Society in its Challenges : Philosophical Considerations of Living in Society [1 ed.] 9781443857963, 9781443856423

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Society in its Challenges

OTHER BOOKS BY SANTIAGO SIA God in Process Thought: a Study in Charles Hartshorne's Concept of God Process Thought and the Christian Doctrine of God Charles Hartshorne's Concept of God: Philosophical and Theological Responses. (with Marian F. Sia), From Suffering to God: Exploring Our Images of God in the Light of Suffering (with André Cloots) Framing a Vision of the World: Essays in Philosophy, Religion and Science

Religion, Reason and God: Essays in the Philosophies of Charles Hartshorne and A.N. Whitehead Philosophy in Context: Dharma Endowment Lectures 2005 (with Ferdinand Santos), Personal Identity, the Self and Ethics

Ethical Contexts and Theoretical Issues: Essays in Ethical Thinking (with Marian F. Sia), From Question to Quest: Literary-Philosophical Enquiries into the Challenges of Life (with Marian F. Sia), The Fountain Arethuse: a Novel Set in the University Town of Leuven

Society in its Challenges: Philosophical Considerations of Living in Society

By

Santiago Sia

Society in its Challenges: Philosophical Considerations of Living in Society, by Santiago Sia This book first published 2014 Cambridge Scholars Publishing 12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2014 by Santiago Sia All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-5642-8, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-5642-3

To

MARIAN friend, spouse, co-traveller, co-author

in heartfelt gratitude

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword .................................................................................................... ix Preface ........................................................................................................ xi Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 Part One: Chapter One ............................................................................................... 11 Philosophizing, Philosophy and the Social Context: A Reflection on Human Living Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 29 Public and Individual Interests, the Common Good: An Analysis and a Proposal Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 45 Distinct, Not Separate: A Critique of Dualistic Thinking of and in Society Chapter Four .............................................................................................. 65 Relationships and Communal Living: A View on Types of Relationships Chapter Five .............................................................................................. 87 The Individual and Society: A Philosophical Conception of the Self Chapter Six .............................................................................................. 113 Ethical Thinking and Formation: A Challenge for Life in Society

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Part Two: Contextual Considerations Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 131 Images, Reality and Truth: Some Philosophical Considerations Chapter Eight ........................................................................................... 149 Human Freedom, Its Power and Limits: Some Implications for Life in Society Chapter Nine............................................................................................ 167 Social Roles, Public Office, and Moral Society: Lessons from the Past for the Present? Chapter Ten ............................................................................................. 189 Economic Crisis and Accountability: A Re-Examination of Certain Views and Practices Chapter Eleven ........................................................................................ 207 The Marketplace, Academia and Education: A Philosophical Assessment of the Bologna Process Chapter Twelve ....................................................................................... 223 Developments in Contemporary Society and Faith-based Higher Education: Challenges and Issues Conclusion ............................................................................................... 237 In Retrospect Appendices Appendix A ............................................................................................. 251 Is Life a Sentence?: The Quest for Meaning by Marian F. Sia and Santiago Sia Appendix B.............................................................................................. 265 Meaning and Significance: A Fundamental Challenge to Human Living by Marian F. Sia and Santiago Sia Selected Bibliography ............................................................................. 279

FOREWORD

Ours is an exciting period in history. We have witnessed, and continue to experience to the present day, tremendous developments in various fields—social communications is a good example—which have immensely impacted on our lives. They have transformed society in various ways, bringing the entire global community much closer and helping improve standards of living. But ours is also a troubled period in history, for despite the onward march of democracy and human rights, peace is still elusive for many; and the hopes for widespread prosperity have been dashed by the global economic crisis which haunts and ravages families and communities. Some of these problems exist side by side with the positive developments. Others are regrettably the effects of these developments. Thus, while acknowledging their benefits, we also need to address urgently and convincingly the problems which have arisen. In our attempts to deal with all these developments and to meet the consequent challenges, we ought to employ all the resources we can muster. Our society and the world generally have become increasingly complex and complicated and so solutions are not easy to find. Harnessing whatever is good about all these developments is essential as is facing up squarely to what is not good. The same easy communications which allow us to stay in touch and informed also invade our privacy and make our children vulnerable to exploitation. Yes, we can be instantly alerted to the miserable plight of people, near and far, and thus are enabled to respond more quickly. Yes, instant and easy dialogue can promote peace and cooperation; but they can just as easily harden attitudes and force dangerous rushes to judgment. To truly address the challenges of living in this society entails that we face up to our responsibilities as individuals as well as members of society. This involves debating the fundamental values that make for a humanly decent society for all. It is worth constantly reminding ourselves that many of our problems are not merely due to random human failings but rather to lack of an embedded moral rectitude. People make really bad choices for the vanity of their own short-term gain, with terrible consequences for others as our economic crisis has illustrated. It is crucial, therefore, that we continuously educate ourselves, enlarge our vision and develop our personal and collective value-system around a sense of be-

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longing to a wider community and a studied sense of responsibility to and for others. In the various essays in this book, Santiago Sia considers and discusses in an accessible philosophical way some of these pressing challenges of living together in society. He calls us all to a fresh dialogue. It is a call that is worth heeding. He contends that in addressing these challenges, it is not enough to look for immediate solutions. He urges us to probe deeper into our assumptions and to re-examine age-old, and at times entrenched, viewpoints. In this task, he maintains that philosophical thinking can be an important resource and ally. I have no doubt that his book will help provoke the kind of probing discussions we need to be having about how we can live humanly together, draw wisdom from information and experience and not simply accrete knowledge. The hope is that our exciting yet troubled period of history will also turn out to be a better one for us all and that our society will become one that will enable each to thrive and flourish as a human being. As Dean of Philosophy at Milltown Institute, Santiago has been a tower of inspiration to countless students, just as he has always been during such a distinguished academic career. As well as being a fine teacher, he has never put down the pen—or the keyboard!—of the researcher and the writer, and his legacy also includes such an impressive corpus of writing and wise scholarship. I congratulate Santiago on the publication of his latest book which is a very important addition to that corpus and to our civic discourse. It is a wonderful and generous gift on his part of continuing service to the people and to the spirit which animates the very best of what it is to be human. Mary McAleese Former President of Ireland

PREFACE

A prevalent view to which I had ardently subscribed for a long time is that during our younger years, we should heed Confucius’s admonition that we ought to participate actively in the life of society. It then suggests that in our more advanced years we should emulate Lao-tzu and withdraw from society to commune with nature, appreciating its beauty and peace. Tranquility and serenity are worth seeking and enjoying. That may still come—hopefully! But in the meantime, it seemed to me that A.N. Whitehead’s description of speculative thinking—which he compared to the flight of an airplane—as starting from the ground, then lifting off into the rarefied atmosphere, but landing back on the ground became much more pressing and challenging after a career in academia. By landing back on the ground he meant showing the relevance for other experiences in life of what one has engaged in for a long time. The society we live in today—as it has presumably been the case in the past—is fraught with problems and beset with challenges. Retirement provides one with opportunities, whether sought out or imposed, to pay more attention to what events, problems or issues are grabbing the attention of the public at large. It also opens up one’s vistas as one sees and hears—day in and day out—the plight of people, near and far—at closer range. Philosophy, the main academic subject which nourished my teaching and research and preoccupied my academic career for several years, sometimes appears to distance itself from those problems and challenges. It should not. Whitehead’s insightful metaphor becomes all too real—there is the need to consider the relevance and applicability of one’s philosophical thinking in understanding those problems and addressing those challenges. This volume of essays is an attempt on my part to put aside momentarily Lao-tzu’s example and to follow A.N. Whitehead’s injunction instead—which has exercised considerable influence on my philosophical thinking. Following Charles Hartshorne, the other philosopher to whom I am greatly indebted, and whose fundamental metaphysical concept of creative synthesis has become a foundation for my own thinking,1 I have endeavoured to build on what I had laid out in the past, entered into dialogue 1

As I complete this work, perhaps one can after all combine these two philosophical insights: “do nothing—creatively!”

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with the present concerns in the meantime, and forged my way ahead into the future in the hope of sharing new findings. Whether it has been a worthwhile and successful venture on my part is left to the reader. I am grateful to the former President of Ireland, Mary McAleese, who in her message on my retirement wrote: “Given his great energy and enthusiasm, I have no doubt that retirement day will be for Santiago merely another milestone along the journey of such a full and active life and no doubt we can look forward to several more interesting publications in the future.” 2 Her words have stimulated the writing of this book. It is a particular honour for me that, despite her various commitments, she graciously accepted the invitation to write the Foreword. Given the theme of this book, I believe that it is appropriate to pay tribute to her in these pages for her efforts and achievements in—among several others—building bridges across various divides in society. I should also like to thank Sjur Bergan for his gracious endorsement of this book. His own work and publications have been of immense value in assessing educational policies throughout Europe and further afield. The various institutions, with which I have had the good fortune to have been associated throughout my career, deserve my thanks: Newman College (now Newman University College), Birmingham, UK; Katholieke Universiteit, Leuven, Belgium; Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, USA; Milltown Institute, Dublin, Ireland. Other academic institutions and professional societies in various countries have honoured me with invitations to share my work with them. The experience, for which I am grateful, has enriched my thinking on many of the issues discussed in these essays. I also appreciate their library resources and the help of the library staff. Colleagues and students at those academic institutions as well as elsewhere have greatly contributed to the development of my thinking—they have my gratitude. There are many, many more whose assistance and encouragement facilitated the process of writing and the completion of this present publication. It is not possible to mention them all, but they should be assured that I am in their debt. I am grateful to publishers/editors/co-authors for their cooperation and for their permission to include in this volume selected chapters/essays/sections from previously published works:“Philosophizing, Philosophy and the Religious Context: Reflections on the Source, Resource and the Setting of a Quest,” in Brendan Sweetman (ed.), Philosophical Thinking and the Religious Context: Essays in Honor of Santiago Sia 2

Mary McAleese, “Message from President McAleese” in Brendan Sweetman (ed.), Philosophical Thinking and the Religious Quest: Essays in Honor of Santiago Sia , (London and N.Y.: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), p. ix.

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(Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 171-189; “Balancing Public and Individual Interests: a Philosophical Analysis,” European Commission, Radiation Protection No. 167, International Symposium on Non-Medical Imaging, 2011 (Proceedings of a Symposium held in Dublin 8-9 October 2009), 9397; “Ethical Thinking and Philosophy,” New Blackfriars: a Review (UK), Vol. 91, No. 1033 (May 2010), 242- 252; “An Alternative Conception of Power: Some Implications,” Sofia Philosophical Review (Bulgaria), IV, 1, (2010), 64-74; “Images, Reality and Truth: Some Philosophical Considerations,” Tattva: Journal of Philosophy (India), V, 2 (July-December 2013), 1-20 and New Blackfriars (UK) (forthcoming); (with Ferdinand Santos), Personal Identity, the Self and Ethics, (N.Y. and U.K: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); “Contemporary Society and Faith-based Higher Education: Challenges and Issues,” Gabriella Pusztai (ed.), Religion and Higher Education in Central and Eastern Europe (Debrecen, Hungary: Center For Higher Education Research and Development, 2010), 12-23; “Education, the Business Model and the Bologna Process: a Philosophical Response,” in Alexander L. Gungov and Karim Mamdani (eds.), The Addressees of the EU Internal and External Policy: De Jure and De Facto (Sofia: Sofia University Press, 2011), 87-111; (with Marian F. Sia), “Punctuating Life’s Message: a Grammatical-Philosophical Exercise on the Quest for Meaning,” Santalka (Lithuania) XVIII, 4, 2010, 81-92. http://www.coactivity. vgtu.lt/en/; Janez Juhant and Bojan Žalec (eds.), The Art of Life, Theologie Ost-West, Europäische Perspectiven 14 (Berlin and Münster: Lit Verlag, 2010), 79-89; (in Slovenian) trans. Rok Blažiþ “Postavljanje loþil v sporoþilo življenja: gramtikalno-filozofska vaja v iskanju smisla,” Tretji dan, Letn. 39, ¾ (Mar/Apr 2010), 23-31; “Economic Crisis and Accountability: a Re-examination of Certain Views and Practices,” Studies (Ireland) (forthcoming). The publishers and staff of Cambridge Scholars Publishing have placed their confidence in my work. The present volume completes a trilogy, the first two of which have already been published by them: Ethical Contexts and Theoretical Issues: Essays in Ethical Thinking, and (with Marian F. Sia) From Question to Quest: Literary-Philosophical Essays on the Challenges of Life. For that confidence and for their professionalism throughout my association with them, I am immensely thankful. My extended family, both living and deceased, have supported me and my endeavours from the very beginning. The geographical distance between us has never been a barrier. I have benefited from all the encouragement I have received from them over the years. To them, my sincerest thanks. More than ever before, I am truly indebted to my beloved wife, Marian, who has always accompanied and supported me in my personal

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and professional journeys—she truly deserves my greatest gratitude. I had dedicated my first book to her at the start of my academic career. As I look back on that career with this work, this is a most opportune time to dedicate it too in her honour.

INTRODUCTION

Challenges in Society Living in society has always presented a variety of challenges to its members. Some of these are fairly routine, requiring immediate and even cursory attention. Others demand more planning, organizing and networking. But there are certain challenges which require intensive debates, prolonged discussions and sustained scrutiny due to the nature of these challenges or the long-term effects on individual citizens or on society as a whole. Irrespective of what is required in terms of time and effort, addressing these challenges is a task that has to be undertaken and pursued if we are to improve our lives and membership in society. This observation can be made throughout human history, of course. But it is particularly true today because of certain developments that have arisen in our time. We are witnessing much progress but also increased deterioration in the lives of people, and it is essential to understand the causes in order to support the positives and rectify the negatives. One such challenge is the present economic crisis that looms large on practically everyone’s horizon these days. Society, too, is constantly changing—in form, in structures, in composition—for several reasons; and with the transformed situation comes fresh problems and new issues which need to be tackled. The complicated advances made in medical research demand that more information is sought and other relevant skills are developed. Ethical issues have arisen which had not been anticipated. Advances in science, technology and communications, among others, almost unthinkable in the past, present problematic situations that challenge assumptions, views and standpoints. They require more careful and rigorous investigation that is not always possible compared with the rather routine challenges associated with living in society. Moreover, because of what is at stake, they do point to the necessity of examining the implicit or underlying thought-patterns that inform policies or solutions. The society of today is thus not merely a replica of yesteryears but a vibrant, complex and complicated one. These challenges of living in society, whatever they may be, confront every one of us, albeit differently. As members and citizens, we are all affected. We are duly impacted by any twist and turn in and by society and

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Introduction

its members. Societal developments in whatever form and from whatever quarter make a difference, minimally or otherwise, to our ordinary and professional lives. And yet, we are also influential to varying degrees as we carry on with our daily lives and deal with our own concerns and preoccupations. Interacting with one another in different ways and forms, we bring our respective personalities, skills and competence as we meet these challenges, sometimes indirectly but at other times more directly. Some of us may occupy specific roles or have special status in society and therefore have particular duties and responsibilities. There are also those who have acquired specialized training or accrued relevant experience that puts them at an advantage in tackling these challenges. In addition, many are motivated to contribute, with whatever they can muster, their share in renewing societal life. But in whatever circumstance or position we find ourselves, membership in society and the presence of those challenges entail being influenced by, and even indebted to, one another while reciprocating that influence on others. Thus, there is a certain onus on all of us to deal with these challenges as best we can.

A Philosophical Perspective If the above observation is true, to what extent can philosophers and philosophical thinking participate in this process? Can their particular skills and competence contribute positively to the betterment of society? How can they enable citizens to respond to the concrete and varied challenges in life? Somehow these questions sound surprising, at least initially, since these do not readily come to one’s mind when one is confronted by the challenges in society. In fact, there is a perception that philosophy and philosophers are so detached from what is regarded as “reality” and “real life” that they could hardly claim to have any worthwhile contribution to make. In fact, sometimes it is alleged that they even muddle the discussions! While it is regrettable that this perception is wide-spread and not totally undeserved, the criticism, nevertheless, seems to forget that philosophical thinking in ancient Athens actually took place in the agora—not in any ivory tower. As Plato mingled with the crowds, asking searching questions, he was urging them to think more deeply about the issues that mattered more, so as to make a difference to their way of life. He interrogated ordinary citizens with a view to widening and deepening their interests and concerns. He challenged those whose task it was to govern the lives of the citizens of society to consider fundamental issues as they embarked on their responsibilities. And in ancient China during the period of

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the Hundred Schools of Thought, racked by wars and strife, the community actually turned to the sages, i.e. philosophers, for an answer to their urgent question: How can we live at peace with one another? The expectation was that philosophical thinking had much to contribute in dealing with concrete and practical questions and regulating our conduct in society. Although society and the world have changed considerably since those times, this expectation that philosophical thinking can come to our aid in the important task of meeting today’s challenges is still heard nowadays. Given the present economic crisis, for example, the President of Ireland, Michael D. Higgins, calls for some fundamental re-thinking of economic affairs and strategies in the hope of improving the lives of citizens and of society as a whole. In his view, an improvement of society and its structures can come about only with a transformation in points of view and general outlook. He believes that this can be accomplished, or at least initiated, through education. Challenging economists and economic theory to shift their priorities and to address human concerns, he adds that: “The society we so dearly wish for will not take shape unless we acknowledge the need for an education of character and desires, the need to encourage and support critical reflection and a more holistic approach to knowledge.”1 He then specifically refers to philosophical thinking as facilitating the fostering of an ethical consciousness among the citizens of society. Philosophy, in his view, “trains one in how to think, how to address issues of decision-making in areas of life’s fundamental and applied questions”2 and is a gift or skill that can be taught and acquired. It is an endorsement that is simultaneously a challenge! One hopes that the task is being taken up and the expectation is being met.

Philosophical Considerations This book is an attempt to explain and pursue this important and fundamental task. Enlisting philosophy as a significant resource for clarifying and addressing relevant issues, it examines various social contexts, some of which are continuing while others are relatively current. The book contains a number of essays, each of which is focused on a specific context and particular challenge, but all of which are informed not just by the relevant issues but also by philosophical thinking. The aim of this project is to 1

Michael D. Higgins, “Toward an Ethical Economy,” Ethics for All Public Lectures, Dublin City University, 11 September 2013. 2 Ibid.

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Introduction

show the need and the value of engaging in critical analysis and sustained investigation by providing philosophical considerations if we are to inform and contribute substantially to the debates in society. Contrary to the perception that philosophy is concerned exclusively with purely theoretical problems—some of which are of its own making—the essays offer discussions that make use of conceptualities and worldviews that can illuminate certain avenues which may be followed fruitfully. In short, its purpose is to show the relevance and importance of philosophical considerations of the challenges of living in society and hopefully, to add to its enrichment. The title of the book indicates its theme; namely, the challenges of living in society. It is not a study of society such as would be undertaken in a sociological work. The subtitle explains both the content and the approach: the essays are primarily considerations, from a philosophical viewpoint, of some of the challenges arising in one’s life in society. There is no claim that these are the most crucial or the most pervasive ones.3 The topics of the essays are those which the author has had the opportunity to address in various contexts. These are pursued individually, which explains the inevitable varying emphases and styles in the essays as well as some unavoidable repetitions. These have been kept to the minimum, however, and retained primarily to preserve the integrity of the original discussions. Although each essay stands on its own, having been written at different times and for a specific readership, there is a consistent conceptuality that informs all of them. This is evidenced by the cross-references in the footnotes to other essays in the book. In addition, ample use has been made of footnoting, not just to acknowledge sources as is traditionally done, but also to make comments on, or observations of, certain events in contemporary society. Following an Introduction, the book project is divided into two parts: Part I: Theoretical Considerations and Part II: Contextual Considerations. However, the division of the book is not intended to be exclusive since in each of the parts, both theoretical and contextual issues are given attention. The division is introduced mainly because of the focus of the respective essays. The chapters comprising Part I deal with more theoretical issues, including the role of philosophical thinking in addressing some of the problems and issues in society. They also critique certain conceptions of one’s relationship to society and of society itself. The chapters which form Part II are more context-dependent. Each focuses on a particular social 3

One can easily point to other challenges to society and its members: wars, revolutions, terrorism, child labour and boy soldiers, abuse of women and children, unequal distribution of wealth, unjust commercial practices, environmental issues and global warning, human trafficking, and many others—all of which are urgent.

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context and provides a philosophical consideration of some of the more fundamental issues of that context. Some readers, depending on their interests and background, may prefer to start with Part II and then be informed by the discussions in Part I. Those who are more philosophicallyoriented may want to delve into Part I and then see how the issues analyzed and developed there are followed up in the contextual discussions of Part II. The book project ends with a concluding chapter, two Appendices and a Selected Bibliography. Part I opens with Chapter One titled “ Philosophizing, Philosophy, and the Social Context: A Reflection on Human Living” . As the initial essay in the collection, the discussion here revolves around the starting point and the approach of the entire work. Reflecting on the process of philosophizing, it looks into what is involved in the raising of fundamental questions. It then discusses the basis for it—the nature of human beings. It sets the act of philosophizing within the societal context inasmuch as such questioning takes place in that setting. Turning to philosophy as a valuable resource, it defends the role of philosophical thinking in addressing certain challenges in society. The title of Chapter Two indicates the specific theoretical issue to be pursued and the manner of the investigation: “ Public and Individual Interests, the Common Good: an Analysis and a Proposal” . A constant challenge of living in society is the tension, and even conflict, between public and individual interests. It is usually resolved by resorting to striking a balance between the competing interests and making references to the common good. In its analysis the essay shows that such a tension and suggested resolution are really due to certain conceptions of the individual and society. It proposes in its place an alternative conception of self and society, discussed in later chapters, and provides certain practical guidelines that can be usefully followed on that basis. Chapter Three called “ Distinct, not Separate: a Critique of a Dualistic Conception of and in Society” is a critical analysis of a pervasive interpretation of the relationship between the individual and society which is underpinned by a dualistic conception of society. As well as offering a rival understanding of society, it examines critically the logic of dualistic thinking and highlights some of its implications for other facets of life in society. It shows how the philosophy of Charles Hartshorne lends support to non-dualistic thinking. Chapter Four: “ Relationships and Communal Life: a View on Types of Relatedness” examines human relationships in its various forms. Developments in social networking mean that the traditional ones are complemented, or even replaced, by newer forms. What these relationships

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Introduction

mean and their implications for the society that we live in are the subjectmatter of this chapter. It draws on the philosophical writings of Martin Buber who has devoted much of his attention and concern to the topic of our relationships with one another and within society. Buber, the essay points out, reminds us that the most important consideration here is the kind of relationship that is nurtured and developed, rather than who enters into it. This way of thinking has also some implications for society’s response to some of the social developments and relationships today. The focus of Chapter Five called “ The Individual and Society: a Philosophical Conception of Self as Social” is the question: How should one understand one’s identity and status in society? It pursues further the discussion contained in the previous chapters. Drawing largely on Charles Hartshorne’s philosophy, it develops a conception of self as social, while acknowledging its uniqueness, and argues that such a view has implications for our appreciation of, and response to, some of the contemporary challenges of living in society and for our understanding of self-identity. It also anticipates and responds to possible criticisms of the notion of a social self. Living in society and interacting with one another inevitably result in challenges which have ethical significance. In Chapter Six titled “ Ethical Thinking and Formation: a Challenge for Life in Society” the discussion shifts more intently to the issue of ethics. It explains the significance of an ethical consideration in meeting some of the challenges in society. Given the important contributions to this topic by the ancient Chinese philosopher Mencius, particularly as a political mentor of his time, this essay sets out his insights into the moral nature of human beings and its development. It then expands further on what is involved in the ethical challenge: the importance of ethical thinking, of developing moral sensitivity and of taking a moral stance. Part II examines selected social contexts for some philosophical considerations. One such context takes the shape of developments in computing and technology, which have enhanced the status and role of imaging and of media communications in general. But with the welcome advances have also come undesirable and even threatening consequences for both individuals and society generally. These have presented challenges and issues which need to be addressed urgently which are the subject-matter of Chapter Seven: “ Images, Reality and Truth: Some Philosophical Considerations.” Focusing first on the tension between image and reality, it provides a philosophical background to the debate. It then discusses the question of truth and the related issues of the right to know, freedom of speech and the right to privacy. It provides the foundation for these fundamental

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rights but also examines the tensions or conflicts in their exercise. The essay then offers and discusses some guidelines to deal with these challenges and issues; namely, the criteria of appropriateness and acceptability and the importance of accountability. In the next essay, Chapter Eight: “ Human Freedom, its Power and Limits: Some Implications for Life in Society” , the focus is very much on whether human beings are truly free. Our daily lives in society do present at times situations which make us wonder about this issue. The essay presents first the philosophical debate between indeterminists and determinists. It then follows a related line of enquiry which underpins many of the debates in contemporary society, especially regarding human rights. To what extent are human beings free and, even more importantly, to what extent should they be free? The essay claims that taking this route puts us in a better position to appreciate the implications of what it means for human beings to be free and to provide some guidance on how we are to conduct our lives in society. Ethics in the public scene is the subject-matter of Chapter Nine: “ Social Roles, Public Office and Moral Society: Lessons from the Past for the Present?” . It looks closely at the ethical responsibility attached to social roles, particularly to public office. It enquires into the extent that we can expect society to be moral and discusses the lessons we can learn from Confucius and his teachings, especially on the ethical living out of one’s role in society, with particular reference to public office. The topic of Chapter Ten: “ Economic Crisis and Accountability: a Re-examination of Certain Views and Practices” has been prompted by the global economic situation that has affected large sections of various societies. While the problem itself and its effects are not new, certain issues are definitely contemporary primarily because of the present-day banking crises which have affected countries and their populations. While there are of course several causes, some of which are outside one’s control, there has been the ever-growing awareness that the crisis is the concretization of a particular “mindset” and the consequent “culture”. The essay exposes and critiques that way of thinking and acting and points to the need for a different outlook to conduct business and financial affairs. It discusses the issue of accountability in the context of two key notions: “moral hazard” and “moral luck”. Developments in society present a constant challenge to the educative process—which is dealt with in Chapter Eleven: “ The Marketplace, Academia and Education: a Philosophical Assessment of the Bologna Process.” One such development in contemporary society has occurred in the marketplace. Since education, among its manifold aims, is expected to

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Introduction

prepare learners for the marketplace, an important consideration for educators is how to meet the changing demands which have occurred and may occur, particularly because of the phenomenon of globalization. Furthermore, it has been linked to what has become known as the knowledgesociety and to the importance of competitiveness in education. The Bologna Process attempts to address and meet that challenge. This essay provides a philosophical critique of that on-going process. Chapter Twelve: “ Developments in Contemporary Society and Faithbased Higher Education: Challenges and Issues” again pursues the topic of education. The essay sketches some developments in contemporary society which present specific challenges and raise particular issues, such as secularization, mechanization and globalization, for a faith-based higher education. It offers suggestions as to why and how, precisely because of its distinctiveness, it can respond to these. The concluding chapter, In Retrospect, takes up once again the theme of the book project, sets out the philosophical vision that informs the various philosophical considerations, and explains further the methodology of the book. It then puts forward a philosophical interpretation of society’s creative advance and the challenge to enliven and enhance life in society. It describes how this philosophical vision can provide hope for a transformed society. The two Appendices focus on a specific challenge confronting society, which regrettably has led to unwelcome consequences: the loss of meaning. In Appendix A: “ Is Life a Sentence?: the Quest for Meaning” the question as to whether life is a sentence imposed on human beings or a series of sentences which need to be read is considered. It then proposes that, just like a text which must be punctuated properly for the message to be read intelligently, the challenge for everyone in society is to engage in various activities in line with our human nature, that will facilitate the discovery of meaning in, but more importantly of, life. The topic is developed further in Appendix B: “ Meaning and Significance: a Fundamental Challenge to Human Living” . Here the suggestion is offered that the search for meaning can be complemented, or even replaced with, developing the human capacity for creativity and thus of being able to put significance on one’s life. Human nature is such that it can create, and not just discover, meaning as one lives one’s life in society. At the same time, it claims that society too has an important role in making that possibility an actuality for its members. A Selected Bibliography is listed at the end of the book.

PART ONE: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

CHAPTER ONE PHILOSOPHIZING, PHILOSOPHY AND THE SOCIAL CONTEXT: A REFLECTION ON HUMAN LIVING

“Philosophy” The word “philosophy” is rather provocative. When one mentions it in various contexts, it elicits certain reactions that in a curious way the adjective “philosophical” or the noun “philosopher” does not. More often, the word “philosophical” is used to pass judgment or to make a comment. For instance, whenever one refers to one’s attitude as “philosophical” one is understood to be rather stoical or even indifferent. When it is used to characterize one’s thinking, one is probably regarded as being logical or at least argumentative. In a more dismissive or even deprecating way, the same word is resorted to—often in conjunction with “too”—when one’s contribution to a debate or conversation is judged to be rather abstract, tangential or even irrelevant, that is to say, ”too philosophical”. The same observation can be made about the word “philosopher”. Sometimes, when one is referred to as a “philosopher” the reaction is one of awe; at other times, it is a non-committed silence. However, there are also certain occasions—unflattering or disheartening ones—when it leads to a genuine confusion on the part of the listener as to what someone is or does.1 In contrast, although the word “philosophy” is obviously linked with “philosophical” as well as with “philosopher” and therefore invites similar comments, more often it is the subject of curiosity and leads to a number of questions. The most obvious one, despite its frequent usage in ordinary discourse, is: “What is philosophy?” And when one resorts to the ready answer, from the etymology of the word, that philosophy is “love of wisdom”, it sparks off yet another question: “But what is it really?”, with the 1

One would not want to generalize, of course, but my nephews and nieces, when they were much younger, were always puzzled as to what it was that I was “really doing” since I was considered to be a philosopher. Their reaction has been replicated several times over the years by various conversation partners.

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expectation of another short answer rather than a treatise or a lecture.2 Although it is true that at times mention of “philosophy” results in a blank stare on the enquirer’s face or a shrug of the shoulders as if to indicate that one was sorry to have asked, more often the word “philosophy” continues to challenge the curious. Somehow the common explanation that it is “love of wisdom” is not sufficient. It is no wonder that philosophy itself, as distinct from the various topics, issues or questions discussed by philosophers in their teaching and publications, is a topic that continues to challenge the very practitioners of this subject.3 Their own reflections or answers have charted the history of philosophy. A student of philosophy will readily notice that the nature of philosophy has changed and can expect it to continue to do so. Philosophers are renowned for disagreeing not just on their conclusions or their methodologies but even on the very subject-matter of their investigations. It is not surprising then that the word “philosophy” is truly provocative.

Questions and Question The specific question: “What is philosophy?” which serves as the background to this reflection takes one back to a more general observation: we humans continually ask questions. Some of these are routine or even trivial. Others are more pressing or significant. But now and then, as we conduct our daily business, interact with one another or are caught up in specific situations, thought-provoking questions in their various guises and contexts do arise and challenge us. This observation in turn leads us to the rather fundamental consideration: Why do we ask questions in the first place? What enables us to raise questions? Why does it matter that we seek answers? What kind of answers can we expect?4 There is something curious about the process of such fundamental questioning. While the intended goal is to move ahead from the original 2

This can be the typical reaction of some students, particularly those who have to take philosophy courses as part of the core curriculum rather than as their major subject. This was a particular challenge to me when I was teaching in the USA. 3 The theme of the International Philosophical Congress held in Seoul, Korea in 2008 was “Re-thinking Philosophy.” A comparable theme was addressed by the subsequent International Philosophical Congress in Athens, Greece in 2013. 4 This essay complements the Postscript “‘Where Does it All End?’: the Quest for Answers” in Marian F. Sia and Santiago Sia, From Question to Quest: LiteraryPhilosophical Enquiries into the Challenges of Life (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), pp. 169-189, which is a more literary treatment of these issues.

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situation—with an answer that one expects to a question in most cases—in this context, it is actually a challenge to move back, as it were! The symbol of the question mark, in the English language, is particularly appropriate in this instance. It curls back as if to invite one to look at its foundation. And the Latin word for this movement (reflectere) feeds into the whole idea of “re-flecting”—thinking again, re-examining, or taking a second look. The word “reflection”, as used in the subtitle of this essay, indicates some “mulling over”. There is an expectation of a return to the basics in the hope of throwing some light on the present situation. And, although not immediately apparent, if one were to analyze another meaning of the English word, “reflection”, i.e. “an image on a surface”, one realizes that the mere glimpse of the original source could be a motivation to seek it out. Plato’s “analogy of the cave” readily comes to mind here. The same claim could probably be made if by “reflection”—as in “it is a reflection on one’s education”—one passes a comment, positive or negative. There is a hint that to understand the present situation one needs to trace it back to the past. An equally curious feature of a question—and this has an implication for the fundamental process of questioning—is that somehow it already contains implicit knowledge rather than pure ignorance. It arises because one already knows something, however vague, confused or distorted that knowledge is. While receiving an answer is a step further in the process, the raising of the question itself is possible only because there is some background information already possessed. This is not to say, as some philosophers are prone to conclude, that humans have innate ideas. Rather, it shows that the questioning process tells something about the nature of a questioner. The process of fundamental questioning does reveal the nature of the source of the question if one were to uncover its root. While the process of questioning may take place in the present—and as has already been mentioned, it returns us to the past—it also urges us onwards. It is not surprising that the word “question” is allied to “quest” as if the nature of this activity is to lure us, to prod us on, or to put us on track. This is particularly true of the more fundamental questions we ask about life. Somehow, for instance, the question “Does life have any meaning?” is meant to unsettle us insofar as it challenges us to search for adequate answers. And the answers are not intended to be straightforward, not because there are none, but because such answers are not solutions to a problem but rather mere responses that demand more probing on the part of the questioner.

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Question in Context Fundamental questions, such as the ones cited above, do not just arise. They are not merely posed to keep the conversation going even if at times these questions and suggested answers are mentioned in passing. They emerge because one finds oneself in a particular situation, now and then even in dramatic form. Sometimes, they come to one’s serious attention in the silences of life or with the beauty of nature. In other words, this kind of questioning takes place in a context. A very good example of this is the questioning that occurs because one finds oneself faced with suffering or evil. Tragedies and misfortunes leave us bewildered not just as to how they happened but even more importantly why they occur in the first place. It is a question that continues to haunt thinking beings. Other examples are the unjust situations as well as the admirable acts of many—which cause deep-rooted questioning of the behaviour of individuals, of groups and of society in general. It makes one wonder about the nature of ethics and of an ethical judgment. Inasmuch as religion in contemporary society continues to spark off debate and controversy, it remains an enigma and causes questioning. In this sense, religious belief (and other aspects of religion) is an issue that demands quite a thorough investigation. The word “context” and its use here need some explanation. The word itself can be equated with “background” or “setting”.5 When one maintains that to understand a comment, for example, it has to be put in its context, one is expecting a more accurate understanding of the comment as a result of doing so. Or if one insists that it is crucial to contextualize the debate or the discussion, one is indicating that there is a wider setting within which it is occurring and that must be taken into consideration. Moreover, the historical context of an idea, just as much as of an event, lends itself to a better grasp of the nuances and complexities of that particular idea or event.6 But “context” has also been employed—and is so used here—to suggest the concreteness of the situation.7 Whereas philosophical thinking is very often dismissed as too abstract and too generalized to be of use in 5

This meaning of “context” is also applicable to philosophical thinking, a point that will be treated later in this essay. 6 The insistence here on providing the context of one’s answer or comment is not always popular in media circles which prefer sound bytes. It will grate on the ears of those who demand and insist on straightforward answers, typically a “yes” or “no” or at most “dos palabras”, to the exclusion of a broader explanation. 7 This is particularly true in process philosophy, the school of thought associated with A.N. Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne.

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practical situations, in actuality the basis of much philosophical thinking is none other than the concrete situation in all its details and particularity.8 Often it is in such a situation, in its specific context, that one begins to wonder and ponder.9 It is useful to keep this in mind as we address the “what and why” of philosophy.10 Contrary to popular misconception, the reference to the ivory tower which philosophers allegedly inhabit is really misplaced. Its home-base is more akin to what the poet W.B. Yeats in his “The Circus Animals’ Desertion” describes graphically when he states: “I must lie down where all ladders start,/In the foul rag-and-bone shop of the heart.” Philosophical thinking does start from and end in the same “shop”.

Philosophizing and its Source This leads us to a consideration of the source of all this questioning. Why do questions, particularly fundamental ones, come to the surface in the first place? What triggers off the quest for answers? Who is asking the questions? As was already noted, the symbol of the question mark “curls back”, seemingly to suggest that we take a good look at the base.11 Indeed, an examination of the questioning process inevitably brings us to the nature and status of the questioner.12

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To the question then as to whether one can make a living from philosophy, it would be more true to claim that one can shape one’s life with philosophy. This is especially relevant to the educative process. 9 Philosophy has been presented as “starting in wonder”. It is as if the exclamation point of wonder—to resort to the language of punctuation marks—needs to turn to itself (reflectere) to ponder thereby becoming a question mark. See Appendix A: “Is Life a Sentence?: the Quest for Meaning”. 10 This methodological principle takes its cue from Whitehead’s well-known reference to the flight of the airplane: it starts on the ground, soars up into the air but lands back on the ground. Speculative thinking, he maintains, is embedded in the concreteness of life, but lifts off into abstract thinking only to return to the ground of life with renewed vision and energy. The same sentiment, it seems to me, is poetically described by T.S. Eliot: “...we arrive where we started/ And know the place for the first time.” “Little Gidding”. 11 The issue of the nature of the questioner is a multi-faceted one and has engaged the attention of philosophers and others. 12 In more philosophical language, one could say that the effect reveals something about the reality of the cause.

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In raising questions, the questioner has already started to philosophize.13 Even the child or the untutored is engaged in it.14 Admittedly, it is an activity that is tentative and probably unstructured. It may even be confused and confusing. Sometimes it is spontaneous—occasionally in conversation, one is said to be “philosophizing”—but more often one philosophizes in response to certain situations. In such situations one wants to “make sense” or one needs “to know”. Accordingly, one is motivated to press ahead with an enquiry. This is when questions surface as an initial step forward. Questioning is a process that is in quest of answers. Questions arise because of the sort of beings that we are. Philosophers have frequently referred to human nature as rational. Endowed with rationality, humans are equipped to think intelligently and to act freely. The process of questioning or philosophizing is possible because the questioner has the ability to know reality. Moreover, the questioner does not just perceive or sense (and accepts) reality but also, and more importantly, conceives and constructs it. The questioner is capable—and has the will to do so—of laying out a different reality. The questioner is gifted not just with the ability of sensing reality but also with the talent for re-shaping what is there. And for all that to happen, one starts on the quest for understanding through asking questions, probing into reality, in the hope that it will lead to its transformation. That transformation of reality, brought about through questioning, also inevitably changes the questioner. Curiously, the more we humans ask questions and the more intense the quest for answers is, the more we develop our own nature as human beings. Philosophizing, i.e. the questioning process, takes place at different levels, from the more mundane to the highly specialized. It would be rather presumptuous to hold that insofar as one is raising a question, one’s activity can already be labelled as fully an act of “philosophizing”. There is a certain amount of competence and skill required. Moreover, not everyone has the leisure or the pleasure to engage in this activity. Nonetheless, it lies within every human being’s reach precisely because it is a human activity, that is to say, “in accord with our nature”.15 At the most ele13

I have found it useful to explain to students and others that there is a distinction between “philosophizing” (which I believe is more generally practised) and the “study of philosophy” (which only a few are in a position to pursue). 14 The move to introduce children to philosophical thinking has been gaining some momentum in some countries. Cf. Joe Humphreys, “Saying No to Groupthink: How Philosophy Can Change Learning,” The Irish Times, November 19, 2013, pp. 14-15. 15 There is no specific reference here to the distinction between actus humanus and actus hominis as made by Thomas Aquinas.

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mentary level, philosophizing is simply “wondering”. The higher levels of this activity are really a matter of strengthening, deepening or sharpening that sense of wonder. Philosophizing is usually associated with the intellect. For this reason it is classed as an intellectual activity which only rational beings are capable of. There is much support for this observation, particularly as regards the higher levels of this activity. But philosophizing itself should not be interpreted so narrowly. The process of questioning occurs not just because we possess an intellect—although it is what enables us to follow through with our quest for answers—but because we confront reality, including ourselves, in all our humanity. And this nature of ours includes our feelings, our sense experience, our imagination and other such traits and gifts.16

Question and Context Earlier in this essay, there was a reference to “context” as also meaning “background” or “setting”. This complementary meaning of the word has added significance here. While questioning (and philosophizing) may and does take place in specific situations or contexts, it is equally important to “contextualize” it; that is to say, to situate the question (and the possible answers) against the backdrop of the larger picture.17 There is a need to set the particular or the detail against a so-called horizon in daily life. The same can be said in philosophizing.18 This is because one asks a

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The distinction held, for example, between “the mind” and the “heart” is, I believe, a false one. It is important, of course, to make a “conceptual distinction” but the reality itself is one. Of particular relevance here is the BBC Four documentary film, “Heart or Mind: What makes us Human?”, aired 10 July 2012. See also Chapter Six: “Ethical Thinking and Formation: a Challenge for Life in Society”. 17 This claim would be challenged and dismissed by postmodern thinkers—which I believe is a mistake on their part and on those who subscribe to that view. There is the presumption that such a claim is an attempt to return to the metaphysics of the past. Process metaphysics, however, would reject that misconception. Moreover, it seems to me to be important to distinguish between metaphysical thinking itself and specific metaphysical systems which illustrate it (some of which are indeed to be rejected). 18 Many have commented that the financial crisis that has gripped contemporary society at large has been brought about by the narrow mindset of those in the financial and banking sectors. See Chapter Ten: “Economic Crisis and Accountability: Re-examining Certain Views and Practices”. Also, the lacuna experienced by many in their lives can be traced back, one supposes, to the lack of an over-all

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specific question only because there is an implicit more general knowledge. And that implicit general knowledge has a way of broadening our knowledge as well as of directing the focus of our enquiries. Thus, it needs not just to be made explicit but also scrutinized more thoroughly.19 This meaning of “context”, and its significance for an understanding of the process of questioning, can also be traced back to our reality. To appreciate this point, we need once again to return to home-base, as it were; that is to say, to our make-up as human beings. As was already noted, we are beings who can and do ask questions. But we are also beings who can, and in different ways and in various degrees do, transcend our specificity and particularity. In a figurative and literal way we are capable of “going beyond” what is immediate or singular. In fact, more often than not, we have the natural tendency to generalize, to ignore the uniqueness of the situation, and to stretch a point to cover what has been perceived somehow as comparable cases. While it is true that usually it is indicative of our preference for simplification in our thinking, it is also the case that it betrays our natural sense of the interconnectedness of reality.20 Admittedly, the judgment coming from this natural sense to generalize is not always accurate. In fact, it often results in questionable conclusions. But what is relevant, for our purposes here, is that it is the immediate source of what has been described as the contextualization of our questions. This usage of “context” and the need to recognize its significance in the questioning process can also be explained in terms of a “vision” of reality.21 There is a difference between having a mere perspective or view vision. See Appendix A: “Is Life a Sentence?; the Quest for Meaning” and Appendix B: “Meaning and Significance: a Fundamental Challenge to Human Living”. 19 I do not mean just examining presumptions or assumptions which can colour one’s views but evaluating the conceptual framework within which one operates. 20 Although the interconnectedness of reality referred to in the text is in the abstract sense, it nevertheless has implications for our understanding of human nature. Our identity as human beings is not just comprised of our individual traits but also, and in an important sense, constituted by our connectedness with ourselves, with one another, and with the whole of reality. Referred to sometimes as our social nature, this dimension of our reality is more than just—as analyzed and interpreted by psychologists or anthropologists—the need to live together. It is more than just a behavioural pattern although it is recognized more explicitly in this way. See Chapter Four: “Relationships and Communal Living: a View on Types of Relatedness” and Chapter Five: “The Individual and Society: a Philosophical Conception of the Self”. 21 In a related sense, institutions, among others, have come to see the need for a “vision statement” to direct their activities. It provides some kind of framework, within which these institutions conduct their business.

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and possessing a vision. The former indicates a standpoint from a certain angle while the latter refers to a more fundamental understanding. A.N. Whitehead supplies us with graphic imagery: “seeing the wood by means of the trees”.22 Whitehead makes use of this imagery in making a distinction between wisdom and knowledge. However, it can be used for our purposes here since “vision”, just as “wood”, looks at the totality composed of the individual realities. At the same time, however, “vision” is not just a picture of the whole of reality in the same way that “wood” is not simply all the trees put together even if it is in the trees and because of them that we can see the wood.23 In short, it is distinct but not separate from them.24 The importance of contextualization is highlighted by some literary critics, although admittedly rejected by others. According to the former grouping, to understand the meaning of a text, one should not isolate the text from its proper context; otherwise, one runs the risk of interpreting it from an outside point of view. Textual analysis requires that one “gets into the thinking” behind the text. By doing so, the hidden meaning is revealed and enriches one’s understanding of the text. While interpretations of a text, which reveal more of the thinking of the reader, can be exciting and even refreshing, they could cloud the real intentions of the writer or author and therefore lose the intended significance of the text. This observation is particularly relevant to the questioning process insofar as setting it in its proper context is essential to a fuller appreciation of the questions.25

The Societal Setting From what has been set out so far, one could get the impression that philosophizing is an individual activity. Worse, it could depict an activity carried out in isolation from everyone else. That may well be the case in some instances, especially if one is indeed “deep in thought”. Sometimes and in many contexts, we do need to get away from it all to be able to concentrate on the more important issues. It is not surprising that much phi22

Cf. A.N. Whitehead, The Aims of Education and Other Essays (The Free Press Paperback Edition, 1967), p. 6. 23 One may see some connection here to the distinction between Being and beings. However, “vision” or “context”, as used here, would have more subjective connotations since these refer to the questioner’s knowledge of reality, rather than to reality itself. 24 This claim is discussed more fully in Chapter Three: “Distinct, not Separate: A Critique of Dualistic Thinking of and in Society”. 25 See also Appendix A: “Is Life a Sentence?; the Quest for Meaning”.

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losophizing takes place at one’s desk or—nowadays, in front of a computer/laptop. Or one associates it with lonely walks or reflective rests away from the crowds. Understandably, and unfortunately generally, one equates it therefore with the “ivory-tower syndrome”. But it would be a mistake to draw this conclusion regarding the act of philosophizing. Rather, it should be stressed that philosophizing occurs and is carried out in a societal setting. Everyday life—which has already been claimed to be the homebase of philosophizing—is lived surrounded by others and is entrenched in social situations. Questions arise because of our interactions with others, and challenges emerge as we carry out our routine. Whether it is simply the unintended meeting with one another as we go about our daily business or in more structured ones in our professional or social settings, there are certain issues which require our attention and response. Again this brings us back to our very nature as human beings: we are essentially social. We always react to one another even if in different ways and even if not at all times in a conscious manner. Not only do we depend on one another, but we also form one another.26 Accordingly, we have families, groups, communities and societies. We become who we are because of others, and they in turn owe something to each of us. As the existentialists remind us, each existence is really and truly a coexistence. With the increasing globalization we are becoming more and more aware of our interconnectedness much further afield.27 The tremendous advances in communication result in our becoming alerted very quickly to happenings throughout the world. Consequently, we become more exposed to these situations and more conscious of the spread and extent of their consequences.28 Descartes’ scene for his philosophical endeavours known to us as the Cogito (from his axiom: Cogito ergo sum) is often regarded as the starting point for much of philosophical thinking in modern times. Regrettably and mistakenly, this has to some extent promoted a type of individualism as well as shifted the emphasis to intellectualism in one’s expectation of philosophizing.29 Furthermore, this erroneous view of the act of philosophiz26

This claim is developed more fully in Chapter Four: “Relationships and Communal Life: a View on Types of Relatedness”. 27 See Chapter Twelve: “Developments in Contemporary Society and Faith-based Higher Education: Challenges and Issues”. 28 See Chapter Seven: “Images, Reality and Truth: Some Philosophical Considerations”. 29 Dualistic thinking, which many trace back to Descartes, can be found in much of everyday life. It is the type of thinking that promotes and supports separateness rather than distinctiveness. It splits reality rather than highlights a distinctive fea-

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ing—as described here—would hardly encourage anyone to listen to the philosophers to address the problems of society. But whatever one may say about the more advanced stages in the process of philosophizing, this disjunction from the societal setting in our initial thinking ignores a fundamental truth about the nature of our existence30 or of the process of philosophizing. It is definitely not detached from the social setting.

Turning to Philosophy as Resource So far, in dealing with the question of “what is philosophy?”, we focused on the questioning process as a natural activity by human beings. Questions, it has been claimed, are raised in context, by which is meant that they arise not only from concrete situations but also against a background of implicit general knowledge and in a societal setting. Furthermore, it had been stated that questions have a way of spurring us on, in quest of answers. In seeking answers, depending on the kind of questions and information being sought, the questioner has various resources to hand.31 One such resource—relevant to our present purposes—is the study of philosophy. There is no claim here that it is the best one or the most important one. Even those who regard it as a valuable resource will have varying reasons and views.32 But given what has been discussed in this essay, one ture of the one reality. It has unfortunate consequences on how we conduct our lives in society. Cf. Chapter Three: “Distinct, not Separate: a Critique of Dualistic Thinking of and in Society”. Dualism, which separates the individual from society, is different from duality, which accepts the need to focus on certain aspects of the one reality. Dualism separates the intellect from the emotion and divides the human reality into soul and body. It is also the kind of thinking that inevitably leads to a tension, even conflict, between individual and public interests. See Chapter Two: “Public and Individual Interests, the Common Good: an Analysis and a Proposal”. 30 This claim will be explored further in other essays in this book. For a more extensive discussion, see Chapter Five: “The Individual and Society: A Philosophical Conception of Self as Social”. 31 One has to be sensitive to the lack—for whatever reason—of such opportunities for innumerable individuals and groups. The point that is being made here is simply that human beings do, in various ways and in different capacities, resort to resources that will help improve their knowledge of themselves and of the world around them. 32 Recent challenges to university education—with the consequent need to justify academic subjects or disciplines—have been ushered in, among others, by the

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will perhaps appreciate that there seems to be something congenial about turning to the study of this academic subject.33 Despite its sometimes esoteric connotations and misconceptions, the pursuit of philosophy and its heritage does follow rather naturally from the first step of asking fundamental questions. After all, philosophers down through the ages have dealt with these questions in a protracted and often systematic manner. One can expect to learn from the results of their intellectual quests. There is also something interesting, and even helpful, in the way that they have addressed the fundamental questions and provided some answers. At times, even the very questions are re-phrased in such a way that they can pry open new windows, unlock different doors and point to unexpected paths that can lead to another direction, thus facilitating one’s quest for answers. It is inevitable that when one turns to the study of philosophy, one’s choice is often dictated by the questions with which one is concerned. While one cannot generalize, insofar as circumstances vary, there is nevertheless some support in the claim that in any intellectual quest in the context of an academic subject, one’s personal interest in a particular topic or specific issue is crucial. In the study of philosophy, this is especially true.34 It is as if one’s academic curiosity is nurtured by one’s own questions and sustained by an affiliation with a philosophical topic, a philosopher(s), or a philosophical school of thought. Philosophy is sometimes described as the study of ideas. Indeed when one peruses the writings of philosophers, one could readily agree. There is even something familiar about what they are saying even if one is not always clear about or conversant with the sources. Ordinary conversations as well as serious discussions—on the streets or in the media, in classrooms or in public debates—are laced with references, mostly passing, to ideas that have been the subject of much attention by philosophers. Today, for example, there is much talk about the urgent need for ethics and ethical thinking—identified as a result of the collapse of the world economy. Debates about religion have been interspersed with the call for more rational thinking, on both sides of the debate, sometimes with menBologna Process and contemporary developments in society. See Chapter Eleven: “The Marketplace, Academia and Education: A Philosophical Assessment of the Bologna Process”. 33 As used here, philosophy is the academic study taken up at institutions of learning or privately. The word is sometimes used more colloquially and means different things, depending on what the speaker is trying to communicate. 34 Arguably, this is also the case with the great thinkers themselves. Several of them develop their original insights in dialogue with other thinkers in history or in their lifetime.

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tion made of particular philosophers. Educational policies call for greater attention to the knowledge-society for which educators are preparing future citizens—a task that has been of immense interest to philosophers. It is not too far off thus to claim that not only is philosophy a valuable resource but it even serves already as a reference point for much of our discourse.

Philosophy in Context But while the study of ideas itself can attract some people, the philosophical treatment of such ideas can also deter others. As was noted previously, there is the tendency to regard philosophical thoughts as lofty ideals, divorced from the practicalities and complexities of life. That observation is even supported by some philosophers themselves, who relegate its pursuit to those who have the leisure and therefore not for others who have to be preoccupied with their daily lives and work.35 It is not surprising, therefore, that philosophy is indeed regarded as “academic”, and its own discussions are brushed aside as “abstract”. The use of rather uncommon vocabulary among some philosophers lends itself to the accusation that philosophy is in a world of its own.36 Such perception can isolate those who study it and cast the subject in a negative light. Somehow even if the claim that philosophy is the love of wisdom may seem alluring at first, it can nevertheless sound hollow. Such negative perceptions of philosophy are regrettable but understandable. Abstract thinking, as is carried out in much of philosophy, has a price to pay. Not only does it demand much closer and more prolonged attention, but it also loses some grounding in concrete experience. As A.N. Whitehead explains regarding speculative thinking: it is like the flight of the airplane into the rarefied atmosphere. Charles Hartshorne distinguished between the concrete and the abstract dimensions of reality. Philosophical thinking, he explains, always runs the risk of concentrating on the abstract dimension to the neglect of the concrete dimension of reality.37 35

This was the case in ancient Greece as witnessed in Aristotle’s philosophical works. 36 This observation has certainly been made of Whitehead’s philosophy. On the other hand, he has rightly defended coining a new vocabulary to avoid the connotations (which he wished to distance from his philosophy) associated with words, terms or labels in common parlance or traditional usage. 37 An interesting study on types of thinking is set out and described fully in Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Penguin Books, 2012). The author was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002.

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Returning to the previous discussion on the “context” of the question and its two meanings as used here, one can perhaps appreciate more what the pursuit of philosophy can offer if one notes that it can facilitate the questioner’s examination of the larger picture or vision of reality that often remains implicit. It will be recalled that the nature of the questioner is not only the basis for the raising of the questions but it also provides the ability to “transcend” their particularity. Exposure to the philosophical ideas of philosophers down through the ages, in different parts of the world and from various backgrounds, enables one to investigate much more thoroughly and critically the context from which one is pursuing the questions.38 Martin Buber, the eminent Jewish thinker, maintained that he had no philosophy; he merely opened the window to share the view that he was seeing, with the invitation to his readers/listeners to join him in looking at reality in that way.39 The questioning process, described earlier as the act of philosophizing, is an initial stage in the quest. One can of course remain there. Insights, opinions and viewpoints—formed in the act of philosophizing—are valuable. They do contribute to knowledge and provide information. But the challenge always presents itself to advance further as well as to dig deeper in our thinking. It is a challenge that one cannot ignore with impunity. One ought to scrutinize the larger or general picture. Otherwise, one can easily be swayed by what is fashionable or what is acceptable. Sometimes trends or conventions do not just mislead; they can also be dangerous. False ideas have, unfortunately, a way of leading one astray. Piecemeal or ad hoc responses, while understandable and even appropriate in the circumstances, can be limited and limiting.40 Restricting oneself to the 38

Philosophy—certain practitioners insist—should be critical. This is indeed correct, but it does not mean always offering negative remarks or exposing the weaknesss in other ways of thinking as in done in much of academic philosophy in the West. Rather, critical thinking really means facilitating clearer and more grounded thinking. Sometimes, rather than being dismissive, it means being more inclusive. 39 Buber is also known as an existentialist. The existentialist philosophers certainly showed the significance of the questions about life and the importance of one’s decisions in life. Buber’s approach to philosophy and his own philosophical output have had a lasting positive influence. His challenge of “hallowing ordinary life” vivifies one’s routine. The “life of dialogue” which he practiced and taught has a way of enabling one to value relationships and one’s place in society. Cf. Chapter Four: “Relationships and Communal Living: a View on Types of Relatedness”. 40 Changing situations, e.g. medical ones, many times demand immediate or quick thinking if one is to respond to the ethical issues which present themselves there and then. The challenge then is how to form an ethical basis that will facilitate decision-making.

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fragmentary details, so essential in various branches of knowledge in order to make progress, can nevertheless blinker one’s quest for truth. Philosophical thinking for its part goes beyond the trivial, the superficial and the transitory and stretches out towards the important or substantial in the hope of arriving at the truth. It is of course to be admitted that the attempt to heed the demands of generalization and conceptualization— as a further stage in the questioning process—can be frustrating and even pointless. In fact, one would have to accept that it has its critics, even among philosophers themselves.41 But as Charles Hartshorne puts it, the problem is not generalization itself since we naturally engage in it; rather, it is how we generalize that should occupy our attention. For this reason, one’s context against which one is engaged in philosophizing should also be the subject of close scrutiny.42 Otherwise, insofar as the background or the setting of any query can also colour one’s point of view, one can easily be directed to questionable or even wrong conclusions.

The Quest as Pursuit of Wisdom Returning to philosophy itself, we will recall that it has been traditionally defined as the love of wisdom.43 In this essay, we have regarded it as a valuable resource in the pursuit of wisdom. Today there is a tendency in academic institutions, one that is particularly evident in our marketdriven and technological society, to stress the acquisition of knowledge and the development of skills. This is not only understandable but also crucial if the education an institution provides is to be found appropriate and relevant. Nonetheless, something is amiss if the entire focus of one’s pursuit becomes narrowly directed at this consideration, important though it may be. Moreover, as Alfred Lord Tennyson puts it, “Knowledge comes, but wisdom lingers.” The pursuit of wisdom—with which philosophy has been closely associated—understood as the active participation in 41

This is particularly true with postmodernists and positivists. This is really to engage in metaphysical thinking (to be distinguished from subscribing to a metaphysical system) as explained in note 17. 43 This understanding of wisdom was more holistic in ancient times, both in the West and in Asia. The later development of philosophy, particularly in the West, has made it into more of an intellectual exercise. While the intellectual is an essential element in one’s quest, human rationality which is the source of one’s questioning and quest should not be limited to it. The integral connection to the whole of one’s humanity cannot be overlooked. For how it is an integral part of moral formation see Chapter Six: “Ethical Thinking and Formation: a Challenge for Life in Society”. 42

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our full development as human persons, highlights certain essential features that need to be repeatedly stressed these days. While taking into account contemporary needs, we should not ignore these features either as we reflect on contextualizing the fundamental questions one asks.44 The term “wisdom” itself is understood in different ways, so it is essential to explain its usage here. The pursuit of wisdom, as has been pointed out already, is not just the acquisition of knowledge or the development of skills and talents although these are an integral part of it. These interpretations fail to take into serious account the fullness of our humanity, which—one will recall—is the basis of the question and the quest. Wisdom ultimately is rooted in our nature as human beings and the various dimensions of our humanity: intellectual, emotional, ethical, spiritual, aesthetic, social, creative and others. The pursuit of wisdom is the attempt to recognize, integrate and develop all those dimensions. It is also an awareness that our identity as human persons is shaped by and nourished by the community to which we belong.45 In turn our own activities, decisions, and commitments have an effect on the community. Plato, Confucius, Buber, and Martha Nussbaum, to cite a few, draw our attention to this understanding of wisdom when they wrote about the importance of the development of one’s moral character and sense of responsibility in connection with the search for wisdom. The pursuit of wisdom is thus a holistic process because the goal and its foundation are themselves holistic. The pursuit of wisdom is truly a journey or an exploration whereby one addresses the questions that one is asking, evaluates their significance and draws on various resources—including philosophy—for possible answers. Moreover, the process of questioning and the consequent search for answers are just as important as any answers one may arrive at since the very act itself of pursuing wisdom already enhances one’s development as a human being. The process is also important because hopefully it transforms one into a better human being inasmuch as one has taken the time to delve deeper into those questions and to face up to their implications. If wisdom is indeed the development of the whole person, then the transcendent dimension—which one can become aware of when one goes beyond the questions themselves—cannot be ignored. If one is to do the human person justice, then the transcendent side becomes an important factor

44

See Chapter Eleven: “The Marketplace, Academia and Education: A Philosophical Assessment of the Bologna Process”. 45 See Chapter Five: “The Individual and Society: a Philosophical Conception of the Self as Social”.

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in the pursuit of wisdom.46 In fact, it is what sets one on the quest and spurs the seeker further. The pursuit of wisdom, it must be repeated, is not a purely intellectual activity. Thus, it implies another fundamental question: how should one live?47 In fact, for many philosophers, seeking wisdom is intended to lead towards living a meaningful life, not in isolation from but within one’s society.48 It should result in changing not just the way one understands but also how one acts, feels, imagines, and relates to others.49 It makes one conscious of one’s uniqueness as distinctive and awakens one’s sense as a responsive and responsible member of the greater whole. It is a lifetime preoccupation. Since it involves all of one’s human nature and its full development, then it does indeed transform one. In short, philosophy, as the love and pursuit of wisdom, does not just facilitate the questioning process but it can also, and more significantly so, enrich one’s life and that of others. In this sense it is a valuable resource in one’s quest that has its source in our human nature and is set within the societal context. The hope is that it also improves life in society.50

46 I do not necessarily equate the “transcendent” with “religious” although there are close links between the two. This dimension of human nature is what provides hope. See “In Retrospect” and Appendix B: “Meaning and Significance: a Fundamental Challenge to Human Living”, 47 This is associated with the ethical enquiry; but as used here, it refers to the more general one of conducting one’s life. 48 This is generally true although Lao Tzu, the ancient Chinese philosopher, would have a different view. 49 This is particularly the case with much of Asian philosophies. 50 See Mary McAleese, “Foreword”.

CHAPTER TWO PUBLIC AND INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS, THE COMMON GOOD: AN ANALYSIS AND A PROPOSAL

Setting the Scene One of the constant challenges of living in society is how to reconcile public and individual interests. It inevitably arises, for instance, when an individual is confronted by the expectations or demands of society, or where there is a perceived conflict between the claims of the individual and the so-called common good. There is much talk of balancing1 those interests to ensure that one does not give undue attention to either one to the disadvantage of the other. The difficulty is exacerbated when one shifts the discussion to the issue of rights with the understanding that both sides have rights which cannot be ignored or trodden upon without committing an injustice.2 1

“Balancing” is the oft-used term; but in my view, this assumes that both sides have equal weight in one’s deliberation. However, as I hope the argumentation in the essay shows, the term “reconciling” is preferable since one may have at times to consider that one side has a greater claim. 2 This is illustrated when a judge has to consider the rights of an accused against the public welfare or safety. Given the presumed innocence of an accused, for example, a decision has to be made as to whether there is any real danger to society by allowing the accused continued freedom. This delicate situation also arises when a judge has to examine the merits of an application for a particular action as was the case with the recordings of the emergency calls during the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting on the first anniversary. Judge Eliot Prescott granted their release over the objection of the Newton Police Department and members of the public because in the judge’s view, “it [would] assist the public in gauging the appropriateness of law enforcement’s response to calls for help from the public...and may even serve to vindicate and support the professionalism and bravery of the first responders.” Wall Street Journal, Dec. 4, 2013. Recently, the issue has become of public interest in Ireland because of the insistence of the Public Ac-

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There is a certain relevance and poignancy in the topic in our times since various populations today are feeling the tension between individual and public interests much more personally.3 They are, for instance, suffering the effects of the action of the few who created the economic crisis. The proposed remedy of austerity is supposed to benefit their country, but it hurts individuals who are innocent. Does one make the sacrifice for the sake of the whole? The topic has also made the headlines because of the controversy over the Edward Snowden affair and the publication of the data by a newspaper in England. It is claimed that this was done in the public interest.4 It seems to have been the reason given to justify putting the confidential information in the public domain.5 However, one difficulty cited regarding the alleged justification is what constitutes “public interest” and who judges something to be such.6 There is a sneaking suspicion that it is immediately resorted to by those with vested interest in the matter. This essay is a philosophical analysis of this discussion rather than an examination of any specific situation as such. It will first provide a wider philosophical context to the topic and then propose some relatively specific guidelines. There is some advantage in engaging in a philosophical analysis here rather than in examining the specific situations since to do the latter necessitates knowledge of particulars and competence in the special field or fields. Admittedly, often a general discussion can and does counts Committee to call before it certain bodies, which claim that to be outside its political jurisdiction. 3 A problematic situation occurs when sectional interests threaten and even damage the wider society because of a planned strike or withdrawal of work. While the rights of the group of workers deserve to be protected, sometimes the strategy resorted to does have severe repercussions on innocent individuals/parties and on society as a whole. 4 The phrase “public interest” was specifically resorted to by the Irish government when it passed the Financial Emergency Measure in the Public Interest (FEMPI) as an alternative to the Haddington Road Agreement in 2013. 5 In an article “A Manifesto for the Truth” published in Der Spiegel Edward Snowden is quoted as claiming that: “Instead of causing damage, the usefulness of the new public knowledge for society is now clear because reforms to politics, supervision and laws are being suggested.” He is said to state further: “Citizens have to fight against the suppression of information about affairs of essential importance for the public. Those who speak the truth are not committing a crime.” (Reuters). The saga continues with more revelations about one country spying on other countries. 6 See Chapter Seven: “Images, Truth and Reality: Some Philosophical Considerations”.

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complicate matters. On the other hand, a different general way of viewing the perceived tensions in these individual situations can result, if not in a resolution, at least in a clearer perception of the important issues. At times, it may even change one’s understanding of the tension itself.

Contextualizing the Discussion There is a broader background that we should become aware of at the outset of this philosophical consideration; namely, that of the relationship itself between the individual and society, of which the present topic is a part. It is an ever-recurring problem. Should a human being be considered primarily as an individual, responsible for oneself alone and therefore above society; or should society be given the preference thereby making the individual, not necessarily a fragment of society, but subservient to it?7 To deal with the question, some tend to cite the common good and to emphasize society or the social aspect of the human self, and his or her obligations to the rest of the group. Or at times reference is made to the fact that the human self is formed physically, mentally and psychologically within society. These people would seem to uphold the priority of society over the individual members. Others, in contrast, would be inclined to underline the dignity of the individual being and would therefore claim that no society has the right to suppress any individual member or to treat him or her as if they were merely jigsaw pieces whose value lies in fitting into the whole pattern of society. The challenge for those who would not go along with either of these standpoints is to look for a middle way, presuming there is one. That is our present task here—a task that is daunting not only because situations are different and distinct and may therefore require some fine-tuning to whatever is considered as acceptable but also because making a judgment that is defensible is in itself a highly complex one. Philosophers have debated this topic in various contexts—with varying success. It may be helpful therefore for our purposes to take such debate into account in our considerations not only because there is a realiza7

While the discussion here centres on the tension between individual interests and public interests, it is also applicable to the debate on national and international concerns. The topic continues to be particularly acute in the European Union because of the referendum on the Euro treaty. One key question is whether a member country’s interests are being sacrificed for Europe rather than strengthened because of that country’s support for the euro zone. Another important consideration, given the interconnectedness of the member states, is whether a particular country can afford not to support the treaty as it could damage its own economic position.

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tion that the philosophical basis of present practice needs to be examined but also because the philosophical debate itself, even without any direct reference to it, has been influential in our daily thinking. Two names immediately come to mind in this context: Immanuel Kant who championed the dignity of the human individual and John Stuart Mill who strongly supported a utilitarian interpretation of the social good.

