Social Policy in the Islamic World [1st ed.] 9783030577520, 9783030577537

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xxviii
Introduction (Ali Akbar Tajmazinani)....Pages 1-12
Front Matter ....Pages 13-13
Foundations of Social Policy and Welfare in Islam (Ali Akbar Tajmazinani, Zahra Mahdavi Mazinani)....Pages 15-35
Social Policy and the Islamic World in Comparative Perspective: Taking Stock, Moving Forward (Rana Jawad, Rana Eseed)....Pages 37-62
Beneficence and Welfare: Notes for the Comparative Study of “Doing Good” Practices (‘amal Khayr) in the Islamic World (Sahar Aurore Saeidnia, Laura Ruiz de Elvira)....Pages 63-82
Cash Transfer Programs in MENA from a Child Rights Perspective (Charlotte Bilo, Anna Carolina Machado)....Pages 83-105
Front Matter ....Pages 107-107
Challenges of Establishing an Islamic Welfare State: A Historical Overview of Welfare System Developments in Post-Revolution Iran (Ali Akbar Tajmazinani)....Pages 109-136
Institutions and Individuals: Social Policies in Contemporary Turkey (Mehmet Fatih Aysan, Ummugulsum Aysan)....Pages 137-157
The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism: A Lesson from Algeria (Walid Merouani)....Pages 159-185
The Effects of Social Protection on Informal Employment: Evidence from Tunisia (Nidhal Ben Cheikh, Jean Yves Moisseron)....Pages 187-223
Perspectives on the Analysis and Development of Social Policies in Azerbaijan (Vugar Bayramov, Rashad Hasanov, Narmina Gasimova)....Pages 225-240
Islamic Dimensions of Egyptian Social Policy Productive Mechanisms or Mobilized Discourses? (Amany M. El-Hedeny)....Pages 241-261
Social Policy Implementation in Malaysia and Its Impact on the Community (Mohamad Zahir Zainudin)....Pages 263-278
Islam, Neoliberalism and Social Inequality in Bangladesh: A Social Policy Perspective (A. I. Mahbub Uddin Ahmed)....Pages 279-315
Back Matter ....Pages 317-321

Citation preview

INTERNATIONAL SERIES ON PUBLIC POLICY

Social Policy in the Islamic World

Edited by Ali Akbar Tajmazinani

International Series on Public Policy

Series Editors B. Guy Peters Department of Political Science University of Pittsburgh Pittsburgh, PA, USA Philippe Zittoun Research Professor of Political Science LET-ENTPE, University of Lyon Lyon, France

The International Series on Public Policy - the official series of International Public Policy Association, which organizes the International Conference on Public Policy - identifies major contributions to the field of public policy, dealing with analytical and substantive policy and governance issues across a variety of academic disciplines. A comparative and interdisciplinary venture, it examines questions of policy process and analysis, policymaking and implementation, policy instruments, policy change & reforms, politics and policy, encompassing a range of approaches, theoretical, methodological, and/or empirical. Relevant across the various fields of political science, sociology, anthropology, geography, history, and economics, this cutting edge series welcomes contributions from academics from across disciplines and career stages, and constitutes a unique resource for public policy scholars and those teaching public policy worldwide. All books in the series are subject to Palgrave’s rigorous peer review process: https://www.palgrave.com/gb/demystifying-peer-review/792 492

More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/15096

Ali Akbar Tajmazinani Editor

Social Policy in the Islamic World

Editor Ali Akbar Tajmazinani Allameh Tabataba’i University Tehran, Iran

ISSN 2524-7301 ISSN 2524-731X (electronic) International Series on Public Policy ISBN 978-3-030-57752-0 ISBN 978-3-030-57753-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57753-7 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To My Father Peace and blessing upon him

Contents

1

Introduction Ali Akbar Tajmazinani 1 The ‘Islamic World’? 2 Structure of the Book 3 Reflections References

1 2 4 9 12

Part I Conceptual and Comparative Aspects 2

Foundations of Social Policy and Welfare in Islam Ali Akbar Tajmazinani and Zahra Mahdavi Mazinani 1 Introduction 2 Main Sources of Islamic Teachings 3 Principles of Social Policy and Welfare in Islam 3.1 Intrinsic Altruism 3.2 Religious Brotherhood and Sisterhood 3.3 Multi-level Responsibility 3.4 Social Rights 3.5 Avoidance of Tadawul 3.6 Social Balance (Tawazun) and Equality 3.7 Social Justice 3.8 Undesirability of Poverty

15 15 16 18 18 19 20 23 23 24 25 26 vii

viii

CONTENTS

3.9 Cooperation Policy Instruments for Financing and Providing Social Welfare 4.1 Zakat 4.2 Khums 4.3 Anfal 4.4 Kaffarah 4.5 Al-Qard Al-Hassan 4.6 Waqf 4.7 Nazr 4.8 Charity 4.9 Welfare Through Ethics 5 Conclusions References

27

4

3

Social Policy and the Islamic World in Comparative Perspective: Taking Stock, Moving Forward Rana Jawad and Rana Eseed 1 Introduction 2 Religion 3 Social Policy 4 Religion and Social Policy 5 Judaism 6 Christianity 7 Hinduism 8 Islam 9 Implicit and Explicit Forms of Islamic Social Welfare 10 “Multiple Islams” 10.1 Case Study 1: Social Service Provision by Faith Based Organizations: A Case Study of the Islamic Movement in Kafr Qassim 10.2 Case Study 2: Islamic Welfare in the UK Social Policy Context 11 Conclusion References

27 28 29 30 30 31 31 32 32 33 34 34

37 37 38 39 41 42 43 44 45 46 49

49 53 54 56

CONTENTS

4

5

Beneficence and Welfare: Notes for the Comparative Study of “Doing Good” Practices (‘amal Khayr ) in the Islamic World Sahar Aurore Saeidnia and Laura Ruiz de Elvira 1 Introduction 2 Beneficence: Alongside, Together with, or Against the State? 3 Welfare Through the Lens of Everyday Interactions of “Doing Good” 4 Conclusion Bibliography Cash Transfer Programs in MENA from a Child Rights Perspective Charlotte Bilo and Anna Carolina Machado 1 Introduction 2 Background on Social Protection in MENA 3 Non-Contributory Cash Transfer Programs in MENA 3.1 Overview of Cash Transfers in Place 3.2 Legal Frameworks Underpinning Cash Transfers 3.3 Child-Sensitive Design Features 4 Conclusion Annex: Analysis of human rights principles of selected programs in the region References

ix

63 63 66 70 77 78

83 83 86 87 87 89 93 96 98 103

Part II Country Case Studies 6

Challenges of Establishing an Islamic Welfare State: A Historical Overview of Welfare System Developments in Post-Revolution Iran Ali Akbar Tajmazinani 1 Introduction 2 Social Policy in Theory: The Iranian Constitution 3 Historical Phases of Social Policy Developments 4 Current Social Policy Map

109 109 110 112 116

x

CONTENTS

4.1 Housing Policy 4.2 Health Policy 4.3 Education Policy 4.4 Income Maintenance 5 Social Policy Outcomes 6 Discussion References 7

8

Institutions and Individuals: Social Policies in Contemporary Turkey Mehmet Fatih Aysan and Ummugulsum Aysan 1 Introduction 2 Main Characteristics of Welfare Distribution in Turkey 3 The State and Social Policies in Turkey 3.1 A Brief History of Social Policies in Turkey 3.2 Social Policies in Contemporary Turkey 3.3 Social Policy Perceptions in Turkey 4 Recent Challenges for the Turkish Welfare Regime 4.1 Economic Risks 4.2 Migration Flows 4.3 Young but Aging Population 4.4 Family Change 4.5 Populism and Patronage 5 Conclusion References The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism: A Lesson from Algeria Walid Merouani 1 Introduction 2 How to Do Social Protection 2.1 Liberal Welfare State 2.2 Corporatist Welfare State 2.3 Social Democratic Welfare State 3 The Corporatist Components 3.1 Description

116 119 124 125 127 131 134

137 137 138 141 141 143 145 148 149 150 151 152 152 153 155

159 159 161 162 162 163 164 164

CONTENTS

Some Statistics About the Corporatist Component 4 The Liberal Residual Component of the Algerian Social Protection System 4.1 Program for Professional Integration (DAIP) 4.2 ADS’ Programs for Helping Professional Integration 4.3 Programs of Promoting Enterprise Creation 5 Universalist Component: Healthcare and Education 5.1 Education System in Algeria 5.2 Healthcare System 6 The Religious Component 7 Conclusion References

xi

3.2

9

The Effects of Social Protection on Informal Employment: Evidence from Tunisia Nidhal Ben Cheikh and Jean Yves Moisseron 1 Introduction 2 The Horizontal Extension of Social Protection to the Informal Economy in Tunisia 2.1 Overview on the Social Protection System in Tunisia 2.2 Horizontal Extension of Social Security to the Informal Economy 2.3 Social Assistance Programs in Tunisia 3 Methodology and Data Sources 3.1 Methodology for the Estimate of Informal Employment and Data 3.2 Methodological Approach Adopted for Informal Behaviors Analysis and Perverse Incentives 4 Informal Employment in Tunisia: Extent and Main Determinants 4.1 The Informal Employment in the Economy 5 Determinants of Informal Employment and Disincentive Effects of Social Assistance on Social Insurance 5.1 The Identification of Perverse Incentives

166 169 170 171 175 177 178 179 181 182 184

187 187 190 190 190 193 195 195 196 202 202

207 208

xii

CONTENTS

5.2

Determinants of Informality Among Beneficiaries of Social Assistance Programs 5.3 Inter-temporal Choices of Informal Workers and Risk Aversion 6 Intertemporal Preferences 7 Attitudes Towards Risk 8 Conclusion References 10

11

12

Perspectives on the Analysis and Development of Social Policies in Azerbaijan Vugar Bayramov, Rashad Hasanov, and Narmina Gasimova 1 Introduction 2 Comparative Social Protection System in Azerbaijan 3 Social Protection System 4 Healthcare 5 Social Housing, Employment and Education 6 Conclusion Bibliography Islamic Dimensions of Egyptian Social Policy Productive Mechanisms or Mobilized Discourses? Amany M. El-Hedeny 1 Introduction 2 Social Policy as Voluntary Activity 3 Nasser Era: Fierce State Based on Socialist Discourse 4 Sadat: Social Policy with Islamic Flavour 5 Mubarak: Between SAP and Islamic Discourse 6 Morsi: Islamization of Social Policy 7 El-Sisi: Counter-Islamism 8 Conclusion References Social Policy Implementation in Malaysia and Its Impact on the Community Mohamad Zahir Zainudin 1 Introduction

211 212 214 215 216 219

225

225 226 227 233 234 236 238

241 241 244 245 247 248 251 253 255 256

263 263

CONTENTS

Social Policy Influence on Community Development in Malaysia 3 First Phase: 1957 to 1970 4 Second Phase: 1971 to 1980 5 Third Phase: 1991 to 2020 6 Social Policy in Community Development 7 The Implementation of Social Policy in Malaysia: The Role of the Government in Social Policy Transformation 8 Social Development in Malaysia 9 Conclusion References

xiii

2

13

Islam, Neoliberalism and Social Inequality in Bangladesh: A Social Policy Perspective A. I. Mahbub Uddin Ahmed 1 Introduction 2 Welfare Regime and Social Welfare Practices in Bangladesh: Historical Developments 2.1 Main Historical Phases of Social Welfare Practices in Bangladesh 2.2 Typologies of Welfare Regime 2.3 Established Welfare Ideologies and Welfare Practices in Different Historical Phases of Bangladesh 3 Main Social Policy Domains in Bangladesh: An Overview of Current Policy Initiatives 4 Islam and Social Policy in Bangladesh: Role of Islamic Teachings and Islamic Welfare Practices in Bangladesh 5 Financing of Social Policy in Bangladesh 6 Poverty Reduction in Bangladesh: Role of the Third Sector 7 Islamic Zakat Versus Neoliberal Microfinance: The Case Study of Shakkhom Project of Obhizatrik in Poverty Alleviation of Bangladesh 7.1 Zakat-Based Poverty Alleviation Programme of the Obhizatrik 7.2 Efficiency of Zakat Over Microfinance in Poverty Alleviation

265 265 266 267 270

271 273 275 276

279 279 284 284 290

291 294 297 299 301

305 305 305

xiv

CONTENTS

7.3

Future Potentiality of Islamic Social Policy in a Unipolar World 8 Conclusion References Index

309 309 310 317

Notes on Contributors

A. I. Mahbub Uddin Ahmed is Professor in Sociology and former Chairperson of Sociology and Director of Criminology and Criminal Justice Program at the University of Dhaka, Bangladesh. Ahmed’s research focuses on social inequality: the relationship between ethnicity and class in the context of Toronto and Bangladesh. He authors “The Ethno-Class Formation and Contemporary National Identity in Bangladesh” in Understanding Social Dynamics in South Asia (Springer, 2019). Ahmed received his Ph.D. from York University, where he held TA-ship, Entrance scholarship and Canada Council research grant. Prior to this, Ahmed obtained Dalhousie University Fellowship and TA-ship for his MA program. Mehmet Fatih Aysan is Associate Professor of Sociology. He earned his Ph.D. from the University of Western Ontario (2011) and thought Sociology in the same university (2010–2012). His sociological interests are rooted at the intersection of sociology of work, family, demography, and social policy. His study centers on how labor markets and social policies combine to influence the welfare of societies. His research is comparative with a focus on Europe and the Middle East. His studies were supported by the EU, IDRC, Turkish Academy of Sciences, TUBITAK and have appeared in edited books and peer-reviewed journals such as Population and Development Review, Canadian Journal of Sociology, Emerging Markets and Finance, Economia&Lavoro, Routledge, Palgrave, and Springer. xv

xvi

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Ummugulsum Aysan is an Assistant Professor of Social Work at University of Health Sciences, Istanbul. She earned her Ph.D. from Istanbul University, department of Labor Economics and Industrial Relations in 2017. Her research interests are in the areas of social policies, subjective well-being, happiness, ageing. Her work focuses specifically on the subjective well-being, namely life satisfaction and happiness of elderly populations. She also studies the variations of quality of life across different welfare regimes. She have presented papers in the scientific meetings including International Sociological Association, Eurasia Business and Economics Society, Southern Ontario Behavioral Decision Research and her research projects were published in edited books and journals such as Springer and Psychology. Vugar Bayramov is a think tanker in Azerbaijan. He was a visiting faculty member at the Washington University (USA) in 2002/2004. Bayramov has a Ph.D. in economics. His papers/books have been translated into 25 languages. In 2010, Bayramov was named one of the 500 most influential Muslims in the world by The Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Centre (RISSC) in Jordan. Mr. Bayramov has served as co-chair at the EU Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum in 2013/2104. He was the co-coordinator of the Economic Integration and Convergence to EU Standards Working Group at the EaP CSF in 2011–2012. Bayramov is the author of Anti-Crisis Concept Project of Azerbaijan Republic, whose stated policy recommendations were adopted by the government. As one of the leading economic-experts in the region, Bayramov has been several times involved in developing state programs, including anti-crisis programs by CIS Countries’ Governments. Nidhal Ben Cheikh is a researcher at the CESSMA Laboratory at Paris Diderot University. In addition, he works as an international consultant specialist in social protection with expertise in several countries in the Arab world such as Tunisia, Morocco, Iraq, Kuwait and the Sultanate of Oman. He was also research director (2011–2016) of the Tunisian Centre for Research and Social Studies (CRES) and economic advisor to the Tunisian Minister of Social Affairs (2017). Charlotte Bilo is a researcher at the International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG), where she currently works on child- and gender-sensitive social protection in Latin America, MENA and South

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

xvii

Asia. Charlotte holds a Master’s Degree in Poverty and Development from the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), Brighton, UK. Amany M. El-Hedeny has studied and worked as a professor at Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, and the British University in Egypt. She got her M.A. degree from Cairo University and her joint supervision Ph.D. degree, high diplomas in international relations and development (IRD) and Human Resources (HR) from the Institute of Social Studies (ISS)-Netherlands where also she posted her doctoral fellowship in Leiden University. She was a Fulbright Scholar in Residence in Nebraska Wesleyan and Winona State Universities. She is ex-director for the Center for the Study Developing Countries (CSDC), Cairo University. She gives more interests in her research area to the socio political dimensions in studying politics. Rana Eseed is a lecturer at the School of Social Work and Social Welfare at the Hebrew University. Her research concerns the complex relationship between social work, religion, multiculturalism, the welfare state, and minority groups. In this broad field, studies on social services provided by faith-based organizations (FBOs), especially those representing ethnic minority groups, are of particular interest. Narmina Gasimova is a Junior Researcher at the Center for Economic and Social Development. She studied the elements of macroeconomics and political economy as well. The scope of her researches covers social and economic topics. Gasimova is serving at the Center for Economic and Social Development since 2019. She produced some quarterly reports on the economy of Russia and studied the topics of diversification and monetary policies in CIS countries. At the same time, she is engaged in the implementation of particular projects devoted to social and economic matters. Rashad Hasanov is as an independent economist and has worked with civil society institutions, think tanks and government agencies over the past 10 years. At the same time, he has been volunteering for public projects. After receiving a bachelor’s and master’s degrees in International Trade from 1998 to 2004, Hasanov has been working as a researcher at the Center for Economic and Social Development (CESD) since 2011. Hasanov, who specializes in macroeconomics and public finance, was an expert in the National Budget Group in 2014–2015. Moreover, he’s a member of the Mining Industries Transparency Initiative since 2015. In

xviii

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

2015–2016, he took part in the development of the “Strategic Roadmaps for the National Economy and Key Sectors of the Economy” and to date has published more than 20 researches in various languages. Rana Jawad is a senior lecturer in social policy at the University Bath. Her research interests are social protection and welfare systems in the Middle East and North Africa region, with particular focus on the role of institutions and normative values, including religion. She is convener of the MENA social policy network: https://www.menasp.com/. Key publications include Social Welfare and Religion in the Middle East: A Lebanese Perspective (2009) and (2019). A new era for social protection analysis in LMICs? A critical social policy perspective from the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/ article/pii/S0305750X19301822?dgcid=author. Anna Carolina Machado works as a researcher at the International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG) where she has contributed to projects on social protection and child-sensitive policies. She holds a M.Sc. in Public Policy from the University of Bristol, UK. Her research interests include social protection, child development and poverty reduction. Zahra Mahdavi Mazinani (Ph.D.) is Graduated in Islamic Jurisprudence and Law at Imam Khomeini and Islamic revolution Research Institute, Tehran, Iran. Her main research interest is Islamic foundations of family policy. She has presented and published several papers on various aspects of family law and women’s issues in Iran. Walid Merouani holds a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Caen-Normandy & a Ph.D. in Economics and Applied Statistics from the High School of Statistics and Applied Economics (Algiers). Since 2011, he has investigated issues of pension, social protection and behavioral economics. He has published articles and has been involved in research projects related to these issues. Merouani frequents several research centers in France, Luxembourg, and Algeria. Currently, he is a permanent researcher at the Center for Research in Applied Economic for Development where he is the head of the team working on ‘Economics of Social Security’. Merouani is also an associate researcher in the Centre for Research in Economic and Management (CREM-CNRS, France).

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

xix

Jean Yves Moisseron is a socio-economist at the CESSMA laboratory (University Paris Diderot) and Research Director at the French Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD). He is particularly interested in his research on the changes in the Arab world and the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. He coordinates the Observatoire des Transformations du Monde Arabe (OTMA) and participates in the Territorial Analysis of Women Access to Labor (TAWALA) project in Morocco. Laura Ruiz de Elvira is a permanent researcher at the French Institut de Recherche pour le Développement. Her research interests focus on collective action, charitable practices and social policies in Syria. She has published Vers la fin du contrat social en Syrie. Associations de bienfaisance et redéploiement de l’Etat (2000–2011) (Karthala, 2019). She edited, together with Christoph H. Schwarz and Irene Weipert-Fenner, Clientelism and Patronage in the Middle East and North Africa. Networks of Dependency (Routledge, 2018). She also co-edited the special issues “Le quotidien économique dans un Proche-Orient en guerre” (Critique Internationale, 2018), and “Syrie: entre fragmentation et résilience” (Confluences Méditerranée, 2016). Sahar Aurore Saeidnia is a Cofund MARIE CURIE ULB postdoctoral researcher. Her research interests have revolved around two main axes related to her Iranian fieldwork: developing a comparative anthropological approach of ordinary politics; and reflecting on the circulations of discourses and practices (from global to micro-local and viceversa). Alongside her publications in peer-reviewed journals (Gouvernement et Action Publique, Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée, Sens Public), she has published “Experiences with Deliberation in the Islamic Republic of Iran”, in Deliberation in Divided Societies: Case Studies and Cross-Sectional Analysis, Juan Ugarriza & Didier Caluwaertz (eds.) (Palgrave Macmillan, New York: 2014). Ali Akbar Tajmazinani is Associate Professor of Social Policy and currently the Dean of Social Science Faculty at Allameh Tabataba’i University in Tehran, Iran. He has undertaken several research projects and has published a number of works on social policy and youth studies with various national and international institutions including the National Youth Organization, UNICEF Representative in Iran, Council of Europe’s Youth Directorate, Social Security Research Institute, and

xx

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Tehran Municipality. He has been involved in organizing several scientific events including the international conference on ‘Social Policy in the Islamic World’ (http://spiw.atu.ac.ir). Mohamad Zahir Zainudin is a senior lecturer at Islamic Studies and Humanities Department, Center for Languages and Human Development, Universiti Teknikal Malaysia Melaka, Malaysia. His expertise areas are social policy, human development and community education. A writer for academic books such as Jom Bisnes (Let’s Do Business, 2020), Minda Kerja Cemerlang (Excellent Work Mind, 2020) and Kemahiran Pengucapan Awam (Public Speaking Skills, 2020). He also is a co-author in a few books throughout the years. Previously he assigned as an Editorial Manager for Journal of Human Capital Development from 2011 to 2019.

Abbreviations

ADB ADS AFS AMGII ANGEM ANSEJ ASA ASP BA Ba˘g-Kur BBS BGMEA BRAC CAPMAS CASNOS CBN CCT CESD CIS CNAC CNAM CNAS CNRPS CNSS

Asian Development Bank Agence de développement Social Allocation Forfaitaire de Solidarité Aide Médicale Gratuite type II Agence Nationale de Gestion de Microcrédit Agence Nationale de Soutien à l’Emploi des Jeunes Association for Social Advancement Al Nour Salafist Party Blanche Algérie Social Security Institution of Craftsmen, Tradesmen, and Other Self-Employed People Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics Bangladesh Garment and Manufacturers and Exporters Association Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Sociale des Non-Salariés Cost of Basic Needs Conditional Cash Transfers Center for Economic and Social Development Commonwealth of Independent States Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Chômage Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Maladie Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Sociale des Salariés Caisse Nationale de Retraite et de Prévoyance Sociale Caisse Nationale de Sécurité sociale xxi

xxii

ABBREVIATIONS

DAIS DPN DTCIDC EPF ES EU FELCRA FELDA GDP GFI GK GNP GS GSF GSS HIECS HIES IDPs ILO IMF IMMC JDP LGBT LJP MB MDGs MENA MISA MNE MO MOF MoST MSO NDP NEP NGO NOSI NSIS NSSS OECD ONS OOP

Dispositif d’Activité d’Insertion Sociale National Development Policy Danish Trade Council for International Development and Cooperation Employees Provident Fund Retirement Fund European Union Federal Land Consolidation and Rehabilitaiton Authority Federal Land Development Authority Gross Domestic Product Global Financial Integrity Ganoshastho Kendro Gross National Product Sharia Association (Gam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya,) The Government Social Fund Gono Shahajya Sangstha Expenditure and Consumption Survey Household Income and Expenditure Survey Internally Displaced Persons International Labor Organization International Monetary Fund Islamic Money Management Companies Justice and Development Party Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Liberty and Justice Party Muslim Brotherhood Millennium Development Goals Middle East and North Africa (Ministry of Insurance and Social Assistance) Ministry of National Education Muslim Orthodox Ministry of Finance Management of Social Transformation Ministry of Social Solidarity The National Democratic Party New Economic Policy Non-government Organization National Organization for Social Insurance National Social Insurance Scheme National Social Security Strategy The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Office National des Statistiques Out-of-Pocket Payment

ABBREVIATIONS

PID PMT PNAFN PNCTP PNSF PPBSF RISDA RMG RSNA RTFR RTNS RTNSSA SAPs SFYP SOCSO SOFAZ SSK SSNP SSPF SWD SWF TUP-HIMO TURKSTAT UGTT UNHCR UNICIF WB WHO

xxiii

Programme d’Insertion des Diplômés Proxy Means Test Programme National d’Aide aux Familles Nécessiteuses (National Programme of Assistance to Needy Families) Palestinian National Cash Transfer Program Programme National de Solidarité Famille (National Programme of Family Solidarity) Public and Private Business Sector Fund Rubber Industry Smallholders Development Authority Ready-Made Garment Régimes des Salariés Non Agricoles Régime des Travailleurs à Faibles Revenus Régime des Travailleurs Non-Salariés Régime des Travailleurs Non-salariés non agricoles Structural Adjustment Programs Seventh Five Year Plan Social Security Organization State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan Social Insurance Institution Social Security Network Program State Social Protection Fund Social Welfare Department Social Welfare Fund Le dispositif des Travaux d’Utilité Publique à Haute Intensité de Main-d’uvre Turkish Statistical Institute Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Children’s Fund World Bank World Health Organization

List of Figures

Chapter 5 Fig. 1

Number of programs with child-sensitive design features by dimension (Note One program can have more than one of the features above. Source Based on Machado et al. [2018])

94

Chapter 6 Fig. 1 Fig. 2

The Gini index trend in Iran 1975–2017 (Source CBI 2018) Expenditure share of highest decile divided by expenditure share of lowest decile 1975–2017 (Source Calculated based on SCI data 2018b)

130

130

Chapter 7 Fig. 1 Fig. 2 Fig. 3

Social policies and satisfaction levels for various age groups (%) (Source Aysan 2016) Social policies and satisfaction levels for various ethnic groups (%) (Source Aysan 2016) Satisfaction levels from selected social policies (%) (Source Aysan 2016)

146 147 148

xxv

xxvi

LIST OF FIGURES

Chapter 8 Fig. 1 Fig. 2

Fig. 3

The balance of the different social security funds (millions of dinars) (Source ONS [multiple years]) The percentage of active occupied covered by social security (by employment status) (Source ONS [multiple years]. Labor Force Surveys) Health expenditures (% GDP) (Source The World Bank [2020]. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator)

167

168 180

Chapter 9 Graph 1

Graph 2

Graph 3

Increasing cumulative frequencies of informal employment by gender and age structure in 2014 (Source Author’s compilations based on INS [Census, 2014] and Pension Schemes) Age structure of the informal employment rate in 2014 (Source Author’s compilations based on INS [Census, 2014] and Pension schemes data) The age pyramid of informal employment (2014) (Source Author’s compilations based on INS [Census, 2014] and Pension Schemes Data)

204

204

205

Chapter 10 Fig. 1 Fig. 2

Fig. 3 Fig. 4 Fig. 5

Budget transfers to social sector as percentage of total expenditures annually for 6 years beginning from 2012 Budget transfers to State Social Protection Fund as percentage of total expenditures annually for 6 years beginning from 2012 Budget transfers to healthcare sector as percentage of total expenditures annually for 6 years beginning from 2012 Budget transfers to education sector as percentage of total expenditures annually for 6 years beginning from 2012 Budget transfers startle to education, healthcare and social sectors as percentage of total expenditures annually for 6 years beginning from 2012

230

231 235 236

237

Chapter 12 Fig. 1

Policies development in Malaysia to achieve Vision 2020

268

List of Tables

Chapter 6 Table 1 Table 2 Table 3

Main policy developments related to social exclusion in the past four decades Current social policy map Changes in social indicators in Iran in the past four decade

113 117 121

Chapter 8 Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 Table 4 Table 5 Table 6

The three typologies of the welfare state The number of employment created under PID The number of the employment created in the DAIS program Employment programs cost (in billion dinars) Number of ANSEJ projects Employments funded by ANGEM micro-credit

164 172 173 175 176 177

Chapter 9 Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 Table 4 Table 5

Coverage of the social assistance programs Rate of informal employment by age and sex (2014) The evolution of informal employment over the period 2005–2015 Informal employment rate in the non-agricultural economy Employment and informality of beneficiaries and household members

195 203 206 207 209

xxvii

xxviii Table 6 Table 7

Table 8 Table 9

LIST OF TABLES

Distribution of wages of employees who are beneficiaries and household members Logistic regression about the determinants of informal employment among the population benefiting from social assistance Logistic regression about determinants of time preferences Logistic regression about determinants of risk aversion

210

213 217 218

Chapter 12 Table 1 Table 2

Social development phase in Malaysia Incidence of poverty, Malaysia 1997–2018

266 269

Chapter 13 Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 Table 4 Table 5 Table 6

Evolution of social protection in Bangladesh, 1970–2020 Social safety net programs budget, 2012–2013 to 2018–2019 Comparison of Grameen Bank and BRAC, 2018 (amount in USD) Trend of income poverty, 2005–2016 Overall effect of zakat on yearly income of 82 zakat recipients of Sokkhom project, 2016–2017 Annual and daily income from zakat-based enterprises in BDT and USD

295 300 302 303 306 307

CHAPTER 1

Introduction Ali Akbar Tajmazinani

Social policy literature is mainly dominated by the concepts, theories, and practices developed in countries with established welfare states. This literature is strongly rooted in the historical, socio-cultural, economic, and political context of these nations. Even the literature on social policy in developing countries views their situation through the lens of mainstream theories and conceptual frameworks. With a population of about two billion people, Muslims make up a majority of the population in nearly 40 countries around the world from Morocco and Algeria through Iran and Azerbaijan to Malaysia and Indonesia and still constitute a considerable part of other mixed societies. One of the most notable elements of Islamic social teachings relates to social welfare concepts, principles, as well as practices and solutions. However, it is a tall order to portray a single picture of social policy in Muslim societies given the vast diversity of historical, political, and economic circumstances they have experienced as well as various cultural characteristics they possess. Despite these diversities, they have to respond to more or less similar issues and problems with regard to education, employment, health, housing, family and gender, inequality, and poverty

A. A. Tajmazinani (B) Allameh Tabataba’i University, Tehran, Iran © The Author(s) 2021 A. A. Tajmazinani (ed.), Social Policy in the Islamic World, International Series on Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57753-7_1

1

2

A. A. TAJMAZINANI

as well as social security. Hence, there are two important questions: how do they deal with these issues and what is the status and role of Islamic teachings in such social policies. The present book is intended to fill this gap in the literature by reviewing and comparing the experience of several Muslim countries from across the world. Existing social policy literature lacks a comprehensive appraisal of the social policy scene in Muslim societies, especially from a comparative perspective. Therefore, this book could be of interest to a wide audience in the academic and policy forums related to and interested in Muslim societies and communities.

1

The ‘Islamic World’?

Is there such a ‘unified entity’ which could be labeled as the ‘Islamic world‘ or the ‘Muslim World’? In his seminal book titled ‘The Islamic World’, Andrew Rippin (2008) adopts a multi-perspective approach (geopolitical, religious, intellectual, cultural, and social) to examine this idea. His overall conclusion is that “The Islamic world is a dynamic notion, shifting through time, finding its manifestation adjusting to the pressures of the moment. Of course, there are symbolic touchstones, especially in the dimensions of human existence we call “religious,” but to no extent do those symbols serve to dictate absolutely and uniformly every aspect of life in every circumstance” (p. 5). Cemil Aydin (2017) rejects essentialization of the Muslim world and suggests that the idea of a unified Muslim world emerged in the late nineteenth century, when European empires ruled the majority of Muslim societies, as the antithesis of Western Christian civilization. He points to the role of Muslim intellectuals in illustrating and essentializing an idealized pan-Islamic society that refused claims of Muslims’ racial and civilizational inferiority. Various discourses about such concepts as the ‘Islamic World’ or the ‘Muslim World’ exist both within and outside academia. The Islamist discourse may use this concept to portray a unified Ummah or a glorious civilization in the past and call for a return to it or to construct a new Islamic civilization based on its legacy. Muhammad Abduh, Ali Shariati, and Muhammad Iqbal are among Muslim thinkers who generally fall in this category, although with notable difference among them. As a recent example, Masudul Alam Choudhury has called in his book ‘Reforming the Muslim World’ for the reconstruction of a future Muslim world. The

1

INTRODUCTION

3

range of his proposed reformation includes economic, social, political, and socio-scientific inquiries for realizing the common good of the Ummah, the world nation of Islam, and of the Ummah in relation to the global order (Choudhury 2010). The anti-Islamist discourse may appeal to the same concept in order to illustrate a unified enemy for the non-Muslim world, especially ‘The West’, which threatens the modern civilization and therefore fuel the Islamophobia movements and attitudes. There is also a policy-oriented discourse like the one developed by Cooper and Yue (2008) which portrays the Muslim world as a real or potential threat for the west and calls for non-military responses to this treat. Analyzing challenges of the Muslim world like clashes over natural resources like gas and oil, population increase and youth bulge, rapid urbanization and its problems, illiteracy and poor education as well as fundamentalist thoughts and movements, they recommend adoption of economic and social development approaches by western countries to deal with these challenges. The social science discourse may see some value in categorizing Muslim groups, entities, communities, and societies as a distinct sociological reality for descriptive and explanatory purposes. For example, Kamal Salhi (2014) has edited a valuable collection of chapters on ‘Music, Culture, and Identity in the Muslim World: Performance, politics, and piety’. According to him, the criss-crossing axes of the global, the local and the transnational impel them to consolidate collective identities, confirm their historical legacies and look forward to the future, including through making, listening to and being emotionally sustained by music. Therefore, the book aims to look at the influence of Islamic religious beliefs on the role and realization of the art of sound and its manifestation in the Muslim world and its diaspora. However, others (see for example Aydin 2017) may refute to do so based on the argument that these kinds of differentiations between human societies may tend to portray ordinary social and cultural differences as essential and unresolvable disparities. While adopting a social science approach to the concept in question, the present book seeks to explore the suitability of the concept in the study of social policy issues faced by Muslim societies and communities. The main questions of this book are as follows: Is there such a deep divergence between Muslim and non-Muslim societies in terms of social policy and welfare which necessitates distinct conceptualization and theorizing? Are there multiple Muslim worlds with disparate ‘welfare systems’ and no substantial coherence or they share a level of convergence which makes

4

A. A. TAJMAZINANI

them a distinct type of social welfare regime that is capable for social science inquiry? Are there—and if yes, what are—local and/or indigenous social policy and welfare initiatives as well as intellectual social policy achievements in Muslim societies?

2

Structure of the Book

The present book has been organized around two main parts. The first part deals with conceptual and comparative aspects of social policy in Muslim societies. Chapter 2 by Ali Akbar Tajmazinani and Zahra Mahdavi Mazinani aims to elaborate various aspects of Islamic social teachings with regard to social policy and welfare in two main areas of values and principles as well as instruments and practices. Adopting a ‘social theology‘ approach, this chapter provides the reader with a conceptual framework to understand the status of Islamic teachings in the social policy atmosphere of various Muslim societies studied throughout the book. After explaining the main sources of deriving Islamic rules by Muslim scholars, the chapter illustrates a set of values and principles which underpin and guide the practice of social welfare in Islamic teachings, namely: intrinsic altruism, religious brotherhood, personal responsibility, takaful or public responsibility, state responsibility, social rights, social balance (tawazun) and equality, avoidance of tadawul, collective and public ownership, undesirability of poverty, and social justice. These principles all together constitute a holistic conceptual framework within which one could understand the general approach of the Islamic school to social policy and welfare. Based on the above-mentioned principles, this chapter briefly examines a series of practices and solutions for providing social welfare according to Islamic teachings, including inter alia: Zakat, Khums, Waqf , Sadaqah, Qard-al-Hasan, Anfal , and Nazr. These practices are mostly of a redistributive nature and include both obligatory and non-obligatory actions by the Islamic state and individual Muslims. Chapter 3 by Rana Jawad and Rana Eseed offers a comparative perspective on the conceptual and practical linkages between social policy as a field of public practice and the subject focus of this volume which is the Muslim world. The primary focus on Islamic social welfare here is related to the importance given to social responsibility in the major world religions and the historic influence of religion on issues of social welfare action and care for the vulnerable. The chapter provides two case

1

INTRODUCTION

5

study illustrations: one about Muslim social welfare activism in the United Kingdom (UK) and one about Islamic social movements in Jerusalem. These serve to support the overarching argument which is that Islamic social welfare practices are not homogenous and it may be more apt to refer to “Muslim worlds” in order to recognise the diverse range of actors and organisations in different parts of the world but also who have differing interpretations of the Muslim faith. Chapter 4 by Laura Ruiz de Elvira and Sahar Aurore Saeidnia revolves around the issue of beneficence and welfare and aims to provide insights for the comparative study of ‘doing good‘ practices (‘amal khayr) in the Islamic world. The authors suggest that since the 1990s, in the context of states’ reconfiguration, beneficence has become a powerful ethic and repertoire of action that spans all social spaces. A growing number of actors resort to this notion while claiming to act for ‘the good’ of ‘the poor’, ‘the weak’ or ‘the dependent’. They argue that the study of beneficence, understood as a socio-historically constructed realm of encounters and conflicts, offers a stimulating point of entry into understanding contemporary social policies in the Islamic world. They first highlight the complex and ever-changing relations between the ‘doing good‘ actors and practices and the State and then explore the multiple logics that their everyday interactions may generate. Chapter 5 by Charlotte Bilo and Anna Carolina Machado focuses on Cash transfer programs in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region from a child rights perspective. They argue that the MENA region in recent years has seen a number of social protection reforms, which have often included the removal of universal subsidies and the introduction of targeted cash transfer programs. An ever-growing body of research has documented the positive effects of cash transfers on children, not only on reducing monetary poverty but also on improving key determinants of multidimensional poverty. Despite increased efforts, many of the region’s cash transfer programs remain small in scale and their design could be improved to better respond to children’s needs by making, amongst others, more explicit linkages to nutrition and health services. In addition, they state that only few programs are embedded in a legal framework, an important attribute to guarantee children’s right to social protection. The second part of the book is devoted to examining the status of social policy in several Muslim-majority countries. Selected cases include a wide range of countries with diverse geographic, economic, social,

6

A. A. TAJMAZINANI

political, and cultural features. Geographically, there are representatives from major Muslim populated regions: North Africa (Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia), Middle East (Iran and Turkey), Central Asia and Caucasus (Azerbaijan), South Asia (Bangladesh) and South East Asia (Malaysia). These countries have diverse political systems which range from secular Republic (Azerbaijan) to Islamic Republic (Iran). This is also the case concerning the experience (or lack) of colonial history and its impact on the political landscape of a given country. From the religious perspective, Iran and Azerbaijan are countries with Shia Muslim majority population while all other countries are home to Muslim populations who belong to various Sunni sects. In terms of economy, the sample includes countries with natural resources as the main source of financing social policies (Iran, Egypt, Algeria, and Azerbaijan) which are also called the ‘rentire states’ as well as those relying on other revenues including taxation (such as Turkey and Bangladesh). There is also a high level of diversity with regard to language, ethnic origin and cultural practices within the sample. Therefore, it could be argued that an acceptable level of representation is guaranteed within the selected sample given the maximum variation criteria. Chapter 6 by Ali Akbar Tajmazinani attempts to provide a brief but holistic overview of social policy in the Post-Revolutionary Iran. This chapter studies six distinct phases in the history of welfare state development in Iran in the past four decades (Early post-Revolution, Iraq-Iran war, Reconstruction, Reforms, Principle-ism, and Moderation). It then provides the reader with a ‘social policy map’ and describes some of the major social policies in such policy domains as income maintenance, housing, health, and education, identifying various challenges in their implementation. Finally, the chapter focuses on the social policy outcomes in the post-Revolution era and concludes that despite considerable achievements in various policy domains, the country is far from realizing the landscape envisaged in the Constitution; an issue which could be traced through rising social inequality and recurrent poverty especially after the structural adjustment turn. Reviewing the main historical developments in the welfare arrangement as well as dominant welfare discourses in Iran throughout the past four decades, the chapter concludes that various theoretical and practical challenges have impeded the establishment of the desired welfare system outlined in the Constitution, namely: lack of a coherent theoretical framework for an Islamic welfare system, mismatch between economic and

1

INTRODUCTION

7

social policies, unsustainable financing mechanism, politicization of social policy, poor welfare governance, and various national and international crises. Chapter 7 by Mehmet Fatih Aysan and Ummugulsum Aysan on social policy in Turkey analyses the roles of four main institutions—namely the family, the state, the market, and non-governmental actors—in social welfare distribution shaped by the intersections of age, ethnicity, class, and gender relations in this country. Based on a nation-wide dataset, this chapter examines the effects of different welfare actors on welfare distribution and citizens’ levels of satisfaction with social policies. The findings considered in this chapter show, first, that four main institutions determine the distribution of welfare, and second, that there are more generous social policies for the elderly, children, and men, than there are for young people, women, and the Romany. Even though important reforms aimed at achieving an advanced social policy strategy in the 2000s, social, economic, and demographic risks necessitate a more sustainable social welfare strategy in Turkey. Chapter 8 by Walid Merouani contributes to the debate on the typology of welfare states by providing an economic evaluation of the Algerian social protection system relying on Esping Andersen’s typology. He discusses how the Algerian government attempts to use a social protection system to provide a better life for the citizens and ultimately to avoid Arab-spring-inspired events. Studies to this point have mainly analyzed some segments of the Algerian social protection system separately; hence this chapter is aimed at presenting a more global overview, including all the segments of the system. He concludes that the Algerian social protection system is hybrid with respect to Esping Andersen and includes elements from each of the three types. Chapter 9 is contributed by Nidhal Ben Cheikh and Jean Yves Moisseron and attempts to analyse the impact of contributory and noncontributory social protection programmes in Tunisia on workers’ choices between formal and informal employment. Official statistical data sources have been used to constitute a series that tracked the evolution of informal employment over the period 2005 to 2015. Microdata from a survey evaluating the performance of the two flagship social assistance programmes in Tunisia (cash transfer and subsidized health insurance programmes) have been used to identify the major determinants driving informal behaviour among workers who benefit directly from these programmes as well as their household members. The results achieved provide evidence

8

A. A. TAJMAZINANI

that social assistance programmes would create perverse incentives by diverting a proportion of workers endowed with contributory capacities from joining one of the social insurance schemes. Similarly, the analysis of workers’ intertemporal preferences and risk attitudes revealed that barriers might lie in the price to be paid to purchase social insurance. In Chapter 10 written by Vugar Bayramov, Rashad Hasanov, and Narmina Gasimova, socio-economic processes in Azerbaijan, development trends, the scale of existing social policies and the level of adaptation of international experiences have been studied. According to the authors, although there have been times when initiatives were undertaken to develop certain elements of Islamic banking in the Azerbaijani economy, there are no mechanisms derived from Islam in social policy. In current social policies, it is possible to observe elements of the Islamicsocial model, such as poverty alleviation, fair distribution of income, overall welfare, and care for vulnerable people. However, Azerbaijan’s social protection system is not considered as an Islamic model. Socialdemocratic and liberal elements are common in Azerbaijan’s current social policy. The social protection policy implemented in the country is reflecting dynamics of improvement and expansion-driven development. Chapter 11 by Amany M. El-Hedeny is devoted to the Islamic dimensions of Egyptian social policy. For this purpose, she firstly refers to the ongoing debate over the necessity of having an effective social policy that highlights ethical considerations and does not ignore the moral dimension in its implications. Then, she focuses on the concept of goodness as the core of the Islamic perspective. Her chapter argues that although social policy in Egypt appears to be based upon Islamic discourse, in the practical sense, the actions of both the state and Muslim non-state actors deviate from the actual purpose of Islamic social policy. This is apparent when examining the following: the historical roots of social policy in Egypt and Islamic discourse regarding the alleviation of poverty from different ideological perspectives; from socialism with an Islamic spirit under Nasser, semi-liberalism during the time of Sadat, to a vague sort of neo-liberalism under Mubarak. They have politicized Islamic discourse in order to legitimize biased and ineffective social policies that do not consider the interest of the poor and do not advocate for sustainable social solidarity, cohesion, or the well-being of laypeople. Chapter 12 by Mohamad Zahir Zainudin relates to the social policy and social development in Malaysia. He argues that social policy development is becoming increasingly important to manage a growing complex

1

INTRODUCTION

9

community in Malaysia which is known as the National Social Policy. Throughout the years, Malaysia has attempted to integrate its social policy with the economic policy to create political unity, social stability, and social equality. Thus, Malaysia has taken the approach of concentrating its roles in the country’s development and economic growth. He points to two elements in the Malaysian social policy: First, there is a social relief element that is designed to cater for those who do not have a job to look after their needs, and second, there is a social welfare element which is organized under the principle of economies of scale. His conclusion is that directly or indirectly, social policy has contributed to economic growth for the nation. Chapter 13 by Mahbub Uddin Ahmed explores the relationship between zakat and reduction of social inequality in Bangladesh via historical development of Bangladesh social policy, social welfare regime, and social welfare practices from 1201 to the present. It compares the neoliberal strategy of microfinance and Islamic strategy of zakat through Shokkhom Project data of a zakat-based Third Sector, Obhizatrik. It collects profiles of 82 beneficiaries, 49 males and 33 females, who received zakat between 2016 and 2017. The chapter finds that Islamic welfare practice of zakat is more effective in the alleviation of poverty and ensuring social welfare than the neoliberal strategy of interest-based microfinance.

3

Reflections

Theoretically, there is a distinct Islamic welfare regime with its unique system of values, principles, and policy initiatives as discussed briefly in Chapter 2. However, none of the states in countries studied in the present book exemplify this type of regime in its totality. For example, religious mechanisms for financing welfare programs (including zakat and khums ) are not adopted by the governments as a key source for social expenditure and revenues from these sources mainly remain in the realm of religious NGOs as well as religious figures like maraji’ 1 in Shia societies. Therefore, religious welfare is regarded mainly as a kind of ‘charity’ welfare instead of being perceived and practiced through a ‘right-based 1 Marja (Plural: Maraji’) refers to the highest rank of Shia scholars whose edicts or fatwas are followed and acted upon by a group of Shi’a followers and to whom his followers give their religious taxes like zakat, khums and kaffarah.

10

A. A. TAJMAZINANI

approach’ as is explained in Chapter 2 (see sections on social rights and social justice). This is despite the potential of these funding mechanisms as for example is stated by Aysan and Aysan in their chapter on social policy in Turkey with an estimation of the annual sum of about 24.2 billion Euros in 2015 for potential zakat revenues. It means that neither the governments nor the individual Muslims in these countries adheres to these practices in full. Moreover, it seems that governments have mainly refrained from the ‘institutionalization of religious welfare‘ as part of their formal structure while continuously attempted to govern it through devolving and regulating it. If we consider the role of the state in social policy and focus on official welfare establishments in Muslim countries, they are usually hybrid in their nature and incorporate elements from various welfare regimes introduced by researchers such as Esping-Andersen (1990). This issue was explicitly illustrated in chapters on Iran and Algeria while it could be inferred from competing policy paradigms in other countries. However, considering the wider landscape of welfare provision and focusing on the ‘welfare mix‘ in Muslim societies, a kind of ‘pseudo-Islamic welfare regime‘ could be identified with prominent roles played by the family and the community actors based partly on Islamic teachings and practices. Yuda (2020) call this mix the ‘Islamic welfare diamond‘ and finds in his study on Muslim countries in South East Asia that while Malaysia and Indonesia have demonstrated the most balanced form of ‘Islamic welfare diamond‘ in the relationship between welfare actors (state, market, family/relatives, and community), Brunei has taken a different route with the state playing a major role in welfare distribution. Concentrating on the interconnection of religion and social policy in the Middle East, Jawad (2009) provides a typology of religious welfare with five distinct but sometimes interrelated types of NGO actors (the religious order, the elite family, the popular political movement, the international humanitarian relief organisation, the para-state organisation) and as a result, Jawad and Yakut-Cakar (2010) challenge the long-established notion of ‘rentier state’ in explaining welfare arrangements in Muslim societies of the region with reference to the prominent role played by non-state actors in this regard. Data on the role of NGOs and faith-based organizations in countries under study in this book seems to support their claim. Since the religious welfare remains mainly in the third sector, the interaction between the state and non-governmental actors (and among

1

INTRODUCTION

11

the NGOs, both religious and non-religious) becomes a dynamic field for the provision and distribution of welfare in Muslim societies. These relationships could range from cooperation to competition and even contradiction. As the case of Egypt shows, successive administrations have adopted diverse and even contradictory policies towards the role of these NGOs during the last four decades. This is also the case in other countries. Although all these states are perceived to be located within the ‘Islamic world‘, in fact, they apply various ‘regimes of religious governance’ which impact their relationship with Islamic as well as nonreligious NGOs. By exploring the actual division of tasks and responsibilities in social welfare and by underlining the polysemy and the contribution of khayriyye practices, the chapter by Saeidnia and Ruiz de Elvira has highlighted the complex and ever-changing relations of these actors with the state and offers a way to explore the multiple logics that everyday beneficence practices may generate beyond the ‘retreat’, the ‘redeployment’ or the ‘off-loading’ of the state. Another important issue in this regard is that various contributions in this book have pointed to the fact that the outbreak of welfare related Islamic NGOs is in fact in line with the neoliberal tendencies of the governments in Muslim countries to replace the state-centred approaches with charity-based and community-based approaches and therefore, transfer their welfare responsibilities to other actors and justify it with recourse to Islamic ethos. Similarly, Öktem and Erdogan (2020) suggest that the social assistance regime in Turkey has moved from a welfare state paradigm in the 1970s (embodied in the social pension programme) to a ‘state-organised charity paradigm’, which aims to reinvigorate the Islamic tradition of charitable foundations (waqf ) in the 1980s (embodied in the Fund for the Encouragement of Social Cooperation and Solidarity). Capacity of the states in most Muslim countries to design and deliver sustainable social policies are heavily undermined by external factors especially in such regions as the Middle East and North Africa. Foreign interventions and imposed wars such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, Libya, and Occupied Palestine not only weaken the states in these countries (as well as undermining the ‘informal welfare actors’ like family and community) but also pose serious challenges to neighbouring Muslim countries. While much is said in the mainstream policy forums, media and research about the burden of immigrations from this region on the welfare systems in the West, less is discussed

12

A. A. TAJMAZINANI

about millions of immigrants in countries such as Turkey, Pakistan and Iran, with the latest country also having to struggle with harsh US led sanctions vanishing its financial resources to be spent on social protection programs. Vast diversity in trajectories of social policy development across time and place in Muslim majority countries points to the existence of ‘multiple Muslim worlds‘ in terms of welfare arrangements. Competing readings and conceptions of the desired ‘Islamic welfare system’ by various Muslim scholars, different political fronts, as well as among the grassroots may challenge the very idea of the utopian ‘Islamic welfare state‘. Therefore, social policy and welfare in Muslim societies remain a novel field of study with fresh research agenda for the future.

