South Africa: The Political Economy of Transformation 9781685856571

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South Africa: The Political Economy of Transformation
 9781685856571

Table of contents :
Contents
Preface
1 Introduction
2 South Africa: Transition and Transformation
3 South Africa: Economic Crises and Distributional Imperative
4 At War with the Future? Black South African Youth in the 1990s
5 Local Negotiations in South Africa
6 Dislodging the Boulder: South African Women and Democratic Transformation
7 Race Relations Law in a Reformed South Africa
8 National Reconciliation and a New South African Defence Force
9 The Dynamics of Transforming South Africa's Defense Forces
10 Reconstructing Regional Dignity: South Africa and Southern Africa
11 Southern Africa's Transitions: Prospects for Regional Security
12 South Africa: The Political Economy of Growth and Democracy
Select Bibliography
About the Contributors
Index
About the Book

Citation preview

SOUTH AFRICA

SAIS African Studies Library General Editor I. William Zartman

SOUTH AFRICA The Political Economy of Transformation edited by Stephen John Stedman

Lynne Rienner Publishers • Boulder & London

Published in the United States of America in 1994 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, C o l o r a d o 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London W C 2 E 8LU © 1994 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of C o n g r e s s Cataloging-in-Publication Data South Africa : the political e c o n o m y of transformation / edited by Stephen John Stedman. p. cm. — (SAIS African studies library) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55587-421-5 (alk. paper) 1. South A f r i c a — E c o n o m i c policy. 2. South A f r i c a — E c o n o m i c conditions—1991. 3. South A f r i c a — P o l i t i c s and g o v e r n m e n t — 1 9 8 9 4. Industrial m o b i l i z a t i o n — S o u t h Africa. I. Stedman, Stephen John. II. Series: SAIS A f r i c a n studies library (Boulder, Colo.) HC905.S685 1994 338.968—dc20 93-33330 CIP British C a t a l o g u i n g in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of A m e r i c a

&

T h e paper used in this publication meets the r e q u i r e m e n t s of the American National Standard for P e r m a n e n c e of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

Contents

Preface 1 2 3

4

5 6

7 8

vii

Introduction Stephen John Stedman South Africa: Transition and Transformation Stephen John Stedman South Africa: Economic Crises and Distributional Imperative Jeffrey Herbst At War with the Future? Black South African Youth in the 1990s Colin Bundy Local Negotiations in South Africa I. William Zartman Dislodging the Boulder: South African Women and Democratic Transformation Amy Biehl Race Relations Law in a Reformed South Africa Thomas G. Krattenmaker National Reconciliation and a New South African Defence Force Herbert M. Howe

9 The Dynamics of Transforming South Africa's Defense Forces Jacklyn Cock 10 Reconstructing Regional Dignity: South Africa and Southern Africa Peter Vale 11 Southern Africa's Transitions: Prospects for Regional Security Gilbert M. Khadiagala V

1 7

29

47 65

85 109

127

139

153

167

vi

CONTENTS

12 South Africa: The Political Economy of Growth and Democracy Robert M. Price

181

Select Bibliography About the Contributors Index About the Book

199 203 207 213

Preface

T

he title o f this book reflects my consideration o f what needs to be

explained if South Africa is to b e c o m e a long-lived multiparty democracy. As I describe in Chapter 2, transition deals only with the formal institutions of a polity, whereas transformation involves the informal rules, interactions, and power relationships upon which formal institutions rest. While much attention has been devoted to whether South Africa will make the transition to multiparty democracy, less study has been directed at the factors that will determine whether South A f r i c a will sustain democracy. T h e chapters in the book go far beyond current political developments in South A f r i c a and capture a series o f c o n f l i c t s , problems, and dilemmas that will face that country for the foreseeable future. Like previous books in this series, this book is the product o f an annual S A I S Country Day C o n f e r e n c e ; this one held on April 13 and 14, 1 9 9 2 . I would like to thank all o f the participants o f the c o n f e r e n c e , including the discussants and authors w h o s e c o m m e n t s and papers do not appear in this b o o k : Millard Arnold, Danisa B a l o y i , G r a e m e B l o c h , Michael Clough, Chester Crocker, Errol de Montille, Patricia Kiefer, Anthony Marx, Lindiwe Mabuza, Steven Mufson, S a m Nolutshungo, T h o m a s Ohlson, W i t n e y S c h n e i d m a n , G a y e S e i d m a n , T i m o t h y S i s k , Rosalind T h o m a s , and Richard T o m l i n s o n . T h e c o n f e r e n c e could not have taken place without the able, cool management o f Theresa T a y l o r S i m m o n s , who also assisted in the compilation o f the book. T h a n k s must also go to four chapter authors who were not present at the c o n f e r e n c e ; to my senior c o l league, I. William Zartman, for helping to coordinate the publishing o f the manuscript while I was in South Africa; to Gia Hamilton at Lynne Rienner Publishers; and to Victoria W h i t e , who c h e c k e d the manuscript and prepared the index. T h e editing o f the manuscript took place at the Centre for Southern African Studies at the University o f the Western Cape, where I was a visiting f e l l o w from January to S e p t e m b e r 1 9 9 3 . I would like to thank the Centre and its codirectors, R o b D a v i e s and Peter V a l e , for their encouragement and hospitality. Acknowledgments must go to the Fulbright Grant vii

viii

PREFACE

program f o r a S e n i o r R e s e a r c h G r a n t that m a d e my stay in S o u t h A f r i c a possible. T h i s b o o k is e v i d e n c e o f the depth o f the F u l b r i g h t S o u t h A f r i c a p r o g r a m , as t w o o f the o t h e r a u t h o r s — A m y B i e h l and J e f f r e y

Herbst—

w e r e a l s o F u l b r i g h t s c h o l a r s there during 1 9 9 3 , and o n e o t h e r a u t h o r — T h o m a s K r a t t e n m a k e r — w a s a S o u t h A f r i c a Fulbright s c h o l a r in 1 9 9 1 . M y final t h a n k s g o to my w i f e , C o r i n n e T h o m a s , w h o a c c o m p a n i e d me to S o u t h A f r i c a and shared the highs and lows o f l i v i n g there. T h e j o y s were m a n y — t h e friendship, c r e a t i v i t y , and ingenuity o f S o u t h A f r i c a n s o f all w a l k s o f life, all c o l o r s and political p e r s u a s i o n s , q u i e t l y , o f t e n i n v i s i bly, w o r k i n g toward a new nation. T h e s o r r o w s were f e w , but p r o f o u n d . In April o f 1 9 9 3 , the very w e e k e n d that 1 f i n i s h e d e d i t i n g this b o o k and w r i t i n g the i n t r o d u c t i o n , C h r i s Hani—-a c e n t r a l c h a r a c t e r in three o f the c h a p t e r s o f the b o o k — w a s a s s a s s i n a t e d . A c r u c i a l link b e t w e e n the l e a d e r s h i p o f the A N C and its most m a r g i n a l i z e d c o n s t i t u e n c i e s — y o u t h and U m k h o n t o we S i z w e ( M K ) c a d r e s — H a n i s t r e s s e d the n e e d for a n e gotiated transition in S o u t h A f r i c a , c o n d e m n e d the v i o l e n c e o f the A z a n ian P e o p l e s L i b e r a t i o n A r m y ( A P L A ) , and c a l l e d for the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a " P e a c e C o r p s " for t o w n s h i p youths. A s I w a t c h e d the o u t p o u r i n g o f g r i e f and a n g e r at his funeral, I w o n d e r e d i f S o u t h A f r i c a ' s transition c o u l d s u r vive his death. E v e n with s u c h a s e t b a c k , the j o u r n e y t o w a r d d e m o c r a c y in S o u t h A f r i c a c o n t i n u e d . O v e r the next f e w m o n t h s e v e r y party, with the e x c e p tions o f the Inkatha F r e e d o m P a r t y , the C o n s e r v a t i v e P a r t y , and a f e w o f the parties o f the h o m e l a n d g o v e r n m e n t s , a g r e e d on a date f o r S o u t h A f r i c a ' s first i n c l u s i v e e l e c t i o n . T h e A N C and NP prepared to f o r m a transitional c o u n c i l to steer the country to d e m o c r a c y . I prepared to leave the c o u n t r y in A u g u s t 1 9 9 3 c a u t i o u s l y o p t i m i s t i c a b o u t the future o f S o u t h Africa. F o u r days b e f o r e 1 left South A f r i c a , and only t w o d a y s b e f o r e she w a s to return to the U n i t e d S t a t e s to a t t e n d g r a d u a t e s c h o o l , A m y

Biehl—a

c l o s e f r i e n d and author o f the c h a p t e r on w o m e n and d e m o c r a t i c t r a n s f o r m a t i o n in S o u t h A f r i c a — d i e d

in G u g u l e t u t o w n s h i p o u t s i d e o f

Cape

T o w n . A m y p o s s e s s e d b o u n d l e s s e n e r g y and r e f u s e d to a c c e p t the i n f o r mal apartheid that c o n t i n u e s to s e p a r a t e b l a c k s f r o m w h i t e s and rich from poor in South A f r i c a . S h e was o n e o f the bravest s o u l s I h a v e e v e r k n o w n : s h e had f e a r s a b o u t " c r o s s i n g the l i n e , " as it is s o m e t i m e s d e s c r i b e d in South A f r i c a , but o v e r c a m e them e v e r y day. T w o lives then are and will a l w a y s be a s s o c i a t e d indelibly in my m i n d with this b o o k . B o t h C h r i s Hani and A m y B i e h l , f r o m s u c h drastically d i f f e r e n t b a c k g r o u n d s , u n d e r s t o o d and i n s i s t e d that w i t h o u t a d e m o c r a t i c transition, a more fundamental transformation o f South African s o c i e t y c o u l d not t a k e p l a c e . B u t they a l s o u n d e r s t o o d and i n s i s t e d that w i t h o u t

PREFACE

ix

that t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , a d e m o c r a t i c t r a n s i t i o n w o u l d n o t b e l o n g - l i v e d in South Africa. A m y w a s a p p a l l e d at t h e d i s t i n c t r e a c t i o n s of the m e d i a to v i o l e n c e in South Africa. " W h i t e deaths," she said, "involve individuals with families, friends, and most importantly, names. Black deaths involve numbers." She o n c e told m y w i f e that if a n y t h i n g e v e r h a p p e n e d to her in S o u t h A f r i c a , she h o p e d that s h e w o u l d be j u s t a n o t h e r n a m e l e s s v i c t i m . S h e w a s t o o special to too m a n y p e o p l e f o r that to h a p p e n — a n d that s h o u l d be s a i d of all the v i c t i m s of S o u t h A f r i c a ' s v i o l e n c e . T h i s b o o k t h e n is d e d i c a t e d to C h r i s H a n i , A m y B i e h l , a n d all of t h e v i c t i m s , n a m e d a n d u n n a m e d , of v i o l e n c e in S o u t h A f r i c a , w h o s e d e a t h s pose an i n c r e d i b l e b u r d e n on the living: that their d e a t h s not be in v a i n . N o better m e m o r i a l than a living one: a just, p e a c e f u l , d e m o c r a t i c South A f r i c a , w h e r e t h e r e are n o lines to be c r o s s e d o r f e a r s to b e o v e r c o m e . — S. J. S.

1 Introduction Stephen John Stedman

I

n February 1990, South Africa entered its second interregnum—a period of great uncertainty when old rules had collapsed with no clear sense of w h a t would replace them. Unlike South A f r i c a ' s first interregnum of the 1 9 8 0 s — a decade of ungovernability when the efforts of the white government to maintain racial supremacy vied with a liberation movement unable to force revolutionary c h a n g e — m a n y South A f r i c a n s in the 1990s believed that a transition to majority rule would deliver the country f r o m its political limbo. A c c o m p a n y i n g that o p t i m i s m , h o w e v e r , were heightened expectations and violence as political parties m a n e u v e r e d to be part of a new political compensation or tried to wreck a nonracial, democratic future. By D e c e m b e r 1993 the shadows, if not the substance, of a new order w e r e at last discernable. A transitional executive council consisting of representatives of different parties was established to oversee South A f r i c a ' s first nonracial, one-person-one-vote national election, scheduled for April 1994. T h e poll w o u l d c h o o s e a constituent assembly and establish a gove r n m e n t of national unity consisting of ministers f r o m all parties that rec e i v e d a m i n i m u m percentage of the vote. T h e constituent assembly, b o u n d by prior principles set by the political parties, w o u l d write South A f r i c a ' s new constitution and act as the interim g o v e r n m e n t ' s legislature. T h e government of national unity would last for a period of five years as the new constitution was gradually put into e f f e c t . At the end of the f i v e y e a r s a new election would be held. T h i s book d e s c r i b e s s o m e f u n d a m e n t a l e c o n o m i c , social, and political p r o b l e m s that will f a c e the interim r e g i m e of national unity that e m e r g e s in 1994 in South A f r i c a and the g o v e r n m e n t that f o l l o w s f i v e y e a r s later. T h e p r o b l e m s are basic, long-term in nature, and defy easy solutions. Nonetheless, if democracy is to be sustained in South Africa, these p r o b l e m s will need to be addressed. Without progress toward transforming

1

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the existing economy, society, and state, South Africa's transition to democracy will falter.

Arrangement of the Chapters In Chapter 2 , 1 define two key words used throughout the book—transition and transformation—and explore the interrelationships between the two in recent works on democratic theory and about South Africa. Based on a distinction raised by Robert Price in his book The Apartheid State in Crisis, I refer to transition as changes in a polity's formal institutions and to transformation as changes in the substructure of domination that underpins those formal institutions: cultural norms, social and political values, economic relationships, and resources of key actors. I then ask whether changes that took place during the 1980s in South Africa's substructure of domination provide a firm basis for the transition to stable, multiparty democracy. Political and social transformations of the 1980s provide an ambiguous legacy for a democratic South Africa. Major changes in South African society rendered that country's racial authoritarianism untenable. But while some changes—especially the rise of a thriving civil society and culture of negotiation—make possible the creation of a stable, multiparty democracy, other changes—intensified economic crisis, intolerance, and violence—could just as easily lead to political disintegration, or what Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley call "multiracial domination." The result depends on whether elites who enter into narrow transitional pacts are willing to work toward social and economic transformation that can undergird democracy. Such a willingness rests on the ability and efforts of the main political parties, business, and organized labor to create mutual interests through debate and problem solving. Evidence in the last three years of South Africans stepping beyond their limited conception of selfinterest has been mixed, but encouraging. Chapter 3, by Jeffrey Herbst, examines what many believe will be the crucial problem for South Africa's transition: the simultaneous restructuring of South Africa's economy so that it will prosper and the redistribution of wealth and resources to the formerly dispossessed majority. While Herbst acknowledges the imperatives of the latter, he specifically looks at two components of the former: the necessity of fiscal responsibility on the part of the new state and the need for curbing wages. He concedes that the African National Congress (ANC) has shown much sensitivity to questions of macroeconomic balance and investment, but questions whether their good fiscal intentions will be overwhelmed by the need for immediate social spending and constrained by the high-wage policy of organized labor,

INTRODUCTION

3

one of the A N C ' s most important and b e s t - o r g a n i z e d c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . He concludes on a pessimistic note, believing that the A N C will not have the political will to carry out policies that will generate m u c h needed economic growth. In C h a p t e r 4, Colin Bundy investigates the crucial role that will be played by youth in South A f r i c a ' s future. South A f r i c a ' s democracy must find a positive role for youth if it is to survive in the future. In one sense, this is simply an a c k n o w l e d g m e n t of d e m o g r a p h i c realities. But deeper than the q u e s t i o n of n u m b e r s is the question of the political attitudes of youth. In the 1980s, "the children of iron" w e r e key actors in making South A f r i c a u n g o v e r n a b l e . D e p r i v e d of c h i l d h o o d , thrust into a day-today political struggle, and given the e n o r m o u s p o w e r of " d e c i d i n g w h o would live and w h o would die," radical youth inspired both admiration and fear a m o n g their elders. 1 No section of South African society has faced a greater challenge in the transition f r o m revolutionary struggle to the politics of democratic negotiation than youth. Whereas the A N C ' s ex-guerrilla fighters have the benefit of militaristic discipline and leaders w h o were given prominent positions in the A N C ' s e x e c u t i v e c o m m i t t e e , South A f r i c a ' s radicalized youth have been largely ignored by A N C leaders. T h e lack of inclusion in the transition negotiations has led the A N C Youth League to o p p o s e the power-sharing interim arrangements between the A N C and the National Party (NP) and to experience a larger alienation f r o m the creation of a new South A f r i c a . Peter Mokaba, head of the A N C Youth League, has warned that youth feel disenfranchised from the struggle to which they had contributed: N o o n e c a n d o a n y t h i n g p r o p e r l y w i t h o u t the y o u t h . W e s a y that f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s t o s u c c e e d t h e y m u s t i n v o l v e all the p e o p l e w h o w i l l b e a f f e c t e d . . . . W e a g r e e that t h e r e s h o u l d b e n e g o t i a t i o n s but the q u e s t i o n b u g g i n g the m i n d s o f y o u t h and o t h e r s is w h e t h e r n e g o t i a t i o n s are about the t h i n g s w e h a v e b e e n f i g h t i n g f o r . 2

M o k a b a w a r n s that if the needs of youth are not a d d r e s s e d in a f u t u r e democracy, they will pose "a greater threat to S A ' s stability than either the Right or a reactionary bureaucracy." 3 D e m o c r a c y in South A f r i c a will also depend in large part on whether its leaders nurture and sustain c o n n e c t i o n s to citizens at the grassroots level. In South A f r i c a such c o n n e c t i o n s may prove easier to maintain because of the growth of important c o m p o n e n t s of civil society such as civic associations, labor union m e m b e r s h i p , and peace c o m m i t t e e s over the last eight years. In Chapter 5, I. William Zartman explores the connections between local-level negotiations, t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of society, and democracy in South A f r i c a .

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As Z a r t m a n o b s e r v e s , local-level n e g o t i a t i o n s can prove crucial for democratic transformation in South Africa. First, the participation in locallevel politics can e m p o w e r citizens, w h o can then hold rulers accountable for their actions. S e c o n d , as Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert eloquently describes, " I m p o r t a n t as national n e g o t i a t i o n s about d e m o c r a t i c transition are, negotiations at the regional and local level can be critical in restoring and healing the fractured civil society of South A f r i c a . " 4 Zartman warns, however, that the effectiveness of local negotiations in assisting democratic t r a n s f o r m a t i o n d e p e n d s on w h e t h e r they are incorporated into a national process or are ignored, controlled, and repressed in a national pact. In Chapter 6, Amy Biehl looks at the need to transform the position of w o m e n in South A f r i c a . Although w o m e n m a k e up more than half of South African society, they are seriously underrepresented in positions of e c o n o m i c and political power. If d e m o c r a c y is to have a tangible impact on South A f r i c a ' s people, it must address the problem of substantive equality for w o m e n . But the imperative to e m p o w e r w o m e n in South Africa is not only normative; it is also practical. Like local civic organizations, women can be a powerful lobby for accountability in South Africa and play a leading role in f o r c i n g government to carry out democratic praxis and providing democracy with the legitimacy it will need to survive. While Biehl puts forward various constitutional and legal remedies that can assist in transforming the position of w o m e n in society, Thomas Krattenmaker in Chapter 7 poses a series of d i l e m m a s that will face any South African government that tries to use legal remedies to bring about social change. While Krattenmaker looks only at racial law, his examples from the United States show the delicate balance that must be achieved in crafting laws that address discrimination, yet maintain the basic privacy of individuals. Although Krattenmaker does not say so directly, he suggests that the use of legal remedies to address discrimination can have the net effect of racializing a struggle that the A N C has maintained is a nonracial conflict. In Chapters 8 and 9, Herbert H o w e and Jacklyn Cock respectively address the role of security forces in a d e m o c r a t i c South Africa. The issue is crucial, for the military under s u c c e s s i v e apartheid regimes w a s used to carry out a covert war against critics of the regime within South Africa and in the larger region. Both of the authors focus on the need to bring together the various w a r r i n g f a c t i o n s in the c o u n t r y — t h e South A f r i c a n D e f e n c e Force ( S A D F ) , U m k h o n t o we S i z w e ( M K ) guerrillas, and homeland a r m i e s . W h i l e H o w e a r g u e s that integration will take place on S A D F terms, Cock cautions that integration without transformation of the norms and values of the South African D e f e n c e Force will prove counterproductive to strengthening the larger democratic transition. Chapters 10 and 11, by Peter Vale and Gilbert Khadiagala respectively, provide the regional context for South A f r i c a ' s transition to d e m o c r a c y .

INTRODUCTION

5

Vale presents a w i d e array of crises and threats to regional security that can undermine progress toward democratic stability in South Africa and in its n e i g h b o r s w h o are also building d e m o c r a t i c institutions. He believes that South Africa can play a key role in assisting its neighbors to find regional solutions to these crises and threats, but such assistance will be f o r t h c o m i n g only if the new South A f r i c a t r a n s f o r m s its d i p l o m a c y and foreign service. T h e crux of the matter is whether South Africa can create a new self-image that it can project in the region and in the larger world. Khadiagala asks a d i f f e r e n t question: " W h a t will the s i m u l t a n e o u s transitions underway in the region mean for regional identity and coopera t i o n ? " He contends that the turn to multiparty d e m o c r a c y in the region will bring new actors with new priorities to the national forefront. Khadiagala argues that the domestic transitions c o u l d b r i n g to an end m u c h of the regional cooperation that was present in the 1980s. A democratic South Africa will provide the region's other states with a dilemma: Should they act collectively to bargain as one to c o m p e n s a t e for South A f r i c a ' s asymmetrical power in the region, or should they negotiate bilaterally with South A f r i c a ? T h e e x a m p l e of Frederick C h i l u b a in Z a m b i a , Khadiagala suggests, provides evidence that patterns of interstate relationships in the f u t u r e in Southern A f r i c a will be functional and bilateral. This, says Khadiagala, is not necessarily bad: the region w o u l d be better served by pragmatic policies that bolster the current domestic transitions, rather than by regional integration s c h e m e s that are likely to c o m e to naught. Chapter 12, by Robert Price, concludes the book. He rejects the view that conflict over political identity will be paramount in the future in South Africa and insists that economic conflicts over growth and distribution will be central. Price is optimistic about South A f r i c a ' s democratic future. He argues that the transformations of the 1980s provide the basis for a thriving civil society, a key to democratic consolidation. But Price warns that if South A f r i c a ' s leaders choose constitutional principles that address identity rather than distribution, South A f r i c a ' s prospects f o r d e m o c r a c y will be diminished. For e c o n o m i c growth to bolster South A f r i c a ' s democratic prospects, a strong central g o v e r n m e n t will be n e e d e d to enter into partn e r s h i p with organized labor and business to restructure South A f r i c a ' s e c o n o m y . Price ends his essay by speculating that the failure to address the key questions of growth and distribution could lead South Africa to the experience of Weimar G e r m a n y in the 1920s. Upon reading this book, one may c o m e away pessimistic about South A f r i c a ' s ability to meet the o v e r w h e l m i n g challenges of building a stable d e m o c r a c y . But one should not underestimate the abilities and talents of South Africans to solve their problems. T h e s e essays should be read in the spirit of attempting to contribute to a dialogue within South Africa, a c o m petition a m o n g ideas that has already led to creative, ingenious attempts to

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r e s o l v e their m y r i a d c o n f l i c t s — a p r o c e s s ail o f us h o p e and e x p e c t w i l l c o n t i n u e to bear fruit.

Notes 1. " T h e children of iron" comes from J. M. C o e t z e e ' s apocalyptic novel of South A f r i c a ' s first interregnum, The Age of Iron ( N e w York: R a n d o m House, 1990), pp. 4 8 - 5 1 . The power of " d e c i d i n g who would live and who would die," comes from Mamphele Ramphele, "Social Disintegration in the Black Communities—Implications for T r a n s f o r m a t i o n , " Monitor. 2. Quoted in the Financial Mail, March 5, 1993, p. 48. 3. Ibid. 4. Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert, The Quest for Democracy ( L o n d o n : Penguin, 1992), p. 93. Slabbert dedicates this book to those he has worked with on the Metropolitan Chamber in greater Johannesburg for helping him "to understand how essential services like water, electricity, sewerage and r e f u s e removal can help to sustain democratic practice" (p. iv).

2 South Africa: Transition and Transformation Stephen John Stedman

The foundation upon which the formal political order rests can be thought of as a "substructure" of domination—social interactions, cultural norms, economic activities, and informal power relationships that create the basis for compliance with the prescriptions of the ruling group. Changes in the underlying structure are often the precursor of and condition for alteration in the political system's "superstructure, " the formal system of power. Basic alterations in the former, the substructure of power, can be thought of as involving political transformation, and can be distinguished from political transition, the movement from one formal arrangement of power to another. Transformation prepares the way for transition. —Robert Price, The Apartheid State in Crisis

T r y i n g to analyze the potential for d e m o c r a t i c transition in South A f r i c a has been likened to trying to check the oil level in a car w h o s e e n g i n e is running. T h e shaking of the motor and c h u g g i n g of the pistons obliterate any fixed mark from which to j u d g e the m o t o r ' s worthiness. Nonetheless, pundits and scholars alike k e e p putting their dipsticks into the South A f r i c a n sludge and k e e p believing that their readings are accurate. S o m e see the oil level as a d e q u a t e and p r o n o u n c e South A f r i c a ' s democracy as ready to roll; others fret about putting the e n g i n e into gear under so much uncertainty. Of course, the proof in this case will c o m e only w h e n s o m e one tries to drive the vehicle. 7

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If the study of transition can be likened to examining the motor of political c h a n g e , the study of transformation can be c o m p a r e d to analyzing the chassis in which the motor sits. Here political analysts can m a k e firmer j u d g m e n t s : even if the motor is purring, the car will not go a n y w h e r e if it has three flat tires and lacks a steering wheel. But in the case of South A f r i c a , social scientists tend to hover under the c a r ' s hood, p o k i n g at the plugs, points, belts, and hoses of transition, and never check to see if the car is sitting on cinder blocks or steel-belted radials. S u c h transition fixation reflects the rise of a narrow school of analysis that believes that democracy depends solely on agreements m a d e by elites, and that democratic transition will naturally result in d e m o c r a t i c consolidation and stability. T h i s c h a p t e r o p p o s e s such a view and a r g u e s that while the agreement of elites is necessary for democracy to e m e r g e , it is i n s u f f i c i e n t to sustain and consolidate d e m o c r a c y . For that to take place, elites w h o enter into transition must actively labor to transform their societies and e c o n o m i e s to provide the pillars, or to keep in m e t a p h o r , the w o r k i n g chassis for d e m o c r a c y . In South A f r i c a , such a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n will not be easy, but it is by no means impossible.

Narrow Transitionism For s o m e current analysts of d e m o c r a c y , when South A f r i c a has its first nonracial election, the story will end there. Having agreed reluctantly to b e c o m e democrats, elites of different political persuasion need only to remain c o m m i t t e d to their a g r e e m e n t for d e m o c r a c y to s u c c e e d . T h e most e x t r e m e example of this school is Giuseppe D i P a l m a ' s work on transitions to d e m o c r a c y , which dismisses the consolidation of democracy as a trivial process and states baldly, " T h e decisive role in establishing democracy belongs to the agreement phase, not to consolidation." 1 In a similar vein, by f o c u s i n g on democracy solely as transition, the work of Terry Lynn Karl asserts that there is no precondition necessary f o r d e m o c r a c y to e m e r g e and that "very uncivic behavior, such as w a r f a r e and internal social c o n f l i c t " rather than "trust and tolerance" can lead to d e m o c r a c y . 2 T w o arguments, one empirical and one normative, p r o v i d e the bases for the narrow transitionists to claim that there are no essential preconditions f o r democratic success. First, many countries in Latin A m e r i c a and A f r i c a have e m b a r k e d on f o r m a l transitions to d e m o c r a t i c institutions. Many of these countries s u f f e r f r o m desperate poverty and seemingly disprove the claims that economic development is necessary for democracy to e m e r g e . Second, f r o m a n o r m a t i v e perspective, a belief in a b s o l u t e preconditions would lead o n e to ignore these new experiments in d e m o c r a c y . Lacking essential economic and social prerequisites, they are bound to fail. T h e a b s e n c e of those prerequisites can then j u s t i f y the most horrific

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authoritarian practices of governments that preside over societies not developed enough for democracy. On the other hand, the belief in no preconditions justifies the demands for harsh economic conditionalities and rigid structural adjustment programs and allows the narrow transitionists to ask the impossible of the new experiments in multiparty democracy. These considerations lead the narrow transitionists to use questionable data and logic. Take, for instance, René Lemarchand, who lambasts the work of Almond and Verba on civic culture, Lipset on social requisites of democracy, and Rustow, who put forward national unity as a necessary background condition for democracy: If national unity is to b e r e g a r d e d as a b a s i c p r e c o n d i t i o n , w h a t is o n e to m a k e o f M a u r i t i u s , w h i c h is s u r e l y o n e o f the m o s t c u l t u r a l l y f r a g m e n t e d s o c i e t i e s a n y w h e r e in the w o r l d — a n d o n e w h e r e d e m o c r a c y h a s s h o w n r e m a r k a b l e v i t a l i t y . Or t a k e the c a s e s o f B e n i n , S e n e g a l , or e v e n Z a m b i a , w h e r e the l e v e l s o f p o v e r t y are a m o n g the m o s t g r i n d i n g o n the c o n t i n e n t : f r a g i l e a s their r e s p e c t i v e h o l d s o n d e m o c r a c y m a y b e , t h e s e e x a m p l e s are l i k e l y to e r o d e f u r t h e r still w h a t little c r e d i b i l i t y the L i p s e t thes i s still h a s a m o n g s c h o l a r s . A s f o r the " c i v i c c u l t u r e " or " f i v e C s " a r g u m e n t , o n e is c o m p e l l e d to w o n d e r w h y it m i g h t c o n c e i v a b l y a p p l y to c o u n t r i e s like S e n e g a l , B o t s w a n a , or M a u r i t i u s , and n o t to o t h e r s . 3

This paragraph displays a core assumption of the narrow transitionists: Short-term success at establishing democratic institutions is tantamount to having established consolidated democracy. Leaving aside the remarkable cases of Mauritius and Botswana, which have sustained democratic institutions for over twenty-five years, Lemarchand's assault on democratic preconditions is based on the experiences of Senegal, a de facto one-party democracy for fifteen years, and Benin and Zambia, both of whose democratic experiments are less than two years old and have already shown signs of backsliding. The fragility of democracy in these latter cases matters: next year, none may have formal democracy. If the point is simply to say that there are no preconditions for democracy to emerge, then these cases can be used to disconfirm a categorical cause and effect proposition. But should it be surprising that in the complex, chaotic, indeterminate world we inhabit, no single cause can bear the burden of explaining the complex historical process of the development of democracy? Most social scientists who take their self-identification seriously would put the question in probabilistic terms: All things being equal, is democracy more likely to succeed when there is economic growth, a vibrant middle class, national unity, and a civic culture? The alternative theory of the narrow transitionists is that democratic institutions themselves create economic growth, equitable income distributions, and a civic culture. In the words of Karl, these good things "may better be treated as the products of stable democratic processes, rather than as the prerequisites of their existence." 4 The crucial words here are "may"

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and "stable," which prompt two questions. In situations where a narrow transition has taken place in unamenable circumstances, can democracy survive if it does not lead to economic growth, lessen inequalities, and create national unity and norms of tolerance? Second, in the absence of these good things, how likely are democratic processes to be stable? Democracy may lead to all good things, but it certainly does not do so automatically. By sweeping aside insights and contributions from sociology, economics, and history about factors that make probable the consolidation of democracy, the narrow transitionists breed complacency about the hard work that is needed to sustain democracy once an elite agreement is in place. The literature on the social and economic requisites of democracy (which should be recast in a probabilistic and not deterministic form) insists that at some point there must be a connection between politics at the top and the broad social, economic, and demographic forces that affect people's lives in society writ large. One can agree with the narrow transitionists that political democracy is not economic democracy, that it is not social democracy. One can also agree that political democracy, narrowly defined, is a good in and of itself. The important issue in South Africa and the nations of the world's periphery, however, is whether political democracy can survive if it doesn't lead to progress toward economic and social democracy. And on this question the narrow transitionists have been rather silent. 5 The case of South Africa can help further our understanding of the difference between democratic transition and consolidation. The narrow transitionists' accounts of democracy have ignored the need for societal and economic transformation to underpin transitions if they are to be sustained in the long term. In the rest of this chapter I ask four questions of the South African case that have relevance for the larger literature on transition: (1) How do changes in South African society generated during the conflict to end white rule in the 1980s relate to conditions necessary to sustain democracy? (2) What barriers stand in the way of consolidating democracy in South Africa? (3) Will the terms of the formal transition to democracy in South Africa prove to be a stepping stone or stumbling block to the transformations needed to sustain democracy? (4) And finally, what processes can drive elites to move beyond formal rules and build the pillars that will sustain South African democracy?

South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s: Slouching Towards Democracy? Key transformations of South African society and economy in the 1970s and 1980s created a disjunction between South A f r i c a ' s formal political institutions of apartheid and herrenvolk democracy and the substructure of

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domination on which those institutions once rested. 6 Will democracy as a set of formal institutions bring South A f r i c a ' s political system into proper alignment? T h e answer to this question depends largely on the analysis of South A f r i c a ' s societal, e c o n o m i c , and political t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s of the 1980s. T h e insurrections of the 1980s in South A f r i c a resulted f r o m a long chain of causation running back to the late 1940s and the implementation of apartheid. National Party policies of state p a t r o n a g e m o v e d most A f r i k a n e r s out of rural poverty and into b u r e a u c r a t i c j o b s . E c o n o m i c growth, in part the product of the g o v e r n m e n t ' s protectionist e c o n o m i c policies, dramatically raised the living s t a n d a r d s of A f r i k a n e r s . By the 1970s, h o w e v e r , the s u c c e s s f u l p e r f o r m a n c e of South A f r i c a ' s e c o n o m y demanded the relaxation of formal prohibitions on labor mobility and collective bargaining. T h e very success of apartheid in lifting Afrikaners into a f f l u e n c e induced divisions within their ranks concerning the need for political c h a n g e and created an o p e n i n g for the National Party in the early 1980s to attempt basic reforms. Those reforms, however, had the unanticipated effect of provoking black resistance in the townships. Instead of creating a stratum of blacks w h o would accept white supremacy in exchange for material prosperity, townships were rendered ungovernable by a coalition of youths, labor, church m e m b e r s , and w o m e n w h o looked to the African National Congress in exile as their legitimate leaders. In turn, the ungovernable townships were then themselves the basis for the establishment of dual authority as street committees, civic associations (civics), and people's courts replaced the discredited structures of the apartheid state. 7 By the late 1980s, the formal political rules in South A f r i c a had no legs to stand on. New political institutions were therefore needed to harmonize the e c o n o m y , society, and polity of South A f r i c a . But are the changes, internal conflicts, and uncivic behavior of the 1980s likely to lead to democracy in the 1990s and beyond, as Karl suggests above, or are they just as likely, as others speculate, to lead to one-party h e g e m o n y or reversed racial domination? 8 In his conclusion to this book, Price a n s w e r s that the c h a n g e s of the 1980s, especially the rise of civic associations and local authority structures, will play a key role in creating a vibrant civil society—a crucial pillar necessary to consolidate multiparty democracy. Others, however, question w h e t h e r a r r a n g e m e n t s f o r g e d d u r i n g a s t r u g g l e f o r liberation a n d revolution can adapt and contribute to a different historical context. South Africans, not just f r o m the liberal c o m m u n i t y , argue that for the civics to play a positive role in civil society, they must stand outside formal political structures. T h e A N C and the South A f r i c a n National Civic O r g a n i s a t i o n ( S A N C O ) a c k n o w l e d g e the need f o r a strict separation between political parties, a new formal authority, and extraparliamentary o p position. But this demands the " T " word: a transformation in identities and

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strategies that must cope with new and unanticipated challenges. So far, according to Jeremy Seekings, the results have been meager. Many civics leaders harbor explicit national a m b i t i o n s , and tensions have arisen at grassroots levels between the A N C and civics on the division of responsibilities between politics and development work. Finally, a shortage of resources has hindered both the civics and the A N C from making necessary changes to support their new official roles. 9 A n d some analysts have raised the question of whether financial support for the civics will vanish once an internationally legitimate g o v e r n m e n t is in place. Flows of cash from nong o v e r n m e n t a l organizations ( N G O s ) and international lending organizations can skew the balance of power away f r o m the grassroots to the central government. 1 " T h e crunch time for the civics will c o m e , Seekings suggests, when the first elections take place. Elected officials w i l l c l a i m a s u p e r i o r m a n d a t e , a n d w i l l take o v e r m u c h o f the d e v e l o p m e n t a l role p l a y e d b y s o m e c i v i c s n o w in the a b s e n c e o f l e g i t i m a t e and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e local g o v e r n m e n t . A n y c l a i m b y a c i v i c to b e the "true" repr e s e n t a t i v e o f the " c o m m u n i t y " w i l l b e c o n t e s t e d by e l e c t e d c o u n c i l o r s . "

Tensions between civics and the new government could just as easily lead to ungovernability as to democratic accountability. Khehla Shubane raises another issue concerning the ability of civic associations to play a positive role in civil society: whether they will possess political tolerance. T o p r o m o t e d e m o c r a c y c i v i c s w i l l h a v e t o start b y l e a r n i n g h o w t h e y t h e m s e l v e s c a n b e c o m e m o r e t o l e r a n t . Q u i t e s i m p l y t h i s is a q u e s t i o n o f h o w p r e p a r e d c i v i c s are t o l i v e w i t h o t h e r o r g a n i z a t i o n s in the c o m m u n i t y , o r g a n i z a t i o n s w h i c h m a y b e o r g a n i z i n g the s a m e c o m m u n i t y . 1 2

T h e issue of political tolerance within the civics c a m e to the f o r e in South A f r i c a in February 1993 w h e n Dan M o f o k e n g , S A N C O ' s general secretary, a n n o u n c e d that w h i t e parties would not be allowed into townships to c a m p a i g n in a new election b e c a u s e of their previous affiliation with apartheid structures. W h i l e the A N C criticized this stance, the ann o u n c e m e n t revealed a tendency a m o n g s o m e civics to try to be a gatekeeper and control information to their communities. 1 3 Another major difficulty is that the present civic associations seldom represent all interests in a c o m m u n i t y . When a civic attempts to be a gatekeeper either to outside development agencies or to competing political interests, conflict tends to erupt between the civic and those members of the community w h o feel that the civic does not represent them. 1 4 This leads to the broader issue of attitudes of struggle and liberation, which may not be compatible with the informal norms necessary to foster

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multiparty democracy. Donald Horowitz, for instance, in his book A Democratic South Africa? sees the politics of liberation as a hindrance to South A f r i c a ' s democracy, because it has raised expectations, destroyed tolerance of opposition, created an antidemocratic style of organization, and eschewed the compromises necessary for multiparty democracy to thrive. In his words, "Revolutions require the use of undemocratic methods and the consolidation of undemocratic leadership. Both are inimical to the development of democracy later." 15 The overblown expectations of the resistance in the 1980s may prove problematic to sustaining a democratic transition. Similar to Jeffrey Herbst's analysis in the next chapter, Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley stress: O n e l e g a c y o f the e x t e n s i v e p o l i t i c i z a t i o n in S o u t h A f r i c a is that p e o p l e n o w h a v e h i g h e x p e c t a t i o n s that d e m o c r a c y w i l l b r i n g q u i c k m a t e r i a l imp r o v e m e n t s . A n e w A N C - l e d g o v e r n m e n t m a y f i n d i t s e l f the v i c t i m o f the s a m e u n r e a l i s t i c m a s s e x p e c t a t i o n s that the A N C and o t h e r g r o u p s e n c o u r a g e d d u r i n g the p e r i o d o f r e p r e s s i o n . 1 6

The fears of expectations surpassing democratic performance has even led Nelson Mandela to state that the ANC must educate its supporters to expect less of political change. 1 7 But the legacies of resistance demand a more nuanced reading than Horowitz provides. Whereas Horowitz asserts that the ANC is a coherent movement suffused with revolutionary intentions, he ignores an important change during the 1980s: the development of a culture of bargaining within the top of the union movements and within the ANC itself. Such a culture of bargaining—the willingness to engage in give and take—can take place only if participants enter negotiations from a position of perceived equality. Here Adam and Moodley rightly point out that the liberation protest of the 1980s has created attitudes necessary for democratic transition: "The dominant mindset of active, resilient protest rather than passive acceptance of subordinate conditions" is "an important precondition of successful negotiations and pacting, and perhaps even a minimal sense of common nationhood." 1 8 Horowitz's depiction of the ANC as a revolutionary organization that desires hegemony in the new South Africa presents a caricature. The simple truth is that the ANC does not stand for one thing, is a large tent for diverse constituencies, and is as much distinguished by its pluralism as by its dogmatism. All of these qualities are associated with democratic political parties and provide hope for democratic consolidation in South Africa. At the elite level, the most in-depth study of tolerance in South Africa concludes that leaders of the A N C - S o u t h African Communist Party (SACP) alliance show high levels of political tolerance, scoring only second to members of the Democratic Party (DP). While the leaders of those

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t w o parties s h o w tolerance ratings of 75 percent and 83 percent respectively, the National Party ( N P ) , C o n s e r v a t i v e Party (CP), Indian parties, and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) all score less than 50 percent. 1 9 Contrary to the arguments made by Horowitz and others w h o see the parties of liberation of the 1980s as the font of intolerance, the survey s h o w s that the parties that were either part of the government, to the right of the government, or c o m p r o m i s e d by the g o v e r n m e n t harbor the most intolerant attitudes that can threaten stable d e m o c r a c y in South Africa. T h e continued high levels of intolerance on the part of actors associated with the g o v e r n m e n t or to the right of the g o v e r n m e n t pose major problems for democratic stability in South Africa. Here one has to return to P r i c e ' s analysis and ask w h e t h e r he fully captured the transformations of the 1980s. Both Patrick M c G o w a n and Kate Manzo, and Hermann G i l i o m e e have questioned the extent to which A f r i k a n e r c o m m i t m e n t to their identities has changed. 2 0 Large sections of the white population still score high on racist attitudes. 2 1 A n o t h e r aspect of the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of the 1980s c o n c e r n s lasting e f f e c t s of the unintended c o n s e q u e n c e s of both g o v e r n m e n t and revolutionary policies. While the g o v e r n m e n t has o f f i c i a l l y changed its policy of "total o n s l a u g h t " of the 1980s, m a n y of the i n d i v i d u a l s a s s o c i a t e d with the policy are still in positions of influence. Having created a covert g o v e r n m e n t capability to kill and destabilize, the current leaders of the NP have found it difficult to c l o s e it d o w n . On the liberation side, opinion polls show an o v e r w h e l m i n g a c c e p t a n c e of negotiation and rejection of v i o l e n c e , yet there still r e m a i n s a h a r d - c o r e c a d r e a m o n g the youth w h o s e lives have been steeped in v i o l e n c e and w h o have been unable to c h a n g e identities. What then can be said of the transformations of the 1980s? In sum, the t r a n s f o r m a t i v e c h a n g e s of the last d e c a d e leave a mixed legacy. T h e r e should be little doubt that c h a n g e s in society and economy have created an opening for a democratic transition. But if elite agreement leads to formal democratic institutions, there will still be a p r o f o u n d disjunction between South A f r i c a ' s formal political institutions and their societal foundations. T h e mixed legacy of the 1980s will mean that South A f r i c a ' s d e m o c r a t i c consolidation will d e p e n d on the ability of its elites to address a w i d e range of p r o b l e m s and build f i r m e r supports for d e m o c r a c y in " t h e substructure of domination."

Other Likely Barriers to Democratic Consolidation Analysts suggest that in addition to the legacies of the 1980s, three other barriers may b e p a r a m o u n t in s u b v e r t i n g a d e m o c r a t i c f u t u r e f o r South

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Africa: economic legacies of apartheid, ethnicity, and the desire for hegemony on the part of the A N C . Economic Legacies of Apartheid A wide consensus among scholars holds that South A f r i c a ' s skewed economic system and its inequalities will pose the greatest threat to democracy. Echoing Price's analysis in this book, Adam and Moodley insist that the "chances of a future South African democracy and stability do not falter on incompatible identities but depend mainly on the promise of greater material equality in a common e c o n o m y . " 2 2 Similarly, Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert writes, "Development without democracy is possible, but democracy without development has a very short lifespan." 2 3 And Timothy Sisk, one of the most impressive U.S. scholars writing on South Africa, states, "Without economic and social transformation, any political settlement will be ultimately unsuccessful." 2 4 T h e d e e p inequalities between black and white in South Africa will be difficult to resolve because the economy faces a crisis of productivity. If it was the case that the South African e c o n o m y was healthy and growing at a steady rate, the demands for redistribution could be more easily met. As Stephen Lewis aptly describes, "It is easier to deal with difficult distributive issues . . . if the total size of the cake is increasing." 2 5 But increasing numbers of analysts now recognize that for South A f r i c a ' s economy to grow, it will need dramatic restructuring to become internationally competitive. I will not dwell on the simultaneous challenges of redistribution of resources and economic restructuring to promote sustainable economic growth, as they are addressed by both Herbst and Price in this book. But it should be noted that pessimism about the ability of democracies to make difficult choices in restructuring their economies has prompted some analysts to believe that democracy is doomed to fail in South Africa. A prominent example is the Nedcor/Old Mutual forecasting exercise that, by including in its definition of successful transition to democracy the criterion of rising incomes, comes to the tautological conclusion that "there have been no successful transitions without strong economic p e r f o r m a n c e before, during, and after the transition." 2 6 Such an analysis can provide a justification for authoritarian solutions to South A f r i c a ' s crisis.

Ethnicity Perhaps the most controversial question in South Africa is the extent to which ethnicity may hinder the development of stable democracy there. With the exception of two outside observers of the country, Donald

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Horowitz and Arend Lijphart, most analysts believe that ethnicity has been blown way out of proportion as a present or likely future factor in South African political life. As Price suggests in the conclusion of this book, most black South Africans identify themselves as South Africans before any racial or ethnic category. Only one political party in South Africa, the Inkatha Freedom Party, mobilizes on the basis of ethnicity. Even within Natal and the KwaZulu homeland, where Inkatha is strongest, the IFP currently polls only about 40 percent support. Outside of Natal in the Vaal triangle, conflict has reflected a materially and politically based struggle between "the have-nots" of the hostels, who happen to be Zulu, and those "haves" who live in the communities around the hostels. 27 Violence rose precipitously after the IFP began to mobilize there in 1990. The danger in South Africa is that what began as politically inspired conflict over material issues can easily lead to indiscriminate hatred and stereotyping of people based on ethnicity. For instance, in June and July 1993 two articles in the Weekly Mail described how within the townships around Johannesburg verbal and physical assaults were common on Zulu speakers, as residents assumed such individuals were Inkatha supporters or troublemakers. 28 Once such enemy formation begins, and groups believe that the basis of conflict is endemic to the character of one's adversary, peacemaking becomes extraordinarily difficult. 29 Horowitz writes that the ANC, while asserting South African identity, is essentially a Xhosa-based party. Yet as Adam and Moodley observe, "there is no evidence that Xhosa culture has been elevated to an ethnocentric ideal" within the ANC.3() If Horowitz is correct, one can only assume that the anomalous support of massive numbers of non-Xhosa (for instance, 80,000 registered members in Natal alone) is a product of largescale false consciousness, which Horowitz as an outsider can observe. The ANC has bent over backwards during the constitutional negotiations in South Africa to acknowledge the symbolic importance of ethnic cultural identity. Some, however, feel that the ANC should do more and include within the constitution "a guaranteed right to secede." The danger, of course, is that a right to secession can become a weapon to any leader whose support is based on ethnic mobilization. In the case of Natal, where the people are clearly split in their allegiances toward Buthelezi and Inkatha and the ANC, the right to secession can substitute a regional civil war frir a national civil war. Moreover, to put the onus of reconciliation firmly on the shoulders of the ANC misses a key aspect of the conflict equation. Donald Rothchild has pointed out that ethnic conflict in African societies can result as much from the nature of demands made by groups as from the response of the government or rivals. 31

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Future ANC Hegemony H o r o w i t z a l s o c o n t e n d s that a key barrier to a future d e m o c r a t i c S o u t h Africa is the desire o f the A N C to rule as a one-party state. His b e l i e f stems f r o m t w o s o u r c e s : the triumph o f one-party states e l s e w h e r e in Africa and the desire for radical transformation a m o n g important c o n stituencies within the A N C . I have already q u e s t i o n e d the stereotypical v i e w of the A N C as a party bent on domination, s o 1 will f o c u s on the relevance o f A f r i c a ' s e x p e r i e n c e with d e m o c r a c y as a p o s s i b l e harbinger of South A f r i c a ' s fate. A d a m and M o o d l e y argue that four reasons mitigate the potential for South A f r i c a d e s c e n d i n g into "a p s e u d o d e m o c r a t i c patronage s y s t e m . . . characterized by high l e v e l s of corruption and little d e m o c r a t i c accountability." 3 2 First, b e c a u s e any new g o v e r n m e n t will have to d e p e n d on e x i s t i n g civil servants and bureaucrats, A f r i c a n s will gradually enter the state and gain e x p e r i e n c e in g o o d g o v e r n m e n t as a result. S e c o n d , "the e m p l o y m e n t capacity and opportunities in private b u s i n e s s for s k i l l e d b l a c k s will relieve the civil service from a wasteful e x p a n s i o n . " Third, a strong private sector e c o n o m y will not a l l o w any "post-apartheid g o v e r n m e n t . . . to sabotage the p r o s p e c t s of e c o n o m i c g r o w t h through poor g o v e r n a n c e . " A n d finally, the sheer diversity o f social f o r c e s in S o u t h A f r i c a m i t i g a t e s the possibility o f authoritarianism. 3 3 If H o r o w i t z overstates the c a s e for likely one-party h e g e m o n y , A d a m and M o o d l e y underestimate its potential in South Africa. T h e y naively believe that d e m o c r a c y per se will end patronage p o l i t i c s in S o u t h A f r i c a . Their description of f o r c e s in s o c i e t y that will insure g o o d g o v e r n a n c e s e e m s sorely at odds with South African reality. T h e e x i s t i n g civil s e r v i c e in South A f r i c a has b e e n marred by a s e r i e s o f recent s c a n d a l s and corruption. 3 4 South A f r i c a n big b u s i n e s s has l i k e w i s e s u f f e r e d a s y s t e m a t i c decline in ethics. 3 5 Indeed, the present e x a m p l e s of g o v e r n m e n t and business b e h a v i o r in the f a c e o f crisis present a d i f f e r e n t e x a m p l e to black South A f r i c a n s : s e l f i s h n e s s and immorality are proper. Finally, m u c h o f A d a m and M o o d l e y ' s a n a l y s i s a s s u m e s a healthy, g r o w i n g e c o n o m y , which is far from certain.

Transition: Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block? A theme that runs through this book and that has been e m p h a s i z e d by others is that d e c i s i o n s taken during the transition in South Africa will either make it easier to carry out transformation or will c l o s e o f f possibilities for transformation.

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The question of the transition's role in transformation has two aspects. T h e first concerns the institutions that are chosen: Will they enable South A f r i c a ' s rulers to resolve their c o n f l i c t s or will they prevent them f r o m doing so? T h e second concerns the process of transition: Will the ways in which the leaders interact provide a positive experience f o r the f u t u r e or will they undermine a democratic future? On the first question, Price, in this book, argues that any constitution that emerges during the transition must provide a central government with enough power to manage the e c o n o m y , carry out its restructuring, and implement policies of m e a n i n g f u l redistribution. A d a m and M o o d l e y agree, but they also recognize that ethnic identity can play a role in disrupting South A f r i c a ' s transition to democracy and therefore favor a federal solution to South A f r i c a ' s constitution. They insist that f e d e r a l i s m in South Africa must enable a strong center to redistribute resources a m o n g unequal regions and to formulate a coherent national e c o n o m i c strategy.- 16 In order for South Africa to o v e r c o m e the a n t i d e m o c r a t i c f o r c e s of ethnicity and hegemony, Horowitz suggests that the f o l l o w i n g institutions should be written into a new constitution: a presidential s y s t e m , federalism, and an electoral s c h e m e called the alternative vote. Important, but less important than the substance of a new constitution, is the process of creating a new constitution; a new constitution should not be the result of narrow "horse trading" a m o n g the parties, but the product of inclusive, enlightened deliberation. 3 7 H o r o w i t z has drawn much criticism b e c a u s e only about nine of his b o o k ' s 282 pages address e c o n o m i c problems of distribution. T h e lack of attention given to that subject has prompted many observers to write that Horowitz has ignored the problem altogether. Yet Horowitz admits that the striking disparities in income, wealth, and resources will pose problems for d e m o c r a c y in South A f r i c a and sensibly cites Robert D a h l ' s work that meeting some of the d e m a n d s for redistribution can appease the have-nots. T o H o r o w i t z ' s credit, he r e c o m m e n d s a presidential system of government f o r South A f r i c a , precisely b e c a u s e a strong central g o v e r n m e n t will be needed to deal with the distribution crisis. 3 8 T w o key questions arise, h o w e v e r . First, will H o r o w i t z ' s other reco m m e n d a t i o n s dilute the strong central government needed to address the distribution problem? Second, does H o r o w i t z ' s emphasis on ethnicity and likely A N C hegemony so dominate his analysis that people fasten on to his calls f o r strong checks and balances to combat those problems and ignore his muted calls for a strong center? Price, in his c o n c l u d i n g essay in this b o o k , a n s w e r s a f f i r m a t i v e l y to these questions, whereas I believe in a mixed verdict. T o the first question, there is nothing inherent in federalism, for e x a m p l e , that w o u l d diminish the c e n t e r ' s power to cope with e c o n o m i c crisis. G e r m a n y ' s federalist

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s y s t e m has been able to c o m b i n e s t r o n g local representation with a national corporatist f r a m e w o r k for b u s i n e s s - u n i o n - g o v e r n m e n t cooperation in e c o n o m i c p o l i c y m a k i n g . Indeed, f o r f e d e r a l i s m to work in South A f r i c a , w h e r e the c o n s t i t u e n t units will vary w i d e l y in their s o c i o e c o nomic viability, a strong center will have to play a redistributive role. Yet Price is correct in w o r r y i n g that s o m e f o r m s of federalism, and certainly the consociational s c h e m e s put f o r w a r d by s o m e , could impinge upon the ability of a new g o v e r n m e n t to carry out the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of South Africa's economy. On the second question I agree with Price, that one of the c o n s e quences of Horowitz's preoccupation with and prioritization of the identity and h e g e m o n y problem in South Africa has contributed to the delegitimization of the need f o r a strong state and central g o v e r n m e n t in South A f r i c a . T h e diagnosis of South A f r i c a ' s ills plays into the hands of those South A f r i c a n s w h o desire what I call a G u l l i v e r state—a massive giant immobilized by numerous constitutional strings.

Will South Africa's Leaders Do the Right Thing? L e t ' s assume that we can describe a set of optimal institutions and policies that will increase the c h a n c e of sustaining d e m o c r a c y in South A f r i c a . What is the likelihood of elites choosing those policies? In South Africa new institutions and new policies will result from the individual interests of the political parties and their mutual desire to create a new South A f r i c a . A s H o r o w i t z argues, h o w e v e r , the institutions and policies that may be the best for the political parties there may not be the best f o r the public. Indeed, in the case of South A f r i c a the very c o m m i t ment of the d i f f e r e n t political parties to d e m o c r a c y is in question. What then will determine which institutions and policies are established? H o r o w i t z argues that d e m o c r a t i c c o m m i t m e n t c o u l d c o m e f r o m f i v e possible routes: (1) habituation, w h e r e actors c o m e to accept d e m o c r a t i c n o r m s through their p u b l i c m o u t h i n g of them; (2) deterrence by f o r c e s c o m m i t t e d to d e m o c r a c y and the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of institutions that will strengthen those forces; (3) reciprocity b e t w e e n f o r c e s c o m m i t t e d to d e m o c r a c y and those w h o are not—in essence b u y i n g off opposition; (4) learning, whereby through the gaining of new information forces not previously committed to d e m o c r a t i c institutions b e c o m e "enlightened"; or (5) a coalition structure that p u s h e s previously u n c o m m i t t e d parties into the moderate middle against the extremes. 3 9 Horowitz rightly dismisses the first route—habituation can only c o m e well after democratic institutions have been created. He further argues that deterrence and reciprocity are unlikely because any party with hegemonic

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aspirations will fight constraining institutions b e f o r e they are established. This implies that parties can see the distributional c o n s e q u e n c e s of institutions and will fight the creation of a r r a n g e m e n t s that disadvantage them. Horowitz also d i s m i s s e s the possibility of actors u n d e r g o i n g a cognitive c h a n g e by "learning just how explosive and inimical to e v e r y o n e ' s interests intergroup conflict and violence can be in a divided society." He contends that South A f r i c a ' s political history of w h i t e exclusive democracy and the high stakes in a new constitution will prevent such a cognitive shift.4«» Horowitz argues that one should f o c u s on the interests of the political parties and the incentives that may drive them to choose institutions that are in the public good. Here he contends that incentives can change during the transition process as parties d i f f e r e n t i a l l y c o m m i t themselves to democracy. Those actors w h o first publicly c o m m i t themselves to democratic competition will f i n d that they have a c o m m o n interest against extremists on both sides w h o are opposed to d e m o c r a c y . The structure of the c o a l i t i o n — a c o m m i t t e d d e m o c r a t i c m i d d l e against antidemocratic extremes—constrains the middle parties to act democratically. In this model, parties with hegemonic pretensions w h o find themselves in the middle discover that as they d e f e n d the d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s , their interests change incrementally. 4 1 Horowitz hopes that the result of such a c h a n g e will lead the parties of the middle to c h o o s e institutions that will best serve the public. He suggests that this will be more likely if the d e v e l o p m e n t of a constitution occurs through a "social contract m o d e " rather than through negotiation. Such a m o d e e m p h a s i z e s broad participation and c o n s e n s u s , rather than "horse trading" between narrowly interested parties. 4 2 H o r o w i t z ' s formulation ignores that a coalition of the middle will still f a c e incentives against e n l i g h t e n e d p o l i c y m a k i n g . T h e first problem, which he mentions himself, is that the parties of the middle can choose to be narrowly exclusive and establish a c o n d o m i n i u m on p o w e r — a " p a c t " — that omits other p o w e r f u l actors. 4 3 South A f r i c a ' s narrow transition may result in a multiracial authoritarian regime or at best an extremely limited d e m o c r a t i c polity. 4 4 A coalition of the m i d d l e c o u l d order an authoritarian crackdown on opposition. 4 5 Second, the parties of the center still have incentives during a transition to think about future elections, in which they will campaign independently. There will be strong temptations to undercut their partners in the transition to score points for a future election. If the parties in the middle succumb to this temptation, the net result will be continued ungovernability. Even in the absence of an agreement about the transition, the National Party has been accused of such double-dealing. O n e newspaper editor, f o r instance, castigated NP behavior in the w a k e of Chris H a n i ' s assassination

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as n a r r o w - m i n d e d e l e c t i o n e e r i n g at t h e e x p e n s e of its n e w p a r t n e r in negotiations, the A N C : White South Africans are being asked to contemplate a future as erless minority, under the ANC, yet when the A N C leaders try with a national crisis which is beyond the power of government trol, the white politicians snipe viciously from the sidelines, and and try to save themselves by attacking the ANC moderates. 4 6

a powto deal to conbluster,

If w e a c k n o w l e d g e that a c o a l i t i o n of t h e m i d d l e c a n j u s t as likely lead to an a u t h o r i t a r i a n c o n d o m i n i u m on p o w e r o r u n g o v e r n a b i l i t y as to " e n l i g h t e n e d " d e m o c r a t i c d e c i s i o n s , then w e m u s t l o o k e l s e w h e r e f o r s o u r c e s that c a n b r i n g a b o u t t h e n e c e s s a r y e n l i g h t e n m e n t . A d a m a n d M o o d l e y b e l i e v e that r a t i o n a l i t y will u l t i m a t e l y lead to o p timal c h o i c e s by S o u t h A f r i c a ' s l e a d e r s . L i k e P r i c e , A d a m a n d M o o d l e y stress that G e r m a n - s t y l e s o c i a l d e m o c r a c y a n d e c o n o m i c c o d e t e r m i n a t i o n is " t h e m o s t rational a n d a l s o the m o s t likely s c e n a r i o f o r S o u t h A f r i c a . " 4 7 B u t A d a m a n d M o o d l e y err in s e e i n g r a t i o n a l i t y a s t h e key p r o c e s s that will lead to t h e o p t i m a l s o l u t i o n f o r S o u t h A f r i c a . T h e r o a d to d e m o c racy in S o u t h A f r i c a is s t r e w n w i t h t r a p s in w h i c h l i m i t e d s e l f - i n t e r e s t c a n lead r a t i o n a l a c t o r s to c h o o s e s e l f - d e f e a t i n g c o u r s e s of a c t i o n . T h e r e a r e plenty of s t r a t e g i c g a m e s l e f t in the t r a n s i t i o n , w h e r e r a t i o n a l i t y in a n d of itself will n o t p r o v i d e t h e n o r m a t i v e l y b e s t a n s w e r . O n e s u c h g a m e o f s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n is m e n t i o n e d a b o v e — b o t h s i d e s will s i m u l t a n e o u s l y try to c r e a t e n e w i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d c a m p a i g n f o r a future election. Such a situation can easily descend into Machiavellian u n d e r c u t t i n g of o n e ' s e r s t w h i l e p a r t n e r , a n d at s o m e p o i n t t h e g a m e c a n b e c o m e p u r e c o m p e t i t i o n i n s t e a d of c o o p e r a t i o n . If p l a y e r s k n o w that t h e c o o p e r a t i v e g a m e will e n d , t h e r e is i n c e n t i v e to d e f e c t at t h e e a r l i e s t p o i n t . A n o t h e r s t r a t e g i c t r a p l i e s in t h e c r e a t i o n of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s t h e m s e l v e s . W i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n of t h e f a r r i g h t a n d t h e l e a d e r s of s o m e of t h e " i n d e p e n d e n t h o m e l a n d s , " S o u t h A f r i c a n s s e e t h e b e n e f i t of n e w i n s t i t u tions. A l m o s t a n y d e m o c r a t i c d i s p e n s a t i o n will p r o v i d e a p a r e t o - s u p e r i o r s o l u t i o n to t h e o n e that e x i s t s n o w . B u t p a r e t o - s u p e r i o r i t y d o e s not lead to a u t o m a t i c c o m p r o m i s e : t h e d i f f e r e n t s o l u t i o n s to t h e b a r g a i n i n g p r o b l e m in South A f r i c a p r o v i d e widely different distributional b e n e f i t s to the c o m p e t i n g p a r t i e s . 4 8 A s the p a r t i e s j o c k e y f o r d i s t r i b u t i o n a l b e n e f i t s , they risk c r e a t i n g a s i t u a t i o n w h e r e t h e i r e v e n t u a l c h o i c e c a n n o t h o l d b e c a u s e of ungovernability. It is a l e a p of f a i t h t o b e l i e v e that s e l f - i n t e r e s t o r r a t i o n a l i t y will lead to e n l i g h t e n e d p o l i c i e s a n d l a u n c h S o u t h A f r i c a ' s d e m o c r a c y o n a p o w e r ful p o s i t i v e b a s i s . T h e o n l y s o l u t i o n is o n e d i s m i s s e d b y H o r o w i t z : c o g n i tive c h a n g e or " e n l i g h t e n e d " s e l f - i n t e r e s t , w h e r e g r o u p s " s e e t h e l o n g - t e r m s u p e r i o r i t y of s o c i a l c o n t r a c t s o v e r s i m p l e c o n t r a c t s . " 4 9 O n l y t h r o u g h

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learning and problem solving will the parties of South Africa step beyond short-term limited self-interest.

Points of Optimism W e can take t w o e x a m p l e s straight f r o m H o r o w i t z ' s b o o k that suggest learning and redefinition of self-interest have played a part so f a r in the creation of a new South Africa: the A N C ' s positions on proportional representation (PR) and federalism. T h e choice of an electoral system in a new constitution will have distributional consequences. T h e rule governing representation—plurality or proportional—influences the number of seats in a legislature that political parties can win. For instance, with a plurality rule, a party with plurality support can win a much greater proportion of seats in a legislature than the proportion of votes it receives nationally in an election. T h e r e f o r e , if a party believes that it has majority support, it will press for a plurality rule in the hopes of gaining disproportionately. In the South A f r i c a n case, if we f o c u s solely on distributional gains to be earned f r o m the institutional rule governing representation, then the African National Congress would be best served by the plurality rule. Yet the A N C ' s formal constitutional proposals support proportional representation. Sisk, in his analysis of institutional choice in South Africa, suggests that the A N C has done so b e c a u s e it has been able to include a criterion in its decisionmaking of fairness over and above limited self-interest. Proportional representation will e n s u r e that minority groups in South Africa are represented in parliament; it will e d u c e cooperation by e n c o u r a g i n g coalition building. 5 0 Only through tortured reasoning can the A N C ' s institutional choice of PR be attributed to narrow self-interest. One such explanation, for example, states that the A N C ' s choice of proportional representation stems from its white S A C P m e m b e r s , w h o desire to control the electoral process through the party list system. 5 1 T h e p r o b l e m with this e x p l a n a t i o n is twofold. First, it shows that " s e l f - i n t e r e s t " can be evoked post hoc to explain any choice—in this case the power of "self-interest" is maintained by c h a n g i n g the pursuer of self-interest f r o m the A N C as a party to w h i t e S A C P m e m b e r s in the A N C . S e c o n d , by c h a n g i n g the pursuer of self-interest to a small clique within the A N C , the explanation implies that the A N C as an organization and African n o n - S A C P leaders in the A N C are either stupid and d o n ' t know their own self-interest or are completely p o w erless to fend off the machinations of the S A C P cabal. Neither implication stands well with what w e know of individuals such as Cyril R a m a p h o s a , T h a b o Mbeki, Bridgette Mbandla, or other A N C leaders.

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W h e n w e turn to the issue of f e d e r a l i s m , w e see a d r a m a t i c shift in A N C institutional choice. W r i t i n g just t w o years ago, H o r o w i t z states baldly, " C o n s i d e r the persuasion it will take to c o n v i n c e the extra-parliamentary opposition that federalism is not just a c l e a n e d - u p version of the homelands policy. The bias against federalism is so strong that, according to a sophisticated U D F leader w h o c o n c e d e s its possibilities, it is not worth the immense effort it would take to change minds." 5 2 But in 1993, the A N C negotiating committee conceded the desirability of strong regionalism (and in fact their proposals fit some Western versions of federalism). Could it be that the discussion, debate, and exchange encouraged by works such as H o r o w i t z ' s , by seminars presenting U.S. and German versions of federalism could actually have impressed m e m b e r s of the A N C to see it as a good in and of itself? T h e elite survey that I cited earlier, f o u n d that in 1992 almost 20 percent of A N C leaders preferred a federal constitution as their first choice. 5 3 T h e analysis of institutional choice relates to the key e c o n o m i c transf o r m a t i o n necessary to sustain d e m o c r a c y in South A f r i c a . Both Herbst and Price in this book agree that South A f r i c a ' s economy needs to be overhauled. While Price believes that a strong central g o v e r n m e n t , in c o n j u n c tion with labor and business, can deliver the c o m p r o m i s e s necessary for South Africa to be economically competitive in the world, Herbst argues that the h i g h - w a g e policy of the unions will pose an insurmountable barrier to j o b creation and e c o n o m i c growth. F r o m a narrow f o c u s on o r g a n i z a t i o n a l interest, Herbst is certainly correct. A f t e r all, why should we expect p o w e r f u l l y o r g a n i z e d unions to f o r e g o higher w a g e s — a policy that w o u l d be at o d d s with their raison d ' ê t r e ? From a long-term perspective, however, it is in the interest of the unions to have a thriving South African e c o n o m y . If there was reciprocity f r o m business in South Africa to reinvest profits to create jobs, then there w o u l d be an incentive for the unions to hold the line on w a g e s . T h e key to realizing P r i c e ' s h o p e f u l s c e n a r i o is through a p r o c e s s of d e b a t e and problem solving to get the main corporate actors in South Africa to redefine their limited definitions of self-interest. Will such redefinition on e c o n o m i c policy take place in South A f r i c a ? Again there are hopeful signs. T h e unions have begun to think creatively about the need for j o b creation. They have expanded their concerns to include the needs of the u n e m p l o y e d . T h e mutual f u n d that the labor unions have established to invest worker pension f u n d s places foremost a m o n g its priorities of social criteria for investment whether a c o m p a n y has an active policy a n d proven track record of j o b creation. T h e National E c o n o m i c Forum ( N E F ) in South Africa has already forged the beginnings of a consensus a m o n g government, business, and labor on tough questions of strategy and sacrifice.

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Conclusion T h e S o u t h A f r i c a n c a s e s u g g e s t s that t h e r e is a d i a l e c t i c at w o r k in the c r e a t i o n of s t a b l e d e m o c r a c y . C h a n g e s in s o c i e t y , c u l t u r e , a n d e c o n o m y (Transformation 1) l e a d to a n a r r o w t r a n s i t i o n to d e m o c r a c y . B u t in the c o u r s e of c r e a t i n g a h i g h l y e x p l o s i v e s i t u a t i o n t h a t leads e l i t e s to a d e m o c r a t i c c o m p r o m i s e , t h e initial t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l s o c r e a t e s a t t i t u d e s , r u l e s , a n d c o n d i t i o n s that w o r k a g a i n s t d e m o c r a t i c c o n s o l i d a t i o n . T h e t a s k of the e l i t e s w h o n e g o t i a t e the n a r r o w t r a n s i t i o n is t h e n to w o r k f o r Transformation 2—progress t o w a r d e l i m i n a t i n g e c o n o m i c i n e q u a l i t y , t h e c r e a t i o n of a c u l t u r e of t o l e r a n c e , a n d t h e b u i l d i n g of a h e a l t h y civil s o c i e t y t h a t w i l l then s u p p o r t a n d s u s t a i n d e m o c r a c y . T h e a l t e r n a t i v e is f o r t r a n s i t i o n to rem a i n in c r i s i s , w i t h the f o r m a l p o l i t i c a l r u l e s of e l i t e s s o r e l y out of t o u c h w i t h the i n f o r m a l r u l e s a n d i n t e r a c t i o n s of t h e s o c i e t y . T h e result c a n e a s ily s l i p into a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m o r t h e c o l l a p s e of t h e state. In t h e S o u t h A f r i c a n c a s e , t h e c h a n g e s ( a n d c o n t i n u i t i e s ) of t h e 1 9 8 0 s p r o v i d e a m i x e d legacy f o r b u i l d i n g a l o n g - l i v e d d e m o c r a c y . S o u t h A f r i c a ' s l e a d e r s h a v e the o p p o r t u n i t y to p u r s u e p o l i c i e s t h a t can c o n t i n u e to t r a n s f o r m s o c i e t y a n d build a f i r m e r b a s e f o r its d e m o c r a t i c c o m p r o m i s e . But let us b e v e r y c l e a r : w h e t h e r or not S o u t h A f r i c a ' s l e a d e r s p u r s u e s u c h p o l i c i e s w i l l not b e m e r e l y a p r o d u c t of r a t i o n a l i t y or s e l f - i n t e r e s t . L e a d e r s r a t i o nally p u r s u i n g their s e l f - i n t e r e s t in S o u t h A f r i c a c a n j u s t a s l i k e l y lead to m u l t i r a c i a l d o m i n a t i o n , a o n e - p a r t y state, or c h a o s . In the e n d it w i l l b e the a b i l i t y a n d w i l l i n g n e s s of t h e a c t o r s to d e f i n e t h e i r s e l f - i n t e r e s t in n e w w a y s , to c r e a t e t o g e t h e r the n e e d f o r a s t a b l e , d e m o c r a t i c S o u t h A f r i c a . W i l l t h e y d o s o ? T h e q u e s t i o n is n o t s i m p l y a b o u t o p t i m i s m o r p e s s i m i s m . It is a b o u t w h a t d r i v e s t h e c a l c u l a t i o n s of l e a d e r s a n d w h e t h e r l e a r n i n g , p r o b l e m s o l v i n g , a n d c o m m u n i t y will m i t i g a t e t h e e x c e s s s t r i v i n g of l i m i t e d s e l f - i n t e r e s t a n d t h e d i c t a t e s of p o w e r .