Philosophical Bases For Kant, each and every human individual is an “end to itself”. This means that every human being has intrinsic worth and is not a means to an end and should not be treated merely as such. The nature of each one of us deserves to be respected, and it confers an obligation on others to honour that. Everyone’s worth is therefore not conferred but acknowledged. It is for this reason that a human individual is not just described as “human” but more significantly a “person”. This evaluative term is the basis for the fundamental rights of the individual which all others have a duty to respect and the foundation for the acceptance of the status of individual interests. Accordingly, as a Kantian interpretation would phrase it, every human individual has dignity and not just value. Unlike the worth of, say, a work of art or a material possession, it is invariable and cannot be taken away without doing an injustice to that human individual. In our times, one can contrast the worth of a human being with stocks, shares and pension funds. Unlike them it does not fall and is not subject to the vagaries of circumstances! A human person has dignity, irrespective of background, achievements or interests. For Kant (and for the vast majority of philosophers) the human individual is therefore itself the source of one’s law, by which he means that such an individual is truly free or autonomous and has inalienable rights. This dignity is what marks the human individual off from every other creature. But the affirmation of human dignity is complicated by the fact that such affirmation takes place within a social context. In other words, since every human individual is autonomous and since every such individual needs to exercise its autonomy in human society, a conflict of rights does take place. There is a fundamental need to recognize and acknowledge that other human individuals, who together form a society, are themselves centres of autonomy whose dignity and rights must also be respected. It is for this reason that Kant’s view has been modified by others: the suggestion has been made that while one cannot and should not compromise human dignity, one must not regard human autonomy or human rights in absolute

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terms.8 Even Kant qualifies his own statement by using the phrase “treating the person merely as a means”. In other words, one may treat human beings as means so long as one does not degrade their personhood, i.e. denying them as “ends-in-themselves”. There has been talk therefore of prioritizing human rights, rather than balancing them. Such a modified version is much more than just putting rights on a sliding scale, an impossible task in itself, but rather of putting the onus on those who wish to override the fundamental status and rights of the human individual to provide reasons which can legitimately and justifiably be accepted. In short, the autonomy of the human individual remains intact and duly protected until there are good and solid reasons to affirm otherwise. To a large extent, this is where utilitarianism, particularly as developed by the philosopher, John Stuart Mill, can be helpful, especially when we are focusing on society’s interests, in that it does supply us with a way towards reconciling competing claims. The need to reckon with the consequences of our actions and to evaluate them in terms of the kind of impact and the number of affected parties—despite the ambiguity of both the criterion itself and the difficulty of its implementation—gives a more tangible and manageable way out. However, it should be added that this philosophical theory is criticized for sacrificing the individual good—and not always in a laudable way—by pushing forward what is claimed to be the common good. It has been rightly pointed out that the common good is after all not simply the majority view. Moreover, this theory can be accused—at least, in certain versions of utilitarianism—of pre-judging both the kind and extent of the consequences while ignoring the basic rights. Despite its seemingly theoretical air about it, this philosophical discussion—intended to provide the wider context—has practical implications, not least for our present topic. Accepting the need to reconcile individual and social interests is in fact an implicit recognition of the dignity of every individual as a subject, rather than an object. In other words, the human individual is not regarded as a thing but rather a unique individual. For this reason, each human individual and his or her interests do require serious attention and should not be lightly sacrificed for the larger society; hence, the appearance of a tension or conflict. But we need to qualify all this—again implicit in the acceptance of the need to reconcile individual and social interests. Just as there are difficulties with the Kantian emphasis on the autonomy of the individual subject, we must also be aware that the grouping of human individuals as a 8

An important qualification needs to be introduced here: the claim that human rights are not absolute does not mean that they are not fundamental.

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whole gives that grouping, known as society, a set of justified expectations. “Society” is not just an aggregate of individuals, but an important entity that is distinct from its individual members. This means that social or public interests must therefore also be taken into serious account. Along the same lines, the concept of “common good”, prevalent in ethics as well as in social and political philosophy, is not to be confused with the majority view, as was already pointed out earlier. The common good is what is good for all members of society and does not or should not disadvantage the minority or specific subgroups. Thus, it is important that social or public interests, as least in ethics, be acknowledged as a distinct category as well for only then can one have a legitimate referent for the concept of public or social interests to be distinguished from those of the majority or dominant group. Earlier I had referred to the notion of autonomy as indeed highlighting the dignity of the human individual, but this has to be understood in context. For our purposes here, we ought to note that what is really more crucial is not so much the autonomous nature of the human individual as such but the exercise of that autonomy. The distinction between the two is conceptual of course, hence abstract, but its reality is concrete and therefore has practical implications. That is to say, while we must indeed respect the autonomy of each human individual because of its dignity, we must also be alerted to the factual situation regarding its exercise. It is worth repeating that this is because the exercise of autonomy is always social: it is always over another. And that other—whether it means a grouping of other individuals, especially if they are also autonomous, or society as such—has rights which must also be respected.9 And that is what leads not just to a conflict of rights between individuals but also to the tension between public and individual interests. For this reason, one should not overplay the “autonomy” card—without considering that it cannot and should not be absolute.

Informed Consent A case in point in the discussion on reconciling individual and public interests is the issue of informed consent.10 Eliciting what one regards as 9

Cf. Chapter Eight: “Human Freedom, its Power and Limits: Some Implications for Life in Society”. 10 This essay is based on a paper originally presented at an international conference of radiologists and radiographers for whom the question of informed consent was paramount in the discussion on the use of non-medical exposures in specified situations. The particular issue is the extent to which one can justifiably resort in

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the informed consent of an individual may well lead us to believe that one is addressing the concern for the individual. But in line with what has been noted earlier, I should like to point out that just as there are difficulties with the Kantian emphasis on the autonomy of the subject, we must also be aware that soliciting the consent of the recipient is not always nor necessarily acting in the best interests of the recipient.11 Otherwise, one could be accused of “reverse paternalism”12 whereby we offload responsibility on the recipient without taking into serious consideration whether indeed the recipient—and I am not necessarily talking of extreme cases—is in a position to make the decision. The phrase “informed consent” or “valid consent” thus requires further analysis. Having the relevant information and communicating it to the recipient of the action is of course of primary importance in acknowledging the recipient as a human individual.13 As has been noted already, this is to recognize that he or she is entitled to such knowledge as befits his or her nature. However, as Aristotle has rightly pointed out, having the right knowledge is merely one aspect to being able to make the right judgment. The situation is aggravated by the complexity of the data. We have become aware of the enormity and complexity of the information that is thrust upon us by all the developments in the scientific and technological world in which we live. “Informed consent” should therefore not merely mean “being in possession of the relevant information” but more crucially “being able to process correctly all the information that has been given”.14 This presents the agent of the action with a difficulty and may account for the paternalistic practice of withholding some information or of relegating decision-making to those who do have the expertise to make the right judgment. Worse, providing all the information to the recipient could lead to unacceptable consequences for the recipient, including damaging that individual’s well-being. circumstances where exposures are not determined by or necessitated on medical grounds. 11 Nor is this necessarily part and parcel of the “duty of care”. 12 This is a comment on the current discussion on justification. In the past, there had been what was regarded as “paternalistic” practice in radiography and radiology in that the decision was the responsibility of the practitioner. There has been a shift towards a more patient-oriented approach. It should be stressed, however, that the onus remains to ensure, as much as is reasonable, that information is transparent. 13 This is sometimes referred to as “the duty of openness”. 14 The issue of communication, already identified in the current discussion on justification in radiology, is particularly relevant. It is not simply “imparting data” but dealing with a human situation.

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For this reason, clarity and accuracy of the communication are not sufficient as the human situation also calls for sensitivity on the part of the agent. It is important to take into account how the information will be received or processed by the recipient. “Being able to process correctly all the information that has been given” therefore means more than just being able to understand the data but also being able to correctly act on the information. This is where the “consent” part of the phrase “informed consent” is crucial. For “consent” in the ethical sense—as distinguished from other contexts—is not simply agreeing on the basis of one’s knowledge but “being in a position to agree”. And that differs from individual to individual and from case to case. Moreover, “consent” refers to the recipient as one who has not just an intellect but also free will. This complicates the matter even further since the question could be asked as to how freely given the consent is. Outside pressures as well as circumstances, both individual and social, do limit the degree of freedom which an individual has in decision-making.15 The keyword here is “voluntary”. And the pertinent issue is thus the extent to which the consent is given in a voluntary way. In short, just as excluding the recipient from the decision process is ethically questionable, putting the onus of decision-making on him or her is not always the best way forward either in our attempts to re-think the ethical issue of justification since the recipient may not after all be in a position to really exercise his or her autonomy.

Motivation versus Consequences In a rather ironic twist, it can also be said that Kant’s and Mill’s philosophies—to return to their standpoints on the topic under present consideration—can be described as competing views. That is to say, Kant appears to champion individual interest while Mill seems to promote public interest. It could be claimed therefore that these philosophers aggravate the situation rather than resolve it! One becomes more aware of the tension or conflict when one pays attention to what Kant has to say about the status of the individual which should always be respected while heeding Mill’s advice that we should be guided more by the quality and quantity of the impact of any action. A further observation on their respective philosophies can be introduced here in the context of the topic of this essay. Kant is the thinker who 15

This observation is often made in the case of voluntary euthanasia. Its extension to terminally-ill minors, as has been legally approved in Belgium, makes the situation more complex and questionable.

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is best known for insisting that morality revolves around motivation. For him, an action is morally good only when it has been motivated by what he terms “a good will”, i.e. an intention that is not rooted in interest, inclination or results. Mill, on the other hand, puts aside any consideration of intention or of the deed itself but instead focuses on the kind of consequences which actually result. For this reason, his admonition is thus to “bring about the greatest happiness for the greatest number”. Taking these emphases together, as would be suggested by our topic, means that they are simply irreconcilable even when they are nuanced. With respect therefore to the tension between individual and public interests, one is left with the problem. Since Kant admits of no exception to his principle of acting only from a good will, there is no way that one can be drawn towards what is regarded as the public good. For his part, Mill has been rightly criticized as ignoring and even rejecting the individual’s interests. Notwithstanding this observation, however, it does not mean that neither philosopher can be helpful in addressing the topic. What both of them contribute to the present consideration is that they focus on important aspects of a moral act. An examination of the motivation, as Kant rightly insists that it be done, can determine whether our action is or is not selfishly motivated. Good will means that the action must be done even if one is not inclined to do so or even if it does not serve one’s own private interests. Good will, therefore, enables us to be in fact generous rather than self-centred. Kant would also remind us that doing the right thing may incur sacrifice or suffering and thus can promote heroism. It challenges one to put aside any self-serving interests. Mill, for his part, enlarges our focus since one is made much more aware of the bigger body that we should serve. The emphasis on consequences also facilitates awareness of the far-reaching results rather than merely short-term interests. Hence, in asking that we pay more attention to the public interest, his philosophy also takes us out of our small or narrow space and enables us to consider how we can in fact contribute to, rather than merely benefit from, the deed. It can—although does not always— promote altruism. It can even be said to enable one to be more caring or sympathetic.

A Different Philosophical Perspective So far we have noted that reconciling competing claims (or maintaining a balance, as is commonly stated) between different interests is acknowledging the existence of a tension. Indeed, in the majority of cases we accept this not just to be true but, even more so, to be problematic. The expectation therefore is for some kind of a set of guidelines which will

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enable us to deal with the matter and any issues which may arise. The background discussion on the two philosophers provided the wider context. In addition, the reference to Kant and Mill and their respective philosophical doctrines sharpens our understanding of the tension and the fundamental issues. But the problem remains unresolved. Are we back then at our starting point? To some extent that is correct. But philosophical thinking, rather than just taking for granted the accepted starting point, sometimes challenges the traditional or dominant way of looking at reality and at specific situations. In other words, it looks at the underlying assumptions and questions. The resulting conclusion, as would be expected, can be quite different. Admittedly, this can be irritating—remember what Socrates did and note what happened to him! On the other hand, at times a different way of looking at things does change the outcome—a lesson we have learned even in ordinary life. This is what I propose to do now. The wider philosophical context that we have just analyzed, namely the debate between Kant’s philosophy and utilitarianism, has been criticized by some contemporary philosophers like the Jewish philosopher, Martin Buber; the British philosopher, Alfred North Whitehead; and the American philosopher, Charles Hartshorne. While the existence of competing claims is close to our commonsense view, it is claimed by the critics to rest on a foundation that needs more investigation. To accept that we are not merely individuals but autonomous individuals and that society is a separate entity can lead not just to the tension that we have been focusing on but also to extolling individualism on the one hand and totalitarianism on the other hand.16 What these other philosophers propose—and argue for—is taking seriously the relationship itself and giving it primacy. This standpoint, it should be noted, is quite different from simply maintaining that a relationship is what individuals “enter into”. That is to say, these individuals retain their individuality but “bond” with another. For these thinkers, in contrast, relationship is what constitutes the partners. More importantly, as Buber would express it, the I (or she or he) becomes so because of the relationship. Each of us is constituted by the kind of relationships which dominate our lives and shape our realities.17 In more philosophical language, the relationship is described as having ontological primacy. This philosophical perspective of Buber, Whitehead and Hartshorne may be somewhat unfamiliar and would seem to be contrary to our ordi16

I am using this word to indicate that society is pitted against the individual but not necessarily in any sociological or political sense. 17 This claim is elaborated further in Chapter Four: “Relationships and Communal Life: a View on Types of Relatedness”.

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nary perception of our reality as individuals truly different from everyone else. However, it is actually closer to our contemporary experience of the interconnectedness of reality and of the world we live in today. More significantly, if one were to delve deeper into reality—as we do in various fields—and not just assume what is regarded as factual because our senses tell us so, then the reality is actually different. A useful illustration of this point is when we disregard the commonsense view and ordinary language usage which regard the sun as “setting or rising”. Reality, as contemporary physics in fact shows us, is in essence relatedness itself.18 Buber takes seriously our existential situation while Whitehead and Hartshorne are very much informed by contemporary science. These philosophers, highlighting this relatedness of reality, show the implications for our understanding of the human situation. What relevance has this perspective to the present topic? It is not possible to develop this philosophical perspective here,19 but for our present purposes it should be stated that one of the advantages of this view on reality is that it shows that “balancing” or “reconciling” public and individual interests is a rather misplaced issue. It places our starting point, as it were, in a different light. Separating rather than just simply distinguishing20 individual from public interests, because it is assumed that an individual is separable from society and vice-versa, means that what is good for one party may not be so for the other. It leads to thinking that there can be disparity or inequity of bargaining power between the two parties. In Buber’s, Whitehead’s and Hartshorne’s philosophical perspective, since there is no separation, merely conceptual distinction, whatever takes place—good or bad, an advantage or a risk—affects both parties always. The issue therefore is not whose interests are served—the individual’s or society’s—but rather whether the activity, the practice or the situation is itself good or advantageous, bad or risky.21 Every happening to and by any 18 The word I have used is “relatedness” because “relativity” (which is also used) is sometimes associated with “subjectivism”—which is denied by this perspective. 19 Buber’s and Hartshorne’s alternative perspective are explored further in the other essays in this volume. 20 The philosophical principle behind this claim is explained and defended in Chapter Two: “Distinct, not Separate: a Critique of Dualistic Thinking of and in Society”. 21 This observation is made in the practical advice given by Linda Fisher Thornton in her book, 7 Lenses: Learning the Principles and Practice of Ethical Leadership (Leading in Context, 2013). Stressing that getting employees to act ethically in the workplace starts at the top, she points out that this will not only improve the business and culture of the organisation but will also help make a difference in the

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member affects the whole as well as itself, and any development in the whole has repercussions for every member. It seems that this way of thinking—so long as one takes into account the central concept of relatedness (or in more contemporary idiom, interconnectedness) even if it removes us from the factual circumstances that we find ourselves in—will have implications for practice, including the various situations we have to deal with.

Some Practical Considerations Notwithstanding expectations, a philosophical analysis, such as the one which I have just undertaken, is not intended by its nature to lead to determinate guidelines that will regulate conduct. As was already acknowledged at the start, to be able to provide that, especially if it applies to a specific situation or group of situations, demands full knowledge of the particulars and high competence in the specific area. Nonetheless, it should set out some pointers that will hopefully assist with our deliberations if it is to be an effective conceptual tool. Let me therefore suggest the following practical considerations in the context of the present topic and in the light of our philosophical considerations: 1. It is useful to be reminded that a value judgment—a judgment that one has to make in the face of a perceived tension in the situation such as one between public and individual interests—necessarily complicates matters since it involves taking a number of relevant factors into account. Since it is a human act, there is a certain amount of subjectivity—which should not, however, be equated with subjectivism. Rather, this means that there is always the possibility of error, a consideration that is integral to any value judgment. At the same time, however, a value judgment should be as informed as is reasonably possible. This is where a constant review which results in guidelines or codes of conduct can facilitate the decisionmaking process. 2. The concept of the “dignity of a human individual”, irrespective of interpretation or elaboration, means that no activity, practice or situation should be so degrading that a human being loses his or her special status. If it does, then it cannot be justified—even if some other acceptable outcome, such as a benefit for others, can be achieved or foreseen. As Kant shows us, this is a fundamental consideration. The question of course is whether the activity, practice or situation—and here the issue of individual and public interests is a good example—is truly degrading. The concreteworld. She is a former bank senior vice-president who now runs her own leadership consulting practice.

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ness and the specificity of each situation and its consequences (as Mill and utilitarians remind us) do matter too. However, it will have to be assessed with that fundamental consideration as the benchmark. This means that the further step of making a value judgment is called for. 3. The issue of “interests”, whether individual or public, needs to be contextualized. These interests, if they are simply expressive of the individual or society rather than truly integral to them, can and should be prioritized since some—compared to others—may be more instrumental in respecting or furthering the individual’s dignity or society’s general wellbeing. But if indeed they truly contribute to society’s general being, i.e. in an integral way, then, as Buber, Whitehead and Hartshorne show us, they actually further the interests of the individual too even if these do not always manifest themselves as such.22 If they are shown to harm individuals—and not merely inconvenience them—then they also contribute to the deterioration of society’s well-being.23 But these conclusions should be constantly questioned and reviewed. 4. It must be acknowledged that our deliberations, faced with particular situations, will have to evaluate the extent that certain practices, like non-medical exposures on specific individuals or groups, do affect them. This is where the evidence provided by scientific or medical studies is crucial. We should also note that these cannot be isolated from the general impact on society as such. It is false to continue to think, as Buber, Whitehead and Hartshorne remind us, that individual and public interests are really poles apart. The relevant consideration here is not just the benefits/risks to the affected party or parties but also the general well-being of the whole of society. Most of that impact can be measured or is immediately evident but others are not. Some may be positive in the short term 22

During the presentation at the conference, one participant questioned whether this argument would convince a smuggler who was being subjected to X-rays by society. I replied that it probably would not. But the point that the harm that that individual is inflicting on society is also detrimental to him is the reason why society puts deterrence, including punishment, in that individual’s way. This is to show—not necessarily, convince—him/her that smuggling is not in the long run to his/her benefit. This is an implicit admission, therefore, of the point of the argument made here. 23 A particular problem in contemporary China is the effect that the government policy of one-child family has had not only on individual families but also on society itself. Because of the preference for male children who are expected traditionally to care for their aged parents, there are very few female adults. This in turn has resulted in difficulties finding brides. That difficulty has now extended to how society will be able to care for the large numbers of the aging population. Not surprisingly, China has recently rethought this policy.

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but actually detrimental in the long run. This calls for vigilance and caution therefore. 5. Public interest and the common good have been closely and rightly associated. Thus, we sometimes hear of sacrificing individual interests or needs for the sake of the greater interests or needs of the group, of the community or of society. But we need to be aware that the “common good” is not always the same as the view of the majority or what is deemed to be beneficial to the majority.24 The “common good”— admittedly a difficult criterion to define and measure—is more properly understood as the general well-being of the whole (including its individual members).25 6. Individual interest does not have to be limited to the interests of one individual. It could be a group in or a sector of society. Public interests too could mean the wider body to which one is a member rather than society in general. The conflicting interests between these parties could also be due to an ideological difference which each party is determined to protect rather than a clear benefit that would be accrued.26 We have also to be cautious about a claim to what is supposedly in the public interest as it can easily slip into the vested interests of the claimant.27 7. Legitimate individual or sectional interests need to be recognized and catered for, as is their right, but not separately from those of society. That is to say, these should not be pursued in isolation from the general welfare of society. Each and every citizen is an integral member whose well-being is a matter of concern by all and whose activity affects every24

This point is dramatically brought out in the work of the great Norwegian writer, Henrik Ibsen, An Enemy of the People, and adapted by Arthur Miller. Described as “the story of one brave man’s struggle to do the right thing and speak the truth in the face of extreme social intolerance”, it challenges equating the notion of the common good with the dominant view of the community. 25 Regarding the situation of debt-forgiveness described in Chapter Ten: “Economic Crisis and Accountability: a Re-examination of Certain Views and Practices”, it would be particularly useful and highly instructive if it can be shown that on the whole this gesture is actually for the real well-being of society. Here one is dependent on the findings of economists because of the financial implications as well as on the insights of psychologists due to the impact on the general mood of society. 26 This was well exemplified by the stand-off between Barack Obama and the US Senate over the budget that would fund what has been dubbed the Obamacare programme. It is claimed that the repercussions of the standoff would not be limited to the American economy but would impact severely on the global economy. 27 See Chapter Seven: “Images, Truth and Reality: Some Philosophical Considerations”.

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one else. Thus, all involved parties should truly investigate whether any attempts to protect their rights entail cutting themselves off from the rest of society through the strategies that they choose, e.g. the specific form of boycott or strike. If they do, damage will be done to all even if one individual or group succeeds in obtaining what it has fought for as the longterm and wider effects may not immediately be visible. On the other hand, it is also imperative that due attention is given and appropriate action is taken to ensure that the morale and the well-being of society itself are not negatively impacted because the individual and group interests have been neglected. 8. Finally, the issue of “informed consent” (or lack of it) in nonmedical situations is important and makes these situations distinct from medical ones.28 However, informed consent can be actual or implied.29 By belonging to a society, one can assume that one supplies consent to its practices.30 The real issue therefore is whether those situations or activities can be ethically justified or not in the first place. This amounts to the need for constant vigilance over the practices.

Concluding Remarks The issue of reconciling individual and public interests has both concrete and theoretical aspects. Those who have to make a decision, based on certain relevant evidence and relying on a value judgment, are faced with the concrete demands of the situation. A philosophical analysis, such as the one undertaken here, attempts to provide a conceptual tool in the hope that it can aid with the decision-making. It is focused on the theoretical aspect of the issue and is not, therefore, a substitute for the individual and group constant review of the specifics. On the other hand, the underlying assumptions in any decision-making and value judgments do need to be investigated. The hope is that thereby philosophical thinking has a positive contribution to that task.

28

This point is being made since, as was mentioned earlier, this essay was originally presented as a paper at an international conference in Dublin Castle on the nonmedical use of imaging. 29 Implied consent should not, however, be readily inferred in specific situations as the survey of students shows. Cf. “Students say sexual consent ‘grey area’, Irish Examiner, January 29, 2014. 30 This is a reference to what is known as the “social contract theory” associated with the philosophies of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and more recently, with John Rawls.

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In any consideration of this issue it should not be assumed readily that there is a conflict rather than merely an inevitable tension between individual interests on one hand and public interests on the other. Moreover, conflict arises because of the assumption that these are really separate realities. In contrast, the argument was put forward in this philosophical consideration that if one views the two as an integral reality, that is to say, instead of the individual versus society, then public and individual interests will be seen as distinctive claims rather than opposing ones. To enable us to accept this, it is essential to recognize relatedness as the fundamental consideration rather than individuality or the social grouping. This will help us to appreciate how and why any decision or activity will have an impact on both parties. So while there is no denying that there can be real tension, the change of perspective will open up a different strategy; namely, focusing and acting on whether any decision or activity is in fact good or moral itself. Ultimately, the strategy rests on the value-judgment by the decision-maker or the agent. And that has to be well-informed and sincere. Any consideration of public and individual interests is usually associated with the concept of the common good. It was pointed out here that the commonly-heard references to “sacrificing for the common good” can be misleading, particularly if they are made in the context of calls on the individual or individuals in relation to the bigger grouping. Because many times the emphasis is on “common” rather than on “good”, there is the tendency to see it in terms of quantity rather than quality; that is to say, on number instead of on the standard. Identifying the common good with benefits for the majority (as utilitarians are wont to do) fails to take into account that the individual claim could be right because it is right. In other words, the important point to be considered is whether something is right, not whose interests it serves.31 Sometimes the majority is misguided or simply wrong. And the task may therefore take the form of challenging and correcting it.

31

Again it is essential to bear in mind also that whoever makes the judgment that something is in the public interest or that information be put in the public domain may in fact have other motives.

CHAPTER THREE DISTINCT, NOT SEPARATE: A CRITIQUE OF DUALISTIC THINKING OF AND IN SOCIETY

The Individual in Society We do not have to be reminded that living in society exposes us to a myriad of challenges and issues—we encounter this fact in daily life. These somehow arise in our ordinary routines as well as in various other contexts. Ordinarily, it is a matter of getting on with them, meeting those challenges, and dealing with the issues as best we can. Sometimes we even face them enthusiastically and positively. On the other hand, there are times when they are so overwhelming that we become frustrated or stressed. But matter what situation presents itself, we seem to assume that there is an obvious divide between our own existence and that of society. There are times, however, when these challenges do present themselves to us not as separate individuals but as a society as a whole. Such situations, like the ones we are currently experiencing because of the economic downturn in the world brought about by the activities of a few individuals or the inconvenient airport security arrangements because of the activities of a few terrorists,1 make us wonder and question the traditional relationship between the individual and society. Why does the action of a few impact, negatively in this case, on the rest of us? Why are we saddled with the consequences of the misguided and ill-conceived strategies of a few others to enrich themselves2 or to fight for what many would regard as 1

This is not a comment on the situation created for security reasons but rather on the impact on millions of air passengers throughout the world because of the strategies devised and implemented by a few—which unfortunately remains a viable threat. 2 Such comments have been made by those who believe that they will be burdened –despite honouring their own financial commitments or paying their mortgages—if loans taken out by those who invested in property in Ireland during the boom times

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an ill-informed cause? The realization of the existence of that society even extends farther than our immediate one as we become more and more aware of living in a global society. We certainly feel the reverberations. We are thereby led to believe that there seems to be a greater whole that takes a life of its own and impacts on its components. Somehow, we seem to lose our precious individuality and to lose out to the dominant greater whole.3 The relationship between the individual and society—and how it is perceived and conceived— lies behind many social problems, such as the ones just cited. There are of course several reasons for such problems. But sometimes the tension or conflict arises, as was already noted in passing, because it is justifiably taken for granted that each of us is an individual citizen with individual rights and responsibilities and living with a group of other individuals thus forming the society that we live in. We have separate existences even if we would also readily acknowledge that the group, the community or the society would have its own identity. In fact, it is for this reason that at times there are clashes between specific individuals and society in general. We are then confronted with the question of how to reconcile our individual interests with public or societal interests.4 Sometimes we would even go so far—admittedly, depending on the kind of society that we have in mind—as to stress that each of us has separate personalities which are more fundamental than the group that we belong to.5 Democratic societies would appear to lean towards this view. In such societies recognition and defence of the individual citizen is paramount. From the opposite angle, similar tensions occur when those who despise what has been called “rugged individualism” and its consequences remind us that we should not extol any individual above the rest of society. We are shown the inequalities which result when individuals step on othare not repaid. From their point of view, the idea of a bank write-off is unfair and inequitable. The possibility of a “legacy debt” highlights the issue of the uneven distribution of the burden between individuals and society in a very concrete way. See Chapter Ten: “Economic Crisis and Accountability: A Re-examination of Certain Views and Practices”. 3 A similar sentiment has been felt—and constantly aired—in some EU countries due to the perceived erosion of the country’s national identity because of decisions being made in Brussels on behalf of the European Community. 4 See Chapter Two: “Individual and Public Interests, the Common Good: an Analysis and a Proposal”. 5 Generally, the political system of a country has a bearing on how its citizens view their relationship with their society and vice versa. Sometimes because of contrary views, such as democratic liberalism and socialism/communism, there are clashes even in the same society.

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ers in their efforts to rise above the crowd.6 What seems to be taken for granted here is that individuals exist for society and not the other way around. Totalitarian regimes would definitely endorse such a view. These opposing views are echoed in debates between the defenders of the individual’s fundamental rights versus those of society and the advocates of the responsibilities of members to serve the society that they belong to. One will also find such views articulated in, or at least shown to underpin, various programmes that government and its agencies design for the citizens. Surprisingly, however, despite their divergence in outlook and emphasis, there is a common assumption in these two camps; namely, the separateness of the individual and of society. In both camps the individual is pitted against society and vice-versa. This particular common view on the relationship between the individual and society interprets the uniqueness of each individual to be its separateness from the society of which it is a part. This conception, common in many cultures particularly in the Western hemisphere, may be adequate for ordinary purposes. The claim being made in this essay, however, is that it is really an implicit dualism and that it does need to be investigated much further insofar as it illustrates a way of thinking which can be divisive or at least problematic. It is alleged to be a contributory factor to some of society’s problems. To help us with the task, I will be making use of Charles Hartshorne’s criticisms of such dualistic thinking. I will put forward the view that a re-thinking of the relationship of the individual with society as distinct, rather than separate, will enable us to understand and appreciate the status of the individual without compromising or diminishing it. Moreover, this re-thinking of the relationship between the individual and society can also facilitate—because it is not merely a theoretical construction but a practical strategy— a resolution of some of the challenges that one encounters in living in society. Later in the essay I will be suggesting an alternative conception of society for our further consideration.

Dualistic Thinking But first let us examine dualistic thinking itself, illustrated by the view described above that separates the individual and society, since I 6

One is reminded here of an anecdote that tells of a Chinese visitor to America who commented on one major difference between the two cultures and systems. She was quoted as saying that the American way of life applauds when an individual sticks out his neck to assert his individual rights whereas in China, such an individual would be silenced (have his neck chopped off, figuratively that is)!

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believe that it is quite pervasive, even if not always noticed, in various facets of ordinary life. This way of thinking has been the subject of much debate in philosophical circles. It can be characterized as an either-or mentality permeating certain perspectives and attitudes in society. It is also to some extent detectable, although again not always in an evident way, in prevailing understandings of problematic issues in society. Since, like the philosophical doctrine of dualism it influences the way we respond to social situations, it is worth our while scrutinizing some examples. One prevalent example of this kind of thinking can be seen in the separation of the physical and the mental. While the debate on this issue is mainly at the theoretical level, splitting the physicalists or materialists on the one hand from the idealists or spiritualists on the other, this view is nevertheless evident in people’s day-today attitudes. In fact, materialism, particularly in its extreme form, is not just a point of view; it is also a way of life and is exemplified by the one-sided desire for material possessions and the overpowering push towards meeting physical needs. But such a way of life, despite initial satisfaction, fails to do full justice to the humanity of the person involved insofar as it makes out the human person to be merely a physical entity. Equally, a spirituality that rejects anything smacking of the physical is not just one-sided but is also detrimental since it ignores the reality of the body and its needs. Extreme asceticism, for instance, while it may evince admiration from some, is in the long-run questionable as a truly human way of life.7 Along similar demarcating lines, the human person as seen by extreme atheism and by extreme religiosity suffers from a one-dimensional interpretation of human nature.8 This type of atheism is in fact an off-shoot of secularism which denies completely any transcendence in creation and rejects in an outright manner any religious explanation of it. Accordingly, humans are regarded then as nothing but material or physical entities, and all human functions are explained in the same way. Extreme religiosity for its part completely neglects whatever it is that extreme atheism holds— 7

This criticism should not, however, be taken as extending to monastic or similar ways of life despite phrases used to describe them, such as “withdrawal” or “retreating” from society, since in reality these merely “highlight” or “focus on” a specific aspect of human living, rather than deny it. Focusing on an aspect of human life is not the same as excluding the rest which is what the either-or approach of dualistic thinking is inclined to do. 8 Similarly, the perceived conflict between reason and faith and between religion and science may be traced to the gulf created in one’s thinking to separate these distinct areas. See S. Sia, Religion, Reason and God: Essays in the Philosophies of Charles Hartshorne and A.N. Whitehead (Peter Lang, 2004).

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once again, showing that both ways of thinking are worlds apart. But it too fails to account fully for the nature of human beings. This other-worldly perspective seems blind to the legitimacy of a human person as spatiotemporal reality. Among the population in today’s society it is also rather commonplace to separate the body and the soul/mind, in thought and in practice.9 This unfortunate assumption has resulted in the inability by many to address the true human needs of the person—who is neither simply body nor only soul. These needs include, but are not just limited to, what has become known as physical, like nourishment, but also what is misleadingly labeled as “higher needs”, such as knowledge.10 Some adherents to this separation would even denigrate whatever is seen as satisfying merely the senses, appetites or physical desires. Others, in contrast, would reject any hankering after spiritual needs. Contrary to what both groupings would hold, however, such separation and hierarchical order actually fail to do justice to the human person who is a unity rather than a unified being. Again the separation of body and mind becomes evident in the way traditional medicine sometimes casts aside psychology when dealing with illnesses. The reverse is also true with a purely psychological approach. What is essentially merely a conceptual distinction—as Hartshorne has argued—is made into an actual reality. If there is indeed a strict separation between the two disciplines, then there are the two unrelated treatments of the human person as patient—which can be detrimental, one focusing only on the physical health, the other only on the mental well-being. As a way of correcting this prevailing view, there have been calls for a more holistic approach to illness of every type and for more social skills on the part of carers in all fields.11 The call is a timely reminder that it is patients, who are human beings, and not merely the illnesses that need the treatment.12 The same message must also be relayed to those whose concern is the 9

This claim is not a denial of the existence of the spiritual side of humans but a comment on how it has been conceptualized—employing certain philosophical doctrines. 10 An interesting development, relevant to this point, is that in the last few years cognitive psychologists now accept that we think with our bodies, and not just with our brains. 11 This comment should not be taken to be an endorsement of non-traditional ways of healing patients. What is being considered here is a holistic approach—that can also be seen now in some medical practices and approaches carried out in the traditional way. 12 This is illustrated in the work of Dr. Mark Rowe. See his The Men’s Health Book (Dublin: Orpen Press, 2009.

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mental state of individuals. While we have become more aware of how biological and emotional disorders affect our mental health, we do not always appreciate how the mind too has a tangible effect on our bodies. Arguably, the most common separation of society that we have become familiar with is the so-called separation of Church and State. Given that it has become an established tradition, this is an issue that definitely deserves a more thorough discussion than is possible here.13 But it does exemplify a certain viewpoint that can also be described as dualistic. Admittedly, it is a view that has served us relatively well. It has ensured the recognition in our society of specific legitimate boundaries to Church and State in our thinking and in our practice.14 In fact, one could even argue that forging policies which keep a respectable distance from those of the other body enable and even establish communication between them. In fact, when these boundaries are blurred or even broken down there are problems which beset society—both history and our present times attest to that fact. But while indeed the term “separation” can be a useful description—with the consequent notable demarcation lines—it can be less helpful when it leads to, as often it unfortunately does, hard-line separateness and divisive territorial claims. Dualistic thinking, it seems, keeps them apart. It can even promote antipathy and hostility between the two.15 And yet both State and Church after all serve the same society of human beings even if they do not have exactly the same constituents. That service by

13

On a related point, an interesting and comprehensive case is made by Brendan Sweetman in his Why Politics Needs Religion: The Place of Religious Arguments in the Public Square (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2006). 14 A similar observation could be made here regarding the so-called separation of powers, for example, between the government and the judiciary or within the branches of government. Again, the concept and practice of separation of powers have advantages and usefulness. However, it is so entrenched that any questioning by one of the other power is seen as unjustified and unjustifiable encroachment. On the other hand, such an observation reflects a confusion between “separation of powers” and “division of labour”. The latter, which is non-dualistic thinking, respects respective areas of responsibility and reminds all those concerned that the real aim is to serve society rather than to guard jealously respective territories. 15 Necessary and crucial boundaries can be set, but they need not be insurmountable walls which keep the terrains apart but rather fences which designate recognizable areas. They retain their distinctiveness. One can feel safe and secure in one’s area yet have the possibility of communication and cooperation with the other—of “leaning over to the other side,” as it were. On this point Robert Frost’s “Mending Wall” can provide a qualified but illuminating insight.

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each institution16--which should be distinguished since each has its own goals and particular context—has its own specified place in the development of society as a whole.17.

Dualistic Thinking and Social Problems Dualistic thinking can also be detected in certain approaches to social problems. It has of course to be admitted that there are a number of reasons for or causes of these problems, and it would be simplistic to believe that a non-dualistic way of understanding these would be sufficient to solve or even minimize these. Sociology and related disciplines attest to their complexity, and it would be foolhardy to ignore it. Nevertheless, it would still be of some benefit, given the aim of this essay, to examine also some of these in terms of the assumed dualism that underlies both the understanding of and the approach to them. The trend to separate or split reality into components, as is done in dualistic thinking, rather than to distinguish or highlight aspects or dimensions of the same reality puts these into opposition with each other. Separatism, which embodies such thinking, can lead to discriminating by one of the other. This observation should not be interpreted to mean, however, that separation or division itself is suspect since there are often excellent reasons for doing do. But it is the thinking that underlies this way of viewing social problems that is under scrutiny here inasmuch as separatism in society does often result in segregation, apartheid, discrimination and elitism.18 Separatism in thought and in practice simply accepts that reality itself is composed of separate realities and split-up groups, for example, because of race or gender. This is of course in accord with our common observation of the make-up of society. But when the separateness becomes the criterion or the focus, as is done in separatism, then it becomes ques16

The reference to Church here is to the external organization, rather than to the religious community that it ministers to. The latter is a living body that is nourished by its own set of beliefs and practices. 17 This does not by any means entail that every member of that society should recognize both of them as necessarily having a claim on him or her. It simply means that there are two distinct “agencies” with respective claims to and responsibilities for those whom they serve. 18 Discriminations occur in various other areas and not just in racial and sexist situations. There are discriminatory attitudes and practices based on age, sexual orientation, religion, mental and physical abilities and so on. Separate education, in different forms, can also promote elitism and isolationism despite acceptable results in the formation of students.

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tionable as it can harden into inimical attitudes towards those different from one.19 When society is divided according to race, colour or gender and these become the basis for the individual’s or society’s response then the result is very much a skewed view of the human person. Racism excludes those from another race or of a different skin colour precisely because they are different.20 Sexism ignores the humanity of the individual or of the group while tilting its view towards gender—which is an important aspect naturally but not the main one. Noting and capitalizing on the differences in race or gender is thus a questionable initial step for one’s decision or action.21 Ironically, a related observation can be made on the otherwise laudable attempts to overcome or combat racism and sexism. Often there is talk of integration or representation or of having “gender balance”. Efforts, many of them quite commendable, are continuously being made to bring such disparate individuals or groups together, the idea being to have a more unified kind of society. Although one should not minimize the positive results, these efforts still show dualistic thinking. Integration after all assumes that there are separate realities which are being brought together. Representation by segregated individuals or parties, whether because of colour or gender, attempts to strike a balance. But once again, the assumption—which is what is also being questioned—is that the difference between them is what identifies them. Effort is thus made to rectify the imbalance. But regrettably, this is to perpetuate the assumed or obvious separation. Furthermore, the focus on balance becomes a numerical issue as 19 Separatism that is human-made, such as the divide between the two extremes of people caused by the unequal distribution of wealth, should not just be condemned but eliminated. 20 Segregation, whether in social life or education, creates problems which sometimes do not erupt until much later, whether spontaneously as a response to specific incidents or planned as in organized protests. Contemporary society, as well as history, regrettably bears this out. 21 Along similar lines, one will also notice the idea of separateness lurking in the minds of those who defend nationalistic interests or who insist on exclusive social arrangements for a particular country as heard in the debates raging over protecting national interests against the encroachments of the European Community (represented by Brussels). In some countries, including present-day Africa, it has led to the tribalism which has resulted in violent clashes and even alleged genocide. It can also be identified as being one of the contributory factors in hostile attitudes towards the vulnerable, the poor, those with special needs and others. One also suspects that separatism has resulted in ageism, homophobia, and other discriminatory social practices

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can be seen in the call for a so-called “gender quota”. It can also be a matter of appearances which is rather a form of tokenism and can even lead to reverse discrimination—which in turn raises some ethical problems. Instead, what we need to recognize, accept and value are the distinctive contributions that can be made and have been made arising from the differences in gender, culture and other similar basis.22 To summarize, what needs to be done is to discard that assumption of separateness and not to perpetuate that way of thinking. The differences between races and genders are no doubt real and must be respected, but if one adopts the view that they are correlatives, rather than opposites, one will begin to value the distinctiveness of each of the parties without debasing either of them or overlooking their differences. While there are various causes of racism and sexism, one significant consideration that deserves society’s considerable attention is to what extent the colour of the skin and the gender of the individual really matter as a starting point. After all, the essential thing is the humanity of each of us and the skin colour or the gender of the individuals is not what we are essentially. Our human nature is our common ground. In our dealings in society it should be the fundamental issue. We can then appreciate our differences from one another, including in our ethnicity, race, and gender as these can make distinctive and even distinguished contributions to society.

Non-Fragmentation of Reality, Asymmetry and Symmetry In order to advance this consideration of dualistic thinking in society and its implications, we will turn to Charles Hartshorne’s philosophy for some support.23 Hartshorne stresses that the fragmentation of reality as well as any dichotomization in any of its levels—which is what dualistic thinking does—has significant repercussions on our considerations about reality itself as well as on our membership in society. Critical of dualism, he provides the metaphysical and logical underpinnings of the alternative: 22

In this respect, affirmative action, despite some problems, is a more positive way of addressing this issue insofar as proactive steps are being taken to acknowledge these distinctive contributions. This observation may strike others as a mere quibble, but it seems to me that at least affirmative action is reflective of non-dualistic thinking compared to gender quota. 23 This section—an edited version of Chapter 5 from a book co-authored with Ferdinand Santos, Personal Identity, the Self and Ethics (St. Martin’s/Macmillan, 2007)—has been inserted specifically to provide a more advanced discussion of non-dualistic thinking.

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the non-fragmentation of reality and non-dualistic thinking. Furthermore, to overcome it, he puts forward the suggestion that we need to conceive and describe reality in an asymmetrical rather than symmetrical way. This suggested way of viewing reality enables us to see how the different aspects or dimension of the one reality can nevertheless be described in distinctive terms and how these terms relate to each other. One example of the fragmentation of reality that Hartshorne provides is the absolute break made, in the thinking of various quarters, between human and non-human reality. Instead, he interprets the whole of reality as a continuous spectrum of complexity in organisms, from the hypothetical superhuman to human beings down to the one-celled amoeba and even further. In conjunction with a number of authors, Hartshorne supports the evolutionary viewpoint which regards human reality as continuous with that reality out of which it has evolved.24 Another example he gives is the relationship between humans themselves. According to Hartshorne, separating them as individuals leads to egoism which he holds to be an inadequate regard for the other inasmuch as it seeks to find its origin and justification in a love of oneself.25 In contrast, he maintains that interest in others is basically altruistic since, in his view, self-love and love of others are in reality alike.26 Hartshorne regards love as the most fundamental principle.27 For him, love-of-neighbour means, not so much that one must be concerned for the other in the same way that one shows concern for one’s self, but that one is concerned for

24

See: J.C. Polkinghorne, “A Revived Natural Theology,” Science and Religion: One World Changing Perspectives. Papers presented at the Second European Conference on Science and Religion. eds., Jan Fennema and Iain Paul (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990), pp. 87-97; Ian G. Barbour, “Attitudes toward Nature and Technology,” Earth Might Be Fair: Reflections on Ethics, Religion, and Ecology, ed., Ian G. Barbour (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972), pp. 146-68; Arthur Peacocke, Intimations of Reality: Critical Realism in Science and Religion (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984). 25 Cf. Charles Hartshorne, “Some Not Ungrateful but Perhaps Inadequate Comments on Comments on my Writings and Ideas,” Process Studies, XXI, 2 (Summer 1992), p. 127. 26 Cf. Charles Hartshorne, “Beyond Enlightened Self-Interest,” Process Philosophy: Basic Writings, eds., J.R. Sibley and P.A.Y. Gunter (New York: University Press of America, 1978), p.397. Reprinted in: Mohammad Valady, ed., The Zero Fallacy and Other Essays in Neoclassical Philosophy (Chicago and LaSalle, Illinois, Open Court, 1997), pp. 185-202. 27 Hartshorne, “Some not Ungrateful but Perhaps Inadequate Comments,” op. cit., p. 127.

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the other as oneself because one’s self is first and foremost an other.28 Hartshorne thus gives no privileged metaphysical basis for self-interest in his philosophy.29 He sees no disjunction between love for others and love for oneself. Still another example is in the area of psychology. Hartshorne’s theory of perception refuses to admit any dichotomization which effectively endorses quantitative entities to the neglect of important features of experience and perception. Hartshorne rejects the bifurcation of nature into matter and mind. In place of these he argues first of all that no percepta lie outside the boundaries of nature.30 He also argues that no concrete entity, no actual existent, can be regarded as incapable of even the most primitive type of experience.31 Thus, Hartshorne endorses a view of reality as an unbroken and seamless whole.32 To explain the logic behind his claim of the non-fragmentation of reality, Hartshorne explains that, despite its usage in common parlance, a simple view of complementarity between the two aspects or dimensions of the one reality will not be sufficient. He states that merely correlating experienced object to experiencing subject, for instance, is inadequate to provide a viable solution to the difficulties that arise on account of the bifurcation of nature and the disconnectedness of experience. Instead he 28

This claim is discussed more fully in Chapter Five: “The Individual and Society: a Philosophical Conception of Self as Social”. 29 Charles Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method (London: SCM Press1970), p.191; also p.198. The obstacle to obeying the Great Commandment, Hartshorne insists, is “not metaphysical or absolute, but psychological and relative”. 30 Cf. Charles Hartshorne, Beyond Humanism: Essays in the New Philosophy of Nature (Chicago: Willet, Clark and Company, 1937), pp. 121-22. The very possibility of understanding non-human nature by taking human reality as the point of departure is based on this notion. 31 CSPM, op. cit., pp. 49-50. The total absence of experience is an instance of what Hartshorne terms the “zero fallacy”. Zero, he says, is an unthinkable extreme. It may indeed be a quantity, but with one exception, “an unobservable one”. He insists further that “only where there is abrupt discontinuity can one observe a pure absence. Thus the zero of elephants in a room is observable because nothing else is much like an elephant, and the smallest elephant is still observably large. But natural laws of the kind required to predict what happens involve continuous variables, e.g. velocity, acceleration, angle of incidence. Observations of values under these variables are at best approximate.” Charles Hartshorne, Wisdom as Moderation: A Philosophy of the Middle Way (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1987), p. 98. 32 Charles Hartshorne, Beyond Humanism: Essays in the New Philosophy of Nature (Chicago: Willet, Clark and Company, 1943), pp. 169-70.

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appeals to the method of regarding metaphysical contraries as asymmetrical concepts. What we are seeing here is the unfolding of Hartshorne's theory of relations. He maintains that, taken simply by themselves, metaphysical contraries are symmetrically related. However, this binary relation is itself contained in a triad, namely, the relation between the two terms and the proposition produced by their combination. This is where asymmetry can be a more helpful explanation. To understand what Hartshorne means, one has to consider not only relations of comparison such as equality, likeness, and difference but also relations of existential connectedness such as effect and cause, experience and object experienced, succeeding events and their predecessors. Relations of comparison are directionless and, hence symmetrical. With regard to relations of existential and dynamic connectedness, however, the basic idea is directional. The mere juxtaposition of contrary concepts, i.e. their simple comprehension in terms of equality, puts them in no ordered relation to each other. This renders their defining power negligible since a relation which expresses mere equivalence yields no more than an idle symmetrical tautology.33 In contrast, a symmetrical relation which is comprehended within an overall asymmetry possesses the highest defining power. For although two propositions taken as equivalent are related symmetrically, taken as a triad (the two propositions plus the compound proposition which results from their combination), the conjunction is less symmetrical. Now if negation were added to the conjunction, what results is a proposition with the highest defining power. Symmetry within an overall asymmetry, Hartshorne believes, is a paradigm for metaphysics. Thus comprehensive asymmetry, i.e. directional order which embraces symmetry as its subordinate concept, is what we must look for in basic concepts. He therefore decries the fact that philosophy has, for so long, regarded symmetry as the basic concept, as in dualism. For instance, he criticizes Hume's dictum, “What is distinguishable is separable”, as a blurring together of a non-directional relation of comparison with an asymmetric relation of existential dependence. Two terms X and XY (a whole containing X plus an additional factor) are distinguishable. However, while X may in some cases be separable from XY, the latter term can never be separated from X. The dependence is not bi-directional. If we had a term X, we will not necessarily have a term XY; but if we had XY, there is simply no way that we will not have X. Symmetrical separability by no means follows from distinguishability.

33

CSPM, op. cit., pp. 206-207.

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Hartshorne does grant that Hume was right in holding that an X separable from XY, which in this case denotes X plus something additional, is simpler than XY. And indeed Hume assumes that the entities to which his maxim is to be applied are equally simple. Successive “impressions” or events are not related as x and xy.34 Impressions for Hume are either simple or complex. If the first, then no other ideas can be entailed by them; if the second, however, they are distinguishable into parts. Thus, to be distinct in this case means to be separable. However, Hartshorne argues that there are basically two types of separability and only the disjunction of the two coincides with distinguishability:35 A later event is related to its predecessor by its inseparability from the earlier event, while a preceding event is related to its successor by its separability from this successor-event.36 The later event had obviously not yet been actualized when the earlier one occurred; this makes for the independence of the predecessor-event. When the second event comes to pass, however, the earlier one being already in existence, the synthesis of earlier and later can no longer be undone. There is thus no possibility of separation—and no empirical proof of such, at least not in this direction. The observation of an event as it takes place happens in a proper temporal order. The future cannot be observed as already completed; this is the realm of the past. The future is the domain of events anticipated, a realm influenced by the past in a way far stronger than the influence going in the reverse direction.37 This, according to Hartshorne, is especially evident in

34

Cf. Ibid. pp. 211-12. “Suppose event E' follows event E; they are then not identical, not one but two events. However, in which of two very different senses are they separable? (a) One of the two, say E, could have occurred alone, but not vice versa (not E' without E); or (b) either event could have occurred alone. A whole, say XY, is inseparable from either one of its parts, X or Y, but X might occur though XY did not. This illustrates separability in sense (a). Similarly, a set of premises is in its truth inseparable from that of an entailed consequence, but the latter could be true though the conjunct of the premises were false. Here again we have one-way inseparability, together with distinguishability. (For the truth of the conclusion is not identical with that of the set of premises).” Charles Hartshorne, Insights and Oversights of Great Thinkers: an Evaluation of Western Philosophy (Albany: S.U.N.Y Press, 1983), p, 139. 36 At this point, the word “event” is employed in its usual sense, i.e. something that “takes place”. The other sense, peculiar to Hartshorne's philosophy, is “ultimate units of reality”, although this specific Hartshornean sense is already implied in our usage. 37 IO, op.cit., p. 139. 35

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the case of memory.38 For what is shown, contrary to the Humean maxim, is that later experiences refer back to and are complicated by experiences which have come before in a way unmatched by the forward reference that characterizes anticipation. What is future is merely a rough blueprint, while what is past is made up of events irrevocable to the last item.39 Symmetry discloses a lack of order; its simplicity is deceptive.40 X simply equal to Y puts neither X nor Y in a definite order relative to each other.41 Even human beings, Hartshorne holds, are not all strictly equal in any factual sense. Concreteness always means contrast. To know simply that Frankie and Charlie are friends does not ipso facto disclose anything as to who is the friendlier, kinder, or more understanding one. And this contrast cannot but exist. For they cannot be equal in terms of friendliness nor in other aspects, such as intelligence, looks, creativity, and so on. The contrast is concrete; but the contrast of Frankie with Charlie cannot be same as the contrast of Charlie with Frankie, as this can only be the case in the limiting and scarcely realizable instance of perfect balance. It is only by means of abstraction that this symmetrical notion can be obtained. Hartshorne's intention is not to depreciate the value of symmetry. Indeed, he says it has its indispensable place.42 But given the witness of both ordinary human experience as well as formal logic, he holds that symmetry is, in a certain technical sense, secondary to asymmetry and is indeed contained in it. Symmetrical cases are derivatives of asymmetrical ones and are therefore inexplicable solely on their own terms.43 In short, symmetry is a special case, not the general principle.44 This reference to Hartshorne’s philosophy is intended to show that the rejection of dualistic thinking—the focus of this essay—can be supported by a certain logic. As we have seen, in its place Hartshorne insists on the non-fragmentation of reality and puts forward non-dualistic thinking backed up by the notion of asymmetry. Since he claims this to be more viable—with practical implications for our life in society, among others— this makes him critical of certain descriptions of reality, including a socalled commonsense view of the relationship between individual and society.

38

CSPM, op. cit., p. 212. BH, op. cit., p. 136. 40 IO, op. cit., p. 165. 41 CSPM, op. cit., p. 221. 42 Ibid. p. 219. 43 Ibid. p. 215. 44 Ibid. p. 205. 39

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But, given the main topic of this essay, is there an alternative conception of society? Can one demonstrate another way of depicting society and its members? How would the individual feature in its relationship to the body of which it is a part? In the next section, we will examine such a conception known as “corporate personality”.

Corporate Personality45 The notion of corporate personality, a cultural pattern of thinking prevalent among ancient Semites, represents a different understanding of the status of society in relation to its members. It may be unfamiliar to many but quite pervasive, even if unexamined, in other cultures. This notion of corporate personality may even seem strange to many of us since our way of thinking has been conditioned to a large extent, even if not always directly, by Greek thought-patterns compounded by Cartesian dualism. Because of their considerable influence, sometimes unnoticed, often we overlook the fact that there may have been other ways of thinking. What may seem to us obvious may not after all be the only way of viewing and describing reality. Society as corporate personality is one such example. As has already been noted, dualistic thinking regards a human being as an entity composed of body and soul. A clear demarcation line can be drawn between the two: the soul is not the body, and the body is not the soul. One is spiritual while the other is physical.46 In ancient Semitic thinking, however, such a separation is simply not made: a human being is not a composite made of a soul encased in a body, but is a living being, primarily that by which he or she experiences others through sight, touch and hearing and all that this involves in the way of motion, emotion, perception and capabilities. Similarly, for many of us the individual’s relationship to society— because we take it for granted that the individual and society are different and separate— leads to questions such as: Does the individual exist for society or society for the individual? What rights does a member have which a group cannot side-step without committing an injustice to him or her? Such questions, however, seem not to have bothered the ancient Hebrews. They seem to have been content to dwell on the group without 45

The discussion here on “corporate personality” is a condensation of H. Wheeler Robinson’s work, Corporate Personality in Ancient Israel Biblical Series, Vol. XI (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1964). 46 See note 8.

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questioning the relationship between it and their—as, in accordance with our way of thinking, we would say—separate personalities. For the ancient Hebrews the group had a more extensive membership than simply the traditional family as we know it today.47 They counted as belonging to the group not only the present members but also the past and the future. For example, the concept of family was extended to include its ancestors who may have lived hundreds of years ago. This is best expressed in phrases scattered in the Old Testament about “being gathered to one’s fathers, or going to one’s fathers or to one’s kindred.” The memory of their forefathers was very intimately linked to the lives of the living members. Amos, for instance, could address his contemporaries in the eighth century as still “the whole family which I brought up out of the land of Egypt,” (Amos 3:1) since they were both its representatives and its actual constituents. Similarly, the living members of the group could count as part of its unity future members. This is best expressed in the dominant aspiration of the Hebrew, in ancient times, to have male children to perpetuate his name, the name that was so much part of himself that something of him died when his name ceased. Just as the memory of the dead members were so much a part of the lives of those living, so too was the name that would be borne by the future members of the group. Thus, to have no male children was indeed a mighty misfortune. For the Hebrews then the family was made up of a whole line of ancestors and heirs besides those who were actually present. What Robert Smith said of a living family should therefore be understood as extending both to the past as well as to the future: “A kin was a group of persons whose lives were so bound up together, in what must be called a physical unity, that they could be treated as parts of one common life. The members of one kindred looked on themselves as one living whole, a single animated mass of blood, flesh and bones, of which no member could be touched without all the members

47 This understanding can also be noted in some Asian and African ways of thinking. In his Elements of Filipino Philosophy (Tacloban: Divine Word Publications, 1974), p. i, Leonardo Mercado writes that “…Filipino’s worldview is nondualistic…wants to harmonize the object and the subject while at the same time holding both as distinct.” He shows these to be the case in various aspects of Filipino philosophy. See also his Applied Filipino Philosophy (Tacloban, Divine Word Publications, 1977). A useful discussion of African thought can be found in Henry Odera Oruka, Sage Philosophy: Indigenous Thinkers and Modern Debate on African Philosophy (Nairobi: African Center for Technological Studies; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1990).

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suffering.”48 Along such lines, then, the corporate personality of the family, the clan and the people was conceived realistically as a unity. Each of these was a much bigger grouping than ours would be. This Hebrew conception of corporate personality cannot be considered as a literary personification or merely an ideal. It is an instinctive rather than a consciously-made unification. On the other hand, this unity is so realistically conceived that it can be concentrated into a single representative figure. This relationship between corporate personality and the individual personality can be traced in the psychological ideas of the Hebrews. For them, personality consisted of a number of bodily organs animated by the breath-soul and each possessing a diffused and distributed psychical and ethical quality. It is precisely the same idea which belongs to the unity of the group. The group possesses a consciousness which is distributed amongst the individual members and does not exist simply as a figure of speech or an idea. This conception of corporate personality affected the whole relation of the Israelites with one another as well as their relation to Yahweh. The high purpose of the group was articulated by a minority within it, sometimes a minority of one. Yet the same one or two remained the representatives of the group. The representatives or representative were considered as voicing out the sentiments of each member of that group. This was especially true with the prophets. A prophet was a man of God, but he truly represented his people. When he went to meet Yahweh, it was Israel meeting its God. And whatever message Yahweh handed to him, it was always intended for the whole people. The mission of the prophet was always collective, even if his experience of Yahweh was individual. And any covenant Yahweh made with him was a covenant made with the people, not with the individual, except as a member or representative of the nation. It is the group which occupies the foreground of thought and feeling since Yahweh is always the covenanted God of Israel. This way of thinking applied not just to the prophets but also to each of them, who was, in a certain sense, a “prophet”. The corporate personality of Israel could not stand in right relation to God unless it approached God in the unity of internal and individual fellowship. There was then that mingling of duty and love which springs directly from the conception of common ties and expands to include and regulate the conception of Yahweh’s relations to Israel, so uniting morality and religion in the most characteristic feature of all Israel’s development. True individuality was seen 48

W. Robertson Smith, Lectures on the Religion of the Semites (new ed. Rev.: London: A. and C. Black, 1894), pp. 273-4. Quoted by H.W. Robinson, op.cit., p. 4. Donne expresses this point poetically as “no man is an island”.

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to be grounded solely in the indivisible responsibility of each man to God. It rested in the uniqueness of the divine word or call to everyone which demanded from him an inalienable response. As can be concluded from these lines, even with so strong a group consciousness, the ancient Hebrews were also aware of an individual relation with Yahweh. This is especially true during the later period with the emergence of the prophetic consciousness. As H. Wheeler Robinson explains, “It would be wrong to suppose that in the earlier period of Israel’s history, for example, there was little or no consciousness of the individual; the point is rather that the individual then was more conscious of being one of the group. It would be equally wrong to suppose that, in the later period, the greater sense of individuality altogether excluded the consciousness of membership in a corporate unity.” 49 Now his flesh-body was not portioned off from his neighbour; it was rather what bound him in the bundle of life with all and with nature, so that he could never make his unique answer to God as an isolated individual apart from his relation to his neighbour. His neighbour was a unique message of Yahweh for him. It was Yahweh revealing himself through his neighbour. Thus, his thinking was done, as it were, in the vertical dimension of man’s relatedness to God as a creature and a fallen creature. The ancient Hebrews never abstracted the individual from this relationship and set that individual upon a pedestal apart from not just fellow humans but also the rest of creation. One finds one’s personality and achieves true existence in the corporate personality.

Lines of Thought It has already been admitted that the notion of corporate personality may be alien to the thinking of many in today’s individualistic and competitive society. Thus, we need to clarify it more so as to contrast it with dualistic thinking which was claimed in this essay to facilitate and even encourage individualism and competitiveness although at times implicitly. Certain lines of thought emerge from this conception of society as corporate personality. An immediate clarification is in place since an initial reaction is to associate the notion of corporate personality with a type of group mentality. Indeed the notion of corporate personality does not just focus on the group itself as constituted by its members but it also accepts the reality of that grouping to such an extent that it is given more prominence than the individuals which comprise it. It has a status that somehow takes over 49

Ibid. pp. 22-23.

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from that of the members. It is recognized as having a distinct personality. In other words, what matters is the group rather than the individual members. Given this association, therefore, one would be inclined to dismiss the notion of corporate personality outright since such group mentality could easily slip into collectivism, with all its disastrous implications and consequences. Collectivism—a form of which we have witnessed, with much regret, in contemporary times in some political systems—has rightly been criticized because it neglects the individual or sacrifices the members to the so-called good of the whole. Furthermore, it was stressed that collectivism as a way of thinking and living absolves any individual of responsibility since the collective group has been given not just the authority but also the charge over the members. An immediate and notable criticism then is that corporate personality is indeed tantamount to group mentality or collectivism. The criticism is understandable, but it neglects to take into account that the notion of corporate personality does not actually disregard the individual’s distinctiveness, merely its separate existence from society. It illustrates very well the significance of distinguishing, rather than separating, aspects or dimensions of reality. The criticism itself is reflective of the common view of the relationship between the individual and society, which as has been noted previously has been subjected to Hartshorne’s critique of dualistic thinking and the fragmentation of reality. It bears repetition that the notion of corporate personality does not reject personal responsibility. If anything, responsibility of each member of society has been widened rather than weakened or removed.50 In fact, awareness of being an integral member of society, rather than a detached individual merely interacting with it, heightens the need to take more seriously the value of one’s status and one’s relatedness. It makes more explicit the point that personal responsibility is ultimately to the entire social reality inasmuch as whatever one does has a bearing on the welfare of the whole. Furthermore, society’s well-being or the deterioration of its moral fibre affects everyone.51 It may be remarked further that the notion of corporate personality wipes out the uniqueness of the individual thereby debasing the person. If this were true, that would indeed be doing violence to specific individuals 50

An important corollary to this notion of responsibility is its extension over time, thus raising the question of how to address the so-called “sins of the fathers”. See note 103, Chapter Five: “The Individual and Society: a Philosophical Conception of the Self as Social”, p. 103. 51 Cf. Chapter Nine: “Social Roles, Public Office and Moral Society: Lessons from the Past for the Present?”

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or would entail the suppression of individual rights. This criticism is significant as unfortunately history bears it out, particularly when society subsumes its members as in done in collectivism. But that would be true only if the notion of corporate personality is actually equated with a particular social or political system that is repressive and oppressive. It should not be. “Corporate” does not entail any particular system and should therefore not be confused with any particular political set-up. It is a way of thinking. As such, corporate personality in fact enhances the importance of each member since each one actually embodies the whole community—as the notion of prophet brings out. Furthermore, any violence to or dehumanizing of any member is truly doing the same to the rest. It diminishes the very make-up of society itself, and not just any of its members.52 That is a significant consideration for every member of society. Membership in society is a personal and a communal privilege and responsibility. The notion of corporate personality exemplifies the possibility of thinking of one’s membership in society in a non-dualistic way. In another essay in this volume we will look more closely at the logical and metaphysical ramifications of such a view and will return to Hartshorne’s asymmetrical description of reality.53 The aim of the present essay was to point out that our dualistic way of thinking, both implicit and explicit, does have implications for the way we regard society and one another and how we approach some of the challenges of living in society. While admitting that these challenges are quite complex and are attributable to a number of factors and causes, it nevertheless argued that an important consideration is precisely the need to investigate underlying assumptions.

52 See Chapter Two: “Public and Individual Interests, the Common Good: an Analysis and a Proposal”. 53 See Chapter Five: “The Individual and Society: A Philosophical Conception of Self as Social”. It is not primarily about the notion of corporate personality but a further discussion of Hartshorne’s metaphysics as it applies to such a notion.

CHAPTER FOUR RELATIONSHIPS AND COMMUNAL LIVING: A VIEW ON TYPES OF RELATIONSHIPS

Living in Society, Living in Relationships One feature of living in society is that all of us are involved—in one way or another, spontaneously or cultivated, personal or professional—in a network of relationships. This is true whether it is in the context of family life, friendships, the social milieu, the workplace and so on. We also find ourselves inescapably part of the larger context of society, in particular or in general, to which we are bound. Moreover, we are regularly reminded by a growing number of concerned groupings of our intimate connection and indebtedness to the environment and to nature in general. All of these relationships—even if not always uppermost in people’s minds— have existed so long as humans have reason to interact with one another and with the universe. Nowadays, however, what is becoming quite commonplace is a different kind of relationship, popularly known as “social networking”. While the experience of networking itself, particularly in a social or professional sense, has been common practice, the new phenomenon of social networking has been brought about by the tremendous developments in technology and the communications media. One does not have to be in physical contact with the other party or have developed some familiarity with each other to have some kind of relationship. In fact, there could be great geographical distance separating the two. Moreover, the relationship is immediately built up, simply because of the ease of communication. The possibilities opened up by Facebook and Skype, for instance, are unbelievable and staggering. The labels “neighbour” or “friend” take on a different connotation.1

1 See Chapter Seven: “Images, Reality and Truth: Some Philosophical Considerations”.

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Because relationships are truly an integral feature of life in society, we would do well to pay particular attention to the type of relationships that will enrich our individual and communal lives. At the same time, we need to avoid, or at least minimize, those that will harm them, particularly in the light of the threats and abuses that one hears nowadays about these newer forms of relating to one another. In this essay, I will draw on the philosophy of Martin Buber. He was well-known for providing welcome insights into the challenges of daily life—“hallowing everyday life”, as he puts it. Furthermore, his philosophical legacy has contributed greatly to philosophical thinking on the concept of relationship and distinguishing between types of relatedness.