References Aydin, C. (2017). The idea of the Muslim world: A global intellectual history. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Choudhury, M. A. (2010). Reforming the Muslim world (2nd ed.). New York: Routledge. Cooper, W., & Yue, P. (2008). Challenges of the Muslim world: Present, future and past. Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing. Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Jawad, R. (2009). Social welfare and religion in the Middle East: A Lebanese perspective. Bristol: The Policy Press. Jawad, R., & Yakut-Cakar, B. (2010). Religion and social policy in the Middle East: The (re)constitution of an old-new partnership. Social Policy & Administration, 44(6), 658–672. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9515.2010.007 36.x. Öktem, K. G., & Erdogan, C. (2020). Between welfare state and (stateorganized) charity: How Turkey’s social assistance regime blends two competing policy paradigms. International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 40(3/4), 205–219. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJSSP-11-2018-0217. Rippin, A. (2008). The Islamic world. Oxon: Routledge. Salhi, K. (2014). Music, Culture and identity in the Muslim world: Performance, politics and piety. New York: Routledge. Yuda, T. K. (2020). The development of “Islamic welfare regime” in South East Asia: Drawing experiences from Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia and Indonesia. International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 40(3/4), 220–235. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJSSP-08-2018-0137.

PART I

Conceptual and Comparative Aspects

CHAPTER 2

Foundations of Social Policy and Welfare in Islam Ali Akbar Tajmazinani and Zahra Mahdavi Mazinani

1

Introduction

A great deal of Islamic teachings revolves around social issues, specifically social protection and welfare. However, these issues are underrepresented in the related literature especially in English language. Therefore, it is a hard task to find a coherent and comprehensive theory of Islamic social welfare based on the bulk of original sources at hand. Obviously, there are differences among various Islamic sects as well as competing readings of these teachings over time and place. For example, it is possible to find socialist, liberal, conservative and social democratic conceptions or readings of Islamic texts with regard to economic issues among Iranian religious intellectuals before, during and immediately after the 1979 Islamic Revolution which were influenced by various political currents at the time. However, it is possible to portray a general illustration of

A. A. Tajmazinani (B) Allameh Tabataba’i University, Tehran, Iran Z. Mahdavi Mazinani Imam Khomeini and Islamic Revolution Research Institute, Tehran, Iran © The Author(s) 2021 A. A. Tajmazinani (ed.), Social Policy in the Islamic World, International Series on Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57753-7_2

15

16

A. A. TAJMAZINANI AND Z. MAHDAVI MAZINANI

social welfare idea in the Islamic school of thought by reviewing the main authentic sources of Islamic teachings. Adopting a ‘social theology’ approach, this chapter aims to elaborate various aspects of Islamic social teachings with regard to social policy and welfare in two main areas of values and principles as well as instruments and practices. A set of values and principles underpin and guide the practice of social welfare in Islamic teachings, namely: intrinsic altruism, religious brotherhood, personal responsibility, takaful or public responsibility, state responsibility, social rights, social balance (tawazun) and equality, avoidance of tadawul, collective and public ownership, undesirability of poverty, and social justice. These principles all together constitute a holistic conceptual framework within which one could understand the general approach of the Islamic school to social policy and welfare. Based on the above-mentioned principles, a series of strategies and solutions for providing social welfare could be identified according to Islamic teachings, including inter alia: Zakat (a religious obligation or tax as a proportion of a Muslim’s total savings and wealth above a minimum amount known as nisab), Khums (one-fifth of certain items which a person acquires as wealth, and which must be paid as an Islamic tax), Waqf (endowment of properties to be held in trust and used for a charitable or religious purpose), Sadaqah (giving money or other items without that being made obligatory in shari’ah), Qard-al-Hasan (interest-free loan on the basis of benevolence), Anfal (public resources), and Nazr (a vow with Allah to be fulfilled). These practices are mostly of a redistributive nature and include both obligatory and non-obligatory actions by the Islamic state and individual Muslims. This chapter will provide the reader with a conceptual framework to understand the status of Islamic teachings in the social policy atmosphere of various Muslim societies studied throughout the book.

2

Main Sources of Islamic Teachings

This chapter adopts a ‘social theology’ approach to illustrate the main ideas with regard to social policy and welfare in Islamic teachings. Social theology refers to an interdisciplinary component of Islamic theology which deals with the social aspects of human life. It encompasses five disciplines of social hadith or narration, social tafsir or Quran commentary, social fiqh or jurisprudence, social kalam or scholasticism, and social akhlaq or ethics. All of these disciplines of Islamic theology adopt their

2

FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL POLICY AND WELFARE IN ISLAM

17

own methodology for the study of original religious texts and social theology builds on all of them to elaborate social teachings of Islam (Taghizahed Davari, 2009). The reason behind this is to familiarize the reader with original and first-hand sources of inference. Muslim scholars derive Islamic rules from a series of sources. The main source among all Muslims is Quran1 which is regarded as a holy book revealed by Allah to his messenger Mohammad. There is consensus among Muslims that the existing Quran text is the same as what has been received by the Prophet and was at hand at the beginning of Islam without any distortion. Sunnah or tradition of the Prophet (the words, actions, and silent assertions of him) is the second source of deducting Islamic teachings. For Twelver Shia scholars, the words, actions and acknowledgments of twelve Imams from the prophet’s household and his daughter Fatimah (the 14 infallibles) are valid as authentic media of transmitting his tradition through succeeding generations.2 The third source for exploring Islamic rules is the consensus or ijma’ of Muslim Scholars on a specific issue in question. According to Sunni jurisprudence, this consensus has been legitimized by the Prophet when saying that his ummah or followers “will never agree [make consensus] on an error” (Ibn Majah, Book 36, hadith 25), while Shia jurists believe that ijma’ should act as a mean to discover the real viewpoint of the infallibles. Whereas aql or reason is the fourth source of Shia jurisprudence, analogical reasoning (or qiyas ) is the fourth one and refers to the process of deducting new propositions from those which have been previously accepted. Public interest or al-maslahah al-mursalah, istihsan 1 The full text of Quran and its various translations which has been used in this chapter could be accessed at: http://tanzil.net. For comparative study of Quran’s commentaries visit: https://quran.inoor.ir/en/ayah/1/2/commentary. 2 The most important and authentic hadith books (collection of narrations) among Shia (referred to as ‘The Four Books’) are: Al-Kafi (by Al-Kulayni), Man la yahduruh al-faqih (by Ibn Babawayh or al-Shaykh al-Saduq), Tahdhib al-ahkam (by Al-Tusi), and Al-Istibsar (by Al-Tusi). The full text of these sources which has been used in this chapter could be accessed at: https://hadith.inoor.ir/fa/home. For Sunni scholars, there are six most reliable hadith collections (called ‘The Authentic Six’) which include: Sahih al-Bukhari (by Imam Al-Bukhari), Sahih Muslim (by Muslim bin al-Hajjaj), Sunan Abu Dawud (by Abu Dawood), Sunan Ibn Maja (by Ibn Maja), Jami’ al-Tirmidhi’ (by al-Tirmidhi) and Al-Sunan al-sughra (by Al-Nasa’i). The full text of these sources which has been used in this chapter could be accessed at: https://sun nah.com.

18

A. A. TAJMAZINANI AND Z. MAHDAVI MAZINANI

or juristic discretion/preference, customs (urf ) of local people during the Prophet’s era, inference or istidlal are other main sources of Islamic jurisprudence which are accepted among Sunni scholars though there are disagreements and variations with regard to these sources. This chapter builds its arguments on verses from the Quran and narrations or hadiths from the tradition or Sunnah as the two main authentic sources of Islamic teachings among all Muslim sects.

3 Principles of Social Policy and Welfare in Islam Social policies are based on specific conceptions of key values and principles in various schools of thought. The way a certain welfare ideology conceptualizes principles such as equality, right, responsibility, justice, etc. affects selection and implementation of different types of policy instruments. The Islamic school of thought has its own viewpoint about these principles and values which are briefly elaborated in this section. 3.1

Intrinsic Altruism

The original nature or disposition of human beings (fitrah) according to Islamic teachings is purified and therefore they are requested to adhere to “the fitrah [nature] of Allah upon which He has created [all] people” (Quran, Ch. 30, Verse 30). Human beings have the potential and capability of going to the right or wrong directions because of possessing free will: “Indeed, We guided him to the way, be he grateful or be he ungrateful” (Quran, Ch. 76, Verse 3). However, their original fitrah includes philanthropy and altruism. “Indeed Allah, to the people, is Kind and Merciful” (Quran, Ch. 22, Verse 65) and “He [has] placed between you [them] affection and mercy” (Quran, Ch. 30, Verse 21). Therefore, He wants human beings to exemplify Him as stated by His Messenger: “The merciful are shown mercy by Ar-Rahman [Allah]. Be merciful on the earth, and you will be shown mercy from Who is above the heavens” (At-Tirmidhi, Book 27, Hadith 30). Moreover, he has warned his followers that “none will have the sweetness (delight) of faith till he loves a person and loves him only for Allah’s sake” (al-Bukhari 1, Book 78, Hadith 71). According to the Prophet, “Allah divided His Mercy into one hundred parts. He kept ninety nine parts with Him and sent down one part to

2

FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL POLICY AND WELFARE IN ISLAM

19

the earth, and because of that, its one single part, His Creations are merciful to each other” (al-Bukhari, Book 78, Hadith 3). Based on the ‘shared humanity’ principle, this should be extended to all human beings including the none-believers: “Allah does not forbid you from dealing with kindness and justice with those [polytheists] who did not make war against you” (Quran, Ch. 60, Verse 8). In Islamic viewpoint, as outlined by the Prophet “people are family of Allah and the most loved people to Allah are those who are of benefit to his family and make them happy” (Al-Kulayni, vol. 2, p. 164), while one of the major criteria for a Muslim’s true belief is to love for others “that which he loves for himself” as narrated form him as well (Ibn al-Hajjaj, Book 1, Hadith 77). Moreover, some prominent believers have been admired for giving the needy “preference over themselves, even though they are in privation” (Quran, Ch. 59, Verse 9). Accordingly, Muslims are warned that “by no means shall you attain righteousness unless you give (freely) of that which you love” (Quran, Ch. 3, Verse 92). 3.2

Religious Brotherhood and Sisterhood

‘Social solidarity’ in Islam is best understood in the concept of ‘religious brotherhood’. Islam regards believers as sincere brothers and sisters and this issue is clearly articulated in Quran: “The believers are but brothers [and sisters]” (Quran, Ch. 49, Verse 10). While the terms ‘brother’ and ‘brotherhood’ are mainly used in religious texts, they are general terms which include both sexes. One of the first measures undertaken by Prophet Mohammad after establishment of the Islamic State in Medina was to form ‘brotherhood ties’ between Muhajirin (emigrants from Makka to Medina) and Ansar (or helpers who supported him in Medina). This practice was also followed by the Prophet at the beginning of his movement in Mekka. Religious brothers and sisters were agreeing upon certain mutual rights and duties which included economic and welfare support and even sharing their assets (in addition to spiritual and moral aspects). There are numerous narrations from the Prophet as well as other Islamic authorities from various sects about Islamic brotherhood. For

20

A. A. TAJMAZINANI AND Z. MAHDAVI MAZINANI

example, it is narrated from Prophet Mohammad and Imam Jafa AlSadiq3 that “believers are brothers like a body; if one part feels unwell other parts feel its pain” (Al-Kulayni, vol. 2, p. 166; Ibn Al-Hajjaj, Book 45, Hadith 84). Various rights have been defined for religious brothers by them (and other religious authorities) including inter alia: loving them from their bottom of hearts, sharing their money and assets, trying to meet their needs and seeking their satisfaction, helping them by money and body, not being full if they are hungry and not well-clothed if they are bare (Al-Kulayni, vol. 3, p. 167 and vol. 71, p. 222). Religious brotherhood was not limited to the beginning of the Islamic movement in its early years and remains as an established principle in its main teachings. Many social and political movements throughout the history and across the world have adopted this religious brotherhood as their main motto and even operational strategy. 3.3

Multi-level Responsibility

Personal responsibility: The initial responsibility of securing one’s welfare is on him/her. Islam regards all individuals as responsible human beings. In fact, only Allah “is not questioned about what He does, but they will be questioned” (Quran, Ch. 21, Verse 23). All people should be accountable for all possibilities that they have and capabilities which they possess and the way they use or not use them: “Indeed, the hearing, the sight and the heart - about all those [one] will be questioned” (Quran, Ch. 17, Verse 36). Therefore, no one is permitted to depend on others for livelihood if he/she is able to work as warned by the Prophet: “Whoever puts his/her burden on other people is cursed, is cursed” (Al-Kulayni, vol. 4, p. 12). However, emphasizing individual responsibility does not imply forgetting structural causes of poverty or social barriers of welfare; an issue which will be discussed below. Family responsibility: Family members have also duties towards each other, especially the head of family and fulfilling this responsibility is highly appreciated by Allah, securing the highest rewards which belong to those who take part in jihad or holy war: “Whoever makes efforts for the livelihood of his family is like mujahid in the path of Allah” (Al-Kulayni, vol. 5, p. 88). Therefore, no one is permitted to avoid family duties and 3 The sixth Imam of Twelver Shia and founder of the Ja’fari school of jurisprudence.

2

FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL POLICY AND WELFARE IN ISLAM

21

“whoever lets down his family is cursed, is cursed” (Al-Kulayni, vol. 4, p. 12). Providing maintenance for family members including spouse, children, and parents is mandatory and Islamic courts could force the head of household to fulfill it as a duty (Al-Tusi, vol. 6, p. 293). Public responsibility ( Takaful): The third level of responsibility is related to all people in society. All members of society are required to be sensitive to those in need and “if somebody hears that an individual is asking ‘Oh! Muslims help me’ and does not help, certainly is not a [true] Muslim” (Al-Hur Al-Ameli, vol. 15, p. 141). Moreover, “if a religious brother requests him to help in satisfying his need but does not do his best has certainly betrayed Allah, his messenger and all believers” (Al-Kulayni, vol. 2, p. 362). According to Al-Sadr (1996) trying to meet these needs is wajib (obligatory) since the person who avoids helping despite being asked and being able to help has been warned in a narration from Imam Jafar Al-Sadiq to “arise (from his grave) on the Day of Resurrection, with his face blackened, his eyes blinded, and his hands tied to his neck… Then he will be ordered to Hell” (Al-Hur Al-Ameli, vol. 16, p. 387). It is noteworthy that this level of responsibility is limited to ‘severe needs’ and is obligatory upon a believer within the limits of his means and capacity. It is also not restricted to meeting the needs of the fellow Muslims but is extended to all fellow human beings based on a ‘shared humanity’ principle as is clearly stated in many narrations which use general terms like ‘individual’, ‘man’, or ‘person’ for those asking help. A notable aspect of the public responsibility relates to the community or neighborhood level. It has been narrated from Fatimah (daughter of the Prophet) that “neighbor is first and the home comes second” (Al-Hur Al-Ameli, vol. 7, p. 113) while the word ‘neighbor’ has been defined as those living in 40 houses from the four sides (Al-Bukhari 2, Book 6, Hadith 9; Al-Kulayni, vol. 2, p. 669) and has narrated the Prophet that “has not believed in me who is sleeping full while his neighbor is hungry” (Al-Bukhari 2, Book 6, Hadith 12; Al-Kulayni, vol. 2, p. 1). The importance of paying attention to the neighbors’ rights is so high that the Prophet is narrated by his wife Aishah that: “Jibril continued to recommend me about (treating) the neighbors so (kindly and politely), that I thought he would order me to make them heirs” (At-Tirmidhi, Book 27, Hadith 48). State responsibility: Responsibilities of individuals, families and the public towards each other do not imply that the Islamic state has no or little responsibility in providing welfare for its citizens. Indeed, one could argue that the most substantial responsibility belongs to the state.

22

A. A. TAJMAZINANI AND Z. MAHDAVI MAZINANI

According to Quran, Allah has put the share and rights of the needy in the wealth of the rich (Quran, Ch. 70, Verses 24–25; Sharif Razi, Hadith 328) and it is the duty of Islamic ruler to take it out of their wealth by which they will be purified (Quran, Ch. 9, Verse 103) and to redistribute it in the society. Muslim scholars from various disciplines, especially Islamic jurisprudence and law as well as the Quran commentators have consensus that this is a strong command from Allah and not an optional measure (see for example Tabataba’i, 1996; Al-Qaradawi, 1986). This responsibility is strongly outlined in a letter from Imam Ali4 to Malik al-Ashtar an-Nakha’i when appointing him as the Governor of Egypt: “[fear] Allah and keep Allah in view in respect of the lowest class … Take care for the sake of Allah of His obligations towards them for which He has made you responsible… All these people are those whose rights have been placed in your charge (Sharif Razi, letter 53). In fact, no other responsibility could overshadow the duty of welfare provision for the lowest class: “You cannot be excused for ignoring small matters because you were deciding big problems” (ibid.). Failure of the state in extracting the rights of the lower classes from the wealth of the upper classes and redistributing it in a way that eradicates poverty and fight exclusion and class gap (see ‘social balance’ below) is regarded as the main structural cause of disadvantage and the main social barrier to the public welfare. According to Imam Ali, “Allah has made mandatory the livelihood of the poor in the wealth of the rich and no poor remains hungry except if the rich avoid [to fulfil their duty] and certainly Allah will question them about that” (Sharif Razi, Hadith 328). Similarly, Imam Sadiq has been narrated that what Allah has made mandatory in favor of the poor in the wealth of the rich is enough for them to meet their needs and if He knew that it was not enough, He certainly would add for them. “They are not poor because of the [inadequacy or weakness of the] divine mandatory rule but because of the avoidance of those who have deprived them of their rights … and if people fulfill their [the poor’s] rights, they would be living in a good manner” (Al-Kulayni, vol. 3, p. 496). It is noteworthy that the responsibility of the Islamic state towards the welfare of its citizen is not restricted to Muslims and all citizens should be covered by its welfare programs. Imam Ali has been narrated while passing alongside his companions by an old Christian man who was begging on the street: “You were making use of him until he became old 4 The son in law of Prophet Mohammad, his forth Caliph (or successor) and the first Imam of Twelver Shia.

2

FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL POLICY AND WELFARE IN ISLAM

23

and unable to work, then you deny him [his livelihood]?! Give him his maintenance from the ‘House of Money’ or the treasury” (Al-Tusi, 1997, vol. 6, p. 292). 3.4

Social Rights

Social rights are the other side of state responsibility through which, the state has the duty to take care of the ‘social needs’ of its citizens. Social rights may be justified on a social contract between the state and its citizens or it could be justified by attributing them to the natural or divine order. Base on the Islamic viewpoint, all human beings are bestowed divine dignity and honor with the provision of living necessities being one of the main aspects of this dignity: “And We have certainly honored the children of Adam and carried them on the land and sea and provided for them of the good things and preferred them over much of what We have created, with [definite] preference (Quran, Ch. 17, Verse 70). Consequently, enjoying a proper living standard is right for all people; this right is either given directly to them or has been defined in the wealth of the well-off: Believers are described in Quran as “those within whose wealth is a known right, for the petitioner and the deprived” (Quran, Ch. 70, Verses 24–25). As stated above, Imam Ali states clearly that the ruler must be accountable to the social rights of all people, especially the lowest class: “All these people are those whose rights have been placed in your charge… these people are the most deserving of equitable treatment, while for others also you should fulfill their rights so as to render account to Allah” (Sharif Razi, letter 53). Securing the provision of living standards for the needy is not merely an act of ‘charity’ which could be devolved to members of the society, but it is a right that must be guaranteed by the state. 3.5

Avoidance of Tadawul

The term ‘tadawul ’ refers to the accumulation and circulation of a society’s wealth among the rich, resulting in their monopoly over resources. A major principle in Islamic economics with relevance to social welfare is the responsibility of the state to provide an economic system with regulations and mechanisms that ensure all members of society have access to various resources and these resources are not concentrated among a small rich proportion of the population. The Quran clearly states that

24

A. A. TAJMAZINANI AND Z. MAHDAVI MAZINANI

these resources should be redistributed among specific groups especially the poor and orphans “so that it will not be a perpetual distribution among the rich from among you” (Quran, Ch. 59, Verse 7). Although this rule was originally established with regard to the distribution of spoils obtained from those towns which surrendered without any war but it is a general principle which has been applied to various instances and accordingly, the Islamic state must materialize it through various strategies and measures which will be discussed below. 3.6

Social Balance (Tawazun) and Equality

Although people are different in their personal characteristics including intelligence, physical ability and motivations as well as in their family attributes which leads to differences in material enjoyment, none of these factors could justify social gaps in society especially with regard to welfare needs. Differences in social positions and roles as well as resulting material enjoyment are considered as natural and inevitable: “Do they distribute the mercy of your Lord? It is We who have apportioned among them their livelihood in the life of this world and have raised some of them above others in degrees [of rank] that they may make use of one another for service. But the mercy of your Lord is better than whatever they accumulate” (Quran, Ch. 43, Verse 32). Therefore, people are asked: “in no wise covet those things in which Allah Hath bestowed His gifts More freely on some of you than on others: To men is allotted what they earn, and to women what they earn: But ask Allah of His bounty” (Quran, Ch. 4, Verse 32). However, these differences do not imply superiority of some groups on others since according to the Prophet, “people are equal like the teeth of a comb” (Ibn Babawayh, vol. 4, p. 379) and “there is no superiority for an Arab over a non-Arab nor for a non-Arab over an Arab. Neither is the white superior over the black, nor is the black superior over the white - except by piety” (Ibin Hanbal, vol.6, p. 570). According to Al-Sadr (1996, pp. 671–676) although differences in income and wealth could be permitted, ‘social balance’ in terms of the ‘living standards’ should be strictly pursued by the Islamic state within the means at its disposal. This social balance is secured through instructions about both the rich and the poor. A series of mandatory economic instruments like zakat, khums, kharaj, etc. (see below) are designed for ‘vertical redistribution’ while the rich are not ethically allowed to undertake extravagant practices and wasteful consumption; an issue which is

2

FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL POLICY AND WELFARE IN ISLAM

25

clearly stated in many verses of Quran, including: “But waste not by excess: for Allah loveth not the wasters” (Quran, Ch. 6, Verse 141) and “Verily spendthrifts are brothers of the Evil Ones; and the Evil One is to his Lord (himself) ungrateful” (Quran, Ch. 17, Verse 27). On the other hand, revenues from the above-mentioned instruments (as well as from other public resources like anfal ) should be spent to uplift those people who are enjoying lower standards of living. It has been narrated from Imam Jafar Al-Sadiq that “you may give to him [the poor person] zakat till you make him prosperous” (Al-Hur Al-Ameli, vol. 6, p. 178) and “… whatever amount of zakat he [the poor person] takes, he may contribute towards the upkeep of his family so as to join them (on level) with people” (Al-Hur Al-Ameli, vol. 6, p. 59). Similarly, there is a narration from Imam Musa Al-Kazim5 stating that “the Governor should dispense it [zakat] to them in their annuities of such amount as would render them dispense with their needs without difficulty and dread … the Governor would make up the shortage by providing out of funds with him an amount which would do to render them dispense their needs” (AlKulayni, vol. 1, p. 541). According to these narrations and many other similar narrations from other sources, it is not just the severe need which should be met but the state should provide conditions which uplift the living condition of the poor to a level comparable by average people in society. Therefore, it is the ‘equality of outcomes’ in the form of ‘equality of welfare’ which should be followed by the Islamic state instead of mere ‘equality of opportunities’ or complete ‘equality of resources’ in terms of income and wealth. 3.7

Social Justice

Social justice could be inferred both directly from the wordings as well as indirectly from the overall approach of the religious texts. There are two main words which are interchangeably used (adl and qest ) and are synonyms with the word ‘justice’ in English. The most substantial mission of all messengers of Allah and all divine religions according to the Quran is to establish and maintain justice: “We have already sent Our messengers with clear evidences and sent down with them the Scripture and the balance that the people may maintain [their affairs] in justice” (Quran,

5 The seventh Imam of Twelver Shia.

26

A. A. TAJMAZINANI AND Z. MAHDAVI MAZINANI

Ch. 57, Verse 25). Similarly, Prophet Mohammad himself is asked by Allah to publicly announce that “my Lord has ordered justice” (Quran, Ch. 7, Verse 29). More generally, “Indeed, Allah orders justice” (Quran, Ch. 16, Verse 90) to be observed in all spheres of the life. Apart from the general emphasis on justice, it is the ‘social justice’ in terms of enjoying an equitable living standard which is desirable. According to Imam Musa Al-Kazim “Allah has bestowed every rightholder his general and specific rights” (Al-Tusi, vol. 4, p. 128) and “if justice was observed among people they would be prosperous” (AlKulayni, vol. 1, p. 542); therefore manifestations of poverty and unmet social needs could be attributed to lack of social justice. As a general rule, it the ‘social justice’ and not the ‘charity’ which should be stressed as the basis for welfare provision as openly stated by Imam Ali when he was asked which of the two is better; justice or generosity? and he replied: “Justice puts things in their [right] places while generosity takes them out from their directions; justice is the general caretaker while generosity is a particular benefit. Consequently, justice is superior and more distinguished of the two” (Sharif Razi, Hadith 437). It could be clearly concluded that besides the ‘procedural justice’, it is the ‘distributive justice’ which is stressed by the Islamic teachings. This issue could be inferred from evidences about redistributive policy instruments like zakat, khums, kharaj and other mandatory religious duties (see below) which seek to maintain social balance in society. The definition adopted by Tabataba’i attempts to mix these two dimensions and is based on the two definitions by Imam Ali and Imam Kazim: “justice is to give every right-holder its rights from the strong and to put everything in its right place which deserves” (Tabataba’i, vol. 1, p. 371). 3.8

Undesirability of Poverty

There are plenty of Quranic verses as well as narrations about poverty and wealth. The content of these statements may even seem contradictory at first glance since some of them appreciate the poor and poverty and condemns wealth accumulations and the well-off in some documents and vice versa in some others. However, it could be inferred that the kind of wealth which is accumulated from wrong ways like exploitation and unlawful practices, is not spent on meeting the needs of others, is used in a wasteful manner, and causes the rich to be unthankful to the God (and the like) is disapproved and condemned.

2

FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL POLICY AND WELFARE IN ISLAM

27

On the other hand, poverty is firmly rejected since according to Imam Ali “poverty is the greatest death” (Sharif Razi, Hadith 163), “poverty is deficiency of religious belief, perplexity of intelligence, and it is conducive to hatred of obstinate people” (Sharif Razi, Hadith 319) and “poverty is almost unbelief” (Al-Kulayni, vol. 2, p. 307) which contradicts with the most important goal of any religion; because of this, poverty is attributed to Satan in Quran: “Satan threatens you with poverty and orders you to immorality, while Allah promises you forgiveness from Him and bounty” (Quran, Ch. 2, Verse 268). In fact, and according to Imam Jafar AlSadeq, it is the opposite which is desirable: There are three things that all people need them: security, justice, and prosperity (Al-Majlesi, vol. 75, p. 234). 3.9

Cooperation

Since the nature of the human beings (fitrah) is built on intrinsic altruism, the standard and desirable mode of interaction between them is cooperation and mutual support. The Quran encourages believers to “cooperate in righteousness and piety” (Quran, Ch. 5, Verse 2) and righteousness by no means could be attained unless they give (freely) of that which they love (Quran, Ch. 3, Verse 92). The only accepted competition is towards the mercy of God: “race toward forgiveness from your Lord and a Garden whose width is like the width of the heavens and earth” (Quran, Ch. 57, Verse 21). In line with this, believers are ordered to compete in attaining ‘the goods’ “so race to [all that is] good (Quran, Ch. 2, Verse 148) including the ‘common good’.

4

Policy Instruments for Financing and Providing Social Welfare

Principles outlined above are the basis for a set of policy instruments which together aim at eradication of poverty, creation of social balance, and improving the level of welfare in society. These instruments are mostly of a redistributive nature and include both obligatory and non-obligatory practices by the Islamic state and individual Muslims. This section briefly introduces some of the most important instruments and practices.

28

A. A. TAJMAZINANI AND Z. MAHDAVI MAZINANI

4.1

Zakat

Zakat is a religious obligation or tax as a proportion of a Muslim’s total savings and wealth (2.5–10% and even 20% according to jurisprudence of some Islamic sects) above a minimum amount known as nisab (threshold). It is one of the five pillars of Islam alongside prayer, fasting, pilgrimage (Hajj) and belief in Allah and the Prophet Muhammad. Zakat is mentioned alongside ‘salat’ (prayer) in numerous cases as the main signs of true believers. To compare, ‘salat’ represents Allah’s rights upon believers and ‘zakat’ is considered as the rights of other people which has been placed upon believers. The Quran states that it is the responsibility of the Islamic state to collect zakat and it is mandatory by Allah’s order: “Take, [O, Muhammad], from their wealth a sadaqah [zakat] by which you purify them and cause them to increase” (Quran, Ch. 9, Verse 103). The terms sadaqah and zakat are used interchangeably in Quran and other religious texts (referring to both mandatory and charity almsgiving) but the direct order of God in this verse and many related narrations imply that it is compulsory for the state and the people to take and give it respectively. In fact, poverty is the result of the failure of the state or disobedience of the rich to accomplish this responsibility as outlined by Imam Ali: “Allah, the Glorified, has fixed the livelihood of the destitute in the wealth of the rich. Consequently, whenever a destitute remains hungry it is because some rich person has denied (him his share). Allah, the Sublime, will question them about it” (Sharif Razi, Hadith 328). There are two kinds of zakat: zakat of wealth and the zakat of body (or Zakat al-Fitr). There are differences between Shia and Sunni schools of religious jurisprudence about the items and proportions of zakat. The zakat of wealth is wajib (or obligatory) for nine items according to narrations from the Prophet cited by Shia sources: Two types of Coins (silver and gold), three animals (cows, sheep and goats, camels) and four food crops (wheat, barley, dates, raisins). These items are not mentioned in Quran (as is the case for details of salat and many other religious duties) but instead are explained by the Prophet (see for example Al-Tusi, vol. 4, p. 5). On the other hand, Al-Qaradawi (1986) discusses about the following as zakatable items and compares opinions of various Sunni divisions about them: assets, livestock, gold and silver, business inventory, agriculture, honey and animal products, minerals and sea products, exploited assets, earning of laborers professionals, shares and bonds.

2

FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL POLICY AND WELFARE IN ISLAM

29

The other notable issue is regarding those groups who are eligible for receiving zakat. Eight groups are mentioned in Quran for this purpose: “zakat expenditures are only for the poor and for the needy and for those employed to collect [zakat] and for bringing hearts together [for Islam] and for freeing captives [or slaves] and for those in debt and for the cause of Allah and for the [stranded] traveler - an obligation [imposed] by Allah” (Quran, Ch. 9, Verse 60). Clearly the poor are prioritized for receiving zakat while phrases such as for the cause of or on the path of Allah could compass many other cases of expenditure with relevance to those in need. Zakat al-Fitr or zakat of body is a kind of almsgiving which is paid before Eid al-Fitr (end of Ramadan festival or the fasting month) prayer by every self-supporting Muslim adult who has food in excess of his needs. It is mandated by the following Quranic verse which has been clarified by the Prophet. “He has certainly succeeded who purifies himself” (Quran, Ch. 87, Verse 14). The amount of zakat is the same for everyone regardless of their level of income and it is three kilos of the main food item (rice, wheat, etc.) on one’s routine meal or its price which must be paid to the person in need before the Eid prayer. 4.2

Khums

Khums is one-fifth (20%) of certain items which a person acquires as wealth, and which must be paid as an Islamic tax. It is legislated in Quran in the following verse: “And know that anything you obtain - then indeed, for Allah is one-fifth of it and for the Messenger and for [his] near relatives and the orphans, the needy, and the [stranded] traveller, if you have believed in Allah and in that which We sent down to Our Servant on the day of criterion - the day when the two armies met. And Allah, over all things, is competent” (Quran, Ch. 8, Verse 41). Like zakat, khums revenues are mainly intended to provide social protection and increase the welfare of the needy. Apart from citing specific needy groups, the first three shares (those of Allah, the Messenger and his near relatives which according to Shia perspective are subsequent 12 Imams from his family and is referred to as the ‘Imam’s share’) are meant for public expenditure by the Islamic state which certainly could prioritize creating ‘social balance’ in society. Sunni scholars believe that this rule has been specific to obtained war spoils and other revenues and wealth items are included in zakat

30

A. A. TAJMAZINANI AND Z. MAHDAVI MAZINANI

as explained above. Shia scholars suggest that the verb ‘obtain’ refers to any kind of gains including the war booty. Based on Shia jurisprudence, the following items are included in khums obligation: Revenues gained through a business or a job and all other profits after deducting the annual expenses of the family; War spoils; Mines including gold, silver, lead, copper, iron, oil, etc.; Treasure trove; Gems obtained from the sea diving; Amalgamation of Halal wealth with Haraam in a way that it is almost impossible to separate them and the owners of the haram part and its amount is unknown; A land which a non-Muslim citizen living under the protection of Islamic Government purchases from a Muslim. 4.3

Anfal

Anfal refers to those properties at the disposal of the Islamic ruler for public expenditure. There is a chapter in the Quran named Al-Anfal and its first verse states that “the anfal belong to Allah and the Apostle” (Quran, Ch. 8, Verse 1). While Sunni scholars mainly believe that anfal refers to the war spoils (the same for khums and fay’ ), Shia scholars infer based on narrations from the prophet through Imams from his family that anfal and fay’ are more general and encompass all public properties with no private owner like rivers, mountains, deserts, valleys, forests and grasslands, wastelands, seas and lakes, mines, oil and gas as well as inheritance without any heir. As a major mechanism for financing social welfare programs, anfal could play a vital role in improving the living standards of the general population, especially the needy. 4.4

Kaffarah

Kaffarah is a penalty or fine imposed on committing certain forbidden actions (haram) or avoiding doing certain religious obligations. Some of these penalties are financial and some are acts of worship. They are designed to cover (as the word literally means) or compensate for the sinful act or inability to observe the religious duty. The main actions or omissions which cause a Muslim to become liable for kaffarah include the following: intentionally breaking one’s fast, breaking one’s swear or promise, committing forbidden actions during hajj, unintentionally killing a human being, etc. for example, Verse 89 of chapter five describes the kaffarah of breaking one’s swear as following: “He will impose blame upon you for [breaking] what you intended of oaths. So its expiation

2

FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL POLICY AND WELFARE IN ISLAM

31

is the feeding of ten needy people from the average of that which you feed your [own] families or clothing them or the freeing of a slave. But whoever cannot find [or afford it] - then a fast of three days [is required]. That is the expiation for oaths when you have sworn” (Quran, Ch. 5, Verse 89). The main forms of kaffarah include the emancipation of a slave, feeding or providing clothes for people in need, alternative days of fasting, and slaughtering a sheep or other animal and giving the meat to the needy. Numerous verses and traditions outline the cases for kaffarah obligation and its type and amount, including the following verse: “[Fasting for] a limited number of days. So whoever among you is ill or on a journey [during them] - then an equal number of days [are to be made up]. And upon those who are able [to fast, but with hardship] - a ransom [as substitute] of feeding a poor person [each day]. And whoever volunteers excess - it is better for him” (Quran, Ch. 2, Verse 184). 4.5

Al-Qard Al-Hassan

Al-Qard Al-Hassan (or goodly loan) is a kind of interest-free loan that is given by a lender to a borrower for the sake of Allah. Quran describes this practice as giving a loan to Allah and promises multiplication of rewards: “Who is it that would loan Allah a goodly loan so He may multiply it for him many times over? And it is Allah who withholds and grants abundance, and to Him, you will be returned” (Quran, Ch. 2, Verse 245). It is also stated that the loan is going ahead of the lender towards Allah and will be protected by Him and will be than any other reward: “So recite what is easy from it [Quran] and establish prayer and give zakat and loan Allah a goodly loan. And whatever good you put forward for yourselves you will find it with Allah. It is better and greater in reward (Quran, Ch. 73, Verse 20). Prophet Mohammad has been narrated that while sadaqah (charity) will be rewarded tenfold, al-qard al-hassan will be multiplied by 18 times (Al- Kulayni, vol. 4, p. 10). 4.6

Waqf

Waqf (called also hubous or mortmain) is referred to the permanent endowment of a property in order to be held in trust by a trustee (a defined person or institution) and used for a specific purpose (mainly charitable or religious) specified by the endower. The word waqf has

32

A. A. TAJMAZINANI AND Z. MAHDAVI MAZINANI

not been directly mentioned in Quran but there are numerous narrations explaining its importance and explaining the rules which regulate it. Waqf has been described by the Prophet as ‘recurrent sadaqah’ or charity which remains even after one’s life ends: “if a believer dies, his/her deed ceases except for three thins; recurrent sadaqah, beneficial knowledge, and a righteous child who supplicates [God] for him/her” (An-Nasa’i, vol. 4, Hadith 41; Al-Majlesi, vol. 2, p.22). Many of waqf cases are in the field of social welfare (hospitals, schools, housing, residential care, food and water supply initiatives, etc.) and have social protection functions. 4.7

Nazr

Nazr is a vow with Allah to fulfil an act. It is usually used by a believer as a mean by which he/she seeks assistance and pleasure of Allah. If the intended problem was solved or the desired item was gained then it is the duty of the person to fulfil the Nazr. Failure to fulfil a nazr is regarded as a serious offense and should be compensated by the person in charge. While having spiritual implications, it is closely related to welfare provision. Many instances of nazr are related to provision of food, money, social service, charity, etc. to the poor. One of the most notable cases in the Islamic history mentioned in Quran relates to the nazr of Ali and Fatima (son in law and daughter of the Prophet) with regard to the sickness of their two sons: “They fulfil their vows and fear a day whose ill will be widespread. For the love of Him, they feed the needy, the orphan, and the prisoner. [saying,] We feed you only for the sake of Allah. We desire no reward from you, nor thanks” (Quran, Ch. 76, Verses 7–9). 4.8

Charity

While religious acts like paying zakat and khums are obligatory duties on Muslims and serve as mandatory policy instruments for vertical redistribution, charity is voluntary in nature. Terms such as infaq, sadaqah, ihsan, and khairiah/khayriyyah are used interchangeably to denote this voluntary practice. Infaq is cited in numerous verses as the main sign of true belief and Allah asks his messenger to “tell My servants who have believed to establish prayer and spend [make infaq] from what We have provided them, secretly and publicly, before a Day comes in which there will be no exchange, nor any friendships” (Quran, Ch. 14, Verse 31).

2

FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL POLICY AND WELFARE IN ISLAM

33

According to the Prophet “Sadaqah (charity) extinguishes sins just as water extinguishes fire” (At-Tirmidhi, Book 6, Hadith 71). Charity could be directed towards a diverse range of human beings as well as ‘non-human life forms’ including animals and plants. Certain groups (the poor, orphans, widows, etc.) have been specifically emphasized for this purpose. The Prophet has been narrated that “I and the person who looks after an orphan and provides for him, will be in Paradise like this - putting his index and middle fingers together” (Al-Bukhari, Book 78, Hadith 36). He has also said that “the one who looks after and works for a widow and for a poor person, is like a warrior fighting for Allah’s Cause or like a person who fasts during the day and prays all the night” (Al-Bukhari, Book 78, Hadith 37). As examples for charity towards non-human entities, the Prophet has described the person who feeds horses as one who makes sadaqah (Ibn Babawayh 1984, Vol. 2, p. 283) and the person who plants a tree and protects it as making sadaqah for the sake of Allah (Rayshari, 1996, Hadith 9143). 4.9

Welfare Through Ethics

Ethical codes of behavior are an integral part of any religion. While the initial functions of ethics may not be related to providing welfare, they have prominent implications in this regard (Ghabel, 2003). For example, ‘respect and support for the elderly’ especially regarding parents ensures social support for them and providing informal care if needed; stressing ‘benevolence’, ‘love for others’, and avoidance of ‘niggardliness’ is key to promoting charity and almsgiving; keeping family ties (selah Ar-rahem) among the extended family members ensures a strong social support network; ‘humbleness’ especially for the rich and those in power and ‘avoiding extravagance’ and wasteful consumption prevents a sense of inferiority among the needy and the lower class and ‘being hopeful’, refraining tul al-amal (harboring over-reaching wishes) and greed, as well as ‘contentment’ in the simple life are key to subjective wellbeing. These ethical values are merely a small sample of the whole Islamic moral philosophy which could contribute to the improvement of subjective and objective well-being.

34

A. A. TAJMAZINANI AND Z. MAHDAVI MAZINANI

5

Conclusions

This chapter aimed to provide the reader with a brief but holistic overview of the Islamic idea of social welfare using a ‘social theology’ approach. Islamic foundations of social policy and welfare were explained in two main categories of ‘principles and values’ as well as ‘policy instruments and practices’. The chapter claims that although competing readings of the Islamic teachings may provide diverse and even contradictory understandings about the Islamic viewpoint with regard to social policy and welfare, a pro-welfare state interpretation could be provided and justified based on the bulk of original and authentic texts. It was argued that in the Islamic viewpoint human beings are altruist by nature and this altruism and philanthropy should be extended to all creatures including the non-human life forms. Because of this nature or fitrah, cooperation should be the basis of interactions in society towards the ‘common good’. One of the main conclusions of this chapter is the argument that social welfare based on Islamic teachings is not merely a kind of charitable and residual welfare designed for those who could not be cared for by themselves or their families. Those living under an Islamic state have the ‘social rights’ with regard to enjoying a dignified living standard and it is the responsibility of the state to secure it. Principles such as social balance (tawazun) and avoidance of tadawul support this idea. Social justice is obviously more compatible with ‘distributive’, ‘patterned’, and ‘end-state’ theories of justice and which could be inferred by reference to strong redistributive and mandatory instruments like zakat and khums. However, social welfare should not be totally state dominated in design and implementation. A prominent role is reserved for the community regarding the provision of welfare in the ‘multi-level responsibility approach’ outlined in the chapter, while welfare provision by the state and community by no means should lead to ‘welfare dependency’.

References Al-Bukhari, M. (n.d.-1). Sahih al-Bukhari. https://sunnah.com/bukhari. Accessed 20 April 2020. Al-Bukhari, M. (n.d.-2). Al-Adab Al-Mufrad. https://sunnah.com/adab. Accessed 20 April 2020. Al-Hur Al-Ameli, M. (1996). Was¯ a’il al-Sh¯ıa. Qom: Alulbayt Institute.

2

FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL POLICY AND WELFARE IN ISLAM

35

Al-Kulayni, M. (1987). Al-usul men al-Kafi. Tehran: Dar al-Kutub al-Islamyiah. Al-Majlesi, M. (1985). Behar al-anwar. Tehran: Dar al-Kutub al-Islamyiah. Al-Qaradawi, Y. (1986). Fiqh al zakah: A comparative study of zakah, regulations and philosophy in the light of Qur’an and sunnah. London: Dar al-Taqwa. Al-Sadr, M. B. (1996). Our economics. Qum: Daftar Tablighat Islami Publications. Al-Tusi, M. (1997). Tahdhib al-Ahkam. Tehran: Sadooq Publications. An-Nasa’i, A. (n.d.). Sunan an-Nasa’i. https://sunnah.com/nasai. Accessed 20 April 2020. At-Tirmidhi, M. (n.d.). Jami‘ at-Tirmidhi, https://sunnah.com/tirmidhi. Accessed 20 April 2020. Ghabel, A. (2003). Islam and social security. Tehran: Social Security Research Institute. Ibin Hanbal, A. (1994). Musnad Ahmad Ibin Hanbal. Beirut: Dar Ihya al-Turath al-Arabi. Ibn Al-Hajjaj, M. (2000). Sahih Muslim (Abd-al-Hamid Siddiqui, Trans.). Ontario: Kitab Bhavan. Ibn Babawayh, M. (1984). Man L¯ a Yahd.uruh¯ u al-Faq¯ıh. Qum: Islamic Publications Institute. Ibn Majah, M. (n.d.). Sunan Ibn Majah. https://sunnah.com/ibnmajah. Accessed 20 April 2020. Rayshari, M. M. (1996). Mizan al-Hikmah. Qom: Dar al-Hadith. Tabataba’i, M. H. (1996). Al-Mizan fi Tafsir al-Qur’an. Qom: Islamic Publication Office of Qum Seminary Teachers Community. Taghizahed Davari, M. (2009). Social theology of Shia’. Social Theology Journal, 1(1), 11–36.

CHAPTER 3

Social Policy and the Islamic World in Comparative Perspective: Taking Stock, Moving Forward Rana Jawad and Rana Eseed

1

Introduction

This chapter offers a comparative perspective on the conceptual and practical linkages between social policy as a field of public practice and the subject focus of this volume which is the Muslim world. The primary focus on Islamic social welfare here is related to the importance given to social responsibility in the major world religions and the historic influence of religion on issues of social welfare action and care for the vulnerable. The chapter begins by defining the key concepts of religion and social policy as well as mapping out their main historical interactions though a range of actors and institutions. It then reviews the definitions of social policy in Islam and the other major world religions,

R. Jawad (B) University Bath, Bath, UK e-mail: [email protected] R. Eseed School of Social Work and Social Welfare, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel © The Author(s) 2021 A. A. Tajmazinani (ed.), Social Policy in the Islamic World, International Series on Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57753-7_3

37

38

R. JAWAD AND R. ESEED

namely Judaism, Christianity and Hinduism. Following this conceptual overview, we examine contemporary applications of social policy in Muslim-populated countries. The chapter provides two case study illustrations: one about Muslim social welfare activism in the United Kingdom (UK) and one about Islamic social movements in Jerusalem. These serve to support the overarching argument which is that Islamic social welfare practices are not homogenous and it may be more apt to refer to “Muslim worlds” in order to recognise the diverse range of actors and organisations in different parts of the world but also who have differing interpretations of the Muslim faith. As such, this chapter takes the attention away from radical Muslim movements that are the focus of the scholarly literature and instead sheds light on less studied examples of Muslim activism in contexts where Islam is not the dominant religion.

2

Religion

As recognised by various scholars, it is a challenging task to provide a singular definition of religion, given that the term is both historically and politically contingent. However, in this chapter we adopt Beckford’s (2001) pragmatic and interpretive approach. Beckford and Demerath (2007) defines religion as largely what individual believers or communities say it is, rather than imposing a narrower substantive or functionalist approach. Given that the meaning of religion is varied, inconsistent and changeable, what individuals see as religious or spiritual beliefs and as practices significant to them are recognised as such (Furness and Gilligan 2010). In a similar vein, Wuthnow (1988) argues that religion is part of lived experience and not just a symbolic set of abstract beliefs. Opielka (2008) also recognizes that religion is a dynamic concept that extends beyond the traditional world religions such as Hinduism or Christianity. However, what is common to all these religious orientations is that they represent ultimate values, sacredness and transcendence (Opielka 2008). For Gwynne (2009, p. 87), religion represents ‘a comprehensive socio-cultural framework that provides members with ultimate meaning and purpose’. These concepts can explain the meaning of religion and its place in individual life both abstractly and practically. The relationship between religion and social welfare is not new and in many ways, it is mutually constitutive: world religions are not just belief systems, they are social systems with strong motivations to be active in the public sphere (Haynes 1993). This includes both traditional philanthropy and religious social welfare.

3

3

SOCIAL POLICY AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD …

39

Social Policy

Social policy as a professional subject of study and public intervention is deeply associated with the development of secular, liberal democratic welfare states after the Second World War in Europe and North America. These had the mission of protecting citizens from life contingencies and comprised of social security systems, public health and educations systems as well as social safety nets. A strong association is made in the literature between high levels of welfare state development and low levels of religiosity in a given society, with the exception of the United States (Norris and Inglehart 2004). In some ways therefore, the subject of social policy may be considered as antithetical to religious practice and also perhaps also absent from largely Muslim-populated countries. However, leading commentators such as Peter Townsend have long noted that all countries have social policies because on the one hand the instruments of social policy exist in most countries (such as employment-based social security or public education systems) but also because they are traditional and culturally-specific forms of social welfare such as through the family or religions community that merit attention and credit. According to Townsend (1975, p. 6): ‘The underlying and professed rationale by which social institutions and groups are used or brought into being to ensure social preservation or development… all societies have social policies”. In broad terms, social policy refers to society’s response to social needs in several areas. It refers to the policies the government promotes for the citizens’ wellbeing, welfare and social protection. These policies include delivery of social services in several areas: social care, healthcare, education and social work. This is reflected in Marshall’s remarks (quoted in Townsend 1975, p. 2): ‘The policy of governments with regard to action having a direct impact on the welfare of citizens, by providing them with services or income [the core of which includes] social insurance, public (or national) assistance, housing policy, education and the treatment of crime.’ According to Seelkopf and Starke (2019), social policy is the deliberate use of organized power in an effort to shape market processes and modify outcomes of market forces to (a) guarantee a minimum income, and (b) provide insurance against life contingencies such as unemployment or illness for (c) all citizens without distinction of status. In sum, it is a political process of accountability and social justice. As it developed in the post-war European context, some of the basic assumptions of social policy as a subject of study and its adjunct welfare theories were based on

40

R. JAWAD AND R. ESEED

two thinkers who greatly influenced the development of research and the shaping of social policy in the twentieth century: Richard Titmuss and Thomas Marshall (Arts and Gelissen 2002). Marshall (1950) elaborated the key concept of citizenship which included three dimensions: civil, political and social rights. While civil rights pertain to the liberty of the individual to acquire and express his opinion, and political rights include the right to participate in the political game, to vote and be elected, social rights relate to the right to live in the same standard of living accepted by society. Social rights are at the basis of the modern welfare state (EspingAndersen 1990). Titmuss (1959) argues that two types of welfare states deal with the concept of social citizenship: the residual and the institutional. The former provides responses only after the family, the individual’s support mechanisms or the free market have failed to meet the individual’s social needs. The latter, the institutional welfare state, assists the general population as a basic right and acts to reduce the citizen’s dependence on the free market. The traditional purpose of the welfare state was to provide for needs that were not met through the market, or more precisely, to balance mismatch between income and needs throughout the lifecycle. The life risks addressed by the welfare state have changed following major changes in the labour market (such as unemployment) and its structure (such as integration of women). By the beginning of the 2000s, the term ‘new risks’ came to refer to the new challenges people face as result of socioeconomic changes in the post-industrial society (Taylor-Gooby 2005). These changes in the life risks challenged both the welfare state and external providers of social services, either the free market or the civil society originations. The conventional and mainstream welfare state and social policy literature focus on the core OECD countries. As Seelkopf and Starke (2019) argue, most of the research focus on social insurance and state provided social services in advanced Western economies, making the discussion of social policy and its development very narrow. More recently, researchers have been trying to fill the gap in this era by discussing social policy in developing countries (Dorlach 2019; Jawad 2009) and by other ways (Béland 2019; Dorlach 2019; Moeys 2019). These studies are few, though, and fewer still are studies that focus on the Middle East and North Africa. One of the models that criticize Esping-Andersen’s (1990) welfare state typology is Gal’s (2010), which focuses on Mediterranean countries,

3

SOCIAL POLICY AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD …

41

including Israel, Portugal, Malta, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Spain and Turkey. Gal points to three main similarities between these countries. First, religion, whose values occupy a central place in these countries, is organized and has considerable political power and influence on social policy. This power is not the result of historical circumstances but is also related to the absence of a clear separation between church and state. Despite the differences between the religions in the Mediterranean welfare states, one can point to the socio-political strength of religious-based community organizations dealing with social welfare, especially those focusing on poverty. Family also plays a central role in the Mediterranean countries analysed by Gal, so that the women’s share in the labour market is lower than that of men, and the dominant model of labour is the man as sole breadwinner. The centrality of the family enables the state to avoid responsibility for various areas of care that remain under the responsibility of the families. The third and final common denominator, clientelism, refers in this context to the linkage of provision of services to citizens and their loyalty and political support in the framework of patron-client relations that characterize the political system. This model points to the uniqueness of regimes in the Mediterranean countries and highlights the importance of religion in social policy. In the rest of the Middle East and also specifically in Muslim countries, the focus on the social policy literature has tended to be on the services provided by Islamic political movements such as Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood (Jawad 2009).

