriate time to ensure the successful operation of Concorde on BOAC’s chosen routes. The air corporations will be faced, like other major world airlines, with a number of challenging uncertainties over the next few years, of which Concorde is only one. It is the Government’s task to provide the British Airways Board with a capital structure which will enable it to meet this challenge. We have in particular to give the board a sensible debt–equity ratio having regard to that existing in foreign airlines. The board’s present debt-to-equity ratio, 66:34, is considerably higher than is normal in world airlines. I consider a ratio of around 35:65 to 50:50 would be appropriate for the board. To achieve this range the Government have decided that the requirements of the board for new external capital will be met in the next two or three years by means of issues of public dividend capital, under Section 43 of the Act, to a total of approximately £200 million; that this facility will be available for refinancing existing debt as it matures as well as for financing new capital projects; and that the ratio will be maintained within the range thereafter by means of further issues of public dividend capital to finance a part of the board’s capital expenditure.

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364 S p e e d b i r d I have also agreed that the Government will be prepared to review the financial position periodically with the board in the light of the outcome of the board’s operations and of the conditions prevailing in international civil aviation at the time; and, if necessary, to take steps to ensure that the board maintains a sound financial performance. It would, of course, be perfectly open to the BAB to refer in its published reports and accounts to the way in which various assumptions made at the time of its equipment purchases had worked out in practice.

On the 26th the Minister took “due note” of Nicolson’s letter of the 24th. On the same day, Granville reported to the BOAC Board. In this case the Board of BOAC thought it had been given proper assurances. And both Sir Keith Granville and Ross Stainton, in January 1977, said that what made them agree to order five Concordes was the combination of these and the profit forecasts of the Overseas Division of British Airways (as BOAC would become by the time it would be operating Concordes). The latter seemed sufficient for BOAC to afford a £5,000,000 loss for pioneering supersonic travel. And this proved true, at least for the first year, when in 1976–1977 British Airways’ four Concordes, denied New York, lost £8,000,000 on an 86 per cent load factor, going only to Bahrain and Washington and Overseas Division’s profit for that year being £55,000,000. BOAC bought the Concorde with Nicolson’s approval as the British Airways Board had no funds. It bought the supersonic transport to protect its good name and it bought it to gain experience in case there was a follow-on aircraft. But when it made that decision, it had not expected that it would have the monopoly of Concorde services in and out of Britain. The remainder of BOAC’s negotiations concerning Concorde dealt mostly with a contract with BAC, a process which dragged on until 28 July. While the details were being worked out, BOAC continued to worry that the Government would give away traffic rights (which it would do) in return for allowing Concorde overflights at supersonic speeds or to boost sales of the aircraft. The Concorde Project Coordination Committee was activated on 27 June, the day after the contract should have been signed, to process the aircraft into service. The signing of the contract for the five Concordes was delayed because prices escalated from £115,000,000 to £121,000,000 in the first month after the announcement of BOAC’s intention to buy. BOAC queried the Government once again as the figures showed the aircraft becoming even more uneconomic, but was assured that the Government still wanted BOAC to take Concordes. The Minister noted that as the public dividend capital was available to the British Airways Board, it was up to it to allocate funds to BOAC for Concorde, upon which BOAC would have to pay interest. The Board of BOAC responded that that was not the basis upon which their decision had been reached and noted that BOAC had already been forced to dip into its cash reserves to make the down payment on the aircraft. The British Airways Board then supplied BOAC with and made compensation for loss of interest on the reserve cash.

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As the most profitable route appeared to be London–Johannesburg, the Government showed an interest in helping the Nigerians develop the runway at Lagos for Concorde services. But when the cost estimates reached £3,000,000, enthusiasm waned quickly. In February 1973 BOAC was forced to point out that the following were “Major Matters Outstanding”: 1. The effect of other airlines’ cancellations on the price and delivery dates of BOAC aircraft; 2. The acceptability of Concorde noise levels at Heathrow; 3. Whether or not Concorde could use John F. Kennedy Airport in New York; 4. Whether Lagos would be usable on time and whether sonic boom corridors would be established across the Sahara, Angola, South-West Africa, Botswana, and South Africa; 5. Whether a Soviet airport, preferably Norilsk, would be available for a onestop London–Tokyo service; 6. Whether boom-corridors would be established on the London–Australia route to enable Concorde to compete with “cannon-ball” one-stop operations by long-range wide-body aircraft [such as the 747 and 747SP]; 7. Whether air-traffic-control procedures would be established to enable Concorde to operate economically; 8. Whether traffic and over-flying rights were secure for Concorde on all projected routes. Indeed, some of these questions had not been settled even in 1978. Meanwhile, in January 1973 BOAC forecast in-service dates starting with a daily operation to New York on 31 May 1975. But already new low fares on widebodies made Concorde less attractive, and when at the end of the year fuel prices skyrocketed, the economic assessment of the aircraft became even worse, despite its pilot and passenger appeal and substantial technical achievement, for, as Pierre Sparaco noted in 2010 in Aviation Week, “to cross the Atlantic, Concorde consumed about 1 metric ton of JP4 per passenger.”8 Then Pan Am and TWA, faced with mounting losses, postponed their options for Concordes. In March BOAC objected to having to pay for alterations to Terminal 3 at Heathrow because the Minister for Aerospace thought Concorde passengers should be given preferential treatment. Greater cooperation developed with Air France, not only over Concorde matters, but also in other areas. On the other hand, in May QANTAS dropped completely out of the Concorde picture, and BOAC became increasingly concerned about the burden of meeting its profitability requirements and its target of making a 12.5 per cent return on fixed assets. In June BAC said that ensuring the compatibility of Air France and BOAC aircraft would cost £400,000 per aircraft and an eleven-month delay, and the DTI said it was optimistic about getting Concorde supersonic over-flight and airport clearances abroad. The Minister suggested that the British Airways Board send him a new route map each month marked to show progress.

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366 S p e e d b i r d In October there was a new Concorde Director-General at the DTI, and in that month BOAC was told by BAC that it would deliver one Concorde a month from September 1975 to January 1976 at a price escalation of £2,000,000. On 20 November 1973 the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry told the members of the British Airways Board that he believed the Ministry should go slow in obtaining operating rights for Concorde; this did not calm the fears of the BOAC Board, and it said so. The British Airways Board initiated a Concorde review in the light of spiralling fuel costs in December. At the same time, Management suggested withdrawing fuel supplies from Concorde training for the benefit of other operations. In January 1974 BAC claimed a six-week excusable delay in the delivery of Concordes because of industrial action, in addition to the DTI, BOAC, and BAC having argued about costs, and the manufacturers proposing a new longer-ranged aircraft, starting with No. 15. In February the Board was informed that because of escalation and fuel prices, the expected loss on the five-aircraft fleet was likely to be £30,000,000 per annum. In March, after the Conservatives lost the election, Sir Peter Thornton of the DTI suggested that a meeting with the Minister would be appropriate when one was appointed, as all the assumptions upon which the Concorde purchase of May 1972 were based were now invalid. But, apparently none took place before the Minister made his announcement on the 18th (Hansard Cols. 666–676).9 Mr. Anthony Wedgwood Benn pointed out that the latest total estimate for the development of Concorde was £1,070,000,000 at January 1974 prices with another £130,000,000 still to be spent in the United Kingdom. He noted that British Airways saw Concorde as substantially worsening its results, that its noise level would be about that of the 707 and VC-10, but higher than that of the new subsonic aircraft, and that uncertainty existed as to whether the aircraft would be acceptable at New York’s JFK Airport, Tokyo, or Sydney. He then went on to give figures to show what continued production and development costs were likely to be, and noted that the manufacturers were usually low in their estimates, and that the French refused to go for developing a new wing. He also made a point that the statement and its written insertion revealed more to Parliament than his Conservative predecessors had made available. All of the delays did enable BOAC to meet Government demands for reduced capital expenditure, while protecting the 747 purchases. No further decision was made before BOAC was merged into British Airways. But the rest of the story can be briefly told. The cost of development rose to at least £1,000,000,000. British Airways started flights to Bahrain on 21 January 1976, and the first Concorde service to Washington took place on 24 May 1976 after it was banned in New York. The British Minister of State for Industry, Gerald Kaufman, appeared before a hearing held by the US Secretary of Transportation, who then ruled in Concorde’s favour for sixteen months’ experimental operations out of Washington’s Dulles Airport.10 Flights into New York finally started on 22 November 1977.

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In October 1977 it was announced by the French Government that Air France would receive a subsidy for flying Concordes of something like £30,000,000 per annum.11 And on 2 November the British and French governments announced that no more Concordes would be built beyond the sixteen then completed or under construction. At the end of 1977, New York rights had been granted by the US Courts and Concordes had passed noise tests at John F. Kennedy Airport, but Malaysia had refused to grant over-flying rights and the Singapore service had to be suspended after but a few flights. Like the VC-10, Concorde was a dream to fly; also recalling the VC-10 experience, much of the programme was eventually cancelled—but not before BOAC had been induced again to order an aircraft it did not want and had proved to be uneconomical, and was forced to take without airtight financial safeguards. The legacy to British Airways looked remarkably like that which Sir Matthew Slattery inherited—a prestige problem-child. But, unlike the VC-10, Concorde was technically ahead of the competition, though hopelessly uneconomic, until the new wide-bodies appeared in service in 1975. (R. E. G. Davies comments that the VC-10, properly supported with one-tenth of the efforts made by H. M. Government, Slattery, and BAC in support of Concorde, could have gained a useful share of the 707/DC-8/CV 880 market.) Concorde remains a brilliant technical achievement, yet nevertheless a political plane, whose sales or leasing were directly linked to concepts of acceptable noise levels at airports and sonic boom over-flight rights. This, Davies adds, “was the outstanding factor that should have killed the Concorde, as the market was automatically restricted solely to trans-Atlantic routes—it did not have transPacific range.” Problems which BOAC had correctly anticipated in its last decade remained unresolved because of a lack of foresight and drive by those outside the Corporation.

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106. Sir Keith Granville, BOAC Chairman, 1971–1974

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Chapter XV Concluding the BOAC Story In writing the history of any large organization, there is always the problem of selectivity. The story of BOAC has been no exception. The operational history and that of the staff who spent their lives making sure that BOAC took good care of its customers has necessarily had to be neglected, but the material is available for an illustrated operational history. The concentration in this book has been on the higher direction of the Corporation, because this is the first time (with this manuscript accepted by British Airways in late 1978) that the intimate history of a nationalized airline has been possible. The story suggests the RAF’s motto, Per Ardua, Ad Astra—Through Toil to the Stars. As in all things, success can be measured in a variety of ways, and in this case the best measure is probably profits and productivity. Assessment must also be made of the forces that contributed to the end result, a highly profitable, professionally run, long-haul airline.

The Government, 1939–1974 John Dos Passos in 1919 noted that those who do not read history are apt to repeat it. This certainly seems clear from the study of the British Government’s management, if that is the word, of Britain’s overseas airlines. That British airlines could not compete against themselves and against foreigners was amply demonstrated in 1923, so Imperial Airways was formed in 1924. That it was wasteful and inefficient to have competing national airlines trying to fly both long-haul and short-haul routes was realized in 1938, and so the Conservatives created BOAC. These are stories already set out in my Britain’s Imperial Air Routes, 1918–1939. But those are by no means the last turns of the historical cycles. Both the Churchill and the Attlee governments at the end of the Second World War had very confused ideas about overseas air transport because three forces outside of BOAC were at work—RAF Transport Command, the shipping companies, and the railway interests. It was Labour which then made three basic decisions, all of them wrong in the long run. First, there was the division of BOAC’s potential into the three Corporations: BOAC, BEA and BSAA, though as R. E. G. Davies has noted to the author, “this was not the error,” but rather “the divisional problem was in Management .  .  . [Lord] Douglas [and Peter] Masefield showed how to support a British product—Viscount—and succeed.” Second, there was the uncommercial Treasury ruling that BOAC could not buy more than six Constellations and could not finance them out of dollar earnings.

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370 S p e e d b i r d Third, there was Pakenham of Labour’s opening of the dyke with the admission of the Independents to Associate status with the Corporations. History quickly repeated itself with the compulsory absorption of BSAA into BOAC in 1949 and much less rapidly with the eventual merger of BOAC and BEA in 1974. History also shows that the Constellation decision was only one of a series of misguided economic decisions made by people both at the Ministry and at the Treasury who were unfamiliar with airlines, were not currency experts, and not responsible for the results. As the Management of BOAC so adequately proved, running an airline is a highly professional business which should not be controlled by a transient company of Ministers and civil servants as such a system is inimical to commercial operations. And history has shown too that all the actions taken by both Labour and Conservative governments to preserve the Independents by letting them feed like parasites on the Corporations have not in the end saved them from inexorable economic and political forces. It is evident in the study of British airlines, Imperial Airways, and BOAC in particular, that Ministerial decisions have generally not been in the best interests of either “the chosen instrument” or the nation, even though “the national interest” has often been given as the reason for such decisions, nor have they provided a Direction. The other side of the coin is that the Board Members of BOAC failed to stand up to Ministerial pressure on a number of key occasions, but that when they did, BOAC benefitted. The patterns of Government actions in relation to BOAC can be divided roughly into four chronological periods. The first was the Second World War, in which BOAC was under Government direction. This was followed by postwar reconstruction from 1946 to 1964, when there was a lack of clear direction on both the Government’s and BOAC’s parts, resulting in the accumulation of a vast “lost capital”—upon which, nevertheless, BOAC was always expected to pay interest. The third period covered the sound years from the financial reconstruction of 1966 to the implementation of the Edwards Report and the Concorde purchase, the great period of commercial judgments and high profitability. And in the last period, 1971– 1972 to 31 March 1974, the Second Force was created and Concorde purchased. In the Second World War the Government was concentrating on the war and at first took the view led by Harold Balfour that air transport had nothing to contribute and so cancelled new airliners, fragmented BOAC, took its resources, and otherwise largely ignored it. Then it expected it to achieve the impossible, and when it could not, turned to Transport Command and to American aircraft. Nevertheless, the BOAC Management did persuade the Government that it had to look ahead, and by the end of the war BOAC was on the rise again. But with the return to peacetime, the Corporation once again became vulnerable in the House of Commons and the Press; although the Minister was responsible for it, BOAC was rarely throughout its career either defended by its guardian or allowed (and this was partly self-inhibition) to develop its own full-fledged public relations counterattack to make its case before Parliament, the public, and the Press.

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After the war, the critical decisions were frequently taken for the wrong reasons, especially in connection with the purchase of aircraft. It cannot be denied that the prestige of British aircraft, the overseas earnings of aviation exports, and unemployment in Britain were and remained cogent reasons for BOAC to “fly British.” But even better reasons, as Rolls-Royce has long demonstrated, are that the product is not only reliable and available on time, but also the best in the world. Too often a decision that required BOAC to buy the wrong aircraft at the wrong time was made by the Government, and on occasion by the Board, because what was thought to be in the immediate national interest was given more emphasis than it deserved. The great heyday of BOAC really came when the Magna Carta of 1 January 1964, Amery’s letter, finally clearly stated what BOAC’s mission was—to be commercial. And the fact that this coincided with the long-desired rationalization of the fleet into essentially one composed of two types and their variants allowed the Corporation to take real advantage of the rising air traffic market in both passengers and cargo. The heyday also coincided with the growing realization in Parliament and the Treasury that the management of nationalized industries had been mishandled by the Government. After 1964, BOAC was able to buy suitable aircraft off the shelf on a two-year lead time, thus enormously reducing the risks. The last period, ushered in by the Edwards Report, saw a new set of Ministers proceeding, under domestic political pressure, to create another Second Force airline in the wake of British United’s move to sell out to BOAC, and to make it viable by slicing off some of BOAC’s profitable routes without compensation to the Corporation or the taxpayer. And lastly, the circumstances under which BOAC was pressed by the Minister into buying Concorde, and the economic theory under which it was to be financed, seemed to repeat especially the VC-10 purchase and to fly in the face of both the new wide-bodied aircraft’s appeal and rising fuel prices. The evidence of thirty years of amateur management of the national economy in war and peace suggests that airlines, whether nationalized or not, should be run professionally as free enterprises, for the best return on investment. Certainly the results for the twenty-eight years when there were measurable results, show that when allowed to be commercial, and to remain largely free from governmental policy guidance and financial control, BOAC achieved estimable results. In all fairness, it must be noted that on the technical side, close cooperation between BOAC and middle Management in the Civil Service in technical matters generally led to mutual respect and friendship, as well as outstanding safety. Particularly notable has been cooperation in air traffic control and in relations with the former Air Registration Board, a professional organization held in world-wide respect.

Board and Management, 1939–1974 The higher direction of BOAC itself must be divided into five periods, which almost coincide with Chairmanships. It also had a strong supporting layer of top Management, whose interwoven longevity is a steel strand running continuously

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372 S p e e d b i r d from Imperial Airways and British Airways (1936) before the Secord World War to the new British Airways of 1971–1974 onward. The Reith–Pearson–Runciman regime struggled to establish BOAC, but was overcome by events and resigned to emphasize the need to plan for peace, because that was a longer-term affair with more world-wide complications than concern with the next Parliamentary elections. The Knollys regime then led BOAC from 1943 to the end of the war and started the postwar reconstruction. Sir Harold Hartley began to move the Corporation toward its status as a real airline, but was hampered by the aircraft of the day and by Treasury rulings, though not by age (at 69, when he became Chairman, he was about the same age as many Prime Ministers at the time). The third period, and possibly the most exciting, was when Sir Miles Thomas moved to do away with subsidy and to rely on the profitability of the Comet to usher in a new era. Sadly, he was plagued by a series of tragedies. His regime had been profitable, but more mundane problems than the Comet were encountered—notably the high costs of Engineering and Maintenance, which were only beginning to be tackled when he left. His regime also had a continuity with the postwar period in that the Corporation was still using wartime aircraft, and it was still seriously hampered by having too many types. The fourth period is hard to define, for it can be said to cover the d’Erlanger and Slattery regimes, the period when Smallpeice was Managing Director, or it can

107. A Boeing 747-100, introduced in 1969 and still, in 2010, 747s were the backbone of the long-haul fleet.

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108. A Boeing 747 cockpit before the introduction of glass flat-panel electronic flight displays.

be considered to stop in 1960, with the Slattery regime’s inclusion in the period of success, 1960–1974. The reason for this ambiguity lies in the five-year cycles of change. The d’Erlanger period was burdened with high engineering costs and a wide variety of types in the wake of the disasters to the Comet 1. It was also the period of multiple problems with the Associated Companies and the rising independence of the former colonies, which ended cabotage routes at the same time that Ministers insisted that the Independents share the African traffic and opposed the buyout by BOAC they desired. However, in the fourth period, daily operations and engineering costs were being brought under control, long-range planning was going forward, Management techniques and training improved, market research was in progress, and computers were coming into use, as were the 707s, the first of the real money-making big jets. For a long time the BOAC higher direction had suffered a mental block in its attitude, which Imperial Airways had been abolishing with the Empire flyingboats: that the same aircraft could not do both the trans-Atlantic and the Empire routes. BOAC Management’s attitude was a milder form of the provincialism which so affected the Government.

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374 S p e e d b i r d Perhaps the real turning point in BOAC’s fortunes came with the appointment of Sir Matthew Slattery as Chairman. With long experience in both aircraft procurement and business, and with the new management of BOAC Associated Companies, he was able to undertake drastic reforms while encouraging the cost-cutting already underway. He had, however, three misfortunes to overcome: d’Erlanger’s hasty order for the Super VC-10 (which Slattery should have accepted as a “done deal,” and he had the authority to promote, not to denigrate the VC-10. Slattery’s off-the-cuff sneers cost Britain many a VC-10 order1); the Minister’s appointment first of the Swash and then of the Corbett Inquiries; and his own salty tongue. So, like Pearson, he was driven to resignation, and Smallpeice and Neden went with him. Sad as it was, this did the trick. Sir Giles Guthrie came in with his Magna Carta, the cancellation of the VC-10 orders was given serious attention, and the capital was reconstructed. Planning was improved, the Jumbos bought, and by good luck the Concorde decision delayed. All of this coincided with a lull in Parliamentary activity as study after study showed ill-trained Ministers concerned with minutiae and not with over-all policy management, the Treasury in error, and the nationalized industries better run by underpaid professionals than the public had been led to suspect. The Guthrie regime also enjoyed the benefits of Management’s hard work under Slattery and Smallpeice, and of the mid-Sixties’ boom in air travel and cargo shipments. Guthrie, moreover, wisely recognized that there was a very sound professional team in BOAC that was perfectly capable of running a profitable airline without outside interference. By the end of the period this Management group had risen to the point where it was dominating BOAC from Chairman Granville and Stainton on down, and when they and others moved to the British Airways Board and then formed an important part of British Airways.

Other Patterns A great deal has been said about aircraft procurement. Here perhaps all that need be noted is that the immense disruption of the fledgling BOAC caused by the Second World War and the “Fly British” policy meant that twenty-five of the Corporation’s thirty-five years were spent trying to get back to the Imperial Airways ideal of a two-type fleet. Profitability has generally coincided with a fleet comprising the fewest types possible. On the other hand, as the story of punctuality demonstrated, some of the weaknesses that affected financial results proved to be in unsophisticated areas such as motor vehicle maintenance, terminal facilities, employment, and working conditions. Route structures varied and pools changed, and the combination of these as formalized in bilateral treaties and pooling agreements became the heart and soul of BOAC’s commercial side. Inevitably, of course, BOAC’s general route patterns were affected by the arbitrary slicing-off of the profitable West African services. In terms of maintaining the Commonwealth spirit, a great deal of credit must go to

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109. 110. The interior of a 1947 Avro York (top) and of a 1970 Boeing 747-100 (bottom) to the same scale (look at the seats), to illustrate the improvements.

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376 S p e e d b i r d

111. By 1970 it was becoming obvious that there was an overlap between BOAC and BEA. This joint advertisement tried to damp down some of the criticism.

the pools which BOAC negotiated; often these were the means of enabling former British colonies to satisfy their craving for prestige without going bankrupt. BOAC’s role as a leader in the export business and in the sale of computer software was recognized by the Queen’s Awards to Industry for 1971 and 1972. Many other contributions could be listed if space permitted, for the Speedbird story was one of continuity, struggle, and success against many odds, both foreign and domestic.

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Appendix A British Governments by Prime Minister 28 May 1937–11 May 1940 11 May 1940–23 May 1945 23 May 1945–26 July 1945 26 July 1945–26 Oct. 1951 26 Oct. 1951–7 Apr. 1955 7 Apr. 1955–13 Jan. 1957 13 Jan. 1957–20 Oct. 1963 20 Oct. 1963–16 Oct. 1964 16 Oct. 1964–24 June 1970 24 June 1970–1 Mar. 1974 1 Mar. 1974–5 Apr. 1976

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Neville Chamberlain (Conservative) Winston Churchill (National) Winston Churchill (Conservative) Clement Attlee (Labour) Winston Churchill (Conservative) Anthony Eden (Conservative) Harold Macmillan (Conservative) Alexander Douglas-Home (Conservative) Harold Wilson (Labour) Edward Heath (Conservative) Harold Wilson (Labour)

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Appendix B Ministers Responsible for Air and Aviation, 1939–1974 Secretary of State for Air, January 1919–September 1944 Apr. 1940 Rt. Hon. Sir Kingsley Wood Apr. 1940–May 1940 Rt. Hon. Sir Samuel J. G. Hoare, Bt. (later Lord Templewood) May 1940–May 1945 Rt. Hon. Sir Archibald Sinclair, Bt. G.M.G. (later Lord Thurso) Minister of Civil Aviation, September 1944–October 1951 Sept. 1944–July 1945 Rt. Hon. Baron Swinton, G.B.E., M.C. (created Earl, 1955) Aug. 1945–Sept. 1946 Rt. Hon. Baron Winster Oct. 1946–May 1948 Rt. Hon. Baron Nathan, T.D. June 1948–May 1951 Rt. Hon. Baron Pakenham May 1951–Oct. 1951 Rt. Hon. Baron Ogmore, T.D. Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation, October 1951–October 1959 Oct. 1951–May 1952 Rt. Hon. J. S. Maclay, C.M.G. May 1952–Oct. 1954 Rt. Hon. A. T. Lennox-Boyd, D.L. Nov. 1954–Dec. 1955 Rt. Hon. J. A. Boyd-Carpenter Dec. 1955–Oct. 1959 Rt. Hon. H. A. Watkinson Minister of Aviation, October 1959–July 1966 Oct. 1959–July 1960 Rt. Hon. Duncan Sandys July 1960–July 1962 Capt. the Rt. Hon. Peter Thorneycroft July 1962–Oct. 1964 Rt. Hon. Julian Amery, Oct. 1964–Dec. 1965 Rt. Hon. Roy Jenkins Jan. 1966–June 1966 Rt. Hon. Fred Mulley June 1966–Feb. 1967 Rt. Hon. John Stonehouse Board of Trade, July 1966–May 1971 July 1966–Feb. 1968 Rt. Hon. Douglas Jay as President Feb. 1968–June 1970 Rt. Hon Anthony Crosland as President June 1970–May 1971 Rt. Hon. John Davies as Secretary of Trade and Industry and President of the Board of Trade

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M i n i s t e r s R e s p o n s i b l e f o r A i r a n d Av i at i o n , 1 9 3 9 – 1 9 7 4

381

July 1966–June 1970 Rt. Hon. Roy Mason as Minister of Aviation July 1966–June 1970 Rt. Hon. Anthony Wedgwood Benn as Minister of Technology Oct. 1969–June 1970 Rt. Hon. J. P. W. Mallalieu as Minister of State in the Ministry of Technology June 1970–May 1971 Rt. Hon. Frederick Corfield as Minister of State June 1970–May 1971 Rt. Hon. Michael Noble as Minister for Trade Department of Trade and Industry, May 1971 Onwards May 1971–Oct. 1972 Rt. Hon. John Davies as Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and President of the Board of Trade May 1971–Nov. 1972 Rt. Hon. Frederick Corfield as Minister for Aerospace May 1971–Nov. 1972 Rt. Hon. Michael Noble as Minister for Trade Apr. 1972–Mar. 1974 Rt. Hon. Michael Heseltine as Minister for Aerospace, and after Nov. 1972 as Minister for Aerospace and Shipping Oct. 1972–Mar. 1974 Rt. Hon. Peter Walker as Minister for Trade Mar. 1974–Apr. 1976 Rt. Hon. Peter Shore as Minister for Trade and President of the Board of Trade; Rt. Hon. Anthony Wedgwood Benn as Minister for Industry

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Appendix C Chairmen of BOAC 24 Aug. 1939–Jan. 1940 Jan. 1940–20 Mar. 1943 25 March–26 May 1943 May 1943–30 June 1947 1 July 1947–30 June 1949 1 July 1949–30 Apr. 1956 1 May 1956–28 July 1960 29 July 1960–31 Dec. 1963 1 Jan. 1964–31 Dec. 1969 1 Jan. 1969–31 Dec. 1970 1 Jan. 1971–30 Mar. 1974

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Sir John Reith Clive Pearson Sir Harold Howitt Lord Knollys Sir Harold Hartley Sir Miles Thomas Gerard d’Erlanger Rear Admiral Sir Matthew Slattery Sir Giles Guthrie Sir Charles Hardie Sir Keith Granville

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Appendix D Members of the Board of BOAC Age on appointment Name 50 52 36 34

Resigned

28 Nov. 1939 24 Nov. 1939

24 Mar. 1943 30 Feb. 1940

24 Nov. 1939 1940

24 Mar. 1943 24 Mar. 1943

6 Mar. 1940

58 56 54

Irving Campbell Geddes Sir Harold Howitt Sir Simon Marks John Marchbank

6 Mar. 1940 24 Mar. 1943 24 Mar. 1943 24 Mar. 1943

48 53

Viscount Knollys Brig. Gen. A[lfred] Critchley Miss Pauline Gower [Mrs. Fahie] Sir Harold Hartley

26 May 1943 26 May 1943 26 May 1943 1 Jan. 1946

Lord Burghley [later Marquess of Exeter] G. M. Garro-Jones [later Lord Trefgarne] Major R. H. Thornton Major J. R. McCrindle Sir Clement W. Jones Lord Rothschild H. L. Newlands Sir Harold Hartley Whitney [Wilfred] Straight Sir Miles Thomas [later Lord Thomas of Remenham]

10 Jan. 1946

31 July 1946 (to BEA) 24 Mar. 1943 31 Mar. 1948 22 Jan. 1946 23 Mar. 1946 (died) 30 June 1947 22 Jan. 1946 22 Jan. 1946 31 July 1946 (to BEA) 31 Mar. 1956

10 Jan. 1946

16 Dec. 1947

10 Jan. 1946 10 Jan. 1946 22 Jan.1946 24 Apr. 1946 18 May 1946 1 July 1947 1 July 1947 1 Apr. 1948

31 Mar.1955 30 June 1958 31 Mar. 1954 30 Sept.1948 31 Mar. 1960 30 June 1949 31 Oct. 1955 30 Apr. 1956

68 41 50 53 51 65 35 48 69 34 51

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Harold George Brown Sir John Reith [Sir John Charles Walsham Reith; later Lord Reith] Hon. [Bernard] Clive Pearson Hon. W[alter] Leslie Runciman [later Lord Runciman of Doxford] Gerard d’Erlanger

Appointed

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384 S p e e d b i r d

Age on appointment Name

Resigned 14 Mar. 1949 (to BEA) 30 Apr. 1965 31 Dec. 1958 (to BOAC AC) 31 Dec. 1959 31 Dec. 1963 20 Nov. 1964 6 June 1964 30 July 1960 30 Apr. 1960 31 Dec. 1963 31 Oct. 1960 31 Aug. 1972 23 July 1961 (died) 19 June 1964 31 Mar. 1964 31 Dec. 1963 7 Jan. 1964 31 Mar. 1974 31 Dec. 1968 31 Dec. 1970 1 Jan. 1970 31 Dec.1970

54

Lord Douglas of Kirtleside

1 Oct. 1948

45 60

John W[ells] Booth Sir Francis Brake

21 Mar. 1949 1 Jan. 1950

62 47 58 43 50 59 65 53 48 57

Sir John W[alker] Stephenson Sir Basil Smallpeice Lord Rennell of Rodd Lord Tweedsmuir Sir Gerard d’Erlanger Sir George Cribbett Sir Wilfred Neden Francis [later Sir Frank] Taylor [Sir] Keith Granville John A. Connell

1 Jan. 1950 30 Sept. 1953 1 Apr. 1954 6 June 1955 1 May 1956 1 May 1956 11 Dec. 1958 11 Dec. 1958 1 Jan. 1959 20 June 1960

65 60 58 57 50 43 58 44 53

Lionel Poole Sir Walter Worboys Sir Matthew Slattery Kenneth Staple Gilbert H. C. Lee Sir Giles Guthrie A. H. [later Sir Anthony] Milward Ron Smith Charles [later Sir Charles] E. M. Hardie Sir Duncan Anderson Sir Arthur G. Norman Lord Normanbrook

20 June 1960 20 June 1960 29 July 1960 18 Jan. 1961 6 Nov. 1961 1 Jan. 1964 1 Jan. 1964 1 Jan. 1964 18 Jan. 1964

B. S. Shenstone G. R. Chetwynd J. Ross Stainton Sir Richard Way Derek Glover Alan Fisher Henry Marking Winston Bray

1 Dec.1964 1 Jan. 1966 16 Sept. 1968 1 Nov. 1967 6 Feb. 1969 2 Jan. 1970 1 Jan. 1971 22 Jan. 1971

62 43 63 58 49 50

50

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Appointed

1 Apr. 1964 20 June 1964 6 June 1964

31 Dec. 1970 21 Dec. 1971 14 June 1967 (died) 31 Dec. 1966 31 Dec. 1973 31 Mar.1974 31 Dec. 1973 21 Dec. 1971 10 Feb. 1972 1 Sept. 1972 31 Dec. 1973

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385

M e m b e r s o f t h e B o a r d o f BOA C

Age on appointment Name 62

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R. M. Hilary Captain Frank Walton Charles Abell P. M. R. Hermon K. W. Reddish R. M. Forrest K. A. Wilkinson P. C. F. Lawton R. Watts Basil Bampfylde

Appointed

Resigned

21 Dec. 1971 21 Dec. 1971 1 Apr. 1972 11 Apr. 1972 1 Sept. 1972 1 Sept. 1972 1 Sept. 1972 27 Dec. 1972 1 Jan. 1974 1 Jan. 1974

31 Mar. 1974 31 Mar. 1974 31 Mar. 1974 1 Sept. 1972 31 Mar. 1974 31 July 1973 30 Nov. 1972 31 Dec. 1973 31 Mar. 1974 31 Mar. 1974

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Appendix E Salaries According to Whitaker’s Almanack Year of Ministry Position and Salary Change 1945

1947 1949 1950 1952 1953 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963

Speedbird.indb 386

BOAC Position and Salary

Minister: £5,000 Parliamentary Secretary: £1,500 Permanent Under-Secretary: £3,000 Deputy Secretary, MCA: £2,200 Permanent Secretary: £3,500 Chairman: £7,500 plus £1,000 Deputy Secretary: £2,500 expenses Deputy Chairman: £3,500 Board Member: £500 Permanent Secretary: £4,500 Board Member: £500–£1,500 Deputy Secretary: £3,250 Minister: £4,000 (Ex-Permanent Secretary on BEA Board: £1,750) Unpaid Chairman: £1,000 expenses Minister: £5,000 Ex-Deputy Secretary Permanent Secretary: £6,000 Deputy Secretaries: £4,250 Chairman: £5,000 plus £1,000 Deputy Chairman: £2,500 plus £500 Managing Director: £5,000 Permanent Secretary: £7,000 Board Members: £0–£1,000 Deputy Secretary: £5,000 Deputy Secretaries: £5,000 Chairman: £8,500 plus £1,000 expenses Managing Director: £6,500 Permanent Secretary: £7,015 Managing Director: £6,500 plus Deputy Secretaries: £5,015 expenses Solicitor: £6,500 plus £1,000 Deputy Chairman: £4,500

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s a l a r i e s a cc o r d i n g t o w h i ta k e r ' s a l m a n a c k

Year of Ministry Position and Salary Change 1964

1966

1967 1968 1969

1970

1971 1972

1973

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Minister: £8,500 Parliamentary Secretary: £3,750 Permanent Secretary: £8,285 Deputy Secretaries: £5,885 Permanent Secretary: £8,600 President of Board of Trade: £8,500 Minister of State: £5,625 Second Secretary: £6,300 Second Permanent Secretary, Board of Trade: £8,100 Under-Secretary (Civil Aviation): £5,250 Permanent Secretary: £9,800 Under-Secretary (Civil Aviation): £6,000 Permanent Secretary: £14,000 Under-Secretary: £6,750

387

BOAC Position and Salary Chairman and Chief Executive: £15,000 Deputy Chairman: £9,500 Deputy Chairman (part-time): £2,500

Chairman (part-time): £5,500 Deputy Chairman and Managing Director: £11,000 Chairman (part-time): £7,500 Deputy Chairman: £17,000 Chairman: £17,000 Deputy Chairman (part-time): £2,000 Managing Director: £12,000 Chairman and Chief Executive: £19,000 Deputy Chairman: £15,000

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Appendix F BOAC Companies Subsidiaries

Date Registered

British Airways (Iberia) Ltd.