The Human Person and Relationships A human being, according to Martin Buber, is essentially a related subject. As human beings, he explains, we do not engage only in activities which have a thing for an object. That is to say, we do not just do something, think of something, or feel something; we also have activities which establish relationships. Thus, for instance, we can feel a certain kinship with another person so that he or she becomes “part of ourselves and enters into our very lives.” In this particular activity, something takes place not only in us, but between us and the other. This existential experience of ours serves as the starting point for Buber for formulating the categories of “I-Thou” and “I-It”. For him, this state of relatedness is an existential reality such that the human person is said not to exist, except as related. For this reason Buber describes relation as a primary word. The categories of I-Thou and I-It always exist as combined words and are meant to differentiate the two kinds of relatedness. Moreover, the I of the I-Thou relation is different from the I of the I-It. The human person has a two-fold attitude: the attitude of the I-Thou and that of the I-It. Correspondingly, the world is also two-fold in that we can approach the same world in two diverse ways: as a Thou or simply as an It. If one approaches it as an It, one is doing so from a vantage point. This means that only part of one’s being is involved in the meeting, something is kept outside of the relation. One does not completely reach out to the world which remains a detached object.2 On the other hand, if one says 2

As Buber himself puts it: “He perceives what exists round him—simply things, and beings as things; and what happens round about him—simply events, and actions and events; things consisting of qualities, events of moments; things entered in the graph of place, events in that of time; things and events bounded by other things and events, measured by them, comparable with them: he perceives an or-

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Thou to the world, one’s whole being is involved, and one does not withhold oneself in the relationship. The world is addressed with one’s whole being, without any defences set up to block the I from the world. This world to which we can be related in two different ways consists of things, people and spiritual beings.3 Since it is manifold, our relationship—although we can have the same I-Thou relationship with any of them—takes place in three spheres. In our life with nature, there is not much of a relation yet. Even when it is addressed as Thou, there seems to be no mutuality since nature does not seem to respond.4 But in our relationships with other humans, there can be full relationship for there can be mutuality inasmuch as we can give and accept the Thou. In this relationship speech or the spoken word plays a dominant part. The same is not the case in our relation with spiritual beings since we perceive no Thou although we can sense that we are addressed and we answer—forming, thinking, acting—not with the use of verbal speech but with our being. Focusing on our relationships with fellow humans, Buber maintains that we can be interested in a man and woman because they are aggressive or domestic, because they are social or reserved, because they are handsome or unassuming. Our interest in them is based on qualities which appeal to us as if they were a package of attractive and desirable qualities. But we also find ourselves open to accept the other person in his or her wholeness, seeking the other’s self, that which makes the other this particular individual person. We accept them for what they are. Because we long for the other to become present to us as “person”, going out as we to the other, choosing and recognizing us as we do them, we can be related to them in an I-Thou relationship. We may speak to them vocally or we may not, but we instinctively want to meet that other with our whole selves. We yearn to be more total in our response, to be able to bring everything that we are and are capable of into this encounter. There is evidently a basic difference in this second kind of relationship. According to Buber, the other “is not He or She, bounded from every other He or She, a specific point in space and time within the net of the world; nor is he or she a nadered and detached world…. It is your object, remains it as long as you wish, and remains a total stranger, within you and without.” Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. R. Gregor Smith, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1966), pp. 31-32. 3 In the original German edition of the I and Thou, the phrase is geistige Wesenheiten which R.G. Smith has translated as “spiritual beings”. I and Thou, op.cit., p. xi. 4 Buber’s view would coincide with the common view. However, increasingly, one wonders whether nature does respond in its own way—as environmentalists and nature lovers have been saying.

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ture able to be experienced and described, a loose bundle of named qualities.”5 He continues, “But with no neighbour, and whole in himself, he or she is Thou and fills the heavens. This does not mean that nothing exists except himself/herself. But all else lives in their light.”6 This person who has become a Thou for us is not relegated to a mere content or object of our knowledge. This Thou is no longer just one among other things of the universe; instead, the whole universe is seen in the light of the Thou and not the Thou in the light of the universe. The other’s qualities count but not in a necessary way for as Thou it is his or her wholeness, the fact that he or she is, which confronts us. It is a fundamentally different kind of relationship from the I-It: it is the I-Thou The I-Thou relationship, being a direct one, exists in the present7 and is continuous and enduring. Buber explains that the I in this type of relatedness does not regard the Thou as something to be experienced and used (and therefore using the other as an object), and hence, should be laid aside after the encounter. One’s knowledge of the other is not determined by his or her past, by what they have been, but rather by what they are. One does not, as it were, set up a screen of prejudgments to filter their presence so as to be able to accept them. Because no past event or knowledge guides us in this relationship, the I-Thou breaks away from the past, living instead in the present moment. This effect of directness and presentness in an I-Thou relation with fellow humans is, however, usually misunderstood as one of feeling. Buber assures us that feelings may accompany the relation, but they do not constitute it. They may exist, but they do not cause the existence of the I-Thou relation. For when one says Thou to another, one accepts the wholeness of the other’s being unconditionally, that is, regardless of what one feels for him or her.8 In contrast, for someone who has come to terms with the world of It, Buber observes, the world about us changes. One’s attitude of experienc5

Ibid. p. 8. Ibid. 7 By the present for Buber is meant “not the point which indicates from time to time in our thought merely the conclusion of ‘finished time’ but the real, filled present, exists only in so far as actual presentness, meeting and relation exist.” Ibid. p. 12. One is reminded of the richness of time in the sense of kairos. 8 The I-Thou relationship does not have to be mutual; however, for it to be full, it must be mutual. Buber explains: “Even if the man to whom I say Thou is not aware of it in the midst of his experience, yet relation may exist.... No deception penetrates here: here is the cradle of the Real Life.” Ibid. p. 9. He adds that the IThou relation, no matter how present and direct it is, will fade away into an I-It. In fact, a strong response to the Thou reduces it to an It (p. 39-43). But even if it does, it has the nature and disposition to be changed back into a Thou (p. 17). 6

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ing and using others develops as one becomes less inclined to enter into an I-Thou relation with them. Yet this changed attitude—which is the I-It—is the cause of progress: economic, scientific, cultural and others. Both the history of individuals and of humankind bears witness to the progressive development of the world of It which has in turn benefited humankind. Through the ability to experience and use, the primary connection of humans with the world of It, the world is enlarged. Nations grow, and cultures flourish. This I-It relation can also be beneficial even between human beings for many times we have “to look on men with whom we have to deal not as bearers of the Thou that cannot be experienced but as centres of work and effort, whose particular capabilities it is our concern to estimate and utilize”.9 Buber states it succinctly by saying that a Thou will not bring in profit, but a He or She will. This is especially true in the economic sphere. If we do not think in terms of assets and work accomplished, on what women or men and workers can do to profit, then there is no sense in focusing our attention on the economy whose very purpose is to usher in material benefits for us. Thus, one can see that the world of It is not evil in itself and is even necessary if we are to achieve prosperity. Our progressive life cannot dispense with it. It is of fundamental importance for the proper ordering of nature and of ourselves. Although silence before the Thou leaves it free and unmanifest, human greatness, Buber emphasizes, lies in the strong response humans give, and which binds them, to the world of It. It is through this response that science, culture, economies and other related fields are developed. Though the return of the Thou into an It is described by Buber as a melancholy; nevertheless, he regards it as exalted. According to him, what makes the I-It evil is to allow it to dominate.10 When one is ruled more by the desire to profit and to progress to the neglect of establishing an I-Thou relation with others, there is an imbalance in one’s life. When one cannot feel free to leave the world of It in order to set oneself in an I-Thou relationship, then the I-It has indeed become evil.11 As had already been mentioned, the I of the I-It is different from the I of the I-Thou. It is not the same I that relates itself sometimes to an It and sometimes to a Thou. Buber explains that the I of the I-It is a subject of

9

I and Thou, op. cit., p. 47. This observation is particularly relevant given the economic crisis being experienced on a global scale. See Chapter Ten: “Economic Crisis and Accountability: a Re-examination of Certain Views and Practices”. 11 I and Thou, op. cit., pp. 48-49. Nicolas Berdyaev describes it as a form of slavery. Cf. his Slavery and Freedom, trans. R. M French (London: G. Bles, 1943). 10

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experiencing and using.12 It is an individuality differentiated from other individualities.13 It is set and detached; and it aims to fulfil its physical life, which is a “dying that lasts the span of man’s life”. This I, in Buber’s rather picturesque language, thrills at looking at the world as if it were only a shop window where it can buy all that it can afford to buy. Other beings are just other goods in the market, as it were, goods that it can purchase if they are attractive enough. It seeks them just as it seeks prized commodities. The I of the I-Thou, in contrast, is a person who finds fulfilment by entering into a genuine relationship with other persons. It aims at contact with the Thou. It exists through a genuine connectedness with it, without any intention of appropriating the other for itself as if it were a commodity. This is the I that lives fully, and in Buber’s view, the “real self [that] appears only when it enters into relation with the Other”.14 As the I says Thou, that I becomes a particular kind of I. When it says Thou, it becomes more of a person, a subject. It achieves fuller existence since it becomes more of what it should be—a person. To be a person, from Buber’s perspective, is to achieve wholeness of being. And since the I says Thou with its whole being, it becomes more a person through its relationship with the Thou. To quote Buber, “The more direct the contact with the Thou the fuller the sharing. The I is real in virtue of its sharing in reality. The fuller 12

Martin Buber, Eclipse of God: Studies in the Relation between Religion and Philosophy (N.Y.: Harper and Row Publishers, 1957), p. 128. 13 To clarify for us his concept of individuality, Buber contrasts it with his concept of person: “An individual is just a certain uniqueness of a human being. And it can develop just by developing with uniqueness. This is what Jung calls individuation. He may become more and more an individual without becoming more and more human. I know many examples of man having become very, very individual, very distinct from others, very developed in their such-and-suchness without being at all what I would like to call a man. The individual is just this uniqueness; being able to be developed thus and thus. But a person, I would say, is an individual living really with the world. And with the world, I don’t mean in the world—just in real contact, in real reciprocity with the world in all the points in which the world can meet the man. I don’t say only with man, because sometimes we meet the world in other shapes than in that of man. But this is what I would call a person and if I may say expressly Yes and No to certain phenomena, I’m against individuals and for persons.” The Knowledge of Man, op.cit., p. 184. This is particularly helpful in understanding the regrettable consequences of individuality (rather than personhood). See Chapter Three: “Distinct, not Separate: A Critique of Dualistic Thinking of and in Society”, and Chapter Five: “Individual and Society: a Philosophical Conception of Self as Society”. 14 I and Thou, op. cit., p. 63.

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its sharing the more real it becomes.”15 Thus, though this I may step out of the I-Thou relation, the reality of this I is never lost. Something of it remains, no matter how small. It will grow and mature again when it steps back into an I-Thou relation. Thus, this personal I recognizes its existence as actually a co-existence. It is other-centred, even if it takes cognizance of the fact that it is a different being, an individual. It is aware that other beings exist beside and besides itself and that there is a reality and power existing between them and itself. This reality and power make it an authentic personality. Thus, since it is aware that it co-exists, the loneliness of the personal I, Buber claims, is never a forsakenness.

The Dialogical Principle Buber develops further the categories of I-Thou and I-It in his unique explanation of dialogue. According to him, dialogue comes about when one opens up one’s whole being towards another without waiting for a response. It does not have to be mutual for it to be possible. It can occur even without words, gestures or any outward manifestations.16 What is essential for dialogue to exist, in Buber’s view, is the very openness of one’s being. This is, he holds, the basic presupposition. No doubt, external manifestations such as words and gestures are characteristic of human dialogue. When humans, for instance, wish to communicate with one another, they design signs to convey their message. They make use of language to be able to do so meaningfully. They must rely on these if they want to be understood. But communication in the dialogue that Buber speaks of can exist even without these outward manifestations, although admittedly not in an objectively comprehensible form.17 While communication in the usual sense calls for an interchange of content, at its highest moment, this interchange is surpassed by what Buber means by dialogue. For dialogue, according to him, is “completed outside contents, even the most personal which are or can be communicated.”18 Thus, in this context, it is more than just communication as we commonly understand that term. It is actually communion—the encounter of beings in their openness. It occurs “where each of the participants really has in mind the other or others in their present and particular being and turns to them with the intention of establishing a living mutual relation between 15

EG, op.cit., p. 97. “Dialogue,” BMM, op.cit., p. 3. 17 Buber provides an example, Ibid. pp. 4-5. 18 Ibid. p. 4. 16

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himself and them.”19 What is important, Buber explains further, is “that for each of the two men the other happens as the particular other, that each becomes aware of the other and is thus related to him in such a way that he does not regard and use him as his object, but as his partner in a living event.”20 In dialogue—to return to the language of I-Thou—the I encounters the other in his or her very openness, and the I addresses them as such. The I does not ask what impression one’s speech and being will make on the others for it is to their very being that the I turns. This I does not forfeit the other’s person: he and she remain the same. Neither does the I leave its ground in order to meet the other. The I does not, so to say, trade in its uniqueness when it turns to him or her. The I and the other therefore remain distinct from each other; yet, between them is a definite relationship. Because genuine dialogue is communion, it takes place in spite of conflicting opinions for it is independent of them. Neither of the participants needs to give up his or her point of view, insists Buber. In fact, essential views demand that whoever holds them maintains his or her stand. Accepting one’s partiality as well as the limitation imposed by the other participant, he or she may still cling to their own viewpoint. This difference of opinion should not, however, clam down the openness of each to the other. This point must be understood well, Buber warns, for otherwise dialogue may be interpreted as hemming in those who engage in it so that they find themselves not bound to say everything which in all righteousness they should say.21 As he puts it, “If genuine dialogue is to arise, eve19

Ibid. p.19. To be distinguished from this kind of dialogue are technical dialogue and monologue disguised as dialogue, both of which are not intent on establishing a living mutual relationship. Buber explains further: “There is technical dialogue which is prompted solely by the need of objective understanding. And there is monologue disguised as dialogue, in which two or more men, meeting in space speak each with himself in strangely tortuous and circuitous ways and yet imagine they escaped the torment of being thrown back on their resources.” This latter kind of dialogue is what we commonly—to be distinguished from Buber’s sense—refer to as a “dialogue” where the participants are simply waiting for a chance to speak without listening at all to the other. 20 “Elements of the Interhuman,”KM, op.cit., p. 74. 21 To say everything which they should say does not mean simply anything they want to say. As Buber says, open dialogue should not be equated with unreserved speech: “But in the great faithfulness which is the climate of genuine dialogue, which I have to say at any one time already has in me the character of something that wishes to be uttered, and I must not keep it back, keep it in myself. It bears for me the unmistakable sign which indicates that it belongs to the common life of the word. Where the dialogical world genuinely exists, it must be given its right by

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ryone who takes part in it must bring himself into it. And that also means that he must be willing on each occasion to say what is really in his mind about the subject of the conversation. And that means further that on each occasion he makes the contribution of his spirit without reduction and without shifting his ground.”22 One’s basically different view about the subject of the conversation may even urge one to aim at convincing the other of the righteousness of one’s way of looking at the matter. This desire to influence the other, however, does not mean the effort to change the other, to inject one’s own “righteousness” (as Buber would say) into him. For as we have seen, genuine dialogue cannot come about unless one affirms the very otherness of the other and accepts it: “Everything depends so far as human life is concerned on whether each thinks of the other as the one he is, whether each, that is, with all his desire to influence the other, nevertheless unreservedly accepts and confirms in his being this man and his being made in this particular way.”23 For Buber, this strictness and depth of human individuation,24 what he calls “the elemental otherness of the other”, is not merely a starting-point to be discarded at a later stage, but is recognized and confirmed at all times. When one desires to influence the other, it means making an effort to “let that which is recognized as right, as just, as true (and for that very reason must also be established there, in the substance of the other) through one’s influence take seed and grow in the form suited to individuation.”25 keeping nothing back. To keep nothing back is the exact opposite of unreserved speech. Everything depends on the legitimacy of ‘what I have to say.’ And of course I must also be intent to raise into an inner word and then into a spoken word what I have to say at this moment but do not yet possess as speech. To speak is both nature and work, something that grows and something that is made, and where it appears dialogically, in the climate of great faithfulness, it has to fulfil ever anew the unity of the two.” BMM, op.cit., p. 86. 22 Ibid. To explain what he means, Buber cites a personal experience that occurred during a conference at Easter 1914. Buber had raised a protest against a man’s opinion concerning the Jews. He vehemently opposed this opinion, and he stood his ground with regard to his opposition. But in spite of their conflicting views, Buber and that man established a dialogical relation between themselves manifested by the exchanging of the kiss of the brotherhood. “Dialogue,” BMM, op. cit., pp. 5-6. 23 “Distance and Relation,” KM, op.cit., p. 69. 24 This points to a person’s uniqueness or distinctiveness, rather than individuality. 25 Buber compares this attitude with those connected with “propaganda” and “suggestion”: “Opposed to this effort is the lust to make use of man by which the manipulators of ‘propaganda’ and ‘suggestion’ is possessed, in his relation to men remaining as in a relation to things, moreover, with which he will never enter into

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When one relates to the other, what occurs is usually ascribed to the social realm, but for Buber genuine dialogue is not a social or psychological phenomenon. In fact, Buber gives it an ontological reality. Buber goes further than a sociologist though the latter is also concerned with what takes place between humans. A sociologist deals with human relationships, too, and does not exclude from consideration the sympathetic perception of one for another. But for Buber relation assumes a special meaning. It is not just a pyschological event, either, such as comradely relation in work or the recollection of an absent comrade. But this occurrence between persons, the interhuman, is a sphere in which one is actually confronted by the other; and in this confrontation or meeting, characterized by spontaneity, directness, presentness and the personal element, there is a definite reality—that of dialogue. Dialogue is not just the coming together of individuals, not even if in living together they become close to one another and share experiences and reactions with one another. To be thus bound up together means only that each existence is enclosed and contained in a group existence. It does not yet mean that they are tied together in any kind of personal relationships. True, they sense some belongingness which an outsider would not experience. They stick together, carried by the sense of collectivity which keeps them away from the feeling of estrangement. Their membership in the group consoles them in their loneliness and secures for them a definite place to turn to. Frequently, too, especially in the case of smaller groups, the situation would favour the birth of individual relations although the contrary would also be possible. That is to say, individual relationships could hardly be formed because collectivity aims at holding in check the inclination to an individual life by making the members concerned in the main with the activities of the whole group. Whatever takes place between individuals is mandatory. Such a grouping, however, does not necessarily involve an existential relationship among the members. They are not necessarily living the life of dialogue. Accordingly, to try to understand dialogue as merely a psychological event is to miss the point Buber wants to put forward. Likewise, to eliminate completely the psychological element is also to misunderstand dialogue. When two individuals engage in conversation, the psychological is certainly an important part of the situation as each of them listens and each prepares to speak. But this merely accompanies that sphere which Buber terms “dialogue”. Dialogue is found neither in one of the two individuals relation, which he is indeed eager to rob of their distance and independence.” “Distance and Relation,” Ibid. p. 69.

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nor even in both of them together. Dialogue is in fact in-between them. Reminiscent of the I-Thou relation, dialogue requires an open attitude to bring it about. Buber speaks of the I as opening up itself, as giving its whole being, when it confronts its Thou. Their confrontation is direct and personal. The sphere of the interhuman or of dialogue assumes existence when this attitude is present. This is why when one enters into dialogue, one enters a realm where the law of the point of view no longer holds. Buber explains that one suffers the limitations of human nature: the limitations by others, by one’s own finitude, partialness, need of completion. Moreover, one’s own relation to truth is heightened by the other’s different relation to the same truth by being another individual.26 Recognizing and honouring these limitations, one allows oneself to be free and meets the other and really speaks to and towards that other. Martin Buber offers a particularly helpful summary of what has been presented above: The chief presupposition for the rise of genuine dialogue is that each should regard his partner as the very one he is. I become aware of him, aware that he is different, essentially different from myself, in the definite, unique way which is peculiar to him; and I accept whom I thus see, so that in full earnestness I can direct what I say to him as the person he is. Perhaps from time to time I must offer strict opposition to his view about the subject of our conversation. But I accept this person, the personal bearer of a conviction, in his definite being out of which is his conviction he has grown—even though I must try to show bit by bit, the wrongness of this very conviction. I affirm the person I struggle with: I struggle with him as his partner, I confirm him who is opposed to me as him who is over against me. It is true that it now depends on the other when genuine dialogue, mutuality in speech arises between us. But if I thus give to the other who confronts me his legitimate standing as a man with whom I am ready to enter into dialogue, then I may trust him and suppose him to be also ready to deal with me as his partner.27

For Buber, therefore, dialogue is “not limited to men’s traffic with another; it is, it has shown itself to be, a relation of one another that is only represented in their traffic.”28 He adds that where speech and communication are absent, dialogue essentially and minimally is the mutuality of the inner action: “The men thus bound together in dialogue must obviously be 26

Ibid. “Elements of the Interhuman,” KM, op.cit., pp. 79-80. 28 “Dialogue” BMM, op.cit., p. 8. 27

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turned to one another, they must therefore—no matter with what measure of activity or indeed of consciousness of activity—have turned to one another.”29

The Life of Dialogue The life of dialogue, Buber claims, is a situation of the everyday, formed by people, events, and things of day-to-day existence. There is nothing extraordinary about it in the sense that we do not go out of daily existence. As he puts it, our task is not to escape from everyday life but to hallow it. Dialogue makes this possible as it affects our very lives. An attitude of bringing our whole selves to every encounter we make revitalizes our lives. Yet life in dialogue is not ordinary or humdrum either, for it always offers fresh encounters for us. Something new awaits us, a new message seeks to be heard by us. We sense new freshness that renews all our contacts with reality so that every appearance and event is for us a vessel of meaning. We seem to unearth hidden dimensions of the world around us. Dialogue makes us aware that we are being addressed. Buber reminds us that the signs of daily happening speak to us—in the very air that we breathe, in the environment that surrounds us, and in the very people that we deal with. But many times instead of opening ourselves up to receive their message, we keep evading it. We prefer to close ourselves in until we become convinced that there is no significance in what life has to offer, or that everything is ordinary. Buber counters a possible criticism that in seeing meaning in daily life, we are presuming to put significance where there is none.30 He maintains that in the life of dialogue we become aware of and receive signs. Every sign is new; in fact, every message is unique and every address has an original significance.31 Buber explains: “It can never be interpreted nor translated. I can have it neither explained nor displayed; it is not a what at all, it is said into my very being; it is not experience that can be remembered independently of the situation, it remains the address of that moment and cannot be isolated.”32 The signs that meet us thus afford no information or appeasement but instead offer a presence. And it is 29

Ibid. Cf. Appendix B: “Meaning and Significance: a Fundamental Challenge to Human Living”. 31 Ibid. p. 12. 32 Ibid. 30

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to this presence that one brings oneself in the life of dialogue. Buber illustrates this point: I approach a being, let us say, a man, as one who bears a message for me, as one who “says something to me”. He addresses me, and I am asked to respond. He himself may not be conscious of the address of his being. Nevertheless, his presence is indeed an address. That address is for me, not for any other. Each one of us is addressed, that is true, but each is addressed in a different way. What meets you is the address for you; what confronts me is the address for me. These are the moments of our personal everyday life, and they vary for each of us. And it seeks to establish a relationship with me, a relationship that will involve my whole being. I have become aware of that man as indeed a presence.33

Becoming aware is, however, not yet our decided attitude in the life of dialogue, not even if we become aware of the signs of the everyday as vessels of meaning. It is only the first step, Buber tells us. We can become aware and still shut ourselves in or step aside into our accustomed way. We can turn away still though, as Buber describes it, “with an unhealable wound”, a wound because we have become aware but unhealable because we have turned away instead of responding to it. But we could venture to respond, to enter “upon the situation, into the situation, which as at this moment stepped up to us, whose appearance we did not and could not know, for its like has not yet been.”34 We could face creation as it happens. In that case it would be speech directed at us, rather than above us, affording us with the opportunity to appropriate it into our lived lives that would be more than just a sum of moments of responding. Because it will be a continuous responding, it is one of meaning. With no advance thought or routine, we face reality continually, accepting with our whole being presences that meet us. In this way we assume re33

Ibid. p.16. To be contrasted with this response of becoming aware are those of observing and of looking: “We approach a man in another way. We can be interested in details, eyeing them intently. Our main concern then are the externals in this regard. The face of the man whom we approach is for us mere physiognomy, his movements, mere gestures of expression. We are, so to say, observing this man. But we can also respond to this man’s presence in another way. We can simply remain passive, letting his activities happen as they come without any intent on our part. In this approach we are onlookers. Divergent though these two responses may be, they converge on one point. In both the object of our response remained apart from us. There was noticeable detachment on our part. We did not claim any participation in the man. He was just an object cut off from us. He was an It.” 34 Ibid. p.17.

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sponsibility, the kind that exists only in lived life for “genuine responsibility exists only where there is real responding”.35 Then we shall not just exist, we shall exist meaningfully. We shall not just live, we shall live responsibly.

Communal Life of Dialogue How does the life of dialogue affect our relations towards other beings? The I that says Thou relates itself to others but also wants that others say Thou to it, to confirm it in its existence, to acknowledge that it is good that this I exists. According to Buber, there is in us that craving that our Iness be accepted too so that whosoever accepts it could live a life of a living relationship. In a word, we long for mutuality. As Buber puts it, “For every man wants to be confirmed in his being and in his existence. This is his avowed secret.”36 One, however, does not turn to the other and establishes an I-Thou relationship with them because one believes there are advantages in doing so. Nor does one do so only because one feels happy and free to be with them. Though these other considerations may be present, what Buber calls “this avowed secret” is really the principle of wanting to stand in relation to others, with others, in a relationship which one knows will vivify because it is mutual. This, in Buber’s view, is the basis on which genuine friendship, true marriage and real community life stand. With this in mind, he reminds us that a genuine friend is one who accepts you for what you are. Despite being conscious of your faults, such a friend does not let them block the genuineness of his or her acceptance of you. With no desire to dominate or possess you, a friend is concerned that you grow and unfold for your own sake and not for the purpose of serving him or her. However, Buber adds, a real friend will correct you if you go astray in your ways, but will still accept you even if you did. A true friend feels one with you but with you as you are, not as he or she needs you to be an object for their use. You yourself feel the same way for him or her. Between the friend and you is a deep, personal, dialogical relationship that passes the test of being full because it is mutual.

35

Ibid. p.16. “Community and Environment,” A Believing Humanism: 1902-1965, trans. M. Friedman (NY: Simon and Shuster, 1967), p. 95. See also “Distance and Relation,” KM, op.cit., pp. 67-68: “The basis of man’s life is twofold, and is one—the wish of every man to be confirmed as what he is, even as what he can become by man, and the innate capacity in man to confirm his fellow man in this way.”

36

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Buber describes marriage as being built on the same principle: two people reveal the Thou to each other. This is what gives new life to the married couple, not their feelings for one another, no matter how strong these may be: Institutions of the so-called personal life cannot be given new life by free feeling (though indeed not without it). Marriage, for instance, will never be given new life except by that out of which true life always arises, the revealing of the Thou by two people to one another. Out of this a marriage is built by the Thou that is neither of the I’s. This is the metaphysical and metapsychical factor of love to which feelings of love are mere accompaniments. He who wishes to give new life to marriage from another source is not essentially different from him who wishes to abolish it. Both clearly show that they no longer know the vital factor. And indeed, if in all the much discussed erotic philosophy of the age we were to leave out of account everything that involves experience in relation to the I, that is, every situation in which the one is not present to the other, given present status by it, but merely enjoys itself in the other—what then would be left?37

Each of the two partners accepts and confirms the otherness of the partner. This person is other, essentially other than oneself. It is this otherness that the I means and confirms, wishing its otherness to exist, because it wishes this particular being to exist:38 Buber explains further: “He who ‘has entered on marriage,’ who has entered into marriage, has been in earnest, in the intention of the sacrament, with the fact that the other is, with the fact that I cannot legitimately share in the present being without sharing in the being of the other, with the fact that I cannot answer the lifelong address of God to me without answering at the same time for the other; with the fact that I cannot be answerable for the other as one who is entrusted to me.”39 From this same basis, Buber continues, one is led to the insight of what the vital factor of a real community consists in. True community is based on this interpersonal relationship between the members, the genuine dialogue in which each allows the other to exist in his or her otherness and accepts that otherness in its wholeness and uniqueness: The true community does not arise through peoples having feelings for one another (though indeed not without it) but through, first their taking their stand in living mutual relation with a living Center and second, their being 37

IT, op. cit., p. 46. “The Question to the Single One,” BMM, op. cit., p. 61. 39 Ibid, pp. 60-61. 38

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Chapter Four in living mutual relation with one another. The second has its source in the first, but is not given when the first alone is given. Living mutual relation includes feelings, but does not originate with them. The community is built up out of living mutual relation, but the builder is the living effective Center.40

Unless this togetherness is recognized and acknowledged, the coming together of individuals will merely form a crowd where the members subsume their personal and individual identity blindly to any of its movements. Buber compares the individual members of such crowd to a “stick in a bundle moving through the water, abandoned to the current or being used by a people from the bank in that or this direction. Even if it seems to the stick at times that it is moving by its own motion it has in fact none of its own, and the bundle too, in which it drifts has only an illusion of selfpropulsion.”41 It is only in a genuine community that people live not alongside one another but with one another. There is a dynamic flowing from I to Thou, that basic mutual trust in each member because, being in mutual relation, they become communally-minded. Where this is present, then a real community exists for a “people is community to the extent that it is communally disposed.”42 This does not mean that members of a community have an I-Thou relationship always, but their togetherness must include the possibility of such direct, mutual dialogue. Otherwise, their togetherness becomes a mere bundling together of individuals, as we have already noted, or a collectivity whose existence is acceptable in so far as its effects are. The group then loses its identity as a reality on its own, a consequence lamented by Buber: In the view customary today, which is defined by politics, the only important thing in groups, in the present as in history, is what they aim at and what they accomplish. Significance is ascribed to what goes on within them only in so far as it influences the group’s action with regard to its aim. Thus it is conceded to a band conspiring to conquer the state power that the comradeship which fills it is of value, just because it strengthens the band’s reliable assault power. Precise obedience will do as well, if enthusiastic drill makes up for the associates remaining strangers to one another; there are indeed good grounds for preferring the rigid system. If the group is striving even to reach a higher form of society then it can seem dangerous if in the life of the group itself something of this higher form begins to be realised in embryo. For from such a pre-mature seriousness a 40

IT, op. cit., p. 45. “The Question to the Single One,” BMM, op. cit., p. 64. 42 “Dialogue,” BMM, op. cit., p. 31. 41

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suppression of the “effective” impetus is feared. The opinion apparently is that the man who whiles away his time as a guest on an oasis may be accounted lost for the project of irrigating the Sahara.43

For Buber dialogue permeates the whole of society. It is in his view such a fundamental principle that it can and does transform the members into a community.

Lessons for Contemporary Society At the start of this essay, it was noted that today, as it has always been throughout the history of humankind, relationships play a significant role in our life in society. In fact, because we live in society, we are bound to one another. We are conceived because of a relationship and born into a relationship. Throughout our lives we are interconnected with one another and with the entire universe. We also forge various relationships as we carry on with our lives. As the existentialists pointed out, each existence is indeed a co-existence. One can even add that we become who we are because we are in relationships.44 We realize that for every society and for every period of history, new challenges alongside traditional ones arise for various reasons. This observation is also true today with our relationship with one another. While most relationships are the well-known ones, there have also been nontraditional ones due to changes in the make-up of friendships, of marriage, of family-life, and even of society itself. Consequently, there have been discussions on and debates about gay/lesbian friendships, same-sex and inter-racial marriages, one-parent families, a global community, among several others. Many of the issues under consideration regarding such relationships are truly contemporary. It would of course be misleading and ignorant to lump all these together since, despite comparability, there are particular issues and challenges that deserve careful and nuanced attention. However, what is rather of common concern in these different situations is the nature of relationships itself, and that I believe is Buber’s welcome contribution to the discussions and debates about these different more contemporary relationships. Interestingly, the categories of I-Thou and I-It have found their way into ordinary parlance as well and can also enrich discussion of the more traditional relationships. Buber provides a strong reminder that it is the 43

Ibid. pp. 30-31. This point is discussed further in Chapter Five: “Individual and Society: a Philosophical Conception of Self as Social”. 44

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type of relationship that one enters into and cultivates that is the most essential consideration. With human relationships and unions, the reality of the in-between, the interhuman, dialogue deserve our considered attention more than who enters into it. While heeding cultural concerns, religious beliefs, personal convictions and so on—and it is important that these are seriously taken on board in any discussion or debate regarding the various relationships and unions in contemporary times45—these can cloud the most fundamental issue; namely, forming and enabling I-Thou relationships in all our encounters. Such relationships nurture the individuals concerned as well as the groupings involved whether these are friendships, marriages, families, or society itself in a more wholesome way.46 In contrast, I-It relationships, if they dominate, can damage those who are party to it as well as society as a whole Functional relationships, essential in specific contexts as Buber points out, should not replace or destroy what can truly contribute to our development as human beings; namely, the IThou relationship. Buber’s insightful discussion of types of relationships also facilitates appreciation of, and the distinction between, different ways of relating to one another. Contemporary society, as possibly never before, can rightly be described as connected, a situation boosted no doubt by all the developments in technology and social networking. One would therefore expect that proximity, in various senses, to one another would amount to closeness in the less physical sense. In many instances this is true insofar as the enhanced methods of communicating have enabled us to stay in touch with one another—indeed, an important way of establishing and strengthening bonds. As Buber explains, communication in the life of dialogue is indeed valuable. There are good reasons therefore for welcoming and utilizing these recent developments in society. At the same time, however, Buber shows us that dialogue itself is not merely the exchange of information or

45 For instance, marriage as a social arrangement is an official recognition of a particular union by the state or by a religious community and all it implies; hence, all these other considerations should also feature. 46 Perhaps it may be useful also to distinguish between married life and family life although of course there is a natural and social connection between these. Entering into a marriage arrangement, in whatever form or context this takes place, is not necessarily or automatically consenting to a family life. There may be an implicit or expected arrangement, but marriage and family life are really distinguishable. Recognition of such a distinction may facilitate the debate regarding nontraditional marriages inasmuch as the issues, though related, are actually different.

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the sharing of views but a special kind of bonding.47 It is this which matters more in our interactions with one another. Unfortunately, however, it is a lesson that is often forgotten, as we immerse ourselves in the latest gadgets and constantly turn to them to stay in touch. Sometimes, one would even wonder whether, in specific cases, they are really instrumental in forging the kind of I-Thou relationships that Buber speaks of or contributory to relegating them into I-It bonds.48 The developments in contemporary society brought about by technology, science, industry and in other areas have transformed it radically. These have generally improved standards of living, even if one has also to express regrets that they are not as universally true as they should be.49 Buber’s carefully qualified discussion of the I-It type of relationship indicates that not only are these developments necessary and even to be appreciated but also that in this case the I-It relationship is of paramount importance. We cannot have progress otherwise, as Buber points out. Efficiency and productivity can only be achieved when there are what he calls the I-It relationships. They are an essential feature of contemporary living, and even more so than in the past. At the same time, nonetheless, they should not dominate, again as Buber warns us. The same developments which do contribute to the betterment of society can and have at times resulted in less wholesome results and have ruined certain features of con-

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Another philosopher associated with the philosophy of dialogue is Emmanuel Levinas. He and Buber have themselves dialogued about their respective philosophical perspectives. Although they have much in common, Levinas criticizes Buber, among other things, for not putting ethics as the root of his dialogical principle and for not placing due emphasis on the Other. Buber has replied to and rejected these criticisms. Cf. Peter Atterton et al. (eds.), Levinas and Buber: Dialogue and Difference (Duquesne University Press, 2004). It seems to me, however, that Buber has already addressed these points in his philosophy. On the other hand, Charles Hartshorne who has himself also appreciated yet criticized Buber’s philosophical contributions seems to me to provide a welcome metaphysical development of the notion of relationship that Buber describes in more phenomenological terms. See Chapter Five: “The Individual and Society: a Philosophical Conception of the Self”. 48 A very relevant consideration is whether empathy, which is crucial in establishing relationships could ever be a feature in such bonding. For a particularly insightful and fundamental examination of empathy and its role, cf. Edith Stein, “On the Problem of Empathy,” in Waltrant Stein (trans.), Collected Works of Edith Stein, Vol. III, 3rd rev. ed. (Washington, ICS Publications, 1989). 49 With all this progress, it is disheartening to note that there is still today a gap between various regions in the world regarding their development.

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temporary life.50 One can even claim that they have to some extent dehumanized society. Buber shows that it is not so much the material or objective world and its development, however, that are responsible but rather the kind of relatedness to what should be secondary that is questionable. It is thus not so much the so-called material world that dehumanizes but our attitudes towards it. An over-emphasis on profit-taking, competitiveness, and accumulation of wealth, as a result of all these developments, creates an environment that promotes and sustains the I-It type of relationship.51 It encourages greed. One would do well to heed Buber’s message and extend it to society as a whole. After all, the type of relationship that dominates in society can make a difference to the kind of environment that is possible among its citizens. Some may find it difficult to understand and appreciate Buber’s stand on our relationship with nature. Having an I-Thou relationship with nature and its components would appear to give them a status contrary to the commonsense view. It would appear to personalize them. On the other hand, that difficulty in itself is a possible reflection of what seems to have dominated our attitudes towards nature and the environment; namely, those of control or dominance—the I-It relationship in Buber’s terminology. Fortunately, contemporary society is becoming more and more conscious, even if it can be faulted that the message is not always heeded, that nature should be respected. Time and again one hears about the consequences, such as global warming which has been the subject of very recent studies, that threaten this generation and certainly future generations. The I-Thou relationship with nature that Buber refers to does not personalize it. Rather, it is a throwback on our attitude towards it. Moreover, it can be a strong reminder of our responsibility to care for the environment, rather than an attempt to change its status. In some circles, fortunately, there is even talk that creation has been entrusted to us, not for our selfish needs but for the benefit of the entire universe. 50

Martin Heidegger calls into question the thinking behind the technological development. See his, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in David Farrell Krell (ed.), Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings (San Francisco: Harper, 1964), pp. 287-317. See also, Herbert Marcuse, “Some Social Implications of Modern Technology,” in Douglas Kellner (ed.), Technology, War and Fascism: Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse, Vol. I (London and N.Y.: Routledge, 1998, 2004), pp. 41-63. 51 A very contemporary example is the existence of the sweatshops in Bangladesh, Pakistan and India. The recent destruction of these, resulting in tragic deaths due to poor construction and inhuman conditions certainly attest to the over-emphasis on profit-making at all costs.

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Buber’s philosophical thoughts offer a refreshing description of what it means to be a human being. The dominant conception, influenced by philosophers like Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes and others, is that humans are rational beings, uniquely characterized by their intellect and free-will. They stand out from the rest of creation precisely because they and only they possess these gifts. In fact, their rationality is said to define them as human since they also share other characteristics with non-humans. It is a definition that serves us well. It honours an important asset among humans. At the same time, however, it can be a definition that can overemphasize certain attitudes towards the rest of creation. Furthermore, too much focus on rational thinking and free choice can at times blind us to the importance of human relatedness. Buber’s philosophical anthropology shifts our attention—with some justification—from the consideration of what is essential about our human nature to what it is that makes us more human. While the traditional definition of rationality is a reference to essence, Buber’s emphasis on relationship makes explicit our social nature. Moreover, by starting with a description of our relatedness, rather than with our solitary make-up as rational beings, he stresses our presence in the world as a “with-ness”. Becoming more human rather than simply being human is an important consideration that could well have implications for our life in society and how we live it.52

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This point should not be understood as indicating that our nature as humans is a stage rather than a starting point or a potentiality rather than an actuality. It merely suggests that there is also a challenging task for humans to develop themselves as humans.

CHAPTER FIVE THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY: A PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTION OF THE SELF

Querying the Obvious Philosophy gets a bad press, or at least a mocking reaction, when it starts querying something which we take for granted. One such situation is when one questions the commonly accepted fact that each of us is an individual. Ordinary experience informs us that Peter is not John and viceversa. It is quite obvious that John has a separate identity from Peter and from everyone else. Our usual understanding of reality, backed by what we can readily observe, also indicates that society is really nothing else but a grouping of such individuals. It could be a loose one, such as a crowd, or a more organized one, like a team, a club, or a nation; but it does not have a separate existence apart from all the individuals who are grouped together. Common sense surely shows this to be the case. It would seem to be preposterous to maintain otherwise. When philosophical thinking, however, challenges such views, it does so not just because what is obvious does not always bear up when examined more critically, but also because at times unchallenged assumptions or ordinary knowledge do have a way of leading us astray.1 More crucially, taken for granted, they can have implications for the way we interpret reality and conduct our lives. A very good example of this— taking up the situation described earlier—is our acceptance of the obviousness of our being separate individuals and of society as nothing else but a composite of individuals. It has been argued that such a view leads to individualism and to all the consequences of that way of thinking and behaving. Another reason for engaging in a re-examination of the obvious way of understanding the world around us is that the exercise can also expose us to other ways of viewing the same reality. It can make us realize 1

One will readily think of Socrates and his method of questioning what was commonly held as he roamed around ancient Athens.

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that what has been taken for granted is really the perpetuation of a dominant worldview—which has somehow become accepted as the obvious. Again a relevant example would be our conception of the individual and of society. It has been pointed out that it is very much a Western conception, which somehow runs counter to the thinking and conduct of other cultures and philosophies. It is when one turns to these that one becomes aware of competing worldviews.2 In this essay I will set out the alternative philosophical conception of self as itself a society in the metaphysics developed by Charles Hartshorne. In his view, the self is intrinsically social and what we refer to as human society, i.e. a grouping of constituent members, is a further development of the intrinsically social nature of reality. This view has implications not just for our understanding of identity but also for our appreciation of and response to some of the contemporary challenges of living in society. Admittedly, one could be skeptical about this different understanding of the self since it seems to run counter to the commonsense view referred to previously. More significantly, it makes problematic the notions of personal identity as well as of personal responsibility and the implications of our relationship with society at large. This possible criticism and related issues would thus need to be borne in mind and addressed as we now turn our attention to Hartshorne’s metaphysical views.

Personal Identity and Experience According to Hartshorne, any changing yet enduring thing has two aspects: the aspect of identity (what is common to the thing in its earlier and later stages) and the aspect of novelty. A being which changes through all time has an identical aspect which is exempt from change. It is in this sense immutable. However, this unchanging identity should not be confused with the substantial soul of dualism. For Hartshorne personal identity is an abstract aspect. He writes: “The self-same ego is an abstraction from concrete realities, not itself a fully concrete reality.”3 This is not to say that it is unreal, but it is real within something richer in determination than itself. Hartshorne explains that the “I” spoken by me is distinct from the “I” uttered by someone else because there is a different referent of the pronoun in each case. In the same, though subtler, way the “I” which I say now has a differ2

Cf. Chapter Three: “Distinct, not Separate: A Critique of Dualistic Thinking of and in Society”. 3 Charles Hartshorne, “The Development of Process Philosophy,” in E.H. Cousins (ed.), Process Theology: Basic Writings (N.Y. Newman Press, 1971), p. 56.

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ent referent from the “I” which I uttered earlier. The reason for the difference is that the pronoun “I” (or any of the personal pronouns) is a demonstrative and is context-dependent or token-reflexive; that is, the meaning and referent change each time it is used. There is, of course, an enduring individuality or a specific subject with definite experiences. But each new experience which the subject undergoes means a new actuality for that subject.4 The persistent identity itself is abstract while the actual subject having these experiences is concrete. Thus, there is a new I every moment, and the “I” really means not just “I as subject here” but also “I now”. In short, spatial and temporal considerations are intrinsic to one's concrete reality. The concreteness of the subject is due to the society or sequence of experiences of which the subject is composed. The referent of “I” is usually some limited part of that sequence of experiences. As Hartshorne himself puts it, “Personal identity is a partial, not complete identity: it is an abstract aspect of life, not life in its concreteness.”5 This is why it would be erroneous to hold that each of us is always simply the same subject or the same reality even if we must admit that we are the same individuals. We are identical through life as human individuals, but not so in our concreteness. Concretely, there is a new man or woman each moment. To recognize the sameness of that man or woman, we must disregard that which is new at each moment. Hartshorne furthermore differentiates personal identity from strict identity. Identity in its strict meaning connotes entire sameness, total nondifference, in what is said to be identical. If x is identical with y, then “x” and “y” are two symbols with but one referent. The difference between them is only in the symbols or the act of symbolization, not in the thing symbolized. It follows that “x” does not have any property which “y” does not have and vice versa. Personal identity, on the other hand, is literally partial identity and therefore partial non-identity. Personal identity is the persistence of certain defining characteristics in a very complex reality which constantly changes.6 4

Compare this with Martin Buber’s assertion that the I of the I-Thou and the I of the I-It are different and are developed by the specific kind of relationship. See Chapter Six: “Relationships and Communal Life: a View on Types of Relatedness”. 5 Charles Hartshorne, “Beyond Enlightened Self-Interest: a Metaphysics of Ethics,” in Harry James Cargas and Bernard Lee (eds.), Religious Experience and Process Theology (Paulist Press, 1976), p. 302. 6 Charles Hartshorne, “Strict and Genetic Identity: an Illustration of the Relations of Logic to Metaphysics,” in H.M. Kallen et al. (eds.), Structure, Method and Meaning: Essays in Honor of Henry M. Sheffer (N.Y.: Liberal Arts Press, 1951), p. 26. See also his “Personal Identity from A to Z.” Process Studies, II (1972), pp. 209-215.

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Peter Bertocci agrees with Hartshorne that identity is never a strictly logical identity as attested by personal experience since one is selfidentifying unity-continuity in change. Nevertheless, he has reservations over Hartshorne’s statement that “reality is the succession of units” (i.e. actual entities or experient occasions). In Bertocci's view, this statement cannot be rendered coherent with personal self-conscious experience. Instead he argues that he experiences himself as a unity, as a self-identifying continuant who can recognize and recall his own experiences as successive. He writes, “There is nothing in my synthesis of successive moments. I am indeed active in any moment, but I am neither a collection of moments nor a ‘synthesis’”.7 Bertocci is voicing a basic epistemological and ontological disagreement. He questions the validity of Hartshorne’s doctrine that the present contains the past—this doctrine forms the basis for Hartshorne’s version of personal identity—because there does not seem to be an experiential basis for this, despite Hartshorne’s claim. Simply put, in Bertocci’s view, the past does not come into the present for it is gone forever. When it comes to personal identity, therefore, one cannot say that one is in one’s past, but only in one’s present. “The burning, present experience is a present complex unity that is able to identify itself as changing and successive.... In a present [experience] I recognize aspects I describe as past, but my present is never an accumulation of pasts (hidden, distinct, or clear)”.8 In short, Bertocci claims that one knows the past but this does not mean that the past itself exists. Bertocci, it would appear, is equating experience with the substance theory. He himself wonders whether his uneasiness with Hartshorne’s theory is due to an obstinate residue of the psycho-logic of substantive metaphysics. In this respect, one could indeed ask whether Bertocci is justified in regarding the substantive theory as our experience of personal identity. After all, many others, notably the Buddhists and the ancient Hebrews9 would have a different interpretation of their sense of personal identity. One suspects that the Western mind has been shaped mainly by Greek conceptions which make it easy for some Westerners to accept them as indeed their experience. Robert Neville does acknowledge this point. In his criticism of Hartshorne's account of continuity, Neville writes that Hartshorne's event pluralism,

7 Peter Bertocci, “Hartshorne on Personal Identity: a Personalistic Critique,” Process Studies, II (1972), p. 217. 8 Ibid. p. 219. 9 See Chapter Three: “Distinct, not Separate: a Critique of Dualistic Thinking in Society”.

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which is intended to account for continuity, does not articulate “the Westerner's sense of individual continuity”.10 Both critics accuse Hartshorne’s theory of not having a basis in experience. What is surprising about their criticism is that some have rejected the substance theory precisely because it does not seem to square with personal experience. The Buddha had rejected the Hindu doctrine of Self (although this is not the same as the substantial self) because he could only experience momentary, transitory states, which he regarded as constituting “the self”. David Hume was critical of the classical notion of “soul” since, according to him, there was nothing in our experience to support it. The point at issue here is really which aspects of our experience can justifiably serve as the basis for philosophical thinking. The more crucial question then is: What exactly do we mean by experiencing ourselves as subjects? The answer to that question will shape our response to Hartshorne's theory of personal identity. But to understand more adequately Hartshorne’s metaphysical perspective on this topic—and to answer his critics—we need to develop further what he says about it in a wider context. This will take us to the metaphysical underpinnings of his philosophical anthropology.11

The Self as a Society of Event-Experiences The self, according to Hartshorne, is primarily a society of eventactualities linked together across spatiotemporal lines. Causality, as interpreted by Hartshorne, shows how the past influences the present thus making it possible for him to hold that we are related, first to our more minute “parts”—the cells that make up our bodies and which are genuine others to ourselves,12 then to our past selves which are likewise real others to us.13 10

Robert Neville, “Neoclassical Metaphysics and Christianity,” International Philosophical Quarterly, X (1969), p. 56. 11 Parts of the discussion in this essay make use of material from my (co-authored with Ferdinand Santos), Personal Identity, the Self and Ethics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), particularly Chapter 8. 12 Charles Hartshorne, Whitehead and the Modern World: Science, Metaphysics and Religion (Boston: the Beacon Press, 1950), p. 36. Here Hartshorne decries the neglect of this fact by a majority of philosophers. Causality for Hartshorne is described as creative synthesis. See Chapter Eight:”Human Freedom, its Power and Limits: Some Implications for Life in Society”. 13 Cf. Charles Hartshorne, “The Compound Individual”, Philosophical Essays for Alfred North Whitehead (New York: Russell and Russell, 1936), pp. 212-215. Also: his Beyond Humanism, op. cit., pp. 170-172.

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What we experience here and now are not experiences we simply constitute ourselves; they are, rather, experiences of “selves” truly different from us and whose experiences which we “house”, here and now, belong completely to the past. A human self is thus a special type of society of selves, a personal society in which there is a nexus—to use a Whiteheadian term—forming a single line of inheritance of the defining characteristic.14 “Nexus” is a technical term used by Whitehead to describe the ultimate fact of the togetherness or unity of actual entities15—a unity that the older concept of an enduring substance intended, but ultimately failed, to articulate and safeguard.16 All the enduring entities encountered in everyday experience: humans, chairs, tables, books, etc., are societies of actual occasions.17 They are, as Hartshorne says, “changing persisting things”.18 They are complex societies, not simply because they are made up of more minute constituents—a block of ice is not simply a society because it is made up of ice molecules, nor simply because they are constituted by successive epochal actualities. Rather, they are societies because they are clusters or strings of superseding actualities which are unified by a particular defining characteristic.19 This can be illustrated in terms of the concepts of contemporary physics. An ordinary physical object, for instance, is made up of a multiplicity of atoms, with each atom being itself composed of more minute entities, e.g. protons, electrons, and so forth.

14 Cf. A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, corr. ed. by David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne (The Free Press, 1978), n. 51, p. 34; his Adventures of Ideas (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1961), p, 206. 15 Whitehead, Process and Reality, op.cit., n. 30, p. 20. 16 Of course, even Hartshorne admits that in normal everyday use, the idea of an enduring individual is not only perfectly acceptable, it is likewise scarcely dispensable as a way of putting what the event-terminology analyzes into eventsequences or “societies”. Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, op. cit., p. 204. 17 Charles Hartshorne, Whitehead and the Modern World, op.cit., p. 37. Here Hartshorne puts forward the notion of “the universality of societies in the cosmos, at all levels”, and he argues that “what is called an individual in common life (and much philosophy) can only be understood as a form of sequence of particular actualities socially inheriting a common quality from antecedent members”, and finally, that “personality itself is a special temporally linear case of such social—that is, sympathetic—inheritance”. 18 Charles Hartshorne, Whitehead’s Philosophy, Selected Essays, 1935-1970 (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1972), p. 181. 19 Cf. Ibid. p. 13.

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Consider now a route of electronic actualities. According to the societal theory, this route constitutes a society in respect to its character as “electronic”. Moreover, such character is inherited by each member of the route from the antecedent actuality of this same route.20 Whitehead explains it thus: A nexus enjoys ‘social order’ where (i) there is a common element of form illustrated in the definiteness of each of its included actual entities, and (ii) this common element of form arises in each member of the nexus by reason of the conditions imposed upon it by its prehension of some other members of the nexus, and (iii) these prehensions impose that condition of reproduction by reason of their inclusion of positive feelings of that common form.21

On account of this, the nexus of actualities constitutes a society. The very defining characteristic of that society takes on a serial form. And when it does, i.e. when the genetic relatedness of its members orders them “serially”, what we have is a special type of society which is called a “personal society or a person”. Hartshorne explains that there are basically two types of societies: (1) Linear societies or personally-ordered societies, the familiar example being a “stream of consciousness” of a single person. (2) Nonlinear societies such as a tree considered as a colony of cells, with each cell being personally-ordered without the entire tree being itself ordered in the same unified manner. But there is a third type of society, which is a sort of combination of the first two. It is a form of nonlinear society that is at the same time accompanied by a linear society of “presiding occasions”. A live human body with its “mind” or “soul” is the example nearest at hand.22 Hartshorne makes use of the same basic distinctions. He says there are societies which involve a “dominating” (“personal” or “regnant”) unit; and societies which do not possess such a unifying thread, and are thus more like “democracies”—plants, for instance. These latter are individuals only in a slight degree for the reality is that their more minute constituents, their cells, are much more unified than the entire organism or society it-

20 The mnemonic structure of awareness, that is to say, the past lives on in the present, ensures that such inheritance is explainable. 21 A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit. n. 50-51, p. 34. 22 Charles Hartshorne, “Personal Identity from A to Z,” Process Studies, II, 3 (Fall, 1972), p. 211.

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self.23 But the human being is not only a society of other-selves which are the innumerable cells that make up her body; she is also, even more importantly, a society of other-selves which are the innumerable past “selves” that constitute her life from birth up to the present moment. And just as a regnant member or dominating unit secures the integrity of her bodily (spatial) components (cells), so too a regnant member or defining character secures the integrity of her temporal constituents (past-selves).24 For Hartshorne, thus, the defining characteristic of a personal society in linear temporal (personal) order is what comprises personality or individuality. It is that which can be said to remain the same in the midst of change. It is personal identity. But it still is “less concrete or particular than its expressions; it has certain abstractness or neutrality with respect to alternative possible experiences and acts”.25 It is that which continues to exist through change of states of itself . 26 It is in fact but a special and abstract form of the concrete society of selves.27 It is what makes one the same at 15 and, say, 51 years of age. It is what makes Philip who is drunk and Philip who is sober still Philip.28

The Relational Self Hartshorne’s conception of the self as actually a society of selves leads him to claim that the self is essentially relational. The concrete subject is shot through and through with a dynamic relationality.29 The self 23

Charles Hartshorne, “The Compound Individual” in Otis H. Lee (ed.), Philosophical Essays for Alfred North Whitehead (N.Y.: Longmans Green, 1936), p. 215. 24 The analogy between a person’s relation to his bodily/spatial components (cells) and a person’s relation to his temporal constituents (other-selves) is itself analogous to the transference of energy from particular occasion to particular occasion in physical nature and the transference of affective tone, with its emotional energy, from one occasion to another in a human person. As Whitehead points out: “the object-to-subject structure of human experience is reproduced in physical nature by this vector relation of particular to particular”. Adventures of Ideas, (Cambridge University Press, 1942). p. 242. 25 Charles Hartshorne, Whitehead’s Philosophy, op cit., p. 13. 26 Charles Hartshorne, “Leibniz’s Greatest Discovery,” Journal of the History of Ideas, VII, 4 (October, 1946), p. 420. 27 Charles Hartshorne, “Personal Identity from A to Z,” p. 212. 28 Charles Hartshorne, Whitehead’s Philosophy, op. cit., p. 13. 29 Cf. Charles Hartshorne, “Lewis’s Treatment of Memory,” in Paul Arthur Schilpp, (ed.) The Philosophy of C.I. Lewis, The Philosophy of Living Philosophers, Vol. 13 (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1968), p. 407.

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here and now is not simply a self existing in splendid isolation from the rest of the world. At every single moment, one is also related in a most intimate way with other-selves which are co-constitutive of one’s identity in space and in time.30 Spatially, one is related first and foremost to the minute constituents of one’s internal environment, i.e. the body as made up of genuine others whose experiences one immediately “feels”. Secondly, one is related to the external environment to which one belongs, from the lowest to the highest level events that comprise one’s world. There are genuine others as well, irreducible to an “I” which is both different from as well as like them. In other words, I do not constitute, but am actually coconstituted by them.31 In all these instances, the structure of pastness holds the real key to understanding the implicated relationality. For the relationality of the self is not only spatial, but temporal as well. As Hartshorne remarks: “The self … is a temporal group mind as well as a spatial one. It focuses, in its present, what it knows of experiences belonging to other selves as well as experiences in its own past and future.”32 And it is in “mnemonic awareness” alone that this structure is given to us in ordinary experience. (The term “mnemonic awareness” is used here to distinguish it from “memory” in the psychological sense. The connection with the past through “remembering” is metaphysical although it also includes the psychological. Hence, it should not be confused with Locke’s use of memory in referring to personal identity.) Contra Bertocci, the mnemonic bridge between a present self and its past data is what finally enables us to make sense of the characteristically human experience of change and self-identity. We are what we “remember”, whether or not this remembering involves consciousness or not.33 For the data which our present reality creatively synthesizes belongs genuinely to the past. That self which we shall eventually bequeath to our anticipated future, be this our own or any future whatsoever, is 30

That which genuinely “individuates” us; namely, our relationality, is genuinely spatio-temporal. Cf. Charles Hartshorne, “Personal Identity from A to Z,” p. 214. 31 For the relation (continuity) between these two forms of relationality, see Part III: “From Physiological Data to Environmental Knowledge,” Charles Hartshorne, “The Organism According to Process Philosophy,” in Ernest Wolf-Gazo (ed.), Process in Context: Essays in Post-Whiteheadian Perspective (N.Y.: Peter Lang, 1988), pp. 74-76. It is interesting to compare this point with Buber’s concept of intersubjectivity. See Chapter Four: “Relationships and Communal Living: a View on Types of Relationships”. 32 Charles Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process: Studies in Metaphysics and Religion ((N.Y. Hafner, 1971), p. 64. 33 Cf. Charles Hartshorne, “The Development of Process Philosophy,” in Douglas Browning (ed.), Philosophers of Process (N.Y.: Random House, 1965), p. xiii.

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grounded and constrained by what the data of the past contributes to the creative coming-to-be of a novel event.34 An event-in-process in Hartshorne’s philosophy is derivative of the very otherness that lies at the heart of becoming as creative synthesis. It is the universal or generalized form of what we ordinarily experience as regard for self and regard for others.35 And since pastness is itself the basis of interdependence, mnemonic identity is therefore inextricably bound with social identity.36 The most important consequence of the Hartshornean notion that personal identity is partial identity is that the non-identity of one self with another self may also be partial. There is, to be sure, a difference between my relation to selves that belong to my own sequence, past and future, and my relation to other selves that do not belong to mine. But the difference is only relative.37 A thoroughgoing sociality is foundational to a metaphysics of selves and persons in Hartshorne’s philosophy. Here as well, the mnemonic structure of identity is the key, for in remembering—again, more in the metaphysical rather than in the psychological sense—what one remembers is no less than the feelings or experiences of another.38 Of course, it can be asked if memory were constitutive of relationality, why then do we not know the memories of other persons? Experience tells us that what we remember is radically our “own”. Hartshorne does not dispute this issue. But it hardly follows from the fact that we do not remember the memories of another as vividly as our own that we can have no direct experience of concrete events other than our own past states.39 Even our remembrance of our so-called own past states is never totally clear and distinct for we are not God. Moreover, as Hartshorne remarks, the maintenance of our personal integrity requires that we have a certain privacy or isolation of feeling from other human beings. Apart from any possible usefulness of telepathy, it is better for human beings that they are not in fact clearly and dis-

34

Albert Shalom and John C. Robertson Jr., “Hartshorne and the Problem of Personal Identity,” Process Studies, VIII, 3 (Fall, 1978), pp. 177-178. 35 Charles Hartshorne, “Whitehead’s Differences From Buddhism,” Philosophy East and West, XXV, 4 (October, 1975), p. 407. 36 Charles Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, op. cit., p. 197. 37 Charles Hartshorne, “Personal Identity from A to Z,” p. 213. 38 Charles Hartshorne, “The Social Structure of Experience,” Philosophy, XXXVI, 137 (April and July, 1961), p. 106. Hartshorne states that the query “Can I know another’s feelings as directly as I know my own?” is hardly distinguishable from the question, “Can I, as it were, ‘remember’ the feelings of another?” 39 Charles Hartshorne, “Lewis’s Treatment of Memory,” p. 403.

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tinctly aware of the feelings and experiences of their fellows.40 We can synthesize their many trivial feelings into one feeling on our own higher level. This instance of relationality—since it spans the gap between metazoan and cellular individuality, together with the relationality involved in memory—shows that there can be an analogy between self-knowledge and a hypothetical direct intuition of “other” minds.41 This is what Hartshorne means by the broadening of memory (again the term “mnemonic” is probably less misleading). For this reason—a point worth repeating—it must not be confused with Locke’s view on the status and role of memory in his version of personal identity. Hartshorne’s standpoint is shown to include not only nonhuman and even non-animal forms. Moreover, it is conceivable for an individual to remember past experiences belonging to other individuals. Causality must connect enduring individuals with one another, not simply with their own pasts and futures. Whitehead has shown that there is no absurdity in this.42 For Hartshorne, the otherness implicated in our experience of other persons, i.e. otherselves, is no more than the particular instance of the more general case which is disclosed by the relations we have, first to our bodily cells, and second, to our remembered past selves.43 From the idea that personal identity involves partial identity and non-identity—which therefore means that identity with one’s past selves is relative rather than absolute—Hartshorne extrapolates to the notion that our difference from other human beings, other-selves of a much higher level on the scale of beings, is likewise relative rather than absolute. The same causal connections hold in selfrelatedness and other-relatedness. One remembers one’s past experiences in quite the same way that one would remember the past experiences of others with whom one is acquainted. The difference in vividness notwithstanding, no absolute difference exists between the two types of remembering. Neither self-identity nor non-identity is absolute.44

40

Cf. Charles Hartshorne, “The Social Structure of Experience,” pp. 108-109. Ibid. p.108. See also Charles Hartshorne, “Lewis’s Treatment of Memory,” p. 403. 42 Charles Hartshorne, “Causal Necessities: an Alternative to Hume,” The Philosophical Review, XLIII, 4 (October 1954), p. 493. 43 Charles Hartshorne, “Whitehead’s Differences From Buddhism,” p. 407. 44 Charles Hartshorne, “Berdyaev as a Philosopher,” in David Bonner Richardson (ed.), Berdyaev’s Philosophy of History: an Existentialist Theory of Social Creativity and Eschatology (Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), p. xii. See also Charles Hartshorne, “Beyond Enlightened Self-Interest,” p. 397. 41

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This is the primacy of relatedness of which Hartshorne speaks.45 It is the core of Hartshorne’s account of personal identity, and is also the most central concept of an ethical discourse in his philosophy. And foundational to this theory of relatedness is the mnemonic structure of personal identity, which enables us to regard ourselves as a society of innumerable individuals, each of which could be regarded in its uniqueness, as another self.46 A person, in her deepest and innermost being, is truly altruistic. And by this we do not mean that a person is always and immediately selfless, or that because her nature is to be other-regarding, she will in fact act accordingly. Instead, what is meant by this altruism is that the nature of personhood is to be other-oriented, a person being a “society of past and future experiences bound together by a mode of sympathy which, in a specifically different but generically similar way, unites us also to the experiences belonging to the temporal societies constituting other personalities.”47 Hence, there can be no absolute independence of the self from other selves, both those belonging to its own sequence, as well as those not its own. And it can no longer be held, as did substantialistic theories of extreme individualism, that if all others were annihilated, the essential self would remain the same.48 For the identity of a person, as against a substance, is—from the perspective of Hartshorne’s philosophy—increased by its relations. As Whitehead says of an atom that it is a system of all things, we can say of self-identity, that it is a relational system of all selves. Personal identity is achieved by relationship. No entity is self-contained or absolutely unique in the sense of being unrelated to other entities and sharing nothing with them. This constitutes the most comprehensive and far-reaching statement that is an offshoot of the mode of philosophizing peculiar to this philosophy. Each person, like the world itself, is an indefinitely extended plenum of interrelated events, stretching all the way back to the events now shrouded in the mists of history, and all the way to the indefinite future which is the ever-growing consequent nature of God. It is the nature of the person to be relational; and the account of this nature as it is offered by Hartshorne’s metaphysics constitutes its most radical and comprehensive explanation. 45

See Charles Hartshorne, “Martin Buber’s Metaphysics,” in Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Martin Buber , The Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. 12 (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1967), p. 50. 46 Ibid. p. 55. 47 Charles Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process, op. cit. p. 64. 48 Lynne Belaief, Towards a Whiteheadian Ethics (Lanham, MD: University of America Press, 1984), p. 56.

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Ethics: The Self Transcending and the Self Transcended To what extent and on what basis is the self as social also ethical? What implications does it have for our life in society? Hartshorne’s conception of personal identity and the self does have ethical implications since, in contrast to egoism, the vocation of all reality, according to him, is to go beyond itself, to extend itself as far as it can, beyond its heretoforearrived-at boundaries. To exist is to be more, to expand and reach out. Actual entities are not locked up in that small portion of space and time where they are ordinarily understood to be located. Rather, the nature of an event is that of a constant struggle with its past “for objective existence beyond itself ” .49 Thus, while there may be a focal region—a concentration of activity—which we ordinarily refer to as a thing, this thing does not merely sit there. Rather, it transcends itself; or as Whitehead puts it, its “influence streaming away from it with finite velocity throughout the utmost recesses of time and space”.50 There is no separating the entity from this divergent stream overflowing its known limits. The idea that the vocation of event-actualities is always towards a “more” is enshrined by both Hartshorne and Whitehead in their ethical theory, the essence of which is captured by the terms “optimization”, “generalization”, “widened concern”, and “enlargement”.51 Ethical anthropology for both thinkers is therefore ultimately founded on a metaphysics of relationality and the nature of all entities as endlessly selftranscending.52 Such “ethics of enlargement” moreover requires a view of the event as somehow unbounded in terms of its other-regarding reach.53 It is an unboundedness that Hartshorne intimates by saying that the moment 49

Cf. Alfred North Whitehead, “The Analysis of Experience,” Process Philosophy: Basic Writings, eds., Jack R. Sibley and Pete A.Y. Gunter (New York: University Press of America, 1978), p. 256. 50 A.N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, op. cit., p. 202. 51 Charles Hartshorne, “Beyond Enlightened Self-Interest,” p. 12. See also Charles Hartshorne, “Continuity: The Form of Forms in Charles Peirce,” Monist, 39/4 (October, 1929), p. 531; Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, op.cit., p. xx; and Process and Reality, op. cit., n. 23, p. 15, where Whitehead states: “Morality of outlook is inseparably conjoined with generality of outlook”. 52 Cf. Lynne Belaief, “A Whiteheadian Account of Value and Identity,” Process Studies, 5/1 (Spring, 1975), p. 39. The author calls it a “creative ethics” or a theory of “creative evolution in the ethical life” which is founded on the idea that the essence of life itself is the gaining of intensity made possible by the genuineness of freedom. 53 Cf. Charles Hartshorne, “Continuity: The Form of Forms in Charles Peirce”, p. 531.