4

Religion and Social Policy

Until the 1970s, social scientists tended to ignore the role played by religion in society and its impact upon political and policy processes. Moreover, when religion was discussed, social scientists tended to ascribe a regressive role to it, or to regard it as a cultural product ancillary to other phenomena. However, more recently we have seen growing interest by social scientists in social activities and particularly social service provision by faith-based organizations. Some of the first major studies on this “religious turn” examined Christian and Jewish communities in Northern America and Europe (Cnaan et al. 2002), as well as Muslim, especially immigrant, communities in Europe (Adamson 2005). Religion and faith have played a significant role in shaping social policy over the past century. This role has been championed not only by the clerical establishments of the major religions but also and more significantly

42

R. JAWAD AND R. ESEED

by laypersons, including prominent intellectuals and social reformers as in the cases of Christian socialism (Atherton 1994); the Christian Democratic movement in Europe’s Catholic countries (Van Kersbergen 1995); modern Hindu thinkers such as Gandhi and Ram Mohan Roy (Richards 1985); and Muslim reformists such as the Iranian Abdolkarim Soroush and the Egyptian Seyyed Qutub (Tripp 2006). In all cases, religiously inspired ideals have been at the forefront of public action, and many have found their way directly into modern administrations. Pavlioni et al. (2018) recognize three types of interconnected levels between Social policy and religion on Western Europe and north America; The political party; the Faith based organizations; and the individual level. The small number of researchers who study the relationship between religion and social policy in the Middle East region examine on the role of faith-based organizations on social service provision or in shaping wider state social policy (Eseed 2018, 2019; Jawad 2009). Though this chapter focuses on Islam, in order to have a bigger picture about the relation between religion and social policy, we will briefly review the major world religions of Judaism, Christianity and Hinduism which, together with Islam command adherents from over half the world’s population. What is noteworthy about these religions is that they have spawned some of the most elaborate discourses on public social welfare that can be found in any faith. Moreover, while all religious orientations share the three key issues of ultimate values, sacredness and transcendence (Opielka 2008), these five are the only ones to have penetrated the formal state apparatus in countries as diverse as India, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Germany, or the United States.

5

Judaism

Judaism is the first of the ‘theocentric’, world-rejecting religions, as classified by Weber (Gorski 2005, p. 181). Judaism thus has a substantial body of canonical law and is more deeply concerned with ethico-legal matters affecting the life of the community than with the spiritual experience of religious life (Wuthnow 1988; Novak 1992). This is captured in Yeshayahu Leibowitz’s words: ‘We define Judaism as an institutionalized religion – not only in the sense that it has institutions, because institutions exist in every religion, but in the sense that these institutions – the practical commandments – do not exist outside these institutions’ (1953).

3

SOCIAL POLICY AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD …

43

Numerous Jewish biblical passages call on human beings to be just and righteous (Gwynne 2009). Kindness is a key dimension of all branches of Judaism, and Rabbi Neuberger (2008) sees it as a cornerstone of welfare from the Jewish perspective, arguing for the simple precept of the importance of giving to others. Neuberger places emphasis on the term g’millut chassadim, which denotes all acts of selfless kindness and service to others beyond the obligatory 10% almsgiving in Judaism known as tzedakah (not far off semantically or practically from the Islamic term sadaqah). G’millut chassadim and tzedakah may be seen as part of a broader perception in Judaism, tikkun olam (repairing or mending the world), which in recent decades has often been synonymous with socio-political activism in Jewish communities, or by Jews, not necessarily in the purely religious context (Diemling 2015). Green (1999), a leading authority on Jewish spirituality, argues that Jews need to be ‘concerned with the welfare including the feeding, housing and health of all, the active pursuit of justice for all and the protection of resources.’ This points to the importance of social responsibility and activity in Judaism. Like its sister theocentric faiths, Judaism has special injunctions on charity and helping those in need. Lifshitz (2007) argues that in spite of tzedakah, wealth accumulation is not frowned upon in Judaism and there are no clear rules about economic equality since the accumulation of wealth is not seen as coming at the expense of the poor. To conclude, Judaism is unclear about how imperative the obligation of charity is: how far should private property take precedence over the commandment of charity (Lifshitz 2007; Makris 2007).

6

Christianity

Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth. (Matthew 5:5) Or ‘Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your strength and with all your mind’; and, ‘Love your neighbour as yourself’. (Luke 10:27)

Being human, according to the teachings of Jesus Christ, is to embrace virtue and not only to avoid the sin. The concern for poverty is a major

44

R. JAWAD AND R. ESEED

dimension of righteousness in Christianity and directly relates to the rewards of afterlife (Martin et al. 2007). The quote above shows the parable of Good Samaritan, some scholar point to this parable as a key lesson about caring for the plight of fellow humans (Tyndale 2000). In Christianity, there are there main branches: Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant. Each has a different point of view and different practices regarding social welfare and poverty, and even different ways of devolving the social policy in Christian countries (Hornsby-Smith 1999; Kahl 2005). For example, in Catholicism, poverty was sacred and helping the poor thought private charity earned the benefactor salvation in the afterlife (Kahl 2005). The Roman Catholic Church is the most stringent in its articulation of just redistribution of resources and the fact that, to please God, humanity must live in equality (Pemberton 1990). In the middle Ages, the main charity was known as tithe, which grew smaller in the modern times. Today, Western Christian groups carry their missions into developing countries where they set up hospitals, income-generating projects and schools (Clarke and Jennings 2008; Cnaan et al. 2002). In the case of Protestantism, modern social teachings on poverty and social welfare gained formal status as a result of the 19th -century Social Gospel Movement, which spread particularly in Britain and the US, where it continues to be quite influential (Atherton 1994). Over the years, there have been various changes in perceptions regarding the various churches in reducing inequality and poverty. However, it is impossible to ignore the role of Christianity in shaping Western social policy, especially the function of the Catholic Church. Higgins (1981) goes on to point out the influence of the church on key figures in the development of discourse on modern societal policies, such as William Beveridge and Seebohm Rowntree.

7

Hinduism

The real implication of equal distribution is that each man shall have the wherewithal to supply all his needs and no more. (Gandhi 1960/1980, p. 18)

One of the three ‘cosmocentric’ religions, Hinduism, like the other world faiths, transmits its teaching about moral life and purpose of the human existence through accounts of the lives of the Hindu deities. Selfless

3

SOCIAL POLICY AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD …

45

service (seva) is a central tenet in Hinduism, which is to fulfil one’s duties without selfishness and meaning sacrifice towards the deity (Jawad 2009). In addition, there are four central aims for human existence according to Hinduism (Multi-Faith Centre 2007): dharma (religious life) as the foundation and duty for virtuous living; artha (economic development) as the necessity of life; kama (sensory gratification) by which sensual pleasures are enjoyed in order to maintain a healthy body and mind; and moksha (liberation and salvation) relating to the ultimate escape from the endless wheel pf reincarnation. The first aim, dharma, is the most relevant to the discussion regarding the social solidarity in Hinduism. Which is the source of religious inspiration to help poor and deprived. Dharma, as expressed by spiritual leader Sahajanad Swami, fights against social injustice. In the nineteenth century, together with his followers, Swami established alms-houses and dug ponds in times of famine and drought (Martin et al. 2007). Later one, Mahatma Gandhi, who was not averse to being called a socialist (Richards 1985), was deeply concerned with the economic development of India. The motives for his political thinking were grounded in the Hindu concept of ahimsa (love), which he likened to doing good in society, and of satyagraha (search for truth), which underpinned the belief in non-violence for which Gandhi was famous. These two concepts gave a religiously inspired basis for Gandhi’s socio-political vision of a prosperous and just India (Jawad 2009). As can be seen in the quote above, Gandhi promoted a very radical socialist ideal of equal distribution’, whose implementation, he realized, would require reconstructing the entire social order (Prasant 2014).

8

Islam

Righteousness is not that you turn your faces toward the east or the west, but [true] righteousness is [in] one who believes in Allah, the Last Day, the angels, the Book, and the prophets and gives wealth, in spite of love for it, to relatives, orphans, the needy, the traveller, those who ask [for help], and for freeing slaves; [and who] establishes prayer and gives zakat; [those who] fulfil their promise when they promise; and [those who] are patient in poverty and hardship and during battle. Those are the ones who have been true, and it is those who are the righteous. (Surah Al-Baqarah 2:177)

46

R. JAWAD AND R. ESEED

Islam, the third of the monotheistic religions, is the fastest growing religion in the world (Sutton and Vertigans 2005). Islam followed closely in the ideological steps of Judaism and Christianity with Abraham as the grand patriarch (Ashencaen Crabtree et al. 2008). It is often argued that Islam is a way of life. For instance, Islamic law (Shari’a) provides detailed rulings on family and social relations, sexual relations, eating, warfare, crime etc. It is also argued that the Shari’a represents the public interest (Behdad 2006; Tripp 2006) and includes safeguarding religion, life, future of society, sanity and property (Behdad 2006). In Islam, there are five fundamental duties, one of which, zakat, refers directly to promoting socio-economic equality. Though the amount may vary, Zakat is normally paid as a 2.5% tax on assets. Historically, it has acted acted as an important form of social welfare provisioning through income redistribution and socio-economic development. Zakat is based on the notion of community solidarity and the poor are not obliged to pay. Other kinds of voluntary almsgiving, which is optional charity recommended for Muslims, are the aforementioned sadaqah (Gwynne 2009); zekat al-fitr and kurban (Morvaridi 2013). In addition to the charities, the waqf (religious endowment) is also a basic principle in Islam. The waqf represents a social initiative in the interest of the public good. Its main use was to provide public funds and to fulfil many of the functions of the modern nation state (Dallal 2004). These three Islamic principles capture the concept and application of redistribution of resources in Islam. In addition, in terms of social welfare these principles represent the demand for social justice towards the community in the shape of social welfare (Banks 2006). Since Islam is the major religion discussed in this chapter, we will next elaborate about the mechanism of charity in different Islamic countries.

9

Implicit and Explicit Forms of Islamic Social Welfare

Islam is often described by scholars as a religion that affects all aspects of a Muslim’s life (Gellner 1991; Lewis 1994). However, the Islamic world is not homogenous and a range of differences exist between different countries or societies at several key levels: commentary and perceptions of the ethical aspect of the religion (e.g. Sunnah vs. Shia); religious practice (institutionalization vs. voluntary activity); what we might call “multiple Islams” or “multiple Islamic worlds”. To illustrate this, the chapter

3

SOCIAL POLICY AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD …

47

presents two case studies: one about Muslim social welfare activism in the contemporary UK context and one about an Islamic social movement in Jerusalem. As in other religions, in Islam the implications of social welfare take different shapes, some implicit and some explicit. Here, we address three of them. First, religious welfare charities and Islamic social movements play a growing role in the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia (Esposito 2000). Islamic faith-based organizations (FBOs) work on a range of initiatives, including peacebuilding, promotion of sustainable and long-term development support, assistance with emergencies and disasters, health improvement, poverty, education programmes and programmes focused on helping widows and orphans (Morvaridi 2013). Many Islamic movements adopt the self-reliance approach inspired and informed by the Muslim Brotherhood (Wickham 2003). In her study of FBOs in Lebanon, Jawad (2009) suggests that they play a major role in providing social services, compensating for the lack of social security provision by the state. In the last two decades, researchers have begun applying social movement theory to Islamic movements in other Arab countries (Clark 2004; Wickham 2003). The discussion of these movements cannot be uncoupled from their attitude towards the state, which they perceive as a secular entity. In Egypt, for example, the emergence of faith-based social organizations established by the middle class was a response to the state’s weakening desire to meet the socio-political needs of this class, as well as of the poor (Clark 2004). Note that what is especially interesting about the resurgence of Islam in these cases is the fact that it is not only a banner under which poor and dispossessed populations mobilize, but it also includes members of the elites as well as intellectuals and professionals (Esposito 2000). The idea that Islam is the solution for a country’s socio-economic and political woes is central to many of those movements, and is manifested by the establishment of alternative organizations such as Islamic hospitals in Egypt (Ali 2004; Clark 2004; Göçmen 2013; Peled 2001; Rosmer 2012; Wickham 2003). These alternative organizations, in turn, manifest the superiority and power of Islam over the state. They challenge not only the state’s (in)ability to provide essential services but the very raison d’être of the modern, Western secular nation-state. According to Clark (2004), this represents the formation of an alternative society. In addition, Islam is very much a channel of protest in mainstream society and in the absence of effective democracy in the Middle East, it acts as the only platform for

48

R. JAWAD AND R. ESEED

political opposition that society can resort to (Esposito 2000). In sum, the presence of religious services in the Middle East is essential to the survival and reproduction of the welfare system (Banfi 2018). Second, in Islamic as well as in other religious communities, and especially traditional communities, family-based charity and philanthropy play a central role in providing social services (Gal 2010). The main source of income of Islamic charities is the obligation for Muslims to donate. In the Kantian sense, these charities are not acts of kindness or compassion, but rather stem from religious obligation (Morvaridi 2013). Third, the social safety net provided to vulnerable groups by the state apparatus represents the translation of the main principles of social welfare in Islam into a formal social policy. A classic example for this form is the zakat as a state institution in Saudi Arabia or the family law in Tunisia that is based on the Shari’a. These open a window onto the different meanings of charity and welfare in Muslim countries. As mentioned above, in Islam there are three core practices that directly relate to wealth distribution and charity: zakat (and khums in Shi’a), sadaqah and waqf . Each takes different shape in different countries. In the Middle East, zakat is a formal state institution in Saudi Arabia only, but it also acts as a vital source of informal income redistribution and welfare spending on which the poor depend in all Muslim countries, such as in Jordan or among the Palestinians in Israel (Eseed 2018). In Iran, khums is a private matter and may be paid to the national welfare agencies such as Behzisti, or privately to local clerics and mosques. All Islamic countries have waqf ministries, which administer the assets owned by the religious establishments that are designated for public benefit. In Turkey, the waqf continues to have immense symbolic resonance in philanthropic action in several of organizations. These organizations make use of waqf land or infrastructure to provide services to the poor and vulnerable groups in society. The practices of zakat and waqf inform a voluntary ethos of philanthropy and charity in the Middle East (Ibrahim and Sherif 2008; Jawad 2009). The importance of Islamic or religious welfare provision the Middle East and Asia has two dimensions. On the one hand, religiously motivated charity and philanthropic action have always been a feature of Middle Eastern society (Ibrahim and Sherif 2008). On the other hand, provision of social services has also become a hallmark of Islamic political movements, part of their mass mobilization against what they perceive to be poorly resourced or corrupt secular states.

3

SOCIAL POLICY AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD …

49

When discussing charity, social policy and community development in Islamic communities and countries, we cannot ignore the role of FBOs that provide social services especially to orphans, the elderly or poor families. Many scholars point to the important role of Islamic FBOs in various Islamic countries and communities (see, e.g., Jawad 2009; Clark 2004; Cammett 2014; Wiktorowicz 2004; Roy 2011). Atalay (2017) argues that Turkish FBOs equip neoliberal governmentality by facilitating the market logic that externalizes the cost of social reproduction to households. Through the services, they provide instead of the state services and through the social policies they promote the Islamic FBOs in Turkey promote a neoliberal agenda (Morvaridi 2013). Indeed, as per the example of Turkey, in some Muslim-populated countries, religious and indeed Islamic values help to support a social welfare system that relies heavily on the voluntary sector. This is especially evident in Lebanon and Iraq as argued in Aljabiri and Jawad (2019). This is not to deny that Islamic teachings do not contain injunctions about the just government, as evidenced in the writings of Sadr. However, there is a more charity-orientates strain of Islamic charity that supports a residual social policy approach focused on vulnerable groups such as orphans, elderly or female-headed households. In settings like Lebanon and Iraq, charities including the zakat are not part of the governmental social policy and the main responsibility for responding to citizens social needs rests on Faith Based Organisations.

10

“Multiple Islams”

In this final section, the chapter reviews two case studies of how Islamic social welfare action takes shape in contexts outside the Muslim-populated countries hence elaborating on the notion of “multiple Islams”. 10.1 Case Study 1: Social Service Provision by Faith Based Organizations: A Case Study of the Islamic Movement in Kafr Qassim There is extensive literature on the role, modus operandi, and uniqueness of faith-based organizations (FBOs) compared to secular organizations, as well as the methodology of studying them (Bielefeld and Cleveland 2013; Clarke and Ware 2015; Cnaan and Curtis 2013; Heist and Cnaan 2016; Schneider 2013). Some studies discuss their role in providing

50

R. JAWAD AND R. ESEED

social services such as education, health, culture and charity. There is also extensive literature on the unique role of FBOs relative to (other) NGOs (Clarke 2011), stressing either their similarities (Clarke 2006) or their differences (Berger 2003). Clarke and Ware (2015) propose a third approach, according to which FBOs do have unique characteristics but at the same time, share social contents and purposes with civil society organizations and NGOs, particularly welfare and charity. Here, we adopt this approach in reference to the case of the Islamic Movement in Palestinian society in Israel.1 Accordingly, we refer to the movement as a FBO with some similarities to NGOs, so that analysing it is informed by the literature on both. The objective of this study is to understand the factors that motivate an FBO—in this case the Islamic Movement that has both a religious and a political aspect—to provide social services to an indigenous ethnic minority—in this case, the Palestinians in the town of Kafr Qassim, Israel. Despite being physically located in central Israel, like other Palestinian towns Kafr Qassim belongs to the country’s social periphery.2 According to the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (2015), it is home to 21,400 people, nearly all Muslim Palestinians. Similarly, to the Palestinian population in general, Kafr Qassim’s inhabitants are predominantly young, with 46.4% under the age of 19. Wages are extremely low: in 2014, the average monthly wage in Kafr Qassim was only 1130 GBP, compared to a national average of 2066. Accordingly, like the great majority of Palestinian municipalities, Kafr Qassim is rated low in the Israeli Socioeconomic Index (3 out of 10) and high in the Peripherality Index (7 out of 10). As in most other Palestinian towns in Israel, Kafr Qassim is a traditional community, with different levels of religious devotion. Many if not most locals observe Islamic commandments, including prayers, fasts, religious dress, zakat and charity, and the entrusting of personal properties to the waqf . The Islamic Movement in Israel started out in Kafr Qassim in 1972. Most of its leaders and nationwide organizations emerged there. Moreover,

1 In what follows, “Palestinians/Palestinian society in Israel” refer to Palestinian citizens of sovereign Israel, excluding Palestinians in East Jerusalem who have residency status only and Palestinians in the rest of the Occupied Territories who have no citizenship rights whatsoever. 2 It is also highly symbolic in the history of Palestinian citizens due to the massacre of 47 of its inhabitants by the Israel Border Police in 1956.

3

SOCIAL POLICY AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD …

51

between 1989 and 2008, and since 2013, its mayor has been a movement representative. Eight FBOs associated with the Islamic Movement are active in Kafr Qassim: the Muslim Woman Forum (1979); Daycare Centers (1982); the Association for the Orphans and Needy (AON; est. 1982); the Al-Sirat art and culture company (1987); the Rescue and Assistance Committee (RAC; 1991); the Community Night Watch (1991); the AlKalam student association (2013); and the Quran Academy (2015). In terms of their formal status, the organizations are divided into NGOs that are registered independently, such as the AON, and organizations that are local branches of the movement’s national organizations, such as RAC and the Quran Academy. The most important of these organizations is the AON. Established in 1980, it began operating locally, and by 1990, it was formally registered as an NGO. This NGO coordinates the diverse social activities of the Islamic Movement in Kafr Qassim, including daycare centers for children aged three and four, RAC and AON, and is responsible for funeral arrangements. In addition, it is also responsible for “seasonal” projects such as charity events during Ramadan, volunteer camps in town, and student scholarships. Various reasons account for the involvement of the Islamic Movement in Social Services. Lack of service provision by the state is a key driver. The religious welfare organizations that emerged in Kafr Qassim were ground-breaking in that they had not been preceded by any secular government or non-governmental alternative. One of the first services provided by the Islamic Movement was day-care centres. At first, in 1982, this activity was completely voluntary. Note that at the time, and unlike Jewish municipalities, there were no day-care centres in Kafr Qassim. Historically, in the pre-statehood period, day-care centres in Jewish communities were operated by NGOs such as the Women’s International Zionist Organization (WIZO). This tradition continued after the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, with the state assuming some responsibility for funding and oversight, but not for the actual service provision. Conversely, no such services—government or non-government—were offered in Palestinian municipalities. Thus, a lack of provision by the government or the Zionist NGOs was the main cause behind the establishment of this service by the Islamic Movement. Religious ideology plays a key role in the motivation for establishing the social services in Kafr Qassim and is central to their provision. This

52

R. JAWAD AND R. ESEED

factor may be divided into two categories. First, the idea that Islam is a way of life that encompasses all spheres. This means that Islamic values should be made part of all daily activities, rather than being limited to the observance of religious commandments. This is illustrated in the following statement by the former head of the Islamic Movement: We believe that Islam is a way of life and that the Islamic Movement is a comprehensive project of redemption relevant to all spheres in life, both material and emotional. The social services are part of this activity (Ibrahim Sarsor 2016, May). The second category relates to religious values and commandments. The movement’s activities in this regard promote the observance of Islam by both young and old. This includes the educational services in the daycare centres, the Quran Academy and the Al-Sirat company. The latter, for example, was established in order to perform in social events organized by the movement, as well as private occasions such as weddings. The songs and plays are informed by Islamic values and performed according to religious precepts (such as gender separation). The political aspect of service provision by the Islamic Movement, although rarely referred to directly in the interviews, cannot be ignored. Over the years, the movement has clearly gained significant political power thanks to its extensive service provision in town, as indicated by popular support for its candidates in municipal elections. In addition to direct support of movement’s representatives in municipal elections, there were two other manifestations of the locals’ political support: their volunteering in social activities and donations to movement organizations. For example, the Muslim Woman Forum has been active for 33 years on a purely voluntary basis and funded exclusively by local donations. The forum includes the five founders, 15 board members selected by forum members, fifty educators who provide the workshops and activities after a three-year training, and 500 supporters and volunteers. Intentional or not, the movement’s repeated victories at the polls has obviously had a significant effect on the relations between its social organizations and the municipality. This is manifested in the nature of the services provided in Kafr Qassim in genera. The close relations between the movement and the municipality are also manifested in the scope and funding of some of its services. A prime example is the Community Night Watch that has no parallel in any other Palestinian municipality in Israel. It could not have operated

3

SOCIAL POLICY AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD …

53

without using municipal resources, including the town system of surveillance cameras and offices in the municipality buildings, let alone the political support required to maintain this service in the face of the Israel Police’s opposition. A third aspect in which this political cooperation is manifested is coordination of welfare provisions for the needy. Welfare departments in Israel no longer support the needy financially on the local level. Therefore, to meet local needs, Kafr Qassim’s Social Services Department often directs the needy to the AON, which also consults with the department on allocating its own funds. This reciprocal relationship is no doubt facilitated by the fact that the director of the AON, is also the deputy mayor. The key factor that was necessary for the establishment of the Islamic social services in Kafr Qassim was the failure of the state and more broadly, the lack of public social services that are provided to the rest of Israeli society, a factor central to the establishment of NGOs elsewhere in the world (Salamon and Anheier 1998; Salamon et al. 2017; Weisbrod 1988, 1998). Flanigan et al. (2014) suggest that when the state fails to provide services to minority groups, in particular, group members will provide for their own. 10.2

Case Study 2: Islamic Welfare in the UK Social Policy Context

The Faith Regen Foundation is a British charitable organisation with a Muslim background (Jawad 2012). As one of the larger and more professional religious welfare organisations in the United Kingdom (UK), it is able to take on government-funded contracts such as to tackle domestic violence or find training and work placements for unemployed people. As a minority ethnic organisation, it is able to serve a large ethnic minority population all around the UK. Often, these populations are marginalised and some of them are of the Muslim faith. Faith Regen does not require for all of its staff to be Muslim. This is the case of members of staff who are in charge of the running of the employment and training programme are not Muslims. The service-users are also from a wide variety of backgrounds and know hardly anything about the religious character of the organisation. Instead, members of staff refer to the culture of “humanity” within the organisation that means that clients are properly listened to and members of staff enjoy a good work rapport. Secular members of staff are aware that the organisation may have other services which are specifically directed to members of its own faith

54

R. JAWAD AND R. ESEED

community but this is considered a separate strand of activity which the organisation is involved in. Hence, being able to get involved in such programmes gives a chance to minority religious organisations to prove that they have come of age as British citizens in the UK. Faith Regen is a Muslim organisation and works with many deprived ethnic minority populations. Moreover, when such organisations enter into government contracts, they are in effect delivering public services and need to abide by criteria set by government. Such services are necessarily secular in character and be used by clients who have specific needs. Religious organisations do not change the rules of social policy or the way in which the government programmes operate as such, an organisation such as Faith Regen might be Muslim but its work fits into the social policy framework of the UK context and it is able to act in the public good interest. A second example from the UK is the example of international humanitarian aid which includes Muslim religious organisations in the international development effort. Some of the most active humanitarian organisations are British and religious in character such as Islamic Relief, Tearfund and Christian Aid. These organisations focus their efforts on emergency relief services in disaster zones such as earthquakes or famine or Tsunami or may spend longer periods of time involved in development projects. For ethnic minority religious organisations such as Jewish and Muslim ones, these organisations may help to organise visits or pilgrimages to the Middle East. At this level, such organisations are active civic actors in the field of global humanitarian aid and global politics.

11

Conclusion

This chapter discusses Islamic welfare practices in comparative perspectives. It has reviewed the meaning of social policy and its historical association with post-War European welfare state development. The chapter examines the understanding of social welfare and religion in the major world religions, namely Judaism, Christianity and Hinduism. Following this conceptual overview, it discussed the contemporary application of social policy in Muslim-populated countries. The chapter provides two case study illustrations: one about Muslim social welfare activism in the contemporary UK context and one about Islamic social movements in Jerusalem. These serve to support the overarching argument which is that Islamic social welfare practices are diverse and it may be more apt to refer to “Muslim worlds” in order to recognise the diverse range of actors and

3

SOCIAL POLICY AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD …

55

organisations in different parts of the world but also who have differing interpretations of the Muslim faith. Here we draw the chapter to a close by reflecting on some of its key implications. Research on social policy in non-European and certainly in Muslimpopulated countries should be aware of the cultural, social and political context. Religion is certainly a central and important issue, unlike in European countries that promote secularism and the separation of church and state. This discourse is not always compatible elsewhere, especially as we have seen here in the Middle East, mainly because of the close ties between culture and religion in these societies. Two main connections between religion and social policy emerge from this review and apply in both the Islamic world and the Christian worlds. The first is religion as a designer of social policy, namely the role of the Islam in shaping social policy in Muslim countries such as in the Middle East. Most of the available academic knowledge is about the Islamic religious principles drawn from the Quran and the Shari’a and much less about the relationship between religion and the implementation of social policies by the Islamic states. In general, little research has examined the historical development of social policy in these countries. As a first step to a close comparison between the development of social policy in Europe and the Muslim-populated countries, research on social policy in this region must be further developed, particularly by emphasizing a more institutionally oriented analysis of social policy systems. The second connection between religion and social welfare is the application of social policy by religious actors, whether institutional or not—their role in the implementation of social policy, and especially the role of religious communities and organizations in the provision of social services. Regarding this connection, there is considerable literature in the context of Islamic FBOs in both Islamic and non-Islamic countries (Banfi 2018; Jawad 2012; Eseed 2018; Kuznetsova and Round 2014). The review above shows that this is one of the direct ways of implementing Islamic social principles. Especially in the Middle East region, where state social security networks are absent or weak, Islamic organizations, in quite a few countries such as Lebanon, Egypt and Yemen offer an alternative to the state’s inadequate services. In effect, the government’s social policy is one of the factors that strengthen these FBOs. Research on social policy in the Middle East context should thus take into account the roles of these FBOs in shaping or failing to shape social policy.

56

R. JAWAD AND R. ESEED

In order to understand each of these connections deeply and to develop our knowledge about Islam, FBOs and social policy, we can also learn from the experience of veteran immigrant Muslim communities in European countries such as the Turks in Germany (Göçmen 2013; Wittberg 2012) or the Muslims in the UK (Jawad 2012), Italy and Switzerland (Banfi 2018). Apart from the fact that their organizations can shed light on additional and fascinating interpretations of social policy practice, they might add another layer to the discussion about the connection between religion and welfare in general. Moreover, they can highlight the role of Islamic FBOs in shaping multicultural social policies in non-Islamic countries. Finally, the Muslim world includes many religious and ethnic minorities, including Christians (Rowe 2019). Research on social policy derived from religion cannot be disconnected from the discourse on the social rights of these minorities in the world of Islam.

References Adamson, F. (2005). Islam in Europe: The challenges of institutionalization. New York: Council for European Studies, Columbia University. Ali, N. (2004). Political Islam in an ethnic Jewish state: Historical evolution, contemporary challanges and future prospects. Holy Land Studies, 1, 69–92. Aljabiri, J., & Jawad, R. (2019). Social protection, political mobilisation and Islamic NGOs in Iraq post-2003. In R. Jawad, N. Jones, & M. Messkoub (Eds.), Social policy in the Middle East and North Africa region and the new social protection paradigm: From social assistance to universalism? Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Arts, W., & Gelissen, J. (2002). Three worlds of welfare capitalism or more? Journal of European Social Policy, 12, 137–158. Ashencaen Crabtree, S., Husain, F., & Spalek, B. (2008). Islam and social work: Debating values, transforming practice. Bristol: The Policy Press. Atalay, Z. (2017). Partners in patriarchy: Faith-based organizations and neoliberalism in Turkey. Critical Sociology, 45, 431–445. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 0896920517711488. Atherton, J. (1994). Social Christianity: A reader. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. Banfi, E. (2018). Welfare activities by new religious actors: Islamic organizations in Italy and Switzerland. Basel: Springer. Banks, S. (2006). Ethics and values in social work. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Beckford, J. A. (2001). The construction and analysis of religion. Social Compass, 48, 439–441. https://doi.org/10.1177/003776801048003009.

3

SOCIAL POLICY AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD …

57

Beckford, J. A., & Demerath III, N. J. (2007). Introduction. In J. A. Beckford & N. J. Demerath III (Eds.), The Sage handbook of the sociology of religion (pp. 1–16). London: Sage. Behdad, S. (2006). Islam, revivalism and public policy. In S. Behdad & N. Farhad (Eds.), Islam and the everyday world: Public policy dilemmas (pp. 1–37). London: Routledge. Béland, D. (2019). Varieties of social policy by other means: Lessons for comparative welfare state research. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 21, 306–311. https://doi.org/10.1080/13876988.2019.157 4088. Berger, J. (2003). Religious nongovernmental organizations: An exploratory analysis. Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 14, 15–40. Bielefeld, W., & Cleveland, W. S. (2013). Faith-based organizations as service providers and their relationship to government. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 42, 468–494. Cammett, M. (2014). Compassionate communalism: Welfare and sectarianism in Lebanon. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Clark, J. (2004). Islam, charity and activism: Middle-class networks and social welfare in Egypt, Jordan, and Yamen. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Clarke, G. (2006). Faith matters: Faith-based organisations, civil society and international development. Journal of International Development, 18, 835– 848. Clarke, M. (2011). Development and religion: Theology and practice. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. Clarke, G., & Jennings, M. (2008). Introduction. In G. Clarke & M. Jennings (Eds.), Development, civil society and faith based organisations: Bridging the sacred and the secular (pp. 1–16). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Clarke, M., & Ware, V. (2015). Understanding faith-based organizations: How FBOs are contrasted with NGOs in international development literature. Progress in Development Studies, 15, 37–48. Cnaan, R., Boddie, S., Handy, F., Yancey, G., & Schneider, R. (2002). The invisible caring hand: American congregations and the provision of welfare. New York: New York University Press. Cnaan, R. A., & Curtis, D. W. (2013). Religious congregations as voluntary associations. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 42, 7–33. Dallal, A. (2004). The Islamic institution of Waqf: A historical overview. In S. P. Heyneman (Ed.), Islam and social policy (pp. 13–43). Nashville, TM: Vanderbilt University Press. Diemling, M. (2015). The politics of food Kashrut, food choices and social justice (tikkun olam). Jewish Culture and History, 16, 178–195. https://doi. org/10.1080/1462169x.2015.1069468.

58

R. JAWAD AND R. ESEED

Dorlach, T. (2019). Retrenchment of social policy by other means: A comparison of agricultural and housing policy in Turkey. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 21, 270–286. https://doi.org/10.1080/138 76988.2018.1466856. Ernest, G. (1997). The Turkish option in comparative perspective. In S. Sibel Bozdo˘gan & R. Kasaba (Eds.), Rethinking modernity and national identity in Turkey (pp. 233–245). Seattle: Washington University Press. Eseed, R. (2018). When the state fails to provide services: The case of the Islamic movement in Israel. Journal of Social Policy, 47, 565–582. https://doi.org/ 10.1017/s0047279417000757. Eseed, R. (2019). Social service provision by minority religious organizations: A case study of the Islamic Movement in Kafr Qassim. Journal of Social Policy, 49, 507–524. Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Esposito, J. L. (2000). Introduction: Islam and secularism in the Middle East in the twenty-first century. In J. L. Esposito & A. Tamimi (Eds.), Islam and secularism in the Middle East (pp. 1–13). London: Hurst and Company. Flanigan, S. T., Asal, V., & Brown, M. (2014). Community service provision by political associations representing minorities in the Middle East and North Africa. Voluntas, 26, 1786–1804. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266014-9516-4. Furness, S., & Gilligan, P. (2010). Religion, belief and social work: Making a difference. Bristol: Policy Press. Gal, J. (2010). Is there an extended family of Mediterranean welfare states? Journal of European Social Policy, 20, 283–300. Gandhi, M. K. (1960/1980). Trusteeship. Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publications. Gellner, E. (1991). Muslim society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Göçmen, I. (2013). The role of faith-based organizations in social welfare systems: A comparison of France, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 42, 495–516. Gorski, P. S. (2005). The return of the repressed: Religion and the political unconscious of historical sociology. In J. Adams, E. S. Clements, & A. Shola Orloff (Eds.), Remaking modernity: Politics, history and sociology (pp. 161– 189). Durham and London: Duke University Press. Green, A. (1999). These are the words: A vocabulary of Jewish spiritual life. Woodstock, VT: Jewish Lights. Gwynne, P. (2009). World religions in practice: A comparative introduction. Oxford: Blackwell. Haynes, J. (1993). Religion in third world politics. Buckingham: Open University Press.

3

SOCIAL POLICY AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD …

59

Heist, D. H., & Cnaan, R. A. (2016). Faith-based international development work: A review. Religions, 7, 1–17. Higgins, Joan. (1981). States of welfare: Comparative analysis in social policy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell and Martin Robertson. Hornsby-Smith, M. (1999). The Catholic Church and social policy in Europe. In P. Chamberlayne, A. Cooper, R. Freeman, & M. Rustin (Eds.), Welfare and culture in Europe: Towards a new paradigm in social policy (pp. 89–172). London: Jessica Kingsley. Ibrahim, B. L., & Sherif, H, D. (2008). From charity to social change: Trends in Arab philanthropy. Cairo and New York: American University in Cairo Press. Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. (2015). Characterization and classification of geographical units by the socioeconomic level of the population (Publication no. 1530). Jerusalem, Israel. Jawad, R. (2009). Social welfare and religion in the Middle East: A Lebanese perspective. Bristol: Policy Press. Jawad, R. (2012). Religion and faith-based welfare in the UK: From wellbeing to ways of being. Bristol: The Policy Press. Kahl, S. (2005). The religious roots of modern poverty policy: Catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed Protestant traditions compared. European Journal of Sociology, 46, 91–126. Kuznetsova, I., & Round, J. (2014). Communities and social care in Russia: The role of Muslim welfare provision in everyday life in Russia’s Tatarstan region. International Social Work, 57 (5), 486–496. Leibowitz, L. (1953). Judaism, human values, and the Jewish state. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lewis, B. (1994). Islam and the West. New York: Oxford University Press. Lewis, J. (2002). Gender and welfare state change. European Societies, 4, 331– 357. Lifshitz, J. I. (2007). Welfare, property and charity in Jewish thought. Social Science and Modern Society, 44, 71–78. Makris, G. P. (2007). Islam in the Middle East: A living tradition. Oxford: Blackwell. Marshall, T. H. (1950). Citizenship and social class and other essays. In C. Pierson & F. G. Castles (Eds.), The Welfare State Reader (pp. 30–40). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Martin, J. P., Chau, J., & Patel, S. (2007). Religions and international poverty alleviation: The pluses and minuses. Journal of International Affairs, 61, 69– 92. Moeys, H. (2019). Social policy by other means from a comparative historical perspective continuity and change in nineteenth-century Belgium (1800– 1920). Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 21, 235–250. https://doi.org/10.1080/13876988.2017.1409939.

60

R. JAWAD AND R. ESEED

Morgan, K. J., & Campbell, A. L. (2011). The delegated welfare state Medicare, markets, and the governance of social policy. New York: Oxford University Press. Morvaridi, B. (2013). The politics of philanthropy and welfare governance: The case of Turkey. European Journal of Development Research, 25, 305–321. Multi-Faith Centre. (2007). Religions in the UK Directory 2007–2010 (P. Weller, ed.) (P. Weller, M. Wolfe, & E. Fry, researched). The Multi-Faith Centre, University of Derby. Neuberger, R. J. (2008). Faith, morality, giving time to others. In T. Blair, et al. (Eds.), Faith and life in Britain (pp. 65–80). Chelmsford, UK: Matthew James. Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2004). Sacred and secular: Religion and politics worldwide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Novak, D. (1992). Jewish social ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. NurBarizah, A. B. (2007). A Zakat Accounting Standard (ZAS) for Malaysian companies. American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 24, 74–92. O’Brien, D., Wilkes, J., de Haan, A., & Maxwell, S. (1997). Poverty and social exclusion in North and South (IDS Working Paper No. 55). Brighton: IDS. Opielka, M. (2008). Christian foundations of the welfare state: Strong cultural values in comparative perspective. In V. W. Oorschot, M. Opielka, & B. Pfau-Effinger (Eds.), Culture and the welfare state: Values and social policy in comparative perspective (pp. 89–116). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. Pavlioni, E., Béland, D., & Jawad, R. (2018). Mapping the relationship between religion and social policy. Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy, 33, 240–260. Pedersen, S. (1993). Family, dependence, and the origins of the welfare state: Britain and France 1914–1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Peled, A. R. (2001). Towards autonomy? The Islamist movement’s quest for control of Islamic institutions in Israel. The Middle East Journal, 55, 378–398. Pemberton, A. (1990). Rescuing the good Samaritan: An exposition and a defence of the Samaritan principle in the welfare state. Journal of Social Policy, 19, 281–298. Prasant, J. P (2014). The Gandhian concept of social justice. In M. Reisch (Ed.), The Routledge international handbook of social justice (pp. 39–47). Routledge Handbooks Online. Richards, G. (1985). A sourcebook of modern Hinduism. Richmond, UK: Curzon Press. Rosmer, T. (2012). Resisting “Israelization”: The Islamic movement in Israel and the realization of Islamization, Palestinization and Arabization. Journal of Islamic Studies, 23, 325–358.

3

SOCIAL POLICY AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD …

61

Rowe, S. P. (2019). Introduction: Reclaiming ‘minorities’ in the Middle East. In S. P. Rowe (Ed.), Routledge handbook of minorities in the Middle East (pp. 1–16). New York: Routledge. Roy, S. (2011). Hamas and civil society in Gaza: Engaging the Islamist social sector. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Salamon, L. M., & Anheier, H. K. (1998). Social origins of civil society: Explaining the nonprofit sector cross-nationally. Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 9, 213–248. Salamon, L., Sokolowski, S., & Haddock, M. (2017). Explaining civil society development: A social origins approach. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. Sarsor, I. (2016, May 23). Personal communication [Interview]. Schneider, J. A. (2013). Introduction to the symposium: Faith-based organizations in context. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 42, 431–441. Seelkopf, L., & Starke, P. (2019). Social policy by other means: Theorizing unconventional forms of welfare production. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 21, 219–234. https://doi.org/10.1080/138 76988.2019.1574089. Shalev, M., & Gal, J. (2018). Bullets and benefits in the Israeli welfare state. In H. Obinger, K. Petersen, & P. Starke (Eds.), Warfare and welfare: Military conflict and welfare state development in Western countries (pp. 393–426). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sutton, W., & Vertigans, S. (2005). Resurgent Islam: A sociological approach. Cambridge: Polity Press. Taylor-Gooby, P. (2005). Is the future American? Can left politics preserve European welfare states from erosion through growing “racial” diversity? Mimeo, School of Social Policy, Sociology and Social Research, University of Kent. Titmuss, R. (1959). Essays on the welfare state. London: Allen & Unwin. Townsend, P. (1975). Sociology and social policy. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Tripp, C. (2006). Islam and the moral economy: The challenges of capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tyndale, W. (2000). Faith and economics in development: A bridge across the chasm? Development in Practice, 10, 9–18. Van Kersbergen, K. (1995). Social capitalism: A study of Christian democracy and the welfare state. London: Routledge. Weisbrod, B. (1988). The nonprofit economy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Weisbrod, B. (1998). To profit or not to profit: The commercial transformation of the nonprofit sector. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Whelan, R. (1996). The corrosion of charity: From moral renewal to contract culture. London: IEA.

62

R. JAWAD AND R. ESEED

Wickham, C. R. (2003). Mobilizing Islam: Religion, activism and political change in Egypt. New York: Columbia University Press. Wiktorowicz, Q. (2004). Introduction: Islamic activism and social movement theory. In Q. Wiktorowicz (Ed.), Islamic activism: A social movement theory approach (pp. 112–142). Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Wittberg, P. (2012). Faith-based umbrella organizations: Implications for religious identity. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 42, 540–562. Wuthnow, R. (1988). The restructuring of American religion: Society and faith since World War II . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

CHAPTER 4

Beneficence and Welfare: Notes for the Comparative Study of “Doing Good” Practices (‘amal Khayr) in the Islamic World Sahar Aurore Saeidnia and Laura Ruiz de Elvira

1

Introduction

Since the 1990s, in the context of states’ reconfiguration (Hibou 1999), beneficence has become a powerful ethic and repertoire of action spanning all social spaces, both in the Islamic world and worldwide (e.g. Brown and Pierce 2013; Ruiz de Elvira and Saeidnia 2020). A growing number of actors resort to this notion while claiming to act for “the good” of “the poor”, “the weak”, “the dependent”, the “migrants” or the “inhabitants of developing countries”. Humanitarian and development organizations, religious associations and private foundations alongside public institutions, simple citizens and informal networks, etc. are all “benefactors” undertaking welfare programs today (Ruiz de Elvira 2012;

S. A. Saeidnia (B) Université libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium L. Ruiz de Elvira Institut de Recherche pour Le Développement (IRD), Paris, France © The Author(s) 2021 A. A. Tajmazinani (ed.), Social Policy in the Islamic World, International Series on Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57753-7_4

63

64

S. A. SAEIDNIA AND L. RUIZ

DE

ELVIRA

Cammett and MacLean 2014) who therefore act as producers of social relief policies. This logic, mainly documented in the Islamic world from the first decade of the 2000’s onwards, raises numerous questions about the (re)configuration of welfare policies. How do actors, institutions and practices of “doing good”1 (‘amal khayr in Arabic) contribute to the production of social policies? How do these actors relate to each other and to the State? Who defines the vulnerable communities in need of protection? What can the relations between those who give and those who receive tell us about issues of social and political justice? These questions underline how, far from simply designating religious individual selflessness and generosity, beneficence refers to socially- and historically-situated practices involving the distribution of resources and social hierarchizations as well as public policies. Moreover, this questioning highlights the fact that even though in the Islamic world “doing good” seems a consensual and legitimate emic repertoire of action, the practices, actors and institutions vary greatly between different social, religious and political contexts. At the Social Policy in the Islamic World (SPIW) Conference in Tehran that led to this book, researchers demonstrated how in some cases the Islamic ethos mobilized by the actors in question challenges the bureaucratic processes, while in other cases it embraces and deepens ongoing neoliberal trends. In the same way, at times the very notion of social justice draws on redistributive practices while in other situations actors instead resort to the narrative of individual empowerment.2 This polysemy characterizing beneficence is crucial for understanding its contribution to contemporary social policies in the Islamic world. It invites us to rethink our analytical tools and frameworks in two ways. On the one hand, as we explain in section one, the analysis of the role of beneficence actors in the production of social policies allows us to take some distance from a state-centered perspective and take into account the plurality of actors who historically have intervened in the definition and the government of social issues (Cammett and MacLean 2011). Indeed, 1 This expression refers to governing and mobilization processes of the self and the others in the name of the “good.” (Ruiz de Elvira and Saeidnia 2020) 2 Social Policy in the Islamic world International Conference, Panel on “Practices of doing good and social policy in Islamic world”, Tehran, May 2018. Organisers: Laura Ruiz de Elvira & Sahar Aurore Saeidnia. Speakers: Leila Drif, Lucas Faure, Ester Sigillo, Muhammad Supraja & Blandine Destremau.

4

BENEFICENCE AND WELFARE: NOTES FOR THE COMPARATIVE STUDY …

65

the assumption that the State should be the main, or even the only, actor to handle social issues is far from trivial. While it is far from inevitable that every country will one day develop a welfare state, in the social fields in each national and local context we can observe shifting configurations of multiple actors. On the other hand, as shown in section two, by studying social policies in this world region through the lens of beneficence we are able to question the classical public/private division, and to apprehend in practice the conflicts and the arrangements around the definition of what is the “legitimate” distribution of the social product. “Doing good” actors are not pitted against the state and civil society, nor can they be split into religious and non-religious institutions. On the contrary. Seminal works in the field have not only underlined the diversity of benevolent practices and actors in the Islamic world (Tugal 2017) but also highlighted the different ways in which they may both entangle with each other and with larger welfare programs and social policies (Karshenas and Moghadam 2006; Bonner et al. 2003; Renard 2008) thus at times generating conflicts and discontent (Catusse et al. 2009; Longuenesse et al. 2005; Clark 2004; Ruiz de Elvira 2019). With these two founding principles in mind in this chapter we will argue that rather than solely defining al-‘amal al-khayri as Islamic charity (Clark 2004; Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003), it is more heuristic to tackle beneficence as a socio-historically constructed realm of encounters and conflicts over resource distribution (material, financial, and moral) between a wide variety of individuals, institutions (local, national and international), as well as private and public organizations. Within this perspective, the analysis of khayriyye practices, representations and narratives proves to be remarkably valuable for enhancing our understanding of the reconfigurations of social policies in the Islamic world (Singer 2018).3

3 The great importance of beneficence for the understanding of Muslim contexts, both in a historical perspective and in terms of contemporary political, social and economic processes, is symbolized in the launching of two new academic journals on this issue in 2017: The Journal on Muslim Philanthropy and Civil Society and the Journal of Islamic Philanthropy & Social Finance.

66

S. A. SAEIDNIA AND L. RUIZ

DE

ELVIRA

Our chapter draws on personal fieldwork conducted in Syria and Iran since 2007 as well as on an ongoing collective reflection4 and a transversal—if non-exhaustive—study of the literature about beneficence in the Islamic world (and beyond).