29 Jan. 1936

Imperial Airways (Continental), Ltd. The Airways Housing Trust, Ltd.

British South American Airways, Ltd. Aden Airways Ltd.

Arab Airways ( Jerusalem) Ltd. Bahamas Airways Ltd.

Nassau Aviation Co. Ltd.

British West Indian Airways Ltd.

British International Airlines Ltd. British Caribbean Airways Ltd. International Aeradio Ltd.

Gulf Aviation Company Ltd.

Associated British Airlines (Middle East) Ltd. Middle East Airlines S.A.

BOAC Associated Companies Ltd.

21 Aug. 1935 28 Apr. 1948 26 Jan. 1944 1 Mar. 1949

23 Aug. 1953 1 Dec. 1936

2 Nov. 1946

24 June 1948 15 Apr. 1944

23 Dec. 1946 9 Jan. 1947

24 Mar. 1950 6 Sept. 1955

30 Dec. 1949–16 Aug. 1961 6 Sept. 1957

Associated Companies

Date Registered

Malayan Airways Ltd.

21 Oct. 1937

Airways Aero Associations Ltd. (formerly Speedbird 17 Mar. 1949 Flying Clubs Ltd.) Palestine Air Transport Ltd. 18 Dec. 1934–14 Mar. 1956 Société Internationale de Télécommunications Aéronautiques College of Air Training (Properties) Ltd. (formerly Airways Training Ltd.) Bermuda Development Company Ltd. Baltic Mercantile and Shipping Exchange Aeronautical Radio of Siam

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1939(?)

30 Apr. 1947 (1920) Feb. 1948 1947(?) 1948

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389

BOA C C o m pa n i e s Cyprus Airways Ltd.

24 Sept. 1947

Alitalia

Sept. 1946

Egyptian Aircraft Engineering Co. Mideast Aircraft Service Co. S.A. Air Terminals Ltd.

Hong Kong Airways Ltd.

Aircraft Services (Gulf ) Ltd.

Turkish Airlines, Inc. (THY)

5 Feb. 1949

1 June 1955–16 Aug. 1961 Aug. 1955–6 Sept. 1960 4 Mar. 1947

11 Apr. 1957

Ghana Airways Ltd.

4 July 1958

Liquidated Companies

Date Registered

West African Airways Corp. (Nigeria) Ltd.

23 Aug. 1958

Borneo Airways Ltd. (ex-Sabah)

Airways (Africa) Ltd.

British Airways (Bermuda) Ltd. British Airways (Atlantic) Ltd.

Indian Trans Continental Airways Ltd. Wizard Spark Plugs Ltd.

Gulf Aviation Company (Kuwait) Ltd. QANTAS Empire Airways Ltd.

Rhodesia and Nyasaland Airways Ltd. Wilson Airways Ltd.

Elders Colonial Airways Ltd. Railway Air Services Ltd.

Sociedade Portuguesa de Cooperação Aérea LDA Airgraphs Ltd.

Mail Airgraphs Ltd.

Aer Lingus Teoranta

Tasman Empire Airways Ltd.

British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines Ltd. British Overseas Airways S.A. (Mexico) Imperial Airways (S.A.) Belge

6 June 1929–20 Oct. 1941 22 Aug. 1936–21 Mar. 1942 31 May 1937–21 Mar. 1942 28 June 1933 19 June 1933

16 June 1951–4 May 1953 18 Jan. 1934

12 Oct. 1933 31 July 1929 7 Nov. 1935

21 Mar. 1934 Apr. 1938

10 Jan. 1938–4 Aug. 1949

1 Mar. 1941–29 June 1949 22 May 1936 26 Apr. 1940 25 June 1946

20 Aug. 1948 12 Apr. 1948

Companies Available for Use When BOAC Came into Being Imperial Airways (Africa) Ltd. Imperial Airways (Bermuda)

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390 S p e e d b i r d Imperial Airways (Atlantic) Ltd. Pan American Airways–Imperial Airways Ltd. Imperial Airways (Far East) Ltd. Imperial Airways (Nigeria and Gold Coast) Ltd. Air Pilots Training Imperial Airways (Repair Works) Imperial Airways (Societe Anonyme) of Belgium Company “C” Company “T” Wizard Spark Plugs Imperial Airways (Continental) Ltd. British Airways (Iberia) Ltd. Additional Board Members of the Following Companies, Nominated by BOAC Tasman Empire Airways QANTAS Empire Airways Elders Colonial Airways Malayan Airways Palestine Air Transport Railway Air Services

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Appendix G Comprehensive BOAC Fleet List The aircraft listed below appear in their delivery order to an airline base: G = UK registration VT = Indian VH = Australian Aircraft HP42 G-AAGX

Name

Delivered Disposal

Date

Hannibal

1933

1.3.40

G-AAUC G-AAUD

Horsa Hanno

1933 1933

G-AAUE G-AAXC

Hadrian Heracles

1933 1933

G-AAXD

Horatius

1933

G-AAXF

Helena

1933

Aurora

1933

Atalanta Artemis Arethusa

1933 1933 1933

RAF RAF RAF

5.3.41 5.3.41 3.41

Astraea

1933

RAF

7.3.41

Short Scylla G-ACJJ

Scylla

1935

1.4.40

G-ACJK

Syrinx

1935

Damaged, gale, Edinburgh Written off

AW15 Atalanta G-ABTM (VT-AEG) G-ABTI G-ABTJ G-ABPI (VT-AEF) G-ABTL

Speedbird.indb 391

Lost between Jask and Sharjah RAF Damaged, gale, Whitchurch RAF Damaged, gale, Whitchurch Wrecked, Tiverton forced landing RAF

31.5.40 19.3.40 4.6.40 19.3.40 7.11.39 8.6.40

7.3.41

4.6.40

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392 S p e e d b i r d Aircraft DH-86 G-ADUF G-ACPL G-ACWC G-ACWD G-ADUE G-ADUI G-ADFF G-ADUG G-AEAP

Name

Delivered Disposal

Date

Dido Delphinus Delia Dorado Daedalus Denebola Dione Danae Demeter

1936 1934 1935 1935 1936 1936 1936 1936 1936

RAF RAF RAF RAF RAF RAF RAF RAF RAF

1941 1941 17.9.41 1941 1941 1941 1941 1941 27.10.41

Rapide G-AFFF

Juno 28.12.44

Stationed at Exeter at 1939 beginning of war RAF (delivered in error) 3.1.45

T 13062 Short Empire Flying-Boat S.23 G-ADHL G-ADHM G-ADUV G-ADUW G-ADUX G-AEUI (VH-ABE) G-AFBL (VH-ABF) G-AETV G-AETX G-AETZ G-AEUB (VH-ADU from 1941)

Speedbird.indb 392

Canopus Caledonia Cambria Castor Cassiopeia

22.10.36 4.12.36 15.1.37 31.12.37 24.1.37

23.10.46 22.3.47 13.1.47 4.2.47 29.12.41

27.2.38

Broken up Broken up Broken up Broken up Crashed, Sabang, Sumatra Broken up

Coorong Cooee

30.3.38

Broken up

2.2.47

Coriolanus Cerex Circe

15.6.37 17.7.37 16.8.37

Camilla

13.9.37

QEAL Caught fire, Durban Lost between Tjilatjap and Broome by enemy action Force-landed in sea off Port Moresby

10.2.47

1.12.42 28.2.42 22.4.43

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393

C o m p r e h e n s i v e BOA C F l e e t L i s t Aircraft G-AEUC

Name Corinna

G-AEUD G-AEUE G-AEUF G-AEUA

Cordelia Cameronian Corinthian Calypso

Delivered Disposal 30.9.37 Destroyed, enemy action at Broome 9.10.37 Broken up 23.10.37 Broken up 9.11.37 Crashed, Darwin 28.8.37 Requisitioned by Australian Government RAAF 3.4.37 Broken up 10.2.38 Destroyed, enemy action

Date 3.3.42

9.3.47 9.7.40

Requisitioned by Australian Government Destroyed, Townsville

8.6.40

Crashed, Bathurst Broken up Crashed, Lisbon Requisitioned for Australian Government RAAF Returned QEA for internal service Damaged on alighting, Rose Bay, and sank

14.9.42 16.3.47 15.2.41 20.6.40

RAAF Damaged, enemy action at Poole

15.5.40 11.5.41

G-ADVB G-AEUH (VH-ABD) G-AFKZ G-AETY

Corsair Corio

G-AFBJ (VH-ABA) G-AEUG (VH-ABC)

Carpentaria

8.3.40 Broken up End July RAAF 1937 3.12.37 Broken up

Coogee

19.1.38

Short Empire Flying-Boat S.30 G-AFCZ G-AFCT G-AFCX G-AFBK

Cathay Clio

Clare Champion Clyde Coolangatta

Mayo-Composite G-ADHJ Mercury G-ADHK Maia

Speedbird.indb 393

24.4.39 4.11.38 30.3.39 18.12.37

5.2.47 13.1.47 21.3.42 22.9.39 12.3.42 20.1.47 29.1.42

19.1.47

28.2.42

12.3.42 1943 12.10.44

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394 S p e e d b i r d Aircraft Short FlyingBoat S.33 G-AFPZ

Name

Delivered Disposal

Date

Clifton

22.4.40

G-AFRA

Cleopatra

10.5.40

RAF Crashed, Sydney Broken up

12.3.42 18.11.44 4.11.46

Short FlyingBoat S.26 G-AFCI G-AFCJ

Golden Hind Golden Fleece

Written off RAF

16.8.47 July 1940

G-AFCK

Golden Horn

27.11.41 Never del. 29.11.41

Crashed on test flight, Lisbon

9.1.43

9.39

RAF

27.5.40

Fokker FXII G-AEOS Focke Wulf Condor G-AGAY

Wolf

1940

Destroyed, White Waltham

Early 1942

K-Class G-AFYE G-AFYF

King Arthur King Alfred

20.7.40 1.11.40

15.2.43 23.11.44

G-AFYJ

King Richard

14.2.41

G-AFYK

King James

19.3.41

G-AFYL

King Charles

27.5.41

G-AGBY

King William

8.2.41

G-AFYG G-AFYI

King Harold King Henry

14.11.40 29.12.40

Crashed, Asmara Written off, reduced to produce Written off, reduced to produce Written off, reduced to produce Written off, reduced to produce Written off, reduced to produce Crashed, Addis Ababa Crashed, Adana

Speedbird.indb 394

23.11.44 23.11.44 23.11.44 23.11.44 18.11.42 13.9.42

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395

C o m p r e h e n s i v e BOA C F l e e t L i s t Aircraft A W Ensigns G-ADSR G-ADSS G-ADST G-ADSU G-ADSV G-ADSW G-ADSX G-ADSZ

Name

Delivered Disposal

Date

Ensign Egeria Elsinore Euterpe Explorer Eddystone Ettrick Elysian

5.10.38 17.11.38 11.11.38 24.11.38 24.11.38 15.6.39 7.6.39 29.6.39

31.3.45 20.3.46 19.2.46 2.3.46 22.2.46 5.6.46 3.6.40 15.5.40

G-ADSY G-ADTA

Empyrean Euryalus

29.6.39 19.8.39

G-ADTB G-ADTC

Echo Endymion

31.8.39 9.10.39

G-ADTD (G-AFZV) G-ADTE (G-AFZU)

Enterprise

21.10.41

Everest

24.6.41

Broken up Broken up Broken up Broken up (cannibalized) Broken up Broken up Destroyed, Le Bourget Destroyed, enemy action, Heston Broken up Damaged, aerial attack return from France Broken up Destroyed, enemy action, Whitchurch Abandoned to French, Bathurst Broken up

20.10.40

30.9.41 4.41

DH Albatross G-AFDI

Frobisher

G-AFDJ G-AFDK G-AFDL

Falcon Fortuna Fingal

22.11.38 10.1.39

G-AFDM G-AEVW G-AEWV

Fiona Franklin Faraday

15.6.39 6.5.40 28.5.40

Destroyed by fire, Whitchurch Broken up Crashed, Eire Destroyed in forced landing, Pucklechurch Broken up RAF RAF

JU-52/3m G-AERU G-AERX

Juno Jupiter

1.1.37 31.3.37

To SABENA To SABENA

Speedbird.indb 395

7.1.46 23.5.40 18.2.46 24.11.40 3.2.42 10.5.46

29.9.43 16.7.43 6.10.40 29.9.43 24.10.40 28.2.41

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396 S p e e d b i r d Aircraft G-AFAP

Name Jason

Delivered Disposal Lost at Oslo following German invasion of Norway

Date 9.4.40

RAF Crash-landed, Almaza, on training flight Written off

16.12.39 14.4.44

4.8.41 13.12.41 2.10.41 22.4.40

Lockheed 10 Electra G-AEPN G-AEPR

Leith

1.4.37 (?) 1.4.37

G-AFCS

Lea

1.3.38

Lockheed 14 Super Electra G-AFGP

Livingstone

19.9.38

G-AFGR G-AFKD

Lafayette Lochinvar

26.9.38

G-AFKE G-AFMR

Lothair Leander

30.12.38 30.3.39

Wrecked, Khartoum Dismantled Wrecked, El Fasher Crashed into hill near Loch Lomond RAF RAF

18.11.42

Returned RAF

14.3.43

American authorities

26.4.46

A W Albemarle P.1454 Beechcraft AT/7/42/2509

Anson CF-DXJ CF-DXK 4263

Speedbird.indb 396

Navigational 17.12.42 trainer from Fleet Air Arm

Gander Goose Arrived 20.10.44 Durban for Port Elizabeth Vaaldam for 21.10.44 training

28.9.43

9.10.43 20.7.44

27.5.48 27.5.48

RAF, after damage at Vaaldam

16.11.44

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397

C o m p r e h e n s i v e BOA C F l e e t L i s t Aircraft 4280

Delivered Disposal 19.5.44 RAF

Date 26.6.44

20.5.44

RAFSA

20.10.44

28.11.44

RAF

4.5.45

5.5.45

SAAF

26.4.46

17.1.46

To Northolt

6.3.46

G-AHON (Auster) 121193V

Name Vaaldam for training Vaaldam for training Replacement for 4263 at Durban Vaaldam for training Replacement for 4547 at Durban Vaaldam for training On loan from White Waltham To Northolt for training To Northolt for training

Boeing 314A G-AGCB

Bangor

23.7.41

15.4.48

G-AGBZ

Bristol

22.5.41

G-AGCA

Berwick

21.6.41

General Phoenix Corp., Baltimore General Phoenix Corp., Baltimore General Phoenix Corp., Baltimore

Catalina 44-33965 G-AGBJ G-AGDA G-AGFL G-AGFM G-AGID G-AGIE G-AGKS

Guba Catalina Vega Star Altair Star Rigel Star Antares Star Spica Star

15.8.44 10.12.40 22.6.41 26.19.42 27.10.42 13.7.43 13.7.43 16.3.44

RAF Saunders Roe Crashed, Poole RAF RAF RAF RAF RAF

22.5.45 14.1.44 23.3.43 25.7.45 25.7.45 25.7.45 25.7.45 25.7.45

4379 4547

4585

G-AHBN NK-270

Speedbird.indb 397

11.6.46 11.6.46

15.4.48 15.4.48

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398 S p e e d b i r d Aircraft C W 20 G-AGDI

Name

Delivered Disposal

Date

Saint Louis

12.11.41

Bristol Aeroplane Co.

24.10.43

Dakota (C-47) G-AGIS G-AGIT

28.12.43 27.12.43

G-AGIU G-AGIW G-AGIX (A) G-AGIY G-AGIZ (A) G-AGJU (A)

9.1.44 23.1.44 28.1.44 8.1.44 8.2.44 28.5.44

1.8.46 1.8.46 16.8.47 1.12.49 1.8.46 1.8.46 2.10.46 15.4.46 22.6.49 3.1.47

G-AGJV (A) G-AGJW (A) G-AGJX (A) G-AGJY (A)

28.5.44 28.5.44 3.7.44 3.7.44

G-AGJZ G-AGKA (B) G-AGKB (B) G-AGKC (B) G-AGKD (B) G-AGKE (B) G-AGKF (B)

3.7.4 27.8.44 27.8.44 29.8.44 30.8.44 10.9.44 9.9.44

G-AGKG (B)

9.9.44

G-AGKH (B) G-AGKI (B) G-AGKJ (B) G-AGKK (B) G-AGKL (B)

12.9.44 16.10.44 16.10.44 18.10.44 19.10.44

G-AGKM (B)

16.11.44

BEA BEA Hong Kong Airways Jardine Matheson BEA BEA BEA Crash-landed, El Adem BEA Crash-landed, Whitchurch BEA BEA Crashed, Ashford, Kent Hong Kong Airways Jardine Matheson BEA Aden Airways Service Air Carrier Service Corp. Airwork Damaged, Malta Aden Airways Service Field Aviation Services Ltd. Field Aviation Services Ltd. Aden Airways Service East African Airways Aden Airways Service Lep Services Ltd. Field Aviation Services Ltd. Damaged, El Adem

Speedbird.indb 398

1.10.47 6.8.47 11.1.47 22.7.47 1.12.49 1.8.46 1.2.50 2.6.50 18.10.49 23.12.46 1.2.50 17.6.49 14.10.49 1.2.50 4.10.49 1.2.50 25.3.49 17.6.49 8.4.45

23/04/2013 10:34:41



399

C o m p r e h e n s i v e BOA C F l e e t L i s t Aircraft G-AGKN (B) G-AGMZ (B) G-AGNA (B)

Name

Delivered 23.11.44 23.11.44 26.11.44

G-AGNB (B) G-AGNC (B) G-AGND (B)

18.12.44 18.12.44 7.1.45

G-AGNE (B)

19.1.45

G-AGNF (B)

22.1.45

G-AGNG (B) G-AGNK (B)

22.1.45 28.1.45

G-AGGB

7.2.43

G-AGHR G-AGHS (A) G-AGHT G-AGFY

6.9.43 6.9.43 6.9.43 16.2.43

G-AGGI

16.4.43

G-AGHF (A) G-AGHH (A) G-AGHJ (A) G-AGHM (A) G-AGHN (A) G-AGHO (A) G-AGHU

2.5.43 9.5.43 18.5.43 8.7.43 27.7.43 31.7.43 24.9.43

G-AGFX

Speedbird.indb 399

9.2.43

Disposal Crashed, SW Toulon Aden Airways Service Crashed, Basra Written off Aden Airways Service Lep Services Ltd. Field Aviation Services Ltd. East Africa Airways Corp. Field Aviation Services Ltd. Blueline Airways Ltd. Field Aviation Services Ltd. Automobile & Aircraft Services Ltd. Crashed, Malta BEA Crashed, Malta Airways Training Ltd. Automobile & Aircraft Services Ltd. Airways Training Ltd. Automobile & Aircraft Services Ltd. Northwest Airlines Ltd. Britavia Ltd. BEA Skyways Charter Guinea Air Traders Ltd. Scottish Aviation Ltd. Hong Kong Airways Ltd. Crashed, Hong Kong Automobile & Aircraft Services Ltd.

Date 14.7.48 1.2.50 1.11.45 26.5.46 1.2.50 25.3.49 14.10.49 21.11.49 14.10.49 7.1.49 1.7.49 17.6.48 25.10.45 27.5.47 14.8.46 17.6.48 1.1.48 17.6.48 21.6.49 6.5.49 11.6.47 11.11.48 17.8.48 21.3.49 12.2.48 11.7.49 17.6.48

23/04/2013 10:34:41

400 S p e e d b i r d Aircraft G-AGFZ G-AGGA G-AGIO

Name

G-AGIP G-AGIR G-AGHE (A) G-AGHK G-AGHL G-AGHP (A) G-AGBD G-AGYZ (A) G-AGYX (A) G-AGZA (A) G-AGZB (A) G-AGZC (B) G-AGZD (A) G-AGZE (A)

Delivered 16.2.43 6.3.43 20.11.43 10.12.43 13.12.43 28.4.43 23.5.43 5.6.43 13.8.43 1.1.52

Mark III Mark III

28.1.46 10.1.46 11.2.46 19.2.46 19.2.46 4.3.46 8.3.46

G-AHCS (A)

11.3.46

G-AHCT (A) G-AHCU (A) G-AHCV (A) G-AHCW (A) G-AHCX (A) G-AHCY (A) G-AHCZ (A) G-AHDA (A) G-AHDC (A)

11.3.46 25.3.46 6.4.46 8.4.46 10.4.46 19.4.46 30.4.46 2.5.46 11.6.46

Speedbird.indb 400

Disposal Crashed, Stockholm Aviation Traders Ltd. Hong Kong Airways Ltd. Jardine Matheson BEA Crashed Malayan Airways Force-landed, Madrid BEA Crashed, Croydon British International Airlines Ltd. Transair Ltd. RAS BEA RAS RAS BEA BEA BEA Hong Kong Airways Lep Services Ltd. BEA Crashed on approach, Oslo BEA BEA BEA BEA BEA BEA BEA BEA RAS BEA

Date 21.1.44 7.7.48 10.12.47 1.12.49 1.8.46 28.8.44 8.8.48 17.4.46 1.8.46 5.8.47 31.3.52 18.2.53 22.3.46 1.8.46 11.3.46 3.3.46 1.9.49 1.8.46 1.8.46 20.5.48 25.3.49 1.8.46 7.8.46 1.8.46 1.8.46 1.8.46 1.8.46 1.8.46 1.8.46 13.8.46 13.8.46 27.7.46 13.8.46

23/04/2013 10:34:41



401

C o m p r e h e n s i v e BOA C F l e e t L i s t Aircraft G-AHDB (A)

Name

Delivered Disposal 15.5.46 RAS BEA 3.6.46 RAF 3.6.46 RAF 1.1.52 British International Airlines Ltd.

Date 27.7.46 13.8.46 6.11.46 6.11.46 31.3.52

DH-89 Dominie G-AGNH

14.5.45

19.5.45

G-AGOX

9.7.45

G-AGOW

9.7.45

G-AGOU

24.7.45

G-AGOT

24.7.45

G-AGOV

30.8.45

G-AIBS G-AIBB

1.7.46

G-AIAZ G-AIBA G-AIWC

Halifax PP325

27.9.45

G-AIAR G-AIAS G-AIAN G-AIAO G-AIAP G-AHYH G-AHYI G-AIID Hudson III G-AGDC

Speedbird.indb 401

Loch Lomond

East African Airways Corporation East African Airways Corporation East African Airways Corporation East African Airways Corporation East African Airways Corporation East African Airways Corporation Patrick Motors

11.7.45 12.7.45 25.7.45 25.7.45 31.8.45 1.12.48

27.9.45 25.9.45 19.7.46 15.7.46 23.7.46 5.9.46 26.8.46 26.8.46

Damaged on landing Written off RAF Written off RAF RAF RAF RAF RAF RAF

29.8.46 4.6.47 19.11.46 25.4.47 25.4.47 25.4.47 29.12.47 10.6.47 28.5.47

26.6.41

RAF

17.8.45

23/04/2013 10:34:41

402 S p e e d b i r d Aircraft G-AGDF

Name Loch Leven

A-AGDK

Loch Lyon

Hudson V G-AGCE Hythe G-AGJJ G-AGJK G-AGJL G-AGJM G-AGJN G-AGJO G-AGKV (?B) G-AGKW G-AGKX G-AGKY G-AGKZ G-AGLA G-AHEO G-AHEP G-AGER G-AGEU G-AGEW G-AGHW G-AGHX G-AGHZ G-AGIA G-AHER G-AHJR Lancaster G-AGJI G-AHCD G-AHVN

Speedbird.indb 402

Henley Howard Hobart Hythe Hudson Honduras Huntingdon Hotspur Himalaya Hungerford Harwich Hunter Halstead Hanbury Hadfield Hampshire Hanwell Hamilton Harlequin Hawkesbury Hazlemere Helmsdale

Delivered Disposal 10.10.41 Force-landed on sea outside Smögen 24.1.42 RAF

Date 22.6.42

7.6.41

RAF

14.8.41

13.1.44 21.1.44 23.1.44 2.2.44 3.2.44 3.2.44 13.7.44 21.7.44 27.7.44 28.7.44 3.8.44 12.8.44 2.3.45 16.3.45 8.1.43 21.1.43 29.1.43 27.8.43 2.9.43 3.9.43 8.9.43 1.3.46 2.5.46

Aquila Airways Ltd. Aquila Airways Ltd. Aquila Airways Ltd. Aquila Airways Ltd. Aquila Airways Ltd. Accident, Moorings Short Bros. & Harland Short Bros. & Harland Aquila Airways Ltd. Aquila Airways Ltd. Broken up Aquila Airways Ltd. Aquila Airways Ltd. RAF Aquila Airways Ltd. Aquila Airways Ltd. Accident at Sourabaya Crash at Isle-of-Wight Accident at Darwin Aquila Airways Ltd. Aquila Airways Ltd. Aquila Airways Ltd. RAF

26.1.49 25.2.49 25.2.49 7.2.49 10.2.49 21.2.49 20.12.48 6.12.48 23.5.49 28.12.48 19.5.49 4.1.49 21.7.48 22.9.47 6.12.48 18.1.49 5.9.48 19.11.47 2.2.48 18.1.49 21.7.48 13.10.49 15.4.48

9.11.43 16.4.47

RAF BEA

24.12.46 6.6.47

17.8.45

23/04/2013 10:34:41



C o m p r e h e n s i v e BOA C F l e e t L i s t Aircraft PP744

Name on loan

PP741

on loan

Lancastrian G-AGLF G-AGLS G-AGLT G-AGLU

Nelson Newcastle

G-AGLV G-AGLX

Delivered 2.7.46 6.5.47 2.7.46 6.5.47 16.4.47

Disposal Flight Refuelling Ltd. Returned BEA Flight Refuelling Ltd. Returned BEA BEA

Date 24.2.49 28.5.47 24.2.49 28.5.47 6.6.47

18.2.45 10.3.45 21.3.45 5.4.45

Skyways Ltd. Written off R. J. Coley Ltd. Damaged on takeoff, Hurn Skyways Ltd. Lost between Colombo and Cocos Islands Written off Written off Delivered QEA Written off Crashed, Tengah airfield Damaged, Sydney, while training Delivered QEA R. J. Coley Ltd. Crashed, St. Aubin de Ternay Written off Undercarriage collapsed on landing, Karachi Written off Written off Delivered QEA Written off R. J. Coley Ltd. R. J. Coley Ltd. R. J. Coley Ltd.

10.5.46 7.11.50 14.12.49 15.8.46

19.4.45 18.5.45

G-AGLW G-AGLY G-AGLZ G-AGMA G-AGMB G-AGMC

Northampton Norfolk Nottingham Newport Norwich

27.4.45 30.5.45 8.6.45 13.6.45 18.6.45 23.6.45

G-AGMD G-AGME G-AGMF

Nairn Newhaven

2.7.45 5.7.45 27.7.45

G-AGMG G-AGMH

Nicosia

23.8.45 31.8.45

G-AGMJ G-AGMK G-AGML G-AGMM G-AKRB G-AKPY G-AKPZ

Naseby Newbury Nicobar Nepal Nyanza Natal Nile

2.9.45 25.9.45 17.10.45 9.10.45 13.1.48 19.1.48 16.1.48

Speedbird.indb 403

403

16.5.46 23.3.46 15.1.51 11.1.50 28.10.47 15.1.51 27.8.48 2.5.46 15.8.47 14.12.49 20.8.46 4.11.50 17.5.46 15.1.51 15.1.51 15.8.47 7.11.49 14.12.49 14.12.49 14.12.49

23/04/2013 10:34:41

404 S p e e d b i r d Aircraft Liberator AM 258 (LB 24) AM 918 G-AGDR (LB 24A) AM 914 G-AGDT (LB 24A) AL 610

Delivered Disposal

Date

21.10.41 24.10.41

Crashed, Prestwick Shot down over English Channel

13.9.43 15.2.42

15.4.42

RAF

8.42

AL 619 G-AGKT (II) AL 547 G-AGKU (II) AL 541 G-AGTI (II) AL 587 (LB 30) AL 591 (LB 30)

5.5.44

Allocated May 1942 but never delivered QEA

8.4.46

21.6.44

QEA

8.4.46

24.9.45

QEA

8.4.46

6.42 3.4.42

5.8.42 9.2.43

AL 597 (II)

23.3.44

AL 625 (II) AL 614 (LB 30) AM 259 G-AGCD (LB 24) FL 909 G-AGFN (B 24D III) FL 915 G-AGFO (B 24D III) FL 917 G- AGFP (B 24D III) FL 918 G-AGFR (B 24D III) FL 920 G-AGFS (B 24D III) AM 263 G-AGDS (LB 24)

9.4.44 5.42 30.9.41

Ferry Command Wrecked 10 miles NE of Gander Struck snowbank landing, Goose Written off Written off RAF Transport Command

9.11.42

RAF

2.2.45

12.7.43

RAF

3.3.45

22.12.42

RAF

5.3.45

10.4.43

RAF

2.2.45

6.4.43

RAF

2.2.45

21.10.41

RAF Transport Command

19.8.44

Speedbird.indb 404

Name

27.2.46 15.7.46 1.7.46 6.7.44

23/04/2013 10:34:41



405

C o m p r e h e n s i v e BOA C F l e e t L i s t Aircraft Name AM 262 G-AGHG (LB 24) AL 512 G-AGEL (LB 30) AL 528 G-AGEM (LB 30) AL 514 G-AGJP (LB 30) AM 920 G-AHYB (LB 24A) AL 507 G-AHYC (II) AL 522 G-AHYD (II) AL 529 G-AHYE (LB 30) AL 592 G-AHYF (LB 30) AL 603 G-AHYG (II) AL 627 G-AHYJ (LB 30) AL 524 G-AGTJ (II) KL 632 (Mk 6) AL 635 (II) Allocated

Delivered Disposal 23.9.41 RAF Transport Command

Date 11.9.44

2.42

Crashed, Gander

27.12.43

3.4.42

Force-landed due to weather, Charlottetown

21.2.46

3.42

STA Paris

6.4.51

9.41

STA Paris

6.4.51

17.5.44

Belly-landed, Heathfield 13.11.46

19.7.44

STA Paris

6.4.51

7.42

Reduced to produce

7.12.48

5.42

STA Paris

6.4.51

12.6.44

STA Paris

6.4.51

5.42

Written off

25.9.46

28.1.44

QEA

8.4.46

14.2.47 16.6.44

Ministry of Supply Retained by Ferry Command

31.7.46

Lockheed 14 EW 454 EW 618

31.5.43 5.6.43

16.7.43 30.6.43

EW 884 EW 888 EW 926 EW 958

30.6.53 5.11.42 9.42 9.42

RAF Crashed prior to landing, Khartoum RAF RAF RAF RAF

Speedbird.indb 405

16.7.43 18.7.43 16.7.43 9.12.42

23/04/2013 10:34:41

406 S p e e d b i r d Aircraft EW 960 EW 971 FK 391

Name

Delivered 24.6.43 2.10.42(?) 2.10.42(?)

