Social Justification and Political Legitimacy: How Voters Rationalize Direct Democratic Economic Policy in America [1st ed.] 9783030517151, 9783030517168

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xiii
Introduction (Luis Antonio Vila-Henninger)....Pages 1-24
Front Matter ....Pages 25-25
Theory (Luis Antonio Vila-Henninger)....Pages 27-64
Analytical Approach and Broader American Political and Economic Discourses (Luis Antonio Vila-Henninger)....Pages 65-84
Data and Methods (Luis Antonio Vila-Henninger)....Pages 85-102
Front Matter ....Pages 103-103
Proposition 201 (2008) (Luis Antonio Vila-Henninger)....Pages 105-150
Proposition 202 (2008) (Luis Antonio Vila-Henninger)....Pages 151-203
Proposition 204 (2012) (Luis Antonio Vila-Henninger)....Pages 205-249
Moral Economies (Luis Antonio Vila-Henninger)....Pages 251-283
Conclusion and Theory Building (Luis Antonio Vila-Henninger)....Pages 285-325
Back Matter ....Pages 327-331

Citation preview

Social Justification and Political Legitimacy How Voters Rationalize Direct Democratic Economic Policy in America Luis Antonio Vila-Henninger

Social Justification and Political Legitimacy

Luis Antonio Vila-Henninger

Social Justification and Political Legitimacy How Voters Rationalize Direct Democratic Economic Policy in America

Luis Antonio Vila-Henninger UCLouvain Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

ISBN 978-3-030-51715-1 ISBN 978-3-030-51716-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51716-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 Portions of this book have been reproduced from my dissertation, as well as VilaHenninger 2017, 2018, 2019a, and 2019b. This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

I would like to dedicate this book to those who supported and encouraged me throughout this entire process. To name a few: Loretta Vila-Henninger, Luis R. Vila-Henninger, Miguel Vila-Henninger, Rosario Rizzo Lara, Terrence Hill, Harvey, Nazir Harb, Maitham Naeemi, Omar Harb, Patrick Gahr, Chris Miller, Shanda Romans, Justin Knoll, the Qualidem team, UCLouvain ISPOLE, the University of Arizona Graduate and Professional Student Council, and the University of Arizona School of Sociology—especially Heather Bremenstuhl, Jessie K. Finch, Kate Gunby, and Sosuke Okada.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Jeff Sallaz, Jane Zavisca, Albert Bergesen, Lane Kenworthy, Terrence Hill, Henry Walker, Jurgita Abromaviciute, Corey Abramson, Jodi O’Brien, Mark Cohan, Louise Roth, Taylor Danielson, Rosario Rizzo Lara, and anonymous reviewers for their feedback throughout the development of my dissertation and/or this book. I would also like to thank all of my respondents, Gina Walsh, Eleanor Stilson, Colleen Pignato, Rochelle Cox, Sherry Bao, Christine Scolinos, Adrian Barbachan, The Arizona Department of Economic Security, and B. Torres-Traylor for their contributions. Finally, I thank Virginie Van Ingelgom, Claire Dupuy, Margherita Bussi, Cal Le Gall, Mauro Caprioli, Damien Pennetreau, and Ferdinand Teuber for all of their support and feedback—as well as for helping me to refine my qualitative research skillset through our collaboration on qualitative secondary analysis with Qualidem. This research was made possible in part by a grant from the University of Arizona Graduate and Professional Student Council. Award Reference Number RSRCH-505FY’15.

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Contents

1

Introduction

1

Part I 2

Theory

27

3

Analytical Approach and Broader American Political and Economic Discourses

65

Data and Methods

85

4

Part II 5

Proposition 201 (2008)

105

6

Proposition 202 (2008)

151

7

Proposition 204 (2012)

205

8

Moral Economies

251 ix

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CONTENTS

9

Conclusion and Theory Building

Index

285 327

List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 4.4 Table 5.1

Table 5.2 Table 5.3

Table 5.4

Table 5.5

The functions of legitimation from contemporary sociological literature Quasi-independent variable operational definitions Initial comparison groups with projected number of respondents Achieved case set for the analysis in this book Unusable cases from project case set for analysis in this book Proposition 201 (2008): expected Proposition 201 position by economic position/partisan affiliation comparison group and percentage Proposition 201 support Rationales and rationale groups for Proposition 201 (2008) Legitimations distinctive of partisan affiliation and DDEP position alignment and opposition for Proposition 201 (2008) Legitimations exclusive to economic position and DDEP position alignment and opposition for Proposition 201 (2008) Expected: legitimations exclusive to the expected DDEP position for partisan affiliation and economic position for Proposition 201 (2008)

29 93 97 97 98

115 126

128

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 5.6

Table 5.7

Table 5.8

Table 6.1

Table 6.2 Table 6.3

Table 6.4

Table 6.5

Table 6.6

Table 6.7

Table 6.8

Table 7.1

Table 7.2

Unexpected: legitimations exclusive to the unexpected DDEP position for economic position and partisan affiliation for Proposition 201 (2008) Conflicting expectations: legitimations exclusive to the expected DDEP position for economic position and unexpected DDEP position for partisan affiliation for Proposition 201 (2008) Conflicting expectations: legitimations exclusive to the expected DDEP position for partisan affiliation and unexpected DDEP position for economic position for Proposition 201 (2008) Expected Proposition 202 (2008) position by economic position/partisan affiliation comparison groups and percentage Proposition 202 support Rationales and rationale groups for Proposition 202 (2008) Legitimations distinctive of partisan affiliation and DDEP position alignment and opposition for Proposition 202 (2008) Legitimations exclusive to economic position and DDEP position alignment and opposition for Proposition 202 (2008) Expected: legitimations exclusive to the expected DDEP position for partisan affiliation and economic position for Proposition 202 (2008) Unexpected: legitimations exclusive to the unexpected DDEP position for economic position and partisan affiliation for Proposition 202 (2008) Conflicting expectations: legitimations exclusive to the expected DDEP position for economic position and unexpected DDEP position for partisan affiliation for Proposition 202 (2008) Conflicting expectations: legitimations exclusive to the expected DDEP position for partisan affiliation and unexpected DDEP position for economic position for Proposition 202 (2008) Proposition 204 (2012): expected Proposition 204 position by economic position/partisan affiliation comparison groups and percentage Proposition 204 support Rationales and rationale groups for Proposition 204 (2012)

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164 177

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216 227

LIST OF TABLES

Table 7.3

Table 7.4

Table 7.5

Table 7.6

Table 7.7

Table 7.8

Table 8.1 Table 8.2 Table 8.3 Table 8.4 Table 8.5 Table 8.6

Legitimations distinctive of partisan affiliation and DDEP position alignment and opposition for Proposition 204 (2012) Legitimations exclusive to economic position and DDEP position alignment and opposition for Proposition 204 (2012) Expected: legitimations exclusive to the expected DDEP position for partisan affiliation and economic position for Proposition 204 (2012) Unexpected: legitimations exclusive to the unexpected DDEP position for economic position and partisan affiliation for Proposition 204 (2012) Conflicting expectations: legitimations exclusive to the expected DDEP position for economic position and unexpected DDEP position for partisan affiliation for Proposition 204 (2012) Conflicting expectations: legitimations exclusive to the expected DDEP position for partisan affiliation and unexpected DDEP position for economic position for Proposition 204 (2012) Rationales and rationale groups for Proposition 201 (2008) Legitimations distinctive of DDEP position for Proposition 201 (2008) Rationales and rationale groups for Proposition 202 (2008) Legitimations distinctive of DDEP position for Proposition 202 (2008) Rationales and rationale groups for Proposition 204 (2012) Legitimations distinctive of DDEP position for Proposition 204 (2012)

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Empirical Issue: Direct Democratic Economic Policy (DDEP) Legitimation The narrative around American politics in popular culture is that citizens have rejected economic voting and are instead engaged in a culture war (e.g., Frank 2004; Kirk 2020). In social scientific terms, the picture is much more complex but in some ways analogous: rather than responding out of self-interest to economic policy incentives (Downs 1957), Americans’ voting decisions are largely driven by group allegiances—such as partisanship (for summaries see Young 2013; Achen and Bartels 2016; Bailey 2019). However, historically, the American voter has tended to vote for the political party that passed economic policy that benefited those in his/her economic position—thus making it appear as if voters were acting out of self-interest in response to economic policy incentives (Stonecash 2000; Brewer and Stonecash 2001; Bartels 2006; McCarty et al. 2006; Volscho and Kelly 2012; Franko et al. 2013; Widestrom et al. 2018). In other words, for decades, self-interest and partisanship have appeared to align to predict—on average—Americans’ vote choices for presidential candidates (for summaries see Bartels 2006; Gelman 2008). These findings have then been confirmed by recent work (Geus 2019; Ladewig 2020). Thus, the empirical findings suggest an interaction between the economic model of voter self-interested response to economic policy incentives (Downs 1957) and the model of voter partisan bias (Achen © The Author(s) 2020 L. A. Vila-Henninger, Social Justification and Political Legitimacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51716-8_1