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a limit is decided upon, one “shall already have come in sight of passing beyond that limit”.54 With human individuals especially, such unboundedness takes on a much greater significance. For Hartshorne, thinking on a scale that goes with language—a human prerogative—carries with it the burden of being either ethical or unethical. Neutrality is not an option at all. Thinking extends the scope of an entity’s domain of concern and influence indefinitely, if not infinitely. Thus, it is the vocation of rational creatures to generalize, to go beyond themselves. Hartshorne believes that to be able to think is a privilege that brings with it the demand to have a goal that is both allembracing and eternal. Because of this, he calls the human being “the obligated animal”55 for whom being ethical cannot but entail “the generalization of instinctive concern, which in principle transcends the immediate state of the self and even the long-run career of the self, and embraces the ongoing communal process of life as such”.56 Hartshorne says that he is in basic agreement with Kant in maintaining that the ethical will is the rational will, and that this is the only form of will appropriate to a thinking animal. “Conscience,” Hartshorne adds, “is practical reason”.57 And he contends that the only end that can be said to make an absolute claim on the rational will is “the maximizing of the val-

54

Charles Hartshorne, “Beyond Enlightened Self-Interest,” p. 410. This is a view consistent with that perspective on reality that is peculiar to process philosophy, namely, the “unbounded” nature of each entity. See for instance, Process and Reality, op.cit., n. 104-105, p. 67, where Whitehead states that the actual entities that constitute the extensive continuum “pervade the continuum”, which in turn is “present in each actual entity”. This view represents a repudiation of the “punctual view” of entities such as is found in Newtonian physics and Cartesian philosophy, according to which there are atomic substances whose existence can be understood apart from the existence of any entity in its environment—the fallacy of “simple location”. 55 Charles Hartshorne, “Beyond Enlightened Self-Interest,” p. 409. It would be interesting to compare this with what Mencius says about human nature. Cf. Chapter Six: “Ethical Thinking and Formation: a Challenge for Life in Society”. 56 Ibid. p. 411. In words that parallel Hartshorne’s ideas here expressed, Whitehead says that the “antithesis between the general good and the individual interest can be abolished only when the individual is such that its interest is the general good, thus exemplifying the loss of the minor intensities in order to find them again with finer composition in a wider sweep of interest”. Cf. Process and Reality, op. cit., n. 23, p. 15. 57 Ibid. p. 411.

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ue-content of the universe”.58 Such, he admits, is a metaphysical as well as a theological principle. This represents a clear restatement on Hartshorne’s part of the point of contact between the ethical, metaphysical, and theological sciences that have become fragmented by the critique of what John Cobb calls a “victorious modernity”59 and pushed even further by the voice of postmodern deconstructionist modes of thinking. Hartshorne’s thought, mirroring much of process philosophy itself, recognizes the validity of the modern and deconstructionist critiques. The unquestioning use of reason and an uncritical regard for its power to give a unified voice to the diverse disciplines of thought which characterized pre-modern modes of thought is also rejected by Hartshorne, Whitehead, and other process thinkers. However, their thoughts diverge from the deconstructionist tendency of postmodernity in that they allow for the possibility of a constructive postmodern thought. The latter rejects modernity’s ideas of individualism, materialistic atomism, anthropocentrism, and its fragmentation of knowledge into academic disciplines.60 At the same time it retains modernity’s self-critical stance, its concern for the personal, commitment to human freedom and the freedom of inquiry. But it also attempts a recovery of certain premodern elements such as the unity of more organic traditions that were obscured and ridiculed by the triumphant march of modern thought. In regard to such, Cobb notes that “the mood is not so much to recover and renew earlier stages of Western thought as to search globally for insight and wisdom and for points of contact with new speculations arising from contemporary sciences.”61

Ethics and Aesthetics The supreme ethical principle is no less than the contribution to the creation of beauty, of intense and harmonious experience in ourselves, in and for others, to life in general, and ultimately, to the life of deity as the 58 Charles Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process, op. cit., p. 192. By this he means of course the adding of novel actualities to those that have already been realized. 59 John B. Cobb, “Two Types of Postmodernism: Deconstruction and Process,” Theology Today, 47 (July, 1990), p. 153. 60 Ibid. p.152. With regard to the “points of contact” that process philosophy has managed to create between the philosophical, scientific, and theological disciplines, Leonard Sweet provides a kind of counter-balance to Cobb’s more optimistic tone. See Leonard I. Sweet, “Straddling Modernism and Postmodernism,” Theology Today, 47 (July, 1990), pp. 159-164. 61 John B. Cobb, “Two Types of Postmodernism,” p. 53.

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supreme goal of all moral action.62 We are called, as Cobb points out, “to appropriate as broadly, as inclusively, as is possible from the past. The freshness and originality of our present being correlates positively with this inclusiveness. The task is to take elements that seem in themselves mutually opposed and mutually exclusive and to transform them into a novel contrast that gains richness and intensity through inclusion of the best of both”.63 This statement amply captures what Hartshorne calls the aesthetic basis of value theory in process philosophy. Its primary notion is that “aesthetic experience heightens the sense of subjective individuality through the intensity of enjoyment … evoking the awareness of compelling entities other than ourselves which lay their grip on us in such experiences”.64 For Hartshorne thus, the question, What is good? is inseparable from considerations that deal with what in experience is beautiful. “Goodness, truth and beauty”, he says, “overlap in important ways”.65 Ethics, in Hartshorne’s account, is thus intimately connected with aesthetics.66 In order to understand this association, it must first be noted that, according to Hartshorne, all qualities directly given in experience are aesthetic or emotional.67 This is an echo of Whitehead for whom all feelings are rooted in aesthetic experience.68 For Hartshorne, sensing is not so much like cognition (knowing), but is emotional (feeling) “in its utter im.

62 Cf. Charles Hartshorne, “Berdyaev as Philosopher,” Preface to David Bonner Richardson, Berdyaev’s Philosophy of History: An Existentialist Theory of Social Creativity and Eschatology, op. cit., p. xi. See also W. Widdick Schroeder, “Toward Belief: A Process Perspective on the Social Sciences and on Social Ethics,” Belief and Ethics: Essays in Ethics, the Human Sciences, and Ministry in Honor of W. Alvin Pitcher . Studies in Religion and Society, ed., W. Widdick Schroeder (Chicago: Center for the Scientific Study of Religion, 1978), p. 425. 63 John B. Cobb, “Two Types of Postmodernism,,” pp. 153-154. 64 Eva Schaper, “Aesthetic Perception” in The Relevance of Whitehead, ed., Ivor Leclerc (New York: Macmillan, 1961), p. 264. 65 Charles Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, op.cit., p. 31. Italics added See also Chapter XVII of Adventures of Ideas, op.cit., pp. 265-272 for Whitehead’s discussion of the relationship between the true and the beautiful. 66 Charles Hartshorne, “Beyond Enlightened Self-Interest,” p. 412. See also Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, op. cit., p. 308: “Since the intrinsic value of experience is by definition aesthetic value, and since goodness is the disinterested will to enhance the value of future experiences, ethics presupposes aesthetics”. 67 Ibid. p. 76. 68 Cf. A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, op.cit., n. 427, p. 280.

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mediacy and non-inferential character”.69 The immediately given is felt, for “there is no independent faculty of cognition which includes a neutral way of sensing qualities …. The given world is the enjoyed or suffered world.”70 What is felt is thus a component in the becoming of actual entities—the primary data, in fact. The given, which is felt, is productive of the process leading to the event’s satisfaction. But it is also determined by what the individual ultimately takes as important in actualizing its subjective aim. Since value depends upon the entity’s subjective interest, satisfaction is understood as dependent upon the achievement of harmony and intensity in the overall outline or pattern created by the event’s process of becoming. It is such intensity and harmony “arising not only from visual or auditory stimuli as in painting or music, but in experience of whatever sort”, that give life its value.71

The Good, the Aesthetic Matrix and Society The good, according to Hartshorne, is inseparable from this aesthetic matrix. In some places, in fact, he goes as far as saying that in certain ways aesthetic values are more ultimate than ethical ones.72 An ethically good act is one that brings about an increase or enlargement of this “good”. An individual optimizes it, not only for herself, but also for her environment, her community.73 Optimization of experience for oneself involves a widening of concern and an opting for the higher experience in place of a lower one. And according to Whitehead’s rather strong indictment of the latter, to choose it over the higher form is a kind of “destructive evil, purely

69

See: John Hospers, “Hartshorne’s Aesthetics,” The Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne, Vol. XX of The Library of Living Philosophers, ed., Lewis Edwin Hahn (La Salle: Open Court, 1991), p. 114. 70 Charles Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, op.cit., p. 76. 71 Charles Hartshorne, “Beyond Enlightened Self-Interest,” p. 412. He articulates further the relationship between ethics and aesthetics in Reality as Social Process, op. cit., p. 44. 72 Charles Hartshorne, “Idealism and Our Experience of Nature,” Philosophy, Religion, and the Coming World Civilization: Essays in Honor of William Ernest Hocking, ed., Leroy Rouner (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), p. 70. 73 Charles Hartshorne, “ Beyond Enlightened Self-Interest,” p. 412. Hartshorne argues that there are two senses by which an act can be regarded as ethically good. First, it makes its contribution to the harmony and intensity of experience, both in itself and in others. And second, the repercussion of the act will be the enhancement of possibilities for intense and harmonious experiences among the other entities in the individual’s environment.

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self-regarding”.74 This type of evil decried by Whitehead is that stable “goodness” that refuses to broaden one’s outlook through a willingness to respond in a sympathetic way to an ever-widening range of elements, inharmonious as they may at first seem. Instead, one narrows one’s field of attention if only to block fear-inducing and stressful elements of discord. Whitehead refers to this as the choice for “perfection at a low level” which “ranks below imperfection with higher aim”.75 Optimization of experience for the community, on the other hand, involves not merely striving towards the good for others, but also aiming at that which is better. The concrete embodiment of this first level of optimization is social progress, and its key concept is adventure. In The Function of Reason, Whitehead describes the art of life as the impetus “to live, to live well, to live better”.76 To be ethical in this regard is to seek to contribute to the realization of a society’s ideal of itself, concretely embodied for instance in its churches, governments, educational system, and whatever else constitutes a society’s overall structure.77 He warns of the danger of an individual’s arrival at a static form of goodness. He likewise highlights the danger to a society of what he calls the “Gospel of Uniformity” which quells the urge towards betterment by a conformation to established ideals leading to nothing more than static repetition and the gradual but certain slide toward minor forms of experience. The need for adventure in the maintenance of the freshness of the human spirit is captured by Whitehead in these words: When man ceases to wander, he will cease to ascend the scale of being. Physical wandering is still important, but greater still is the power of man’s spiritual adventures—adventures of thought, adventures of passionate feeling, adventures of aesthetic experience. A diversification among human communities is essential for the provision of the incentive and material for the Odyssey of the human spirit. Other nations of different habits are not enemies: they are godsends. Men require of their neighbours something sufficiently akin to be understood, something sufficiently different to provoke attention, and something great enough to command admiration.78

A second dimension of the call to optimize experience for the community is an extension and enlargement upon the first. It is founded upon the widest possible generalization from what Hartshorne takes to be the 74

A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit., n. 525, p. 346. A.N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, op. cit., p. 263. 76 A.N. Whitehead, The Function of Reason, op. cit., p. 14. 77 Ibid. p. 65. 78 A.N. Whitehead, Science in the Modern World, op. cit., p. 258. 75

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most fundamental principle of other-regarding concern, namely, “the appeal of life for life, of feeling for feeling, experience for experience, consciousness for consciousness”.79 And for him, it is the contribution of individual creatures to the life of deity that serves as the ultimate motive for good action. Thus, he says that we are “co-workers with God, in that we add nuances of feeling to the ocean of feeling” which is the richness of God’s ever-growing experience.80 And for Hartshorne, there is no simple “and” between God and the world—the latter being included in the allembracing nature of the former. Thus, the raising of one’s goal from a purely local, i.e. individual concern, to a universal one, i.e. one that seeks to contribute to the ongoing growth of God’s relational pole, renders one a true citizen of the world in the sense that the ultimate value is cosmic citizenship.81 It is a belongingness that entails a willingness to contribute to the ongoing life and development of the whole. On the cosmic level this is the essence of the universal fellowship of all creatures; and on the human level, the notion of human brotherhood.82The “movement” towards ever-widening circles of concern and influence is at the centre of the reflections on ethics and social relations in both Hartshorne and Whitehead. As has already been noted, a morally good act has, as its ultimate foundation, the contribution of richness and intensity of experience, to oneself but also, and more importantly, to other selves, both now and in the future. Hartshorne therefore emphasizes that without such an aim “beyond self, and even beyond any merely human good, life on this temporary planet seems as absurd as Sartre says it is”.83 Harmony and intensity are two significantly entwined elements of the optimization of aesthetic experience.84 Both of these elements depend up-

79

Charles Hartshorne, “Beyond Enlightened Self-Interest,” p. 398; See also his, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, op. cit., p. xx. 80 Charles Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process, op. cit., p. 204. Hartshorne’s concept of God differs from the classical theistic conception. He maintains that God has a concrete aspect to which all reality contributes. See my God in Process Thought: a Study in Charles Hartshorne’s Concept of God, with a postscript by Charles Hartshorne (Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985). 81 Charles Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process, op. cit., p. 195. 82 Charles Hartshorne, Logic of Perfection, op. cit,, pp. 310, 322. 83 Charles Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, op. cit., p. 316. 84 Charles Hartshorne, “Beyond Enlightened Self-Interest,” p. 412: “Here ethics must lean upon aesthetics. For the only good that is intrinsically good, good in itself, is good experience, and the criteria for this are aesthetic. Harmony and intensity come close to summing it up.” [Italics added.] See also his Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, op. cit., p. 303, where Hartshorne points out that har-

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on a concept that is integral to our attempt at understanding Hartshorne’s concept of personhood and personal identity. This is the notion of contrast which is given an important niche in Hartshorne’s theory of aesthetic value85, and which he defines as “the amount of diversity integrated into an experience”.86 Beauty for Hartshorne is a “balance”, a harmonization of unity and variety.87 In this he follows the old Aristotelian ideal of the golden mean which regards the mean as the desirable quality between the two undesirable extremes of the hopelessly monotonous, arrived at when there is too little contrast, and the hopelessly chaotic, which results when there is too little similarity. In this regard, harmony is first and foremost “a kind of relation between things such that though they are felt to be different from each other … are yet felt to be not merely different”.88 It is the harmonization of elements otherwise diverse and contrasting that makes something beautiful. This harmonization is achieved only through the interweaving of pronounced unlikeness with pronounced likeness. Hartshorne sums it up: “Contrast is essential to maintaining the vitality of life’s harmonies”.89 Harmony, however, according to Hartshorne, also involves the interweaving of expectation and fulfillment as well as the ingression of “that unforeseen novelty [which is] as essential as the realization of the foreseen”.90 This constitutes the temporal aspect of the contrast involved in harmony which Hartshorne tries to explain by giving several examples. He asks us first to consider what sometimes happens when we listen to a beautiful piece of music. The point comes when, because of our having become too familiar with it, its magic disappears; and it becomes possible for us to anticipate its future passages in great detail. At such moment, we begin to get tired of it. Excitement has died down, and we may decide that it is time to listen to something else and not to listen to the familiar piece mony alone is not a sufficient condition of great value; intensity must likewise be present—hence the intertwinement of the two in his theory. 85 Ibid. p. 59. 86 Ibid. p. 303. The entire second chapter: “Harmony in Life and Nature”, of Hartshorne’s book Reality as Social Process is given to a discussion of the “essential” role “contrast” plays in maintaining the harmony of life. Cf. pp., 44-52. 87 Charles Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, op. cit., p. 304. 88 Charles Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process, op. cit., p. 45. 89 Ibid. p. 47. 90 Cf. Charles Hartshorne, “Contingency and the New Era in Metaphysics,” Journal of Philosophy, 29 (1932), p. 466. Hartshorne remarks that the same holds true for painting, “which is not a wholly timeless art, since vision is perpetually shifting its attention from point to point”. Also his Reality as Social Process, op. cit., pp. 49, 51.

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for some time. We become bored when what was new becomes old. Moreover, the excitement that powers the scientific enterprise is also an illustration of the role the new and the different play in the realization of harmony. Science, being a romantic adventure, is a means of widening the horizons of beauty.91 The more one knows about the past, the more likely it is that one becomes less capable of being satisfied with its mere repetition. One would want something new, something different.92 And this is perfectly consistent with the reconciliation of order and novelty at which process philosophy strives to arrive.93 Hartshorne calls our attention also to the phenomenon that “in highly civilized communities fashions succeed each other in rapid succession in spite of the protests of those who are able to avoid discord between past and present only by avoiding all vital contrast between them”.94 The entrance of what is new and different is an integral part of our experience as human beings.95 Hence, while being ethical, as Whitehead says, requires of us the “control of process so as to maximize importance”,96 it is likewise an ethical demand—and for both thinkers, a much bigger one at that—to save process from decay and deterioration through the welcoming of novelty which is additionally creative and which alone can further the value of experience.97 Moreover, since time is change through and through, the genuineness and freshness of harmony can only be maintained with the bold use of contrast.98 Pronounced contrast is thus the essence of intensity; it is what gives strength and vitality to art, to na-

91

Charles Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method, op. cit., p. 311. Lynn Belaief, “A Whiteheadian Account of Value and Identity,” Process Studies, p. 35. 93 A.N. Whitehead, Modes of Thought, op. cit., p. 142. Even Whitehead would say that “the form of process is not wholly dependent upon derivation from the past. As epochs decay amid futility and frustration, the form of process derives other ideals involving novel forms of order.” 94 Charles Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process, op. cit., p. 51. In a similar vein, but involving a civilization on a much larger scale, Whitehead makes the comment that “on the whole, the great ages have been unstable ages”. Science in the Modern World, op. cit., p. 208. 95 Charles Hartshorne, “Contingency and the New Era in Metaphysics”, p. 466. 96 A.N. Whitehead, Modes of Thought, op.cit., p. 19. 97 Thus both thinkers reject static and unchangeable moral codes as a dogmatic and dangerous error. Charles Hartshorne, “Beyond Enlightened Self-interest,” p. 413; A.N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, op. cit., pp. 59, 291. 98 Charles Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process, op. cit., p. 51. 92

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ture, and to life itself.99 As experience arrives at the point of culmination, and teeters on the brink of staleness, the introduction of elements of stronger contrast serves to further intensify the harmony already achieved, bringing it to an even higher level of value.

Another Look at Hartshorne’s View of Self as Social Taking up once again the notion of personal identity in Hartshorne’s philosophy, we note that it is incurably abstract.100 This is why he regards the notion of a self-same ego as a stumbling block to an account of personal identity. He has difficulties with the notion that the self is a thinglike substance. Likewise, he looks askance at the view that whatever occurs in one’s mind and one’s thoughts is no more than the activity of a substantial entity of a certain kind, whether this is a physical brain or a substantial mind. Personal identity, for Hartshorne, encompasses a much wider domain than the simple question of the trans-temporal sameness of a numerically-identical self. It also involves delving into a far more complex 99

Ibid. pp. 46-48. These are the three areas which Hartshorne singles out as providing clear instantiations of harmony. 100 The discussion here is a philosophical one. Personal identity is also an important psychological consideration—with social implications. The question “Who am I?” is at times a very personal search for one’s significance in society. It can also be a search for one’s origins. For instance, a number of those who have been trying to locate their birth mothers have voiced this concern intensely. It became again a topic of discussion in Ireland following the release of the movie, Philomena. It has also put the spotlight on the practice of adopting the babies of unwed mothers, particularly in the past. (Recently, the real Philomena lent her name and her support to a group which is seeking information that will enable mothers and their separated children to find one another—thereby regaining their lost or missing identities). Similarly, personal identity is behind the question as to what makes one stand out from everyone else. Because often we define ourselves by our jobs and careers, when these are gone, we seem to “lose our identity”. In the present scenario in society of unemployment and the downsizing of businesses, the question results in a crisis for many. For example, Kate Holmquist writes that Irish men who have been severely affected by unemployment and reduced earnings are suffering an identity crisis—affecting negatively those around them. See her “Men Overboard,” Irish Times Weekend Review, October 5, 2013, pp. 1-2. The issue of identity is also entangled in legal complications as demonstrated recently in the Irish courts regarding the maternity claim over the child by the woman whose egg was in her sister’s womb. Support for the claim is based on the new understanding of genetic identity based on DNA findings against the traditional understanding of motherhood based on the experience of giving birth.

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conglomeration of ideas and concerns than theories dealing only with numerical identity. Hartshorne’s rejection of substance ontology as a foundation for a theory of personal identity is based on the thesis that “persons” and “selves” encompass a far greater and richer range of concepts than which belongs to an unchanging substrate localizable within a definite spatiotemporal locus. The classical conception of substance as located within a fixed spatiotemporal locus, existing in isolation from every other substance, and related to another only externally, far from being the reality itself, is already an interpretation of reality. That we encounter books, tables, chairs, trees, humans, far from being the primordial and original approach to the real, is already an interpretation on our part, conditioned to a very great extent, by the weakness of our senses and, to some degree, by the manner in which we have been accustomed to use them. According to Hartshorne, it is “events” (as process philosophy and much of contemporary physics tell us) that we actually encounter. The mind abstracts from the overwhelming richness of reality, focusing on a specific locus in order to “get a handle” on things, in order to manage what would otherwise be an unmanageable complexity. Harmless and useful as it may seem at first, this abstraction, transformed into dogma, becomes a hindrance to an adequate description of the richness and complexity of the real. Whitehead has termed it the “fallacy of simple location”; and it has transformed, what is merely a “way of approaching the real”, into a complete and dogmatic description of reality itself—a map turned into the reality it attempts to describe: this is method transformed into metaphysics. It has likewise transformed what is no more than a useful way of starting an investigation into the nature of a “person” into a doctrine concerning this very nature. It is an abstraction that has come to define theories of personal identity. The difficulties affecting the substantial view of persons and of reality itself is not that obvious, says Hartshorne. This is what makes it more dangerous; but it is also why rejecting it is even more important. Hartshorne regards the substantialistic notion of person as foundational to an ethics of self-interest and a morality that puts oneself and everything else that is closely or even remotely related to it, over and above the interests, concerns, and needs of others. There is no question about the difference between one’s concern for oneself and one’s concern for another. Hartshorne does not deny the difference. But it is the absolutizing of this dis-

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tinction which he most emphatically rejects.101 For it leads ultimately to the enshrining of an enduring self untouched by change, a selfsame ego in a metaphysics of the person, and consequently the raising to the level of dogma an ethics that says one must love oneself first before (and in order to be able to love) others. There is a difference between the self and its others. But it is relative, not absolute. Self-identity is always and inextricably bound up with otheridentity. This represents a most comprehensive insight of process thought. The key to understanding this concept is Hartshorne’s theory of personal identity based on a metaphysics of event that reverses the very relation by which “stability” and “change” have been traditionally conceived. Although mutually dependent, one term expresses the complete reality of the entire relation. The other in fact acquires its content by being inserted into the descriptive domain of the more concrete concept. Change and stability are such a kind of metaphysical pair. Traditionally, of course, the latter has been regarded as the more important and inclusive term. A substance remains unchanged, but not its accidents, just as a person remains identical throughout her lifetime, with only her accidental features changing. The self is untouched by these transformations, i.e. however close to the core of its being these changes may be, and even if the entire cosmos were to disappear, the person would still remain herself. Contrary to this traditional view, Hartshorne holds that change is the more original and concrete experience from which the derivative notion of stability is abstracted. The situation is analogous to the relation between being and becoming. For process thought, becoming is reality itself, and being is only an aspect of this reality. Becoming can be taken as inclusive without suppressing the contrast between itself and being. The opposite case would destroy this contrast. That which remains the same in a person is no more than an abstraction derived from that which constantly changes. An unchanging identity is the abstract correlate of the concrete reality which is the self that is different at every moment. This does not amount to a denial of enduring individuality or of a specific subject having definite experiences. Instead, it is an assertion that each new experience that a subject undergoes represents a novel actuality for that subject. It is the present subject of the experiences that is concrete; the “I here and now”, not the subject simply. There is no denying a stable “I”, therefore—hence, there is personal responsibility—but this stable “I” is no more than a limited portion of the entire sequence or series of “I’s”. It is 101

Cf. Chapter Three: “Distinct, not Separate: a Critique of Dualistic Thinking of and in Society”.

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this series that Hartshorne calls a “personal society”. It is constituted by innumerable other-selves, and is given integrity, not by some underlying substrate that remains unchanged throughout the vicissitudes of the personal society’s career, but by a “defining characteristic” which is no more than a blueprint of possibilities for further becoming. It is held together as it realizes these possibilities by a “regnant member” of the society of events. Experience gives witness to the structure of such personal societies. Hartshorne’s use of “memory” (again, understood as mnemonic) as an explanatory tool enables us to make sense of the causal structure involved in the coming-to-be of events on the one hand, and of persons on the other. Hence, unlike other philosophers for whom memory is that which actually constitutes the identity of persons, Hartshorne understands memory as a conceptual apparatus which, by means of its asymmetrical causal structure, discloses the fact that causality, contrary to Hume, is actually experientiable. Consequently, this is true of the causal chain that unifies into a coherent life of a person what are actually innumerable “other-selves” which are both partially the same and partially different. Here, too, the situation is such that what is different encompasses a wider domain and actually includes within its compass what is selfsame. For what is likewise revealed by the experience of memory is that the self doing the remembering is not simply reducible to (or even deducible from) the thoughts, experiences, or deeds it is actually remembering. The present self doing the remembering is a new creation, fashioned out of the data of the past (which it remembers) but synthesized into a new reality by the present creative moment.102 In other words, that stable “I” is also responsible for the shaping of the new “I”—and that is where one’s ethical accountability can also be located in this ethical theory.103

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This notion of creative synthesis is discussed further in Chapter Eight: “Human Freedom, its Power and Limits: Some Implications for Life in Society”. 103 Responsibility in this way of thinking is extended over time, an important consideration for the kind of legacy that we inherit as well as leave behind. This is an issue that challenges notions of social accountability for deeds that we personally have not committed but are attributable to the history of the society or institution to which we belong.

CHAPTER SIX ETHICAL THINKING AND FORMATION: A CHALLENGE FOR LIFE IN SOCIETY

The Challenge of an Ethical Life in Society Living in society and interacting with others inevitably result in challenges which have an ethical significance. While the question “What should I do?” can often be a simple request for information or advice, at other times it can be for a more serious consideration because it is seeking an answer to a fundamental query of what one ought or ought not to do and whether it is right or wrong. That question is raised on a number of occasions and in different contexts. For this reason, among others, ethics has become a particularly relevant topic for ordinary discussion in addition to being a subject for serious study. It has a very long tradition, of course; but nowadays one hears frequently of the need, because of abuses or concerns, to formulate and adopt ethical codes in various areas or professions. Advances in science and technology resulting in new developments in various fields, including medicine, have presented fresh ethical problems, some of which could hardly have been anticipated. The banking and financial sectors have even been accused of moral bankruptcy. The perception of a loss of moral values in society has sparked off a persistent demand for more ethical training at home, in schools, and in society in general. There has also been a call to upgrade the moral status of a country.1 For various reasons, not all of which are altruistic or disinterested, “ethical,” “responsibility” and “accountability” have indeed become buzz words in present-day society. Ethics and ethical issues do indeed continue to challenge us individually and collectively.2 1

This was particularly evident in the 2008 American elections. Such a call has been echoed in other countries and contexts. 2 Ethics has literally become fashionable! In the Irish Times Magazine (March 14, 2009), the article with the comment “Ethical fashion is big business.” states: “At the recent London Fashion Week, the most extensive area in the Exhibition Hall

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The felt need for ethics, however, is translated into different expectations or conception of ethics and its challenges. There has always been a tendency to regard ethics as concerned with rules and regulations. Today that view equates ethics with codes of conduct. As a result, the ethical challenge is identified with the formulation, adoption and implementation of a set of clear guidelines that will regulate and evaluate behaviour or practice. This is particularly true in several professional bodies such as in medicine, science or business. Increasingly, this understanding of ethics also seems to underlie the call for ethics among politicians as can be seen in the kind of ethics committees formed for that purpose. Politicians are even hauled before such committees to establish whether their behaviour can be deemed ethically appropriate. Another common conception of ethics is that it is a matter of taking a position or even having an opinion on specific situations. Many times the debates on euthanasia, abortion, or evolving family structures, come down to this. Behind such a view of ethics is the assumption that ethics is ultimately a subjective judgment or decision that one makes. In some cases, it is even equated with simply expressing what one believes or even what one feels about the matter. It is an assumption that is at times expressed as “in ethics there are no right or wrong answers”, a statement that results from realizing, but mistakenly interpreting, the complexity of arriving at an acceptable ethical point of view. It is also heard in statements such as, “in ethical matters, I want to be able to assert my freedom or to have a choice”, a claim that emphasizes the subjective nature of the decision. Still another conception of ethics, which has long roots in society, is that it is the general consensus of the individuals composing that society. That view is sometimes referred to as “conventional or the majority view”. One’s behaviour is expected to be in line with what is agreed upon by that society. Sometimes this is equated with the culture of a particular people. Such an understanding of ethics especially comes to the fore as we become more aware of the diversity in the ways of life throughout the world. was Esthetica, which was showcasing ethical designer fashion and which grows bigger each season…. It is all part of a growing awareness of how, where and in what conditions our clothes are made.”(p. 22). Moreover, Fashion Theory (December 2008) contains essays on topics like slow fashion, ethical branding and the consumer, eco tech fashion and celebrity chick, and the “green commodity fetish” (www.ingentaconnect.com). See also, Rosemary MacCabe, “A Slow Revival: is Ethical Clothing Coming Back into Fashion?” The Irish Times, January 13, 2014, p. 11. The Irish Times Travel Supplement (every Saturday) also regularly carried a column titled “Ethical Tourism” which provided information to those who wished to take ethical considerations into account in their travels.

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Ethical Thinking But ethics and its challenges are much more than these—when we take into account the nature and status of the moral agents and the factors which make up ethical decision-making itself. In ethics, one is simply not talking about asking for directions or guidelines. Nor is the agent merely an implementer of a pre-established rule or guideline. Although in judging what is ethical or not and in deciding which course of action to take, there is greater involvement on the part of the agent, this does not mean that an ethical decision is merely a matter of preference or choice. It is not necessarily the majority view of society or the culture of that society either. Because of our make-up as human beings, endowed with intellect and free will, such decisions and actions should be characterized with a certain amount of reflection and freedom on our part. It is for this reason that one must distinguish mere instinctive behaviour from human conduct in various contexts and the cultural from the social. Furthermore, exercising one’s freedom is not the same as exercising one’s freedom responsibly.3 In ethical considerations, one cannot overemphasize the importance of thinking. While it would be rather naïve and even mistaken to claim that in the various expectations and conceptions of ethics sketched above and the ethical task mentioned earlier there is no thinking involved, it is nevertheless true that in some cases the injunction to simply “follow your heart”, “trust your feelings”, or “go with the flow” would convey that impression. The same point could be made with the insistence on “abiding by the code” or “following the laws of society.” But there is a greater and more urgent need to think through the judgments we make and the decisions we take in ethical situations. We should also investigate more critically the basis of and motivation for such judgments and decisions. Moreover, in ethics, as well as in other areas of life, it is important to have an overall vision that should ground, inform and support any judgment or decision we make. An ethical act is a rational activity that is undertaken by rational agents. Philosophy, as an academic discipline, and not just in ethics, has always been associated with this line of enquiry. In fact, philosophy as the love of wisdom is indeed interested not merely in raising questions to advance our knowledge but also, and even more importantly so, in pursuing any answers received in the hope of arriving at a more consistent and defensible point of view. Regrettably, often philosophical thinking—in the 3

See Chapter Eight: “Human Freedom, its Power and Limits: Some Implications for Life in Society”.

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view of many, including some philosophers themselves—is seen to be such an intellectual exercise that it is perceived to be divorced from the concrete concerns of ordinary life. Rationality is often interpreted— unfortunately, some philosophical squabbles illustrate this—to mean disembodied thinking! Admittedly, as we engage in more serious and protracted thinking—as is done in philosophy and in other disciplines—it could appear more and more abstract. This is inevitable. But hopefully this consequence of the pursuit of wisdom does not lessen the valuable advantage to our daily lives or restrict our ability to conduct what is really a human exercise. In addressing the fundamental challenge of ethical thinking in society, it will be instructive to probe into the teachings of an ancient Confucian philosopher, Mencius, whose concerns in these matters are particularly significant to this day.4 In turning to his views, we will examine two philosophical considerations: his notion of human nature and his understanding of moral responsibility. Unlike some of his contemporaries who advised rulers on political, legal and military strategies in dealing with society’s problems, Mencius highlights the importance of ethical thinking and living.5 According to Benjamin I. Schwartz, Mencius maintains that the source of disorder in society is the evil deeds of evil rulers and that any intellectual confusion and violence in civil society are simply the symptoms and consequences, rather than the causes. Accordingly, Mencius insists on the need to nurture and develop moral guidelines to assist the rulers of his society and promote the moral growth of their people.6 Schwartz adds that Mencius argues that only those who are “wholly motivated by the right who can in any long run produce a good society”, and he sets out to prove that “the achievement of a good society depends wholly on the inherent moral intentionality of good men.”7 Later in the essay we will consider the relevance and appropriateness of his insights to contemporary society. 4

A discussion of this topic raises expectation of specifics. Mencius, the book containing the philosophical teachings attributed to the thinker Mencius, does provide practical and even detailed advice to rulers. In addition, it comments on various activities and rulings of named rulers of his own and past times, including on the assumption of power. However, the present essay focuses mainly on a general consideration of the ethical issues. 5 Cf. James Legge, trans. The Works of Mencius (N.Y.: Dover Publications, 1990). 6 Benjamin L. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 258-9. 7 Ibid. p. 263.

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The Moral Nature of Humans Confucius teaches that “by nature, men are very much the same, it is through practice that they drift apart”.8 While he provides guidance on the practice of morality, it was left to his later disciples like Mencius and Hsün Tzu, who take different routes in their development of the Master’s insight due to the pressing concerns of their times, to analyze the nature of human beings.9 Dealing with the seemingly theoretical issues was regarded by the two disciples as essential to unraveling the more practical question as to how practice makes individuals “drift apart”, which takes place specifically in the context of one’s life in society. Mencius argues that humans are naturally good, an innate quality that needs to be developed while Hsün Tzu teaches that goodness is acquired by, rather than in-bred in, human beings.10 D.C. Lau maintains that the reason for the divergence in Hsün Tzu’s views stems from a different understanding of “natural”. This Confucian disciple holds that for a characteristic to be natural, it must be “inseparable from that thing, impossible to learn to do or learn to do better through application”.11 In other words, Hsün Tzu is looking for what is inseparable while Mencius has his sight on what is distinctive.12 In focusing on what we can learn from Mencius regarding the moral nature of humans, we could take as the starting point a particular teaching attributed to him: “Slight is the difference between man and the brutes. The common man loses this distinguishing feature while the gentleman retains it.”13 Like Aristotle, Mencius starts with what humans have in common with non-humans; but unlike him, Mencius singles out the heart, rather than rationality, as the distinguishing feature of humans. Although 8

Confucius, The Analects trans. Raymond Dawson (Oxford University Press, 1993), xvii, 2. 9 Cf. Herrlee G. Creel, Chinese Thought: From Confucius to Mao Tse-Tung (University of Chicago Press, 1953); Fung Yu-Lau, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy (N.Y.: The Macmillan Company, 1962) 10 Wing-tsit Chan, trans. and comp., A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy (N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973). 11 D.C. Lau provides the ability to see as an example: “This can be considered part of the nature of the eye, because it cannot be separated from the eye. An eye that cannot see is not, properly speaking, an eye at all. Further, seeing is something that we can learn and we do not improve our ability to see through application.” Cf. his “Introduction,” Mencius (Penguin Books, 1988), p. 21. 12 On this point, it may be useful to refer to Chapter Three: “Distinct, not Separate: A Critique of Dualistic Thinking in and about Society”. 13 Mencius (iv. B.19).

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this forms a small part of human nature, it is nevertheless unique to humans. By “heart”, however, is not simply the biological organ that living creatures possess. For Mencius it is the source of morality. Moreover, he holds that the function of the heart is to think, not conceptually but morally.14 At the same time, this way of viewing the heart and its function shows that Mencius, like his contemporaries, does not separate the physical body from non-physical activities. At the same time, he holds that human beings who merely look after their physical needs are no more than mere brutes. In fact, he maintains that humans who care about their “higher desires and needs”—foremost of which is morality—do develop their human nature more fully, as the sages do.15 Schwartz points out that Mencius believes that “only if humans understand that what is right is inherent in their ‘natures’ can they be brought to exercise their responsibilities as moral agents.”16 This is where Mencius parts company with Hsün Tzu for whom human nature is bad and who considers it as consisting of desires. Fulfilling these desires inevitably results in conflict, given the scarcity of goods and the competing desires of individuals. Since for Hsün Tzu conflict is bad and the consequence is bad, human nature itself is bad. On the other hand, like Mencius he emphasizes the importance of moral activity. He believes that it will resolve the situation, as had been observed by the sages, insofar as it will result in a set of rules which will clearly designate what everyone is entitled to, given the scarcity of goods. Moral action needs to be developed. Morality, therefore, in Hsün Tzu’s view is invented and humans can be trained to act contrary to their bad nature and its desires. In contrast, Mencius maintains that the essentially moral nature of the human heart, is bedded in four incipient tendencies17: “compassion”, 14

Schwartz explains that “the category of the heart/mind (hsin) is certainly as important as the category of the ‘nature’ (hsing) itself…. The hsin is, in fact, the ultimate ‘locus’ of that part of man’s nature which differentiates him from other animals. The hsing is, rightly understood, the innate tendency of the heart to grow toward the full actualization of its moral capacities.” op. cit., p. 266. A recent television documentary aired on BBC Four on 10 July 2012 provides an interesting and well-documented account of the role of the heart which is strikingly reminiscent of Mencius’s view. Cf. “Heart versus Mind: What Makes Us Human?” David Malone, a science documentary maker, concludes that contemporary science is restoring to the heart its unique role in making us truly human. Mencius would agree with what John Keats wrote and quoted in Malone’s documentary: “I am certain of nothing but the holiness of the heart’s affections and the truth of the imagination”. 15 Mencius (vii. A.21; vii. A. 38). 16 Schwartz, op.cit., p. 264. 17 This is comparable to Aristotle’s “potentialities” which need to be actualized.

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“shame”, “courtesy and modesty”, and “right and wrong”. Compassion is the germ of benevolence; shame, of dutifulness; courtesy and modesty, of observance of the rites; and right and wrong, of wisdom. Each of these tendencies is significant in its own way. Compassion, which enables humans to sympathize with one another, is the strongest motive to moral action18 while the feeling of shame makes them aspire to be better human beings and to advance morally.19 The observance of rites, which is also highlighted by Mencius, is more than the dutiful fulfillment of rituals—a practice attacked by Confucius’s critics. In Mencius’s development of this teaching, the tendency of courtesy and modesty is a restriction on selfaggrandizement. It prompts one to be more other-centred. The tendency of right and wrong is what enables humans to distinguish right from wrong and to approve what is right and disapprove what is wrong. Mencius stresses that this tendency, while it does not necessarily mean doing what is right and avoiding what is wrong, does account, in conjunction with the sense of shame, for the realization that what one has done is right or wrong. Mencius is careful to point out that these tendencies, while containing the germs of moral activity, do need to be nurtured and developed. Otherwise, contrary habits will take over. All he is claiming is that they are pre-conceptual and pre-action, and for that reason he understands them to be natural in human beings. No one is, in his view, devoid of these, no matter how transitory or momentary they may be. Mencius thus provides us with an account of human nature as having an inborn moral capacity. This capacity is shown in the four tendencies that he has identified as present in every human being. They do need to be developed actively, or at least unhindered from burgeoning into fulfillment. Ultimately, however, they are all one and the same inasmuch as they are what enable the human individual to become moral.20 In short, Mencius maintains that human nature is at heart good. Since humans have the built-in capacity, it is with18

The well-known passage from Mencius, puts it this way: “Suppose a man were, all of a sudden, to see a young child on the verge of falling into a well. He would certainly be moved to compassion, not because he wanted to get in the good graces of the parents, nor because he wished to win the praise of his fellow villagers or friends, nor yet because he disliked the cry of the child.” (II.A.6). 19 As he puts it, “”Only when a man will not do some things is he capable of doing great things.” Ibid. ((IV.B.8). 20 Mencius holds that all humans have been bestowed by Heaven with an intelligence, which he understands to mean a mind which can think and reason and a capacity to know what is just and right and what is fitting expression of one’s humanity. He adds that what characterizes the wise and noble is their utmost dedication to cultivating what is peculiarly human.

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in their reach to exercise benevolence and to train themselves to make the correct responses.21 How one develops these tendencies marks a “gentleman” off from the “small man”. The former pursues morality above everything else while the latter concentrates on self-interest to the detriment of morality. The two goals are not necessarily incompatible; it is what dictates one’s ultimate action or what is given priority that differentiates the two kinds of individuals. The gentleman follows his heart while the small man gives in to his desires or the lesser parts of his nature. The following quote from Mencius expresses this point succinctly: “One who is guided by the interests of his person that are of greater importance is a great man; one who is guided by the interests of his person that are of smaller importance is a small man.” 22 But Mencius, like Confucius, does not see a necessary opposition between looking after one’s own interest, e.g. profit or one’s welfare, and pursuing the demands of moral living. Again, continuing the Master’s practical view, he accepts that adequate physical nourishment and the satisfaction of all basic material needs are part and parcel of human nature. Only when they stand in the way of the moral quest must these be relegated to a secondary place or even sacrificed. He stresses that morality is our proper end as human beings, unlike other beings for whom those needs and desires are dominant. Consequently, the gentleman, on the way to becoming a sage, seeks morality out and pursues it wholeheartedly. In a tone comparable to Kant, Mencius regards the pursuit of morality itself, rather than its achievement, as the most important human endeavour. In fact, seeking morality is already being moral. Mencius pursues the question of what makes humans, who are inherently good, nevertheless go astray. Schwartz explains that Mencius believes that there are forces within and without the individual which impede and even thwart moral development. Schwartz explains: “The vital psychophysical energy of chi’ which expresses itself in man’s emotions, passions, and appetites (which are quite natural in themselves) can easily become disordered, unbalanced, and depleted; and this imbalance itself blocks and enfeebles the heart’s inertial tendency toward goodness.”23 This can happen because of the individual’s habits formed by the choices made as well as through interactions in the socio-political environment which serves as the context in which those choices are made and activities carried out. On the other hand, Mencius also argues that it is within the 21

See, for comparison on this conception of human nature, Chapter Five: “The Individual and Society: a Philosophical Conception of the Self as Social”. 22 Mencius (VI.A.15). 23 Schwartz, op. cit., p. 277.

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individual’s innate capacity to turn to inner resources to withstand those obstacles and even overcome them through assiduous moral strivings. Mencius advocates that one can master one’s emotions and desires or channel them to enable one to make moral existential decisions that will promote one’s moral growth. Again, it is within one’s inner resources that one can interact with and respond to the various challenges in one’s society in a moral way. As he puts it: “If one makes one’s stand on what is of greater importance in the first instance, what is of smaller importance cannot displace it. In this way, one cannot but be a great man”. 24 In short, like Confucius, Mencius’s message is one of hope, based on a certain faith in human nature.25

The Continuing Challenge of Ethics in Societal Life In ethical matters it is imperative that we make an effort, as Mencius points out, to develop our tendencies or aptitude for moral life. Moreover, —to repeat what has been stressed earlier— we also need to engage in serious and protracted thinking if we want to arrive at a more coherent and more defensible judgment of what is ethical or not. Such a step is crucial for enabling us to act on what has been reasonably judged to be the right decision. While engaging in this activity will not necessarily prevent us from carrying out unethical deeds, it will nevertheless point us to, and may even motivate us to move, in the right direction. Such an exercise in ethical thinking is due to our nature as rational beings, endowed with intellect and free will. As in other situations that we find ourselves in, the more we engage in such rational activities, the more we develop our very humanity. Mencius rightly emphasizes this point.26 As we reflect on certain challenges in our contemporary society, we realize that ethical questions—some more urgent and demanding than others—arise for different reasons and in various contexts, some of which have been unforeseen. But, irrespective of reason and context, they arise primarily and essentially because of who we are, rather than what we do, 24

Mencius (VI. A. 15). It would also be enlightening to compare and contrast Mencius’s focus on the moral nature of human beings with the investigations into Filipino culture for a similar ethical basis by Dionisio Miranda, see his Loob the Filipino Within: A Preliminary Investigation into a Pre-theological Moral Anthropology (Manila: Divine Word Publications, 1989). 26 Lau comments that when Mencius talks about thinking, it is always in connection with moral duties. Intellectual thinking plays a secondary role for him. Cf. his “Introduction,” Mencius, op. cit, p. 15 25

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even if they come to the surface generally because of what we are doing. For this reason they are fundamental questions. Because of their serious nature and the implications of any answers given, it is important to pursue them much more thoroughly than other questions that we raise and the answers that we receive. This is even more true as developments in various fields arise and present new challenges to us. Science and medicine, for instance, are particularly important contexts today for ethical thinking because the rapid advances made in these fields have created increasingly complex ethical problems for our life in society. Keeping pace with the developments is difficult enough; but the newness of any discoveries, which in turn requires fresh ethical thinking, is certainly challenging.27 The escalating demand that education adopt the so-called business model in conducting its affairs, including the educative process itself, leaves those of us in this business wondering whether it is really a “fit” since, for many educators, the focus of education is the human person, correctly stressed by Mencius, rather than simply the outcomes. One important ethical consideration is how in this change in academic climate educators can continue to live up to the task of educating the moral person, and not just producing the skilled worker or the competent technocrat for society. When one hears about some of the increasing problems in society, particularly those posed by some youths, one wonders to what extent moral growth through education has been seriously promoted or sadly neglected. Psychology, a strong ally of education in many respects, has contributed research into moral development. Its methodology and findings are crucial in identifying the relevant factors which need our attention in our ethical tasks. An empirical discipline and a science, it nevertheless shows how we need to probe into the theoretical underpinnings of conclusions reached because an investigation into the foundation of the empirical studies can throw some light on our understanding of ethics itself and the implications for social living. Religion has been so closely identified with ethics that an important issue in the debate is whether one can have ethics without any religious belief or affiliation. The debate in society has been sharpened more recently with the allegation that religion actually corrupts not just the mind but also the conduct of its adherents.28 Literature provides a channel for expressing our sentiments. It engages not just our minds but also our hearts. It provides insights into our very humanity and into our responses, including ethical ones, to the various chal27

In addition to all the developments in science and medicine, ethicists now have to reckon with yet another contemporary challenge: nanotechnology. 28 Religion and fanaticism are regrettably and wrongly equated sometimes—to the detriment of society and individuals.

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lenges in the different concrete situations that we find ourselves in. Since we live in society, social and public issues inevitably arise. One such issue is the conflict between individual and public interests. This is an issue that concerns not just ethicists but those who have to implement certain policies and practices. While guidelines are obviously needed, it is important to situate the discussion within a wider context.29 Lastly, the fascinating yet dizzying advances in media and social communications, as a result of the increase in sophisticated gadgets, have compounded the problem for ourselves and for those in our charge because of abuses and misdemeanors. The situation brings about its own set of ethical issues.30 As these contexts—and there are many others—alert us to certain concerns and challenges, an important response that can be made is to continue the ethical pursuit, including by focusing on specific theoretical issues. Philosophy is in a particularly strategic position to help in this respect since ethics has been an area that it has explored quite thoroughly.31 In fact, many ways of thinking that we have become familiar with as we discuss ethical situations are echoes, some faint while others are stronger, of philosophical ethical theories.32 Philosophers, down through the ages and throughout the world—and we have noted Mencius’s contributions— have indeed focused on such important and fundamental issues regarding the good. The philosophical discipline itself can be useful in negotiating this rather complex, and in some cases unfamiliar, territory. The problem, of course, is that philosophers themselves are divided—the debate between Mencius and Hsün Tzu illustrates this—not just in terms of their respective ethical theories but even in what philosophy itself can offer us. Nevertheless, one can enlist their help in our own ethical pursuit and in the task of shaping our own outlook on the ethical challenge.33 The ethical debate itself can advance the pursuit and the task. 29

Cf. Chapter Two: “Individual and Public Interests, the Common Good: an Analysis and a Proposal”. 30 See Chapter Seven: “Images, Reality and Truth: Some Philosophical Considerations”. 31 In his rather tantalizingly-titled book, Against Ethics: Contributions to a Poetics of Obligation with Constant Reference to Deconstruction (Indiana University Press, 1993), John D. Caputo nevertheless acknowledges the sense of obligation that is embedded in our humanity. 32 Alasdair MacIntyre makes a strong case for the need to examine tradition, including the philosophical one, to enable one to make a rational moral judgment. See his, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1988). 33 Cf. my Part II of my Ethical Thinking and Theoretical Issues: Essays in Ethical Thinking (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010).

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Developing Moral Sensitivity Ethical thinking, however, is not intended, given the nature of the ethical enquiry and the ethical task itself, to lead to clear, detailed and conclusive answers to ethical dilemmas and situations. Admittedly, this can be frustrating. But one can and should expect ethical thinking to challenge our presuppositions and even our initial conclusions precisely in the hope that we can reject, modify and substantiate them. This seems to have been known by Confucius’s disciples and what prompted them to engage in more theoretical debates, unlike Confucius himself. Unreflected viewpoints or perspectives have a way of leading us astray even if we also have to admit that any protracted and extensive enquiry can and does lead to more questions. This is true in any field, and ethical thinking is no exception. Despite inherent difficulties with ethical thinking in itself, however, it highlights an important area in human life and helps to focus on an essential human concern: how are we to live? That question is as timely as it was in Mencius’s time. It sharpens our ethical sensitivities, which may have been awakened in various contexts, literature being a very good example. It probes into our feelings, which psychology helps us to understand. It checks our particular insights against the wider picture. Ethical thinking, above all, facilitates and develops “moral sensitivity”—which is probably a more appropriate contemporary term than Mencius’s “heart”. An important aim of education and religion, among other contexts, is to nurture moral sensitivity. We rely on it when faced with new situations, as we may have to do at times in medicine and science and elsewhere. It is a difficult task indeed. But ultimately, since we have to, and indeed do, make moral judgments, it is essential that we are guided by a moral sensitivity that has been deepened and strengthened by continuous ethical reflections. Moral sensitivity is much more than moral sentiment or feeling. It is not exclusively an intellectual ability that enables one to distinguish between right and wrong either. Nor is it simply a direction one takes when one exercises one’s free will. And yet all of these come into play since moral sensitivity is ultimately based on our very humanity. As human beings, we possess feelings, imagination, intellect and free will, and when we ask what is ethical and what is not and draw a conclusion, we make use of all these gifts. Mencius has such an integrated conception of human nature. The word “sensitivity” is based on “sense”, a term with different meanings, each of which we can avail of to shed light on moral sensitivity

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as used in the present context.34 “Sense”, of course, means our five senses that enable us to be in contact with the outside world. The word is also used to refer to someone having “sense” and by that we mean that that person does not just know but has the right knowledge. It can also mean simply “in a particular instance” as when we qualify a statement or claim that we make when we say “it is true in this sense”. But “sense” can also have a stronger meaning as a more or less coherent overall view as when we talk of “life making (or not making) sense”. The phrase “moral sensitivity” draws on these meanings. It is through our senses that we accumulate experience, including moral experience, of the world around us. We require the right knowledge, and not just any knowledge, to enable us to act ethically. We need to be aware of the particularity of a situation to enable us to judge the appropriateness of our judgment or decision. More importantly, we ought to be informed by an overall perspective that helps us not just to situate the particular moral situation or context but also to judge it more coherently and consistently. The various uses of “sense” and their applicability to the phrase “moral sensitivity” means that ethical thinking should not be interpreted as solely a cerebral activity. It is a rational activity—in Mencius’s understanding—that involves all the abilities that human beings possess, including the use of our intellect. Particular individuals engage in it in concrete situations. It is an activity that draws on various sources, including gender, culture and religion, whenever we resort to it. It is, to use Charles Hartshorne’s phrase, “context-dependent”. Ethical thinking enables us to appreciate our own status as agents and recipients: beings with “moral sensitivity” that needs to be developed, as Mencius stressed, so that we can indeed give a responsible response to the challenges of personal and societal life.

Taking a Moral Stance So far the emphasis in this ethical enquiry has been on the moral nature of humans and of ethical thinking. But ethical thinking should lead not just to knowing what is involved in our judgment of right and wrong but ultimately to doing that which is right and avoiding that which is wrong. For this reason, there is a justified expectation that it should facili34 Moral sensitivity as used here is different from, although comparable to, the way “moral sense” has been used by philosophers like Frances Hutcheson and David Hume. Cf. Maria Elton, “Moral Sense and Natural Reason,” Review of Metaphysics, LXII, 1, issue 245 (Sept. 2008), pp. 79-110. See also, Elmer Sprague, “Moral Sense,” The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Vols. 5 & 6 (Macmillan Publishing Co., reprint 1972), pp. 385-387.

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tate our becoming more responsible, better behaved, and more civicminded. Such an expectation is exemplified in the past and still today by the call for codes of conduct or the listing of virtues/vices. It is therefore understandable that one should ask how ethical thinking will help us to achieve “the aim of moral striving”, whether this is interpreted in the context of Confucius, Aristotle, or Aquinas. Ethical thinking should motivate us—at least we hope so—to work towards the betterment of ourselves, of society and of the world we live in. In short, how does ethical thinking lead to our taking a moral stance? Philosophers, like Aristotle and Aquinas, have always been aware of the distinction between knowing and willing, not just conceptually but also in reality. That translates to saying that knowledge of the good does not necessarily lead to wanting to do the good. Others, however, like Plato and Augustine, have insisted that the attraction of the good is such that it will make us pursue it. Thus, the more we get to know it, the more we would want it. For this reason, what bars us from ethical conduct is the veil of ignorance on our part. Common experience, however, would seem to favour the first point of view. We do need other incentives aside from knowledge, like law for Aquinas, to make us tread the ethical path. A more cynical observation would be that ethicists or moral philosophers and theologians, who spend their professional time studying and teaching ethics are not necessarily the most ethical human beings! On the other hand, ethical thinking, while it may not necessarily lead to ethical conduct of the individual agent, nevertheless promotes and sustains it, at least indirectly. While knowledge of what is right needs other factors to make us want and pursue the good, ignorance of relevant information, including what is involved in making the ethical judgment or decision can easily lead to irresponsible or unethical conduct. The will to act, spurred on by our passions, is not sufficient to ensure that we are indeed acting ethically. Too many misdeeds—also in the ethical sense—have been performed in the name of righteousness or God’s will. Since acting ethically is dependent on our knowledge of the situation, the more we know the relevant factors, including our moral norms, the less we are in danger of acting unethically. Even if we cannot provide an indubitable connection, at least in the ethical sphere, between thinking and willing, in Plato’s and Augustine’s sense, it remains nevertheless true that one’s moral sensitivity, developed through ethical thinking among others, does lead to what could be described as exemplary conduct. Martin Luther King, Mahatma Gandhi and Nelson Mandela easily come to mind since these individuals as moral agents were inspired and sustained in their way of life and their moral

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stance by the principles, arrived at through constant and protracted reflection, that they subscribed to. While one may have difficulties with Lawrence Kohlberg’s methodology and conclusions on moral development, one can still accept that moral reasoning does promote moral growth (not necessarily in the hierarchical order described by him) insofar as one has harnessed one’s thinking powers to broaden one’s perspective and increasing the likelihood of being guided by this. And that means that we are indeed developing our true nature and progressing towards our calling as responsible human beings, as Mencius teaches us. In taking a moral stance—which leads to moral action—it is important once again to note that it is not simply a matter of deciding and then acting but of situating it against a wider background. Situation ethics, which focuses almost exclusively on the particular situation or circumstance as dictating the morality of an action, ignores the need not only to be consistent in our ethical judgments—a lesson that can be learned from Kant—but also to be right about our judgment. We have to guard ourselves against making simply ad hoc decisions. In this respect, developing moral sensitivity—a sense of responsibility that is stimulated by what we can do but is constantly guided by what we ought to do or not do—is particularly crucial. This underlies the need for the larger picture.35 While certain ethical considerations do arise in specific professional contexts in a practical way, e.g. engineering, medical, business, all ethical debates by their nature is grounded in certain theoretical foundations. “What ought I to do?” (and the expected answer) in the ethical context is not as straightforward as they are in another context. Probing more fully into it, we will see that even in that particular situation, several factors have to be taken into account, e.g. intention, circumstances, values, criterion and so on. It inevitably leads to further questions: “What is the basis for one’s judgment, and why does the question arise in the first place?” We need to “think through” the question itself and any answer that may be given. Ethical thinking challenges us to provide a more consistent and more systematic answer. In some cases the answer to the question “what ought I to do?” has to be a quick and even instinctive one. But in the ethical context, one’s answer should be much more thoughtful. This does not mean that every time we find ourselves in an ethical situation, we cannot and should not act until we have undergone a prolonged and thorough process of thinking about the matter. Many cases, particularly medical ones, do not allow us that luxury for every prob35

This where ethical theories—and the study of them—can have a role to play, pace Caputo

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lem. But ethical thinking can be of paramount importance as it can provide us with a “theoretical framework” that enables us to work out an ethical solution to the problem. The basis for one’s judgment, even those done in a hurry, can then be more firmly grounded. What ethical thinking does is to expose underlying theoretical assumptions and subject them to a critical evaluation, thus giving us an“early lead”, as it were, in urgent cases. Ethical thinking thus can be described as bringing to the fore, with a view to scrutinizing more critically, not just the questions we are asking but also and more importantly disclosing the underlying assumptions behind those questions. That is a crucial step, albeit an early one, towards becoming responsible members of society.

PART TWO: CONTEXTUAL CONSIDERATIONS

CHAPTER SEVEN IMAGES, REALITY AND TRUTH: SOME PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Imaging in the Contemporary World The tremendous advances made in imaging in our contemporary world have been a great boost to many of us. We have certainly benefited from the various developments in this area, whether in technology1, medicine2, communications3, the film industry4 or just ordinary life.5 We can be truly grateful for the improved clarity and greater accuracy of images—for example, digital, HD and 3D imaging—as well as for the impressive ease and fantastic speed of relaying those images to every corner of the world. Just think of Facebook, Skype, YouTube, among others. It can be claimed, with some justification, that individuals, society and the world itself have progressed because of these advances. It would certainly be no exaggeration to acknowledge that the world we live in has been transformed radi1 The tremendous development in and the widespread use of information technology generally and of the internet particularly would have been unbelievable a few years ago. 2 Cf. Heiner Fangerau et.al. (eds.), Medical Imaging and Philosophy: Challenges, Reflections and Actions (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2012). 3 This is well exemplified by the role that social media played in effecting change during the Spring revolution in the Arab world. 4 An example of this—from a personal point of view—is the breathtaking photography in the film Samsara. It was done in such a way that it elicited a range of emotions—in the absence of any dialogue—merely from watching it and listening to the accompanying music. 5 The protection offered by CCTV in residential homes and commercial shops has been welcome. It has been a great boost in tracking suspects and criminals. It certainly facilitated a speedy outcome in the recent murder case of an Irish woman in Australia. “Selfie” (self-portrait from a digital camera) has now become so much a part of ordinary life that it has become the Oxford Dictionary word for 2013. The “selfie” of Pope Francis and of three political leaders during Nelson Mandela’s funeral certainly received much coverage and attracted considerable interest worldwide.

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cally by the widespread proliferation and productive use of images. News coverage, particularly live ones, have enabled viewers to become not just viewers but even participants in the events being covered or activities being reported.6 It cannot, of course, be denied either that not everything is positive about these advances and their usage. One has merely to consider the abuses and the crimes committed which are associated with imaging— again in the very same areas of life where the advances have contributed to their betterment. Certain developments in the recent past have certainly confirmed that.7 The criticism is often heard of the proliferation of images that can be downloaded in smart phones, IPods, tablets and others, and blame is squarely laid on their rapid developments and easy accessibility. The competition is even hottening up to produce wearable gadgets—a marketing ploy that is preoccupying the attention not only of the ambitious manufacturers but also of vulnerable consumers. In the view of some, this is yet another unwelcome development of the consumerist mentality. In this essay, my focus will be less on decrying the negativity that is legitimately equated with imaging but rather on providing a philosophical context and some considerations in the hope that these will facilitate a better understanding and appreciation of the situation we find ourselves in today due to these advances. At the same time, my hope is that these considerations will help facilitate a greater awareness of fundamental issues that need to be addressed constantly as well as promote protective and corrective vigilance over abuses.

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For example, the graphic coverage by various media of the devastation wrought by super typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) in Tacloban City, Philippines, on 8 November 2013 enabled viewers to be alerted speedily to the vast devastation suffered by the population and the city. It was generally regarded as the strongest typhoon (category 5) ever to make landfall. CNN also reported on how people, following the devastations, have resorted to ireport.cnn.com, posting notes and photographs, to connect with friends and relatives to let them know that they were safe or to contact missing relatives. 7 The media had been giving full coverage to the widespread disturbances prompted by the film—and more recently, a cartoon published in a French paper—which purportedly insults the prophet Mohammed. It also had been providing constant updates on the situation following the publication and dissemination of specified photos of members of the British royal family.

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Image versus Reality Any reference to image and reality, particularly in a philosophical context, will inevitably bring us to Plato, the great Greek philosopher of ancient times. In his rather picturesque way of discussing truth, he made use of the distinction between images (concrete representations on the wall of the cave) as opposed to true reality (outside the cave). Warning that images provide us with an inadequate and even falsified representation of reality—since they are merely shadows or copies—he insisted that truth can only be found in confrontation with reality itself. While images may serve some purpose, they cannot be relied upon for an accurate knowledge of reality. For this reason, he tirelessly argued, we need to probe deeper, widen our view and persist in our quest if we are to enrich our development as seekers of truth. Plato’s discussion of image and reality and his standpoint on the matter have certainly triggered the long-running dispute between those who champion sense experience (called empiricists) or perception insofar as, in their view, it provides us with an immediate and measurable grasp of reality versus those who uphold reason rather than the senses as the source of truth (known as idealists). Since our senses can easily mislead us, we should, according to the idealists, strive to form ideas, abstracted from the particularity and changeability of any grasp of reality by our senses. The idealists thus emphasize that truth can only be attained by reason. Our acceptance of human nature as rational would seem to favour the idealist standpoint. Indeed, we distance ourselves from the animal world insofar as we are endowed with the ability to think and not just to sense. On the other hand, the empiricist camp has strong supporters, particularly in the empirical sciences and in ordinary life. For many of us, professionally and personally, credible and reliable evidence comes from experienced reality rather than from thought reality. In this context, images arising from sensory experience have a powerful role to play. They do not just capture our immediate attention but they also have a way of resonating with our own experiences. The dispute between the empiricists and the idealists inevitably makes one wonder whether there is a third point of view, particularly since there seem to be merits in both of them. After all, as human beings, we do possess reason (and free will) and senses. Both provide us with some grasp of reality; hence, both of these must be a source of truth and a channel to reality. Indeed there is a philosophical school, called realism—there are variations of it, of course—which connects the senses (source of images) with reason (responsible for ideas). Its standpoint can be summed up in

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this adage from Scholastic philosophy: Nihil in intellectu nisi prius in sensu (nothing is in the intellect without having been previously in the senses).8 There is a certain continuity, therefore, in knowledge since any ideas we have originate from our senses. Sensory experience is in this way regarded as an initial stage, with thinking a later stage, in the entire process of knowing reality. The problem, of course, is how to account for that continuity in the process of knowledge since images and ideas, as products of each stage of the process, as it were, are very different in nature and status.

The Philosophical Context as Backdrop The philosophical context sketched above does provide an interesting backdrop to our consideration of image and reality. It highlights the importance of the topic and provides some kind of focus. But how appropriate and relevant is it to our present scenario? Interestingly, many of our contemporary discussions can actually be traced back to a number of these philosophical disputes. In fact, at times it would be difficult to understand and appreciate these without some reference to the seemingly abstract philosophical discourses that would seem to interest only a few. More significantly, much of contemporary discussion of viewpoints, issues or topics is underpinned by standpoints or assumptions, which need to be made explicit in a philosophical discussion to enable us to evaluate them properly. This is certainly the case with the situation we face today because of the advances in imaging. The philosophical context within which we get a glimpse of the disputes can help us understand the nature and features of images and how they contrast with reality itself. In fact, many of those dealing with the creation of images, for example in advertizing and the media, do capitalize on these. The so-called pulling power of images is well-known and well-utilized by these, even more so today because of further developments in technology and computing.9 It will be recalled that Plato metaphorically describes images as mere reflections on the cave-wall and hence apparent, rather than true, reality. 8

This school of thought has to be distinguished from another school which holds that humans have innate ideas, which is sometimes associated with Plato who maintains that the knowing process entails “remembering” what we already know. 9 One of the latest developments in this area is face recognition now being implemented by businesses to enable advertisers to capitalize on information accrued in the process. See also the research done on image recognition which led to the development of the apps Style-Eyes designed for the fashion world and downloadable for free on the iOS and Android stores.

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He also reminds us of the transitoriness and fickleness of these images. While they can be graphic and captivating—a feature that is given significance in advertising and by the media—they can be misleading—a point stressed by their critics. For Plato, true reality can only be found when we go beyond the images and confront what is (emerging from the cave to see the sun) rather than what appears to be. The idealists—depending on which variety of idealism one has in mind—would be very much on Plato’s side although would not necessarily endorse Plato’s analogy. The empiricists, however, would have us appreciate our sense experience, which yields the images, as genuine and more credible knowledge, inasmuch as it is verifiable, as opposed to abstract ideas, the result of much “theorizing”. The empiricist’s point of view and regard for the resulting images would find much support among those who value images themselves in our professional and personal lives. In the above reference to Plato and to the dispute between empiricism and idealism the contrast between images and reality itself, between apparent and true reality, is given prominence. In contrast, it is in the connectivity between them that the realist’s position can be of particular relevance to this philosophical consideration. What is the relationship between images and reality? How do images impact on our knowledge of true reality? What role do our senses and our reason play in the acquisition of knowledge? While these questions are also addressed in the philosophical disputes referred to above, the issue of truth is even more striking when one probes into the realist’s position. Where does truth really lie? If the senses provide us with an initial grasp of reality, can one have truth at the stage of images or only at the stage of reason? Or are there different kinds of truth?

Truth as a Consideration Given the dazzling developments in the creation of images and their impact on all of us, truth in this case is definitely a concern that needs to be addressed more widely. One begins to wonder, given the widespread use of images and their seemingly faithful reproduction of reality, to what extent they can be regarded as reliable data. We are aware that a picture is more effective than a thousand words, but many times the picture or the image even replaces reality itself in the minds of many.10 We have become witnesses today to the creation of virtual reality which some are beginning 10 One wonders about the attraction of the Xbox and similar gadgets and the preoccupation with computer games.

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to regard as reality itself.11 The creativity of film-makers and photographers sometimes makes it easy to confuse real actors or sceneries with those which have been created by talented graphic artists. The issue of truth and the question of truth have always been of concern to philosophers, irrespective of which side of the dispute one belongs to. Of course, truth is not their exclusive prerogative. Although in ordinary life or in our varied professions we do not always focus on it, truth at all times underpins what we do and how we act. Nonetheless, the concern for truth and its implications does occupy much of the philosopher’s attention. Moreover, it is a philosophical consideration inasmuch as it is a fundamental issue. We have already noted the nature of images as described by the philosophers cited above. Despite the empiricists’ view that sense experience, which results in images or percepts, is the more reliable guide to truth, Plato’s reference to images as merely shadows or copies of reality is a more helpful way of distinguishing between the representation of reality and the reality itself. It facilitates the appreciation of the role of subjective factors in the assimilation of data, and thus alerts us to a more critical understanding of the status of images. The realist position is even clearer here, expressed in the Scholastic adage: Quidquid recipitur recipitur ad modum recipientis (whatever is received is received according to the mode of the recipient). Insofar as images are products of the senses experiencing or being in contact with the reality, these images will take on the characteristics of the senses, particularly the eyes of the beholder. That is how they will be received. Thus, despite the common claim that one can trust the senses as evidence—hence, as bearers of truth—a more credible view is that not only can senses mislead but that they are also subjective. In this regard, images would be characterized as merely reflecting reality and would have a more limited truth-value. In the present context of the advances in the development and use of images and the issue of truth, how does this philosophical consideration help us? The suggestion being made here is that: (1) alerting us to the nature and status of images should sensitize us not only to the impact of images but even more so to the responsibility that rests on the shoulders of

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This was well illustrated recently in the effective sting operation done by a childprotection charity, Terre des Hommes Netherlands, using a computer-generated image of a “10-year old girl” called “Sweetie” which downloaders mistakenly believed to be that of a real girl and which led to their being caught and identified. Recently, there have been media reports of a successful follow-up operation called “Operation Endeavour” involving a number of countries.