FK 397 FK 456 FK 459

9.42 9.42 10.42

FK 478 FK 486 FK 580 FK 943 G-ABGB G-ABAV G-AGDO G-AFGN

10.42 9.42 5.6.43 31.5.43 17.6.40 6.40 (?)

Lowicz Lublin Loch Loyal

G-AFMO G-AFYU

Disposal RAF RAF Crashed on takeoff, Cairo RAF RAF Crashed landing, Khartoum RAF RAF RAF RAF Polish Government Polish Government RAF Caught fire in air, Luxeuil Wrecked taking off, Heston Crashed into sea near Malta

Date 16.7.43 16.7.43 22.12.42 18.7.43 16.7.43 16.6.43 16.7.43 18.7.43 16.7.43 16.7.43 9.42 9.42 13.4.42 11.8.39 15.1.40 21.12.39

Lodestar G-AGBO G-ACBP G-AGCR

Lanark Leicestor Lake Rudolf

20.3.41 12.3.41 7.41

RAF RAF Destroyed by fire during takeoff, Malta

5.10.43 13.11.43 14.5.42

Lockheed 18/10 (Norwegian) G-AGDE

Loch Lesja

18.8.41

17.12.43

G-AGDD

Loch Losna

1.8.41

G-AGCT G-AGCW G-AGCX

Lake Timsah Lake Tana Lake Mweru

7.41 7.41 1.42

Lost, enemy action over North Sea Transferred, Norwegian Government RAF RAF RAF

Speedbird.indb 406

30.10.43 13.10.43 18.9.43 21.9.43

23/04/2013 10:34:41



407

C o m p r e h e n s i v e BOA C F l e e t L i s t Aircraft G-AGCZ G-AGEI G-AGIH G-AGLI G-AGLG G-AGLH G-AGII G-AGIJ G-AGIK G-AGBU G-AGBV G-AGBW G-AGBR G-AGBX G-AGCM G-AGCV G-AGIM G-AGIN G-AGIG G-AGJH G-AGEH G-AGIL G-AGBS G-AGBT G-AGCU G-AGCY G-AGCP EW 981

G-AGCN

Speedbird.indb 407

Name Delivered Disposal Lake Stephanie 10.41 Wrecked landing, Western Desert Loch Loen 30.6.42 Norwegian Government 14.8.44 Crashed, Kinekulle On service 15.12.44 Sank, Umea Gulf On service 24.2.45 Ceased operating On service 12.2.45 Ceased operating 30.7.44 Ceased operating 10.4.44 Ceased operating 2.4.43 Ceased operating Lowestoft 2.6.41 Australian International Airways Ludlow 25.8.41 East African Airways Lyndhurst 26.8.41 Missing, flight Juba to Nairobi, found Aberdare range Lewes 22.4.41 East African Airways Llandaff 26.8.41 East African Airways Lake Mariut 9.41 RAF Lake Chad 7.41 RAF Lake 12.9.43 RAF Tanganyika Lake Tinsah 12.9.43 RAF Lake Qarum 22.6.43 RAF Lake Tana 11.10.43 RAF Lake Baringo 22.5.42 RAF Lake Nyasa 22.8.43 RAF Lake Lichfield 8.5.41 East African Airways Lincoln 19.5.41 East African Airways Lake Kivu 6.41 RAF Lake Rukwa 10.41 RAF Lake Edward 6.41 RAF Training at Vaaldam not on our strength, aircraft struck large boulder and seriously damaged Lake Victoria 10.41 RAF

Date 23.2.42 30.10.43 28.8.44 1.5.45 16.5.45 16.5.45 18.5.45 16.4.45 16.5.45 12.12.47 3.2.48 1.1.45 3.2.48 3.2.48 17.8.46 17.8.46 26.11.47 3.12.47 26.11.47 3.12.47 12.11.47 12.11.47 3.2.48 3.2.48 26.11.47 12.11.47 19.11.47 16.7.43

19.11.47

23/04/2013 10:34:41

408 S p e e d b i r d Aircraft G-AGCO G-AGEJ

Name Lake Albert Loch Lange

Delivered Disposal 10.41 RAF 9.7.42 Lost near Smögen

Date 19.11.47 5.4.43

Mosquito G-AGGF

HJ 720

24.4.43

Flew into hillside, Invermark Found Crashed near Leuchars Crashed in sea near Leuchars Lost on night flight, Gothenburg-Leuchars, presumed crashed in sea RAF RAF RAF RAF RAF RAF Reduced to produce RAF RAF

20.8.43

RAF RAF RAF RAF Flew into balloon barrage, Gosport RAF RAF RAF RAF SAAF RAF RAF

3.11.43 3.11.43 3.11.43 18.10.43 20.11.39

G-AGGG G-AGKP

HJ 721 LR 296

2.5.43 22.4.44

G-AGKR

HJ 792

11.4.44

HJ 667 DZ 411 HJ 680 HJ 681 HJ 718 HJ 723

21.2.44 22.4.45 28.11.43 27.4.44 15.12.42 16.4.43 16.4.43 23.4.43 2.5.43

LR 524 HJ 898 HJ 985 G-AGKO G-AGFV G-AGGC G-AGGD G-AGGE G-AGGH Oxford P.8996 P.6263 P.1985 BG.543 G-AFFM

6.11.42 24.10.42 6.11.42 1.10.43

AP.474 3583 3662 HN 832 3552 PG.933 PG.950

16.5.44 29.11.45 28.8.44 26.8.44 28.8.44 29.3.45 29.3.45

Speedbird.indb 408

8.9.43 25.10.43 18.8.44 28.8.44 4.12.44 12.5.45 26.1.44 22.6.45 6.1.45 9.1.46 3.1.44 22.6.45 22.6.45

10.8.45 14.2.46 14.2.46 24.8.45 29.11.45 4.2.47 16.7.46

23/04/2013 10:34:41



409

C o m p r e h e n s i v e BOA C F l e e t L i s t Aircraft PH.939 G-AIAY G-AIAW G-AIAT

Name

Delivered 29.3.45 27.5.44 25.5.45 28.5.45

G-AIAX

6.45

G-AIRZ

7.45

G-AIAV

28.9.44

G-AIAU ED.141

13.6.45 12.10.43

R.6070 P.1895 T1379

2.10.43 24.10.42 8.10.43

W.6626 LB.523 HM.914 G-AIVY

1.10.13 9.6.47 13.6.47

Star Mentor

Disposal RAF Written off Short Bros. & Harland Air Services Training Ltd. Air Services Training Ltd. Air Services Training Ltd. W. S. Shackleton & Co. Ltd. Cyprus Airways Overran runway, Lyneham RAF RAF Written off after starboard leg retracted during taxying RAF (Collected) RAF RAF Cyprus Airways Ltd.

Date 4.2.47 6.6.47 10.10.50 2.3.51 2.3.51 2.3.51 11.5.51 20.1.53 8.7.44 10.8.45 4.43 3.4.44 5.3.45 19.6.47 19.6.47 24.9.53

Puss Moth ES 916

11.42

ATA

26.2.43

Sunderland G-AGIB

15.9.43

6.11.43

G-AGES

15.1.43

SZ 573 G-AGEV G-AGET G-AGHV

9.11.45 29.1.43 16.1.43 21.8.43

Caught fire in air, Sollum Crashed into mountain, County Kerry RAF Accident landing, Poole Accident, Calcutta Broke away from moorings Written off

Speedbird.indb 409

28.7.43 2.4.46 4.3.46 15.2.46 10.3.46 30.4.46

23/04/2013 10:34:41

410 S p e e d b i r d Aircraft

Name

Warwick G-AGLD

30.3.44

Delivered Disposal

Date

Vickers Armstrong for CofA

3.11.45

Wellington BAW 1 BAW 2 BAW 3 BAW 4

8.42 8.42 8.42 8.42

SAAF SAAF SAAF SAAF

22.7.43 26.7.43 17.7.43 17.7.43

Whitley G-AGCF G-AGCG G-AGCH G-AGCI

19.4.42 20.4.42 27.4.42 4.5.42

22.7.43 22.7.43 5.3.43 25.9.42

G-AGCJ G-AGCK G-AGDU G-AGDV G-AGDW G-AGDX G-AGDY G-AGDZ G-AGEA G-AGEC G-AGEB

3.5.42 4.5.42 28.2.42 28.2.42 28.2.42 7.5.42 7.5.42 7.5.42 3.5.42 8.5.42 8.5.42

RAF RAF RAF Crashed into sea, Gibraltar RAF RAF RAF Returned to 9 MU Returned to 9 MU RAF RAF RAF RAF RAF RAF

4.4.42 4.4.42 22.7.43 9.1.43 27.1.43 27.1.43 6.43 27.1.43

27.7.44 7.11.45 6.9.45 4.1.46

Crashed, Tripoli Eagle Aviation Ltd. Crashed, Basra Eagle Aviation Ltd.

1.2.49 12.10.49 16.7.47 12.10.49

York G-AGJD G-AGNM G-AGNR G-AGMZ

Speedbird.indb 410

Mansfield Murchison [See Z.SATP] Monmouth

17.10.43 16.10.43

23/04/2013 10:34:41



411

C o m p r e h e n s i v e BOA C F l e e t L i s t Aircraft G-AGJA

Name Mildenhall

G-AGJB G-AGJC G-AGJE

Kingston Marathon Malmesbury Middlesex Panama

G-AGNO

Manton

6.7.45

G-AGNN

G-AGNV

Madras Atlantic Trader Manchester Melville Pacific Trader Mandalay Montgomery Nassau Morville

G-AGNW

Morecambe

G-AGNX

Caribbean Trader Moray

G-AGNP G-AGNS G-AGNT G-AGNU

Delivered Disposal 31.1.44 Lancashire Aircraft Corp.

Date 29.5.51

14.4.44 27.5.44 26.9.44

4.11.53 22.11.57 27.4.49 31.7.51

14.7.55

Aviation Traders Ltd. Skyways Ltd. BSAA Sold to Lancashire Aircraft Corp. Lancashire Aircraft Corp. Skyways Ltd.

1.8.45 25.9.45

Air Freight Ltd. R. J. Coley & Son

12.8.52 6.2.57

9.10.45 7.11.45

Air Freight Ltd. Air Charter

15.8.52 29.8.52

29.5.51 3.4.57

8.11.45 Skyways Ltd. In service 19.12.45 Lancashire Aircraft Corp.

30.3.55

21.12.45

29.5.51

G-AGNY G-AGOA

Lima Melrose Montrose

Lancashire Aircraft Corp.

3.1.46 9.1.46

12.10.49 29.5.51

G-AGOC G-AGSM

Malta Malvern

24.1.46 22.2.46

G-AGSN

Marlow

11.3.46

G-AGSP

Marlborough Santiago

26.3.46

Eagle Aviation Ltd. Lancashire Aircraft Corp. R. J. Coley & Son Lancashire Aircraft Corp. Lancashire Aircraft Corp. Dismantled

Speedbird.indb 411

29.5.51

25.11.49 29.5.51 25.7.51 18.4.55

23/04/2013 10:34:41

412 S p e e d b i r d Aircraft G-AGSO

Name Marston

Delivered Disposal 23.3.46 Skyways Ltd. In service 27.2.46 Lancashire Aircraft Corp. 12.1.46 Lancashire Aircraft Corp. 13.1.46 Lancashire Aircraft Corp. 21.2.46 Lancashire Aircraft Corp. 4.1.46 Lancashire Aircraft Corp. 6.9.45 Crashed near Basra

Date 22.11.57

G-AGOF

MacDuff

G-AGOB

Milford

G-AGOD

Midlothian

G-AGOE

Medway

G-AGNL

Mersey

Morley

14.3.46

29.5.51

MW.122 MW.106 MW.167 MW.181 G-AHEY

Star Quest

9.4.47 18.4.47 1.5.47 8.5.47 9.7.46

G-AHEA

Star Dale

19.8.46

G-AHFB

Star Stream

28.8.46

G-AHFC

Star Dew

12.9.46

G-AHFD

Star Mist

25.9.46

G-AHFE

Star Vista

30.9.46

G-AHFF

Star Gleam

23.10.46

G-AHFG

Star Haze

28.10.46

G-AHFH

Star Glitter

4.11.46

Z.SATP (Also known as G-AGNR) G-AGSL

Speedbird.indb 412

Lancashire Aircraft Corp. RAF RAF Airways Training Ltd. Airways Training Ltd. Lancashire Aircraft Corp. Lancashire Aircraft Corp. Lancashire Aircraft Corp. Lancashire Aircraft Corp. Lancashire Aircraft Corp. Lancashire Aircraft Corp. Lancashire Aircraft Corp. Lancashire Aircraft Corp. Lancashire Aircraft Corp.

27.2.52 29.5.51 29.5.51 5.8.52 30.5.52 16.7.47

24.2.48 22.4.49 1.7.47 1.7.47 4.4.52 7.12.51 7.9.51 14.3.52 29.10.51 3.8.51 15.1.52 29.8.51 20.11.51

23/04/2013 10:34:42



413

C o m p r e h e n s i v e BOA C F l e e t L i s t Aircraft

Name

Delivered Disposal

Date

Consul G-ALTZ

Star Monitor

24.8.49

28.7.54

G-AIUX

Star Master

10.6.49

Central Aeronautic Bureau Ltd. East African Airways

Force-landed while on development flight test Crashed, Highcliff, on development flight Gulf Aviation

14.8.46

7.4.54

Dove G-AGUC

29.7.46

G-AHRA

17.1.47

G-AHPR

23.5.47

G-ALTM

28.6.49

G-AKCF G-AMZY G-AODN G-AKNT [Could be G-AMKT] G-AOFI G-AMKT

4.9.47 30.6.53 24.8.55

Force-landed in sea south of Taranto Crashed on training flight, London Mr. T. D. Keegan Chequer Taxicabs Mr. T. D. Keegan

14.11.56 30.11.51

Pressed Steel Co. Gulf Aviation

13.3.59 6.3.57

Lincoln II RF.345

19.5.47

RAF

9.6.47

Gemini G-AKHW

26.11.47

Plymouth Airport Ltd.

9.5.50

28.5.47 17.6.47 11.7.47 6.3.47 22.4.47

QEA Montra Ltd. QEA Montra Ltd. Montra Ltd.

2.7.51 2.7.51 31.3.54 31.3.54

G-AJHL

Plymouth G-AHZD G-AHZE G-AHSF G-AHYY G-AHZA

Speedbird.indb 413

3.9.47

Porthmarnock Portsea Poole Portsmouth Penzance

13.3.47 1.10.56

10.2.48 22.6.55 26.1.60 19.2.59 26.1.60

23/04/2013 10:34:42

414 S p e e d b i r d Aircraft G-AHZB G-AHZC G-AHZG G-AJMZ G-AKCO G-AKCP

Name Portland Pembroke Pevensey Perth St. George St. David

Delivered 26.4.47 17.5.47 23.9.47 19.12.47 18.3.48 15.4.48

Disposal Crashed, Bahrain Montra Ltd. QEA Montra Ltd. W. S. Shackleton Ltd. Compañía Aeronáutica Uruguaya Compañía Aeronáutica Uruguaya

Date 23.8.47 31.3.54 2.7.51 31.3.54 5.3.54 1.3.51

G-AKCR

St. Andrew

1.5.48

Proctor HM.347 G-AGTH

Star Pixie

3.5.46 5.9.45

RAF W. S. Shackleton Ltd.

15.12.47 27.6.50

24.4.46 18.4.46 31.7.46

RAF RAF RAF

30.6.47 2.5.46 17.10.46

26.9.46 22.11.46 7.6.48 18.5.48 30.6.48

Ministry of Supply Ministry of Supply BSAA BSAA BSAA

27.2.47 11.3.47 9.8.48 9.8.48 3.8.48

21.11.47

Ministry of Civil Aviation Ministry of Civil Aviation Ministry of Civil Aviation

12.10.51

12.12.50

Sandringham G-AGKX Seaford G-AGWU ML.765 ML.771 DD.860 Tudor I G-AGRE G-AGRD G-AGRH G-AGRJ G-AGRG Tudor IV G-AHNJ

Star Panther

G-AHNK

Star Lion

G-AHNN

Star Leopard

Speedbird.indb 414

6.6.48

12.10.51 12.10.51

23/04/2013 10:34:42



415

C o m p r e h e n s i v e BOA C F l e e t L i s t Aircraft Tudor IVB G-AGRF

Name

Delivered Disposal

Elizabeth of England

Tudor V G-AKBZ G-AKCA G-AKCB G-AKCC G-AKCD

Star Falcon Star Hawk Star Kestrel Star Swift Star Eagle

4.11.48 7.12.48 5.1.49

Constellation 049 G-AHEJ G-AHEK G-AHEL G-AHEM G-AHEN

Bristol II Berwick II Bangor II Balmoral Baltimore

26.4.46 1.5.46 12.5.46 23.5.46 31.5.46

G-AKCE G-AMUP G-AMUR

Bedford Boston Barnstaple

1.11.47 1.12.52 1.12.52

Constellation 749 G-ALAM G-ANTF G-ANUV G-ANUX G-ANVB

Belfast Berkeley Blantyre Bala Blackrod

14.6.48 26.7.54 28.6.55 3.12.54 28.3.55

G-ALAK G-ALAL G-ALAN G-ALAO G-ANNT

Brentford Banbury Beaufort Braemar Buckingham

14.6.48 14.6.48 14.6.48 14.6.48 27.9.54

Speedbird.indb 415

16.2.49

Date

Ministry of Civil Aviation

12.10.51

J. G. Weston J. G. Weston J. G. Weston Wm. Dempster Ltd. Wm. Dempster Ltd.

1.11.51 21.9.51 1.11.51 6.4.50 9.9.50

Capital Airlines Inc. Capital Airlines Inc. Capital Airlines Inc. Capital Airlines Inc. British Aviation Insurance Capital Airlines Inc. Capital Airlines Inc. Capital Airlines Inc.

27.5.55 28.2.55 27.1.55 11.10.54 20.2.51

Crashed Babb Co. Inc. Babb Co. Inc. Pacific Northern Airlines Babb Co. Inc. Californian Air Motive Skyways Ltd. Skyways Ltd. Pacific Northern Airlines Capital Airlines Inc. Capital Airlines Inc.

13.3.54 6.12.57 8.1.58 25.4.57 11.3.58 1.62 10.6.59 21.7.59 20.3.59 27.9.58 25.3.58

27.6.55 28.3.55 28.4.55

23/04/2013 10:34:42

416 S p e e d b i r d Aircraft G-ANTG G-ANUP G-ANUR G-ANUY G-ANUZ

Name Bournemouth Branksome Basildon Beaulieu Belvedere

Delivered 21.8.54 15.2.55 28.2.55 28.1.55 28.2.55

G-ANVA G-ANVD

Blakeney Beverley

27.5.55 28.4.55

Solent G-AHLS G-AHIV

Salcombe

9.2.48

G-AHIM

Scarborough

21.5.48

G-AHIO

Somerset

19.5.49

G-AHIW

Stornoway

26.3.48

G-AHIN

Southampton

22.4.48

G-AHIT

Severn

30.4.48

G-AHIR

Sark

3.5.48

G-AHIY

Southsea

23.11.48

G-AHIU

Solway

1.3.48

G-AHIL

15.6.48

G-AKNP

City of Salisbury City of Cardiff

G-AHIS

City of York

7.7.48

G-AKNS

City of Liverpool

27.7.49

Speedbird.indb 416

8.4.49

Disposal Pacific Northern Airlines Skyways Ltd. Skyways Ltd. Avianca New Jersey Babb Co. Inc. Miami Airways Avianca Avianca

Date 2.12.58 25.9.59 6.7.59 13.5.59 14.3.58 29.6.60 29.4.59 27.5.59

Ministry of Civil Aviation Ministry of Civil Aviation Ministry of Civil Aviation Ministry of Civil Aviation Ministry of Civil Aviation Ministry of Civil Aviation Ministry of Civil Aviation Ministry of Civil Aviation Ministry of Civil Aviation Ministry of Civil Aviation Ministry of Civil Aviation Ministry of Civil Aviation RAF Felixstowe

5.10.50 23.3.50 17.11.50 23.10.49 10.11.50 23.10.49 4.1.50 11.10.50 17.10.49 3.10.50 8.11.50 2.10.50 7.11.50

23/04/2013 10:34:42



417

C o m p r e h e n s i v e BOA C F l e e t L i s t Aircraft G-AHIX G-AKNO G-AKNR

Name Delivered Disposal City of 19.10.48 Accident, Southampton Edinburgh City of London 28.4.49 Ministry of Civil Aviation City of Belfast 17.5.49 Ministry of Civil Aviation

Viking G-AGOM G-AGON G-AGRO G-AGRM G-AGRP G-AGRR

18.5.46 8.5.46 13.6.46 17.6.46 19.6.46 11.7.46

G-AGRS G-AGRN G-AGRT G-AHOS G-AHPF G-AHPB G-AHPS

9.7.46 18.7.46 22.7.46 1.1.47 7.6.47 12.6.47 12.6.47

G-AHPA G-AHOZ G-AHPD G-AHY G-AHPE Halton G-AHDU G-AHDX G-AHDL G-AHDM G-AHDO G-AHDP G-AHDR

Speedbird.indb 417

Falkirk Folkestone Fitzroy Falmouth Forfar Fleetwood Foreland

Date 1.2.50 15.11.50 9.11.50

3.6.46 2.5.47 11.6.47 16.6.47 18.6.47 3.6.50

23.6.47 23.6.47 28.6.47 2.7.47 15.7.47

Vickers Ltd. BEA BEA BEA BEA Ministry of Civil Aviation BEA BEA BEA BEA BEA Airways Training Airways Training BEA BEA Airways Training Airways Training BEA Airways Training

12.7.46 5.6.47 19.9.46 18.7.46 14.8.47 31.3.47 8.7.47

Aviation Traders Ltd. Aviation Traders Ltd. Aviation Traders Ltd. Aviation Traders Ltd. Aviation Traders Ltd. Aviation Traders Ltd. Aviation Traders Ltd.

22.9.48 22.9.48 9.6.48 9.6.48 27.5.48 9.6.48 29.5.48

11.7.47 17.6.47 16.7.47 6.8.47 7.10.47 1.7.47 1.7.47 1.10.47 11.8.47 1.7.47 1.7.47 8.7.47 1.7.47

23/04/2013 10:34:42

418 S p e e d b i r d Aircraft G-AHDS G-AHDT G-AHDV G-AHDW G-AHDN

Name Freemantle Fife Finisterre Falaise Flamborough

Delivered 26.8.46 6.6.47 19.8.46 1.8.46 31.3.47

Disposal Aviation Traders Ltd. Aviation Traders Ltd. Aviation Traders Ltd. Aviation Traders Ltd. Aviation Traders Ltd.

Date 9.6.48 9.6.48 9.6.48 9.6.48 9.6.48

Argonaut G-ALHC

Ariadne

29.3.49

14.1.60

G-ALHD G-ALHI

Ajax Antares

10.5.49 22.7.49

G-ALHM G-ALHU G-ALHP G-ALHR G-ALHT G-ALHY G-ALHF G-ALHJ

Antaeus Artemis Aethra Antiope Athena Arion Atlas Arcturus

15.8.49 24.10.49 2.9.49 14.9.49 28.9.49 9.11.49 25.6.49 27.7.49

G-ALHN G-ALHV G-ALHH

Argosy Adonis Attica

19.8.49 7.10.49 15.7.49

G-ALHE G-ALHK G-ALHO G-ALHW

Argo Atalanta Amazon Aeolus

15.6.49 3.8.49 29.8.49 18.10.49

G-ALHL G-ALHG G-ALHS G-ALHX

Altair Aurora Astra Astraea

9.8.49 5.7.49 20.9.49 27.10.49

Royal Rhodesian Air Force Overseas Aviation Ltd. Royal Rhodesian Air Force EAAC Overseas Aviation Ltd. Overseas Aviation Ltd. Aden Airways Ltd. Overseas Aviation Ltd. Overseas Aviation Ltd. EAAC Retained for apprentice training Overseas Aviation Ltd. Aden Airways Ltd. Royal Rhodesian Air Force Crashed, Kano Overseas Aviation Ltd. EAAC Royal Rhodesian Air Force Crashed, Tripoli Overseas Aviation Ltd. Overseas Aviation Ltd. Aden Airways Ltd.

Stratocruiser G-AKGH

Caledonia

15.11.49

Boeing Airplane Co.

Speedbird.indb 418

22.5.59 28.3.60 30.8.57 30.1.59 12.6.59 17.2.60 31.10.58 9.3.60 25.8.57 1.2.60 14.7.60 23.2.60 24.6.56 25.3.59 29.3.57 15.12.59 21.9.55 19.4.60 17.2.60 28.1.60

4.8.58

23/04/2013 10:34:42



419

C o m p r e h e n s i v e BOA C F l e e t L i s t Aircraft G-AKGI G-AKGJ G-ALSB G-ALSC G-ALSD G-ANUM G-AKGK G-AKGL G-AKGM G-ANTX G-ANTY G-ANTZ G-ANUA G-ANUB G-ANUC G-ALSA

Name Caribou Cambria Champion Centaurus Cassiopeia Clyde Canopus Cabot Castor Cleopatra Coriolanus Cordelia Cameronian Calypso Clio Cathay

Hermes II G-AGUB Hermes IV G-ALDB

Hebe

G-ALDC

Hermione

G-ALDD G-ALDE

Horatius Hanno

G-ALDF

Hadrian

G-ALDG G-ALDH G-ALDI G-ALDJ G-ALDK

Horsa Heracles Hannibal Hengist Helena

Speedbird.indb 419

Delivered 10.1.50 6.2.50 24.10.49 2.12.49 16.12.49 26.8.54 17.2.50 7.3.50 24.3.50 3.1.55 27.10.54 16.12.54 29.12.54 22.9.54 1.12.54 12.10.49

Disposal Boeing Airplane Co. Boeing Airplane Co. Boeing Airplane Co. Boeing Airplane Co. Boeing Airplane Co. Boeing Airplane Co. Boeing Airplane Co. Boeing Airplane Co. Boeing Airplane Co. Boeing Airplane Co. Boeing Airplane Co. Boeing Airplane Co. Boeing Airplane Co. Sold as scrap Sold as scrap Crashed, Prestwick, and caught fire

Date 8.1.59 26.1.59 7.2.59 8.1.59 7.9.58 7.7.58 12.3.59 12.9.58 15.3.59 27.7.59 31.7.59 14.4.59 3.8.59 6.1.60 6.1.60 25.12.54

9.5.49

Ministry of Supply

24.3.50

Never Airwork Ltd. delivered Never Airwork Ltd. delivered Finally Airwork property 20.6.51 Skyways Ltd. 7.5.51 Lancashire Aircraft Corp. Never Airwork Ltd. delivered 14.11.51 Airwork Ltd. 22.5.51 Skyways Ltd. 5.7.50 Britavia Ltd. 10.7.50 Britavia Ltd. 12.7.50 Britavia Ltd.

1.5.52 12.6.52 14.11.56 28.2.55 14.9.54 1.3.52 25.7.57 25.6.55 17.6.54 25.5.54 2.6.54

23/04/2013 10:34:42

420 S p e e d b i r d Aircraft G-ALDL G-ALDM G-ALDN G-ALDO G-ALDP G-ALDX G-ALDR G-ALDS G-ALDT G-ALDU G-ALDV G-ALDW G-ALDY G-ALDA

Comet 1 G-ALZK G-ALYT G-ALYP G-ALYR

Name Hector Hero Horus Heron Homer Hyperion Herodotus Hesperides Hestia Halcyone Hera Helios Honor

On loan from Ministry of Supply On loan from Ministry of Supply

Delivered 6.3.51 17.7.50 21.7.50 20.7.50 27.8.50 14.12.50 1.9.50 8.9.50 15.9.50 14.10.50 3.10.50 2.11.50 19.1.51 Never delivered

Disposal Skyways Ltd. Trek Airways Ltd. British Aviation Ins. Co. Unimetal Industries Ltd. Britavia Ltd. Britavia Ltd. Skyways Ltd. Skyways Ltd. Skyways Ltd. Britavia Ltd. Skyways Ltd. Skyways Ltd. Skyways Ltd. Airwork Ltd.

22.3.51

Ministry of Supply

24.10.51

29.7.53

De Havilland Aircraft Co.

23.9.53

13.3.52 17.10.51

Crashed off Elba De Havilland Aircraft Co. Ministry of Supply Written off after tests at Hatfield Crashed, Calcutta De Havilland Aircraft Co. Ministry of Supply Crashed off Naples Written off after crashlanding, Rome

10.1.54 6.6.55

G-ALYS G-ALYU

15.1.52 6.3.52

G-ALYV G-ALYW

24.4.52 14.6.52

G-ALYX G-ALYY G-ALYZ

23.7.52 23.9.52 30.9.52

Speedbird.indb 420

Date 9.5.55 25.9.56 17.7.52 11.3.59 23.6.54 21.1.57 12.4.55 2.2.55 2.2.55 5.12.56 2.2.55 2.2.55 2.2.55 15.10.52

Finally Airwork property 14.11.56

30.3.55 31.10.54 2.5.53 6.6.55 30.3.55 8.4.54 27.1.53

23/04/2013 10:34:42



421

C o m p r e h e n s i v e BOA C F l e e t L i s t Aircraft G-ANAV

Name

Delivered Disposal 12.8.53 Ministry of Supply

Date 30.3.55

On loan from Ministry of Supply On loan from Ministry of Supply

29.8.57

Returned, Ministry of Supply

2.6.58

26.8.57

Ministry of Supply

12.2.60

Britannia 102 G-ANBC

30.12.55

11.11.60

G-ANBD G-ANBE G-ANBF G-ANBG

30.12.55 2.3.56 14.3.56 8.5.56

Written off after crash, Khartoum BKS Transport Ltd. Britannia Airways Ltd. Britannia Airways Ltd. BKS Transport Ltd.

29.6.56 22.11.56 28.11.56 11.12.56 19.12.56 4.5.47 31.5.57 10.6.57 24.7.57 12.8.57

Britannia Airways Ltd. Britannia Airways Ltd. BKS Air Transport Ltd. Britannia Airways Ltd. Laker Airways Laker Airways Britannia Airways Ltd. Britannia Airways Ltd. BKS Transport Ltd. Britannia Airways Ltd.