Notes 1. Giuseppe DiPalma, To Craft Democracies: sitions

An Essay on Democratic

Tran-

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1 9 9 0 ) .

2 . T e r r y L y n n Karl, " A R e s e a r c h P e r s p e c t i v e , " in Transitions to Democracy: Proceedings of a Workshop, C o m m i s s i o n o n B e h a v i o r a l and S o c i a l S c i e n c e s a n d Education, National Research Council (Washington, D.C.: National A c a d e m y P r e s s , 1 9 9 1 ) , p. 3 2 . 3 . R e n é L e m a r c h a n d , " A f r i c a ' s T r o u b l e d T r a n s i t i o n s , " Journal 3, n o . 4 ( O c t o b e r 1 9 9 2 ) , p. 1 0 1 .

of

Democracy

4 . T e r r y L y n n Karl, " D i l e m m a s o f D e m o c r a t i z a t i o n in L a t i n A m e r i c a , " in D a n k w a r t R u s t o w and K e n n e t h P. E r i k s o n , e d s . , Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives ( N e w Y o r k : H a r p e r C o l l i n s , 1 9 9 1 ) , p. 1 6 8 . E m p h a s i s mine.

TRANSITION & TRANSFORMATION

25

5. Nancy Bermeo, "Shortcuts to Liberty," Journal of Democracy (Spring 1991), p. 116. See also the criticism of Adam and Moodley that the burgeoning literature on democratic transition ignores key economic components of distribution that make possible consolidation of democracy, in The Negotiated Revolution: Society and Politics in Post-Apartheid South Africa (Parklands, South A f r i c a : Jonathan Ball, 1993), pp. 32, 224. 6. Robert Price, The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa: 1975-1990 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). 7. Ibid., Chapters 2, 5, 6. 8. T h e assertion that South Africa is likely to b e c o m e a one-party state is found in Donald Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). The possibility of South Africa becoming an "elite cartel" that will rule through "multiracial d o m i n a t i o n " is found in Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, The Negotiated Revolution: Society and Politics in Post-apartheid South Africa (Parklands, South Africa: Jonathan Ball, 1993). 9. J e r e m y Seekings, " F r o m B o y c o t t s to Voting? T h e Extra-parliamentary Opposition in Transition," Die Suid-Afrikaan, F e b r u a r y - M a r c h 1993, pp. 3 3 - 3 4 . 10. Such concerns were raised by A n t h o n y Marx and Richard T o m l i n s o n in their presentations at the SA1S Country Day Conference, April 1 3 - 1 4 , 1992. T h e very issue of maintaining a healthy balance between the state and civil society has led one t h o u g h t f u l policy analyst to r e c o m m e n d that U.S. foreign policy overwhelmingly provide direct assistance to N G O s and grassroots o r g a n i z a t i o n s in Africa, instead of channeling aid money through the state. See Michael C l o u g h , Free at Last? U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Africa in the Post Cold War Era (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992). 11. Seekings, "From Boycotts to V o t i n g ? " p. 34. 12. Khehla Shubane, "Civics as a Building Ground for a Democratic Civil Society," Die Suid-Afrikaan, F e b r u a r y - M a r c h 1993, p. 36. 13. See Stephen Friedman, The Elusive "Community": The Dynamics of Negotiated Urban Development (Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies, 1993). 14. Ibid. 15. Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? p. 89. 16. Adam and Moodley, Negotiated Revolution, p. 31. 17. Quote by Mandela in .Argus, May 8. 18. A d a m and Moodley, Negotiated Revolution, pp. 2 2 1 - 2 2 2 . 19. Hennie Kotze, Transitional Politics in South Africa: An Attitude Survey of Opinion-Leaders, Research Report No. 3, (Stellenbosch, South A f r i c a : Centre for International and Comparative Politics, 1992), pp. 6 5 - 7 6 . 20. Kate Manzo and Pat M c G o w a n , " A f r i k a n e r Fears and the Politics of Despair: Understanding Change in South A f r i c a , " International Studies Quarterly 36 (1992), pp. 1 - 2 4 ; and Hermann Giliomee, "Broedertwis: Intra-Afrikaner Conflicts in the Transition from Apartheid," African Affairs 91 (1992), pp. 3 3 9 - 3 6 4 . 21. Manzo and M c G o w a n , " A f r i k a n e r Fears and the Politics of Despair," pp. 1-24. 22. A d a m and Moodley, p. 222. 23. Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert, The Quest for Democracy: South Africa in Transition (London: Penguin, 1992), p. 91. 24. T i m o t h y Sisk, The Illusive Social Contract: Democraticization in South Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, F o r t h c o m i n g ) . T o get an incisive and thorough examination of the d e v e l o p m e n t of the negotiating positions of the

26

SOUTH AFRICA

m a j o r parties in South A f r i c a and their potential for reaching a stable agreement, this m a n u s c r i p t is m a n d a t o r y r e a d i n g . 25. Stephen Lewis, The Economics of Apartheid ( N e w York: C o u n c i l on Foreign Relations, 1990), p. 136. 26. B o b T u c k e r and B r u c e Scott, eds., South Africa: Prospects for Successful Transition, Nedcor/Old Mutual S c e n a r i o s (Cape T o w n : Juta, 1992), p. 27. The exercise d e f i n e s s u c c e s s f u l transition as c o m b i n i n g stable d e m o c r a c y , rising real incomes, r e a s o n a b l e distribution of i n c o m e s , and stable social fabric (p. 15). T h e definition c o m b i n e s the fact of t r a n s i t i o n — a c h a n g e in the f o r m a l political r u l e s — w i t h w h a t m a n y see as p r e r e q u i s i t e s of s u s t a i n i n g such a transition. By d o i n g so, it substitutes a d e f i n i t i o n — " s t a b l e d e m o c r a c y is the presence of a set of c o n d i t i o n s " — f o r a h y p o t h e s i s — " t h e p r e s e n c e of a set of c o n d i t i o n s is likely to lead to stable d e m o c r a c y . " T h u s , the T u c k e r and Scott book categorizes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua, Eastern E u r o p e , and the Soviet Union as " u n s u c c e s s f u l transitions to d e m o c r a c y " (p. 22), which would probably shock the peoples and analysts of these countries to k n o w that their e x p e r i m e n t s have already failed! I have tried to put forward here that it is an open question whether d e m o c r a c y can survive as a set of formal institutions w i t h o u t progress on various transformational issues. T h i s at least o p e n s the possibility that t r a n s i t i o n s in d i f f i c u l t o b j e c t i v e situations are not d e t e r m i n e d to fail. It also a l l o w s the possibility that there may be a significant lag time for narrow transitions to a d d r e s s key t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l issues. Normatively, it puts forth t r a n s f o r m a t i o n as a needed policy to sustain transition and does not insist on t r a n s f o r m a t i o n b e f o r e transition. 27. A d a m and M o o d l e y , Negotiated Revolution, pp. 1 3 3 - 1 4 8 . 28. S e e " ' O u t s i d e r s T u r n D a v e y t o n into Killing Fields," Weekly Mail and Guardian, July 3 0 - A u g u s t 5, 1993; and ' " H i s Sin Is that He S p e a k s Proper Z u l u — in J o ' b u r g , ' " Weekly Mail, June 1 8 - J u n e 24, 1993. 29. D o n a l d Rothchild, " A n Interactive M o d e l for S t a t e - E t h n i c R e l a t i o n s , " in Francis M. D e n g and I. W i l l i a m Z a r t m a n , eds., Conflict Resolution in Africa ( W a s h i n g t o n D . C . : B r o o k i n g s I n s t i t u t i o n , 1991), p. 194; and S t e p h e n John Stedm a n , Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 19741980 ( B o u l d e r : Lynne Rienner, 1991), pp. 1 1 - 2 0 . 30. A d a m and M o o d l e y , The Negotiated Revolution, p. 25. 31. Donald Rothchild, " A n Interactive Model for State-Ethnic Relations," pp. 200-205. 32. A d a m and M o o d l e y , Negotiated Revolution, pp. 2 0 3 - 2 0 5 , 159. 33. Ibid. 34. S e e " T a x p a y e r s to Pay for State B l u n d e r s , " Weekend Argus, February 1 3 - 1 4 , 1993. 35. O n e analyst e s t i m a t e s that f r a u d - r e l a t e d c r i m e s in South A f r i c a over the last five y e a r s may involve u p w a r d s of $ 1 2 0 billion. See N j o r o g e Kariuki, " E c o n o m i c C r i m e s in South A f r i c a : A H i d d e n Legacy of A p a r t h e i d , " Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly, M a y 1993, pp. 4 1 - 4 2 . See also Financial Mail, July 9, 1993, p. 42. 36. A d a m and M o o d l e y , Negotiated Revolution, p. 219. 37. H o r o w i t z , A Democratic South Africa? p. 280. 38. Ibid., pp. 2 3 1 - 2 3 8 on c r i s i s of d i s t r i b u t i o n ; pp. 2 0 5 - 2 1 4 on need for strong p r e s i d e n c y . 39. Ibid., pp. 2 4 5 - 2 7 9 . 40. H o r o w i t z adopts a fairly n a r r o w conception of learning. He dismisses the ability of individuals to learn f r o m historical experiences or cases other than their own and, oddly e n o u g h , he m a k e s no a l l o w a n c e for the participants learning from

TRANSITION & TRANSFORMATION

27

w o r k s such as his own b o o k . Yet over the last f o u r years, the t w o m a i n political parties in South Africa, the A N C and the National Party, have had teams of experts s t u d y i n g the global literature on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e n g i n e e r i n g . P e o p l e such as H o r o w i t z , Arend Lijphart, and Roger Fisher have traveled to South A f r i c a and advised the parties on optimal institutions. And the A N C ' s constitutional c o m m i t t e e has travelled to G e r m a n y and the United S t a t e s to study h o w f e d e r a l i s m w o r k s in practice. 41. Ibid., pp. 2 7 1 - 2 7 9 . 42. Ibid., p. 280 and p. 151. 43. Ibid., pp. 2 8 0 - 2 8 1 . 44. A d a m and M o o d l e y , Negotiated Revolution, pp. 2 1 5 - 2 1 8 . 45. Slabbert, The Quest for Democracy, pp. 8 0 - 8 3 . 46. Ken O w e n , " W h e r e , at T h i s T i m e of Crisis, Are O u r L e a d e r s ? " Sunday Times, April 18, 1993. 47. A d a m and M o o d l e y , Negotiated Revolution, p. 210. 48. On the failure of pareto-superior solutions to explain institution creation, see Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e University Press, 1992), pp. 3 4 - 3 7 . 49. Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? p. 151. 50. Sisk, The Illusive Social Contract. 51. R. W. Johnson, " P R at Work: A Case Study," Die Suid-Afrikaan, FebruaryMarch 1993, pp. 2 0 - 2 1 : " T h e proposed s y s t e m is the product of an unholy alliance between the g o v e r n m e n t on the one hand and the S A C P leadership on the o t h e r — with A f r i c a n n a t i o n a l i s m as the c o m m o n fall guy . . . A s the g o v e r n m e n t stared a g h a s t at the new electoral arithmetic, it naturally u n d e r w e n t a d e a t h b e d c o n v e r sion to PR as the only way to m o d e r a t e the tide of A f r i c a n nationalism. Ironically, the S A C P elite, w h i c h o c c u p i e d the c o m m a n d i n g h e i g h t s w i t h i n the A N C , w a s c o m i n g to the s a m e c o n c l u s i o n . T h e key w h i t e and Indian c a d r e s of the S A C P would have no chance of w i n n i n g seats a m o n g s t their o w n c o m m u n i t i e s under the old single m e m b e r system. A f r i c a n nationalist sentiment would also m a k e them extremely difficult to elect in black t o w n s h i p s . H o w well would even a Joe S l o v o or M a c M a h a r a j fare in a S o w e t o seat f a c i n g a P A C c a n d i d a t e p r e a c h i n g racial nat i o n a l i s m ? " Ironically, an opinion poll of S o u t h A f r i c a n b l a c k s s h o w e d that Joe S l o v o w a s the second most popular South A f r i c a n leader, behind only Nelson Mandela. See The Cape Times, July 17, 1993. 52. Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? p. 243. 53. Kotze, Transitional Politics, p. 60.

3 South Africa: Economic Crises and Distributional Imperative Jeffrey Herbst

T

he first postapartheid government will be faced with a dual economic challenge: to redistribute wealth and to fundamentally reform basic institutions and policies so as to permit faster growth. Indeed, long after the first nonracial election, unhappiness caused by lasting inequalities and perceived e c o n o m i c u n d e r p e r f o r m a n c e will be destabilizing, no matter how elegantly the new constitution is drawn. This chapter will first briefly review the e c o n o m i c situation f a c i n g the first postapartheid g o v e r n m e n t . It will then sketch the political d y n a m i c s that will d e v e l o p around two critical aspects of e c o n o m i c policy: fiscal balance and w a g e policy. T h e s e issues are critical to the health of the postapartheid e c o n o m y ; indeed, failure to be successful on both issues will torpedo all hopes of significantly increasing South A f r i c a ' s growth rate. In addition, the t w o issues go to the heart of the constituency p r o b l e m s the A N C will f a c e when m a k i n g e c o nomic policy.

The South African Economy: Unequal and Inefficient South A f r i c a is classified by the World Bank as an u p p e r - m i d d l e - i n c o m e country with a per capita income of $ 2 , 5 3 0 in 1990, which makes it c o m parable to Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 1 As is now well known, the aggregate income figures hide significant inequalities. 2 T a b l e 3.1 provides a s u m m a r y of i n c o m e share over time by racial g r o u p . W h i l e there has been s o m e improvement in black income shares lately, the society is still 29

30

SOUTH AFRICA

obviously unequal. Indeed, 53 percent of A f r i c a n s live below the poverty line compared to 2 percent of all whites; and to further these inequalities, the g o v e r n m e n t s p e n d s R 2 , 9 1 0 for each white child in primary school compared to R660 for each African child. There are 3 0 7 , 0 0 0 vacancies in w h i t e schools despite the fact that 2 million blacks are w i t h o u t school places; there are 180,000 whites in managerial, technical, and professional positions c o m p a r e d to only 3 , 0 0 0 blacks; there has been one black mine manager in seventy-seven years; and there is not a single black actuary. 3

Table 3.1 Income Shares over Time

African Asian Coloured White

1960

1970

1980

1990

19.9 2.1 5.6 72.5

19.8 2.4 6.7 71.1

24.9 3.0 7.2 64.9

33.0 3.9 9.2 53.9

Sources: IMF, Economic Policies for a New South Africa, Occasional Paper No. 91 (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1992), p. 4; and Max Frankel, Pollak Vinderine, et al., Platform for Investment (Johannesburg: Frankel, Max Pollak Vinderine, 1992), p. 72. Note: These statistics come from a variety of sources that did not use the same methodology. However, the general trend reported in the table is supported by other surveys and anecdotal evidence.

What is less c o m m o n l y known is that the South African e c o n o m y has p e r f o r m e d poorly since the m i d - 1 9 7 0 s and that structural b o t t l e n e c k s in the e c o n o m y will pose m a j o r p r o b l e m s for future leaders. B e t w e e n 1946 and 1974, the South African economy grew at a real rate of 4.9 percent annually. However, over the next decade, growth dropped to 1.9 percent per year and for the d e c a d e of the 1980s, the e c o n o m y e x p a n d e d at a rate of only 1.5 percent. 4 In the 1980s, on balance, no new j o b s w e r e created in the nongovernment sector. 5 A substantial portion of the e c o n o m i c crisis stems f r o m a problem in g a r n e r i n g productive investment. Even in the period f r o m 1963 to 1973, when South Africa managed to match the growth rate of the average T h i r d World country, it was investing 25 percent of G D P compared to 15 percent f o r c o m p a r a b l e c o u n t r i e s . 6 S i n c e 1973, gross fixed investment has declined m a r k e d l y . Given that South A f r i c a needs to invest 14 percent of G D P just to replace existing capital stock, the current figure of 16 percent s u g g e s t s that overall fixed i n v e s t m e n t is barely i n c r e a s i n g . 7 Part of the problem also stems f r o m g o v e r n m e n t investment that w a s manifestly unproductive. Much of government investment went into creating the s h a m structures of apartheid (e.g., capitals, airports, electrical stations f o r the " h o m e l a n d s " w h e r e all A f r i c a n s not w o r k i n g directly in the w h i t e

ECONOMIC CRISES & DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPERATIVE

31

economy were supposed to be d u m p e d ) and strategic projects (notably the S A S O L coal to oil program and the M O S S G A S natural gas to oil program) that were i m p l e m e n t e d to c o u n t e r s a n c t i o n s and that now have no economic rationale. Productive investment w a s f u r t h e r stunted by the inward-looking industrial program that the South A f r i c a n s have continued since 1948. As a result, while South A f r i c a ' s traditional markets were growing by 6 percent annually b e t w e e n 1960 and 1990, its m a n u f a c t u r e d exports were increasing by only 2 percent. 8 Nongold exports did not increase relative to G D P because the South Africans believed that the gold industry was of utmost importance to the economy, a perception e n h a n c e d by sanctions. T h e poor investment climate also deterred investors. T h e periodic political crises, including the S h a r p e v i l l e m a s s a c r e in 1960, the S o w e t o killings in 1976, and the township violence between 1984 and 1986 (which eventually led to the declaration of a nationwide state of emergency), each prompted large flights of c a p i t a l . 9 International sanctions, the constant threat of unrest, and the a l l - p e r v a d i n g uncertainty of white life in South Africa further crimped the investment climate. Finally, part of the South A f r i c a n investment failure in the 1980s can also be explained by a crisis of savings. In 1985, in the midst of the international debt crisis, banks led by C h a s e Manhattan reacted to the outbreak of violence in the townships by calling in South A f r i c a ' s loans. Overnight, the country b e c a m e a net e x p o r t e r of capital. T h e f o r c e d r e p a y m e n t w a s achieved by running a significant current account surplus, which averaged 3 percent of G D P for 1 9 8 5 - 1 9 9 1 c o m p a r e d to a deficit of 2.5 percent of G D P for the period 1 9 8 2 - 1 9 8 4 . Since the total level of savings remained roughly constant, the foreign debt (and the government deficit) was funded out of investment. Indeed, i n v e s t m e n t as a p e r c e n t a g e of G D P declined f r o m 26.4 in 1 9 8 2 - 1 9 8 4 to 20.2 in 1985-1991."> South Africa faces a similar problem with human capital. Its failure to educate blacks caused the economy to begin to suffer from a severe shortage of skills in the 1970s. Currently, the ratio of managers to workers is one of the world's lowest, at 1:42 compared to 1:10 in developed countries." Further, for every 100,000 people in each racial classification, there are 4,467 white students in tertiary education but only 665 A f r i c a n s . 1 2 T h e country will probably continue to lose skilled workers through emigration. 1 3 T h e r e f o r e , any u p s w i n g in the e c o n o m y will quickly cause a rapid rise in imports because of u n d e r i n v e s t m e n t in the m a n u f a c t u r i n g base. Ind e e d , Finance M i n i s t e r D e r e k K e y s calls the c u r r e n t account South A f r i c a ' s " h e a r t - l u n g m a c h i n e " b e c a u s e e v e n d u r i n g the recession of 1 9 8 9 - 1 9 9 2 it w a s under p r e s s u r e . 1 4 F u r t h e r , s u s t a i n e d g r o w t h will also stoke inflationary pressures due to the shortage of skilled labor and other b o t t l e n e c k s in the e c o n o m y . 1 5 T h e R e s e r v e B a n k will be f o r c e d to

32

SOUTH AFRICA

respond to the d e t e r i o r a t i n g current account and inflation by c l a m p i n g down on the money supply and thereby limiting g r o w t h . As a result, the successor g o v e r n m e n t will probably experience a b a s e l i n e e c o n o m i c growth rate in the first f i v e years a f t e r the transition not substantially higher than the population growth rate of 2.7 percent. 1 6 Of course, exogenous shocks, especially caused by an increase in the price of oil or severe drought, could dampen even this mild performance.

The ANC's Economic Beliefs Any new g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d f i n d the e c o n o m i c p r o b l e m s f a c i n g South Africa to be daunting. Indeed, many countries have f o u n d simply the task of r e m o v i n g structural inefficiencies and making the e c o n o m y more outw a r d - l o o k i n g to be exceptionally difficult, without w o r r y i n g about distributional implications. In South Africa, the unique analytic difficulties and uncertainties posed by the e c o n o m i c challenge are aggravated by the state of e c o n o m i c analysis in the A f r i c a n National C o n g r e s s . T h e A N C w a s taken almost completely by surprise when it was legalized by de Klerk in 1990. Up to that point, it had devoted minimal attention to e c o n o m i c s because it w a s focusing on the armed struggle and, as a broad front for those w h o o p p o s e d a p a r t h e i d , it had little interest in d e t a i l i n g e c o n o m i c proposals that could only alienate potential constituencies. Indeed, the A N C has a l w a y s been more like a church for all those w h o opposed apartheid than an actual political party with a d e f i n e d ideology and program of action. T h e years in exile required nothing more. As a result, the extremely v a g u e F r e e d o m Charter a d o p t e d in 1 9 5 5 — w h i c h s e e m e d to d e m a n d the nationalization of the mines, banks, and m o n o p o l i e s — w a s still considered the last w o r d on the A N C ' s e c o n o m i c doctrine w h e n it w a s legalized in 1990. In addition, while the A N C never believed it w o u l d shoot its way into power, the e c o n o m i c analysis that w a s done a s s u m e d that d u r i n g the e n d g a m e the A N C would be dealing f r o m a position of strength with a demoralized and divided g o v e r n m e n t . T h e fact that de Klerk leaped ahead of the p o w e r curve and entered into negotiations as the c o n f i d e n t head of a strong g o v e r n m e n t forced the A N C fundamentally to review the a s s u m p tions behind many of its policies. As Mike Morris perceptively notes:

Much of the left. . . inherited from the 1980s a tradition that shunned effective struggle within institutions. . . . These reflex social conceptions are wholly unsuited to the tasks that clutter the democratization process . . . this transition is about the inclusion of the opposition into existing institutions still inhabited by the same old social forces and people. 17

ECONOMIC CRISES & DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPERATIVE

33

J e r e m y Cronin of the South A f r i c a n C o m m u n i s t Party is even more emphatic: " T h e A N C - l e d alliance has not d e v e l o p e d an adequate strategy for struggle in the p o s t - F e b r u a r y 1990 situation." 1 8 T h e managed transition that South Africa is experiencing does provide the A N C with significant advantages, notably an e c o n o m y and infrastructure that are largely intact. However, taking full advantage of those benefits implies enormous restrictions on the C o n g r e s s ' s f r e e d o m of action. In particular, the C o n g r e s s will have to pay f a r m o r e attention to business c o n f i d e n c e and property rights in order to reassure the private sector than it had anticipated. It is the gradual realization that an intact private sector o f f e r s e n o r m o u s benefits cum significant restrictions, which probably explains the A N C ' s quick abandonment of much of the rhetoric of nationalization that had featured so prominently during the decades of exile. Finally, as the A N C was legalized, its ideological universe collapsed. T h e c o m m i t m e n t to socialism a m o n g A N C m e m b e r s varied tremendously, but there is no doubt that the fall of c o m m u n i s m left the organization without e v e n a set of first principles. Of c o u r s e , the collapse of c o m m u n i s m and de K l e r k ' s legalization of the A N C are closely related. It w a s de K l e r k ' s tactical insight that the fall of the Berlin Wall provided a unique w i n d o w of opportunity for whites to negotiate a transition f r o m a position of strength. T h e speech of February 2, 1990, is extraordinary as a "state of the nation" address because it discusses the opportunities posed by the c h a n g e d international e n v i r o n m e n t b e f o r e r e v i e w i n g e v e n t s in South A f r i c a . 1 9 Further, the message that m u c h of the A N C ' s old e c o n o m i c beliefs were antediluvian has been amplified by the United States and by European countries, which have b e c o m e m u c h more important to the A N C . T h e transition f r o m " s t r u g g l e e c o n o m i c s " to a n u a n c e d d e b a t e about the c o u n t r y ' s future has thus been extremely difficult.

Macroeconomic Balance During the Transition Unless South A f r i c a ' s m a c r o e c o n o m y is in balance, there will be no hope of i m p l e m e n t i n g r e f o r m s to accelerate growth, and the country, given the persistent u n d e r i n v e s t m e n t in the e c o n o m y , will teeter on the brink of a stabilization crisis. Unfortunately, the first postapartheid government will inherit a difficult financial situation. Since 1975, general government expenditures increased faster than the growth rate of the e c o n o m y irrespective of e c o n o m i c conditions. As a result, the government developed what now appears to be a structural deficit. T h e deficit had not been severe until 1 9 9 2 / 9 3 , w h e n it threatened to rise a b o v e 9 percent of G D P , a w o r r y i n g h a r b i n g e r . Further, the c o m p o s i t i o n of g o v e r n m e n t s p e n d i n g is troubles o m e . G o v e r n m e n t s p e n d i n g on c o n s u m p t i o n rose f r o m 18.5 percent of

34

SOUTH AFRICA

G D P in the mid-1970s to 31 percent during the late 1980s. In contrast, the g o v e r n m e n t ' s capital expenditure dropped from 7 to 4 percent of G D P during the s a m e p e r i o d . 2 0 T h e r e f o r e , most of g o v e r n m e n t b o r r o w i n g is to cover consumption. T h e f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m s with fiscal policy in South A f r i c a were m a d e clear by Finance Minister N. C. Havenga in 1950. He pointed to the "unstable climatic conditions of the country, the e n o r m o u s financial burden involved in the advancement of the Black peoples, and the relatively small n u m b e r of income t a x p a y e r s w h o have to bear this b u r d e n . " 2 1 Indeed, throughout the 1980s, South African tax revenue b e c a m e much more dependent on individual taxation as revenue from gold collapsed and company profits were squeezed by recession and high wage settlements. In 1991, direct taxation of individuals accounted for 56 percent of total direct taxation; in 1975, the figure had been only 25 percent. 2 2 South A f r i c a ' s fiscal problems would have been evident earlier except for the brief gold boom in the early 1980s, which caused a temporary spike in revenue collection. Not surprisingly, whites pay the o v e r w h e l m i n g amount of income tax since they are disproportionately w e a l t h y . In 1987, w h i t e s accounted for 72.1 percent of taxes, down only s o m e w h a t from 77 percent that they contributed in 1975. The tax burden of South African whites, at 32 percent of total income, is high by middle-income country standards and c o m p a r a b l e to industrial country levels. 2 3 W h i l e the A N C says its wants to raise revenue by making the tax structure more progressive, 2 4 it is hard to see how this will generate significantly more revenue given the already high marginal rates that most South A f r i c a n s now incur because of bracket creep. In this context, the fiscal d e m a n d s that a new g o v e r n m e n t will f a c e will be immense. Servaas van der Berg estimates that if other government expenditures (currently 17.9 percent of GDP) were held constant and just education, social pensions, health, and housing w e r e increased to w h i t e levels, total government expenditures would increase f r o m 27.4 percent of G D P to b e t w e e n 42.4 and 48.7 p e r c e n t . 2 5 Such a level of increase is, of course, impossible. However, even to increase services s o m e w h a t is an extraordinarily expensive proposition, given the relative size of the impoverished portion of the population. For instance, simply to raise educational s p e n d i n g f o r A f r i c a n s to the level currently received by Indians or coloureds would imply an increase in expenditures of b e t w e e n 65 and 109 percent, an impossible proposition given the relatively high a m o u n t that South Africa already spends on schooling. 2 6 In addition, a f u t u r e South A f r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t will be f a c e d with tremendous pressures to increase s p e n d i n g in other areas. For instance, the next government may want to create j o b s programs f o r the millions u n e m ployed, institute supplemental f e e d i n g programs for the 2.3 million p e o ple—including 1 million c h i l d r e n — w h o are malnourished, begin programs

ECONOMIC CRISES & DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPERATIVE

35

to help the estimated 12 million people without a d e q u a t e water supplies, and help e l e c t r i f y the h o m e s of the 8 0 percent of all blacks without power. 2 7 Further, there will be d e m a n d s to b r i n g black f a r m e r s into the agricultural support system by p r o v i d i n g them with, a m o n g other things, roads, seeds, fertilizer, outreach support, and depots. Finally, public sector e m p l o y m e n t is bound to increase significantly as the next government attempts to reward its own supporters and begins the long effort of making the civil service more representative. There will be an "apartheid d i v i d e n d , " although it will not be significant e n o u g h to solve the fiscal p r o b l e m s of the next g o v e r n m e n t . First, some g o v e r n m e n t s p e n d i n g has already been redirected. D e s m o n d Lachman and Kenneth Bercuson e s t i m a t e that w h i t e s received 56 percent of total government benefits in 1975 but that this had declined to 35 percent in 1987. 2 8 T h e b e n e f i t s whites receive f r o m g o v e r n m e n t today are e v e n lower, especially given that much of the direct cost of operating s c h o o l s has been passed on to white parents. T h e r e will also be savings f r o m administrative duplication once the h o m e l a n d s are abolished, although van der Berg e s t i m a t e s these at only 1 to 2 percent of G D P . 2 9 Finally, there will be s o m e s i g n i f i c a n t savings f r o m d e f e n s e s p e n d i n g , probably in the range of 1.5 to 2 percent of G D P . 3 0 T h e best g u e s s is that the short-run savings will amount to 2 to 4 percent of GDP. 3 1 Of course, a new government is likely to find that government spending is " s t i c k y " in the downward direction. First, transition rules, especially regarding civil service protection and p e n s i o n s , will r e d u c e the a b s o l u t e amounts that can be saved. Since the National Party is guaranteed to have a prominent place in the new cabinet, side agreements on white perquisites can be expected to severely limit the apartheid dividend in the short term. Indeed, the NP will be especially c o n c e r n e d with the f a t e of white civil servants b e c a u s e , over the last f o r t y - f i v e years, g o v e r n m e n t e m p l o y m e n t has been central to the economic upliftment of the A f r i k a n e r s w h o are still core voters for de K l e r k ' s party. T h e fiscal implications of power sharing probably have not been fully analyzed by the A N C . Second, downsizing is an extraordinarily c o m p l i c a t e d task, w h i c h a new g o v e r n m e n t will not have the administrative talent to complete quickly. Bureaucrats can also be expected to wage vicious guerrilla c a m p a i g n s to protect their turf, with the result that actual s a v i n g s will a l w a y s b e less than p r o j e c t e d . D i f f i c u l t i e s in producing short-term fiscal savings are especially important to note because the A N C is c o u n t i n g on e x t r e m e l y large e f f i c i e n c y gains to f u n d new programs. 3 2 Finally, much of the apartheid savings will have to be invested, rather than c o n s u m e d in the short term, if the country is to address its structural p r o b l e m s . F i n a n c e Minister Keys e s t i m a t e s that the p e r c e n t a g e of the economy devoted to investment will have to increase f r o m the present 16

36

SOUTH AFRICA

percent to between 24 and 25 percent of G D P if a 3.5 percent growth rate is to be s u s t a i n e d . 3 3 If half of the increase in investment c o m e s f r o m reductions in g o v e r n m e n t s p e n d i n g , perhaps an optimistic p r o j e c t i o n , the apartheid dividend will be all but eliminated. It is unlikely that f o r e i g n savings will be able to a m e l i o r a t e significantly a future g o v e r n m e n t ' s fiscal problems. South Africa will be able to become a net borrower again on international capital markets, although it will have to be careful not to borrow too much too quickly. Debt servicing already accounts for 17 percent of total government expenditures, and this figure cannot be increased too rapidly or South Africa will fall into a debt trap. 3 4 T h e r e will also be an increase in foreign aid, although it too will not be enough to r e d u c e pressure on the fiscus. S u r p r i s i n g l y , South Africa is already one of the w o r l d ' s most significant recipients of project aid. 3 5 Under a new g o v e r n m e n t , many donors will simply shift this aid from the n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l organizations that run the p r o g r a m s to public authorities. Additional foreign aid will be forthcoming but will be limited in a world that must also f u n d the reconstruction of the states of the former Soviet Union, Central Europe, and the rest of Africa. T h e Nedcor/Old Mutual estimates that overall capital inflows will go f r o m zero in 1992 to 2 percent of G D P in 1995 3 6 s e e m s reasonable but will not p r o v i d e much budget relief given the cost of the programs listed above. T h e result of the e n o r m o u s potential d e m a n d s on the f i s c u s plus the limited possibilities for raising revenue in the short term is a near guarantee of a destabilizing fiscal d e f i c i t . T o their credit, leaders of the A N C seem to realize this problem. As Cyril Ramaphosa, general secretary of the Congress, noted, " M a c r o e c o n o m i c populist pitfalls which can have the opposite of good intentions in the medium to long-term have to be a v o i d e d . " 3 7 Similarly, Tito M b o w e n i of the A N C ' s D e p a r t m e n t of Economic Policy has said that " s o m e t h i n g radical will have to be done to control the level of government expenditure." 3 8 The A N C is probably the only liberation movement in history to speak of financial discipline before it assumes power. However, the means by which the A N C will actually limit expenditures is less clear. T h e A N C faces an enormous expectations crisis among blacks long discriminated against. T h e reasonable statements m a d e in front of international bankers will inevitably give way to irresponsible populist promises during a hard-fought election. 3 9 Indeed, given that the A N C has had neither the time nor the analytic resources to address the enormously complicated questions it faces, the current conservative statements on fiscal policy should be seen as spin control as the A N C desperately searches for a policy appropriate to the situation it finds itself in. In particular, the Congress has raised its constituency on redistributive e c o n o m i c s and has not even begun to d e v e l o p a vocabulary to explain to its erstwhile supporters

ECONOMIC CRISES & DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPERATIVE

37

why they may have to wait before they see the fruits of the liberation struggle. Given that the current government was not able to resist the demands of 5 million relatively affluent whites, it is hard to see how the next government is going to be able to turn down the d e m a n d s of 32 million mainly poor people w h o have suffered f r o m institutionalized racism for decades. Further, any rhetoric f r o m the A N C on fiscal discipline will feed into the critique of radicals that the C o n g r e s s is " s e l l i n g o u t . " W i n n i e M a n dela, estranged w i f e of A N C leader Nelson M a n d e l a , s u m m e d up the feelings of many when she charged in D e c e m b e r 1992 that a deal was being negotiated b e t w e e n "the elite of the o p p r e s s e d and the o p p r e s s o r s " and warned of "the looming disaster in this country which will result f r o m the distortion of a noble goal in favor of a short-cut route to parliament by a handful of i n d i v i d u a l s . " S h e e l a b o r a t e d on this critique in January 1993 when she claimed in a widely printed n e w s p a p e r article that "the NP elite is getting into bed with the A N C to preserve its silken sheets and the leadership elite in the A N C is getting into b e d with the NP to enjoy this newfound luxury." 4 0 Finally, the nature of a significant portion of the A N C ' s constituency suggests that it will have a relatively short grace period before it is under extreme pressure to deliver the political goods. In most of Africa, it is true that g o v e r n m e n t s survived f o r many years despite the fact that not only were they not providing significant benefits to their population but real inc o m e s were declining. 4 1 O t h e r A f r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t s were able to avoid popular protest because 70 to 8 0 percent of their populations were atomistically dispersed throughout the rural areas and, as a result, could not organize easily. H o w e v e r , the South A f r i c a n population is u r b a n i z i n g quickly. Between 1985 and 1990, the percentage of A f r i c a n s in the cities rose from 45.5 to 50.8 percent. It is estimated that by the year 1995 more than 60 percent of the total population will be in the cities. Further, as opposed to most A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s at i n d e p e n d e n c e w h e r e the ruling party was the only organized political force, South A f r i c a ' s population is highly politicized and there are already n u m e r o u s politicians and g r o u p i n g s around which aggrieved urban residents can coalesce. In addition, many of the young people in particular have heard for almost their entire lives A N C d e m a n d s that they m a k e the country u n g o v e r n a b l e until the d e m a n d s of "the p e o p l e " are met. T h e r e is every reason to believe that such rhetoric will come back to haunt the A N C . A further aggravating factor is that, in contrast to most other African countries at independence, machine guns, mortars, and land mines are readily available in South A f r i c a because of the long a r m e d struggle, the regional arms markets that developed f r o m the conflicts in M o z a m b i q u e and Angola, and the greater local capacity to produce weapons. Thus, a future South African government will f a c e a m u c h more d e m a n d i n g population

38

SOUTH AFRICA

t h a t is m o r e c o n c e n t r a t e d , e a s i e r t o o r g a n i z e , a n d b e t t e r a r m e d t h a n w a s the c a s e in t h e rest o f t h e c o n t i n e n t . O n c e in p o w e r , t h e A N C w i l l p r o b a b l y try to r e t a i n m o s t o f its c o n s t i t u e n c y b y w i d e l y d i s t r i b u t i n g i n c r e a s e s in g o v e r n m e n t s p e n d i n g e v e n at t h e c o s t o f i n c u r r i n g a h i g h d e f i c i t . T h e h i s t o r i c a l pattern o f t r y i n g to g a i n m a x i m u m p o p u l a r s u p p o r t is s o d e e p l y e n g r a i n e d in the A N C that it w i l l h a v e g r e a t d i f f i c u l t y s h e d d i n g c e r t a i n g r o u p s to a v o i d d e f i c i t s p e n d i n g . H o w e v e r , f a i l u r e to c o n t r o l g o v e r n m e n t e x p e n d i t u r e s will h a v e d a m a g i n g e f f e c t s in t h e s h o r t a n d l o n g t e r m s . In t h e f i r s t f e w y e a r s a f t e r t h e t r a n s i t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y i f t h e e c o n o m y d o e s b e g i n to g r o w , the C o n g r e s s w i l l f a c e a s t a b i l i z a t i o n c r i s i s . D a m a g i n g d i s i n f l a t i o n a r y p o l i c i e s w i l l h a v e to b e a d o p t e d , w h i c h w i l l r e s u l t in l o w e r g r o w t h r a t e s . In a d d i t i o n , p o l i t i c i a n s w i l l b e l e s s t h a n a n x i o u s to r e m o v e S o u t h A f r i c a ' s h i g h l y

protectionist

trade r e g i m e a n d l i b e r a l i z e import c o n t r o l s , r e f o r m s that m u s t t a k e p l a c e i f t h e c o u n t r y is to b e c o m e m o r e e x p o r t o r i e n t e d . In the l o n g t e r m , f a i l u r e to c o n t r o l g o v e r n m e n t s p e n d i n g , e s p e c i a l l y on c o n s u m p t i o n , w i l l p r e v e n t the i n v e s t m e n t c r i s i s f r o m b e i n g a d d r e s s e d . T h e f a i l u r e to i n c r e a s e i n v e s t m e n t will not b e e v i d e n t f o r s e v e r a l y e a r s ; i n d e e d , high g o v e r n m e n t s p e n d i n g m a y m a k e it a p p e a r that the e c o n o m y is d o i n g w e l l . H o w e v e r , u n l e s s t h e r e is a m a s s i v e r e d i r e c t i o n o f s p e n d i n g f r o m c o n s u m p t i o n to i n v e s t m e n t , S o u t h A f r i c a will n e v e r b e a b l e to g e n e r a t e the res o u r c e s it n e e d s to g r o w a n d a d d r e s s the i n e q u a l i t i e s f o s t e r e d b y a p a r t h e i d . T h e o n l y w a y f o r t h e A N C to a d d r e s s its s t r u c t u r a l f i s c a l

problems

w i l l b e to m a k e s o m e b r u t a l c a l c u l a t i o n s r e g a r d i n g its c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . In p a r t i c u l a r , t h e A N C w i l l h a v e to d e t e r m i n e w h i c h g r o u p s it w a n t s to s u p p o r t a n d w h i c h g r o u p s it c a n a f f o r d to n e g l e c t in o r d e r to b r i n g t h e g o v e r n m e n t b u d g e t i n t o b a l a n c e . A l s o , it w i l l h a v e to c a l c u l a t e w h i c h g o v e r n m e n t p r o g r a m s t o f u n d in a m e a n i n g f u l m a n n e r a n d w h i c h o f t h e m a n y n e g l e c t e d s e r v i c e s in S o u t h A f r i c a w i l l h a v e to r e m a i n s o f o r a c o n s i d e r a b l e p e r i o d o f t i m e . T h e A N C ' s s t r u c t u r e as a v e r y b r o a d c h u r c h f r o n t i n g f o r a h o s t o f d i f f e r e n t c o n s t i t u e n c i e s is s i m p l y i n a p p r o p r i a t e f o r the f i s c a l s i t u a t i o n that it w i l l c o n f r o n t .

The Labor Unions and the ANC It is o n l y n a t u r a l t h a t a t t e n t i o n b e d e v o t e d m a i n l y t o t h e i n e q u a l i t i e s b e t w e e n w h i t e s a n d b l a c k s in S o u t h A f r i c a . H o w e v e r , t h e r e a r e a l s o s e v e r e e c o n o m i c and political inequalities within South A f r i c a ' s b l a c k population that w i l l h e l p s t r u c t u r e p o s t a p a r t h e i d p o l i t i c s a n d m a y h a v e c r i t i c a l i m p l i cations for the A N C

in p a r t i c u l a r .

Calculations

for

1990

reveal

that

A f r i c a n w a g e s in t h e ( p r i m a r i l y u r b a n ) m a n u f a c t u r i n g s e c t o r w e r e a p p r o x imately R 1 2 , 0 0 0

a n d in m i n i n g R 9 , 2 0 0 , w h i l e in t h e i n f o r m a l

sector

ECONOMIC CRISES & DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPERATIVE

39

operators earned an average profit of R4,800 and their employees received incomes of approximately R 2 , 7 0 0 annually. Worst off of those e m p l o y e d were laborers on f a r m s w h o earned R 2 , 4 0 0 and rural dwellers in the homelands w h o received R l , 4 0 0 each year. 4 2 It is estimated that 51.3 percent of the total w o r k i n g p o p u l a t i o n , or 8.4 million p e o p l e (almost all of them black), work in the informal sector or in subsistence agriculture. 4 3 Second, the African work force has b e c o m e more differentiated. Over the past fifteen years, there has been an increase in the number of professional, s e m i p r o f e s s i o n a l , clerical, technical, and n o n m a n u a l skilled j o b s outside of mining and agriculture. 4 4 While w h i t e s continued to d o m i n a t e the skilled sector, A f r i c a n s penetrated the semiskilled, technical, and nonmanual positions (increasing f r o m roughly 1 million to 2 million). T h o s e A f r i c a n s that had the skills to rise in the labor hierarchy as s o m e of the discriminatory practices dropped away b e n e f i t e d , while unskilled b l a c k s were faced with significant j o b losses. 4 5 U n e m p l o y m e n t increased significantly and many more people were forced into the informal sector. Finally, there are, even before the transition to nonracial rule, significant p o w e r a s y m m e t r i e s e m e r g i n g within the black population, primarily due to the power of black unions. Following the Wiehan Report in 1979, the g o v e r n m e n t r e c o g n i z e d unions with A f r i c a n m e m b e r s . Probably the most important reason f o r this recognition w a s the need, constantly stated by business, to ensure orderly collective b a r g a i n i n g . 4 6 As b u s i n e s s e s bec a m e m o r e d e p e n d e n t on skilled and s e m i s k i l l e d A f r i c a n labor, the old form of industrial relations whereby managers issued diktats to a floating g r o u p of nonskilled w o r k e r s ( w h o o f t e n r e s p o n d e d with wildcat strikes) b e c a m e unprofitable. B u s i n e s s e s f o u n d that they had to have reliable m e a n s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n with their increasingly skilled and p e r m a n e n t African workers. In turn, the legalization of the unions further aggravated the trend toward e m p l o y i n g small n u m b e r s of skilled A f r i c a n w o r k e r s w h i l e s h e d d i n g a greater n u m b e r of the unskilled. 4 7 T h e unions are partially responsible f o r the fact that real w a g e s have increased in recent years despite the recession, poor productivity g r o w t h , and rapidly rising unemployment.48 Ironically, the A f r i c a n unions, spawned by business, b e c a m e the most p o w e r f u l domestic opposition to the white g o v e r n m e n t in the 1980s. Unlike much of the rest of the opposition, they had no real fears of being declared illegal, had a well-defined and militant membership, and, due to foreign f u n d i n g , had durable administrative structures. Since 1990, while the A N C has floundered during the understandably difficult process of transf o r m i n g itself f r o m a guerrilla m o v e m e n t b a s e d in Lusaka to a political party b a s e d in South A f r i c a , the unions have g r o w n increasingly strong, led by the 1.2 m i l l i o n - m e m b e r C o n g r e s s of South A f r i c a n T r a d e Unions ( C O S A T U ) . 4 9 Indeed, South Africa has lost more days to strikes in the last

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five years than it did in the previous seventy-five. 5 " Karl von Holdt is undoubtedly correct to clai m that "it [ C O S A T U ] is the biggest and most powerful organization in the democratic movement." 5 1 Further, C O S A T U , along with the South African Communist Party, is formally in alliance with the A N C . Ramaphosa, the day-to-day leader of the A N C and the most likely successor to Mandela, was previously the head of the black miners union, the most powerful labor group in the country. While much can change quickly during the run-up to an election, it appears that C O S A T U will continue its ties with the A N C during South A f r i c a ' s first universal election and therefore be in an exceedingly strong position to at least influence labor- and wage-related issues. 52 However, COSATU and the other unions have made it clear that, unlike many other labor groupings in Africa, they will not join a future government and thereby become coopted. They are confident that "the labour movement is powerful enough to block any strategy of economic development that seeks to sideline or exclude organised workers." 5 3 C O S A T U has a place at the National Economic Forum, and Mboweni of the A N C has said that he expects that "the role of trade unions in e c o n o m i c policy formulation would increase in the f u t u r e and membership would continue to grow." 5 4 T h e asymmetry within the African w o r k f o r c e between the small n u m ber w h o are unionized and w o r k e r s (especially on f a r m s ) w h o are not m e m b e r s of unions, w h o are unemployed, or w h o work in the informal or subsistence sectors is striking. 5 5 T o aid those blacks w h o are not formally e m p l o y e d , South A f r i c a s h o u l d adopt a l o w - w a g e / h i g h - e m p l o y m e n t policy. However, C O S A T U has specifically rejected the idea of its m e m b e r s making sacrifices to increase e m p l o y m e n t . As Ebrahim Patel, C O S A T U ' s representative at the National E c o n o m i c F o r u m , argued, " A low w a g e strategy is not possible because the labour m o v e m e n t is too strong and w e will resist it. Then, too, a low w a g e strategy will not work in a relatively industrialized society." 5 6 As a result, especially in the context of unmet expectations due to fiscal limitations, a future government may be tempted to appease the unions by granting w a g e increases to civil servants and f a v o r ing organized labor more generally even if this means effectively discriminating, especially against unorganized A f r i c a n s in the informal sector of townships and in the distant rural areas. Such a policy would be potentially d a m a g i n g to the overall e c o n o m y ' s ability to create j o b s and its international competitiveness. South African productivity rates have not been impressive, and while there will be some immediate gains once politically inspired strikes end, it w o u l d be quite easy f o r the country to b e c o m e a high-wage e c o n o m y , if it is not one already. T h e dangers of a h i g h - w a g e e c o n o m y at this point in South A f r i c a ' s development can be easily o b s e r v e d by c o m p a r i n g it to the newly industrializing countries ( N I C s ) of East Asia. In these countries, w a g e s w e r e

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held artificially low f o r decades because of government repression, lack of unionization, and a shared willingness to m a k e s a c r i f i c e s b e c a u s e , especially in South Korea and T a i w a n , e c o n o m i c prosperity w a s tied to national security. T h e savings g e n e r a t e d f r o m not having to pay w a g e s appropriate to the level of d e v e l o p m e n t w e r e invested in the e c o n o m y and eventually led to very high growth rates. South A f r i c a aspires to the income levels that the NICs have achieved, but its high wages will prevent it from generating the necessary savings to f u n d investment. T h e unemployed and those w o r k i n g in subsistence agriculture and the informal sector will have only limited options in the f a c e of organized l a b o r ' s political power. C O S A T U has m a d e a series of largely rhetorical pledges that it seeks to ally itself with the unemployed and rural dwellers, but these claims can be dismissed rather easily. 5 7 T h e unions do not have the administrative structures for such alliances nor the political will, given the need to protect their own m e m b e r s during what will undoubtedly be difficult e c o n o m i c times to c o m e . T h e ability of the A N C itself to be a counter to the unions by directly representing the interests of nonunionized w o r k e r s and rural d w e l l e r s is also limited. Since they are already organized and relatively militant, workers will inevitably d e m a n d considerable attention f r o m the A N C itself. Further, the A N C has had difficulty in establishing a political infrastructure in the countryside that would enable it to transmit d e m a n d s from rural dwellers. In its 1986 c o n f e r e n c e at Kabwe, the Congress itself noted its relatively poor j o b in mobilizing A f r i c a n s in the homelands. 5 8 Not surprisingly, organization in the rural areas has been an extremely difficult task since legalization in 1990, and it has naturally been m u c h easier to establish party structures a m o n g s u p p o r t e r s in the urban areas. Many in South Africa, and some within the labor m o v e m e n t , have argued that the trade unions must adjust to the realities of the 1990s by bec o m i n g less militant. H o w e v e r , it is unclear if the leaders of the unions could deliver their m e m b e r s h i p if they agreed to a program that sacrificed wage d e m a n d s to help improve business viability and create more jobs for those w h o are now e c o n o m i c outsiders. Forged in the crucible of the liberation struggle, the unions have b e c o m e strong by constantly d e m a n d i n g more and by being f u s e d c o m m e r c i a l - p o l i t i c a l foci of opposition to "the white system." As South Africa moves through the transition, it is unclear if they can become more like traditional labor unions and c o m p r o m i s e . It is possible that, in the end, the need to create jobs will force a future A N C government to c o n f r o n t the trade unions and thereby shatter the alliance with C O S A T U . However, A N C leaders will be extremely reluctant to m a k e such a break, because if labor w e r e to f o r m its o w n political g r o u p i n g , it w o u l d undoubtedly take with it a s i g n i f i c a n t portion of the C o m m u n i s t Party and many m e m b e r s of the A N C . Further, a public

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conflict with labor might threaten the entire constituency structure of the A N C . O n c e t h e A N C is in p o w e r a n d t h e g l u e of o p p o s i t i o n to a p a r t h e i d c a n n o t h o l d its m a n y d i f f e r e n t c o n s t i t u e n c i e s t o g e t h e r , t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f a c r i t i c a l f a u l t line w i t h l a b o r m a y e n c o u r a g e all k i n d s of o t h e r g r o u p s c e n tered on ethnic, regional, or o c c u p a t i o n a l identities to d e m a n d greater concessions or threaten to leave.

Conclusion S i n c e F e b r u a r y 1 9 9 0 , t h e A N C h a s r e t h o u g h t m a n y of t h e e c o n o m i c p o l i c i e s t h a t it h a d p r e v i o u s l y a d v o c a t e d . H o w e v e r , it h a s n o t e v e n b e g u n t o e x a m i n e if its r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h its v a r i e d c o n s t i t u e n c i e s still m a k e s s e n s e given the e c o n o m i c c h a l l e n g e s f a c i n g the next South African g o v e r n m e n t . I n d e e d , it w o u l d p r o b a b l y b e u n r e a l i s t i c t o e x p e c t t h e A N C to m a k e t o u g h d e c i s i o n s a b o u t w h o s h o u l d b e its c o r e s u p p o r t e r s a n d w h o m i g h t b e s a c r i f i c e d in l i g h t of t o u g h e c o n o m i c r e a l i t i e s until a f t e r t h e f i r s t e l e c t i o n . H o w e v e r , at s o m e p o i n t t h e A N C m u s t m a k e t h i s d i f f i c u l t p o l i t i c a l c a l c u lation if it is to a v o i d a d e s t a b i l i z i n g f i s c a l c r i s i s a n d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f e x i s t i n g w o r k e r s w h o a r e a l r e a d y r e l a t i v e l y b e t t e r o f f d o i n g w e l l at t h e e x p e n s e of t h e m u c h l a r g e r b u t u n o r g a n i z e d g r o u p of A f r i c a n s in t h e i n f o r m a l s e c t o r , o n f a r m s , a n d in t h e r u r a l a r e a s . It is likely that s h e d d i n g s o m e c o n s t i t u e n c i e s a f t e r d e c a d e s of o p e r a t i n g a s a G r e a t C o a l i t i o n of all t h o s e w h o o p p o s e d a p a r t h e i d will be e v e n m o r e t r a u m a t i c for the A N C than the ren u n c i a t i o n of l o n g - c h e r i s h e d e c o n o m i c p o l i c i e s that h a s o c c u r r e d

since

1 9 9 0 . H o w e v e r , t h e A N C c a n n o t a f f o r d to b e all t h i n g s t o all p e o p l e .

Notes Research for this chapter w a s funded by a Fulbright scholarship. I am also grateful to Princeton University for its generous leave policy. 1. World Bank, World Development Report 1992 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1992), p. 219. 2. See generally Francis W i l s o n and Mamphela R a m p h e l e , Uprooting Poverty: The South African Challenge (Cape Town: David Philip, 1989), p. 18. 3. C o m m o n w e a l t h Expert G r o u p , Beyond Apartheid: Human Resources in a New South Africa (Cape T o w n : David Philip, 1991), pp. 7 - 8 ; Andrew Donaldson, "Financing Education," in Ronnie McGregor and Anne McGregor, eds., McGregor's Education Alternatives (Cape T o w n : Juta, 1992), p. 296. 4. Stephen Gelb, "South A f r i c a ' s E c o n o m i c Crisis," in Stephen Gelb, ed., South Africa's Economic Crisis (Cape T o w n : David Philip, 1991), p. 4. 5. Frankel, Max Pollak V i n d e r i n e , eds., Platform for Investment (Johannesburg: Frankel, Max Pollak Vinderine, 1992), p. 5. 6. Bob T u c k e r and Bruce R. Scott, South Africa: Prospects for Successful Transition (Cape T o w n : Juta, 1992), p. 70.

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I.Argus, October 31, 1992, p. 22. Some evidence suggests that in 1993 fixed investment will drop below the replacement rate and, for the first time since 1947, South A f r i c a ' s fixed capital stock will fall. Financial Mail, March 18, 1993, p. 35. 8. Tucker and Scott, South Africa, p. 80. 9. Brian Kahn, "Foreign E x c h a n g e Policy, Capital Flight, and E c o n o m i c G r o w t h , " in Iraj Abedian and Barry Standish, eds., Economic Growth in South Africa (Cape T o w n : Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 88. 10. Brian Kahn, Abdel Senhadji, and Michael Walton, "South Africa: Macroe c o n o m i c Issues for T r a n s i t i o n , " Informal Discussion Papers on Aspects of the Economy of South Africa No. 2 (1992), pp. 4 - 6 . 11. C. B. Strauss, "Education in South A f r i c a , " Standard Bank Economic Review, August 1990, p. 3. 12. T h e s e figures underestimate the problem because 22 percent of A f r i c a n s in tertiary education are in teachers' colleges, compared to only 4 percent of white students. SA Barometer 6 (November 1992), p. 92. 13. One survey suggested that 250,000 young whites, out of a total white population of 5 million, are considering leaving the country. Business Day, January 11, 1993, p. 1. 14. Interview, Cape Town, February 26, 1993. 15. Standard Bank, "Preconditions for Structural Adjustment in South A f r i c a , " Standard Bank Economic Review, August 1992, p. 1. 16. Loots's estimate of 3 percent annually for the first five postapartheid years seems reasonable. Lieb J. Loots, " B u d g e t i n g for Postapartheid South A f r i c a , " in Glen M o s s and Ingrid Obery, eds., South Africa Review 6 ( B r a a m f o n t e i n : Ravan Press, 1992), p. 471. 17. Mike Morris, " W h o ' s In, W h o ' s O u t , " Work in Progress, no. 87 (March 1993), p. 8. 18. Jeremy Cronin, "The Boat, the T a p and the Leipzig W a y , " African Communist, no. 130 (Third Quarter 1992), p. 41. 19. T h e de Klerk speech is reprinted in Robert Schrire, Adapt or Die: The End of White Politics in South Africa (New York: Ford Foundation, 1991). 20. Statistics in this paragraph are from Estian Calitz, "The Limits to Public Expenditures," in Graham Howe and Pieter le Roux, eds., Transforming the Economy: Policy Options for South Africa (Durban: Indicator South Africa, 1992), pp. 79-83. 21. Quoted in G. W. G. B r o w n e , " F i f t y Years of Public F i n a n c e , " South African Journal of Economics 51 (March 1983), p. 147. 22. Calculated f r o m South A f r i c a , Statistical Bulletin, no. 8 (1990), p. 7. T a x e s on the gold industry accounted for 19 percent of revenue in 1975 but only 2.7 percent in 1991. 23. Desmond Lachman and Kenneth Bercuson, Economic Policies for a New South Africa, IMF Occasional Paper No. 91 ( W a s h i n g t o n , D.C.: IMF, 1992), pp. 28-29. 24. A N C , "Discussion Document on Economic Policy," in Economy: Growth and Redistribution (Cape T o w n : IDASA, 1991), p. 11. 25. Servaas van der Berg, " R e d i r e c t i n g G o v e r n m e n t E x p e n d i t u r e , " in Peter Moll, Nicoli Nattrass, and Lieb Loots, eds., Redistribution: Can It Work in South Africa? (Cape T o w n : David Philip, 1991), p. 79 26. Lachman and Bercuson, Economic Policies, pp. 2 2 - 2 3 . 27. Poverty figures from Margie Keeton and Gavin Keeton, "Gearing U p for the Long Road: The Challenges of Poverty in South A f r i c a , " Optima 38 ( N o v e m -

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ber 1992), p. 129; and F r a n c i s W i l s o n , " P o v e r t y , the State and R e d i s t r i b u t i o n : S o m e R e f l e c t i o n s , " in Nicoli Nattrass and Elisabeth Ardington, eds., The Political Economy of South Africa ( C a p e T o w n : O x f o r d University Press, 1990), p. 235. 28. L a c h m a n and Bercuson, Economic Policies, p. 28. 29. Van der Berg, " R e d i r e c t i n g G o v e r n m e n t E x p e n d i t u r e , " p. 80. 30. L a c h m a n and B e r c u s o n , Economic Policies, p. 22. 31. L o o t s ' s estimate is 3 percent. See Loots, " B u d g e t i n g , " p. 4 7 4 . 32. Interview with T i t o M b o w e n i , J o h a n n e s b u r g , February 18, 1993. 33. Argus, February 4, 1993, p. 17. 34. Ronnie B e t h l e h e m , " D e b t T r a p T h r e a t e n s Future G o v e r n m e n t ' s Ability to Function," Business Day, January 6, 1993, p. 4. 35. Business Day, January 6, 1993. 36. T u c k e r and Scott, South Africa, p. 165. 37. Quoted in Argus, O c t o b e r 10, 1992, p. 4. 38. " T o Get Out of the M e s s W o n ' t Be E a s y , " Mayibuye, D e c e m b e r 1992, p. 22. 3 9 . T h e A N C e s t i m a t e s that it will receive r o u g h l y 50 percent of the v o t e based on 6 8 percent of all A f r i c a n s ' votes, 20 percent of c o l o u r e d s ' votes, 30 percent of Indians', and 3 percent of w h i t e s ' . H o w e v e r , there is a high degree of uncertainty c o n c e r n i n g turnout, especially a m o n g A f r i c a n s . Frankel, Max Pollak Vinderine, Platform for Investment, p. 44. 40. Sunday Argus, January 24, 1993, p. 18. 41. I have examined the d y n a m i c s of political survival in the face of e c o n o m i c f a i l u r e in The Politics of Reform in Ghana, 1982-1991 ( B e r k e l e y : U n i v e r s i t y of California Press, 1992). 4 2 . Peter G. Moll, " C o n c l u s i o n : W h a t R e d i s t r i b u t e s and W h a t D o e s n ' t , " in Moll, Nattrass, and Loots, Redistribution, p. 119. 43. U p f r o m 3 2 . 6 p e r c e n t of the p o p u l a t i o n ( 2 . 3 m i l l i o n ) in 1960. D. J. V i l j o e n , Labour and Employment in Southern Africa: A Regional Profile, 1980-1990 ( J o h a n n e s b u r g : D e v e l o p m e n t Bank of S o u t h e r n A f r i c a , 1990), p. E S I . Of c o u r s e , e s t i m a t e s for e m p l o y m e n t in the i n f o r m a l and s u b s i s t e n c e a g r i c u l t u r e sectors, as well as the n u m b e r u n e m p l o y e d , are little m o r e than g u e s s e s b e c a u s e of d i f f i c u l t i e s in m e a s u r e m e n t and the failure of g o v e r n m e n t statistical s e r v i c e s to gather information on the black labor force. 44. T h e n u m b e r of skilled w o r k e r s increased w h i l e the total n u m b e r of j o b s d e c r e a s e d due to technology, increases in w a g e s , and a desire by e m p l o y e r s to escape labor p r o b l e m s by using m o r e m a c h i n e s . 4 5 . D o u g H i n d s o n , " T h e R e s t r u c t u r i n g of L a b o u r M a r k e t s in S o u t h A f r i c a : 1970s,and 1980s," in Gelb, South Africa's Economic Crisis, pp. 2 3 0 - 2 3 4 . 46. See C o m m i s s i o n of Inquiry into Labour Legislation, Report, reprinted in The Complete Wiehahn Report ( J o h a n n e s b u r g : Lex Patria, 1982), p. 35. 47. Hindson, " L a b o u r M a r k e t s in South A f r i c a , " p. 234. 48. South A f r i c a n R e s e r v e B a n k , Annual Report 1992 (Pretoria: South A f r i c a R e s e r v e Bank, 1992), p. 19. 4 9 . T o t a l union m e m b e r s h i p s t a n d s at 3 million p e o p l e . Union m e m b e r s h i p has g r o w n by 11 percent a y e a r since 1980. A n d r e w Levy & A s s o c i a t e s , Annual Report on Labour Relations in South Africa, 1992-1993 (Rivonia: A n d r e w Levy & Associates, 1992), p. 3. 5 0 . D u n c a n Innes, " L a b o u r R e l a t i o n s in the 1 9 9 0 ' s , " in D u n c a n I n n e s , M a t t h e w Kentridge, and Helene Perold, eds., Power and Profit: Politics, Labour, and Business in South Africa ( C a p e T o w n : O x f o r d University Press, 1992), p. 184.

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5 1 . Karl v o n H o l d t , " W h a t Is the F u t u r e of L a b o u r ? " South African Labour Bulletin 16, no. 8 ( N o v e m b e r - D e c e m b e r 1992), p. 36. 52. See g e n e r a l l y J e r e m y B a s k i n , Striking Back: A History of COSATU (Joh a n n e s b u r g : R a v a n Press, 1991), p. 434. 53. Von Holdt, " F u t u r e of L a b o u r ? " p. 36. 54. Quoted in Business Day, January 27, 1993. 55. Estimate for u n i o n m e m b e r s h i p is f r o m A n d r e w Levy & A s s o c i a t e s , p. 3, and J e r e m y C r o n i n , " I s N e l s o n M a n d e l a for R e a l ? " Work in Progress, no. 87 ( M a r c h 1993), p. 16. 56. Quoted in " G o i n g in with C o n f i d e n c e , " South African Labour Bulletin 17, no. 1 ( J a n u a r y - F e b r u a r y , 1993), p. 27. 57. Indeed, C O S A T U ' s initial e f f o r t s to o r g a n i z e the u n e m p l o y e d to p r e v e n t them f r o m being used as scab labor failed badly. B a s k i n , Striking Back, p. 453. 58. See J e f f r e y Herbst, " P r o s p e c t s for R e v o l u t i o n in South A f r i c a , " Political Science Quarterly 103 ( W i n t e r 1 9 8 8 - 1 9 8 9 ) , pp. 6 6 5 - 6 8 6 .

4 At War with the Future? Black South African Youth in the 1990s Colin Bundy

Youth Activism and Youth Crisis When Nelson Mandela addressed a tumultuous crowd in Cape T o w n on the evening of his release from prison, he listed individuals, organizations, and groups that had sustained the struggle against apartheid. " I pay tribute," he said at one point, " t o the endless heroes o f youth. Y o u , the young lions. Y o u , the young lions, have energized our struggle." M a n d e l a ' s salute to the young lions—and the roar with which it was received—acknowledged a central and persistent feature o f South African politics over the past twenty years: the prominence o f student and youth activism. It echoed the recognition and rhetorical convention, during the m i d - 1 9 8 0 s , that " t h e youth" constituted not only a generational but a political category. " Y o u n g p e o p l e , " observed a b l a c k newspaper in April 1 9 8 6 , " h a v e experienced an unprecedented moral ascendancy. T h e y are known universally as 'the youth,' the legion of black teenagers who for the last two years have provided the shock troops o f a nationwide popular insurrection. This has been a children's war." 1 T h e hour o f "the youth" had struck a full decade before this comment was made. T h e B l a c k Consciousness movement o f the early 1 9 7 0 s was based mainly in c o l l e g e s and schools; the year-long youth revolt that began in S o w e t o in June 1 9 7 6 not only qualitatively transformed youth activism but also cracked the mold o f South African politics. Student protest became a mass phenomenon; school boycotts " b e c a m e ordinary features o f the political landscape in the towns and ghettoes: student organizations remained permanent fixtures at the forefront of political agitation." 2 47

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T h e s p a t e of school boycotts in 1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 1 was part of a wider process, a key element in the e m e r g e n c e of radicalized, localized communitybased protest in black townships. In 1979, the Congress of South African Students ( C O S A S ) w a s f o u n d e d , and it b e c a m e the most influential student activist organization that South Africa has known. C O S A S broke with Black C o n s c i o u s n e s s , adopted the F r e e d o m Charter, and b e c a m e one of the largest and most dynamic affiliates of the United D e m o c r a t i c Front. It explicitly sought to mobilize school students on the basis of popular front opposition to apartheid, and it w a s the driving force in the early 1980s behind the proliferation of youth congresses. T h e s e included s o m e students and some y o u n g w o r k e r s but also m e m b e r s of an embittered and volatile army of y o u n g unemployed; they " i n f u s e d a deeper, s o m e t i m e s more desperate militancy into student and c o m m u n i t y politics." 3 In 1984, C O S A S spearheaded protracted school boycotts and initiated a mass stay-away in the Transvaal, together with trade unions and civic associations. For two days, 300 schools were deserted by 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 students, and over half a million workers d o w n e d tools. T h e stay-away was assessed as o p e n i n g "a new phase in the history of protest against a p a r t h e i d " 4 — a phase of united, disciplined, and strategically planned m a s s action. But this phase w a s b e i n g o v e r t a k e n by another w h e n that j u d g m e n t was penned. Already in S e p t e m b e r 1984, townships in the southern Transvaal had erupted; and for the next two years the politics of o r g a n i z e d joint demonstrations was largely replaced by a turbulent politics of direct action and quasi-insurrectionary c o n f r o n t a t i o n . T h r o u g h o u t the 1 9 8 4 - 1 9 8 6 p e r i o d — u n t i l s u c c e s s i v e states of emergency imposed a shaky peace at g u n p o i n t — s t u d e n t and youth activism delivered a c o n s i d e r a b l e voltage to a highly c h a r g e d circuit of resistance. Many m e m b e r s of student and youth congresses became full-time activists. High school students were initially involved mainly in school boycotts, but their e n e r g i e s w e r e diversified in three main directions: participation in mass c a m p a i g n s , service in alternative structures, and participation in direct action and street c o m b a t . Student and youth activism in this period displayed a characteristic dualism. Intertwined with its strengths (intensity, e n e r g y , and creativity) were its shortcomings. Almost by definition, it lacked e x p e r i e n c e and sophistication; it tended to triumphalism or immediatism, anticipating imminent victory with little patience or strategic reality. T h u s , the period saw black y o u t h s attend and run " a l t e r n a t i v e e d u c a t i o n " c l a s s e s , build " p e o p l e ' s parks" on waste sites, patrol the streets in anticrime campaigns, and form the front line in " d e f e n s e c o m m i t t e e s . " It also saw action based on a profound m i s r e a d i n g of the balance of forces (typified in the b o y c o t t e r s ' call for "liberation before education"); it witnessed how rapidly youth politics could pass f r o m intensity to zealotry. " P e o p l e ' s c o u r t s " dominated by

BLACKYOUTH

49

youngsters veered from justice to vengeance; stay-aways and boycotts were sometimes enforced by intimidation; the term com-tsotsi accurately reflected social reality as lumpen elements became caught up in, or made cynical use of, inflammable social movements. 5 These aspects of youth activism began to win the attention of social scientists during the 1980s. Black youth politics stamped itself onto the academic agenda. In the last couple of years, however, a different set of concerns has begun to emerge. It is voiced in various ways but has become audible not only in the media and among academics, but also within black communities, within political movements, and in student and youth organizations themselves. The ruling class press and media often refer to a "lost generation," frequently and falsely explaining the crisis in black schooling as a consequence of the boycotts of the mid-1980s. In a similar vein, alarmist references are made to "Khmer Rouge teenagers" and "agents of anarchy." In a different register, left-wing journalists (writing in the educational supplement to the weekly New Nation) judge that black schools have been turned "into sites of despair and demoralisation," and that in student politics "on the ground active participation has collapsed." Senior officeholders in student organizations concurred. "The black student community is currently largely apolitical, demoralised and individualised," said Sipho Maseko, president of the Azanian Students Convention (AZASCO). The "real crisis" faced by students had created "a strong sense of demoralisation and frustration over the past two years," added Moeti Mpuru, national projects officer of the South African Students Congress (SASCO). 6 Political organizations are concerned about their ability to hold the loyalty of their youthful supporters—and there is mounting evidence that suggests that these anxieties are merited. The focus of attention, in short, has shifted to different aspects of a multifaceted "youth crisis." Members of "the youth" are variously portrayed as the victims or vectors of that crisis. There is growing awareness of the desperate state of black schooling, steepling rates of unemployment and crime, disintegrating family structures, and the threat of AIDS. These various symptoms are sometimes collated in a malaise described, somewhat inadequately, as "marginalized youth." This was the title of an important conference held in June 1991 under the auspices of the Joint Enrichment Project (JEP). 7 The JEP conference established overwhelmingly the severity, urgency, and complexity of the problems confronting young people in South Africa. The working group set up at its close has tried to ensure that the issues discussed at the conference remain on the political agenda of bodies like the African National Congress. It held follow-up workshops and sponsored a program of research; it created a network of regional youth development

50

SOUTH AFRICA

committees; and in June 1992, a National Youth Development Coordinating Committee was elected by delegates f r o m over eighty youth organizations. A second national JEP c o n f e r e n c e on youth (the National Youth Development C o n f e r e n c e ) was held in March 1993. Results of a m a j o r s u r v e y — t h e first s y s t e m a t i c attempt to quantify marginalized y o u t h — w e r e presented at the 1993 J E P gathering. T h e category comprised young people, aged between sixteen and thirty, w h o "see themselves as having little or no future, w h o are alienated f r o m their f a m ilies or j o b or school, w h o are out of touch with, or hostile to, the changes taking place in South Africa, w h o have been victims of abuse and/or violence, w h o have a poor self-image, or w h o are not involved in any organisation or structure." 8 The survey s a m p l e suggests that 2 , 9 0 0 , 0 0 0 people (of whom 2,500,000 are Africans) are already marginalized f r o m political, economic, and social processes. T h e JEP initiatives have identified the need for research into the size, location, nature, and regional incidence of marginalized youth and have already made important contributions toward those tasks. This chapter does not undertake such research; rather, it is an attempt to suggest something of the context in which those details must ultimately be grounded. T h e category " y o u t h " has t e n d e d to be c o n s t r u c t e d in two w a y s in South A f r i c a in recent years: J e r e m y S e e k i n g s has usefully d u b b e d these "liberatory" and "apocalyptic" stereotypes. 9 T h e first refers to militant, politically active y o u n g people: the Y o u n g Lions or, simply, the comrades. 1 0 This usage tended to assume, implicitly or explictly, that the majority of young people evinced similar political c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . " Second, the term " y o u t h " has been used as if it were more or less s y n o n y m o u s with what the JEP c o n f e r e n c e called "marginalized y o u t h , " characterizing young blacks as undisciplined, destructive, and d a n g e r o u s . Both uses are ideological. T h e f o r m e r defines youth according to a set of positive political characteristics; the latter essentially views youth as the vector of a c o m p e n d i u m of social ills and anxieties. This chapter does not f o c u s upon either of these versions of what constitutes "the y o u t h . " It is c o n c e r n e d , rather, with d r a w i n g attention m o r e broadly to the demographic and social salience of y o u n g people in South Africa at present, and to argue that there are specific pressures and problems that affect them. Kumi N a i d o o has complained, correctly, that much of the work on youth p r o d u c e d in the 1980s " i m p l i e d that youth constituted some kind of monolithic bloc"; and he w a r n e d that "failure to disaggregate the category led to unproductive generalisations." 1 2 Alas, much of what follows is open to similar objections, but that is the nature of the exercise. T h e f o l l o w i n g section identifies certain structural or objective f a c tors that s h a p e the e x p e r i e n c e of b e i n g y o u n g and black in South A f r i c a today; the section " V i o l e n c e and Youth C u l t u r e " s k e t c h e s s o m e of the

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BLACK YOUTH

s y m p t o m a t i c o r s u b j e c t i v e e x p r e s s i o n s o f that e x p e r i e n c e ; and the final section is a freehand sketch o f s o m e policy implications.

