South African Jews in Israel: Assimilation in Multigenerational Perspective [Hardcover ed.] 0803255381, 9780803255388

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S o uth Afric a n J e w s i n I s r a e l

Studies of Jews in Society Harriet Hartman, series editor

South African Jews in Israel

Assimilation in Multigenerational Perspective Rebeca Raijman

University of Nebraska Press Lincoln and London

© 2015 by the Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska All rights reserved Manufactured in the United States of America

Publication of this volume was assisted by the University of Haifa and the Kaplan Centre for Jewish Studies and Research at the University of Cape Town. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Library of Congress Control Number: 2015958683 Set in Arno Pro by M. Scheer. Designed by Rachel Gould.

In memory of Mr. Mendel Kaplan, who envisioned and supported this project To the South African olim and their families To my grandsons, Omri, Ido, and Jonathan, the second generation of the Raijman family in Israel

Contents

List of Illustrations

ix

Preface

xv

1. Introduction

1

2. Methodology

41

3. The Process of Migration

53

4. Linguistic Assimilation

83

5. Economic Assimilation

131

6. Identificational Assimilation

171

7. Conclusion

211

Appendix: Letter Sent

231

Notes

233

Bibliography

247

Index

263

Illustrations

Figures 1. Number of Jewish immigrants to Israel per year, 1948–2010

17

2. Trends in South African immigration to Israel

37

3. Hebrew proficiency before arrival among olim, generation 1.0

89

4. Formal Hebrew training among olim, generation 1.0

92

5. Current Hebrew proficiency among olim, generations 1.0 and 1.5

95

6. Current Hebrew proficiency among olim, generation 1.0, by time of arrival

96

7. Language preference, by generation

105

8. Language spoken with parents in Israel, generation 1.5

108

9. Language spoken with parents in Israel, generation 2.0

108

10. Language spoken with siblings in Israel, generation 1.5

110

11. Language spoken with siblings, generation 2.0

110

12. Spouse’s country of origin, by generation

113

13. Language spoken currently with spouse, by generation

114

14. Language spoken currently with children, by generation

114

15. South African friends, by generation

118

16. Other English-speaking friends, by generation

118

17. Israeli-born friends, by generation

119

18. Language spoken currently with friends, by generation

119

19. Language mostly used when listening to the radio, by generation

121

20. Language mostly used when watching television, by generation

121

21. Language mostly used when watching plays at the theater, by generation

123

22. Language mostly used for reading newspapers, by generation

123

23. Language mostly used for reading books, by generation

125

24. Current English proficiency, generations 1.5 and 2.0

125

25. Average years of formal education, by gender and generation

136

26. Academic degree holders, by gender and generation

138

x

List of Illustrations

27. Years of labor market experience, by gender and generation

139

28. Labor force participation rates, by gender and generation

143

29. Self-employment, by gender and generation

146

30. Weekly work hours, by gender and generation

147

31. Full-time employment, by gender and generation

148

32. Distribution by economic sector of South African men in Israel

151

33. Distribution by economic sector of South African women in Israel

151

34. Occupational distribution of South African men in Israel

157

35. Occupational distribution of South African women in Israel

157

36. Occupational prestige of South Africans, by gender and generation

159

37. Earnings distribution among South African men, generation 1.0

160

38. Earnings distribution among South African women, generation 1.0

160

39. Earnings distribution among South African men, generations 1.5 and 2.0

161

40. Earnings distribution among South African women, generations 1.5 and 2.0

161

41. Percent earning above 7,500 nis /month by gender and origin

162

xi

List of Illustrations

42. Expected monthly earnings in social services, by gender, occupation, and language

167

43. Expected monthly earnings in advanced producer services, by gender and language

168

44. Respondents identifying as Jewish and as Zionist

175

45. Religious orientation in South Africa and in Israel, generation 1.0

178

46. Respondents identifying as Israeli and as South African, by generation

182

47. Attachment to South Africa, by generation

183

48. Comparative identity patterns, by generation

184

49. Comparative identity patterns, by generation

184

Tables 1. Immigrants arriving in Israel under the Law of Return, by country and arrival time

19

2. Population in Israel by citizenship status, origin, and migration status

24

3. Arrival of migrant workers with permits, by country of citizenship and gender

26

4. Demographic characteristics of South Africans in Israel, by generation

45

5. Residential patterns of South Africans in Israel, by generation

47

6. Residential distribution of South Africans in Israel

48

7. Selected characteristics of interviewees

50

8. Selected socioeconomic characteristics of South Africans before arrival, generation 1.0

56

xii

List of Illustrations

9. Push factors: reasons for leaving South Africa, by time of arrival

60

10. Pull factors: reasons for choosing Israel as a destination, by time of arrival

66

11. South African olim: other countries considered, reasons for not going

70

12. Involvement in Jewish life in South Africa by generation 1.0 olim

74

13. Sources of information, by period of arrival

78

14. ols regression predicting Hebrew proficiency among generation 1.0

101

15. Language spoken in the family according to mother tongue of spouse

116

16. South Africans’ perceptions of the extent to which English is advantageous

126

17. Reasons for assigning importance to children’s knowledge of English

129

18. Years of education and percent of academic degree, by gender and origin

137

19. Language proficiency, language use at work, and linguistic attributes of work

140

20. Modes of labor market incorporation, by gender and origin

144

21. Workers in advanced producer services and social services, by place of origin

152

22. Occupational distribution, by gender and origin

155

23. ols regression predicting occupational prestige

164

24. ols regression predicting earnings

166

25. Frequency of synagogue attendance and religiosity in South Africa and Israel

177

xiii

List of Illustrations

26. Likelihood of feeling more Israeli than South African and of feeling more Israeli than Jewish

188

27. Central features of South African and Israeli cultures

201

28. Patterns of intergenerational assimilation of South Africans in Israel

214

29. Selected domains of assimilation, by generation and immigrant group

222

30. Paths of assimilation, by immigrant group

227

xiv

List of Illustrations

Preface

In 2007 Mr. Mendel Kaplan, a well-known leader in the South African Jewish community and the Zionist movement worldwide, approached the Institute for Immigration and Social Integration at Ruppin Academic Center expressing his interest in conducting a study of the South African community in Israel, which until then had been invisible to social scientists in Israel. Prof. Moshe Semyonov, chair of the Academic Committee of the institute, asked me to prepare a research proposal; it was accepted and financed through the Kaplan Centre for Jewish Studies at Cape Town University in South Africa. This study (which started at the beginning of 2008) has been a fascinating personal and academic journey for me. I found the life stories and experiences of South African olim very similar to my own experiences as an olah from Argentina who arrived in Israel in 1985. So strong was this feeling that sometimes I sensed that each and every one of the interviewees was telling my own story—both as a Jew living in the Diaspora and as an olah living in Israel. Indeed the South African experience of aliyah and klita (migration and integration) in Israel resembles in some way the experiences of other communities that share with South African Jewry a firm attachment to Judaism and Israel in consequence of a resilient Jewish education in the Diaspora. This research is the result of the contributions, help, and support of

many people and institutions. I am deeply indebted to Prof. Milton Shain, director of the Kaplan Centre for Jewish Studies, Cape Town University, who provided support and encouragement during these years of data collection and analysis and the writing of the book. Special thanks go to Shirley Bruk, who was our statistical consultant for the questionnaire and sample design of the study, and to Janine Blumberg, for her administrative support during the last phase of the project. This study involves many discussions and interviews with representatives of Telfed, the South African Zionist Federation in Israel. I am particularly grateful to Sidney Shapiro (director) and Dorron Kline (deputy director). Without their help and support throughout these years this study would not have been possible. They provided us with important information that helped us to better understand the particularities of the South African community in Israel. I am grateful to the Ruppin Academic Center for giving me the possibility to conduct this research, especially to Anat Kamer, who was in charge of the financial details of the project. My thanks go also to Prof. Shosh Arad (president of the Ruppin Academic Center) and Revital Poleg (director of Resource Development and External Relations), who were involved in the early stages of the project approval. Good research depends on the quality of data collection. I thank Research Success Technologies, under the direction of Dr. Ezra Kopelowitz, and Eitan Malchior, who oversaw the fieldwork required for the interviews. Nor could this study have gone forward without the participation of many excellent graduate students of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at the University of Haifa in Israel. Most of all I wish to express my sincere thanks to Miri Schwartzvald, my research assistant and collaborator during the project. She was involved from the start in all stages and also wrote her master’s thesis on the topic of social assimilation of South African olim using data collected in this study. Chapter 6 xvi

Preface

was written with her collaboration. I also owe a debt of gratitude to Orit Avital, who conducted and transcribed the interviews with South African olim; to Ariane Ophir, for her help with data preparation and analysis in the last stage of the research; and to Rona Geffen, for her assistance during the preparation of the final manuscript. I am grateful to Murray Rosovsky, Oran Moked, and Ursula Wokoeck, for taking care of language editing of the chapters in the book. A special thank-you goes to the University of Haifa for financial support in the editing of the book and to my colleagues at the Department of Sociology and Anthropology for their encouragement along a lengthy and sometimes difficult road. A special thank-you goes to my friend Lilach Lev-Ari (Oranim College), for her good cheer and enthusiastic support during the process of writing the book and finding a publisher. I want to thank Prof. Harriet Hartman, the series editor of the Association for the Social Scientific Study of Jewry, and the Scientific Board, who believed that this book could be an important contribution to the assj program of publications at the University of Nebraska Press (unp ). I want to thank Kristen Elias Rowley, acquisitions editor of the unp , for her dedicated support, help, and guidance throughout the whole process of review and publishing of the book. Likewise I appreciate the useful guidance given in the technical preparation of the manuscript by Marguerite Boyles, editorial assistant. I want to express my deep appreciation to Ann Baker and Debra Corman for their guidance, help, and assistance during the process of copyediting. I am sure that their knowledge and experience contributed to improve the final manuscript. Last, but not least, I want to thank the reviewers of the manuscript, whose comments, suggestions, and advice helped me to improve the book, strengthen it, and enhance its contribution. A final word of thanks goes to the olim who participated in this research. xvii

Preface

Without their collaboration this study would never have seen the light. I believe that this book celebrates the South African olim and their high achievements in Israeli society. Mr. Mendel Kaplan passed away in 2010. It is a great sadness that he did not live to read the results of the study he envisioned. This book is dedicated to his memory.

xviii

Preface

S o uth Afric a n J e w s i n I s r a e l

Chapter 1

Introduction I would like to start this book with the story of Shelly, a South African immigrant who arrived in Israel in 1986 when she was in her early twenties. Talking to us about her reasons for coming to Israel, she said: I am Jewish, Israeli, of South African origin. My grandparents arrived in South Africa from Lithuania in the twentieth century after World War I. My grandfather came to work and saved money to bring his wife and three kids, and they established their home in Johannesburg. We lived in a Jewish environment, within the Jewish community. I went to a Jewish school, to the synagogue on Shabbat. All my friends were Jews. . . . I went to [the Zionist youth movement] Bnei Akiva. This is the reason I am here today, because of the way I was brought up. It sounds idealistic, but what I was nursed on during my childhood and adolescence is what brought me to Israel. My Jewish identity was so central in my life. . . . There were also reasons for leaving South Africa. When I was growing up I was told that I would have to leave the country. . . . “This is not your place. . . .” We were told that someday something is going to happen [about apartheid]. . . . I remember it feeling like Judgment Day. . . . I could not live in South Africa. I was born and grew up

there, but I always felt that we, as Jews, did not belong. We were 120,000 people in a sea of 30 million. . . . Jews and also white. . . . I never felt like I could stay and feel at home. So mostly it was important [for me] to go to a place where I could feel at home. Shelly is part of the South African Jewish community in Israel, and her story epitomizes the stories of many more who left South Africa in search of a different life away from their country of birth. Their European ancestors left for South Africa during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, in consequence of religious and political persecution in their countries of origin (principally Lithuania). Over the years they succeeded in building a vibrant Jewish community in their new South African home. Yet despite their economic success and affluent lives in South Africa, many Jews feared for their future. The unstable political climate of the apartheid system and the perception of negative changes in a post-apartheid era drove almost half of them to leave, looking for a safer environment in which to reestablish their lives. Second- and third-generation South African Jews thus became first-generation immigrants in Australia, England, and Israel, among other countries. Despite the voluminous literature on the Jewish community in South Africa, very little is written on South African Jewish diasporas in general and on South African Jews in Israel in particular.1 In Israel, immigration studies written during the last two decades have focused almost exclusively on groups arriving from “countries in distress,” mainly the former Soviet Union (FSU) and Ethiopia. These groups arrived from countries in which organized Jewish communities were weak or barely existed; their immigration was actively promoted and organized by the State of Israel. On arrival they faced socioeconomic disadvantages in the receiving society; numerous studies have accordingly documented their difficulties in “making it” in Israeli society (for FSU immigrants, see Al-Haj 2004; Ben-Rafael 2

Introduction

et al. 2006; Remennick 2007; for Ethiopian immigrants, see Shabtay 1999, 2001; Anteby 2003; Ben-Eliezer 2004; Offer 2004, 2007). Less academic effort has been devoted to immigrants arriving from countries in which vibrant Jewish communities had developed and flourished over time, such as France, Britain, the United States, Canada, Argentina, and South Africa. The reason for this neglect is probably their noncontroversial and fairly effortless incorporation into Israeli society, which was largely selfevident. Their high levels of human capital and supposedly ideological (Zionist) reasons for moving to Israel potentially enabled them to integrate smoothly into its society. Our study aims to probe this gap and contribute to the literature on the sociology of immigration in Israel in several ways. First, we focus on an uncommonly powerful immigrant group of English-speaking immigrants, namely South Africans and their offspring. Because English is an international language widely used in Israeli society, English-speaking immigrants are likely to be under much less social pressure to improve their Hebrew skills than are non-English-speaking immigrant groups, and they are often able to convert their human capital into high socioeconomic outcomes. Moreover, given the status of English as an international language, our case study may carry important implications for understanding the expected assimilation trajectories of other Anglophone immigrants both in Israel and in other non-English-speaking societies. Second, our study is unique in its multigenerational approach. Despite consensus on the importance of multigenerational analysis for studying the long-term impact of immigration, most studies in Israel have focused on the integration of first-generation immigrants; key changes (in economic, social, linguistic, and identity outcomes) that occur down the generations have been neglected, an important part of the immigration story thereby being left untold. Third, most previous studies on immigrants in Israel focused on a single 3

Introduction

dimension of assimilation, specifically labor market outcomes (e.g., Raijman and Semyonov 1998; Semyonov, Lewin-Epstein, and Yom-tov 2001; Stier and Levanon 2003; Offer 2004; Semyonov, Raijman, and Maskileyson 2014), language proficiency and use (e.g., Ben-Rafael, Olshtain, and Geijst 1998; Mesch 2003; Remennick 2003a; Ben-Rafael et al. 2006; Ben Rafael and Ben Rafael 2013; Raijman, Semyonov, and Geffen 2014), or identity (e.g., Al-Haj 2002; Anteby 2003; Remennick 2003b, 2004; Raijman and Pinsky 2011, 2013; Amit 2012; Amit and Bar-Lev, 2014). In our study we consider several benchmark outcomes of assimilation (economic, social, linguistic, identity) that bear on and reflect South African immigrants’ integration in Israel. Overall the book not only contributes to empirical knowledge about immigrants in Israeli society but also advances our theoretical understanding of the social mechanisms underlying the integration of various generations of immigrants into a variety of societal domains. Finally, most extant studies on immigrants’ assimilation provide either quantitative or qualitative evidence on modes of integration. Our methodologically mixed approach, combining quantitative data of a representative sample of South African Jews in Israel with in-depth interviews, affords a rich and more complete picture of the complex process of immigrants’ assimilation. As we shall see, the qualitative methods prove the validity of the survey findings but also form the framework in which the quantitative findings can be interpreted. The purpose of this chapter is threefold. First, a conceptual framework allows analysis of immigrants’ assimilation, in reference to prevalent theories in the field including classical assimilation, neo-assimilation, and segmented assimilation models.2 Second, an overview of immigration flows to Israel describes the role of the state in promoting the immigration and integration of its Jewish newcomers. Third, the context of origin from which the South African immigrants arrived is portrayed. The history of the Jewish community in South Africa and its unique position as a white 4

Introduction

minority-within-a-minority is important for a better grasp of the newcomers’ motives for immigrating and their integration into Israel.

Theoretical Background In this section we review the theoretical postulations in the debate among the most prominent scholars in the field of immigrant assimilation, as well as the empirical findings supporting each.3 Three main periods can be identified in the development of theories on immigrant assimilation (see Brubaker 2001). The first (1920–65) was dominated by classical assimilation models; the second (1965–85) was characterized by more pluralist perspectives, the rise of identity politics, and a turn away from the term “assimilation.” In the third period (after 1985) scholars edged back toward the concept of assimilation, proposing new models to encompass diverse paths to immigrants’ integration into their host societies. The classical or canonical assimilation model was proposed by Park and Burgess (1921) and further developed by Warner and Srole (1945). The model was originally developed to understand the ways of integration into American society of European immigrants (in the early twentieth century) and their descendants. Based on the notion of linear progression, this model proposed that length of residence, coupled with the emergence of new generations, would lead to the progressive narrowing of economic and social differentials between immigrants and the native-born population. By this model, first-generation immigrants—foreign-born and socialized into their countries of origin—are not expected to achieve social and economic parity with the native-born population, since they must often overcome barriers such as discrimination, learning a new culture, and learning a new language. By contrast immigrants arriving as young children and members of the second generation (native-born children of immigrants) are already socialized into the host country’s culture and are 5

Introduction

therefore expected to narrow or close the gap between themselves and the native population in terms of social and economic outcomes. Following this logic, the third generation (native-born children of native-born parents) can be expected to differ little from the majority native population. In other words, by the canonical account, assimilation is a progressive and irreversible unidirectional process. The view of assimilation as a linear progress persisted in the work of Gordon (1964), who expanded the concept of assimilation by delineating a typology highlighting the multidimensionality of assimilation. The typology has seven assimilation stages: cultural, structural, civic, marital, attitude-receptional, behavior-receptional, and identificational. According to Gordon, the sequence starts with acculturation (adoption of the cultural patterns of the host society); next follow structural assimilation (incorporation into primary groups of the dominant group), civic assimilation,4 and intermarriage—all these progressing in the absence of prejudice and discrimination in the core society (attitude-receptional and behavior-receptional assimilation). The endpoint of the process is identificational assimilation (self-image as unhyphenated American). In Gordon’s view, acculturation can occur without being followed by other forms of assimilation. Structural assimilation, however, has been singled out as the catalyst preceding and stimulating other forms of assimilation. Despite its contribution to the study of assimilation, Gordon’s model has been criticized for its lack of specification of the causal mechanisms giving rise to assimilation (Alba and Nee 1997) and for being both analytically and normatively Anglo-conformist (Brubaker 2001). Still embedded in the canonical account, Gordon’s assimilation is portrayed as a one-way process, in which immigrants adopt the core culture of the host society, which itself remains unchanged by this process. The dominant (or reference) group into whose culture and social life the immigrants are expected to assimilate was in this case the white Anglo-Protestant middle class. 6

Introduction

Acculturation and assimilation would inevitably end in the total disappearance of all traces of ethnicity after several native-born generations have embraced the values of mainstream society. In the second period (1965–85) the theoretical and empirical literature on immigrants’ integration was characterized mainly by pluralist perspectives, reacting against the classical model of assimilation and emphasizing ethnic persistence in a variety of ways (Brubaker 2001). Some argued that while assimilation may have been the dominant trend among the descendants of European immigrants of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,5 the sequence of assimilatory processes was not always as linear and irreversible as suggested by the canonical approach. Research suggested that even the fourth or later generations of European descendants preserved cultural symbols of ethnic group membership, which according to the classical assimilation model should have disappeared (Alba 1990; Waters 1990). The straight-line notion of assimilation was therefore criticized for “underestimating the staying power of ethnicity” (Kazal 1995, 453) and for discounting the possibility that ethnicity may persist or periodically become revitalized among the younger generations in response to societal conditions in the host country (Glazer and Moynihan 1970; Yancey, Ericksen, and Juliani 1976). These scholars showed that even successive native-born generations maintained some connection with their ancestors’ identities and did not completely give up their ethnic identities (see also Alba 1990; Waters 1990). These expressions of ethnicity were defined as “symbolic,” as they emerged, among other avenues, through such symbols as food, festivals, and vacation visits to countries of origin (Gans 1979). Since the late 1980s (third period) scholars have shown renewed theoretical interest in assimilation, especially with respect to the “new’ second generation, the children of post-1965 immigrants arriving mostly from Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Africa (see, e.g., Portes and Zhou 1993; Alba and Nee 1997, 2003; Perlman and Waldinger 1997; Zhou 1997a, 7

Introduction

1997b; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). While becoming one of the most fruitful research topics during the last three decades, the incorporation of the children of the new second generation has generated a lively debate among scholars in the field (see, e.g., Haller, Portes, and Lynch 2011a, 2011b; Alba, Kasinitz, and Waters 2011). Two main approaches can be identified in the current literature: the segmented assimilation model (Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes and Rumbaut 2001) and the neo-assimilation model (Alba and Nee 1997, 2003). The segmented assimilation model challenges the canonical account of assimilation that was formulated to understand the experiences of immigrants arriving in the United States from Europe until 1930. These white European groups were able to go through processes of intergenerational mobility, facilitated by an expanding industrial economy that provided steady employment and earnings that eventually brought about a rough parity of life chances across many ethnic groups in America (Alba and Nee 1997). In light of the socioeconomic, racial, ethnic, and religious diversification of the post-1965 immigrant flows to America, Portes and associates assert that a homogeneous and linear approach to the assimilation process obscures the social mechanisms whereby immigrants and their children integrate into society. Besides the change in immigrants’ racial and socioeconomic composition, opportunities for earning a living and achieving upward mobility have changed dramatically over the past quarter century, as economic restructuring has led to the replacement of “good jobs” in the manufacturing sector by low-level service jobs that do not offer comparable wages, stability, or mobility ladders. Unlike their pre-1930 white European counterparts, recent second-generation members are therefore at risk of experiencing no, or even downward, mobility (Portes and Zhou 1993). In this very different scenario, the segmented assimilation model suggests that the children of post-1965 immigrants are likely to follow one of three 8

Introduction

paths leading to diverse socioeconomic outcomes. The first is mainstream assimilation via acculturation and integration into the majority group in the host society. This path has also been labeled straight-line or linear assimilation, meaning that after two to three generations in the host society, immigrants’ descendants are usually virtually indistinguishable from the rest of society in their behaviors and socioeconomic characteristics. This path of assimilation has been described as characterizing the offspring of white European immigrants through various periods of immigration to the United States. The second path postulated by the model is assimilation into a disadvantaged minority status, or “downward” assimilation, meaning transition to poverty and joining the underclass. This path entails socioeconomic disadvantage, particularly for groups that are visibly distinctive from the majority and whose parental and community-based resources are low. An example of this type is the assimilation of black Caribbean youths into U.S. society, where they are perceived as part of the native African American minority (Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes 1995; Zhou 1997a, 1997b). On the third path, labeled selective acculturation or parallel integration, members of an immigrant minority are able to achieve economic advancement while deliberately preserving their ethnic values and community solidarity. Examples of this path are members of immigrant groups that enjoy well-developed ethnic economies, such as Chinese Americans and Cuban Americans (Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes 1995). Which path is chosen depends on individual factors (education, language skills, age at arrival), family background (family type; parents’ human, social, and cultural capital), and specific contexts of reception (e.g., policies of the host society, racial stratification, spatial segregation, economic opportunities, community organization) (Zhou 1997a; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Empirical research conducted by Portes and associates confirms a pattern of segmented assimilation in the second generation, with a 9

Introduction

significant proportion experiencing downward assimilation, especially among Mexican Americans and black Caribbeans (see, e.g., Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Haller, Portes, and Lynch 2011a, 2011b). In contrast to the segmented assimilation model, sociologists Alba and Nee (1997, 2003) argue for the need of a theory of mainstream assimilation, albeit one that overcomes the problematic aspects of classical approach. The neo-assimilation model recognizes the host society’s complex socioeconomic and cultural stratification, which allows diversity in immigrants’ incorporation patterns (Alba 2008, 40). However neo-assimilationist scholars adduce empirical evidence to suggest that the modal form of incorporation of the new second generation is mainstream assimilation. For example, empirical evidence on the second generation in the United States demonstrates substantial socioeconomic advancement (in terms of educational achievements and average family income) by most of its members, even by children of low-wage immigrant groups—far more than was expected in the early 1990s (Hirschman 2001; Waldinger 2007; Alba 2008; Kasinitz et al. 2008). According to Alba and associates, these studies have found little evidence of second-generation downward assimilation, providing support for the mainstream-assimilation modality (Alba, Kasinitz, and Waters 2011). Alba argues that the foremost contribution of segmented assimilation theory lies in delineating the path of downward assimilation and identifying some of its determinants. He contends that despite its contributions, segmented assimilation is not adequate as the single dominant theory, mainly because the theory takes race as an exogenous constraint on assimilation trajectories, therefore it cannot address “potential changes in the American ethno-racial hierarchy and their consequences for the second generation” (Alba, Kasinitz, and Waters 2011, 765), and most importantly does not address the varied boundary mechanisms of mainstream assimilation (Alba 2008, 37). 10

Introduction

According to Alba and Nee (2003), assimilation is a two-way process of boundary negotiation conducted by immigrants and natives. Formerly impermeable boundaries are crossed in a growing number of ways by both immigrants and natives, moving in both directions with increasing frequency. Ultimately the boundaries become indistinct, so that categorical divisions among ethnic groups are eliminated and social categories are reconfigured. This has resulted, for example, from friendship, kinship, and intermarriage between immigrants and natives and from sharing social and residential spaces. In theoretical terms, how boundary blurring occurs should be understood and the factors influencing its frequency and pace identified (Alba and Nee 2003; Massey and Sanchez 2010, 13). Based on this unique contribution, Alba (2008) concludes that neo-assimilation theory is a necessary complement to the segmented assimilation approach; “both approaches have overlapping explanations for the varying levels of success of the second generation, but contribute insights that are distinct” (Alba, Kasinitz, and Waters 2011, 763). Differences between the neo-assimilation and segmented assimilation models notwithstanding, both theories signaled a shift from the canonical models, introducing a revised concept of assimilation (see Brubaker 2001). This was from a holistic approach, which conceptualized assimilation as a one-way process toward adopting the “core culture” of a supposedly monolithic host society, to a “disaggregated approach that discards the notion of assimilation as a single process, considers multiple reference populations, and envisions distinct processes occurring in different domains” (Brubaker 2001, 543–44). In other words, the new concept avoids the ethnocentric stance of the canonical approach, replacing it with an agnostic stance concerning the likelihood, forms, and desirability of assimilation (Alba and Nee 1997, 159; Brubaker 2001). Common to the old and new theories on assimilation is their reliance on intergenerational change as a key to understanding the modes of 11

Introduction

incorporation of immigrants and their descendants into the host society: “the unit within which change occurs—the unit that undergoes assimilation—is not the person but a multi-generational population” (Brubaker 2001, 543). Generational differences, defined in terms of nativity (of self and parents), age, and life stage at arrival, are expected to have a significant effect on the assimilation of immigrants and their descendants in all domains: educational and occupational attainment, patterns of language proficiency and use, and ethnic identity (Rumbaut 2004). Though the assimilation of immigrant groups can be evaluated only over several generations, comparative multigenerational studies are rare in the literature on immigration, mostly for want of adequate data. Most research on contemporary immigrant integration focuses on the first generation (those arriving as adults) or on the second generation (native-born children of immigrants, mostly schoolchildren and teenagers). However, the real test of immigrants’ assimilation along generational lines involves a comparison of the first generation’s socioeconomic outcomes with those of subsequent generations, when the latter are adults already active in the labor force, with their own families and social networks (Gans 1999).6 Taking these considerations into account, our study contributes to the existent literature by comparing three generational cohorts of adult Jewish South Africans in Israel: those arriving as adults (the first generation), those arriving as children (the one-and-a-half generation), and those born in Israel (the second generation). This multigenerational comparative research design provides a unique opportunity to test prevalent theories of immigrants’ assimilation in their host societies. Almost every immigrant assimilates into the receiving society to some extent, be it linguistically, culturally, socially, or economically. The question, however, concerns the degree and pace this occurs, in which precise forms, and in which specific domains (e.g., language, identity, culture, labor market, intermarriage). Furthermore each assimilation domain is supposed 12

Introduction

to spill over onto the multiple domains of immigrants’ incorporation. Thus assimilation in one dimension (social, cultural, linguistic) can significantly affect assimilation in other domains (e.g., the labor market) by shaping occupational opportunity structures in the host society (Chiswick 1998; Constant and Zimmermann 2008; Hwang, Xi, and Cao 2010). Likewise occupational attainment can affect linguistic assimilation and identities, as immigrants’ socioeconomic status affects their sense of belonging to the new society and provides opportunities to improve their language skills (Chiswick and Miller 2001; Van Turbegen, Maas, and Flap 2004; Amit 2012; Raijman, Semyonov, and Geffen 2014). To date very little research has simultaneously addressed several domains of intergenerational assimilation. This leaves a significant gap in our knowledge about immigrants and their adaptation to the host societies. In this study we attempt to close this gap by taking an intergenerational perspective to examine the socioeconomic assimilation of South Africans in Israel in the economic arena, in the cultural realm with regard to language acquisition and patterns of language use, social networks, and intermarriage, and in terms of identity.7 By carrying out a wide-ranging and systematic comparison across generations and across multiple dimensions, we aim to contribute to the theoretical and empirical understanding of the process of immigrants’ integration into host societies.

Israel as a Country of Immigration Israel is a society of immigrants and their offspring. At the end of 2012, 27% of the Jewish majority were foreign-born, 32% were Israeli-born to immigrant parents (second generation), and 41% were Israeli-born to Israeli-born parents (third generation) (Central Bureau of Statistics 2013, table 2.8, 108). The high percentage of foreign-born population situates Israel at the top of the list of major traditional countries of immigration such as Australia (27%), Canada (16%), and the United States (14%) and 13

Introduction

well above immigration countries in western Europe such as France (12%) and Germany (12%) (United Nations 2013). Over the years the State of Israel has made unparalleled efforts to actively recruit Jewish immigrants (43% of the world’s Jews currently reside in Israel; Central Bureau of Statistics 2013, table 2.11, 115), granting them full participatory citizenship immediately upon arrival (Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein 2003).8 Israel relies exclusively on the system of jus sanguinis (law of blood) to determine the citizenship status of immigrants and their descendants. Israel’s claim to be the homeland of the Jewish Diaspora characterizes its Jewish newcomers as “returning ethnic immigrants.” Jewish immigrants in Israel are labeled olim (literally “ascenders”: Hebrew plural [masculine]; singular oleh [masculine], olah [feminine], from the Hebrew noun aliyah, “ascent”). The centrality of the idea of immigration as a “return” from the Diaspora is reflected in Israel’s Law of Return (1950, revised 1970)9 and Law of Nationality (1952). These laws create a legal framework that grants Jews and their children and grandchildren the right to settle in Israel and the right to Israeli citizenship immediately on arrival. Jewish immigrants do not have to go through a naturalization process, since “Israeli citizenship law views returning Jews as already belonging to the constitutive community; that is, they are considered to have a status equal to Israeli-born citizens” (Shachar 1999, 236). Throughout most of its history, the State of Israel was intensively involved in encouraging the inflow of Jewish immigrants and played a central role in their socioeconomic incorporation. The World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency have branches all over the world where Jews can apply for immigration to Israel and receive assistance for the actual move (journey, possessions).10 Other nongovernmental organizations assist English-speaking immigrants in their move to Israel, including Tehilla and Nefesh B’Nefesh (see Amit and Riss 2007).11 These bodies challenge 14

Introduction

the Jewish Agency’s monopoly in immigration and immigrant absorption (Raijman 2009).12 As a self-defined Jewish state, Israel is committed to the successful integration of its ( Jewish) immigrants. They have privileged access to citizenship and the societal goods that this formal status provides, but they also benefit from state financial and institutional support to ease their transition from their country of origin and facilitate their integration into the local society. This policy of “absorption” (klita in Hebrew), implemented mainly by the Ministry of Absorption (created in 1968), renders problematic the adoption of a “market model” of immigration to understanding immigration policies and assimilation processes in Israel (Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein 2003). In effect Israel has adopted a “social contract” that commits the state to providing assistance to new immigrants in their first years after arrival. From the 1970s immigrants were offered the opportunity to spend five or six months at “absorption centers,” where they received, gratis, intensive Hebrew instruction, health insurance, assistance in finding employment, and grants for university education. They also enjoyed interim subsistence loans and tax exemptions for vehicles, electrical appliances, and various household goods. The government provided a wide range of retraining courses for immigrants whose previous training and experience were not suited to the needs of the Israeli economy. Incentives and financial support were also given to employers willing to hire immigrants (Adler 2007; Lerner and Menahem 2003; Shuval and Leshem 1998). The late 1980s witnessed a shift to a far less centralized incorporation policy, labeled “direct absorption.” Explanations include the immense size of immigration flows in the 1990s, but also the larger liberalization processes taking place in Israel, causing a retreat in state involvement (Leshem and Lissak 1999; Shpaizman 2013). Under the direct absorption program, immigrants are free to choose their place of residence. On arrival they receive an “absorption package” comprising cash and 15

Introduction

services, which they can use as they please (Doron and Kargar 1993; Shuval and Leshem 1998).13 From the 1990s this new policy was applied mainly to immigrants arriving from the former Soviet Union, but also from Western countries. By contrast Ethiopian immigrants were still sent to absorption centers and subject to intensive state intervention, as they were considered a vulnerable population, an “immigration of distress” (Herzog 1999; Ben-Eliezer 2004).

Immigration Flows to Israel Immigration flows to Israel have impacted the size of the Jewish population and shaped Israeli society’s social, cultural, political, and economic structure.14 The character and composition of immigration flows and the nature of immigration policies are both key to understanding patterns of social and ethnic stratification in Israel (see, e.g., Semyonov and Lerenthal 1991; Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov 2000; Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein 2003; Semyonov and Gorodzeisky 2012). Jewish immigrants reached Israel in a series of five waves (Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein 2003): (1) the pre-state era (1880–1948); (2) the first peak of mass immigration shortly after the establishment of the State of Israel (1948–51); (3) sporadic immigration during the following three decades (1952–89); (4) a second peak of mass immigration, mostly from the former Soviet Union after its collapse (1989–95); (5) sporadic immigration from a variety of (mostly Western) countries (1995–present).15 The first wave of Jewish immigrants to Palestine began at the turn of the twentieth century, comprising approximately 550,000 persons arriving between 1882 and 1948 (Central Bureau of Statistics 2011, table 4.2, 230). They were mainly from central and eastern European countries such as Poland, Russia, Romania, and Germany. These were ideological immigrants, aiming to establish a state for the Jewish people. They created new Jewish

16

Introduction

Fig. 1. Number of Jewish immigrants to Israel per year (in thousands), 1948– 2010. Source: Central Bureau of Statistics 2011, table 4.2, 230–31.

settlements and developed a wide variety of economic, social, civic, and political institutions (Shafir and Peled 2002). To illustrate the size and the composition of the immigration flows since statehood, figure 1 and table 1 show the absolute number and percentages of immigrants arriving from 1948 to 2010.16 The data reveal that the second wave of Jewish immigrants arrived shortly after the establishment of the state. The years 1948–51 marked what Cohen (2002) has called the “demographic transformation” of Israel. It involved two migration processes of almost equal size: the forced emigration of Palestinians (about 760,000 of whom fled or were expelled from their homes in Palestine’s towns and villages), and the immigration of both Middle Eastern Jews and Jewish European survivors of the Holocaust (about 687,000; see table 1). This demographic transformation secured a Jewish majority in the new state, with the proportion of Jews rising from 44.7% in 1947 to 89% at the end of 1951 (Cohen 2002, 37).17 Since then, the history of immigration to Israel

17

Introduction

has been closely intertwined with the history of nation-state building and the protracted ethno-national conflict between Jews and Palestinians. The massive, heterogeneous Jewish immigration from eastern Europe (Ashkenazi Jews) and Asian and North African countries (Mizrahi Jews), together with the scarcity of resources in the post-independence period (1948–51), had a detrimental effect on the socioeconomic achievements of the Jewish immigrants arriving during this critical period, and its imprint is evident in the stratification of Israeli society to this day (Semyonov 1996; Cohen and Haberfeld 1998; Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein 2003).18 Mizrahi immigrants were characterized by a traditional orientation, limited education and occupational skills, and large families. They fared worse than their European (and American) Jewish counterparts in every socioeconomic dimension (education, occupation, income) (e.g., Tyree, Semyonov, and Kraus 1987; Semyonov and Lerenthal 1991). While over time Mizrahi Jews improved their socioeconomic attainment, the gaps between them and Ashkenazi Jews did not narrow (Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein 2003) even in the second generation (Haberfeld 1993; Cohen 1998). In the third period (1952–89) Jewish immigration under the aegis of the Law of Return was more sporadic and less systematic (see figure 1). Until 1967 most of the immigrants came from Africa (mainly Morocco and Tunisia) and eastern Europe (mainly Romania, the Soviet Union, and Poland). After 1967 flows were characterized by a slow but constant stream of immigrants from North and South America as well as South Africa, eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Ethiopia, and Iran (see table 1). By then a broad infrastructure of public housing and support was available for all new immigrants. Research indicates that with increasing time in the country, most immigrants of the 1970s and 1980s became fully integrated and achieved higher levels of socioeconomic attainment (Semyonov and Lerenthal 1991; Raijman and Semyonov 1995, 1997; Cohen 2002). 18

Introduction

1.20%

7.00% 0.00% 0.20%

13.60%

USSR–Asian Republics (Uzbekistan and Georgia)

Other Asia

Africa—total

0.10% 4.50% 2.30%

South Africa

Libya

Egypt-Sudan

0.60%

17.90%

Iraq

Yemen

0.00%

48.30%

0.00%

Lebanon

Algeria

1.00%

0.40%

Ethiopia

0.30%

5.00%

Turkey

5.90%

0.70%

0.30%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.40%

0.60%

2.30%

1.80%

Syria

5.30%

3.20% 0.30%

12.50%

34.60%

Asia—total

Iran

297,138

687,624

Grand total (N)

India-Pakistan

1952– 60

Period of immigration 1948– 51

0.70%

0.60%

0.90%

0.00%

3.00%

38.50%

0.10%

0.00%

0.20%

0.80%

0.50%

0.70%

3.30%

3.10%

4.60%

13.10%

427,828

1961– 71

0.20%

0.10%

2.10%

0.10%

0.80%

7.20%

0.10%

0.00%

0.00%

0.40%

0.20%

0.30%

1.20%

1.30%

3.60%

7.30%

267,580

1972– 79

0.20%

0.00%

2.30%

11.00%

1.20%

18.60%

0.40%

0.00%

0.00%

0.10%

0.10%

0.60%

1.40%

1.00%

5.50%

9.40%

153,833

1980– 89

0.00%

0.00%

0.30%

4.10%

0.10%

5.10%

0.80%

5.20%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.00%

0.10%

0.20%

0.00%

6.40%

956,319

1990– 99

Table 1: Immigrants arriving in Israel under the law of Return, by country and arrival time

0.10%

0.00%

0.70%

10.20%

0.80%

13.40%

0.10%

8.70%

0.00%

0.10%

0.00%

0.00%

0.40%

0.50%

0.60%

11.00%

284,907

2000– 2010

1.20%

1.20%

0.60%

2.80%

0.90%

17.40%

0.30%

2.40%

1.60%

4.30%

0.10%

0.30%

2.00%

0.90%

2.50%

14.90%

3,075,229

1948– 2010

32.30% 7.90% 0.00%

4.10% 1.90% 0.00%

48.40%

Morocco

Tunisia

Other Africa

Europe—total

0.00% 0.60% 0.10% 4.60% 0.20% 3.30% 0.10% 0.20%

0.00% 5.40% 0.00% 1.20% 1.20% 0.20% 2.10% 1.10%

Nordic countries

Bulgaria

Belgium

USSR

Germany

Netherlands

Hungary

Yugoslavia (former)

0.20%

0.10% 13.30%

0.00%

15.50% 2.70% 0.40%

Spain

Poland

Czechoslovakia (former)

France

0.60%

0.30%

0.50%

0.30% 0.30%

Greece

United Kingdom

0.50%

0.10%

0.40% 0.20%

Austria

Italy

35.80%

1952– 60

Period of immigration 1948– 51

1.90%

0.60%

3.40%

0.10%

1.50%

0.10%

0.10%

0.60%

0.30%

0.70%

6.90%

0.30%

0.20%

0.20%

0.20%

0.20%

37.90%

0.20%

2.70%

30.50%

1961– 71

2.00%

0.30%

2.30%

0.10%

2.30%

0.10%

0.00%

0.40%

0.40%

0.80%

51.20%

0.30%

0.00%

0.30%

0.30%

0.20%

68.50%

0.20%

0.80%

2.90%

1972– 79

4.90%

0.30%

1.80%

0.20%

4.60%

0.10%

0.10%

0.70%

0.80%

1.10%

19.30%

0.50%

0.10%

0.80%

0.30%

0.20%

46.10%

0.10%

1.30%

2.50%

1980– 89

1.10%

0.10%

0.30%

0.00%

0.50%

0.00%

0.20%

0.20%

0.10%

0.20%

80.80%

0.10%

0.40%

0.10%

0.10%

0.00%

84.90%

0.10%

0.10%

0.30%

1990– 99

5.10%

0.10%

0.40%

0.10%

1.50%

0.00%

0.10%

0.40%

0.20%

0.40%

50.70%

0.40%

0.20%

0.10%

0.20%

0.10%

60.60%

0.00%

0.70%

0.90%

2000– 2010

1.70%

0.80%

5.60%

0.10%

1.00%

0.10%

0.40%

1.00%

0.20%

0.60%

36.90%

0.20%

1.40%

0.20%

0.20%

0.20%

59.80%

0.10%

1.80%

8.80%

1948– 2010

0.00%

0.20% 0.60%

Other Europe

America and Oceania—total

0.50% 0.30%

0.00% 0.10% 0.20% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%

Central America

Argentina

USA

Brazil

Venezuela

Mexico

0.00%

0.00% 1.10%

0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.90%

687,624

Colombia

Canada

Other countries

Not known

Grand total

0.00%

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics 2012, table 4.4, 233–34.