29.4.66 5.5.65 11.4.64 26.6.65 8.4.66 21.4.66 17.11.65 14.11.64 10.3.65 28.3.65

Britannia 312 G-AOVB

10.9.57

15.10.63

G-AOVC

15.11.57

British Eagle International British Eagle International

Comet 2e G-AMXK G-AMXD

G-ANBI G-ANBJ G-ANBK G-ANBL G-ANBM G-ANBN G-ANBO G-ANBB G-ANBH G-ANBA

Speedbird.indb 421

Registered G-APLL 23.3.53

17.11.65 2.2.66 4.1.65 29.12.65

15.5.64

23/04/2013 10:34:42

422 S p e e d b i r d Aircraft G-AOVD

Delivered Disposal 4.12.47 Crashed on approach, Hurn 21.12.57 British Eagle International 2.1.58 British Eagle International 31.1.58 British Eagle International 11.2.58 Caledonian Airways 26.2.58 Caledonian Airways 13.3.58 Caledonian Airways 5.4.58 British Eagle International 21.4.58 British Eagle International 13.5.58 British Eagle International 27.5.58 British Eagle International 15.7.58 British Eagle International 31.7.58 Lloyd International Airways 27.8.58 British Eagle International 22.9.58 Lloyd International Airways 1.1.59 British Eagle International

Date 24.12.58

DC-7C G-AOIA

23.10.56

25.5.64

G-AOIB

16.11.56

G-AOIC

27.11.56

G-AOID

26.11.56

G-AOVE G-AOVF G-AOVG G-AOVH G-AOVI G-AOVJ G-AOVK G-AOVL G-AOVM G-AOVN G-AOVO G-AOVP G-AOVR G-AOVS G-AOVT

Speedbird.indb 422

Name

Fred B. Ayers & Association Fred B. Ayers & Association Fred B. Ayers & Association Fred B. Ayers & Association

6.6.64 4.3.64 3.4.64 6.11.64 19.1.65 28.4.65 31.5.65 30.4.65 29.3.64 2.6.64 17.1.64 15.4.65 22.2.63 14.7.65 13.9.63

23.3.64 12.2.64 29.5.63

23/04/2013 10:34:42



423

C o m p r e h e n s i v e BOA C F l e e t L i s t Aircraft G-AOIE

Delivered Disposal 15.12.56 Caledonian Airways (Prestwick) 29.12.56 Fred B. Ayers & Association 14.1.57 Fred B. Ayers & Association 29.1.57 Universal Leasing Corp. 19.4.57 Universal Leasing Corp. 2.1.57 Fred B. Ayers & Association

Date 28.4.64

Comet 4 G-APDA G-APDB G-APDC G-APDD G-APDE G-APDF

4.10.58 12.9.58 30.9.58 18.11.58 2.10.58 31.12.58

8.12.65 9.9.65 13.10.65 5.11.65 4.10.65 1.3.67

G-APDG G-APDH

28.11.59 6.12.58

G-APDI G-APDJ G-APDK G-APDL G-APDM G-APDN G-APDO G-APDP G-APDR G-APDS G-APDT

18.12.59 11.1.60 12.2.59 6.5.59 16.4.59 10.6.59 14.5.59 11.6.59 7.59 14.8.59 19.10.59

G-AOIG G-AOIH G-AOII G-AOIJ G-AOIF

Speedbird.indb 423

Name

Malaysian Airways Malaysian Airways Malaysian Airways Malaysian Airways Malaysian Airways Ministry of Technology (RAE) Kuwait Airways Written off following crash-landing while on lease to Malaysian Airways Aerovías Ecuatorianas Dan Air Dan Air Dan Air Dan Air Dan Air Dan Air Dan Air Mexicana de AviaciÓn Ministry of Technology Retained for apprentice training

17.4.63 6.5.63 1.6.65 15.5.65 1.6.64

15.12.66 20.4.64

5.5.66 19.4.67 19.5.66 14.1.69 3.1.69 28.12.68 26.5.66 13.1.69 7.12.64 30.1.69 6.12.69

23/04/2013 10:34:42

424 S p e e d b i r d Aircraft Boeing 707 G-APFD G-APFE G-APFB G-APFF G-APFC G-APFG G-APFH G-APFI G-APFJ G-APFK G-APFL G-APFM G-APFN G-APFO G-APFP G-ARRA G-ARWD G-ARWE

Delivered

Accepted

Disposal

Disposal Date

28.4.60 7.5.60 11.5.60 14.5.60 17.5.60 23.6.60 14.7.60 23.7.60 25.9.60 29.9.60 22.10.60 5.11.60 18.11.60 9.12.60 22.12.60 16.2.62 28.10.62 6.7.62

27.4.60 29.4.60 9.5.60 13.5.60 16.5.60 22.6.60 13.7.60 23.7.60 22.9.60 28.9.60 21.10.60 4.11.60 17.11.60 9.12.60 22.12.60 9.2.62

To BEA Air Tours Crashed near Tokyo

15.2.73 5.3.66

To BEA Air Tours To BEA Air Tours

30.3.73 15.1.72

To BEA Air Tours To BEA Air Tours

30.12.71 1.12.72

To BEA Air Tours

15.11.72

15.1.73 8.4.68

G-ARRB G-ARRC

13.2.63 16.3.63

12.2.63 14.3.63

To BEA Air Tours Burned out, London Airport

VC-10 G-ARVA G-ARVB G-ARVC G-ARVE G-ARVF G-ARVG G-ARVH G-ARVI G-ARVJ G-ARVK G-ARVL G-ARVM

8.12.64 6.2.65 1.12.64 1.10.64 4.9.64 12.6.64 2.7.64 22.4.64 23.4.64 2.5.64 16.6.64 22.7.64

8.12.64 6.2.65 1.12.64 1.10.64 4.9.64 12.6.64 2.7.64 22.4.64 23.4.64 2.5.64 16.6.64 22.7.64

Nigeria Airways

6.10.69

Speedbird.indb 424

6.7.62

23/04/2013 10:34:42



425

C o m p r e h e n s i v e BOA C F l e e t L i s t Aircraft

Delivered

Accepted

Super VC-10 G-ASGA G-ASGB G-ASGC G-ASGD G-ASGE G-ASGF G-ASGG G-ASGH G-ASGI G-ASGJ G-ASGK G-ASGL G-ASGM G-ASGN

31.12.65 30.4.65 1.4.65 1.4.65 27.3.65 2.4.65 21.6.67 4.11.65 12.2.66 7.3.67 27.10.67 25.1.68 9.4.68 7.5.68

31.12.65 30.4.65 1.4.65 1.4.65 27.3.65 2.4.65 21.6.67 4.11.65 12.2.66 7.3.67 27.10.67 25.1.68 9.4.68 7.5.68

G-ASGO G-ASGP G-ASGR

27.9.68 6.12.68 31.5.69

27.9.68 6.12.68 31.5.69

Boeing 707-336C G-ASZF G-ASZG G-ATWV G-AVPB G-AWHU G-ATZD G-AXGW G-AXGX G-AYLT

22.12.65 23.12.65 2.12.67 15.8.68 1.7.68 18.5.69 7.3.70 26.3.70 30.5.71

19.12.65 20.12.65 1.12.67 13.8.68 27.6.68 6.3.70 25.3.70 29.5.71

Boeing 707-336B G-AXXY

18.2.71

18.2.71

Speedbird.indb 425

Disposal

Disposal Date

Hijacked, then destroyed, 12.9.70 Dawson’s Field, Jordan

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426 S p e e d b i r d Aircraft G-AXXZ

Delivered 16.4.71

Accepted 17.4.71

Boeing 747 G-AWNA G-AWNB G-AWNC G-AWND G-AWNE G-AWNF G-AWNG G-AWNH G-AWNI G-AWNJ G-AWNK G-AWNL G-AWNM G-AWNN G-AWNO

23.5.70 24.5.70 30.6.70 1.3.71 8.3.71 15.3.71 9.9.71 17.12.71 12.1.72 22.3.72 25.3.72 20.4.72 4.3.73 11.11.73 8.12.73

22.4.70 22.5.70 29.6.70 13.2.71 19.2.71 28.2.71 8.9.71 23.11.71 7.1.72 21.3.72 24.3.72 19.4.72 3.3.73 7.11.73 7.12.73

Disposal

Disposal Date

Note: Delivery dates are arrival dates of the delivery flights at London Heathrow Airport.

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Abbreviations ABAMEL Associated British Airlines (Middle East) Ltd. ABC Advance Booking Charter AC Associated Companies AEA Aeronautical Engineers Association AI Air India ANZ Air New Zealand AOC Air Officer Commanding AOC-in-C Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief ARB Air Registration Board ASSET Association of Supervisory Staffs and Engineering Technicians ATA Air Transport Auxiliary ATAC Air Transport Advisory Council Atfero Atlantic Ferry Organization ATLAS Air France, TAP, Lufthansa, Alitalia, and SABENA (the ATLAS group) ATLB Air Transport Licensing Board BA British Airways BAA British Airports Authority BAB British Airways Board BAC British Aircraft Corporation BAL Bahamas Airways Ltd. BALPA British Air Line Pilots Association BASSA British Airline Stewards and Stewardesses Association BCAL British Caledonian (also B-Cal) BCL BOAC-Cunard Ltd. BEA British European Airways BIATA British Independent Air Transport Association BOA British Overseas Airways BOAC British Overseas Airways Corporation BOAC AC BOAC Associated Companies Ltd. BOT Board of Trade BSAA British South American Airways Corporation BUA British United Airways BWIA British West Indian Airways CAA Civil Aviation Authority CAAC Central African Airways Corporation CAB Civil Aeronautics Board c.c. civilian courtesy

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428 S p e e d b i r d

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CofA Certificate of Air Worthiness CPF convertible passenger/freighter CPR Canadian Pacific Railway ctm capacity ton miles DGCA Director-General of Civil Aviation DME distance-measuring equipment DOC direct operating costs DTA Department of Transport and Aviation DTI Department of Trade and Industry E&M Engineering and Maintenance EAA East African Airways EAAC East African Airways Corporation EAMS Empire Air Mail Scheme ETD estimated time of departure ETU Electrical Trades Union FAA Federal Aviation Administration FAC Future Aircraft Committee GPO General Post Office IATA International Air Transport Association ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization IFALPA International Federation of Air Line Pilots Association IHC Inter-Continental Hotels Corporation INA Iran National Airlines ITT International Telephone and Telegraph ITX inclusive tour-basing excursion JAL Japan Airlines JFK John F. Kennedy Airport, New York K-Class Flamingo DH-95 LAP London Airport-Heathrow LHR Heathrow MAL Malaysian Airlines Ltd. MAP Ministry of Aircraft Production MASCO Middle East Aircraft Service Company MCA Ministry of Civil Aviation MEA Middle East Airlines Met’ Meteorological MRAF Marshal of the Royal Air Force MRE Medium-Range Empire MSA Malaysia-Singapore Airlines MT Motor Transport MU Maintenance Unit NAC National Air Communications NGTE National Gas Turbine Establishment

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A b b r e v i at i o n s

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429

NJC National Joint Council P&O Peninsular and Oriental PAA Pan American Airways PDC public division capital PERA Propeller and Engine Repair Auxiliary PIA Pakistan International Airlines PIB Prices and Incomes Board PICAO (Provisional) International Civil Aviation Organization PIP Profit Improvement Programme QEA QANTAS Empire Airways QEAL QANTAS Empire Airways Ltd. RAE Royal Aircraft Establishment RAF Royal Air Force RFS Return Ferry Service SAA South African Airways SBAC Society of British Aircraft Constructors SIA Singapore International Airlines SST Supersonic Transport TAP Transportes Aereos Portugueses TBO Time Between Overhauls TCA Trans Canada Airlines TEA Tasman Empire Airways TEAL Tasman Empire Airways Ltd. TGWU Transport and General Workers Union THY Türk Hava Yolları (Turkish airline) TWA Trans World Airlines USAAF United States Army Air Forces UTA Union de Transportes Aériens (French) VTOL vertical-takeoff-and-landing WAAC West African Airways Corporation

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Notes

I. The Corporation at War 1 378 H.C. Deb.5s., 1485, 18 March 1942; 385 H.C. Deb.5s., 218–256, 17 December 1942. 2 These various exchanges of correspondence were published in a series of White Papers. 3 This was no secret, but simply expediency. Pan Am had the experience of transocean flying. The US Navy provided the equipment. The US Navy and Army also had their own transport organizations. 4 John Longhurst, A Study of UK Nationalized Industries: Their Role in the Economy and Control in the Future. 2 vol. (London: HMSO, November 1976). 5 When it was known that the Board was resigning, the members of Management sent a letter to Sinclair asking for the reappointment of Lord Reith as Chairman. (The Aeroplane, 2 April 1943, 376). Reith had lunched with them on 19 November 1942 (Lord Reith, The Reith Diaries, 297 and also 301), as Sinclair asked Reith to have the letter withdrawn. Handover, who signed it, dropped by BOAC, became Chairman of a British subsidiary of the Scandinavian Airlines System, 1946–1954. 6 Peter Masefield has always strenuously denied this. It is not at all clear who made this decision. The issue is obscured in Duncan Hall, North American Supply (London: HMSO, 1955). Certainly no representative of BOAC was present. MRAF Sir John Slessor, The Central Blue: Recollections and Reflections (London: Cassell, 1956), 410, sheds some light; in a personal letter to the author on 28 October 1963 he pointed out that the decision was really taken in London in May 1942 when discussions took place between the Americans, General Arnold, and Admiral Towers, and the RAF’s Portal, Freeman, and Slessor. It was a military decision in the context of winning the war. Nothing was ever on paper, but purely a sensible understanding. Britain did not need transport aircraft to win the war against Germany; but the United States had to have virtual armadas of transport airplanes to reach all its war zones.

II. Wartime Routes and Services

1 The full story has been given: John Pudney, Atlantic Bridge and Merchant Airmen, the official wartime histories. This account is based on the Corporations’ files. 2 As they were known to BOAC because their self-sealing fuel tanks began to leak after installation. Some reminiscences of the hazards of flying the 314s with VIPs were recalled some years later by Captain Gordon Store. He noted that on a flight with Churchill from Anacostia, Maryland, USA, to Gibraltar in Bristol in May

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432 N o t e s t o pa g e s 3 6 – 5 7 1943 they suffered two lightning strikes and found eighty seagull claw holes in the fabric of the trailing edges (of the elevators?), as well as having 600 gallons of sea water instead of fuel pumped aboard by mistake. (The Aeroplane, 18 February 1965, 7; also 28 January, 5–6, and 11 February, 8–9.) 3 Tom Culbert and Andy Dawson, Pan Africa: Across the Sahara in 1941 with Pan Am. 4 In the period October through May they flew Baltimore–Bermuda–Lisbon– Foynes–Lisbon–Lagos–Bathurst–Belem–Trinidad–Nassau–Baltimore and the rest of the year Baltimore–Botwood–Foynes–Lisbon–Lagos and return. 5 In RAF Transport Command in 1945 we normally flew 80 hours per month or 960 hours annually. Eventually we might do 120 hours (1,440 hours annually), but that was frowned upon. We usually flew ten hours every third day or fewer. Our duty-time day was from 0330 to perhaps 1800–2000 hours (a fifteen- to eighteen-hour day).

III. Planning the Return to Commercial Operation 1 378 H.C. Deb.5s., 749–769, 4 March 1942. 2 The Aeroplane, 20 March 1942, 326–328. 3 383 H.C. Deb.5s., 803–804, 30 September 1942. 4 385 H.C. Deb.5s., 701–702, 25 November 1942. 5 385 H.C. Deb.5s., 1304–1305, 3 December 1942. 6 The members were Lord Brabazon of Tara, W. P. Hildred and Sir Francis Shelmerdine of the Air Ministry, N. E. Rowe and K. T. Spencer of the Ministry of Aircraft Production. 7 The list given to Parliament was somewhat different: I. Bristol’s super trans-Atlantic design. II. A 100,000-pound aircraft to do the Atlantic via Newfoundland. III. A 70,000-pound, trunk-route (Empire) landplane. IV. A 40,000-pound, twin-engine landplane. V. An evolutionary civil jet airliner. VI. A fourteen-passenger landplane. VII. An 8,000-pound, twin-engine, eight-passenger landplane. In addition, the Secretary of State for Air, Sinclair, said there was to be a military conversion called the Tudor. (398 H.C. Deb.5s., 161–162, 14 March 1944). 8 See the very interesting articles by D. L. Brown, “Before the Britannia,” The Aeroplane, 19 August 1960, 220–222; 30 September, 482; and “Before the V-Bombers,” 25 December 1959, 663–666. 9 The new membership was now Lord Brabazon, Captain Geoffrey de Havilland, Group Captain William Helmore, W. G. Hildred, Major McCrindle and Campbell-Orde from BOAC, Major R. H. Thornton, and Air Commodore A. R. Wardle, additional members being co-opted for particular sessions. 10 The proposed membership was: Dr. Roxbee Cox, Sir Henry Tizard, Sir Melvill Jones, Prof. G. T. R. Hill, Group Captain W. Helmore, Sir Robert Watson-Watt, Mr. E. W. Hives, Sir Roy Fedden, and Professor L. Bairstow.

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433

11 See Don L. Brown, Miles Aircraft Since 1925, 257–263. 12 D. L. Brown, “The Origin of the By-pass and Ducted Fan,” The Aeroplane, 13 March 1959, 313–316; 4 April 1958, 491. The first published reference to Whittle’s work appeared in The Aeroplane, 14 January 1944, 33–34. 13 388 H.C. Deb.5s., 1346, 14 April 1943. A Commonwealth airline had been a major part of Reith’s plan for nationalization in 1938. 14 390 H.C. Deb.5s., 100, 1 June 1943. 15 388 H.C. Deb.5s., 1513–1514, 20 April 1943. 16 Handley Page appears to have been a consummate salesman for although the Halifax had constantly to be modified for the RAF, or perhaps because of this, the Air Ministry was forever suggesting that BOAC use the aircraft, which, while it had weight-lifting ability, lacked the volumetric capacity to make it a commercial proposition. Unfortunately the Handley Page company is about the only major British constructor not covered by the Putnam series of aircraft company histories. 17 130 H.L. Deb.5s., 437–470, 19 January 1944. 18 See, for instance, 397 H.C. Deb.5s., 1321–1382, 29 February 1944.

IV. Re-Establishing a Commercial Airline 1 Further modified in Cmnd.482 (1958) and up for reconsideration in toto in 1976. 2 Critics have generally overlooked the fact that BEA operated American Dakotas on scheduled services from 1946 to 1962. BSAA failed as its British aircraft disappeared after it had already become uneconomic when faced with competitors with American equipment. 3 137 H.L. Deb.5s., 651–727, 6 November 1945. 4 The Aeroplane, 9 November 1945, 523; The Daily Telegraph, 1 December 1962, reported Parliamentary answers showing this had indeed become true. See also Sir Gilmour Jenkins, The Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation, 163. 5 The Times, 8 January 1948; The Liverpool Daily Post, 19 November 1948. 6 451 H.C. Deb.5s., 995, 2 June 1948. 7 See Robin Higham, Britain’s Imperial Air Routes, 266, 284. 8 472 H.C. Deb.5s., 1073–1074, 15 March 1950. 9 424 H.C. Deb.5s., 1326–1447, 26 June 1946; 425 H.C. Deb.5s., 41–194, 8 July; 593– 713, 11 July. The ATAC became the Air Transport Licensing Board in 1961. 10 Sixth Report of the Estimates Committee, 1947, viii. 11 Sixth Report of the Estimates Committee, 1947, vi. See also Cmd.5685 and 5664 (1938) on its early problems. 12 Sixth Report of the Estimates Committee, 1947, Q. 1299. 13 Ibid., 7–8. 14 Because Schipol had been devastated, it bought three RAF hangars on Benbeclaa off northern Scotland, transported them to home base, and erected them as one. Neither BOAC nor the Ministry showed the same enterprise at London Airport. 15 Statement by the Under-Secretary, 444 H.C.Deb. 5s., 358, 12 November 1947. 16 Sixth Report of the Estimates Committee, 1947, xxi, xx, and Q. 1330.

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434 N o t e s t o pa g e s 8 4 – 1 1 5 17 The new 1949 Certificate of Safety, good for so many hours, was replaced in 1954 by a Certificate of Maintenance signed by a group of specialists rather than by one man. 18 446 H.C. Deb.5s., 25, 21 January 1948; 447 H.C. Deb.5s., 2151, 2153, 26 February 1948. 19 The 1951 Report by Lord Brabazon was placed under the Defence of the Realm regulations. See, however, Nevil Shute, No Highway (London: Heinemann, 1948), which was based on this aircraft’s story. 20 In about 1960, BOAC changed their marks from Roman to Arabic numerals: i.e., Comet I to Comet 1; Comet II to Comet 2, etc. The same applied to other aircraft types. 21 157 H.L. Deb.5s., 1101–1171, especially 1124–1126, 21 July 1948. Though the second Courtney Report had tried to save face by having BOAC use the Tudors as freighters on the North Atlantic, what finally killed their career was Sir Harold Hartley’s refusal to operate them without a Direction. This is the only one of two occasions on record, except for the Kuwait affair of the late Fifties, until the Slattery regime, in which a Chairman stood up to the Minister. The other was in February 1948 when BOAC refused to operate a second service to Teheran at a loss. 22 Seventh Report of the Select Committee on Estimates, 1953, Q. 1513–1533. 23 466 H.C. Deb. 5s., 179, 22 June 1949. 24 164 H.L. Deb. 5s., 274–301, 20 July 1949. 25 447 H.C. Deb. 5s., 2139, 26 February 1948. 26 On the founding of BALPA see my Britain’s Imperial Air Routes, 271–288. 27 388 H.C. Deb. 5s., 155–156, 31 March 1943. 28 430 H.C. Deb. 5s., 813–824, 19 November 1946; Trades Union Congress, 78th Annual Report (London: TUC, 1946), 218. 29 467 H.C. Deb. 5s., 1103–1120, 18 July 1949. 30 477 H.C. Deb. 5s., 728–788, 6 July 1950; 168 H.L. Deb. 5s., 313–334, 13 July 1950.

V. Postwar Operations, 1945–1949 1 White Paper, The Financial Problems of the British Overseas Airways Corporation (London: HMSO, 23 November 1963), 7. For the figures which follow see The Report from the Select Committee on Nationalized Industries . . . The Air Corporations, 1959, 300–316. 2 Perhaps the best non-technical explanation of all this is given in Cmd.7517 (1948), the report on the loss of Star Tiger. 3 Ministry statement, 466 H.C. Deb.5s., 1260, 29 June 1949. 4 On 19 March 1963 the first all-Nigerian crew began operations in a Fokker F-27. 5 136 H.L. Deb.5s., 16–17, 24 April 1945. 6 H.L. Deb.5s., 373–381, 15 March 1949. 7 See below, Chapter VIII.

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435

VI. Apex and Aftermath 1 R. E. G. Davies notes, in a communication to the author regarding this manuscript: “I remember, while with Masefield at the time, that he checked the terms of reference for BEA and claimed that, in spite of the corporate name, the airline could fly anywhere it liked to.” 2 The term appears first to have been used in The Aeroplane, 10 October 1952, 526. 3 See Sir Miles Thomas, Out on a Wing, 331. The Minister stated that the Members of the Boards of nationalized industries were not civil servants. (546 H.C. Deb.5s., 1454–1458, 23 November 1955). 4 TIME, 2 April 1956, 102; Thomas, Out on a Wing, 347. 5 The Aeroplane, 27 May 1949, 617. 6 The text is given in Appendix C, Report of the Air Transport Advisory Council, 1951. 7 489 H.C. Deb.5s., 54, 20 June 1951. 8 174 H.L. Deb.5s., 820, 5 December 1951. 9 501 H.C. Deb.5s., 1152–1157, 27 May 1952. 10 503 H.C. Deb.5s., 2180, 2184–2185, 16 July 1952; and 524 H.C. Deb.5s., 1769–1770, 8 March 1954. 11 Seventh Report of the Select Committee on Estimates, 1953, Q. 1498. 12 In Out on a Wing, 320–321, Thomas says the selling price was £125,000 and the Ministry wanted them for £90,000. My version is based on the records. 13 523 H.C. Deb.5s., 1147-1156, 10 February 1954. 14 524 H.C. Deb.5s., 1741–1748, 8 March 1954. 15 439 H.C. Deb.5s., 1344, 2 July 1947; ibid., 2183, 9 July 1947. 16 16 June 1950, 678. 17 For an analysis of the significance of this, see my Armed Forces in Peacetime (London and Hamden, CT, 1963), Chapter VII. 18 Seventh Report of the Select Committee on the Estimates, 1953, Q. 1541. 19 Ibid. 20 The story, as told in J. D. Scott, Vickers: A History, 346, needs to be read with caution. 21 546 H.C. Deb.5s., 1921–1928, 28 November 1955; “The Unwanted Civil Contender,” The Aeroplane, 23 November 1955, 795–796. Three-view drawings are in C. F. Andrews, Vickers Aircraft since 1908, 487. 22 The Comet 1 cost £250,000 for a 105,000-pound aircraft, or £2.5 per pound, while the later Comet of 1958 cost £1,250,000 or £8 per pound. 23 A careful check of BOAC’s records shows that no technical appraisal was ever made as to the likely life of the aircraft; the ten-year period was based on a purely economic assessment. However, it must be noted that American airlines then made only a financial calculation. Moreover, in 1954 the probability that metal fatigue could affect the life of an aircraft had not arisen, at least in airline circles, though there was some knowledge of it in the Second World War. 24 For Sir Miles Thomas’s side of the story see Out on a Wing, 321–326. 25 BOAC owned eighteen 749 Constellations, but Belfast crashed at Singapore on 13 March 1954. See Appendix G.

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436 N o t e s t o pa g e s 1 4 5 – 1 6 8

VII. Organization and Operations, 1949–1956

1 As Peter Masefield once explained, air transport costs can be viewed as a family tree:

Civil Air Transport Costs BASIC Annual Costs VARIABLE Operating Costs Aircraft Airline Promotional Hourly Cruising Takeoff & Landing Costs Costs Costs Costs Costs Cost of Aircraft Insurance Aircraft Airline Aircraft Airline Costs Costs Costs Costs Crew, Fuel, Maintenance

Source: The Aeroplane, 25 May 1951, 637. 2 On a similar occasion The Aeroplane’s inimitable humourist, E. A. “Chris” Wren, quoted an insider as saying, “We are reorganizing the Corporation again—it’s rather like musical chairs, only instead of taking a chair away each time, we add one.” (8 April 1955). 3 568 H.C. Deb.5s., 172–194, 1 April 1957. 4 For instance, 473 H.C. Deb.5s., 1405–1415, 6 April 1950.

VIII. The d’Erlanger Regime, 1956–1960 1 552 H.C. Deb.5s., 1212–1214, 9 May 1956. 2 In order of date of independence (up to August 1976): India and Pakistan Sri Lanka Ghana Malaysia Federal Republic of Nigeria Republic of Cyprus Sierra Leone United Republic of Tanzania Jamaica Trinidad & Tobago Uganda Kenya Malawi Republic of Malta Zambia The Gambia Singapore Guyana Botswana Lesotho Barbados Mauritius

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437

Swaziland Tonga Western Samoa Fiji Republic of Nauru Bangladesh Commonwealth of the Bahamas Grenada Papua New Guinea Seychelles 3 If customs duty had not been waived, BOAC would have paid an additional £10,000,000 on the DC-7Cs and 707s. 4 558 H.C. Deb.5s., 1772–1847. 5 The Aeroplane, 24 July 1953. 6 The Aeroplane, 21 October 1955, 647–648. 7 The Aeroplane, 21 October 1955, 641. 8 563 H.C. Deb.5s., 174–175, 30 January 1957. 9 570 H.C. Deb.5s., 82, 22, May 1957. 10 The Aeroplane, 1 November 1957. 633. 11 571 H.C. Deb.5s., 397–400, 29 May 1957. 12 572 H.C. Deb.5s., 38–40, 26 June 1957. 13 Details of the directives given in connection with these loans are to be found in the BOAC Annual Report and Accounts 1964–65, 54–69. Report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General. Civil Appropriation Accounts, 1957–58, xvi– xvii. See also Second Report from the Estimates Committee, 1963, xxiv–xxv, on the SST contract. 14 The Air Corporations, 14 May 1959, xviii–xix. 15 197 H.L. Deb.5s., 454–499, 16 May 1956. 16 574 H.C. Deb.5s., 46–48, 110–166, 24 July 1957. 17 574 H.C. Deb.5s., 194, 31 July 1957. 18 20 December 1957, 917–918. 19 BIATA Annual Report, 1957–1958, 6. 20 527 H.C. Deb.5s., 367, 5 May 1954. 21 Material in the Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas, indicates that it was not only Northwest that caused the delay, but CAB concern that though the USA had made twenty route additions to the UK’s four, the value in 1960 was estimated to be on a 6:9 ratio in favour of the UK. See Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS, 62–1959/60. 22 Much of this squabble, R. E. G. Davies notes to the author, was caused by the determination of Jamaica to be completely separated from Trinidad. 23 On the Ministry’s actions, see the comment in the Reports of the Select Committee on Nationalized Industries, 1962, xxvii. 24 Report of the Select Committee on Nationalized Industries, 1962, 181. 25 John Corbett, Report on the Management of BOAC, 1957 (Confidential).

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438 N o t e s t o pa g e s 1 9 5 – 2 1 0

IX. Aircraft Procurement 1 579 H.C. Deb.5s., 869–873, 9 December 1957. 2 The Aeroplane, 14 March 1958, 341. 3 588 H.C. Deb.5s., 226–232, 13 May 1958. 4 Second Report from the Select Committee on Estimates, Session 1956–1957; Second Report from the Committee on Public Accounts, 1960; Report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General, 1955/56; etc. 5 For the Bristol side of the story see C. H. Barnes, Bristol Aircraft Since 1910, 343–360. 6 R. G. Worcester in The Roots of British Air Policy, 26, makes the point that the great failing of British aircraft in the Second World War and after was that they carried too little fuel. It settled the fate of many projects. 7 Civil Appropriations Accounts .  .  . Report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General, 1957–58, xii–xiii. 8 R. E. G. Davies has noted to the author that negotiations with TWA’s Howard Hughes were “the stuff of fiction.” Davies added, “Incidentally, I was the one who, setting up market research, revealed TWA’s critical need.” 9 For the story of the TSR-2 penetration Cold War bomber, see AVM A. F. C. Hunter, CBE, AFC, ed., TSR 2 with Hindsight (Royal Air Force Historical Society, 1998). This reveals much about the official and manufacturing scenes at the time. On the Britannias see the autobiography of Sir Stanley Hooker, Not Much of an Engineer (Shrewsbury: Airlife, 1984), especially 132–138, and A. J. “Bill” Pegg, Sent Flying: The Autobiography of Bill Pegg, 47 ff. Pegg was Bristol’s chief test pilot. 10 R. E. G. Davies has commented here regarding “the leisurely way”: “Until Masefield—but he had to paddle his canoe against the current of lethargy at Bristol.” 11 Civil Appropriations Accounts .  .  . Report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General, 1957/58, xiii–xv. 12 547 H.C. Deb.5s., 1927, 20 December 1955. 13 195 H.L. Deb.5s., 721–726, 1 February 1956. 14 On this point see the particularly perceptive British study by Roy Lewis and Rosemary Stewart, The Boss (London: Dent, 1963), published in the USA as The Managers. 15 One important spin-off of BOAC’s pressing Boeing to develop a 707 with RollsRoyce engines was that after BOAC placed its order, Air India, Lufthansa, El Al, and Varig ordered their 707s also with Rolls-Royce Conways. Trans Canada (now Air Canada) and Alitalia then ordered their DC-8s with Conways, too. All of which was extremely good for Rolls-Royce, at this time producing over 60 per cent of the free world’s jet engines, and for British export business. Again, BOAC pioneered for the aircraft industry. 16 Second Report from the Estimates Committee .  .  . Transport Aircraft, 1963, paras. 426–443, esp. 431, and 91–111. One of BOAC’s constant problems was that the Treasury, which did not require shipping companies to buy British, insisted that

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439

BOAC do so. Yet, aircraft in airline service earned their capital cost in one year vs. three and a half for ships. BOAC was limited to fifteen rather than seventeen 707s because the Treasury routinely cut estimates or requests by 10 per cent, i.e., 1.7 Boeings in this case. 17 J. H. Motum, in The Journal of Transport History, November 1957, 224. 18 The Aeroplane, 2 November 1956, 641. 19 C. F. Andrews, Vickers Aircraft Since 1908, 468, confirms that it was thirty-five and not thirty-two. It was, however, later reduced to thirty-two. See also the Report of the Select Committee on Nationalized Industries, 1964, Q. 1244 (page 141), where Sir Basil Smallpeice made the point that the VC-10 order “cannot be called by any stretch of the imagination a commercial decision.” It was tied by the Government to permission to buy the 707. See also the Second Report from the Estimates Committee . . . Transport Aircraft, 1963, xxxvii–xl and 57–71. 20 617 H.C. Deb.5s., 957–964, 15 February 1960. But see also Report of the Select Committee on Nationalized Industries, 1962, iv, xv-xxx, and App. 7; and Robert Gardner, From Bouncing Bombs to Concorde: The Authorised Biography of Aviation Pioneer Sir George Edwards, OM. 21 626 H.C. Deb.5s., 956–957, 11 July 1960. 22 The Aeroplane, 21 June 1962, 6; and see Bibliography. 23 This was limited by the height of the hangar doors at “the Kremlin.”

X. The Slattery Regime and the Crisis 1 A great deal of this is explored and commented upon in the 1964 two-volume Report from the Select Committee on Nationalized Industries: British Overseas Airways Corporation, which largely vindicates BOAC while criticizing the Ministry. The Committee was not pleased to be denied both the Corbett Report (to be discussed below) and the minutes of meetings between the Minister and the Chairman of 30 July 1959, especially as both BOAC and Ministry representatives either quoted from or claimed to summarize them. A précis of the 200-page Corbett Report, submitted by the Ministry, appears in the Select Committee’s Report (II, 257–284). 2 For the Cunard side see Francis E. Hyde, Cunard and the North Atlantic, pp. 293–302. 3 663 H.C. Deb.5s., 548–550, 18 July 1962. According to the 1964 Select Committee Report, the Minister told the House on 5 November 1962 that it was a private agreement and he could not show it to the House; but the Committee noted that on 5 February 1964 he said BOAC and Cunard refused to let him see a copy. 4 Stated in The Aeroplane, 25 July 1963, 10. 5 The Aeroplane, 28 November 1963, 4. House of Commons, Official Report, 21 November 1963, 1187–1194. 6 It became Air India on 1 June 1962. 7 The Aeroplane, 23 November 1961, 673.