2 Beneficence: Alongside, Together with, or Against the State? Voluntary charity (sadaqa), alms tax (zakat ), endowments (awqaf ) and other faith-related beneficent practices have organized Islamic societies for centuries, and historians have traditionally described them as social welfare forerunners (Bonner et al. 2003; Singer 2008). Indeed, religious, charitable and assistance practices predate the institutionalization of welfare policies in most countries of the Islamic world. For instance, Ener has shown in her groundbreaking work on Egypt’s politics of benevolence how private and public charities have structured the poor relief system since the nineteenth century (Ener 2003). In the same vein, Harris has underlined the persistence of beneficence institutions in providing social support to vulnerable populations after the first welfare policies at the beginning of the twentieth century (Harris 2017). In the Syrian case, Ruiz de Elvira’s work has established that the religious charitable institutions which were active in the first half of the twentieth century focused their attention on the poor as well as the sick, elderly, orphans, widows, women who were not able to breastfeed their children, and young students (Ruiz de Elvira 2019). Other seminal research on Islamic contexts, such as Hodgon’s or Ghazaleh’s, have equally revealed the multiplicity of social institutions dedicated to poor and vulnerable relief, funded and supported through waqfs , e.g. hospitals, clinics, schools, and social kitchens (Ghazaleh 2011). Their work underlines that “even familiar terms like zakat, sadaqa, waqf , birr, and ihs¯ an should always be 4 This chapter draws on a collective reflection that we initiated in 2017 by organizing a conference about beneficence in Aix-en-Provence (http://iris.ehess.fr/index.php?3803). Subsequently, we pursued the discussion in a series of workshops in 2018/2019 at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (http://iremam.cnrs.fr/spip.php?article545) that led us to edit a collective volume on the Worlds of “doing good” practices (Les Mondes de la bien-faisance, to be published by CNRS Editions in 2020). In this book, a dozen historians, sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists ask what “doing good” entails and means in different periods and countries, from Ancient Judea to twentiethcentury Iran or contemporary Lebanon.

4

BENEFICENCE AND WELFARE: NOTES FOR THE COMPARATIVE STUDY …

67

considered contextually according to their usage before assigning them meaning, and certainly should not be assumed to reflect a literal definition or single practice based on the Quran or another normative text” (Singer 2018, p. 228). More generally, from the 1990’s onwards, an increasing number of academics have undertaken anthropological and sociological analysis of religious khayriyye practices and actors by analyzing their collective action and political strategies (Ghandour 2002; Clark 2004; Challand 2008; Aït Aoudia 2013). However, khayriyye actors and practices go beyond what is usually defined as religious charity. Arguably, if “doing good” was and still is mainly framed in the language of religious piety, beneficence practices have historically hinged on a plurality of repertoires of legitimation (Tugal 2017). Moreover, the wide array of benefactors who have met the needs of the poor and the vulnerable through history cannot be reduced to the category of “religious actors”. Indeed, along with faith-based organizations, horizontal networks stemming from the neighborhoods and families (Baylouny 2006; Saeidnia 2016), as well as NGOs (Ruiz de Elvira and Zintl 2014; Nejima 2016), public administrations (Harris 2017) or even private entrepreneurs (Osella and Osella 2009) carry out “doing good” activities. Finally, beneficence actions in practice involve a variety of endeavors including medical care (Clark 2004), education support, micro-credits or even environmental protection (Wiepking and Handy 2015). In other words, al-‘amal al-khayri encompasses both religious and non-religious “doing good” practices that existed in the Islamic world long before the development of welfare policies, and which continue both to shape contemporary social policies and frame narratives on the social question. Yet until now there has been little work examining the role played by these “doing good” actors in the reconfiguration of social policies. As Cammett and MacLean point out in their seminal book on how nonstate actors provide social welfare services around the world: “despite their growing visibility and importance, non-state providers are an understudied component of welfare regimes” (Cammett and MacLean 2014, p. 2). Moreover, much of the existing work covering the Islamic world focuses on the impact that the rise of these actors may have on the State, following a functionalist perspective and developing an analysis in terms of strengthening or undermining the States’ capacity. For example, Clark reads beneficence as an answer to state weaknesses in providing social services. In the same vein, Cammett and MacLean explain the

68

S. A. SAEIDNIA AND L. RUIZ

DE

ELVIRA

development of beneficence in other world regions as a response to subsidy cuts, to social policy reforms and to state “weaknesses”: “For the past three decades, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other donors have advocated economic reforms that require states to reduce their roles while NGOs, private companies, community groups, and other non-state actors increasingly provide public goods and basic welfare” (Cammett and MacLean 2014 p. 2). More precisely they describe non-state actors’ relations with the State in terms of appropriation, substitution, State domination, coproduction or delegation. By doing so, in spite of assuming the blurriness of state/non-state actors relations in the provision of social welfare services (p. 13), these works usually do not address the very nature of these relations beyond the binary representation they claim to be deconstructing. In developing a critical dialogue with these approaches, in this chapter we argue for studying the relations between the multiple actors who constitute what Destremau calls the “contemporary welfare mixes” by deconstructing the task division between public and private actors (Destremau 2019). Rather than putting forward new typologies, asking if ‘amal khayr represents an alternative to the State, or endorsing an evolutionist approach that reads the social world through the lenses of the welfare state, we suggest here that it is more heuristic to move away from the non-state/state binary and choose to focus on the processes of definition and partition of social responsibilities. Only by building on the empirical evidence can we show how, in a given political context, a specific division of tasks between all the players intervening in the social welfare sector can gain—or fail to gain—social and historical legitimacy. This issue appears quite complex, as we have seen that these particular types of aid/welfare institution act within different ethical and moral frameworks, different temporalities, on different scales, and in different institutional cultures. Given this assumption, a certain number of questions arise: How does benevolence fit into the various fields of public administration of assistance, social protection, and population control? Which combination of individual and collective accountability is socially dominant and perceived as legitimate? Which tensions, struggles and adjustments shape and are shaped by this division/distribution? How do the different actors of the “doing good” field define the role of the State, poverty, social justice, and the common interest?

4

BENEFICENCE AND WELFARE: NOTES FOR THE COMPARATIVE STUDY …

69

Several authors have started to provide some interesting answers to these questions. For example, through her research on the postrevolutionary Tunisian Islamic charitable sector, Sigillò has shown how since 2011, Ben Ali’s oppressive and ubiquitous charité d’Etat (state charity) has been challenged by new forms of civic engagement, most notably the Islamic charities (Sigillò 2018). In her work, Sigillò underlines how, in a context characterized by strong political competition and semi-paralyzed state institutions, these Islamic charities have managed to obtain funds and professionalize themselves while, interestingly, still seeking more integrated relations with the State. Thus, while beneficence was once monopolized by an authoritarian regime who sought to create clientelist relations and relegated Islamic charity to work clandestinely, in post-2011 Tunisia practices of “doing good” have become the realm of powerful Islamic actors who increasingly partner with local administrations. In her work, Vannetzel offers a consonant perspective on power dynamics between Egyptian political actors, highlighting how conflict and cooperation were deeply intertwined in the relationships between Mubarak’s regime and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). She argues that “the vision of two models of development opposing one another unravels when we move from abstract approaches towards empirical studies” (Vannetzel 2017, p. 222). Furthermore, she shows how, in practice, both the MB and the elites of the former regime participated in what she calls the politics of “goodness” (khayr). Vannetzel defines these politics as a “conflictual consensus built on entrenched welfare networks, and on an imaginary matrix mixing various discursive repertoires of state developmentalism and religious welfare” (ibid.). The relations between “doing good”, States, and public institutions are indeed continually reconfigured, at times politicizing or depoliticizing the social question. This is also shown in Ruiz de Elvira’s research on Syrian charitable associations in the twentieth and twenty-first century. “The work of associations of the charitable type evolves in line with the political transformations of the country and the recompositions in terms of social management that these transformations generate” (Ruiz de Elvira 2020). Koochakzadeh makes the same argument, pointing out that the very notion of “good” has been transformed in Iran over time, “moving gradually and in part from a concept relating to religious morality to a secularized and politicized notion, backed by the project of nationbuilding through education” (Koochakzadeh 2020). This reminds us that practices of “doing good” result not only from negotiations, adjustments,

70

S. A. SAEIDNIA AND L. RUIZ

DE

ELVIRA

and arrangements between different actors, but also from tensions and conflicts around the “right” division of labor, namely the one considered “legitimate” by governments and legislators. These conflicts over the allocation of responsibilities may derive from disagreements about the relation between the individual and the collective (Saeidnia 2019). For example, although the new regime resulting from the 1979 Revolution in Iran does not deny the importance of welfare, the lack of consensus in the country on the sharing of responsibilities between public, semi-public and private actors, has made social action an arena for political struggles (Harris 2017). Finally, by observing the distribution of tasks and responsibilities in the social field one can also delve into the question of what makes the State exist in a given social and historical context (Sharma and Gupta 2006; Mitchell 1991; Das and Poole 2004). As Perrier rightly puts it, “the ‘Good’ is not only a sum of individual initiatives but also a matter of State” (Perrier 2020). Turiano demonstrates something similar in her analysis of a female Egyptian philanthropic association. By studying the Tahsin al-Sihha society, Turiano not only documents interesting associational and charitable dynamics between the years 1930 and 1970 but also sheds light on the evolution of Egyptian social policies and on the subsequent strategies used by the old elites in their attempts to adjust and to integrate the new system of redistribution defined by the Nasserian regime. Against this background, it therefore seems essential to explore welfare policies through the lenses of the everyday interactions between the multiple actors that take part in these practices of “doing good”, including benefactors, employees, voluntary workers, hosting populations, brokers, beneficiaries, state civil servants, and NGO staff. At the same time, we also need to consider the power, domination and dependency dynamics that actually shape their relations. Only then will we be able to understand the role that these practices historically have played, and still play, in the (re)production, (re)organization and government of welfare issues.

3

Welfare Through the Lens of Everyday Interactions of “Doing Good”

Until now, most research on “doing good” in the Islamic world has focused on the history, gradual professionalization, services or funding of

4

BENEFICENCE AND WELFARE: NOTES FOR THE COMPARATIVE STUDY …

71

‘amal khayr, but it neglects the actual transactions and interactions that these practices involve and the tensions and multiple dynamics that they may generate. Yet it is during these everyday interactions and relations that beneficence is actually negotiated and even redefined—in terms of its nature, its organizational forms, its moral norms and representations. In this section, therefore, we will outline some of the most important logics characterizing these everyday interactions, which in turn shape welfare policies in practice.5 The first line of logic is the dependency dynamics underlining the provision of services, goods, humanitarian relief, etc. Here we should pay attention not only to the dependency of those who receive aid from benefactors and charitable organizations, but also to the dependency of NGOs on beneficiaries to secure new funding, and also the dependency of previously excluded hosting communities who hope to benefit from international aid programs (in the context of refugees’ displacements in the Middle East). In this regard, Drif has shown how in Lebanon, in the context of the massive arrival of Syrian refugees, the social and political fabric of vulnerability has produced new clientelistic relations between local and international NGOs, Syrian refugees and Lebanese Dom hosting communities. She writes: In Hayy Gharbe and Chatila, as in all Syrian settlement areas in Lebanon, the implementation of the International Assistance Plans (IAPs) since 2015 has led to a global reconfiguration of the criteria for access to assistance based on the categorisation of vulnerabilities. These have been requalified giving priority to Syrian refugees, according to a dichotomy

5 We would like to stress that for us, it is necessary to take into account in our analysis both those who give and those who receive (beneficiaries, recipients, or whatever labels they may have in different situations). The latter have been generally regarded as politically apathetic or purely dominated, and sometimes have simply been overlooked. Indeed most research on beneficence analyzes the role of the benefactors, often part of the elites, or else the work of volunteers. To date, the points of view of those who are assisted, as well as of those who are excluded from aid transactions, have barely been documented. It is therefore important to foster a joint historical analysis of the institutional actors and the beneficiaries through the lens of their collaborative, contentious, and competitive interactions. This approach allows us in our analysis to take into account the multiplicity of actors in play, from the most fragile and least visible groups of actors to the international institutions.

72

S. A. SAEIDNIA AND L. RUIZ

DE

ELVIRA

between “Syrian refugees” and “host communities”. However, the distinction between these two categories of populations remains largely artificial. (Drif 2020)

Her work reminds us of the importance of paying attention to the local social scale of social policies, where these programs are implemented, in order to understand how the khayriyye register concretely entangles with the economic logic of aid. Indeed, the presumed political equivalence between hosts and refugees, as well as the posture of hospitality and rights to aid, produces multiple dependences at this level: Syrian refugees are dependent on NGOs for obtaining humanitarian aid; NGOs depend on Syrian refugees, since an NGO’s institutional reproduction is linked to its capacity to (re)produce beneficiaries; finally, to a lesser extent, the host populations depend on Syrian populations. These new dependency dynamics have also been observed by Mouawad in the Lebanese Wadi Khaled region, which has become a zone economically governed by “the power of aid” (Duffield 2001) since the arrival of Syrian refugees (Mouawad 2018). In other political settings such as Arab authoritarian regimes, ambiguous dependency logics can also be observed. In Bashar al-Assad’s Syria, for instance, charitable organizations depended not only on the multiple permissions that the different ministries (Social Affairs and Labor, Religious Affairs, Foreign Affairs…) granted according to clientelistic calculations but also, on another level, on individual donors who financed their activities and on religious leaders who sponsored them. At the same time, in a context of economic liberalization and State redeployment, the Syrian regime in turn also became increasingly dependent on these actors in order to keep providing social services to the growing Syrian population (Ruiz de Elvira 2019). The second logic that appears when observing the everyday interactions that take place in the “doing good” sector is the competition between the different actors. We see competition between organizations and networks to get funding,6 competition between recipients to obtain charitable aids or services,7 and also, among the benefactors, to gain or 6 The competition between benefactors to prove “the greater need of their beneficiaries’ in order to access private and public funding” (Singer 2018). 7 Singer underlines how “recipients also participate in a politics of philanthropy in order to gain access to donations by proving their superior deservedness or need” (Singer 2018).

4

BENEFICENCE AND WELFARE: NOTES FOR THE COMPARATIVE STUDY …

73

maintain a certain social status. For example, in Iran—as elsewhere—a growing number of actors claim to address the grievances of “the poor”, “the oppressed”, “the weak” or “the dependent”. Currently there are many such actors: international institutions like the World Health Organization and the UNDP; national and local political institutions such as the Ministry of Cooperatives, Labor and Social Welfare; religious and revolutionary charitable trusts such as the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee; local cooperatives; international and local NGOs; local religious associations and mosques; Islamic interest-free loan banks; militia of basidj-s; neighborhood councils; as well as individual actors. This long list indicates, firstly, that far from being centralized, the Iranian social relief sector and welfare system is a realm with multiple actors intersecting and competing over who should be morally entitled to benefit from part of the social product (Saeidnia 2019). Secondly, it is a space at the crossroads of the different legitimation repertoires of the Iranian Republic, whether religious, revolutionary or civic. Lastly, it is a realm of encounters and conflicts over resource distribution (material, financial, and moral) between these various actors (Saeidnia 2016). Similar dynamics exist in Syria. In an interview, the director of one of the biggest charitable organizations, the Jam’iyyat al-Ansar al-Kahyriyya, eloquently described the competitive dynamics existing in the country within the charitable sector: There is competition to do good (‘amal khayr). For example, if we want to build a hospital, other associations will also want to build a hospital rather than open a pharmacy. Associations do not complement each other. There should be competition in the sense of complementarity (tak¯ amul ) and not in the sense of uniformity (tam¯ athul ). Now everyone is reproducing and copying the same projects, making unfair competition. In short, there is no cooperation between charities.8

Interestingly, this same competition has also been documented by historians of charity. Singer, for instance, writes that “Competition could be as fierce in charitable endeavors as in any other route to power and glory because beneficence contributed so directly to enhancing reputation, status, and legitimacy” (Singer 2008 p. 131). In a similar vein,

8 Interview, Damascus, March 2009.

74

S. A. SAEIDNIA AND L. RUIZ

DE

ELVIRA

Girardin describes a striking example of competition in his work about piety and charity in ancient Judaea (1st–4th century CE): Since the gift is prescribed as a pledge of piety, it would seem that some people evaluate the piety of their entourage according to the sums they pay in offerings. And this does not seem to be an isolated case, since there is a real competition among donors in giving, each seeking to be more generous. Thus, a certain Naqdemon ben Gorion, perhaps the Nicodemus of John’s Gospel, laid out blankets on his way and left them behind so the poor could pick them up, according to the (late) Babylon Talmud (TB, Ketubot, 66b-67a). It’s not only a question of giving, it’s also a question of showing your greatness and, through your generosity, your wealth. (Girardin 2020)

This quotation links to the third logic we want to discuss: the intertwining of charitable practice and political exchange (in terms of notability, legitimacy, recognition, etc.) which at times may generate conflicts and discontent. Many authors have indeed shown the complex articulation between the enactment of “good” and power. “Doing good” allows actors to position themselves socially, to show their belonging to a social group, to anchor their reputation or to distinguish themselves. Thus in certain contexts beneficence works in a way that is complementary to political power, as Turiano observes in her research on the Egyptian organization Tahsin al-Sihha: Investing in good practices allows these young girls from the liberal elite to engage in public life and increase their respectability while maintaining their rank. Since Ottoman times, charity has been, as historian Adam Mestyan notes, a means of “religious and social distinction”. It works in a complementary way to the exercise of political power: the same (or almost the same) families manage public affairs on the one hand and private charity on the other. (Turiano 2020)

Of course, this is not exclusive to the Islamic world since the same dynamics have been observed in other contexts. Cavallo, for instance, notes this in her work on the motivation of benefactors in Italy of the seventeenth century: “That involvement in charity was sought partly out of concern for individuals’ own position in power or status has often been noted. It is almost commonplace to observe that the charitable impulse

4

BENEFICENCE AND WELFARE: NOTES FOR THE COMPARATIVE STUDY …

75

was motivated by aims which were secular and which involved personal rewards.” (Cavallo 1994 p. 52) The fourth logic we want to point out here is the ability of the different actors to evaluate and adapt to changing and sometimes contentious situations, either by adjusting their moral conceptions or by displaying new narratives. Going back to Sigillò’s work, we see how Islamic charities established in post-2011 Tunisia have not only professionalized and standardized their work, but also adapted to international norms and projects in order to increase their legitimacy, particularly in the development sector. Thus, from 2014 onwards, several of these organizations have been operating in the “social development” sector (tanmia ijtima’ia), a local version of the “social economy” that is mainly implemented in the country by international donors (Sigillò 2020). We are referring here to broad dynamics that affect “doing good” practices beyond the Islamic world. In other contexts, interactions are also structured by processes of evaluation and adjustment that not only redefine the concept of “doing good”, but also refine its very implementation. Moral transactions and adjustments may, for instance, take place during street-level relief work with homeless people that are sometimes perceived as “hostile” by the volunteers (Flaureau 2020). Or it can happen where hosts welcome “courageous”, “resilient” and “deserving” refugees who may be later conceived of as “immoral” or “profiteers” (d’Halluin et al. 2020). The fifth logic that emerges when observing everyday “doing good” interactions is the (re)production of inequalities and social borders, and therefore of existing hierarchies and partitions of the social body. Arguably, if “doing good” practices can nowadays somehow reduce economic inequalities through aid distribution, they might however reinforce other inequalities (e.g. racial inequalities).9 Moreover, one could claim that by aiming to attenuate the impact of liberalizing economic measures on the most vulnerable populations (by alleviating poverty and unemployment for instance) rather than trying to transform the system, beneficence reinforces, or at least maintains, the status quo and the established order (Ruiz de Elvira 2019; Benthall 2004 p. 182). “Doing good” practices thus may help the unacceptable to become acceptable by making it seem natural and inevitable. At the same time, beneficence makes it 9 In her analysis of a Swiss charitable association, Aubry shows that beneficence towards the needy can indeed strengthen racial inequalities and hierarchies between Swiss and foreign beneficiaries and volunteers (Aubry 2020).

76

S. A. SAEIDNIA AND L. RUIZ

DE

ELVIRA

possible to preserve and strengthen the hierarchy established between different social classes, reaffirming the place and role that each of them is called upon to play in society (the rich must give and the poor must receive). Girardin reminds us that point in Judaea, since the benefactors who gave tsedaka aimed above all to treat the poor as poor. In other words, they gave without calling into question the established social order. However, in other contexts, charitable practices can be associated with ambitions of social reform as Turiano documents in the Egyptian case and Koochakzadeh illustrates for the Iranian case. The latter writes: From the very end of the nineteenth century onwards, a major movement of so-called “new” or “national” school foundations in Iran appeared, mad¯ ares-e jad¯ıd or mad¯ ares-e mell¯ı of private initiative, which were supposed to provide modern education accessible to all, especially children from disadvantaged classes. The action of the school founders seeks to overcome the country’s educational deficiencies, as no real state education system existed in Iran at the time. Their action follows on first and foremost traditional Islamic charity. But they also give a strong political charge to their amal-e kheyr, “acts of beneficence”: the modernization and reform of Iran is the goal of their enterprise, and for that they rely on the development of a based mainly abroad non-governmental press to promote their initiatives. They also use support campaigns and financing methods inspired by the West. (Koochakzadeh 2020)

Finally, the last logic is the ambiguous and evolving entanglement in everyday interactions of beneficence with religion (Jawad and Yakut-Cakar 2010). Indeed, even if, as we have stated above, beneficence should not be reduced to its religious dimension, religious morals and ethics indeed are sometimes important. They play a role in defining legitimate recipients of aid (the good poor) as well as ways of giving (donations, taxes, etc.). As Singer writes, “it seems an incomplete undertaking to isolate religious belief from the dynamics of society and culture, politics, and economics” (Singer 2018 p. 12). For this reason, in her research, Saeidnia sees religion(s) as multidimensional social processes (e.g. a repertoire of public action, a social experience, a cultural and normative framework and a historically build social field where multiple actors and institutions intersect), that shape the production of social policies and everyday investment of “doing good” practices in diverse ways (Saeidnia 2016). Indeed, in Iran, religion organizes daily life in multiple ways. It shapes relationships to time and memory (e.g. calls to prayer, religious holidays or holidays

4

BENEFICENCE AND WELFARE: NOTES FOR THE COMPARATIVE STUDY …

77

linked to revolutionary historiography, as well as electoral temporalities), and also to space and other bodies (e.g. through the gendered segregation of certain places and practices). Within these contexts, religion also contributes not only to the definition of who is allowed to benefit from social aid, and how, but also who is allowed to delineate those criteria of legitimacy in the first place. For example, Saeidnia tells the story of how Mahnaz, a neighborhood councilor, helped a family who had been evicted because of financial issues. Mahnaz helped them get institutional social support in her Tehrani neighborhood, although she described them as immoral because “they helped runaways, did corrupted and immoral things in their home and took drugs”.10 Mahnaz had been a benevolent nurse during the war and also helps her son who is a basidji in his cultural activities. In order to get help for the evicted family from the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee, Mahnaz used her personal contacts and reminded the institutions of “their Islamic duty” which surely precluded the “indecency” of leaving a family in the streets. She also threatened to publicize their refusal, and wrote letters, etc. In other words, Mahnaz acted as an intermediary between these inhabitants and social aid institutions. Like other neighborhood councilors, her daily practices entangle religious discourse, bureaucratic and interpersonal processes that grant her a margin of action, and discretionary power (Lipsky 2010) in the distribution of social support. Furthermore, rather than contesting the institution moral norms, she suggested another definition of decency using religious and revolutionary sources.

4

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have tried to show that the study of beneficence offers a stimulating and rewarding point of entry into understanding the reconfigurations of social policies in the Islamic world. The concept of “doing good” first allows us to escape the binary state/society analysis. By exploring the actual division of tasks and responsibilities in social welfare and by underlining the polysemy and the contribution of khayriyye practices, we have highlighted both the plurality of actors participating in the (re)definition of social policies and their complex and ever changing relations with the State. In the words of Catusse and

10 Interview, Tehran, September 2011.

78

S. A. SAEIDNIA AND L. RUIZ

DE

ELVIRA

Perrier, there is an urgent need to overcome earlier approaches which suggested “a single linear history of religious charity to the welfare state to show how these registers could merge in the same institutions” (Catusse and Perrier 2018). The study of “doing good” also offers us a way to explore the multiple logics that everyday beneficence practices may generate beyond the “retreat”, the “redeployment” or the “off-loading” of the state. In this regard we have shown that ‘amal khayr nourishes not only dependency and competition, but also enhances power strategies and individual abilities to adapt and adjust to changing political and social situations. Furthermore, “doing good” practices can both (re)produce social inequalities and social boundaries but also sometimes be conceived of as a tool for social reform. The focus on these practices lastly brings us back to the importance of contextualization when studying social processes, with a need to identify singularities as well as circulations. The experiences we have described are indeed socially and historically constructed. They are embedded in social processes that are produced by both local and transnational social, economic and political dynamics. Khayriyye institutions and practices are also inhabited by actors with diverse backgrounds, trajectories, and social networks. They thus cannot be separated from norms of ordinary sociability, notability processes, job market contexts, situation of the welfare state or even international contexts. Acknowledgements This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 801505.

Bibliography Aït-Aoudia, M. (2013). La genèse d’une mobilisation partisane: continuités et politisation du militantisme caritatif et religieux au sein du FIS. Politix, 102(2), 129–146. Aubry, A. (2020). Les divisions du travail caritatif: enquête au sein d’une structure d’aide « aux plus démunies » de Suisse romande. In L. Ruiz de Elvira & S. A. Saeidnia (Eds.), Les mondes de la bien-faisance. (Se) mobiliser pour le « bien », (se) gouverner par le « bien ». Paris: CNRS Editions. Baylouny, A. M. (2006). Creating kin: New family associations as welfare providers in liberalizing Jordan. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 38(3), 349–368.

4

BENEFICENCE AND WELFARE: NOTES FOR THE COMPARATIVE STUDY …

79

Benthall, J. (2004). Islam et charité institutionnelle. Doctrine, réalité et interprétation. In B. Destremau, A. Deboulet, & F. Ireton (Eds.), Dynamiques de la pauvreté en Afrique du Nord et au Moyen-Orient (pp. 181–192). Paris: Karthala. Benthall, J., & Bellion-Jourdan, J. (2003). The charitable crescent: Politics of aid in the Muslim world. London, UK: I.B. Tauris. Bonner, M. D., Ener, M., & Singer, A. (Eds.). (2003). Poverty and charity in Middle Eastern contexts. Albany: State University of New York Press. Brown, R. A., & Pierce, J. (2013). Charities in the Non-Western world: The development and regulation of Indigenous and Islamic charities. New York: Routledge. Cammett, M. C., & MacLean, L. (2011). Introduction: The political consequences of non state social welfare in the global South. Studies in Comparative International Development, 46(1), 1–21. Cammett, M. C., & MacLean, L. (Eds.). (2014). The politics of non-state social welfare. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Catusse, M., Destremau, B., & Verdier, E. (Eds.). (2009). L’Etat face aux débordements du social au Maghreb: formation, travail et protection sociale. Paris: Karthala. Catusse M., & Perrier A. (2018). « Enquêter sur la bienfaisance. Compte rendu des journées d’études ». Le Carnet du Mouvement Social. Cavallo, S. (1994). The motivations of benefactors. In J. Barry & C. Jones (Eds.), Medicine and charity before the welfare state (pp. 46–62). London and New York: Routledge. Challand, B. (2008). A nahda of charitable organisations? Health service provision and the politics of aid in Palestine. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 40(2), 227–247. Çizkaça, M. (2000). A history of philanthropic foundations: The Islamic world from the seventh century to the present. Istanbul: Bo˘gaziçi University Press. Clark, J. A. (2004). Islam, charity, and activism: Middle-class networks and social welfare in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Das, V., & Poole, D. (Eds.). (2004). Anthropology in the margins of the state. Santa Fe: School of American Research Press. D’Halluin, E. Maestri, G. Monforte, P., & Rambaud E. (2020). Déstabilisations et réévaluations des cadres du mérite chez les bénévoles engagés auprès des réfugiés au Royaume-Uni. In L. Ruiz de Elvira & S. A. Saeidnia (Eds.), Les mondes de la bien-faisance. (Se) mobiliser pour le « bien », (se) gouverner par le « bien ». Paris: CNRS Editions. Destremau, B. (2019). Doing good and taking care: Challenges of social protection in the Arab world. SPIW Conference Proceedings.

80

S. A. SAEIDNIA AND L. RUIZ

DE

ELVIRA

. Accessed 17 February 2020. Drif, L. (2020). La fabrique sociale des bénéficiaires de l’aide à Beyrouth. Entre rhétorique d’hospitalité aux réfugiés syriens et reconfiguration des vulnérabilités. In L. Ruiz de Elvira & S. A. Saeidnia (Eds.), Les mondes de la bien-faisance. (Se) mobiliser pour le « bien », (se) gouverner par le « bien ». Paris: CNRS Editions. Duffield, M. (2001). Governing the borderlands: Decoding the power of aid. Disasters, 25(4), 308–320. Ener, M. (2003). Managing Egypt’s poor and the politics of benevolence, 1800– 1952. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Flaureau, E. (2020). Penser la bienfaisance au sein des maraudes paroissiales: enjeux moraux et contraintes pratiques chez les bénévoles catholiques. In L. Ruiz de Elvira & S. A. Saeidnia (Eds.), Les mondes de la bien-faisance. (Se) mobiliser pour le « bien », (se) gouverner par le « bien ». Paris: CNRS Editions. Ghandour, A. (2002). Jihad Humanitaire. Enquête sur les ONG islamiques. Paris: Flammarion. Ghazaleh, P. (Ed.). (2011). Held in trust: Waqf in the Islamic world. Cairo: The American University of Cairo Press. Girardin, M. (2020). Piété et charité obligatoire dans les judaïsmes anciens (Ier – IVe siècles apr. J. C.). In L. Ruiz de Elvira & S. A. Saeidnia (Eds.), Les mondes de la bien-faisance. (Se) mobiliser pour le « bien », (se) gouverner par le « bien ». Paris: CNRS Editions. Harris, K. (2017). A social revolution: Politics and the welfare state in Iran. Oakland: University of California Press. Hibou, B. (1999). « La « décharge », nouvel interventionnisme ». Politique africaine, 73(1), 6–15. Hodgson, M. G. S. (1974). The venture of Islam (Vol. 2). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Jawad, R., & Yakut-Cakar, B. (2010). Religion and social policy in the Middle East: The (re)construction of an old-new partnership. Social Policy and Administration, 44(6), 658–672. Karshenas, M., & Moghadam, V. M. (Eds.). (2006). Social policy in the Middle East: Economic, political, and gender dynamics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Koochakzadeh, L. (2020). Entre action publique et charité privée: la création d’écoles comme acte de bienfaisance en Iran au tournant des XIXe et XXe siècles (1898–1911). In L. Ruiz de Elvira & S. A. Saeidnia (Eds.), Les mondes de la bien-faisance. (Se) mobiliser pour le « bien », (se) gouverner par le « bien ». Paris: CNRS Editions.

4

BENEFICENCE AND WELFARE: NOTES FOR THE COMPARATIVE STUDY …

81

Le Renard, A. (2008). Pauvreté et charité en Arabie Saoudite: La famille royale, le secteur des affaires et “l’État-Providence”. Critique internationale, 41, 137– 156. Lipsky, M. (2010). Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public services. New York: Russel Sage. Longuenesse, E., Catusse, M., & Destremau, B. (Eds.). (2005). Le travail et la question sociale au Maghreb et au Moyen-Orient. Aix-en-Provence, France: Edisud. McChesney, R. D. (1995). Charity and philanthropy in Islam: Institutionalizing the call to do good. Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Center on Philanthropy. Mitchell, T. (1991). The limits of the state: Beyond statist approaches and their critics. The American Political Science Review, 85(1), 77–96. Mouawad, J. (2018). La région libanaise de Wadi Khaled à la frontière avec la Syrie: quelles transformations économiques en temps de paix et de guerre? Critique Internationale, 80(3), 67–88. Nejima, S. (Ed.). (2016). NGOs in the Muslim world: Faith and social services. London: Routledge. Osella, F., & Osella, C. (2009). Muslim entrepreneurs in public life between India and the Gulf: Making good and doing good. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 15(1), 202–221. Perrier, A. (2020). Les biens du Bien. Charité et assistance publique dans l’œuvre des fondations pieuses (awq¯af) tunisiennes (1875–1956). In L. Ruiz de Elvira & S. A. Saeidnia (Eds.), Les mondes de la bien-faisance. (Se) mobiliser pour le « bien », (se) gouverner par le « bien ». Paris: CNRS Editions. Ruiz de Elvira, L. (2012). Les catégories à l’épreuve des “associations réelles”: ni tout à fait “laïques” et développementalistes, ni tout à fait confessionnelles et de bienfaisance. A Contrario, 18, 79–96. Ruiz de Elvira, L. (2019). Vers la fin du contrat social en Syrie. Associations de bienfaisance et redéploiement de l’État (2000–2011). Paris: Karthala. Ruiz de Elvira, L. (2020). Associations de bienfaisance et prise en charge du social en Syrie. De l’étatisme à la « décharge ». In L. Ruiz de Elvira & S. A. Saeidnia (Eds.), Les mondes de la bien-faisance. (Se) mobiliser pour le « bien », (se) gouverner par le « bien ». Paris: CNRS Editions. Ruiz de Elvira, L., & Saeidnia, S. A. (Eds.). (2020). Les mondes de la bienfaisance. (Se) mobiliser pour le « bien », (se) gouverner par le « bien ». Paris: CNRS Editions. Ruiz de Elvira, L., & Zintl, T. (2014). The end of the Bathist social contract in Bashar Al-Asad’s Syria: Reading sociopolitical transformations through Charities and broader benevolent activism. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 46(2), 329–349.

82

S. A. SAEIDNIA AND L. RUIZ

DE

ELVIRA

Saeidnia S. A. (2016). “Faire avec” les contraintes: l’expérience du politique des conseillers de quartier de Téhéran (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris. Saeidnia S. A. (2018, July 5). Faire du ‘social’ à l’échelle locale. Une analyse par le bas des acteurs et dispositifs de l’aide sociale en Iran [Panel introduction]. 3rd Congrès du GIS Moyen-Orient et Mondes Musulmans, Paris, France. Saeidnia, S. A. (2019). Une république des martyrs? La guerre comme répertoire d’action publique dans la République islamique d’Iran. Gouvernement et action publique, 4, 145–167. Sharma, A., & Gupta, A. (2006). The anthropology of the state: A reader. Chichester: Blackwell. Sigillò E. (2018). Mobilizing for development or through development? Trajectories of civic activism in post-authoritarian Tunisia (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Institute of Political and Social Sciences, Scuola Normale Superiore, Florence. Sigillò, E. (2020). Se spécialiser dans le secteur associatif: la transformation de la charité islamique à l’aune de la reconfiguration du jeu politique en Tunisie. In L. Ruiz de Elvira & S. A. Saeidnia (Eds.), Les mondes de la bien-faisance. (Se) mobiliser pour le « bien », (se) gouverner par le « bien ». Paris: CNRS Editions. Singer, A. (2006). Soup and sadaqa: Charity in Islamic societies. Historical Research, 79(205), 306–324. Singer, A. (2008). Charity in Islamic societies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Singer, A. (Ed.). (2014). The politics of benevolence [Special Issue]. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 46(2), 227–238. Singer, A. (2018). The politics of philanthropy. Journal of Muslim Philanthropy & Civil Society, 2(1), 2–20. Tugal, C. (2017). Caring for the poor: Islamic and Christian benevolence in a liberal world. London: Routledge. Turiano, A. (2020). Une société de bienfaisance féminine en Égypte. Tahsîn alSihha et la lutte contre la tuberculose (1930–1970). In L. Ruiz de Elvira & S. A. Saeidnia (Eds.), Les mondes de la bien-faisance. (Se) mobiliser pour le « bien », (se) gouverner par le « bien ». Paris: CNRS Editions. Vannetzel, M. (2017). The Muslim brotherhood’s ‘virtuous society’ and state developmentalism in Egypt: The politics of ‘goodness’. International Development Policy, Revue internationale de politique de développement, 8, 220–245. Wiepking, P., & Handy, F. (Eds.). (2015). The Palgrave handbook of global philanthropy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

CHAPTER 5

Cash Transfer Programs in MENA from a Child Rights Perspective Charlotte Bilo and Anna Carolina Machado

1

Introduction

Although in the past decade the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)1 region has made important advances in terms of reducing extreme poverty and improving health, education and child survival indicators, progress 1 Based on UNICEF’s definition of the MENA region, this study covers the following 20 countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, State of Palestine, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.

The findings presented in this chapter are based on two joint publications by the International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth and UNICEF Middle East and North Africa Regional Office (Machado et al. 2018; Machado and Bilo 2018) which provide a closer look at child-sensitive social protection in the region and an analysis of program’s legal frameworks from a child rights perspective. Some references have been updated for the chapter at hand. C. Bilo (B) International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG), Brasilia, Brazil e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 A. A. Tajmazinani (ed.), Social Policy in the Islamic World, International Series on Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57753-7_5

83

84

C. BILO AND A. C. MACHADO

has remained uneven across the region. Countries affected by conflicts and humanitarian situations (such as Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen) in particular have seen a reversal in child well-being indicators (UNICEF 2017). Child poverty in the region remains a critical concern. According to a study in 11 Arab countries, one in four children suffers from acute multidimensional poverty (LAS et al. 2017). Another recent report points out that MENA region spends only 0.1% of GDP on child benefits, far below the global average of 1.1% (ILO and UNICEF 2019). An ever-growing body of research has documented the positive effects of cash transfer programs, not only on preventing and reducing monetary poverty but also on improving key determinants of multidimensional child poverty. By providing income security to households, cash transfers can decrease financial barriers to the wellbeing of children and improve their access to basic services. In fact, cash transfers have been shown to increase children’s school participation and to improve their food intake and health status. They also produce positive impacts by alleviating family’s financial stress, consequently helping to reduce risks of violence, child labor and child marriage (see Bastagli et al. 2016; ILO and UNICEF 2019; Yang et al. 2019). While the region has a long tradition of providing social support to the most vulnerable segments of society, in many countries non-contributory social protection systems remain limited, relying to a large extent on food and fuel subsidies and the support of charitable and other nonstate organizations. In recent years the region has seen a number of social protection reforms, which often included the gradual removal of universal subsidies and the introduction or scale-up of targeted cash transfer programs, as in the case of Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Such reforms can, in principle, offer a good opportunity to invest in children with positive impacts on several dimensions of their well-being. Against this background, organizations concerned with children’s rights, such as UNICEF have been promoting a child-sensitive approach to social protection, which requires bearing in mind the different dimensions of children’s well-being and addressing the “unique social disadvantages, risks and vulnerabilities children may be born into or acquire later in childhood due to external circumstances” (UNICEF 2019, p. 31).

A. C. Machado International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG), Brasilia, Brazil

5

CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN MENA …

85

This means that age- and gender-specific vulnerabilities as well as the different dimensions of children’s well-being, such as health, nutrition and education, have to be considered already in programs’ design phase. Social protection policies do not necessarily have to target children to benefit them. Yet, their design can further foster synergies with other basic social services in the areas of health, nutrition and education. As suggested in this chapter, a social protection program can be understood as having a child-sensitive design if it has at least one of the following five key features: (1) directly targeting children or families with children; (2) supporting children’s food and nutrition security; (3) supporting children’s access to health; (4) supporting children’s access to education; (5) providing additional benefits to children beyond the immediate (direct) beneficiary of the program. The concept of child-sensitive social protection is closely linked to that of a human-rights based approach to social protection. As enshrined in several international human rights instruments, including the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child, every child has the right to social protection. Therefore, it is important that programs are anchored in a system of rights, clearly establishing citizens’ entitlements and corresponding obligations for the State. Strong legal frameworks help to promote social protection as a right, which is important in order to shift away from a charity-based perception of it. Embedding social protection in comprehensive legal frameworks is particularly relevant for children, as they are not only more vulnerable to malnutrition, disease and abuse (and thus in need of adequate programs) but are also more dependent on others for support. Moreover, social protection schemes enshrined in national legal frameworks are less prone to shifts in governments’ priorities and to political manipulation. However, according to (Sépulveda 2019), fundamental child-protective principles of human rights2 are often not included in legal frameworks of cash transfer programs, especially those using mechanisms to select beneficiaries. While new cash transfer programs are emerging in the MENA region, little is known about the comprehensiveness of their legal frameworks and the child-sensitivity of their design. In light of this, this chapter aims to evaluate the legal set-up and design of non-contributory cash transfers in 2 Four main principles: (i) equality and non-discrimination; (ii) “best interests of the child”; (iii) respect for dignity and avoidance of stigma; (iv) compliance with other children’s rights (Sépulveda 2019).

86

C. BILO AND A. C. MACHADO

the region from a children’s right perspective. The next section provides a short overview of the social protection systems in MENA, which is followed by an analysis of the region’s cash transfer programs. In particular, the analysis looks (amongst other features) at their target groups, targeting mechanisms and coverage. In addition, the extent to which the region’s cash transfer schemes are embedded in legal frameworks is analyzed, along with an investigation of whether existing program laws comply with a human rights-based approach to social protection. Following this, the programs are assessed with regard to their childsensitivity, as per the five key features outlined above. Finally, concluding remarks and overall recommendations towards the enhancement of childsensitive social protection systems are presented. The findings presented in this chapter are based on two studies developed by the International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth and UNICEF Middle East and North Africa Regional Office (Machado et al. 2018; Machado and Bilo 2018).

2

Background on Social Protection in MENA

Social protection systems in MENA can be characterized by a strong reliance on universal food and energy subsidies and on contributory insurance schemes. However, there is a growing consensus that non-targeted subsidies disproportionally favor the wealthy and have little effect on poverty reduction. Social insurance funds and pension schemes are available for civil servants and those working in the formal sector. Yet, it is estimated that only one-third of the workforce in the region is covered by formal social insurance systems (Silva et al. 2013). Non-contributory social assistance programs are often aimed at reaching citizens who are unable to work due to old age, illness or disability; in need of protection (i.e. orphans); or dependent family members who have lost the family provider/breadwinner (i.e. widows and their children, divorced women, or even women who are single after a certain age) (Machado et al. 2018). In recent years, budget constraints—largely due to decreasing government revenues and a decline in oil prices—have contributed to a change in the composition of social protection spending in Arab countries. Universal or quasi-universal energy and food subsidy schemes have been undergoing significant reforms. Countries are facing a double challenge, seeking to address protection gaps and deal with fiscal pressure at the same time (UN ESCWA 2019). In 2010 for instance, the Iranian government introduced one of the largest cash transfer programs of its

5

CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN MENA …

87

kind to compensate for the impacts of a subsidy reform (see Shahyar 2017). In 2014, the Government of Egypt launched substantive fossil fuel price reforms and announced the allocation of nearly 50% of the resulting savings (USD3.6 billion) towards health care, education and social protection programs, including the targeted cash transfer program Takaful and Karama (World Bank 2015). In 2017, reforms that took place in the context of decreasing oil prices led Saudi Arabia to create the program Citizen Account, covering more than half of population by the time and reaching 3.7 million beneficiary households in 2019 (UN ESCWA 2019). In addition, the region has recently seen a dramatic increase in the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. Conflicts and violence are widespread in parts of the region, leaving millions of children in need of humanitarian assistance. In some countries such as Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, humanitarian cash programs have been designed to make use of parts of national social protection systems, providing vital support to the population. Another important peculiarity of social protection in the region is the role of Zakat funds. One of the five pillars of Islam, Zakat —the compulsory giving of a portion of one’s wealth to charity—is considered a religious duty for all adult Muslims with a minimum standard of wealth and functions as an important redistribution mechanism. In some countries, Zakat collection is regulated by the State and its distribution has been merged with social protection systems. In Sudan for example, the Zakat Fund supports over 2 million families with cash transfers and other benefits (Zakat Fund 2016).

3 Non-Contributory Cash Transfer Programs in MENA 3.1

Overview of Cash Transfers in Place

A variety of non-contributory social protection schemes exist in the MENA region, including cash transfers, in-kind (often in the form of food), non-contributory health insurance programs, and school feeding programs. Yet, of all program types, cash transfers remain the most prevalent. Out of a total of 155 programs in the MENA region, 74 are cash transfers (conditional and unconditional). In comparison, only 26 programs are in-kind transfers and eight are cash-for-work (for more see

88

C. BILO AND A. C. MACHADO

Machado et al. 2018). In all 20 countries analyzed, at least one noncontributory cash transfer scheme is available, varying in scale, benefit value and delivery frequency. The majority of cash transfer programs use a categorical targeting approach to identify particularly vulnerable groups. Often a means-test is applied in addition to categorical targeting to select those who are eligible for the program. Proxy means test (PMT) approaches (in which targeting is based on a score calculated after the evaluation of observable characteristics) are becoming more common and are used for at least 10 programs. In the case of Yemen’s Social Welfare Fund (SWF), for example, a PMT was introduced during a later stage of the program to improve the accuracy of the geographical, categorical and unverified means-testing targeting mechanisms used before 2008. There are, however, also cases in which PMTs have been used since program inception, such as Takaful in Egypt and the Palestinian National Cash Transfer Program (PNCTP). In total, 35 cash transfer programs target children, of which 18 are explicitly targeted at orphans. This indicates a relatively high prevalence of financial support programs for orphans compared to cash transfers specifically targeted at children or families with children. Moreover, financial support schemes targeting widows and unmarried women, people with disabilities and/or the elderly are common in the region. Especially unconditional cash transfers (UCT) in MENA are often designed to support households without a (male) breadwinner or those whose head is unable to work, which explains why children are usually not the focus of these programs (except for orphans and children with disabilities). The limited data availability in MENA presents a great challenge for any incidence analysis of the existing cash transfer schemes in the region. However, based on those programs for which coverage numbers are available, it is safe to say that programs vary greatly in size, covering from 2.9% of all children under the age of 18 in Jordan (National Aid Fund Cash Assistance), up to 34% in Yemen (SWF, suspended due to conflict after 2015) and 32% in Sudan (Zakat-funded cash transfers), based on the authors’ estimations.3 Yet, most cash transfer programs are rather small in

3 Note that the programs considered here are programs for poor households as well as other vulnerable groups, they are hence not explicitly targeted at children.

5

CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN MENA …

89

size and reach less than 2% of the respective national population of children. Provided that there are no overlaps,4 Takaful , Karama and the Social Solidarity Pension in Egypt together cover about 12.5% of all children in the country, which is high in absolute terms, as the country has one of the largest under-18 populations in the region, but lower in relative terms when compared to other countries such as Palestine, where the PNCTP alone reached 13.5% of children in 2013. Comparing these coverage estimations with the number of multidimensional poor children (based on multi-dimensional child poverty estimations presented in UNICEF 2018), is a useful exercise as it provides an idea of the capacity of programs to reach the poorest children, if they were perfectly targeted at them. Here, different poverty levels in each country have to be kept in mind. In Tunisia, the Programme National d’Aide aux Familles Nécessiteuses (PNAFN) is targeted at poor families whose head is not able to provide for the household. As of 2016, more than 225,000 households benefited from the program (Centre de Recherches et d’Études Sociales 2017). Program coverage was estimated at 7.12% of all children in the country, with the potential to reach almost 34% of all multi-dimensionally poor children. This is explained by the fact that multi-dimensional poverty levels in Tunisia are relatively low (21%) compared to other countries in the region (UNICEF 2018). Sudan is the country with the highest poverty incidence and 87% of all Sudanese children are estimated to be multi-dimensionally poor (ibid). Based on these estimations, the Sudanese Zakat Fund reaches about one-third of all children in the country, with the capacity to reach 37% of those who are multi-dimensionally poor. 3.2

Legal Frameworks Underpinning Cash Transfers

A human rights-based approach is based on the understanding that access to social protection is a human right, as also enshrined in several core human rights instruments. Importantly, it understands individuals as rights-holders with legitimate claims on the provision of basic services and social protection. The state and other actors, on the other hand, are

4 Note that Karama was designed to gradually replace the Social Solidarity Scheme. A residual group will remain in the social pension program, including poor separated and divorced women.

90

C. BILO AND A. C. MACHADO

duty-bearers which have certain obligations and can be held accountable for acts and omissions (Sepúlveda and Nyst 2012). A lack of comprehensive legal frameworks can threaten beneficiaries’ right to social protection, as schemes become more vulnerable to changes in government short-term priorities and political and partisan manipulation. Without a legal framework, governments are not bound by any compulsory action, and thus more likely to discontinue social protection programs. Moreover, there is a higher risk that programs suffer from underfunding. In order to secure their continuity and create entitlements, it is therefore of uttermost importance that social protection schemes are enshrined in national legal frameworks (Sepúlveda and Nyst 2012; UNICEF 2014). It is needless to say, however, that the sole existence of a law is neither a guarantee nor an indispensable prerequisite for the implementation of programs. A country’s socio-economic and fiscal conditions, as well as political disputes, are also determinant for accurate and speedy program implementation. Conflict and political instabilities also pose significant threats to the implementation of a program established by law. Moreover, it is not unusual to see the implementation of programs that are not anchored in laws or other regulations. As argued by Kaltenborn et al. (2017) the absence of a legal framework for an existing social protection scheme can be due to both political and practical reasons: while in some cases governments can be reluctant to make long-term commitments, in others, legal processes can be extremely lengthy, and non-legal regulations (such as policy statements and operational manuals) are therefore preferred by decision-makers - especially if the program is still in a pilot phase. Looking at the cash transfers in the MENA region, it can be observed that legal gaps remain wide-spread. Apart from Libya, none of the countries in the region has passed a legislation creating a universal child allowance system (Law No. 27 of 2013).5 A few of the countries offer employment-related family allowances, namely Algeria, Djibouti, Iran, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia(ILO 2017). These, however, are only paid to those who work in the formal labor market, leaving out families who are not covered by the contributory social security system.

5 Given the current conflict in the country, it is uncertain whether this law is really applied.

5

CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN MENA …

91

Analyzing the types of non-contributory cash transfers in MENA, a diverse scenario can be observed. Out of 74 cash transfer programs (conditional and unconditional) mapped, more than two-thirds present a legal framework or a regulation6 (see Machado and Bilo 2018). However, important schemes for families with children, such as the PNAFN in Tunisia or the Tayssir in Morocco do not (yet) have a legal framework. For some programs, such as Shamel in Sudan or the PNCTP, legal frameworks are in the process of deliberation (Machado et al. 2018). The degree of consolidation of legal frameworks can vary significantly. Takaful and Karama, Egypt’s flagship program, for example, is ‘only’ grounded in an administrative decree issued by the prime minister, making it less immune against political manipulation and changes in the government. To guarantee the compliance with human rights standards, legislations of social protection schemes should at a minimum: 1. Set out precise eligibility requirements; 2. Define the different roles and responsibilities of institutions involved in the scheme’s implementation; 3. Envisage long-term financial resources for financing the scheme; 4. Establish accessible complaints and appeal mechanisms; and 5. Create participation channels for citizens. A selection of 18 cash transfer programs regulated by a legislative provision or a regulation (such as a presidential decree) were analyzed in more depth to investigate to which extent they comply with the human rights standards listed above (see Annex for an overview). These criteria are presented in UNICEF’s social transfers toolkit (UNICEF 2014) and are aligned with ILO’s Social Protection Floors Recommendation No. 202.7 The analysis of the region’s major cash transfer programs shows that 6 The term ‘legal framework’ is defined here as “all national laws and other decrees or secondary legislations and regulations” (Transform 2017, Glossary). 7 At least one scheme was included for each of the 20 countries, except for Morocco, Lebanon and the State of Palestine, where the main national cash program do not (yet) have a legal framework. Two programs were included for Algeria, Egypt and Jordan each. For Yemen and Syria, where the ongoing humanitarian crises have led to the suspension of most state-provided social protection schemes, the SWF and the National Social Aid Fund (NSAF) respectively were considered. The analysis is limited to a selection of programs that are targeted at children or families with children, or whose benefit structure increases with the number of household members/children.