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and Bartels 2016). This is supported by work in direct democracy, which demonstrates that policy positions and partisanship can align (Colombo and Kriesi 2017) and that conservative political identification often aligns with pragmatic justifications (Colombo 2019). However, this flies in this face of theory from neuroscience in which scholars posit that self-interest and partisanship compete (Jenke and Huettel 2016). This interaction seems not to apply to voting in the 2016 American presidential election, which raises the question of if partisan bias and selfinterest indeed interact to affect voter reasoning. While scholars study this question in terms of vote choice (Sears and Funk 1991; Bartels 2005; Franko et al. 2013; Hersh and Nall 2016; Widestrom et al. 2018) and political attitudes (Weeden and Grusky 2012; Dodson 2017), they have yet to study if or how self-interest and partisanship interact to structure voters’ political rationalizations. Such rationalizations are important to understand because they are a form of political legitimation—which is theorized to affect actors’ compliance or cooperation with political power and personal belief in the legitimacy of policy and the American political system more broadly (Weber 1978 [1922]: 212–6 (esp. 213), 953–5; Lipset 1959, 1963, 1990; Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998; for qualitative analysis see Van Ingelgom 2014: 5–6). However, despite being recognized as a key element of the political legitimacy in liberal democracies (Lipset 1994: 10), voter legitimation has largely been overlooked. In order to help tease out the role of economic incentives and selfinterest in voter legitimation, I use data from semi-structured interviews with American voters about their positions on different economic policies that contain both economic policy incentives and indicators of partisan affiliation. To collect data on voter legitimations of their stances on real economic policy for which they could have voted, I interviewed respondents about actual economic referenda—which I refer to as direct democratic economic policy (DDEP). Direct democracy was first implemented in Switzerland in 1844 and first adopted in America in 1898 as part of the Populist political agenda. South Dakota, the first state to implement direct democracy, did so in response to growing frustration over the control of key parts of the economy by monopolies and the failure of the Republican controlled state legislature to respond to the needs of farmers. While the first initiatives passed in South Dakota dealt with a variety of issues, the most prominent

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concerned political reform and economic policy—including the regulation of cars, banks, and alcohol (Piott 2003). Thus, since its inception in American politics, DDEPs has been a key political tool for bypassing the control of political and market elites in order to give citizens the opportunity to shape important elements of state economic policy. Over the past 40 years, voter say in the economy via DDEPs has had serious consequences. In 1978, California residents voted for Proposition 13—which severely limited the ability of the state to collect real estate taxes. This vote subsequently underfunded key municipalities, increased tuition in Californian schools, and spurred the contemporary tax revolt in American politics (Martin 2008). Furthermore, as states wrestle with budget deficits, they give citizens the choice to enact political reform via economic policy. For example, in 2012 Colorado residents voted for Amendment 64, legalizing recreational sales of marijuana in the state and increasing funding for public education. Finally, the 2016 United Kingdom European Union membership referendum—or “Brexit”—forever changed European Union and British politics.

Empirical Puzzles Investigating voters’ legitimations of their positions on DDEPs allows us to investigate two important corresponding empirical puzzles. First, while voter reasoning and rationalization are seen as primarily driven by partisanship (e.g., Achen and Bartles 2016), American citizens appear to vote for parties that they are economically incentivized to support (e.g., McCarty et al. 2006). This raises the question: How do partisanship and self -interest interact to shape partisan voters’ rationalizations of their position on direct democratic economic policy (DDEP)? Second, the voter reasoning literature sees actors’ rationalization of their policy positions as based on discourses supplied by political parties (for a summary see Achen and Bartels 2016). Such a perspective overlooks the role that non-partisan discourses play (Taylor-Gooby et al. 2019), as well as how party-transmitted discourses extend beyond any given party (Vila-Henninger 2019b). This raises a subsequent question: What are the discourses that voters draw upon to rationalize their direct democratic economic policy (DDEP) positions?

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Empirical Agenda Thus, this book empirically addresses two research questions. First, I investigate how partisanship and self-interest interact to shape partisan voters’ legitimations of their position on DDEPs. Answering this question is important because it helps us to understand political legitimation. Political legitimation is theorized to affect actors’ compliance or cooperation with political power and personal belief in the legitimacy of policy and the American political system more broadly (Weber 1978 [1922]: 212–6 (esp. 213), 953–5; Lipset 1959, 1963, 1990; Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998; for qualitative analysis see Van Ingelgom 2014: 5–6). The first question then investigates the motives that affect how people (de)legitimate DDEPs. Second, I investigate the widely accepted political and economic beliefs, norms, and values that voters draw upon to rationalize their DDEP positions. The second question helps us to understand the normative basis of the political legitimacy of DDEPs. In particular, I investigate the values (Lipset 1963), standards of governance (Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998), and normative ends (Spillman 2012; Spillman and Strand 2013) that actors use to (de)legitimate DDEPs. These values, ends, and standards of governance are thus part of the normative basis upon which respondents socially accept (legitimate) or reject (delegitimate) of the political power of DDEPs. Subsequently, these values, normative ends, and standards are then theorized to constitute part of the basis of actors’ compliance or cooperation with political power and personal belief in the legitimacy of DDEPs and the American political system more broadly (Weber 1978 [1922]: 212–6 (esp. 213), 953–5; Lipset 1959, 1963, 1990; Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998; for qualitative analysis see Van Ingelgom 2014: 5–6). Research Question 1: How Do Partisanship and Self-interest Interact to Shape Partisan Voters’ Rationalizations of Their Position on Direct Democratic Economic Policy (DDEP)? This question bridges the gap between rational choice perspectives on legitimacy (Rogowski 2016) and behavioral economics on the one hand and legitimation on the other. Quantitative research in political sociology, political science, and political psychology has provided many important insights into the factors that affect voter decision-making, as well as

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how voters make decisions about voting for partisan candidates. This scholarship utilizes recent iterations of rational choice models to focus on bounded rationality (Simon 1997) and the biases (Kahneman and Tversky 1972) and heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman 1974) that shape information processing in political reasoning. Voter decision-making and public opinion is then either enhanced (in the case of heuristics) or hampered (in the case of biases) by political norms and partisan identity (e.g., Gigerenzer and Todd 1999; Bartels 2002; Lau and Redlawsk 2006; Westen et al. 2006; Martin and Desmond 2010; Baldassarri 2012; Brooks and Manza 2013; Lodge and Taber 2013; Baldassarri and Goldberg 2014; Achen and Bartels 2006, 2016; Baldassarri and Park 2020). In the process of transforming the rational choice model, research on political reasoning has transformed our outlook on voter motives. Instead of assuming a materialist approach to politics, in which voters often seek to maximize utility through voting (e.g., Downs 1957), scholars have demonstrated that voters only pursue self-interest in circumstances where the stakes are high and the issues are clear (Sears and Funk 1991; Bartels 2005). Scholars have also argued that policy preferences (e.g., Brooks and Brady 1999; Ansolabehere et al. 2006; McCarty et al. 2006) shape voter decision-making. Furthermore, American citizens have historically tended to vote for parties that they are economically incentivized to support (e.g., McCarty et al. 2006; Widestrom et al. 2018). Researchers have found that measures of household income distribution correspond with actors’ political views and policy positions (Weeden and Grusky 2012; Dodson 2017). This extends to the literature on American presidential voting, which suggests that a citizen will tend to vote for the candidate from the party that supports policy that shifts household income distribution in favor of the voter (Stonecash 2000; Brewer and Stonecash 2001; Bartels 2006; McCarty et al. 2006; Volscho and Kelly 2012; Franko et al. 2013; Widestrom et al. 2018). By some estimates, this trend extended from 1976 through 2004 for presidential voting among white Americans (Bartels 2006). The trend in American presidential voting was that as a citizen’s household income increased, so did the probability that (s)he would vote for a Republican presidential candidate (Gelman 2008; Baldassarri and Gelman 2008). This relationship held even after controlling for variables such as sex, age, education, and gender (Gelman 2008). Moreover, scholars have found a persistent relationship between American partisan control at the

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federal level and “share of income gains” for the top 1% of income earners (Volscho and Kelly 2012; Widestrom et al. 2018: 6). Taken together, this literature suggests a potential alignment between American voter partisanship and economic incentives stemming from federal economic and tax policies that influence household income distribution. This then raises the question of if and how self-interest and partisanship interact to affect voter reasoning and demonstrates the potential to expand theories in which self-interest and partisanship compete (Jenke and Huettel 2016). While quantitative work has investigated this process as it is associated with voter decision-making, scholars have yet to investigate the role it plays in structuring voter political rationalization. Furthermore, the broader literature on political rationalization overlooks the role of self-interest in shaping rationalization. This literature has established that actors rationalize for a variety of reasons: to comply with social pressure (e.g., Haidt 2001; Vaisey 2009), in response to group loyalties—including partisan allegiances—to reaffirm “prior beliefs” (e.g., Achen and Bartles 2006, 2016), to perform information transfer (Cushman 2019), to respond to moral intuitions (e.g., Haidt 2012), for consonance of behaviors and attitudes (Heider 1958), to “sound rational” and avoid cognitive dissonance (e.g., Festinger 1962), and/or to avoid social or existential threat—thereby defending the status quo (e.g., Jost et al. 2009). However, while some have begun to theorize the role of self-interest in rationalization (Jost et al. 2017), the literature is in its infancy and has yet to investigate how partisanship and self-interest interact to structure political rationalization. A further gap is that these perspectives do not recognize political rationalizations as legitimations. Lipset (1994: 10) highlights the importance of the electorate in understanding the legitimation of democratic governments. However, in the sociological literature on legitimation, there is a gap concerning motives. For example, Weber (1978 [1922]) theorizes the factors that shape how actors ascribe legitimacy, as well as compliance with legitimate power, but does not theorize the factors that affect legitimation itself. Thus, in this analysis I address these gaps by responding empirically the first research question. Furthermore, research demonstrates that the bases for legitimacy and illegitimacy are asymmetrical (Schoon 2014). Thus, I investigate the motives as legitimation and delegitimation as potentially separate.