297,138

0.10%

0.00%

0.10%

0.00% 0.00%

Paraguay

Chile

0.10%

0.00%

1.00%

0.00%

0.10%

0.00% 0.00%

Australia, New Zealand

Uruguay

2.30%

0.10%

0.00%

Switzerland

10.90%

17.20%

Romania

427,828

0.20%

0.30%

0.50%

0.10%

0.40%

0.00%

0.20%

0.10%

0.60%

4.40%

2.70%

0.00%

0.40%

0.20%

9.90%

0.10%

0.20%

20.10%

267,580

0.10%

0.20%

0.80%

0.20%

0.40%

0.00%

0.30%

0.10%

0.70%

7.80%

4.90%

0.00%

0.80%

0.50%

16.80%

0.10%

0.20%

6.90%

153,833

0.30%

0.30%

1.20%

0.30%

0.70%

0.00%

0.60%

0.10%

1.10%

12.30%

6.90%

0.00%

1.30%

0.60%

25.60%

0.20%

0.50%

9.50%

956,319

0.00%

0.10%

0.20%

0.10%

0.10%

0.00%

0.10%

0.00%

0.20%

1.60%

0.90%

0.00%

0.10%

0.10%

3.50%

0.10%

0.10%

0.60%

284,907

0.00%

0.70%

0.70%

0.40%

0.30%

0.00%

0.30%

0.20%

0.90%

6.10%

4.10%

0.30%

0.60%

0.20%

14.90%

0.10%

0.30%

0.40%

3,075,229

0.80%

0.20%

0.30%

0.10%

0.20%

0.00%

0.10%

0.10%

0.40%

3.10%

1.90%

0.00%

0.30%

0.20%

6.90%

0.10%

0.10%

9.00%

The fourth wave, beginning in the early 1990s, marked a turning point in the history of immigration to Israel on two accounts. First, the massive immigrant influxes throughout the 1990s were similar in intensity and abruptness to the large and formative immigration flows of the 1950s (see figure 1). They involved two main groups: a mass exodus from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopian Jews (many of them brought to Israel in two state-initiated and organized operations) (see table 1). Between 1989 and 2010, Israel—a country with a population of only 4.5 million in the early 1990s—took in over 920,000 immigrants from the FSU (400,000 between 1989 and 1991).19 This massive flow resulted in unemployment among these newcomers. The labor market was unable to offer appropriate and adequate jobs to the large supply of highly educated immigrants. Many had to compromise and take low-paying jobs well below their qualifications and credentials (see, e.g., Flug, Kasir, and Ofer 1997; Raijman and Semyonov 1998; Stier and Levanon 2003). Since then, however, many of the immigrants (especially those who arrived at younger ages) have experienced upward occupational and economic mobility (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2011). As for the Ethiopian immigrants, religious motives, the desire to reunite with family members already in Israel, and push factors such as the difficult economic and political situation in Ethiopia all set the stage for massive emigration (Friedman and Santamaria 1990; Offer 2004, 2007). The Ethiopian immigrants arrived in Israel in three major waves. The first (1980–89) numbered approximately 17,000 immigrants, including 8,000 arriving in Operation Moses in November 1984–January 1985. The second (1990–99) numbered approximately 40,000 immigrants, including 14,400 individuals arriving during Operation Solomon in 1991. The third wave (2000–12) numbered 34,000 immigrants and officially ended in 2013, at the height of a major public debate in Israeli society since the 1990s over the inclusion of 22

Introduction

the converted Falas Mura, who are not considered Jews according to halakahic (religious) Jewish law. A large part of the Jewish community in Ethiopia lived in isolated and remote districts of the country. The great majority were peasants and artisans who used traditional technologies. Their illiteracy rate was very high, their educational levels were very low, and most of them brought with them occupational skills too low to be relevant to the Israeli labor market. For the first time the Ethiopian immigration has riven racial cleavages in Israeli society, adding to existing ethno-national, class, and religious cleavages.20 Accompanying the massive flow of immigrants from the FSU and Ethiopia was a much sparser stream of immigration from western Europe, North and South America, South Africa, and Australia (Raijman 2009). By 1995, the beginning of the fifth period, the immigration flow from the FSU had greatly subsided, with only 50,000 immigrants arriving in the decade 1995–2006. During this period most immigrants arrived in Israel from western and central Europe (especially Britain and France), North and South America (especially the United States and Argentina), South Africa, and Australia.21 These accounted for some 10% of all immigrants arriving during the 1990s, 25% of those entering between 2000 and 2005, but 55% of all immigrants arriving between 2006 and 2010. Overall immigrants from Western countries are a very selective population in terms of educational and economic achievement. They choose Israel for both Zionist-ideological and religious reasons, mainly because they wish to live among Jews in the homeland of the Jewish people (Waxman 1989; Amit and Riss 2007; Raijman 2009). One important aspect of the 1990s waves is the growing number of immigrants arriving for the first time under the provisions of the amended Law of Return (1970) who are not Jewish according to Jewish religious law; these are entrants primarily from the FSU and Ethiopia.22 23

Introduction

The arrival of this new group has had an impact on the ethno-national composition of the Israeli population, reducing the percentage of Jews from 80% in the early 1990s to 75% in 2012 (see Central Bureau of Statistics 2013, table 2.1, 89). Table 2 displays information on the total population residing in Israel by citizenship status, origin, and migration status. The data show that in 2012 non-Jewish olim constitute 5% of the Israeli population and are labeled “Other” in the official statistics (see table 2, upper panel). This last category was created in 1995 by the Central Bureau of Statistics to differentiate non-Jewish immigrants who arrived in Israel under the Law of Return from the Arab population.23Arabs constitute 20% of the Israeli population (the overwhelming majority being Muslim, the rest Christian, Druze, and Bedouin) (see table 2, upper panel, second column). Table 2: Population in Israel by citizenship status, origin, and migration status (2010) Citizens

N

% of total

% in Israel

Jews

5,999,600

75

73

Arabs

1,647,200

20

20 4

Other (non-Jewish/non-Arab) Total citizens Non- citizens

337,800

5

7,984, 500

100

N

% of total

% in Israel

Undocumented labor migrants (entered as tourists and did not leave the country)

95,000

40

1.2

Labor migrants with a valid permit

74,778

31

0.9

Labor migrants overstaying their visas

14,118

6

0.2 0.7

Asylum seekers Total non-citizens Total citizens and non-citizens

54,497

23

238,393

100

8,074,993

100

100

Sources: Central Bureau of Statistics 2013; Population, Immigration and Border Authority 2012.

24

Introduction

To the main immigration flows entering Israel under the Law of Return we should add a significant flow of labor migrants—documented and undocumented—and asylum seekers from Africa. In 2012 these three groups numbered about 240,000 people. They account for 3% of the total population of residents (citizens and non-citizens) in Israel (see table 2, bottom panel, third column). Labor migration has become a significant feature of Israel society since the mid-1990s, when a managed migration scheme for low-skilled foreign workers was enacted to replace Palestinian commuters from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Bartram 1998; Raijman and Kemp 2007).24 Labor migrants were formally recruited for three main sectors: construction (mainly from Romania, Turkey, Bulgaria, and China), agriculture (mainly from Thailand), and long-term care (mainly from the Philippines but lately also from India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka) (Kemp and Raijman 2008; see table 3).25 Documented and undocumented labor migrants accounted for 8.7% of the private sector labor force in 2007 (Bank of Israel 2007, figure e -3, 191), a figure that placed Israel at the top of the industrialized economies most heavily dependent on foreign labor (Kemp and Raijman 2008). In addition, from 2005 a new flow of migration became evident as African asylum seekers clandestinely crossed the Egyptian-Israeli border.26 By 2012 the total number of asylum seekers was estimated circa 55,000, mostly from Eritrea and Sudan (see table 2). United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (unhcr ) declared Sudan and Eritrea as sites of severe human rights violations constituting an acute risk for human life and liberty (Natan 2012b). Accordingly asylum seekers from these countries meet non-refoulement conditions and are not to be sent back to their home countries. The Israeli government has granted “group protection” status to asylum seekers from Sudan and Eritrea. For this reason almost 90% of asylum seekers in Israel are not entitled to have their individual cases heard and to go through the Refugee Status Determination Process 25

Introduction

33.1 0.4 7.7 5.9 2.4 2.9 13.3 — 0.5 0.4 62.3 2.6 3.2 52.7 3.8 3.0 2.2 0.8 2.9 100.0 (78,300) 35.0

% 81.0 86.0 94.0 74.0 97.0 18.0 90.0 — 79.0 75.0 87.0 96.0 85.0 89.0 59.0 70.0 69.0 71.0 81.0 85.0

% Men

1995 44.1 1.3 3.4 1.7 5.6 14.6 15.3 — 2.1 1.1 51.1 4.4 8.2 31.8 6.8 3.3 2.1 1.1 0.2 100.0 (52,200) 35.4

% 63.0 78.0 98.0 56.0 96.0 17.0 91.0 — 66.0 51.0 78.0 69.0 66.0 86.0 61.0 63.0 67.0 55.0 78.0 71.0

% Men

2000

Sources: Central Bureau of Statistics 2005, table 4.10; Central Bureau of Statistics 2011, table A.

Mean age

Asia (total) India Turkey Lebanon China Philippines Thailand Nepal Other Africa (total) Europe (total) Bulgaria Former Soviet Union Romania Other America and Oceania (total) USA Other Not known Total

Country of citizenship 74.6 3.4 3.4 — 10.1 19.6 27.5 8.6 2.1 0.3 24.5 1.2 13.1 8.0 2.1 0.6 0.3 0.3 — 100.0 (32,700) 35.2

%

Table 3. Arrival of migrant workers with permits, by country of citizenship and gender

62 53 100 — 99 14 93 17 52 82 30 20 19 38 74 61 90 38 — 54

% Men

2006 74.3 9.6 2.5 — 5.0 18.0 23.5 4.6 10.8 0.3 23.8 0.3 17.6 — 2.8 1.5 0.9 0.6 — 100.0 (32,300) 36.4

%

57.0 40.0 99.0 — 96.0 13.0 94.0 19.0 48.0 92.0 18.0 14.0 7.0 — 83.0 70.0 85.0 50.0 — 48.0

% Men

2010

(rsd ) (Yacobi 2010; Kritzman and Berman 2011; Natan 2012b; Yaron, Hashimshony-Yaffe, and Campbell 2013). However this temporary protection does not include any entitlement to civil rights and social benefits and can end at any time. Indeed the context of reception faced by asylum seekers in Israel is rather complex in terms of policy, legal status, and rights, as well as in the way the phenomenon has been highly politicized in the public discourse (Yacobi 2010; Paz 2011). In sum the 1990s brought new kinds of immigrants hitherto unknown in the Israel context, transforming the ethno-national mosaic of Israeli society. The changing composition of the ethnic landscape poses new challenges to both the collective identities in Israel and to patterns of social inequality based on citizenship, nationality, and ethnicity (Raijman and Kemp 2010). The Israeli regime of incorporation reflects a double standard: an exclusionary model for non-Jews versus an “acceptance-encouragement” model for Jews. The current immigration regime is highly exclusionary toward non-Jews not covered by the amended Law of Return (labor migrants and asylum seekers), removing a priori any possibility of incorporation into the society and the polity (Rosenhek, 2000, 2007; Shafir and Peled 2002; Kemp and Raijman 2008; Kritzman-Amir 2009). Unwillingness to accept non-Jewish immigrants is expressed through exclusionary immigration policies (especially restrictions on family reunion and refusal to grant residence status or refugee status) and restrictive naturalization rules. The citizenship axis is thus relevant to understanding the marginal status of labor migrants and asylum seekers in Israel (Raijman 2010). Another axis of inequality formed by immigration flows to Israel is based on the distinction between major ethnic or geo-cultural groups within the Jewish population. Four distinct ethnic subpopulations of immigrants are now recognized in Israeli society: Jews of European and American origin, Jews of Asian and African origin (mainly pre-1989 arrivals), immigrants from the former republics of the Soviet Union (mainly post-1989 arrivals), 27

Introduction

and Ethiopian immigrants who arrived in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Semyonov, Raijman, and Maskileyson 2014) . The socioeconomic status of these four subgroups is often linked to the circumstances of their arrival in the country and their human capital pre-migration (Raijman and Kemp 2010; Amit, Borowski, and DellaPergola 2010; Semyonov and Gorodzeisky 2012). Current immigration flows to Israel are diverse with respect to their socioeconomic background. They include the most educated and successful individuals in the labor market (mainly from Western countries and the FSU) alongside the least educated and poorest new immigrants (mainly from Ethiopia). Immigrants from Ethiopia stand in a mirror-image relation to immigrants from Western countries and the FSU, pointing to the diverse challenges facing both Israeli society and the new immigrants (Raijman and Kemp 2010; Amit, Borowski, and DellaPergola 2012; Semyonov, Raijman, and Maskileyson 2014). As noted earlier, whereas the migration experiences and integration processes of immigrants from Asia-Africa, the FSU, and Ethiopia are well documented in the academic literature, those immigrants arriving from western Europe, America, South Africa, and Australia have largely been neglected. Only in recent years have some scholars begun to focus on the integration of immigrants from North America (see Amit and Riss 2007, 2013) and France (see Pupko 2009; Ben-Rafael and Ben-Rafael 2013; Amit and Bar-Lev 2014). By focusing on South Africans we join the incipient trend of academic research on immigrants arriving in Israel mainly for ideological reasons and with high levels of human capital. The South Africans’ integration experiences are also likely to shed light on those of other Anglophone groups (British, American, Canadian, and Australian) in Israeli society. Together these groups constitute 20% of all immigrants arriving in Israel in recent years (see Central Bureau of Statistics 2013, table 4.4). In the coming decade, English and French speakers seem to be the groups with the highest potential to immigrate to Israel under the auspices 28

Introduction

of the Law of Return, as they currently constitute the largest groups of non-Israeli Jews in the world (DellaPergola 2012).

South Africa: The Emergence and Development of a Jewish Community Migration Flows to South Africa Awareness of the history of the Jewish community in South Africa and its unique position as a white minority-within-a-minority is important for a better grasp of South African Jews’ motivation to immigrate to and become integrated in Israel.27 The permanent settlement of Jews in South Africa started after the British conquest of South Africa (around 1806) with a small community of British Jews, which hardly expanded over the years. The Jewish community of South Africa as it existed during much of the twentieth century was largely fashioned by the immigration of eastern European Jews, mainly from Lithuania (Shain 1994; Horowitz and Kaplan 2001; Shimoni 2003). These newcomers were part of a mass exodus of some three million eastern European Jews who left their countries between 1881 and 1910 in search of better opportunities, mainly in North America but also in Latin America, western Europe, Israel, and South Africa. Available data show that by 1880 about 4,000 Jews were living in South Africa (0.8% of the country’s white population). During the following decades its Jewish population grew dramatically due to two main impelling factors: the discovery of gold and diamonds in Kimberley and on the Witwatersrand (Shain 1994, 2001) and the deteriorating political conditions in eastern Europe. In 1904 the Jewish population numbered over 38,000. By 1911 it had risen to 47,000 and by 1926 to 71,000, constituting 4.3% of South Africa’s white population (DellaPergola and Dubb 1988, 105). Jews were allowed to enter the country freely until the implementation of the 1930 Quota Act and the 1937 Aliens Act—laws that caused a drastic reduction in the numbers of Jews arriving in South Africa.28 The last 29

Introduction

relatively large flow of Jewish immigrants took place between 1933 and 1939 and comprised refugees from Germany, which was not included in the list of “quota” countries (DellaPergola and Dubb 1988).29 Jewish immigration to South Africa ceased between 1941 and 1945. It resumed with the ending of the World War II, albeit at a much lower rate (an average of 200–300 persons per year), with immigrants entering from Rhodesia/ Zimbabwe (25%), Israel (20%), the United Kingdom (15%) and other countries in Europe, North Africa, North America, Australia, and the Middle East (40%) (DellaPergola and Dubb 1988, 66–67).

The Jewish Community The cessation of a massive flow of Jewish immigration in the 1930s reinforced the rather homogeneous character of the community, reproducing over the years an “even more homogeneous, native-born, cohesive and unified community” (Horowitz and Kaplan 2001). Due to the large number of Jews of Lithuanian origin, or “Litvaks,” South African Jewish community life was a close replica of Jewish community life in Lithuania (Shimoni 1980). Over the years the newcomers created and nurtured a network of organizations to meet their specific needs, including Jewish schools, synagogues, and various social, cultural, and social institutions that proliferated over the years (Dubb 1977).30 Examples of such organizations include the South African Zionist Federation, the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, the Union of Orthodox Synagogues, the South African Union of Progressive Judaism, and the South African Board of Jewish Education (Shain 1999, 106). The Jewish community reached its peak in the 1970s, numbering an estimated 118,200 members—about 0.3% of South Africa’s total population and almost 3% of the total white population (Mendelsohn and Shain 2008). Two significant markers constituted the main pillars of the community: Zionism and Judaism. Both contributed to the development of a strong 30

Introduction

ethnic identity, with Jews exhibiting a high level of commitment to the local community, to Israel, and to the Jewish people as a whole. This commitment was clearly expressed in a well-developed network of Jewish and Zionist organizations with corresponding wide-scale organizational affiliation (DellaPergolla and Dubb 1988, 102).31 The resilient Jewish and Zionist identities should be perceived within the unique context of the racially and ethnically segmented South African society. The lack of a generic, all-inclusive category of South Africans (Shimoni 1988) and the segregationist character of South African society (Shain 1999) encouraged the development of ethnic identities that were not only socially acceptable but widely praised (Herman 2007). The centrality of Zionism was evident from the start of Jewish community life and was reflected in the creation in 1898 of the South African Zionist Federation. This was the first representative communal institution of South African Jews, covering many areas of the community’s activities. Among these were representation of the Jewish community in contacts with the local authorities and the establishment of local branches of Zionist youth movements such as Habonim, Hashomer Hatzair, Betar, and Bnei Akiva (Shimoni 1980).32 By 1948 almost all South African Jews were Zionist affiliated (Stevens 1971). “To be a good Jew in South Africa meant to be a good Zionist” (Shimoni 1980, 30). In this sense South African Jews differed from Jews in other Anglophone Western countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, where Jews avoided joining Zionist movements for fear of “dual loyalty” allegations (Campbell 2000). Still, the commitment to aliyah was not strong, as Jews felt that they could nurture a full Jewish life in South Africa. Their Zionism was mainly expressed through fund-raising activities and support for the State of Israel (Dubb 1977; Shimoni 1980; Herman 2007). Besides Zionism, the South African Jewish community was also characterized by the centrality of Judaism, with religion becoming a strong 31

Introduction

social unifying factor. Synagogue attendance and the observation of Jewish rituals were both manifestations of ethno-national identification and an occasion for social encounters.33 The religiosity of the vast majority of the community combined Orthodox traditions with the more tolerant religious attitudes typical of the first Anglophone Jews to arrive in South Africa in the early 1800s (Herman 2007). This form of religiosity has been labeled “non-observant Orthodoxy”; it is characterized by adherence to certain rituals, but without strict observation of religious prescriptions. Local rabbis came to terms with this unique form of religiosity, where Judaism was perceived more as a form of ethnic identification than as a matter of religious observance (Dubb 1977; Herman 2007). Since the 1970s, however, ultra-Orthodox practices have increasingly permeated the traditional modern Orthodox synagogues, following the emigration of many leading rabbis belonging to the more moderate streams34 and the arrival of a large number of strictly Orthodox yeshiva-trained rabbis filling positions at a number of mainstream synagogues. Different from their moderate counterparts, the latter were more concerned with increased religious observance and were completely detached from the community and wider society. This new trend has been defined by Herman as a “shift from an identity based on ethnicity to one based on religion with a fundamentalist undertone” (Herman 2007, 35). Over time this new fundamentalist religious worldview was also adopted by community members and leaders who were influenced by the charisma of the new religious leaders.35 The shift toward greater religiosity was also evident in the Jewish community schools, where the previously hegemonic moderate Orthodoxy came to be replaced by the dominance of religious extremism (Herman 2006). Several explanations for this shift have been advanced. These include the upbringing of South African Jews in families with a strong attachment to Judaism, therefore naturally predisposed to a more intense version of 32

Introduction

Orthodox Jewish belief and practice. Second, increased feelings of insecurity as a consequence of escalating crime rates caused many to seek refuge and solace in religious communities. Third, disillusion with Zionist ideology created an ideological void that was filled by religiosity (Shimoni 2003). The rise of Orthodox religiosity in the community also changed the balance within the Zionist movement, with secular Zionism shifting toward religious Zionism and moderate Orthodoxy becoming replaced by ultra-Orthodoxy (Shimoni 2003, 209; Herman 2007). These changes should also be understood in relation to the general decline in Zionist hegemony in the 1970s, partially a result of Israel’s policy on apartheid. The South African Jewish community felt embarrassment over the diplomatic and trade relations that existed between Israel and South Africa during the apartheid era. The turning point in official relations between the two countries was Israel’s position in favor of sanctions against South Africa. The South African government condemned Israel’s policy and put pressure on the local Jewish community, which felt caught in the middle, being loyal to both countries. These events affected attitudes to Zionism of many Jews who had become disenchanted with Israel’s foreign policy on South Africa. As a result Zionist institutional structures lost much of their influence, and interest in immigration to Israel dwindled (Shimoni 2003).

Emigration of Jews from South Africa Successive generations of Jews in South Africa have become highly acculturated and integrated into the country’s socioeconomic and political life (Dubb 1994). They have settled in urban centers, especially in major metropolitan areas such as Johannesburg and Cape Town, where they tend to concentrate in specific neighborhoods (DellaPergola and Dubb 1988). As elsewhere in the Diaspora, Jews’ educational attainment is much higher than that of the general population—in this case the white population (Dubb 1977; DellaPergola and Dubb 1988). Relative to their 33

Introduction

proportion among the white population in South Africa, Jews incline to be overrepresented in the professional, administrative, and sales occupations, to concentrate in the commercial, financial, and manufacturing sectors, and to belong largely to the middle and upper income categories (DellaPergolla and Dubb 1988; Bruk 2006).36 A relatively large percentage of the Jewish labor force consists of the self-employed and of employers.37 From a peak estimated number of 118,200 members in the 1970s, the Jewish community of South Africa started to dwindle thereafter, becoming a major source of Jewish emigration to other English-speaking countries and to Israel. These emigration flows have been part of the massive exodus of whites from the country during the last four decades (Horowitz and Kaplan 2001; Tatz, Arnold, and Heller 2007).38 The current estimated figures fluctuate between 72,000 and 85,000 individuals of Jewish origin remaining in the country. The emigration of mostly young members of the community resulted in the decline of the Jewish community, but also affected its age composition, with median age rising from thirty-two in 1970 to thirty-nine in 1991 (Mendelsohn and Shain 2008, 183, 214). Analyzing the complex relationship between the Jewish community and the apartheid regime is essential for understanding why so many South African Jews emigrated during the apartheid years. Many believed that the community did not take a firm enough stand against apartheid, while others were apolitical but simply viewed the system as unsustainable. Like the majority of whites, the vast majority of Jews complied with apartheid and showed little concern for the groups it subordinated (e.g., blacks, Indians). Fearing anti-Semitism, community leaders supported a policy of noninvolvement in political issues in South Africa. Only a few in the Jewish community were actively involved in the opposition to the apartheid system, and these acted on an individual basis (Shimoni 1988, 11). The Board of Deputies and the majority of the community valued unity 34

Introduction

and conformity, distancing themselves from those involved in antigovernment acts, even ostracizing them, as they were perceived as endangering the entire community. Many activists left the country in the years before the abolition of apartheid (Herman 2007). Political instability and violence—or fear of such circumstances in the future—were an important determinant of emigration. In the 1970s the emigrants’ target destinations were primarily Israel (38%), followed by English-speaking countries (23.7% to the United States, 15.2% to Britain, 12.9% to Australia, 9.4% to Canada) (Dubb 1994, 20–21). Emigration soared in the 1990s, in the wake of a dramatic surge in violent crime, coupled with political and economic uncertainty, both of which were associated with the 1994 transformation to black majority rule (Dubb 1994; Kosmin et al. 1999; Tatz, Arnold, and Heller 2007).39 By then the choice of destination countries had greatly changed, with Australia topping the list at almost 40%, followed by the United States with 20%, Israel with 15%, and Britain and Canada at around 10% (Horowitz and Kaplan 2001). Australia’s popularity, like that of the other English-speaking countries, is explained by the fact that many emigrants sought to replicate the familiar cultural and economic lifestyles they enjoyed in South Africa. Israel’s diminishing desirability suggests a decline in its ideological appeal for South African Jews. The evidence suggests that it sometimes serves as an emergency “last resort” when the more elaborate barriers to entry into English-speaking countries cannot be overcome readily at short notice (Horowitz and Kaplan 2001, 9).40

South African Immigration to Israel The financial support provided by the State of Israel to prospective immigrants makes government agencies key actors in the process. For example, the Jewish Agency has two main offices in South Africa, one in Cape Town, the other in Johannesburg; prospective olim go there to meet the 35

Introduction

shlichim (emissaries) and discuss their aliyah (immigration) plan. The South African Zionist Federation in Israel, known as “Telfed,” also plays an important role in South African Jews’ immigration and integration. Designed “to assist the olim successfully in the process of absorption in Israel,”41 the organization is involved quite intensively in both processes. Telfed encourages aliyah from South Africa and assists olim entering Israel to achieve successful integration. The organization does so by providing employment counseling, financial support, and social welfare services. More specifically it defines its mission as “promoting the quality of life of Southern Africans in Israel while engaging them to participate in and contribute to Israeli society.”42 Since the founding of the State of Israel, approximately 25,000 South African Jews entered the country under the terms of the Law of Return.43 Figure 2 displays the absolute numbers of South African immigrants arriving in Israel each year since 1948. The data reveal that historically South African aliyah to Israel has stayed slightly lower than 400 arrivals per year, surging after the Six Day War (1967) and during periods of political unrest and violence in the late 1970s, mid-1980s, and mid-1990s, when South African Jews, anxious for their immediate safety, took advantage of Israel’s Law of Return. We identify four main peaks: the first was the post– Six Day War period (1968–71), when Israel became a magnet for Jewish immigrants from Europe and North and South America also; the second and most pronounced was in the late 1970s during the Soweto uprising (in 1976), which led to a flow of more than 1,000 olim in each of the two following years (1977–78); the third period is associated with the 1985 State of Emergency in South Africa, and the fourth is the early 1990s with the transition to democracy after Nelson Mandela won the elections.44 In 2003 immigration flows fell to relatively low levels; some increase occurred between 2008 and 2009, but immigration has decreased again 36

Introduction

Fig. 2. Trends in South African immigration to Israel. Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. Compilation and processing: Sergio DellaPergola, Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

since 2010. As we showed earlier, these new arrivals have joined the rising influx from Western countries in general and from English-speaking countries in particular since the turn of the century. What motivated South African Jews to leave their country, their families and homes, a high standard of living, and a rich Jewish communal life? How have the migrants gone about their migration, and on what types of individual and institutional resources have they relied to make their decisions? These questions are among the many addressed in chapter 3, where we show how ethnic identities related to the host society (e.g., the Jewish and Zionist identities of South African Jews) affect the potential immigrants’ decision making. Furthermore we highlight the importance of institutional and social networks in both countries, of origin and of destination, in the establishment and organization of South African migration flows to Israel. 37

Introduction

While chapter 3 focuses on the process of immigration, chapters 4, 5, and 6 examine what happens to the immigrants after they arrive in Israel. In chapter 4 we focus on the linguistic assimilation of South Africans in Israel. Language is regarded as one of the principal barriers before newcomers on arrival in the host society. Learning to speak the new language is a basic step enabling the new immigrants to participate in the life of the new society and find work commensurate with their skills, but also to obtain access to social services and consumption. Language assimilation is important instrumentally, but symbolically as well, since it also lies at the heart of national identities and ethnic solidarities. To learn about the linguistic assimilation of South Africans in Israel we describe patterns of language proficiency and use (in both private and public settings) as well as patterns of cultural consumption. Specifically we identify issues of linguistic assimilation, native-language maintenance, or mother-tongue shift among members of three generations (first, one-and-a-half, and second) of the South African community in Israel. Closely connected with issues of linguistic assimilation are issues of social networks and patterns of marriage, which are also addressed as aspects of social assimilation. In chapter 5 we focus on economic assimilation, which has been the subject of an extensive literature. This interest in the issue reflects the belief that economic integration is the key to social integration. We provide an overview of South Africans’ modes of incorporation into the Israeli labor market by presenting a socioeconomic profile (by gender and generation) in terms of human capital and occupational and income attainment. We also compare South Africans’ socioeconomic outcomes with those of other migrant groups in the labor market, and we highlight the advantaged position of this Anglophone group in Israeli society. In chapter 6 we provide a comprehensive analysis of the immigrants’ assimilation in terms of identity patterns. As with issues of language, much research has centered on newcomers’ clinging to the culture and values of 38

Introduction

their country of origin as against those of their country of destination. It has been shown that first-generation immigrants are more likely to maintain robust ethnic identities over time, whereas those arriving as children or born in Israel (one-and-a-half and second generation, respectively) are more likely to thin out their ethnic identities. This is because those born in the host society lack the memories and the symbolic “birth connection” of their emigrant parents (Rumbaut 2004, 1161). To learn about issues of identity we focus on two of its main aspects: the immigrants’ subjective identities, that is, how South Africans perceive and define their own identities; and their perceptions of the intercultural ethnic boundaries between themselves and other groups in Israeli society. An analysis of these two aspects will enable us to examine to what extent integration, understood in terms of identificational patterns, manifests itself in successive generations. The final chapter (chapter 7) summarizes and discusses the study’s main findings in light of existing theories of assimilation. We compare South Africans’ assimilation outcomes with those of immigrants of other countries of origin, not only to track generational changes within and across groups but also to provide a general assessment of ethnic stratification of immigrant groups in Israeli society. Before turning to our case study, a discussion of the methodological tools is called for. Therefore in the next chapter (chapter 2) we introduce the mixed method employed in our research, which combines quantitative and qualitative data.

39

Introduction

Chapter 2

Methodology The research takes a mixed-methods approach, combining quantitative and qualitative data and methods. Quantitative data were collected by a survey of a representative sample of South Africans of three different generations: those arriving as adults (the first generation or generation 1.0), those arriving as children (the one-and-a-half generation or generation 1.5), and those born in Israel (the second generation or generation 2.0).1 The qualitative data are from in-depth interviews with South African respondents, conversations with community leaders at Telfed, and participant observation during visits to sites of social gatherings. Whereas the survey data provide a quantitative insight into the immigrants’ socioeconomic assimilation, the qualitative data make for deeper understanding of the processes of immigration and integration as perceived by the immigrants themselves. Together the data shed light on South Africans’ modes of socioeconomic incorporation into Israeli society.

Mixed Methods in the Social Sciences During the last decade, the long-standing methodological debate between qualitative and quantitative researchers has switched its focus to the integration of both methods into a new methodological paradigm labeled triangulation, or the mixed-methods approach. By this approach, instead

of viewing qualitative and quantitative methods as mutually exclusive alternatives, social scientists can benefit from integrating them as a single mixed research design to overcome the specific weaknesses inherent in the separate use of each (see, e.g., Erzberger and Prein 1997; Kopinak 1999; Raijman and Hochman 2011). Two main supporting arguments have been advanced in the expanding literature on the benefits of linking qualitative and quantitative methods in the social sciences. The first relates to issues of convergence, which deal with obtaining further evidence, or counter-evidence, for research findings. That is, by combining methods of data collection and conducting tests that draw on diverse methods, we can improve the validity of theories. The second argument is based on the issue of complementarity of findings and assumes that each methodological tradition (qualitative and quantitative) can only interpret specific aspects of reality, which have to be combined to produce a deeper understanding of social phenomena (see, e.g., Miles and Huberman 1994; Miller and Gatta 2006). In choosing the mixed-methods approach here, we assumed that neither the quantitative nor the qualitative methodological tradition can provide a complete picture of the mechanisms underlying immigrants’ integration, but together they may yield a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomena under study. The quantitative study was designed on concepts from prevalent theories in the field. It was based on a large sample, which permitted us to describe systematically the socioeconomic integration of South Africans and their offspring into their new home in Israel. The qualitative study provided an opportunity to learn more about how individuals think, explain, and interpret their own experiences of immigration and integration in Israel. Overall our mixed-methods approach shows that when methods and results are combined, we can produce a more comprehensive picture of the modes of incorporation of immigrants into receiving societies. Below we describe in detail each part of the study. 42

Methodology

The Quantitative Study Before constructing the questionnaire used in the survey, we conducted several in-depth interviews with respondents of each generation. These preliminary interviews facilitated the formulation of the problems and hypotheses that directed the study and the construction of items and scales for the questionnaire. The latter were constructed in the spring of 2008 and were extensively pretested and revised. The instrument solicited data on socio-demographic characteristics, the process of migration to Israel, social networks, language abilities before and after arrival, labor market incorporation, attachment to South Africa, Jewish and national identity, and residential patterns. Data were collected by Research Success Technologies under the direction of Dr. Ezra Kopelowitz, who oversaw the fieldwork required for the interviews. Bilingual interviewers were hired and trained. The interviewing process was under way from June 2008 through December 2008. Before administering the survey, we informed members of Israel’s South African community about our study in several ways. First, we published a description of the project in the Telfed newsletter, which is sent by the institution to all its members. In addition, a letter was sent explaining the objectives of the research (see appendix 1). The letter emphasized that interviews would be confidential and that respondents would remain anonymous. The sampling method adopted in the research is respondent-driven sampling (rds ) (Heckathorn 1997). It combines two approaches: using institutional records provided by Telfed and snowball sampling through social networks. This method ensures that respondents who lack institutional affiliations or are not connected to the South African community can be also included in the sample. The final sample comprised 608 respondents who had arrived in Israel as adults (hereinafter the first generation or generation 1.0), 125 who had 43

Methodology

arrived aged six to seventeen years (hereinafter the one-and-a-half generation or generation 1.5, and 174 who had arrived before their sixth birthday or were born in Israel to at least one South African parent (hereinafter the second generation or generation 2.0). The sample was gender balanced. Demographic data for our respondents are presented in table 4. As the data show, most members of generations 1.0 and 1.5 were born in South Africa (90% and 97%, respectively). Most generation 2.0 respondents were born in Israel, but one-third arrived before the age of six. Most of the respondents’ parents were born in South Africa but were the offspring of eastern European Jews who had immigrated to South Africa by the early twentieth century.2 Not surprisingly, marital status and age distributions differed across the generational groups. Members of generations 1.0 and 1.5 were on average much older than members of generation 2.0 (aged 46.4, 41.1, and 35.1 years, respectively)3 and were more likely to be married (76%, 70%, and 55%, respectively) and to have children. Time of arrival in Israel also differed across the generations. Whereas members of generation 1.0 were equally distributed over the decades, respondents in generation 1.5 tended to cluster in earlier periods.4 Likewise their tenure in the country was longer than that of generation 1.0. Table 5 provides information regarding patterns of residential distribution of different generations of South Africans in Israel. Overall there is a general tendency for South Africans to concentrate in the center of the country, generation 2.0 preferring Tel Aviv (30%) and generations 1.0 and 1.5 drawn to Ra’anana, the town with Israel’s highest concentration of South Africans and other native English speakers (13%).5 Almost a quarter of generation 1.0 but only 16% and 20% of generations 1.5 and 2.0 live in Jerusalem and its vicinity and in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria). The residential distribution of our sample resembles the patterns of residence of South Africans in Israel as reported by Telfed and the Ministry of Absorption (see table 6). 44

Methodology

16.6

Israel

Other

3.8 22.5 50.0

Other

Percent female

3.2

Other English-speaking countries

Israel

70.5

South Africa or other sub-Saharan countries

father’s country of birth (%)

5.0 3.8

Other English-speaking countries

74.6

9.7

90.3

South Africa or other sub-Saharan countries

mother’s country of birth (%)

Other

South Africa

country of birth (%)

Generation 1.0

54.4

6.4

4.0

0.0

89.6

4.8

3.2

2.4

89.6

3.2

96.8

Generation 1.5

Table 4: Demographic characteristics of South Africans in Israel, by generation

47.1

9.7

6.3

3.5

80.4

10.8

9.8

3.5

75.8

65.5

34.5

Generation 2.0

50.1

17.9

4.3

2.8

75.1

14.0

4.9

4.2

76.9

19.5

80.5

All

46.5 (11.4) 18.9 (11.7)

Age (average and standard deviation)

Tenure in the country (years since migration average and standard deviation—only for foreign-born)

1990–99

2000–2008 608

28.6 22.7

1980–89

N

20.9 22.5

1970–79

5.3

Before 1970

period of arrival (%)

13.0 82.6

With Children

Married

Other

10.9 76.2

Single

marital status (%)

Generation 1.0

125

0.0

13.6

25.6

41.6

19.2

29.1 (9.7)

41.1 (9.5)

77.6

14.4

69.6

16.0

Generation 1.5

174

—

—

—

—

—

—

35.1 (8.7)

54.6

15.5

54.6

29.9

Generation 2.0

907

15.3

21.2

20.5

28.3

14.8

24.1 (13.6)

43.6 (11.6)

76.5

13.7

71.1

15.2

All

12.0 0.7

Northern Israel and Haifa

Southern Israel

125

N

608

10.6

Presence of English speakers as a reason for choosing place 25.6 of residence % To a great or very great extent

23.9 37.0

34.9

1.6

12.8

16.0

—

More than one-third during adolescence in Israel

More than one-third currently

Concentration of English speakers in neighborhood (%)

23.8

Jerusalem / Judea and Samaria

38.4

12.0

13.8 32.6

Ra’anana

19.2

Generation 1.5

17.1

Rest of central Israel

Tel Aviv

Central Israel

Residential Distribution (%)

Generation 1.0

Table 5: Residential patterns of South Africans in Israel, by generation

174

5.2

46.0

24.1

0.6

15.5

19.5

31.6

2.9

29.9

Generation 2.0

The bottom panel of Table 5 provides additional information on the patterns of residence by generational groups. Overall members of the first generation tend more than the other groups to live in places with a high concentration of English speakers (35% compared to 24% among the younger generations) and count as very important the presence of English speakers when choosing a place of residence (26%, compared with 11% and 5% of the younger generations). Interestingly patterns of ethnic enclosure have decreased over time for generations 1.5 and 2.0. While 37% and 46% of generations 1.5 and 2.0, respectively, lived in neighborhoods where over a third of the residents were English speakers during their adolescence, by adulthood most of them have relocated to places where the percentage of Anglophones is much lower. These changes in residential patterns already suggest interesting intergenerational processes of assimilation, which are the focus of the book. Table 6: Residential distribution of South Africans in Israel (survey data, Telfed data, and Ministry of Absorption data) Residential distribution (%)

Survey

Ministry of Telfed Absorption

Tel Aviv

19.8

18.0

18.0

Central Israel

44.7

39.0

36.0

(Ra’anana)

(12.0)

(12.0)

(14.0)

Jerusalem / Judea and Samaria

22.0

20.0

23.0

Northern Israel and Haifa

12.8

16.0

15.0

0.8

6.0

8.0

9,265

9,759

Southern Israel N

907

The Qualitative Study The qualitative study is based on thirty-one semi-structured in-depth individual interviews conducted with South Africans of all three generations (see list in table 7). Interviews were conducted in Hebrew and English according to each respondent’s preference and were recorded with their 48

Methodology

consent. Average interview length was about two hours. The interviews were guided by an outline that included questions about pre-migration background, incentives and reasons for immigration, the immigration process, patterns of residence, language proficiency and use, patterns of identity, social networks, and community participation. Immigration stories allow us to explore immigrants’ self-reflective narratives of their own immigration and integration experiences. We also paid visits to synagogues and sports clubs and conducted participant observation as well as interviews with leaders and members of these institutions. The transcripts of the in-depth interviews were coded with atlas computer software for text classification and management. Analysis of the interviews started with a thorough reading of the transcripts to detect prominent topics and develop the themes and categories as expressed by the respondents themselves. This preliminary coding allowed us to create a conceptual map of the main subjacent categories in the narrative corpus. Following Lerner, Rapoport, and Lomsky-Feder (2007, 175), the analysis was conducted on three levels: (1) individual stories: ascertaining the central themes of each individual narrative in the context of the entire corpus; (2) the corpus as a whole: identification and interpretation of the central themes that appear in different narratives; (3) the general context: analysis of the narratives as a whole in the context of migration processes in both South Africa and Israel. In presenting our findings, we have tried to strike a balance between giving a voice to a variety of interviewees and highlighting the narratives regarded as the most representative of their respective generational groups. Through the qualitative analysis, we aimed not only to conduct a validity test of our quantitative findings, but also to grasp the mechanism underlying individual processes of assimilation and the ways they manifest themselves differently over successive generations. The mixed-methods approach was thus not only enlightening but indeed crucial to understanding the immigration and assimilation process of South Africans in Israel. 49

Methodology

1

1

Orah

Rachel

Warren

Leslie

Daniela

Stacey

Shelli

Jack

Carla

Samantha Robert

Megan

Judy

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

1

Shannon

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

David

2

Generation

1

Alias

Female

Female

Female Male

Female

Male

Female

Female

Female

Female

Male

Female

Female

Female

Male

Gender

1998

2007

1987

1985

1986

1986

1977

1988

1989

1979

1971

1981

1972

1963

Year of immigration

Table 7: Selected characteristics of interviewees*

49

42

54 55

47

52

43

58

39

46

69

61

49

61

64

Current age

Living with partner

Married +2

Married +3

Married +3

Married +3

Married +3

Married +2

Married +2

Married +2

Divorce +3

Married +1

Married +3

Married +3

Divorced +3

Marital status and number of children

Barak

Inbal

Shira

30

31

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

1.5

1.5

1.5

1

Female

Female

Male

Male

Female

Male

Male

Female

Male

Male

Male

Female

Female

Female

Male

Male

Male

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

1965

1970

1960

2001

1987

1989

1987

2008

2003

1997

* No additional details are given to maintain the anonymity of the interviewees.