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image-makers and (2) one can also point to the need to educate ourselves adequately so that images are received in a more critical way. In the use and creation of images, precisely because they are so powerful, one cannot but admire human creativity. This human gift should indeed be encouraged not just because the end-result can be fascinating and even mind-boggling but also because the development of our humanity in all its positive features is a human task and responsibility. But creativity itself is not the main consideration. Rather it is the wholesome development of humanity. Creativity is meant to facilitate that, not thwart it. Unfortunately, creativity can at times be exercised—including by many image-makers—in such a way that instead of leading us to genuine reality and truth it confuses and misleads those who are at the receiving end. Accordingly, there really is a need for image-makers to be aware of—and to heed—the responsible challenge that confronts them. The same can be said of the recipients of these images. That is practically all of us, given the fact that our contemporary world is truly an image-laden world. In every aspect of life, images surround and confound us. Again, we should welcome the progress made in this field. While not everyone would agree that all these developments in imaging have made our world a better one to live in, it has to be admitted nonetheless that they have transformed it radically. But we do need to understand images for what they are—and here the philosophical context can be of help. They do not and should not replace reality. We need to go beyond the images. We need to critically assess them. And we do need to contextualize them. For that to happen, we must educate ourselves.

Another Look at Truth But what is truth? How do we know that we are in possession of truth? How can we educate ourselves so that we are led by the truth, rather than by the images? These are age-old questions which nevertheless continue to challenge life in society to this day. The developments in the production and circulation of images that we have noted certainly give these questions a starker profile. For that reason philosophical conceptions of truth, illustrated in the debate noted earlier, need to be re-examined today. We have noted that a working definition of truth, implicit in the discussion above, is that it corresponds with the facts or with reality. A popular way of expressing it is when one claims that it is “telling it as it is” without any embellishment, any value judgment or any comment on the part of the speaker. The claim is that one is thereby being “objective”. But there is a presumption in this common view—and it needs to be chal-

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lenged just as subjectivism or relativism must also be critically assessed. It has to be pointed out that imparting truth or truths is not like delivering goods. There is always a certain amount of subjectivity precisely because one cannot completely exclude a contribution, conscious or unconscious, from the speaker. In the same way that any form of communication, including images, is received in accordance with the nature of the recipient—as was already noted—so any communication from the communicator is always tainted with the background, concerns and perspective of the communicator. All that one can really and legitimately claim is that one makes an effort to be as objective as is possible. Truth, therefore, in the human sphere, is hardly “telling it as it is”.12 So to what extent can one have or communicate the truth? Can one be objective at all? Are relativism and subjectivism right after all? Drawing on the insights of process philosophy, a contemporary school of thought associated with Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne, we can arrive at a perspective that may facilitate our consideration of these questions. Using again the working definition that truth is correspondence with reality,13 one can make a crucial distinction between absolute truth and relative truth. In other words, truth ultimately is about the reality itself (absolute truth) rather than experienced or thought reality (relative truth). Since our contact with reality is always in accordance with our nature as knowers14 there is always an element of subjectivity. Hartshorne puts it rather succinctly when he asserted that “our knowledge of the absolute is not absolute”. That is to say, assuming that there are absolute truths, our grasp of these same absolute truths is relative. The claim that there are absolute truths is supported not by tangible evidence, which empiricists would be inclined to insist on, but by a logical process of reasoning. In other words, it is not and cannot be an empirical fact that one can point to. Rather, it is a matter of realizing that not every12 Even the so-called telling of facts as facts involves a selection and judgment on the part of the speaker. For example, the citing of a date as 17 March 1970 already indicates that one has chosen to refer to it using the Arabic/Christian preference for listing dates rather than another system and preferring the English system of putting the day before the month. This is why there is much truth in the claim that whatever is said is not just informing us but also telling us something about the speaker. The same can be said about “evidence-based” presentations. 13 The “correspondence criterion” of truth can be complemented by the “coherence criterion” in this perspective inasmuch as it pays particular attention to the content of knowledge and the role of the knower 14 This point is reminiscent of, but not equivalent to, Kant’s “reality itself vs. reality as it appears to us” distinction.

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thing, literally everything, can be relative simply because the allegation that everything is relative is to make an absolute of the allegation itself. In that case there would be at least one absolute truth; namely, that everything is relative. Rather, relative truths are relative precisely because they are anchored on what one must conclude as absolute.15 To sum up, absolutism, which to some extent shares some of the characteristics of extreme idealism, errs in not realizing that as knowers, we cannot be completely detached, a point made above. In this respect, empiricists and realists are right in acknowledging the role of sense experience. One could even go further and accept that there is always a subjective factor, in varying degrees, in all knowledge and communication. In other words, truth is also always relative. On the other hand, complete relativism and subjectivism are mistaken in rejecting absolute truth or objectivity. The process perspective on truth thus is at the same time critiquing both extremes. Both positions, according to this perspective, are guilty of completely ignoring the other side. This philosophical consideration has some implication for the status and role given to imaging. While images may contain truth—or factual evidence, the phrase commonly used by those who advocate their dominant use as if to clinch their claim to truth—they should never be considered absolutes. The nature and the features of any image indicate that they have a relative value as far as the issue of truth is concerned. This is a point worth bearing in mind by both image-makers—particularly when they are tempted to endow them with such importance—as well as by those exposed to the images—lest they are so captivated by them that they begin to dominate their lives and outlook.16 Of course, they should be given the importance that is rightfully theirs, but they should not be elevated to a suspect level either.

The Right to Know, Freedom of Speech, and Privacy This philosophical consideration of truth does need to be pursued further, however. This is because while the above consideration focused on a particular context, namely the development and dominance of images in present-day society and the consequent challenges to us, it opens up a 15

It will be noted that there will always be difficulties in listing absolute truths. But this difficulty does not contradict the claim that there are absolutes precisely because there must be absolutes. Otherwise, relative truths cannot be considered relative either. 16 Sometimes this happens because of the status given to the photos in fashion magazines—and now with images on the internet.

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wider field for our attention here insofar as this situation is really part of the larger picture in the media, whether it is graphic, print, verbal or digital. An important function of images—and this accounts to a great extent for their appeal—is the sharing of information. The use and distribution of images, it seems, is part and parcel of the human need to communicate with one another. One can even talk of this need being heightened and motivated because of the tremendous development in the technology and the availability of communication tools and techniques. Again, much of this development is to be welcomed. One will have to admit that it has resulted in considerable improvement for society as a whole even if one must also decry some of the consequences to society. But the sharing of information inevitably brings up fundamental issues such as, among others, the right to know, freedom of speech and privacy.17 The proliferation of sources of information, the ever-increasing possibilities of retrieving that information, and the speed of divulging that information world-wide have created a new situation that threatens one’s life in society. Added to this problem is the difficulty, and even impossibility, of removing false information that remains available to all and endangers one’s reputation.18 Cyber-bullying has ruined many lives, particularly the vulnerable. Somehow the ability and willingness to eradicate the false information are not matched by the skills and expertise of those who upload the information in the first place. It is not surprising therefore that many today have serious reservations about, and even reject outright, such sources of information as the internet, e-mail, Twitter, Facebook and others. The abuses at times can be so overwhelming to the extent that they indicate a worrying trend in certain quarters in society. That worry extends to the retrieval of highly confidential matters that could endanger lives. Yet those who do engage in what has become known as “hacktivism” justify their action by defending the right to know and freedom of speech and 17 They have become particularly relevant in light of the Levenson Inquiry in England over phone-hacking and the call for inquiries into the handling of the Twitter information by Radio Telefis Eireann in Ireland in two of its programmes during the presidential campaign. There is also the ongoing dispute regarding the sharing of data contained in the electronic files of various agencies and even in internet servers for various uses. There have also been the legal issues connected with WikiLeaks. 18 Those who print or communicate false or misleading information seem to ignore the fact that despite an apology or correction in a later edition or broadcast, one cannot really retrieve the previous information and retract any damage done since the readers and the audience do not always remain the same. Thus, vigilance and sensitivity are paramount from the very start.

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accusing those who have the information of covering up.19 Clearly, there are critical issues regarding the dissemination of information which deserve serious consideration far beyond just the communication of images Those who insist on everyone’s right to know, which underpins the sharing of information, are correct to point out that this is indeed a human right and not just a legal right.20 In that sense, it is really more fundamental and pervasive than any recognition of it by society. In fact, because it is a human right, one can rightfully challenge a society that limits it or worse, thwarts it. Political systems have suffered their downfall because, among others, they have blocked the communication of information which their citizens have claimed a right to be given. There have been numerous protests and rallies denouncing such political regimes. Many have suffered, or even sacrificed their lives, to protect this right.21 This human right to know is rooted in human nature itself. As Thomas Aquinas pointed out in his discussion of the natural law, which he regards as the basis for ethics, the awareness that human nature is directed towards an ultimate goal of fulfilling itself—individually and collectively—cannot be accomplished if it is not provided with the opportunity to develop itself.22 Since human nature is rational and since a necessary means to its flourishing as rational is knowledge, one can truly and justifiably assert the right to know. That right to know extends to getting information that will contribute towards the development of one’s rationality.23 While the human right to know is indeed part and parcel of our human nature, it does not, however, extend to getting every kind of information or even to every truth. This consideration is often ignored to the detriment of everyone.24 The right to know is a basic right. It is also a uni19

Cf. “How Hackers Changed the World,” written and directed by Brian Knappenbergen and aired on BBC Four, 20 February 2013. 20 A related phrase that is in currency these days is “transparency” in all one’s dealings. More recently, there has been talk of the legal duty of candour, particularly in the medical profession. 21 Among these has been the plight of certain groups in contemporary China who have been fighting for free speech and the right to information—which regrettably seem to be understood differently by those in power in that country. 22 For Aquinas, the ultimate end of human beings is communio, participation in the very nature of the Creator. 23 It is for this reason that one can rightfully assert everyone’s right to education. It excludes being unduly exposed to propaganda or spin, so common in communications by those who wish to throw a veil on the truth. 24 A recent example of this is the prank phone call made by two Australian DJs to the hospital enquiring about Kate Middleton. To claim that the tragic death of the nurse who answered the phone was “unforeseen” does not lessen the necessity to

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versal right. But it should not be confused with an imagined or claimed entitlement to a particular piece of information, or even a specific truth. It does not cover retrieving every single datum or ferreting out details from every source. While the right to know is an individual right, by which is meant that every human being possesses it, it does not confer a right to solicit information from lawfully protected sources. Nor does it necessarily override the legitimate need to shield the information from those seeking it. This is because the right to know is exercised in an important context; namely, one’s involvement with others and with society at large. This right, while fundamental, does not take away one’s duty to acknowledge and respect the rights of other individuals and of society itself. The human right to know should not, therefore, be regarded as a blanket assertion, which unfortunately is sometimes the case in certain situations or with certain individuals or groups. It is not the same as the mere desire to satisfy one’s curiosity—much as that is appealing to many of us. Connected with the right to know is the issue of freedom of speech. Again, the basis for asserting freedom of speech is our human nature. Not only are human beings endowed with an intellect but they are also gifted with free will. Unlike non-humans, human beings can choose freely. They can exercise their ability, when faced with various options, to opt for one rather than another. This gift and ability, inherent in what makes one human, includes being able to speak or communicate freely, unhindered by any exterior cause or factor. Anyone who tries to curtail, restrict or deny that right is violating a fundamental human right. A government that does not honour this right is rightly criticized or denounced. It also provides a basis for legitimate protest and opposition. At the same time, however, it must be borne in mind that the right to speech is not, and cannot be regarded as absolute inasmuch as it is a right that impacts on others. To claim freedom of speech because one simply wants to exercise it is being irresponsible. For speech to be effective, it has to be heard. Unlike talking to oneself privately, the exercise of the freedom of speech connotes that there is a hearer or receiver—and that other party will be affected. This is why freedom of speech is really a “relational” right, i.e. it connects and is not just exercised. Many supporters of this right seem to forget this basic point.25 Accordingly, one must—in the very exercise of the freedom to speech—be aware of and respect the other party or parties.

consider seriously all possible consequences, especially to those who are victimized, before undertaking such a deed. 25 Cf. Chapter Eight: “Human Freedom, its Power and Limits: Some Implications for Life in Society”.

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This brings us to the equally fundamental right to privacy, another right so often asserted not just in the context of a tension with the right to know or the freedom of speech but also in various situations when someone else interferes with or intrudes into one’s “space”—physical, intellectual, emotional and so on.26 At times this right is associated with one’s strong wishes to “be left alone” by, or “to create a distance” from, others.27 The right to privacy extends to groups or societies and is seen as crucial in their development, and any interference by outsiders is considered to be an unwelcome encroachment. This is particularly true in the case of the protection of sensitive material.28 So to what extent is it, firstly, a truly fundamental right? Again, its basis is our make-up as human beings. There is something in each of us that is unique to us. For this reason, every individual has rightly been called “a world unto itself”. That irreplaceable status is never duplicated, and is the basis of self-esteem. Since it is coming from oneself rather than endowed on one,29 it cannot be taken away, overridden or violated without defacing one’s very humanity. Given the nature of this basis, the right to privacy is indeed fundamental. It thereby imposes an equally fundamental obligation on everyone else to acknowledge and respect it.30 Thus, prying information from any of us or exposing one to public scrutiny to the extent that it degrades us, i.e. robbing us of our very humanity, is justifiably challenged or even stopped. In the case of a group’s or society’s comparable right to privacy, not only is it also based on the nature of the individuals comprising the grouping but it could also be its very survival—or at least its well-being—that is a stake. In varying 26

A recent controversy in this regard is a piece of Facebook’s facial-recognition technology, the so-called “tag suggest” feature, in Europe. Opposed due to privacy laws, Facebook has had to switch it off in the meantime. Previously, there had been unease over the technology developed by Google Earth over the mapping of streets, which led to their blurring recognizable details, such as car registration information. 27 The French president has resorted to this right in his claim that his private life should be respected. Commentators have pointed out, however, that it has political and social implications because of the position he holds. 28 Debates about, and tensions over, this particular issue have been heightened and broadened because of developments with Wiki Leaks and with the Snowden affair. 29 This claim can still be asserted even if one takes the religious view that it is a gift from the Creator. 30 The trend of selling or circulating personal data that one has entered into the websites of companies when doing business with them and photos in social networking sites is worrying. Fortunately, there are moves to update the data protection laws in Europe (drawn up prior to the internet) to eliminate some of the abuses.

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degrees, a threat to it could be a threat to its very existence, and it is understandable as well as justifiable that the group or society as a whole would seek to protect it. A related consideration here is the issue of confidentiality. Confidentiality is an acknowledgement of the right to privacy inasmuch as when one confides in or entrusts information to another, it is with the expectation that no one else is party to the information. It remains private. One could even go further and claim that a breach of confidentiality is tantamount to trampling the confidant’s right to privacy. At the same time, however, there can be a tension since one cannot hide behind the curtain of confidentiality or the right to privacy if by upholding it and because one is protecting it, other rights are ignored and even endangered. Thus, such situations lead to questions such as: To what extent should one’s right to privacy be respected? If someone entrusts information on the basis of strict confidentiality and particularly does so only on that basis, are there circumstances which can override the promise to maintain confidentiality? Is confidentiality such that it must be maintained even if the consequences are grave?31 It is obvious, from what has been stated here, that the right to privacy and the related right to confidentiality would come into conflict—as has earlier been pointed out—with the right to know and the freedom of speech, both of which have already been shown to be fundamental. Accordingly, certain guidelines or laws need to be drawn up and have been drawn up. This is because the right to privacy is situational, that is to say, it is asserted because one is in society. If one were to be in complete isolation—which is not possible realistically—then there would be no need even to be aware of it. There would be no one to interfere with it. But because we live in the immediate surroundings of others—and affect one another—then it is inevitable that, while fundamental, it is not a right that trumps the right of others to secure information about one or relevant others, or to impose on one an obligation to be more open about oneself or one’s actions. In other words, the right to privacy is not a complete withdrawal from the social aspect of one’s humanity. It is certainly not an alibi to ignore one’s obligations to others and to their safety and welfare.

31

These questions have certainly come to the fore recently because of abuses in various areas and spheres which have been covered up by those in authority resorting to the alleged need for confidentiality. Also, reference to “commercial sensitivity” is used to avoid divulging information on certain business transactions.

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Appropriateness, Acceptability and Accountability as Guidelines It will be obvious from this discussion of the right to know, freedom of speech, and privacy, as a corollary to the original discussion of the issue of truth in the context of images, that living in society creates—as is to be expected—a rather complex situation. How do these rights feature in named circumstances? What happens when there is a tension or even a conflict between these rights? How does one reconcile these? Who has the authority to address and redress the conflict?32 The difficulty with these questions—and for anyone attempting possible answers—is that they are dependent on the specificity of each case. It would be unhelpful and in fact foolhardy to attempt answers that could be regarded as generally applicable. Equally, it would be unwelcome and even preposterous to state that there can be no answers because each situation is so unique. Somehow and in some way, answers must be provided if one is to continue living in society—which we all must do—and to meet its challenges. I should like to suggest that the criterion of appropriateness can be of help with our thinking in the present scenario; that is to say, whatever is appropriate in a given instance would be the determining factor. We do need, however, to examine both the criterion and its usage more closely as certain connotations, as is the case with every word, are associated with it. First of all, appropriateness as used here does not mean that what one regards as appropriate is completely subjective, i.e. totally dependent on the speaker or agent. Neither is it totally tied to the particular situation. It is not entirely limited to a specific time either. As was set out previously, our considerations of these issues should indeed take into account circumstances and subjective features, but we have likewise noted the need for an objective basis of one’s answers. The claim here is that the criterion of appropriateness, contrary to the other connotations, fulfils this need. This is because one’s judgment of what is appropriate in a given circumstance should be shaped by one’s knowledge of both the concrete and abstract dimensions of the situation. It is showing sensitivity regarding the content, activity, or decision. It is alert to the suitability of both the material and its method of implementation. It is a realization that the agent, the recipient and the communication itself are all involved or to be considered in what one deems appropriate. In short, appropriateness means that ultimately it is a considered judgment that one has to make in the face of the specificity of 32 See Chapter Two: “Individual and Public Interests, the Common Good: an Analysis and a Proposal”.

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the situation against the background of certain fundamental factors. It is not a mere opinion, view or choice.33 This means that a considerable amount of responsibility rests on whoever, be it an individual or a group, judges that it would be appropriate to communicate or display images, exercise the right to know, claim freedom of speech, breach confidentiality, or withdraw information.34 Since a judgment, and not just an expression of opinion, is called for, it must be well-informed and substantiated. What are at stake, after all, are fundamental rights that all parties possess and must be respected. These are not mere slogans that are mouthed or issued. Judging a course of action or an activity to be appropriate, in keeping with our rational human nature, demands consideration of several relevant factors, including the well-being of all and not just the interests of one side. The inevitable subjective feature of this criterion, which has been acknowledged, simply means that one has to take measures to ensure that one’s judgment is not completely one-sided. The criterion of appropriateness actually makes it open too to others to question whether what one individual or a group has judged to be appropriate is right.35 Because the display of images or communication of information affects the recipient, because the claim to freedom of speech can run counter to another’s right to privacy, because breaking confidentiality can jeopardize security, it is not enough for someone or some group to simply claim that, as far as one is concerned, the activity or course of action is appropriate.36 33

In the Denis O’Brien claim of defamation against the Irish Daily Mail, which he won, the jury agreed that the article on him was the author’s honest opinion but said that it was not based on fact and was not in the public interest. The defence of “honest opinion” in a major defamation was introduced in Ireland as part of the Defamation Action 2009. Criticizing the outcome, Associated Newspapers lamented the alleged demise of being able to voice strong opinions in a democracy. Cf. Irish Times February 15, 2013, p. 5. But a strong opinion must also be informed; otherwise, it is nothing but “hot air”. The latter can hardly be regarded as defensible. 34 These issues have been stirred up with the Edward Snowden controversy which has now extended to governments and countries. 35 This consideration has certainly become pertinent in the light of the controversy in Ireland following the reference by a Minister to what some regard as confidential information regarding another politician. 36 One wonders how those who distribute or upload pornography—especially, when children are both the subject and possible recipients—can consider their action as appropriate. The same can be said about those who incite violence, upload graphic footage of violent incidents, or resort to sextexting through these channels of communication. The move by Google and Microsoft to introduce safe-

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This observation brings us to the second guiding principle being proposed here: acceptability. Admittedly, its introduction here risks suspicion since after all, what is acceptable even for the majority is not necessarily what is right. Acceptability as a criterion is too close to convention, a standard rightly criticized by Plato. He pointed out that many of the practices during his time may have been acceptable to the society, but he questioned whether they were just. Moreover, what is acceptable may be suitable to certain parties and yet may in itself be unfair or even harmful. It may even be a violation of certain rights. Nonetheless, the criterion of acceptability provides an important consideration in ascertaining the merits of one’s judgment of appropriateness; namely, it makes one ask whether the activity or course of action is truly acceptable to those who will be affected by it.37 Asking that question provides some kind of corrective to the judgment of appropriateness inasmuch as it enables one to be more objective.38 Taking into account the criterion of acceptability amounts to considering the susceptibility and even vulnerability of the recipient of one’s communication, activity or decision. Thus, it does not just mean asking whether it would be acceptable to oneself if one were the recipient as those others who will be affected may not be in the same frame of mind or state of receptivity. Moreover, acceptability as a criterion also applies to the content, i.e. the image or the information. One must also scrutinize it as to whether it will generally be accepted as well as to whether it will be acceptable to the specific recipient or recipients and how it will be received.39 The third criterion that is being suggested here is: accountability. We have been discussing various rights principally in connection with imaging guards, announced on 18 November 2013, is to be welcomed. Recently, the social media phenomenon of “Neknominate” has been blamed, due to peer pressure, of promoting irresponsible drinking among the young and even of causing deaths. 37 Paparazzi, among others, really need to consider this point seriously. 38 This is not the same, however, as merely eliciting consent since a consensual decision does not always make the activity right—there can be consensual consent to do wrong or evil. 39 One of the rather unwelcome developments of the facilities of Facebook or YouTube is the rush of some people to upload practically anything, or going viral irrespective of the content of the image or information. We have become what has been described as an “oversharing society”. Cf. Una Mullaly, “The Oversharing Society” The Irish Times, Weekend Review, August 24, 2013. There is a need to educate users of the consequences of their action for themselves and for viewers— and to awaken their sense of responsibility—before they do so. A particularly informative and sobering documentary, based on real-life experiences, was aired by Channel Four on 8 January 2013, narrated by Yasmin Bannerman and titled: “Don’t Blame Facebook”

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and have noted that the basis of such rights is our nature as human beings. But while the existence of any right gives the possessor a claim, it also imposes a corresponding duty. The exercise of the right entails that one must do so in a responsible way—as befits a rational human being. Therefore, one must be accountable in one’s pursuit of the truth or information or in one’s exercise of freedom of speech. Accountability also entails that one acknowledges not just the existence of others but also, and more significantly, their dignity. It means that they have rights too that must be honoured in one’s own exercise of one’s rights. It is regrettable that many seem to ignore or simply violate that fundamental datum. It is, therefore, essential that the criterion of accountability features in any discussion—or exercise—of the fundamental rights which we have been discussing.40 These three criteria proposed here are meant to be guidelines that hopefully can facilitate both an appreciative as well as a critical look at the issues. The earlier analysis of these shows the complexity of the situation. Ultimately, much depends on the moral sensitivity of individuals.41 The guidelines are not intended to replace concrete measures such as laws or policies. Given the frailties of human nature and the lessons of history, society would also benefit from having the external support provided by laws and policies.42

40

See also, Chapter Ten: “Economic Crisis and Accountability: a Re-examination of Certain Views and Practices”. 41 See Chapter Six: “Ethical Thinking and Formation: a Challenge for Life in Society”. 42 There have been legitimate doubts cast about the efficacy in this regard of selfregulation, such as proposed by the media in England.

CHAPTER EIGHT HUMAN FREEDOM, ITS POWER AND LIMITS: SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR LIFE IN SOCIETY

Human Freedom as an Issue The existence of human freedom is one that many of us, who enjoy it, probably take for granted in everyday life insofar as we find ourselves making decisions, choosing between alternatives, and even opting for a particular course of action in our daily lives and routine.1 At the same time, however, other situations when we experience restrictions or limitations to our choices leave many of us wondering whether we only seem to be free even if we are making those decisions or choices. Have we not simply been programmed—as some have suggested—towards a particular direction in our lives, and all those decisions or choices along the way merely appear to be ours? One could brush this off as an academic or even futile exercise. Weighing up the pros and cons of either perspective may be very interesting or entertaining—and even heated at times. However, some would hardly regard it as worthwhile to devote much time to it. That may well be true in a number of cases and occasions; but if we examine our daily lives in society, we will find ourselves surrounded by situations that do prompt us to take a closer look at this topic. Interacting with one another, as we do in our daily lives, inevitably leads to certain situations—for example, the debate regarding human rights, the conflict in law between the individual’s interests and the common good, the tension between privacy and transparency and many such complications—that are underpinned by the reality or only apparent existence of human freedom. It does matter, to a large ex-

1

Regrettably, this is not the case with several other societies and individuals whose lives can only be described as “unfree” for several diverse reasons. One has only to look around, listen to the media, or read various reports contained in different sources.

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tent, whether we can claim that humans are really free or controlled.2 It is important—so that we can appreciate and enrich our relationships with one another—to realize whether these decisions, choices, and alternatives in daily life are really and truly of our making. While keeping in mind that the topic of human freedom is grounded in our ordinary concerns, I will be developing it in a philosophical context given that this is a philosophical consideration on living in society. That is to say, in dealing with the topic, I will be referring firstly to the philosophical debate between those who uphold the reality of human freedom (the so-called indeterminists), and those who reject it altogether claiming that it is a misconception on our part (referred to as determinists). According to the latter group, we only appear to be free or we think that we are indeed free when in reality we are controlled or determined. There are of course variations of these two camps. In fact, many would take a middle position, i.e. that human beings are indeed free but not in any absolute sense. It may even be stressed that freedom varies from one human being to another as well as from one situation to another. Later in this essay I will be pursuing a related line of philosophical enquiry inasmuch as it underpins many of our ordinary concerns; namely, the questions: To what extent are human beings free and, even more importantly, to what extent should they be free? Presuming that human are truly free, are there limits to human freedom? It seems to me that by taking this route, we will be in a better position to appreciate the implications of what it means for human beings to be free—if indeed they really are— and to provide some guidance on how we are to conduct our lives in society.

Science and the Determinism/Indeterminism Debate The influence of scientific thinking on the philosophical school of thought that claims that humans are only apparently free can be illustrated by reference to Newtonian physics. Isaac Newton had put forward the hypothesis, backed by certain evidence, that in order to understand and control nature properly we need to discover its laws. There are laws which apply universally. But humans need to discover those laws, and if they do so, they can predict exactly the precise effects of any causation. Unpredictability or imprecision is due to human ignorance whereas full 2

This issue is comparable to the discussion on the reality or mere appearance of chance. Whether one should take risks or gain control has repercussions both mundane and substantial. Cf. “Tails You Win: the Science of Chance” presented by the mathematician, Prof. David Spiegelhalter of Cambridge University, and aired on BBC Four on October 18, 2012.

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knowledge will correct that. Confidence and accuracy can be gained by being enlightened about those universal laws. Determinists find Newtonian physics supportive of their claim that human actions are also governed by predetermined rules and laws. Hence, they would rule out human freedom as a reality while acknowledging that in many cases we may believe that we are free when in fact we are misled into believing that to be the case. Full explanation for any activity, no matter how it may initially appear, is possible but only if we have full knowledge. That is to say, for every effect, including human action, there is a cause. Precise and accurate knowledge of the cause will lead—because it dictates it—to exact knowledge of the effect. But given the complexity of our knowledge of the cause, we are not in a position to be fully precise and accurate. But it would be wrong to think that there is any room for chance or an indeterminate factor in human action just as it would be false to believe that humans are free. Science too has come to the rescue of philosophical indeterminists. But this time it is contemporary physics, particularly exemplified by the work and thinking of Werner Karl Heisenberg,3 rather than the modern physics of which Newton was an exponent. Contemporary physics has shown that unpredictability is not due to human ignorance but is part and parcel of reality itself. The uncertainty theory proposed by him is rooted at the subatomic level where it can be observed and concluded that there is an element of randomness at the very heart of reality. Quantum mechanics, in examining activity at the lowest level, shows that uncertainty is not due to human error or ignorance but exists in reality itself. It is not traceable, therefore, to lack of knowledge; there is unpredictability in the whole of nature. Process philosophy, a school of thought closely associated with A.N. Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne, draws on this finding to support its point of view. While accepting that there is a certain amount of determinateness or order present in varying degrees depending on which level of reality is in question, it strongly champions indeterminism as the primary truth about all reality. At the human level then, albeit not merely at that level, there is genuine freedom (which it refers to as creativity). In other words, there is universal creativity but the kind of creativity or freedom that is linked to humans is one that is specific to them. It will be gathered from what has just been said that the reality of freedom for process philos3

Werner Karl Heisenberg (1901–1976), a German theoretical physicist was awarded the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1932 "for the creation of quantum mechanics”.

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ophy is not merely with human beings. Rather what characterizes freedom in human beings is that it is in keeping with their status of being human.

The Concept of Creative Synthesis Are human beings free? If so, to what extent are they really free? In what sense are human beings unique in this regard? Let me turn to Charles Hartshorne, one of the two process philosophers cited earlier. His concept of creative synthesis sets out the core of what freedom means in this context. Creative synthesis can perhaps be succinctly described as a metaphysical description of the workings of reality. Given the hostility in some quarters to anything that smacks of metaphysics, it is essential to add that the term “metaphysical” as used by him is quite different from the usage of that term that has led to the criticisms of those who have opposed any reference to metaphysics in any philosophical discussion. Moreover, it will be asserted that such a conception—far from being a merely theoretical construct—is actually based on some scientific interpretation of the nature of reality. In Hartshorne’s philosophy, “metaphysical” means that the description can be said to be applicable to the whole of reality,4 rather than to a transcendent reality. As a metaphysical category, creative synthesis is thus a description that covers all of reality and is necessarily true of every reality, including human reality. According to Hartshorne, in every happening or event there is an old as well as a new (or creative) element. The old consists of previous happenings or experiences which give rise to and which persist in the new. There is permanence since in the synthesis the prior data are preserved, the synthesis being the holding together of data. The many become one which in turn produces a new many, and so on. It is an accumulation of these prior acts or a “putting together” of factors into a whole. But the resulting synthesis is a new actuality or experience because a different kind of actuality or experience has emerged from the coming together of past ones. Previously there were the separate existences of the included realities, but now there is a unity. Furthermore, the synthesis is spontaneous or free because none of these —individually or collectively— dictated the exact unity that would arise.5 A synthesis is thus more appro4

For further discussion of Hartshorne’s understanding of metaphysics, see his Creative Synthesis and Philosophical Method. (London: SCM, 1970), Chs. II and III and more recently his Creative Experiencing: a Philosophy of Freedom edited by Donald Wayne Viney and Jincheol O, (SUNY Press, 2011). 5 Cf. Charles Hartshorne, “Religion and Creative Experience,” Unitarian Register and Universalist Leader , 141 (1962), pp. 9-11; “Process and the Nature of God,”

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priately described as emerging rather than is determined. Hence, an actuality, experience or happening cannot be fully described in its total unitary quality merely by specifying what its constituents are. Each of these enriches the totality of reality by being an additional member. A.N. Whitehead’s axiom is particularly useful in summarizing the process: reality becomes one and is increased by one. The concept of “creative synthesis” (or simply, creativity in Whitehead’s terminology) is really Hartshorne’s interpretation of causality. Every act is viewed by him as creative. However, each creative act is influenced by its past acts and does require them even if it cannot be determined precisely or fully by these antecedent acts, which are simply earlier cases of freedom. These acts, those of ourselves or of others, restrict the freedom of the new act, establishing and limiting the possibilities for an otherwise free and creative activity. On the other hand, they never determine them fully. Thus, Hartshorne defines causality as the way in which any given act of creativity is influenced or made possible, but yet not completely determined, by previous acts.6 Because past free acts narrow down any creative act, there can be a certain measure of prediction. Hartshorne uses the analogy of the banks of the river which give the flowing water its direction but do not entirely determine its movement. As he puts it, “Causality is the boundary within which resolution of indeterminacies takes place. Causal regularities mean not the absence of open possibilities but their confinement within limits.”7 Hartshorne thus repudiates the deterministic version of causality. He interprets absolute determinism as regarding a happening to be already completely predefined in its antecedent causes, each state of the world described as containing in reality an absolute map, as it were, of all subsequent and all previous states. He adds that absolute determinism does admit that humans will never be able to read the maps, except in radically incomplete and inaccurate ways. But Hartshorne regards this doctrine as an incorrect reading of the universality of causation because it is too strict an interpretation. Causes, as far as he is concerned, never determine the effect in all its details. A cause is necessary in the sense that without it, there can be no effect. But when all necessary conditions for an event have in G. McLean, (ed.), Traces of God in a Secular Culture (Staton House: Alba House, 1973), pp. 117-141. 6 Charles Hartshorne, “Philosophy after Fifty Years” in P. Bertow (ed.), MidTwentieth Century American Philosophy: Personal Statements (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1974), p. 143. 7 Charles Hartshorne, “Can Man Transcend His Animality?” Monist. 55 (1971), p. 216.

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been fulfilled, it does not follow that the event will take place in precisely the way it is predicted, merely that it may take place. In other words, a cause is necessary, but not the effect. There will be an effect but not a specific or a fully determinate effect. The creative aspect of a particular effect, therefore, lies in that it is never literally anticipated. According to Hartshorne, “To ask ‘why may not the antecedent cases completely determine the given?’ is to show that one has not grasped the meaning and pervasiveness of creativity or spontaneity.”8 There is a certain originality or freshness in every effect. Inasmuch as it is creative, it is partly unpredictable and undetermined in advance.

Some Logical and Metaphysical Underpinnings To understand more fully Hartshorne’s concept of creative synthesis, we need to examine its logical and metaphysical underpinnings. It will be noted that the term “creative synthesis” indicates a certain amount of duality (as opposed to dualism) in the description as well as in reality itself. It is a concept that is grounded in the logic of what Hartshorne calls the law of polarity and supported by his general metaphysical scheme.9 To these we must now turn. According to the law of polarity, which Hartshorne says he has taken over from Morris Cohen, “ultimate contraries are correlatives, mutually interdependent, so that nothing real can be described by the wholly onesided assertion of [ultimate categories such as] simplicity, being, actuality and the like, each in a ‘pure’ form, devoid and independent of complexity, becoming, potentiality and related categories.”10 However, although polarities are ultimate, it does not follow that the two poles are in every sense on an equal status. As mere abstract concepts they are indeed correlatives, each requiring the other for its own meaning. But in their application to the reality itself, one pole or category includes its contrary.11 This law is said to pervade reality. If one reflects sufficiently, one can expect to find all of reality revealing certain abstract contrasts, such as complex-simple, relative-absolute and so forth, which are ultimate or metaphysical contraries. The two poles or contrasts of each set stand or fall together. Neither pole is to be denied or explained away or regarded as 8

Charles Hartshorne, “Philosophy after Fifty Years,” p. 143. See also, Chapter Three: “Distinct, not Separate: A Critique of Dualistic Thinking in and of Society”. 10 Charles Hartshorne (with William Reese), Philosophers Speak of God (University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 2. 11 CSPM, op cit., p. 99. 9

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“unreal”. If either pole is real, the contrast itself, i.e. the two poles together, is also real. Although only one expresses the total reality, its correlative also says something about that reality since it is included in the other pole. There is a basic asymmetry or one-sided dependence: what is concrete includes what is abstract, not vice-versa. As a result, metaphysical categories as exemplified by concrete realities are always to be found in pairs. No concrete individual is merely simple, it is also complex. There is no such thing as pure effect. The same entity is, in another aspect, also a cause. No concrete entity can be said to be solely necessary for in a different context it is also contingent. No happening is merely a synthesis, it is also creative. The pairing of metaphysical categories runs through Hartshorne’s metaphysical system. He does not see any contradiction in ascribing opposite metaphysical categories to the same reality provided they refer to different aspects of that reality. According to him, the law of noncontradiction is incorrectly formulated as “no subject can have the same predicates p and not-p at the same time”. What needs to be made explicit is that they cannot be applied in the same respect. Hartshorne explains that a person can change in some respects without changing in every way and the world may be finite spatially and infinite temporally. In all of these the predication of contrasting attributes is not on the same ontological level for one set refers to the concrete aspect while the other to the abstract. Turning now to his metaphysical scheme, it should be clear at this stage that reality for Hartshorne consists of events or happenings, not substances. The concept of creative synthesis is in fact a description of activity or of action rather than of things. It is for this reason that the term “process” has also been used with reference to his philosophy inasmuch as process or becoming, rather than being, is the fundamental reality. Reality thus is a series of events or activities or processes interconnected in creative synthesis. Hartshorne introduces a metaphysical distinction which has a bearing on the concept of creative synthesis. Calling the concrete state of any reality its actuality, Hartshorne says that actuality is always more than bare existence. “All existence …is the ‘somehow actualized’ status of a nature in a suitable actuality, this actuality being always more determinate than the bare truth that the nature exists, i.e. in some actual state.”12 That the defined abstract nature is somehow concretely actualized is what Hartshorne understands by existence. How it is actualized, i.e. in what particular 12

Charles Hartshorne, “Tillich and the Other Great Tradition,” Anglican Theological Review, 43, 3 (1961), p. 258.

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state or with what particular content, is what is meant by actuality. The abstract definition of something, its essence, exists if and only if it is actualized or concretized somehow or is in some concrete form. However, one cannot deduce actuality which is concrete from an essence which is the abstract definition of the thing. In other words, actuality never follows from essence. Thus, the essence “humanity” exists if there are men, no matter which men or what states are actualized. But from “humanity” one cannot ascertain which men are actualized.13 There is a manifest difference between existence (the truth that an abstraction is somehow concretely embodied) and actuality (how that embodiment occurs). Since actuality is concrete, it is finite. This means that some possibilities are left out and thus prevented from being actualized. Actual reality in all cases is limited. Actualization is determination which in turn implies partial negation. It is the acceptance of limitation. It means choosing this and therefore not that. Hartshorne maintains that concrete actuality must always be competitive; that is to say, it must at all times exclude something else which could be equally concrete. Thus, as events come together or are “synthesized”, other events are being excluded. It would be more accurate in this metaphysics to say that the resulting synthesis comes into actuality (rather than into existence).

Creative Synthesis, Freedom and Power Taking freedom in the first instance as implying a certain amount of autonomy the concept of creative synthesis means that there is truly a plurality of freedom and that every reality is endowed with some freedom. In other words, to be is to have some freedom because it is the actualization of some potentiality by that entity. This is because actualization is to some extent self-creation. A plurality of beings therefore connotes a plurality of freedom. For Hartshorne, every item of reality is creative and thus exercises varying degrees of freedom. It can to some degree decide what it wants to be. Every reality has its own appropriate form of creativity. This variety means that every concrete effect has numerous real causes. But every cause is also an effect. Creativity means freedom and novelty but it also signifies partial determination by previous creativities or creative acts. In being determined in this way, any creative act is at the same time, though not in the same respect, an effect. Activity and passivity are correlatives: what cannot act cannot be acted upon, and what cannot be 13

Charles Hartshorne, “How Some Speak and yet do not Speak of God,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 23, 2 (1962), p. 276.

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acted upon cannot act. The exercise of freedom is thus acting upon other genuine freedoms. Every reality thus sets limits to the freedom of others but does not destroy it. Recognizing the genuineness of the freedom of others means, not taking away or preventing the freedom of others, but fostering and inspiring that freedom. The powerful—in this conceptuality—is like the creative orator, thinker and artist who inspire creative responses in others. The truly powerful ones, that is to say, those who exercise their freedom, are those who encourage appropriate originality in others, rather than dictate specific actions. The powerful ruler is one who places others in a position to make fruitful decisions of their own. He or she awakens creativity in others, inspires them by providing them with opportunities and by fostering creativity in them. The powerful can impose limits on the disagreements, conflicts and confusions; but it cannot simply eliminate these confusions. For that to happen, there has to be a monopoly of power—which is what is rejected in this conceptuality. The truly powerful does not deny their existence since the meaning of power is, contrary to its more frequent usage, not controlling but eliciting responses which are partially selfdetermining or free. The ideal form of power does not monopolize power, but allots to all their due measure of creative opportunity.14 It inspires freedom in others thus enabling them to act freely yet in such a way that a coherent and in general harmonious world comes about. There is nothing ideal about possessing total control and reducing others to powerlessness. Hartshorne maintains that such idealization is actually symptomatic of weakness. It is the inferior, weak beings who yearn to be able to manipulate everything.15 Concentration of decision-making in the one being is in principle undesirable because the values of life are essentially social, involving the interactions of more or less free individuals. Power over others—understood in this way by Hartshorne—is comparable to the control of one mind over another. A mind is influenced by what it knows, its object. A mind which knows A but not B would be different from one which knows B but not A. Change is effected in the mind through a change in the object. By altering the object of our awareness, the powerful also influences us. When it changes, we as other knowers change in response to the altered state. The powerful thus influences us not by 14

Charles Hartshorne, “Biology and Spiritual View of the World: a Comment on Dr. Birch’s Paper,” Christian Scholar, 37, 3 (Sept., 1954), p. 409; also his, Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes (SUNY Press, 1984), pp. 10-26. 15 Although many would not be convinced by this observation, one would sincerely hope nevertheless that dictators or tyrants and those who aspire to be one would keep this in mind!

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controlling every detail of our action but by determining its own action which is the inclusive object of our thoughts. We can still disobey but not disregard it. In reacting against its suggestion the disobedient is still influenced even though negatively. A state of rebellion or resistance to a suggestion is not the same as the state of unawareness of the suggestion. Governance in this scheme is taking each successive phase of development and making good use of that phase in one’s own development and furnishing others with such guidance or inspiration as will optimize the ratio of opportunities and risks for the next phase. The truly powerful, Hartshorne maintains, sets the best or optimal limits to freedom. Optimal limits mean that they are such that, were more freedom allowed, the risks would increase more than the opportunities, and were less freedom permitted, the opportunities would decrease more than the risks. The powerful sets optimal limits for the free action of others by presenting oneself at each moment a partly new ideal which influences our entire activity. Thus, there is no guarantee of a perfection of detailed results for, according to Hartshorne, no power could ensure the detailed actions of others. There is no complete determination of any action by one will. Rather, all realities form themselves and form each other within limits. Hartshorne sums this up by stating that it is the setting of these limits which constitutes the ordering of all activities.

Some Observations and Considerations Given such a conceptual model for freedom, what are the implications for our understanding of the various forms of limitation to it? One important consideration is that such a description of the workings of reality—generalized to include human actions—means that the relationship of one cause with another does not result in the loss of freedom of the other cause even when there is an attempt to do so. Rather, they become included or incorporated into the original cause, resulting in a new entity. In other words, there is no absolutizing of the control that one exercises over the other even if the control is so great that one is left tremendously restricted. Ultimately, however, there is no robbing of anyone’s autonomy. The other always remains an entity in its own right; and there is no complete loss of the other’s own power, so to speak. This is what makes each of us distinctive and is the basis of our uniqueness. Another consideration to be made is that the attempt to exercise unilateral control, robbing others of their freedom—and it is merely an attempt according to this way of thinking—actually has an effect on that party as well. It becomes an integral part of its actuality, and therefore has

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a real consequence to it. In other words, one becomes a different reality because of what one does or tries to do. The restrictions that we impose on others have an impact on our very own reality. Dictators, tyrants and despots appear to be ignorant of how their controlling actions do not merely deprive their subjects of the opportunity to exercise their freedom but they are also short-changing themselves. There is some truth to the observation, paradoxical as it may seem, that total control by them actually restrains their own ability to be a true human being.16 It could be objected that such a conception of freedom is too theoretical and even idealistic. But that would hardly be true if indeed we take into account, not how we perceive the workings of nature but how, at a deeper level, reality actually works. This conceptuality, as had been clarified earlier, is based on a certain scientific explanation of reality. If this is indeed correct, then it is more realistic than idealistic.17 Admittedly, there is a real need to continue to reflect on this topic since it involves a shift in our thinking and challenges entrenched conceptions in our discourse regarding human activity. Otherwise, an unfortunate consequence here is not just confusion but also questionable behaviour. And if we are to correct that, it is important that we do regularly and consistently uncover our assumptions and subject them to a critical appraisal. In the present context, the challenge of re-thinking our conception of freedom really means that there is a need to direct people towards a fundamental issue as it will have implications not just on how we are to think but also on how we are to live individually and in society.18 Such a philosophy of human freedom would have an impact on, among others, ethics.19 If ethical responsibility, for instance, is measured 16

It is doubtful whether tyrants and dictators would be convinced of this comment, but this does not make it any less true. 17 The reference to science is not intended to clinch the argument, but merely to show that this metaphysical concept is based on contemporary physics. One of the rather disturbing argumentations brought up in a discussion or debate is when one makes an assertion and claims that it is “evidence-based” to convince others of the truth of the claim without taking into account that this further assertion raises suspicions as to who selected, interpreted, and judged the so-called “evidence” in the first place. 18 Interestingly, this investigation is mirrored in economic theory. The debate between John Maynard Keynes versus Frederick Hayek shows the contrasting thinking between them on government’s interference with the banks of the country. The controversy revolves around the concept of freedom and control. Cf. “Masters of Money: Hayek,” presented by Stephanie Flanders on BBB2, 24 Sept., 2012. 19 For a fuller discussion of this topic, see Ferdinand Santos and Santiago Sia, Personal Identity, the Self and Ethics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

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not just by one’s intention but also by the amount of control that the agent has on one’s action, then it seems that one must also take into consideration the nature of the action itself. In many cases our understanding of causality shapes our attribution of responsibility. In this interpretation of causality as creative synthesis, human action is both a given as well as a free act. If freedom is necessary for ethical responsibility, then every action has ethical significance since it has an element of freedom. It is not merely the necessary or expected effect of circumstantial or societal factors. It means that every human action carries a certain amount of ethical worth. It should be noted, however, that here it is the action itself (and not just the agent, in the Aristotelian sense, that is free). Because it is free it could have been otherwise; because it could have been otherwise, there is a need to account for the actuality of the action. In this sense no action can be regarded as “value-free”. It is good to remind ourselves of this point. We should also note, however, that since there is a hierarchy of freedoms, as explained above, it would be wrong to conclude that ethical responsibility is being attributed to all forms of creative synthesis, but simply that it has ethical worth. At the same time, however, such a philosophy of human freedom recognizes that no action is totally free either; thus, the ethical dimension can never be regarded as exhaustive, i.e. complete. Because every action is a result of the interplay of various other actions, it is always influenced.20 Such an interpretation accepts, but only partially, the claim of those who insist on the role of external forces which leave every action determined. There is some truth in the claim that praise and blame—to use Aristotle’s terms—must take into account that one’s action is not completely one’s own after all. Hartshorne’s concept of creative synthesis, which is a metaphysical one, translated into a philosophy of human action, can provide a possible grounding of an ethical theory that is cognizant of both freedom and restriction. The distinction between the “creative” and the “synthesis” aspects of our action can be helpful too in grounding the notion of responsibility towards the future, e.g. in environmental ethics, inasmuch as the givenness that we create by our actions now will shape the kind of situation that future generations will have. We owe it to those who come after us to ensure that their environment is suitable for their own development. Just as we are the recipients of what had happened in the past, we are contributors— 20

As our knowledge of the biological make-up of human beings increases, we are becoming more and more aware that certain medical factors do influence human behaviour and restrict the amount of freedom. This in turn means that attribution of ethical responsibility is much more complex than sometimes is claimed.

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in a real way—to what will be the future. It is our efforts, or lack of them, that certain possibilities are or are not actualized for others.21 In such a philosophy of human freedom, which makes a distinction between the abstract and the concrete, one can also see in discussions of rights, e.g. freedom of speech, that one can indeed uphold the existence of such an abstract right but the concrete exercise of such a right may have to be more circumspect.22 This point has become particularly relevant in the debates regarding the alleged freedom of speech which was used to justify the publication of what was considered by many as insulting cartoons on a spiritual leader or the uploading of certain photographs of specific celebrities. The exercise of any right does not occur in a vacuum. The identification of the abstract with the concrete can lead not just to conceptual confusion but also to unfortunate tangible consequences. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that human rights, often quoted by those championing freedom of speech, are based on our nature, and not simply on the existence of freedom which is also attributable to non-humans. Our freedom as human beings enables us to exercise those rights, but it is not their basis. It also means that any exercise of freedom, by ourselves or by others, which devalues our human nature is at best suspect and at worst unjustifiable. Similarly, curtailing human freedom by imposing limitations can only be justified if these enhance the humanity of all those involved. At the same time restricting human freedom is not in itself a downgrading or violation of human rights.23 This understanding of human freedom, making use of the concept of creative synthesis, also shows that conversion or the chance to renew oneself, is not only possible but should also be fostered. Past mistakes, bad 21

Climate warming is a particularly relevant example. It is most unfortunate that some countries are still disputing their ethical responsibility in this respect despite some terrible disasters, including super typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda), which are happening in our time. This was a point raised at the Warsaw Climate Change Conference in November 2013 by the leader of the Philippine delegation. One does not have to wait for incontrovertible scientific findings to realize that this issue needs immediate attention by those in authority. It has been acknowledged that the sea levels are rising, fastest in the Philippines, which has just been devastated by the strongest ever typhoon. 22 See Chapter Seven: “Images, Truth and Reality: Some Philosophical Considerations”. 23 This point becomes particularly relevant in discussions, which have ethical significance, involving the deprivation of freedom ,such as imprisonment. It is also a relevant consideration in cases which involve the overriding of one’s freedom, as in court decisions to give food or blood to those who refuse it despite the danger of death.

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decisions, and even irresponsible previous activities do not have to be condoned. They do after all always continue to affect the present and the future; that is to say, they are not eradicable. But they should not totally close off the challenge of the future and of a more positive outlook for any of us. Although accountability is intrinsic to any ethical consideration of all one’s actions, the reality of a certain openness of the future means that reform or “a change of heart” is not impossible.24 This should also shape our own responses to that possibility.25

Further Comments on Human Freedom Developments in contemporary society certainly show the need for an investigation of the issue of human freedom. Human freedom and its various expressions feature in debates regarding the proposed legislation on abortion in Ireland and elsewhere, the legalization of same-sex marriage in Britain and France, the unrestricted use of Facebook and Twitter, the proliferation of cyber-bullying, the protection of whistle-blowers and the wearing of particular garbs at work or in the larger society—to mention just a few examples. There have been constant references to freedom of choice, to respect for individual rights and to transparency in public affairs.26 There have also been recent cases, involving the media, when the right to information as well as freedom of speech have been cited to justify certain activities. But should we be bothered with these issues and questions, particularly since there seem to be no straightforward answers? Unfortunately, unless we take a harder look at them, we could be misled. What is taken for granted and what has always been held may have a useful purpose for ordinary contexts, but they can also be unhelpful or even wrong when investigated further. It is essential therefore that we do reflect on such issues and questions more thoroughly even if no ready and neat answers are immediately forthcoming. On the issue of freedom, while we may realize that we are free insofar as we are decision-makers—a point made at the start of this essay—we 24

One very disturbing documentary that has been shown on television recently was “12-year-old Lifers” narrated by Noah Huntley and based on the true story of Colt Lundy, 15, and Paul Gingerich, 12, who were given life-imprisonment for a murder committed. It was filmed by Nerd Productions for Channel Four and aired on 2 May 2013. 25 A welcome example is provided by the Irish Association for the Social Integration of Offenders,. Cf. http://iasio.ie. 26 This was recently illustrated in the repeal of the anti-protest laws by the Ukraine Parliament in response to the street demonstrations in Kiev and other cities.

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need to be even more aware that the human form of freedom is a privilege for which we humans should be grateful. It gives us a certain status and dignity—not merely, value. Thus, it deserves our utmost respect. Because it is so fundamental to our make-up as human beings, we can definitely justify claims to having rights at different levels. Furthermore, removing our freedom or restricting it can and does destroy our very essence; therefore, defending it and our rights is necessary if we are to live genuinely human lives in human society.27 At the same time, however, it needs to be stressed and seriously considered—which regrettably does not always happen—that being free is a fundamental responsibility. The rights we possess due to our freedom also provide us with duties to others. Therefore, we need to be conscious of the rights of others as we interact with them. Human beings are not isolated individuals; and our existence is always a co-existence, not just with other human beings but also with the whole of creation.28 Human freedom is not just about exercising it but even more importantly, respecting it and accepting certain limitations.29 With it comes a certain amount of accountability. The concept of creative synthesis affirms the universality of freedom, but as befitting the nature of the reality in question. In the human case, creativity or freedom is in keeping with human nature, i.e. rationality. Since human rationality entails the use of the intellect, it means that the exercise of freedom must also be in line with such use. Accordingly, human freedom is the rational exercise of creativity. It is not simply a matter of exercising it because one possesses the ability to do so. As was mentioned earlier, it is most unfortunate when resort is made to the various forms of freedom, such as the freedom of speech, without the accompanying rational reflection on one’s activity or intended action. Aristotle, Aquinas and many others have rightly emphasized that free will is one important feature of rationality but the other one is the intellect. These are meant to be used concurrently by human beings for an act to be truly ethical and therefore justified and justifiable. 27

This situation is borne out by the continuing fight for freedom throughout the world on an individual as well as societal level. History shows how it has cost countless lives and ruined so many societies. Human freedom is rightly described as priceless. 28 See Chapter Five: “The Individual and Society: a Philosophical Conception of Self as Social”. 29 One of the most difficult cases highlighting this point has been the alleged freedom to determine the ending of one’s life. Cf. the recent Marie Fleming case in Ireland over her claimed right to die as an MS sufferer.

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Understandably, the existence of human freedom and its various forms may lead to a conflict—and we are experiencing it in the various debates mentioned earlier—that needs to be addressed and hopefully resolved. This is why there is a tension, for instance, between individual and public interests.30 Additionally, certain laws in society have to be introduced not just to limit certain actions but also to protect the innocent. But precisely because we are free we should be in a position to resolve these matters. Reconciling conflicts, easing tensions, balancing opposing claims are possible only because we have been endowed with freedom.31 Were we completely determined, many of these conflicts and tensions would of course not arise in the first place, but neither could we improve any situation either. Our choices and decisions may at times have unacceptable and even disastrous consequences, but it is also within our abilities to seek out remedies and solutions. And surprisingly, the more we deal with those conflicts and tensions conscientiously and the more we respect the freedom of others, the more we develop our own respective freedoms. Not only will we deepen our appreciation of being free, we will also grasp the true meaning of human freedom. In short, human freedom, which dignifies our status, can be the source of conflict but is also the resource for a solution. Finally, can humans have too much freedom? Can having so much choice actually be healthy for our development as human beings?32 Is to be free the same as to live, rather than just to survive, as humans? Given that some people crave for it, fight for it and even die for it, is it not rather absurd even to consider this question?33 Nonetheless, it would be instructive to note that Hartshorne’s concept of creative synthesis to explain freedom

30

See Chapter Two: “Public and Individual Interest, Common Good: an Analysis and a Proposal”. 31 This was illustriously exemplified in the life and work of Nelson Mandela who insisted that freedom is not about losing chains but more importantly about being able to help others. After his release from prison, he devoted his time to working for the elimination of apartheid in South Africa and mediating conflicts throughout the world. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his work. 32 Advertising by a number of businesses capitalize on the attraction of “freedom” , such as the freedom that comes with the use of their credit cards, the purchase of a new car, or being transformed into a more attractive individual! 33 With teenagers in general, growing up is many times equated with “being free”, i.e. being able to do whatever one wishes. On a more serious note, one can sympathize with those who have been denied any freedom at all. From another rather ironic angle, there are those who have risked imprisonment or torture for the sake of their freedom.

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also shows that the absence of any restriction actually results in chaos.34 If there is no causality at all, we would have a chaotic situation. If we all exercised our freedom fully, we would have a hopelessly unsurvivable society. Paradoxically, parameters, limits, restrictions—and these can be in different forms—can actually enhance our freedom insofar as they enable us to exercise our creativity differently.35 They can even motivate us to make the right choices. Ethical behaviour is a particularly excellent example. Here once again we do need to be guided by our human intellect. Rational thinking can and does provide certain justified reasons for curtailing freedom. But it is also rational thinking that can challenge us to seek out alternatives, map out another route, and opt for the better choice.

34

Given the tremendous developments in digital technology, there is much talk in Greece about digital rights, a topic that considers a number of issues dealing with freedom as well as restrictions, as was broadcast on Euronews, 18 October 2013. 35 It has seemed to me to be true that at times when certain doors in life have closed on us, other doors open as a result. They lead us to a different route which may not have been planned.

CHAPTER NINE SOCIAL ROLES, PUBLIC OFFICE, AND MORAL SOCIETY: LESSONS FROM THE PAST FOR THE PRESENT?

Roles in Society As we live out our lives in society--that is to say, in the company of others and in interactions with them—we invariably find ourselves in various roles. The first ones start with our families—as son, daughter, sister, brother, and as parents.1 As we enlarge our circle of relationships so do the number of roles that we play. With some of these we are born into those roles, as in our widening family life. But with others they are of our choosing, whether with friends or in a school or work environment. Sometimes, the roles simply come our way, so to speak, as we meet people in daily life. In each of these roles, no matter how we find ourselves in them, there are respective commitments and responsibilities. For that reason, one can, like Confucius, talk of “filial duties”. There is also an acknowledgement of the existence of parental obligations and one’s responsibilities towards one’s immediate family, relatives and friends. There is even encouragement of neighbourliness, especially in the context of looking out for one another at times of danger. In the workplace, there is an expectation to treat one another in a professional way, which implies following certain codes of conduct. These duties and responsibilities vary of course, and not all of them demand our serious or full commitment. In fact, some of these, as with passing acquaintances, entail a mere cursory attention. What is generally true of them, however, is that the specific role is associated with a certain behaviour. But there are some roles that some of us take upon themselves because they have decided or agreed to serve society in a particular way. 1 On a contemporary challenge to the notion of parent, see note 100, Chapter V: “The Individual and Society: a Philosophical Conception of Self as Social”, p. 108.

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This is the case with public office. Whether undertaken voluntarily, appointed or elected, there has always been an understanding that not only are specific responsibilities attached to the role,2 but there is also an expectation, even if at times implicit, that whoever has that role must have, among others, personal integrity. Although at times those whom they serve may admit that a person’s private life should not necessarily determine one’s judgment of the competence of that person in public life to discharge his or her duties satisfactorily, nonetheless there is widespread agreement that it cannot be put aside altogether either.3 In fact, it is regarded as crucial in determining the over-all credibility of the office-holder.4 Somehow, there is a greater expectation not to have a disconnect between one’s public and one’s personal life. That is to say, there is a very strong view that the public image of such officials is much more than mere optics.5 It is expected that holding public office entails, additionally, both discharging their public responsibility and upholding their personal integrity. Admittedly, there is some degree of divergence on the matter, especially because that view imposes an extra burden on those who take up public office, often at the expense of any privacy in their lives and those of their family. Still, the intimate connection between one’s public responsibility and one’s personal integrity has always been an issue in and a concern for society. The word “transparency”, currently in wide circulation nowadays due to certain suspect practices in various areas in society, is also demanded—or at least, strongly urged—not only as regards the official work of public officials but also their non-official activities. Consequently, while there are codes of conduct drawn up to regulate professional work and ethics boards to monitor conduct, social sentiment appears to go further, insisting that public officials themselves must be above reproach. 2

This feeling is well expressed in the words of Shakespeare’s character, Henry IV: “Uneasy is the head that wears the crown”. 3 Cultural differences, it seems, do determine the extent to which this is true as illustrated in the different public reactions in the USA and in France to the sexual activities of their respective top officials. However, the recent controversy regarding the present French president indicates that expectations in France about the conduct of their public officials—in what he regards his private life—are changing. 4 A common tactic that is used in some circles when one is calling into question the continued occupation of a public office is a call for the office-holder “to consider his or her position”. 5 This was clearly evident in the recent public outcry over the personal life of the mayor of Toronto and in the Italian Senate’s decision regarding the political career of the former Italian prime minister.

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The social roles that we find ourselves in or undertake for various reasons, particularly illustrated by public office, result from and are imbedded in our relationships with one another. Since our lives are lived in society and each of us develops our personality in the midst of others, the expectations described above are inevitable. Furthermore, insofar as social roles incur a certain amount of responsibility, the issue of moral living in society does matter. Accordingly, this essay will investigate social roles, particularly public office, and moral responsibility. It will pursue the topic by enquiring whether there are lessons that contemporary society can learn from the philosophical thinking of the past.

A Moral Society?6 But first, we need to raise the question as to whether one can legitimately expect a moral society.7 This question and what it entails will hopefully place us in a better position to look into what is at stake when we direct our attention to public office. Raising the question of a moral society in turn leads to a series of other questions. To what extent is society an important factor in one’s moral development? Should society itself be promoting such a life for all its members? Should it advocate and promote specific values to enable ethical living? Is it right to expect an ethical climate in one’s society? These considerations have arisen and have been addressed at various periods throughout human history. In recent times, however, illustrated by the election campaign of Barack Obama, there has been much talk of pro-

6

I am using the term “moral society” in preference to the more usual “just society” because the connotation of a just society is that it should take care of the various needs of the citizens. The association of society with a welfare state is not what is implied by the discussion here although it does make references to it. Rather, what is of main concern in this essay is the kind of society which promotes the moral growth of its members. 7 The Archbishop of Dublin in a homily to mark the opening of the new law term remarked that the work of fostering justice and of the administration of justice is a vital one within society, adding that the real challenge was to build a just society “constructed, not by an elite, but by a participative society in the broadest sense”. He explained: "Our society needs to find ways of educating and fostering responsibility, not just for our own endeavours, but for the type of just society we wish to create for all. This involves education to morality and to the ability to seek and discern what is truthful and good in the fullest sense." The Irish Independent (1 October 2012), p. 5.

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moting traditional values,8 and of cherishing the welfare of all. While the focus in this instance was understandably on the American way of life, it has nevertheless raised once again an important issue regarding any society and the moral growth of its people. The same can be said about Vladimir Putin’s call to the Russian people to embrace traditional values. In his state-of-the nation address in 2012 which was wide-ranging he urged them—rather unexpectedly—to strengthen the moral basis of society since present-day Russia, in his view, is experiencing what he called a “clear deficit of spiritual bonds: support, charity and mutual help for one another.” In present-day Ireland the collapse of the Celtic Tiger phenomenon has to some extent awakened a seemingly dormant desire for the traditional values which somehow had nourished Irish society in the past. The blame for this undesirable situation that the country now finds itself in has been laid squarely on the irresponsible and greedy conduct of bankers and financial institutions. While the country was flush with wealth—falsely, it now appears—it was also losing its grip on the so-called old Irish values. The Irish President, Michael D. Higgins, has been bringing to the fore in his speeches the importance of focusing on ethics in the important challenge of reviving both the morale and the financial health of the country. Surprisingly, even in China today, after decades following the rise of Maoism, debunking and debasing the centuries-old teachings of Confucian philosophy, there has been a revival and support of Confucian values at the official level.9 Confucius, to whom some political rulers of his time had turned for advice, was the first teacher in Chinese history to clarify principles and ideals which dominated all future education in China. But to what extent should these calls by political leaders and others be heeded? Should morality be of concern to society as a whole?10 Should 8

One will probably be inclined to compare this point with the moves, which have been spreading, to shape a country in accordance with a religious way of life. The reference in this essay to a moral society is merely to show the connectedness between the ethical lives of individual citizens and their society, irrespective of their religious beliefs. 9 Writing in The Irish Times (December 8, 2012), Clifford Conan observes: “…as in many other areas of society in China, there has been a change in thinking on Confucius. The leadership believes burgeoning wealth and the rise of consumerism have seen many traditional Confucian values of honour and decency slip away in favour of self-serving, money-grabbing behaviour. …Scholars and, increasingly, the Communist Party believe following some sound Confucian principles should be conducive to the building of a ‘harmonious society’”, “How Confucian theory is back in Chinese fashion,” News Review Section, p. 4. 10 One insightful remark by Sister B who was interviewed regarding the Magdalene Laundries in Ireland for her opinion on Taoiseach Enda Kenny’s apology to

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its members strive after a moral society? Do those in political office have any responsibility in this area?