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440 N o t e s t o pa g e s 2 2 3 – 2 3 1 8 This paper will be found in The Report of the Select Committee on Nationalized Industries, 1964, II, 260–64. It was basically the work of J. B. Scott as Chief Economics Adviser and of Winston Bray as Director of Planning. 9 See Clarence B. Randall, The Folklore of Management (New York: Little, Brown, 1962), pp. 65–71, on the myth of the cost-cutter. 10 The Economist, 13 October 1962, 161–162; also Mary Goldring of The Economist on BBC TV “Tonight,” 9 October 1962. 11 The Aeroplane, 11 October 1962, 4, 6. Dr. Beeching had in 1962 just issued a report in which he recommended a drastic pruning of British Railways. 12 702 H.C. Deb.5s., 420–421, 18 November 1964. There is no evidence that anyone in BOAC took advantage of Sir Giles Guthrie’s offer that top management could read it in his office. Certainly neither Sir Matthew Slattery nor Sir Basil Smallpeice have ever seen a copy. Sir Matthew was offered a chance to read part of it but refused to read an incomplete version. Even Sir Giles had some trouble getting a complete copy for planning purposes. 13 As early as 1957, the Corporation had decided that E&M was too big, by 3,000 employees. The 1964 Select Committee Report noted that not only had E&M costs dropped from 1957 to 1962, but productivity had increased from 36,000 capacity ton miles per employee to 153,148 capacity ton miles, though staff had fallen from 7,666 to 6,530. Moreover, in 1964 BOAC’s aircraft averaged 2.32 more hours a day in the air than its seven competitors cited in the Ministry’s White Paper of November 1963, due to better scheduling and lack of night-stops. When BOAC strongly objected to the Ministry figures showing over-staffing in E&M, the Ministry backed off. (The Second Report from the Estimates Committee, 1963–1964, noted that the Ministry of Aviation’s Bloodhound contractor made a 72 per cent profit because the Ministry’s figures were way off [iii–vi].) 14 Richard Worcester, in The Roots of British Air Policy, 92, called the Corbett Report a good example of Parliamentary failure to get to the roots. He was also unfair in his attack on BOAC’s “low productivity and surrealistic financial affairs.” BOAC had close to the right-sized staff for its anticipated size and too few in some important branches, such as heavy goods vehicle drivers. 15 Sir Basil Smallpeice went from BOAC to an administrative directorship and then to the Chairmanship of the Cunard Steamship Company. He was in 1975 the air and sea transportation consultant to Peat Marwick, Mitchell, John Corbett’s firm. In addition, in June 1964 he was appointed the first administrative adviser to the Queen’s Household. Sir Matthew Slattery and Sir Wilfred Neden were given a golden handshake at Ministry’s orders. Sir Matthew then went to an aviation consultancy with Stephen Wheatcroft; he continued on the Air Registration Board, which refused to accept his resignation. Later he went to the shipbuilders R. and W. Hawthorne Leslie as Vice-Chairman, succeeding to the Chairmanship in 1965. On 17 January 1964 the Board said of the Members about to retire, “rarely in public life [had they] found such fruitful leadership and such pleasant personal relationships,” and the Cunard Directors of BOAC-Cunard agreed. The Board “accepted with great reluctance and regret the resignation of Sir Basil Smallpeice.” 16 685 H.C. Deb.5s., 786–913, 2 December 1963.

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17 See also Report from the Select Committee on Nationalized Industries, 1962, 58. 18 R. E. G. Davies has commented to the author: “BOAC should have stuck to the VC-10 (for Africa, etc.) and the Super VC-10 for the Atlantic. Its seat-mile costs were higher than those of the 707, but its higher revenue per mile (VC-10Tenderness) more than compensated for this. Some of the 707’s traffic to New York was, during the Sixties, overflow of people who could not get on the VC-10s. Given a unified campaign by BOAC, Vickers, and H. M. Govt., all working in harmony (as did the French), the whole picture would have been different. And Vickers would have exported more.”

XI. Beginning the Last Decade 1 BOAC Annual Report, 1964–1965, 53–54 (I have corrected the misprint of the Command Paper number). Guthrie had been at Eton with Julian Amery and on the BEA Board since 1959 when he was asked to lunch with Sir Anthony Milward and Amery in August 1963 to discuss a successor to Lord Douglas, then about to retire after fifteen years as Chairman of BEA—though Milward was already assumed to be the man. Later, Amery suddenly decided that Guthrie should succeed Slattery and Smallpeice. After reading the Corbett Report and Slattery’s 1962 proposals, Guthrie agreed on condition that he would serve but one fiveyear term and that he receive £15,000 per annum in compensation for giving up his remunerative directorships. Slattery had been paid £8,500 and Smallpeice £7,500. Thus, the matter was settled before the White Paper was released. Sir Giles drafted the “Magna Carta,” which Amery signed and sent to him. 2 See the special profiles in The Aeroplane, “Inside BOAC,” 19 August 1965. 3 A typical view of BOAC was evidenced in Richard Worcester’s lecture at the Royal Aeronautical Society, which claimed BOAC only needed 15,000 staff (The Aeroplane, 1 July 1965, 38). 4 However, see Cmnd.2056 (1963) Noise, much of which was devoted to Heathrow, and the Board of Trade, Aircraft Noise (London, 1967). 5 The Aeroplane, 30 April 1964, contained a special supplement on the VC-10, “the last big subsonic jet before the SST.” In the same issue it was noted that Boeing jet production in March was nine 727s and three 707s a month, or normally one jet every two working days. See also Andrews, Vickers Aircraft Since 1908, 461. 6 Personal communication to the author while reading the manuscript. 7 Cmnd.2853 (1965). 8 At its annual meeting in April, Vickers announced that in spite of the sale of four aircraft to East African Airways Corporation (EAAC), the first sale in four years, the loss on the VC-10 programme was £15,300,000 on sales of £29,800,000. The Aeroplane, 8 April 1965, 15. 9 The Aeroplane, 13 January 1966, 9. This list was headed by 201 Boeing 727s, 184 DC-9s, 129 Boeing 707s, 86 Boeing 737s, and 81 Douglas DC-8s. 10 The Aeroplane, 10 September 1964, 32. 11 The Aeroplane, 10 November 1964. 12 The Aeroplane, 11 November 1965, 3.

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442 N o t e s t o pa g e s 2 6 4 – 2 9 6 13 The Aeroplane, 25 February 1965, 34. 14 The Aeroplane, 18 March 1965, 9. 15 Salaries were under the Air Corporations Act of 1949 set by the Board. In 1964 the Treasury attempted to usurp this power and was opposed, but in the Air Corporations Act of 1966 in connection with the financial reconstruction of BOAC it took the power. On the general subject see Cmnd.3970 (1969): The National Board for Prices and Incomes Report No. 107. Top Salaries in the Private Sector and Nationalized Industries, which includes a discussion of expense allowances and perquisites. 16 Seventh Report from the Estimates Committee. . . Movement of Service Personnel and Stores (H.C.365. 1967). 17 Cmnd.4018 (1969), 22. 18 For an interview with Hermon on this, see The Aeroplane, 15 July 1965, 32, 34–35. 19 A. N. J. Blain, Pilots and Management: Industrial Relations in the U.K. Airlines, 33, provides a useful capsule history. 20 BBC TV, June 1976. 21 At the end of 1970 the PIB was replaced by the Monopolies Commission, which would control inquiries into nationalized industries. 22 A number of interesting studies on cabin staff have been done by the medical officers, including both sickness rates and Social Security legislation, rostering, and sleeping patterns. See Air Corporations’ Joint Medical Service, An Investigation into the Workload and Working Conditions of Cabin Crew in the British Overseas Airways Corporation, March 1972. 23 See The Sunday Times, 10 December 1972, and the Civil Aircraft Authority, Report of the Committee on Flight Time Limitations ( June 1973); Department of Trade and Industry, . . . Trident 1 G-ARPI . . . 18 June 1972; Civil Aircraft Accident Report 4173 (London: HMSO, May 1973), and also Victor Bignell, Geoff Peters and Christopher Pym, Catastrophic Failures, 201–229. 24 In the late Sixties they supplied only about fifteen pilots a year, according to the Medical Director. But in 1967 the Personnel Director said the services would have 800 surplus aircrew in 1968–1969 and 1,500 in 1970 owing to changing defence requirements. Nobody was sure who to believe.

XII. Edwards and the Second Force 1 Cmnd.4018 (1969). 2 Cmnd.4018 (1969), Cmnd.4213 (1970), Cmnd.4899 (1972), and Cmnd.6400 (1976). 3 They certainly disagreed with this historian’s submission. (Cmnd.4018 (1969), 271, where he is erroneously listed as a British witness.) 4 Cmnd.6400 (1976). Future Civil Aviation Policy. 5 The Roskill Report in two volumes, and ten volumes of evidence. Report of the Commission on the Third London Airport (London: HMSO, 1971). 6 809 H.C. Deb.5s., 18 January 1971, 195. 7 See Cmnd.4641 (1971) on government reorganization, which, beside changing the Board of Trade into the Department of Trade and Industry, also included from

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October 1970 to May 1971 a Ministry of Aerospace Supply with a staff of 23,600 costing £56,000,000 per annum, almost exactly the size of BOAC. 8 814 H.C. Deb.55s, 29 March 1971. 9 Aerospace, March 1976, 28–29. 10 706 H.C. Deb.5s., 17 February 1965, 1187. 11 Cmnd.2853 (1965). Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Aircraft Industry. 12 The Aeroplane, 14 October 1965, 10. 13 See The Aeroplane, 21 January 1965, 14–15, for the history of Air Holdings. 14 797 H.C. Deb. 5s., 9 March 1970, 911–919; 798 H.C. Deb. 5s., 18 March 1970, 417–530. 15 The Civil Aviation Act of 1970 provided that in the future such action had to be laid before Parliament. For various official statements see 804 H.C. Deb.5s, 3 August 1970, 808 H.C. Deb.5s, 15 December 1970, 1254–1275; 814 H.C. Deb.5s., 29 March 1971, 1172–1282.

XIII. Challenges and Responses in the Final Decade, 1964–1974 1 See General Laurence S. Kuter, The Great Gamble: The Boeing 747. See also The Aeroplane, 2 June 1966, 18–19. 2 See Derek Wood, Project Cancelled: British Aircraft That Never Flew, 233. 3 On the 747 see Douglas J. Ingells, 747: The Story of the Boeing Superjet, and especially Peter M. Bowers, Boeing Aircraft Since 1910, 507–527.

XIV. Further Challenges and Responses, 1964–1974

1 John Davis, The Concorde Affair; T. E. Blackall, Concorde: The Story, the Facts, and the Figures; Richard Wiggs, Concorde: The Case Against Supersonic Transport; John Costello and Terry Hughes, The Battle for Concorde, and in a revised and expanded version The Concorde Conspiracy: The International Race for the SST; Anon., Concorde: The Story of the World’s Most Advanced Passenger Aircraft (London: 1976); and in Geoffrey Knight, Concorde: The Inside Story. See also Ministry of Technology, Productivity of the National Aircraft Industry, 1969 (the Elstub Report); British Airways, Medical Aspects of Supersonic Flight; and Eighth Report from the Committee of Public Accounts, 1977, xii. 2 Julian Amery claimed that there was endless American pressure in the Kennedy and Johnson years to cancel the project and that the October 1964 re-evaluation of advanced projects in general was a condition of an American loan to support the pound. The New York Times, 7 May 1956, 2, quoting from Geoffrey Knight’s book (notes on pp. 28–29 and 46–49). Knight was director of the Concorde project to 1974. 3 The Aeroplane, 17 December 1964, 30, gives one example. 4 The Aeroplane, 19 May 1966, 26. 5 On this see the comprehensive report by the Department of Trade and Industry, Rolls-Royce Limited. 6 817 H.C. Deb.5s, 10 May 1971, 20–21.

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444 N o t e s t o pa g e s 3 6 1 – 3 7 4 7 834 H.C. Deb.5s, 10 April 1972, 839. 8 Pierre Sparaco, “Elusive Denouement,” Aviation Week, 14/21 June 2010, 71. 9 856 H.C. Deb.5s, 18 May 1973, 666–676 10 US Department of Transportation, The Secretary’s Decision on Concorde Supersonic Transport (Washington: 4 February 1976); and US Department of Transport, FAA, Concorde Supersonic Transport Aircraft. Final Environmental Impact Statement (Washington: February 1976). 11 Flight, 2 October 1976, 1008–1009. On 9 December 2013, years after the Air France Concorde crashed on takeoff at Charles de Gaulle, Paris, on 25 July 2000, a French appeals court ruled that maintenance mistakes were not criminal.

XV. Concluding the BOAC Story 1 R. E. G. Davies to the author, personal communication. Davies has also commented: “Compare BEA’s equally hasty order for the Viscount. The Elizabethan (Ambassador) was just as good!”

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Bibliography Introduction The bulk of the materials used for this book have come from BOAC’s (now BA’s) own archives. These sources include the minute books of the Board and related papers, the daily or weekly minutes of the Management meetings, and files on all sorts of problems. BOAC raised some 110,000 new files a year at Headquarters alone. By the time I went there to start my work in the autumn of 1962 some 2,500,000 files had been accumulated. A certain number had been destroyed, but almost all those of value have been kept and can be located. Some went first to the RAF Museum at Hendon, but all were later recalled to the British Airways Archives at Heathrow. BOAC kept a large office filled with Press clippings, and these I consulted when it seemed necessary to obtain a wider view; however, in 1975 they were destroyed by order of the new British Airways Management. In addition to the above sources, as was done for my Britain’s Imperial Air Routes, 1918–1939 (London: Foulis, 1960), I read through the Official Reports of the Debates in the House of Lords and of the Debates and Questions in the House of Commons (Hansard). The wide range of official government documents provided a wealth of information both on particular points and on the Government mind. As they become open they are available at The National Archives at Kew. The Aeroplane, up to its demise in 1967, also provided a good deal of routine information and a certain amount of generally hostile comment. Flight was useful on occasion, as well, but in general its contents for my purpose merely duplicated those of The Aeroplane. Subsequently, Flight International, the aeroflight and commercial aviation news, after it absorbed The Aeroplane, became a basic source. Additionally, The Log, the official journal of the British Air Line Pilots’ Association, is representative of special interest periodicals. The Bibliography has been divided accordingly: Introduction Primary Sources BOAC Medical Works by BOAC Staff Official Works Command Papers General Legislation Parliamentary Inquiries

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446 S p e e d b i r d Statutory Instruments Additional Sources Secondary Sources 2010 Bibliographic Additions General Official Works

Primary Sources BOAC Annual Report and Statement of Accounts of the British Overseas Airways Corporation for the Year Ended 31st March. Annual from 1947, they contain a mine of information; the last three relevant for this book are contained in the reports of the British Airways Board. Similar reports exist for BEA and BSAA for the years in which the companies existed. BOAC Aviation News Digest. A weekly which succeeded the Reference Bulletin compiled by T. E. Scott-Chard, the Reference Officer and staff, 1952–1966. BOAC Aviation News Digest. A useful weekly summary from a wide variety of English-language publications of what was occurring in Parliament and the aviation world, compiled by T. E. Scott-Chard, the Reference Officer from 1966 to the end of 1976. BOAC News. Weekly Corporation newspaper for all staff, 1959–1974. BOAC Review. 1940–1973. BOAC Telephone Directories. A useful source of information as to who was doing what, when, in the London area; regional area directories should also be retained for reference, but most have been destroyed. College of Air Training. Prospectus. Hamble, Southampton, UK: 1960. (BOAC was a sponsor.) Cunard Eagle and the Atlantic—BOAC’s Appeal. 9 October 1961. Cunard Eagle and the Atlantic—BOAC’s Case. 31 May 1961. Handbook of Instructions and Information. Originally issued in November 1944, subsequently revised to 1948. Part I is a history and contains information as to the origins of crests, etc. Organization Manual. Though confidential, it was used to locate persons and to find out their responsibilities.

Medical Works by BOAC Staff Air Corporations Joint Medical Service. Effects of Time Zone Changes in the Sleep Patterns of BOAC B-707 Crews on World-Wide Schedules, The. London: July 1970.

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——. An Investigation into the Workload and Working Conditions of Cabin Crew in the British Overseas Airways Corporation. London: March 1972. Barnes, R. M. “Physical Energy Expenditure in Long-Haul Cabin Crew.” Aerospace Medicine, 44.7 (1973): 783–785. ——. “Survey of the Medical Causes of Rejection of Applicants for the BEA/ BOAC Sponsored AB-Initio Pilot Training Scheme.” Aerospace Medicine, 42.9 (1972): 941–946. Bennett, G., and P. J. O’Connor. “Medical Wastage of Military and Civil Aircrew in Great Britain, 1963–68.” Aerospace Medicine, 41 (1970): 550–552. Bergin, K. G. Aviation Medicine: Its Theory and Application. Bristol, UK: John Wright & Sons Ltd., 1949. ——. “Scope and Functions of an Airline Medical Service with Particular Reference to B.O.A.C, The.” British Medical Journal, 2.5250 (19 August 1961): 508–512. British Airways. Medical Aspects of Supersonic Flight. London: British Airways, ca. 1971. Bruton, D. M. “Health of Ground Employees in Relation to New Generation Aircraft, The.” National Safety Congress Transactions. Chicago, 1971. ——. “Medical Aspects of Cathode Ray Tube Display Systems.” Transactions of the Society of Occupational Medicine, 22 (1972): 56–57. ——. “Pollution Levels at London (Heathrow) Airport and Methods for Reducing Them.” AGARD (NATO) Conference Reprint No. 125, Atmospheric Pollution by Aircraft Engines. January 1973. Cassie, Alexander, S. D. Fokkema, and J. B. Parry, eds. Aviation Psychology Studies on Accident Liability, Proficiency Criteria, and Personnel Selection. London: Charles Skilton, 1964. Green, R. L. “Carriage of Invalid Passengers by Civil Airlines, The.” A paper read to the Board of Trade Aviation Medicine Symposium, 14 March 1970. ——. “Clinical Aviation and Aerospace Medicine: Peptic Ulcer in Airline Stewards.” Aerospace Medicine, 40.12 (December 1969): 890–893. ——. “Selection of Patients for Air Travel, The.” Modern Medicine, February 1972 (reprint). Human Problems of Supersonic and Hypersonic Flight. Proceedings of the Fifth European Congress of Aviation Medicine. London, 29 August–2 September, 1960. Edited by A.  Buchanan Barbour and Sir Harold E. Whittingham. London: Pergamon Press, 1962. McGirr, Owen. “Control of Toxic Materials in Aircraft Maintenance, The.” Mimeographed, Dublin, 16 September 1964. ——. “Health Considerations—Shift Work and Health.” Paper presented at the Production Engineering Research Association, Melton Mowbray, Leicestershire, UK, June 1966. ——. “Health in Offices—When is an Office an Offence?” Royal Society of Health Congress. Scarborough, North Yorkshire, UK, 9–13 April 1962.

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448 S p e e d b i r d ——. “More than Meets the Eye: Some Less Frequently Encountered Aspects of Medicine.” Medicine in Civil Aviation, No. 4. St. Bartholomew’s Hospital Journal (St.BHJ) (September 1967): 340–345. ——. “Screening of Food Handlers” [Transmission of Exogenous Infections]. Proceedings Royal Society of Medicine, 62.6 ( June 1969): 601–602. McGirr, P. O. M. “Circadian Rhythms in Flight.” Transactions of the Society of Occupational Medicine, 18 (1967): 3–12. ——. “Environmental Targets in Offices and Commercial Premises.” 20 March 1959. Peffers, A. S. R. “The Effects of Jet Air Travel on the Respiratory and CardioVascular Systems.” Paper presented to the International Congress on Diseases of the Chest. Tokyo, Japan, 1958. ——. “Health Problems of High Speed Travel: Immunization Requirements for International Travel.” A paper presented to the Occupational Medicine Section, Royal Society of Medicine, 11 December 1969. ——. “Medical Aspects of the Comet Disaster.” Typescript of paper given by the BOAC Medical Officer who investigated the G-ALYF accident in 1954. ——. “Pulmonary Tuberculosis: Carriage of Cases by Air.” Health Bulletin, Department of Health for Scotland, 12.4.59, October 1954. Preston, F. S. “Effects of Flying and of Time Changes on Menstrual Cycle Length and on Performance in Airline Stewardesses.” Aerospace Medicine, 44.4 (1973): 438–443. ——.“Feeding Round the Clock—Physiological Considerations.” Royal Society of Health Journal, 94.3 ( June 1974): 110–113. ——. “Medical Aspects of Supersonic Travel.” Aviation, Space and Environmental Medicine, August 1975: 1074–1078. ——. “Outbreak of Gastro-enteritis in Aircrew, An.” Aerospace Medicine, 39.5 (May 1968): 519–521. ——. “Physiological Problems in Air Cabin Crew.” Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine, 67.9 (1974): 825–829. ——. “Radiation Problems of Supersonic Flight—The Operator’s Viewpoint.” Mimeographed paper, October 1972. ——. “Twelve Year Survey of Airline Pilots.” Aerospace Medicine, 39.3 (March 1968): 312–314. Turner, Anthony C., A. N. Hepburn, and Dudley M. Bruton. “Occupational Health in the Airline Industry.” British Medical Student’s Journal, offprint, n.d., ca. 1967. United States Federal Aviation Administration. Fatigue in Aviation Activities. 1965. University of Chicago Industrial Relations Center. Flying Staff Attitude Survey. 18 August 1967. Whittingham, Sir Harold. “Air Transport of Pregnant Women.” The Practitioner, 166 (February 1951): 156–158.

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British Government Official Works (London: HMSO) Command Papers (Published by Command of Parliament; found in library Government Documents collections) Cmd.5864 (1938) Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Working of the Directorate of Operational Services and Intelligence of the Department of Civil Aviation. The Rae Committee, Air Ministry. Cmd.5961 (1939) Report of the Committee on the Control of Flying. Cmd.6038 (1939) Production of Civil Aeroplanes: Report of a Committee Appointed by the Secretary of State for Air. The Brown Committee. The report was originally entitled “Report . . . into the Best Methods of Fostering the Production of Civil Aeroplanes.” Cmd.6561 (1944) International Air Transport. The Coalition Government’s plan for postwar civil air transport. Cmd.6605 (1945) British Air Transport. A general policy statement. Cmd.6614 (1945) Interim Agreement on International Civil Aviation, Chicago, 7 December 1944. The Chicago Convention. Cmd.6712 (1945) British Air Services. The Labour programme. Cmd.6747 (1946) Bermuda Agreement. 11 February 1947. Cmd.7268 (1948) Capital Investment. Cmd.7307 (1948) Interim Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Tudor Aircraft . . . The first part of the Courtney Report. Cmd.7478 (1948) Final Report . . . into the Tudor Aircraft. Cmd.7517 (1949) Report of .  .  . the Accident to Tudor IV .  .  . “Star Tiger”.  .  . on 30 January 1948. Cmd.7564 (1948) Report of the Committee on Accident Investigation Procedures. The Newton Committee. Cmd.7705 (1949) Report of the Committee on Certification of Civil Aircraft and Approval of Equipment . . . The Helmore Report. Cmd.7746 (1949) Report of the Committee on Recruitment, Training and Licensing of Personnel for Civil Aviation and Memorandum by the Minister of Civil Aviation. The Wilcock Report. Cmd.8147 (1951) Landing and Taking-off Aircraft in Bad Weather. Ministry of Civil Aviation. Lord Brabazon of Tara, Chair. Cmd.8561 (1952) Fifth Annual Report of the Advisory Council on Scientific Policy (1951–1952). For the first five years, the Council was guided by Sir Henry Tizard as Chairman, until 31 March 1952. This is the report which showed Britain to be getting woefully short of scientific manpower. Cmd.8902 (1953) London’s Airports. Minister’s views on Gatwick. Cmd.9215 (1954) Report of an Inquiry into the Proposed Development of Gatwick Airport. The Sir Colin Campbell Report to the Minister of Housing. Cmd.9296 (1954) Gatwick Airport. The Government’s comments upon the Campbell Report.

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450 S p e e d b i r d Cmd.9388 (1955) Supply of Military Aircraft, The. A summary of developments since 1945. Cmnd.105 (1957) Report .  .  . of a Dispute between the British Overseas Airways Corporation and the Merchant Navy and Airline Officers Association. The Jack Report. Cmnd.256 (1960) Second Report of the Committee of Public Accounts, The. An exposé of the lack of financial control in the Ministry of Supply and the Ministry of Aviation. Cmnd.288 Miscellaneous No. 23 (1975) Customs Convention on the Temporary Importation for Private Use of Aircraft and Pleasure Boats . . . Geneva. Cmnd.608 (1958) Report of a Court of Inquiry into the Causes and Circumstances of a Dispute at London Airport . . . The Second Jack Report. Cmnd.708 (1959) Economic Survey, The. In 1960 this annual report was split into two parts, with Public Investment in Great Britain being published separately. The series started with Cmd.6527 (1944). Cmnd.1337 (1962) Financial and Economic Obligations of Nationalized Industries, The. Cmnd.1373 (1960) Convention Relating to Cooperation for the Safety of Air Navigation. Eurocontrol. Cmnd.1457 (1961) Civil Aerodromes and Air Navigational Services. Cmnd.1552 (1961). The Public Investment in Great Britain. Cmnd.1680 (1962) Government Expenditure Below the Line, 1962–63. London. This follows up on Cmnd.1552 and deals with repayment of BOAC loans. Cmnd.1695 (1962) Aviation Safety. A handbook on the Government’s responsibilities, with a bibliography of statutory instruments. Cmnd.1916 (1962) Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom .  .  . and the Government of the French Republic Regarding the Development of a Civil Supersonic Transport Aircraft. Cmnd.2056 (1963) Noise. The Wilson Committee Report (Reprinted 1968). Cmnd.2428 (1964) First Report of the Inquiry into the Pricing of Ministry of Aviation Contracts (Sir John Lang, Chairman) (Reprinted 1969). Cmnd.2581 (1965) Second Report of the Inquiry into the Pricing of Ministry of Aviation Contracts. (Sir John Lang, Chairman) (Reprinted 1967). Continues Cmnd.2428. Cmnd.2853 (1965) Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Aircraft Industry Appointed by the Minister of Aviation Under the Chairmanship of Lord Plowden, 1964–65. Cmnd.2937 (1966) Shipbuilding Inquiry Committee, 1965–1966 Report. Chairman: Mr. R. M. Geddes, OBE. Useful as an insight into a British industry that parallels the aircraft industry described by Plowden in Cmnd.2853. Cmnd.3235 (1967) Prices and Incomes Board. Prices and Incomes Policy. Cmnd.3428 (1968) Ministry of Labour. Report of the Court of Inquiry. Under the chairmanship of Mr. A. J. Scamp.

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Cmnd.3551 (1969) Ministry of Labour. Report of the Court of Inquiry. Under the chairmanship of Lord Pearson. Cmnd.3623 (1968) Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations, 1965–1968. Chairman: the Rt. Hon. Lord Donovan. Report. The fifth such study and the first since the Whitley Reports of First World War days. Cmnd.3639 (1968) Civil Service, The. The Fulton Committee. Cmnd.3789 (1968) National Board for Prices and Incomes Report No. 88. Pay of Pilots Employed by the British Overseas Airways Corporation. Cmnd.3888 (1969) In Place of Strife: A Policy for Industrial Relations. Cmnd.3970 (1969) National Board for Prices and Incomes Report No. 107. Top Salaries in the Private Sector and Nationalized Industries. Cmnd.4018 (1969) British Air Transport: Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Civil Air Transport. Chairman: Sir Ronald Edwards, KBE. Cmnd.4197 (1969) National Board for Prices and Incomes, Report No. 129. Pay of Pilots Employed by the British Overseas Airways Corporation. Cmnd.4213 (1969) Board of Trade. Civil Aviation Policy. Cmnd.4449 (1970) Final Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Disruption of Operations and Industrial Relations at Heathrow (London) Airport. Cmnd.4506 (1970) Reorganization of the Central Government, The. Cmnd.4641 (1971) Government Organization for Defence Procurement and Civil Aerospace. Cmnd.4899 (1972) Department of Trade and Industry. Civil Aviation Policy Guidance. Cmnd.6400 (1976) Department of Trade. Future Civil Aviation Policy. Cmnd.7084 (1978) Department of Trade. London Airport Policy.

General Air Ministry. Flight Safety. 1962. ——. Report on the Progress of Civil Aviation, 1939–1945. Microfilm. Cambridge, MA: Baker Library, Harvard University. Air Pilot, The. Modified by 510: Notices to Airmen; reissued as complete, 1949. Air Registration Board. Annual Reports, 1938–. ——. British Civil Airworthiness Requirements. Known as the Blue Book. 1949–. ——. Civil Aircraft Inspection Procedure. Known as the Red Book. 1949–. ——. Register of British Civil Aircraft. Monthly, with an annual volume in May, starting in 1952. Annual Report of the Director of the Meteorological Office. Annual Survey of Accidents to Aircraft of the United Kingdom. 1934–. Army Work Study Group, BAOR Team Reports. Air Trooping. Part I, Bidding and Allocation of Seats. 1963.

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452 S p e e d b i r d Board of Trade. Aircraft Noise: Report of an International Conference on the Reduction of Noise and Disturbance Caused by Civil Aircraft. Held at Lancaster House, London, 22–30 November 1966. 1967. ——. Safety Performance of United Kingdom Airline Operators, The: Special Review (Chairman: W. E. B. Griffiths). 1968. British Airports Authority. Gatwick Airport, London: Master Plan Report. July 1974. ——. Report and Accounts. London, HMSO. The series starts with 1965–1967; thereafter annual. British Airways Board. First Report on Organization. 14th July 1972 (H.C.386). ——. Second Report on Organization. 22 January 1973 (H.C.74). ——. Third Report on Organization. 29 November 1973 (H.C.81). British Standards Institution. Glossary of Aeronautical Terms. London, 1962. Central Office of Information. Britain’s Associated States and Dependencies. 1976. Civil Aviation Authority. Airport Planning: An Approach on a National Basis. 1976. ——. Report on the Committee on Flight Time Limitations. June 1973. Civil Aviation Licensing Notes. Issued from 1960 by the ATLB instead of the ATAC’s advertisements in the press. Commission on the Third London Airport. Papers and Proceedings. 2 vol. 1969. Department of Trade. Air Strategy for Great Britain. Part I, The London Area. 1976. ——. Air Strategy for Great Britain. Part II, The London Area. 1976. ——. Maplin: Review of Airport Project. 1974. Department of Trade and Industry. Civil Aircraft Accident: Report on the Accident to Boeing 707-463 G-ARWE at Heathrow Airport, London on 8th April 1968. CAP.324. 1969. ——. Fire and Rescue Operations at Heathrow Airport: Report of the Working Party. CAP.356. 1961. ——. Rolls-Royce Limited. Investigation .  .  . by R. A. McCrindle, QC, and P. Godfrey, FCA. 1973. Great Britain Ministry of Technology. Productivity of the National Aircraft Effort. Report of a Committee Appointed by the Minister of Technology and the President of the Society of British Aerospace Companies under the Chairmanship of Mr. St. John Elstub. 1969. Heastie, H., and P. M. Stephenson. Upper Winds Over the World. Geophysical Memoirs, No. 103. 1960. HMSO. No. 8, Aeronautical Research Council. London: HMSO. Occasional. Issued from time to time; older lists should be kept as papers go out-of-print and are removed. ARC papers show the development of noise research from the 1920s. ——. No. 15, Air Ministry. Occasional. ——. No. 22A, Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation. 1954–. ——. No. 48, Ministry of Aviation. London: HMSO, 1962. A serial publication containing references to all Command and other important papers, including accident reports. Varies with Ministry in charge of civil aviation. ——. No. 59, Royal Commissions, 1936–1954. Revised to 30 September 1954.