Structural Pressures Demographics S o m e a b s o l u t e l y b a s i c pressures are d e m o g r a p h i c in c h a r a c t e r .

South

A f r i c a is in a phase o f a c c e l e r a t e d population growth, with an annual increase o f about 2.5 percent a y e a r — w h i c h means that the total doubles in roughly thirty years (see T a b l e 4 . 1 ) . T h e rate o f increase is far more rapid in the b l a c k population than in the w h i t e . In 1 9 8 0 , the fertility rate o f African w o m e n was more than double that o f white w o m e n . 1 3

Table 4.1

Population Statistics and Projections

Year

Total population

1950 1960 1985 2000 2020

12,671,000 15,841,000 33,621,000 47,000,000 80,000,000

Source: Based on census figures and projections in South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) surveys.

It is not only the size o f the population but a l s o its shape that is significant. T h e d e m o g r a p h i c profile is typical o f a period o f rapid growth in that a very large proportion o f the population is youthful. South A f r i c a , in fact, has " a n e x t r e m e l y youthful population by world s t a n d a r d s . " 1 4 In South A f r i c a today, half the population is under the age o f twenty-one. In 1 9 9 0 , 4 2 percent o f Africans were in the age bracket 0 - 1 4 years; and fully two-thirds o f the African population were t w e n t y - s e v e n or younger. T h i s p h e n o m e n o n is e s p e c i a l l y p r o n o u n c e d w h e r e poverty is m o s t a c u t e — i n rural areas and in the Bantustans. There are also a number o f demographic indications that many children are being raised in f a m i l y units under c o n s i d e r a b l e pressure. T h e r e is " a very high rate o f family b r e a k d o w n " a m o n g the A f r i c a n population (and, a m o n g white South A f r i c a n s , " o n e o f the highest d i v o r c e rates in the w o r l d " ) . 1 5 T h e r e are extremely high rates o f teenage pregnancy, o f illegitimacy, and o f female-headed households. 1 6 S u r v e y s a m o n g young A f r i c a n s show that teenage pregnancy is the most frequently cited problem.

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SOUTH AFRICA

Political considerations entirely aside, these demographic realities guarantee that in the foreseeable future there will be very large numbers of children and young adults experiencing a wide range of wants and deprivations. They ensure a continuing e n o r m o u s pressure on educational resources. They make highly likely the persistence of youth unrest, and they underline the importance of the directions taken by youth culture. S. Burman is surely correct in her conclusion: "At present, any examination of current political developments and influences in South Africa must include children as an active and visible force." Under any government, the probability is that schools will continue to be both "laboratories and fortresses of resistance, providing raw political education to the pupils passing through them." 1 7 Economics The second and equally obvious set of structural pressures on young people is economic. In the 1970s, South Africa entered a period of economic recession. In the 1980s, crucially, South African capitalism did not share in the recovery evinced by the most industrialized and many of the newly industrializing economies. This is confirmed by a glance at the figures in Table 4.2. The all-too-familiar symptoms of slowed growth, falling investment, rising unemployment, and chronic inflation persisted—compounded by an international credit squeeze and balance of payments and exchange rate pressures.

Table 4.2 Annual Growth Rate of Gross Domestic Product Period

Average Annual Growth (%)

1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989

5.9 3.1 1.3

Source: B. Godsell and J. Buys, "Growth and Poverty," in Robert Schrire, ed., Wealth or Poverty? Critical Choices for South Africa (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 640.

The economic factor with the most direct implications for youth marginalization is u n e m p l o y m e n t . Unemployment statistics in South Africa are notoriously imprecise, but a recent considered estimate is that formal unemployment has risen f r o m about 22 percent in 1970 to 30 percent in 1980 to 40 percent by 1989. While the total of people out of work expands, the number of available j o b s shrinks. G o v e r n m e n t statistics c o n f i r m that between 1984 and

BLACK YOUTH

53

1987 there w a s a fall of 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 jobs in mining, construction, manufacturing, electricity, transport, and the postal services. In Durban, heart of the second largest industrial region in the country, the labor force contracted by 20 percent between 1982 and 1984. In October 1991, the Development Bank of South Africa a n n o u n c e d staggering figures: over the previous five years, only 12.5 percent of nearly 400,000 people entering the j o b market had found e m p l o y m e n t . T h e c o m p a r a b l e rate in the early 1960s w a s 89 percent; in the early 1970s it w a s 49 percent."* T h e great majority of these new j o b seekers are, of course, school leavers. U n e m p l o y m e n t is a mass phenomenon in South Africa but is visited with particular ferocity on the age bracket 1 6 - 3 0 . It is estimated that up to 90 percent of the unemployed may be under the age of thirty and that 95 percent of first-time work seekers in the 1990s will be under the age of t w e n t y - f i v e . A financial journalist concluded: " S o a more accurate n a m e for the u n e m p l o y m e n t crisis is the youth u n e m p l o y m e n t crisis." 1 9 (Findings published in March 1993 paint a picture less bleak in some respects. T h e Educational Policy Unit at the University of the Witwatersrand traced some 1,200 individuals w h o had matriculated in 1984 and in 1988. O v e r two-thirds of the 1984 class w e r e either in wage e m p l o y m e n t or studying; for the 1988 school leavers, only 36 percent of the males and 23 percent of the females had found work. Crucially, however, this study dealt only with the small minority of African school children who completed matriculation [the certificate obtained on successful completion of the final year of high school]. In 1984, only 9 percent of children w h o had enrolled in primary school had stayed within the system until the end of high school.) 2 0 T h e crisis in black schooling has been long in the making. It is rooted most directly in the system k n o w n as Bantu E d u c a t i o n , introduced in 1 9 5 5 — a l t h o u g h educational segregation is m u c h o l d e r than that. T h e Bantu Education Act of 1953 allowed for direct state control over A f r i c a n e d u c a t i o n , and its f r a m e r s s p e c i f i e d that the content of such e d u c a t i o n should be in accordance with the subordinate status of A f r i c a n s in South African society. H. F. Verwoerd (then minister of Bantu affairs, and later prime minister), piloting the bill through parliament forty years ago, w a s brutally f r a n k : N a t i v e e d u c a t i o n s h o u l d b e c o n t r o l l e d in s u c h a w a y that it s h o u l d b e in a c c o r d w i t h the p o l i c y o f the s t a t e . . . . If the n a t i v e in S o u t h A f r i c a t o d a y . . . is b e i n g t a u g h t t o e x p e c t that h e w i l l l i v e h i s a d u l t l i f e u n d e r a p o l icy o f e q u a l rights, h e is m a k i n g a b i g m i s t a k e . . . . T h e r e is n o p l a c e f o r h i m in t h e E u r o p e a n c o m m u n i t y a b o v e the l e v e l o f c e r t a i n f o r m s o f labour.

Bantu Education p r o v i d e s f o r rigid educational s e g r e g a t i o n . A f r i c a n children are taught in s e p a r a t e schools, with t e x t b o o k s and syllabi

54

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designed for use in those schools, by teachers trained in separate institutions. Although spending on black education has increased substantially in recent years, it still lags well behind per capita expenditure on white children and has done little to remedy the physical backlog. High schools in African townships and in B a n t u s t a n s have all the features one would expect f r o m an educational system starved of f u n d s : dilapidated buildings, c r o w d e d c l a s s r o o m s , i n a d e q u a t e e q u i p m e n t , high student:teacher ratios, and u n d e r q u a l i f i e d teachers. T h e r e is a d i s m a y i n g l y high dropout rate. Only 5 percent of African children w h o enter the school system m a k e it to matriculation. Sixty percent do not complete primary school. T w e n t y - f i v e percent of all dropouts are Grade I pupils. An already dismal situation was transformed in scale during the 1970s and 1980s. For the first time, high school education for A f r i c a n s b e c a m e a mass p h e n o m e n o n , the problems were multiplied, and pressure on existing resources grew worse (see Table 4.3).

Table 4.3 The Expansion of African Education in South Africa Year

Total at School

High School

Matriculation

1950 1960 1970 1975 1980 1984 1987 1991

779,534 1,506,034 2,741,087 3,486,261 3,532,233 5,547,467 6,644,859 8,100,510

23,316 48,600 122,489 318,565 577,584 1,000,249 1,474,333 2,208,480

449 717 2,938 9,009 31,071 86,873 157,274 280,918

Source:

Based on SAIRR surveys.

T h e education crisis deepened during the mid-1980s and has taken on new d i m e n s i o n s in the last few years. Politicized black school s t u d e n t s d e m o n s t r a t e d their rejection of the system by boycotting their s c h o o l s in the 1980s; about 30 percent of all African schools were boycotted and the g o v e r n m e n t closed about 9 0 percent of these for v a r y i n g periods. H u n dreds of t h o u s a n d s of scholars simply dropped out of school. M a n y w h o stayed or returned received patchy, disrupted, deteriorating schooling. Increasingly, there is r e f e r e n c e a m o n g educationists of how the "culture of learning" is being eroded in African schools. "Simply put, this means that students and teachers alike have lost all faith in the system." 2 1 T h e education crisis m a n i f e s t s itself in d i f f e r e n t s y m p t o m s and at various levels of intensity in d i f f e r e n t regions. S o m e vivid insights of how thoroughly destabilized black schooling has become in some areas are

BLACK YOUTH

55

p r o v i d e d in a survey of 2 4 4 m a t r i c u l a t i o n (final year) A f r i c a n high school s t u d e n t s in n i n e Natal and K w a Z u l u s c h o o l s . Most of the s t u d e n t s had entered high school in 1985 or 1 9 8 6 — a t the time, that is, " w h e n the v i o l e n c e in Natal a s s u m e d w a r p r o p o r t i o n s . " A c t u a l v i o l e n c e , or the threat of viol e n c e , p e r m e a t e s the s c h o o l e x p e r i e n c e . It a f f e c t s travel to a n d f r o m s c h o o l , f o r c e s the u n s c h e d u l e d c l o s u r e of s c h o o l s , leads to the c o l l a p s e of c o m m i t m e n t a n d motivation on the part of the s t u d e n t s , a n d permits the inc r e a s i n g p e n e t r a t i o n of the s c h o o l y a r d and c l a s s r o o m s by c r i m i n a l gangs.22

Urbanization T h e d e m o g r a p h i c , e c o n o m i c , and e d u c a t i o n a l f e a t u r e s j u s t o u t l i n e d will be increasingly c o n c e n t r a t e d in the cities. T h i s may s e e m a truism, but in the context of apartheid history it is e x t r e m e l y s i g n i f i c a n t . Central to a p a r t h e i d w a s a s y s t e m of c o n t r o l s o v e r labor, mobility, and residential rights. T h i s w a s i n t e n d e d to k e e p the p e r m a n e n t l y u r b a n i z e d black proletariat as small as p o s s i b l e , f o r c i b l y c o m p e l l e d h u g e n u m b e r s of p e o p l e to reside in the B a n t u s t a n s , a n d p e r p e t u a t e d the s y s t e m of o s c i l l a t i n g , l o w - w a g e m i g r a n t labor. In the m i d - 1 9 8 0 s , the m a c h i n e r y of urban i n f l u x c o n t r o l s and pass laws w a s a b r u p t l y s c r a p p e d . E c o n o m i c decay and p o p u l a r d e f i a n c e of the restrictions e x a c t e d this important policy reversal. In the 1990s, the c o l l a p s e of influx control and the p r e s s u r e of p o v e r t y in rural a r e a s m a k e s p e l l - m e l l u r b a n i z a t i o n i n e v i t a b l e . P e o p l e will p o u r into cities e v e n while u n e m p l o y m e n t rises and r e s o u r c e s s h r i n k . M u c h of the new u r b a n i z a t i o n will take the s h a p e of " i n f o r m a l s e t t l e m e n t " or squatting. A l r e a d y , an e s t i m a t e d 7 million p e o p l e live in s q u a t t e r c o m m u n i t i e s up a n d d o w n the c o u n t r y . T h e d e m a n d s e x e r t e d by this p r o c e s s f o r h o u s ing, health c a r e , e d u c a t i o n , f o o d , a n d e m p l o y m e n t will be intense. A very high p r o p o r t i o n of the new urban p o p u l a t i o n will be y o u t h f u l . S p e c i f i c a l l y urban a s p e c t s of youth c u l t u r e — l i k e c r i m i n a l g a n g s a n d street c h i l d r e n — will reach n e w levels. O n e of the central f a c t s of rapid u r b a n i z a t i o n is that it will n o l o n g e r be p o s s i b l e , as it w a s u n d e r high a p a r t h e i d , to e x p o r t une m p l o y e d y o u t h to the B a n t u s t a n s a n d to m a r g i n a l i z e t h e m g e o g r a p h i c a l l y .

Societal

Violence

P e r h a p s the S o u t h A f r i c a n p h e n o m e n o n most w i d e l y r e p o r t e d in the international m e d i a over the last d e c a d e has b e e n m o u n t i n g political v i o l e n c e . T h e m o s t c u r s o r y recital of s o m e of its f o r m s c o n v e y s h o w f a m i l i a r they b e c a m e : g u e r r i l l a a t t a c k s ; a c t i o n s by p o l i c e a n d a r m y t r o o p s a g a i n s t p r o t e s t o r s ; the rise of local v i g i l a n t e s ; d e s t a b i l i z a t i o n t a c t i c s t h r o u g h o u t the r e g i o n ; the civil w a r in Natal a n d its e x t e n s i o n to the t o w n s h i p s of the

56

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W i t w a t e r s r a n d , with the horrors o f mass attacks upon squatter c a m p s and m i g r a n t h o s t e l s ; c a r n a g e on trains and b u s e s ; and the g r i m l o g i c o f v e n g e a n c e and retribution. Y e t any discussion o f v i o l e n c e that c o n c e n t r a t e d solely on these f o r m s or that i s o l a t e d the last ten y e a r s as the field o f study w o u l d b e seriously d e f i c i e n t . A s an important study o f the " e p i d e m i o l o g y and c u l t u r e o f viol e n c e " r e m i n d s us, S o u t h A f r i c a n s o c i e t y is p e r m e a t e d by v i o l e n c e . Political v i o l e n c e " i s o n l y a s m a l l part o f the o v e r a l l p i c t u r e , " w r i t e S h u l a M a r k s and Neil A n d e r s s o n , and must be s e e n as " b u t o n e o f the many f o r m s and v a r i e t i e s o f e n d e m i c v i o l e n c e . " A p a r t h e i d m a d e i n d u s t r i a l i z a tion in S o u t h A f r i c a a particularly violent and t r a u m a t i c p r o c e s s . T h e e x plicit repression o f recent y e a r s c o m e s o n top o f o t h e r f o r m s o f v i o l e n c e w h i c h a r e no l e s s d e v a s t a t i n g and p e r n i c i o u s . T h e c o u n t e r p a r t o f the state v i o l e n c e is the c o n t i n u e d v i o l e n c e o f u n n e c e s s a r y d e a t h , d i s e a s e , d e g r a d a t i o n and d i s a b i l i t y i m p o s e d b y t h e r a c i a l l y s t r u c t u r e d i n e q u a l i t i e s and h u m i l i a t i o n s o f t h e a p a r t h e i d s y s t e m . . . . It is as u b i q u i t o u s as the i m p e r i o u s attitude a d o p t e d e a c h day by w h i t e s t o w a r d s b l a c k s , in the streets and s h o p s , f a c t o r i e s and f a r m s o f S o u t h A f r i c a ; and it is a s q u a n t i f i a b l e as the s t a t i s t i c s o f v i o l e n t death and social dislocation.-3

S o u t h A f r i c a has e x t r e m e l y high rates o f j u d i c i a l e x e c u t i o n s , a l c o h o l and drug a d d i c t i o n , m o t o r v e h i c l e and industrial a c c i d e n t s , s u i c i d e , h o m i c i d e , and f a m i l y m u r d e r s . B e t w e e n O c t o b e r 1 9 8 9 and F e b r u a r y

1991,

3 , 2 0 0 p e o p l e died in " u n r e s t " k i l l i n g s ; barely r e m a r k e d in the s a m e period w e r e 2 6 , 3 0 0 r e c o r d e d m u r d e r s . S o u t h A f r i c a has the highest k n o w n i n c i d e n c e o f rape in the world ( 2 million w o m e n have b e e n raped s i n c e 1 9 8 4 ; s t a t i s t i c a l l y , o n e o f e v e r y t w o w o m e n is likely to b e raped in her l i f e t i m e ) . T h e c o m m o n f a c t o r b e t w e e n c r i m i n a l v i o l e n c e and p o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e is that b l a c k youths " f e a t u r e prominently as both the perpetrators and v i c t i m s o f the v i o l e n c e . " 2 4 It is against this s o m b e r b a c k d r o p that political v i o l e n c e b e c a m e m o r e v i s i b l e and m o r e i n t e n s e in the 1 9 8 0 s , with m a s s - b a s e d p o l i t i c a l protest and h e i g h t e n e d state r e p r e s s i o n its most o b v i o u s i n d i c e s . Y o u n g p e o p l e p l a y e d a c e n t r a l part in the w a v e s o f protest that e b b e d and f l o w e d b e t w e e n 1 9 7 6 and 1 9 8 9 . C o l l a t e d o f f i c i a l f i g u r e s s h o w that f o r the p e r i o d f r o m 1 9 8 4 to 1 9 8 6 , 3 0 0 c h i l d r e n were killed, 1 , 0 0 0 w o u n d e d , 1 1 , 0 0 0 d e tained without trial, 1 8 , 0 0 0 arrested on protest c h a r g e s , and 1 7 3 , 0 0 0 held a w a i t i n g trial in p o l i c e c e l l s . " T o these grim f i g u r e s s h o u l d b e added t h o s e o f tens o f thousands o f c h i l d r e n w h o have e x p e r i e n c e d deaths in the f a m ily . . . d e t e n t i o n s o f f a m i l y m e m b e r s , b e i n g on the run f r o m a u t h o r i t i e s , and n u m e r o u s f o r m s o f i n t i m i d a t i o n . " 2 5 T h e toll o f d e a t h s and i n j u r i e s through political v i o l e n c e has i n c r e a s e d s i n c e F e b r u a r y 1 9 9 0 . B e f o r e then,

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it was primarily an overt conflict between the regime and the forces of liberation. Now, political violence takes a n u m b e r of tangled and intractable f o r m s between various antagonists with a range of motives. T h e most distinctive feature of contemporary political violence is that for the most part it takes the form of attacks by impoverished working-class A f r i c a n s upon other impoverished working-class Africans. In part, this stems f r o m the intensification of political competition b e t w e e n the A N C and Inkatha; in part, it stems f r o m die-hard elements within the security and intelligence forces who have an intrinsic interest in internecine black violence. T h e following section tries to assess some of the c o n s e q u e n c e s of the intensification of political and criminal violence in the 1980s and early 1990s.

Violence and Youth Culture A number of commentators have posited as a direct consequence of intensified violence in the 1980s the "brutalization" of y o u n g South A f r i c a n s , or their "internalization" of violence. T h e central point m a d e is that violence generates violence, that v i o l e n c e is a learned r e s p o n s e . Levels of "socialized violence" a m o n g children and youth appear to have increased during the 1980s as parental, school, and other institutional controls were weakened or swept aside. Society became simultaneously more violent and more polarized; and political behavior echoed this. Fierce activism was acc o m p a n i e d by shallow understanding. Its practitioners often inhabited a political landscape shaped by simplistic absolutes and perverted morality, w h e r e people were killed b e c a u s e they w o r e the w r o n g color T-shirt or walked on the w r o n g side of a boundary road. Children w h o witnessed or initiated acts of violence developed a range of psychological and p s y c h o s o m a t i c disorders. T h e p s y c h o l o g i s t Saths C o o p e r noted that there was "very little n o r m a l i t y " in the lives of politicized children. There was, he added, "a very short gap between being the victim of brutality and beginning to c o m m i t it o n e ' s self. Distinctions between right and w r o n g , killing and not killing, a t t a c k i n g a n d d e f e n d i n g , b e c o m e blurred. . . . Personalities begin to f r a c t u r e . " 2 6 In O c t o b e r 1986, the South African Institute of Clinical Psychology w a r n e d of a generation of maladjusted children. 2 7 Even very y o u n g children internalized violence. G a m e s played by toddlers involved Casspirs, A K - 4 7 s , a m b u s h e s , and f u nerals. Frank Chikane wrote in 1986: Life in the townships seems to have changed irrevocably. A township resident said, "When my two-year old daughter sees a military vehicle passing, she looks for a stone." Nursery school children are no exception. They too have learned the language of siyanyova [we will destroy]. 2X

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Recently, these emphases—analytical and a n e c d o t a l — h a v e been challenged by Gill Straker. Her work is based upon lengthy interviews with sixty y o u t h f u l activists f r o m Leandra t o w n s h i p w h o fled their h o m e s in 1986 and w h o s e subsequent experiences were explored in 1989. She distinguishes between "leaders" (the most resilient individuals in the group); " f o l l o w e r s " ( w h o did not b e c o m e antisocial or dysfunctional as a result of their exposure to violence); and "casualties" (about 20 percent of the sample, w h o s h o w e d clinical signs of depression a n d anxiety). She f i n d s , in sum, "little e v i d e n c e of the L e a n d r a youth h a v i n g b e c o m e a brutalised generation in the sense that their capacity for e m p a t h y and guilt . . . had been i m p a i r e d . " Equally, there w a s little to indicate that they w o u l d engage in indiscriminate violence, "although there w a s much to indicate that violence w o u l d be their response to particular sets of c i r c u m s t a n c e s . " 2 9 Similarly, an attitudinal survey f o c u s i n g on leisure activities and p r e f e r ences of "ordinary urban and peri-urban youth" also emphasizes that many youth "still express a positive attitude and remain receptive to opportunities" and rejects the "lost generation" stereotype.- 10 T h e most detailed attempt to gauge s u b j e c t i v e responses to v i o l e n c e and u n e m p l o y m e n t s u g g e s t e d that a quarter of all y o u n g South A f r i c a n s were "fully engaged with society" and needed no interventions on their behalf; that 4 3 percent of the s a m p l e were "at risk," showing some signs of alienation; that over a quarter (27 percent) were already marginalized; and that 5 percent (or just over half a million young people) were " l o s t " — t h a t is, ejected by society, with no hope for the f u t u r e and frequently involved in criminality and/or violence. 3 1 T h e same report proposed three " s y n d r o m e s " of marginalization. Antagonists are " m o r e politically alienated, racially antagonistic and hostile to the older generation"; outsiders, typically f r o m broken families, are alienated f r o m school or the work environment or are u n e m p l o y e d , have a poor s e l f - i m a g e , and are often f o u n d in squatter settlements; victims have suffered a b u s e or have had wide e x p o sure to political violence. 3 2 Each of these studies warns against blanket generalizations, and they provide w a y s of differentiating y o u n g people and their needs. At the s a m e time, certain sorts of violent behavior involving mainly young people appear to be increasing. T h e intensification of criminal youth gangs has been widely noted—graphically by Glenn Frankel in the Washington Post, w h o wrote that many youngsters " a r e c o m i n g of a g e into a society that o f f e r s no jobs and no hope." One result, he continues, is a new generation of gangs like S o w e t o ' s "Zebra Force," w h o s e leaders have boasted that they plan to rape every woman in the township under 26. They can be seen on the dusty streets of Soweto—angry young men in Nelson Mandela T-shirts. They move in packs, some brandishing

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w e a p o n s , s t a l k i n g their o w n c o m m u n i t i e s with the s a m e p a s s i o n their p r e d e c e s s o r s used to e x p e n d on battling white soldiers and p o l i c e . 3 3

Another symptom in 1992 was the extent to which violence had spilled over into schoolyards and classrooms. South Africa's school year begins at the end of January. The Weekly Mail reported in February 1992 that pupil power has taken over as frustrated youths turn on their teachers in the T r a n s v a a l t o w n s h i p s . T h e D e p a r t m e n t of E d u c a t i o n said this w e e k it could not g u a r a n t e e the s a f e t y of w h i t e t e a c h e r s a f t e r a lecturer w a s set alight in his c l a s s r o o m . T h e i n c i d e n t f o l l o w e d a w e e k of v i o l e n c e in w h i c h white staff w e r e t h r e a t e n e d by a r m e d youths . . . inspectors w e r e chased f r o m the premises and black teachers were taken hostage. T h o u s a n d s of pupils refused entrance to o v e r c r o w d e d s c h o o l s are r o a m i n g the s t r e e t s — w h i l e , in s o m e , p u p i l s h a v e taken control of a d m i s s i o n s . . . . Each year the crisis d e e p e n s as failure rates soar. Pupils have lost all faith in the s y s t e m . T e a c h e r s , the most i m m e d i a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of a u t h o r ity, are o f t e n the butt of their a n g e r . 3 4

A year later, further school protests in Soweto were characterized by City Press as schoolchildren "on the rampage," and the writer deplored the "common knowledge" that in township schools children "call[ed] the shots." 35 Indeed, during 1993, not only the black media but also political leaders grew increasingly edgy about the disruptive capacity of marginalized youth. Peter Mokaba, president of the A N C Youth League, warned that youth, once in the forefront of the struggle, "have become spectators, Codesa watchers, and are disillusioned by the political process." 3 6 Further ground for concern by political organizations is provided by the survey carried out for JEP, which indicated that the proportions of "lost" and "marginalized" youth are appreciably higher in political organizations than in the sample as a whole. 3 7 One of the most eloquent editorial pronouncements on the topic, which captured the realities of commitment and its costs, was written by Percy Qoboza, editor of City Press, in April 1986. If it is true that a p e o p l e ' s wealth is its children, then South A f r i c a is bitterly, tragically poor. If it is true that a n a t i o n ' s f u t u r e is its children, w e h a v e no f u t u r e , and d e s e r v e none. . . . [ W e ] are a nation at w a r with its f u t u r e . . . . For w e have turned our children into a generation of fighters, b a t t l e - h a r d e n e d soldiers w h o will n e v e r k n o w the c a r e f r e e j o y of c h i l d h o o d . What we are w i t n e s s i n g is the growth of a generation w h i c h has the c o u r a g e to reject the c o w a r d i c e of its parents . . . to fight for w h a t should be theirs, by right of birth. T h e r e is a dark, terrible b e a u t y in that c o u r a g e . It is also a s o u r c e of great p r i d e — p r i d e that w e , w h o have lived under apartheid, can p r o d u c e children w h o r e f u s e to d o so. But it is also

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a source of great shame . . . that [this] is our heritage to our children: The knowledge of how to die, and how to kill. 38 T h e s e chilling w o r d s w e r e written at the height of repression, during the state of e m e r g e n c y . South A f r i c a n s have g r o u n d s for hope now that were not available then. It is easier now to think in the future tense than it was then. But the process of negotiations and the prospects of transition should not be allowed to occlude the realities of brutalization a m o n g the youth. Nor should expectations of a new political dispensation obscure for a moment the grave social and structural pressures that threaten further to alienate and marginalize huge numbers of y o u n g people in the years ahead.

Policy Implications T h e question of what policy r e s p o n s e s are appropriate and possible demands a chapter of its own. Here, very briefly, it may be useful simply to identify s o m e of the more o b v i o u s areas that must e n g a g e p o l i c y m a k e r s and to pose the issue as a political challenge. First, there is an acute need for imaginative and effective welfare programs that deal directly with s o m e of the e f f e c t s of youth marginalization. It will be necessary to target such p r o g r a m s accurately: to distinguish, for example, between the very different needs of school dropouts with no literacy or numeracy; those who c o m p l e t e d primary schooling only and possess r u d i m e n t a r y educational skills; and those w h o d r o p p e d out during high school or failed to pass the matriculation examinations. Second, an area of priority is the transformation of South A f r i c a ' s educational system. It is not merely that more resources will have to be directed to education, nor that the present proliferation of racially distinct education systems must be replaced by a unitary, nonracial school system. T h e s e are necessary but not sufficient responses to the crisis. There is also the massive problem of inherited b a c k l o g , especially in the level and nature of teacher training; there are unresolved debates as to the balance between a c a d e m i c and technical training needed for the twenty-first century; and at every step there is the question of how to ensure equality of access to s c h o o l i n g in a society so p r o f o u n d l y unequal as South A f r i c a i s — a n d will continue to be, even after the abolition of statutory apartheid. T h e other area that virtually d e f i n e s itself as a priority is j o b creation. Attention is being paid to ways in which c o m m u n i t y organizations, small e m p l o y e r s , large e m p l o y e r s , trade unions, f u n d i n g agencies, and f o r e i g n aid can play their part. But structural u n e m p l o y m e n t is of such a scale that analysts are increasingly looking at e x a m p l e s of j o b creation on a m a s s scale by g o v e r n m e n t s . T h e r e has been a rediscovery of some of the N e w

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D e a l e x p e r i m e n t s of t h e 1 9 3 0 s , e s p e c i a l l y t h e W o r k s P r o g r e s s A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , a n d a d v o c a c y of p r o g r a m s t h a t w o u l d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y c r e a t e e m ployment and build schools, roads, and other infrastructural requirements. S t r i k i n g l y , this a p p r o a c h h a s b e e n s u p p o r t e d , o n t h e o n e h a n d , by a d v i s ers to i n s t i t u t i o n s of f i n a n c e c a p i t a l a n d , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , by l e f t - w i n g r e s e a r c h e r s a t t a c h e d to t h e b l a c k t r a d e u n i o n s . 3 9 P e r h a p s the m a i n t h r u s t of t h e J E P c o n f e r e n c e in M a r c h 1 9 9 3 w a s to call f o r a n a t i o n a l l y d r i v e n y o u t h d e v e l o p m e n t p o l i c y . T h e c o n f e r e n c e e n d o r s e d the c r e a t i o n of a N a t i o n a l Y o u t h D e v e l o p m e n t F o r u m ( N Y D F ) , a b r o a d l y b a s e d b o d y i n t e n d e d to " e n s u r e the i n t e g r a t i o n of y o u t h as a key interest g r o u p " in n a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g . T h e c o n f e r e n c e c a l l e d on t h e n e w N Y D F to i m p l e m e n t a t w o - p r o n g e d s t r a t e g y . It c a l l e d f o r a s p e c i f i c p r o g r a m of i n t e r v e n t i o n s t o a d d r e s s p r o b l e m s c o n f r o n t e d by y o u t h in f i e l d s like e d u c a t i o n , h e a l t h , e m p l o y m e n t , a n d s o o n ; but it a l s o e n v i s a g e d a l o n g - t e r m f o r m u l a t i o n of p o l i c i e s n e c e s s a r y to e n a b l e a n d e m p o w e r y o u t h in the l o n g e r t e r m . F r e q u e n t l y , h o w e v e r , s u c h p o l i c y p r o p o s a l s a r e p i t c h e d in a t e c h n o cratic a n d o d d l y a p o l i t i c a l r e g i s t e r . C a l l s f o r " t r a i n i n g " and " j o b c r e a t i o n " or f o r c o m b a t i n g d r u g s , g a n g s t e r i s m , a n d v i o l e n c e o f t e n fail to c o n s i d e r the i d e n t i t y , c a p a c i t y , a n d c o n s c i o u s n e s s of y o u n g p e o p l e t h e m s e l v e s . T h e y t e n d to b e s e e n as p o l i c i e s that w i l l b e i m p l e m e n t e d on b e h a l f of s c h o o l c h i l d r e n , s c h o o l l e a v e r s , and y o u n g a d u l t s . T h e y d o not ask i n s t e a d how such groups can be e m p o w e r e d , how youngsters can d e v e l o p confid e n c e a n d a s e n s e of s e l f - w o r t h , n o r h o w the e n e r g i e s a n d d y n a m i s m of youth can b e h a r n e s s e d to p r o g r a m s of r e b u i l d i n g . ( T h e J E P s t r a t e g i c p r o p o s a l s are l a r g e l y — b u t not e n t i r e l y — e x e m p t f r o m this c r i t i c i s m . ) In p a r t i c u l a r , the p o l i t i c a l q u e s t i o n n e e d s t o be p u t . W h a t lead m i g h t be g i v e n by politically a c t i v e y o u n g s t e r s ? T o ask this is not to fall into t h e e r r o r of a s s u m i n g that all or m o s t of t h o s e in t h e i r t e e n s or early t w e n t i e s will be p o l i t i c a l l y a c t i v e . S e e k i n g s a n d o t h e r s h a v e p u n c t u r e d t h i s m y t h , by s h o w i n g that a l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n of y o u n g b l a c k p e o p l e a r e p o l i t i c a l l y i n a c t i v e o r i n c u r i o u s , a n d a n i m a t e d b y a w i d e r a n g e of o t h e r c o n c e r n s a n d i n t e r e s t s . 4 0 E v e n so, b y c o m p a r a t i v e s t a n d a r d s h i g h l e v e l s o f d y n a m i s m , p a r t i c i p a t i o n , a n d s o c i a l p u r p o s e w e r e a c h i e v e d in c o m m u n i t y - b a s e d o r g a n i z a t i o n s in S o u t h A f r i c a in t h e 1 9 8 0 s . L a r g e s e c t o r s of t h e y o u t h w e r e p o l i t i c i z e d . S i m i l a r l e v e l s of " m o b i l i z a t i o n f o r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n " will h a v e to b e a c h i e v e d in the 1 9 9 0 s if p o l i t i c a l p r o g r a m s a d d r e s s i n g t h e p r o b l e m s c o n f r o n t i n g y o u n g p e o p l e a r e to h a v e a c h a n c e of s u c c e e d i n g . For m a n y y o u n g b l a c k S o u t h A f r i c a n s — l i k e t h o s e S t r a k e r i n t e r v i e w e d in L e a n d r a — t h e p o l i t i c s of n e g o t i a t i o n s h a s b e e n a d i s i l l u s i o n i n g e x p e r i e n c e . T h e y feel s i d e l i n e d , m a r g i n a l i z e d , a n d d e m o b i l i z e d . T h e y f e e l " t h a t t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n at t h e f o r e f r o n t of t h e s t r u g g l e w a s b e i n g u n d e r v a l u e d , that they w e r e not s u f f i c i e n t l y r e c o g n i s e d as p a r t n e r s in t h e n e g o t i a t i n g

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p r o c e s s . " 4 1 T h e A N C Y o u t h L e a g u e h a s not r e c r u i t e d m e m b e r s in a n y t h i n g l i k e t h e n u m b e r s t h a t j o i n e d t h e y o u t h c o n g r e s s e s in t h e l a t e 1 9 8 0 s ; f o r s o m e t h e f o r m a t i o n of t h e L e a g u e w a s " a d u l l , s l o w p r o c e s s , w h i c h h a s f a i l e d t o c a p t u r e t h e m o o d a n d i m a g i n a t i o n of t h e y o u t h . " 4 2 T h e a r t i c u l a t e and engaged spokespersons for the National Youth D e v e l o p m e n t Coordin a t i n g C o m m i t t e e w a r n t h a t y o u t h s h o u l d b e a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a n t s in p o l i c y m a k i n g and negotiations and not b e " f u r t h e r m a r g i n a l i z e d by b e i n g c o n verted into tokens and r u b b e r - s t a m p s . " 4 3 T h e challenge c o n f r o n t i n g the A N C a n d o t h e r p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s s h o u l d b e s e e n a s o n e of r e m o b i l i z i n g its y o u t h f u l c o n s t i t u e n c y a n d o f t u r n i n g " s p e c t a t o r s , C o d e s a - w a t c h ers" into activists. W h e n p o s t a p a r t h e i d e l e c t i o n s a r e h e l d , f u l l y half o f t h e p r o j e c t e d e l e c t o r a t e o f 21 m i l l i o n w i l l b e v o t e r s u n d e r t h e a g e of t h i r t y . A b o u t o n e - t h i r d of t h e p o t e n t i a l v o t e r s w i l l b e u n d e r t h e a g e of t w e n t y - f i v e . H o w s u c c e s s f u l l y t h e n e w g o v e r n m e n t c o n t e n d s w i t h t h e d a u n t i n g a g e n d a a w a i t i n g it w i l l d e p e n d in l a r g e m e a s u r e o n h o w s u c c e s s f u l l y it r e c o g n i z e s a n d r e s p o n d s to t h e p r o b l e m s t h a t c o n f r o n t y o u n g S o u t h A f r i c a n s o n a m a s s scale. Y o u n g people must be taken seriously—which means

enrolling

t h e m f o r c h a n g e a n d n o t m e r e l y c o n t r o l l i n g t h e m — i f S o u t h A f r i c a is t o b e c o m e a n a t i o n at p e a c e w i t h its f u t u r e .

Notes This chapter is a revised and expanded version of my "Introduction" in D. Everatt and E. Sisulu, eds., Black Youth in Crisis: Facing the Future (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1992), pp. 1-9. 1. City Press, April 20, 1986, quoted in S. Johnson, "'The Soldiers of Luthuli': Youth in the Politics of Resistance in South Africa," in S. Johnson, ed., South Africa: No Turning Back (London: Macmillan, 1988), p. 94. 2. M. Murray, South Africa: Time of Agony, Time of Destiny (London: Verso, 1987), p. 246. 3. L. Chisholm, "From Revolt to a Search for Alternatives," Work in Progress 42 (1986), pp. 14-19. 4. Labour Monitoring Group, "Report: The November Stayaway," South African Labour Bulletin 10, no. 6 (May 1985), pp. 7 4 - 1 0 0 . 5. The phrase com-tsotsi combines the widely used appellation "comrade" with tsotsi, or "youthful gangster." A sensitive study of how youthful intolerance and violence affected a "people's court" is W. Scharf and B. Ngcokoto, "Images of Justice in the People's Courts of Cape Town, 1985-7: From Prefigurative Justice to Populist Violence," in N. C. Manganyi and A. du Toit, eds., Political Violence and the Struggle in South Africa (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 3 4 1 - 3 7 2 . 6. Between October and December 1991, "Learning Nation" ran a six-part series on educational issues. The quotations here are from "Education Issues 3: Results and Prospects," New Nation, November 8 - 1 4 , 1991; and "Education Issues 6: Organisation Then and Now," New Nation, November 2 9 - D e c e m b e r 5, 1991.

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7. T h e J E P w a s established in 1986 by the Southern A f r i c a n Council of Churches and the South African Catholic B i s h o p s C o n f e r e n c e as part of a church initiative "to address the problems of young people roaming the streets as a result of the dislocation of the normal school process and lack of employment prospects." Some of the papers presented at the J E P c o n f e r e n c e are collected in Everatt and Sisulu, Black Youth in Crisis. 8. 'Growing up Tough': A National Survey of South African Youth, designed and analyzed for the J E P by D. Everatt and M. Orkin of the C o m m u n i t y Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE) (presented at National Youth Development Conference, Broederstroom, March 1993). The survey is based on a sample of 2,200 people, interviewed for up to one and a quarter hours each. 9. J. Seekings, Heroes or Villains? Youth Politics in the 1980s (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1993), pp. 2 - 1 0 . 10. For a sensitive account of the ideological and cultural matrix of the comrades, see A. Sitas, "The Making of the C o m r a d e s M o v e m e n t in Natal 1 9 8 5 - 9 1 , " Journal of Southern African Studies 18, no. 3 (September 1992), pp. 6 2 9 - 6 4 1 . 11. For example, G. Straker, Faces in the Revolution: The Psychological Effects of Violence on Township Youth in South Africa (Cape T o w n : David Philip, 1992), p. 19: " A m o n g the youth it was the majority w h o participated in the eruptions [of 1984-1986]. The youngster w h o did not participate . . . was the exception rather than the rule." 12. K. Naidoo, "The Politics of Youth Resistance in the 1980s: T h e Dilemmas of a Differentiated D u r b a n , " Journal of Southern African Studies, 18, no. 1 (1992), pp. 144-145. See also Seekings, Heroes or Villains? pp. 1 - 2 , 9 9 - 1 0 1 . 13. C. Simkins, "Household Composition and Structure in South Africa," in S. Burman and P. Reynolds, eds., Growing Up in a Divided Society: The Context of Childhood in South Africa (Evanston, 111: N o r t h w e s t e r n University Press, 1986), pp. 2 8 - 2 9 . 14. Population Trends, published for the Urban Foundation ( J o h a n n e s b u r g , 1990), p. 13. 15. S. Burman and R. Fuchs, "When Families Split: Custody and Divorce in South Africa," in Burman and Reynolds, Growing Up in a Divided Society, pp. 119, 116. 16. Simkins, " H o u s e h o l d Composition and S t r u c t u r e , " pp. 32, 3 6 - 3 7 ; E. Preston-Whyte and J. Louw, "The End of C h i l d h o o d : An Anthropological Vignette," in Burman and Reynolds, Growing Up in a Divided Society, pp. 3 6 1 - 3 6 2 . 17. S. B u r m a n , " T h e Contexts of C h i l d h o o d in South A f r i c a : An Introduction," in Burman and Reynolds, Growing Up in a Divided Society, p. 4; Johnson, "Soldiers of Luthuli," p. 96. 18. A. A. Ligthelm and L. Kritzinger-Van Niekerk, " U n e m p l o y m e n t : The Role of thé Public Sector in Increasing the Labour Absorption C a p a c i t y of the South African E c o n o m y , " Development Southern Africa 7, no. 4 (November 1990); quoted in R. Riordan, "Marginilised Youth and U n e m p l o y m e n t , " in Everatt and Sisulu, Black Youth in Crisis, pp. 7 5 - 7 6 . 19. R. R u m n e y , " B r i n g Back R o o s e v e l t to Give the J o b l e s s J o b s , " Weekly Mail, January 1 7 - 2 3 , 1992, p. 17. 20. These findings were reported in "All Is Not L o s t . . . for S o m e Youths," in Review Education, supplement to Weekly Mail, March 1 2 - 1 8 , 1993. 21. New Nation, "Education Issues 3: Results and P r o s p e c t s , " N o v e m b e r 8-14,1991. 22. Blade N z i m a n d e and Sandile Thusi, Children of War: The Impact of Political Violence on Schooling in Natal (Education Policy Unit, University of Natal,

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1991). The quotation is from p. 26. For a slightly earlier but similar study, see John Gultig and M. Hart, ' " T h e World Is Full of B l o o d ' : Youth, Schooling and Conflict in Pietermaritzburg, 1 9 8 7 - 1 9 8 9 , " Perspectives in Education 11 (1990). 23. Shula Marks and Neil Andersson, "The Epidemiology and Culture of Violence," in Manganyi and du Toit, Political Violence, pp. 30, 32. 24. Steve Mokwena, " L i v i n g on the Wrong Side of the Law: Marginalisation, Youth and Violence," in Everatt and Sisulu, Black Youth in Crisis, pp. 3 0 - 3 1 . 25. L. Swartz and Ann Levett, "Political Oppression and Children in South Africa," in Manganyi and du Toit, Political Violence, p. 265. 26. Quoted in Johnson, "Soldiers of Luthuli," p. 120. Cf. A. T h o m a s , " V i o lence and Child Detainees," in B. McKendrick and W. H o f f m a n , People and Violence in South Africa (Cape T o w n : Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 460: "Children, brutalized by physical and institutionalized violence have often, as a means of survival, resorted to violence themselves. In this process they are in danger of losing all sense of right and w r o n g . " 27. Quoted in Straker, Faces in the Revolution, p. 2. 28. F. Chikane, " C h i l d r e n in Turmoil: The E f f e c t s of Unrest on T o w n s h i p Children," in Burman and Reynolds, Growing Up in a Divided Society, p. 343. 29. Straker, Faces in the Revolution, p. 105. 30. V. Moller, R. Richards, and T. Mthembu, "In Search of a New Morality," Indicator South Africa 9, no. 1 ( S u m m e r 1991), pp. 6 5 - 6 7 ; V. Moller, Lost Generation Found: Black Youth at Leisure, Indicator South Africa Issue Focus (Durban: Centre for Social and Development Studies, University of Natal, 1991), esp. pp. 6, 5 4 - 5 5 , 57. 31. Growing Up Tough, survey for JEP conference, pp. 3 4 - 3 5 . The degree of marginalization was calculated on the basis of a series of indices or "dimensions of c o n c e r n " : these included e x p e r i e n c e of abuse; family disintegration; gang m e m bership and recidivism; attitudes toward the future and other races; s e l f - e s t e e m , etc. 32. Ibid., p. 39. 33. "Murderous Interregnum in South Africa," Guardian Weekly, week ending February 2, 1992. And cf. M o k w e n a , "Living on the W r o n g Side of the Law," pp. 39-41. 34. Weekly Mail, January 3 1 - F e b r u a r y 6, 1992. 35. Quoted in the Cape Times, February 24, 1993. 36. Cape Times, February 26, 1993. 37. Growing Up Tough, survey for 1993 JEP conference, p. 38. 38. Quoted in Johnson, "Soldiers of Luthuli," p. 130. 39. Rumney, "Bring Back Roosevelt." 40. Seekings, Heroes or Villains? pp. 16-19, 9 8 - 9 9 . 41. Straker, Faces in the Revolution, p. 134. 42. Seekings, Heroes or Villains? pp. 8 9 - 9 0 . 43. "Presentation by the National Youth Development Coordinating Committee to the [JEP] National Youth Development C o n f e r e n c e , " March 1993, p. 9.

5 Local Negotiations in South Africa I. William Zartman

B

eneath the headline-catching maneuvering o f the South African parties through national-level negotiations and regime change lie myriad local, limited, and lesser negotiations that lead, pace, contest, and support the larger process. 1 Local negotiations are little stitches holding together small pieces o f the larger fabric o f civil society. T h e y may head in the same direction as the larger regime-change negotiations, producing a harmonious and supportive political structure; or they may run at cross-purposes, in many directions, leaving snags and gaps and structures o f incoherence. T h e two levels interact with and affect each other, struggling for harmony and dominance. T h e pace and nature o f national negotiations have constantly influenced the outcome o f local negotiations; the reverse effect is in the longer run.

Beyond the fate of South Africa itself, local negotiations pose important theoretical issues. One set of issues enters the state-society debate, at a crucial point in a nation's history. The relation between the two levels of negotiation has a powerful role in determining the nature of state-society relations and indeed of the state itself. In South Africa, as in other states newly achieving control of their destinies, society is taking over state and defining it, but not in a vacuum. Like society, the state already exists, a heritage from the previous regime, and it too is fighting to impose itself on its society. This does not refer to the white struggle for dominance over blacks; that is a separate struggle, between parts of society (or societies) over the control of the state. Rather, there is both a level and a pattern of behaviors that are seeking to impose themselves on society. Local negotiations pit local representatives o f society—essentially black citizens' and workers' groups—against local representatives of the state—usually provincial authorities; but they also pit

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the national protostate level of society—mainly the African National Congress—against the local representatives—mainly the civic organizations (civics). Thus, the local and national branches of society have their own competing agendas, fighting over autonomy versus control, respectively, as well as over the specific issue at hand. In previous notable cases—soviets in the Russian Revolution, comités de salut publique in the French—the state won. One may hypothesize the same outcome in South Africa, but the game is not up and the struggle itself has important consequences, whatever the result. Another set of issues revolves around the concept of power. Local negotiations in South Africa in the early 1990s are asymmetrical, and therefore run against the basic assumption of equality underlying either the nature of the negotiation process or at least its successful occurrence. 2 How do negotiations take place under conditions of extreme asymmetry? What is the relation between negotiation and power generation? An intuitive hypothesis might be that negotiations await power generation, since power is needed to negotiate and equal power is an o p t i m u m condition. But might the process of negotiation itself also create power? T h e subject of grassroots political organization and e m p o w e r m e n t is one that has attracted the attention of both a c a d e m i c s and activists. It responds to the deepest attachments of democratic ideals, where the people t h e m s e l v e s practice their o w n g o v e r n a n c e , u n i m p e d e d by the c o n f l i c t i n g interests and personal vulnerabilities of representative g o v e r n m e n t . Aristotle's praxis and R o u s s e a u ' s paradoxes centered around direct democracy, without resolving many of its p r o b l e m s . H o w e v e r , w h e n the additional complication of a revolutionary situation is added, where local democracy faces an alien s t a t e — a s in anticolonial m o v e m e n t s , racial and n e i g h b o r hood revolts, and classical revolutions—the drama of unequal power adds a new dimension to the debate over democracy. This study is based on research conducted in Johannesburg, Pretoria, Pietermaritzburg, Durban, Port Elizabeth, G r a h a m s t o w n , Cape T o w n , and their environs throughout July and August 1990 and revised in August 1992. 3 It aggregates the findings f r o m analysis of s o m e two dozen local negotiations, about which the following questions were asked: What is the power relation of the parties? What efforts are made by the weaker to overcome asymmetry? What is the relation between negotiation and the generation of power? What is the relation between the local negotiations and national negotiations on the same subject area, or national negotiations in general? What is the impact of local negotiations on the evolving nature of state and society?

Cases of Local Negotiations Local negotiations can be divided into four categories: community (housing and services), labor, education, and security. It is significant that it w a s

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hard to find negotiations over education; its time had not yet come. There were also fewer negotiations—especially successful ones—in the security field, although, while intercommunal strife has worsened, more cases—including successes—have occurred since the National Peace Accord of September 15, 1991. It should be emphasized that not all negotiations have been successful; the best that can be said about some of them is that they have not ended. Still, even these contain lessons about the general practice and patterns of local negotiations. Not all of the cases studied are reported below, but only those that bring some broader insights or are typical of a larger number. The vignettes presented here are necessarily inconclusive and ongoing, not completed experiments but illustrative examples. Community Among community negotiations, the best-known and most significant is negotiation on the Soweto rent dispute.4 Beginning in 1986, inhabitants of Soweto (South West township, near Johannesburg) refused to pay rent for inadequate services and housing that they had used for decades and were prohibited from owning. It took two years for the possibility of negotiation between the Soweto People's Delegation (SPD) and the white state's Transvaal Provincial Authority (TPA) to emerge, during which time the SPD built its organization and support and the two sides tested their strength. Evictions were blocked by organized crowds, confiscated furniture was replaced, and further occupation was barred. Any drastic retaliation by the TPA, such as service cutoffs or mass evictions, would provoke a reaction so massive as to render it impossible. The clincher came in October 1988, when the popularly rejected elections for the township council brought in the Sofasonke Party (SP), a populist organization that supported the boycott; the point is not that the SP was an alternative to the SPD but rather that even the official attempt at an alternative supported the boycott. In April 1989, the consulting firm PlanAct suggested a five-point platform to the SPD for its negotiations with the TPA: (1) write off service and rent arrears, (2) transfer housing stock to residents, (3) upgrade services, (4) assess an affordable service charge, and (5) create a single tax base combining the white cities and their dependent black townships. SPD also insisted on a number of other far-reaching principles: (a) electricity supplies must be integrated, so as to adhere to the single tax base requirement; (b) the Soweto Township Council must be excluded from service determinations; (c) a new electric utility must be established, with community participation; and (d) fundings for services should come as grants from national, regional, city, or private sources, not as loans from the TPA. At the same time, in a useful diversion, Eskom, the state electrical utility company, proposed an independent electrical utility for Soweto to be run by the township; the talks collapsed, largely over the relations

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between the local talks and national authorities, but in the process, the S P D learned a lot about the electricity business. On October 2, 1989, the S P D and T P A resumed negotiations on the basis of the five points; talks were again interrupted throughout January by the S P D to protest the existence of a separate d e v e l o p m e n t c o m m i t t e e within T P A that m a d e decisions f o r the body. When talks resumed, on January 27, the T P A had run out of m o n e y , and the g o v e r n m e n t , r e f u s i n g any f u r t h e r b r i d g i n g aid, issued a July 31 deadline f o r the end of n o n p a y m e n t s , later e x t e n d e d by a month by President de Klerk. Over the summer, the T P A tried for some interim agreement, which the A N C vetoed. Finally, at the end of the deadline period, the two parties a s k e d for a three-week period to reach an agreement with their parent organizations, which w a s achieved in principle in S e p t e m b e r 1990 with the acceptance of the five points. In June 1993, the decade-long rent boycott ended and Soweto was integrated under the Johannesburg and Roodepoort city councils, o p e n i n g it to all city services and eliminating the t o w n s h i p councils. T h e S P D was s u c c e e d e d by a monitoring forum c o m p o s e d of all black political parties. Although the initial a g r e e m e n t w a s only to study the implications of the f i v e principles, it had constitutional s i g n i f i c a n c e . A s a result of the S P D rejection of the township council, the central government repealed the Black Local Authorities Act of 1982, whereas the creation of new service utilities with c o n s u m e r participation b e c a m e an a g e n d a item d e m a n d for national constitutional negotiations. Since 1990, negotiations have broadened to the J o h a n n e s b u r g metropolitan chamber, w h e r e the municipality, the S P D , the T P A , and others work out the allocation of services for the greater Johannesburg metropolitan area; while the results do not have the force of law, they are closely f o l l o w e d by the g o v e r n m e n t and will be enacted when adopted by the c h a m b e r . By 1992, at least one metropolitan area, Kimberley in the Transvaal, had already held its own elections for an all-municipal council. T h e negotiations t h e m s e l v e s also had p o w e r s i g n i f i c a n c e . T h e S P D had been able to build up its local support and technical competence, impose unbearable costs on the T P A , and win some side contests along the w a y . T h e state w a s caught b e t w e e n t w o cost c r u n c h e s — t h e high cost of providing services without payments and the threatened cost of civil unrest in the event of service c u t o f f s — a n d w a s a prisoner of its c o m m i t m e n t to negotiate. That gave S P D the p o w e r to r e f u s e to a g r e e , and so keep the issue alive for p u r p o s e s of m o b i l i z a t i o n . T h e civic a s s o c i a t i o n had also been able to block or coopt all other alternatives to itself and its program at a time when the g o v e r n m e n t needed to show its w i l l i n g n e s s to resolve problems by negotiation, and it has consolidated and demonstrated its popular support and organizational ability. All of these e l e m e n t s provided power to the civic.

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A much lesser case involved the Salt River community hall in Cape Town. The health and amenities committee of the Cape Town City Council (CTCC) planned to close the hall in 1988 because it was losing money; community organizations opposed the move. Some forty civics were involved, in various states of organization and rivalry, many of which would not join in the same meeting with others. A further complication that arose in many cases was a difference in political culture and experience between the two sides. The city council was an expeditious and businesslike body, controlled by the Democratic Party, whereas the civics needed time to confirm their organization, elect their spokespersons, develop a consensus, legitimize their positions, and overcome their sense of suspicion and inferiority vis-a-vis the city council. Following conciliation by a CTCC community relations specialist, the CTCC halted its plans and sought a meeting with the civics, which was finally achieved in July 1990, two years later. The civics challenged the council's reasons for closing, showed a need and use for the hall, established a need for upgrading, and made proposals. A joint working group of civics and the council was established to plan upgrading and then the establishment of a day-care center; in the process, extravagant demands of the civics were confronted with budgetary realities and pared down to realizable programs. The result was not only a compromise of positions based on common interests, but also an education process for both parties. The city council learned to consult with affected populations through their ad hoc civic organizations; the community learned to organize and to present its views. In the process, both learned to develop a negotiation culture that gave legitimacy and understanding to the negotiations going on at the national level. Although the Salt River dispute involved a relatively minor and specific issue, the process by which the authority agreed to consult the affected population and the civics agreed to meet with the authority was one that gradually came to characterize other larger issues, such as the decisions of the South African Committee on Sports on the use of the Greenpoint Stadium in 1989 or the response of the CTCC to the Thornhill Commission report on local governance in 1990. At Hout Bay squatters sites, south of Cape Town, nearby white residents were disturbed in 1990 by the encroaching settlements of 2 , 0 0 0 3,000 squatters. In a new pattern of events, the Cape Provincial Authority (CPA) convened a meeting of both sides, in the presence of the Urban Foundation and, in exchange for a promise to freeze further influx, promised limited sites and services elsewhere, combining state land and private funds in a new approach. Again, the difference in styles and situations was used tactically: to a quick plea to accept the offer because of local residents' pressures, the squatters responded with an agreement to a lengthy study of the proposal because of other settlements' pressures

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against setting a harmful precedent. Because the state wanted to avoid a festering and eventually conflictual situation that would endanger private properties, the squatters' strength was found in their opponents' weakness. The result is close to "normal politics" or "petition politics," in which citizens petition their government for redress of grievances. The shadow of the future also hangs over the evolving pattern, since it gives impetus to national negotiations—to "normal politics" on the national level—while at the same time setting precedents for a new, presumably ANC government that will be hard to bear. In Zwela Themba, the township of 25,000 near Worcester (100,000) in the western Cape Province, representatives of the township and appointed administrators from the city met regularly in 1990 in the presence of lawyers and city planners called in by the squatters. The township's Committee of 7 refused to cooperate in the meetings (which it had called for in the first place) until services were provided for the squatter settlements. It further demanded agreement on the principle of a single jurisdiction for the combined city and township, and rejected a development plan for Zwela Themba because it was treated separately from Worcester, although it accepted partial development measures. On the side of the coloured community in Worcester, two competing civics had arisen, one ANC-dominated and one autonomous. When the community sought to join the township in support of the proposal, it was told to unite its civics first. The Cape Town-based Center on Inter-Group Studies of Hendrick van der Merwe proposed its services and helped consolidate the coloured group, then set up workshops for the three racial groups. The process was then in turn handed over to the Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa of Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert for further workshops in democratic elections, in view of electing an all-municipal council. In mid-1992, however, the civics halted the process for fear that further progress would undermine the legitimacy of civic organizations in other municipal areas that had not been elected, making them vulnerable to a government challenge to the solidity of their mandate. Commitment by local authorities to a process of dialogue on limited matters gave the powerless a platform from which to demand greater concessions, using the authorities' willingness to dialogue as a lever. But in its success and its attempt to take constitutional matters into its own hands, the same process ran up against national-level politics and attempts to control. In Hillside, near Fort Beaufort in the eastern Cape, where 1,000 residents had title deeds to their land from 1858 but no water, schools, electricity, or health facilities, the municipality refused any responsibility for upgrading but instead harassed the settlement in order to gain the land. The Hillside Residents' Association (HRA) refused to join another township on the other side of town in general negotiations with Fort Beaufort

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since it would be overshadowed by its partner, but it was also split internally between haves and have-nots. Like so many others, their only power seems to be found in their nuisance. At Phola Park, a squatter settlement at Thokosa, a Johannesburg township, events over three years and still running show the breakdown of promising local negotiations and agreements triggered by state interference. Because of proximity to a white residential area, the TPA tried in 1990 to move Phola Park squatters to an area provided with sites and services 8 kilometers away. The provincial authorities imposed the duty of removing the squatters on the local authorities, thus further weakening their legitimacy. The squatters had no organization, only a new grassroots Residents' Committee that was without experience and split between Pan African Congress (PAC) and United Democratic Front (UDF) sympathizers. The Thokosa township council applied to the courts for summary removal, and the Phola Park Residents' Committee also went to court; the court sent in a mediator but the effort fell through, overtaken by problems with the police over the local hostel for migrant bachelor workers. In September 1991, Phola Park accepted the National Peace Accord (discussed below) and joined in an agreement with the police to establish an advisory center, where the police would check in before entering the settlement. The agreement was crowned by a R25 million grant for housing development from the Independent Development Trust, a private philanthropic fund. The agreement worked for the last three months of 1991. Then the police officers were changed and, one day, the police declared that the agreement was off; it was politically not acceptable to Pretoria that the police have to give notice to enter the settlement. In reaction, a "selfdefense unit" of thugs and criminals staged a "military coup," took over the advisory center, and ousted the Residents' Committee. A thousand police from the Internal Stability Units then surrounded Phola Park, set up four entry points, and checked for weapons. The self-defense unit was disarmed, but the Residents' Committee was also discredited because the people suspected collaboration with the police. By the end of the year, all alternatives for effective governance in the settlement—township council, civic, warlords, police—had been exhausted. Development (the IDT grant) was suspended. A mediator was needed that was acceptable to the parties, but the job required building structures, legitimacy, receptivity, and skills into the parties as well as mediating—a formidable task. In many cases, including some already discussed, the parties were too inexperienced and too hostile to be able to proceed to negotiations on their own, a situation not uncommon in international as well as domestic affairs. A third party was needed to act as a catalyst and produce the necessary negotiations. Institutional mediators have arisen rapidly in the current context, brought together for the most part under the Independent Mediation

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Service of South A f r i c a ( I M S S A ) of Charles Nupen; in its first eight years of operations since its f o u n d i n g in 1983, I M S S A ' s activities rose to over 6 0 0 mediations and nearly 4 5 0 arbitrations. T h e functions of the mediator in South Africa are classic and universal: establish meeting procedures, fully air grievances, ensure p a r t i e s ' representativity, open c o m m u n i c a tions, f o c u s on problems and solutions, and engage parties to d e f e n d and d e v e l o p a stake in their joint decisions. 5 With or without mediation, these and other cases of c o m m u n i t y negotiations show how civics used their entrenched position a n d the authorities' obligation to resolve conflicts with minimum disturbance by negotiation to generate power through organization and obduracy. Inexperience, internal divisions, uncertainty, slowness, and lack of i n f o r m a t i o n were their greatest weaknesses. But their badgering and organizing activism, in a situation where they could no longer be ignored or eliminated, gave them power to the point where they impinged on the national actors and agenda.

Security Security negotiations concern the politico-ethnic relations b e t w e e n followers of the A f r i c a n National Congress and the Inkatha F r e e d o m Party. T h e conflict arises over positioning by the parties for a place at the ongoing national negotiations, but it exists in different f o r m s at four different levels. While solutions exist at any level, they cannot take hold unless ratified at other levels, and yet a solution at one level is not a solution to the f o r m that the c o n f l i c t takes at another level. T h i s poses a c h a l l e n g e that no local negotiations have been able to o v e r c o m e , although a f e w have been tried at various levels. T h e first level of the c o n f l i c t is b e t w e e n the national leaders themselves, involving the positions and personalities of Nelson M a n d e l a and Mangosuthu Buthelezi. T h e second is between contending political organizations, the A N C and Inkatha, where Inkatha correctly sees itself threatened by the recruiting e f f o r t s of the A N C . T h e A N C t h r e a t e n s I n k a t h a ' s position and even existence; Inkatha threatens the A N C claim of broad representativity. But a negotiated c e a s e - f i r e would also have to meet the needs at the third level of local groups, many of which have their own grievances and s o m e of which are quite a u t o n o m o u s of organizational control. T h e conflict is tearing apart neighborhoods and workplaces, creating cycles of rev e n g e and conditions of siege. While s o m e of these f a c t o r s serve to perpetuate and escalate the violence, others build war fatigue and a propensity to reconciliation. But a n e i g h b o r h o o d peace also has to cover a fourth level of conflict involving local warlords, youth gangs, and thugs who thrive on conditions

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of violence. In wartime, these groups are useful and their usefulness gives them a hold over the decision to pursue violence or reconciliation. At the end of 1990, neighborhood reconciliations reduced s o m e warlords' control to a f e w households, but they then used their islands of control as a base f r o m which to expand when reconciliation broke d o w n . In 1991 and 1992, a n u m b e r of local negotiations in Natal (notably Brundtville township) but also in Transvaal (notably A l e x a n d r a ) stalled f o r lack of agreement over the place of warlords in the local delegations. Warlords are not always autonomous, and their activities play into the hands of the war faction in the top Inkatha leadership. Gangs and warlords can be brought under control only through e f f e c t i v e and respected e f f o r t s of the police. But the e f f e c tiveness and impartiality of the police is suspect and in s o m e cases they may even be involved with the warlords. At the middle level of leadership, a code of conduct was negotiated by Frank Chikane and Archbishop D e s m o n d Tutu of the South African Council of Churches, beginning in late 1988 at Cape T o w n and then moving to the more difficult area of Natal. By f o c u s i n g on principles rather than on parties, and benefiting from the pressure of impending bloodshed, the mediators got a semblance of agreement. However, the middle-level leaders involved in setting up the code had uncertain mandates and could deliver the compliance of neither the top leadership nor the c o m m u n i t y groups or warlords. T h u s , the code of conduct never b e c a m e a b i n d i n g pact a m o n g major organizations and fell apart when the new situation arose f o l l o w i n g M a n d e l a ' s release. Its d e m i s e can be dated to the S e b o k e n g massacre in the Transvaal on July 22, 1990, at the hands of Inkatha. At the second level and below, a joint working group ( J W G ) was set up by the United Democratic Front, Inkatha, and the Congress of South African Trade Unions ( C O S A T U ) in 1989 to handle intercommunity violence in Natal province. With the disappearance of the U D F after the unb a n n i n g of the A N C in 1990 and then the collapse of plans f o r the M a n dela-Buthelezi meeting on March 23, 1990, it turned from a collective body into a " 5 + 5 " committee of Inkatha and C O S A T U , grouped in two distinct sides around Oscar Dhlomo and Alec Irwin. When these talks proved fruitless, it then evolved, under pressure f r o m the exasperated grassroots and from international agencies (International Labour Organisation, UNICEF), into a multilevel committee based on the alliance of the A N C , C O S A T U , and the South African Communist Party, which sponsored two levels of activities: forums of business, church, and even Inkatha groups; and local rehabilitation committees for local truces. T h e J W G in any of its f o r m s w a s unable to deliver the a d h e r e n c e of the organizations f o r and to which it spoke, and so it could operate neither as an effective agent nor as an e f f e c tive mediator. It was only after the 1991 National Peace Accord provided a larger f r a m e w o r k of all parties that it w a s able to find its place in a process.

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T w o lesser agreements were negotiated within the J W G context but at the local level. The Mpumalanga township agreement was a truce brokered by local businesspeople and shop stewards to stop the most violent war in Natal. T h e conflict left the c o m m u n i t y exasperated, producing grassroots support for an agreement; business w a s threatening to leave the area as a result of the conflict. T h e truce ended the war in the factories, and the police and S A D F e n f o r c e d it in the township, under the surveillance of the press and diplomatic observers. However, b e c a u s e it w a s not locked into place with an agreement on the first and fourth levels, c o m m i t t i n g the national leaders and restraining local warlords, the truce broke down in early 1990. A second attempt to restore peace to M p u m a l a n g a t o w n s h i p was undertaken by local A N C and Inkatha leaders t w o years later, and it has shown success in deescalating violence and initiating reconstruction. T h e participants had simply had enough. In Imbasi, a local rehabilitation c o m m i t t e e a r r a n g e d a similar truce a m o n g warring and ill-controlled f a c t i o n s in the s u b u r b of Pietermaritzburg in 1991 by depoliticizing the conflict and harnessing local resentment at continuing insecurity. By trading insecurity f o r insecurity, and then truce for truce, and by using local business resources as an incentive, the mediators were able to restore law and order. But the local mediator was threatened with assassination, probably by Inkatha elements, and the local truce collapsed. Business b e c a m e skittish about risking its resources, the participating organizations did not cooperate, and resentment and suspicion rose against the peace initiative. T h e experience s h o w s that a mediated truce is only the first step and requires firm follow-through to stay in effect. Security negotiations are possible at various local levels; p a r a d o x i cally, by capitalizing on local community exasperation at rampant insecurity, they eliminate the very incentive that makes their o u t c o m e attractive. After a time, the lack of buttressing agreements at higher and lower levels destroys the progress achieved, and insecurity returns. T h e resulting situation is actually worse than before, since negotiation has been discredited in the process. Nonetheless, local attempts at security a g r e e m e n t s were a major contributor to the negotiation of the National Peace A c c o r d 6 a m o n g the South African g o v e r n m e n t , the A N C , the IFP, the labor unions, of many other parties, and religious and civic organizations. Signed on S e p tember 15, 1991, this agreement was the culmination of local e f f o r t s that has then helped to hold the local agreements in place.

