Soviet Policy in Xinjiang: Stalin and the National Movement in Eastern Turkistan 1793641269, 9781793641267

Table of contents :
Contents
Abbreviations
Introduction
1 National Movement in Eastern Turkistan and Moscow’s Growing Influence in Xinjiang (1930–1934)
2 Strengthening of Soviet Control over Eastern Turkistan (1934–1939)
3 Deepening Crisis in Soviet-Xinjiang Relations and Downfall of the Sheng Government
4 Activation of Moscow’s Policy in Xinjiang and Creation of the Eastern Turkistan Republic (1944–1945)
5 The Urumqi Agreement and the Establishment of a Coalition Government in Xinjiang (1946–1947)
6 The New Wave of Soviet Activities in Xinjiang and the Victory of the Communist’s in China (1947–1949)
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index
About the Author

Citation preview

Soviet Uniting PolicyEurope in Xinjiang

The Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series Series Editor: Mark Kramer, Harvard University Recent Titles in the Series Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, 1945–1959: A New History    By Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa during the Cold War: Between Ideology and Pragmatism    By Radoslav A. Yordanov The Power of Dynamic Détente Policies: U.S. Diplomacy between the Military Status Quo and the Transformation of Europe, 1964–1975    By Stephan Kieninger The Tito–Stalin Split and Yugoslavia‘s Military Opening toward the West, 1950–1954: In NATO‘s Backyard     By Ivan Laković and Dmitar Tasić Bridging the Baltic Sea: Networks of Resistance and Opposition during the Cold War Era    By Lars Fredrik Stöcker US–Spanish Relations after Franco, 1975–1989: The Will of the Weak    By Morten Heiberg Stalin‘s Legacy in Romania: The Hungarian Autonomous Region, 1952–1960    By Stefano Bottoni Mao and the Sino-Soviet Split, 1959–1973: A New History     By Danhui Li and Yafeng Xia A Cold War over Austria: The Struggle for the State Treaty, Neutrality, and the End of East-West Occupation, 1945–1955    By Gerald Stourzh and Wolfgang Mueller The Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968: The Russian Perspective    By Josef Pazderka Stalin‘s Double-Edged Game: Soviet Bureaucracy and the Raoul Wallenberg Case, 1945–1952    By Johan Matz The Red Army in Austria: The Soviet Occupation, 1945–1955 Edited by Stefan Karner and Barbara Stelzl-Marx The Hungarian Agricultural Miracle?: Sovietization and Americanization in a Communist Country By Zsuzsanna Varga Soviet Policy in Xinjiang: Stalin and the National Movement in Eastern Turkistan By Jamil Hasanli

Soviet Uniting PolicyEurope in Xinjiang Stalin and European the National Integration Movement and the in Eastern Post-Cold Turkistan War World Europe Today

Jamil Julie Hasanli Kirsch

ROW L EM XA I NNG& T OLN I TB TO LE OFKI S ELD

Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Published by Rowman & Littlefield A wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. Published by Lexington Books 4501 ForbesofBoulevard, Suite&200, Lanham, Maryland 20706Inc. An imprint The Rowman Littlefield Publishing Group, www.rowman.com 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www.rowman.com Unit A, Whitacre Mews, 26-34 Stannary Street, London SE11 4AB 6 Tinworth Street, London SE11 5AL, United Kingdom Copyright © 2015 by Copyright © 2021 The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by anyrights electronic or mechanical including All reserved. No part ofmeans, this book may beinformation reproducedstorage in any and formretrieval or by systems, without permission the publisher, except by aand reviewer who any electronic or written mechanical means, from including information storage retrieval may quote passages in a review. systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Insert CIP data ISBN: 978-1-7936-4126-7 (cloth) ISBN: 978-1-7936-4127-4 The paper used in this(electronic) publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper \ Printed for Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992. The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper Printed in the United States ofANSI/NISO America Z39.48-1992. for Printed Library Materials,

Contents

Abbreviations vii Introduction 1 1 National Movement in Eastern Turkistan and Moscow’s Growing Influence in Xinjiang (1930–1934)

16

2  S  trengthening of Soviet Control over Eastern Turkistan (1934–1939)

53

3  D  eepening Crisis in Soviet-Xinjiang Relations and Downfall of the Sheng Government

81

4  A  ctivation of Moscow’s Policy in Xinjiang and Creation of the Eastern Turkistan Republic (1944–1945)

123

5  T  he Urumqi Agreement and the Establishment of a Coalition Government in Xinjiang (1946–1947)

171

6  T  he New Wave of Soviet Activities in Xinjiang and the Victory of the Communist’s in China (1947–1949)

212

Conclusion

253

Bibliography

261

Index

273

About the Author

283

v

Abbreviations

APDUDPAR Arkhiv Politicheskikh Dokumentov pri Upravlenii Delami Prezidenta Azerbaidzhanskoi Respubliki (Archive of Political Documents of the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Azerbaijan) APRF Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskii Federatsiia (Archive of the President of the Russian Federation), Moscow, Russian Federation AREC All-Russian Extraordinary Commission Armenian SSR Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic ASSR Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic AVPRF Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation) AUCP (B) All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) CAB CC RCP (B) Central Asia Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) CC Central Committee CC CPA (B) Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan (Bolshevik) CC CPKaz Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan CC CPKy Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kirghizstan CC CPTaj Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan CC CPTur Central Committee of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan CC CPUz Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan CCP Chinese Communist Party CC RCP (B) Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) CEC Central Executive Committee vii

viii

Abbreviations

CIA U.S. Central Intelligence Agency CP Communist Party CPC USSR Council of People’s Commissars CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union CSDM Central Spiritual Directorate of Muslims DVP SSSR Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki Soiuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik ECRW East China Railway FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States HSE Higher Soviet of the Economy GARF Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (State Archive of the Russian Federation) Glavkom Commander in Chief Glavnickeltin Main Directorate of the Mining and Processing of Nickel and Tin Glavtsinksvinets Main Directorate of the Zinc and Lead Industries GMD (or KMT) Guomindang or Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party) ICP Iranian Communist Party Kaz. SSR Kazakhstan Soviet Socialist Republic Kir. SSR Kirghizstan Soviet Socialist Republic MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs MGB Ministry of State Security MID Main Intelligence Directorate MVD Ministry of Interior Affairs NARA National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD Narcom People’s Commissar NKVD People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs NSA National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington DC PCD People’s Commissariat of Defense PCFA People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs PCFT People’s Commissariat of Foreign Trade PCHI People’s Commissariat of Heavy Industry PCIA People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs PLA People’s Liberation Army Politburo Political Bureau PPX People’s Party of Xinjiang PRC People’s Republic of China PRM People’s Republic of Mongolia PRO Public Records Office, London



Abbreviations ix

RFSFR Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic RG Record Group RGASPI Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial’no-Politeicheskoi Istorii (Russian State Archive of Social-Political History) RTA (ROSTA) Russian Telegraph Agency SCNDC Supreme Council for the National Defense of China SDC State Defense Committee Sovkitmetal Soviet-Chinese joint metallurgical company Sovkitneft Soviet-Chinese joint oil company Sovmongoltorg Soviet-Mongolian Trade Organization Sovnarkom Council of People’s Commissars Sovsintorg Soviet-Xinjiang Trade Organization SPA State Political Administration Taj. SSR Tajikistan Soviet Socialist Republic TIRET Turkic-Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkistan Torgsin Trade of Xinjiang Tur. SSR Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic UK United Kingdom UN United Nations USCR All-Union Society of Cultural Relations USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Uz. SSR Uzbekistan Soviet Socialist Republic VKP (B) All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)

Introduction

The Uyghur-populated region of Eastern Turkistan (Xinjiang) has recently gained international attention as a result of China’s establishment of vast reeducation prison camps and massive human rights abuses. The Chinese government has rejected charges of ethnic and religious discrimination, but overwhelming evidence has emerged that millions of individuals are deprived of their fundamental rights as the central government has tightened its grip over China’s peripheral region populated by Turkic-Muslims. In many ways, the Communist government’s challenges in the region resemble those faced by the Nationalist government in China under Chiang Kai-shek. Examination of the events that took place in the 1930s and 1940s in what was then known as Eastern Turkistan may help shed some light on the root causes of the conflict. Collaboration among the Allies during World War II did not last long. Shortly after the victory over the Axis Powers, local conflicts along the USSR’s southern borders dampened the sense of partnership among the countries once fighting against a common enemy. The historic victory in the war whetted Moscow’s appetite for expansion across its southern boundaries. These ambitions manifested themselves in China’s Xinjiang province, Iranian Azerbaijan, and Turkey’s eastern regions. Dramatic events followed the war in the spring of 1945. Given the general consistency on the issues during the meetings of the Big Three and in discussions among the Allied governments during the war, the Soviet Union’s claims on the three border regions in the Middle East (in addition to Eastern Europe and the Balkans) came as a surprise. Against the background of these events, which remained mostly a mystery to the West, the first cracks appeared in the relationship as the wartime cooperation gradually transformed into confrontation. Soon, the first signs of the Cold War became apparent in the Soviet government’s bid to revise the USSR’s southern borders. 1

2

Introduction

The opening of formerly top-secret Soviet archives has clarified certain issues. Accordingly, some aspects of Cold War history need to be rewritten. Speculations gave way to certainties soon after the Soviet archives were opened, even creating new shades of the West-East conflict. The Soviet documents also brought the long-forgotten eastern episodes of the Cold War to the attention of scholars. These documents demonstrate that events in Greece, Turkey, and Iran, which brought the Cold War from West to East, can be analyzed in accordance with the events in China (Xinjiang), Iran, and Turkey.1 The Iranian and Turkish episodes of the Cold War were already imprinted in historical memory. The Soviet pressure on these countries has been documented by other scholars. The confrontation that began in the region between the Anglo-American Allies and the Soviet Union ended with the defeat of Moscow in the first phase of the Cold War. “My strongest impression,” the journalist Walter Lippmann (who popularized the term “Cold War”) wrote after this initial showdown, “is that the Russians have lost the cold war and they know it.”2 This was in effect the first defeat of the Soviets in local conflicts since the victory in World War II. In recent years, new historical literature on the history of the Cold War has appeared, particularly, about the crisis in Iranian Azerbaijan.3 Similar attention has been given to the Turkish crisis of the Cold War.4 Compared to the Iranian and Turkish crises during the Cold War, it cannot be said that the events of 1944–1949 in the Chinese province of Xinjiang played a major historical and theoretical role in that framework. However, the analysis of Soviet archival documents that became public after the collapse of the USSR shows that the Soviet policy toward the west Chinese province of Xinjiang had elements of its overall political strategies of the Cold War. Moscow used the Xinjiang events to squeeze the central Chinese government, organized political and economic destabilization in the region, and created tension in the border areas of Xinjiang—which all served the expansionist intentions of the USSR. The timing and nature of events in the Iranian part of Azerbaijan revealed the Soviet Union’s intentions and goals in Eastern Turkistan. The Soviet claims against Turkey were similar to those made against Eastern Turkistan (the Xinjiang province of western China). Soviet archival materials have shed light on the subject over the last twenty years. Thus, the historical chronicle of the Cold War period, especially its components in Xinjiang, is reflected in the Soviet archival documents. While at the State Archive of the Russian Federation in Moscow, I was riveted by a collection titled “Xinjiang, Iranian Azerbaijan, Turkey 1941–1953.” It was no coincidence that documents on the three counties to the south were grouped in this manner. These documents are reflective of an identical po-



Introduction

3

litical line adopted by the Soviets during the period. Most of the collection addresses the Soviet policy in Xinjiang, including folders named “On Prospecting and Development of Oil-Rich Areas of Xinjiang Province (Western China) in 1941,” “On Adoption of the Plan of Operation of the ‘Xinjiangtin’ Concession for 1941,” “Reports of Soviet Specialists on Academic Trips to Western China, 1943–1944,” “On Adoption of the Plan of Operation of the ‘Xinjiangtin’ Concession for 1946,” “Internal Documents of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU),” “On Admission to USSR Citizenship of Persons Arriving in the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic (Kirg. SSR) from Western China, 1951,” “Correspondence with Northeast China and Xinjiang,1951–1953,” and others. The developments of 1944–1949 in the three northern provinces of Xinjiang were, first of all, regulated by relevant decisions of the Politburo Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) or AUCP(B). These decisions and resolutions are reposited in box 17, folder 162, of the Russian Social and Political History State Archive (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial’no-Politeicheskoi Istorii, RGASPI). These documents in the archives of the former Communist Party are strictly confidential, containing information about the Soviets’ territorial claims to neighboring countries and their aspiration to establish “friendly governments” along the USSR borders. Decisons of this sort were made with respect to Xinjiang as well. This study makes use of more than 60 secret decisions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the AUCP(B) concerning the political, military, and economic life of Xinjiang and the operations of Soviet special services and punitive organs. Among the party documents of particular value are the materials of the foreign policy department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). National and local bodies, governing directives of an ideological nature, and the forms and methods of organization of the separatist movement in Xinjiang were essentially developed within this department. Unfortunately, the contents of the Russian Social and Political History State Archive are not fully open: many Party documents, including those about Xinjiang, remain closed in special folders. Most of the documentary sources on Soviet policy in Xinjiang from 1944 to 1949 used in this study are kept at the State Archive of the Russian Federation (Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii, GARF) in the Special Folder of Joseph Stalin, the Special Folder of Viachelav Molotov, and the Special Folder of Lavrentii Beria. These documents consist mainly of memoranda, analytical notes, and reports of the heads of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) and People’s Commissariat of State Security (NKGB) on the situation in Xinjiang. They make it possible to reconstruct

4

Introduction

developments in the province in the period under review and the political line of Soviet leaders in respect to the province. Of particular importance is the information provided by the heads of the task forces of the Soviet NKVD in Xinjiang in mid-1940s, including Major-General Vladimir Egnarov and Lieutenant-General Аleksandr Langfang of the NKGB USSR. Many secret documents related to revolutionary movements in three districts of Xinjiang (Ili, Tarbaghatai, and Altai) are currently kept at the Russian State Archives. On December 5, 1944, USSR commissar of internal affairs Lavrentii Beria ordered a special tasks department to be set up. Its primary mission was to lead the national-liberation movement of Xinjiang Muslims and render all necessary assistance to its participants. With Stalin’s approval, General Egnarov and a group of Soviet officers were sent on an assignment to Ili district to organize the rebels’ combat operations against the Chinese army. The Russian State Achives also contain several letters to Stalin from Shakirkhojayev Alikhan Törä, the head of the Eastern Turkistan national government. Important information about Soviet activity in Xinjiang in the 1940s is kept at the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii, AVPRF). While writing this work I was often referred to diplomatic documents by the Commissariat (later Ministry) of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. Of great interest are materials from the collections of foreign commissar Viacheslav Molotov, deputy commissar for foreign affairs Аndrei Vyshinskii, deputy foreign commissar Vladimir Dekanozov, and others. The materials include not only instructions and official correspondence but also a great number of reports, analytical notes, and memoranda. Scores of these documents, especially those from 1944 to 1949, provide their author’s appraisals of the situation, conclusions that frequently ran counter to official Party and governmental points of view. Interesting information is contained in the folder titled “In Reference to China,” which includes dispatches of authorized agents of the Foreign Ministry in Xinjiang and consular officers in the province from 1944 to 1949. The documents provide a thorough analysis of the political and economic situation in Xinjiang, enabling researchers to retrace the evolution of processes occurring in the province and the Soviet leaders’ reactions to these transformations. Materials of the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, APRF) were useful in regard to Anastas Mikoian’s secret missions to China, meeting and discussions with Chairman Mao Zedong and other leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. Mikoian’s extensive report, certificates, telegrams, and a cryptogram about the meeting at Xibaipo helped clarify the Soviet policy with relation to China, including Xinjiang. Despite my attempts, unfortunately, I was unable to ac-



Introduction 5

cess the documents of the Archive of the Federal Security Service (former NKGB and KGB archive) and the materials of the Military Historical Archive of the Russian Federation. The American sources from the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) provided a valuable opportunity to study the Soviets’ intentions in Xinjiang through the eyes of American experts. NARA documents make it possible to trace the tensions in Eastern Turkistan and the concern of the Western allies in regard to China and the separatist movement in Xinjiang. I often turned to memoranda and directives of the State Department to the embassies and consulates in China and the USSR and diplomatic workers in these countries, as well as confidential reports and communications from U.S. diplomatic officials in China and the Soviet Union to Washington, DC. Many NARA documents address the events in Xinjiang from 1944 to 1949, which were not included in FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States) publications noted in this book. The secret decisions of the Soviet government in June and July of 1945 on Eastern Turkistan and Iranian Azerbaijan were as follows: On June 10, 1945, the Council of People’s Commissars (CPC) of the Soviet Union decided to “Organize Soviet Industrial Enterprises in Northern Iran.”5 On June 21 the State Defense Committee (SDC) passed a decision “On Geological Oil Exploration Operations in North Iran.”6 On July 6 the Politburo (Political Bureau) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union adopted a resolution “On Measures regarding the Organization of a Separatist Movement in South Azerbaijan and Other Provinces of Northern Iran.”7 On October 8, 1945, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, which recognized the seriousness of the situation, deemed it necessary to revise its own earlier decision of July 6, 1945.8 At about the same time the decision were being made regarding Iranian Azerbaijan in June–August 1945, the Soviet Union was busy formulating and putting forward its claims on Turkey. On June 7, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Viacheslav Molotov received Turkish ambassador Selim Sarper in the Kremlin and laid down Soviet territorial claims to Eastern Turkey.9 On June 18, 1945, they met for the second time. Molotov informed Sarper about Soviet intentions to build a military base in the Turkish Straits and to establish joint Soviet-Turkish control over the Bosporus and Dardanelles.10 On August 18, the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs determined an area to be annexed from Turkey and officially declared that these territories would form part of the Armenian and Georgian Soviet Socialist Republics. At the height of the euphoria over victory against Germany, the Soviet leaders even established local committees of the Communist Party and nominated individuals to fill the leadership positions in the regions to be

6

Introduction

occupied. According to the Soviet plans, the total area of the lands captured from Turkey would be 26,000 square kilometers. Of that, the Armenian lands would constitute 20,500 square kilometers (about 80 percent of the territory of the Armenian Republic), while the Georgian lands would amount to 5,500 square kilometers (8 percent of the territory of the Georgian Republic).11 Interestingly, the Soviet decision regarding Xinjiang predated the events in Iran and Turkey. On May 4, 1943, Moscow adopted a secret decree “On Xinjiang,” which provided for curtailment of Soviet activity in the province.12 On June 22, 1945, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union passed a decision on assistance to Eastern Turkistan’s provisional government.13 On September 15, 1945, the Politburo returned to the Eastern Turkistan issue and passed a new decision on the situation in Xinjiang.14 With the mediation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the Republic of Eastern Turkistan entered into an agreement with the Chinese government on June 6, 1946. Seeing that China was not in compliance with the articles of this treaty, however, the Soviet Union tried to complicate the situation in Eastern Turkistan in February and September 1947. With this decision, Moscow launched a new Islamic national liberation movement in Xinjiang.15 But this movement did not last after 1947 and was not successful. Russian Sinologists Andrei Ledovskii and Raisa Mirovitskaia, taking into account all these factors, including the tensions in regard to China, wrote that China had become the main theater “on the Asian front” of “the Cold War.”16 The beginning of the postwar confrontation between the former allies had intensified the civil war in China. Odd Arne Westad notes that “the civil war in China (1946–1949) originated with the emergence of the Cold War.”17 According to David Wang, “the American activities of 1945–49 in Xinjiang mirrored the general tendency of the Soviet-American Cold War. . . . In 1947, in order to prevent the Soviet Union from expanding its influence, Truman initiated a policy of ‘containment of the Soviet Union’ and the nuclear arms race quickly became a central feature of the Cold War. Another ‘Iron Curtain’ descended in Asia. It stretched from Turkey through central Asia (Iran, Xinjiang, Mongolia) to Manchuria and north Korea, and the western Pacific.”18 In fact, “China provided the crucial factor that separated the Cold War in East Asia from the first front of the Cold War, between the United States in alliance with Western Europe and the Soviet Union.”19 The victory of the Communist revolution in China inflamed the Cold War in Asia. According to Chen Jian, “in the late 1940s, when Mao and his comrades focused their vision on the outside world, they encountered an international environment that had been divided by the Cold War. The deteriorating relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States drove the world into repeated crises, making the global situation replete with elements of instabil-



Introduction

7

ity and conflict. Facing such a situation, Mao and his fellow CCP leaders defined the nature of the emerging Cold War in light of the Marxist-Leninist theory of international class struggle, as well as of the CCP’s need to win the war against the GMD [Guomindang].”20 In fact, the Soviet Union had been active in Xinjiang from the 1930s. As a result of Muslim movements in Eastern Turkistan between 1931 and 1934, the Turkic-Islamic Republic and national government had been founded. Through secret decisions of the Soviet government and the interference of the USSR, Muslim movements had been suppressed and the Turkic-Islamic Republic had been subverted in 1934, when duban (governor) Sheng Shicai’s government came to power with the help of Moscow. During this time, Xinjiang was more connected to the Soviet Union than to the Chinese government. Sheng Shicai was able to take power in the province and established a despotic regime that lasted until 1944. During these ten years, with direct assistance from Moscow, Sheng subjected the local Muslim population to his personal regime, to Soviet interests, and to the formal administration of the Chinese government bodies. What happened at the end of World War II and beginning of the Cold War in the Chinese province of Eastern Turkistan (Xinjiang)? What did the world know about developments there? What did this have to do with the confrontation that evolved into the Cold War? Russian historian professor Vladislav Zubok considers that at the end of the war “Chiang Kai-shek was well aware that Stalin had greater leverage in the struggle for North China, including Mongolia, the separatists in Xinjiang and, most importantly, the Chinese Communists.”21 Recently declassified Soviet documents have revealed some details on this issue. The Soviet policy had some successes in relation to the struggle of the Muslim peoples of Eastern Turkistan beginning in the early 1930s and the period of activity of the Eastern Turkistan Republic from 1944 to 1949. A number of publications on the history of rebel movements in Xinjiang were published in the 1950s and 1960s by researchers such as Aleksandr Iakovlev, N. Mingulov, and M. Kutlukov.22 But these authors did not cover the most important stories of these events, especially the role played by the Soviet Union. These scholars identified the problems and contributed to the collection and systematization of factual material, but their works were fragmentary and mostly ideological in nature. More active research on the problems of Xinjiang and its role in the development of Soviet-Chinese relations, devoted to the national movements of Muslim peoples, began to be conducted in the 1970s and 1980s. It is especially important that these studies began to cover a wider range of subjects related to the insurgency in the province in the 1930s and 1940s. This

8

Introduction

intensification of historical research in the USSR on the problems of Xinjiang was the result of the deterioration of Soviet-Chinese relations. These issues, in particular, were the focus of the works of Alimjan Khakimbaev, Vasilii Bogoslovskii, Aleksei Moskalev, Vladimir Moiseev, and other authors.23 Professor Moiseev created a serious scientific school dealing with the history of Xinjiang. But these studies did not fit into the procrustean bed of the Soviet ideological schemes and therefore were not regarded as valid. As a result, in accordance with Communist ideology, the Muslim movement in Xinjiang was wrongly presented as part of the general Chinese national liberation movement. However, the objectives and even the forms of these two struggles were completely different. A noticeable change in such research took place after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In particular, access to many previously classified archival collections allowed the emergence of new scientific works on the history of Xinjiang, including the events of the 1930 and 1940s in Eastern Turkistan. Studies were published in the 1990s concerning the Sino-Soviet relationship, the Soviet Union’s policy toward Eastern Turkistan, and the individual parts of the Muslim rebel movement in Xinjiang against the Chinese authorities. A number of scientific studies and memoirs about the events in Eastern Turkistan resulted from this interest, especially the works of Iurii Galenovich, Andrei Ledovskii, Valerii Barmin, and some other authors.24 This research covers the postwar years of the Muslim movement spreading in China and the assistance that the Soviets provided. Two very interesting studies by Barmin, enriched by the new classified archival material and offering new scientific interpretations, were published in the late 1990s. These works, based on materials from the archive of the USSR Foreign Ministry, showed the involvement of the Soviet Union in the internal affairs of Xinjiang and direct Soviet participation in the events of the insurgency in the 1930s and 1940s. At the same time Barmin created at the Altai State Pedagogical University (Barnaul) a school of study on the history of Xinjiang, which in recent years has produced scientific achievements and successfully defended his views on the history and political life of the Eastern Turkistan region.25 In recent years, a number of studies by Kommunar Talipov, Vasilii Petrov, Konstantin Syroezhkin, Ablet Kamalov, Vladimir Krasil’nikov, Vadim Obukhov, Elena Nazemtseva, Vladimir Sokolov, and Aleksandr Kadyrbaev have also been published, revealing the significance of the events in Eastern Turkistan in the 1930s and 1940s.26 Several works devoted to the separatist movement of the Muslims of Eastern Turkistan have been published in the West, including policy discussions in the Soviet Union. These Western studies of the national movement of the Uyghurs and other Muslim peoples in Xinjiang are versatile and extensive.



Introduction

9

Western historians have long shared a common view of the expansionist goals of the Soviet Union’s policy toward Xinjiang in the 1930s and 1940s, which sought the eventual annexation of Eastern Turkistan in order to obtain a wealth of natural resources. This view is found in the works of many American, British, and other Western historians who have long engaged the Xinjiang topic, including Owen Lattimore, Nathan Miller, Jack Dabbs, George Moseley, Jack Chen, Andrew Forbes, Arthur Christos Hasiotis, Linda Benson, Gilbert Chan, James Millward, and others.27 Their works were based on the American, British and some Chinese sources and consequently did not examine the Soviets’ support and leadership of these groups in Xinjiang. The Western research sometimes reflected more accurate version of the events, but it did not always adequately acknowledge the role of Moscow in Xinjiang. The same also holds true of the scholarly literature about the Xinjiang events of the postwar period published in Turkey, India, Afghanistan, Australia, China, and other countries.28 However, recently, a qualitative change in the Western studies of the history of Eastern Turkistan has taken place. A collection of articles on the history, economic, and cultural life of Eastern Turkistan and the struggle of the indigenous population against Chinese rule in Xinjiang, edited by Frederick Starr, was published in 2004.29 Michael Dollı’s book, published in 2014, is equally interesting in terms of its historical analysis of UK archival documents related to the events in Xinjiang and in Kashgar (one of the historical cities of Eastern Turkistan) in the early twentieth century.30 Unfortunately, these works did not make enough use of Soviet archival materials that became available after the collapse of the USSR. David Brophy’s recently published book is an exception, notable for its in-depth use of rich archival sources and a new perspective. Brophy uses not only English-language sources but also local Uyghur literature and recently declassified Soviet archival materials from the RGASPI, GARF, Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voennyi Arkhiv (RGVA), Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voenno-Istoricheskii Arkhiv (RGVIA), and even the state archives of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.31 The study of the history of Xinjiang in the triangle of Ottoman Turkey, Russian Empire, and China provides additional opportunities to delve into the historical processes in Eastern Turkistan. Brophy’s book is a breakthrough achievement in these new and successful developments in studying the history of Xinjiang. The last two chapters of his work cover the period examined here. Another recent successful study on the history and ethnography of Xinjiang is the book by Justin M. Jacobs. Dr. Jacobs studied historical process of the late Qing, Republican, and Communist periods in the Xinjiang, a Republican period of special interest for our research.32 The historiographic significance of Jacobs’ book lies in the fact that the author successfully

10

Introduction

utilizes not just the Anglo-American sources, but also the Russian archives, the Taiwanese sources, and archival documents of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomy. Scientific novelty attracts the attention of the author’s article published in the same year in the Journal of Cold War Studios.33 However, Dr. Justin Jacobs used the expression “cold war” attitude to East Turkistan mainly after the events of 1949. In our opinion, the ghosts of the Cold War were earlier periods (1945–1947) over the Xinjiang sky.34 Because, newly opened Soviet archives documents help to clarify Moscow policy toward Xinjiang during the early period of the Cold War in the context Chinese and Inner Asian history.35 Books and memoirs written by participants in the national struggle in Eastern Turkistan, members of the national government, and some well-known personalities have exceptional value for the study of this movement. After the defeat of the national government, some leaders who were not associated with the USSR immigrated to Turkey and other countries. During their exile, they published books, memoirs, and articles about their experiences in Xinjiang.36 The history of Eastern Turkistan during the rebellions of 1931–1934 and 1944–1949 is full of drama. The main objective of this study is to analyze these dramatic events against the background of Soviet policy. Specifically, I want to examine the success and failure of Stalinist policy in the fate of the peoples of the border areas: in the first stage, the Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities of Eastern Turkistan became a target for Soviet plans; in the second stage, they turned into a testing ground as the Soviet Union strove to expand its borders. Both experiments ended tragically and left a deep mark on the fate of the Muslim population of Xinjiang. NOTES 1.  Bruce Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Grеat Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece. Princeton. 1980; Geoffrey Roberts, Moscow’s Cold War on the Periphery: Soviet Policy in Greece, Iran, and Turkey, 1943–8, Journal of Contemporary History, 2011, Vol. 46(1); Artem Ulunian, Soviet Cold War Perceptions of Turkey and Greece, 1945–1958, Cold War History 3(2) (January 2003). 2.  Ronald Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Sentury. An Atlantic Monthly Press Book. 1980, 447. 3.  Fawcett Louise L’Estrange, Iran and the Cold War: the Azerbaijan crisis of 1946. Cambridge University Press, 1992; Natalia Yegorova, The “Iran Crisis” of 1945–1946: A View from the Russian Archives, Working Paper, Cold War International History Project. No. 15, Washington, DC, 1996; Scheid Fernande Raine, The Iranian Crisis of 1946 and the Origins of Cold War, In Leffler P. Melvin and Painter S. David. Origins of the Cold War. An International History. Second Edition.



Introduction 11

Routledge. New York and London, 2005; Jamil Hasanli, At the Dawn of the Cold War: The Soviet–American Crisis over Iranian Azerbaijan, 1941–1946. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2006; Kristen Blake, The US–Soviet Confrontation in Iran, 1945–1962: A case in the annals of the Cold War. University Press of America, Inc. Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Plymouth, UK, 2009; Natalia Yegorova, “Iranskii krizis” 1945–1946 gg. Po rassekrechennym arkhivnym materialam, Novaia i Noveishaia istoriia. 1994, No. 3; Dzhamil’ Gasanly, SSSR–IRAN: Azerbaidzhanskii krizis i nachalo kholodnoi voiny (1941–1946 gg.). Moscow, 2006.   4.  Ekavi Athanassopoulou, Turkey–Anglo–American Security Interests, 1945– 1952. London: Frank Cass, 1999; Eduard Mark, The Turkish War Scare, In Melvin P. Leffler and David S. Painter. Origins of the Cold War. An International History. Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, New York and London, 2005; Jamil Hasanli, Stalin and the Turkish Crisis of the Cold War, 1945–1953. Lexington Books, 2011; Ayşegül Sever, Soğuk Savaş Kuşatmasında Türkiye, Batı ve Orta Doğu. 1945– 1958. Istanbul, 1997; Nikolai Kochkin. SSSR, Angliia, SShA i “Turetsky krizis” 1945–1947, Novaia i Noveishaia Istoriia, 2003, No. 3; Natalia Yegorova. Istoki Sovetsko–Amerikanskogo sopernichestva v Irane i Tursii, 1944–1945, Amerikanskii ezhegodnik, 1997. Moscow, 1997; Dzhamil’ Gasanly. SSSR–Turtsiia: ot neitraliteta k kholodnoi voine (1941–1946 gg.). Moscow, 2008.   5.  Resolution of the Council of People’s Commissariats of the USSR “On organization of these Soviet industrial enterprises in North Iran.” June 10, 1945, Arkhiv Politicheskikh Dokumentov pri Upravlenii Delami Prezidenta Azerbaidzhanskoi Respubliki (hereafter referred to as APDUDPAR), f. 1, o. 89, d. 106, l. 8–10.   6.  Resolution of the State Defense Committee “On geological prospecting operations in North Iran,” June 21, 1945, Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial’noPoliteicheskoi Istorii (hereafter referred to as RGASPI), f. 644, o.2, d.507, l. 144   7.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On measures on organization of separatist movement in South Azerbaijan and other provinces of North Iran,” July 6, 1945, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 37, l. 147–148   8.  See: Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On South Azerbaijan and North Kurdistan,” Octobor 8, 1945, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 37, l. 152–153   9.  See: From diary of V. Molotov. Reception of the Ambassador of the Turkish Republic S. Sarper. June 7, 1945, Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (hereafter referred to as AVPRF), f. 06, o. 7, p. 2, d. 31, l. 1–11. 10.  See: From diary of V. Molotov. Reception of the Ambassador of the Turkish Republic Selim Sarper. June 18, 1945, AVPRF, f. 06, o. 7, p. 2, d. 31, l. 30–38. 11.  See: On the Soviet–Turkish relations. June 18, 1945, AVPRF, f. 06, r. 7, fol. 47, v. 762, pp. 13–18 12.  See: Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” May 4, 1943, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 37, l.76–78. 13.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” June 22, 1945, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 37, l. 145–146.

12

Introduction

14.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On the situation of Xinjiang,” September 15, 1945, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 37, l. 150–151. 15.  See: Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” February 24, 1947, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 38, l.154–155; Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” September 10, 1947, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 38, l.202–203. 16.  Andrei Ledovskii and Raisa Mirovitskaia, Otnosheniia SSSR s Kitaem (1946 –1950), Russko-Kitaiskie otnosheniia v XX veke. Dokumenty i materialy. Tom V. Kn. 1. Moscow, 2005, 8. 17.  Odd Arne Westad, Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, 176. 18.  David Wang, The Xinjiang question of the 1940s: the story behind the Sino– Soviet treaty of August 1945, Asian Studies Review, 1997, Vol. 21, No. 1, 98–99. 19.  The Cold War in East Asia, 1945–1991, Edited by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, D.C., Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 2011, 3. 20.  Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War. The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation. New York, Columbia University Press, 1994, 17. 21.  Vladislav Zubok, Neudavshaiasia imperiia: Sovetskii Soiuz v kholodnoi voine ot Stalina do Gorbacheva. Moscow: Rossiiskaia politicheskaia ėntsiklopediia— ROSSPĖN, 2011, 64. 22.  Aleksandr Iakovlev, K voprosu o natsional’no-osvoboditel’nom dvizhenii narodov Sin’tsziana v 1944–1949 gg., Uchenie zapiski instituta Vostokovedeniia AN SSSR. Kitaiskii sbornik. T. XI. Moscow,1955; M. Kutlukov, Natsional’noosvoboditel’noe dvizhenie 1944–1949 gg. v Sin’tsziane kak sostavnaia chast’ narodno-demokraticheskoi revoliutsii Kitaia. Avtoreferat . . . kan. ist. nauk. Tashkent, 1963; N.N. Mingulov, Natsional’no-osvoboditel’noe dvizhenie narodov Sin’tsziana, kak sostavnaia chast’ obshchekitaiskoi revoliutsii (1944–1949 gg.), Trudy instituta istorii, arkheologii i etnografii in.Ch.Ch.Valikhanova AN Kaz.SSR. T. 15. Alma-Ata, 1962. 23.  A.A. Khakimbaev, Natsional’no-osvoboditel’noe dvizhenie korennogo naseleniia Sin’tsziana v 30-kh i 40-kh godakh ХХ veka, Institut vostokovedenie AN SSSR. Spetsial’nyi biulleten.’ No. 4 (120). Moscow, 1971; A.A. Khakimbaev, Natsional’noosvoboditel’noe dvizhenie v Sin’tsziane 1931–1949 godakh: В 2-kh. ch. Chast’ 1, Institut vostokovedenie AN SSSR. Spetsial’nyi biulleten.’ No. 5 (156). Moscow, 1974; Vasilii Bogoslovskii, Aleksei Moskalev. Natsional’nyi vopros v Kitae (1911–1949). Moscow, 1984; Vladimir Moiseev, Sin’tszian v sovetsko-kitaiskikh otnosheniiakh (1917–1987 gg.), Alma-Ata, 1988. 24.  Iurii Galenovich, “Belye piatna” i “bolevye tochki” v istorii sovetskokitaiskikh otneshenii: в 2-kh тomakh. Tom 1. Moscow, 1992; Andrei Ledovskii, Sekretnaia missiia Mikoiana v Kitai (ianvar’–fevral’ 1949 g.), Problemy Dal’nego Vostoka. 1995, No. 2–3; Andrei Ledovskii. SSSR i Stalin v Sud’bakh Kitaia. Do-



Introduction

13

kumenty i svidetel’stva uchastnika sobytii 1937–1952. Moscow, 1999; Valerii Barmin, SSSR i Sin’tszian 1918–1941 gg. (Regional’nyi faktor vo vneshnei politike Sovetskogo Soiuza). Barnaul, 1998; Valerii Barmin, Sin’tszian v sovetsko-kitaiskikh otnosheniiakh 1941–1949 gg., Barnaul, 1999; Valerii Barmin, Politika vybora: vzaimootnosheniia Sovetskogo Soiuza i Sin’tsziana posle samorospuska VostochnoTurkistanskoi respubliki (1946–1947 gg.), Sravnitel’naia politika, 2011, No. 4 (6). 25.  Elena Komissarova, Belogvardeiskaia emigratsiia v Sin’tsziane v 1920–1935 gg., Avtoreferat . . . kan. ist. nauk. Barnaul, 2004; Kirill Barmin, Politika Velikikh derzhav v Sin’tsziane v 1918–1949 gg., Avtoreferat . . . kan. ist. nauk. Barnaul, 2005; Ivan Polikarpov, Politika Sovetskogo Soiuza v otnoshenii natsional’nogo dvizhenia korennykh narodov Sin’tsziana. V 30–40-kh gg. ХХ veka. Avtoreferat . . . kan. ist. nauk. Barnaul, 2012. 26.  Kommunar Talipov, Pantiurkizma v Vostochnom Turkistane v 30-e–40–e gody ХХ veka, Issledovaniia po Uyghurovedeniiu: filolgia, istoriia, ekonomika, K 75-letiiu izvestnogo tiurkologa T.T. Talipova. Alma-Ata, 2000; Russko-kitaiskie otnoshenia v XX veka. Dok. i materialy. Sost. Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitsskaia, Vladimir Miasnikov. Tom IV. Kn. 2. Moscow.: Pamiatniki ist. mysli, 2000; Vasilii Petrov, Miatezhnoe “serdtse” Azii: Sin’tszian: kratkaia istoria naradnykh dvizhenii i vospominaniia. Moscow, 2003; Konstantin Syroezhkin, Mify i real’nost’ etnicheskogo seperatizma v Kitae i bezopasnost’ Tsentral’noi Azii. Alma-Ata, 2003; Ablet Kamalov. Amerikanskie diplomaty v Vostochnom Turkistane: Duglas Saymur Makirnan (1913–1950), Rossiia, Sibir’ i Tsentral’naia Aziia: vzaimodeictvie narodov i kul’tura, Materialy III Mezhdunarodnoi nauchno-prakticheskoi konferentsii. Barnaul, 2001; Ablet Kamalov, O poezdke amerikanskogo konsula v Urumchi Dzh. Kholla Pakstona v Kul’dzhu i Tarabagatai v 1947 g., Vestnik Kazakhskogo Natsional’nogo universiteta im. Al’-Farabi, Seriia “Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia i mezhdunarodnoe pravo,” No. 2 (8), Alma-Ata, 2003; Iu.P. Guan,’ Shtirikhi k politicheskomu portretu Shen Shitsaia, Vostokovedcheskie issledovaniia na Altae. Altai. Gos.un-t. Vyp.4, Barnaul, 2004; Vladimir Krasil’nikov. Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie. Zabytye stranitsy istorii rossiiskogo prisutstviia v Severno-Zapadnom Kitae (1850–1950). Moscow, 2007; Vadim Obukhov, Skhvatka shesti imperii. Bitva za Sin’tszian. Moscow, 2007; Elena Nazemtseva, Russkaia emigratsiia v Sin’tsziane (1920–1930-e gg.), Barnaul, 2010; Vladimir Sokolov, Sekretnaia missiia V.Q.Dekanozova v Urumchi (Sin’tszian) v 1942 godu, Novaia i Noveyshaia istoriia, 2011, No. 3; Aleksandr Kadyrbaev, “Podlezhaishchii likvidatsii” po prigovoru “Vozhdia narodov,” “Stepnoi volk Ospan.” 1940–1951, Iran—name, No. 1 (45), 2018; Aleksandr Kadyrbaev, Lider kazakhov Kitaia Ospan Batyr i “revoliutsiia trekh okrugov” v Vostochnom Turkistane.1940–1951 gg., Vostochnyi arkhiv, No. 1 (39), 2019. 27.  Owen Lattimore, Pivot of Asia. Sinkiang and the Inner Asian Frontiers of China and Russia. Boston. 1950; Nathan Miller, Soviet Imperialism and Sinkiang. The University of Maryland, 1951; Sheng Li, The Soviet Grip on Sinkiang, Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXXII No. 3, April 1954; Li Chang, The Soviet Grip on Sinkiang, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Apr., 1954); Suess Whiting Allen, Whiting and Sheng Shicai, Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot? East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1958; Jack Dabbs, History of Discovery and Exploration of Chinese Turkistan. Texas,

14

Introduction

1963; Harry Schwartz, Tsars, Mandarins, and Comissars. A History of ChineseRussian Relations. Philadelphia and New York. 1964; George Moseley, A SinoSoviet Cultural Frontier. The Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou. Cambridge. 1966; Jack Chen, The Sinkiang Story. New York and London, 1977; Donald McMillen, Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949–1977. Boulder, Colorado, Dawson, 1979; Andrew Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia. A Political History of Republican Sinkiang 1911–1949. Cambridge, 1986; Arthur Christos Hasiotis, Soviet Political, Economic, and Military Involvement in Sinkiang from 1928 to 1949. New York and London, 1987; Linda Benson, The Ili Rebellion. The Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang 1944–1949. Armonk, New York, London. 1990; Gilbert Chan, Regionalism and Central Power: Sheng ShihTs’ai in Sinkiang, 1933–1944, In China at the Crossroads: Nationalists and Communists,1927–1949. Boulder: Westview, 1990; Lars-Erik Nyman, Sinkiang 1934–1943. Dark Decade for a Pivotal Puppet, Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique, Vol. 32, No. 1, En asie centrale soviétique: Ethnies, nations, états (Jan.–Mar., 1991); James A. Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang. Columbia University Press, 2007; Sergei Radchenko, Choibalsan’s Great Mongolia Dream, Inner Asia, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2009); Michael Share, A Little Known and Explored Front: The Russian Civil War in Chinese Xinjiang, 1918–1921, Europe-Asia Studies. May 2010. Vol. 62. No. 3; Shen Zhihua and Xia Yafeng. Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, 1945–1959. A New History. Lexington Books, 2015. 28.  Baymirza Hayit, Türkistan Rusiya ile Çin arasında. Istanbul, 1975; Baymirza Hayit, Türkistan Devletlerinin Milli Mücadileleri Tarihi. Ankara, 1995; Muhämmäd Imin Buğra, Şarki Tiirkistan Tarihi. Ankara, 1987; Seypidin Ezizi, Ömür Dastani. Beijing, 1991; Ahmed Khan. Islam and Muslims in Eastern Turkistan, Central Asia. Peshawar. 1992. No. 30; David Wang, The Xinjiang question of the 1940s: the story behind the Sino–Soviet treaty of August 1945, Asian Studies Review, 1997, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 83–105; David Wang, Under the Soviet Shadow. The Ining Incident. Ethnic Conflicts and International Rivalry in Xinjiang 1944–1949. Hong Kong, 1999; Ahat Andican, Cedidizm’den Bağimsızliğa Hariçte Türkistan Mücadelesi. Istanbul, 2003; Mahesh Ranjan Debata, China’s Minorities: Ethnic-Religious Separatism in Xinjiang. New Delhi, 2007. 29.  Xinjiang. China’s Muslim Borderland. Edited by S. Frederick Starr. M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, London, England, 2004. 30.  Michael Dillon, Xinjiang and the Expansion of Chinese Communist Power: Kashgar in the Early Twentieth Century. Routledge, 2014. 31.  David Brophy, Uyghur Nation. Reform and Revolution on the Russia-China Frontier. Harvard University Press, 2016. 32.  Justin M. Jacobs, Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State. University of Washington Press, Seattle and London, 2016. 33.  Justin M. Jacobs, Exile Island: Xinjiang Refugees and the “One China” Policy in Nationalist Taiwan, 1949–1971, Journal of Cold War Studies, Volume 18, Issue 1, Winter 2016. 34.  See: Justin M. Jacobs, Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State, 198–207.



Introduction 15

35.  See: Jamil Hasanli, The Soviet Archives and Xinjiang, 1944–1949. On May 4, 2020, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/. 36.  Isa Yusuf Alptekin, Demir Perde Arkasindaki Şarki Türkistan, Milli Türkistan, 1951, No. 72, 73, 74; Isa Yusuf Alptekin, Doğu Türkistan Insanliktan Yardim Istiyur. Istanbul, 1974; Isa Yusuf Alptekin, Esir Doğu Türkistan Için Mücadile Hatiraları. Istanbul, 1985; Muhämmäd Imin Buğra, Doğu Türkistan’ın Hürriyet Davasi ve Çin Siyaseti. Istanbul, 1954; Muhammad Kasım Türkistani. Şarki Türkistan’ın Milli Inkilap Tarihi. Istanbul-Karachi, (1391), 1971; Muhammed Emin Buğra, Isa Yusuf Alptekin and Mesut Sabri, Central Asia Survey 10, No. 4, 1991; Haci Yakup Anat, Doğu Türkistan’da Milliyetçilik Haraketleri. Ankara, 2005.

Chapter One

National Movement in Eastern Turkistan and Moscow’s Growing Influence in Xinjiang (1930–1934)

Soviet interest in Xinjiang began to appear much earlier than in Iranian Azerbaijan and in Turkey and intensified during the 1930s. As a result of the Muslim movement in Eastern Turkistan between 1931 and 1934, the Turkic-Islamic Republic and national government had been founded. Given the ethnic-national composition and Muslim faith of the population, as well as the ethnic kinship of Uyghurs with peoples of Central Asia, large territories of Eastern Turkistan became attractive for the Soviets in early 1930s. Sergei Rostovskii carried out research at the recommendation of the Communist International in the mid-1930s, showing that the territory of Eastern Turkistan was 1,425,000 square kilometers, one-third the size of China according to his estimates. He wrote that this territory was equal in size to Iran, twice as big as Turkey, and close to the size of France, Germany, and Great Britain taken together.1 Xinjiang also shared a 1,000-mile-long border with the USSR.2 THE BEGINNING OF AN UYGHUR UPRISING AGAINST THE CHINESE During the same period, about 800,000 to 900,000 Uyghurs were living in the Soviet republics of Central Asia. They were closely related to the indigenous Uyghur population of Xinjiang.3 Estimates of the number of people living in Eastern Turkistan on the eve of the movement for autonomy and their ethnicnational composition vary. Brophy wrote that the “Uyghur nation was an innovation in the early 1920s, and its meaning was often questioned, but by the mid-1930s the Uyghurs had been accorded official recognition as a nation in both the Soviet Union and the Chinese province of Xinjiang.”4 According to Soviet information obtained from various sources in Xinjiang, on the eve 16



National Movement in Eastern Turkistan

17

of World War II the population of Xinjiang was approximately 3,900,000 people: 2,500,000 Uyghurs, 235,000 Kazakhs, 230,000 Chinese, 200,000 Dungans (Chinese-speaking Muslims), 130,000 Manchurians, 120,000 Kirghizes, and 85,000 Torgouts, as well as Chahars, Dulans, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Tatars, Indians, Russians, Tanguts, and others.5 These figures are very close to those set forth by the governor-general of Xinjiang, Sheng Shicai, on the population of the region as of 1941. Some differences are due to the numbers of Uyghurs and Kazakhs. According to him, of the 3,730,000 people in Xinjiang, 2,984, 000 were Uyghurs and 326,000 Kazakhs.6 Dr. Jacobs wrote that, though vastly outnumbered by Uyghurs, Kazaks, Kirghizes, Hui, and Mongols, who together comprised roughly 90 percent of the population, Han rulers in Xinjiang consistently maintained their position atop the ethnopolitical hierarchy.7 However, a memorandum prepared in 1934 for the Communist International (Comintern) by Umar Islamov, a revolutionary from Eastern Turkistan, said that none of the figures were correct and that the population of Xinjiang was approximately 14 to 15 million, 70 percent Uyghurs; 9 percent Mongolian-Kalmyks; 6 percent Dungans; 5 percent Chinese; 4 percent Kazakhs; 4 percent Kirghizes; and 2 percent other nationalities.8 In the first half of the twentieth century there was no reliable census in Eastern Turkistan. In his speech at the end of Xinjiang developments in 1949, Mao Zedong determined that the Turkic-Muslim population in Eastern Turkistan was 9 million. The reduction in the size of this population was attributable to the confrontation of 1944–1949. A reference by Soviet specialists noted that the Chinese “are not a native population of Xinjiang but aliens from Inner China once evicted for infringement of the laws of Chinese landlords.”9 Out of a population of 3.9 million in Uyghuria, 2,868,000 (72 percent) lived in the countryside; 487,000 (12.5 percent) lived in towns, and 604,500 (15.5 percent) were nomads.10 The USSR’s open interference in Eastern Turkistan during 1931–1934 contributed to the strengthening of the Muslim movement. Uprisings against the Chinese oppression had taken place earlier in various parts of the region led by Tömür Khalfa in Hami in 1912, by Ahmad in Turfan in 1915, by Muhammad Alikhan in Kucha in 1917, and by Salidin in Kashgar in 1923. Starting in 1928, Jin Shuren, governor of Xinjiang, under the pretext of a Bolshevik threat, started arresting well-educated people to prevent mutiny by Uyghur intellectuals. He also settled a great quantity of Chinese immigrants in Xinjiang, who exploited Uyghurs in their own interests.11 The new phase of events in Xinjiang started in early 1931 on the basis of a family conflict. In February 1931 a Chinese officer protecting Chinese immigrants wanted to forcibly marry the daughter of Salih Darga, one of the prominent figures in Hami. But this was considered a humiliation for a Muslim.

18

Chapter One

So Salih Darga gave his consent for this marriage, but at the wedding party he had about fifty Chinese shot after they got drunk.12 This event led to the start of a revolt in Hami. The uprising spread to other areas of Hami in April, and the rebels took control of the town of Hami in May. Shortly afterward, the uprising spread to all areas where Muslims lived. Led by Uyghur leader Khoja Niyaz Haji and Yolbars Kazi, grandson of Yolbars khan, the overthrown prince of Hami, the uprising became a national liberation movement against the Chinese rule. After the victory over government troops, Khoja Niyaz Haji was advised to become the commander of the Islamic Army and took command of the rebellious forces.13 People in Ghulja led by the prominent religious figure Sabit Damolla, people in Turfan led by merchant Maksudakhun Muhitov, and people in Khotan led by Muhämmäd Imin Bughra showed their solidarity with the Hami revolt. Events began simultaneously in seven places. The primary slogan of the rebels was the creation of a “Muslim People’s Republic.” On May 15, 1931, Khoja Niyaz, a member of the Uyghur revolutionary committee, sent a secret letter on behalf of the Muslim population of the region to the Mongolian revolutionary committee engaged in the struggle against the Chinese regime, asking for military aid. The letter openly discussed the reasons for the uprising: We Muslim peoples have for hundreds of years paid taxes to the Chinese and been exploited by them like dogs and donkeys. The Chinese have intensified their oppressions over the past 10–20 years: they are seizing our lands and property; assigning their own functionaries to deprive us of foodstuffs, firewood, etc.; taunting us. We have been long on patience and have taken no measures to oppose them. But they do not cease administering injustices and meting out punishments against our families. We Muslim peoples are not going to endure these outrages any longer, so we have decided to fight against them and it would be better to die than to be killed by them, so help us God. We want to be the masters in our native land.14

To establish ties with Mongol leaders, Khoja Niyaz sent his representatives to Mongolia, including Ismail Akhun, Imin Kurmal, and Zuretdin Akhun. He wrote about the establishment of ties with the Muslim population of Turfan, Kashgar, Khotan, and Astana; and Kashgar Torgouts who were waiting for them to come. Khoja Niyaz noted: “We Muslim peoples are doing this not only for ourselves but for all those being exploited by the Chinese. To attain this goal, we are sacrificing ourselves.”15 The letter was signed by Khoja Niyaz and his assistants Yolbars Kazi, Qurban Darga, Salih Darga, Baki Niyaz Darga, Sadyk Kurmal, and Mullah Temür Niyaz. Khoja Niyaz Haji’s appeal to Mongolia bore fruit, and in April 1932 his representatives coordinated a



National Movement in Eastern Turkistan

19

shipment of weapons, uniforms, and cash to Hami.16 However, after the Soviet pressure on Ulaanbaatar, this process did not last long. The weakness of the Guomindang (Nationalist Party or GMD) regime, which in 1928 was headed by Chiang Kai-Shek (Jiang Jieshi), also contributed to the rebellions. Not only did Muslims take advantage of the current situation but local Chinese authorities did so as well, to consolidate their positions and establish a regime of personal authority. After Yang Zengxin, who had long ruled in the region (1912–1928), was assassinated on July 7, 1928, Jin Shuren (1928–1933) was appointed duban border defense commissioner, as de facto ruler of the province of Xinjiang.17 Despite his post of commissar of internal affairs of the region, he was relatively new in Eastern Turkistan. Thus, he preferred to continue the political line of the Yang office and did not want to run risks or make any changes in the Soviet-Xinjiang relations.18 Chin imposed taxes on slaughtering animals and prohibited Muslims from making the hajj-pilgrimage.19 Since the end of the 1920s Muslims from Eastern Turkistan had to cross Soviet territory during the hajj to Mecca. The British consul general was informed of the obstacles raised by the Chinese for Muslims of Kashgar making the hajj via Soviet territory.20 General Ma Shaowu, a governor of the Chinese province of Kashgar, taking advantage of the weakening of power in the provinces, established secret ties with Soviet diplomats in Xinjiang a year before the revolt of the Muslim population. He asked for help in fomenting a coup d’état and turning Kashgar into an isolated district. In exchange for military aid, Ma promised to bring Kashgar under Soviet influence. He declared: “You’ll get here what the Japanese have in Manchuria.”21 However, the Soviet authorities in Xinjiang preferred to be cautious with Ma. Xinjiang was a raw-material base for Soviet industry, and they faced difficulties in guarding the Soviet border with Eastern Turkistan and Afghan-Indian and Chinese influence in the region, so they refused to render military aid to the Kashgar governor. The People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (PCFA) authorized Мikhail Slavutskii to serve as representative to Uzbekistan. He wrote to deputy foreign commissar Lev Karakhan that the “[a]ctions of Ma or others like him at the present moment are a struggle for power and incapable of changing the social structure of Xinjiang.”22 Another reason for the refusal was that the Soviet authorities believed that Ma Shaowu and his entourage were Japanese agents.23 After a revolt broke out in Hami, Ma Zhongying, the Dungan leader in Gansu, proposed aid to Khoja Niyaz and the other Uyghur chiefs. Khoja Niyaz accepted Ma Zhongying’s offer despite distrust of the Dungans. General Ma Zhongying, who had led the Dungan revolt as far back as 1928 in Gansu, was noted for his decisive actions. In concert with the rebels, he wanted to

20

Chapter One

avail himself of the situation to weaken and then overthrow Jin Shuren’s regime. With that end in view, he sent a 1,000-man cavalry to assist the Hami rebels. Niyaz’s army was also composed of 1,000 soldiers.24 However, during the offensive of the Chinese against the rebels, the Dungan cavalry of Ma Zhongying seized Chinese weapons as the spoils of war and returned to Gansu.25 As a result of differences with Khoja Niyaz, Yolbars Kazi together with his detachment of 170 left the battlefield.26 The 200-man Uyghur detachments headed by Khoja Niyaz who were fighting against the Chinese troops had to retreat to the mountains. Hence the first stage of the Uyghur uprising of the 1930s was over.27 When the revolt started in Eastern Turkistan in 1931, the Uyghur rebels hoped that the Soviet Union would provide assistance, as the Soviets had acted as the initiator of world revolution since 1917 and had transferred the focal point of the struggle against international capitalism from Europe to Asia, especially in the 1920s. However, in the 1930s, their revolutionary illusions were already gone. From a theoretical viewpoint, the Bolshevik leadership of Moscow favored national liberation revolutions, but in practice Moscow evaluated such issues from the perspective of the USSR’s interests. Thus, Moscow also approached the struggle of the Muslim population of Eastern Turkistan against the Guomindang regime from this perspective. Although representatives of the rebels requested arms from the Soviet consulate in Kashgar, their request was refused. Karl Bauman, secretary of the Central Asian Bureau of the Communist (Bolshevik) Party of the Soviet Union, proposed to send Uyghur Communists residing in Soviet Turkistan to work among rebels in Xinjiang. But the Politburo removed this proposal from its agenda, discarding it.28 The Eastern Secretariat of Comintern and the Soviet leadership had essential differences in their views of the Xinjiang uprising. The economic factor was decisive for the Soviets in Eastern Turkistan. Earlier in the 1930s it had been reported that “80 percent of foreign trade and 90 percent of Xinjiang exports go to the USSR.”29 On October 1931 the Agreement on Economic Relations between the Xinjiang provincial government and the USSR was signed in Urumqi. The agreement provided for the expansion of economic ties with the Soviet Union.30 Following the downfall of the Chinese regime in Eastern Turkistan, Soviet leaders worried about the possible use of Xinjiang’s territory by British and Japanese special services for anti-Soviet purposes. Moscow worried about the sympathy that Great Britain, Japan, Turkey, and some Muslim countries showed for the Uyghur uprising. In the meantime, John William ThompsonGlover, the British consul in Xinjiang, noted in his 1931 report to foreign minister John Simon that the “uprising of Moslems was stirred up by the Soviet Union.”31 Some reports from Moscow pointed out that after the history



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of the uprising in Xinjiang the Japanese were going to support the establishment of the so-called Turan Empire, which would have included Xinjiang, Mongolia, the Central Asian Soviet Republics, and Kazakhstan. The plan was supposed to have come from Japanese agents implanted in the environment of Dungan leader Ma Zhongying.32 The rumors seemed to be accurate, for “Abdul Karim, an offspring of the Turkish sultan, was staying in Japan as a pretender to the throne in Xinjiang, and pan-Turkist newspapers were issued to support separation of Xinjiang from China and formation of the Islamic state there.”33 Taking this into account, Soviet foreign affairs commissars considered it inappropriate to support the Muslim movement in Xinjiang, asking themselves: “What is the nature of this movement—reactionary or revolutionary?” As viewed by Soviet executives in Central Asia, the Xinjiang movement was “a bourgeois-democratic movement free of the agrarian issue. The national-liberation movement is not struggling against imperialism or following the USSR.”34 Instead, the eastern commissariat of the Comintern and its representatives in Central Asia suggested that the USSR aid the Muslim movement in Eastern Turkistan. The Comintern’s representative in Tashkent, David Dorf, informed the eastern secretariat that the argument of the People’s Commissariat of “Foreign Affairs distorts the actual state of things and gives a deliberately wrong assessment of the movement.”35 Responsible officials of the Central Asian Bureau of the RCP characterized the insurrection in Xinjiang as national liberation, while the military and Chief Political Authority (CPA) of the region considered it necessary not to assist the Chinese administration of Xinjiang in suppressing the uprising. The report of April 1931 recommended to the Eastern Secretariat of Comintern and Joseph Piatnitskii not to assist or sell arms to the regime of Jin Shuren.36 In the summer of 1931 the Xinjiang government asked for arms and aviation equipment from the USSR. The Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern drew up a recommendation: The uprising should be viewed in connection with the national-liberation movement of Muslims in Gansu, Shanxi, Yunnan, and other provinces of China. The fact that the movement is headed by feudal lords does not rule out its nationalliberation nature. All this makes us watch Xinjiang developments closely. The indubitable strengthening of anti-Soviet activity of the militarist reactionary Xinjiang government and the threat of new diversions and counterrevolutionary actions and aspirations to weaken relations with the USSR may only temporarily be stopped with the help of our armed assistance. Suppression of the nationalliberation movement of Uyghurs with the help of our arms and the subsequent bloody terror are sure to damage this movement as a whole and contribute to the greater consolidation of counterrevolutionary forces and expansion of the anti-Soviet base in Xinjiang. So we consider it inexpedient to help the Xinjiang government in suppressing the Uyghur uprising.37

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However, prior to the proposals of the Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern, on August 5, 1931, the Politburo of the CC AUC RCP, after Lev Karakhan’s presentation, approved the decision: “To Accept the Foreign Commissariat’s Proposal of Selling Two Aircraft to Xinjiang.”38 In so doing, the Soviet leaders put an end to doubts about the Xinjiang developments and lent support to the Chinese regional bodies of power in the struggle against the Muslim population of Eastern Turkistan. This line was secured by four decisions on Xinjiang adopted by the Politburo in 1932. On April 8, 1932, the Politburo, having discussed the question of Xinjiang, entrusted Lev Karakhan, Кliment Voroshilov, and Ivan Akulov “to agree on sending 10–15 airplanes for strengthening maneuver groups of frontier guards along the western frontier of China with directives to destroy gangs with machine guns from airplanes.”39 By “gangs” the Politburo meant Uyghur, Kazakh, Kirghiz, and Dungan rebels who retreated northward to the mountains along the Soviet borders under pressure from the armed forces of duban Jin Shuren. On May 23 of the same year the Politburo reconsidered the question of Xinjiang and entrusted Voroshilov and Henrich Iagoda, first deputy chair of the State Political Administration (SPA), “to finalize a question of putting into practice a Resolution of the Politburo dated 8.IV.32.”40 In June 1932 the Politburo three times suggested discussing the question of selling arms to the Xinjiang government. On June 16 the Politburo, after discussing the question in a memo by Mechislav Loganovskii, authorized Voroshilov and Akulov to carry out these arms sales.41 That same day the Politburo considered the question “Оn Deliveries under Agreements with Xinjiang” and passed a secret decision “to consider it necessary to comply with earlier made arrangements.”42 Finally, on June 22, Soviet leaders voiced their intention to sell arms to Xinjiang. The Politburo passed a secret decision about this, “[o]wing to the fact that sales to the Xinjiang government of 8 aircraft, aerial bombs, cartridges, petrol, and other ammunition totaling $200,705 have already taken place and in consideration that the Xinjiang government has paid $ 2,070 in gold bullion and, in addition, brought $46,680 worth of gold bullion to the border to be delivered to us.”43 Politburo decisions about Xinjiang were secret and kept as “special files” even after the disintegration of the USSR. It should be noted that Soviet arms sales inspired the Chinese authorities of Xinjiang to intensify their struggle against the rebels. To suppress the Uyghur uprising, the Chinese exploited both Russian White émigré and Cossack groups residing in Xinjiang. According to the Soviet intelligence service, despite the presence of a Chinese army with 25,000 soldiers in the region, the “White Guard unit of 1,000 men proved to be the most combat-ready.” Ian Karlovich Berzin told the Soviet leaders that “this single battleworthy detachment may betray Jin Shuren at the crucial moment, since they are aware of



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Muslim hatred and fear for their own and their family’s lives.”44 At the end of his note, Berzin warned that “further development of the insurgent movement may lead to the destruction of Chinese authority in Xinjiang and the establishment of a Muslim state.”45 However, Jin Shuren succeeded, at least temporarily, in suppressing the uprising through the use of force. Small detachments of rebels retreated to the mountains and carried on local sorties during 1932. They paralyzed the activities of the Chinese administration through sudden attacks on the Chinese army in the region. A new stage in the Uyghur movement started in December 1932 in the district of Hami. The movement quickly spread to the Turfan oasis and from there to Aqsu. After uniting protesters and locals in neighboring areas, Muslims succeeded in creating a 3,000-man army. The defeat of government forces by Muslim forces in Kara Khoja played a crucial role. Muslim forces seized arms from the Chinese army. The rebels fell back to Turfan and held the line with the help of thousands of Uyghur soldiers.46 Members of the Uyghur Committee for National Revolution decided to create a government on February 20, 1933. The kadi of Karakash, Muhammad Niyaz Alam, was appointed as head of state, Sabit Damolla as prime minister, and Muhämmäd Imin Bughra as commander of the army. Sabit Damolla had received an advanced education in Kashgar and was an intellectual who understood political affairs very well. On the eve of the uprising, he had returned from his pilgrimage to Mecca. He created a secret committee in Karakash, located in the northwest of Khotan, and promoted the idea of independence. 47 On February 21, 1933, Dungans rebelled in Urumqi. They seized Karakash on February 22 and Khotan on February 28. In March the rebellion embraced Tchantsi, Hutubi, and Manas. Later in March the Kashgar district and a greater part of the capital of Urumqi fell to the rebels. At the same time there was an uprising in the district of Altai under the leadership of Osman (Ospan), who led a 500-man detachment composed of Kirghizes. The detachment numbered 1,000 and attacked Shara-Sume, the provincial capital.48 The Chinese army was paralyzed. In February–March 1933 the defense of Urumqi city and a 100-kilometer front line around it as well as the personal security of duban Jin Shuren were dependent on troops of the White Guards, which had recently been created. However, on the evening of April 12 Sheng Shicai, commander of the government forces that fought against the rebels, carried out a military coup against Jin Shuren with the participation of former Russian White Guard troops in Xinjiang under the command of Baron Pavel Pappengut and Colonel Nikolai Bekhteev. Thus, Jin Shuren barely escaped the battle.49 Various versions of a coup d’état with direct assistance from the Soviet Union are told.50 For Moscow, which feared the transfer of power in Eastern Turkistan into the hands of Muslims, such a step was likely. Later in

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1932 Bolshevik cadres to be sent to Eastern Turkistan started training at the Communist University in Moscow. The main purpose of the training was “to cleanse Moscow-related Uyghur cadres of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism.” When the Uyghur uprising broke out, these cadres were not yet ready, while some of them were reputed to be agents of international imperialism implanted in the Communist University.51 Russian White Guard immigrants in Xinjiang supported the establishment of a Chinese government led by Liu Wenlong, who had headed the education department during the previous government and opposed the Jin Shuren government. At the same time, they sent a message to General Sheng Shicai, who had previously fought against Muslim rebels, stating that the Russian White Guards would help him if he wanted to come to power in Xinjiang.52 Sheng Shicai realized that a crucial moment had come. He immediately sent his representatives to the heads of the Uyghur army and suggested that if Uyghurs laid down their arms they would be entitled to rule territories to the south of Tian Shan, while territories to the north from Tian Shan would be ruled by the Chinese government. However, “southern Uyghurs opposed this proposal.”53 On April 12 the new government disseminated news about its existence. In its appeals the new government recounted how governor Jin Shuren had seized power in 1928 and enumerated his crimes. In its appeal of April 28, 1933, the Guomindang regional committee protected the new government.54 Liu Wenlong was formally in power, but General Sheng Shicai actually ruled the region. On the instructions of the head of the new government, he was appointed commander of all Chinese troops in Xinjiang.55 Since autumn 1930 Sheng Shicai had stayed in Xinjiang. In July 1931 he was appointed commander-in-chief of the regional army of the East and directly led combat operations against the national liberation movement of the Muslim population of Eastern Turkistan led by Khoja Niyaz.56 In August 1932 Sheng sent letters to the Comintern and Joseph Stalin that expounded his views on the future of Xinjiang.57 He tried to do his utmost to attract the attention of the Soviet leadership. Sheng wrote that “in 1923–1927 I studied in Japan and continued analyzing the works of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and other theorists of Marxism and finally became a follower of communism.”58 Following a series of successful operations in Turfan and Shanshan, Sheng Shicai was nicknamed the “victorious general.” However, rumors were afloat in Xinjiang that when Sheng encircled Khoja Niyaz’s army in the mountains of Talatshani he received valuable gifts from Niyaz and let him escape.59 On April 12, when Duban Jin Shuren was ousted and resigned, Sheng succeeded in concentrating all power in Xinjiang in his hands and proclaimed the Day of the April Revolution. He made himself the hero of this “revolution.” Soon after, “in the spirit of classical Chinese refinement,” he replaced Liu Wenlong



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as head of the government with a very old man, Li Yong, and then seized office himself.”60 According to David Brophy, “a campaign led by a Red Beard officer named Sheng Shicai soon restored provincial authority in the Turfan oasis. Yet despite this success, Governor Jin’s troops lacked faith in his ability to defeat the insurrections, and in April 1933 his White Russian recruits, supported by the Red Beards, turned on him and carried out a coup.”61 Beginning on June 12, 1933, Sheng officially executed the duties of governor (duban) in Eastern Turkistan and concentrated all power in his hands. His first step was to establish relations with Ilia Zlatkin, Soviet general consul in Urumqi. In the first meeting, Sheng told Zlatkin that he supported “communism and friendship with the USSR.”62 A few days after coming to power, Sheng proclaimed his famous “six main directions (Six Great Policies) of policy”: the struggle against imperialism, friendship with the Soviet Union, racial and national equality, the struggle against arbitrariness and bribery, the struggle for peace, and creation of a new economy. National and democratic reforms were approved under the government program. These included equality for all Xinjiang peoples, observance of national equality of employment and wages, freedoms of meetings, speech, and the press, liquidation of illegal resolutions of the former government, enhancement of the living standards of the population, prospecting and development of mineral resources of province to ensure economic independence of the region, support of peasants, good neighborly relations in foreign policy, joint creation of a financial system with the central Chinese government, and creation of popular schooling and education.63 Sheng realized that it was not possible to overcome the crisis only by means of reforms and wars. On the one hand, he intended to expand relations with the Soviet Union, get support from abroad, and hold separate talks with representatives of the rebels to win them over to his side and thus disrupt the unity of the national movement. On the other hand, a new duban started talks with Khoja Niyaz in the summer of 1933 and wanted to attract the Uyghurs to his side, who were the main basis of the uprising. In July 1933 Sheng made an agreement with them and ceased the combat operations of Uyghurs against government forces. The agreement set the goals of forming a national autonomy of Uyghurs in the south of Xinjiang, ensuring the representation of various nationalities in the government, and conducting democratic reforms as set forth in the governmental program. In return, Khoja Niyaz had to collaborate with the Xinjiang government and join the struggle against Ma Zhongying and mutinous forces of Zhang Peiyuan in Ghulja. In the duban’s view, the Kazakhs of the Altai district and the Mongols of Karashar would join an agreement signed by Uyghurs.64 However, in autumn 1933 the Muslim movement in Xinjiang increasingly expanded. The agreement with Khoja Niyaz slightly stabilized the position of

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the government but did not put an end to the national struggle of the Uyghurs. Along with Khoja Niyaz, Sheng Shicai tried to reach an agreement with the leader of the Dungans, Ma Zhongying, and thus sow discord between Dungans and Uyghurs. Despite promises to make great concessions, he failed to achieve an agreement with Ma.65 Simultaneously with the Uyghur uprising, in Dzungaria province Dungans led by Ma Zhongying rose up with the slogan of creating a Muslim state under the leadership of Ottoman Prince Abdul Karim. Although this difference in opinions initially resulted in the Dungans’ opposition to the Uyghurs, it did not last long. In the summer of 1933 Dungans led by Ma Zhongying expressed their support for Muslim forces. His advisors were Turks, and he hoped to establish a pan-Islamist state in the Central Asia.66 The forces under the command of Colonel Temür Beg took over the city of Ghulja on March 20, Aqsu on March 25, and Kashgar on April 25. The wave of resistance to Chinese rule also spread to the Altai and Tarbaghatai regions. On June 13 forces under Abdullah (Abdu) Niyaz took over Yarkent. These successes of the Muslim forces prompted the Xinjiang government to intensify its relations with the Soviet Union. In his appeals to Moscow, Sheng tried to convince the Soviet leadership that the events happening in Xinjiang were connected with Japanese and British imperialism. In order to infuriate Moscow, he wrote, “English and Japanese imperialism will inevitably use such a situation to create a Muslim state in Xinjiang with the help of the Muslim population, for the purpose of suppressing the revolution in the USSR and China.”67 Under the influence of such appeals, on June 27, 1933, the Politburo created a commission headed by Kliment Voroshilov and composed of Gregorii Sokolnikov and Shalva Eliava to discuss the Soviet policy in Xinjiang in depth. The commission was to discuss recommendations as drawn up by the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.68 In July the commission, together with the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and other relevant commissariats of the USSR, prepared a document on Soviet policy in Xinjiang and submitted it to the Politburo. This 12-point document considered separation of Xinjiang from China unacceptable, deemed provision of assistance to the Urumqi government to be necessary, viewed use of Russian immigrant White Guard squads as possible, and saw the necessity of strengthening work discipline in the Soviet offices operating in Xinjiang. The proposals of the joint deliberations suggested creating local self-governance bodies in districts where English and Japanese agents would not have a chance of success. According to the third point of the document, “in the first place, it should be considered necessary to give active support to the Urumqi government to destroy Ma Zhongying and the Dungan forces, which represent the real basis for plans to



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turn Xinjiang into a springboard of anti-Soviet activities.”69 On August 3 the Politburo discussed the proposals prepared by the commission and adopted the Directives on the Work with Xinjiang. The recommendations drafted by the commission were adopted by the Politburo without any amendments. The decision embraced political, diplomatic, military, economic, trade, and transport aspects of the Soviet policy in Xinjiang.70 To implement the decision of August 3, the Politburo repeatedly resumed debates over the situation in Xinjiang in the second half of 1933. Eastern Turkistan developments were discussed on September 29, October 20, and October 23. The Politburo adopted these top-secret decisions on November 17.71 When the Japanese attacked in December 1932, the Politburo passed a resolution on allowing a 10,000-man Chinese army to enter Eastern Turkistan across the Soviet frontier to render military aid to the government of Sheng Shicai in Xinjiang. The resolution permitted the passage of “interned Chinese into Xinjiang.”72 Meanwhile, the Politburo passed a decision to allow the interned Chinese in the territory of the USSR to return to Xinjiang. Headed by General Su Bingwen, the army moved against the Japanese troops and authorities of Manchuria. The Soviet government contributed to the conduct of talks between the Japanese authorities and Su Bingwen at the Matsiievskii station. However, later in 1932 the Japanese assumed the offensive and ousted the Chinese army from Manchuria. On December 5, 1932, the troops of Su Bingwen were forced out into Soviet territory and interned there.73 Changes in Soviet policy after the Japanese invasion led to great discontent among the Muslim population of Eastern Turkistan. In their protest sent to the Soviet consulate in Chuguchak on March 21, 1933, Uyghur representatives asked the Soviet government “not to allow these troops into Xinjiang.”74 The protest noted that this step was unexpected for them: “We were confident that if the oppressed people would rise against their Chinese oppressors to liberate their nation and homeland from foreigners the Soviet state would feel sympathy and protect the oppressed.”75 However, all appeals to the USSR failed to influence Soviet leaders in the matter of support for the government of Sheng Shicai. A decision on November 17 stressed the necessity of organizing Soviet military transport bodies in Xinjiang and taking additional measures to create political departments in the military and in Soviet institutions: “in pursuance of the resolution of August 3 this year, to consider it necessary for labor discipline purposes and improvement of the production situation and enhancement of responsibility to carry out complete militarization of Sovsintorg [Soviet-Xinjiang Trade Organization] transport activity.” Nikolai Ezhov, the commissar of internal affairs, was instructed “to select and send appropriate employees to work at political departments until December 1.”76

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THE FORMATION OF THE TURKIC-ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF EASTERN TURKISTAN While four local governments in a row were created in Xinjiang during the spring and summer of 1933, the national forces of Eastern Turkistan decided to unite under the name of the Turkic-Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkistan (TIRET). Sabit Damolla secretly sent a message to Khoja Niyaz, who was in Aqsu, that they wanted to create an independent state. When Khoja Niyaz agreed with this idea, preparation for proclamation of an independent state accelerated.77 On November 12, 1933, the Turkic-Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkistan was declared and the National Assembly of Eastern Turkistan was established. Tahir bey was elected chair of the assembly and Zulfizade was elected secretary. By the decision of the National Assembly, a national government was formed. Khoja Niyaz Haji was elected as president and commander-in-chief of the republic, while Abdulbaki Sabit Damolla was appointed the prime minister. A governmental cabinet with thirteen members was elected, including foreign minister Muhammad Qasym Haji, minister of justice Zarif Kari, internal affairs minister Yunis bey Saidzadeh, health minister Abdullah Ishan Khoja Hani, defense minister Sultan bey Bahtiyar, education minister Abdulkarim khan Makhdum, finance minister Ali Akhun bey, trade minister Sadyg bey Insanuddinzadeh, post and telegraph minister Abdullah Damolla, and minister without portfolio Nur Ahmad, emir of Khotan. To remain informed of the activity of the government, the chair and secretary of the National Assembly joined the Cabinet of Ministers as observers.78 The government announced the separation of Eastern Turkistan from China and proclaimed its independence. The newly established Turkic-Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkistan (ТIRET) considered itself to be spiritually close to Turkey, to which it was related religiously and ethnically. Its leaders did not conceal their feelings of affinity with Ankara.79 However, they realized that Turkey was far away and could not protect them. Therefore, Sabit Damolla, the head of the Eastern Turkistan government, considered it possible to get closer to Great Britain. The government of Great Britain had developed an interest in the region after the Soviet Union openly backed the government of Sheng Shicai. Sabit Damolla wrote to the British consul in Kashgar to inform him that “we are always ready to be under the patronage of the British government and seek to break off ties with the Bolsheviks.”80 In September 1933 Khoja Niyaz Haji also sent a secret letter to the British consul in Kashgar, addressed to the king and Parliament of Great Britain, which briefly and succinctly described the situation of the Muslims of Eastern Turkistan.