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Research Question 2: What Are the Discourses That Voters Draw Upon to Rationalize Their Direct Democratic Economic Policy (DDEP) Position? The second question helps us to understand the normative basis of the political legitimacy—or lack thereof—of DDEPs. In particular, I investigate the values (Lipset 1963), standards of governance (Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998), and normative ends (Spillman 2012; Spillman and Strand 2013) that actors use to (de)legitimate DDEPs. These values, norms, and standards of governance are thus part of the normative basis upon which respondents publicly accept (legitimate) or reject (delegitimate) of the political power of DDEPs. Subsequently, these values, norms, and standards are then theorized to constitute part of the basis of actors’ compliance or cooperation with political power and personal belief in the legitimacy of DDEPs and the American political system more broadly (Weber 1978 [1922]: 212–6 (esp. 213), 953–5; Lipset 1959, 1963, 1990; Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998; for qualitative analysis see Van Ingelgom 2014: 5–6). This perspective begins with John Locke’s (Locke and Thomas 1952 [1689]) theorization of the normative ends of government being the provision of basic rights. From here, contemporary sociologists and political scientists have theorized the bases of legitimacy in terms of normative ends and standards of governance (e.g., Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998). An analogous line of literature arose in response to Marx and Engels’ (1845–7 [1976]) materialism and Max Weber’s historical sociology. Seymour Lipset (e.g., 1963, 1990) pioneered this approach and argued that values and efficacy in achieving popular ends were bases for political legitimacy in democracies (e.g., Lipset 1963: 245). Supplementing this perspective is classic work on the role of selfinterest as an end key end for governments trying to establish or maintain legitimacy. Classic political theory (Smith 1776; Kant 1785 [1969]) and contemporary perspectives in social psychology (e.g., Zelditch and Walker 2003) have argued that a legitimation that appeals to self-interest can only help to legitimate political power if the conditions for competition are fair. Contemporary qualitative work (Vila-Henninger 2017) has buttressed this argument by demonstrating that self-interest and fairness converge in voters’ legitimations of DDEPs.

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Here, I refer to “legitimacy” using Max Weber and Seymour Lipset’s definitions definition of legitimacy as “a ‘believed-in title to rule’” (Lipset 1963: 290, also 17). More generally, for power to be “legitimate,” it must be acknowledged, accepted, or affirmed by those upon which it is exercised as normative (Weber 1978 [1922]; Lipset 1959, 1963; Dornbusch and Scott 1977; Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998; Zelditch 2001, 2006; Johnson et al. 2006; Van Ingelgom 2014; Walker 2014; Gordon 2020). Subsequently, a political legitimation in this context is an actor’s rationalization (or justification or validation or consecration or defense) of a political system or element of a political system on normative grounds— usually by reference to widely accepted beliefs and values (for summaries see Weber (1922: 954; Lipset 1959: 86–7; Beetham 1991; Zelditch 2001, 2006; Zelditch and Walker 2003; Walker 2014; Johnson et al. 2006; Van Ingelgom 2014; for morally-specific legitimation see Abulof 2016). Furthermore, in the Weberian tradition, legitimation is a mechanism that transforms power into authority. This is because authority is power that is accepted as obligatory or normative by those upon which it is exercised. Legitimation is then a mechanism that then facilitates such acceptance—and thus acquiescence to the demands of power without enforcement (Zelditch 2006). Rationalization, which in this context is legitimation, spreads legitimacy or re-establishes the legitimacy of social systems whose legitimacy is directly contested (for a summery see Zelditch and Walker 2003, Zelditch 2006; Walker 2014). However, the justification of power is crucial even when the legitimacy of a social system is not directly contested or even if justifications do not make explicit claims about legitimacy. For example, Max Weber theorizes that continuation of organizational authority relies upon ongoing processes of self-justification in terms of the basis of said authority (Weber 1978 [1922]: 953–5). From this perspective, the justification of power facilitates continual compliance with authority (ibid.: 953). David Beetham expands this theorization to the legitimacy of political authority. For political authority to achieve or maintain legitimacy, its rules must be justifiable in terms of widely held beliefs about a political authority’s source—as well as beliefs about the appropriate standards and ends of governance. This form of justification is referred to as “normative justifiability” (Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998). Beetham’s concept of normative justifiability is central for qualitative work in sociology and political science on political legitimacy (Duchesne et al. 2013; Van Ingelgom 2014).

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Beetham’s perspective overlaps with classic theory from American political sociology. For example, Seymour Lipset’s (1959, 1963) application of Weber (1978 [1922]) also argues that legitimacy stems from widely shared beliefs. In particular, Lipset theorized that a political system was legitimate in the eyes of citizens to the extent that the values upon which the political system is based match with the group’s values or how well the government meets popularly demanded ends (Lipset 1963). I refer to these popular demanded “ends” as “normative ends” because they are social norms about the ends that actors or society should pursue. Thus, analyzing direct democratic economic policy (DDEP) position rationalizations allows me to investigate the widely accepted beliefs— available in public discourse—in terms of which voters justify their DDEP positions. Building on the qualitative literature on political legitimacy, as well as theory from political sociology, I will analyze the popular beliefs in terms of which voters justify their position on a given DDEP. Following Weber (1978 [1922]), Beetham (1991), Beetham and Lord (1998) and Lipset (1959, 1963, 1990), I focus on the shared standards (e.g., fairness), values, and normative ends upon which voters base their legitimations. These values, normative ends, and standards of governance are thus part of the normative basis upon which respondents publicly accept (legitimate) or reject (delegitimate) of the political power of DDEPs. Subsequently, the values, normative ends, and standards are then theorized to constitute part of the basis of actors’ compliance or cooperation with political power and personal belief in the legitimacy of DDEPs and the American political system more broadly (Weber 1978 [1922]: 212–6 (esp. 213), 953–5; Lipset 1959, 1963, 1990; Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998; for qualitative analysis see Van Ingelgom 2014: 5–6). Furthermore, research demonstrates that the bases for legitimacy and illegitimacy are asymmetrical (Schoon 2014). Thus, I investigate the values and standards of governance on which legitimations and delegitimations are based separately. This research is important because there is a gap in the literature concerning the actual values, normative ends, and standards of governance that actors use in their legitimations and upon which political legitimacy is based. Recent quantitative work has been done on values (Ciuk 2017). Qualitative work has also been done on the role of nonpolitical values in economic situations (Livne 2019; Altomonte 2020). Furthermore, much work has also been done on public forms of culture

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(Swidler 1986, 2001; Lamont 1992, 2000; Eliasoph and Lichterman 2003; Patterson 2014; Lizardo 2017). However, this work largely focuses on schemas, frames, and narratives and ignores values, normative ends, and standards of governance (for a review see Wood et al. 2018; also see Tavory and Swidler 2009; Vaisey 2009; Vaisey and Lizardo 2010; AventHolt 2012; Ghaziani and Baldassarri 2011; Frye 2017; Hull and Edgell 2020). Finally, qualitative work has focused on legitimacy and the use of state force (Gordon 2020; Rios et al. 2020) or meso-level processes (Luft 2020), but not on political legitimacy or the values, normative ends, and standards of governance that actors use to (de)legitimate. We see this gap when we turn to the qualitative work in sociology and political science. For example, Perrin (2005) and Stoker et al. (2016) use focus group data to analyze citizens’ democratic deliberation. Lane (1967), Prasad et al. (2009, 2016), Eliasoph (2010) Kidder and Martin (2012), Cramer (2016), Hochschild (2016), Kidder (2016), Pacewicz (2016), Skocpol and Williamson (2016), Williamson (2017), Andreouli and Nicholson (2018), Duina (2018), Wuthnow (2018), Silva (2019), Curtis (2020), Hull and Edgell (2020), and Leeds (2020) all use ethnography and/or semi-structured interviews to understand issues such as identity and citizens perspectives on politics. However, this work has largely overlooked both legitimation as well as the values, normative ends, and standards of governance upon which legitimation draws. We know that these values, normative ends, and standards of governance are of importance because of the work being done on the role of partisan morality. For example, Jung (2020) demonstrates that partisan moral rhetoric mobilizes voters by activating emotions related to partisan preference. Furthermore, Luttrell et al. (2019) provide evidence of the effectiveness of political moral appeals. Finally, Vössing (2020) shows the importance of partisan justifications for public opinion.

Theory Building Agenda and Generalizability More broadly, this book builds on the qualitative tradition of investigating how citizens’ positions on economic and political issues are embedded in rationalization processes that people use in their daily lives (Lamont 1992, 2000; Swidler 2001; Díez Medrano 2003; Lamont and Swidler 2014; Van Ingelgom 2014). By addressing the two aforementioned puzzles empirically, I aim to extend classic theories of legitimacy (e.g., Weber 1978 [1922]; Lipset 1959, 1963; Dornbusch and Scott 1977; Beetham 1991;

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Beetham and Lord 1998; Zelditch 2001, 2006). I also seek to extend theories of voter rationalization (Achen and Bartels 2006, 2016) and justification (Mills 1940; Scott and Lyman 1968; Boltanski and Thévenot 2006: 131; Barnard 2016; Hansen 2019). Specifically, I use my findings to bridge the justification, rationalization, and legitimacy literatures in order to develop a theory of voter DDEP position rationalization. My analytical approach employs Michael Burawoy’s “Extended Case Method” (ECM) (Burawoy 1998, 2009; Sallaz 2009) to interpret my findings and engage in theory building (Vila-Henninger 2017, 2018, 2019a, 2019b). Specifically, I use Burawoy’s principle of “reconstruction” in the coding and analysis of my data. Reconstruction uses a core theory to identify anomalous cases in the data in order to build theory. In particular, my analysis consists of identifying policy-specific iterations, or “rationales,” of widely accepted beliefs that are available in public discourse. The process that results from this strategy of “reconstruction” is a mode of analysis that is similar to abduction in its theory-building logic based on identifying anomalous cases (Timmermans and Tavory 2012: 171; Tavory and Timmermans 2014), but is distinct to the extent that it starts with two core theories in order to identify theoretically anomalous cases. The important point of distinction here is that I seek to contribute by expanding extant theory rather than generalizing to a population. By elaborating extant theory, this book can help facilitate future scholarship by contributing to the analytical framework that researchers can use in their research design and analysis—as well as in formulating hypotheses (Shadish et al. 2001). In this sense, my findings will be generalizable to the extent that any theory is generalizable.