Education Negotiations on education are in a paradoxical situation. It was an educational crisis that triggered the school boycott of 1985 and the state of

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emergency for the rest of the decade. T h e National Education Crisis C o m mittee ( N E C C ) a n d various school c o m m i t t e e s of parents, teachers, and students negotiated with school administrators in 1986. Yet these negotiations a c c o m p l i s h e d little; the authorities w e r e less v u l n e r a b l e to student disorders than they were to squatter disorders, and to school boycotts than to rent boycotts. A s a result, education negotiations in the 1990s have thus far addressed traditional student concerns more than the much needed constitutional c h a n g e s . An S P D leader has identified education as "the next issue." T w o cases are not exhaustive but rather indicate the limits of the current education negotiations. In late 1989, at the University of the W i t w a tersrand, the two student organizations—the black South African National Student Congress ( S A N S C O ) and the white Student Representatives Counc i l — j o i n e d in a national campaign to protest the termination of students w h o fail to meet university standards. T h e vice-chancellor's reply was not deemed satisfactory, and in February 1990, a three-day strike alleging inadequacies in remedial counseling, f u n d i n g , and housing, and calling for a m o r a t o r i u m on t e r m i n a t i o n s attracted a small n u m b e r of s t u d e n t s . T h e university then o f f e r e d to constitute a special review panel of two N E C C m e m b e r s and two university senators to examine the twenty-nine cases of termination; t w e n t y - t w o were rejected, three were r e a c c e p t e d (one declined), and four were to be reconsidered in 1991. T h e response was a precise answer to a general grievance; a university spokesperson noted that "the university had to invent a solution to get the students off the h o o k . " The university also f o u n d a new h o u s i n g facility, although not n e a r b y . Both the termination and the h o u s i n g issues were complicated by racial implications, and the d e m a n d s posed by student org a n i z a t i o n s ( b a c k e d by C O S A T U ) pointed to a " 1 9 6 0 s - t y p e student and workers g o v e r n a n c e , " as the university put it. T h e negotiations were more typical of a normal c a m p u s than of a national regime change; they enlisted little student support and raised no p o w e r issues, despite s o m e intentions to the contrary. But they did not address an underlying issue d e e p in the matter of r e g i m e c h a n g e : the clash b e t w e e n s t a n d a r d s and the d e m a n d s made on students unprepared by the apartheid system of education to meet those s t a n d a r d s f o r a d m i s s i o n or c o m p l e t i o n of their studies. A similar round of demonstrations and negotiations also took place at the University of Cape T o w n , w h e r e students were invited to be part of the review c o m mittee on readmittances but refused. T h e other case concerns the integration and privatization of Bernardo Park girls' high school in order to keep it open. Population aging and depletion in the neighborhood dropped the all-white student body to less than a third of its f o r m e r size of seven h u n d r e d , w h i l e the rise of the A f r i c a n population in the area brought individual requests to enter the school. T h e

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situation, not the parties, made for conflict, and there was no debate over the curriculum. There was no organized pressure on the black side, and a small group of leaders acting as a " b o a r d of trustees" of the school acted for the black parents; the white p a r e n t s ' o r g a n i z a t i o n , Save O u r School, did not oppose the integration and w a s more interested in k e e p i n g the school open. T h e conflict arose over the status of the school and hence its financial position. T h e state could not run an integrated s c h o o l , but the school was not in a position to operate as a private institution. By the White Only Schools Act, as a m e n d e d on June 29, 1990, registered schools had to be more than 50 percent white; B e r n a r d o P a r k ' s s t u d e n t body of two hundred sixty was only 40 percent white, and A f r i c a n s constituted the largest group. Negotiations were c o n d u c t e d a m o n g the parents and with the school administration and were successful in keeping the school open and integrated in 1990; negotiations were also conducted with the government and were unsuccessful in resolving the legal anomaly, despite agreement all around that the problem had to be met and was growing. T h e legal contradictions are typical of the apartheid s y s t e m ' s o p e r a t i o n s in many sectors of life, and of the need for constitutional resolutions. Educational negotiations are still not at the stage of direct action and confrontation of the constitutional issues that are typical of c o m m u n i t y negotiations. As a result, ad hoc solutions are worked out a m o n g consenting adults, while the authorities proclaim their impotence in the absence of a constitutional resolution. T h e question of p o w e r d o e s not arise in the cooperative negotiations and is inadequate in the c o n f r o n t a t i o n with the authorities.

Labor Labor negotiations rose significantly first in the 1980s and then again after 1990 as the political system opened up and prospects for codetermination (if not self-determination) suddenly improved. Labor, like local c o m m u n i ties, saw not only the possibility for taking pieces of its destiny in its hands, but also the immediate need to assert its role a m o n g the players as m a j o r negotiations b e c a m e imminent. But labor was also under pressure f r o m its m e m b e r s , w h o s e expectations rose e n o r m o u s l y after the e v e n t s of February 1990 and then the constitutional negotiations in the C o n f e r e n c e f o r a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) in 1992, impelling union leadership into greater challenges but also bearing an implicit threat of more radical leadership if the incumbent moderates were not able to produce results. L a b o r ' s s o u r c e of power s t e m m e d f r o m that threat, but more f u n d a mentally f r o m o n e of the most important early r e f o r m m e a s u r e s that e m e r g e d from the Botha regime: the legalization of black trade unions in 1979. This established the f r a m e w o r k for institutionalized negotiations on

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social as well as e c o n o m i c issues b e t w e e n black w o r k e r s and white e m ployers, ultimately with d e e p constitutional implications. Legislation circumvents labor power, however, by regulating strike conditions, prohibiting strike f u n d s , and a l l o w i n g blacklisting, repatriation, and vagrancy arrests. Thus, despite the legalization of unions, labor negotiations are as asymmetrical as communal negotiations. At one extreme, P. G. Byson in J o h a n n e s b u r g is a holding company of ten firms and a member of the Cooperative Business Movement founded in 1987 and d e v o t e d to good labor relations. T h e c o m p a n y seeks to avoid strikes and confrontational negotiations, but rather attempts to expand information and develop cooperation. W a g e negotiations began in May 1990 with m a n a g e m e n t first issuing information to the union about the financial condition of the c o m p a n y . It then o f f e r e d an increase of 17 percent, o n e point below the top possibility in the budget. T h e o f f e r w a s rejected for B o u l w a r i s m , 7 and the w o r k e r s held solidarity d e m o n s t r a t i o n s — i n c l u d i n g toitoiing (traditional conflict d a n c i n g ) — o u t s i d e the factory at lunchtime. Negotiations were resumed in July, in a five-hour session, and ended with an agreement at 17.6 percent. S h o p stewards are the active agents of negotiations, with the support of the workers, and are not hesitant about dem a n d i n g i n f o r m a t i o n or r e j e c t i n g o f f e r s ; C O S A T U w a r n e d the s t e w a r d s about " b o s s e s undercutting labor m i l i t a n c y " d u r i n g the n e g o t i a t i o n s and the stewards rejected that criticism too. T h e c o m p a n y reports that its settlements without strikes tend to be about equal to or slightly below fellow c o m p a n i e s ' settlements after strikes. Retail w o r k e r s ' negotiations in m i d - 1 9 9 0 b e t w e e n the South A f r i c a n C o m m e r c i a l , C a t e r i n g and Allied W o r k e r s ' Union ( S A C C A W U ) and Checkers, O K , Pick & Pay, Trador, and Metro Cash & Carry, a m o n g others, were an important hallmark of the new labor confrontations of the new decade. Each c o m p a n y has its personality and way of dealing with its e m ployees, and the fate of each set of negotiations was determined in part by its place in the series. T h e n e g o t i a t i o n s have been crucial b e c a u s e they mark an interplay of sociopolitical and e c o n o m i c goals. W a g e d e m a n d s skirt the edge of the 8 percent profit margin, while at the s a m e time defining and reshaping the f u t u r e shapes of l a b o r - m a n a g e m e n t relations in the new order. On its side, S A C C A W U had just e m e r g e d in new form and under new leadership in its November 1989 congress. It w a s dominated by a new outspoken leader, J e r e m y D a p h n e , w h o had t r u m p e t e d the targets of R 1 6 0 raises and R 8 0 0 m i n i m u m w a g e s as the union goals. But the union w a s still torn by horizontal and vertical divisions not only b e t w e e n A N C and Pan A f r i c a n C o n g r e s s ( P A C ) f a c t i o n s but also b e t w e e n national leadership, politically versus professionally motivated s h o p stewards, and rank and file w o r k e r s . T h e u n i o n ' s goal w a s to return to an industrial council

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arrangement, where S A C C A W U would negotiate with all retailers together. Such an arrangement had existed b e f o r e the legalization of black trade unions, with white labor negotiating with white m a n a g e m e n t and then applying the agreement to blacks. Now management continued to reject the industrial council model as inimical to business competition and as conducive to the practice of "second-tier bargaining," where unions returned three months after a generalized agreement to leapfrog improvements on a company basis. S A C C A W U also launched a broad labor relations program as part of its new existence, calling for a cradle-to-the-grave plan in June 1990, endorsing union solidarity at its conference in mid-July, and at the end of the month holding a one-day work stoppage for the right to strike and picket without punishment. Its wage negotiations took place in the midst of these campaigns, which strengthened both its image and its position. In the early settlements in July 1990, Pick & Pay, after a twenty-fourhour strike, reached the first agreement on an across-the-board increase of R160, which then became the b e n c h m a r k figure. Trador f o l l o w e d with the s a m e figure; it had s o u g h t close relations with its e m p l o y e e s , f e d them d u r i n g the strike, and agreed to a m o r a t o r i u m on l a y o f f s f o r eighteen months, even though it had planned to close two stores. T h e two key companies were O K and Checkers, t w o very d i f f e r e n t c o m p a n i e s . C h e c k e r s sought good, interactive labor relations but without the extremes of Trador or Byson; it had never had a strike but was b l a m e d by its workers for bad management. O K was an old-time hardline firm, operating on a low profit margin, high dividends, and little plowback into c o m p a n y development; it had a major, costly retail strike in 1987. OK and S A C C A W U began n e g o t i a t i o n s in February 1 9 9 0 with the aim of reaching agreement in early April. A f t e r initial discussions on the scope of the talks and the topics at issue, with the mediator ( I M S S A ) suggesting e x c h a n g e s of information and fairness guidelines as a beginning, the talks bogged d o w n . By April the parties w e r e at R 1 1 5 and R 1 6 0 , respectively; the union asked f o r a t w o - w e e k reflection period but instead began preparing for a strike. A f t e r t w o w e e k s of strike, the c o m p a n y offered stepped longevity increases ( f r o m R 1 1 5 to R 1 4 5 for every five years' service), which won agreement f r o m the two-thirds of the e m p l o y e e s w h o w e r e nonunion, f r o m a third of S A C C A W U m e m b e r s , and f r o m another small union. O K then used police and dismissals a g a i n s t the r e m a i n i n g strikers. T h e union r e s p o n d e d with R 1 5 0 ; the c o m p a n y c o u n t e r e d with three longevity grades ( R 1 2 5 - R 1 4 5 ) instead of five. In mid-July, the mediator brought the union to f a c e the real costs of a c o n t i n u i n g strike, and then brought the c o m p a n y to m a k e an o f f e r the union w o u l d be able to accept. O K then added a new holiday, raised the m i n i m u m f r o m R 7 2 0 to R 7 3 0 , increased each longevity g r a d e by R5, but also included plans f o r retrenchment and punishment of strikers. A n additional R 5 w a s added to the grades and the deal w a s struck, at less than the b e n c h m a r k and other

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than across the board. T h e pattern of m o v e m e n t w a s a typical labormanagement concession/convergence dynamic, but the key, wielded by the mediator, w a s the vulnerability of each party to the power of the other. Checkers also negotiated during the period and by mid-July had moved from an R 6 0 to an R5 gap. On July 16, Checkers issued a take-it-or-leaveit offer until ten o'clock the next morning, but S A C C A W U locked the negotiators in the room until they agreed to continue negotiations. O n c e agreement had been reached at R145 and R770, the union added on more details (some rather large loopholes), which management sharpened to acceptable points; and then it changed negotiators, bringing in Daphne himself at the last minute. Agreement was held up by the union leader for twentyfour hours, in order—as it turned out—to sign at the same time as OK. T h e 1990 retail negotiations were tests of strength between an aggressive union locked in its policies by political conditions and a m a n a g e m e n t on the d e f e n s i v e politically despite narrow e c o n o m i c m a r g i n s . B e y o n d raises and minima, it got into other e c o n o m i c details such as bonuses and discounts and political c o n d i t i o n s such as new holidays and retaliation. Still o u t s t a n d i n g w e r e joint d e t e r m i n a t i o n issues such as pension f u n d m a n a g e m e n t , a g r o w i n g — a n d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l — i s s u e f o r unions in m i n i n g and manufacture. Retail workers were able to use the strike as their m a j o r weapon, but were unable to go further into c o n s u m e r boycotts f o r the issues at hand; they were able, however, to play on the competitive nature of the industry and its narrow profit margins and turn them to its advantage. T h e final case is a fascinating f o r e s h a d o w of the new order, constitutional in depth but local only in the sense that it was a sectorial, e c o n o m i c negotiation rather than a broad political one. It concerned a m e n d m e n t s to the Labor Relations Act ( L R A ) . The previous round of intense labor union activity in 1987 led to a series of government a m e n d m e n t s to the act under pressure f r o m some business sectors to recover initiative f r o m the unions and strengthen business in its dealing with the unions. At the s a m e time, some management groups—notably the Federation of C h a m b e r s of Industry, some members of the National M a n p o w e r Commission, and eventually the South A f r i c a n E m p l o y e r s ' C o - o r d i n a t i n g Council on L a b o u r A f f a i r s ( S A C C O L A ) — f e l t that it was time to initiate direct and c o m p r e h e n s i v e business-labor talks to deal with the current pressures of both j o b actions and sanctions. T a l k s began in March 1988 b e t w e e n S A C C O L A and the t w o labor federations, the National Council of T r a d e U n i o n s ( N A C T U ) , close to the PAC, and C O S A T U , close to the A N C . Half a dozen members of each of the three organizations met to discuss labor issues for the first time. However, COSATU at its congress in mid-May decided on a three-day strike the following month in protest against the impending a m e n d m e n t s , seen as a result of business pressures. Instead, a delegation of S A C C O L A representatives and labor lawyers met with the m a n p o w e r minister t h r o u g h o u t July and A u g u s t and o b t a i n e d a g r e e m e n t on w i t h h o l d i n g six

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particularly o f f e n s i v e articles (on strike limitations, use of courts, time limits, and unfair labor practices, a m o n g others). H o w e v e r , despite an agreement a n n o u n c e d on August 11 not to p r o m u l g a t e the law, it was passed by parliament and issued on September 1, the minister apparently having been m i f f e d at the u n w i l l i n g n e s s of l a b o r — r a t h e r than its l a w y e r s — t o meet and discuss with g o v e r n m e n t . T h e unions, in a laborbased sense of the way organizations work, then asked S A C C O L A to instruct its m e m b e r s not to apply the o f f e n d i n g articles, but S A C C O L A had no such power. T h e first round of negotiations broke down over erroneous expectations on all sides. In mid-1989, the talks revived under union initiative and by May 1990 had reached an agreement on changes in the law. In mid-March, the manpower minister had promised the three parties that any agreement a m o n g them would be taken into account by government; most of the agreement (except for provisions on labor courts and unfair labor practices) was later endorsed by the National M a n p o w e r C o m m i s s i o n . Throughout the negotiations, the parties again had problems establishing their mandate and engaging their constituencies. But a further p r o b l e m arose w h e n the labor unions w a n t e d to take a d v a n t a g e of the new negotiations and e x t e n d the provisions of the law to civil servants, currently not covered by the LRA, thus bringing government into a tripartite consultation with labor and management. National M a n p o w e r C o m m i s s i o n e r Fourie demurred, stating that government could not be both a party and an adjudicator, a reflection of g o v e r n m e n t ' s position on the u p c o m i n g constitutional negotiations. In the end, the proposal w a s submitted to parliament in September and enacted in early 1991. T h e LRA labor-management consultations were an extraordinary exercise of u n o f f i c i a l — e v e n if not local—negotiations. Far outreaching the impact of normal l a b o r - m a n a g e m e n t bargaining, even when these e x t e n d beyond wage and productivity issues, the negotiations were clearly constitutional in nature. M a r k e d by s t a y - a w a y s , w a l k o u t s , and external diversions to add pressure, they tested the ability of the basic elements of society to c o m e to terms on a social contract. T h e potential p o w e r of both sides was t r e m e n d o u s , too large to be w i e l d e d effectively in the negotiations but large enough to contemplate in the danger of breakdown. In the process, the parties learned to talk to each other and to c o m m u n i c a t e and negotiate in g o o d faith, b e g i n n i n g with o v e r c o m i n g the o b j e c t i o n s of N A C T U to participating at all.

Implications of Local Negotiations There are a n u m b e r of apparent patterns to these negotiations. First, they follow a standard pattern of "petition p o l i t i c s , " in which social g r o u p s

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pose d e m a n d s to the authorities and then put on the pressure, with threats of greater disruption, until a response is f o r t h c o m i n g . This is petition politics rather than "normal politics" because the authorities are in no way responsible to the social g r o u p s , since the m a j o r i t y has no vote in South Africa. It is different f r o m standard negotiations in that the parties are not equal and d o not e n g a g e in e x c h a n g e of b e n e f i t s ; the o n l y — b u t b a s i c — trade-off underlying the negotiations is the e x c h a n g e of responses for the release of pressure. T h e pressure can take the f o r m of a d e m o n s t r a t i o n , picket, strike, boycott, e t c . — s o m e f o r m of denial and disruption that constitutes the only m e a n s by which the petitioning g r o u p can redress the power imbalance. Yet how does the social g r o u p get the p o w e r to pose a credible petition, or, put otherwise, what elements of power do authorities have and petitioners not have that m a k e f o r asymmetry and that need to be o v e r c o m e to escape f r o m it? Four such elements can be identified: m a n d a t e , standing, o r g a n i z a t i o n , a n d i n f o r m a t i o n . W o r k e r s , squatters, c o m m u n i t y residents, parents, and s t u d e n t s f i n d that they need to d e v e l o p a m e a n s of representation and accountability toward their client groups, achieve recognition from governmental authorities, provide structure and continuity for their support, and inform themselves on the technical details of their subject matter so that they will not be dependent on the expertise of government. If they do not do these four things, they will be too vulnerable to petition e f f e c t i v e l y . T h e need for e m p o w e r m e n t or c o n s o l i d a t i o n is a precondition to local negotiations, and it often requires that negotiation be s u s p e n d e d until it is a c h i e v e d ; yet to the extent that c o n s o l i d a t i o n is achieved and a response is obtained, the petitioner e m e r g e s f r o m each encounter e m p o w e r e d by the very process of negotiation. E m p o w e r m e n t e m e r g e s f r o m the content as well as the conduct of local negotiations. W h i l e all local negotiations begin as petitioning, new issues inevitably are added to move the local g r o u p f r o m a petitioner to a c o d e t e r m i n a t o r . T h e increase in p o w e r that a c c o m p a n i e s a s h i f t f r o m a p r o b l e m poser to a p r o b l e m m a k e r raises the party in status to a ( j ° ' n t ) problem solver. W h e n a union b e c o m e s a c o m a n a g e r of a pension f u n d , w h e n w o r k e r s or their r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s b e c o m e directors of a trust f u n d , when townships achieve a single tax base with cities, when parent-teacher associations d e c i d e on new curricula or e n r o l l m e n t s , the parties have m o v e d f r o m petition-and-response to joint d e c i s i o n m a k i n g or full negotiations, or from substantive to constitutional issues. B e y o n d petition a n d e m p o w e r m e n t is the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of relationships between local and national negotiations. T h e r e is no doubt that local negotiations parallel and exist independently of national negotiations. Both o c c u r r e d during the s e c o n d half of the 1980s, on totally distinct issues; both have increased dramatically in importance in the 1990s, with convergence on both process and issues, but still occur a u t o n o m o u s l y . Yet as the

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t w o levels b e c o m e more o p e n and e x p a n d their subject matter, they bec o m e necessarily linked, in a number of d i f f e r e n t ways. First, e m p o w e r m e n t — g r o w t h in standing, mandate, organization, and information—at the bottom e m p o w e r s the top. This is particularly true when there is an organizational link between the two levels, but it is true too even when unions, civics, parent-teacher associations, and other g r o u p s remain organically distinct from the A N C . Second, local negotiations reinforce the national process. T o the extent to which local petitioners d e m a n d responses from and then m a k e joint decisions with local authorities, they work to m a k e participatory rather than authoritarian d e c i s i o n m a k i n g the dominant m o d e of governance. Unless rooted at the bottom, a c h a n g e at the top in the m o d e of g o v e r n a n c e has no chance of survival. T h i r d , local n e g o t i a t i o n s d e m o c r a t i z e national negotiations. W h i l e they do not remove the possibility of the elite deal that figures so prominently in the d e m o c r a t i c transition literature f r o m Latin A m e r i c a and Southern Europe, x they provide an active basis for any deal that evolves, and a deal of their o w n that keeps the upper level f r o m d r i f t i n g too far away from the base. In addition to wrestling with local issues, usually of national import, local negotiations also have their procedural agenda as a struggle between o r g a n i z a t i o n s of top-down versus b o t t o m - u p politics, p r o v i d i n g a vigor to the lower dimension that cannot be ignored. In the process, attempts to control the civics or the locals can also disrupt negotiations, destroy initiative, and even open the way for a breakdown of local patterns of politics and a u t h o r i t y . That is to be expected, for the w h o l e South African evolution in the 1990s involves a sudden breakdown and reconstruction of politics a n d authority. Local p r o c e s s e s are important ingredients in that accelerated evolution. Fourth, talking at all levels tends to replace fighting. At the beginning, pressure, including supportive use of violence, is part of the negotiating process. Here as elsewhere, it would be a mistake to think that the two are mutually exclusive alternatives rather than mutually supportive means. But as negotiation b e c o m e s the accepted mode, violent pressure b e c o m e s secondary or no longer necessary. In order to become the accepted mode, negotiation must be tried, tested, and eventually institutionalized, at all levels. Fifth, some issues begin to be decided at the local level, locking the nationals into jointly determined results. T h e c o m m o n tax base issue and the all-municipal c o u n c i l s are an important e x a m p l e , so important that local moves have s o m e t i m e s been delayed for national moves to catch up with them. W h e n the S o w e t o P e o p l e ' s Delegation and the T r a n s v a a l Provincial Authority agreed to study jointly implementation of the S P D ' s five demands, the first steps were being taken in local negotiations to legislate a c o m m o n tax base and a c o m m o n urban area as a national policy;

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o t h e r m u n i c i p a l areas a d d e d to the p r e s s u r e in their o w n t e r m s . O n e of the m o s t s t r i k i n g c a s e s of e v o l v i n g local n e g o t i a t i o n s is t h e C O S A T U N A C T U - S A C C O L A a g r e e m e n t o n a m e n d m e n t s to the L a b o r R e l a t i o n s A c t , w h i c h g r e w out of individual l a b o r - m a n a g e m e n t n e g o t i a t i o n s ; of it, a l e a d i n g C O S A T U s p o k e s p e r s o n s a i d , " W e w a n t to get a L a b o r R e l a t i o n s A c t that a new A N C g o v e r n m e n t will h a v e to live w i t h . " U n l e s s local n e g o t i a t i o n s c o n f r o n t a b e r r a t i o n s in l a b o r r e l a t i o n s p r a c t i c e s , or e x p o s e t h e u n w o r k a b l e c i t y - a n d - t o w n s h i p s y s t e m , o r b r i n g to light the c o n t r a d i c t i o n b e t w e e n s t a n d a r d s and e d u c a t i o n , or s h o w u p the police role as well as the national r i v a l r i e s in local i n s e c u r i t y , the p r e s s u r e f o r c h a n g e in n a t i o n a l legislation w o u l d not be p r e s e n t , o r at least not as c o m p e l l i n g . It is notew o r t h y that in the p r o c e s s , " p r e s s u r e " c h a n g e s m e a n i n g f r o m the local to the national level as the p r o c e s s of n e g o t i a t i o n e x p a n d s . F i n a l l y , as s o m e a s p e c t s of t h e p r e v i o u s t w o e x a m p l e s a l s o s u g g e s t , local negotiations have o f t e n taken an issue as far as they c o u l d a n d then, r u n n i n g into national legislation, h a v e k i c k e d it u p s t a i r s f o r a legal solution. Local n e g o t i a t i o n s are limited in w h a t they can do; they can run into legal barriers to the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of their d e c i s i o n s a n d f a c e d e a d l o c k . T h i s d e a d l o c k is used tactically by the central g o v e r n m e n t on o c c a s i o n as a m e a n s of d i s c r e d i t i n g the c i v i c s a n d the local p a r t i c i p a t i o n p r o c e s s . C i v i c s and o t h e r local actors then r e f u s e to s i g n b e c a u s e they c a n n o t d e liver w h a t they have d e c i d e d . D e a d l o c k c r e a t e s f r u s t r a t i o n s , t u r n i n g labor, e d u c a t i o n , and h o u s i n g d i s p u t e s into s e c u r i t y c o n f l i c t s . T h u s , local n e g o tiations alone are not the solution; the n e w s y s t e m c a n n o t be r e m a d e f r o m the b o t t o m up. But in the last a n a l y s i s , e v e n f r u s t r a t i o n of the p r o c e s s in s o m e local i n s t a n c e s c r e a t e s p r e s s u r e f o r a national s o l u t i o n , w i t h m e a n i n g f u l local participation.

Notes I am grateful for the helpful comments of Sipho Shezi, Mark Anstey, and Thomas Karis on this chapter. I am also grateful to the MacArthur Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation for support for the research on this topic, to the Human Sciences Research Council and Louise Nieuwenmeijer for a timely conference, and to the United States-South Africa Leadership Exchange Program (USSALEP) for its assistance. 1. There is an impressive literature in South Africa on this subject. See Mark Swilling, Local Level Negotiations: Case Studies and Implications (Johannesburg: Urban Foundation, 1987) and Beyond Ungovernability: Township Politics and Local Level Negotiations (Johannesburg: University of Witwatersrand Centre for Policy Studies, 1989); three books by Paul Hendler, all published by the South African Institute of Race Relations in Johannesburg: Urban Policy and Housing (1988), Paths to Power (1989), and Politics on the Home Front (1989); and Mark Anstey, Negotiating Conflict (Cape Town: Juta, 1991), Practical Peacemaking

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(Cape T o w n : Juta, 1993), and " M e d i a t i o n in the South A f r i c a n T r a n s i t i o n , " Genève-Afrique 30, no. 2 (1992), pp. 1 4 1 - 1 6 3 . 2. See J e f f r e y Rubin and Bert B r o w n , The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation (New York: A c a d e m i c Press, 1975); 1. William Zartman, The Politics of Trade Negotiation Between Africa and the EC (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971); I. W i l l i a m Z a r t m a n , ed., Positive Sum: Improving NorthSouth Negotiations (New B r u n s w i c k , N.J.: Transaction, 1987); M a r k Habeeb, Power and Tactics in International Negotiation (Baltimore: Johns H o p k i n s University Press, 1991); Jeffrey Rubin and I. William Zartman, eds., Power and Asymmetry in International Negotiation ( L a x e n b u r g , Austria: International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis, forthcoming). 3. This is a study in oral history, for which there are few written records other than internal documentation of the parties. It is based on over seventy interviews conducted in the J o h a n n e s b u r g , Pretoria, Pietermaritzburg, Natal, Port Elizabeth, Grahamstown, and Cape T o w n areas in 1990 and 1992. 4. See Khehla Shubane, The Soweto Rent Boycott, B.A. Honors diss., Political Science Department, University of the Witwatersrand, 1987; Mark Swilling, The Soweto Rent Boycott (Johannesburg: Plan Act, 1989). 5. On the universalities of m e d i a t i o n , see Kenneth Kressel and Dean Pruitt, eds., Mediation Research (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1991); in South Africa, see Anstey, Practical Peacekeeping. 6. T h e text has been published by the UN Centre Against A p a r t h e i d , Notes and D o c u m e n t s 23/91, N o v e m b e r 1991. For another successful peace initiative in local mediation, see K h o t s o Kekana and Albert Nolan, " M a k i n g Peace from Below," Challenge 1 4 : 2 - 4 (April 1993). 7. Named after the tactic of a G E official w h o in the 1950s m a d e fair o f f e r s to labor as ultimatums, and was rejected for taking the participation out of collective bargaining. See David Lax and J a m e s Sebenius, The Manager as Negotiator (New York: Free Press, 1986), p. 235. 8. Guillermo O ' D o n n e l l and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

6 Dislodging the Boulder: South African Women and Democratic Transformation Amy Biehl

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n August 9, 1 9 5 6 , 2 0 , 0 0 0 South African women marched in Pretoria and threw their passbooks at the feet of Prime Minister Strydom. As they marched, they sang: Wathint'abafazi.

Wathint'mbokotho.

Uza kufa.

[ Y o u have struck the w o m e n . Y o u have dislodged a boulder. Y o u will be crushed.]1

Nearly forty years later, on April 1, 1 9 9 3 , women marched to the World Trade Centre in Johannesburg to demand a central role in the national negotiations forum. T h e A N C W o m e n ' s League secretary-general, B a l e k a Kgositsile, reminded the negotiators that women were more than 5 3 percent o f South A f r i c a ' s voting population. " N o stone will be left unturned in the battle for the rights o f the m a j o r i t y , " she said. 2 For South African women, the World Trade Centre protest marked a change in approach from mass resistance to strategic inclusion. Nevertheless, as in 1 9 5 6 , the message was clear—the boulder had been dislodged. After decades of resisting apartheid, women would not be excluded from negotiations for a d e m o c ratic government. Between 1 9 5 6 and 1 9 9 3 , the South African political climate changed dramatically from resistance and armed struggle to negotiations and political compromise. For nearly three decades, w o m e n ' s liberation had been considered secondary to national liberation. However, according to Cherryl Walker, " T o d a y , as a victory over apartheid moves into the realm o f

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feasible rather than Utopian politics, so, finally, more serious attention is b e i n g given to what the most appropriate ordering of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between w o m e n ' s and national liberation should be." 3 T h e failures of w o m e n to benefit equally from national liberation elsew h e r e in Africa helped spark a debate over w o m e n ' s rights both within the M a s s D e m o c r a t i c M o v e m e n t ( M D M ) inside the country and w i t h i n the A N C in exile. O r g a n i z a t i o n s such as the United W o m e n ' s O r g a n i s a t i o n ( U W O ) of the Western Cape played an important role in the formation of the United D e m o c r a t i c Front d u r i n g the 1980s. Several c o n f e r e n c e s and f o r u m s were convened outside of the country prior to and during 1990 to discuss gender within the liberation movement, including an A N C seminar in Lusaka in 1989 and the joint A N C - M D M M a l i b o n g w e c o n f e r e n c e in A m s t e r d a m in 1990. T h e unbanning of the A N C in 1990 and the beginning of the negotiations process c h a n g e d the rules of liberation politics. Mass resistance, which had relied heavily on the support of w o m e n , changed to " c l o s e d d o o r " negotiations dominated by male leaders. For women, this c h a n g e has not been easy to m a k e for many reasons: vast d i f f e r e n c e s a m o n g w o m e n themselves, a culture of patriarchy that crosses all political lines, a n d a culture of violence engulfing the country. Nevertheless, women from all social and political backgrounds agree that the negotiation process presents a historic opportunity for w o m e n to help shape the form and content of a new democracy and to develop long-term strategies for transformation. This chapter will (1) describe the current legal, demographic, a n d socioeconomic position of South African women; (2) outline strategic issues for women in the transition as well as in the long-term process of democratic transformation; (3) discuss the impediments and challenges to w o m e n ' s success in this process; and (4) discuss possible strategies for change.

Profile of South African Women T h e r e are 10,188,521 adult w o m e n in South Africa, excluding the T B V C areas (the "independent" homelands of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, V e n d a , and Ciskei). 4 Of these women, 70 percent are African, 16 percent are white, 11 percent are coloured, and 3 percent are Indian. Of all w o m e n ( e x c l u d ing the T B V C areas), 38 percent are located in the "self-governing territories" of Gazankulu, K a N g w a n e , K w a N d e b e l e , KwaZulu, L e b o w a , and Q w a Q w a . T h e exclusion of the T B V C areas f r o m census figures m a k e s it difficult to obtain accurate numbers, but the Development Bank of South Africa estimates that one in eight South African adults, and o n e - f i f t h of the A f r i c a n population, live in the T B V C areas. Many more women than men live in the T B V C areas as a result of male migrant labor c a u s e d by the

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apartheid s y s t e m . An estimated 2,105,000 adult w o m e n live in the T B V C areas. T h i r t y - f o u r percent of South A f r i c a n w o m e n ( e x c l u d i n g the T B V C areas) and 41 percent in the T B V C areas are under the age of fifteen. Thus, while South A f r i c a n women currently m a k e up approximately 54 percent of the potential voters in the first nonracial elections, by the turn of the century, w o m e n will be more than 6 0 percent of the v o t i n g population. 5 Over half of the African w o m e n (excluding the T B V C areas) live in rural areas, while 82 percent coloured, 92 percent white, and 96 percent Indian w o m e n live in urban areas. In terms of education, w o m e n are disadvantaged in comparison to men only at the highest levels of education. However, a m o n g w o m e n of different race g r o u p s , significant disparities in literacy occur. For example, 99 percent of white women thirteen years or older have at least a Standard IV (sixth-seventh grade) education, while 1989 figures for the Transkei show that one-third of all women over the age of five have no education at all and only 15 percent have s o m e secondary education. An estimated 3 million w o m e n in South Africa are f u n c t i o n a l l y illiterate. M o r e than threef i f t h s of the 5 4 2 , 7 1 3 w o m e n with postmatric (university level) degrees (excluding the T B V C areas) are white. A p p r o x i m a t e l y 41 percent of adult w o m e n in South A f r i c a are married. W h e n analyzed by race, 59 percent of white w o m e n are married, 57 percent of Indian w o m e n , 4 0 percent of coloured w o m e n , and 35 percent of A f r i c a n w o m e n . However, statistics on the marital status of South African w o m e n are extremely difficult to calculate because several different marital regimes can apply. Marriages can be recognized as civil marriages or as customary marriages. For civil marriages, coloured, Indian, or white women married before November 1, 1984, and African w o m e n married before December 2, 1988, are considered legal minors. These w o m e n are required to have permission from their husbands to open bank accounts, sign property leases, and conduct similar legal transactions. W o m e n married after the change in marital laws are considered adults before the law. However, in all South African marriages the husband has "marital power." Marital power allows the husband to decide " w h e r e and how the family will live," including issues such as the custody of children in the event of divorce or separation. 6 A marriage can take place under ante-nuptial contract, specifying the legal power of each spouse. Civil marriages can occur in community of property, out of community of property, or by ante-nuptial contract with accrual, which determines the division of property in the event of the death of one spouse or divorce. Under South African law, a w o m a n cannot charge her husband with rape. T w o types of customary m a r r i a g e s are r e c o g n i z e d in South A f r i c a : African customary marriages and Muslim marriages. 7 Outside of KwaZulu

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or Natal, women married by African customary marriage are considered minors. In KwaZulu and Natal, the husband has marital power similar to that under current civil law. Under Muslim marriages, women are considered full adults. Under customary law, a married woman has some rights, including a right to her husband's pension in the event of his death and the right to claim maintenance for children, if she can prove the marriage with a certificate or by demonstrating that lobola (a form of bride price) was paid. However, most women in customary marriages are unaware of these limited rights. Under the inheritance provisions of customary law, most of the husband's property goes to the men in his family. Prior to December 1988, if a husband took a second wife by civil marriage, the date of the civil marriage officially terminated the customary marriage. Excluding the TBVC areas, women represent 36 percent of the workforce, but only 11.5 percent are found in mid-level management positions and 6.7 percent at top-level positions. 8 In the TBVC areas, an average of 9 percent are classified as economically active. However, statisticians do not regard women engaged in subsistence agriculture as economically active. Of economically active women, white and Indian women are found mostly in clerical, sales, professional, and technical positions. Coloured women work in service, clerical, sales, and supervisory positions, but in fewer technical and professional positions. African women are found mostly in service positions and in the agricultural sector. Over 95 percent of the few African women in professional occupations are teachers or nurses. 9 Most African women and most coloured women in the service profession are domestic workers. More than 70 percent of South African women (excluding the T B V C areas) report having no income at all. This includes more than 7 percent of those women classified as economically active. Eleven percent earn between R1 (33 cents) and R4,999 ($1,675) annually. Fewer than 2 percent of each of the three "black" groups earn more than R10,000 ($3,330) a year, compared to 9 percent of white women. Despite their extremely low incomes, large numbers of African women are considered de facto heads of household. It is estimated that nearly half of working women (excluding the T B V C areas) are single mothers and heads of household; the percentage rises as high as 59 percent in rural homelands. The only child care system that exists for working mothers (who can't afford domestic labor!) has been a result of informal networking among women in townships. Many working mothers send their children to rural areas to be cared for by relatives. Violence against women has reached crisis proportions in South Africa. Rape Crisis Cape Town estimates that a rape occurs every 83 seconds. One in every six adult women is regularly assaulted by her partner. 1 0 In 1992, 218 women were killed and 251 women injured in "politically

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m o t i v a t e d " violence. 1 1 W o m e n m a d e up t w e n t y - f i v e out of f o r t y victims identified at the 1992 Boipatong massacre, which led to the b r e a k d o w n of negotiations later that year. T h e r e are an estimated 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 illegal a b o r t i o n s p e r f o r m e d each y e a r . 1 2 T h o u s a n d s m o r e w o m e n die each year as a result of b a c k s t r e e t a b o r t i o n s . As a result of existing marital laws, many h o s p i t a l s require a h u s b a n d ' s signature b e f o r e they will permit surgical p r o c e d u r e s f o r m a r ried w o m e n . 1 3 Overall, w o m e n ' s s p e c i f i c health issues have b e e n inadequately addressed by the state, and community health projects designed to assist w o m e n have been underfunded and overstretched. T h e a b o v e statistics d e m o n s t r a t e that South A f r i c a n w o m e n are inc r e d i b l y diverse in terms of race, income, literacy, and other s o c i o e c o n o m i c indicators. T h e majority are economically dependent on their husb a n d s or relatives, and those w o m e n w h o work do so in the least desirable p o s i t i o n s , earning the lowest i n c o m e s . Black w o m e n are particularly at risk in terms of economic survival. W o m e n of all races and i n c o m e levels are threatened by physical violence. W o m e n have little control over their o w n r e p r o d u c t i v e f r e e d o m and marital relationships. T h e s e f a c t o r s will s h a p e the strategies w o m e n will pursue in the transition and their goals in the broader process of transformation. T h e current position of w o m e n in South A f r i c a n society requires that consideration be given to (1) strategic issues of political participation and the establishment of formal gender equality during the transition process, a n d (2) practical issues, such as access to e m p l o y m e n t and physical safety f r o m violence during the broader process of democratic transformation. A combination of these t w o approaches is necessary if w o m e n are to participate fully in, and benefit equally f r o m , the transition to a d e m o c r a t i c society. Whether strategic or practical, m e c h a n i s m s for w o m e n ' s e m p o w e r ment must recognize the intersection of race, class, and gender as it affects South African w o m e n . Strategies to remedy discrimination must not only r e f l e c t these d i f f e r e n t experiences, but they must e m p h a s i z e the e m p o w e r m e n t of the rural w o m a n living in the f o r m e r h o m e l a n d s if they are to reach to the " a v e r a g e " South African w o m a n .

Women's Political Activity: 1990-1993 T h e unbanning of the A N C and other liberation organizations in February 1 9 9 0 changed the nature of w o m e n ' s activities. W o m e n w h o had been in e x i l e returned to join w o m e n w h o had r e m a i n e d in the c o u n t r y . F o r u m s s u c h as the 1990 M a l i b o n g w e c o n f e r e n c e helped s m o o t h this transition process for women within the liberation movement and helped them define an a g e n d a consistent with the new situation. W o m e n a d a p t e d to t h e s e

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circumstances much more quickly than their male counterparts, recognizing an important political opportunity to m a k e their views heard. Several w o m e n ' s groupings, such as the W o m e n ' s Alliance of the Western Cape and the W o m e n ' s Alliance of S o u t h e r n Natal, o r g a n i z e d e f f o r t s to f o r g e links a m o n g w o m e n , collect d e m a n d s for a w o m e n ' s charter, and c a m paign for w o m e n ' s full equality. A l a r m e d by the lack of w o m e n negotiators at C o d e s a , w o m e n proposed that a m e c h a n i s m be established to ensure their participation. T h e Gender Advisory C o m m i t t e e ( G A C ) was subsequently established in 1992 as a subcommittee of the Codesa management committee. Coordinated primarily by A N C and DP w o m e n , the G A C was in fact one of the few committees at Codesa II that reached consensus, and its m e m b e r s chose to retain the G A C ' s locus standi after Codesa was disbanded. 1 4 Despite important progress m a d e by different w o m e n ' s organizations and the G A C , many w o m e n expressed the need for a national w o m e n ' s organization that could enjoin w o m e n f r o m the broadest possible spectrum of political organizations to articulate w o m e n ' s d e m a n d s . As a result, in April 1992, the W o m e n ' s National Coalition ( W N C ) w a s launched. A p proximately seventy organizations were represented and more than sixty organizations have since c o n f i r m e d membership. Regional coalitions currently exist in eight regions of the country and more are expected to be initiated. W N C m e m b e r s include the A N C W o m e n ' s League, the Democratic Party W o m e n ' s Forum, the A f r i c a n W o m e n ' s O r g a n i z a t i o n of the P A C , the National W o m e n ' s Chapter of the National Party, the W o m e n ' s W i n g of the Disabled People of South A f r i c a , religious organizations, o c c u p a tional and professional groups, advocacy groups, service groups, and special interests groups, a m o n g others. A c c o r d i n g to W N C Director Pregs Govender, The W N C was formed to unify w o m e n in formulating and adopting a Charter entrenching equality for w o m e n in South Africa's new constitution. It plans to do this through a process aimed at empowering women. The W o m e n ' s Charter Campaign consists of an organized and systematic exercise to do the above. . . . A multi-method programme of participatory research will be an integral part of the whole project. 1 5

Although originally given a period of one year, the steering c o m m i t t e e of the coalition has extended this period to a c c o m m o d a t e the changing transition process. Despite its successful launch, difficulties of working across vast political d i f f e r e n c e s , inadequate infrastructure, and p r o b l e m s with facilitating regional activities have plagued the W N C . Many organizations, such as Black Sash and C O S A T U , have expressed concern that their own constitutions will not permit them to affiliate with the W N C . T h e limited m a n d a t e

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of the W N C has angered s o m e m e m b e r s w h o w o u l d like to address national issues such as violence through the coalition. At the W N C Council meeting in F e b r u a r y 1993, the national c o n v e n e r , Frene G i n w a l a of the ANC, a c k n o w l e d g e d that the expectations of the coalition had "been based on hope rather than reality," but the W N C revised its program, strengthened its infrastructure, and agreed to continue to " w o r k across differences to achieve the W N C goals." 1 6 P e r h a p s the most serious test of the W N C to date w a s the debate sparked by a National Party proposal f o r three draft bills on w o m e n ' s equality: the A b o l i t i o n of D i s c r i m i n a t i o n Against W o m e n bill; the Prevention of D o m e s t i c Violence bill; and the Promotion of Equal Opportunities bill. T h e bills had been drawn up by a junior advocate in the Ministry of J u s t i c e with minimal consultation with w o m e n ' s organizations. Most important, the W N C was excluded f r o m the consultation process. W o m e n in the NP considered the bills an important victory. Outside the NP, h o w e v e r , most w o m e n were extremely dissatisfied with both the content of the bills and the unilateral m e t h o d by which they w e r e introduced. D e m o c r a t i c Party MPs Dene S m u t s and Carole C h a r l e w o o d argued in parliament that the draft legislation was an inadequate attempt to duplicate the participatory process initiated by the W N C , and that it had occurred at t a x p a y e r s ' expense. At a c o n f e r e n c e convened by the Ministry of Justice to explain and promote the bills, Professor June Sinclair received a standing ovation f o r her scathing review of the proposed legislation, in which she a r g u e d that the omissions in the legislation, including the disregard for black w o m e n and the avoidance of abortion law reform and tax equity for w o m e n , represented more glaring policy statements than the legislation itself. 1 7 T h e g o v e r n m e n t proposed that w o m e n and w o m e n ' s organizations be given a p p r o x i m a t e l y o n e month to s u b m i t c o m m e n t s on the legislation. While some organizations provided significant c o m m e n t a r y on the legislation, many groups, including the W N C , rejected the process and refused to c o m m e n t . T h e s e activities b e c a m e a divisive f o r c e within the W N C . W o m e n of the liberation movement believed that NP w o m e n had used the coalition as a vehicle to preempt the goals of the W N C , while NP women believed that the " A N C Charter C a m p a i g n " ( W N C ) w a s preventing women from capitalizing on an important window of opportunity presented by the legislation. Nevertheless, the W N C agreed to differ on the issue of the government's legislation and proceeded with the Charter Campaign. T h e current activities of w o m e n and w o m e n ' s o r g a n i z a t i o n s can be classified as f o c u s i n g on one of three phases in the transition/transformation process: (1) f r o m the current negotiations to elections for a constituent assembly/new parliament, (2) the constitution-writing process, and (3) the G o v e r n m e n t of National Unity a n d R e c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d b e y o n d . S o m e

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issues intersect and o v e r l a p with these d i f f e r e n t phases. H o w e v e r , a discussion of key strategic elements with regard to each phase follows.

Current Negotiations T h e b r e a k d o w n of Codesa destroyed important progress made by w o m e n to increase their representation through the G A C at Codesa II. The bilateral talks that took place f o l l o w i n g the b r e a k d o w n of Codesa II virtually e x c l u d e d w o m e n . S u b s e q u e n t l y , the reconstituted World T r a d e C e n t r e talks b e g a n as nearly an all-male f o r u m . T h e bilateral meetings also brought a greater number of conservative and fundamentalist organizations and traditional leaders into negotiations. In addition to the main negotiating f o r u m , w o m e n have also been excluded f r o m the peace f o r u m s , econ o m i c f o r u m s , local g o v e r n m e n t f o r u m s , and other parallel negotiating structures. In March 1993, the f o r m e r G A C put forth a proposal to revive the G A C at the World T r a d e C e n t r e talks. W o m e n in the D e m o c r a t i c Party proposed that the G A C be given subcommittee status and an "input f u n c tion" to the negotiations. T h e A N C W o m e n ' s League felt that " s u b c o m mittee status" for the G A C was insufficient and lobbied their organization f o r an A N C proposal to a m e n d a pending proposal that the N e g o t i a t i n g Council consist of one negotiator and o n e adviser f r o m each party. T h e A N C p r o p o s e d that this be c h a n g e d to o n e negotiator and two advisers, and that at least one of the three representatives per party be a w o m a n . T h i s proposal, put forth by A N C negotiator Cyril R a m a p h o s a , w a s b o o e d and j e e r e d by the negotiators present. Only three parties of the twenty-six—the A N C , the S A C P , and the Natal Indian Congress/Transvaal Indian C o n g r e s s — s u p p o r t e d the proposal. A s a result, the A N C w o m e n caucused with other w o m e n ' s organizations to protest their exclusion. Following these meetings, the IFP W o m e n ' s Brigade c a m e forth with an even stronger approach. It rejected the reconstitution of the G A C and proposed that all party delegations and committees be expanded to add one w o m a n delegate, w h o would have full negotiating rights. W o m e n ' s efforts resulted in the final wording, agreed upon by all the parties, that "at least o n e out of f o u r representatives be a w o m a n . " 1 8 T h i s inclusion w a s an important strategic victory for w o m e n , and it averted the potential disaster of almost complete exclusion from the talks. Strategic concerns for w o m e n during this phase of negotiations h a v e included e n s u r i n g a c o m m i t m e n t to substantive equality in a f u t u r e c o n stitution; securing w o m e n ' s participation in areas that had previously e x cluded them, such as security and the economy; providing w o m e n ' s input on the "rules of the g a m e " for the electoral process, including the

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establishment of an independent electoral commission, the development of a code of conduct, and the reintegration of the homelands; establishing a gender-sensitive, independent media; and, perhaps most important, lobbying for w o m e n ' s participation in the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) —the most powerful decisionmaking body of the transition.

Constitution-Writing Process It is hoped that women will be well represented in the constituent assembly/new parliament. However, even with an exceptional performance at the polls, it is unlikely that w o m e n will be represented anywhere near in proportion to their percentage of the population, nor is there any reason to expect that all of the women elected will be concerned with the positions supported by the majority of South A f r i c a n w o m e n . Therefore, multiple approaches to ensuring the presence and visibility of women and w o m e n ' s issues will be a strategic concern during the constitution-making process. Women have focused much of their efforts since the late 1980s on the constitution-writing process. A long process of debate and dialogue between the A N C leadership and the A N C W o m e n ' s League has occurred over the A N C ' s draft bill of rights, and more recent drafts of the document have reflected w o m e n ' s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s . 1 9 The National Party has included provisions for w o m e n ' s rights in its draft Charter of Fundamental Rights. Progressive Western Cape lawyers have proposed substantive equality for w o m e n in a Charter for Social Justice. The purpose of the W N C ' s extensive participatory research e f f o r t is to articulate the needs and demands of w o m e n in a legal d o c u m e n t for the constitution-making process, while educating women about their rights. The participatory research undertaken by the W N C will provide several important functions with respect to the constitution-writing process: (1) it will attempt to identify and articulate the shared goals and priorities of a broad range of women; (2) it will produce a legal document, above the whims of political parties, that can be easily utilized by constitution •drafters; (3) it will educate women about the process underway to ensure their constitutional rights; and (4) it will provide an important research foundation to inform lawmakers in the development of the constitution and further legislation on w o m e n ' s issues. T h i s research is expected to occur during mid-1993.

Substantive Equality Ensured in the

Constitution

South African women have learned from the experiences of other countries that formal equality in a constitution is not enough to ensure equal treat-

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ment. T h e y argue that formal equality must be supported by constitutional provisions that address the substantive issues of w o m e n ' s equality. This involves creating access to legal and constitutional remedies for inequalities that stem from particular disadvantages. Substantive equality seeks to "equalize o u t c o m e s " f o r men and w o m e n and to address the d i f f e r e n t realities of their lives. Constitutional m e c h a n i s m s will not c o m p l e t e l y e n s u r e s u b s t a n t i v e equality. This process involves changing attitudes that are engrained in society and even reinforced by many constitutions, such as that of the United States, which f e m i n i s t s a r g u e have inhibited substantive equality for w o m e n . 2 0 However, South African w o m e n have proposed several methods for enshrining substantive equality in a bill of rights/constitution. D i f f e r ent proposals for equality clauses have been written in such a m a n n e r to ensure equal o u t c o m e s through phrases like " w o m e n and men will be equal b e f o r e the l a w " or "will have equal b e n e f i t of the law." Most of these p r o p o s a l s have clauses that prohibit discrimination based on sex, gender, or sexual preference. Affirmative action and positive action clauses, as well as directives of state policy along the lines of the Namibian constitution, have been introduced to help remedy existing inequalities. Constitutions that provide for "gender equality," referring to the socialized behaviors of men and women as opposed to their physical attributes, are perhaps the most likely to succeed at eliminating existing social biases. The A N C has proposed a section on gender rights in its draft bill of rights, which prohibits discrimination based on "gender, single parenthood, legitimacy of birth or sexual orientation." 2 1 S e c o n d , b e y o n d the p h r a s i n g of an equality clause, the general language of a bill of rights/constitution has implications for s u b s t a n t i v e equality. The A N C has proposed the use of the terms " m e n and w o m e n " as much as possible to avoid a m b i g u i t i e s and e n s u r e that w o m e n can " s e e themselves" in the constitution. Other proposals have argued that genderneutral language is less c o n f u s i n g and avoids the p r o b l e m of e x c l u d i n g certain groups by not listing them. Third, a bill of rights/constitution that g u a r a n t e e s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e review and judicial accessibility can help w o m e n use the constitution in favor of substantive equality. Fourth, given that the m a j o r i t y of South A f r i c a n w o m e n e x p e r i e n c e discrimination mostly in the private spheres of the home and the family, a bill of rights/constitution that protects w o m e n f r o m discrimination in these two vital areas will be better positioned to guarantee substantive equality. T h e current debate has centered on issues of vertical versus horizontal application, with the g o v e r n m e n t on the side of the former, the A N C on the side of the latter, and o t h e r g r o u p s f a l l i n g in b e t w e e n . In addition to whether the constitution is applied horizontally or vertically, clauses that

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protect the equal rights of partners in marriage, for example, can help protect women from discrimination in the home. Issues of custom and religion form an important part of the public/private debate, and women have demanded that they be addressed in the constitution-making process. The A N C does not address customary and religious discrimination in its draft bill of rights, although the d r a f t ' s horizontal application and other attributes appear to be more accessible to women faced with religious or cultural discrimination. The NP leaves the issue of customary law to the status quo, and its strict vertical application of a bill of rights excludes the private sphere. Fifth, the most contentious debate to date has been over ensuring socioeconomic, or second generation, rights in a bill of rights/constitution. On one side are those who support a strictly liberal view of individual rights based on the U.S. Constitution as a model, such as the government's support for its draft Charter of Fundamental Rights. In the center are the authors of the Charter for Social Justice, who propose a negative constitution interpreted along the lines of a " f r e e and open social democracy." 2 2 They argue that second generation rights cannot be enforced and have proposed Directives of State Policy to ensure that government policy includes a commitment to improving the socioeconomic position of the disadvantaged. The A N C believes that second generation rights are enforceable in a bill of rights/constitution. Article 17 of its revised draft contains instructions to courts for the enforcement of second generation rights. Feminist critiques of constitutional proposals by A N C w o m e n argue even more strongly for positive enforcement of second generation rights. These women believe that rights are "indivisible," and it is therefore not necessary to distinguish between a civil right, such as the right to vote, and a social right, such as the right to housing. They reject the hierarchical notion of rights under which w o m e n ' s rights have been viewed as less important than human rights and social rights as less important than civil rights. 2 3 Many women believe that the enforcement of second generation rights will be one of the most important vehicles for improving the status of women, who are the most disadvantaged in terms of socioeconomic development. Type of Constitution: The Federalism

Debate

The extent to which federalism/regionalism is developed during this process will be critical for women, w h o must carefully consider how the powers delegated to regions affect their lives. For example, situations where states are given control over social w e l f a r e issues, where states make their own legislation on abortion, or where the constitution of a particular state or region provides for a greater jurisdiction of customary law could have a tremendous impact on w o m e n .

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The constitution of the state of KwaZulu provides an interesting example in this regard. While the constitution would be considered discriminatory by many women because it proposes to "recognize and protect the application of traditional and customary rules" without reform, it actually provides a clause on "procreative f r e e d o m " that would permit women to "terminate an unwanted pregnancy when safe." 2 4 The implications of state powers in this case could be comparable to experiences in the United States and Canada. One envisions men moving to KwaZulu to enjoy the benefits of customary law, or women traveling to KwaZulu to obtain legal abortions! Abortion The issue of abortion in a future constitution has been continually raised by women only to be ignored by male decisionmakers. Abortion exposes race and class divisions in that rich white women have access to overseas abortions while poor black and rural women do not. There is a strong religious lobby that opposes abortion. Even progressive w o m e n ' s organizations like the Black Sash held a position against abortion for many years, until it adopted a pro-choice position at its 1993 national conference. In their respective proposals, the NP leaves the issue to a future constitutional court and the A N C leaves the issue to legislation. The A N C position is a significant departure from the A N C W o m e n ' s League position put forth at several forums in support of reproductive freedom. 2 5 Women across the political spectrum have criticized the major players for inadequately addressing the issue. If the status of abortion is going to change from the current position of indifference by the negotiators to an informed position for a future constitution, women will have to exert a significant amount of muscle in the negotiations. If women identify the issue as a strategic priority, then abortion will be an important battle in the constitution-writing process. CEDAW The United Nations Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women ( C E D A W ) has played an important role in advancing the status of women worldwide. At the Lusaka c o n f e r e n c e in 1989, A N C women demanded the ratification of C E D A W by a democratic government and proposed that it be used as a guideline in the constitution-writing process. Progressive w o m e n ' s organizations began researching methods for the implementation of C E D A W in the South African context. In January 1993, the de Klerk government signed C E D A W , sparking much controversy and fear that it hijacked an issue that had been a central pillar for women in the liberation movement. The government justified its

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rushed p r o p o s e d legislation on w o m e n ' s equality on the g r o u n d s that " p u r g i n g the b o o k s of discriminatory s t a t u t e s " is a natural f o l l o w - u p to signing C E D A W . Yet many w o m e n believe that by the government signing C E D A W , b e f o r e black w o m e n c o u l d even vote, the importance of w o m e n ' s rights as human rights enshrined in C E D A W w o u l d be diminished. H o w e v e r , even NP w o m e n conceded that the government could not ratify C E D A W — i t must be ratified by a future d e m o c r a t i c government. 2 6 H o w e v e r , despite the current tension over the issue, C E D A W received the attention and support of a broad spectrum of parties. In light of this, a c o m m i t m e n t to the principles of C E D A W in the w r i t i n g of the constitution, s u p p l e m e n t e d by a w o m e n ' s charter, w o u l d help ensure that the dem a n d s of w o m e n are a c c o m m o d a t e d and that the m e c h a n i s m s to ensure their rights conform to international human rights principles. Decisionmaking

Structures for Women

A n o t h e r strategic issue for w o m e n in the c r e a t i o n of a new constitution and a d e m o c r a t i c g o v e r n m e n t i n v o l v e s political d e c i s i o n m a k i n g structures f o r w o m e n . W o m e n have already initiated the d e b a t e about the types of structures for w o m e n that c o u l d exist in a f u t u r e g o v e r n m e n t . A f o r u m s p o n s o r e d by the Institute f o r a D e m o c r a t i c A l t e r n a t i v e in South A f r i c a ( I D A S A ) in D e c e m b e r 1992 b r o u g h t t o g e t h e r w o m e n from organizations across the political spectrum to discuss structures for w o m e n in g o v e r n m e n t . At the w o r k s h o p , a c o n s e n s u s e m e r g e d that South A f r i c a n w o m e n s h o u l d utilize a " p a c k a g e a p p r o a c h " of s t r u c t u r e s and m e c h a nisms that would target d i f f e r e n t levels of g o v e r n m e n t , the judiciary, political parties, and o r g a n i z a t i o n s of civil s o c i e t y . It w a s agreed that the p a c k a g e s h o u l d be c a r e f u l l y linked to the c o n s t i t u e n c i e s of g r a s s r o o t s and rural w o m e n . W o m e n also e x p r e s s e d the need f o r these structures to be given s u f f i c i e n t o p e r a t i n g b u d g e t s . A p a c k a g e of w o m e n ' s d e c i s i o n m a k i n g m e c h a n i s m s c o u l d p r o v i d e a c o m p r e h e n s i v e and f l e x i b l e approach to integrating w o m e n into a n e w d e m o c r a t i c g o v e r n m e n t and enc o u r a g i n g w o m e n ' s participation in p u b l i c life. D i f f e r e n t political parties and o r g a n i z a t i o n s h a v e p r o p o s e d d i f f e r e n t m e c h a n i s m s . T h e r e is c o n s e n s u s a m o n g m a n y g r o u p s , i n c l u d i n g the A N C , DP, and NP, that a system of w o m e n ' s desks, integrated throughout g o v e r n m e n t departments, should be d e v e l o p e d a l o n g the lines of the system of W o m e n ' s Units in A u s t r a l i a . T h e r e is also interest in an indep e n d e n t c o m m i s s i o n on the status of w o m e n , such as the C a n a d i a n Advisory Council on the Status of W o m e n . V a r i o u s parties have put forth proposals for d i f f e r e n t types of q u o t a s or r e s e r v e d positions for w o m e n , but there is little c o n s e n s u s about w h a t types of q u o t a s will best e n s u r e w o m e n ' s participation in public life.

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Transformation Issues: Reconstruction and Beyond B e y o n d the c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k i n g process and the establishment of South A f r i c a ' s first d e m o c r a t i c g o v e r n m e n t lies the challenge of consolidating democracy and " d e l i v e r i n g the g o o d s " of d e m o c r a t i c g o v e r n m e n t to the people. If a democratic transition is to lead to w o m e n ' s full participation and equality in public and private life, then issues relating to the position of w o m e n in the e c o n o m i c and cultural life of the c o u n t r y , as well as w o m e n ' s physical safety both inside and outside the h o m e , must be addressed. If democratic transformation is to succeed, the f o l l o w i n g issues, at a m i n i m u m , must be addressed. Legal Access for Women and Rights

Education

Even if a c o m m i t m e n t to substantive equality is achieved in the constitution, mechanisms must be created to give women affordable and timely access to law. M e t h o d s to claim child maintenance, access to magistrates, and legal protection for rural w o m e n are just a few of the d e m a n d s made by w o m e n that are relevant to legal accessibility. Furthermore, if w o m e n are not aware of their rights, they will not be able to invoke the constitution in their favor. The e x p e r i e n c e of Z i m b a b w e has s h o w n that despite s o m e important legislative g a i n s for w o m e n , improved access to courts, and changes in the relationship between customary law and common law, most w o m e n are not aware of their rights or the process by which they can challenge the abuse of those rights through the courts. 2 7 T h e logistical challenges of creating a system of accessible legal administration are daunting given the demographic realities of South African w o m e n . C o n f e r e n c e s on administrative law and judicial reform have discussed issues of access and administration and the overall restructuring of the judiciary. T h e r e have been different proposals for equal opportunities commissions and o m b u d s to deal with issues of sexual discrimination and maladministration. Other options under consideration include the participation of lay people in the judicial process; special land claims courts and other specialized tribunals; a revised role of traditional courts; and the expansion of the role of existing legal advice offices, such as those provided by the Black Sash and L a w y e r s for Human Rights in many townships and rural areas. T h e experiences of different countries, such as Australia, have shown that national publicity campaigns to promote awareness of the mechanisms and institutions established to deal with legal administration have been e f fective in informing citizens of how their institutions can be utilized. Education about these institutions is essential if ordinary citizens are to use them effectively. T h e cost of legal services will be an important consideration given the economic position of most South African w o m e n .

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Customary Law Reform Large numbers of South African women believe that issues of custom and religion as they affect women's lives have not been adequately addressed during transitional discussions. Yet these issues are most critical if the majority of women in South Africa are to enjoy full participation in a democratic society. Women have identified customary law reform as a top priority. According to Mary Maboreke, "Most African people have neither completely moved away from the customary way of life, nor have they remained squarely rooted in it. In most cases they have a foot in each world." 28 Customary law intersects with women's modern lives in such areas as property ownership, inheritance, and child support. African women have sought to educate a broad spectrum of South Africans about the reality of customary law and its implications for their lives. The abolishment of polygamy, the initiation of a debate over lobola, and the recognition of African and Muslim marriages by civil law are frequently raised by women at various forums. Despite the necessity for reform articulated by women, the NP has opted for a position that essentially maintains the status quo, although its recent pamphlets on women's equality promote the party's decision "not to interfere with the choice of women to live under the current system of indigenous law." Many women argue that in fact there is no choice in this issue at all—customary law is chosen for them by their husbands and their society. The ANC proposals say little about customary and religious discrimination against women, although ANC women have argued against discriminatory practices of traditional leaders during ANC discussions on the future role of traditional leaders and courts. The KwaZulu constitutional proposals "recognize and protect the application of traditional and customary rules not inconsistent with the provisions of [the] constitution," and further state that "traditional and customary rules . . . shall not be modified or repealed by the law." 2 9 Although current transitional players have failed to address the issue, a debate is slowly beginning to develop among women, progressives, traditional institutions, and religious institutions regarding the future role of customary laws in a democratic society. Several forums have been planned for 1993 to engage women and traditional and religious institutions in a process of dialogue that will be crucial to evolving a position of custom and religion in accordance with the principles and laws of a democratic society.

Measures to Protect Women front Domestic

Violence

Domestic violence and rape are of immediate concern to women across the political spectrum. Women's organizations such as Rape Crisis Cape Town and others have been effective in mobilizing around this issue. A

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recent initiative by lawyers, academics, social workers, and the attorney general in the Western Cape to form a special rape court is an example of one cooperative approach. Township-based organizations have also emerged to deal with rape and battery. South African universities have conducted inquiries into sexual harassment and abuse and have developed sexual harassment policies and counseling services. The marital rape exemption in the government's draft legislation on domestic violence caused an outcry from women of all political and social backgrounds, demonstrating that women demand a real commitment to this crucial issue. Domestic violence is a sensitive issue for several reasons. First, it is not a clear-cut apartheid issue—members of the democratic movement are involved in domestic violence and rape. At the launch of the Western Cape Women's Charter Campaign, several woman articulated that "sexual harassment—especially at rallies and meetings—[must be addressed]. Women must be able to speak without fear." 3 0 While politically motivated violence has taken precedence over domestic violence, many women in South Africa argue that there is a strong political content to domestic violence. According to Mamphela Ramphele and Emil Boonzaier, T h e s o c i a l a n d p o l i t i c a l o r d e r in S o u t h A f r i c a i m p a c t s o n w o r k i n g c l a s s m e n in a w a y that b r i n g s o u t the w o r s t k i n d s o f c h a u v i n i s m in t h e m . B l a c k w o m e n p r e s e n t the o n l y c u s h i o n a g a i n s t their c o m p l e t e p o w e r l e s s n e s s . . . . T h e o p p r e s s i o n t h e y s u f f e r in the w i d e r s o c i e t y a c t s as a parad i g m for their d o m i n a t i o n o f w o m e n . 3 1

Furthermore, there appears to be a lack of recognition among the male peace negotiators that women are in fact victims of the political violence. Many women's organizations have criticized constitutional proposals that fail to address the private spheres of the home and the workplace, where sexual harassment and physical abuse occur at alarming rates. Women have also demanded a restructured police force that is sensitive to the needs of rape and battery victims. The traditional police position of not interfering with domestic affairs must be transformed into one that accommodates victims and provides safety and protection. Economic

Empowerment

Much of women's work in South Africa is not recognized as formal labor. Even within the formal workforce, both the labor organizations of the democratic movement and the private business community continue to discriminate against women. These groups are the primary players in the National Economic Forum and other business groupings formed to lobby the transition. However, there has been significant progress by women in

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these areas, which, h o w e v e r slowly, may a f f e c t the long-term process of transformation. In the business community many large companies, such as Pick & Pay a n d Southern Life, have d e v e l o p e d g e n d e r equity policies and i m p r o v e d their capacity to accommodate the needs of w o m e n workers. A cooperative e f f o r t by the W o m e n ' s Bureau and the University of Pretoria has utilized those c o m p a n i e s with favorable gender policies to encourage similar practices in other c o m p a n i e s . T h e National M a n p o w e r C o m m i s s i o n has been restructured and now includes two w o m e n . In late 1992, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) began consultations with a newly f o r m e d South A f r i c a n e m p l o y e r s consultative g r o u p , c o n s i s t i n g of the nine m a j o r e m p l o y e r o r g a n i z a t i o n s in the c o u n try. Nearly all of these o r g a n i z a t i o n s are m a l e - d o m i n a t e d mining g r o u p s that employ very few w o m e n . Businesswomen have focused on finding ave n u e s f o r w o m e n ' s participation in these negotiations, but have f o u n d it extremely difficult to convince these major employers to acknowledge the gender c o m p o n e n t in the e c o n o m i c transition. 3 2 T h e gender debate rose in visibility in the trade union m o v e m e n t w h e n , at the 1989 C O S A T U c o n g r e s s , w o m e n put t w o issues on the agenda: (1) the sexual conduct of shop stewards and (2) the lack of w o m e n in the leadership of the unions. 3 3 T h e congress debated a proposed resolution on these issues for more than four hours only to d e f e a t it. H o w e v e r , the defeat served to mobilize w o m e n , and at the 1991 C O S A T U congress, w o m e n won the right to continue building w o m e n ' s f o r u m s and establish m i x e d - g e n d e r f o r u m s , to e m p l o y a f u l l - t i m e gender c o o r d i n a t o r to oversee a f f i r m a t i v e action programs, and to receive a proper allocation of resources f o r these activities. 3 4 Issues of child care and shared parenting are now on union agendas. T h e r e is o p t i m i s m that over time w o m e n will b e f r e e d f r o m serious issues of harassment and discrimination in order to rise appropriately in the labor m o v e m e n t . Outside the formal labor and business spheres, many w o m e n are e n g a g e d in informal sector b u s i n e s s . D e b b i e B u d l e n d e r suggests that alt h o u g h the informal sector is o f t e n o f f e r e d as a solution to p r o b l e m s of general subsistence and access to e m p l o y m e n t , most w o m e n enter the inf o r m a l sector "out of desperation at the lack of alternatives. And even in this sector, w o m e n generally earn less than m e n . " 3 5 Budlender argues that e c o n o m i c development policies to e m p o w e r w o m e n must not only address their current situation, but also create a range of options for w o m e n in the economy. Since the shift in the political climate brought on by the events of February 1990, w o m e n ' s o r g a n i z a t i o n s and N G O s have a d d e d issues of dev e l o p m e n t and reconstruction to w o m e n ' s activities. A l o n g with international trends, two a p p r o a c h e s have been utilized in this process. T h e

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W o m e n in D e v e l o p m e n t ( W I D ) a p p r o a c h a i m s to integrate w o m e n into the d e v e l o p m e n t p r o c e s s . W I D has g r a d u a l l y u s h e r e d in the G e n d e r and Dev e l o p m e n t ( G A D ) a p p r o a c h , w h i c h a s s u m e s w o m e n ' s i n t e g r a t i o n and add r e s s e s both the s t r a t e g i c a n d p r a c t i c a l n e e d s of w o m e n in the d e v e l o p ment process. O r g a n i z a t i o n s i n v o l v e d in this process include the W o m e n ' s Health Policy P r o j e c t at Wits U n i v e r s i t y , the Rural W o m e n ' s M o v e m e n t , the Natal O r g a n i s a t i o n f o r W o m e n ' s E m p o w e r m e n t , a n d the W o m e n ' s C o l l e g e in C a p e T o w n , a m o n g o t h e r s . 3 6 It is critical that these g r o u p s d e v e l o p links with p o l i c y m a k i n g organs if w o m e n ' s d e v e l o p m e n t issues are to be d e t e r m i n e d a priority d u r i n g the transition and b e y o n d . T h e a p p o i n t m e n t of a g e n d e r c o o r d i n a t o r by the National Land C o m m i t t e e is a g o o d e x a m p l e of an attempt to e s t a b l i s h such a link for w o m e n ' s land and h o u s i n g c o n c e r n s . T h e success of w o m e n in ens u r i n g their i n c l u s i o n in the n e g o t i a t i o n s o v e r land p o l i c y is essential since, a c c o r d i n g to B u d l e n d e r , "In all cases, the greatest p r o b l e m facing all w o m e n is their lack of l e g i t i m a t e a c c e s s to land. Land m e a n s not only a possibility of p r o d u c t i o n , but also h o u s i n g , shelter, security, and access to political p o w e r . " 3 7

Affirmative

Action

S u c c e s s of a f f i r m a t i v e action in both the p u b l i c and private s p h e r e s is the crux of w o m e n ' s political, e c o n o m i c , and social e m p o w e r m e n t . If e f f e c t i v e strategies are p u r s u e d , black w o m e n stand to gain the most f r o m a f f i r m a tive action p r o g r a m s . T h e g e n d e r / r a c e b a l a n c e of a f f i r m a t i v e action will be an important c o n s i d e r a t i o n in the d e v e l o p m e n t of p r o g r a m s . W o m e n ' s part i c u l a r d i s a d v a n t a g e s m u s t b e c o n s i d e r e d b a s e d on their d i v e r s e e x p e r i e n c e s . E m p h a s i s must be placed on the training c o m p o n e n t s of these prog r a m s if w o m e n are to s u c c e e d in the l o n g term. P r o g r a m s must also seek to integrate w o m e n into a broad s p e c t r u m of j o b c a t e g o r i e s , as o p p o s e d to r e i n f o r c i n g their e x i s t i n g i n e q u a l i t i e s . W o m e n m u s t be t r a i n e d to be scientists and d o c t o r s , not only n u r s e s and teachers. A f f i r m a t i v e action must c o n s i d e r d e v e l o p m e n t s in t e c h n o l o g y as they relate to w o m e n ' s skills and not simply f o c u s on s m a l l - s c a l e i n c o m e - g e n e r a t i n g p r o j e c t s . If a f f i r m a t i v e action is to s u c c e e d , e v a l u a t i o n m e c h a n i s m s m u s t b e b u i l t into p r o g r a m s to c o n t i n u a l l y e x a m i n e their s u c c e s s e s a n d f a i l u r e s . W o m e n m u s t p a r t i c i p a t e in t h i s e v a l u a t i o n p r o c e s s to e n s u r e that their n e e d s are met. T h e goals and criteria f o r p r o g r a m s must be t r a n s p a r e n t if they are to b u i l d the c o n f i d e n c e of t h o s e a f f e c t e d by t h e m . S p e c i a l structures, such as e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y c o m m i s s i o n s , must be g i v e n not only the a u t o n o m y to d e v e l o p p r o g r a m s , but also the p o w e r s to e n f o r c e those prog r a m s . Several of S o u t h A f r i c a ' s m a j o r universities have d e v e l o p e d highp r o f i l e a f f i r m a t i v e action p r o g r a m s a n d a p p o i n t e d g e n d e r c o o r d i n a t o r s to

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o v e r s e e t h e m . T h e s e e f f o r t s p r o v i d e an i m p o r t a n t l e a r n i n g e x p e r i e n c e f o r d e v e l o p i n g a c o m p r e h e n s i v e a p p r o a c h to a f f i r m a t i v e action in S o u t h A f r i c a .