Alon

29

Noga

28

Mark

23

24

Dana

Graham

27

Brian

21

22

Lior

1.5

Keren

20

Idan

1.5

Mia

25

1.5

Lauren

18

19

26

1.5

Neil

17

1

Ryan

16

1

Peter

15

33

25

30

30

43

25

28

52

52

59

22

27

25

27

37

25

36

Married

Single

Single

Married

Married +3

Single

Single

Married +4

Married

Divorced +2

Single

Single

Single

Married

Married +3

Engaged

Married +4

Chapter 3

The Process of Migration What motivated South African Jews to leave their country, families, homes, high standard of living, and rich Jewish community life? Did they consider immigrating to another country, or was Israel their first choice? What were their main reasons for choosing Israel as a destination? How much did the motives for immigration change over time, in line with political and economic changes in South Africa? How did immigrants go about their immigration, and on what types of individual and institutional resources did they rely to make their decisions? These are some of the questions we would like to answer in this chapter, focusing on the main driving forces of Jewish South African immigration to Israel, the process of decision making, and the types of resources (individual and institutional) on which the immigrants relied when making and implementing their decisions. To date, immigration studies have tended to focus on integration into the host society, overlooking the immigration process itself, the immigrants’ motives, and the implementation of the move to the new host society. To leave one’s country of origin and relocate to a new society is among

the most radical decisions a person can make (Gold 1997). Nevertheless immigrants’ motives are still a poorly developed area in the immigration literature. This neglect is somewhat surprising given that motives are key factors in understanding not only the process whereby people change locations (Winchie and Carment 1989), but also the ways in which immigrants integrate into host societies (Berry 1997; Gold 1997, 2002).1

Theoretical Background Most migration theories conceptualize migration as economically motivated (see Stark 1991; Massey et al. 1998). From the neoclassical economic perspective, the decision of individuals or families to migrate is rationally guided by a comparison between potential income in the host country and actual income in the country of origin. Based on this logic, rational individuals decide to migrate when the benefits of the move outweigh the costs over some time horizon (Todaro and Maruszko 1987; Borjas 1990). Sociologists, by contrast, tend to focus on the sociocultural causes of migration, such as social networks and institutional frameworks that develop as a consequence of migration (Boyd 1989; Massey et al. 1998). According to the sociocultural approach, the migration process itself—the process of preparing for departure to a new country—is full of uncertainty. Prospective immigrants must rely on several sources for information, guidance, and financial and emotional support. Knowing or being related to immigrants already in the destination country opens up sources of information and connections that mitigate the uncertainty. Among people considering migration, ties to an immigrant already living in the host country increase the probability that that destination will be selected (Massey et al. 1987, 1998; Amit and Riss 2007, 2013; Shoham and Kaufman Strauss 2007). Despite their focus on the social dimensions of migration, most migration theories downplay ethnic, national, religious, and other collective 54

The Process of Migration

ideologies as forces shaping migration decisions. According to Gold (1997), however, it is necessary to consider (1) how collective identities associated with the host society affect the prospective immigrants’ decision making and (2) the social structures (institutions and social networks) in the countries of origin that nurture the relationship between prospective immigrants and the receiving societies. Following Gold (1997), we suggest viewing the migration process in general, and the decision to immigrate in particular, as a “multi-level process (demographic, political, economic, cultural and familial) that involves various links between two or more settings, rather than a discrete event constituted by a permanent move from one nation to another” (410). We must consider not only the economic, political, and cultural structures within which immigrants develop their communities and lives in the destination countries, but also the specific contexts of origin in the sending countries (Amit and Riss 2007). In our view, certain characteristics of the contexts of origin (participation in ethnic networks, institutions, and local values) and the ways in which they nurture a strong national attachment to the host society are relevant for understanding the migration process itself as well as the patterns of immigrants’ integration into their host societies. As we shall see, these considerations are especially relevant for understanding Jewish immigration to Israel in general and South African immigration to the country in particular. To analyze the complex process of making aliyah, we start with a demographic profile of the olim at the time of their emigration from South Africa.2 We then focus on (1) push and pull factors affecting immigrants’ decision to leave and move to Israel, (2) the decision-making process, and (3) the role of social networks and institutional frameworks in the migration process. As we shall see, the rich data gathered in the research afforded us a better grasp of the complex process involved in the move to the new destination. 55

The Process of Migration

Motivations for Aliyah The Newcomers’ Socioeconomic Profile Table 8 shows a general profile of the South African olim prior to immigration to Israel, according to selected socio-demographic characteristics. We focus here on those who were older than seventeen upon arrival (first generation). As table 8 shows, most of the immigrants in our sample lived prior to immigration in Johannesburg and Cape Town, the two cities where the majority of South African Jews reside (Horowitz and Kaplan 2001). After leaving the country, most respondents (93%) came directly to Israel. The few who did not immigrate directly to Israel immigrated first to English-speaking countries such as England, Canada, the United States, and Australia, moving on to Israel after a short stay in these countries. Most newcomers were young on arrival, twenty-seven years old on average with 84% younger than thirty-four. The age distribution was naturally linked with the immigrants’ family status at the time of arrival. Many were single (58%), and among those married (39%) only about one-third had children before aliyah. Half arrived in Israel alone, over one-third with

Table 8: Selected socioeconomic charactersitics of South Africans before arrival, generation 1.0 (percentages or means [standard deviations]) Residence before migration (%) Johannesburg

60.6

Cape Town

25.5

Durban

3.6

Port Elizabeth

3.1

East London

0.7

Pretoria

2.8

Other Migrated directly to Israel (%) Migrated to other countries first (%)

56

The Process of Migration

3.6 93.0 7.0

Australia

11.4

USA

11.4

Canada

25.0

England

43.2

Other

9.1

Years since migration

18.9 (11.7)

Age at migration

27.6 (8.3)

Age distribution (%) 18–24

42.3

25–34

41.4

35–44

11.7

45–54

2.8

55–64

1.8

Marital status before migrating (%) Married or living with a partner

39.3

Divorced, separated or widowed

2.5

Single (never married and not living with a partner) 58.3 Had children before aliyah (%)

28.8

Number of children

2.8 (1.1)

Came to Israel (%) Alone

44.0

With family

38.1

With friends

4.0

With an organized group

13.9

Family’s income in South Africa (%) Far or slightly below average

8.0

About average

37.2

Slightly or much above average

54.8

Participated in the labor force in South Africa (%)

66.4

Occupational status in South Africa (for those in the labor force) Professional, technical, and managerial (%)

63.5

N

608

57

The Process of Migration

family members, and 14% as part of groups mostly organized by such youth movements as Habonim or Bnei Akiva. South African newcomers displayed a relatively high socioeconomic background, with over half ranking their family’s income in South Africa above average. Almost two-thirds of the immigrants were active in the labor force before departure, many of them (64%) in professional, technical, and managerial jobs.3 By any standards South African olim are remarkably highly skilled, making it particularly challenging to identify the constellation of factors that explain their decision to immigrate to Israel.

Push and Pull Factors I visited Israel several times as a young girl and liked the country very much. I said to myself that I wanted to make aliyah. I was active in [the Jewish youth movement] Habonim. . . . I come from a home with a very strong Zionist background—that is the main reason, Zionism . . . I think Zionism pulled us to Israel . . . and we thought, if we leave South Africa, we are not going to go to Canada or Australia. We wanted to raise our children in a Jewish state. . . . And [there was also] the political circumstances, the apartheid in South Africa. Had the situation been more stable we might not have immigrated at the time we did . . . but we did not want to raise children in such difficult political circumstances. . . . We did not know that things would change and everything would be under the control of blacks. But I did not want to raise children knowing that we [whites] were dominating and controlling everything. . . . Blacks did not have a good life. . . . We did not like the apartheid system and did not want to raise children under this “quality of life.” . . . [The period of time] before we left was a time of massive immigration of Jews from South Africa. Unfortunately not all of them arrived in Israel. The majority went to America, England, and Australia. In the 1980s many, many Jews left. (Shelly) 58

The Process of Migration

Shelly’s narrative clearly illustrates that it is always a constellation of factors that drives the individual or family decision to immigrate. This constellation includes push and pull factors related to ideological, political, and economic motivations, all of which tend to be interconnected, facilitating and giving meaning to the decision to leave South Africa for Israel. To understand the process of South African immigration to Israel, we asked the olim (in the survey and the in-depth interviews) for their reasons for making aliyah. By focusing on the relative importance of these reasons as ranked by the olim themselves, the data enable us to examine each motivation separately, track its relation to other motivations, and identify trends over time. In what follows we present the various motivations for immigration classified into push and pull factors. What Pushed South African Jews Away from South Africa?

Table 9 presents the reasons that most decisively influenced the decision to leave South Africa in different decades.4 The table shows that relatively low percentages of olim reported push motives as reasons for migrating. That said, close scrutiny of the data reveals that political reasons, namely feelings of dissatisfaction with political upheavals in South Africa, personal safety concerns, opposition to apartheid, and concern for the future under a black government ranked among the most important reasons inducing them to emigrate from South Africa (35.5%, 27.8%, 27.6%, and 25.9%, respectively). The percentage of respondents reporting political upheavals as an important push factor was higher for those arriving up to the end of the 1980s, much lower for those arriving during the 1990s (the Mandela period), but rising again for those arriving in 2000–2008. Carla, for example, told us she had decided to leave South Africa during the Soweto uprising in 1976, when she was still a youngster: 59

The Process of Migration

4.3 608

Anti-Israel sentiment in SA

N

8.2 4.7

Economic situation in SA

Antisemitism in SA

9.2

Affirmative action in SA

Dwindling of the SA Jewish community

19.6 12.1

Wishes of other family members

27.6 25.9

Concern for the future under a black government

27.8

Opposition to apartheid government

35.5

Personal safety concerns

All

32

3.2

9.7

0.0

0.0

0.0

12.9

13.0

43.8

3.1

40.0

1961– 69

Period of arrival

Dissatisfaction with political upheavals

Push factors

127

2.4

5.5

0.8

0.0

1.0

18.9

12.5

46.0

14.2

48.8

1970–79

137

0.7

1.5

3.7

2.9

4.3

18.4

30.6

35.6

19.7

43.8

1980–89

174

2.3

7.0

11.6

10.5

12.0

19.8

26.0

10.2

36.6

21.5

1990–99

Table 9: Push factors: reasons for leaving South Africa, by time of arrival (% to a great / very great extent)

138

12.5

2.9

17.0

24.4

29.1

22.7

34.8

12.9

43.4

31.6

2000–2008

Q: When did you start thinking about leaving South Africa? Carla: During the revolts of 1976. They disturbed me a lot. I was fifteen years old and I thought to myself that I did not want to live here, it was scary and I was scared of it all. Around me a lot of people started to get organized and pack and leave South Africa. . . . My best friend came to Israel with her family. And it affected me, it really did. So from a very young age I knew this was not the place where I would bring up my children. I did not agree with the government and could not stay there. But to stay there and fight, I did not see how I could do that. Clearly associated with political upheavals, concerns over personal safety scored relatively high among the motives fueling South African aliyah to Israel (more so for women, at 32%, than for men, at 22%), becoming increasingly marked for newer arrivals. For example, only 14% of immigrants arriving during the 1970s stressed this reason as a factor affecting their decision to a very great extent, a figure rising to 43.4% in 2000–2008. Personal safety was a concern for Daniela, who arrived in Israel in 1988. When asked about the factors that affected her decision to leave South Africa, she compared the differences between the two countries in that regard: The situation was not good there [in South Africa], not as bad as today but still not good. When I came to Israel and started living here, and I saw girls walking alone in the street, and my son walking freely in the street, I said . . . there’s no such thing there! I grew up [in South Africa] with a sense of insecurity from an early age. There was no such thing as “I’m going out,” no such thing as “I’m going for a walk with friends.” You don’t do these things over there . . . it was always dangerous. To this day when my parents go out in their car, they don’t stop at a red 61

The Process of Migration

light. My parents are afraid, and they live in a building with bars and a video camera that sees anyone who comes near. Like Daniela, many olim stressed the difficult security situation in South Africa, their constant fear of being attacked and robbed. In Israel, by contrast, they feel secure and value the ability to walk freely in the streets. In their view this contributes to a better quality of life. The reasons for leaving South Africa were also cast in terms of social dilemmas: apartheid and the changes that its abolition would pose to whites and Jews. This was especially true for individuals arriving in Israel before the 1990s: 46% and 36% of the 1970s and 1980s cohorts, respectively. Concern over the moral consequences of living in a society characterized by apartheid emerged spontaneously from the in-depth interviews. A case in point is Stacey, who arrived in Israel in 1977: First of all, when I grew up under apartheid, I didn’t know that not everyone lived like this. . . . It was natural to get on a bus that said “whites only”—I took the train every day; blacks were crowded together and we [whites] had room—and did not to ask why. . . . [Then] I traveled to Europe. . . . I suddenly I saw it all. . . . When I returned I couldn’t take it anymore. That’s why I wanted to leave South Africa, because I knew I could not change it [apartheid] or even begin to change it. . . . We knew we could not continue to live under these circumstances. . . . We didn’t like apartheid in general and did not want [our children] to be part of it. And I thought that if something were to change in the future, we did not want [the children] to be in the middle of it. We wanted them to grow up in a normal society. Like Stacey, many interviewees told us that political mobilization against apartheid was not viewed favorably by Jewish community leaders. They wished to maintain the political status quo and wanted members of the 62

The Process of Migration

community to refrain from any political activity that might endanger the fragile status of Jews in the South African polity. David, who arrived in Israel in 1963, shared his feelings with us: Although we were very left-wing, the Zionist Federation told us, “In this place you should not be active politically.” Yet we could not keep quiet. I mean, we were not active against the government, but of course we were against apartheid and against the government.” Along with their critical stance on apartheid, concern for the future under a black government greatly affected the respondents’ decision to emigrate. This is especially true for olim arriving from the late 1980s onward, in the years leading up to the abolition of apartheid. On average 30% of the respondents reported such a concern: I was concerned about the future, and you know, blacks were oppressed then, and people were anxious that at some time the situation could flip over. What would the future of the Jews be then [under a black government]? Next to political reasons, immigration was also a consequence of the wishes and decisions of other family members. Almost 20% of the olim in our survey reported this reason as very important. It was more prevalent among women (25%) who came to Israel with their husbands or other family members than among men (15%).5 In fact many of these women came to Israel against their wishes, hoping to convince their spouses to emigrate from Israel to some other (English-speaking) country. Carla, for example, did not want to make aliyah, wishing to immigrate to Australia instead. Because of her husband’s determination they ended up in Israel contrary to her wishes: 63

The Process of Migration

I was dating [my current husband] and we decided to get married, and . . . things happened by inertia. He did not want to stay in South Africa, he really never wanted to be there, he wanted to come to Israel. He was very Zionist. . . . I was very anti-Israel, I didn’t want to come to Israel. . . . I really wanted to go to Australia and that was my desired destination. I said to him: Let’s fill out the forms for Australia. He refused, he didn’t want to, so he said, “No, I won’t.” Overall, economic reasons did not play an important role in the decision to emigrate, though economic circumstances in South Africa and fears of the consequences of affirmative action in the South African labor market were notably relevant for recent cohorts (2000–2008) (24% and 29%, respectively; see table 9).6 One important aspect of these policies is preferential treatment of blacks in employment, intended to improve their economic status. South Africa’s employment legislation reserves 80% of new jobs for blacks and favors black-owned companies. Perceived as affecting whites’ occupational mobility in the South African labor market, this policy has become an important factor fueling the recent immigration of South African Jews to other countries in general and to Israel in particular. In Israel since 2003, Ryan noted employment issues as a reason for leaving South Africa: I knew it would be hard for me to get a job [in South Africa] just because I’m white. I knew it from [someone] whose job was to examine the racial composition of employees in companies. . . . I also hear it from my friends who remained in South Africa. . . . [It is difficult] to find work and to get promoted. . . . It is one of the reasons but not the main one. Some olim, like Stacey (in Israel since 1977), went as far as defining the new affirmative action policy as anti-white discrimination, labeling it a “new type of apartheid”: 64

The Process of Migration

And now . . . it’s really the opposite, there’s a reverse apartheid, there’s racism against whites. Whites can’t get jobs—first of all blacks and then maybe, if there’s a place left, then whites get a job. Everything is now backward. As table 9 reveals, the dwindling of the Jewish community has been a push factor, especially for those arriving since the 1990s, when Jewish emigration from South Africa was high and the size of the Jewish population fell steeply (from 120,000 in 1980 to 80,000 in 2000; see Horowitz and Kaplan 2001). Though this motivation ranks low relative to others (8.2%), it seems to have become increasingly important for later arrivals (17% among the 2000–2008 cohorts). Finally the data in table 9 show that antisemitism and anti-Israeli sentiments played only a minor role in fueling immigration to Israel.7 Each cohort of olim ranked these reasons at the bottom, and less than 5% of all respondents reported them as motivating their decision to make aliyah.8 Note, however, that anti-Israel sentiments have played a more important role for those arriving more recently, leaping from 2% in the 1990s to 13% in 2000–2008.9 Pull Factors: What Draws South African Jews to Israel?

So far we have discussed the respondents’ reasons for leaving South Africa. We now turn to the pull factors attracting South African Jews to Israel. Table 10 presents the factors reported by olim of different decades as making Israel attractive to them to a great or very great extent. Overall we have identified three main pull factors, ranked in a descending order of importance as follows: (1) ideological (i.e., ethnic and religious identities), (2) social (e.g., the wish to join friends and family), and (3) instrumental (e.g., employment opportunities and the quality of social services). 65

The Process of Migration

Table 10: Pull factors: reasons for choosing Israel as a destination, by time of arrival (% to a great / very great extent) Pull factors Period of arrival

All

1961–69 1970– 79 1980–89 1990–99 2000–2008

ideological Zionism

74.5

75.0

74.8

80.3

71.8

71.5

Having children 66.3 grow up in a Jewish environment

53.1

64.3

66.2

66.5

72.0

Living among Jews 66.0

56.3

60.3

70.1

66.7

68.6

Religious beliefs

38.6

18.8

22.0

29.9

47.1

56.2

Joining relatives and friends

26.3

6.7

20.2

25.0

28.9

34.1

Wishing to find a partner/spouse in Israel

25.6

16.0

13.9

13.6

27.8

45.3

10.3

6.5

9.5

5.2

9.9

18.1

Israel’s health system 8.8

0.0

1.6

5.1

11.6

17.5

Career opportunities 8.7 in Israel

3.1

4.7

8.0

9.8

13.1

social

instrumental Israel’s educational system

N

608

32

127

137

174

138

Ideological Factors

Table 10 makes it evident that Jewish emigration from South Africa to Israel has been above all ideological.10 The motivations for choosing Israel as the destination country were primarily Zionism (75%), the desire to live among Jews (66%), and the desire to have the immigrants’ children grow up in a Jewish environment (66%).11 These reasons have remained quite stable across different immigrant cohorts. 66

The Process of Migration

Strong feelings of attachment to Judaism and to Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people are not surprising, given the long-standing tradition of the Zionist movement in South Africa (Weisbord 1967; Shimoni 2003). In addition most olim were raised in a segregated Jewish environment, deeply embedded in the dense fabric of Jewish tradition and community life in which the synagogue, Jewish schools, youth movements, and other organizations played a major role (Dubb 1977; Elazar 1983). As we shall see, then, this Jewish-Zionist identity assumed a central role in shaping the immigration decisions of prospective immigrants.12 Table 10 also reveals the salience of religious beliefs for later arrivals.13 The percentage of respondents reporting religious motives as pull factors has significantly increased, from 22% in the 1970s to 56% in 2000–2008.14 These findings suggest that later arrivals grew up in a community that, while still Zionist, had a more pronounced religious orientation (see Horowitz and Kaplan 2001). Social Factors: The Power of Social Networks

Non-ideological factors have also played an important part in attracting South African Jews to Israel. Already prior to immigration, the majority of respondents had established extensive social networks in Israel, as most (88%) had family members and/or friends residing in Israel prior to their own immigration.15 A quarter of all South African olim considered the desire to join relatives and friends already in Israel an important reason for choosing this country, their percentage rising from 20% in the 1970s to 34% in the 2000–2008. Orah is a case in point. She first moved to another English-speaking country to pursue a career, but after a couple of years decided that her family was more important: Q: When did you start thinking about aliyah? Orah: I didn’t think about it. . . . I’m not an ideological person. . . . It was a matter of fate. I came because my [family] was here. . . . I came 67

The Process of Migration

here to try and see how I would manage. . . . I wanted a family life surrounded by my sisters. New reasons for choosing Israel as a country of destination have gained importance for recent immigrants. One is the wish to find a ( Jewish) spouse in Israel, reported by less than 14% of those arriving in the 1970s and 1980s and by a staggering 45.3% of those arriving in 2000–2008. Arguably this motivation’s increasing importance over time is connected to the dwindling of the Jewish community in South Africa, which has shrunk the marriage market for young Jewish people. Instrumental Factors

Though of relatively lesser importance, instrumental reasons for making aliyah were also reported, especially among new arrivals. For example, approximately 20% of respondents arriving in the 2000–2008 cited as important the advantages of the national health and education systems (universal coverage in the first case, free public education in the second). Education is highly valued, especially for religious and traditional-religious olim, who in South Africa had to send their children to expensive private Jewish schools for a Jewish education.16 Megan (in Israel since 2007) set out the benefits of living in Israel in clear terms: Certain things are much easier here. Schooling doesn’t cost a fortune. My kids were in private schools in South Africa—they had to go to private schools to get an education—while here schooling doesn’t cost as much, not nearly what it cost there. Medical care here is much cheaper—those were the two items that used to kill us every month. . . . Medical aid also cost a lot of money because you didn’t want to go to a government hospital; it’s not up to standard. Interestingly, although the South African olim tend to be very highly skilled, economic motives did not constitute a pull factor: only 9% cited 68

The Process of Migration

career opportunities as a reason for choosing Israel as their destination. On the contrary, for many of them immigration, at least during the first few years in Israel, meant downward economic and occupational mobility. In sum the data in the survey help to highlight the degree to which different factors triggered the immigration of South African Jews to Israel. The key role of non-economic motives in their decisions, namely a strong Zionist and Jewish identity that characterized most of the respondents in the sample, is striking. But these pull factors in themselves were seemingly insufficient to separate prospective immigrants from their social origins. The political, social, and economic deterioration in South Africa served as the catalyst for the pull factors to become operative at a particular point in time.

Moving to Israel or to an English-Speaking Country? Considering Alternative Destinations We did not consider immigrating to another country. Israel is the state of the Jewish people. Friends asked me, “How could you go to a place where English is not the official language? You’re making a mistake—go to Australia. If they expel you from there, then you can go to Israel, where doors are always open for Jews.” We have relatives in several [English-speaking countries] and we could have gone to other places. Israel was the only place where we didn’t have relatives. . . . Life is much more difficult here but [we wanted to come here]. (Samantha, in Israel since 1987) Samantha’s story resembles the usual narrative heard during most of our interviews with South African olim: Israel as the preferred destination mainly for ideological reasons. Although people around them sometimes suggested that they leave for other destinations, they were firm in their decision. To learn about their decision-making process, we asked the respondents 69

The Process of Migration

in the survey whether prior to immigration they had considered destinations other than Israel. As table 11 shows, the majority (81%) chose Israel as their unique destination without considering any alternative. Still, 19% did consider immigrating to English-speaking countries where most of the South African diaspora resides, primarily the United States and Australia (over 40%), followed by Britain (32%) and Canada (23%). Australia was described as a preferred destination because of its cultural and linguistic similarities with South Africa. As Judy succinctly put it: I told you that I traveled a lot . . . and one of the places I liked very much was Australia. The reason for that, I think, is that it is very similar to South Africa. Culturally it is pretty much the same. . . . They do a lot of sports and live outdoors with the barbecue and everything else [just like they do in South Africa]. Respondents who considered countries other than Israel were asked for the main reason they did not move there (see bottom panel of table 11). Interestingly a high percentage of olim (42%) used this opportunity to reaffirm their ideological motivation for choosing Israel: Zionism. Table 11: South African olim: other countries considered, reasons for not going % considered migrating to another country Countries considereda

19.1

%

USA

43.1

Australia

40.5

England

31.9

Canada

23.3

New Zealand

5.2

Other

2.6

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Main reason for not migrating to another countrya Israel is the place for the Jews (Zionism)

% 41.6

Immigration rules and procedures are strict/lengthy

18.6

Family reasons

15.9

Other

12.4

Israel offers economic benefits for olim

7.1

Job opportunities

4.4

N

120.0

aRespondents could give multiple answers.

Family reasons (16%) and strict or lengthy immigration rules and procedures in other countries (18%) deterred some immigrants from their original plans, finally landing them in Israel. This was the case with Megan, who arrived in Israel in 2007: We started maybe looking at Australia. Australia wanted so much paperwork and information, and it was just too much. Australia doesn’t really want too many South Africans. Q: Why not? I think they just have too many [already]; they make it very difficult for you to enter their country. Q: And why did you decide to come to Israel? Was it for Zionist reasons? Not really. I have a sister here, and you know Israel is a country that wants us, wants us as Jews. Not many countries want us. Israel definitely wants us and we get a lot of support, which is very important. Q: From Telfed [the South African Zionist Federation in Israel]? Yes, in general we get a lot of support. . . . Friends said, “How can you go to a country with bombings?” . . . And I said to them, you don’t

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really understand, [I said] we live in a country [i.e., South Africa] where they kill you, attack you for no reason. They don’t quite understand . . . they’ve got to come here to really see. . . . . They don’t know, we live a very good life [in Israel]. I mean, you know, we didn’t live that kind of life in South Africa. Though Megan and her family would have preferred Australia as a destination, the support provided by the State of Israel and by nongovernmental organizations such as Telfed, contrasted with Australia’s reluctant immigration policy with its strict rules, persuaded them to come to Israel. This is just one case in which state policies as well as social and institutional networks in Israel affected the final decision to choose Israel as the destination.

Making Aliyah as a Natural Consequence of Jewish and Zionist Education I think that if you’re a Zionist there’s no need to convince you to come [to Israel]. . . . For me, just the fact that I would be living among Jews, in our own country, this is for me the most important thing. (Warren, in Israel since 1979) One of the themes emerging most frequently from the immigrants’ narratives during the in-depth interviews is that making aliyah was a natural outcome of their upbringing in South Africa, where a unified and closely knit Jewish community raised its children on values of Judaism and Zionism. Table 12 reflects the Jewish environment in which the South African olim spent most of their life prior to immigration. Attendance at Jewish schools and membership in Jewish youth movements were fairly common among South African olim (58% and 83% of all arrivals, respectively). A close look at differences between immigrants from different decades reveals that attendance at Jewish schools increased among those arriving during the last two decades, while membership in nonreligious youth movements such as Habonim experienced some decline. At the same time membership in religious movements such as Bnei Akiva increased considerably. 72

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Synagogue attendance in South Africa was quite common. Fully 52% of all first-generation respondents attended religious services and activities at least once a week, and as we noted earlier, such religious involvement has become more pronounced among olim arriving after 1990. Here, as elsewhere in our study, it is evident that the typical South African Jew was rooted in a community highly devoted to the nurturing of a Jewish and Zionist identity and was therefore receptive to the idea of making aliyah. The next story provides a vivid insight into the everyday life of Jews in South Africa, illustrating the extent to which the ethnic community contributed to the construction of a strong Jewish identity and a fervent attachment to Israel. [In South Africa] I went to a Jewish school [for twelve years], I went to [religious youth movement] Bnei Akiva, I went to synagogue on Shabbat. . . . Life revolved around the synagogue community. . . . The only non-Jewish friends I had were neighbors who lived near us, but life itself was within the Jewish community. . . . We were at the synagogue on the holidays, on [Israel’s] Independence Day, and on other festive occasions. . . . That’s why I’m here today. . . . It may sound too idealized, but what I absorbed [in South Africa] and the [education] I got—this is what brought me to [choose] Israel over any other option. (Shelly, in Israel since 1986) This narrative conveys the vibrancy of Jewish life in South Africa and the ways in which Jewish and Zionist values and culture were nurtured in Jewish schools, synagogues, and youth movements. Also described in many of the narratives were the connections between Israel and South Africa’s Jewish community and the efforts made by Israeli institutions and organizations to sustain the community’s Jewish and Zionist character. To nurture attachment to Judaism and Israel among South Africa’s Jewish youth, the Israeli government and various Zionist 73

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51.8 40.5

Habonim

Bnei Akiva

1.5

Ultra-Orthodox

51.8 608

1–3 times a week

N

synagogue attendance (%)

41.8 33.4

Modern Orthodox

4.5

Reform or Progressive

Traditional

18.7

Secular

religious practice (%)

15.6

Beitar

membership in each movement (%)

57.6 82.5

Youth movement membership (%)

All

32

38.7

0.0

29.0

35.5

6.5

29.0

29.6

55.6

7.4

87.1

38.8

1961–69

Period of arrival

Attended Jewish school (%)

type of school

Involvement in Jewish life

127

44.9

0.0

29.1

41.7

3.9

25.2

26.4

60.0

18.2

87.3

41.3

1970– 79

Table 12: Involvement in Jewish life in South Africa by generation 1.0 olim

137

47.1

0.0

22.8

47.1

7.4

22.8

31.7

65.8

15.0

88.2

58.1

1980–89

174

55.2

1.8

39.8

40.9

3.5

14.0

46.9

44.6

14.6

75.6

60.4

1990–99

138

61.7

4.5

41.4

39.1

3.0

12.0

59.8

35.5

16.8

79.9

73.2

2000–2008

organizations encouraged Israeli youth movements to send emissaries to summer camps in South Africa, where they would organize seminars and conferences and introduce the local Jewish youth to Israeli songs and folk dancing. Attachment to Israel was also nurtured through frequent visits to Israel. Many of the interviewees had gone there as tourists, either as children with their parents or alone via youth movements and other programs designed to encourage emotional connection to Israel.17 Ryan (in Israel since 2003) told us: I had visited three times before [making aliyah]. I participated in a quiz on Jewish identity organized in South Africa by Bar-Ilan University. The first time I won third place, the second time I won second place. The winners go to Israel along with winners from other countries, and here in Israel there’s the world quiz on Jewish identity. I also came here once alone and stayed with family. . . . I especially wanted to see what life was like here. Such visits to Israel had a significant impact on the decision to make aliyah, especially among younger people, for whom aliyah was a natural outcome of strong affective ties with Israel nurtured from childhood to maturity.18 As Shelly told us, “When I was in tenth grade I visited Israel as part of a three-month program, and it was probably then that I caught the bug to live in Israel.” Since Judaism and Zionism were among the most important motivators of immigration to Israel, it is hardly surprising that many of the olim described Israel as a place in which they felt as part of the majority group. Experiencing themselves as a minority in South Africa, many of them sought the advantages of being part of a cultural and political majority, of living in a society steeped in Jewish culture and traditions.19 In particular they wished to raise and educate their children in such an environment. For Shelly, living as a Jew in South Africa was a complicated experience, especially during the Jewish holidays, when South Africans carried on with 75

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their everyday routines at school and at work while she needed to juggle the two worlds (e.g., not go to work or to school on Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur, when everyone around her did). In Israel, by contrast, you just live it. . . . It is part of everyday life and you don’t have to negotiate being a Jew with your immediate environment. [Back in South Africa] my husband had to work on Yom Kippur and other religious Jewish holidays. . . . [Back there] we needed to deal with [the situation whereby] gentiles worked and we didn’t. . . . And to this day I enjoy this bit, that on holidays I don’t have to worry. And you Israelis just don’t get it. I see my children who don’t understand, and you [Israelis] don’t get it. In summary, our respondents’ reasons for coming to Israel were mainly cast in terms of subjective personal dilemmas having to do with Zionism and with Jewish identity. The latter especially became a central component of the olim’s social identity. They sought a place where they could feel part of the majority group and where it would be easier to conduct a traditionally Jewish way of life.

The Immigration Process: The Role of Social Networks and Institutions Immigrating to a new country is a process fraught with uncertainty. To mitigate the uncertainty, prospective immigrants must rely on various sources for information, guidance, and financial and emotional support. Acquaintance and personal relationships with immigrants already in the destination country open up sources of information and provide muchneeded social contacts. Foremost among these are family relations, which constitute the most important bases for immigrants’ social organization and provide newcomers with a secure, constant source of favors and help, though friendship ties are another important source of assistance. 76

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At the societal level, governmental and nongovernmental organizations influence the size and composition of immigration flows. In the case of Israel, some of these organizations (i.e., the Jewish Agency and community associations in the country of origin and in Israel) have become strongly involved in efforts to encourage and sponsor emigration from selected countries with Jewish communities (Raijman 2009). These institutional and social networks become a sort of social capital, which not only helps the immigrants in all spheres of life but also forms a social structure capable of supporting further immigration flows (Massey et al. 1987). To learn about the role of networks and institutions in the immigration process, respondents were asked whether they relied on specific sources for information and whether the specific source was helpful.20 Their answers to both questions, in percentages, are set out in table 13. As the data show, most olim actively sought information about benefits for newcomers and used two types of support sources: formal agencies and informal networks. These functioned as complementary sources of information in the transitional process. Formal institutions have not only the knowledge but also, and most importantly, the financial resources to support prospective immigrants. Informal networks are more effective for managing the emotional tasks involved in everyday socialization (Litwak 1985). Informal ties are also crucial to the decision-making process, however, for example by making it possible to receive or confirm reliable information, friendly advice, and emotional support (Amit and Riss 2007). Prospective olim were likely to rely on institutional frameworks such as the Jewish Agency and Telfed (almost two-thirds of the olim) and to a lesser extent on youth movements such as Habonim and Bnei Akiva (onethird). Fully 60% of those who used such formal venues described them as effective and helpful. Far fewer olim relied on personal networks for information (26% on family members, 33% on friends), but these networks were nevertheless valuable, as reported by over 50% of those who used them. 77

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9.4 35.8 608

Internet

% reported as helpful or very helpful

N

33.4

60.3

% reported as helpful or very helpful 70.0

61.0

Telfed

% reported as helpful or very helpful

61.3

% reported as helpful or very helpful

Youth movements

57.1 61.1

32.6

Family

Jewish agency

56.3

% reported as helpful or very helpful

% reported as helpful or very helpful

26.4

Friends

source of information

All

32

0.0

0.0

75.0

62.5

64.3

43.8

46.2

43.8

66.7

18.8

62.5

25.0

1961–69

Table 13: Sources of information, by period of arrival

127

0.0

0.0

81.2

41.7

55.1

63.8

58.9

44.9

63.7

26.0

66.7

23.6

1970– 79

137

0.0

0.0

76.0

39.4

62.6

60.0

68.4

59.1

58.4

35.0

58.1

22.6

1980–89

174

28.6

4.0

61.6

29.9

61.1

65.5

57.5

61.5

56.4

35.6

63.7

25.3

1990–99

138

36.7

36.5

45.9

17.5

61.5

58.4

63.0

81.8

51.0

35.8

40.4

34.3

2000–2008

The differences in the use of formal and informal networks should be understood in light of the proactive role of the Jewish Agency and Telfed in stimulating immigration to Israel. The financial support provided by the State of Israel to prospective immigrants makes government institutions such as the Jewish Agency key actors in the process. The Jewish Agency has two main offices in South Africa, one in Cape Town, the other in Johannesburg. Prospective olim go there to meet the shlichim (emissaries) and discuss their aliyah plans, assistance with travel costs, attendance at an ulpan (Hebrew classes for olim), and other forms of support, especially during the first months after arrival. The shlichim thus play a very special role representing Israel and the Israeli agencies dealing with aliyah: We met several times with the shlichim. It was very, very important. I still have contact with them. All my family still have contact with them. . . . They were very, very special there [in South Africa], and I think that many people [made aliyah] because of them. (Peter, in Israel since 1997) We got the information from the shaliach [emissary] at the Jewish Agency. What she said was [treated with] reverence because we didn’t have any other way to check or know. . . . We didn’t have relatives or know anyone there who could tell us. . . . It was before the Internet era—we still sent letters. (Shelly, in Israel since 1986) Telfed also plays an important role in the process of immigration. The organization is characterized by its rather intensive involvement in both immigration and integration. Telfed representatives maintain permanent contact with the Jewish community in South Africa, organizing and participating in special fairs aimed to motivate Jews to make aliyah: In South Africa it was through . . . Telfed, and they too were very helpful. We had quite a few meetings with them, they were very good . . . 79

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and people came from Israel to visit [in South Africa]. . . . It was quite interesting what we heard, it was great. (Megan, in Israel since 2007) Pilot trips organized by Telfed were mentioned by many olim who had taken the opportunity to visit Israel. These pilot trips helped them decide on potential places to live, search for jobs, and seek out other types of necessary information (on driving licenses, schools, health insurance, and so on). We went to the South African Zionist Federation and talked with the representative of Telfed. We joined the pilot tour, a tour organized by Telfed, to learn about options in Israel. . . . We were also in touch with [South African] friends in Israel who had already made aliyah. (Samantha, in Israel since 1987) The arrival of South African olim is always celebrated by Telfed. A delegation is always present at Ben-Gurion Airport to receive them, along with Jewish Agency staff. Telfed representatives escort the newcomers through the first steps of the immigration process and help carry their luggage through customs and onto the bus.21 The advent of the Internet as a global communications technology has transformed the aliyah experience, the World Wide Web becoming a new source of information for olim over the last decade. Community organizations and Israeli government institutions have set up websites where most of the necessary information can be gathered and where prospective immigrants can learn about their options in Israel and contact various sources of information. Those considering aliyah can even watch videos of Israel on YouTube, allowing them not only to imagine but to have a vivid glimpse of their future in Israel. In both South Africa and Israel, prospective olim have access then to social networks and organizations that play an especially salient role in the immigrants’ decision-making process and in the actual move to Israel. 80

The Process of Migration

Conclusions This chapter has focused on the aliyah, or immigration, process of South African Jews to Israel, with the goal of identifying its main driving forces, the ways the olim organized their move, and the types of resources (individual and institutional) on which they relied to make their decision and implement it. Our study suggests that push as well as pull factors explain South African Jewish immigration to Israel. The unstable socioeconomic and political situation prevalent in South Africa was the main push factor explaining the desire to leave the country, whereas a strong Jewish and Zionist identity acted as a strong pull factor driving South African olim to Israel. In addition the existence of social networks and institutional frameworks linking the two countries helped perpetuate the immigration over time. The important role of networks and institutions highlights the social embeddedness of the immigration process. Two salient conceptual points emerge. First, theories that stress the economic aspects of immigration alone are not helpful in explaining South African Jewish immigration to Israel. Our findings suggest that in addition to economic concerns, we must also consider how ethnic identities related to the host society (e.g., Jewish and Zionist identity) affect potential immigrants’ decision making. Second, our case study suggests the need to consider the contexts of both origin and reception as the social structures in which individuals’ decisions to immigrate develop and concretize. The current chapter has described the stages preceding the aliyah of South African Jews to Israel. In the next few chapters we will discuss the olim’s experiences after their arrival in Israel. In the next chapter we provide a thorough analysis of linguistic assimilation among the three generational groups.

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Chapter 4

Linguistic Assimilation This chapter focuses on the process of linguistic assimilation of South Africans in Israel. Language is a crucial domain for assessing immigrants’ economic and social adjustment in their host countries, an assertion supported by substantial research (Espenshade and Fu 1997; Espinosa and Massey 1997; Chiswick 1998; Chiswick and Miller 1998). In Israel numerous studies have examined patterns of language proficiency and use among immigrants, many focusing on immigrants from the former Soviet Union (see, e.g., Ben-Rafael, Olshtain, and Geijst 1998; Mesch 2003; Remennick 2003a, 2004; Ben-Rafael et al. 2006; Tannenbaum 2009), on French speakers (see Ben-Rafael and Ben-Rafael 2013), and on multiple immigrant groups comparatively (Beenstock 1996; Chiswick 1998; Beenstock, Chiswick, and Repetto, 2001; Raijman, Semyonov and Geffen, 2014).1 Still, relatively little is known about the process of linguistic assimilation from a comparative generational perspective. Knowledge and use of the local language is one area in which generational differences are strongly felt. Studies conducted elsewhere have shown that proficiency in the host

country’s language is almost universal in the second generation (Portes and Schauffler 1994; Hurtado and Vega 2004), sometimes resulting in loss of the parents’ mother tongue and in conversion to monolingualism (Alba et al. 2002). Studies of linguistic assimilation from a comparative generational perspective are scarce in Israel because of the lack of adequate data. The unique research design of our study, which collected data on three generational groups, provides an opportunity to fill this lacuna.

Theoretical Background Scholars have emphasized the need to differentiate two aspects of linguistic assimilation: language proficiency and language use (Espinosa and Massey 1997; Mesch 2003; Van Tubergen and Kalmijn 2009a). It is widely recognized that language use and language proficiency are separate linguistic characteristics and that their causes and consequences may be quite different (Stevens 1992). Language proficiency, usually viewed as connected to socioeconomic attainment, tends to vary along different dimensions, with oral and comprehension skills typically being higher than reading and writing skills among immigrants (Remennick 2004). Language use, by contrast, is often viewed as an indicator of ethnic identity and acculturation (Gordon 1964; Van Tubergen and Kalmijn 2009a) and as a cause of cultural difference and ethnic boundaries (Alba et al. 2002). Research has shown that immigrants are more likely to use the local language in formal domains such as work and other public settings, and their native language in informal domains, with family (especially if the spouse or partner belongs to the same ethnic group) (Van Tubergen and Kalmijn 2009a, 2009b) and with co-ethnic friends (Remennick 2003a, 2004). The literature on immigrants’ linguistic assimilation suggests several factors associated with language proficiency and use. Sociologists and economists describe the process of language acquisition as an investment 84

Linguistic Assimilation

in human capital that improves labor market opportunities for new immigrants. The human capital approach tends to stress three main factors: (1) economic incentives for acquiring language skills, (2) exposure to the new language in the country of origin and the host country, and (3) efficiency in converting economic incentives and exposure into language skills (see Chiswick 1998, 255). The logic underlying economic incentives is that investment in language skills improves economic assimilation. Since language is also acquired through interaction with coworkers, it is expected that immigrants active in the labor market will acquire more language skills than their counterparts who are not part of the labor force (Beenstock 1996). Although participation in the labor market increases the likelihood of improving language proficiency and use (Espenshade and Fu 1997), the literature suggests that this is particularly relevant for immigrants in highly skilled occupations where the payoff for command of the local language is especially high (Beenstock 1996; Espinosa and Massey 1997; Remennick 2003b; Raijman, Semyonov, and Geffen 2014). Exposure to the new language in the country of origin and in the host country is associated with higher levels of linguistic assimilation. Immigrants who received (formal or informal) language training in either country (origin and/or destination) tend to be more fluent than those who did not (Beenstock 1996). Likewise language proficiency and use both tend to increase with length of stay in the country of destination, as immigrants accumulate experience in their new society (Stevens 1986, 1992; Espenshade and Fu 1997; for the case of Israel, see, e.g., Chiswick 1998; Mesch 2003; Remennick 2004; Raijman 2013; Raijman, Semyonov, and Geffen 2014). Exposure is also related to the degree of ethnic enclosure of specific immigrant groups, measured by residential concentration and the ethnic composition of social networks (Stevens 1992; Espenshade and Fu 1997; 85

Linguistic Assimilation

Mesch 2003). It has been argued that immigrants who tend to bond with co-ethnics and live in neighborhoods with a larger concentration of immigrants from the same country of origin or in language-specific communities are less exposed to the local language and use their mother tongue more often in daily interactions.2 Another relevant arena of linguistic exposure is the family; marital status may therefore affect language skills (Stevens 1992; Chiswick and Miller 1998). Individuals married to co-ethnic spouses tend to use their mother tongue more often for daily family interactions, whereas singles and individuals married to non-co-ethnic spouses have more opportunities to become proficient in the local language (Van Tubergen and Kamijn 2009a, 2009b). The presence of young children increases the likelihood of language proficiency, as children are more likely to use the local language in daily interactions. Efficiency refers to the ways in which incentives and exposure affect language proficiency. Education and age at immigration have been singled out as key determinants of language acquisition and use. Highly educated immigrants are better able to acquire new language skills than less educated counterparts (Stevens 1999) and are more willing to invest in language acquisition, mostly because language skills improve economic assimilation in the host society (Mesch, 2003; Van Tubergen and Kalmijn 2009a, 2009b). It has been argued that younger immigrants have greater economic incentives to learn the language because the expected socioeconomic returns on such an investment extend over more years. Immigrants arriving at an older age will presumably display lower levels of language acquisition because of the shorter time remaining to enjoy returns on the investment (Stevens 1992; Chiswick 1998). In addition, because of maturational constraints, immigrants arriving at older ages have greater difficulties than younger counterparts in learning a new language, even when tenure in the country is controlled for (Stevens 1992; Espenshade and Fu 1997).3 86

Linguistic Assimilation

Gender is likely to affect language acquisition among immigrants, mostly because men and women tend to participate in different social environments, and differences in social environments are expected to have significant implications for language acquisition and language use (Stevens 1999). For example, immigrant men are more likely to join the labor force than immigrant women. Consequently immigrant men are expected to evince higher levels of local language fluency than immigrant women. However, as immigrant women have been narrowing the employment gender gap, one would expect that gender differences in language proficiency would also narrow (Rebhun 2014). It has also been argued that because women are more likely than men to be responsible for child education and family health care, they might acquire a good command of the destination language in order to perform these activities efficiently (Stevens 1992; Rebhun 2014). In general, however, studies have revealed that immigrant women are less likely than their male counterparts to learn the host country’s language ( Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990; Espinosa and Massey 1997; Beiser and Hou 2000). Some scholars have also suggested that factors prior to immigration, such as motivations for immigration (e.g., push or pull factors), also affect linguistic assimilation. The motivation hypothesis holds that immigrants who arrived as a result of push factors may see themselves as temporary residents in the host country and thus have greater motivation to maintain their own culture and language. By contrast, immigrants drawn by pull factors may be more interested in adapting to the new culture, hence more willing to invest in acquiring the host country’s language (Chiswick and Miller 2001; Mesch 2003). Finally, the immigrants’ commitment to their new country is also an important consideration. Those who feel attached to the host society may be more willing to invest in language acquisition and therefore become more proficient in the local language (Chiswick and Miller 1995; Mesch 2003). Based on this theoretical outline, we next examine the processes of linguistic assimilation among members of three generations (first, 87

Linguistic Assimilation

one-and-a-half, and second) in Israel’s South African community. First, we describe the levels of Hebrew proficiency among first-generation South African immigrants and the process of Hebrew acquisition in both South Africa and Israel. This is followed by a multivariate analysis to identify the main factors affecting the Hebrew proficiency of those who arrived in Israel as adults. Second, to describe the process of language shift, we analyze language preferences and patterns of language use in private and in public, as well as patterns of media and cultural consumption among members of the three generations. Third, we examine native language maintenance by assessing the levels of English proficiency among the one-and-a-half and second generations and discuss both the instrumental and symbolic value attributed to the English language as an asset in Israeli society.