Case Selection In studying voter DDEP position rationalizations, I wanted to select ballot measures that were not simply a result of partisan politics but rather incorporated economic policy incentives and cues about partisan affiliation. In contrast to ballot measures written by state legislatures, Citizen Initiated State Statutes (CISS) are written by citizens and appear on the ballot because the proponents of the measure succeeded in collecting a state-determined number of signatures. This type of process requires some financing and organization, but produces statutes that are more organic to the state’s population.

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Availability of CISSes that were economic policy limited states where I could recruit respondents. In terms of selecting a timeframe, I wanted to select ballot measures about topics that were politically salient. For this reason, I selected ballot measures that occurred within the two presidential elections (2008–2012) before I began recruitment in 2013. 2008 was an especially relevant and polarizing political year because not only did the nation see its first African American president elected, but it also marked the beginning of a major recession. With these parameters in mind, I was left with CISSes in Arizona, Colorado, and California.1 Given that political culture and salience of household income varies according to average state household income (e.g., Gelman 2008), it was important to choose a state where household income would be the most salient. Only Arizona was in the bottom half of average state household income distribution, meaning that household income should be a more salient political factor than in California or Colorado—which were both in the upper half of average state household income distribution (Gelman 2008). Thus, I chose to recruit respondents in Arizona. I chose the second congressional district in Tucson as my place of recruitment for several reasons. First, research shows that a polarized political environment helps political beliefs become more salient for voters (e.g., Baldassarri and Gelman 2008). With this in mind, I sought an area that was extremely polarized within a congressional district, and had a marked household income disparity in the population, so that economic position and partisan affiliation would both be salient for my respondents. The second congressional district in Tucson met all of these requirements. Tucson is split between the second and third congressional districts. The third district is consistently Democratic, while the second congressional district is extremely polarized. In 2012, the Democratic congressional candidate won by around 0.1%, while Romney carried the district by 1.5%. In 2014, the Republican candidate won the district by less than 1000 votes. Such polarization is to be expected in this district— which has a history of polarization dating to before the tenure of Gabrielle Giffords. In order to employ my analytical approach to build theory in response to the book’s two research questions, I use data from respondents who were recruited based on two factors that I used to operationalize voter partisanship and self-interest: partisan vote choice and economic position—respectively. These two indicators are used in the empirical research

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on trends in American presidential voting that is in line with or in opposition to voters’ economic policy incentives (e.g., Bartels 2006; McCarty et al. 2006; Gelman 2008; Gelman et al. 2010; Widestrom et al. 2018). These indicators are also often used in investigations into associations between economic incentives and political attitudes (e.g., Brooks and Brady 1999; Manza and Brooks 1999; Ansolabehere et al. 2008; Weeden and Grusky 2012; Baldassarri and Goldberg 2014; Boutyline and Vaisey 2017). Thus, these indicators are appropriate for my investigation into how the alignment or opposition of self-interest and partisanship influenced voters’ rationalizations of real DDEPs.

Research Design In order to employ my analytical approach to build theory in response to the book’s two research questions, I use data from respondents who were recruited based on two quasi-independent variables that correspond to voter partisanship and self-interest: partisan affiliation and economic position—respectively. It is crucial to note that in my research design, instead of standard quantitative “variables,” partisan affiliation and economic position are each instances of a “quasi-independent variable.” As defined by the American Psychological Association Dictionary of Psychology, a quasi-independent variable is “in experimental design, any of the personal attributes, traits, or behaviors that are inseparable from an individual and cannot reasonably be manipulated. These include gender, age, and ethnicity. Such attributes may be modeled and treated as statistically independent but are not subject to random assignment, as are independent variables.”2 I operationalized each quasi-independent variable—partisan affiliation and economic position—as dichotomous: Democrat vs. Republican and High vs. Low-Income—respectively. Because I address the empirical puzzle of how partisanship and self-interest interact to shape voter rationalization, each quasi-independent variable is categorical and cannot be operationalized in terms of “treatment” versus “pre-treatment.” Thus, rather than comparing a pre-treatment group to a treatment group, I compared four different comparison groups that constituted the four different possible combinations of each of my two dichotomous categorical quasi-independent variables (Shadish et al. 2001). This means

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that I used a quasi-experimental design that implements a “PosttestOnly Design with Nonequivalent Groups” (Shadish et al. 2001: 115–7; Privitera and Ahlgrim-Delzell 2019). Furthermore, regardless of the mechanisms that produced each respondent’s position on a measure, I treated respondent DDEP position as a quasi-independent variable that shaped the participant’s legitimation. Thus, for each ballot measure, I had eight comparison groups: lowincome Democrats who supported the measure, low-income Democrats who opposed the measure, low-income Republicans who supported the measure, low-income Republicans who opposed the measure, highincome Democrats who supported the measure, high-income Democrats who opposed the measure, high-income Republicans who supported the measure, and high-income Republicans who opposed the measure. As respondent DDEP position often varied from one ballot measure to the next, so did their placement in a proposition-specific comparison group for a given DDEP. Thus, this analysis investigates how these three quasi-independent variables—Economic Position, Partisan Affiliation, and DDEP Position— interact to shape respondent legitimations.

Research Agenda for the Selection of Each of the Three Ballot Measures Given the first empirical puzzle, the most important selection criteria were that each ballot measure has associated economic incentives and partisan cues that could then shape how voters legitimated their positions. For this reason, I selected three ballot measures for this book. The first ballot measure was “The Arizona Homeowners Bill of Rights, Proposition 201 (2008).”3 This ballot measure, which was overwhelmingly financed and endorsed by a wide array of construction-related unions, was put on the ballot in the midst of the bursting of the real estate bubble in a state whose economy was heavily dependent on the construction of new homes. It sought to create standards for quality in home repair, give all new homebuyers a 10-year-warrantee, and to give homeowners increased legal leverage over contractors who did fraudulent work. This measure gave me an opportunity to understand how voters legitimated a ballot measure that was pro-labor, pro-market regulation, and concerned the status of land as a commodity.

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The second ballot measure, “Arizona Stop Illegal Hiring, Proposition 202 (2008),” sought, in a variety of ways, to reregulate undocumented immigrants’ access to the Arizona labor market. I chose this initiative because I wanted to include a measure that proposed to regulate labor as a commodity. It was overwhelmingly financed by business associations. Third, I selected the “Quality Education and Jobs Act, Proposition 204 (2012),” which proposed to extend a one-cent sales tax primarily to fund public education. Given the budgetary crisis in Arizona in 2012 due in part to the collapse of the real estate market, the state legislature proposed cuts to public education. This proposition was written and organized by the Quality Education and Jobs Committee, which is a propublic education advocacy group. This ballot measure was clearly partisan in terms of its endorsements, being officially endorsed by the mayor of Phoenix and the major of Tucson, both Democrats, and officially opposed by the Arizona state treasurer and Arizona Governor, both Republicans. Selecting this ballot measure allowed me to analyze an extremely partisan element of economic policy that could potentially pit short-term self-interest against partisanship. A quick note here is that although I interviewed respondents about the “Arizona Medical Marijuana Act, Proposition 203 (2010),” I did not include an analysis of these data in this book. This is because there was no economic incentive for respondents for this measure. For analysis of this measure, see Vila-Henninger (2018).

Chapter Overview In order to conduct this analysis and theory building process, I proceed in Chapter 2 by providing an overview of theory and empirical work relevant for understanding this research puzzle and conducting an empirical analysis of voter DDEP rationalizations. As previously mentioned, I then outline my analytical approach and theory building strategy in Chapter 3. Next, I provide an overview of my data and methods in Chapter 4. Subsequently, I conduct empirical analysis for each of the aforementioned DDEPs (Chapters 5–7). Each of the empirical chapters about individual DDEPs analyzes legitimations according to the interaction of self-interest and partisan affiliation. In a final empirical chapter (Chapter 8), and in order to extend theory, I investigate legitimations in each of the three ballot measures that extend across partisan affiliation and economic position. I then conclude with a chapter in which I use my findings to build theory (Chapter 9).

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Notes 1. Ballot measures available on NCLS.org. 2. https://dictionary.apa.org/quasi-independent-variable. 3. The text each measure is available in the corresponding empirical chapter and at the Arizona Secretary of State’s website.

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———. 2019a. “Turning Talk into ‘Rationales’: Using the Extended Case Method for the Coding and Analysis of Semi-Structured Interview Data in Atlas-ti.” Bulletin of Sociological Methodology 43 (1): 28–52. ———. 2019b. “The Moral Economy of Neoliberalism: How Voters Use Neoliberal Ideology to (De)Legitimate Undocumented Worker Access to Labor Markets.” Sociological Inquiry 89 (2): 239–62. Volscho, Thomas W., and Nathan J. Kelly. 2012. “The Rise of the Super-Rich Power Resources, Taxes, Financial Markets, and the Dynamics of the Top 1 Percent, 1949 to 2008.” American Sociological Review American Sociological Review 77 (5): 679–99. Vössing, Konstantin. 2020. “Shaping Public Opinion About Regional Integration: The Rhetoric of Justification and Party Cues.” Political Studies 003232172090513. Walker, Henry. 2014. “Legitimacy and Inequality” Pp 353–377 in Jane D. McLeod, Edward J. Lawler, and Michael Schwalbe. Handbook of the Social Psychology of Inequality. New York: Springer. Weber, Max. [1922] 1978. Economy and Society 1 & 2. Berkeley: University of California Press. Weeden, Kim A., and David B. Grusky. 2012. “The Three Worlds of Inequality.” American Journal of Sociology 117 (6): 1723–85. Westen, Drew, Pavel S. Blagov, Keith Harenski, Clint Kilts, and Stephan Hamann. 2006. “Neural Bases of Motivated Reasoning: An FMRI Study of Emotional Constraints on Partisan Political Judgment in the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election.” Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 18 (11): 1947–958. Widestrom, A., T. J. Hayes, and C. Dennis.2018. “The Effect of Political Parties on the Distribution of Income in the American States: 1917–2011.” Social Science Quarterly 99 (3): 895–14. Williamson, Vanessa. 2017. Read My Lips: Why Americans Are Proud to Pay Taxes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Wood, Michael Lee, Dustin S. Stoltz, Justin Van Ness, and Marshall A. Taylor. 2018. “Schemas and Frames.” Sociological Theory 36 (3): 244–61. Wuthnow, Robert. 2018. The Left Behind: Decline and Rage in Rural America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Psress. Young, Frank W. 2013. ““What’s the Matter with Kansas?” A Sociological Answer.” Sociological Forum 28 (4): 864–72. Zelditch, Morris. 2001. “Processes of Legitimation: Recent Developments and New Directions.” Social Psychology Quarterly 64 (1): 4–17. ———. 2006. “Legitimacy Theory.” Pp. 324–52 in Contemporary Social Psychological Theories, edited by Peter J. Burke, Stanford: Stanford Social Sciences. Zelditch, M., and H. A. Walker. 2003. “The Legitimacy of Regimes.” Pp. 217– 49 in Advances in Group Processes, vol. 20, edited by S. R. Thye and J. Skvoretz. Oxford: Elsevier.