Learning from Confucius and his Teachings The ancient Chinese philosopher, whose insights are widely regarded as having been recorded in The Analects,11 is credited with having maintained that one should live up to one’s moral responsibilities and will thereby transform society.12 The goal for the individual, therefore, if one wants to serve society, is the development of one’s personality, which as we shall see later really means becoming a moral person (chun-tzu). Accordingly, his programme for the reform of society was very much targeted on the education of the individual citizen. This development is accomplished by the careful regulation of all human relationships at every level, thus promoting the harmony and peace necessary for the development of a rich and happy communal life. In his view, this will help achieve the goal for society, which is universal order and harmony under the rule of a perfect sage. In Confucius’s time society was organized on the traditional and hierarchical basis of family life. In his teachings he stresses that unless the intimate relationships of family life were controlled by jen and i13 there would be neither filial piety (hsiao-ti)14 nor brotherly affection; and the the women on behalf of the state for its role, pointed out that he had also apologized on behalf of the society at that time. She explained that the social culture at that time was quite oppressive for women in general. This remark illustrates the importance of critiquing not only practices but also the social milieu. 11 Confucius, The Analects trans. Raymond Dawson (Oxford University Press, 1993). 12 In addition to the Analects, The Great Learning and Doctrine of the Mean, the discussion here of Confucius’s teachings draws from David Howard Smith, Confucius and Confucianism (Paladin Books, 1974), H.G. Creel, Chinese Thought: From Confucius to Mao Tse-Tung (The University of Chicago Press, 1953), and Leonard Shihlien Hsü, The Political Philosophy of Confucianism London: Curzon Press, 1975. 13 I is usually translated as righteousness or justice. It is the virtue that enables one to do what is regarded as fitting, right or seemly. Rather than provide an abstract definition, Confucius teaches that it is a quality seen in the character and conduct of the chun-tzu who is motivated by jen and acts in accordance with li. He holds that a chun-tzu learns to distinguish between what is righteous or not in the concrete situations of life. 14 Confucius is quite specific regarding the duties of children to their parents, Analects (2:6-8; 4:18; 2:5)

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family as a social unit would inevitably disintegrate. This would in turn lead to the deterioration of the larger society. In contrast, morally developed citizens would ensure a morally upright society which then would bring about the over-all well-being of its members.15 Confucius teaches that it is with the development of certain virtues that one will form one’s moral character. Of all the virtues which characterize a true “gentleman” (chun-tzu), however, jen is the most supreme.16 It represents the highest perfection of goodness, such as only a holy sage can attain, and yet all men may strive after, for its possession is more important than life itself. Only by strenuous moral effort can one hope to increase in jen. Such moral effort involves self-cultivation, love towards others and the continuous practice of goodness. In addition, the partialities of one’s nature need to be corrected so as to reach a harmonious balance. By self-cultivation one attains mastery over self. Chun-tzu originally meant noble by birth, but Confucius taught that anyone might be a gentleman if that person’s conduct was noble, unselfish, just and kind.17 Confucius emphasized likewise the development of chun-shu (loyalty and compassion) to be of fundamental importance to life in society as well those in public service. By loyalty, he meant living by one’s principles rather than submission to a human master. Compassion is putting oneself in the place of others and “not doing to others what one would not desire them do to one”.18 According to this teacher, a noble character is never prepared to part company with goodness19 and is as concerned to discover what is right as lesser men are concerned with their pay.20 He pointed out that such a character will not seek to escape poverty through questionable means but is prepared to find contentment, if need be, “with coarse food, water to drink and a bent arm for a pillow”.21 At the same time, however, Confucius repudiates wealth and rank only if these are obtained by wrong means.22 He is realistic enough to realize that one cannot be expected to be 15

One could imagine Confucius teaching that if every householder cleans the road in front of one’s house, one would have a clean street. 16 Jen, which is used in the Analects more than 40 times, is translated into English variously as “love”, “goodness”, “benevolence”, and “human-heartedness”. 17 The Analects (4:1-6; 7:29; 15: 8, 9). For this reason, Confucius accepted any rank to his school, diverging from the traditional pattern of schooling, which consisted in training in techniques to enable men to carry on certain traditional functions. 18 Ibid.(12:2) 19 Ibid.(4:5) 20 Ibid.(4:16) 21 Ibid.(7:15) 22 Ibid.(14:13; 16:10)

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morally upright on an “empty stomach”, so to speak. And he sees rank in society as enabling one to stretch out to others and is thus a further route to developing one’s moral growth. He resurrected the use of the term li as a standard for behaviour. Originally, however, the term was used for religious rites; but he broadened it to include all habitual, customary and socially accepted rites. In his usage, li embraced all the customary regulations and acknowledged practices which govern social relationships. Li (propriety, or rules of good behaviour) is what is generally fitting, i.e. the mores of polite society. Confucius maintains that the perfection of personality can only be attained by the cultivation of right manners and the study of propriety23 insofar as it brings external restraints upon conduct so that it does not exceed what is deemed to be fitting and right. It is to be complemented by the study of music inasmuch as this brings about inner harmony of the mind and thus puts one in the proper mood to behave and relate to others in an appropriate manner.24 For Confucius the purpose of education—and he was ahead of his time in this—is primarily the development of character. One does not engage in education for the sake of education. Instead, its purpose is to prepare one to go out to work and struggle for one’s principles. For Confucius to be educated is to develop and cultivate oneself mentally and morally. It is to expand, strengthen and discipline oneself not just to be “an instrument of the ruler” but to play the dynamic role of revolutionizing any government. The aim of his system of education is to supply the right kind of people to assist in the administration of government. Confucius regards “exalted virtue as the foundation of government” and likens a ruler who governs by moral force “to the pole-star, which remains in its place while all the lesser stars do homage to it.”25 Rulers should be as seriously attentive to governing, he stresses, as they are to sacrificing to their ancestors. Moreover, if ministers treated one another with courtesy, they should be as considerate toward the common people, who form the backbone of the state.

23

Sometimes li is translated as “etiquette”, which unfortunately is supported by the overemphasis on external conduct during Confucius’s time. However, Confucius does not disassociate the external conduct from the more important internal formation of the individual. 24 Confucius regarded moral development as a matter “of the heart and mind”. 25 The Analects (2,1).

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The Great Learning,26 probably written by some unknown Confucian scholar in the middle of the 4th century B.C. but considered as articulating the Confucian idea of education re-affirms his conviction that people can be appealed to by reason, moved by the force of example, and bettered by education.27 Confucius holds that it is possible to persuade those who possess power and authority to exercise virtue and seek righteousness and above all to consider as of paramount importance the welfare of the people. He realizes that all humans desire happiness, however differently it may be defined by individuals. In this respect, his teaching is comparable to Aristotle’s.28 He therefore advises that a good government insofar as is possible should enable its people to be happy and provide for all their wants. At the same time, good government should show the power of a moral personality, exercise love to all its citizens and be content only with the highest good. Acquisition of knowledge, in Confucius’s view, is important but secondary. Knowledge of culture and of the fine arts is undoubtedly useful and assists in the production of a well-rounded and balanced personality, but this too is secondary. While laying great emphasis on study and the search for knowledge, he adds: “To learn and not to think over [what one had learned] is useless; to think without learning is dangerous”29 A chuntzu should be widely learned in all elements of culture, but should know “how to bring all this learning under the restraining influence of ritual”.30 At the same time, by highlighting learning in this way, the Confucian understanding of education shows that the cultivation of one’s personal life is fundamental to the well-being of family and state and the precondition of that universal peace which all people desire. Through learning one gains a penetrating insight into the meaning of things. Confucius points out that “he who is really good (jen) is never unhappy, he that is really wise is nev26

The Great Learning in Wing-tsit Chan, trans. and compiler, A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy (N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973). 27 Confucius, however, was not a pacifist. He taught that there are times when force must be used by moral men to prevent themselves and the world from being enslaved by those for whom force is the only argument and sanction. Force must be the last resort, however, and it must always be subordinate to the power of justice. He stresses that virtue, rather than force, should be the foundation of government. 28 See my “The Aim of Moral Striving: a Creative-Comparative Approach to Aristotle’s and Confucius’s Ethical Theories,” International Journal of Philosophy (Taiwan) (July 2009), pp. 1-13. 29 The Analects (2:15). 30 Ibid.(6:25).

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er perplexed; he that is really brave is never afraid.”31 Goodness brings about tranquility of mind, equanimity, and serenity of life. The ideal of education is to produce the perfect sage but this is not practical or attainable by everyone. But becoming a chun-tzu is. And that is the main purpose of Confucian education. Confucius also refers to the role of the master (or the teacher). Referring to his own role, he observes: “I have learned in silence and noted what was said. I have never grown tired of learning, nor wearied in teaching others what I have learned.”32 In another passage, he expresses his view of himself: “To be a sage or a perfectly good man, how dare I claim such qualities? Still, I can claim that the practice of them has never been distasteful nor have I tired of teaching others.”33 One is fit to be a teacher, he maintains, “who could so interpret the learning of former times as to apply it to the problems of the present”.34 In his view, the most important aspect of education was the silent, pervasive influence of the personality and character of the teacher.35 He adds that it is just as important to know that one knows or does not know. He himself exemplified this because his disciples commented: “We are permitted to know our master’s voice concerning culture and the manifestation of goodness, but he will tell us nothing about the nature of man or the ways of Heaven.”36 Confucius bases his teachings on a certain understanding of the nature of the human being but without indicating whether it is good or bad.37 He does not consider the individual as existing quite separately from society or think of society as a kind of metaphysical entity so completely prior to the individual that the individual is wholly absorbed in it.38 For him human beings are essentially social beings. To a very considerable extent, as far as he is concerned, they are formed by society. Thus, he holds it wrong to become a recluse. But since society is nothing more than 31

Ibid. (14:13). Ibid. (7: 1) 33 Ibid. (7:33). 34 Ibid. (2:11). 35 In this respect, Confucius has much in common with Martin Buber, the Jewish existentialist philosopher, whose views in education continue to be influential. 36 Ibid. (5.11). 37 Confucius did not engage in metaphysical issues. It was left to his disciple, Mencius, to argue that human nature is essentially good. Cf. Chapter Six: “Ethical Thinking and Formation: a Challenge for Life in Society”. 38 On this point, it would be interesting to compare Confucius and Martin Buber, cf. Chapter Four: “Relationships and Communal Living: a View on Types of Relationships”, and Confucius and Charles Hartshorne, cf. Chapter Five: “The Individual and Society: A Philosophical Conception of the Self”. 32

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the interaction of people and is composed by the individuals themselves, simply following the crowd is therefore also wrong. What one should follow above all others is the Tao (the Way).39 For much of traditional Chinese philosophies, it is the standard for individuals and for society. It guides the ethical conduct of the individual and the pattern of government which should bring about the fullest possible measure of the well-being and self-realization of everyone. It ensures that the activities are animated by the ideal of justice and motivated by love for all. Li should be rooted in it. Confucius nuances this important teaching, however. He explains that while society should respect and obey li which have been handed down, these are not immutable. The formation of li, which demands loyalty to the Tao, is more like “groping after the truth”.40 He does not believe that attaining the truth comes from a sudden flash of mystical enlightenment since he does not accept, unlike some of his contemporaries, that meditation alone leads to wisdom. In Chung Yung (Doctrine of the Mean)41 which shows signs of composite authorship one finds a competent philosophical development of one of the most central beliefs of Confucius; namely, that the Way of Man (Jen Tao) is intimately related to and dependent on the Way of Heaven (T’ien Tao) and that human beings owe their moral nature to Heaven.42 The equilibrium and harmony characteristic of the Way of Heaven are at the same time the basis and motivating power of human nature as constituted by Heaven. Moderation in all things is strongly advised: the noble-minded person avoids going to extremes, seeks moderation in the expression of opinions and as regards conduct of affairs and pursues the Way in the 39 “When the Way prevails in your land, count it as disgrace to be needy and obscure. When the Way does not prevail, count it a disgrace to be rich and honoured.” The Analects (8:13). 40 He teaches that it is not a fixed or unchangeable law. Through the passage of time, what emerges in a civilized society is a generally accepted standard that is in tune with the Tao. 41 The Doctrine of the Mean in Wing-tsit Chan, trans. and compiler, A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy (N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973). The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean are often mentioned together, both of which constitute a chapter in the Li chi (Book of Rites). In tone, the former is more rational while the latter maps out, as it were, a vision and a route and is more mystical and spiritual. 42 “Heaven” here should not be understood in the way it is done in present times and from a religious perspective. However, it invites comparison with Aquinas’s theory of the natural law. Cf. Chapter Ten: “Natural Law and Change: a Review of Aquinas’s Moral Norm,” in my Ethical Contexts and Theoretical Issues: Essays in Ethical Thinking (Newcastle upon Tyne, 2010), pp. 123-139.

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common relationships and activities of ordinary life. In this way, harmony in the very centre of one’s being could be established similar to that which pervades the universe. The establishment of that harmony, that singleness of purpose or absolute sincerity is the Way for all good men to tread. Absolute sincerity by which one is true to oneself and loyal to others in harmony is central in this work and has been the basis of Confucian philosophy and life down through the centuries. By referring to the Tao Confucius shows that there is a norm beyond what has become acceptable in practice. In fact, it serves as a critique of society. In Confucius’s teachings there is a constant reference both to the ancient order (which he claims was in line with the Tao) and with the society of his time which was not living in accordance with the Tao. And yet it is not simply repeating history since he knows, as was already pointed out, that tradition must also be interpreted afresh. It is not merely a question of transmitting it. Learning from the past does not necessarily mean, and should not mean, harking back to those times but assessing their value and functionality for the present. Given the focus of this essay, it is a teaching that we need to bear in mind and will return to later.

Social Roles and the Concept of Li Rulers and political leaders have a considerable role in society in creating a socio-economic environment so as to facilitate a moral society in Confucius’s view. For this reason he provides practical advice to those who have charge of society on how to accomplish this. At the same time he seems to be convinced that in general peace and harmony can only be brought about through the efforts and achievements of upright public officials. Believing that people’s behaviour is fundamentally shaped by their socioeconomic environment, he insists that the shaping of their social environment is the responsibility of those who rule. Like Plato, Confucius is of the view that since ordinary citizens, lacking in wisdom,43 need support to achieve true virtue and happiness, the socio-political order must provide it. But that order must be of the ethical-intellectual kind that will bring about a society which enjoys harmony and welfare. Confucius admonishes rulers, therefore, to enrich as well as instruct the people as they can become more open to moral influence only when they are not shouldering the heavy burden of oppression. Benjamin Schwarz explains Confucius’s admonition: “The people may be brought to a point…where their moral 43

This observation on Confucius’s part must be put in the context of his society.

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life is governed by a ‘sense of shame’ (ch’ih). The ‘sense of shame’ in Confucius is not simply the ‘shame ethic’ so often referred to in dealing with Chinese culture. It is, on the contrary, a deep inner sense of selfrespect. To the extent that it involves one’s image in the eyes of others, it presupposes a society in which only truly virtuous men are respected”44. By removing any negative social environment, rulers enable the fostering of a sense of moral autonomy in the people. According to Benjamin Schwartz, Confucius is convinced that, “A government that can rely on the autonomous moral sense of the people would not basically rely on punishments and coercion To the extent that it eschews such means, it reinforces the trust and faith of the people”45 In short, in endorsing the need for a moral society, Confucius also lays some of the responsibility on those in charge of the social and political order. In this respect, Confucius provides a direction: he revives and reinforces the regulatory function of li. As was already explained, he speaks of their importance in maintaining the harmony in society. Describing li as “all those ‘objective’ prescriptions of behavior whether involving rite, ceremony, manners or general deportment, that bind human beings and the spirits together in networks of interacting roles within the family, within human society, and with the numinous realm beyond”46, Schwartz compares their significance to Tao which he understands to be encompassing both the sociopolitical order as well as the moral life of the individual. But what enables li to bind society together is that it largely involves the behavior of persons related to each other in terms of role, status, rank, and position within a structured society 47 By paying heed to li, citizens learn how to perform their respective roles well and thereby play their part in society. When the different roles are performed properly and regulated by li, there is harmony in society48. Clearly, Confucius sees the need for hierarchy, status and authority within a universal order, all of which are enabled by the strict observance of li. In a series of rhetorical questions, Confucius states this point clearly: “If one is able to rule a state by li and the spirit of yielding [jan] [appropriate to it] what difficulty will there be? If one is not able to rule a state by li and the spirit of yielding, of what use is 44

Benjamin I. Schwartz, op. cit., p. 107. Ibid. 46 Ibid.. p. 67. 47 Ibid. 48 Confucius was a strong advocate of hierarchy and authority to ensure harmony and order in society. One can liken this point to the harmonious playing of an orchestra despite being composed of different musical instruments, each of which is playing according to its form. 45

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li?”49 This spirit of yielding to others is the opposite to what Confucius refers to as the love of mastery, self-aggrandizement, resentment and covetousness, passions which negate social harmony and peace. In a work that makes ample use of the role of li in regulating conduct of the individual, the ruler and of society itself, it may come as a surprise that there is not much discussion of li itself in the Analects. Perhaps this was because the notion itself and the tradition were very familiar in Confucius’s time. But the more acceptable reason is that this work is less concerned with the details of practice as with the general principle of morality. Even the virtues and dispositions associated with the observance of li are those which are intimately linked not so much with specific acts but with specific living individuals.50 In other words, it is about the development of the moral persons who will in turn facilitate a moral, and thus a harmonious, society.51

Public Office and Social Responsibility52 Confucius’s teachings were developed further by his disciple, Mencius.53 His contribution to Confucian teaching on social and political life is of particular relevance here since, according to D.C. Lau, Mencius regards politics as an extension of morality and the relationship between the ruler and the subject as a special case of the moral relationship between individuals.54 Defining his mission in life as that of perpetuating the influence of Yu the Great, of the Duke of Chou,55 and of Confucius, Mencius adds that he also wants to correct what he regards as the one-sided actions of specif49

Quoted by Benjamin I. Swartz, op. cit., p. 73. A criticism levelled against the Confucians in ancient times was that they were so much absorbed in ceremonies and rituals as to be obsequious. But this was more true of some of Confucius’s followers than of Confucius himself. 51 This important objective seems to have been misunderstood by some Confucians who were rightly criticized for placing importance on regulating conduct through observance of external rituals. 52 Emphasizing family solidarity, especially filial piety, Confucius regarded the family as the natural unit of order and continuity. This has resulted in a deeply instilled and almost unconscious ethic and the doctrine of social responsibility in Chinese culture. 53 See, James Legge, trans. The Works of Mencius (N.Y: Dover Publications, 1990). 54 D.C. Lau, trans. Mencius (Penguin Classics, 1988), p. 37. 55 It is not enough for a ruler to be virtuous; he must also model himself after the good kings of old (Yao, Shun). In Mencius’s view, the doctrine of the sage-kings of old constitutes the perfect pattern for men’s thoughts and actions. 50

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ic rulers and to rebut the perverse doctrines of Mo Tzu and Yang Chu. Convinced of the superiority of Confucius’s insights, Mencius regards the virtues of jen and i as most central and important, and he works out their implications to political life and to family and social relations. Taking up further Confucius’s insistence that the aim of government is to enrich and educate the people, Mencius holds that all government is for the benefit of the people. In fact, he insists that the only legitimate ruler is one who governs by moral force which is engendered by human heartedness and strict justice. Not surprisingly, he deprecates the rule of the tyrant.56 Essentially Mencius holds that only a benevolent man is fit to be in high position.57 The basic postulate of his political programme is that virtue brings success.58 Maintaining that all government is for the sake of the people, Mencius provides practical advice to rulers to enable them to care for those they govern. He pictures a utopian society resulting from a benevolent society. Convinced that individuals cannot follow the stirrings of their heart, i.e. pursue morality, without their material needs being catered for—already stressed by Confucius himself—Mencius insists that rulers consider this to be of primary importance. They must take practical economic measures to assure people’s welfare.59 Mencius sees the connection between economics and ethics.60 Given the conditions of his society and times he also reminded rulers that those who had completely lost the good will of the peo-

56

Mencius (IV.A.1). Mencius, like Confucius, saw an intimate connection between the way of humans and the way of the heavens. Both saw economic disaster and discontent of the people as punishment from heaven for the abandonment by the rulers of moral rectitude. If unheeded by the ruler, Heaven transfers the mandate to rule to another who has the right to rebel and duty to do so. Accordingly, Mencius holds that an erring ruler might properly be disciplined by his ministers. 57 Like Confucius, Mencius puts much emphasis on the role of education, not just for the individual citizens but also for the ruler. According to him, government should be turned over to those who have studied the art of government. 58 While the Kantian view is that virtue is its own reward, both Mencius and Confucius were also convinced that it brings about societal prosperity. Their view should not, however, be interpreted as asserting that material success is an automatic outcome of a moral life but rather reminding rulers that a moral society is the kind of environment that provides motivation which in turn does lead to a happy and contented population. 59 Mencius instanced this by advocating the conservation of fisheries and of forests. 60 See also Chapter Ten: “Economic Crisis and Accountability: a Re-examination of Certain Views and Practices”.

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ple could not depend upon them to fight on their behalf in time of war.61 He describes a so-called “nobility of Heaven and a nobility of men”. By nobility of heaven, he explains that it entails: “being benevolent, just, high-principled and faithful and taking unwearying joy in being good”. In citing nobility of men, he is referring to “being a duke, a minister, a great officer”62—in other words, public officials who are expected to mirror the qualities of heaven in their ministry. But Mencius also shows some realism in his advice. Despite his assertion, similar to Rousseau’s, that human nature is basically good, he insists that benevolent government must also have institutional expression, adding that: “Goodness alone is not sufficient for governing while the laws [institutions] cannot implement themselves.”63 However, this is in the context of facilitating the moral growth of the people. Confucius had taken the same line when in the Analects, he admonishes rulers: “Govern the people by penal laws [cheng] and order them with punishments and they will try to evade [the punishments] and lose their sense of shame. Lead them by moral power [te] and keep order by li. They will have a sense of shame and correct themselves.”64 The entire thrust of this passage, according to Schwartz, strongly supports the notion of a government based on spiritualmoral force. Furthermore, it shows government to be the ultimate instance of legitimate force since presumably there will always remain an element of society not accessible to control by moral force.65 The concept of li thus shows the importance of, and compliance with, external regulations. But both thinkers teach that they are there for the benefit of individuals and society.66

Some Observations for Contemporary Society The appeal of any past thinking to our times somehow also reflects the mood of our society. Although such insights may have some historical significance, circumstances, values, concerns and similar factors do change. Consequently, the change may make past thinking irrelevant and unhelpful. In this respect, a philosophical consideration such as the present one 61

This specific observation on Mencius’s part should be understood in the context of his time and society. 62 Mencius (V.A.1). 63 Ibid. 64 Analects (2,3). 65 Cf. Benjamin Schwartz, op.cit., pp. 103-104. 66 This leads to the issue of the role of a law in society. See Chapter Eight: “Human Freedom, its Power and Limits: Some Implications for Life in Society”.

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will make one wonder whether the ancient philosophical teachings of Confucius and Mencius can contribute to the task of addressing the challenges of living in contemporary society. After all, the society of their times was radically different from most societies today. Moreover, would one not rather be aided more by an examination of specific strategies and political policies for the betterment of society today rather than by a discussion of mere guiding principles? This reaction is, of course, understandable—and that urgent task needs to be undertaken, too. Today, however, due to the economic downturn, government corruption and other developments, there is more openness to the role of ethics and moral thinking for life in society.67 The awareness has been growing that many of the problems in society in our time, including the financial situation, is due to a lack of attention given to, among others, moral concerns by those in authority. At the same time there is the perception that in the end the over-all welfare of the members of society—and not merely in the economic sense--does matter to the existence of society itself. Certain human considerations persist—confirmed by both a careful reading of history and a close examination of cultures throughout the world—even if at times these are overlooked or ignored. As had been stated at the outset in this philosophical consideration, social roles are essentially about relationships. Moreover, unlike theatre or film roles, they are not “taken on and cast off”, mask-like, once the performance is over. And we have seen from Confucius and Mencius that taking on public office amounts to accepting a special role in society and therefore a distinctive relationship to its members. For both of these Chinese thinkers, such roles are an extension of the roles within a family since after all they believe that society is but the larger family that one is born into. Confucius and Mencius are prescriptive as to what responsibilities children have towards their parents and vice-versa, and they also expect those in authority to appreciate their status in a responsible manner and play their role accordingly. In other words, it means—in the language of democratic societies today—that holding public office is more than just getting the popular vote. The nature of a public office in any society, irrespective of the political system, is such that one could legitimately expect that holders are competent in the discharge of their duties. The expectations range from their being fully versed with the situation and its challenges to their being capable of meeting those challenges. Unfortunately, this is not always the 67

Confucius and his philosophy seem to have become more influential after, rather than during, his lifetime. On the continuing appeal of his thought, see D. Howard Smith, Confucius and Confucianism (London: Paladin Books, 1985).

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case. For that reason, irrespective of political systems, public officials who lack such competence would rightly be criticized and held accountable— although expressing the criticism and taking the necessary action would vary depending on the political set-up. At the same time, however, one must also reckon with, and appreciate the difficulty of, the enormity of the task which confronts public officials. Not only is the situation constantly changing, but often the resources available to deal with situations may be inadequate or even non-existent. Having taken all that into consideration, citizens nevertheless do rightly expect them to function—and function well. There is thus the assumption that those in charge should only have the office because they have the ability—whatever the resources—to meet the challenges sometimes imaginatively! For Confucius and Mencius, following the ancient Chinese tradition that “a mandate from heaven” is what gave rulers legitimacy to be in office, the competence of the rulers when scrutinized could be confirmed by the continued prosperity and peace throughout the land. These were regarded to be the outward signs of divine approval of their authority and competence. That criterion may not always be applicable today, but one can still legitimately expect those in public office to be also resourceful as well as competent. Competence for both of these ancient thinkers is much more than the required skills to govern, however. Of more interest to us here is that they link public office with moral responsibility and not merely with ability or talent in running the government. Unlike Machiavelli who espouses the use of whatever would advance the policies and strategies of the ruler, these two thinkers stress that the discharge of public office should be supported with moral considerations. Warning that unworthy conduct on their part would result in chaos and the withdrawal of the mandate of Heaven, i.e. legitimacy, they insisted that the moral stability of society is of paramount importance and hence ought to be of tremendous concern to the rulers. In other words, they have a moral responsibility to those in their charge and they are to act in a responsible manner. Furthermore, both claim that such considerations will inevitably bring about visible success in their governance. The question nonetheless remains for contemporary society: how practical and realistic is this consideration? Furthermore, should rulers really promote moral values along with governing society as was noted earlier in the essay? Contemporary society, at least in many countries, is likely to be a composite rather than a homogenous one not just in culture, religious beliefs, and traditions but also in values. How can that be accomplished then? Which set of values should be upheld? In fact, one of the greatest problems in some countries is the radical promotion of a specific

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set of values that run counter to the make-up of the population of those countries. Should we not instead insist on tolerance and acceptance of plurality in society?68 But that would not be acceptable to the others either. So in what sense then can there be a moral society, and, granted that that is a legitimate goal, how could that be achieved by those in authority? These are complex questions—and even Confucius and Mencius have had to face them since during their time there were competing schools of thought (the so-called Hundred Schools) with their respective answers and advices. It would be rash therefore to play down the complexity of the situation. And yet, precisely because many today insist that a return to moral values could transform society, one would wonder what lessons, despite the remoteness of their period in history, can be distilled from the ancient teachings of Confucius and Mencius for these times.69 While we must be cognizant of the major differences between their society and ours, we could also be accepting of a certain commonality nevertheless. We do not have to import every single detail—Confucius himself insisted that any teaching from the past should be interpreted afresh—but neither should we filter it out to simply suit our contemporary tastes. There is something about moral concerns that is distinctly different from fashions, mores or conventions. Moreover, there is some truth in the belief that history has a way of repeating itself, and many of society’s problems in our times are remarkably comparable to those of ancient times. In this respect, I should like to suggest first of all that because public office is a social role, rather than a mere task or assignment, certain moral considerations do need to be reckoned with. Interacting with others affects both parties, and thus as Confucius and Mencius rightly point out, incurs obligations and duties. As they describe it, there is a rightness about interacting with and relating to one another that has to be appreciated and observed. Moreover, they emphasize that fulfilling one’s role properly means being cognizant of the status of that role first of all and then fulfilling it properly. And just as parents as parents have to be guided by the status of parenthood in their actions, so should public officials recognize, uphold

68 This question is particularly pertinent in some countries today where there have been conflicts and revolutions because of the push to establish a more homogeneous society based on the one religion. 69 A particularly useful book on this point is Raymond Dawson, The Chinese Experience (London: Phoenix Press, 1978) where he discusses the integration of the philosophical experience (with particular reference to Confucianism) with the political, social and economic, and aesthetic experiences of Chinese society.

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and discharge the office they have as public officials and the responsibilities attached to these.70 Setting up public office with legitimate moral expectations, however, does not entail that public officials should be beyond blemish or fault71— human nature being what it is, that would be an impossibility. Nor does it mean that society should expect public officials to be under public scrutiny all the time, including in their private lives. That would be questionable since they—and that is true of every human being—do have a legitimate claim to privacy.72 An invasion of their privacy would itself be unethical. The challenge nonetheless is that morality is not one that we can tap into only at certain times and switch off at other times. Accordingly, Confucius and Mencius speak of the development as a moral person by everybody, including those in public office. It is a continuous and continual process. For while compliance with regulations (li) may at times appear as external behaviour, being an upright person is both an internal and external concern. Moreover, governing in a moral way or supporting a moral society would be, conceivably, of greater interest to one who can be described as a moral person whereas there can be some doubt over the intentions of a ruler of questionable character. So, as Confucius and Mencius observe, there is an intimate connection between the character of the public officeholder and the task of creating and strengthening a moral society for all. Accordingly, they set about teaching it. It is a lesson worth taking to heart also in our times.

70

In Chinese philosophy, the rectification of names means that that the “name” or role given to one indicates the duties attached to it. For example, Confucius holds that if one is a father then one should act as a father—rather than merely as a friend. Cf. Chapter III: “The Doctrine of Rectification” in Leonard Shihlien Hsü, op. cit., pp. 43-60 71 It seems to me that there is a difference between being “beyond blemish or fault” and being “beyond reproach” although the distinction may seem like casuistry. One can be beyond blemish or fault and yet not be beyond reproach. The first refers to “personal uprightness” while the second refers to “perception or judgment by others”. In the context of this essay, it is really the first one that public officials should aim for since that is more within their control. 72 This was a particularly sticky point recently with the fuss regarding a particular Minister in the Irish government. There was much talk about confidentiality, the right to privacy, the public domain—and scoring political points on the part of the opposition party.

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Moral Sensitivity, Personal Integrity and Social Credibility So in what sense can we side with these two ancient thinkers as we consider contemporary society? We will recall that they acknowledged that many of the problems of their society related to the material needs of the people and for that reason they urged the rulers to see that these were catered for. At the same time, however, unlike the practice of ancient Roman emperors of simply providing the masses with “bread and circus”— which regrettably seems to be emulated by several corrupt politicians in certain countries today—Confucius and Mencius emphasize the need to consider the non-material needs, so to speak, of the people. Providing the right environment to ensure stability, growth and harmony is more than just supplying them with the essential necessities of life or ensuring that they have the ability and the facilities to meet those. These are undeniably important. But it is not sufficient either to make the so-called luxuries of life available at their disposal. For Confucius and Mencius, who realize that human needs and consequently societal needs are deeper than these, those in charge of governing society have to be conscious of their responsibilities in this respect. In other words, there is a major difference between serving human society composed of human individuals and fitting a complex machinery with complicated parts. Governing society is not a mechanical process which requires those parts to run smoothly. For that reason, they remind the rulers that their success would be judged by the contentment and satisfaction of the people. And fundamentally, that means creating a moral atmosphere for only in such a society will the people truly prosper. It will also uplift their morale. A good number of those who hold political office today will no doubt dismiss this point as being irrelevant and inapplicable. After all, they would argue, that is not the reason for taking on the office nor is it the expectation of those who put them there.73 In fact, given the make-up of pre-

73

It is interesting to note that Prime Minister Cameron of Great Britain is quoted in his address to the Conservative Party as asserting that, “Profit, wealth, creation, tax cuts, enterprise—these are not dirty elitist words. They are not the problem. They are the solution because it is not government that creates jobs, it’s businesses. It is business that gets wages into people’s pockets, food on the tables, hope for their families and success for our country.” James Kirkup, Telegraph (2 October 2013). Cameron seemingly was rebutting the criticisms of the Labour Party leader’s assertions at their party conference. It would be interesting and instructive to contrast this way of thinking with that of Pope Francis in his recent Apostolic Exhortation,

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sent-day society, there would be major objections and loud protests were they to engage in such an undertaking. More significantly—and one must admit there is a point in their objection—the promotion of such a moral society by public officials would incur so many problems that it would be impossible for them to conduct their delegated business efficiently and satisfactorily. Society today is so much more heterogeneous, even with competing moral values among its members, compared to ancient China.74 But this rebuttal misses an important point in what Confucius and Mencius are teaching. Neither of them was too keen on the specifics as on the general principle—those in public office should not detach their actions from the moral consideration. I interpret that to mean that the role of public office includes having moral sensitivity rather than implementing a particular moral code or following a stated moral route.75 Despite exhorting the rulers to take action on specific problems and warning them to avoid particular strategies, their advice centred more on the importance for the ruler to provide the people with moral example and to have their moral welfare at heart. Moral sensitivity rules out indifference to moral concerns. Moral sensitivity admittedly is an opaque consideration, and it could be dismissed therefore as unhelpful. But to do so is really to misunderstand the complexity of morality itself.76 To be moral is more than just complying with stated moral teachings. It is to wrongly insist that obedience, rather than discretion, is what matters. It is to neglect to take into account that morality is not truly about external conduct. Moral sensitivity means awarenesss of the complexity of the moral demand. It is knowing that consistency is not the same as uniformity. Rather, it is to accept that behavior must be based on reflection. It means that acting morally is not ad hoc but reflective even if at times a specific activity may have to be such. It means openness to differences in moral viewpoints and a willingEvangelii Gaudium. Although it is primarily addressed to his religious flock, he has also a message to political leaders of all or no religious persuasion. 74 Irish politicians at the moment are wrestling with legislation on ethical issues, like abortion, assisted suicide, same-sex marriage and so on, as their introduction into legislation, even for very qualified cases, would radically change traditional Irish society. Given much opposition, politicians are wondering, and are being questioned, about the basis for their action. 75 What is being suggested, despite similarities, is different from the advice to “follow their conscience”. While there is much to recommend about this advice, there is a tendency to misinterpret this in a rather subjectivist way. Even the term “informed conscience” still needs much qualification, simply because interpretations are left too open. 76 See Chapter Six: “Ethical Thinking and Formation: a Challenge for Life in Society”.

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ness to learn critically. It is to assume, rather than shrug off, accountability for one’s decision and actions. This, I believe, is what one can draw from the preponderance of moral considerations in the advice given by Confucius and Mencius to the rulers of their time. Moral sensitivity does have more ramifications, and I suggest, following Confucius and Mencius, that it entails personal integrity and social credibility on the part of public office-holders.77 Personal integrity, it must be pointed out again, does not necessarily mean being completely unblemished or having no questionable baggage in tow.78 That would be unreasonable and unattainable. Nor does it entail that anyone and everyone has the right to subject public officials to every scrutiny.79 Although transparency in public office does extend to all relevant aspects of the lives and activities of public officials, it does not amount to having no privacy at all. What it does mean is the realization that in one’s own life, there is also the need to be upright. Personal integrity distinguishes “private” from “public” but does not separate the two aspects of one’s life. Integrity means just that—it is “togetherness”—and morality is part and parcel of living. It means that one needs to account for one’s life as a whole, and to realize that every act does contribute to the actuality of one’s entire life.80 And this is what gives social credibility. It becomes part of one’s life-record. Because one relates to others in society as a public official, then it means that one’s record is believable and supportable. Confucius and Mencius reminded the rulers of their time that approval by others is not what is crucial as far as society is concerned but the “mandate from Heaven”. Whatever one may say about that particular criterion, the more important and relevant consideration for us today is that their life-record sets out for society a solid reason for continuing to believe that they are responsible office-holders. That, together with their accomplishments, will truly serve society in our time.

77

In the recent vote in the Irish parliament on the Protection of Life during Pregnancy Act, this was particularly tested since one of the ruling parties did not allow a free vote. Some party members had to wrestle with their personal views on the issue and the party line. 78 This seems to have been uppermost, if the media is to be believed, in the minds of the cardinals when electing the new Pope. See note 70. 79 Many journalists, among others, seem to think otherwise for reasons which themselves need to be subjected to scrutiny. 80 For metaphysical support of this claim cf. Chapter Five: “The Individual and Society: a Philosophical Conception of the Self” and Chapter Eight: “Human Freedom, its Power and Limits: Some Implications for Life in Society”.

CHAPTER TEN ECONOMIC CRISIS AND ACCOUNTABILITY: A RE-EXAMINATION OF CERTAIN VIEWS AND PRACTICES

An Economic Crisis The past few years have provided contemporary society with a particular crisis. The serious economic setback, being experienced on a relatively global scale, has upset not just an exceedingly turbulent market but also the daily lives of ordinary people. One hears much talk—in the various media, in daily conversations, in numerous discussions—about recession, and even an economic depression. Severe cutbacks and strict austerities have been the expected outcomes. Zero, or even negative, growth of economies has been rather a regular occurrence. Emigration in search of a better life or just a job, mortgage defaults, bank loan arrears and so on have been a grim option for many.1 Unfortunately, the economic crisis has also created a depressing mood in society, exacerbated by the constant media attention given to it and through the recounting of the experiences of the population. Previously, the effects of this gloomy situation had been limited to specific countries or settings. But somehow what is more disturbing in the recent past is the increasing realization that what is happening is not just in one’s country or in one’s continent but on a far greater geographical spread.2 It is almost like the menacing tentacles keep on getting longer. 1

Regrettably, this is the plight of many in Ireland today. This essay was written in the context of the economic predicament of present-day Ireland, which had enjoyed a decade of prosperity when it was called the “Celtic Tiger”. There has been a growing awareness that the severe downturn in the country’s finances and economy is endemic not just in Europe but also in numerous other countries which heretofore have been regarded as economically sound. There are, of course, exceptions inasmuch as today there is also much talk of the rapid rise of the economies of the BRICS countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China and

2

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Because of the ease and the speed of communications, we have become more aware of the precariousness of the world’s economy. It is the kind of knowledge that does not make particularly good reading or welcome news. It certainly does not lift the mood of any country and its people nor of the world itself. It is natural that one should be greatly concerned to know the causes of this economic crisis for only then could one hope to provide some kind of remedy. As is to be expected, several causes can be identified and held responsible, whether this is traceable to political mismanagement, individual or group corruption, hostile social factors, and questionable bank practices, among others. Understandably, if this global concern is to be tackled, it is crucial that all these are thoroughly investigated and corrected. Given the devastating effects on society and individuals, one would seriously hope that the competent and responsible individuals, groups and governments would indeed address this challenge. But more and more there is the awareness that this specific crisis is a concretization of a particular way of thinking described as a “mindset”, and the consequent way of life called a “culture”. It exemplifies how certain activities, including those connected with this global concern, are really an outgrowth of an underlying worldview and its implications. Somehow, it has been alleged, a certain mentality has set in that has driven those in decision-making roles in banking and the financial world to set their sights, away from human considerations, to profit and more profit and to be stimulated by a gnawing hunger for performance-related bonuses.3 It has set about legitimizing the competitive nature of this outlook.4 It has South Africa, although there are some signs that their economics are also starting to be buffeted by the severe winds of the global economic crisis. 3 It is disconcerting to read that this is still the situation today in the midst of all the cut-backs, redundancies and losses suffered by the majority of the population who have had to suffer the consequences of the turbulence in the financial market. What is particularly frustrating is that while one can understand and even justify performance-related bonuses as a whole, the reverse, namely, their removal or a penalty when the performance has been disastrous, does not seem to feature that much in their thinking and action. There has been much indignation in Ireland over the exorbitant salaries and bonuses paid to the top bank officials, whose banks had been bailed out from financial ruin by the government using taxpayers’ money. 4 It has also led to the mentality, not limited to those in the banking or financial sectors, that claims that exorbitant salaries are necessary in order to attract the best candidates. One wonders how and by whom “the best candidates” are assessed, especially if the offer of an attractive salary is necessary to entice those candidates. One would be understandably suspicious if such an offer is what will strongly motivate the candidate and crunch a deal. There are other, non-monetary means, of

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even led to the state of mind that regarded certain risks worth taking despite possible negative consequences for many—as long as the books show the alleged profits. This mindset seems to have influenced the outlook of people who have been responsible for the present economic woes in society.5 The former President of Ireland, Mary McAleese, describes the situation well. Noting that the world has been turned upside down by the global and economic crisis, she maintains that: “One of the dimensions of the crisis that engendered considerable public anger and resentment is the growing evidence of low ethical standards and values which have had devastating consequences.”6 Observing that the contemporary tumult is both global and local and is consuming the attention of governments and citizens alike, she continues: “One of the clearest points of consensus to emerge so far is the need for a new and sharp focus on ethical values and thinking in terms of the world of business and financial institutions around the world.”7 She is convinced that “the unprecedented focus in this context has the potential to create a significant momentum for real change and real good.”8 At the same time she acknowledges that the opportunity for a new adequately compensating real talent and solid achievements. Along similar lines, the abhorrence felt by the Irish general public, who are bearing the effects of the cutbacks in health care due to the economic downturn, on learning recently that the so-called “top-up payments” to already well-paid hospital administrators come from charitable public donations to the medical institutions is palpable. Very recently, it has come to light that the pension of a retiring administrator was “topped up” from charitable contributions to the institution. 5 For an informative collection of essays on this topic, cf. Susan Will, Stephen Handelman and David C. Brotherton (eds.), How They Got Away with It (Columbia University Press, 2012). The essays comment on the collapse of economies, businesses and individuals at the start of the financial meltdown of 2008. Among the topics are the workings of the toxic subprime loans industry, the role of external auditors, the consequences of Wall Street deregulation, the manipulation of hedge fund managers and the so-called Ponzi-like culture of contemporary capitalism. The contributors, who come from diverse backgrounds, comment on the failure to sanction the major players who brought about the crisis. The editors conclude that the separation of white collar criminals administratively has resulted in the perception by themselves, the general public or criminologists that their activities were not a crime. It has consequently meant that ordinary citizens have had to pick up the tab. See also, David Williams, "A Heavy Price for Banking Failure,” The Sunday Business Post, September 8, 2013, n. 19. 6 Mary McAleese, “Message from President McAleese,” Teaching Ethics, IX, 1, (Fall, 2008), p. 3. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid.

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beginning will not come about quickly or easily since the causes are complex and multi-faceted. But she welcomes and encourages the public debate and discussion on these matters. The current President of Ireland, Michael D. Higgins, voices a powerful plea that economic theory needs to reconstruct itself along ethical lines and human considerations. Critical of the thinking that has prevailed in economic theory which has brought about the economic crisis, with high levels of unemployment, poverty and inequality, he adds that it has been a source of concern, anxiety and even moral outrage. He suggests that “the problem might not lie so much in a lack of the right answers to this most recent crisis of capitalism as in an absence of the right questions.”9 He maintains that the reason for the lacuna has to do with institutional or ideological falsehoods and the status accorded to economics as a discipline. He points therefore to a need for a radical re-examination of this way of thinking if we are to make a difference to society today.10 The aim of this essay is to expose and critique that worldview or the mindset described earlier. It does not purport to provide economic or financial solutions despite the urgent need for these.11 It will show instead how practical implications for both the individual and society as a whole follow from a seemingly side issue or an abstract theoretical discussion. It will argue for the need to re-examine certain perspectives in economic and financial matters; that is to say, to review the considerations which many are convinced have escaped the attention of key personnel in the banking and financial sectors. Moreover, it will discuss critically certain ethical issues associated with the crisis.

Ethical Concerns and Corporate Accountability12 It should, however, be stated from the start that it would be unfair to arrive at the conclusion that businesses, banking, financial institutions and 9

Michael D. Higgins, “Toward an Ethical Economy,” Ethics for All Public Lecture Series, Dublin City University, 11 September 2013. He has been drawing attention to this point in his addresses and interviews, referring to the moral crisis that exists side by side with the economic crisis in the European Community and the importance of addressing it. 10 Ibid. 11 Such concrete situations and specific factors call for competent as well as specialized knowledge of economic and financial matters and of the relevant circumstances. 12 Corporate accountability is related to corporate social responsibility but as used in this essay should not be confused with it.

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the corporate world in general are devoid of any ethical concerns or a sense of moral responsibility.13 Despite the popularity of the saying that “in business there are no ethics”14 a general condemnation can be unjust given the good that is also being accomplished by the business, economic and financial world in addition to bringing about the material betterment and prosperity of society. Whatever one may say about some of their intentions, e.g. as merely promoting or advertising their products or services, they have also been generous sponsors of activities, events and programmes that have benefitted individuals, groups and societies.15 In fact, because they have the resources and the generosity, they are at times more suitably positioned to make inroads into hitherto unexplored terrains that have since improved the lives of individuals as well as of the general population. In addition, many of them have conceived or adopted certain policies that provide general and specific guidance to their behavior.16 Corporate 13 I have conflated these although I am aware that there are distinct concerns and issues more applicable to one rather than the other. However, there is a certain commonality that allows one to discuss to discuss these generally. 14 Cf. This was a topic raised in the interview on RTE Radio 1, “Today with Seán O’Rourke”, Sept 5, 2013. The businessman being interviewed rejected any socalled “business ethics”. He explained that, given the variety of ethical sources, he could not accept the notion of business ethics even if he admits that there is a need to conform to certain standards. It seems, however, that this individual restricts ethical considerations to specific ethical teachings by particular sources, e.g. religion, rather than a fundamental human concern irrespective of outside sources. An economist on a Prime Time programme on RTE TV1 on October 22, 2013 quoted a common saying that “economists do not do fair, they do efficient”. One wonders and worries about the logic here: can being fair not being efficient at the same time, and is being efficient not necessarily being fair? Such dichotomization is rather suspect. Cf. “Chapter Three: “Distinct, not Separate: a Critique of Dualistic Thinking in and of Society”. There are others, however, who believe that “honesty is the best policy” to become a success in business. This was a claim made by Dermot Desmond, the 62-year old entrepreneur who is worth €1.5bn and who was honoured with the Outstanding Achievement prize by the Business and Finance Awards and recognized for the role he played in establishing the IFSC in Dublin, home to half of the world’s top 50 banks. 15 This observation should not be seen as an endorsement of sports sponsorship by alcoholic drinks companies. There are other relevant considerations to be taken into account regarding this issue. Cf. Chapter Seven: “Images, Reality and Truth: Some Philosophical Considerations”. Nor is it taking sides with companies which endow enormously huge monetary sponsorships of international sports which richly reward sports people. 16 This is exemplified in policies which reflect “corporate social responsibility”. According to the Wikipedia article, “‘Corporate social responsibility’ (CSR), also

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accountability, to which institutions and organizations subscribe, describes how ethical concerns are taken on board. It has been defined as the “measure of an organization's state of being mindful of the emerging social concerns and priorities of internal and external stakeholders (community, employees, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, management, and owners).”17 Its implementation can be verified by examining the organization's commitment to “certain factors (which may or may not be tied directly to its processes) such as (1) willing compliance with employment, health and hygiene, safety, and environment laws, (2) respect for basic civil and human rights, and (3) betterment of community and surrounding.”18 Nevertheless, it is not surprising that much of the criticism leveled at the banking and financial sector in the context of the economic crisis has been focused on the perceived lack of ethical sensitivity in much of their dealings. Moreover, one would have to agree—given the coverage of the crisis and certain information leaked or published—with the correctness of the prevailing view that a certain mindset has indeed influenced the outlook of those who have been responsible for the dire global situation.19 called corporate conscience, corporate citizenship, social performance, or sustainable responsible business/ Responsible Business) ... is a form of corporate selfregulation integrated into a business model. CSR policy functions as a built-in, self-regulating mechanism whereby a business monitors and ensures its active compliance with the spirit of the law, ethical standards, and international norms. CSR is a process with the aim to embrace responsibility for the company's actions and encourage a positive impact through its activities on the environment, consumers, employees, communities, stakeholders and all other members of the public sphere who may also be considered as stakeholders.” The term "corporate social responsibility" came into currency in the late 1960s and early 1970s following the adoption by many multinational corporations of the term “stakeholder”” by which is meant “those on whom an organization's activities have an impact” and referred to corporate owners beyond stakeholders. The practice owes its origin to an influential book, which appeared in 1984 by R. Edward Freeman, Strategic Management: a Stakeholder Approach. 17 A social compliance program is usually based “on adherence to rules of social accountability, established by certified conformance to standards such as SA8000.” See: http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/social-accountability.html# ixzz28yVQyDrG. 18 Ibid. 19 Ireland’s Chief Justice Susan Denham, speaking at the launch of the Courts Service annual report for 2012, said that Ireland’s boardrooms must place more emphasis on ethics rather than keeping a “constant eye on the needs of shareholders” if trust in the economy is to be rebuilt. “Knowing what is the right thing to do in a situation, and then doing it, comes from exercising self-awareness, personal integ-

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Thus, it is important that we examine these criticisms. Since there has to be some accountability for the decisions made and the policies and strategies being pursued in the business, economic and financial sectors of society some ethical concerns would also have to feature in our considerations. It must also be noted, however, that the criticism, arising from the economic crisis, is not restricted to this sector of society. In Ireland, where numerous households have been subjected to severe financial blows, there have been loud calls for debt-forgiveness due to the inability of borrowers to honour their commitments. Mortgage defaults have become commonplace.20 However, it has been pointed out by critics that debt-forgiveness would be a terrible injustice to those who had not taken the risk of overborrowing to enrich themselves21 and to those who, despite their own financial difficulties, have paid back their loans. In the view of these objectors, wiping out the loans or mortgages of those unable to make their repayments means that others will have to be burdened with the unpaid debt in various ways. Even if debt-forgiveness or write-offs/write-downs is to be introduced, it should not necessarily remove moral and financial accountability from those involved. It should only mean, it is argued, a changed strategy or a rethinking of the original arrangement to suit the circumstances.22 Keeping in mind that the wider society is deeply affected, as has been said, it should not penalize innocent parties. A more trenchant criticism has also been directed at those who are guilty of what has become known as strategic mortgage default, whereby the borrower defaults on the repayment of the mortgage or loan but redirects his/her liquid assets into savings in the hope that there will be debt-forgiveness eventually.23

rity and often no small amount of courage.” Cf. Chapter Six: “Ethical Thinking and Formation: a Challenge to Living in Society”. 20 An illuminating lecture on this situation was given by Yvonne McCarthy to the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, 31 January 2014. Cf. The Barrington Lecture: “Dis-entangling the Mortgage Arrears Crisis: the Role of the Labour Market, Income Volatility and Negative Equity,” http://www.ssisi.ie/SSISI-PaperMcCarthy.pdf. 21 While this may be true in some cases, one must also consider that many had availed of the opportunity with a view to understandably securing their financial future. 22 There has been much talk about split mortgages and other options. More recently, the Irish government has introduced the personal insolvency arrangements for specific individuals who are unable to pay back their mortgages. 23 There are important ramifications of any strategy that involves debt-forgiveness which are outside the competence of this writer since they involve specific arrangements to suit the individuals concerned.

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Policymakers have not escaped the criticisms and the anger of stakeholders either. Central banks, regulators and governments have been attacked and subjected to much negative judgments because of their failure to foresee the oncoming financial crashes and to put in place essential controls.24 After all, individual citizens are faced with monetary needs and concerns which extend beyond their own control and thus need an overarching authority that serves them. Those in charge, it has been vociferously expressed, have both the responsibility and authority to maintain, monitor and regulate monetary affairs and financial institutions.25 Their advisers, who are richly compensated from taxpayers’ money for their advice, have also been targeted because of the financial mess that has arisen. Their competence and experience—the basis for their appointments in the first place—have been questioned. Clearly, with the economic crisis there are ethical concerns and accountability issues all around.

Moral Hazard and Risk-taking Given the onset of the economic crisis on a global scale and the need for some accountability, there has been much talk in the media and elsewhere of moral hazard. A number of commentators have cited it as a major factor. Interestingly, despite the description “moral”, the concept of moral hazard features in economic theory analysis rather than in ethics. There are of course some ethical implications regarding its practice and it has therefore attracted the interest of those who want to establish its link to accountability. Originally carrying the connotation of fraud or immorality in its historical usage, the term in its more current use by economists is simply a reference to inefficient monitoring of risks taken. Moral hazard is a description of a situation where one party to a financial agreement tends to take risks because that party does not foresee being negatively impacted, unlike its opposite party who will have to bear any consequent burden arising from the financial transaction and thus suffers all the losses. Moral hazard can arise because of what economists call “information asymmetry”, that is to say, one party has more information 24 The debate between John Maynard Keynes versus Frederick Hayek shows the contrasting thinking between them on government’s interference with the banks of the country. The controversy revolves around the concept of freedom and control. Cf. “Masters of Money: Hayek,” presented by Stephanie Flanders on BBC2, 24 Sept., 2012. 25 See Chapter Nine: “Social Roles, Public Office and Moral Society: Some Lessons from the Past for the Present?”.

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than the other thus giving that party an advantage and even an incentive to act inappropriately. The result is that the other party is laden with the disadvantages which may occur. Moral hazard may also be present in a socalled principal-agent problem. In this scenario, one party called an agent acts on behalf of the principal and possesses more information than the principal who cannot monitor the agent fully. There is therefore the possibility for the agent to act contrary to the interests of the principal. An example of where there is moral hazard would be the subprime loans to borrowers who, despite not being in a position to make the repayments in the long run, are nevertheless given the loan.26 The originators, given the interest of the many buyers of these loans, do not care about any possible negative long-term consequences since they themselves would be insulated from these after selling these loans. Moral hazard arises, too, as a result of financial bailouts of lending institutions by their governments, central banks or others. It encourages greater risk-taking by the lenders, e.g. banks, particularly since higher risks result in more rewarding returns for them. When such expectations do not materialize, however, the taxpayers, depositors and other creditors, rather than the lenders, bear the financial cost of the bailout. Still another example cited is the euro debt crisis being experienced in the last few years in Europe. In this case, the troika (the ECB, the IMF and the EC), which makes the financial transactions with the indebted countries, like Ireland, is not exposed to the risks of a money-run and the resulting market crash in Europe, unlike the countries which have borrowed the money. Governments of these countries have had to embark on austerity programmes, with the consequent increase in the number of jobless in these countries and in the range of financial difficulties being experienced by ordinary families. Borrowers too can themselves bring about moral hazard by investing or spending funds in a reckless manner in the belief that the lender this time will have to bear the burden of a default. There can be moral hazard also when the insured take more risks, given the existence of the cover provided by their insurance, thereby transferring the risks and consequent loss to their insurers.27 In short, there is moral hazard because of risk-taking. Since moral hazard with its consequences is tipped considerably in favour of one party in the process but to the detriment of the other, and is 26

This was a widespread practice in the USA. The insurance industry sometimes restricts “moral hazard” to describe character flaws in the client while using “morale hazard” to describe the more risky behaviour on the part of the client due to the insurance. The client’s behaviour can change before the event (taking more risks) and after the event (insisting that the insurer covers more costly medical treatment or lying about the medical situation).

27

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traceable to risk-taking by the first party, is the practice itself of taking risks therefore suspect? That would hardly be true inasmuch as it is also the situation that opens up benefits which are to be welcomed by all. In the financial sector especially, greater gains are made precisely because bigger risks have been undertaken. Taking risks is a fact of life, and a certain degree of courage to do so can be necessary and laudable. As we live our personal, professional and communal lives, there are risks which need to be faced, accepted and supported if we wish to make any progress and achieve positive results. In fact, one could also claim that risk-taking is embedded in reality itself because of the very openness of the future.28 While we can and should be guided by the past, the future is to some extent unpredictable. No matter how much care and attention are given to possible consequences, therefore, we are unable to be so precise as to anticipate and prevent any unacceptable or detrimental results. Complete certainty in any matter or aspect of life is desirable but never an achievable goal. The process that leads one to take risks, on the other hand, does need closer scrutiny. In particular, a valuable lesson can be learned from the experience of bankers and the risks which they took that led to the financial crisis from which the world is still reeling.29 While indeed there are welcome and valuable returns from taking risks, as has already been admitted, what is sometimes ignored is that risks are not simple mathematical calculations that can provide quite precise results.30 It is not therefore a matter of the management of risks that experts can confidently handle, no matter how smart or experienced they are. The perception of risk by the managers and by others, including the market, can change the equation, as it were. It is commonly accepted—and ordinary investors are warned— that past performances of assets and investments will not necessarily be 28 See Chapter Eight: “Human Freedom, its Power and Limits: Some Implications for Life in Society”. 29 This was shown to be the case in the documentary film, “Banking Risks it All,” presented by Alex Jennings and aired on BBC2, May 15, 2013. Cf. “The Lehman Effect: Understanding the Crisis of 2008-2013,” Supplement, The Irish Times, Sept. 12, 2013. See also, William D. Cohen, Money and Power: How Goldman Sachs Came to Rule the World (N.Y. Anchor Books, 2012), and Lawrence McDonald and Patrick Robinson, A Collosal Failure of Common Sense: The Inside Story of the Collapse of Lehman Brothers (Crown Business, 2009). The news announced in various media on 20 November 2013 that JP Morgan Chase is going to make a settlement is a welcome development. There have been recent notices that others are to follow suit. 30 This was the mindset that was informed by the so-called “Value at Risk” employed by some banking institutions.

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matched in the future, yet there was a growing belief among some bankers that the future, at least in the investment sector, could actually be predicted if the necessary data have been collected and properly analyzed.31 It led to a false optimism on their part.32 Worse, it desensitized them to the human costs and insulated them from human concerns. For this reason, it is also necessary to criticize their objectives. In the context of the present economic crisis the risk-taking by bankers was very much and almost exclusively targeted towards more and more profits.33 Such sharp focus on this goal places humans in the shadows even if they are the ones who will be hurt if the venture fails. This particular process of risk-taking is thus highly questionable. Returning to the situation of moral hazard, we have seen that the situation exists because of a lack of transparency, among other reasons. Again it is not so much the taking of risks as the absence of clarity that seemingly creates the moral hazard. While not everything can be placed on the table, as it were, it is imperative nevertheless that there is considerable relevant information made available to all parties involved. Transparency after all increases credibility. This is an important and relevant consideration since it means that one is leaving open the possibility of review and investigation. After all, to be in a position to take risks necessitates possessing some awareness of the extent of the risks and the seriousness of any decision to be made. This also entails ensuring that enough time is given for examining and mulling over the information and all aspects of the transaction. While one cannot expect that both parties should be entirely open about their own intentions and plans—privacy and freedom should after all also be respected—the need for transparency is such that one dis31

This is another example of a fallacy: thinking that data or facts speak for themselves neglecting that these have to be interpreted. The interpretation or judgment could lead to false or at least misleading conclusions. 32 It is instructive to read the description of the situation by Daniel Kahnemann, a winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics, in Chapter 24 “The Engine of Capitalism,” in his Thinking, Fast and Slow (Penguin Books, 2012), pp. 255-265. 33 The following passage is particularly relevant and illuminating: “The general theme of these findings [studies of priming effects] is that the idea of money primes individualism: a reluctance to be involved with others, to depend on others, or to accept demands from others. The psychologist who has done this remarkable research, Kathleen Vohs, has been laudably restrained in discussing the implications of her findings, leaving the task to her readers. Her experiments are profound—her findings suggest that living in a culture that surrounds us with reminders of money may shape our behaviour and our attitudes in ways that we do not know about and of which we may not be proud.” Daniel Kahnemann, Thinking, Fast and Slow, op. cit.,, p. 56.

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closes known and possible risks to which the other party may be exposed. It is disconcerting to note that the economic crisis, which has ruined the lives of many and continues to do so, can also be attributed to the lack of transparency among different parties. The one-sided advantage brought about in moral hazard reminds one of the importance of considering Cicero’s adage: Cui bono? Who benefits from the transaction? Additionally, how would the other party be affected as a result? If there is a bailout or a debt forgiveness, who has to pay for it ultimately? It is imperative therefore to give due recognition to the possible imbalance in the transaction, particularly if it is such that one party is better situated to take undue advantage from it and reap more benefits. This seemed to have been the case with a number of loans being practically handed out by the lending institutions to those who, if more careful checks had been made initially, could not make the repayments. Moral hazard is heightened in the case of sub-prime loans, particularly since the originators are protected from subsequent losses suffered by the buyers of those loans as well as by the borrowers themselves. A suspect imbalance sets in. Since it is rather commonsense to note that the loan will need to be paid somehow and by someone at some stage, it is reasonable to assume that one could anticipate—and should have anticipated—some of the detrimental consequences of this manner of lending. Unfortunately, that did not seem to have been the case. This process of risk-taking should therefore be questioned. Finally, there seems to have been a misconception too by those to whom money has been entrusted regarding their role in the transaction. Between the parties is a relationship based on trust. The party who accepts what has been entrusted does not have ownership but stewardship over the money. That role involves much good faith, and it is to be expected of all the parties involved. The transaction is not purely a material or a financial process but is primarily—although unfortunately, many in the economic or financial sector would disagree—a human affair insofar as humans are involved and are affected. The view that economics is purely about goods, rather than about values—prevalent in the thinking of those who brought about the economic crisis—has to be enlightened. The mindset here has to be criticized and to be transformed.

Accountability and Moral Luck In the context of the economic crisis, we will in this essay examine further the process of risk-taking by taking on board the ethical issue of accountability. The question of who is to blame, and to what extent, has

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been raised several times and on various occasions. Understandably, those who have been affected want to know. They also have the need and the right to be informed. Identifying the causes of the global economic crisis, however, is a task that demands a high competence in economic and financial matters, wide knowledge of the specific details and a sharp mind to analyze the findings. Here our consideration will have to be limited to the general issue of accountability rather than of culpability. In the interests of justice, however, it is essential to raise and pursue the issue of culpability by the proper authorities and systems.34 Accountability is more than just reckoning with what has been done and its consequences. It is not a mere review. To a large extent it refers to the intentions or motivations of the perpetrators or agents. It is also about views or the kind of thinking that influence the behaviour. There has already been some reference to this point earlier when it was noted that the economic crisis happened because some individuals and institutions were motivated by greed and the expectation of large financial gain. The risks which these institutions took resulted in the wide-spread economic crisis being experienced and the enormous burden being shouldered by innocent parties. The slogan, heard a number of times, that a financial institution is “too big to fail” seems after all to have masked the instability of its own base and cloud the insecurity of those in charge. The issue of accountability and the legitimate concerns of those affected—and possible lessons to be learned from the past—entail pressing on further with our philosophical consideration of this topic, this time in connection with the philosophical discussion on moral luck.35 The notion of moral luck, introduced by the philosopher Bernard Williams and developed further by Thomas Nagel, refers to a situation where one makes a moral judgment on an agent’s action despite the fact that it includes factors outside the control of that agent.36 Nagel puts it this 34 Attributing culpability to a party or parties requires full knowledge of relevant details. Iceland followed through with this task. At present there are some moves in the USA, Britain and Ireland and probably elsewhere to penalize the financial institutions and individuals who were responsible. 35 For a useful discussion on this topic, cf. Dana K. Nelkin, "Moral Luck", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . 36 Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Bernard Williams, “Postscript,” in D. Statman (ed.), Moral Luck (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981); Thomas Nagel, Moral Questions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). Also, Martha Nussbaum, The Fragili-

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way, “Where a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck”37. The apparent anomaly (or oxymoron in Williams’s description) is that we associate moral judgment only with actions that one knows and freely chooses. Since it is generally held that morality is about rational activity, which implies being in control, moral luck seems to contradict this. And yet Williams and Nagel provide several instances of our acceptance of the existence of moral luck insofar as we make a moral judgment despite our awareness that many of the included factors are not freely chosen but are chance happenings. Immanuel Kant, who has influenced much of our thinking on morality, has been interpreted as maintaining the immunity of morality from luck. This German philosopher insists that we are acting morally if and only if we are acting from a sense of duty. Morality is rooted in good will and only in good will, he argues. That is to say, morality is about our intention rather than about the deed itself and certainly not about consequences. One is acting in a particularly moral way if one acts from a good will even if one is not inclined to do so and if one does not derive any satisfaction from it. While inclinations and passions may prompt us to carry out the deed, what gives our action moral worth is the sense of duty. In this case, the agent so acting deserves the fullest praise although that is not the objective. Moreover, the kind of consequences of our act does not count either in assessing the moral worth of our acts. What is implied in Kant’s conception of morality—in relation to moral luck—is that humans are only accountable because of their intentions since these alone are what can be freely chosen. Irrespective of outcome, therefore, their actions are to be judged only on the basis of the motivation behind them. Consequently, two comparable actions which differ from each other primarily because of the consequences outside of the agent’s control should not be assessed differently. This seems to accord with some of our intuitive assessments of human actions. Yet Nagel also provides a number of examples where our ordinary judgments nevertheless seem to challenge these and the Kantian understanding of morality as being immune from luck.38 Moreover, and more significantly, even our ty of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 37 Thomas Nagel, Moral Questions, op. cit., p. 59 38 Nagel explains, “Let me give a few examples, beginning with the type of case Kant has in mind. Whether we succeed or fail in what we try to do it nearly always depends on factors beyond our control. This is true of murder, altruism, revolution,

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intentions can be influenced by the presence of luck. Nagel moreover identifies different kinds of luck which can affect not just our actions but even every intention and every willing. In his view, these show us that no factor on which our action depends and is subjected to moral assessment is immune from luck.39 One is thus left with a paradoxical understanding of morality on the basis of Kant’s teaching. Moral luck, as identified and described by Williams and Nagel, has implications for various aspects of life in society, not least of all is the justification of laws and punishments that govern conduct in society.40 Not surprisingly, there have been various attempts to address the problem. Our interest here, however, would have to be confined to how moral luck has repercussions for the issue of accountability in the context of the economic crisis. Given that much of it can be traced back to risk-taking by those in the banking sector and others, and since risks by their nature are generally regarded as outside one’s control, does the problematic nature of moral luck apply to the economic crisis? If it could be argued that the motivation—which their critics would doubt very much—was to enrich the stakeholders or investors rather than benefit the risk-takers, would this excuse them from any accountability? Since much of what has happened was due to the volatility of the market and therefore outside their control, and given the ambiguity of moral luck, should they still be judged for their the sacrifice of certain interests for the sake of others—almost any morally important act. What has been done, and what is morally judged, is partly determined by external factors. However jewel-like the good may be in its own right, there is a morally significant difference between rescuing someone from a burning building and dropping him from a twelfth-storey window while trying to rescue him. Similarly, there is a morally significant difference between reckless driving and manslaughter. But whether a reckless driver hits a pedestrian depends on the presence of the pedestrian at the point where he recklessly passes a red light. What we do is also limited by the opportunities and choices with which we are faced, and these are largely determined by factors beyond our control. Someone who was an officer in a concentration camp might have led a quiet and harmless life if the Nazis had never come to power in Germany. And someone who led a quiet and harmless life in Argentina might have become an officer in a concentration camp if he had not left Germany for business reasons in 1930.” http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarnson/Courses/NAGELMoralLuck.pdf. 39 These are: resultant luck (luck in the way things turn out), circumstantial luck (luck in the circumstances in which one finds oneself), constitutive luck (luck in who one is, or in the traits and dispositions that one has), causal luck (luck in how one is determined by antecedent circumstances), Nagel, Moral Questions, op. cit., p. 60. 40 Cf. Dana K. Nelkin, op. cit.

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actions and decisions? From another angle, yet given the existence of moral luck, would it change matters if the outcome had been much more positive for everyone? To what extent then would it be credited to those who did take the risks? In dealing with these questions, it should be noted that moral luck, as a philosophical problem, is a derivative of a certain conception of morality. In other words, it arises because of the way moral judgment is conceived. While motivation, as was noted already, is indeed a funda-mental component of moral judgment, it is not the only one—pace Kant and his supporters. Aristotle, whose views on ethics have likewise been influential in history, teaches that there are a number of relevant considerations to be made in ethics. In his view, not only should we examine the reason why one acts but we should also take into account the ultimate purpose of the act. In other words, far from maintaining that intention alone is what counts in morality, he argues that even short-term goals are not sufficient to justify ethically what one does. It is more important to reconcile our actions with what he calls telos, the ultimate end of being human. Since he holds that the essence of human nature is rationality, by which he means endowed with knowledge and free will, he classifies human action—and the basis for ethical responsibility—according to the presence of knowledge and choice. Similarly, Thomas Aquinas, another influential thinker on ethical matters, maintains that ethical conduct is rational conduct, which means that for it to be truly assessable, the agent must have full knowledge and full consent. But the lack of either of these does not necessarily place the agent outside ethical scrutiny although it does lessen ethical responsibility. He also holds that just as a good deed can be corrupted by an evil intention, an action that is inherently wrong is not rectified by a laudable intention. What these other conceptions of morality amount to, and the reason for citing them here, is that even certain factors outside of our control, contra observers of moral luck, do count toward moral assessment, albeit in a limited way. More-over, since morality, as far as these other philosophers are concerned, is not just about committing deeds but also omitting deeds, particularly if these are attached to one’s duties or responsibility, failure to discharge them, knowingly and/or willingly in different degrees, makes one also morally accountable. In short, even presuming the existence of moral luck, one cannot totally discard accountability. But there is yet another way of attributing accountability even if one accepts the existence of moral luck and the status of risk-taking. On this

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view, unpredictability and uncertainty are true of all reality.41 The philosophical systems developed by A.N.Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne in dialogue with contemporary physics hold that there is universal creativity. They interpret causality throughout the whole of reality, and not just in the human realm, as resulting from previous events but with some spontaneity shaping the future. Therefore, risk-taking insofar as the future is partially open and unpredictable is inherent as reality and human history unfold. The future is precisely future because it is unforeseen It consists of “maybes or may-not-bes”, of probabilities and possibilities rather than of certainties. That is to say, all present happenings or activities are caused and shaped by past occurrences. The actuality of the future, on the other hand, is never completely determined by them. There is always a freshness about it. There is always luck involved, and the result could be good or bad, positive or negative, welcome or unacceptable and so on. Causality as interpreted in this way of thinking is both determinate as well as open. In one respect, there is definiteness while in another respect there is indeterminateness. It is therefore not merely in the realm of morality or moral judgment that there is unforeseen or uncontrolled element around which the problem of moral luck is based. It is universally the case. The issue of accountability in this way of thinking, rooted in Whitehead’s and Hartshorne’s philosophies, is grounded not just in one’s intention—which is crucial in any moral assessment as Kant and others rightly insist—but also, and more crucially, in what one does to shape the future. Every human being contributes to the kind of future that results. Because of universal causality, interpreted in this philosophical thinking as determinism-indeterminism, and because each and every one of us is a recipient as well as a contributor, there is universal accountability although in varying degrees.While Aristotle and Aquinas, given their understanding of human nature as rational, focus on the exercise and level of thinking and choosing in one’s act when assessing accountability, in Whitehead’s and Hartshorne’s philosophies an important consideration is the active role that one plays in bringing about what is essentially an open-ended future. All of us and each of us mould everyone else’s future. Because of that we are accountable to each other. It is the realization that the future when it becomes the past does have repercussions all the time. It means that all of us, no matter what we do and where we are, should show caution, care, and—

41

This conception of the workings and nature of reality, referred to as determinism-indeterminism, has been developed by Charles Hartshorne. See Chapter Eight: “Human Freedom, its Power and Limits: Some Implications for Life in Society”.