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The Bolsheviks slaughtered a large number of Moslems in Eastern Turkistan, the remaining were turned into atheists by dint of force and cruelty, thus was the religion of Islam trampled. We fearing the fatal infection of Bolshevism, and secondly unable to bear any longer the tyranny of the Chinese, rose and fought without arms against the Chinese. The All Merciful Lord placed the crown of victory on our heads and we came into possession of numerous arms from the conquered Chinese. The Chinese becoming helpless in avenging themselves on us gave vent to their anger on the Moslems of Turfan, by slaughtering and burning their houses. The Moslems of other places becoming aware of this barbaric deed of the Chinese raised the banner of revolt from Altai to Khotan. The Chinese of Urumqi desired peace and the resignation of Jin Shuren, but the latter possessed no other idea except fighting—in the end he was defeated and fled. After this the Chinese sent their representatives from Urumqi for peace negotiations. We, after drafting the terms such that all powers were vested in ourselves, provisionally accepted peace. The terms of peace were so drafted that from one hundred kilometers from Urumqi on this side, the whole of Eastern Turkistan was wholly and solely under our rule, and this peace pact was certified by the Chinese of Urumqi. . . . The Bolsheviks have supplied the Chinese with armored cars and other arms. For this reason, the Chinese have captured and burnt fourteen towns. After our peace the Bolsheviks remained silent for the time being. Just now in Moscow some thousands of Chinese soldiers are intending to leave for Eastern Turkistan. The Moslems of Chochaq have petitioned to me for help, saying that unless the Chinese are not totally turned out of the country the spirit of Communism will soon be spread throughout Sinkiang. Therefore, we look and expect for help from the British Government to save us from the terrible and infectious wave of Communism. Moreover, we pray for arms from your government and in return the British Government can receive the products of this country, i.e. silk, wool and skins. The British Government may become our guide, and we request the Government may spread education among our masses. For trade treaty with British Consul-General, I am sending as my “vakils” Abdur Rahim Akhun, Karim Zada Akhun Bayoff and Azam Jan Haji.81

Although the Eastern Turkistan government was in a state of war and was waging military operations in all directions, on December 3, 1933, it began discussing a draft Constitution of the Turkic-Islam Republic, consisting of thirty articles. Under Article 1 of the Constitution, the Eastern Turkistan state was governed on the basis of Sharia laws and principles as set forth in the Quran. Article 2 said that the Eastern Turkistan state was built on republican principles and was seeking national prosperity and welfare. The Eastern Turkistan government was authorized to protect the state and the nation against foreign intervention and was in charge of religious, national, cultural, and economic questions. The first seven articles of the draft Constitution stipulated the functions of the National Assembly, the rights of the president and prime minister, and the composition of the government, Articles 8–16

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dealt with questions of religion and defense, foreign affairs, trade, agriculture, and the powers of the ministries of education and health. Articles 17–19 concerned local self-government. The other eleven articles stipulated legal issues, the powers of functionaries, and other factors.82 However, implementation of the Constitution was impeded by Soviet military interference. In November 7, 1933, after the proclamation of the Turkic-Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkistan, thousands of Soviet army troops and the 13th Almaty Regiment of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (PCIA) of the USSR, united under the name “Altai Volunteer Army”; accompanied by heavy military equipment and air support, they penetrated into Eastern Turkistan. Russian diplomat and Orientalist Vladimir Krasilnikov wrote: “The military units and subunits that entered Xinjiang’s territory are ‘disguised’ as Russians, and on the shoulders of Red Army commanders are the hated shoulder straps [of the White Guards].”83 Under a decree from the duban, the Soviet side, along with military units, received twenty planes, eleven armored cars, thirty tanks, and five hundred trucks. A separate Red Army regiment was directly subordinated to the orders of Sheng Shicai.84 Dr. Jacobs asked: “But why would the Soviets choose to support Sheng, a relatively unknown Han general, against any number of Muslim leaders in the field? After all, in an age that valorized national determination, any one of them could construct a narrative of political legitimacy in Xinjiang far more convincing than that of Sheng, who was an ethnic and political outsider to the region. To answer this question, we must reconstruct the early days of the Soviet state in Central Asia with the aid of Russia archival documents.”85 We must add that, on the one hand, the Soviets were more interested with the military forces that were in the hands of General Sheng, and on the other hand, Soviet leaders were interested in the puppet regime in the region that depends on Moscow. The result was that “Soviet support in crushing Turkic-Muslim rebellions in 1933 created a Xinjiang that was essentially a Soviet satellite.”86 Red Army units in Xinjiang were led by Mikhail Frinovskii, head of the main office of frontier guards of the USSR,87 who was soon replaced by Nikolai Kruchinkin. Military units composed of White Guardists were also subordinated to the Soviet command. In case of successful completion of the operation, they were promised rehabilitation and the granting of Soviet citizenship. Despite the 10,000-man Manchurian army and the 7,000-man Red Army that invaded in Eastern Turkistan, the Chinese authorities faced difficulties in retaining power in their hands in central Urumqi.88 There was heavy fighting with army units of the Eastern Turkistan Republic, while the Dungan troops of Ma Zhongying reached the environs of Urumqi. On January 12, 1934, Ma began besieging Urumqi. To conduct operations in Xinjiang on January 20, the Politburo passed a decision “(а) to allocate 10,000 rubles



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in gold to the State Political Administration under the Council of Peoples’ Commissars for practical work; (b) to supply 2,000 sets of civilian attire for units of White Guardists in Xinjiang.”89 To carry out the decision, both items were sent to Henrich Iagoda: item (а) to Gregorii Grinko the USSR commissar of finance; and item (b) to Viacheslav Molotov, the chair of the CPC. At the same time, to coordinate Soviet political, military, and diplomatic activity in Xinjiang, the Foreign Commissariat authorized sending an agent, Garegin Abramovich Apresov, to Uzbekistan then to Urumqi.90 THE SOVIET INVASION: THE RED ARMY IN WHITE GUARD UNIFORM After the decision was adopted in January 1934, the Soviet armed forces in the guise of an army allegedly composed of White Guard emigrants crossed the Altai and Ili region and headed for Xinjiang, where they were joined by detachments of White Guardists.91 The united Russian forces, particularly the air forces, started active combat operations against the Xinjiang rebels. The unexpected Soviet air raids created panic among the rebels. One of the participants of the events, Fedor Polynin, wrote: An internecine war broke out in Xinjiang. General Ma Zhongying, stirred up by Japanese militarists, rebelled against the provincial government. . . . The governor of the province, Sheng Shicai, is asking for help. . . . Flying up to the town [Urumqi], we noticed huge crowds of people at the fortress wall. Behind the assaulting infantry came prancing horsemen. . . . We descended to throw 25 kg frag bombs on the rebels. Immediately, torrents of men rushed back from the walls to escape. There were dead bodies on the approaches to the fortress. The rebels seemed to lose their senses from the unexpected air raids. . . . Soon afterward the mutiny was suppressed. A grand reception was arranged in honor of the victory. The governor of the province awarded all Soviet pilots and other participants of combat operations.92

Earlier in February, when the Altai Volunteer Army began approaching Chuguchak (Tacheng), Ma Zhongying sent military units of Dungans against them. On February 11, under pressure from the Soviet armed forces, the defenses of Urumqi were penetrated. Joint combat operations of the Red Army and White Guardists lasted until April 1934.93 In the course of hostility both the duban Sheng Shicai and Soviet representatives tried to separate leaders of the Eastern Turkistan Republic from Ma Zhongying’s forces. As early as the summer of 1933, the Soviet representatives in Central Asia managed to establish ties with Khoja Niyaz, so the

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Uyghur leader secretly sent a small delegation to Tashkent for talks with the Soviets in September of that year.94 Also, the Soviets gave him 1,200 rifles in exchange for 50 kg of gold and promised another batch of 10,000 in the near future. At the same time, the Soviets considered it possible to render aid to the Uyghurs through Mongolia if Eastern Turkistan turned into a state like Mongolia. At the last moment, Khoja Niyaz rejected the agreement with the Soviets.95 Relying on past relations, the Soviets, through authorized agents, informed Khoja Niyaz in mid-1934 of their preparedness to hold talks, so he was secretly called to Irkeshtam station in the Kirghiz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic on the border with Xinjiang.96 Without notifying the government of Eastern Turkistan, Khoja Niyaz headed for the Soviet Union. In the course of talks, the Soviet representative Ivan Nikishov submitted a final text of the agreement, saying: “Do you accept our demands? If you fail to sign an agreement, we are sure to arrive in Eastern Turkistan very soon. For long years the government has allocated millions of rubles for Eastern Turkistan. We would like to introduce order and defend Eastern Turkistan.”97 On February 26, 1934, Khoja Niyaz signed an agreement submitted to him by Soviet representatives and through the efforts of his aide told Sabit Damolla, prime minister of the Eastern Turkistan Republic, about it. On March 2 Sabit Damolla held a session of the government cabinet with the participation of the top leadership. He informed the participants about Khoja Niyaz’s trip to the Soviet Union and the agreement with the Soviet government. A letter from Khoja Niyaz to the head of the government mentioned the terms and conditions of the twelve clauses of the agreement. It stated that from now on Khoja Niyaz would break off his relations with the Nanjing government, Eastern Turkistan would be proclaimed a country with internal autonomy under Soviet patronage, the independence of Eastern Turkistan would end, the government of the Islamic Republic would be disbanded, and its authority would be assigned to Sheng’s government. Following the resignation of the head of the government, Khoja Niyaz would be appointed a lifetime vali (governor-general) of Eastern Turkistan, He would take decisive measures to subordinate the national armed forces to Sheng and render aid to Manchurian, Chinese, and Russian soldiers. The Hami (Kumul) and Turfan soldiers of Mahmut Shizhang would be at the disposal of Sheng. An agreement between duban Sheng and the Soviet Union on redeployment of Manchurian soldiers to Eastern Turkistan would remain in effect. Foreign military advisors attached to the Turkic-Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkistan would be immediately dismissed. The Soviet government would assist Eastern Turkistan in developing and prospering. It would guarantee protection of Eastern Turkistan from Nanjing, Manchuria, and others. The



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Soviet government would assist in creating an up-to-date army in Eastern Turkistan and send military advisors with that end in view. A special agreement would be signed between the Soviet Union and the Urumqi government on political and economic cooperation.98 However, the document said nothing of the Soviet demand that “Khoja Niyaz and his companions should immediately arrest leaders of the independent government in Aqsu.”99 A March 2 session of the cabinet of ministers charged Khoja Niyaz with betraying the interests of the peoples of Eastern Turkistan. The agreement that he had signed was voted down. A resolution of the government said that Khoja Niyaz’s activity, unauthorized by the nation, in going to Irkeshtam on the invitation of the Soviet government and signing an illegal and antinational agreement with the Bolsheviks was regarded as treachery by the population of Eastern Turkistan. The twelve-clause agreement signed between Khoja Niyaz and the Soviet government was proclaimed to be illegal. The Muslims of Eastern Turkistan were ready to fight and protect their national independence and categorically denied the Soviet domination. For this reason, the popular protest at the Soviet consulate in Kashgar was brought to the notice of the USSR government. Occupation of Eastern Turkistan by Soviet troops was contrary to the standards of international law and was an unprecedented aggression of Communist imperialism against Eastern Turkistan. The resolution provided for the mobilization of Muslim population against the Soviet intervention, enhancement of the army’s fighting efficiency, and the taking of necessary measures by the commander-in-chief and the Foreign Ministry. To prevent further intervention of the Manchurian army redeployed from the Soviet territory to Chochaq, it was decided to instruct Altai’s sovereign Sharifkhan. A session of the Cabinet of Ministers passed a decision on convening the National Assembly on March 10, 1934, to discuss an agreement signed with the Soviet Union. Clause 11 of the resolution said: “Should Khoja Niyaz disclaim the Cabinet of Ministers’ proposals, the National Assembly would be authorized to consider the question of terminating the powers of Khoja Niyaz as president and commander-in-chief.” Finally, the last clause of the resolution noted that “it is necessary to appeal to the Nanjing government of China, Japan, and the League of Nations to protect our rights.”100 Although the resolution of the government was brought to Khoja Niyaz’s notice, he preferred to fight against the Eastern Turkistan government jointly with the Russians and Chinese. He drove this government to the wall by acting in collusion with Soviets and duban Sheng Shicai’s forces. In early April 1934 the Soviet troops invaded Kashgar. The government of Eastern Turkistan collapsed. On April 16 members of the national government were arrested and handed over to the Chinese government authorities in Gansu.101

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The fate of the Eastern Turkistan government had been decided. Moscow withdrew the Altai Volunteer Army from Xinjiang, leaving Sheng Shicai with a small number of military advisors. A meeting of the Politburo on April 1, 1934, discussed the situation in Xinjiang and through the mediation of the Soviet Foreign Commissariat authorized sending Garegin Abramovich Apresov and military advisor Nikolai Kruchinkin as agents to Uzbekistan, as Sheng Shicai was notified: Adhering to our point of view, we consider it inappropriate to endure the Altaians’ stay in Xinjiang. However, in considering the duban’s urgent request and his desire to secure the results of the victory by depriving Ma Zhongying of the opportunity to settle down in the region of Aqsu-Uchturfan, we agree to leave a cavalry group of Altaians in Xinjiang for a term of 3–4 months, numbering 350, to thus secure other regions of Aqsu and Uchturfan with the intention of firmly establishing the provincial government of the Aqsu and Uchturfan districts and creating a barrier against attempts of Dungan groups to penetrate from the Kashgar region into northern Xinjiang. As for the remaining part, an order for the withdrawal of Altaians at a stated time (April 1–10) remains in force; hence Altaians (except for the detachment to stay here) must leave the region of Urumqi and go back to Manas no later than April 7–8.102

Under clause 2 of the decision, Apresov and Kruchinkin were instructed “to explain to the duban the necessity of creating battleworthy army units together with the use of Urumqi government-owned technical personnel and logistics; to ensure a careful selection of loyal cadres and establish appropriate discipline in the Russian units. To inform the duban that by making use of instructors and logistics he has every opportunity to create an effective, strong army.”103 For a period of six months to one year, the duban had at his disposal the material-technical base of the Red Army withdrawn from Xinjiang as well as military instructors (eight pilots and a mechanic, eighteen drivers of armored vehicle, six artillerymen, three machine-gunners, and fifteen commanders). Clause 4 of the decision was: To leave at the disposal of the Urumqi government the commanders and soldiers of the Caucasian detachment to comply with the following principles: (а) instructor personnel will be added to the staff of the Urumqi government on the basis of individual contracts with each instructor; (b) a Caucasian group of Altaians will be formed as a separate army unit disguised under the Russian Caucasian regiment of the White Guard émigrés and given appropriate ranks, insignia, etc. A remaining Altaian detachment is to be materially supplied by the Urumqi government. To entrust comrades Apresov and Kruchinkin, with due regard for specific conditions and opportunities, to establish salary amounts for the personnel of the Altaian detachment and payment for instructor personnel.104



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Also, the decision provided that Moscow would present valuable gifts to Sheng Shicai and three other members of the government and award Soviet soldiers and officers who showed their worth in action against Muslims in Eastern Turkistan. In addition, they were to get a cash award from the duban. The Politburo reached a decision: To consider the operation in Xinjiang successful and award the personnel that took part in the operation with 300 rubles each; junior commanders with 500 rubles; senior command with two months’ wages. Soldiers and commanders showing their worth are to be awarded with the orders “Red Banner” and “Red Star.” .  .  . At the duban’s order, to reward Altaians with a gratuity from the Urumqi government.105

An extract from the Politburo’s decision was sent to Kliment Voroshilov, deputy foreign commissar Gregorii Sokolnikov, and Henrich Iagoda. Under this decision, some graduates from the Frunze Military academy were sent to Xinjiang as military advisors. While at Urumqi, they acted as ministers. White Guardists and Cossacks as war participants were given awards as well. To explore their needs, the Urumqi government set up a special commission. Each Cossack demobilized from the Chinese army was allocated ten hectares of arable land. The families of the dead were provided with pensions. Against the background of the victory over Muslims, the White Guardists of Xinjiang had every opportunity to enrich themselves after the results of the civil war and Sovietization in Russia.106 The main targets of Sheng Shicai’s government after the fall of the government of Eastern Turkistan were armed units of Dungans headed by Ma Zhongying, which occupied Kashgar in May and established their control there. Shortly after the end of the events in Xinjiang on May 31, 1934, the Politburo passed a decision “Оn Xinjiang,” which stated that the liberation of Kashgar was the main strategic goal of Soviet forces in Xinjiang. The first part of the decision titled “General Measures” stressed the necessity of conquering Xinjiang and consolidating the existing government of Sheng. The decision discussed the “removal of danger on the part of Ma Zhongying, particularly his leaving Kashgar; creation of a regular army of the Urumqi government; and improvement of the Xinjiang economy, especially renovation of SovietXinjiang trade.”107 The second part of the decision was called “Measures for the Kashgar Region.” It contained Sheng’s recommendations concerning the reaction to the peace proposals of Ma Zhongying. Sheng Shicai was to declare that if Ma was sincere in his intentions he should liberate regions of MaralbashiKashgar-Yarkend-Tan and draw off subsidiary forces to Khotan and the east. The Urumqi government put forward this decision as the main condition for

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talks to suspend military actions and start peace talks. Simultaneously with the start of talks, the Urumqi government was to inform the population of Kashgar about Ma’s subordination to the regional government, the new allegiance of some Kirghizes, Uyghurs, Chinese, and Dungans to the government, the good equipment of the southern front of the regional government and its preparedness to repel the attack, the pardoning of the soldiers and officers of Ma, and the brutal punishment of those who resisted the successful completion of the operation. “Owing to reports on simultaneous negotiations between Ma Zhongying and the British, immediately to exploit all possibilities for unmasking and discrediting him before the British Consulate and the authorities. To focus on contacts between Ma Zhongying and the Japanese.”108 If these demands were not met by Ma Zhongying, military units of the southern front were to advance toward Maralbashi. The Politburo also specified military subunits and their movement. In the first echelon, the units of Haji Niyaz (Mongols and Kirghizes) as well as the 1st Chinese Cavalry Regiment were to advance toward Maralbashi. In the second echelon were the1st, 2nd, and 5th Russian regiments. In the third echelon were the 3rd Russian and 6th Altai regiments. They would use an airport in Aqsu during the course of hostilities. On the Politburo’s decision, Frinovskii was to head the attack on behalf of the Xinjiang government. It recommended that Sheng Shicai approve Ma Shaowu as governor “after cleansing of Kashgar and appoint one Chinese cavalry regiment and one of Haji Niyaz’s detachment as a garrison due to the fact that units of the southern front were delayed in the region of Maralbashi-Aqsu. It is necessary to recognize that the engagement of any White Russian troops in Kashgar is inadmissible.”109 The third part of the Politburo decision dealt with the creation of a regular army of the Xinjiang government. It planned to create a 4,000-man regular army of the Urumqi government without Mongolian, Kazakh, Uyghur, or other local armed units. The Politburo entrusted the Naval Commissariat to drawing up an army project for the Urumqi government and prepare recommendations for sending instructors there to implement the project. Appropriate Soviet bodies were commissioned to explore the needs of the army of the Urumqi government in regard to arms and ammunition and discuss the issue separately. The document gave instructions “to satisfy the request of the provincial government on immediately assigning instructors for intelligence and counterintelligence in Xinjiang.”110 The fourth part touched upon economic measures. It included a plan immediately to send forty tons of aviation fuel for the needs of the southern front and twenty-five vehicles and to send an authoritative economic commission to Urumqi to develop and implement jointly with Apresov a plan of revival of the Xinjiang economy; sending a competent a financier to Uumqi to consult with the government; and expan-



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sion of trade relations with the Urumqi government. Appropriate organizations were tasked with submitting to the Politburo a list of trade and financial specialists to work in Xinjiang within three to five days. A meeting of the Politburo of June 8 reconsidered some items of the decision and discussed separate issues. It was considered expedient to deploy White Guardist participants of the battle against Ma Zhongying and their families in the regions of Pichan-Chitym, Lantsyang, Karashar-Kurlin, in parts of Tarbaghatai, and in the Ili district. Consul General Apresov was commissioned, under this plan and with the duban’s consent, to consider the issue of deployment of White Guardists in Xinjiang and deployment of Russians in Urumqi. Under the second item of the decision, it was considered inexpedient to open new consular offices in Xinjiang in the current political situation. Under the treaty of 1931, however, it was considered necessary to send unofficial consular agents to Hami, Turfan, and Aqsu as representatives of Sovsintorg (the Soviet-Xinjiang Trade Organization). In fact, officials of Sovsintorg were to be sent to Xinjiang as secretaries of the consular agency. Under the Politburo’s decision, these consular agencies were to act as intelligence centers. Three intelligence officers to work in Hami, Turfan, and Aqsu arrived to take positions as assistants of the Sovsintorg agent. The decision said: “To strengthen the provincial and local administrative apparatus in Xinjiang, it is considered necessary to send from the Union ten Chinese and fifteen Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and Dungans to work as functionaries.”111 The Politburo instructed consul general Apresov to accelerate signing of an agreement between Sovsintorg and the Xinjiang government and agree on repayment within three years of 1 million gold rubles in funds allocated to the Xinjiang government in the form of arms. Of this amount, 425,000 rubles were used for purchase of military equipment, 225,000 for transportation, and 300,000 for fuel, ammunition, and other purposes. Also, the Xinjiang army was furnished with twenty-five vehicles. The fifth and final clause of the decision said: “Due to the undesirability in the very near future of letting foreigners out of Xinjiang, we consider it necessary to restrict the issuing of visas from Xinjiang.”112 On the day after the June 8 decision the Politburo suggested discussing the question “On Trade with Xinjiang” and instructed commissars of light industry, trade, and heavy industries to allocate to Xinjiang railway cars of cotton fabric by June 25–30 as well as five hundred tons of sugar and thirty ZIS (Stalin Factory) trucks with spare parts not later than June 15. Commissars of railway, river shipping, and other transport structures were instructed to deliver the cargo immediately to the destination.113 After the receipt of military aid from the Soviet Union in June, government forces started the operation to capture Kashgar. The Dungan detachments were fated to be defeated due to the inferiority of their forces. Consequently,

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Ma Zhongying began talks with Max Dumpis, the Soviet consul in Kashgar, in June. According to some data, Ma Zhongying and several officers accompanied by Soviet consulate officials were taken to the Soviet Union through a frontier point in Irkeshtam. The remains of his army retreated back to the mountains under the command of Ma Zhancang.114 Although Sheng Shicai tried to seize Ma Zhongying, the Soviet leaders did not fulfill the duban’s request. According to the Politburo’s decision, Soviet diplomatic representations in Xinjiang were instructed “To tell the duban politely that Ma Zhongying is interned, so he cannot be given up to the duban on the basis of our constitution.”115 To retain influence on Sheng Shicai, Ma Zhongying was not turned over to him. Ma requested asylum in the USSR; he was taken first to Alma-Ata then to Moscow. Stalin showed his hand with respect to Ma Zhongying in 1938: in case of war with Japan, he needed a trustworthy individual. Ma Zhongying proved to be the right person for this. 116 However, there was no longer any need for him. At the end of the 1930s Ma Zhongying died in Moscow in unclear circumstances. By August 1934 the uprising had been suppressed in all populated areas of Eastern Turkistan. After it ended, three ministers and a number of top officials of the Eastern Turkistan government defected. Muhämmäd Imin Bughra emigrated to India. On the orders of Sheng Shicai, prime minister Sabit Damolla and justice minister Zarif Kari were executed in Aqsu in July 1934. According to Uzbek historian Baymirza Hait, a resident of Germany, 200,000 Muslims were killed during hostilities with the Red Army, in the struggle for independence of Eastern Turkistan.117 This figure seems to be exaggerated and is based on memoirs rather than on official data. One of the central figures, Khoja Niyaz Haji, was appointed a deputy duban in Urumqi. However, he did not rejoice long. An uprising by General Abdul Niyaz took place in May 1937 in Eastern Turkistan. Khoja Niyaz was arrested and was executed in the gas chamber in April 1942.118 According to the “Secret Report” of the U.S. Central Intelligence Group, “in August 1934 a new situation arose in Xinjiang due to the policy of the Soviet Union.”119 In the end, with help of the Soviet Union, military units of former White Guardists, and the Manchurian Voluntary Army, Sheng Shicai was successful in annihilating all his enemies in Xinjiang.120 SHENG’S LETTER TO THE SOVIET LEADERS AND THE SVANIDZE COMMISSION IN XINJIANG Sheng was delighted by the victory over the Muslim rebels with the help of the Soviet Union. In his euphoria, he sent a letter through Apresov to Stalin,



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Molotov, and Voroshilov in June 1934. First, he thanked the Soviet leaders for their assistance: “I consider it my duty to express to you my deep gratitude for your help in keeping Xinjiang calm and destroying the bandit Ma Zhongying.”121 Then he wrote about his familiarity with Marxist literature, his loyalty to the ideas of Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin, his being “a convinced supporter of communism,” and his hatred toward the Nanjing government. He also noted that he saw the salvation of China, including Xinjiang, in Sovietization under the Comintern’s leadership. Sheng wrote: “There is only one way left to liberate China and Xinjiang—under the leadership of the Comintern to overthrow the bloodthirsty, decadent Nanjing government and establish the Soviet government and start to fight against imperialism together with the USSR. . . . I have firmly decided to fight any manifestations of imperial influence in Xinjiang, for the creation of a Comintern stronghold.”122 He tried to persuade the Soviet leaders that “Xinjiang not only matters a great deal for the USSR but is a crucial factor in the future world war and world revolution.”123 In his letter to Soviet leaders he voiced his desire to go to Moscow and meet with Stalin: “I’m a staunch supporter of communism and hope to be a member of the Communist Party. . . . I believe that this opportunity has come and I can fulfill the desire of my life . . . If Moscow revolutionary leaders consider me worthy of being a Party member, I ask you to admit me to the Party.”124 At the end of his letter Sheng touched upon the question of instructions from Moscow. He suggested the establishment of a “union of struggle against imperialism” and voiced his willingness to do his utmost for it. According to Sheng, the union was not only to fight against imperialism but also to deal with management, education, culture, and industry and operate as a leading body in resolving other issues of Xinjiang. He expressed his gratitude to Moscow for having sent twenty-five Party workers and financial advisors. Attached to the letter was a draft Charter of the Union. Sheng wrote: “I will obey instructions and am ready to apply all efforts to improve the leadership over the union under the guidance of Moscow and in accordance with the Committee’s decisions adopted by majority of votes. Also, the union’s work will be agreed upon with Plenipotentiary Representative Apresov.”125 Sheng Shicai opined that the only obstacle in doing this work was that he was not a Party member and asked to be admitted to the Party so he could better aid the Soviet Union’s efforts. Sheng’s letter, especially his proposal to Sovietize Xinjiang, angered Stalin. On June 27, 1934, he wrote a letter to Apresov, Sheng’s Soviet advisor: “The letter of Sheng Shicai has produced a depressing impression on our comrades. Only a provocateur or an unreliable leftist who has no idea about Marxism could write this. How could Sheng, who has an advisor such as you,

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write such a letter to us (me, Molotov, and Voroshilov)?”126 Stalin informed Apresov that their reply to the letter of Sheng Shicai would be given via Alexander Svanidze and that Apresov should explain to the duban the meaning of questions set forth in the reply letter. He warned that “if our instructions are not taken into account, we shall have to discontinue Sheng’s aid.”127 That same day, July 27, 1934, the reply signed by Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov was sent to Xinjiang via Svanidze. The Kremlin leaders first voiced their gratitude to Sheng for his cordial words addressed to the Soviet Union and said that they highly appreciated his role in stabilizing the situation in the region. We are used to telling the truth. So, we’d like to tell you the truth about the contents of your letter. We consider it inappropriate to build communism immediately in Xinjiang. . . . We consider it untimely for Xinjiang to overthrow the Nanjing government. Although mistakes are made by the Nanjing government, it is still fighting with external imperialist forces of China. . . . We disagree that you should now join the Communist Party. First, it would spoil our relations with Nanjing; second, this would help imperialist agents in Xinjiang and various separatists to fight against you. Anyone who wants to be a Communist is one even without joining the Party. If the situation and expediency demand that you to refrain from joining the Party, you must obey for the sake of China’s liberation. You are aware that it is not Party membership but a person’s real and actual devotion to the idea of communism that makes him a genuine Communist.128

The Soviet leaders believed that giving help and advice to Sheng Shicai would earn his trust. “We are in accord with the telegram that we sent you a few months ago and in line with the instructions that we asked you to take into account in your practical work.”129 They told Sheng that Moscow would support him if he accepted all the criticisms set forth in the letter. Although Stalin and other Soviet leaders approved the draft program sent by Sheng, they indicated a discrepancy between paragraph 5 of the program (on equality of women) and Xinjiang’s conditions. “We believe that in terms of backward Xinjiang with its predominant Muslim population this paragraph is premature.”130 The letter also said that the Kremlin’s stand on other issues would be clarified by Svanidze, who was on his way to Urumqi. Along with this letter, Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov sent a telegram to Soviet consul Apresov with their remarks and recommendations. This time, unlike Stalin’s denunciatory letter to the consul dated July 27, the telegram from three leaders was more constructive. “We consider your telegram about Sheng Shicai’s ‘common room’ [Red Corner, with Communist paraphernalia] and rumors of Sovietization of Xinjiang to be rather alarming.”131 An eight-paragraph passage of the telegram contained characteristic recommendations and instructions dealing with the Sovietization of Xinjiang. “Soviet-



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ization of Xinjiang in any manner is not in line with our plans, so we consider any concept of Xinjiang’s Sovietization and its joining Soviet regions of China to be rather dangerous.”132 The first item of the telegram noted that the Soviet Union was firm in staunchly backing China’s territorial integrity and that the USSR had no direct or indirect territorial claims on Chinese territory. The second item said that the Soviet leaders were supporting Sheng Shicai because the territorial integrity of China was expedient and desirable not only from China’s position but for Soviet interests as well. The third item explained that the USSR, despite the schemes of the Japanese, the British, and other imperialistic states, protected China and would continue to do so. The fifth and sixth items dealt with economic ties. The seventh item stressed the necessity of receiving instructions of this sort from Moscow and rigorously carrying them out. Finally, the eighth item charged Apresov with reading this telegram, item by item, to Sheng.133 In the summer of 1934, a Soviet commission headed by Alexander Svanidze visited Xinjiang. The main duty of the commission was to prepare economic, financial, and administrative-management reforms in the province. Svanidze also brought Stalin’s letter and special instructions to Sheng. On the one hand, Sheng was cautious with Svanidze, as he was Stalin’s old friend and relative. On the other hand, he considered it a sign of Stalin’s trust in him that someone so close to him headed the delegation to Xinjiang. Sheng was especially encouraged that Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov sent their portraits to him. Alexander Svanidze arrived in Xinjiang with a program of “Measures to Improve the Xinjiang Economy” as adopted on July 21, 1934. Under this document, the regional government received a loan worth 5 million rubles in gold with in order to improve the financial system and revive industrial production in Xinjiang. This amount was to be reimbursed within five years with payment of 4 percent annual interest. The program laid special emphasis on the expansion of trade relations with Xinjiang. The USSR was supposed to import wool, cotton, crude silk, tea, and dry fruits from Xinjiang. In turn, the Soviet Union planned to export oil, petroleum products, and industrial goods to Xinjiang. A transport section of the program provided for the construction of inland roads in Xinjiang, including highways from the USSR to Eastern Turkistan from Frunze to Torugart from 1934 to 1935. For that purpose 9 million rubles were allocated by the CPC. The Svanidze commission was entrusted with implementing the industrial construction. In particular, the commission was to conclude an agreement with the Xinjiang government on development of tin and gold deposits and start work as soon as possible. With that end in view, Grigorii (Sergo) Ordzhonikidze, people’s commissar for heavy industry of the USSR, was instructed to ensure all necessary technical

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means no later than September 15, 1934, and to provide the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Trade (PCFT) with seven radio stations, one “Pioneer” printing house, and three “Amerikankas” (small printing machines) to send to Xinjiang by August 10. Under the program, Svanidze’s commission was entrusted with starting work on construction of electric power stations in Urumqi and Ghulja and silk-spinning production in Kashgar. The last item of the program was devoted to the implementation of agrarian measures in Xinjiang. The Svanidze commission was to render all possible aid to the Xinjiang government in improving agriculture and cattle-breeding. The Soviet agriculture commissar was charged with sending to Xinjiang two agronomists, two livestock breeders, two veterinarians, and irrigation engineers no later than September 1. Along with this, the Svanidze commission was to draft a budget for the Xinjiang government for 1935, carry on monetary reform, launch a credit system, and ensure circulation of hard currency.134 Sheng Shicai told Svanidze that he was delighted with the comprehensive nature of the rehabilitation program for Xinjiang agriculture. After reading the letter and special instructions sent to him by Stalin via Svanidze on July 1934, Sheng wrote another letter to Stalin on November 1, confessing the mistakes that he had made in his June letter: “I am glad that the leaders of world revolution do not refuse to give me their advice, which I consider essential and accept as instructions and directives.”135 He reaffirmed the impropriety of his suggestions and adopted the standpoint of the Soviet leaders that Xinjiang was “a country with a feudal society and backward culture and industry” where communism could not be built. He agreed with the instructions from Moscow regarding the inexpediency of overthrowing the Nanjing government. Sheng stated that if the government did not desert to the camp of imperialism, he would submit to it. Sheng viewed Moscow’s wishes about his joining the Communist Party as appropriate: “I realize that the given political situation makes it impossible; however, I’m sure of myself and ask you to believe that I’m a devoted and staunch follower of MarxismLeninism.”136 He expressed his gratitude to the Soviet leaders for all possible aid and linked the stabilization of the situation in Xinjiang to Soviet assistance. If they did not receive help from the Soviet commission led by Svanidze and Soviet specialists as a whole, the situation in the region would be desperate. As a staunch Communist Sheng asked Moscow “always to lead them ahead.”137 At the end of the letter, he asked permission to come to Moscow for medical treatment together with consul general Apresov. Sheng wrote, “I’d like to make not an ordinary trip but, I hope, to introduce myself to you personally and get necessary instructions from you as well as to familiarize myself with achievements in building the USSR.”138 He expressed his gratitude to the Soviet leaders for sending Svanidze to Xinjiang, saying that



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as an easterner he was well versed in local conditions. Sheng noted that the Svanidze commission’s plans played an essential role in strengthening the regional government. and added: “I’d like to stress the role of Apresov, who as your loyal disciple was our irreplaceable friend, advisor, and comrade. We shall never forget his services to pacification, consolidation, and establishment of peace in Xinjiang. Together with him, I hope to implement all your instructions.”139 Before Sheng Shicai’s letter reached Moscow, in order to make the Svanidze commission’s work more effective, the Politburo passed a decision “Оn Xinjiang” on November 2, 1934. Based on the commission’s recommendations, it became clear that the Soviet representatives had managed to reach agreement on some issues with Sheng’s opponents and put forward some proposals to reconcile them with the government of Xinjiang. Clause 1 of the decision considered it necessary to start talks with representatives of Liu Bing, commander of Kashgar garrison, and Ma Zhongying. It recommended that Sheng Shicai amend the terms of the agreement regarding relations with these forces. Under a Politburo decision, enmity between the Urumqi government and the commanders of the 36th Division was to end. It recommended that a joint struggle should be waged to restore peace in Xinjiang and withstand internal and external threats to the province. The Politburo suggested the establishment of the Khotan administrative district with thirty-six administrative divisions. It also recommended that the civilian bodies of administration and orders and decrees of the Urumqi government pertaining to Khotan and other places in Xinjiang should be addressed directly to the military and civilian authorities. The decision also mandated the reestablishment of mail and telegraph ties with neighboring uyezds and regulation of human and cargo transportation. Further, it ensured that the frontier service would continue the struggle against banditry, while the Xinjiang government should provide Khotan with necessary funds. Clause 3 of the decision was “To recommend that Sheng, simultaneously with the signing of this peace agreement, publish and widely circulate an appeal drawn up by the Xinjiang commission.”140 In late 1934 there were many Soviet specialists in Xinjiang, so on December 25 the Politburo passed a decision on regulation of their salaries. The monthly salary of Soviet instructors and advisors to be received from the Xinjiang budget could not be higher than the salary of Xinjiang officials. The resulting decrease in salaries of Soviet specialists was to be compensated by Moscow. “The difference between the current and the new salary will be reimbursed to Soviet instructors and advisors at the expense of the USSR in Torgsin bonds or in currency.”141 On November 7, 1934, Apresov sent a letter to Stalin about the works carried out in Xinjiang and clarified the criticisms of Stalin and other Moscow

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leaders about himself. First, Apresov gave an explanation of Sheng’s June 1934 letter, which had angered Stalin. He noted that Sheng had written the letter long before sending it to Moscow and given it to him for review. When Apresov totally disapproved of the letter, Sheng agreed with his remarks, with a few small exceptions. Apresov wrote, “The only issue on which we disagreed was his aspiration to join the party and sending you this disturbing letter. The delay of the letter annoyed duban Sheng; he saw this as an evidence of our distrust in him. Knowing his deeply dubious character and his extreme suspicions about everything and everybody, keeping all this in my heart, I returned the letter to him without any correction in order to avoid further deterioration of our relations; and he, having added several new points, sent the letter to you.”142 In his letter to Stalin, Apresov expressed great appreciation of Sheng and his personal qualities as well as his attitude toward the Soviets and “infatuation” with the classics of Marxism-Leninism: Duban Sheng is not silly but is rather a sensible and well-oriented person. As expected, your letter and the fact that comrades Molotov and Voroshilov sent him photographs produced an effect on him, so he got down to work, telling me that he wanted to join the Party in the future. He is working hard to improve himself, studying works of classic Marxism, so I witness his changing for the better from day to day. Comrade Svanidze will tell you what he is.143

Apresov considered it necessary to regard Sheng as a follower of the Soviets and stressed the increased attention to Sheng Shicai from Chinese statesmen. Apresov assured Stalin that it would be good if Sheng went to Moscow. “The latter is important in view of the eagerness of Chiang Kai-Shek and other Chinese leaders to win Sheng-Duban to their side. For some time, past, they have been more active along this track. It would be useful to satisfy his request and allow him to arrive in Moscow under the pretext of treatment, especially as he needs a surgical operation.”144 In addition to stressing the political-strategic importance of Xinjiang for the Soviet Union, Apresov also substantiated the economic importance of the province: Besides its primary political-strategic significance, Xinjiang is a rich region and can be a raw-material and meat source for us. Utilization of its legendary inexhaustible resources promises Xinjiang a wealthy future. If necessary with the coal and oil of Xinjiang we could meet the demands of not only the Turkish but also Central Asian republics and Western Siberia. There are 25 known districts in Xinjiang with gold resources. Utilization of lead, radium, and other valuable and rare ores needed by us will return to us the investment that we are making and justify the assistance that we are providing to the Xinjiang government.145



National Movement in Eastern Turkistan 45

In the end of his letter Apresov complained of sluggishness in complying with the Politburo decisions on restoring the Xinjiang economy, stressing that “our political achievements will not be secured, instead they will be reduced to zero” by delay in carrying out these decisions.146 Thus, the first wave of the liberation struggle of Uyghurs and other Muslim peoples against the Chinese government in Eastern Turkistan during 1931–1934 ended in defeat. Due to the USSR’s crucial role in suppressing the uprising, the Xinjiang province of China fell into the Soviet sphere of influence. It was the Soviet assistance that allowed Sheng Shicai to take power in the province and establish a despotic regime that lasted until 1944. During these ten years, with direct assistance from Moscow, Sheng subordinated the wishes of the local Muslim population to his personal regime, to Soviet interests, and to the formal administration of the Chinese government bodies. NOTES   1.  Sergei Rostovskii. Brief essay on pre-war history of Xinjiang. RGASPI, f. 532, o. 4, d. 328, l. 5; in another document prepared in mid-20th century, the territory of Eastern Turkistan was shown 1.426.000 km. sq. See: Territory and population of Xinjiang, RGASPI, f. 532, o. 4, d. 330, l. 3.   2.  See: Li Chang. The Soviet Grip on Sinkiang, 491   3.  From revolutionary Umar Islamov based in West China–Eastern Turkistan, “Xinjiang” in Chinese. Reporting Note. March 15, 1934, RGASPI, f. 514, o. 1, d. 1075, l. 44.   4.  Brophy, Uyghur Nation. Reform and Revolution on the Russia-China Frontier, 1.   5.  Territory and population of Xinjiang, RGASPI, f. 532, o. 4, d. 330, l. 17.   6.  See: Sheng Chih-yi. Land Utilization and Settlement Possibilites in Sinkiang, Geographical Reiew 39, 1949, 62; Xinjiang. China’s Muslim Borderland, 245.   7.  Justin M. Jacobs, Exile Island: Xinjiang Refugees and the “One China” Policy in Nationalist Taiwan, 1949–1971, 189.   8.  From revolutionary Umar Islamov based in West China–Eastern Turkistan, “Xinjiang” in Chinese. Reporting Note. March 15, 1934, RGASPI, f. 514, o. 1, d. 1075, l. 42; For more information about Umar Islamov, see. Brophy, Uyghur Nation. Reform and Revolution on the Russia-China Frontier, 188–226.   9.  Territory and population of Xinjiang, RGASPI, f. 532, o. 4, d. 330, l. 24. 10.  Ibid, p. 33 11.  Military Information: Sinkiang Rebeltions 1931–1937. History of the Independence Movements in Sinkiang. Central Intelligence Group. Intelligence Report. December 5, 1946, National Archives and Records Administration of the USA, CIA-RDP 82, p. 1; For more information about the struggle of the Uyghurs for their independence during the civil war in Russia, see. Share. A Little Known and Explored Front: The Russian Civil War in Chinese Xinjiang, 1918–1921, 389–420

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12.  See: Baymirza Hayit. Türkistan Devletlerinin Milli Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 308; Petrov. Miatezhnoe “serdtse” Azii, 344; Military Information: Sinkiang Rebellions, 1931–1937. History of the Independence Movements in Sinkiang, Central Intelligence Group, Intelligence Report. December 5, 1946, National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter referred to as NARA) of the USA, CIA-RDP82, p. 2. 13.  See: Military Information: Sinkiang Rebellions, 1931–1937. History of the Independence Movements in Sinkiang. Central Intelligence Group. Intelligence Report. December 5, 1946, NARA, CIA-RDP82, p. 2. 14.  Letter of Khoja Niyaz Haji to Mongolian Revolutionary Committee. May 15, 1931, RGASPI, f. 514, o. 1, d. 1022, l. 3; In translating letters to the Russian language from Uyghur mistakes were made on the Islamic calendar. At the end of the letter is the date 25th of the 2nd month in 1350, which was translated as February 1931. In fact, according to the Gregorian calendar, it corresponds to May 15, 1931. 15.  Ibid., 3a. 16.  See: Brophy, Uyghur Nation. Reform and Revolution on the Russia-China Frontier, 239. 17.  For more information about Jin Shuren’s governor activities in Eastern Turkistan, see: Justin M. Jacobs, Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State, 77–88. 18.  See: Li Chang, The Soviet Grip on Sinkiang, 491; For more information about the Yang Zengxin’s policy in Xinjiang see: Share, A Little Known and Explored Front: The Russian Civil War in Chinese Xinjiang, 1918–1921, 389–420; Justin M. Jacobs, Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State, 49–80. 19.  See: Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang, 1911–1949, 40–42. 20.  For more details see: Charles Shaw, Friendship under lock and key: the Soviet Central Asian border, 1918–34, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 30, Nos. 3–4, September– December 2011, 338. 21.  Krasil’nikov. Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 157. 22.  Posted from Slavutskii to Karakhan, 1930, RGASPI, f. 62, o. 2, d. 2209, l. 9. 23.  Rostovskii. Events 1931–1934 in Xinjiang, RGASPI, f. 532, o. 4, d. 328, l. 212. 24.  See: Military Information: Sinkiang Rebeltions 1931–1937. History of the Independence Movements in Sinkiang. Central Intelligence Group. Intelligence Report, December 5, 1946, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, p. 2. 25.  Letter of Khoja Niyaz Haji to Mongolian Revolutionary Committee, May 15, 1931, RGASPI, f. 514, o. 1, d. 1022, l. 3. 26.  Petrov, Mjatezhnoe “serdtse” Azii, 349; Military Information: Sinkiang Rebeltions 1931–1937. History of the Independence Movements in Sinkiang. Central Intelligence Group. Intelligence Report, December 5, 1946, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, p.2 27.  Rostovskii, Events 1931–1934 in Xinjiang, RGASPI, f. 532, o. 4, d. 328, l. 212–13. 28.  Krasil’nikov, Sin’zianskoe Pritiazhanie, 164–65. 29.  Reference of the Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern to I. Piatnitskii. April 3, 1931, RGASPI, f. 495, o. 154, d. 457, l. 7. 30.  See: Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 155.



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47

31.  British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print II. From the First to the Second World War. Series E. Asia, 1914–1939. Vol. 20 China, 1927–1931. University Publications of America, 1968, 398. 32.  See: Petrov, Miatezhnoe “serdtse” Azii, 345. 33.  Viktor Usov, Sovetskaa razvedka v Kitae: 30-e gody XX veka. Moscow, 2007, 358; In Russian historical studies this statement is not explained. The pretensions of the Ottoman Prince Abdul Kerim to create an Islamic state in Xinjiang have been linked to the fact that the sultan had been deposed ten years ago in Turkey, while Islamic caliph. However, this issue is mainly bloated Soviet propaganda and was used as a pretext for the USSR’s intervention in the affairs of Xinjiang. In early 1934 the Japanese Foreign Ministry announced false statements by Prince Abdul Kerim about the alleged formation of an Islamic state in East Turkistan. See: Baymirza Hayit. Türkistan Devletlerinin Milli Mücadileleri Tarihi, 318. 34.  Recording conversations Sabir Rahmatov with Jalil Baratov, August 24, 1931, RGASPI, f. 514, o. 1, d. 1022, l. 22; For more detailes, see. Brophy, Uyghur Nation. Reform and Revolution on the Russia-China Frontier, 252–253. 35.  Reference Dorf Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern, September 1931, RGASPI, f. 495, o. 154, d. 457, l. 38. 36.  See: Reference of the Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern to Iosif Piatnitskii, April 3, 1931, RGASPI, f. 495, o. 154, d. 457, l. 2–8; Even in 1928 Jin Shuren, after coming to power, appealed to Moscow to buy arms and ammunition, but the Soviet government refused to sell on the advice of the Comintern. See: Reference of the Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern to Piatnitskii, April 3, 1931, RGASPI, f. 495, o. 154, d. 457, l. 1. 37.  The Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party (b), September 13, 1931, RGASPI, f. 495, o. 154, d. 457, l. 30. 38.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” August 5, 1931, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 10, l. 140. 39.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” April 8, 1932, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 10, l. 81. 40.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” May 23, 1932, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 10, l. 148. 41.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On the West China,” June 16, 1932, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 10, l. 180. 42.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On the supply under contracts with Xinjiang,” June 16, 1932, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 10, l. 184. 43.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” June 22, 1932, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 10, l. 195. 44.  Ian Berzin. The paper prepared by the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Red Army (intelligence division), 1931, AVPRF, f. 08, o. 16, p. 162, d. 117, l. 3. 45.  Ibid., 9.

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46.  See: Military Information: Sinkiang Rebeltions 1931–1937. History of the Independence Movements in Sinkiang. Central Intelligence Group. Intelligence Report, December 5, 1946, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, p. 3. 47.  Ibid., 5. 48.  See: Ibid., 6. 49.  Rostovskii, The 1931–1934 events in Xinjiang, RGASPI, f. 532, o. 4, d. 328, l. 219–221; Krasil’nikov, Sin’zianskoe Pritiazhanie, 166; Baymirza Hayit, Türkistan Devletlerinin Milli Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 310. 50.  Barmin, Sin’tszian v sovetsko-kitaiskikh otnosheniiakh 1941–1949, 5. 51.  See: Ahmatov, In East Secretariat of Executive Committee of the Communist International, March 25, 1934, RGASPI, f. 514, o. 1, d. 1075, l. 54–55. 52.  Isa Yusuf Alptekin, Doğu Türkistan Davasi, Istanbul, 1973, 158. 53.  Military Information: Sinkiang Rebeltions 1931–1937. History of the Independence Movements in Sinkiang. Central Intelligence Group. Intelligence Report, December 5, 1946, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, p. 4. 54.  Rostovskii, Events 1931–1934 in Xinjiang, RGASPI, f. 532, o. 4, d. 328, l. 221–224. 55.  See: Li Chang, The Soviet Grip on Sinkiang, 492. 56.  Guan,’ Shtirikhi k politicheskomu portretu Shen Shitsaia, 118. 57.  Letter from Duban Sheng Shicai to comrades Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, June 1934, RGASPI, f. 558, o.11, d. 323, l. 3. 58.  Ibid., 7. 59.  Guan,’ Shtirikhi k politicheskomu portretu Shen Shitsaia, 118–19; Baymirza Hayit, Türkistan Devletlerinin Milli Mücadileleri Tarihi, 312. 60.  Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 166. 61.  Brophy, Uyghur Nation. Reform and Revolution on the Russia-China Frontier, 240. 62.  Letter from Duban Sheng Shicai to comrades Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, June 1934, RGASPI, f. 558, o.11, d. 323, l. 7. 63.  See: Barmin, Sin’tszian v sovetsko-kitaiskikh otnosheniiakh 1941–1949, 120–21. 64.  Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 168–69. 65.  Ibid., 172. 66.  See: Li Chang. The Soviet Grip on Sinkiang, 492. 67.  Letter from Duban Sheng Shicai to comrades Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, June 1934, RGASPI, f. 558, o.11, d. 323, l. 7. 68.  Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 173. 69.  Recommendation of the joint meeting to Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Soviet Union on Policy of the USSR in Xinjiang, July 1933, AVPRF, f. 08, o. 16, p. 162, d. 117, l. 21. 70.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” August 3, 1933, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 15, l. 32–33. 71.  See: Politbiuro TsK RKP(b)–VKP(b). Povestka dnia zasedanii, Tom 2, 1930– 1939, Moscow, 2001, 463, 474–475, 482.



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72.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” September 29, 1933, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 15, l. 117. 73.  See: Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR. Tom 15, Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1969, 614–18; For more details see: Amir Amirbaev, Rostislav Petrov. Proizvol sud’by, Zhurnal Prostor, 2017, # 4, 78. 74.  The reference of Intelligence division of the Red Army addressed to Karakhan, 1933, AVPRF, f. 08, o. 16, p. 162, d. 117, l. 8. 75.  Letter from merchants Uyghur groups to the Soviet government, March 21, 1933, AVPRF, f. 08, o. 16, p. 162, d. 117, l. 11. 76.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Sovsintorg,” November 17, 1933, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 15, l. 143. 77.  See: Military Information: Sinkiang Rebellions, 1931–1937. History of the Independence Movements in Sinkiang. Central Intelligence Group. Intelligence Report, December 5, 1946, NARA, CIA-RDP82, p. 7. 78.  See: Baymirza Hayit, Ost Turkistan. Machtkampf zwischen China und Russland, Das Parlament, Bonn, B 28, 1963, 341; Military Information: Sinkiang Rebeltions 1931–1937. History of the Independence Movements in Sinkiang. Central Intelligence Group. Intelligence Report, December 5, 1946, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, p. 8. 79.  See: Viacheslav Kuznetsov, Panislamizm v Kitae, Dvadtsat’ chetvertaia nauchnaia konferentsiia “Obshestvo i gosudarstvo v Kitae.” Tezisy dokladov. Chast’ 1. Moscow, 1993, 131. 80.  Letter from Sabit Damolla to British Consul in Kashgar Thomson-Glover, 1933, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 2, d. 3037, l. 71. 81.  Joe Lee, The Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkistan and the Formation of Modern Uyghur Identity in Xinjiang, B.S., United States Air Force Academy, 2005, 91–92. 82.  For the complete text of the Constitution, see: Yaş Türkistan, 1934, No. 53, 31–36, No. 54, 32–35, No. 55, 29–32. 83.  Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 174. 84.  See: Baymirza Hayit, Ost Turkistan. Machtkampf zwischen China und Russland, 340. 85.  Justin M. Jacobs, Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State, 93–94. 86.  Mikhael Clarke, The ‘centrality’ of Central Asia in world history, 1700–2008. From pivot to periphery and back again?, China, Xinjiang and Central Asia. History, transition and crossborder interaction into the 21st century. Edited by Colin Mackerras and Mikhael Clarke. Routledge, London and New York, 2009, 35. 87.  Mikhael Petrovich Frinovskii in 1930–1933 was chair of the State Political Administration of the Azerbaijan SSR. The State Political Administration under the Council of People’s Commissars of the Azerbaijan SSR existed from 1923 to 1934. This organization was the predecessor of the KGB. 88.  See: Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 174; See: Li Chang, The Soviet Grip on Sinkiang, 494.

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  89.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang“, January 20, 1934, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 16, l. 168.   90.  Garegin Abramovich Apresov was born in 1890 in Kusar, a district of Baku province. In 1923–1924 he was the chargé d’affaires of the USSR in Persia; in 1929 he was a representative of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR in the Council of People’s Commissars of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic; and in 1930 was a representative of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR under the Council of People’s Commissars of the Uzbekistan SSR. In 1934 he was appointed consul general of the USSR in Urumqi and interacted with duban Sheng Shicai, providing a liason with Moscow; See: Amir Amirbaev, Rostislav Petrov. Proizvol sud’by, 80.   91.  See: Military Information: Sinkiang Rebeltions 1931–1937. History of the Independence Movements in Sinkiang. Central Intelligence Group. Intelligence Report, December 5, 1946, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, p. 9.   92.  Fedor Polynin, Vypolnyaia internatsional’nyi dolg, V nebe Kitaia. 1937– 1940, Moscow, 1986, 18–21. It should be noted that the personnel of units of the United State Political Administration under the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR were strictly instructed to deny their affiliation with the Soviet Union and pledged not to disclose details of action in Xinjiang for fifty years, so the memoir of the surviving witnesses appeared in the mid-1980s.   93.  For more details on the activities of the White Army and their joint struggle with Red Army against the rebel Uyghurs in Xinjiang, see: Kamoludin Abdullaev. Ot Sin’tsziana do Khorasana. Iz istorii sredneaziatskoi ėmigratsii ХХ veka. Dushanbe: “IRFON,” 2009, 267–338.   94.  See: Military Information: Sinkiang Rebeltions 1931–1937. History of the Independence Movements in Sinkiang. Central Intelligence Group. Intelligence Report, December 5, 1946, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, p. 9.   95.  See: Baymirza Hayit, Türkistan Devletlerinin Milli Mücadileleri Tarihi, 318.   96.  See: Military Information: Sinkiang Rebeltions 1931–1937. History of the Independence Movements in Sinkiang. Central Intelligence Group. Intelligence Report, December 5, 1946, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, pp. 9–10.   97.  Baymirza Hayit, Şarki Türkistan ve Rusya, Milli Türkistan, 1950, sayı 68, 26.   98.  Yaş Türkistan, 1935, No. 71, 19–21.   99.  Military Information: Sinkiang Rebeltions 1931–1937. History of the Independence Movements in Sinkiang. Central Intelligence Group. Intelligence Report, December 5, 1946, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, p. 10. 100.  Yaş Türkistan, 1935, No. 71, 22–25. 101.  See: Baymirza Hayit, Türkistan Devletlerinin Milli Mücadeleleri Tarihi, 321. 102.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” April 1, 1934, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 16, l. 32; All authors, citing this Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang“ wrote, that the decision was taken on April 15. However, this decision was taken at a meeting of the Political Bureau, held



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on April 1. See: Politbiuro TsK RKP(b)–VKP(b). Povestka dnia zasedanii. T. II. 1930–1939. Moscow, 2001, 522. 103.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” April 1, 1934, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 16, l. 32. 104.  Ibid., 32. 105.  Ibid., 33. 106.  See: Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 178–179. 107.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” May 31, 1934, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 16, l. 96. 108.  Ibid., 96. 109.  Ibid., 97. 110.  Ibid., 97. 111.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” June 8, 1934, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 16, l. 90. 112.  Ibid., 90. 113.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On trade with Xinjiang,” June 9, 1934, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 16, l. 93. 114.  See: Military Information: Sinkiang Rebeltions 1931–1937. History of the Independence Movements in Sinkiang. Central Intelligence Group. Intelligence Report, December 5, 1946, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, p. 10. 115.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” July 15, 1934, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 16, l. 123. 116.  See: Conversation Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov with Duban occurs in the Kremlin, September 2, 1938, RGASPI, f. 558, o. 11, d. 323, l. 39. 117.  See: Nicholas Vakar. The Annexion of Chinese–Turkistan, Slovonic Review, 1935, Vol. XIV, No. 40, 121. 118.  See: Baymirza Hayit, Türkistan Devletlerinin Milli Mücadileleri Tarihi, 322. 119.  Military Information: Sinkiang Rebeltions 1931–1937. History of the Independence Movements in Sinkiang. Central Intelligence Group. Intelligence Report, December 5, 1946, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, p. 10. 120.  See: David Wang, The Xinjiang Question of the 1940s: the story behind the Sino–Soviet treaty of August 1945, Asian Studies Review, 1997, Vol. 21, No. 1, 86. 121.  Letter from Duban Sheng Shicai to comrades Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, June 1934, RGASPI, f. 558, o.11, d. 323, l. 3. 122.  Ibid., 4–5. 123.  Ibid., 5. 124.  Ibid., 5–9. 125.  Ibid., 10. 126.  Letter from Stalin to Apresov, July 27, 1934, RGASPI, f. 558, o.11, d. 323, l. 22. 127.  Ibid., 22. 128.  Letter from Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov to Sheng Shicai, July 27, 1934, RGASPI, f. 558, o.11, d. 323, l. 12–13. 129.  Ibid., 13.

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130.  Ibid., 14. 131.  Letter from Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov to Apresov, July 1934, RGASPI, f. 558, o.11, d. 323, l. 1. 132.  Ibid., 1. 133.  See: Ibid., 1–2. 134.  See: Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On measures to improve the economy of Xinjiang,” July 21, 1934, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 16, l. 153–181. 135.  Sheng Shicai, My most right guides—Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov, November 1, 1934, RGASPI, f. 558, o.11, d. 323, l. 26. 136.  Ibid., 26. 137.  Ibid., 27. 138.  Ibid., 27. 139.  Ibid., 28. 140.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” Noveber 2, 1934, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 17, l. 74. 141.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “About salary of Soviet workers in Xinjiang,” December 25, 1934, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 17, l. 95. 142.  Letter from Stalin to Apresov, November 7, 1934, RGASPI, f. 558, o.11, d. 323, l. 29. 143.  Ibid., 29. 144.  Ibid., 30. 145.  Ibid., 30. 146.  Ibid., 31.

Chapter Two

Strengthening of Soviet Control over Eastern Turkistan (1934–1939)

Despite some flawed provisions, the Politburo, guided by Garegin Apresov’s presentation, gave its consent on August 5, 1934, to the establishment of the Union of Struggle against Imperialism in Xinjiang. It would be composed of representatives of the Soviet special services and headed by duban Sheng as a key figure to pursue the Soviet regional policy.1 “Under the direction of the Anty-Imperialist Society, residents of Xinjiang experienced a revolution in print culture. Every time they went to the market, they paid in bills displaying both Chinese and Uyghur script. By 1936, there were 260 different booklets, magazines, journals, pamphlets, and newspapers available for purchase on the street. Later, the society consolidated operations into a single flagship monthly journal, Anti-Imperialist Frontline (Fandi zhanxian) which soon tallied a print run of 5,000 to 15,000 copies, in both Chines and Uyghur editions.”2 In turn, the creation of the Moscow-controlled organization would play an important role in consolidating the USSR’s position in Xinjiang. On the one hand, the Soviets held control over broader economic reforms in Xinjiang. On the other hand, the establishment of Moscow’s political control over the province was regarded by foreign (particularly British and Japanese) mass media as a sign of the USSR’s aspiration to create “another Mongolia” in Asia. KAGANOVICH’S COMMISSION AND SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN EASTERN TURKISTAN Thus, the Chinese press wrote that “Xinjiang is completely in the hands of Russians seeking to annex it immediately as part of the USSR.”3 Consequently, foreign consulates in Xinjiang closely watched events in the region. In 1935 the British consul in Kashgar sent a report to the British 53

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Foreign Office, noting that the Soviet Union’s influence on the province, specifically on the population, had been visibly strengthened.4 In an attempt to determine the credibility of these rumors, the extent of the USSR’s influence in the provinces, and the prospects of the Sovietization of Xinjiang, the government of China sent a special commission to Urumqi. The commission found that the Soviet aid was of a friendly nature, however, and similar to the aid previously rendered to the province.5 The governments of Xinjiang, China, and the Soviet Union made a joint statement that rumors about the forthcoming annexation of Eastern Turkistan to the USSR were untrue. It was undoubtedly Sheng and “trustworthy people” in the region that made the Chinese authorities come to such a conclusion. This statement allowed the Soviet Union an increasingly freer rein in Xinjiang politics. In 1935 the Politburo adopted a number of secret documents aimed at strengthening Soviet influence in the region. According to the decision of the Politburo dated March 19, some senior officials from Eastern Siberia and Central Asia were sent on a business trip to Xinjiang: “(а) from Eastern Siberia: Zhang Yi Feng (Kashen), Jin Yu (Crystal), Kaspina Tatiana, Zhen Yu Jun (Aleev); (b) from Central Asia: Siradjetdinov Abdulla, Aminov Said Khojayevich (Aminov Karim), Ruziyev Mashyr, Rahimov Ahmed (Kabulov), Anvarov Yusup Ibrahimovich (Ibrahimov Yusup).”6 Henrich Iagoda, Iakov Agranov, Maksim Litvinov, Nikolai Krestinskii, and Andrei Andreev were instructed to ensure this business trip to Xinjiang. The Soviet Politburo set up a commission headed by the secretary of the CC and newly appointed member of the Council of Labor and Defense Lazar Kaganovich to develop the collaboration with Xinjiang. The commission’s proposals were discussed and then approved by the Politburo on March 22, 1935.7 The first section of the proposals dealt with trade relations with Xinjiang. Trade with Xinjiang in 1935 was worth 9,750,000 rubles: 5,000,000 rubles for import operations and 4,750,000 rubles for export operations. In accordance with the needs of Soviet industry, preference was given to purchases from Xinjiang, especially cotton, wool, leather, cattle, and other raw materials. The document stipulated some privileges and low-interest loans to Xinjiang merchants. The Soviets of People’s Commissars of Central Asia and the Kazakhstan Autonomous Republic were instructed to improve the quality of goods exported to Xinjiang. At the same time, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, and the Central Asian Republics were given the responsibility of holding annual autumn fairs in Zaysan, Bakhty, Khorgos, Karkar, and other frontier towns of Xinjiang. The commission entrusted the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs with reducing visa duties for citizens of Xinjiang entering the USSR: from 5 to 2 rubles for a single visa; from 10 to 4 rubles for an entry/exit visa; from 30 to 10 rubles for a multiple visa.8



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The Soviet leaders permanently focused on the expansion of trade relations with Xinjiang. The trade figures mentioned in the Kaganovich proposals had proved to be unrealistic. Consequently, on June 17, 1936, the Politburo discussed the issue again and passed a resolution titled “On Trade with Xinjiang.” It was decided to reduce the volume of goods imported from the province to the USSR: cotton from 2,000 to 1,000 tons, sheep and goats from 350,000 to 250,000, and wool from 5,475 to 4,675 tons. At the same time, the Politburo passed a decision not to reduce the volume of exports to Xinjiang and credits granted to the province.9 In August 1936 the Politburo, in addition to the resolution of June 8, 1934, passed a decision to increase the number of Soviet trade workers in Xinjiang. According to an additional decision, the number of workers at the trade mission in Hami rose to five and in Aqsu to three. Sovsintorg was allowed to maintain small deposits of goods at these missions.10 The second section of proposals dealt with financial issues, such as balancing the budget for reviving the financial branch of the Xinjiang economy and strengthening the provincial currency as the top priority. With that end in view, it was planned to reduce costs in the administrative-managerial and military areas, centralize expenses and tax operations, replace all taxes with general provincial taxes, prohibit the issuing of counterfeit money, and reconstruct the provincial bank. The third section of the document dealt with agriculture, and the fourth with transport. It was planned to construct a highway to connect Xinjiang and the USSR and to raise cargo transportation on the Ili and Karairtysh rivers, among others. Later the plans were revised. In October 1937 they started laying the Saryozek-Urumqi-Lanzhou road, 2,925 km long: 230 km in the territory of the USSR; 1,530 km in Xinjiang, and 1,165 km in Gansu and Lanzhou provinces. Several thousand Soviet citizens were engaged in constructing the road.11 The fifth section of the Kaganovich proposals regulated commodity credits. Vehicles and equipment from the USSR for industrial enterprises of Xinjiang were to be formalized as goods credits. A document on prospecting operations in Xinjiang read as follows: “Geological work in Xinjiang to prospect for mineral resources, primarily tin, is to be done at the USSR’s expense. For this to happen, the People’s Commissariat of Heavy Industry should send a geological expedition in 1935.”12 Of particular interest was section 6 of the document, which regulated personnel questions: “in view of the great importance of Soviet organizations in the economic and political life of Xinjiang, departments sending advisors and instructors to Xinjiang should pay particular attention to the qualitative selection of cadres arriving in Xinjiang. These workers are sent under the personal responsibility of the department leadership.”13 According to the Kaganovich commission, the number of military advisors and instructors sent to Xinjiang

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could not exceed fifty. Finally, the Politburo proposals instructed the Commissariat of Finance to expand the Soviet Consulate General in Urumqi and allocate 100,000 rubles in gold for the construction of a new building for employees of the consulate and other structures.14 On September 11, 1935, the Politburo raised the question of the number of advisors and instructors sent to Xinjiang. On March 22 it stated that the figure did not include Soviet specialists in various branches.15 On September 13, at the suggestion of the Kaganovich commission, the Politburo decided to send Karim Musayev, Nazrulla Rustamov, Zunun Sadykov, Ilyas Fazilov, Abdullah Valishev, Hasan Bulatov, Arzibay Jumbabayev, and comrade Lianov on a mission to Xinjiang. Nikolai Ezhov, Iakov Agranov, and Boris Stomoniakov were to carry out the decision.16 September 11, 1935, can be called the Day of Xinjiang in the Politburo, which passed five resolutions on Xinjiang in one day. A Politburo amendment in the Kaganovich commission’s proposal, Resolution 2, considered it inexpedient to set up a Vostvag (joint stock society) in Xinjiang and suggested instead setting up a special Soviet trade office.17 The Politburo later discussed the question “On Xinjiang Oil” and passed a resolution: “(а) To develop oilfields near our border in the name of the Xinjiang government; (b) to instruct the People’s Commissariat of Heavy Industry, after the arrival of a geological commission from Xinjiang, jointly with the People’s Commissariat of Heavy Industry (PCHI), to draft specific proposals.”18 Prospecting work yielded results in 1938: oil deposits were discovered near the town of Shiho. That same year a mixed joint stock Soviet-Xinjiang society called “Xinjiang Oil” was set up. The Soviets were also greatly interested in tin, tungsten, and molybdenum. On March 17, 1936, the Politburo allocated 75,000 rubles in gold and 2,000 Soviet rubles to carry on prospecting operations from the reserve fund of the Soviet of People’s Commissars. Under a Politburo resolution, Dmitrii Perkin (head of the central board of Glavtsinksvinets, the Main Directorate of Zinc and Lead Industries of the People’s Commissariat of Metallurgy, USSR) was assigned to lead a twenty-member expedition. The resolution warned “against excessive ballyhoo around the expedition and the related movement of specialists.”19 During February 1937, the Soviet leadership instructed the People’s Commissariat of Heavy Industry to perform the following tasks through the expedition in Xinjiang: “(a) conduct a detailed prospecting for Surtas tin and tungsten deposits; (b) organize a pilot program to draw up a technological scheme for Surtas ore enrichment; (c) do prospecting work in Ili district with a view to expanding reserves of native tin deposits.”20 For this to happen, the special expedition was provided with $40,000 and 2,000 Soviet rubles for 1937. Clause 3 made a proposal “[t]o discuss in the State Planning Committee the question of the construction of a mine in the territory of Xinjiang and a



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concentrating mill in the region of Jarkend by connecting the two enterprises with a highway or a narrow-gauge railway.”21 The Politburo focused on the continuation of prospecting and production of precious metals. To coordinate large-scale operations in Xinjiang and guide Soviet policy in the province, the Politburo entrusted the consul general in Urumqi, Apresov, with additional powers on September 11. The Politburo resolution “On Our Representatives in Xinjiang” read as follows: “To assign comrade Apresov a CC-authorized person in charge of political leadership over all our departments in Xinjiang. Representatives of these departments, including the PCIA (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) and PCD (People’s Commissariat of Defense), have no right to take steps that are politically important for the USSR and our current line in Xinjiang without preliminary authorization from comrade Apresov.”22 Another clause of the resolution prohibited all Soviet consuls in Xinjiang from engaging in the activity of operating agents, while PCIA officers in Xinjiang were not allowed to interfere with matters under the authority of consuls. Apresov was authorized immediately to dismiss those who misbehaved in alien territory from their posts and send them back to the USSR. Two days later, on September 13, the Politburo awarded Apresov with an Order of Lenin “for his successful activity in Xinjiang (not made public in the press).”23 Along with decisions aimed at developing the economy, the Politburo passed a resolution on September 11, 1935, that provided education for Xinjiang youths in the USSR. Under this resolution, fifteen vacancies for Xinjiang youths were assigned in agricultural institutions of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The secretary of the Kazakhstan regional committee, Levon Mirzoian, and the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, Akmal Ikramov, were instructed “to provide students with the necessary amenities.”24 In June 1936 the Politburo allowed another 100 youths from Xinjiang to study at the administrative-law faculty of Central Asian universities, starting in autumn of the same year.25 The process subsequently intensified. By a decision of the Soviet leaders, approximately 30,000 Xinjiang residents received an education in the Soviet Union in the 1930s. One of them was duban Sheng’s brother, Sheng Shiqi. (They were five brothers: Sheng Shicai, Sheng Shi Jun, Sheng Shiqi, Sheng Shiji, and Sheng Shi Ying). He was sent to get an education at the Frunze military academy in Moscow, which was kept secret from the central government of China. He married a Russian woman and returned to Xinjiang together with his family after finishing his education.26 Not only civilian educational institutions but the PCIA contributed to the secret training of special personnel. On August 5, 1935, the Politburo passed a decision to allocate 1,200,000 rubles to the PCIA for accommodation of people who arrived from Xinjiang.27 The work

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continued later. Thus in March 1936, on the recommendation of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, the Politburo instructed the appropriate bodies to allocate 1,206,243 rubles and 20,700 in foreign currency to maintain and service people from Xinjiang.28 However, preference was always given to the Chinese from Xinjiang when selecting personnel for training at military and civil educational institutions and security bodies. A Politburo resolution dated September 13, 1935, dealt with a matter of paramount importance: reconstruction of the Xinjiang army. The size of the Xinjiang army could not exceed 10,000 men. Thirty-one Soviet instructors were to be sent to the Xinjiang army: “they are to be paid in accordance with the Politburo Resolution of December 25, 1934.”29 Three weeks later the Politburo returned to this question and passed a decision to send 500,000 gold rubles’ worth of military equipment to the government of Urumqi and 5 million rubles allocated to Xinjiang. Under this decision, four U-2 aircraft were to be delivered to the Xinjiang army; equipment for aviation, rifle and machine gun, and artillery shops, equipment and supplies for personnel, two passenger airplanes, eight aviation engines, and other items were to be sent to Urumqi by May 1, 1936.30 As a continuation of the process, following the suppression of the Muslim movement in 1935, aviation schools led by Soviet pilots were opened in Xinjiang. Working as an instructor in one of these schools was Fedor Polynin, an active participant in fighting against Muslim insurgents. The role of these schools increased after the Japanese-Chinese war. Under a “gentlemen’s agreement” between the two countries, Soviet specialists were invited to work at the aviation school in the town of Ghulja. In mid-1939, under a mutual agreement between the USSR and China, an aviation-assembly plant was built 40 km away from Urumqi to meet the Chinese army’s need for fighter planes. For secrecy reasons, official documents referred to the construction of an “agricultural equipment plant.”31 It has to be kept in mind that the reconstruction of the Xinjiang army was directly carried out by the chief military advisor of the duban and acting head of the General Staff of Urumqi, the famous intelligence officer Hadi Malikov (intelligence), future marshal Paul Rybalko (aviation), and a Colonel Chernov (infantry). Malikov was assigned as Sheng’s security advisor (1934–1936), while Rybalko was the military advisor to the Xinjiang army.32 Thus, for the first time since the Revolution of 1917, the similarly uniformed “Red” and “White” Russians fought for one party. Sheng disagreed with the Soviet proposal to reduce the army to 10,000 soldiers. He considered it expedient to reduce the army to 20,000 by demobilizing soldiers older than thirty-five and opium smokers. Following suppression of the Muslim revolt, Sheng’s main concern was to deal with the 36th Dungan Division that fell back to Khotan. While Ma Zhongying, the commander of the division, took refuge in



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the USSR and was not handed over despite the duban’s urgent requests, the 6,000-soldier army was capable of opposing the government of Urumqi at the right moment. Although talks were held with the Dungan division commanders, they made no concessions. The government of Urumqi considered it undesirable to station such an armed group within the province because it would strengthen the idea of Uyghur independence. The intelligence section of the Central Asian military district wrote in December 1935 that “the concept of independent Uyghuristan holds a high position in the minds of Uyghur leaders.”33 Intelligence data said that the duban invited twenty-right commanders from the Red Army and the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs to increase the fighting efficiency of the army. However, the Soviets still hesitated to liquidate the 36th Dungan Division. Moreover, a secret resolution of the Politburo on October 3, 1935, mentioned delivery of some Dungan commanders to the USSR with the help of Ma Zhongying; sending Dungan commanders who had earlier found asylum in the Soviet Union to Khotan, and establishment of trade relations with the 36th Division. “(а) With Ma Zhongying’s assistance, to send commanders of the division to the USSR who were hostile to the Xinjiang government, including Ma Hushan, Bai Ji-Li, etc., as well as to entertain the request of the group of Ma Sheng-Gui about Ma Zhongying’s trip and ensure their return to Khotan. To authorize exit from the USSR to Khotan of one or two Dungan commanders from Ma Zhongying’s entourage. Personnel candidates will be agreed upon between the PCIA and the PCFA; (b) not to await conclusion of peace between the 36th Division and the Xinjiang government; to consider it expedient to establish commercial ties with the 36th Division.”34 Soviet representatives held secret talks with Ma Zhongying about the destiny of the 36th Division. In early 1936 the Dungan general presented his proposals to the Soviet leaders, who decided to adopt Ma Zhongying’s proposals and “recommended that the Urumqi government make appropriate concessions during peace talks with the 36th Division.”35 This secret resolution of the Politburo showed that the Soviet leaders intended to preserve the 36th Dungan Division as an alternative to Sheng. After suppression of the April 1937 Muslim mutiny, the intelligence section of the Central Asian military district suggested to the Soviet leaders that the “time is ripe to finish dealing with the Dungans.”36 Based on the proposals of the Svanidze and Kaganovich commissions, these resolutions consolidated duban Sheng’s position in Xinjiang. Soviet low-interest loans, various economic aid, and the numerous consultants and specialists sent to Eastern Turkistan led to the strengthening of Chinese authorities in the region. On October 4, 1936, Sheng sent a two-page letter of appreciation to Viacheslav Molotov, the chair of the Council of People’s Commissars. First, Sheng thanked Molotov as head of the Soviet state on behalf of the 4 million

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“Xinjiang people” and voiced his gratitude to the head of the “friendly state” for moral and material support, especially for the historically low interest rate on a loan of 5 million gold rubles. “The devoted and heartfelt work of military instructors, advisors, engineers, physicians, etc., proved to be unprecedented in the previous history of foreign experts engaged in China. . . . At present we are making efforts to make Xinjiang a brilliant example for all of China from a political, military, economic, and cultural standpoint. . . . We are happy that the neighboring state that maintains the closest relations with our Xinjiang is not an imperialistic state pursuing aggression against poor and minority peoples but the Soviet Union, rendering aid to poor and minority peoples.”37 At the end of his letter Sheng expressed his desire to come to the USSR, meet with Soviet leaders, and obtain instructions from them directly. However, he added, “to my great chagrin, I won’t be able to realize my desire this year.”38 He wrote of sending “a humble present” to Molotov through Apresov, the Soviet consul general to Urumqi, and asked the head of the Soviet state to receive him. Backed by the Soviets, Sheng imagined himself to be a central figure in the political history of China. At his earliest convenience, he willingly joined various coalitions to oppose Chiang Kai-Shek and tried to urge the Soviet leaders to do the same. Although his proposal to overthrow the government of Chiang Kai-Shek in 1934 was not approved by Moscow, when an insurrection headed by Zhang Xueliang started in Xi’an in December 1936 and Chiang Kai-Shek was arrested by insurgents, the duban fully sided with Zhang Xueliang, adding that the insurgents were protected by the government of Xinjiang.39 However, Sheng backtracked after the Soviet government denounced the Xi’an insurrection, calling it a provocation. The Soviet leadership was well aware that “Sheng Shicai was no second Chiang Kai-shek” and could not replace him.40 The Soviet government stated that “mutinous actions of Zhang Xueliang against the Chinese government and the arrest of the leader of the Chinese people Chiang Kai-Shek contribute to the Japanese aggression and damage Chinese interests.”41 Due to the Sian insurrection an urgent directive was sent to the duban: “to respond to Zhang Xueliang saying that you disapprove of his actions and will not join in them.”42 Following urgent requests from the Soviet government, Sheng gave up backing Zhang Xueliang and his insurrection against the central government of China. THE START OF A NEW WAVE OF PROTEST BY THE MUSLIMS IN XINJIANG In his letter to Molotov, Sheng was lying about the stability and triumph of the “friendship of peoples.” In 1936 local Muslim nationalists of Altai headed



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by Yunus Haji founded the Society for National Defense. The society included influential people: Sattar-khan from Kachen, Ali Akbar from Urumqi, Yusuf Akurday, Omar Salin, Nurteze, and Mirza Salili from the Tarbataghai region, and Jayir Bey and Kanat Bey from the Ili region. Sheng was informed of preparations for a strong protest movement. However, he did not have enough forces to suppress the movement independently.43 Soon afterward an event occurred in Kashgar that was like the Sian insurrection of December 1936. A new wave of protests against the Chinese government and Sheng by Uyghurs and other Muslim peoples broke out in April 1937. To hold the Muslim population in subjugation, Sheng together with the Russian advisors invented 125 kinds of torture and 28 methods of killing.44 All this caused serious discontent among the local Muslim population of Eastern Turkistan. At this time the Muslim movement was headed by the commander of the Turkistan military association in Kashgar, Mahmut Shizhang. In mid-1936 he and his supporters began campaigning for the idea of establishing an “independent Uyghur state.” He was supported by Muslim religious figures and influential persons of Eastern Turkistan. After the fall of the national government of Turkistan in 1934, Khoja Niyaz Haji went over to the Chinese, having unraveled Sheng’s anti-Muslim policies; he also joined the pro-independence struggle. Through contacts with the Soviet consul in Kashgar, named Smirnov, Mahmut Shizhang tried to get arms from the Soviet Union, bypassing the Urumqi government, but failed. Then Mahmut Shizhang contacted his former opponents, the Dungans. Early in April 1937 he succeeded in fomenting an uprising against the Chinese government. However, only two regiments of the 6th Uyghur Division stationed near Kashgar supported him; the other two regiments declared their loyalty to the Urumqi government. On April 4 the Politburo discussed the situation in Xinjiang and the revolt against the Chinese authorities. A final resolution was adopted to urge the duban to appeal to Mahmut Shizhang and ask him to return to Kashgar and negotiate for peaceful resolution of all disputes. With that end in view, Sheng was ready to send a special delegation to Kashgar and “tell Shizhang that the insinuation of the allegedly inimical intentions of the Urumqi government came from hostile forces seeking to stir up a civil war in Xinjiang and enslave its people. It was necessary to take measures to spread the duban’s appeal widely among the Uyghur division.”45 The second clause of the resolution instructed the consul in Kashgar, Smirnov, on behalf of the Soviet government, to meet with Mahmut Shizhang and persuade him of the necessity to return to Kashgar and resolve the disputes with Urumqi peacefully. Consul Smirnov was authorized “to guarantee Mamut [Mahmut Shizhang] on behalf of the Soviet government that the Urumqi government would take

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no measures against him and give careful consideration to all his claims and complaints.”46 The third clause of the Politburo resolution instructed the first deputy foreign commissar, Mikhail Frinovskii, “to talk with Ma Zhongying about sending a telegram to the commander of the Dungan division, Ma Hushan, offering to support him and disarm all Uyghur units coming into the division’s territory.”47 Finally, the Politburo empowered Frinovskii and Semën Urutskii “to draw up a plan of combat operations against the Uyghur division in case Mamut [Mahmut] starts combat operations against the Urumqi government.”48 Under these instructions, on April 6–8, 1937, the government of Urumqi sent a peacemaking commission to Kashgar in hopes of attaining “a peaceful resolution to the conflict.” However, no talks were held, and the Soviet leaders decided to disarm Mahmut Shizhang and his army with the help of Dungan division. A secret resolution of the Politburo was adopted on April 8 to instruct Frinovskii to “suggest that Ma Zhongying send a telegram to the commander of the division, Ma Hushan, that he go south to Mamut [Mahmut] and disarm him. If necessary, units of the division may go beyond the Khotan district and come back upon completion of the operation.”49 Deputy foreign minister Boris Stomoniakov and first deputy of internal affairs Mikhail Frinovskii were empowered to carry out this order. However, Mahmut Shizhang together with seventeen associates managed to flee to India.50 After he left Xinjiang, nationalists and patriotic-minded officers of the Turkic associations appointed Abdul (Abdu) Niyaz commander of 6th Uyghur Division and promoted him to the rank of general. In April 1937, Abdul Niyaz was going to move from Yarkend to Kashgar. After Kashgar was captured, protests broke out in the district of Gansu. Soon afterward the two movements merged.51 Niyaz’s military successes caused great anxiety not only in Urumqi but in Moscow as well. On April 19, 1937, the Politburo debates focused on Xinjiang. A resolution was adopted: It is considered necessary to disarm the straggler units of the 6th Division in Yarkendi behind Mamut [Mahmut] and prevent their advance toward Kashgar. The command staff, inimical to the Urumqi government should be arrested. To establish order in Yarkend and the district, as well as disarm units of the 6th Division, it is essential to apply to the deputy commander of the 36th Division, Ma Hushan, and ask him through the mediation of Ma Zhongying to station a regiment in Yarkend carry out these measures in accord with the Urumqi government. To organize the power in Yarkend, it is essential to send a group of proven and energetic Chinese and Uyghurs from Kashgar. It is desirable that the personnel of the 6th Division be familiar with Uyghurs going to Yarkend.52



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Despite the efforts of the Chinese and Soviet armed forces, Abdul Niyaz ordered the 6th Uyghur Division to capture Kashgar and move toward Karashehir. During the whole march, the Uyghur peasants and artisans protected the rebel regiments and helped them. An order came from Urumqi to break up the Uyghur forces. With that end in view, a Tashkent military graduate named Kurban was appointed to prevent expansion of the movement headed by Abdul Niyaz.53 In order to oppose the Chinese and Russians, Abdul Niyaz signed a secret agreement with Dungan general Ma Hushan on May 15: “it was decided that that they would jointly capture Kashgar in a secret alliance of Dungan and Uyghur troops.” Under the agreement, on May 26 a 1,000-man Tungkan detachment united with a 2,000-man Uyghur army and, together with 1,000 unarmed Uyghur soldiers commanded by Abdul Niyaz, began fighting for Kashgar on June 1.54 Siding with the mutineers were famous persons of Gansu province: Ilyas-khan, Sultan Sharif Timi, Huseyn Teichi, and Nur Ali.55 The uprising threatened to spread across the whole of Eastern Turkistan. On June 6 practically all of Kashgaria was controlled by Abdul Niyaz. Despite the Soviet consul’s mediation efforts to reconcile the parties in the conflict, Abdul Niyaz easily smashed the 2,000-man governmental army from Urumqi. In a twenty-day battle he captured four vehicles and shot down two aircraft. The rest of the Urumqi army fled to Aqsu. After the liberation of Kashgar, Ma Hushan, with a 3,000-man Dungan army, entered the town. “The cases of pillage and plunder by the Dungan soldiers occurred in this period.”56 A number of Russian authors seek to describe the aspirations of the Muslim population of Eastern Turkistan (primarily Uyghurs, the overwhelming majority of the province) as the desire “to create an independent Muslim state outside Xinjiang.” Other researchers contend that the protests of the local population against the Chinese authorities in 1931–1934 and in 1937 were the result of Great Britain’s intention to set up a Muslim state in the region. Some authors explain these protests by Japan’s desire to get access to eastern Turkistan via Mongolia and establish a pro-Japanese regime there.57 However, in both cases representatives of Eastern Turkistan Muslims appealed first to the Soviets for help. Some researchers assert that the Soviet Union’s rejection of the Muslim movement for independence in Eastern Turkistan in 1931–1934 and in 1937 was based on a belief that such independence could set “a bad example” for the Soviet republics of Central Asia. According to Isa Yusuf Alptekin, “the creation of a national government in Eastern Turkistan independent of China and its recognition by world nations might set a precedent for Western Turkistan. In other words, the Turks of Western Turkistan could refer to Eastern Turkistan as a precedent to get rid of the Russian oppression and gain freedom.”58

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Closely watching these developments, particularly the defeats of the Urumqi army, the Soviet military advisors concluded that the duban’s army’s commanders were incompetent. They viewed the command staff of the Urumqi army as illiterate, cowardly officers, “so it was natural that the undernourished army systematically robbed by its commanders was engaged in pogroms, marauding, and pillage.”59 Realizing the helplessness of the Chinese military units and taking into consideration Sheng’s request, the Soviet leadership decided to send additional military aid. A resolution was adopted on May 19, 1937, by the Politburo: “Owing to the aggravation of the situation in Kashgar, we consider it expedient to assist the duban by sending six new aircraft with our pilots and six armored vehicles. The aircraft are to be sent to Kashgar in the summer. Our pilots should be used by a special directive from Moscow if it is found that the uprising cannot be suppressed by the duban and Ma Hushan’s troops. Send our military advisor under the duban, comrade Fedinov, immediately to Kashgar and assist the Chinese command to suppress the mutineers.”60 Boris Stomoniakov, Kliment Voroshilov, Nikolai Ezhov, and Semën Urutskii were to implement the resolution. Sheng was anxious about the seizure of towns and populated localities in Kashgar by the Uyghur division. Incapable of opposing the mutineers, he had to appeal to Moscow leaders for urgent military aid. With a view to easing his situation and rendering immediate help, it was decided “to concentrate Uzbek and Kazakh regiments on the Soviet border with Xinjiang, the 19th Osh and 13th Alma-Ata regiment of the PCIA as well as an air squadron.”61 To enlist the support of the Soviet leadership, Sheng presented the uprising in Xinjiang as Trotskyite. During the uprising against the duban, the Trotskyites intended to seize the power and abrogate the anti-imperialist policy of friendship with the Soviet Union. They especially focused on reforms based on the basic political principles made public in April 1933. Sheng suggested that if the mutineers were victorious the agents of Japan and Germany would set up their bases in Xinjiang and thus harm the interests of the USSR and China. He wrote to the Soviet leaders that the Trotskyite organizations in Xinjiang were led by the Soviet consul general, Garegin Abramovich Apresov, who allegedly sought to embroil Xinjiang and Russia.”62 In his secret message to Moscow Sheng was successful in adjusting the Xinjiang developments to the Soviet model: he stressed that he was the main target of “Trotskyite plotters” as the USSR’s close friend. He even asked the Kremlin to send an investigator to inquire into the matter. The Politburo complied with Sheng’s request and adopted a resolution on September 24, 1937: “To entertain the request of the duban to send him an experienced investigator to inquire into a conspiracy against him.”63 By Sheng’s order, his secret message about the “Trotskyite plot” was brought to Moscow by his younger brother,



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Sheng Shiqi. Apresov was dismissed from his post on June 13, 1937, and sentenced to ten years of imprisonment “for anti-Soviet activity.” On September 11, 1941, he was executed. The death of Stalin in 1953 was followed by the 20th Congress of the CPSU, which rehabilitated those repressed in the 1930s. Anastas Mikoian wrote that Stalin had personally ordered Apresov to be shot because the former consul general knew too much about the Soviet policy in Xinjiang.64 The struggle against Trotskyites in Xinjiang was waged through serious repression: more than four hundred people were exterminated, including prominent leaders of the province and Chinese Communists whom Sheng considered to be his rivals. The Russian author Vasilii Petrov, who was born in Xinjiang and took an active part in the 1930–1940 developments, remembered that many Russian emigrants were arrested during the repressions of 1937.65 In connection with the “Trotskyite conspiracy,” Sheng wrote to Molotov: “Recently a plot was unveiled. The plotters, including Trotskyites, have been arrested. The peoples of the provinces are well disposed toward the government’s measures against plotters. The power of the 6-principle policy in Xinjiang and peace in the province are being increasingly consolidated.”66 Sheng’s decisive struggle against Trotskyites was received favorably by Moscow leaders. Unlike the developments of 1931–1934, this time the question of rendering aid to the duban was promptly resolved. The Soviets managed to isolate the 36th Dungan Division with the assistance of General Ma Zhongying, who had been disarmed and was under surveillance in the USSR. Following secret talks between consul Smirnov in Kashgar and the deputy commander of the division, Ma Hushan, on June 4, 1937, Ma offered his services to the Soviet government in written form and on June 6 to the Soviet consul in an oral form. The Politburo discussed his appeal and instructed the consul that “the command of the 36th Division should settle the question of the Kashgar district’s occupation by addressing the Xinjiang government and making an agreement with it on conditions as set forth by Ma Hushan. The command of the division should ensure unconstrained peace in the south of Xinjiang. In this respect, any further advance of the division must be stopped in the north and east of Kashgar.”67 In this case the Soviet government could give “some friendly advice” to the government of Xinjiang in the interests of peace: “to avoid any steps against the 36th Division and to make an arrangement with it about stationing of troops in the Kashgar district similar to the peace agreement of July 15, 1936.” Otherwise “the Soviet Union would not be able to ignore the military actions and civil war in Xinjiang, near the Soviet borders.”68 At the same the Politburo recommended that if the commander of the 36th Dungan Division appealed to Sheng it would be appropriate “to conclude an agreement with him about extending the peace agreement

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between Urumqi and Khotan of July 15, 1936, in addition to Khotan, to the entire Kashgar district, provided its troops are withdrawn from the Kashgar district northward.”69 Agreements with Ma Hushan also touched upon the question of Ma Zhongying’s release and his return to Xinjiang, which the Politburo considered. The Politburo wanted to hold similar talks with Gen. Ma Zhongying, who was currently interned in the USSR, and receive guarantees from him. The resolution proposed “together with the talks of comrade Smirnov with Ma Hushan, to hold here similar talks with Ma Zhongying. To entrust comrade Kruchinkin with conducting the talks in agreement with the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.”70 On July 20, 1937, after military preparations, ten Soviet war aircraft landed near Ghulja. The Soviet troops began advancing toward Kashgar while aircraft were transporting military cargo from Urumqi to the combat zone. On July 23 the Soviet troops assumed the offensive against Uyghur units in the direction of Uchturfan. Two regiments formed from the Red Army and PCIA (conventionally Osh and Narynskii regiments), at the orders of the PCD fought in the frontline for Kashgar in Eastern Turkistan. For secrecy purposes a new service uniform was designed for the soldiers and officers of the two regiments. Except for the black boots of the Red Army, this uniform had nothing in common with the Soviet Army uniforms. The main strategic task of the command of the Central Asian military district in Xinjiang was to purge Kashgar of mutineers. Seeing that the battle for Kashgar favored the Chinese-Soviet forces, the Soviet leaders made some amendments in the existing instructions and directives. A resolution of the Politburo dated July 29, 1937, said: “(1) Not to release Ma Zhongying; (2) To recommend that the duban reject the agreement with Ma Hushan; (3) To bring two regiments with aircraft and tanks into Xinjiang south of the Maralbashi line that stymied the advance of the 36th Division northward; (4) To instruct the Frontier Guards Department to replace comrade [Andrei] Fedin with a new military advisor together with a small group of commanders. As for our other military advisors in Xinjiang, instruct comrades Voroshilov and Frinovskii to make the necessary arrangements; (5) To authorize the acceptance of a new group of fifty young people in autumn 1937 into the Central-Asian University in Xinjiang.”71 On September 1, accompanied by the Soviet airplanes, the governmental troops of Urumqi and the Osh and Naryn regiments began the military operation toward Maralbashi. Following combat operations of the “Kirghiz national army” in Xinjiang, the insurgent Uyghur and Dungan units were routed in September.72 On September 6 the united Soviet-Chinese troops defeated Uyghur units in Aqsu. On September 10 Ma Hushan managed to flee to India together with a hundred soldiers. Eight hundred soldiers of another part of the Dungan army routed in Khotan, headed by Ma Fu-yüan, escaped



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to Chinghai.73 On September 12 the Soviet troops seized Yarkend then took Kashgar, Yanghihisar, and Khotan within three weeks. The 36th division was smashed. On September 15, 1937, general Abdul Niyaz of the 6th Uyghur Division was arrested in Yarkent county of Eastern Turkistan and murdered. In mid-October South Xinjiang was subordinated to the duban’s authority. Using the methods of a dictator, Sheng was imposing a verdict of guilty on the representatives of the revolutionary army. His repressions embraced the whole of South Xinjiang. About 6,000 soldiers of the Dungan Division and 8,000 soldiers of the 6th Uyghur Division were captured and killed.74 The civil population greatly suffered from the bombardment of towns and populated localities by the Soviet aircraft and joint military operations by the Soviet-Chinese units. According to some Uyghur authors, more than 80,000 Turkistanians were killed in this war.75 A period of severe repression started. According to the well-known researcher. Baymirza Hayit, “A Soviet citizen, the head of the Kashgar police, Mavlanov, ordered 6,000 shot. In addition, more than 300,000 Turkistan residents were arrested in Eastern Turkistan, and the property of 10,000 families was confiscated.”76 Reports from India said that “Khoja Niyaz’s plot in connection with the secret committee of ten was exposed, and he was arrested and executed in 1938.”77 The national protest of Uyghurs against the Chinese authorities in the 1930s was quelled with the direct participation of Moscow. After the suppression some of the Soviet units and aircraft in Xinjiang were withdrawn from the province; others remained at the disposal of the duban. The People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs was instructed to withdraw the members of the cavalry detachment of Colonel Nikolai Noreiko from Xinjiang and return them to the places of their permanent deployment. However, with the consent of the Chinese government and the duban it was considered expedient to reinforce the Soviet cavalry regiment in Hami with fifteen I-15 fighters and reassign the air squadron to the commander of the regiment. A resolution of the Politburo gave orders “[t]o leave the regiment and a military vehicle company as part of border troops and reinforce them with 1,570 soldiers and 1,025 horses. Personnel of military units on the territory of Xinjiang will be dressed in the uniform of the Urumqi government.”78 Since January 1938, to form a regiment and a motor-transport company, the PCIA had obtained 5 T-38 tanks, 10 BT-7 tanks, 55 ZIS-5 trucks, 120 tons of lubricants and fuel, and other technical installations to be sent to Xinjiang. A resolution of the Politburo instructed the duban “to reinforce the governmental apparatus in the south of Xinjiang with politically reliable officers from the central offices of the Urumqi government; to consolidate the Chinese units in the south of Xinjiang, first the Khotan and Kashgar districts, with personnel of the Chinese Red Army stationed in Urumqi; to staff the Chinese units in

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the south of Xinjiang with the best soldiers and disciplined officers whom the duban trusts unconditionally; to form police detachments of thirty to a hundred men in all police departments of large towns and regions where bandits are most active.”79 A year later, the specified military units of the PCIA came under the control of the PCD. A secret resolution of the Politburo on January 10, 1939, ordered “the Xinjiang army organization and guidance of Soviet instructors to be transferred to the PCD.”80 Moscow leaders instructed Lavrentii Beria and Voroshilov to comply with the resolution. The Soviet leaders sought to keep military units of the Central Chinese government in Eastern Turkistan, along with national military units, to suppress the Uyghur uprising in 1937. With that end in view, Sheng was instructed “to telegraph Chiang Kai-Shek that in conformity with his order: the duban armed one regiment and moved it toward Erlitsykh in the end of December, so it would be inexpedient to withdraw. Thus, he kindly requested that Chiang Kai-Shek allow the regiment to reach its destination.”81 SHENG’S UNOFFICIAL VISIT TO MOSCOW Sheng was greatly pleased with the Soviet aid when suppressing the Uyghur mutiny. He realized that it was the Soviet military, political, economic, and diplomatic support that enabled him to preserve his authority in Eastern Turkistan. Upon completion of these developments he sent a brief letter on November 10, 1937, to Molotov, the chair of the Soviet People’s Commissariat, and the Soviet government, thanking them for their support: Developments in the south of Xinjiang were about to disturb the peace in the province that had lasted over the past few years. It was imperialists who wanted to disturb the peace. The tranquility in Xinjiang was restored thanks to your friendly aid. At present, the 36th Division has been fully liquidated in the south of Xinjiang. Imperialist intrigues were unmasked, and the peoples of all nationalities can live in peace and tranquility in Xinjiang. They will be able to continue to build peace. And I’m very grateful to you personally. As the representative of a population of 4 million composed of fourteen nationalities of Xinjiang, I thank you on their behalf. . . . Peoples of all nationalities of Xinjiang will always remember the aid of the Soviet Union, both in the past and today. . . . You are an advanced worldwide revolutionary and the head of the government of the great Soviet Union. I sincerely ask you give me advice to be used in my practical work.82

At the end of his letter Sheng told Molotov, in a manner typical of world leaders: “I’m sending you my photograph and an embroidered picture.”