Part I

CHAPTER 2

Theory

Introduction This book empirically addresses two research questions. First, I investigate how partisanship and self-interest interact to shape partisan voters’ legitimations of their position on direct democratic economic policy (DDEP). Answering this question is important because it helps us to understand political legitimation. Subsequently, legitimation is theorized to affect actors’ compliance or cooperation with political power and personal belief in the legitimacy of DDEPs and the American political system more broadly (Weber [1922] 1978: 212–6 (esp. 213), 953–5; Lipset 1959, 1963, 1990; Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998; for qualitative analysis see Van Ingelgom 2014: 5–6). The first question then investigates the motives that affect how people legitimate DDEPs. My empirical response helps to fill a key gap in the literature concerning voter legitimation—which has been recognized as an important element of the political legitimacy of liberal democracies (Lipset 1994: 10). Second, I investigate the widely accepted political and economic beliefs, norms, and values that voters draw upon to rationalize their DDEP positions. The second question helps us to understand the normative basis of the political legitimacy—or lack thereof—of DDEPs. In particular, I investigate the values (Lipset 1963), standards of governance (Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998), and normative ends (Spillman 2012; Spillman and Strand 2013) that actors use to (de)legitimate DDEPs. These values, normative ends, and standards of governance are © The Author(s) 2020 L. A. Vila-Henninger, Social Justification and Political Legitimacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51716-8_2

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thus part of the normative basis upon which respondents socially justify supporting (legitimating) or opposing (delegitimating) the political power of DDEPs. Subsequently, these values, normative end, and standards are then theorized to constitute part of the basis of actors’ compliance or cooperation with political power and personal belief in the legitimacy of DDEPs and the American political system more broadly (Weber [1922] 1978: 212–6 (esp. 213), 953–5; Lipset 1959, 1963, 1990; Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998; for qualitative analysis see Van Ingelgom 2014: 5–6). My analysis then synthesizes overlapping models of reasoning from the voting literature and the morality literature—thereby addressing a gap in the literature noted by political sociologists (Brooks and Manza 2013: 745).

Legitimacy and Legitimation This book analyzes the legitimations of political power made by everyday people. Here, I define an “everyday person” as someone who does not occupy a position of political authority. The key component here is that a “legitimation” is a rationalization (or justification or validation or consecration or defense) of political power in normative terms—often by appeal to widely accepted standards of governance (Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998), values (Lipset 1963), or normative ends (Spillman 2012; Spillman and Strand 2013). Legitimation of power by everyday people, or “popular political legitimation,” stands in contrast to the legitimations of those in positions of political (e.g., Stryker 1989) or organizational (e.g., Suchman 1995) authority. Legitimation as discourse is also distinct from approaches that analyze legitimation as behavioral compliance (e.g., Burawoy 1979; Przeworski 1980; Willis 1981; Johnson et al. 2006; Sallaz 2009). This book’s theoretical perspective on legitimacy and popular political legitimation combines work that spans American and European sociology and political science. I proceed by providing a review of these literatures as they pertain to “popular political legitimation.” From this review we will see ten distinct types of legitimation. Legitimation differs in terms of its broader justification of power or specific claims about legitimacy. Legitimation then serves to maintain, undermine (in the form of delegitimation), repair, spread, or establish legitimacy. For an overview see Table 2.1. As we can see, the empirical analysis in

Broader justification

Claims to legitimacy

Table 2.1

Legitimacy Theory (for summaries see Zelditch 2001, 2006; Zelditch and Walker 2003; Walker 2014; Gordon 2020) Weber [1922] 1978: 953–55); Berger and Luckmann (1966); Homans (1974); Beetham (1991); Beetham and Lord (1998); Duchesne et al. (2013); Van Ingelgom (2014)

Maintain legitimacy Legitimacy Theory (for summaries see Zelditch 2001, 2006; Zelditch and Walker 2003; Walker 2014; Gordon 2020) When applied to political justifications: Sociology of Accounts (Mills 1940; Scott and Lyman 1968; Polletta et al. 2011; Kiviat 2017) French Sociology of Justification Tradition (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006; Barnard 2016; Hansen 2019)

Legitimacy Theory (for summaries see Zelditch 2001, 2006; Zelditch and Walker 2003; Walker 2014) This Book

Repair legitimacy

Undermine legitimacy

Legitimacy Theory (for summaries see Zelditch 2001, 2006; Zelditch and Walker 2003; Walker 2014; Gordon 2020)

Legitimacy Theory (for summaries see Zelditch 2001, 2006; Zelditch and Walker 2003; Walker 2014; Gordon 2020) Lipset (1959, 1963); This Book

Weber ([1922] 1978); Lipset (1959, 1963)

Establish legitimacy

Spread legitimacy

The functions of legitimation from contemporary sociological literature

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this book focuses on how legitimations as broader justifications that are theorized to spread or undermine political legitimacy.

Legitimacy Much of the work in American and European sociology and political science on political legitimacy is based on the theory of Max Weber. For Weber, legitimate power establishes both obligations and standards for desirable conduct (Weber [1922] 1978: 31). Action driven by legitimacy is thus normative rather than the result of strategic calculation (Weber [1922] 1978; for a summary see Dornbusch and Scott 1977; Walker 2014). According to Weber, authority then gained or maintained legitimacy by appeal to (1) tradition, (2) legality, and/or (3) charisma (Weber [1922] 1978: 215–6, 952–5; Lipset 1963; Walker 2014). From the Weberian tradition, understanding legitimacy begins with power. Power is unstable if it must continually be enforced or relies upon actors’ interests for compliance. Thus, for Weber, power is legitimate if those subject to power accept and/or comply with the demands of power upon normative grounds—meaning that power is seen as obligatory or exemplary. The idea here is that power is much more stable if those who are subject to power accept it as normative. Most importantly from the Weberian perspective is the idea that legitimacy needed to be analyzed as actors’ “belief in legitimacy”—which enabled sociologists to study legitimacy as a social phenomenon rather than a philosophical issue (for empirical analysis see Van Ingelgom 2014). Furthermore, power is legitimate to the degree that it is widely perceived as legitimate (Weber [1922] 1978; Johnson et al. 2006; Van Ingelgom 2014). This means that individuals do not need to agree with the exercise of power or the collective beliefs, norms, and values with which power is aligned. Rather, individuals need to perceive both power and the collective elements it is justified in terms of as being widely accepted (Johnson et al. 2006: 55–6; Van Ingelgom 2014: 5–6). This means that legitimacy exists regardless of individuals’ opinions of power. Instead, the key is that power is accepted, acknowledged, and/or complied with. An integral part of this process is then the perception that others accept and comply with power—which reinforces the perception of power as legitimate. Action that is purely driven by legitimacy is thus normative rather than the result of strategic calculation (Weber [1922] 1978: 31–3, 212–5; Lipset 1959, 1963; Dornbusch and Scott

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1977; Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998; Zelditch 2001, 2006; Zelditch and Walker 2003; Johnson et al. 2006; Van Ingelgom 2014; Walker 2014; Gordon 2020). Thus, in the Weberian tradition, political power is “legitimate” to the extent that it is acknowledged (Walker 2014) as constituting an obligation or an exemplary form of conduct. Power can be explicitly acknowledged through discourse or acknowledgement can be shown through behavioral compliance. A major figure in this tradition is Seymour Lipset (1959, 1963, 1990). Lipset defines legitimacy as a normative “title to rule” (1963: 17, 290). Lipset builds on Weber’s characterization of political legitimacy as stemming from tradition, legality, and charisma (1963). For Lipset, the central element of legitimacy for legal systems was that they share the “values” of the citizens. Thus, institutions were formed and legitimated based on shared beliefs (e.g., Lipset 1963: 16) and values in particular (ibid.: 245, Lipset 1990). However, Lipset saw the role of values as a legitimating force extending beyond legal systems to, for example, charismatic authority. For Lipset, charismatic leaders could gain and legitimate their authority by appealing to values shared by their audience (Lipset 1963: 18). Besides values, the other key source of legitimacy for Lipset was a government’s efficacy in achieving commonly held goals for governance (Lipset 1963: 90). However, this source of legitimacy was ultimately unstable. Thus, it was advantageous for governments to establish legitimacy by rooting themselves in widely held values—as values serve as a normative rather than performative basis of legitimacy (ibid.: 245). A key element of Lipset’s political analysis, then, was to understand a country’s shared values (e.g., ibid. 1990). By analyzing these shared values, scholars could then investigate the development of a nation’s institutions and their legitimacy (ibid. 1963: 2). Importantly, Lipset shared the Weberian perspectives that values were historically determined (ibid.: 7). Another strand of literature in American sociology comes from “Legitimacy Theory” (for summaries see Zelditch 2001, 2006; Zelditch and Walker 2003; Walker 2014; Gordon 2020). This work in Legitimacy Theory by social psychologists is based on Dornbusch and Scott’s (1977) distinction between two types of legitimacy they claim Weber conflated: “propriety” and “validity.” Propriety is an individual’s evaluation of a social system, or element of a social system, as exemplary (Homans 1974;