92

C. BILO AND A. C. MACHADO

the degree to which their legal frameworks conform with human rights standards varies significantly. All program frameworks define which groups are eligible for their respective benefits. However, few clearly spell out the precise eligibility criteria, hampering programs’ accountability and transparency. The lack of clear criteria can jeopardize human rights principles, as those excluded have little legal basis to claim their inclusion. All selected frameworks define the roles and responsibilities of the agencies involved in the program’s implementation. However, some schemes, such as Algeria’s Allocation Forfaitaire de Solidarité, refer merely to the ‘ministry in charge of social protection and other ministries concerned’ as the responsible entity for implementing the program, while others have special committees with well-defined tasks, such as Yemen’s SWF. Long-term financial requirements are usually not well defined in the legal frameworks of the programs analyzed, with the exception of Iraq’s Social Protection Network. The lack of defining financial requirements presents a major gap, as it can curtail the program’s sustainability and the predictability of benefits. Complaints and grievance mechanisms are also not very well established in most of the programs assessed, and none of the frameworks analyzed complies with all the criteria put forward by international human rights standards on this matter. Participation of beneficiaries is clearly one of the least well-established mechanisms in legal frameworks in the region, presenting a critical gap in terms of social accountability and citizen’s participation in policymaking. Only two programs (Allocation Forfaitaire de Solidarité in Algeria and Programme National de Solidarité Famille (PNSF) in Djibouti) envisage some form of participation by beneficiaries (or their representatives). Overall, the analysis of the region’s major cash transfer programs shows that most frameworks comply with only two or three of the criteria assessed (see Annex). Only a few programs stand out for having more comprehensive legal frameworks and for complying with at least four of the five criteria assessed. Décret n°2015-279/PR/SESN (modified by Décret N° 2017 -096/PR/SEAS) regulating the PNSF in Djibouti is the only framework that complies with all criteria (although with varying degrees of detail, for example, complaints procedures are not detailed but left to be regulated by the State Secretariat for National Solidarity). It needs to be noted here, however, that the program has not been embedded in a legislative framework yet. The decree was approved by the Council of Ministers and therefore ranks lower in the legal hierarchy

5

CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN MENA …

93

than a law passed through the legislative process. Moreover, although the framework is relatively comprehensive, the program itself is still being scaled up. In the absence of sufficient funds, it currently only covers a fraction of each region in the interior of the country, reaching a total of about 4000 households (République de Djibouti 2017). Iraq’s Law No. 11 of 2014, regulation the Social Protection Network, is another positive example as it clearly defines eligibility criteria, roles and responsibilities, sets the financial requirements of the program and establishes a complaints and appeal mechanism. Moreover, it defines those elements with more detail than most other programs. The World Bank also highlights that the law was passed using “key best practice” as “government officials sat down with members of parliament to draft the law, along with senior advisors from the Council of Minister and from the Shura Council, and with advisory support from the World Bank team” (Alkhoja et al. 2016, p. 2). 3.3

Child-Sensitive Design Features

In addition to a comprehensive legal framework, it is likewise important that programs take children’s vulnerabilities and needs into account in the design stage. Given the growing literature on the topic, there are many ways to operationalize the analysis of child-sensitive social protection. The approach used here to assess the child-sensitivity of the non-contributory programs draws on the research conducted by Marcus et al. (2011) and has the purpose to understand the extent to which the specific needs of children are incorporated into program design. Issues such as the accuracy of implementation or impact evaluations that measure specific child-related outcomes were not considered at this stage. It is not suggested that programs with child-sensitive design features automatically result in children’s increased well-being. Many other factors need to be considered, such as the local context and the availability of basic services. Moreover, other programs—such as general food or cash transfers targeting poor households—can have indirect positive effects on children without explicitly including child-related features in their design. For conditional cash transfers (CCT) in particular, there is no final consensus on whether conditionalities are really needed to achieve desired program outcomes, when compared to unconditional cash transfer programs.

94

C. BILO AND A. C. MACHADO

2 6 14 34 35 Supporting children's access to nutrition Supporting children's access to health Supporting children's access to education Benefits increase w/ nr. of household members/ children Programmes targeting children

Fig. 1 Number of programs with child-sensitive design features by dimension (Note One program can have more than one of the features above. Source Based on Machado et al. [2018])

As outlined above, cash transfers in the region were benchmarked against the following criteria: 1. directly targeting children or families with children; 2. supporting children’s food and nutrition security; 3. supporting children’s access to health; 4. supporting children’s access to education; 5. providing additional benefits to children beyond the immediate (direct) beneficiary of the program. Of a total of 74 cash transfer programs, 38 contain one or more of the above-listed features. Most programs target children (35) and/or pay additional benefits per child (34) (see also Fig. 1). While unconditional cash transfer programs remain more common, twelve countries in the region also have one or more CCT. The majority of CCTs8 are linked to educational conditionalities. Some of the more 8 Education-related CCTs include cash transfers for families with school-age children, which are conditional on school attendance or enrolment (whether verified or not), but also educational scholarships and student grants paid to individual students, with an implicit conditionality.

5

CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN MENA …

95

recent programs include the Takaful in Egypt and the Direct Assistance to Widows program in Morocco, both introduced in 2015. In fact, scholarships and/or financial support to purchase school materials, as well as CCTs linked to school attendance, are the two main ways in which cash transfers tend to be linked to education. Algeria’s Allocation Spéciale de Scolarité, for example, was created to incentivize school attendance among children from poor households. Similarly, Morocco’s Tayssir program was designed to minimize school drop-out rates in the most impoverished regions of the country. In comparison, programs with explicit linkages to the health sectors are less frequent. Takaful presents an exception, requiring four visits a year to health clinics by mothers and children under the age of 6. The Recurring Cash Assistance of the National Aid Fund in Jordan requires immunization (among other conditionalities). Although health is one of the dimensions in which children in many of the countries in MENA still face high levels of deprivation (see UNICEF 2018), access to health services appears to be one area in which the contribution of social protection programs remains smaller compared to education. While it will be important to expand universal health care coverage to reach all children in the region, other types of social protection programs can also make important contributions by including health-related components. Only two programs have explicit linkages to nutrition, namely the PNSF in Djibouti and the Social Fund for Development Program in Yemen. While the former offers accompanying measures on health, nutrition, education and hygiene, the latter is a public works program which includes a CCT and an integrated nutrition intervention for pregnant women and mothers with young children. These two programs are the only ones which explicitly target pre-school-age children, compared to 10 that are targeted only at school-age children (mostly CCTs). Data shows that children under 5 are especially vulnerable to malnutrition (see UNICEF 2018), suggesting that there is still significant room to improve linkages between social protection programs and nutrition interventions. While the benefit levels of different cash transfer schemes vary, it can be observed that it often increases according to the size of the household and, to a lesser extent, with children’s age or school grade. In comparison to programs which pay a fixed amount of benefit per household, they are considered child-sensitive here, as they take into account higher expenditure levels of larger families (and for older children). Examples include most cash transfer schemes in the Gulf region, such as in Oman, Saudi

96

C. BILO AND A. C. MACHADO

Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), where the level of financial support is commonly determined by the number of dependents (children and wives) in the household.

4

Conclusion

Many countries in the region are now reducing or phasing out food and energy subsidies and reallocating parts of the accrued budget savings to targeted cash transfer programs. The region has introduced many new cash transfer programs, some of which specifically target families with children. Cash transfers have shown to play a crucial role in improving children’s well-being. Yet for this, they should be embedded in a comprehensive legal framework and their design needs to respond to children’s needs. This chapter has shown that many cash transfer schemes in MENA still target individuals who are unable to work or who live in households without a male breadwinner. An over-reliance on programs based on these traditional target groups can jeopardize the child-sensitivity of social protection systems by excluding the children of vulnerable (working) families. It is, therefore, necessary to rethink the targeting mechanisms currently used, to better reach vulnerable children without generating unjustifiable exclusion errors. Moreover, estimations based on the comparison between the child coverage estimations and the number of poor children in the country shows that the region’s cash programs are often not large enough to reach all vulnerable children. Even large-scale programs would only have enough scope to reach less than half of all multi-dimensionally poor children in their respective countries, which highlights a strong need to expand existing programs. Given the above, universal child allowances should be discussed as a policy option, as they can help overcome exclusion errors, expand coverage and strengthen a rights-based approach to social protection. This is particularly relevant in the context of subsidy reforms in MENA, which calls for a larger compensation base to maintain social and political stability, as opposed to narrow targeting. Universal benefits for families with children could be made affordable and equitable, especially when combined with progressive tax systems. Regardless of the type of cash transfer chosen (whether universal or not) it is important that programs are embedded in comprehensive legal

5

CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN MENA …

97

frameworks. This is of particular importance for children as they are not only especially in need of adequate and reliable social protection but are also more dependent on others for support. The analysis of the legal frameworks underpinning the existing cash transfers shows that most of them do not fully comply with a human-rights based approach to social protection. Most human rights criteria are only vaguely mentioned or completely absent. Only eligibility criteria and roles and responsibilities of the institutions involved are better established in the programs’ legal frameworks. In fact, all legal frameworks analyzed define who is eligible for the respective benefits and who is responsible for implementing the program, even though with varying level of detail. In comparison, the financial requirements and complaints and appeal mechanisms are less well articulated. Only two programs envisage some form of participation by beneficiaries (or their representatives), and only one foresees the participation of representatives of children. The analysis shows that besides enhancing legal frameworks in line with a human rights-based approach, mechanisms that allow monitoring and evaluation need to be implemented to hold governments and program implementers accountable. In addition, this chapter assessed the design features of cash transfers in MENA with regard to their child-sensitivity. Many programs identified as having child-sensitive design features support children’s access to education through, for example, education-related conditionalities. However, programs supporting children’s access to health care or nutrition are less common. Few programs were found to directly address malnutrition, especially among pre-school-age children. Given the importance of addressing children’s needs at early stages of development, more schemes targeting lactating women and younger children (under 6) should be promoted in the region. The consolidation of a child-sensitive social protection system is possible and demands a change of perspective. The recent social spending reforms undertaken in countries in MENA offer a crucial opportunity for countries to enhance their systems, by embedding them in strong legal frameworks and by making them better prepared to meet the specific needs of children throughout the different phases of their life. Given the importance of child-sensitive social protection, the information and findings presented can serve as a useful starting point to further support the production of evidence and encourage the constant development of

98

C. BILO AND A. C. MACHADO

systems in the MENA region and beyond to better address children’s needs.

Annex: Analysis of human rights principles of selected programs in the region

Social Solidarity Pension

Egypt

5

4

3

2

Allocation Forfaitaire de Solidarité Algeria Allocation Spéciale de Scolarité Bahrain Social Assistance Scheme Djibouti PNSF

Algeria

1

Country Program

Décret n°2015279/PR/SESN du 11 octobre 2015; Décret N° 2017 -096/PR/SEAS Law No. 137 of 2010 Social Solidarity Law, Executive Regulations 451 of 2010, Ministerial Decree 186 of 2015

Décret exécutif no 94-336 du 24 octobre 1994 Décret présidentiel no 01-238 du 19 août 2001 Provisions of Law No. 18/2006

Legal Instrument

Art. 18 (Décret 2017 -096 /PR /SEAS)

Art. 13, 16

Art. 14 Art. 2, 4 (Law No. 137) Art. 4, 6 (Executive Regulations 451) Art. 2 (Ministerial Decree 186)

Art.11, 13

Art. 6, 12

Art. 2

Art. 6–10

Art. 8

Art. 18

Establishing accessible complaints and appeal mechanisms

Art.3 (Décret Art. 16 n°2015279/PR/SESN) Art. 2,4,6,7,8,9 (Décret 2017 -096 /PR /SEAS) Art. 8 Art. 8

Art. 10, 15, 16

Art. 3

Art. 12, 16, 18, 19

Setting out Articulating Defining the roles and eligibility long-term responsibilities of those requirements financial involved in the requirements scheme’s implementation

Relevant article(s)

(continued)

Art. 13, 17

Art. 3

Setting foundations for citizen participation

5 CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN MENA …

99

Egypt

Iran

Iraq

6

7

8

Social Protection Network

Targeted Subsidy Reform Act

Takaful and Karama

Country Program

(continued)

Prime Ministerial Decree No. 540 of 2015 Targeted Subsidy Reform Law 2009, Bylaw of Art. 7 ratified by cabinet in April 2010 Law No. 11 of 2014 on Social Protection

Legal Instrument

Art. 7a, and Art. 1-4, 7 Bylaw on Art.7 (Articles 5, 6 and 7) Art. 1, 28 Art. 19

Art. 2

Art. 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 18

Art. 15 Bylaw on Art.7

Art. 3, 9

Setting out Articulating Defining the roles and eligibility long-term responsibilities of those requirements financial involved in the requirements scheme’s implementation

Relevant article(s)

Art. 10, 12, 25

Art. 10

Establishing accessible complaints and appeal mechanisms

(continued)

Setting foundations for citizen participation

100 C. BILO AND A. C. MACHADO

Jordan

11 Libya

10 Kuwait

9

General Assistance Family Allowance

National Aid Fund

Country Program

(continued)

Law of the National Aid Fund No. 36 of 1986; Instructions issued in 2015 under the provisions of Article (8 g) of the Law of the National Aid Fund No. 36 of 1986; Instructions issued in 2012 under the provisions of Article 8 (j) of the Law of the National Aid Fund No. 36 of 1986 Decree No. 23 of 2013 Law No. 27 of 2013 on Allowances for Children and Wives

Legal Instrument

Art. 1,3

Art. 1

Art. 6 Ch. 5 (Art.12-17), Ch. 6 (Art. 18-23), Ch. 7 (Art. 24-28) (Provisions of Article 8 g)

Art. 6,7

Art. 8

Art. 7 (Law No. 36), Art. 7 (Provisions of Article 8 j)

Setting out Articulating Defining the roles and eligibility long-term responsibilities of those requirements financial involved in the requirements scheme’s implementation

Relevant article(s) Establishing accessible complaints and appeal mechanisms

(continued)

Setting foundations for citizen participation

5 CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN MENA …

101

Law No. 38 of 1995 on Social Insurance Royal Decree No. M/45 of 2006

Art. 3,4,7, 19 Art. 4,5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13

Art. 38 Art. 19

Art. 2, 3, 5

Art. 3

Art. 33

Art. 16, 39 Art. 4,6

Art. 18

Art. 15

Art. 11

Establishing accessible complaints and appeal mechanisms

Art. 23, 24

Art. 18, 21

Art. 7 Art. 9, 10

Art. 20

Art. 13, 14

Art. 9, 10, 12, 13, 17 Art. 20, 21

Art. 4, 21

Art. 10,12, 15,16, 20, 21

Setting out Articulating Defining the roles and eligibility long-term responsibilities of those requirements financial involved in the requirements scheme’s implementation

Relevant article(s)

Sultani Decree 84/87 Art.2. Promulgating the Social Security Law (1984)

Zakat Law of 2001 Legislative Decree No. 9 establishing the National Fund for Social Assistance (2011) Monthly Cash Federal Law No. 2 of Benefit 2001 SWF Social Welfare Law No. 39 of 2008

Social Security Benefits (Monthly Cash Assistance Program) Social Insurance Supplementary Support Program Zakat Fund NSAF

Legal Instrument

Source Machado and Bilo (2018)

28 Yemen

17 UAE

15 Sudan 16 Syria

14 Saudi Arabia

13 Qatar

12 Oman

Country Program

(continued)

Setting foundations for citizen participation

102 C. BILO AND A. C. MACHADO

5

CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN MENA …

103

References Alkhoja, G., Neman, R., & Hariz, S. (2016). Social safety nets in Iraq: Reform in a time of fragility, conflict, and violence (MENA Knowledge and Learning) [Quick Notes Series]. World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank. org/bitstream/handle/10986/25342/110141-BRI-MENA-Quick-Note-ser ies-PUBLIC-QN161.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. Accessed 30 November 2018. Bastagli, F., Hagen-Zanker, J., Harman, L., Barca, V., Sturge, G., Schmidt, T., & Pellerano, L. (2016). Cash transfers: What does the evidence say? A rigorous review of programme impact and of the role of design and implementation features. Overseas Development Institute. https://www.odi.org/sites/odi. org.uk/files/resource-documents/10749.pdf. Accessed 30 November 2018. Centre de Recherches et d’Études Sociales. (2017). Évaluation de la performance des programmes d’assistance sociale en Tunisie pour optimiser le ciblage des pauvres et freiner l’avancée de l’informalité. http://www.cres.tn/uploads/ tx_wdbiblio/Rapport_CRES_mai_2017.pdf. Accessed 30 November 2018. ILO. (2017). World social protection report 2017–19: Universal social protection to achieve the sustainable development goals. Geneva: International Labour Organization. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgrepo rts/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_604882.pdf. Accessed 30 November 2018. ILO, & UNICEF. (2019). Towards universal social protection for children: Achieving SDG 1.3. International Labour Office and United Nations Children’s Fund. https://www.unicef.org/media/49401/file/Towards%20univ ersal%20social%20protection%20for%20children.pdf. Accessed 11 May 2020. Kaltenborn, M., Abdulai, A.-G., Roelen, K., & Hague, S. (2017). The influence of policy and legal frameworks on the development of national social protection systems (IDS Working Paper No. 501). International Development Studies. https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123 456789/13353/Wp501_Online.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. Accessed 30 November 2018. LAS, ESCWA, UNICEF, & OPHI. (2017). Arab multidimensional poverty report. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia. https://www.unescwa.org/sites/www.unescwa.org/files/publications/files/ multidimensional-arab-poverty-report-english.pdf. Accessed 30 November 2018. Machado, A. C., & Bilo, C. (2018). Children’s right to social protection in the Middle East and North Africa region—An analysis of legal frameworks from a child rights perspective. International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth and UNICEF Middle East and North Africa Regional Office. https://ipcig. org/pub/eng/RR24_Children_s_Right_to_Social_Protection_in_the_Mid dle_East_and_North_Africa_Region.pdf. Accessed 30 November 2018.

104

C. BILO AND A. C. MACHADO

Machado, A. C., Bilo, C., Soares, F. V., & Osorio, R. G. (2018). Overview of non-contributory social protection programmes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region through a child and equity lens. International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth and UNICEF Middle East and North Africa Regional Office. http://www.ipcig.org/pub/eng/JP19_Executive_ Summary_Overview_of_non_contributory_social_protection_programmes. pdf. Accessed 30 November 2018. Marcus, R., Pereznieto, P., Cullen, E., & Jones, N. (2011). Children and social protection in the Middle East and North Africa (Working Paper No. 355). Overseas Development Institute. https://www.unicef.org/socialpol icy/files/wp-335_children_social_protection_mena_FINAL.pdf. Accessed 30 November 2018. République de Djibouti. (2017). Stratégie Nationale de Protection Sociale de la République de Djibouti (2018–2022)—Version provisoire. Secrétariat d’Etat chargé des Affaires Sociales. http://www.affairessociales.dj/wp-content/upl oads/2015/12/Strat%C3%A9gie-Nationale-de-la-Protection-Sociale-20182022.pdf. Accessed 30 November 2018. Sépulveda, M. (2019). The legal and human rights case for universal child benefits. United Nations Children’s Fund. https://www.socialprotection. org/sites/default/files/publications_files/The%20Legal%20and%20Human% 20Rights%20case%20for%20Universal%20Child%20Benefits.pdf. Accessed 11 May 2020. Sepúlveda, M., & Nyst, C. (2012). The human rights approach to social protection. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ Issues/EPoverty/HumanRightsApproachToSocialProtection.pdf. Accessed 30 November 2018. Shahyar, S. (2017). Social protection in modern Iran: A historic perspective (Policy in Focus Volume 14, Issue No. 3). International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth. https://ipcig.org/pub/eng/PIF40_Social_pro tection_after_the_Arab_Spring.pdf. Silva, J., Levin, V., & Morgandi, M. (2013). Inclusion and resilience: MENA development report. World Bank. https://doi.org/10.1596/978-0-82139771-8. Accessed 30 November 2018. Transform. (2017). Social protection floors legal framework. Building social protection floors in Africa. International Labour Organization, United Nations Children’s Fund and United Nations Development Programme. http:// virtualcampus.socialprotection.org/repository/TRANSFORM/library/exc erpts/module2/Why%20a%20Rights-based%20framework%20for%20Social% 20Protection%20is%20important.pdf. Accessed 30 November 2018. UNICEF. (2014). Assessing child-sensitivity in social protection. A toolkit for social transfers. United Nations Children’s Fund Regional Office for South

5

CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN MENA …

105

Asia. http://socialprotection.org/sites/default/files/publications_files/Ass essing_child-sensitivity_in_social_pr%20(1).pdf. Accessed 30 November 2018. UNICEF. (2017). Progress for children with equity in the Middle East and North Africa. United Nations Children’s Fund Regional Office for the Middle East and North Africa. https://www.unicef.org/mena/reports/progress-childrenequity-middle-east-and-north-africa. Accessed 30 November 2018. UNICEF. (2018). Child poverty in the Arab states: Analytical report of eleven countries. United Nations Children’s Fund. https://www.unicef.org/mena/ sites/unicef.org.mena/files/2018-03/Child%20poverty%20full%20report% 20-%20English.pdf. Accessed 30 November 2018. UNICEF. (2019). UNICEF’s global social protection programme framework. United Nations Children’s Fund. https://www.unicef.org/media/64601/ file/Global-social-protection-programme-framework-2019.pdf. Accessed 11 May 2020. World Bank. (2015). Project appraisal document on a proposed loan in the amount of US$400 Million to the Arab Republic of Egypt for a Strengthening Social Safety Net Project (No. PAD611). World Bank. http://documents.wor ldbank.org/curated/en/944911468023332501/text/PAD6110PAD0P140 10Box385454B00OUO090.txt. Accessed 30 November 2018. Yang, L., Walker, R., Chen, J., & Zhang, R. (2019). Universal child benefits and dignity and shame. United Nations Children’s Fund. https://www.soc ialprotection.org/sites/default/files/publications_files/Universal%20Child% 20Benefits%20and%20Dignity%20and%20Shame.pdf. Accessed 11 May 2020. UN ESCWA (2019). Social protection reform in Arab countries. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia. https://www.unescwa. org/publications/social-protection-reforms-arab-countries-2019. Accessed 11 May 2020. Zakat Fund. (2016). Annual performance report 2016. Sudan Zakat Fund.

PART II

Country Case Studies

CHAPTER 6

Challenges of Establishing an Islamic Welfare State: A Historical Overview of Welfare System Developments in Post-Revolution Iran Ali Akbar Tajmazinani

1

Introduction

Social policy in Iran has witnessed considerable fluctuations in the past four decades due to various social, political and economic developments. Islamic Revolution of 1979 was a turning point in contemporary Iran leading to the adoption of a new constitution which aimed to establish an Islamic Republic with new policy orientations including in the field of social policy. High population growth rate has made the country home to more than 81 million inhabitants while the population was less than 35 million in 1979, causing huge demands in terms of meeting social needs. Located in west Asia and amid the geostrategically sensitive region of the Middle East, Iran has encountered several international crises including the long lasting war with Iraq for eight years (during Saddam who was backed by western and eastern powers as well as many Arab countries in the region who were considering Revolutionary Iran as a common threat

A. A. Tajmazinani (B) Allameh Tabataba’i University, Tehran, Iran © The Author(s) 2021 A. A. Tajmazinani (ed.), Social Policy in the Islamic World, International Series on Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57753-7_6

109

110

A. A. TAJMAZINAN

to their interests for various reasons), huge immigrations (more than three millions) from neighboring countries especially Afghanistan and constant sanctions from the United States (which due to Islamic Revolution of 1979 lost his main ally, Shah of Iran, in the region) and the United Nations. Economic dependence on oil revenues has also been a key factor in determining the nature of social policies in Iran and its ups and downs. This chapter aims to provide the reader with a general understanding of the main features of social policy in Iran, its contemporary historical developments and its current circumstance in various policy domains. After illustrating the Iranian welfare system envisaged in the Constitution, it studies six distinct phases in the history of welfare state development in Iran in the past four decades. It then provides the reader with a ‘social policy map’ and describes some of major social policies in such policy domains as income maintenance, housing, health, and education. Finally, the chapter focuses on the social policy outcomes in the postRevolution era and concludes with discussing various theoretical and practical challenges faced by the welfare system.

2

Social Policy in Theory: The Iranian Constitution

The Islamic Revolution of 1979 was based on a national movement which sought eradication of domestic oppression, injustice and deprivation alongside ending foreign interventions and exploitations (Alikhani 1995). The new Constitution (Constituteproject 2019) portrayed the favourable alternative system as a kind of comprehensive and universalistic welfare state. Various articles of the constitution illustrate goals and strategies to achieve this welfare regime through: 1. Confirming the responsibility of government in “uprooting poverty and deprivation” (article 43) and “provision of basic necessities for all citizens: housing, food, clothing, hygiene, medical treatment, education, and the necessary facilities for the establishment of a family” (article 43-1). 2. Stating the goal of providing “social insurance for all” (article 312) and the ‘universal right’ of all citizen to “social security with respect to retirement, unemployment, old age, disability, absence of a guardian, and benefits relating to being stranded, accidents,

6

CHALLENGES OF ESTABLISHING AN ISLAMIC WELFARE STATE …

111

health services, and medical care and treatment, provided through insurance or other means” (article 29-1). 3. Emphasizing “free education and physical training for everyone at all levels, and the facilitation and expansion of higher education” (article 3-1) and obligation of government to “provide all citizen with free education” (article 31). 4. Asserting “the right of every Iranian individual and family to possess housing commensurate with his needs” and responsibility of government to “make land available” while prioritizing the people with greatest need “in particular the rural population and the workers” (article 31). 5. Affirming the duty of government to “provide every citizen with the opportunity to work and to create equal conditions for obtaining it” (article 28) aiming at “attaining full employment; placing the means of work at the disposal of everyone who is able to work but lacks the means” (article 43-2). 6. Stressing a protective family policy which aims to support “mothers, particularly during pregnancy and child-rearing” and protect “children without guardians” (article 21-2). Considering the fulfillment of various basic needs like education, housing, health and insurance as ‘citizenship rights’, commitment to free social services especially education, using a universalistic rhetoric such as ‘for all’ and ‘every citizen’, direct reference to ‘full employment’, and portraying the state as the main responsible agent for providing these welfare services indicate that a traditional social democratic welfare system has been meant by the constitution (Tajmazinani 2011). In theory, all these goals and strategies should be implemented through a “correct and just economic system, in accordance with Islamic criteria” (article 3-12) which “neither results in the concentration or circulation of wealth in the hands of a few individuals or groups, nor turns the government into a major absolute employer” while paying attention to “the requirements governing the general economic planning of the country at each stage of its growth” (article 43-2). However, article 44 portrays the state as the main or absolute owner and administrator of large-scale economic firms (including the insurance system) and considers the cooperative and private sector as complimentary to it. This article became subject to reinterpretation in 2005 and 2006 through adoption of ‘The General Policies Pertaining to Principle 44 of the Constitution’ which provided

112

A. A. TAJMAZINAN

the ground for privatization and liberalisation in various economic fields and had profound impacts on social policy domains; an issue which will be addressed in the following sections.

3 Historical Phases of Social Policy Developments To have a clear idea of the current social policy context in Iran, it is necessary to review the main policy developments which have taken place in the past forty years in the Iranian society and have formed the existing policy framework. Six distinct phases could be distinguished in the history of the past four decades. Each of these phases is characterised with differentiated orientations in the field of social policy which are summarised in Table 1. The ‘early post-Revolution’ era (1979–1981) witnessed various initiatives by the new system to achieve ambitious goals of the constitution. It was believed that the existing capitalism and its related corruptions (among the ruling class) are the main causes of deprivation and exclusion for the oppressed. Therefore, a profound wave of nationalisation began which devolved major economic and financial firms (such as banks, factories, shipping, mining and aviation) to the state. Moreover, a number of Revolutionary institutions (para-governmental foundations called Bonyads ) were established to eradicate the social disadvantages of the poor and ‘the oppressed’ (mostazafin). Assets of the main capitalists and industrialists were confiscated by the Revolutionary Courts and devolved to these Bonyads alongside other economic assets devolved to them by the state to fulfil their missions (Saeidi 2009). These institutions included, inter alia, ‘Foundation of the Oppressed and Disabled’, ‘Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation’, the ‘Construction Jihad’, the ‘Martyrs Foundation’ (then ‘Martyrs and War Veterans Foundation’), the ‘Literacy Movement’ and the ‘Islamic Revolution Housing Foundation’. While some researchers believe that this issue has led to a ‘dual institutionalisation’ phenomenon in post-Revolutionary Iran through which the new revolutionary organizations appeared in tandem with the inherited bureaucracies of the Pahlavi Monarchy (Harris 2017) it could be argued that this phenomenon existed even before the Revolution since many Para-governmental foundations like Pahlavi Foundation and Farah Foundation (Farah Pahlavi Charitable Society), Imperial Organization for Social Service, Ashraf Pahlavi Foundation, etc. existed at least for two or

6

Table 1 decades

CHALLENGES OF ESTABLISHING AN ISLAMIC WELFARE STATE …

113

Main policy developments related to social exclusion in the past four

Titles of the phases

Years and heads of administration

Main policy developments

Early post-revolution

1979–1981 (multiple)

Imposed war (Holy Defence)

1981–1988 (Mousavi)

Reconstruction

1989–1997 (Hashemi Rafsanjani)

Reforms

1997–2005 (Khatami)

Principle-ism

2005–2013 (Ahmadinejad)

Nationalisation of major economic firms; establishment of several Revolutionary institutions to tackle poverty and deprivation Expanding the role of the state sector; rationing and subsidising of the basic consumer goods Structural adjustments; privatisation; liberaliztion of prices Civil society expansion; more focus on political and civic inclusion (e.g. for dissidents and minorities), The Comprehensive System of Welfare and Social Security Structure Act A bold focus on ‘social justice’; redistribution of wealth and state benefits and advantages through such policies as ‘Justice Share’, ‘Compassion Housing Fund’ and ‘Targeted subsidies’ made possible by the oil boom

(continued)

three decades before the Revolution. The main functions of these foundations and numerous institutions related to them were in the field of social policy and welfare. Being under the auspices of Shah Court and the royal family members, these bodies were promoting a philanthropic face of Pahlavi dynasty. With the beginning of the ‘Iraq-Iran war’ which lasted for eight years (1981–1988), all those institutions were involved directly (like the

114

A. A. TAJMAZINAN

Table 1

(continued)

Titles of the phases

Years and heads of administration

Main policy developments

Moderation

2013–present (Rouhani)

Neoliberal tendencies for privatisation and marketization in various fields of economy is paralleled with a serious reform to achieve a universal health system, all of which are heavily affected by political and economic challenges such as intensified US led sanctions and decreasing oil revenue

‘Construction Jihad’ at the forefront) or indirectly (like the ‘Foundation of the Oppressed and Disabled’ in supporting the war veterans and wounded and their families). The war situation meant that the state seized the opportunity to take control of more and more economic and social aspects of the public life. Moreover, various shortages regarding the basic needs resulted in a welfare system based on the rationing and subsidising the basic consumer goods, especially food and energy items (Dejpasand and Raoofi 2009). The ‘Reconstruction’ period of after war (1989–1997) involved the implementation of Structural Adjustment plans imposed by the IMF and the World Bank and was followed by the administration at the time in order to use their financial support. Various bodies which had been involved in the war (including the ‘Revolutionary Guard’, the ‘Construction Jihad’, and other Bonyads ) were assigned the mission to become active in the reconstruction process. It was argued that these measures will lead to more economic growth and creation of more wealth in the country which in turn uplift the standard of living for all. However, the liberalisation of prices, removing some of the subsidies, and the start of privatisation coincided with increasing inflation and high unemployment rates. These developments, which took place in the absence of a coherent and universal welfare system, led to deeper exclusion for the already excluded strata of the society (Momeni 2007). Therefore, the resulting economic growth and progress did not achieve its goal of favourable

6

CHALLENGES OF ESTABLISHING AN ISLAMIC WELFARE STATE …

115

social inclusion for all, despite considerable improvements in such areas as education, health, ICT, and public facilities (especially for the rural and deprived areas). Under the ‘Reforms ’ administration (1997–2005), emphasis was mainly on political and civic inclusion. Expansion of NGOs, political parties, and the press alongside social freedom was emphasised. Although a ‘Ministry of Welfare and Social Security’ was established in this period (according to the Comprehensive System of Welfare and Social Security Structure Act) to combine and optimise the activities and services of the existing welfare organisations like ‘Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation’, the ‘Well-being and Rehabilitation Organisation’, and various medical and social insurance funds and corporations, little was achieved in this field (Saeidi 2004). Various economic plans which began during the ‘Reconstruction’ period were continued throughout this phase as well, while some new initiatives in the field of welfare and inclusion, like the ‘Rural Insurance Plan’, the ‘Urban Hospital Insurance Plan’, the ‘Rural ICTs Services’, and the ‘Renewal of Old Urban Buildings’ were launched. The ‘Principle-ist ’ administration of Ahmadinejad (2005–2013) started its work by challenging and accusing the premises and practices of the post-war administrations as deviating from the Revolutionary principles of social justice, spiritual and religious improvement, and combating capitalism, liberalism and materialism. With regard to social policy, it called for the redistribution of national and state wealth, advantages and benefits through a range of policies including the ‘Justice Share’, the ‘Compassion Housing Plan’ and the ‘Targeted Subsidies’. With the reelection of Ahmadinejad in the controversial presidential election of 12th of June 2009—which was in part due to the successful portrayal of his administration as a puritan and serving government with the main aim of social justice and his rivals Mousavi (and his major supporters, Khatami and Rafsanjani) and Karoubi as being backed by the corrupted political and economic power forums and pursuing liberal and capitalist ideas— these plans continued with even greater conviction by the administration. However, these policies have been widely criticised as being populist and counter-productive. The ‘Moderation Administration’ of Rouhani (2013–present) has moved toward a mixed welfare system where neoliberal tendencies for privatization and marketization in various fields of economy are paralleled with a serious reform to achieve a universal health system. Several authorities within the administration including the president have declared their

116

A. A. TAJMAZINAN

trust in market-based solutions to meet social needs in the fields of education, housing, employment while condemning state-oriented initiatives of the previous administration as leftist, populist and unproductive policy mistakes. All of these initiatives are heavily affected by political and economic challenges such as intensified foreign sanctions, recent high inflation, devaluation of the national currency and decreasing oil revenues.

4

Current Social Policy Map

There are currently a number of initiatives in various domains of social policy. These consist of new policies which have begun under Rouhani’s administration such as the Health Reform Plan (Rouhanicare) as well as older policies like the ‘Justice Share’ scheme and ‘Martyr Rajayee Scheme’ which have been in place since previous administrations. A brief description of these policies is presented in Table 2. It should be mentioned that these are the main policy initiatives and the list does not include less prominent plans as well as the routine activities of various ministries, organisations and bonyads pertaining to social welfare. It is outside the realms of this chapter to go into details of these policies in terms of their origins, coverage, achievements, strengths and weaknesses. However, a general overview of the current policy landscape will be presented to provide the reader with a holistic insight into the Iranian social policy atmosphere. 4.1

Housing Policy

The post-revolutionary era began with such housing initiatives as establishment of the ‘Islamic revolution Housing Foundation’ (1979) and the ‘Urban Land Act’ (1980). Nationalization of the unused urban lands, restriction of the private ownership of land in urban areas (to 1000 square meters), allocation of lands to the poor as well as housing cooperatives, housing rental regulation, construction of houses for the needy people, low interest loans and subsidized construction materials were among measures which sharply favored poor people and those connected to revolutionary bodies. While these measures resulted in the annual growth rate of housing production by 4.7% and the reduction of unfavorable housing units (like slum and hut) from 2.5 to 0.93% as well as rental reduction or stabilization and home ownership for low and middle income families, they also caused massive immigration to big cities, bias in allocation of

6

Table 2

CHALLENGES OF ESTABLISHING AN ISLAMIC WELFARE STATE …

117

Current social policy map

Policy domains

Current main policy initiatives

Brief description

Income maintenance

Targeted Subsidies (cash transfer)

Cutting the subsidies for various goods and services and pay the related budgets in cash to all members of households Devolving 40% of the shares of state owned economic firms to the low income deciles of the population and paying dividend to shareholders Paying monthly allowances to the over-60s poor people without sufficient income Periodical allocation of food assistance packages to low income households Providing housing for the disadvantaged population by giving them almost free access to use public lands (through 99-years-rent contracts) and providing them with loans to build their own residences (through public cooperatives) Offering low-interest loans for the regeneration of old buildings in the most deprived and crowded urban areas Grants and low interest loans by Social Welfare Organization of Iran for the construction, renovation, retrofitting and rental of housing units paid to people with disabilities and low-income clients (including female headed poor households)

Justice Share

Martyr Rajayee Scheme

Sabade Kala (Food assistance)

Housing

Compassion Housing Plan

Renewal of Old Urban Buildings

Housing for the disabled and low-income households

(continued)

housing subsidies to employees of the formal sector who were able to get organized in housing cooperatives, expansion of informal settlement, and failure of the banking system to provide low-interest loans (Athari 2006).

118

A. A. TAJMAZINAN

Table 2

(continued)

Policy domains

Current main policy initiatives

Brief description

Rural housing Renovation

Grants and low interest loans by Imam Khomeini Releif Committee for the construction, renovation and retrofitting of rural housing units paid to rural poor households Reconstruction of housing units destroyed due to natural disasters and war by the Islamic Revolution Housing Foundation Started in 2014, the plan aims to reduce out-of-pocket payments for health care services (OOPP), improve medical services in public hospitals, enhance retention of doctors in rural areas, promote natural childbirth, and support difficult to cure patients Establishment of ‘Iran Health Insurance Organization’ (in 2012) to inetgrate all basic health insurance of all existing public insurance funds and to cover uninsured groups of the population

Reconstruction of housing units

Health

Health reform plan (Rouhanicare)

Universal Basic health Insurance

Housing policy in the post-war period was characterized by a series of market-oriented strategies including mass production by housing companies, construction of ‘new towns’, low-interest loans, and the so-called ‘housing density selling’1 under the ‘Self-sufficiency of Municipalities in Big Cities Plan’ (1989). The latest plan played a major role in escalation of housing prices in big cities since it allowed municipalities to base the main part of their budget on selling housing density which intensified the commodification of the urban space.

1 Permission to build more units (flats, shops, etc.) in a given space than the standard in return for paying charges to the municipality.

6

CHALLENGES OF ESTABLISHING AN ISLAMIC WELFARE STATE …

119

The most recent and biggest ever policy, Compassion Housing (Mskan-e Mehr) with the initial ambitious goal of providing the most disadvantaged households with housing began during Ahmadinejad’s administration in 2007. Considering the fact that the cost of the land to build a residence was the most important part of the related costs (even equal to 80% in the case of big cities) this plan intended to provide housing for the disadvantaged population by omitting the costs of the land (giving them almost free access to use public lands, through 99-years-rent contracts) and providing them with low-interest loans to build their own residences (mainly through public cooperatives but also through mass production companies and private ownership). In total, conctruction of 2,201,566 housing units or apartments have been started, from which 1,950,619 units have been finished until 2017 (IPRC 2017). The plan was halfway when Rouhanni came to power. Although his administration did not believe in the plan, he had no choice other than continuing it, therefore half of the units were completed during his term of presidency though with a slower pace. Meanwhile, the promised ‘Social Housing Plan’ of Rouhani’s administration has not come to reality yet due to preexisting obligations caused by the Compassion Housing Plan, falling oil revenues, and market oriented tendencies of the Ministry of Road and Urban Development. The Compassion Housing Plan has been widely criticized by housing policy experts. Improper financing of the plan through the Central Bank which increased the monetary base and liquidity as well as inflation, inefficient bureaucracy, up-down planning, far distance of the allocated lands in the case of big cities, ‘spatial trap’ (lack of sufficient urban facilities and infrastructures in the areas where the related lands are allocated) which causes some kinds of social exclusion as well as requiring large scale finances during the coming years for various infrastructures (Nurollhai et al. 2015; Aghaei 2018). 4.2

Health Policy

Poor health indicators from the pre-revolutionary era alongside the emphasis of the new constitution on health justice made health a top item on the social agenda. Most endeavours were related to expansion of health infrastructures (including health homes for rural areas), establishment of a country-wide health and treatment network, provision of qualified physicians and other staff for medical units, universal immunization, moving

120

A. A. TAJMAZINAN

toward self-sufficiency in medicine production, and subsidizing main food items and medicines. Although these measures improved the situation of health related indicators to a considerable level (see Table 3 the long lasting Iraq-Iran war and low oil revenues meant that universal health access and insurance coverage were not materialized. The structural adjustment approach of the postwar administration focused on expansion of health related infrastructures, family planning and birth control, promotion of mother and child health, raising health awareness among the public, and a residual provision of medical services for the poor through relief bodies (Qarakhani 2013). Health policy under Khatami went mostly in the same direction of Rafsanjani’s Administration. However, adoption of the ‘Comprehensive System of Welfare and Social Security Structure Act’ which established the Ministry of Social Welfare and devolved the Medical Services Insurance and Social Security Insurance to the Ministry, launch of the Rural and Nomads Insurance Plan which aimed at providing free insurance for all rural population (though they had to pay a proportion of the medical costs) and the Urban Hospital Insurance Plan which provided low-cost insurance for those became hospitalized (e.g. for a surgery) upon their entry were among outstanding policy initiatives of the Reform Administration which followed a more inclusive and universal approach in the final years of his second term of presidency. Iranians Insurance Plan (started in 2008) was the main initiative under Ahmadinejad which aimed to cover all those who were without health insurance by paying half of the defined insurance contribution amount (half of the amount was paid by the government) while exempting low-income households from the payment. ‘Iran Health Insurance Organization’ was established in 2012 to integrate all basic health insurance of all existing public insurance funds and to cover uninsured groups of the population. The ‘Family Physicians and Referral System in Rural Areas’ plan improved health services for the rural population and determination of tariffs for diagnostic and therapeutic services returned to the government after it has been devolved to the Iran Medical Council (representative body of physicians) during Khatami. Despite all these plans, health indicators were not satisfying at the end of Principle-ist Administration. Therefore, Rouhani focused on the health sector as his main social policy agenda alongside the nuclear deal at the foreign policy level. The Health Reform Scheme (Rouhanicare) started in 2014 aimed to reduce out-of-pocket payments for health care services

53

72

–

–

3259

14.851

56

88

–

–

1336

22.66

Life expectancy at birth, total(years)a mortality rate, infant (per 1000 live births)a Health expenditure, total (% of GDP)c Out-of-pocket health expenditure (% of total expenditure on health)c Number of active health homes in rural areasd School enrollment, preprimary (% gross)a

1981

1978

5.333

4113

–

–

57

55

1985

9.9

7923

–

–

46

62

1989

8.987

11,171

–

–

39

67

1993

11.594

14,924

–

–

33

69

1997

Changes in social indicators in Iran in the past four decade

Years indicators

Table 3

20.548

16,281

53.71

5.02

27

71

2001

45.234

16,725

54.89

6.06

22

72

2005

42.701

17,608

54.32

7.63

17

73

2009

37.996

17,749

47.80

6.89

15

75

2013

(continued)

50.59 (2015)

17,792 (2015)

40h

7.6 (2015)

10

76

2017

6 CHALLENGES OF ESTABLISHING AN ISLAMIC WELFARE STATE …

121

92.879

–

–

–

–

7.131

105.77

48.72

0.641

56.454

–

5.416

School enrollment, primary (% gross)a School enrollment, secondary (% gross)a gender parity index—primary and secondary (GPI)a Literacy rate, youth total (% of people ages 15–24)a gender parity index— university (GPI)a Government expenditure on education, total (% of GDP)a

1981

1978

(continued)

Years indicators

Table 3

3.46

–

75.205

0.763

44.347

101.92

1985

3.997

–

–

0.819

–

104.638

1989

4.315

–

86.974

0.865

63.33

109.309

1993

3.538

–

93.028

0.915

74.42

102.15

1997

4.072

0.944

–

0.944

77.801

99.969

2001

4.057

1.06

97.432

0.968

75.559

99.501

2005

3.842

1.07

97.871

0.984

82.356

106.594

2009

3.068

–

97.777

1.009

86.237

117.989

2013

3.366

–

98.10

1.035 (2015)

88.946 (2015)

108.606 (2015)

2017

122 A. A. TAJMAZINAN

2499

–

–

2168

–

–

–

–

3806

14.28

–

–

2200

–

15

5.1

1081

10.458

1993

15

4.9

1817

10.154

1997

13

4.3

1891

13.892

2001

17

5.7

3216

12.1

2005

23

7.8

5619

11.97

2009

37

12.2

6036

10.44

2013

18 (2019)f 53 (2019)f

5415

12.516

2017

Sources a UNESCO (2020), b MRUD (2017), c World Bank (2020), d MHME (2019), e ILO (2020), f Tasnimnews (2019), g Tabnak (2017), and h SCI (2017)

–

10.27

1989

6,703,866 7,284,200 9,326,795 11,737,176 16,900,463 23,386,000 26,505,623 27,850,403 30,675,472 39,099,380 42,379,629

1985

Covered by Social Security Organizationh Unemployment, total (% of total labor force)e GDP per capita(current US$)c Access to urban housingb Housing: waiting period (years)b

1981

1978

Years indicators

6 CHALLENGES OF ESTABLISHING AN ISLAMIC WELFARE STATE …

123

124

A. A. TAJMAZINAN

(OOPs), improve medical services in public hospitals, enhance retention of doctors in rural areas, promote natural childbirth, and support difficult to cure patients. The ‘Family Physicians and Referral System in Urban Areas’ plan (with a priority for informal urban settlements) started in the same year. Although the Health Reform Scheme was successful to some extent in reducing the OOPs and improving some health indicators in the initial steps of its implementation, it failed to achieve its goals and has been criticized on several accounts: (a) considerable increase in costs related to specialized diagnosis and therapeutic services due to partial implementation of the ‘Family Physicians and Referral System’ and its deficient gate-keeping function; (b) extraordinary rise in tariffs of specialized diagnosis and therapeutic services (justified by the argument that it is necessary to abolish under the table payments) which caused a considerable income gap among various agents (specialized physicians, general and family physicians, nurses, etc.) in the health sector; (c) serious financial burden for insuring organizations as well as the governmental health budget which forced the insuring organizations to receive high interest loans from the banking system to cover it; (d) social frustration due to decreasing commitments by insuring organizations and hospitals as well as rising health related costs; (e) induced demand by the people for specialized health services intensified by unsupervised and unprecedented order of these services by specialized physicians which in turn increases their revenues; (f) geographical disparity in benefiting from the scheme; (g) unreliable sources of financing the scheme (mainly through the Targeted Subsidies Plan) which caused constant fluctuations and shortages; (h) prioritization of treatment over prevention and general health (MEAF 2017; Peykanpoor et al. 2018; Izadkhah 2019; Rafiei 2019). 4.3

Education Policy

Free and accessible education at all levels was one of the main policy orientations underlined by the Iranian Constitution, as was mentioned in previous sections. Various attempts were made to fulfill this goal after the Revolution including an increase in the educational expenditure, recruitment and training of teachers, expansion of educational infrastructures and establishment of the Literacy Movement Organization. Despite an initial increase in governmental expenditure on education it decreased again and remained nearly stable between 3.5 and 4% of GDP (see Table 3) during the last four decades.

6

CHALLENGES OF ESTABLISHING AN ISLAMIC WELFARE STATE …

125

The Iraq-Iran war circumstances as well as the influx of baby boom generation into the educational system caused unprecedented burden for the government and strengthened policy orientations toward the engagement of private sector into the education sector. Justified through rhetoric of public participation, parents’ involvement and civic engagement, process of privatization began even before the beginning of the so-called structural adjustment agenda in other social and economic policy domains. Reviewing the policy instruments and budget allocation in various post-Revolution administrations, Saei et al. (2012) argue that no meaningful difference could be found among them in terms of legal and financial inputs. Establishment of Islamic Azad University in 1982, adoption of the Act on the Establishment of Not-for-profit (private) Higher Education Institutions in 1985 and the Act on the Establishment of Not-for-profit (private) Schools in 1988 were the main landmarks in the process of re-commodification of education in the country. Competition of governmental or public universities with Not-for-profit and Azad Universities in admission of students to non-free courses or tuition-based campuses (apart from their free courses and tuition-free campuses) has been the recent phenomenon in the last decade. 4.4

Income Maintenance

The main policy to support all citizens after the Revolution was to subsidize nearly all basic food items (bread, oil, sugar, etc.), some other goods and services like medicine and public transportation as well as energy related items. Distributing of coupons for basic items during the Iraq-Iran war was also designed to ensure provision of food and other basic needs of families through a nation-wide rationing system. These two schemes were gradually abandoned with the structural adjustment agenda of the postwar administration. The most recent development in this area has been the introduction of Targeted Subsidies Scheme (Cash Transfer Scheme) in 2010, through which subsidies for various goods, especially energyrelated items have been cut or reduced and the resulting revenues was paid in cash to nearly all the country’s population. Although the adopted act by the Parliament clearly stated that half of the revenues should be allocated to welfare related initiatives (cash transfer to households based on a means-testing mechanism, improving the social security and health services, etc.), Ahmadinejad administration decided to allocate nearly all

126

A. A. TAJMAZINAN

the revenues to households on an equal basis without means-testing in the form of a universal cash transfer (UCT). The amount was a flat rate of monthly 450,000 Iranian Rials (nearly equal to 45 USD) for each member of the family which was paid to the head of household. So the administration claimed that it has eradicated severe poverty in the country according to the standard of 1.5 USD per day. The scheme has continued up to present with the same monthly amount but the inflation and devaluation of the national currency have decreased its value to nearly three USD in 2020. Rouhani administration has removed some of the highest income deciles of the population from the scheme gradually, increased the monthly amount paid to the lowest income deciles (mainly those under the protection of social assistance organizations) and allocated some portions of the revenues of the scheme to the Health Reform Scheme. His administration started the new phase of the scheme in 2019 by a shocking increase in petrol prices, declaring that the revenues will be allocated to nearly 60 million people in the form of monthly payments called the ‘livelihood support allowance’ in addition to the existing monthly cash transfer. The scheme which was launched without previous public announcement and clarifications provoked nationwide unrests, mixed with political protests and led to considerable erosion of social cohesion. Another scheme started under Rouhani administration is the Food Assistance Scheme (Sabade Kala), through which food assistance packages are allocated to low income household several times during the year. In the most recent development of this scheme and instead of delivering the food assistance package, a certain amount of credit is allocated to each household to buy food and other basic items from designated stores. Allocating subsidized governmental foreign currencies (at nearly one-third of its market price) to import 25 basic items (including food and medicine related items) are among other initiatives to support the general population especially the low-income during the recent economic destabilization due to the re-launch of economic sanctions by the United States under Trump who exited the Iranian nuclear deal with five world powers called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Another scheme started under Ahmadinejad and continued up to present is the Justice Share Scheme, through which 40% of the shares of state owned economic firms were planned to be devolved to the people especially the low-income deciles the population and the dividend is paid

6

CHALLENGES OF ESTABLISHING AN ISLAMIC WELFARE STATE …

127

to shareholders periodically. The Martyr Rajayee Scheme is another initiative administered by Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation, through which monthly allowances are paid to the over-60s poor rural people without sufficient income. They may also become eligible to other social assistances if covered by this scheme. IKRF has also another social assistance scheme for needy household due to being female headed, incapacitated, etc. which includes both in cash and in kind support. Social Welfare Organization of Iran has also pension and social assistance schemes for needy lone mothers and female heads of households as well as disabled peoples which aims at raising their income and reducing their life expenses.