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In November 1937, during his meeting with the Chinese ambassador Yang Jie, Stalin confessed that the USSR had rendered aid to the Chinese authorities in Xinjiang. Stalin told the ambassador, “We shall help you, sparing no money and weapons. You did not know that we helped in Xinjiang by sending troops uniformed like the Chinese. . . . They wanted to establish a Muslim state under the British protectorate directed against China and the USSR.”83 During his meeting with Sun Fao, the chair of the legislative assembly of China and son of Sun Yat-sen (Sun Yixian), who visited the USSR in February 1938, Stalin declared that the Soviet aid was not intended to seize lands. He pointed out that the USSR had its own lands and that it “has to help Xinjiang, because China is too weak to provide this help to Xinjiang.”84 Following the Soviet-backed stabilization of the situation in Xinjiang, General Sheng was invited to pay an unofficial visit to Moscow to discuss the Soviet military, economic, and technical aid to the Urumqi government. In August 1938 he arrived in Moscow. His long-awaited dream finally came true. Later in August a short meeting was held between Sheng and Maksim Litvinov, foreign commissar of the USSR, and a long meeting with defense commissar Voroshilov. The meeting lasted several hours, during which Sheng sang the praises of Stalin, Voroshilov, the Red Army, and Soviet military might. A transcript of the meeting said that in acknowledgment of the military aid to Xinjiang, Sheng “stands up, embraces, and kisses comrade Voroshilov.”85 September 2, 1938, proved to be the most interesting day. Sheng was to be received in Kremlin by Molotov and Voroshilov. Quite unexpectedly Stalin came to see him as well. When the talks started, the duban thanked the Soviet leaders for the aid to Xinjiang. Discussions began with Stalin’s question: “Is there any army in Xinjiang?” Sheng replied that there were only a few army units. He explained that the situation was due to the hard-financial conditions of Xinjiang and emphasized that he had no opportunity to maintain a big army. At this moment Stalin cut in: “How can you exist without a strong army? Whom can you rely on?” He added that it was impossible to have a hard currency and a strong army simultaneously: it was essential to choose one.86 The duban noted that there were very few Chinese in Xinjiang, so he had “no people available to make a reliable army.” When Voroshilov inquired about the number of Chinese there, Sheng replied that they represented about 10 percent of the population (400,000 people). However, a letter of his in 1941 says that there were 230,000 Chinese in Xinjiang.87 Meanwhile, Russian researcher Vasilii Petrov indicates that the population of Xinjiang was 5,315,246 in 1942: 80 percent Uyghurs, 4 percent Chinese, and 16 percent representatives of other nationalities.88 The duban’s figure proved to be exaggerated, although in reality the number of Chinese in Eastern Turkistan

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tended to grow. In the summer of 1938, the stateless Chinese who resided in the USSR, particularly in the Far East, were “voluntarily” moved to Xinjiang. An order signed by Nikolai Ezhov, head of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs, on June 3, 1938, noted: “The Chinese who have no Soviet or Chinese passports but claim to be Chinese subjects are to be evacuated to Xinjiang. . . . The same is true of Soviet citizens who are wives of the Chinese subjects.”89 On June 10 the Politburo, after a presentation by the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs, passed a resolution on moving the Chinese residing in the USSR to Xinjiang, which was implemented without any further delay.90 Thus the Chinese population in Xinjiang increased not only because of the Chinese living in the USSR but also because of their Russian wives. Vasilii Petrov writes: “As is known, all the Chinese were evicted from the Soviet Union in 1937, primarily to Xinjiang. That’s why a great many Russian women appeared in the streets of towns, since the Chinese left together with their families.”91 Contributing to the growth of the Chinese population in Xinjiang was a mass dispatch of Chinese Communists who had stayed in the USSR to Eastern Turkistan after Sheng started running the “Anti-Imperialistic Union.” In any case the duban’s estimate of the Chinese population of Eastern Turkistan at 400,000 was sufficient to organize a 20,000-man army. In the course of conversation Stalin and Voroshilov stated that “it was enough to choose 20,000 young Chinese and thus train them at military colleges to create a strong army.”92 Then Sheng replied to the Soviet leaders’ questions about industrial enterprises, logging, deposits of oil, tin, gold, and other things. When the duban was asked if he knew about the construction of a large aviation plant and a military college in Urumqi as agreed between the Soviet leaders and the central government of China, he replied that he had learned about it from the Chinese ambassador in Moscow, Yang Jie. 93 During the conversation Stalin took an interest in the Chinese activities in Xinjiang. Sheng noted that “there are traders, artisans, and peasants among them.” Stalin asked which peasants were stronger: Uyghur or Chinese? The duban confessed that “the Uyghur peasant in Xinjiang is stronger” but added that well-known Uyghur merchants and big Chinese firms in Xinjiang had proven to be Japanese agents. When ask if there were Trotskyites in Xinjiang, he replied that there had been Trotskyites but he had arrested all of them. Stalin added that “in addition to Trotskyites there are nationalists headed by Uzbeks from our territory.”94 Then the talk turned to the former consul general, Apresov. Stalin asked: “Is it true that Apresov threatened the dupan?” Sheng noted that “Apresov’s behavior sharply changed after his second arrival in Urumqi. He was surrounded by a group of bad actors and, when I demanded that he move them to other towns, he categorically refused, saying that by mistrusting these



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people the duban was mistrusting Apresov and thus the Soviet government and greatly damaging himself.” Molotov finished the debates: “Apresov followed the 36th Division to catch up with it and is unlikely to come back.”95 As the conversation neared its completion, Molotov asked if the duban had any wishes. Sheng stated that “his lingering dream was to join the Party and that he had repeatedly appealed to Apresov.”96 He explained that his wish was due to his love for the teaching of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin, especially because the world’s only proletarian state helped oppressed peoples not by words but in practice. Sheng stressed that he valued the opportunity to talk with Stalin, the leader of the world proletariat: “if comrade Stalin considers it possible to admit him to the Party, he will be very happy.”97 Thus he gained favor with Stalin, who noted that he had no objection. However, Voroshilov objected, saying that this might damage the duban’s activity and that when both “Chiang Kai-Shek and Ambassador Yang learned about it, they would be very discontented.” Sheng said that he would keep it secret and that neither Chiang Kai-Shek nor Yang would know about it. Stalin noted that it would be rather difficult to conceal this fact, because Sheng would be registered at a Party organization and a few people would be aware of this. He asked if Chiang Kai-Shek would think that he “had been bullied and forcibly admitted to the Party.” Sheng tried to persuade the Soviet leaders that Chiang Kai-Shek would not know about it. Finally, the Soviet leaders agreed to admit him to the Party. Molotov stated that “upon joining the Party the duban will have new rights and responsibilities.”98 Sheng declared that he was not afraid of any responsibilities and pledged that he would discharge his duties with great pleasure. Upon completion of the talks, Molotov, on behalf of the Soviet government, invited Sheng and his family to attend a party in September. The duban replied that his wife would be immeasurably glad to meet comrade Stalin and other Soviet leaders. He told Molotov that his wife had voiced her desire to meet but he “forbade her to mention it. The Soviet leaders were too busy with other important things.” When Stalin heard these words, he noted that the duban was wrong in thinking so: “we are all simple folk and accessible to everyone.” When Sheng reported that he had brought gifts for Stalin and other Soviet leaders, Stalin said that this was a mistake: “if Chiang Kai-Shek learns about it, he will think that the duban wants to bribe them.” Sheng objected that “it is accepted in China to make gifts as a remembrance.”99 In the end, “the leader of the world proletariat” agreed to accept the present, and Sheng was happy. Sheng’s meeting in the Kremlin unlocked the secret of Ma Zhongying’s stay in the USSR. Until 1938 Dungan general Ma Zhongying had been kept in reserve somewhere in the Soviet Union, in case Sheng caused problems

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for the Soviets.100 Stalin asked about the duban’s view of Ма, saying: “if we have to fight against Japan, we are going to suggest that the Nanjing government nominate a person for the top position in Manchuria.” Aware of Sheng’s anxiety about Ма, Stalin told him that the disarmed and jailed Dungan general would not be exploited against him. When the duban spoke of his old rival Ма in a perfunсtory manner, Stalin asked who would be appropriate to take the leading office in Manchuria. To please Stalin, Sheng suggested nominating a person from the ranks of the Chinese Communist Party or the 8th Army. However, Stalin objected that “such a person is not suitable, for he won’t be able to unite all strata; we need a Sun Yat-sen (Sun Yixian) supporter to lead all the people.”101 On September 7 the duban had a detailed conversation with the deputy foreign commissar of the USSR, Vladimir Potemkin, and on September 11 with the head of the 2nd Eastern Department of the PCFA, Sergei Mironov. They discussed political, diplomatic, economic, and military questions. Prior to the departure of the Xinjiang delegation from the USSR on September 29, Semen Gendin, deputy head of the intelligence office of the Red Army, gave Sheng Party card N-1859118 and a copy of the rules of the Communist Party.102 Thus Sheng Shicai was admitted to the Communist Party of the USSR and authorized by the Bolsheviks to rule in Xinjiang. It should be noted that during Sheng’s stay in Moscow preference was given to prominent Chinese Communist Party leaders in ruling Xinjiang. A brother of Mao Zedong, Mao Zemin, settled down in Xinjiang. Huang Dong and Ban Dong were the governors of Aqsu and Khotan. The 8th Army was represented in the province by members of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, while the government of Urumqi rendered aid to this army by sending food, ammunition, and uniforms. On the eve of his trip to Moscow, Sheng sent 50,000 pea jackets, 500,000 Mexican dollars, 6 antiaircraft guns, and 10 light machine guns to the Communist Party of China.103 The 8th Regiment of the Red Army was stationed in Hami, while an air squadron of the Soviet air force was deployed around Urumqi. In 1939–1941 Soviet-Xinjiang relations continued to develop as before.104 The theories of Marxism-Leninism and Stalinism were taught in the schools of Eastern Turkistan in 1938–1939 as a fundamental principle. It was compulsory for schoolchildren and students, mostly Muslims, to study the Russian and Chinese languages. Works propagandizing national moral values in education were confiscated by Soviet “volunteers” and Chinese authorities.105 After Sheng joined the Communist Party in Moscow, as “the number one Communist of the province” he began intriguing against CPC members. Four months after his return to Xinjiang, on January 4, 1939, at 2 a.m., he sent a 7-page letter to Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov, saying that he and his wife



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were still impressed by their trip to Moscow and that joining “the ranks of the glorious Communist Party gave him additional strength.” Sheng wrote that “for some years I’ve been follower of Marxism, Leninism, and Stalinism. As follower of communism, after the April revolution in Xinjiang in 1933 I put forward a 6-principled policy based on the practical application of Marxism, Leninism, and Stalinism in terms of feudalism and economically and culturally backward Xinjiang. While in Moscow, I joined the CPSU, achieved my dreams, and spiritually enriched myself.”106 In his letter addressed to the Soviet leaders Sheng noted that after his return to Xinjiang he was spiritually discontented with Fang Lin (Deng Fa) and other senior Chinese Communists of Xinjiang. Fang Lin represented the 8th Army in Xinjiang. On the Comintern’s invitation he was staying in the Soviet Union from June 1936 to September 1937, and on Moscow’s recommendation he was sent to Xinjiang as a representative of the 8thArmy. Sheng was probably apprehensive about activities in the province of the leading Chinese Communist close to Moscow. He alleged that Deng Fa was insincere to him: Before Moscow agreed to my trip to the USSR, I wrote a letter to comrade Stalin. Having noticed words like “Marxism, Leninism, and Stalinism” in my letter, Fang Lin advised me not to use “Stalinism.” He explained that this was because Stalin had no original ideas; he had deserved no “ism” so far. So Fang Lin forbade me to use “Stalinism,” which seemed to me rather strange. The leader of the Chinese Communist Party wrote a book on materialistic dialectics. Fang Lin told me once that “Mao Zedong’s work on materialistic dialectics is 8/10 correct and 2/10 wrong.” It seemed very strange to me that when criticizing Mao Zedong’s work Fang Lin focused on its incorrectness.107

It has to be kept in mind that Sheng did not confine himself to Deng Fa: he sent the Kremlin “revelatory” information about Mao Zedong’s closest associate, Lín Biao, who had headed the Guomindang army in 1934–1936 and since 1937 had been in command of the 115th division of the 8th Army in the war against Japan. In autumn of 1937 he was recognized as a hero of the “great victory at Píngxíng Guān Dàjié.” Duban pointed out that “Lín Biao together with Fang Lin on behalf of Chinese Communist leaders called upon me to secretly join the CCP and thus live a Party life. I asked: ‘[A]re the Comintern and the Soviet government aware of it?’ Lín Biao said that the Comintern and the USSR were unaware of it.” Sheng added that “it would be improper not to inform the Comintern and the Soviet government about this decision, especially as I have not concealed anything from the USSR and Stalin for the last five years. However, I have no secrets to conceal from comrades Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov.”108 Sheng wrote that he told Lin Biao and Fang Lin about the impropriety of their joining the Urumqi group of

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the Chinese Communist Party without the knowledge of the Soviet leadership and Comintern, saying that “it is dangerous to know this Chiang Kai-Shek and the imperialists and that will affect China’s resistance war. I say this not because I do not accept an order of the Chinese Communist Party but because I have not yet officially joined this Party.”109 Sheng told the Moscow leaders that he informed Lín Biao and Fang Lin that he would not conceal this proposal from the Comintern and the Soviet leadership. He pointed out he had joined the All-Union Communist Party and did not want to join the Chinese Communist Party, adding that “I’ve told no one about my joining the AUCP.”110 In reality, relations between the duban and the Chinese Communists became strained in autumn 1938. On December 9, 1938, during his talks with Ivan Ovdiienko, the acting Soviet general consul to Urumqi, he voiced his dissatisfaction with the creation of an illegal Communist nucleus in Xinjiang by Lin Biao and Fang Lin and dissemination of Communist literature. On December 12 Sheng informed Ovdiienko that he had received a proposal to join the Chinese Communist Party but declined.111 The requests that Sheng addressed to Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov after all the “revelatory materials” about the Communists of China are of great interest. First, he asked the All-Union Communist Party immediately to send to Urumqi a politically grounded man “to carry on talks about my education and Party training.” At the same time, the duban wanted to discuss with him all political and other major issues pertaining to Xinjiang. Second, Sheng asked them to grant his request that the “Comintern order the Chinese Communist Party to liquidate the Party organization and cancel secret meetings of the Chinese Communist Party in Xinjiang.” He asked that the request not be interpreted as directed against the activities of the Chinese Communist Party in Xinjiang: he opposed the development of communism due to the danger that Chiang Kai-Shek and the imperialists could learn about the activity of Communists in Xinjiang. Sheng wrote: “Because there is an organization of the Chinese Communist Party in Xinjiang, members of the CCP will follow Party instructions, not the orders of the Xinjiang government.” Third, Sheng tried to convince the Soviet leadership that the “existence of the CCP in Xinjiang aggravates the political situation in the region and undermines the guiding force of the Xinjiang government, but it also gives the impression that there is no unified political power of Xinjiang.” Fourth, Sheng wrote: “[S]hould we agree to the existence of the Communist Party in Xinjiang, this would mean that the advantage passes to the organization of the All-Union Communist Party. Why is the existence of the CCP in Xinjiang inadmissible? This is because the leader of Xinjiang, Sheng Shicai, is a member of the All-Union Communist Party.” Not knowing how these proposals would be received, Sheng pointed out that he had written his letter hurriedly



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and that there were some mistakes: “I kindly ask you to forgive, instruct, and criticize me properly.”112 On January 29, 1939, Ivan Ovdiienko sent a detailed memorandum to the PCFA. He pointed out that Sheng intended to ban Chinese Communists who promoted Communist propaganda. According to Ovdiienko, the duban had reprimanded a few Chinese Communists nicknamed “nomads” in Xinjiang and informed the press about it. Ovdiienko wrote: “Nomads . . . have a propensity for leaving Xinjiang. Note that Fang Lin raised the question of their dismissal from jobs in Xinjiang.” All these disputes and the discord between Sheng and the Chinese Communists were reported to Lavrentii Beria, the people’s commissar for internal affairs, in a letter on June 23, 1939, by newly assigned deputy foreign commissar Vladimir Dekanozov.113 Despite the attempts of Soviet representatives to settle disputes between the duban and the Chinese Communists sent to Xinjiang by the Comintern, Sheng behaved confidently after receiving his Party membership card in Moscow. A cunning and hard-to-decipher person (according to Ivan Ovdiienko), Sheng suggested to the Soviet General Consulate on July 10, 1939, that seventy-four German missionaries engaged in espionage activities should be arrested. It was the agreement of August 23, 1939, welcomed by the duban, that saved the German missionaries in Xinjiang from unavoidable arrest.114 Thus, following the suppression of the Muslim movement in 1934, Sheng used the Soviet Union to ensure his power in the region. In the mid-1930s Eastern Turkistan passed under the control of Moscow in political, military, economic, and ideological respects. In these years the duban repeatedly raised the question of building Mongol-type socialism in Xinjiang (a Communist state identical to the Soviet one) or annexing the province to the USSR. Moscow was cautious about this proposal of the Bolshevik duban from Xinjiang but nevertheless continued its efforts to turn Eastern Turkistan into a “Soviet citadel” at the gateway to China. NOTES 1.  See: Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” August 5, 1934, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 16, l.140. 2.  Justin M. Jacobs, Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State, 106. 3.  Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 185. 4.  See: Dabbs, History of Discovery and Exploration of Chinese Turkistan, 171. 5.  See: Mirovitskaia, Sovetskii Soiuz v strategii gomin’dana (20-30 gody), 161–62. 6.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” March 19, 1935, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 17, l.151. 7.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” March 22, 1935, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 17, l.156.

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  8.  See: Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” Appendix, March 22, 1935, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 17, l.174–75.   9.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On trade with Xinjiang,” June 17, 1936, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 19, l.195. 10.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” August 16, 1936, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 19, l. 49. 11.  Krasil’nikov. Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, s.198. 12.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” Appendix, March 22, 1935, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 17, l.179. 13.  Ibid., 179. 14.  Ibid., 180. 15.  See: Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “About advisers and instructors in Xinjiang,” September 11, 1935, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 18, l. 140. 16.  See: Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” September 13, 1935, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 18, l. 142. 17.  See: Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “About Joint Stock Company (Vostvage),” September 11, 1935, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 18, l. 140. 18.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On the Xinjiang oil,” September 11, 1935, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 18, l. 141. 19.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” March 17, 1936, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 19, l. 122. 20.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” February 16, 1937, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 20, l. 181. 21.  Ibid., 181. 22.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On the work of our representatives in Xinjiang,” September 11, 1935, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 18, l. 141. 23.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On awarding comr. Apresova,” September 13, 1935, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 18, l. 141. 24.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “About learning Xinjiang youth in the USSR, September 11, 1935, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 18, l. 141. 25.  See: Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “About learning Xinjiang youth in the USSR,” June 17, 1936, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 19, l. 195.



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26.  See: .Petrov, Miatezhnoe «serdtse» Azii, 434; Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 182, 208. 27.  See: Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On the allocation of funds People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs,” August 5, 1935, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 18, l. 105. 28.  See: Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “Question of People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs,” March 29, 1936, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 19, l. 127. 29.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” September 13, 1935, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 18, l. 141. 30.  See: Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” October 1, 1935, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 18, l. 170. 31.  See: Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszanskoe pritiazhenie, 203–207. 32.  See: Military Information: Sinkiang Rebeltions 1931–1937. History of the Independence Movements in Sinkiang. Central Intelligence Group. Intelligence Report, December 5, 1946, NARA, CIA-RDP82, p. 11. 33.  Obukhov, Skhvatka shesti imperii. Bitva za Sin’tszian, 211. 34.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” October 3, 1935, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 18, l. 172. 35.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” February 7, 1936, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 19, l. 44. 36.  Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 194. 37.  Letter of Sheng Shicai to Molotov, October 4, 1936, RGASPI, f. 82, o. 2, d. 1238, l. 154–55. 38.  Ibid., 155. 39.  For more details on Xi’an incident, see: Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009, 124–37. 40.  Lars-Erik Nyman, Sinkiang 1934-1943. Dark Decade for a Pivotal Puppet, Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique, Vol. 32, No. 1, En Asie Centrale Soviétique: Ethnies, nations, états (Jan.–Mar., 1991), 99. 41.  Letter of Molotov to Sheng Shicai, July 3, 1942, RGASPI, f. 558, o. 11, d. 323, l. 56. 42.  Ibid., 56. 43.  See: Baymirza Hayit, Türkistan Rusiya ile Çin arasinda, 324. 44.  See: Isa Yusuf Alptekin. Doğu Türkistan Davasi. Istanbul, 1973, 162. 45.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party” On Xinjiang,” April 4, 1937, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 20, l.11 46.  Ibid., p. 11. 47.  Ibid., p. 11. 48.  Ibid., p. 11.

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49.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” April 8, 1937, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 20, l. 18. 50.  See: Military Information: Sinkiang Rebeltions 1931–1937. History of the Independence Movements in Sinkiang. Central Intelligence Group. Intelligence Report, December 5, 1946, NARA, CIA-RDP82, p.13. 51.  Ahat Andican, Cedidizm’den Bağımsızlığa Hariçte Türkistan Mücadelesi, 386. 52.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” April 19, 1937, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 20, l. 26. 53.  See: Military Information: Sinkiang Rebeltions 1931–1937. History of the Independence Movements in Sinkiang. Central Intelligence Group. Intelligence Report, December 5, 1946, NARA , CIA-RDP82, p. 14. 54.  Ibid., 14. 55.  See: Baymirza Hayit, Türkistan Rusiya ile Çin arasinda, 323. 56.  See: Military Information: Sinkiang Rebeltions 1931–1937. History of the Independence Movements in Sinkiang. Central Intelligence Group. Intelligence Report, December 5, 1946, NARA, CIA-RDP82, p. 15. 57.  See.Sokolov, Sekretnaia missiia V.Q.Dekanozova v Urumchi (Sin’tszian) v 1942 godu, 165; Sovetsko-Kitaiskie otnosheniia, Tom IV, 1937–1945, Kniga 1, 1937–1944, Moscow, 2000, 153. 58.  Alptekin, Doğu Türkistan Davasi, 164. 59.  Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 194. 60.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” May 17, 1937, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 20, l. 43. 61.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “The question of People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs,” June 14, 1937, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 20, l. 33. 62.  Ibid., 190. 63.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” September 24, 1937, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 20, l. 12. 64.  For more information see: Valentin Berezhkov, Riadom so Stalinym. Moscow, 1999, 381–385. 65.  Petrov, Miatezhnoe «serdtse» Azii, 411. 66.  Letter of Sheng Shicai to Molotov, November 10, 1937, RGASPI, f. 82, o. 2, d. 1238, l. 162. 67.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” June 14, 1937, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 20, l. 62. 68.  Ibid., 62. 69.  Ibid., 62. 70.  Ibid., 63. 71.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” July 29, 1937, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 20, l. 115. 72.  See: Aleksei Voskresenskii. Rossia i Kitai: teoriia i istoriia mezhgosudarstvennykh otnoshenii. Moscow, 1999, 213–14.



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73.  See: Military Information: Sinkiang Rebeltions 1931–1937. History of the Independence Movements in Sinkiang. Central Intelligence Group. Intelligence Report, December 5, 1946, NARA, CIA-RDP82, p. 16. 74.  See: Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 190–95. 75.  Amaç Karahoca, Doğu Türkistan—“Çin müstəmləkəsi,” Istanbul, 1960, 16. 76.  Baymirza Hayit, Türkistan Rusiya ile Çin arasinda, 323–324. 77.  See: Military Information: Sinkiang Rebeltions 1931–1937. History of the Independence Movements in Sinkiang. Central Intelligence Group. Intelligence Report, December 5, 1946, NARA, CIA-RDP82, p. 16; See: Lars-Erik Nyman, Sinkiang 1934–1943. Dark Decade for a Pivotal Puppet, 100. 78.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” January 10, 1938, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 21, l. 101–102. 79.  Ibid., 102. 80  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” January 10, 1939, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 22, l. 82. 81.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” January 9, 1938, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 22, l. 101. 82.  Letter from Sheng Shicai to Molotov, November 10, 1937, RGASPI, f. 82, o. 2, d. 1238, l. 162. 83.  Sovetsko-Kitaiskie otnoshenie, Tom IV, 1937-1945. Kniga 1. 1937–1944, Moscow, 2000, 153. 84.  Sokolov, Sekretnaia missiia V. Q. Dekanozova v Urumchi (Sin’tszian) v 1942 godu, 167. 85.  Pavel Aptekar,’ Beloe solntse Sin’tsziana, Rodina, 1998, No. 1, 82. 86.  Conversation Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov with Duban occurs in the Kremlin, September 2, 1938, RGASPI, f. 558, o. 11, d. 323, l. 32. 87.  Sheng Chih-yi, Land Utilization and Settlement Possibilites in Sinkiang, 62; Xinjiang. China’s Muslim Borderland, 245. 88.  Petrov, Miatezhnoe «serdtse» Azii, 397. 89.  Stalinskie deportasii. 1928-1953. Dokumenty. Pod obsh. red. akad. A.N. Iakovleva. Moscow, 2005, 102. 90.  Politbiuro Tsk PKP(b)–VKP(b) povestika dnia zasedanii, Tom II, 1930–1939, Moscow, 2001, 980. 91.  Petrov, Miatezhnoe «serdtse» Azii, 401. 92.  Conversation Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov with Duban occurs in the Kremlin, September 2, 1938, RGASPI, f. 558, o. 11, d. 323, l. 32. 93.  Ibid., 33–34. 94.  Ibid., 35. 95.  Ibid., 36. 96.  Ibid., 37. 97.  Ibid., 37. 98.  Ibid., 38. 99.  Ibid., 38-41.

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100.  Lars-Erik Nyman, Sinkiang 1934-1943. Dark Decade for a Pivotal Puppet, 98. 101.  Ibid., 39; For more details about the future fate of Ma Zhongying, see: Amir Amirbaev, Rostislav Petrov. Proizvol sud’by, 85. 102.  See: Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 212; See: Li Chang. The Soviet Grip on Sinkiang, 498. 103.  Translation of letters Duban Sheng Shicai to Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, January 4, 1939, RGASPI, f. 82, o. d, v. 1238, l. 178. 104.  See: Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 213–14. 105.  See: Baymirza Hayit, Türkistan Rusiya ile Çin arasinda, 324. 106.  Translation of letters Duban Sheng Shicai to Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, January 4, 1939, RGASPI, f. 82, o. 2, d. 1238, l. 176. 107.  Ibid., 178. 108.  Ibid., 179. 109.  Ibid., 180. 110.  Ibid., 181. 111.  See: Sokolov, Sekretnaia missiia V.Q. Dekanozova v Urumchi (Sin’tszian) v 1942 godu, 169. 112.  Translation of letters Duban Sheng Shicai to Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, January 4, 1939, RGASPI, f. 82, o. 2, d. 1238, l. 181–82. 113.  See: Sokolov, Sekretnaia missiia V.Q. Dekanozova v Urumchi (Sin’tszian) v 1942 godu, 169. 114.  Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, Tom XXII, Kniga 2, Moscow.: Gospolitizdat, 1992, 660.

Chapter Three

Deepening Crisis in Soviet-Xinjiang Relations and the Downfall of the Sheng Government

The beginning of World War II in September 1939 had an effect on the situation in Xinjiang. Chiang Kai-Shek and other Chinese leaders wanted to take advantage of these developments and draw the USSR into the war against Japan. In turn, Sheng tried to find an opportunity to preserve his power under new circumstances. On October 20, 1939, he held a reception in honor of officials of the Consulate-General of the USSRs in Urumqi, led by Ovdiienko. During the reception, the duban made a detailed report on the great assistance rendered to the people of Xinjiang by the Soviet Union and proposed a toast to the Soviet leader. On October 25 a reception was held at the Consulate General in honor of public figures of the province, focused on the first results of Soviet assistance and the strategic importance of Eastern Turkistan for China. All this was intended to sound out Sheng’s stand on the issues. THE BEGINNING OF WORLD WAR II AND THE SOVIET UNION’S GROWING ECONOMIC INTEREST IN EASTERN TURKISTAN The beginning of the war brought no changes in relations between the USSR and Xinjiang. Thus, the earlier projects were entering their final stage. The activity of Soviet geologists was underway, and the Soviets gave permanent aid to the Chinese government through the territory of Xinjiang. However, the commissar of internal affairs of the USSR was in charge of relations with foreign countries, due to the war. On December 28, 1939, the Politburo passed a decision “On Control over All Kinds of International Communication” in order “to control all international conversations of foreign diplomats and correspondents by means of sound recording and stenography. To ban 81

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international conversations of private individuals.”1 Although this decision primarily concerned Great Britain and France, it was in effect for all members of the international community, including Xinjiang. In pursuance of the Politburo decision, the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs allowed secret encoding subdivisions of all embassies and consulates to act independently. An appropriate order in respect to Xinjiang was approved in the Politburo decision of March 14, 1940: “To divide the united secret-encoding sector of the Consulate-General and Trade Mission of the USSR in Urumqi into independent secret-encoding subdivisions.”2 Disturbances started in the first days of 1940 in the Altaian regions of Xinjiang bordered by the USSR and Mongolia, which were populated primarily by Kazakhs. Sheng decided to suppress these actions with the help of a ruse. Early in 1940 he invited 350 persons of consequence to visit Urumqi to discuss the situation in Altai. They were immediately arrested upon their arrival in the city. These actions caused a storm of indignation among local leaders and led to an armed insurrection in February under the leadership of Nogaybay Batyr. The USSR rendered aid in suppressing the insurrection. On March 16, 1940, the united Soviet, Chinese, and Mongolian troops attacked the rebels. The insurgent Kazakhs incurred great losses in an unequal battle. Nogaybay was among those lost. However, the insurrection did not cease. Nogaybay was replaced by his son Iris.3 On April 20, 1940, the 8,000-man Chinese army backed by six Soviet aircraft launched an offensive against Iris khan’s supporters. However, the government forces, inexperienced in fighting in mountain conditions, had to retreat with great losses. Under these circumstances, Sheng decided to release the arrested Kazakh leaders. To reach an arrangement on a ceasefire, he sent Shu Ting-jang, his nearest associate in charge of finances, to the insurrection area. In the course of the meeting he told Iris khan that if they surrendered the duban was ready to accept their conditions, which the leader of insurgents then put forward: (1) To release all representatives of Altai and other regions of Xinjiang who had been arrested in Urumqi. (2) To assign a Kazakh representative as head of the Altai district. (3) To prohibit exploitation of Altai gold mines by Soviet specialists. (4) To stop secret arrests. (5) To end the persecution of disarmed Kazakhs.4 In accord with these conditions, on May 15, 1940, a ceasefire agreement was concluded between representatives of Sheng and Iris khan. However, Iris khan did not live long and died from plague. After his death one of his followers who was a leader of the insurrection, named Osman Islam (known later as Оspan Batyr), disagreed with the terms of the agreement and forbade his people to lay down arms. They moved to the Badayshan mountain on the Mongolian border to continue the struggle. When Sheng permitted Soviet specialists on July 5, 1940, to develop the gold deposits of the region in



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defiance of the agreement, the insurrection broke out again. This time the movement was led by Osman Batyr. He and seven associates proposed the slogan “We shall die for freedom.” The insurgents were divided into small guerrilla detachments, which did great harm to the government forces. These successes won great fame for the insurgents. An increased number of Kazakh residents of Xinjiang joined the rebels. In 1940 they gained a victory over government troops and liberated Koktogay. However, the government troops soon regained control over the town and started pogroms against the Muslim population. Eight of Osman Batyr’s eleven children were killed. His wife, Memey, drowned with their remaining children. His associate Suleyman Batyr lost all his family in the warfare.5 Despite heavy losses, the rebels did not cease resisting. In May 1941 many Soviet specialists in the Chinese part of Altai were killed on the orders of Osman Batyr. The uprising could not be suppressed despite the joint efforts of Soviet and Chinese troops. In October 1941 Sheng sent a group of negotiators, including Zhanym khan Haji (a native of Eastern Turkistan), to the region to hold talks with the rebels. Osman Batyr declined to hold any talks because the Xinjiang government was not meeting any of the conditions of the agreement. This time Zhanym khan succeeded in persuading the head of the insurgents that the terms and conditions of the agreement would be complied with. Osman Batyr believed Sheng’s representatives and sent a seventeen-member delegation to Urumqi. However, they were arrested immediately upon their arrival at the airport.6 Despite this, Osman Batyr did not cease resisting his enemies. He continued struggling against the Chinese government forces in 1942. This enhanced his authority in the regions of Koktogay, Chingil, and Bulunthoy, and his fame among the Muslim population grew. Many people considered him a symbol of the struggle for liberation of the Muslims of Eastern Turkistan from their Chinese oppressors.7 Soon afterward Osman Batyr decided to retreat to the mountains to preserve his troops. He managed to do this until 1944. The Soviet trade-economic organizations did not stop their full-scale activity before the beginning of World War II. On January 9, 1940, the deputy foreign commissar, Solomon Lozovskii, during talks in Moscow with the Chinese ambassador, Yang Jie, informed him of the Soviet leaders’ consent to construct an aircraft-assembly plant with an annual capacity of 300 planes in Urumqi. On February 27, 1940, the Commissariat of Foreign Trade instructed the Soviet trade representative in China, Ivan Bakulin, to agree to construction of the enterprise with the government in Chongqing. He was told that “the agreement was strictly confidential.”8 Despite the secrecy around the activities of Soviet offices in Xinjiang, the agreement was closely watched by Western diplomats and members of missionary organizations. Thus Dr. Harold Dewey Heyward, an American missionary in Urumqi, reported in

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January 1940 that “Soviet control is thorough but well camouflaged. Antireligious propaganda exists only in the schools and private trading has not been disturbed.” Doctor Heyward added that “plenty” of Soviet material was going through to China but “declined to discuss particulars. He believes that there are no Japanese in Xinjiang.”9 In autumn 1940 the Soviet leaders decided to discuss a question of prospecting and extracting tin in Xinjiang. Thus, on October 26, the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR and the CC AUCP (Bolshevik) at the recommendation of the People’s Commissariat of Nonferrous Metallurgy passed a joint decision on developing tin mines in Xinjiang and instructed the commissariat “to conclude a concession deal with the Provincial Government of Xinjiang for a term of fifty years with the right to search for, prospect, and exploit tin deposits and related mineral resources in the territory of Xinjiang.”10 Under this decision, Fedor Karpenko was assigned as head of the concession, Petr Shibayev as his deputy, Constantin Shimanov as chief engineer, and Michael Lozhechkin as chief geologist. Karpenko was charged with holding talks jointly with Bakulin, the Soviet consul general in Urumqi, and the government of Xinjiang on concluding a concession deal. At the same time, the Economic Council under the CPC was entrusted to allot all necessary materials, equipment, and funds to the Commissariat of Nonferrous Metallurgy by the fourth quarter. No later than December 1940 the commissariat was to develop a working plan of concessions for 1941 to be submitted to the CPC of the USSR and the CC AUCP (B). On March 7, 1941, the leadership of the party and the government of the USSR approved a working plan developed by the Commissariat of Nonferrous Metallurgy, which had been actively involved on it since January 1941, for submission to the CPC and Politburo for approval.11 “By means of geological prospecting the expedition of the special mission ‘Glavnickeltin’ (General Directorate of the Mining and Processing of Nickel and Tin) in western China (province of Xinjiang) has established the tin-capacity in placers and native deposits. However, no industrial prospects for the deposits have been revealed. The most reliable of all the tin deposits discovered are tin-tungsten deposits in the region of the Borotali River.”12 Xinjiangtin was entrusted with continuing the search for tin and other minerals in Borotali and yet-unexplored regions of Xinjiang and start operations on “detailed prospecting for beryl in the Altai district and organizing experimental extraction of beryl in Altai.”13 Under a working schedule, Xinjiangtin was to continue prospecting operations for tin and tungsten in the basin of the Borotali River and adjacent regions of Kozhurta, Urtak-sary, Motta, Zengin-Kunde, downriver Turgun, and the village of Shofan as well as in Jekerty, Chogan-Keldy, and Kusdtay. Beryl prospecting was to start on May 1 in Altai, so members of a group of engineers of the Altai geological



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expedition were to leave Moscow before April 1.14 The plan included tin and tungsten prospecting work in the districts of Ghulja, Kashgar, and Khotan and a search for beryl in the deposits of Koktogay. With that end in view, the Koktogay geological group was to start fieldwork on May 15 and the Khotan, Yarkend, Kashgar, and Dzinkho groups on June 1. Engineering personnel of the group were to travel to these areas from Moscow by April 25. Under the working plan, a topographic survey in the basin of Borotali River was to start on April 15 and engineering personnel were to go there on March 20, 1941.15 A topographic group of the military attaché of the USSR Defense Commissariat in Xinjiang was to assist in a topographic survey. After the commissariat’s presentation, on April 19, 1941, the Politburo allocated funds to maintain the militarized subdivisions under the Soviet military attachés in Mongolia and Xinjiang: “To allocate to the Commissariat of Defense 5,250 foreign currency rubles to maintain until the end of 1941 a staff of military attachés, instructors, and a separate rifle battalion of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs in Mongolia and Xinjiang.”16 To implement the conditions set forth in the working plans of Xinjiangtin the Politburo entrusted the Prombank of the USSR in fiscal year 1941 to finance Xinjiangtin without estimate and design documents. The Chief Department of Civil Aviation was to assign an RP–5 aircraft by April 15 together with a set of spare parts, and the Defense Commissariat was to assign two new M-17 aircraft engines. The Commissariat of Nonferrous Metallurgy would be provided with fuel and lubricants by the Commissariat of Foreign Trade. The Commissariat of Electrical Industry would assign to Xinjiangtin three 11 АK “Lada” type radio stations with a full set of spare parts by May 1, 1941. The Commissariat of Water Transport would provide top-priority transportation of cargo across the Irtysh River. The Commissariat of Internal Affairs would prepare documents for 260 engineering-technical and administrative-economic personnel attached to the Commissariat of Nonferrous Metallurgy. Clause 7 was: “To license export of arms, ammunition, and explosives from the USSR to meet the needs of the ‘Xinjiangtin’ concession. The quantity of necessary arms and ammunition will be specified by the Internal Commissariat and the Commissariat of Nonferrous Metallurgy of the USSR.”17 A draft agreement for regulating relations between the governments of the USSR and Xinjiang was worked out.18 In autumn 1941 practical measures were implemented by the Soviet Union to establish a meteorological service in western China.19 Appropriate Soviet organizations fulfilled the requests of the Chinese in August 1941 to expand electricity to Urumqi as the chief city of the province.20 Also, the Soviet Union passed a decision to provide veterinary aid to Xinjiang because of a deadly epidemic that affected the region’s animal husbandry.21

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Oil prospecting work carried out by Soviet geologists in Xinjiang yielded results at the end of the 1930s. A deposit of 50 million tons of oil was found in the Shibo region, 8–9 km away from the route from Khorgos to Urumqi. Soviet geologists continued intensive work in Xinjiang to discover oil from January to June 1941.22 An oil refinery in Dushanzi was put into operation in 1942. The construction of the plant had begun in 1938 with Soviet technical assistance. In the first period of operation the plant manufactured 7,830 tons of petrochemical products. Shortly afterward the Soviet geologists discovered oilfields in the Khorgos and Aqsu region of Xinjiang.23 On February 7, 1942, the CPC discussed a question of oil refineries in Dushanzi and submitted an appropriate resolution to the Politburo for approval, which it received on March 20, 1942.24 It stipulated that Ivan Bakulin, the Soviet consul general in Urumqi, and D. Neretun, director of construction works, would sign a contract titled “On Establishment of a Mixed Soviet-Xinjiang Society” with the government of Xinjiang. The Soviets were to assign the director of oil refinery and the chief engineer; Xinjiang would choose the deputy director. It was planned to set up a two-member supervisory board (one representative from each party) and finance construction equally (50 percent from each party). To reimburse these costs, the USSR gave Xinjiang a three-year credit in U.S. dollars (from April 1, 1942, to January 1, 1945) at 4.5 percent annual interest. The Soviets were thereby entitled to purchase gold, cattle, and wool customs and duty free in Xinjiang out of the profits from operating the plant and Xinjiang’s payments on the loan. Clause 7 of the agreement said: “The government of Xinjiang is committed to freely allocate plots of land for prospecting and industrial development of oil.”25 Ensuring the protection of the plant was entrusted to the People’s Commissariat of the Oil Industry of the USSR. The last clause stipulated that the agreement would last for a term of twenty-five years. Xinjiang was entitled to buy back the enterprise at the expiration of the term but had no right to resell or transfer the buy-out rights to a foreign party. By this time, a “Communist plot” had been unveiled in Urumqi; due to the situation at the beginning of World War II, Sheng began seeking a chance to drift apart from the USSR. With that end in view, on May 4, 1942, he sent a secret message to Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, and Semen Timoshenko, suggesting that they “carry out trilateral exploitation of the Dushanzi oilfields by the USSR, China, and Xinjiang, because the USSR was late in concluding a bilateral agreement with Xinjiang.”26 The Soviet presence in Xinjiang was so great that Sheng imagined himself to be the head of the Soviet Republic and was very proud of it. Thus, James A. Millward and Nabijan Tursun, who did joint research devoted to Turkistan, correctly wrote that “from 1934 to 1941, Xinjiang had been a Soviet satellite like Outer Mongolia.”27 In fact, Sheng was informed about political devel-



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opments worldwide, particularly in Eastern Europe, after the beginning of World War II. He was inspired by the annexation of Western Ukraine and western Belarus by the appropriate Soviet republics and the annexation of the Baltic Republics, Northern Bukovina, and Bessarabia by the Soviet Union. In January 1941 the duban sent an interesting letter to Stalin. He suggested “moving away from China and creating a Soviet Republic in Xinjiang, then annexing it to the USSR” by providing “a situation where British imperialists and Chiang Kai-Shek cannot interfere with Xinjiang, while Soviet Xinjiang could lead China to the path of Sovietization.”28 However, the Soviet leaders considered this proposal untimely and did not agree to transform Xinjiang into a new Soviet republic. Soon afterward the international situation seriously changed when the USSR and the United States joined the war. THE “COMMUNIST CONSPIRACY” IN URUMQI AND THE SECRET DEKANOZOV MISSION Fascist Germany’s assault on the USSR on June 22, 1941, led to the creation of another front in the war. The rapid advance of German troops toward Moscow and Leningrad undermined Sheng’s faith in Bolshevism. The sudden Japanese attack on the U.S. naval base in Pearl Harbor and the British base in Singapore led to the formation of a new military-strategic situation regarding China. Consequently, especially after the Red Army’s quick retreat, Sheng decided to drift away from Moscow and the Chinese Communist Party and get closer to the government in Chongqing headed by Chiang Kai-Shek. In the second half of 1941 he began dismissing top officials of the Chinese Communist Party who had held their positions in Xinjiang since the end of the 1930s and prohibited meetings of Soviet-Chinese public organizations patronized by the Soviet Consulate General. He gave direct instructions that “the Communist Party of China in Xinjiang not be allowed to function as a mass political organization or carry on propaganda work.”29 To verify the sincerity of Sheng’s anti-Soviet position, in March 1942 Chiang Kai-Shek sent a commission to Urumqi, headed by the commander of the 8th military zone of the Guomindang, General Zhu Shaoliang. The commission worked until July and praised Sheng’s Anti-Communist activity in its report upon return to Chongqing. The commission was authorized to resolve two major issues: “to establish Guomindang power in Xinjiang and alienate Sheng Shicai from the Soviet Union.”30 While Stalin was engaged in combating Hitler, Chiang KaiShek attempted to extend his influence to Xinjiang. In turn, Sheng decided to take advantage of the situation and get rid of Soviet influence in the province with the help of the Guomintang.31

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In spring 1942, when fascist troops were approaching Stalingrad, Sheng started a new campaign “to fight Trotskyites.” He made a great effort to search for “conspirators” in his milieu and verified their ties with the Consulate General, which in his view was behind “anti-Xinjiang” activities. Sheng believed that Soviet consul general Ivan Ovdiienko was the “inspirer and organizer of the Uyghur-Kazakh White Guard conspiracy.”32 To his own entourage the duban stressed that Leninist-Stalinist teaching had no relation to Marxism, so the USSR was pursuing a policy of “Red imperialism.” However, Sheng “realized all this at the moment when German armies were approaching the Caucasus. Due to Russia’s possible defeat, it would be desirable to strengthen his relations with Chongqing, so quite unexpectedly he ordered General Sheng Shiqi to remove Russian advisors and citizens from Xinjiang. His brother declined to obey this order, and his refusal was backed by the whole cabinet.”33 Because the cabinet had disobeyed his orders Sheng began developing plans to get rid of his younger brother, who was commander of the Xinjiang army. He had graduated from a military academy in Moscow and was married to a Russian woman (other sources say that he was married to a Chinese woman, Chen Xiuying, who lived in Moscow). The process culminated in the “unmasking of a Communist plot” in spring 1942 by the security service of the Xinjiang government, which “aimed to seized power in the province and physically eliminate the governor.”34 What was “the Communist conspiracy” that radically changed the situation in Xinjiang? On March 19, 1942, the duban’s younger brother Sheng Shiqi, the commander of a mechanized brigade, who was considered the main advocate of the USSR in Xinjiang, was killed in Xinjiang under strange circumstance. A detailed inquiry about Xinjiang developments prepared in November 1943 by the American consul in Vladivostok reported that “the first semi-official version in regard to the cause of death of Sheng Shiqi (there appears to have been no account published in the local press at the time) was that he had been killed by the accidental firing of a pistol in the hands of his 5 or 6 year-old son.”35 Sheng contended that the murder was associated with Chen Xiuying, the general’s wife brought from Moscow, and hence with the Soviet Consulate General in Urumqi. He ordered his security service to arrest all those suspected of involvement in the crime. This revealed “the scope of the two plots as indicated by the fact that he arrested three out of four of his Provincial Commissioners, seven out of eleven of his Special Administrative Commissioners, two of his generals and large proportion of the most strategically situated minor officials of the Province.”36 Some 140 ringleaders were arrested the first night and between 300 and 2,000 others suspected of participating in the two secret Communist organizations revived the year before were also arrested. Many



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of those arrested “on the first day were known to me personally and some of those last arrested were fourteen-year-old school children.”37 On May 10, 1942, Sheng sent a ten-page message to Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, and Timoshenko containing evidence that the “conspiracy” had been staged from beginning to end by Soviet representatives in the province. Attached to the message were records of the investigation, including witness testimony and even an excerpt from the diary of surgical operations of the military hospital in Urumqi.38 According to the message, Following the results of the investigation, Chen Xiuying was arrested on March 21. In the course of investigation Chen Xiuying confessed that she had killed Sheng Shiqi. The cause of the murder was as follows. As a member of the Russian Communist Party, Sheng Shiqi maintained good relations with the military advisor Lieutenant-General Ratov, assigned to Xinjiang from the Soviet Union. Chen Xiuying met Ratov in August 1941 when they arrived in Xinjiang from the USSR. Upon arrival in Xinjiang Chen Xiuying often visited Ratov to get news from Sheng Shiqi, who was in Moscow in this period. Taking advantage of this, Ratov stirred up the jealousy of Chen Xiuying by saying that Sheng Shiqi had met a young pretty woman in Moscow and forgotten Chen Xiuying.39

The investigators concluded that Ratov had gradually persuaded Chen Xiuying “to seek the death of Sheng Shiqi . . . prior to the anniversary of the April Revolution.” Of course, the “conspirators” did not include only Ratov. According to the evidence obtained, these activities were guided “in political terms by consul general Bakulin; in military terms by military advisor Ratov; in economic terms by trade agent Veselov.” Witness testimony mentioned practically all the Soviet officials of diplomatic, military, and trade organizations as well as the Chinese who worked there. As a rule, evidence was taken only from locals. The investigation formulated the conspiracy as follows: “With a view of overthrowing the present government of Xinjiang, it is essential to remove, first of all, commander of the mechanized brigade Sheng Shiqi, because he is the right-hand man of the duban, graduated from the Soviet Military Academy of the Red Army, and knows all Soviet instructors in Urumqi.”40 Sheng went very far, saying that the Soviet government was aware of the activity of the conspirators in Urumqi. Thus, the evidence noted that “the organization is led in Xinjiang by consul general Bakulin and that this government was aware of the fact.” Sheng told the Soviet leaders that the main participants in the “Communist conspiracy” in the province were Soviet officials, including financial advisor Pakhomov, trade advisor Kruglov, trade agent Veselov, instructor Malanichev, and members of a “counterrevolutionary organization” aiming to overthrow the government of Xinjiang and thus “weaken the rear guard of China waging a defensive war against Japan,”

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acting “under the instructions and guidance of Bakulin, the Soviet consul general to Urumqi, and military advisor Ratov.”41 At the end of his message Sheng asked Moscow to send experts to Xinjiang and investigate the “conspiracy” and punish those mentioned in the investigatory materials. Stalin’s repressions of the 1930s became the model of the “conspiracy” against the Xinjiang leader. Sheng, who fought against “Trotskyites” of Eastern Turkistan, benefited from his broad experience of such a struggle. Simultaneously with the message sent to Moscow Sheng “sent to Chongqing the former representative of Xinjiang to Chiang Kai-Shek , his [Sheng’s] brother Sheng Shiji, with a large number of gifts, including 31 kg of gold.”42 Following this scandal, on May 21, 1942, Ivan Kurdiukov of the Soviet Consulate General in Urumqi phoned Sheng to inform him that Ratov and Bakulin had been recalled to Moscow, the first permanently; the second “for consultations.” He told the duban that Bakulin would like to see him before going to Moscow. However, Sheng turned down the meeting.43 The Soviets had another view of current developments based on reports from Soviet representatives in Xinjiang. According to this version, Sheng’s brother, Sheng Shiqi, attended the reception. When Sheng Shiqi refused to carry out the duban’s order to expel Soviet citizens from the province, “Sheng Shicai’s father-in-law and his closest advisors demanded that Sheng Shicai kill his brother. However, since Sheng Shicai could not do this at a family council, his father-in-law went out in the courtyard with General Sheng Shiqi and shot him down.”44 The report of the American consul to Vladivostok on Xinjiang events that circulated a year later had much in common with the Soviet version. The consul reported that the killing occurred for one of three reasons: Contemporary rumor in Tihwa (Urumqi) had it that he (Sheng Shiqi) was killed 1) by his (Chinese) wife to whom he had been married for eight years, that wife having recently returned from a trip to the Soviet Union only to discover that her husband had been indulging in a love affair during her absence; 2) by the (Chinese) chauffeur of the family, who was in love with the wife; or 3) by the orders of Defense Commissioner Sheng himself, as a result of a basic difference between the two men in regard to questions of political policy.45

On the basis of the information available, on July 3, 1942, foreign commissar Molotov, at the instructions of the Soviet government, sent a strongly worded letter to Sheng. He reminded him that the allegations set forth his letter regarding Soviet consul general Bakulin, military advisor Ratov, and other officials had not been proven by any evidence and came from unconfirmed information: “If rumors circulating, for instance, in Xinjiang and Moscow, are to be trusted, you, Mr. Duban, are guilty of Sheng Shiqi’s death. In so doing, it is alleged that you staged Sheng Shiqi’s killing, believing him to



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be your rival in controlling Xinjiang. However, the Soviet government is far from believing rumors, while you did so, Mr. Duban.”46 Molotov declared that the Soviet government had no faith in the group of investigators involved in the matter. He reminded Sheng that accusations of this sort had been put forward in Shara-Sume against Soviet vice-consul H. K. Bikmurzin, while the accusations against Bakulin, Ratov, and other Soviet officials were slanderous. As for sending Soviet specialists to Urumqi to investigate the case, the Soviet Foreign Ministry reported that “the Soviet government considers the investigation to be an internal affair of Xinjiang, so it sees no necessity to send Soviet investigators to Urumqi. Especially as the Soviet government finds no grounds to hold the Soviet officials mentioned above accountable on the basis of slanderous materials.”47 Molotov warned the duban against carrying out continuing repressions because the Soviet government had grounds to believe that these harsh measures were unfair. There was talk of dismissals and large-scale arrests of well-known figures of Xinjiang that were becoming dangerous. He voiced his view that actions of this sort “could lead to the liquidation of most of the civil and military cadres of Xinjiang.”48 Before World War II the USSR experienced repressions that greatly damaged the cadre potential of the country. Molotov was one of the organizers of the repression as one of the country’s leaders. In a strange twist of fate, he warned Sheng of the consequences of mass extermination. Despite this warning, a wave of arrests began in Xinjiang because of the “Communist conspiracy.” Among those arrested were about 100 well-known figures of the Chinese Communist Party, including members of the Central Committee: Chen Tanqiu, Lin Jilu, and Mao Zemin, a younger brother of Mao Zedong, whom the Comintern had sent to Xinjiang for security purposes.49 Mao Zemin was shot on Sheng’s orders. Others arrested included the ministers of finance and education of the province, the governors of several regions, including Kashgar and Hami, the editor-in-chief of Xinjiang Zhibao, and other figures of the province. Practically all specialists who had been educated in the USSR, including the students returning home in 1941, were arrested. By 1942 the number of citizens repressed had reached 100,000.50 Among those executed was Sheng Shiqi’s wife, Chen Xiuying, who was falsely charged with the murder. After the arrest, she was tortured mercilessly and went mad. Following her execution, the Chinese mass media wrote: “Madam Sheng Shiqi [Chen Xiuying] was a Russian who coordinated the Soviet conspirators.”51 The most interesting reports dealt with Sheng Shiqi. He was posthumously upgraded to lieutenant-general and ceremoniously buried.52 In his letter to the duban Molotov reminded him of actions against the central government. For instance, in 1934 Sheng had written to Moscow that “urgent building of communism in Xinjiang and its spreading to Gansu and

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Shensi . . . is the only way to rescue China and Xinjiang and overthrow the central government of China led by Chiang Kai-Shek.” It should be noted that in 1936 during a Xi’an revolt headed by Zhang Xuelliang, when Chiang Kai-Shek was arrested, Sheng sided with the mutineers. Most important, in January 1941 he had suggested that Xinjiang join the USSR as a Union Republic. Molotov emphasized that in all issues of this sort the Soviet Union had shown him the right way. At the end of his letter Molotov wrote: “The Soviet government believes that you, Mr. Duban, will draw the necessary conclusions for yourself and make a correct decision to prevent the worsening of our relations.”53 After the letter was sent to Sheng, its text was forwarded to the Soviet ambassador in China, Aleksandr Paniushkiun, on July 7 together with instructions to seek an urgent audience with Chiang Kai-Shek to acquaint him with Stalin’s oral statement and copies of the letter to Sheng on July 3. On July 9 the ambassador met with Chiang Kai-Shek and conveyed to him the oral statement of the Soviet government and Stalin personally, noting that Sheng’s actions had caused well-grounded suspicions of the Soviets. Some time ago the duban had made a number of unfounded accusations against Soviet representatives in the province. Molotov had sent him an explanatory message, reminding him that his actions and mistakes might lead to severe consequences. The Soviet ambassador told Chiang Kai-Shek: “You need to know the state of affairs, so the Soviet government considers it necessary to acquaint you with the text of the letter sent to Xinjiang for delivery to Sheng Shicai.”54 Moscow took this step to uncover old secrets and thus sow discord between Chongqing and Urumqi and maintain its previous position in Xinjiang. The Soviet ambassador tried to persuade Chiang Kai-Shek that the Soviet aid to Xinjiang was intended to save the Chinese regime, which risked being overthrown by Muslims (who wanted to install a Japanese puppet in Xinjiang: the so-called emperor in the person of the second son of the Turkish sultan).55 Chiang Kai-Shek took this into consideration but did not hasten to take measures regarding the duban. He realized that he was dealing with a diplomatic move on the part of the USSR and meant to take advantage of the situation to put Xinjiang under the control of the Chinese government. For this reason, Molotov’s report on the uprising in Xi’an, Sheng’s idea to make Xinjiang part of the USSR, and Sheng’s membership in the All-Union Communist Party (B) was conveyed to the Americans. Washington was informed that “Duban Sheng wanted to make Xinjiang a part of the Soviet Union.”56 In turn, Sheng Shicai looked for ways to expand ties with the government of Chongqing and restore Chiang Kai-Shek’s citizenship. With that end in view, in the summer of 1942 he sent his middle brother, Sheng Shiji, to Chongqing. He had studied in the USSR and received an education at the



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Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies. On July 7, 1942, Sheng sent a long letter on the events in Xinjiang to Chiang Kai-Shek through his brother.57 In the course of the meeting Chiang Kai-Shek demanded that he oust the Communists from Xinjiang and remove Soviet influence. With that end in view, in August 1942 Chiang Kai-Shek arranged a meeting of governors of northwestern provinces in Lanzhou. However, the duban declined the meeting, fearing that the USSR would stage a coup in his absence. In this situation Chiang Kai-Shek’s wife, Song Meiling, was sent to Xinjiang. A day before her arrival in Urumqi, on August 28, Sheng signed an order for mass arrests of Communists.58 Song Meiling, who intended to subordinate Xinjiang to the central government, was cordially welcomed in Urumqi. She seemed to attain her goal: the headquarters of Chiang Kai-Shek’s government, led by Zhu Shaoliang, was opened in Urumqi. Also, a provincial committee of the Guomindang was set up, and an authorized agent of the Chinese Foreign Ministry began work in Xinjiang. The talks reached an agreement on stationing forces in the province to support Chiang Kai-Shek and assignment of Guomindang Party members to top positions. They also agreed to open a U.S. Consulate General in the province.59 This happened on April 19, 1943. Consul Horace Smith began closely observing activities in the province. Then Edmund Clubb, an expert in Soviet-Chinese relations and the second secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Chongqing, arrived in Urumqi as the first American consul to Xinjiang. From early 1945 to the early winter of 1946, the American consul in Xinjiang was a pro-Soviet diplomat. However, his successor, John Hall Paxton, took an anti-Soviet and anti-Communist position.60 Despite these changes, the Soviet leaders would not so easily give up their influence in Xinjiang. As viewed by the U.S. consul, the Soviet government was acting [with] a primary objective of securing a “friendly” regime or group of regimes in what is now Sinkiang [Xinjiang] and of securing for Soviet Russia assurance of controlling the development of the Tungsten, Gold and Petroleum resources of the region and with a possible secondary objective of securing a corridor for more direct aid to the Yenan Communists if Russia intends to take a hand in China “within the Wall” and in Inner Mongolia and Manchuria to ensure that “friendly” regimes also control the larger and more significant areas; it has been decided to try as opportunity can be make relatively safely from an international point of view.61

Stalin and Molotov prepared a strongly worded reply to Sheng and decided to send deputy foreign minister Vladimir Dekanozov to Urumqi to pressure the duban. Dekanozov arrived in Urumqi on July 6, 1942, and the next day

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was received by Sheng. Sheng’s brother Sheng Shiji served as interpreter for Xinjiang and Tikhon Skvortsov, advisor of the embassy, interpreted for the Soviets. After greeting Sheng and presenting gifts, the deputy foreign minister conveyed to him two letters on behalf of the Soviet government. These were replies to his letters addressed to the Soviet leaders on May 4 and 10, 1942. The first letter from Molotov was a reply to Sheng’s letter of May 4 concerning an oil-processing plant in Dushanzi. Molotov wrote that for a few months Soviet specialists had been prospecting for oil, had discovered oilfields, and had built an oil refinery The Soviets presented the duban with a fait accompli. Molotov wrote: “If you, Mr. Duban, are going to insist on your proposal, the Soviet government will have to recall its specialists and take the equipment back from the enterprise in Dushanzi.”62 During a trip to Chongqing, Sheng Shiji, as the representative of his brother, discussed a number of questions with Chiang Kai-Shek, including the oil refinery in Dushanzi. Chiang Kai-Shek promised to send his representative to Xinjiang to settle the refinery situation. When Sheng notified Molotov of this on July 17, he received a reply telegram stating that the Soviets had no objection to the Central Chinese government’s participation in refinery management.63 However, these talks yielded no results. The Soviets eventually recalled their specialists from Xinjiang. Note that during this period the American specialists had already started prospecting for oil in the province. They believed that that the oil deposits were “probably of sufficient importance to give a considerable addition to the Soviet Union’s total potential oil reserves if they can ensure political domination of the Northern side of the Tian Shan and the Gansu corridor down to Yumen.”64 The Americans believed that “the emergence of Soviet political and economic power in Central Asia has transformed the Soviet-Xinjiang border from theoretical to practical strategic importance. The potential mineral and petroleum wealth of Xinjiang may invite Soviet attention.”65 In May 1944 the Office of Far Eastern Affairs of the U.S. State Department described the mineral resources of the province: “[I]t is known that there is some gold in the Altai region and in south Xinjiang, with an annual production reported to total 10,000 ounces per year, that there is some petroleum present, production at Dushanzi having reached possibly as much as one million gallons of crude per month; coal exists in fair quantity; the presence of iron is reported, but the ore thus far exploited has an iron content of only 35 to 43 percent. There are reasonably reliable reports of the presence of mica, zinc, bismuth, and wolfram, but in what quantities these minerals exist is yet to be known.”66 Although the duban had already made a decision on relations with the USSR, he was outwardly cordial when communicating with Soviet representatives and complied with protocol. Thus, in response to the Chinese visit of



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Dekanozov, he sent a letter of appreciation on July 17 to the Soviet leaders to thank them for the gifts. Soviet expectations that Dekanozov would be able to explain things to the duban and persuade him to resume their previous forms of collaboration were not realized. In the course of bilateral contacts Sheng defined the USSR as an aggressor-state and stressed the necessity of dropping out of the AUCP (B). He alleged that the Soviets had been privy to the Communist conspiracy against him.67 Dekanozov informed Moscow of Sheng’s view that Soviet officials had participated in the conspiracy against him. On July 13 Molotov sent a telegram saying that the Soviet government had no new information capable of changing Sheng’s stand on these groundless and slanderous accusations.68 Having realized that no arrangements could be made with Sheng, Dekanozov sent him “a brief booklet” on oppression of the Soviet specialists in Xinjiang. He voiced his hopes that the duban would take the necessary steps to improve the situation. The “booklet” contained a reminder that since the end of 1941 and particularly in the spring of 1942 the Xinjiang officials had radically changed their attitude toward Soviet specialists working at Xinjiang enterprises.69 However, Sheng did not react to this appeal. On July 26 Dekanozov returned from Urumqi, having achieved got nothing, and made a suggestion “to liquidate our enterprises in Xinjiang (aviation plant, oil refinery in Dushanzi, Xinjiangtin trust), bring back their workers and material-technical facilities from Xinjiang to the Soviet Union, curtail trade activity of the Soviet organization Sovsintyorg, recall to the Soviet Union all of our advisors and instructors sent ton Xinjiang at the request of the Xinjiang government to work in Chinese institution.”70 A U.S. State Department memorandum noted that “in 1942, the Russians closed most of their commercial establishments in the province and withdrew Soviet troops which had been invited into the province by the Chinese Governor. A strengthening of Xinjiang political ties with the Chinese Nationalist Government resulted.”71 “It is believed that the Chinese authorities, in the course of their negotiations in the summer of 1942 with General Sheng, probably indicated to the latter that American or British supplies would replace any Soviet goods which might be lost by Sheng by virtue of his reorientation.”72 Following Sheng Shicai’s decision to end the collaboration in 1943, the USSR had to recall its personnel from Xinjiang, which led to the strengthening of American and British influence in the region.73 After the departure of Soviet specialists from Xinjiang and the termination of work on industrial enterprises, the duban started secret talks with the U.S. consul over purchase of industrial equipment and military technology from the United States. He noted in the course of talks that “it was not now planned to establish heavy industry in Xinjiang because of the province’s proximity to the Soviet Union.” Despite the close cooperation between “China and the Soviet Union in international organizations, there

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are no guarantees that in the future there will be no problems between the two countries.”74 However, American diplomats in China made Sheng understand through the leaders of Chongqing that it was very difficult now, but “it appears further quite possible that certain Chinese groups actually hope and think that it may later become feasible, by means of military equipment and technique obtained from the United States and Great Britain in the course of the war against Japan, to launch an attack on the Soviet Union for the nominal purpose of ‘effecting the return of lost Chinese territory.’”75 In December 1943 the American magazine Life wrote that “with the aid of Soviet Russia, he [Sheng] saved Xinjiang for China.”76 On April 12, 1943, the Commissariat of Nonferrous Metallurgy of the USSR began liquidating the entity Xinjiantin, which had ended by April 1.77 In May 1943 the Soviet government notified the government of Chongqing about its plans to curb the activities of Soviet organizations in Xinjiang.78 Thus not only Dekanozov’s mission but also the first stage of the ten-year policy of the Soviet Union in Xinjiang failed. In assessing the Soviet aid to the government of the province, the American consul in Urumqi pointed out that “Soviet economic assistance and advisers bolstered up an autonomous administration in Xinjiang from 1933 until 1943, when Soviet personnel was withdrawn.”79 The U.S. Consulate General in Urumqi closely observed the tensions in Soviet-Xinjiang relations. The U.S. Consulate in Vladivostok also displayed a serious interest in the developments in the northwestern part of China. Consul general Edmund Clubb wrote a report on the political situation in Xinjiang in 1942–1943 and on November 1 sent it to the U.S. ambassador in Chongqing, Clarence Gauss, who sent it to the U.S. secretary of state on December 20, 1943. Despite some shortcomings caused by limited information, the ambassador considered Clubb’s report on the situation in Xinjiang to be important. When analyzing the recall of Soviet specialists from Xinjiang, Clubb came to the conclusion that “the effort of the Chinese to get the withdrawal of Soviet troops led to Soviet action bringing bitter fruits from Chinese policy.”80 THE POLITBURO’S SECRET DECISION ON THE SEPARATIST MOVEMENT OF EASTERN TURKISTAN Immediately after notifying the government in Chongqing of the plans to recall all specialists from Xinjiang, on May 4, 1943, the Politburo of the CC AUCP (B) passed a decision on pursuing a new political line in the province. It noted that after coming to power in 1933 Sheng, making use of Soviet military, economic, diplomatic and economic aid, had managed to strengthen



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his authority and attract representatives of non-Chinese nationality (Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kirghizes, and Mongols) into the administration of the province. However, the awakening of the national consciousness of the ethnic groups of Xinjiang began to conflict with the duban’s desire to provide himself and his clique with unlimited power in the province. Not wanting to allow an increase in the influence of the national cadre on the broad masses of the population, the duban began to conduct mass arrests and remove ethnic leaders from the governing bodies of the province. In reality, the government switched to a policy of colonial oppression. In view of the growing sympathy of the peoples of Xinjiang toward the Soviet Union the governor began to propagandize that his policy of oppressing non-Chinese nationalities was supposedly being conducted with the agreement of the Soviet government.81

The introductory part of the decision mentioned that “the Soviet government cannot tolerate such provocative activity on the part of the governor, which is hostile to the Soviet Union and cannot give him help to pursue his present policy directed at the oppression of the peoples of Xinjiang.” For this reason, this secret decision set the following tasks for Soviet organizations in Xinjiang for the current period: 1.  Help support the non-Chinese nationalities of Xinjiang (Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kirghizes, Mongols, and others) in their struggle against the oppressive colonial policy of the duban and the Xinjiang government: (a) for equal rights for all the nationalities of Xinjiang; (b) for the free development of the culture of each ethnic group and for primary and secondary education in the native language at government expense; (c) against religious oppression; (d) for the creation of government bodies in districts and subdistricts composed of people who enjoy the trust of the local ethnic population; (e) for the creation of a national political council of Xinjiang organized on the basis of election of its representatives in proportion to the size of each ethnic group’s population; (f) against combining civil and military power in the same hands in district government bodies; (g) for reinstituting national military units; (h) for releasing public figures and tribal authorities arrested by the governor; (i) for easing the tax burden on broad sectors of the population and reducing the inflated military and police budget; (j) for providing merchants with the right of free trade with the USSR and removing any restrictions and prohibitions impeding trade; (k) for the elimination of the setting of prices as a measure not in accordance with the Xinjiang economic way of life; (l) for an expansion of the construction of irrigation canals with government assistance; (m) for the cancellation of intolerable labor obligations; (n) against the massive resettlement of the

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population from other provinces of China to Xinjiang as a measure that worsens the position of broad sectors of the population of this province.82 As this text shows, the broader plan of actions adopted by the Politburo was meant to organize a separatist movement of the Muslim population in Eastern Turkistan. To protect the national movements of Xinjiang, clause 2 of the Politburo decision instructed the first secretaries of the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kirghizstan (respectively, comrades Usman Yusupov, Nikolai Skvortsov, and Aleksei Vagov) as well as the chairs of the CPC of all three republics (respectively, Abdujabar Abdurahmanov, Nurtas Undasynov, and Turabay Kulatov) to carry out the following actions: a.  to create illegal groups (“Groups for National Revival”) in Xinjiang among Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kirghizes, Mongols, and others with both local ethic personnel and specially trained officials of the Soviet Central Asian republics; (b) to help the “Groups for National Revival” train military and political personnel, creating schools in the Uzbek, Kazakh, and Kirghiz SSRs for this purpose, and also furnish the necessary weaponry; (c) to organize written communications between scientists and public figures and also the scientific institutions of the Uzbek, Kazakh, and Kirghiz SSRs and cultural and educational societies and prominent public and political figures of Xinjiang; (d) to organize the printing and distribution in Xinjiang of leaflets and fiction and political literature in the languages of Xinjiang about economic, political, and cultural development in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, and other places; (e) to organize the sending of patriotic letters to emigrants from the USSR who live in Xinjiang from their relatives in the USSR; (f) to organize the publication of books for distribution in Xinjiang on behalf of the Central Spiritual Directorate of Muslims (CSDM) in the USSR about the state of affairs of the Muslim religion in the USSR and the participation of Muslims in the Patriotic War [World War II].83 To implement the last clause, on June 10 the Politburo, at the recommendation of the People’s Commissariat of State Security, adopted a decision “To Authorize the Establishment of Religious Department of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan.”84 The implementation of the decision was entrusted to Viacheslav Molotov, Georgii Malenkov, and Vsevolod Merkulov as well as the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. The decision resulted from the necessity of preserving national movements in Xinjiang and



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persuading the Muslim population of Eastern Turkistan of the acceptance of Islam in the USSR. In the summer of 1944, for the purpose of strengthening the struggle against fascism, Soviet Muslims adopted an appeal to Muslims worldwide. It was printed in 5,000 copies and was circulated in neighboring Muslim countries.85 The appeal evoked a broad response in Xinjiang as well. Despite its calls to Muslims to fight fascism, the basic purpose of the document was to persuade Muslim peoples of neighboring countries of the existence of Islam in the Soviet Union. Clause 3 of the Politburo decision of May 4 laid emphasis on propaganda issues in Xinjiang. In particular: a.  exposure of the false nature of the propaganda being conducted by the duban claiming that these actions of the governor and the Xinjiang government that are incompatible with Soviet policy are being conducted with the agreement of the Soviet government; ( b) an explanation to the peoples of Xinjiang that the recall of Soviet specialists, the removal of industrial facilities, and the curtailment of trade with Xinjiang were caused by the absolutely intolerable conditions for the Soviet specialists, Soviet trading organizations, and industrial enterprises created by the duban and also the governor’s attempt to use our organizations and specialists against the interests of the Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kirghizes, Mongols, and other broad sectors of the population of Xinjiang.86 Citizens of the USSR who had illegally deserted to Xinjiang were allowed to return home. The decision granted amnesty “to Soviet citizens who illegally crossed into Xinjiang, granting them the right of return to the USSR. To grant the right of asylum in the Soviet Union to persons persecuted by the Xinjiang government for participation in the struggle against national oppression, providing them with the necessary aid on Soviet territory. To permit the migration of Kazakhs, Kirghizes, and Mongols to and from Xinjiang to the USSR, establishing an appropriate favorable procedure for this on the Soviet border.”87 Clause 7 of the Politburo decision stipulated holding “the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Trade and the Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR together with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Uzbek, Kazakh, and Kirghiz SSRs responsible for organizing illegal trade with Xinjiang merchants in the border zone.” Clause 8 of the decision entrusted the State Commissariat of Security with “(a) using the existing agent network in Xinjiang to help in the organization of the ‘Groups for National Revival’ to conduct verbal and printed illegal propaganda and other measures provided by this decree; (b) organizing the publication of a patriotic appeal to

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the Orthodox population of Xinjiang on behalf of the Moscow Patriarchate.”88 In addition, the NKVD and the People’s Commissariat of Health would be responsible for “expanding medical aid posts at Soviet consulates in Xinjiang, permitting them to treat the location population in them; and organizing a Soviet outpatient clinic in Urumqi, expected to accept up to 200 people a day if possible.” On May 30, 1943, immediately after the Politburo decision, the CPC issued a decree on allocating additional funds for maintenance of firstaid posts in Xinjiang,89 to be implemented by Molotov, Merkulov, Mikoian, Dekanozov, Beria, Yusupov, Skvortsov, and Vagov. Also, it decreed that “Comrade Malenkov is charged with monitoring the implementation of this directive.”90 The Politburo decision was a harbinger of big changes in Eastern Turkistan. According to Russian historian Sergey Radchenko, Stalin preferred to act tacitly. He could not afford a direct intervention in Xinjiang to defend Soviet economic and strategic interests or to get rid of Sheng Shicai.91 It is interesting that two years later, on July 6, 1945, the Politburo adopted the same decision in regard to Iranian Azerbaijan.92 The main purpose of this decision was that “an openly unfriendly regime such as Sheng’s should not be permitted to continue to exist in the territories bordering the Soviet Union.”93 For ten years Moscow had backed Sheng as the leader of the province but after new developments decided to support the anti-Chinese movement of the Muslim population. Before this decision the Soviet leaders had rendered allround aid to the Sheng government in Urumqi in consolidating his authority and oppressing the Muslim population of the province. At that time, it was unclear what would be the outcome of “Soviet and Chinese jockeying for position and influence in Xinjiang. The Chinese want to hold on at all costs and it appears likely that the Soviets would like to see Xinjiang fall back into their control or area of influence for the least cost.”94 A decision on May 4, 1943, allocated the fuel and lubricants to provide for transport facilities to carry equipment for oil-refining works Dushanzi in the USSR.95 In pursuance of the Politburo decision, on May 13 the CPC raised the salaries of Soviet consulate offices operating in the west of China.96 Also, a decision was adopted on May 23 to make more personnel available for the Soviet consulate offices in Xinjiang.97 The American diplomatic services closely watched all these preparations and reached the conclusion that the Soviets’ usual relationship to the province had changed: “the indications are rather that the contemporary Soviet attitude is ‘Let Xinjiang stew in its own juice.’”98 Following the Politburo decision of May 4, 1943, Sheng managed to hold out slightly more than a year. During his reign he executed an estimated 70,000 to 80,000 people in Xinjiang and imprisoned more than 100,000. This repression became increasingly aggravated in the last months of his rule. More than a hundred methods of sophisticated medieval tortures were