Impediments to Transformation T h e r e a r e m a n y o b s t a c l e s to w o m e n ' s s u c c e s s d u r i n g the n a r r o w t r a n s i t i o n a n d b r o a d e r t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . First, s t r u c t u r a l a n d c o n t e x t u a l f a c t o r s of the n e g o t i a t i o n s t h e m s e l v e s will i m p e d e w o m e n in t h e t r a n s i t i o n . It is u n l i k e l y that w o m e n ' s i s s u e s will b e c o n s i d e r e d a p r i o r i t y by m o s t of the n e g o t i a tors, p o l i c y m a k e r s , and c o n s t i t u t i o n w r i t e r s . W o m e n will be a c c o u n t a b l e to the m a l e l e a d e r s h i p of their p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . T h e r e is n o r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f o r w o m e n as w o m e n in the p r o c e s s , a l t h o u g h the G A C h a s b e e n i m p o r t a n t in this r e g a r d . T h e s e c u r i t y s i t u a t i o n a n d p r e v a i l i n g a t m o s p h e r e of v i o l e n c e a r e l i k e l y to r e m a i n t h r e a t e n i n g to t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n of l a r g e n u m b e r s of w o m e n in the p r o c e s s . F u r t h e r m o r e , u n c e r t a i n t y as to t h e o u t c o m e o f the t r a n s i t i o n a l n e g o t i a t i o n s will m a k e it d i f f i c u l t f o r w o m e n to d e v e l o p l o n g - t e r m s t r a t e g i e s . O n t h e o n e h a n d , the deal cut by the A N C a n d t h e N P on the b r o a d f r a m e w o r k of the t r a n s i t i o n l a r g e l y e x c l u d e d w o m e n ' s c o n c e r n s . O n the o t h e r h a n d , w i t h i n that f r a m e w o r k , t h e r e is little a g r e e m e n t o n d e t a i l s a m o n g the v a r i o u s p a r t i e s . T h i s will p o s e d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r w o m e n , e v e n if t h e W N C C h a r ter C a m p a i g n is s u c c e s s f u l at a r t i c u l a t i n g the r a n g e of w o m e n ' s d e m a n d s a n d b r i n g i n g t h e m to the t a b l e . W o m e n m u s t i d e n t i f y t h e s e s t r u c t u r a l o b s t a c l e s a n d d e v e l o p a f l e x i b l e a p p r o a c h that b o t h r e s p o n d s to t h e d y n a m i c t r a n s i t i o n a l e n v i r o n m e n t a n d c o n s i d e r s t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of t r a n s i t i o n a l d e c i s i o n s in the c o n t e x t of a l o n g e r - t e r m p r o c e s s of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . S e c o n d , the m o s t w i d e s p r e a d i m p e d i m e n t to w o m e n in b o t h t h e n a r r o w t r a n s i t i o n a n d t h e b r o a d e r t r a n s f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s is p a t r i a r c h y . A N C N a t i o n a l E x e c u t i v e C o m m i t t e e m e m b e r A l b i e S a c h s h a s s a i d , "It is a s a d f a c t that o n e of the f e w p r o f o u n d l y n o n - r a c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s [in S o u t h A f r i c a ] is p a t r i a r c h y . " 3 8 P a t r i a r c h y is at t h e c r u x of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a n d v i o l e n c e a g a i n s t w o m e n . It has d e t e r m i n e d t h e p r i o r i t i e s of the t r a n s i t i o n p r o c e s s . It is f o u n d in nearly all of t h e s t r u c t u r e s a n d a g e n t s o f t r a n s i t i o n a n d in e v e r y political organization. T h e n o w f a m o u s q u o t a d e b a t e at t h e f o r t y - e i g h t h A N C N a t i o n a l C o n f e r e n c e in D u r b a n in J u l y 1991 p r o v i d e s an i m p o r t a n t e x a m p l e o f p a t r i a r c h y w i t h i n the l i b e r a t i o n m o v e m e n t . A c c o r d i n g to P a t H o r n , It had previously been accepted by the Constitutional Committee, the outgoing NEC, and all the Regions at an Inter-Regional workshop, that as an affirmative action programme to increase the participation of women in the ANC, there should be a minimum quota of 30 percent women of the 50 elected delegates. 3 9

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When the conference commission on the constitution proposed to drop the quota, a lively debate ensued. Most women argued in support of the quota. Of the mixed male reaction Horn reports that "some of the interventions were just crudely sexist," others were concerned with "the disappearance of merit as a criterion," and others supported the women. 4 " After a long debate, the issue of the quota came to a vote. A n d , partly b e c a u s e o f the lack o f a f f i r m a t i v e a c t i o n in the A N C u p to n o w , o n l y 1 7 p e r c e n t o f the C o n f e r e n c e d e l e g a t e s w e r e w o m e n . S o the tried and t e s t e d m e t h o d o f r e s o l v i n g i s s u e s by m a j o r i t y v o t e w a s in d a n g e r o f p e r p e t u a t i n g , rather than r e s o l v i n g , the p r o b l e m . A s a r e s u l t a f t e r the v o t e w a s c o m m e n c e d , a m e m b e r o f the A N C W L d e l e g a t i o n a n n o u n c e d that the A N C W L w o u l d b e a b s t a i n i n g f r o m the v o t e . . . . T h e c o n f e r e n c e f e l l apart and w o m e n , s u p p o r t e d b y m a n y m e n — i n c l u d i n g m e n a n d w o m e n w h o had v o t e d a g a i n s t the quota, s a n g a n d d e m o n s t r a t e d in f a v o u r o f the q u o t a . 4 1

The very next proposal to give Umkhonto we Sizwe commanders automatic seats on the NEC received nearly unanimous support, without objections "on the basis of merit or democracy." 4 2 The quota debate illustrates that although the ANC has made significant progress in developing policy proposals designed to ensure w o m e n ' s equality, the organization has a long way to go before these policies will be practiced by the majority of its members. The parliamentary debates over the NP's draft legislation on women's equality provide evidence for the existence of patriarchy within South Africa's predominantly white political parties. The following comment was made by a National Party MP in support of the legislation: W h i l e w o m e n d o not w a n t to f o r f e i t their f e m i n i n i t y , . . . it is a l s o n e c e s sary that w o m a n as a w o r k e r and an a c h i e v e r s h o u l d b e v i e w e d in a n e u tral m a n n e r . S e x i s t r e m a r k s , o f t e n w e l l - i n t e n t i o n e d , c a n b e e x p e r i e n c e d b y w o m e n a s v e r y d e g r a d i n g . W h i l e a c o m p l i m e n t o n her a p p e a r a n c e is a p p r e c i a t e d , s h e a l s o a s k s f o r r e c o g n i t i o n for h e r c o n t r i b u t i o n t o o t h e r fields.43

The clearly sexist jokes and comments made by members of the Conservative Party during these debates further attest to the existence of patriarchy in the white male culture of South Africa. The influence of the allmale Afrikaner Broederbond on white politics is perhaps the most important example of patriarchy in the Afrikaner political culture. A third impediment to w o m e n ' s success in the transition and transformation process is found in differences among women themselves. Many women point to the lack of a strong women's movement in South Africa. Rhoda Kadalie argues that because political activities of both white and

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black w o m e n in S o u t h A f r i c a h a v e b e e n b a s e d on race c o n s c i o u s n e s s a n d not g e n d e r c o n s c i o u s n e s s , s u c h a m o v e m e n t h a s not e m e r g e d . 4 4 T h e W N C has b e e n the b r o a d e s t attempt to c r e a t e a w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t . H o w e v e r , anger o v e r the W N C ' s l i m i t e d m a n d a t e and the u s e o f the W N C i s s u e s by the N P , w h i l e it u n i l a t e r a l l y p r o c e e d e d w i t h its draft l e g i s l a t i o n ,

have

threatened to d e s t r o y the W N C . T h e W N C has c o n t i n u e d to e x i s t by a g r e e i n g to w o r k a c r o s s d i f f e r e n c e s . H o w e v e r , the historical e x p e r i e n c e s o f S o u t h A f r i c a n w o m e n w i l l c o n t i n u e to test the f r a g i l e c o a l i t i o n . K a d a l i e s u g g e s t s that black women initially articulated their concerns primarily in terms of racial oppression, relegating their oppression as w o m e n to the b a c k ground. . . . [This] was to silence the very important voices which [are] crucial to our understanding of real d e m o c r a t i c t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . T h i s is the fulcrum around which such a coalition will evolve. 4 5 W h e t h e r through the current f o r m o f the W N C or a m o r e l o o s e l y c o ordinated w o m e n ' s e f f o r t , w o m e n m u s t m a i n t a i n p r e s s u r e o n the p r o c e s s and p r o v i d e i n f o r m a t i o n about their i s s u e s a n d c o n c e r n s . T h e p a t r i a r c h y e n t r e n c h e d in S o u t h A f r i c a ' s p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p w i l l not d i s a p p e a r during the p r o c e s s . If v i o l e n c e a c c e l e r a t e s , o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r w o m e n

will

narrow. T h u s , w o m e n m u s t adopt a f l e x i b l e s t r a t e g y that c o n s i d e r s t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of certain priorities and not o n l y u t i l i z e s the m u l t i p l e institutions o f political parties and a d v o c a c y g r o u p s , but a l s o w o r k s as part o f a c o o r d i n a t e d n a t i o n a l w o m e n ' s e f f o r t . T h i s s t r a t e g y m u s t s e e k to i n c o r porate the p o l i t i c s o f d i f f e r e n c e that h a v e t e s t e d the W N C .

Notes 1. Wathint' Abafazi: Stories of Four Women Who Were Beaten by Their Husbands (Cape T o w n : Battered W o m e n ' s W o r k i n g Group, 1992). 2. Quoted in the Star, March 23, 1993. 3. Cherryl Walker, Women and Resistance in South Africa (Claremont: David Philip, 1991), pp. x i i i - x i v . 4. In this section, the description of w o m e n in South A f r i c a is based on preliminary work of the W o m e n ' s National Coalition research coordinator, Debbie Budlender, and from an unpublished report by Shireen Hassim, Centre for Social D e v e l o p m e n t Studies, University of Natal, D u r b a n . Most statistics on South African women fail to truly reflect the reality of their situation. First, official statistics exclude the "independent h o m e l a n d s " of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei ( T B V C areas), where large n u m b e r s of w o m e n live. S e c o n d , few socioeconomic statistics in South Africa are disaggregated by gender at all. For example, the 1991/1992 Race Relations Survey, considered a c o m p r e h e n s i v e statistical yearbook, m e n t i o n s w o m e n on f e w e r than twenty of its m o r e than 6 0 0 pages and provides only one statistical table disaggregated by g e n d e r . Third, statistics

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often consider women broadly and do not examine the wide variances among women of different races and economic backgrounds. 5. Statement by Carole Charlewood, MP, Democratic Party, in Debates of Parliament: Fifth Session—Ninth Parliament, 8-12 February 1993 (Cape Town: Government Printer, 1993), p. 1160. 6. Cathi Albertyn, "You and Your Marriage," Speak, March 1993, p. 23. The government has recently proposed legislation to abolish marital power. This legislation was to be debated in mid-1993. 7. Information on customary marriages was taken from Cathi Albertyn, "You and Your Marriage: Customary Marriages," Speak, April 1993, pp. 1 4 - 1 5 . Customary marriages are not recognized by civil law, only by customary law. 8. Crecentia Mofokeng and Thembi Tshabalala, " N A C T U Women Speak Out," South African Labour Bulletin 17, no. 1, p. 72. 9. Jacklyn Cock, Maids and Madams: Domestic Workers Under Apartheid (London: The Women's Press, 1989), p. 7. 10. Desiree Hansson, "Working Against Violence Against Women: Recommendations from Rape Crisis," in Susan Bazilli, ed., Putting Women on the Agenda (Braamfontein: Ravan Press, 1991), p. 181. 11. Violence in South Africa: The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Mission to South Africa, Phase 1: October 1992-January 1993, p. 12. 12. Bazilli, Putting Women on the Agenda, p. 18. Hansson reports that in 1985 alone, 32,500 women (of whom 13,600 were between fifteen and nineteen years old) had surgery to complete botched illegal abortions. See Hansson, "Working Against Violence," p. 189. 13. Navi Pillay, "Judges and Gender," in Agenda: A Journal About Women and Gender, (Durban), no. 15 (1992), p. 47. 14. Agenda, no. 13 (1992), p. 23; "Press Release of Gender Advisory Committee," March 16, 1993. The GAC was made up of one member of each organization represented at Codesa, and its terms of reference included advising the management committee on gender issues and scrutinizing the decisions of Codesa in terms of their gender implications. 15. Pregs Govender, unpublished paper, Women's National Coalition, February 1993. 16. National Council Meeting Report to the Western Cape Branch of the WNC, February 1993. 17. National Conference: Women and a Charter of Fundamental Rights, March 8, 1983, Pretoria. 18. Weekend Argus, April 3 - 4 , 1993. 19. See Dorothy Driver, "The ANC Constitutional Guidelines in Process: A Feminist Reading," and articles by Murray et al., Ginwala, Mabandla, and Hansson in Bazilli, Putting Women on the Agenda. 20. See Melissa Haussman, "The Personal Is Constitutional: Feminist Struggles for Equality Rights in the United States and Canada," in Jill M. Bystydzienski, ed., Women Transforming Politics: Worldwide Strategies for Empowerment (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 70. 21. ANC Draft Bill of Rights (preliminary revised version), February 1993, p. 10. 22. Hugh Corder, et al. A Charter for Social Justice (Cape Town: Legal Resources Centre, 1992), p. 29. 23. Conversations with A N C women and meetings of the National Association of Democratic Lawyers, January to April, 1993. 24. The Constitution of the State of KwaZululNatal, December 1993.

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107

25. Bridgette Mabandla in Bazilli, Putting Women on the Agenda, p. 77. Mabandla reports that demands made by women at the 1989 A N C conference in Lusaka included that "the law should enable women to have full control over their bodies and that they should have the right to choose to have a child or terminate a pregnancy." 26. Interview with Sheila Camerer, March 1993. Even within the NP, particularly among the men, there is significant confusion as to whether the government has signed or actually ratified CEDAW. Camerer confirms that it has only signed the convention. 27. Mary Maboreke, "Women and Law in Post-Independence Zimbabwe: Experiences and Lessons," in Bazilli, Putting Women on the Agenda. 28. Ibid. p. 220. Maboreke describes how Zimbabwe has attempted to reform its customary law system through the review of choice of law criteria between common law and customary law. This experience has had important implications for women. 29. The Constitution of the State of KwaZulu/Natal, December 1992. 30. Problems and Demands of the W o m e n ' s Charter Campaign in the Western Cape, August 1992. 31. M. Ramphele and E. Boonzaier, "The Positioning of African Women: Race and Gender in South Africa," in E. Boonzaier and J. Sharp, eds. South African Keywords: The Uses and Abuses of Political Concepts (Cape Town: David Philip, 1988), p. 166. 32. Interview with Professor Ronel Erwee, University of Pretoria, March 1993. 33. Rhoda Khadalie, " W o m e n ' s Organisations in South Africa: Models for Peaceful Co-Existence in South Africa," unpublished paper, p. 20. 34. Fiona Dove, "Clearing the Gender Hurdles," South African Labour Bulletin no. 8, p. 67. 35. Debbie Budlender, "Women in Economic Development," in Glenn Moss and lngrid Obery, eds., South Africa Review 6: From 'Red Friday' to CODESA (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1992), p. 359. 36. Michelle Friedman, "Fine-tuning the Gender Agenda," Work in Progress (February 1993). Friedman defines w o m e n ' s practical needs as those that arise out of the customary division of labor and are of daily concern, such as water, shelter, and health care. W o m e n ' s strategic needs address issues of gender relations such as political power and access to employment. Strategic needs must be addressed over the longer term. 37. Debbie Budlender, "Rural Women: The 'Also-Rans' in the Development Stakes," Agenda, no. 12 (1992). 38. Bazilli, Putting Women on the Agenda, p. 9. 39. Pat Horn, " A N C 48th National Conference," Agenda, no. 11 (1991), pp. 15-16. 40. Ibid., p. 16. 41. Ibid., pp. 16-17. 42. Ibid., p. 117. 43. Parliamentary Debates, p. 1175. 44. Kadalie, " W o m e n ' s Organisations in South Africa," p. 7. 45. Ibid., p. 27.

7 Race Relations Law in a Reformed South Africa Thomas G. Krattenmaker

T

he f u n d a m e n t a l principles of South A f r i c a n law r e g a r d i n g race relations are undergoing substantial c h a n g e . In particular, South African law now appears to accept, or to be on the verge of accepting, what I will call an " a n t i - r a c e discrimination principle." T h i s principle forbids statutes or rules employing explicit racial classifications that are intended to subj u g a t e , segregate, or otherwise d i s a d v a n t a g e a d i s f a v o r e d racial g r o u p . A n d there is some reason to hope that South A f r i c a n law may soon incorporate a principle that forbids racial discrimination in assigning the right to vote. 1 In this chapter, I will not try to guess precisely when or to what extent these revolutions in South A f r i c a n law will o c c u r . Rather, a s s u m i n g (or h o p i n g ) that they will occur, I will attempt to d e f i n e and c a t e g o r i z e the s u b s e q u e n t legal and political c o n t r o v e r s i e s over the precise c o n t o u r s of South A f r i c a n race relations law that are virtually certain to arise on the heels of South A f r i c a ' s adoption of the a n t i - r a c e discrimination principle and the principle that voting rights should be assigned without regard to race. In this fashion, I hope to provide a preview to s o m e of the race relations issues one can expect to see debated in South A f r i c a n law f o r the next several years. Legal d e v e l o p m e n t s in the United S t a t e s and e l s e w h e r e teach that b e i n g rid of overt racially discriminatory legislation and granting the franchise without express racial qualifications are only the first, albeit the most important, steps in moving toward a nonracial democratic society. 2 T h e issues addressed here arise whether these initial f u n d a m e n t a l principles are adopted by a parliament or a constitutional c o n v e n t i o n and w h e t h e r they are enforced by the executive or the j u d i c i a r y . 3

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In the first part of this chapter, I a r g u e that a prohibition o n statutes or rules that e m p l o y explicit racial c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s that are i n t e n d e d to s u b j u gate, s e g r e g a t e , or o t h e r w i s e d i s a d v a n t a g e a d i s f a v o r e d or v i l i f i e d race ( U . S . " J i m C r o w " l a w s ) will not e n d the c o n t r o v e r s y o v e r w h a t the basic c o n t o u r s of race relations law s h o u l d be in a nonracial s o c i e t y . Rather, the s o c i e t y that a b o l i s h e s overt, p u n i t i v e , racially d i s c r i m i n a t o r y legislation will a l m o s t certainly and rather q u i c k l y find itself c o n f r o n t i n g three other q u e s t i o n s about the c o n t o u r s of its race relations law: the s c o p e of permissible, p r i v a t e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ; the legal status of u n i n t e n t i o n a l d i s c r i m i n a tion; a n d the legitimacy of r a c e - b a s e d remedial legislation (or a f f i r m a t i v e action). In the s e c o n d part of the c h a p t e r , I a r g u e that a d o p t i n g the p r i n c i p l e that the right to v o t e shall be a s s i g n e d without regard to race will c o n f r o n t South A f r i c a with a s u b s e q u e n t s e r i o u s d i l e m m a : w h e t h e r to e m b o d y that principle in a law that is easily u n d e r s t o o d and a p p l i e d but p o t e n t i a l l y ine f f e c t i v e or, rather, to adopt a legal rule that a p p e a r s m o r e s o p h i s t i c a t e d but may prove incoherent or useless in s o m e cases.

Elaborating the Contours of the Anti-Race Discrimination Principle As noted above, South A f r i c a n law has not abolished racial d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , a l t h o u g h it has taken relatively large strides in that d i r e c t i o n . For p r e s e n t p u r p o s e s , h o w e v e r , a s s u m e that the a n t i - r a c e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n p r i n c i p l e described a b o v e is e n s h r i n e d in South A f r i c a n law. W h a t issues, p r e v i o u s l y s u b m e r g e d in a legal regime that f o s t e r e d discrimination, will then e m e r g e ?

The Problem

of Private

Discrimination

N o d e m o c r a c y , no m a t t e r h o w c o m m i t t e d to a c h i e v i n g e q u a l i t y , can outlaw all f o r m s of racial d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . A r a c e - b a s e d r e f u s a l to p e r m i t s o m e o n e to j o i n the n e i g h b o r h o o d card g a m e or the f a i l u r e to i n c l u d e p e o ple of color on o n e ' s w e d d i n g invitation cannot be o u t l a w e d w i t h o u t first e s t a b l i s h i n g an intolerably intrusive police state. 4 On the o t h e r h a n d , if the legal rule that e m e r g e s f r o m c o m m i t m e n t to the a n t i - r a c e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n principle is that only the g o v e r n m e n t is b o u n d to r e f r a i n f r o m d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , p r o m i s e s of liberation m a y i n d e e d ring hollow. M a y p e o p l e of color be e x c l u d e d f r o m u n i v e r s i t i e s , f r o m h i g h - r a n k ing j o b s in m a j o r c o r p o r a t i o n s , f r o m the c o u n t r y ' s g r e a t s h o p p i n g c e n t e r s , or f r o m large h o u s i n g d e v e l o p m e n t s by the n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l o w n e r s of these institutions? If so, one w o n d e r s how m e m b e r s of d i s a d v a n t a g e d r a c e s may ever be a b l e f u l l y and e f f e c t i v e l y to participate in political a s p e c t s of

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society if they are excluded f r o m schooling, jobs, goods, and housing that make possible daily enjoyment of the nonpolitical benefits of that society. May g o v e r n m e n t avoid its obligations by n a r r o w i n g its responsibilities, selling schools or s w i m m i n g pools or public corporations to private entities that can then discriminate? 5 If so, then the areas within which f r e e d o m from racial discrimination may be e n j o y e d could prove to be very narrow indeed. As these rather simple hypothetical e x a m p l e s show, it is both necessary and difficult, in a society c o m m i t t e d to humane race relations law, to mark out the proper respective b o u n d s of public and private decisionmaking spheres. T h e task is difficult b e c a u s e it involves b a l a n c i n g the c o m mitment to equal opportunity and participation with the concomitant quest for a d e m o c r a t i c society free of e x c e s s i v e intrusion in private matters, while also attempting to determine what are the essential roles of the state that may not be delegated to nongovernmental bodies. Obviously, different societies and different cultures will strike the balances a m o n g these f u n damental values differently. But, at a m i n i m u m , calls for effective controls over private discrimination in such key areas as housing, e m p l o y m e n t , schools, and access to places of public a c c o m m o d a t i o n will be persistent and earnest in a society moving toward a nonracial democracy. T h e problem, as I see it, is s o m e w h a t more acute in South Africa than it is in the United States because of d i f f e r e n c e s in the two countries' economic organizations. A truly open, competitive, and diverse private sector can mitigate the need for legal regulation of discrimination within that sector. Discrimination may not be as consequential or as durable if the disfavored group enjoys equally attractive alternative nondiscriminatory outlets. 6 It is easier to speak of a multifaceted, competitive, and accessible private sector in the United States than it is in South Africa. While portraying itself as a capitalistic society, built on individual initiative and free enterprise, the g o v e r n m e n t white South A f r i c a n s established in fact has practiced a form of state socialism for at least the past four decades. 7 Government is so incestuously intertwined with industry and higher education, for example, that it is quite difficult to argue that a proper respect for private z o n e s of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g c o m p e l s a n a r r o w s c o p e for the a n t i - r a c e discrimination principle. Most major industries in South Africa appear to be protected from competition by government limitations on entry. Universities are not f r e e in South Africa; they are established only by permission of the g o v e r n m e n t , and, until recently, each w a s rigidly c o n f i n e d to adm i t t i n g people of only o n e race. T h u s , f o r e x a m p l e , the a r g u m e n t is not very compelling that one could permit the mining company or sugar refinery or medical school to hire only w h i t e s on the g r o u n d s that these are only the voluntary decisions of nongovernmental units w h o s e competitors may behave differently.

112

The Problem of Unintentional

SOUTH AFRICA

Discrimination

Citizens in a nonracial South African state will repeatedly have to answer the question "What is the discrimination we seek to eradicate or remedy?" Of course, subject to resolution of the public-private boundary dispute just discussed, unlawful discrimination would include rules or standards that explicitly employ race with the purpose of subjugating or segregating people of color. But what of rules that bear more harshly on disadvantaged races although they were not expressly designed for that purpose? Should these rules also be judged "discriminatory"? A leading case from the reports of the Supreme Court of the United States, Washington v. Davis* neatly illustrates the problem. Local authorities in the District of Columbia administered a test of general knowledge and communicative skills to all applicants for jobs on the city's police force. No one ever tested the test, i.e., analyzed whether in fact those who passed made better police officers than those who did not. It was simply assumed, not illogically, that better educated, more capable communicators would make better police officers. 9 But someone did test the test to see how it affected applicants. This analysis showed that a much higher percentage of black than of white applicants failed the test. The city was unable to cite any factor other than race that appeared to account for the differences in performance. Was this racial discrimination? From the standpoint of a job applicant, it must certainly have appeared to be so. Because of the government's regulation, if you were a black person, your chance of obtaining a job was substantially less than if you were white. The District of Columbia might just as well have enacted a statute providing that, in all police hirings, white job seekers were to be preferred over black applicants. But the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that utilizing the test did not constitute racial discrimination in the constitutional sense because no one intended to distinguish among applicants on the basis of race. The disproportionate impact on black citizens was "merely" an unintentional byproduct of a perfectly legitimate, purposeful, and explicit discrimination against people who got lower test scores. Administrators could (as in this instance they later did) choose not to administer the test because of its differential effects, but the anti-race discrimination principle did not require them to do so. Why would one wish to condemn only intentional racial discrimination in a just society? One way to understand the Supreme Court's rationale is to consider what would be required had the Court resolved the matter differently. 1 0 If the disparate impact of the employment test had rendered its use illegal, then it would appear that those who hired police officers would be required to act on overtly racial grounds. They would

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have to either (1) not give the test to black applicants or (2) set different passing rates for blacks and whites. That is, the principle of nondiscrimination would be turned into a legally binding requirement that government must equalize outcomes on a racial basis (except in situations where members of disfavored races did better than members of privileged races) even to the extent of expressly employing race as a legal criterion." This rationale for the Washington case, while impressive, is not necessarily convincing. Others might well assert that, in a society still emerging from a past of oppressive discrimination, unintentional discrimination, in reality, is often or even usually a by-product of previous hostile discrimination. 12 For example, is it not likely that the results of the District of Columbia's test were rooted in an inferior, segregated education that many black Americans received before the fundamental law was altered to forbid racial segregation in public facilities? Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has also been attracted by reasoning like this. The Washington case involved the question whether the city of Washington, D.C., had engaged in unconstitutional discrimination. In an earlier case, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 1 3 the Court considered what Congress meant when it forbade private employers to deprive anyone of employment opportunities because of race. In Griggs, an employer adopted a policy that required job applicants (and current employees seeking to transfer to another line of work within the firm) to have a high school degree or to pass two standardized general intelligence tests. Of people living in the employer's area, white workers were much more likely than black workers to have graduated from high school and to pass the tests. Since many people who had been hired before these requirements were adopted nevertheless performed admirably, there was no serious contention that the requirements measured ability to do the job. But lower courts had found the practices lawful because the employer had no intention, in adopting the requirements, to discriminate on the basis of race. The Supreme Court held that the employer had committed racial discrimination within the meaning of the statute because the company had adopted an employment practice that excluded black workers and that was not shown to be related to job performance. The graduation and test requirements were "fair in form, but discriminatory in operation." Washington and Griggs are technically consistent with each other because the former construes the Constitution while the latter reads a statute. In fact, however, they represent the Court looking each way at the troubling issue of unintentional discrimination. Adherents of the Washington Court's view of discrimination would ask whether the Griggs Court was sufficiently sensitive to the overt racial analysis that Griggs compels. Employers subject to the Griggs rule must not discriminate, but they must

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constantly be acutely race conscious as they monitor the impact of all their policies on various racial groups. Proponents of the Griggs view of discrimination would argue that the Washington Court was insensitive to the underlying causes of the test's disparate impacts and disregarded the intermediate alternative of simply requiring that job tests be job validated. 14 South African lawmakers and jurists will find the issues no less perplexing. As with the problem of private racial discrimination, the problem of devising a wise legal response to unintentional racial discrimination will be especially troublesome in South Africa. The chance that a society's laws will produce disproportionate impacts along racial lines is substantially affected by the extent to which benefits and burdens in that society are disproportionally distributed by race. Given the extreme income and wealth disparities in South Africa, 1 5 disparities that are possibly the world's greatest and that certainly rest on racial lines, this means that the effects of a myriad of laws in South Africa are likely to be felt closely along racial lines. Any statute that affects people differently depending on their wealth, income, education, job status, residence, or language—to cite a few examples—is almost certain to produce effects that correlate very closely with the race of the person affected by the law. And, of course, policymakers will not be able to dismiss easily the argument that they must, because of previous governments' responsibilities for these conditions, treat such unintended effects as unlawful discrimination. The question of whether to treat unintentional discrimination as no less odious than intentional discrimination is in fact a question about the extent to which one believes that the ills of the past continue to infect the present society, as well as a question about the dangers of engendering race-conscious decisionmaking as an antidote to the race-explicit regime of the past. In this manner, the issue of unintentional discrimination is tied to the question of remedial or affirmative action. The Problem of Affirmative

Action

Suppose that, in granting access to educational or employment opportunities, people of color are explicitly favored. For example, a rule might provide that, whatever other criteria are employed, twenty-five seats in an entering university class will be reserved for black students 1 6 or that 50 percent of all new job openings in a certain category will be filled by black workers. 1 7 Would such rules be condemned by the anti-race discrimination principle? To answer this question requires that one first answer another: Precisely what is it that was most objectionable about the previous system of racial discrimination? If the fault was that racial classifications were employed by privileged elites to dominate, subjugate, and impoverish

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members of disfavored racial groups, then this "reverse discrimination" is not objectionable at all, for it seeks to liberate, e m p o w e r , and enrich those who s u f f e r e d f r o m previous harmful discrimination. But if the flaw in the previous system was that it j u d g e d people a c c o r d i n g to the color of their skin rather than according to their individual merit, that it e n g e n d e r e d a political racial spoils s y s t e m , that it r e i n f o r c e d habits and a t t i t u d e s of racial stereotyping, then such discrimination is no better than the disease for which it is said to be a cure. It is easy to overstate the significance of this issue. In many, perhaps most, cases remedial action need not employ any form of racial discrimination. A rule that equalizes per pupil primary school expenditures across the board does not d i s c r i m i n a t e on the basis of race. 1 8 A p r o g r a m that gives special m a n a g e m e n t training to c o r p o r a t e e m p l o y e e s w h o have not previously been given executive responsibilities does not discriminate on the basis of race. It is not racial discrimination to decide to spend less on defense and more on shelter for the homeless. Such laws and policies do not d i s c r i m i n a t e on racial g r o u n d s . And, although they may in practice largely b e n e f i t people of o n e race, the b e n e f i c i a r i e s are not d e f i n e d by their color but rather by their need or by the harm they have suffered in the past. 1 9 T y p i c a l l y , it is only w h e n race-neutral remedial action fails to b r i n g about substantial equality in practice that d e m a n d s for race-specific affirmative action are urged. A s indicated above, such policies will be advocated on the grounds that they merely seek to correct the imbalances created by previous discrimination and attacked on the g r o u n d s that they perpetuate racial s t e r e o t y p i n g by a s s u m i n g that all m e m b e r s of f o r m e r l y d i s f a v o r e d races were equally h a r m e d by the previous laws and that all m e m b e r s of the privileged race were equally to blame for their e n a c t m e n t and e n f o r c e m e n t . In the United States, c o u r t s have o f t e n been reluctant to s c r u t i n i z e c a r e f u l l y r a c e - s p e c i f i c a f f i r m a t i v e action on the g r o u n d s that m a j o r i t y white legislatures are unlikely to impose such disabilities on white people unless they are clearly called f o r . 2 0 If, in the new South A f r i c a , the lawmaking body is c o m p o s e d predominantly of people of color, it will be less easy to conclude that the simple passage of a race-specific remedial measure proves its justification. On the other hand, legislators in a new South Africa may not need to resort to explicit racial classifications to ameliorate present evils. Simply d i s p e r s i n g g o v e r n m e n t b e n e f i t s without r e g a r d to race, returning property that w a s earlier confiscated in a racially discriminatory m a n n e r , and e n f o r c i n g fair e m p l o y m e n t laws may g o a long w a y t o w a r d redressing the current e x t r e m e disparities a m o n g " W h i t e , " " C o l o u r e d , " "Indian," and " B l a c k " that now dominate the d e m o g r a p h y of South A f r i c a .

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Some Conclusions Experience shows that in a society that has practiced pervasive racial discrimination, outlawing state-enforced segregation is an important and ind i s p e n s a b l e beginning in restructuring race relations law. It is, however, only a beginning and not an end. T h e society will rapidly c o n f r o n t a variety of s u b s e q u e n t issues that are quite v e x a t i o u s , at least at the margin. Particularly troublesome issues are the extent to which private discrimination will be tolerated, the proper response to unintentional discrimination, and the permissibility of certain f o r m s of remedial (or a f f i r m a t i v e ) action. Issues such as these will move rapidly to the forefront of political and juridical debate over race relations law o n c e the f u n d a m e n t a l a n t i - r a c e discrimination principle is firmly enshrined in South African law. Further, the unique characteristics of South African race relations history ensures that no ready answers to these questions will be found in the law books of other countries. In large measure, a new South Africa must devise its own response to the challenge to establish a h u m a n e race relations law for all its citizens.

Elaborating the Contours of a Prohibition on Racial Discrimination in Voting Rights Black p e o p l e of African descent constitute an o v e r w h e l m i n g majority of South African citizens. However, black people have never been given any voting rights in South A f r i c a (except f o r rights to participate in rather meaningless elections within the so-called homelands). A central tenet of those a d v o c a t i n g constitutional reform in South A f r i c a is that racial discrimination in assigning the right to vote should be prohibited. 2 1 Surely such a step is an indispensable prerequisite to achieving a durable d e m o c ratic social order in South Africa. Abolishing voting discrimination should also aid in protecting against other f o r m s of racial discrimination in South A f r i c a . Black, as well as socalled coloured and Indian, citizens have been more vulnerable to public discrimination because they have been denied m e a n i n g f u l participation in the conduct of South A f r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t a l a f f a i r s . If the f r a n c h i s e w e r e fairly distributed in South Africa, r e f o r m e r s might feel more c o m f o r t a b l e leaving s o m e thorny issues of race relations l a w — s u c h as the permissible b o u n d s of private or unintentional discrimination, discussed a b o v e — t o legislative, rather than constitutional or judicial, resolution. M o r e than 120 years ago, the United States adopted a constitutional a m e n d m e n t f o r b i d d i n g race discrimination in v o t i n g . 2 2 Many statutory

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prohibitions have been added in the past four decades. 2 3 If the U.S. experience teaches anything, it is that outlawing race discrimination in awarding the f r a n c h i s e is not a simple matter or one that requires resolving only one issue. T h u s , I seek to draw on the U.S. experience to illuminate some of the f u n d a m e n t a l issues of constitutional law and of democratic politics that are likely to be debated and discussed in South A f r i c a should that country take the noble, but complicated, step of seeking to define and outlaw racial discrimination in assigning the right to vote. T o those u n f a m i l i a r with this area of law, the task might s e e m quite simple. T o end discrimination in voting, o n e w o u l d just provide, by c o n stitution or by statute, that in every electoral system established in the country, the vote of e v e r y o n e shall be c o u n t e d equally, irrespective of race. Obviously, such a rule would make a large difference in the conduct of politics in South A f r i c a . But whether it w o u l d be a d e q u a t e to protect against discrimination in a w a r d i n g the f r a n c h i s e should be a debatable issue. People will fiercely d e b a t e w h o is c o v e r e d by the prohibition and precisely what constitutes voting discrimination. Who Is Forbidden

to

Discriminate?

The issue addressed here is precisely the s a m e as that raised a b o v e c o n cerning private discrimination generally. What if a political party, not an arm of the state, adopts a rule that f o r b i d s m e m b e r s of a certain racial group f r o m participating in its processes f o r selecting candidates to run in general e l e c t i o n s ? 2 4 If such a practice is not f o r b i d d e n , a p o w e r f u l party may effectively e x c l u d e that racial g r o u p f r o m participating in South A f r i c a ' s governance. For example, suppose that under a new constitution in which all South Africans are entitled to vote many political parties arise. S u p p o s e further that in o n e town, which remains majority white, the National Party adopts a rule that only w h i t e s can be n o m i n a t e d as N P c a n d i d a t e s for the city council. If white voters elect only NP candidates, people of color will have little or no say in the c i t y ' s governance even though they are fully entitled t o ' v o t e on election days. Or s u p p o s e the A f r i c a n National C o n g r e s s becomes the politically dominant national party but refuses to permit Indians to sit on the p a r t y ' s e x e c u t i v e council. T o the extent that the e x e c u t i v e council affects the positions taken by elected A N C candidates, such an action w o u l d diminish the value of the f r a n c h i s e to South A f r i c a n citizens of Indian descent. The simplest way to deal with such potential problems, of course, is to outlaw racial discrimination by political parties. But a simple rule that all political organizations must be nondiscriminatory may unduly intrude into individuals' political rights. Would a w o m e n ' s caucus within the National

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Party be required to admit males? If a South A f r i c a n political action organization were f o r m e d to address issues, created by previous d i s c r i m i n a tion, of particular c o n c e r n to persons f o r m e r l y classified as c o l o u r e d , would the organization be required to admit white and black voters—even if the numerical strength of the latter groups threatened to overwhelm control of the new organization by coloured citizens? T h e problem, of course, is that the nondiscrimination principle, particularly when applied to voting rights, can be in tension with other core values, especially the rights to self-expression and self-determination. 2 5 In a true nonracial democracy, political parties would take pride in being utterly f r e e of discrimination and would be punished at the polls w h e n they were not. But, because politics in South Africa have always been expressly racially polarized, it will not be easy to assert that a broad prohibition on racial discrimination by private political organizations is appropriate. At a minimum, some of those w h o have suffered in the past from severe political discrimination may strongly believe that they have at least a t e m p o rary urgent need to establish political o r g a n i z a t i o n s that they control. I know of no simple way to define when such control transcends a necessary modicum of self-protection and b e c o m e s an e f f e c t i v e denial of equality at the polling place.

What Is Discrimination

?

T h e manner in which representatives are chosen also can substantially affect the value of the votes cast by m e m b e r s of d i f f e r e n t racial g r o u p s . Thus, a principle that there shall be no racial discrimination in voting may be ineffective or inadequate if not combined with control over the method of representation. However, to m a k e matters more complicated, there is no system of representation that does not threaten some measure of discrimination when c o m p a r e d to its alternatives. T h e problems that arise in scrutinizing systems of representation are quite similar to those, discussed in the first part of this chapter, that arise in attempting to determine to what extent one should c o n d e m n laws as discriminatory when they a f f e c t people of different races differently. I think these points are easiest to illustrate if w e a s s u m e that a large city in South A f r i c a w i s h e s to be governed, in all or s o m e matters, by a city council, consisting of ten elected council m e m b e r s . T w o basic q u e s tions need to b e a n s w e r e d in resolving how best to c h o o s e ten p e o p l e to represent residents of the city. First, will each m e m b e r of the council be elected from one of ten separate districts within the city ( " s i n g l e - m e m b e r districts") or will all members be elected by all the people within the city ("at-large" elections)? 2 6 Second, how will winners be determined in contests under either system? Under a scheme of proportional representation,

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electors vote for parties and each party is allocated the proportion of council seats that correspond to the proportion of votes the party received. Alternatively, in a winner-take-all system, p e o p l e may vote f o r c a n d i d a t e s rather than parties. T h e candidate receiving the most votes gets the seat in s i n g l e - m e m b e r district cases and the top ten vote getters b e c o m e council m e m b e r s in an at-large system. What if the city decides to select the m e m b e r s of its city council by dividing the city into ten districts and selecting o n e council m e m b e r f r o m each district? Unless housing patterns within the city are c o m p l e t e l y desegregated racially, choosing single-member districts rather than selecting council m e m b e r s at large is quite likely to affect the racial composition of the council. 2 7 For a simple example, a s s u m e that 90 percent of the c i t y ' s voters are black while the remaining 10 percent are white, and that the w h i t e residents live in an isolated enclave. Suppose further that, to ensure s o m e continuity on the council, council members will serve for two-year terms, with half the council standing f o r election each year. U n d e r a s i n g l e - m e m b e r district system, one white person will probably be elected to the council every other year from the w h i t e e n c l a v e . If council m e m b e r s were to be elected on an at-large basis, however, it is highly probable that all of them would be black people. 2 " May racial groups (in this case, black v o t e r s ) that w o u l d have done better under an at-large system c o m p l a i n that the s i n g l e - m e m b e r s y s t e m constitutes racial discrimination b e c a u s e it dilutes their v o t i n g p o w e r ? May racial groups (in this case, w h i t e voters) that b e n e f i t f r o m singlem e m b e r districting assert that they are entitled to that system because any other scheme would dilute their voting power? O n e cannot agree with both of these a r g u m e n t s b e c a u s e then no system of representation c o u l d be adopted. But if both a r g u m e n t s are rejected, it is permissible, but not required, to choose either system; then voters are f r e e to choose the system that b e n e f i t s their racial g r o u p at the e x p e n s e of others. That is, in this case, the black majority c o u l d c h o o s e an at-large system in o r d e r to enhance black political power without violating the prohibition on racial discrimination in assigning voting rights. S u p p o s e the city is a l l o w e d to e m p l o y s i n g l e - m e m b e r districts. T h e delineation of these districts can raise equally intractable problems. T h e principle of o n e - p e r s o n - o n e - v o t e p r e s u m a b l y requires that each district contain an equal n u m b e r of voters (in order to ensure that citizens in each district have an equal say in the selection of city council m e m bers). So the city needs to be divided into ten districts, each with an equal n u m b e r of voters. S u p p o s e f u r t h e r that, in this city, people of Indian descent constitute a racial minority. Finally, s u p p o s e that in dividing part of the city into two districts of equal size there are basically t w o o p t i o n s .

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Under option one, Indians will constitute a majority of voters within one district and a very small minority in the other. Under option two, Indians will constitute a significant minority in each district. 29 Does choosing either option one (which virtually guarantees people of Indian descent one representative on the city council, but leaves other Indians virtually politically powerless in one district) or option two (which probably means no Indians on the city council, but may well mean that the representative in each district will be attuned to Indians' interests and concerns) constitute racial discrimination in voting? Do both options violate the nondiscrimination principle? It might appear that the city could avoid the previous problems by adopting two principles: (1) all council seats would be filled by persons elected at large and (2) elections would follow the rule of proportional representation. In the first example, if voters cast their ballots along racial lines, a white candidate is likely to get 10 percent of the vote and thus one of the ten council seats would go to that person. In the second example, following the same reasoning, Indians would be able to obtain a percentage of council seats that corresponds to their percentage of the entire voting populace. But, of course, this response does not avoid the charge of discrimination at all. If black (or white, or whatever) voters would have had more power under a single-member system or a system of voting for candidates rather than parties, then at-large proportional representation constitutes a dilution of that power and, for that reason, can be said to be discriminatory. Indeed, the simple choice between proportional representation and winner-take-all schemes, in which voters choose among candidates rather than parties, can have racial effects. Consider again the first example, in which ten council members must be chosen from a city that is 90 percent black and 10 percent white, but assume the racial distribution of voters is the same in each voting district. Under a proportional representation scheme, a white candidate could receive 10 percent of the vote in each district and thus be awarded a seat. But if one council member is selected on a winner-take-all basis from each district, all council members are likely to be black. In a democracy that does not permit racial discrimination in voting, is the "correct" outcome that 90 percent of council seats should go to black people because blacks constitute 90 percent of voters (proportional representation), or is it that 100 percent of seats should go to blacks because blacks win 100 percent of the district elections (winner-take-all)? In these examples, I have used city council governing bodies for illustrative purposes because I think the consequences are easier to grasp. It should be clear, however, that the difficulties apply equally at the level of the national legislature. One can distribute representatives to the national legislature either by districtwide (single-member) or nationwide

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(at-large) voting. Citizens in either type of election can vote for candidates (largest vote getter wins) or for parties (proportional representation). The p r o b l e m s with i d e n t i f y i n g what one m e a n s by a v o t i n g system f o r a national legislature that is free of racial discrimination are identical to those portrayed with respect to city councils. Some

Conclusions

I do not wish to be misunderstood. T h e f o r e g o i n g is not an argument for m a i n t a i n i n g the status quo in South A f r i c a . Certainly, a c o r n e r s t o n e of constitutional r e f o r m for South A f r i c a should be a d o p t i o n of the simple principle that there should be no racial d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in assigning the right to vote. Such a principle is widely, p e r h a p s universally, understood as an indispensable element of a truly d e m o c r a t i c society. Without doubt, adoption of such a principle would very substantially increase the political power wielded by people of color in South A f r i c a . Reality teaches, however, that the simplicity of this principle can be deceptive. In truth, the principle of nonracial voting laws masks a serious dilemma that must be confronted at some time, although not necessarily at the outset of reform. T o express that principle as a rule of law, one must apparently choose between a rule that is easily understood and easily applied, but potentially ineffective in some cases, and a rule that promises to have more teeth but is likely to prove incoherent or useless in some cases. On the one hand, the nondiscrimination principle is simple to understand and apply if all it means is that, once a system of representation is set up, the vote of everyone counts equally regardless of race. If that is all the nondiscrimination principle means, however, the effective voting power of s o m e racial groups may be diluted by private political organizations or by the choices made a m o n g various possible systems of representation. On the other hand, the nondiscrimination principle has no readily ascertainable and acceptable meaning if it is taken to require that all citizens shall enjoy equal voting power regardless of their race. T h e goal of prohibiting racially discriminatory franchises may be thwarted if the law does not also reach private political activity that is racially segregated. Yet such a law might unduly interfere with the constitutional political rights of freedom of speech and association that are established to permit people to seek to define and further their own welfare. Moreover, the choice of geographical units from which representatives will be elected can dramatically affect the political power of various racial groups. This " p r o b l e m " is not "solved" but only repackaged by expanding or contracting the geographical unit or by adopting or rejecting a system of proportional representation. Ironically, it a p p e a r s that there is only one, o b v i o u s l y unacceptable, way to guarantee complete racial equality in the exercise of the franchise.

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T h a t is to d e c r e e that ( 1 ) in e v e r y b o d y of e l e c t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s e a c h race shall h a v e the s a m e p r o p o r t i o n of m e m b e r s of the b o d y as its p r o p o r t i o n in the e l e c t o r a t e , a n d ( 2 ) v o t e r s may v o t e o n l y f o r m e m b e r s of their o w n race. T h a t s u c h a r e s p o n s e w o u l d b e m o n s t r o u s l y p e r v e r s e 3 0 in a S o u t h A f r i c a that is s u p p o s e d to b e t u r n i n g a w a y f r o m a past of strict p o l i t i c a l s e g r e g a tion d o e s not m e a n t h e r e is no point in s e e k i n g to e r a d i c a t e r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in v o t i n g . R a t h e r , I b e l i e v e t h e p o i n t is t h a t , as in all m a t t e r s of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m , t h e s e a r c h is not f o r t h e " p e r f e c t " b u t f o r t h e " b e t t e r " a n d that, at s o m e p o i n t in t h e e v o l u t i o n of the law, t h e d e f i n i t i o n of " r i g h t s " r e q u i r e s h a r d c h o i c e s , f o r t h e e x e r c i s e of a r i g h t b y o n e p e r s o n m a y o f t e n b e p e r c e i v e d as the d i m i n u t i o n of the right of a n o t h e r .

Observations T h e e n t i r e p o p u l a c e of S o u t h A f r i c a , not o n l y its c i t i z e n s o f c o l o r , w i l l t a k e g r e a t s t r i d e s f o r w a r d s h o u l d S o u t h A f r i c a n l a w c o m e to i n c o r p o r a t e t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t o p p r e s s i v e , s t i g m a t i c r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n is i m p e r m i s s i b l e a n d i l l e g a l . A key e l e m e n t of s u c h a l e g a l r e f o r m w i l l b e e x t e n d i n g t h e r i g h t to v o t e to all c i t i z e n s w i t h o u t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n o n t h e b a s i s of r a c e . But it w o u l d be f o o l i s h to i g n o r e the plain historical f a c t t h a t a d o p t i o n of s u c h legal p r i n c i p l e s will be the b e g i n n i n g , rather than t h e e n d , of d e f i n i n g the c o n t o u r s of r a c e r e l a t i o n s law in S o u t h A f r i c a . T h e r e a s o n s f o r the c o n t i n u i n g d e b a t e o v e r t h e s e c o n t o u r s a r e not p e c u l i a r to S o u t h A f r i c a , alt h o u g h they are v e r y p o w e r f u l l y e x p e r i e n c e d t h e r e . W h e r e v e r p e o p l e c o n t i n u e to think or act in racial t e r m s , the i s s u e of t h e p e r m i s s i b l e s c o p e of p r i v a t e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n will r e m a i n . W h e r e v e r b e n e f i t s a n d b u r d e n s a r e not s p r e a d e q u a l l y in s o c i e t y , w i t h o u t r e g a r d to race, l a w s will a f f e c t d i f f e r e n t races differently no matter how sensitive or h u m a n e the legislator. A n d w h e r e v e r p r e s e n t d i s p a r i t i e s a r e o b v i o u s l y t r a c e a b l e , at l e a s t in p a r t , to p r e v i o u s o v e r t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n by t h e s t a t e , a c a s e c a n be m a d e f o r t h e leg i t i m a c y of r a c e - b a s e d r e m e d i a l a c t i o n . In d e c i d i n g to a d o p t b a s i c a n t i - r a c e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n p r i n c i p l e s to g o v e r n their p u b l i c a n d p o l i t i c a l l i f e , S o u t h A f r i c a n s will e n r i c h t h e m s e l v e s a n d their c o u n t r y a n d e n d t h e i r i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l i s o l a t i o n . In c o n f r o n t i n g the s u b s e q u e n t i s s u e s c o n c e r n i n g t h e p r e c i s e p a r a m e t e r s of t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s , S o u t h A f r i c a n s will s t a r e into t h e v e r y s o u l of t h e i r n a t i o n a n d will c o n f r o n t , a g a i n a n d a g a i n , the q u e s t i o n s of j u s t h o w m u c h they a r e d i v i d e d a l o n g r a c i a l l i n e s a n d j u s t h o w f a r t h e y a r e w i l l i n g t o g o to try t o e r a s e those lines. T o s o m e , t h e q u e s t f o r a neat set of r u l e s i m p l e m e n t i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e of n o r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n is a f o o l ' s v e n t u r e . C e r t a i n l y , U . S . l a w h a s

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p r o d u c e d n o tidy a n s w e r to s u c h q u e s t i o n s as h o w to d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n p e r m i s s i b l e p r i v a t e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and that w h i c h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l or statutory law f o r b i d s or h o w to d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n unintentional and p u r p o s e ful d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . S o u t h A f r i c a , I h a v e s u g g e s t e d , w i l l f i n d t h e s e q u e s t i o n s e v e n harder to r e s o l v e . Perhaps, then, a r e f o r m e d S o u t h A f r i c a w i l l g i v e up that s e a r c h f o r legal c o n t r o l s o n racial d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and s i m p l y c o n t i n u e s q u a b b l i n g — o f t e n a l o n g racial l i n e s , but w i t h d i f f e r e n t racial g r o u p s h o l d i n g the p o w e r — o v e r the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f S o u t h A f r i c a ' s res o u r c e s . S h o u l d this c o m e to pass, it w i l l s i g n a l the a b a n d o n m e n t o f h o p e for a stable nonracial d e m o c r a c y in S o u t h A f r i c a .

Notes I owe special thanks to Bill Gould, Mike S e i d m a n , and Gerry Spann for very helpful comments. This chapter was inspired by my colleagues at the University of Natal, particularly G e o r g e D e v e n i s h , Karthy G o v e n d e r , David M c Q u o i d Mason, and Vincent Mntambo, all of w h o m are working to instill the reality of j u s tice in South A f r i c a n law. An earlier d r a f t of the first part of this chapter was published in the June 1992 edition of the South A f r i c a n A t t o r n e y s ' journal, De Rebus. This chapter is also scheduled for publication in volume 10 of the Harvard Black Letter Journal. 1. The African National Congress has, of course, long advocated such a policy. See, for example, A N C Constitutional Committee, A Bill of Rights for a New South Africa, Article 3 (Political Rights), 1990. T h e National Party has also proposed a voting system in which blacks would be franchised, but additional provisions would dilute the voting power of the m a j o r i t y . See A N C , "National Party Plans for a Future South A f r i c a " (undated mimeo, copy on file with author). 2. In the United States, racial discrimination in v o t i n g was outlawed by the Fifteenth A m e n d m e n t to the Constitution, ratified in 1870. Nine years later, Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) forbade most racial classifications (except for so-called separate but equal provisions). T h e s e events, obviously, did not usher in a democratic, nonracial United States. 3. Thus, this chapter deals with the content, rather than the source(s), of the emerging South African law of race relations. Whether this discussion proves to be about administrative law or constitutional law or legislative options depends upon the resolution of other questions confronting South African constitution makers not taken up here, such as the distribution of authority to m a k e rules a m o n g the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. 4. See, for example, Moose Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (dissen'ting opinion of Justice Douglas): " T h e associational rights which our system h o n o r s permit all white, all black, all brown and all yellow clubs to be f o r m e d . . . . Government may not tell a man or woman w h o his or her associates must be. T h e individual can be as selective as he desires." T h e principle that an open, democratic society may tolerate s o m e f o r m s of private discrimination is not boundless. At some point, the m a g n i t u d e of the harm caused by such discrimination or the transparency of the g o v e r n m e n t ' s willful refusal to stop it may require that government intervene. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding unconstitutional state court e n f o r c e m e n t of racially restrictive covenants on the resale of private housing).

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5. In Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), ¡he Supreme Court held that a city council was permitted to close a municipal s w i m m i n g pool f o l l o w i n g a desegregation decree. 6. Of course, 1 do not mean to say that the presence of competitive markets vitiates the utility of or the need for antidiscrimination laws. I do mean to observe that where to draw the public-private line is a difficult and delicate matter that will be a f f e c t e d , inter alia, by the degree of freedom afforded by private markets, organizations, and institutions. 7. T h i s point is based on my own observations of the economy of South Africa while residing there from May through August 1991. Sadly, very little of the literature on South Africa discusses with care the industrial organization policies of the South African (white) government and the e f f e c t s these policies have had on freedom and initiative in South Africa. A general overview of the extent to which government controls output, prices, and entry in m a j o r areas of c o m m e r c e can be gleaned from L. T h o m p s o n , A History of South Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). 8. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 9. Of course, the extent to which this conclusion was "logical," as well as what might constitute a valid, racially neutral test of communicative skills as those skills predict effective police work, may be a tightly contested issue. See note 18. 10. See Ely, "Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law," 79 Yale L.J. 1205 (1970). 11. As the following paragraphs show, o t h e r — p e r h a p s less racially intrusive—remedies might have been available. 12. See Perry, " T h e Disproportionate Impact T h e o r y of Racial D i s c r i m i n a tion," 125 U.Pa.L.Rev. 540, 558 (1977). 13. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). It is not my intention, in this short piece, to pretend to provide a primer on U.S. race relations law. However, the Griggs doctrine was s o m e w h a t qualified in Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 4 9 0 U.S. 6 4 2 (1989), partly because of some of the concerns reflected in Washington v. Davis. 14. S o m e w h a t hidden in the concepts of "unintentional d i s c r i m i n a t i o n " or "disproportionate impact" or "job validation" is the question of what w e might mean by racially just e m p l o y m e n t standards. To the extent that, particularly because of previous discrimination and segregation, educational levels and cultural norms are generally distinct for black people and white people who reside in the same geopolitical entity, there may be no such thing as a generally valid j o b perf o r m a n c e test that treats black and white people equally. A test that measures verbal skills as they accurately predict workplace p e r f o r m a n c e might need to be worded very differently for black and white applicants. Again, this problem is likely to be particularly acute in South Africa, where no single language is spoken by more than 40 percent of the populace and where people of color and white people have been systematically prohibited from intermingling. In a country w h e r e , until very recently, black and white people could not ride the same bus or rest on the same stretch of beach, much less attend school together, it is quite likely that cultural differences divide the races in ways that few people understand. 15. For example, one source calculates that in 1985, whites (who constitute less than 15 percent of the populace) accounted for 67.2 percent of all household e x p e n d i t u r e s , while b l a c k s ( w h o m a k e up m o r e than 75 percent of S o u t h A f r i c a n s ) accounted for 20.7 percent. " S o u t h A f r i c a , " Economist, N o v e m b e r 3, 1990, p. 9. For even more extreme disparities in land o w n e r s h i p , see s a m e article, pp. 1 8 - 2 2 .

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16. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), the Supreme Court invalidated a medical school's admissions plan that ensured the admission of a specified number of students from certain minority groups. 17. In United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 92 (1987), the Supreme Court upheld a trial j u d g e ' s order that "for a period of time" the Alabama highway patrol must award at least 50 percent of its promotions to corporal to black troopers if qualified black candidates were available. 18. Interestingly, this may be true only if we regard Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), discussed in the first part of this chapter, as correctly decided. In a world in which disproportionate impact established discrimination (or was substantial evidence of purposeful discrimination), such a rule could be said to be discriminatory in that it would lower the level of spending on white children, who constitute a small percentage (a "discrete and insular minority") of the population. 19. The principle that remedial measures that do not employ express racial classifications are, where feasible, preferable to overt racial preferences is a centerpiece of the current Supreme Court's affirmative action jurisprudence. See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (Part IV). 20. The argument for such a position is forcefully set out in Ely, "The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination," 41 U.Chi.L.Rev. 723, 7 3 5 - 7 3 6 (1974). For a recent case in which the U.S. Supreme Court looked more critically at a race-based remedial program in part because it was enacted for the benefit of black citizens by a majority black city council, see City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (Part III. A). 21. See ANC Constitutional Committee, A Bill of Rights for a New South Africa (1990). 22. U.S. Constitution, Fifteenth Amendment, ratified 1870. 23. Particularly important is the Voting Rights Act of 1965. That act is discussed in detail, and upheld against constitutional challenges, in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 24. In U.S. legal history, the most famous example concerns the long-running battle between the U.S. Supreme Court and the Texas Democratic Party over the latter's attempts to preclude black voters from exercising any influence in the party. This history is summarized in Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). 25. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that U.S. political parties have such rights. See, for example, Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208 (1986). 26. Of course, intermediate alternatives exist. For example, one could divide the city into five distinct districts and select two people from each district. Or one might select some council members from districts and others "at large." Such devices can mitigate, but do not avoid, the instances of apparent discrimination, discussed below, that might arise. 27. This problem is suggested by the facts in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). Black citizens argued that an at-large, winner-take-all system for selecting city commissioners discriminated against black voters, who were consistently outvoted by the white majority. The Supreme Court, in a supremely ironic result, could not muster a majority of justices who could agree on a single theory to dispose of the case. In Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982), the Court affirmed a trial court's decree invalidating an at-large voting system that submerged the minority of black voters. 28. Under the hypothetical plan, five positions are open each year. With ninety black voters for every ten white voters, five black candidates could each re-

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c e i v e e i g h t e e n v o t e s for e v e r y ten v o t e s g a r n e r e d by t h e t o p w h i t e c a n d i d a t e if an a t - l a r g e s y s t e m w e r e in p l a c e . 2 9 . T h i s p r o b l e m is s u g g e s t e d , in p a r t , by United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 4 3 0 U . S . 144 ( 1 9 7 7 ) . S e e k i n g to e n h a n c e b l a c k v o t i n g s t r e n g t h , N e w Y o r k d r e w a d i s t r i c t line s o that a 3 0 , 0 0 0 - m e m b e r H a s i d i c J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y , p r e v i o u s l y l o c a t e d in o n e d i s t r i c t , w a s t h e n s p r e a d a c r o s s t w o d i s t r i c t s . T h e S u p r e m e C o u r t f o u n d no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n in t h e s e o v e r t racial p o l i t i c s b e c a u s e N e w Y o r k w a s not m o t i v a t e d by hostility t o w a r d w h i t e s or J e w s . 3 0 . P r i n c i p l e ( 2 ) is a l r e a d y the law in a p a r t h e i d S o u t h A f r i c a . " W h i t e s , " " C o l o u r e d s , " and " I n d i a n s " e a c h h a v e their o w n s e p a r a t e p a r l i a m e n t s and a d m i n ister their " o w n a f f a i r s . " For t h e liberation s t r u g g l e that b l a c k S o u t h A f r i c a n s h a v e w a g e d to turn out to be a v e h i c l e for, inter alia, s u b s t i t u t i n g b l a c k for w h i t e d o m i n a n c e o v e r the s o - c a l l e d c o l o u r e d and Indian r a c e s w o u l d be a tragedy i n d e e d .

8 National Reconciliation and a New South African Defence Force Herbert M. Howe

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he new South A f r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t will seek a c o m p e t e n t military loyal to the nation's constitution. While the new government will include leading African National Congress m e m b e r s , it will have to rely for its military mostly upon the present South A f r i c a n D e f e n c e Force ( S A D F ) — a long-time o p p o n e n t of the A N C . T h e A N C ' s military w i n g , U m k h o n t o we Sizwe (MK), is small and lacks conventional military capabilities. Many A N C members will suspect the loyalty of the S A D F . Even as late as 1992, elements within the S A D F considered the legalized A N C as "the e n e m y " and were mounting covert operations against it. 1 What problems might the new government encounter when seeking a more representative military that includes some M K m e m b e r s , especially at the senior levels, and the demobilization of some present S A D F units or personnel? A representative military that includes both S A D F and M K m e m b e r s could greatly assist national reconciliation. Initially, an agreement on a new defense force is necessary for the A N C to accept an overall negotiated settlement. T h e symbolism of former combatants uniting could aid reconciliation. Significant inclusion of white personnel could reassure the economically important whites about protection of their rights. By drawing from the two opposing forces, the new military would underline a general "no-losers" policy, would decrease sources of potential opposition through inclusion, and would protect the government's economic and political reforms. An examination of military s t r u c t u r e / c o m p o s i t i o n , control, training, and t i m i n g issues indicates that the S A D F and the M K will accept a 127

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merger and that the m e r g e r could begin under the Transitional Executive Council. T h e merger will probably c o m p r i s e the smaller M K integrating into the larger and more conventionally skilled S A D F , but c o n t i n u i n g S A D F "dirty trick" operations make the creation of a new force, drawing upon e x - S A D F , MK, a n d other personnel, increasingly likely. W h i l e the merger will probably include personnel f r o m the h o m e l a n d a r m i e s and conceivably even f r o m other g r o u p s ( K w a Z u l u Police and the A z a n i a n Peoples Liberation A r m y ) , I will limit my examination in this chapter primarily to the S A D F and M K because of their present and f u t u r e military capabilities and their affiliation with the two major political actors. Both the S A D F and the M K are u n d e r g o i n g unusual, u n p r e c e d e n t e d physical, personnel, and psychological changes that reflect their declining status. President de Klerk lessened the power of South A f r i c a ' s securocrats who reigned supreme during the 1980s. Throughout the 1980s, the S A D F played a key administrative and d e c i s i o n m a k i n g role in P. W . B o t h a ' s Total Strategy, which m a r s h a l e d all the n a t i o n ' s political, e c o n o m i c , and coercive tools to c o m b a t o p p o s i t i o n . T h e S A D F helped run the National Security M a n a g e m e n t System ( N S M S ) , the State Security Council ( S S C ) and the Joint M a n a g e m e n t Committees of the SSC. De Klerk d o w n g r a d e d the S S C and relegated it to its original status as one of four standing cabinet committees. T h e cabinet, which previously had simply acceded to S S C actions, now has veto p o w e r over S S C decisions. President de Klerk has cut the S A D F budget since 1990 and has dramatically downsized the a r m s industry. A R M S C O R ( A r m a m e n t s Corporation of South Africa) and its affiliates have laid off over 45,000 e m p l o y e e s and canceled at least eleven m a j o r w e a p o n s projects. De Klerk has cut South A f r i c a ' s standing f o r c e f r o m about 75,000 to about 5 0 , 0 0 0 by initially halving national service to only o n e year and then by abolishing it altogether. He removed ex-General Magnus Malan as minister of d e f e n s e and initially replaced him with Roelf Meyer, w h o reportedly e n g i n e e r e d the early departures of hardliners Lieutenant-General W i t k o p B a d e n h o r s t of Military Intelligence and Major-General Joep Joubert of Special Forces. In late D e c e m b e r 1992, de Klerk fired twenty-three high-ranking o f f i c e r s for acting, in unspecified w a y s , against his reform p r o g r a m . Most of the o f f i c e r s had served in the D e p a r t m e n t of Military Intelligence ( D M I ) , which observers had linked to an ongoing campaign against the A N C . Finally, under de Klerk the R e c o n n a i s s a n c e C o m m a n d o s , an elite special warfare unit with close ties to DMI, went from a full force of about 6 , 0 0 0 down to about 2,500. T h e A N C political leadership has suspended internal recruitment and training. Most of M K is still several thousands of miles away, in Tanzania and Uganda, and foreign supporters have largely stopped weapons shipments

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to M K . T h e s e security downsizings may have aided negotiations by reassuring each s i d e — e s p e c i a l l y South A f r i c a ' s w h i t e s — o f the o t h e r ' s motives. T h e A N C ' s August 1990 suspension of its armed struggle " m a r k e d a watershed in South A f r i c a ' s history," notes Pauline Baker. It " s h o w e d the s e c u r i t y - c o n s c i o u s white electorate that d e Klerk w a s e n g a g e d with genuine m o d e r a t e s w h o were prepared to c o m p r o m i s e . " 2 W h i l e the S A D F ' s downsizing initially appealed to the A N C , the apparent involvement of individual S A D F personnel in continued urban violence has w e a k e n e d political reconciliation and angered all levels of the A N C . P s y c h o l o g i c a l l y , each force a c c e p t e d heavy political i n d o c t r i n a t i o n about the other as its i m p l a c a b l e e n e m y a n d yet n o w , a f t e r years of opposition, sees its political master negotiating a political settlement. Political resolution of the A n g o l a n and N a m i b i a n c o n f l i c t s d a m a g e d the m o r a l e of both units. T h e 1990 s u s p e n s i o n of the M K ' s s t r u g g l e disappointed many M K partisans "to w h o m the s y m b o l i s m of the a r m e d conflict r e m a i n s i m p o r t a n t . " 3 T h e S A D F had militarily r e i g n e d s u p r e m e in Namibia (and usually in Angola), but the political settlement f o r c e d it to give way to its e n e m y and f o r c e d the M K to l e a v e its only southern A f r i c a n c a m p s for T a n z a n i a and U g a n d a . Inquiries into the past conduct of both f o r c e s have probably hurt internal m o r a l e by r e v e a l i n g serious misuses of authority. Relations b e t w e e n the S A D F and the M K have i m p r o v e d d u r i n g the r e f o r m i s t de Klerk era. By m i d - 1 9 9 3 h i g h - r a n k i n g personnel f r o m both forces were meeting to discuss their inevitable integration. Continued political c o m p r o m i s e s between government and A N C negotiators as well as increased personal contact between S A D F and M K personnel have significantly lowered mutual suspicions. Will the g o v e r n m e n t and the A N C agree to a military m e r g e r ? A laughable proposition during the P. W . Botha era, merger now is a virtual certainty. T o p government and A N C s p o k e s p e r s o n s agree that inclusion of M K personnel will g i v e increased legitimacy to both the S A D F and the new g o v e r n m e n t , w h i l e the nation will need the c o m p e t e n c y of existing S A D F personnel. Will the S A D F accept a g o v e r n m e n t - m a n d a t e d m e r g e r ? T h e S A D F ' s top echelon e n j o y e d a generally reformist reputation during P. W . B o t h a ' s era and more recently has publicly supported de K l e r k ' s c h a n g e s and employed physical f o r c e , notably twice at Ventersdorp, against white conservatives. It has assented, h o w e v e r g r u d g i n g l y , to de K l e r k ' s limited res t r u c t u r i n g of the d e f e n s e f o r c e . In 1992, Kat L i e b e n b e r g , chief of the S A D F , a c k n o w l e d g e d f u t u r e M K inclusion in his p r o p o s e d " S u p e r Def e n c e Force." 4 T h e r e f o r e , s o m e o b s e r v e r s a s s u m e an a u t o m a t i c S A D F acceptance.