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Zelditch 2001, 2006; Walker 2014). On the other hand, power is “valid” when compliance is widely accepted as obligatory (Zelditch 2001, 2006; Walker 2014). Actors “acknowledge” validity through their compliance (Walker 2014). Validity is then justified in terms of tradition, rational or natural law, or charisma (Weber [1922] 1978: 215; Walker 2014), and science (Stryker 1994). Validity involves two self-reinforcing mechanisms: support by authority figures (authorization) and popular support (endorsement) (Dornbusch and Scott 1977; Zelditch 2001, 2006: 335; Walker 2014; Walker and Willer 2014; Gordon 2020). An important nuance here is that endorsement can then be understood as collective propriety (Walker 2014: 368). Both of these mechanisms serve to reproduce the perception that valid orders are widely accepted and thus reinforce the obligation for compliance (for summaries see Zelditch 2001, 2006; Zelditch and Walker 2003; Walker 2014). European qualitative political science and political sociology have long utilized political theorists such as David Easton and David Beetham. For example, for Easton, legitimacy is the belief “[t]hat it is right and proper…to accept and obey the authorities and to abide by the requirements of the regime. It reflects the fact that in some vague or explicit way [a person] sees these objects as conforming to his own moral principles, his own sense of what is right and proper in the political sphere” (Easton 1965: 278; 1975: 451). This seems to echo Weber’s argument that legitimacy is the sense that something is “obligatory” or “exemplary.” Easton then decomposes legitimacy into different types that vary according to “objects of legitimacy” (Regime vs Authorities) and “Sources of Legitimacy” (Ideology vs. Structure vs. Personal Qualities) (see Easton 1975: 452). For Beetham (Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998), political power is legitimate if it satisfies three conditions. First, power must be established and exercised within the bounds of widely accepted rules. This principle is referred to as “legality.” Second, the rules by which power is bounded must be justifiable according to broadly accepted beliefs about the source of authority, as well as widely accepted beliefs about the standards for, and ends of, governance. This principle is referred to as “normative justifiability.” Third, positions of power must be expressly affirmed by both subordinates as well as others in legitimate positions of power. This principle is referred to by Beetham as “legitimation.” This

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conception of normative justifiability builds on the work of John Locke (1952 [1689]) on basic rights as the normative ends of democracies. Drawing on Max Weber ([1922] 1978: 215–6), recent qualitative work in this tradition focuses on legitimacy as citizens’ acceptance of political domination of normative grounds (Van Ingelgom 2014: 5–6). The goal of this work is then to understand the normative grounds upon which citizens support political power by drawing upon Beetham’s conception of “normative justifiability.” Legitimation A political legitimation, then, is an actor’s rationalization (or justification or validation) of a political system, or an element of a political system, in terms of widely accepted beliefs, norms, or values (for summaries see Weber [1922] 1978: 954; Lipset 1959: 86–7; Zelditch 2001, 2006; Zelditch and Walker 2003; Walker 2014; Johnson et al. 2006). Weber emphasizes that organizational power requires selfjustification—or “legitimation”—in order for such power to continue to be exercised. In this sense, for Weber ([1922] 1978: 952–4) legitimation is the justification of power. This was then appropriated by Seymour Lipset. Along the lines of Weber’s conception of legitimation as the justification of power, Lipset framed legitimation as “morally accepting” (ibid. 1963: 232) a political system—or an element of a political system. Legitimacy Theory restricts its definition of “legitimation” to justifications that explicitly address claims to legitimacy. We see this in Legitimacy Theory’s work on “justification”—which builds on the conceptualization of justification from the “Sociology of Accounts” (Mills 1940; Scott and Lyman 1968; Polletta et al. 2011; Kiviat 2017) as an attempt to legitimate unexpected or deviant acts (Mills 1940; Zelditch 2001: 7). Legitimacy Theory is referred to by some as the “cognitive orientation” approach to legitimacy (Stryker 1994) and complements similar work in social psychology (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Cook 1975; Ridgeway and Berger 1986). Beetham’s definition of “legitimation” is analogous to Legitimacy Theory’s concept of “propriety.” By contrast, this book uses “legitimation” to connote Beetham’s concept of “normative justifiability.” Empirical work over the past decade (e.g., Duchesne et al. 2013; Van Ingelgom 2014) in Europe investigates legitimation as normative justifiability by building on Juan Díez Medrano’s (2003) analysis of “frames”

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to investigate popular political justifications. The key here is that the emphasis is on legitimation as a justificatory process through which citizens rationalize political power by appealing to widely held beliefs.

Framework for Research Questions Next, I will discuss legitimacy as it applies to each research question. In particular, for the first question I provide background on legitimation, as well as the influence on legitimation of self-interest and partisanship. For the second question, I provide background on the widely held beliefs upon which legitimacy is based. I then discuss the types of beliefs I investigate in this book: political values, norms of self-interest, and economic fairness. In particular, I discuss how economic fairness is understood in the moral economy literature, as well as neoliberalism. Research Question 1: How do partisanship and self-interest interact to shape partisan voters’ rationalizations of their position on direct democratic economic policy (DDEP)? Answering this question is important because it helps us to understand political legitimation. Subsequently, legitimation is theorized to affect actors’ compliance or cooperation with political power and personal belief in the legitimacy of DDEPs and the American political system more broadly (Weber [1922] 1978: 212–6 (esp. 213), 953–5; Lipset 1959, 1963, 1990; Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998; for qualitative analysis see Van Ingelgom 2014: 5–6). This question bridges the gap between rational choice perspectives on legitimacy (Rogowski 2016), behavioral economics, and legitimation. We can understand this process of the justification—or rationalization—of political power in terms of widely held beliefs, norms, and values as “legitimation” (Lipset 1959: 86; Almond and Verba 1963; Easton 1975: 451–2; Della Fave 1986; Weil 1989; Tyler 1990; Suchman 1995; Van Ingelgom 2014; for a summary see Stryker 1994). This approach to legitimation is similar to the “normative approval” of power (Della Fave 1986: 477; see also Habermas 1973; Collins 1975). Legitimation is then a mechanism that facilitates the acceptance, acknowledgment, and compliance with power on normative grounds. Thus, for this analysis I define “legitimation” as an actor’s rationalization (or justification or validation or defense) of a political system or element of a political system on normative grounds—and usually in

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terms of widely accepted beliefs and values” (for summaries see Weber [1922] 1978: 954; Lipset 1959: 86–7; Beetham 1991; Zelditch 2001, 2006; Zelditch and Walker 2003; Walker 2014; Johnson et al. 2006; Van Ingelgom 2014; for morally specific legitimation see Abulof 2016). Political legitimation then spreads, re-establishes, or maintains the legitimacy of social systems whose legitimacy is directly contested (for a summery see Zelditch and Walker 2003, Zelditch 2006; Walker 2014). However, the justification of power is crucial even when the legitimacy of a social system is not directly contested or even if justifications do not make explicit claims about legitimacy. For example, Max Weber theorizes that the continuation of organizational authority relies upon ongoing processes of self-justification in terms of the basis of said authority (Weber [1922] 1978: 953–5). From this perspective, the justification of power facilitates continual compliance with authority (ibid.: 953). Furthermore, for Weber ([1922] 1978), we can see an important gap concerning the motives that drive legitimation. According to Weber, compliance with legitimacy may be based on interest or maybe be subjective (ibid.: 33, 213). Individuals’ ascription of legitimacy as a “belief in legitimacy” (ibid.: 213) is then based on normative factors (ibid.: 36). Subsequently, there are then three ideal types of legitimacy beliefs that have three corresponding normative bases: rational grounds with a corresponding belief in legality of rule and right of authority figures to rule, traditional beliefs and corresponding belief in sanctity of tradition and legitimacy of traditional authority figures, and charismatic grounds and corresponding devotion to a charismatic leader (ibid.: 215). Each of these normative bases of legitimacy beliefs then constitutes a grounds for legitimation (ibid.: 954). However, for Weber ([1922] 1978), legitimation is broader than these three ideal types and is fundamentally normative (ibid.: 31, 213, 764–5). Thus, there are different normative grounds upon which authority may be legitimated: natural law (ibid.: 867), utilitarian (ibid.: 870), status (ibid.: 766), and knowledge (ibid.: 766). For example, legal authority is established through reference to legal norms, which are established through reference to value rationality and expedience (ibid.: 217). The gap in Weber’s work then concerns factors that motivate legitimation. Turning to the rationalization literature, scholars have established that actors rationalize for a variety of reasons: to comply with social pressure (e.g., Haidt 2001; Vaisey 2009), group loyalties—including partisan allegiances—to reaffirm “prior beliefs” (e.g., Achen and Bartles 2006,

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2016), to perform information transfer (Cushman 2019), to respond to moral intuitions (e.g., Haidt 2012), for consonance of behaviors and attitudes (Heider 1958), to “sound rational” and avoid cognitive dissonance (e.g., Festinger 1962), and/or to avoid social or existential threat— thereby defending the status quo (e.g., Jost et al. 2009). However, while some have begun to theorize the role of self-interest in rationalization (Jost et al. 2017), the literature is in its infancy and has yet to investigate how partisanship and self-interest interact to structure political rationalization. Various studies have investigated the relationship between partisanship and self-interest—or indictors of these two—(Hersh and Nall 2016; Bosancianu 2017), as well as how policy positions and partisanship can align (Colombo and Kriesi 2017). However, scholars have yet to investigate this as it pertains to rationalization. This is important, because work in neuroscience suggests that identity and policy compete in voter reasoning (Jenke and Huettel 2016). The key here, then, is that rather than competing (Jenke and Huettel 2016), this research question investigates how self-interest and partisanship interact to affect legitimation. This builds on decades of election results (e.g., McCarty et al. 2006; Widestrom et al. 2018) as well as the research on attitudes (Brooks and Brady 1999; Weeden and Grusky 2012; Dodson 2017) and voting behavior (Hersh and Nall 2016).1 The agenda will then be to investigate if and how self-interest and partisanship interact in order to develop models of voting (Jenke and Huettel 2016) and rationalization (Haidt 2001, 2012; Vaisey 2009; Vaisey and Lizardo 2010; Lodge and Taber 2013). This work can then be used to build on qualitative work on legitimation and political socialization (Vila-Henninger 2018). Research Question 2: What are the discourses that voters draw upon to rationalize their direct democratic economic policy (DDEP) positions? The second question helps us to understand the normative basis of the political authority—or lack thereof—of DDEPs. In particular, I investigate the political values (Lipset 1963), standards of governance (Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998), and normative ends (Spillman 2012; Spillman and Strand 2013) that actors use to (de)legitimate DDEPs. These political values, ends, and standards of governance are thus part of 1 For a review of the self-interest and partisanship literature see the introduction.