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more importantly, a sense of responsibility—for what is to come.42 This is unfortunately contrary to the thinking that we have been re-examining in the context of the economic crisis and to which we can trace it back. It also appears to have been a gap in the outlook of some of the bankers, economic and financial decision-makers. In its place should be the thinking that holds (with scientific support if contemporary physics is correct in its description of the workings of all of reality) that what matters is, even in the context of economics and finance, not always the high returns which great risks can achieve but rather and more seriously the wider picture—creation in general—of which the human world is an integral part and to which every act is an active contributor.

Concluding Comment This essay discussed the economic crisis by undertaking the task of re-examining certain views and practices which contributed to the situation. It commented on the predominant mindset which led to a particular culture that promoted the kind of behavior which in turn ushered in the economic crisis. Turning to philosophical thinking, it explored the notion of accountability to enable us to learn from the past, deal with the present and provide hope for the future. The crisis after all is not just a monetary issue but a human problem and it affects humankind. Accordingly, philosophical thinking can and does have a positive contribution to make to the debate and to a possible resolution.

42

For a fuller discussion of this issue, see my (with Ferdinand Santos), Personal Identity, the Self and Ethics (Palgrave/Macmillan, 2007).

CHAPTER ELEVEN THE MARKETPLACE, ACADEMIA AND EDUCATION: A PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE BOLOGNA PROCESS

Developments in Society and Education Developments in society present a constant challenge to the educative process. Those of us who have been tasked with educating future citizens know only too well that the age-old adage that education is about preparing them for the future is not as straightforward as it appears to be. It can be helpful, of course, to make the distinction between their immediate future and their long-term development. Consequently, one can focus closely on the job-market, further training (or postgraduate education); or one can stress the more long-term process of facilitating the learners’ entry into society or even their personal development. The responsibility of preparing for the future through education can also benefit by taking into account not only different age groups (hence, there are different levels) but also natural abilities (hence, the distinction between technological and academic institutions). But in addition to all of these—and there are others—educating for the future must also be cognizant of the kind of society in which the learners are expected to live and to play a role. It is vital therefore that educators become aware of any developments in society. Preparation for the future thus entails that the educative process should also address the needs which arise from these developments. One such development in contemporary society has occurred in the marketplace. Since education, among its manifold aims, is expected to prepare learners for the marketplace, an important consideration for educators is how to meet the changing demands which have occurred and may occur. While the marketplace has featured at all times in any consideration of education as a preparation for the future, today the phenomenon of

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globalization presents a particular challenge. Furthermore, it has been linked to what has become known as the knowledge-society and the importance of competitiveness in education. In this respect, as a consequence of these developments, there has been a shift in emphasis in university education in Europe effected by what is referred to as the Bologna Process,1 Indeed we have already been feeling the impact of this climate of change2 and the need to prepare learners for a demanding and competitive knowledge-society.3 There has been an urgent demand on educational institutions to be alert and responsive to

1 The Bologna Process was intended to create the European Higher Education Area in 2010. Launched on 19th June 1999, with the signing of the Bologna Declaration by 29 Education Ministers of Education, and preceded by the Sorbonne Declaration of 1998, it aimed, among others, to make academic degree standards and quality assurance procedures more comparable and compatible throughout Europe. The Bologna Process has increased from the original 29 countries to 47 countries (in 2010). Since 1999 subsequent meetings took place in Prague (2001), Berlin (2003), Bergen (2005), London (2007), and Leuven /Louvain-la-Neuve (2009). The European Higher Education Area (EHEA) was launched along with the Bologna Process’s decade anniversary, in March 2010 during the Budapest-Vienna Ministerial Conference. In April 2012, a Ministerial Conference and Third Bologna Forum took place in Bucharest. The EHEA’s strategy for the next decade is consolidation. Its official website is: http://www.ehea.info/. 2 This is definitely the case in Ireland. See HEA document, “Towards a Future Higher Education Landscape”, 13th February 2012. Also, A. Hyland for HEA and NCCA (2011), Entry to Higher Education in Ireland in the 21st Century, www.hea.ie; Kathleen Lynch et al., New Managerialism in Education: Commercialization, Carelessness and Gender (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Tom Dunne, “Education, the Market and the Careless Culture,” The Irish Times, Weekend Review Supplement, June 1, 2013, p. 10. 3 The Bologna Process (Berlin 2003) communiqué states: “Ministers take into due consideration the conclusions of the European Councils in Lisbon (2000) and Barcelona (2002) aimed at making Europe ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustaining economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’…”. The Sorbonne Joint Declaration (1998) maintains that “Europe is not only that of the Euro, of the banks and economy” and asserts the desire that “it must be a Europe of knowledge as well”. This is reiterated in the Bologna Declaration (1999): “A Europe of Knowledge is now widely recognised as an irreplaceable factor for social and human growth and as an indispensable component to consolidate and enrich the European citizenship, capable of giving its citizens the necessary competences to face the challenges of the new millennium, together with an awareness of shared values and belonging to a common social and cultural space.” This emphasis on a knowledge-based society is re-affirmed in subsequent communiqués.

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this change in the workplace.4 As is to be expected, there are implications for our programmes, learning outcomes, teaching/learning, assessment methods and so on.

The Marketplace This attention in the Bologna Process to the demands of the marketplace is hardly surprising, given the nature of education as mentioned earlier. To some extent, all these changes are inevitable and even necessary, and one wonders whether academics and institutions should simply accept the situation and adapt accordingly, whether enthusiastically or grudgingly. For some, however, the crucial question here is whether the marketplace or the labour arena should serve not only as the context but also the criterion for our educational task. There has been much criticism of the socalled “business model” being imposed on the academic community.5 Before probing into that criticism, however, we may need to examine, first of all, whether the basis for the call to academic institutions to focus more sharply on the marketplace or the labour arena as they review their role and place in contemporary society is really contrary to what university education is about. After all, universities and institutes of learning—whether funded publicly or privately—originate, develop and flourish within society. Consequently, they do have a social role and responsibility.6 That society to which they belong and are accountable, whether we like it or not, includes the marketplace and the labour arena. In fact, it may even be argued that it is predominantly of that nature since finance and business are what regulate our daily lives. It would be unimaginable to 4

The important role of universities is duly acknowledged from the very beginning in the various documents of the Bologna Process. The European University Association (EUA) as well as the National Unions of Students in Europe (ESIB) has been actively involved. Cf. http://www.eua.be 5 This is a reference to a perception by some academics rather than to a deliberate policy of the Bologna Process. 6 The “Communiqué of the Conference of Ministers responsible for Higher Education: Realising the European Higher Education Area” (Berlin 2003) reaffirms the notion that “higher education is a public good and a public responsibility.” The Bergen 2005 Communiqué stresses the “social dimension” of education: “The social dimension includes measures taken by governments to help students, especially from socially disadvantaged groups, in financial and economic aspects and to provide them with guidance and counselling services with a view to widening access.”

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survive without them. The marketplace and the labour arena are indeed the context in which we play out our roles in academia. But does that mean that the so-called “business model” of such a context should also regulate and evaluate our schedules, our performance and our outcomes? To this question, let me offer a typical philosophical answer: yes and no. Yes, because to some extent that context directs us to our co-players, as it were; namely, the business world. Academia needs to be able not only to live with but also to dialogue with these co-players in language to which they are attuned. To resort to Wittgensteinian-speak, the specific language games we academics play should be matched by family resemblances that we ought to discover. And it seems to me that much of what is happening as a result of the Bologna Process and the changes we are expected to implement are facilitating that situation. As Americans (and others) are fond of saying, we do need not just to talk the talk but also to walk the walk!7 The second part of my answer to the question as to whether the business model should also regulate and evaluate us was “no”. Simply put, academia is not the business world. It has a distinctive status in society and makes a specific contribution to it. Earlier I had referred to academia’s responsibility to society. The value of that word “responsibility”, aside from its common meaning of accountability, is that it also reminds us that it is a “response”, not merely an “implementation”. Academia, in its endeavours to fulfil its role within society, may need to challenge and critique the marketplace, the labour arena and the business world.8 While academia needs to address common concerns, it can offer another valuable perspective framed by its traditions, widened by its studies, and grounded in its values. I will return to this claim a little later. It is worth noting at this stage, however, that the distinction between training and Bildung—as a focus of this conference—is particularly appropriate to this philosophical assessment of the Bologna Process.9 7

The London Communiqué “Towards the European Higher Education Area: responding to challenges in the global world,” words it differently: “As we look ahead, we recognise that, in a changing world, there will be a continuing need to adapt our higher education systems, to ensure that the EHEA remains competitive and can respond effectively to the challenges of globalisation.” 8 An interesting article which describes the situation regarding how all these have affected private education in Britain is “Is it worth it?” The Economist March 1st7th 2008, pp. 36-37. See also how these changes are affecting French higher education, “Under threat of change,” The Economist June 7th-13th, 2008, pp. 35-36. 9 This distinction is associated with Wilhelm von Humboldt, whose views on education are particularly relevant in the context of this conference [in Vilnius]. Cf. “Wilhelm von Humboldt”, Prospects: the Quarterly Review of Comparative Education, XXIII, 3/4 (1993), pp. 613-623.

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Standardization and Distinctiveness The Bologna Process is seeking to bring about a certain amount of standardization among universities in Europe.10 The different levels of our academic programmes ensure a practical uniformity, and the diploma supplement issued by the host university is recognizable by the other universities.11 Consequently, there can be a certain amount of mobility, enabling our learners and teachers to echo Erasmus’s description of himself: Sum civis mundi (or at least, Europae).12 But is this truly a welcome development in universities in Europe? Do standardization, uniformity and mobility as envisioned by the Bologna Process really promote the interests of universities today? Let me make a few observations. The reality of globalization reminds us of the need to take account of this important challenge to university education. This was highlighted in an interesting and informative article which appeared in Newsweek (August 27, 2007) on what it called “the common university system in Europe” and what it referred to as “the urgency of being competitive in the global scene”. This is indeed the situation, and we would do well to heed the challenge. In addition, we could examine the etymological meaning of “university” (rather than its present-day usage to describe an institution comprising a number of schools, colleges or faculties): universitas. A university should indeed be such that it extends further than its own campus and prepares its learners to assume a rightful place not just in the local community but much further afield. And this can be achieved by cooperation and collaboration among universities, nationally and internationally. In some cases it might even be integration. All these would indicate a positive reply to the questions that I have just raised. But there is a legitimate concern here. If the Bologna Process were to be implemented fully, what happens to the distinctiveness and autonomy of the universities? “Academia” is a generic term, and like all generic 10

The statement on the EHEA website, created following the Bologna Process, refers to “comparable, compatible and coherent systems of higher education in Europe”. 11 The Berlin Communiqué set as an objective that every student graduating as from 2005 should receive the Diploma Supplement automatically. This is intended to foster employability and to facilitate academic recognition for further studies. 12 In the Communiqué of the meeting of European Ministers in charge of Higher Education “Towards the European Higher Education Area” (2001), there is specific reference to this point: “The choice of Prague to hold this meeting is a symbol of their will to involve the whole of Europe in the process in the light of the enlargement of the European Union.”

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terms, it does not communicate the vibrancy or the richness of its individual constituents. Here is probably where John Henry Newman’s “sense of place” as set out in his Idea of a University is especially acute when he not only describes the university as “a community of learning” but also specifies its details. For him, and for many, today and in the past, the university is a place apart. In the context of the Bologna process and standardization, one is inclined to ask: what sets a university in Ireland apart from one in Italy, or in Poland, in Lithuania, or anywhere else in Europe?13 For a possible answer I should like to suggest a concept that has been used in different contexts: ethos. Ethos, as I should like to use it here, is the specific context in which an individual or an institution, finds itself and develops itself.14 The ethos, in the form of values, traditions, beliefs and so on, nurtures individuals or members. It is the distinguishing feature that marks off an institution. That ethos—whether religious, interdenominational, or secular—is articulated by the institution’s vision, the overarching understanding of itself and what it stands for. It is that vision that articulates and drives its mission, the specific objectives that it has set for itself. Thus, while aligning itself with similar institutions, in itself a worthwhile goal, a specific university can nonetheless, through its chosen ethos, be distinctive and to some extent autonomous. Here we can learn from the academic institutions in the USA. And, among others, it is this awareness of the distinctiveness of one’s university or college, spurred on by one’s loyalty, that makes the alumni in the USA create space for their alma mater in their hearts—and pockets! And aligning themselves with an institution’s vision and mission, many benefactors translate that support to monetary realities. It seems to me then that Newman’s “sense of place” as portrayed in his model of the university as a community of learning would be better translated into, and understood as, a “sense of identity”.15 As with other models or paradigms, one could ask whether it is the model or the paradigm itself that can serve a valuable purpose. Thus, the suggestion of a need to adapt to the changed and changing demands of contemporary soci13

The later Communiqués affirm autonomy, but of the different national systems. On how this is a particular challenge for faith-based higher education, see Chapter Twelve: “Developments in Contemporary Society and Faith-based Higher Education: Challenges and Issues”. 15 During the discussion following the presentation of this paper, the question was asked about how “a sense of identity” of a Humanities University—since this was a theme at the conference—would fit in my reference to the specific ethos of a university. My suggestion was to talk of the “focus” of that university as a further refinement of its ethos. 14

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ety leads me to examine the underpinning of the model proposed by Newman, rather than just the model by itself, for that may well be what could still be valid and valuable in present-day society.

Knowledge, Competence and Skills Since we are being asked in university education in Europe to specifically state the knowledge, competence and skills that we expect from all our programmes—the so-called “learning outcomes” that somehow have become the objectives of education today—we need to look more closely at how that expectation relates to what we are doing in education, particularly in our present context. When the end products seem to have become more important than the process itself, then there is a need to take stock. When the success of educational endeavours is measured in terms of empirical evidence, the so-called “hard outputs”, that the learning outcomes have been achieved—all of which justify the academic award—one begins to wonder to what extent we are committed to simply ensuring that we reach our targets. All along one would be forgiven for wondering whether education has become too oriented towards producing the right products— as indeed some, whether in the printed media or in academic circles, have already been alerting us to. Those of us who have looked at education as the process that begins in wonder but ends in wisdom—no doubt, influenced by ancient Greek philosophy’s conception of itself—can become disoriented and even aggrieved at this changed focus of education. And if you add to that view the claim that education itself, educere, is about “the leading out” of the learner from darkness to the light, then one begins to have misgivings about the emphasis on the actual results rather than on the attempts or the efforts of both the educator and the educand. And one will suspect that the destination has become more important than the journey, robbing all of the excitement, the ups and downs as one moves towards the light. Nonetheless, as I have already indicated previously, there are good reasons for this shift not only because it is called for and even required by the authorities to whom, among others, our educational task is accountable but also because it is crucial that students are prepared by their academic institutions with appropriate knowledge, skills, and competence to enable them to meet the present demands of society. The task of educating our students today takes place in a society that is fast changing, complex, and diverse, features which present significant challenges to educators. Every society and every generation, of course, has its own set of characteristics and problems that require different responses from educators throughout

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history. But it seems to me that today’s society, with the values that it upholds, has a particular challenge for those of us who are involved in educating today’s students. I have defended as the context of our academic work the marketplace (or if you prefer, the agora , just as it was in ancient Greece). The reasonable demand that we take account of the labour market or that we consult our stakeholders whenever we propose or review our academic programmes rightly forces us to remain relevant and competitive—a justified concern of the Bologna Process.16 It is very much worth our while to keep the end-result in sight. The same can be said of the view that life-long learning, also affirmed by the Bologna Process and which is what education is really about, should be marked by recognizable stages. Each stage has a definite goal, and a goal is worth pursuing when there are tangible features. In insisting that we clearly identify the learning outcomes for each of these stages, we are recognizing and acknowledging the achievements at each stage of the learning process. Knowledge, competence and skills are important to enable our students to take their rightful place in society. And it is our responsibility as educators to facilitate that process. On the other hand, education is much more than that. And with all the call for a “knowledge-based society” we are in danger of forgetting that point. I believe—and this is a conviction that comes from several years of being closely involved in education in Ireland, Britain, the USA, and for shorter periods in various other countries—that this wider vision of education is just as true for students in the sciences, business, engineering, and other professional schools as it is in the humanities.17 This is because I firmly believe that education, in whatever form or context, should ultimately be grounded in the development of the human person.18 It is a be-

16 Bucharest Communiqué (2012) recognizes as an important concern, among others, “investing in higher education for the future” as an important solution to the present economic situation. 17 Von Humboldt puts it this way: “...this whole education system therefore rests on one and the same foundation. The commonest jobbing worker and the finest graduate must at the outset be given the same mental training, unless human dignity is to be disregarded in the former and the latter allowed to fall victim to unworthy sentimentality and chimera.” “Guiding Ideas on a Plan for the Establishment of the Lithuanian Municipal School System,” (Gesammelte Schriften: Ausgabe Der Preussischen Akademie Der Wissenschaften (Berlin, 1906-1936), XIII, p. 278. 18 I have illustrated and developed this point in an article “Teaching Ethics in a Core Curriculum: Some Observations,” Teaching Ethics, II, 1 (Fall 2001), pp. 6976. Reprinted in my Ethical Contexts and Theoretical Issues: Essays in Ethical Thinking (UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), pp. 229-239. In that article I

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lief that has been nurtured, tested and developed by my philosophical pursuits and contextualized, facilitated and deepened by my involvement with various academic institutions throughout the world.19 Alfred North Whitehead talks of the need for “the liberal spirit” in technical education and science.20 This observation is rooted in the claim that human nature, rather than simply culture, is the basis of education. It is interesting to note that the Bologna Seminar on Qualifications Structures in Higher Education in Europe (March 2003) had placed personal development as the first purpose of higher education and training (the second as “preparation for life as citizens in a democratic society”, the third as “development and maintenance of an advanced knowledge base” and the fourth as “preparation for the labour market”).21

Education and the Pursuit of Wisdom Education for me—and I would hazard the hope that many would agree with this understanding—is first and foremost the pursuit of wisdom.22 It is a view that requires some qualification as well as clarification. I have already remarked on the present tendency, one that is particularly evident in our market-driven and technological society, to associate college or university education with the acquisition of knowledge and the development of skills. Let me repeat that this is not only understandable but also crucial if the education that an institution provides is to be found appropriate and relevant. Nonetheless, something is amiss if the entire focus of the educational task becomes narrowly directed at this consideration, important though it may be. The pursuit of wisdom as the educational task, understood as the active participation in our full development as huargue that in our exploration of ethical cases, we need to develop our moral sense as human beings and not just as engineers or scientists. 19 Personal experience, rather than an a priori claim, backs this point. 20 Cf. A.N. Whitehead, Aims of Education and Other Essays (N.Y.: The Free Press, 1967), 43-59. 21 The Bologna Seminar sets the scene for the evaluation of the programmes at university/college level throughout Europe. Compare these priorities with those in The Leuven/Louvain-la-Neuve Communiqué (April 2009) titled “The Bologna Process 2020 – The European Higher Education Area in the new decade” which takes stock of the achievements of the Bologna Process and establishes the priorities for the EHEA for the next decade. 22 This concern for the pursuit of wisdom within the context of academia has led to our writing of a novel on this theme, cf. M.S. Sia, The Fountain Arethuse: a Novel Set in the University Town of Leuven (U.K: The Book Guild, 1997). It is about the search of various fictitious academics and others for the source of wisdom.

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man persons, highlights certain essential features that do not always stand out with the other conceptions mentioned earlier. It is also something that needs to be repeatedly emphasized today, while taking into account contemporary needs, as we reflect on “what it is that we are doing when we are educating our students”. Because the term “wisdom” itself is understood in different ways, I should like to explain how I understand it in this context. Wisdom, as will have been noted from my earlier comments, is not just the acquisition of knowledge or the development of skills and talents although these are an integral part of the pursuit of wisdom itself. Nor is it, as is sometimes narrowly interpreted, the development of one’s individuality, particularly when one associates it with the description of “a learned individual”. These interpretations fail to take into serious account the fullness of our humanity—which is the basis of education. Wisdom ultimately is rooted in our nature as human beings and the various dimensions of our humanity: intellectual, emotional, ethical, spiritual, aesthetic, social, creative and others. The pursuit of wisdom is the attempt to recognize, integrate and develop all those dimensions. Or as Wilhelm von Humboldt puts it, “the complete training of the human personality”. 23 It is also an awareness that our identity as human persons is shaped and nourished by the community to which we belong. In turn our own activities, decisions, and commitments have an effect on the community.24 Plato, Confucius, and Buber, among others, drew our attention to this understanding of wisdom when they wrote about the importance of the development of one’s moral character in connection with the search for wisdom.25 Education towards wisdom is thus a holistic process because the goal and its foundation are themselves holistic. If indeed the educational task entails the pursuit of wisdom as described above, I regard the role of an educator as one who enhances, that is 23 GS, op. cit., XIII, p. 266. He also states in “Theory of Human Education” that “the ultimate task of our existence is to give the fullest possible content to the concept of humanity in our own person...through the impact of actions in our lives”, a task that “can only be implemented through the links established between ourselves as individuals and the world around us.” I, p. 283. 24 Wilhelm von Humboldt argues that “self-education can only be continued...in the wider context of the development of the world.” GS, op. cit. VII, p. 33. He also wrote that “the education of the individual requires his incorporation into society and involves his links with society at large.” Also, ibid.. XIV, p. 155. 25 See Chapter Four: “Relationships and Communal Living: a View on Types of Relatedness” and Chapter Six: “Ethical Thinking and Formation: a Challenge for Life in Society”.

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to say, evokes, provokes, invokes and convokes, that process among the learners.26 In and outside the classroom, in informal and formal contacts with the learners, in creative and scholarly activity, one should strive to keep that task in mind. For this reason, teaching is neither a “pouring of information” nor merely “an intellectual exercise”. Nor should it be seen as primarily preparing learners for the exams that will lead to an award.27 Rather, it is a journey or an exploration whereby the learners and the educator address the questions that they are asking, evaluate their significance and draw on various resources for possible answers.28 Moreover, the process (of searching for answers) is just as important as any answers that they may arrive at because the very act itself of pursuing wisdom already enhances our development as human beings. The process is also important because hopefully it transforms us into better human beings because we have taken the time (inside and outside the classroom) to delve deeper into those questions and to face up to their implications. If wisdom is indeed the development of the whole person, then the spiritual dimension cannot be ignored. There is a transcendent side to the human person, and if we are to do the human person justice, then it becomes an important factor in the pursuit of wisdom. The various service activities and the active cultivation of an ethos, an integral part of the programme of education, further the pursuit of wisdom. Moreover, they contextualize that pursuit as we broaden our vision of what it means to be a human person in the diverse and multicultural community that we find ourselves in and serve today. This understanding of one’s role as an educator should thus inform and substantiate the objectives, content and the methodology of one’s teaching. Because an educator has journeyed towards wisdom, and continues to do so, he/she can be an effective guide in the learners’ pursuit of wisdom. Whitehead talks of the importance of taking into account what he 26

These are stages in my methodology of teaching: evoke (gaining the interest of the students), provoke (critically reflecting on possible answers), invoke (drawing on the sources) and convoke (enabling them to think through and develop their answers) resulting in the acronym: EPIC. 27 The issue of autonomy and pressure on students because of course assignments/examinations inevitably arises, given this emphasis on their personal development. Admittedly, there is always a tension. On the other hand, part of the educational process (and thus of the student’s personal development) is to help students to cope with pressure and to organize their work accordingly. Moreover, in the workplace performance review is regularly carried out. What is crucial, in the light of the argumentation in this essay, is that that aspect does not become the most important consideration. 28 Subjects in the humanities particularly lend themselves to this task of linking the students’ concrete experiences with the academic study.

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calls “the rhythm of education”29 as well “the rhythmic claims of freedom and discipline”.30 Moreover, that role can be complemented and supported by scholarly, creative and professional endeavours. The questions we ask and the answers we gather from various sources need to be pursued even further. They need to be investigated with rigour at a deeper level.31 What prompts scholarly and creative work is similar to that which motivates teaching: the pursuit of wisdom. An educator wants to share with others the excitement, as well as any discoveries, as he/she undertakes his/her own journey. As Whitehead puts it, “it is the function of the scholar to evoke into life wisdom and beauty which, apart from his magic, would remain lost in the past.”32

Learning Outcomes or Learner Outcome? This leads me to make the claim that in highlighting the importance of identifying and achieving learning outcomes at various stages, as the Bologna Process expects us to do, we should not forget the fundamental reason for this task; namely, the development of the person. So perhaps we should be describing the “learner outcome”, awkward though that phrase may be. The question which I believe should be addressed by academic institutions is: “What kind of a learner do they want to leave their trusteeship?”—inasmuch as these institutions have been entrusted with their education? Rather than seek to attract certain individuals (to gain greater prestige) academic institutions, if they are really intent on showing their worth, should concentrate on the kind of graduates whose education they have had the responsibility of providing. Lest this be misunderstood, my point is not so much the compiling of graduate data showing the jobs, careers, achievements or further opportunities of their graduates, but rather supporting the kind of persons who have “emerged from their portals” as it were. An ancient inscription over a library captures my point succinctly: Intra sapiens, exi sapientior. In this instance, let me return to an earlier point which I had made— that academic institutions have also an important role in challenging and critiquing society. We have already noted the changing expectations of academic institutions as a result of a changed society. But we need to be 29

A.N. Whitehead, Aims of Education, op. cit., pp. 15-25 Ibid. pp. 29-41. 31 We tried to illustrate this in M.F. Sia and S. Sia, From Question to Quest: Literary-Philosophical Enquiries into the Challenges of Life (U.K.: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010). 32 Ibid. p. 98. 30

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forcefully reminded that education is not just about outcomes, performance, and standards. Ultimately and fundamentally, it is about the learning process, one that involves the learner and the educator. It is about the human person, individually and collectively, and the human condition. Here is where academic institutions are particularly in a strong position to bring to the notice of society and to work for its well-being. I should like to think that it is what was behind Newman’s model: that education is about the person, not just the worker, the labourer, the technocrat, business individual, and so on.33 Focusing on the humanity of the learner reveals a multi-faceted task since the human person is a multi-faceted reality. As we celebrate our creativeness and genius in the changing emphasis in education, we can lose sight of humanistic values. We can exploit others to our advantage so as to further our interests, unmindful of their dignity as human beings. This is what Moltmann means when he wrote that “we have created a bureaucracy which condemns the individual to impotency”34 and echoed by Eric Fromm when he asks whether we have to produce sick people in order to have a healthy economy.35 For though “science has made possible many marvellous things…[it] has helped to produce a technological society wherein man is reduced to the level of machines.”36 Unless we succeed in putting human goals in this technological society of ours, so that we do not remain fascinated exclusively by the accumulation of economic potencies which urge us to “produce more— consume more” then, as Moltmann rightly observes, the very progress we witness today will devour our very humanity and leave us slaves adjusted to prosperity.37 In what way can we deal with this challenge? What distinctive contribution to society today can those of us who teach philosophy and related subjects (which underpin Newman’s model) make? How can the study of these subjects—traditionally the preserve of universities—convincingly show that the knowledge, competence and skills (the standards set out by the Bologna process) acquired by the learners are relevant? To what extent

33

See Chapter Twelve: “Developments in Contemporary Society and Faith-based Higher Education: Challenges and Issues”. 34 Jürgen Moltmann, “Christian Rehumanization of Technological Society,” The Critic, May-June, 1970), p. 13. 35 Eric Fromm, The Revolution of Hope: Toward a Humanised Technology (N.Y.: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1968), p. 2. 36 David Bradley, “The Western Crisis and the Attraction of Asian Religions,” Concilium: Theology in the Age of Renewal, IX, 6 (November 1970), p. 136. 37 Moltmann, “Christian Rehumanization,” p. 13.

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can all these be made credible to the marketplace, the labour arena and the business world? One of the valuable lessons that I learned during my long stint in the USA teaching philosophy was the clear message coming from law schools, medical schools, institutes of technology and so on: what we need, they told us emphatically, are graduates who can think critically, communicate effectively and relate to others.38 The whole Fall 2007 issue of Conversations in Jesuit Higher Education, the magazine of the Association of Jesuit universities and colleges in the USA, was devoted to this issue with the theme: “Philosophy and Theology: why Bother?”. The answers given by various alumni in different professions are illuminating and reassuring. Repeatedly in Ireland, one hears from IBEC39 of the need for students who are grounded in the humanities and the arts because of the flexibility and adaptability of the graduates in these areas. The Guardian (20 Nov., 2007) carried an article tantalizingly titled “I think, therefore I earn” claiming that philosophy graduates are suddenly all the rage with employers. According to the writer, “It is in the fields of finance, property development, health, social work and the nebulous category of ‘business’ that those versed in Plato and Kant are most sought after.” Why? Here are a few quotes contained in that article: Lucy Adams (human resources director of Serco, a services business and consultancy firm) states that, “We need people who have the ability to look for different approaches and take an open mind to issues. These skills are promoted by philosophical approaches.” Fiona Czerniawska (director of the Management Consultancies Association’s think tank) claims that, “A philosophy degree has trained the individual’s brain and given them the ability to provide managementconsulting firms with the sort of skills that they require and clients demand. These skills can include the ability to be very analytical, provide clear and innovative thinking, and question assumptions.” Deborah Bowman (associate dean for widening participation at St. George’s, University of London) observes that, “Graduates of philosophy who come in to graduate-entry medicine, or to nursing courses, are very useful. Growth areas in the NHS include clinical ethicists, who assist doctors and nurses.” It is 38

Martha C. Nussbaum offers a powerful defence of the humanities in education against the market- and economics-oriented developments in this area. See her Not For Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities (Princeton University Press, 2012). 39 Irish Business and Employers Confederation. IBEC “promotes the interests of business and employers in Ireland by working to foster the continuing development of a competitive environment that encourages sustainable growth and within which both enterprise and people can flourish.”

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good to hear from these sectors of society regarding what we are doing in philosophy in particular, and with the humanities in general.40

Concluding Comment In this essay, I have acknowledged the importance of the marketplace, resulting from changes in society, as the context of education today. However, I have also argued that the process of education, while heeding the call and the proposals of the Bologna Process which accepts that context, should not neglect a very fundamental consideration; namely, that education is about the development of the human person. It is for this reason that I have reminded ourselves that wisdom, and not just knowledge, skills and competence should dominate our considerations and strategies.41 To put it in another way, academia (and that, by the way, includes our subject disciplines) indeed needs to adapt. But it should continue to transform society and not just serve it. We need to acknowledge the climate of change, but we would also want in some respects to change the climate. We have transitioned from the information-society to the knowledgesociety.42 Let us hope that we will soon move to the wisdom-society because of the work that we do in academia, especially in the humanities. Society will then, perhaps only then, be a community—with learning.43

40

See also, Carolyn Gregoire, “This is Irrefutable Evidence of the Value of a Humanities Education,” in the Huffington Post, Huff Post Third Metric “Redefining Success Beyond Money and Power,” January 30, 2014. Interestingly, the views on education expressed by the young participants of Irish President Higgins’s consultation echo this very point: they strongly expressed the desire for education to be broadened and to help citizens become open-minded, self-reliant, involved in society and active citizens. Cf. “Take Charge of Change: a Report on Pres. Michael D. Higgins’ Consultation on Being Young and Irish 2012” (Dublin: Centre for Social and Educational Research, DIT, 2012). 41 A particularly helpful and relevant book in this respect is the collection of essays by Sjur Bergan in his aptly-titled book, Not by Bread Alone (Council of Europe Publishing, 2011). 42 Cf. Chapter Seven: “Images, Reality and Truth: Some Philosophical Considerations”. 43 Newman’s description is a “community of learning”.

CHAPTER TWELVE DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY AND FAITH-BASED HIGHER EDUCATION: CHALLENGES AND ISSUES

Challenges to Education Throughout the ages education has been faced with a number of challenges, and these in turn have led to a number of issues that it has had to deal with. Some of these are perennial, but every age ushers in fresh and even unforeseen challenges and issues. This is hardly surprising, however, given the nature, the status and the tasks of education itself. While one has to duly acknowledge its continued importance in society, education is after all a process, rather than merely an institution or an organization; and its role is always in need of constant scrutiny if it is to remain relevant. The expectations regarding higher education are greater inasmuch as it is—at least, for some—the final step taken in the whole process. Among the other tasks of higher education is to facilitate full membership in society; and how it accomplishes this becomes a benchmark for its significance and relevance. Moreover, since full membership in society takes several forms, higher education is also expected to take that variety and diversity into account. Many of these expectations, challenges and issues are relevant to faith-based higher education. But in addition, it has—to a great extent—to justify its distinctiveness. While it, too, has to address the concerns of higher education in general, whatever they are,1 a faith-based higher education has, in addition, to articulate, communicate and implement an understanding of education that is unique to itself. But it is moreover worth noting that at times, it may, and even should, draw on that understanding to critique prevailing conceptions and practices of education and even certain features of society itself. 1

See Chapter Eleven: “The Marketplace, Academia and Education: a Philosophical Critique of the Bologna Process”.

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This essay will sketch developments in contemporary society—by no means an exhaustive list—which present specific challenges and raise particular issues for a faith-based higher education.2 It will also offer suggestions as to why and how, precisely because of its distinctiveness, it can respond to these.

A Secularized Society A faith-based higher education today finds itself in what can be described as a secularized society. It is the milieu in which it has to fulfill its role and discharge its responsibilities. Inasmuch as a faith-based education appears to be in contrast, and even in opposition, to such a society, it would seem that even its very existence would need to be justified. In this sense, the challenge to its distinctiveness is particularly acute. The question could very well be posed: what place, if any, does such a higher education have in this kind of society? Furthermore, even if an argument could be made for its place, what positive contribution can it make, given that such a society may well be critical of its influence? Secularization is an epochal movement which marks a change in our understanding of ourselves, of the world and of our relationship to God.3 It has led to secularism, a viewpoint and way of life that concentrate on this world with an explicit denial of God’s existence or relevance. Secularism affirms the radical autonomy of human beings, and the intensified concern for this world is brought to the point of breaking way from any religious understanding of themselves and of their world. Focusing one’s attention on the here and now, one narrows oneself down to such an extent as to exclude any thought of the beyond. Such a secularist accuses the religious believer of not accepting full responsibility for this world.4 For when life in this world presents problems and sufferings, religious believers are accused of hastening to explain them with theistic principles. Thus, secular2

Although challenges and issues are quite different realities, and therefore may deserve separate treatment, I am discussing these together in this essay. 3 In his recent book Charles Taylor distinguishes three senses of secularization: 1) the emptying of religion from autonomous social spheres; 2) the falling off of religious belief and practice and turning away from God and Church; 3) the acceptance that belief in God is no longer axiomatic and that there are other alternatives. Cf. his, A Secular Age (Cambridge & London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007). 4 Alasdair MacIntyre makes an interesting observation on the impact of secularization on ethics in his Secularization and Moral Change (Oxford University Press, 1967).

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ism makes one shrug off traditional religion and not to bother with it anymore. The secularist prefers to view reality without a, or any, God.5 Related to this phenomenon of secularization is a new understanding of our relationship with nature. Previously humans thought of themselves as merely creatures of God, endowed with dignity no doubt but still totally dependent on the Creator. Much emphasis was placed on human limitations and weaknesses. Human beings had to submit to the order in the world. But in today’s secularized society, one thinks in terms of human possibilities, not limitations. This is a major shift indeed in our selfunderstanding that seems to open the whole future to human endeavour. “Come-of-age” humans see themselves now as co-creators and not mere creatures, who are entirely subject to the perilous forces of nature. They have come to realize that nature is not complete to the minutest detail but needs their stamp to bring it to its fullness. In discovering that they have been left with the world in their hands, they have come to appreciate their creativeness. Having learned that they do not have to submit to the order of nature, they have become aware that they can change it—without any reference to a Creator. Secularization has also brought about an appreciation that human beings are not a finished product for they have to make themselves. This is their task for they are not just born into the world but they need to “create” themselves, so to speak. To be human is a task, not necessarily a burden but a challenge, a choice. The point is, human nature is essentially a becoming. Humanity is not a static concept, it is a dynamic entity. This is what marks humans off from other animals. Not only are they rational but they can also and do change themselves and the world. This concept of human becoming leads us to human historicity, a point strongly emphasized by Karl Marx. Human existence, since it is dynamic, is history in the making. This means that humans do not only have history, but they are history just as they are flesh and blood. In such a secularized society—where God and the religious view have been sidelined and even abandoned—a faith-based higher education finds itself on the defensive. A major challenge to it is to clarify for itself 5

There is a challenge here too for our concept of God. God was conceived as “gap-filler”, assigned tasks which in our crude knowledge of the world we ourselves could not accomplish. God had been performing the function of “filling the holes” which science at that time had not yet been able to do. Cf. Hubert F. Beck, The Age of Technology (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1970), p. 15. With the growth, however, of our ability to explain the world by itself, this God became redundant. For a discussion of this task, see my God in Process Thought: a Study in Charles Hartshorne’s Concept of God (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985).

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and to share with society its specific role and positive contribution. At the same time, it needs to find a common basis with secularized society that will enable it to enter into dialogue with it and thereby work with and alongside it.6

A Mechanized and Technological Society Another development in contemporary society that presents challenges to a faith-based higher education is the invention of machines and the advancement of technology.7 It has transformed our age into a highly progressive one. While requiring only minimal human labour, machines have enabled us to step up production; hence, meeting more adequately our economic and material needs.8 This tremendous growth of mechanical power since the 18th century—first steam, then electricity, and later atomic and even nuclear power—made possible a great increase of social wealth. While the early stages of the industrial revolution actually impoverished millions, by almost any material standard today’s citizens are better off than were their ancestors. New mechanical power netted in new wealth.9 And this has caused the lifting up of barriers which hindered progress before and has spurred society to forge its way ahead to develop science and technology even more. Realizing thus the value of machines in creating a more progressive world for living in, contemporary society has learned to channel many of its needs through them. But with the advent of machines and the consequent development of science and technology, a new way of life has been gradually setting in. It is a spectre, as Erich Fromm describes it, stalking in our midst and yet noticed only by a few. It radically differs from what we have known till now since this way of life may actually topple down our former scale of values. What Fromm warns us about is the spectre of “a completely mechanized society, devoted to maximal material output and consumption, di6

As some of the essays in Gabriella Puztai, (ed.), Religion and Higher Education in Central and Eastern Europe. Region and Education VI, (Debrecen: CHERD. 2008) indicate, the political and social situation in the region show affinities with the secularized society described here. It is interesting to read how church-related higher education in these countries dealt, and continues to deal, with the challenges and issues in their context. 7 See Chapter Seven: “Images, Reality and Truth: Some Philosophical Considerations”. 8 Hubert F. Beck, op.cit. p.18. 9 Eric Josephson (ed.) “Introduction,” Man Alone: Alienation in Modern Society (N.Y.: Dell Publishing Co. Inc., 1966), p. 20.

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rected by computers.”10 In this social process, humans become part of the total machine. They are well-fed and entertained, true; but they lose their feelings and are reduced to passive and unalive caricatures. Though they have harnessed the powers of nature through science, in a mechanized society they are in turn controlled by their own works and organizations. They have become servants of the machine they have invented.11 “Powerless in the face of modern mechanical and social forces,” they have, according to Eric Josephson, “reached a point in history where knowledge and tools intended originally to serve man now threaten to destroy him.”12 As Jürgen Moltmann puts it: “The product of his mind and the works of his hands have gained dominance over and against him. The power of his creation becomes superior to him. He set free technical and political processes which ran out of control by virtue of their inherent laws. The lord of nature becomes the slave of his own works. The creators of technology bow before their creations.”13 And losing mastery over their own system, these human beings that Moltmann describes have no other aims but to produce and consume more. This mechanization of society with the consequent slavery of free and creative humans has been facilitated by a shift in attitude. Many today are more intent to improve and develop our world, and are anxious to ensure a stable life. Technology provides them with the means to achieve this end. Centring their concern on this end, they come to think in terms of economic progress and of material benefits. Harvey Cox describes them as “little interested in anything that seems resistant to the application of human energy and intelligence. [They] judge ideas, as the dictionary suggests in its definition of pragmatism, by the ‘results they will achieve in practice’. The world is viewed not as a unified metaphysical system but as a series of problems and projects.”14 This one-sided emphasis of many on technique and material consumption has affected not only their attitude towards this world, but it has also permeated their relationship with fellow human beings. They view their relationship in the light of their concept of the value of a human being. For them a human being’s whole life is geared 10

Eric Fromm, The Revolution of Hope: Toward a Humanized Technology (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 1. 11 Or as Gabriel Marcel puts it, they have become so functionalized that they do not even realize the brokenness of their world. 12 Eric Josephson, op. cit. p. 9 13 Jürgen Moltmann, “Christian Rehumanization of Technological Society,” The Critic (May-June, 1970), p. 13. 14 Harvey Cox, The Secular City: Secularization and Urbanization in Theological Perspective, rev. ed. (N.Y.: The Macmillan Company, 1968), p. 52.

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to the machine, and one’s value is commensurate with one’s efficiency at it. The more one can profit from it, the more valuable one is. No doubt, this stress on the teamwork of human and machine has been very advantageous for our world. It has effected the progress we witness today. But unfortunately, it does have negative repercussions. It can bring in an immoderate underlining of that teamwork that even humanwith-human will be narrowed down to mere joint effort for profit. Functional relationships will be formed replacing traditional, personal ones. Factually, human-with-human will then become an impersonal alliance. And what is likely to follow? People will be well-supported, as Fromm says; but they will be unalive and unfeeling towards one another. This is why he cautions us against this spectre. We are in danger of becoming— and may already to a great extent have become—a mechanized society which shackles humans by reducing them to mere machines.15 The tremendous advances contributed by technology, transforming it into a highly-developed environment for us can unfortunately create an atmosphere wherein a human being is pitted against the machine and where his or her value is computed by that individual’s efficiency at the machine. We would then have to cope with an existential problem: if a machine can produce more than a skilled worker; if, taking into account that set-up, it is more profitable to treat man or woman as another machine rather than as a person with whom we are to form personal relations, is there sufficient reason still for respecting his or her existence?16 For another machine could easily replace that individual—and more profitably so. There is the real danger of losing humanistic values and overlooking the dignity of the human being. This development in contemporary society represents another major challenge to a faith-based higher education inasmuch as the latter has always championed values that enable human beings to develop as human beings. To what extent can those values be upheld today, and how can they be inculcated and communicated to those who will be joining the workforce once their education has been completed? Should a faith-based higher education critique this development in society?

15 See Chapter Four: “Relationships and Communal Living: A View on Types of Relatedness”. 16 This is also very much an occupational problem and a trade-union issue due to the loss of jobs, passed off as a re-organizing or re-structuring strategy by management.

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A Globalized Society Still another development in contemporary society that has introduced its own set of challenges to higher education, including a faithbased one, is the reality of globalization.17 Globalization means a number of things, and consequently results in different challenges.18 Its reality, whether one is entirely convinced of it or not, requires a change in one’s thinking of society and in one’s responses to the fresh issues.19 After all, the world we live in has outgrown Marshal McLuhan’s description of it as a global village. In this regard, one will note that the phenomenon of globalization is one of the factors behind the Bologna Process.20 This Process illustrates a climate change in how higher education is to be viewed and implemented. It makes considerable reference to our present society and its needs as well as notes the urgency to attend to these on the part of education at all levels so as to be more competitive. Its communiqués and recommendations have made inroads into academic programmes and academic life generally. The Bologna Process certainly recognizes that this development in the worldwide community means fresh challenges to the education being provided to their learners. It provides strategies which need to be implemented by academic institutions to address globalization, among other challenges. As a continuing process, it accepts that the ongoing response also means regular reviews of the Process by participating member countries.

17

For an informative view on how globalization has positively benefited Europe, cf. Daniel S. Hamilton and Joseph P. Quinlan, Globalisation and Europe: Prospering in the New World Order (Centre for Transatlantic Relations, 2008). For more nuanced reflections and comments, cf. Janez Juhant and Bojan Žalec (eds.), Surviving Globalization: the Uneasy Gift of Interdependence, Theologie Ost-West, Europäische Perspectiven 13 (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2008). 18 The transformation of life and of daily activity in the globalized society created by the internet has resulted in a different understanding of what education means. This situation has resulted in a different challenge and created another set of issues for higher education generally. 19 There is another important and urgent challenge that needs to be addressed because of globalization. See Margarite Walker and Sylvia Marcos, Dialogue and Difference: Feminism’s Challenge to Globalization (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); M.E. Hawkesworth, Globalization and Feminist Actions (Rowman & Littlefield, 2006); Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: a Global Challenge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).. 20 See Chapter Eleven: “The Marketplace, Academia, and Education: a Philosophical Critique of the Bologna Process”.

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This ever-widening society is nevertheless brought tighter together due to the tremendous advances in media technology. Our globalized society is no longer just the global village created by developments in communications but is now very much an interconnected society. The digital age has truly transformed it and the way we communicate. Individual citizens—at least, generally—enjoy a non-traditional closeness with one another by means of their smart phones, tablets and other gadgets. The internet and similar developments have played a significant role in bringing this situation about. We are, with justification, “netizens” of the world. Similarly, the nearness of counties has been enhanced by the fast-growing and increasing sophistication of communications as well as by the ease and speed of communicating by institutions and countries with one another. These have indeed made our world seem so much smaller and closer. Such an interconnected society poses great opportunities for enhancing the educational process. Educational institutions can harness these tremendous improvements in social and media technology not just to establish closer connections but more importantly to create greater opportunities for widening and deepening the educational process. They can truly enrich the educational process and task. At the same time, however, insofar as there is a downside to all these developments, they also pose certain problems and difficulties.21 We are constantly reminded in the media, by hearsay and with surveys that these developments have even contributed to the lowering of standards in, for example, literary and numeracy. They have also been blamed for the loss of real communication, i.e. human interaction, among both the young and the older populations. Despite being interconnected, paradoxically, our society remains divided in certain respects. Even with two World Wars, which were expected to put an end to all wars, we are still witnessing continued warfare between nations as well as conflicts and revolutions within countries. Today one reads and hears about the ongoing violent divisions, all the wars and conflicts constantly raging in countries such as Syria, Somalia, South Sudan and many, many more as well as between countries. The media is full of coverage of displaced peoples, refugee camps and the ravages of war and conflict. One does wonder whether peace in and harmony among nations in this world of ours are a distant dream. Nevertheless, certain developments have provided opportunities, too, for our globalized society to become more of an international community. A number of initiatives have been a welcome product of a changed men21 See Chapter Seven: “Images, Reality and Truth: Some Philosophical Considerations”.

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tality regarding world citizenship. For instance, the United Nations Organization came about because the founders wanted to learn from the disastrous effects of warring nations. Moreover, instead of thinking and acting exclusively not merely as independent but also as separate entities, member nations have begun to value the merits of acting as a united front in tackling many of the common problems and issues. The record admittedly—which is fodder for sceptics and critics—is marred. But while the UN and similar ventures have their critics and have received justified criticisms, the interesting point is that there is a growing awareness that our globalized society could, and should, be an international community. Now and then co-operation shines through, and one is given hope. Recently, the overwhelming tsunami in Asian countries and the catastrophic devastation of the Philippines due to the super typhoon Haiyan—and there have been various other examples worldwide—prompted several nations to respond on humanitarian grounds.22 There have also been the peace-making efforts of the UN in deploying international teams and armed forces to facilitate and support initiatives and structures to bring about peace in troubled countries and territories. Again there have been both legitimate but also illconceived criticisms from different quarters, but the relevant point worth noting here is that such responses to the plight of other nations indicate some sense of belongingness to an international community.23 Inasmuch as the educative process is intended to enlighten people, it would do well if it could also participate more intently and intensely in the transformation of the thinking and action of leaders and citizens alike. The challenge for education generally—and to some extent, more so for a faith-based education that teaches and upholds universality—is how to foster and strengthen that awareness and motivation so that our globalized

22

Despite some limitations and faults noted by critics, there are solid reasons for gratitude to the response of the world-wide community to the tsunami and supertyphoon disasters and some grounds for hope for the future. Listening to the comments aired in the media, perhaps one could suggest that such responses to these disasters should be at two stages. The first one, prompted by the disaster itself should be: prompt, co-ordinated, sufficient and caring. The second stage, since it is more lasting, should enable the victims to come to terms with the disaster as well as to stand on their own. It was appropriately described by someone in the disaster area in the Philippines as a “hand-up”, not a “hand-out”. In this sense, international aid is not so much an ad hoc solution to a specific problem but a concretization of the awareness of being members of a truly international community. 23 See Chapter Five: “The Individual and Society: a Philosophical Conception of the Self as Social”.

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society as an international community is not merely a geographical description or a strategic vision but also a living reality.24

A Faith-Based Higher Education The questions now arise: What distinctive contribution does a faithbased higher education make? Will it be in a position to meet the challenges and address the issues which the developments in contemporary society present to it?25 In light of what has been presented in the previous sections in this essay, it seems that faith-based higher education needs to focus on: (1) dealing with the question of comparability since in education, as in any other area, there is a need to establish common grounds—whether in its objectives, governance or programmes—so as to facilitate and promote dialogue and cooperation; (2) meeting the challenge of competitiveness insofar as certain standards in academia need to be met and upheld; (3) providing a critique of values and practices in society which hinder the full development of its citizens; and, more importantly, (4) establishing credibility so that its presence, role and achievements are acknowledged to be truly positive. To some extent, the questions above and the suggested areas to focus on, are really about whether the religious context—faith-based education is a good example—is a welcome addition to our understanding and practice of life in society generally. How do religious beliefs, practice, and values enliven and enrich our appreciation of what it means to be human and how to conduct our lives in society? In reply, some theists have regarded religious belief as adding depth to life. But the word sounds very much like a negative judgment over non-religious forms of life. It would hardly encourage cooperation with those who hold alternative beliefs and maintain different ways of life. It would also be quite difficult to show, given the complexities of validating the belief in a God, that religion really deepens our knowledge of life. A less contentious word probably is vision. This means then that despite admitting that theists have much in common 24

The distinction introduced by the sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies between association (Gesellschaft) and community (Gemeinschaft) can be helpful to our thinking in this respect. Mary Robinson, former President of Ireland and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, used the phrase “rainbow community” to describe the international community hoped for by Nelson Mandela when she was commenting on his passing away, RTE1 radio, Dec., 6, 2013. 25 See Gabriella Puztai (ed.) Religion and Higher Education in Central and Eastern Europe, op. cit.

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with secularists—and this is particularly true in higher education—they can still claim to be influenced by a vision not shared by secularists of what it means to be human. Because the religious context views creation as standing in a relationship with God, its understanding and practice are shaped by that conviction. It is on this very point where the scriptures, be they Christian, Jewish, Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist, or others play a significant role.26 For the scriptures capture and express in written form that religious vision of creation standing in a certain relationship to God. There are insights and themes which bring out this understanding. For example, this vision influences the Biblical writers in their approach to moral problems and sensitizes them to certain values and colours their outlook and attitude to daily life. This is well illustrated in the Pauline writings. Paul talks of the baptized Christian as a new creature whose conduct ought to reflect this new mode of existence. If one checks Paul’s exhortations and instructions, one will discover that they follow from his explanations of what it means to be a pneumatikos. What gave the early community its distinctive character was its faith more than the conduct of its members. The new life is not to be measured primarily by what Christians do, but by what they hope, believe and love.27 The sacraments or the rituals and worship of the different religions highlight this relatedness to God because these do not make full sense apart from this belief. To a great extent, they are a celebration of the awareness of being related to God. This religious vision is also manifested in the attitudes, values and outlook of such believers. In short, the point is that it is a distinctive vision—even if it is not always evident among religious believers themselves. But of course, that vision is at the same time a challenge. If one believes in that vision then one would be expected to live by it. One could call it motivation. In other words, why one ought to do certain things marks a theist off from the non-theist. Again, there is no claim to a higher kind of motivation, simply a claim that it flows from this religious vi-

26

I have included Buddhism even though it is not universally regarded as a religion. In his Lights of the World: Buddha and Christ, Dharma Endowment Lectures No.2 (Bangalore: Dharmaram Publications, 1997), Ninian Smart shows how interreligious dialogue between Mahayana Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam and Christianity is not only possible but also can bring about harmony to human civilization while preserving the distinctiveness of the religious traditions. 27 The discussion here is based mainly on the Christian tradition—the tradition I know best—but I believe similar claims can be made about the other religious traditions.

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sion.28 That motivation is prompted and supported by a set of values which one gets to form because of that religious vision, as was noted above.29 They are to some extent distinct from secular values, not because morality is the exclusive domain of religion but because they are interpreted differently.30 They are distinct rather than separate.31 However, a further clarification is needed here because in wanting to be motivated by the religious vision of creation, theists have been accused many times (at times rightly so) of not taking this world and their responsibility towards it seriously enough. But this can happen only if one regards God as “being out there” uninvolved in daily affairs. But a vision that is prompted by a realization of God’s presence and involvement in our daily affairs cannot but take our humanity and creatureliness seriously.32 In this sense, secularization can be a welcome opportunity to re-think religious belief itself. Secularization is a neutral historical process that was bound to come, a style of life that occasioned the ensuing progress of technology. “Man’s coming of age” (to use a phrase of Dietrich Bonhoeffer) was to be expected. Secularization, however, does not have to end in secularism for it could actually arouse genuine religious faith and a relationship to God from this new perspective. Grasping one’s responsibility towards this world and this time, one could respond to the demands of the new understanding by re-thinking certain religious beliefs.33 28

This statement assumes, of course, the existence of a personal God, an issue which needs addressing in another context. My point here is that one’s relationship with a personal God—and I would use the analogy of a loving relationship with someone—has a way of motivating us to act in such a way that it deepens that relationship. It may even lead us to do certain acts which we would not do otherwise. 29 In focusing on “vision” and on “motivation” as distinguishing the religious ethos, we will find the symbols of light and salt mentioned in the Bible and used in various religious traditions particularly apt: like light, religion provides a different “view” of reality and like salt, it givas a specific “taste”, i.e. experience, of the same reality. I am grateful to John Cummins for drawing this to my attention.. 30 Cf. Chapter Five, “Ethics and Religion: a Philosophical Contribution to the Debate,” in my Ethical Contexts and Theoretical Issues: Essays in Ethical Thinking (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), pp. 63-70. 31 See Chapter Three: “Distinct, not Separate: a Critique of Dualistic Thinking of and in Society”. 32 This claim is developed further in the context of the challenge of suffering and evil in Marian Sia and Santiago Sia, From Suffering to God: Exploring our Images of God in the Light of Suffering (St. Martin’s/Macmillan, 1994). 33 Regrettably, one cannot ignore the fact that some interpretations of the religious vision and challenge has led to innumerable evil acts well known in history as well

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Turning now specifically to faith-based higher education, I should like to suggest that this religious context which provides a distinctive vision and conduct is its ethos.34 The religious ethos of a faith-based higher education is its greatest asset. To some extent it also defines its status and its role. Thus, faith-based educational institutions need to set out a certain educational programme that is meant to abide by, develop and advance that ethos taking into account the four focus areas cited earlier. Given the developments in contemporary society discussed in this essay, the task of providing a distinctive education to learners and of serving the larger community should be characterized by respect for and care of humanity and the whole of creation—given its view that these stand in a personal relationship with the Creator. Moreover, it should champion human concerns and values and oppose any dehumanization caused by machines and technology precisely because it gratefully acknowledges and participates in the work of the Creator that it believes in. In this area, the challenge is to co-operate with all those, irrespective of belief-system, who are working towards achieving this goal.35 Alongside other alternative educational institutions, they should implement a value system that identifies and supports whatever is good in society and creation. Furthermore, faith-based education should facilitate, support and advance the formation of an international global community because it believes that all nations should stand in unison in promoting peaceful and harmonious co-existence since its relation to the Creator makes a community, and not just a society, of all of us.36 Implementing its ethos by articulating, communicating and living in accordance with it is the foremost challenge and issue for faith-based higher education.37 If it is successful, however, it will have made an imas in contemporary times. It has been correctly pointed out that such interpretations need to be critiqued, resisted and abandoned. For this reason, there is a constant need to question what is passed off as religious vision or way of life. 34 For an explanation of its meaning as used here, see Chapter Eleven: “The Marketplace, Academia and Education: a Philosophical Critique of the Bologna Process”. 35 Here is also where faith-based higher education can ensure that human concerns are not regarded as exclusive to humanists, atheists and secularists. It ought to convince others that its affirmation of transcendence is not a threat to, but a fuller development of, human nature. 36 See also, Chapter Four: “Relationships and Communal Living a View on Types of Relationships.” 37 Faith-based higher education has a particular challenge here with the emergence of digital learning world-wide. Given its ethos and the traditional campus environment which helps to promote it, how can it support and utilize such learning?

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portant contribution to, and will have justified its presence in, the secularized, mechanized, technological and globalized society that we live in today.

How can its powers help to form an international community? How would one communicate and develop values which are established through more personal contacts? On this point, it would be instructive to learn from the experience of those who have implemented digital learning in their educational task. Cf. Tamar Levin, “Setbacks force new look at mass web courses,” International New York Times, Tuesday, December 12, 2013. The appeal of computer –based learning, such as gamification, has implications for education, too. How can it be harnessed to further the goals of faith-based education as well as education generally? See “Gamification is how we’ll live—and work—in the future,” The Measure of Man GMA News-on-line, January 27, 2014.

CONCLUDING REMARKS IN RETROSPECT

The Challenges of Society and Philosophy Addressing the challenges of living in society, which this work purports to do, is itself a challenge! Given the enormity and complexity of the task, it would seem to be preposterous and foolhardy even to attempt it. The problem is compounded since there are variations in the kind of challenge that an individual or a sector in society would find more pressing or more urgent. Thus, any attempt at selecting these or at highlighting specific issues would invite some criticism of bias. Moreover, while some of us are privileged to benefit from the positive side of living in society, there are many, many more who unfortunately are faced with the drudgery, the harshness and the complications of their daily lives in society. That fact alone makes the task even more daunting. One would therefore hardly turn to an academic subject like philosophy to be able to deal with those challenges, never mind find solutions. Not only is philosophical thinking perceived to be concerned with rather abstract matters, it is not regarded as practical enough to deal with many of the concrete challenges that confront all of us in our societal lives. A philosophical consideration of the challenges of societal living would seem therefore to be of limited or even of no value. Because this manner of dealing with these challenges is arduous and lengthy and because one does not always have the leisure or the pleasure to engage in it, philosophical thinking—particularly if carried out at some distance from the concreteness of these challenges—would not seem to be the most helpful contribution. The remoteness of philosophy, far from being a valuable resource, may in fact be rather burdensome and cumbersome. So, in retrospect, what can one say further about sharing one’s philosophical considerations of living in society? It will be recalled that at the outset of this work the claim was made that there is an important need to challenge assumptions, expose faulty reasoning, and appraise viewpoints. It was alleged further that the price that one has to pay if this need is not met—particularly if these challenges arise from our lives in society—or if

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they remain unheeded is that citizens individually and society as a whole are misdirected in their pursuit of the truth. Or their endeavours to attain a more wholesome existence can be thwarted. It was also argued that even when the task does not always result in ready answers or clear-cut solutions, it is nevertheless necessary. The hope here is that this philosophical step may lead us in the right direction. This does not mean, however, that much thinking does not occur in daily life nor that those who have charge of dealing with these challenges can be readily accused of superficial thinking. There is much evidence, both anecdotal and formal, to confirm that serious thinking takes place in all aspects of life. Furthermore, it was acknowledged right from the beginning that every human being, in varying degrees of sophistication, is already engaged in some form of philosophizing.1 Our rational nature enables and facilitates that task. Nor should one conclude that only in the reexamination of our initial assumptions, reasoning and viewpoints as is done in philosophy can we achieve the goal of the betterment of society. That would be a short-sighted observation given that much questioning, close scrutiny of alternatives, and attention to details do characterize the work of many who are involved in improving life in society. Moreover, it hardly needs to be stated that the complexity of the situation demands a multi-dimensional approach, and other skills and competencies are much better equipped to deal with it. Nonetheless, careful, critical and sustained thinking—which philosophy engages in as a main preoccupation— does have an important role since it can alert us to wrong avenues, open up other routes or even redirect us to another destination. In doing so, we may be placed hopefully in a better position to address the challenges. Even when philosophical thinking can be more of a nuisance, as Plato’s activity was judged to be by many of his peers, or brings about what psychologists call “cognitive strain”2, it can still serve a useful purpose in forcing us to re-think entrenched points of view. Such thinking, despite its toll, can bring about effective changes to our ways of dealing with society’s challenges. Whether that claim is borne out remains to be seen of course. Its correctness and effectiveness are open to judgment. And in the end it can and ought to be assessed for the results it shows—and here both history and contemporary times can be the witnesses. 1

See Chapter One: “Philosophizing, Philosophy and the Societal Context: A Reflection on Human Living”. 2 In contrast, some of our responses to the challenges in our daily lives in society can be more easily resorted to because of what psychologists call their “cognitive ease”.

In Retrospect

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Philosophical Vision and Methodology Since this work is a volume of essays rather than a monograph, it risks being fragmented discussions rather than an integral development of a single topic. A stand-alone discussion contained in an essay could be guilty of isolationism. There is after all the danger that as one concentrates on a particular topic and pursues a specific line of thought, as is done in an essay, one leaves oneself vulnerable to inconsistencies with the thoughtpatterns in the other essays. Discussing society’s challenges in diversified essays could also be open to the charge of subjectivism insofar as one would inevitably favour evidence and arguments that support one’s argumentation pursued in the piece of work. Such a situation is comparable with the approach adopted by situation ethics, incurring the negative attitude towards it inasmuch as it grounds its ethical judgment purely on the particular situation. Today, a similar critical observation is made of the postmodern perspective which avoids any reference to and acceptance of an over-arching way of thinking. An ad hoc explanation of, and response to, what confronts something in its individuality without recourse to a general background or a scheme of things is regarded by its critics as too limited and limiting. On the other hand, by addressing the challenges of living in society in the form of individual essays, one can at least make the effort of respecting the diversity and the particularity—which is indeed the case—of these challenges. It also helps to avoid the temptation that philosophical thinking is often justifiably accused of committing; namely, of imposing a general theory on a particular problem or of merely applying a set of disembodied principles to contextual issues. Such a generalization is accused of ignoring the role of circumstances and other relevant details. Advocates of the natural-law theory, for example, are often criticized for adopting this approach to ethical problems. The criticism is not always wellfounded, however, since certain interpretations of the natural-law theory are much more nuanced than its critics allow for.3 But it is important that as one tackles society’s challenges they are not simply lumped together, and it is essential that we address these in their specificity. This, I believe, is the advantage of a collection of essays offering some considerations of the challenges of living in society. In the Introduction the reader’s attention was drawn to the use of a number of cross-references in the book. It was intended to show that, de3

See Chapter Ten: “Natural Law and Change: Another Look at Aquinas’s Moral Norm,” in my Ethical Contexts and Theoretical Issues: Essays in Ethical Thinking (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), pp. 123-129.

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spite the differences in style and content of the various essays, there was a certain vision that informed them all. That vision was cited and described in some detail in some of the essays, particularly those which referred to the philosophy of Charles Hartshorne.4 It would be appropriate here to add, without repeating what has already been discussed in the essays, that the metaphysics developed by him and which he himself referred to as a philosophy of creative synthesis is a holistic understanding and explanation of reality. Thus, it does not split reality as is done in dualism, which as was noted in one of the essays, results in many of society’s problems, such as segregation, discrimination, separatism and others.5 It therefore understands the status and role of the individual person always as related to others.6 Even if in real life there are inevitable divergences and differences between citizens and society, in this way of understanding reality there is no divisive conflict, but a real tension, between individuals and society.7 Contrary to the ordinary way of speaking, this philosophical thinking regards the individual as unique, not because he or she can be separated from others but because each is distinctive. In other words, it is a conceptual rather than an ontological differentiation. It is a vision of reality, despite its abstractness, that does have implications for the way we approach the challenges of society as was hopefully illustrated and clarified in the various essays. Given that this work is divided into two parts, it may be pointed out that, notwithstanding the over-all vision to which the essays subscribe and the philosophical methodology that this book followed, there is nonetheless a compartmentalization of the two sets of essays. It may therefore give the impression that these are separate sections. But as was mentioned in the Introduction, this was a matter of convenience since the two parts treat both theoretical and contextual philosophical considerations. The essays in Part I were grouped together because they contain more discussions of theoretical issues while those in Part II were more focused on specific issues under consideration. Again it is a matter of distinctiveness and emphasis rather than of separation. Every theoretical consideration of socie4

In particular, Chapter Eight: “Freedom, its Power and Limits: Some Implications for Life in Society”. 5 Chapter Three: “Distinct, not Separate: a Critique of Dualistic Thinking in and of Society”. 6 Chapter Four: “Relationships and Communal Living: a View on Types of Relationships” and Chapter Five: “The Individual and Society: a Philosophical Conception of the Self”. 7 Chapter Two: “Public and Individual Interests, the Common Good: an Analysis and a Proposal”.