Hebrew Proficiency among First-Generation Olim Previous research has shown that higher levels of linguistic assimilation result from exposure to the host society’s language in the country of origin and in the host country. South African olim who have had Hebrew training in either country or in both will therefore presumably be more fluent than those who have not had such training. With this conjecture in mind, the following two sections describe (1) the level of Hebrew language skills with which first-generation respondents arrived in Israel (pre-immigration levels of Hebrew proficiency), and (2) their level of investment in language acquisition on arrival in Israel. These two sections are followed by an analysis of current levels of Hebrew proficiency among first- and one-and-a-half-generation respondents.4

Hebrew Proficiency among First-Generation Olim prior to Arrival Since attendance at Jewish schools, involvement in synagogue activities, and membership in Jewish youth movements were relatively high, it is expected that South African olim will have acquired some familiarity with 88

Linguistic Assimilation

Fig. 3. Hebrew proficiency before arrival among olim, generation 1.0.

Hebrew prior to their aliyah through their active participation in the Jewish communities in South Africa. Figure 3, which displays self-reported levels of pre-immigration reading, speaking, and writing proficiencies in Hebrew, confirms our expectations. Almost half the respondents reported pre-immigration reading and writing proficiencies ranging from “fair” to “very good” (47% and 40%, respectively), but fewer reported comparable levels of speaking proficiency (roughly 30%). These results suggest that some of the respondents had a minimal baseline for further language improvement after arrival. Despite some prior familiarity with Hebrew, many olim were not able to take advantage of their language skills during their first year in Israel. This lack of language skill transferability may be explained by the fact that in most institutional settings in which Hebrew was taught or used in South Africa, emphasis was placed on reading and writing, less on speaking. Moreover reading and writing were taught mostly with the use of vowel 89

Linguistic Assimilation

signs (nikkud); but since most written communication in Israel does not make use of vowel signs, the immigrants could not read or write Hebrew fluently after arrival in Israel.5 Many olim also complained that the Hebrew vocabulary they learned in South Africa derived from texts such as the Hebrew Bible or classical Jewish literature, and therefore part of their vocabulary was poorly suited to everyday life in Israel. Many olim discovered that despite their investment in learning Hebrew in South Africa they were unable to conduct a fluent and simple conversation with Israelis. Take for example Shelly and Leslie, both first-generation olim, who as children in South Africa had studied Hebrew from the first grade until graduation from high school: I studied Hebrew twelve years at school. When I came to Israel I could not speak. Okay, I had the basics of grammar, I had studied the Bible, I had studied literature, read Tchernichovsky; but not speaking. It gave me a very good basis when I got here, but I had to learn to talk here. (Shelly, aged forty-three, in Israel since 1986) I learned [Hebrew] in school . . . but it was a different [kind of] Hebrew. When I came [to Israel] they told me to forget what I had learned in school, it was not related to daily life, but it was some kind of foundation. (Lesley, aged forty-six, in Israel since 1989) Although previous training in country of origin does not always promise a good command of Hebrew on arrival, it does serve as a stepping-stone for linguistic assimilation in the future, as we shall show.

Language Training in Israel among First-Generation Olim On arrival, all adult olim in Israel are given the opportunity to participate gratis in a five-month intensive Hebrew course held in ulpanim.6 The primary purpose of the ulpan is to help newcomers integrate into the social and cultural life of their new country through the acquisition of language 90

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skills. Newcomers are taught as quickly as possible enough basic vocabulary and grammar for simple conversations in Hebrew and for reading and writing simple texts. Some studies report that 70% of all immigrants to Israel attended an ulpan during their first year in the country, though almost a quarter of those who began their studies dropped out before completing the full course of studies (Adler 2007). To learn about investment in acquiring language skills, we asked our respondents how many months they spent studying Hebrew formally. The results are shown in figure 4. Most first-generation olim attended an ulpan, 40% four to six months, 30% longer than six months. Only 10% did not learn Hebrew in any formal setting, opting to bypass the ulpan and enter the workforce without adequate language skills. This is evident especially among men, possibly because as breadwinners the ulpan option presented them with higher opportunity costs than it did for women (see Beenstock 1996). A case in point is Neil (aged thirty-seven, in Israel since 2008): When I came [to Israel] I started working straightaway. My wife went to the ulpan, and now she’s doing another one. I’d like to speak more Hebrew but don’t have time to go to the ulpan. It’s important to learn; attending an ulpan is important to anyone who comes to Israel. In Ra’anana [one of the Israeli towns with the largest concentration of South Africans] you can manage . . . without going [to the ulpan], but as long as you live here, if you don’t speak Hebrew you’ll be like a stranger in the country. For those arriving without any prior knowledge of the language, the ulpan was a very important first step in acquiring basic Hebrew language skills. This was the case with Megan (aged forty-two, in Israel since 2007): Yes, I came to Israel knowing nothing, not even aleph,7 and when I finished the ulpan . . . I could read and write, but I [still] don’t understand 91

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Fig. 4. Formal Hebrew training among olim, generation 1.0.

everything. But I can read and I can write. So I learned a lot. I knew nothing [before I came to Israel]. Learning a new language at an older age is often very difficult because language acquisition is bound by age-linked maturational constraints. These are especially marked in the case of Hebrew, whose grammar and syntax are not always easy for English speakers to grasp. These difficulties are described in Megan’s account of her ulpan experiences: Yes, it’s important for me [to study Hebrew], and I must, but it’s difficult. I’m learning slowly and I’m doing what I can. I think that for Englishspeaking people it’s more difficult than for French or Spanish speakers. Q: Why? They’ve got the masculine and feminine, whereas we don’t, a chair is a chair, whereas in French or in Spanish a chair can be feminine or 92

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masculine like in Hebrew. For us to even understand that, and understand where that is coming from . . . I find it difficult. Ulpan attendance does not always result, then, in a good command of the Hebrew language. As we shall see, however, it provides a foundation upon which the immigrants’ language skills can progress over time. The One-and-a-Half Generation

All the respondents who had arrived in Israel as young children reported no knowledge of Hebrew at that time. Despite the common understanding that immigrant children find it easy to learn the local language, some of our one-and-a-half-generation interviewees did not find the process quite so simple. On the contrary, many recalled the trauma of entering kindergarten or elementary school without any knowledge of the language and how these traumatic experiences affected their lives. Mia’s and Keren’s experiences are illustrative in this regard: [I remember] the trauma of coming to Israel without [knowing] a word [of Hebrew]. [My parents] simply assumed that at my age [it would be easy], since young children do pick up language quickly. . . . In short, the first day I went to kindergarten not knowing a word of Hebrew, and somehow it hit me. For several months I did not speak [at all]. (Mia, aged twenty-five, in Israel since 1989) I went through a crisis . . . in my feeling of self-confidence. I think that until high school I was a quiet child who did not talk. Even today I’m still reluctant to read aloud under any circumstances. Even now, on Passover, when we read the Haggadah,8 I always ask to be skipped over. I won’t read out loud; to this day I’m afraid of the way it sounds when I speak in Hebrew. (Keren, aged twenty-seven, in Israel since 1987) Their early traumatic experiences notwithstanding, most members of the one-and-a-half generation are currently fluent in Hebrew, 93

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suggesting that with tenure in the country and exposure to the school system the process of linguistic assimilation among younger generations is inevitable.

Hebrew Acquisition and Hebrew Proficiency in Israel To learn about current levels of Hebrew proficiency, we asked generation 1.0 and 1.5 respondents to rate their speaking, reading, and writing skills on a scale of 1 (low) to 5 (high). The percentages of those describing their skills as “good” or “very good” are set out in figure 5.9 The data show marked differences in Hebrew proficiency between generation 1.0 and 1.5 respondents. While the latter display almost universal competence in the local language, the former show some variation along the various linguistic dimensions. First-generation olim displayed a linguistic hierarchy in which speaking was the easiest (79% good or very good), followed by reading (62%) and writing (51%). As figure 6 shows, a positive linear relationship exists between time of arrival and Hebrew proficiency: language skills among first-generation olim tend to improve with tenure in the country. Generational differences in linguistic attainment can be explained by two factors. First, immigrant children are socialized in the host country’s schooling system and therefore develop language skills comparable to those of native speakers. Second, for older immigrants the ability and motivation to acquire grammar and vocabulary steadily decline with age; they therefore face greater difficulties when acquiring a new language. Coping with Linguistic Disadvantages

First-generation olim reporting lower levels of Hebrew proficiency were asked to what extent their inadequate Hebrew skills disrupted their everyday life—an apt question given that competence in the local language is crucial not only for economic success but also for other aspects of daily 94

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Fig. 5. Current Hebrew proficiency among olim, generations 1.0 and 1.5.

life such as consumption, use of media, use of public services, and contacts and negotiations with educational, health-care, and other societal institutions. About 60% of those answering the question reported that their lower command of Hebrew made them feel handicapped in various ways. The disadvantage was mostly felt in interactions with various institutions (banks, schools, health-care institutions) and at work. Filling out forms and signing contracts were stressful tasks, as illustrated by Carla (in Israel since 1985): I don’t think you can live in a country without knowing the language. There are things that really scare me, for example if I have to sign a printed form in Hebrew. I can read—it’ll take me a long time, I’ll read it because I have to sign it—but if I don’t know the language, how can I sign these forms? If you’re not thoroughly familiar with the language, you’ve got a problem. [Knowing the] language is [basic], but it’s hard to learn the language at an older age. . . . Language is important. 95

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Fig. 6. Current Hebrew proficiency among olim, generation 1.0, by time of arrival.

Interacting with bank officials to secure a mortgage to buy a house provided Leslie (aged forty-six, in Israel since 1989) with a vivid reminder of the need to command the local language: When we went to the bank to get a mortgage to buy an apartment . . . [we] still did not have enough language [skills] to understand everything. We had friends and we asked where they took out the mortgage, and they said from [name of bank], so we went [to that bank] but we didn’t understand the interest rates and fines, didn’t understand anything. We signed, and that was it. . . . We got a letter from the attorney by mail, but we didn’t understand and didn’t know anything and there was nobody to help us. For many olim lack of linguistic skills was a serious drawback at work. In Israel since 1963, David never attended an ulpan but learned Hebrew “on the street.” He is very concerned about his limited Hebrew skills, which have become a barrier to keeping his professional skills up-to-date: 96

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My boss always complains and gets mad that I cannot read [specific professional literature] in Hebrew. . . . But I always find [the information] in English. Q: Does it bother you? Yes, of course, I’d like [to read in Hebrew]. . . . I can’t read books. I read only in English. . . . I understand the language, but I didn’t take the opportunity to study in the ulpan. Other South African olim reported feeling at a disadvantage vis-à-vis Israeli workers who have a good command of the language. Daniela (aged thirty-nine, in Israel since 1988) felt embarrassed by her lack of Hebrew skills despite her many years in Israel and by the difficulties she experienced at work as a result: For simple things in everyday life I get along just with English, I manage. [In Israel] people like and want to speak English. But not at work. It’s problematic. I feel that others find it easier to integrate and understand. [At work] I don’t understand everything the first time they tell me. . . . It could be in my head, but I can also feel that people talk [about my poor language skills] behind my back. . . . The bottom line is that [Israelis] find it easier to talk with clients and explain. . . . The language is important for selling and explaining things correctly. . . . I have to break my teeth. . . . I feel very limited in front of people who were born here. As these views indicate, salaried employees without a good command of Hebrew find this a barrier to good job performance, decreasing their chances of promotion. By contrast, business owners and the self-employed can overcome their lack of Hebrew skills by hiring native Hebrew speakers as employees or by working in sectors where English is an asset. They 97

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do not see their lack of Hebrew skills as a drawback. A case in point is Warren (aged sixty-nine, in Israel since 1979), who currently runs his own business: [Laughs] I am an Israeli who does not speak Hebrew well, and because in our business we do most of the work in English I have no need to, really. I have a secretary and if there is something to do in Hebrew, she does it for me. . . . I define myself as an Israeli who manages to live here and I am very happy. English is an international language, which, unlike other foreign languages, is widely spoken and understood in Israeli society; this, too, makes English-speaking adult newcomers less motivated to acquire or improve their Hebrew skills.10 For some of these olim the ubiquity of English in Israel and the existence of a large and residentially concentrated Englishspeaking community are a potential disincentive for improving Hebrew skills. In Warren’s words: I regret I cannot read Hebrew better so I could be more involved in what happens in Israel. I read the English editions of [daily newspapers] Haaretz and the Jerusalem Post . . . . I can manage with English everywhere . . . I think so. People in Israel are very excited to talk to you in English. Everyone wants to practice their English. So I think you can get by in Israel with just English. Some olim are aware of the adverse consequences of linguistic enclosure for their chances of improving their Hebrew, but also of the beneficial aspects in terms of social integration. A case in point is Peter (aged thirtysix, in Israel since 1997), resident of Ra’anana, home to more than 10% of the all Israel’s South African immigrants: Q: Can you get by only in English? 98

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In Ra’anana? Yes, you don’t need any Hebrew anywhere. On Saturdays I don’t speak a word of Hebrew besides Shabbat shalom . . . . If I lived [elsewhere] for a year or so I’m sure my Hebrew would improve. But in Ra’anana . . . there is an English majority. I can do everything using only English. . . . It’s good and not good. . . . As I said initially, if you want to succeed [in the new country] you must do it together with people who understand you. Some olim, like Carla and Shelly, are critical of their counterparts who seem to get along in the country without knowledge of the local language. For them command of Hebrew is not only important for economic and instrumental reasons but is a precondition for understanding Israeli culture and being part of the new society: I don’t think we have the right to immigrate to Israel and say, “I’ll get by in English.” Q: Why? Because to get in, to be part of the society, and understand the culture and mentality, you have to speak Hebrew. You want to be like everyone else. . . . You cannot ever be like everyone else, because still people ask me, “Where are you from?” because of my accent. . . . I will always be different, but I have to understand the Israeli mind. I don’t think you can live in a country without knowing the language. (Carla, aged fortyseven, in Israel since 1985) I’m not like many South Africans. I don’t expect Israelis to talk to me in English, I don’t think that because I live in the ghetto of Ra’anana, people at the bank should talk to me in English. I don’t think I have this right, not at the bank, not at Kuppat Holim, or the Ministry of Interior, or even in the garage where I take the car for a test. I believe I ought to 99

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speak Hebrew in these places. . . . I think that if you don’t try to speak the language of the people then you’re placing yourself outside. . . . [Knowing the language] is part of entering the society. (Shelly, aged forty-three, in Israel since 1986) In summary, our analysis of language proficiency among the first generation of South African olim reveals a rather moderate process of linguistic assimilation. The middling levels of Hebrew proficiency in the first generation may reflect a tendency to belong to a linguistic “ghetto,” which reduces the need and opportunity to use Hebrew. The slow process of language acquisition is also explained by the status of English as a lingua franca widely spoken and understood in Israel.

Explaining Hebrew Proficiency in the First Generation In this section we use the theoretical model outlined at the beginning of this chapter to identify the factors affecting Hebrew proficiency among respondents arriving in Israel as adults (the first generation). Specifically, we run an ols regression model that predicts the level of Hebrew proficiency using the following independent variables. To test the economic incentives hypothesis, we included in the model the variable labor market position (measured as a set of dummy variables: professional, technical, and managerial jobs = 1; other = reference category). To test the exposure hypothesis, we included the following variables: level of Hebrew proficiency before arrival, ulpan attendance in Israel (measured as a set of dummy variables: did not attend at all, attended less than six months, attended over six months = reference category), years since immigration, marital status (measured as a set of dummy variables: married to an English-speaking spouse, married to a non-English-speaking spouse, not married = reference category), presence of children under eighteen living at home = 1, other = reference category; percentage of English-speaking olim residing in the neighborhood (measured as a set 100

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of dummy variables: “half or more” = 1, “less than half ” = reference category), and ethnic composition of networks (measured as a set of dummy variables: “half or more of closest friends are Israelis” = 1, “less than half of closest friends are Israeli” = reference category). To test the efficiency hypothesis, we included the following variables: age at immigration and years of education. Motivation for migration was measured as a set of dummy variables (ideological reasons = 1, other reasons = reference category), and attachment to the host country was measured by level of Israeli identity (measured in a 1–5 scale, 1 = low, 5 = high). We also control for gender (male = 1). Results of the ols model are presented in table 14, showing unstandardized coefficients, standard errors, and standardized coefficients for the variables in the model.11 Table 14: ols regression predicting Hebrew proficiency among generation 1.0 Variables

Coefficients

Gender (male = 1)

–0.01 (0.06) –0.00

Age at migration

–0.03* (0.004) –0.225

Professional, technical, and managerial (ptm ) occupations

0.00 (0.06) 0.00

Hebrew proficiency before arrival

0.44* (0.03) 0.45

Studied Hebrew over 6 months

0.15* (0.06) 0.07 101

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Years since migration

0.02* (0.003) 0.18

Married to English-speaking spouse

–0.13 (0.09) –0.06

Married to non-English-speaking spouse

–0.01 (0.09) –0.00

Presence of children under 18 years of age

0.04 (0.07) 0.02

Percent Israeli friends (half or more)

0.30* (0.07) 0.15

Percent English-speaking olim residing in the neighborhood (half or more) –0.05 (0.09) –0.02 Years of formal education

0.03* (0.01) 0.09

Ideological pull factors

0.05* (0.02) 0.06

Israeli identity

0.13* (0.03) 0.14

R2

0.54

N

(593)

*p < 0.05

In line with the economic incentives hypothesis, the data show that Hebrew proficiency is higher among olim who arrived at younger ages, as these 102

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individuals have a better ability for language acquisition than their older counterparts. After controlling for all relevant variables, the coefficients for labor market position were not significant; that is, we found no differences in Hebrew proficiency between those working in professional, technical, or managerial occupations and those who work in services, clerical, or blue-collar occupations or are out of the labor force. In accordance with the exposure hypothesis, Hebrew proficiency is higher among olim who have been in the country longer and whose social networks include Israeli friends. Language training in the country of origin or destination was also found to affect language proficiency, with olim arriving in Israel with language skills and those attending ulpan six months or more likely to report higher levels of Hebrew proficiency than those without such language training. After all relevant factors were controlled for, gender12 and family circumstances (ethnic origin of partner and presence of children under eighteen) had no significant effects on Hebrew proficiency.13 In accordance with the efficiency hypothesis, we found a positive correlation between language acquisition and education: those better educated may be more capable of learning the language either because they have accumulated more learning skills or because they are inherently more capable. Finally, those who were pulled to Israel by ideological reasons and those who felt Israeli to a great extent were more likely to report higher levels of Hebrew proficiency. In summary, our analysis reaffirms most of the findings established by prior studies of linguistic assimilation. Although proficiency levels depend on age at arrival, we find clear evidence that Hebrew proficiency rises sharply with exposure to Israeli society (tenure in the country) and exposure to the Hebrew language in the country of origin or destination. Language training in the country of origin provides immigrants a head start over those without such training. Immigrants’ human and social capital also plays an important role in structuring the process of 103

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language acquisition: Hebrew proficiency is much higher for olim who have more extensive contacts with Israelis and for those with more education. There is also positive synergism between language acquisition on the one hand and reasons for immigration and attachment to the host society on the other, with those immigrating to Israel for ideological reasons and those strongly identifying as Israeli tending to report higher levels of Hebrew proficiency. Having identified the factors affecting Hebrew proficiency among first-generation South African olim, we now turn to an account of language shift and language maintenance across generations.

Language Shift across Generations Many sociological studies have addressed native language shift among immigrants (Alba et al. 2002; Remennick 2003a, 2003b; Brown 2008; Gogonas 2009). The process whereby members of one linguistic community gradually shift to another language is often termed linguistic assimilation. The rate of linguistic assimilation refers to the percentage of speakers of a foreign mother tongue (in our case English) who speak the language of the host country (in our case Hebrew) in private and in public. It is often used to measure changes in language preferences and use across generations within a linguistic community. To illustrate the magnitude of intergenerational language shift, we next describe patterns of language preference and language use among different generational groups (1) in private settings (with family and friends) and (2) in media and cultural consumption.

Language Preference Figure 7 shows patterns of language preferences among three generations of the South African community in Israel. The data reveal clear intergenerational differences in the tendency to prefer Hebrew versus English as 104

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Fig. 7. Language preference, by generation.

the main language of communication. Whereas the majority of generation 1.0 olim prefer to speak English (64%), the majority of generation 2.0 members prefer to speak Hebrew (64%). Respondents of generation 1.5 tend to prefer both languages equally (50%), with 24% preferring English and 26% preferring Hebrew. The preference for English among those who arrived in Israel as adults is not likely to change, even for those with a good command of Hebrew. For some first-generation olim like Stacey, this preference is due not only to the fact that their social and family networks are composed mainly of English speakers but also to issues of group identity: Q: How important is knowledge of English to you? Very much, because it’s my native language, because I read in English, because of all my family relationships. . . . It’s very emotional. . . . I think it’s part of [my] identity because it’s my native language. I know people who say that after you make aliyah Hebrew is also part of [your 105

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identity] . . . but for me, it will take many, many years, I think. (Stacey, aged fifty-eight, in Israel since 1977) Unlike those who came to Israel as adults, members of the younger generations who were raised in Israel prefer to use either Hebrew or a mixture of Hebrew and English, depending on the situation and the social context (private versus public settings). Dual preferences were voiced by several one-and-a-half- and second-generation respondents when asked in which language they preferred to express their feelings: It depends what it’s about. When it’s about school or the army it’s only Hebrew. But when I think of my family or home, it’s only English. (Inbal, aged twenty-five, second generation) Today mostly in Hebrew. Q: What language is it easier for you to speak? I think Hebrew. In English I understand everything and can also express myself, but I’ve noticed that I don’t use the highest language, I don’t use the same language that I understand. In Hebrew it’s different. Q: Which language is more important to you? Let’s put it this way: As an Israeli, Hebrew is the most important language. As an educated person, English is the most important language. And as someone who lives in Israel and looks for a way to live here together [with the Arab people], Arabic is also a very important language. (Barak, aged thirty, second generation) While language preference is a significant aspect of acculturation, language use is considered the most significant test of linguistic assimilation. In the next section we document linguistic shift over generations by 106

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focusing on patterns of language use (1) in private settings (with family and friends) and (2) in media and cultural consumption.

Language Use at Home Language use at home is central to the analysis of linguistic assimilation, since the family is the principal domain where immigrants continue to speak their native language—“the last bastion in terms of language maintenance” (Brown 2008, 1). Language use in the family is therefore the most important measure of immigrants’ linguistic assimilation (Alba et al. 2002). Language Use with Parents and Siblings: One-and-a-Half and Second Generations

We start with a comparative analysis of patterns of language use among generation 1.5 and 2.0 members and their families of origin, currently and during adolescence. Figures 8–11 show marked differences between the linguistic environments in which members of generation 1.5 and members of generation 2.0 were raised. Immigrant children, members of generation 1.5, grew up in an English-speaking environment at home: during adolescence, the majority spoke only English with their parents (91%) and siblings (53%) (see figures 8 and 10). This pattern is to be expected: the families of generation 1.5 members had spoken English at home back in South Africa, and this habit did not change on arrival in Israel. By contrast, members of generation 2.0 usually grew up as bilinguals: half spoke Hebrew or a mixture of Hebrew and English at home with their parents, and 77% spoke only Hebrew with their siblings (see figures 9 and 11). Interestingly, intra-generational patterns of language use with parents and siblings did not change over time. The only exception is in generation 1.5, where the percentage of respondents speaking Hebrew or a mixture of Hebrew and English with their siblings moderately increased (from 17% 107

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Fig. 8. Language spoken with parents in Israel, generation 1.5.

Fig. 9. Language spoken with parents in Israel, generation 2.0.

to 24% and from 30% to 38%, respectively), while the use of English-only decreased (from 53% to 38%) (see figure 10). Despite these changes, the use of English in generation 1.5 remains high compared with generation 2.0, suggesting that the rate of conversion to Hebrew tails off only after generation 1.5. The use of English at home was not always a natural outcome. For some South African children attending kindergarten or primary school in Israel, speaking Hebrew at home with their parents was natural. Some parents accepted this linguistic change, letting the children answer in Hebrew even while they continued talking to them in English. In many cases parents used different languages to speak with their different children—for example, English with those born in South Africa but Hebrew with those born in Israel. Samantha (first generation, aged fifty-four, in Israel since 1987) described this phenomenon: I try not to mix the two languages together. But sometimes with my younger son we talk in Hebrew because he is a sabra14 and was born here. There are things I feel he will understand better if I say them in Hebrew. Sometimes both languages come out in the same sentence, which is not good [so] I try not to do it. I try to speak well. English is my best language. . . . He needs to hear a language correctly spoken. My Hebrew is not bad, but my English is better so I prefer to speak English with him. Many other South African parents explained they preferred to speak English at home because they felt that their Hebrew was relatively poor. The decision to switch to Hebrew at home with the children often came as a consequence of social pressure from teachers who argued that not speaking Hebrew at home would adversely affect the children’s linguistic attainments. Such apprehensions are vividly described by Shira (second generation, aged thirty-three): 109

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Fig. 10. Language spoken with siblings in Israel, generation 1.5.

Fig. 11. Language spoken with siblings, generation 2.0.

Q: What language do you speak at home? English, I was born into English. My sister too. . . . When she started kindergarten, the teacher reprimanded my mother that my sister didn’t know how to speak Hebrew and asked her to stop talking English at home and start to speak Hebrew. . . . Then my parents talked to me in Hebrew. . . . [My mother] had no choice. She saw that it really was damaging, that [my sister] started kindergarten and couldn’t speak [Hebrew]. Despite social pressure, some parents insisted that their children speak only English at home. Eventually, they argued, the children would acquire a good command of Hebrew at school, but to ensure for them a good command of English parents had to use only that language at home. The implementation of an English-only policy at home was not always easy, however, as Carla’s (first generation, aged forty-seven, in Israel since 1985) account illustrates: [At home] and with the children I speak only in English. Today there is more mixing, but when the kids were little, only English. . . . If they answered in Hebrew I would say, “No, only English.” . . . I insisted until [my daughter] had [no choice but] to answer in English. I refused to speak Hebrew. I told her that my mother tongue was English and there was no reason for her not to speak that language. The school nurse kept saying it was not good, not healthy. I didn’t believe it. I think it’s nonsense. Today [my daughter] thanks me for that. In many South African families the language spoken at home was a contested issue, especially among members of the second generation, many of whom viewed speaking Hebrew at home as very important as they were struggling to integrate into Israeli society and culture. In the words of Shira (second generation, aged thirty-three): 111

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When I was little my parents talked to me in English. . . . I was angry with them and told them to stop doing that. We are here in Israel, [I would say,] talk to me in Hebrew, not English. In Israel [you should] speak Hebrew. Today, I don’t care. I talk to them in English. But when I was little it was very important to me to speak Hebrew. I didn’t want to attend the English-speakers class [at high school],15 which my sister attended. Q: Why? I don’t know, I think it may have been related to my “private war” about my Israeli identity [at that time]. So far we have described patterns of language use with parents and siblings among one-and-a-half- and second-generation individuals. These are likely to change, however, once members of the younger generations establish families and homes with spouses and children of their own. Language Use at Home with Spouses and Children

To understand current patterns of language use at home, especially among the one-and-a-half and second generations, we must first discuss patterns of intermarriage among South Africans in Israel.16 Intermarriage is often seen as the ultimate proof for the assimilation, linguistic and otherwise, of immigrants and their offspring (Gordon 1964; Waters and Jiménez 2005). Families in which both spouses belong to the same linguistic community are far more likely to conduct daily interactions in their mother tongue than are families in which the spouses belong to different linguistic communities. Figure 12 indicates a clear pattern of intermarriage that increases down the generations. Whereas most members of generation 1.0 are married to English-speaking spouses, whether of South African origin (43%) or from 112

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Fig. 12. Spouse’s country of origin, by generation.

other English-speaking countries (14%), the numbers are lower among generation 1.5 (13% and 14%, respectively) and still lower among generation 2.0 (4% and 3%, respectively). Most members of the younger generations (65% of generation 1.5, 81% of generation 2.0) are married to Israeli-born spouses who are not native English speakers.17 Given these intermarriage patterns, a clear pattern of linguistic shift can be expected among members of the younger generations. Figures 13 and 14 display current patterns of language use with spouses and children among respondents of the three generations. As figure 13 shows, most individuals in the younger generations (63% of generation 1.5, 92% of generation 2.0) speak Hebrew with their spouses or partners, whereas most first-generation olim (67%) still speak English with their spouses. Language shift is also evident in the high percentage of respondents who reported speaking Hebrew with their children (figure 14). While the majority of first-generation olim (54%) speak only English with their children, this pattern is less pronounced among those who arrived as children (31% ) and those born in Israel (23%). The shift to Hebrew is especially marked among the latter, a development many respondents attribute to 113

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Fig. 13. Language spoken currently with spouse, by generation.

Fig. 14. Language spoken currently with children, by generation.

their marriage to a spouse who is not a native English speaker. As Dana (second generation, aged forty-three) put it: I don’t talk to [my children] in English. My mother and father have started talking to them in English a little bit. . . . But when the [children] were little I didn’t speak English with them, because it wasn’t possible for me—because Hebrew is my native language. I used to talk to my parents in English, but it wasn’t natural for me. Maybe if my husband had spoken English it would have been different. I have a cousin who speaks English to his child and many other people do it. . . . But it was not the most natural thing for me to do. . . . I had to speak Hebrew. At first my parents tried to speak English, but because they wanted to communicate with him [i.e., with Dana’s son] they switched to Hebrew. To document the extent to which parental exogamy leads to the use of Hebrew as the dominant language at home, we present in table 15 patterns of language use at home (between spouses and with the children) according to the native language of the interviewees’ spouses (native English speaker or not native English speaker). The data reveal that overall South Africans who had married native English speakers are more likely to use English as the main language of exchange with spouses and children. By contrast, South Africans married to those not native English speakers are more likely to communicate in Hebrew with their spouses and children, especially among the younger generations. In summary, patterns of language use at home among the South African community show a marked intergenerational change, with the younger generations displaying higher levels of Hebrew use at home. Overall the high rates of language shift reflect a clear process of linguistic assimilation over generations. 115

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20.5 8.8

English only

Mixed

Both equally

4.4 1.4

Mixed

Both equally 293

92.8

English only

N

1.4

Hebrew only

Language use with children (%)

5.3 65.4

Hebrew only

Language use with spouse (%)

English speaker

192

10.9

14.1

28.6

46.4

15.0

16.8

37.1

31.1

Not English speaker

Generation 1.0

25

—

12.0

80.0

8.0

27.3

18.2

45.5

9.1

English speaker

67

6.0

9.0

3.0

82.1

10.0

6.7

26.7

56.7

Not English speaker

Generation 1.5

Table 15: Language spoken in the family according to mother tongue of spouse

20

5.9

5.9

17.6

70.6

7.1

—

42.9

50.0

English speaker

96

1.0

2.1

1.0

95.8

5.4

9.5

20.3

64.9

Not English speaker

Generation 2.0

Social Networks and Language Use with Friends Language use with friends constitutes another important dimension of linguistic assimilation in the private sphere. To understand patterns of language use with friends, we must first discuss the generational differences in the ethnic composition of social networks. Figures 15–17 show the composition of social networks for each of our three generational groups. As expected, first-generation olim tended to develop friendships within the English-speaking community, many reporting that half or more of their friends were South Africans (46%) or individuals from other English-speaking countries (31%) (see figures 15 and 16). By contrast, 85% of generation 1.5 and 97% of generation 2.0 respondents reported that half or more of their friends were Israeli-born (see figure 17). Alongside the different composition of social networks, clearly different patterns of language use were evident among the different generational groups (see figure 18). Most first-generation olim tended to speak English with their friends (42%), whereas members of the younger generations tended to speak Hebrew (62% of generation 1.5 and 88% of generation 2.0 respondents). The above patterns of language use confirm what we have shown so far. Clearly the steep rise of Hebrew as the main language spoken with friends reflects an expanding process of both social and linguistic assimilation down the generations.

Cultural Consumption Language is a critical domain for assessing acculturation because it is a socially salient indicator of cultural difference and a marker of ethnic boundaries. Patterns of media and cultural consumption in Hebrew and English are viewed as manifesting immigrants’ adjustment and acculturation to the host country (Elias and Lemish 2011). To assess patterns of language use in media and cultural consumption, 117

Linguistic Assimilation

Fig. 15. South African friends, by generation.

Fig. 16. Other English-speaking friends, by generation.

Fig. 17. Israeli-born friends, by generation.

Fig. 18. Language spoken currently with friends, by generation.

our respondents were asked to state the language they listen to (1) on the radio, (2) on television, and (3) at the theater and read (4) in newspapers and (5) in books. The next set of figures (19 to 23) display the extent to which members of the three generations consume specific types of media and culture (1) mainly in Hebrew, (2) mainly in English, and (3) in Hebrew and English equally. The answers reflect not only cultural preferences regarding the use of specific languages, but also the types and levels of language proficiency required by the specific media consumed, with the first three types of media requiring conversational proficiency (radio, television, and theater) and the latter two requiring reading skills (newspapers and books). Like the other aspects of language use discussed above, media and cultural consumption displayed certain intergenerational differences. First, as expected, those arriving as children or born in Israel tend to consume Hebrew-language media more often than members of the first generation. Second, in all three generations Hebrew consumption is more prevalent for media requiring conversational skills (radio, television, theater) than for those requiring reading skills (books and newspapers).18 Despite the widespread use of Hebrew, however, members of generation 1.0 are still more likely than their counterparts in generations 1.5 and 2.0 to listen to the radio, watch TV, and attend theater productions mainly in English (14%, 15%, and 29%, respectively) or in the two languages equally (see figures 19–21). Intergenerational differences are evident with regard to newspaper and book consumption (figures 22 and 23, respectively). Preference for English among first-generation olim was clear, with half reporting reading newspapers in their mother tongue, compared with radically lower levels among the younger generations (10% for generation 1.5; 2% for generation 2.0). The latter reported reading newspapers mainly in Hebrew (78% of generation 1.5; 94% of generation 2.0). As for books, most of those 120

Linguistic Assimilation

Fig. 19. Language mostly used when listening to the radio, by generation.

Fig. 20. Language mostly used when watching television, by generation.

born in South Africa, regardless of the age of arrival, preferred to read books mainly in English (92% of generation 1.0; 79% of generation 1.5), whereas most members of generation 2.0 (56%) preferred to read books in Hebrew only. The more extensive use of English for reading literature than for reading newspapers may be explained by the fact that the former requires a higher reading proficiency than the latter. Reading for pleasure is thus an activity most immigrants prefer to do in their mother tongue. According to Peter (first generation, aged thirty-six, in Israel since 1997): I find [reading] difficult in Hebrew, but perhaps in my head I feel like I’d never speak Hebrew well. . . . If I have to choose between reading the newspaper in Hebrew or in English, I’ll take the latter. I have never read a book in Hebrew. . . . Books are for relaxation . . . and it’s so hard. I used to read the newspaper with nikkud but I felt so silly! In summary, here, as with respect to other aspects of language use analyzed in this chapter, our findings attest to a gradual process of acculturation and linguistic assimilation down the generations, with cultural and media consumption gradually shifting from English among members of the first generation to Hebrew among the younger generations.

Language Maintenance: English Proficiency among the Younger Generations Loss of the parents’ native language among members of the younger generations is among the most important issues regarding the linguistic assimilation of immigrant groups. In Israel, however, native English speakers enjoy abundant opportunities to practice the language, unlike other immigrant groups whose native language is not widely spoken in the country (e.g., Spanish, French). English is taught in Israeli schools from third grade through secondary school,19 and native-English-speaking 122

Linguistic Assimilation

Fig. 21. Language mostly used when watching plays at the theater, by generation.

Fig. 22. Language mostly used for reading newspapers, by generation.

high school students can attend advanced English classes adapted to their skills. Proficiency in English is a form of human capital highly valued in Israel’s labor market and higher education system. Furthermore many English-speaking olim report ample opportunities to use English in daily interactions because “Israelis love to speak English for practice.” To learn about the levels of English proficiency among individuals arriving as children or born in Israel, we asked generation 1.5 and 2.0 respondents about their English skills along three dimensions (reading, speaking, and writing). The results (presented in figure 24) show that English proficiency in all three dimensions is universal among members of generation 1.5. Speaking skills remained fairly high in generation 2.0 (with 93% reporting good or very good proficiency), but reading (86%) and writing (74%) skills were somewhat lower. Overall these results suggest no signs of language attrition among members of the younger generations. Given English’s status as an international language and its central role in Israel’s labor market and society, some interviewees emphasized the instrumental advantages derived from a good command of the language. These advantages are explained by a general positive attitude to the English language, which is considered not only an asset but also a status symbol in Israeli society. Table 16 shows the extent to which respondents believed that their English skills are an asset in Israeli society. Members of all three generations indicated that English gave them an advantage at work (over 80% of generations 1.0 and 1.5, but only 61% of generation 2.0), in everyday life (60%–70% for all generations), and in terms of how Israelis perceived them as compared with immigrants from non-Englishspeaking countries (over 70% of generations 1.0 and 1.5, but only 64% of generation 2.0). 124

Linguistic Assimilation

Fig. 23. Language mostly used for reading books, by generation.

Fig. 24. Current English proficiency, generations 1.5 and 2.0.

Table 16: South Africans’ perceptions of the extent to which English is advantageous (percentage reporting English as advantageous / very advantageous) Generation 1.0 Generation 1.5 Generation 2.0 At work

81.8

85.5

60.8

In everyday life

61.6

69.7

60.4

Positive perceptions of English speakers

71.2

79.3

64.7

N

587

116

156

The instrumental advantages accruing from being a native English speaker were expressed repeatedly by members of all three generations: Q: Does your command of English as a mother tongue help you in everyday life? Obviously, when I was studying I summarized for my friends all the articles in English . . . Internet access, access to everything. . . . My first job, I got hired because of my English skills. . . . Even today, my current job has to do with my language skills. . . . I only work with tourists from the United States. (Shelly, first generation, aged forty-three, in Israel since 1986) In many areas of my life, English is more important to me. . . . And it is an advantage in life. . . . It’s my native language. I really want to improve my English because although I speak English at a very good level, it’s still not as good as the level of people who went to school in South Africa. (Lauren, one-and-a-half generation, aged twentyseven, in Israel since 1987) First of all, [English] is part of who I am and the advantages are clear. Command of this language is an asset all over the world. And all my friends [at the university] are jealous of this advantage, even though Israelis have a very good level of English. . . . But when I read a paper 126

Linguistic Assimilation

in five minutes and it takes my friend three hours, the advantage is rather clear. (Barak, second generation, aged thirty) Some interviewees nevertheless noted that since English proficiency is an extremely importance asset for socioeconomic outcomes in the Israeli labor market, many Israelis have also achieved excellent levels of English proficiency. As a result, native English speakers have lost some of the edge over other Israelis: Q: Do you feel that you have an advantage because English is your mother tongue? Yes, but now I’m starting to think otherwise, because I’m looking for a job and I see many ads looking for Russian speakers, and many Russian speakers also speak English and Hebrew. . . . Today everyone entering high-tech knows English, otherwise they don’t get hired. (Leslie, first generation, aged forty-six, in Israel since 1989) In addition to its instrumental value, many interviewees indicated that English is also a status symbol in Israel, giving the English speakers an advantage over other immigrant groups: I don’t know whether the English accent is better. . . . Maybe, I’m not sure. I think that [people] look at us with more respect compared to [people] with a Russian accent. (Samantha, first generation, aged fiftyfour, in Israel since 1987). Israelis stigmatize other immigrant groups, and these stigmas haven’t changed. But there are no stigmas related to South Africans—on the contrary, only good things. (Lauren, one-and-a-half generation, aged twenty-seven, in Israel since 1987) For some olim (especially generation 1.0), having an “Anglo- Saxon” accent is an advantage also because it signals to Israelis their belonging to 127

Linguistic Assimilation

the prestigious group of native English speakers. As Shelly and Graham shared with us, an English accent is a kind of cultural capital enhancing one’s social status in Israel: It is an accent that expresses some sort of [cultural] capital. I learned this concept from one of my lecturers [at the university]. . . . I always knew that I had an accent. I should not be ashamed of it, but I did not know it was upgrading me [in the eyes of the native population]. (Shelly, first generation, aged forty-three, in Israel since 1986) Knowing English gives me an advantage over some people. . . . When I make a mistake in Hebrew, I say, “It’s the dyslexic Anglo-Saxon in me.” Immediately I see the change . . . it can be a judge, an editor, a lawyer, no matter who—I see how they look at me differently. Why? Don’t ask me, I have no idea. (Graham, one-and-a-half generation, aged fifty-nine, in Israel since 1960) Because of the above-noted advantages, both instrumental and symbolic, virtually all respondents (98%) considered it important for their existing or future children to have a robust knowledge of English. As table 17 shows, the reasons they gave (regardless of generation) were mostly instrumental in nature, based on (1) the status of English as an international language (over 80%) and (2) the language’s importance to career and studies (especially among the younger generations: 88%). Take for example the case of Lauren, who clearly emphasizes the instrumental advantages driving members of the younger generations to transmit the English language to their own children: Q: Is it important for you that your kids know English? Sure, because it’s an international language, and if I can pass it on to them, it will make it easier on them and will help them. Look at me! I

128

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got hired because of my English, not because of anything else. (Lauren, one-and-a-half generation, aged twenty-seven, in Israel since 1987) Besides the instrumental value of the English language, 60% of the interviewees in all generational groups reported that command of the English language plays an important role in facilitating contact with family (especially with those who do not speak Hebrew and live overseas). Only one-third of the respondents assigned emotional or cultural significance to the intergenerational transmission of English-language skills. Table 17: Reasons for assigning importance to children’s knowledge of English Generation 1.0 Generation 1.5 Generation 2.0 International language (%)

84.5

86.6

87.0

Useful in career and studies (%)

72.3

88.2

87.0

Ability to speak to family (%)

62.0

63.9

59.2

Emotional and cultural significance (%)

34.4

32.8

37.0

N

582

119

169

In summary, levels of English proficiency were high among members of the one-and-a-half and second generations. South Africans in Israel reported several incentives to maintain the language and transmit it to their descendants. These incentives are grounded in the language’s advantages in terms of both human and cultural capital and thus in its ability to affect individual attainment in Israeli society.