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applied to those arrested.99 According to James A. Millward and Nabijan Tursun, during his office Sheng “executed between 50,000 and 100,000 political prisoners.”100 Yet he failed to preserve his power despite the repression. The Politburo plan to back the national movements of Muslim peoples yielded results. The second half of 1943 in Altai marked the strengthening of combat operations of Kazakh rebels led by Osman Batyr. F. Mikhailov, the Soviet consul in Shara-Sume, informed Moscow that supporters of the Kazakh leader were reinforced by recruits from the local population. Thus their number rose to 300 by November 1943.101 In autumn of 1943 the Soviets sought to get in contact with the insurgents of Osman Batyr. In October a Soviet representative named Pakhomov had a secret meeting with him. Following this meeting, the rebels began receiving arms and ammunition from the USSR. The rebels were supplied with 27 rifles, 2,600 cartridges, and 10 Mausers. Osman was personally given an English tommy gun and 1,000 cartridges. In return Osman Batyr gave the Soviet representatives his gifts (thirty-eight horses, eight carpets, and gold).102 Russian historian Sergey Radchenko wrote: Osman Batyr spent his life in rather different pursuits, and made quite a different impression. Admired by the Kazakhs and feared by the Chinese, Osman roamed the sparsely populated lands of northeast Xinjiang at the head of an armed band of rebels, pillaging Chinese establishments in the name of freedom for his people. His men were few but skilled in guerilla warfare. Demoralized Chinese troops in the Altai had to take Osman seriously. Despite his banditry, he commanded the respect of local Kazakhs and, when the time was ripe, could lead a rebellion against the Chinese. A rebel and a self-proclaimed freedomfighter, Osman expected that his pursuits would one day lead to the creation of an independent kingdom of Altai, of which he would become ruler.103

The U.S. Consulate General in Xinjiang closely watched the strengthening protest sentiments among Kazakhs. In the autumn of 1943 consul general Clubb in Vladivostok began sending secret reports to the U.S. Embassy in Chongqing on the issue, although this information did not always reflect the reality. For instance, on October 20 he reported that there were 5,000 rebels. In the meanwhile, another report of December 10 estimated 400 rebels. Also, the consul’s dispatches said that the rebels in Altai were largely backed by Mongolia. Ambassador Gauss wrote to the secretary of state that “some Chinese in Xinjiang appear to believe that after the present war China will be forced to fight Soviet Russia in order to regain control of Outer Mongolia.”104 On November 1 Clubb wrote to Gauss that “the Kazakhs and Kirghizes have long been turbulent elements in Central Asia: as the Chinese in Gansu describe the Kazakhs, ‘they like killing people’—and history would indicate

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that there are other elements in the Xinjiang population who are not averse to killing Chinese when the occasion arises.”105 It should be noted that Sheng’s attempts to enlist the support of Chongqing in his confrontation with Moscow and replace Communists with Guomindangs yielded no results. In July 1943 thirty-one local Party committees were set up, but the number of Party members did not exceed 21,696.106 In the summer of 1944 Sheng felt that power in the province was slipping away from him. Also, great changes occurred on the Soviet-German front. Soviet troops were approaching the borders of Europe. Sheng had to appeal to Stalin, asking him to annex Xinjiang as part of the USSR if he himself would become chair of the CPC in the province.107 However, his initiative was not approved by Moscow. Sheng clearly realized that he would not be able to cheat Stalin. [I]n Xinjiang, Stalin knew that the first stage had been successful with the consummation of the Russian-endorsed coup and the promulgation of the “Eight points” and “Six policies.” His problem was to move into the second stage as smoothly as possible without arousing the combined antagonism of Britain, the United States, and China. Once this was accomplished, it would be only a matter of time before Xinjiang would be directly absorbed into the Soviet Union. . . . Stalin might better have compared it with a snake which, having swallowed half of a fish, is determined to gorge itself upon the rest of the unfortunate victim.108

The Communist Party of China, whose position in the country became increasingly strengthened and which even Chiang Kai-Shek had to reckon with, believed the duban’s position to be hopeless:109 “the position of Sheng Shicai has become desperate, and now he does not know how to get out of the impasse. One hundred senior officials from Guomindang are currently in Xinjiang to seal the fate of the province.”110 Thus, against a background of the successful actions of Soviet troops and their allies in the summer of 1944, Sheng became a serious obstacle to improving Soviet-Chinese relations. American officials were well aware of that, as representatives of the country that fought jointly with China against Japan in the Far East. The United States, especially President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, urgently wanted to bring the war to an end. Consequently, they tried to draw the USSR and China deeper into it. WALLACE’S MISSION TO CHINA AND THE REMOVAL OF SHENG SHICAI FROM XINJIANG In May 1944 Vice President Henry Wallace met with Stalin and Molotov during his visit to the USSR. They discussed a wide range of issues. Then he visited Soviet Central Asia. On Beria’s initiative, he was accompanied by



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Amaiak Kobulov, a former member of Soviet intelligence and diplomat in Berlin, who in 1941–1944 headed the Commissariat of Internal Affairs of Uzbekistan.111 Upon completion of his trip across Central Asia Wallace arrived in Xinjiang on June 19. His arrival was not incidental and gave rise to various rumors. Local newspapers wrote: “Henry Wallace will come, watch, assess our needs, and render necessary assistance to China.”112 Wallace was given a ceremonial reception. Townspeople with Chinese and American flags in their hands were lined up in two rows by police in the streets along which the vice president was traveling toward the duban’s residence. Wallace was given a sumptuous reception there. All newspapers carried headlines about the visit. They published statements by Wallace, Sheng, and Chiang Kai-Shek.113 In 1944 Xinjiang was also visited by Republican candidate Wendell Willkie (who had visited before in 1942), who had lost the U.S. presidential election. In regard to the visits by Wallace and Willkie, Sheng Shicai noted: “Xinjiang is traditionally regarded as the back door of China . . . [after these visits] we felt that Xinjiang had suddenly become the front door of China.”114 One of the goals of Wallace’s talks with leaders of the central Chinese government was to establish closer relations with two large countries: China and the USSR. The discussions emphasized that Sheng Shicai was a serious obstacle on the path to developing the Soviet-Chinese relations.115 During his meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek, the leader of the central Chinese power, Wallace told him President Roosevelt’s recommendations for the Soviet-Chinese talks aimed at improving bilateral relations.116 “During his stay in Chongqing and meetings with leaders of the national government and Kuomintang, Mr. Wallace spoke enthusiastically about the USSR, particularly, achievements of the Soviet people in the Far East and Central Asia. At a farewell dinner, Mr. Wallace once again noted that Chinese leaders should think of establishing good, friendly relations with the USSR.”117 Despite his ceremonious reception in Urumqi, the visit of the U.S. vice president to China played an important role in resolving the “Sheng problem,” which was a matter of principle for Soviet leaders. Sheng Li, the author of an interesting article about Xinjiang developments, wrote that “Vice-President Wallace was sent in spring 1944 with a special mission to the Soviet Central Asia. On his advice, Sheng was dismissed from his post of governor in July same year. In so doing, the Chinese government hoped to restore peace on the Soviet-Chinese border.”118 However, the main purpose of Wallace’s trip to China was associated with reforms. Americans understood that without reform Chiang Kai-Shek could not stay in power. The Chinese historian Chen Jian wrote that “in June 1944, Roosevelt sent his vice president, Henry Wallace, to visit China to press Jiang (Chiang) toward conducting democratic reforms.”119

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Prior to Wallace’s visit to China, a decision of the Politburo on May 4 instructed the Soviet consul general in Kashgar, Nikolai Shesterikov, to prepare a report on the prospects of the national liberation movement in Xinjiang and its social base. The consul general sent the report to Dekanozov in April 1944. It said that the overwhelming majority of various social strata of the non-Chinese population of southern Xinjiang resented the Chinese due to their repression, police terror, and colonial oppression that led to pauperization of the population. All internal contradictions receded into the background: intensification of the national liberation movement was inevitable, and it needed support and real aid from the outside. Most people of all strata felt sympathy for the USSR. Only a few merchants and religious figures were pro-British, in the hope of establishing an Islamic state with Great Britain’s assistance. It was impossible to expand the national liberation movement without enlisting the help of Muslim clerics as a leading force at all stages. Therefore, it was essential to think of a slogan on statehood with the aid of the clerics.120 In the spring of 1944 other Soviet consulates in Xinjiang sent Moscow data on the sociopolitical and economic situation as well as international relations in the related consulate districts. The Soviet consul in Altai, Fedor Mikhailov, wrote that the Kazakh insurgent group headed by Osman could play a decisive role under favorable conditions in organizing and staging a new Kazakh uprising. But he did not rule out the active involvement of the remaining part of the population in the national liberation struggle.121 The information from Soviet diplomats from Xinjiang was discussed in Moscow. It was considered expedient to start the national liberation movement of Eastern Turkistan from the northern part of the province: the districts of Altai, Ili, and Tarbaghatai. The popular movement in these regions was more active than in the southern part of Xinjiang, and the area had a border with Soviet Altai and Mongolia. The Soviet diplomats in these regions indicated that conditions there were favorable to stir up a national liberation movement.122 After Sheng’s departure from the province, “Urumqi had already lost control of north-eastern Xinjiang.”123 The choice of these regions bordered by the USSR as centers of the national liberation movement was also due to the activity of underground revolutionary circles composed of a great number of Uyghur, Kazakh, Uzbek, and Kirghyz intellectuals who had received an education in the Soviet Union and even been members of the Communist Party since the 1920s. For instance, the membership of the underground organization Union of Liberation of Eastern Turkistan, established in 1943 in Xinjiang, included well-known representatives of the intelligentsia, officials, clerics, and merchants, such as Alikhan Törä, Rahimjan Sabirkhojayev, Ahmetjan Kasimi, Abdulkarim Abbasov, Abdurauf Mahsum, Muhamedjan Mahsun, Salihjanbay Babajan,



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Muhitdin Kanat (son of the prime minister of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Republic, Sabit Damolla); Zunun Tailpov, Gany Yuldashov, Kasymjan Ganbari, Nurdun Bey Ilakhun, and Omarjan Pirmuhammad.124 Stalin formed a special coordinating group to perform the tasks defined by the decree and protect the political and economic interests of the USSR in Eastern Turkistan: Aleksei Kosygin from the CPC, Lavrentii Beria from the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Nikolai Shvernik from Trade Unions of the USSR , and Mikhail Suslov from the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party.125 The activities of the special coordinating group included the exploitation of the underground riches of Eastern Turkistan and planned political influence organized by a group directly related to the economic interests of the Soviets. The rich deposits of uranium and oil in Eastern Turkistan were very attractive for nuclear development and would cover the fuel needs. At the end of May 1943, under the leadership of Lavrentii Beria, an operational meeting of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the People’s Commissariat of State Security was held in Xinjiang. Along with the representatives of the central authorities, the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, intelligence officials of Altai, and Soviet residents from different cities of Xinjiang and Mongolia were invited. The meeting was opened by Lavrentii Beria, a member of the Politburo of the CC AUCP (B), who said: The Soviet Union borders the Chinese province of Xinjiang for about 1,700 kilometers, This province was ruled for about ten years by the Chinese warlord Sheng Shicai, who was firmly established in power with our military, political, and economic support. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War [World War II], taking advantage of the Soviet government’s distraction the Soviet-German front, Sheng Shicai at first secretly and eventually openly began to pursue a hostile policy against the USSR. Stalin and the Soviet government for a long time tolerated the unfriendly and at times explicitly hostile assaults of the Guomindang Sheng Shicai. But our patience has come to an end. The patience of the local non-Chinese population of the province, languishing under the yoke of the colonialist policy of Sheng Shicai, has also come to an end. In the vast expanses of Xinjiang an underground anti-Guomindang struggle of the peoples of the province has long been taking place. Some representatives of these underground organizations have repeatedly appealed to us for help. At that time, their appeals did not elicit our sympathy and support.126

Then Major-General Pavel Fitin of the People’s Commissariat of State Security of the USSR outlined the planned activities: to take concrete measures to strengthen the intelligence agents in Xinjiang with experienced personnel and to improve their logistics; to send experienced propaganda personnel,

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by agreement with the parties along the USSR’s border with Xinjiang in the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan, to infiltrate the antigovernment underground forces of Xinjiang with the aim of strengthening their ideology and organization; and to organize in the cities of Alma-Ata, Tashkent, and Frunze training courses for guerrilla commanders participating in local underground antigovernment activities to be brought to the USSR for this purpose. The intelligence departments of the people’s Commissariat of State Security of Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan proposed setting up strongholds at the border checkpoints to engage in intelligence activities and establish contacts with the anti-Sheng underground in the border areas of Xinjiang. The leaders of the People’s Commissars of State Security of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kirghizstan proposed forming military units among immigrants from Xinjiang settled in their territories and organizing training in the methods of guerrilla warfare. These units would be introduced in Xinjiang at the beginning of the armed uprising of the population of the province against the Sheng Shicai regime.127 The vice-consul of the Soviet Consulate in Kobdo (People’s Republic of Mongolia), Konstantin Mamyshev, said: “Our intelligence agents operate from the border area of friendly Mongolia against the Altai district administration of Sheng-Duban. The Kazakh people of the Altai Republic for a long time have been carrying on an armed struggle against the Chinese administration. We are aware of one group headed by an implacable enemy of the Chinese. His name is Osman. We gave him the pseudonym ‘Hero.’”128 The meeting adopted an operative action plan prepared by the head of the commissariat of Internal Affairs, Vladimir Egnarov; the chief of the fourth department of the State Security Committee, Aleksandr Langfang; and a representative of the intelligence department of the defense commissar, Boris Kuznetsov. The document proposed to strengthen the Soviet residency of the special service in Xinjiang; to provide propaganda and ideological workers for the intelligence agencies of the Central Asian republics; to prepare partisan groups in Alma-Ata, Tashkent, and Frunze; to develop the relationship between the state security agencies of Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan and the secret organization against Sheng in Xinjiang; and to have the Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kirghizstan security committees create military units composed of individuals from Xinjiang living in their territories and train them in guerrilla warfare. The intention was to occupy these areas once the armed rebellion against Sheng began.129 Before the proclamation of the Republic of Eastern Turkistan, Moscow set up a special mobile group to coordinate revolts in the three provinces, headed by General Vladimir Egnarov and his deputy, General Aleksandr Langfang.130 General Egnarov was born in 1903 and had been working in law enforcement agencies, including the secret police, since 1926. His service report stated that as well as being experienced



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in matters of intelligence he had “great knowledge about military affairs. Comrade Egnarov knows the situation and people in Xinjiang excellently.”131 According to a decision of the Politburo on May 4, 1943, in autumn of that year the magazine Shark Hakikati (Truth of the Orient), edited by Abdumajid Rozybakiyev, was published in Tashkent in Uyghur and the magazine Kazak yeli (Kazakh People), edited by Mashur Ruziyev and Kadyr Hasanov, was published in Alma-Ata in Kazakh.132 The two magazines were secretly forwarded to Xinjiang. They contributed to the dissemination of national liberation ideas among the population of Eastern Turkistan and to the development of national self-consciousness and provided the Muslim population of the region with detailed information about the literary-cultural life of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, and Kirghizes. In the first half of 1944 leaflets supporting the fighters for national independence were circulated in Xinjiang in areas near Soviet territory. They called upon the Muslim population to fight for independence and overturn Chinese colonial power in the province. The leaflets said that the struggle was being waged for the destruction of all sources of Chinese power and tyranny in Eastern Turkistan; equality of all peoples of the province, and development of national cultures. They alleged that Eastern Turkistan had turned into a big prison; its population into prisoners, and the Chinese into executioners. Champions of independence announced the start of the struggle for the release of peoples from the prisons of Sheng Shicai and stressed that termination of trade and economic ties with the USSR would have severe consequences for the population of Eastern Turkistan. The leaflets also emphasized the necessity of freedom of religion; removal of restrictions on freedom of thought, an end to Chinese resettlement of the province, and opposition to discrimination against the local population.133 After the beginning of uprising in the north of Xinjiang the Chinese press of Chongqing denied the indigenous origin of the Turkic peoples of the province (Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kirghizes, Uzbeks, and Tatars). Kazakhs were even said “to be of the same race as the Cossacks in the Soviet Union [Don and Kuban Cossacks]; they are well known as expert horsemen. Up to the present time it has not been possible to determine their origin.” 134 Such an approach was reflected in the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s report on the Kazakhs prepared in 1952. Their “name was adopted by the Russians, Poles and Ukrainians, and is pronounced in an identical manner. The English-language version of this name, however, changed the Slavic pronunciation of Kazakh to Cossack.”135 The measures that followed the decision of the Politburo CC AUCP (B) on Xinjiang, especially on Soviet special services, finally undermined the foundations of Sheng’s regime and his role as head of the province. In August 1944 he unveiled a new “plot” against himself and arrested several hundred

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members of the Guomindang. This step made Chiang Kai-Shek dismiss him from the position in Xinjiang. On the government’s recommendation, Sheng retired from his post for health reasons.136 On August 29 the government declared that “Mr. Sheng Shicai, a member and chair of the Xinjiang government as well as duban, asked to be released from his position for legitimate reasons. Therefore, Sheng Shicai is released from all the positions that he has occupied. Sheng Shicai is appointed the minister of agriculture.”137 The same declaration stated that “Wu Zhongxin is appointed as a member of the local government and chair of the Xinjiang government. Zhu Shaoliang will be the temporary chair until he arrives in Urumqi. Sheng left Urumqi in early September.”138 When leaving Chongqing “he needed transport planes and 187 cars to take property robbed from people during his reign in Xinjiang.”139 According to the U.S. Consulate General in Xinjiang, Chiang Kai-Shek’s decision to dismiss Sheng from his position ruling the province had three purposes: “1. to strengthen the Central Government’s control in Xinjiang; 2. to eliminate an obstacle to improved Sino-Soviet relations; 3. to prevent Sheng from reaching an agreement with the Chinese Communists.”140 Sheng’s appointment to a top position in the Chongqing government was given a hostile reception by the Chinese, especially the eighty-two members of the Guomindang whom he had imprisoned. They wrote to the government: “We, members of the Guomindang sent to work in Xinjiang, lived there for a long time, know his [Sheng Shicai’s] crimes very well. Moreover, we lived long in this prison of peoples and felt his inhumanity very strongly. We can no longer keep silent about these facts and we want them to be public to the entire nation. We cannot conceal his past misdeeds and allow this brigand and embezzler to play mean tricks.”141 As the number of appeals of this sort rose, Chiang Kai-Shek realized the necessity of Sheng’s dismissal, which occurred in the summer of 1945. He served as officer at a frontier post in Uhan for a while and moved to Taiwan in 1949 to work as an advisor to Chiang KaiShek for state policy questions. The former “ruler” of Xinjiang died on July 3, 1970, at the age of seventy-eight.142 Wu Zhongxin started his work in Urumqi as a leader of the provincial government in early October 1944. But this appointment did not bring any changes in national relations in the province. As the American consul in Urumqi mentioned, “General Sheng has been replaced by General Wu Zhongxin, but Guomindang policies continue to antagonize the non-Chinese elements.”143 On October 5 Wu Zhongxin spoke at the general meeting of functionaries in Urumqi and expounded the main principles of his rule. In place of the “Six Great Policies” that Sheng was guided by for ten years, Wu Zhongxin put forward his five principles. The population of Eastern Turkistan was part of the Chinese nation, one of its tribes. Differences in the



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languages between the Chinese and non-Chinese peoples were due to their living so long far from the main part of the Chinese population. Wu Zhongxin believed that the entire population of Turkistan should study the Chinese language, without which it was impossible “to restore friendly feelings” toward the Chinese. Chinese men should marry Turkistan women to create and strengthen international kinship relations and feelings of friendship and love. Eastern Turkistan was a large country, but its population was small, so it was necessary to settle the Chinese from other regions of the country there. Thus the Chinese and the local population would be closer to each other because it would be easier for Muslims to study the Chinese language. As for relations with the Soviet Union, due to the lengthy frontier between the two countries, Wu Zhongxin would devote attention to the development of ties between the two great nations with their long history.144 However, it seemed to be too late to put forward peace-loving slogans. Along with news about that meeting, a senior official of the consulate information bureau notified Moscow that “the Muslim population resolutely intends to get free of Chinese colonizers. It is difficult to say whether the Muslim population will be able to cope with this risk. But if they are assisted from the outside, the issue may be resolved.”145 In May 1944 the Kazakhs rose against Chinese dominance in the areas that bordered the USSR and Mongolia. According to a report made by the U.S. State Department’s Far East office, Kazakhs were the largest ethnic group people after Uyghurs, numbering 247,000 in the northern provinces, while not more than 187,000 Chinese lived in the entire province, making up 5 percent of the total population.146 According to 1941 data, the Kazakh population Xinjiang numbered 318,716 “or slightly over 8.5 percent of the total population of the province,”147 along with 202,239 Chinese, who made up 5.5 percent of the population.148 The census of 1941 cited by the Americans showed 3,730,051 residents in Xinjiang, of which 2,900,173 (93.1 percent) were Uyghurs.149 The number of Dungans was 92,146 (2.4 percent),150 Kirghizes 65,248 (1.75);151 Mongols 63,018 (1.69 percent);152 Uzbeks 7,966 (0.21 percent);153 Tajiks 8,867 (0.24 percent);154 Tatars 4,601 (0,12 percent);155 and Russians 13,408 (0.47 percent).156 So in the period that preceded the events of 1944 the population of Xinjiang was 3,730,001, of which 3,439,024 were Muslim peoples, mainly of Turkic origin (3,346,878).157 Uyghurs were the main ethnic group of the province. According to U.S. intelligence service data, in the early 1940s the province of Xinjiang was divided into ten administrative districts. “The four districts of Kashgar (900,000), Khotan (605,000), Aqsu (581,000), and Yarkand (561,000) contained over two-thirds of the population.”158 Practically the entire population was of Turkic-Islamic origin. Before the start of the uprising in the north of Xinjiang, Soviet diplomatic representatives took

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practical steps to resettle Russians (former White Guard supporters) to these regions. According to American consulate services, “prior to 1943, the White Russians who remained in Xinjiang were forced to accept Soviet passports and the approximately 1,200 who resided in Urumqi were ordered to move to either Ghulja or Chuguchak and some ultimately to the USSR. After the Soviets withdrew from Xinjiang in 1944, they were able, in September 1944, to sponsor a rebellion in the northwestern part of Xinjiang which again put them in control of the Ili, Tarbaghatai and Altai regions of Xinjiang.”159 Moscow’s oil interests played a crucial role in protecting the insurgent movement in western China and northern Iran. In the spring of 1944, Stalin was considering methods of consolidating the Soviets’ position in China and Iran as well as establishing a sphere of Soviet influence along the USSR’s southern frontiers in the postwar period. Another important issue for the Kremlin was an access to Xinjiang mineral resources and Iranian oil. Simultaneously with events in western China, the Soviet Union was searching for oil resources in northern Iran along the southern Caspian seacoast. In the spring of 1944 Stalin returned to the old idea of gaining a foothold in China and Iran to incorporate them into the postwar sphere of Soviet influence. Xinjiang’s natural resources and Iranian oil were a no less attractive factor. In February 944 large oil deposits were discovered 20 km south of the Soviet border, very near the Soviet district center of Ordubad, as well as in Gorgan, Tash-Abad, and Seminan; the Rasht valley proved to be rich in gas.160 In August 1944 America and Britain organized a bilateral conference that produced a special agreement (signed on August 8 in Washington, DC) that envisaged joint actions in the oil-related sphere. The Soviet diplomats and Soviet intelligence reported from Iran that the British oil companies producing oil in the south of Iran were showing a lively interest in the oil-rich areas in the country’s north near the Soviet border.161 On August 16, 1944, Lavrentii Beria sent an analytical report to Stalin and Molotov on the world’s oil reserves and oil production, including the British and American oil-related policies in Iran, their rivalry over the Iranian oilfields, and their determination to keep the Soviet Union or “any third country” out of Iran. Beria suggested that the Soviet Union “purposefully launch talks with Iran about a concession in North Iran.” He pointed out that “the British, and probably the Americans, are secretly opposing the transfer of North Iran’s oilfields to Soviet use.” Beria believed that the Soviet Union should join the British-American oil talks “to defend the Soviet Union’s interests in the sphere of international oil-related developments.”162 On March 6, 1944, in the context of another power play that was unfolding in Iran, the Soviet leaders revived the Azerbaijan issue with the decision “On Measures Designed to Increase Cultural and Economic Aid to the



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Population of South Azerbaijan.”163 Similar attitudes to the natural resources of neighboring territories were typical in Xinjiang. Mongolian leaders were also interested in strengthening the struggle against the Chinese government in Xinjiang. As far back as October 5, 1943, Mongolian leader Khorlogiyn Choibalsan had met with Osman Batyr, the leader of Kazakh rebels, in Alak-Tolgo on the Mongolian-Xinjiang border and discussed the question of supplying the rebels with arms, ammunition, and food. The deputy interior minister of Mongolia, who participated in the meeting, promised to send forty to fifty military instructors to the headquarters of the rebels. Three months after the meeting, on January 21, 1944, Choibalsan met in Moscow with Stalin and informed him of the heightened tensions on the Chinese-Mongolian border. According to the Russian historian Sergey Radchenko “by the early 1940s Choibalsan became, with Stalin’s support, Mongolia’s own Stalin.”164 During these talks, Stalin assured him that in the face of the Chinese threat the USSR would protect Mongolia. During the meeting, Choibalsan recalled how Kazakhs had struggled against Chinese rule in Altai since 1939 and how many of their leaders were killed and captured—now only Osman remained. Kazakh rebels did resort to out-and-out banditry, but did Osman participate in the raids? Choibalsan said that he did not know, but of course he knew. He later admitted as much to Osman’s face. But Choibalsan was willing to overlook Osman’s questionable pursuits, as long as he fought the Chinese. “If [Osman] is used to cleanse Altai of the Chinese, the Kazakhs and other nationalities there will find freedom.” A moment later Choibalsan clarified his reference to “other nationalities”: “I think that the Mongols living there will also become free.”165 Stalin said that Mongols could live free in the Altai. He also did not mind an independent Kazakh state there. Stalin thought that Osman’s weakness would make him rely on Soviet support. His supposed hatred of the Chinese meant that he would have no fallback position, unlike the costly and unpredictable Sheng Shicai. Osman, like other nationalist leaders in Xinjiang, and indeed like Choibalsan, would inadvertently serve Soviet interests in Asia against encroachments by the Chinese and the Japanese. It did not matter that Osman was not a Communist. Ideology was immaterial to Stalin’s strategic game in Asia. Ideology was more of a liability than an asset, because ideological affinity created expectations that the Soviet commitment would prove stronger, and aid more generous, than would otherwise be was the case. Osman interested Stalin more as a friendly warlord than as a comrade-in-arms in the global struggle against capitalism.166 A second secret meeting between marshal Choibalsan and Оsman Batyr was held on February 25, 1944, on the bank of Bukgyn River in the frontier district of Mayhan-tolga. It was attended by Ivan Ivanov, the Soviet ambassador to Ulan Bator; Iosif Rubin, commander of the Baikal front; Lampanak,

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head of Soviet intelligence in Mongolia; Mongolian internal affairs minister Sagoirzhan; and his Soviet advisor Gredyev. In the course of the meeting the head of the rebels was promised “to turn Altai into independent state and appoint him a khan of Altai after liberation of the country from the Chinese.”167 During a conversation between Choibalsan and Osman the former declared that “the Mongolian government had decided to go beyond ‘moral’ support of the Kazakh comrades, and furnish them with military equipment for use in the rebellion against the Chinese.”168 The Mongolian leader notified Osman that a paramilitary group had been created in Mongolia to help the rebels. A provisional independent government of Altaian Kazakhs conferred the title of Batyr-khan on Osman as a leader of the uprising. Sergey Radchenko wrote that this meeting was “a more like a conference of two Asian khans than a covert meeting of communist operatives.”169 In so doing, the Soviet government gave the insurgent Kazakhs 395 rifles, 200 tommy guns, 6 heavy and light machine guns and 30 light machine guns, 2,000 hand grenades. and 400,000 cartridges.170 “Kazakhs took 105 camels to carry all of these weapons and ammunition back to Osman’s base.”171 Thus, starting in the spring of 1944, the MPR provided weapons to antigovernment Kazaks in Xinjiang.172 After his meetings with Osman, on March 6, 1944, Choibalsan dispatched a telegram to Stalin. He said that his meetings with Osman had been successful and that he had “delivered the presents.” At the same time, Choibalsan was not convinced that Osman could be trusted. “In general, these Kazakhs have bad faith,” he wrote, but he concluded by saying that he would “stay here for a few days and observe Osman’s subsequent actions.”173 An arrangement had been reached on resettling relatives of Osman and families backing the uprising from Koktogay to Mongolia. On March 11, 1944, 360 Kazakh families persecuted by the Guomindang found shelter in Mongolia and were provided with all the necessities to survive.174 Because of the threat of reprisal by the government forces, residents of Kazakh areas moved not only to Mongolia but also to frontier areas of Soviet Kazakhstan. On August 2, 1944, Beria reported to Stalin that twenty-one Kazakh families numbering eighty-seven persons from frontier regions of Kazakhstan had resettled in the USSR with their property and livestock. Along the Kazakhstan sector of the Soviet-Chinese frontier, Chinese border guards, who persecuted immigrants, were given a sharp rebuff, while the Kazakh immigrants were given a warm welcome by local authorities and the population of Mongolia. Developments of this sort strengthened relations between Osman Batyr and the Mongolian leadership and expanded the ties between the USSR and the leader of the Kazakh anti-Chinese uprising. Despite all this the Soviet leaders followed Osman very closely. They feared that “Osman was Choibalsan’s project. He was not a Mongol, but if he won and the Chinese had to leave Altai, Osman



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would fall into Mongolia’s orbit of influence; and Altai could participate in one form or another in the pan-Mongolian movement.”175 In the summer of 1944, after Chinese armed forces along the frontier were brought to readiness, Soviet and Mongolian advisors recommended that the head of the rebels oppose the duban’s troops. He launched the offensive and defeated the Chinese troops with support from the air forces of Luzukhan, largely consisting of Soviet aircraft. This success strengthened the Soviet and Mongolian leaders’ confidence in him. Inspired by these victories, residents of Ili rebelled in July 1944, and a broader anti-Chinese movement headed by Alikhan Törä started in Ghulja. According to the US Consulate General in Urumqi, Kazakh rebels began the struggle thanks to the aid of Soviet advisors and Mongolian arms deliveries: “if the Kazakh revolt succeeds, the Chinese control of the rest of Xinjiang, hanging like a thread, may almost certainly be expected to be thrown off like bonds of rotten rope.”176 The American consul considered cutting off the rich Turfan and Hami areas and all of the lowlands of Xinjiang south of the Tian Shan, including Kashgar, Yarkand, and Khotan, to form one or more semiautonomous Dungan-Uyghur states. He also believed that they might logically be expected to declare the establishment of a semiautonomous Kazakh state and appeal to their fellow Kazakhs of the Republic of Kazakhstan for aid and sympathy.177 A memorandum by the U.S. Consulate General for the State Department on the Xinjiang developments said: “Chinese maladministration is cited as the cause of the insurrection but local Chinese authorities are openly suspicious that assistance is coming to the native Kazakhs from the adjoining Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan. There are probably elements of truth in both accusations.”178 Consul Horace H. Smith correctly understood the main trends of the situation developing in Eastern Turkistan. Removal of duban Sheng from power in 1944 proved to be a new stage of dramatic developments in Eastern Turkistan that marked a new round of Soviet-Chinese confrontation. The Muslims of the region were fated to face great shocks in their history. NOTES 1.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On the control of all types of international communications,” December 28, 1939, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 22, l. 158. 2.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “Question of People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs,” March 14, 1940, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 23, l. 52. 3.  See: Baymirza Hayit, Türkistan Rusiya ile Çin arasinda, 334–35. 4.  See: Baymirza Hayit, Türkistan Devletlerinin Milli Mücadileleri Tarihi, 325.

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  5.  See: Aliia Kyzilkulova, Rastrel Osman Batyra, Tsentral Aziia, 2007, No. 24 (686), 22–28 24 iiunia.   6.  See: Baymirza Hayit, Türkistan Rusiya ile Çin arasinda, 325–326.   7.  Reference consul of Mikhailov in Altai district to People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, Aprel 1944, AVPRF, f. 0/100, o. 32a, p. 299, d. 9, l. 9.   8.  Sokolov, Sekretnaia missiia V.Q. Dekanozova v Urumchi (Sin’tszian) v 1942 godu, 171.   9.  See: Conditions in Xinjiang, January 8, 1940, NARA, RG 59, Box: 5838, NND 730032, Doc. 893.00/1–840, pp. 3–4. 10.  Resolution of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR and Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party ”On the exploration and production of tin in Xinjiang,” October 26, 1940, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 23, l. 142; See: Li Chang, The Soviet Grip on Xinjiang, 498. 11.  See: On approval of the work plan of the concession “Xinjiangtin” for 1941, January 4–March 7, 1941, Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (hereafter referred to as GARF), f. Р-5446, o. 25а, d. 2775, l. 1–121. 12.  Work plan of the concession the People’s Commissariat of non-ferrous metallurgy “Xinjiangtin” in 1941. Approved by the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR and Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, March 7, 1941, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 24, l. 150. 13.  Ibid., 150. 14.  Ibid., 151. 15.  Ibid., 152–153; See: Lars-Erik Nyman. Xinjiang 1934–1943. Dark Decade for a Pivotal Puppet, 100. 16.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “Question of People’s Commissariat of Defense,” April 19, 1941, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 24, l. 24. 17.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On approved work plan of the concession “Xinjiangtin” of the People’s Commissariat of non-ferrous metallurgy in 1941,” March 7, 1941, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 24, l. 115. 18.  See: About the project agreement between the USSR and Xinjiang the organization of Meteorological Service in Xinjiang, August 5, 1941, GARF, f. Р-5446, o. 25а, d. 348, l. 1–3. 19.  See: On the organization of the meteorological stations in Western China, November 10, 1941, GARF, f. Р-5446, o. 25а, d. 8454, l. 6–10. 20.  See: Adoption order to expand the power plant in Urumqi, August 19–23, 1941, GARF, f. Р-5446, o. 25а, d. 563, l. 1–5. 21.  See: Assistance to Xinjiang in the fight against murrain, June 14, 1941, GARF, f. Р-5446, o. 25а, d. 7485, l. 1–9. 22.  See: On conducting exploration and development of oil areas in Xinjiang in 1941, January 8–June 12, 1941, GARF, f. Р-5446, o. 25а, d. 1266, l. 1–59. 23.  Sokolov, Sekretnaia missiia V.Q. Dekanozova v Urumchi (Sin’tszian) v 1942 godu, 171.



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24.  See: On the work of Dushanzi oil plant in Xinjiang province, February 7, 1942, GARF, f. Р-5446, o. 25а, d. 668, l. 1–13. 25.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On signing an agreement with the government of Xinjiang on the operation of an oil plant Dushanzi,” March 20, 1942, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 25, l. 33. 26.  See: Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR. Tom XXV, Kn. 1. Moscow, 2010, 325. 27.  Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, 79. 28.  Letter of Molotov to duban of Xinjiang Sheng Shicai, July 3, 1942, RGASPI, f. 558, o. 11, d. 323, l. 57. 29.  The truth about the events in Xinjiang, 1944, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 824, l. 405. 30.  Ibid., 406; For more information, see: Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 224. 31.  See: David Wang, The Xinjiang Question of the 1940s, 87. 32.  Sokolov, Sekretnaia missiia V.Q. Dekanozova v Urumchi (Sin’tszian) v 1942 godu, 174. 33.  The truth about the events in Xinjiang, 1944, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 824, l. 406. 34.  Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 217. 35.  From Edmund Clubb to Clarence Gauss, American Ambassador Chongqing. Political developments in Xinjiang, 1942–1943, November 1, 1943, NARA, RG 59, Box: 5842, NND 730032, Doc. 893.00/11–143, p. 35. 36.  From American Councul Tihwa (Urumqi), Sinkaing Horace H.Smith to the Secretary of State. Soviet Policy in Xinjiang Possibly works toward Creation of a Group of Semi-autonomous States, July 19, 1944, NARA, RG 59, Box: 5844, NND 130033, Doc. 893.00/7–1944, p. 43. 37.  Ibid., 45. 38.  See: Extract from the operational log Urumqi Military Hospital, May 4, 1942, RGASPI, f. 558, o. 11, d. 323, l. 53. 39.  Letter of Duban of Xinjiang Sheng Shicai to Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov and Timashenko, May 10, 1942, RGASPI, f. 558, o. 11, d. 323, l.43. 40.  Ibid., 47. 41.  Ibid., 51. 42.  Sokolov, Sekretnaia missiia V.Q. Dekanozova v Urumchi (Sin’tszian) v 1942 godu, 174. 43.  Ibid., 175. 44.  The truth about the events in Xinjiang, 1944, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 824, l. 406. 45.  From Edmund Clubb to Clarence Gauss, American Ambassador in Chongqing. Political developments in Xinjiang, 1942–1943, November 1, 1943, NARA, RG 59, Box: 5842, NND 730032, Doc. 893.00/11–143, p. 35. 46.  Letter of Molotov to Duban of Xinjiang Sheng Shicai, July 3, 1942, RGASPI, f. 558, o. 11, d. 323, l. 54.

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47.  Ibid., 55. 48.  Ibid., 55. 49.  See: Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, 81. 50.  See: Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 217–18. 51.  The truth about the events in Xinjiang, 1944, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 824, l. 406; Several Soviet documents indicated that Chen Xiuying was Chinese, not Russian. See: The truth about the events in Xinjiang, 1944, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 824, l. 406. At the same time we must remember that her husband, General Sheng Shiqi, had the Russian surname Petrov. 52.  The truth about the events in Xinjiang, 1944, RGASPI, f. 17, r. 128, v. 824, p. 407. 53.  Letter of Molotov to Duban of Xinjiang Sheng Shicai, July 3, 1942, RGASPI, f. 558, o. 11, d. 323, l. 56–57. 54.  From Moscow to Chongqing—Soviet Ambassador, July 7, 1942, RGASPI, f. 558, o. 11, d. 824, l. 58. 55.  From American Councul Tihwa (Urumqi), Sinkaing Horace H. Smith to the Secretary of State. Soviet Policy in Xinjiang Possibly works toward Creation of a Group of Semi-autonomous States, July 19, 1944, NARA, RG 59, Box: 5844, NND 130033, Doc. 893.00/7–1944, p. 44. 56.  From Edmund Clubb to Clarence Gauss, American Ambassador in Chongqing. Political developments in Xinjiang, 1942–1943, November 1, 1943, NARA, RG 59, Box: 5842, NND 730032, Doc. 893.00/11–143, p. 36. 57.  See: Li Chang. The Soviet Grip on Xinjiang, 498. 58.  The truth about the events in Xinjiang, 1944, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 824, l. 407. 59.  See: Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 226. 60.  See: David Wang. The Xinjiang question of the 1940s, 97. 61.  From American Councul Tihwa (Urumqi), Sinkaing Horace H. Smith to the Secretary of State. Soviet Policy in Xinjiang Possibly works toward Creation of a Group of Semi-autonomous States, July 19, 1944, NARA, RG 59, Box: 5844, NND 130033, Doc. 893.00/7–1944, p. 39. 62.  Sokolov, Sekretnaia missiia V.Q. Dekanozova v Urumchi (Sin’tszian) v 1942 godu, 178. 63.  See: Li Chang. The Soviet Grip on Xinjiang, 499. 64.  From American Councul Tihwa (Urumqi), Sinkaing Horace H. Smith to the Secretary of State. Soviet Policy in Xinjiang Possibly works toward Creation of a Group of Semi-autonomous States, July 19, 1944, NARA, RG 59, Box: 5844, NND 130033, Doc. 893.00/7–1944, p. 41. 65.  Department of State. Chinese. Division of Far Eastern Affairs, December 8, 1944, NARA, RG 59, Box: 5844, NND 130033, Doc. 893.00/12–844, p. 1. 66.  Department of State. Office of Far Eastern Affairs. Xinjiang. Confidential, May 8, 1944, NARA, RG 59, Box: 5843, NND 730032, Doc. 893.00/5–844, p. 16. 67.  See: Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 221; Sokolov, Sekretnaia missiia V.Q. Dekanozova v Urumchi (Sin’tszian) v 1942 godu, 178.



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68.  Telegram of Molotov to Dekanozov, July 13, 1942, AVPRF, f. 06, o. 4, p. 21, d. 222, l. 27. 69.  See: Brief reminder of Dekanozov to duban of Xinjiang Sheng Shicai, July 21, 1942, AVPRF, f. 06, o. 4, p. 21, d. 222, l. 40–41. 70.  Sokolov, Sekretnaia missiia V.Q. Dekanozova v Urumchi (Sin’tszian) v 1942 godu, 180. 71.  Memorandum about Xinjiang, July 17, 1945, NARA, RG 59, Box: 4013, NND 760090, Doc. 761.93/7–1745, p. 1. 72.  Department of State. Office of Far Eastern Affairs. Xinjiang. Confidential, May 8, 1944, NARA, RG 59, Box: 5843, NND 730032, Doc. 893.00/5–844, p. 20. 73.  See: David Wang. The Xinjiang Question of the 1940s, 84. 74.  From Edmund Clubb to Clarence Gauss, American Ambassador in Chongqing. Sino-Soviet Relations: Attitudes of Certain Chinese Officials, December 9, 1943, NARA, RG 59, Box: 5842, NND 730032, Doc. 893.00/12–943, p. 47. 75.  Ibid., 47–48. 76.  William Vandivert. Heart of Asia, Life, December 6, 1943, 35. 77.  See: On liquidation of the concession “Xinjiang Tin” of the People’s Commissariat of non-ferrous metallurgy, January 12,–April 1, 1943, GARF, f. Р-5446, o. 44а, d. 1882, l. 1-23. 78.  The truth about the events in Xinjiang, 1944, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 824, l. 408. 79.  From Friedman to Acheson, September 11, 1945, NARA, RG 59, Box: 4013, NND 760090, Doc. 761.93/9–1145, p. 151. 80.  See: From Clarance Gauss to the Secretary of State. Single copy to the Department, December 20, 1943, NARA, RG 59, Box: 5842, NND 730032, Doc. 893.00/12–2043, p. 33. 81.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” May 4, 1943, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 37, l. 76. 82.  Ibid., 77. 83.  Ibid., 77. 84.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “Question People’s Commissariat of State Security of the USSR,” June 10, 1943, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 37, l. 79. 85.  Appeal religious figures of Soviet Muslims to Muslims of the world, 1944, APDUDPAR, f.1, o.89, d.63, l. 36–38. 86.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” May 4, 1943, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 37, l. 77. 87.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” May 4, 1943, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 37, l. 77–78. 88.  Ibid., 78. 89.  On the additional cost of maintaining the health centers in Xinjiang for 1943, May 30, 1943, GARF, f.R-5446, o. 44a, d. 5528, l. 1–2. 90.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” May 4, 1943, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 37, l. 78.

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  91.  Sergei Radchenko. Choibalsan’s Great Mongolia Dream, Inner Asia, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2009), 236.   92.  See: Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On measures on organization of separatist movement in South Azerbaijan and other provinces of North Iran,” July 6, 1945, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 37, l. 147–148; APDUDPAR, f.1, o. 89, d. 90, l. 4.   93.  From American Councul Tihwa (Urumqi), Sinkaing Horace H.Smith to the Secretary of State. Soviet Policy in Xinjiang Possibly works toward Creation of a Group of Semi-autonomous States, July 19, 1944, NARA, RG 59, Box: 5844, NND 130033, Doc. 893.00/7–1944, p. 40.   94.  Department of State. Office of Far Eastern Affairs, January 11, 1945, NARA, RG 59, Box: 5844, NND 130033, Doc. 893.00/1–1145, p. 80.   95.  See: On the allocation of gasoline and avtol to ensure the evacuation of the plant number 600 from West China to the Soviet Union, May 12–23, 1943, GARF, f. Р-5446, o. 44а, d. 9028, l. 1–10.   96.  See: On increase of wages in foreign currency of the consular post of the USSR in West China, May 13, 1943, GARF, f. Р-5446, o. 44а, d. 198, l. 2–5.   97.  See: On increasing the staff consular offices of the USSR in Western China, May 23, 1943, GARF, f. Р-5446, o. 44а, d. 202, l. 1–3.   98.  From Edmund Clubb to Clarence Gauss, American Ambassador in Chongqing. Political Distrubances in Xinjiang, November 1, 1943, NARA, RG 59, Box: 5842, NND 730032, Doc. 893.00/11–143, p. 45.   99.  Punish the traitor party, and pest killer Sheng Shicai, June 5, 1945, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 824, l. 163. For more information see: Khakimbaev, Natsional’noosvoboditel’noe dvizhenie v Sin’tszjane 1931–1949 godakh: В 2-kh. ch. Ch. 1, 110. 100.  Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, 80. 101.  See: Reference consul of Mikhailov in Altai district to People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, Aprel 1944, AVPRF, f. 0/100, o. 32a, p. 299, d. 9, l. 9. 102.  See: Aliia Kyzilkulova. Rastrel Osman Batyra, Tsentral Aziia, 2007, 24 iiunia. 103.  Sergei Radchenko. Choibalsan’s Great Mongolia Dream, 233; For more details about Osman Batyr, see: , Aleksandr Kadyrbaev. “Podlezhaishchii likvidatsii” po prigovoru “Vozhdia narodov,” “Stepnoi volk Ospan.” 1940–1951, Iran—name, No. 1 (45), 2018, 149–165; Aleksandr Kadyrbaev. Lider kazakhov Kitaia Ospan Batyr i “revoliutsiia trekh okrugov” v Vostochnom Turkistane.1940–1951 gg., Vostochnyi arkhiv, No. 1 (39), 2019, 78–88. 104.  From Clarance Gauss to the Secretary of State. Sino-Soviet Relations in Xinjiang, December 21, 1943, NARA, RG 59, Box: 5842, NND 730032, Doc. 893.00/12–2143, p. 2. 105.  From Edmund Clubb to Clarence Gauss, American Ambassador in Chongqing. Political Distrubances in Xinjiang, November 1, 1943, NARA, RG 59, Box: 5842, NND 730032, Doc. 893.00/11–143, p. 44. 106.  Continuation of the report of the Committee of Xinjiang Guomindang to VI Congress of the Guomindang, 1945, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 824, l. 155. For more



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information, see: Report of the Xinjiang Provincial Party Committee in from January 1943 to March 1945, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 824, l. 151–54. 107.  Guan.’ Shtirikhi k politicheskomu portiretu Sheng Shicaiia, 128. 108.  Allen S. Whiting and Sheng Shih-ts’ai, Xinjiang: pwnor pivot? Michigan State University Press, 1958, 167–68. 109.  For more information, see: Communist Party of China for the past 10 years. Secret brochure of Guomindang. June 15, 1945, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 824, l. 358–369. 110.  Recording of the interview with the Chairman of the Special Area comrade. Ling Zhuhan, June 5, 1944, RGASPI, f. 82, o. 2, d. 1239, l. 32. 111.  See: Sergo Beria. Moi otets Beria. V koridorakh Stalinskoi vlasti. Moscow, 2002, 134. 112.  An overview of the local press for the period May-August 1944, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 992, l. 195. 113.  See: Ibid., 194–95; For more information about Henry Wallace’s trip to Moscow, Soviet Central Asia, Eastern Turkistan (Xinjiang), and China see: Henry Wallace Diary, January 1, 1944–September 19, 1944, FDR Library, v. 26-42 (Reel 2 of 2); Russian author Vladimir Krasil’nikov writes that Henry Wallace’s visit to Xinjiang was held in June 1943, however, it is known that it took place in June 1944. See: Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 331. 114.  David Wang, The Xinjiang Question of the 1940s, 96. 115.  See: Gilbert Chan, China at Crossroads: Nationalism and Communism, 1927–1949. Westview Press.Colorado, 1980, 142; David Wang, The Xinjiang question of the 1940s, 87. 116.  See: Ledovskii, Na diplomaticheskii rabote v Kitae v 1942–1952 gg., 115. 117.  Recording of the interview with Percy Chan, June 26, 1944, RGASPI, f. 82, o. 2, d. 1239, l. 35. 118.  Sheng Li, The Soviet Grip on Xinjiang, 501. 119.  Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 23. 120.  See: Shesterikov, Information about the state and prospects of the national liberation movement in the south of Xinjiang, April 1944, AVPRF, f. 0/100, o. 32a, p. 299, d.11, l. 1–18. 121.  Mikhailov, Information about the situation in the consular district of the Altai. April 1944, AVPRF, f. 0/100, o. 32a, p. 299, d.9, l. 10–11. 122.  Ibid., 9–11. 123.  Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, 82. 124.  See: Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 261. 125.  Ibid., 258. 126.  Amin Amirbaev, Rostislav Petrov. Proizvol sud’by, 85–86 127.  Ibid., 87–88. 128.  Ibid., 88.    129.  See: Obukhov, Skhvatka shesti imperiy, 298–99. 130.  See: Operational information of Beria to Stalin, 1944, GARF, f. R-9401s/ch, o. 2, d. 96, l. 197–98.

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131.  Telegram of Fedotov to Molotov, September 10, 1947, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 38, l. 208. 132.  See: Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 261. 133.  For more information see: Benson, The Ili Rebellion, 200–205. 134.  From the American Consulate in Tihwa (Urumqi). Are the Compatriots in the Province of Xinjiang of the Turkish Race? October 14, 1944, NARA , RG 59, Box: 7262, NND 760050, Doc. 893.00/10–1444, p. 16. 135.  The Kazakh Race of Xinjiang. Information Report, November 24, 1952, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, p. 1; According to Kazakh writer and scientist Olzhas Suleymenov “Kazakhs and Cossacks have common historical roots. Cossacks are the fruit of the interaction of steppe Turks and eastern Slavs generated during the collapse of the Gold Hordee Empire.” See: O.O. Suleymenov. No liudiam ia ne lgal . . . Almaty, 2011, 37. 136.  See: Telegram of Chairman Sheng Shicai to all its subordinate authorities, August 29, 1944, RGASPI, f. 17, r. 128, v. 992, p. 136. 137  Reorganization of the Government of Xinjiang, August 29, 1944, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 992, l. 135. 138.  Report of the Xinjiang Provincial Party Committee in from January 1943 to March 1945, May 28, 1945, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 824, l. 152. 139.  Punish the traitor party, and pest killer Sheng Shicai, June 5, 1945, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 824, l. 163. 140.  From Robert Ward to the Secretary of State, October 10, 1944, NARA, RG 59, Box: 5844, NND 130033, Doc. 893.00/10–1044, p. 2. 141.  Punish the traitor party, and pest killer Sheng Shicai, June 5, 1945, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 824, l. 164. 142.  See: Guan.’ Shtirikhi k politicheskomu portiretu Shen Shi-tsaia, 130. 143.  Department of State. Chinese. Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Dcember 8, 1944, NARA, RG 59, Box: 5844, NND 130033, Doc. 893.00/12–844, p. 1. 144.  Information letter, October 16, 1944, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 992, l. 159; For more information see: Isa Yusuf Alptekin, Doğu Türkistan Davasi, 170–71. 145.  Information letter, October 16, 1944, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 992, l. 159 op. 146.  See: Department of State. Office of Far Eastern Affairs. Xinjiang. Confidential, May 8, 1944, NARA, RG 59, Box: 5843, NND 730032, Doc. 893.00/5–844, p. 16. 147.  For more information on Kazakhs, see: The Kazakh Race of Xinjiang. Informatin Report, November 24, 1952, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, pp. 1–5. 148.  See: The Chinese Population of Xinjiang. Informatin Report, November 24, 1952, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, p. 1. 149.  See: The 1941 Xinjiang Population Survey, March 21, 1953, NARA, CIARDP 82, p. 1. 150.  See: The Dungan Race of Xinjiang. Informatin Report, November 28, 1952, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, p. 1. 151.  See: The Kirghiz Race of Xinjiang. Informatin Report, December 18, 1952, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, p. 1. 152.  See: The Mongols Race of Xinjiang. Informatin Report, January 19, 1953, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, p. 1.



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153.  See: The Uzbek Race of Xinjiang. Informatin Report, January 19, 1953, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, p. 1. 154.  See: The Tajik Race of Xinjiang. Informatin Report, January 19, 1953, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, p. 1. 155.  See: The Tatar Race of Xinjiang. Informatin Report, January 19, 1953, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, p. 1. For more information about Tatar population Xinjiang, see: Mirkasim Usmanov, Tatar Settlers in Western China (Second Half of the 19th Century to the First Half of the 20th Century), in, “Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 20th Centuries. Vol. 2: Inter-Regional and Inter-Ethnic Relations.,” Edited by Anke von Kügelgen, Michael Kemper and Allen J. Frank, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, [Islamkundliche Untersuchungen, 216], 1998, 243–269. 156.  See: The Russian Population of Xinjiang. Information Report, January 22, 1953, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, p. 1. 157.  See: The 1941 Xinjiang Population Survey, March 21, 1953, NARA, CIARDP 82, p. 1. 158.  See: The Population of Xinjiang. Information Report, October 30, 1952, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, p. 1. 159.  The Russian Population of Xinjiang. Information Report, January 22, 1953, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, p. 3. 160.  Information about the investigation of North Iran (Gorgan, Mazandaran, Gilan), February 24, 1944, APDUDPAR, f.1, o. 89, d. 77, l. 28–29. 161.  From Beria to Stalin and Molotov. World output and reserves of oil, August 16, 1944, AVPRF, f. 06, o. 6, p. 37, d. 461, l. 13–18. 162.  Ibid., 18. 163.  Resolution of People’s Commissars of the USSR “On measures to strengthen the cultural and economic aid to the population of South Azerbaijan,” March 06, 1944, APDUDPAR, f. 1, o. 89, d. 84, l. 3–5. 164.  See: Sergei Radchenko. Choibalsan’s Great Mongolia Dream, 233. 165.  Ibid., 235–236. 166.  Ibid., 236. 167.  Letter of Beria to Molotov, October 15, 1945, GARF, f. R-9401s/ch, o. 2, d. 104, l. 62. 168.  See: Sergei Radchenko. Choibalsan’s Great Mongolia Dream, 239. 169.  Ibid., 239. 170.  See: Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 276. 171.  Sergei Radchenko, Choibalsan’s Great Mongolia Dream, 239. 172.  Xiaoyuan Liu, Reins of Liberation: An Entangled History of Mongolian Independence, Chinese Territoriality, and Great Power Hegemony, 1911–1950. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006, 353. 173.  Sergei Radchenko, Choibalsan’s Great Mongolia Dream, 240. 174.  See: Aliia Kyzilkulova, Rastrel Osman Batyra, Tsentral Aziia, 2007, 24 iiunia. 175.  Sergei Radchenko, Choibalsan’s Great Mongolia Dream, 237.

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176.  From American Councul Tihwa (Urumqi), Sinkaing Horace H. Smith to the Secretary of State. Soviet Policy in Xinjiang Possibly works toward Creation of a Group of Semi-autonomous States, July 19, 1944, NARA, RG 59, Box: 5844, NND 130033, Doc. 893.00/7–1944, p. 48. 177.  Ibid., 47. 178.  Memorandum about Xinjiang, July 17, 1945, NARA, RG 59, Box: 4013, NND 760090, Doc. 761.93/7–1745, p. 1; See: Sergei Radchenko, Choibalsan’s Great Mongolia Dream, 243.

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Activation of Moscow’s Policy in Xinjiang and the Creation of the Eastern Turkistan Republic (1944–1945) The wave of protests that began on November 7, 1944, in three northern districts of Xinjiang resulted in a rebellion against the Chinese authorities in Ghulja. Later the Eastern Turkistan Republic was proclaimed. On that the same day it was officially decided to start the uprising against Chinese rule in Yining (Ghulja), the central city of the Ili valley. The date selected for the start of the Three Districts Rebellion was deliberately chosen: it coincided with the twenty-seventh anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, which the Soviets considered sacred. On November 6 the most senior officials of Chiang Kai-Shek’s government attended a reception held by the Soviet Embassy in Chongqing to mark this anniversary. On November 7 China’s main newspapers published a congratulatory telegram sent to Moscow by Chiang Kai-Shek on the occasion. The Chinese newspapers in Chongqing printed wide coverage of Marshal Stalin’s speech on the twenty-seventh anniversary of the October Revolution. He called Japan the aggressor in the speech, which caused great interest in Chinese government circles. Chiang Kai-Shek said in a statement released in connection with the anniversary that the “friendship of the USSR with China is necessary not only for both but also for the cause of the war [War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, 1937–1945].”1 THE UPRISING IN GHULJA AND THE THREE DISTRICTS REBELLION In connection with the twenty-seventh anniversary of the October Revolution, the Soviet Consulate General in Urumqi and USSR diplomatic offices operating in other cities of Xinjiang held banquets. The chair of the Xinjiang 123

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Provincial Government, Wu Zhongxin; the commander of the Xinjiang army, General Zhu Shaoliang; the head of the government secretariat; and the American and British consuls, vice consuls, and other officials attended the banquet held in Urumqi. “The Soviet Consul bent over backward to accommodate Wu, adjusting the ceremonies to the governor’s schedule and giving Wu the honor of first toast. Afterwards, he escorted Wu to his vehicle, where the governor praised Stalin as a ‘remarkable leader.’ Had he known of the horrific bloodshed then taking place in the street of Yining.”2 On the same day, information was published in the newspapers about the decision of the Guomindang’s 268th plenum to appoint Wu Zhongxin as the committee chair of the Guomindang in Xinjiang. A day earlier, he had delivered a speech at a meeting of the Guomindang province committee, giving detailed information about education, health, and the status of communications in Xinjiang.3 A major holiday event was held for representatives of regional authorities and the public at the Soviet consulate in Yining (Ghulja) on the occasion of the twenty-seventh anniversary. On the eve of this event, the head of the provincial government’s Interior Department, Deng Xianghai (who had recently returned from Ili), issued a statement that “the population of the Ili district is imbued with a sense of devotion to the government policy and a deep love for the chair of the Xinjiang government, Wu Zhongxin.”4 Despite his reassuring statement, the situation was very tense in Ghulja in early November. In the summer of 1944 two special units (“Buyqu” and “Batyr”) trained by the USSR state security agencies in the mountain village of Issik-Ata, located 78 km from Frunze (now Bishkek) near the Chinese border, were sent to Xinjiang to organize guerrilla war against the Guomindang army.5 In October the Xinjiang government’s decision to confiscate 10,000 head of cattle from the people for the needs of the war had caused great discontent among the population of the Ili district (oymak), which was mainly engaged in animal husbandry. According to the decision, the population of Xinjiang had to pay 700 yuan for each horse that was not handed over, although the real price of the horse was only half that much.6 The protest of the nomadic pastoralists, which started initially in Nilka county, turned into a revolt against the Chinese authorities in the main city of the Ghulja valley on November 7.7 The main slogan of the rebellion was “Don’t bow to the Chinese minority: rise and rule yourselves.”8 The center of the rebels’ operation was located in Alma-Ata and Khorgos, but its main coordination center operated in the territory of the Soviet consulate in Ghulja. According to some reports, a number of “guests” (especially representatives of the White Russians), after having received instructions from consul G. S. Dobashin in the meeting at the Soviet Consulate, joined the ranks of the rebels and began to lead military operations against the Chinese army. That same day, November 7, the secret



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military revolutionaries came to an agreement on the establishment of the Eastern Turkistan Republic. A week later they announced the composition of the secretly formed provisional national government. American intelligence agencies reported on the “Soviet sponsored uprising in Ghulja (Yining) and the subsequent fighting which resulted in the separation of the three northwestern regions of Sinkiang (Ili, Tarbaghatai and Altai) and the establishment of the East Turkistan People’s Republic.”9 According to U.S. security agencies there was large influx of Soviet troops, engineers, technicians, and advisors into the Eastern Turkistan People’s Republic during and after the Ghulja uprising of November 7, 1944.10 Developments in the northern region were not taken seriously at first in Chongqing. The central Chinese government officials believed that the “Soviets have no territorial ambitions in Xinjiang, but do desire the establishment in Tihwa (Urumqi) of regime disposed to be friendly with USSR.”11 According to Chinese historian Chen Jian, “in November 1944, a pro-Communist rebellion backed by the Soviet Union erupted in Tacheng, Ili, and Ashan (the three northernmost counties in Xinjiang) and the rebels had since controlled that area.”12 On November 16, 1944, a report fom the military revolutionary headquarters announced that Alikhan Törä Shakirkhojayev was the head of the newly formed national government. He was an ethnic Uzbek, born near the town of Tokmak (formerly known as Balasog’un), Kirghizstan, in 1887. Later he took the pseudonym Sog’uniy. His father, Shakirkhan Törä, was an educated person and sent his eldest son Alim khan and second child Alikhan to Arabia for religious education. After returning from Arabia, Alikhan Törä continued his theological studies at the Bukhara madrasa and enriched his religious knowledge through his familiarity with the Arabic, Persian, and Turkish languages. Apart from religion, he showed a great interest in the science of medicine and was very fond of Abu Ali Ibn Sina. In 1916 he participated in the antiwar revolt started in Semirechiye and Kirghizstan then went to Kashgar to avoid the tsarist government repression. Alikhan Törä returned to Turkistan in 1918. Due to the civil war that swept the country in 1920, he wanted to make the pilgrimage to Mecca via Xinjiang and came to Ghulja for this purpose. Because of the chaos enveloping the Middle East, however, he could not carry out this desire. On April 25, 1945, Lavrentii Beria and Andrei Vyshinskii wrote to Stalin about Alikhan Törä: “In 1931 he was arrested for anti-Soviet work and sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment but escaped from custody and crossed into Xinjiang. In Xinjiang, as an artful interpreter of the Quran, Shakirkhojayev soon gained authority among believing Muslims and later was the chief mullah of the city of Ghulja.”13 In 1937 Törä could not escape from the repression launched against Trotskyites: he was arrested, and his property was confiscated. After being released from prison in 1941, he

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returned from Urumqi to Ghulja and began to pursue his religious activities, which had a political aspect. In his sermons in the mosque and speeches in the madrasa, he criticized the Guomindang regime and called upon the people to fight against Chinese rule. Törä was one of the founders of the Freedom Society in Ghulja and became the focus of attention of the Soviet authorities in Xinjiang at the beginning of 1944. Isa Yusuf Alptekin writes that “Alikhan Törä was a bold, extremely patriotic, and enlightened religious scholar. He gained the trust and love of the population of Ili.”14 Hakimbeg Khoja, a large Uyghur landowner and Abulkhayri Törä, one of the well-known representatives of the region’s Kazakhs, were appointed deputy chairs. Hakimbeg Khoja had a great reputation among the population; Abulkhayri Törä was known as a pro-independence Kazakh leader. Besides them, the government included representatives of the ethnic groups living in the region: Rahimcan Sabirkhojayev (Uyghur), Anvar Musabayev, Nabiyev (Uyghur), Uraxan (Kazakh), Fucha efendi (Kalmyk), and White Russians Fotii Leskin and Ivan Polinov, who once served in the Cossack troops of chieftain Aleksandr Dutov in Orenburg, among others. General Fotii Leskin led all Soviet White Russian forces who served in the Ili government. Madsharov served as his assistant. The secretariat of Alikhan Törä’s government was headed by Ahmedjan Kasimov (Kasimi), who played an important role in the subsequent stages.15 The report of the American chargé d’affaires in Chongqing noted an “insurgent regime at Yining said to be headed by triumvirate, including a White Russian, a Uyghur and a Kazakh.”16 The composition of the government was varied, in terms of both nationalethnic origin and worldview. Right-wing circles under the leadership of Alikhan Törä, by uniting all Turkish people of Xinjiang under the banner of Islam, preferred to fight against the Chinese authorities and communism. Along with Törä, this group included Muhämmäd Imin Bughra, Sayfuddin Azizi, and others. They were called the “neutrals” or “idealists who wanted autonomy.” The prominent representatives of this group thought that the term “Xinjiang” should be rejected and that the country should be called “Eastern Turkistan.” Left-wing circles that preferred to receive Soviet assistance viewed the USSR as the main stronghold in the fight against the Guomindang and acted on the basis of Moscow’s program. A well-known representative of the group was Ahmedjan Kasimov, who had studied in the USSR and defended his PhD dissertation in history. Alimkhan, Osman, Abulkhayri, Alimjan, and other influential persons were also included in this group. They were called the Yining (Ghulja) group or the Soviet trends group. The members of this group were better prepared theoretically. A third group was trying to find a form of compromise that reconciled the interests of the USSR, Xinjiang, the Chinese Communist Party, and the Guomindang and wanted to see all Com-



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munist ethnic groups of the province under the Chinese authorities. Yolbars khan, Aysa bey, Masud Sabirkhojayev, and others were represented in this group. In the first stage of these events, right-wing circles that controlled the key positions in the government prevailed.17 United around Alikhan Törä, the Islamic nationalist camp feared that Russians who supported the struggle against the Chinese authorities could bring the Muslim movement under their control and would try to intervene in the internal affairs of the national government. In their view, such attempts would prevent them from erecting the blue flag with a crescent and star as a national symbol and could impede the use of words such as “Turkish” and “Turkistan.”18 Commissar for internal affairs Beria and commissar for foreign affairs Vyshinskii wrote to Stalin: “Nevertheless, the rebel government enjoys authority among the Muslim population of the Ili district itself as well as the districts of Xinjiang that border it. Under the influence of the rebel movement attempts at anti-Chinese actions are being noted among the Muslim population in Ili district, in Tarbaghatai and Altai districts in the north, and in Aqsu and Kashgar [districts] in the south.”19 Although the Three Districts (Ili, Tarbaghatai, and Altai) Rebellion that swept the north of Xinjiang received support from abroad, its discontent had a national-ethnic basis. Chiang Kai-Shek’s doctrine of one nation, one party, one doctrine, and one leader was designed to assimilate non-Chinese ethnics. His 213-page book China’s Destiny (published in 1943) included many conflicting views on the issue of national identity.20 According to Jay Teylor, that “it was Chiang’s answer to Mao Zedong’s major essay on the future of China, On the New Democracy. As was the case in Communist areas with Mao’s booklet, China’s Destiny became required reading for students in government-controlled territory and for all officials, military officers, and KMT members. The book reflects Chiang’s distinctly nationalist, highly anti-imperialist, and strictly authoritarian outlook, but on world affairs it struck a liberal, internationalist stance.”21 Because it rejected Chinese national identity, the book was speedily translated into Russian. After the revolution started in the Ili district, Chiang Kai-Shek wrote: “Our Chinese nation was formed by the merger of many people of the same origin and consists of large and small branches of the same blood.”22 He also mentioned in his book the “northeastern provinces, Inner and Outer Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet—all this is a stronghold for the existence of a people, and separation of any of these parts of the territory means the loss of China’s national defense.”23

After the capture of important strategic points in Ili and neighboring districts in the early days of 1945, the interim national government, after discussing its primary goals at its fourth meeting, adopted a nine-point manifesto, adopted on January 5:

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1. End forever the Chinese despotism in the territory of Eastern Turkistan; 2. Create a truly free, independent republic based on the equality of the peoples inhabiting Eastern Turkistan; 3. Promote comprehensive development of the economy of Eastern Turkistan, especially the development of industry, agriculture, and private trade, in order to improve the welfare of the population; 4. Since the majority of the people of Eastern Turkistan are Muslims, maintain that religion and at the same time promote and protect religious freedom for other religions; 5. Develop culture, education, and health; 6. Maintain friendships with all the democratic governments of the world, especially with the Soviet Union, which directly borders Eastern Turkistan, and in the meantime establish equitable political and economic relations with the Chinese government; 7. Build a strong army with representatives of all nationalities in order to defend Eastern Turkistan and preserve peace; 8. The banks, postal service, telephone and telegraph, forestry, and all mineral resources belong to the nation; 9. Eliminate selfishness, bureaucracy, nationalism, and corruption.24

The nine-point manifesto was perceived as an activity program of the interim national government, uniting the interests of the right, left, nationalists, and Islamists. Although the manifesto was prepared by Ahmedjan Kasimov, Abdulkarim Abbasov, and others who were close to the Soviet authorities, it was in the best interests of supporters of Alikhan Törä. Shortly after the manifesto, a group of Muslim leaders represented in parliament and in the Chinese government agencies in Chongqing prepared a draft constitution granting autonomy to Xinjiang under the Chinese authorities. In the fourth paragraph of the proposed draft they suggested replacing the word “Xinjiang” with “Turkistan.” According to them, “the name Xinjiang was given by the Manchu imperial monarchy to suppress those whose opinion differed from theirs and to show their military prowess.”25 The group that had prepared the draft was led by an authoritative young man, Isa Yusuf Alptekin, who was a member of the China Legislative Assembly (Yuan) in Xinjiang, which also included Masud Sabri, a member of the Chinese executive committee; Abdulqadir Mansur, the head of the civil rights committee; Muhammad Aghay, a member of the People’s Political Council Muhammad; and others. Robert Ward, the American consul in Urumqi, wrote that “these men were all highly educated; one of them being for instance, a graduate of Beirut, while several of the others were educated in Paris, most of them appeared to speak French, as well as Turkish and Chinese. They referred themselves as Turkish, stating that the name Uyghur was one used by the Chinese in describing them, but had never been used by the Turkish themselves.”26 In evaluating the demands of the Turkish-Muslim population of the Ili district the U.S. Department of State’s Chinese Affairs Office studied the documents obtained through diplomatic channels from Urumqi and Chongqing. After analyzing the report “Demands of the Sinkiang Autonomists” sent by



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American consul Ward on February 5, 1945, they came to the conclusion that autonomy under the sovereignty of China was acceptable to the population of Xinjiang. These State Department officials considered that the autonomist movement in Xinjiang has a history of greater duration and support of greater numbers than the current insurrectionist movement in the Ili valley region. From the scanty information now available, its influence in the present situation in Sinkiang is evident. The Turkis of Yining have been demanding the creation of an “East Asia Turki Republic.” The requests of the Xinjiang Guild are important not because of their source but because they indicate the lines along which many Turkis are thinking. In this connection it is worth remembering that the demands of Asiatic peoples for equal treatment, cultural autonomy, and self-determination are directed not only to the western nations but also to Asiatic nations engaging in imperialistic practices.27

Along with the Ili district, the Soviet authorities also focused on the Altai region, where the Kazakh rebels since 1940 had fought at intervals against the Chinese authorities and army. After adoption of the Politburo’s decision on May 4, 1943, Ahmed Abuzarov, colonel of the security agency, was sent to the Altai region as a representative of the USSR State Security Committee. His main task was to create army groups among Altai’s progressive people to fight against the “Guomindang reaction.”28 When the Eastern Turkistan Republic was proclaimed, the head of the Kazakh rebel groups, Osman Batyr (1899–1951), and his military forces obeyed the command of this government. The Ili government sent representatives to see him several times and offered cooperation with the Altai rebels.29 However, the Soviet authorities had information that the decision of Osman Batyr was temporary and that he would not recognize the legitimacy of the Eastern Turkistan government in Ghulja once Altai was liberated. According to the Soviet intelligence agencies, Osman Batyr “considers Altai an independent state and himself its khan.”30 Despite the discontent, his Kirghiz-Kazakh forces liberated the Altai region from the Chinese army in a short period. In the autumn of 1944, the whole Altai region came under the rebel forces’ control.31 Osman began to serve as interim governor of the Altai region at the suggestion of the Soviet advisors. Despite having promised to be guided by the Soviet representatives, he reminded them of Choibalsan’s promises. He was hoping to establish his own state by receiving aid from the USSR through Mongolia.32 According to historian Xiaoyuan Liu, “shortly after an “Eastern Turkistan” uprising broke out in November 1944, Moscow adopted a secret policy of sending Soviet military personnel and Kazak units of the MPR Army into Xinjiang to join Uygur and Kazak insurgents in fighting Chinese government troops.”33 Along

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with Kazakh-Kirghiz troops the rebels were supported by armed Torgouts from Tian Shan.34 After the establishment of the national government the rebel groups came under its control. Within a week the new government rules were introduced in Ghulja. The Chinese government forces suffered heavy casualties in the city, and the survivors were captured by the rebels. Due to the Chinese army’s difficult situation in the northern provinces a statement from the Guomin-dang provisional organization said: “Kazakh bandits rebelled on November 7, 1944. This rebellion caused the county party committee huge material and human losses. As soon as the provincial party committee received the news about the revolt, it immediately started to take measures and offered to find ways to protect the members of the district committees and their families in the area of the uprising and to provide them with financial assistance. At the same time, it was proposed to combine military and political works, to mobilize the masses in order to regain the lost areas with joint efforts, and to prepare for pacification on the one hand and demobilization on the other.”35 In the second half of November the national government forces liberated the main residential areas of the Ili district from the Guomindang administration. The fighting over Boratalı, Celpanzı, Tokuz-Torau, Kure, and Nilka was successfully ended. The Guomindang forces that had been sent to help Chinese troops were stopped in time. On December 2, 1944, Beria reported to Stalin and Molotov that the revolt of Muslim population in the counties of Ili district had been widespread and that Nilka city had been seized by the rebels.36 The active participation of Muslims in the revolt, who had been indifferent toward Soviet policies in the past, was due to the Soviets’ direct support. Muslims were told that the goal of the revolt was to separate Eastern Turkistan from China and to convert Xinjiang into an independent Muslim state.37 While the fighting was expanding in the province, on December 5, a Special Assignments Department was created by order of Beria, the commissar of internal affairs of the USSR. The main objective of the department was to lead and support the national liberation movement of Xinjiang Muslims. Vladimir Stepanovich Egnarov, a former chief of the intelligence department of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs, was appointed as head of the department, and Colonel Nikolai Arkhipovich Prokopiuk, a former deputy chief of the fourth department, became his deputy.38 With the approval of Stalin, Soviet officers under General Egnarov’s leadership were sent to the Ili district to organize military operations of the rebel groups against the Chinese army.39 A coordinating center of Soviet security and intelligence agencies began to operate in Ghulja. Known as “House No. 2” and functioning as the secret police, this coordinating center controlled everything in Ghulja, includ-



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ing all departments and high-ranking officials.40 Events were developing so fast that the leader of the Soviet forces in the north of Xinjiang, known by the code name Aleksandrov, promised that “those who joined his forces would spend the coming summer in Urumqi.”41 The American diplomats in Xinjiang understood very well that without the assistance of the Soviet Union it was impossible for the rebel forces, who were few in number, to achieve such success in a short period. Consul Horace H. Smith noted in his memorandum that “the revolt of 1000 Tatars and White Russians, living in and around Yining, on November 7, 1944 could hardly have taken place without Soviet arms and promises of support.”42 At the end of December 1944, Boratalı, Arasan, and Suydun, which was considered the most important strategic point, were seized by the military forces of the Eastern Turkistan Republic (ETR). Gani Batyr’s Uyghur groups, Osman Batyr’s Kazakh forces, Mansur Lomiyev’s Dungan regiments, Fotii Leskin’s Russian immigrant forces, and Fatih Batyr’s Tatar horsemen played an important role in these military operations. In the spring of 1945 Kalibek and his Kazakh troops in the valley of the Gızıl-Uzan River, having inflicted heavy losses on the Guomindang army, seized the strategically important area.43 But in general the operations against the Chinese army were carried out under the supervision of the Soviet “advisors.” The major combat operations of the rebel groups were coordinated by Egnarov; the plans of all combat operations were developed in House No. 2; and the USSR Commissariat of Internal Affairs officers were forming rebel units in the “liberated” regions of the northern provinces.44 In early January 1945, according to the information given to the American consul in Urumqi by General Zhu Shaoliang, commander of Chinese forces in the province, there was “no substantial improvement in Yining fighting; Chinese are making no attempt to retake Yining or Hsin Erthai which is still held by insurgents; although Suiting and Huiguan remain in Chinese hands, latter is now under attack by insurgents. Chinese defenders of Yining airfield are being supplied by parachute. Chu appears convinced insurgents at Yining are obtaining Soviet ammunition by truck from Khorgos; he states agitation is continuing for ‘East Asia Turk Republic.’”45 Along with leading the special operation team, General Egnarov also served as a senior military advisor of the ETR government. Under his leadership the rebel forces for the second time attacked a strategically important place—Ayrembak fortress in Ghulja—and captured the castle.46 Lavrentii Beria on the same day, January 11, 1945, sent to Stalin, Molotov, and Malenkov information that he had received from Egnarov, who was in Ghulja. It became clear that the situation in Ghulja was controlled by the USSR Commissariat of Internal Affairs and that the rebel groups operated on the “recommendations” of General Egnarov. Information coming from Chongqing

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also confirmed the rebels’ capture of Ghulja district. On January 25, B. Godunov wrote from Chongqing to Moscow: “Ghulja district is almost entirely occupied by the rebels. Repeated attempts to crush the uprising by the Chinese authorities are still ineffective.”47 On the January 11, 1945, Horace Smith, the American consul in Urumqi, prepared a memorandum in connection with the dramatic events that took place in the northern provinces and sent it to Washington. The memorandum noted that “Cossack bands are well armed and using Russian type rifles and machine guns and trench mortars.”48 Along with Chongqing and Urumqi, American institutions in Washington followed the developments in western China with great excitement. In mid-January 1945 Harold Henry Fisher, a professor of Russian history at Stanford University, discussed USSR-Chinese relations with Vladimir Rogov, who was a former representative of the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS) in Chongqing. Rogov informed him of the evacuation of Soviet equipment and specialists from Xinjiang province, adding that “the Soviets had every intention of someday returning to Xinjiang.”49 Evaluating events in Ili, Americans understood that an unexpected day for the Soviet Union had come. According to Australian historian Michael Clarke, This situation remained until the exigencies of World War II intervened to leave Sheng Shicai bereft of Soviet support in 1941, and inducing the warlord to seek the aid of the Republic of China the following year. The Republic’s writ, however, was never consolidated, with the outbreak of a major Turkic-Muslim rebellion in late 1944 and proclamation of the East Turkistan Republic (ETR) in early 1945 in the north-west of Xinjiang, which left the region divided between Chinese- and ETR-controlled spheres. This rebellion is seen by a number of scholars as having been directly or indirectly inspired and supported by the Soviet Union in an attempt to re-establish its influence in Xinjiang and prejudice the ongoing Sino-Soviet negotiations regarding the Yalta agreement.50

After the uprising swept across the northern regions of Xinjiang province, in order to study the situation on the ground, Bu Daoming, the head of the West Asian Department of Chinese Foreign Ministry, went to Urumqi on the instructions of Chiang Kai-Shek and minister of foreign affairs Song Ziwen. While in Urumqi, he had discussions with the provincial government and met with the Soviet consul in the city and the Soviet Union trade commissioner of Xinjiang province. Bu Daoming on behalf of the Chongqing government recognized the need to restore trade and economic activity between Xinjiang and the Soviet Union. After the meetings and discussions Bu Daoming and Liu Tse-yung, who was the newly appointed commissioner of the Ministry of



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Foreign Affairs, returned to Chongqing and gave detailed information to the Chinese government about the events taking place in the province.51 After the first military success was achieved in November–December 1944, the interim national government of the Eastern Turkistan Republic decided to create regular army units. The first attempt to form such an army was in February 1945. In order to make military service legitimate, the government passed the “conscription law” and adopted at the same time a resolution “on the creation of the national army of the Eastern Turkistan Republic.” These laws and regulations strengthened the legal framework of the newly created national army of the Eastern Turkistan and the formation of its command staff, while ensuring the supply of arms and ammunition.52 Following these steps taken by the government, guerrilla groups and rebel forces began to be incorporated into the national army, which was completed on April 8. This became the official date of the creation of the Eastern Turkistan National Army.53 The government approved the army uniforms and symbols of Eastern Turkistan as well as the pay rates, from ordinary soldiers to army generals. The epoletsə of officers of the National Army bore red patterns on a blue background with various white insignia in the form of squares and rectangles.54 Most of the soldiers came from the ethnically Uyghur-Taranchi population of Ili district. One of the two newly created infantry divisions was led by Major General Iskhak bey Monunov and his deputy, Taipov Zunun; the division personnel were mainly Uyghur-Taranchi. The second division was led by General Ivan Polinov and his officers. A separate army cavalry regiment was formed in the Ghulja army.55 In the spring of 1945, the number of soldiers and officers who served in the Eastern Turkistan National army already exceeded 10,000. Apart from the weapons and ammunition seized in the fight against the Chinese army, the national army was equipped with German-made arms and ammunition seized by the Soviet army during World War II and secretly delivered to the Eastern Turkistan guerrillas and army. In addition, the Soviet officers and military experts participated in military operations. According to the plan prepared by the Soviet “advisors,” on April 9, 1945, at Torgustay (Malyi Yuldus) the rebels surrounded and forced a roadblock of Chinese troops to surrender. Two hundred and twenty soldiers and officers (all Mongols) were taken prisoner. There were no losses on the part of the rebels. Captured weapons: 177 rifles, 14,900 rounds, and 32 camels. On the night of April 14 Chinese positions were attacked by troops in the area of Takiantszy; the Chinese garrison under blockade in the city of Takiantszy rapidly abandoned [its] positions and withdrew to Dzinkho. According to the statements of a Chinese soldier who was taken prisoner, the garrison in Takiantszy consisted of two battalions of the 1st Regiment of the 45th Division and one battalion of the 191st

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Division. The rebels seized in Takiantszy one tractor, 13,000 rounds; 430 grenades; 12,000 poods of wheat; 800 poods of corn; and 3,600 poods of kaoliang.56

Inspired by the first victories of the national army with assistance from the Soviet authorities and directed by the Soviet instructors, on April, 22, 1945, Alikhan Törä addressed a letter to Stalin: I send ardent greetings to the creator of the culture and equal rights of all peoples, the great leader of the Soviet Union. I, and the peoples of Eastern Turkistan recently liberated from oppression, place my hope in you, Chief Marshal, that the peoples of East Turkistan will be liberated only with the aid of the Great Soviet Union, which is giving us comprehensive aid in this cause. Millions of people of Eastern Turkistan constantly look to you as their leader, protecting the interests of oppressed peoples. We are deeply confident that we will always receive legitimate and necessary assistance from you. We will thereby be able to expel all our oppressors from our homeland. I hope that the colonizers will be expelled if we have the aid that we need from the Soviet Union. I greet the Red Army and its heroes, which have finally defeated the enemies of freedom-loving peoples of the world, the fascists. I have sent all our remaining wishes to dear Petr Andreevich. I still expect favorable results from our conversation with him. I also impatiently await the return to us of dear Vladimir Stepanovich, who will give us the necessary aid.57