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the normative basis upon which respondents publicly justify supporting (legitimate) or opposing (delegitimate) of the political power of DDEPs. Subsequently, these political values, ends, and standards are then theorized to constitute part of the basis of actors’ compliance or cooperation with political power and personal belief in the legitimacy of DDEPs and the American political system more broadly (Weber [1922] 1978: 212–6 (esp. 213), 953–5; Lipset 1959, 1963, 1990; Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998; for qualitative analysis see Van Ingelgom 2014: 5–6). This perspective begins with John Locke’s (1952 [1689]) theorization of normative ends of democracies as providing basic rights. From here, contemporary European sociologists and political scientists have theorized the bases of legitimacy in terms of normative ends and standards of governance (e.g., Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998). This European perspective overlaps with classic theory from American political sociology. For example, Seymour Lipset’s (1959, 1963) application of Weber ([1922] 1978) also argues that legitimacy stems from widely shared beliefs. In particular, Lipset theorized a political system was legitimate in the eyes of citizens to the extent that the values upon which the political system is based match with the group’s values or how well the government meets popularly demanded ends (Lipset 1963). Thus, analyzing DDEP position rationalizations allows me to investigate the widely accepted beliefs—available in public discourse—in terms of which voters justify their DDEP positions. Building on the qualitative literature on political legitimacy, as well as theory from political sociology, I will analyze the popular beliefs in terms of which voters justify their position on a given DDEP. Following Beetham (1991; Beetham and Lord 1998) and Lipset (1959, 1963, 1990), I focus on the shared standards (fairness), political values, and normative ends (norms of self-interest) upon which voters base their legitimations. In order to bridge the gap further between the motivated reasoning and prior beliefs literature and the political legitimacy scholarship, we can conceptualize the “prior beliefs” that shape political legitimations as internalized iterations of collective beliefs, norms, and values. This allows us to understand individual legitimations as part of a broader process of political reasoning that is largely driven by automatic cognitive processes. Such a conceptualization speaks to work that analyzes legitimation as indicator of an individual’s socialization into—and internalization of—collective beliefs, norms, and values (Easton and Dennis 1967; Della Fave 1986;

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Tyler 1990; Stryker 1994; for similar work on other types of legitimation see summaries in Zelditch 2001; Johnson et al. 2006; Jost et al. 2017). Answering this second question will help to address some key gaps in the qualitative work in sociology and political science. For example, Perrin (2005) and Stoker et al. (2016) use focus group data to analyze citizens’ democratic deliberation. Lane (1967), Prasad et al. (2009, 2016), Eliasoph (2010) Kidder and Martin (2012), Cramer (2016), Hochschild (2016), Kidder (2016), Pacewicz (2016), Skocpol and Williamson (2016), Williamson (2017), Andreouli and Nicholson (2018), Duina (2018), Wuthnow (2018), Silva (2019), Curtis (2020), Hull and Edgell (2020), and Leeds (2020) all use ethnography and/or semi-structured interviews to understand issues such as identity and citizens perspectives on politics. However, these literatures have largely overlooked both legitimation as well as the political values, normative ends, and standards of governance upon which legitimation draws. Widely Held Beliefs Classic (e.g., Converse 1964) and contemporary work (e.g., Kinder and Kalmoe 2017) has found that most citizens’ individual political attitudes are “innocent of ideology.” Much work has therefore been done on the role—or lack thereof—of ideology in individuals’ political attitudes (e.g., Converse 1964; Zaller 1992; Miller and Shanks 1996; Ansolabehere et al. 2008; for sociological perspectives see Martin and Desmond 2010; Baldassarri 2012; Baldassarri and Goldberg 2014; Boutyline and Vaisey 2017; Kinder and Kalmoe 2017; Baldassarri and Park 2020; Kiley and Vaisey 2020). Still others have studied how ideological values—driven by moral intuitions—are used as prior beliefs to generate public opinion and issue positions (Feinberg and Willer 2015). However, this literature neglects the public discourse upon which individual political rationalization is based. Furthermore, while scholars of legitimacy recognize the importance of individual-level factors (e.g., Jost et al. 2009; Azevedo et al. 2019), they have yet to provide a theory of the widely held beliefs to which legitimations appeal. For example, classic work in social psychology on legitimation and justification describes the importance of collective values, but speaks about them in general terms as part of a “pre-given social framework” (Zelditch 2001: 8) or an “existing, widely accepted cultural framework” (Johnson et al. 2006: 60). Suchman (1995) discusses how

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institutional actors define what is “morally desirable” by defining the predominant values for a field. This work, then, takes collective beliefs, norms, and values as largely undefined preconditions of legitimacy and legitimation. Further work on legitimacy describes cases in which widely accepted or “traditional” values are used to generate (de)legitimation (Stryker 1989: 349, 353; Clayman 2017: 53)—but does not provide a theoretical framework for understanding these values. To respond to this gap concerning the widely held beliefs to which legitimations appeal and upon which legitimacy is based, I turn to recent scholarship in the sociology of culture. Researchers have documented relationships between social context, collective narratives, and decisionmaking or behavior (Somers 1994; Tilly 2002; Polletta et al. 2011; Frye 2017; Rosen 2017), as well as the importance of values for understanding behavior (Miles 2015). This builds on work in the sociology of culture that has theorized public elements of culture (Sewell 1992; Swidler 2001; Patterson 2014; Lizardo 2017; Goldberg and Stein 2018; Hallett et al. 2019; Lizardo and Larson 2019). Moreover, this literature from the sociology of culture has established “narratives” and “vocabularies” as part of public culture, but has yet to address values (Haidt 2012), norms of fairness or self-interest (Spillman 2012; Spillman and Strand 2013), or standards of fairness (Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998) as part of public culture. Thus, this book will analyze the intersection of “personal culture” and “public culture” (Lizardo 2017) by investigating how voters use “widely held beliefs” in the form of public political values, normative ends, and normative standards of governance in their legitimations. It is important to note that these public political values, normative ends, and normative standards of governance are distinct from, but complementary to, collective systems of categorization upon which qualitative research traditionally focuses (Swidler 1986, 2001; Lamont 1992, 2000; Steensland 2006; Tavory and Swidler 2009). Values: Most Sacred Values Qualitative work has established the importance of understanding voters’ values (Prasad et al. 2009). This work is part of a broader literature on how morality is used in voters’ political justifications (Prasad et al. 2016) and used by parties to mobilize voters (Jung 2020). In the context of the

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analysis, the goal is to isolate American ideological political values that are used by parties. While sociologists have traditionally seen values as historically constructed (Lipset 1963, 1990) or from a functionalist perspective (Parsons and Shils 1951), recent work extends psychological theories of values to sociological analysis (Longest et al. 2013; Miles 2015). Here, I seek to bridge the psychological and contemporary sociological perspectives with Lipset’s framework for understanding the relationship between values and legitimacy (1963, 1990) and the subsequent literature that developed from Lipset’s account (Baer et al. 1990; Baxter-Moore et al. 2018; Besley and Persson 2019). To do so, I build on the work on Jonathan Haidt and colleagues from moral psychology (e.g., Haidt 2012). This begins the process of creating an empirical synthesis between overlapping models of reasoning from the voting scholarship and the morality scholarship (e.g., Vaisey 2009; VilaHenninger 2018), thereby addressing a gap in the literature noted by political sociologists (Brooks and Manza 2013: 745). Psychologically, there appears to be a broad divide in the political ideology of liberals and conservatives in terms of “universalism” versus “parochialism.” Liberals tend to be universalists and conservatives tend to be parochialists (for a summary see Waytz et al. 2019). The key here is that “[u]niversalism refers to moral regard directed toward more socially distant and structurally looser targets, relative to socially closer and structurally tighter targets. Parochialism refers to moral regard directed toward socially closer and structurally tighter targets, relative to socially more distant and structurally looser targets” (ibid.: 2). This distinction is based on decades of theory and empirical work in moral and political psychology (e.g., Singer 1981; Deutsch 1990; Jost et al. 2009; Graham et al. 2009; Waytz et al. 2019). Haidt and colleagues (Haidt 2001; Haidt et al. 2009; Graham et al. 2009; Haidt 2012) build on this research by empirically establishing links between judgments, moral intuitions, partisanship, and reasoning. This agenda begins with Haidt’s (2001, 2012) “dual-process” model of moral judgment, in which judgment is driven by automatically generated moral intuitions, and then justified by explicit post hoc reasoning. Haidt’s (2012) work on the dual-process model in political reasoning and judgment theorizes that explicit post hoc individual-level political reasoning indicates the presence of specific individual-level combinations of moral intuitions, which also spur individual-level political judgments.