Conclusions This chapter set out to analyze the process of linguistic assimilation among South Africans in Israel. Our analysis of patterns of language proficiency

129

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and use among South Africans in Israel reveals several interesting findings. First, though most first-generation olim had participated in state-sponsored Hebrew classes (ulpanim) and reported fair levels of language proficiency, Hebrew did not become their primary language. Their still-extensive use of English reflects the first generation’s higher levels of ethnic enclosure, also reflected in their residential patterns and the composition of their social networks. Second, members of the younger generations, unlike those of the first, tend to prefer Hebrew and to use it more frequently in private settings (with friends and family) and in media and cultural consumption. Furthermore on establishing their own families, those arriving as children or born in Israel tend to speak only Hebrew with their spouses and children. This shift is due, among other factors, to the high rates of intermarriage, which attest to another important aspect of assimilation.20 Third, evident differences between the one-and-a-half and second generations attest to the importance of age at arrival to levels of acculturation and to language acquisition and use. Whereas in the second generation Hebrew tends to replace English (which is used mainly with parents), in the one-and-a-half generation English and Hebrew coexist. Overall, our findings suggest a general trend whereby the first generation makes some progress in the local language but retains its native tongue as dominant, the one-and-a-half generation is bilingual (uses both languages equally), and the second generation speaks the local language exclusively. Fourth, despite the intergenerational language shift toward Hebrew, English proficiency among the younger generations is still high. Since English is an international language, highly valued in Israeli society and thus reflecting human and cultural capital, the incentives to retain these skills are very high. The theoretical implications of these findings are discussed in the concluding chapter. 130

Linguistic Assimilation

Chapter 5

Economic Assimilation The sphere of work is a primary point of contact between immigrants and the receiving society and a core dimension of immigrants’ integration (Massey and Sanchez 2010). Several studies have highlighted the ways in which labor market outcomes shape the relationship between immigrants and the host society by affecting linguistic outcomes, the ethnic composition of social networks, and identity patterns among newcomers (see, e.g., Alba and Nee 2003; Remennick 2007; Amit 2012). We therefore continue our analysis of the process of integration of South Africans in Israel by examining their modes of labor market incorporation. After some general theoretical background on immigrants’ economic assimilation, we sketch a socioeconomic profile of three generational groups of South Africans in Israel in terms of educational attainment, work experience, language proficiency, and language use at work, and we describe their modes of economic incorporation into the Israeli labor market in terms of labor force participation rates, modes of employment, industrial and occupational distribution, and earnings. We then identify

specific factors accounting for the socioeconomic attainment of South Africans in Israel.

Theoretical Background The incorporation of immigrants into the host country’s labor market has been the focus of substantial theoretical and empirical work (e.g., Chiswick 1979; Bloom and Gunderson 1991; Borjas 1994; Raijman and Semyonov 1995, 1997; Semyonov 1996; Kogan 2003; Van Tubergen et al. 2004; Cohen and Kogan 2007; Reitz 2007; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2011; Logan and Rivera Drew 2011; Pichler 2011; Semyonov, Raijman, and Maskileyson 2014). Labor force participation, occupational attainment, and earnings are the three most commonly used measures for assessing immigrants’ economic progress in the host societies. The first (labor force participation) reflects immigrants’ success in securing jobs, the second (occupational attainment) indicates whether the immigrants have succeeded in attaining jobs commensurate with their skills, and the third (earnings) is a key indicator of economic well-being deriving from labor market activity (Raijman and Tienda 1999). Immigrants’ entry into the labor market and socioeconomic outcomes are affected by human capital resources such as education, labor market experience, and language skills. Education as a proxy of productive capacity is the most important asset for promoting labor market integration (Chiswick 1979; Borjas 1990). The literature has demonstrated that better-educated immigrants earn higher wages, experience less unemployment, and work in more prestigious occupations than their less educated counterparts. Likewise labor market experience enhances immigrants’ human capital, affecting their likelihood of enjoying higher socioeconomic returns in terms of occupational prestige and earnings. Good command of the host country’s language has also been singled out as a key factor explaining socioeconomic success (see, e.g., 132

Economic Assimilation

Rivera-Batiz 1990; Dustmann, 1994; Chiswick and Miller 1995, 1998, 2001; Pichler 2011). Studies reveal the importance of language proficiency in enhancing the transferability of skills from the country of origin to the host country. Immigrants who have mastered the official host country’s language are more likely to join the labor market, obtain jobs commensurable with their skills, and work in high-wage positions than immigrants who lack comparable language skills. Many studies conducted in immigrant-receiving societies have shown that fluency in the local language has a positive effect on earnings, producing a language premium. This is true of immigrants in the United States and Canada (Chiswick and Miller 2001), Israel (Chiswick 1998; Semyonov, Raijman, and Maskileyson 2014), the United Kingdom (Dustmann and Fabbri 2003), and Germany (Dustmann and Van Soest 2001). By contrast, inability to speak the local language constrains labor force participation and is likely to result in occupational downward mobility, especially in occupations that require language proficiency such as clerical, sales, and teaching jobs (Raijman and Semyonov 1998; Dustmann and Fabbri 2003). Empirical evidence also suggests that the positive effect of local language proficiency on immigrants’ economic success depends on the language environment where the immigrant lives and works (Hwang, Xi, and Cao 2010). In the Israeli case, Hebrew proficiency is unquestionably important to labor market success, yet its importance is probably smaller in places where other languages, especially English, are accepted and even preferred. Acquiring Hebrew skills may thus be less important for native English speakers, who can use their mother tongue to enhance their socioeconomic attainment (Beenstock, Chiswick, and Repetto 2001; Raijman, Semyonov, and Geffen 2014). Chiswick (1998) has shown that English speakers are at a great advantage in the Israeli labor market. Immigrants with a good command of both English and Hebrew tend to earn more 133

Economic Assimilation

than Hebrew-only speakers, their advantage reflecting the value of English as an international language in a global market. Besides human capital resources, tenure in the host society and age at migration have been traditionally used to explain the location of immigrant groups in the social hierarchy. Recent immigrants lack knowledge, information, and social and cultural resources to function efficiently in the host country’s labor market. With the passage of time, however, immigrants, especially those with high levels of human capital, are likely to improve their standing and close the socioeconomic gaps with comparable segments of the native-born population (Chiswick 1978, 1979; LaLonde and Topel 1990). Age at the time of immigration is also likely to affect labor market incorporation and outcomes (Rumbaut 2004). It has been argued that those who arrive young and have lived in the receiving country for most of their life and have attained domestic education (one- anda- half generation) tend to have occupational experiences resembling those of their native-born counterparts. By contrast, those arriving much older (first generation) may experience disadvantages in the labor market such as insufficient language skills for the destination country and foreign education; therefore they tend to develop occupational profiles typical of immigrants (Myers, Gao, and Emeka 2009; Pichler 2011). Generational groups may thus be hypothesized to differ significantly with regard to various outcomes such as proficiency in the host country’s language and socioeconomic attainment in the labor market. Finally, any study of labor market incorporation must consider gender as an important dimension. A large body of sociological research has repeatedly demonstrated that because of occupational sex segregation, women are concentrated in a small number of occupational categories—mostly semiprofessional, clerical, and service-related jobs (e.g., England et al. 1988; 134

Economic Assimilation

Reskin and Roos 1990; Levanon, England, and Allison 2009).1 This is a problem faced by all women regardless of origin, race, or ethnicity (Reskin 1993). The problem is especially severe, however, for immigrant women who compete not only in a tight labor market but also for occupations (e.g., clerks, teachers) in which language skills and formal credentials are a prerequisite (Remennick 2013). They thus face a double disadvantage, as women and as immigrants (Boyd 1984; Raijman and Semyonov 1995, 1998; Rebhun 2008, 2010). Following this theoretical outline, we present a general overview of the patterns of economic assimilation of South Africans in Israel along both generational and gender lines. When similar data are available, we compare the socioeconomic outcomes of South Africans with those of other benchmark groups such as Israel’s total Jewish population and immigrants from other countries of origin to highlight the uniqueness of South Africans among the heterogeneous multiethnic landscape of the Israeli labor market.2

Modes of Labor Market Incorporation Human Capital: Education, Labor Market Experience, and Language Proficiency We begin our analysis of the South Africans’ incorporation into the Israeli labor market by describing their human capital resources in terms of education, labor market experience, Hebrew proficiency, and language use at work. As suggested earlier, education as a proxy of productive capacity is the most important asset for promoting labor market integration. In addition to education, labor market experience and especially good command of the local language (as a major attribute of human capital resources) enhance immigrants’ successful integration into the labor market of the host society. 135

Economic Assimilation

Fig. 25. Average years of formal education, by gender and generation.

Education

Figures 25 and 26 reveal the high levels of human capital of South Africans in Israel, both men and women in all generations. The average number of years of formal education is sixteen, and the percentage of those with an academic degree is particularly high, with circa 70% holding a bachelor’s or higher degree. While most members of generations 1.5 and 2.0 acquired their credentials in Israel,3 most generation 1.0 olim did so in South Africa.4 Viewed comparatively, the data presented in table 18 clearly reveal that South Africans are one of most highly skilled groups in the Israeli labor market. Their educational levels, both in terms of education and percentage of academic degree holders, are much higher than those of the general Israeli population (both Jewish and Arabs) and of immigrants from the former Soviet Union, Latin America, and Europe, though quite similar to those of immigrants from the North American continent. Immigrants from Ethiopia have the lowest levels of schooling according to both indicators. 136

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Table 18: Years of education and percent of academic degree, by gender and origin Mean years Academic N of education degree (%)

Immigrants from South Africa Men

16.0

72.6

(429)

Women

16.0

71.5

(411)

Men

13.9

30.2

(15,488)

Women

14.3

37.3

(16,174)

Israeli Jews

Israeli Arabs Men

11.1

16.4

(2,992)

Women

13.1

34.6

(907)

Men

15.3

49.0

(368)

Women

15.4

47.2

(328)

Men

13.9

39.3

(3,097)

Women

14.2

44.3

(3,591)

Men

7.7

3.2

(124)

Women

6.7

14.7

(88)

Men

15.8

47.7

(262)

Women

15.4

43.7

(293)

Men

17.8

69.1

(213)

Women

16.8

74.8

(211)

Immigrants from Europe

Immigrants from FSU

Immigrants from Ethiopia

Immigrants from Latin America

Immigrants from North America

Sources: Data for South Africans are calculated from the South Africans Survey 2008. Data for other groups are calculated from the Labor Force Survey 2006–7 collected by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics.

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Fig. 26. Academic degree holders, by gender and generation.

Labor Market Experience

As noted earlier, labor market experience has been singled out as an important factor influencing socioeconomic attainment in the labor market. Figure 27 displays generational and gender differences in the respondents’ labor market experience.5 As the data show, generation 1.0 olim had on average nineteen years of labor market experience, compared with much lower levels among generation 1.5 and 2.0 respondents (17 and 13 years, respectively). These differences are not surprising given the age composition of the generational groups. Note that gender differences in labor market experience were negligible among the younger generations, suggesting that South African men and women of these generations do not differ in their patterns of labor force attachment.

138

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Fig. 27. Years of labor market experience, by gender and generation.

Language Proficiency, Language Use, and Linguistic Environments at Work As outlined earlier, another important aspect of human capital likely to enhance socioeconomic attainment is language proficiency. Table 19 displays information concerning language skills, patterns of language use at work, and linguistic attributes of respondents’ work environments. The data reveal that the command of Hebrew is quite similar across the genders but varies across generations. As expected, Hebrew proficiency among respondents who arrived in Israel as children was much higher than among those arriving as adults.6 In a five-scale variable, generation 1.0 respondents reported an average of 3.8 points, compared to 4.8 points for generation 1.5. Overall, command of Hebrew was much higher for speaking but lower for reading and writing, especially among generation 1.0.

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3.8 (1.1) 3.4 (1.2)

Speaking

Reading

Writing

21.1 19.4

Only English

Both English and Hebrew

15.9 10.4 285

Percent working for English-speaking employers

Percent working mostly with English-speaking coworkers

N

Linguistic attributes of work settings

59.5

Only Hebrew

Language use at work (%)

3.8 (0.93) 4.3 (0.9)

Language proficiency (mean and s.d.)

263

13.4

23.3

19.0

34.5

46.6

55

2.3

5.6

24.6

7.0

68.4

3.6 (1.3) 4.7 (0.6)

3.8 (1.2) 4.8 (0.5)

4.2 (1.1) 5.0 (0.2)

61

3.9

17.6

27.9

17.6

54.4

4.8 (0.5)

4.8 (0.5)

5.0 (0.2)

3.9 (1.0) 4.8 (0.39) 4.9 (0.36)

Women

Men

Men

Women

Generation 1.5

Generation 1.0

Table 19: Language proficiency, language use at work, and linguistic attributes of work

86

4.3

10.0

11.0

7.6

80.4

—

—

—

—

Men

79

2.8

9.0

12.0

7.3

81.7

—

—

—

—

Women

Generation 2.0

Given that the effect of proficiency in the host country’s language on economic assimilation is contingent on the language environment where immigrants work (Hwang, Xi, and Cao 2010), we complement our analysis by presenting information on the linguistic characteristics of the respondents’ work environments. Data in table 19 suggest that although most South Africans tend to use Hebrew in their place of employment, there are remarkable differences in the frequencies of language use both by gender and by generation. Among men, the use of “only Hebrew” at work is relatively lower among generation 1.0 (59%) but steadily increases in generations 1.5 and 2.0 (68% and 80%, respectively). Among women, the use of “only Hebrew” at work is relatively much lower among those who were born in South Africa (47% and 54% for generations 1.0 and 1.5, respectively) but increases dramatically for generation 2.0 (82%). Overall, generation 1.0 olim were clearly more likely than their generation 1.5 and 2.0 counterparts to work in places where the primary language is English. Gender differences were evident among generations 1.0 and 1.5, with women more likely than men to use English as a primary language at work, many of them as English teachers or as secretaries in firms where their native English-language skills benefited them, not only in getting the job but also in receiving much higher salaries.7 Gender differences were less marked in the category of respondents using both “Hebrew and English” in the workplace, but generation 1.5 olim who benefit from a good command of both languages display the highest percentages in this category. Interestingly no gender differences with respect to language use at work were found among generation 2.0. To complement the analysis of the language environment where the respondents work we also display data on the ethno-linguistic background of their employers/managers and coworkers (see bottom panels of table 19).8 The data reveal gender and generational differences in the 141

Economic Assimilation

linguistic composition of work environments. For example, generation 1.0 male immigrants were more likely than their generation 1.5 and 2.0 counterparts to work for employers from South Africa or other Englishspeaking countries (16%, 6%, and 10%, respectively) and to work mostly with English-speaking coworkers (10%, 2%, and 4%, respectively). South African women were more likely than their male counterparts to work for English-speaking employers or managers, but this tendency also tends to decrease along generations (23%, 18%, and 9% for generations 1.0, 1.5, and 2.0, respectively). To recap, South Africans in Israel display high levels of human capital resources, which may potentially translate to high socioeconomic attainment in the Israeli labor market.

Labor Force Participation, Employment Status, and Modes of Employment We now turn to the analysis of patterns of labor market incorporation in terms of labor force participation, employment status, and modes of employment. Labor Force Participation

We begin the analysis of the South Africans’ incorporation into the Israeli labor market by displaying their labor force participation rates by gender and generation (figure 28) and compare them with those of other benchmark groups in Israel (table 20). As figure 28 shows, participation rates among the respondents were very high, with over 90% working at the time of the survey.9 This figure is extremely high compared with Israel’s total Jewish population (78% for men, 71% for women) and with other highly skilled immigrant groups (such as those arriving from Europe, North and South America, and the former Soviet Union), which display much lower employment levels (see table 20, first column). These figures contrast with the lower levels of

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Fig. 28. Labor force participation rates, by gender and generation.

labor force participation of Israeli Arabs and Ethiopians, especially among women. Employment Status: Self-Employment

Though the majority of South Africans were employees, self-employment and business ownership were high relative to the general Israeli population. Figure 29 shows this high proportion, especially among generations 1.0 and 1.5 (26%). The rates were much lower among members of generation 2.0 (14%). These generational differences with regard to entrepreneurship are not surprising given the fact that the experience and financial resources necessary to open a business depend on prior work experience (Raijman 2001). As expected, self-employment also differed by gender, with men of all generations more likely to be self-employed than women. Comparison of these figures with self-employment rates in Israel’s general Jewish population (17% for men, 8% for women) and in other immigrant groups (see table 20, second column) suggests that South Africans are

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95.2

Women

71.5

Women

21.0

Women

70.0

60.3

Men

Women

Immigrants from Europe

65.8

Men

Israeli Arabs

78.1

Men

Israeli Jews

94.7

Men

Immigrants from South Africa

Percent labor force participation

16.5

19.7

7.3

18.5

7.7

16.7

17.2

29.2

Percent self- employed

31.1

43.8

32.5

44.9

34.0

44.6

37.0

47.0

Weekly hours of work (mean)

Table 20: Modes of labor market incorporation, by gender and origin

49.5

78.7

41.8

83.2

51.2

78.4

40.9

90.4

Percent full- time

(328)

(368)

(907)

(2,992)

(16,174)

(15,488)

(411)

(429)

N

74.4

Women

55.0

Women

75.5

Women

65.9

Women

12.7

20.6

11.3

11.7

1.3

0.6

5.1

8.2

32.1

41.7

34.9

45.5

31.1

43.5

35.6

46.0

46.1

64.4

55.6

79.9

44.4

80.1

57.9

83.4

(211)

(213)

(293)

(262)

(88)

(124)

(3,591)

(3,097)

Sources: Data for South Africans are calculated from the South Africans Survey 2008. Data for other groups are calculated from the Labor Force Survey 2006–7 collected by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics.

66.8

Men

Immigrants from North America

84.8

Men

Immigrants from Latin America

63.6

Men

Immigrants from Ethiopia

84.0

Men

Immigrants from FSU

Fig. 29. Self-employment, by gender and generation.

overrepresented in self-employment in the Israeli labor market. These higher rates are perhaps explained by a long- standing background in business ownership back in South Africa10 and their higher socioeconomic status, which provide them with the needed resources to start their own businesses. Mode of Employment: Part-Time and Full-Time Work

The number of hours immigrants work has important consequences for their wages, but also for their occupational attainment and career prospects. Therefore we illustrate the modes of employment of the respondents in our survey by displaying the number of weekly hours spent at work (figure 30) and the percentages working full-time jobs (figure 31) according to gender and generation. South Africans’ modes of employment are also compared with those of other benchmark groups in Israel (table 20, third and fourth columns).

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Fig. 30. Weekly work hours, by gender and generation.

The data in table 20 reveal that compared with the general Israeli population and with other immigrants groups, our respondents, both men and women, reported both a much higher number of weekly work hours and percent working full-time jobs. Once again these differences attest to the selective character of the South African population compared with other groups in the Israeli labor market. The data in figure 30, which displays the means of weekly hours worked by gender and generations, suggest that on average, members of the second generation tend to work fewer hours than members of generations 1.0 and 1.5; these differences may be explained by the fact that many younger people are still in the formal education system acquiring credentials. Indeed 26% of generation 2.0 respondents reported that they both worked and studied, compared with only 8% and 10% of generations 1.0 and 1.5, respectively. As expected, gender differences are very marked, as men of South

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Fig. 31. Full-time employment, by gender and generation.

African origin tend to work ten more hours per week than their female counterparts (see figure 30). Gender differences in the workplace also have to do with full-time versus part-time work (see figure 31). As expected, full-time employment was more prevalent among men than among women regardless of generational affiliation, with 40% of women concentrated in part-time positions. Because options for part-time employment are concentrated in a limited number of occupations (mostly in social services and sometimes in dead-end jobs), women who work part-time are often denied access to better-rewarded positions. This is because high- status jobs demand a strong labor force attachment in terms of both work hours and continuity in the labor market. As we will show in the following sections, though part-time work facilitates labor market integration, it segregates women in specific occupational niches, thereby reproducing gender inequality.

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Socioeconomic Attainment: Economic Sectors, Occupations, and Earnings Immigrants’ socioeconomic attainment can be measured by the economic sectors and types of occupations to which they have access in the host country’s labor market. Economic sectors and occupations represent opportunity structures that mediate the access to economic rewards (earnings) (Grodsky and Pager 2001). In this section we provide a general overview of sectoral, occupational, and earnings distributions along gender and generational lines. Distribution across Economic Sectors

To track the distribution of South Africans along economic sectors, we asked our respondents to describe the main activities of their current places of employment and classified their answers according to the following division between segments of the economy: transformative industries (construction, utilities, manufacturing); distributive services (transport, communication, wholesale, retail, hotel, food and beverages); advanced producer services (aps ) (banking, insurance, real estate, engineering, accounting, legal, computers, and other miscellaneous business services); social services (medical, health, education, welfare, government, nonprofit, and other miscellaneous social services); and personal services (domestic care, repair, laundry, barber and beauty shops, entertainment, security, and other miscellaneous services) (see Sassen 1991; Raijman, Menahem, and Kemp 2008). Figures 32 and 33, showing the distribution of South African male and female respondents in the various segments of the economy, reflect the gendered nature of patterns of labor market incorporation.11 The data reveal that men cover a much wider spectrum of economic participation than

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their female counterparts. While aps and social services are the main two sectors in which South African men concentrate (40% and 22%, respectively), distributive services and transformative industries jointly employ a third of all male respondents in the sample (17% and 14%, respectively). By contrast, women’s employment is much narrower, most of it restricted to social services (50%), especially in the public sector,12 and to aps (26%). One the most important characteristics of employment in social services in the public sector is the greater availability of part-time jobs, which presumably eases the trade-off between paid work and traditional family roles. South African women’s concentration in social services might thus explain the higher percentage in part-time employment we described earlier. Interestingly a gendered distribution is apparent even within aps . For example, men tend to concentrate in banking, finance, real estate, and engineering, especially in high-tech research and development, as well as in computer business services. Women, by contrast, tend to concentrate in accounting, legal services, and marketing and in other miscellaneous business services such as advertising, public relations, labor recruitment, and provision of personnel. Table 21 presents data on the distribution by economic sector of South Africans and other benchmark groups, highlighting once more the former group’s advantaged position in the Israeli labor market. Since South Africans tend to concentrate in aps and in social services, the percentages of men and women working in these two sectors are shown by origin groups. The data reveal that compared with Israel’s general Jewish population and with other immigrant groups, men of South African origin are concentrated in aps to a greater extent than men in the other groups: 40% reported working in this sector. The concentration of South African women in social services (50%) reflects the pattern displayed by other women in the Israeli labor market. Nevertheless, compared to their counterparts from 150

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Fig. 32. Distribution by economic sector of South African men in Israel.

Fig. 33. Distribution by economic sector of South African women in Israel.

26.2

17.4

Women

8.4

Women

26.1 17.7

Men

Women

Immigrants from Europe

7.8

Men

Israeli Arabs

16.6

Men

Total Jewish population

40.0

Women

Advanced producer services (%)

Men

Immigrants from South Africa

Groups

56.6

23.7

71.7

18.8

49.6

21.2

50.0

22.0

Social services (%)

Table 21: Workers in advanced producer services and social services, by place of origin

(411)

(429)

(328)

(368)

(907)

(2,992)

(16,174)

(15,488)

N

15.0

Women

Women

14.6

Women

14.8

Women

16.6

65.4

39.7

54.4

30.0

43.4

9.0

42.1

(211)

(213)

(293)

(262)

(88)

(124)

(3,591)

(3,097)

Sources: Data for South Africans are calculated from the South Africans Survey 2008. Data for other groups are calculated from the Labor Force Survey 2006–7 collected by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics.

32.1

Men

Immigrants from North America

26.0

Men

Immigrants from Latin America

10.3 20.4

Men

Immigrants from Ethiopia

16.0

Men

Immigrants from FSU

other origins, their share is higher than FSU (42%) and Ethiopian females (43%) but lower than the share of Arab women (72%) and immigrants arriving from North and South America and Europe (65%, 54%, and 57%, respectively). As occupational distribution might also explain patterns of socioeconomic attainment, we focus next on occupational attainment of South Africans in the Israeli labor market. Occupational Distribution

To analyze the occupational distribution of South Africans we divided the various occupations into three major standard categories: (a) upper whitecollar workers: high-level occupations comprising professional, technical, and managerial (ptm ) workers; (b) lower white-collar workers: mid-level occupations including clerical, sales, and service workers; (c) blue-collar workers: skilled and unskilled workers in industry, services, and construction. The data in table 22, which displays occupational distribution by gender and origin, provide further support for the selective character of the South African working population. Compared with Israel’s general Jewish population and with other immigrant groups, South Africans, both men and women, are overrepresented in the high-status professional, technical, and managerial category, with 60% holding high-status jobs. Relative to other groups, South African workers are underrepresented in blue-collar jobs; tough men are more likely to work in this segment than women. Although South Africans as a group enjoy an advantaged position in the Israeli labor market, this advantage accrues to men more than it does to women. To evaluate the extent to which South African men and women are sorted into different types of jobs, even within the ptm category, we present an occupational profile of our respondents with more detailed categories (figures 34 and 35).13 It should be noted that because we did not find significant differences in the occupational distributions of the three generations, we display occupational profiles by gender only. 154

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60.0

Women

40.1

Women

47.5

Women

53.3

52.2

Men

Women

Immigrants from Europe

18.2

Men

Israeli Arabs

39.5

Men

Total Jewish population

62.0

Men

Immigrants from South Africa

Professional, technical, and managerial (%)

Table 22: Occupational distribution, by gender and origin

42.5

23.6

37.1

17.2

48.1

24.4

39.0

31.0

Clerical, sales, and services (%)

5.4

23.1

15.4

64.6

11.7

36.1

1.0

7.0

Skilled and unskilled workers

(328)

(368)

(907)

(2,992)

(16,174)

(15,488)

(411)

(429)

N

30.9

Women

10.7

Women

43.2

Women

71.5

Women

24.4

15.5

44.4

23.2

30.8

13.0

41.9

15.0

Clerical, sales, and services (%)

4.1

12.4

12.4

28.2

58.5

82.2

27.2

55.0

Skilled and unskilled workers

(211)

(213)

(293)

(262)

(88)

(124)

(3,591)

(3,097)

N

Sources: Data for South Africans are calculated from the South Africans Survey, 2008. Data for other groups are calculated from the Labor Force Survey 2006–7 collected by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics.

71.8

Men

Immigrants from North America

48.6

Men

Immigrants from Latin America

4.7

Men

Immigrants from Ethiopia

30.0

Men

Immigrants from FSU

Professional, technical, and managerial (%)

Fig. 34. Occupational distribution of South African men in Israel.

Fig. 35. Occupational distribution of South African women in Israel.

The data clearly reveal the segregated nature of occupational attainment even within the broad category of highly skilled jobs. Whereas men tend to concentrate in professional and academic jobs, women tend to cluster in semiprofessional and technical jobs, in such female-dominated occupations as teaching and paramedical specialties, especially in the public sector.14 The gender gap in managerial jobs is similarly high, with men three times as likely as women to occupy management positions. Differences are also discernible in lower-level white-collar jobs. Women tend to concentrate in clerical jobs, whereas men tend to cluster in sales, often as self-employed. We further assess occupational attainment by examining occupational prestige.15 As figure 36 shows, the respondents’ occupational prestige scores were very high, reflecting the high quality of jobs available to South Africans in the Israeli market. Generation 1.0 and 1.5 men scored fairly high (59 and 61 points on average, respectively) compared with women of the same generations (50 points on average in both groups). As expected, occupational prestige scores were slightly lower in generation 2.0 due to the generational groups’ age structure, which reflects differences in labor market experience and education.16 So far we have described South Africans’ industrial and occupational distributions as indicators of labor market attainment. However the best indicator of the relative position of an immigrant group within the ethnic hierarchy of the host country’s labor market is their earnings levels. These are the focus of the next section. Earnings Levels

We now analyze South Africans economic outcomes as expressed by earnings distribution along generation and gender lines (figures 37–40). The data reveal that women were overrepresented in the lower and medium

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Fig. 36. Occupational prestige of South Africans by gender and generation.

levels of the earnings scale. The monthly earnings for 47% of generation 1.0 and 57% of generations 1.5 and 2.0 were less than 7,500 nis (New Israeli Shekel), the average monthly earnings in Israel at the time of the survey (see figure 38).17 Men, however, were clustered in the upper levels of the earnings distribution, with 61% of generation 1.0 and 51% of generations 1.5 and 2.0 earning over 14,000 nis a month. Only 12% of generation 1.0 and 32% of generation 1.5 and 2.0 men earned less than 7,500 nis a month (see figures 37 and 39). The lower earnings among respondents of generations 1.5 and 2.0 (figures 39 and 40) can be explained by their lower labor market experience, since earnings tends to increase with age and seniority. But while generational gaps are likely to disappear as younger immigrants acquire experience, gender gaps are likely to remain, largely because of the sorting of men and women into different economic sectors and occupations.

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Fig. 37. Earnings distribution among South African men, generation 1.0.

Fig. 38. Earnings distribution among South African women, generation 1.0.

Fig. 39. Earnings distribution among South African men, generations 1.5 and 2.0.

Fig. 40. Earnings distribution among South African women, generations 1.5 and 2.0.

Fig. 41. Percent earning above 7,500 NIS /month by gender and origin. Sources: Data for South Africans is calculated from the South Africans Survey, 2008. Data for other groups is calculated from the Income Survey 2006–7.

To what extent do the South African immigrants’ advantages in terms of human capital translate into higher levels of earnings than those of other benchmark groups with comparable human capital in the Israeli labor market? Figure 41 shows the percentage of South African men and women and the percentages of other benchmark groups earning over 7,500 nis a month.18 Clearly compared to all other groups in the Israeli labor market, high earnings are more prevalent among South Africans, men and women alike. These findings suggest the capacity of members of this unique group to achieve high returns on their human capital.

Explaining Socioeconomic Outcomes: Occupational Attainment and Earnings So far we have presented the human capital profile and socioeconomic outcomes of South Africans in Israel along generational and gender lines. 162

Economic Assimilation

Though interesting, the descriptive data do not tell whether and to what extent human capital, labor market experience, language skills, generational affiliation, or gender affect the immigrants’ socioeconomic attainment in the labor market. In the following section we use several models to examine the effect of these variables on (1) occupational attainment and (2) earnings.

Explaining Occupational Attainment To identify the factors that explain occupational attainment in the labor market we use an ols regression model in which the dependent variable is the socioeconomic index for occupational prestige in Israel (see Semyonov, Lewin-Epstein, and Mandel 2000). The model incorporates the traditional human capital variables such as education and labor market experience. Language used at the workplace was also included, since it has been found that proficiency in both Hebrew and English increases socioeconomic attainment (Chiswick 1998). Accordingly, we introduced into the model the dummy variables reflecting language use at work: English only and both English and Hebrew, with Hebrew only defined as the reference category. A dummy variable (male = 1) was introduced to capture the gender gap. Two other dummy variables, social services and advanced producer services, were used to characterize the immigrants’ distribution across economic sectors, with transformative industries, distributive services, and personal services (clustered as “other”) as the reference category. We also controlled for marital status (married = 1), generation (1.0 = 1), employment status (1 = self-employed), hours of work, and place of residence ( Jerusalem and its periphery, Tel Aviv and Central Israel, with North Israel as the reference category). Results of the ols model are presented in table 23, which also shows the unstandardized coefficients and standard errors, and levels of significance for the variables in the model. 163

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Table 23: ols regression predicting occupational prestige (unstandardized coefficients and standard errors) Variables

Coefficients

Marital status (married = 1)

1.23

(1.4)

Years of education

2.4*

(0.2)

Gender (Male = 1)

5.3*

(1.4)

Generation (1.0 = 1)

–0.3

(1.3)

Labor market experience

0.15*

Mode of employment (full-time job = 1)

4.3*

(1.6)

Language at work (only English)

0.53

(1.6)

Language at work (English and Hebrew)

1.9

(1.6)

Social services

3.5*

(1.7)

Advanced producer services

6.0*

(1.5)

Jerusalem area

(0.06)

–2.9

(2.2)

Center–Tel Aviv area

1.7

(1.8)

Constant

2.5

(4.0)

R2

22.0

*p < 0.05

As table 23 shows, occupational prestige is positively affected by education and labor market experience: the higher the respondents’ human capital, the greater their occupational status in the Israeli labor market.19 Working in social services and aps raises respondents’ status by 3.5 and 6.0 points, respectively, above other sectors in the economy. Full-time employment also affects occupational status significantly, raising it by 4.3 points; this is because positions associated with high prestige are also characterized by authority and seniority, therefore usually demanding strong labor force attachment in terms of work hours. Contrary to our expectations, language use at work does not directly affect occupational attainment. No significant differences were found

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between those who use only Hebrew and those who use only English or both Hebrew and English at work. Likewise no significant differences were found between the generational groups after controlling for all the relevant variables. The data in table 23 suggest, other things being equal, that women are at a disadvantage in attainment of occupational status. On average, men hold jobs with 5.3 status points far higher than those of women with similar characteristics in terms of human capital, marital status, uses of language, industrial distribution, and place of residence. This gap reflects the net gain of South African men in the Israeli labor market.20

Explaining Earnings In this section we identify the factors that affect earnings. To do so, we estimated an ols equation in which the dependent variable was monthly earnings (in nis ). The explanatory variables in the model were the same as in the previous model. In addition we controlled for employment status (self-employed = 1; other = reference category) and occupational attainment (ptm = 1; other occupations = reference category). The results of the ols regression are presented in table 24, which shows the unstandardized coefficients and standard errors, and levels of significance for the variables in the model. The data clearly confirm our theoretical expectations, according to which education and labor market experience positively affect earnings. Likewise having a ptm job, working in the aps sector, and working full-time significantly increase earnings.21 By contrast, workers in social services (mostly in the public sector) are more likely to have lower earnings (on average, 1,438 nis less than workers in the other sectors).

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Table 24: ols regression predicting earnings (unstandardized coefficients and standard errors) Variables Marital status (married = 1) Years of education Gender (male = 1) Generation (1.0 = 1) Labor market experience

Coefficients 1,442.5* (308.5) 241.7*

(51.2)

1,991.5* (305.0) 294.7 58.9*

(293.9) (14.0)

Mode of employment (full-time job = 1)

3,717.2* (342.4)

Language at work (only English)

–219.5

Language at work (English and Hebrew) Social services Advanced producer services Jerusalem area Center–Tel Aviv area

(331.0)

1,191.6* (352.8) –1,438.5* (370.7) 938.2* (342.9) –484.6

(472.2)

795.4* (402.4)

Self-employed

–223.7

ptm

1,255.2* (296.9)

Constant

–272.2

R2

(322.3) (809.6)

43.0

*p < 0.05

The gender coefficient captures the earnings gap between men and women. The data show that even after controlling for all relevant variables (such as age, marital status, hours of work, human capital, labor force experience, language use, type of occupation, and sector of employment), men earn more than women (1,991 nis on average). While language use at work does not significantly affect occupational attainment, it has a significant effect on earnings, with those using both English and Hebrew at work earning on average 1,191 nis more than those who use only Hebrew. This suggests that South African workers are able to benefit from their English skills when they are combined with a good command of Hebrew.

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Fig. 42. Expected monthly earnings in social services, by gender, occupation, and language (full-time employment).

The Impact of Language Use at Work on Earnings To further illustrate the effect of language use at work on earnings, figures 42 and 43 show the predicted earnings for different profiles of respondents based on the main variables affecting economic attainment: gender, language use (only Hebrew or both Hebrew and English), type of occupation (ptm or other), sector of employment (social services and advanced producer services).22 From the comparison between levels of earnings between ptm and other occupations in the social service sector (figure 42) and in the aps sector (figure 43) we learn that workers who use both languages at work always receive a wage “premium.” It is also interesting to note that respondents working in non-ptm jobs but using both Hebrew and English at work achieve earnings levels that are similar to those working in ptm jobs but using only Hebrew at work. In other words, the wage penalty that men

167

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Fig. 43. Expected monthly earnings in advanced producer services, by gender and language (full-time employment).

and women incur from working in non-ptm occupations is offset by their linguistic advantage over similar workers who use only Hebrew at work. Finally, the figures clearly illustrate how men and women with similar characteristics are rewarded differently. For example, South African men and women similar in age, marital status, full-time employment, education, and generation who work in social services in ptm occupations and in places where both Hebrew and English are used earn 11,804 and 9,813 nis , respectively. Likewise their male and female counterparts working in the advanced producer services earn 15,372 and 13,381 nis , respectively. Other things being equal, then, men still earn on average 20% more than their female counterparts. On the assumption that all relevant variables have been controlled for, this gap can be understood as the result of discrimination against women in the labor market.

Conclusions This chapter aimed to examine the economic assimilation of the generational groups of South Africans in Israel. The findings suggest that Israelis 168

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of South African origin enjoy an advantageous position in the Israeli labor market compared both with the general Israeli population and with other immigrants groups. Overall the South African olim (generation 1.0) have high socioeconomic status to begin with, and the younger generations maintain this advantage in all measures of socioeconomic attainment, far outpacing the societal standards. Regardless of generation, South Africans display higher levels of human capital, they are concentrated in the most privileged sectors and jobs in the economy, and their earnings are well above the average in the Israeli economy. Thus the economic integration of South Africans in Israeli society does not seem to be in question. It is even possible that the second generation will surpass the economic outcomes of the first and one-and-a-half generations as these individuals improve their education and skills and gain more experience in the labor market. Despite this advantaged position, gender gaps prevail within the South African community. While South African women enjoy high levels of human capital, labor force participation, and socioeconomic attainment compared with other women in Israel, they suffer from disadvantages in the Israeli labor market compared with men. Like other Israeli women, they are affected by structural disadvantages that derive from women’s concentration in female-dominated occupations, in part-time positions, and in the social services sector. By contrast, their male counterparts tend to predominate in professional and academic jobs, mostly in the aps sector, where salaries are much higher than in other sectors (Raijman, Menahem, and Kemp 2008). Part of the gender gap lies, then, in men’s and women’s differential affiliation with sectors and jobs that are firmly linked to the global economy (e.g., aps ) versus those only weakly linked to it (e.g., social services). Though the growth in social services entails a concomitant increase in women’s labor force participation, it also channels women into female-typed 169

Economic Assimilation

occupations with low levels of responsibility and job authority. These characteristics reduce women’s earning capacity and thus contribute to the gender gap.23 The paradox, then, is that woman-friendly economic sectors that promote their labor force participation replicate gender inequality by reinforcing occupational sex segregation (Mandel and Semyonov 2006). The persistent effect of gender, which remains significant and powerful after all controls, serves as a reminder that even among highly skilled immigrants, gender is a powerful determinant of occupational and economic attainment. This chapter has examined the patterns of socioeconomic assimilation of South Africans in Israel and has highlighted the relevance of language skills in explaining the economic outcomes. We turn now to our last empirical chapter, focusing on the analysis of identificational assimilation.

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Chapter 6

Identificational Assimilation Alongside social networks and language, identity patterns are widely considered among the most significant indicators of immigrants’ assimilation in their host societies. Since identity is a complex, fluid, and multidimensional concept, we will focus on just two of its main aspects: (1) the subjective identities of Israelis of South African origin, that is, how they perceive and define their own identities; and (2) the South Africans’ perceptions of the intercultural boundaries between themselves and other groups in Israeli society. An analysis of these two aspects will enable us to examine to what extent assimilation, understood in terms of identity, has increased in successive generations of Israel’s South African community. This chapter begins with a brief survey of theoretical approaches to the study of identificational assimilation among immigrants. The remainder of the chapter synthesizes data of three types: (1) a descriptive analysis of four identity components predominant in the subjective identities of South Africans in Israel: Jewish, Zionist, Israeli, and South African; (2) the results of regression models examining identification as (a) Israeli versus

South African and as (b) Israeli versus Jewish; and (3) qualitative findings gleaned from in-depth interviews that may contribute to our understanding of intergenerational differences in patterns of identity.

Theoretical Background Patterns of ethnic identification among immigrant groups have been the focus of substantial research (e.g., Alba 1990; Waters 1990; Berry 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Diehl and Schnell 2006; Zimmermann, Zimmermann, and Constant 2007). According to this literature, immigrants’ identity is a multidimensional phenomenon ranging over varying degrees of identification with the country of origin and the host society. This identificational range is captured by the following typology suggested by Berry (1997): (1) integration: strong identification with both the host country and the country of origin; (2) assimilation: strong identification with the host country and weak identification with the country of origin; (3) separation: strong identification with the country of origin and weak identification with the host country; (4) marginalization: weak identification with both the host country and the country of origin. Immigrants’ identity can be affected by the following factors: (1) structural assimilation (e.g., labor market and economic assimilation); (2) social adaptation or acculturation (via contacts with members of the majority, language acquisition, etc.); and (3) ethnic competition (e.g., experiences of discrimination, perceptions of social climate toward immigrants). According to the structural assimilation hypothesis, immigrants in advantaged socioeconomic positions (in terms of education and income) are more likely to identify with their host country (see Portes and McLeod 1996; Amit 2012). Since socioeconomic mobility makes possible equalstatus contacts between immigrants and majority members in the public sphere (in the workplaces and in neighborhoods), it is also conducive to greater attachment to the host country. 172

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According to the acculturation perspective, a major transition from identification with the country of origin to identification with the host country occurs over generations (Alba and Nee 1997). Identification with the country of origin, or ethnic identification, is more likely among members of the first generation and less so among members of successive generations, whose socialization takes place in the host society (Ono 2002). Other factors associated with lower degrees of ethnic identification are use of the host country’s language (Hochman and Davidov 2014) and escape from ethnic enclosure (e.g., geographic concentration of immigrants and social networks primarily composed of co-ethnics), which facilitates and strengthens cultural ties and perpetuates ethnic practices (Portes and Zhou 1993). It is worth noting that several studies specific to Israel have also stressed the role of the military service in strengthening feelings of attachment and belonging among immigrants to the country (see, e.g., Shabtay 1999). Migrants’ identity is also a response to processes of ethnic competition in the host society (Nagel 1994; Alba and Nee 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Ono 2002). Competition along ethnic lines and experiences of discrimination in the host society may lead immigrants to develop feelings of exclusion, enhancing their ethnic identification and ethnic enclosure and lowering their identification with the host society. Since identities are constructed not only by individuals but also by outside agents and organizations that reflect internal and external defining processes (Nagel 1994), immigrants’ perceptions of the societal climate toward them is likely to affect their identificational patterns (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). We follow this theoretical outline with an account of identification patterns among South African olim, testing several hypotheses implied by the above three perspectives to explain processes of identificational assimilation. 173

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Identity Components of South Africans in Israel When I go abroad, outside of Israel, I tend to feel more Jewish-Israeli. [But] in South Africa I’m just South African, and I no longer think of myself as Israeli. Is there a part of my identity that’s more important? I think it’s a combination of all of them, because to say that my identity is just one thing . . . if you come from a different place, then I don’t think that’s true. Your identity is everything you’ve gone through. And since I’ve gone through all of these things—Jewish, South African, Israeli— then that’s the way [I am]. ( Judy, first generation) Judy’s words express the complexity of the concept of identity for immigrants, especially first-generation ones. The condition she describes can be defined as a symphony of coexisting identities, in which different identities come to the fore in different times and places. To learn about patterns of identification, we asked participants in our study to address four identity components presumably prevalent among members of Israel’s South African community: Israeli, South African, Jewish, and Zionist. Since South African immigration to Israel has largely been ideologically motivated, we begin the analysis with a discussion of the respondents’ Jewish and Zionist identity components.