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Yet, as Samuel Huntington notes, political reform may transform military beliefs f r o m reformist to conservative: " A s society changes, so does the role of the military. In the world of oligarchy, the soldier is a radical; in the middle-class world he is a participant and arbiter; as the m a s s society looms on the horizon he b e c o m e s the conservative guardian of the existing order." 5 Could South A f r i c a r e s e m b l e Algeria of the late 1950s w h e n French o f f i c e r s initially o b e y e d de G a u l l e but then, as de G a u l l e ' s policies increasingly f o r c e d the o f f i c e r s to act against fellow w h i t e c o n s e r v a t i v e s , began to militarily oppose their civilian president? Could the Ventersdorps not prove an a f f i r m a t i o n of military loyalty but e m e r g e as a w i d e n i n g crack in civil-military relations? T h e removal of Generals Malan, B a d e n horst, and Joubert as well as the D e c e m b e r 1992 firing of twenty-four top o f f i c e r s may have raised civil-military tension. As Jacklyn Cock notes in Chapter 9, the S A D F is divided into constitutionalist and praetorian wings, with the latter c o n t a i n i n g operational army units. Early 1992 polls estimated Conservative Party support a m o n g white S A D F members at around 60 percent. 6 Clearly, a widening division between de Klerk and his o f f i c e r s or between M a n d e l a and the M K w o u l d threaten both a s u c c e s s f u l military merger and overall negotiations. Yet several factors will temper overt military opposition to a restructured S A D F that includes M K . Despite g r o w ing international displeasure about continuing covert operations, de Klerk has moved cautiously on w e a k e n i n g the m i l i t a r y ' s c o r p o r a t e status. Perhaps fearing a variety of hostile reactions f r o m his military or else because he needs a loyal security force if negotiations fail, de Klerk has cautiously restructured his security forces. A n d r é du Toit writes that "the securocrats have been willing to go along with the new political initiatives launched by de Klerk, but on the implicit understanding that they will remain masters in their o w n house." 7 T h e n , until the D e c e m b e r purge, he had e a s e d his personnel changes by seeking r e a s s i g n m e n t s and not resignations and by o f f e r i n g attractive pensions to early retirees. Despite growing evidence of rogue, or praetorian activity f r o m the S A D F , de Klerk waited until Dec e m b e r 1992 b e f o r e restructuring his military. He b a l a n c e d his f i r i n g of top o f f i c e r s by apparently alloting t h e m full pension b e n e f i t s a n d by not pressing any legal charges against them. While some S A D F officers regard the force as a "guardian of the v o l k " (and the S A D F o f f i c e r corps is about 8 0 percent A f r i k a n e r ) , the strong March 1992 referendum vote for de K l e r k ' s r e f o r m s d a m p e n e d military thoughts of opposition. Over 60 percent of the Afrikaners (and 6 8 percent of all whites) supported de Klerk. D e K l e r k ' s popularity has fallen significantly since then, but no o p p o s i n g individual or organization has gained

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wide acceptance as an alternative to de Klerk and his reforms. Interviewed SADF officers acknowledge a war-weariness and the inevitability of a political change. Continuation of the status quo would prolong the nation's negative growth rate and growing violence while reinviting sanctions. MK will accept merger of its small force into the much larger SADF. MK has generally been regarded as one of the A N C ' s more radical forces; given its ongoing drop in status and presumed opposition to the ANC's compromises with the government, could MK actively oppose merger with its former foe? Stephen Davis, author of Apartheid's Rebels, notes that MK has publicly supported the A N C ' s attempts at peaceful negotiation and even the Pretoria Minute, which suspended armed violence. "There's no real evidence of a split on the negotiations issue," says Davis, "only over the specifics." 8 Marina Ottaway suggests that the ANC and MK favor inclusion: "Disbanding MK without obtaining its integration in the SADF would involve new risks [from township youth]." 9 By mid-1993, the ANC was losing control of the returned MK cadres, who were increasingly protesting the lack of jobs and turning to violent crime. As with possible rogue SADF units, the only threat from rebellious MK personnel would be that of provoking limited hostilities that would slow down negotiations.

Structure and Composition Will MK form a new army along with S A D F personnel or will it merge with the present SADF? What proportions of SADF versus MK personnel might the reconstructed military include? What might the size of the new army be? Should the new government conduct loyalty checks, based on past behavior, or should it adopt a general amnesty policy? Two realities— one military and one political—will largely determine the structure/composition of South Africa's new military. The SADF is a far superior military force. The S A D F outnumbers MK, having a standing force of about 45,000 (Permanent Force and National Servicemen) and an estimated Citizen Force and Commando reserve of about 360,000. Recent estimates place the present MK membership between 4,000 and 9,000. The SADF is a modern mechanized army well trained and experienced in both conventional and counterinsurgency warfare. Until recently, very few MK officers had received any significant conventional training, and few MK have seen military combat. Leading ANC officials, including the late Chris Hani, former head of MK, have acknowledged the professional competence of the SADF and that a new South Africa would be wise to retain much of the existing SADF.

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T h e liberation struggle for South A f r i c a was largely a political struggle. Unlike M o z a m b i q u e , Angola, Z i m b a b w e , and Namibia, an insurgent military played a relatively minor role. Given its military w e a k n e s s and its lack of results, MK has less of a bargaining position, both within the A N C and with the g o v e r n m e n t , than did Z A N L A with Z A N U in Z i m b a b w e or FALA with U N I T A in Angola. Partially b a l a n c i n g the S A D F ' s military c a p a b i l i t i e s will be South A f r i c a ' s new political reality of black majority rule. T h e composition (and conduct) of the new security f o r c e s must more accurately reflect South African society as a whole. The S A D F has publicly favored only integrating limited numbers of M K personnel into existing structures. Yet integration of a limited M K into the largely u n c h a n g e d S A D F w o u l d present overtones of continuing white h e g e m o n y . M K supporters would enter existing units and receive the uniforms, e m b l e m s , and mottoes that symbolized the previous white supremacy. T h e e x - M K m e m b e r s , given their general lack of conventional training, would be c o m m a n d e d by existing S A D F officers. Such a situation of "the more things change . . . " w o u l d decrease the new g o v e r n m e n t ' s legitimacy to many blacks. S o m e A N C o f f i c i a l s have s u g g e s t e d d e m o b i l i z i n g the present S A D F and creating a new military that would select and then train e x - S A D F and M K personnel. Yet South A f r i c a ' s c o n t i n u o u s l y p r e s s i n g security needs (in mid-1993, 10,000 troops w e r e patrolling the t o w n s h i p s ) p r e c l u d e s f o r m i n g a new army. Most likely, a f u t u r e S A D F will retain its existing structures but provide n o n o f f e n s i v e s y m b o l s (e.g., new unit n a m e s , uniforms, emblems). Whether South A f r i c a ' s future military is an integrated or a new force, present MK members will initially play a more s y m b o l i c than substantive role. Both the S A D F and M K are presently j o c k e y i n g for m a x i m u m participation. T h e conventional and well-trained S A D F is increasingly nonwhite: by early 1992 it w a s about 35 percent nonwhite c o m p a r e d to about 10 percent in the early 1980s. C o c k , in Chapter 9, states that the P e r m a nent Force now is 52 percent nonwhite. Recent volunteer intakes included only a minority of whites (and less than a third of eligible whites answered their conscription call-up). In August 1993 the g o v e r n m e n t a n n o u n c e d that national conscription, which had included only whites, would end. By the time an interim g o v e r n m e n t begins the process of merger, the active-duty S A D F could be at full strength f o r peacetime with an overall trained force of about 50 percent nonwhite, with no f o r m a l a l l e g i a n c e s to the A N C . From the approximately 10,000 m e m b e r s of the S A D F - t r a i n e d h o m e l a n d forces should c o m e additional n o n - M K enlistees. T o gain public acceptance, the new military will have to appoint some M K o f f i c e r s into high positions and o f f e r enlistment to f o r m e r M K

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supporters. M K can reasonably argue that to help legitimate the new government, the military must include a reasonable number of e x - M K , and offer an a f f i r m a t i v e action policy and accelerated training programs. T h e new South A f r i c a will f a c e no serious external threats, and the political benefits of e x - M K participation will o u t w e i g h any temporary losses of efficiency. T o meet the r e q u i r e m e n t s of S o u t h A f r i c a ' s new military (and to help ensure its own survival), M K has stopped its guerrilla training and is seeking conventional o f f i c e r training f r o m foreign sources. R e p o r t e d l y , Tanzania now o f f e r s only conventional training to some 3,500 MK members. Other c o u n t r i e s apparently training MK, in small n u m b e r s , include India (naval o f f i c e r s ) and, at least until recently, Ethiopia (pilots). Given M K ' s small size, its initial representation will appear more noticeable in a f e w high-ranking positions than within the enlisted ranks. Importantly, the A N C a p p e a r s willing to accept the S A D F (and h o m e l a n d units) initially d o m i n a t i n g the new military. T h e M K has established a welfare program for e x - m e m b e r s to aid their adjusting to civilian life and to provide them with j o b skills. T h e f o r m e r S A D F will initially control the air f o r c e and navy (the A N C has received minimal training in these two branches) and, along with the homeland armies, will staff most of the a r m y ' s specialist grades as well as the majority of the army c o m m a n d and control positions. As with other Southern African states, South A f r i c a will likely have a relatively small peacetime army. South A f r i c a ' s major security problems, resulting f r o m the legacy of apartheid c o u p l e d with rising expectations, arise from within South A f r i c a ' s borders. T h e South A f r i c a n police force will continue to g r o w — s o m e experts believe that by the year 2 0 0 0 the force will be over 130,000 (versus about 35,000 ten years a g o ) — a n d thus can accommodate potential enlistees. T h e civilian e c o n o m y , were it to revive, should begin a b s o r b i n g potential enlistees and thereby lessen pressure to convert the military into an e m p l o y m e n t agency. T h e new government will face extraordinary "peace d i v i d e n d " pressures and thus continue the present downsizing of its defense f o r c e . T h e A N C prefers a small army also because it w o u l d lessen the numerical disparity b e t w e e n the present MK and S A D F . While reserve units will be less necessary, the new government could retain, at least for an interim period, a restructured Citizen Force. T h i s nonracial system c o u l d a b s o r b u n e m p l o y e d soldiers, o f f e r education to above-age secondary school students, e n g a g e in civic action programs, and function as a local militia force backing up police units. A s for loyalty, both the S A D F and M K publicly state that the new government should not use past political loyalties (or a c t i o n s ) to bar

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individuals f r o m the new d e f e n s e force. T h e A N C has indicated a willingness for a future amnesty. Yet several S A D F units will either disappear or face overhaul. Special Forces units are most at risk, because of both their past actions and their future threat during the transition. Africa Confidential claims that covert units like the Civil C o - o p e r a t i o n B u r e a u ( C C B ) " h a v e their o w n structures and, o f t e n , sources of f u n d i n g and are composed of individuals for w h o m v i o l e n c e is a way of life. Quite literally, they have a vested interest in destabilization. It is their j o b . " 1 " Annette Seegers believes that soldiers in covert units have a ' " s p e c i a l operations mentality,' here m e a n i n g that s o m e soldiers could view t h e m s e l v e s as s o m e h o w above normal military ethics . . . that only e x t r e m e measures could prevent political d e m i s e . " 1 1 Several o b s e r v e r s suggest that special units outside of the normally tight chain of c o m m a n d have profited f r o m sales of ivory, diamonds, and hardwoods. 1 2 Having borne the brunt of destabilization's battles, these Special Forces units might see their ideological world (Afrikaner dominance and A N C dislike), their military identity (covert/ Special Forces groups), and possible personal aggrandizement threatened by a c h a n g i n g political universe. De Klerk has disbanded the 32 Battalion and Koevoet (although its m e m b e r s still remain with the security forces). Other S A D F groups at future risk include the presently structured Reconnaissance C o m m a n d o s and Military Intelligence, both of which de Klerk has downsized through attritions or firings. Numerous observers, as Cock notes, link these groups to the perceived "third force," whose violent actions have threatened negotiations. Military Intelligence still retains access to the publicly unaudited Special D e f e n c e Fund of $1.5 billion. Presumably the longer these groups aid domestic political violence, the less chance of their survival under a new government.

Control For the new military to serve as a force for national reconciliation, it must impartially adhere to constitutional principles. Yet neither the S A D F nor the A N C has fully risen a b o v e partisan politics. O p p o n e n t s of apartheid have s o m e t i m e s identified the S A D F as the e n f o r c e r of the National Party's regional destabilization and as a policer of the townships in the late 1980s. Critics of the M K note the use of political c o m m i s s a r s and w o n d e r whether the A N C will f i n d d i f f i c u l t the transition f r o m o b e y i n g (and directly i n f l u e n c i n g ) a political m o v e m e n t to u n q u e s t i o n i n g l y e n f o r c i n g statutes. Both sides received p r o l o n g e d political indoctrination that cannot be quickly wished away. T h e dichotomy of a largely black-elected g o v e r n m e n t and a whitestaffed military curiously may lessen potential political interference. Both

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sides will g a i n f r o m a n o n p o l i t i c a l f o r c e . T h e w h i t e s u n d e r s t a n d a b l y will s e e k a p r o f e s s i o n a l , a p o l i t i c a l m i l i t a r y , while the g o v e r n m e n t e q u a l l y will a v o i d p r o v o k i n g a f o r c e initially d o m i n a t e d by o f f i c e r s o n c e trained to s e e the A N C as the n a t i o n ' s e n e m y . A new g o v e r n m e n t m i g h t not have to worry about S A D F l o y a l t y , e s p e c i a l l y i f the i n t e r i m g o v e r n m e n t d e m o b i l i z e s the S p e c i a l F o r c e s units. T h e S A D F t r a d i t i o n a l l y has e n t e r e d p o l i t i c s o n l y w h e n r e q u e s t e d .

As

J a k k i e C i l l i e r s n o t e s , " T h e S A D F is e s s e n t i a l l y a p r o f e s s i o n a l , b u r e a u c r a t i c - t y p e institution with s t r o n g internal c o n t r o l . " 1 3 In F e b r u a r y 1 9 9 1 , de K l e r k r e v o k e d the d e c r e e e x e m p t i n g S A D F o f f i c e r s from trial for murders c o n d u c t e d in operational areas. In O c t o b e r 1 9 9 2 , both s i d e s a g r e e d that the new S A D F should b e a b o v e p o l i t i c s w h e n they a g r e e d to a draft c o d e o f c o n d u c t as part o f the N a t i o n a l P e a c e A c c o r d . Inter alia, the c o d e holds that individual soldiers are legally r e s p o n s i b l e for their a c t i o n s . T h e y m a y thus d i s o b e y orders that c l e a r l y are u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . In the short run, d e s p i t e the s e r i o u s l a c k o f e n f o r c e m e n t

mecha-

nisms, as noted by C o c k , it is hoped that the c o d e indicates a g r o w i n g acc e p t a n c e by S A D F planners o f the need for a c o n s t i t u t i o n - o b e y i n g military.

Training M i l i t a r y training not only m o l d s previous c o n v e n t i o n a l and guerrilla f o r c e s into a new c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e but should a l s o instill loyalty to the c o n s t i tution rather than to a political m o v e m e n t . In S o u t h e r n A f r i c a n s t a t e s — n o t a b l y Z i m b a b w e ( 1 9 8 0 ) , N a m i b i a ( 1 9 9 0 ) , and A n g o l a ( 1 9 9 2 ) — w h e r e all a r m i e s r e m a i n e d s t a n d i n g at w a r ' s e n d , the g o v e r n m e n t c a l l e d in p o l i t i c a l l y neutral f o r e i g n trainers. S o u t h A f r i c a ' s situation has f e w , if any p r e c e d e n t s . P o l i t i c a l and e c o n o m i c pressure f o r c e d the g o v e r n m e n t to enter negotiations, although its security f o r c e s e f f e c t i v e l y prevented M K from p o s i n g any s e r i o u s threat. T h e S A D F f e e l s fully c o m p e t e n t to train w h a t e v e r M K or Inkatha personnel it m i g h t i n t e g r a t e . Y e t n o n - S A D F t r a i n i n g o f a new m i l i t a r y w o u l d lessen M K ' s s e n s i t i v i t y about b e i n g a b s o r b e d by the e r s t w h i l e e n e m y . T h e A N C has a p p r o a c h e d o t h e r c o u n t r i e s , e . g . , B r i t a i n , F r a n c e , and India, as future and politically a c c e p t a b l e trainers o f the new military. T h e most likely e x ternal c a n d i d a t e s are a C o m m o n w e a l t h f o r c e or B r i t a i n , w h o s e B r i t i s h M i l itary A d v i s o r y T r a i n i n g T e a m ( B M A T T ) has an e x t e n s i v e training record in S o u t h e r n A f r i c a . S u c h i n v o l v e m e n t w o u l d initially f o c u s upon infantry b a s i c training. E l e m e n t s o f the h o m e l a n d a r m i e s c o u l d s e r v e a s u p p l e m e n tary training role. R a c i a l f a c t o r s probably increase their acceptability to M K and its f o l l o w e r s , and their S A D F training and their n o n - B r i t i s h c i t i z e n s h i p c o u l d m a k e them a c c e p t a b l e to the largely A f r i k a n e r o f f i c e r c o r p s .

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Timing The existing South African government will retain full military control until the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) begins, probably by late 1993. The T E C will exercise oversight of the S A D F but will leave operational responsibilities to the defense force. Between late 1993 and April 1994 the TEC, acting along with the South African government, will coordinate plans for integration of MK with the SADF. A likely precursor to full integration could be a National Peace Keeping Force, comprising the SADF, MK, and the South African police. After the 1994 elections, the new goverment will assume full control over the SADF. Unforeseen difficulties could still undermine negotiations and forestall a military merger. More likely, however, both sides will accept a merger (an integrated force is more likely than a new one) and contribute to national reconciliation. The force will be smaller and less funded than before and certainly less involved in regional conflicts. The better-trained S A D F and homeland army members will initially dominate the new military, with only limited representation by M K and even less by Inkatha and other groups. The new government should have little reason to disregard the traditional division between civil and military relations. Demographic differences, accelerated training, and early retirements should see blacks, both A N C and non-ANC, dominate the lower and then the middle ranks of the new SADF.

Notes 1. " S A D F Plan to C o u n t e r A N C ' E n e m y , ' " Weekly Mail, M a y 1 5 - 2 1 , 1 9 9 2 . 2. P a u l i n e B a k e r , " A T u r b u l e n t T r a n s i t i o n , " Journal of Democracy 1, n o . 4 (Fall 1 9 9 0 ) , p. 12. 3 . M a r i n a O t t a w a y , " T h e A N C in T r a n s i t i o n : F r o m S y m b o l to P o l i t i c a l

Party," CSIS Africa Notes, no. 113, June 20, 1990, p. 5. 4 . Ibid.

5. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies

(New

H a v e n : Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1968), p. 3 6 3 . 6 . " S o u t h A f r i c a : V i o l e n t R e a c t i o n s , " Africa Confidential, February 21, 1992. 7. A n d r é du Toit, " T h e White Body Politic: W h a t H a s de Klerk W r o u g h t ? "

The Southern Africa Policy Forum Report (Queenstown, Md.: Aspen Institute, 1 9 9 1 ) , p. 3 0 . 8 . I n t e r v i e w with D a v i s , A p r i l 15, 1 9 9 1 . 9 . O t t a w a y , " T h e A N C in T r a n s i t i o n . "

10. "The Rule Of Law," Africa Confidential, May 3, 1991. 11. A n n e t t e S e e g e r s , " A f t e r A n g o l a a n d w i t h d e K l e r k : C u r r e n t T r e n d s in S o u t h A f r i c a ' s S e c u r i t y E s t a b l i s h m e n t , " in V e r n o n J. K r o n e n b e r g et al., e d s . , The

Military and Democracy (forthcoming).

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12. " S A D F Hits at Press over Ivory," Cape Times, May 26, 1989. 13. Remarks prepared for the Institute for Democratic Alternatives in South Africa conference on a future SADF, May 23-27, 1990.

9 The Dynamics of Transforming South Africa's Defense Forces Jacklyn Cock

A

ny discussion of the dynamics of transforming South A f r i c a ' s defense f o r c e s must be a n c h o r e d in the political c o n t e x t within which the S A D F and M K operated until recently. 1 South Africa is only just emerging f r o m the period of "total onslaught." This ideology was the launch pad f o r the militarization of the entire society as the state mobilized resources for war on political, ideological, and e c o n o m i c levels. 2 T h i s process w a s spearheaded by the S A D F . T h e S A D F has always been used to maintain the apartheid regime and white minority rule. It has done so inside the country with a policy of violent repression and has e n g a g e d in an undeclared war of destabilization against neighboring states that has been described as a " h o l o c a u s t . " 3 T h e process of creating a legitimate and representative d e f e n s e force reflects all the political difficulties involved in the transition to a nonracial democratic order in South A f r i c a . Current attempts to understand and debate the process are f l a w e d by a number of analytical problems.

Analytical Problems T h e current d e b a t e on the f o r m a t i o n of a new d e f e n s e f o r c e in South A f r i c a has f o c u s e d narrowly on the integration of the existing a r m i e s — t h e S A D F , M K , and the h o m e l a n d f o r c e s — i n t o a single d e f e n s e force. T h i s conceptualization neglects t w o more crucial aspects of integration. First, soldiers must be incorporated into the wider society. This applies both to 139

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MK cadres returning to South Africa and S A D F soldiers w h o are being retrenched or w h o prefer not to serve in a f u t u r e nonracial d e f e n s e force. Second, these two aspects of i n t e g r a t i o n — o f armies and of s o l d i e r s — should be related to the larger issue of the integration and transformation of the entire society. Our central task in South Africa is to build a c o m m o n society and create institutions that unify rather than divide us. T h e next analytical problem involves c o n t e x t u a l i z a t i o n , in both the political and historical senses. T h e question of a new d e f e n s e f o r c e must be firmly located in the context of the current negotiations on a new constitutional d i s p e n s a t i o n . 4 T h e d e b a t e must also be located within the process of restructuring the S A D F and the a r m s industry, which has already b e g u n . S i n c e 1990, m a n d a t o r y military service has been e l i m i nated, d e f e n s e s p e n d i n g has been cut, p r o g r a m s and p e r s o n n e l of the S A D F have been reduced, various S A D F bases have been closed, the National S e c u r i t y M a n a g e m e n t S y s t e m has been d i s m a n t l e d , A R M S C O R has b e e n p r i v a t i z e d , and several A R M S C O R p r o j e c t s h a v e been canceled, leading to the r e t r e n c h m e n t s of almost 4 5 , 0 0 0 w o r k e r s in the arms industry. 5 This points to a further analytical problem in the debate about the new defense force. The current focus on the possibility of a coup d'état by the S A D F in the future diverts attention away from the covert, clandestine ways in which the S A D F is already intervening in the political process in the present. Another analytical problem is the tendency of analysts to a s s u m e that the A N C and the g o v e r n m e n t are m o n o l i t h i c entities. Both M K and the S A D F are extremely fractured institutions. MK is fractured geographically with its members dispersed into three categories: those inside South Africa in underground structures (often involved in defense units); 6 about 3,000 in camps in Uganda and Tanzania; and a third category undergoing training in India, Cuba, and other overseas countries. T h e S A D F is also a fractured institution but along ideological lines. While there is no systematic sociological evidence, there are reports that the senior o f f i c e r corps of the S A D F is deeply divided between "constitutionalist" and " p r a e t o r i a n " factions, the latter clustered around the Department of Military Intelligence/Special Forces axis. There are also ideological d i f f e r e n c e s within MK. S o m e of these have surfaced in relation to future d e f e n s e policy. There is a militarist tendency that is eager to maintain a powerful defense capability and not to erode the technological capacity South A f r i c a ' s a r m s m a n u f a c t u r e r s have developed. 7 There is also an antimilitarist tendency that is illustrated by the statement of John N k a d i m e n g , w h o outlined s o m e basic principles of M K ' s future d e f e n s e policy at the Lusaka conference in 1990 on the f u t u r e of security and defense in South Africa, jointly hosted by the A N C and the Institute for a D e m o c r a t i c A l t e r n a t i v e in South A f r i c a ( I D A S A ) . 8 " T h e

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ultimate objective of our society should not be to build more barracks but more schools and hospitals. It should not be to manufacture more AK and R1 rifles but more tennis rackets and golf clubs. Not more tanks and Hippos [military vehicles] but more tractors and harvesters." 9 There are also differences within MK on the appropriate model of military organization for a future defense force, with some officers attracted to a Western professional model with its emphasis on the corporate neutrality of the armed forces and many cadres attracted to a more populist ideal along the lines of the professional revolutionary model of civil-military relations as in China or Cuba. There is a good deal of romantic populism among MK cadres. 1 0 This kind of differentiated analysis is also necessary to offset the tendency to portray the SADF as a racially homogeneous institution. In reality, 55 percent of the 43,000 members of the SADF Permanent Force are African, coloured, and Indian. However, it remains a white-dominated and white-controlled organization. The most senior black officers in the SADF are three colonels (compared to ten women), and all brigadiers and generals are white. A further flaw in debates about the new defense force is that reliance on public utterances blocks developing a more nuanced analysis that takes account of different factions and competing positions within the two armies. Furthermore, the responses of the various actors are assumed to be static. In fact, they have changed significantly in recent times. A final difficulty in analyzing the dynamics of transformation to a new defense force concerns access to information. The SADF has always operated in a sealed environment shielded from public knowledge and scrutiny. A mass of laws and emergency regulations hides its powers and activities behind a veil of secrecy. By necessity, as an underground structure, the operations of MK are also shrouded in secrecy. Despite these analytical difficulties, there are four reasons to be optimistic about the possibility of creating a new, legitimate, and representative defense force.

Grounds for Optimism First, the present SADF is itself the product of a process of integration of armies previously at war, a process achieved in 1912 without international supervision. "The early Union Defence Force (UDF) represented a synthesis of diverse military traditions and structures—a conventional armed force on the one hand and a guerrilla type army on the other." 1 1 At the time, it was agreed that in the interests of white unity the integration should involve equal numbers from the opposing British and Boer forces

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in both the rank and file and the c o m m a n d structures. This would appear to be a powerful model from our own history that we could draw on. T h e second reason for optimism is that the most vociferous opponent of integration was demoted and has now retired f r o m politics. T h e previous minister of defense, General M a g n u s Malan, emphatically rejected the possibility of integrating the S A D F and M K on n u m e r o u s occasions. For example, in May 1990, he stated: " T h e S A D F is an instrument of the state which protects the security, life and property of all people. On the other hand, MK acknowledges that it is a revolutionary organization. It conducts the revolutionary struggle against the population and aims to destroy that part of society it disagrees with." 1 2 Malan was emphatic that MK m e m b e r s would not fit into a professional d e f e n s e force because of different f o r m s of training and the technologically advanced level of the S A D F . 1 3 A third reason for optimism about the creation of a new legitimate and representative defense force concerns the experience of two of our neighbors. T h e transitions to independence in Namibia and Z i m b a b w e involved the m e r g i n g of g o v e r n m e n t a n d guerrilla a r m i e s in the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of new national defense forces. 1 4 Another factor providing g r o u n d s for optimism is that there seems to be quite a considerable level of agreement a m o n g different political actors that the new defense force should be a constitutional army working within the rule of law; that it should be nonpartisan and nonracial; that its primary role should be to protect the territorial integrity of South Africa; and that it should be subordinate to civilian authority and fully accountable to parliament. At the M K c o n f e r e n c e in A u g u s t 1991, the seven hundred delegates declared in f a v o r of a p r o f e s s i o n a l nonpolitical army a n s w e r a b l e only to the constitution. 1 5 T h e r e are o f f i c e r s within M K , the h o m e l a n d armies, and the S A D F w h o support the notion of a Western " p r o f e s s i o n a l " model with its emphasis on the corporate neutrality of the armed forces. A surprising level of a g r e e m e n t e m e r g e d at the 1990 Lusaka c o n f e r ence. T h e joint proposals that e m e r g e d f r o m this c o n f e r e n c e of senior A N C leaders, homeland army o f f i c e r s , and an unofficial S A D F delegation included the following: 1. T h e r e should be a m u t u a l l y b i n d i n g c e a s e - f i r e prior to t h e c o m mencement of negotiations. 2. T h e future d e f e n s e f o r c e should be nonracial, open to all citizens. 3. T h e new d e f e n s e f o r c e will be a p r o f e s s i o n a l - t y p e o r g a n i z a t i o n with high standards of e f f i c i e n c y . 4. In anticipation of integration the S A D F and M K should initiate "politically sensitizing p r o g r a m s . " 5. A joint commission m a d e up of d e f e n s e experts and S A D F and M K leaders should be f o r m e d to investigate the process of integration.

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6. An all-party agency should be established to monitor the security forces in the transition period. 7. Once negotiations have commenced, the return of ANC soldiers to South Africa should be organized in a formal manner. 8. The system of conscription should be phased out and replaced by a professional permanent force and a volunteer reserve. 9. There should be a "gradual but substantial" reduction in force levels of up to 50 percent. Overall the atmosphere was one of reconciliation and commitment to the future democratic South Africa. (Incidentally, the conference also illustrated the unifying power of patriarchal ideology and practices. Outside the formal sessions there was much socializing among former antagonists, and this took place along conventional patriarchal lines of heavy drinking, discussions of favorite weapons, early morning jogs, and so on.)

Obstacles to Transformation The Political Intervention of the SADF The major obstacle to the transformation to a new, legitimate, and representative defense force is the political intervention of the SADF. This intervention ranges from covert and clandestine activities to disrupt the present negotiation process to the possibilities of a coup to overthrow de Klerk, or noncooperation with a new civil authority. There are reports that de Klerk's position is threatened by a cabal of high-powered generals in the SADF who are implacably hostile to the ANC and whose resistance to reform is growing. F. W. de Klerk's purge of twenty-three officers from the SADF did not include General van der Westhuizen, who remains head of Military Intelligence despite evidence suggesting he is linked to political assassinations. According to John Carlin of the Independent, talk of a coup is widespread in Pretoria among police and army officers as well as civil servants. However, Mike Hough of the Institute of Strategic Studies and Helmut Romer Heitman, Jane's Defence Weekly correspondent, maintain that top generals are more concerned with issues of financial security and pending retirement packages. The issue of job security within the military is seen by Hough as a potential breaking point: "The potential of dissatisfaction turning into militancy would increase if there were a direct threat to job security through further dramatic cuts to the military budget or through racial integration in the army." 1 6 It is known that right-wing sentiments supporting the Conservative Party and the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) are strong within

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sizable sectors of the SADF's Citizen Force and Commando units. There is some evidence of links between this level of the SADF and the growing militant white right wing. A total of thirteen paramilitary groups in the right wing have been identified. 1 7 According to the AWB leader, Eugene Terreblanche, many AWB commando members are SADF trained. 1 8 The numbers involved are small, but a tightly organized group of well-trained people with access to weaponry could cause considerable disruption and political instability. It seems certain that there is a very reactionary element within the SADF and the South African Police (SAP) that is intent on destabilization, the weakening of the ANC, and the disruption of the current negotiations. Since 1990, the ANC has frequently claimed that these security elements, referred to as a "third force," were engaged in a covert, clandestine campaign that involved committing acts of terror, training and arming Inkatha members, and fueling township violence. There is mounting evidence that this third force is located in the Department of Military Intelligence, which is responsible for the operations of SADF Special Forces. A number of former agents have come forward to confirm these allegations. For example, Major Nico Basson, a former military intelligence officer in the SADF, has claimed that the SADF was arming Inkatha members and that the assassination of ANC activists—sixty assassinations in 1991 alone— and the random killing of black train commuters—112 killed in attacks on trains on the Reef during the eighteen months ending on January 31, 1992—were part of an elaborate government plan of disruption. 1 9 Since that time, a number of individuals have given evidence to the Goldstone Commission on extensive linkages between the SADF, Inkatha, and township violence. In January 1992, then-Defence Minister Roelf Meyer said that neither he nor President de Klerk knew of a third force operating to discredit the negotiation process. "But there are those elements who would like to disrupt the process." 2 0 Malan himself admitted that he was concerned about the loyalty of some Commando and Citizen Force units, but believed 99 percent of his top officer corps were loyal to the government's reform process. 21 In the SADF there is a tradition of covert intervention rather than independent action. In a perceptive piece in the Weekly Mail, Anton Harber dismisses the threat of a coup as "paranoia." The threat takes insufficient account "of the way key elements of the SADF, in particular DMI and the Special Forces, have always operated: not seizing direct control but using their powers, covertly or overtly, to manipulate and control the political situation. In Zimbabwe, Namibia, Mozambique and Angola, they developed surrogate forces and used a sophisticated combination of training, provision of arms and propaganda to weaken the civilian powers." Harber

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points out that this is precisely the strategy that is being followed in South Africa now. C o u p speculation detracts attention f r o m this process. 2 2

A Leadership Crisis One of the most serious obstacles to the creation of a new, legitimate, and representative d e f e n s e f o r c e in South Africa is the e x i s t e n c e of a leadership crisis within the two institutions central to the formation of this new a r m y — t h e S A D F and MK. There are reports that since General M a l a n ' s departure the S A D F has been in a political vacuum characterized by an acute lack of confidence in the future and an overall lack of any clear political direction. Brigadier Ramushwana, head of the Venda Military Council, warned in 1991, "Military personnel cannot be left in a v a c u u m . . . . By adopting a wait and see attitude South A f r i c a n s run the risk of pushing the existing military forces in South Africa into the role of typical interventionist f o r c e s . " 2 3 This lack of political leadership within the S A D F ' s General Staff is especially serious at the present time because direction is needed to bring the S A D F within the terms of the current negotiations. At the same time, there has been an equally serious d e v e l o p m e n t within M K — f i r s t , the resignation and then assassination of the MK chief of staff, Chris Hani. A thoughtful man (his favorite writer w a s Jane Austen), H a n i ' s public s t a t e m e n t s in the twelve months b e f o r e his death displayed a clear c o m m i t m e n t to c o m p r o m i s e and reconciliation. These statements also demonstrated an acceptance that the S A D F d e m a n d for the m a i n t e n a n c e of " p r o f e s s i o n a l s t a n d a r d s " must be met. Hani was enormously popular a m o n g M K cadres. His resignation created a "crisis of leadership" within M K , and his assassination will further alienate many MK cadres who are dissatisfied and feel marginalized f r o m the current negotiation process.

Differences in Skills and Force Levels Between the SADF and MK Herbert H o w e in C h a p t e r 8 points to the s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s in size, skill levels, capability, and technical s o p h i s t i c a t i o n a m o n g the S A D F , M K , and the h o m e l a n d armies. T h e S A D F is the most p o w e r f u l force in Africa, with the capacity to mobilize a force of almost 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 , extensive battle e x p e r i e n c e , and technically a d v a n c e d w e a p o n r y a n d e q u i p m e n t . T h e M K by contrast is a c o m p a r a t i v e l y small and ill-equipped guerrillatype army. However, there are reports that the A N C is attempting to address these disparities. In October 1990, Chris Hani a n n o u n c e d that hundreds of M K recruits had left South Africa to receive training in regular w a r f a r e in several countries abroad. Again in July 1991, he w a s reported as saying that

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M K w a s in the process of b e i n g t r a n s f o r m e d into a c o n v e n t i o n a l a r m y : "Only a professional army will be c o m p e t e n t to man a f u t u r e d e m o c r a t i c order. M K is preparing to be part of this." 2 4 T o k y o Sexwale, M K c o m m a n d e r and A N C head of special projects, has e m p h a s i z e d the urgency and i m p o r t a n c e of the " u p g r a d i n g and recruiting of MK s o l d i e r s " in preparation for this professional a r m y . " W e have 15 d i f f e r e n t a r m i e s running a r o u n d South A f r i c a . If w e d o n ' t integrate them soon there will be c a r n a g e here—a b l o o d y civil w a r . " 2 5 A n other M K official, Calvin Khan, stated: " W e are training a regular army in order to participate fully in the new army of a f u t u r e South A f r i c a — both in terms of professional ability and to ensure that the new army will not be s w a m p e d by an all-white officer corps." 2 6 This " s w a m p i n g " is a very real possibility. It is uncertain w h e t h e r overseas training will substantially alleviate the problem of disparities. Laurie Nathan has argued that the inequalities in size and capacity between the two armies are likely to result in the absorption of M K into the new d e f e n s e force that will continue to be dominated by white S A D F officers. 2 7 On the other hand, Rocky Williams has suggested that the d i f f e r ences are not as absolute as Nathan suggests. He points out that part of the "total strategy" project was the extensive recruitment of African, coloured, and Indian soldiers and seamen in addition to the creation and a r m i n g of the h o m e l a n d d e f e n s e f o r c e s (with present f o r c e levels of about 1 0 , 0 0 0 personnel). He refers to a current internal S A D F microstrategy " t o create an ideological and political counter-balance within its ranks to the e v e n tual incorporation of M K and rebellious homeland ' d e f e n s e f o r c e ' m e m bers into its ranks. This strategy is evident in the S A D F ' s ' A f r i c a n i z a t i o n ' of the lower rungs of the S A D F and the rapid p r o m o t i o n of A f r i c a n , ' C o l o u r e d ' and Indian soldiers into positions of responsibility at these levels." 2 « The Highly Politicized,

Partisan Nature of Both Armies

A m a j o r s t u m b l i n g block in the creation of a new d e f e n s e f o r c e is the s t a t e ' s c o n c e p t i o n of M K as a private army that should be i m m e d i a t e l y disbanded instead of simply suspending its activities. At a press briefing in 1992, Roelf Meyer said, "An organization which w a s still e n g a g e d in an armed struggle was prohibited f r o m a military viewpoint, from b e c o m i n g part of the S A D F . " 2 9 T o m a n y South A f r i c a n s M K is not a private army but a p e o p l e ' s army, and the S A D F is the private army or military w i n g of the National Party. Williams has cited e x a m p l e s of the close relationship b e t w e e n the S A D F and the National Party. 3 0 As Nathan writes, " O v e r the past t w o decades the military played a coercive internal and external role, aligned

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to a particular political party, hostile to others, with a distinct ideological agenda and with the explicit aim of preventing the realization of a nonracial democracy." 3 1 There is a sense in which both armies were partisan. Even an editorial in the Sunday Star—a newspaper not renowned for its radicalism—stated in an editorial in 1990: "It is plain to see why the SADF and Umkhonto must eventually merge. Just as with Umkhonto, the SADF has become a partisan army in the eyes of the majority in this country. The army is seen as actively assisting in the enforcement of the Government's discriminatory laws." 32 Hani admitted that both the SADF and MK were partisan: Y e s , M K is an a r m y o f the A N C and t h e r e f o r e i t ' s in a w a y p a r t i s a n in the s a m e w a y a s the S A D F is p a r t i s a n . T h e n e w a r m y m u s t c o n t a i n the b e s t o f M K a n d the S A D F . W e d o n ' t d i s m i s s the S A D F a n d a n y o t h e r a r m i e s that m i g h t b e a r o u n d . B u t it m u s t b e c l e a r l y d e f i n e d s o that the n e w a r m y w o n ' t b e u s e d b y a n y p o l i t i c a l g r o u p to e n t r e n c h a p o l i t i c a l party in p o w e r . T h e a r m y m u s t a l s o b e n o n - p a r t i s a n and n o n - p o l i t i c a l b e c a u s e w h e n w e s a y w e b e l i e v e in p l u r a l i s m a n d a m u l t i p a r t y g o v e r n m e n t , t h i s m e a n s the a r m y m u s t n o t h a v e a p r o b l e m a b o u t s e r v i n g w h a t e v e r party is v o t e d into p o w e r . 3 3

Stages in the Transformation Given these obstacles, it is difficult to write with any certainty about the pace and trajectory of the formation of a new defense force. However, it is clear that the crucial questions concern the control of the military in the current fluid and uncertain period of transition, and the subordination of the military to the civilian control of a future democratically elected government. There is a strong argument that the seeds of a future defense force must be sown during the present transition process. Orientation programs and confidence-building measures should be immediately instituted for all soldiers. But in the immediate term, while multiparty negotiations continue, the most urgent requirement is the control of the security forces. At the time of this writing there is no agreement on a code of conduct for the SADF. The code proposed to the National Peace Committee involved greater civilian control. The cornerstone of the proposals is a defense council to be appointed by the state president made up of experts from across the political spectrum who are acceptable to all parties in the negotiating process. In addition, the proposals call for the appointment of a military ombudsman to investigate irregularities and human rights violations within SADF ranks. Continuing SADF resistance to these proposals raises the question of whether even a multiparty interim government can manage the security

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forces. An increasing number of people believe that there will have to be s o m e level of assistance f r o m the international c o m m u n i t y in m a n a g i n g the process of transformation. T h e international c o m m u n i t y could also play a valuable role in helping to establish s o m e kind of regional security arrangement. 3 4 Discussions in Africa of such arrangements have stressed the connections between the four " c a l a b a s h e s " of security, stability, d e v e l o p m e n t , and c o o p e r a t i o n . Current threat a n a l y s e s f o c u s on the variety of security p r o b l e m s in the Southern A f r i c a n region brought about by the e f f e c t s of poverty, S A D F destabilization activities, drought, disease, and social dislocation. Furthermore, there is an urgent need f o r s o c i o e c o n o m i c reconstruction in South A f r i c a . T h e new army could play a part in the orderly redirection of resources presently e m p l o y e d in military activities to d e v e l o p m e n t ends. S o m e form of conscription could be considered in a society where 66 percent of the population are under the age of twenty-seven and have experienced an inadequate (either in material or ideological terms) e d u c a t i o n , and 48 percent of the potentially e c o n o m i c a l l y active population are une m p l o y e d . Such an a r r a n g e m e n t could c o n t r i b u t e to nation-building as well as the teaching of functional skills. 3 5

Conclusion T h e scenario suggested by some, that the future involves a choice between a totally new d e f e n s e f o r c e and the m a i n t e n a n c e of the current S A D F as the basis of any f u t u r e d e f e n s e f o r c e , is p r o b l e m a t i c . T h e unification of g o v e r n m e n t , h o m e l a n d , and guerrilla f o r c e s is inevitable. T h e key questions are w h e t h e r the f u t u r e will involve a b a l a n c e d integration of these forces in a way that will contribute significantly to building national unity and reconciliation or, as Nathan and J a k k i e Cilliers argue, w h e t h e r the S A D F will maintain its dominance. Cilliers argues that the future military "will be built around and upon the S A D F as it exists today." In his view, the new defense force is likely to be "still run by whites and its military culture will essentially be that of the S A D F for many years to c o m e . " 3 6 Nathan has w a r n e d of the " a b s o r p t i o n " of M K cadres into the institutional structures of the S A D F . In his analysis, continued S A D F control of the new defense force could mean the continuance of the military's potential to destabilize and disrupt; a low level of legitimacy in the perceptions of the masses; and feelings of suspicion and insecurity in Southern A f r i c a as a whole, particularly among the Frontline States. Countries like M o z a m bique and Angola that have had to divert vast resources to defense may be inhibited from substantially reducing force levels and military spending. 3 7

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T h e s t a k e s are h i g h for all o f us in S o u t h e r n A f r i c a . A s S i m o n B a y n h a m has p o i n t e d o u t , "In s o c i e t i e s d e e p l y d i v i d e d by r a c e , e t h n i c i t y or o t h e r primordial a f f i l i a t i o n s , the c o m p o s i t i o n o f the s e c u r i t y f o r c e s is o f vital i m p o r t a n c e to the state and its inhabitants." 3 K T h e s o c i a l c o m p o s i t i o n and l e a d e r s h i p o f a future d e f e n s e f o r c e M U S T r e f l e c t that o f the w i d e r s o c i e t y . S i m i l a r l y , the i d e o l o g y o f the d e f e n s e f o r c e m u s t r e f l e c t t h o s e v a l u e s o f the s o c i e t y that the n e w a r m y is c o m m i t t e d to d e f e n d . T h i s underl i n e s the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n v o l v e d in c r e a t i n g a u n i f i e d d e f e n s e f o r c e in a s o c i e t y that is w h i t e - d o m i n a t e d , scarred by d e e p i n e q u a l i t i e s , and riven by c o m p e t i n g and apparently i r r e c o n c i l a b l e i d e o l o g i e s . Our m a i n s t r u g g l e is to c r e a t e a c o m m o n s o c i e t y in S o u t h A f r i c a . T h e c r e a t i o n o f a united leg i t i m a t e d e f e n s e f o r c e is o n e a s p e c t o f this task.

Notes 1. My understanding of these issues o w e s a great deal to discussions in the Military Research Group. I am especially indebted to Laurie Nathan and Rocky Williams. 2. Jacklyn Cock and Laurie Nathan, eds., Society at War: The Militarisation of South Africa (New York: St. M a r t i n ' s Press, 1989). 3. Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, Apartheid Terrorism ( L o n d o n : C o m monwealth Secretariat, 1989), p. 11. It is important to remember this because some influential analysts refer to the security problems now faced by the Southern African region without any a c k n o w l e d g m e n t of the role the S A D F played in creating those problems in the first place. For example, see J. Cilliers, "Integrating the Military into D e m o c r a c y : T h e South A f r i c a n Soldier as a Citizen in U n i f o r m , " paper presented at the DISA conference "Southern African Security Relations T o wards the year 2000," Pretoria, 1991, p. 3. 4. T h e issue continually plagues the negotiations process. T h e status of M K was the subject of a major row between de Klerk and Mandela at the opening session of Codesa. De Klerk argued that an organization that remained committed to armed struggle could not be trusted and demanded that the A N C " t e r m i n a t e " M K before it could enter into binding agreements at Codesa. Mandela replied that to do so in the current climate of political violence would be to c o m m i t suicide. T h e A N C has repeatedly stated that armed struggle (presently suspended) will be abandoned only under an interim g o v e r n m e n t . 5. Weekly Mail, October 18, 1992. 6. It was resolved at the A N C 1991 conference that M K should "act in the defence of the people" against so-called third force violence by operating and training self-defense units answerable to local civic structures. T h e s e are paramilitary organizations. See J. Cronin, " F o r the Sake of Our Lives: Guidelines for the Creation of People's Self-defence Units" seminar paper presented at the Project for the Study of Violence, April 1991. T h e r e has been no systematic social research on these self-defense units, but B. X e k e t w a n e has reported the fear expressed by 75 percent of the township residents he interviewed in the area of S o w e t o near Merafe Hostel, that in the long run the d e f e n s e units prolonged the violence and worked against the creation of a culture of political tolerance. B. Xeketwane, "The

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W a r o n t h e R e e f : T h e P o l i t i c a l V i o l e n c e in the R e e f B l a c k T o w n s h i p s S i n c e J u l y 1 9 9 0 . " B . A . H o n o r s Diss., U n i v e r s i t y of t h e W i t w a t e r s r a n d , 1991, p. 7 2 . 7. S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , the s t a t e m e n t of T o k y o S e x w a l in the Weekly Mail, O c t o b e r 18, 1 9 9 1 . 8. T h i s c o n f e r e n c e " T h e F u t u r e of S e c u r i t y a n d D e f e n c e in S o u t h A f r i c a , " w a s a t t e n d e d by a r a n g e of m i l i t a r y a c t o r s , i n c l u d i n g M K and i n d i v i d u a l s c l o s e to the S A D F . 9. R e m a r k s p r e p a r e d for t h e I n s t i t u t e f o r D e m o c r a t i c A l t e r n a t i v e s in S o u t h A f r i c a C o n f e r e n c e on a F u t u r e S A D F , M a y 2 3 - 2 7 , 1990. 10. S e e H. B a r r e l l , MK: The ANC's Armed Struggle ( L o n d o n : P e n g u i n , 1 9 9 1 ) . 11. R . W i l l i a m s , " T a m i n g t h e S A D F : H o w to B u i l d a L e g i t i m a t e D e f e n c e F o r c e , " Mayibuye, M a r c h 1992, p. 32. 12. M a l a n , as q u o t e d in the Citizen, M a y 28, 1990. 13. " T h e t y p e of a r m y that is p l a n n e d for the f u t u r e is of s u c h a n a t u r e that it is d o u b t f u l that M K ' s m a n w h o h a n d l e s an A K ( a s s a u l t r i f l e ) w i l l f e e l at h o m e t h e r e . W e a p o n r y s u c h as t h e G 5 , G 6 ( c a n n o n s ) a n d o t h e r are e x c e p t i o n a l l y a d v a n c e d t e c h n i c a l l y . T h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n the S A D F and M K is not j u s t the level of t r a i n i n g . T h e S A D F c r e a t e s t e c h n o l o g y , M K is s i m p l y a u s e r . W e are not on t h e r o a d to u s i n g the a r m y to k e e p u n e m p l o y m e n t o f f the s t r e e t s . " Cape Times, M a y 18, 1 9 9 0 , c i t e d in L a u r i e N a t h a n , " R i d i n g the T i g e r : T h e I n t e g r a t i o n of A r m e d F o r c e s a n d P o s t - a p a r t h e i d M i l i t a r y , " Southern African Perspectives, Working P a p e r S e r i e s N o . 10 ( B e l l v i l l e , S o u t h A f r i c a : C e n t r e f o r S o u t h e r n A f r i c a n S t u d i e s , 1991), p. 3. 14. H o w e v e r , N a t h a n , ibid., has p o i n t e d to i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n their s i t u a t i o n a n d o u r s . In S o u t h A f r i c a , u n l i k e in N a m i b i a and Z i m b a b w e , t h e r e h a s b e e n no f o r m a l c e a s e - f i r e , a n d in b o t h t h o s e c o u n t r i e s the t r a n s i t i o n to i n d e p e n dence was internationally supervised. 15. Weekly Mail, A u g u s t 16, 1991. 16. M i k e H o u g h and H e l m u t R o m e r H e i t m a n , as q u o t e d in the Star, F e b r u a r y 2 5 , 1 9 9 2 . T h i s i m p l i e s that t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of g e n e r o u s d e m o b i l i z a t i o n b e n e f i t s , i n c l u d i n g p e r h a p s a G l Bill of R i g h t s - t y p e m e a s u r e for all v e t e r a n s — b o t h f r o m the S A D F and M K — c o u l d be i m p o r t a n t . (I a m g r a t e f u l to A l i s o n B e r n s t e i n f o r p o i n t ing o u t the s i g n i f i c a n c e of this p i e c e of l e g i s l a t i o n to N o r t h A m e r i c a n I n d i a n s . ) 17. Star, F e b r u a r y 6, 1 9 9 2 . 18. Sunday Times, F e b r u a r y 2, 1 9 9 2 . 19. Star, J u n e 11, 1 9 9 1 . 2 0 . Star, J a n u a r y 28, 1 9 9 2 . 2 1 . Star, F e b r u a r y 8, 1 9 9 1 . 2 2 . Weekly Mail, F e b r u a r y 28, 1 9 9 2 . If t h e r e w e r e s u c h a d i r e c t , o v e r t i n t e r v e n t i o n by t h e S A D F , a t r a d i t i o n of n o n c o o p e r a t i o n w o u l d be m o b i l i z e d to m a k e t h e c o u n t r y u n g o v e r n a b l e . W e h a v e a p o w e r f u l t r a d i t i o n of c i v i l i a n - b a s e d d e f e n s e or d e f i a n c e in S o u t h A f r i c a to w h i c h t h e m a s s b o y c o t t s and s t r i k e s of t h e e i g h t i e s attest. 2 3 . Q u o t e d in M . R a m u s h w a n a , " T h e F u t u r e of the A r m e d F o r c e s of T r a n s k e i , B o p h u t h a t s w a n a , Venda and Ciskei: Expectations and Prospects," D I S A C o n f e r e n c e P a p e r , 1991, p. 6. 2 4 . Q u o t e d in the Weekly Mail, J u l y 5, 1 9 9 1 . 2 5 . Ibid. 2 6 . Sowetan, O c t o b e r 15, 1991. 27. Nathan, "Riding the Tiger."

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27. Nathan, " R i d i n g the T i g e r . " 28. R. W i l l i a m s , " B a c k to the B a r r a c k s : T h e S A D F and the D y n a m i c s of T r a n s f o r m a t i o n , " Southern African Perspectives, W o r k i n g P a p e r S e r i e s No. 10 (Bellville, South A f r i c a : Centre for Southern A f r i c a n Studies, 1991), p. 28. 29. Quoted in the Star, January 28, 1992. 30. R. Williams, " T a m i n g the S A D F . " 31. Nathan, " R i d i n g the T i g e r , " p. 16. 32. Editorial, Sunday Star, J u n e 3, 1990. 33. Quoted in the Star, October 24, 1990. 34. The possibility of setting up a regional c o n f e r e n c e a l o n g the lines of the C o n f e r e n c e for Security and Cooperation in E u r o p e ( C S C E ) m o d e l w a s suggested by Chester C r o c k e r in February 1991. He argued that such a f o r u m could g r o w out of the joint c o m m i s s i o n monitoring the N a m i b i a n / A n g o l a n peace accords. T h e idea has subsequently been suggested by a diverse range of politicians, f r o m President de Klerk to Carlos Cardosa, a former M o z a m b i c a n g o v e r n m e n t figure at the January 1992 meeting of the Southern African D e v e l o p m e n t C o - o r d i n a t i o n C o n f e r e n c e (SADCC). 35. T h e r e is a strong argument that this should take the f o r m of n o n m i l i t a r y service in order to erode the legacy of m i l i t a r i s m — t h e a c c e p t a n c e of violence as a legitimate solution to c o n f l i c t — w h i c h is w i d e s p r e a d a m o n g our y o u t h . The A N C has consistently opposed military conscription. H o w e v e r , this view is s h i f t i n g with the realization that conscript armies are less liable to i n d e p e n d e n t political intervention. 36. Cilliers, "Integrating the Military," p. 3. 37. Nathan, " R i d i n g the T i g e r . " 38. S. B a y n h a m , "Security Strategies for a Future South A f r i c a , " Journal of Modern African Studies 28, no. 3 (1990), p. 419.

10 Reconstructing Regional Dignity: South Africa and Southern Africa Peter Vale

I

nterstate relations in Southern Africa will be profoundly affected by how South Africa conducts its foreign policy; this is nothing new. What is new, however, is that the region f a c e s a series o f daunting challenges in the 1990s. As global change has stripped away the patina of orderliness in other parts of the world, the ending o f apartheid has sparked an interest in a range of issues that touch upon the future of both the region and its individual countries. These have not superseded residual concerns; rather, old anxieties have been intensified by the quickly shifting sands of international relations. In this mélange o f issues old and new, South Africa, strictly speaking, is an unknown quantity. Its regional policy, like much o f its national life, is the prisoner of its incomplete domestic transition; as a result, policy is wholly unformed. But the very newness o f South Africa in the region opens the space for creative and farsighted initiatives. If South Africa is to help Southern Africa meet the challenges o f our times, it will need to transform its international affairs toward universal goals o f dignity, development, and democracy. This chapter describes both residual and new concerns in the region and sets out a series of challenges to South Africans as they restructure their regional policy process.

South Africa and the Region Southern A f r i c a ' s tangled and violent history has encrusted dependencies that bind all its people in a common cause. Against this backdrop, South

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A f r i c a n s a r e n o m o r e a n d n o less than their r e g i o n a l c o u s i n s : t h e y inhabit an i n c r e a s i n g l y f o r g o t t e n c o r n e r of a c h a n g i n g w o r l d . T h i s c o m m o n destiny, h o w e v e r , hides current realities. For w o r s e r a t h e r t h a n b e t t e r , S o u t h e r n A f r i c a is d i v i d e d into s t a t e s . Its f u t u r e t h e r e f o r e h a n g s on t h e o u t c o m e of i n t e r s t a t e b a r g a i n i n g ; this t o o is not n e w . If history w e r e a linear p r o c e s s , this w o u l d b e easy to g r a s p . A f t e r all, the ruin S o u t h A f r i c a has g e n e r a t e d in the region is e v e r y w h e r e m a n i f e s t . A s this is w r i t t e n , the c o n t i n u i n g w a r in A n g o l a a n d t h e m u t i l a t e d c h i l d r e n in M o z a m b i q u e a r e just t w o e x a m p l e s of a p a r t h e i d ' s w a n t o n regional legacy. T h e e n d i n g of the C o l d W a r , h o w e v e r , h a s s h o w n that h i s t o r y a d v a n c e s by m e l t d o w n ; s u d d e n t h a w s b r i n g to the s u r f a c e d e e p l y e m b e d d e d issues. As a c o n s e q u e n c e , a g e n d a s are constantly restructuring. R e c e n t S o u t h e r n A f r i c a n e v e n t s c o n f i r m this p a t t e r n , a n d S o u t h A f r i c a n s w h o will m a k e p o l i c y will h a v e to r e c o g n i z e that t h e r e g i o n a l i n v e n t o r y is c l u t t e r e d with compelling i s s u e s — s o m e recurring, some novel—all requiring a creative and a measured response. Of i m m e d i a t e i m p o r t a n c e f o r t h e r e g i o n ' s s e c u r i t y is the f u t u r e of t h e c o n f l i c t w i t h i n S o u t h A f r i c a itself. U n l e s s S o u t h A f r i c a n s d i s c o v e r the will to s t o p t h e i r civil w a r , t h e r e will be n o p e a c e in the r e g i o n . M o r e o m i n o u s l y , e a c h u p w a r d r a t c h e t in t h e c o n t e s t is t r a n s m i t t e d d e e p i n t o t h e n e i g h b o r h o o d . D e s p i t e e f f o r t s to seal b o r d e r s , S o u t h A f r i c a ' s internal disc o r d c o n t i n u e s to s p e w a c r o s s t h e r e g i o n ' s b o r d e r s . In t h e 1 9 9 0 s , t h i s s p i l l a g e h a s t a k e n on n e w a n d v e r y d a n g e r o u s f o r m s b e c a u s e t h e r e g i o n ' s b o r d e r s h a v e b e c o m e , if a n y t h i n g , m o r e p o r o u s . T h e s t r u g g l e f o r S o u t h A f r i c a is e s p e c i a l l y d e s t r u c t i v e b e c a u s e of t h e h i g h level of s m a l l a r m s w i t h i n t h e c o u n t r y a n d t h e i n a b i l i t y to p o l i c e t h e m . In 1991, f o r e x a m p l e , 1 1 , 5 7 7 f i r e a r m s w e r e stolen in S o u t h A f r i c a ; a l m o s t a q u a r t e r of t h e s e w e r e t a k e n f r o m p r i v a t e h o m e s . In the s a m e y e a r , a total of 1 9 7 , 5 0 9 a p p l i c a t i o n s w e r e r e c e i v e d f o r f i r e a r m l i c e n s e s : of t h e s e , 18,268 applicants were refused registration.1 A n x i e t y is a d d e d to t h e f e a r of S o u t h A f r i c a ' s c l o s e s t n e i g h b o r s b y t h e r e c o g n i t i o n that t h e b a t t l e f o r t h e soul of S o u t h A f r i c a is not o n l y r a c i a l , b u t as C o l i n B u n d y p o i n t s in C h a p t e r 4, it is a l s o g e n e r a t i o n a l : a l a r g e y o u n g b l a c k m a j o r i t y f a c e s an a g i n g w h i t e e s t a b l i s h m e n t . F i n d i n g a less v i o l e n t m e a n s of r e s o l v i n g t h e c o n f l i c t w i t h i n the c o u n t r y is c o n s e q u e n t l y all the m o r e d i f f i c u l t . B u t t h e r e a r e o t h e r m i s g i v i n g s a b o u t S o u t h A f r i c a in its n e i g h b o r h o o d . U n d e r t h e w e i g h t of its m u l t i p l e s t r a i n s , S o u t h A f r i c a m a y c r a c k , e v e n disi n t e g r a t e . T h i s is not a w i s h b u t , in t o d a y ' s w o r l d , a s e n s i b l e o b s e r v a t i o n . A f t e r all, if t h e S o v i e t U n i o n a n d Y u g o s l a v i a c a n d i s i n t e g r a t e , c a n o t h e r multiethnic, highly armed states be far behind? T h e r e will t h e r e f o r e b e n o r e g i o n a l p e a c e until S o u t h A f r i c a n s t h e m s e l v e s f i n d a c c o r d . B u t t o u n d e r s c o r e t h e p o i n t , this will not b e e a s y . In

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no place on earth (with the possible exception of the f o r m e r Soviet Union) is the transition to a p o s t - C o l d War regime likely to be more complex than in the Republic of South Africa. In this, there is very little that those w h o m a k e foreign policy can do. A f t e r all, the f o r c e s that formally drive South A f r i c a ' s current violence are d i v o r c e d f r o m external factors; this w a s not a l w a y s the case. In the dark days of f u l l - b l o w n apartheid, foreign policy, especially in the region, was nearly indistinguishable f r o m domestic politics. T h e prospect of South A f r i c a ' s disintegration d o e s raise different sets of foreign policy concerns. Not least of these is that each sovereign corner of a d i s m e m b e r e d state, as Y u g o s l a v i a and the Soviet Union clearly show, begins to conduct separate foreign policies. If this happens to South Africa, the regional situation will be f r a u g h t with uncertainties. Paralleling the Soviet experience, d e e p anguish will follow f r o m the fact that South A f r i c a has a potent w a r - m a k i n g capacity. Its army is well equipped and highly mobile; though plagued with aging equipment, its air force is the r e g i o n ' s finest; and no other country in the region has a navy. As important for the neighborhood is South A f r i c a ' s indigenous a r m s industry, no match for the big powers to be sure, but impressive in A f r i c a n terms. As Solly Nkiwane has pointed out, "In the period 1 9 8 5 - 1 9 8 9 , South A f r i c a ' s total military e x p e n d i t u r e w a s $ 1 7 , 1 0 9 billion, w h i l e the other states of the region, excluding Namibia, together spent $7,185 million as military e x p e n d i t u r e s . [These latter a r m s ] . . . c a m e f r o m outside the region, in fact f r o m outside A f r i c a . South A f r i c a ' s imports of arms for the s a m e period totalled only $185 m i l l i o n — a b o u t 1.2% of its total military e x p e n d i t u r e . " 2 A d d to this the c o u n t r y ' s s e l f - c o n f e s s e d nuclear capabilities, 3 and it is easy to see why South A f r i c a ' s neighbors consider the c o u n try a p o w d e r keg. All this suggests that o r t h o d o x — n o , near old-time—strategic concerns will dominate the regional horizon until South Africa itself comes to peace and until, by whatever means, it can assure its neighbors of its peaceful intentions. Until then, the states of the region will regard South Africa as a cocked gun. Until this perception changes, there can be no serious e c o n o m i c develo p m e n t in the region. Sustainable g r o w t h , as events in Southeast Asia so graphically show, follows upon political stability. In most ways, then, the region is still in South A f r i c a ' s grip. T h e ending of the Cold W a r may well have primed Southern Africa for liberation, but until the r e g i o n ' s rogue is brought to heel, the states of the region will remain wary of South Africa. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g South A f r i c a ' s g r a v i t a t i o n a l pull, Southern A f r i c a does have a political axis that is independent of the r e g i o n ' s preponderant power. As a result, those who make regional policy in Pretoria will have to respond to a panoply of issues over which they ostensibly have little or no

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control. As servants of the regional power, however, they will need to appreciate that only cautious and honest behavior on these issues can help restore the r e g i o n ' s c o n f i d e n c e in South Africa. T a k e , for instance, the d e e p s h i f t s underway in the r e g i o n ' s political g e o m o r p h o l o g y . S o m e of these, like the changes in South Africa, are the product of wider global c h a n g e . W h a t e v e r their individual roots, they are likely to be disruptive to regional relations. How should Pretoria respond? S o m e important lessons are to be learned f r o m the c h a n g e s currently underway in Zaire and M a l a w i . Both were sparked by d e e p s h i f t s in geopolitical circumstances. In Z a i r e ' s case, the c r u m b l i n g f o r t u n e s of Mobuto Sese Seko are in direct proportion to the United States' waning interest in A f r i c a . Hastings K a m u z u B a n d a ' s fate in Malawi appears linked more to his long association with South Africa than to his age. But history may well prove that political c h a n g e in South A f r i c a helped to d e v a l u e M a l a w i ' s strategic importance to apartheid. Elsewhere in the region, too, c h a n g e is u n d e r w a y — i n S w a z i l a n d , T a n z a n i a , M o z a m b i q u e , A n g o l a , a m o n g others. While each d e v e l o p m e n t will be measured, sudden shifts in the geology cannot be d i s c o u n t e d . Because of the unpredictability of the times, the region will be lucky if these transitions all turn out to be as smooth as Lesotho's. Without a shot fired in anger, a military that had itself o v e r t h r o w n a single-party g o v e r n m e n t h a n d e d p o w e r to a political party after an election. In nothing short of a miracle, the once exiled B a suto Congress Party b e c a m e a democratically elected one-party state! For policymakers the lessons of change lie b e y o n d the wider disruption it can cause. They must r e c o g n i z e that the political t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s of the kind experienced in Lesotho are very different from those of the ind e p e n d e n c e era of the 1960s and 1970s. In those halcyon days, liberation gave states political space even if only to play the s u p e r p o w e r s off against each other. T o d a y , the m o v e to d e m o c r a c y e f f e c t i v e l y restricts the capacity of both governments and leaders. Only the stouthearted would want to share the fate of Z a m b i a ' s Frederick Chiluba, a democratically elected leader of a country with soaring unemployment, poor terms of trade, depressed c o m modity prices, and eager y o u n g f r e e marketers of the international f i n a n cial institutions beating a path to the door of G o v e r n m e n t House. Even democratically elected g o v e r n m e n t s can b e c o m e e m b r o i l e d in conflicts with their n e i g h b o r s . South A f r i c a ' s p o l i c y m a k e r s will have to understand the m a n i f o l d sensitivities around conflicts of this kind. M a n aging these will be all the m o r e difficult because the region has a poorly developed tradition of conflict resolution, despite the fact that the protocols for regional integration are fairly well developed. From a c o m p a r a t i v e p e r s p e c t i v e , the Southern A f r i c a n D e v e l o p m e n t Conference (SADC, formerly S A D C C ) has an interesting genealogy. Most

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attempts at regional integration, even of an e c o n o m i c kind, aim to surrender sovereignty. S A D C C was a creature of a different kind: it w a s primarily aimed at d e f e n d i n g the sovereignty of individual m e m b e r s f r o m South African aggression. At the August 1992 W i n d h o e k meeting, which transf o r m e d the development coordinating c o n f e r e n c e into a regional c o m m u nity, security aspects w e r e added to S A D C ' s routine b u s i n e s s , but it remains to be seen w h e t h e r this will e n c o u r a g e the p a c i f i c s e t t l e m e n t of disputes between neighbors. As events play out in the region, m e c h a n i s m s of this kind will increasingly be needed since many of the r e g i o n ' s borders are under dispute. The most obvious example is the South African port and enclave of Walvis Bay on the Namibian coast, a case that has been handled by the two neighbors with much equanimity. Less certain is the outlook f o r the resolution of other border disputes, as the case of the conflict between N a m i b i a and Botswana over the territory once known as S w a m p y Island demonstrates. T h e trauma of this particular case is highlighted by the fact that the two countries call the island different names: to Namibians it is Kasikili Island; to B o t s w a n a it is Sidudu Island. 4 T i y a n j a n a M a l u w a points out both the Monty Pythonesque and the serious face of the conflict by o b s e r v i n g that to the c a s u a l o b s e r v e r , the s p e c t a c l e o f t w o a p p a r e n t l y f r i e n d l y n e i g h b o r s t h r e a t e n i n g to fall o u t o v e r c o n t e s t e d s o v e r e i g n t y o v e r an u n i n h a b i t e d island w h i c h is, in a n y c a s e , s u b m e r g e d u n d e r w a t e r d u r i n g a c e r t a i n p e r i o d o f the year s e e m e d s o m e w h a t l u d i c r o u s , if n o t f a r c i c a l . . . . [ B u t ] the i m p o r t a n c e a t t a c h e d b y n a t i o n s to territorial o w n e r s h i p n e e d s little d e m o n s t r a t i o n or e m p h a s i s . 5

In Southern Africa the propensity of border tensions to quickly escalate appears high because of the cloak of stability that apartheid purportedly drew over regional relations. T h e a b s e n c e of an e s t a b l i s h e d m e c h a nism—like a regional court of justice along the European m o d e l — t o deal with these conflicts will m a k e them difficult to resolve. But sound regional relations are not only for the i m p e r v i o u s , that is, the states that can match South A f r i c a ' s o w n b u r e a u c r a t i c m a c h i n a t i o n s . W e a k e r states of the region too will have to be c a r e f u l l y m o n i t o r e d bec a u s e of their very vulnerability. Global c h a n g e and the r e g i o n ' s uncertainties will worsen their sense of exposure. 6 As seriously, weak states are exposed to the predatory ambitions of large neighbors. Policymakers will have to be especially vigilant in d e t e r m i n i n g South A f r i c a ' s relations with these states. At each level of the debate on the r e g i o n ' s painful need to reconstruct itself in the face of w i d e r change, new issues e m e r g e . A s South A f r i c a ' s policymakers grapple with these issues, they will have to understand that

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policy, like life, can be understood backwards but must be m a d e forwards. T o be constructive, coherent, and competent, sound regional policy must look toward the future and anticipate issues that can suddenly ascend the policy agenda. If the region is to reduce its dependency on foreign aid, as many believe it must, serious policy adjustments will weaken the stability of governments and further weaken individual states. In some cases, this will bec o m e linked to the idea that s o v e r e i g n t y — a s w e now u n d e r s t a n d the c o n c e p t — m a y have to be redefined. This is really a Southern A f r i c a n version of the global debate. But its implications will be p r o f o u n d l y unsettling because sovereignty has been the central o r g a n i z i n g c o n c e p t in the development of the subcontinental state system. Moreover, in the region, as elsewhere in Africa, sovereignty has c o m e to enjoy a far stronger currency as a result of the f a m o u s injunction by the Organization of A f r i c a n Unity ( O A U ) that A f r i c a n states should respect the authority of colonial boundaries. If the centerpiece of interstate relations is under threat, then the entire system of conflict and its resolution may change its cadence. In this situation, states may fracture and disintegrate. This, too, will occur in S o u t h ern Africa. Consider the case of T a n z a n i a : i f — a s the present direction of that c o u n t r y ' s discourse s u g g e s t s — t h e union collapses and Z a n z i b a r is launched on a separate trajectory, then that island will b e c o m e susceptible to all the security problems faced by small states. It is instructive to recall, however, that predicting secessionist movements in the Third World is a graveyard for analysts. In the 1960s and the 1970s, there was only o n e successful secessionist, Bangladesh. The bloody conflict over Biafra s h o w s how a state, with the willing support of allies, can coerce its citizens into s u b m i s s i o n . What this means in the 1990s is still uncertain; plausibly it might be argued that the greater concessions toward ethnicity make it inevitable that fragmentation might b e c o m e the rule of international life. T h e long-term predicament f o r p o l i c y m a k e r s is to m a n a g e a process by which threats to the sovereignty of the r e g i o n ' s states can be met without generating panic and new f o r m s of instability. T r a u m a is added to this by the recognition that the OAU, the one African body charged with regulating conflict, is itself p r o f o u n d l y threatened by s o v e r e i g n t y ' s w a n i n g hold. All this is not c o n d u c i v e to building internal cohesion nor, indeed, wider international c o n f i d e n c e in the continent. These general points on the implications of political c h a n g e in Southern Africa are augmented by a range of more practical concerns. Each of these, as South A f r i c a n s are discovering, is to be found at the global level. O n e is the question of natural resources. T h e d e v a s t a t i n g d r o u g h t of the 1 9 9 1 - 1 9 9 2 s e a s o n , which deeply touched security relations, has

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highlighted a regional soft spot: without water, southern A f r i c a is a dust bowl. This is o n e reason why South A f r i c a ' s p o l i c y m a k e r s will c o m e to recognize (perhaps, even value) s o m e decisions taken by South A f r i c a in the 1980s. T h e links between South Africa and Lesotho, which are k n o w n by the generic p h r a s e the L e s o t h o Highland Water S c h e m e , w e r e politically c o n c e i v e d but were g r o u n d e d by longer-term c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of resource scarcity. T h e r e g i o n ' s v u l n e r a b l e f o o d basket is another potentially s e r i o u s source of tension. P o l i c y m a k e r s will need to understand why it is that overall agricultural production declines in a region that, w h e n the rains do fall, is very f e c u n d . T h e y will need to master the e m e r g i n g series of explanations that link the decline in f o o d output to poor international prices for agricultural commodities; the life and death nature of the issue m e a n s it can no longer be simply ignored. 7 T h e immediate multilateral c h a l l e n g e is to develop mechanisms that will foster cooperation on food security. 8 T h e rediscovery in the 1990s of the importance of life-providing c o m modities is linked to the deepening concern for the e n v i r o n m e n t . But the devastating regional drought of 1992 has been primarily ascribed to changing weather patterns. Although there is a nascent debate on this issue in, particularly, South A f r i c a , it is totally underplayed in the regional discourse. Almost certainly, Southern African governments will be c o m p e l l e d to pay m o r e and m o r e attention to the issue. This will be d i f f i c u l t — p e r haps, i m p o s s i b l e — s i n c e relatively sophisticated responses need to be put into place, and often these destroy distinctive features of national life. How, as an e x a m p l e , d o e s an A f r i c a n state deal with issues of overgrazing, which contributes to desertification, when cattle populations have grown d r a m a t i c a l l y ? How do they deal with degradation of soil as the human load on the same soil increases? And how do governments counter deforestation in the f a c e of population increases? T h e s e are not the only threats to A f r i c a ' s e n v i r o n m e n t . Air pollution, acid deposition, g r o u n d water depletion, pesticide and heavy metal contamination, e n v i r o n m e n t a l diseases, and (as w e have already s e e n ) climatic c h a n g e are s o m e of the many possible environmental p r o b l e m s that could significantly i n f l u e n c e A f r i c a ' s long-term future. 9 T h e sheer physical capacity of the region to carry ever i n c r e a s i n g numbers of people is an important question that impinges directly on poli c y m a k i n g in the field of f o r e i g n a f f a i r s . W h i l e Malthusian c o n c e r n s of population questions have been modulated by advanced understanding of the carrying capacity of the planet, f e w can believe that Southern A f r i c a ' s average population growth rate of 3.5 percent cannot have serious e f f e c t s on the entire region f r o m a number of points of view. T w o e f f e c t s , for example—cross-border migration and the future of the r e g i o n ' s cities—will d e m a n d the attention of South A f r i c a ' s policymakers.