On May 11 Lavrentii Beria delivered Alikhan Törä’s letter, translated into Russian, to Stalin and Molotov. He added that “the Petr Andreevich and Vladimir Stepanovich mentioned in Shakirkhojayev’s [Törä’s] letter are our officials.”58 “Vladimir Stepanovich” was undoubtedly General Egnarov; “Petr Andreevich” was presumably Colonel Prokopiuk, who possibly operated in Xinjiang under this name. On April 29, 1945, the USSR Interior and Foreign Affairs Commissariats sent to Stalin their proposals on these developments and the latest information on events in Xinjiang. Beria and Vyshinskii informed Stalin that the Ili district, with a population of about 400,000 people, is located in the northwest part of Xinjiang and directly borders the Kazakh SSR. The district is one of the richest regions of Xinjiang and is the main supplier of grain and livestock for the Xinjiang government. As a result of the combat operations of the rebels, the Chinese have lost 2,520 killed and 2,632 captured. There are 50 officers among the prisoners. The rebels have seized the following equipment: 1,807 rifles, 151 machine guns, 17 mortars, 4 field guns, 2 armored cars, 36 aircraft, 24 aircraft engines, 4 radios, and also depots with weapons, spare parts, food, and clothing. The rebels have also seized over 300,000 poods of grain, 100,000 poods of wool, 90,000 sheepskins, and more than 40,000 head of cattle and small livestock.59



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The letter also said that “armed forces of the rebels are composed of 9,300 men, from which one cavalry brigade, four rifle regiments, and five independent cavalry squadrons have been formed. The permanent composition of the rebel forces in Ili district might reach 12,000 men in the next two months. A further increase of the rebel armed forces is complicated by the peasants’ reluctance to tear themselves away from their farms. In addition, an armed rebel detachment of Altai Kazakhs up to 4,000 strong in the Altai district of Xinjiang is headed by a local authority, Osman Batr.” Beria and Vyshinskii wrote that the “Koktogay and Chingil counties of Altai district directly bordering the Mongolian People’s Republic have been occupied by Osman’s detachments. Osman’s detachments are in regions bordering the capital of the Altai district, Shara-Sume; however, they are not yet undertaking active operations to seize the city and clear the district of the Chinese.”60 The letter noted the small numbers of the rebel army; its weak training and combat readiness, the small weapons supply, and the lack of professional military personnel. Along with the army, the shortage of the workers with experience in management and economic and political activities in the interim national government of Eastern Turkistan and the lack of financial resources to maintain the state apparatus and armed forces were also mentioned: according to USSR NKVD information the national Chinese government, concerned by events in the Ili and Altai districts, intends to switch to active operations to put down the national liberation movement of the Muslims. The command of the Chinese Army is increasing the strength of its troops in Xinjiang, where about 80,000 men are concentrated at the present time. Considering the obvious superiority of the armed forces of the Chinese in Xinjiang we must think that in the event of counteroffensive operations on the part of the Chinese forces the rebels might be defeated and the national liberation movement of the Muslims of Xinjiang might be crushed if this movement does not get appropriate support from us. For our part we consider it advisable to support the national liberation movement of the Muslims in Ili and Altai districts and help the rebels expand this movement to other districts of Xinjiang.61

Beria and Vyshinskii presented their seven-point plan to Stalin. It included the use of the rebel army to defend the Ili district from Chinese army attacks; assistance to the national government in spreading the Muslim national liberation movement to the Altai, Tarbaghatai, Aqsu, and Kashgar districts; sending subversive groups to the rear of the Chinese army in Xinjiang; sending soldiers and officers of Central Asian nationalities discharged from the Soviet army to Xinjiang; and providing the national army units with weapons and ammunition.62 This proposed plan was approved by the Soviet leader and confirmed by the Politburo without any changes on June 22, 1945. Thus, the national liberation movement started by Muslims to paralyze the Chinese

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army and the government authorities in Xinjiang began to receive practical assistance from the Soviet Union. The Soviet military instructors and flexible battle groups were sent to Ili district, which was considered the capital of the Muslim movement. A U.S. intelligence report stated that “during the actual hostilities the Soviet troops, including the officers, always wore half-length brown lamb coats and fur hats and absolutely no identifying insignia. These fur coats had two pockets and a high collar. Their military equipment was not marked in any way, except that the trucks and armored cars had small Soviet flags displayed on the hood. The Soviet aircraft which participated in this war, especially in the bombardment of Chinese military aircraft stationed at Ghulja and Manas, were clearly marked with Soviet insignias.”63 In late 1944 seizure of the Ghulja air base belonging to the Chinese Air Forces played a vital role in the supply of arms and military equipment to the national army. The air base was defended by five thousand Chinese soldiers, who feared that the rebel forces would not stop with the capture of Ghulja air base and could advance toward Dzinkho bases, where the Chinese air forces were deployed.64 During the operation, rebel forces captured thirty-six defective airplanes, including seven SB–7s, twenty-three I–16s, four I–15s, and two UT–2s. Beria’s report to Stalin and Vyshinskii indicated that “these planes at one time were passed to the Xinjiang government by the Soviet Union.”65 Not only the Chongqing government but the Chinese Communists were also seriously interested in the armed rebellion taking place in Xinjiang’s northern provinces. In 1945, when the leader of Communist Party, Mao Zedong, was in Chongqing, Bai Chongxi informed him that “in Ili district the local rebels have Soviet-made artillery, tanks, and aircraft.”66 However, Mao believed that the independence movement launched in the Ili district and its refusal to obey Urumqi resulted from the presence of the Communist Party in Ghulja. SOVIET PROTECTION OF THE EASTERN TURKISTAN REPUBLIC To discuss the situation in the Eastern Turkistan Republic and as a whole in Xinjiang, on May 28, 1945, Alikhan Törä (Shakirkhojayev), the head of provisional national government, met with state security lieutenant colonel Nikolai Prokopiuk, who was the secret representative of the USSR Internal Affairs Commissariat in Ghulja. During the discussions Alikhan Törä insisted on “the need to renew active operations of the rebels, beginning with the expulsion of the Chinese from Dzinkho and sending partisan groups into Tarbaghatai District and the south of Xinjiang to spread the rebel movement.” He stated that “the lack of active operations on the part of the rebels is having



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an adverse effect on the mood of Muslims and helps the Chinese demoralize the rebellious mood among the Muslim population beyond the Ili district.” According to him, “[t]he uneasiness of the Chinese that ‘wolves in sheep’s clothing’ are acting as the champions of Islam in Ghulja is beginning to find support.” Prokopiuk, who was sending information about the discussions to the USSR State Security Commissariat, noted that “during the meeting Shakirkhojayev was clearly nervous and persistently stressed the flexibility of the Chinese foreign and domestic policy throughout the entire conversation.”67 A day after the meeting, on May 29, in order to protect the pastures of the Mongol people, the Eastern Turkistan National Army began operations to free Yuldus valley from the Chinese. The local Mongolian population actively participated in these operations. The 2nd Cavalry Division military units attacked the Chinese army posts and seized Dalin-Daval pass, from there they set up the defense of the freed territories. The Chinese army lost thirty-two people in the Yuldus valley, and eleven soldiers were captured. Seventeen rifles, twenty-one grenades, nineteen horses, and twenty-six saddles were seized from the Chinese army. After the Eastern Turkistan army took control of Dalin-Daval pass, the Mongolian population with their herds began to migrate to areas that had been freed by the rebel forces.68 The victory in Yuldus valley strengthened the position of the Eastern Turkistan army and caused the Mongolian population of the northern regions to join actively in the fight against the Guomindang government. In fact, the Mongolian people living in the north of Xinjiang were influenced by the propaganda pursued for years by the People’s Republic of Mongolia (PRM). Even the textbooks used in all Mongol schools in the northern part of the province had been prepared in the People’s Republic of Mongolia. The American intelligence agencies believed that “the Sinkiang Provincial officials have been either too indolent or too timid to interfere with this spread of PRM influence.”69 Alikhan Törä determined to expand the military operations to the north and the south. On June 8 he sent a telegram to Lieutenant Colonel Prokopiuk from Kalmak-Kure: “Due to continuous rain from the day of my arrival I could not return. It’s time to move to the south and the north. Soon we will manage to relieve our ‘itchy hands.’ If no other delays occur by the grace of God, then on June 10 we will be in Ghulja. I hope that you will take all measures to accelerate the march to the south. There is not a single minute to waste. The decisive moment has come; we must strike while the iron is hot.”70 The “special report” sent by General Egnarov to Beria included this telegram and interesting orders from Beria. He commanded General Egnarov, who was responsible for all activities in Xinjiang, to take no additional actions and to comply with previous directives. Beria wrote: “Go to the place, restore order, and prevent any provocation.”71 It is clear that the instructions came from

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Stalin and Molotov. A day later Beria informed Stalin and Molotov that “we instructed comrade Egnarov to put measures in place to prevent an active insurgency in accordance with previously given directives.”72 Undoubtedly, in late June 1945 the Soviet leadership’s final directive to refrain from active military operations at the time when the Eastern Turkistan National Army was having critical success against the Guomindang forces could be related to the forthcoming visit by the chief of the Executive Yuan and Chinese minister of Foreign Affairs, Song Ziwen, to Moscow. During this visit they were expected to discuss a Soviet-Chinese treaty. But on the eve of Song Ziwen’s visit the Soviet leaders made the final decision in connection with Xinjiang. Numerous appeals by Alikhan Törä to the representatives of the USSR produced results. On June 22, 1945, the Politburo passed a resolution “About Xinjiang,” which included protecting the Eastern Turkistan Republic, providing military assistance to the Muslim separatist movement expanding in the province, and spreading the national movement to the southern provinces. The Soviet leadership’s decision on June 22, judging by its content and strategic objectives, was a direct continuation of the decision that had been made by the Politburo on May 22, 1943. Its first and second paragraphs gave instructions: 1.  Use the armed forces of the rebels to organize a defense of the Ili district from the offensive operations of the Chinese forces. As defense of the Ili district is being organized, give the Provisional Government of Eastern Turkistan help in spreading the national liberation movement of Muslims in the Tarbaghatai, Altai, Aqsu, and Kashgar districts of Xinjiang. 2. Create intolerable conditions for the Chinese troops in Xinjiang by helping the rebels of the Ili district to organize sabotage groups of rebels and infiltrate them into the cities of Urumqi, Kashgar, Shara-Sume, Chuguchak, Aqsu, and others to conduct sabotage, mainly killing personnel, destroying equipment, and disrupting the communications of the Chinese troops.73 According to the third paragraph of the Politburo decision, the people’s commissar of defense, Nikolai Bulganin, was assigned the task of “(a) demobilizing 500 officers and 2,000 enlisted men of Central Asian nationalities from the Red Army for their use in rebel formations under the disguise of inhabitants of Xinjiang; (b) allocating captured rifles and mortars and the ammunition for them for 15,000 men for the needs of the Muslim rebel detachments of Xinjiang.”74 The fourth paragraph of the decision ordered the replacement of defective aircraft seized during the attack on the Ghulja airport with new ones. “In view of the possible need for the use of aircraft by the rebels in combat operations against the Chinese forces, it is considered expedient to replace the



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thirty-six aircraft seized from the Chinese by the rebels with nine aircraft fit for use, of which three are SB [high-speed bombers] and six are I-16 fighters.”75 The fifth paragraph of the Politburo’s decision recommended that the provisional government of Eastern Turkistan act through the NKVD representative, General Egnarov: “(a) To organize the necessary preparatory measures and start to distribute to the Muslim underclass land that previously belonged to landowners and rich peasants; (b) To enlist representatives of the workers of Muslim regions cleared of the Chinese troops and administration in order to democratize the government; (c) To issue an internal loan, introduce a taxation system, and organize state trade to ease the financial situation of the government.”76 The sixth paragraph of the decision “holds the Central Committees of the CP (B) of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan responsible for helping the Provisional Government of Eastern Turkistan tp regulate administrative and economic activity in coordination with the USSR NKVD and selecting and sending one experienced political worker and one specialist from local ethnic groups each in finance, trade, and health to Ghulja.” The seventh paragraph of this decision relates directly to trade and economic relations: “Suggest that in trade with the Provisional Government of Eastern Turkistan the USSR People’s Commissariat of Foreign Trade should expand the range of consumer goods being released in exchange for raw materials received, taking into account the requests of the population of the regions liberated from the Chinese administration.”77 Molotov and Beria were assigned the task of implementing the decision. In the summer of 1945, the secret goal of these broad action plans was to separate Xinjiang from the rest of China. In fact, the American intelligence agencies did not rule out the possibility of establishing a Uyghur Soviet Socialist Republic. After the establishment of the ETR several consultants sent from Moscow had begun to implement some socialist measures aimed at creating cooperatives. Women were even instructed to work with uncovered heads in some companies controlled by Soviet experts, which caused dissatisfaction among the local Muslim population.78 However, the leaders of the Eastern Turkistan government were far from accepting Marxist ideas, especially Alikhan Törä, who was against the Sovietization of the region. Several authors have rightly pointed out that they preferred nationalist views over ideological values.79 After the decision of the Politburo, the battles against the Chinese army intensified. The preparations were begun for sending guerrilla groups, each with 100–150 members, to Aqsu, Kashgar, Yarkand, Khotan, and other southern districts. The Guomindang military leadership understood well that the events in Xinjiang would become impossible to control if the Muslim movement started in the northern provinces spread to the more densely popu-

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lated and ethnically Uyghur southern provinces. Therefore, the government of Urumqi decided to launch a counterattack against the Eastern Turkistan army. On June 28 the Guomindang army of Young-Jiho went on the offensive against Dungan rebels. The position of the Dungan forces was attacked with sixteen mortars and three military aircraft. After achieving a small military victory in the urban battles, the Chinese forces seized control of the YoungJiho-Takiantszy highway. The Dungan rebels were in danger of being besieged. But help from the 3rd Ghulja Regiment changed the situation on the battlefield. The Chinese army was forced to retreat to its previous positions. Lavrentii Beria gave information about these operations to Stalin and Molotov: “The losses of the Chinese were up to one hundred men killed. The losses of the rebels were three killed and one wounded. Two machine guns and four rifles were captured.”80 On July 11 General Egnarov wrote in a telegram to Beria that no significant changes were occurring in the military operations in Young-Jiho provision. However, he noted that “individual enemy aircraft conducted reconnaissance, bombed, and strafed rebel positions in the region of Young-Jiho with machine-gun fire.”81 On July 3, 1945, General Vladimir Egnarov sent detailed information to Beria about the meetings that he had held in Ghulja; the situation in Xinjiang; and the prospects of development of the Muslim national liberation movement. He informed Moscow about his meeting with a person code-named “Sadyg,” their discussion of the situation concerning the Eastern Turkistan Republic, and Sadyg’s insistence on the necessity of expanding the national movement to the south. It becomes clear from the content of the conversation that the person presented as “Sadyg” in the information was Alikhan Törä. Egnarov said that Sadyg had come to him me with an urgent request to send the main forces to the south and to start active operations against the Chinese. “‘Sadyg’ declared that the political situation in the south has utterly boiled over. The population is expecting aid from the Eastern Turkistan Republic, and if this immediate situation is not made use of, the tension in the mood of the population will worsen and be difficult to correct afterward; he is convinced of this. He has studied the psychology of the Muslims during his 30-year revolutionary struggle.”82 During the conversation, Egnarov said that Kokanbayev’s forces had already been sent toward Taskurqan-Yarkand and would move in the coming days. In response, “Sadyg” noted that ‘the main role in the liberation of the south is being played by Kashgar and that success is doubtful without the presence of “Sadyg” and [his] units. He absolutely has to be in the south. “Sadyg” stressed that the very clever British consul in Kashgar would interfere in the uprising, but his own presence would influence the authorities in favor the success of the cause of liberation from the Chinese.83



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General Egnarov tried to convince Alikhan Törä that “at present, when there are not enough forces, the time has not yet come for large-scale offensive operations in the south.” He explained that at the moment the main task was to defend Ghulja district and “prepare a manpower base in the rear of the Chinese [forces].” In response to Egnarov’s explanation, Törä told him that “the Buyga brigade is sufficient for the liberation of Kashgar. He guarantees success with these forces.”84 Despite Egnarov’s many arguments to discourage him from the attack in the south during the meeting, “Sadyg” was upset with the Soviets for delaying the active struggle against the Chinese. In justifying the necessity to attack the Chinese, he said that “the desire to begin active operations is dictated not only by the absolutely burning desire of the Muslims to liberate themselves from the Chinese government but also by talk that has started among the population of Ghulja that they have been sold out by the Bolsheviks and that the defense of the Muslims’ interests in liberation from the Chinese government has now receded into the background.”85 Later Egnarov wrote to Beria that on July 3, 1945, he had received the directive sent from Moscow and begun to implement it. He reported to Moscow about the work done in connection with the defense of the Ili district, writing that the 2nd Ghulja Regiment had entered Young-Jiho-Takiantszy county and that the 5th Mongol Cavalry Division, numbering 1,700 men, had been placed at his disposal. The Kensai Regiment, with 1,500 soldiers, was deployed in Talki county, situated in Santay pass, and the 1st Mongol Cavalry Division of about 350 men was assigned to protect Dzhimpan. Egnarov added that he had sent the 1st Suidun Infantry Regiment, consisting of 1,350 men, as a reserve force to Lanzhou and armed them with the reserve ammunition. The report also mentioned that the Achali pass near Jinho-Shixo was guarded by a regiment of the “Buyga” brigade and that no other changes had occurred in the other places. General Egnarov wrote that currently the number of the Eastern Turkistan National Army had reached 11,800 men, with 73 mortar launchers, 17 antitank rifles, 225 machine guns, 5,480 rifles, and 348 guns at the disposal of the national army. Moreover, he reported the formation of five well-trained five units of 150 members each to operate behind the Chinese army; the activities of these units in the counties of Shixo-Durbiljin, Manas, Taksun, and Aqsu; and Sadyg’s direct involvement in the implementation of these measures. General Egnarov suggested deploying Kokanbayev’s unit in the Takhtamish region in the vicinity of Tashkurgan-Yarkand then later sending it to Xinjiang through Sandia pass. He told Beria how he would use these units immediately once he arrived in Takhtamish and about Nikolai Prokopiukin’s departure to Takhtamish in order to take general control of these units and arm them with weapons and ammunition placed ahead of time at the Murqab and Osh military bases. Egnarov reported to the Soviet leader-

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ship the formation of the Usenbekov detachment from the Kazakh regiment in Ghulja, which was to be sent to the Tarbaghatai district; the uprising of Kazakh people in Manas; and how the Chinese government was looking for ways to suppress the Muslim national liberation movement. In this situation, Egnaov proposed that the Soviet government must take steps to intensify the activity of Kazakh units, including “Geroi [Hero]” (he probably meant the Kazakh leader Osman Batyr) in the Altai region and to free Tarbaghatai. Egnarov wrote: “The departure of only one regiment of rebels for the Tarbaghatai District, in coordination with the Kazakhs who have revolted in Manas county, will allow interruption of communications between Urumqi and Dzinkho and Chuguchak [known currently as Tacheng, alternatively as Qoqek], elimination of the garrison in Chuguchak and Dorbiljin, and linking up with the Kazakhs of ‘Hero.’ This situation will undoubtedly undermine the presumed Chinese offensive on Ghulja and strengthen the position and authority of the Eastern Turkistan Republic.”86 On July 13 Beria delivered the information that he had received from Egnarov to Stalin as chair of the National Defense and to Molotov as chair of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR.87 In the summer of 1945, a subversive group led by Warrant Officer Zatolokin was sent to Manas. The information sent to Moscow stated that “at the end of June an uprising of Kazakhs that involved up to 2,000 families erupted in Manas county of Xinjiang. The Kazakhs who rebelled left for the mountains south of Manas and organized a rebel detachment numbering up to 800 men. A small group under the command of Warrant Officer Zatolokin, who also heads the Manas rebels, was sent to the aid of the Manas rebels.”88 When the Guomindang forces attacked the Kazakhs, the united rebel groups could repel them. They retreated to the Purtanq valley, located 25 km from Manas. On July 17 General Egnarov informed Beria that the 3rd Kamski Division, with up to 350 soldiers, had been sent to Manas to help the Kazakh rebel forces there. A Soviet officer named Firsov led the military operation in Manas.89 General Egnarov believed that it was also important to strengthen the forces in Tarbataghai district. According to him, the Chinese army that had been forced out of Dorbiljin had retreated to the south and intended to seize Junqar in order to get access to Dzinpan. Egnarov wrote: In order to prevent a Chinese attack on the Tarbaghatai district I am moving up the 3rd Kensai Regiment and the 1st Mongolian Cavalry Squadron with a total strength of 1,800 men. Leadership of the operation has been entrusted to “Maksim.” The 1st Cavalry Regiment of the Buyga Brigade has been moved up to strengthen defenses in the region of Dzinkho at the Achali Pass, with the mission of attacking the Chinese flank in the event that they attack. It is obvious that a Chinese attack from the Tarbaghatai district will be coordinated with an attack



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from the direction of Dzinkho, where preparations are being made. “Buyga” has been appointed head of the combat sector in the area of Dzinkho.90

SOVIET-CHINESE TALKS IN MOSCOW AND THE MILITARY SITUATION IN XINJIANG At a time when heavy fighting was taking place between the Eastern Turkistan Republic and the Guomindang government in the northern provinces of Xinjiang along the border with the Soviet Union, Soviet-Chinese talks were held in Moscow. On June 30, 1945, the acting chair of China’s Legislative Assembly (Yuan), minister of foreign affairs Song Ziwen, came to Moscow to discuss a number of controversial issues involving between the USSR, the United States, and China, particularly the issues related to Manchuria, Port Arthur, the East China Railway, the People’s Republic of Mongolia, and the details of the prepared contract on friendship and alliance between China and the Soviet Union. Before the talks in Moscow, at the end of May, the Americans met Song Ziwen and the delegation accompanying him at the conference in San Francisco (Dr. Victor Hoo, vice minister for Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Wei Daoming; and Chu Hain-ming, chief of the Russian Department, Ministry of Information) and discussed a number of issues. The summary of negotiations regarding Xinjiang noted that “they are also somewhat worried about the situation in Xinjiang. The latest troubles in Xinjiang, where the non-Chinese Kirghizes and Kazaks had begun to shoot the Chinese, disturbed the Chongqing government. The Chinese would like to find out whether the Soviet arms used by the non-Chinese population were left during the Soviet-Chinese condominium over this province which ended two years ago with the withdrawal of the Soviet forces, or whether they were later brought to Xinjiang from across the border.”91 Despite Stalin’s order through Beria to halt military operations in Xinjiang on the eve of Song Ziwen’s visit, in the first half of July, while the negotiations were being held, a series of successful battles were carried out against the Chinese army and the authorities in Ili and surrounding regions. In fact, the intensity of the fighting was due to the tense talks in Moscow. Stalin and Molotov in the discussions of the Soviet-Chinese agreements insisted on the recognition of the People’s Republic of Mongolia by Chiang Kai-Shek’s government. However, Song Ziwen, who was in constant touch with Chiang Kai-Shek, did not agree to this, based on instructions received from Chongqing. In order to mitigate the requirements of the Soviet leadership, Chiang Kai-Shek unofficially sent his son Chiang Ching-kuo (Jiang Jingguo) to the Soviet ambassador, Apollon Petrov. At the time, the son was in Moscow as

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an unofficial member of the delegation. On behalf of Chiang Kai-Shek, Chiang Ching-Kuo said: “As the man most familiar with the situation in China, I understand the point of view of Chiang Kai-Shek on the impossibility of presently recognizing the independence of Outer Mongolia, because such recognition would greatly weaken the position of the Chinese government and would cause a very sharp reaction in China’s public opinion.”92 In response, ambassador Petrov said that the Soviet proposal to recognize Outer Mongolia (the People’s Republic of Mongolia: PRM) was the most reasonable course of action and was based on recognition of the status quo. He noted that Outer Mongolia was de facto an independent state and in this regard adoption of the Soviet proposal would only mean recognizing the situation that actually existed. If the Chinese government was worried, then this declaration could be made later, after the end of the war, once the territories lost during the war were returned to China. But Chiang Ching-kuo said that “recognition of the independence of the PRM would be contrary to Sun Yat-sen’s principle of the territorial integrity of China. If the PRM was not an issue, then all would go well; as Song Ziwen has no particular objection to draft treaties and agreements, it is possible to agree quickly.”93 Petrov stressed that the recognition of the PRM would not contradict Sun Yat-sen’s principle but on the contrary would fit the spirit of his teachings on the national issue. When Chiang Ching-kuo asked the ambassador what he could do make the negotiations successful, Petrov replied that “he must convince his father of the reasonableness of the Soviet proposal on recognition of the independence of the PRM.” The ambassador added that “the question of the PRM was very significant, and the Soviet government would insist on acceptance of its proposals on declaring the independence of the PRM, and that negotiations would remain deadlocked, if the Chinese delegation did not agree to this proposal.”94 During the talks held on July 9, when Chiang Ching-kuo asked Stalin about the solution of the Outer Mongolia issue, the Soviet leader responded that “China could say something like ‘the Chinese government has no objection to recognizing the independence of Mongolia after the plebiscite. . . .’ Mongolia does not wish to join either China or the USSR. For internal purposes it would be desirable to specify that after the recognition of the independence of Mongolia the Soviet Union would respect the territorial integrity of Mongolia as an independent state.”95 In the talks held on July 10 Molotov wanted to clarify whether the Chinese were ready to recognize the independence of Mongolia after the defeat of Japan and the implementation of the plebiscite in Mongolia. Song Ziwen said that the Chinese would make a statement on recognition of the independence of Mongolia after the end of the war against Japan and after the plebiscite. He added that “it would be much easier for the Chinese government to do it then.” Although the Soviets insisted that this is-



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sue be reflected in the draft agreement, Song Ziwen persuaded Molotov that the issue of recognizing Mongolia would not be much different in the project that he was about to prepare that night and present to the Soviets. Song Ziwen considered it Chiang Kai-Shek’s “major concession in the matter of Outer Mongolia.”96 The Potsdam conference between the two allies was due to start soon. Stalin and Molotov were expected to conduct negotiations with Harry Truman and Winston Churchill, so the Chinese wanted to sign the agreement with the Soviet Union before the Soviet leaders’ visit to Berlin. But the Chinese government did not succeed. Talks between the USSR and China were suspended when the Soviet delegation left for the Berlin conference on July 14. They decided to continue the talks after the Potsdam conference. In spite of the suspension of the talks in Moscow, the fighting between the Guomindang army, the Chinese regional administration, and the Eastern Turkistan Republic in the northern provinces of Xinjiang province did not stop. On July 15 the rebel army assembled from the population of Tarbaghatai province entered the fight in the Yamat region, 70 km south of Dorbulchin, against the Chinese troops coming from the southwest. Military operations continued for several days. During this time the Chinese military airplanes bombed the Eastern Turkistan rebel positions near Young-Jiho and conducted reconnaissance flights near Takiantszy and Dzhimpan. On July 17, in accordance with Directive No. 362 received from Alma-Ata, it was considered appropriate to send a group of 150 rebel troops to the Bay-Aqsu region to expand the guerrilla movement there. Alikhan Törä, whose name was shown in the document as “Sadyg,” was closely involved in the formation of this detachment. Originally from Aqsu and ethnically Uyghur, Sufi Akhun Surbayev was appointed the leader of the detachment. He was the former Chinese army commander who defected during the fighting near Sikho and joined the rebels. Together with Surbayev, 90 Uyghurs from Kashgar who had joined the national army were also included in the detachment. In mid-July the report of the special services stated that “[a] group of Uyghur officials with ties in the south headed by a member of the government is being sent along with the detachment. The former will be supplied with newspapers, leaflets, and letters from ‘Sadyg’ to the authorities in Aqsu. It is inadvisable to organize a broad operation in the south for the time being, chiefly because of lack of the forces needed for this. The operations of Surbayev’s detachment [which is] being sent will be a test of the capability and advisability of an operation on Kashgar.”97 In late July 1945 the Eastern Turkistan National Army had a number of significant achievements. On July 21 the 1st Mongol Cavalry Division of the 3rd Kensai Regiment began to move in the direction of Chuquchak toward Tarbataghai province. On July 29, Durbiljin, one of the largest cities of Xinjiang province, located 50 km southeast of Chuquchak, passed into the hands of the

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national army. After the seizure of Durbiljin, on July 31 the Soviet vice-consul in Chuquchak, K. Z. Zaynulin, came to the 30th Bakhti border point at 2 a.m. and informed the frontier chief Colonel Kovalevskii that after Durbiljin had been captured by the national army an ultimatum was given to the government authorities to surrender Chuquchak without a fight. The governor of Tarbataghai province had come to the consulate to ask that 300 Chinese officials and the same number of soldiers be given shelter in the USSR. Kovalevskii said to the vice-consul that this issue was within the competence of the Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. When the time set for the ultimatum ended at 10 a.m. on July 31, the governor himself came to the border point. When he asked Colonel Kovalevskii to let him enter the territory of the Soviet Union, the frontier chief told him, “if Chinese officials and soldiers cross the border they will be interned.” 98 At 9:40 p.m. on July 31, the Chinese were allowed to enter Soviet territory. By three o’clock the next afternoon, nearly 1,413 Chinese had crossed into the Soviet Union. Among them was the governor of Tarbaghatai province, Ping Yuen; his secretary; the provincial police chief and his assistant; 414 officers from the governor’s office, the police, the judiciary, and customs employees as well as their family members; 452 soldiers and officers from the 3rd and 7th Cavalry Regiments; and 457 civilians, mostly Chinese.99 The deputy commissar of foreign affairs, Solomon Lozovskii, was informed immediately about the Chinese who had crossed the Soviet border. The governor, along with his inner circle, was placed at the Bakhti border point. The rest of the Chinese were placed in two camps set up for them in the Arkarli mountains, 15 km away from the Bakhti checkpoint.100 On August 7 the Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR prepared operational information about the situation in Xinjiang and the military operations carried out by the Ili rebel groups on August 5.101 Based on information from Nikolai Stakhanov, acting chief of the military units of the USSR Commissariat of Internal Affairs, on August 7 Beria wrote to Stalin and Molotov: “Taken from the internees: 13 heavy and light machine guns; 480 rifles and carbines; 3 automatic weapons; 45 revolvers and pistols; 80 cavalry smoke charges; 6 trucks; 2 automobiles; and about 500 horses.”102 On July 31 the central city of Tarbataghai province, Chuquchak city, had passed into the hands of the rebels. After suffering serious losses in the battles near Shikho city, which had begun on July 28, the Chinese army had retreated. According to an intelligence report, the Chinese authorities had set up military fortifications with 4,000 people in Shikho city.103 On August 3 the national army units seized Sacak point near Shikho. On August 18 the White Russian forces under the command of Firsov, with the intention of committing sabotage, were able to reach the Shikho-Manas line.104 In the battles conducted from July 21 to August 3 “the Chinese losses were 239 killed and 700 soldiers and offi-



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cers captured. . . . The rebels’ losses were 52 killed and 72 wounded.” In the battles near Shikho city the rebels seized from the Guomindang army “707 rifles, 17 machine guns, one mortar, 100,000 rounds, 68 trucks, two radios, 68.4 kg of gold nuggets, and several storehouses with various equipment.”105 Realizing the impossibility of suppressing the revolt by force, the Xinjiang government tried different methods to attract the rebels to its side. The senior military advisor of the USSR who served in the Eastern Turkistan army wrote to Beria: “On August 11 of this year, in the city of Dzhimpan, a Chinese airplane flew at a low-level scattering leaflets with an appeal to the rebels of all nationalities. The leaflets urged the rebels to side with the Chinese. They promised to pay each soldier who changed sides 10,000 Xinjiang dollars; platoon commanders 50,000, company commanders 100,000.”106 But the Xinjiang government’s attempts did not produce any serious results. In the summer of 1945, against the background of military victories achieved, the Eastern Turkistan National Army was at its peak. Surbayev’s detachment that had been sent to the Aqsu area reached the Bay settlement on August 9, 1945. Egnarov sent to Beria information that “a Chinese post of 70 men fled, creating a panic in the Bay garrison and forcing all the soldiers to fight the panic-mongers in Aqsu. The population of Bay selected a delegation to Ghulja, which is expected in the next few days.”107 The national army’s guerrilla groups seized the Bay area on August 14, the day when the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance was signed in Moscow. Egnarov wrote to Beria: On August 19 Firsov on the road east of Shikho seized seven trucks with wheat for Shikho. The convoy and vehicles were destroyed. On August 23 the enemy retreating from the region of Kum-Beshen (25 km north of Kosh-Tologoy) turned sharply to the south and headed for Kosh-Tologoy. Up to 200 enemy soldiers and officers were killed or taken prisoner during the pursuit of the enemy by Leskin’s brigade. The weapons seized were rendered unusable by the Chinese. On August 23 units of Leskin’s brigade entered Kosh-Tologoy and the Utu-Vulak line. The same day one I-15 aircraft made a raid on Kobuk, dropping three bombs. Four soldiers of the brigade were killed and three were injured during the bombing. The pursuit of the enemy continued simultaneously with an attack on Altai. The total strength of the Chinese defending Kobuk has reached 1,500 soldiers and officers.108

On September 5, 1945, Lavrentii Beria on behalf of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs prepared an extensive report to Stalin, Molotov, and Malenkov about the progress of the national movement in Xinjiang. A copy of the report sent to Andrei Vyshinskii at the Foreign Affairs Commissariat on September 10 described the end of the fighting in the spring and summer of

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1945 between the Eastern Turkistan Republic and the Chinese authorities in Xinjiang. Beria wrote: In rebel hands by August 28 as the result of active operations against the Chinese [by] forces of the government of Eastern Turkistan headed by Alikhan Törä Shakirkhojayev: all of the Ili district of Xinjiang with the exception of the city of Dzinkho; the majority of the Tarbaghatai district with the main cities of Chuguchak, Dorbiljin, and Kosh-Tologoy; and Jeminay, Koktogay, and Qinggil counties of the Altai district of Xinjiang. In the second half of August the rebels launched active operations in the south of Xinjiang, as a result of which the cities of Bay and Nurgak in the northern part of Kashgar District, the city of Tashkurgan, and the posts of Bulunkul, Subashi, and Lefdar in the south of this district were seized by the rebels. With the occupation of the city of Bay by the rebels the main road connecting the south of Xinjiang with Urumqi has been cut.109

The Urumqi Dzinkho road was controlled by guerrilla units in two places, so they carried out acts of sabotage there in order to cut off the supplies to the Chinese military units. The report noted: “During their advance the forces of the government of Eastern Turkistan are encountering a favorable attitude toward themselves and the support of the Muslim population of Xinjiang.110 Beria provided information about the armed forces of the Eastern Turkistan government, currently 17,000 men in two cavalry brigades, five rifle regiments, one cavalry regiment, six cavalry divisions, one artillery division, one machine-gun squadron, and twelve guerrilla detachments. During the military operations, the Eastern Turkistan National Army killed 3,676 Chinese and captured 4,182 of them. The national army losses for the same period were 314 killed and 548 wounded. Beria informed the Soviet leadership that the Chinese government had grown stronger in Xinjiang since the beginning of August; Ma Bufang’s 5th Cavalry of 12,000 fighters was brought to Xinjiang from Suzhou city of Gansu province. He wrote: “According to available information from agents, Chiang Kai-Shek intends to introduce several additional well-trained units into Xinjiang from armies that have operated against the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance up to now and also to transfer up to 200 aircraft.”111 Beria stressed the lack of combat-readiness of the Chinese army in Xinjiang as well as the newly introduced military units in the province and the poor military discipline of the Guomindang army, noting the widespread desertions. At the end of the report Beria stated: The NKVD of the USSR thinks that the government of East Turkistan still has favorable conditions for further development of the rebel movement of the Muslims in Xinjiang. However, the national government of China has every possibility of henceforth changing the situation in its favor, especially after the



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surrender of Japan. The NKVD of the USSR requests your instructions concerning the advisability of further support to the rebel movement of the Muslims in Xinjiang. In the event that it is found inadvisable to continue our support of the active operations of the rebels, it ought to be kept in mind that the Chinese government will obviously undertake decisive operations against the rebels in the near future. In these conditions, in the event of failure some of the armed rebels and also the active leaders of the rebel movement will be forced to cross into our territory.112

Beria attached to this report the map reflecting the military situation on August 28, 1945, between the Eastern Turkistan army and the Chinese army.113 After submitting the report to the Soviet leadership, Beria asked for instructions on the further developments in Xinjiang. The Soviet Union already had declared war on Japan. On August 10 Molotov and Song Ziwen resumed the negotiations that had remained unfinished since July, agreeing on separate articles of the draft treaty related to the East China Railway (ECRW), Port Arthur, Dairen, and other issues.114 On August 12 the parties directly discussed issues such as the Port Arthur civil administration, the Soviet-Chinese mixed military commissions, management of the ECRW and the custom rules of cargo transportation, and other questions. At the end of the negotiations Song Ziwen expressed his desire to meet Stalin that evening. Although, Molotov suggested leaving this meeting for the next day, Song Ziwen insisted.115 On August 14, the final work was carried out on the draft agreement. The parties agreed to publish the text of the treaty and agreements after the signing, with the exception of the Mongolia issue. Song Ziwen suggested that “agreement on the MPR [Mongolian People’s Republic] can be published only after the ratification.” Molotov accepted and said that the Soviets would “inform the Government of PRM about this agreement.”116 On the evening of August 14, the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of China was signed. Thus the Soviet Union recognized the territorial integrity of China and confirmed its intention in the fifth paragraph of the agreement. Without doubt, this commitment also included Xinjiang. As late as Jule 1945, Soviet leaders regarded the ethnic conflict in Xinjiang as a “real opportunity to topple the (Chinese) provincial government and bring into power representatives of the indigenous population loyal to the Soviet Union.” The subversive policy in Xinjiang was, however, interrupted after the Sino-Soviet treaty was concluded in August 1945.”117 On the day the agreement was signed the Soviets presented a note to the Chinese foreign minister, stating that, in regard to the events in Xinjiang, “the Soviet Government confirmed that, as stated in the Fifth Article of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, it had no intention of interfering in China’s internal affairs.”118 With the August 14 agree-

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ment, the Soviet Union acknowledged that the Xinjiang crisis was a matter of the “internal affairs of China.”119 According to the agreement, the Chinese government recognized the independence of Outer Mongolia within existing borders.120 According to historian Xiaoyuan Liu “in their agreements with the GMD regime, the Soviets indeed pledged to respect China’s sovereignty in Manchuria and Xinjiang as well as to give “moral, military, and other materials assistance” only to the “Nationalist Government” of China. With these understandings in the background, the MPR plebiscite was held according to the script prepared by Sino-Soviet diplomacy in Moscow.”121 On August 25, on the occasion of the signing of the agreement, Chiang Kai-Shek spoke in Chongqing: “With regard to national groups living on the borders of the province, as soon as they show the ability for self-government, the government will give them the opportunity.”122 At the same time, Patrick Jay Hurley, the American ambassador in Chongqing, recommended that Chiang Kai-Shek avoid any confrontation with the Soviet Union. At a meeting on September 7, he advised Chiang Kai-Shek resolve the situation in Xinjiang with Moscow through diplomatic channels before taking any measures.123 Chiang Kai-Shek agreed to this. On that same day the deputy minister foreign affairs for China, Gan Hai-Quan, appealed to the Soviet leadership to resolve the issue of Xinjiang through negotiations.124 In addition, Liu Tse-yung, commissioner of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the Xinjiang government, suggested that Zhang Zhizhong, who had been appointed a special representative of Chiang Kai-Shek in the province on September 2, make some concessions, including self-government, for local non-Chinese nationalities. Instructions from Chongqing were also a signal for the provisional government of Xinjiang. After this statement the Urumqi government began to seek ways to build mutual relationships with the local population of the province. After the signing of the Soviet-Chinese agreement, Soviet consul general I. G. Evseev, who had been called back to Moscow, and the commissioner of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Urumqi, Liu Tse-yung, who had been called back to Chongqing, returned to Urumqi with the instructions of their governments.125 Before being appointed as the commissioner to Urumqi by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Liu Tse-yung had worked as an advisor in the Chinese embassy in Moscow and knew the USSR very well.126 After the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance “the Soviet Union and China also signed an Agreement on the Chinese Changchun Railway, Agreement on Dalian (Dairen), Agreement on Lüshun (Port Arthur), and other associated documents.”127



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MOSCOW’S RETREAT AND THE “MEDIATION MISSION” BETWEEN GHULJA AND URUMQI In September 1945 the Soviet Union was looking for ways to retreat gradually from Xinjiang. At the end of August and beginning of September the military aircraft of the Eastern Turkistan National Army, which were controlled by the Soviet military advisors serving in that army, participated in offensive operations in a number of areas of Xinjiang province. Military aircraft with Soviet insignia flew over the border town of Puli. On September 5 two aircraft with the Soviet insignia supported the rebel attack on Wusu from the air and dropped eight bombs on the Chinese army positions.128 In September 1945, at a meeting of the foreign affairs ministers, China’s new foreign minister Wang Shijie met Molotov and asked him to investigate the incident. Stressing the great importance of the Soviet-Chinese agreement, Molotov added that now “these incidents are not of a serious nature.”129 The incident in Wusu had a heavy impact in Urumqi. The open bombardment of the Chinese city by Soviet warplanes caused various rumors in Xinjiang. The American ambassador in Chongqing and high-ranking military generals had supposedly arrived in Urumqi and held a secret meeting with the China military and civilian officials in order to protect Xinjiang from the Soviet Union. After the bombing of Wusu it was rumored that some 150 American army planes were on their way to Tihwa to avenge the attack. A public declaration to the people of Tihwa that American intervention was imminent appeared on the large bulletin board inside the South Gate of Tihwa City on or about September 15.130 On September 12 he wrote to Stalin: “On September 11 we empowered a representative of the Internal Commissariat under the ‘Government of Eastern Turkistan’ to insist on termination of air support. Proposals on further actions in Xinjiang are still being developed to be submitted to you by comrade Vyshinskii.”131 The American consul in Urumqi wrote that such a large crowd gathered around the bulletin board that his car could hardly get by. “The driver told me that the crowd was reading an important official notice which had been posted that day. The following Monday morning in the office I was informed that the notice was said to state that president Truman had issued a warning to the Soviet Union against the further breach of its new treaty with China in its relations with Sinkiang.”132 But at the last moment it became clear that these were all rumors and that the authorities were aware of them. On September 13, 1945, Chiang Kai-Shek’s special representative in the province, Zhang Zhizhong, returned to Urumqi shortly after being called back to Chongqing. He had a long meeting with the leadership of the province at the government building. A day later he held a two-hour discussion with the

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Soviet consul general Evseev. Zhang said that “he recognizes that the revolt arose from internal factors and is purely an internal affair but asks for Soviet help in bringing himself and representatives of the insurgent regime together in the hope that a settlement of the insurgents’ grievances by negotiation may prove possible.”133 Consul Evseev informed Moscow about the discussion on the same day: On September 15 the Politburo discussed the situation in Xinjiang and passed Moscow’s decision to carry on “a mediation mission” in Ghulja and Urumqi. The decision said: 1. Owing to the conclusion of the treaty on friendship and alliance between the Soviet Union and China, as well as some agreements and an exchange of notes on Xinjiang, mediation between the insurgents in Xinjiang and the Central Government of China is considered reasonable. 2. To commission the Soviet ambassador to China, comrade [Apollon] Petrov, to make a statement to vice-minister foreign affairs Gan Naiguang: “In answer to your statement of September 7 this year I have the honor to inform you of the following: the Soviet Consul in Ghulja has informed the Soviet government that some Muslim representatives of the insurgents in Xinjiang have appealed to him, hinting that the Russians should act as mediators between them and the Chinese authorities in resolving the conflict. In so doing, they declared that the insurgents did not aim to separate from China. They intended to gain autonomy in the part of Xinjiang where Muslims constitute an absolute majority, particularly, in Ili, Tarbaghatai, Altai, and Kashgar districts. They stressed violation of the rights of the Muslim population in Xinjiang as well as oppression and mass repressions by the Chinese administration, whose actions forced the Muslims to protect their interests militarily. Interested in establishing order on its border with Xinjiang, the Soviet government is ready to entrust its consul in Ghulja with rendering possible assistance to the Chinese government in resolving the crisis in Xinjiang. 3. To recommend that the insurgents suspend combat operations until the Chinese government’s answer to the statement of the Soviet ambassador is received and during the talks, if any.134

The text of this decision prepared by Beria and Vyshinskii the day before was sent to Stalin on September 14 and adopted by the Politburo without any changes.135 Implementation of the decision was entrusted to Molotov, Beria, Vyshinskii, and Bogdan Kobulov. Immediately after the decision, the senior officials of the Commissariats of Internal Affairs and State Security who worked in Ghulja and other revolutionary regions were instructed by Beria that the Eastern Turkistan army must refrain from active military operations and move to a defensive position.136 Once the decision adopted, the Soviet military, diplomatic, and intelligence agencies in Xinjiang were told to direct the leadership of the Eastern Turkistan government to hold talks with the Urumqi government. However, the instructions from Moscow were not universally welcomed by the government of



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Eastern Turkistan. At the discussion of this issue in mid-September, headed by Alikhan Törä, Rahimjan Sabirkhojayev, Mutasli Halfat, Gani Yuldashev, Abdurauf Mahsum, Karim Haji, Colonel Zunun Taipov, and other influential members of the government, they opposed any talks with the Chinese government and insisted on continuation of active military actions. But the members of the government who were close to the Soviets, such as Ahmedjan Kasimov, Abdulkarim Abbasov, General Dalelkhan Sgurbayev, and others, following the instructions from Moscow, insisted that it was necessary to negotiate with the Urumqi government. They believed that the Chinese Communist Party would win soon and build a relationship with Xinjiang like the relationship that existed between Moscow and the Soviet National Republics in the USSR.137 But despite all the expectations of the Guomindang authorities in the province, the Soviet-Chinese agreement still had not brought peace to Xinjiang. U.S. deputy secretary of state Dean Acheson, referring to the American consul in Urumqi, stated in a memorandum on September 17 that the rebels, consisting of Kazakh, Kirghiz, and Uyghur tribesmen, are protesting against oppressive Chinese political, economic, and social policies in Xinjiang and propose a program of political freedom and equality and cultural autonomy. The Consul states that the “failure of Chinese to comprehend nature of revolt and their conviction that it is inspired and directed one hundred percent by Soviets has caused sharp increase in suspicion and hostility since conclusion of Sino-Soviet pact which Xinjiang authorities expected vainly would be followed by peace in Xinjiang.”138

A few days before the memorandum the American Embassy in Chongqing, in response to consul Ward’s information, tried to find out what was happening in Xinjiang. “Is there a war going on, or are these tribal or sectional disputes? Who is fighting? What arms and equipment are being used? What are they fighting for?” In response to these questions, consul Ward said: A revolution is occurring which revolting elements considered as a revolutionary war and which Chinese consider as bandit activity incited by Soviets. Those taking part are Kazakh, Kirghiz and some Uyghur tribesmen, with some active and widespread tacit support from Muslim majority of general populace. Most effective insurgent weapons are rifles and fast horses. Although some units are apparently well armed with mortars, machine guns and possibly some anti-aircraft guns, some non-official sources indicate that not all possess rifles. Originally, tribesmen undoubtedly had some arms themselves; some have been turned over to them by provincial forces going over to rebels and some have been captured from Chinese. While some arms probably have been obtained from across border, it is impossible to secure accurate reports as to type and number. . . . Rebels assert they are fighting to break Chinese minority rule over

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“East Turkistan”; to assure proportional representation of each race in new government of East Turkistan; to obtain equality of all races in East Turkistan.139

In the middle of September, the United States interim commissioner in Moscow, George Kennan, sent to the secretary of state his private views about the Soviet policy in Xinjiang: Given conditions existing in Xinjiang—long standing misrule by Chinese minority and insurgency among central Asian majority—USSR need not resort to rough shod intervention along Polish and Balkan pattern to attain hegemony over Xinjiang. To achieve and maintain predominant influence in Xinjiang Moscow needs do little more than guide discreetly the activities of central Asian political and military elements in Soviet and Mongolian regions adjacent to Xinjiang frontiers. Such activities will doubtless continue to be expertly blended into the tribal affinities overriding the vague borders of Nomadic Central Asia and are not likely to be readily identifiable as Moscow directed.140

Osman Batyr, who controlled the border between Mongolia and China along with Alikhan Törä’s supporters in the Ghulja government, refused to obey Moscow’s instruction to suspend military operations and to negotiate with the Chinese. He was appointed as the governor of the Altai region by the Ghulja government on September 23, 1945, and together with the Eastern Turkistan National Army in September 1945 cleared the Altai region of the remnants of the Chinese army. At the same time Osman Batyr and Dalelkhan Sgurbayev were included in the government of the Eastern Turkistan Republic as Kazakh and Kirghiz representatives. But relations between Osman Batyr and the Ghulja government, especially with the Soviet representatives, were not strong. “Osman’s open defiance of Dalelkhan and the Ili rebels was quickly brought to the attention of Soviet officials in Moscow.”141 A special report sent to the Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR by General Egnarov on October 5 stated that Osman Batyr had ignored the instructions given by the Soviet authorities. Considering the close ties between the governor of Altai and the leader of Mongolia, Beria suggested that he influence Osman Batyr through Ulan-Bator. He wrote in the letter to Molotov: “Taking into account the result of the negotiations between the Ghulja rebels and the Chinese government, I think it is appropriate to entrust Choibalsan to instruct Osman Batyr to cease active military operation against the Chinese, to move to a defensive position, and to support the Ghulja rebels in negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the conflict with the Chinese.”142 But the efforts of the Ghulja army leadership and the Soviet representatives in the government of Eastern Turkistan failed: Osman Batyr did not obey the order to cease military operations.



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The head of the Eastern Turkistan national government, Alikhan Törä, nominally agreed to cease military operations and to send a delegation to Urumqi, but his secret letters addressed to the national army commanders urged them to ignore the Soviet proposal to cease military operations and to continue the fight against the Chinese army and authorities. Soviet intelligence agents working in Xinjiang intercepted some of these letters and informed Moscow about “Sadyg’s” (Alikhan Törä’s) disobedience of the Soviet leadership’s instructions on ending active military operations. On October 7, the Soviet authorities added Törä’s translated letters on the situation in Eastern Turkistan to the information “on the situation in Ghulja” that they were about to send to Moscow.143 In return, the Soviet authorities began to pull back their military instructors from the front positions and to take back the weapons and ammunition previously distributed among the national army and guerrilla groups. All this led to an undesirable situation on several fronts. In turn, a number of influential circles in the Xinjiang government did not believe in the prospects of the negotiations. General Zhu Shaoliang, China’s army commander in Urumqi province, told the American consul that “Turkistan is now being attacked and he predicts its capture will be followed by attack on Kashgar; he believes situation only seems better, expects negotiations will fail, and believes winter will witness more severe fighting than any so far.”144 After the Soviets stopped active military operations, the Ghulja government took a number of steps necessary to strengthen control over the army. The government established the Supreme Military Council and appointed Alikhan Törä as chair of the council, which also included Iskhak bey Monunov, the commander of the Eastern Turkistan army, as well as members of the government Ahmedjan Kasimov and Karim Hajı. Alikhan Törä was awarded the rank of marshal in the Eastern Turkistan army. In order to maintain the national army and supply it with arms and ammunition, the council members increased budget allocations for military purposes.145 They understood very well that after Soviet forces withdrew the national army would face difficulties. For example, on October 5 the Chinese army besieged the city of Aqsu and succeeded in forcing Sufi Akhun Surbayev’s detachment out of the old city. Having lost seventy-two soldiers, the national army units withdrew to Nurgak. Alikhan Törä and some members of the government explained the defeat as the result of the Russian policy. On October 22 Egnarov and Langfang wrote to Lavrentii Beria: On October 18 we intercepted two letters of “Sadyg” [Alikhan Törä], addressed to Surbayev and government representatives at Surbayev’s detachment. In his letters “Sadyg” suggests continuing the active operations without paying attention to the orders from headquarters to move to the defensive. With regard

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to the losses “Sadyg” accuses us, referring to the instructions on moving to defense and withdrawal of our people and weapons from that direction. From the tone of “Sadyg’s” letter, his intention is clearly to hold out by any means in the south near Aqsu; obviously “Sadyg” continues to reveal his old aspirations. In recent years, in general, “Sadyg” has been actively engaged in the general political and military work by acting through the heads of government agencies and headquarters.146

The Soviet representatives who coordinated the process in Xinjiang wrote to Beria: “On the situation for October 20: we withdrew all demobilized persons from the rebel forces and concentrated on the border strip from whence they would be sent to the Jarkent district. Simultaneously the rebels have been stripped of all weapons that came from the arsenal of the Chinese army, with the exception of the battalion mortars. Weapons have been removed in Khorgos. We have stopped supplying the rebels with ammunition.”147 After intense pressure from the Soviet authorities, the Eastern Turkistan national government agreed to start negotiations with the Chinese authorities in Xinjiang. The interim commissioner of the United States in China, Walter Robertson, informed the secretary of state that “Moscow had agreed and Yining representatives were to be sent to Tihwa (Urumqi). Yining regime now reported to be seeking autonomy within regions under its control rather than separation from China or expulsion of Chinese sovereignty.”148 Three delegates were selected for negotiations. The government appointed as the head of the delegation Uyghur Rahimjan Sabirkhojayev, a close ally of Alikhan Törä, thirty-seven years old and ethnically Uyghur, as well as delegates Ahmedjan Kasimov, a thirty-two-year-old Uyghur who was very close to the Soviets, and fifty-year-old Abdulkhayri Törä, who had great prestige among the Kazakhs.149 The delegation was instructed by the Eastern Turkistan national government to insist “on the transfer of the whole territory of Xinjiang to the authority of this government, the recognition of China, the independence of Xinjiang, and the establishment of equal relations between China and the ETR.”150 The Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR proposed to the Chinese government in a note to hold the talks in Ghulja, but the Chongqing government did not agree and replied that “if the Soviet consul in Ghulja wants to help our government, then we ask him to tell the rebellious people of the necessity of sending their representatives to Urumqi for negotiations with the authorized agent of China, Zhang Zhizhong. We completely guarantee the safety of these representatives.”151 In the end, the Soviet Union agreed with Chongqing’s proposals: the representatives of Ghulja went to Urumqi. Egnarov and Langfang, who controlled the situation in Xinjiang, wrote to Beria: “On October 12 of this year at 9:30 a.m. local time, a delegation of the Eastern Turkistan Republic, headed for the negotiations with



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the Chinese, successfully passed the front line in the direction of the China, where was received by the representative of the Chinese authorities.”152 On October 13 Beria sent to Molotov, Malenkov, and Mikoian this information that he had received from Alma-Ata. When the Ghulja representatives reached Urumqi, they went first to the Soviet consulate in the city. Consul general Evseev received them and after some discussion called the commissioner of the China Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Urumqi, Liu Tse-yung, and introduced them to him. On October 14 Zhang Zhizhong, the special representative of Chiang Kai-Shek, together with the delegation of the Chinese government came to Urumqi from Chongqing. He was a politician who had earned the trust and confidence of Chiang Kai-Shek and was considered his right-hand man. Earlier he had been sent by the Guomindang government to talk with the Chinese Communists. The delegation of the Chinese government included Liang Hansao, Deng Wenyi, Peng Zhaoxian, Wang Shen-shan, Qu Wu, Liu Mengchun, and others.153 The first meeting between the parties took place on October 15. When Zhang first asked about the wishes of the Ghulja representatives, the delegation members did not express their opinions. They were interested in what the Chinese government could give to the Eastern Turkistan people. Zhang touched on some rights that the Chinese government was willing to offer. According to him, the Eastern Turkistan government would be expanded by adding delegates appointed by the local people. The number of people in the provincial government would be increased from ten to twenty-five. All positions except the head of the provincial government would be filled by representatives of the rebels, the local people, and the Chinese national minority. An Eastern Turkistan Council would be established, consisting of representatives of the local people. Along with the Chinese language, the Uyghur language would be used in state offices. Local languages would be used in primary schools, but Chinese would be used in secondary and higher education. Freedom of speech and of the press would be allowed provided it did not conflict with the law.154 However, when the Ghulja representatives raised the issue of recognition of the Ili government, Zhang said that it was impossible and that he was not authorized to do so. On October 16 he told the Soviet consul general that “he cannot deal on that basis. The Soviet consul general needs in the near future to inform the delegation of the rebels that the Chinese could not recognize the independence of ‘Eastern Turkistan’ and moreover that the Soviet government itself would not recognize such a government.”155 Zhang said that China’s good intentions in the talks were based on the principles of the memorandum submitted to the Soviet ambassador in Chongqing by the Ministry of China Foreign Affairs on September 17. But the “Chinese did

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not contemplate meeting with delegates of an independent state, but rather with delegates of rebellious areas.”156 On October 24 General Egnarov and Langfang reported to the Commissariat of Internal Affairs that “on October 22, 1945, in the morning, ‘Sadyg’ urgently convened a meeting of the government, where the question of the recall of the delegates from Urumqi was raised.”157 In accordance with the directive the delegation of the Eastern Turkistan government suspended the negotiations and on October 22 returned to Ghulja for consultation. The delegation that came back from Urumqi informed not only the Ghulja government about the progress of the negotiations but also the Soviet representatives who controlled the situation in the north. Egnarov and Langfang wrote to Beria that on October 24 they “met the rebel delegation in Dizinkho and heard its report on the result of negotiations with the Chinese.”158 On October 28 Egnarov reported to the Commissariat of Internal Affairs that “protracted negotiations with the Chinese have caused a lot of talk among the population.”159 Based on the extensive information from Zhang Zhizhong, the American consul in Urumqi prepared a detailed report to Washington about the talks of the Chinese delegation. Robert Ward believed that the revolt in Xinjiang should be studied and explained within the framework of two conceptual approaches. The first “has been that the revolt was essentially and basically an internal problem. As long as the Chinese would not accept this concept, it was impossible for them even to approach the problem.” The second approach “is as simple as the first: that is, that there is no necessary connection between ‘communism’ and ‘autonomy’; there is no reason why a non-communist government should regard itself as debarred from employing the approach to subject peoples embodied in the idea of autonomy.”160 The failure of Urumqi talks from the beginning and Alikhan Törä’s determination to continue the fight did not please the Soviet representatives in Xinjiang. Starting in September and October of 1945, Egnarov and Lanfang began to frame a plan for replacing him with someone more manageable. Törä wanted to use the failure of the Urumqi talks as a pretext to continue the fight against the Chinese government and tried to convince the Soviets to do this. When the talks stalled, on October 31 he appealed to Stalin with a special letter in which he attempted to persuade the Soviet leader that the only fair solution to the Xinjiang problem was freeing the province from Chinese bondage. He wrote: “We peoples of Eastern Turkistan have already been under the yoke and bondage of the Chinese government for 200 years. Having spent this long period under the yoke of the Chinese government, we not only do not have any rights but have been deprived of shelter, since our property has been periodically subjected to confiscation.”161 Alikhan Törä noted that their best men had been thrown into prison on the basis of false



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information and unprecedentedly tortured and killed; their holy religion was insulted; and increasing taxes every year made their once prosperous country poor. He told Stalin that having bought an official position in central China, Chinese careerists have been pursuing a dirty policy with respect to us. They have equated the peoples of Eastern Turkistan with animals and exploited them like animals. The Chinese, being a people of little culture themselves, have exploited us savagely, considering us an inferior race. Having deprived us of knowledge and culture, they have brought us to a wretched condition. As a result of all this, all of our people, who have clearly recognized our position and united under the slogans of friendship and unity, rose up against oppression. A bloody battle broke out among us. We united under the slogan “the power of the majority is God’s power,” and the people’s strength smashed the enemy everywhere he was encountered. We have liberated three districts of our homeland from the Chinese oppressors and created our republican government.162

Alikhan Törä stated that at present the people of Eastern Turkistan did not recognize the authority of the Chinese government and were determined to protect their rights and their own homeland. He added that their victories and successes achieved as a result of the revolutionary struggle depended on their great neighbor, the Soviet Union, which had love for other nations, respected human rights, and stood behind the oppressed people of world, and on its great leader Stalin, “the Father of Nations.” In declaring the separation of the Eastern Turkistan people from the China government, Törä wrote: “We have severed ourselves, because water cannot be combined with a flame, as a sheep cannot get along with a wolf. We the people of the Eastern Turkistan have sworn before God not to put down [our] weapons until we win our motherland and achieve full rights.”163 Along with Alikhan Törä, ten other members of the Eastern Turkistan national government signed the letter addressed to Stalin. With this letter the members of the Ghulja government demonstrated their will to fight. But they believed that the success of this struggle depended on support from the Soviet Union. The letter was presented to Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Mikoian, and Vyshinskii on November 3, 1945, but did not have a significant impact on the further course of events in Xinjiang. Moscow did not give up its policy of cooperating with the government of Chiang Kai-Shek. The Soviet diplomats and intelligence agencies were persistent in requiring continuation of the Urumqi talks by the Eastern Turkistan government. They forced the Ghulja government to negotiate through all means. The conciliatory position of the supporters of the Soviets within the government made Moscow’s policy of continuing negotiations sustainable. Under these pressures, the delegation of the Eastern Turkistan government, after comple-

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tion of the consultations in Ghulja on November 13, returned to Urumqi.164 On November 16 the Soviet authorities in Xinjiang prepared information about the mood of the population, especially within the Eastern Turkistan Republic, and sent it to Moscow. The report stated that the Muslims were not willing to negotiate with the Chinese authorities.165 When the next round of talks began on November 19, this mood became more obvious. In accordance with the instructions of the Ili government, the Ghulja representatives made a statement: “As the government of Eastern Turkistan we have discussed in Ili the proposals of the Chinese government. As a result, we have come to the conclusion that the Chinese proposal does not satisfy us. Our conditions are that national defense and foreign affairs will be under the authority of the central government; the Chinese government will recognize the high-level ‘internal autonomy’ of Eastern Turkistan; the Eastern Turkistan national army will not be disarmed and the Chinese government will recognize this army as the ‘State Army’”; the national structure and form of the army will not be changed.166 After that, a document with eleven articles by the Ili representatives and a document with twelve articles by the central government representatives were presented for discussion. The rebels sought to limit Chinese participation in local government to their numerical proportions and to constitute a provincial government on the basis of an elected Provincial Assembly, while Chinese sought in effect to maintain control of all offices higher than district magistrates. The tenacity with which the Chinese seemed to be insisting on a Chinese chair appointed by Chongqing cast some doubt locally on the sincerity of the continued assertions that all provinces would elect their own chair under a new constitution. The ultimate concession that Chiang Kai-Shek was willing to permit was said to be the election of district magistrates and including among the appointed heads of provincial bureaus six or seven (out of twelve or thirteen) “local people” who would either be Chinese or be natives acceptable to the local Guomindang.167 While the talks were going on, Ward, the American consul in Urumqi, wrote that the “Soviet Consul General has worked earnestly for a settlement and is urging rebels to accept above terms.”168 However, this round of talks did not last long. The parties could not agree on the ruling of the province, so the national government delegation returned back to Yining (Ghulja) on November 26. In late November Alikhan Törä prepared a detailed letter to the Soviet leadership about the suspended talks in Urumqi between the representatives of the Eastern Turkistan Republic and the representatives of the Chinese government with his assessment of the whole situation in Xinjiang. On November 28 this document with a cover letter from the Commissariat of Internal Affairs was sent to the Soviet leadership.169 Two days later, General Egnarov sent to Moscow a memorandum about the draft agreement



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on the Xinjiang issue proposed by the representatives of China to the representatives of the Eastern Turkistan during the talks in Urumqi.170 At that time, the Soviet authorities had already taken a number of steps to weaken the position of the Eastern Turkistan government in Xinjiang. The most effective was the recall of the Soviet military and instructors from the Eastern Turkistan army and taking back the weapons distributed to the rebels. On December 4, 1945, Egnarov and Langfang wrote to Lavrentii Beria: 1. On the situation on December 1 of this year, 3,00 German rifles, all German machine guns, and all battalion mortars given by us to the rebels have been taken back. The further removal of rifles continues. 2. The Takhtamish and Altai operative group has been disbanded and personnel with weapons transferred to the [Soviet] Union. The previously sent officers of the Border Guards will be directed to their place of permanent service. 3. All “demobilized” forces, numbering 2,707 people transferred to the Union, have been handed over to a representative of the staff of the Turkistan Military District and directed to the place to carry out their further service. 4. Pursuant to your instructions, necessary measures for disabling aircraft have been carried out.171

According to the Soviet authorities, in the second half of 1945 nearly three thousand soldiers and officers of the Turkistan Military Department took part in the events in Xinjiang. They played important roles in military operations carried out by the Eastern Turkistan National Army, in the sabotage organized by the guerrilla groups behind Chinese lines, and in management of military equipment and aviation.172 Along with these measures, the Soviet supporters within the Eastern Turkistan national government became active. By the end of 1945 a number of members of the government, including Ahmedjan Kasimov, opposed Alikhan Törä’s hard line. Abdulkarim Abbasov, head of the Government Propaganda and Agitation Department, openly criticized Törä’s political course by creating a semilegal organization called the People’s Revolutionary Party in 1945. His party included people who had played an important role in the rebel movement, such as Ibrahim Turdi, Anvar Khanbabyev, Abdullah Zakirov, and other well-known persons. At the end of 1945 the Eastern Turkistan Revolutionary Youth Union also began to oppose Alikhan Törä’s policy. According to some reports, the head of the Youth Union, Sogdulla Sayfullayev, with the help of Ahmedjan Kasimov supporter Gani Batyr, broke into Törä’s residence and demanded that he resign from his post as head of the government.173 Despite all this, Alikhan Törä was still perceived as a central political figure in Eastern Turkistan who was determined to lead an active political struggle. After the delegation returned from Urumqi, in December he called

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a meeting of the activists and confirmed the hard line of himself and his supporters in a resolution adopted by the meeting. It indicated that it was necessary to continue to fight for the liberation of all of Eastern Turkistan and to create there a “free, happy life, which already existed in the three freed districts.” The resolution stated: “If the Chinese government does not give us freedom, we ourselves will win it and spread our national revolution to all the territory of Eastern Turkistan.”174 Törä and his supporters stated that “there is only one way for us to go: the independence of our nation.”175 In order to maintain this political course, they wanted to hold a Muslim demonstration in Ghulja. A report sent to Moscow on December 8 warned of this possibility.176 On the same day a resident of the USSR Commissariat for State Security in Urumqi sent a two-page operational report to his leadership about the situation in Xinjiang.177 Both reports brought the extremely critical situation in Eastern Turkistan to the attention of the Soviet leadership. Despite the adoption of the tough resolution, the solemn speeches about the necessity of the struggle for independence, and the continued fight against the Chinese government at the meeting held by the Eastern Turkistan government, the Soviet authorities in Xinjiang prepared their supporters to negotiate with Chiang Kai-Shek’s representatives and to make some concessions on a number of important issues. On December 25 the Ghulja representatives came to Urumqi almost at the instructions of the Soviet authorities rather than the national government. They were expecting Chiang Kai-Shek’s son Chiang Ching-kuo to arrive in Urumqi on December 26.178 The mood of the Ghulja delegation reflected the first signs of the preparation of the defeatist peace agreement, the end of active struggle, and the weakening position of the national government. The Soviet leadership had disarmed the national government’s opposition to the Chinese government by withdrawing its military units, techniques, advisors, weapons, and ammunition from the Eastern Turkistan Republic. These steps by the Soviet Union strengthened the position of the Chinese representatives in the Urumqi talks. In December 1945 the active phase of the Muslim national movement in Xinjiang was over. A difficult ordeal awaited the Ghulja government and its leaders in the upcoming new year. NOTES 1.  Consulate General of the USSR in Urumqi. Bulletin press number 213, 1944, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 822, l. 39–40. 2.  Justin M. Jacobs, Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State, 140. 3.  See: Consulate General of the USSR in Urumqi. Bulletin press number 213, 1944, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 822, l. 44–45.



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  4.  Ibid., 42.   5.  See: Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 260.   6.  See: Iakovlev, K voprosu o natsional’no-osvoboditel’nom dvizhenii narodov Sin’tsziana v 1944–1949 gg., 165.   7.  See: James Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang, 215.   8.  The Soviet Sponsored Uprising in Ghulja, April 13, 1953, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, p. 2.   9.  Soviet Troops in Sinkiang/ The National Army of the East Turkestan People’s Republic, September 12, 1953, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, p. 2. 10.  See: The 1941 Sinkiang Population Survey/Shift of Population Since 1941, March 21, 1953, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, p. 2. 11.  The Charge in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State, February 21, 1945, Foreign Relation of the United States (FRUS). Diplomatic Paper 1945. Volume VII. The Far East, China. Washington, 1969, 994. 12.  Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War. The Making of the SinoAmerican Confrontation, 74. 13.  Letter from Beria and Vyshinskii to Stalin, April 29, 1945, GARF, f. R-9401s/ ch, o. 2, d. 95, l. 335. 14.  Isa Yusuf Alptekin, Doğu Türkistan Davasi, 173. 15.  See: Military Information: Soviet Russians with Ili Group in Sinkiang Province, December 13, 1947, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, p. 1; Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 250–251. 16.  The Charge in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State, February 21, 1945, FRUS, Diplomatic Paper 1945, Volume VII, 994. 17.  See: Political information: Sinkiang, February 24, 1947, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, pp. 1–2; Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 251–252. 18.  Isa Yusuf Alptekin, Doğu Türkistan Davasi. Istanbul, 173. 19.  Letter from Beria and Vyshinskii to Stalin, April 29, 1945, GARF, f. R-9401s/ ch, o. 2, d. 95, l. 337. 20.  Chiang Kai-Shek, China’s Destiny and Economy Theory. New York: Roy Publishers, 1947. 21.  Taylor, The Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China, 260. 22.  Jiang Batai. Criticism of the book “China’s Destiny,” April 7, 1945, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 823, l. 73. 23.  Chiang Kai-Shek. “China’s Destiny,” April 7, 1945, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 823, l. 3. 24.  Khakimbayev,  Natsional’no-osvoboditel’noe dvizhenie korennoe nasilenie Sin’tsziana v 30-kh i 40-kh godov ХХ veka, 127. 25  The views of the Sinkiang Guild on the Draft Contitution, February 5, 1945, NARA, RG 59, Box: 7264, NND 760050, Doc. 893.00/2-545, p. 9. 26.  Robert S. Ward, Demands of the Sinkiang Autonomists, February 5, 1945, NARA, RG 59, Box: 7264, NND 760050, Doc. 893.00/2-545, p. 15. 27.  Reference on “Demands of the Sinkiang Autonomists,” July 23, 1945, NARA, RG 59, Box: 7264, NND 760050, Doc. 893.00/7-2345, p. 15.

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28.  Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 261. 29.  See: Political information: Sinkiang, February 24, 1947, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, p. 2. 30.  Letter from Beria to Molotov, Malenkov and Mikoian, October 15, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 с/ч, o. 2, d. 104, l. 62. 31.  See: Baymirza Hayit, Türkistan Devletlerinin Milli Mücadileleri Tarihi, 327. 32.  See: James Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang, 215. 33.  Xiaoyuan Liu, Reins of Liberation, 353. 34.  See: Petrov, Miatezhnoe “serdtse” Azii, 452–478. 35.  Continuation of the report of the Committee of Xinjiang Guomindang to VI Congress of the Guomindang, 1945, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 824, l.156. 36.  See: Letter from Beria to Stalin and Molotov. About the revolt of the Muslim population Nilka County of Xinjiang and the capture of the city Nilka, December 2, 1944, GARF, f. Р-9401 с/ч, o. 2, d. 68, l. 61–66. 37.  The Soviet Sponsored Uprising in Ghulja, April 13, 1953, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, p. 2. 38.  See: Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 260–261. 39.  Letter from Beria and Vyshinskii to Stalin, April 29, 1945, GARF, f. R-9401s/ ch, o. 2, d. 95, l. 336. 40.  See: The Soviet Sponsored Uprising in Ghulja, April 13, 1953, NARA, CIARDP 82, p. 4. 41.  Ibid., 2. 42.  Memorandum by Mr. Horace H. Smith, January 11, 1945, FRUS, Diplomatic Paper 1945, Volume VII, 989. 43.  See: Petrov, Miatezhnoe “serdtse” Azii, 453. 44.  See: General Information from Egnarov addressed to Beria about the situation in Xinjiang, January 11, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 с/ч, o. 2, d. 92, l. 74–82. 45.  From Hurley to Secretary of State, January 2, 1945, NARA, RG 59, Box: 4013, NND 760090, Doc. 761.93/2-145, p. 5. 46.  See: General Information from Egnarov addressed to Beria to re-attack on the fortress Ghulja Ayrembak, January 11, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 92, l. 44. 47.  B.Godunov, The situation in Xinjiang, January 25, 1945, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 822, l. 87. 48.  Memorandum by Mr. Horace H. Smith, January 11, 1945, FRUS, Diplomatic Paper 1945, Volume VII, 988. 49.  Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Devision of Chinese Affairs (Meyer), January 20, 1945, FRUS, Diplomatic Paper 1945, Volume VII, 993. 50.  Miсhael Clarke, The ‘centrality’ of Central Asia in world history, 1700–2008, 35. 51  See: B.Godunov. The situation in Xinjiang, January 25, 1945, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 822, l. 87. 52.  See: Letter from Beria to Stalin and Molotov. On the national liberation movement of Muslims in Xinjiang, March 21, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 94, l. 106–111.



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53.  See: Letter from Beria to Stalin and Molotov. On the national liberation movement of Muslims in Xinjiang , in addition to the note dated March 21, 1945, April 11, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 94, l. 395–396. 54.  See: Soviet Troops in Sinkiang/ The National Army of the East Turkestan People’s Republic, September 12, 1953, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, p. 2. 55.  See: Petrov. Miatezhnoe “serdtse” Azii, 478–479. 56.  Special reports from General Egnarov to Beria, April 17, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 95, l. 63. 57.  Letter from AlikhanTöra to Stalin, April 22, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 95, l. 393–394. 58.  Letter from Beria to Stalin and Molotov, May 11, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ ch., o. 2, d. 95, l. 392. 59.  Letter from Beria and Vyshinskii to Stalin, April 29, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 95, l. 334. 60.  Ibid., 335. 61.  Ibid., 336. 62.  Ibid., 337–338. 63.  Soviet Troops in Sinkiang/ The National Army of the East Turkestan People’s Republic, September 12, 1953, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, p. 2. 64.  The Charge in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State, February 21, 1945, FRUS, Diplomatic Paper 1945, Volume VII, 994. 65.  Information from Beria to Stalin and Vyshinskii, September 12, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 98, l. 398. 66.  From Mikoian to Stalin. On the independence movement in Xinjiang, February 5, 1949, Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskii Federatsiia (hereafter referred to as APRF), f. 45, o. 1, d. 331, l. 101. 67.  Information from Beria to Stalin and Vyshinskii, June 2, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 98, l. 197. 68  See: Special reports from General Egnarov to Beria, June 9, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 96, l. 326. 69.  Failure of Sinkiang Mongols to Participate in Prince Te’s Autonomy Movement, August 23, 1949, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, p. 1. 70.  Telegram from AlikhanShakirkhojaev to Lieutenant Colonel Prokopiuk, June 8, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 96, l. 326–327. 71.  Special reports from General Egnarov to Beria, June 9, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 96, l. 326. 72.  Letter from Beria to Stalin and Molotov, June 10, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ ch., o. 2, d. 96, l. 325. 73.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” June 22, 1945, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 37, l. 145. 74.  Ibid., 145. 75.  Ibid., 145. 76.  Ibid., 145. 77.  Ibid., 146.

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  78.  See: The Soviet Sponsored Uprising in Ghulja, April 13, 1953, NARA, CIARDP 82, p. 3.   79.  See: Barnett, China on the Eve of Communist Takeover, 276.   80  Letter from Beria to Stalin and Molotov, July 3, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 97, l. 137.   81.  Telegram from General Egnarov to Beria, July 11, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ ch., o. 2, d. 97, l. 331.   82.  Special reports from General Egnarov to Beria, July 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 97, l. 354.   83.  Ibid., 354.   84.  Ibid., 354.   85.  Ibid., 355.   86.  Ibid., 357.   87.  Letter from Beria to Stalin and Molotov, July 13, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ ch., o. 2, d. 97, l. 353.   88.  Letter from Beria to Stalin and Molotov, August 7, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 98, l. 51.   89.  Special reports from General Egnarov to Beria, July 17, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 98, l. 1.   90.  Ibid., 1–2   91.  The Situation in China. Summary of talks with Song Ziwen—the Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, May 20, 1945, NARA, RG 59, Box: 4013, NND 760090, Doc. 761.93/5-2045, p. 3.   92.  From the diary of Apallon Petrov. Recording conversations with Chiang Ching-kuo, July 8, 1945, The National Security Archive of George Washington University, R 3158. p. 1.   93.  Ibid., 2.   94.  Ibid., 2.   95.  From the diary of Molotov. Receiving Chairman of the Executive Yuan and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, Song Ziwen, July 10, 1945, The National Security Archive of George Washington University, R 3159. p. 3.   96.  Ibid., 10.   97.  Overhead incoming No. 2511. From Sergei to Paul and Petrov, July 18, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 98, l. 23.   98.  Telegram from Stakhanov to Beria, July 31, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 98, l. 31.   99.  Letter from Beria to Stalin and Molotov, August 7, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 98, l. 50. 100.  Telegram from Stakhanov to Beria, July 31, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 98, l. 31. 101.  See: Information NKVD of the USSR about the situation in Xinjiang and the actions of the rebels in Ili district on August 5, this year, August 7, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 103, l. 268–270. 102  Letter from Beria to Stalin and Molotov, August 7, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 98, l. 50; Telegram from Stakhanov to Beria, July 31, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 98, l. 32.



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103.  Special reports from General Egnarov to Beria, August 27, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 98, l. 319. 104.  Special reports from General Egnarov to Beria, August 23, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 98, l. 292. 105.  Letter from Beria to Stalin and Molotov, August 7, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 98, l. 51. 106.  Special reports to Beria, August 25, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 98, l. 207. 107.  Special reports from General Egnarov to Beria, August 23, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 98, l. 292. 108.  Special reports from General Egnarov to Beria, August 27, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 98, l. 318. 109.  A memo from Beria to Stalin, Molotov and Malenkov, August 5, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 98, l. 377. 110.  Ibid., 377–378. 111.  Ibid., 378. 112.  Ibid., 379. 113.  The scheme of the situation in Xinjiang, August 28, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 98, l. 379а. 114.  See: From the diary of Molotov. Receiving Chairman of the Executive Yuan and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, Song Ziwen, August 11, 1945, The National Security Archive of George Washington University, R 3160. pp. 17–24. 115.  See: From the diary of Molotov. Receiving Chairman of the Executive Yuan and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, Song Ziwen, August 12, 1945, The National Security Archive of George Washington University, R 3161. pp. 25–30. 116.  From the diary of Molotov. Receiving Chairman of the Executive Yuan and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, Song Ziwen, August 14, 1945, The National Security Archive of George Washington University, R 3162. p. 34. 117.  Xiaoyuan Liu, Reins of Liberation, 353. 118.  Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnoshenia 1917–1957, Moscow, 1957, 205–206. 119.  See: James Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang, 217. 120.  See: Military Information: Invasion of Sinkiang Province, June 19, 1947, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, p. 1. 121.  Xiaoyuan Liu, Reins of Liberation, 41. 122.  Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 291. 123.  See: The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the Secretary of State, September 7, 1945, FRUS, Diplomatic Paper 1945, Volume VII, 1008. 124.  See: Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On the situation of Xinjiang,” September 15, 1945, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 37, l. 150. 125.  See: Robert Ward, Sinkiang and the Sinkiang Revolt: From the Middle of July to the end of October. The Opening of Negotiations, October 31, 1945, NARA, RG 59, Box: 7262, NND 760050, Doc. 893.00/10-3145, p. 310. 126.  See: Godunov, The situation in Xinjiang, January 25, 1945, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 822, l. 87.

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127.  Shen Zhihua and Xia Yafeng, Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, 12. 128.  See: The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the Secretary of State, September 7, 1945, FRUS, Diplomatic Paper 1945, Volume VII, 1008. 129.  From the diary of Molotov. Receiving the Minister of Foreign Affairs of China Wang Shi-jie, September 15, 1945, The National Security Archive of George Washington University, R 3163. p. 35. 130.  See: The consul at Tihwa (Ward) to the Secretary of State, October 31, 1945, FRUS, Diplomatic Paper 1945, Volume VII, 1018–1019. 131.  Letter from Beria to Stalin, September 12, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 98, l. 399. 132.  Ibid., 1019. 133.  Robert Ward. Sinkiang and the Sinkiang Revolt: From the Middle of July to the end of October. The Opening of Negotiations, October 31, 1945, NARA, RG 59, Box: 7262, NND 760050, Doc. 893.00/10-3145, p. 311. 134.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On the situation of Xinjiang,” September 15, 1945, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 37, l. 150–151. 135.  See: Letter from Beria and Vyshinskii to Stalin, September 14, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 66, l. 7. 136.  See: Special reports of the Egnarov and Langfang to Beria, Octobor 22, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 104, l. 118. 137.  See: Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 291–292. 138.  Memorandum of Acheson, September 17, 1945, NARA, RG 59, Box: 4013, NND 760090, Doc. 761.93/17-945, p. 161. 139.  From Hurley to Secretary of State, September 13, 1945, NARA, RG 59, Box: 4013, NND 760090, Doc. 761.93/9-1345, pp. 156–158. 140.  From Kennan to Secretary of State, September 17, 1945, NARA, RG 59, Box: 4013, NND 760090, Doc. 761.93/9-1745, p. 164. 141.  Justin M. Jacobs, Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State, 161. 142.  Letter from of Beria to Stalin, Octobor 15, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 104, l. 62–63. 143.  See: About the situation in Ghulja. Appendix: Translation letter AlikhanTörä Shakirkhojaev, October 7, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch, o. 2, d. 105, l. 344–347. 144.  From Robertson to Secretary of State, September 26, 1945, NARA, RG 59, Box: 4013, NND 760090, Doc. 761.93/9-2645, p. 169. 145.  See: Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 300. 146.  Special reports of the Egnarov and Langfang to Beria, October 22, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 104, l. 117–118. 147.  Ibid., 118. 148.  From Robertson to Secretary of State, September 22, 1945, NARA, RG 59, Box: 4013, NND 760090, Doc. 761.93/9-2245, p. 167. 149.  See: Isa Yusuf Alptekin. Doğu Türkistan Davasi, 179. 150.  Khakimbayev, Natsional’no-osvoboditel’noe dvizhenie korennoe nasilenie Sin’tsziana v 30-kh i 40-kh godov ХХ veka, 159. 151.  Khakimbayev, Natsional’no-osvoboditel’noe dvizhenie v Sin’tsziane 1931– 1949 godakh: V 2-kh ch. Ch. 1, 48.