Jewish and Zionist Identities Figure 44 shows the percentage of respondents from three generations strongly or very strongly identifying as Jewish and as Zionist. As the data indicate, the two identity components were found to be similarly strong among all three generations. Most respondents (over 93% in each generation) strongly identified as Jewish. Many (though slightly fewer, between 79% and 86%) strongly identified as Zionist as well. The importance of the Jewish and the Zionist identity components was also expressed in the in-depth interviews. Judaism and Zionism had 174

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Fig. 44. Respondents identifying as Jewish and as Zionist.

been central values for the Jewish community in South Africa, values on which most first-generation members were raised from a young age. As one first-generation respondent, Jack, put it: Life in the Jewish community was an experience of Judaism and fraternity. . . . First of all, I went to a Jewish school which had its own activities. . . . I mean all the holidays . . . all the activities related to the Jewish life cycle. . . . [Israel’s] Independence Day is something I remember. . . . My longest and earliest memories are from the times my father and grandfather would take me to the stadium, and all the Jewish people would be there . . . and I remember the [Israeli] ambassador coming in his black limo, and everyone cheering him on for representing Israel, and we’d each get two candles at the entrance, one white, one blue, and we’d light them up and stand up for the Israeli national anthem . . . on the eve of [Israeli] Memorial Day, with the ceremonial vigil and siren, just like here in Israel. As this account indicates, Judaism and Zionism were integral aspects of Jewish communal life in South Africa, particularly manifested in the 175

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celebration of Jewish holidays at home and at school, in the central role played by the synagogue, in Jewish and Zionist youth movements, and in a great enthusiasm for all things Israel. For most of the respondents, this communal framework formed a strong sense of belonging to the Jewish people and to the Israeli state. This strong identification with the Jewish people and with Zionism may be explained by Benedict Andersons’s (1991) concept of “imagined communities,” which draws attention to people’s tendency to identify deeply with an “imagined community” despite not being directly acquainted with most of its members. The strong feelings harbored by South African Jews toward both the Jewish people and the State of Israel may also be partly due to their special circumstances as an ethnic and religious minority within the white South African minority; this dual minority status may have intensified their need to belong to a larger community such as the Jewish people or the Zionist movement (see Shain 1999; Herman 2007). As already shown in chapter 3, Jewish identity in South Africa comprised two interrelated components, ethnic and religious. Religion played an important role in the lives of South African Jews, among other reasons because it was a social hub for the Jewish community. The synagogue was not only a place of worship but also an important social and cultural center. As Shelly (first generation) recounted: I went to synagogue on Saturdays. . . . Life revolved around the synagogue community. My parents went as far as selling the house and buying a new house closer to the synagogue . . . Life itself was all within the Jewish community. This special convergence of social and religious life within ethnic communities has been termed by Gans “symbolic religiosity.” The concept refers to “the consumption of religious symbols, apart from regular participation in a religious culture and in religious affiliations, other 176

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than for purely secular purposes . . . it involves the consumption of religious symbols in such a way as to create no complications or barriers for dominant secular lifestyles” (Gans 1994, 585).1 The concept can thus accurately be used to describe the religious way of life of some members of South Africa’s Jewish community, one that combined the celebration of Jewish holidays, the lighting of candles on the Sabbath and on holidays, and so forth, with such practices as driving on the Sabbath (to the synagogue, no less), a sort of “traditional” secularism that made possible a relatively frictionless religious and national (Zionist) Jewish identity. The transition from country to country effects considerable changes in the lives of immigrants, including changes in the content and components of their new identities in the host country. Our study reveals certain changes in the immigrants’ Jewish identity, in particular a lesser degree of religiosity in Israel. As table 25 shows, for some first-generation olim, the synagogue has relatively lost its importance both as a place of worship and as a social hub: whereas 97% of the first-generation respondents had attended synagogue services in South Africa (over half of them once a week or more), only 75% continued to do so in Israel (30% once a week or more).2 Table 25: Frequency of synagogue attendance and religiosity in South Africa and Israel (generation 1.0) Synagogue attendance (%)

South Africa

Israel

Once a week or more

51.8

29.9

1–3 days per month

13.2

9.1

Only on the High Holidays

31.9

36.2

Not at all

3.2

24.9

% secular

18.7

32.1

N

608

177

608

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Fig. 45. Religious orientation in South Africa and in Israel, generation 1.0.

Another striking change has been the significant increase in the percentage of first-generation olim self-identifying as secular, from 19% in South Africa to 32% in Israel. As figure 45 indicates, the respondents moved toward less strict religious categories once in Israel.3 For example, of those who had self-identified as modern Orthodox in South Africa, 14% self-identified as traditional and 7% as secular in Israel.4 Of those who had self-identified as traditional in South Africa, nearly one-third (29%) self-identified as secular in Israel.5 The most significant change has been in the category of Reform (or Progressive) Jews, with 41% of those who had self-identified as Reform in South Africa self-identifying as secular in Israel.6 The reasons for such changes in religious orientation were strikingly summed up by Brian, a one-and-a-half-generation respondent: “When you come here [to Israel] you’re in the so-called ‘Jewish state,’ so you do a lot less.” Judy and Barak expressed similar sentiments with regard to being Jewish in South Africa and in Israel: When I come here I don’t go to the synagogue because I think you don’t need to. . . . There’s a Jewish community here—everybody is Jewish, actually, so you don’t need the community. It’s different in South Africa: 178

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if you want to be part of it, you have to participate in the community. Otherwise you’re an outsider. Here [in Israel] you no longer need it. ( Judy, first generation) I think the reason they used to go to synagogue in South Africa is because there was a Jewish community, and that’s what the Jewish community did to preserve itself. As soon as you’re in Israel, you’re Jewish and that is that, you don’t need to prove it anymore, you don’t need to prove that you’re Jewish. That’s it, you’re here. (Barak, second generation) The sentiments articulated by Brian, Judy, and Barak were expressed in many of the other interviews as well: immigrating to Israel diminished the need to actively preserve one’s religious Jewish identity. Some olim and their children have preserved the “symbolically religious,” secular-traditional pattern on which they were raised and which, in their view, is not adequately understood in Israel since it falls under neither of the two mutually exclusive categories, “religious” and “secular,” commonly recognized in Israel. As Brian (one-and-a-half generation) eloquently put it: Here [in Israel] you’re considered either “religious” or “secular.” The idea of me going to the synagogue on Friday evening and then driving to Tel Aviv to go out drinking with my friends—to most Israelis that doesn’t make sense. They can’t wrap their heads around it. They don’t understand that being Jewish in South Africa has a very big cultural component to it. . . . When you find yourself in this situation where either you’re totally religious or you’re totally secular and there’s nothing in-between, you run into lots of arguments and strange looks. People constantly tell you, “How can you do this? You’re a hypocrite! How can you go to the synagogue and then go out? How can you fast on Yom Kippur but not observe the Sabbath?”—stuff like that. 179

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Though most South African respondents in our sample are secular (40%) or traditional (28%), about one-quarter are observant Orthodox Jews who regularly attend synagogue services. The latter group (many of whose members live in towns with a relatively high percentage of native English speakers, e.g., Beit-Shemesh and Ra’anana) fits more comfortably into the conventional Israeli category of “religious Jews.”

Instilling Jewish and Zionist Values in the Younger Generations The central role of both Zionism and Judaism in South African Jewish life has greatly affected members of the first generation and thus also the education of the one-and-a-half and second generations. As noted earlier, the different generations did not differ significantly with respect to their members’ self-identification as Jewish and as Zionist (see figure 44). Jewish and Zionist values seem, then, to have been passed on successfully and to have remained significant for those arriving as children or those born in Israel. The in-depth interviews have lent further support to the quantitative data on the importance of Zionism for the younger generations: There is something special about Israel. I don’t know how to explain it, except that it’s a sense of . . . Zionism maybe. . . . I’ve gone abroad many times, and I always say the best part of traveling is coming back home—coming back here, I mean. To see Israel from the plane— it’s a feeling that really fills me with happiness. (Mia, one-and-a-half generation) My grandfather always wanted to immigrate to Israel; that was his dream. And he instilled that in my father, probably from a very young age—that Jews have only one place, that we must come here and feel pride about where we come from. (Inbal, second generation)

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As Mia’s and Inbal’s accounts indicate, Zionist ideals were instilled at home from a young age in what can be described as an intergenerational transmission of Zionist ideas and practices. The desire to preserve Jewish traditions and practices has similarly remained strong among those arriving as children. A case in point is Brian, who stressed his wish to continue to sustain Jewish traditions in his family: I feel that when I settle down, when I decide to marry and have kids, I’ll return to a traditional Jewish way of life. It’s very important for me to find someone who believes in God, someone traditional—even to the point that I’d like her to be Ashkenazi because that’s the style of service I was raised on. (Brian, one-and-a-half generation) We see, then, that Jewish and Zionist values have taken root among the younger generations, with the result that members of the one-and-a-half and second generations differed little from their first generation counterparts with respect to their self-identification as Jewish and as Zionist. Not so with respect to the other two identity components under scrutiny, the Israeli and the South African, to which we now turn.

Israeli and South African Identities Our study of the respondents’ identification with their country of origin (South Africa) and their host country (Israel) reveals a move away from the former identity and toward the latter across successive generations. Though members of Israel’s South African community, regardless of generational status, tend to self-identify more strongly as Israeli than as South African, members of generation 2.0 are more likely to do so than members of generations 1.5 and 1.0 (98%, 90.4%, and 82%, respectively; see figure 46). Predictably olim born and at least partly raised in South Africa, that is, members of generations 1.0 and 1.5, are more likely than generation 2.0

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Fig. 46. Respondents identifying as Israeli and as South African, by generation (% strong or very strong).

members to strongly or very strongly self-identify as South African (60%, 53%, and 28%, respectively). These differences are manifest in various aspects of the respondents’ attachment to South Africa (see figure 47). For example, members of generation 1.0 follow current events (politics and popular culture) in South Africa more closely than do members of the younger generations. They are also more likely than generation 1.5 and 2.0 members to maintain close ties with relatives and friends in South Africa (78%, 51%, and 29%, respectively). Examining separately the Israeli and the South African identity components can provide important information about each. To investigate the two components’ relative importance, we asked respondents to indicate to which they felt closer (see figure 48). The answers revealed sharp intergenerational differences, with the Israeli component growing and the South African declining in relative importance over the generations. Generation 2.0 members were the most likely to feel “more Israeli than South African” (94%), followed by generation 1.5 and 1.0 respondents (72% and 54%, respectively). Conversely 18% of generation 1.0, 11% of 182

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Fig. 47. Attachment to South Africa, by generation.

generation 1.5, and absolutely no generation 2.0 members reported feeling “more South African than Israeli.” Since “Israeli” and “Jewish” were found to be the two most significant identity components among members of Israel’s South African community, we asked the respondents to indicate which of the two they deemed more important (see figure 49). The most common answer in all three generations was “equally important.” Intergenerational differences were nevertheless found, indicating changing identity patterns over the generations: while generation 1.0 members tended to stress the Jewish component (34%, compared with 14% and 12% of generation 1.5 and 2.0 members, respectively), generation 1.5 members strongly tended to hold both components equally important, and generation 2.0 members strongly tended to stress the Israeli component (41%, compared with 25% and 19% of generation 1.5 and 1.0 members). In summary, our analysis of the immigrants’ subjective identities reveals the prominence of certain ethno-national identity components (Israeli, Jewish, and Zionist). Their relative importance changes across successive 183

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Fig. 48. Comparative identity patterns (Israeli versus South African), by generation.

Fig. 49. Comparative identity patterns (Israeli versus Jewish), by generation.

generations, however, with second- and one-and-a-half-generation members feeling closer to the Israeli component than do their first- generation counterparts.

Determinants of Israeli versus South African Identity Patterns In this section we use the theoretical model outlined at the beginning of this chapter to identify the factors affecting different types of identification among members of the South African community in Israel. Since the dependent variable is categorical, we have chosen to use a logistic regression with a dichotomous dependent variable: (1) “more Israeli,” (0) “other.”7 The multivariable regression analysis is used to measure the net effects of the variables, in particular generational affiliation on the identity patterns. Since members of different generations differ in many other respects as well, it was necessary to control for social and economic attributes other than generational affiliation that could affect their identities. Variables included in the model are generation (generation 1.0 = 1; generation 1.5 = 1; generation 2.0 = reference category), gender (male = 1), age (in years), education (in years), religiosity (secular = 1; Reform or traditional = 1; modern Orthodox = reference category), language preferences (“only Hebrew” = 1; “both Hebrew and English” = 1; “only English” = reference category), percentage of English-speaking olim residing in the neighborhood (“half or more” = 1; “less than half ” = reference category), Israeli friends (“half or more of closest friends are Israelis” = 1; less than half of closest friends are Israeli = reference category), South African friends (“half or more of closest friends are South African” = 1; “less than half of closest friends are South African” = reference category), other Englishspeaking friends (“half or more of closest friends are English-speaking” = 1; “less than half of closest friends are English-speaking” = reference category), and satisfaction with socioeconomic status, as well as the respondents’ sense of how the host society perceives them (as Israeli = 1; 185

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other = reference category) (Ono 2002; Remennick 2003b; Zimmermann, Zimmermann, and Constant 2007; Burton, Nandi and Platt 2010; Amit 2012). Also examined was the effect of military or national service on the respondents’ self-identification.8 Table 26 reports regression coefficients for the likelihood of feeling more Israeli than South African (see model 1). The model is significant, with the explained variation of the independent variables ranging from 27% to 36% (depending on which measure of explained variation is used). The findings of the regression analysis show that even after all the relevant variables are controlled for, there persist intergenerational differences in the likelihood of feeling more Israeli than South African. Generation 1.0 and 1.5 members are less likely than their generation 2.0 counterparts (reference category) to feel more Israeli than South African. As the literature on immigrants’ identities predicts, the respondents’ use of Hebrew, social networks, economic satisfaction, and sense of how Israelis define them were all found to affect their likelihood of feeling more Israeli than South African. The likelihood of feeling more Israeli than South African was higher among those preferring to use Hebrew or Hebrew and English equally than among those preferring to use English only (the reference category), and lower among those reporting that half or more of their friends were South African than among those reporting that fewer than half of their friends were South African (the reference category). Identity as perceived by Israelis was found to increase the likelihood of feeling more Israeli than South African; that is, respondents who felt that veteran Israelis perceived them as Israeli were more likely to feel more Israeli than South African than respondents who felt that veteran Israelis did not perceive them as Israeli. Satisfaction with economic status was found to increase the likelihood of feeling more Israeli than South African; that is, the more a respondent was satisfied with his or her economic condition, the more likely he or she was to feel more Israeli than South African. 186

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Finally, several socio-demographic variables, including gender, age, education, and religiosity, as well as the concentration of English speakers in one’s neighborhood and a history of military or national service, were not found to significantly increase the likelihood of feeling more Israeli than South African (after controlling for all relevant variables in the model) .

Determinants of Israeli versus Jewish Identity Patterns Since Jewish identity is an important component in the amalgam of identities reported by the respondents, we have chosen to examine the determinants of Israeli versus Jewish identity patterns using a multinomial regression model (see model 2 in table 26). The model’s dependent variable was garnered from a question asking the respondents to indicate whether they felt “more Israeli,” “equally Israeli and Jewish,” or “more Jewish” (the reference category). The regression model included the independent variables in model 1 as well as two further variables relevant to Jewish identity: political orientation (left = 1; other = reference category) and frequency of synagogue attendance. Table 26 presents the regression coefficients for the likelihood of feeling more Israeli than Jewish and of feeling equally Israeli and Jewish. The model is significant, with the explained variation of the independent variables ranging from 37% to 42% (depending on which measure of explained variation is used). An analysis of the regression coefficients shows that after controlling for all the relevant variables, there exist no intergenerational differences with respect to the likelihood of feeling more Israeli than Jewish or of feeling equally Israeli and Jewish.9 Language preference, by contrast, positively affects the likelihood of feeling more Israeli than Jewish. Respondents who prefer to speak in Hebrew, “Hebrish” (mixed English and Hebrew), or both Hebrew and English are more likely to feel more Israeli than Jewish than respondents who prefer to speak in English only (the reference 187

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–1.4* 0.07 0.06 0.00

Generations (generation 1.0 = 1)

Gender (male = 1)

Age

Age squared

(0.00)

(0.07)

(0.2)

(0.5)

(0.4)

(1.5)

0.1 0.09

Religiosity in Israel (secular = 1)

Religiosity in Israel (Reform or Progressive + traditional = 1)

(0.2)

(0.2)

–0.002 (0.03)

–1.4*

Generations (generation 1.5 = 1)

Years of education

–2.1

(Constant)

B

1.1

1.1

0.99

1.0

1.1

1.1

0.24

0.25

0.12

Exp(B)

More Israeli

Model 1: Likelihood of feeling more Israeli than South African

(0.1)

(0.3)

(0.5)

(0.5)

(0.2)

0.98

0.93

1.3

0.96

Exp(B)

1.4*

2.5*

–0.01

(0.6)

(0.6)

(0.05)

4.1

12.2

0.99

0.001 (0.00) 1.0

–0.01

–0.07

0.20

–0.05

–3.1

B

More Israeli

Model 2: Likelihood of feeling more Israeli than Jewish

Table 26: Logistic regression coefficients for the likelihood of feeling more Israeli than South African and multinomial regression coefficients for the likelihood of feeling more Israeli than Jewish

(0.1)

(0.2)

(0.4)

(0.4)

(1.7)

0.5

0.9*

0.03

(0.3)

(0.4)

(0.04)

0.001 (0.00)

0.01

–0.3

0.3

–0.2

–3.1

B

1.6

2.5

1.0

1.0

1.0

0.74

1.4

0.81

Exp(B)

Both equally

(0.2)

0.1 0.2** (0.06) 0.4

Concentration of English speakers in neighborhood (unknown = 1)

Satisfaction with economic status

Military or national service (yes = 1)

5.8

1.4*** (0.4)

(0.4)

0.36

Negelkerke R Square

* P < 0.05

0.37

0.27

Cox & Snell R Square

0.42

–0.3** (0.1)

(0.4)

(0.1)

(0.4)

(0.5)

(0.4)

(0.4)

(0.4)

Frequency of synagogue attendance in Israel

0.10

0.10

–0.5

–0.8

0.3

–0.5

0.7

0.8*

1.1*** (0.3)

1.0*** (0.3)

1.48

1.19

1.13

1.2

2.6

1.0

0.57

0.7

2.8

Political orientation (left = 1)

(0.2)

(0.3)

(0.3)

1.0*** (0.3) 0.2

Concentration of English speakers in neighborhood (half or more = 1)

(0.20)

(0.2)

Identity as perceived by Israelis (Israeli = 1)

0.01

English-speaking friends (half or more = 1)

–0.4 –0.6*

South African friends (half or more = 1)

Preferred language (mixed + Hebrew and English equally = 1)

Israeli friends (half or more = 1)

1.8*** (0.4) 1.1*** (0.2)

Preferred language (Hebrew = 1)

0.76

2.7

1.1

1.1

0.95

0.46

1.4

0.61

2.1

2.2

3.0

4.1

0.2

(0.4) (0.2)

(0.3)

(0.3)

(0.3)

(0.3)

(0.3)

(0.3)

(0.3) –0.008 (0.07)

0.6*

0.2

0.2*** (0.07)

0.2

0.01

0.5

–0.2

0.3

0.7** (0.3)

0.6*

1.3

0.99

1.9

1.2

1.3

1.3

1.0

1.7

0.9

1.4

2.1

1.8

category). Respondents who prefer to speak in both Hebrew and English are more likely to feel equally Israeli and Jewish than respondents who prefer to speak in English only. Of the three social network variables included in the model, the ratio of Israeli friends was found to increase the likelihood of feeling more Israeli than Jewish and of feeling equally Israeli and Jewish.10 That is, respondents reporting that half or more of their friends were Israeli were more likely to feel more Israeli than Jewish than those reporting that less than half of their friends were Israeli (the reference category). Furthermore, respondents reporting that half or more of their friends were Israeli were more likely to feel equally Israeli and Jewish than respondents reporting that less than half of their friends were Israeli. Satisfaction with economic status was found to increase the likelihood of feeling equally Israeli and Jewish. Political orientation was also found to be correlated with the relative strength of the Jewish and the Israeli identity components: respondents leaning to the political left were more likely to feel more Israeli than Jewish and more likely to feel equally Israeli and Jewish than respondents leaning to the center and to the right (the reference category). Finally, religiosity and the frequency of synagogue attendance in Israel were significantly correlated with the relative strength of the Jewish and the Israeli identity components. Secular, Reform, and traditional respondents were more likely than their modern Orthodox counterparts (the reference category) to feel more Israeli than Jewish and to feel equally Israeli and Jewish. Conversely, the frequency of synagogue attendance was positively correlated with the likelihood of feeling more Jewish than Israeli. Several socio-demographic variables, including gender, age, and education, as well as the concentration of English speakers in one’s neighborhood, identity as perceived by Israelis, and a history of military or national service, were not found to significantly increase the likelihood of feeling more Israeli than Jewish or of feeling equally Israeli and Jewish. 190

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To sum up, the findings of the regression analysis revealed intergenerational differences with respect to the Israeli versus the South African identity components. These differences remained significant after controlling for demographic and other variables. The apparent influence of generational variables on the Israeli versus the Jewish identity components disappeared, however, after controlling for the other relevant variables. The findings of the regression add to our understanding of the influence of assorted variables on the various identity components and offer us statistical information on the intergenerational differences. To better understand the meaning of these intergenerational differences with respect to the Israeli and the South African identity components, we now turn to an analysis of the in-depth interviews.

Understanding Intergenerational Differences with respect to Israeli and the South African Identity Components As noted earlier, several identity components coexist in members of all three generations, though their relative importance varies. The Israeli component is present among members of the first generation, though the South African identity is strongly present as well. Ryan and Leslie had this to say about their hybrid identities: I don’t know. . . . Let me tell you the truth: When people ask, I say I’m Israeli—but of course I am not, and never will be, a hundred percent Israeli. . . . I never say “South African,” I say “Israeli” because the Israeli aspect is more important to me. . . . I don’t say “South African Israeli” either—I just say “Israeli”—but inside I know who I am, which is a very personal matter, because I don’t connect with everything that goes on here in Israel. . . . I’ll always have my South African side, so it isn’t quite possible to pick out my identity. (Ryan, first generation) I’m a South African Israeli. 191

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Q: Which is more important? Um . . . neither is more important, because my roots will stay with me all my life, I can’t give up my roots or who I am . . . but I’m here now, I’m living my life now, and no time is more important than right now. (Leslie, first generation) Like Ryan and Leslie, respondents of the first generation find it very important to note their Israeli identity and to stress that they are Israelis because they presently live in Israel. Nevertheless they are highly aware of the South African component of their identity. A combination of both identity components, Israeli and South African, characterizes members of the one-and-a-half generation as well, though in their case the two components genuinely blend, as the cases of Mia and Keren exemplify: I do feel Israeli, I really do; I don’t make that distinction between Israeli and South African, it all just blends in me. (Mia, one-and-a-half generation) It’s not in-between; they go together, they sort of blend with one another. I can feel the gap, like I told you: I can see differences between my home and other homes. But it’s not that glaring, nothing that might create such a gap. (Keren, one-and-a-half generation) This blending of Israeli and South African identity components among members of the one-and-a-half generation is sometimes preceded by a period of ambivalence and nostalgia for South Africa, followed by disenchantment. Some respondents who came to Israel as children or adolescents reported feeling “torn” from their native land. Some pined for South Africa during their adolescence in Israel, feeling that South African culture was superior to the culture they found in Israel. Spurred by such

192

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feelings, quite a few of them decided to visit South Africa, where, however, they soon came to realize how different they were from their counterparts who grew up in South Africa. This often led to disenchantment with the nostalgia for South Africa and to renewed identification with Israeli life and culture. Keren, who arrived in Israel at the age of seven, shared her feelings about her year in South Africa following her discharge from the military: Q: The decision to go to South Africa of all places—did you always know you wanted to go there? When you’re taken at a young age from a country that you . . . that something in your genes . . . I can’t explain it, something in your body just has to be there, some part of your identity is still there. When I was growing up I always felt that South Africa was better than Israel, that South Africans were better than Israelis, more polite, more civilized, just all-round better. . . . When I was there, though, I went through a process I hadn’t expected. I wanted to leave Israel as soon as possible and go live somewhere else, but when I was there I found myself missing Israel so much. I learned things about myself that surprised me, and I didn’t like the South African community as much. It was as if everything got turned upside down for me over there. After a year there I really started to see myself as an Israeli and wanted to go back to Israel, where my friends are. Because I couldn’t really connect, I couldn’t form real friendships with people over there, and I felt the culture gap, because I was in the military, and I live in Israel, and they live a very different kind of life, which sort of kept me from connecting with people over there. Q: What does that mean—do you mean you didn’t like their lifestyle? First of all, that kind of life: it’s very easy over there. I find life is too easy there. They don’t know anything about any kind of deprivation,

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most of them have a maid at home, they’re very spoiled. . . . And the girls were like Barbie dolls, always busy with clothes—not that it’s bad, but I just couldn’t connect.11 Like Keren, many one-and-a-half-generation respondents expressed yearnings and wished to return to the familiar setting of their adolescence. At some point they began to examine more critically their utopian assumptions about life in South Africa and to assess life there from an Israeli perspective, leading to critical conclusions about the lifestyle and character of their South African counterparts. One corollary of this process has been a new sense of distance from their old South African identity and a strengthening of the Israeli component of their identity. The latter trend—the strengthening of the Israeli identity component— has persisted among members of the second generation, in whom the South African component, though still present, has become weaker: Well, the South African part is still a part [of me]—a small part, I know it’s not significant—but I do know that my parents’ ideas about all sorts of things have affected and still have an effect on me; and I think that some of these ideas they brought with them from South Africa. I’m Israeli, but with some amorphous ties to South Africa. When people ask, I say I’m Israeli, but they identify my accent and ask if I’m somehow connected to South Africa, and I say “yes!”—I say it gladly, which means it’s still a part of me. (Dana, second generation) I’m totally Israeli, but there’s no doubt my South African background is still there, in my culture, in my language . . . you can feel it, you can’t . . . I don’t define myself as anything other than Israeli. (Barak, second generation)

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As the cases of Dana and Barak illustrate, it seems that members of the younger generations experience South African culture as more distant than do their first-generation counterparts. They are aware of their South African roots, but this fact does not crucially affect their everyday lives. They may choose which practices or behaviors to adopt from the full menu of options offered by their culture of origin. For some, being connected to South African culture involves nothing more than meeting the extended family for a Friday night dinner, watching typically South African sports on television, and so forth. Some respondents described their maneuvers between Israeli and South African behaviors: Q: Some immigrants claim they live in-between two cultures. Do you identify with this sort of claim? Yes. [Laughs.] That’s exactly what it’s like to be Israeli without forgetting you’re South African. Q: How is it expressed? It’s a kind of attitude, like if I’m in a pub and someone comes on to me and it comes up that I’m South African, then I sort of perk up, like it’s something to be proud of, and then I also feel that maybe I need to behave more like a good, polite South African girl than like, you know, an Israeli . . . it’s funny how you do that switch. . . . As soon as I remember I’m South African, I sort of have more respect for what’s going on. (Mia, one-and-a-half generation) Lior, member of second generation, explained how his behavior may change depending on his circumstances. When he visits England, he revives the manners on which he was raised at home, whereas back in Israel he

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decides how to behave in a more strategic, calculating manner, opting for the kind of conduct that is likely to better serve his goals: Let’s just say, if you sent me to England, I’d feel at home. When I speak to people there, I talk to them like I do at home, with that kind of culture, with all the manners my mom taught me. Q: And when you talk to someone here, in college? Well, here I’m better than the others with regard to some things. I’m one of those of say “bless you” if someone sneezes in class, and “thank you” and “please” and things like that. But it comes out less often, and sometimes if I see it does me no good, then I don’t say it at all. We can discern here the choice element of symbolic ethnicity; that is, the respondents are able to choose which aspects of their ethnicity and their culture of origin to preserve and which to discard (Waters 1990; Gans 1994). It is a sort of instrumental ethnicity,12 in which one can choose to highlight certain elements of one’s ethnic identity if this can benefit one in some way. In addition to tracing the respondents’ closeness to or distance from each identity component, it is also important to understand the contents of each identity and the boundaries between the Israeli and the South African identities.

Intercultural Ethnic Boundaries Individual ethnic identity is shaped by one’s affiliation to a certain social group (Phinney and Ong 2007), but also by the way in which the group constructs the social boundaries between itself and other ethnic groups (Nagel 1994). Over the last decade the concept of boundaries has been advanced to illuminate the ways in which ethnic identities are constructed as relational

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processes. “Ethnic boundaries are patterns of social interaction that give rise to, and subsequently reinforce, in-group members’ self-identification and outsiders’ confirmation of group distinctions” (Sanders 2002, 327). Boundaries are the result of a dynamic interplay of processes of internal and external definitions (Lamont and Molnar 2002). “On the one hand, individuals must be able to differentiate themselves from others by drawing on criteria of community and a sense of shared belonging within their subgroup. On the other hand, this internal identification process must be recognized by outsiders for an objectified collective identity to emerge” (170). An important strategy for learning about group boundaries is to focus on how individuals think of themselves—as similar to or different from others—and how they present and explain their differences and similarities relative to other groups. Feelings of similarity and group membership are based on criteria of community and on a sense of shared belonging within the group. In other words, ethnic boundaries emerge on the basis of perceived cultural similarities and differences between group members and other groups in the larger society. This analytical framework suggests that to understand the complex mixture of identities characterizing Israel’s South African community, we must understand the culture in which these identities are rooted, as perceived by the respondents themselves. This is the aim of the third part of this chapter. The in-depth interviews discuss the respondents’ two main cultures, the South African and the Israeli. As we shall see, the respondents’ answers reveal a variety of layers that alternately unite and differentiate the culture of origin and the Israeli culture, highlighting the respondents’ unique place between those two cultures, as they themselves perceive it. The respondents sometimes described each culture in comparison to the other, sometimes separately.

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South African Culture According to the interviewees, South African culture encompasses various elements that affect their lives in different ways. Asked to describe the culture’s central values, the respondents mentioned several themes, predominantly special food and dishes, a pervasive and varied sports culture, the importance of family and education, characteristics of interpersonal relationships, manners and respect for others, and so forth.13 Two central elements that emerged as characteristic of South African culture are sports and food, both of which are often associated with familyoriented activities. Dana (second generation) explained: It starts with things like doing sports a lot, which is part of our life today, too. . . . And if we go on a picnic, it’s with the extended family, and it’s never just about sitting down and eating, there’s always a ballgame organized by my dad which is something . . . I don’t know if it’s even South African or not, but for me it’s always connected to South Africa, which is part of life. Respondents of different generations reported that one thing they or their relatives remember from South Africa is the ubiquity of sports— especially rugby (a very popular sports in South Africa, much less so in Israel)—in which they or their relatives engaged both as active participants and as spectators: I miss a good game of rugby, but . . . watching rugby on Sunday afternoon like I used to do with my dad . . . but that’s it. (Ryan, first generation) Food and dining—especially barbequed meat (“over the fire” in Israeli slang: respondents used both terms)—came up in many interviews as central aspects of South African life that the olim have brought with them to Israel.

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The most family-oriented thing we do is barbeque, which we do pretty often. But what I took with me is Friday night dinner. That’s like the center of our lives—the whole week revolves around Friday night, who’s going to come over and who’ll do the cooking and what we’re going to make. (Carla, first generation) As the above answers suggest, various activities typical to the South African community are family-oriented. Indeed, when asked about their culture’s central values, many of the respondents mentioned the family and its various extensions as very important. Some indicated the extended family as a highly significant part of life in South Africa, noting its absence in Israel: In South Africa there was something really hermetic and clannish about the family, and not just the nuclear family but the extended family—uncles, aunts—everyone living nearby, everyone seeing each other. That’s something that I miss in my life somehow, cousins, I don’t know . . . it’s something that . . . my parents grew up surrounded [by family] and they still keep in touch with everyone, and that’s something I don’t really know. . . . I don’t really know my cousins. (Keren, oneand-a-half generation) Community life, including dinners with friends and a rich social life, was also frequently mentioned as central to life in South Africa. Respondents now living in places without many South African or other English-speaking immigrants reported missing the kind of social life they used to have: On Saturday night we would have about twenty people over . . . dinner parties. . . . The rich social life we used to have is something I really miss here. Now, on Saturday night we just get ready for work on Sunday. We really miss that. And today we also don’t have twenty people we could

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invite over, we don’t have the company we used to have over there (Samantha, first generation). The repeated mention of family life and other similar values as central features of South African culture reflects a common tendency among ethnic groups to attribute general values (e.g., family) to their particular culture of origin—a tendency identified in Waters’s (1990) study of several immigrant communities in the United States. Though it is only expected that members of the South African community would perceive these features as unique to South African culture and identity, some of these values are universal, characterizing other ethnic communities around the world including Israeli culture, which many view as devoted to familial and communal values (Fogel-Bijaoui 1999). Few of the respondents acknowledged this—though another central feature of Jewish South African culture, the focus on Judaism, was frequently noted as a central feature of Israeli culture as well.

The Boundaries between South African and Israeli Cultures Our analysis of the in-depth interviews shows that the respondents sometimes tended to define each culture by contrasting it with the other. Attempts to delineate the social boundaries between “us” (South Africans) and “them” (Israelis) were frequently made. This pattern of identification was sometimes reversed, however, especially among younger-generation respondents, with “us” designating the Israelis and “them” the South Africans. Realizing that the immigrants themselves defined each culture largely by contrasting it with the other, we have chosen to present the central features of each culture in a comparative fashion. To make the logic of this procedure easier to follow, central features of South African and Israeli cultures are presented comparatively in table 27, with each batch of features contrasted with its counterparts in the other culture.

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Table 27: Central features of South African and Israeli cultures South African culture

Israeli culture

1

Courtesy, respect

Rudeness, impatience, violence

2

Insincerity, strictness, reticence, materialism

Solidarity, mutual aid, openness, candor

3

South African culture = British/ Anglo-Saxon culture

Israeli culture = American culture

South African Culture of Courtesy and Respect versus Israeli Culture of Rudeness, Impatience, Violence, and Dishonesty

Manners, courtesy, and respect for others were often noted as cornerstones of South African culture. Respondents from the three generations nearly always mentioned them first when asked to describe the central values of South African culture, often in the context of contrasting them with Israeli values. The courteous behaviors they mentioned included table manners, patient driving, waiting in line without pushing or cutting, and respecting other people in general and adults and authority figures (e.g., teachers) in particular. First-generation respondents sometimes noted these differences between the two cultures as a source of pride, adding that Israelis could learn a thing or two from South Africans. Remarks of this sort can be taken to express a certain aggrandizement of South African culture as well as condescension over the “Israelis”: I’m not completely Israeli, and I don’t think that’s bad, I don’t feel it’s some sort of disability. The things I feel different about are actually things I’m proud of. I think the Israelis could learn something from me. I think I can contribute, I think I’ve educated quite a few kids here at home—when they come in to visit they come looking for me to say hello, and when they leave they come to say good-bye. (Carla, first generation)

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Feelings of cultural difference were also prevalent among respondents who came to Israel as children. Keren and Mia both described situations in which such differences were strongly felt: I think it’s a cultural thing with me, I’ve always felt different somehow from this very bristly Israeliness. . . . Something in me is a bit more refined and a bit more . . . my manners . . . I often run into Israelis who tell me, “Don’t be so polite.” For years, also when I was in school, this thing with my manners was very strong, and even I felt I was being too polite (Keren, one-and-a-half generation) Q: What in your view are the negative features of Israeli culture? The rudeness. Um . . . the sense of entitlement and of not wanting to be a sucker. I find all these things very ugly, because my attitude is maybe more altruistic, trying not to cross the lines into someone else’s space to get what I want. Actually, seeing what’s happening with the other person before I look at myself? Yes, which is something I think is more South African than Israeli. Maybe, I don’t know, or maybe it’s just something personal, I don’t know anymore . . . but I do think Israelis don’t have respect for other people’s personal space, especially on the physical level—“We’re all brothers, we’re all pals.” (Mia, one-and-a-half generation) The sense of being different was especially striking among one-anda-half- and second-generation respondents describing their childhoods in Israel. Their feelings stemmed in large part from the attitudes of those around them, both adults and children, who often told them they were “too polite.” As children they habitually experienced the conflict between the behaviors and values they learned and witnessed at home and those of the broader social environment. Having learned how to conduct themselves in the world primarily from their parents, they found it difficult to come to terms with the fact that their parents’ practices and values were 202

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different from those of the broader society. They consequently felt different from other children. The first time Brian (one-and-a-half generation) felt Israeli, he says, was when he acted rudely. Being able to talk and behave “inappropriately” marked for him his initiation into Israeli society: The first time I felt really Israeli, it wasn’t anything ideological. I went to this fast food place—and like I said, South Africans are very polite—and I ordered a burger, and the guy at the counter said something I couldn’t hear, so I turned around and said “What?!”—you know, instead of saying “Sorry?”—and I thought to myself, “Oh my god, you’ve turned Israeli.” You start developing that Israeli culture, you start talking in a certain way. In addition to impolite and outright rude behavior, the respondents described Israeli behaviors reflective of a violent and aggressive culture: I think the culture here is very violent, and not just physically— everything here is very violent . . . violence is expressed in everything here. . . . Beyond the conflicts with other countries, it’s also people being aggressive toward each other in everyday life. People allow themselves too much. (Idan, second generation) According to many young interviewees, another facet of Israeli culture is a certain type of dishonesty. It is, as the respondents put it, a culture of shady dealings and schemes, which they again saw as standing in stark contrast to South African culture: Um . . . based on my personal acquaintance with people from South Africa, I don’t know if I can generalize . . . uh . . . I guess being honest costs you, and here in Israel people might even see it as being naïve in a way. How is it expressed? Uh . . . Israel has this culture of shady dealings, where everyone is always looking to cut corners, whereas there [in South Africa] it’s different . . . the straight way is the only way. We don’t 203

Identificational Assimilation

have shortcuts and shady dealers and rackets. Everything is done by the book, which has to do with this strictness and inflexibility. Things have to be done by the book, there’s a certain way things need to be done. (Idan, second generation) English speakers always joke about how there’s no word for “accountability” in Hebrew because Israelis are just not aware of that concept. No one’s responsible. . . . We’re the Zionist kings of shady dealings. Everything here is a racket, we deal ourselves silly. That’s our country. (Mark, one-and-a-half generation) His criticism notwithstanding, Mark talks about “our country.” Despite the respondents’ disapproval of the negative features of Israeli culture and their efforts to distinguish between Israel culture and its South African counterpart, it seems that some of them, especially members of the younger generations, feel they do belong to Israeli society and culture. South African Culture as a Culture of Insincerity, Strictness, Reticence, and Materialism versus a Culture of Solidarity, Mutual Aid, Openness, and Candor

While describing South African culture as a culture of manners, courtesy, and respect, the respondents also drew attention to its negative aspects. Some perceived its “extreme” expressions of courtesy as indicating insincerity and hypocrisy. Younger members of the community described the pervasive desire to constantly appease and “be okay” with everyone: Courtesy, doing everything gently and politely, is very typical of South Africans. Sometimes to the point that they’re not really honest. They’re so busy being nice that you don’t know if they’re telling you the truth . . . because that would be awkward . . . they need to be okay with everyone all of the time. (Shannon, first generation) 204

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The South Africans on my mother’s side of the family, they’re not authentic, they’re so inhibited. It’s just impossible to live so much for others, to impress others, to forget who and what you are, what you need, what you want . . . to be so concerned with what the others think. . . . Her entire family is so amazing, so polite, “pardon,” “I’m sorry” . . . and . . . sometimes when I look at my mom’s relationship with her brother, who also lives in Ramat Hasharon, I don’t see a sibling relationship, I don’t see authenticity, it’s like a relationship between neighbors . . . there’s something missing, there’s no warmth. (Shira, second generation) The above descriptions of insincere, inauthentic behavior were accompanied by descriptions of South African culture as characterized by strictness, over-formality, and materialism. Like courtesy and respect, these aspects of South African culture were often contrasted with features and elements of Israeli culture, only this time the Israeli features were considered positive, the South African negative. Some respondents, as Graham (one-and-a-half generation), described South Africans as “materialistic” and “spoiled”: On the whole, South Africans are really dorky, really spoiled, hanging on to a reality that’s out of touch with Israel. As the quoted snippets indicate, most criticisms of South African culture as strict, inhibited, and so forth came from one- and-a-halfand second-generation respondents who spent at least some of their formative years in Israel and were able to observe more critically the culture on which they were raised at home. First-generation olim made little mention of the negative aspects of South African culture and were more likely to think that Israelis could learn a thing or two from that culture’s values. 205

Identificational Assimilation

Correspondingly interviewees who arrived as children or were born in the country tended to highlight the positive aspects of Israeli culture, such as mutual aid and solidarity, often contrasting them to features of South African culture. According to Lauren (one-and-a-half generation): In Israel in times of crisis everyone signs on to be together. If you’re abroad and you’re in trouble and there’s an Israeli nearby, they’ll always help you out, always. It happens less often here in Israel, but abroad, when you need help, only Israelis will help you. If you’re abroad and you walk down the street, just for example, and an Israeli sees you, they’ll talk to you right away; if a South African sees you, they won’t open their mouth to say hi. In addition to solidarity and mutual aid, the respondents often noted openness and candor as characteristic of Israeli culture, as opposed to South African strictness and reticence. The freedom to voice one’s opinion was a positive surprise for some respondents, especially those who had endured limitations on free speech during apartheid: I started liking Israel only once I got here and suddenly discovered the freedom here in Israel; you can say what you want, and, again, because I was running away from apartheid, I suddenly found something different in Israel. (David, first generation) “Openness” was one of the most common answers to the question “What are the positive aspects of Israeli culture?” Many respondents claimed to like this characteristic in Israelis, contrasting it to the reticence and distance they sometimes experienced at home. The same openness was sometimes associated, however, with an Israeli tendency to invade the privacy of others and to meddle unwarrantedly in other people’s affairs; in fact the two traits were often described as two sides of the same coin. 206

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Noga (one-and-a-half generation) expressed this clearly when asked about the positive and negative features of Israeli culture: Q: What in your view are the positive aspects of Israeli culture? Um, the openness. To a point: I don’t like it when people start being too nosy. Yes, that’s a South African thing. In South Africa people respect your privacy and there are limits. Q: And what is this openness like? Being comfortable [around people], the conversation flows, and . . . I don’t like it when people start prying though. Q: what else? Respecting other people’s privacy, not snooping around and all that, I don’t like it when people knock on my door and go, “I’m here!” I’d like them to call first and ask whether I’m up for it. . . . Still, I feel more comfortable among Israelis than among South Africans. British Influence on South African Culture versus American Influence on Israeli Culture

South Africa was under British sovereignty for many years. But even after independence, British culture has continued to exert considerable influence on white South Africans in general and on Jews in particular (DellaPergola and Dubb 1988). Several respondents described some of the cultural features noted so far—manners, respect for others, strict discipline, and so forth—as rooted in British culture. We were raised British at home, school was British, some of the teachers were British, that was the culture. It was about being more British than the British. What does that mean? Just what I’m saying. Every time I go to England there’s a part of me that feels like I’ve gone home. From the

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first grade until I was thirteen, everything was British. These are very important years in forming your identity. It’s the education, the values I was raised on, it’s everything. . . . The cultural center was Britain, not South Africa, definitely a British culture. . . . Culturally very little of it was South African, there were some Jewish elements, but mostly it was British. (Mark, one-and-a-half generation) Let’s just say, if you sent me to England, I’d feel at home. . . . When I go there I behave like I do at home, even when I’m with friends. When I speak to people there, I talk to them like I do at home, like with that kind of culture, with all the manners my mom taught me. (Lior, second generation) Israeli culture, by contrast, was seen by many South Africans as closer to and influenced to a greater extent by American culture, with some of the influence seen as negative. Respondents aligning themselves with British culture tended to feel superior to American culture and, by extension, to its Israeli offshoots: They [the Israelis] have a different culture, a different education, actually a different way of life. I think South Africans get a different sort of education, more British. It’s a different kind of culture. Israelis get a more American type of education. Q: What’s the difference between the two? I think it’s a different way, different manners. British people are very well-mannered and buttoned-up, Americans are a bit noisier. (Megan, first generation) I think language in general gives you a perspective on culture. I mean, I’m sure that being an English speaker gives me a better understanding

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of British culture. It’s hard to say that about Americans because they don’t have a culture. . . . Q: What is culture to you? I don’t know . . . it’s manners . . . how do you explain that? Here, too—I can’t really say we have a culture in Israel, we don’t, we’ve got a mix of all kinds of stuff, we don’t have our own direction, our own way, our own culture—I’m not saying it disparagingly. (Barak, second generation) Once again we find the respondents engaged in the marking of social boundaries—this time between British culture, with which they identify, and American and Israeli cultures, which they view as similar to one another and inferior to British/South African culture.