5

Social Policy Outcomes

A quick review of the main social indicators in Table 3 shows considerable improvements in various policy domains in the past 40 years. While this may indicate achievements of social policies described in the previous section, many factors could be identified as impeding the full success and effectiveness of these policies. With regard to health situation, it is noteworthy that life expectancy has reached 76 in 2017 (from 56 in 1978) and infant mortality rate has fallen from 88 per 1000 live births in 1978 to 10 in 2017. This has been due to the constant increase in health expenditure and significant expansion of health related infrastructures (e.g. the number of active health homes in rural areas has raised from 1336 in 1978 to 17,792 in 2015). However, failure to achieve universal health insurance coverage is the main challenge of the health system. According to the former health minister (who resigned due to budget constraints of the Health Reform Scheme in late 2018) 45% of people are insured by the Health Insurance Organization and 48% are insured by the Social Security Organization. About 7% are not insured despite the fact that 10 million people have been insured free of charge under the Health Reform Scheme and about 8% are insured through more than one insurance scheme (Ghazizadeh Hashemi 2018). Moreover, diversity in the range of insurance arrangements has led to considerable disparities in terms of level and quality of services received by those under health insurance coverage. While some governmental employees (especially middle and high rank officials), members of the armed forces as well as those with complementary private insurance schemes may enjoy high quality health services in the shortest possible

128

A. A. TAJMAZINAN

time, the majority of people on ordinary health insurance arrangements have to wait long periods before they can receive major health treatments requiring serious medical operations and have to do considerable amounts of out of pocket payments. Situation of educational indicators has also witnessed a remarkable improvement. For example, youth literacy rate has increased from 56.5 in 1978 to 98.1 in 2017 (Table 3) and number of university students has increased from 175,000 in 1979 to nearly 4,800,000 in 2013 and about 3,600,000 in 2018 (SCI 2018a). Moreover, gender parity index for primary and secondary education has improved from 0.641 in 1978 to 1.035 in 2015 and gender parity index in higher education has reached 1.07 (Table 3). However, a meta-analysis of research papers published on privatization of higher education in Iran showed that it has led to reduction of governmental financial constraints, quantitative expansion and decentralization of and diversity in higher education, while turning universities into economic firms, stratification of higher education in favor of higher socio-economic strata, educational corruption and plagiarism as well as decreasing quality of education and high rate of unemployed university graduates (Ghoraishi Khorasgan et al. 2017). The same trend was followed in primary and secondary education and was justified by the necessity to attract parent’s participation and engagement in improvement of their children’s education. This has led to a situation whereby more than 50% of the public education costs are paid by parents with severe consequences for social inequality. For example, only 8% of students admitted to high rank public universities have been from the lowest three income deciles compared to 63% of the three highest deciles (Omidi 2018). Despite numerous policy initiatives in the past decades by various administrations, housing remains arguably the worse social indicator in Iranian social policy. The two main housing indicators have deteriorated constantly in recent decades: ‘Access to urban housing’ and ‘waiting period’ for buying urban houses have increased respectively from 5.1 and 15 years in 1993 to 12.2 and 37 years in 2013 (mainly after the heightening of international sanctions over the Iranian nuclear program in the last years of Ahmadinejad’s second term of administration) and to 18 and 53 (Tasnimnews 2019) in 2019 (after the unilateral withdrawal of USA under Donald Trump from the JCPOA and imposing historical unprecedented sanctions against Iran). Although international sanctions have been influential in this regard, it is mainly a by-product of the Iranian

6

CHALLENGES OF ESTABLISHING AN ISLAMIC WELFARE STATE …

129

economy which provides the ground for increasing commodification of land and space. In the absence of a productive economy with growing domestic and international investment in production (especially in the industrial sector), brokering and investment in land and housing (alongside foreign currencies) has become an unproductive option for saving and increasing the capital. Therefore, it is not surprising that even many banks, financial institutions and para-governmental entities are involved in this phenomenon. It is estimated that 2,528,000 (about 500,000 in Tehran city) vacant housing units and 2,090,000 second-owned housing units exist in the country (Aslani 2020). Because of the strong lobby of the owners of these housing units in the government and parliament, the ‘Tax on Vacant Housing Units Act’ adopted in 1987 has not been implemented, though justified on the basis of respect for ‘property right’, lack of required data banks and other executive challenges. Although a diverse range of income maintenance and social protection policies are in place and cover several millions of individuals and households, no reliable statistics and reporting system exists about the poverty rate in Iran. Successive administrations refrained from formal and routine calculation of the poverty line and even Ahmadinejad’s administration considered it is a useless practice. It was claimed at the beginning of the first phase of Universal Cash Transfer scheme in 2010 that no one has remained in poverty due to this program based on a 1.5 US Dollar a day, since the monthly 455,000 Rials paid to each Iranian individual was nearly equal to $45. However, it could be easily imagined that poverty dynamics have not been considered in such statements: cycles of economic recession, international economic sanctions, high inflation and devaluation of the national currency, high unemployment rate (12.5% in 2017, as seen in Table 3), several widespread natural disasters, and catastrophic health expenditures are among the main causes which push various groups of population under the poverty line. Therefore, it is not surprising that Garivan et al. (2019) have found that 48.1% of the rural population has been under the absolute poverty line in 2016 and Deputy Minister for Social Welfare has declared that between 18 and 35% of the country’s population are living in poverty according to various definitions and by different regions (Meydari 2018). Finally, although levels of social inequality have decreased dramatically compared to the pre Revolution era, there are still considerable inequalities in contemporary Iranian society. The Gini index has decreased from above 0.5 in the immediate years before the Revolution to less than 0.37

130

A. A. TAJMAZINAN

in some years (during the first steps of the Targeted Subsidies Scheme which began in 2010) but it has increased again to above 0.4 in recent years (see Fig. 1). This is also evident from Fig. 2 according to which the highest expenditure decile of the population spend nearly 57 times more than the lowest expenditure decile for their education. This figure is 26, 10, and 4.9 times for health, housing and nutrition expenditures respectively while the overall figure for all living expenditures is 3.9, meaning GINI INDEX 0.6 0.5

0.502 0.4805 0.4584

0.436 0.4618

0.3984 0.4197 0.391 0.4092 0.3976 0.4029 0.39850.4023 0.39390.3952 0.4008

0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009 2013 2017 GINI INDEX

The Gini index trend in Iran 1975–2017 (Source CBI 2018)

Fig. 1

Housing

Education

Health

Nutrition

All

160 140

131.5 129.7 127

120

138.5

111.5 108.8 100

99.3 86

4.5 1.5

26 10 3.9 2017

14.2 8.5

21 12.12 16 9.13 7.5 2009

15 8.03 5.5 2

57 39.5

37.5

33 22 17.8 7.5

27.5

19.3 16 1993

1985

1981

1980

1979

1977

0 1975

36.5

34 20.8 20 11 6

2001

35.5 27.35 26.3 27 21.7 14.5

34.5

20

58

54

2013

57

50.24 42.7 40

1989

40

2005

72.5 62

60

1997

80

Fig. 2 Expenditure share of highest decile divided by expenditure share of lowest decile 1975–2017 (Source Calculated based on SCI data 2018b)

6

CHALLENGES OF ESTABLISHING AN ISLAMIC WELFARE STATE …

131

that the spending disparity is more evident with regard to meeting social needs.

6

Discussion

There is a huge gap between the nature of Iranian welfare system as portrayed in the Constitution (universal and comprehensive) and its materialized characteristics which is mainly conservative (due to its reference to religion and traditional institutions), residual, and semi-institutional with gradual move towards neoliberal goals though with some exceptions in certain policy domains. In fact, one could find a ‘hybrid welfare regime‘ with elements from ‘the three worlds of welfare capitalism’ (Esping-Andersen 1990). Despite notable improvements in social welfare indicators, the welfare system in Iran faces serious challenges which could be summarized as follows: Financing mechanisms for social welfare programs is one of the fundamental challenges. As a rentier state, Iran’s social welfare system is mainly dependent on oil revenues for social expenditures. Fluctuating and unreliable financial resources make it impossible to formulate and implement sustainable welfare programs. Launch, alteration and abandonment of many welfare programs have been a function of the availability of such revenues with severe consequences for state capacity to manage constant improvement of social indicators. Recent resort to revenues from cutting energy subsidies for financing social policy initiatives like the ‘Universal Cash Transfer’, the ‘Livelihood Support Allowance’ and the ‘Health Reform Scheme’ face the same problem and worsen the situation. Subsequent administrations are refraining from radical reform of the taxation and social insurance systems as sustainable mechanisms of financing the welfare state. Temporary attempts for reforms in these fields during periods of economic austerity (due to US led foreign sanctions or falling oil revenues) have usually been reverted during oil boom periods. Contradictions in economic policy and social policy goals are another major challenge in Iran. Many social policies show no or little synergy with the economic goals of growth, efficiency and productivity and therefore may prove to be counter development. For example, while devolving the shares of the state-owned firms to the low income groups (through the ‘Justice Share’ scheme) has been justified as part of the privatisation strategy to enhance their productivity, their management still remains

132

A. A. TAJMAZINAN

under governmental control, and even adding to the existing bureaucracy. Moreover, the alleged ‘dividend’ which is paid to the shareholders is not a real profit (it comes from other sources like petro-dollars), since many of these firms are not making profits. The same problem could be identified with the UCT scheme: the expenditures have been more than revenues and the budget deficit has been compensated from the development (or capital) budget of the country hindering the economic development process. Moreover, the scheme has brought about constant inflation, devalued the national currency as well as lowering the value of lower class incomes. It is also argued that many industries and businesses had to shut down or reduce their size in terms of production and staff due to increasing production costs. Iranian welfare system is characterized by a unique type of ‘bureaucratic oversupply’ since overlapping and parallel welfare institutions and programs pose a main challenge and burden for the whole system. Many governmental welfare institutions are paralleled with para-governmental institutions and bonyads with overlapping agendas. Although this phenomenon is not limited to welfare institutions and could be traced in other sectors like the armed forces and cultural institutions, shrinking social budgets suffer more from this situation. While the most apparent case is the overlap between State Welfare organization and Imam Khomeini Relief Committee in the field of social assistance, it is by no way restricted to this policy domain. For example, a study by Yazdani (2015) has found that various programs in more than 11 institutions are related to the issue of housing policy and deliver housing benefits, services, facilities and subsidies. This ‘institutional convolutedness’ brings about wasting of resources, policy dis-coordination, corruption, and nonconstructive competition which leads to a situation that more than 80% of the budget goes for day to day running of these institutions (Dini Torkamani 2017). Rising inequality after a decade of decreasing trends in post-Revolution era (especially after the implementation of structural adjustment policies at the end of 1980s) points to the role of the welfare system in heightening social divisions and ‘social stratification’ in terms of access to and enjoying welfare advantages. For example, while certain groups like middle and high rank governmental officials, members of the armed forces, war veterans/disabled (ithargaran and janbazan) and their families as well as those with complementary private insurance schemes may enjoy high quality health services, decent pension schemes and other

6

CHALLENGES OF ESTABLISHING AN ISLAMIC WELFARE STATE …

133

social services and social insurance benefits, a considerable proportion of the population have to rely on minimum wages, low pensions and minimalistic social assistance and cash transfer schemes. Using explanations of Gough et al. (2004) about welfare arrangements in developing countries, it could be argued that while the welfare regime as a whole in Iran could be categorized as a ‘more effective informal security’ one, certain groups are enjoying a genuine ‘welfare state‘ while others are experiencing the weaknesses and shortages of a ‘residual welfare system’. These advantages, benefits, quota and welfare entitlements have negative impacts on ‘horizontal social solidarity’. Social policy is highly politicized in Iran. It is usual that some welfare schemes are politically manipulated and periodically used as a tool to achieve political ends such as what happened through the wide distribution of the ‘Justice Share’ profits, increase in the payments to pensioners without necessary reforms in pension funds which brings about new revenues, and other welfare incentives immediately before some presidential elections. Another example was abandonment of the Parliament Act about paying only a portion of revenues from energy price reform as cash subsidy according to income groups by Ahmadinejad’s Administration after the 2009 controversial presidential election and paying all related revenues (and even revenues from other sources) to the whole population mainly due to the political situation. Abandonment of welfare schemes launched by previous administrations (most notably, the Compassionate Housing scheme by Rouhani Administration) is another manifest of political encounter with social policies. Finally and despite the rhetoric of establishing an Islamic welfare state based on Islamic teachings and the Islamic Republic’s Constitution, there is no consensus about the nature, characteristics and operational definition of its social policies. Subsequent administrations after the Revolution have claimed that they are going to materialize Islamic social justice through various social and welfare policies but they have adopted contradictory approaches and policies, undoing policy initiatives of the past administrations and labeling them as non-Islamic, socialist, neoliberal, etc. without any ‘welfare consensus’ or shared ‘welfare discourse’ based on the Constitution. Therefore, lack of a coherent theoretical framework about what constitutes an ‘Islamic welfare system’ in the Iranian academy and among

134

A. A. TAJMAZINAN

political and policy platforms could be regarded as a serious obstacle in achieving a welfare state in the country.

References Aghaei, P. (2018). Evaluation of Urban Housing Policy provision in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Resource document. The Network for Public Policy Studies. http://npps.ir/ArticlePreview.aspx?id=172011. Accessed 17 January 2020. Alikhani, A. A. (1995). Values of the Islamic Revolution. Islamic Development Organization. Aslani, P. (2020). Taxation on luxary houses is on the government’s agenda. http://dolat.ir/detail/335414. Accessed 20 February 2020. Athari, K. (2006). Official justice and objective justice in in the legislation of the housing sector. Journal of Majlis and Research, 51, 41–55. Central Bank of Iran (CBI). (2018). The Gini index. https://tsd.cbi.ir/Display/ ShowHtmlReport.aspx?DT=0. Accessed 20 January 2018. Constituteproject. (2019). Iran (Islamic Republic of)’s Constitution of 1979 with amendment through 1989. Resource document. Constitute project. https:// constituteproject.org.Pdf. Accessed 17 January 2020. Dini Torkamani, A. (2017). Institutional convolutedness: A disaster for economicpolitical system of the country. https://www.magiran.com/article/3701843. Accessed 20 February 2020. Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Cambridge and Oxford: Polity Press. Garivani, F., Ahmadi Shadmehri, M. T., Fallahi, M. A., & Raghfar, H. (2019, Summer). Dynamic poverty analysis in rural areas of Iran. Journal of Research and Rural Planning, 8(3), 13–25. Ghazizadeh Hashemi, H. (2018). Insurance is for the poor. Resource document. Alef news. https://www.alef.ir/news/3970806051.html. Accessed 17 January 2020. Ghoraishi Khorasgani, M., Yamani, M., Zakersalehi, GH. M., & Golnar, M. (2017). A content of articles in privatization of higher education in Iran scientific journals. Journal of Science and Technology Policy, 9(3), 61–76. Gough, I. & Wood, G. with Barrientos, A., Bevan, P., Davis, P., & Room, G. (2004). Insecurity and welfare regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America: Social policy in development contexts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

6

CHALLENGES OF ESTABLISHING AN ISLAMIC WELFARE STATE …

135

Harris, K. (2017). A social revolution: Politics and the welfare state in Iran. Oakland: University of California Press. ILO. (2020). Country profile: Iran. https://www.ilo.org/ilostat. Accessed 17 January 2020. Islamic Parliament Research Center (IPRC). (2017). Review of the activities of the Ministry of Road and Urban Development in the 11th Administration [First Term of Rouhani]. Resource document. http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/report/show/ 1031314. Accessed 17 January 2019. Izadkhah. (2019, January 1). The Insatiable Health Reform Scheme. Hamshahri Daily. http://newspaper.hamshahri.org/id/43108/ .html. Accessed 17 January 2019. Meydari, A. (2018). About 18% to 35% of the population are under the poverty line. http://www.salamatnews.com/news/257021/ . Accessed 20 February 2020. Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance (MEAF). (2017). Evaluation of the Health Reform Scheme. Resource document. http://econo.mefa.ir/Por tal/File/ShowFile.aspx?ID=e2c84337-e041-4439-b0a4-cb59e27bc16c.Pdf. Accessed 17 January 2020. Ministry of Health and Medical Education (MHME). (2019). Major health indi. Accessed 20 cators. http://it.behdasht.gov.ir/page/ February 2019. Ministry of Roads and Urban Development (MRUD). (2017). Access to urban housing indicator. https://www.mrud.ir/Portals/0/ pdf?ver = 1396-03-02-131015-077. Accessed 20 February 2020. Momeni, F. (2007). Iran’s economy during the structural adjustment period. Tehran: Naghonegar. Nurollhai, H., Khalili, A., Rashidi, N., & Rahmani, M. (2015). Evaluation of Mehr housing policies in Iran and presentation of solutions for their improvement. Journal of Urban Studies, 4(13), 83–92. Omidi, R. (2018). Privatization of the educational system as the main indicator of class gap in Iran. https://www.irna.ir/news/83026940/ . Accessed 20 February 2020. Peykanpoor, M., Esmaeeli, S., Yoosefi, N., Aryayeenejad, A., & Rasekh, H. R. (2018). A review of the achievements and challenges of the Iranian health system reform scheme. Payesh Journal, 17 (5), 481–494. Qarakhani, M. (2013). State and health policy in Iran (1981–2009). Journal of Social Sciences, 21(61), 211–254.

136

A. A. TAJMAZINAN

Rafiei, Z. (2019, January1). The Insatiable Health Reform Scheme. Hamshahri, p. 17. http://newspaper.hamshahrionline.ir/id/43108/ .html. Accessed 20 February 2020. Saei, A., Qarakhani, M., & Momeni, F. (2012). State and education policy in Iran (1981–2009). Journal of Social Sciences, 19(56), 117–166. Saeidi, A. A. (2004). The accountability of para-governmental organizations (bonyads): The case of Iranian foundations. Journal of Iranian Studies, 37 (3), 479–498. Saeidi, A. A. (2009). Iranian para-governmental organizations (bonyads). Resource document. Middle East institute. https://www.mei.edu/publicati ons/iranian-para-governmental-organizations-bonyads. Accessed 17 January 2020. SCI. (2017). Social services. https://www.amar.org.ir/ . 20 February 2020. SCI. (2018a). Higher

education.

Accessed

https://www.amar.org.ir/5553670#

. Accessed 20 February 2020. Statistics Centre of Iran (SCI). (2018b). Family income and expenditure data. http://lib.sci.org.ir/DiglibGuest/WebUI/TreeBrowse.aspx?lang=fa&Tre eId=0#HandleRequest.aspx?ReqId=8&_nodeValue=1716&TreeId=0&_nod eCode=01/01/15/02/03&ResultKind=0&_isLeaf=false&_showFull=true. Accessed 20 January 2018. Tabnak. (2017). Comparing the economy of the country before and after the Islamic Revolution. https://www.tabnak.ir/fa/news/663854/. Accessed 17 January 2020. Tajmazinani, A. A. (2011). Typology of welfare systems in the world. Welfare planning and social development quarterly. Journal of social development & welfare planning, 3(6), 203–234. Tasnimnews. (2019). Waiting time for house ownership just 53 years! https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1398/02/07/1998268/ . Accessed 20 February 2020. UNESCO. (2020). Education statistics database. http://data.uis.unesco.org/. Accessed 17 January 2020. Yazdani, F. (2015). Evaluation of housing social protection policies in Iran. In A. Tajmazinani & M. Zahediasl (Eds.), Social welfare in the sixth development plan (conference proceeding). Tehran: Allameh Tabataba’i University publications. World Bank. (2020). World Bank open data. https://data.worldbank.org/. Accessed 17 January 2020.

CHAPTER 7

Institutions and Individuals: Social Policies in Contemporary Turkey Mehmet Fatih Aysan and Ummugulsum Aysan

1

Introduction

Social well-being and the transformation of social policies are frequently discussed in the social policy literature. There are several factors fueling the discussions on the distribution of the welfare and the future of social policies. These factors include economic fluctuations, technological developments, demographic changes, rising waves of migration. Another factor is the combination of these effects on unemployment in tandem with the growing populist discourse around the world. These discussions mostly concern industrialized countries, particularly in Europe. Whether through neglect or the difficulty of finding reliable data, very few theoretical or empirical studies have studied social policies in the Islamic world. Those studies that do focus on social policies in

M. F. Aysan (B) Department of Sociology, Marmara University, Istanbul, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] U. Aysan Department of Social Work, University of Health Sciences, Istanbul, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 A. A. Tajmazinani (ed.), Social Policy in the Islamic World, International Series on Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57753-7_7

137

138

M. F. AYSAN AND U. AYSAN

Muslim countries tend to do so using Eurocentric views and concepts, a general common problem of analyses on developing countries. As a result, social policy analyses on the Islamic world suffers from a lack of depth and clarity. Emphasis on the of role welfare actors in welfare distribution and the role of religion in welfare distribution can solve these problems. This study aims to address this state of affairs through an examination of the welfare regime and citizens’ welfare perceptions in Turkey. It shows that while the state and the family stand out as the most important welfare actors, markets, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have relatively fewer roles in the distribution of welfare. To this end, we begin by examining the four main actors involved in Turkey’s welfare regime— namely the state, the family, the market, and NGOs. Furthermore, the third section is dedicated to a discussion of the historical evolution of social policies in Turkey and an analysis of citizens’ perceptions of social policies for different groups. We then conclude with a discussion of recent challenges to the Turkish welfare regime.

2 Main Characteristics of Welfare Distribution in Turkey Since the 1990s, the classification of welfare regimes has occupied much of the social policy literature, which focuses on social expenditures, policy reforms, and social inequalities (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999; Cousins 2005; Scruggs and Allan 2006). Following Titmuss’s (1974) threefold social policy classification, Esping-Andersen (1990) developed the notion of welfare state regimes in order to analyze the variations across 18 countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). For him, OECD countries’ welfare regimes can be examined under three headings: Social Democratic, Continental European, and Liberal (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999). In addition to Esping-Andersen’s popular classification, there are other welfare regime types with varying institutional and historical features, such as Southern European (Ferrera 1996; Trifiletti 1999), Eastern European (Deacon 2000), East Asian (Walker and Wong 2005; Gough et al. 2004; Kam 2012), Latin American (Barrientos 2004; Lloyd-Sherlock 2009), and Middle Eastern (Ismael and Ismael 2008; Jawad 2009; Karshenas and Moghadam 2009). In these welfare regime classifications, Turkey emerges as an interesting case because of its historical, cultural, and institutional characteristics. Some comparative studies treat Turkey as member of the Middle Eastern

7

INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUALS …

139

welfare regime (Aybars and Tsarouhas 2010), while many others consider it as part of the Southern European (Bugra and Keyder 2006; Gal 2010; Aysan 2013, 2019). These studies do not focus specifically on the role of welfare actors; their analyses rather focus on social expenditures, specific social policies such as health and social security, or particularly on cultural and historical factors, which affect social policies. Four main actors determine the distribution of social welfare: the state, the family, the market, and NGOs such as non-profit organizations, associations, and foundations (Aysan 2018b). Similar to other Muslim countries, role of families in the welfare distribution is crucial in Turkey. Individuals primarily, rely on their families, relatives, or other social networks. The Turkish welfare regime can be thus characterized by a preference for family oriented solutions to socio-economic problems. Individuals live with their families, share their earnings, and care for one another. Intergenerational family transfers are high in Turkey (Aysan 2018a). Extended family members, parents, children, or siblings are generally available to help deal with social risks. For instance, young adults do not generally leave the home until they get married and tend to live close to their parents afterward. Family relations are deeper and stronger compared to those in many European and North American countries. According to Aysan (2018b, p. 106), the state has an extensive role in welfare distribution, chiefly in the areas of healthcare, social security, and education in Turkey. Besides, its role is expanding, as the state pays increasing attention to social services and poverty alleviation projects. The social security system is financed by the state through pay-as-yougo (PAYG) contributions based on employees’ occupations and direct state support from the public budget. Basic healthcare is provided by the state through the general health insurance system, for those who do not have social security support through their occupations. Hence, the Turkish welfare regime is distinct from those of many Muslim and European countries, with its combination of national health services for all citizens and income transfers for particularly needy people. Even though the market does not extensively contribute to social welfare in Turkey, and certainly not to the degree that the state and family do, it has an increasing role in welfare distribution. Until the implementation of neo-liberal policies in the 1980s, the market did not have a noteworthy role in any part of social life in Turkey, least of all in welfare distribution. According to Aysan (2018b, p. 105), beginning

140

M. F. AYSAN AND U. AYSAN

in the 1980s, new economic policies resulted in, first, to the privatization of state-owned enterprises and, second, to increasing investment on the part of the private companies in various social policy areas that had traditionally been controlled by the state. For profit companies started to play a more vigorous role in welfare distribution through the individualization of social risks and the privatization of social policy areas. One can see these trends in all social policy areas. For instance, in the 2017–2018 academic year, 8% of students (1.35 million students out of about 17.8 million students) in the formal pre-primary, primary, and secondary education were registered in private schools (MNE 2018). The student enrolment in the private universities also increased from 21,000 in the 1997–1998 academic year to 596,000 in the 2017–2018 academic year (CHE 2019). Similarly, the role of market in the health care and social services increased. The number of clients in private nursing homes increased from 351 to 10,823 between 2007 and 2015 (Aysan 2018b, p. 112). NGOs have relatively a lower contribution to the Turkish welfare regime. Nevertheless, their significant roles in the Turkish welfare regime through associations, non-profit organizations, solidarity groups, and foundations based on religious values cannot be denied. For many Muslim countries, including Turkey, Islam is the main determinant of the charitable activities in society and the social policies of the state. In the Islamic tradition, all forms of assistances for the needy were carried out by charitable foundations, including individual almsgiving (sadaka) and compulsory economic support for the poor people (zakat) (Ozbek 1999, p. 6). Unlike many Muslim countries, zakat is not collected by the state and there is no specific mechanism for collecting and distributing it in Turkey. While many religious foundations collect and distribute zakat, individuals also distribute it to needy people in their surroundings. Despite the lack of official statistics about the amount of zakat collected, according to estimates in 2015, 80 billion TL (about 24.2 billion Euro in 2015) zakat could be collected in Turkey (Tabakoglu and Turan 2017, p. 933). Resent research shows that the most important reason to donate is to fulfil the religious obligations, and among these donations, the top three charity activities are closely related to Islam; supporting mosque constructions, and giving sadaka and zakat (Carkoglu and Aytac 2016). Most of these voluntary activities and donations are carried out by NGOs heavily influenced by social solidarity and religious values. According to

7

INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUALS …

141

the Directorate General for Relations with Civil Society (2020), there are over 119,000 active associations in Turkey mostly focusing on occupation and social solidarity (31%), sports (22%), religious services (16%), and social assistances (5%) in 2020.

3

The State and Social Policies in Turkey 3.1

A Brief History of Social Policies in Turkey

Waqfs met the various needs of the communities and played an active role in welfare distribution during the Ottoman Empire. For example, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, about 80% of the lands in Istanbul were owned by these foundations (Ozbek 1999, p. 7). The establishment of the Ministry of Endowments (Evkaf -i Humayun Nezareti) in 1826 might be considered as the centralization of social policies in the late Ottoman era. The Ottoman-Russian War of 1877–1878 caused a massive migration flow to the empire; most of the poor immigrants settling in Istanbul. Whatever might have been the nature of poverty in Istanbul and Anatolia at the time, migration alone does not enlighten the state’s increasing involvement in taking care of the needy people and establishing new institutions for them (Ozbek 1999, p. 7). Increasing state involvement and centralization in social policies were closely related to the state’s legitimation efforts. Darulaceze, the first modern poorhouse for children, elderly, and disabled people in the Ottoman Empire, was founded during this period. In 1917, a special institution, the Himaye-i Etfal Society, was established for children. The Republic of Turkey developed these Ottoman institutions and they spread across the country. For instance, the Himaye-i Etfal Society was restructured and took a new name, the Directorate of Social Services and Child Protection, in 1983. The main task of the directorate was to provide services for needy children, elderly, and disabled people across Turkey. According to Seekings (2005), in some developing countries, an inegalitarian corporatist character have transformed in a redistributive path, with greater stress on the provision of social assistance for the least privileged social groups (Seekings 2005). Solidarity Fund was established to fulfil this redistribution responsibility of the state in 1986. It was largely designed as a charitable institution, providing cash and in-kind benefits

142

M. F. AYSAN AND U. AYSAN

without any clear criteria of eligibility and, hence, without an appeal to well-defined social rights (Bugra and Keyder 2003, p. 36). At the beginning of the Turkish Republic, the state had very limited resources, with which to provide for the basic needs of its citizens, including nutrition and shelter. In this respect, Turkey’s socio-economic situation was similar to that of many countries during that period. EspingAndersen (1999, p. 33) argues that poverty in rural areas and a lack of poverty relief were the main problems for many countries. There was no institutionalized and organized public policy for disadvantaged groups. For many years, social assistance was perceived as a voluntary action rather than the state’s responsibility. Turkey’s 1961 Constitution represents the state’s aspiration to get involved in social policies. In the second article of the constitution, Turkish Republic is defined as “a nationalistic, democratic, secular, and social state governed by the rule of law based on human rights and the fundamental tenets set forth in the preamble”. The emphasis on the social state in the constitution was noteworthy. The economic policies of this period aimed to protect the domestic bourgeoisie, achieve industrialization targets, and form a social consensus among different social groups. In order to achieve this consensus, the new constitution granted some labor rights to employees, such as the right to join labor unions and go on strikes. While social rights were first protected by the 1961 Constitutions, the social security system has a long history in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey. It was first established for military personnel in 1866, and a separate fund was established for public employees in 1880. The first national scheme, the Social Insurance Institution (henceforth SSK), was established in 1946 for blue-collar employees working in the public and private sectors. In 1949, the Retirement Fund (henceforth ES) was established solely for white-collar public workers. Finally, in 1971, social security coverage was extended by the Social Security Institution of Craftsmen, Tradesmen, and Other Self-Employed People (henceforth Ba˘g-Kur), to craftsmen, merchants, agricultural workers, and all remaining selfemployed people. The division of the social security system based on according to employees’ occupations shows the hierarchical nature of the Turkish welfare regime. Compared to the SSK and ES, Ba˘g-Kur delivered relatively low levels of benefits, such as disability, old-age, and health insurances. The gap of social benefit between Ba˘g-Kur and other social security institutions may have led to decline in the percentage of Ba˘g-Kur coverage in Turkey. Statistics show that the percentages of the insured

7

INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUALS …

143

population were 17% for the ES, 52% for SSK, and 31% for Ba˘g-Kur in 1990 while the percentages of the insured population were 17% for the ES, 61% for SSK, and 22% for Ba˘g-Kur in 2018 (SSI 2020). The structural and economic differences among these three institutions reveal the fragmentary structure of the social security system, which also exists in the Southern European and Continental welfare regimes (Aysan 2013, p. 150). 3.2

Social Policies in Contemporary Turkey

OECD (2020) data show that contrary to some who claim that there has been a crisis and retrenchment of the welfare state (O’Connor 1973; OECD 1981; Offe 1984; Mishra 1999), the public social expenditures of the welfare state have not decreased since the 1980s. In the case of Turkey, public social expenditure increased from 7.5% to 12.5% between 2000 and 2016 (OECD 2020). Old-age and survivors spending increased from 3.9% in 2000 to 7.7% in 2016. Healthcare expenditures also expanded significantly during this period. In 2000, 2.9% of GDP in Turkey was spent on public health services, whereas it was 3.4% in 2016. Even though family expenditures remained relatively low with 0.4% in 2016, the needy families, children, and disabled were supported through fourty-one different social policy programs provided by the Ministry of Family, Labor, and Social Services. According to the General Directorate of Budget and Fiscal Control (2019), the amount of money allocated for social assistances from the central government budget was about 51 billion TL (about 12 billion Euro) in 2018. The significant increase in social spending, particularly in old-age and healthcare for the last twenty years cannot be illustrated simply by the populism of the governing conservative party (Justice and Development Party, henceforth JDP) or by the progression of the Turkish welfare regime to a Social Democratic regime (Aysan 2018b). In order to understand this significant increase and the characteristics of social policies, one should examine the evolution of those social policies over the last two decades. The great economic crisis of 2001 had serious impacts on Turkish politics. While government parties could not enter the parliament, the newly founded JDP won the majority of the votes and came to power alone in 2002. In order to overcome the negative impacts of the economic crisis, the government adapted structural adjustment policies ordered by the

144

M. F. AYSAN AND U. AYSAN

International Monetary Fund (IMF). In addition, it provided social assistance to mitigate citizens’ economic difficulties. The ideological view of the conservative JDP, which gets its support mostly from relatively poor people, was in line with the idea of social solidarity and social support. In the 2000s, while the JDP worked to heal the wounds of the economic crisis through reforms, it sought to provide relief to people in difficult situations through social policies. During this period health, education, old-age, family, and other social expenditures in the percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP) significantly increased (Aysan 2018b). Even though there were important social policy reforms during this period, the 2006 social security and healthcare reform was the most significant. It set up a new and overarching institution under a single administrative body for the three separate social security institutions (Ba˘gKur, ES, and SSK), and provided a wider coverage for basic health services. While recalibration and cost-containment are the key dimensions of Turkish social security reform (Aysan 2013), the quality of social security and health services were improved. In line with the 2006 social security reform, a 10-year health transformation program was introduced to develop a public universal healthcare system for all citizens (Aysan 2018b). These new reforms precipitated a significant growth of health insurance coverage, particularly for the poor. According to new regulation, if one’s monthly household income is less than one-third of the gross minimum wage, the health insurance premium is paid by the state. In 2019, 85% of the population had access to health services through their social security plans (Ba˘g-Kur, ES, and SSK) while about 15% had healthcare coverage through general health insurance system supported by the state (SSI 2020). Another crucial social policy program started in 2007 is the longterm home care support for the disabled and their caregivers. This state support not only provides additional financial aid for those disabled people who need it but also empowers women, who are generally the caregivers at home. In 2018, more than half a million people received this support (General Directorate of Budget and Fiscal Control 2019). Another important development was the establishment of the Ministry of Family and Social Policies in 2011. For the first time in Turkish history, social policies controlled by different state bodies began to be managed by one single ministry. In 2018, in order to focus on both workfare and social policies it was merged with the Ministry of Labor and Social Security under a new name; the Ministry of Family, Labor, and Social Services.

7

INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUALS …

145

According to the Ministry of National Education (2018), the formal education system has improved significantly between 2002 and 2018. The net schooling ratio, which is the number of students of a theoretical age group enrolled in a specific level of education by the population in that age group, increased from 51% to 84% for the secondary education, and from 15% to 46% for the higher education. New administrative reforms and improvements in school conditions positively affected the education system. The student-teacher ratio in primary education developed from 28:1 in the academic year of 2002–2003 to 17:1 in the academic year of 2017–2018 (MNE 2018). Education expenditures also increased during this period. According to the General Directorate of Budget and Fiscal Control (2019), the share allocated to higher education from the central government budget increased from 3% in 2002 to 5.5% in 2018. 3.3

Social Policy Perceptions in Turkey

To grasp the characteristics of the Turkish welfare regime, it is crucial to understand citizens’ perceptions of social policies and how social welfare is distributed by different welfare actors for different groups. The effects of various welfare players and citizens’ welfare perceptions and satisfaction levels can be analyzed using a nation-wide dataset entitled Understanding the Welfare Regime of Turkey: Institutions and Individuals (Aysan 2016). As highlighted above, there are four main players determining the distribution of welfare in Turkey: the state, the family, the market, and NGOs, such as non-profit organizations, associations, and foundations. Aysan (2016) attempted to show how individuals evaluate the role of different actors in welfare distribution, based on 2016 data. According to those data, people viewed the family and the state as having stronger roles in welfare distribution compared to the market and NGOs. About 93% of the participants stated that the family has a decisive role in social welfare. Similarly, 90% of the participants responded that the state plays an important role in welfare distribution. The market and NGOs, in contrast, were seen as having moderate roles in welfare distribution. While 60% of the participants indicated that the market has a decisive role in welfare distribution, 54% responded that NGOs play an active role in welfare distribution. Figure 1 illustrates how individuals evaluate social policies for different age groups. Social policies for the elderly and children received higher

146

M. F. AYSAN AND U. AYSAN

60.0

40.0

48.1

47.4

50.0

43.7

41.3

39.0

33.7

31.5

30.7

30.0 20.0

21.1

19.6

22.6

21.2

10.0 0.0

Chidren (0-17) Unsatisfied

Young (18-30)

Middle Age (31-64)

Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied

Old(65+)

Satisfied

Fig. 1 Social policies and satisfaction levels for various age groups (%) (Source Aysan 2016)

satisfaction scores compared to social policies for the young and middleaged people. Nearly half of the respondents (48%) evaluated social policies for the elderly as satisfactory and 41% stated that social policies for children are satisfactory. The percentage of participants who considered social policies for adults and young people satisfactory is much lower. While 34% of the participants evaluated social policies for middle-aged people as satisfactory, 32% of the participants evaluated social policies for the young people as satisfactory. In addition, about half of the participants (47%) found social policies for young people unsatisfactory. The main reasons behind this perception might be the establishment of the social security system earlier than other social policy provisions and relatively generous pension income for the elderly. In addition, free public transportation, tax exemptions, and some other benefits for elderly people may have led people to find elderly policies more satisfactory. Figure 2 illustrates the evaluations regarding the social policies for different ethnic groups in Turkey. Most of the participants (60%) stated social policies targeting Turkish people to be satisfactory. Similarly, 59% evaluated social policies for Laz and Kurdish people as satisfactory. Social policies for Romani people, however, received poorest satisfaction levels. While 51% of the participants found social policies targeting Romanies as

7

INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUALS …

147

70.0 60.0

60.0

59.5

59.1

51.4

50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0

32.9 27.2

26.7

24.9

13.3

13.7

15.6

15.7

Turkish

Kurdish

Laz

Romany

10.0 0.0

Unsatisfied

Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied

Satisfied

Fig. 2 Social policies and satisfaction levels for various ethnic groups (%) (Source Aysan 2016)

satisfactory, 33% stated that social policies for Romanies are unsatisfactory. These results indicate that the Romani group is viewed as the most disadvantaged group in Turkey. However, it is important to emphasize that the response rate for this question regarding Laz (84%) and Romany (80%) social policies were lower compared to that for Turkish (91%) and Kurdish (89%) social policies. Moreover, further analyses show that one’s answer is affected by his or her ethnicity. For instance, 63% of Kurds evaluated social policies for Turks as satisfactory, whereas only 41% of them evaluated social policies for Kurdish people as satisfactory. Similarly, 59% of Turkish people evaluated social policies for their ethnicity as satisfactory, whereas 68% of them evaluated social policies for Kurdish people as satisfactory. These statistics show that ethnicity plays an important role in the perception of social policies and that people find social policies for other ethnicities more satisfactory than those for their own ethnic group. In addition to age and ethnicity, gender is another important determinant in the perception of social policies. While 44% of the participants found social policies for women as unsatisfactory compared to those for men, 35% considered social policies for women as satisfactory compared to those for men. Further analysis demonstrates that there is a gender difference in the evaluations. About 41% of men stated that social policies for women were satisfactory, whereas only 29% of women found social policies for women satisfactory.

148

M. F. AYSAN AND U. AYSAN

70.0 59.1

60.0

50.7 50.0 40.0

38.9

42.0

40.7

43.2

39.2

35.0

31.1 30.0 20.0

24.1

19.1

20.1

Education

Retirement

16.8

21.8

18.2

10.0 0.0 Unsatisfied

Fig. 3

Health

Social Services Cultural Services

Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied

Satisfied

Satisfaction levels from selected social policies (%) (Source Aysan 2016)

Figure 3 shows individuals’ satisfaction levels from the main social policy areas. Individuals’ subjective satisfaction is an important determinant of the success of social policies. The area of social policy that people are most satisfied with is health care. While 59% of the respondents said they are satisfied with healthcare system, social services (51%) and cultural services (43%) follow it, respectively. Satisfaction with the education and retirement system, on the other hand, received relatively lower scores, 42% and 39% respectively. The high satisfaction scores of the healthcare system may stem from the 2006 healthcare reform, which brought significant improvements in the system. The new reforms precipitated a significant growth of health insurance coverage, particularly for the poor. Dissatisfaction with the retirement system, however, may have increased due to constantly changing retirement eligibility regulations and relatively low pension income.

4 Recent Challenges for the Turkish Welfare Regime In Muslim countries with relatively underdeveloped welfare systems, including in Turkey, policies that are appropriate to new social and economic challenges are increasingly difficult to establish. Both global risks and the endogenous risks of the countries bring new threats for

7

INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUALS …

149

welfare regimes. These risks are increasingly grim for countries whose social policy institutions are relatively late in developing, as in Turkey and other Muslim countries. In the case of Turkey, welfare distribution and social policies face five interconnected challenges: economic risks, migration waves, demographic aging, change in the family structure, and populism and patronage. The first two are closely related to regional and global developments, while the others are mostly caused due to Turkey’s internal dynamics. 4.1

Economic Risks

Neo-liberal globalization has challenged almost all the gains of the welfare state. Increasing rates of unemployment, non-standard employment, and part-time jobs have led researchers to put forward new arguments for the future of work and society (Ritzer 1996; Kalleberg 2000). Socioeconomic challenges have resulted in claims of crisis of the welfare state as a result of financial problems (O’Connor 1973), growing social expenditures (OECD 1981), contradictions of the welfare state (Offe 1984), and globalization (Mishra 1999). The key economic characteristics of the contemporary world are technological progress and deskilling, in which less employees are required to manufacture products and services (Rifkin 2004). Dynamic international competition and profit-maximization strategies have driven multinational corporations to move their production to newly industrializing countries with less regulation and job protection. The increase in the number of immigrant workers also have a significant negative impact on the conditions of unskilled workers and their social security in Turkey. Some of the biggest Turkish companies relocated their factories to newly industrializing countries in which the labor costs are cheap and social security requirements are loose. In spite of high rates of GDP growth in the last two decades, Turkey’s unemployment rate has remained at around 10%. In 2019, the overall unemployment rate in Turkey was about 12%, but it was 25% among young adults aged 15–24 (TURKSTAT 2020). Continuous high unemployment poses a significant threat to the social security system, which is financed by the state through pay-as-you-go (PAYG) contributions based on employees’ occupations and direct state support from the public budget.

150

M. F. AYSAN AND U. AYSAN

4.2

Migration Flows

In Turkey, as of 2019, about 3.6 million people were living under temporary protection status and about 455 thousand irregular immigrants were caught that year (Directorate General of Migration Management 2020). According to estimate, in total, about 5 million legal and illegal immigrants live in Turkey. There are three main reasons behind these migration flows. First, Turkey has become an economic and political power in the region over the last two decades. Second, ongoing economic and political problems, security issues, and domestic wars in the Middle East and North Africa make Turkey a safe zone for many people. Third, the reluctance of European countries and other rich countries to admit these immigrants has led people to turn to Turkey. According to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Turkey has the largest number of refugees worldwide (3.6 million people), and it continues to host the second-largest number of refugees relative to its national population, where 1 in 23 people was a refugee in 2018 (UNHCR 2018). The main reason for this increase in a very short period is the civil war in Syria. In addition to Syrians, there are many legal and illegal immigrants from other countries including Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkmenistan. With regional unrest projected to continue for many years, Turkey will likely experience new migration waves in the coming years. However, social policies in Turkey and labor market regulations mean that many of these immigrants will have problems accessing to social security. As highlighted above, social policies in Turkey are a combination of Beveridgean universal national health services and Bismarckian income transfers. One’s citizenship and employment status determine the right of access to social policies in Turkey. Immigrants living in Turkey under temporary protection status, especially Syrians, have free access to healthcare and public education and they are eligible for basic monetary supports provided by the Turkish Red Crescent and the European Union. Even though the majority of the immigrants have access to these social policies, their status are not protected by the legislations. There is no long-run government strategy for Syrian immigrants or other nationalities, especially those who are coming from Asia, and there is a great deal of public discontent about illegal immigrants, compounded by Turkey’s economic problems and high unemployment rates. Even though some Turks believe that immigrants are taking their jobs, most immigrants actually work

7

INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUALS …

151

in unstandardized, unsecured, and low-paid jobs, which Turkish citizens generally do not favor. Social and cultural biases against immigrants and the lack of policies to integrate them may increase the ethnic tensions between Turks and Syrians and may create security threats. Hence, having young immigrants might be a big opportunity for the Turkish economy through proper adaptation policies. If these policies are not immediately applied, having a massive young immigrant population may instead bring new economic and social risks for Turkey. 4.3

Young but Aging Population

It is difficult for many industrialized countries to provide substantial social policies, particularly health services and retirement benefits, because of their aging populations. Aging population has negative outcomes for economic growth because of the old-age dependency ratio. Similarly, the continuing demographic transition raises considerable risks in meeting the needs of the aging population in Turkey. According to TURKSTAT (2018), the proportion of the elderly population, which is defined as those 65 years of age and over, was 8.7% in 2018, and it is expected to be 22.6% in 2060. In other words, by the mid twenty-first century, Turkey will have lost its demographic advantage, indicating that the financial pressures on its social policies would worsen. Unlike industrialized countries, which develop their social and economic policies for their aging populations, Turkey will face many risks for its economic and social policies. There are two main reasons for these risks. First, Turkey has not been able to provide new job opportunities for its younger population in the last three decades. On the contrary, governments preferred to transfer the wealth from the youth to the elderly with a relatively generous pension system. Due to these populist policies, the pension system has suffered from budget deficits since 1993 (Aysan 2013, p. 155). Second, Turkey has one of the fastest aging populations in the world, and there are very limited economic resources to meet the increasing needs of this aging population. Similar to the situation in the Continental and Southern European welfare regimes, unsustainable pension benefits and elderly-care expenditures lead to a strongly perceived sense of injustice among younger populations in Turkey (Aysan 2013).

152

M. F. AYSAN AND U. AYSAN

4.4

Family Change

Changes in gender roles and family structures pose significant challenges to welfare states (Orloff 1996; Pierson 2007; Esping-Andersen 2009). In Turkey, social welfare has traditionally been distributed based on the gendered division of labor in the family (Aysan 2013). This gendered division of labor has changed especially among educated couples since the 1990s. As of 2019, about 72% of Turkish women with a university degree participated in the labor force (TURKSTAT 2020). The labor force participation rate is also higher for younger women. In 2018, about 49% of women aged between 25 and 29 participated in the labor force while it was only 34% for all age groups (OECD 2020). In Turkey and other industrializing countries, flexible employment regulations make unregistered employment an important survival model for poor women, while employers prefer young women to decrease labor costs, in order not to pay social security premiums (Aysan 2008, p. 226). In addition to the increase in the rates of women’s labor force participation, there are other factors affecting the active role of the family in welfare distribution. The divorce rate is increasing, young people are delaying marriage, and couples are having fewer children (Aysan 2016). All of these social changes directly affect families and the traditional system of welfare distribution in Turkey. All of these economic and social trends bring new pressures as well as new options for families, and particularly for Turkish women. Nowadays, an increasing number of Turkish couples buy social services from private companies to meet the needs of their children and their elderly parents. Besides, the state provides an increasing number of childcare institutions for children, retirement houses for elderly people, and retreatment centers for disabled people (Aysan and Aysan 2016). In addition to these public institutions, the state has provided long-term care support at home to over a half million disabled people and their caregivers, mostly mothers and daughters of a disabled person, since 2007. The total amount paid by the state for home-care nursing was about 4 billion TL (about 1.3 billion Euro) in 2015 (Aysan and Aysan 2016, p. 41). 4.5

Populism and Patronage

Ferrera (1996) argues that populism and patronage are interconnected with the establishment of state institutions and the process of political

7

INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUALS …

153

mobilization in the Southern European countries. Similarly, populism and patronage play a crucial role in state formation and regime legitimation in Muslim societies (Hamzeh 2001; Karshenas and Moghadam 2009). In Turkey, rapid urbanization has meant that populism and patronage have come to be considered a general welfare distribution mechanism, and where clientelist relations have been strengthened by ongoing political tensions among political parties, particularly in the 1990s (Aysan 2018b, p. 116). For instance, the decision to abolish the official retirement age in 1992 and ongoing zoning amnesty for unregistered buildings are some of the populist policies that have negatively affected the longterm financial management of the pension system. Patronage—favoring some groups or making appointments to state office in return for political support—is a general welfare distribution mechanism in Turkey and many other Muslim countries. It is compounded by ongoing political conflicts between various parties and a lack of social trust in these societies. Since 2015, Turkey has witnessed the resurgence of populist policies because of the increasing political tensions in the country. Given the long-term financial risks associated with populist policies, politicians use them to win a majority of voters’ votes for future elections. Hence, populism and patronage are used as indirect welfare distribution mechanisms. Nevertheless, it poses a severe threat to the sustainability of social policies in the beginning of the twenty-first century (Aysan 2018b, p. 116).