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152.  Special reports from Egnarov and Langfang to Beria, Octobor 22, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 104, l. 59. 153.  See: Robert Ward. Sinkiang and the Sinkiang Revolt: From the Middle of July to the end of October. The Opening of Negotiations, October 31, 1945, NARA, RG 59, Box: 7262, NND 760050, Doc. 893.00/10-3145, p. 311; Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 298; Isa Yusuf Alptekin, Doğu Türkistan Davasi, 179. 154  See: Isa Yusuf Alptekin, Doğu Türkistan Davasi, 180. 155.  Robert Ward. Sinkiang and the Sinkiang Revolt: From the Middle of July to the end of October. The Opening of Negotiations, October 31, 1945, NARA, RG 59, Box: 7262, NND 760050, Doc. 893.00/10-3145, p. 312. 156.  The Charge in China (Robertson) to the Secretary of State, October 27, 1945, FRUS, Diplomatic Paper 1945. Volume VII, 1017. 157.  Special reports from Egnarov and Langfang to Beria, October 24, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 104, l. 123–124. 158.  Special reports from Egnarov and Langfang to Beria, October 29, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 104, l. 296–297. 159.  Reports from Egnarov to Beria, October 28, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 104, l. 298–299. 160.  The consul at Tihwa (Ward) to the Secretary of State, October 31, 1945, FRUS, Diplomatic Paper 1945. Volume VII, 1021. 161.  Letter from AlikhanTöra to Stalin, October 31, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 100, l. 270. 162.  Ibid., 270–271. 163.  Ibid., 271. 164.  See: The Charge in China (Robertson) to the Secretary of State, November 17, 1945, FRUS, Diplomatic Paper 1945. Volume VII, 1022. 165.  See: Information of NKVD about mood of the population in Xinjiang, November 16, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 105, l. 106–108. 166.  Isa Yusuf Alptekin, Doğu Türkistan Davasi, 181. 167  The Charge in China (Robertson) to the Secretary of State, November 27, 1945, FRUS, Diplomatic Paper 1945. Volume VII, 1023. 168.  Ibid., 1023. 169.  See: Cover letter to the NKVD with translation of the letter of AlikhanTörä— head of Xinjiang Muslims government, about the situation in Xinjiang, November 28, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 105, l. 228–235. 170.  See: A report of the NKVD on the draft agreement proposed by the Chinese side on the question of Xinjiang, November 30, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 105, l. 245–251. 171.  Special reports from Egnarov and Langfang to Beria, December 4, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 104, l. 337. 172.  See: Polikarpov, Pozitsia Sovetskogo Soiuza v otnoshenii natsional’noosvoboditel’nogo dvizhenia v Sin’tsziane v 1944–1945 gg., 180. 173.  See: Krasil’nikov, Sintszianskoe pritiazhenie, 307. 174.  Ibid., 305. 175.  Political information: Autonomist Propaganda in Sinkiang, March 14, 1947, NARA, CIA-RDP 82, p. 1.

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176.  See: Information NKVD about possible demonstration of Muslims in Ghulja, December 8, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 105, l. 363. 177.  See: Information of a resident of the USSR NKGB in Urumqi on the situation in Xinjiang, December 8, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 105, l. 361–362. 178.  The Charge in China (Robertson) to the Secretary of State, December 28, 1945, FRUS, Diplomatic Paper 1945. Volume VII, 1024–1025.

Chapter Five

The Urumqi Agreement and the Establishment of a Coalition Government in Xinjiang (1946–1947)

On the advice of Soviet authorities, a delegation from the Eastern Turkistan Republic arrived in Urumqi in late 1945 to reach arrangements with the local Chinese government. In later December, despite determination of Alikhan Törä and his supporters to launch combat operations, pro-Soviet elements in the province favored peace. In furtherance of Chiang Kai-Shek’s support for the talks, Chiang Ching-kuo arrived in Urumqi on December 26. Dr. Jacobs wrote that “the Generalissimo’s Soviet-educated son and minister of education, stopped in Urumchi on his way to Moscow. Governor Wu played the role of host. “He suggested that we might now adopt the idea of some of out comrades in other clans, and try to appoint some of their talented people to government positions,” Wu noted in his diary, adhering to the oficial party line of “clans” (zongzu) and “tribes” (buluo) rather than “ethnicities” (minzu). Chiang-kuo also recommended “placing representatives from other clans as heads of government bureaus, with a Han occupying a secondary post.” Eventually, he told Wu, the Nationalist might even consider appointing someone from another “clan” as deputy governor of the province.”1 Chiang-kuo’s recommendations were to be taken into consideration in the upcoming turn round of events in Eastern Turkistan. NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE CENTRAL CHINESE GOVERNMENT AND THE EASTERN TURKISTAN REPUBLIC However, without waiting for the results of the talks, Chiang-Ching-kuo left for Moscow on December 28. According to Professor Vladislav M. Zubok, “from December 1945 to January 1946 Chiang Kai-Shek tried again to find a mutual understanding with the Kremlin rulers. This time, instead of the pro-American 171

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Dr. Song [Song Ziwen], he sent his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, to Moscow. Chiang had grown up in the Soviet Union and was a former member of the Soviet Communist Party.”2 On December 30 the Chinese representative met with Stalin and handed him a message from Chiang Kai-Shek. During the visit the Chinese intended to discuss a wider range of questions, not only the issue of Xinjiang. Despite the postwar intensification of American interest in China and the visit to Chongqing of special representatives of President Harry Truman and George Marshall, Chiang Kai-Shek was well aware that “a key to the peaceful resolution of relations with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is in Moscow rather than in Washington.”3 The main purpose of Chiang Ching-kuo’s Moscow visit was to persuade Stalin to mediate between the CCP and the Guomindang. He wanted “the Soviet government to convince the Communists to reach an agreement with the national government.” However, Stalin was not in a hurry to take the mission upon himself. During his meeting with the Chinese representative he pointed out that “the Soviet government is tied up with decisions of the Moscow conference, which insisted on termination of the civil war in China and the inclusion of democratic principles in the work of the government. . . . The Soviet government recognizes the national government as the government of China.” In so doing, he opined that “the Soviet government cannot mediate on the issue, since it is not confident that the Communists agree with this view.”4 Stalin tried to persuade Chiang Ching-kuo that “Moscow is in no position to influence the CPC.”5 In his message for Chiang Kai-Shek through Chiang Chingkuo on January 5, Stalin wrote that the Soviet-Chinese agreement signed in August 1945 had been a turning point between the parties. “During my talks with him [Chiang Ching-kuo], some aspects of Soviet-Chinese relations as well as questions of interest for China and the Soviet Union were touched upon. I hope that relations between our countries will develop along the lines of the Soviet-Chinese agreement.”6 The USSR insisted on holding talks between the government of Eastern Turkistan and the central government of China. In turn, under the SovietChinese treaty, in the first days of January the government of Chongqing adopted a decision on the recognition of the independence of Outer Mongolia. Thus, in late October 1945 the Supreme Council for the National Defense of China (SCNDC) considered the results of the referendum in the People’s Republic of Mongolia and decided to recommend that the central government recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia, based on the will of the Mongolian people. The Chinese legislative body (Yuan) instructed the Ministry of Internal Affairs to notify the Mongolian government of its official recognition of Outer Mongolia’s independence.7 In the first days of 1946 this step by the Chinese government resulted from Chiang Kai-Shek’s desire to ensure



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mutual trust in Soviet-Chinese relations. Historian Xiaoyuan Liu wrote that, Mongolia expected more from the Soviet Union, than they received: “to the dismay of MPR leaders, in World War II Moscow never considered a similar policy for Inner Mongolia. Having served as Moscow’s revolutionary mercenary in exploring opportunities in Xinjiang, Ulaanbaatar was not rewarded with an opportunity of its own in Inner Mongolia.”8 Another round of talks in Urumqi with representatives of Eastern Turkistan in the last days of 1945 brought the two parties closer together and raised expectations for the resolution of problems. The talks did not last long: on the evening of January 2, 1946, the parties signed a preliminary agreement with eleven clauses: “On Termination of Combat Operations and the Peaceful Resolution of Disputed Political and Economic Issues.”9 But the agreement did not include the proposals put forward earlier by the government in Ghulja. The document was a compromise, especially on the part of the Ghulja government. Representatives of the central Chinese government made no concessions that would cast doubt on China’s territorial integrity. Yet two concessions in the negotiations led to discontent among the Chinese representatives of Xinjiang: that “that troops brought in to put down the rebellion be withdrawn after settlement and that the secret police be disbanded.”10 Along with other issues, the document stipulated the formation of local governing bodies on the basis of elections; use of national languages together with Chinese by these local bodies; ensuring freedom of religions and conviction; teaching national languages in primary and secondary schools; formation of a coalition government; preservation of national military units within the army; no prosecution of proponents of democracy; and release of national movement activists.11 The parties agreed on supplemental items arising from the provisions of the preliminary agreement. The first provided for a mechanism to form the coalition government; the second dealt with development of the army of the central government in Xinjiang and national military units. Representatives of the government in Ghulja voiced their readiness to sign supplemental texts only after they had been accepted by the government in Ili. An arrangement had been reached that representatives of Eastern Turkistan would notify Zhang Zhizhong in writing about their arrival in Urumqi to finalize the agreement.12 During a reception arranged by the provincial government after the signing of the agreement, General Zhang Zhizhong said in the presence of U.S., British, and Soviet consuls that “permanent and friendly relations are to be maintained between China and the USSR. These relations are to be particularly close and friendly in Xinjiang.”13 On January 3, the day after the signing, Zhang Zhizhong and his delegation left by special plane for Chongqing, while representatives of the government of Eastern Turkistan returned to Ghulja. Four days after the agreement

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in Urumqi, China recognized the independence of the Mongolian People’s Republic of Mongolia on January 6, 1946. That put an end to the legal uncertainty that had plagued Outer Mongolia since Beijing had relinquished political control there a quarter-century earlier.14 Under a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated January 20, 1946, all Russian emigrants in Xinjiang were recognized as rehabilitated together with their families. They were entitled to obtain a document of citizenship and go to the Soviet Union unimpeded.15 Upon his return from Urumqi, General Zhang had a wide exchange of views in talks not only with Chiang Kai-Shek but with the Soviet ambassador in Chongqing, Apollon Petrov. He thanked the ambassador for the assistance rendered by the Soviet Consulate General during the talks and said: “While I was in Xinjiang, members of some circles voiced their hope that I’d be authorized to rule Xinjiang as chair of the provincial government. I will probably stay in Xinjiang to chair the local government, so the question of my appointment is now being decided by the president.”16 He added that he did not want to work in Xinjiang but would gladly go there to strengthen Soviet-Chinese relations. Zhang compared this province of China with the Soviet republics of Central Asia, telling the ambassador that “while at Xinjiang I read some books on the achievements of the Central Asian Republics—the Kazakh SSR and Uzbek SSR—and was shocked by the enormous contrast between these Republics and Xinjiang. Urumqi is like Alma-Ata in the past century, and if I could choose, I would prefer Alma-Ata rather than Xinjiang.”17 The situation in the Soviet republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan was somewhat better than in Xinjiang, of course, but not as bright as described in the books that the general read. In spring 1945 human flesh was sold in various towns of Uzbekistan that suffered from starvation. On April 17, 1945, the state security bodies informed Stalin, Molotov, and Malenkov “about the detention of twelve-year-old D. A. Abdukarimov on April 10, 1945, in the Andijan region and K. Nikanorov on April 13, 1945, in Samarkand for selling human meat.”18 Zhang Zhizhong described his talks with representatives of Eastern Turkistan in Urumqi: I told the representatives of the insurgents that their revolt against the central government is absolutely natural. If I were them, I would have long ago revolted. The government is to blame for their discontent. However, the situation is likely to change in the future. Before Sheng Shicai, Xinjiang had been ruled by several princelings, while the position of the government was rather unstable in the region. During the reign of Sheng Shicai in Xinjiang, the government failed to do anything good for minority nations. For some time, the government was busy with waging war against Japan and thus ignored Xinjiang. However,



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from now on the government intends to develop Xinjiang both politically and economically; to raise the cultural level of minority nations and grant them democratic freedoms. In my view, the Chinese-Soviet collaboration will play a significant part in restructuring Xinjiang.19

Zhang Zhizhong emphasized that in a day or two the Soviet-Chinese trade and economic collaboration in Xinjiang would be restored. The ambassador voiced his view that a necessary prerequisite for Soviet-Chinese economic cooperation was a sustained political situation in the province. In his response Zhang Zhizhong pointed out that “after the resolution of the army issue, the Xinjiang provincial government will be carefully reorganized, so the situation in Xinjiang will be stabilized.”20 At the end of the talk Zhang noted that he hoped that the Soviet consul general in Urumqi would continue his efforts to resolve the remaining issues. It should be noted that simultaneously with the Soviet-mediated talks in Urumqi with representatives of Eastern Turkistan General Zhang Zhizhong represented the government in Chongqing on Chiang Kai-Shek’s instructions during talks between the Guomindang and Chinese Communists on military issues with American mediation (General Marshall).21 Note that the United States regarded the talks in Urumqi and the Soviet policy in China in general as an indicator of China’s involvement in the sphere of Soviet influence. U.S. chargé d’affaires to the USSR George Kennan wrote to the U.S. secretary of state on January 10, 1946: [T]he USSR cannot be satisfied with a “friendly” China in the sense that Canada or Mexico are “friendly” to the USA. Under real stress such relationship is, in Soviet view, politically, economically and militarily undependable. Ideologically convinced that Soviet system must eventually come into open conflict with Capitalist West, strategically obsessed with concept of national defense in great depth, and incredulous that there can exist between nations any satisfactory permanent relationship not based on the recognized ascendancy of one to the other, USSR can be satisfied only with influence eventually amounting to effective control.22

In Kennan’s view, in countries like the USSR where the state and the party are led by one person, terms like “democracy,” “loyalty,” “cooperation,” “interference,” and “free elections” have their own meaning. Touching upon China, he wrote: Toward China thus far USSR has been patient and courteous in its tactics. Patient because USSR is in many respects playing a waiting game in China-with confidence that events will someday play into Soviet hands. . . . USSR has indicated that it favors a more “Democratic” regime in China, i.e. coalition. It has not yet explicitly criticized National Government as a whole. Rather it has

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maintained generally correct attitude toward Chongqing. At same time it is not concealing its approval of program and action of Chinese Communists. In other words, USSR is for time being retaining its diplomatic mobility.23

The American diplomat’s assessment of Soviet foreign policy is of interest: he noted the probable relevance of the Soviet policy of supporting separatism in Iranian Azerbaijan for the Chinese province of Xinjiang. In this connection Kennan wrote: While granting presence in Xinjiang situation of all ingredient’s spontaneous rebellion without outside encouragement we hesitate to believe that USSR for first time in its history is so unimaginative and impractical as to forego an inviting opportunity to improve its position along its frontier. Soviet fissionist tactics employed in Iranian Azerbaijan may well be with local adaptations equally effective in Xinjiang. Moscow has not yet revealed any desire to press for any change in nominal sovereignty as was done in Outer Mongolia. In this area it probably prefers authority without responsibility.24

Along with Xinjiang, Kennan analyzed the situation in Manchuria, Port Arthur, and other Chinese territories bordered by the Soviet Union, stressing the probability of Yenan Communists falling under the Soviet influence. In particular he wrote: “In these circumstances Moscow’s possibilities for making its influence effective in Yenan in decisive moments are enormous and need not be too closely related to subjective sentiments of Yenan Communists.”25 In view of the growth of Communist influence in China and in order to monitor developments in the country more effectively, the USSR resolved to expand its presence and business activities there. In early 1946 five out of eight Soviet consulates in China were scattered in various towns of Xinjiang province. Despite the preliminary agreement signed on January 2 between the government of Eastern Turkistan and the central Chinese government, the Soviet diplomatic offices in Urumqi, Kashgar, Ghulja, Chuguchak, and Shara-Sume did their utmost to keep the province within the sphere of Soviet influence. The USSR intended to raise the number of consulate offices in China to thirteen.26 However, the strengthening of the central government in the province created some problems in sending Soviet diplomats to their destinations. During the reign of duban Sheng Shicai, until 1942 the Soviet consul in Urumqi had been appointed by approval of the head of the provincial government without notifying the Chinese Foreign Ministry. He was given an entry visa at the Chinese consulate in Alma-Ata. However, since late 1942, following the worsening of relations between the USSR and the government of the province, the Chinese had demanded that the Soviet Foreign Ministry inform the Chinese Foreign Ministry about the appointments of the consul general,



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consuls, and even vice-consuls. For a few months the government of Xinjiang did not recognize the Soviet diplomats I.  G. Evseev, Ivan Kurdiukov, and Ulmasov as vice-consuls. Note 1 from the Far East department addressed to Vladimir Dekanozov suggested resolving the problem by notifying the Chinese Foreign Ministry about the appointment of leading diplomats by the Soviet Embassy in Chongqing.27 After the Soviet diplomatic offices in Xinjiang agreed with the government in Chongqing on the appointments of senior diplomatic officers, a representative of the central government’s Foreign Ministry in the province, Liu Tse-yung, sent a note to Evseev, the acting Soviet consul general in Urumqi, which raised the question of the necessity of registering foreign citizens residing in Xinjiang. This problem resulted from the need to take control of the activities of Soviet citizens, particularly representatives of the Russian émigrés, who had played a key role in revolutionary events in the province since 1944. “[W]e’ve received a letter from the Xinjiang provincial government saying said that owing to the great number of foreign citizens in the province and with a view to protecting them and avoiding misunderstanding, foreign citizens will be registered within two months, starting on April 1.”28 In this difficult international situation China went through a hard period of maneuvering between the USSR and the United States. On January 10, when George Kennan sent a telegram about China to the State Department, a Political-Consultative Conference arranged by the Democratic League was held in Chongqing to deal mainly with ensuring the country’s territorial integrity, achieving the unity of political forces, and ceasing armed struggle between the Communist Party and the Guomindang. The positions of the Democratic League and the Communists coincided on these and other issues of domestic life of China. The convening of a conference was largely due to China-related decisions of the Moscow session of the Council of the Heads of Foreign Political Departments of the USSR, United States, and Great Britain held in December 1945. The session stressed the necessity of reforms and democratization of government bodies in China. As a matter of fact, the mission of General Marshall in Chongqing was intended to urge Chiang Kai-Shek to reform the country in the right way. However, Chiang Kai-Shek intended to carry out reforms on the basis of the previous principles of the Constitution of May 5: he set up the government in which the leading ministries remained under Guomindang control and remained its leader. The Communists disagreed but were ready to make concessions on some issues. The Communist Party of China assessed decisions adopted within the framework of the Political-Consultative Conference as a step forward. Zhou Enlai, who represented the CPS, expressed the view that “the decision of the Political-Consultative Conference is a first step in the democratic movement

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and the beginning of the destruction of the Guomindang dictatorship.”29 The CPC opined that by autumn 1946 its position would become stronger, making talks with Chiang Kai-Shek easier.30 This view of Zhou Enlai, one of the leaders of the Chinese Communists, proved to be correct. He had begun by giving secret financial aid to the Chinese Communists since October 1946. A receipt from Zhou Enlai given to Mikhail Suslov on October 16 stated that “by providing my signature below I confirm that I have received 50,000 (fifty thousand) American dollars.”31 Although the Political-Consultative Conference was held in a strained atmosphere, its participants stated that “the leading position of Chiang KaiShek was improving. From now on, Chiang Kai-Shek was to be recognized not only as a leader of the Guomindang and its government but also as the head of the democratic government based on the collaboration of various parties and social groups of Chinese society.”32 Perhaps the situation seemed to be as stated, but in reality it was rather difficult. Controversies among the participants in the political process were very deep. Even so, control over the country could be established only with the use of real force, not by conference decisions. Thus in 1946 the Communist Party of China was growing into the center of the country’s real force, with the help of open diplomatic and moral support as well as secret military and political aid from the USSR. The 2nd Plenum of the CEC of the Guomindang, held on March 1, 1946, was marked by heated debates. General Zhang Zhizhong informed the plenum about the talks in Urumqi and the agreement signed by representatives of the government in Ghulja. Members of the radical intra-Party group “Gesinpai,” which took an irreconcilable stand against the Communists, harshly criticized the decisions of the Political-Consultative Conference. The Soviet Union played an important role in adopting its compromise decisions. Both Communists and representatives of government circles supported reconciliation at Chongqing and voiced their agreement with Moscow’s proposal to end the civil war. The radical nationalistic forces inside the Guomindang were not satisfied with these proposals. Anti-Soviet publications appeared in pro-government newspapers after the conference. On February 22 an anti-Soviet demonstration had been held in Chongqing to protest against the delay in withdrawing Soviet troops from Manchuria. Protesters screamed out slogans criticizing the Soviet Union and its leaders. A note from the Soviet Embassy in Chongqing delivered to the Chinese Foreign Ministry openly maintained that government forces were behind the anti-Soviet views published in the press and voiced at the demonstration.33 This anti-Soviet line was manifest during the plenum of the Guomindang. Discontented forces demanded the dismissal of some senior officials for “disloyalty to the ruling Party.” Officials of the Soviet Embassy



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in Chongqing wrote to Moscow about the results of the plenum: “Reactionaries demand the dismissal for disloyalty of Guomindang foreign minister Wang Shijie, secretary general of the People’s Political Council Shao Lizu, governor of the province Sichuan Zhang Qun, and marshal Feng Yuxiang. The reports at the plenum by the chair of the executive chamber, Song Ziwen, minister of the economy Weng Wenhao, and minister of finance Yu Hong-jun were harshly criticized.”34 In spring 1946 China entered a period of severe political crisis, accompanied by a profound economic crisis in industry, trade, and the financial market, which increasingly aggravated the situation. Although the preliminary agreement signed in January 1946 provided for cessation of combat operations in Xinjiang, the situation in the province remained unstable. Drawing the attention of American and British diplomats in China, including Xinjiang, became an additional source of concern for Soviet representatives. Chinese officials in Chongqing assured the Soviet ambassador that the ChineseAmerican and Chinese-British collaboration in Xinjiang would be restricted. General Zhang Zhizhong, who expected that Chiang Kai-Shek would appoint him as head of the provincial government in Urumqi, told ambassador Apollon Petrov on March 18: “China is not going to develop relations with America and England in Xinjiang, nor allow expansion of the influence beyond consular service lines.”35 Several days later, on March 25, General Zhang arrived in Urumqi to discuss unresolved issues with Eastern Turkistan representatives. To fulfill the general’s promises to the Soviet ambassador, the Chinese allowed the Soviets to restart tin prospecting operations in Xinjiang in March.36 A final round of talks began on March 27, upon the arrival of Ghulja government representatives. According to the U.S. consul, the “rebel army remains on Manass River and crisis cannot be regarded as safely past as long as this situation prevails.”37 The situation in Xinjiang before the next round of talks remained strained. During the preliminary agreement period, the rebels carried on restricted military operations, attacking the positions of governmental forces of the Guomindang. Military operations were particularly fierce in the southwestern part of the province, including the Posgam oasis and the Kargalyg and Yarkend regions. This led to the loss of the Guomindang’s control over some populated localities. Through great efforts the Chinese army managed to regain lost ground. On March 24 General Egnarov reported to Kruglov that “according to information from deserters and intelligence, Chinese infantry and cavalry are nearing Manas from Urumchi. At Karashar the Chinese are actively involved in mobilizing transport facilities for military supplies to the front.” He added that “under orders from comrade Molotov, appropriate talks were held on March 22–23 with leaders of the insurgents. Note that ‘Sadyg’

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behaved guardedly during the talks. On March 25 the delegation is going to fly to Urumchi. The plane is in Ghulja.”38 On March 27 Egnarov and Langfang informed Moscow that the Chinese have massed four cavalry divisions in the regions of Karashar, Yarkend, Yanghihisar, Aqsu, and Davanchi, totaling 10,000 horsemen armed not only with rifles but with mortars and mountain artillery. . . . As for the insurgents, they include approximately 2,500 people armed with 2,086 rifles and 30 machine-guns. . . . In addition, the insurgents have organized a training center with 2,000 people who have been training since February this year. . . . On March 13 the southern operation group received thirty professional soldiers, of which twenty-two were sent to Tahtamysh as instructors of insurgent units. Echelons with arms have arrived at Osh and are presently being transferred to Tahtamysh. The transportation is carried out by seventy trucks furnished by comrade Yusupov. Also, the latter supplied the insurgents with 5,000 overcoats. Our purpose is to organize a durable defense of our lines and prepare for offensive operations.39

On March 28, 1946, General Egnarov told Kruglov about the continuing military confrontation in Xinjiang and violation of the ceasefire on January 2 in the southwest of the province. Kruglov immediately told Stalin and Molotov.40 The Chinese also informed Soviet institutions in Xinjiang about violation of the agreement and the combat operations waged by Eastern Turkistan troops against the government forces. It strove to weaken the rebels by winning them over under various pretexts, including sowing discord in their ranks. Thus, in March 1946 the government forces managed to win over Ahmad-bey, a commander of insurgent troops and authoritative person in Tashmalyk, to the Chinese army.41 A new round of talks started in Urumqi in late March that lasted longer than usual. The most disputed point was the status of the Eastern Turkistan army. The crisis in the negotiation process ended due to the efforts of the Soviet consul and General Zhang. On May 11–12 the parties finally agreed that the army of Eastern Turkistan consisting of six regiments (three infantry and three cavalry) called national-military units would be stationed in Ghulja, Chuguchak, Kobuk, Shinatsy, Shikho, and Altai. In so doing, representatives of Eastern Turkistan insisted that the “rebels on their side drop the demand to have one regiment each at Kashgar and Aqsu.”42 The Chinese representatives promised to consult with the central government. At the end of the talks, “Chinese have agreed not to dispatch troops other than those so stationed into areas garrisoned by ex-rebel regiments, although the border of Xinjiang is to be held by Chinese troops. The Chinese have also agreed to consult ex-rebel views in the proposed reorganization of the Peace Preservation Corps in Kashgar and Aqsu.”43



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Representatives of Eastern Turkistan submitted to General Zhang Zhizhong on May 29 a list of eight persons to join the provincial government. Only a few of the six items of the governmental development plan had not been resolved. Even so, completion of the concordance and signing of an additional agreement were expected to take place quickly. The formation of a new government of Xinjiang was also planned. U.S. Embassy diplomats believed that “the Chinese have now procured another chance, albeit almost certainly their last one, to make good their governance of Xinjiang. If they fail again, Xinjiang will be irrevocably lost.” As viewed by American diplomats, the Chinese planned “vigorous action to raise the living standards of the people, to increase production, to reopen trade, to provide for at least a bare minimum in public health, to build an adequate system of good roads, to establish an educational system in the Turkish language, to set up native printing presses, and to wipe out the present fantastic corruption among the Chinese Government officials.”44 Having stayed three years in the province, Americans believed that the results of the latest agreements should cause the new government to take drastic measures to establish law and order. Horace H. Smith, an advisor to the U.S. Embassy to China, wrote to the secretary of state: “Chang [Zhang] should receive complete support from the Central Government in a crusade to clean up the Government of Xinjiang; several leading officials of the last regime should be publicly exposed and their gross speculations should be spread over headlines in China. . . . For Xinjiang at least, this is a political imperative of the first order of importance.” Smith also informed the secretary of state about the necessity of urgent reforms: “if they do not act at once to attain them, peace is impossible and China will be fortunate if she loses only Xinjiang.”45 On May 20 Egnarov and Langfang sent a report to Sergei Kruglov on measures being taken by the Chinese command to suppress the national forces in Xinjiang. Interior minister Kruglov informed Stalin, Molotov, and Beria about the information it contained. Despite the attempts of the Eastern Turkistan government to violate the ceasefire signed with the central government, it was frequently violated by the Chinese command. On May 31, 1946, a week before the agreement between representatives of Eastern Turkistan and the central government, led by Egnarov and Langfang, in regard to Colonel Ralnikov, the head of the southern operative group of Soviet state security bodies, came into effect, higher authorities were notified that reports of the attacks of rebels from the south on Tashmalyk and Kargalyk were not true. According to their information, on May 24, on the orders of the commander of the Kirghiz brigade Tahir bey and his advisor Nurgaliyev, three sixty-member reconnaissance groups were sent to the Chinese garrison of Tashmalyk, where they killed forty Chinese soldiers

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and captured Ahmad bey, a platoon commander of the insurgents and brother of Tashmalyk bey, who sold out to the Chinese. The insurgents lost four [killed] and one wounded. On May 24 one hundred Chinese soldiers conducted a raid against a post of the Yarkend brigade of insurgents who guarded the pass of Suget. The insurgents lost fourteen in action, including Sergeant Aliyev, captured seven, and had one missing. The Chinese captured twenty-one carbines, one light automatic gun, and fourteen horses. The fighting lasted from 18 to 21 [6 p.m. to 9 p.m.] The garrison on Suget pass has been fortified. The commander of the brigade, Tahir bey, and his advisor are warned that henceforth they will be tried for unauthorized combat operations. All commanders of rebel units are ordered not to take offensive actions and to take up a defensive position.46

A copy of this dispatch was obtained from Alma-Ata on June 7 and sent to Molotov and Beria. Soviet officials linked the successes of local combat operations with the great authority of Alikhan Törä, the head of the government in Ghulja. According to their information, the continued resistance by national forces in the south of Xinjiang was directly attributable to this prominent leader of the local Muslims. To cease actions of this sort, immediately after the last adjustments in the agreement in Urumqi, the Soviets reinforced their supporters in Ili, isolated Törä, and consolidated their positions in the government of Ahmadjan Kasimov and the army of General Iskhak bey Monunov. THE URUMQI AGREEMENT AND BRINGING ALIKHAN TÖRÄ TO THE USSR The last days of May were marked by work on the final variant of the agreement and translating it into Uyghur. To avoid discrepancies in the interpretation of the text, representatives of Eastern Turkistan compared the Chinese original and its Turkic translation word-by-word. Upon completion of their work, they left for Ili to submit the agreement to the government in Ghulja for discussion. On May 25, 1946, a meeting of the government of Eastern Turkistan was held to discuss the results of the talks with the Chinese delegation and the text of the agreement. The main purpose of the discussions was to approve the agreement with the central government and start complying with it. The discussions ended with the adoption of the position of the Soviet supporters, while the defeat of the proponents of independence made the previously real authority of Alikhan Törä a formality. Egnarov and Langfang wrote to Kruglov: “On May 25, before these meetings, ‘Sadyg’ and the delegation were thoroughly instructed on the upcoming meeting procedures. ‘Sadyg’ agreed with our advice and held the meeting properly. However, on the morning of May 26 ‘Sadyg’ sent me a personal letter addressed to ‘Ser-



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gei’ [probaby Kruglov’s code name] that revealed the true sentiments and aspirations of ‘Sadyg.’”47 The letter read: My dear friend and associate and companion in arms, Mr. Vladimir Stepanovich: I offer you the following heartfelt words with a clear conscience. My prime goal in this revolution is the full liberation of the peoples of Eastern Turkistan . . . and restoration of full independence. If that could not be achieved, I was sure that that we would succeed in reaching full autonomy, so I assured the nation that we would attain our goal. Because of my contribution to the nation’s well-being and my efforts along this line, the people recognize me as their emancipator and leader capable of building a new and happy life. However, unforeseen difficulties arose, and all our sweet dreams have remained unrealized in practice. Following six-month talks, we got nothing for our pains, so we are faced with a great struggle. At the same time, the question of citizenship has arisen. It seems to me that Moscow is inclined to give its consent, but I have warned Mr. Consul to prevent rumors from spreading among the population. There are those who say that our issue evidently is not yet mature and that you cannot believe the government of Eastern Turkistan or Törä, who was the head of government but later only governor. These developments may damage our future struggle; however, I’m not going to retreat and nothing can stop me. Beyond any doubts, we shall attain our goals eventually. That’s my last request, my last words: successes in three districts by force of arms, bloodshed, and your love for ordinary people and military skills will enable us to gain final victory. This is the basis of our future struggle and successes that are not possible without the peoples’ armed struggle, so let your military headquarters and our army be in my hands. I have a perfect right to command the army.48

Törä lost real power even though he formally retained his post. On May 28 the Chinese delegation returned to Nanjing and submitted the Urumqi agreement to the Yuan session for approval.49 It is interesting that the beginning of the peace process in Xinjiang was concurrent with similar developments in Iranian Azerbaijan. Just a week passed between the peace agreement signed in Xinjiang between representatives of Eastern Turkistan and the central government of China and the agreement in Iran between the national government of Iranian Azerbaijan and the central government of Iran. Both provincial governments were set up in one week’s time as well. Moscow orchestrated both processes but had to retreat in Iran under pressure from the international community. However, the Soviet Union hoped to preserve the Chinese province under its control in view of the ever-growing influence of the Communist Party. U.S. ambassador to the USSR Walter Smith wrote to the secretary of state on June 6, 1946: Essential difference between developments in Azerbaijan and those in Xinjiang is one of timing. USSR manipulation of Azerbaijan situation was precipitate and

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therefore Soviet tactics were necessarily heavy-handed and obvious. Overt nature of Soviet aggression in Azerbaijan aroused rest of world and caused strong international opposition which proved embarrassing to USSR and obstructive to smooth realization of Soviet aims. Soviet timing in Xinjiang has been most deliberate and cautious. USSR is taking its time with regard to Xinjiang, quietly assisting or perhaps only standing by and watching genuinely indigenous forces accomplish changes favorable to USSR. By not forcing pace of developments in Xinjiang, USSR may get what it seeks—effective control over province— without arousing international alarm and concerted resistance.50

Smith considered it necessary to strengthen domestic resistance to “Moscow intrigues” and view the expansionist actions of the USSR as aggression at the international level and thus get out of the impasse. In particular, he wrote to Washington, his goal “while at Xinjiang, Azerbaijan or Greece, is to heighten domestic resistance to Soviet intrigue and to expose any Soviet expansionist movements as pure aggression.”51 Following the debates and concordance of the final text of the agreement by the national government in Ghulja and legislative Yuan in Nanjing, the delegations of the contracting parties returned to Urumqi. On June 6 at 7:30 p.m., the agreement composed of eleven articles and two supplements was signed. On behalf of the central government it was signed by General Zhang Zhizhong; on behalf of the government in Ghulja by Ahmadjan Kasimov, Rahimjan Sabirkhojayev, and Abdulhayri Törä. The agreement said: 1. The central government is responsible for the election of regional authorities. 2. The central government is responsible for prevention of actions aimed against religion to ensure freedom of belief. 3. All office work in all institutions will be conducted in Chinese and in local languages. 4. Teaching at primary and secondary schools will be in local languages; however, Chinese is compulsory for teaching at all secondary schools. 5. Full freedom of the national culture and language will be ensured. 6. Freedoms of the press, assembly, meetings, and speech will be ensured. 7. Taxes will be levied in proportion to production volume. 8. Freedom of Xinjiang internal and external trade will be ensured. 9. By approbation of the central government, the Xinjiang coalition government will number twenty-five members. Fifteen of the twenty-five members will be nominated by the Xinjiang population and approved by the central government; the remaining ten will be appointed by the central government, including the chair of the coalition government; two deputies of the chair will be elected from local nationalities. 10. National military units will be set up. Commands will be given in the Uyghur and Kazakh languages. Military units of the central government will not be stationed at places where national military units are deployed. The central government should reduce its military units. National military units will be supplied with food, uniforms, and necessary armament equally with units of the central government. They should both maintain friendly relations



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with each other. 11. No persecutions of progressive and democratic elements will be acceptable. All those detained for participation in the national liberation movement will be released.52

The second supplement to the agreement contained six clauses to regulate issues arising from the national army of the government of Eastern Turkistan: 1. The rebel troops in Yining, Tacheng [Tarbaghatai], and Ashan [Altai] administrative districts will be reorganized into six regiments, three cavalry and three infantry, totaling 11,000 to 12,000 men, three regiments of which will become National Government troops and three of which will become part of the forces to preserve peace in the province; 2. A Muslim nominated by Yining will command all six regiments, being responsible to the Xinjiang garrison commander for three national regiments and to the Xinjiang peace preservation commander for three regiments of the Peace Preservation Corps; the same Muslim will be vice-commander of the entire Xinjiang Peace Preservation Corps; 3. Six regiments will remain in the three administrative districts of Yining, Tacheng, and Ashan and have sole responsibility for maintenance of peace in those districts. The central government frontier defense troops will undertake defense of the national frontiers, following the methods and distribution of troops identical to those used before the revolt; 4. The Aqsu and Kashgar units of the Peace Preservation Corps will be reorganized, using native recruits and in consultation with the Muslim commander; 5. The supplies, equipment, and treatment of the six regiments will be on a par with the top national army and Peace Preservation Corps, respectively; 6. The reorganization of rebel troop into six regiments will be the responsibility of the Muslim commander; the garrison points of these troops in the three administrative districts will be reported to and approved by provincial authorities.53

After the agreement accepted by both parties was approved by Chiang KaiShek, the list of new members of the provincial government was to be submitted on June 18 to the Yuan for consideration. The appointment had already been made when signing the agreement, however. Thus, it became known that General Zhang Zhizhong would head the government of Xinjiang. Since March he had been in the province serving in that position. Ahmadjan Kasimov and Burhaneddin Shahidi were to act as deputy heads of the government. The signing procedure and negotiations were supervised by General Egnarov in charge of revolutionary events in three districts. Petr Fedotov, the head of the counterintelligence department of the Soviet Ministry of National Security, wrote to Molotov: “In 1945–1946, he [Egnarov] led all combat operations of Ghulja against the Chinese as well as their political tactics during talks with the Chinese.”54 As the text of the agreement shows, the Chinese did not recognize Eastern Turkistan as an independent state and even tried to dissolve the Ili government

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after the agreement came into effect and to form a coalition government on its basis. Despite recognition of some national-cultural rights, the agreement did not stipulate any territorial or cultural autonomy. The only success of the Ghulja representatives was maintaining “national military units” in force under clause 10, with their personnel not exceeding 11,000–12,000. There was no equality in the government to comply with the terms of the agreement. As Russian Soviet diplomat and orientalist Vladimir Krasilnikov pointed out, “[F]ifteen members of the government would represent the interests of 95 percent of Xinjiang’s native population while ten members of the cabinet would represent just the Chinese 5 percent. Even so, the Chinese head of the government of the province would not be elected but would be appointed by the central government.”55 A week after the signing of the agreement in Urumqi, on June 13 “an agreement in Tabriz between the Iranian state and Azerbaijani representatives” was signed.56 Composed of fifteen clauses, the agreement was signed on behalf of the Iranian government by deputy prime minister Mozaffar Firouz; on behalf of Azerbaijan by the head of the national government, Seid Jafar Pishevari. Believing the Soviet policy in Asia to be a continuation of its policy in Europe and drawing a parallel between the Soviet policy in Xinjiang and in Iranian Azerbaijan, U.S. ambassador Smith wrote to the secretary of state: “Development of Soviet policy in Asia appears to be shaping up on different pattern from Soviet policy in Europe. USSR mediated in Xinjiang between Government and rebels, and conduct of Soviet officials there appears to have been designed to avoid giving open cause for criticism of USSR. Trend with regard to Iran seems to be in similar direction.”57 The Soviets clearly realized that the head of the government in Ghulja, Alikhan Törä Shakirkhojayev, was the main obstacle to implementation of the clauses of the agreement signed on June 6 in Urumqi. Under instructions from Moscow, on the night of June 16, “Törä was taken to the Soviet Union in order to avoid some actions that he may take in the future.”58 Törä’s aides Alaiddin Amir and Sonur Munir (who both lived to old age in Ghulja) remembered: “On July 12 [actually on June 12] we, together with Alikhan Törä, arrived in apartment No. 2 (the clandestine residence of the Soviet intelligence in Ghulja). Doors opened, and Törä was let in. In a while, a man came up and ordered us to go away. We returned and no longer saw AlikhanTörä and never knew where he was taken.”59 On the morning of June 16, rumors were afloat in Ghulja about Shakirkhojayev’s intention to give up political activity. Egnarov informed Kruglov and Abakumov that on June 14, I was visited by Shakirkhojayev, who was outwardly anxious. Shakirkhojayev declared that he had found an anonymous letter among his papers whose “well-wisher” strongly recommended that Shakirkhojayev resign from



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the post of governor and give up political activity, saying that Shakirkhojayev had no authority among the population. Shakirkhojayev noted that the author of the letter came from Hakimbeg Haji’s group and that his men would identify him. At the same time, he pointed out that he was familiar with Muslim psychology, which demands strict management, while any relaxation is usually used as means to fight for power, ignoring the interests of the people. Also, Shakirkhojayev expressed his intention to finish off his political rivals. Egnarov advised him to ignore the letter, saying that the open struggle against opponents might be fraught with undesirable consequences for him and undermine his authority among the population and negatively affect the unity among Muslim nationalities.60

However, General Egnarov informed Kruglov and Abakumov that he had followed their instructions and had personally had taken Alikhan Tora to the town of Khorgos on June 16, “and on the night of June 17 he headed for Alma-Ata, accompanied by Muzipov [Kirgiz SSR MGB officer]. Details will be given later. Pending instructions from the KGB of the Kazakh SSR, comrade Aleksei Byzov, and the MGB [Ministry of State Security] of the Uzbek SSR, comrade Iurii Baskov.”61 Iskhak bey Monunov (a member of the Xinjiang government) and Aziz Tokhtabayev, the representative of Usman Yusupov, had arrived in Jarkent. Egnarov reported that their arrival had been used as a pretext for removing Shakirkhojev from Jarkent to Tashkent. Monunov was warned about his meeting in Tashkent with Yusupov and his proposals to discuss a program and a charter for the People’s Party. Monunov declined comrade Yusupov’s proposal, pleading his incompetence, and recommended that he send his assistant to resolve the issue with Shakirkhojayev. Yusupov agreed with this proposal and sent Tokhtabayev by plane to Jarkent, who awaited the arrival of Shakirkhojayev in Khorgos. After an exchange of views on the evening of June 16 in Ghulja, Shakirkhojayev had agreed to leave secretly for Khorgos. He went out into a courtyard and told his driver and guards to return to the government building because he would be staying late in my home. At 6 p.m. Shakirkhojayev was brought to Khorgos and met with Tokhtabayev. The latter suggested a variant in keeping with your instructions. Shakirkhojayev voiced a desire to leave for Tashkent, and at 7 p.m., on June 16, accompanied by Muzipov and Tokhtabayev he went to Alma-Аtа. Shakirkhojayev was in high spirits. Before his departure, Shakirkhojayev wrote a letter to his son Asylkhan, saying that important political matters made it necessary for him to leave Ghulja for 4 to 5 days. In his letter Shakirkhojayev asked Asylkhan keep his absence from the town secret and not to worry about him. On June 16 at 11 p.m. Shakirkhojayev’s letter was handed over to Asylkhan.62

On June 19 the heads of the appropriate ministries informed Stalin, Molotov, and Beria about this. The same day Egnarov sent a report to the

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Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security, stating that he had taken out of Xinjiang a person formerly intended to help the Ghulja government and confiscated arms from the insurgents.63 His following report was rather dramatic: “On July 15, at 11 p.m., the head of the 4th department of the 1st Board of the MGB of the USSR, Lieutenant-General Langfang, tried to commit suicide. . . . The attempted suicide was caused by ordinary family scandal.”64 In Xinjiang from 1944 to 1946, Langfang, jointly with Egnarov, had led the implementation of the Soviet policy in the province and reported the arrival of Ahmadjan Kasimov in Ghulja as deputy head of the new government of the province.65 According to nationalistic circles, Kasimov had been “guided in his political actions solely by Soviet political views.”66 At the orders of appropriate Soviet authorities, his main purpose had been to end the government of Eastern Turkistan and the Republic as a whole to comply with the Urumqi agreement. The last session of the government of Eastern Turkistan had been held on June 28. The session officially announced the termination of the authority of the Republic. Thus, a new stage began in the destiny of the Chinese region of Eastern Turkistan and particularly its northern provinces. Further developments indicated that the Turkic-Muslim population of Xinjiang had become the instrument of Moscow’s policy. Russian author Vladimir Krasilnikov accurately stated that the peoples of Xinjiang had proved to be pawns in the political game between the USSR and China.67 After signing the agreement with the Chinese government, the USSR sought various methods to retain its influence in the province. In this connection, Moscow attached great importance to the formation of the People’s Revolutionary Party in late 1945 and its rising numbers. A draft Party program promoted by pro-Soviet Abdulkarim Abbasov was sent to Moscow by the first secretary of the central committee of the Uzbekistan Communist Party (B), Usman Yusupov. An additional draft Party program was developed by the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security and submitted to Mikhail Suslov, the head of the foreign policy department of the central committee of the All-Russian Communist Party (B). On June 26, 1946, Suslov wrote to the party secretary for ideology, Andrei Zhdanov, that the draft prepared by Yusupov had been compared with the draft of the two ministries and taken as a basis for the program for with some changes. “The section titled ‘Gaining of Political Freedoms and State System’ should stipulate that granting of internal autonomy to Xinjiang does not cancel China’s sovereign rights to the province. Unless the program stipulates this, in view of the past and current strained relations between Xinjiang and the central Chinese authorities, the probability remains that this will complicate the question of



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the Party’s legal status, its registration and activity.” Suslov therefore suggested the following wording for clause 1: “Granting Internal Autonomy to the Xinjiang Province of China Together with the Democratic Structure and Elected Bodies in Proportion to the Number of Each Nationality.”68 He suggested clarifying the Party’s attitude to foreign policy in the closing part of the program: “The Party will support all progressive measures of the government of the Chinese Republic. The Party considers it necessary to strengthen good-neighborly and economic relations with the Soviet Union and maintain friendly relations with other member-countries of the United Nations.”69 In his letter to Zhdanov, Suslov considered it expedient to change Yusupov’s variant of the name to the People’s Party of Xinjiang. In his view the projects of the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security made insufficient allowance for the local specificities of Xinjiang and conditions for legal party activity. “In some cases the projects focus on the charter of the ruling party and hence are similar to the charter of All-Russian Communist Party (B) (a clause on duties of party members, etc.). The draft charter submitted by Usman Yusupov is rather like the requirements of the party that is acting in the political arena for the first time.”70 Along with the establishment of the Party, the Soviets were going to extend activities of the All-Union Society of Cultural Relations (USCR), intended to work with Xinjiang’s population. After the start of the revolutionary movement in the three districts and until March 1946 the Chinese authorities practically banned USCR activities in the region. A report for 1946 said that USCR activity in Xinjiang was insignificant, for the domestic situation was very strained. The Chinese authorities banned contact with Soviet citizens, reading Soviet literature, and so forth. After some agreements were reached between the central Chinese government and Ghulja representatives in the second half of March 1946, due to some weakening of the regime, the local population was allowed to communicate with Soviet citizens and institutions.71 It should be noted that local Muslims constituted the main part of the population involved in the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations activities. An authorized representative of the USCR named Ulmasov coordinated his activity with the Soviet consulate in Urumqi. Thus USCR activity expanded in this period in Xinjiang to include not only Urumqi but Muslim-populated regions of the province, including Kashgar, Ghulja, Turfan, Tuksun, Chuguchak, Durbuljen, and Shara-Sume.72 Note that the USCR mission in Xinjiang was to disseminate Soviet influence among the locals, especially Muslims, by means of literature and the press, films and exhibitions, and sanitation and health. Another duty of the USCR was “to help progressive democratic circles of Xinjiang to oppose reactionary elements and the penetration of American and British influence in Xinjiang.”73

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THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT IN XINJIANG On July 1, 1946, under the agreement signed on June 6 between the central Chinese government and representatives of Ghulja, the coalition government of the province was set up in Xinjiang. As expected, by order of Chiang KaiShek, General Zhang Zhizhong was appointed as the head of the government, with the local Muslims Ahmadjan Kasimov and Burhaneddin Shahidi as his deputies. Kasimov represented revolutionary forces, while Shahidi represented influential circles uninvolved in the revolution. The new government was to include fifteen representatives of local population, with eight of them representing regions where revolutionary developments had occurred. Note that all eight candidates were approved by the Soviet consulate. The Guomindang was represented in the government by Liu Mengchun, Wang Zengshan, Bai Wenbo, Zhanym khan Haji, Isa bey Yusuf, and others. Princess Khadija Kugedayeva (Khadi-van) was approved as the mayor of Urumqi. In addition to Kasimov and Shahidi, the Eastern Turkistan Republic was represented by officeholders Abdulkarim Abbasov, Osman Batyr, Dalelkhan Sgurbayev, Iskhak bey Monunov, Rahimjan Sabirkhojayev, and Sayfuddin Azizi.74 Kazakh historian Gulnara Mendikulova writes that Osman Batyr joined the government as “War Minister without portfolio.”75 For the first time ever, the local peoples of Eastern Turkistan were widely represented in the government, an important result of the fifteen-year struggle for their national rights waged by representatives of the Turkic-Muslim peoples since the 1930s. The remaining seven ministerial posts were delegated to representatives of the local population. Some of them had lived in emigration, issuing various publications in the 1940s that expressed national ideas and opposed the Chinese authorities. Representatives of these circles held ministerial posts in the new government of Xinjiang, including Muhämmäd Imin Bughra, Isa Yusuf Alptekin, Masud Sabri Khojayev, Aysa bey, Umar Damolla, and Zhanym khan Haji. The post of secretary general was held by Liu Mengchun, known for his closeness to General Zhang, and his deputies were Abdulkarim Abbasov and Salis Emreoglu of the local population. The remaining ten ministerial posts were held by representatives of the local Chinese, Mongols, and Dungans.76 During the formation of the coalition government General Song Xilian, noted for his irreconcilable stand on the USSR and Communists, was appointed commander-in-chief of the Guomindang troops in the province. Despite his post in the government, Osman Batyr did not recognize it and continued his struggle against the Chinese authorities.77 In April 1946 he broke off all ties with the government in Urumqi.78



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On July 11, 1946, the first session of the new coalition government began. It adopted a new political program that proclaimed participation of all peoples of the province in political life, the equal rights of all nations, strengthening of the Soviet-Chinese friendship, economic aid to the rural population, construction of irrigation canals, creation of industrial enterprises, use of a single monetary system, and development of trade, communication, transport, education, public health, culture, and so forth. Adoption of the political program was followed by a decision on the establishment of electoral bodies in the province. The elections were held in an atmosphere of intense struggle. On the instruction of the relevant Soviet authorities, all entries into and exits from Ili, Tarbaghatai, and Altai were prohibited during the election period. As a result, these districts were ruled by politicians closer to the Soviets. Thus, the Soviet Union managed to retain its presence in the economically rich northern regions of Xinjiang. The American ambassador to Nanjing told the secretary of state that “election of Turki district magistrates in ex-rebel areas was proceeding apace by middle of November.”79 The elections in regions like Hami, Urumqi, Karashehir, Aqsu, Kashgar, Yarkend, and Khotan were won by representatives of local Muslims. Government posts in the bodies of power were also held by representatives of the Chinese and Russian-emigrant population.80 However, those who were elected faced great difficulties: “they were persecuted in some regions and had to leave their jobs and flee; others went on working despite threats and were in the end imprisoned; still others were removed from their posts. This occurred in Yarkend, Khotan, Guma, Kargalyk, Bugur, and Maralbashi.”81 The results of the elections were ignored in some districts, so the Chinese military appointed people to some offices. “The Chinese authorities appointed their men to positions of district heads and members of advisory committees in Aqsu, Kucha, Bay, and Karakash.”82 In late November, upon completion of the local elections in the districts, a group of eighteen members representing Xinjiang (fifteen Muslims and three Chinese) headed by Ahmadjan Kasimov, deputy head of the provincial government, arrived in Nanjing to attend the National Assembly of China, “working for realization of full Turki autonomy under Chinese sovereignty. In this objective the delegation is representative of a large body of Turki opinion. However, the understanding of geography and other matters of many influential Turkis of Eastern Turkistan is so limited that they believe they are working for an entirely independent Turki state in Xinjiang.”83 Kasimov and two Muslim representatives at the National Assembly made statements which “demanded full internal autonomy for the province and joint Turki-Chinese control of foreign affairs and national defense.”84

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To normalize Soviet-Xinjiang relations, General Zhang Zhizhong, the head of the provincial government, in September 1946 established the Society for Chinese-Soviet Cultural Relations. With that end in view, a special sevenmember group was set up: Qu Wu, the mayor of Urumqi; Liu Tse-yung, an authorized agent of the Chinese Foreign Ministry to Xinjiang; Sayfuddin Azizi, minister of education of the provincial government; Abdulkarim Abbasov, deputy secretary general of the government; General Ulmasov, representative of the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations in the Soviet Consulate; and consulate officials Konstantinov and Suvorov. In a month and half they held six meetings; drawing up draft charters and programs of the society. The board of the society was to consist of seventeen members; the auditing committee of seven. On October 22 a constituent assembly of the society was held in Urumqi under the leadership of Zhang Zhizhong. It was attended by 160 representatives of cultural-educational and public institutions of the province. All of them had special invitation cards in Uyghur, Russian, and Chinese, which also explained the tasks and purposes of the society. “General Zhang made a detailed speech about strengthening the friendship between China and the USSR as well as about the tasks of the society in familiarizing the people with the cultural life of the two countries.”85 The constituent assembly elected Zhang Zhizhong as chair of the society. Also, sections were set up to render services to society members in culture, art and sports, travels, and excursions. In September 1946 Zhang Zhizhong submitted his proposals to the central government to restore trade and economic ties between the USSR and Xinjiang. To draft an agreement on the basis of these proposals, the central government of China established a special committee with three members: Zhang Zhizhong as head and Liu Tse-yung, a representative of the Chinese Foreign Ministry in the province, and Kao Shu-kang, a representative of the Ministry of the Economy. On November 1 Kao Shu-kang arrived in Urumqi. On November 4 the proposals drafted by the committee were submitted to the Soviet consul general, Aleksandr Savelev, who was asked to bring them to the attention of the Soviet government in order to restore Soviet-Chinese trade and economic cooperation in Xinjiang. The Chinese offered “to organize in Xinjiang mixed societies on a parity basis to prospect and extract tin, tungsten, and oil with a proviso that the chairs of boards of societies be put forward by the Chinese and managing directors by the Soviets.”86 The heads of the province realized that it was not possible to sustain such activities without normalization of relations with the USSR in Xinjiang. The proposals drafted by the committee said: “1. Trade will be reopened across Xinjiang border; with the actual trading to be controlled by the Chinese (a) by a government-organized trading body or (b) by a government-organized monopoly formed by merchants



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engaged in the trade. 2. Xinjiang oil, tin, and tungsten will be exploited by a Sino-Soviet company, with shares to be held equally by China and Russia; China will retain administrative primacy, while the Soviets will have precedence in control of the technical operations of the company. 3. Soviet Russia will assist China in reconstruction of Xinjiang by supplying industrial equipment, etc., with the actual terms and amounts of equipment to be settled after conclusion of the present agreement.”87 Despite the economic attractiveness of the Xinjiang government’s proposals to the USSR, the “Soviet leadership showed restraint in regard to Zhang Zhizhong’s offer. There are several reasons for this restraint. First of all, intensification of collaboration with Xinjiang will lead to objective strengthening of the Guomindang government’s economic base in the region. In the meanwhile, in terms of confrontation between the Guomindang and the Communist Party of China, any strengthening of the economy in the regions controlled by the government of Chiang Kai-Shek is adverse to the interests of the Soviet Union, which is supportive of the Chinese Communists.”88 The Soviet minister of foreign trade, Аnastas Mikoian, later wrote to Stalin: “In April 1947 the Ministry of Foreign Trade drew up proposals to restore economic relations with Xinjiang; however, the Ministry of Foreign Relations considered it inexpedient to start talks with the Chinese on the subject.”89 According to the Russian diplomat and Orientalist Vladimir Krasilnikov, the Soviet leaders’ restraint in regard to these proposals on economic collaboration was attributable to the tendency of the central and provincial governments to strengthen American and British influence in Xinjiang. As far back as in mid-August, during the talks on economic issues, the Soviet consul general to Urumqi appealed to Zhang Zhizhong, asking as a compromise to give “concessions to the Soviets of all mineral and petroleum rights in the province.” However, Zhang informed the executive body of Yuan that the Chinese declined to do so at the level of the provincial government. Yuan chair Song Ziwen and president of the Chinese War Production Board Weng Wenhao advised Chiang Kai-Shek to hold talks on the mineral and oil resources of Xinjiang at the level of the central government. However, this did not satisfy the Soviets.90 U.S. diplomatic missions closely watched the implementation of Soviet economic interests in Xinjiang. On November 27, 1946, the U.S. consul general to Shanghai telegraphed the secretary of state: “Xinjiang Governor offered to Soviets the joint participation in exploitation of tungsten, tin and petroleum deposits. No other concessions offered except possibly parallel arrangement on gold.”91 As viewed by the American ambassador to Nanjing, the Soviet policy in Xinjiang largely depended on three factors:

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(one) Course of present negotiations for resumption of Xinjiang-Soviet trade; (two) direction followed by events in China; (three) world developments. If (one) trade negotiations fail; (two) Chiang Kai-shek is victorious over Chinese Communists and develops an anti-Soviet policy in China proper and (three) if word situation continues to develop in direction of word-wide division between pro-Soviet periphery plus Soviet proper and opposing coalition, then Soviet Union may well decide to exploit its present favorable position in Xinjiang to the limit, which might amount at maximum to the absorption of Xinjiang.92

The U.S. and British consuls in the province as well as the ambassadors of recently allied countries in Nanjing and Moscow drew parallels between Moscow’s policies in Xinjiang and in Iranian Azerbaijan. American consul Ward and British consul Walter Graham visited Ghulja, after the signing of the agreement in Urumqi and prepared interesting reports. Their views coincided on many positions. They noted in their reports that “many of same symptoms of Soviet policy which appeared in Azerbaijan were present in Xinjiang.”93 Having summarized the two reports, as well as information from Iran, Horace Smith, the U.S. ambassador in Moscow, wrote to the secretary of state in December 1946: “In both Central Government was shown oppressive and corrupt in dealing with subject racial groups. There consequently existed ample causes for spontaneous revolt and genuine demands for autonomy. Although Soviet army occupied Azerbaijan and not Xinjiang and tempo of developments in former has been more rapid, Soviet policy towards both appears to us to be substantially same. It is a policy of political rather than military subjugation.”94 Smith considered these coincidences to be accidental and regarded the Soviet policy in Xinjiang as goal-oriented, more secretive, and long-term. In particular, he noted, “It must seek ultimate control over that province, first as an ‘autonomous’ province in Chinese Republic, later perhaps as an ‘autonomous’ state like Mongolian People’s Republic and possibly much later as an integral part of USSR like Tannu Tuva. Therefore, USSR must through its own agents and obedient local elements direct course of rebel movement towards realization of Soviet objectives. As Kremlin’s Xinjiang policy appears to be geared to slow penetration and consolidation, it is better able than in Azerbaijan to conceal its activities.”95 The ambassador’s interpretation of the general tendencies of pro-Soviet forces that rose against the central governments is interesting. For instance, following the example of USSR-sponsored Mongolia seemed to be attractive for leaders of Iranian Azerbaijan. Soviet special services were informed that Seyid Jafar Pishevari considered the concept of Azerbaijani national autonomy as part of Iran to be politically unpromising. He dreamed of the creation of Azerbaijan people’s democratic republic under the auspices of the USSR according to the Mon-



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golian type after the restoration of all of Azerbaijan. Members of the Baku Troika in Tabriz submitted to Mir Jafar Bagirov their proposal on the implementation of the secret decision of the Central Committee of Communist (Bolshevik) Party of USSR, dated July 6, 1945, regarding the organization of separatist movements in South Azerbaijan and other provinces of north Iran, stating that the leaders of Iranian Azerbaijan believe that the creation of an independent people’s democratic state, like the People’s Republic of Mongolia, can be the only guarantee for the protection of the national rights of people living in Iranian Azerbaijan. Therefore, the ineffective and inflexible policy of the reactionary Teheran government toward Azerbaijan renders the creation of an independent people’s democratic state inevitable. We suggest that the National Committee and the Central Committee of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan create a state in the form of the People’s Republic of Mongolia and deem it their duty to abolish historical injustice and to provide the historical rights of the Azerbaijani people.96

In the document called the “Demands of the Azerbaijani People,” prepared a month later and signed by Pishevari and other leaders, the ideas of independence were emphasized even more: “We should entirely separate from Iran and establish our own independent state: the National Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan.”97 In comparing the Soviet policy in Xinjiang and Azerbaijan, ambassador Smith suggested that the State Department apply in Urumqi the policy used in Tabriz in the winter of 1945 and spring of 1946: “We venture to suggest that Department may consider it desirable, if it has not already done so, to furnish Nanjing and Urumqi with several of Tabriz’s very able despatches of past winter and spring analyzing Azerbaijanian object lesson.”98 In the second half of 1946 the heads of three northern districts of Xinjiang were under strong Soviet influence and in no hurry to comply with the military clauses of the Urumqi agreement of June 6. Beyond any doubt, this disregard of contractual obligations came was the result of instructions from well-known Soviet authorities. This clearly manifested itself during General Zhang Zhizhong’s visit to Ghulja in late August 1946, when he noticed flags of the Eastern Turkistan Republic being widely used in the military units of Ili district. Also, he was rather coolly received there. Stuart, the American ambassador to Nanjing, wrote to the secretary of state that “ex-rebels . . . continue to use their ‘national’ flag; on visit of General Zhang later in August to Yining, there were more rebel flags in evidence than Chinese; some Chinese also felt that Zhang was not received with full honors and courtesies due to chairman of Xinjiang.”99 In autumn 1946 Soviet-Chinese relations cooled. Thus, Zhang Zhizhong wrote on July 7, 1947, to Soviet consul general Savelev that “an official

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letter of November 9 last year addressed to me by the Tarbaghatai governor stamped ‘Eastern Turkistan Republic’ in Russian and Uyghur represents a violation of the terms of the agreement of June 6.” 100 In autumn 1946 rumors were afloat in China that members of the councils of Muslim districts had allegedly left for Moscow to get political instructions “and that as Soviet citizens these members may propose dismemberment of Xinjiang province into four republics, which would each have borders adjoining Soviet territory.”101 Despite the central government’s decreasing power in Xinjiang, the Americans considered General Zhang Zhizhong to be the single guarantor of Chinese sovereignty in the province. In this respect, ambassador Stuart wrote: “Turkis have already lost faith in the whole Chinese Central Government save only in Zhang Zhizhong, if they lose faith in him, or are forced to recognize that he is powerless to help them, the last hope of retaining Chinese sovereignty in Xinjiang will be lost.”102 General Zhang Zhizhong on March 18, 1946, assured Soviet ambassador Apollon Petrov that ties with the United States and Great Britain would not exceed the framework of consul relations. The USSR distrusted Chinese authorities in this regard. After his assignment as the head of Xinjiang government and adoption of some measures to normalize the situation in the province, General Zhang arrived in Nanjing in late December 1946. On January 7, 1947, he visited the Soviet Embassy and met with ambassador Petrov. During their conversation General Zhang pointed out that he was doing his best to strengthen Chinese-Soviet relations in Xinjiang, believing that there were no obstacles in the province to establishing lasting friendly relations between the two countries. To dispel the Soviets’ concern over the growing American and British influence in the province, Zhang noted: “There are no ChineseAmerican and Chinese-British relations in Xinjiang; there are only SovietChinese relations.” Also, he stressed friendly relations with Savelev, detailing their frequent meetings and long debates over issues beyond the limits of Xinjiang’s problems. During the debates Zhang Zhizhong offered Savelev “to turn Xinjiang into an exemplary province of Soviet-Chinese friendship to demonstrate to the people of China that truly friendly relations may be established.” Zhang recounted the activity of the Chinese-Soviet friendship society, saying that its exhibition had been attended by 6,000 visitors. At the same time he thanked the Soviets for aid in resolving the Xinjiang issue, adding that there was now “a question of economic and trade collaboration with the USSR.” Zhang also informed the ambassador that he had conveyed his proposals to the Soviet consul general in Urumqi on forms of collaboration and was awaiting a reply. At Petrov’s request, he told about relations between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Guomindang and denied rumors about his recall from the province. In regard to reports that he was going to



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head a governmental delegation in the talks with the Communists, he noted that he had “no instructions so far but would gladly agree if any.”103 In late January ambassador Petrov met with Zhang Zhizhong in Nanjing. This time the general tried to reconcile the Communists and the Guomindang and thus achieve civil peace in China by seating them at the bargaining table. In particular, he expressed his regret to the Soviet diplomat that that “previous attempts to resolve the Communist problem failed because of the USSR’s removal from the process.” General Zhang did not forget about Xinjiang. He asked the Soviet ambassador to expedite his government’s reply to the proposals submitted to Consul General Savelev on November 4, 1946, aimed at developing Chinese-Soviet trade and economic collaboration in Xinjiang, adding that he would like an answer before leaving Nanjing for Xinjiang.104 Petrov promised to bring his request to the attention of the Soviet government. Although Petrov informed Moscow about these talks, he received no reassuring reply. Despite General Zhang’s efforts, the situation in Xinjiang failed to become normalized. The interference by the Chinese military in internal affairs and lack of action by the head of the province undermined the faith of the Muslim population in the coalition government. THE POLITBURO DECISION ON THE ELIMINATION OF OSMAN BATYR AND THE FORMATION OF MASUD SABRI’S GOVERNMENT In February 25, 1947, popular unrest broke out in various towns of the province. By March 5 protests had intensified. In June 1947 the driver of the deputy head of Kasimov’s government was arrested. Chinese newspapers linked the mass demonstrations to representatives of Ghulja in the government and published critical materials against them. Some clauses in the agreement of June 6 remained unimplemented. Although the agreement provided for the creation of self-defense detachments in Aqsu and Kashgar, they were not created until the spring of 1947. The agreement promised not to repress the participants of the mutiny. However, it had repeatedly been violated, especially in southern regions of the province. Well-known representatives of local Muslims wrote to consul general Savelev: “Leaders of the revolt were killed or disappeared, including Tabit Kary, Hasan Habul, Tursun Akhun, and others. The present situation in the south is very strained. The population is largely ruined and lives in very hard material conditions; scores of them have been driven away from their lands.”105 In the course of the twenty-seventh meeting of the government, some members openly objected to activities in Nanhuanyuan (the residence of the

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Ghulja representatives). However, anti-Chinese sentiments were stronger in the mutinous northern regions strongly pressured by the Soviets. During the repatriation of Chinese refugees who had left Tarbaghatai and sheltered in the USSR as set forth in the Soviet-Chinese agreements, unacceptable developments occurred. According to Muslim representatives of the provincial government, “during the repatriation of refugees from the Soviet Union, the population of Chuguchak persecuted 10–15 soldiers and policemen. Thus, a delegate of the Turkistan government was killed at Durbuljin.”106 General Zhang Zhizhong described these developments in his letter to Savelev as the “disgraceful killing of thirty refugees from the Soviet Union in Chuguchak; murder of the Turkistan delegate and his attendants at Durbuljin.”107 A member of the coalition government, Isa Yusuf Alptekin, wrote that “during demonstrations in the region the protesters demanded the appointment of a representative of the Muslim-Turkic population as the head of the provincial government. Also, the population attacked homes of the Chinese who kidnapped Turkic girls and killed them, sending the girls home. To keep them from being kidnapped again by the Chinese, the girls were quickly married to local residents.”108 Martial law was announced in Kashgar on July 22, 1947. All civilian officials together with Governor Karim Mahsum were arrested on the charge of preparing an armed revolt. In mid-June the protests spread to Turfan oasis. In late July governmental troops were brought into the southern regions of Xinjiang. The revolt was mercilessly repressed: about 2,000 mutineers were killed and a number of villages were burned. The events of June–August 1947 were a gross violation of the agreements signed between the central government of China and the Eastern Turkistan Republic.109 In spring 1947 a wave of demonstrations protested against the government of General Zhang Zhizhong. Both the representatives of Ghulja and the Soviet leaders were displeased by the secret contacts between Osman Batyr, the leader of Altai rebels, and General Zhang, who had switched his allegiance to the Chinese side. In November 1946 Osman’s special detachments clashed with troops of the Eastern Turkistan Republic in Altay.110 An enquiry into the situation showed that these detachments were “backed by the Chinese military command in Urumqi.”111 No longer under Soviet control, Osman Batyr posed a serious threat to Moscow’s interests in western China. Therefore, a meeting of the Politburo of the CC AUCP (B) on February 24, 1947, decided to eliminate him together with his detachment: With the intent of suppressing the hostile activity of the governor of the Altai district of Xinjiang, Osman Batyr, directed against interests of the Soviet Union in Xinjiang, the CC (B) resolves: 1. To hold the Ministry of State Security (MGB) of the USSR responsible through the secret communications channels



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available to it for approving the measures against the bands of Osman Batyr adopted by Lieutenant General Iskhak bek Monunov, the commanding general of the national forces in Xinjiang, and Dalelkhan Sgurbayev, vice governor of the Altai district (he is also the commander of the Altai Regiment), and recommend to them that they pursue these bands until they are completely defeated and eliminated. 2. To hold the MGB of the USSR responsible through the same channels for proposing to Ahmed Kadyrov, the deputy chair of the Xinjiang government, that he raise the issue of the immediate removal of Osman Batyr from the Xinjiang government and his removal from the post of governor of the Altai district before the Xinjiang government, suggesting that Dalelkhan Sgurbayev be appointed governor of the Altai district. The cause for the removal of Osman Batyr is that he avoids and does not carry out his responsibilities, has retired to his camp, does not wish to return to the district capital, does not take steps to maintain public peace and order in the district, and in particular does not fight the bands operating in the region of his camp and does not protect the population of the district from the raids of these bands. 3. To help Iskhak bey Monunov and Dalelkhan Sgurbayev with ammunition. To hold the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) responsible for allocating the following ammunition to the USSR Ministry of State Security for this purpose: (a) 1 million (Russian) rifle and heavy machine gun cartridges; (b) 100,00 light machine gun cartridges (German).112

This decision made the Soviet Ministry of State Security responsible for ensuring that “the transfer of the ammunition to Xinjiang is to be organized secretly.”113 Implementation of all items of the decision was entrusted to Molotov, Viktor Abakumov, and Iakov Malik and implementation of item 3 to Kruglov. To render practical assistance in the north of Xinjiang and inspire confidence in the struggle of the Muslim population, in February 1947 the first secretary of the CC of Kazahkstan, Zhumabay Shayahmetov, appealed to the CC AUCP (B) to create an Uyghur autonomous region as part of the Kazakhstan SSR in his letter to the secretary of the CC AUCP (B), Nikolai Patolichev. He proposed an Uyghur autonomous region, including the Panfilov and Oktiabrskii regions of Taldy Kurgan province and the Chilik, Enbekshi-Kazakh, Uyghur, Narynkol, and Kegen districts of Alma-Ata province. The formation of the Uyghur autonomous region is necessitated by the following reasons: (а) The Uyghurs of Kazakhstan are striving for national unity and development of a national culture. A distinctive feature of Kazakhstan Uyghurs is the fact that they preserve their national identity and are concentrated in these regions. The establishment of Uyghur autonomy is likely to contribute to the formation of an Uyghur culture national in form and socialist in content; promotion of Uyghur cadres in Party and Soviet bodies; improvement of political work among Uyghur cadres and

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elimination of the grounds for anti-Soviet propaganda here and abroad on the basis of the imaginary inequality of the Uyghur people, shutting down of Uyghur newspapers, and closing of Uyghur schools; (b) The economic development of the region will be more effective and accelerated. This is significant because the Uyghur region is bordered by the Ili district of Xinjiang as the hearth of the national-liberation movement in China; (c) Formation of the Uyghur region will be greeted positively by the 3 million members of the Uyghur population of Xinjiang to promote their national-liberation movement in regard to the Soviet Union.114

The area in the autonomous region had 23,000 Uyghurs. more than 20 percent of the population. As viewed by Shayahmetov, the new region was to become a center of attraction for Uyghurs residing in Kazakhstan and neighboring republics, and their numbers would rise considerably in a short period. The town of Panfilov (former Jarkent) would become the capital of the region. However, Moscow disapproved the idea. In this period the Soviets considered it inappropriate to create a Uyghur autonomous region in the Kazakh, Uzbek, and Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republics. Kazakh historian Ablet Kamalov wrote that “the need for institutional support for Uyghur culture in the Soviet Union increased with the proclamation of the East Turkistan Republic in the three westernmost districts of Xinjiang in 1944–9. The Soviet Uyghurs as well as other Turkic peoples were actively used by the government in providing military, economic and cultural support to this pro-Soviet regime.”115 Fearing a new wave of protests among the Xinjiang population, the Central Chinese government passed a decision to appoint a representative of the local Muslim population as the head of the provincial government. On May 28, 1947, Zhang Zhizhong tendered his resignation as head of the government. He was replaced by a member of the coalition government, Uyghur Masud Sabri Baykuz, who had been born in Ghulja in 1886. He began his studies at a lycee in Istanbul in 1904 and received a higher medical education. In 1914 he returned to Ghulja. He was a patriot of great renown among Xinjiang’s population. While abroad, Sabri lived in India then in Japan. Jointly with Isa Yusuf-bey, Muhämmäd Imin, Kurban Koday, and others he took part in publishing special digests and magazines of pan-Turkic orientation in Uyghur: Japanese Correspondent (Yapon Mekhbire) in Tokyo and Tian Shan (Tyan Shan), Voice of Chinese Turkistan (Chini Türkistan Awazi), War News (Harbiy Yangiliklar), and other publications in Tyantsin and Shanghai. In 1945 Sabri returned to Chongqing. In 1946 he was appointed chief controller of the CC Guomindang in Xinjiang. Chiang Kai-Shek placed great hopes on Sabri.116 John Hall Paxton also tried to cultivate friendships with some upperclass and influential individuals like Sabri, Muhämmäd Imin, Isa Yusuf,



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Yolbars, and Osman, who had anti-Soviet and anti-Communist tendencies.117 The historian Jacobs wrote that, “as governor, Masud remained remarkably true to form and continued to issue incendiary statements regarding Chinese rule in Xinjiang.”118 Following his resignation, General Zhang was appointed head of the northwestern headquarters (Shensi, Xinjiang, Chin-Hai, Gansu and Ning-Hsa provinces of China). Liu Mengchun, general secretary of the government of Xinjiang, also resigned from his post and was replaced by Isa Yusuf Alptekin. However, this reshuffling did not suit the Soviet Union and pro-Soviet members of the coalition government. Although General Zhang Zhizhong had left his position as head of the government, the final word in Xinjiang still rested with him. Following Soviet instructions, Ahmadjan Kasimov and members of the left wing of the government from three districts opposed Masud Sabri and Isa Yusuf. They began to spread rumors that the new head of the government and the secretary general would try to improve relations between China and the USSR, which would result in unrest in Eastern Turkistan. On Moscow’s instructions, Zhang Zhizhong received a delegation from the three northern districts protesting against the formation of the new government. The Soviets mobilized their agents in some regions to hold demonstrations and even mutinies against Masud Sabri and Isa Yusuf. Pro-Soviet circles began issuing critical leaflets.119 Nonetheless, Masud Sabri began to act as the head of the government and dismissed pro-Soviet functionaries with leftist views in provincial governing bodies by replacing them with representatives of nationalist circles. The government appointed Polat Turfani as the editor of the newspaper Xinjiang, which he had once led earlier. He was instructed to call the province’s population “Turks.” This was the first time that the official state newspaper’s authors used the phrase “Eastern Turkistan” in place of “Xinjiang” and “Turks” instead of “Uyghurs,” “Kazakhs,” “Uzbeks,” and “Tatars.” Also, the history of Turkic peoples and religions was taught at schools. The government paid special attention to the shaping of a single literary language, for public institutions did not accept documents written in a mixture of various dialects. It encouraged the opening of printing houses and press organs. Soon the newspapers Yalkyn (Flame), Nurlu Yol (Bright Path), Tynchlyk (Peace), Khan (A ruler), Tanry (Deity), Yurt (Homeland), and Erk (Freedom), as well as the magazine Altay were being published. The publishers of some newspapers had been educated in Turkey. According to a decision of the Education Department, practically all teachers of Eastern Turkistan schools arrived in Urumqi to take special courses. Senior officials of state bodies such as Masud Sabri, Muhämmäd Imin Bughra, Isa Yusuf Alptekin, and others delivered lectures on Turkic history, language, and literature. According to historian

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Jacobs that “Isa and Emin (Imin) were Uyghur intellectuals who, through Nationalist-funded periodicals in the 1930s and 1940s, advocated Han tolerance for Muslim and Turkic culture, while occasionally pushing the envelope for various forms of political autonomy in Xinjiang. They sat on Nationalist consultative committees, and their views were sometimes solicited on matters pertaining to the Nationalist posture toward various warlord regimes in Xinjiang.”120 Also, the government opened a library opened in Urumqi, with most of the books having been brought from Turkey. All these actions were disapproved in pro-Soviet circles. Burhaneddin Shahidi, a member of the government, demanded that secretary general Isa Yusuf Alptekin discontinue efforts along these lines.121 After Masud Sabri came to power, the relations between the USSR and the government in Xinjiang became cooler. Armed clashes of June 1947 in Baytashan on the Xinjiang-Mongolian border stirred up tensions between Moscow and the government of Xinjiang and the central government of China. The Mongolian authorities described them as a June 2 invasion of Kazakh detachments of Osman Batyr controlled by the Guomindang on the territory of the republic; they had allegedly been forced out by the Mongolian army on June 5. But in reality, this was the USSR’s attempt to ferment tensions in Xinjiang and aggravate relations with the Nanjing government. As usual, the Mongolian Republic acted as an instrument of the Soviet policy in Eastern Turkistan and China. In so doing, the Soviets intended to place Inner Mongolia under its influence as well. In this respect the Russian author Pavel Dudin justly claimed that in 1946–1947 the eastern lands of Inner Mongolia proclaimed their autonomy and under the influence of the Soviet Union began shaping their own federative statehood based on Communist ideology based on class struggle, collectivization, and a struggle against religious institutions.122 A Chinese Foreign Ministry statement on to the frontier incident of June 5 in the Baytashan region said that it was provoked by the Mongolians with Soviet air support. The Chinese ambassador to Moscow, Fu Bin-chan, on June 11 gave Molotov a telegram from foreign minister Wang Shijie. It said that “on June 5 this year four aircraft with Soviet identifying signs flew over China’s territory to Xinjiang and bombed Chinese troops at a distance of 200 km from the border in Baytashan.”123 However, on June 14 TASS (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union) denied the Nanjing government’s allegation, saying that it was a provocation contrary to reality. In summer 1947 tensions between Urumqi and the northern provinces of Xinjiang increasingly intensified. Various Western circles looked for ways to stabilize the situation and attain domestic tranquility in the province. One idea was to send the Turkistan prince Vali Kayum Khan, who was living in Europe and had great authority among the representatives of the Turkic peoples of



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Central Asia, to Xinjiang. In the first years of World War II he managed to save from death about 100,000 Soviet prisoners of war from Central Asia and was nicknamed “Аtа” (father). At the end of the war, Kayum khan preferred to stay in Germany as leader of the Turkistan National Committee.124 In the course of debating this idea Walther Schieber wrote to Max Mandellaub: “By utilizing the services of a well-known Turkmenian personality, the Western policy—independent of China and Russia—will probably enable itself to win a decisive influence. I see this personality in the Turkistan prince, Kayum khan. Through his courageous bearing in the difficult destiny that confronted his fellow countrymen in the first months when they were German prisoners of war in the East he has gotten a better than average recognition from them.”125 However, at the last moment this plan found no support. Xinjiang developments led to the growth of the pro-Soviet population in the north of the province as well as the number of participants in guerrilla movement willing to migrate to the USSR. Sergei Kruglov, Soviet minister of the interior, wrote to Molotov on June 12, 1947: “From January 1 to June 10, 1947, 260 infiltrators who crossed the border in quest of a better life have been detained.”126 After being checked by the Ministry of State Security, the “infiltrators” were, as a rule, settled in regions bordering Eastern Turkistan. Owing to the sharp rise in their number, in mid-1947 the first secretary of the Central Committee of Kazakhstan, Zhumabay Shayahmetov, sent a telegram to Moscow, asking for funds for accommodation of the refugees from Xinjiang. Reports to the Soviet leaders said that the border crossings were incessant. In July 1947 deputy minister of the interior Ivan Serov reported to Molotov and Beria that on July 22 the head of the Tuyun police point of Xinjiang, Sabitkhojayev, the commander of the squad and four soldiers, as well as his wife and two children, in total nine, were detained on the territory of Kirghizia. All the detainees were Uyghurs and Kirghizs by nationality. Sabitkhojayev witnessed that the Chinese authorities were victimizing Muslims in South Xinjiang loyal to the national liberation movement of peoples in Xinjiang; Uyghurs were dismissed from top positions and replaced by Chinese. Fearing arrest, Sabitkhojayev decided to go to the USSR together with five soldiers. The detainees had with them eleven horses, five rifles, one pistol, and 220 ball-cartridges.127

Owing to the incessant inflow of migrants from Xinjiang, Kruglov sent a memorandum to Molotov, which revealed the reasons for the migrations: a search for more comfortable living conditions, the hard economic situation in Xinjiang, a rise in youth unemployment, high prices for industrial and food products, and the desire of Eastern Turkistan’s youth to study in the USSR.128

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A new stage of Soviet policy began in Xinjiang after the formation of Masud Sabri’s government. Soviet law-enforcement and security bodies utilized a previously created spy-ring to stage anti-government actions by the Muslim population. With that end in view, leaders of the Kazakh, Uzbek, and Kirghiz SSRs were given new instructions. On June 29, 1947, the first secretary of the CC of Kazakhstan, Shayahmetov, sent his proposals to Andrei Zhdanov to consolidate the Soviets’ position in Xinjiang: With a view to strengthening the political and economic achievements of Muslims who rose against the Chinese in the northern districts of Xinjiang and further development of the national liberation movement of non-Chinese masses of the province, the CC of the All-Union Communist Party considers it possible to submit the following proposals: on the basis of uncoordinated groups of national revival and among the anti-China part of the Muslim population to set up a Communist Party and title it the “People’s Party of Xinjiang,” with its own program and charter having been approved by the CC AUCP (B); the permanent undercover political leadership should entrust the CC AUCP (B), CC CP of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizstan, and Tajikistan, and CC PPX [People’s Party of Xinjiang] with carrying out appropriate work in certain districts. In particular, the AUCP (B) will work in the Ili, Tarbaghatai, and Altai districts territorially adjoining Kazakhstan.129

The question of the necessity of setting up the People’s Party of Xinjiang (PPX) was raised in the summer of 1946 after signing the Urumqi agreement. Usman Yusupov, first secretary of the CC Uzbekistan, sent his proposals on the issue to the head of the foreign policy department of the CC AUCP (B), Mikhail Suslov. In this connection Shayahmetov appealed directly to Zhdanov, the CC secretary for ideological matters: “The CC of the People’s Party of Xinjiang considers it expedient to create a 15-member group composed of well-known, progressively minded Muslim leaders who cast their lot with the masses and took an active part in the last anti-Chinese armed insurrection as well as Communist advisors and instructors who were sent to the bordering Soviet Republics.. Also, it would be appropriate to create PPX committees in the districts; first in Ili, Tarbaghatai, and Altai, then in all other districts of Xinjiang.”130 Most of Shayahmetov’s proposals concerned cultural events in Xinjiang, including creation of a youth organization in the province and full-scale restoration of the activity of national-cultural education societies. With that end in mind he suggested instituting the post of second secretary at the Soviet consulates in the district centers of Ili, Tarbaghatai, and Altai, to be held by an official from the Kazakhstan Foreign Ministry; expanding the publication of popular scientific, literary, and historical literature and textbooks in Uyghur in Alma-Ata for residents of Xinjiang; and organizing broadcasting in Uy-



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ghur from Moscow, Kazan, Tashkent, Alma-Ata, and other places. Clause 20 of the proposal said: “To attract Xinjiang Muslims to the religious-patriotic development of mosques in the USSR and ensure personal contacts between influential Muslim clerics of Xinjiang and representatives of the Central Asian Religious Department in our territory, it is essential to restore the legal pilgrimage to the mosque in the town of Jarkent.”131 It should be remembered that implementation of these measures suggested by Shayahmetov ran contrary to the agreement of June 6, 1946, signed between the central government of China and government in Ghulja through the mediation of the Soviet Union and would activate Soviet policy in the region to pose a threat to compliance with the agreement. Two weeks after Shayahmetov addressed Zhdanov, the CC AUCP (B) adopted a secret decision on July 14, 1947, on the start of broadcasting to Xinjiang in Uyghur. The radio staff was to be located in Tashkent.132 After the failure of Soviet policy in Iranian Azerbaijan, it is interesting that the Politburo learned from previous experience and passed a secret decision to resume broadcasting to Iran. On November 21, 1947, the Politburo passed a secret resolution on resumption of the political emigrant newspaper Azerbaijan and radio station “Pchela” (Bee), earlier banned on Stalin’s direct orders in January 1947.133 Immediately after the start of Uyghur broadcasting from Tashkent, the radio programs harshly criticized the government of Masud Sabri: “in the past Ankara was the center of pan-Turkism. Now it has moved to Urumqi. Earlier figures like Fuat Köprülü, Besim Atalay, etc., sold themselves to the British and focused on disseminating pan-Tukism and pan-Turanism. At present, Masud Sabri and Isa Yusuf together with their friends have sold themselves to imperialists to begin to develop these trends in Eastern Turkistan.”134 Broadcasts of this sort were an open demonstration of Moscow’s discontent with the government of Xinjiang province. Thus, the coalition government set up through Soviet mediation lived out its last days. Eastern Turkistan was on the brink of a new stage of the Soviet threat. NOTES 1.  Justin M. Jacobs, Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State, 143. 2.  Zubok, A Failed Empire .The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachov, 35; Zubok, Neudavshaiasia imperiia: Sovetskii Soiuz v kholodnoi voine ot Stalina do Gorbacheva, 64. For more information see: Ledovskii, Stalin i Chan Kaishi. Sekretnaia missiia syna Chan Kaishi v Moskvu. Dekabr’1945–Ianvar’ 1946 g. Iz Arkhiva Prezidenta RF, Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, 1996, 4, 100–129. 3.  Ledovskii and Mirovitskaia, Otnosheniia SSSR s Kitaem (1946 –1950), 9. 4.  Otnosheniia SSSR s Kitaem (1946–1950) // Russko-Kitaiskie otnosheniia v XX veke. Dokumenty i materialy. Tom V. Kn. 1, 46.