Conclusions Identity is an aspect of social assimilation where generational differences among immigrants are expected to be especially pronounced. In this chapter, we have focused on the ways in which South Africans in Israel define their own identities, perceive their ethnic group boundaries, and explain their differences and similarities relative to other groups in Israeli society. Indeed our findings reveal generational differences with respect to identity. Members of the first generation have tended to take the integrative route (Berry 1997) to becoming part of Israeli society: they have preserved some of their South African identity and culture while partially adopting Israeli identity and culture. Members of the younger generations (especially the second generation) have taken something closer to the assimilative route: they have adopted Israeli identity and culture and become part of the majority group in Israel, though, as we have seen, they have not completely abandoned their South African identity. In other words, members of the younger generations have developed a symbolic ethnicity, choosing

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which aspects of their culture of origin to preserve and which to discard (Waters 1990; Gans 1994). Many have chosen to preserve certain South African practices for the sake of their parents and grandparents but have not formed ties with the broader ethnic community. Second-generation respondents are aware of their South African roots, yet define themselves as “Israelis with weak ties to South Africa.” Feelings of cultural difference are nevertheless prevalent with respect to manners and various forms of social behavior. Members of this generation often contrast the courtesy and respect prevailing in the South African culture to the “rudeness, impatience, and violence” typical of Israeli culture. Despite such criticism, members of the younger generations often feel that they do belong to Israeli society, praising its sense of social solidarity and openness, which they contrast to the “materialism, insincerity, and strictness” of South Africans. The picture that emerges is one in which the two cultures are viewed as different from one another and as sharply separated. Respondents of the one-and-a-half and second generations tend to place themselves on the Israeli side of the divide, whereas members of the first generation align themselves more closely with South African culture. Finally, members of all three generations self-identify to an equally high degree with two of the central elements of what they define as Jewish South African culture: Zionism and Judaism. The centrality of these two elements in South Africa has had considerable effect on the first generation, and values associated with them have been instilled successfully and remain significant for members of the younger generations living in Israel. Some of this success may also be due to the fact that Zionism and Judaism are accorded utmost importance in Israeli society as well (indeed the respondents mentioned Judaism as one of the central values of Israeli culture). The meaning of these findings in light of existing theories is discussed in the next chapter. 210

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Chapter 7

Conclusion “I became Israeli when I made aliyah. But I’m not like everybody else [here]. My children are really Israeli.” —Daniela, first-generation immigrant

The words of Daniela, based on her own experience of immigration, succinctly summarize the meaning of assimilation as a process that requires an intergenerational perspective. Indeed the literature suggests that tracking immigrants’ assimilation progress requires examining the achievements of the younger generations relative to those of the first generation (Waters and Jiménez 2005; Alba and Nee 1997; Brubaker 2001). Whereas the first generation experiences some changes while accommodating to their life in a new society, their patterns of integration are constrained in many ways: on arrival they usually lack knowledge of the local language and familiarity with social and cultural codes; they tend to display a high level of ethnic enclosure expressed in their patterns of residential segregation, social networks, and intermarriage; they lack social ties and networks that can lead to good jobs; and in many cases they are less able to convert skills into economic success, and therefore they are more likely to experience higher rates of downward occupational mobility. By contrast, the younger

generations who are socialized in the destination country tend to outperform their parents in language skills and socioeconomic outcomes in the labor market, and they display lower levels of ethnic enclosure evinced in their patterns of residence, the composition of their social networks, which are less ethnic-oriented, and their rates of intermarriage. Therefore it is only with the native-born (second generation) or those who immigrated at an early age and were raised mostly in the host country (one-and-a-half generation) that there is any possibility of assessing the true prospects for the assimilation of immigrant groups (Rumbaut 1999; Alba and Nee 2003, 215). Based on this approach our book has analyzed the forms of integration of South Africans in Israel through the comparison of the assimilation experiences of three generational groups: those arriving as adults (the first generation), those arriving as children (the one-and-a-half generation) and those born in Israel (the second generation). As assimilation is not a single process but occurs in different domains and at different paces, we have examined several dimensions such as the labor market, language, social relations, intermarriage, and identity. By emphasizing the multigenerational and multidimensional perspective, this research establishes solid ground for understanding the mechanisms that encourage or undermine immigrants’ integration into society. In these concluding remarks we attempt a reflective integration of our main findings in light of theories of assimilation outlined in chapter 1. For that purpose we will rely on two main comparisons. First, we will examine the achievements of the younger generations relative to those of the first generation among South Africans in Israel across the different domains of assimilation. Second, we will compare South Africans’ assimilation outcomes to those of immigrants from other countries of origin. In combination the comparisons enable us not only to track generational changes within and across groups but also to provide a general assessment of ethnic stratification of immigrant groups in Israeli society. 212

Conclusion

Patterns of Intergenerational Assimilation From the evidence presented in the book, we can conclude that, in the main, South Africans are very well integrated into Israeli society.1 In all domains our findings indicate an increasing assimilation across generations, in line with neo-assimilation models. Table 28 provides a succinct summary of key findings on which this generalization is made.2 Table 28 (panel A) shows that South Africans in Israel have assimilated very well economically. The fact that the first generation arrived with educational and professional credentials had obvious effects on the character of their integration. Furthermore their human, social, and cultural capital enabled them not only to benefit from opportunity structures available at large in the Israeli labor market but also to retain socioeconomic advantages into the younger generations. For the latter, economic assimilation mostly involves horizontal intergenerational socioeconomic mobility, as they remain in the same or similar occupational categories as their firstgeneration counterparts. The second generation may even surpass the economic outcomes of the first and one-and-a-half generations as they improve their education and skills and gain more experience in the labor market. The relatively high level of social and economic resources of South Africans in Israel permits them to participate in mainstream society on rather favorable terms and thereby encourages other forms of assimilation, such as language, identity, and social mixing across ethnic lines. Panel B in table 28 reflects intergenerational progress by focusing on three dimensions that are crucial to any evaluation of the ultimate course of social assimilation: the ethnic makeup of immigrant neighborhoods, social networks, and intermarriage (Waters and Jiménez 2005; Alba and Nee 2003). The findings on the ethnic makeup of neighborhoods indicate a process of spatial assimilation across generations of South Africans in Israel. Younger generations, especially the second generation, are more likely than their parents to live in neighborhoods with a low concentration of Anglophones. 213

Conclusion

High High

Occupational attainment

Earnings attainment

Low

Intermarriage

High

Low High

Medium

Ratio of native Israeli friends

Low

Low

Low

High

High

High

Generation 1.5

Ratio of friends who immigrated from other English-speaking countries Medium

Ratio of South African friends

High

Medium

Neighborhood choice based on the concentration of English speakers there

Ethnic makeup of social networks

Medium

Residency in neighborhoods with a concentration of English speakers

Ethnic makeup of neighborhoods

B. Ethnic enclosure

High

Human capital

A. Labor market outcomes

Generation 1.0

Table 28: Patterns of intergenerational assimilation of South Africans in Israel

High

Very high

Low

Very low / nonexistent

Very low

Low

High

High

High

Generation 2.0

Workplace

Language use in public sphere Hebrew and English

English

— —

Parents

Siblings

Hebrew and English

Hebrew and English

Hebrew Hebrew

English English

Significant others

Children

Hebrew and English

Full

English / Hebrew and Hebrew English

English

Medium

Friends

Language use in private sphere

Preferred spoken language

Language use

Hebrew proficiency in Israel

Language proficiency

C. Language

Hebrew

Hebrew

English

Hebrew

Hebrew

Hebrew

Hebrew

Full

Hebrew

Radio/television/theater

Medium low

Medium high

Medium Low

More Israeli than South African

More Israeli than Jewish

Comparative identity patterns

Participation in activities organized by members of the South African community in Israel

Medium low

High

Low

Medium

High Medium

Very high

High

Israeli

South African

Ties with South Africa

High

Hebrew

English

Hebrew

Generation 1.5

High

Jewish and Zionist

Self-identification

D. Identities

English English

Newspapers

Books

Cultural consumption patterns

Generation 1.0

Medium

Very high

Very low

Low

Low

Very high

High

Hebrew

Hebrew

Hebrew

Generation 2.0

The ethnic or linguistic composition of the neighborhood is not relevant at all for their residential choices. Likewise we found clear evidence of intergenerational change in the ethnic composition of social networks. Those who immigrate as adults tend to associate with people of similar ethnic or linguistic background (South Africans and other Anglophone groups), while those who came as children or were born in Israel tend to associate mainly with native-born Israelis. Similarly, sharp differences are evident regarding intermarriage. Endogamous patterns were found among the first generation whereas the younger generations display high levels of intermarriage with native-born partners not of Anglo-Saxon origin. The social relations of the first generation reflect the natural tendency to privilege those of similar ethnic or linguistic background, especially in relationships involving trust and intimacy. By contrast, those socialized in the country (the one-and-a-half and second generations) display a pattern of full-fledged social assimilation, as they tend to associate with and marry native-born Israelis. Acquiring the language of the host country is of paramount importance for both social and economic assimilation, therefore patterns of language proficiency and use are important markers to assess modes of immigrants’ integration into society. Data in table 28 (panel C) tell a clear story of linguistic assimilation over the generations. Immigrants who came to Israel as adults exhibit intermediate levels of Hebrew proficiency and naturally prefer to speak English in their everyday activities. Those who immigrated during their childhood or adolescence, occupy the middle position with respect to their linguistic habits, tending to prefer both languages equally. As can be expected, members of the second generation, who spent their formative years in a Hebrew-speaking social environment, prefer Hebrew in private (with relatives and friends), in public (e.g., at work), and in patterns of cultural consumption. Despite the shift to Hebrew, the command of English is rather high even among those born in Israel. Given that the Israeli labor market is 217

Conclusion

part of an Anglo-centric global economic system, English proficiency has not only a high instrumental value in Israeli society but confers to native English speakers prestige and an elevated status vis- à-vis other immigrant groups and even native Israelis. Despite the significant advantages of English skills in Israel, most South Africans realize that speaking and understanding Hebrew are nevertheless crucial for their integration in Israeli society, for social ties, and for understanding the Israeli mentality. Language is considered not merely a means of communication but also an integral feature of the social fabric and national identity, especially for the younger generations, who clearly see mastering Hebrew as a prerequisite for their social assimilation. Despite the considerable advantages of English skills, there is the accepted need to acquire Hebrew proficiency. Identity is another aspect of social assimilation examined in this study. Usually studies relate to two types of identities that are key markers of assimilation: ethnic identity (attachment to the country of origin) and national identity (attachment to the country of destination). The literature suggests that ethnic identities are likely to remain “thick” for the first generation, while the younger generations’ attachment to the culture and values of the country of origin can be expected to thin in a concomitant process. By contrast, national identities are likely to be strong for those socialized in the new country, whereas they will probably remain low for those who immigrated as adults. Our findings confirm these theoretical expectations: social ties and attachment to South Africa (ethnic identity) tend to decrease linearly over the generations. By the second generation, South African identity is merely symbolic, as many have chosen to preserve some aspects of it within the family circle. Although identification with Israel (national identity) is high across generational groups, when respondents had to decide the relative importance of each identity, it was rather clear that attachment to the 218

Conclusion

country of origin remains as a core component for the first generation, whereas the Israeli identity is the core component for the one- and-ahalf and second generations. Besides the South African and Israeli identity, Judaism and Zionism were also prominent markers of self-identification. The centrality of Zionism and Judaism among South Africans in Israel is largely due to their centrality to the identity of the Jewish community in South Africa. Even prior to immigration, South African Jews felt extremely familiar with Israeli ( Jewish) society. A variety of community-oriented activities and institutions such as synagogues, youth movements, and schools have nurtured a resilient Jewish identity coupled with a strong Zionist ethos and a strong attachment to Israel. Judaism and Zionism provide a common denominator for identification with Israeli society at large as well as a shell thinning cultural differences with other groups, especially among the first generation. These values have been instilled successfully and remain significant for members of the younger generations living in Israel, where Zionism and Judaism are accorded utmost importance as well. Summing up, our findings provide support for the assessment that the integration of each successive generation of South African immigrants followed the mainstream path of assimilation that seems to be relevant for the integration of economically advantaged groups belonging to the dominant ethnic group (Ashkenazi)—features that South Africans share with immigrants from Western countries in Europe and America. We further develop this point in the next section when examining patterns of generational assimilation among other immigrant groups.

Assimilation in Comparative Perspective The literature suggests that another form of examining assimilation processes is by comparing the socioeconomic outcomes of specific immigrant 219

Conclusion

groups with those of other benchmark populations such as immigrants from other countries of origin and the native-born (Brubaker 2001). It should be noted that this type of comparison in Israel is rather complicated because, with the exception of labor market outcomes, there is a lack of pertinent data (i.e., language, social networks, and identity) that would permit a comprehensive comparison between South Africans and other immigrant groups. Furthermore there is lack of information regarding issues of identity and social relations that allows for a comparison of immigrants to mainstream society. Fortunately the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics conducted in 2011 the “New Immigrant Survey” among a representative sample of immigrants (generations 1.0 and 1.5) arriving in Israel after 1990 who were twenty-seven to seventy-five years of age at the time of the survey.3 Although these respondents reside for shorter periods of time in the country than our South African respondents (fourteen years on average compared to twenty years, respectively), we can still compare outcomes along several domains of integration, as we can assume that after fourteen years of residency, patterns of labor market participation, language proficiency and use, social networks, and identity are already consolidated. Our comparative analysis is based on table 29, which displays selected indicators of assimilation of first- and one-and-a-half-generation immigrants of four main groups arriving in Israel under the Law of Return: (1) former Soviet Union (hereafter FSU), (2) Europe, North and South America, Australia, and South Africa (hereafter EUAM), (3) Ethiopia, and (4) Asian and African countries (hereafter ASAF).4 This comparison permits us to assess whether processes of generational change have proceeded at the same pace and direction in different domains (labor market, language, social relations, and identity) among the four immigrant groups. 220

Conclusion

Table 29 (panel A) compares patterns of intergenerational educational and occupational attainment (years of schooling and percent in professional, technical, and managerial [ptm ] jobs) across groups. The data reveal that highly educated immigrants, such as those from EUAM, are able to translate their human capital into relatively high educational and occupational attainment for the younger generation. This group displays a pattern of horizontal mobility according to which those who arrived as children or adolescents were able to achieve socioeconomic positions similar to those arriving as adults, in terms of education and access to highstatus jobs. FSU and ASAF immigrants who arrived as children surpassed the outcomes of those who arrived as adults, suggesting a clear process of upward occupational mobility. Although the one-and-a-half generation of Ethiopians have made a dramatic improvement compared to that of those arriving as adults in terms of socioeconomic outcomes, compared to other immigrant groups they still face severe disadvantages in the labor market. These findings clearly suggest an ethnic socioeconomic hierarchy, with immigrants who arrived from EUAM at the top and Ethiopian immigrants at the bottom. Immigrants from FSU and ASAF are placed in between and are still disadvantaged in the attainment of high-status occupations in comparison to EUAM immigrants. We suggest, however, that with the passage of time and in light of their high level of education and (mostly) European origin, it is conceivable that the socioeconomic outcomes of the one-and-a-half generation FSU immigrants will eventually converge with the dominant EUAM group. Further scrutiny of table 29 reveals substantial patterns of social and linguistic assimilation as evinced by the increase trend in Israeli friendships, fluency and use of Hebrew, and Israeli identity across the generational groups. On the other hand, a number of differences among the groups suggest different paces and outcomes of assimilation across generations in different domains. 221

Conclusion

PTM jobs (%)

Hebrew as main language used during the day 35.1

Language use in Israel (%)

Hebrew proficiency in Israel (mean and s.d.)

3.4 (1.1)

27.3

Veteran Israeli residents

C. Language

54.9

Immigrants from the country of origin

Most of friends are (%)

B. Social networks

15.5 (3.6) 48.4

Years of schooling (mean and s.d.)

A. Labor market 15.0 (2.5)

87.3

4.8 (.42)

81.8

13.6

45.2

1.0

FSU

1.5

1.0

ASAF

1.5

14.3

1.9 (1.0)

12.6

83.6

1.9

84.8

4.3 (.98)

22.0

75.8

13.4

24.3

2.6 (1.1)

10.4

74.9

25.9

69.2

4.6 (.67)

32.7

59.2

37.9

39.7

3.3 (1.0)

30.4

65.2

26.3

93.5

4.6 (.76)

71.4

23.8

33.4

2.0 (3.7) 10.6 (4.9) 14.1 (3.1) 14.2 (2.6) 13.2 (4.2) 13.3 (2.4)

1.5

1.0

1.0

1.5

Ethiopians

EUAM

Table 29: Selected domains of assimilation, by generation and immigrant group

Television (% only mother tongue)

77.4 62.4 504

Israeli (national)

Country of origin (ethnic)

N

Self-identification (% to a great extent)

D. Identities

21.1 29.3

Radio (% only mother tongue)

Cultural consumption patterns

Workplace (% only mother tongue)

19.6

62.8

Children (% only mother tongue)

Language use in public sphere

38.2

Friends (% only mother tongue)

Language use in private sphere

63

49.2

90.2

10.7

1.7

6.7

30.8

3.2

480

88.3

76.0

22.3

67.6

9.0

44.2

61.5

112

89.3

81.0

—

8.2

—

4.5

6.3

2,555

59.3

64.8

50.2

54.5

19.2

71.3

63.6

373

57.9

84.3

13.6

8.3

3.7

35.6

22.3

234

57.2

79.6

23.9

18.1

10.3

52.6

33.2

31

60.0

80.0

—

3.4

5.4

8.0

6.5

One domain in which the pace of assimilation seems to differ across immigrant groups is that of social networks (table 29, panel B). Although overall the percentage of immigrants relying mostly in co-ethnic networks decreases by the one-and-a-half generation, these percentages still remain very high among Ethiopians and FSU immigrants. By contrast, the ethnic composition of EUAM and ASAF immigrants’ social networks has switched by the one-and-a-half generation mostly to Israeli friends, suggesting, among other things, the greater ability of these two immigrant groups to assimilate into social circles of the dominant group compared to their Ethiopian and FSU counterparts. One domain in which intergenerational assimilation is rather similar across groups is that of language proficiency and use (table 29, panel C). We witness uneven levels of Hebrew fluency among the first generation, with immigrants from EUAM and ASAF having the highest, followed by FSU, and Ethiopians displaying the lowest levels of Hebrew proficiency.5 Despite these group differences, the command and the use of Hebrew for daily interactions are very high for all groups in the one-and-a-half generation. This trend in language shift is accompanied by a decrease in the use of mother tongue with family members and friends, at work, and in media consumption. These intergenerational changes clearly suggest a process of linguistic assimilation for all groups. Identity patterns are considered among the most significant X-rays of immigrants’ assimilation. A comparison across generations allows assessing the extent to which ethnic identity declines and Israeli identity increases in line with assimilation expectations. The data in panel D of table 29 reveal a clear tendency of greater attachment to the Israeli identity across generations for all immigrant groups, and this trend is especially marked in the case of EUAM and FSU. However, the increasing centrality of the Israeli identity was not always concomitant with a decrease in the selfidentification in ethnic terms in the one-and-a-half generation. With the 224

Conclusion

exception of EUAM immigrants, the stable levels of ethnic identity across generations suggest that for members of these groups self-identification in national terms as Israeli is not incompatible with a strong ethnic identity. It is noteworthy that in distinction to other groups, Ethiopians prioritize their ethnic identity vis-à-vis their Israeli identity. For this specific group, ethnic identity is not just “symbolic” (like in the case of EUAM) but “reactive,”6 and reinforced through perceptions of discrimination in Israeli society (see Ben-Eliezer 2004). In light of these findings, how can we characterize the forms of intergenerational assimilation of immigrant groups in Israel? In the next section we attempt a reflective integration of our main findings in light of current theories of assimilation.

Explaining Paths of Assimilation In chapter 1 we discussed the concept of assimilation and the main theories that guided our analysis of immigrants’ integration. Although these theories and their correspondent models and typologies have been developed in the American immigration context, we believe that they are relevant for the Israeli context. The migration literature suggests three possible outcomes of assimilation: (1) mainstream assimilation, meaning acculturation and economic integration into the middle class; (2) downward mobility, meaning permanent poverty and assimilation into the lower socioeconomic strata; (3) selective acculturation, meaning economic advancement coupled with deliberate preservation of ethnic membership, culture, language, and values of their countries of origin (Portes and Zhou 1993; Alba 2008). Paths of assimilation are not just a matter of individual choice but conditioned by differential access to resources at the micro and macro levels. The former relates to individual, familial, and community resources available to immigrants in their new societies, and the latter refers to macro 225

Conclusion

societal factors such as racial-ethnic stratification, economic opportunities, spatial segregation, and the social climate toward specific immigrant groups (Morawska 1994; Portes and Rumbaut 1990, 2001; Alba and Nee 2003). Gaps in the structure of socioeconomic resources of the immigrants, their families and ethnic communities, and different structures of opportunity confronting immigrant groups shape the diverse pathways of assimilation. Based on this approach we try now to assess outcomes of assimilation for immigrant groups in Israel (see table 30). The evidence presented in table 30 suggests that “mainstream assimilation” constitutes the main path for immigrants from South Africa and EUAM. The configurations of factors that created conducive conditions for mainstream assimilation are (1) absence of a relationship of economic subordination in the labor market; (2) lower levels of ethnic enclosure (i.e., minimal ethnic networks, residential dispersion); (3) minimal cultural barriers to personal social contacts between immigrants and members of the dominant group; (4) good command of the local language; (5) absence of discrimination against an immigrant group at the individual as well as the institutional levels; and (6) small size of the group.7 An important element of the pro-assimilation cluster among EUAM immigrants in general and South Africans in particular is the migrants’ high human capital, which allows them to integrate into the higher rungs of the labor market (even above native-born). In addition their inclusion in the dominant Ashkenazi group locates them at an advantaged position in society. Entry into the primary circles of that group and intermarriage are common among the younger generations, who have not developed an ethnic-related social life. The fact that younger generations adopt an attachment to “symbolic” forms of ethnicity does not undermine the overall trend of mainstream assimilation. An important element in this configuration is the small size of the communities (whether ethnic or linguistic), which arguably facilitates social integration when combined 226

Conclusion

Medium

Small Mainstream Mainstream assimilation assimilation

Group size

Path of assimilation

High Small

Very low

High Very low

Social contacts with veteran Israelis

Perceived discrimination

Low

Ethnic networks and residential concentration Low

Medium

Very high

Very high

Israeli identity

Attachment to country of origin

None High

None High

Economic subordination in the host society

Hebrew proficiency and use

South Africans EUAM

Table 30: Paths of assimilation, by immigrant group

High and concentrated in specific localities

Medium

Low

High

High

High

High

Low

FSU

Mainstream Selective acculturation assimilation

Small

Very low

High

Low

High

High

High

Low

ASAF

Assimilation into lower socioeconomic strata (underclass)

Small but segregated in specific localities

High

Low

Very high

Very high

High

High

High

Ethiopians

with the absence of discrimination. Although they belong to the Mizrahi group, ASAF immigrants who arrived in their childhood or adolescence are making some socioeconomic progress and resemble the patterns of social assimilation of EAUM in terms of social relations, language, and identity.8 Other immigrant groups such as FSU and Ethiopians face quite different conditions for their assimilation into Israeli society. FSU immigrants display a pattern of selective acculturation in which intergenerational upward socioeconomic mobility is accompanied by a strong preservation of ethnic identity. This salient ethnic cultural distinctiveness manifests itself in the significant in-group homogeneity of social networks, Russian-language maintenance, and cultural continuity, which has not weakened even among those who have been socialized in Israel. Strong ethnic attachment is facilitated by the size of the Russian-speaking community (almost 20% of the Jewish population in Israel) and the concomitant development of a cultural and media market (see, e.g., Ben-Rafael, Olshtain, and Geijst 1998; Leshem and Lissak 1999; Al-Haj 2004). In addition many scholars have suggested that cultural pride and the sense of cultural superiority visà-vis Israeli society, which remains high among the younger generation, explain the persistence of ethnic identity across generations (Shumsky 2004; Al-Haj 2004; Remennick 2007). In the case of Ethiopians, socioeconomic integration is a real challenge, as racism enters as a complicating factor limiting the chances for social mobility.9 As a racial group they are visibly distinctive from the majority group, and their individual, parental, and community resources are low. Under these conditions, the path of integration is characterized by persistent and substantial disadvantages vis-à-vis the mainstream and by assimilation into the lower socioeconomic strata. Ethiopians in Israel display very low levels of formal schooling and hold jobs in the bottom rungs of the labor market. Initial disadvantages in human-cultural capital coupled with racial discrimination persist into the younger generations, 228

Conclusion

placing them in a disadvantaged minority status. Their reliance on coethnic-based social capital reinforces social closure within the ethnic community (Offer 2007). The persistence of ethnic identity among the one-and-a-half generation is not “symbolic” but is rooted in responses to discrimination by majority members against them (Ben Eliezer 2004).10 The differences in the paths of assimilation of immigrant groups in Israel suggest that a new system of ethnic and racial stratification is likely to become an intrinsic part of stratification processes that will impinge on next generations’ socioeconomic mobility and cultural incorporation. Given the striking differences in terms of human and social capital, skin color, size and character of the two ethnic communities, and the levels of societal discrimination against the two groups, the question arises to what extent the second generation of FSU and Ethiopian immigrants will succeed in assimilating into Israeli society. It is difficult to predict whether second-generation FSU immigrants will crystallize into a distinct ethnic group, as have their first- and oneand-a-half-generation counterparts, or will integrate into the main circles of the social mainstream and develop a “symbolic ethnicity,” as have their EUAM and South African counterparts. It is possible to speculate that with the dramatic reduction in the immigration flows from the FSU, the second scenario might be the case. By contrast, Ethiopians, even those in the second generation, are likely to remain on the bottom rungs of the socioeconomic ladder and form a new, particularly fragile and isolated underclass. Given our scanty knowledge about the complex ways by which generations of immigrant groups are incorporated into Israeli society, future studies are urgent and necessary.

Final Words We would like to conclude our book with a paragraph written by Ruben Rumbaut, a prominent Cuban American sociologist and a leading expert 229

Conclusion

on immigration, who, in our view, synthesizes the essence of intergenerational assimilation in the following words: Assimilation looks to the future, not to the past; it works its alchemy chiefly in the realm of the young, and the malleable next generation, but most superficially on those already formed adults who made the fateful decision to come and who bring with them a dual frame of reference. Assimilation is about seduction, and not simply coercion; about discovery, and not only loss and twilight; about profound conflicts of loyalties and a kind of existential red-alertness, and not merely conforming to group pressure (as if the process of assimilation were but a gigantic Asch experiment) and taking the path of least resistance. It is also about creative intermingling and extraordinary hybridities, and not at all simply surrender on the terms of a dominant core. (Rumbaut 1999, 192) We will be happy if at least some of these insightful thoughts are somehow illustrated in our book.

230

Conclusion

Appendix

Letter Sent to South African Households in Israel Dear Oleh: The Institute for Immigration and Social Integration at Ruppin Academic Center, in collaboration with the Kaplan Centre for Jewish Studies and Research at the University of Cape Town and with Telfed, is conducting a study about the South African community in Israel. The general aim of this research project is to explore various social, economic, and cultural aspects of South African Jewish immigration to Israel. Your responses will provide us with a general portrayal of the community and its process of integration in the country. You have been randomly selected to participate in the study. While your participation is voluntary, it is vital to the success of the research. The survey takes about 45 minutes to complete and most people find it quite interesting. All the information you give will be held in confidence and will be used for research purposes only. Results of the study will be made public only in summary or statistical form, so that individuals who participate cannot be identified.

We are most grateful for your collaboration in realizing this important study. Please feel free to direct all questions to us at 0545674839, Sunday to Thursday between 10.00 a.m. and 3.00 p.m. Dr. Rebeca Raijman Sidney Shapiro Institute for Immigration and Social Integration Director, Telfed Ruppin Academic Center

232

Appendix

Notes

1. Introduction 1. For studies on the Jewish community in South Africa, see Shain 1994; Shimoni 1988, 2003; Herman 2007; Mendelsohn and Shain 2008, among others. For studies on South African Jews in Australia, see Tatz, Arnold, and Heller 2007. For studies on South African Jews in England, see Caplan 2011. 2. The following chapters analyze these various dimensions of assimilation, elaborating and presenting a theoretical background for each specifically. 3. For a thorough analysis of theories of assimilation, see Morawska 1994; Barkan 1995; Kazal 1995; Alba and Nee 1997; Zhou 1997a. 4. Civic assimilation refers to “activities of the general civic life which involve earning a living, carrying out political responsibilities, and engaging in the instrumental affairs of the larger community” (Gordon 1961, 279). 5. Studies from this period documented progressive trends of social mobility across generations (in terms of education and occupational attainment) and increasing rates of intermarriage, English proficiency, and exposure to American culture (Lieberson 1980; Alba 1985, 1988; Neidert and Farley 1985; Lieberson and Waters 1988). 6. According to Gans (1999), while studies supporting the linear assimilation model were conducted among adult second generation white Americans of European origin, current studies on the second generation that contradict the predicted linear assimilation are mainly based on children attending school and living with their parents. These outcomes might be explained by the fact that while living with their parents, children could be under more ethnic retentionist pressures than they will be in their adult life. Rejection of the mainstream assimilation model is therefore perhaps premature, as it may be contradicted when today’s second generation reaches the same life-cycle position as the second generation of older immigration flows (Gans 1999, 167). 7. These domains do not cover the whole spectrum of assimilation dimensions, which for example also includes political integration.

8. Since 1948 over five million Jews have immigrated to different countries in the world, Israel being the main recipient, with 63% of all Jewish immigrants (DellaPergola 2012, 10). 9. The Law of Return was reformed in 1970, with the “Right of Return” extended to grandchildren of Jews and their nuclear families (even if they themselves are not Jewish). Paradoxically, this amendment created a new oxymoronic category of “nonJewish olim” (Weiss 2002). 10. The Jewish Agency for Israel is a global Jewish organization committed to the rescue of Jews in distress and to Jewish immigration and absorption in Israel (Shoham and Kaufman Strauss 2007, 203). By its own definition, the Jewish Agency’s special mission is to “bring a substantial number of Jews to live in Israel and to ensure their successful integration” (http://www.jewishagency.org/JewishAgency/English/Aliyah /Aliyah+Info). 11. Tehilla was established in 1982 as a voluntary organization to encourage religious aliyah within Jewish communities around the world. It also supports the newcomers’ integration in Israel (see http://www.tehilla.com). Nefesh B’Nefesh was established in 2001 as a nonprofit organization to encourage North American and British Jews to make aliyah. The organization aims to increase the number of prospective olim by “removing the professional, logistical and financial obstacles that prevent many individuals from actualizing their dreams” (see http://nbn.org.il). 12. Since September 2008 Nefesh B’Nefesh has enjoyed official government recognition. The Israeli government currently funds one-third of its annual aliyah-servicing budget (see http://nbn.org.il). 13. The value of the “absorption package” can be calculated as the average of the financial support previously provided to each individual. The absorption package is paid in six monthly instalments, all of which are transferred directly into the immigrant’s Israeli bank account. Singles receive approximately nis 18,000. A family of five receives nis 55,700–66,500 ($16,000–19,000 at 2013 exchange rates), depending on the children’s age (http://www.nbn.org.il/aliyahpedia/aliyah-benefits/sal-klita.html). 14. Between 1948 (when the State of Israel was founded) and 1960 immigration accounted for 69% of the total Jewish population growth. The figure dropped to 7% in the 1970s, rising again to 65% in the early 1990s, and again diminishing to 11% after 2000 (Amit, Borowski, and DellaPergola 2012). 15. For an overview of immigration to Israel, see Cohen 2002; Raijman 2009; Raijman and Kemp 2010; Amit, Borowski, and DellaPergola 2012; DellaPergola 2012; Semyonov and Gorodzeisky 2012. 16. Census data collection in Israel began in 1948. 17. Although Arabs were granted Israeli citizenship in 1948, it was not until 1966, with the abolition of the military government to which they were subject, that they formally enjoyed full civil and political rights. Even then such rights were accorded on an individual basis only, as long as they did not conflict with the national goals of the Jewish

234

Notes to pages 14–17

18.

19.

20. 21.

22.

majority (Shafir and Peled 2002). The Arab population is disadvantaged relative to Jews in every aspect of social stratification, including education, occupational status, earnings, and standard of living (Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov 1993; Semyonov, Lewin-Epstein, and Spilerman 1996). These disadvantages can be attributed largely to socioeconomic discrimination and should also be understood in the context of the larger Jewish-Arab conflict (e.g., Haidar 1990; Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov 1993). To appreciate the challenges mass immigration posed to the newly founded state, consider that within four years approximately 600,000 Jewish inhabitants took in 900,000 new immigrants (see Semyonov and Gorodzeisky 2012, 5). The huge flow of immigration to Israel from the FSU should be understood in the context of the political disintegration and economic crisis in the USSR, relaxation of restrictions on freedom of movement from that state, and most importantly a change in U.S. policy in 1989, which prevented Soviet Jews from acquiring asylum and refugee status in the United States. This change was made under Israeli pressure to stop the dropout of Soviet Jewish emigrants en route to Israel at the transit camps in Vienna during the 1980s (the majority chose to go to the United States). This change in policy forced Jews wishing to leave the USSR to immigrate to Israel. In an additional effort to curtail the dropout rate, direct flights between the USSR and Israel were authorized from 1989, eliminating the need for transit camps (Gitelman 1997). On the main cleavages in Israeli society, see Smooha 1978. Immigration from France to Israel has been on the rise since 2002: in 2006 French immigrants composed about 20% of all new immigrants to Israel. Anti-Semitic incidents coupled with a strong Jewish identity are among the factors impelling them to move to Israel (Raijman 2009). The arrival of immigrants from Argentina since 2002 is mainly explained by economic reasons. The economic recession and political crisis that struck Argentina at the end of 2001 and the economic collapse of the Jewish community in that country were among the main push factors explaining the arrival of a high number of Argentinean Jews to Israel at the beginning of the new century. For example, between 2000 and 2003, 10,206 immigrants went to Israel from Argentina; in 2002 they composed about 20% of all new immigrants to Israel (http://www.aliyah .org/JewishAgency). While the majority of FSU immigrants arriving in the early 1990s were Jewish (96% in 1989), by 2006 their share had dropped to 44% (Raijman and Pinsky 2013). The reason for the high percentage of non-Jews arriving under the amended Law of Return could be explained by high rates of out-marriage among Jews in the FSU. According to Remennick (2007), 63% of Jewish men and 44% of Jewish women in Russia are married to non-Jewish partners. Likewise most Ethiopians arriving in this period were converted Falas Mura, who are not considered Jews according to Jewish halakhic law. Non-Jewish immigrants arriving under the Law of Return suffer from institutional discrimination and have greater difficulties than normal in exercising some of their civil rights (e.g., marriage, divorce, burial, and family unification). This is because

235

Notes to pages 18–23

Israel delegates most matters of family law to religious courts, making it difficult for non-Jews to exercise some of these basic rights (see Shafir and Peled 2002, 315–16). 23. Until 1995 the category Arabs included other non-Jews arriving under the Law of Return. The numbers in the latter group increased from 85,000 in 1995 to 337,800 in 2012 (Central Bureau of Statistics 2013, table 2.1, 89). 24. The outbreak of the first Palestinian intifada in 1987 created a shortage of labor in low-status positions, when the entry of non-citizen Palestinian workers into Israel was prevented because of imposed closure or self-imposed strikes. These events set the initial stage for the organized recruitment of labor migrants (Bartram 1998; Raijman and Kemp 2007). 25. As for undocumented labor migrants, they arrive from almost every corner of the world—though mainly from eastern Europe (primarily the FSU and Romania), South Asia (primarily the Philippines), Africa (primarily Ghana and Nigeria), and South America (primarily Colombia and Ecuador)—and are employed mainly in construction and the services sectors (see Bar-Zuri 2001). 26. By 2006 roughly 1,000 asylum seekers had entered Israel, while in 2007 and 2008 their estimated numbers were 5,000 and 8,700 respectively. The peak influx was in 2010–11, when more than 14,000 African asylum seekers entered Israel each year (Natan 2012b; Population, Immigration and Border Authority 2012). Recently, however, since the completion of a fence along the Egyptian border, the number of arrivals has plummeted. 27. My overview of the history of the Jewish community in South Africa is based on Elazar and Medding 1983; Shain 1994, 1999, 2011; Shimoni 2003; Herman 2007; Tatz, Arnold, and Heller 2007; Mendelsohn and Shain 2008; and others. 28. The Immigration Quota Act established a limited quota of immigrants from all countries specified in the act, which included eastern European countries from which most Jews had reached South Africa (DellaPergola and Dubb 1988). 29. The number of Jews as a proportion of the total immigrants to South Africa “decreased from a peak of 35% in 1929 to 7% on the eve of World War II. During the 1960s and 1970s the level of Jewish immigration was below 1% of the total” (DellaPergola and Dubb, 1988, 66). 30. The South African Board of Education was established in 1928 to promote and coordinate Jewish education in the country. By 1933 there were 115 Jewish schools, mostly operated in the afternoon for pupils attending public schools in the morning. The first Jewish primary school, King David School, was established in 1948 in Johannesburg, and by 1967 fourteen day schools were affiliated to the Board of Education, catering to 30% of the Jewish school-age population. By 1980 the number of Jewish schools comprised 24 primary and secondary institutions, providing education to 60% of the Jewish school-age population. By 2000 almost 80% of the Jewish school-age population attended Jewish schools (DellaPergola and Dubb 1988; Bruk 2006; Herman 2006). A series of push and pull factors explain the dramatic increase in the percentages of Jewish children attending Jewish day schools. Failing standards in public education

236

Notes to pages 24–30

and fear of assimilation, among others things, drove Jewish families to choose a private Jewish school instead of a public school. At the same time the importance of a Jewish environment for the intergenerational transmission of Jewish identities and high academic standards and small classes can be mentioned as main pull factors influencing parents’ decisions on educational options (Herman 2006, 2007). For a detailed historical account of the development of religious movements and synagogues in South Africa, see Herman (2006, 97–103). 31. Bruk (2006) reports that by 2005 approximately two-thirds of the Jews in South Africa were members and active participants in Jewish communal or religious organizations, and another 16% were not members but participated in activities offered by the community organizations. 32. Founded in 1929 in Great Britain, Habonim Dror is a worldwide Jewish Zionist youth movement, which was introduced into South Africa in 1930. Today it remains the largest and most vibrant Jewish youth movement in that country (http://www.habo.org .za/wiki.php?page=Overview). For details of South African youth movements, see http://www.sazionfed.co.za/pages/youth_movements.htm. Bnei Akiva was founded in 1929 at the time of the British Mandate in Palestine. It is the largest religious Zionist youth movement, with branches in Jewish communities worldwide. It is also a very important youth movement in South Africa (see http://www.bnei.co.za). Betar is a Revisionist Zionist youth movement founded in 1923 in Riga, Latvia, by Vladimir (Ze’ev) Jabotinsky. In Israel, Betar was traditionally linked to the Herut and then the Likud political party. Today Betar promotes Jewish leadership on university campuses as well as in Jewish local communities in the Diaspora. Once one of the largest youth movements in the nation, Betar South Africa has since dwindled greatly. Headquartered in Johannesburg, the group continues annual programs sending youth to Israel (see http://www.betar.org). 33. Over 70% of Jews in South Africa reported attending synagogue, and the traditional Orthodox scored notably higher than any other synagogue in the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century (see Bruk, 2006, 181). 34. This emigration was explained as based on opposition to South Africa’s apartheid policies (Herman 2007). 35. According to Herman (2007), local leaders have little Jewish knowledge to debate the issues and therefore adopted without criticism the new forms of religiosity. Leaders’ charisma rather than intellectual argumentation played a very important role in the transformation of the community. 36. According to the 1980 census, Jews reported a median annual per capita income of 8,323 zar (South Africa rand) (worth U.S. $6,658 in 1980), as against 6,139 zar ($4,911) for total whites—36% more. Twenty-six percent of Jews reported an annual per capita income over 18,000 zar , compared with 6.8% of total whites (DellaPergola and Dubb 1988, 97, 137). 37. According to DellaPergola and Dubb (1988), the socioeconomic mobility of Jews in

237

Notes to pages 31–34

38.

39.

40.

41. 42. 43. 44.

South Africa has been quicker and more extensive than in the United States and Britain. Whereas unskilled Jewish immigrants arriving in the United States and Britain were absorbed as laborers, this was not the case in South Africa. “There, most unskilled labor was performed by blacks, so that the immigrants were virtually forced into entrepreneurial activities. Thus, in South Africa it was often the immigrants themselves who moved up the socioeconomic ladder” (92). From 1996 to 2006 between eight hundred thousand and a million whites left South Africa, mostly for English-speaking countries (Tatz, Arnold, and Heller 2007; Griffiths and Prozesky 2010). Emigration of whites from South Africa has been explained in terms of push factors such as political uncertainty, increasing rates of violence and delinquency, and socioeconomic factors such as the implementation of affirmative action (race-based hiring quotas), which were perceived as a significant obstacle to whites’ economic advancement (Mattes and Richmond 2000). To these we need to add pull factors such as wage differentials between South Africa and destination countries, which accounted for the exodus of high-skilled South Africans looking for better economic opportunities, mainly in the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States (see Myburgh 2004). Tatz, Arnold, and Heller (2007) report that according to Interpol statistics, in 1997 South Africa had “the highest per capita rates of murder and rape in the world, and the second highest of robbery and violent theft” (197). In 2001 the bbc reported that “South Africa is the most dangerous country in the world which is not at war” (198). Regarding political and economic uncertainty, Jews as well as other whites feared that the new policy of job preference for previously disadvantaged non-white South Africans would affect their privileged socioeconomic status. According to a survey conducted among the South African Jewish community, the most popular reasons for not considering Israel as a destination were the wish to immigrate to an English-speaking country, personal safety concerns with regard to Israel, family elsewhere, and the ability to relate better to people in other countries than to Israelis (Bruk 2006, 108). Telfed, http://www.telfed.org.il. Telfed, http://www.telfed.org.il. Averaging the number of South African Jews over the past century, we find that some 20%–25% of them made aliyah (Shapiro 2004). For a description of the political, economic, and social forces that drove South African Jews to emigrate and for a historical description of the main political events, see Tatz, Arnold, and Heller 2007, chapter 8, 160–83.

2. Methodology 1. Immigrants who arrive as children can be classified into three main categories: (1) those who arrive in early childhood, between ages 0 and 5 years (sometimes called generation 1.75), display adaptive outcomes closer to those of generation 2.0 (children

238

Notes to pages 34–41

2.

3. 4.