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Ministry of Aircraft Production. College of Aeronautics .  .  . 19 July 1944, A. The Fedden Report. Ministry of Aviation. Air Traffic Control. 1964. ——. Civil Aircraft Accident: Report on the Accident to Britannia G-ANCA which occurred on 6th November, 1957 at Downend, Bristol. CAP.162. 1960. ——. Civil Aircraft Accident: Report on the Accident to Britannia G-AOVD which occurred on 24th December, 1958 at Sopley Park, Christchurch, Hants. CAP.164. 1960. ——. Final Report of the Air Transport Advisory Council .  .  . 31 March 1961 and Statement by the Minister of Aviation (H.C.259). 1 August 1961. ——. Fuelling of Aircraft (Landplanes), The. CAP.74 revised. 1961. ——. Report of the Committee on Civil Aircraft Accident Investigation and Licence Control. The Cairns Committee. CAP.169. 1961. ——. Report of the Committee on Pilot Training. CAP.194. June 1963. ——. Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Third London Airport. CAP.199. June 1963. ——. Report of the Working Party on Aviation Kerosene and Wide-Cut Gasoline. CAP.177. 1962. ——. Report of the United Kingdom Altimeter Committee. 1965. ——. Reports of the Air Transport Licensing Board. 1961–1971. ——. Report . . . on the Third London Airport . . . June 1963. Ministry of Civil Aviation. A Survey of the Accidents to Aircraft of the United Kingdom in the year ended 31 December 19—. That for 1950 is MCAP.89 ——.Civil Aircraft Accident: Report of the Court of Investigation on the Accident to Comet G-ALYV on 2nd May, 1953. MCAP.112. 1953. ——. Civil Aircraft Accident: Report of the Court of Investigation on the Accident to Tudor Aircraft G-AKBY on 12th March, 1950. 1950. ——. Civil Aircraft Accident: Report on the Accident to Comet I D.H. 106 G-ALYZ Which Occurred on 26th October, 1952 at Ciampino Airport, Rome. MCAP.107. 1953. ——. Civil Aircraft Accident: Report on the Accident to Short S.25 Sandringham G-AHZB Which Occurred on 23rd August, 1947, at Bahrain. MCAP. 39. 1948. ——. Civil Aircraft Accident: Report on the Loss of Tudor IVB “Star Ariel” G-AGRE Which Disappeared on a Flight Between Bermuda and Kingston ( Jamaica) on 17th January, 1949. MCAP.78. 1949. ——. Civil Aviation Report, 1946 and 1947. MCAP.60. 1948. ——. Civil Aviation: Report of the Ministry of Civil Aviation for 1948 and 1949. MCAP.81. 1950. The last of a series, it contains statistical data back to 1924. Accident reports were published as Command Papers until January 1947, when they began to be issued as Civil Air Publications. ——. First Report of the Interdepartmental Helicopter Committee. MCAP.92. The Cribbett Report. September 1950.

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454 S p e e d b i r d ——. Report of the Air Transport Advisory Council for the period 11th June 1947 to 31st December 1948 and Statement by the Minister for Civil Aviation (H.C.155). 4 May 1949. Thereafter annually to 31 March 1961, when the ATAC became the Air Transport Licensing Board. ——. Report of the Investigation of Tudor IV Aircraft by the Committee Under the Chairmanship of Lord Brabazon of Tara. London, 24 February 1949 (Secret). Ministry of Supply. Royal Aircraft Establishment. The College of Air Training Prospectus, 1960. ——. Report on the Comet Accident Investigation. September 1954. This is an elevenpart documentary from which the Court of Inquiry drew the materials for its Report. ——. Report on the Loss of Skyways York G-AHFA in the North Atlantic, February 1953. Accident report dated 16 November 1953. Mimeographed. ——. Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Civil Aviation in the West Indies, 2 July–15 October 1960. The Tymms–Wheatcroft Report. (Trinidad Government Printing Office) 1961. Ministry of Transport. Report of Steering Group on Development Cost Estimating (The Gibb–Zuckennan Report). 1969–. Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation. Civil Aircraft Accident: Report of the Court of Inquiry into the Accidents to Comet G-ALYP on 10th January, 1954 and Comet G-ALYY on 8th April, 1954. CAP.127. 1955. ——. Civil Aircraft Accident: Report on the Accident to Tudor G-AGRI Which Occurred in Flight Approximately 30 miles South-east of Paris on 2nd March, 1954. 1954. ——. London Airport Central: Terminal Buildings. 1955. ——. Report of the London Airport Development Committee. CAP.145. 1957. National Joint Council. Report of the Committee of Investigation Set up by the National Joint Council for Civil Air Transport, Resolution Dated 17 July 1961. Mimeographed. Noise Advisory Council. Aircraft Noise. Flight Routeing Near Airports. 1971. Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, Social Survey Division. Second Survey of Aircraft Noise and Annoyance Around London (Heathrow) Airport. 1967 Survey. Report of the Commission on the Third London Airport (The Roskill Report). 2 vol. 1971. Report of the Committee of Investigation set up by the National Joint Council for Civil Air Transport Resolution dated 17 July 1961, October 1961. Reports by the Director of Scientific and Industrial Research, as Industrial Research and Development Expenditure. 1958, 1960. Reports of the International Commission for Air Navigation, 1919–1946. Sutcliffe, R. C. Meteorology for Aviators. 1940, amended 1953. Weather in the Mediterranean. 2 vol. 1937, rev. 1963. Aeronautical Research Council, 1938–1948, The. 1951. Aeronautical Research Council, 1948–1954, The. 1955.

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Legislation 1939. British Overseas Airways Act, The. 1945. Ministry of Civil Aviation Act, The. 1946. Civil Aviation Act, The. 1947. Air Navigation Act. 1949. Air Corporations Act. 1949. Civil Aviation Act. 1953. Air Corporations Act. 1960. Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act. 1971. Civil Aviation Act.

Parliamentary Inquiries (with date ordered to be printed) 7 August 1947. Sixth Report from the Select Committee on Estimates . . . Civil Aviation. 24 March 1948. Second Report from the Select Committee on Estimates . . . Cost of the Construction of the Brabazon I. 24 March 1948. Fourth Report . . . Departmental Replies. 28 July 1948. Tenth Report . . . 13 May 1953. Seventh Report from the Select Committee on Estimates . . . Rearmament. 10 November 1954. Eighth Report from the Select Committee on Estimates, Session 1953–54, Royal Air Force Non-Flying Establishments. 19 December 1956. Second Report from the Select Committee on Estimates . . . Session 1956–1957, The Supply of Military Aircraft. 22 May 1957. Fourth Report from the Select Committee on Estimates . . . Customs and Excise. 25 July 1957. Third Report from the Committee of Public Accounts . . . Civil Appropriations Accounts .  .  . Together with the Report of the Comptroller-and-Auditor-General Thereon. This series often contains useful information on aircraft development costs, etc. 1958. Sixth Report from the Select Committee on Estimates .  .  . Treasury Control of Expenditures. H.C.257. London: HMSO, 1958. 14 May 1959. Report from the Select Committee on Nationalized Industries (Reports and Accounts . . . The Air Corporations). H.C.213. London: HMSO, 1959. July 1960. Second Report from the Committee of Public Accounts. 25 October 1960. Special Report from the Select Committee on Nationalized Industries . . . The Air Corporations. This is the fundamental volume, the answers of witnesses containing a great deal of evidence. 21 June 1961. Fifth Report from the Estimates Committee . . . London’s Airports. 20 December 1961. First Report from the Estimates Committee . . . Trooping. 20 December 1961. Fifth Special Report from the Estimates Committee . . . London’s Airports (Observations of the Minister of Aviation).

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456 S p e e d b i r d 20 February 1962. Report from the Select Committee on Nationalized Industries .  .  . Reports of Former Select Committees on Nationalized Industries: Outcome of Recommendations and Conclusions. H.C.116. London: HMSO, 1962. 19 December 1963. Second Report from the Estimates Committee . . . Transport Aircraft. 1964. Report from the Select Committee on Nationalized Industries: British Overseas Airways Corporation. I. Report and Proceedings of the Committee. II. Minutes of Evidence, Appendices, and Index. H.C.240. London: HMSO, 1964. A most important set of documents. 1964. Report of the Estimates Committee: . . . Concord. London: HMSO, 1964. 19 February 1964. Fourth Report from the Estimates Committee . . . Session 1963–64. Form of the Estimates of the Defence Departments. H.C.119. London: HMSO, 1964. 9 April 1964. Second Report from the Committee of Public Accounts . . . Session 1963–64, Guided Weapons Contracts Placed by the Ministry of Aviation with Ferranti, Ltd. H.C.183. London: HMSO, 1964. 13 May 1964. Fifth Report from the Estimates Committee . . . Session 1963–64. Treasury Control of Establishments. H.C.228. London: HMSO, 1964. 17 June 1964. First Report from the Select Committee on Procedure . . . Session 1963–64, The Form of the Defence Estimates. H.C.248. London: HMSO, 1964. 17 June 1964. Sixth Report from the Estimates Committee .  .  . Session 1963–64, Variations in Estimates. H.C.250. London: HMSO, 1964. 21 July 1964. Second Report from the Select Committee on Procedure . . . Session 1963– 64. The Disclosure of Matters Contained in the Reports of the Select Committees. H.C.295. London: HMSO, 1964. 1967. Seventh Report from the Estimates Committee . . . Session 1966–67, The Movement of Service Personnel and Stores. H.C.365. 1967. 24 February 1967. First Report from the Select Committee on Nationalized Industries: The Post Office. Vol. I. Report and Proceedings. H.C.340. London: HMSO, 1967. 18 July 1967. Second Special Report from the Committee of Public Accounts, Session 1966-67, Bristol Siddeley Engines Ltd. H.C.571. London: HMSO, 1967. 24 July 1968. First Report from the Select Committee on Nationalized Industries, Session 1967-68, Ministerial Control of the Nationalized Industries. 2 vol. London: HMSO, 1968. 27 March 1971. First Report from the Select Committee on Nationalized Industries . . . Session 1970–71, British Airports Authority. London: HMSO, 1971. 1972. Minutes of Evidence. Expenditure Committee, Session 1971–72. Vol. I, II, III. London: HMSO, 1972. 1975. First Report from the Select Committee on Nationalized Industries .  .  . Session 1975–76. British Airways: The Merger of BEA and BOAC. H.C.56. London: HMSO, 1975. November 1976. A Study of UK Nationalized Industries: Their Role in the Economy and Control in the Future. 2 vol. London: HMSO, 1976.

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26 July 1977. Eighth Report from the Committee of Public Accounts . . . Session 1976–77. London: HMSO, 1977.

Statutory Instruments For instance: 1954 No. 900 Civil Aviation, Air Navigation (Radio) Regulations, The. 1954.

Additional Sources Aerospace. Monthly magazine of the Royal Aeronautical Society, London, since January 1974; occasionally contains interviews or articles of historical interest. Airline Ownership, Fleets, and Liner Prices, Aviation Report Supplement No. 98. London: Studies (International) Ltd., n.d. Annual Reports of the British Independent Air Transport Association, 19–. London. No report was issued for 1955–1956, and the year was changed from 1 July–30 June to 1 April–31 March in 1959– 1960. Aviation Directory of Asia (including Australia and New Zealand), 1964. Bombay: Aeronautical Publications of India Private Ltd., 1964. Barry, W. S. Language of Aviation, The. With Introduction by Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Douglas of Kirtleside. London: Chatto & Windus, 1962. British Independent Air Transport Association, The. Annual Reports. London, 1950. Started in 1948 as the British Air Charter Association. British South American Airways Corporation. Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, from 1 August 1946 to 31 March 1949. Esso Air World. 1948–. (Later Exxon Air World). Flight. 1909– (Flight International). UK. Journal of the Society of Licensed Aircraft Engineers, The. 1950–. The SLAE has been part of the Royal Aeronautical Society, London, since 1987. Lexicon of Terms Used in International Civil Aviation. Montreal: International Civil Aviation Organization, 1964. Log: Official Journal of the British Air Line Pilots Association, The. 1940–. London. Whitaker’s Almanack (annual). London: A & C Black. Contains salaries from the BOAC Board’s private minute book. Who’s Who (annual). London: A & C Black.

Secondary Sources In order to keep this list to the items bearing directly on BOAC, only those works by BOAC personnel or about BOAC have been included. Few articles are listed, though many have been consulted.

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458 S p e e d b i r d Aeroplane, The. Special issue devoted to BOAC with biographical sketches of top Management team. 19 August 1965. Aero Publishers. DC-10 Jetliner. Fallbrook, CA: Aero Publishers, 1973. “Aerospace talks to Sir Stanley Hooker.” Aerospace, September 1976: 32–33. Agrawala, S. G. Aircraft Hijacking and International Law. Bombay, India: N.M. Tripathi Private Ltd.,1975. Air League of the British Empire. Future of British Air Transport, The. I. (1957), II. (1960), by Sir Miles Thomas. Airline in Action: BOAC’s Account of its Wartime Operations. 1945. Allen, Roy. Great Airports of the World. London: Ian Allan, 1964. Andrews, C. F. Vickers Aircraft Since 1908. London: Putnam, 1969. Anon. “Haven of Refuge.” Flyghistorisk Revy, November, 1976. Armstrong, William. Pioneer Pilot. London: Blandford Press, 1951. Armstrong provided John Pudney with information for Seven Skies, The: A Study of BOAC and Its Forerunners Since 1919 (London: Putnam Aeronautical Books, 1959). Ashley, C. A. First Twenty-Five Years, The: A Study of Trans-Canada Airlines. Toronto: Macmillan, 1963. Bainbridge, John. Like a Homesick Angel. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1964. Baitsell, John M. Airline Industrial Relations: Pilots and Flight Engineers. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966; London: Bailey Bros., 1966. Banks, Air Commodore F. R. “Importance of Timing in Aircraft Manufacture, The.” Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society, October 1956. Barclay, Stephen. Air Crash Detective. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1969. Barnes, C. H. Bristol Aircraft Since 1910. London: Putnam, 1964. ——. Handley Page Aircraft Since 1907. London: Putnam, 1976. ——. Shorts Aircraft Since 1900. London: Putnam, 1967. Beaty, David. Four Winds, The. New York: Morrow, 1954. ——. Human Factor in Aircraft Accidents, The. London: Secker and Warburg, 1969. Bennett-Bremmer, E. Front-Line Airline. London: Elek, 1945. Bignell, Victor, Geoff Peters, and Christopher Pym. Catastrophic Failures. Milton Keynes, Bucks., UK: Open University Press, 1977. Blackall, T. E. Concorde: Story, the Facts, and the Figures, The. Henley-on-Thames, Berks. UK: G. T. Foulis, 1969. Blain, A. N. J. Pilots and Management: Industrial Relations in the U.K. Airlines. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1972. “BOAC Story: Thirty-Four Years Old, Fifty-Four Years Long, The.” Esso Air World, 25.3 (1972): 58–63. Brabazon, Lord . . . of Tara. Brabazon Story, The. London: Heinemann, 1956. Brackley, Frida H. Brackles: Memoirs of a Pioneer of Civil Aviation. Privately printed at Chatham, 1952. Brancker, J. W. S. “Bilateral Agreements in International Air Transport.” Journal of the Institute of Transport (September 1961): 167–178.

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Bristol Aircraft Ltd. Bristol Britannia Turboprop Airliner. Filton, Bristol, UK: September 1958. “British Independent Operators, The.” The Aeroplane (14 March 1952): 305–309. A history plus list. Brooks, John. Telephone—The First Hundred Years. New York: Harper & Row, 1976. Brooks, Peter W. Modern Airliner, The. London: Putnam, 1961; reprinted, Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1982. Brown, Don L. Miles Aircraft Since 1925. London: Putnam, 1970. Burns, R. “What Are Airlines For?” Paper given at the Institute of Transport, 10 February 1969. Central Office of Information for the Ministry of Supply. Fifty Years at Farnborough (1905–1955), 1955. Cheesman, E. C. Brief Glory: The Story of ATA. Leicester, UK: Harborough Publishing Co., 1946. The story of the Air Transport Auxiliary. Clark, F. G., and Arthur Gibson. Concorde: The Story of the World’s Most Advanced Passenger Aircraft. London: Phoebus Publishing Co./BPC Publishing Ltd., 1975. Coleman, E. H. How Aviation Came to Nigeria. Lagos: Federal Ministry of Aviation, 1960. The author was Director of Civil Aviation there. Corbett, David. Politics and the Airlines. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965. Costello, John and Terry Hughes. Battle for Concorde, The. Salisbury, UK: Compton Press, 1971. ——. Concorde Conspiracy, The: The International Race for the SST. New York: Scribners, 1976. Cowell, J. Graham. D. H. Comet: The World’s First Jet Airliner. Hounslow, Middx.: Airline Publication and Sales, Ltd., 1976. Critchley, A. C. Critch! The Memoirs of Brigadier-General A. C. Critchley, CMG, CBE, DSO. London: Hutchinson, 1961. Crossman, R. H. S. Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, The. Vol. I. Minister of Housing 1964–66. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1976. ——. Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, The. Vol. II. Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons, 1966–1968. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1977. ——. Myths of Cabinet Government, The. Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press, 1972. Curtis, Lettice. Forgotten Pilots, The: A Story of the Air Transport Auxiliary 1939–45. Henley-on-Thames, Berks.: G. T. Foulis, 1971. Davies, D. P. Handling the Big Jets: An Explanation of the Significant Differences in Flying Qualities Between Jet Transport Aeroplanes and Piston-Engined Transport Aeroplanes Together with Some Aspects of Jet Transport Handling. London: Civil Aviation Authority, 1967, 1968, 1971. Davies, R. E. G. Airlines of the United States Since 1914. London: Putnam, 1972. ——. A History of the World’s Airlines. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964.

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460 S p e e d b i r d Davis, John. Concorde Affair, The. London: Leslie Frewin, 1969; Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1970. de Havilland, Sir Geoffrey. Sky Fever: The Autobiography of Sir Geoffrey de Havilland. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1961. Dempster, Derek. Tale of the Comet, The. New York: McKay, 1959. Douglas, Lord . . . of Kirtleside. Years of Combat and Command. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966. The memoirs of the Chairman of BEA, a sometime Director of BOAC. Drummond, John D. Gap of Danger. London: W. H. Allen, 1963. The story of the Atlantic weather ships. Eddy, Paul, Elaine Potter, and Bruce Page. Destination Disaster: From the Tri-motor to the DC-10. The Risk of Flying. New York: Quadrangle, 1976. Edwards, Chris and Liz. Concorde: Ten Years and a Billion Pounds Later. London: Pluto Press for the Anti-Concorde Project, 1972. Fedden, Sir Roy. Britain’s Air Survival. London: Cassell & Co., 1957. ——. “Britain’s Aircraft Needs.” The Lord Semphill Lecture to the Aircraft Conference of the Institution of Production Engineers, January 1956. Fish, Donald. Airline Detective: The Fight Against International Air Crime. London: Collins, 1962. Fish was head of BOAC security. Friedman, Jesse J. A New Air Transport Policy for the North Atlantic: Saving an Endangered System. New York: Athenaeum, 1976. Fulton, Kenneth T. “Concorde’s Olympian Power.” Esso Air World, 38.3 (1976): 63–68. Fysh, Sir Hudson. Qantas Rising: The Autobiography of the Flying Fysh. Sydney, Australia: Angus and Robertson, 1965. ——. Qantas at War. Sydney, Australia: Angus and Robertson, 1968. Grey, C. G. Civil Air War, The. Leicester, UK: Harborough Publishing Co., 1945. Gunston, Bill. Attack Aircraft of the West. New York: Scribners, 1976. ——. Early Supersonic Fighters of the West. London: Ian Allan, 1976. Haines, Joe. Politics of Power, The. London: Coronet Books (Hodder & Stoughton), rev. 1977. Hannah, Donald M. Sabena: An Air-Britain Airline History Monograph. London: Air Britain, 1965. Hardy, M. J. De Havilland Mosquito, The. New York: Arco, 1977. Hartleg, K. “Mergers in the UK Aircraft Industry, 1957–60.” Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society, December 1965. Heastie, H., and P. M. Stephenson. “Upper Winds Over the World,” Parts I and II. Geophysical Memoirs, No. 103. London: HMSO, 1960. Hewat, Timothy, and W. A. Waterton, Comet Riddle, The. London: Muller, 1955. Higham, Robin. Britain’s Imperial Air Routes, 1918–1939. London: Foulis, 1960. ——. “Sir Giles Guthrie’s Heritage: Politics and the Growth of BOAC.” Airways International, January–February 1965: 19–21.

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——. “37 Steps: An American Blueprint for British Air Transport, The.” The Aeroplane, 3 January 1968: 25–28. Hopkins, George E. Airline Pilots, The: A Study in Elite Unionization. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971. Hubbard, David G. Skyjacker, The: His Flights of Fantasy. New York: Collier, rev. 1973. Hubler, Richard G. Big Eight: The Biography of an Airplane. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1960. Hunt, Leslie. Twenty-One Squadrons: The History of the Royal Auxiliary Air Force. London: Garnstone Press, 1972. Hurst, Ronald, ed. Pilot Error: A Professional Study of Contributory Factors. New York: Granada, 1977. Hyde, Francis E. Cunard and the North Atlantic, 1840–1973: A History of Shipping and Financial Management. London: Macmillan, 1975. “IAL: The Great Providers.” Esso Air World, 24.1 (1971): 14–19. Ingells, Douglas J. L-1011 Tristar and the Lockheed Story. Fallbrook, CA: Aero Publishers, 1975. ——. 747: Story of the Boeing Superjet. Fallbrook, CA: Aero Publishers, 1970. Jackson, A. J. Avro Aircraft Since 1908. London: Putnam, 1965. ——. British Civil Aircraft, 1919–1959. 2 vol. London: Putnam, 1959, 1960. ——. British Civil Aircraft Since 1910. Vol. II, 2nd ed. London: Putnam, 1973. ——. De Havilland Aircraft Since 1915. London: Putnam, 1962. Jenkins, Sir Gilmour. Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation, The. London: Allen and Unwin, 1959. Joyner, Nancy Douglas. Aerial Hijacking as an International Crime. Leiden, Netherlands: A. W. Sijthoff, 1974. Kelly-Rogers, Captain J. C. “Commercial Flying on the North Atlantic from Infancy to Maturity.” Aerospace, January 1976: 20–27. Knight, Clayton and K. S. Plane Crash! The Mysteries of Major Air Disasters and How They Were Solved. London: Elek, 1958. Knight, Geoffrey. Concorde: The Inside Story. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976. Kuter, General Laurence S. Great Gamble, The: The Boeing 747. University, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 1973. “Laker the Leader.” Exxon Air World (formerly Esso Air World), 37.3 (1975): 67–70. Latimer-Needham, C. H. Refuelling in Flight. London: Pitman, 1950. A history of Flight Refuelling Ltd., by its Chief Engineer. Lee, Lincoln. Three-Dimensioned Darkness. London: Allen and Unwin, 1962. The problems of an airline pilot by a BOAC captain. “Lion Rampant: BCAL Is Five Years Old, But 47 Years Long.” Exxon Air World (formerly Esso Air World), 28.2 (1967): 47–49. Longford, Seventh Earl of (Lord [Francis] Pakenham), Five Lives. London: Hutchinson, 1964.

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462 S p e e d b i r d MacInnes, C. M. Bristol at War. London: Museum Press, 1962. Mansfield, Harold. Vision: Saga of the Sky. New York: Duell, Sloan, & Pearce, 1956. The story of Boeing’s development, including the prototype of the 707, by Boeing’s Director of Public Relations. May, Garry. Challenge of BEA, The: The Story of a Great Airline’s First 25 Years. London: Wolfe, 1971. McNair, Lord Q. C. Law of the Air, The. London: Sweet, Mannell, Stevens & Sons, rev. 1964. Miller, Ronald, and David Sawers. Technical Development of Modern Aviation, The. New York: Praeger, 1968. Mills, Stephen E. More Than Meets the Sky: A Pictorial History of the Founding and Growth of Northwest Airlines. Seattle: Superior, 1972. Moggeridge, “Jackie.” Woman Pilot. London: Pan Books, 1959. Munson, Kenneth. Pictorial History of BOAC and Imperial Airways. London: Ian Allan, 1970. Narracott, A. H. Unsung Heroes of the Air. London: Frederick Muller, 1947. National Fire Protection Association. S.O.P. Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting 1973. No. 402. Boston, MA: NFPA, 1973. Nayler, J. L., and T. F. Saunders. Handbook of the Aircraft Industry. London: George Newnes, 1958. Nunn, A. G. “Modern Aircraft Maintenance Procedures and Techniques.” The Journal of the Society of Licensed Aircraft Engineers, 8.6 ( June 1959). Oldfield, S. “From Hounslow Heath .  .  . to Heath Row: An Historical Review of Four Decades of British Air Transport.” The Journal of the Society of Licensed Aircraft Engineers, 9.9–12 (1962): 5–56. An illustrated book in itself; interesting because of the point of view. Patterson, T. T. Morale in War and Work: An Experiment in the Management of Men. London: Parrish, 1955. Pearcy, Arthur, Jr. Dakota, The: A History of the Douglas Dakota in RAF and RCAF Service. London: Ian Allan, 1972. Pegg, Bill. Sent Flying: The Autobiography of Bill Pegg. London: Macdonald’s, 1959. [Pudney, John]. Atlantic Bridge: The Official Account of RAP Transport Command’s Ocean Ferry. London: HMSO, 1945. ——. Laboratory of the Air: An Account of the Royal Aircraft Establishment of the Ministry of Supply, Farnborough. London: HMSO, 1948. This work was commissioned by R. B. Williams-Thompson, then Chief Information Officer of the Ministry of Supply. See his autobiography below. ——. Merchant Airmen: The Air Ministry Account of British Civil Aviation, 1939– 1944. London: HMSO, 1946. ——. Seven Skies, The: A Study of BOAC and Its Forerunners Since 1919. London: Putnam, 1959. Commissioned by BOAC in 1955, it is in the same vein as Pudney’s other works listed above. Ramsden, J. M. Safe Airline, The. London: Macdonald and Jane’s, 1976.

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2010 Bibliographic Additions Since late 1978 when this manuscript was completed and subsequently accepted by the Secretary/Solicitor of British Airways, many relevant works have appeared, listed below.

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Orlebar, Christopher. British Airways: The Concorde Story. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1986. Ormes, Ian, and Ralph Ormes. Sky Masters, The. London: Kimber, 1976. Overton, Bill. Valetta, The: Vickers’s Last Piston Transport. Loughborough, Leics., UK: Loughborough University, Audio Visual Services, 1996. Owen, David. Air Accident Investigation: How Science Is Making Flying Safer. Somerset, UK: PSL, Haynes Publishing, 1999. Owen, Kenneth. Concorde and the Americans: International Politics of the Supersonic Transport. Shrewsbury, Shrops., UK: Airlife, 1997. Painter, Martin. DH 106 Comet, The: An Illustrated History. Suffolk, UK: Air Britain (Historians) Ltd., 2002. Pearce, Ian. Lost on Easby Moor: The Last Flight of Hudson NR-E. Wolviston, Co. Durham, UK: Printability Publishing, 2003. Pearcy, Arthur. Sixty Glorious Years: A Tribute to the Douglas DC-3 Dakota. Shrewsbury, Shrops., UK: Airlife, 1993. Penrose, Harald. Wings Across the World: An Illustrated History of British Airways. London: Cassell, 1980. Phillips, David. Skyjack: The Story of Air Piracy. London: Harrap, 1973. Phipp, Mike. Airfield Focus: No. 14. Bournemouth/Hurn Airport. Peterborough, Cambs., UK: GMS Enterprises, 1994. Pamphlet. Pickler, Ronald A., and Larry Milberry. Canadair: The First 50 Years. Toronto, Can.: CANAV Books, 1995. Pither, Tony. Boeing 707 720 and C-135, The. Liverpool: Air Britain (Historians) Ltd., 1998. Poolman, Kenneth. Flying-Boat: The Story of the Sunderland. London: Kimber, 1962. Powell, Air Commodore Griffith “Taffy.” Ferryman: From Ferry Command to Silver City. Shrewsbury, Shrops., UK: Airlife, 1982. Pugh, Peter. Magic of a Name, The: The Rolls-Royce Story. 3 vol. Cambridge, UK: Icon Books, 2000, 2001, 2002. Putnam Aeronautical Review, The. 1 (March 1989). Articles on the VC-10. Quinn, Tom. Wings Over the World: Tales from The Golden Age of Air Travel. London: Aurum Press, 2004. Rapier, Brian J. Halifax at War. London: Ian Allan, 1987. Rawlings, John, and Hillary Sedgwick. Learn to Test, Test to Learn: The History of the Empire Test Pilots’ School. Shrewsbury, Shrops., UK: Airlife, 1991. Rayner, Jay. Star Dust Falling: The Story of the Plane That Vanished. London: Doubleday, 2002. On the loss of the BSAA Lancastrian in August 1947. Reed, Arthur. Airline: The Inside Story of British Airways. London: BBC Books, 1990. Reiss, Bob. Frequent Flyer. One Plane, One Passenger, and the Spectacular Feat of Commercial Flight. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994. Robertson, Alan. Lion Rampant and Winged: Commemorative History of Scottish Aviation. Scotland: The author, 1986.

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474 S p e e d b i r d Robertson, Bruce. Lancaster: Story of a Famous Bomber. Letchworth, Herts., UK: Harleyford, 1964. Robson, Graham. Propliner Renaissance. Ramsbury, Wilts., UK: Crowood Press, 2002. Restored airliners. Royal Aeronautical Society. CD-ROM No. 2. Imperial Airways. N.d. Russell, Sir Archibald. A Span of Wings: An Autobiography. Memoirs of a Working Life in Aircraft Design Encompassing a Span from Biplanes to Concorde—Bristol Fashion. Shrewsbury, Shrops., UK: Airlife, 1992. Sampson, Anthony. Empires of the Skies: The Politics, Contests, and Cartels of the World’s Airlines. New York: Random House, 1984. Saunders, Wayne. “Shentone: An Unparalleled Career: Part I: The Pre-war Years.” Canadian Aviation Historical Society Journal (Fall 2011): 80–85. Savoie, Donald J. Court Government and the Collapse of Accountability in Canada and the United Kingdom. Toronto, Can.: University of Toronto Press, 2008. Scott-Hill, Ian, and George Behrend. Channel Silver Wings: A Record of Service. Channel Islands: Jersey Artists Ltd., 1972. Share, Bernard. Flight of the Iolar, The: The Aer Lingus Experience, 1936–1986. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1986. Shaw, Robbie. Boeing Jetliners [Osprey Civil Aircraft]. Oxford, UK: Osprey, 1995. Shepherd, William G. Economic Performance Under Public Ownership: British Fuel and Power. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1965. Sherwood, Philip. Heathrow: 2000 Years of History. Stroud, Glos., UK: Sutton, 1999. Sherwood, Tim. Coming in to Land: A Short History of Hounslow, Hanworth and Heston Aerodromes, 1911–1946. Hounslow, UK: Heritage Publications [Hounslow Library], 1999. Smallpeice, Sir Basil. Of Comets and Queens: An Autobiography. Shrewsbury, Shrops., UK: Airlife, 1981. Smith, Philip. It Seems Like Only Yesterday: Air Canada—The First 50 Years. Toronto, Can.: McClelland & Stewart, 1986. St. John Turner, Paul. Handbook of the Vickers Viscount. London: Ian Allan, 1968. Stait, Bruce A. Rotol: History of an Airscrew Company, 1937–1960, The. Stroud, Glos., UK: Sutton, 1990. Sterling, Christopher H. Commercial Air Transport Books: An Annotated Bibliography of Airlines, Airliners, and the Air Transport Industry. McLean, VA: Paladwr Press, 1996. Supplement, 1998. Stevenson, Garth. Politics of Canada’s Airlines from Diefenbaker to Mulroney, The. Toronto, Can.: University of Toronto Press, 1987. Stroud, John. Airports of the World. London: Putnam, 1980. ——. Annals of British and Commonwealth Air Transport, 1919–1960. London: Putnam, 1962. ——. Jetliners in Service Since 1952. London: Putnam, 1994. ——. Passenger Aircraft and their Interiors, 1910–2006. Gosforth, Newcastle Upon Tyne, UK: Scoval Publishing Ltd., 2002.