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  5.  Ledovskii and Mirovitskaia, Otnosheniia SSSR s Kitaem (1946 –1950), 10.   6.  Russko-Kitaiskie otnosheniia v XX veke. Dokumenty i materialy, Tom V. Kn. 1, 33.   7.  See: The transcript of the Soviet Ambassador in China Apollon Petrov with Interior Minister of China Zhang Lisheng, January 5, 1946, AVPRF, f. 0/100, o. 34, p. 253, d.209, l. 359.   8.  Xiaoyuan Liu, Reins of Liberation, 353.   9.  See: Petrov, Miatezhnoe “serdtse” Azii, 491. 10.  The Charge in China (Robertson) to the Secretary of State, January 2, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Volume X, 1201. 11.  The Charge in China (Robertson) to the Secretary of State, January 8, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Volume X, 1202. 12.  See: The transcript of the Soviet Ambassador in China Apollon Petrov with General Zhang Zhizhong, January 25, 1946, AVPRF, f. 0/100, o. 34, p. 253, d. 20, l. 48. 13.  The transcript of the Soviet Ambassador in China Apollon Petrov with General Zhang Zhizhong, March 18, 1946, AVPRF, f. 0/100, o. 34, p. 253, d. 20, l. 77. 14.  See: Sergei Radchenko. Choibalsan’s Great Mongolia Dream, 231. 15.  See: Petrov, Miatezhnoe “serdtse” Azii, 492. 16.  See: The transcript of the Soviet Ambassador in China Apollon Petrov with General Zhang Zhizhong, January 25, 1946, AVPRF, f. 0/100, o. 34, p. 253, d. 20, l. 48. 17.  Ibid., 48–49. 18.  To Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov. On the sale of of human meat in the Uzbek SSR, April 17, 1945, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 95, l. 57. 19.  The transcript of the Soviet Ambassador in China Alexandr Petrov with General Zhang Zhizhong, January 25, 1946, AVPRF, f. 0/100, o. 34, p. 253, d. 20, l. 49. 20.  Ibid., 49. 21.  See: The transcript of the Soviet Ambassador in China Apollon Petrov with the member of Central Committee of the China Communist Party Zhou Enlai, February 6, 1946, AVPRF, f. 0/100, o. 34, p. 253, d. 20, l. 19. 22.  The Charge in Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, January 10, 1946, NARA, RG 59, Box: 4013, NND 760050, Doc. 761.93/1–1046, p. 162. 23.  Ibid., 163–164. 24.  Ibid., 164–165. 25.  Ibid., 169. 26.  See: Report of memo Solomon Lozovskii to Molotov, January 19, 1946, AVPRF, f. 0/100, o. 34, p. 256, d.54, l. 3. 27.  Information note from Tunkin to Dekanozov, January 26, 1946, AVPRF, f. 0/100, 0. 34, p. 3, d. 250, l. 9. 28.  Note China Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Tse-yung to Evseev, January 26, 1946, AVPRF, f. 100, o. 33, p. 125, d. 8, l. 3. 29.  The transcript of the Soviet Ambassador in China Apollon Petrov with the member of Central Committee of the China Communist Party Zhou Enlai, February 6, 1946, AVPRF, f. 0/100, o. 34, p. 253, d.20, l. 16.



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30.  See: The transcript of the Soviet Ambassador in China Apollon Petrov with the Secretary of Central Committee of the China Communist Party Zhou Enlai, January 16, 1946. // AVPRF, f. 0/100, o. 34, p. 253, d. 20, l. 8–11; For more biographical information about Zhou Enlai, see: Gao Wenqian, Zhou Enlai: The Last Perfect Revolutionary, A Biography. Translated by Peter Rand and Lawrence R. Sullivan. New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2007. 31.  The Receipt by Zhou Enlai, October 16, 1946, The NSA at the George Washington University, Doc. R8845. 32.  The transcript of the 1st Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in China Federchuk a public figure in China Guo Moruo, January 30, 1946, AVPRF, f. 0/100, o. 34, p. 22, d.250, l. 49. 33.  See: Russko-Kitaiskie otnosheniia v XX veke. Dokumenty i materialy. Tom V. Kn. 1, 67. 34.  Information from Baranov to Zhdanov, Molotov and, Malenkov, March 16, 1946, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 992, l. 214. 35.  The transcript of the Soviet Ambassador in China Apollon Petrov with General Zhang Zhizhong, March 18, 1946, AVPRF, f. 0/100, o. 34, p. 253, d. 20, l. 77. 36.  See: On approval of the work plan of the concession “Xinjiang Tin” to 1946, March 7, 1946–June 25, 1946, GARF, f. Р-5446., o. 48a, d. 821, l. 1–41. 37.  The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smith) to the Secretary of State, March 21, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Volume X, 1204. 38.  Information from General Egnarov to Kruglov. March 24, 1946, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 135, l. 163–164. 39.  Information from General Egnarov to Kruglov. On the situation the warring parties in the region of Xinjiang, March 27, 1946, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 135, l. 167 40.  See: Information from General Egnarov to Kruglov. On the situation the warring parties in the region of Xinjiang, March 28, 1946, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 135, l. 168. 41.  See: Report from General Egnarov and Langfang to Kruglov. About the events held by the Chinese command against the rebels in Xinjiang, May 20, 1946, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 136, l. 221. 42.  The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smith) to the Secretary of State, May 29, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Volume X, 1204. 43.  Ibid., 1205. 44.  Ibid., 1205. 45  Ibid., 1205. 46.  Information from Egnarov and Langfang to Kruglov and Abakumov, May 31, 1946, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d.142, l. 309–310. 47.  See: Special reports from Egnarov and Langfang to Kruglov and Abakumov. On the session of the government of East Turkistan, to discuss the results of the negotiations with the Chinese, May 28, 1946, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 135, l. 237. 48.  Ibid., 238–239. 49.  See: The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smith) to the Secretary of State, May 29, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Volume X, 1206.

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50.  The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State, June 6, 1946, NARA, RG 59, Box: 4013, NND 760050, Doc. 761.93/6–646, p. 181. 51.  Ibid., 182. 52.  Barmin, Sin’tszian v sovetsko-kitaickikh otnosheniiakh 1941–1949 gg., 114– 115; See: Baymirza Hayit, Türkistan Devletlerinin Milli Mücadileleri Tarihi, 328. 53.  The Counselor of Embassy in China (Smith) to the Secretary of State, June 13, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Volume X, 1208. 54.  Telegram from Fedotov to Molotov, September 10, 1947, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 38, l. 208. 55.  Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 308–309. 56.  See: Agreement between the Iranian State and Azerbaijani Representative, June 13, 1946, APDUDPAR, f.1, o.89, d. 155, l. 12–17. 57.  The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State, June 15, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Volume X, 1208–1209. 58.  See: Isa Yusuf Alptekin. Doğu Türkistan Davasi, 184. 59.  See: http://polusharie.com/index.php/topic,2564.900.html. 60.  Information from Egnarov to Kruglov and Abakumov. On bring to the USSR former Prime Minister of East Turkistan Republic AlikhanTörä Shakirkhojaev, June 17, 1946, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d.137, l. 210–211. 61.  See: Information from Egnarov to Kruglov and Abakumov. On bring to the USSR former Prime Minister of East Turkistan Republic AlikhanTörä Shakirkhojaev, June 16, 1946, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d.137, l. 208; For more detailed information about bring in the USSR AlikhanTörä and emigration some other leaders of the Eastern Turkistan Republic in the Soviet Union, see: GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 68, l. 242–245, 157–158. 62.  Information from Egnarov to Kruglov and Abakumov. On bring to the USSR former Prime Minister of East Turkistan Republic AlikhanTörä Shakirkhojaev, June 17, 1946, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d.137, l. 209–210. 63.  See: Information from General Egnarov to Kruglov and Abakumov, June 19, 1946, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 137, l. 212. 64.  Information from General Egnarov to Kruglov and Abakumov. About suicide attempt chief 4 of the first control Ministry for State Security Lieutenant General Langfang, June 19, 1946, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 137, l. 213. 65.  See: Information from General Egnarov and Langfang to Kruglov and Abakumov. On arrival at Ghulja deputy chairman of the new provincial government Ahmetjan Kasimov, June 19, 1946, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d.137, l. 214–215. 66.  Baymirza Hayit, Türkistan: Rusiya ilə Çin arasinda, 329. 67.  Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 310. 68.  Letter of Mikhail Suslov to Andrei Zhdanov, June 26, 1946, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 996, l. 10. 69.  Ibid., 11. 70.  Ibid., 11. 71.  Report of the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations at Xinjiang in 1946, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 86, l. 35.



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72.  See: Correspondence with the authorized All-Union Society for Cultural Relations in Xinjiang on the exchange and sending literature and exhibitions, January 7, 1946–December 28, 46, GARF, f. Р-5283., o. 18, d. 60, l. 1–83. 73.  Report of the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations at Xinjiang in 1946, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 86, l. 45. 74.  See: Petrov, Miatezhnoe “serdtse” Azii, 491. 75.  Mendikulova, Istoricheskie sud’by kazakhskoi diaspory, 140: For more information about Osman Batyr, see: Justin Jacobs, “The Many Deaths of a Kazak Unaligned: Osman Batur, Chinese Decolonization, and the Nationalization of a Nomad,” The American Historical Review, Vol. 115, No. 5 (December 2010), pp. 1291–1314. 76.  See: Isa Yusuf Alptekin, Doğu Türkistan Davasi, 183–184; Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 311–312. 77.  See: Baymirza Hayit, Türkistan Devletlerinin Milli Mücadileleri Tarihi, 329. 78.  See: Petrov, Miatezhnoe “serdtse” Azii, 493. 79.  The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State, November 30, 1946, NARA, RG 59, Box: 4013, NND 760050, Doc. 761.93/11–3046, p. 212. 80.  See: Isa Yusuf Alptekin, Doğu Türkistan Davasi, 184–185. 81.  Letter from Ahmedjan Kasimov and Rahimjan Sabirkhojayev to Soviet Consul General in Urumqi Alexandr Savel’ev, July 12, 1947, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 391, l. 116–117. 82.  Ibid., 117. 83.  The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State, November 30, 1946, NARA, RG 59, Box: 4013, NND 760050, Doc. 761.93/11–3046, p. 214. 84.  The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State, December 18, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Volume X, 1222. 85.  Report of the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations at Xinjiang in 1946, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 86, l. 41. 86.  Report of memo from Anastas Mikoian to Stalin, December 7, 1948, AVPRF, f. 0/100, o. 41, p. 278, d. 58, l. 8. 87.  The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State, November 30, 1946, NARA, RG 59, Box: 4013, NND 760050, Doc. 761.93/11–3046, p. 211. 88.  Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 318–319. 89  Report of memo from Anastas Mikoian to Stalin, December 7, 1948, AVPRF, f. 0/100, o. 41, p. 278, d.58, l. 8. 90.  The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State, Octobor 3, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Volume X, 1209. 91.  The Consul General at Shanghai (Davis) to the Secretary of State, November 27, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Volume X, 1214–1215. 92.  The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State, November 30, 1946, NARA, RG 59, Box: 4013, NND 760050, Doc. 761.93/11–3046, pp. 215–216. 93.  The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State. 09.12.1946 // Foreign Relation of the United States. 1946. Volume X. The Far East, China. Washington, 1972, p.1220. 94.  The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State, December 9, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Volume X, 1220.

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  95.  Ibid., 1221.   96.  Letter of People’s Commissar of State Security Azerbaijan SSR Stepan Emelianov to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan Mir Jafar Baghirov, December 11, 1945, APDUDPAR, f.1, o. 89, d. 97, l. 78.   97.  Claims of the people of Azerbaijan.Tabriz, January 16, 1946, APDUDPAR, f. 1, o. 89, d. 118, l. 54–55.   98.  The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State, December 9, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Volume X, 1221.   99.  The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State, November 30, 1946, NARA, RG 59, Box: 4013, NND 760050, Doc. 761.93/11–3046, p. 213. 100.  Letter from General Zhang Zhizhong to Soviet Consul General in Urumqi Alexandr Savel’ev, Julay 7, 1947, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 391, l. 121. 101.  The Consul General at Shanghai (Davis) to the Ambassador in China (Stuart), October 23, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Volume X, 1213. 102.  The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State, November 30, 1946, NARA, RG 59, Box: 4013, NND 760050, Doc. 761.93/11–3046, p. 216. 103.  The transcript of the Soviet Ambassador in China Apollon Petrov with General Zhang Zhizhong, January 7, 1947, AVPRF, f. 0/100, o. 40a, p. 264, d. 21, l. 35–36. 104.  The transcript of the Soviet Ambassador in China Apollon Petrov with General Zhang Zhizhong , January 27, 1947, AVPRF, f. 0/100, o. 40a, p. 264, d. 21, l. 58. 105.  Letter from Ahmedjan Kasimov and Rahimjan Sabirkhojayev to Soviet Consul General in Urumqi Alexandr Savel’ev, July 12, 1947, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 391, l. 119. 106.  Ibid., 119. 107.  Letter from Zhang Zhizhong to Soviet Consul General in Urumqi Alexandr Savel’ev, July 7, 1947, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 391, l. 120. 108.  Isa Yusuf Alptekin, Doğu Türkistan Davasi, 185–186. 109.  See: Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 314. 110.  See: Petrov, Miatezhnoe “serdtse” Azii, 493. 111.  Letter from Ahmedjan Kasimov and Rahimjan Sabirkhojayev to Soviet Consul General in Urumqi Alexandr Savel’ev, July 12, 1947, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 391, l. 118. 112.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” Fevruary 24, 1947, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 38, l. 154–155. 113.  Ibid., 155. 114.  Report of memo from Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party Kazakhystan Zhumabay Shayahmetov to the Secretary of Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party Nikolai Patolichev, February 1947, Arkhiv Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan (hereafter referred to as APRK), f. 708, o. 2, d. 171, l. 59–60. 115.  Ablet Kamalov, Uyghurs in the Central Asian Republics. Past and present, China, Xinjiang and Central Asia, 118. 116.  See: Petrov, Miatezhnoe “serdtse” Azii, 494. 117.  David Wang, The Xinjiang question of the 1940s, 97.



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118.  Justin M. Jacobs, Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State, 163. 119.  See: Isa Yusuf Alptekin, Doğu Türkistan Davasi,186–187. 120.  See: Justin M. Jacobs, Exile Island: Xinjiang Refugees and the “One China” Policy in Nationalist Taiwan, 1949–1971, 189. 121.  See: Isa Yusuf Alptekin, Doğu Türkistan Davasi, 188–190. 122.  Dudin, Mongol’skaia Alashan’skaia respublika kak politicheskii proekt 1940-kh gg., Vostok, 2014, No. 2, s.37 123.  Telegram from Wang Shijie to Molotov, June 11, 1947, AVPRF, f. 100, o. 41, p. 164, d.7, l. 130. 124.  Ahat Andican, Cedidizm’den Bağımsızlığa Hariçte Türkistan Mücadelesi, 569. 125.  From Walther Schieber to Max Mandellaub, June 15, 1947. NARA, RG 59, Box: 4013, NND 760050, Doc. 761.93/6–1547, p. 1. 126.  Letter from Kruglov to Molotov, June 12, 1947, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 172, l. 384. 127.  Letter from Serov to Molotov and Beria, July 24, 1947, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ ch., o. 2, d. 173, l. 143. 128.  See: Letter from Kruglov to Molotov, 1947, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 173, l. 90. 129.  Letter of Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party Kazakhystan Zhubabay Shayahmetov to the Secretary of Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party Andrey Zhdanov, June 29, 1947, APRK, f. 708, o. 2, d.171, l. 61. 130.  Ibid., p. 62. 131.  Ibid., p. 65. 132.  See: Resolution of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Broadcasting to Xinjiang,” July 14, 1947, APRF, f. 4, o. 15, d. 616, l. 17. 133.  See: Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Iranian Azerbaijan,” November 21, 1947, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 37, l. 1. 134.  Isa Yusuf Alptekin. Doğu Türkistan Davasi. Istanbul, 1973, s.192.

Chapter Six

The New Wave of Soviet Activities in Xinjiang and the Victory of the Communists in China (1947–1949)

In the second half of 1947 the Soviet Union decided to intensify its new policy in Xinjiang. With the aim of obtaining detailed information about the events in Eastern Turkistan and preparing a new political approach to the province in the summer of 1947, the Soviet leadership called the general consul in Urumqi, Aleksandr Savelev, back to Moscow. After learning about the consul’s upcoming visit to Moscow, the former head of the Xinjiang government, Zhang Zhizhong, sent him a message of thanks: “The ‘Ghulja events’ in Xinjiang have been resolved peacefully through the mediation of your country. For this friendly and benevolent attitude, we must first express our deep sense of respect and gratitude to the leaders of your country, Mr. Stalin and Mr. Molotov.”1 THE GOVERNMENT CRISIS IN URUMQI AND ACTIVITIES OF THE USSR IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES OF EASTERN TURKISTAN At the same time, Zhang acknowledged that despite the June agreement signed between representatives of the central government and the Ghulja government “the situation in Xinjiang did not adequately develop in normal fashion.” He justified this opinion by revisiting past events and citing examples. Zhang thought that the intrigues against Masud Sabri, the appointed head of the provincial government, were coming directly from Ghulja. Zhang had been sent to the province by the central government with two goals: to establish peace there and to establish friendship with the Soviet Union. He noted that he had worked on that over the years and expressed the opinion that “at the moment the main difficulty in the question of Xinjiang is the presence 212



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of two opposing ideas: on the one hand the idea that ‘friendship with China means being against the Soviet Union’ and on the other hand the idea that ‘being friendly with the Soviet Union means being against China.’ All the existing problems here are generated by the presence of these two points of view.”2 In order to normalize the situation in the province and achieve genuine peace, true friendship with the Soviet Union, and sincere relations with the central government of China, Zhang believed, it would be necessary to eliminate this contradiction and this false way of thinking: “Such erroneous views and actions generate an inevitable result: namely, they cause rivalry between China and the Soviet Union in Xinjiang, and political rivalry today can lead to military rivalry in the future. I believe that this perspective, of course, is undesirable for the governments of our two countries.”3 General Zhang Zhizhong stressed in his message that the policy of the current provincial government was fundamentally different from the policies pursued in the past. Therefore, the Soviet government should also review its policy in Xinjiang and put into practice the statement made by Molotov at the signing of the treaty of friendship between the USSR and China. In terms of international politics, Zhang believed that “from the point of view of Xinjiang, regardless of how international relations in general and Sino-Soviet relations in particular develop, the geographical position of Xinjiang, both for China and for the Soviet Union, is in a zone ‘not affected by artillery fire,’ a zone that has no strategic value. . . . As the Soviet Union has no aggressive intentions, seeking only to secure its borders, likewise China is even more devoid of any aggressive intentions: it only seeks to ensure the integrity of its territory.”4 At the end of his message Zhang admitted: “I am a military man and have no diplomatic training. Everything that I have said above, I have said with complete sincerity and frankness.” It is quite possible that he was sincere in outlining his vision of Soviet policy in the province. However, Soviet policy in Xinjiang was much more complicated than he imagined. He repeatedly discussed some aspects of it with the U.S. consul in Urumqi. On July 12, 1947, five days after the general’s four-page letter to the consul general of the USSR, Ahmedjan Kasimov and Rahimjan Sabirkhojayev wrote to Savelev. Having learned that you are leaving for Moscow in the next few days, we take this opportunity to ask you to pass on to the leader of the Soviet Union, Mr. Stalin, heartfelt greetings from the Muslims of Xinjiang province. At the same time, we take the liberty of drawing your attention to some issues as the mediator in the conclusion of the peace agreement between the peoples of Xinjiang and the Central Chinese government. We, the representatives of three districts, in signing the peace agreement, had great hopes that the peoples of Xinjiang would be granted equal rights. More than one year has passed since then, but all the points of the agreement have remained only on paper, and the agreement

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itself has been turned into a trap for the people living in the province, making it easy to implement even worse oppression than before.5

Kasimov and Sabirkhojayev noted that the signing of the agreement on June 6 was initially greeted by the people with great enthusiasm, which soon gave way to disappointment. The letter stated that the Chinese authorities had tried to prevent the holding of elections to choose local authorities. Some people were persecuted, subjected to repression, arrested, or not allowed to perform their duties. They claimed that the third paragraph of the agreement had not been implemented, except for education issues, and that the implementation of the fifth paragraph had turned into a mockery. All those who advocated for the development of national culture and art and freedom of speech and the press had been harassed and either had fled to Ili district or had hidden in villages. Not only had the sixth paragraph on releasing the participants in the uprising from custody not been implemented, but, on the contrary, the number of arrests had increased. They also pointed to the failure of the parts of the agreement related to the national army: “Based on the agreement, an 11,000–12,000-man army was created and administrative institutions were reorganized in the three districts. This work was entrusted to the command of the army of the three districts, which was carried out in a timely manner and reported to the relevant authorities. At the same time, the army of the three districts was outfitted with Chinese uniforms.”6 Recognizing that some criminal acts had been committed in the three districts, they reminded Savelev that as mediator he “will oversee the accurate and full implementation of the agreement.” They asked that “the mediator who was the initiator in ensuring calm in Xinjiang will draw the attention of his government to the foregoing.”7 In addition to the discontent expressed in the letter from the Ghulja leaders to the Soviet consul general, there were rumors among the population that the relationship between the Ili representatives and the Soviet Union had deteriorated. To clarify the authenticity of these rumors, the Nanjing correspondent of Time magazine, Frederick Gruin, visited Xinjiang along with the former information minister of the central government, Peng Xuepei, to talk with Ahmedjan Kasimov. Citing information received from the Time correspondent, ambassador Stuart wrote to Washington, noting that “despite the unpleasantness between Ahmed and the Soviets he shows no signs whatever of any animosity toward the Soviet Government.”8 On August 19, 1947, letters from Zhang Zhizhong and Kasimov and Sabirkhojaev (translated respectively from Chinese and Uyghur) were sent with accompanying documents to Leonid Baranov, an employee of the Information Department of the Central Committee of the AUCP (B), and Tikhon Skvortsov, deputy of the First Division for Far Eastern Affairs of the USSR Foreign Ministry.9



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With the issue of Xinjiang again on the agenda, discussions on the need for scientific research related to the province and the creation of the corresponding sector began in one of the institutes of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. In the course of these discussions, a memorandum was drawn up and forwarded to the department of agitation and propaganda of the Central Committee of the AUCP (B) on the establishment of a new institute to study the modern East and conduct research in Xinjiang. “The worsening political situation in Xinjiang and the development of the national liberation movement of indigenous nationalities inhabiting it—the Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kirghizes, and Kalmyks—require our careful attention and in-depth study of all these events.”10 The note suggested implementation of a study of the history, economics, and geography of Eastern Turkistan in the following areas: 1.  The physiographic features of the Xinjiang region as part of a single geographic entity with Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan; 2.  The ethnogenesis of peoples of Xinjiang, in connection with the ethnogenesis of the peoples of Central Asia and ways to solve national problems in Xinjiang; 3.  The history of Xinjiang and the national liberation struggle of its peoples as a source of inspiring patriotic feelings in its indigenous nationalities; 4.  Questions of the national culture of the peoples of Xinjiang: language, literature, folklore, and the influence of socialist culture; 5.  The religious issue in Xinjiang and the possibility of using it; 6.  The economy of Xinjiang, in light of its colonial status, the dominance of the remnants of feudalism, and the prospects for recovery through the development of economic relations with the USSR.11 Tensions between the parties had reached a high level, and on August 26, 1946, the Ghulja representatives announced their withdrawal from the government. On August 29 Ahmedjan Kasimov, Rakhimjan Sabirkhojayev, and other members of the Ili district group left Urumqi and departed by plane to Ghulja. Then the members of the Advisory Board also left Urumqi.12 In the summer of 1947 the Ghulja representatives, after withdrawing from the government, returned to Ili, creating a new situation in Xinjiang. As a result of this maneuver by the northern regions’ representatives, Moscow lost its influence on the government of Masud Sabri. To bring Xinjiang back into its sphere of influence, the Soviet Union launched the next phase of the national liberation struggle of the Muslims. On August 29, at Molotov’s recommendation, the Politburo adopted a resolution “to approve the proposal of the Committee of Information of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on giving it the official name ‘Committee for Economic Research of the Council

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of Ministers of the USSR.’”13 The first issue considered by the newly formed committee was to prepare proposals on Xinjiang and submit them for consideration of the Politburo. The proposals raised for discussion on September 10 stated that in order to prevent the defeat of the Muslim national liberation movement in Xinjiang and consolidate the success achieved by Muslims in the fight against the Chinese, the Committee of Economic Research considers it necessary to undertake the following activities: “To invite Muslim members of the Xinjiang government—Ahmedjan Kasimov, Burhaneddin Shahidi, Rahimjan Sabirkhojayev, Sayfutdin Azizi, and Abdulkarim Abbasov, who left Urumqi for Ghulja—to give letters to the head of the northwestern General Headquarters, General Zhang Zhizhong, and the consul general of the USSR in Urumqi (the mediator in the negotiations in 1946), stating that they left Urumqi as a result of adverse Chinese reaction, which is a direct violation of the Chinese terms of the agreement dated June 6, 1946, and the current intolerable situation for them in the government.14

The proposals highlighted the need for such demands as immediate release of the arrested Islamic scholars; punishment of those responsible for this as well as for the punishment of progressive Chinese; the resignation of Masud Sabri from his post as chair of the provincial government; and implementation of all points of the agreement of June 6. The Soviet leadership sent these proposals in a letter to General Zhang and Savelev, indicating that if these requirements were met the Muslim representatives were ready to return immediately to Urumqi and continue working in the government under the leadership of Zhang Zhizhong. The Committee of Economic Research suggested that the Politburo intensify the guerrilla movement of Muslims against the Chinese in Turfan oasis of Urumqi district under the slogan “Fight for the implementation of the agreement of June 6. 1946” and at the same time “intensify the guerrilla movement in southern Xinjiang (Aqsu, Kucha, and Kashgar districts), where a significant number of participants in the uprising against the Chinese in 1944–1946 lived.”15 The proposal recommended announcing mass arrests of local Muslims by the Chinese authorities in Kashgar and emphasizing their arbitrary actions in relation to the local population, the main reasons for the anti-Chinese movement in southern Xinjiang. The committee also chose the leaders of the guerrilla movement in the south of the province: “Toe lead the guerrilla movement in southern Xinjiang the former leaders of the rebel movement temporarily residing in the territory of the Uzbek and Tajik SSR (Karavansho bey Tajimulla, Akyul bey, Tahir bey Mirza Ahmedov, Mukhtar Abdukerimov, and others) will be sent there clandestinely; to provide assistance to the Xinjiang guerrillas with arms and ammunition by bringing them secretly from the Soviet Union.”16 The third



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point of the proposal concerned the need for immediate armaments and technical equipment for the 12,000-man former army of Eastern Turkistan. The fourth point called for the creation of an organization to guide the national liberation movement in Xinjiang: “To invite the leaders of the progressive Muslim movement in Xinjiang to establish an ‘Association for Promoting Peace in Xinjiang’ based in Ghulja, which indeed needs to take over the leadership of the national liberation movement in Xinjiang, acting under the slogan of struggle for the implementation of the agreement of June 6, 1946.”17 The proposal suggested taking the first convenient opportunity to establish the association as a legal political party that would stand at the head of the national liberation movement and guide it to the next stage of the struggle. At the same time, it was considered appropriate to create regional, county, and local organizations; to attract progressive Muslim activists, clerics, and tribal leaders. On the basis of these proposals on September 10, 1947, the Politburo of the AUCP (B) adopted a resolution “On Xinjiang,” with six points dealing with these main issues: To oblige the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR (comrade Kruglov): (a) to make available to the Committee of Economic Research the following quantities of arms and ammunition from the Russian supplies (old) and the captured German supplies: 9,000 rifles, 70 heavy machine guns, 300 light machine guns, 40 company mortars, 40 antitank guns, 18,000 grenades, 8,000,000 rifle cartridges, 15,000 mines to company mortars, 15,000 antitank gun cartridges. The weapons and ammunition will be delivered to the locations specified by the committee; (b) to instruct the border agencies to allow people and goods to pass freely in and out of Xinjiang at the request of the committee; (c) to provide the committee, if necessary, with air squadrons to fly across the territory of the USSR.18

According to the third paragraph of the decision, the USSR State Planning Committee was entrusted with allocating spare parts for motor vehicles of the Committee of Economic Research; their delivery was assigned to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR. The decision of the Politburo noted that “the Communist party (Bolshevik) of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, and Tajikistan should provide the necessary assistance to the Committee of Economic Research in conducting the planned activities for the Xinjiang.” It also recommended that “weapons be sent not all at once but when necessary and by agreement between comrade Malik (Iakov) and comrade Fedotov (Petr).”19 Implementation of the organizational and political measures based on the decision was entrusted to the minister of internal affairs of Turkmenistan, Vladimir Egnarov, who had been the main organizer of the first phase of the events in Xinjiang: the revolutionary movement in the north. His

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candidacy was proposed to Molotov in a telegram from the deputy chair of the Information Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers, Petr Fedotov: In accordance with your instructions, together with Comrades Sergei Kruglov and Sergei Ogoltsov, I discussed the question of who could be entrusted with carrying out the organizational and political activities in Xinjiang. We agreed to submit for your consideration the nomination of Major-General Vladimir Stepanovich Egnarov. . . . Currently Egnarov is the minister of internal affairs in the Turkmen SSR. In order to work with our agents in Xinjiang, it is advisable to appoint Colonel Petr Andreevich Chibaev as deputy to Egnarov, who is former chief of the Far Eastern Intelligence Department of the Ministry of State Security (USSR) and is also a very experienced scout, was a participant in the operations in Xinjiang in 1945–1946, and at present is engaged with Xinjiang affairs in our committee.20

To organize a new guerrilla movement and political work in Xinjiang, Fedotov considered it appropriate to consult with the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (B) of Uzbekistan and to send the operational staff of state security to the province. He wrote to Molotov: “To ensure the political work in Ghulja, it is advisable to assign an appropriate employee of Uzbek ethnicity. If you approve it, then I ask permission to contact comrade Usman Yusupov and to negotiate the appointment of such a person. In order to help these comrades we will find 15 to 20 operatives who can be sent to Xinjiang; to perform tasks involving the secret transfer of weapons under the disguise of local people and monitor the use of weapons in our interests to resolve all sorts of other problems through our agents among the Ghuljas.”21 Having observed the intensification of Soviet policy since the beginning of the autumn of 1947, the American consul in Urumqi sent the U.S. secretary of state a lengthy report on the political events and military situation in Xinjiang on November 10. After analyzing the Soviet policy in the province, he came to the following conclusions: “So long as Chinese troops are not patrolling the border, no direct move to expand the part of Sinkiang [Xinjiang] now under effective control by the Soviet Union is at present planned by their local representatives. This picture could be changed overnight, however, if the Kremlin world policy called for an advance in this area, when it is considered that the price of world repercussions would be worth the prize of the rest of Xinjiang.”22 The Soviet-U.S. Cold War had developed during the middle 1940s, and Paxton intensified his activities with the expansion of American influence into Central Asia. He was mostly interested in collecting information regarding the Soviet Union, especially information on atomic bomb tests in Soviet Central Asia and Soviet uranium-mining activities in Ashan.23



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The adoption of the Politburo’s secret decision of September 10, 1947, based on the proposals of the Committee of Economic Research; the development of organizational and political measures for its implementation; approval of the committee as the main decision-making body of the ruling party; providing managerial personnel to coordinate the separatist movement under the guise of a national liberation struggle; and sending operational USSR state security groups to various areas of Eastern Turkistan all reflected a return to the agenda, under new political conditions: the Politburo decision dated May 5, 1943, on creating a separatist movement in Eastern Turkistan. The Soviet Union’s creation of the conditions for the rise of a new wave of separatist movements took the central government of China to the next round of the struggle. Ambassador Stuart in Nanjing wrote to the secretary of state: “Current ‘war of nerves’ which keeps everyone agitated, may be intended to conceal basic purpose of merely fomenting continued disorder. Chinese fear of actual Soviet attack calls for more Central Government armed forces than are needed to maintain local order and their presence in province is another disturbing factor in addition to general alarm arising from recurrent rumors of trouble to come.”24 In the autumn of 1947 the Americans began to be aware of new nuances of the Soviet policy in Xinjiang, as noted in a memorandum prepared by the U.S. Department of State on Soviet policy toward China: “Although the USSR professes to recognize the sovereignty of the National Government over Xinjiang, evidence indicates continued encouragement by the USSR of minority group activities to the detriment of the National Government. The Yining Autonomous Movement is a natural outgrowth of such sponsorship.”25 When Paxton paid a sudden visit to Ili in 1947, a Russian source accused him of trying to establish contact with counterrevolutionaries and of conducting espionage activities there.26 However, neither the proposals of the Committee of Economic Research nor the top-secret decision of the Politburo ever mentioned the restoration of Eastern Turkistan and use of its symbols. The region was ruled by the Association for Promoting Peace in Xinjiang, an organization created by Ghulja representatives in the coalition government. Observing these processes, consul Paxton wrote to the secretary of state about a year after the beginning of new developments in the province: “Rumors received from the two separate sources that dissident zones beginning to discontinue designation of area as ‘East Turkistan Republic’ in favor of ‘Sinkiang’ [Xinjiang], to replace independent flag (white star and crescent on green field) with Chinese national standard and even to accompany Turkistan official documents with Chinese text. Abassof, Ili-appointed Vice Secretary General of Provincial Government, is said to be heading organization in Yining for ‘peace and unity.’”27 The concurrent timing of the proposals of the Committee of Economic

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Research, the adoption of the top-secret Politburo decision on Xinjiang, the end of negotiations between the Chinese Communists and the central government, and the beginning of a new phase of the civil war was not accidental. A FAILED SOVIET PROJECT: THE ASSOCIATION FOR THE PROTECTION OF PEACE AND DEMOCRACY IN XINJIANG Nevertheless, unlike the situation from 1944 to 1946, there was no unity in the northern districts of Xinjiang in the autumn of 1947. Osman Batyr and his Kazakh fighters became a new headache for the Soviets. Although the Soviet leadership in February 1947 had ordered the security authorities to eliminate Osman Batyr and the troops under his command, his fight for the restoration of his control over the Altai region became more intense. Despite the danger to “Sintszyanolova” (Xinjiangtin) and other enterprises, “the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs instructed the chief of the maneuver groups [Ministry of Internal Affairs Border Guard detachments stationed in Ghulja and Kok-Toge ] to protect and vigorously defend Kok-Toge, the base of the expedition, and not to interfere in the ongoing fighting between Osman Batyr and the national units.”28 In September 1947 the Osman groups (1,500 swordsmen) and Kalibek (900 swordsmen) raided the Altai district. The sudden capture of Koktogay on September 3 and Shara-Sume, the center of the Altai district, on September 12 by Osman Batyr forced the district chief Dalelkhan Sgurbayev, who was responsible for implementing the decisions of the Politburo, to flee the city. Soviet officials responsible for the situation in Xinjiang explained the success of these military operations by saying that the Chinese authorities of the province had assisted Osman with soldiers, weapons, equipment, and food. This assistance was mainly linked to the commander-in-chief of the Guomindang forces in Xinjiang, General Song Xilian. Referring to his conversation with Sung, which took place on September 23, Paxton, the American consul in Urumqi, wrote to the secretary of state that General Sung denied any connection with the army of Osman: “Osman was attempting to return after had been forcibly expelled from his post as legally appointed zone commissioner. Sung admits that Osman’s advance was aided by Chinese materiel but insists no Chinese troops were sent.”29 The radio station “Voice of America” broadcast programs about Osman, calling him “a friend of United States of America.”30 However, Osman did not reap the fruits of his victories for long. Dalelkhan arrived in Chuguchak in late September, charged with providing additional assistance to deal with Osman’s forces, and began recruiting volunteers in Tarbaghatai district. As a result of these extraordinary measures two cavalry



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squadrons and several battalions of infantry were recruited and placed under Dalelkhan’s command. In addition, according to the directives from Moscow, the Soviet army also joined in clean-up operations in the districts of Altai and Tarbaghatai to rid them of Osman’s forces. “On October 16 about 100 trucks transporting over 3000 heavily armed troops accompanied by 6 tanks entered northern Ashan [Altai] zone. Ili troops have no source other than Russia of reported materiel particularly tanks which could not be claimed to have been captured from Chinese Army during the insurrection as it had none there.”31 Regular government troops of the Tarbaghatai district, together with the newly formed units of the Soviet army, launched an offensive and regained control of Shara-Sume in the second half of October. Osman’s forces retreated into the mountains. The American consul believed that this victory of Ili national army units was impossible without the help of the Soviet Union.32 General Song Xilian in conversation with Paxton openly declared that “despite the supposed presence of Red Army personnel this force may have entered zone only to eject the Kazak troops and take back the mining project ‘wolfram’ mines at Fuwen [Koktogay].”33 The attempt of the Soviet Union to remove Osman with the help of Mongolia failed. On September 30, 1947, during the meeting of Choibalsan with Molotov, the Mongol leader made a proposal that could avoid the “undesirable” results but also remove Osman from the picture in Altai. Choibalsan said that Osman had influence among his bandits, so it would be better to kill him, because he had sold himself to the Chinese. Molotov remarked that they would have no regrets about Osman. The Soviet foreign minister also allowed Choibalsan to “work in the rear of Osman’s gang” (to send intelligence operatives from Mongolia rather than to engage Osman’s forces in direct combat). With this permission to conduct covert activities and even to kill Osman, Choibalsan departed for Mongolia.34 However, Osman arrested the Mongol envoys, who had arrived in December 1947 with offers of cooperation, and handed them over to Urumqi. 35 Because of Soviet fears that Osman’s forces would seize the deposits of tin and tungsten that had strategic importance to the USSR, Savelev, the Soviet consul general in Urumqi, demanded that the government of Xinjiang influence the rebel leader to end hostilities. According to Paxton, the government in Urumqi stated that “Osman does not obey it and the Chinese government does not provide any assistance to him.”36 Along with Osman Batyr, the Chinese authorities established secret ties with Kalibek, a district chief in Savan who enjoyed great authority among the inhabitants of the Tarbaghatai district. Having received 9 million Xinjiang dollars from the Chinese, Kalibek was supposed to take over the population of his district in the territory controlled by the forces of the Guomindang, in order to weaken the revolutionary forces in the area. But this plan was foiled

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by national forces under the control of Ghulja. Kalibek barely managed to hide in Urumqi and emigrated to Pakistan in 1949.37 After the armed detachments of Osman Batyr were pushed back from the mineral-rich regions of the Altai and Tarbaghatai, the military units of the Interior Ministry and the operational group of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR in the northern areas of the province returned to their defensive positions. In order to ensure the “security” of the three revolutionary districts, the Soviet Union considered it necessary to augment the personnel of the Ghulja national army and strengthen its material and technical base. According to Soviet security consultants, these three districts had only 11,000 to 12,000 soldiers of the national army units (reorganized under the June 6, 1946, agreement) to guard Urumqi against encroachment. In view of the minimization of the military threat from Osman Batyr on February 14, 1948, Vladimir Egnarov sent a telegram to Sergei Kruglov, the minister of internal affairs of the USSR, “to recall the group of employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs led by him in Xinjiang to their permanent place of service.”38 In order to obtain instructions, on February 18, 1947, Kruglov forwarded this telegram to Molotov.39 The Soviet leaders agreed with Egnarov’s proposal. In the spring of 1948, they began to focus on strengthening the army of the northern districts and institutions under their power. The Soviet advisors since 1948 had been planning a gradual transformation of the national liberation movement of Ili’s local population into a general Chinese Communist revolution. During the civil war, which intensified after the cessation of negotiations between the central government and the Chinese Communists, Chiang Kai-Shek lost control over a number of important areas of the country. The ensuing decisive phase of the struggle between the Chinese Communists and the Guomindang had consequences for Xinjiang. Faced with strong pressure from Moscow and the “national forces” that it controlled, the government of Masud Sabri, which was subordinated to the central government of China, started to pursue a more anti-Soviet policy. Due to the provincial government’s view that “all evil” came from Russia, under its auspices a public organization called the Committee to Struggle against the Soviet Union, the CCP, and the Three Districts Revolution was established. Its adjunct paramilitary youth organization, mainly consisting of Kazakh youths, their leadership was entrusted to Osman Batyr. A bitter fight began against Soviet agents in Urumqi and other government-controlled areas.40 The actions of pro-government forces to curb the activities of Soviet organizations in Kashgar in May 1948, along with threats to the Soviet citizens living there, caused particular opposition from the Soviet institutions of the province. The Soviet consul general protested to the head of the province



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on May 7. The Soviet Embassy in Nanjing sent a note of protest to China’s Foreign Ministry on May 29: “The Embassy of the USSR in China considers it necessary to specify that such brutalities on the part of the local authorities of Kashgar are outrageous evidence of the brutal massacre of Soviet citizens and insists on urgent measures to end such atrocities and to prevent them in the future.”41 Nikolai Roshchin, the new Soviet ambassador in Nanjing, after presenting his credentials to President Chiang Kai-Shek on June 1, 1948, drew the attention of the Chinese leaders to the anti-Soviet actions in Kashgar. The Chinese Foreign Ministry did not respond to the May 28 note from the Soviet Embassy, so on June 21 the embassy sent the Chinese a written reminder that “the Chinese government must take urgent measures to end the atrocities by local authorities of the city of Kashgar and punish those guilty of the beatings, robberies, and violence committed against Soviet citizens and repair the damage caused to the Soviet citizens of the city of Kashgar.”42 On August 3, 1948, the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that, although Kashgar authorities had made some mistakes during “this quarrel,” “they did not have any political intentions.”43 However, the Soviet Embassy did not agree with this interpretation of these events. A note from the embassy on August 30 stated that “the attack on Soviet citizens by 50 armed men, known for their links with the local Chinese military authorities, cannot be explained as a simple quarrel between the Chinese and Soviet citizens.”44 In a period of increased tension throughout China as well as on the borders of Xinjiang, control of the three northern districts could not long remain in a state of uncertainty. On April 24, 1948, the Politburo of the AUCP (B) adopted a resolution “On Measures to Strengthen the Political and Economic Situation in the Ili, Tarbaghatai, and Altai Districts of Xinjiang”: In order to improve the civil and military administration and strengthen the political and economic situation in the Ili, Altai, and Tarbaghatai districts of Xinjiang, it is necessary to take the following measures: To recommend that Ahmedjan Kasimov (deputy chair of the Xinjiang government) convene a meeting of governors and their deputies in Ghulja as well as heads of financial and economic institutions of the three districts in order to discuss the situation; to set up a permanent commission with 5 to 7 members at the meeting, which will represent the political and economic governing body for all three districts but will not be public. In order to hide the real purpose of this institution from the Chinese, call it the “Commission to Study and Improve the Financial and Economic Situation.”45

The regulation stated that if the Chinese asked questions about the reasons for the creation of this commission the answer should be that “its task is to develop activities in all three districts and supervise the collection of the

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necessary money and material resources for the maintenance of the army and civil administration, due to the fact that the Chinese government has not released these funds and is thereby violating the relevant paragraph of the agreement of June 1946.” The document proposed giving the commission the right to control the political and economic life of the three districts “and also to give secret guidance on these issues, which is mandatory for all three districts.”46 The Soviet leaders proposed that the commission should be composed of trusted supporters of the national liberation movement in Xinjiang, although it was considered impractical to include Ili leader Ahmedjan Kasimov and Iskhak bey Monunov, commander of the Ghulja forces. Moscow decided that they should just remain the leaders of the national liberation movement without any official position in the commission. Its activities within the boundaries of the three districts included establishing a single financial and natural-tax system; keeping the level of taxation lower than in other parts of Xinjiang; ensuring collection of material resources for the army, government agencies, education, and health; and preparing budgets for the three districts in 1948 as well as staff schedules and salaries for the army and government agencies. As a result of these measures, prices on the ETR markets in 1948 were five to twelve times lower than in the other areas of Xinjiang.47 The regulation envisaged the establishment of the Association for the Protection of Peace and Democracy in Xinjiang and the adoption on its behalf of an “Appeal to the Peoples of Xinjiang,” confirming the text of the appeal submitted for the Politburo’s approval. The Soviet government considered it appropriate to entrust management of the association to Kasimov and Monunov. The third paragraph of the regulation gave orders: To rid the three districts of Osman’s activists and Chinese agents through the efforts of local workers. With the aim of involving the local population in active combat against Osman’s activists and Chinese agents, to create in the governorates “commissions to promote the strengthening of law and order” on the ground. The composition of these commissions must include the most reliable tribal leaders and clerics. To impose on the commissions the obligation to hear the results of the investigation into the cases of detainees and make decisions on them, which are subsequently to be approved by the governors.

The fourth and fifth paragraphs of the document adopted by the Politburo dealt with industry and the economy. It was deemed appropriate to create in Ghulja an “Ili commercial-industrial joint-stock company,” giving it advantages in conducting internal and external trade and organizing various cooperatives in its framework composed of trusted people, including one or two specially sent from the USSR for this purpose. On September 1, 1948,



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Anastas Mikoian, the minister of foreign trade of the USSR, was instructed to allocate a total of 1.5 million rubles to the Ili Commercial and Industrial Joint Stock Company through September 1, 1948, to pay for equipment for a small oil refinery; telephone-telegraph and medical equipment; medicines, exchange of raw materials, animal products, and other products. According to the last paragraph of the resolution, Usman Yusupov, the first secretary of the Uzbekistan CC CP (B), and Zhumabay Shayahmetov, the first secretary of the Kazakhstan CC CP (B), were instructed: To identify immediately all educated Uyghurs, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and Kirghizes who have emigrated from Xinjiang and settled in these republics in order to return them to Xinjiang to strengthen the administrative and managerial staff of the three districts. The best trained and fit among them should be directed, in agreement with F[edor] Kuznetsov [deputy chair of the Information Committee under the USSR Council of Ministers] to work in Xinjiang; to organize with the assistance of educational institutions of the Uzbek and Kazakh SSR special groups of Xinjiang students in the Soviet Union for training doctors, teachers, agronomists, administrative workers, and other specialties for their subsequent use in work in Xinjiang.48

The implementation of the decree signed by Stalin was assigned to Molotov, Kuznetsov, Mikoian, Yusupov, and Shayakhmetov. Along with this decree, the Politburo adopted the four-page text of the “Appeal to the Peoples of Xinjiang,” which stated that the Muslim peoples of Xinjiang were subjected to oppression and exploitation and that saving them would lead to the unity and friendship of the entire population and preserve the achievements of the revolution. The appeal affirmed the need to protect the democratic points of the agreement of 1946: However, there are still some elements of hostility toward some of the authorities who again want to take away the freedom won by population and recognized by the government of the Republic of China. This is evidenced by the predatory raids, atrocities against civilians, murder of women and children, violence, and tyranny that have been carried out and still continue to be carried out by the prairie wolf Osman and his rapacious gang with the support of people in power. The population of Xinjiang cannot forget the betrayal of the people’s cause by Osman’s associate Kalibek, who is as much of a bandit as Osman.49

In order to establish friendship among the peoples of Xinjiang and build a free society, the appeal proclaimed the creation of the Association for the Protection of Peace and Democracy in Xinjiang. In conclusion the appeal stated that the association would have “a great and sacred duty before the people to solve these pressing challenges, with the support of the people and fulfilling

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their will” and would “also fully support all progressive and truly democratic steps of the government of the Republic of China. . . . Local branches of the association will be established in the districts, auls, and villages across the province with the same goals.”50 All members of society were invited to join, regardless of gender, national origin, religion, profession, or social status. Following the adoption of these two important documents on Xinjiang on April 24, 1948, the Politburo on May 10 adopted the “Instructions to the Soviet Ambassador in China,” addressed to the Soviet ambassador in Nanjing. Although he was not told to avoid contact with the ambassadors of the United States, Great Britain, and other countries, he was instructed “not to engage with them in disputes about the Chinese Communists, other domestic issues, and the military situation in China; in all cases to declare that the USSR does not interfere in China’s internal affairs.”51 The document prescribes appropriate measures aimed at preserving the economic interests of the USSR in Xinjiang. The ambassador was instructed to “exercise extreme caution” in contacts and negotiations with the secret democratic and progressive organizations in hiding and to monitor closely the activities of the United States and Great Britain, paying attention to the identification of data and facts on the following issues: (a) the participation of the Americans and their assistance to Chiang Kai-Shek in the fight against the democratic forces in China; (b) the form and dimensions of the economic penetration of American capital in China; (c) the training in China of a military bridgehead against the Soviet Union; (d) cooperation (the essence, forms, and methods of cooperation) of American official representatives and private organizations, firms, and companies in China with the Chinese Guomindang government and organizations against the interest of the USSR in China and the Far East as well as political campaigns and other activities of organizations hostile to the Soviet Union. The ambassador must also monitor the British policy and the existing disagreements between the United States and Britain in China.52

In conclusion, the Politburo ordered the ambassador in Nanjing “carefully and systematically to study the measures of the Chinese government in foreign and domestic policy, the military-economic condition of China, the plans and activities of the Guomindang command, the financial situation of the country, and all changes in these areas, promptly informing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR about these issues.”53 The Politburo then adopted several decisions to protect the interests of the Chinese Communists. In this period of acute civil war in China, it often gave Aleksei Kosygin, the minister of finance, instructions to allocate to Mikhail Suslov foreign currency “for special purposes.” On August 13, 1948, the Politburo decided to educate a group of twenty children of leaders of the



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CPC and the members of the national liberation army of China in the Soviet Union.54 On December 28 the Ministry of Cinematography of the USSR was instructed to send a film crew to the liberated areas of China for a period of eight months and assign Ivan Bolshakov, the minister of cinematography of the USSR in 1949 “to prepare a documentary film, depicting the heroic struggle of the Chinese people for freedom and independence, showing in it the fighting of the People’s Liberation Army of China and the most important political and economic events in the liberated territory of China.”55 Although the document was classified “top secret,” its intention was to provide clearly visible images of the Communist victory in the Chinese civil war. In the summer of 1948, the time came for practical implementation of the activities of the Association for the Protection of Peace and Democracy in Xinjiang. In July, on the initiative of the People’s Revolutionary party, the Union of Revolutionary youth, the Society of Freedom, and other public organizations, as well as a number of public figures, a conference of representatives of all democratic forces, groups, and associations was held in Ghulja. Ahmedjan Kasimov delivered a speech “on the current situation in China and the tasks of democratic organizations and groups.” The conference adopted the decision on the establishment of the Association for the Protection of Peace and Democracy in Xinjiang. The central office of the organization was headed by Kasimov. Its members included Abdulkarim Abbasov, Iskhak bey Monunov, Dalelkhan Sgurbayev, and Sogdulla Sayfullayev. The conference issued the “Appeal to the People of Xinjiang” approved by the Politburo on April 24. None of the twelve items of the appeal had been changed. Among other things, it called for freedom of speech, press, assembly, and religious belief; equal rights for all peoples; the formation of local governments through the election of people trusted by the local population; the establishment of public control over the activities of executive bodies; the creation of popular-educational societies; the publication of books and periodicals in the national languages; the opening of primary, secondary, and vocational schools in these languages; the conducting of legal proceedings in the national languages; elimination of sex discrimination; expansion of the network hospitals; free medical services for the poor; protecting the inviolability of private property; and improving the use of agricultural land, livestock development, land reclamation, and the expansion of pastures.56 The Soviet institutions in Xinjiang participated actively in the creation of the association, in accordance with Moscow’s plan. This helped to give it wide support in the shortest possible time. One year later, in the districts of Ili, Tarbaghatai, and Altai, it had a total of more than 50,000 members in 27 counties and 755 primary organizations. As head of the association, Ahmedjan Kasimov in public speeches, articles, and letters of that time openly

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expressed the idea of maintaining broad autonomy for Xinjiang in the new China.57 Paxton, the American consul in Urumqi, explained the desire of the USSR to preserve three northern districts to the secretary of state in November 1948: “Soviet sponsors of 3 zones may have undertaken to bring them back into the fold in exchange for Chinese acceptance of terms for renewal of airline and trade pacts more favorable to USSR and general Sino-Soviet accommodation for the entire area at Muslim expense may be in process.”58 In December 1948 Mikoian as minister of foreign trade sent to Stalin his views and comments on the main outlines of Soviet trade with Xinjiang in light of the decision of the Politburo on April 24: At the end of November of this year a number of prominent merchants in Urumqi appealed to our Ministry of Foreign Trade with an offer to sell to the Soviet Union wool, raw silk, leather, and furs in exchange for Soviet goods, noting that they will be able to get permission from the Xinjiang provincial authorities to trade these items. Such interest on the part of the Chinese to trade with us is understandable, as they face now serious economic difficulties in the areas under their control in Xinjiang. Therefore, we can expect that they will make concessions to us, and we can agree on the resumption of trade and economic cooperation on terms acceptable to us.

Mikoian opposed delay in the negotiations, which “is unlikely to be useful for us. The resumption of trade and economic cooperation will legitimize our cross-border trade with Xinjiang’s population and contribute to strengthening of our positions in Xinjiang as well as production of rare metals by the Ministry of the Metallurgical Industry of the USSR in the Altai and Ili border districts of Xinjiang.”59 Mikoian stressed the importance of trade with Xinjiang not only in oil, tin, and tungsten but also in other rare metals and noted that all nonferrous and rare metals produced in the province except the amounts required to meet local needs must be exported to the USSR. He suggested immediately beginning negotiations with the provincial government of Xinjiang and instructing Aleksandr Savelev, the Soviet consul general in Urumqi, and A. Ivanchenko, a Soviet trade agent in Xinjiang, to implement them. However, a number of Soviet institutions, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, did not consider it appropriate to start negotiations on the restoration of trade and economic relations with the government of Xinjiang. Nikolai Fedorenko, the director of the 1st Far East Administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, wrote to deputy minister Andrei Gromyko: “The current unfavorable situation for Guomindang in China is not suitable for activation of our side of negotiations on trade and economic cooperation in Xinjiang. This could be perceived as political support of the Nanjing government.”60 By that time, the position of



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the Nanjing government was critical: panic was intensifying among the leaders of the Guomindang, the future of the country was in dispute, and even the question of replacing President Chiang Kai-Shek had been raised. FROM “PROTECTING” XINJIANG’S MUSLIMS TO AIDING THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS: A MEETING BETWEEN MAO AND MIKOIAN At the end of 1948 Moscow openly supported the Chinese Communists and increased its economic pressure on the government of the Guomindang. Some of these events were directly related to Xinjiang. Disputes continued between Moscow and Nanjing in connection with the expenditures in dealing with the 1,600 Chinese citizens and military personnel from the Tarbaghatai district who had crossed the border into the Soviet Union in July 1945, fleeing from the rebellious forces of Ghulja. Although all these citizens had returned on September 15, 1946, under the agreement with the Chinese government, during their stay in the USSR, the Soviets claimed to have spent 2,592,893 rubles on their maintenance. On March 30 and December 7, 1947, the Soviet Foreign Ministry handed over to the Chinese government notes concerning this issue. The Chinese proposed to pay the debt in U.S. dollars at a reduced diplomatic exchange rate (1 U.S. dollar = 1 ruble), but the Soviets did not agree to this. On December 6, 1948, Gromyko sent a letter to Molotov: “In view of the fact that the Chinese are still delaying paying the specified debt to the Soviet Union and have not responded to the note from the Foreign Ministry of the USSR dated May 19, 1948, I consider it appropriate to instruct comrade Grigorii Tunkin to call the advisor of the Chinese Embassy to the Soviet Foreign Ministry and hand him a new note from the Foreign Ministry.”61 Gromyko gave instructions to inform the Chinese that the interest on the debt would be 3 percent per annum from March 7, 1947. After army of the Guomindang suffered serious defeats in the summer and autumn of 1948, the Soviet aid to the People’s Liberation Army of China led by the Communists and to the territories under its control was becoming greater and greater. At the end of December 1948, by order of the Council of Ministers, the CCP government in Manchuria was given 86 locomotives and 1,000 wagons at a total cost of 44 million rubles.62 According to American historian Odd Arne Westad, “more than 1,500 young Chinese officers got their training in Soviet military academies before the People’s Republic was set up, and more were trained by Soviet instructors in Manchuria between 1947 and 1949.”63 As a result of the People’s Liberation Army’s successful Liaoshen, Huaihai, and Pingjin campaigns in the autumn of 1948, the fate of

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the Nanjing government was virtually decided. On December 31, 1948, in his New Year’s speech, Chiang Kai-Shek appealed to the Chinese Communist party with a proposal to end the civil war and start peace talks. A week later he turned to the USSR, the United States, Great Britain, and France to become mediators in these negotiations. However, on January 17, after consultation with Mao Zedong, the USSR refused to mediate. In its response, approved by the Politburo, the Foreign Ministry of the USSR stated: “Having considered the appeal of the Chinese government, the Soviet government considers it necessary to declare that it has always adhered and continues to adhere to the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries and in accordingly does not consider it appropriate to accept the mediation referred to in the appeal of the Chinese government.”64 In these circumstances, on January 24, 1949, Chiang Kai-Shek resigned as the president on his own initiative. All these dramatic events had an effect on Xinjiang. General Zhang Zhizhong, who had once tried to reconcile the Communists and the Guomindang in order to avoid civil war, continued to exercise control over Xinjiang as civil governor of the province and commander in chief of the Chinese armed forces headquarters of the northwestern part of China. The Communists treated him well: their leader Mao Zedong even “called him his friend.”65 He closely observed the military-political events in China, saw the advantage of the Communists, backed by the USSR, and wanted to maintain the possibility of influencing the situation in Xinjiang in the new political environment. At this time the Soviet representatives, dissatisfied with the government of Masud Sabri, secretly sent Burhaneddin Shahidi, a former member of the coalition government and a ruling member of the Association for the Protection of Peace and Democracy in Xinjiang, to the headquarters of General Zhang. Shahidi informed the general that “the Communist Chinese soldiers are moving toward the northwestern region of China. And, if you cut your ties with the Chinese nationalists in order to prevent the capture of this region, he will have to come to an agreement with the Chinese Communists not to introduce troops into Eastern Turkistan; then the USSR, with the aim of strengthening his position in regard to the Communists and supporting his independent status, will give him great military and economic assistance.” But first Shahidi offered “to remove from power Masud Sabri, secretary general Isa Yusuf Alptekin, and the commander of the national government in Eastern Turkistan, Song Xilian.”66 Alptekin remembers that a secret agreement in this regard was achieved between the General Zhang and the Soviet ambassador in Nanjing, whereby the Soviet Union pledged to help the northwestern region of China to create a modern army; to provide economic assistance; and to give aid in personnel training, the construction of the air force, the development of communication, and the growth of agriculture



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and the recycling industry; and if necessary to send a sufficient number of troops into the region.67 A report prepared by the consular district of Urumqi for the Soviet Foreign Ministry stated: “Before leaving for Nanjing, Zhang Zhizhong told the consul general of the USSR in Urumqi, comrade Savelev, that he was ready to remove Masud as chair and to appoint to this post Burhan [Shahidi], who enjoys the trust of Ghulja and maintains close contact with the Chinese.”68 According to this agreement, in late December 1948 General Zhang met with Chiang Kai-Shek and told him: We, as Chinese nationalists, have been forced to give up all efforts to engage in deadly combat with the Chinese Communists. The Russians, taking advantage of this opportunity, with the help of Ili rebels, could capture other districts. In order to prevent a possible Russian conquest of Xinjiang, General Song Xilian, the commander who is known for his anti-Russian sentiment, should be withdrawn from the province and the milder Tao Zhiyue be appointed in his place. The appointment of Burhan Shahidi instead of Masud Sabri and Liu Mengchun in place of Isa Yusuf is also more consistent with our national interest.69

Chiang Kai-Shek, already in a difficult situation, was looking for opportunities to improve relations with the Soviet Union, so General Zhang’s proposal seemed attractive. First, China’s central government approved the order to recall Song Xilian from the post of commander of Xinjiang garrison in December 1948. General Tao Zhiyue was appointed in his place and tried in every way to demonstrate his positive attitude toward the Soviet Union. He immediately canceled some of the orders of his predecessor, General Sung. Soviet institutions in the province welcomed the abolition of Sung’s secret order including Osman Batyr’s detachments in the Chinese regular troops. General Tao Zhiyue stated that “the order, according to which the Kazakhs were included in Chinese regular army, was misunderstood by my predecessor, General Sung. The Ili agreement [he must mean the Urumqi agreement] gave local nationalities the right to recruit their local militias. This did not mean that they should be part of the Chinese army.”70 Tao told Masud Sabri that the central government had decided to replace him and some members of the government, allegedly to prevent the conquest of the province by the Soviet Union. On January 10, 1949, two days after Chiang Kai-Shek had appealed to the USSR with a request to mediate in the negotiations with the Communists, General Tao dismissed Masud Sabri from his post as head of the provincial government. Dr. Sabri refused the offer of the Nanjing government to appoint him ambassador of China in Iran.71 Burhaneddin Shahidi, known for his pro-Soviet sentiments, was appointed as the head of government. James Millward and Nabijan Tursun describe his role as a “well-travelled Kazan-born

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Tatar with family roots in Aqsu. Burhan was partially successful in stabilizing Xingjian’s finances by restoring the Xinjiang dollar. He also allowed the renewed expansion of Turkic nationalist organization. However, besides negotiating with the Soviets to reopen full trade relations, there was little he could do about the deteriorating economy or the political situation before the victory of the Chinese Communist party (CCP) in China once again realigned the outside forces shaping Xingjian’s fate.”72 Shahidi’s appointment as head of the government was completely approved by the Soviet institutions in the province and the Soviet leaders in Moscow. Shahidi supported preserving the province as part of China on the condition of autonomy. Thus this appointment meant that Ghulja groups backed by Moscow came to power in Xinjiang. The Russian author Vladimir Krasilnikov wrote about this event: “This is even more important because during Masud’s period, under the growing influence of pan-Turkism and panIslamism, the penetration and strengthening of the position of Pakistan and Afghanistan in Xinjiang was becoming quite noticeable.”73 The Times article “Russia and Xinjiang” characterized the government of Shahidi, established in early 1949 in Urumqi: This revolt has now been brought to an end by the appointment of Burhan, a Russian speaking Turki, as Governor of Xinjiang. Burhan appears to have been associated with the moderate groups which have tried to play a mediating role between the Guomindang Government of Xinjiang and the Soviet-sponsored rebels. It is generally assumed that he will not resist the consolidation of Russian influence. The Russians have now put into cold storage the threatened “East Turkistan Republic,” and agitation for it has died down. The leader of the East Turkistan Republican Party, Muhammad Amin, has, however, been made junior Deputy Governor of the new Xinjiang Government, while the leader of the original Ili separatists, Ahmed Jan, becomes senior Deputy Governor.74

After receiving the Nanjing government’s offer on mediation and on the proposal of the Foreign Ministry of the USSR, the Politburo discussed the situation in China at its meeting on January 14, 1949. The victory of the Communists in China had become real. “When it became clear that the Chinese Communists were going to win the civil war, both the CCP and the Soviet Union felt the need to strengthen their relationship.”75 At the meeting, the text of the cryptogram from Stalin to Mao Zedong was approved under “top secret” classification. Mao was preparing to travel to Moscow, but Stalin considered it appropriate to postpone the visit and send someone from the Politburo to China.76 “We still insist that you temporarily postpone your trip to Moscow, as your stay in China is very necessary at the present time. If you wish, we can immediately send to you a responsible member of



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the Politburo in Harbin or another location for negotiations on the issues of our concern.”77 On January 17 a reply was received from Mao. He expressed his agreement on temporarily postponing his visit to Moscow and welcomed the idea of sending a member of the Politburo to China. Regarding the place of meeting, he wrote: “The most appropriate place for his arrival is Shijiazhuang. This is a relatively hidden location and from there one can drive directly to the location of our Central Committee.”78 The attitude of the Soviet Union toward the Chinese Communists and in general its confidence that they would prevail in the internal power struggle was not unequivocal. The Chinese historian Shen Zhihua correctly described Stalin’s ambiguous and wavering politics with respect to the Chinese Communist Party after the Soviet-Chinese Treaty signed on August 14, 1945: “From 1945 until the creation of the PRC [People’s Republic of China], the Soviet Army was stationed in the northeastern territories of China and during all this time the relations between the CPC and Moscow were uncertain: there was neither full rapprochement nor full estrangement.”79 After reviewing Mao’s response, Stalin assigned Mikoian a secret mission to travel to China. Therefore, on January 26, 1949, Mikoian traveled from Moscow to the Far East “to review the state of the fishing industry in the Kuril Islands and Kamchatka.” On January 30, in the village of Xibaipo, he held his first meeting with Mao. Among the issues discussed at the meeting were the military situation in China, the attitude of the People’s Republic of China toward its mistakes, and the Marxist education of Chinese cadres. In regard to the purpose of this visit Mao’s biographer Philip Short writes that “Mao wanted a rupture, a clean break, with the Western powers, to expunge the last remnants of a century of humiliation. Earlier that year he had explained to Anastas Mikoian, a veteran member of the Soviet Politburo whom Stalin had sent on a fact-finding visit to China, that the policy of ‘leaning to one side,’ which the government would follow, involved a degree of diplomatic isolation. Russian help would be welcomed, he said. But until China had ‘set its house in order,’ others would be kept at arm’s length.”80 The first discussion on the issue of Chinese Muslims took place on February 1 at a meeting of Mikoian with Zhou Enlai. When Mikoian asked whether the Muslims of northwestern China were making any demands, Zhou Enlai replied: “The Muslims would like to obtain autonomy. They will cooperate with us, if we give them autonomy and exercise caution in regard to their religion.” In response to Mikoian’s question about the situation of Muslims in the northwest, Zhou Enlai noted: “This part of the country is full of national minorities, who are at a low level of development, and only few of them rise to high social status.”81 The question of Xinjiang was fully discussed during the meeting of the envoy of the Politburo with Mao on February 4. Mao spoke about his

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vision on the national question. Mikoian reported: “I informed Mao Zedong that our Central Committee did not advise the Chinese Communist Party to allow too much leeway on the national question by granting independence to the national minorities and thereby reducing the territory of China in connection with the coming to power of the Communists. National minorities should be given autonomy but not independence. Mao Zedong was delighted with the advice, but it was clear that he was not going to give independence to anyone.”82 In his detailed report about this 1949 trip prepared on September 22, 1960, for the Central Committee of the CPSU, Mikoian described Mao’s interest in the problem of Xinjiang: “Mao Zedong was suspicions about our intentions in Xinjiang. He said that there was an independence movement in the Ili district of Xinjiang, which was not subject to the government of Urumqi, and there was a Communist Party there. He told me that when he met with Bai Chongxi in Chongqing in 1945, the latter informed him that the local rebels in the Ili district had artillery, tanks, and planes of Soviet manufacture. I clearly stated that we did not support the independence movement of Xinjiang nationalities and especially did not have any claims on Xinjiang territory, considering that Xinjiang was and should be part of China.”83 Of course, Mikoian, with the confidence peculiar to Soviet leaders in such cases, was lying. After all, he was not only a participant in all meetings of the Politburo that adopted secret resolutions about Xinjiang but personally implemented some points of these resolutions. Mikoian told Mao that “this movement is generated by the ill-advised policies of the Chinese government, which does not want to reckon with the national characteristics of these ethnic groups, does not grant them the rights of self-government, and does not allow for the development of national culture. If you give autonomy to the nationalities of Xinjiang, the basis for the independence movement is likely to remain. We stand for economic cooperation and trade with Xinjiang, in accordance with the contract proposed by Zhang Zhizhong, the representative of the Guomindang government in Xinjiang, on its behalf.” In this regard, Mao noted that “they mean to grant full autonomy to Xinjiang, as well as to Inner Mongolia, which is already an autonomous region.”84 On the difference in attitude toward the national question between the Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders Westad writes that the preexisting links between the Soviets and some of the groups on China’s border areas complicated the encounter between Soviet and Chinese nationalities policies. The Chinese political leaders at the center were from the very beginning of their rule torn between the perceived need to learn from Soviet political and academic theory on these thorny questions and the desire to underline Chinese, and not Soviet, predominance inside China’s borders. Reading through



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the archival records of top-level conversations on questions of nationality, I have the sense that the Chinese interlocutors often consciously replaced examples from minorities along the Soviet border with those from minorities of the interior (or other borders, e.g., the Tibetans) when discussing policy with the Soviets. But while sometimes embarrassing to both sides—and often inconvenient—the Soviets in China understood the CCP’s sensitivities with regard to the border issues and underlined their desire to help the Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and Mongols living in China find their place within the new Chinese community of peoples.85

During the talks with Mikoian, Mao was especially interested in the volume of oil reserves in Xinjiang. Mikoian replied: “During the time of Sheng Shicai, we extracted and refined oil in considerable quantity; in the absence of transportation for export, it all went to meet the domestic needs of Xinjiang.”86 Mao asked: “Is it possible to build a railway connecting China with the Soviet railways through Xinjiang? It would be of great importance for mutual defense in the event of a new war. In such a war China will certainly side with the Soviet Union. If Manchuria faces a military threat, such a railway would be a very important channel of supply for the Chinese warring armies.”87 Mikoian did not reply, because he did not know Stalin’s view on this matter. On February 5 he sent him a telegram.88 Only after Mikoian’s return from China, during their discussion of the results of his trip, did Stalin express the opinion that it would be more appropriate to build a railway connecting the Soviet Union and China through Mongolia. A member of the Politburo wrote to Mao that “it would be shorter and cheaper to build a road through Mongolia, as was already done by the People’s Republic, and secondly to build a road through Xinjiang.”89 On February 6, in another conversation, Mao and Mikoian again discussed the situation of Chinese Muslims. Mao said: “We recognize the Muslims as a nation. We have never approved of the Guomindang’s policy of oppression of Chinese Muslims and therefore believe that we should grant them autonomy within China. The total number of Muslims living in China is only about 30 million.” During these negotiations, Mao briefly outlined his plans for Xinjiang: “Xinjiang is home to about fourteen ethnic groups, numbering nearly 3 million people. Xinjiang is of great strategic importance and connects us economically with the Soviet Union. According to our plan, we will be there in 1951.”90 Chinese historians Shen Zhihua and Yafeng Xia write that “Mao touched on an issue which was very sensitive to the Soviet Union. It appeared that Mikoian was too eager to protest Soviet innocence.”91 But Stalin did not agree with Mao’s plan for the spread of communism in China, reaching Xinjiang only in 1951. In June 1949 he sent him a special telegram on the need to accelerate the establishment of the Communist regime in Xinjiang: “We recommend that you pay serious attention to Xinjiang, where there is

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oil underground and where you can get cotton. It will be very difficult to you without oil. If you start working in Xinjiang soon, it will be possible in two to three years to have your own oil. You could construct an oil pipeline from the area of extraction and refining to Chinzhou station and from Chinzhou you could deliver oil to China, both by waterways and on the railways. Therefore, you should not delay the occupation of Xinjiang too long.”92 However, at that time Stalin was not interested in moving the Chinese Liberation Army to the south of the country. Short noted that “the Soviet leader himself had made sure of that: that spring, he had urged Mao not to send his forces across the Yangtse, but to content himself with controlling the northern half of China. This was prudent, he had explained, to avoid provoking America. But Mao knew, and Stalin knew, that a divided China was in Russia’s, not in China’s interest. ‘There are real friends and false friends,’ Mao told Mikoian pointedly. ‘False friends are friendly on the surface, but say one thing and mean another. They dupe you . . . We shall be on our guard against this.’”93 Stalin returned to this discussion in June 1949, when he received the delegation led by Liu Shaoqi, the secretary of the CPC Central Committee, in Moscow. During their meeting, he raised the issue of the economic and strategic importance of Xinjiang for the new government: “You should not delay the occupation of Xinjiang, because postponement may cause British interference in the affairs of Xinjiang. They can encourage Muslims, including Indians, to continue the civil war against the Communists, which is undesirable, because Xinjiang has large reserves of oil and cotton that are badly needed by China.” Stalin’s insistence on the necessity of an early occupation of Xinjiang by the Chinese Communists resulted from concern about the probability of the spread of Pan-Islamism in the Middle East. The formation of the state of Pakistan on August 14, 1947, predominantly populated by Muslims, increased this worry. The Soviet leaders and especially Stalin explained the emergence of a new Muslim state in the Middle East as the result of British intrigue. In his opinion, the British could provoke similar events in Eastern Turkistan. The Chinese historian Chen Jian wrote that “during Liu’s visit to the Soviet Union, Stalin told Liu that, according to Soviet intelligence reports, the United States planned to use Muslim GMD [Guomindang] forces in northwestern China to establish an independent Islamic republic in Xinjiang, which he believed would be extremely harmful to both the CCP and the Soviet Union. He offered to use the Soviet-supported revolutionary forces in northern Xinjiang to check the GMD so that it would be easier for the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] to enter Xinjiang.”94 However, according to archival documents, the Soviets believed that the British intended to establish a Muslim state in Eastern Turkistan. To overcome this threat in the future Stalin considered it important to change



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the ethnic composition of Xinjiang. In his advice to the leadership of the CPC Central Committee, he said: “The Chinese population in Xinjiang is only 5 percent of whole population. After the occupation of Xinjiang, it is necessary to bring the percentage of the Chinese population to 30 percent by the resettlement of Chinese for the full development of this vast and rich region and to strengthen the protection of China’s borders. Actually, in the interests of strengthening of the China’s defense, it is reasonable for Chinese to settle all border areas.” However, he disagreed with the members of the Chinese delegation that the delay in the occupation of Xinjiang was related to the power of the Guomindang army in the northwestern district, led by Muslim general Ma Bufang. Stalin said: “You overestimate the forces of Ma Bufang, whose cavalry can very easily be defeated by artillery. If you want, we will give you forty fighter planes that will help to defeat and disperse the cavalry very quickly.”95 On the first day of the Soviet-Chinese talks, the Politburo adopted a secret decision about payment of the expenses of the CPC delegation: “To issue at the expense of the Soviet government to the Chinese delegation for current expenses to comrades Liu Shaoqi, Gao Gang, Wang Jiaxiang, and Karsk 20,000 rubles each and to other employees of the delegation 50,000 rubles.”96 Liu Shaoqi, on behalf of the delegation, prepared a report “On the Present Stage of the Chinese revolution and Soviet-Chinese Relations” during his stay in Moscow and sent it to Stalin on July 4.97 The report contained a summary of China’s position on many issues as well as its attitude toward Stalin’s advice about Xinjiang, “We would liberate Xinjiang as soon as possible, but the big challenge for us in this case is clearing the enemy from the route leading to Xinjiang and to allow traffic on it. Another great difficulty is the lack of necessary means of transport. . . . If we overcome these difficulties, then we could free Xinjiang much earlier.”98 During the talks in Moscow, Stalin suggested that the Communist Party of China must send its representative to Xinjiang immediately with the aim of building a connection with leaders of the Ghulja national liberation movement and progressive intellectuals of the province. The representative should initially stay in Ghulja to establish control over the situation. Liu Shaoqi said that Deng Liqun, a member of the delegation, could be sent but that Mao’s agreement on this issue was needed. During the negotiations, Stalin agreed with the Chinese delegation on a number of issues, including inviting a delegation of Eastern Turkistan’s national liberation movement to the First Plenary Session of the People’s Political Consultative Council of China in September 1949. In addition, they agreed to unite the Party and organizational forces left in the three northern districts under Soviet control with the Communist Party of China. The units of the national army of these districts would be included in the People’s Liberation Army of China.

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THE MYSTERIOUS CATASTROPHE IN IRKUTSK AND COMPLETION OF STALIN’S EXPERIMENTS IN EASTERN TURKISTAN On January 24, two weeks after the appointment of Burhaneddin Shahidi as head of the provincial government, the Soviet consul general in Urumqi said that the USSR was ready to begin negotiations for the restoration of economic and trade relations with Xinjiang. On February 7, 1949, preliminary talks began in Urumqi on trade and economic relations between the Soviet Union and Xinjiang. The decision on these negotiations was made in Moscow: Soviet consul general Savelev received instructions to begin talks with the Chinese delegation led by Liu Tse-yung. Along with the consul general, the Soviets were represented by Ivchenko, a commercial agent in Urumqi. In the next stages of the negotiations Arzhannikov, Grdzelov, and Monin joined them. Despite the adoption of the Soviet proposals as the basis for negotiation, the Chinese made some additions, such as stipulating that “oil production that the Soviets wish to sell must first be proposed to the provincial government of Xinjiang.”99 In the negotiations on February 11 the Chinese expressed their own economic interests more specifically, demanding that the USSR must notify China in writing about the prospecting and processing of metals and other minerals in Xinjiang and provide a list of districts of the province in which it would prospect for oil and metals. Savelev wrote on the subject of the Chinese reaction to the Soviet proposal giving the Soviets the right to purchase all products from the companies for the exploration and production of nonferrous and rare metals. The Chinese offer to grant this right to both parties. Moreover, they insist that “the category and quantity of purchased metals be agreed to by both parties.” In other words, the Chinese are willing to agree in advance what metals will be purchased by each of the two parties and in what proportions. The Chinese have in mind that products purchased by them may be used not only to meet the domestic needs of Xinjiang but also for export to central China.100

In the negotiations on February 15 the parties mainly discussed the restoration of Soviet-Xinjiang trade relations. They agreed in principle that there would be no prohibitions or restrictions on the import and export of products that were not prohibited by the legislation of the two countries. The sixth paragraph of the agreement stated: “When importing and exporting goods from Xinjiang the parties will be guided by the interests of the normal economic development of Xinjiang and the interests of its people.”101 After the talks on February 22 the Chinese asked for a delay of two weeks to resolve some controversial issues.



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The new round of negotiations began on March 5. The Soviets and Chinese were able to reconcile their positions on a number of issues in relation to the timing of the creation and management of two trading joint stock companies. The Chinese demanded that the Soviets clarify the question of what fell into the category of “nonferrous and rare metals.”102 On March 25 the Chinese delegation gave the Soviets their written suggestions, opinions, and comments on the issues discussed. At the talks on April 7 and 11 the two parties largely agreed on many issues related to the restoration of trade and economic relations between the USSR and the province and clarified questions of interest to both sides. Finally, on June 8 the parties agreed on an itemized bilateral agreement. In these negotiations, the Chinese asked to exclude “Sovmongoltorg” (the Soviet-Mongolian Trade Organization) from the list of the founders of organized joint stock companies in the draft agreement. Liu Tse-yung expressed the opinion that this “could be misunderstood and interpreted by the Chinese as meaning that the Soviet Union supposedly wants to unite Mongolia with Xinjiang.”103 However, the Guomindang did not have enough time to complete these negotiations. The discussion of these issues related to the restoration of economic and trade relations between the USSR and Xinjiang was completed after October 1949 with representatives of the new Chinese Communist regime. After the Communist victory in 1949, at the meeting of the Politburo AUCP (B) on November 10, 1949, the Soviet consul in Urumqi was given the following instruction: “Notify the Xinjiang provincial government and representatives of the CPC Central Committee that the Soviet trade representatives are willing to enter into economic and trade talks after the Xinjiang provincial government receives authorization from the central government of the People’s Republic of China to conduct these negotiations.”104 After receiving such authorization, the Xinjiang government continued talks in January–August 1949 between the USSR and the Guomindang (Chiang Kai-Shek government) on the establishment of a Soviet-Chinese joint-stock company for oil. The proposition to Stalin from Molotov, Mikoian and Vyshinskii highlighted the conditions of the establishment of Sovkitneft (Soviet-Chinese joint oil company), which had a duration of forty years and was capitalized in the amount of $U.S. 11.5 million, with a production capacity of 50 million tons per year.105 Negotiations about creating the company in Moscow continued in Urumqi at the suggestion of Zhou Enlai. On March 27, 1950, an agreement was signed between the USSR and China on the establishment of the Xinjiang joint stock companies Sovkitneft and Sovkitmetal (Soviet-Chinese joint metallurgical company) as well as a joint Soviet-Chinese company in the field of civil aviation. All three of the joint stock companies were to operate in Xinjiang.