5.

born in the host country to immigrant parents); (2) those who arrive between ages 6 and 12 years: the classic generation 1.5; (3) those who arrive between ages 12 and 17 years: labeled generation 1.25 because their adaptive outcomes are closer to those of generation 1.0 (Rumbaut 2004). We combined the last two categories to constitute generation 1.5, and the first category together with those born in Israel to constitute generation 2.0. Hereafter, these two generational groups will be also labeled “younger generations.” It should be noted that Rumbaut first coined the term “one-and-a-half generation” in 1976 to represent the children of immigrants who were born in their country of origin but came of age in the receiving country (Rumbaut 2005, 8). With the passage of time scholars in the field referred to this group as the 1.5 generation. These figures resemble the country-of-birth distribution reported for the Jewish population in South Africa by the Kaplan Centre for Jewish Studies and Research at the University of Cape Town (Bruk 2006, 13). About 85% of generation 2.0 and 66% of generation 1.5 were under the age of forty-four, compared with only 44% of generation 1.0. This concentration is explained by sampling constraints. The minimum age for inclusion in the sample was twenty-five years by the time of the survey, which excluded members of generation 1.5 arriving in later periods. It is also the city where Telfed established its offices.

3. The Process of Migration 1. It has been argued that immigrants motivated by push factors are less motivated to integrate into the host societies than immigrants attracted to their new destination by pull factors, which facilitate their assimilation (Berry 1997; Chiswick 1998; Mesch 2003). 2. We use the word olim rather than “immigrants” because this is the way South African respondents in our sample defined themselves. Similarly we use the term “making aliyah” rather than “immigration” to refer to their move to Israel. 3. The newcomers’ socioeconomic profile resembles that of Jews living in South Africa. According to a survey of the South African Jewish community conducted by the Kaplan Centre for Jewish Studies and Research at the University of Cape Town (Bruk 2006), 68% of South African Jews participated in the labor force and 46% had completed academic studies. 4. Because no significant differences were found between men and women regarding most of the motives for immigration, we report gender differences only in the items where such differences were evident. 5. These gendered differences were reported in other immigration studies and for other immigrant groups; see, e.g., Cerrutti and Massey 2001. 6. These preferential policies have been enacted by the African National Congress (anc ) in South Africa since its election in 1994 (Wood 2006).

239

Notes to pages 44–64

7. Similar results are reported for North American olim in Israel. See Antonovsky and Katz 1979. 8. These results are consistent with other studies, which found that antisemitism and anti-Zionist sentiments are considered minor problems by South African Jews (Bruk 2006, 49). 9. Anti-Israel sentiments have been increasing in many parts of the world, especially since 2000. They are reactions to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the siege of the Gaza Strip, as well to the Second Lebanon War in 2006 and the 2009 war (Operation Cast Lead) in the Gaza Strip. 10. This conclusion follows from a comparison of the percentage of respondents reporting ideological reasons as pull factors with the percentage citing any of the push factors shown in table 9. Twice as many respondents reported ideological factors than did political and safety concerns. 11. According to Zionist precepts, one realizes one’s Jewish identity by returning to Zion and settling in the Land of Israel. The emphasis on Zionism as one of the main motives for aliyah differentiates South African olim from their North American counterparts. According to Amit and Riss (2007), the motives stated by the latter were mainly religious, as they considered Israel the Holy Land and therefore the religiously proper place in which to live. See also Dashefsky and Lazerwitz 1983. 12. Note that although most Jews in South Africa have been exposed to these institutions and environment, not all of them have decided to emigrate; among those who have, not all have chosen the same destinations. 13. Men were more likely than women to report religious and Zionist beliefs as very important factors in their decision to make aliyah. 14. The increasing relevance of religious motives is also supported by the rising affiliation with Bnei Akiva and the declining affiliation with Habonim among later cohorts (see table 12 in this chapter). 15. The presence of social networks was measured by the percentage of immigrants with family and friends in Israel prior to immigration. According to Bruk (2006), 78% of Jews residing in South Africa have friends or relatives in Israel (116). 16. According to Bruk (2006), 52% of South African Jews characterized health care in South Africa as fairly or very poor, while 44% had an equally poor view of the South African education system (62). Most of the respondents believed Israel fared better than South Africa in these two service areas (59% for health care, 67% for education) (113). 17. Visiting Israel is a very common element of Jewish life in South Africa. The overwhelming majority of South African Jews have visited Israel (83%) and have close friends or relatives living there (78%) (115). 18. Similar results were reported by Amit and Riss (2007) for North American olim. 19. For similar findings among North American olim, see Dashefsky and Lazerwitz 1983. 20. In the survey respondents were asked, “Before you left for Israel, how did you obtain

240

Notes to pages 65–77

information about the aliyah process?” and “How much would you say it helped in the preparations for the aliyah (on a scale of 1 = ‘did not help at all’ to 5 = ‘helped a lot’)?” 21. Telfed, http://www.telfed.org.il/Projects#welcoming. 4. Linguistic Assimilation 1. The relatively few studies of the last type rely on data from 1970 and 1983 censuses, which asked individuals about the languages they speak daily (as a primary or secondary language) but did not ask about their degree of fluency in Hebrew (Chiswick 1998). Paradoxically, since 1983, Israel—a country of mass immigration—has not included in any systematic way questions on Hebrew proficiency in its population censuses and labor force and income surveys, which are the main sources of public data. 2. In his study of immigrants from the former Soviet Union to Israel, Mesch (2003) found that residential concentration had no effect on language proficiency but had a negative effect on language use (56). 3. Maturational constraints in second-language acquisition are the product of biologically based neurological processes (see Stevens 1999 for a detailed account of the empirical research). 4. For those who were born in Israel or arrived before the age of six (second generation) and attended public schools in Israel, universal knowledge of Hebrew was assumed. It should be noted that no significant differences were found between men and women in the various measures of linguistic assimilation; therefore we report information only for each one of the generations. 5. In Hebrew orthography, nikkud is a system of diacritical marks to represent vowels or distinguish alternative pronunciations of letters of the Hebrew alphabet. In modern Israeli orthography nikkud is seldom used, except in specialized texts such as dictionaries, poetry, or writing for children or new immigrants. See http://en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Niqqud. 6. An ulpan is an institute or school for the intensive study of Hebrew. Ulpan (plural ulpanim) is a Hebrew word meaning “studio” or “teaching, instruction.” 7. The first letter of the Hebrew alphabet. 8. The Haggadah is a book that Jews read on the first night of Passover. It contains the order of the Passover seder and is used by the seder leader and participants to conduct the rituals of the meal. The Haggadah recounts the story of the Exodus, when the Israelites were freed from slavery in Egypt. (See http://judaism.about.com/od /holidays/g/whatisahaggadah.htm.) 9. Our findings on Hebrew proficiency were based on respondents’ self-reports. Though some researchers have expressed concern about the validity of self-reports about language proficiency, several studies have shown strong correlations between self-reports and objective measures of proficiency (Stevens 1992). 10. In his study of the linguistic assimilation of immigrants in Israel in the 1970s, Beenstock

241

Notes to pages 80–98

(1996) reports that immigrants from South America, eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa tended to have higher levels of Hebrew proficiency than immigrants from North America. According to Beenstock, this difference reflects the widespread use of English in Israel. A recent study on linguistic assimilation of post-1990 first-generation immigrants in Israel has shown that speakers of Spanish and French attain higher levels of Hebrew proficiency than speakers of Russian, English, and Amharic. The lower probabilities of English speakers achieving high levels of Hebrew proficiency can be attributed to the lack of social pressure on them (in contrast to other linguistic groups) to invest in the local language (Raijman, Semyonov, and Geffen 2014). 11. For readers not familiar with multivariate methods of analysis, the coefficients in the regression model measure the effects of each independent variable on the dependent variable. 12. Apparently the lack of a significant gender effect is due to the similarity of South African men and women along human capital characteristics, rates of labor force participation, and experiences of integration in Israel. 13. These findings are similar to those of Chiswick and Miller 1998. 14. Jews born in Israel are often called sabras, after the sabra (tzabar in Hebrew), a native Israeli fruit that is prickly on the outside but smooth and milky on the inside. 15. English speakers study English at school in special classes with other native or nativelevel English-speaking pupils. 16. Here we define intermarriage in terms of linguistic exogamy, that is, in terms of marriage between partners of different mother tongues. 17. These patterns of intermarriage attest not only to the social assimilation of the younger generations but also to the tight marriage market of English speakers in Israel. Israelis of so-called Anglo-Saxon origin, both foreign and native-born, compose approximately 4% of the Jewish population (Central Bureau of Statistics 2013, table 2.8, 108). 18. These results are not surprising for the first generation in light of the many South African immigrants reporting much better speaking than reading skills. 19. Since the 1969 reform in Israel’s education system, English has enjoyed the status of favored additional language, optional in the third and fourth grades and compulsory from the fifth grade through graduation from high school (Kheimets and Epstein 2001). 20. We are not arguing for a causal effect between intermarriage and language shift. Language shift may have occurred before, not after intermarriage; in such cases the mixed marriage may well be viewed as an effect rather than a cause of the language shift. 5. Economic Assimilation 1. See, Cohen, Bechar, and Raijman 1987 for the case of Israel. 2. For the comparison we rely on data from the Income Survey (2006–7) and the Labor Force Surveys (2006–7). 3. Most generation 1.5 and 2.0 respondents took their high-school matriculation exams

242

Notes to pages 101–136

in Hebrew. Only 13% among generation 1.5 and 3% among generation 2.0 took the exams in English. 4. According to Bruk (2006), 46% of the Jewish population over age eighteen in South Africa have some academic education, though this figure would be higher for individuals over twenty-five, such as those included in our study. 5. Unfortunately the Labor Force and Income Surveys do not provide information on respondents’ labor market experience. We were therefore unable to compare South Africans with other groups with respect to this variable. 6. No comparable data are available from the Central Bureau of Statistics for other groups. 7. We further develop this point in the section explaining earnings attainment. 8. Respondents were asked about the ethnic origins of their employers and coworkers (e.g., South African, other English-speaking countries, native Israeli, other). 9. It should be noted that generational differences were negligible among men, ranging from 94% among generation 1.0, 97% for generation 1.5, and 94% among generation 2.0. Among women, rates of labor force participation were lowest among generation 1.0 (87%), followed by generation 1.5 (90%), and highest among generation 2.0 (96%). 10. According to Bruk (2006), 46% of all Jews active in the South African labor force had been self-employed in South Africa. A logistic regression predicting the odds of being self-employed in Israel shows that the probability of self-employment is much higher for those with previous business experience in their country of origin, who were found to be 1.5 times more likely to open their own businesses in Israel than those lacking such experience. Data are available upon request. 11. Because the sectoral and occupational distribution of men and women did not differ significantly along generations, we present the data highlighting gender differences for the sake of parsimony. 12. Within social services, women tend to concentrate in education: 27%, 20%, and 17% of generations 1.0, 1.5, and 2.0, respectively. These generational differences probably attest to the occupational constraints imposed on female immigrants arriving as adults. One strategy for many female immigrants from South Africa (and from other Englishspeaking countries) has been to teach English, thus overcoming their lack of Hebrew skills. Members of the younger generations socialized in the Israeli education system have had more attractive opportunities open to them, especially in other segments of the public sector and in aps . 13. This is because the use of gross categories obscures the extent to which men and women operate in distinct occupational labor markets. 14. Previous research conducted in Israel has shown that in occupations such as teaching, secretarial work, nursing, and social work, over 60% of the workers are women (Kraus and Yonay 2000). 15. We rely on the socioeconomic occupational status scale developed by Semyonov, Lewin-Epstein, and Mandel (2000) that was computed as the weighted average of earnings and education for each occupation.

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Notes to pages 136–158

16. As said before, many of the second generation respondents were still acquiring their education at the Israeli universities. 17. The rate of exchange at the time of the survey was $1 = 4 nis . 18. To provide data on earnings levels we rely on the Income Survey. This database provides information by continents and not countries of origin. Therefore we could not differentiate between North American and Latin American immigrants. 19. Thus, for example, each year of education increases occupational status by 2.4 points. 20. This finding confirms previous findings on gendered socioeconomic inequality in the Israeli labor market (see Raijman and Semyonov 1997). 21. The differences between full-timers and part-timers apply to both genders, but since women are more likely than men to work part-time, this contrast accounts for some of the gender earnings gap. 22. Predicted earnings were calculated only for full-timers, using the regression coefficients in table 24. We decided to exclude part-time workers, whose low earnings might be explained by their lack of full-time responsibility and by engagements unrelated to their jobs (domestic work in the case of women). 23. Studies have shown a negative relationship between the percentage of women in an occupation and both the level of earnings and the percentage of women in authority positions in the occupation (Kraus and Yonay 2000). 6. Identificational Assimilation 1. Symbolic religiosity is not unique to the Jewish community in South Africa; Gans (1994) has identified it in Jewish communities in the United States as well. 2. Only first-generation respondents were asked about the frequency of synagogue attendance, as members of the one-and-a-half generation had been too young to attend synagogue services independently of their parents while in South Africa. 3. The “ultra-Orthodox” category has not been included in figure 45 due to the low percentage of ultra-Orthodox Jews in South Africa’s Jewish community and among South African Jews in Israel—1% and 2%, respectively. 4. Members of South Africa’s main observant Jewish groups label themselves “modern Orthodox.” They are Orthodox in that they observe Jewish law in full (e.g., no driving on the Sabbath, kosher laws). They are modern in that they take an active part in South African everyday life: they work, study nonreligious subjects, attend institutions of higher education, and so on (conversation with Doron Kline, deputy director of Telfed, December 20, 2010). 5. Those labeled “traditional” in South Africa are Orthodox Jews who do not observe Jewish law in full yet find it important to preserve a distinctly Jewish way of life; for example, they may drive to Sabbath services at the synagogue. They respect modern Orthodoxy, however, and Orthodox rabbis have been known to welcome “traditional” Jews to their synagogue services and to other activities (conversation with Doron Kline, deputy director of Telfed, December 20, 2010). Herman (2007) labels this group “non-observant Orthodox.”

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Notes to pages 158–178

6. The Reform (or Progressive) movement aims to adapt Jewish religious tradition and law to modern life. South Africa’s Jewish Reform movement has been opposed by Orthodox rabbis since its arrival in the country in 1933. It has not thrived to the same extent as Jewish Reform movements in other countries, among other reasons because South African Orthodox Judaism has demonstrated considerable flexibility over the years, welcoming non-observant (traditional) Jews into its synagogues and communities (Herman 2007; conversation with Doron Kline, deputy director of Telfed, December 20, 2010). 7. This variable was measured by asking the respondents to indicate whether they felt “more Israeli,” “more South African,” or “both equally.” The decision to use a logistic rather than a multinomial regression model was due to the fact that no secondgeneration respondents claimed to feel more South African than Israeli. The absence of cases falling under one of the dependent variable’s categories precluded the use of a multinomial regression to identify the effect of the generational variable. 8. Military service is a highly significant agent of socialization in the lives of young Israelis and thus in their integration in and identification with Israeli society (Shabtay 1999). 9. Without controlling for the relevant variables, generational status predicted the likelihood of feeling more Israeli than Jewish and of feeling equally Israeli and Jewish. Generation 1.0 respondents were less likely than their generation 2.0 counterparts (the reference category) to feel more Israeli than Jewish and to feel equally Israeli and Jewish. The two younger generations did not differ significantly, however: generation 1.5 and 2.0 respondents were equally likely to feel more Israeli than Jewish and to feel equally Israeli and Jewish. 10. The ratio of South African friends and the ratio of English-speaking friends were not found to affect the likelihood of feeling more Israeli than Jewish or of feeling equally Israeli and Jewish. 11. The process Keren describes has been identified among generation 1.5 immigrants from the former Soviet Union to Israel (see Lomsky-Feder and Rapoport 2000, 113). 12. The concept of instrumental ethnicity is discussed in articles by Nagel (1994) and Al-Haj (2002), among others. 13. Immigrants enact ethnic identities through cultural codes—cuisine, language, art, holidays, festivals—which define the meaning of ethnic group membership (Nagel 1994; Jimenez 2010, 1758). 7. Conclusion 1. It should be noted that with the exception of the labor market, gender differences were minimal in explaining social outcomes of assimilation. 2. Each indicator is rated on a scale ranging from “nonexistent/low” to “high/very high.” 3. The Central Bureau of Statistics survey does not provide information for the second

245

Notes to pages 178–220

4.

5.

6.

7. 8.

9. 10.

246

generation. For the new immigrant groups, the second generation is still largely young, and thus studies can track it at best through the initial phases of adulthood. Given the small sample of EUAM and ASAF immigrants we cannot differentiate by country of origin. EUAM immigrants arrived mainly from England, France, United States, Canada, and Argentina. They belong to the dominant group of Ashkenazi Jews. Migrants from Asia are arriving mainly from Iran, India, and Turkey. Migrants from Africa are arriving mainly from Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria and belong to the subordinate Jewish ethnic group (Mizrahi Jews) (see chapter 1). This finding is not surprising given the fact that over 70% of the first generation is illiterate in Amharic, as they did not attend any formal schooling before arriving in Israel. Illiteracy in the mother tongue is one of the main factors predicting low levels of proficiency in the language of the receiving society (Esser 2006). Portes and Rumbaut (2001) define “reactive ethnicity” as “the product of confrontation with an adverse native mainstream and the rise of defensive ethnicities and solidarities to counter it” (284). See Morawska (1994) for an analysis of the cluster of factors facilitating the thinning of ethnic identities. It should be noted that the current Jewish immigration from North Africa and Asia differs in terms of the socioeconomic characteristics from previous ASAF immigrant groups who arrived in Israel after 1948. The arrival of Ethiopians caused for the first time the articulation of race cleavages in Israeli society, adding to existing ethno-national, class, and religious cleavages. For studies on ethnic identity among Ethiopians in Israel, see, e.g., Anteby-Yemini 2003; Ben-Eliezer 2004; Shabtay 2001.

Notes to pages 220–229

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Index

Page numbers followed by f indicate pages with figures; numbers followed by t indicate pages with tables absorption centers, 15–16 absorption packages, 15–16, 234n13 absorption policy, 14–16 accents, 127–28 acculturation, 6–7, 9, 117, 172–73, 225, 227t , 228–29 “The Acquisition of Language Skills by Immigrants” (Beenstock), 241–42n10 affirmative action policies of South Africa, 60t , 64–65, 238n38, 239n6 African immigrants, 19–20t , 26t ; assimilation and, 220–25, 222–23t , 227t , 228, 246n4, 246n8; as asylum seekers, 25–27, 236n26; as labor migrants, 236n25. See also Ethiopian immigrants African National Congress (anc ), 239n6 age: distribution of South Africans in Israel by, 44, 46t , 56, 57t , 239n3; labor market incorporation by, 134; linguistic assimilation and, 86, 92 Alba, Richard, 10–11 Aliens Act, 29 aliyah (term), 14, 239n2 American culture, 208–9

American immigrant assimilation, North and South, 220–25, 222–23t Amit, Karin, 240n11, 240n18 Anderson, Benedict, 176 anti-Israeli sentiments, 60t , 65, 240nn7–9 antisemitism, 60t , 65, 240nn7–8 apartheid: free speech and, 206; Israeli position on, 33; as a push factor, 1–2, 34–35, 58, 59, 60t , 62–63 Arabs: economic incorporation and, 137t , 142, 144t , 152t , 154, 156t ; Israel population of, 24, 24t , 236n23; socioeconomic disadvantages of, 234–35n17 Argentinean immigrants, 21t , 23, 235n21, 246n4 Arnold, Peter, 238n39 Ashkenazi Jews, 18, 219, 226, 246n4 Asian immigrant assimilation, 18, 19t , 26t , 220–25, 222–23t , 227t , 228, 246n4, 246n8 assimilation. See economic assimilation; identificational assimilation; linguistic assimilation

Assimilation in American Life (Gordon), 6 assimilation paths, 225–29, 227t assimilation theories, 5–13 asylum seekers, 24t , 25–27, 236n26 attitude-receptional assimilation, 6 Australia: assimilation of immigrants from, 220–25, 222–23t ; as immigration destination, 35, 56, 70–72, 70t , 238n38; immigration to Israel from, 13, 21t , 23, 56 Barak interview, 51t ; identity and, 178– 79, 194, 209; language and, 106, 126–27 Beenstock, Michael, 241–42n10 behavior-receptional assimilation, 6 Berry, John, 172 Betar, 31, 237n32 birth country of South Africans in Israel, 44, 45t Bnei Akiva, 1, 31, 58, 72–73, 74t , 237n32, 240n14 boundaries. See intercultural ethnic boundaries Brian interview, 51t , 178, 179, 181, 203 British culture, 207–9 Bruk, Shirley, 237n31, 240nn15–16, 243n4, 243n10 Burgess, Ernest W., 5 canonical assimilation model, 5–8, 11 Carla interview, 50t , 59–61, 63–64, 95, 99, 111, 199, 201 Central Bureau of Statistics, Israeli, 24, 220, 245–46n3 charisma of religious leaders, 32, 237n35 Chiswick, Barry R., 133 citizenship, Israeli, 14–15, 24–25, 24t , 26t , 27, 234n17 civic assimilation, 6, 233n4 civil rights, 235–36n22 classical assimilation models, 5–7

264

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Cohen, Yinon, 17 comparison of immigrant groups’ assimilation, 219–29, 222–23t , 227t countries considered for migration, 69– 72, 70t crime in South Africa, 33, 35, 238n39 cultural consumption, 117–22, 121f , 123f , 130, 216t , 223t , 242n18 Dana interview, 51t , 115, 194, 198 Daniela interview, 50t , 61–62, 97, 211 David interview, 50t , 63, 96–97, 206 DellaPergola, Sergio, 237–38n37 demographic characteristics of South Africans in Israel, 44, 45–46t demographic transformation of Israel, 17 destination consideration, 69–72, 70–71t direct absorption, 15–16 discrimination, institutional, 235–36n22 dishonesty, as culture description, 203–4 documented labor migrants, 24t , 25, 27, 236n24 domains of assimilation, 12–13, 212, 220– 21, 222–23t , 224, 233n7 downward assimilation, 9–10, 113, 211, 225 Dubb, Allie A., 237–38n37 earnings, 132–33, 158–62, 159–62f , 165–69, 166t , 167–68f , 214t , 244nn17–18 eastern European Jews: and assimilation of FSU immigrants, 220–25, 222–23t , 242n10; migration to Israel by, 16, 18; migration to South Africa by, 29, 236n28 economic assimilation: compared to other immigrant groups, 221, 222t ; human capital and, 132, 135–42, 136f , 137t , 138– 39f , 140t , 242–43nn3–5; labor force participation, employment status, and modes of employment and, 142–49, 143f , 144–45t , 149–48f ; overview of,

38, 131–35, 169–70, 213, 214t ; socioeconomic attainment and, 149–54, 151f , 152–53t , 155f , 156–57t , 158–59, 159–62f , 162; socioeconomic outcomes and, 163–69, 164t , 166t , 167–68f , 244n19 economic motivation: for language acquisition, 85, 86, 100, 102–3; for migration, 54, 60t , 64–65, 68–69, 81 economic sectors, 149–54, 151f , 152–53t economic status and identification, 186, 189t , 190 education: economic assimilation and, 132, 135–36, 136f , 137t , 138f , 164, 164t , 221, 242–43nn3–4; language assimilation and, 86, 103, 122–24, 125f , 242n19; as a pull factor, 66t , 68, 240n16; in South Africa, 236–37n30 efficiency of language, 86, 101, 103 emigration flows of South African Jews, 34–35, 237–38nn37–38 employment status, 143–46, 144–45t , 146f “The Endgeneity between Language and Earnings” (Chiswick), 133 English language: as an asset, 3, 124–29, 126t , 129t , 133; economic assimilation and, 163–68, 164t , 167–68f ; identity and, 186, 187–90, 189t ; intergenerational assimilation patterns and, 215–16t , 217–18; preference for, 104–6, 105f ; proficiency of, 122–30, 125f , 126t , 129t , 140t , 242n19; use of, 97–100, 107–15, 108f , 110f , 114f , 116t , 117–22, 118–19f , 121f , 242n10; at work, 140t , 141–42 English-speakers class, 112, 242n15 English-speaking countries as immigrant destinations, 34, 35, 56, 69–72 Eritrea, 25 Ethiopian immigrants: arrival of, 2, 16, 18, 19t , 22–24, 235n22; compared to other immigrant groups, 220–25, 222– 23t , 227t , 228–29, 246n9; economic

assimilation of, 142, 145t , 153t , 154, 157t ; education and, 136, 137t ; socioeconomic status of, 27–28 ethnic boundaries. See intercultural ethnic boundaries ethnic competition, 172, 173 ethnic identity: compared of other immigrant groups, 224–25, 228–29; identification assimilation and, 181–85, 182–84f , 191–96; of Jews in South Africa, 31, 32, 81; language and, 84, 173; overview of, 39, 216t , 218 ethnicity, symbolic, 7, 196, 209–10, 225, 226, 229 Ethnic Options (Waters), 200 ethno-national composition of Israel, 23–24, 27 euam (Europe, North and South America, Australia) immigrant assimilation, 220–26, 222–23t , 227t , 246n4 exclusionary immigration policies, 27 exposure to language, 85–86, 88, 100, 103 Falas Mura, 23, 235n22 family and South African culture, 198–200 family law, 236n22 first generation assimilation overview, 211 first Palestinian intifada, 236n24 food and dining, 198–99 French immigrants, 14, 20t , 23, 235n21, 246n4 French speakers, 28–29 “From Haven to Heaven” (Cohen), 17 fsu immigrants: arrival of, 2, 22, 23, 28, 235n19, 235n22; compared to other immigrant groups, 220–25, 222–23t , 227t , 228–29; economic assimilation of, 145t , 153t , 154, 157t , 235n25; education of, 137t future as a push factor, 60t , 63

265

Index

Gans, Herbert, 176–77, 233n6, 244n1 gender: economic sectors and occupation and, 149–54, 151f , 152–53t , 155f , 156– 57t , 158; education and labor market and, 136f , 137t , 138, 138–39f ; employment and, 142–43, 143f , 144–45t , 147–48, 147–48f ; language and, 87, 103, 140t , 141–42, 241n4, 242n12; occupational attainment and earnings and, 158–62, 159–62f , 165, 166, 167–68f , 168– 69, 244nn20–21, 244n23; overview of, 26t , 134–35, 169–70, 239nn4–5, 245n1 generational differences: economic assimilation and, 141–42, 143, 147, 147–48f , 243n9, 243n12; identity and, 182–83, 183–84f , 186–87, 191–96, 209; in language preference, 104–9, 105f , 108f , 110f ; in language proficiency, 83–84, 86, 94, 241n3; in language use, 120–22, 121f , 242n18; overview of, 11– 12; social networks and, 117, 118–19f Gold, Steven, 55 Gordon, Milton, 6 Graham interview, 51t , 128, 205 group protection status, 25–27 Habonim, 31, 58, 72, 74t , 237n32, 240n14 Haggadah, 241n8 health care as a pull factor, 66t , 68, 240n16 Hebrew: acquisition among firstgeneration olim, 94–100, 95–96f ; economic assimilation and, 133, 139, 140t , 141, 163, 165–68, 167–68f ; identity and, 186–90, 189t , 221; intergenerational differences in use of, 215–16t , 217–18; media and cultural consumption and, 120–22, 121f ; preference and use of, 104–15, 105f , 108f , 110f , 114f , 116t , 117, 241n4; proficiency and use compared to other immigrant groups, 222–23t , 224,

266

Index

227t , 241–42n10, 246n5; proficiency of, 88–94, 89f , 92f , 100–104, 101–2t , 130, 222t , 224, 241n1, 246n5 Heller, Gillian, 238n39 Herman, Chaya, 32–33, 237nn34–35, 244n5 Holocaust survivors, 17 human capital: compared to other immigrant groups, 221, 226; economic assimilation and, 132, 135–42, 136f , 137t , 138–39f , 140t , 162–65, 242–43nn3–5; intergenerational assimilation and, 214t ; language assimilation and, 85, 124 hybrid identities, 191–96 Idan interview, 51t , 203–4 identificational assimilation: compared to other immigrant groups, 223t , 224–25; Israeli and South African culture differences and, 200–209, 201t ; Israeli and South African identities and, 181– 87, 182–84f , 188–89t , 191–96, 245n7, 245n11; Israeli versus Jewish identities and, 187, 188–89t , 191, 245nn9–10; Jewish and Zionist identities and, 174–81, 175f , 177t , 178f , 244–45nn1–6; outside influences on South African and Israeli cultures and, 207–9; overview of, 6, 171–74, 209–10, 216t , 218–19 ideological pull factors, 65–67, 66t , 240nn10–11, 240nn13–14 illiteracy, 23, 246n5 imagined communities, 176 “Immigration, Acculturation, and Adaptation” (Berry), 172 immigration flows to Israel: inequalities formed by, 27; overview of, 16, 234n14; from South Africa, 35–37, 37t , 238n40, 238n43; waves of, 16–18, 17f , 19–21t , 22–29, 234–35nn16–18 Immigration Quota Act, 29, 236n28

Inbal interview, 51t , 106, 180 institutional discrimination, 235–36n22 institutions as immigration information sources, 77–80, 78t instrumental ethnicity, 196, 245n12 instrumental pull factors, 65, 66t , 68–69, 240nn15–16 intercultural ethnic boundaries: identity and, 171; overview of, 10–11, 39, 196– 97; South African and Israeli cultures and, 198–209, 201t , 245n13 intergenerational assimilation patterns, 213–19, 214–16t , 245nn1–2 intermarriage: assimilation patterns and, 212, 214t , 217, 226, 233n5; fsu Jews and, 235n22; language and, 112–15, 113f , 116t , 130, 242n16–17, 242n20 Internet, 78t , 80 interview methodology, 48–49, 50–51t Israel: as a country of immigration, 13–16, 71–72; policy on apartheid of, 33; South African visits to, 75, 80, 240n17 Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 24, 220, 245–46n3 Israeli culture, 200–209, 201t Israeli identity, 181–96, 182f , 184f , 188– 89t , 245n7, 245n11 Jabotinsky, Vladimir, 237n32 Jack interview, 50t , 175 Jerusalem, South Africans in, 44, 47t , 48t Jewish Agency, 14–15, 35, 77–80, 78t , 234n10 “The Jewish Community in the PostApartheid Era” (Herman), 32–33, 237nn34–35, 245n5 Jewish community dwindling as a push factor, 60t , 65 Jewish identity, 174–81, 175f , 177t , 178f , 187–91, 244–45nn1–6, 245nn9–10

The Jews of South Africa 2005 (Bruk), 237n31, 240nn15–16, 243n4, 243n10 Judaism: identity and, 174–81, 175f , 177t , 178f , 187–91, 210, 216t , 219, 244–45nn1–6, 245nn9–10; as a pull factor, 67; in South Africa, 30–33; South African culture and, 200 Judy interview, 50t , 70, 174, 178–79 jus sanguinis system, 14 Kasinitz, Philip, 10 Keren interview, 51t , 93, 192, 193–94, 199, 202 “The Kids are (Mostly) Alright” (Alba, Kasinitz, and Waters), 10 Kopelowitz, Ezra, 43 labor force participation, 132–33, 142, 143f , 144t , 169–70, 242n12, 243n9 labor market incorporation. See economic assimilation labor market outcomes, 214t labor migrants, 24t , 25, 26t , 27, 236nn24–25 labor shortages, 25, 236n24 language assimilation. See linguistic assimilation language preference, 104–6, 105f , 187–90, 187t . See also language use language proficiency: compared to other immigrant groups, 222t , 224; coping with disadvantages of, 94–100; economic assimilation and, 132–33, 139–41, 140t , 163; of English in the younger generation, 122–29, 125f , 129t , 216t , 242n19; of first generation olim, 88–94, 89f , 94–103, 95–96f , 241–42nn9–10; overview of, 83–87, 103–4, 130, 215t , 217–18, 241nn2–3; of second generation olim, 241n4; selfreports of, 241n9

267

Index

language shift, 104, 113, 115, 130, 224, 242n20. See also language proficiency; language use language training, 85, 90–93, 103–4, 241n6 language use: compared to other immigrant groups, 222–23t ; economic assimilation and, 139–42, 140t , 163, 165, 166–68, 167–68f , 242n22; at home, 107–15, 108f , 110f , 114f , 116t ; identificational assimilation and, 186; in media and cultural consumption, 117–22, 121f , 242n18; overview of, 84–87, 215t , 241n1; social networks and, 117, 118–19f . See also language preference Lauren interview, 51t , 126, 127, 128–29, 206 law of blood system, 14 Law of Nationality, 14 Law of Return: immigration due to, 14, 18, 19–21t , 29–30, 36, 220; non-Jews and, 23–25, 27, 234n9, 235–36nn22–23 Legacies (Portes and Rumbaut), 246n6 Leslie interview, 50t , 90, 96, 127, 192 letter to South African households, 231–32 Lewin-Epstein, Noah, 243n15 linear assimilation, 5–7, 9–10, 233n6 linguistic assimilation: compared to other immigrant groups, 221, 222–23t , 224, 246n5; language preference and, 104–6, 105f , 187–90, 187t ; language training and, 85, 90–93, 103–4, 241n6; overview of, 38, 83–87, 129–30, 215t , 217–18, 241nn1–2; rate of, 104. See also language proficiency; language use linguistic environment at work, 140t , 141–42, 243n8 Lior interview, 51t , 195–96, 208 Lithuania, 2, 29, 30 logistic regression models, 185–87, 188– 89t , 243n10, 245n7

268

Index

mainstream assimilation, 7, 9–10, 219–20, 225, 226–28, 227t , 233n6 Mandel, Hadas, 243n15 marital status: language and, 86, 100, 102t ; of South Africans in Israel, 44, 46t , 57t Mark interview, 51t , 204, 207–8 marriage seeking as pull factor, 66t , 68 maturational constraints in language proficiency, 86, 92, 94, 241n3 media consumption, 117–22, 121f , 123f , 216t , 223t , 224, 242n18 Megan interview, 50t , 68, 71–72, 79–80, 91–93, 208 methodology of research, 41–44, 45–48t , 48–49, 50–51t Mia interview, 51t , 93, 180, 192, 195, 202 Middle Eastern Jews, 17, 30 migrant workers, 24t , 25, 26t , 27, 236nn24–25 migration: destination considerations and, 69–72, 70–71t ; flows to South Africa, 29–30, 236nn28–29; sources of information for, 76–80, 240–41n20. See also motivation for migration from South Africa military service, 173, 186, 245n8 Ministry of Absorption, 15, 44, 48t Min Zhou, 8 mixed method approach of research, 41–42, 49 Mizrahi Jews, 18, 228, 246n4 models of immigrant assimilation, 5–13 mode of employment, 144–45t , 146–49, 147–48f modern Orthodox Jews, 32, 74t , 178, 178f , 180, 190, 244–45nn4–6 motivation for migration from South Africa: language and, 101; overview of, 54–55, 58–59, 81; pull factors as, 58–59, 65–69, 66t , 87, 239n1, 240nn10–11,

240nn13–16; push factors as, 58–65, 60t , 87, 239n1, 240nn4–8 multidimensionality of assimilation, 6 multinomial regression models, 187–91, 188–89t , 245nn9–10 national identity, 68, 216t , 218–19 Nee, Victor, 10–11 Nefesh B’Nefesh, 14–15, 234n11–12 neighborhoods, 47–48t , 48, 213–17, 214t Neil interview, 51t , 91 neo-assimilation models, 4, 8, 10–11, 213 networks, social. See social networks “New Immigrant Survey,” 220, 245–46n3 “The New Second Generation” (Portes and Min Zhou), 8 nikkud, 89–90, 241n5 Noga interview, 51t , 206–7 non-Jewish olim, 24, 234n9 non-observant Orthodoxy, 32, 244n5 occupational attainment, 13, 132, 158, 163– 66, 164t , 214t , 221, 244n19 occupational distribution, 154, 155f , 156– 57t , 158, 243nn11–14 occupational prestige, 134t , 158, 159f , 163–65, 243n15, 244n19 olah and oleh, defined, 14 olim, term of, 14, 234n9, 239n2 ols regression models: on earnings, 165–69, 166t ; on Hebrew proficiency, 100–103, 101–2t , 242n11; on occupational attainment, 163–65, 164t one-and-a-half generation assimilation overview, 211–12 openness, 201t , 206–7, 210 Operation Moses, 22 Operation Solomon, 22 Orah interview, 50t , 67–68 organizations as immigration information sources, 77–80, 78t

Palestinians, 17–18, 25, 236n24 Park, Robert E., 5 part-time employment, 148–49, 150, 244nn21–22 paths of assimilation, 225–29, 227t patterns of intergenerational assimilation, 213–19, 214–16t , 245nn1–2 Peter interview, 51t , 79, 98–99, 122 pilot trips, 80 pluralist perspectives on assimilation, 5, 7, 233n5 politeness as a culture descriptor, 201–3, 204–6, 210 political orientation, 187, 189t , 190 political upheaval as a push factor, 58, 59–61, 60t populations: of Israel, 22t , 23–25, 24t ; of Jews in South Africa, 29, 30 Portes, Alejandro, 8, 9–10, 246n6 preference of language. See language preference preferential policies of South Africa, 60t , 64–65, 238n38, 239n6 proficiency of language. See language proficiency Progressive Jews, 74t , 178, 178f , 188t , 190, 246n6 pull factors for migration, 58–59, 65–69, 87, 239n1, 240nn10–11, 240nn13–16 push factors for migration, 58–65, 60t , 87, 239n1, 240nn4–8 qualitative data, 41–42, 48–49, 50–51t quantitative data, 41–44, 45–47t , 48, 238–39nn1–4 questionnaire for quantitative study, 43 Quota Act, 29, 236n28 Ra’anana, 44, 47–48t , 91, 98–99 racism, 228–29 reactive ethnicity, 225, 246n6

269

Index

reading and writing proficiency, 84, 89–91, 89f , 94, 95f , 120, 122, 124, 139–41, 140t recruitment of immigrants to Israel, 14, 25, 236n24 Reform Jews, 74t , 178, 178f , 188t , 190, 246n6 Refugee Status Determination Process (rsd ), 25–27 religiosity: identity and, 176–77, 177t , 178f , 179, 188t , 190, 244–45nn1–6; in South Africa, 32–33, 237n34–35 religious pull factors, 65–67, 66t , 240nn10–11, 240nn13–14 Remaking the American Mainstream (Alba and Nee), 10–11 Research Success Technologies, 43 residential concentration and language, 85–86, 98, 217, 241n2 residential distribution of South Africans in Israel, 44, 47–48t , 48 respondent-driven samplings (rds ), 43 “Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration” (Alba and Nee), 10 Right of Return, 234n9. See also Law of Return Riss, Ilan, 240n11, 240n18 “The Role of Social Networks in the Immigration Decision Process” (Amit and Riss), 240n11, 240n18 rudeness as a culture descriptor, 201–3, 201t , 210 Rumbaut, Ruben G., 9–10, 229–30, 239n1, 246n6 Ryan interview, 51t , 64, 75, 191, 198 sabras, 109, 242n14 safety as a push factor, 60t , 61–62 Samantha interview, 50t , 69, 80, 109, 127, 199–200 second generation assimilation overview, 212

270

Index

secularism, 74t , 177–78, 177t , 178f , 179– 80, 190 segmented assimilation model, 8–11 selective acculturation, 9, 225, 227t , 228–29 self-employment, 143–46, 144–45t , 146f , 243n10 Semyonov, Moshe, 243n15 Shannon interview, 50t , 204 Shelly interview: on Jewish life in South Africa, 1–2, 73, 75–76, 90, 176; on language, 90, 99–100, 126, 128; on migrating, 1–2, 58–59, 75–76, 79 Shira interview, 51t , 109–12, 205 shlichim, 35, 79 social adaptation, 6–7, 9, 117, 172–73, 225, 227t , 228–29 social assimilation, 38, 209, 213, 214t , 217– 18, 228, 242n17 social integration, 38, 98–99, 226–28 social life, 199–200 social networks: compared to other immigrant groups, 222t , 224, 228; identity and, 186, 190, 245n10; language and, 38, 103, 117, 118–19f ; as a pull factor, 66t , 67–68, 81, 240n15; social assimilation and, 213, 214t , 217; as sources of immigration information, 76–80 sociocultural motivation for migration, 54–55, 65, 66t socioeconomic profile of South African migrants, 56–57t , 56–58, 239n3 sources of information for immigration, 76–80, 78t , 240–41n20 South Africa: emigration of Jews from, 34–37, 37f , 237–38nn37–38, 238n40, 238n43, 240n12; Jewish community in, 30–34, 65, 72–76, 74t , 236–37n31; migration flows to, 29–30, 236nn28–29 South African Board of Education, 236–37n30

South African culture: about, 198–200, 245n13; differences between Israeli and, 200–209, 201t ; influences of British on, 207–8 South African identity, 181–87, 182–84f , 188–89t , 191–96, 245n7 “South African Jewry” (DellaPergola and Dubb), 237–38n37 South African Zionist Federation in Israel (Telfed). See Telfed speaking proficiency, 89–90, 89f , 92–97, 95f , 122–24, 125f , 140t , 241n1, 242n18 sports, 198 Srole, Leo, 5 Stacey interview, 50t , 62, 64–65, 105–6 straight-line assimilation, 5–7, 9–10, 233n6 structural assimilation, 6, 172 subjective identities, 39, 171 symbolic ethnicity, 7, 196, 209–10, 225, 226, 229 symbolic religiosity, 176–77, 179, 244n1 “Symbolic Religiosity” (Gans), 176–77, 244n1 Synagogue attendance: in Israel, 177, 177t , 179–80, 190, 244n2; in South Africa, 32, 73, 176, 177, 177t , 237n33, 244n2 Tatz, Colin, 238n39 Tehilla, 14–15, 234n11 Tel Aviv, South Africans in, 44, 47–48t Telfed: about, 31, 239n5; assistance to immigrants from, 36, 71–72, 77–80, 78t ; research methodology and, 41, 43, 231– 32; residential distribution and, 44, 48t theories on immigrant assimilation, 5–13 Traditional Jews, 178f , 180, 190, 244–45nn5–6 training, language, 85, 90–93, 103–4, 241n6 transcripts, interview, 49 “Transnationalism and Vocabularies of Motives in International Migration” (Gold), 55

typologies, 172, 209 ulpanim, 79, 90–93, 92f , 100, 103, 241n6 ultra- orthodox Jews, 32–33, 74t , 244n3 undocumented labor migrants, 24t , 25, 27, 236nn24–25 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (unhcr ), 25 “Updated Socioeconomic Scale for Occupations in Israel” (Semyonov, Lewin-Epstein, and Mandel), 243n15 U.S. policy on Soviet Jews, 235n19 use of language. See language use violence and aggression as culture descriptors, 201t , 203, 210 vocabulary, Hebrew, 90–91 vowel signs, 89–90, 241n5 Warner, Warner Lloyd, 5 Warren interview, 50t , 72, 98 Waters, Mary C., 10, 200 West Bank, 44, 240 “Why We Still Need a Theory of Mainstream Assimilation” (Alba), 11 wishes of other family members as a push factor, 60t , 63–64, 239n5 Worlds Apart (Tatz, Arnold and Heller), 238n39 World Zionist Organization, 14 youth movements, 31, 72–75, 77–79, 78t , 237n32 YouTube, 80 Zionism: identity and, 174–77, 175t , 180– 81, 210, 216t , 219; as a pull factor, 58, 66–67, 70, 72–76, 240n11, 240n13; in South Africa, 30–31, 33

271

Index