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——. Railway Air Services. London: Ian Allan, 1987. Swanborough, Gordon, and John William Ransom Taylor. British Civil Aircraft Register. London: Ian Allan, 1970. Sykes, David. Aeroplanes in My Briefcase. London: Quiller Press, 1987. The author started as a BOAC flight engineer on flying-boats; he was station engineer at Lisbon and then a salesman for Vickers Viscounts. Taylor, Frank J. “Pat” Robertson. Menlo Park, CA: Lane Magazine and Book Co., 1967. Pat was head of United Airlines to 1966. Taylor, John W. R., and Gordon Swanborough. Civil Aircraft of the World. London: Ian Allan, 1974. Taylor, Michael J. H. Planemakers No. 1: Boeing. London: Jane’s, 1982. ——. Shorts: Planemakers No. 4. London: Jane’s, 1984. Thomas, W. Donald. Lindbergh and Commercial Aviation: A Pictorial Review of Colonel Lindbergh’s Association with TAT, TWA and PAA as Technical Advisor. N.p.: Don Thomas Foundation Publishing, 1988. Thomson, Sir Adam. High Risk: The Politics of the Air. London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1990. Trubshaw, Brian. Concorde: The Inside Story. Foreword by Captain Jock Lowe. Stroud, Glos., UK: Sutton, 2000. Trubshaw, Brian, with Sally Edmondson. Brian Trubshaw Test Pilot. Foreword by HRH The Duke of Edinburgh. Stroud, Glos., UK: Sutton, 1998. Trubshaw was the Vickers’ test pilot for the Valiant, VC-10/Super VC-10, and the Concorde. He helped create Concorde. Vander Meulen, Jacob. Building the B-29. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995. Walker, Timothy. First Jet Airliner, The: The Story of the De Havilland Comet. Gosforth, Newcastle Upon Tyne, UK: Scoval Publishing Ltd., 2007. Wall Street Journal, 10 November 1982. White, Graham. R-2800: Pratt & Whitney’s Dependable Masterpiece. Shrewsbury, Shrops., UK: Airlife, 2001. Winterbotham, F. W. Ultra Spy, The: An Autobiography. London: Macmillan, 1989. After the war, Winterbotham joined BOAC, then retired in 1952. Wixey, Ken. Lockheed Constellation, The. Stroud, Glos., UK: Tempus Publishing, 2001. Woodley, Charles. BOAC: An Illustrated History. Stroud, Glos., UK: Tempus Publishing, 2004. ——. Bristol Britannia. Ramsbury, Wilts., UK: Crowood Press, 2003. ——. History of British European Airways, 1946–1972. Barnsley, Yorks., UK: Pen and Sword, 2005. Woods, Eric (Timber). From Flying Boats to Flying Jets: Flying in the Formative Years of BOAC, 1946–1972. Shrewsbury, Shrops., UK: Airlife, 1997. Wragg, David W. Boats of the Air: An Illustrated History of Flying-Boats, Seaplanes, and Amphibians. London: Robert Hale, 1984.

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476 S p e e d b i r d Wright, Alan. J. Cargo Airlines. London: Ian Allan, 2000. Product guides, 1998 and 2000. ——. Vickers Viscount. London: Ian Allan, 1992. Wykes, Alan. Air Atlantic: A History of Civil and Military Transatlantic Flying. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1967. “X,” Captain [Capt. Brian Power Waters], and Reynolds Dodson. Unfriendly Skies: Revelations of a Deregulated Airline Pilot. New York: Doubleday, 1989. Yenne, Bill. Lockheed. Avenel, NJ: Crescent Books, 1987. Yes, Minister. Satirical BBC comedy series, 1980–1982, 1984; written by Antony Jay and Jonathan Lynn. BBCDVD1462 [The Complete “Yes, Minister”], released 15 November 2004. Young, Gavin. Beyond Lion Rock: The Story of Cathay Pacific Airways. London: Hutchinson Radius, 1988.

Official Works United Kingdom Department of Trade. Maplin: Review of Airport Project. London: HMSO, 1974. United Kingdom Parliament: House of Commons, Transport Committee. Session 1987–1988. Third Report. Airline Competition: Computer Reservation Systems. I. Reports, Minutes of Proceedings and Appendices. London: HMSO, 28 July 1988. United Kingdom Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation Publications. HMSO Sectional List No. 22. 31 December 1954; No. 22A, February 1955.

United Kingdom Public Record Office (PRO), now The National Archives (TNA) AVIA 2. Contains all the Air Ministry Civil Aviation files, 1919–1945, with a few before plus some after. AVIA 3. Aircrew licenses. AVIA 4. Certificates of Air Worthiness and aircraft licenses. AVIA 5. Air Ministry et al., Air Requisition Board, 1919–1936. AVIA 6. Royal Aircraft Establishment Reports, 1916–1972. AVIA 27. Air Transport Auxiliary. AVIA 47. Bristol Brabazon I. AVIA 60. Air Registration Board. AVIA 63. Most civil aircraft. AVIA 70. Aviation publications. AVIA 75. Ministry of Aviation Aerodrome Information files. AVIA 78–89. Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation and Ministry of Civil Aviation files. AVIA 95–96. Air Transport Licensing Board. AVIA 99. Chief Economist, Ministry of Aviation.

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B i b l i o g r a p h y

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Cmnd.1457 (1961) Civil Aerodromes and Air Navigational Services. Ministry of Aviation. Cmnd.3437 (1967) Nationalised Industries: A Review of Economic and Financial Objectives. Cmnd.4018 (1969) British Air Transport in the Seventies: Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Civil Air Transport. Chairman, Sir Ronald Edwards KSE. London: HMSO, 1969. Cmd.6865 (1946) Wartime Tank Production. Cmnd.7084 (February 1978) Airports Policy.

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Index Page numbers in italics refer to illustrations. ABA (Swedish airline) 29, 50, 53 Abadan crisis (1951) 112, 119, 160–61 ABAMEL 190, 191, 335 Abell, Charles (later Sir Charles) 87, 151, 246, 300, 314; Abell Committee 141 accidents (1948–55) 152, 153, 154, 156, 157 Aden Airways 129, 188, 189, 190 Admiralty 6, 24, 35 Aer Lingus 76, 149, 183 Aeroflot 321, 322, 323 Aeronautical Engineers Association 94, 95–96, 237–38 Aeroplane, The 18, 20, 46, 50, 63, 121, 132, 135, 167, 175, 196, 210, 214, 225, 262, 264, 313, 318 Africa: associated companies in 187–88; service to 29 agreements, bilateral 117, 127, 161, 180, 181, 332–33, 336, 338 Air Canada 292, 304 Air Ceylon 189, 296, 328, 329, 331, 333 Air Corporations Acts (1949) 89, 90, 96, 125, 127, 167; (1946) 93; (1953) 120; (1966) 264, 265; (1967) 307, 309 Air Council 20, 21 Air Estimates 49–50, 89 Air France 76, 77, 92–93, 160, 208, 276, 351, 355, 359, 361, 362, 365, 367 Air Holdings Ltd. 304, 306, 307; structure, early 1962 222 Air India International 113, 160, 181, 221, 321, 322, 326, 329, 331, 332, 333–34, 335, 336 Air League of the British Empire 120, 170 Air Ministry 3, 4, 6, 11, 13, 17, 18, 19, 24, 25, 28, 33, 35, 37, 40, 41, 42, 45, 46, 48, 50, 62, 89, 113, 223; committee on aerodromes 63–64; Integration Policy Committee 21; and trooping contracts 126, 128–30 Air Ministry–Ministry of Aircraft Production joint post-war planning committee 53 Air New Zealand 182, 287, 326, 327, 328, 329, 335, 336 Air Registration Board (ARB) 47, 82, 98, 137, 195, 198, 199, 200, 202, 215, 233, 237, 257, 294, 312, 371 Air Service Training 100 Air Transport Advisory Council 119–20, 123, 125, 127, 129, 130, 164, 169, 171, 174, 179

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Air Transport Auxiliary 6, 15, 18, 20, 75 Air Transport Licensing Board (ATLB) 173, 179, 218, 220, 222, 223, 269, 303, 304, 305, 310; Annual Report 1961/62 222; Seventh Report (1967) 305 Air Union 63, 181 aircraft: airliner purchase costs 90–91; American 57, 59–60, 132–33; Brabazon proposals 54, 57, 58; jet airliner development 59; jet operations requirements 140; MediumRange Empire (Type III) proposal 54, 57, 58, 60; Atlantic crossing modifications 33; post-war types planning 53–55, 57–58; pressurized 59, 156; spare parts 97–98, 345; standards, post-war 98, standards, wartime 18, 40; turbine-powered 140; see also individual manufacturers aircraft fleet 55; 1940 5; 1943 11; 1944 67; 1945 25, 90; 1946 98; 1962 226; 1964 80 aircraft procurement and modification 25–26, 28, 33; post-war 76–77, 374 airframe engineer 300 airgraphs 12, 58, 131 Airline Chairmen’s Committee 228, 236, 294, 336 Airline Detective (1962) 91 Airlines Common Automated Services Association 275 airmail 4, 12, 25, 37, 42, 44, 57, 58–59, 101, 131–32, 148, 161, 172 Airways Training Ltd. 100 Airwork 89, 110, 119, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 162, 164, 171, 174, 175, 179, 187, 188, 212, 221 Alamuddin, Sheikh Najib 190, 191 Aldermaston 100 Alexandria, Lake Mariut marine airport 110 Alitalia 76, 187, 221, 321, 336, 351 ALTA Travel Ltd. 309 American Airlines 215, 327 American Export/Overseas Airlines 31, 33, 75, 104, 118 American Express 275 Amery, Julian 220, 221, 223, 224, 225, 229–30, 231, 262, 371; “Magna Carta” letter 245–46, 249, 268, 360, 361, 371, 374 Amin, General Idi 310, 311 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 112, 160

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480 S p e e d b i r d Armstrong Whitworth: Albermarle 18; AW15 Atalanta 7, 44; Ensign 5, 10, 10, 26, 31, 36, 37, 41, 42, 44, 46, 67, 111; Whitley 17, 17, 18, 29, 37 “Arnold Service” 33 Asmara base 35, 40, 42 Associated British Airlines (Middle East) Ltd. (ABAMEL) 190, 191, 335 Association of Supervisory Staffs and Engineering Technicians (ASSET) 95 Atlantic Bridge (1945) 24 Atlantic Ferry Organization (Atfero) 15, 32 ATLAS group 360 ATLB see Air Transport Licensing Board Attlee, Clement 61 Australia–South Africa Horseshoe service 12, 15, 29, 41, 42, 44–47, 47, 109 Australian Government 45, 114, 115, 180 Australian (Kangaroo) route 76, 77, 78, 111, 114–15, 321; 21st birthday 163 Aviation Week 365 Avro Atlantic (Vulcan conversion) 133 Lancaster 59, 64, 106 Lancastrian 27, 28, 33, 47, 60, 67, 76, 78, 84, 98, 106, 111, 113, 114, 115, 123; interior 27 Shackleton 173 Tudor 28, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 75, 79, 80, 86, 88, 89, 90, 98, 106, 107, 109, 113, 124, 142 Tudor I 67, 76, 103, 109 Tudor II 76, 79, 86, 109, 112 Tudor IV 106 York 17–18, 19, 23, 28, 53, 54–55, 58, 60, 62, 63, 67, 76, 98, 99, 106, 108, 110, 111, 113, 114, 125, 126, 129, 159, 188; cabin 375 BAC (British Aircraft Corporation) 195, 212, 214, 250, 252, 254, 255; One-Eleven 252, 332, 361; TSR-2 354 Bader Report (1973) 287 BAe/Aérospatiale Concorde 196, 247, 321, 324, 351–67, 352, 357, 370, 371; BOAC Blue Book 358, 359, 361, 363; cabin 353; cruise profile 362; draft contract 354; flights commence 366; fuel consumption 365; “Major (BOAC) Matters Outstanding” 365; noise problems 355, 356, 358, 362, 366, 367; orders 354, 359; purchased by BOAC 362–64 Bahamas Airways Ltd. (BAL) 183, 184, 186, 192 Bahrain 112, 349 Balfour, Harold (later Lord Balfour of Inchrye) 5, 6, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 23, 24, 33, 48, 54, 59, 62, 65, 370 BALPA (British Airline Pilots Association) 94, 95, 152, 153, 277, 278, 279–80, 281–82, 284, 286, 287, 323, 327

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Bamberg, Harold 217, 219, 220 Bampfylde, Basil 324–25, 331 Banks, Air Commodore F. R. 195 bases 4, 12, 24–25 BCAL (British Caledonian) 296, 297, 302, 309, 310–11, 320, 327, 328, 335–36 BEA (British European Airways) 34, 63, 67, 74, 81, 87, 88, 89–90, 91, 100, 113, 117–18, 130, 132, 134, 149, 150, 153, 155, 156, 161, 164, 168, 172, 178, 179, 183, 191, 206, 210, 211, 220, 223, 224, 226, 228, 277, 280, 284, 305, 307, 311, 317, 321, 323, 336, 339, 341, 351, 359, 369; advertisement with BOAC 376; BEACON computer system 272, 274, 275, 276; formation 75–76; and merger proposals 291, 292, 301, 302 BEA Air Tours 297, 310, 311 Beatty, Sir Edward 31, 32 Beaver Tourist-Class services 158 Beaverbrook, Lord 21, 25, 62, 63, 64; Beaverbrook Plan 66 Beeching, Lord 225, 228 Beirut 162 Bennett, Air Vice-Marshal D. C. T. “Pathfinder” 31, 88, 105, 106 Berle, Adolf 63 Berlin Airlift 88 Bermuda 157, 158, 159, 217, 218; service to 101–103, 104, 105 Bermuda Agreement (1946) 73, 181, 182, 183, 317–18, 325–26 Beswick, Frank 170 Bevan, K. W. 183 BIATA (British Independent Air Transport Association – formerly British Air Charter Association) 123, 124, 126, 174, 167, 169, 179, 223, 304 Blair-Cunynghame, J. O. 153 Blue Streak stand-off weapon 195–96 BOAC (British Overseas Airways Corporation) 1949–56 145–50; 1949 89–90 absorbed into British Airways 303 Accounts Department 93 Air Safety Board 23 Air Safety Committee 152; Report (1955) 152–53, 156 aircraft development costs 98 Aircraft Requirements Committee 170 aircraft requirements during war 12–13, 15, 17–18, 19 Annual Report: 1946–47 74; 1958–59 172 Associated Companies 127, 128, 182–93, 247, 350, 351, 374 and BEA merger proposals 291, 292, 301, 302 Blue Book on Post-War Planning 63–64, 115

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I n d e x Board, 1939–74 371–74; 1943 21; 1946 79–80, 91–92; 1948 93; 1949 89; 1955–56 121, 167–68; 1964 289 Board Commercial and Economics Committee 165 Board Development Committee 23, 49, 103 Board during Second World War 6, 7 Board resignations: 1943 18–21, 60; after Corbett Report (1963) 229, 232 Board Technical Committee 98 Board to include members of executive 120 Board’s last meeting 303 Central Technical Unit 151 Chairman’s Planning Committee 23 coat of arms ii Comet 1 withdrawal, effects of 149 Concorde Project Coordination Committee 364 Development Flight 98 Engineering and Maintenance (E&M) Dept 93, 109, 142, 153, 237–38, 341, 345, 349 Engineering Costs Committee 233–34 Executive Committee 19, 21, 23 finances: arrangement on formation 7–8; losses, 1950s 178; reconstruction, 1960s 263–65 Flight Advisory Committee 156 Flight Operations Planning Department 98 “Fly British” policy 64, 73, 76, 116, 132–35, 172, 203, 207–208, 371, 374 formation of 5–8 Future Aircraft Committee 313, 314 growth from 1945 to 1950 90–93 and Independents 220–21; 1964–74 303–311 line organization in 1947 92 and “Magna Carta” letter 245–46, 249, 268, 360, 361, 371, 374 Management, 1939–74 371–74; 1943–45 21, 23–25; 1947 81, 85 Management Services Department 275, 276, 342 market research unit 92 Medical Department 92 merger with BSAA 89–90, 93, 96, 106, 116 Middle Eastern Division 92, 108, 111 No. 5 Line 8, 113, 115, 154 obsolescence policy 86–88 Operational Research Section 92 operational standards lowered in wartime 18, 40 Operations Department 91, 98–99, 151, 152, 233 organization: 1950s 233–35; 1971 298; changes, 1949–56 150–53 Organization and Methods Section 92 Overseas HQ 12, 36, 44–45 Pilot Utilization Department 277

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policy, 1959–60 179–82; public, 1943–45 60–64; public, 1946–47 79–84 Policy Committee 151–52 post-war operating difficulties 80–81 post-war planning 15, 18, 20–21, 48, 49–50, 53–55, 57–69; Brabazon Committee see Brabazon Committee; and formation of public policy, 1943–45 60–64; and international developments 65, 66–67; preliminaries, 1939–42 49 Project Coordination Committee 315 proposed BUA purchase 305–307, 308–309 proposed relationship with RAF Transport Command 20, 21 sales organization, post-war 150–51 security section 91 Select Committee (1955) 152 Strategic Planning Group 295 Supply Department 93 Support Services Department 344, 348 Technical Development Project Branch 91 Technical Requirements Branch 139 wartime HQ (Grand Spa Hotel, Bristol) 19 wartime relations with Air Ministry 19, 40, 48 wartime staff shortage 15, 17 BOAC Associated Companies Ltd. 183, 184, 247, 350, 351, 374 BOAC-Cunard Ltd. (BCL) 219–20, 221, 266, 268–69, 279 BOADICEA computer system 271–72, 274–76, 342 Board of Trade 264–65, 283, 296, 306, 307, 308, 315; Civil Aviation Research and Development Programme Board 295; Economic Services Division 294 Boeing 313 314 flying-boat 12, 13, 33, 35, 36, 67, 77, 101, 185 707: 55, 101, 122, 134–35, 140, 141, 160, 162, 168, 169, 196, 203, 205, 208–10, 212, 213, 214–15, 219, 249, 251, 254, 259, 276, 316, 373; cockpit 283; engines 300; insurance 316; pilots’ manual 261; spare parts inventory 17; ventral fin/tail skid 215, 256, 258 707-320 215, 249, 252, 320; 707-320C 257 707-336B 260; 707-336C 215, 221, 250, 254, 256–60, 268, 269, 273, 279 707-400 215 707-436 257, 258–59, 297, 310, 316, 326–27, 333; “full-life extension” personnel 348 747: 265, 269, 305, 313–15, 321, 334, 342, 344–45, 345; cockpit 373; insurance 317; interior 14; pay for flying 280, 281–82, 283–84; weight 340 747-100 372; interior 375 747SP 320

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482 S p e e d b i r d Boeing (contd) 820: 313 B-29 Superfortress 133 C-97 (later Stratocruiser) 62 SST 265, 356 Stratocruiser 62, 77, 78, 86, 87, 88, 93, 100, 101, 102, 104, 105, 107, 125, 132, 134, 142, 143, 149, 154, 157, 158, 159, 173, 187, 202, 210; simulator 100–101; sleeper accommodation 100, 107 Booth, John W. 89, 93, 106, 118 Borneo Airways 185, 189, 329 Bosworth, Frederick 190 Bowhill, Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick 33, 65 Boyd-Carpenter, John (later Lord) 87, 120, 121, 131, 143, 301 Brabazon, Lord 208 Brabazon Committee (1942) 5, 18, 19, 53–55, 57–60, 61, 75, 77, 132, 138; aircraft types proposed 54, 57, 58, 60, 63; committee reports 54–55, 57, 59, 60 Brackley, Air Commodore H. G. 4, 63, 88, 106, 112 Brake, Sir Francis 184 brake specialists 306 Brancker, J. W. S. 44, 223 Bray, Winston 241, 247, 305, 322, 356 Brazil 260, 262 Bristol: Filton 84–85, 104, 105, 153; Grand Spa Hotel (BOAC wartime HQ) 19 Bristol Aeroplane Co. 55, 133, 198, 200 175 Britannia 55, 85, 87, 93, 98, 121, 125, 128, 133, 134, 158, 161–62, 169, 170, 172, 187, 196–204, 251; cockpit 199; flame-out problems 198, 199, 200, 202, 203; flight engineers 236–37; fuelling stop 202; prototypes 198, 203 175 Britannia 102: 196, 198, 200, 203, 211, 223 175 Britannia 312: 181, 198, 199, 200–201, 202, 203, 216, 223, 227, 237 175 Britannia 420: 121 175 Britannia 430: 208–09 Brabazon I 55, 57–58, 59, 60, 77, 103, 125 engines: Centaurus 196, 197; Hercules 91; Proteus 197, 198, 200, 203, 234 propeller repair organization 12 six-engine bomber design 54 Britain’s Imperial Air Routes, 1918–1939 (1960) 328, 369 Britavia 130, 174 British Air Charter Association see BIATA British Aircraft Corporation see BAC British Airline Pilots Association see BALPA British Airline Stewards and Stewardesses Association (BASSA) 286 British Airports Authority (BAA) 319, 332, 339, 342, 344, 345–46, 347

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British Airways 260, 301–303, 336; 1936 3, 4, 5, 6–7, 25, 29, 34, 68, 105 British Airways Board 289, 293, 297, 301–302, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 366; initial Group arrangement 299 British and Commonwealth Shipping 304, 307 British Caledonian see BCAL British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines (BCPA) 115, 161–62, 179–80, 325 British Eagle International Airlines 220, 258, 304, 305 British European Airways see BEA British Government, 1939–74 369–71 British Independent Air Transport Association see BIATA British Latin American Air Lines Ltd. 62, 66, 105 British Overseas Air Charter Ltd. 309–10 British Overseas Airways Act (1939) 3, 7, 19, 50, 308–309 British Overseas Airways Corporation see BOAC British South American Airways Corporation see BSAA British United Airways see BUA British West Indian Airways see BWIA Brown Committee Report (1939) 4–5 BSAA (British South American Airways Corporation) 62, 75, 79, 81, 86, 87, 88, 89–90, 93, 96, 105–107, 116, 138, 145, 154, 159, 185, 369, 370 BUA (British United Airways) 124, 179, 187, 188, 218, 219, 220, 222, 223, 247, 262–63, 264, 296, 303, 304–307, 308–309, 322, 371 Burke, A. F. (later Sir Aubrey) 23, 57 Butterfield & Swire 189 BWIA (British West Indian Airways) 159, 183, 184, 185–86, 192 CAA see Civil Aviation Authority CAAC (Civil Aviation Administration of China) 324 cabin staff 95, 267, 270, 286; agitate for changes 282–84, 286, 287–88 Cabin Staff Bulletin 278 Cabinet 82–83, 131, 232 see also War Cabinet cabotage services 65, 110, 147–48, 158, 162, 168–69, 171, 218, 220 Cadman Inquiry (1937–38) 3 Cairo (Almaza-Heliopolis) 4, 12, 24, 26, 33, 35, 37, 39, 40, 41, 44, 111, 161, 164; base 42; Farouk Airport 113 Caledonian Airways 270, 296, 297, 303, 304, 305, 307, 308, 309 see also BCAL Campbell-Orde, Alan Christopher 21, 53, 54, 55, 58, 59, 63–64, 134, 151, 153, 156 Canada service 105 Canadair: Argonaut 58, 72, 79, 84, 85–86, 88, 93, 97, 105, 107, 114, 125, 129, 132, 136, 146,

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I n d e x 159, 160, 161, 162, 164, 165, 173, 196, 201; CL-44 127, 221, 257, 258, 259, 342 Canadian Car and Foundry 34 Canadian Government 86, 180, 181, 221 Canadian Pacific 15, 31, 32, 58, 67, 180 capacity ton mile cost 93; 1957–58 and 1963–64 232; per employee 232, 241–42 Capital Airlines 142, 159 captains 152, 323 cargo services see freight services catering 100; staff 295 Cathay Pacific 188–89, 325, 332, 333, 334 Central African Airways Corporation (CAAC) 109, 164, 171, 187–88, 336, 338 Ceylon 99, 160 Chadwick, Roy 28, 59 charters 123–24, 125–26, 162, 304, 309–11; emigrant 335 Chen Tu 324 Chicago Convention (1944) 65–66, 73 China 160, 324–25; service to 115–16 Chivenor 12 Chou En Lai 324 Churchill, Winston 19, 23, 25, 36, 64, 80, 126, 142 Civil Aeronautics Act (US) (1938) 103 Civil Aircraft Requirements Committee 135 Civil Aviation Acts: 1946 67, 80, 88, 94, 95–96, 123; 1949 90; 1971 296 Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) 324 Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) 293, 294, 301, 308, 311, 312, 334, 336 Civil Aviation (Declaratory Provisions) Act (1971) 309 Civil Aviation Department 49 Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act (1961) 220, 223 Civil Aviation Report, 1946 & 1947 (1948) 74 Clan Line 130 Cobham, Sir Alan 44 Cochrane, Air Marshal Sir Ralph 81 Cocos Islands 45, 46 College of Air Training, Hamble 100, 241, 277 Colonial Airways 103 Colonial Coach operations 127, 128, 130, 131, 164, 168–69, 170, 171, 174, 175, 187–88 Commonwealth Air Training Scheme 33 Commonwealth Air Transport Council 65 Commonwealth conferences: Air Transport (1944) 65; 1945 84; Pacific (1946) 179 computer developments 271–72, 274–76, 342 Congo flying-boat route 36, 38 Consolidated 26: Catalina 35, 45, 46, 47, 47; Liberator (B-24) 12–13, 15, 17, 18, 24–25, 28, 32, 32, 33, 34, 37, 39, 46, 47, 54, 58, 63, 67, 84, 101; Liberator I 39; Liberator II 33, 34, 46, 101; Liberator III 33, 36, 37, 47

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483

Corbett, John 92, 167–68, 192, 224, 227–28; Corbett Inquiry 229, 374 Corbett Report (1963) 167–68, 212, 224, 225, 226, 227–29, 230, 231, 246, 247 Corfield, Frederick 282, 296, 308, 356 Courtney, Air Marshal Sir Christopher 86; Courtney Report (1951) 86 Cox, Dr. Roxbee 59 Craig, David 247, 315, 322, 330–31, 350 Crete 39, 41 Cribbett, Sir George 121, 167–68, 174, 183, 184, 192, 228 Critchley, Air Commodore “Critch” 21, 22, 23, 25, 57, 63, 75, 77, 79, 91 Croydon servicing base 11 Crum, Donald Erskine 350 Cumming, Sir Duncan 183, 184 Cunard 62, 67, 215, 217, 218, 219, 268–69, 275 Cunard-Eagle 186, 187, 218–20 Cunningham, “Cat’s Eyes” 147 Curtiss C-46 18, 19, 33–34 Cyprus 117, 173 Cyprus Airways 117–18, 190 d’Erlanger, Gerard (later Sir Gerard) 6, 20, 58, 75, 81, 90, 167–68, 172, 175, 184, 194, 203, 208, 211, 212, 227, 228, 352, 373, 374 Daily Express, The 306 Daily Telegraph, The 333 Davies, John 301, 356, 360 Davies, R. E. G. 31, 150, 180, 204, 208, 214, 215, 250, 254, 303, 318, 326, 341, 349, 355, 356, 367, 369 Dawson’s Field, Jordan 316, 317 De Havilland 25, 58, 205 Albatross (Frobisher) 12, 14, 36, 38 Comet 55, 58, 60, 87, 93, 122, 132, 135, 137, 138–43, 145, 149, 155–56, 158–59, 160, 161, 162, 164, 172, 188, 198, 251; Conwayengined proposal 121, 122; prototype 138 Comet 1: 86, 87, 98, 139, 141, 157; cabin 148; cockpit 147; disasters 141–42, 203 Comet 2: 133, 138–39, 140, 141, 142; Comet 2E 140, 143, 205 Comet 3: 140, 141, 143, 157, 204 Comet 4: 98, 122, 134, 140, 141, 191, 196, 203, 204–208, 215, 227, 253, 260, 261, 328–29; inaugural trans-Atlantic flight 255 Comet 5 (DH 118) 169–70, 171, 204–205, 208–209, 210 DH-86 13, 26, 34, 35, 42 DH-89A 110 DH-95 Flamingo (K-Class) 26, 28, 36, 41, 42 DH-98 Mosquito 29, 30, 67 DH 120 (swept-winged Comet 4 design) 211 DH 121 Trident 117, 210, 284, 359 Heron 152

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484 S p e e d b i r d De Havilland (contd) Vampire 59 “X” design 133 de Havilland, Geoffrey (later Sir Geoffrey) 58, 59, 138 Dean, Group Captain Gordon 4 Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 275, 284, 297, 302, 309, 310, 320, 346, 348; and Concorde 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 365, 366 Dos Passos, John 369 Douglas 26, 313, 314, 315; C-74 Globemaster 59–60; DC-3 Dakota 11, 12, 13, 19, 23, 28, 29, 37, 38, 38, 42, 53, 59, 67, 98, 108, 111, 113, 114, 185–86; DC-4 Skymaster (C-54) 33–34, 46–47, 53, 58, 60, 75, 76, 86, 103–104, 109, 113, 127–28; DC-4M see Canadair Argonaut; DC-5 5, 6; DC-6 88, 128; DC-6B 158; DC-7 141, 143, 149, 201; DC-7C 87, 98, 133, 143, 149, 169, 170, 173, 181, 198, 201, 203, 205, 221, 223, 225; DC-7D 121, 143; DC-8 122, 134, 169, 208–209; DC-8-63 314; DC-8-84 314; DC-10 see McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Douglas, John 48, 330 Douglas of Kirtleside, Marshal of the RAF Lord 90, 117, 123, 127, 226, 229, 369 Durban: flying-boat base 4, 41, 44; Overseas HQ 12, 44–45 Eagle Airlines of Iran 114, 189 Eagle Airways (Bermuda) Ltd. 217, 218, 335 East African Airways Corporation (EAAC) 110, 171, 172, 188, 310, 336, 338 East African services 110 East Burnham staff college 236 Eastern routes, 1949–56 160–62 Economic Survey of the American Merchant Marine, The (1937) 61 Economist, The 225, 313 Economy-Class 171, 172, 174, 178, 292; meals 295 Eden, Anthony (later Lord Avon) 80, 120 Edwards, George 134 Edwards, Prof. (later Sir) Ronald 289, 291, 293, 362 Edwards Committee on British Air Transport in the Seventies (1967) 264, 265, 266, 289, 291–93, 303, 312 Edwards Report (1969) 120, 270, 292–93, 294, 303, 305, 307, 311, 312, 319, 370, 371 Egypt 4, 12, 35, 39, 99, 113, 164 Eisenhower, Dwight D. 181 Elder Dempster Lines 64, 108, 187 Electrical Trades Union (ETU) 155 elephants as cargo 146 Elizabeth II, Queen 158, 164, 173, 201 see also Queen’s Awards to Industry Empire Air Conference 62

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Empire Air Mail Scheme 4, 25, 42, 44, 57, 131 engineering officers 236–37, 284 Estimates Committee Report (1963) 5 European Air Research Bureau 340–41 European Hotels Corporation 351 Exeter base 4, 12 Facts for Management 247 Fairey 6; 15/38 (FC-1) 26, 105 Falla, Colonel N. S. 42 Falmouth 4 Far East: associate companies 188–89; route across USSR to 321–25, 323 fares: North Atlantic route 103; Very Low 336; see also Economy-Class; First-Class cabin service; Tourist-Class services Farnborough, Royal Aircraft Establishment see Royal Aircraft Establishment Fedden, Sir Roy 53 female traffic workers 51, 72 Ferry Service, Return see Return Ferry Service “Fifth Freedom” traffic rights 65–66, 160, 260, 334 Fiji Airways 327 Financial Times, The 167 First-Class cabin service 233, 356 First National City Bank of New York 258 Fish, Donald 91 Floyd Report (1969) 356 Flying Tiger 257, 258 flying-boats 6, 31 bases 4, 41, 44, 110; Hythe 11, 77, 79, 154; Poole 4, 12, 24, 35, 36 Horseshoe service see Horseshoe service, South African–Australian policy, post-war 77–79 Focke-Wulf Fw-200 Condor 11 Fort Lamy 35 Foynes 33, 35, 36; shuttle 24, 36 France, fall of (1940) 10, 11, 31, 35 freight services 108, 114, 123, 124, 125, 127–28, 146, 148, 221, 257, 273; scheduling 271 French Equatorial Africa 35 French Government 93, 367 “Frood” frozen food 100 fuel consumption study 36–37 fuel crises: 1951–52 119; 1973 320, 334, 348 Furness-Withy 62, 102–103, 130, 304 Fysh, Hudson (later Sir Hudson) 3, 19, 21, 45, 53, 58, 66, 114, 115, 123, 141, 180, 325 G (Guthrie) Plans 247, 248, 249; G-1 247–48; G-7 291, 292, 318, 356; G-9 356; G-10 296, 322, 333 Gardner Committee 202 George, General Harold L. 118 Georgetown, Guyana 349