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T h e pathology of migration in southern A f r i c a is no d i f f e r e n t f r o m that in other parts of the globe. A series of linked c i r c u m s t a n c e s have set in motion a tide of humanity across the face of the s u b c o n t i n e n t . In turn, this has impacted upon the r e g i o n ' s well-established patterns of migrant labor. For centuries, southern A f r i c a ' s p e o p l e — s o m e t i m e s on a seasonal basis—have crossed its borders in pursuit of work. In most cases this flow has been s o u t h w a r d toward the W i t w a t e r s r a n d , the r e g i o n ' s industrial heartland. T h e ending of apartheid appears to have unleashed a tide of migrants, who see South Africa as a suitable location in which to better life's chances. Southern African migration resembles, therefore, the kinds of patterns the Europeans are currently experiencing. 1 0 T h e threat to i n t e r c o m m u n a l harmony that migration has posed in Europe might c o n c e i v a b l y be repeated in Southern Africa. 1 1 Waves of migration can disturb tolerable patterns of social relations within host countries. Certainly, j u d g i n g by the numbers of immigrants in small business in South Africa, it seems probable that they will transform this sector of the c o u n t r y ' s economy. This should not be surprising since, to make a general point, immigrants are likely to be more e d u c a t e d than South Africans w h o have suffered generations of deprivation as a result of apartheid. If they prosper in the small business sector, they will b e c o m e better off than South Africans. New patterns of economic and political dislocation throughout the region have installed immigration and its cousin, the r e f u g e e condition, as almost permanent features of regional life. Almost every country in the region is a home or a host country for migrants. Continuing strife in M o z a m bique and Angola has scattered refugees across the east and the west of the subcontinent. But the myriad of issues associated with both d r o u g h t and debt have further scattered the r e g i o n ' s people. Aside f r o m the intrinsically destabilizing nature of this m o v e m e n t of people both for the host and the home countries, the subterranean features of mass migration are increasingly treacherous: the killer d i s e a s e s — A I D S , malaria, T B — c r o s s borders at an alarming rate. As cross-border migration increases, it also b e c o m e s difficult, if not impossible, to control the f l o w of additional migrant-borne threats: small arms and drugs are just two obvious examples. Africa is no longer a rural continent. Indeed, the drift to the cities of the last decade has ended the myth of the predominance of the rural-based African peasant. 1 2 Within the continent, southern and northern A f r i c a are the most urbanized, and western and eastern Africa the least. T h e push toward the cities m e a n s far more concentrated p o p u l a t i o n s and the real prospect that the r e g i o n ' s urban concentrations will b e c o m e megacities. Exact numbers are d i f f i c u l t to estimate, but cities in e x c e s s of 5 million

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people b e c o m e very difficult to manage in a First World setting. In Southern A f r i c a , they will be near impossible b e c a u s e its cities too w e r e built for the c o m f o r t of the ruling minorities. 1 3 At first blush these issues might seem far r e m o v e d f r o m the f o r e i g n policy a g e n d a . H o w e v e r , the w e a k e n i n g capacity of the state in A f r i c a holds out the prospect that with time its cities can overtake the state itself. As the E u r o p e a n experience teaches, cities can b e c o m e independent foreign policy players; at times they can compete with the international goals of central governments. T h o s e w h o m a k e South A f r i c a ' s external policy will have to be as close to the politics of this as they are sensitive to the p r o b l e m s of unprecedented urban growth. T h e reason is clear: the political agglomeration of a w e a k e n i n g state, massive urbanization, and e c o n o m i c stagnation will have far-reaching effects on a range of issues upon which this chapter has already t o u c h e d — " f e r t i l i t y , e m p l o y m e n t , education, agriculture, political stability, and other demographic and socio-economic factors." 1 4 T h e long-term prospects for Southern Africa will follow f r o m the reg i o n ' s capacity to balance different sets of relations. In all these, of course, South Africa is preponderant. The challenge for South African policymakers is simple: Can they avoid regional conduct that is instinctively bellicose? If they cannot, they will remain the region's bully. If they can, how will they engineer the policy process? Given the region's weight, can South Africa help to ensure harmony in one of the w o r l d ' s most troubled regions?

Restructuring the Policy Process T h e Chinese curse " m a y you live in interesting times" has a double-edged m e a n i n g for those w h o will govern South A f r i c a w h e n a p a r t h e i d ' s walls all finally crumble. Global change has left diplomats and academics alike g r a p p l i n g to f i n d new a p p r o a c h e s — e v e n perhaps a new l e x i c o n — f o r des c r i b i n g international d e v e l o p m e n t s . This p r o b l e m of u n d e r s t a n d i n g is c o m p o u n d e d by the intellectual Somalia s y n d r o m e : although there are many good ideas around, powerful conceptual warlords continue to protect increasingly fragile conceptual f i e f d o m s . On the one hand, then, South A f r i c a n p o l i c y m a k e r s will have to face the c h a l l e n g e of new realities and accept that there are only limited passages to understanding and appreciating their d y n a m i c . On the other hand, they must wrestle with the daunting task of creating a new self-image of their country. Until this happens, South A f r i c a ' s o f f i c i a l international relations will be simply an e x t e n s i o n of w h a t has gone b e f o r e — a set of positions informed by narrow understandings of national interest, driven by unacceptable patterns of international behavior,

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and largely out of touch with the hopes and desires of the c o u n t r y ' s people. Only a new, distinctive imprint of South Africa as a fully accepted international player can help drive a creative new regional and foreign policy. Establishing this will not, however, be easy; like its d o m e s t i c policy, South A f r i c a ' s foreign relations were blighted by apartheid. Until its political process was freed, the country conducted not one but a series of foreign policies. A powerful one w a s located in the apparatus of the state and essentially had two d i m e n s i o n s : a security arm that, a m o n g other things, caused havoc in Southern Africa, and a diplomatic arm. This was the foreign policy of South A f r i c a ' s minority rulers. T h e liberation m o v e m e n t s c o n d u c t e d an equally potent strain of f o r eign policy. Nurtured in the exile experience, its public persona aimed at isolating the minority-ruled state while its military dimension sustained efforts to destroy apartheid by force of arms. These two traditions have recently been dubbed the " u p s t a i r s " of state diplomacy and the "downstairs" of the diplomacy of the liberation movements. Although some have called these terms pejorative, they are useful analytical bridges because they explain the dualistic nature of South A f r i c a ' s international experience. Like so m a n y other sectors of its society, the upstairs and the downstairs were f o r m e d and informed by discrete understandings of South A f r i c a ' s realities; each perspective is a prisoner of a certain understanding of the c o u n t r y ' s history. The ending of the Cold War enabled both to accept the limitations of their own positioning in the world. So, South A f r i c a ' s minority recognized that it was not a specially cloistered, racially pure enclave that w a s to be defended at all costs because it s a f e g u a r d e d Western interests in a hostile corner of the planet. And South A f r i c a ' s m a j o r i t y , a m o n g o t h e r things, came to realize that the Soviet c o m m i t m e n t to their cause w a s w e a k e n i n g in parallel to the deepening crisis in M o s c o w . If, however, South Africa is to emerge as a serious international player, it will have to meld together its two experiences of the world. This will not be easy because each tradition has different instincts and different understandings of priorities. These have c o m e sharply to the fore in the nascent debate over South A f r i c a ' s economic position in the e m e r g i n g world order. T h e upstairs school believes that South A f r i c a has no option but to c a r v e a niche for itself b e t w e e n N A F T A , the European C o m m u n i t y , and the Asian countries: a triangle of trading blocs called the T r i a d . This crudely mercantilist view holds that middle-ranking countries with limited strategic purchase, like South A f r i c a , will have little or no c h o i c e but to fall into line with the economic designs of the Triad. T h e d o w n s t a i r s sees things d i f f e r e n t l y . T h e e m e r g i n g w o r l d order, they hold, will not fully serve South A f r i c a ' s interests. T h e y consequently

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r e c o m m e n d that the country contest the rules as they emerge. This is to be achieved by seeking a series of links with states and f o r m a t i o n s with the countries of the South. T h e n u b of their position is that South A f r i c a ' s global links should serve its o w n interests, not those of states that w o u l d ultimately m a r g i n a l i z e it. This is not altruism, they argue, but a position spurred on by collective self-interest. T h e s e strongly divergent v i e w s follow f r o m different understandings of the current situation and are f o r m e d by d i f f e r e n t e x p e r i e n c e s of the world. O n e m e a s u r e of the c o u n t r y ' s capacity to f o r g e a new s e l f - i m a g e will be how it manages the transformation of the state agency responsible for regional and international issues, the Department of Foreign A f f a i r s . Measured by any objective standard, South Africa has not had a professional diplomatic service. True, the formal (read the state's) foreign service has w o r k e d long and hard at d e v e l o p i n g a professional ethos. Their efforts, however, were thwarted by the apartheid question. This bald statement needs qualification on two counts. First, a g r o u p of diplomats serving South A f r i c a did try to set t h e m s e l v e s above the political fray. 1 5 It is fair to say, h o w e v e r , that the apartheid w e i g h t increasingly drew t h e m f r o m this goal. Second, at a functional level South A f r i c a ' s diplomats were required to p e r f o r m day-to-day d i p l o m a t i c and c o n s u l a r work; by all accounts, this w a s proficiently done. T h e history of South A f r i c a ' s international positioning p r o d u c e d , as we have noted, another dimension: a p a r t h e i d ' s opponents also conducted a species of foreign policy. In the West, this work was a combination of political activism and information o f f i c e s ; in the f o r m e r East and in Africa, it w a s c o m b i n e d with regular d i p l o m a t i c work. B u t — a n d this is the important point—it served specific political objectives: it aimed at the isolation of the apartheid state. In no way can it be c o n s i d e r e d professional diplomatic work. Driven partly by e c o n o m i c considerations and partly by the wider international changes, South Africa is set to integrate its two experiences of the world. It is destined to create f r o m two f o r e i g n policy cultures a single one, and bureaucrats will be the tools of this experience. This is nearly unique in modern times. T h e Eastern European experience aside, two other e f f o r t s at c h a n g i n g foreign policy culture, Namibia and Zimbabwe, were somewhat different f r o m what South Africa faces. In N a m i b i a ' s case, a new service was established; since Pretoria had handled the foreign dimension of its w a r d ' s interests, the end of South A f r i c a ' s occupation gave the Namibians the opportunity to initiate a new service. While Z i m b a b w e ' s experience is often thought to be analogous to South A f r i c a ' s , it is in fact very different. In the former Rhodesia, the twenty-year sanctions experience reduced the foreign office to a shadow. Moreover, the prevailing ideological mood when Z i m b a b w e gained independence m a d e it

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almost inevitable that the Smith r e g i m e ' s diplomats b e — l a r g e l y because of the Cold W a r — o f very little interest to Robert M u g a b e and his colleagues as they entered g o v e r n m e n t . T h e restructuring of state departments is not easy, and South A f r i c a n s will have to tackle it conscious of looming financial constraints and, as we have noted, in the face of global change. In many important w a y s , South A f r i c a ' s path to d e v e l o p i n g a new s e l f - i m a g e will be s m o o t h e d by the impressive range of second-track diplomatic instruments close at hand. The country has world-class universities, a potent trade union sector, an energetic business c o m m u n i t y , c h u r c h e s deeply steeped in international relations, thriving N G O s , and parastatals well versed in regional affairs. Also, individual South A f r i c a n n a m e s — T u t u , M a n d e l a , de Klerk, to mention three of perhaps a thous a n d — a r e household names across the planet. But sound backdoor diplomacy is no substitute for robust international e n g a g e m e n t and, as w e have suggested, this can develop only after South A f r i c a fully u n d e r s t a n d s its role in the international s y s t e m — u n t i l its image of itself in the world mirrors its understanding of itself as a country. All this, as we have learned, will not be easy. And it is in Southern Africa that the new South A f r i c a ' s true test as a responsible international citizen will take place. In the region, South A f r i c a ' s new foreign relations will be most clearly reflected, and here too patterns of b e h a v i o r will be s h a p e d and reshaped. South A f r i c a ' s search f o r a new self-image that will drive its foreign policy will be reinforced by the series of organic processes already underway t h r o u g h o u t the region. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g its regional p r e p o n d e r a n c e , South A f r i c a cannot halt the r e g i o n ' s progress; but it is equally true that Southern A f r i c a ' s sense of destiny will be hollow without South A f r i c a . Global c h a n g e has p r o f o u n d l y altered the w a y s in which S o u t h e r n A f r i c a looks toward its f u t u r e . In the old days, the G o o d G u y s all w o r e white hats, stood for the correct things, and supported each others' views of the world; the Bad G u y s wore black hats, stood f o r the w r o n g things, and supported the other side. This parody of human and international behavior no longer plays, h o w e v e r . C o n s e q u e n t l y , the c h o i c e s states must m a k e are far more difficult. South A f r i c a ' s policymakers in particular will d i s c o v e r that they are caught b e t w e e n increasingly narrow o p t i o n s : between the rock of more issues to think about and the hard place of shrinking budgets, as J e f f r e y Herbst has shown in Chapter 3. T h i s inventory of c h a l l e n g e s f o r South A f r i c a ' s p o l i c y m a k e r s is intimidating. Many have understandably asked whether, given its i m m e n s e problems of domestic reconstruction, South Africa will have the time, let alone the resources, to deal with these. Ironically, both South A f r i c a ' s long

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isolation and the p r o c e s s e s o f g l o b a l c h a n g e teach the s a m e l e s s o n : n o country can afford to be e x c l u d e d from the international c o m m u n i t y . More prosaically put: these days, if a country has a border and a fax machine, it needs a foreign p o l i c y . Can South Africa lift the payload the international c o m m u n i t y e x p e c t s of it? N o o n e can say for sure. A s they g o about their d e m a n d i n g business, policymakers might draw comfort from the fact that the international c o m munity isolated apartheid, not South A f r i c a ' s people. Support from the w i d e r international c o m m u n i t y will certainly h e l p South Africa d e v e l o p its s e l f - i m a g e within the w i d e r w o r l d . But the real test is for South A f r i c a n s t h e m s e l v e s . Will they, e s p e c i a l l y in the neighborhood, draw the lesson from C i c e r o ' s question: "Where is there dignity unless there is honesty?"

Notes 1. Paratus 43, no. 5 (May 1992), p. 8. 2. Southern Africa: Political and Economic Monthly 6, no. 2 (November 1992), p. 10. 3. Washington Post, May 1, 1993. 4. This is a small uninhabited island in the Choebe River located within the area bounded by, approximately, 25° 07' and 25° 08' E longitude and 17° 47' and 17° 50' S latitude. See Tiyanjana Maluwa, "Disputed Sovereignty over Sidudu (or Kasikili) Island (Botswana-Namibia)," in Southern Africa: Political and Economic Monthly 6, no. 2 (November 1992), pp. 18-22. 5. Ibid., p. 18. 6. C. E. Diggines, "The Problems of Small States," Round Table, no. 295 (1985), pp. 193-194. 7. For a discussion of this, see Carol B. Thompson, Harvests Under Fire: Regional Co-operation for Food Security in Southern Africa (London: Zed Books, 1991). 8. See Peter Vale, "A Drought Blind to the Horrors of War (. . . and the Challenge of Peace)," Die Suid-Afrikaan, August-September, 1992, pp. 51-52, 57. 9. Chinua Achebe et al., Beyond Hunger in Africa: Africa 2057: An African Vision (London, James Currey, 1990), pp. 70-71. 10. See François Heisbourg, "Population Movements in Post-Cold War Europe," Survival 33 (1991), pp. 31-43. 11. Gil Loescher, Refugee Movements and International Security, Adelphi Papers No, 268 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1992). 12. This point underpins one of the most interesting books on Africa to come out in recent years; see Basil Davidson, The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation State (London: James Currey, 1992). 13. In early January 1993, South Africa's Sunday press reported on conditions in the Johannesburg suburb of Bertrams. One story claimed that sixty-three people were living in a house in Ascot Road ( S u n d a y Times, Johannesburg, January

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31, 1993). A n o t h e r report claimed that sixty people were o c c u p y i n g h o u s e s in the same s u b u r b ( S u n d a y Star, J o h a n n e s b u r g , January 31, 1993). 14. A c h e b e et al., Beyond Hunger in Africa, p. 45. 15. South A f r i c a n d i p l o m a t s have been reluctant to write up their stories. A r a r e — a n d t h e r e f o r e i n t e r e s t i n g — e x c e p t i o n is Donald Sole, "This Above All": Reminiscences of a South African Diplomat [no place, no publisher] 1990.

11 Southern Africa's Transitions: Prospects for Regional Security Gilbert M. Khadiagala

D

iscussions o f regional security dominate most analyses o f Southern

A f r i c a . T h e s e a n a l y s e s are i n f o r m e d by the need to explain the impact

and r e l e v a n c e o f o n g o i n g t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s on the future o f r e g i o n a l relationships. P r e v a i l i n g t r a n s i t i o n s , h o w e v e r , m a k e p r e d i c t i o n s d i f f i c u l t ; the past is dying without g i v i n g rise to a m a n a g e a b l e present or a p r e d i c t a b l e future. S i n c e they i n v o l v e s o m e d i s c e r n i b l e m o v e m e n t f r o m o n e p h a s e to an-

other, transitional p e r i o d s a l w a y s c o n t a i n the potential f o r p r o j e c t i n g new issues and a c t o r s into the p o l i c y m a k i n g a r e n a . T h u s , the r e s o l u t i o n o f o n e issue might c o n c e i v a b l y l e s s e n the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f a c t o r s a s s o c i a t e d with it; o t h e r a c t o r s p r e v i o u s l y m a r g i n a l to t h e p r o c e s s m i g h t then t a k e their turn at d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . N e w s e c u r i t y p r o b l e m s o f t e n , t h e r e f o r e , r e q u i r e different a c t o r s with d i s t i n c t a p p r o a c h e s and c a l c u l a t i o n s ; in a word, trans i t i o n s c o u l d c a u s e d i s c o n t i n u i t y in p e r c e p t i o n s o f s e c u r i t y . B y the s a m e token, transitions c o u l d b e d e c i d e d l y d e c e p t i v e e v e n t s , p r o m i s i n g c h a n g e s in a c t o r s and a p p r o a c h e s yet c o n c e a l i n g c o n t i n u i t i e s . M o r e o v e r , w h e n old a c t o r s r e m a i n on the s c e n e to c o n f r o n t e m e r g i n g s e c u r i t y i s s u e s with the s a m e p o l i c y a r s e n a l s , t r a n s i t i o n s b e c o m e no m o r e than b r e a t h i n g s p a c e s , akin to o p e r a t i c i n t e r l u d e s . D e s p i t e their illusory nature, h o w e v e r , transitions still need to b e studied b e c a u s e they p o t e n t i a l l y represent c o n s p i c u ous departures f r o m a d e f i n e d past and y e a r n i n g s and f e a r s a b o u t a n e w future. P r e s e n t t r a n s i t i o n s in S o u t h e r n A f r i c a p r o v i d e its s t a t e s w i t h an opportune m o m e n t f o r r e d e f i n i n g m o d e s o f interstate c o o p e r a t i o n . A l t h o u g h

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the inconclusive nature of national and regional transitions presents problems for predicting a clear pattern of regional security in the short and medium terms, long-term scenarios point to the establishment of regional p r o b l e m - s o l v i n g m e c h a n i s m s along more minimalist lines. I argue that while such minimalist structures may mean the p o s t p o n e m e n t of a dream of a fully integrated regional c o m m u n i t y , they are a p p r o p r i a t e for the postapartheid era. As states address the long-standing issues of domestic insecurity and work to establish viable democracies, the e m b r a c e of f u n c tional cooperation will gain legitimacy.

Retrospective Views of Regional Security Between 1960 and 1990, regional security in Southern Africa revolved around decolonization conflicts. A remarkable subsystem shaped by geography and colonialism, it witnessed both the centrifugal forces of wars of national liberation and the centripetal forces of regional economic interdependence pushing in opposite directions. With its constituent units consumed by these conflicts, its security assumed explicitly external dimensions. M o r e so than for states in the w i d e r continental s y s t e m , security for Southern African states w a s intimately tied to the purpose of realizing the ideals of A f r i c a n n a t i o n h o o d and dignity. T h e o b d u r a c y of colonial and racist r e g i m e s only s t r e n g t h e n e d the links between security and d e c o l o nization. Throughout this period, the nature of threats to the r e g i o n ' s independent states was not s o m e imaginable danger to sovereignty, but the more tangible one of survival within a malignant environment. Elite strategies of various s h a d e s — f r o m the e x t r e m e s of S a m o r a M a c h e l ' s M o z a m bique to Kamuzu B a n d a ' s Malawi—largely reflected a conscious need to adapt to overweening minority regimes in the regional neighborhood. At the height of d e c o l o n i z a t i o n , the a c h i e v e m e n t of n a t i o n h o o d w a s just a first step toward the broader goal of c o n f r o n t i n g a hostile regional environment; the road f r o m the traumas of nationalist struggles led invariably to the realities of e c o n o m i c d e p e n d e n c e and, increasingly, to South A f r i c a n destabilization. Yet i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e in adversity c o n t r i b u t e d to the creation of equally tangible attempts at regional cooperation and problem solving. Hesitant at first, these attempts nevertheless culminated in the establishment of the Frontline States (FLS) and the Southern African Development Coordination C o n f e r e n c e ( S A D C C ) as the minimal cooperative mechanisms for regional underdogs. A s most writers have s h o w n , these alliances contained both the strengths and weaknesses of subordinate states to pursue relatively grandiose goals on limited resources. 1 A g g r e g a t i n g strengths to c o m p e n s a t e for

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their w e a k n e s s e s allowed them a measure of l e v e r a g e in regional a f f a i r s but w a s not sufficient to meet all of their objectives. Given this q u a n d a r y , most policy o u t p u t s of these alliances exhibited w h a t Sam N o l u t s h u n g u refers to as "intentional a m b i g u i t y . " 2 At the regional level this ambiguity was evident in e f f o r t s by s o m e states to a c c o m m o d a t e the interests of minority regimes even while agitating for their demise; for instance, Z a m b i a at o n e point s u c c e e d e d in m a k i n g the o b j e c t i v e of Z i m b a b w e ' s d e c o l o nization entirely c o m p a t i b l e with reopening transport routes through that country. At a more critical level, S A D C C largely thrived on r e c o n c i l i n g the long-term goals of r e d u c i n g d e p e n d e n c e on South A f r i c a w h i l e increasing this d e p e n d e n c e in the short term. Put succinctly, intentional a m biguity was a markedly successfully strategy for carrying both the b u r d e n s of consolidating nationhood and contributing to decolonization. A large part of the conceptualization of regional security in the past revolved around the issues of external participation in the s u b s y s t e m . Whether it was the extent of the communist threat to Western interests, the " c o m m u n i s t o n s l a u g h t " on South Africa, the imperialist threat to national liberation struggles, or simply the levels of aid S A D C C partners w o u l d disburse in a given year, the debates on foreign involvement underscored the differentiated nature of external actors in the region. Here too the regional alliances pursued a variety of a m b i v a l e n t app r o a c h e s : they s i m u l t a n e o u s l y requested a r m s f o r the liberation s t r u g g l e from the former Soviet bloc nations while d e m a n d i n g e c o n o m i c assistance and mediation e f f o r t s f r o m W e s t e r n c o u n t r i e s . T h i s posture t o w a r d e x traregional actors p r o d u c e d a n u m b e r of results. In just under ten years, external actors had helped to decolonize Z i m b a b w e and Namibia, secured the A n g o l a n regime, and m o b i l i z e d a m e a s u r e of e c o n o m i c and military support for the beleaguered Mozambican regime. Whereas the FLS decried s u p e r p o w e r intervention, the conflicts they e n g e n d e r e d provided the i m pulse that generated s y s t e m i c changes, allowing regional states to b o r r o w power at a relatively low cost. 3 In addition, foreign assistance was largely instrumental in providing the necessary capital that gave S A D C C its present regional s t a n d i n g . S t r e n g t h e n i n g the m o m e n t u m for c o o p e r a t i o n , S A D C C enabled the r e g i o n ' s states to withstand increased pressure in the era of destabilization; to the extent that it stymied South African efforts toward constellation, foreign assistance helped tame the regional leviathan. T h e conclusion of decolonization resolves o n e of the major sources of regional insecurity; with it, however, c o m e issues of finding new m o d e s of interstate relations consistent with the e m e r g i n g priorities of domestic reconstruction. T h e present regional context for the pursuit of these o b j e c tives is constantly changing, presenting both opportunities and c h a l l e n g e s to decisionmakers.

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Prospective Views Internal

Dimensions

Attempts to define new regional relationships that will c o n f o r m to global changes hinge, more than ever before, on the o u t c o m e s of domestic transitions. T h e broader f o c u s of these transitions is to redress the d o m e s t i c sources of insecurity by increasing political participation and restoring the f o u n d a t i o n s of nationhood. But one of the m a j o r uncertainties revolves around whether elites used to the status quo are c a p a b l e of making c o m promises that are essential to e n d u r i n g p r o c e s s e s of institution b u i l d i n g and e c o n o m i c recovery. A c r o s s the region, demand for multiparty democracy promises to unleash new conflicts and put forth new leaders. T h e collapse of c o m m u n i s m and the stagnation of regional political e c o n o m i e s have already produced a period of potential reorientation throughout the r e g i o n . R e f l e c t i n g on these changes, John Saul has perceptively observed that "there is now that much less conceptual ground on which to hide opportunistic leaderships of a Zambia or Z i m b a b w e who seek the solace of one-party solutions to political complexity in their countries." 4 T h e r e are two broad categories of internal e f f o r t s directed at revitalizing Southern African political systems. T h e first consists of the negotiated transitions in Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa, where ruling parties entered into talks to break long-drawn political and military stalemates. In Angola, the M P L A ' s triumph in parliamentary elections of 1992 seemed to offer it the mandate it has sought over the years, but this mandate was denied by U N I T A ' s decision to return to seeking power with the gun. Without peace, it is inconceivable that the attempts by A n g o l a n leaders to create a thriving Angolan nation and e c o n o m y will succeed. In M o z a m b i q u e , two years of negotiations b e t w e e n Frelimo and R e n a m o resulted in the R o m e a g r e e m e n t for a c o m p r e h e n s i v e c e a s e - f i r e that w o u l d lead to elections in 1994; what will remain unclear in the immediate future is the commitment of both parties to a b r o a d - b a s e d p r o c e s s of reconciliation and c o n f i d e n c e building as they enter the uncertain terrain of electoral c o m p e tition. T h e crippling effects of war on the e c o n o m y will ensure that even if a political transition is successful, M o z a m b i q u e must then grapple with the Herculean task of economic reconstruction. In South A f r i c a , three years of talks have finally produced arrangements for a transition to formal democracy. But as analysts in this book warn, obstacles ranging from security and right-wing forces w h o want to derail democratization and majority rule to continuing township violence and the need to transform the economy and local government and address the concerns of youth and w o m e n all point to the protracted nature of South A f r i c a ' s break f r o m the past.

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The second category of political c h a n g e is the transition of dominant African one-party systems into pluralist systems. T h e multiparty transition in Namibia gave impetus to moves toward democratization in Lesotho, Malawi, Tanzania, and Zambia. The Namibian transition was also instructive in dissuading Z i m b a b w e ' s Robert Mugabe from the folly of making his country a de j u r e one-party state. More important, the ouster of Kenneth Kaunda from Z a m b i a ' s presidency through electoral mechanisms emboldened budding opposition movements across the region. Underlining this renewed confidence in democratization, Frederick Chiluba, the new Zambian leader, observed that the stream of democracy " d a m m e d up for 27 years has been finally freed to run its course as a mighty African river." 5 Overall, the most profound questions raised by these domestic changes center on whether pluralism and expansion of political space will lead to genuine national renewal and transformation or merely fragmentation along ethnic, class, and regional fault lines. Might the newly unleashed "civil societies" overwhelm the e c o n o m i c and political capacities of " r e f o r m i n g " politicians? D o e s the democratization process have structural roots in Southern Africa or is it merely a palliative to address the ephemeral problems of political economies under siege? Drawing on the experiences of the immediate postcolonial period in the rest of A f r i c a , s o m e scholars have warned of the euphoria accompanying the democratization processes; they caution that building democracies on culturally diverse bases in the absence of elite consensus is b o u n d to be a frustrating task. Further, after passing through the preliminary phases of d e m o c r a t i c transitions, these countries confront daunting problems of transforming their e c o n o m i e s and building participatory democratic cultures and mechanisms. Regional

Dimensions

Old and new political elites alike have to m a k e d e c i s i o n s relating to interim measures of regional cooperation before the transition processes sort t h e m s e l v e s out. D o m e s t i c t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s dovetail, and are intimately linked, with changing perceptions and priorities of state actors about their place in the regional equation. Like the domestic arenas, the regional env i r o n m e n t presents both opportunities and constraints; c o n s t r a i n t s lie in new f o r m s of pressures f r o m politically interventionist yet economically less charitable external actors. Opportunities, on the other hand, inhere in the possibilities of building bridges across the erstwhile racial divide. With respect to the role of external actors, the conclusion of decolonization conflicts saw a marked diminution of external military intervention in regional conflicts. T h e lifting of the East-West political-military rivalry, has, nonetheless, been accompanied by enhanced Western economic intervention via the dominant Bretton W o o d s institutions, the World Bank

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and the International Monetary Fund ( I M F ) . For the most part, Western h e g e m o n i c sway is symbolized by the political conditions the World Bank and I M F are imposing on e c o n o m i c aid as part of the crusade for accountability a n d d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n . C o m p l a i n t s about the deleterious impact of the W o r l d B a n k ' s structural a d j u s t m e n t programs illuminate the predicament of reconciling d e p e n d e n c e on external e c o n o m i c aid with that of m a i n t a i n i n g a s e m b l a n c e of political sovereignty. T h e present phase that T h o m a s Callaghy aptly characterizes as "enhanced neocolonialism" 6 promises to curtail the room for maneuverability of Southern African states. A related issue a f f e c t i n g regional actors in the p o s t - C o l d War era is the now familiar one of marginalization. While the c o n s e q u e n c e s of marginalization are often projected in terms of the shifts of aid resources away f r o m A f r i c a to Eastern Europe, their more durable impact s e e m s to e m anate f r o m obstacles to African market access subsequent to growing protectionism in the West. Internal d y n a m i s m in the E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y , captured in the Maastricht project, portends far greater c o n s e q u e n c e s for Southern Africa than the decline in aggregate aid levels. T h e opportunity for building bridges within the region is underscored in the wide array of e c o n o m i c and diplomatic links between the FLS and South A f r i c a since 1990. Christopher Coker e m p h a s i z e s the need for these openings largely because Southern Africa should forge a regional life and meaning of its own choosing: " S o far, Southern A f r i c a ' s meaning has been a construction of the outside world. . . . In the past, local states made too many d e m a n d s on the outside world in terms of a r m s , s a n c t i o n s or aid, [yet] too f e w of each other." 7 South A f r i c a ' s diplomatic o f f e n s i v e in 1990, appropriately christened the " N e w D i p l o m a c y , " began as a counterpart to its d o m e s t i c normalization process; it involved b r e a k i n g out of regional, A f r i c a n , and international isolation. As Peter Vale observes, the underlying assumption of this policy w a s that success abroad would secure de Klerk's efforts at home: diplomatic recognition by South Africa's neighbors would carry forward the understanding that the incumbent government had the necessary authorization to dictate the pace and progress of domestic change. This would help, in addition, to speed the end of sanctions. 8 South A f r i c a ' s neighbors responded with c a u t i o u s optimism to these overtures. Visible m o v e m e n t toward c h a n g e in South A f r i c a appeared to be the start of checking the cycle of violence and instability that had characterized the region for decades. Although s o m e w e r e reticent to readmit South A f r i c a into the political fold due to c o n c e r n s about alienating the d o m i n a n t nationalist f o r c e s , the imperatives of normalization prevailed. Their precarious economic situation as a result of the structural adjustment

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programs and drought in the region m a d e them more receptive to promises of trade and limited foreign aid f r o m South A f r i c a . It w a s against this background that initial promises to isolate Pretoria until there was a "profound and irreversible process of c h a n g e " f o u n d e r e d on c o m p e t i t i v e unilateral m o v e s by the FLS and S A D C C states. T h e m i n i m a l level of consensus that had typified their a p p r o a c h to regional issues began to evanesce as most of them made unilateral initiatives, primarily toward economic cooperation with South Africa. It is, however, in the area of regional institutions that the transition poses problems to African states. At the heart of this dilemma is the future of S A D C (the f o r m e r S A D C C ) , the symbol of collective endeavor by the FLS to strengthen their structural position in the subsystem. Throughout the 1980s, S A D C C was sustained by a tentative but p o w e r f u l ideological rationale of reducing dependence on South Africa; more critically it became a tangible e m b o d i m e n t of their relative success in attracting international attention. Yet the peaceful regional e n v i r o n m e n t characterized by the absence of pressure from Pretoria threatened S A D C C ' s leverage to attract external support and deprived it of its exclusive position as an alternative avenue of economic access. Simba Makoni spoke to this dilemma by noting that although S A D C C generated a lot of support since its formation, I regret to s a y that a large part o f t h i s s u p p o r t h a s r e a l l y n o t c o m e to u s o n o u r o w n a c c o u n t . It h a s c o m e t o u s a s s y m p a t h y s u p p o r t a g a i n s t apartheid. P e o p l e s a w o u r c o u n t r i e s b e i n g d e s t a b i l i z e d , b e i n g a g g r e s s e d , b e i n g a t t a c k e d by S o u t h A f r i c a , a n d t h i s w a s their r e s p o n s e . It w a s n o t their r e s p o n s e to S A D C C , and that is g o i n g t o b e o u r n e x t m a j o r c h a l l e n g e in t e r m s o f o u r i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . P e o p l e h a v e to a c c e p t S A D C C f o r w h a t it is, a n d w e h a v e a lot o f p o s i t i v e t h i n g s in o u r o w n r i g h t — S A D C C a s S A D C C , w i t h or w i t h o u t S o u t h A f r i c a . . . . W e h a v e to g e n e r a t e s u p p o r t w i t h or w i t h o u t a p a r t h e i d . . . . T h a t is b o t h a c h a l l e n g e a n d a d i s a p p o i n t m e n t b e c a u s e there are a lot o f p e o p l e w h o h a v e read us in the o p p o s i t e i m a g e o f a p a r t h e i d . 9

T h e decrease in S A D C C ' s external appeal w a s c o m p o u n d e d by misgivings over its relations with South A f r i c a . During this transition phase, questions about South A f r i c a ' s role were tied to its overall potential contribution to regional economic cooperation. Optimistic scenarios envisaged South Africa p l a y i n g a benign role, c o m m e n s u r a t e , in de K l e r k ' s words, with its status as " A f r i c a ' s J a p a n . " 1 0 P r o p o n e n t s of this scenario contend that as the d o m i n a n t e c o n o m y , South A f r i c a will play its natural role of e c o n o m i c leadership; as Simon Brand, the head of the South A f r i c a n Development Bank, argues: "In a normalized environment in the region as a w h o l e . . . South Africa will be able to play the normal kind of leadership role that its e c o n o m i c prominence in the region, the strength of its institu-

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tions, both in the p u b l i c and in the private sector, really suggest that it should have played a long time ago already." 1 1 T h e collapse of international c o n s e n s u s f o r sanctions r e v e a l e d that even in the absence of a clear picture on an overall postapartheid package, South Africa could reestablish its image in the eyes of influential external actors. D o u g l a s Anglin r e m a r k s that g o v e r n m e n t s in the region " f o u n d t h e m s e l v e s in d o u b l e j e o p a r d y since, as the political rehabilitation of South A f r i c a proceeds, that c o u n t r y is once again b e c o m i n g a p o w e r f u l rival magnet for overseas investment and even aid." 1 2 It is partially South A f r i c a ' s g r o w i n g international a c c e p t a n c e that leads pessimists to posit its h e g e m o n i c intentions within the rubric of any c o n c e i v a b l e regional e c o n o m i c a r r a n g e m e n t . Colin S t o n e m a n and Carol T h o m p s o n , for instance, c o n t e n d that international financial institutions and leading industrial powers seem to be increasingly in favor of regional integration with market forces determining trade and investment f l o w s ; the c o n s e q u e n c e s of this a p p r o a c h , they note, " w o u l d primarily b e n e f i t the largest of the economies, South Africa, and leave little room for coordination of economic activities by S A D C C governments or for national industrialization strategies." 1 3 O t h e r s have indicated that as it gains more respectability and a c c e p t a n c e , South A f r i c a will draw countries such as B o t s w a n a , Lesotho, S w a z i l a n d , and Namibia f u r t h e r into its e c o n o m i c ambit to the detriment of more geographically distant regional states. Fears of South A f r i c a n d o m i n a n c e persist in spite of the A N C ' s oft enunciated policy that a f u t u r e d e m o c r a t i c government would renounce all h e g e m o n i c a m b i t i o n s by b a s i n g relations on principles of e q u a l i t y , balance, and mutual benefit. 1 4 Based on this perspective, many within the region believed that the best way to preempt South A f r i c a ' s h e g e m o n y was to strengthen attempts to build a regional e c o n o m i c bloc. T o w a r d this end, S A D C C became S A D C and launched a program of e c o n o m i c integration in January 1992 similar to the E E C that envisages provisos such as a single regional market; f r e e m o v e m e n t of goods, labor, capital, and services; and a single currency by 1994. T h e establishment of S A D C was predicated on the notion that w e a k e r states should create workable programs and e f fective institutions that will allow the eventual integration of South Africa on terms more favorable to the region. During this transition phase, the empirical process of unilateralism by South A f r i c a ' s neighbors points to a possible realignment of regional relationships. Apart f r o m the e c o n o m i c contacts that so far sidestep the institutional arrangements of S A D C , unilateralism is evident in the stream of diplomatic and cultural contacts established b e t w e e n most regional states and South Africa. 1 5 Besides, South A f r i c a ' s success in bridge building outside Southern Africa has bolstered its regional position by dramatizing its supposed extraregional capabilities; it is instructive to note that de Klerk has consistently invoked i m a g e s of "regional p o w e r h o u s e s " r e v o l v i n g

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around E g y p t i a n , K e n y a n , N i g e r i a n , and S o u t h A f r i c a n g r o w t h p o l e s that w o u l d p r o v i d e "stability, p o l i t i c a l p r o g r e s s , and e c o n o m i c g r o w t h f o r the c o n t i n e n t as a w h o l e . " 1 6 Fundamentally, S A D C ' s short-term future has already been a f f e c t e d by the c o n s c i o u s q u e s t i o n i n g o f its c a p a c i t y and g o a l s b y the n e w r e g i m e in Z a m b i a , u n d e r s c o r i n g a g a i n the link b e t w e e n d o m e s t i c c h a n g e and reg i o n a l p r o c e s s e s . E v e n b e f o r e the t r a n s i t i o n in S o u t h A f r i c a has taken a d e f i n i t e s h a p e , C h i l u b a c a l l e d for a m u c h s p e e d i e r e c o n o m i c reintegration o f S o u t h A f r i c a . C h i d i n g the p r e v i o u s g o v e r n m e n t ' s i n s i n c e r i t y w i t h respect to r e l a t i o n s with S o u t h A f r i c a , he noted: We intend to trade with South Africa . . . we want to take advantage of economies of scale in South Africa. In terms of the statistics available, trade between this country and South Africa has never declined. It is rather the hypocritical language which was applied by the previous administration that fooled the world into believing that there was any slow-down or decline in trade. There never was at all. What we intend to do is, in addition to the figures and facts that do exist, we want to speak a language that is compatible with the facts and figures, so that the world knows that we are neighbors and we trade together. . . . We do believe that whilst we are kind of helping in the political process, South Africa and the rest of the countries in the area must begin to think seriously about turning the whole area into an economic unit; integrated for c o m m o n purposes. 1 7 Apart f r o m a l l o w i n g S o u t h A f r i c a to o p e n a trade m i s s i o n in Lusaka, C h i l u b a has a r g u e d u n e q u i v o c a l l y in r e c e n t r e g i o n a l m e e t i n g s f o r Pretoria's m e m b e r s h i p in S A D C and the Preferential T r a d e A r e a ( P T A ) o f East and Central A f r i c a . T h i s e n t h u s i a s m h a s led s o m e o b s e r v e r s to liken C h i l u b a to M a l a w i ' s Banda. 1 K In a p e r c e p t i v e a n a l y s i s o f the rapid c h a n g e s in p o s t - K a u n d a Z a m b i a , S t e p h e n C h a n n o t e s that the n e w g o v e r n m e n t is c o m m i t t e d to r e v i t a l i z i n g the d o m e s t i c e c o n o m y ; in t h e s e e f f o r t s , it will seek, as a principal regional policy, closer e c o n o m i c contacts with South Africa. This will mean that, unlike the attempt made by S A D C C to strengthen the horizontal or broadly based transnational e c o n o m i c linkages in the region, Zambia will seek to strengthen the vertical linkages between itself and South Africa, b y p a s s i n g the e m p h a s i s on developing linkages with others in what has been the frontline. T h e image of the frontline will itself fade from the region, and the c h a n g e of g o v e r n m e n t in Z a m b i a — w i t h the new Zambian p r e o c c u p a t i o n s — w i l l hasten this process. 1 9

Conclusion: Postapartheid and Beyond T h e e n d o f apartheid is u n l i k e l y to r e m o v e the b a s i c p o w e r a s y m m e t r i e s and c h a n g e the o b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s o f S o u t h A f r i c a ' s n e i g h b o r s . G r a h a m

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Evans goes so far as to argue that " d e s p i t e the p r e s u m p t i o n in favor of equality with its neighbors, a new majority-ruled g o v e r n m e n t . . . would be unable to resist the obvious b e n e f i t s of being the key player in local balance-of-power politics. . . . In the absence of an external force the role of manipulating ' b a l a n c e s ' seems preordained, w h o e v e r occupies the Union Building in Pretoria." 2 0 Given this overall scenario, the future strategies by small states might still comprise a combination of collective and unilateral approaches, with the choice of each strategy determined by a convergence of domestic and international factors. With the disappearance of the primary source of regional adversity and the loss of external interest, the possibilities of regional security may lie in limited cooperative schemes based on prevailing e c o n o m i c structures and limited p r o b l e m - s o l v i n g security a r r a n g e m e n t s . As in the past, the dictates of minimalist approaches in the economic realm will far outweigh the temptations for grandiose and politically attractive maximalist m e c h a n i s m s . The e n d u r i n g tension between collective aspirations and individual reality is not peculiar to S o u t h e r n A f r i c a , but it promises to constitute the basis for regional foreign policies. Writers w h o have posited that the region will f r a g m e n t into economic zones reflecting the current areas of interdependence and functional cooperation proceed f r o m the a s s u m p t i o n that when national entities f o c u s more on the problems of domestic insecurity, they have less impetus for a maximal approach to regional e c o n o m i c cooperation. 2 1 Subregional econ o m i c zones might be s u p p l e m e n t e d by cooperation a r o u n d vital f u n c tional areas such as energy, water resources, and trade. Existing regional institutions with o v e r l a p p i n g m e m b e r s h i p s such as S A D C , the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), and the PTA could be restructured to fulfill more scaled-down and focused modes of e c o n o m i c cooperation. Equally pertinent, since most of the existing institutions have often been competitive, restructuring them means that individual states w o u l d have to decide which ones are optimal for their needs without the pressures to conform to preestablished organizations. In the long run, such voluntary choices would resolve the a w k w a r d questions of overlapping m e m berships and duplication of e f f o r t s , which were the c o n s e q u e n c e s , no doubt, of the past political e f f o r t s to straddle both sides of the racial chasm. T h e minimalist scenario is pessimistic about the long-term ability of S A D C to move beyond what its predecessor achieved in the last decade; other than, perhaps, the continued resuscitation and expansion of the transport corridors in Angola and M o z a m b i q u e , S A D C ' s role in a postapartheid Southern A f r i c a might be m i n i m a l . T h e r e will be no S o u t h A f r i c a n - l e d Southern A f r i c a n economic c o m m u n i t y because of the potential f o r conflicts over the costs and b e n e f i t s b e t w e e n admittedly unequal e c o n o m i c partners.

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T h i s minimalist approach to regional c o o p e r a t i o n goes against the grain of concerted efforts to fulfill S A D C ' s EEC-style integration s c h e m e . In spite of the logic of sustaining a credible c o o p e r a t i v e a r r a n g e m e n t to check South A f r i c a ' s economic power, ill-conceived schemes requiring increased member obligations could obviate the practice of flexibility so crucial in past regional cooperation. Increasing skepticism about how diverse regional nations could come together under a treaty with binding economic and political obligations cannot be lightly d i s m i s s e d even by well-intentioned p o l i c y m a k e r s . Furthermore, the c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s a m o n g regional states for bilateral concessions from South Africa and other external actors are telling lessons as to the futility of grand e c o n o m i c s c h e m e s for the future. W h e r e bilateralism and strategic bargaining f o r unilateral advantages predominate, collective aspirations take a backseat. T h e same concerns carry over to future regional security institutions. S o m e writers have envisaged for Southern A f r i c a a future c o m p r e h e n s i v e security umbrella on the lines of the C o n f e r e n c e on Security and Cooperation in Europe ( C S C E ) . For example, Bernhard W e i m e r and Olaf Claus have contended that "the FLS alliance will disappear but its experience in consultation and conflict resolution will c o n t i n u e to p r o v e valuable for . . . the possible formation of a C o n f e r e n c e for Security and Cooperation in Southern Africa ( C S C S A ) . " 2 2 In spite of the need to improve channels of c o m m u n i c a t i o n and c o n sultation in the future, the C S C E f r a m e w o r k with its elaborate structures d e f i e s a n y t h i n g these countries w o u l d c o n t e m p l a t e . Like the e c o n o m i c arena, however, Southern Africa might need limited, manageable, and focused m e t h o d s of conflict resolution rather than t h e c o m p r e h e n s i v e o n e s f o u n d in Europe. T h u s , proposals for c o o p e r a t i o n in a r m s control, m a s s migration and r e f u g e e issues, AIDS, and joint action on natural disasters appear to be feasible in light of prior practice of ad hoc and flexible political a r r a n g e m e n t s for problem solving. T h e e x p e r i e n c e of the F L S and S A D C C , then, is how m i n i m u m c o o r d i n a t i o n in issue areas can be f r u i t fully pursued within the realistic context of c o m p e t i n g national agendas. In the postapartheid era, such limited arrangements could provide methods of regular consultation over specific issues as they also preempt the costs and conflicts associated with comprehensive security s c h e m e s . D i s c u s s i o n s of a c o m p r e h e n s i v e security a r r a n g e m e n t f o r S o u t h e r n A f r i c a ought, more appropriately, to relate to the f u t u r e and viability of the A f r i c a n continental system that finds institutional expression in the O A U . T h e white redoubt of South A f r i c a w a s the " u n c a p t u r e d " portion of the A f r i c a n interstate system a w a i t i n g f u t u r e r e d e m p t i o n . 2 3 A watertight security system for Southern Africa existing independent of the continental security system would, consequently, defeat the larger purpose of the liberation process. For despite its myriad flaws, the O A U has contributed to

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b u i l d i n g e n d u r i n g interstate n o r m s , p r i n c i p a l l y the r e s p e c t f o r the i n d e p e n d e n c e o f s m a l l states. In the A f r i c a n s y s t e m , t h e s e n o r m s h a v e primarily laid the f o u n d a t i o n that a l l o w e d the c o a l e s c e n c e o f s t a t e s at the regional

and

functional

level

in their

assorted

attempts

at

economic

integration. R e i n t e g r a t i o n o f S o u t h A f r i c a into the c o m m u n i t y o f n a t i o n s m i g h t t h e r e f o r e n e e d to b e g i n w i t h the A f r i c a n interstate s y s t e m rather than the m o r e restrictive Southern A f r i c a n o n e . E v e n w i t h o u t the e c o n o m i c b e n e f i t s a c c r u i n g f r o m S o u t h A f r i c a n m e m b e r s h i p in the O A U , there certainly will be great v a l u e in its political p a r t i c i p a t i o n ; a " s t r e n g t h - i n - n u m b e r s " a r g u m e n t s u g g e s t s that a p o w e r w i t h h e g e m o n i c p r o c l i v i t i e s w o u l d b e better t a m e d within a larger o r g a n i z a t i o n than w i t h i n a s m a l l e r o n e . T i e d to c o n t i n e n t a l interstate n o r m s , a p o w e r f u l S o u t h A f r i c a is l i k e l y to h a v e little i n c e n t i v e to play an o v e r t l y s u b i m p e r i a l regional role. M o r e critically, S o u t h A f r i c a ' s role in the O A U m i g h t c h e c k the trend o f its present l e a d e r s h i p to f r a g m e n t the O A U by p r o m o t i n g o s t e n s i b l e "regional p o w e r h o u s e s . "

Notes 1. See, for example, Douglas Anglin, "Southern Africa Under Siege: Options for the Frontline States," Journal of Modern African Studies 26, no. 4 (1988), pp. 5 4 9 - 5 6 5 ; Leslie H. B r o w n , "Regional Collaboration in Resolving Third World Conflict," Survival 28, no. 3 (1986), pp. 2 0 8 - 2 2 0 ; and Mahnaz Z. Ispahani, "Alone T o g e t h e r : Regional Security A r r a n g e m e n t s in Southern Africa and the Arabian G u l f , " International Security 8, no. 4 (1984), pp. 152-175. 2. Sam Nolutshungu, "Strategy and Power: South Africa and Its Neighbors," in Shaun Johnson, ed., South Africa: No Turning Back (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989), pp. 3 3 5 - 3 5 2 . 3. I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa, updated edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 179. 4. John Saul, " F r o m T h a w to Flood: T h e End of the Cold War in Southern A f r i c a , " Review of African Political Economy 50, no. 2 (April 1991), p. 157. 5. Quoted in the Plain Dealer, N o v e m b e r 3, 1991. 6. T h o m a s Callaghy, " A f r i c a and the World Economy: C a u g h t B e t w e e n a Rock and a Hard Place," in John Harbeson and Donald Rothchild, eds., Africa and World Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 3 9 - 6 8 . 7. Christopher Coker, " ' E x p e r i e n c i n g ' Southern Africa in the T w e n t y - f i r s t Century," International Affairs 67, no. 2 (1991), p. 285. 8. Peter Vale, "The Search for Southern A f r i c a ' s Security," International Affairs 67, no. 4 (1991), p. 703. 9. Simba Makoni, "Interview," Africa Report 35, no. 3 (1990), p. 35. 10. Quoted in the Daily Nation, June 10, 1990. 11. Quoted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-Africa, September 10, 1990. 12. Douglas Anglin, "Southern A f r i c a n Responses to Eastern European Developments," Journal of Modern African Studies 28, no. 3, p. 438.

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13. Colin S t o n e m a n and Carol T h o m p s o n , " S o u t h e r n A f r i c a A f t e r A p a r t h e i d : E c o n o m i c R e p e r c u s s i o n s of a Free South A f r i c a , " Africa Recovery Briefing Paper No. 4, D e c e m b e r 1991, p. 10. 14. T h r o u g h a wide range of s t a t e m e n t s , especially at regional m e e t i n g s , the A N C has assured S A D C states that it a b j u r e s past h e a v y - h a n d e d p r a c t i c e s . T h e issue that p e s s i m i s t s dwell on, h o w e v e r , is w h e t h e r such p r o m i s e s will be translated into actual policies w h e n the A N C is c o n f r o n t e d with both the realities of p o w e r and the t e m p t a t i o n s of h e g e m o n y . As Peter Vale argues in C h a p t e r 10, the result will depend in large part on w h e t h e r South A f r i c a n diplomacy is t r a n s f o r m e d and a new image of South African diplomacy is f o r g e d . 15. For a compilation of such contacts, see Colleen L. M o r n a , " S o u t h A f r i c a : T h e P a r i a h ' s New Pals," Africa Report 36, no. 2 (1991), pp. 2 8 - 3 0 . 16. Quoted in the Washington Post, J u n e 9, 1991. See similar c o m m e n t s by de Klerk in the New York Times, O c t o b e r 27, 1991, and in Africa Confidential, June 19, 1992. 17. Quoted by the B B C , N o v e m b e r 25, 1991. 18. See, for e x a m p l e , M e l i n d a H a m , " Z a m b i a : End of H o n e y m o o n , " Africa Report 37, no. 2 (1992), pp. 6 1 - 6 3 ; and Steve Kibble, " Z a m b i a : P r o b l e m s for the M M D , " Review of African Political Economy 53, no. 2 (1992), pp. 1 0 4 - 1 0 8 . 19. S t e p h e n C h a n , " D e m o c r a c y in S o u t h e r n A f r i c a : T h e 1 9 9 0 E l e c t i o n s in Z i m b a b w e and the 1991 Elections in Z a m b i a , " Round Table, April 1992, p. 199. 2 0 . G r a h a m E v a n s , " M y t h s and Realities in S o u t h A f r i c a ' s Foreign P o l i c y , " International Affairs 67, no. 4, p. 716. 2 1 . T o n y H a w k i n s , " H a r d - h e a d e d R e a l i s m , " Southern African Economist 3, no. 5 (1990), pp. 7 - 9 ; Gavin Maasdorp, " A C h a n g i n g Regional Role for S A D C C ? " Harvard International Review 12 (Fall 1989), pp. 1 0 - 1 3 . For a general explanation of the tensions between nation-building and regional cooperation, see Stephen John S t e d m a n , " C o n f l i c t and Conflict Resolution in A f r i c a , " in Francis M. D e n g and I. W i l l i a m Z a r t m a n , eds., Conflict Resolution in Africa ( W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . : B r o o k ings Institution, 1991), pp. 3 7 7 - 3 7 8 . 22. Bernhard W e i m e r and Olaf Claus, " A C h a n g i n g S o u t h e r n A f r i c a : W h a t R o l e for B o t s w a n a ? " in S t e p h e n J o h n S t e d m a n , ed., Botswana: The Political Economy of Democratic Development (Boulder: L y n n e Rienner Publishers, 1993), pp. 1 8 5 - 2 0 2 . 23. I. William Zartman, " A f r i c a as a Subordinate State System in International R e l a t i o n s , " International Organization 21, no. 3, pp. 5 4 5 - 5 6 4 .

12 South Africa: The Political Economy of Growth and Democracy Robert M. Price

A society divided between a large impoverished mass and a small favored elite results either in oligarchy (dictatorial rule of the small upper stratum) or in tyranny (popular-based dictatorship). — S e y m o u r Martin U p s e t '

By the t e r m s of conventional w i s d o m the p r o g n o s i s f o r d e m o c r a c y in South A f r i c a is decidedly unfavorable. If e x t r e m e s of wealth and poverty create infertile soil f o r democracy to take root, as is c o m m o n l y asserted, then o v e r eighty years of white rule w o u l d s e e m to have b e q u e a t h e d to South A f r i c a a particularly inhospitable e n v i r o n m e n t to sustain a democratic order. Its poverty profile may well reflect the most e x t r e m e c o m b i nation of a f f l u e n c e and impoverishment of any country in the c o n t e m p o rary w o r l d — a n d o n e that is especially e x p l o s i v e politically because it coincides with a racial, and thus highly visible, divide. W h i t e wealth and black poverty in South A f r i c a p r o d u c e s a Gini c o e f f i c i e n t (the standard measure of income inequality) that is the highest of any of the fifty-seven c o u n t r i e s in the w o r l d f o r which data are available. 2 Sixty percent of all black S o u t h A f r i c a n s ( 8 0 percent of those living in h o m e l a n d s ) have inc o m e s below the minimal living level ( M L L ) , according to a study by the Carnegie C o m m i s s i o n . 3 T h e basic contour of South A f r i c a ' s poverty prof i l e — t h e huge g a p b e t w e e n white wealth and black p o v e r t y — w a s somewhat eroded during the 1970s but has been reinforced in the past decade.

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A stagnant e c o n o m y for much of the last ten years, resulting in large part f r o m a combination of domestic political upheaval and internationally imposed sanctions, has produced a decline in personal i n c o m e and soaring rates of black u n e m p l o y m e n t . T h e prognosis for economic growth in a country with a poverty profile like South A f r i c a ' s is no better than for democracy. Majority impoverishment breeds an atmosphere of populism that is hostile to the adoption of growth-producing economic policies. W h e r e mass poverty breeds desperation, the time horizon of the majority is not c o m p a t i b l e with e c o n o m i c policies that would sustain growth over the long run. W h e n the poor are politically mobilized, pressures are created for economic policies geared to immediate c o n s u m p t i o n and expenditure rather than investment and production. T h e populist politician sustains a hold on power by distributing s o c i e t y ' s material resources in the short run while b a n k r u p t i n g it in the long run. T h e history of postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa is a textbook portrait of this form of political e c o n o m y . Despite the apparent inhospitable nature of South A f r i c a ' s socioeconomic environment for either democracy or growth, the thesis of this chapter is that in fact there is much in the c o u n t r y ' s contemporary situation that can provide a foundation for both. While the obstacles are substantial, in comparative terms South A f r i c a ought to be seen as o f f e r i n g perhaps the best c h a n c e for success of the current cases of transition. Relative to the c o u n t r i e s of Eastern Europe, the f o r m e r Soviet Union, and the states of tropical Africa, South Africa can be seen as possessing the most substantial social base for democracy and e c o n o m i c base for growth. South A f r i c a ' s " a d v a n t a g e s , " which I will turn to presently, can certainly be undermined by the political c o n s e q u e n c e s of its poverty profile, but that is not inevitable. I will a r g u e that the key to s u s t a i n e d d e m o c racy a n d g r o w t h in the f a c e of inevitable p o p u l i s m will be f o u n d in the arena of " g o v e r n a n c e . " A p o s t a p a r t h e i d g o v e r n i n g elite will need to m a n a g e populist p r e s s u r e s so as to s i m u l t a n e o u s l y build legitimacy f o r d e m o c r a t i c institutions a n d protect i n v e s t m e n t , p r o d u c t i o n , and thus g r o w t h - g e n e r a t i n g e c o n o m i c activities. This will be the challenge of gove r n a n c e in South A f r i c a o n c e the d e m i s e of w h i t e rule is c o m p l e t e . T h e ability of a new g o v e r n m e n t to meet the c h a l l e n g e will be decisively affected by the institutional a r r a n g e m e n t s that e m e r g e out of negotiations. T h e matter is not reduced to w h e t h e r these institutions meet a d e m o c r a tic standard. S o m e " d e m o c r a t i c " institutional a r r a n g e m e n t s will facilitate meeting the c h a l l e n g e of g o v e r n a n c e while others may not. T h e latter, alt h o u g h f o r m a l l y d e m o c r a t i c , m a y , b e c a u s e they do not m e e t the c h a l lenge of g o v e r n a n c e , c o n t r i b u t e o v e r the m e d i u m term to d e m o c r a c y ' s demise.

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The Social Bases of Democracy South Africa possesses two important social assets for the establishment of a democracy: the acceptance of South Africa as a single political c o m m u nity by the dominant political forces in society, and the existence of a vibrant civil society. The first means that it is unlikely to experience in the postapartheid era the type of corrosive politics of ethnicity or " t r i b a l i s m " that is today witnessed in the f o r m e r Yugoslavia, certain republics of the former Soviet Union, and in most of the postcolonial states of sub-Saharan Africa. T h e second is important for two reasons: it provides a social base for m a i n t a i n i n g electoral c o m p e t i t i o n , the essence of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e d e m o c r a c y ; and it contains a m e c h a n i s m for a m e l i o r a t i n g the populist pressures that otherwise will threaten both the legitimacy of a new d e m o cratic order and the prospects for i m p l e m e n t i n g g r o w t h - g e n e r a t i n g economic policies.

Political Cleavage and Political Community in a New South Africa It is b e c o m i n g c o m m o n p l a c e to d e s c r i b e South A f r i c a as a "deeply divided" society, 4 one in which intra-African ethnic cleavages require special constitutional a r r a n g e m e n t s to prevent a new d e m o c r a t i c order f r o m being destroyed by the centrifugal and violent forces of communalism. Not just the white ruling party, which for over a decade has proclaimed South Africa to be without a genuine majority because it is a country of cultural minorities, promotes this v i e w , but respected a c a d e m i c s at h o m e and abroad, as well. 5 Constitutional engineering—consociational schemes embodying minority vetoes over g o v e r n m e n t policy, federalism or regionalism with a strong devolution of power, electoral systems that allow small party parliamentary representation and f o r c e coalition g o v e r n m e n t s — i s said to be necessary to avoid a situation in which fears of " d o m i n a t i o n " will splinter South Africa, probably violently, along the lines of its ethnocultural pluralism. A l t h o u g h the image of South A f r i c a as a society "deeply d i v i d e d " along lines of intra-African cultural pluralism increasingly goes unquestioned, there is actually little or no direct evidence to support this picture of the c o u n t r y ' s political cleavages. T h e few attitude surveys that m a k e an effort to tap the relationship between culture and politics in South A f r i c a indicate a rejection by black South A f r i c a n s of ethnicity as a basis for political m e m b e r s h i p and identity. 6 For example, in one study of high school students in Soweto, respondents were asked what n a m e they would prefer to describe "their people." Not a single one of the randomly selected students interviewed o f f e r e d an e t h n i c label ( 6 4 percent preferred the term

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" A f r i c a n " a n d an a d d i t i o n a l 13 p e r c e n t " B l a c k s " ) . 7 N e a r l y 9 0 p e r c e n t of t h e s a m p l e s a i d that b l a c k S o u t h A f r i c a n s s h o u l d " f o r m o n e n a t i o n irres p e c t i v e of tribal o r i g i n , " a n d n e a r l y 7 0 p e r c e n t a n s w e r e d n o w h e n a s k e d if t r i b a l i d e n t i t y s h o u l d b e p r e s e r v e d . 8 S i m i l a r r e s u l t s w e r e o b t a i n e d in a r e c e n t n a t i o n w i d e s t u d y of b l a c k t r a d e u n i o n s h o p s t e w a r d s , a g r o u p of o v e r 2 0 , 0 0 0 f a c t o r y - f l o o r - w o r k e r a c t i v i s t s . In i n t e r v i e w s c o n d u c t e d d u r i n g 1 9 9 1 , it w a s f o u n d that 8 6 p e r c e n t i d e n t i f i e d t h e m s e l v e s m a i n l y as S o u t h A f r i c a n s a n d o n l y 5 p e r c e n t m a i n l y as m e m b e r s of an e t h n i c g r o u p . 9 M o r e s i g n i f i c a n t , w i t h r e s p e c t to b l a c k p o l i t i c s t h e r e is, with o n e e x c e p t i o n , not a s i n g l e p o l i t i c a l , o r e v e n q u a s i - p o l i t i c a l , o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h a n y real f o l l o w i n g that d e f i n e s its m e m b e r s h i p , m o b i l i z e s its f o l l o w e r s , or s h a p e s its d e m a n d s in e t h n i c t e r m s . 1 " In o t h e r w o r d s , the existential lands c a p e of S o u t h A f r i c a n b l a c k p o l i t i c s is s i m p l y not c o n t o u r e d by e t h n i c c l e a v a g e . Political o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d m o b i l i z a t i o n , the t h i n g s that c o u n t in t h e w o r l d of c o m p e t i t i o n a n d c o n f l i c t , d o not r e f l e c t a t e r r a i n s c a r r e d by m u l t i p l e a n d d e e p p o l i t i c o - c u l t u r a l f i s s u r e s , a s both P r e t o r i a a n d v a r i o u s liberal a c a d e m i c s w o u l d h a v e us b e l i e v e . T h e o n e e x c e p t i o n is, of c o u r s e , t h e l n k a t h a F r e e d o m P a r t y of C h i e f M a n g o s u t h u B u t h e l e z i a n d t h e K w a Z u l u g o v e r n m e n t . But is t h e e x i s t e n c e of l n k a t h a , a n d of the political r e a c t i o n to it a m o n g b l a c k S o u t h A f r i c a n s , e v i d e n c e of t h e f r a c t u r i n g of A f r i c a n p o l i t i c a l a l l e g i a n c e a l o n g e t h n i c l i n e s ? I t h i n k not. First, t h e r e is the q u e s t i o n of the e x t e n t of I n k a t h a ' s f o l l o w i n g . Virtually every s u r v e y of p o l i t i c a l a l l e g i a n c e in t h e last t w o y e a r s p l a c e s l n k a t h a s u p p o r t at less than 10 p e r c e n t of A f r i c a n a d u l t s c o u n t r y w i d e . A s u r v e y i n v o l v i n g i n t e r v i e w s w i t h u r b a n , r u r a l , a n d h o m e l a n d r e s i d e n t s , c a r r i e d o u t in S e p t e m b e r O c t o b e r 1991, f o u n d that o n l y 3 p e r c e n t of the A f r i c a n p o p u l a t i o n w o u l d v o t e f o r e i t h e r l n k a t h a o r its l e a d e r , C h i e f B u t h e l e z i ( 6 7 p e r c e n t said they w o u l d v o t e A N C ) . 1 1 M o r e r e c e n t l y , an i n t e r v i e w s u r v e y c o n d u c t e d in M a y 1 9 9 2 , in all m a j o r u r b a n c e n t e r s ( i n c l u d i n g D u r b a n ) , r e v e a l e d a g a i n that o n l y 3 p e r c e n t of a d u l t u r b a n A f r i c a n s w o u l d v o t e f o r l n k a t h a . 1 2 E v e n m o r e s t r i k i n g , 71 p e r c e n t of t h e r a n d o m l y s e l e c t e d s a m p l e i n d i c a t e d that t h e y r e j e c t e d l n k a t h a " c o m p l e t e l y a n d on p r i n c i p l e . " T h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e s e s u r v e y s is that Z u l u - s p e a k i n g S o u t h A f r i c a n s living o u t s i d e of N a t a l , a n d e v e n t h o s e w i t h i n N a t a l ' s u r b a n a r e a s , r e j e c t l n k a t h a a n d its e t h n i c a l l y c h a u v i n i s t a p p e a l s . T h i s is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h v a r i o u s e s t i m a t e s that l n k a t h a s u p p o r t is r e l e g a t e d l a r g e l y to rural N a t a l , i.e., t h e area that falls u n d e r the s w a y of the K w a Z u l u p a t r o n a g e m a c h i n e a n d p o l i c e f o r c e . For e x a m p l e , a r a n d o m s a m p l e s u r v e y c o n d u c t e d in 1 9 8 5 in D u r b a n ' s largely Z u l u - s p e a k ing townships f o u n d support for lnkatha and Buthelezi among only 4.8 p e r c e n t of t h e p o p u l a t i o n (in c o n t r a s t to 5 4 . 2 p e r c e n t f o r M a n d e l a ) . 1 3 T h e r e a c t i o n of t h e n o n - Z u l u A f r i c a n p o p u l a t i o n to I n k a t h a ' s b l a t a n t l y c h a u v i n i s t r h e t o r i c a l s o i n d i c a t e s t h e w e a k n e s s of t e n d e n c i e s t o w a r d e t h n i c f r a g m e n t a t i o n in c o n t e m p o r a r y S o u t h A f r i c a . H a v e o t h e r A f r i c a n s r e a c t e d

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to this u s e of Z u l u n a t i o n a l i s m b y s e e k i n g p o l i t i c a l p r o t e c t i o n in t h e i r o w n e t h n i c i t y ? O n t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e r e is s i m p l y n o e v i d e n c e that I n k a t h a ' s e f f o r t s at e t h n i c m o b i l i z a t i o n h a v e p r o d u c e d a c o u n t e r - Z u l u e t h n i c m o b i l i z a t i o n , f r a c t u r i n g the A f r i c a n p o p u l a t i o n into n e w political o r g a n i z a t i o n s that m a k e e x c l u s i v i s t e t h n i c a p p e a l s to X h o s a , T s w a n a , V e n d a , P e d i , S o t h o , a n d the like. R a t h e r , t h e m u l t i - or, as it p r e f e r s , n o n e t h n i c A N C h a s held its d o m i n a n t p o s i t i o n a m o n g t h e A f r i c a n p o p u l a t i o n . In t h e 1 9 9 2 s u r vey that f o u n d o n l y 3 p e r c e n t u r b a n A f r i c a n s u p p o r t f o r I n k a t h a , the A N C r e c e i v e d the s u p p o r t of 7 0 p e r c e n t ( o n l y 3 p e r c e n t r e j e c t e d it " c o m p l e t e l y and o n p r i n c i p l e " ) . In s u m , n e i t h e r the level of s u p p o r t f o r I n k a t h a a m o n g Z u l u s , n o r the political r e a c t i o n by o t h e r e t h n i c g r o u p s to the m o b i l i z a t i o n of Z u l u c h a u v i n i s m , s u g g e s t s that p o l i t i c s in a " n e w " S o u t h A f r i c a w i l l b e d e f i n e d a l o n g lines of i n t r a - A f r i c a r . e t h n i c c l e a v a g e . P r o p o n e n t s of the t h e s i s that S o u t h A f r i c a is a d e e p l y d i v i d e d s o c i e t y are not d e t e r r e d by the lack of e v i d e n t political c l e a v a g e a l o n g e t h n i c lines. T h e i r a r g u m e n t s are b a s e d p r i m a r i l y on a p r o j e c t i o n o n t o S o u t h A f r i c a of the p o l i t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e of A f r i c a ' s o t h e r p o s t c o l o n i a l s t a t e s . T h e y a s s u m e that o n c e the " g l u e " of w h i t e s u p r e m a c y h a s b e e n r e m o v e d , the b l a c k p o p u l a t i o n will f r a g m e n t p o l i t i c a l l y a l o n g e t h n i c / t r i b a l l i n e s , as o c c u r r e d in p l a c e s l i k e N i g e r i a a n d U g a n d a . T h u s , a c c o r d i n g to D o n a l d H o r o w i t z , " P o l i t i c s all o v e r A f r i c a . . . h a s a s t r o n g e t h n i c c o m p o n e n t . . . . W h a t is true of Z i m b a b w e , N i g e r i a , Z a m b i a , K e n y a , a n d M a u r i t a n i a is a l s o l i k e l y to b e t r u e of S o u t h A f r i c a . " 1 4 " E l i m i n a t e w h i t e d o m i n a t i o n , a n d i n t r a A f r i c a n d i f f e r e n c e s will b e p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t . " 1 5 In t h e s a m e v e i n , A r e n d L i j p h a r t a s s e r t s t h a t " t h e r e is n o d o u b t " that b l a c k S o u t h A f r i c a is " a n e t h n i c a l l y plural s o c i e t y on a p a r w i t h m o s t o f t h e b l a c k s t a t e s in A f r i c a . " W h i l e " t h e s e e t h n i c c l e a v a g e s a r e c u r r e n t l y m u t e d by the f e e l i n g s of b l a c k s o l i d a r i t y in o p p o s i t i o n to w h i t e m i n o r i t y r u l e , " L i j p h a r t c o n t i n ues, " t h e y are b o u n d to r e a s s e r t t h e m s e l v e s in a s i t u a t i o n of u n i v e r s a l s u f frage and free electoral competition."16 Such simple and u n e x a m i n e d proj e c t i o n s o n t o S o u t h A f r i c a of political life e l s e w h e r e in s u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a fail to t a k e into a c c o u n t t h e r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t e x p e r i e n c e of S o u t h A f r i c a in t h e n i n e t e e n t h a n d t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s — a n e x p e r i e n c e that m a k e s a n a l o gies w i t h o t h e r c o u n t r i e s in A f r i c a d a n g e r o u s l y m i s l e a d i n g . In.the south, the nineteenth century w a s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a c o n t i n u ing s e r i e s of w a r s of d i s p o s s e s s i o n . T h e s e r e s u l t e d n o t o n l y in a l o s s o f s o v e r e i g n t y f o r t h e t r a d i t i o n a l A f r i c a n p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t i e s of t h e S o u t h A f r i c a n i n t e r i o r , b u t a l s o in t h e w h o l e s a l e d i s p l a c e m e n t of c o m m u n i t i e s f r o m t h e i r i n d i g e n o u s h a b i t a t s , a n d in e x t e n s i v e l a n d a l i e n a t i o n . T h e t r a ditional social s y s t e m s w e r e left w i t h i n a d e q u a t e l a n d to s u p p o r t their p o p u l a t i o n s . T h i s had dire c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r t h e f u n c t i o n i n g a n d s o l i d a r i t y of traditionally defined political communities. T h e material basis for kinship and village solidarity, upon which traditional A f r i c a n social s y s t e m s are

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b u i l t , lay in t h e s y s t e m of " u s u f r u c t " l a n d t e n u r e . B y v i r t u e of m e m b e r s h i p in a kin g r o u p , a p e r s o n ' s a c c e s s to c o m m u n a l l y " o w n e d " f a r m i n g l a n d w a s a s s u r e d . T h e a l i e n a t i o n of m o s t A f r i c a n l a n d b y t h e e n d of t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y v i t i a t e d this k i n s h i p - b a s e d g u a r a n t e e , and t h u s f u n d a m e n t a l l y u n d e r m i n e d t h e t r a d i t i o n a l s y s t e m of l a n d t e n u r e a n d w i t h it the e n t i r e t r a d i t i o n a l s o c i o p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m . In m u c h of A f r i c a to the north of S o u t h A f r i c a , c o l o n i a l i m p o s i t i o n , w h i l e i n v o l v i n g a loss of s o v e r e i g n t y , l e f t t h e t r a d i t i o n a l s y s t e m s o t h e r w i s e i n t a c t . T h e s e , w i t h their c o r e s y s t e m of c o m m u n a l land t e n u r e , t h e c e n t r a l i t y of k i n s h i p o r g a n i z a t i o n , a n d the o v e r r i d i n g i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h v i l l a g e c o m m u n i t i e s , c o n t i n u e d to f u n c t i o n , p r o v i d i n g v a l u e d r e s o u r c e s to their m e m b e r s t h r o u g h o u t the c o l o n i a l a n d i n t o t h e p o s t c o l o n i a l e r a s . T h e v e r y d i f f e r e n t h i s t o r i c a l e x p e r i e n c e of S o u t h A f r i c a c o m p a r e d to its n e i g h b o r s to t h e n o r t h , a n d the r e s u l t a n t diff e r e n c e in their c o n t e m p o r a r y s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , d o e s not s u p p o r t an e x p e c t a t i o n of s i m i l a r i t y w i t h r e s p e c t to t h e n a t u r e of p o l i t i c a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n in e a c h . In the twentieth c e n t u r y , the d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n S o u t h A f r i c a and other t e r r i t o r i e s in s u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a w e r e r e i n f o r c e d . A f r i c a n s in S o u t h A f r i c a w e r e , b e g i n n i n g in t h e last d e c a d e s of the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , d r a w n and f o r c e d into a p r o c e s s of p r o l e t a r i a n i z a t i o n and u r b a n i z a t i o n . A f r i c a n society, in very s i g n i f i c a n t p r o p o r t i o n , b e c a m e part of a m o d e r n industrial order. T h e s a m e c a n n o t be said f o r t h e rest of A f r i c a , w h o s e s o c i e t i e s e m e r g e d out of c o l o n i a l i s m as still essentially p e a s a n t . S o m e thirty y e a r s after the era of ind e p e n d e n c e , South A f r i c a r e m a i n s the only s i g n i f i c a n t l y industrialized c o u n try in s u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a . T h e r e is n o r e a s o n a b l e b a s i s to a s s u m e that the tribal politics of A f r i c a ' s peasant s o c i e t i e s p r o v i d e s a b e n c h m a r k f o r e x p e c tations a b o u t the f u t u r e s h a p e of politics in industrial S o u t h A f r i c a . F i n a l l y , t h e a p a r t h e i d e x p e r i e n c e of t h e last f o r t y y e a r s c a n b e e x p e c t e d to s h a p e t h e w a y e t h n i c i t y is p o l i t i c i z e d in S o u t h A f r i c a . S i m p l y p u t , b y t r y i n g to u s e t r a d i t i o n a l i d e n t i t i e s a n d e t h n i c i t y as a m e a n s to div i d e a n d t h u s b e t t e r c o n t r o l S o u t h A f r i c a ' s b l a c k m a j o r i t y , the w h i t e min o r i t y s t a t e h a s d e l e g i t i m i z e d t r a d i t i o n a l e t h n i c i t y as a b a s i s f o r p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d m o b i l i z a t i o n . W i t h the e x c e p t i o n of the " h o m e l a n d " c o l laborationist elite, politically aware black South A f r i c a n s have, for four d e c a d e s , r e a c t e d to P r e t o r i a ' s s e p a r a t e d e v e l o p m e n t d e s i g n s by e x p l i c i t l y a n d f e r v e n t l y r e j e c t i n g p o l i t i c i z e d e t h n i c i t y . T h i s is r e f l e c t e d t o d a y in the total a b s e n c e of e t h n i c a l l y o r g a n i z e d p o l i t i c a l g r o u p s , s a v e t h o s e t h a t a r e tied t o h o m e l a n d g o v e r n m e n t s . T h o s e w h o e x p e c t S o u t h A f r i c a n p o l i t i c s to f r a g m e n t a l o n g t r a d i t i o n a l e t h n i c lines, o n c e t h e d e m i s e of w h i t e p o l i t i c a l s u p r e m a c y is c o m p l e t e , i g n o r e or d i s m i s s , w i t h o u t t h e slightest r a t i o n a l e or e v i d e n c e , t h e i m p a c t of n e a r l y f o r t y y e a r s of i n t e n s e political s o c i a l i z a t i o n in w h i c h a S o u t h A f r i c a n p o l i t i c a l i d e n t i t y h a s b e e n h e l d u p as a p p r o p r i ate a n d j u x t a p o s e d to an i l l e g i t i m a t e , a n d r e a c t i o n a r y , e t h n i c i t y .