5

Conclusion

This chapter has analyzed the Turkish welfare regime in light of the country’s welfare actors. While the state and the family stand out as the most important welfare actors, markets and NGOs have relatively fewer roles in the distribution of welfare. When citizens’ view of social policies are examined, people think that social policies are more satisfactory for the elderly and children, and they find social policies for young people and adults less satisfactory. In terms of ethnic groups, the policies for Turkish, Kurdish, and Laz people are deemed more satisfactory, while those for Romani are deemed less satisfactory. In terms of gender, approximately half of respondents find social policies for women less satisfactory than those for men. The family has an essential role in the Turkish welfare regime, similar to many Southern European and Muslim countries. Nevertheless, the economic, demographic, and social risks noted above make it difficult

154

M. F. AYSAN AND U. AYSAN

for the family to continue to play this role. In this context, the state has begun to stand out in social policies over the past several decades. A social security system that protects occupational-centered social hierarchies and means-tested social assistance form the basis of Turkish social policies. The relatively generous pension system and universal healthcare services protect particularly the well-being of elderly people, while women receive less than their share of this distribution. While the state and the family are still the main welfare actors in Turkey, the roles of the state and the market are increasing in the welfare distribution. The key reason behind this change could be defined as a restructuration of the role of welfare distribution among welfare actors. On the one hand, Turkey, as a latecomer welfare state, has developed its social policies for its flourishing but aging population. On the other hand, it attempts to further collaborate with other welfare actors to address new and emerging social and economic risks (Aysan 2018b). In this regard, while the family is losing its welfare role, the market is increasing its welfare role through neo-liberal policies. Hence, recent developments in welfare distribution and social policies must be analyzed not only through global challenges but also through the country’s endogenous features. The welfare regime approach, focusing on the roles of welfare actors (the state, the family, the market, and NGOs) can provide an explanatory framework not only to understand the features of the welfare states but also to develop novel and reliable solutions for new social and economic risks. Turkey and other Muslim countries can draw lessons from the mistakes of those countries in which social policies emerged much earlier. Nevertheless, increasing global and local risks and problems in the institutionalization of social policies pose significant threats for Turkey and many other Muslim countries. States that can analyze these risks correctly and produce proper solutions to them will increase their social welfare in the next decades. Hence, the Turkish welfare regime is in need of sustainable social policies for all sorts of groups that can provide new opportunities for its citizens. Acknowledgments This research is supported by TUBA-GEBIP.

7

INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUALS …

155

References Aybars, A. I., & Tsarouhas, D. (2010). Straddling two continents: Social policy and welfare politics in Turkey. Social Policy & Administration, 44(6), 746– 763. Aysan, M. F. (2008). Jobless growth or transformation of the welfare regime: The case of recent unemployment issue in Turkey. Indian Development Review, 6(2), 215–230. Aysan, M. F. (2013). Reforms and challenges: The Turkish pension regime revisited. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 49(sup5), 148–162. Aysan, M. F. (2016). Understanding the welfare regime of Turkey: institutions and individuals (TUBITAK 3501 Final Report). Aysan, M. F. (2018a). Changes in inter-generational transfer and its effect on happiness. Family structure in Türkiye: Advanced statistical analyses, 2018 (pp. 337–357). Ankara: The Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services. Aysan, M. F. (2018b). Between risks and opportunities: Social policies in contemporary Turkey. In A. F. Aysan, M. Babacan, N. Gur, & H. Karahan (Eds.), Turkish economy: Between middle-income trap and high-income status (pp. 101–120). Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Aysan, M. F., & Aysan, U. (2016). Who cares? Elderly care in Turkey. Economia & Lavoro, 50(3), 33–46. Aysan, U. (2019). Subjective well-being in European welfare regimes and Turkey. Turkish Journal of Sociology, 39(1), 197–214. Barrientos, A. (2004). Latin America: Towards a liberal-informal welfare regime. In I. Gough (Ed.), Insecurity and welfare regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America (pp. 121–168). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bugra, A., & Keyder, C. (2003). Poverty and the changing welfare regime of Turkey. Ankara: UNDP. Bugra, A., & Keyder, C. (2006). The Turkish welfare regime in transformation. Journal of European Social Policy, 16(3), 211–228. Carkoglu, A., & Aytac, E. (2016). Individual donation and philanthropy in Turkey. Istanbul: TUSEV. Council of Higher Education [CHE]. (2019). Higher education statistics. https://istatistik.yok.gov.tr. Accessed 13 February 2019. Cousins, M. (2005). European welfare states: Comparative perspectives. London: Sage. Deacon, B. (2000). Eastern European welfare states: The impact of the politics of globalization. Journal of European Social Policy, 10(2), 146–161. Directorate General for Relations with Civil Society. (2020). Association statistics. https://www.siviltoplum.gov.tr/. Accessed 20 April 2020. Directorate General of Migration Management. (2020). Migration statistics. https://en.goc.gov.tr/. Accessed 30 April 2020.

156

M. F. AYSAN AND U. AYSAN

Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Esping-Andersen, G. (1999). Social foundations of post-industrial economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Esping-Andersen, G. (2009). Incomplete revolution: Adapting welfare states to women’s new roles. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Ferrera, M. (1996). The southern model of welfare in social Europe. Journal of European Social Policy, 6(1), 17–37. Gal, J. (2010). Is there an extended family of Mediterranean welfare states? Journal of European Social Policy, 20(4), 283–300. General Directorate of Budget and Fiscal Control. (2019). 2018 Budget overview. https://en.hmb.gov.tr/. Accessed 20 December 2019. Gough, I., Wood, G., Barrientos, A., Bevan, P., Room, G., & Davis, P. (2004). Insecurity and welfare regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America: Social policy in development contexts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hamzeh, A. (2001). Clientalism, Lebanon: Roots and trends. Middle Eastern Studies, 37 (3), 167–178. Ismael, J. S., & Ismael, S. T. (2008). Social policy in the Arab world: The search for social justice. Arab Studies Quarterly, 30(2), 23–44. Jawad, R. (2009). Social welfare and religion in the Middle East: A Lebanese perspective. Bristol: Policy Press. Kalleberg, A. L. (2000). Nonstandard employment relations: Part-time, temporary and contract work. Annual Review of Sociology, 26(1), 341–365. Kam, Y. W. (2012). The contributions of the health decommodification typologies to the study of the East Asian welfare regime. Social Policy & Administration, 46(1), 108–128. Karshenas, M., & Moghadam, V. M. (2009). Bringing social policy back in: A look at the Middle East and North Africa. International Journal of Social Welfare, 18, S52–S61. Lloyd-Sherlock, P. (2009). Social policy and inequality in Latin America: A review of recent trends. Social Policy & Administration, 43(4), 347–363. Ministry of National Education [MNE]. (2018). National education statistics: Formal education 2017–2018. Ankara. Mishra, R. (1999). Globalization and the welfare state. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing. O’Connor, J. (1973). The fiscal crisis of the state. London: St Martins Press. OECD. (1981). The welfare state in crisis. Paris: OECD. OECD. (2020). OECD statistics. https://stats.oecd.org/. Accessed 25 April 2020. Offe, C. (1984). Contradictions of the welfare state. London: Hutchinson Education.

7

INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUALS …

157

Orloff, A. (1996). Gender in the welfare state. Annual Review of Sociology, 22(1), 51–78. Ozbek, N. (1999). The politics of poor relief in the late Ottoman Empire 1876– 1914. New Perspectives on Turkey, 21, 1–33. Pierson, C. (2007). Beyond the welfare state? The new political economy of welfare. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press. Rifkin, J. (2004). The end of work (Rev. ed.). New York: Tarcher/Penguin. Ritzer, G. (1996). The McDonaldization thesis: Is expansion inevitable? International Sociology, 11(3), 291–308. Scruggs, L., & Allan, J. (2006). Welfare-state decommodification in 18 OECD countries: A replication and revision. Journal of European Social Policy, 16(1), 55–72. Seekings, J. (2005). Prospects for basic income in developing countries: A comparative analysis of welfare regimes in the South. Cape Town: University of Cape Town. Social Security Institution [SSI]. (2020). Annual social security statistics. http:// www.sgk.gov.tr/wps/portal/sgk/tr/kurumsal/istatistik. Accessed 20 April 2020. Tabakoglu, A., & Turan, M. (2017). Re-estimating the potential of zakat in Turkey. In A. Karaman (Ed.), Zakat in the past and present (pp. 899–936). Istanbul: Ensar Nesriyat. Titmuss, R. M. (1974). Social policy: An introduction. London: George Allen & Unwin. Trifiletti, R. (1999). Southern European welfare regimes and the worsening position of women. Journal of European Social Policy, 9(1), 49–64. TURKSTAT. (2018). Population projections, 2018–2080. TURKSTAT Bulletin no: 30567. http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=30567. Accessed 10 November 2018. TURKSTAT. (2020). Main statistics. http://www.turkstat.gov.tr. Accessed 10 April 2020. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR]. (2018). Global trends: Forced displacement in 2017 . https://www.unhcr.org/5b27be547.pdf. Accessed 5 December 2018. Walker, A., & Wong, C.K. (2005). Conclusion: From Confucianism to globalisation. In A. Walker and C. K. Wong (Eds.), East Asian welfare regimes in transition (pp. 213–224). Bristol: Policy Press.

CHAPTER 8

The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism: A Lesson from Algeria Walid Merouani

1

Introduction

Upon independence, Algeria inherited the French social protection system. It was Bismarckian-contributory, focusing only on the coverage of the workers and their families. The main aim of the Algerian government during the first years of post-independence was to support the social needs of the population. In order to do so, many social laws were introduced. Many non-contributory benefits became available to the Algerian population, some of which are universal and others which are target-based (means-tested). These initiatives provide a new pattern for the current Algerian social protection system. It has transformed from Bismarckian (corporatist) to a hybrid system containing all the components of welfare capitalism (Esping Andersen 1990). As universal components of the Algerian social protection system, health care and education are free for everyone. These

W. Merouani (B) University of Caen-Normandy, Caen, France Research Center in Applied Economics for Development, Algiers, Algeria © The Author(s) 2021 A. A. Tajmazinani (ed.), Social Policy in the Islamic World, International Series on Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57753-7_8

159

160

W. MEROUANI

programs are universal but really efficient as we will show in this article. At the same time, other programs (such as micro credits and temporary jobs) have been created to provide jobs to unemployed young people to assist them in entering the labor market. It is done as a residual-Liberal component of Algerian social protection so as to enable the young people to slowly become independent and have social protection without the help of the State. On the other hand, assistance programs are provided to the elderly, disabled and poor households that do not have any income. The social protection system keeps the corporatist component by providing social insurance for all categories of the working population. This last is covered against social risks through its affiliation to the different social insurance founds. The evolution of the Algerian social protection system is very noisy. Many social programs have been established since the nation gained its independence in 1962. The government has established these programs without being forward looking but simply according to the standard economic conjuncture. They are administered by different institutions, making the social protection system enormous, segmented and difficult to understand. Studies to this point have analyzed some segments of the Algerian social protection system separately. This paper will present a more global overview, including all the segments of the system; and according to the parameters of previous literature, we will define the system’s typology. Social protection systems as they are known today are simply the result of the evolution of the social contract as known first in the seventeenth century (Amarouche et al. 2007). This from beginning was linked to freedom, human rights and equality and was based on the fact that individual behaviors depend on a certain contract among citizens to form the society in which they live. This contract was used to minimize inequality between classes of the population and to recognize liberty for all people. It was the first time that nation states formally recognized the social rights of their citizens in Europe (Palier 1997). Two historical events are the most important in social protection history: Bismarck’s report in 1880 and the Beveridge report in 1940. The former was edited in Germany to reform social policy. Its aim was to support the working class population through the constitution of an insurance system that allowed for the mutualising of risk among workers. The report contained three major laws: for health care insurance,

8

THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM …

161

for workplace injury situations, and for disability and old age insurance. Bismarck established the first mandatory social insurance system—a system funded by workers’ contributions. The second important event in the history of social protection system was the social laws established by Beveridge in the United Kingdom (1941). His report, entitled “Social Insurance and Allied Services,” brought social lows aimed to provide “income maintenance” for all citizens in order to eliminate poverty. The universal system that has developed from the report is funded mainly by taxes and gives the same benefit to all citizens to insure equality between them. Since the appearance of these two social protection systems, many countries have recognized the need to protect their citizens against social risks. These two events had a significant effect on building different welfare state in Europe. They also were used to classify and characterize different social protection systems globally (Palier 1997). Nowadays, the Bismarckian system covers mainly the workers of a nation. Receiving benefits is conditioned on putting in a contribution. Benefits are proportional to income (contributive). The contributions are paid by the employees and the employers and everything is administered by representatives of employees and employers. On the other hand, the Beveridgian social protection system covers all citizens and benefits are paid out at flat rates. This system is funded mainly by taxes and is administered by the state. Palier (1997) showed that institutional analysis should classify social protection systems into three groups according to three parameters: the right to benefits (how can one get a benefit?), the formula of benefits and the way of funding the system. Esping Andersen (1990) presented the three ways of doing social protection. His study has been widely discussed in the last twenty years. Our paper tends to characterize the Algerian social protection system with regard to the Esping Andersen classification system. The aim of this classification is to better understand the Algerian social protection system and its evolving issues. Following this introduction, the second section will present a literature review on social protection system classification. The third section will analyze the Algerian social protection system, highlighting its three components. The fourth section will conclude the paper.

2

How to Do Social Protection

Many previous studies are based on the Esping Andersen classification (Palier and Bonoli 1995; Palier 1997; El Moudden and Dupuis

162

W. MEROUANI

2002; Elbaum 2008; Merouani et al. 2014). This section will present the postulate of Esping Andersen on how to do social protection. The author, in the intention to understand the various social programs, gave his own vision of the kinds of welfare States. He based his study on the parameters of “de-commodification”. This means the degree of market dependence on rights to benefit: “de-commodification” occurs when benefits are provided as a matter of right and individuals can maintain their livelihood independently of the market. Hence, Esping Andersen, based on the relation between state, market and family, distinguishes between three kinds of social protection system: the social democrat, the liberal and the corporatist system. However, Titmuss was the first one who talked about this trilogy in his books of social policy (1974). Leibfried (1993) made the same distinctions but with different names: modern for the social democrat system, institutional for the corporatist system and residual for the liberal system. 2.1

Liberal Welfare State

This system is characterized by means-tested assistance, modest universal transfers or a modest social insurance plan. Benefits concern mainly the low income class and entitlement rules to the system are strict and always associated to stigma. Benefits are usually modest, the state encourages the market, and the middle class have to court insurance companies to get social coverage. The state intervenes in social protection only if the market fails. This intervention is temporary, taking only the time necessary to help citizens and to teach them to cover themselves without state help. In this system, de-commodification is low. This model is used by the United States, Canada and Australia. 2.2

Corporatist Welfare State

Otherwise known as the conservative system, this was built to cater to the new “post industrial class structure.” Rights in this system are attached to class and status. Everything is under the tutelage of the state, and the insurance market plays a very marginal role. Corporatist regimes were typically administered by the church; hence, the preservation of familyhood is one of its objectives. Social benefits encourage motherhood and familial solidarity. The state will only intervene if the family’s capacity to

8

THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM …

163

serve its members fails. Nowadays, corporatist systems are used in Austria, France, Germany and Italy. 2.3

Social Democratic Welfare State

In this system, the principles of universalism and de-commodification are extended to all citizens. It tends to promote an equality of the highest standards (not an equality of minimum needs) between each working class. Benefits and services commensurate with income in the labor market. These characteristics make the program highly de-commodifying and universalistic. Manual laborers have the same benefits as highly qualified salaried workers. All strata are incorporated under one universal system. This system is independent of the market and creates solidarity in favor of a welfare state. All citizens receive benefits from the system and feel obligated to pay taxes. The social democratic system mobilizes both the market and the traditional family. Contrary to the corporatist system, it doesn’t wait for the failure of families to intervene, but it preemptively subsidizes the fees of family-hood. The welfare state also makes transfers to children and takes responsibility for caring for them in the same way it cares for the elderly and the underprivileged. The Scandinavian countries are typical examples of social democratic welfare states today. These three kinds of welfare states give three kinds of social security systems around the world. Palier and Bonoli (1995) summarize the different systems in the Table 1. The Table 1 shows how to link between the Esping Andersen typologies and the historical references of Bismarck and Beveridge. Reading this approach allows us to analyze global configurations and relieve the doctrinal characteristics of Algerian social protection system. The Algerian social protection system was built in 1949 under French control. It was corporatist, with a Bismarckian focus on French workers while Algerian workers were excluded from the system (MPAT 1980). After gaining independence in 1962, Algeria inherited the French system. However, the system is significantly changed nowadays, as it contains many programs it a hybrid of multiple philosophies. We will present the different components of the Algerian social protection system in the following section.

164

W. MEROUANI

Table 1

The three typologies of the welfare state

Geographical area Historical reference Objective

Entitlement principle Operating principle Benefits Funding Administration

Liberal

Corporatist

Social democratic

Anglo-Saxon Beveridge Poverty and unemployment deterrence Needs and poverty

Continental Bismarck Insure workers against social risks

Scandinavian Beveridge Income insurance and promote equality Citizenship

Target the poor Mean testing Taxes State

Social insurance Proportional to income Social contribution Workers or representatives of workers

Employment status

Universalism Flat rate benefits Taxes State

Source Palier (1997)

3

The Corporatist Components 3.1

Description

The corporatist component is made up of the insurance scheme of the workers in the labor market. It was created in 1949 to cover workers and their families against social risk. Nowadays, it is a Bismarckian corporatist system, composed of five funds that provide a retirement pension and insure against all social risks (sickness, maternity, accident or injury at work, death, disability and unemployment1 ) (CNAS 1997a). The National Insurance Fund for Salaried Workers (CNAS) administers the salaried employees’ benefits. Under this scheme, the contribution rate is 34.5% of salary. Social security contributions are due from employees and employers, the former paying 9%, the latter 25.5%. The CNAS recovers all contributions and allocates them to other funds: 18.25% goes to the National Retirement Fund (CNR); 1.5% to the National Unemployment Insurance Fund (CNAC); 13% to health insurance; 0.5% to early retirement; and 1.25 for occupational injury and illnesses (CNAS 1997b). The non-salaried workers (self-employed) and employers are entitled to national insurance found for non-salaried workers (CASNOS). The

1 Unemployment insurance only covers salaried workers with permanent contracts.

8

THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM …

165

contribution rate to this fund is 15% of annual income. The fund taxes a flat rate of 32,000 dinars if the self-employed don’t declare their income. Both salaried and non-salaried workers receive the almost the same benefits. However. Non-salaried workers are not eligible for work injury, sick and Maternity leave. Insured population receive preventive and curative health care, including ordinary medical care, dental care and hospital care. The CNAS and CASNOS reimburse 80% of pharmaceutical fees. In the case of an accident at work, the salaried worker is paid about 100% of his wage. Sickness benefit is about 50% of the daily salary if the illness lasts less than 15 days and 100% of the salary if it lasts more than 16 days. Maternity fees are supported 100% by social security, and mothers take seven weeks’ (98 days) maternity leave, receiving 100% of their income during this period. Disability benefits are accessible to workers who are incapacitated more than 50% of the time; in fact, disability benefits kick in after the sickness benefit period expires. Disability is classified into three categories: Category 1—the person is disabled but still able to work; Category 2—the person is completely disabled and cannot carry out work; Category 3—the person is completely disabled and furthermore needs another person to help accomplish the ordinary tasks of daily life. Pensions are specified for each category: the CNAS offers 60% of annual salary (subject to taxation) to workers in Category 1; 80% under the same conditions to those in the second category; and about 80% of the annual salary plus 40% for the person who assists the disabled individual for Category 3. The National Retirement Fund administers the retirement pension program for salaried employees. The legal age for retirement2 is 60 for men and 55 for women.3 Workers over 50 who lose their job for economic reasons can also demand early retirement (Merouani 2014). Pensions of non-salaried workers are administered by CASNOS. The legal age for retirement for this category of workers is 65 for men and 60 for women. For female salaried workers, the age of retirement decreases by one year for every childbirth, up to 3 children. 2 Some other forms of early retirement use to exist, but they were aborted in 2016. Indeed, before this date were able to retire regardless of age if they work and contribute to social security for 32 (unconditional age retirement). Also, worker of 50 years old (45 for women) who have contributed for 20 years (15 years for women), were eligible to propotional retirement. 3 This number decreases by one year for every child educated, to the limit of 3 children.

166

W. MEROUANI

The National Unemployment Insurance Fund administers unemployment benefits to salaried employees who lose their job involuntarily for economic reasons (downsizing or bankruptcy of the company). The National Social Security Fund for Non-wage Earners administers the social benefit program for non-wage earners. The contribution rate to this fund is 15% of the annual income of self-employed individuals. The fund insures the same risks as the CNAS and provides the same retirement pension to self-employed workers as salaried ones. However, accidents at work and family allowance benefits are not applicable to the self-employed. Besides these funds, a special fund exists for employees in the construction sector which insures paid leave and unemployment due to bad weather. Employers have to contribute 12.21% of the salary for paid leave and 0.75% (0.375% is supported by the salaried worker) for unemployment due to bad weather. In both situations, salaried workers receive 75% of their salary. 3.2

Some Statistics About the Corporatist Component

The national employment survey (National Office of Statistics, 2019) estimates that there are 11,281,000 workers in the labor market. Of those, 67.6% are salaried and are supposed to be entitled to the CNAS. Another 32.4% of workers are self-employed and/or employers. These individuals are supposed to be entitled to the non-wage insurance fund (CASNOS). As it stands today, many workers (40%) are not entitled to social security (Office of National Statistics, 2019. These workers could be covered by the other component of social protection system (residual component) if the target of the eligible population is not well done. This section presents some statistics about the balance of social insurance funds, which compile the corporatist component and the number of insured in each fund. The Fig. 1 shows the shortfall of the different funds of social security system. We can see that CACOBATH, CNR and CASNOS struggle greatly to reach equilibrium in their treasury. These funds could acquire more income if workers from the informal sector were somehow able to pay in their contribution. The CASNOS covers only 30% of the nonsalaried workers in the labor market (Labor force survey, ONS 2019). The CNR is at a deficit, especially these last years, because of its generous payouts. Pensions are calculated proportionally to the reference wage, the latter equaling the mean of the best five lifetime wages of an active laborer.

8

THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM …

167

2,00,000 0 2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

-2,00,000 -4,00,000 CNAS

CNR

CASNOS

CNAC

CACOBATH

Fig. 1 The balance of the different social security funds (millions of dinars) (Source ONS [multiple years])

The replacement rate can reach 80% of the reference wage, presenting a clear moral hazard. People under-declare their salary at the beginning of their active life and increase their income in the last five years of work when retirement comes closer. CACOBATH tends to cover the workers of the construction sector–the hardest sector to manage. The employment survey shows that the social coverage rate in the construction sector is only about 20% (ONS 2016), meaning the rest of the 80% of the workers in this sector constitute potential income to CACOBATH. The CNAC seems to be in excess of its treasury. This fund was created in 1994 to face unemployment caused by the structural adjustment program imposed by the international monetary fund. Many public firms were closed and employees lost their jobs for economic reasons. Nowadays, unemployment insurance only covers salaried workers with permanent contracts, who are less likely to lose their job anyway. It’s worth noting also that the expenditures of CNAC tend toward zero. Finally, we mention that CNAC has administered a program of aiding the unemployed between 30 and 50 years old toward creation of their own firms since 2003. We will come back to this program later when we talk about the residual component of the social protection system. It is well known that the Algerian economy is characterized by the high presence of the informal sector. As mentioned, workers in this sector are not necessarily affiliated with the social security system. This makes the demography of the labor market very different from the demography of the social security system. We have many less insured than we have workers. The Fig. 2 shows the level of social coverage of the workers with respect to their status at work. The social coverage rate presents the number of workers that contribute to the social insurance system divided by the total number of workers.

168

W. MEROUANI

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

Employers and self employed

Salaried workers

Family help

Poly. (Employers and self employed)

Poly. (Salaried workers)

Poly. (Family help)

Fig. 2 The percentage of active occupied covered by social security (by employment status) (Source ONS [multiple years]. Labor Force Surveys)

Figure 2 shows the very low social coverage of the employed population. The self-employed are especially associated with this issue, with only 32% of them covered against social risks in 2014. Meanwhile, 28% of salaried workers are not covered by the social security system at all in 2014. The data for more recent year are not available by categories of workers however the aggregate data shows that only 58% of the total occupied population are affiliate to social security in 2019 (Labor force survey, ONS 2019). The corporatist component of the social protection system has the puzzle of the informal economy that has persisted since the beginning of the ’90s. Informal workers don’t pay their social contribution but can benefit from the universalist component (see the social democrat component below) of the system. The corporatist component seems to offer insurance against all social risks for all categories of the working population. These allow us to conclude the following: the low rate of social coverage is due to the low demand for insurance from the employed population. The government has to think about how to extend social security to informal workers. There are many success stories regarding extending social security to all that have been observed in developing countries.

8

THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM …

169

We propose below some reforms that could be worth testing in the Algerian labor market. First of all, convincing informal workers to ask for social insurance will happen through knowing the determinants of demand for said insurance. Conducting leading surveys on informal laborers to know their characteristics and their behavior with respect to social insurance will be the first step toward doing this in the case of Algeria. There are some clear inefficiencies when we analyze the social security system. We can see that the system doesn’t cover healthcare in the private sector while the supply of health care in the public sector is still very low. This can be seen for example with the long lines waiting in the public hospital emergency rooms (Zehnati and Peyron 2013). In addition, social insurance is a merit good (Kessler 1986); people don’t necessarily know the utility of consuming it. Their preference for the present and their myopia don’t help them to think about covering themselves against future risk (old age, sickness…etc). Proposing immediate benefits like child care may incentivize people to demand social insurance. Family allowance could be one of the immediate benefits. Extending this type of benefit to the self-employed (CASNOS) could encourage demand for social insurance by this category of workers. Doing exactly this in Chile brought significantly more self-employed into their system (Calvo et al. 2010). The low demand for insurance is also caused by low confidence in institutions. Developing an insurance market could be one of the solutions for extending social security to informal workers. This solution was tested in India and some important conclusions were made: social insurance can in fact be offered to and accepted by informal workers when it is brought to their doorstep. Insurance companies could develop the mechanisms for collecting premiums and serving benefits that meet the needs of the informal working class.

4 The Liberal Residual Component of the Algerian Social Protection System The liberal component, or “residual” as Titmuss has called it, of the Algerian social protection system is made up of different employment programs that are offered to unemployed young people. At the beginning of the 2000s, an increase in oil prices put the Algerian government in a favorable situation. As a result, it invested in active social policy. The government instituted many programs to create wage employment and to help create firms for self-employed individuals by providing micro

170

W. MEROUANI

credit. These programs are the liberal–residual because they only target the residual active population that fails to integrate into the labor market. The state intervenes temporarily to teach the population how to integrate into the market. Employment programs were administered by the ministry of labor, employment and social security and by the ministry of solidarity and family and women’s issue. This section presents the different programs and links between them. 4.1

Program for Professional Integration (DAIP)

The Program for Professional Integration (DAIP) brought about by law 4.19 regarding employment regulation in December 2004. It is administered by the national agency for employment (ANEM) under the tutelage of the ministry of labor, of employment and social security. It targets young (18–35 years old) unemployed individuals that are seeking jobs for the first time. It aims to allow them to obtain a job in the public or private sector of the economy. Their wage is totally supported by the state. This program targets many categories of unemployed youth according to their education: 4.1.1 Program for Graduate Integration (CID) The CID targets the new unemployed graduates of universities or national institutes for professional training. The salary of this category of workers is 15,000 Dinars per month for graduates who have more than 16 years of education and 10,000 dinars per month for those who did their training at an institute for professional training (superior technicians). The contract duration is one year in the economic sector and can last for a half year more in public administration. 4.1.2 Program for Professional Integration (CIP) The CIP targets the youth who leave secondary school without any further studies at a university. It also targets young people who have done internships in different firms. The state gives 8000 Dinars of wages per month for this category of workers. The duration of the contract is one year and is renewable. 4.1.3 Program for Integration with Training (CFI) The CFI targets youth without any qualification. This category of workers is placed in firms to learn by doing. The individuals receive a monthly

8

THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM …

171

allocation of 6000 DA. The duration of the contract is one year on a renewable basis also. 4.1.4 Program for Helping Employment (CTA) This program is proposed for workers of the three pervious programs. In this program, the entitled individual will get higher wage. This later is supported by the state and employers for 3 years.. After the third year, the employer will support alone the wage. The amount that stat supports is similar to the amount in the program supra. Actually only the duration of contact changes (3 years rather than one year) As we can see DAIP constitutes a real opportunity for unemployed young people to integrate into the labor market. Besides these programs administered by the agency for national employment, the Agency for Social Development (ADS)4 administers other programs for improving the employment of the disadvantaged population. These programs are quite similar to those administered by the ANEM. 4.2

ADS’ Programs for Helping Professional Integration

The ministry of solidarity uses the Agency for Social Development (ADS) to improve the employment of the disadvantaged. This agency administers the following programs. 4.2.1 Program for Graduate Integration (PID) This program was called CPE (contrat prè-emploi) before 2009. Its aim is to employ unemployed graduates (19–35 years old) and allow them to get experience while improving their employability and making a statesupported wage. The monthly wage is 10,000 DA for university graduates and 8000 Da for graduates from the professional training centers. The duration of the contract is one year and is renewable. In the Table 2 are some statistics about the program. The Table 2 shows the quantity of temporary employment created by the PID program and the proportion that becomes permanent. The number of the jobs increases every year. It moved from 7054 in 1998 to 53,883 in 2011 but fall these last years because of the austerity policy adopted since the downsize of oil prices in 2014. This means that there 4 This agency exercise under the tutelage of ministry of solidarity, of family and woman’s issue.

172

W. MEROUANI

Table 2

The number of employment created under PID

Program

Quota

Employment created

Rate

Renewed contract

Confirmed contract

Confirmation rate

CPE 1998 CPE 1999 CPE 2000 CPE 2001 CPE 2002 CPE 2003 CPE 2004 CPE 2005 CPE 2006 CPE 2007 CPE 2008 CPE 2009 PID 2010 PID 2011 PID 2014 PID 2016

7054 14,006 11,543 6694 4683 8078 53,185 55,616 41,522 62,138 59,908 22,276 53,916 53,883 − −

7054 14,006 11,543 6694 4683 8017 55 550 54,976 41,376 62,467 57,293 14,689 48,843 44,626 54,000 33,879

100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 99.2% 104.4% 98.8% 99.6% 100.5% 95.6% 65.9% 90.6% 82.8% − −

0 0 0 0 0 3177 38,676 34,223 26,023 44,249 36,821 9371 28,853 24,379 43,200 30,000

1080 1664 2565 956 812 1175 3200 4187 2292 2264 2247 151 1004 530 1659 −

15.3% 11.9% 22.2% 14.3% 17.3% 14.7% 5.8% 7.6% 5.5% 3.6% 3.9% 1.0% 2.1% 1.2% 3.8% −

Source Agence de development Social (ADS) (multiple years)

are more and more graduate students from the university, but the market can’t employ them. Column five of the table shows the number of jobs renewed. The latter is significant in that it means that state intervention lasts for some time (more than one year). The last column of the table shows the number of the jobs that have been confirmed in the labor market. This confirmation rate is still low, meaning the program hasn’t really reached its objective. 4.2.2 Program for Help to Social Integration (DAIS) DAIS was created in 2009, but it existed under the name “Local Seasonal Employment Initiative” (ESIL) beginning in 1999. Nowadays, it targets the unemployed with no qualifications who leave school early. Beneficiaries of this program are placed in firms. Their monthly wage (6000 DA) is supported by the state. The duration of the contract is two years and is twice renewable. The Table 3 shows the quantity of jobs created by ADS in the period 1999 to 2016. The second column of the table shows the number of jobs allocated by the finance ministry (state budget). The third column

8

Table 3 The number of the employment created in the DAIS program

THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM …

Program ESIL 1999 ESIL 2000 ESIL 2001 ESIL 2002 ESIL 2003 ESIL 2004 ESIL 2005 ESIL 2006 ESIL 2007 ESIL 2008 ESIL 2009 DAIS 2010 DAIS 2011 DAIS 2012 DAIS 2014 DAIS 2015 DAIS 2016

173

Quota

Employment created by year

Rate

79,000 72,500 89,000 70,500 72,500 70,750 62,581 104,408 126,266 139,060 143,414 90,000 93,800 284,000 − − −

79,000 72,500 89,000 70,500 72,500 70,750 62,581 104,408 126,266 132,484 143,414 90,002 93,159 243,877 9976 10,530 9035

100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 95.27% 100.00% 100.00% 99.32% 85.87% – – –

Source Agence de Développement Social (ADS) (multiple years)

shows the employment created. We can see that the level of employment increased every year, however, it decreased significantly after 2014 because of the economic crises in Algeria. 4.2.3 White Algeria (BA) BA consists of the creation of small firms performing easy tasks like cleaning street and paint public infrastructures. One of the workers leads the project to initiate him into management skills needed for owning his own firm in the future. The other workers are wage workers. Their salary is equaled to SNMG.5 Projects last for three months with the possibility of renewal three times. 4.2.4

Project for Public Utility with High Intensity of Labor (TUPHIMO) The aim of TUPHIMO is to create mass temporary employment and to encourage entrepreneurship. It consists of giving a young potential entrepreneur a project to lead along with 60% of the project’s cost, which must be distributed to payroll. The salaried workers of the project receive 5 Minimum national income granted. It is situated since 2012 at 18,000 DA.

174

W. MEROUANI

the SNMG monthly. The projects consist usually of rehabilitating public infrastructures and or completing something similar with high utility for the economy. 4.2.5

Indemnity of Participating for General Interest Activity (IAIG) IAIG was created in 1994 and has been administered by the ADS since 1997. Its aim is the social integration of disadvantaged individuals of working age and capability. It involves very small projects for the rehabilitation of infrastructure, in the field of textiles, and for the assistance of the elderly, among others. One of the candidates leads the project and receives 1200 Dinars more per month than other salaried employees’ indemnity. The standard employees make about 3000 dinars. Candidates are covered by social security for heath care, work injury and maternity. The state supports their social contribution, and they are not covered against retirement. 4.2.6 Flat Rate Solidarity Allocation (AFS) This allocation is provided by the ADS for the disadvantaged household and for persons who live with some kind of chronic disease and who have low income. The allocation amount is 4000 Dinars per month. The programs below have cost the state 308 billion dinars since 1997. The Table 4 shows the structure of state expenditures on the ADS programs. Table 4 shows the evolution of expenditures on programs for helping with professional integration. These expenditures have increased for all the programs. The table clearly shows the decrease of the Programs shown above are accompanied by social insurance. The state supports the social contribution of all entitled individuals of the programs. Hence, workers are not covered for retirement. This is the first inefficiency of the liberal residual component. Additionally, the remunerations are very low compared to the mean wage of the national economy, which is around 32,000 DA according to the ONS. Also, we found that targeting beneficiaries is not efficient. The informal economy doesn’t allow for the genuine testing of individuals’ financial means. Many informal workers that earn a high income are entitled to these programs because they have no document proving their income. There is no deep evaluation of these programs to assess their true efficiencies.

8

Table 4

THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM …

175

Employment programs cost (in billion dinars)

PROGRAMS

IAIG

ESIL/DAIS

CPE/PID

TUP-HIMO

Blanche Algérie

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2013 2014 2015 2016

4.28 4.99 5.20 5.04 5.80 6.73 7.34 7.94 8.09 9.58 11.60 11.99 11.71 12.23 12.24 − − − −

0.00 0.00 2.40 2.00 2.40 2.19 2.25 2.26 2.01 3.35 4.05 4.43 4.60 15.60 10.84 39.65 39.65 39.73 28.62

0.00 0.28 1.62 0.91 0.45 0.30 0.61 7.77 8.34 5.82 9.51 8.83 3.26 10.43 9.12 − 8.99 − 5.02

1.18 1.34 1.58 0.04 2.62 3.82 3.18 2.82 1.64 3.81 3.95 3.01 3.24 3.08 5.82 − 3.31 −

0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.39 1.48 2.17 1.53 1.85 2.16 7.66 − 16.12 −

21.04

Source ADS (multiple years) and ONS (multiple years)

4.3

Programs of Promoting Enterprise Creation

Besides this program of improving salaried employment, the state developed many programs for issuing micro credit. The aim of these programs is to promote the creation of new firms and to increase economy growth. We provide a short description of them below. 4.3.1

Program of the National Agency for Supporting Youth Employment (ANSEJ) ANSEJ is under the oversight of the ministry of labor, employment and social security. It targets unemployed young people between 19 and 35 years old. Investment credit is expected to create three or more permanent jobs. The credit is offered to a person with the qualifications suitable for the business being created, and the amount of credit can reach 5 billion dinars or more. Because ANSEJ projects are supposed to create work opportunities, we examine some statistics regarding the number

176

W. MEROUANI

Table 5 Number of ANSEJ projects 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Projects funded

Jobs created

Jobs per project

86,380 10,634 20,848 22,641 42,832 65,812 43,039 40,856 23,676 11,262

243,308 31,418 57,812 60,132 92,682 129,203 96,233 93,140 51,570 22,766

2.82 2.95 2.77 2.66 2.16 1.96 2.24 2.27 2.17 2.02

Source ONS (multiple years)

of projects funded by ANSEJ and the employment that was created (Table 5). In examining the funded projects in the ANSEJ program it seems that the objective of creating three jobs for each project is not reached. In reality the total fell from 2.82 jobs per project in 2007 to 2.17 in 2015. It is also worth notice the fall of the number of funded project after 2014 which is due to the fall of oil prices. 4.3.2

Program of the National Insurance Fund for Unemployment (CNAC) As we mention in the last section, CNAC was created in 1994 to slow the unemployment increase that was happening at that time. Since 2004 CNAC has managed a new program for helping to create business activity. It targets the unemployed between 35–50 years old (30–50 in 2010). The beneficiaries can get investment amounting to 10 million dinars to create their activity or to improve it if they already run a firm. This credit is refundable at a subsidized interest rate (and is sometimes interest-free). 4.3.3

Program of the National Agency for Micro-Credit (ANGEM) ANGEM exercises under the umbrella of the ministry of solidarity, family and women’s issues. It targets the unemployment at any age and any qualification. It allows individuals micro credit of 30,000–1,000,000 dinars. The eligibility conditions are the following: being unemployed, place of residence, no affiliation with social security, and presentation of a business

8

Table 6

THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM …

177

Employments funded by ANGEM micro-credit

Industry Number of employments created Number of funded projects Employment by project

Agriculture

Very small Construction manufacturing

Services

Craft

Trade

120,914

258,338

60,482

153,638

132,966

248

80,609

172,225

40,321

102,423

88,644

167

1.50

1.50

1.50

1.50

1.50

1.49

Source ANGEM (2015)

proposal. ANGEM studies the efficiency of the project and then decides whether or not to give the candidate microcredit. In 2012, ANGEM funded 484,389 projects. The number of jobs created by project and by industry are presented in Table 6. The number of jobs created is almost the same in all industries. 1,5 jobs are created for each project on average (ANGEM 2015). This number is still not enough when the amount of credit is quite high (1,000,000 DA). The programs above show the effort that the state has made to counteract youth unemployment. These programs have successfully decreased the unemployment rate but their efficacy is still unknown. Many beneficiaries don’t repay their loans (for ANGEM, for example, only 65% of the beneficiaries repaid their credit in 2012), and no evaluation has been completed to know the impact of these programs. There is no accountability for the beneficiaries after they get their loan, and some of them don’t even end up requesting social insurance.

5 Universalist Component: Healthcare and Education Healthcare system and education are free for everyone in Algeria. At the independence in 1962, big part of the population wasn’t educated. Among the principle government’ objectives was to promote education of the population. In 1974 health becomes free to all. Nowadays everybody have right to go get health care for free in the public hospital.

178

W. MEROUANI

5.1

Education System in Algeria

Education is administered by three ministries: the national education ministry, the ministry of high education and scientific research and the ministry of education and professional training. The law makes the education mandatory between 6 and 19 years old. The education is organized in three cycles (1) five years of education in the primary school (2) four years of education in the middle school and (3) three years of education in the secondary school. In the third year of secondary school. Students take the baccalaureate exam which allow them to access to university/ enter university. The number of student in the primary school in 2011/2012 is estimated at 3,429,361 students (where 47% are females). While the number of teachers is 146,185 (ONS, Algeria in some numbers). That to say a teacher for each 24 students. In middle school, the number of students in 2011/2012 is 2,921,331. While the number of teachers is 142,132. That to say which means a teacher for every 21 students. In secondary school, the number of students is estimated at about 1,263,785. The number of teachers is 80,040. That to say a teacher for each 16 students. The sector of high education receives the student who passed the baccalaureate exam in the end of the secondary school, the number of student at university in 2011/2012 are about 1,090,592 in graduate level and 64,212 post graduate students. The number of teachers at the university is 46,454. Beside the university there is university of continued training (UFC) for people who don’t get access to university. The number of student in UFC in 2011/2012 is 77,128, while the number of teachers is 883, that to say one teacher for 93 student. The expenditures of the state in education are estimated about 34 Milliard of dinars in 2013. That to say 2.02% of GDP are affected to the education sector (Finance ministry). The main fees that State supports are student restoration (51% of total expenditures). Allocations for helpless student’ (27% of total expenditures) and the state’ contributions to buy books for student (19% of total expenditures). The statistic on education system in Algeria seems to be quite good. The schooling rate of the population 6–16 is 97%. The 3% of the rest are sick, handicapped or live very far from the school (CREAD 2015). We have more graduate student, but there is not much evaluation of education system’ efficiency. The education is not connected to the labor market. Many graduate of university are unemployed. The number of students is very high in the field of human and social sciences. Labor market selects other fields like computer sciences and medicine.

8

THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM …

5.2

179

Healthcare System

the Algerian health system was treated in many previous studies (Kaddar 1989, 1990; Oufriha 2006; Zehnati and Peyron 2013), it is one of the political instruments of the welfare stat: government use it like a tool to get the confidence of population. Article 54 of Algerian constitution stipulate: “all citizens have right to healthcare. State supports their protection and struggle for fighting the epidemic and endemic diseases ”. Heath law describe national health system as “the different activities, human resources, material and financial means used to: protect, promote, improve, evaluate, to survey, maintaining and restoring of population’ health”. The health system had known many reforms since the independence. Today, it exercises under the tutelage of ministry of health, of population and hospital reforms. It is organized through many structures: 198 public hospital institutions (EPH). 14 University hospital centers (CHU). 64 specialized hospital institutions. It is also composed by 271 public institutions for community care (EPSP). These later contain: 1491 polyclinic, 5350 care room and 431 public maternities. There is big inequality in distribution of these institutions on around the country (Zenhati and Peyron 2013). The author uses the health ministry data to show the disparities of distribution of doctors around the Algerian territory. Specialist doctors are more concentrated in the north. Algiers contains the biggest number of healthcare institution and specialist doctors. South region have a flagrant deficit of specialist doctors. Health expenditures to GDP are presented in the Fig. 3 The Fig. 3 shows the increase in health expenditure over the twenty last years. It goes from 3.7% in 1995 to 6.76% of the GDP in 2015. Increasing in the expenditure explains the increase in the medical demography and costly diseases. These expenditures don’t necessarily make the health care system efficient. Many imperfections should to be reviewed in the Algerian healthcare system. The far distance between hospital and population who live in the south make healthcare costly. The concentration of all hospitals in Algiers can’t support all sick and make the waiting for doing medical analysis (radiation therapy) very long. This makes people go to the private sector where health cost so expensive. Social security doesn’t reimburse the fees of healthcare in the private sector. It’s necessary today, for the state, to control private sector and link it to social security. It’s is intolerant to pay contribution to social security but without getting indemnities when I care in the private sector.

180

W. MEROUANI

8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Fig. 3 Health expenditures (% GDP) (Source The World Bank [2020]. https:// data.worldbank.org/indicator)

Beside health and education for all, Stat subsidize the price of many products. The price of the alimentary product called “product of first necessity” like milk, sugar and vegetable oil. State subsidies also prices of electricity and carburant. The consumer buys these products paying less than its real price. Furthermore, it is worth to notice that the housing policy is playing, nowadays, an influential role in improving wellbeing of the Algerian population. Many housing policies targeting several categories of population are launched. The Algerian government has provided 3.6 million houses since 1999 according to the Ministry of housing. However, 68% of the built houses are social housing (LPL6 and LR7 ) targeting poor population. As we can see, the universalist component described above is characterized by high level of ‘decommodificaion’. People can benefit from it regardless to their participation in the labor market. This component had to be improved to allow to all to benefit from its services for free. Actually, the supply of health and education seems to be very dispersed 6 Logement publique locatif (30%) (Public Rent Housing) 7 Logement Ruraux (38%) (Rural Housing).

8

THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM …

181

between regions. Some region in Algeria are situated very far from healthcare’ and education’ institutions. Otherwise, in some region, even if the infrastructure exists, doctors and teachers are missing. State have to do more effort to resolve those problem of spatial’ inequality and efficiency of the universalist component of social protection system.

6

The Religious Component

This section is an attempt to highlight a religious component of social protection in Algeria. It has already been shown that religion (Islam) is important in Algerian’s everyday life (Merouani 2015). DDSS survey8 shows that 90% of respondents declare religion is important when it comes to make economic decision. This survey shows also that 65% of the population don’t demand for credit from the banks because interest rate is banned by religion. Furthermore, 15% of respondents in this survey believe that participation to social security system is illicit with respect to Islamic religion. Sahwa9 survey has also shown a similar result with regard to the importance of religion for the Algerian population. In the other hand, Algerian government adopt Islamic religion as the religion of the state (Article 2, Algerian constitution), however it does not use it to launch social policies. Most of social policies (especially social security laws) were inherited from the French colonization. Since the independency in 1962, the Algerian government has tried to improve and modify these social policies so that they can suit the population needs and behaviors. However, it worth noticing one interesting component of social solidarity in Algeria which is the “Zakat”. It is unanimously agreed by Muslims that Zakat is the third pillar of Islam. Zakat is an amount of money taken every year from rich Muslims when their wealth exceeds the minimum threshold (Nissab) and then given to poor Muslims to address poverty related problem and also unemployment problem, hence it contributes to achieves social and economic objectives Djaghballou et al. (2018). Zakat in Algeria is administered by the Ministry of religious affairs and Waqf through its “Zakat fund” that make the legitimate

8 Determinants of demand for Social Security (DDSS) see Merouani (2015). 9 SAHWA is EU project, on youth empowerment, conducted in five Arabic countries

(Algeria, Egypt, Morocco Lebanon and Tunisia). www.sahwa.eu.

182

W. MEROUANI

mediator between the giver and the recipient of Zakat. The literature evaluating the efficiency of the Zakat fund argue that the fund could do better in term of social assistance reducing poverty and reducing unemployment (Bin-Mansour and Bezzaouyaa 2012). One of the reasons of this lack of efficiency is the mistrust of people in the government and its institutions, hence givers of Zakat prefer look themselves for the needy population and give them the zakat instead of contributing to the Zakat fund administered by the state.

7

Conclusion

This article highlighted the global characteristics of Algerian social protection system. It is based on Esping Andersen’ classification. Knowing its main characteristics, we show that the Algerian system is hybrid with respect to Esping Andersen. We presented the three worlds of the Algerian social protection system. The corporatist world is presented by social insurance system of the workers. This system is not open for the unemployed and inactive population who don’t participate in the labor market because they can’t pay their premium. It is lowly de-commodifying. These unemployed are covered by the liberal-residual component. Many programs targeting youth unemployed are exposed in this chapter. State intervention in this case is supposed to be temporary. This chapter shows that it is not always true, many contracts had been renewed two or three times. The remuneration of the workers of these programs is still low and do not allow to entitled to go out of poverty. Adding to wages, the beneficiaries get social security coverage. But this coverage is limited to healthcare, maternity and work injury. Furthermore, some beneficiaries from the ADS programs (13% in 2015) still not untitled to social security at all. Any forward-looking workers need to be entitled to retirement system. There are many eligible candidates that don’t get benefit from this employment programs because of the limited number of the positions provided by finance ministry. The target of eligible population should be reviewed. Some unemployed need benefit of employment program more than others. The informal sector can hide the real means of candidates. Many candidates have comfortable informal income but they subscribe to employment programs. In the other side some other candidates who haven’t any income don’t get access to the employment program because of the limited available positions. Otherwise, employment programs are

8

THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM …

183

quite similar, but their administration is shared between ministry of solidarity and the ministry of labor. Even the remunerations are not the same. These make the system more complicated and spread inequality between unemployed with equal qualification. This chapter exhibits education’ and healthcare’ systems. They form the main part of the social-democrat component (universalist) of the Algerian welfare state. These two systems are open to all regardless to the participation to the labor market. Hence, inequality to access to these services occurs when the hospital or the school is far from residence of population. Algerian social protection system seems to cover all categories of population and nobody left behind. Hence, some components of the system still are inefficient and must be improved. Three lesson of welfare capitalism (Esping Andersen and Pallier 2008) are recommended for states: to provide a good familial social policy, to invest in child and take care about elderly. Algeria may adopt these three recommendations. The Algerian social protection system had to improve its family policy. Currently, family allowances are funded by state budget and administered by CNAS. Only the salaried workers can benefit from the family allowances. The extension of family allowances to self-employed is necessary. It can provide more equity between the members of society. The state budget for family allowances is an investment more than expenditures. The family policy can be improved by improving child care. Social protection system can take care of the children less than 3 years old. This can allow mothers to work. Esping-Andersen shows that this policy allows state to get more taxes from working mothers. These taxes are more important that the expenditures on child care. The work of women is a supplement income for the household. It decreases the poverty of society and avoids potential expenditures of the state to take care of poor. Invest in education: Algeria has improved, during these last years, education system. The schooling rate increases significantly; the number of scalarized children at primary and medium school (5–16 years old) increased from 6.2 million in 2013 to 6.7 million in 2016 (ONS 2016). Nowadays, state has to improve the quality of the school. Students have to reach high levels of education and don’t leave the school early. Population with high level of education is more likely to be productive. And get stable working life. This latter has an impact on retirement system. The old age pension of who get stable working life is more adequate and allowing to its owners to live easy in dignity. This can eradicate poverty of the elderly.