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ty’s challenges ought to be contextualized, and every contextual discussion of any challenge should include an investigation into the theoretical underpinnings. A more telling observation of this volume of essays, however, would be the arrangement itself of the two parts. Given the emphasis here on approaching the challenges in society in the light of the vision of Charles Hartshorne and A.N. Whitehead which starts—like the flight of the airplane—from the concrete situation and then rises to abstract thinking before returning to concreteness again,8 one would expect that the essays in Part II should have preceded those essays in the other Part which are of a more theoretical and general nature. The explanation and justification for this arrangement goes beyond the present volume. This work is the third volume in a trilogy, published by Cambridge Scholars Publishing, which includes Ethical Contexts and Theoretical Issues: Essays in Ethical Thinking and From Question to Quest: Literary-Philosophical Enquiries into the Challenges of Life. In the former book, the arrangement of the essays aligns itself with the philosophical vision described above. The first group of essays in that book concentrates on an examination of diverse contexts which raise ethical questions. The second part is composed of essays which then pursue those questions with reference to certain philosophical theories. The second work, also a volume of essays, starts on the ground, as it were, since in all of them, the specific question which leads to a quest for answers arises from a particular concern in and about life. The pursuit of those questions leads to a discussion of more abstract issues. I have been greatly indebted from the beginning of my academic career to Charles Hartshorne. His fundamental metaphysical concept of creative synthesis has become a foundation for my own thinking. Following him, I have endeavoured in the present work—as was stated in the Preface—to build on what I had laid out in the past, entered into dialogue with the present concerns in the meantime, and forged my way ahead into the future in the hope of sharing new findings. In line with this methodology, I have integrated into this volume and developed in a new context some material from the first two volumes. In my view, ideas—like every other past event—are rooted in the old but continue to grow and develop in the present. Philosophical thinking, in content and method, is—to return to Charles Hartshorne’s description—a

8

Gabriel Marcel expresses this point in a similar tone: “working…up from life to thought and then down again from thought to life again, so that [one] may try to throw more light upon life.” See his Mystery of Being. Vol. I Reflection and Mystery, trans. G.S. Fraser (London: Harvill Press, 1951), p. 41

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“creative synthesis”.9 Together with the preceding two volumes the present one thus attempts to continue the theoretical discussions—the essays in Part I— before landing back, as it were, on concrete contexts—the essays in Part II grouped together as “Contextual Considerations”. Whitehead stressed the need to return to the original concreteness of the situation. To advance in one’s philosophical thinking, according to this philosophical vision, one needs to look back as it were! The arrangement of the essays in this present volume attempts to do just that.

From Vision to Mission There is another consideration that should be brought up here, as we look back, given that this volume of essays is about addressing the challenges of society and that it is informed mainly by and grounded in the philosophical vision of Charles Hartshorne and A.N. Whitehead.10 It is the importance of framing a philosophical vision itself in the light of which one confronts the challenges of living in society. The essays in this work attempted to illustrate this by sharing the philosophical vision of Hartshorne and Whitehead (with some influence on my own thinking from other philosophers like Martin Buber, Confucius, Mencius and others). It argued for and defended its suitability in the task of addressing the challenges of society today. But what is of even greater significance—and the specific aim of this work—is the suggestion of the need and importance of having a vision itself by which one lives one’s life in society. A number of the essays here emphasized this point.11 They indicated how an adequate vision has far-reaching implications not just for our understanding of those challenges but also for our conduct within society. The title of one of Buber’s books is especially relevant here: Pointing the Way. Buber maintained that he did not have a teaching but a vision and that all he did was to open the window, share his vision, and point the way. This observation 9

I differ therefore from those who believe that the published content of one’s thinking should remain that way rather than be part of new material in another publication. In contrast, I maintain that such ideas should remain vibrant and continue to contribute to fresh discussions and debates. In this work I have also availed of copious footnotes as a way of drawing attention to, and commenting on, some of these discussions and debates. 10 Cf. my Religion, Reason and God: Essays in the Philosophies of Charles Hartshorne and A.N. Whitehead (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2004). 11 Chapter Eleven: “The Marketplace, Academia and Education: A Philosophical Assessment of the Bologna Process” and Chapter Twelve: “Developments in Contemporary Society and Faith-based Higher Education: Challenges and Issues”.

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on his part seems to be applicable for our life in society. In our thinking and in conduct we need to be enlightened by a vision so that we will be in a much better position to lead more responsible and fulfilled lives as members of society. The essays in this volume have proposed and have attempted to show that such a vision could be widened and sharpened through engagement with philosophical thinking. After all, the vision may need some focusing and polishing; and the way ahead may also be, because it frequently is, in need of clearing up. It will be recalled that the claim was made at the beginning of this work that philosophy is suited for this endeavour. In this way, it can and does enlighten one’s path in society.12 But a vision, no matter how wide and sharp it may be, would need to be implemented for it to result in a better society. Addressing society’s challenges should make a difference not just in how one thinks about them but more crucially in how one lives in society. The important question then is how. How does philosophical thinking enable and facilitate this important task? How can it “point the way”, to use Buber’s phrase, and provide some motivation? A welcome development in institutional and organizational practice is for respective institutions and organizations to craft and issue a so-called “Mission Statement”. It presents not only the aims and objectives but also sets out the policies and strategies to be pursued. It is thus not merely about their vision but also its implementation. Rather than being merely aspirational, their mission statement is intended to lay out the ground for action. Granting then that such a practice is meant to advance their vision, could one take a cue from it? If so, to what extent and in what sense can a philosophical vision be turned into a workable mission? Some of the essays in this volume dealt with this question in diverse ways.13 But it will be helpful as we look back to consider the question further. It is essential, however, to note that, although the hope is that philosophical thinking will help transform society, the aim here was not to raise as an expectation the creation of a utopian society, even if that would be an interesting exercise for some.14 After all, to a great extent such a society

12

Cf. Chapter One: “Philosophizing, Philosophy, and the Societal Context: a Reflection on Human Living”. 13 Chapter Six: “Ethical Thinking and Formation: a Challenge for Life in Society”; Chapter Nine: “Social Roles, Public Office and Moral Society: Lessons from the Past for the Present?” 14 In his A Philosophy of the Future, trans. John Cumming, (N.Y.: Herder & Herder, 1970), Ernst Bloch defends such a society

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would itself not be without its own problems.15 It would also be unreal and even be, by definition, beyond attainment. The world we inhabit and the society we live in—with the problems and challenges they pose—remind us, sometimes painfully, that we have to cope with reality and face those inevitable challenges. At the same time, we need to move on, and even ahead, as it were. Thus, to some extent in grappling with relevant issues, instead of describing a utopia, these essays outlined a way out of certain confusions, weighed contrary views, and suggested alternatives. One should add that it is not necessary to have agreement on the analysis, the presentation and the proposals. After all, disagreement, criticism and rebuttal could be provocative and even stimulating. If they are intended to lead to some development and even improvement in our thinking—and ultimately, in our action—there can be real progress in the attempt to address those challenges. When that happens, philosophical thinking will have helped us to move forward. The transformation of society is an ongoing process, and the need to keep on addressing its challenges continues. In what way then can Whitehead’s and Hartshorne’s philosophical insights—from which these essays draw their inspiration and much of their content--aid in progressing society? Does their vision also facilitate the drawing up of a mission, as it were? I believe so. It will be recalled that both of them hold that the ultimate category for understanding the whole of reality, including human nature is creativity (or creative synthesis). As a metaphysical construct, it is unreservedly abstract. It may therefore be for many rather uninspiring. But as a concrete description, it has tremendous capacity not just for interpreting universal reality and its workings, but also for “pointing the way—forward”. It had been suggested earlier that although our human creativity may and does result in clashes, it can also be the source of a solution.16 It is integral to our nature not just to inherit the past and incorporate it into our present actuality or situation but also to be able to move forward; in short, the synthesis is also creative. Hartshorne uses the category of creative synthesis to explain the occurrence of evil in the world as the consequence of a clash of creativities. But at the same time he argues that the elimination of the cause of evil is also the removal of the possibility of good. Thus, creativity (or creative synthesis) is what also accounts for all the good in 15

See Nicholas Berdyaev, “The Lure and Slavery of Collectivism. Enticement of Utopia. The Twofold Image of Socialism,” in his Slavery and Freedom, trans. R.M. French (London: G. Bles, 1943), pp. 220-222. 16 Chapter Eight: “Human Freedom, its Power and Limits: Some Implications for Living in Society” and Appendix B: “Meaning and Significance: a Fundamental Challenge to Living in Society”.

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the world even if it must be recognized, following Hartshorne, that it is what explains the existence of evil. It is this claim that now needs to be taken up again in answer to the question of a mission with respect to the challenges of society.

Society’s Creative Advance Creativity exists; but it needs to be nurtured, developed and guided. Because every creative act is also a synthesis, it means that it emerges from what previous creativities have inputted into it. That is true for all of reality, but especially with all human beings. What this entails is that there is an active as well as a passive dimension to it. What we inherit is determined not just by what we do but also, and more significantly for society, by how we individually and as a whole use our creativity. It is important to acknowledge this as we address the challenges of society. In one of the essays, there was a reference to a moral society where members can thrive.17 The discussion centred on the role of public officials to foster this kind of environment. This is because the kind of society that we live in does matter as it is the context in which we live and thrive.18 But it must also be said that any society is the result of what its members do. Creative synthesis means that every action of each and every one of us contributes to the build-up and make-up of society, locally as well as globally. We always leave behind traces, tangible or otherwise, of our efforts and deeds. And they determine the kind of society that we live in and leave behind. More importantly, they qualify society’s advance. This philosophical understanding and interpretation of the whole of reality and its activity are therefore a strong reminder of our responsibility to ourselves, to one another and to the whole universe.19 We are agents not just in the sense of being able to do something but more importantly in the sense that whatever we do affects everyone, including ourselves, and eve17

Chapter Six: “Ethical Thinking and Formation: a Challenge for Life in Society”. Chapter One: “Philosophizing, Philosophy and the Societal Context: a Reflection on Human Living”. 19 Those who have followed the “is-ought” philosophical debate will recall that a popular view has been that one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is”; that is to say, from an examination of reality one cannot validly and justifiably conclude a consequent duty. This argument was used to critique the natural-law theory, for example. The argumentation here is that the awareness of responsibility (not a specific action) becomes explicit when one examines what is actually imbedded in the very nature of creativity (or creative synthesis). The specific activity or course of action can be fully determined only in the concrete situation. 18

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rything else. The same philosophical category of creativity (creative synthesis) also underlines the importance of enabling, protecting and supporting every effort by everyone to make that contribution as positive as possible. It is within our ability, because of our creativity, to support one another and to ensure that society is not thwarted from, but instead encouraged towards, a positive goal. In short, society does advance creatively, but its forward movement—and its quality—is dependent on what each of us contributes to it. For that to happen, the right kind of nurturing is essential. This is one important reason why proper education is correctly regarded an individual and a social right, not just a privilege.20 It is the process that facilitates human flourishing which in turn brings about a more wholesome, and hopefully more stable, society. Proper education—which should not necessarily be equated with schooling since it takes place not just in schools— opens up our minds while creating more opportunities for us to avail of. While it may not necessarily lead to a job or the kind of job we have prepared for—a regrettable comment on the economic crisis being experienced globally and on the uneven distribution of the world’s wealth that robs many of opportunities—education can still equip us with the resources to cope with, to confront, and even to change the situation. Plato’s allegory of the cave to describe education remains relevant to contemporary times. It is the process of moving from the darkness of ignorance, bigotry, selfishness into the light of truth, well-being and fulfilment. Confucius’s insistence that the reform of society starts with the citizens and Mencius’s insistence on their moral formation are valuable lessons in themselves on how society can truly advance. To some extent we are more fortunate than our forbears in that human creativity has led to the creation and development of many welcome resources and placed them at our disposal.21 It is a matter of utilizing these to develop our minds which should in turn lead to the healthy transformation of society.22 It is important to point out, however, that the philosophical category creativity as a description of the workings of reality does not guarantee 20

Chapter Eleven: “The Marketplace, Academia and Education: a Critique of the Bologna Process”. 21 See Chapter Seven: “Images, Truth and Reality: Some Philosophical Considerations”. 22 In this connection, a particular challenge today is how to utilize the advantages of digital learning to widen the scope and influence of education. Cf. Chapter Twelve: “Contemporary Society and Faith-based Higher Education: Challenges and Issues”.

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that at every stage, because of the action of its members, society’s transformation will always turn out to be a positive one. Society’s creative advance is not always or necessarily towards what is truly desirable and wholesome. As was noted in the discussions in the essays, there is a certain amount of unpredictability in the whole of reality. We witness this especially with the human form of creativity. The coming together of various creativities, some of which are beyond anyone’s control, can lead to progress but also to deterioration. In so many ways society has been transformed for the better but sadly, history and contemporary times can testify to the opposite as well. Many of the tragedies in human living can be attributed to the misuse, abuse or just unfortunate use of freedom (human creativity). Creativity does not and cannot, therefore, lead to a utopian society. In that sense it does not provide reason for us to be definitely optimistic about society’s advance. On the other hand, it does—and does so more realistically—give us the ground for hope and therefore the incentive for action.23 Optimism is an outlook or a view, which should of course be cultivated in that it can help us regard reality and its challenges positively. It can energize and even strengthen us, particularly in troubled times. Psychologists and our own ordinary experience attest to its efficacy in combating many problems in life, great or small. But optimism can be personal and even subjective. It may also be short-term. Unfortunately, at least from someone else’s point of view, it may even be ill-informed, unrealistic or groundless. In contrast, in order to have hope one must have a basis in something real, lasting and universal.24 Otherwise, it is merely an illusion. But it is also an openness to what is yet to come with the realization that what has passed is not all that can happen. 25 Creativity (or creative synthesis) shows that. In hope while we look towards the promises of the future, we do have not only to stand on the legacies of the past but also to avail of the opportunities of the present. In this way the realism of hope truly facilitates the pursuit of good

23

In his well-illustrated and enlightening lecture “Don’t Panic: The Truth about Population”, Prof Han Rosling presents information on the impact of the world’s population growth on the world situation and on the challenges ahead. He concludes that while he is not optimistic, he is nevertheless positive about the future of our world. BBCThisWorld, aired on BBC2, 7 Nov. 2013. 24 See Appendix B: “Meaning and Significance: a Fundamental Challenge to Human Living”. 25 See also Gabriel Marcel, Homo Viator: Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope, trans. Emma Crawford (N.Y.: Harper Torchbooks, 1962), who maintains that hope, unlike optimism, is the realization that something is beyond us.

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and the overcoming of evil and harm. Hope is thus a stronger ally in facing up to the challenges of society.26 The hope for society’s advance in the philosophical vision of Whitehead and Hartshorne is rooted in the very nature of creativity (or creative synthesis), especially in its human form. The aspect of synthesis shows us that we form society by our membership and participation in it. But the aspect of creativeness challenges us since it is within our power to contribute to it and thus reform society. In this way creative synthesis points the way for us to really transform society. In other words, it is a vision of society that forges and substantiates a mission for all of us. It presents us with a challenge—and the capability—to meet the challenges of living in society.

26

In his tribute to Nelson Mandela on news of the latter’s death, President Barrack Obama said that Mandela showed how we can move forward when driven by hopes rather than by fears. He developed that point further in his speech at the Memorial Service in Johannesburg, South Africa, adding that “nothing that he achieved was inevitable”.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A IS LIFE A SENTENCE?: THE QUEST FOR MEANING BY MARIAN F. SIA AND SANTIAGO SIA

Sentence or Sentences At a recent interview the question was posed to one of us about the most important fact that he had learned about life. His immediate reply was that, “Life is a series of sentences. We need to find the time to punctuate it properly to be able to read its message. Otherwise, life becomes a sentence.” He added that this comment would probably not be regarded as a fact, but that there are innumerable cases that would justify the claim. It may strike one that such a comment is merely a play on words; and philosophy, which informs it, is certainly not immune to this criticism. Moreover, to many people it certainly would not sound convincing. For various reasons, they find life meaningless; and the attempt to argue otherwise is futile. Such reactions would certainly be understandable. Yet it seems to us that the comment is in fact deeply rooted in our nature as human beings. This is because, in one form or another, our human situation unsettles us. This in turn leads to desire, and even a quest, for meaningfulness. If this observation is indeed correct, then that desire is translated in this context into the question as to whether life has meaning or is after all a sentence passed on us. The reply at the interview also asserts that life’s message could be compared to a series of sentences.1 For it to be properly read—drawing on what one learns from grammar—it needs the correct punctuation marks. We need, as it were, to punctuate it properly for its meaning to become clearer to us.

1 We are using “sentences” in the loose sense, and are therefore including questions, exclamations, imperatives and so on.

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This is an assertion that needs unpacking, of course. We propose to do that here. There is a further assumption in this claim; namely, that life does contain a message, a given one, and that the onus is on human beings to make the effort and to take the time to discover the punctuating moments that will facilitate us in our quest for meaningfulness. It is an assumption that would also need to be addressed.

The Quest for Meaning This quest for meaning in life—which we believe is rooted in our human make-up—takes us in different directions. For some, religion provides the right setting; and the answers that the different religious traditions uphold enable them to appreciate their present situation and the goal ahead of them. St. Augustine articulates this quite well—albeit in a slightly different context—in his famous statement that our hearts are restless until they rest in God. For an increasing number of people, however, a more acceptable road is that mapped out by psychology, the human sciences or even science itself. One can see this trend in the popularity of these disciplines, often as an alternative or even as an antithesis to religion. Others find greater satisfaction, and hence some meaning, in the more immediate and tangible results of their desire for a better kind of life as they pursue wealth,2 health and fame3. There is nothing new here, but somehow as countries become more developed or sophisticated, an increasing number of people seem to turn in this direction. Despite these seemingly unconnected routes being taken, however, there is at least a certain common starting ground; namely, that all of us are questing for an answer. In fact, even the rather negative position adopted by those who reject any meaningfulness to life or the attempt to discover it can be said to be itself some kind of answer—and that in turn implies a certain direction taken in life. Somehow the quest for meaning is much more universal than some may care to admit. It arises simply because of who we are as human beings, irrespective of any traits, qualities or development that distinguish any of us.4

2

The present global economic situation has left many in the developed countries disenchanted with such a direction. Cf. Chapter Ten: “Economic Crisis and Accountability: a Re-examination of Certain Views and Practices”. 3 The lives of the famous are quite instructive in this respect. 4 Gabriel Marcel speaks of the human ontological exigence: the need and demand for coherence in one’s life and place in the cosmos.

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The Philosophical Route Since the claim being made here is that all of us, no matter what station in life we occupy, are in varying degrees engaged in this quest, what then has philosophy to contribute to our understanding of this human situation and of this human pursuit? What kind of route does it open up for us? Is the philosophical route not rather the privilege of a few? So why take a philosophical route on this quest? Centuries ago the Greek philosopher Aristotle had commented on a similar situation. In his Nicomachean Ethics, he raises the question as to what it is that every human being is aiming for (“the object of life”, as he calls it). He defines it as “good”, not in the ethical sense but more in a biological or psychological sense since he bases himself on his observations of the general behaviour of reality. Referring more specifically to the human situation, Aristotle observes that all human beings aim towards a common good (or goal), leading him to maintain that there is agreement on the universality of the human search for happiness, eudaimonia . He notes, on the other hand, that people differ on what they consider to be the form of happiness they want. He lists wealth, fame, pleasure, and virtue as goals that some people set for themselves. Critiquing these as being inadequate—for Aristotle, these are goods rather than the good—he argues that each of these is really a means rather than the ultimate goal or end that human beings desire for its own sake. His own standpoint leads him to consider eudaimonia to be the full development of human rationality: contemplation, not in the religious sense, but thinking for the sake of thinking since he considers this to be the highest and fullest activity that humans are capable of. Aristotle’s own answer to the question which he poses would hardly meet with much approval—in fact, some would view it rather cynically. He has nevertheless shown—and the reason for our reference to him on this point—that the quest itself is more solidly grounded because it is universal. And as he puts it, this is because of the kind of beings that we are. The search for happiness is rooted in our very humanity. It is useful to be reminded of that point as we turn our attention to the quest for meaning in life. There is of course a link between the quest for meaning in life and the desire for ultimate happiness. Not only do both arise from our human nature, but it can also be demonstrated that achievement, or even the recognition, of the meaningfulness of life can be so uplifting that it results in more than transitory satisfaction. It could also be argued that attainment of happiness is only possible when one not only derives complete satisfac-

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tion but also grasps its full sense. It should be added, too, that meaningfulness therefore should not be given a restricted intellectual interpretation. While the distinction between eudaimonia and meaningfulness is probably less crucial, it would be helpful nonetheless to point out that meaningfulness involves not just seeing the sense in life but of life itself. It specifically focuses on more than a mere appreciation of what life has to offer but more significantly a full realization that it matters. Philosophy—the route being pursued here—has long been associated with the pursuit of wisdom and with the search for truth. Since it implies a protracted and systematic activity, there seems to be a perception that only a few can really be engaged in it. Some philosophers themselves, including Plato and Aristotle, have perpetuated that misperception. Plato insists that only a handful of souls manage to emerge from the cave of darkness into the light, a rich image of the philosophical pursuit. Aristotle, for his part, maintains that philosophizing connotes leisure, and hence is only possible for those who can afford it. Given this situation, turning to philosophy can hardly be helpful in our quest for meaning, which it has been claimed here is widespread. And yet, while conceding that philosophy as understood by these two philosophers and others is a specific concern of a few, a role undertaken by a handful and a task fulfilled only by those naturally gifted or properly trained, the pursuit of wisdom and the search for truth are far from being restricted to these individuals or to this grouping. These are human activities, whether we refer to them as philosophy or by another name is not as important. The knowledge and skills imparted by philosophical training can facilitate that pursuit but it does not initiate it. Nor can wisdom or the truth be attained only in philosophy as understood in this specific way. The love of wisdom—the etymology of philosophy—is actually rooted in our common humanity. In one way or the other, all human beings are engaged in philosophical thinking, albeit at different levels.5 In fact, many of the issues discussed and developed further in academic philosophy stem from everyday concerns; and many of the philosophical findings, even when at times they seem rather far-fetched, can enhance everyday life.6 The urge to pursue fundamental questions about life and reality is neither the prerogative nor the privilege of those who have dedicated themselves professionally to this task. Nor is philosophy limited to the academic investigations of those who do wish to delve deeper into funda5

See Chapter One: “Philosophizing, Philosophy and the Societal Context: A Reflection on Human Living”. 6 This search for wisdom is the theme of our novel, The Fountain Arethuse (U.K.: The Book Guild, 1997).

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mental questions and the answers given by past and present practitioners of this discipline. Strictly philosophical debates such as occur in scholarly conferences or recounted in scholarly publications have their place and significance, but they should not restrict our understanding of the nature and use of philosophical thinking. To clarify this point, perhaps one should make the distinction between the study of philosophy and the act of philosophizing.7 In some form or the other, it is actually the act of philosophizing, that every human being engages in, rather than in philosophy itself. But it is that same act that leads to and is the basis of the study of philosophy. The more formal and structured form of this act—which is what concerns students and teachers of philosophy—is what is sometimes regarded as “philosophy”. Needless to say, this is an essential development. After all, the pursuit of the questions asked and the scrutiny of the answers given need to be carried out at a particular level that very few would have the luxury or the leisure to do so. Moreover, we can benefit from reading the works of those who have carried out the act of philosophizing in great depth and to a large extent. Nonetheless, this more academic and formal pursuit should not ignore the basis of philosophical thinking itself. Accordingly, in our quest for the meaningfulness of life, philosophy can be helpful, precisely because the desire for meaning needs to be pursued much more intensely and thoroughly if we are not to be satisfied with merely superficial answers. Admittedly, philosophers understand and practice philosophy differently—and this can result in much confusion—but philosophy, with its insistence on raising fundamental questions, analyzing the issues and pursuing any answer to its logical conclusion, can prod us on towards a viewpoint that can stand the test of careful and rigorous scrutiny by human reason. While it cannot and should not guarantee indisputable conclusions, philosophy nevertheless can abet the task of arriving at a more consistent, coherent and adequate answer. After all, asking whether life is meaningful or not is more than just asking what one would like to do for the day. To give an answer to that fundamental question is definitely unlike merely enumerating the options that one can choose for the day’s activity. Pursuing the meaning of life implies a thoroughness that befits our very humanity itself and challenges it. And for this task philosophy is particularly well-suited.

7

See Chapter One; “Philosophizing, Philosophy and the Societal Context: a Reflection on Human Living”.

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Philosophy and Language Just as philosophy has been associated with wisdom and truth, so has it also, particularly in contemporary times, been linked with language. In fact, at times philosophy is interpreted as the analysis of language. One hears of philosophy’s function to be the clarification of issues that have become clouded in the hope of dissolving, as it were, the problems that baffle philosophical minds. However, while this can be of invaluable assistance in arriving at truth or achieving wisdom, philosophy can and should go beyond—pace some philosophers—merely analyzing language. Here we will try to do both. In the present context, the connection between philosophy and language is particularly appropriate since the initial comment in this reflective essay focused on life as a series of sentences and the correct punctuation to enable one to read its meaning. The grammar of language—more particularly, punctuation marks—will therefore serve as a valuable metaphor for this exercise. Taking up once again what was asserted at the start, the claim that is being made here is that we need to insert “the proper punctuating marks”. That is to say, it is essential that we engage in certain kinds of human acts in life so as to allow life’s meaning to come across to us, like readers, as participants of life. Again, we need to be reminded that the assumption in the present context is that life does have a meaning and that our task is to make the effort to read it or discover it. That meaning is lost if we do not make the effort; and it becomes distorted when we insert the wrong punctuation marks—meaning, neglect certain essential human activities. To assume that life does have meaning is not to ignore that this very fundamental issue itself should be of concern to us here, especially given that there are those who would reject that assumption outright. So taking up this point now, it needs to be said that what is implied by this assumption is that we will not know the answer until we are actually engaged in the very task of searching for it. In other words, it is in and through our efforts to discover meaning that we learn that life has meaning.8 This point is quite different from saying that we create meaning, as some existentialist philosophers were prone to assert, as if there is no other meaning except the one of our subjectivist creation.9 Rather, just as a series of words can 8

In this essay, the focus is on discovering meaning. In Appendix B: “Meaning and Significance: a Fundamental Challenge to Human Living” the emphasis is on giving significance to one’s life. 9 For Camus, the human situation is a similar absurdity, but human beings can create values that will give them some purposes in life.

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simply be a grouping of words with no coherent sense unless and until we punctuate them properly so that they become meaningful sentences, so does life present itself to us. It is of course possible that the grouping of words is merely that: words strung together, not even qualifying as clauses, much less sentences. But generally we will not know that to be the case until we take the trouble to place certain punctuation marks even if only tentatively. We could of course also be accused of reading meaning or sense into the assembled words just as we could impose our views on a text which can colour our interpretation of it. But that would in fact confirm the point that it is in and through our effort that meaning is discovered. In short, the attempt is in a way also a disclosure.

Turning to Grammar Punctuation marks, an integral feature of the grammar of any language,10 enable us to read a group of words in ways that convey a definite sense and elicit a specific response from us. Punctuation marks break up words, sentences and even paragraphs to facilitate our grasp of the message. They are marks which we add to the words of the text to enable us to get the meaning. Without them the text would be merely a collection or even an undecipherable jumble of words. In addition, misplaced punctuation marks will disclose a different meaning.11 For example, a particular grouping of words that ends in a full stop (period) indicates a statement of fact, a description, a declaration and other similar claims. A question mark, in comparison, elicits a different response, this time from the reader or, in conversation, from the other party. At times, it may be what is termed a rhetorical question and thus no specific answer is expected or given. What is common is that a message that is followed by this punctuation mark, unlike a full stop, raises a point or makes a query. What specifically is the difference? It asks rather than states. In contrast, a message that ends in an exclamation point comes across more strongly: it is intended to express the speaker’s feelings (Terrific!) or to alert the reader (Danger!).

10

The present context here is the English language (although there are differences even in that language, i.e. British and American English). 11 An interesting book in this regard is Eats, Shoots & Leaves. A particularly useful example which the author provides is: “A woman, without her man, is nothing.” and “A woman: without her, man is nothing.” Lyne Truss, Eats, Shoots & Leaves: The Zero Tolerance Approach to Punctuation (Profile Books, 2003), p. 9.

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Other punctuating marks play other roles in eliciting grammatical sense.12 Quotation marks enclose the message and disclose a source (see note 13); they can also show that a certain “meaning” is being given to the quoted message in relation to the primary text. A colon (or a semi-colon) halts the message, thus indicating that there is more to come: a further explanation or an illustration. Commas, on the other hand, merely provide a pause in the message, a “breather” as it were. They are essential in delineating the grouping of words, thus bringing out the sense not only of the group of words but also of the entire message. A dash is another kind of pause—more as an aside—but one that is regarded as relevant to the point being made. Punctuation marks can also be the basis of agreement or differences inasmuch as we can agree on their appropriateness or inappropriateness as we seek to interpret the sense of the sentences or the entire message itself. They can be said to set the parameters of how we read (or are meant to read) the text. For this reason, care must be exercised by whoever inserts these marks to forestall any misinterpretation. The author or editor of a text needs to check the extent that a particular punctuation mark serves a purpose, and clarifies or confuses the meaning of the text.

Punctuating Life’s Text On a number of occasions and contexts life has been compared to a book—we even make references to the book of life. It has been said that various events in one’s life are like the chapters of a book. Death is sometimes portrayed as the last chapter in one’s book of life, with the reminder that often, as in a book, the conclusion is written on the basis of the contents of the preceding pages.13 Along these lines, but with a different focus, reading the meaning of life’s message can be likened to the writing of the book. In the present context, instead of the composition of the book of life, it is the significance of the punctuation marks that we put on the text that we wish to stress. For it is also in the editing of our life’s sentences and not just in the authoring of them, as it were, that life’s message is communicated to us. Sometimes we compose the sentences, more often we receive them—and it is in the interaction between the active and the passive side of life, so to speak, that 12

No attempt is made here to provide an exhaustive list of punctuation marks. Existentialist philosophers are at times cited as maintaining that how we die— although not in the physical sense—is shaped by the choices that we have made in life. 13

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life’s message can be read, interpreted and lived. At the same time, how we break up the text of our lives into meaningful phrases, clauses and sentences is what enables us to discover the meaning of life itself. Taking our cue then from grammar, one could say that we need to make the effort—just as much as we need to be given opportunities14—to place the appropriate full stops, question marks, exclamation points as well as the colons, the commas and the dashes in the proper moments, stages and cycles of our lives.15 For only then can we understand and appreciate what life is to us. We need to insert punctuating moments in the sentences that we compose in life as we carry on with our daily routine, engage in specific activities or celebrate certain events. Those sentences may be our responses to what life offers to us, or they could be creations of ours as we make our own contributions to life itself as it moves on, affecting us and others. Just as in our use of language, there is a received as well as a composed side to the over-all communication. Transliterated into the context of life, the full stops (or periods) of life are the moments when we do come to the end of one activity, event, or phase and then move on to the next. These moments spell decisions made, activities completed, or simply points accepted. To some extent, these are the general markers in our lives as we press on from day to day. Sometimes these are just routine; others are more significant but not sufficiently so for us to regard them as “out of the ordinary” such that they are lifechanging moments. They are merely momentary stops indeed. But life, too, has its ups and not just downs: when we are surprised, uplifted and even thrilled. These exclamation points of our lives are moments that enable us to see life as a gift, to see beyond the routine. They make us stand still—and it is a pause that is indeed pregnant. At times, these special situations make it all worthwhile for us to continue; and, since they stand out, they somehow throw light on our lives, enabling us to appreciate what we have been given or what we have achieved. Living is no longer merely “existing”. It will not come as a surprise that philosophical thinking would be associated with a particular punctuation mark—and that is the question mark. As had already been noted above, philosophy is equated with the pursuit of wisdom; and it is generally held that the beginning of wisdom starts with the questions we raise regarding ourselves and our world. The question marks of life are the moments when we, just like the symbol of this punctuation, “curl back” because we are reflecting (reflectere) on our 14

Cf. Appendix B: “Meaning and Significance: a Fundamental Challenge to Human Living”. 15 The poem "The Dash" by Linda Ellis is particularly appropriate in this respect.

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experience of various aspects of life—both humdrum and profound. Daily life presents situations when we ask, query or challenge. Unlike full stop moments, these moments make us step back and not merely move on. There are even occasions when we raise fundamental questions about life itself: asking about its significance, its purpose and its destiny. These questioning moments are sometimes the result of terrible or tragic situations; in some cases, they come about because of our inability to see what is in store for us or whether there is any point in continuing.16 At other times, because we wonder, we ponder. Sometimes we pause, not because we are reflecting or questioning but because we expect further information, explanation or illustration of what we have just experienced. These colon moments of expectation stand between the past and the future, between what has just been or what is to come. And when what was expected has come to pass, we begin to appreciate what has happened because we have been provided with further information, explanation or illustration. Sometimes these colon moments simply take place unexpectedly; at other times, we ought to make them happen. But there is another punctuation mark that can be said to facilitate our search for meaning; namely, the comma. The association of philosophy with the comma is not obvious in the way that the question mark is. But there is something about reflection—integral to the philosophical activity—that invites the comparison. For just as in grammar where, to decipher the meaning of a sentence or a text, appropriate commas can be useful, so in life appropriate pauses—which create an atmosphere of reflection—do enable us to establish balance, maintain priorities and sharpen a focus.17 These comma moments can aid us in making sense of the seemingly endless series of activities that we are engaged in or the various pursuits that we are trying to fulfil—when we take the time to see how the particulars are to be understood in the context of the general, or when we “take a moment” to view the details as they come together in the light of the overall scheme of things.18 These moments enable us to see connec16

The existence of evil and of suffering is one such occasion. In our book, From Suffering to God: Exploring Our Images of God in the Light of Suffering (N.Y. and London: Macmillan, 1994) Part II, we develop this point and its challenge to our concept of God. 17 Our hope, of course, is that reading this book is one such comma moment. 18 A development in this context is the current interest in “mindfulness” and in the Buddhist form of meditation. Religious circles have always encouraged some form of meditation for their followers. The comma moments that we are describing here, however, are not necessarily linked to any religious belief or affiliation. Instead we

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tions, small enough (like the symbol of the comma) to enable us to continue with everyday life but important enough to leave an impression on us. Comma moments are inserted not just as “breathers”, as it were (although they can be useful in that way), but because they serve the important function of providing “sense”. And as we see the sense of the various groupings, they can open up the bigger picture. It seems that as we take—and make—the time to add these comma moments to our lives, we provide ourselves with a greater opportunity to see not just the “sense” of the various happenings in our lives but even more importantly, the “sense of it all”. In this respect, there is something quite instructive in the actual mark of the comma itself. The comma, unlike the period (or full stop), is a dot that curls downwards towards the left. It does more than just bring out the meaning of the sentence. It does this by connecting us, as it were, with the past—the group of words that have been separated by the comma. In life too, we need to be reminded that the question of where we are heading is partly answered by considering where we have come from.19

Text and Context So far, the claim that has been made is that to draw out the meaning of a series of sentences in a text, the proper punctuation marks have to be inserted. This is a task both for the writer if he or she wants to ensure that the meaning is correctly understood and—in the absence of such marks— for the reader to insert the appropriate ones to elicit an intelligible interpretation. It should be added now that such a quest for meaning, particularly on the part of the reader—which is our point of comparison—is often aided by making use of various resources to complement one’s individual efforts. One such valuable resource to understanding the sentences in a text and their meaning is knowledge of the context of the sentences. In fact, a are referring to human nature itself. Our human nature requires these reflective pauses. An interesting twist in our highly digital society is the observation made by Hannah Betts in her, “Q: How do Geeks Relax? A: There’s an App for That,” The Times, November 5, 2013, pp. 42-43. She reports on how the digital age has awakened to the importance of the human need for “doing nothing” with an app to achieve this. We interpret this awakening to mean the realization to “pause between the digital activities to reflect on life itself”! 19 A particularly helpful way of understanding and defending this point is provided by Charles Hartshorne’s metaphysical category of creative synthesis. Cf. his Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method (SCM Press, 1970). There are other editions of this book. See also “In Retrospect” in the present book.

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sentence that has been lifted from the paragraph or the section (or even a greater context like a chapter) does not always convey as full a sense as it is meant to. Awareness of the general theme of the text as well as of the background (including that of the writer), connotations, varying interpretations, culture and so on can heighten and deepen the reader’s sensitivities to such an extent that the reader can confront not only the explicit but also the implicit meaning of the text and of the words which make up the text. The same claim can be made—if life is being likened to a text—about discovering the meaning of life. The quest for meaning can be greatly enhanced by taking life’s contexts into account. This is because this task is not simply a matter of inserting punctuating moments, as it were, by the individual but also of interpreting the meaning of those moments and eventually appreciating them. The task of interpreting a text—as is well illustrated in literature—is much more than merely providing one’s own understanding of it.20 While this can be and often is done, one nonetheless risks arriving at subjective conclusions. This is also the case with our quest for meaning in life. It is important that our individual efforts should also avail of the collective wisdom of humankind and the extensive experiences of others. After all, if it is true that the quest for meaning is a common human activity, then there is something that we can learn from one another. The term “context” is sometimes interpreted differently by other philosophers, particularly by those influenced by Wittgenstein’s philosophy. What it does not mean here is that the act of philosophizing is fenced in by one’s subjective experiences such that one finds it impossible to transcend them. Rather, we take it to mean—and use the term accordingly—that the act of philosophizing takes place in the concreteness of life. These are specific life-situations: “contexts”. But they are not completely subjective nor are they entirely particular instances, such that one does not see any resemblance to other situations. The concreteness of life serves as the starting points for our reflections. But “context” as used here also refers to some kind of a unifying vision or at least the need to recognize its significance. The specific life-situations on which the act of philosophizing is based serve as pointers because it is through these specific situations that we become somewhat aware of a larger picture. In fact, we can only recognize them as specific because there seems to be a broader background against which they are set.21 20

In literary theory, it should be noted that there are various approaches to the study of the text. 21 See Chapter One: “Philosophizing, Philosophy and the Social Context: a Reflection on Human Living”.

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Whitehead’s analogy of “seeing the wood by means of the trees” can be helpful here. It is the trees that we initially encounter; but it is also they, which enable us to become aware of the wood. In seeing the wood, we have gone beyond merely noticing the trees. We may even see them in a different light because we see them against the backdrop of the wood. Similarly, the larger picture or the vision, that is opened up by the various contexts in which we philosophize, can enlighten us when we look again at the specific situations, including those that have set us off initially on our philosophical pursuits. T.S. Eliot puts it even more succinctly: “…we arrive where we started/And know the place for the first time.” “Context”, as used here, thus refers to two distinct but related meanings: (1) the concreteness of our human experience as the basis for our philosophical reflections; and (2) a unifying vision that underlies our response to that experience. The question that inevitably arises is how something concrete (or detailed) can be reconciled with what is essentially abstract (or general). In insisting that philosophizing is always carried out in context, are we therefore claiming that this activity is at all times both concrete and abstract? That would be a correct conclusion except that as these terms apply, they refer to different dimensions of the philosophical act. Insofar as philosophical thinking emerges out of the concreteness of life, it is concrete. It is based on and grounded in the day-to-day questions which need to be addressed as we live our lives and carry on our daily routine. But philosophical thinking, if it is not to be a superficial or an ad hoc response, must address those questions against a more general framework that helps to provide a sharper focus. This is the abstract dimension since it is general and comprehensive. There is something about human nature that is not fully satisfied with mere instances or selected examples. The human desire for some continuity, comprehensiveness, and unity in our understanding of reality, and in our attempts to make sense of it, is what we believe drives us on this quest for a more general vision; a context, so to speak.

Concluding Comment In this essay, we have been concerned with developing further the claim that if life is not to become “a sentence” on us, we can regard it more as “a series of sentences”. However, if we do not wish them to become simply disjointed phrases or merely a collection of words, then we should make the effort to punctuate them properly. The use of punctuation marks in grammar is particularly useful in clarifying and developing this claim. Moreover, again turning to the role of punctuation marks in gram-

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mar, we assert that it is only when we insert those so-called “punctuating moments” that we discover whether life has any meaning at all. In our quest for meaning, the various contexts in life, religion being one of them, can be helpful just as knowledge of the context can facilitate the interpretation of a text—to which life is being likened.22. This is because, as had been asserted, humans have a need for the larger context, the bigger picture as it were. It can provide not just some kind of background but even some sense of direction.

.

22

Another particularly helpful context in deciphering life’s meaning and addressing our questions and quests is education. Cf. Chapter Eleven: “The Marketplace, Academia and Education: a Philosophical Critique of the Bologna Process” and Chapter Twelve: “Developments in Contemporary Society and Faith-based Education: Challenges and Issues”. It is therefore disconcerting that poverty still deprives many of educational opportunities in our day. It is even more unsettling that gender is an obstacle to getting an education, which Malala Yousofzai of Pakistan has been campaigning for. See: Martha Nussbaum, “Women’s Education; a Global Challenge,” Signs, 29, 2 (2003), pp. 325-355.

APPENDIX B MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE: A FUNDAMENTAL CHALLENGE TO HUMAN LIVING BY MARIAN F. SIA AND SANTIAGO SIA

Is Life a Sentence? A fundamental question that human beings raise, in various forms and contexts, is whether life has any meaning at all. Needless to say, this question is not always explicit and may not even be attended to. The routine of everyday life and the preoccupation with more immediate concerns do not always create what many would call the luxury of such a reflective moment At times, however, for various reasons, it does arise, and occasionally forcefully so, as a result of taking stock of one’s life. Somehow one realizes then its importance and urgency. In an earlier essay, we described that situation and articulated the question by asking whether life is a sentence or a series of sentences; that is to say, whether it is an imposition that we have to serve or a message that we need to read.1 In the first instance, life is regarded as a burden to be borne while in the second case, life is understood to present us with a challenge. Both situations require a certain response on our part. We had likened the message of life to that contained in a text. Its message becomes clearer and more intelligible only when it is punctuated properly. We had suggested that life, too, could be meaningful if in our quest for meaning we do engage in various human activities which we compared to the punctuation marks of a text. Only in this way—like the reading of a text—can we know whether life does have any meaning at all. 1

Marian F. Sia and Santiago Sia, “Punctuating Life’s Message: a GrammaticalPhilosophical Exercise on the Quest for Meaning,” Santalka (Co-activity), XVIII, 4 (2010), pp. 81-92. http://www.coactivity.vgtu.lt/en/. Revised and reprinted as Appendix A: “Is Life a Sentence?: the Quest for Meaning in Life”.

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In the present essay, we want to turn our attention to a further challenge for human living. We are aware that the quest for meaning fortunately leads many to truly fulfilled lives. On the other hand, the experience of meaninglessness by others is regrettably genuine. It would be foolhardy and insensitive to affirm otherwise. It is, moreover, a concern, as one observes life in one’s society and in the world generally, that there are individuals, groups or communities that seem destined to lead what can only be described as tragic lives. One is led to wonder how such a troublesome and troubling situation, for example where there is widespread and insurmountable suffering, has become a reality for them—or for anyone else for that matter—inasmuch as it does not make any sense at all. One can only agree that life for them, particularly for the very young, is indeed a sentence, imposed on them. It poses a greater challenge for anyone who cares to seek ways of finding meaning despite their plight and to improve it. Accepting this observation and sharing this concern, we would like to address the related human quest for significance in the face of meaninglessness. We are suggesting in this context that human creativity, as used in this essay, can enable us to move further—not just to search for some meaning of human living but also to put significance into it. It is generally accepted that reason, which makes us distinct from the rest of creation, makes us reflective beings. And that can be both a gift and a curse. But we hope to show that it is also our human nature, endowed with free will, that enables us to direct our lives in a way that gives it significance. There is something in human nature itself, we believe, that provides each of us not just with the ability to think and choose but also to create meaning. In that way, life can become significant for that person even if only in a minimal way. And in some ways that is the greater challenge to human living. We are the sort of beings that need to have reasons and a reassurance to carry on.

Meaningfulness and Meaninglessness To claim that life is meaningful or has meaning is ambitious and may even seem presumptuous. It is much too generalized since ultimately its truth can only be tested or verified on an individual level. That is to say, each one of us has to make that judgment insofar as it is pertinent in our own case. Sadly, there is much empirical and anecdotal evidence to contradict the claim that life has meaning. On the other hand, the same can be said about any assertion that it is meaningless. That life has no buoyancy or lacks any inducement again comes down to the individual’s particular experience. It can also be misleading—although quite helpful in under-

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standing the causes or reasons— to associate either claim with a specific group or grouping, e.g. age-related, gender-based, or other.2 The particularity, therefore of the assertion that life is meaningful or meaningless means that psychologists, sociologists, medical people and social workers are better placed to identify and analyze the situation.3 Knowing the causes or the reasons behind each individual’s claim and experience also puts them at a greater advantage in discussing it and offering helpful comments.4 Since philosophical thinking is inclined to engage in more generalized comments, it would seem, therefore, to be of little value in dealing with this issue. Moreover, philosophers tend to subscribe to more abstract ideas. And yet philosophers down through the ages have turned their attention and employed their skills to this very concern. This is to be expected after all insofar as the question whether life is or is not meaningful is a fundamental one. Accordingly, it is truly a philosophical issue. However, it must be added that such a consideration remains necessarily a generalized one. Given this observation, a philosophical discussion can only provide arguments to support or to criticize the claim that generally life is or is not meaningful. Nevertheless, one could argue that a general belief that life has meaning—whether it is taught in a religious or secular context— can have, and does have, a positive influence on an individual’s life. The generalized claim, despite its limitations, can therefore enable one to see more clearly what one’s life has to offer and may even motivate one to live the kind of life that confirms that generalized assertion.

2

There has been some concern over the increasing number of suicides by specific age groups, e.g. teenagers, prompting attempts to understand the particularity of this situation, e.g. cyber-bullying. 3 Advances in these fields have helped us to become aware of how emotional, psychological, biological, chemical and physical factors, among others, do affect how one views and lives life. The social milieu, as sociologists inform us, also affects one’s perspective on life. One of the pressing problems faced by Irish society today is why several individuals, including the young—and the numbers are increasing— have committed suicide. 4 We must point out that the factors which drive one to suicide are much more complex than the simple assertion that life has become meaningless to that person. For this reason, a certain sensitivity is called for in handling the specificity of suicide. It was refreshing to listen to Donal Walsh, a 16-year old cancer sufferer from Ireland, dissuade his peers from considering suicide as a solution. Regrettably, he passed away but his message has reverberated and touched many. Also, the message of the film, “Inside I’m Dancing” is that life is a gift.

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But why does the question of the meaning of life arise in the first place?5 Why is it a concern for human beings, and to our knowledge, only in the case of human beings? Why does it matter that life is somehow purposeful oe that one would want to live it to the full? Why would we human beings even want to pursue that question? It seems that it is natural for human beings to ask questions, some trivial, others more fundamental.6 It can even be said that we live our lives in response, even if most times only implicitly, to the questions which arise from day-to-day. In most cases because those questions have already been answered by ourselves or by others, we carry on and establish a routine; and so they do not deserve any more attention on our part. Others, however, require more time and effort on our part. The questions just cited are among those. To address these, we need to pause and to reflect first on the source of our quest for meaningfulness.

Meaningfulness/Meaninglessness as a Human Question Human beings, it is generally accepted, are rational beings. By this is meant that they are endowed with the intelligence that equips them with the ability to think. Unlike non-living and non-human creatures, humans do not just occupy space, have weight, move and survive, but they also wonder and query. They can stand back and reflect. Humans are aware not just of what they feel but also of what they are thinking about. A quite common observation is that human beings, and only human beings, know that they know. Their rational nature gives them the ability to observe and express what is, to explain how it is, and even to comment on why it is. They have the ability not just to enquire as to why something is but also to protest as to why it is not otherwise. Human beings are distinct because they can and do ask questions and seek answers to these questions. In many ways the exercise of the ability of human beings to ask questions does advance their plight—even if it has also to be admitted that not every result is positive or welcome. A case can even be made that all knowledge is a further development of their very humanity. As humans search for, and find answers to their questions prodded on by their natural curiosity, they can and often do make personal progress. The accumulation of information, gathered as they pry open heretofore closed sources, makes 5

In the previous essay (Appendix A) we had stated that one will not know whether life is meaningful or not until one makes the effort—in that context, we compared it to placing the correct punctuation points—to read its message. 6 Cf. Chapter One: “Philosophizing, Philosophy, and the Social Context: a Reflection on Human Living”.

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them yearn for even more. Moreover, their constant probing results in greater knowledge which in turn brings about a transformation of their situation and of their world. Such is the nature of rationality; and as a whole, it is of tremendous benefit to humankind. It certainly enhances the status of human beings. On the other hand, the ability to think can also be a burden. While in most cases, it is true that knowledge is liberating, it can also be a deadweight. Although one must accept that having knowledge is not just an advancement of one’s nature but is even empowering—and this is why education at various levels is not merely desirable but is even essential—it can nevertheless become overwhelming. There is some truth in the comment that too much knowledge or certain kinds of knowledge impact negatively on individuals and on society.7 It can even contribute to the deterioration of the human situation and of the world we live in. Much depends of course on the kind of knowledge that one possesses, on the manner that one has acquired it, and on the use that one puts it to. But even the ability to think itself can easily become a curse, as some existentialist philosophers describe it. In some ways it inflicts on human beings an awareness that exerts considerable pressure on them. This is true not just regarding specifics but also with the general task of thinking itself. Too much thinking, it has been said with some justification, is not just dangerous but even unwholesome.8 How does the above observation relate to the question of meaningfulness?9 In the first place, it is because our ability to think is what drives our quest for meaning. It is what makes us pause and enquire whether life makes any sense at all. The question is posed in different ways; but Aristotle articulated it when, having wondered what it is that humans yearn for ultimately, he concluded that it is our rational nature that draws us towards the final goal or the telos, as he puts it. He meant it as the good, and not merely a good, and it is what makes life worthwhile. It is what human beings as rational beings strive for its own sake. In other words, it is what gives ultimate meaning. Aristotle’s question arises because humans can

7

A very contemporary example is the doom and gloom cast on the general public because of all the information on, and the discussions about, the economic crisis and all the wars, disasters and threats in the world. 8 The poet John Keats describes this well in some cases:”Where but to think is to be full of sorrow/ And leaden-eyed despairs,…” “Ode to a Nightingale” st. 3. 9 The discussion here is not about the answers provided by different traditions, e.g. religious or atheistic, to the quest for meaning. The issue addressed in this essay is the quest itself and its nature.

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rise above the merely physical to the intellectual level. Human rationality is thus the source and the resource of the quest for meaning. This quest, it should be noted, is not just the ordinary search for answers. It is unlike other questions that we ask about ourselves, our society and the world around us. It is not a mere request for information and for knowledge. It is a fundamental one. It grounds our very being. It is a quest for the very reason of one’s existence and not merely for survival. More crucially, it is a comprehensive one in that it takes everything into account. It wants to see how all the details are interconnected. It transcends details and longs for the over-all picture, as it were. In other words, it is a pursuit of the very meaningfulness of life itself. Unfortunately, when no over-all answer is forthcoming, when one detects cracks in the picture, or when one goes from one point in life to another in a seemingly directionless manner, then the quest leads to the opposite conclusion and the sense of meaninglessness sets in. It may dawn on us gradually or sometimes strike us dramatically; but no matter how it arises, it is tragic. The situation is comparable, albeit in a limited sense, to noticing a clock that has no hands but which continues to tick or a hand outstretched for a handshake that does not come and is left dangling. Something is amiss. Albert Camus makes use of the myth of Sisyphus to describe this kind of existence: a human being condemned forever to continuously roll a boulder up a hill and who has to do it all over again since once the boulder reaches the summit it rolls down again. Despite one’s efforts, the whole situation is of no avail since every step is merely a repetition of the previous one. The realization of meaninglessness is much more than just an emotional experience or a passing phase in one’s life. It is more than just a series of tragedies that leads one to see the negative side of life. Nor is meaninglessness simply the sentiment that leads one to shrug one’s shoulders when asked about meaning in life. Rather, it is the deep-seated realization that life itself offers nothing worthwhile. It is the full awareness that human existence itself makes no sense whatsoever. It is, as a number of existentialists argue, totally absurd, with Sartre describing it as “a hole in Being”. Arriving at the meaninglessness of life is also due to human rationality even if—given the close association between rationality and meaningfulness—that claim appears rather inconsistent. To allege that it is our very rationality that is at the root of the judgment of meaninglessness even appears to be irrational. What is meant by the above claim, however, is simply that it is our rationality that makes us conscious of the distinction between what is and what is not, and it is the same nature that leads us to

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become aware of why something is and why it cannot be otherwise. As Aristotle has shown us, the quest for meaning, i.e. towards the final good, is the fulfillment of our very existence as rational beings. But when one’s quest is completely thwarted—whether one becomes fully aware of it or merely experiences it—it is due to our very rational nature. We would not have that realization if we did not have that kind of nature in the first place. Only for and with rational beings, as far as one knows, is meaningfulness or meaninglessness a question and an issue.

Human Freedom and Creativity Human beings have also been distinguished from the rest of creation because they possess what has been known as free will.10 The existence of free will, like the presence of intelligence, gives human beings their dignity and not just value. Again, Aristotle is helpful in identifying this feature as intrinsic to our nature. In his view, shared by countless others, we are the kind of beings who are able to choose, accept or reject alternatives. In short, we can decide.11 This is not to say that we are always in such a position because our ability to do so can also be restricted by ourselves, by others, by circumstances and various other factors. Even then sometimes it is still possible to break free from such restrictions or to overcome the barriers. Aristotle clearly points out that being free makes human beings unlike other living creatures who are moved by mere instinct and distinct from physical objects which can only be moved by others. Our freedom as humans is innate rather than bestowed on us. Jean Paul Sartre, too, asserts that human freedom is what defines human nature but he goes further by asserting, in dramatic existentialist style, that humans have been “condemned” to radical freedom.12 He explains that there is no limit except that 10 The discussion here should not be confused with the debate between determinism and indeterminism. Cf. Chapter Eight: “Human Freedom, its Power and Limits: Some Implications for Life in Society”. 11 For Aristotle and those who share his view, only humans possess free will. In process philosophy, however, as in contemporary physics, all reality possesses a certain amount of creativity that allows for unpredictability. This does not, however, detract from the uniqueness of human creativity (or freedom) since their form of creativity is distinctive. 12 For Nicolas Berdyaev, human freedom is also the fate of humans. He adds that: “This fated freedom is the most mysterious phenomenon of human existence.” Cf. his Truth and Revelation, trans. by R. M. French (New York: Harper and Bros., 1953; London: G. Bles, 1954), p. 56. He maintains that it is also a curse: “Truly

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humans cannot choose not to be free. Humans, as conscious beings, are “being-for-itself”, different from non-humans which can be grouped together as “being-in-itself”. Consciousness is always “other than itself” and has the ability to distinguish itself from its object. To be conscious, in his view, is to be completely free.13 This innate ability of human beings also enables them to fabricate things—hence, the description of the nature of human beings as homo faber. Humans are not merely passive recipients of, but are also active participants in fashioning, reality. They can and often do shape their destiny. For this reason human freedom is intrinsically associated with creativity. In the same way that the ability to think and reflect singles human beings out from all other creatures this aspect of human nature makes them also stand out in creation. It also enables them to “stand over” creation, both in the sense of mastering it but also in the less often used sense of being held accountable for creation. While unfortunately, there has been much talk of dominating or “lording it over” creation, we are now beginning to realize that our human abilities involve using them responsibly to enhance and transform creation. There are many aspects of human creativity, including the aesthetic, the literary, and the musical; hence, it is associated with the arts. For this reason it is closely identified with the imagination. But creativity is much more than just imagining or imaging reality, that is to say, it is not merely the talent to “make up” reality but to create reality in the literal sense of bringing it forth into existence. Human beings are, so to speak, creators in their own way. Significantly, it enables them to create values for themselves. Because they are creative, they can put worth on their activities as well as on reality as a whole. This ability is traceable to human free will. As Nicolas Berdyaev expresses it, only one who is free, creates. He maintains that creativity is not just producing a work of art but transforming oneself and the world. He states that, “In every artistic activity a new world is created, the cosmos, a world enlightened and free.”14 It is each person’s highest purpose and fulfillment, rather than self-devolution or evolution which is governed by necessity. He adds, “True life is creativity, there is nothing more torturing and unbearable for man, than freedom.” Cf. “The Worldview of Dostoevsky,” in Dostoevsky, trans. by Donald Attwater (London: Sheed and Ward, 1934; New York: Meridian Books, 1957), p. 203. 13 Another contemporary thinker, Charles Hartshorne, offers an interesting perspective here, particularly since in his metaphysics human freedom is a higher and distinctive level of universal freedom. Cf. note 10. 14 Nicolas Berdyaev, The Meaning of the Creative Act, trans. Donald A. Lowrie (London: V. Gollanz, 1955), p. 225.

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not development: it is the freedom for creative acts, for creative fire, rather than necessity and the heaviness of congealing self-perfection.”15 Human freedom in its creative aspect—which is of interest to us here—enables human beings to attach significance or worth to reality. It facilitates an appreciation of reality by their attaching some importance to it. Thus, human creativity does not only make it possible for human beings to contribute to the whole of reality, it also allows them to transcend their present situation. Admittedly, at times it may involve imagining (in the sense of “making it all up”) rather than plainly describing reality. It may also lead to seeing more than what it is in fact there. But the point is, human creativeness adds to what is there even if only subjectively, rather than merely receives it. It is what prompts us to go beyond merely recognizing or discovering what is but even to appreciating it as well. It is what enables humans to be truly active and discriminating participants. Correspondingly, creativity facilitates the human ability to look towards the future. Its exercise is inevitably associated not just with what has been accomplished but also with what can be done. It leads us to consider the real challenge of facing the openness of the future. While the past continues to be influential in all human lives, the human outlook can truly be described as one of “looking out” or “looking towards”. Human beings can anticipate what is to come and incorporate it into their thinking and behaving. Accordingly, planning ahead and having foresight are closely associated with human activities or traits. We ordinarily understand the future in temporal terms; this is to say, in relation to the past and the present. It is generally regarded as being about what is yet to come. But the future, like the past and the present, is more than just marking time. It is reality even if it is the realm of possibilities and probabilities. In other words, it is not nothing although it is not yet realized. So in looking to the future, we are not merely gazing towards a distant period in time. We are truly anticipating a possible or probable reality. It is more than just a mere figment of the imagination or wishful thinking. This is because the reality of the future is already somehow imbedded in what has been and what is.16 Its reality, details of which are not yet actualized, is nevertheless already in transit because of its connection with the past and the present. In short, the “not-yet” is real. Past events, although not tangible in the way that physical entities are, continue to exist nonetheless in the present. In fact, the present comes into existence because of these past events which to some extent determine 15

Nicolas Berdyaev, The Destiny of Man, trans. N. Duddington (London: G. Bles, 1937; N.Y.: Scribner’s, 1937), p. 140. 16 For metaphysical support for this claim, see note 10.

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how it comes to be. In a comparable way, the anticipated future is regulated by what has happened in the past and in the present. It may or may not come about in all its details, however. If it does, it is largely, but not entirely, because previous past events, including the present which has become past too, remained in existence. We may not always remember the past but it never ceases to exist. For this reason, any future events will always bear its influence. At the same time, however, the future can be said with some justification to be truly anticipated, even if not fully so. One can understand human creativity in the same way. Humans, like the whole of reality, inherit the past in all its forms which become an integral part of the present. On the other hand, human creativeness, can and does break through even if not totally. And it is for this reason, that it is intimately connected with human freedom. As has been pointed out already, the past shapes the present—in causal terms, it is the effect of previous causality—and in turn, when it too becomes past, it shapes the future. But the future is not totally dependent on the past. It is not fully determined since there is always a certain amount of unpredictability or leeway. Indeed the future is future precisely because there is something unforeseen and unforeseeable. Creativity is rooted in this state of affairs, and human creativity is an integral part of this partial openness of the future. In short, human beings, shaped by the past, live in the present and look towards the future.

Human Creativity, Hope and Significance The reference to future, it has been claimed here, is not just about measuring the passage of time. It has also been described as potential reality, shaped by the past and rooted in the present. Considering its nature as what-is-to-come and what humans can do, given their creativity, one may argue further that there is reason and justification for hope. After all, while the past is indeed closed, and persists in the present, it does not close off the future entirely. The very openness of the future means that there are always options or alternatives. Although some doors in life may be sealed off, there are others—and sometimes precisely because certain doors have been closed—that inevitably open up for us. Humans, as free beings, can duly pry them open even more. And these lead to other routes and to different destinations.17 And because human creativity, as described earlier,

17 This was certainly the strong message from the speakers on the Primetime programme of RTE TV1 (14 May 2013). They strongly advocated talking to others

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enables humans to put value into what they choose or decide, it does allow us to be renewed18 and thus to look ahead in hope. There is much truth in the ancient adage: Dum spiro, spero. Hope, unlike a simple wish or an illusory desire, is real precisely because of this rootedness in the past, the very openness of the future and the exercise of human creativity. What grounds hope is the nature of reality itself as well as the human ability to add significance to what we do.19 What implication does this seemingly abstract philosophical discussion have for our present consideration? To what extent can it deal with the human quest for meaningfulness and significance? It will be recalled that the claim was made here that humans do need to exert an effort to discover life’s message. Making sense of life has been compared to reading a text for its message. Just like the insertion of proper punctuation marks in a stream of words to get the meaning and read it properly, life poses a challenge to human beings to engage in various activities to find out the meaningfulness of life. It has also been acknowledged that whether life has a meaning or not can only be concluded when such efforts have been made. Human creativity provides us with a further challenge; namely, that we can create meaning and not just find it. We can write our own message, as it were. We have the ability to do so precisely because of our nature as free beings. Furthermore, as was already noted, we are the sort of beings that can put value on whatever we choose or create. The object or activity to which humans attach value may be different from one individual to another, but the point remains that humans as humans, irrespective of background or traits, have it in their power. In this way, whatever is valued can provide significance to one’s life.20 It can help one get along and get on with life. It is important to bear in mind that it is our human nature primarily, rather than any development on our part or by others, that enables us to

and seeking help because in their own experience this enabled them to see further than the suicide that they were considering. 18 Given the developments in technology, perhaps a more relevant analogy would be, that the human situation is such that we can always push the “refresh” button. 19 See also, Otto Friedrich Bollnow, “The Meaning of Hope,” Universitas, IV (1961), pp. 263-273. 20 This can be illustrated at an elementary level when one observes what gives much joy and satisfaction to children. Simple objects or activities, which would not suit the preferences or tastes of adults, nevertheless yield much satisfaction on their part. Similarly, varying backgrounds, personal traits, and individual preferences account for differences in what adults value for themselves.

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do so.21 But, in various and varying ways, we do need to actualize that ability in order for us to appreciate life. In doing so, we move from searching for its meaning to adding significance to it.22 But there is yet another even more important challenge of creativity. Again this goes back to its very nature. Its exercise is never a “solo flight”, as it were. Because one’s creativity is influenced by past events and activities as well as by actual realities, both past and present, it owes its actualization to countless other creativities. Returning to the concept of causality, we will recall that creativity is also an effect of previous causation, and its actualization is influenced and partially determined by past creativities as causes. What this means is that we cannot isolate our exercise of creativity from what has happened in the past and by what is happening in the present. There is some truth in the claim that every present situation— circumstances as well as every individual reality—is a product of the past. It means that its actualization owes a great deal to others in the distant as well as in the immediate past. In short, how it shapes up is dependent on them, although not that it happens. That is why it is truly, even if not totally, creative. Again, this seemingly theoretical discussion does have a bearing on the present topic. The quest for meaning and significance by the individual can and must be facilitated and supported by the community. It may be a task that we undertake on our own—inasmuch as one discovers meaning and comes to appreciate life’s significance for oneself—but it is not and cannot be a solitary pursuit. The creativity of others—in the metaphysical and symbolic sense—is required to facilitate and realize each one’s pursuit. We are interdependent in various ways, but probably more so in this task.23 Each one’s creativity supports the other’s creativity. In this sense, the role of society includes providing support in different ways. We are 21 Religions have at times claimed that one can find the true meaning of life only through religion. On this point, cf. “Ethics and Religion: A Philosophical Contribution to the Debate,” in Santiago Sia, Ethical Contexts and Theoretical Issues: Essays in Ethical Thinking (Newcastle on Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), pp. 62-70. 22 No doubt, there is an element of subjectivity here inasmuch as the creation of significance is very much dependent on the individual’s own choices. Essentially, it is whatever makes life significant for the individual. Here the Latin axiom, more applicable in a different context, nevertheless can express succinctly the point being made here: De gustibus non est disputandum. 23 This includes recognition of each other’s worth. One of the contributing factors that lead to a loss of meaning for an individual is the feeling of uselessness or worthlessness. The young are particularly vulnerable in this aspect of life. We do need—as psychologists tell us—to be affirmed.

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interdependent not just in the physical sense but also in the emotional, psychological and in the many other ways of developing our human nature.24 The nature of human creativity is such that it is not just about the ability of each one to find meaning or add significance to life but also in the important sense of enabling others to do so. Since it is our own creativity that can open doors for ourselves and for others (unfortunately, also slam them closed), society has an important role to play. It is society, and the kind of society, that provides the context of individual living. But it is much more than that. It is also the appropriate environment to facilitate the quest for meaning and significance.25 The creativity of society, as constituted by its members, enables it to provide support, guidance and hope to each individual search for meaning. That is an important challenge for each of us. It is also a non-negotiable responsibility.

Concluding Remarks In this essay, our main consideration was not so much querying whether life has meaning or significance. Nor was it about offering a specific answer, such as what one would expect in a religious or humanistic tradition. Because we are conscious of individual differences and values, we realize that it would be rash to name possible sources that would make life significant for any of us.26 Rather, this essay is an attempt to describe and develop the question itself. Our concern has been to show why it arises and how it can be pursued further. We have also referred to the impact the question and its pursuit have on individuals and on society.

24

This is especially true with depression which has resulted in so many suicides. The severe economic crisis has claimed several victims who could not see any way out of their situation. Loneliness, experienced by many, has been in some cases a contributing factor. Cf. Sylvia Thompson, “Preventing suicide is more about community than charity,” Health and Family Supplement, The Irish Times, Sept. 10, 2013, p. 6; Padraig O’Morain, “The benefits of a sense of belonging,” Health and Family Supplement, The Irish Times, Feb. 4, 2014, p. 12. 25 See note 3. 26 For many people, the family circle or friends would be such sources. We are more inclined to think with Buber that it is the types of relationships—including family ones and friendships with any specific individual or individuals—that can help us attach some significance to life. In other words, how, instead of simply that, we relate to one another matters a great deal. See Chapter Four: “Relatedness and Communal Living: a View on Types of Relationships”. It is for this reason that we have emphasized too how the social context can make a great difference on this very human challenge.

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The discussion of the challenge of meaningfulness/meaninglessness and significance of life develops further our observation that it parallels the nature of human beings who are endowed with intelligence and free will. Because of their intelligence humans wonder and then pursue the question as to whether there is meaning to life. Its meaning, if there is one, needs to be discovered by each and every one. The challenge of life’s significance also rests with the human individual, who gifted with free will, is in a position naturally to make it so.27 By describing human nature as rational in the wider sense as involving creativity and not just intelligence and by probing into the nature of creativity itself, we claimed that there are options, in the real sense, that are available or made available for each one individually to arrive at a more positive conclusion about life. Human creativity, it was shown, is rooted in human free will, enabling the human individual to create and value reality for oneself. A crucial point is recognizing the important difference between chasing and gaining the object of satisfaction whatever that may be—the goods in Aristotle’s terminology— and placing value on whatever it is that either comes our way or results from our efforts. Life can be significant—and even meaningful—precisely because as creative beings we can make it so.28 In this very important task each of us can and should be aided by society. In turn, everyone should contribute to the challenge of making life significant for all.

27

Human creativity is closely associated with human resourcefulness. We continue to be amazed by, and to admire, the uplifting response by several to disasters in their lives. Cf. “Courage amid Disaster,” CNN Report on the Philippines after Typhoon Haiyan aired 25 November 2013. The refusal to be defeated by, but instead to transcend, the situation certainly confirms the resilient attitude and creative spirit in human beings. 28

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