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In the summer of 1949, some controversial issues were discussed at the talks with the delegation headed by Liu Shaoqi, the secretary of the CPC Central Committee. Liu appealed to Mao Zedong. On July 25 Mao sent a telegram to the delegation on these issues and asked that they be brought to the attention of Stalin. “We agree with the idea of sending Deng Liqun to Xinjiang to establish radio communication with Beiping [as Beijing was called in 1928–1949].” In regard to the military operations of the People’s Liberation Army of China directed toward the northwestern region of the country, Mao told Stalin: Our troops might take Urumqi in the winter of this year. In mid-August, that is, after the completion of military operations in the area of Pinlyan, we can start planning this thing with Comrades Peng Dehuai, Zhang Zongxiong, and Zhao Shushan. According to Comrade Peng Dehuai, they have an extreme shortage of vehicles, and they ask if it is possible to buy 1,000 to 2,000 vehicles from the USSR to transport troops. We believe waiting for the purchase of cars from the USSR and delivery to Gansu province before we start moving troops into Xinjiang will delay the campaign of our troops, at least until the spring or summer of next year. I have already asked Peng Dehuai about the possibility of our troops’ advance in the winter of next year on foot toward the province of Xinjiang, with the subsequent delivery of Soviet vehicles through the areas of Ili and Ghulja. I still have not received a response. When I do, I will inform you.106

In any case, Mao believed that his troops could realistically occupy Xinjiang at the earliest by January–February 1950. On July 29, 1949, the Politburo, acting on proposals made by Liu Shaoqi, adopted a secret decision to install a radio station in Ghulja that would serve the interests of the CPC representative and to provide a special plane to transport the Xinjiang delegation to the first session of the People’s Political Consultative Council of China held in Beiping. To satisfy the requests of the head of the Chinese delegation, Liu Shaoqi, regarding Xinxiang matters. Accordingly, (a) instruct the Ministry of Communications of the USSR (comrade Psurtsev) and Information Committee at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR (comrade Fedotov) to install a special radio station in Ghulja; equip it with the necessary technical equipment, provide operators, and send one responsible manager, two radio operators, a encoder, and an interpreter from the staff servicing the Chinese delegation in Moscow, as requested by comrade Liu Shaoqi, for maintenance of the radio station in Ghulja; (b) instruct the General Directorate of Civil Aviation of the USSR (comrade Baidukov) to provide a special plane for transporting the representatives of the democratic party of Xinjiang to Chita for further travel to Beiping.107



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The implementation of this decision was entrusted to Molotov, Malenkov, Vishinskii, and the chair of the commission for foreign policy of the Central Committee of the AUCP (B), Vagan Grigorian. At the end of the Moscow talks, Deng Liqun, a member of the Chinese delegation, accompanied by three assistants and a specialist radio operator, was sent to Ghulja on August 9. They arrived at their destination on August 15. Immediately establishing radio contact with the Communists in Beiping and Moscow and the first field headquarters of the people’s liberation army of China under the command of Peng Dehuai, they began negotiations with the leaders of the Ili national liberation movement. Thus, “Moscow helped the CCP Central Committee to establish direct contact with the revolutionary forces in northern Xinjiang by assigning Deng Ligun, the CCP Central Committee’s liaison person, to travel from Moscow to northern Xinjiang. Before the PLA finally took over Xinjiang in October 1949, the Soviet Union and outer Mongolia became the main link of communications and transportation between the CCP Central Committee and CCP agents in Xinjiang.”108 The Soviet leadership and the leaders of the CPC were interested in the participation of leaders of Ghulja’s Association for the Protection of Peace and Democracy in Xinjiang in the first session of the National Political Consultative Council of China, which was supposed to begin in Beiping in September 1949. For this purpose, they were sent an invitation signed by Mao. At this time, he called the revolution in the three districts of Xinjiang “part of the Chinese revolution” and therefore invited the delegates from the Eastern Turkistan Republic to Beiping.109 Through a Politburo decision, they were even given a special plane for their flight. The delegation included famous figures who had recently held important positions in the government of Eastern Turkistan, such as Ahmedjan Kasimov, Iskhak bey Monunov, Abdulkarim Abbasov, Dalelkhan Sgurbayev, and Luo Zhi (executive secretary of Sino-Soviet friendship society in Urumqi). The Soviet leaders were aware that the delegates were hesitant and had taken a wait-and-see attitude toward the Chinese Communist movement. Although the secret Politburo decree referred to transporting them to Chita and from there to Beiping, on August 22 the delegates were taken from Ghulja to Alma-Ata and from there set out for Beiping. However, on August 25 the plane carrying the delegation to China suffered a mysterious accident near Irkutsk: all seventeen passengers on board were killed. The Chinese agency “Xinhua” announced this on the same day.110 The Soviet consul in Ghulja had kept in constant contact with Sayfuddin Azizi, one of the leaders of the Association for the Protection of Peace and Democracy in Xinjiang, about the flight route of the delegation from Alma-Ata to Novosibirsk and from there to Irkutsk, but he said nothing about the fate of

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the delegates after their departure from Irkutsk. Not until September 3 did he summon Asimov and read him an urgent telegram from Moscow: “The plane with the delegation on board led by Ahmedjan Kasimov flew from Irkutsk and soon crashed in the area of the Transbaikal mountains due to the awful weather; unfortunately, all seventeen people on board were killed.”111 Isa Yusuf Alptekin, who had served as general secretary in the government of Masud Sabri, believed that this event was the result of Moscow’s need to “obliterate the Soviet footprint” in the Eastern Turkistan Republic. In his opinion, the assassination occurred because “the Chinese Communists were not aware of agreements between Russian and the Ili rebels against the Chinese Communists and Chinese nationalists.”112 The Soviet leadership already had some experience with assassination of the leaders of national liberation movements operating after World War II under the tutelage of Moscow. Seyid Jafar Pishevari, who emigrated to the USSR after the fall of the national government of Iranian Azerbaijan in December 1946, died in a car accident “under very suspicious circumstances” in mid-1947.113 On orders from Moscow, a new delegation was immediately assembled in Ghulja to be sent to Beiping. On September 8, the members of this delegation (including Sayfuddin Azizi, Alimjan, and Shoiu Kyi) went to Beiping to participate in the session of the People’s Political Consultative Council of China. In the summer of 1949, the tensions in Xinjiang rose again. At the insistence of Stalin, the Chinese Communists included the occupation of the province in their immediate plans. In February a large part of Burhaneddin Shahidi’s government, controlled by the USSR, had broken ties with the government of Chiang Kai-Shek, who had moved from Nanjing to Canton due to the advance of the People’s Liberation Army. Cooperation began between this government and the CPC. Even General Zhang Zhizhong, who had played an important role in the fate of Xinjiang, was subject to the not yet officially proclaimed government in Beiping. General Tao Zhiyue, who had been appointed the commander of 100,000 Chinese troops in Xinjiang on Zhang’s recommendation, stopped obeying the official military orders from Canton and was awaiting instructions from the People’s Liberation Army, which had occupied the city of Lanzhou on the border of the province. The appearance of the 1st Corps of the army under the command of General Wang Zhen in Qinghai province created a worrisome situation in Xinjiang. The Communists took up positions about 1,000 km from Urumqi. Even Chinese officials who held high positions in the province one after another announced their defection to the new Communist authorities. Liu Mengchun, secretary general of Burhaneddin Shahidi’s government, and Qu Wu, the mayor of Urumqi, no longer concealed such sentiments. Although the province was officially sub-



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ordinate to the central government of China headed by Chiang Kai-Shek, in August–September of 1949 this submission was nominal. General Zhang sent instructions to General Tao and other officials for the surrender of the province to the Communists. They were ordered to ensure that Xinjiang surrendered without resistance and to remove any obstacles that might appear after the Communists took Gansu province. On August 11, in accordance with these instructions, General Tao gathered all commanders at his headquarters in Urumqi and announced that he intended to surrender to the Communist forces. However, a number of Guomindang generals, accusing Tao of defeatism and treason, declared that they would not participate in this. Tao demanded that the generals who protested leave Xinjiang. In order to find out the intentions of the nationalist forces during this political crisis, the leaders of the province met with Masud Sabri, Muhämmäd Imin Bughra, and Isa Yusuf Alptekin and asked their opinions concerning the upcoming Communist conquest. The purpose of the meeting undoubtedly was not to organize a defense but to discover their positions. The head of the previous government and his colleagues said: Of course, we are against this occupation. But if the Chinese Nationalist government [government of Chiang Kai-Shek] fears being accused of supporting our armed resistance, let it suspend all ties with us and declare that it recognizes the independence of the Eastern Turkistan state. Let it also, as a member of the UN, recognize our independence at the UN. In this case, the occupation of East Turkistan by Red China will cause a protest among the free countries of the world and be considered aggression, occupation, and imperialism; and then we will be able to widen the struggle. Our actions as an independent state will not be linked with Nationalist China. And it will not be blamed in any way.114

Dissatisfied with General Tao, some Chinese commanders (especially the Muslim generals) sought to establish relations with the nationalist forces in Xinjiang. To this end, the corps commander General Muhammad Osman Ma Chengxiang met at his headquarters with representatives of the nationalists, Muhämmäd Imin Bughra and Isa Yusuf Alptekin. During the meeting, he said: “Neither you nor we can alone defend Xinjiang from the Chinese Communists. In addition, there is the possibility of military intervention by the Russians. Therefore, we need to work together. I suggest that you act inside the province, transfer some of our weapons to the local population, and form some local armed forces. Thus we will be able to protect Eastern Turkistan together.” Buqra and Alptekin expressed agreement with General Ma. They considered it necessary to organize the struggle against the Communist conquest and to fight together with the Chinese nationalists. General Ma believed that the joint resistance of Uyghur-Kazakh forces and Chinese

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generals was the only way of protecting of Xinjiang from the Communist danger. He decided to overthrow Tao and Shahidi militarily and thus prevent the Communist invasion of Xinjiang. However, a participant in the meeting, the commander of the 78th Corps, Ye Cheng, under the guise of conducting an important meeting with Tao, informed him about the plans. Tao and Shahidi immediately passed this information to the Soviet consul general in Urumqi, who stated that those who were planning such a coup would come face to face with the Soviet Union.115 Upon learning that the plans for a military coup had become known, the generals who opposed Tao disbanded their military units and escaped through Pakistan to Taiwan. Muhämmäd Imin Buqra, Isa Yusuf Alptekin, and other Turkic nationalist leaders left the country with great difficulty and were forced to emigrate to Turkey. Dr. Jacobs wrote that, Muhämmäd Imin Buqra and Isa Yusuf Alptekin ultimately succeeded in securing asylum in Turkey for 1,734 Kazaks, along with several hundred Uyghurs. The former settled in rural Anatolia, the latter in Istanbul.116 Dr. Masud Sabri was arrested by the Communists and died in prison in 1952. The fate of the Osman Batyr was also tragic. For two years he fought against the Communists in the Altai Mountains. Some prominent opponents of the Communists from all over Eastern Turkistan joined his detachment: Sherif-Khan from Hami; Yolbars Khan, the mayor of Hami; Zhanym khan Haji, former minister of finance in the government of Eastern Turkistan; Oraz Bey from Urumqi; Arif Rahman from Ili; Ali Bey Rahim from Karashar; and others. On February 19, 1951, Osman Batyr, who continued his fight for almost a year and a half after the Communists came to power in China, was captured by soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army. On April 29 of the same year he was shot in Urumqi by verdict of the Chinese court.117 On September 23, 1949, the military units of the People’s Liberation Army of China occupied the city of Suzhou in western Gansu province. On September 25, after the elimination of the danger of a military coup, General Tao announced that he and his troops had cut ties with the government of Chiang Kai-Shek and sided with the Communists.118 The next day the head of the provincial government, Burhaneddin Shahidi, made the same statement. He wrote that the people of Xinjiang had broken relations with the Guomindang and joined the Chinese Communists. On September 27 they sent a joint congratulatory telegram to Mao Zedong and Zhu De as the leaders of the new Communist authorities.119 On October 1, 1949, the Central People’s Government of China issued a statement announcing the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. Mao Zedong became the chair of the Central People’s Government of China. It was decided that the capital of the new state would be Beijing. The statement declared to all countries and govern-



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ments that the Central People’s Government was the only legitimate government of China and the only legitimate representative of the Chinese people. “This government is ready to establish diplomatic relations with any foreign government that is prepared to comply with the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty.”120 On the same day the foreign minister of the new government, Zhou Enlai, asked the Soviet consul general in Beijing to convey a statement to the government of the USSR. In response to this appeal, on October 2 Andrei Gromyko, the deputy foreign minister of the Soviet Union, sent a telegram to Zhou Enlai stating that his government had decided to establish diplomatic relations with China. Thus, diplomatic relations were established between Moscow and Beijing. With the victory of the Communists a new era in the history and destiny of China began. On the day that the People’s Republic of China was proclaimed, General Tao arrived in Suzhou and called for the unification of the People’s Liberation Army in Xinjiang. On October 13 the city of Hami in Eastern Turkistan was already occupied by the Communists. With the intention of capturing the capital of Xinjiang, Mao Zedong sent an urgent telegram to Stalin with a request to provide planes to transport one division to Urumqi. At a meeting on October 13 the Politburo decided to fulfill Mao’s request. A telegram was sent to the Chinese leader: We think that your decision about the transfer of one division by air transport from Suzhou to Urumqi is correct. Regarding your request about the shipment of 1,000 tons of aviation fuel in Urumqi and 200 tons of it to Hami, we acknowledge that we can supply this fuel to Urumqi and Hami by road, with arrival on November 1 to 3. We need to know your opinion about the possibility of a smooth trip for our automotive columns of fuel on the route from Ghulja via Urumqi to Hami; people to improve service in the airports of Urumqi and Hami and five reserve transport aircraft at the disposal of comrade Peng Dehuai, about which you have asked in your telegram, can be provided from our side by the deadline you specify.121

A week after the exchange of these telegrams, units of the People’s Liberation Army arrived in Urumqi. In a short time, the other major towns in the province also came under their control. After the victory of the revolution, General Zhang was personally offered a high-ranking official position in the government by Mao. “He held a senior position in the government of the five provinces of the Northwest: Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, and Xinjiang.”122 On December 17, 1949, in Xinjiang, the new government of the province and Xinjiang military district was formed. Burhaneddin Shahidi was again reappointed as head of the government, and the three northern

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districts were eliminated as a separate territorial unit. Parts of the national army stationed in these territories became the 5th Corps of the People’s Liberation Army of China. After returning to Beijing, on December 28, 1949, Peng Dehuai presented a detailed report on the situation in the province to Mao Zedong. Regarding the military-political situation, he wrote: After the troops of Tao Zhiyue had been reorganized in the 22nd Army Group, the military district was established; activities are planned for a decisive reeducation of these troops, and the provincial government has been reorganized on a national-democratic principle: the general situation in the province has been stabilized. We believe that there will not be large-scale changes in the units of Tao Zhiyue, but we should not exclude the possibility of minor disturbances. The arrival of the Zhang Zhizhong in Xinjiang has played a significant role in the reorganization and rehabilitation of Tao Zhiyue’s units.123

Thus the “Soviet adventure” in Xinjiang came to an end in Xinjiang after the victory of the Chinese Communist revolution. Moscow chose to hide, even from the Chinese Communists, the secrets of the revolutionary events of May 1943 in the northern districts of the province. Active participants in them were physically eliminated as a result of the plane crash near Irkutsk. The USSR gave the Beijing government the three northern districts and the entire province of Xinjiang, which it used as a means of putting pressure on the regime of Chiang Kai-shek. A new period began in the life of the province. “After 1949, it fell to the Chinese Communists to deal with this legacy of ethnopolitical ‘inflation’ in Xinjiang. They did so by introducing one final adaptation o the Soviet affirmative action model: ethnocultural autonomy would would be territorialized (unlike Sheng’s Austro-Marxist interpretation), but it would not be institutionalized at the level of republic, complete with the right of secession.” 124 In 1955 the People’s Republic of China established the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, which is still in existence. NOTES 1.  Letter of General Zhang Zhizhong to Soviet Consul General in Urumqi Alexandr Savel’ev, July 7, 1947, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 391, l. 120. 2.  Ibid., p. 122. 3.  Ibid., 123. 4.  Ibid., 124. 5.  Letter from Ahmedjan Kasimov and Rahimjan Sabirkhojayev to Soviet Consul General in Urumqi Alexandr Savel’ev, July 12, 1947, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 391, l. 116. 6.  Ibid., 118.



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  7.  Ibid., 119.   8.  The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State, September 17, 1947, NARA, RG 59, Box: 4013, NND 760050, Doc. 761.93/9–1747, p. 1.   9.  See: Accompanying letter from Skvortsov to Baranov, August 19, 1947, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 391, l. 115. 10.  Report of memo to the Central Committee of the Communist Party Soviet Union, 1947, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 46, l. 2. 11.  Ibid., 3. 12.  See: The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State, August 30, 1947, NARA, RG 59, Box: 4013, NND 760050, Doc. 761.93/8–3047, p. 1. 13.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Committee of Economic Research at the Council of Ministers of the USSR,” August 29, 1947, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 38, l. 190; on September 14, 1947, the Politburo had returned to this issue and canceled the decision of August 29. The new decision stated: “The Committee for Economic Research shall henceforth be called the Committee for Information.” See: RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 38, l. 191. 14.  Suggestions of Committee of Economic Research at the Council of Ministers of the USSR in connection with the situation in Xinjiang, September 10, 1947, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 38, l. 202. 15.  Ibid., 202–203. 16.  Ibid., 203. 17.  Ibid., 203. 18.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” September 10, 1947, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 38, l. 190. 19.  Ibid., 191. 20.  Telegram from Fedotov to Molotov, September 10, 1947, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 38, l. 208. 21.  Ibid., 208. 22.  The Consul at Tihwa (Paxton) to the Secretary of State, November 10, 1947, Foreign Relation of the United States. 1947. Volume VII. The Far East, China. Washington, 1972, p. 579. 23.  See: David Wang, The Xinjiang Question of the 1940s, 97. 24.  The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State, May 30, 1947, FRUS, 1947, Volume VII, 556. 25.  Soviet Attitude toward China, November 19, 1947, NARA, RG 59, Box: 4013, NND 760050, Doc. 761.93/11–1947, p. 3. 26.  David Wang, The Xinjiang question of the 1940s, 98. 27.  The Consul at Tihwa (Paxton) to the Secretary of State, October 2, 1948, Foreign Relation of the United States. 1948. Volume VII. The Far East, China. Washington, 1973, p. 749. 28.  Report of memo from Kruglov to Molotov and Beria, September 1947, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 173, l. 171.

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29.  See: Petrov, Miatezhnoe “serdtse” Azii, 479; The Consul at Tihwa (Paxton) to the Secretary of State, September 23, 1949, FRUS, 1947, Volume VII, 573. 30.  See: Petrov, Miatezhnoe “serdtse” Azii, 476. 31.  The Consul at Tihwa (Paxton) to the Secretary of State, October 23, 1949, FRUS, 1947, Volume VII, 573–74. 32.  See: The Consul at Tihwa (Paxton) to the Secretary of State, Ocober 24, 1949, FRUS, 1947,Volume VII, 574. 33.  Ibid., 574. 34.  See: From the diary of Molotov. Receiving Chairman of the National Council of Ministers of the MPR Horlogiyn Choibalsan, September 30, 1947, AVPRF, f. 06, o. 9, p. 2, d. 23, l. 3–5; For more details see: Sergei Radchenko, Choibalsan’s Great Mongolia Dream, 253–54. 35.  See: Morrison, Some Notes on the Kazaks of Sinkiang, 72. 36.  The Consul at Tihwa (Paxton) to the Secretary of State, Semtember 23, 1949, FRUS, 1947, Volume VII, 572–73. 37.  See: Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 329. 38.  Telegram from the General Egnarov to Kruglov, February 14, 1948, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 203, l. 207. 39.  See: Cover letter of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR to telegram Egnarov, February 19, 1948, GARF, f. Р-9401 s/ch., o. 2, d. 203, l. 207. 40.  See: Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 335. 41.  Note from the Embassy of the USSR to Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, May 29, 1948, AVPRF, f. 100, o. 35a, p. 150, d. 3, l. 35. 42.  Aide Memoire from the Soviet Embassy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, July 21, 1948, А AVPRF, f. 100, o. 35a, p. 150, d. 3, l. 40. 43.  Note from the Embassy of the USSR to Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, August 3, 1948, AVPRF, f. 100, o. 35a, p. 150, d. 4, l. 179. 44.  Note from the Embassy of the USSR to Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, August 30, 1948, AVPRF, f. 100, o. 35a, p. 150, d. 3, l. 47. 45.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On measures to strengthen the political and economic situation in the Ili, Altay and Tarbagatai counties in Xinjiang,” April 24, 1948, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 39, l. 32–33. 46.  Ibid., 33. 47.  See: Petrov, Miatezhnoe “serdtse” Azii, 499. 48.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On measures to strengthen the political and economic situation in the Ili, Altay and Tarbagatai counties in Xinjiang,” April 24, 1948, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 39, l. 34. 49  Appendix to Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On appeal to the peoples of Xinjiang,” April 24, 1948, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 39, l. 44. 50.  Ibid., 46. 51.  Ibid., 46. 52.  Ibid., 57–58.



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53.  Ibid., 58. 54.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On the request of the Deputy Secretary of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Manchuria China com.Gao Gang,” August 13, 1948, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 39, l. 100. 55.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On secondment to the liberated areas of China Film Group of the USSR,” December 28, 1948, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 39, l. 152. 56.  See: Appendix to Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On appeal to the peoples of Xinjiang,” April 24, 1948, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 39, l. 45–46. 57.  See: Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 339. 58.  The Consul at Tihwa (Paxton) to the Secretary of State, November 13, 1948, NARA, RG 59, Box: 4013, NND 760050, Doc. 761.93/11–1348, p. 47. 59.  Report of memo from Anastas Mikoian to Stalin, December 7. 1948, AVPRF, f. 0/100, o. 41, p. 278, d. 58, l. 9–10. 60.  Report of memo from Fedorenko to Gromyko, December 17, 1948, AVPRF, f. 0/100, o. 41, p. 278, d.58, l. 12. 61.  Letter from Gromyko to Molotov, December 6, 1948, AVPRF, f. 0/100, o. 41, p. 278, d.54, l. 37. 62.  Ledovskii and Mirovitskaia, Otnosheniia SSSR s Kitaem (1946–1950), 17; For more detail, see: Shen Zhihua, Sovetskie spetsialisty v Kitae (1948–1960), 46–51. 63.  Odd Arne Westad, Struggles for Modernity: The Golden Years of the SinoSoviet Alliance, In The Cold War in East Asia, 1945–1991, Edited by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, D.C., Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 2011, 39. 64.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “Approve the Chinese government’s response to the memorandum of mediation,” January 17, 1949, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 40, l. 1–2. 65.  Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 340. 66.  Isa Yusuf Alptekin, Doğu Türkistan Davasi, 194–95. 67.  See: Ibid., 195–96. 68.  A report on the political and economic situation in the consular district of the Consulate General of the USSR in Urumqi for 1948, 1949, AVPRF, f. 07, o. 21, p. 22, d. 314, l. 9–10. 69.  Isa Yusuf Alptekin, Doğu Türkistan Davasi, 196–97. 70.  Kuznetsov, Islam v politicheskoi istorii Kitaia: 30-e gody XX v. -1949 g., 126. 71.  See: Baymirza Hayit, Türkistan Devletlerinin Milli Mücadileleri Tarihi, 329. 72.  See: Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, 85. 73.  Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 341. 74.  From Robert Hooker to Butterworth, Attachment: «Russia and Xinjiang», June 21, 1949, NARA, RG 59, Box: 4013, NND 760050, Doc. 761.93/6–2149, p. 1. 75.  Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 44.

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76.  Correspondence between Stalin and Mao about the preparation of the visit of Mao Zedong to Moscow, see: Shen Zhihua and Xia Yafeng, Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, 16-20; Shen Zhihua, Sovetskie spetsialisty v Kitae, 51–56. 77.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On China,” January 14, 1949, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 40, l. 12–13. 78.  Cipher telegrams from Mao Zedong to Stalin, January 17, 1949, APRF, f. 39, o. 1, d. 31, l. 75. 79.  Shen Zhihua, Sovetskie spetsialisty v Kitae (1948–1960), 26. 80.  Philip Short, Mao: A Life. A John Macrea/Owl Book. Henry Holt and Company, New York, 2001, 420. 81.  Record of the conversation Mikoian with Zhou Enlai, February 1, 1949, APRF, f.39, o. 1, d. 31, l. 25–26. 82.  Record of the conversation Mikoian with Zhou Enlai. February 4, 1949, APRF, f. 39, o. 1, d. 31, l. 54. 83.  Note of Mikoian to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, Sentember 22, 1960, APRF, f. 45, o. 1, d. 331, l.172; For more information, see: Shen Zhihua and Xia Yafeng, Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, 23–25. 84.  Record of the conversation Mikoian with Mao Zedong, February 4, 1949, APRF, f. 39, o. 1, d. 39, l. 55. 85.  Westad, Struggles for Modernity: The Golden Years of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, p. 54. 86.  Record of the conversation Mikoian with Mao Zedong, Febriary 4, 1949, APRF, f. 39, o. 1, d. 39, l. 56. 87.  Ibid., 56. 88.  From Mikoian to Stalin. The question of Xinjiang. On the independence movement. On the construction of the railway through Xinjiang, February 5, 1949, APRF, f. 45, o. 1, d. 331, l. 101. 89.  Note from Mikoian to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. Draft, September 4, 1958, APRF, f. 45, o. 1, d. 331, l. 280. 90.  Record of the conversation Mikoian with Mao Zedong, February 6, 1949, APRF, f. 39, o. 1, d. 39, l. 80. 91.  Shen Zhihua and Xia Yafeng, Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, 24. 92.  Telegrams from Stalin to Mao Zedong, January 17, 1949, APRF, f. 45, o. 1, d. 331, l. 119. 93.  Philip Short, Mao: A Life, 421. 94.  Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War. The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation, 74. 95.  Record of the conversation Stalin with delegation of the Central Committee of the China Communist Party, June 27, 1949, APRF, f. 45, o. 1, d. 329, l. 5. 96.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On delegation of the Central Committee of the China Communist Party,” June 27, 1949, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 40, l. 204. 97.  For more detail, see: Shen Zhihua, Sovetskie spetsialisty v Kitae (1948–1960), pp. 61–66.



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  98.  Report of the delegation Central Committee of the China Communist Party “On the present stage of the Chinese revolution and the Soviet-Chinese relations,” July 4, 1949, APRF, f. 45, o. 1, d. 328, l. 34.   99.  Record of the conversation of Aleksandr Savelev with Liu Tse-yung, February 7, 1949, AVPRF, f. 0/100, o. 42, p. 288, d. 22, l. 60. 100.  Record of the conversation of Aleksandrr Savelev with Liu Tse-yung, February 11, 1949, AVPRF, f. 0/100, o. 42, p. 288, d. 22, l. 63–64. 101.  Record of the conversation of Aleksandr Savelev with Liu Tse-yung , February 15, 1949, AVPRF, f. 0/100, o. 42, p. 288, d. 22, l. 68. 102.  Record of the conversation of Aleksandr Savelev with Liu Tse-yung, March 5, 1949, AVPRF, f. 0/100, o. 42, p. 288, d. 22, l. 107. 103.  Record of the conversation of Aleksandr Savelev with Liu Tse-yung, June 8, 1949, AVPRF, f. 0/100, o. 42, p. 288, d. 22, l. 129. 104.  Directive Soviet Consul General in Urumqi on the negotiation of trade and economic cooperation, November 10, 1949, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 42, l. 123. 105.  Proposition from Molotov, Mikoian, Vyshinskii to Stalin, February 6, 1950, RGASPI, f. 82, o. 2, d. 1247, l. 139–141. 106.  Letter from Head of Delegation Central Committee of the China Communist Party Liu Shaoqi to Stalin, July 25, 1949, APRF, f. 45, o. 1, d. 328, l. 137–138. 107.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On China,” July 29, 1949, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 40, l. 213. 108.  Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War. The Making of the SinoAmerican Confrontation, 74. 109.  See: Petrov, Miatezhnoe “serdtse” Azii, 499. 110.  See: Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 348. According to Russian author Vasilii Petrov. “the delegation flew on August 27, 1949, to Beijing. During a flight over the Gobi, the plane crashed, killing the passengers and crew. “ See: Petrov, Miatezhnoe “serdtse” Azii, 500. 111.  Valentin Stepankov, Aleksandr Kiselev, Ėduard Sharapov. Chekisty Stalina. SPb. “Neva,” 2006, 581; Obukhov, Skhvatka shesti imperii. Bitva za Sin’tszian, 413. 112.  Isa Yusuf Alptekin, Doğu Türkistan Davasi, 203. 113.  From the first secretary of the CC Cummunist Party of Azerbaijan Imam Mustafayev to Mikhail Suslov, August 16, 1954, APDUDPAR, f.1, o. 89, d. 187, l. 177. 114.  Isa Yusuf Alptekin, Doğu Türkistan Davasi, 205. 115.  See: Ibid., 210. 116.  Justin M. Jacobs, Exile Island: Xinjiang Refugees and the “One China” Policy in Nationalist Taiwan, 1949–1971, 199. 117  For more details about Eastern Turkistan refugees, see: Baymirza Hayit, Türkistan Devletlerinin Milli Mücadileleri Tarihi, 331; Krasil’nikov, Sin’tszianskoe pritiazhenie, 331; Isa Yusuf Alptekin, Doğu Türkistan Davasi, 210; Abdülvahap Kara. Osman Batur ve Şehadeti, Tarih ve Medeniyet, No.37, Nisan 1997, 25–28; Kamoludin Abdullaev. Ot Sin’tsziana do Khorasana. Iz istorii sredneaziatskoi ėmigratsii ХХ veka. Dushanbe: “IRFON,” 2009; Justin M. Jacobs, Exile Island: Xinjiang Refugees and the “One China” Policy in Nationalist Taiwan, 1949–1971, 199–206.

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118.  See: Petrov, Miatezhnoe “serdtse” Azii, 500. 119.  See: Li Chang, The Soviet Grip on Sinkiang, 503. 120.  Russko-Kitaiskie otnosheniia v XX veke. Dokumenty i materialy. Tom V. Kn. 1, 187. 121.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “About telegram Mao Zedong,” October 13, 1949, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 42, l. 70. 122.  The transcript of the Soviet Ambassador in China Nikolai Roshchin with General Zhang Zhizhong, October 31, 1949, AVPRF, f. 07, o. 22, p. 36, d. 220, l. 45. 123.  Reports Peng Dehuai on the situation in Xinjiang, December 29, 1949, APRF, f. 45, o. 1, d. 3348, l. 4. 124.  Justin M. Jacobs, Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State, 234.

Conclusion

This book completes my study of the Soviet Union’s efforts to expand its southern borders during World War II and in the early years of the Cold War. The Soviet government’s policy, covering the area from the Black Sea Straits to the Tian Shan Mountains, focused on eastern Turkish, northern Iranian, and western Chinese territory. In general, the attraction of these Middle Eastern territories inhabited by Muslims was, on the one hand, the access they would give to warm-water seas and, on the other hand, the historical, ethnic, national, and religious characteristics of the people living there. Soviet political strategists referred to the ancient ethnic diversity in relation to Turkey, whereas in Iranian Azerbaijan they faced the problem of a divided nation. At a certain stage of historical development, the idea of uniting the two divided parts of the Azerbaijani people suited the interests of Soviet expansion. Soviet policy in Xinjiang was identical to the policies pursued by Moscow in Iran and Turkey and preceded them chronologically. These policies all were intended to expand the southern borders of the USSR, strengthening Soviet influence in the border areas and spreading Communist ideas in the Middle East. The failure of Soviet policy in Eastern Anatolia was associated with the strong international support for Turkey by Western allies. However, the lack of Soviet success in this region was the result of the decreased Armenian and Georgian population in eastern Anatolia. Unlike Turkey, the Soviet experiments succeeded in Iranian Azerbaijan and Eastern Turkistan: national governments controlled by Moscow were created in both areas. The Soviet Union in its political, economic, and strategic interests used these events to put pressure on the central governments of these countries. The Turkic people living in northern Iran and the local population of Soviet Azerbaijan had a common ethnicity, a common history, and the same national characteristics. The situation in Eastern Turkistan was similar. A memorandum prepared for 253

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Soviet political circles considered Xinjiang from a geographical point of view not to be part of China but to be part of a single geographical space: Soviet Central Asia. Features of the ethnogenesis of the peoples of Eastern Turkistan were reduced to the common ethnic roots of the population of the Soviet Republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, intensified by common religious beliefs, culture, literature, and folklore.1 Events in Iranian Azerbaijan and Xinjiang shared the same scenario. The tactics of inciting the national feelings of the local population, activating people under Soviet influence, organizing a separatist movement by secret directives of the Politburo, and assisting the population of the province with arms and ammunition for opposition to the central government were the same in both places. Sometimes the Soviet leaders’ decisions on Iranian Azerbaijan and Eastern Turkistan not only coincided in time but were similar in content. Soon after the victory over Germany, according to a secret Politburo directive adopted in June–July 1945 in respect to both areas, in order to promote the success of the Soviet policy, the employees of the Party, government bodies, and security authorities of Soviet Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics went on business trips in the provinces under various pretexts. As a rule, the Soviet authorities selected employees of the security agencies and the military and sent them to the region after special training courses, sometimes in the guise of local people with false documents. However, regardless of Moscow’s intentions, at certain times Soviet policy and the aspirations of the local population—which was subjected to national, ethnic, religious, and cultural discrimination—coincided. If the Soviets’ interests in relation to Turkey were the formation of a friendly government, having access to Middle East energy resources, and establishing joint control over the Straits, in respect to northern Iran and western China they also needed oil and other natural resources. Although the Soviet policy of expanding the boundaries in Iranian Azerbaijan and Eastern Turkistan were sometimes subordinated to the desire for oil, the USSR was interested in both. In Xinjiang, besides oil, the Soviets were interested in tin, tungsten, beryl, uranium, other minerals, and nonferrous metals. During the war and in the postwar period the Soviet Union met its need for precious metals at the expense of Eastern Turkistan. 2 To what extent was the policy of expansion of the USSR in Eastern Anatolia, southern Azerbaijan, and the eastern areas related to the beginning of the Cold War? A number of earlier previous assumptions now have given way to a new explanation after the collapse of the USSR, which has provided access to previously secret archival documents. In fact, even before the emergence of the term “Cold War” signs of it began to appear throughout the Middle East along the Soviets’ southern borders. Soviet, American, and British



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diplomats in Ankara, Tehran, Tabriz, Urumqi, Chongqing, and Nanjing, in correspondence, diplomatic memoranda, and secret reports describing Soviet policy in the region, used expressions such as “the war of nerves,” “psychological pressure,” “economic sabotage,” “financial chaos,” and “subversive organization.” These elements soon became the main components that defined the Cold War. Although Xinjiang was geographically isolated from the Western allies in comparison with Turkey and Iran, which were at the forefront in the beginning of the Cold War period, in the postwar world the effects of events there were felt even in the Taklamakan desert and the Altai Mountains. According to Professor Vladislav Zubok, “the success of the struggle for North China after the Second World War, it would seem, began with Stalin.”3 The secret Politburo decision adopted in June 22, 1945, openly stated: “Help the rebels of the Ili district to organize sabotage groups of rebels and to infiltrate them into the cities of Urumqi, Kashgar, Shara-Sume, Chuguchak, Aqsu, and others to conduct sabotage, mainly killing personnel, destroying equipment, and disrupting the communications of the Chinese troops.”4 American ambassador Stuart in May 1947 wrote to the secretary of state about Soviet policy in Xinjiang, saying that the “[c]urrent ‘war of nerves’ which keeps everyone agitated” was the main source for the Chinese fear of the Soviet threat.5 Established in the summer of 1947, the Committee of Economic Research at the Council of Ministers of the USSR, as the main coordination center of the Cold War, proposed that the Politburo “assist Xinjiang guerrillas with arms and ammunition, sending them in secret from the Soviet Union.”6 And in the spring of 1948 the committee gave instructions to the Soviet ambassador in Nanjing “to monitor closely the activities of the Americans . . . and British policy . . . in China.”7 All this was designed to paralyze the activities of the government of Chiang Kai-Shek, who had become a close ally of the West, in Xinjiang (the largest province of China) and to prevent the Anglo-American allies from coming into close proximity to the territory of the USSR. It was a confrontation that included all elements of the Cold War. Three Central Asian republics—the Uzbekistan SSR, Kazakhstan SSR, and Kirghizstan SSR—played an active role in the implementation of Moscow’s policy in Xinjiang. Once the Muslim national movement began in Xinjiang, the Soviet leaders in the Central Asian republics took a number of steps to create the appearance of religious freedom and state independence. In the summer of 1943, at the recommendation of the People’s Commissariat of USSR State Security, the Politburo of the AUCP (B) adopted a resolution “To Allow the Organization of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan,” which in the long term was designed for the events in Xinjiang. Moscow’s decision of 1944 on the establishment of

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the People’s Commissariats of Foreign Affairs in these republics served exactly the same purpose. Leaders of the Central Asian republics participated actively in the preparation and practical implementation of the Supreme Soviet and government bodies’ regulations for Eastern Turkistan. The issue of the “Formation of the Uyghur Autonomous Region in the Kazakhstan SSR” was raised in February 1947 by the Kazakh leaders, to stimulate the Muslim movement in Xinjiang.8 As in the cases of the Iranian and Turkish episodes of the Cold War, the main architect of the Xinjiang episode was Joseph Stalin. The projects to expand the Soviet borders were developed personally by him: the secret Politburo decisions on territorial claims along the southern borders were dictated by him and executed on his personal instructions. Despite Stalin’s solemn promises to respect the territorial integrity of China during the discussions with the Allies and in meetings with Chinese officials, secret documents reveal his intention to separate Xinjiang from China or at least to achieve Soviet control of the northern regions of the province, rich in natural resources. As Nikita Khrushchev recalled, “in this province of China were the real rights of our people.”9 The mastermind behind the plan to separate Eastern Turkistan from China was Stalin. In May 1943 he had made this decision, and the victory over Germany enabled the Soviets to take practical actions, including the proclamation of the Eastern Turkistan Republic, the establishment of national governments in the three regions of the province, and the creation of a national army. Together with the Soviet Union, the Mongol people’s republic played an active role in the Xinjiang events, especially in the uprising of the indigenous population against the Chinese administration. According to David Brophy, “the rebellion, which broke out in the east of the province, drew intervention first from Chinese-speaking Muslims of Gansu, then from Mongolian People’s Republic, and finally from the Soviet Union. Viewed from one angle, it was a restorative uprising, aimed at preserving patrimonial privileges from the Qing. Others preferred to see it as the start of a progressive struggle for national liberation. Its most eye-catching result, the short-lived East Turkistan Republic, embodied a modernizing Islamic vision for Xinjiang, that fit neither Chinese Republican nor Soviet paradigms.”10 The Soviet policy in relation to the Chinese province of Xinjiang in the 1930s and 1940s consisted of two stages. The USSR was directly involved in the suppression of the Muslim movement that swept Eastern Turkistan in 1931–1934: the dictatorial regime of duban Sheng Shicai was established in the province only with Soviet assistance. All the protests of the Muslim population of Xinjiang against Chinese rule in the 1930s were suppressed through Soviet military aid and bayonets, with the Red Army dressed in



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White uniforms. Sheng considered himself the shadow of Stalin in Xinjiang, at the forefront of the struggle against imperialism in the region. In the mid1930s Xinjiang acted as a bridgehead for the USSR in creating the Union of the Struggle against Imperialism in the Middle East. This organization was directed against “imperialist” countries, ranging from the United States, Great Britain, and Turkey to Japan. All Muslim protests in Xinjiang against Chinese rule were interpreted as the work of the Anglo-American imperialists, pan-Turkism, and Japanese militarism. Before and during World War II the Soviet leadership and especially the state security organs justified the strengthening of the Soviet positions in Xinjiang by an external threat. In the belief that this threat might come from Japan, Moscow undermined the roles of Chinese leaders and the provincial governments in Xinjiang and justified strengthening its own position in Eastern Turkistan. In the autumn of 1940, an NKVD inquiry in the Khabarovsk region into “the methods of Japanese intelligence in destroying the guerrilla movement in Manchuria” stated: After being arrested by us, a major Japanese gendarmerie agent, Heh Guan Ho, revealed that in May 1940 two Korean scouts, Choi Gen Hyun and Lin Yong Sen, who were from the 2nd Division of the Kwantung army headquarters, came to Tuanshantszy city. In conversation with the staff of the gendarmerie, they reported that in August of this year short-term courses would be opened in Xinjiang for training highly qualified scouts who had been infiltrated into command and political positions in partisan detachments by various methods. They also reported that these scouts must at any cost get into the USSR for political and military training.11

Apparently, this was an example of the notorious Japanese threat to the Soviet Union, through Xinjiang. Duban Sheng Shicai, as a regional leader of Union of the Struggle against Imperialism, saw Moscow as a guarantor of the existence of his regime in Xinjiang. To gain the trust of Stalin, he came up with the ideas of starting to build communism in the province, launching the Sovietization of China from Urumqi, displacing Chiang Kai-Shek, and then beginning the hunt for the Trotskyites in Xinjiang with keen Bolshevik vigilance. He fully implemented the Party directives received from Moscow.12 Even after the outbreak of World War II, inspired by the partition of Poland and annexation of the Baltic states by the Soviet Union, in January 1941 duban Sheng proposed that Xinjiang become part of the Soviet Union as the sixteenth Soviet republic. The only condition for such a major change in the geopolitical situation in the Middle East would be his appointment by Stalin as the chair of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Xinjiang Soviet Republic. When the German

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army approached Stalingrad in autumn 1942, however, the Soviet Union lost its appeal for Sheng. Stalin never forgave him for this betrayal. In May 1943 the Politburo adopted the decision to remove Sheng Shicai, which was enforced in August 1944. But the problem was not solved by this decision. In the spring of 1943 fundamental changes took place in Soviet policy in relation to Xinjiang. Moscow had been taking an active part in the struggle against the Muslims in the province for ten years but now became the main defender of their national rights in the fight against the Chinese government. This Stalinist adventure lasted five years with a few interruptions, until the Communists took power in China in October 1949. After the victory of the revolution in China, the Soviet leaders subordinated the national interests of the Muslims of Eastern Turkistan to the victory of communism in the region. During talks with Chinese leaders, Stalin advised that “the occupation of Xinjiang should not be delayed,”13 because of the expanding Muslim movement in the Middle East and fear that the British might use this movement against communism in China. According to historian Mingjiang Li, “Mao and his colleagues must have been delighted by the Soviet withdrawal from Xinjiang and Manchuria, for Mao had greatly resented Stalin’s insistence on maintaining Soviet influence in those Chinese territories.”14 However, Stalin did not want to share his Xinjiang secrets with the Chinese Communists. In January–February 1949 the personal emissary of Stalin, Politburo member Anastas Mikoian, during his meeting with Mao Zedong, boldly denied Soviet intervention in any form in Xinjiang event and said that “we don’t support the independence movement of Xinjiang nationalities.”15 In order to avoid creating problems in Sino-Soviet relations on the eve of the victory of the Communist revolution in China, the Soviet airplane carrying the leaders of the Muslim movement of Eastern Turkistan on their way to the first session of the People’s Political Consultative Council of China, at the invitation of Mao and on the advice of Stalin, crashed near Irkutsk. Tragically, the fate of the people who had headed the Muslim nationalist movement in various districts of Xinjiang, following Soviet instructions, was decided in the sky over Irkutsk. Two years earlier the head of the national government of Iranian Azerbaijan, Seyid Jafar Pishevari, who had often reminded the Soviet leaders of the commitments that they had undertaken, was killed in an “accidental” car crash, organized by the Main Intelligence Directorate. Mao Zedong believed that Stalin was not sincere in regard to Xinjiang, Port Arthur, and Manchuria. According to Mao, “three out of Stalin’s ten fingers were rotten.”16 Mao was accusing the Soviet leader of creating semicolonies in China: Port Arthur, Manchuria, and Xinjiang. He blamed the Soviet Union for its tendency toward imperialism in relation to these Chinese territories.



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Mao expressed these thoughts in talks with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in the post-Stalin period in the summer of 1958. Khrushchev asked in surprise: “What, do you think we are Red imperialists?” Mao coldly replied that it was “not about Red or White imperialists. There was a man named Stalin, who took Port Arthur and turned Xinjiang and Manchuria into a semicolony.”17 When Mao said this, he knew very little about the activities of his friend Stalin in Xinjiang. Nikita Khrushchev wrote his memoirs that “after Mao came to power, his relations with Stalin soon became strained at the level of trade and industrial cooperation as well as at the level of ideological. At one-point Stalin concluded a treaty with China for the joint exploitation of mineral resources in Sinkiang (Xinjiang–J.H.). The treaty was a mistake on Stalin’s part. I would even say it was an insult to the Chinese people. For centuries the French, English, and Americans had been exploiting China, and now the Soviet Union was moving in.”18 In order to reveal all aspects of Soviet policy in Eastern Turkistan, like a detective story, it was necessary to wait for the collapse of the USSR. Only then did Stalin’s Xinjiang adventure become a part of history.

NOTES 1.  See: Report of memo to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist, 1947, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 128, d. 46, l. 2–3. 2.  See: On conducting exploration and development of oil areas in Xinjiang in 1941, January 8–June 12, 1941, GARF, f. Р-5446, o. 25а, d. 1266, l. 1–59; On approval of the work plan of the concession “Xinjiang Tin” for 1941, January 4–March 7, 1941, GARF, f. Р-5446, o. 25а, d. 2775, l. 1–12; Report of memo from Anastas Mikoian to Stalin, December 7, 1948, AVPRF, f. 0/100, o. 41, p. 278, d.58, l. 9–10. 3.  Zubok, Neudavshaiasia imperiia: Sovetskii Soiuz v kholodnoi voyne ot Stalina do Gorbacheva, 66. 4.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “On Xinjiang,” June 22, 1945, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 37, l. 145. 5.  The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State, May 30, 1947, FRUS, 1947, Volume VII, 556. 6.  Suggestions of Committee of Economic Research at the Council of Ministers of the USSR in connection with the situation in Xinjiang, September 10, 1947, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 38, l. 203. 7.  Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party “About specifying the Soviet ambassador in China,” May 10, 1948, RGASPI, f. 17, o. 162, d. 39, l. 57–58. 8.  See: Report of memo from the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party Kazakhstan Zhubabay Shayahmetov to the Secretary of Central

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Committee of the Soviet Communist Party Nikolai Patolichev, February 1947, APRK, f. 708, o. 2, d.171, l. 59.   9.  Nikita Khrushchev, Vospominania, Moscow, 1997, 344. 10.  Brophy, Uyghur Nation. Reform and Revolution on the Russia-China Frontier, 20. 11.  Organy gosudarsnvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny. Sbornik dokumentov. Tom I. Nakanune. Kniga pervaia (noiabr’ 1938 g.–dekabr’ 1940 g.). Moscow, 1995, 264. 12.  See: V.Berezhkov. Kak ia stal’ perevodchikom Stalina. Moskva, 1993, 335. 13.  Record of the conversation Stalin with delegation of the Central Committee of the China Communist Party, June 27, 1949, APRF, f. 45, o. 1, d. 329, l. 5. 14.  Mingjiang Li, Mao’s China and Sino-Soviet Split. Ideological dilemma. Routledge, 2012, 22. 15.  Note from Mikoian to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, September 22, 1960, APRF, f. 45, o. 1, d. 331, l.172. 16.  The first meeting between Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Zedong on July 31, in the Khuayzhentan hall, July 31, 1958, APRF, f. 52, r. 1, v. 498, p. 60. 17.  Ibid., 59. 18.  Khrushchev Remembers. With intradaction and notes by Edward Crankshaw, Translated and edited by Strobe Talbott. Lettle, Brown & Company, Boston, 1970, 463.

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Index

Abakumov, Viktor, 186–87, 199, 207–8 Abbasov, Abdulkarim, 104, 128, 153, 161, 190–92, 216, 227, 241 Abdullah (Abdul), Niyaz, 26, 36, 47, 62–63, 67 Abdul Karim, Ottoman Prince, 21, 26 Abdurahmanov, Abdujabar, 98 Afghanistan, 9, 232 Agranov, Iakov, 54, 56 Akulov, Ivan, 22 Alam, Muhammad Niyaz, 23 Ali Akhun bey, 28 Alikhan, Muhammad, 17 All–Union Communist Party (Bolshevik), AUCP (B), 3, 74, 84, 92, 95–96, 105, 107, 198–99, 204–5 Alma–Ata (Almaty), 38, 64, 106–7, 125, 145, 157, 174, 177, 182, 187, 200, 204–5, 241 Alptekin, Isa Yusuf, 14–15, 48, 63, 77, 120, 126, 128, 163, 168–69, 190, 198, 200–202, 205, 208–11, 230–31, 242–44, 249, 251, 264 Altai (Ashan), 4, 8, 13, 23, 25–26, 29, 31, 33, 34–35, 60, 82–84, 94, 101, 104–6, 110–14, 118–19, 125, 127, 129, 135, 138, 142, 147–48, 152, 154, 180, 185, 191, 199, 204, 218, 220–23, 227–28, 244, 255, 265;

Altai operative group, 161; Altai rebels, 129, 198; Altai regiments, 36, 199; Altai Volunteer Army, 30, 34; Altaian Kazakhs, 112, 135 Amir, Alaiddin, 186 Andreev, Andrei, 54 Anglo-American Allies, 2, 255; AngloAmerican imperialists, 257 Anti-Imperialist Society, 53, AntiImperialist Frontline, 53; antiimperialist policy, 64; AntiImperialistic Union, 70 Armenian, 6, 253 Apresov, Garegin Abramovich, 31, 34, 36–41, 43–45, 50–3, 57, 60, 64, 70–71, 76; consul general, 42, 64, 70 April Revolution, 24, 73, 89; Six Great Policies,25, 102, 108 Aqsu, 23, 26, 28, 33–34, 36–38, 55, 63, 66, 72, 86, 109, 127, 135, 138–39, 141, 145, 147, 155–56, 180, 185, 191, 197, 216, 232, 256; Bay-Aqsu region, 145; Aqsu-Uchturfan, 34; Maralbashi-Aqsu, 36 Astana, 18 Atalay, Besim, 205 Azizi, Sayfuddin, 126, 190, 192, 216, 241–42 273

274

Index

Babajan, Salihjanbay, 104 Badayshan (Baytashan), 82, 202 Bai Bahtiyar, Sultan bey, 28 Bai, Ji-Li, 59 Baki Niyaz Darga, 18 Bakulin, Ivan, 83–4, 86, 89–91 Ban Dong, 72 Barmin, Valerii, 8, 13, 208, 263 Bauman, Karl, 20 Beijing (Beiping), 14, 174, 240, 241–42, 244–46, 251, 269 Bekhteev, Nikolai, 23 Beria, Lavrentii, 3, 4, 68, 75, 100, 102, 105, 110, 112, 119, 121, 125, 127, 130–31, 134–43, 146–49, 152, 154– 58, 161, 163–69, 181–82, 187, 203, 211, 247, 264 Berzin, Ian Karlovich, 22–3, 47 Bikmurzin, H. K., 91 Bing, Liu, 43 Bingwen, Su, 27 Brophy, David, 9, 14, 16, 25, 45–48, 256, 260, 264 Bufang, Ma, 148, 237 Bughra, Muhämmäd Imin, 18, 23, 38, 126, 190, 201, 243, 264 Byzov, Aleksei, 187 Central Asia, 6, 14, 15–16, 21, 26, 30–31, 44, 46, 49, 54, 63, 94, 98, 101–103, 106, 119, 121, 135, 154, 164, 174, 203, 210, 215, 218, 254–55, 264–68, 272; Central Asian Bureau, 20–21; Central Asia and Kazakhstan, 254–55; Central Asian military district, 59; Central Asian Religious Department, 205; Central Asian Republics, 174, 210, 256; Central-Asian University, 57 Central Spiritual Directorate of Muslims, 98; Religious Department of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, 98 Cheng, Ye, 244

Chengxiang, Ma, (Muhammad Osman), 243 Chiang, Ching-kuo (Jiang Jingguo), 143–44, 162, 171–72 Chiang, Kai-shek, (Jiang Jieshi), 1, 7, 19, 44, 60, 68, 71, 74, 77, 81, 87, 90, 92–94, 102–103, 108, 123, 127, 132, 143–45, 148, 150–51, 157, 159–60, 162–63, 166, 171–72, 174–75, 177– 79, 185, 190, 193–94, 200, 222–23, 226, 229–31, 239, 242–44, 246, 255, 257, 264, 270; China’s Destiny, 127 Chibaev, Petr Andreevich, 218 China, 1–10, 13–14, 16–24, 26–30, 32–33, 36–37, 39–41, 44–49, 53–54, 57–64, 66–67, 69–72, 74, 77, 81–82, 84–93, 96–8, 100–104, 106–7, 109– 13, 115–20, 123–29, 131–49, 151– 54,156–70, 171–80, 182–83, 185–86, 188–98, 200–14, 216, 218–62, 264–71; Chinese-American relations, 196; China army, 4, 22–23, 27, 35, 129–31, 133, 135, 137, 139–42, 145– 46, 149–51, 154–56, 179–81, 221, 230–31; Chinese-British relations, 196; Chinese Civil War, 12, 227, 270; Chinese government, 7, 24, 33, 45, 60–62, 67–68, 81–3, 92, 94–95, 103, 111, 123, 125, 128–30, 133, 135, 141, 144, 147, 149–50, 152, 154, 156, 158–60, 162, 171–73, 176, 181, 188–90, 200, 213, 221, 223–24, 226, 229–30, 234, 258; ChineseMongolian border, 111; Chinese province of Xinjiang, 2, 16, 105, 176, 256; Chinese Cavalry Regiment, 36; Chinese Muslims,233, 235; Chinese-Soviet Cultural Relations, 192; Chinese Republic, 189, 194, 256; Chinese-Soviet relations, 196; Chinese-Soviet friendship society, 196; North China, 7, 255; Western (West, West of ) China, 2, 3, 45, 47, 84–85, 100, 110, 114, 118, 121, 198, 271



Index

Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 4, 7, 72–74, 91, 102, 126, 153, 172, 196, 222, 229–30, 232, 234–36, 241; Chinese Communists, 7, 65, 70, 73, 75, 108, 136, 157, 175–76, 178, 193, 220, 222, 226, 229–33, 236, 242–44, 246; see also: Communist Party of China (CPC), 72, 87, 102, 119, 172, 177–78, 193, 227, 233, 236–37, 239– 42; Chinese Communist revolution, 6, 222, 246, 258 Choibalsan, Khorlogiyn, 14, 111–12, 118, 121–22, 129, 154, 206, 221, 248, 269 Chongqing, 83, 87–88, 90, 92–94, 96, 101–103, 107–8, 115–18, 123, 125– 26, 128, 131–33, 136, 143, 150–51, 153, 156–57, 160, 172, 174–79, 200, 234, 255 Chongxi, Bai, 136, 234 Chuguchak (Tacheng), 27, 31, 110, 138, 142, 148, 176, 180, 189, 198, 220, 255 Chu Hain-ming, 143 Churchill, Winston, 145 Clubb, Edmund, 93, 96, 101, 115–18, Cold War, 1–2, 6–7, 10–12, 14, 119, 205, 218, 249, 253–56, 264–71 Committee of Economic Research, 216–17, 219, 247, 255, 259 Communist International, 16–17, 24, 39, 46–48, 73–75, 91; Eastern Secretariat of Comintern, 20–22 Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU), 3, 65, 73, 214–15, 217, 223, 234, 239, 241, 255 Communist University, 24 Council of People’s Commissars (CPC) of the USSR, 5, 31, 41, 50, 59, 72, 84, 86, 98, 100, 102, 105, 114, 142, 172, 178, 227, 233, 257 Dairen (Dalian), 149–50 Damolla, Abdullah, 28

275

Damolla, Sabit Abdulbaki, 18, 23, 28, 32, 38, 49, 105 Damolla, Umar, 190 Daoming, Bu, 132 Dehuai, Peng, 240–41, 245–46, 252 Dekanozov, Vladimir, 4, 13, 75, 78–80, 87, 93, 95–96, 100, 104, 114–17, 177, 206, 270 Dobashin G. S., 124 Dorf, David, 21, 47 Dumpis, Max, 38 Dungan (Chinese-speaking Muslim), 17, 19–23, 26, 30–31, 34–35, 37, 58–59, 61, 63, 65–66, 71–72, 109, 113, 120, 131, 140, 190, 263; Dungan Division, 59, 62, 67; 36th Division, 58–59, 71 East Asia, 6, 12, 249, 270; East Asia Turki Republic, 129, 131 East China Railway (ECRW), 143, 149; Chinese Changchun Railway,150 Eastern Turkistan (Xinjiang, Sinkiang), 1–10, 13–14, 16–17, 19–25, 28–35, 38, 41, 45–46, 48–51, 53–54, 59, 61, 63, 66–70, 72, 75, 77–81, 83, 90, 93, 96, 98–100, 104–9, 113, 119, 125– 26, 128–30, 133–40, 145, 147–48, 151–65, 167–69, 171–76, 179–83, 185, 188, 190–91, 201–4, 212, 215, 217–19, 230, 236–38, 241, 243–45, 248, 251–52, 253–54, 256–59, 264– 65, 267–69, 270–71 Eastern Turkistan National Army,133, 137–38, 140–41, 147–49, 151–52, 154–55, 160–61, 180 Eastern Turkistan Republic, 7, 123, 125, 129, 131, 133, 138, 140, 142–43, 145, 148, 154, 156, 160, 162, 171, 190, 195–96, 198, 208, 241–42, 256 Egnarov, Vladimir, 4, 106–7, 130–31, 134, 137–42, 154–56, 158, 160–61, 164–69, 179–82, 185–88, 207, 217– 18, 222, 248 Eliava, Shalva, 26

276

Index

Emreoglu, Salis, 190 Enlai, Zhou, 177–78, 206–7, 233, 239, 245, 250, 270 Evseev, I. G., Consul general, 150, 152, 157, 177, 206 Ezhov, Nikolai, 27, 56, 64, 70 Fang Lin (Deng Fa), 73–75 Fedin (Fedinov), Andrei, 64, 66 Fedotov, Petr, 120, 185, 217–18, 240, 247 Fitin, Pavel, 105 France, 16, 82, 230 Frinovskii, Mikhail, 30, 36, 49, 62, 66 Frunze (Bishkek), 35, 41, 57, 106, 124 Ganbari, Kasymjan, 105 Gang, Gao, 237, 249 Gansu, 19–21, 33, 55, 62–63, 91, 94, 101, 148, 201, 240, 243–45, 256 Gauss, Clarence, 96, 101, 115–18 Gendin, Semen, 72 Georgia, 5–6, 253 Germany, 5, 16, 38, 64, 87, 203, 254, 256 Ghulja (Yining), 18, 25–26, 42, 58, 66, 85, 110, 113, 123–26, 129–33, 136– 42, 147, 151–52, 154–60, 162–64, 166, 168, 170, 173, 176, 178–80, 182, 184–90, 194–95, 197–98, 200, 205, 208, 212, 214, 215–20, 222–24, 227, 229, 231–32, 237, 240–42, 245 Great Britain (British), 16, 20, 28–29, 36, 41, 45, 49, 53, 63, 69, 82, 95–96, 104, 124, 140, 173, 177, 179, 194, 196, 205, 226, 230, 236, 255, 257–58,261, 269; British-American, 110, 179, 189, 193, 254; British imperialists, 26, 87 Grinko, Gregorii, 31 Gromyko, Andrei, 228–29, 245, 249 Groups for National Revival, 98–99, 204 Guomindang (Nationalist Party— GMD), 7, 19, 20, 24, 73, 87, 93,

102, 105, 108, 112, 118–19, 124, 126, 129–31, 137–40, 142–43, 145, 147–48, 150, 153, 157, 160, 164, 172, 175, 177–79, 190, 193, 196–97, 200, 202, 220–22, 226, 228–30, 232, 234–37, 239, 243–44 Hai-Quan, Gan, 150 Hait, Baymirza, 14, 38, 46–51, 67, 77–80, 113–14, 164, 208–9, 249, 251, 263 Hakimbeg (Haji) Khoja, 126, 187 Hami (Kumul), 17–20, 23, 32, 37, 55, 72, 91, 113, 191, 244–45, Hansao, Liang, 157 Hasanov, Kadyr, 107 Heh, Guan Ho, 257 Heyward, Harold Dewey, 83–84 Huang Dong, 72 Hurley, Patrick Jay, 150, 164, 167–68 Hushan, Ma, 59, 62–66 Hyun, Choi Gen, 257 Iagoda, Henrich, 22, 31, 35, 54 Ikramov, Akmal, 57 Ilakhun, Nurdun Bey, 105 Ili, 110, 113, 120, 123–30, 132–38, 141, 143, 146, 148, 152, 157, 160, 163, 166, 173, 182, 185, 191, 200, 204, 214–15, 219, 221–25, 227–28, 231–32, 234, 240–42, 244, 248, 255, 264, 268 India, Indians, 9, 17, 19, 38, 62, 66–67, 200, 236 Insanuddinzadeh, Sadyg bey, 28 Iran, 110, 183, 186, 194–95, 205, 208, 231, 253; Northern Iran, 110, 118, 121 Iranian Azerbaijan, 100, 176, 183, 186, 194–95, 205, 211, 242, 253–56, 258, 264–69, 271; South Azerbaijan, 5, 11, 111, 118, 121, 195; Soviet Azerbaijan, 253–54 Iris khan, 82 Irkutsk, 238, 241–42, 246



Index

Islamov, Umar, 17, 45 Ismail Akhun, 18 Ivchenko, A., 228, 238 Jacobs, M. Justin, 9, 10, 14, 17, 30, 45–46, 75, 162, 168, 171, 201–2, 205, 209, 211, 244, 251–52, 266 Japan, 20–21, 24, 26–27, 31, 33, 36, 38, 41, 47, 53, 60, 63–64, 70, 72–73, 81, 84, 87, 89, 92, 96, 102, 111, 123, 144, 149, 174, 200, 257; JapaneseChinese war, 58 Jian, Chen, 6, 12, 103, 119, 125, 163, 236, 249–51 Jiaxiang, Wang, 237 Jilu, Lin, 91 Kadyrov, Ahmed, 199 Kaganovich, Lazar, 53–56, 59, Kalibek, 131, 220–22, 225 Kanat, Muhitdin, 61, 105 Kao Shu-kang, 192 Kara Khoja, 23 Karakash, 23, 191 Karashar, 25, 37, 179, 180, 244 Karpenko, Fedor, 84 Kasimi (Kasimov), Ahmetjan, 104, 126, 128, 153, 155–56, 161, 182, 184–85, 188, 190–91, 197, 201, 208–10, 213– 16, 224, 227, 241–42, 246, 267, 270 Kayum Khan, Vali, 202–3 Khalfa, Tömür, 17 Karakhan, Lev (Levon), 19, 22, 46, 49 Karim Hajı, 155 Kashgar, 9, 14, 17–20, 23, 26, 28, 33–38, 42–43, 49, 53, 61–64, 66–67, 85, 91, 104, 109, 113, 125, 127, 135, 138–41, 145, 148, 152, 155, 176, 180, 185, 189, 191, 197, 198, 216, 222–23, 255, 265, 267 Kazakhstan, 9, 13–14, 21, 54, 57, 64, 98, 105–6, 112–13, 118, 139, 174, 200, 203–4, 210–11, 215, 217, 254, 259; Kazakhstan SSR, 199, 225, 255–56; Kazakhs, 17, 22, 25, 36–37,

277

82–83, 88, 97–99, 101, 104, 106–7, 109, 111–13, 120, 126, 129–31, 134–35, 142, 153–54, 156, 184, 187, 190, 199, 201–2, 204, 215, 220, 222, 231, 235, 243, 256, 264, 268 Kennan, George, 154, 168, 175–77, 206 Khanbabyev, Anvar, 161 Khoja Hani, Abdullah Ishan, 28 Khoja Niyaz Haji, 18–20, 24–26, 28, 31–33, 38, 46, 61, 67 Khojayev, Masud Sabri, 128, 190, 197, 200–2, 204–5, 212, 215–16, 222, 230–31, 242–44 Khorgos, 54, 86, 124, 131, 156, 187 Khotan, 18, 23, 28–29, 35, 43, 58–59, 62, 66–67, 72, 85, 109, 113, 139, 191 Khrushchev, Nikita, 256, 259, 260, 267 Koktogay, 83, 85, 112, 135, 148, 220–21 Kovalevskii, Colonel, 146 Kirghizistan, 54, 98–99, 105–6, 125, 204, 217; Kirghiz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR), 32; Kirghizes, 17, 22–23, 36, 66, 97, 101, 107, 109, 120, 129–30, 143, 153–54, 181, 203, 215, 225; Kirghizistan Soviet Socialist Republic (Kirghiz SSR), 3, 98–99, 200, 255 Kobulov, Amaiak, 103 Kobulov, Bogdan, 152 Kosygin, Aleksei, 105, 226 Krasilnikov, Vladimir, 30, 186, 188, 193, 232 Krestinskii, Nikolai, 54 Kruchinkin, Nikolai, 30, 34, 66 Kruglov, Sergei, 179, 180–83, 186–87, 199, 203, 207–8, 211, 217–18, 222, 247–48 Kulatov, Turabay, 98 Kurban, Koday, 200 Kurdiukov, Ivan, 90, 177 Kurmal, Imin, 18 Kurmal, Sadyk, 18 Kuznetsov, Boris, 106

278

Kuznetsov, Fedor, 225 Kyi, Shoiu, 242 Langfang, Аleksandr, 4, 106, 155–56, 158, 161, 168–69, 180–82, 188, 207 Ledovskii, Andrei, 6, 8, 12–13, 119, 205–6, 249, 267 Lenin, Vladimir, 24, 39, 57, 71 Li, Mingjiang, 258, 260, 268 Lín Biao, 73–74 Lippmann, Walter, 2, 10, 270 Litvinov, Maksim, 54, 69 Liqun, Deng, 237, 240–41 Liu, Tse-yung, 238–39, 132, 150, 157, 177, 192, 206, 238–39, 251 Lizu, Shao, 179 Loganovskii, Mechislav, 22 Lozovskii, Solomon, 83 Lozhechkin, Michael, 84 Mandellaub, Max, 203, 211 Mahsum, Abdurauf, 104, 153 Mahsum, Karim, 198 Mahsun, Muhamedjan, 104 Makhdum, Abdulkarim khan, 28 Malenkov, Georgii, 98, 100, 131, 147, 157, 159, 164, 167, 174, 206–7, 241 Malik, Iakov, 199, 217 Malikov, Hadi, 58 Mamyshev, Konstantin, 106 Manas, 23, 34, 136, 141–42, 146, 179 Manchuria, 6, 19, 27, 32, 72, 93, 143, 150, 176, 178, 229, 235, 249, 257– 59; Manchurians, 27; Manchurian Voluntary Army, 30, 33, 38 Mao, Zedong, 6–7, 17, 72–73, 91, 127, 136, 229–30, 232–37, 240–41, 244– 46, 250, 252, 258–59, 260, 269–71 Mao, Zemin, 72, 91 Maralbashi, (Maral–Bashi), 35–36, 66, 191 Marshall, George, 172, 175, 177 Marxism-Leninism, 42, 44, 72–73, Marxist-Leninist, 7 Meiling, Song, 93

Index

Mengchun, Liu, 157, 190, 201, 231, 234 Merkulov, Vsevolod, 98, 100 Middle East, 1, 125, 236, 253–54, 257–58 Mikhailov, Fedor, 101, 104, 114, 118–19 Mikoian, Anastas, 4, 12, 65, 100, 157, 159, 164–65, 193, 209, 225, 228–29, 233–36, 239, 249–51, 258–60, 268 Millward, A. James, 86, 101, 164, 167– 68, 231, 268 Mironov, Sergei,72 Mirovitskaia, Raisa, 6, 12, 75, 205–6, 249, 268 Molotov, Viachelav, 3–5, 11, 31, 39–41, 44, 48, 51–52, 59–60, 65, 68–69, 71–74, 77–80, 86, 89–95, 98, 100, 102, 110, 115–17, 120–21, 130–31, 134, 138–40, 142–47, 149, 151–52, 154, 157, 159, 164–68, 174, 179–82, 185, 187, 199, 202–3, 206–8, 211– 13, 215, 218, 221, 225, 229, 239, 241, 247–49, 251 Mongolia, 82, 85, 101, 104–5, 109, 111–13, 118, 121–22, 127, 129, 137, 143, 145, 154, 172–73, 194, 202, 206, 221, 234–35, 239, 241, 248, 268–69; Mongolian-Kalmyks, Mongol Cavalry Division, 141–42, 145; Inner Mongolia, 83, 173, 202; Outer Mongolia, 86, 144–45, 150, 172, 176; People’s Republic of Mongolia (PRM), 135, 137, 143–44, 149, 172, 174, 194–95, 256 Monunov, Iskhak bey, 133, 155, 182, 187, 190, 199, 224, 227, 241 Muhitov, Maksudakhun, 18 Munir, Sonur, 186 Muzipov, 187 Naiguang, Gan, 152 Nanjing, 32, 40, 42183–84, 191, 193, 194–97, 214, 219, 223, 226, 229, 231, 242, 255; Nanjing government, 32–33, 39–40, 42, 72, 202, 228–30, 232



Index

Nikishov, Ivan, 32 Nogaybay Batyr, 82 Noreiko, Nikolai, 67 Nur Ahmad, 28 Osman (Ospan) Islam, Batyr, 23, 82–83, 101, 104, 106, 111–12, 114, 118, 121, 129, 131, 135, 142, 154, 190, 197–99, 201–2, 209, 220–22, 224– 25, 231, 244, 251, 265–67 Ovdiienko, Ivan, 74–75, 81, 88 Pan-Islamism, 24, 236 Pan-Turkism, 21, 205, 232, 257 Paniushkiun, Aleksandr, 92, Pappengut, Pavel, 23 Patolichev, Nikolai, 199, 210, 260 Paxton, John Hall, 93, 200, 218–21, 228, 247–49 Peiyuan, Zhang, 25 People’s Commissariat of Defense of the USSR (PCD), 57, 66, 68, 114 People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR (PCFA), 19, 26, 42, 50, 54, 59, 66, 72, 75, 78, 82, 113–14, 118, 256 People’s Commissariat of Foreign Trade of the USSR (PCFT), 42, 99, 139 People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR (NKVD), 3–4, 30, 57, 59, 64, 66–68, 70, 77, 99, 100, 105, 130, 135, 139, 148–49, 166, 169–70, 267 People’s Commissariat of State Security of the USSR (NKGB), 3–5, 98, 105–6, 117, 170, 241, 255 People’s Liberation Army of China, 227, 236–37 People’s Republic of China (PRC), 233, 239, 244–46 Petrov, Apollon, 143–44, 152, 166, 174, 179, 196–97, 205–7, 210 Petrov, Vasilii, 8, 13, 65, 69, 70, 77–79, 164–65, 209–210, 248, 251–52, 269

279

Piatnitskii, Joseph, 21, 46–47 Pirmuhammad, Omarjan, 105 Pishevari, Seyid Jafar, 186, 194–95, 242, 258 Political-Consultative Conference, 177–78 Polynin, Fedor, 31, 50, 58, 269 Port Arthur (Lüshun), 143, 149–50, 176, 258–59 Potemkin, Vladimir, 72 Qasym Haji, Muhammad, 28 Qurban Darga, 18 Qun, Zhang, 179 Qu Wu, 157, 192, 242 Radchenko, Sergey, 14, 100–101, 111– 12, 118, 121–22, 206, 248, 269 Ralnikov, Colonel, 181 Red imperialists, 259 Robertson, Walter, 156, 168–69, 170, 206 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 102–103 Roshchin, Nikolai, 223, 252 Rostovskii, Sergei, 16, 45–46, 48 Rozybakiyev, Abdumajid, 107 Ruziyev, Mashur, 54, 107 Rybalko, Paul, 58 Sabirkhojayev, Masud, 127 Sabirkhojayev, Rahimjan, 104, 126, 153, 156, 184, 190, 209–10, 213–16, 246 Sadykov, Zunun, 56 Saidzadeh, Yunis bey, 28 Salih, Darga, 17–18 Sarper, Selim, 5, 11 Savelev, Aleksandr, 192, 195–98, 212– 14, 216, 221, 228, 231, 238, 251 Sayfullayev, Sogdulla, 161, 227 Schieber, Walther, 203, 211 Sen, Lin Yong, 257 Shahidi, Burhaneddin (Burhan), 185, 190, 202, 216, 230–32, 238, 242, 244–45

280

Index

Shaoliang, Zhu, 87, 93, 108, 124, 131, 155 Shaoqi, Liu, 236–37, 240, 251 Shara-Sume, 23, 91, 101, 135, 138, 176, 189, 220–21, 255 Shark Hakikati, 107 Shaowu, Ma, 19, 36 Shayahmetov, Zhumabay, 199–200, 203–5, 210–11, 225, 259 Sheng-Gui, Ma, 59 Sheng Li, 103, 119 Sheng Shicai (Duban), 7, 13–14, 17, 23–28, 30–36, 38–45, 48, 50–54, 57–61, 64–65, 67–75, 77–82, 86–96, 100–108, 111, 113, 115–120, 132, 174, 176, 235, 246, 256–58, 264, 271 Sheng Shiji, 57, 90, 92, 94 Sheng Shi Jun, 57 Sheng Shiqi, 57, 65, 88–91, 116 Sheng Shi Ying, 57 Shesterikov, Nikolai, 104, 119 Shibayev, Petr, 84 Shimanov, Constantin, 84 Shizhang, Mahmut, 32, 61–62 Shijie, Wang, 151, 179, 202, 211 Short, Philip, 233, 250, 269 Shvernik, Nikolai, 105 Shuren, Jin, 17, 19–24, 29, 46–47 Shushan, Zhao, 240 Sgurbayev, Dalelkhan, 153–54, 190, 199, 220, 227, 241 Simon, John, 20 Sino-Soviet friendship society, 241 Skvortsov, Nikolai, 98, 100 Skvortsov, Tikhon, 94, 214, 247 Slavutskii, Мikhail, 19, 40 Smith, H. Horace, 93, 113, 115–16, 118, 122, 131–32, 164, 181, 194, 207–8 Smith, Walter, 183–84, 186, 195, 208–10 Sokolnikov, Gregorii, 26, 35 Soviet-Chinese agreement, 143, 150–51, 153, 172, 198; Sino–Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, 147–49 Stakhanov, Nikolai, 146, 166

Stalin, Joseph, 3–4, 7, 10–12, 24, 37–44, 48, 51–52, 65, 69–74, 78–80, 86–90, 92–93, 100, 102, 105, 110–12, 115, 119, 121, 123–25, 127, 130–31, 134– 36, 138, 140, 142–47, 149, 151–52, 158–59, 163–68, 172, 174, 180–81, 187, 193, 205–6, 209, 212–13, 225, 228, 232–33, 235–40, 242, 245, 249– 51, 255–60, 264–65, 268, 270–71; “Father of Nations”, 159 Stomoniakov, Boris, 56, 62, 64 Suleyman Batyr, 83 Sun Yat–sen (Sun Yixian), 69, 72, 144 Svanidze, Alexander, 38, 40–43, 59 Surbayev, Sufi Akhun, 145, 147, 155 Suslov, Mikhail, 105, 178, 188–89, 204, 208, 226, 251 Tabit, Kary, 197 Tajikistan (SSR), 204, 216–17; Taipov, Zunun, 105, 133, 153 Taiwan, 10, 14, 45, 108, 211, 244, 251, 266 Tanqiu, Chen, 91 Tanguts, 17 Tarbaghatai (Tacheng), 26, 37, 104, 110, 125, 127, 135–36, 138, 142, 145, 148, 152, 185, 191, 196, 198, 204, 220–23, 227, 229 Tashkent, 12, 21, 32, 63, 106, 107, 187, 205, 267 Tatar, (Tatars),17, 107, 109, 121, 131, 201, 232, 271 Temür Niyaz, Mullah, 18 Thompson-Glover, John William, 20, 49 Tian Shan, 24, 94, 113, 130, 200, 253 Timoshenko, Semen, 86, 89 Tokhtabayev, Aziz, 187 Torgout, 17–18, 130 Törä, Abdulkhayri, 156 Törä Alikhan (Shakirkhojayev), 4, 104, 113, 125–27, 134, 136–41, 145, 148, 153, 156, 158–60, 165, 168–69, 171, 182, 186–87, 208; “Sadyg”, 155–56, 158, 179, 182–83



Index

Trotskyite, 64–65, 70, 88, 90, 125, 257 Truman, Harry, 6, 145, 151, 172 Turdi, Ibrahim, 161 Turfan, 17–18, 23–25, 29, 32, 34, 37, 113, 189, 198, 216 Turfani, Polat, 201 Turkey, 1–2, 5–6, 9–11, 16, 20. 28, 47, 201–2, 244, 253–55, 257, 263, 267, 269; Ottoman, 9, 26, 47 Turkic-Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkistan (TIRET), 7, 16, 28, 30, 32; “Muslim People’s Republic”, 18; National Assembly of Eastern Turkistan, 28–29, 33 Tursun, Akhun, 197 Tursun, Nabijan, 86, 101, 231 Uchturfan, 34, 66 Ulaanbaatar (Ulan-Bator), 19, 111, 154, 173 Undasynov, Nurtas, 98 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Soviet Union, 1–10, 16–17, 20–23, 25–28, 30–31, 33, 37–45, 47–48, 50, 53–61, 63–66, 68–73, 75–76, 81–82, 84–92, 94–97, 99–107, 109–12, 114, 117–18, 121, 123, 125–26, 128–30, 131–32, 134– 138, 142–54, 156, 159, 162, 166, 170, 172–78, 182–83, 186, 188–99, 200–203, 205, 206, 208–10, 212–33, 235–36, 238–42, 244–49, 253–59, 271; Red Army, 30–31, 34, 39, 47, 49, 50, 59, 66–67, 69, 72, 87, 89, 134, 138, 221, 256; Soviet-Chinese relations, 7–8, 93, 102–3, 172–74, 195, 237, 251; Soviet-Mongolian relations, 239 United States of America, 5–6, 38, 49, 86–87, 93–96, 101–3, 107–9, 113, 125, 128, 136, 143, 153–54, 156, 163, 173, 175, 177, 179, 181, 183, 186, 193–94, 196, 209, 213, 218–20, 226, 229–30, 236, 239, 247, 257, 262, 267

281

Urumqi (Tihwa), 20, 23, 25, 26, 29– 31, 33–38, 40, 42–43, 50, 54–64, 66–67, 69–70, 72–74, 81–93, 95– 96, 100, 103–4, 108, 110, 113–18, 118, 120, 122–26, 128, 131–32, 136, 138, 140, 142, 148, 150–53, 155–62, 170–71, 173–74, 176–80, 182–84, 186, 189–96, 198, 201–2, 204–5, 209–10, 212–13, 215–16, 218, 220–22, 228, 231–32, 234, 238–46, 249, 251, 255, 257, 262, 266, 270; Urumqi agreement, 171, 182–83, 188, 195, 204, 231 Urutskii, Semën, 62, 64 Usmanov, Mirkasim, 121, 271 Uyghur(s), 1, 8–10, 13–14, 16–24, 26–27, 32, 36, 45–46, 49–50, 53, 59, 61–62, 66–70, 97–99, 104, 107, 109, 113, 126, 128, 131, 133, 139–40, 145, 153, 156–57, 182, 184, 192, 196, 199–205, 210, 214–15, 225, 235, 244, 266–67; Uyghur autonomous region, 199–200, 256; Uyghur Communists, 20; Uyghur Division (army), 61–64, 67; Uyghuristan, 59; Uyghur-Kazakh forces, 88, 243; Uyghur nation, 14, 16, 45–48, 260, 264; Uyghur uprising, 20–22, 26, 68; Uyghur Committee for National Revolution, 23; Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomy Region, 10, 246 Uzbekistan (Uzbekistan SSR), 9, 19, 31, 34, 50, 57, 64, 70, 98, 103, 105– 6, 139, 174, 187–88, 204, 206, 217–18, 225, 255; Uzbek(s), 17, 37–38, 98–99, 104, 107, 109, 121, 125, 200–1, 204, 216, 218, 225 Vagov, Aleksei, 98, 100 Victor Hoo, 143 Voroshilov, Кliment, 22, 26, 35, 39–41, 44, 48, 51–52, 64, 66, 68–74, 79–80, 86, 89, 115

282

Index

Vyshinskii, Аndrei, 4, 125, 127, 134, 135–36, 147, 151, 152, 159, 163–65, 168, 239, 251

Xiuying, Chen, 88–89, 91, 116 Xueliang, Zhang, 60 Xuepei, Peng, 214

Wallace, Henry, 102–4, 119 Wang, David, 6, 12, 14, 51, 115–16, 119, 210, 247, 270 Wang, Shen-shan, 157 Ward, Robert, 158, 163, 167–69 Wei, Daoming, 143 Wenbo, Bai, 190 Wenhao, Weng, 179, 193 Wenlong, Liu, 24 Wenyi, Deng, 157 Westad, Odd Arne, 6, 12, 229, 234, 249–50, 270 Willkie, Wendell, 103 World War II, 1–2, 7, 17, 39, 47, 81, 83, 86–87, 91, 98, 105, 132–33, 173, 203, 242, 253, 255, 257, 261; Great Patriotic War, 105

Yang Jie, 69–70, 83 Yarkent, 28, 67 Yolbars khan (Kazi), 18, 127, 244 Yong, Li, 25, 257 Yuen, Ping, 146 Yu, Hong-jun, 179 Yuldashov, Gany, 105 Yunus Haji, 61 Yusupov, Usman, 98, 100, 180, 167, 188–89, 204, 218, 225 Yuxiang, Feng, 179

Xia, Yafeng, 168, 235, 250, 271 Xibaipo, 4, 233 Xinjiang, (Sinkiang), 1–10, 13–14, 16–17, 19–25, 28–35, 38, 41, 45–46, 48–51, 53–54, 59, 61, 63, 66–70, 72, 75, 77–81, 83, 90, 93, 96, 98–100, 104–9, 113, 119, 125–26, 128–30, 133–40, 145, 147–48, 151–65, 167–69, 171–76, 179–83, 185, 188, 190–91, 201–4, 212, 215, 217–19, 230, 236–38, 241, 243–45, 248, 251–52, 253–54, 256–59, 264–65, 267–69, 270–71; Appeal to the Peoples of Xinjiang, 224–25, 248– 49; Association for Promoting Peace in Xinjiang, 217, 219; People’s Revolutionary Party, 161, 188, 227; Xinjiang Muslims, 4, 130, 169, 205; Union of Revolutionary Youth, 227; Xinjiang Zhibao, 91 Xiaoyuan, Liu, 121, 129, 150, 164, 167, 173, 206, 268 Xilian, Song, 190, 220–21, 230–31

Zakirov, Abdullah, 161 Zatolokin, 142 Zaynulin, K. Z., 146 Zhanym khan Haji, 83, 190 Zhaoxian, Peng, 157 Zhu De, 244 Zarif Kari, 28, 38 Zhdanov, Andrei, 188, 189, 204–5, 207–8, 211 Zhen, Wang, 242 Zengxin, Yang, 19, 46 Zengshan, Wang, 190 Zhi, Luo, 241 Zhihua, Shen, 14, 168, 233, 235, 249– 50, 271 Zhiyue, Tao, 231, 242, 246 Zhizhong, Zhang, 150–52, 156–58, 174–75, 175, 179–81, 184–85, 190, 192–93, 195–98, 200–201, 206–7, 210, 212–14, 216, 230–31, 234, 240, 242–43, 245–46, 252 Zhongxin, Wu, 108–9, 124 Zhongying, Ma, 19–21, 25–26, 30–31, 34–39, 43, 58–59, 62, 65–66, 71, 80 Ziwen, Song, 132, 138, 143–45, 149, 166–67, 172, 179, 193 Zlatkin, Ilia, 25 Zubok, Vladislav, 171, 205, 255, 259, 271 Zuretdin Akhun, 18

About the Author

Jamil Hasanli is an Azerbaijani historian. He was a professor at Baku State University and formerly a Visiting Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He is an author of numerous books that have been published in Azerbaijan, the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, Turkey, and Iran. He is a member of the Turkish Historical Society. In the past he was an advisor to the President of Azerbaijan and served two terms as a member of the Azerbaijani parliament. In 2013, he was a candidate for the Azerbaijani presidency. In 2015, he received the Ion Ratiu Democracy Award from the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

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