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T h e p r o j e c t i o n of an image of i m p e n d i n g e t h n i c strife on the South African political landscape is not merely analytically misleading but also potentially consequential f o r s h a p i n g the f u t u r e of South A f r i c a . T h o s e w h o propound the "African ethnicity thesis" nearly always combine it with proposals f o r constitutional e n g i n e e r i n g to avoid the centrifugal political forces and intense conflict that are associated with ethnic-communal politics. T h e particulars of these p r o p o s a l s d i f f e r , but they all have o n e element in c o m m o n : they seek to avoid fears of domination, perceived as the e n g i n e of e t h n i c strife, by creating s t r u c t u r e s that will e n s u r e e t h n i c groups, as groups, a share of political representation, power, and public resources. Such efforts may well serve a useful purpose under conditions of ethnic f r a g m e n t a t i o n and strife, but they are c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e in situations like South A f r i c a ' s , which do not exhibit the ethnicization of political c o m p e t i t i o n . By structuring the political g a m e in a way that provides significant resources to political groups organized along ethnic lines, such e f f o r t s have the effect of promoting ethnic " e n t r e p r e n e u r s , " and providing incentives for ethnic organization and m o b i l i z a t i o n . T h e constitutional s c h e m e s to prevent ethnic strife in South A f r i c a , if adopted, are thus likely to bring into being exactly the politicized ethnicity that their p r o p o n e n t s supposedly wish to avoid. In sum, the constitutional proposals put forward by those w h o claim South A f r i c a is a society deeply divided by e t h n i c cleavages should be viewed as a threat to a stable and democratic future.

Civil Society and Democracy

in South Africa

It is generally accepted that sustained d e m o c r a c y requires something that is termed "civil society." At its simplest, what is involved here is the notion that more is required for a f u n c t i o n i n g representative democracy than the holding of regular elections for the selection of o f f i c e h o l d e r s . T h e s e are necessary elements, but they c o n t r i b u t e little to the s u b s t a n c e of d e m o c r a c y unless the organization of political interests takes place independently f r o m the state—that is, o u t s i d e the control of o f f i c i a l d o m . If g o v e r n i n g groups can use their power to f o r m , shape, and control the organization of political interests in society, they destroy the popular sovereignty that the election of officials is s u p p o s e d to bring into being. It follows, then, that democracy requires a realm of "social s p a c e " in which people can act autonomously from the state in their efforts to coalesce, aggregate, organize, and push their perceived political agendas. This realm of autonomy or immunity f r o m state control is what is meant by the term "civil society." State o f f i c i a l s e v e r y w h e r e have an interest in using the a w e s o m e power that their offices provide—coercive, material, symbolic, and informational p o w e r — t o shape the organization of political interest in a m a n -

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ner that will maintain their own incumbency. In other words, state officials are inherently in conflict with civil society; their natural proclivity is to vitiate the realm of a u t o n o m o u s political action. Hence, only when there exist politically oriented social organizations that are consciously jealous of their autonomy from the state, and that possess the resources to protect that a u t o n o m y , will a political system possess a civil society. Only then will the realm of political a u t o n o m y f r o m the state, so necessary for a f u n c t i o n i n g representative democracy, be protected f r o m the o m n i v o r o u s proclivities of o f f i c i a l d o m . An extraordinary thing about c o n t e m p o r a r y South A f r i c a is that it is o n e of the few countries currently u n d e r g o i n g transition away f r o m authoritarianism that actually possesses a vibrant civil society. That civil society was born in the fight against apartheid that marked the decade of the 1980s. T h e c o n t i n u o u s political struggles of the period were driven forward by a concurrent process of social change whose hallmark was organizational effervescence within the black community. The period witnessed a veritable explosion in associational life. It gave birth to new organizations of every variety—community, youth, w o m e n ' s , labor, student, political— which by mid-decade honeycombed the social fabric of all but the smallest and most remote of the c o u n t r y ' s black townships. T h e new associations, the most politically significant of which are the trade unions and township civic associations, articulated a sense of mounting grievance, mobilized collective actions against established authority (rallies, demonstrations, strikes, boycotts), and o f f e r e d a new basis for governance within the urban township communities. By 1984, the array of new community-based grassroots organizations had b e c o m e constituent elements in a full-scale insurrection against white political supremacy. Ultimately, the political pressure these new associations were able to bring to bear, in combination with the international economic sanctions their actions stimulated, forced the state to agree to negotiate an end to white minority rule. A variety of f a c t o r s suggest that the associations that played such a central role in the political upheavals of the 1980s will emerge out of the period of political transition as the core of a new South African civil society. 1 7 From the vantage point of the e m e r g e n c e of civil society, the most significant thing about these new associations is that they were born both in opposition to the state and independently of the African National Congress. Although by 1985 virtually all of the grassroots community-based organizations were closely aligned with the ANC-led political struggle against white supremacy, they were f o r m e d independently of the A N C and developed outside of the A N C ' s formal political and bureaucratic apparatus. T h e formative experience of South A f r i c a ' s new organs of civil society, in particular the trade unions and civic associations, has been key to their ability to maintain an independent o r g a n i z a t i o n a l e x i s t e n c e . T h e i r

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leadership cadre derived its strength and legitimacy from the factory floor and the community grassroots, not from the apparatus of a political movement. The roles that grassroots organizations and their leaders played in the struggle for liberation was not only important but also self-directed. And, a decade-long intense political struggle has bequeathed to the unions and civics, as well as to student, women's, youth, and other communitybased groups, a deep multilayered leadership cadre, operating at national, regional, local (township), and even neighborhood levels. The leadership is also drawn from the full range of layers of social stratification. The new civil society in South Africa is not the preserve of a thin stratum of middle-class intelligentsia, as appears to be the case for much of Eastern Europe, the former USSR, and tropical Africa. The breadth and depth of the black leadership cadre has had two significant consequences. In the period from 1986 to 1990, it undermined the efforts of the state to eliminate the organizations of an incipient civil society. Leadership ability and experience had spread so widely and deeply within the black community that obliterating a narrow elite stratum was no longer sufficient for defeating the state's political opponents. In the period after 1990, when the now legalized ANC with its already extensive exile apparatus returned from abroad, it was virtually impossible for it to absorb the entire local leadership cadre that had arisen during the 1980s. Ironically, the considerable difficulty the ANC experienced in integrating local leadership into its exile-dominated organization, while it may have temporarily weakened the liberation forces, strengthened the chances for democracy by facilitating the autonomy of an incipient civil society. In sum, the community-based organizational efforts had grown too large for them to be either easily repressed by the state or absorbed by the dominant political movement. Although the particular historical circumstances that contributed to the emergence of grassroots associations and to the maintenance of their organizational integrity and independence are the key elements in the creation of an incipient South African civil society, there are several features of the South African situation that will likely help sustain it. A supportive mass media is one. The decade of the 1980s witnessed the birth of a vibrant "alternative," and at the same time professional, press. By giving extensive coverage to developments at the grassroots level in the black community, newspapers like the Weekly Mail and the New Nation have made both the existence and the autonomy of community-based associations part of the public consciousness. While politically sympathetic to the ANC, the "alternative press" are not party papers, and their reporting has been very sensitive to threats to the independence of community-based organizations. In that way they have served to generate and sustain an environment that encourages the continued autonomy of civil society.

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T h e p r o s p e c t s f o r m a i n t a i n i n g a realm of civil society are also enhanced in South A f r i c a by the existence of an array of supportive, influential individuals and institutions. Most significant in the latter category are the Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa, f o u n d e d in 1986, and the Institute for Multi-Party D e m o c r a c y , e s t a b l i s h e d in 1991. Both organizations seek to foster a political culture supportive of democracy through a vigorous program of public education and research. At their n u m e r o u s conferences, symposia, workshops, and other f o r u m s of public education, the exploration of the civil society p h e n o m e n o n and its importance for democracy is a prominent theme. 1 8 South A f r i c a ' s extensive academic and quasi-academic community has also been an important resource in b u i l d i n g and strengthening the organizational capability of grassroots associations. In the past decade and a half, " p r o g r e s s i v e " intellectuals and a c a d e m i c s have provided staffing, technical assistance, and general ideological support for c o m m u n i t y - b a s e d organizations. In the early 1980s, they were deeply involved in the new independent trade union m o v e m e n t . More recently, an infrastructure of private but nonprofit policy and develo p m e n t f i r m s focusing on urban issues has emerged. As civics m o v e from resistance to reconstruction, organizations like the Centre for Policy Studies, P l a n A c t , and C O R P L A N will be available to supply technical assistance in the areas of town planning, housing construction, and local-level negotiations. Another element strengthening organizations of civil society in South Africa is their access to f u n d i n g , much of it f r o m foreign sources. In the current era, genuine community-based grassroots organizations are looked upon with considerable favor by philanthropic f o u n d a t i o n s , labor unions, g o v e r n m e n t s in the industrialized countries, and international a g e n c i e s . T h e level of resource transfers f r o m these sources to South Africa will increase dramatically when and if there is a democratic political settlement. At that point, donor agencies will seek ways to dispense resources in a politically neutral manner. T h e formal nonpartisan stance of c o m m u n i t y organizations like civics will thus place them in an excellent strategic position to be the recipients of major new resource flows. External support f r o m individuals and g r o u p s , both f o r e i g n and domestic, helps strengthen c o m m u n i t y - b a s e d organizations, but the most important factor sustaining South A f r i c a ' s civil society is of a different type. T h e o r g a n i z a t i o n s of civil society, especially the trade unions and the civics, possess important political resources that the national political org a n i z a t i o n s lack. T h e political m o v e m e n t s may have b r o a d p o p u l a r s u p port, but they are lacking in grassroots o r g a n i z a t i o n . 1 9 That is precisely what the civics and unions have, and it can be used both to sustain their autonomy f r o m the state and to influence its policies. In the future, w h e n (if) electoral politics takes hold, the behavior of v o t e r s will likely be

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mediated through these new organizations of civil society. Political parties will vie for the support and e n d o r s e m e n t of the local grassroots a s s o c i a tions. A t t e n d i n g to the issues raised by them will constitute the surest route to electoral success. As long as they remain a u t o n o m o u s f r o m the ruling political party, as they have so far in South Africa, they will provide the social base for the maintenance of electoral competition.

Prospects for Economic Growth Students of South Africa, their vision dominated by ten years of e c o n o m i c stagnation, an e r o d i n g stock of f i x e d capital, an u n e m p l o y m e n t rate that could hit 50 percent by c e n t u r y ' s end, persistent annual inflation of 15 percent, on top of a p a r t h e i d ' s legacy of poverty and inequality, have been overtaken by pessimism about South A f r i c a ' s growth prospects a f t e r the transition from white rule. But, while the c o u n t r y ' s economic problems are real, observers of South Africa might f i n d in a comparative perspective a helpful antidote for their gloom. In the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, virtually every institution of modern market production and e x c h a n g e must be created f r o m scratch and, to be s u c c e s s f u l , probably all at once: property rights, financial institutions, a credit system, capital markets, physical i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , taxation instruments, a private savings system, a convertible currency, and basic cultural orientations like a work ethic and the willingness to take initiative. In this light the obstacles to South A f r i c a ' s economic growth appear minor and the prospects for success, if not bright, at least reasonable. Unlike its counterparts in the former c o m m u n i s t world, South A f r i c a possesses a fully f u n c t i o n i n g marketbased industrial economy, albeit one that is currently strained and requiring major structural adjustments. But the point is that for South Africa the challenge is making adjustments, not, as in the former communist countries, the need to create in just a few years what in other societies took centuries. In addition to the full array of market institutions, and corresponding state mechanisms for fiscal and monetary policy, South Africa will be able to draw on a number of distinctive assets in pursuit of postapartheid economic growth. T h e s e include (1) a m a j o r share of the w o r l d ' s reserves in nearly all important industrial minerals; (2) a highly developed and m o d ern transportation and c o m m u n i c a t i o n s i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ; (3) a s i g n i f i c a n t pool of scientific, engineering, and professional manpower; (4) a very favorable credit situation, the ironic result of international financial s a n c tions that after 1985 forced the payoff of medium-term foreign debt while blocking access to new credit; and (5) in the medium term, a natural and increasingly sizable market f o r its m a n u f a c t u r e d g o o d s in the S o u t h e r n African region.

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O n e of the more positive aspects of the South African situation as far as growth potential is concerned is the e c o n o m i c pragmatism that has been displayed by the leadership of the political m o v e m e n t likely to dominate after the first postapartheid election. T h e A N C has been repeatedly and heatedly criticized by the South A f r i c a n b u s i n e s s c o m m u n i t y and media for its supposed c o m m i t m e n t to the " o u t d a t e d " notions of nationalization and socialism. Indeed, the A N C has been unable to completely cut its tethers to these notions annunciated in the 1955 F r e e d o m Charter; in the contemporary context they are powerful s y m b o l i c c o d e w o r d s for much of its popular constituency, m e a n i n g a c o m m i t m e n t to social justice and economic redistribution. Yet in its e c o n o m i c policy discussions—in numerous w o r k s h o p s , conferences, publications, s p e e c h e s , and i n t e r v i e w s — t h e organization has for the past three years revealed considerable flexibility and realism with respect to economic models and f u t u r e policy. Central to the A N C leadership's emergent e c o n o m i c vision is the notion that improvement in the living c o n d i t i o n s of the black majority (termed redistribution in the South African d e b a t e ) can occur only through e c o n o m i c growth. 2 0 With growth viewed as the foundation for redistribution, a set of related premises has also been a c c e p t e d : that j u m p - s t a r t i n g the growth engine will require attracting foreign capital and mobilizing dom e s t i c saving, which in turn requires a c c e p t i n g that b u s i n e s s e s must be permitted a competitive return on their i n v e s t m e n t s ; that the private sector will play a major role; and that the rights of private property must be respected if a positive investment c l i m a t e is to be m a i n t a i n e d . Nationalization has been relegated to the status of simply o n e a m o n g many potential instruments for j o b creation and controlling the allocation of economic surplus. But the real trend in A N C e c o n o m i c discussions is toward industrial policy and "codetermination," the kind of social pact that has characterized relations between business, labor, and the state in G e r m a n y and through which trade-offs between wages, productivity, and social w e l f a r e spending are agreed upon. S o m e elements of the South A f r i c a n b u s i n e s s c o m m u n i t y and many of the liberal media have greeted the A N C ' s refusal to reject nationalization c o m p l e t e l y and on principle, as well as its p r e f e r e n c e for a strong econ o m i c role for the state, with howls of h o r r o r , as if its e c o n o m i c vision w a s hatched in the old G O S P L A N buildings. But the A N C is modeling the f u t u r e not on the old c o m m u n i s t c o m m a n d e c o n o m i e s but rather on what Lester T h u r o w calls the " c o m m u n i t a r i a n c a p i t a l i s m " of G e r m a n y and Japan, in which the state plays a significant " g u i d e role" in the e c o n o m y . 2 1 Ironically, while the A N C looks f o r g u i d a n c e to the robust capitalist e c o n o m i e s of the 1980s, the South A f r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t , business, and media insist that the only rational w a y to g o is p u r e laissez-faire, an approach practiced only imperfectly by the d e c l i n i n g capitalisms of Britain and the United States.

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T h e real threat to South A f r i c a ' s prospects f o r e c o n o m i c growth lies not in the e c o n o m i c but in the political arena. It is the c o m b i n a t i o n of poverty, inequality, and political mobilization, noted at the outset of this chapter, that m o u n t s the biggest c h a l l e n g e to South A f r i c a ' s f u t u r e . As a leading A N C e c o n o m i s t noted, " T h e r e s o u r c e s that will b e released [through a ' p o s t a p a r t h e i d d i v i d e n d ' ] will hardly be e n o u g h to redress poverty on the scale necessary to o v e r c o m e the crisis [black deprivation]." 2 2 As a c o n s e q u e n c e , will the first postapartheid g o v e r n m e n t , presumably o n e in which black South A f r i c a n s predominate, be able to resist the political pressure to seek immediate redistribution through policies of j o b creation, social spending, p r o t e c t i o n i s m , and c o n f i s c a t o r y taxation, while ignoring inflation, waste, a n d inefficiency? If it cannot, it is certain that the f l o w of foreign and d o m e s t i c investment required for growth will not materialize. S o m e short-run a n d marginal i m p r o v e m e n t in black living c o n d i t i o n s might be obtained, but in the longer term, c o n t i n u e d economic decline and fewer resources for poverty reduction would result. T h e p o p u l i s t challenge e x t e n d s b e y o n d the arena of e c o n o m i c rationality and growth. It will also pose a threat to political stability and to the sustainability of a democratic order. For unless the first postapartheid government can deliver on at least s o m e black expectations, it is unlikely that the current A N C leadership, with its c o m m i t m e n t to e c o n o m i c rationality and a market-oriented and open e c o n o m y , will be able to survive an attack " f r o m the left." Both within the organization and outside it there exist potential challengers w h o are far more attracted to an e c o n o m i c perspective that e m p h a s i z e s autarkic " s e l f - r e l i a n c e " policies, and that has m u c h less tolerance for the rights of private property and the acceptance of the "realities" of the market. Even if the A N C leadership could hold off its populist challengers, the threat to d e m o c r a c y would probably be devastating. For a m o n g South A f r i c a ' s m a j o r i t y the legitimacy of a new d e m o c r a t i c order will have to be earned. A new constitutional order must demonstrate that it can respond effectively to the crisis of poverty and inequality, or it is likely to be swept aside by the political f o r c e of a populism driven by fierce social anger.

The Postapartheid Governance Challenge South A f r i c a ' s postapartheid political e c o n o m y , s h a p e d by a combination of the c o u n t r y ' s severe poverty profile and high levels of expectation and politicization, d e f i n e s certain clear p a r a m e t e r s of action f o r the first postapartheid g o v e r n m e n t . It must, at o n e and the s a m e time, adopt policies that aggressively address at least s o m e of the material expectations of the black majority, while not allowing those policies to undermine the f u n d a m e n t a l investment orientation of e c o n o m i c policy. T h e r e is, I believe,

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room f o r these contradictory imperatives to be effectively dealt with, although it will not be easy. In the last decade and a half, black deprivation has taken on specific political shape in three areas in particular: housing, education, and wages. Grievances in each area gave powerful impetus to the antiapartheid struggle during the 1980s, and each gave rise to f o r m s of organized resistance that today are core c o m p o n e n t s of South A f r i c a ' s f l e d g l i n g civil society. Inadequate township housing provided the context for the development of the civics m o v e m e n t , d e m a n d s for the elimination of Bantu Education produced a student m o v e m e n t , and a p a r t h e i d ' s l o w - w a g e system was the foundation for the trade union m o v e m e n t . Housing, education, and wage d e m a n d s could in a postapartheid context once again be the basis of antistate mobilization. T h e y could also, however, provide the basis for a postapartheid g o v e r n m e n t to c o n s o l i d a t e a new d e m o c r a t i c order and dampen the populist threat to economic growth. Massive programs of urban housing development, school construction, teacher training, and adult literacy, combined with a "social pact" between labor and business entered into through a codetermination process, o f f e r the best hope for combining short-term improvements for the black population with labor discipline, wage restraint, and increased productivity. T h e emphasis in housing and school construction should be on user-built projects, in which community organizations would play a crucial role. T h e cost of building materials w o u l d have to be covered largely by foreign donors, although a special national real estate levy on existing residential and commercial property could be an additional source of f u n d s . 2 3 T h e depressed South African construction industry can produce much of what is needed in the way of building materials, and donated technical skills in architecture, design, and building trades can be m o b i l i z e d f r o m the white sector of society. With u n e m p l o y m e n t in the urban t o w n s h i p s at over 40 percent, it b e c o m e s feasible f o r labor costs to be donated by c o m m u n i t y m e m b e r s themselves. And most important of all, the strong civic association m o v e m e n t provides the organizational resources, on the g r o u n d , to mobilize and direct the local residents in the building of their own homes and schools. T h e political b e n e f i t s of such c o m m u n i t y - b u i l t h o u s i n g s c h e m e s are multiple. Housing is not only a high priority for the black c o m m u n i t y , but it is the kind of benefit that provides tangible evidence that s o m e measure of relief is being delivered to the previously deprived. While not everyone can obtain a new house simultaneously, massive ongoing construction activities will provide credibility to the p r o m i s e of one in the near f u t u r e . User-built houses and c o m m u n i t y - c o n s t r u c t e d schools also create the opportunity to impart valuable skills in the construction and building trades to previously unskilled residents of urban t o w n s h i p s . T h e d e m a n d for

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building materials will rejuvenate a depressed construction industry. T h e mobilization of white professionals to assist black communities in reconstruction can play a supportive role in the all-important task of racial reconciliation. A national adult literacy campaign can provide a role for student organizations akin to the role of civics in the area of housing. It is a low-cost means of mobilizing thousands of young political activists in the task of social reconstruction. And, like the housing schemes, it can provide dramatic and visible evidence that a new government is delivering. T h e most i m m e d i a t e f o c u s of populist pressure will likely be in the arena of labor relations. T h e organized sector of the working class holds a strategic position in the e c o n o m y , has a history of militancy, and has d e m o n s t r a t e d its capacity to disrupt the production process on a large scale. The best hope for a v o i d i n g f r e q u e n t strike actions and k e e p i n g wages and productivity in balance is the creation of institutions that draw both labor and management together to bargain over the major interrelated issues of modern political e c o n o m y . In such arrangements of codetermination, the state participates as arbiter and as guarantor of a g r e e m e n t s reached. Interest groups o r g a n i z e d nationally interact under g o v e r n m e n t auspices to strike "peak bargains" that involve social, fiscal, monetary, and incomes policy. Those industrial countries that practice this form of " d e m ocratic c o r p o r a t i s m " have the best records with respect to combining econ o m i c g r o w t h with social w e l f a r e . 2 4 South A f r i c a already possesses the key national "peak associations" necessary for instituting codetermination, in the form of large labor federations, especially C O S A T U and the several national business chambers in mining, industry, and commerce. T h e leadership of C O S A T U is already thinking in these terms, as witnessed by its support of a National E c o n o m i c F o r u m to set e c o n o m i c policy a f t e r apartheid. 2 5 Although South Africa possesses the grassroots organizations that will permit a new g o v e r n m e n t to aggressively address the "crisis of d e p r i v a tion," the f o r m of g o v e r n m e n t that e m e r g e s out of negotiations may well be not equal to the task. T h e kind of effort required will demand a strong and coherent central state, one that can m a k e decisions, mobilize resources, and galvanize and direct e n e r g i e s toward nationally c o h e r e n t tasks. Students of successful d e m o c r a t i c corporatism and codetermination in Europe e m p h a s i z e that o n e core r e q u i r e m e n t is a centralized g o v e r n m e n t . 2 6 A s s u m i n g that a d e m o c r a t i c constitution emerges out of negotiations, will it e m b o d y an institutional arrangement capable of g o v e r n a n c e of this type? This is far f r o m clear. Pretoria, the Democratic Party, and a number of liberal academics have been pushing a variety of arrangements, all of which have one thing in c o m m o n . T h e y encourage w e a k n e s s at the national center—either through a radical devolution of power to peripheral units ( f e d e r a l i s m / r e g i o n a l i s m ) , or through legislative and/or e x e c u t i v e

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immobilism (vetoes, collective executives, proportional and m u l t i p a r t y c o a l i t i o n c a b i n e t s ) .

SOUTH AFRICA

representation,

F o r t h e liberal a c a d e m i c s , t h e s e p r e f e r e n c e s s t e m f r o m m i s g u i d e d n o tions a b o u t the i m p l i c a t i o n s of S o u t h A f r i c a ' s cultural p l u r a l i s m . M i s j u d g ing t h e n a t u r e of p o l i t i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s , the liberals f o c u s e x c l u s i v e l y o n t h e n e e d to a v o i d w h a t t h e y a s s u m e is i m m i n e n t e t h n i c s t r i f e , a n d in t h e p r o c e s s t h e y d e s i g n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s o l u t i o n s that c o m p l e t e l y i g n o r e t h e tasks of r e d i s t r i b u t i o n a n d g o v e r n a n c e . F e a r i n g the c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r w h i t e l i v i n g s t a n d a r d s of m a j o r i t y r u l e , P r e t o r i a a n d the N a t i o n a l Party s e e k t o b e q u e a t h to S o u t h A f r i c a a c e n t r a l g o v e r n m e n t t o o w e a k to i n t e r v e n e s o cially a n d e c o n o m i c a l l y . In e i t h e r c a s e , s t a t e w e a k n e s s will spell t h e i n a b i l i t y t o d e l i v e r s o m e m e a s u r e of relief to the b l a c k p o p u l a t i o n in t h e s h o r t t e r m . T h e l i k e l y c o n s e q u e n c e will b e to p o l i t i c a l l y u n d e r m i n e t h e most r a t i o n a l and p r a g m a t i c p o r t i o n of the A N C l e a d e r s h i p a n d , m o r e s i g n i f i c a n t l y , to d i s c r e d i t the d e m o c r a t i c a l t e r n a t i v e f o r S o u t h A f r i c a . A f o r m of d e m o c r a c y that l a c k s the p o t e n t i a l f o r e f f e c t i v e g o v e r n a n c e , r e l e v a n t t o S o u t h A f r i c a n c o n d i t i o n s , will b e u n a b l e to d e v e l o p the l e g i t i m a c y n e c e s sary t o s u s t a i n i t s e l f . It will l i k e l y be s w a m p e d by the h i g h l y m o b i l i z e d and p o l i t i c i z e d m a s s e s w h o s e e x p e c t a t i o n s it has d a s h e d . A n a l o g i e s f i g u r e p r o m i n e n t l y in d i s c u s s i o n s on S o u t h A f r i c a ' s f u t u r e . T h e S o u t h A f r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t as w e l l as m a n y l i b e r a l a c a d e m i c s f r e q u e n t l y m a k e s r e f e r e n c e to t h e e x p e r i e n c e s of N i g e r i a , U g a n d a , a n d o t h e r s u b - S a h a r a n A f r i c a n c o u n t r i e s as " m o d e l s " that n e e d to be a v o i d e d in e n g i n e e r i n g a S o u t h A f r i c a n c o n s t i t u t i o n . T h e y m i g h t b e better s e r v e d , h o w e v e r , by l o o k i n g at t h e G e r m a n e x p e r i e n c e d u r i n g t h e i n t e r w a r y e a r s . T h e W e i m a r R e p u b l i c w a s c r e a t e d w i t h o n e of t h e m o s t d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n s of its d a y . It lasted less t h a n f i v e y e a r s . T h e p a r t i c u l a r i n s t i t u t i o n a l a r r a n g e m e n t s of W e i m a r d e m o c r a c y — a dual e x e c u t i v e , p r o p o r t i o n a l r e p resentation, multiparty coalition cabinets—produced a weak central state. T h e r e p u b l i c ' s g o v e r n m e n t w a s c o n s e q u e n t l y i n c a p a b l e of d e c i s i v e a c t i o n in d e a l i n g w i t h t h e s o c i o e c o n o m i c c r i s i s t h a t g r i p p e d G e r m a n y in t h e y e a r s f o l l o w i n g W o r l d W a r I. T h e r e s u l t w a s to d i s c r e d i t d e m o c r a c y in the e y e s of t h e G e r m a n p e o p l e a n d to p a v e t h e w a y f o r N a t i o n a l S o c i a l i s t dictatorship.

Notes 1. Political Man ( N e w York: D o u b l e d a y , 1 9 5 9 ) , p. 5 0 . 2. T h i s result is for 1 9 7 8 . M o r e recent c a l c u l a t i o n s by the I M F s u g g e s t that a d e g r e e o f greater e q u a l i t y w a s a c h i e v e d in the early part of the 1 9 8 0 s . Y e t the c o u n t r y ' s Gini c o e f f i c i e n t remained higher than that of any of the d e v e l o p e d W e s t ern e c o n o m i e s , and o n l y the Latin A m e r i c a n c a s e s that s u f f e r h i g h l y u n e v e n inc o m e distribution c a m e c l o s e to the S o u t h A f r i c a n c o e f f i c i e n t . S e e International

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Monetary Fund, Economic Policies for a New South Africa, Occasional Paper No. 91 (Washington, D.C., January 1992), p. 4. 3. T h e C a r n e g i e calculation was done on data f r o m 1980. A study using more recent data reports that in 1989, 40 percent of South A f r i c a ' s total population lived below the M L L . This, however, underestimates the overall and black poverty level because the data upon which these calculations were based excluded the four nominally independent homelands. See Francis Wilson and Mamphela Ramphele, Uprooting Poverty—The South African Challenge: Report for the Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty and Development in Southern Africa (New York: N o r t o n , 1989); and IMF, Economic Policies for a New South Africa, p. 5. 4. Introduced by Arend Lijphart in his study of c o n s o c i a t i o n a l i s m in the Netherlands, the concept "deeply divided" society refers to systems comprised of essentially self-contained (unintegrated) cultural/ethnic or religious c o m m u n i t i e s . Lijphart has subsequently applied the concept to South Africa in characterizing the cultural pluralism of the c o u n t r y ' s black population. Lijphart uses the terms "deeply d i v i d e d , " " s e g m e n t e d , " and " p l u r a l " society interchangeably. Several South A f r i c a n analysts, especially Hermann Giliomee, have adopted L i j p h a r t ' s usage in their discussions of appropriate constitutional solutions for dealing with their country's problems. See Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley: University of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1968); and, by the same author, Power Sharing in South Africa (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1985). 5. See, especially, Donald L. Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa ? (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); and Arend Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa. 6. See, for example, Lynetter Dreyer, The Modern African Elite of South Africa (London: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 1 0 1 - 1 0 7 . 7. Melville Leonard Edelstein, What Do Young Africans Think? (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1972), pp. 95, 107. 8. Ibid., p. 108. 9. Sipho Mila Pityana and Mark Orkin, eds., Beyond the Factory Floor: A Survey of COSATU Shop-Stewards (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1992), p. 70. 10. Various white r i g h t - w i n g groups, such as the A f r i k a n e r W e e r s t a n d s b e w e g i n g ( A W B ) , d e f i n e t h e m s e l v e s in ethnic terms, and until recently so did the ruling National Party. But those w h o are concerned with constitutional engineering to prevent ethnic conflict are usually focused primarily on the politics of the black community. 11. The survey was conducted by MarkData and published by the Human Sciences Research Council. See story in the Star, " M a n d e l a , FW Lead Head and Shoulders," April 19, 1992, p. 12. 12. T h e survey, conducted by the Markinor polling c o m p a n y , utilized a random sample of 1,300 adult black persons in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging area, Durban, Cape T o w n , East London, and Port Elizabeth. The results are reported in Southern African Report, September 18, 1992, p. 6. 13. See Fatima Meer, Resistance in the Townships (Durban: Madiba, 1989), p. 262. A 1985 survey of black political allegiances in metropolitan areas across South A f r i c a , conducted by Mark Orkin, found that support for Buthelezi and Inkatha a m o n g Zulu speakers in urban Natal stood at 34 percent and d r o p p e d to 11 percent a m o n g Zulus living in the T r a n s v a a l ' s urban areas. See Mark O r k i n , The Struggle and the Future: What Black South Africans Really Think (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1986), p. 40.

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14. Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? p. 41. 15. Ibid., p. 85. 16. Lijphart, Power Sharing in South Africa, pp. 19-20. 17. T h i s presumes, of course, that the transition produces a d e m o c r a t i c and workable constitution. 18. For an overview of the work of 1DASA, see the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s journal, Democracy in Action. 19. See article in the official A N C journal "The Role of the A N C B r a n c h , " Mayibuye: Journal of the African National Congress, July 1991, pp. 2 0 - 2 1 . 20. See Duma Gqubule, " A N C Economist Spells Out Future," Star, February 19, 1992, p. 17. 21. See Lester Thurow, Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle Among Japan, Europe, and America (New York: William Morrow, 1992), pp. 3 1 - 3 3 . 22. Ibid. 23. Ironically, the transitional problems of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, where both d e m o c r a c y and e c o n o m i c growth are less likely than in South A f r i c a , may pull so much of the w o r l d ' s available financial assistance that the considerably smaller sum required in South Africa will not be available. 24. See Harold Wilensky, The 'New Corporatism,' Centralization, and the Welfare State, Contemporary Political Sociology Series (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1976), p. 23. 25. T h e National E c o n o m i c Forum w a s f o r m e d in August 1992 with e m ployer, labor, and government representation. 26. See Wilensky, The 'New Corporatism,' pp. 2 1 - 2 3 .

Select Bibliography

Books Published Since 1990 on Current South African Politics Adam, Heribert, and Kogila Moodley. The Opening of the South African Mind. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. Barrel!, Howard. MK: The ANC's Armed Struggle. London: Penguin, 1990. Baskin, Jeremy. Striking Back: A History of COSATU. Johannesburg: Ravan, 1991. Blumenfeld, Jerome. Economic Interdependence in Southern Africa: From Conflict to Cooperation. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1992. Bond, Patrick. Commanding Heights and Community Control: New Economics for a New South Africa. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1991. Burman, S., and E. Preston-Whyte, eds. Questionable Issue: Illegitimacy in South Africa. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1992. Cawthra, Gavin. The State of the Police: The South African Police and the Transition to Post-Apartheid Society. London: Zed Books, 1992. Chidester, David. Shots in the Streets: Religion and Violence in South Africa. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1992. Christie, Pam. The Right to Learn: The Struggle for Education in South Africa. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1992. Cock, Jacklyn. Colonels and Cadres: War and Gender in South Africa. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1991. Cohin, Robin, Yvonne Muthien, and Abebe Zegeye. Repression and Resistance: Insider Accounts of Apartheid. London: Hans Zell, 1990. Coleman, Keith. Nationalization: Beyond the Slogans. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1991. Crewe, Mary. AIDS in South Africa: The Myth and Reality. London: Penguin, 1992. De Klerk, Michael, ed. A Harvest of Discontent: The Land Question in South Africa. Cape Town: IDASA, 1991. Dugard, John et al. The Last Years of Apartheid: Civil Liberties in South Africa. New York: Ford Foundation, 1992. Ellis, Stephen, and Sechaba Tsepo. Comrades Against Apartheid: The ANC and the South African Communist Party in Exile. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992. Everett, David, and Elinor Sisulu, eds. Black Youth in Crisis: Facing the Future. Johannesburg: Ravan Press. 1992. Frederikse, Julie. The Unbreakable Thread: Non-Racialism in South Africa. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1990. . All Schools for All People: Lessons for South Africa from Zimbabwe's Open Schools. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1992. Gelb, Stephen, ed. South Africa's Economic Crisis. Cape Town: David Philip; London: Zed Books, 1991.

199

200

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hansson, D., and D. van Zyl Smit, eds. Towards Justice? Crime and State Control in South Africa. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1990. Horowitz, Donald L. A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991. lnnes, D., M. Kentridge, and H. Perold. Power and Profit: Labour, Politics and Business in South Africa—lnnes Labour Brief. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1992. James, Wilmot. Our Precious Metal: African Labour in South Africa's Gold Industry. Cape Town: David Philip, 1992. Lee, R., and L. Schlemmer, eds. Transition to Democracy: Policy Perspectives. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1991. Lewis, Stephen R. The Economics of Apartheid. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1990. Lipton, Merle, and C. Simkins, State and Market in Post Apartheid South Africa. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1993. Lodge, Tom, Bill Nasson, et al. All, Here, and Now: Black Politics in South Africa in the 1980s. New York: Ford Foundation, 1991. Malan, Rian. My Traitor's Heart. London: Bodley Head, 1990. Mallaby, Sebastian. After Apartheid: The Future of South Africa. New York: Random House, 1992. Mailer, Judy. Conflict and Co-operation: Case Studies in Worker Participation. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1992. Manzo, Kathryn. Domination, Resistance and Social Change in South Africa. New York: Praeger, 1992. Mare, Gerhard. Brothers Born of Warrior Blood: Politics and Ethnicity in South Africa. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1992. Marx, A. Lessons of Struggle: South African Internal Opposition 1960-1990. Cape Town: Oxford University Press. McKendrick, B., and W. Hoffman, eds. People and Violence in South Africa. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1990. Minnear, Anthony, ed. Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1992. Moll, Peter, ed. Redistribution: How Can It Work in South Africa? Cape Town: David Philip. Moss, Glenn, and Ingrid Obery, eds. South African Review: From 'Red Friday' to CODESA. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1992. Nattrass, Nicoli. Profits and Wages: The South African Economic Challenge. London: Penguin, 1992. Nattrass, Nicoli, and Elizabeth Ardington, eds. The Political Economy of South Africa. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1990. Ohlson, Thomas, and Stephen John Stedman. The New Is Not Yet Born: Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994. Patel, Leila. Restructuring Social Welfare: The Options for South Africa. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1992. Pityana, Sipho Mila, and Mark Orkin, eds. Beyond the Factory Floor: A Survey of COSATU Shop-Stewards. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1992. Preston-Whyte, E., and C. Rogerson, eds. The Informal Economy of South Africa: Past, Present and Future. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1992. Price, Robert M. The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa: 1975-1990. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. Robertson, M., ed. Human Rights for South Africans. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

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Sachs, Albie. Protecting Human Rights in a New South Africa. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1990. Schrire, Robert. Adapt or Die: The End of White Politics in South Africa. New York: Ford Foundation, 1992. , ed. Wealth and Poverty: Critical Choices for South Africa. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1993. Seekings, Jeremy. Heroes or Villains? Youth Politics in the 1980s. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1993. Slabbert, Frederik Van Zyl. The Quest for Democracy: South Africa in Transition. London: Penguin, 1992. Smith, David M. The Apartheid City and Beyond: Urbanization and Social Change in South Africa. London: Routledge, 1992. Sparks, Allister. The Mind of South Africa. London: Heineman, 1990. Swilling, M., R. Humphries, and K. Shubane, eds. Contemporary South Africa Debates Series—The Apartheid City in Transition. Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1992.

About the Contributors

Amy Biehl was a Fulbright research fellow at the Community Law Centre of the University of the Western Cape; her research focused on the role of women in the democratic transition in South Africa. After graduation from Stanford University in 1988, she worked as a program assistant for the National Democratic Institute in Washington, D.C. Amy Biehl died in August 1993, in Guguletu Township. Her editors wish to express their sense of loss and sorrow. Colin Bundy is director of the Institute for Historical Research at the University of the Western Cape. He studied at the Universities of Natal and Witwatersrand before proceeding to Oxford as a Rhodes scholar. He has taught in England, the United States, and South Africa. Author of The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry and (with William Beinort) Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa, he is currently writing a biography of Govan Mbeki. Jacklyn Cock is associate professor of sociology at the University of the Witwatersrand. Author of Maids and Madams: A Study in the Politics of Exploitation and Colonels and Cadres: War and Gender in South Africa, she is currently carrying out research on the impact of military-related activities on the ecology of Southern Africa and the problems of psychological trauma among MK cadres. She was a founding member of the Military Research Group in South Africa. Jeffrey Herbst is assistant professor of politics at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University. He is the author of State Politics in Zimbabwe and The Politics of Reform in Ghana. In 1992-1993, he was a Fulbright lecturer in politics at the University of Cape Town and the University of the Western Cape, during which time he researched the politics of the economic transition in South Africa. Herbert M. Howe is the director of African studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He has written on Southern African 203

204

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

security for CSIS Africa Notes, Armed Forces Journal, Defence Africa, and the Christian Science Monitor and has contributed chapters on Southern African politics to several books and periodicals. He is currently a coordinator of a USAID-funded diplomatic training program for black South Africans. Gilbert M. Khadiagala is assistant professor of comparative politics and African studies at Kent State University in Ohio. He has studied in Kenya, Canada, and the United States. He has published articles on African politics and Southern African security and is currently at work on a book manuscript, Allies in Adversity: The Frontline States in Southern African Security. Thomas G. Krattenmaker is professor of law at Georgetown University Law Center, where he teaches constitutional law. For a three-month period during 1991, he was visiting professor of law at the University of Natal (Durban) College of Law in South Africa. Robert M. Price is a member of the political science faculty of the University of California, Berkeley, specializing in African politics with a primary emphasis on South Africa. He has published widely, including a book on Ghana, a monograph on U.S. foreign policy toward sub-Saharan Africa, and articles on the political economy of change and on South African domestic and foreign affairs. His latest book is The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa, 1975-1990. Stephen John Stedman is assistant professor of African studies and comparative politics at the Johns Hopkins University Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. He is the author of Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980 and (with Thomas Ohlson and Robert Davies) The New Is Not Yet Born: Conflict and Its Resolution in Southern Africa. From January to September 1993, he was a senior Fulbright research fellow at the University of the Western Cape, where he studied the politics of negotiation in South Africa. Peter Vale is director of the Centre for Southern African Studies at the University of the Western Cape. A former president of the Political Science Association of South Africa, he has authored over 200 academic publications. A key contributor to the debate on South Africa's foreign policy in the postapartheid era, he advises the African National Congress on international issues. At present, he is working on a monograph that compares the different foreign policy cultures of the South African state and the African National Congress.

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

205

I. William Zartman is the Jacob Blaustein Professor of International Organization and Conflict Resolution and director of African studies at the Nitze School for Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. He is the author of a number of works on Africa, including Africa in the 1980's (with Legum, Langdon, and Mytelka); Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa; and Conflict Resolution in Africa (with Francis Deng). He has also edited and coauthored a number of the works in the SAIS African Studies Library, including Europe and Africa: The New Phase.

Index

AIDS, 49, 160, 177 Abolition of Discrimination Against Women bill, 91 Adam, Heribert, 2, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21 African National Congress, 3, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 49, 57, 117, 184, 185, 188, 189, 193, 196; constitutional proposals, x, 3, 4, 16, 21, 22, 23, 27, 74, 86, 89-97, 99, 103, 104, 174; defense negotiations, 127-136, 140-147; economic policy, 2, 29, 32-42, 192; local negotiations, 65, 68, 70, 72, 73, 77, 79, 82, 83; National Conference, 103; National Executive Committee (NEC), 103, 104; Women's League, 85, 90, 92, 93, 96, 104; Youth League, 3, 59, 62 African Women's Organization of the PAC, 90 Afrikaner, 11, 14, 35, 130, 134, 135 Afrikaner Broederbond, 104 Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), 143, 144 Alexandra, 73 Algeria, 130 Andersson, Neil, 56 Anglin, Douglas, 174 Angola, 37, 129, 131, 135, 144, 148, 154, 156, 160, 169, 170, 176 Aristotle, 66 Armaments Corporation of South Africa (ARMSCOR), 128, 140 Austen, Jane, 145 Australia, 97, 98 Azanian Students Convention (AZASCO), 49 Azanian Peoples Liberation Army, 128 Badenhorst, Witkop, 128, 130 Baker, Pauline, 129 Banda, Kamuzu, 156, 168,175 Bangladesh, 158

Bantu Education Act of 1953, 53, 194 Bantustans, 51, 54, 55 Basson, Nico, 144 Basuto Congress Party, 156 Benin, 9 Bercuson, Kenneth, 35 Berlin Wall, 33 Bernado Park girls' high school, 75, 76 Biafra, 158 Black Consciousness movement, 47, 48 Black Local Authorities Act of 1982, 68 Black Sash, 90, 96, 98 Boipatong massacre, 89 Bophuthatswana, 86 Botha, P.W., 76, 128, 129 Botswana, 9, 157, 174 Brand, Simon, 173 Bretton Woods, 171 British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT), 135 Brundtville, 73 Bundy, Colin, 154 Budlender, Debbie, 101, 102 bureaucracy, 3, 17 business, 2, 5, 17, 19, 23, 38, 39, 40, 41, 74, 77, 78,79, 101, 192 Buthelezi, Mangosuthu, 16, 72, 73, 184 Byson, P.G., 77, 78 Callaghy, Thomas, 172 Canada, 96 Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 97 Cape Province, 70 Cape Provincial Authority (CPA), 69 Cape Town, 47, 66, 69, 73, 75 Cape Town City Council (CTCC), 69 Carlin, John, 143 Carnegie Commission, 181

207

208

Center on Inter-Group Studies, 70

INDEX

democracy, ix, x, 1 - 2 6 , 32, 66, 95, 98, 99,

Central Europe, 36

110, 111, 120, 123, 156, 170, 171, 181, 182,

Centre for Policy Studies, 190

183, 193, 195, 196; and civil society,

Chan, Stephen, 175

187-191

Charlewood, Carole, 91

Democratic Party (DP), 13, 69, 90, 92, 97, 195

Charter of Fundamental Rights, 93, 95

Democratic Party W o m e n ' s F o r u m , 9 0

Charter for Social Justice, 93, 9 5

Development Bank of South Africa, 53, 86

Chase Manhattan Bank, 31

D h l o m o , Oscar, 73

Checkers, 77, 78, 79

diPalma, Giuseppe, 8

Chikane, Frank, 57, 73

Directives of State Policy, 9 5

Chiluba, Frederick, 5, 156, 171, 175

District of Columbia, 112, 113

China, 141

du Toil, André, 130

Cicero, 165

Durban, 53, 66, 103, 184

Cilliers, Jakkie, 135, 148 Ciskei, 86

East Asia, 40

Citizen Force and C o m m a n d o , 131, 133, 144

Eastern Europe, 163, 172, 182, 189, 191 education, 30, 31, 34, 43, 48, 49, 52, 53, 54,

City Press, 59 civic associations, 3, 9, 11, 12, 48, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 82, 83, 1 8 8 - 1 9 1 , 194 Civil Co-operation Bureau ( C C B ) , 134 Claus, Olaf, 177 Cock, Jacklyn, 130, 132, 134, 135 Coker, Christopher, 172 Cold War, 154, 155, 162, 164 C o m m i s s i o n on the Constitution, 104 C o n f e r e n c e for a D e m o c r a t i c South Africa

55, 59, 60, 67, 74, 75, 76, 87 Educational Policy Unit at University of Witwatersrand, 53 Egypt, 175 Eskom, 67 Ethiopia, 133 ethnicity, 15, 16, 18, 149, 1 8 3 - 1 8 7 Europe, 33, 160, 161, 177, 158 European C o m m u n i t y , 162, 172, 174, 177

(Codesa), 59, 62, 76, 90, 92 Codesa II, 90, 92; G e n d e r Advisory C o m m i t e e (GAC), 90, 92, 103 C o n f e r e n c e for Security and Cooperation in Southern Africa ( C S C S A ) , 177 C o n f e r e n c e on Security and Cooperation in E u r o p e (CSCE), 151, 177 C o n g r e s s of South African Students (COSAS), 48 C o n g r e s s of South African T r a d e Unions ( C O S A T U ) , 39, 40, 41, 73, 75, 77, 79, 83,

federalism, 18, 19, 22, 23, 95, 183, 196 Federation of C h a m b e r s of Industry, 79 Fisher, Roger, 27 Fort Beaufort, 70 France, 135 Frankel, Glenn, 58 Freedom Charter, 32, 48, 192 Frelimo, 170 Frontline States (FLS), 148, 168, 169, 172, 173, 177

90, 101, 195 Conservative Party (CP), 14, 104, 130, 143

Gazankulu, 8 6

Cooper, Saths, 57

Gender and D e v e l o p m e n t ( G A D ) , 102

Cooperative Business M o v e m e n t , 77

German, 21, 23, 196

C O R P L A N , 190

Germany, 18, 27, 192, 196

Crocker, Chester, 151

Giliomee, Hermann, 14

Cronin, Jeremy, 33

Ginwala, Frene, 91

Cuba, 140, 141

Goldstone C o m m i s s i o n , 144 G O S P L A N , 192

Dahl, Robert, 18

Govender, Pregs, 9 0

Davis, Stephen, 131

Grahamstown, 6 6

de Gaulle, 130

Greenpoint Stadium, 6 9

de Klerk, 32, 33, 35, 68, 96, 128, 129, 130,

Griggs v. D u k e Power C o . , 113, 114

134, 135, 143, 144, 164, 172, 173, 174

Gulliver state, 19

INDEX

209

Hani, Chris, x, 2 0 , 1 3 1 , 133, 1 4 5 , 1 4 7 Harber, Anton, 144 Havenga, N.C. (finance minister, 1950), 34 Heitman, Helmut Romer, 143 Herbst, Jeffrey, 23, 164 Hillside, 70 Hillside Residents' Association (HRA), 70 homelands, x, 21, 23, 30, 35, 41, 53, 54, 8 6 - 8 9 , 93, 105, 116, 128, 146, 181, 186 Horn, Pat, 103, 104

Kasikili Island, 157 Kaunda, Kenneth, 171, 175 Kenya, 175, 185 Keys, Derek (finance minister), 31, 3 5 Kgositsile, Baleka, 85 Kimberley, 6 8 KwaNdebele, 86 KwaZulu homeland, 16, 55, 86, 87, 88, 96, 99, 128, 184

Horowitz, Donald, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19,

Labor Relations Act (LRA), 79, 80, 83

2 0 , 2 1 , 2 2 , 23, 27, 185 Hough, Mike, 143 Hout Bay, 69 Howe, Herbert, 145 Huntington, Samuel, 129

Lachman, Desmond, 35 Latin America, 8, 82 Lawyers for Human Rights, 9 8

Imbasi, 74 Independent Development Trust, 71 Independent Mediation Service of South Africa (1MSSA), 72, 78 India, 133, 135, 140 Indian parties, 14 Indians, 34, 86, 87, 88, 115, 117, 119, 120, 141, 146 Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), 14, 16, 57, 72, 73, 74, 135, 136, 144, 184, 185 IFP W o m e n ' s Brigade, 92 Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa (IDASA), 70, 97, 140, 190 Institute for Multi-Party Democracy, 190 Institute of Strategic Studies, 143 Internal Stability Units, 71 International Labour Organisation, 73, 101 International Monetary Fund, 172 Irwin, Alec, 73 Jane's Defence Weekly, Japan, 173, 192 Jim Crow laws, 110

143

Johannesburg, 16, 66, 67, 68, 71, 77, 85 Joint Enrichment Project (JEP), 49, 50, 59, 61, 63

Leandra township, 58, 61 Lebowa, 86 Lemarchand, René, 9 Lesotho, 156, 159, 171, 174 Lesotho Highland Water Scheme, 159 Lewis, Stephen, 15 Liebenberg, Kat, 129 Lijphart, Arend, 16, 27, 185 lobola, 88, 99 Lusaka, 39, 86, 96, 140, 142, 175 Maastricht, 172 Maboreke, Mary, 99 Machet, Samora, 168 Maharaj, Mac, 27 Makoni, Simba, 173 Malan, Magnus, 128, 130, 142, 144, 145 Malawi, 156, 168, 171, 175 Malibongwe Conference, 86, 89 Maluwa, Tuyanjana, 157 Mandela, Nelson, 13, 27, 37, 40, 47, 58, 72, 73, 130, 164, 184 Mandela, Winnie, 37 Manzo, Kate, 14 Marks, Shula, 56 Maseko, Sipho, 49 Mass Democratic Movement ( M D M ) 8 6 Mauritania, 185 Mauritius, 9

Joint Management Committees, 128

Mbandla, Bridgette, 22

Joubert, Joep, 1 2 8 , 1 3 0

Mbeki, Thabo, 22 Mboweni, Tito, 36, 40 M c G o w a n , Patrick, 14

Kabwe (1986 conference), 41 Kadalie, Rhoda, 100, 104, 105 Kahn, Calvin, 146 KaNgwane, 86 Karl, Terry Lynn, 8, 9, 11

Metro Cash & Carry, 77 Meyer, Roelf, 1 2 8 , 1 4 4 , 1 4 6 Mexico, 29 M K . See Umkhouto we Sizwe.

210

INDEX

M o b u t u , 156

New Nation, 49, 189

M o f o k e n g , Dan, 12

Newly industrialized countries (NICs), 40, 41

M o k a b a , Peter, 3, 59

Nigeria, 175, 185, 196

M o o d l e y , Kogila, 2, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21

N k a d i m e n g , John, 140

Morris, Mike, 3 2

Nkiwane, Solly, 155

M O S S G A S , 31

Nolutshungu, S a m , 169

M o z a m b i q u e , 37, 131, 144, 148, 154, 156,

Nupen, Charles, 72

160, 168, 169, 170, 176 M P LA, 170

OK, 77, 78, 79

M p u m a l a n g a , 74

Organisation of African Unity (OAU), 158,

M p u r u , Moeti, 49

177, 178

M u g a b e , Robert, 164, 171

Ottaway, Marina, 131

N A F T A , 162

Pan African C o n f e r e n c e (PAC), 27, 71, 77, 79

Naidoo, Kumi, S' 1

Patel, Ebrahim, 4 0

Namibia, 94, 129, 131, 135, 142, 144, 155, 157, 163, 169, 171, 174 Natal, 1 6 , 5 5 , 73, 74, 87, 88, 184 Natal Indian Congress, 92 Natal Organisation for W o m e n ' s E m p o w e r m e n t , 102 N a t h a n , Laurie, 146, 148 National Council of Trade U n i o n s ( N A C T U ) , 79, 80, 8 3 National E c o n o m i c Forum, 23, 40, 100, 195 National Education Crisis C o m m i t t e e

Pedi, 185 Permanent Force and National Servicemen, 131, 132 Phola Park, 71 Phola P a r k ' s Residents' Committee, 71 Pick & Pay, 77, 78, 101 Pietermaritzburg, 66, 74 P L A N A C T , 67, 190 Port Elizabeth, 6 6 Preferential T r a d e Area (PTA), 175, 176 Pretoria, 66, 71, 85, 143, 155, 156, 163, 173,

93, 95, 96, 97, 99, 103, 104, 105, 117, 134,

175, 176, 184, 186, 195, 196 Pretoria Minute, 131 Prevention of D o m e s t i c Violence bill, 91 Price, Robert, 2, 7, 11, 14, 15, 16, 18, 1 9 , 2 1 , 23

146, 196

Promotion of Equal Opportunities bill, 91

( N E C C ) , 75 National Land Committee, 102 National M a n p o w e r C o m m i s s i o n , 79, 80, 101 National Party (NP), 3, 14, 20, 27, 35, 37, 91,

National Peace Accord, 67, 71, 73, 74, 135

Proportional representation, 2 2

National Peace Committee, 147 National Peace Keeping Force, 136

Qoboza, Percy, 5 9

National Security M a n a g e m e n t System

Q w a Q w a , 86

( N S M S ) , 128, 140 National Socialism, 196

R a m a p h o s a , Cyril, 22, 36, 40, 92

National W o m e n ' s Chapter of the National

Rape Crisis C a p e T o w n , 88, 9 9

Party, 90 National Youth Development C o o r d i n a t i n g Committee, 50, 62

Reconnaisance C o m m a n d o s , 128, 134 R e n a m o , 170 Rhodesia, 163

National Youth Development C o n f e r e n c e , 50

Roodepoort, 6 8

National Youth Development F o r u m ( N Y D F ) ,

Rothschild, Donald, 16

61 Nedcor/Old Mutual forecasting exercise, 15, 26, 3 6

Rousseau, 6 6 Rural W o m e n ' s Movement, 102 Russian Revolution, 66

negotiations, 2, 3, 4, 13, 14, 20, 21, 23, 32, 33, 37, 61, 62, 6 5 - 8 4 , 85, 89, 92, 103, 130, 131,

Sachs, Albie, 103

144, 147, 149, 182, 195

Salt River c o m m u n i t y hall, 6 9

Negotiating Council, 9 2

S A S O L , 31

INDEX

211

Saul, John, 170

Southern Life, 101

Sebokeng massacre, 73

Soviet Union, 36, 154, 155, 162, 182, 183,

Seegers, Annette, 134

189, 191

Seekings, Jeremy, 11, 12, 50, 61

S o w c t o , 27, 31, 47, 58, 59, 67, 68, 183

Senegal, 9

S o w e t o P e o p l e ' s Delegation (SPD), 6 7 , 6 8 ,

Sexwale, T o k y o , 146

75,82

Sharpeville massacre, 31

S o w e t o T o w n s h i Council, 6 7

Shubane, Khehla, 12

Special D e f e n c e Fund, 134

Sidudu Island, 157

Special Forces, 128, 134, 135, 140, 144

Sinclair, June, 91

State Security Council (SSC), 128

Sisk, Timothy, 15, 22

Stoneman, Colin, 174

Slovo, Joe, 27

Straker, Gill, 5 8 , 6 1

Smith, Ian, 164

Sunday Star, 147

Smuts, Dene, 91

S w a m p y Island, 157

Sofasonke Party (SP), 67

Swaziland, 156, 174

Somalia, 161 Sotho, 185

Taiwan, 41

South African Commercial, Catering and

Tanzania, 128, 129, 133, 140, 156, 158,

Allied W o r k e r s ' Union ( S A C C A W U ) , 77, 78, 79

171 T B V C areas, 86, 87, 8 8

South African C o m m i t t e e on Sports, 69

Terreblanche, Eugene, 144

South African C o m m u n i s t Party ( S A C P ) , 13,

T h o k o s a , 71

22, 2 7 , 3 3 , 4 0 , 4 1 , 7 3 , 9 2

T h o m p s o n , Carol, 174

South African Council of Churches, 73

Thornhill C o m m i s s i o n report, 69

South African D e f e n c e Force ( S A D F ) , 4, 74,

T h u r o w , Lester, 192

127-136, 1 3 9 - 1 4 5 , 147, 148

Total strategy, 128, 146

South African Development Bank, 173

Trador, 77, 7 8

South African E m p l o y e r s ' Co-Ordinating

Transkei, 86, 87

Council on Labour A f f a i r s ( S A C C O L A ) , 79, 80, 83 South African G o v e r n m e n t : Department of

Transitional Executive Council (TEC), 93, 128, 136 Transvaal, 59, 68, 73

Foreign Affairs, 163; Department of

Transvaal Indian Congress, 92

Military Intelligence (DMI), 128, 140, 144;

Transvaal Provincial Authority (TPA), 67, 68,

Ministry of Justice, 91 South African Institute of Clinical Psychology, 57 South African National Civic Organisation

71,82 Transvaal stay-away (1984), 48 T s w a n a , 185 Tutu, D e s m o n d , 73, 164

( S A N C O ) , 11, 12 South African National Student C o n g r e s s ( S A N S C O ) , 75 South African Police (SAP), 144 South African Students C o n g r e s s ( S A S C O ) , 49

Uganda, 128, 140, 185, 196 U m k h o n t o w e Sizwe ( M K ) , x, 4, 104, 1 2 7 - 1 3 6 , 139, 140, 141, 142, 1 4 5 - 1 4 9 u n e m p l o y m e n t , 34, 39, 41, 44, 45, 48, 49, 52, 5 3 , 5 8 , 6 0 , 6 1 , 191,

South Korea, 41

194

Southeast Asia, 155

United D e m o c r a t i c Front (UDF), 23, 48, 71,

Southern African Customs Union ( S A C U ) , 176 Southern African Development C o n f e r e n c e (SADC), 156, 157, 1 7 3 - 1 7 7 S A D C C , 156, 157, 168, 169, 173, 174, 175, 177

73,86 U N I C E F , 73 UN1TA, 131, 170 United Nations Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against W o m e n ( C E D A W ) , 96, 9 7

212 United States, 4, 15, 2 3 , 2 7 , 3 3 , 9 4 , 9 6 , 1 0 9 - 1 1 3 , 115, 116, 117, 122, 156, 193

INDEX

Witwatersrand, 5 6 , 7 5 , 1 6 0 women, 4, 1 1 , 8 5 - 1 0 7

United W o m e n ' s Organisation ( U W O ) , 8 6

W o m e n ' s Alliance o f Southern Natal, 9 0

University o f Pretoria, 101

W o m e n ' s Alliance o f the Western Cape, 9 0

Urban Foundation, 6 9

W o m e n ' s Bureau, 101

Uruguay, 2 9

W o m e n ' s Charter Campaign, 9 0 , 100, 103 W o m e n ' s College, 1 0 2

Vaal triangle, 16 Vale, Peter, 172 van der B e r g , Servaas, 3 4 , 3 5 van der Westhuizen, 143 Van Zyl Slabbert, Frederik, 4, 15, 7 0 Venda, 8 6 , 185

W o m e n ' s Health P o l i c y Project at W i t s University, 102 W o m e n ' s National Coalition ( W N C ) , 9 0 , 9 1 , 9 3 , 105 W o m e n ' s W i n g o f the Disabled People o f South Africa, 9 0

Venda Military Council, 145

W o m e n in Development ( W I D ) , 102

Venezuela, 2 9

Worcester, 7 0

Ventersdorp, 129, 130

W o r k s Progress Administration, 61

Verwoerd, H.F. (minister o f Bantu affairs,

World B a n k , 29, 171, 172

later prime minister), 5 3 violence, x, xi, 1, 2, 3, 14, 20, 3 1 , 5 0 , 5 5 - 5 9 ,

X h o s a , 16, 185

7 2 , 7 3 , 74, 8 2 , 8 6 , 8 8 , 8 9 , 100, 139, 144, 145 von Holdt, Karl, 4 0

Y o u n g Lions, 4 7 , 5 0 youth, x, 3, 11, 4 7 - 6 4 Yugoslavia, 154, 155, 183

Walker, Cherryl, 8 5 Walvis B a y , 157

Zaire, 156

Washingon v. Davis, 112, 113, 1 1 4

Zambia, 5, 9, 156, 1 6 9 , 170, 171, 1 7 5 , 185

W e e k l y Mail, 16, 5 9 , 144, 1 8 9

Zanzibar, 158

W e i m e r , Bernhard, 177

Zarlman, I. W i l l i a m , 1 8 8

W e i m a r Republic, 5, 196

Zebra Force, 5 8

Western Cape, 8 6 , 9 3 , 1 0 0

Zimbabwe, 9 8 , 131, 135, 142, 144, 163, 169

White Only S c h o o l s Act, 7 6

170, 171, 185

Wiehahn Report, 3 9

Zulu , 16, 184, 185

Williams, R o c k y , 146

Zwela T h e m b a , 7 0

Windhoek, 157

About the Book

Any multiracial government that e m e r g e s in South Africa in the next several years will f a c e a broad and daunting set of challenges. This book considers those challenges, a d d r e s s i n g the deep-seated e c o n o m i c , political, and social cleavages that must be o v e r c o m e if South Africa is to be transformed into a stable democracy. T h e authors explore such issues as the need to restructure the e c o n omy, integrate both the civil service and the security and police forces, respond to the problems of m a r g i n a l i z e d youth, achieve political and e c o nomic equality for w o m e n , and reorient f o r e i g n policy and regional relations to provide f o r equitable g r o w t h throughout Southern A f r i c a . Though timely, their analyses are designed to serve also as a lasting guide to an inevitably lengthy period of change.

213

The SAIS African Studies Library Botswana: The Political Economy of Democratic Stephen John Stedman

Development,

edited by

Europe and Africa: The New Phase, edited by I. William Zartman Ghana: The Political Economy of Recovery, edited by Donald Rothchild South Africa: The Political Economy of Transformation, John Stedman

edited by Stephen

Tunisia: The Political Economy of Reform, edited by I. William Zartman