184

W. MEROUANI

References Agence de Développement Sociale (ADS). (1997–2016). Rapports annuels. Agence National de Gestion de Micro Crédit (ANGEM). (2015). Rapports annuels. Amarouche, A., Boussaid, A., Bensaber, A., Belkacem Nacer, A., & Illès, A. (2007). La question des retraites en Algérie, état des lieux et perspectives. Rapport CNEPRU N° M1613/04/2005. Bin-Mansour, A., & Bezzaouyaa, A. (2012, June 19 and 20). Evaluation study of the experience of Zakat Fund in Algeria. The First International Scientific Conference on: Promoting the Zakat Funds and Means of Activating it in the Islamic World. Calvo, E., Bertranou, F., & Bertranou, E. (2010). Are old-age pension system reforms moving away from individual retirement accounts in Latin America?. Journal of Social Policy, 39(2), 223–234. CREAD. (2015). Evaluation de la cohérence du système algérien de protection sociale. Rapport non publié. CNAS. (1997a). Ce que vous devez savoir sur l’assurance décès, assurance maternité, assurance maladie et assurance invalidité. Document administratif. CNAS. (1997b). L’assujettissement en matière de sécurité sociale, direction des études statistiques et de l’organisation. Document administratif. Conseil National Economique et Social. (2001, 22/23 juillet). 18ème Session Plénière. Evolution des systèmes de protection sociale, perspectives, conditions et modalités permettant d’assurer leur équilibre financier. Djaghballou, C., Djaghballou, M., Larbani, M., & Mohamad, A. (2018). Efficiency and productivity performance of zakat funds in Algeria. International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management, 11(3), 474–494. EL Moudden, C., & Dupuis J. M. (2002). Economie des retraites. Economica. Elbaum, M. (2008), Economie politique de la protection sociale. Paris: 1ère édition, PUF. Esping Andersen, G. (1990). The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Cambridge: Policy Press. Esping Anderson, G., & Palier, B. (2008). Trois leçon sur l’Etat providence, seuil, coll «la république des idée», 200/, 134p., EAN: 9782020970983. Kaddar, M. (1989). Les rapports entre la sécurité sociale et le système de soins en Algérie. Cahier du CREAD, N°19. Kaddar, M. (1990). Sécurité sociale et contrainte de financement en Algérie : données et problèmes actuels. Cahier du CREAD, N°22. Kessler, D. (1986). Sur les fondements économiques de la sécurité sociale. Revue Française des Affaires Sociales, 1. Leibfried. (1993). Toward an European welfare state? In C. Jones (Ed.), New perspectives on the welfare state in Europe (pp. 133–115). Londres: Routledge.

8

THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM …

185

Merouani, W. (2014). Modélisation des dépenses et recettes du système algérien des retraites. Sarrebruck: éditions universitaires européennes. Merouani, W. (2015). Les déterminants microéconomiques de la demande d’assurance sociale : enquête auprès de la population occupée en Algérie. Thèse de doctorat soutenu à l’université de Caen-Normandie. UFR science économique et de gestion. Merouani, W., Hammouda, N., & El Moudden, C. (2014). Le système algérien de protection sociale entre bismarckien et beverdgien. Les cahiers du CREAD, N°107–108. MPAT. (1980). Le système algérien de sécurité sociale. Minsitére du Plan et de l’Amnagement du Tiritoire. Internal document. Office of National Statistics (ONS). (2007–2016). Algérie en Quelques Chiffre. Office of National Statistics (ONS). (2009–2019). Labor Force Survey. Oufriha, F. Z. (2006). Le système de santé à la croisé des chemins. CREAD, Alger. Palier, B. (1997). Les évolutions des systèmes de protection sociale en Europe et en France: une perspective institutionnelle comparée. Pouvoir, 82, 147–166. Palier, B., & Bonoli, G. (1995). Entre bismarck et beveridge: crise de la sécurité sociale et politique. Revue française de science politique, 4, 668–699. The World Bank. (2020). Share of health expenditure in the GDP. https://data. worldbank.org/indicator. Titmuss, R. (1974). Social policy. Londres: Allen & Unwin. Zehnati, A., & Peyron, C. (2013). Les raisons de la double activité des médecins : le cas de l’Algérie. Maghreb – Machrek, 217 (3), 89–112.

CHAPTER 9

The Effects of Social Protection on Informal Employment: Evidence from Tunisia Nidhal Ben Cheikh and Jean Yves Moisseron

1

Introduction

For a long time, there have been many spates of economic investigations on the determinants of informal employment in the Middle Eastern and North African Countries (MENA) and what role has been played by social insurance schemes in curbing informality among workers. It is worth noting from the outset of this research that informal employment or labor informality are defined by the lack of payment of social security coverage (usually understood as social insurance covering all benefit schemes mainly pensions) which clearly captures the vulnerability associated with informal employment. Indeed, many recent studies indicate that many countries in the MENA region rank among the most informal countries in the world (Chen and Harvey 2017; Gatti et al. 2013). The extent of informality in labor markets in the MENA region is well depicted by the stylized facts highlighted in the report by Gatti et al. (2013). In fact, more than two-thirds of all workers in the region are not contributing to a pension system,

N. Ben Cheikh (B) · J. Y. Moisseron Université de Paris - CESSMA (UMR 245), Paris, France © The Author(s) 2021 A. A. Tajmazinani (ed.), Social Policy in the Islamic World, International Series on Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57753-7_9

187

188

N. BEN CHEIKH AND J. Y. MOISSERON

which is a corollary of a lack of income security upon retirement. This situation is all the more problematic as the majority of MENA countries devote a significant share of their GDP to social protection expenditure (Loewe 2014). However, there is a wide disparity in the legal coverage of workers by social insurance schemes. In this regard, Tunisia has long been portrayed as one of the few countries in the MENA area endowed with an effective social protection system providing legal coverage for almost the entirety of the employed population, taking over almost the majority of the risks mentioned in the 102 ILO Convention (1952) pertaining to minimum standards of social security. Effective performances have been achieved in terms of horizontal extension of the legal coverage of social security for a large part of the socio-professional categories. The pension schemes created in a gradualist approach (Ginneken 2003) were supposed to take into account both the contributory capacities of potential affiliates, as well as different kinds of job they held. However, the rate of the people actually covered by social security systems has always been below the rates of legal coverage which indicates that a part of the workers still remain uncovered by a social security system (Chaabane 2002), hence their informality. On the other hand, levels of labor informality in Tunisia are reported to have increased after 2011 due to economic difficulties and the weakening of the state. Indeed, the size of informal economy and the extent of informal employment have become a major topic of public policy discussion, particularly since 2011 following what is known as the “The Revolution of 14th January”. More recently, the response of social protection policies to the recent COVID-19 outbreak pointed to the need to focus on identifying informal workers living in urban areas who would be most affected by the impact of containment measures (Rutkowski 2020). For all these reasons, the case of Tunisia would be very relevant for the analysis of workers’ informal behaviour in relation to the social protection system and its two components, contributory and non-contributory. This chapter endeavours to answer three central questions. The first concerns the efforts that have been made by the public authorities in Tunisia to extend legal and effective coverage to the informal economy. The constant interest of public authorities in Tunisia in extending social coverage to the informal economy is also motivated by the need to broaden the boundaries of the formal labor market. In addition to

9

THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL PROTECTION ON INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT …

189

protecting workers against risks and poverty traps (Barrientos 2013; Barrientos and Hulme 2007; Dercon 2002), the authorities would also like to increase the number of contributors to social security funds. In fact, among the levers to be activated to slow down the decline in the demographic ratio, is to promote the formalization by encouraging informal workers to join social insurance schemes managed by the CNSS1 in the private sector. It is worth mentioning that an excessive development of the informal economy could result in increased pressure on workers in the formal economy who will bear the full burden of social security taxes and taxation (International Labor Office 2010a, b). It is also important to limit the disincentive effects of social assistance programs on workers with contributory capacities (Chen 2009; Gatti et al. 2013; Levy 2008a; Peracchi et al. 2007). Of course, the expansion of the informal economy would fuel social security funding constraints in the absence of official vision to broaden its fiscal space. Thus, promoting the formalization of informal workers would reduce the average cost of social security for a formal worker (Barrientos et al. 2014). It would also make a significant contribution to improving the financial sustainability of social security insurance schemes and improving the competitiveness. The second issue on which this chapter has focused is to measure the extent and size of informal employment in Tunisia and the profile of informal workers. Through the use of various statistical data sources (household surveys, censuses, administrative data), it was possible to compile a series retracing the evolution of informal employment over the period 2005–2017. The decision to opt for informality depends on a number of determining variables that are likely to influence the worker’s behaviour. Indeed, the last question to be addressed in this chapter is to identify the main determinants of workers’ informal behaviour, such as intertemporal trade-offs, risk aversion and attitudes towards social security schemes. Similarly, investigations have been carried out to detect the existence of disincentive effects of social assistance programs on affiliation to insurance schemes in the case of workers with contributory capacities. These analyses should guide and feed the reflections currently conducted in the MENA region in relation to challenges facing social

1 CNSS: The pensions schemes in the private sector are managed by the «Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale».

190

N. BEN CHEIKH AND J. Y. MOISSERON

protection systems and the emergence of a certain consensus for a phased implementation of national social protection floors.

2 The Horizontal Extension of Social Protection to the Informal Economy in Tunisia 2.1

Overview on the Social Protection System in Tunisia

Tunisia has always made of social protection one of the major pillars of its economic and social development policy. Carrying a modernist project for the Tunisian economy and founder of a new regulation of social relations, the State has, from an early stage, adopted social protection as a major lever to establish its new social policy (Destremau 2010; Guelmami 1996). This new policy was aimed at rapid and widespread improvement of the performance indicators for the sectors of education and health, a more egalitarian distribution of income and ultimately at the emergence of a middle class. Indeed, the gains made in terms of legal and effective coverage of social security, have facilitated the emergence of wage earners, and allowed the consolidation of a middle class that became over the years the considerable achievement of independent Tunisia and one of its most distinctive features compared to other countries in the region. At this level, it is worth mentioning that social protection2 in Tunisia, in its broad definition, is deployed in the form insurance-contributory schemes run by social security funds in Tunisia (CNRPS, CNSS and CNAM3 ) along with non-contributory insurance schemes aimed at reducing poverty and mitigating economic inequalities. 2.2

Horizontal Extension of Social Security to the Informal Economy

Since the independence, the magnitude of the extension of social security to various socio-professional categories has been significant and disproportionate to the progress made in the countries of the MENA region. 2 Social security and social protection concepts according to the ILO (2011) are largely interchangeable. The definition of social protection used in this chapter, covers contributory (social insurance or social security) and non- contributory (Cash transfers and subsidized health insurance programmes) schemes. 3 CNPRS: Caisse Nationale de Protection et de Prévoyance Sociale; CNSS: Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale and CNAM: Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Maladie (for more details see Box 1).

9

THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL PROTECTION ON INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT …

191

In terms of legal coverage, Tunisia has managed to create social insurance schemes for almost the majority of occupational categories in the labor market (Chaabane 2002; Cherif and Essoussi 2004); the legal coverage rate of the employed population today is around 95% of the working population. These efforts, designed to extend horizontally the possibility of benefiting from social security benefits to groups working in the informal sector—not yet covered by appropriate legislation, have constantly been accompanied by measures to better manage risks related to loss or decline of income following the occurrence of a number of contingencies (including maternity disease, industrial accident, disability, old age, death of the breadwinner and unemployment). Box 1: Current Social Protection Organization in Tunisia Social security in Tunisia today plays out as insurance schemes managed by three funds: the National Pension and Social Welfare Fund (CNRPS) for the public sector; the National Social Security Fund (CNSS) for the private sector; the National Health Insurance Fund (CNAM) in charge of health insurance benefits, maternity and occupational diseases; and non-contributory programs to tackle poverty and inequalities (National Program for Needy Families [Cash transfer and free health Insurance]– PNAFN—and a subsidized health care program—AMGII).

Source Author’s conception

Currently, statutory social security schemes cover the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, wage earners, own-account and independent workers, besides the low-income earners with limited contributory

192

N. BEN CHEIKH AND J. Y. MOISSERON

capacity. The extension of social security coverage in Tunisia has taken two distinct paths for the public and private sectors. The Tunisian government’s real achievements in the horizontal extension of social security to the private sector took place during the first three decades after independence. Immediately after independence, the government promulgated two founding legislations: laws 60-30 and the 60-33 of 14 December 1960. The first one pertained to the regulation of the general social security system, the coverage of sickness and death and family allowances. The second law allowed the establishment of an old-age pension, disability, and survivors’ scheme for wage earners in the non-agricultural sector (Ladhari 1990). In the early 70s, Tunisian Government was faced with the intensification of the urban-rural polarization (Séthom 1992) and notably the obvious deterioration in the purchasing power of farmers as a result of the pricing policy in the agricultural sector. It is within this context that the foundations of agricultural social security in the form of social insurance, sickness, maternity, and death plans have been introduced. However, the scope of the law was limited initially to permanent workers employed at least 180 days a year with the same employer before being lowered to 45 days per quarter in 1981. Consequently, all agricultural workers including fisherman could now receive the benefits offered by this new scheme regardless of their status being permanent, seasonal, or casual, provided they can prove to have worked at least 45 days per quarter with the same employer. In contrast to most countries in the MENA region, Tunisia very early on created social security schemes for self-employed workers (RTNS).4 Indeed, in 1982, social security has been extended to self-employers, granting them coverage against vulnerability inherent to employment within the informal economy. It is worth noting that self-employed workers account on average for 35% of the total employed working population in Tunisia. Despite efforts to improve the legal coverage of self-employed workers, the enthusiasm of self-employed workers in terms

4 The CNSS is actually managing two schemes for self-employed workers (RTNS: Régime des travailleurs non-salariés ): A Scheme for the Non-Agricultural Self Employed Workers (RTNSNA: Régime des travailleurs non-salariés dans le secteur non agricole) and a Scheme for the Agricultral Self-Employed Workers (RTNSA: Régime des travailleurs non-salariés dans le secteur agricole).

9

THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL PROTECTION ON INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT …

193

of affiliation and regularity in the payment of pension contributions has always been below target. Because of their limited capacity to contribute to insurance schemes and due to the instability inherent in their jobs, many vulnerable socioprofessional categories with limited income were, de facto, ejected outside the scope of social coverage. Faced with this situation, the Tunisian government set up in 2002 a new scheme—Precarious and Low Income Workers (RTFR: Régims des travailleurs à faibles revenus )—for small farmers and fishermen, domestic workers, craftsmen to improve the supply of social security and make it more suited to their characteristics. Despite its simplicity and generosity, the new scheme has proven unattractive especially for fishermen, domestic workers and craftsmen. In other words, the eligibility criteria for this new scheme would be more suitable for precarious employees involved in single activity and the “immobile” self-employed. It is also noteworthy that a significant proportion of mobile workers have found themselves unwillingly engulfed in informal employment (particularly in the agriculture and fisheries sector, with seasonal or casual jobs). This is indeed a binding choice that derives its rationality from the absence of a scheme that integrates the constraints of mobile work, pluri-activity, uneven income and occasional work. Most recently, in 2019, a new scheme was created for economically vulnerable women workers with limited and irregular incomes, working in agriculture and fisheries. 2.3

Social Assistance Programs in Tunisia

Notwithstanding the remarkable progress made so far in the horizontal extension of insurance systems, several categories of the population are still beyond the reach of the existing schemes. These categories of the population include the poor and those with insufficient contributive capacity due to inactivity, unemployment, illness, age and disability. In order to provide these populations with a social protection floor, Tunisia has been working since the 1970s to diversify the range of noncontributory social assistance programs, by ensuring free access to health services and a minimum income in the form of social assistance in cash or in kind. However, the government’s growing interest in social safety nets culminated in the adoption of the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) under the supervision of the IMF in 1986. In order to spare poor

194

N. BEN CHEIKH AND J. Y. MOISSERON

and vulnerable populations from the adverse effects of fiscal austerity policies, several direct social assistance, income generation and social housing promotion programs were put in place during the adjustment decade (1986–1995). Among the range of social programs, two programs can be distinguished by the scope of coverage in relation to the risks covered, the level of coverage measured by the relative generosity of the benefit and finally the extent of coverage commonly measured by the coverage rate of poor populations by these benefits. First, the National Programme for Assistance to Needy Families (PNAFN5 ) was created in 1986, in the aftermath of an unprecedented economic crisis since the country’s independence. Families who meet the eligibility criteria for the PNAFN receive a monthly monetary assistance currently set at 180 dinars (equivalent to 65 USD) in addition to free access to care in public health hospitals. The number of beneficiary families increased rapidly from 73,500 in 1987 when the programme was launched to 118,300 before 2011 to more than 250,000 in 2019. The second flagship social assistance program provides access only to reduced-tariff care in public health facilities. The eligibility for this Subsidized Health Insurance Programme (AMGII) is subject to family income status verified by an individual survey investigated by social workers. According to the program eligibility criteria, program applicants whose financial capabilities allow them to benefit from any social security scheme, should be automatically excluded. The AMGII provides access to discounted rates only in public health facilities. In 2019, the overall number of beneficiaries of the AMGII amounted to approximately 580,000. Using the micro data from the last evaluation survey of social assistance programs conducted in 2015 (Ben Cheikh et al. 2017), the coverage rate of the Tunisian population by the two programs (PNAFN and AMGII) would be around 24%. The Table 1 provides more details on the distribution of the population receiving social assistance programs.6

5 PNAFN: Programme National d’Aide aux Familles nécessiteuses; AMGII: Programme d’aide médicale Gratuite type II . 6 A non-negligible portion of NAFMP cash transfer recipients are single-parent families and elderly persons, resulting in an average family size of about 2.4 persons. The average number of persons in an AMGII household is 3.6.

9

THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL PROTECTION ON INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT …

Table 1

195

Coverage of the social assistance programs

Direct beneficiaries including family members Total population Rate of coverage (in percent)

PNAFN

AMGII

Total social assistance

578,000

2,089,000

2,667,000

11,162,000 5.2

11,162,000 18.7

11,162,000 23.9

Source Nidhal Ben Cheikh et al. (2017)

Several recent studies have provided empirical evidence that these two programs have made an effective contribution to poverty reduction in Tunisia within the limits of the budgets allocated to them (Ben Cheikh et al. 2017; Jouini et al. 2018). Indeed, according to national poverty lines (155 DT per month in urban areas and 125 DT in rural areas), the numerical incidence of poverty fell rapidly from 23.1% in 2005 to 20.5% in 2010 and reached 15.2% in 2015 (INS 2017).

3 3.1

Methodology and Data Sources

Methodology for the Estimate of Informal Employment and Data

In this article, we are using the indirect residual approach to derive national estimates of informal employment over the period 2005–2015. It is also worth noting that it was not possible to follow the direct method due to the absence of household surveys in Tunisia that produce such estimates. Practically, the approach entails running two different data sources and then making comparisons in order to get an estimate of informal employment (Perry 2007). For informal employment, a broader concept is the definition called legalistic or social protection (Saavedra and Chong 1999). This approach suggests classifying all employed or self-employed workers who are not affiliated to a statutory social security scheme, as informal. Moreover, this definition is fully consistent with the commitments undertaken by international community on decent work and its four pillars—job creation, social protection, the right to work and social dialogue (ILO 2007). The first data source provides comprehensive data on employment, including both formal and informal employment. Such data have been collected from labor force survey results published regularly by the governmental National Institute of Statistics (INS).

196

N. BEN CHEIKH AND J. Y. MOISSERON

The second source of data is made up from the administrative data of workers’ reported contributions workers to pension funds in Tunisia both in public and private sectors. Only workers who have paid their contributions to CNSS at least once during the four quarters of the year will be considered in this research to be effectively declared and therefore formal. The statistics of overall employment, declared and informal, will be structured according to the status in employment (self-employment or non-wage employment status and wage earners). Subsequently, a simple operation of subtracting jobs deemed to be formal from the total exhaustive employment brings in an estimate of informal employment in the economy. The same principle applies to the different types of informal employment: wage employment, non-wage employment, informal employment in the agricultural sector, informal employment in the non-agricultural sector and informal employment by age group. 3.2

Methodological Approach Adopted for Informal Behaviors Analysis and Perverse Incentives

3.2.1 The Theoretical Background The reasons underpinning labor informality are manifold. In general, a distinction is made between workers whose situation of informality is the result of a rational deliberate choice underpinned by a number of arguments and workers who are excluded from social security schemes as they lack enough income to pay social contributions (Fields 1990; Kucera and Roncolato 2008; Maloney 1998, 2003). Opting for informality would be the outcome of a process that involves trade-offs between the gains from a formal situation (benefits of social security, professional stability, access to bank credits, etc.), and those from informality (tax and social evasion, benefits from social assistance programs accessible because of poor targeting, etc.) and similarly for the corresponding costs for instance labor costs (Angel-Urdinola and Kuddo 2010; Djankov and Ramalho 2009). It all boils down to the opportunity cost of informal employment, which reflects the worker’s own appraisal and perception of the gains of all types linked to the formality he had to renounce (Levy 2008b). On the other hand, certain workers are excluded from social security coverage due to the absence of a scheme tailored to their professional status (mobile workers, recurrent changes of employer, etc.) or to the inadequacy of their ability to pay.

9

THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL PROTECTION ON INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT …

197

The decision to opt for informality depends on a number of determining variables that are likely to influence the worker’s behaviour. Firstly, it is about the worker’s ability to contribute that is assessed in terms of his actual contributory capacities determined by a number of objective variables such as family situation, household size, monthly income and expenditure, etc. Other subjective variables are of major importance in understanding the behavioural strategies adopted by workers in the choice of informality and/or upon transition between informality and formality. These variables relate particularly to subjective determinants such as workers’ inter-temporal preferences, attitudes towards social security and risk aversion (Peracchi et al. 2007). It is worth noting that studies conducted in several Muslim countries have revealed that social security or takaful ijtima’i principles and concepts are not alien with Islam (Ismail and Possumah 2014; Jalil et al. 2015). Therefore, questions about the influence of religious beliefs on risk-management or risk-coping strategies of individuals or households will not be raised in this analysis. As labor informality is our main outcome of interest, emphasis will be put on identifying the potentially disincentive effects that social assistance programs are likely to have on workers’ labor market behaviour. Indeed, as social assistance programs provide health coverage and cash transfer to the poorest, they are likely to decrease incentives for workers to contribute to the formal social security schemes and therefore informality would increase. Levy (2008a) argues that the incentive structure implicit in social programs induces changes in workers’ behaviour who would move to seek low productivity jobs. In fact, workers would behave in ways that are contrary to enhancing long-term productivity growth. It is in Latin American countries that social assistance programs have been widely evaluated, particularly conditional cash transfers (CCTs). However, very few studies have been conducted to examine the thorny topic of the impact of Cash Transfer Programs (CTPs) on informal employment. Moreover, the findings of research studies are far from conclusive regarding the existence of crowd out effects or disincentives for CTPs on registered formal employment and social insurance schemes (Bosch and Manacorda 2012). The literature ranges from results that provide evidences of disincentives to formal employment, to results where the effects are not obvious

198

N. BEN CHEIKH AND J. Y. MOISSERON

or even heterogenous showing weak evidences of a decline in labor market formality as a result of social assistance programs. Concerning the first group of findings, Camacho et al. (2013) provided evidences that the subsidized health services and medication programme in Colombia known the Plan Obligatorio de Salud (POS) contributed to increased informal employment. Other research yielded comparable results (Garganta and Gasparini 2015) found the Universal Child Allowance for Social Protection (AUH) in Argentina, a massive CCT, may discourage workers transitions to the formal sector and likewise for the results pertaining to the effect of the Human Development Bonus in Ecuador (Gonzalez-Rozada and Pinto 2011), the Bolsa Familia Programme in Brazil (de Brauw et al. 2015) and the Uruguayan PANES (Amarante et al. 2011). The second group includes the very recent research of the Bosch and Schady (2019) who analyzed the labor market effects of the Bono Desarrollo Humano (BDH) programme in Ecuador and showed that cash transfer did neither reduce labor supply nor cause any significant change in the reallocation of labor from formal to informal sectors. There were many in Mexico who thaught that the shift from an employerbased to universal health coverage could generate crowd-out. However, Azuara and Marinescu (2013) showed that Seguro Popular providing public health coverage to the uninsured has no effect on informality in the overall population. Bergolo and Cruces (2014, 2018) studied the effects of the Asignaciones Familiares-Plan de Equidad (AFAM), a means-tested programme in Uruguay, in the context of widespread labor market informality. Although primary results established beneficiaries respond to the programme’s incentives by reducing their levels of formal employment, the authors found a substantial heterogeneity in these effects. The AFAM is likely to induce reduction in formal employment only among individuals with medium probability to integrate the formal labor market while the program did not seem to be having an impact on individuals with low propensity to work formally. Finally, Angel-Urdinola et al. (2009) provided evidences that the Turkey’s Green Card Programme, a generous social assistance programme, is not influencing worker’s choice between informal and formal sectors. The reason behind this finding, would be the large wage gap between formal and informal workers due to substantial difference in productivity.

9

THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL PROTECTION ON INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT …

199

3.2.2 Data and Methodological Approach Deficiencies in the targeting of social assistance programs in Tunisia (PNAFN, AMGII) are suspected of influencing workers’ behaviour in the informal economy, by lowering the opportunity cost of informality. It would also be very informative to know the main characteristics of informal workers living in households in which at least one member is receiving social assistance programs. This would improve our knowledge of the informal behaviours in this population while attempting to capture its most important determinants. In order to shed light on these questions, microdata from an evaluation survey of social assistance programs conducted in Tunisia in 2015 were used.7 This survey covered 5000 households benefiting from the two flagship social assistance programs (2000 PNAFN and 3000 AMGII) and included several modules covering education, health, income, labor market, social security and then attitudes towards social security and risk aversion. Similarly, 500 informal workers, former contributors to the CNSS under the schemes of self-employed Workers (RTNS) and Precarious and Low Income Workers (RTFR)8 have been survey at individual level. a. Highlighting perverse incentives and capture informal employment determinants For PNAFN and AMGII beneficiaries, the questionnaires were administered to the entire household. This makes it possible to collect information on all members and in particular on those who benefit from care as principal beneficiaries and entitled persons. This approach allows the contribution capacity of the main beneficiary to be assessed in the light of the information provided by the various modules of the questionnaire, in particular that relating to housing characteristics, household composition and demographic characteristics, health and social coverage, the labor market and reported income. b. Subjective determinants of informal behaviour: inter-temporal preferences and risk aversion 7 This survey was conducted by the CRES (Centre de recherches et des études sociales) in 2015. 8 RTNS: Régimes de travailleurs non-salariés; RTNSA: Régimes de travailleurs nonsalariés dans le secteur agricole; RTNSNA: Régimes de travailleurs non-salariés dans le secteur non-agricole; RTFR: Régime des Travailleurs à Faibles Revenus.

200

N. BEN CHEIKH AND J. Y. MOISSERON

Other modules specific to workers belonging to AMGII households and former CNSS contributors are devoted to addressing aspects related to respondents’ attitudes towards social security, their intertemporal preferences and their risk aversion. Individual behaviour in the face of uncertainty and risk provides a large measure of understanding of their decisions about membership of social security schemes. Questions were devoted to the analysis of workers’ intertemporal preferences and risk aversion using robust measures of the “Subjective Discount Factor” and the “Risk Aversion Index” . Interviewees are asked to imagine that they have won a national lottery and that the prize is 10,000 Tunisian Dinars (TD). Even if the gain is secure, it could only be withdrawn after one year. However, the winner has the possibility to sell his ticket to a friend for 8000 TD paid cash. No additional proposal will be proposed if he accepts this deal. But, if he expresses his wish to still have the 10,000 TD in a year, the surveyor grants him another proposal for 9000 TD and then in a third round, in case he continues to opt for his initial choice, a last proposal is made to him of 9500 TD. It is from these responses that different bands of the subjective discount factor are derived. According to the approach developed by (Harrison et al. 2002) and its empirical applications in the work of (Peracchi et al. 2007) which constitute our basic reference for this analysis, the value of the ticket could be defined as T = x(1 + r), where r is the discount factor. If the interviewee prefers to have T after one year and not an amount x immediately, his discount factor is lower than r. By repeating the question for the different proposals of x, it would be possible to identify four levels of the subjective discount factor (Frederick et al. 2002). The same methodology used to estimate the subjective discount factor is used again, but only the gain is paid immediately. However, unlike the previous case, the lottery organization is not very credible since the probability of being paid is reduced to 70%. Thus, x is defined as the amount received in exchange for the ticket. The probable gain from participation in the lottery, P, is 10,000 TD−x with a probability of 70% and −x for a probability of 30%. In order to arrive at a measure of the Arrow-Pratt’s indicator of Absolute Risk Aversion (ARA), the approach of Peracchi et al. (2007), which takes up the developments of Guiso and Paiella (2008), was adopted. In case the interviewee is indifferent between receiving x

9

THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL PROTECTION ON INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT …

201

and keeping his ticket, then ARA is expressed as follows: ARA = 2

E(P) E(P 2 )

Or E(P) = 0.7(10000 − x) + 0.3(−x) Or E(P 2 ) = 0.7(10000 − x)2 + 0.3x 2 Thus, by repeating the question for different levels of x, it would be possible to identify four intervals for measuring risk aversion. c. Logistic regressions The logistic regression analysis or logit models are also used particularly to examine the association between binary and explanatory variables in an attempt to pinpoint the underlying drivers of informal employment, impatience and risk aversion. Let Y i denote the informality of the worker i on the labor market with respect to the outcome of the explanatory variables x 1i ,…,x ki . For example, let Y = 1 denote the default of the worker and Y = 0 the status of formality. Then, using logistic regression, the Probability Default PD for a worker is denoted by:  P(Y = (1 x1 , . . . , xk ) = f (x1 , . . . , xk ) The function f denotes the logistic distribution function. The model can be written as:    Logit P = (1 x1 , . . . , xk ) =β0 + β1 x1 + · · · + βn xn

202

N. BEN CHEIKH AND J. Y. MOISSERON

4 4.1

Informal Employment in Tunisia: Extent and Main Determinants The Informal Employment in the Economy

By following the methodological approach outlined above, it was therefore possible to compile a time series that retraces the evolution of informal employment over the period 2005–2015.9 Informal employment in the economy represents 29.4% of the employed working population in 2015, or 996.7 thousand jobs that do not pay mandatory social security contributions.10 It should be noted that the employment rate followed a downward trend over the period 2005–2011 before rising sharply again over the period 2012–2015 and then declining. The informal employment rate, which peaked at 34.4% in 2005, fell to 27.5% in 2010 and rose to 29.4% in 2015. According to data from the WIEGO statistical brief, which presents a harmonized estimates of informal employment at the world level and in the three country income groupings (Bonnet et al. 2019), our estimates place Tunisia between the rates recorded in developed countries (18%) and those prevailing in emerging countries (67%). This rather moderate level of informality in the Tunisian labor market would be consistent with the high level of legal coverage of the employed 9 These are actually the only available estimates of informal employment in Tunisia that update previous estimates made by the author and published in a chapter report by the Centre de Recherches et des Etudes Sociales (CRES—Ministry of Social Affairs in Tunisia) and the African Development Bank (Ben Cheikh 2016). The report also includes other estimates of the informal economy and the informal sector carried out by Charmes (2016). 10 Results on women’s informal employment have been avoided at this stage due to the considerations outlined hereafter. As pointed out in the methodology, the indirect approach was used in estimating informal employment in Tunisia. As such, on one side, we have official data published by the INS on total employment and the administrative data of the social security schemes. It is noteworthy that only workers who pay their contributions are recorded in the reported employment series. As a result of our approach, the levels of female non-salaried and salaried registered employment are higher than the official INS total employment levels that are supposed to include formal and informal employment. This shows that the labor force survey conducted by the INS has systematically underestimated female employment and particularly salaried employment. In a previous publication, this issue has been brought to the attention of the INS. If we assume that the rate of informality among women would be the same as the prevailing one for men, women’s activity rate, which is paradoxically low in Tunisia despite the achievements made for Tunisian women, would rise by five points. In addition to other impacts on the national unemployment rate and employment rates (Ben Cheikh 2016).

9

203

THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL PROTECTION ON INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT …

Table 2 Rate of informal employment by age and sex (2014)

Share of informal employment in total working population (percent) Age

Male

Female

Total

15–24 Years 25–64 Years 65 Years and over Total

59.7 27.4 83.8 31.7

34.9 7.0 64.3 10.7

51.6 21.7 81.4 25.8

Source Author’s calculations based on the Census (2014) and administrative data of pension schemes

population by insurance schemes as explained in the first section of this article. The misfit between the provision level of mandatory contributive schemes and the needs of the working population, is deemed to be one of the key determinants of informal employment. As stated before, there is evidence that labor force surveys revealed some anomalies with the gender distribution of the working population. As a way of overcoming this difficulty, the data from the general census of population that was conducted in 2014 were used to illustrate sexdisaggregated data and age structure of informal employment in Tunisia. In 2014, the rate of informal employment for men was around 31.7 and 10.7% for women, corresponding to a national rate of 25.8%.11 As for the age structure within the informal population, the results found overlap with those of (Bonnet et al. 2019). The informal employment rate is by far higher among young workers (15–24 years of age) and old workers (65 years and over) than among adult workers (25–64 years). The Table 2 provides more details on the share of informal employment in total employment by age and sex. A closer look at the age structure indicates that informal employment is a phenomenon particularly concentrated in Tunisia among young people in the labor market: 60% of men and 86% of women in informal employment in 2014 are under 40 years of age (see Graph 1). This finding is crucial in the design of policies to tackle all forms of vulnerability, as large parts of the youth labor force are more exposed to the vagaries of the economic cycle than their elders in the labor market.

11 A difference of 2.5 points from the rate found using the labor force survey.

204

N. BEN CHEIKH AND J. Y. MOISSERON

100.0% 90.0% 80.0% 70.0% 60.0% 50.0% 40.0% 30.0% 20.0% 10.0% 0.0% 15-19 years

20-24 years

25-29 years

30-34 years

35-39 years

40-44 years

Male

45-49 years

50-54 years

55-59 years

60-64 years

65-69 years

70-74 years

Female

Graph 1 Increasing cumulative frequencies of informal employment by gender and age structure in 2014 (Source Author’s compilations based on INS [Census, 2014] and Pension Schemes)

Analysis of rates of informality according to the age structure of the population reveals that the phenomenon of informality would clearly be exacerbated among young populations who have just entered the labor market. Rates peak at high levels for the age groups 15–19 and 20–24, 84% and 42% respectively. This may indicate that young populations are more likely to accept precarious, low-decency jobs that do not offer social security (see Graph 2). 100.0 90.0 80.0 70.0 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 15-19 Years

20-24 years

25-29 years

30-34 years

35-39 years

40-44 years

45-49 years

50-54 years

55-59 years

60-64 years

65-69 70 years years and over

Graph 2 Age structure of the informal employment rate in 2014 (Source Author’s compilations based on INS [Census, 2014] and Pension schemes data)

9

THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL PROTECTION ON INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT …

205

It should be noted also that taking up informal jobs would be a way for young people to participate in the labor market, to acquire experience and, possibly, to find formal employment, as informality declines rapidly with age (Gatti et al. 2013). Informality rates are lower than the national average for the age groups between 35 and 59, and increases again thereafter as individuals retire. Informality rates are particularly high among men, at 33% against only 15% for women in 2014. This is true for all age groups and is clearly illustrated in Graph 3. This decline in informal rates observed for people within 25 years of the mandatory retirement age could be explained by a catching-up effort by both employed and self-employed workers to maximize the effective contribution years towards a decent retirement pension. Self-employed workers accounted for 53.9% of total informal employment, while their share of the employed labor force was around 22% in 2015. Indeed, the levels of informality affecting self-employed workers far exceed those estimated for employed workers. In 2015, the rate of informality for the self-employed reached 58.5% against only 18.6% for employees. This finding intersects with the stylized facts about the informal economy for developing countries particularly in the MENA region, which reveal that informal employment is most strongly associated with self-employment (Chen and Harvey 2017; Gatti et al. 2013; Maloney 2003). This means that self-employed workers in Tunisia are particularly less resilient than salaried workers, and would therefore be more exposed to macroeconomic fluctuations and the vagaries of life (Fiess et al. 2010; Maloney 2003) (Table 3). 100

80

60

40

20

0

20

40

60

80

100

70-74 years 65-69 years 60-64 years 55-59 years 50-54 years 45-49 years 40-44 years 35-39 years 30-34 years 25-29 years 20-24 years 15-19 years Male

Female

Graph 3 The age pyramid of informal employment (2014) (Source Author’s compilations based on INS [Census, 2014] and Pension Schemes Data)

206

N. BEN CHEIKH AND J. Y. MOISSERON

Table 3

The evolution of informal employment over the period 2005–2015 Total informal employment

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Total informal salaried employment

Total informal self-employment

Number (Thousands)

Percent

Number (Thousands)

Percent

Number (Thousands)

Percent

1007.2 987.3 953.8 929.9 894.5 900.6 738.5 815.7 880.3 968.5 996.7

34.4 32.9 30.9 29.5 28.0 27.5 23.5 25.3 26.6 28.4 29.4

413.6 389.3 409.6 375.8 334.4 299.4 260.8 316.6 370.8 348.2 459.0

20.5 19.0 19.1 17.2 15.1 13.3 11.7 13.7 15.5 14.7 18.6

593.6 598.0 544.2 554.1 560.0 601.2 477.7 499.1 509.5 620.2 537.7

64.9 62.6 57.8 57.3 56.6 58.2 52.9 54.2 55.2 59.8 58.5

Source Author’s compilations based on INS and Pension Schemes data

However, the number of informal workers declined significantly until 2011 before rising again during the transition period 2012–2015. The remarkable but unexpected decline in informal employment in 2011 can clearly be explained by the unprecedented increase in the number of unemployed following the revolution. The tenure of more than 30,000 workers in the civil service and public enterprises following the agreement concluded in 2011 between the Tunisian government and the UGTT12 relating to the abolition of subcontracting in the public sector, would also explain this decline. Several social and political decisions have helped to explain this trend. The social decisions taken in the aftermath of the revolution under mass pressure, and in particular the regularization of the situation of Public Utility Labor Intensive workers on regional construction sites, whose number has increased to an unprecedented level, have also been decisive in explaining the significant decline in informal employment in 2011. This improvement was very short as an upward trend in informal employment began in 2012 and persists in 2015. This reversal is more pronounced for

12 UGTT: The General Union of Tunisian Workers is the most representative trade union of workers in Tunisia.

9

THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL PROTECTION ON INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT …

Table 4

Informal employment rate in the non-agricultural economy Informal salaried-employment in the non-agricultural sector In percent

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

207

17.3 15.8 15.4 13.8 11.0 10.5 8.1 8.4 10.8 10.7 13.4

Informal self-employment in the non-agricultural sector

Informal employment in the non-agricultural sector

57.2 56.1 53.1 55.8 55.4 55.8 52.3 54.9 58.1 62.2 61.3

25.8 24.4 23.3 23.0 20.8 20.4 17.3 18.3 21.0 22.9 23.9

Source Author’s compilations based on INS and pension schemes data

self-employed workers, who have seen their rate of informality soar from 52.9% in 2011 to 58.5 in 2015, compared to 11.7 and 18.6% respectively for salaried workers. The Table 4 clearly illustrates the dynamics of the evolution of the informal employment rate in the non-agricultural economy, which stood at 23.9% in 2015 against 20.4% in 2010 and 25.8% in 2005. The informality rate for non-employees is particularly high in 2015, at 61.3% compared to only 13.4% for non-agricultural employees.

5

Determinants of Informal Employment and Disincentive Effects of Social Assistance on Social Insurance

In this section, we focus on identifying the main characteristics of informal workers benefiting from social assistance programs as well as selfemployed and low-income workers. First, we seek to outline the profile of these workers and assess their ability to contribute in an attempt to define the rationale underlying the choice of informality. We will then explore the main characteristics of labor market participation, the determinants of informality, intertemporal preferences and risk aversion.

208

N. BEN CHEIKH AND J. Y. MOISSERON

5.1

The Identification of Perverse Incentives

Perverse incentives refer to unexpected effects of targeting social safety nets on insurance systems. In the case of Tunisia, the question consists in investigating to what extent the quality of targeting of assistance programs and in particular the AMGII would have impacted the contributory behaviour of a number of workers supposedly endowed with contributory capacities, who would have opted for social assistance. It is therefore important to consider the impact of the AMGII on the uneven payment of contributions observed, in particular among self-employed and low-income workers. 5.1.1

Detection of Informal Employment Among Populations Receiving Social Assistance The first task addressed in this section was to identify informal workers, whether they are direct beneficiaries of social assistance programs or simply members of the household, who are reported to be employed in the labor market. Indeed, it would be relevant to distinguish the informality of direct beneficiaries from that of household members. The choice of informality by workers in both situations would be driven by economic assessments backed by different rationales that need to be highlighted. All workers who are not registered in a social security scheme are then considered as informal in the light of their answers to the questions on social security coverage in the questionnaire. Not surprisingly, Table 5 shows that the employment rate of AMGII beneficiaries is far higher than that of cash transfer beneficiaries, at 56.7% versus 11.3%, respectively. This result is relatively predictable because the AMGII program targets poor workers who lack the ability to pay due to recurrent employer changes or their low earned income. Nearly, all the workers benefiting from the two programs are informal, unlike the other workers, who record lower informal rates of around 80% for PNAFNist households and 75% for AMGIIist households. It is worth adding that the number of informal workers benefiting from the PNAFN and AMGII programs reached 352,993, representing 35.6% of all informal employment (990,662) in 2014. Hence, The AMGII would be the most important source and reserve of informality, precariousness and vulnerability in Tunisia.

9

THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL PROTECTION ON INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT …

Table 5

PNAFN

AMGII

Total

209

Employment and informality of beneficiaries and household members

Direct beneficiaries Members of the household Direct beneficiaries Members of the household Direct beneficiaries Members of the household

Employment rate

Unemployment rate

Inactivity rate Labor informality rate

11.3

6.4

82.3

100

23.6

19.4

57

80

57

12.3

30.7

99.5

17.7

20.3

62

75.6

38.3

10

51.7

99.6

22

18

60

76.7

Source Author’s own calculations

5.1.2

Assessment of the Contributory Capacities of Informal Workers The detection of perverse incentives would obviously require an assessment of the contributory capacities of salaried and non-salaried workers. It is important to note at this level that the focus will be solely on the contributory capacities of employees for the lack of information on non-wage earnings of self-employed workers. Based on the distribution of the wages of informal workers in the populations receiving social assistance, we find that 37.3% of all AMGIIist informal workers are a priori able to contribute. The results also show that 40% of direct AMGII beneficiaries working in the informal economy reported receiving wages above the minimum wage, indicating the existence of a hypothetical potential for contributory capacity compared to 17.8% for the beneficiaries of the Cash transfer Program. This deduction should be validated by cross-referencing with other relevant variables such as employment status, sector of activity and number of days worked. Table 6 clearly illustrates through the wage distributions of direct beneficiaries of social assistance programs that AMGIIists have more

210

N. BEN CHEIKH AND J. Y. MOISSERON

Table 6 Distribution of wages of employees who are beneficiaries and household members In DT (local currency)

Less than the minimum wage

320–500

500–650

650 and more

Total

PNAFN

82.2

17.8

0

0

100

72

25

2

1

100

60

35

3

2

100

64.2

33

1.5

1.3

100

AMGII

Direct beneficiaries Members of the household Direct beneficiaries Members of the household

Source Author’s own calculations

contributory capacities. This could be explained by the specific characteristics of AMGIIists (younger population, more active on the labor market and less poor than PNAFNists) but also by other characteristics related to the job held. The detection of perverse incentives requires further analysis by focusing on informal populations with a priori contributory capacities in relation to a number of variables. The distribution of informal workers with contributive capacities by place of work revealed a high concentration of these workers in construction sites and buildings (41.5%, of which 73% are direct beneficiaries of the AMGII). Private companies attract equal numbers of direct beneficiaries and their household members, mainly in the industrial, service and commercial sectors. More than 11% of informal AMGIIists endowed with contributory capacities are employed in the agricultural sector, of whom 72.2% are direct beneficiaries. One of the most salient distinctive features of informal workers is high employment instability. Indeed, nearly 65% of informal workers recipient of the AMGII who are endowed with contributive capacities, reported working in seasonal and occasional jobs. The distribution of these employees by place of employment shows that 54.4% of unstable workers are in building sites, 13.4% in agriculture and 8.9% in private workplaces. Direct beneficiaries are more unstable than household members by 67%. For salaried informal workers with contributive capacities, we have determined the distribution of direct beneficiaries of AMGII as well

9

THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL PROTECTION ON INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT …

211

as household members by type of contract and place of work. More than 80% of these employees are employed without a contract in the construction and building sector (51%), the agricultural sector and private premises (12.7% and 12). The majority of these employees are direct beneficiaries of the AMGII (nearly 69%), who do not pay contributions to social insurance schemes and receive social assistance even though they have the capacity to pay. The results showed that the decision to join would depend on a number of factors, including, in particular, place of employment, stability in employment and the presence of a contract. However, for the agricultural employees’ scheme, the contribution depends on the number of days validated. The analysis of employment characteristics for this group of employees reveals that 98% of them hold unstable jobs (recurrent change of employer, mobile work, etc.). Thus, there is still a whole question about what prevents these employees from paying their contributions; is it an instability inherent in agricultural activity or an implicit contract between the employer and the employee? Hence the need to intensify inspections on agricultural farms and construction sites by the CNSS. It should be recalled that the applicable law stipulates that only workers who have validated at least 45 days of actual work with the same employer may be declared by their employers and any period of less than 45 days is neglected. Such a requirement is likely to induce strategic behavior among employers who could opt for a tacit application of a limit on the number of days, thereby depriving workers of their rights to social security. 5.2

Determinants of Informality Among Beneficiaries of Social Assistance Programs

Nearly 43% of the total number of social assistance recipients are active people, 69.6% of whom are AMGIIists. Men are more active than women in both the PNAFN and AMGII programs. It is important to note that 46.6% of direct beneficiaries are employed in the labor market and 88.1% of them are beneficiaries of the AMGII. Informal workers represent 86.9% of all direct beneficiaries of social assistance programs who are employed on the labor market. It is also important to note that nearly 75% of these informals are AMGIIists. By using a Logit model, we assessed the determinants of informality among direct beneficiaries and members of their households (Table 4.3). Only

212

N. BEN CHEIKH AND J. Y. MOISSERON

the sociodemographic and educational variables had significant distinctive effects on informal workers. Indeed, for the entire population receiving social assistance benefits, being married, divorced or widowed and aged between 15 and 19 years is more likely to favour informal employment, while a level of education at least secondary has a significant negative effect on informality. From the results of our estimates, we can see a rather interesting result with respect to the relation AMGII between informality and total observed income. Indeed, the total income has a negative effect on informal employment. As earnings rise, workers would be less interested in taking up precarious jobs that do not entitle them to social security. The informal employment of the occupied person benefiting from social assistance is likely to be most concentrated in the construction, trade and agriculture sectors. Small-scale enterprises attract more informal workers recipient of the two programs (Table 7). 5.3

Inter-temporal Choices of Informal Workers and Risk Aversion

The analysis of informal workers’ inter-temporal preferences and risk attitudes is a crucial section of this chapter given its importance in understanding the factors underlying informal behaviours. An experimental approach explained in the methodological section was adopted to determine the intertemporal discount factors and the absolute risk aversion index. Interviewees are asked to imagine a hypothetical situation in which they won a lottery. In the first three questions of the questionnaire, which focus on the analysis of intertemporal choices, the value of the gain is certain but payable after one year. Then, for the three questions on risk attitudes, the win would be payable immediately but there is a probability that the lottery would be unable to ensure payment of the winner.

9

THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL PROTECTION ON INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT …

Table 7 Logistic regression about the determinants of informal employment among the population benefiting from social assistance

213

Total beneficiaries and members of households Variables Woman Married Divorced Aged 15–19 years Aged 30–44 years Aged 45–54 years Aged 55–60 years Aged 60 years and more None level Minimum secondary level ln (Total income) Construction Trade Agriculture Small firm Intercept N Wald R2

Total

PNAFN

AMGII

0.1430 (0.132) 0.5387*** (0.156) 0.7783** (0.358) 0.7401* (0.379) −0.2177 (0.149) −0.2274 (0.218) −0.4226 (0.270) −0.2319 (0.332)

0.9331*** (0.227) −0.7228*** (0.276) 0.4161 (0.608) 0.7093 (0.721) 0.0167 (0.262) −0.4622 (0.358) 0.2912 (0.547) 1.5255* (0.865)

0.1617 (0.192) 1.0424*** (0.234) 0.7200 (0.510) 0.6450 (0.450) −0.4058** (0.204) 0.0150 (0.344) −0.5883 (0.383) −0.7067 (0.478)

0.0800 (0.180) −0.2468** (0.125)

0.2804 (0.321) −0.3254 (0.231)

0.0739 (0.264) 0.0118 (0.183)

−0.7501*** (0.119) 2.3227*** (0.210) 1.3931*** (0.244) 1.1936*** (0.180) –

−0.3599** (0.156) 1.6956*** (0.345) 1.2362* (0.641) 0.9515*** (0.337) 1.2795*** (0.217) 2.5234** (1.010) 830 132.32*** 0.2127

−0.8404*** (0.186) 2.0661*** (0.291) 1.3726** (0.628) 1.2591*** (0.260) 1.4611*** (0.180) 5.6365*** (1.217) 2172 265.99*** 0.2899

5.6613*** (0.765) 3408 280.61*** 0.1667

Note *Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%

214

N. BEN CHEIKH AND J. Y. MOISSERON

6

Intertemporal Preferences

From the answers of the interviewees, we can determine the intertemporal discount factor r. If the respondent prefers to wait a year to take his T ticket rather than sell it immediately for the value x, his discount rate is lower than r. Thus, and by repeating the question for different values of x, the following three discount levels could be determined: i17

i18

i19

Discount rate

10,000 10,000 10,000 8000

10,000 10,000 9000 –

10,000 9500 – –

0.05 ≤ 0.11 ≤ 0.25 ≤

r r r r