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I n d e x German Luftwaffe 26, 38 Ghana Airways 187, 308 Gibraltar 39; Malta shuttle 29, 36 Glover, Derek H. 186, 188, 228, 229, 241, 263, 266, 297, 305, 357 Goldring, Mary 225 Gorman, John 278–79 Goronwy-Roberts, Goronwy 307 Gower Fahie, Mrs. Pauline 79 Grant, Anthony 359 Granville, E. L. 60 Granville, Keith (later Sir Keith) 20, 92, 184, 185, 193, 246, 247, 266, 269, 278–79, 280, 282, 293–94, 295, 296, 301, 305, 308, 315, 319, 322, 331, 335, 368; and Concorde 357, 357, 358–59, 361, 363, 364 Grey, C. G. 50 “ground-nuts” scheme charters 110, 124, 162 Guild of Air Pilots and Air Navigators, Cumberbatch Trophy 157 Gulf Aviation 161, 185, 190, 192, 331–32, 349 Guthrie, Sir Giles 122, 228, 229, 230, 231, 236, 242, 246, 247, 248, 249, 260, 266, 268, 269, 276–77, 289, 289, 290, 291, 293, 304, 313, 315, 316, 340, 354–55, 374; and “Magna Carta” letter 245–46, 249, 268, 374; Guthrie Plans see G Plans Habbaniyeh 41 Hadramaut Coast route 41, 44 Halaby, Najib 319 Hall, Sir Arnold 142, 204 Hamble, College of Air Training 100, 241, 277 Hamilton Committee (1963) 241 Handley Page 58, 133; Halton 54, 62, 80, 81, 98, 108, 112, 113; Harrow 5; Hastings 89, 135, 197; Hermes 54–55, 58, 62, 78–79, 85, 86, 93, 98, 108, 114, 125, 126, 128, 129, 130, 133, 135–37, 136, 138, 162, 164, 196; Hermes IV 135–37, 162; HP42 10, 11, 41, 44; HP97 (civil Victor variant) 133, 211 Hardie, Charles (later Sir Charles) 263, 266, 269, 290, 293–94, 305, 333, 334, 357, 358 Harrison, Miss 316 Hartley, Sir Harold 50, 74, 79, 81, 84, 89, 94, 106, 136, 372 Havana Convention (1928) 65 Hawker-Siddeley Group 195; Trident 117, 210, 284, 359 Heliopolis 40 Helmore, Air Commodore W. 82; Helmore Report (1947) 154 Hermon, Peter 271–72, 275, 318 Heseltine, Michael 309, 361–64 hijackers 316 Hildred, William (later Sir William) 18–19, 21, 33–34, 55, 57, 61, 66, 130–31

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Hong Kong 116, 161, 188, 189, 329, 331; Penang route from 42 Hong Kong Airways 184, 188–89 Horseshoe service, South African–Australian 12, 15, 29, 41, 42, 44–47, 47, 109 hotels 349–51 Howe, C. D. 15, 32 Howitt, Sir Harold 21 Hulton Award 205 Hunting-Clan 110, 124, 130, 164, 171, 175, 179, 187, 212 Hurn base 12, 18, 24–25, 77, 94, 98, 100 Hythe flying-boat base 11, 77, 79, 154 IATA (International Air Transport Association) 65–66, 92, 103, 124, 131, 147, 148, 171, 178, 218, 231, 304, 305, 315, 354; Charges Working Group 330; insurance company proposal 316–17; Technical Committee 156; Traffic Conferences 145, 146–47, 169 IBM 272, 275, 276 ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) 65, 98, 92, 170 Ilyushin 18: 187 Imperia (flying-boat tender) 39, 41 Imperial Airways 3, 4, 17, 26, 29, 39, 41, 62, 76, 97, 164, 179, 182, 187, 189, 373; assets transferred to BOAC 7–8; capital 153; cooperation with British Airways 4; on declaration of war 5, 7; and Empire Air Mail Scheme 4, 25; formation of 3, 369; passengers carried, 1938–39 91; personnel 68, 94; strikes 94; training facilities 100; trunk routes 39, 44 Imperial Airways–British Airways (1936) Planning Committee 4 Independents 220–21, 247 as “associates” 88–89; competition from 123–31; 1956–60 173–75, 178–79; 1964–74 303–311; proposed new deal for 170 India 44, 99, 111, 112, 160–61, 221, 334; and Pakistan, airlift of refugees between 112, 113; routes 112–13, 114, 115; see also Tripartite Pool Indian Government 44, 113 Indian National Airways 44, 113 Indo-Pakistan Wars 316, 326, 329, 334 insurance 315–17 Inter-Continental Hotels Corporation (IHC) 350 International Aeradio Ltd. 83–84, 182, 330 International Air Transport Association see IATA international air transport developments 64–68 International Civil Aviation Organization see ICAO International Convention for Aerial Navigation (1919) 64–65

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486 S p e e d b i r d International Federation of Air Line Pilots Association (IFALPA) 278 Iran Air 333 Iran National Airlines (INA) 328, 336 Iranian Eagle Airlines 114, 189 Iraq 99; revolt in 41, 44 Iraq Petroleum Company 162 Irish Government 35 Israel 99, 160, 161 see also Palestine ITT (International Telephone and Telegraph) 275 Jack, Prof. D. T. 218, 222, 237 Jack, Peter 332 Japan: service to 115–16; war against (1941–45) 15, 45, 111, 114 Japan Airlines (JAL) 272, 321, 322, 326, 329, 356 Jardine, Matheson 189 Jenkins, Roy 226, 249, 268, 304, 313 jet services, world’s first scheduled 141 Joint Air Transport Committee 60 Joint Air Transport Staff College 236 Joint War Production Board, Aircraft Board 28 Jones, Captain O. P. 137 Junkers Ju-52 29, 32 Kangaroo (Australian) route 76, 77, 78, 111, 114–15, 321; 21st birthday 163 Kangaroo Pool, Tripartite 181, 221, 330, 331, 332, 333, 335 Karachi 44, 161 Kaufman, Gerald 366 Kennedy, John F. 231 Kenya Safari Lodges 349 Khartoum–West Africa route 4, 13, 23 Kingsford-Smith, Sir Charles 335 KLM (Royal Dutch Airlines) 12, 35, 37, 45, 76, 109, 113, 140, 141, 158, 208, 215, 264, 272, 275, 304 Knight, Geoffrey 361 Knollys, Lord 22, 23, 61, 63, 64, 65, 67, 74, 76, 77, 81, 82–83, 84, 86, 91, 109, 114, 372 Korean War (1950–53) 119, 123, 125, 133, 154, 160, 197–98; contingency plans 118–19 Kuwait 113, 162, 190, 191 Kuwait Airways 184, 190, 191, 192, 328 Kuwait National Airlines 190 labour relations: 1930s 3; 1943–49 93–96; 1949–56 153–55; 1956–63 236–39; 1963–74 276–84, 286–88; see also strikes; trade unions Lake Vaaldam, South Africa 45 Laker, Freddie 304 Laker Airways 311 Lamplugh, Captain A. G. 60 landings, automatic 287 Langstone Harbour scheme 78

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Leathers, Lord 126 Lebanon 99, 191 Lee, Gilbert 183, 244, 350 Legal and General Assurance Society 350 Lend-Lease aircraft 23, 36, 47 Lennox-Boyd, Alan (later Lord Boyd) 90, 120, 126–27, 128, 129–30, 134, 142, 143, 181 Leuchars base 12, 29 Liberia, Roberts Field 37 Lima 160 Linstead, John 184, 192 Lisbon route 12, 117; wartime service 10; West Africa service 12 Liverpool 12 Lloyd, Selwyn 120 Lloyd International 304, 310 load factors 170, break-even 232 Lockheed 26 C-5A civil version 313 C-130 Hercules 254 Constellation 50, 59, 60, 69, 76, 84, 86, 87, 97, 98, 103–105, 107, 114, 116, 132, 141, 142, 143, 150, 157, 159, 160, 161, 162, 164, 165, 173, 203, 206, 369, 370; cockpit 102, 206 Constellation Ia 76 Constellation (Model 049) 77, 103, 105, 137, 146, 158, 159 Constellation (Model 749) 77, 110, 114–15, 142, 153, 154, 159, 162 Constellation “Project X” 85, 109 Hudson 31–32, 40, 42 Hudson III 29 L.10: 35; L.10A 10 L.14: 5, 6, 11, 29, 35, 41 L.18 Lodestar 12, 30, 35, 41, 42, 46, 67, 98, 110, 111, 112 L.20: 67 L-1011 TriStar 255–56, 259, 315 London: Buckingham Palace Road hostel proposal 351; central air terminal plan 75; Cromwell Road Terminal plan 149–50; Hamilton Place hotel proposal 350; Victoria Station Airways Terminal 19, 150, 151, 178, 329, 346, 361 London airport, proposed third 295, 347 London Airport Authority, Command Paper on (1961) 221–22 London Heathrow Airport 77, 114, 156, 255, 336, 339, 341, 342, 344–46, 349; bullion raid 91; cargo facilities 342; HQ hangars building (Technical Block A; the “Kremlin”) 143, 150, 155, 300, 347; move to 143–44; night closures 348, 349; North Side check-in, 1946 83; rail link 149, 339–40, 346; Speedbird House 351; Terminal 3: 345, 346, 348, 349, 365 London Transport 341

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I n d e x Longhurst, John 20 Lufthansa 41, 304, 314, 321, 336, 351 Lydda 113, 114 Lyneham 18, 24, 33 Lyons, J. C., and Company 100 Maclay, J. S. 119, 126 Macmillan, Harold 80, 229 Madrid service 37–38 mail, air see airmail maintenance 234–35; costs 84; halls 347 Majendie, Captain A. M. A. 141, 161 Major, E. R. 344 Malayan Airways 180, 188, 189 Malaysia-Singapore Airlines (MSA) 329–31, 332, 333 Malaysian Airlines Ltd. (MAL) 189, 262, 328–29, 333, 335 Malta 41–42, 164; Gibraltar shuttle 29, 36 management training 235–36 Manchester Guardian 226 Manchester Ringway Airport 159 Mansfield & Co. of Singapore 189 Marchbank, John 21, 79 Marking, Henry 302 Marks, Simon (later Sir Simon) 21, 57, 60–61 MASCO see Middle East Aircraft Service Company Masefield, Peter 66, 90, 121, 170, 196, 197, 369 Mason, Roy 307 Maudling, Reginald 120, 122, 208 Maxwell, Robert (later Sir Robert) 19, 39–40 Mayflower Tourist-Class services 158 Mayo, Major 61 McCrindle, Major J. R. 6, 21, 66, 81, 92 McDonnell Douglas: DC-10 287–88; DC-1030 319, 328; F-4K/M Phantom II 254 MEA (Middle East Airlines of Lebanon) 184, 186, 189, 190, 191, 192, 226, 328 Mediterranean service 23, 38 Merchant Airmen (1946) 24 Messenger, Captain 206, 209 Middle East Air Transport Board 25 Middle East Aircraft Board 40 Middle East Aircraft Service Company (MASCO) 190, 191, 226 Middle East Airlines of Lebanon see MEA Middle East associate companies 189 Middle Eastern routes 29, 111–12, 113–14; wartime service 39–42 Mikardo, Ian 154, 175 Miles aircraft company 55; X-11 58 Milward, Anthony 236 Ministry of Aircraft Production 11, 15, 17, 21, 31, 32, 36, 48, 53, 54, 55, 57–58, 59, 68 Ministry of Aircraft Production–Air Ministry joint post-war planning committee 53

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Ministry of Aviation 175, 178, 195, 340, 352 Ministry of Civil Aviation 60, 67, 74, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 114, 118, 123–24 Ministry of Defence 226, 258, 269–70 Ministry of Labour 15, 19, 24, 82, 94, 155, 278, 279; National Service Department 24 Ministry of Supply 83, 85, 134, 136, 138, 195, 196, 197, 198, 204, 209 Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation 119, 135, 175; organisation chart (1959) 176–77 Monarch services 157, 159, 172 Monteux, M. 10 Montgomery, General Bernard (later Field Marshal, 1st Viscount) 23, 37 Montreal base 84–85, 104, 105 Montreal–Prestwick route 32 Morgan, Grenfell 292 Morrison, Herbert 127 Morton, T. W. 175 Moscow 321, 322, 323, 323; service to 34 motor transport 341, 347 Mulley, Fred 268 Munich crisis (1938) 4 Nairobi: Lake Naivasha flying-boat base 110; Pan-Africa Hotel 349 Najib Alamuddin, Sheikh 190, 191 Nandi, Fiji 327, 349 Nathan, Lord 80, 88 National Air Communications (NAC) 3–4, 5, 6, 10, 42 National Airlines 319, 320 National Coal Board 94, 248 National Gas Turbine Establishment (NGTE) 200 National Joint Council for Civil Air Transport 94, 95, 96, 154, 155, 237, 238, 240, 278–79; membership 239 National Union of General and Municipal Workers 96 Nationalized Industries Reports, 1964 and 1968 172 navigators 95, 277 Neden, Sir Wilfred 226, 228, 229, 237, 374 New York, John F. Kennedy International (formerly Idlewild) Airport 103, 105, 205, 305, 356, 366, 367 New York, Port of, Authority 103, 205, 356 New York fares 146–47 New Zealand Government 182 Newlands, H. L. 79 Nicolson, David 301, 312, 361, 363, 364 Nicosia 113, 161 Nigeria, Governor of 108 Nigerian Air Services 108 Nigerian Airways 187, 308 1919 (1932) 369

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488 S p e e d b i r d Nixon, Wilfred 138 No Highway (1948) 28, 79 Noble, Michael 308–309, 358 noise problems 342, 355, 356, 358, 362, 366, 367 North Africa 23, 25, 37 North Atlantic services 29, 53, 54, 55, 75, 76, 77, 99, 101–105; 1949–56 156–59; wartime 31–34 Northeast Airlines 199, 201, 237 Northwest Airlines 181, 318 Norwegian campaign (1940) 10, 29 obsolescence rates 168 Ogmore, Lord 119 operational developments, 1949–56 155–56 Orient Airways 113 Out on a Wing (1964) 89 Overseas Air Travel Ltd. 335 Overseas Food Corporation 110, 124, 162 overseas scheduled air services proposed as open to all 127 Overton, Sir Arnold 168 Oxford Flying School 277 P&O (Peninsular and Oriental) 130, 304, 335 Pacific services 162, 179–81, 182, 297, 325–28, 335, 337 Page, Captain 39 Pakenham, Lord 78, 80, 86, 88, 89–90, 119, 123, 124, 125, 197, 370 Pakistan 99; and India, airlift of refugees between 112, 113 Pakistan International Airlines see PIA Palestine 111, 113 see also Israel Palestine Air Transport 189 Pan American Airways 13, 75, 76, 77, 80, 93, 100–101, 102, 104, 105, 113, 118, 121–22, 124, 132, 140, 141, 142, 143, 145, 146, 149, 156, 157, 158, 170, 179, 180, 186, 190, 203, 205, 208, 210, 221; and Concorde 355, 356, 365; 1964–74 264, 314, 316, 317, 319, 320, 326, 334, 346; wartime operations 3, 6, 13, 20, 31, 33, 35, 36, 45, 50, 59–60, 66 Paris services 8, 10 partnerships 328–36, 338 passengers carried: 1943–44 25; 1946–47 91; 1964–65 91; 1973–74 91 Pearson, the Hon. Clive 6, 7, 11, 13, 15, 18, 21, 44 Pearson Inquiry (1967–68) 278, 279 Pembroke Dock 4 Perkins, Sir Robert 95, 119 Persian Gulf 113, 114, 118, 123, 124, 161, 190 Perth, Australia 335 PIA (Pakistan International Airlines) 321, 322, 329, 330, 331, 334, 336 pilots: manuals 261; salaries 95, 154, 276–77, 278–82, 236; shortage 286; training 100–101, 105, 241, 277; see also captains

Speedbird.indb 488

Pirie, Air Chief Marshal Sir George 120 Plowden Committee/Inquiry (1965) 252, 304 Polar route 322, 326, 327, 337 Policy for Air Transport, A (1943) 62 Poole flying-boat base 4, 12, 24, 35, 36 pooling 328–36, 338; Area Far East Pool 329; Quadripartite Springbok Pool 188; Southern Cross Pool 180, 335, 336; Tripartite Pool 181, 221, 330, 331, 332, 333, 335 Porter, B. G. 155 Post Office 12, 42, 49, 57, 58–59, 101, 131, 161, 172 Prestwick airport 75, 101, 157, 159, 340–41; base 12, 18, 24, 84; Montreal route from 32 Prices and Incomes Act (1966) 277, 278 Prices and Incomes Board 280, 281 Pritchard, Sir Fred E. 219 Propeller and Engine Repair Auxiliary (PERA) 11–12, 24, 25, 40 Pudney, John 24 punctuality 339–42, 344–49; cargo aircraft 341–42; deplaning passengers 342; London Heathrow 339–40, 341, 342, 344–46 QANTAS 3, 45, 46, 66, 76, 78, 111, 113, 114–15, 123, 141, 142, 160, 161–62, 179, 180, 181, 182, 189, 210, 215, 221, 257, 275, 310, 314, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 331, 334, 335, 336, 360, 365 Qantas at War (1968) 19, 21, 45 Quadripartite Springbok Pool 188 quality control 343 Queen’s Awards to Industry 276, 344, 376 radio officers 154 Radio Officers Union 95 RAF (Royal Air Force) 4, 5, 6, 37, 40, 46, 47, 213–14, 251, 254, 325; 110 Wing 25, 75; 1425 Flight 39; Coastal Command 11, 32, 173; commissions, civilian courtesy (“c.c.”) 23; Ferry Command 15, 21, 32, 33, 34, 39, 69; No. 24 Squadron 10; No. 45 Group 15, 34; No. 46 Group 81; No. 54 Group 25; No. 216 Group 81; No. 216 Squadron 140; Return Ferry Service 15, 32, 33, 33 see also Return Ferry Service; Support Command 270, 360; Transport Command 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 34, 37, 42, 47, 48, 60, 69, 74, 75, 81, 88, 89, 123, 124, 173, 179, 197, 369; WingCommanders 17 RAAF (Royal Australian Air Force) 119; No. 622 Squadron 119 Rangoon 99 Rashbrook, Len 48 Reith, Sir John (later Lord) 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 18, 111

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I n d e x Rennell of Rodd, Lord 121, 167, 184 repair facilities, wartime 11–12, 24, 25, 40 Republic Rainbow 77 Return Ferry Service (RFS) 15, 18, 24, 32, 32, 33, 34, 39, 58 revenue: 1946–47 84; 1947–48 84; 1950–51 119; 1952–53 119, 183; 1953–54 183; 1954–55 183; 1955–56 183; 1956–57 169, 183; 1957–58 172, 184; 1958–59 184; 1959–60 184; 1960–61 184; 1961–62 185, 225; 1962–63 185; 1963–64 185; 1964–65 263 Rhodesia and Nyasaland Airways 187 Road Haulage Wages Board 95 Rolls-Royce 205, 259, 314, 358, 371 engines: Avon jet 204; Conway jet 91; Merlin 59, 72, 85, 106 Rome 113, 117, 141, 164 Rommel, General Erwin 12, 42 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 36, 60 Roskill Commission/Committee 295, 347 Rothschild, Baron 79–80, 359 Round the Bend (1951) 161, 190 round-the-world services 181, 318 routes 1946 56 1965 285 developments 320–28; across the USSR to Far East 321–25, 323; Pacific 325–28 feasibility studies 98–99 planned in anticipation of war 4 planned post-war 53 structures of 374, 376 variations 99 wartime 29, 31–42, 44–48; Middle East 39–42; 1943 16; 1944 43; 1945 52; North Atlantic service 31; Russian route 34; South African–Australian Horseshoe service 12, 15, 29, 41, 42, 44–47, 47, 109; Stockholm Run 10, 29, 31, 50; UK– Portugal–West Africa 34–39 Royal Air Force see RAF Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) 59, 200, 203; Farnborough 142 Royal Auxiliary Air Force 89 Runciman, Walter Leslie 6, 12, 13, 15, 17, 33, 39, 40, 44, 55 runways, false thresholds on 152–53, 156 Russian route 34; route to Far East across 321–25, 323 Rylands, Eric 123, 125, 174 SABENA 35, 37, 149 safety (1948–55) 152–53, 154, 156, 157 St. Andrews 350 St. Barbe, Francis E. N. 139 St. Eval 12 St. Mawgan 12

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salaries 155; Chairman 122; Managing Director 122; pilots 95, 154, 236, 276–77, 278–82; senior staff (1955) 153; see also strikes San Francisco 181; Tokyo route from 179, 181 Sandys, Duncan 120, 178–79, 184, 212, 214 Saro (Saunders-Roe) Princess 77, 78, 89, 125, 133 Savioa-Marchetti aircraft 40 SBAC see Society of British Aircraft Constructors Scandinavian service 13, 20, 29, 31 Scotland 118 Scott, J. B. 48, 61 Scottish Aviation 101 Seaboard and Western (later Seaboard World Airlines) 127, 159, 221, 257, 319, 341–42 Second Force airline, proposed 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 303, 307, 308, 309, 312, 370, 371 Select Committee on BOAC (1964) 212, 224, 227, 228, 229, 230, 242, 246 Select Committee on Nationalized Industries Reports: 1962 172, 192; The Air Corporations (1958–59) 234, 235 Shannon airport 36, 63 Shell 145, 161, 284 Shelmerdine, Sir Francis 6, 12, 13, 18, 21, 49 Shenstone, B. S. 137, 228, 300, 355 Sherman Anti-Trust Act (US) (1890) 103 shipping companies’ involvement in air transport 61, 62, 64, 66, 67, 105, 108, 130, 170 Short 55, 77 14/38 26 Bermuda 102 Empire (C-Class) flying-boats 28, 67, 109, 276, 373; interior 9; pilots’ manual 261; see also Short S.23/S.30/S.33 Hythe (Sunderland III) 68, 76, 78, 79, 111, 114, 115 Plymouth (modified Hythe) 79, 84, 112, 114, 116 S.20 31; Mercury 39 S.21 Maia 35 S.23 Empire (C-Class) 35, 38, 39, 41, 45, 46, 47 S.26 (G-Class) 11, 46, 67 S.30 Empire (C-Class) 10, 31, 35, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 44, 46 S.33 Empire (C-Class) 8, 42 Sandringham 115 Scylla 10 Shetland 54–55, 77 Solent 78, 79, 88, 109, 110, 114, 115, 164 Sunderland 6, 19, 23, 28, 32, 37, 46, 53, 67, 68, 77, 78 see also Short Hythe Shute, Nevil 28, 79, 161, 190 Sikorsky VS-44 flying-boat 33 Sinclair, Sir Archibald (later Lord Thurso) 12–13, 15, 20, 21

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490 S p e e d b i r d Singapore 153, 161, 162; Tengah airfield 114 Singapore International Airlines (SIA) 333 Skyways 110, 112, 113, 114, 116, 123, 124, 125, 128, 130, 174, 221 Slattery, Sir Matthew 87, 172, 184, 186–87, 190, 191, 193, 210, 212, 214, 217, 220, 224, 225–26, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 244, 246, 257, 262, 263, 353, 354, 374 sleeping facilities 100, 107, 157, 162 Smallpeice, Basil (later Sir Basil) vi, 87, 93, 120, 147, 151, 157, 165, 167–68, 170, 180–81, 204, 205, 217, 219, 223–24, 226, 228, 229, 230–31, 244, 268–69, 321, 374 Society of British Aircraft Constructors (SBAC) 55, 62, 98, 175, 195 software leadership 271–72, 274–76, 342 South Africa 336; Horseshoe service to Australia 12, 15, 29, 41, 42, 44–47, 47, 109; Springbok route 108–10, 137, 164 South African Agreement (1945) 109 South African Air Conference (1945) 108 South African Air Transport Council 164 South African Airways (SAA) 4, 76, 108, 109, 110, 142, 162, 164, 171, 328, 336, 338 South American services 66, 88, 105–107, 149, 154, 157, 260, 262–63; 1949–56 159–60 Southampton, Berth 50 marine terminal 77–78 Southern Cross Pool 180, 335, 336 Southern Rhodesian Government 109 Southern routes 162, 164–65 Sparaco, Pierre 365 Springbok Pool, Quadripartite 188 Springbok (South African) route 108–10, 137, 164 SST (Supersonic Transport) 313–14, 351, 352, 353, 355 see also BAe/Aérospatiale Concorde; Boeing SST staff numbers: 1940 5; 1943 12; 1944 24; 1945 25; 1947 82; 1949 82; 1950 145; 1962 248; 1963 248; 1964 248; 1966 248 staff redundancies 154–55; severance plan 248 Stainton, Ross (later Sir Ross) 241, 246, 266, 296, 301, 311, 340, 364 Stamp Inquiry (1967) 278 stewardesses 95, 267, 270, 286; agitate for changes 282–84, 286, 287–88 Stewart, Captain W. L. 34 Stockholm Run 10, 29, 31, 50 Stonehouse, John 315 Straight, Air Commodore Whitney 81, 84, 86, 89, 92–93, 107, 112, 120, 121, 121, 124, 134, 143, 196, 204 “Strawson-Dawson” plan 42 Street, Sir Arthur 6, 40 strikes 173, 276–77, 278, 280, 346; 1946 95–96; 1950 155, 157; 1956–63 238 Stuart-Shaw, Max 304

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Sudan Airways 188 Sudan Government Leave Scheme 109 Suez crisis (1956) 99, 172 Sunday Telegraph, The 225 Sunningdale, Dormey House 235–36 “swamping” (over-capacity) 317, 318–20, 334 Swash Inquiry and Report (1962) 226, 374 Swinton, Viscount 65, 66 Swissair 221, 272, 351 Tait, Air Vice-Marshal Sir Victor 93, 149, 204 Takoradi 35, 36 TAP (Transportes Aereos Portugueses) 117 TEAL (Tasman Empire Airways Ltd.) 42, 115, 180, 182 technological developments 97, 156 Tedder, Lord 36, 40; Tedder Plan 18, 40 Teheran 41, 111, 114, 330, 333, 334 telephone reservations 271 Terrington, Lord 174, 218 thefts 344 Thomas, Sir Miles 84, 87, 89, 90, 93, 94, 107, 116, 117, 118, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 137, 141, 143, 144, 145–46, 147, 148–49, 151, 154, 155, 158, 160, 167, 170, 197, 198, 201, 204, 208, 321, 325, 372; achievements and weaknesses 165; and “Flying British” 116, 133, 134, 208 Thomas Cook and Sons 310 Thorneycroft, Peter 191, 219–20, 223, 239 Thornton, Sir Peter 366 Thornton, Major R. H. 61, 76, 80, 84, 120, 165 Thurso, Lord (formerly Sir Archibald Sinclair) 12–13, 15, 20, 21 THY (Türk Hava Yollari) 185, 190, 192, 332 TIME 122 Times, The 224 Tizard, Sir Henry 5 Tokyo 116, 149, 162, 179, 181 Tourist-Class services 145, 146–48, 149, 157, 158, 159, 164, 169 tours, inclusive 303, 304–305 trade unions 152, 153, 154–55, 237–38, 277, 278, 279–80, 281–82, 283, 284, 286, 287, 311, 336; see also labour relations; strikes “traffic ladies” 51, 72 traffic rights 65 training 23, 100–101, 105; apprentice 274; pilot 100–101, 105, 241, 277 Trans Canada Airlines (TCA) 15, 28, 31, 32, 33, 58, 85, 105, 157, 158, 161–62, 180, 181, 186, 221 Trans World Airlines see TWA transit stops 99 transit times 145 Transport Aircraft Requirements Committee 135, 195, 246, 253

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I n d e x Transport and General Workers’ Union (TGWU) 95 Treasury, H.M. 7, 8, 38, 41, 48, 49, 64, 73, 75, 77, 103, 115, 125, 139–40, 141, 142, 143, 159, 172, 204, 229, 241, 265, 297, 370 Treforest relief factory (later repair centre) 11–12, 207, 223–24, 235, 304, 348, 349 Tripartite Pool 181, 221, 330, 331, 332, 333, 335 Tripoli: Castel Benito airfield 23, 42, 112; services 309 Trippe, Juan 3, 23, 36, 62, 65, 141, 317 troop-carrying 123, 124–26, 128–30, 173–74, 175, 220, 223, 269–70 Trust Houses Forte 349–50 Tupolev 144: 356 Türk Hava Yollari see THY Turner, C. O. 180 TWA (Trans World Airlines) 75, 104, 113, 170, 201, 202, 317, 318, 319, 320, 346, 356, 365 Tweedsmuir, Lord 120 US Army Air Forces (USAAF) 103–104; Transport Command 20, 50, 118 US Civil Aeronautics Board 181, 223, 304, 317, 318–19, 320, 325, 327 US Export–Import Bank 314, 315 US Maritime Commission 61 US SST 247, 351, 355, 356, 358 Uganda 310–11 Union Castle Line 35 United Air Lines 142, 152, 235, 327 United States 18, 99; airlines, relations with 317–20; see also US entries Universal Postal Union 132 Urwick, Orr and Partners 92, 93, 151 USSR route 34; route to Far East across 321–25, 323 UTA (Union de Transportes Aériens) 331, 333 Varig 186 Venezuela 160 Vickers 210, 212 Super-Super VC-10 313 Super VC-10 55, 212, 214, 249, 250–51, 251, 252, 253–54, 269, 317, 326–27, 374; leadingedge slats 300 V.1000 (Valiant development) 133, 134–35, 208, 210 Valiant 133, 134, 210 Vanguard 210 Vanjet design 210, 211 VC-10 55, 98, 101, 168, 171, 179, 187, 196, 205, 206, 210–14, 224, 227, 230, 249, 250, 252, 263–64, 332, 342, 367, 374; brakes 306;

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cancellation 249–56; cockpit 287; delays 340, 341; insurance 316; orders 213 VC-10-200 255–56 VC-10 Superb concept 313 Viking 164 Viscount 117, 156, 159, 170, 173, 175, 185–86, 197, 369 Warwick 24 Wellington 5, 35, 42, 46

Wall Street Journal, The 314 Walton, Captain Frank 335 War Cabinet 13, 15, 46, 54, 59 Watkinson, Harold 121, 122, 167, 168, 169, 171–72, 174, 175, 178, 190, 210–12, 225, 257 Watson-Watt, Sir Robert 59 Way, Sir Richard 292 Wedgwood Benn, Sir Anthony 366 Weir, Captain J. N. 200 West African Airways Corporation (WAAC) 108, 164, 187 West African services 4, 12, 13, 23, 63, 108, 164, 296, 297, 308; wartime 34–39 West Indies 185–86 Wheatcroft, Stephen 220 Whitchurch main base 4, 12, 24 White Papers: on Civil Aviation (1945) 66–68, 75; on Defence (1957) 175, 195; on “Financial and Economic Obligations of the Nationalised Industries” 245; The Financial Problems of the British Overseas Airways Corporation (1963) 192, 230–31, 232; on personal incomes, costs and prices (1948) 94 White Waltham engineering training school 100 Whitehall Securities 7 Whittle, Frank (later Sir Frank) 59, 139, 151 Wilcock, Group Captain C. A. B. 82; Wilcock Report (1947) 154 Wilson Airways 187 Winster, Lord 80 With Prejudice (1966) 36 Wolfson, Captain V. 151, 183 Wood, Prof. J. 279, 280, 281 Woods Humphery, George 3, 15, 31, 67, 122 Worboys, Sir Walter 226, 262 World War, Second (1939–45) 3–4, 5–8, 10–25, 67, 370; BOAC services see routes, wartime; D-Day 25, 36; Home Front 12; Japan, war against 15, 45, 111, 114; priorities for air transport agreed (1939) 4 Wrenn, Chris 163 Wyatt, Sir Miles 220, 304 YMCA 351

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About the Author Robin Higham was born in London of Anglo-American parents in 1925. He was educated at Bembridge and Bryanston in England and at Hotchkiss in the United States. He enlisted in the RAFVR in 1943 and saw service in the Far East as a co-pilot on Dakotas with No. 48 Squadron and as an airfield controller. After the war he attended the University of New Hampshire and graduated cum laude from Harvard. He taught at the Webb School of California while taking an M.A. at the Claremont Graduate School. He then returned to Harvard as an assistant in Oceanic History and received his doctorate there in 1957. His dissertation, Britain’s Imperial Air Routes, 1918–1939, was published in 1960, and as a result he was invited to undertake the 25th anniversary history of BOAC. In 1961 he published The British Rigid Airship, 1908–1931: A Study in Weapons Policy and that was followed by Armed Forces in Peacetime: Britain 1918–1940 (1963), The Military Intellectuals in Britain (1966), and in 1973 by Air Power: A Concise History. In the meantime, in 1968, he became Editor of Military Affairs, in 1970 of Aerospace Historian, and at the end of 1976 of the Journal of the West. He has taught at the University of Massachusetts, at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and since 1963 at Kansas State University at Manhattan until his retirement as Professor Emeritus in 1998. In 1976 he was named one of the seven members of the editorial board of the International Commission on Military History and from 1990 to 2009 served on the ICMH’s Military Archives Committee. In 2009 he and Stephen J. Harris of Ottawa edited Why Air Forces Fail: The Anatomy of Defeat, which was chosen for the US Air Force Chief of Staff ’s annual reading list. Recent and forthcoming publications by Robin Higham: Two Roads to War: The French and British Air Arms from Versailles to Dunkirk. Naval Institute Press. 2012. Unflinching Zeal: The Air Battles Over France and Britain, May–October 1940. Naval Institute Press. 2012. The Influence of Airpower Upon History: Statesmanship, Diplomacy, and Foreign Policy Since 1903, with Mark Parillo. University Press of Kentucky. 2013. A Military History of China, with David A. Graff. University Press of Kentucky, rev. 2012. Why Air Forces Fail: The Anatomy of Defeat, with Stephen J. Harris. University Press of Kentucky, rev. and enlarged, 2013.

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