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Applied to political reasoning, the argument is that individuals have a particular pattern in levels of sensitivity across different moral intuitions which allow them to resonate with and adopt culturally constructed “moral matrices” about political ideology (Haidt et al. 2009: 115; Haidt 2012: 114). These moral matrices form the scaffolding for “grand narratives” (Smith 2003) of collective ideological discourse that are anchored by a “most sacred value” (Haidt 2012: 296). Actors then reason using a narrative’s “most sacred value” to reaffirm their ideology’s collective moral narrative and subsequent policy positions (e.g., Haidt 2012: 351, 364–5). Each “most sacred value” corresponds with all of the moral intuitions that are triggered by a given ideology’s collective narrative, is the fundamental goal or principle that cannot be sacrificed by those who resonate with that narrative, and is used by individuals to generate explicit post hoc ideological reasoning that is in line with the corresponding ideological narrative (Tetlock et al. 2000: 853; Tetlock 2003; Graham and Haidt 2012: 14; Haidt 2012: 345, 364). This means that the presence of a given collective political moral narrative in a voter’s reasoning in the form of a “most sacred value” provides evidence of a link between public culture, declarative culture, and nondeclarative culture (Patterson 2014; Lizardo 2017). Given this theory, we can expect that an individual’s use of a political ideology’s “most sacred value” in political reasoning provides evidence of their political socialization by the political party (or parties) that use said political ideology. This perspective on partisanship and policy reasoning is supported by work across the voting literature that shows the connection between partisan affiliation, commitment to partisan ideology or beliefs, and policy stance (e.g., Bartels 2002; Lau and Redlawsk 2006; Baldassarri and Gelman 2008; Brooks and Manza 2013). For my analysis, I focus on the core moral difference between American liberal and conservative political ideology by using Jonathan Haidt’s work on American political ideological “most sacred values” (Haidt 2012; Graham and Haidt 2012). This work draws upon the scholarship of Philip Tetlock (Tetlock et al. 2000; Tetlock 2003) on the concept of a “sacred value”—defined as a core moral value that a community will not compromise at any cost. I analyze the “most” sacred values (Haidt 2012; Graham and Haidt 2012) of liberals and conservatives rather than the broader “universalist versus parochial” divide. This is because American political ideological most sacred values potentially represent the core moral

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distinction between universalism and parochialism in the American political context. This research contributes to literature that has established the importance of these most sacred values in the legitimations of American voters (Vila-Henninger 2018, 2019a, 2019b). A key difference between the work of Haidt and colleagues in moral psychology and the sociological literature is that sociologists typically take the perspective that values develop historically (e.g., Lipset 1963). Conversely, Haidt and colleagues posit that values correspond to intuitions that are the product of genetics (Haidt 2012). However, key work has thrown Haidt and colleagues’ claims about the genetic nature of intuition into question (Hatemi et al. 2019). This book seeks to bridge the gap between these two perspectives by arguing that values correspond to historical differences that are internalized as moral intuitions and other psychological processes through socialization. Building on previous work (Vila-Henninger 2018), I argue that evidence of most sacred values in voters’ legitimations provides evidence of political socialization rather than genetic differences. Furthermore, we can understand actors’ legitimations using these values as “moral proofs.” The argument is that actors’ build their justifications on moral “proofs” that are “based on objects that are external to persons” (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006: 131; Barnard 2016: 1025). In this case, proofs would be examples that actors use to justify their DDEP position that are derived from most sacred values. This then builds on the French sociological tradition of justification analysis (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006; see also Barnard 2016; Hansen 2019). Taking this approach then helps to extend the literature on morality and politics (for a review see Miles and Vaisey 2015). This also supplements the quantitative work that shows the influence of legitimacy and values on behavior (Besley and Persson 2019), as well as the importance of moral discourse in political parties’ mobilization of voters (Jung 2020). Furthermore, this book extends work on the use of values in economic contexts (Livne 2019; Altomonte 2020) by demonstrating how ambiguity in political moral values allows partisans to use these values to interpret different economic situations (represented in different DDEPs) differently. Normative Ends: Norms of Self-Interest Supplementing this perspective is classic work on the role of self-interest as a key end for governments trying to establish or maintain legitimacy.

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Classic political theory (Smith 1776; Kant 1785 [1969]) and contemporary perspectives in social psychology (e.g., Zelditch and Walker 2003) have established that a legitimation that appeals to self-interest can only help to legitimate political power if the conditions for competition are fair. Contemporary qualitative work (Vila-Henninger 2017) has buttressed this argument by demonstrating that norms of self-interest and fairness converge in voters’ legitimations of a DDEP. Thus, I will analyze how voters use norms of self-interest in their legitimations of their DDEP positions. By “norms of self-interest” I am referring to actors’ vocabularies of motive about self-interested action that are socially acceptable. In other words, people tend to discuss interest situations in terms of normative conceptions of what kind of self-interest should be pursued (Spillman 2012; Spillman and Strand 2013; Vila-Henninger 2017). This work builds on psychological findings about actors’ socialization into discourses of self-interested action, which they then use at times to justify their own action (Eliasoph 2010; Miller 1999; Holmes et al. 2002). These norms can then influence behavior (e.g., Gardner and Ryan 2020) and are treated as normative ends for governance when used by voters in their political legitimations (Vila-Henninger 2017). Standards of Governance: Fairness Finally, I investigate the standards of governance that voters use to legitimate their DDEP positions. To do so, I turn to the moral economy literature, as well as neoliberalism. Fairness: Moral Economy To understand economic fairness in voter legitimations of DDEPs, we must turn to the moral economy literature. E. P. Thompson (1971) coined the term “Moral Economy” in his analysis of eighteenth century English riots. In the contemporary literature, a moral economy is a norm, evidenced in a popular consensus, about moral principles of economic exchange that extends beyond simple supply and demand. This norm then serves as a non-rational source of popular economic legitimacy, attitudes, and behavior (Mau 2003, 2005; Sayer 2007; Svallfors 2006; Sachweh 2012; Koos and Sachweh 2019; Taylor-Gooby et al. 2019). Much quantitative moral economy research investigates how citizens’ attitudes about resource allocation are shaped by, or correspond with,

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institutionalized welfare state moral norms about resource allocation (e.g., Mau 2003; Koos and Sachweh 2019). However, qualitative work focuses on legitimations. For example, Taylor-Gooby et al. (2019) found that there was evidence of UK citizens adopting neoliberal values in their (de)legitimations of welfare state priorities. Similar work has been done on moral economies of inequality (Sachweh 2012; Prinzen 2017), the use of social services (Kissane 2012), and economic referenda (Vila-Henninger 2017, 2019a, 2019b). Fairness is a key measure of legitimation in the qualitative moral economy literature (Sachweh 2012: 429; Vila-Henninger 2017, 2019a, 2019b). Crucially, many scholars define a moral economy as a consensus of fairness. Here, consensus is operationalized as agreement among citizens across key economic, social, or political divides (Svallfors 2006, Sachweh 2012; Vila-Henninger 2017, 2019a, 2019b). Thus, I will investigate whether moral economies emerge in voter legitimations of their DDEP positions. Fairness: Neoliberalism Drawing on scholarship that documents neoliberal ideology, I define “neoliberalism” as “the set of discourses, practices, devices which determine a new mode of governance of humans according to the general principle of competition” (Amable 2011: 7). Venugopal (2015) has astutely critiqued the imprecise use of the term “neoliberalism” in the social sciences. In many instances, scholars mistakenly use “neoliberalism” to refer to economic “liberalism”—or the belief that markets are self-regulating. While much work has been done on neoliberal economics and policy (e.g., Springer et al. 2016. Cahill et al. 2017; Brown 2019. Biebricher 2019), little work done on how citizens use neoliberal ideology—or on neoliberal socialization more broadly. Neoliberalism was created in Paris in 1938 at the Colloque Walter Lippmann (Denord 2001, 2007; Foucault 2004; Amable 2011). The colloquium was organized by Louis Rougier—who published a foundational book on neoliberalism in the same year (Rougier 1938). An important element of the ideology of “neoliberalism” is its development of Social Darwinism and the prioritization of “fair” individual economic competition (Rougier 1938; Dardot and Laval 2009; Amable 2011, 2014). A key difference between Social Darwinism and neoliberalism is the belief in neoliberal ideology that the market is socially constructed and

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thus fragile. It is in this light that many neoliberals see state intervention that reregulates—rather than deregulates—markets in order to foster fair individual competition as necessary to maintain a fundamentally fragile, socially constructed market order. Given the belief in the social construction of the market, neoliberal ideology shifts the responsibility for risk and achievement in economic competition away from groups, institutions, and collective processes and onto individuals so as to sustain and foster market order (Bourdieu 1998; Fantasia and Voss 2004; Harvey 2005; Shamir 2008; Dardot and Laval 2009; Wacquant 2009, 2010, 2014; Amable 2011, 2014; Centeno and Cohen 2012; Hall and Lamont 2013; Schmidt and Thatcher 2013; Reich 2014; Mijs et al. 2016; Vila-Henninger 2018, 2019a, 2019b). For neoliberals, a prosperous and stable economy is fragile and socially constructed. As opposed to liberalism or Social Darwinism, where economic competition is a natural law that will allow for the selfregulation of the market—thus justifying economic deregulation—neoliberal ideology asserts that a successful economy depends on individuallevel competition, but that individuals themselves are responsible for economic competition and for integrating themselves successfully into the economic order. This then shifts the burden for economic participation, choices, and outcomes onto individual competitors/consumers. Scholars see this element as the “individualized responsibility” aspect of neoliberal ideology. The other dimension of neoliberal ideology, however, is that because a successful economy is fragile and socially constructed, the government needs to constantly reregulate—rather than deregulate—economic competition in order to ensure “fair market competition.” Thus, while the onus for economic participation in neoliberal ideology is shifted away from collectivities and onto individual consumers/competitors, the responsibility for the ensuring the appropriate conditions for individual competition lays with the government. This is key because in neoliberal ideology, competition is both moral and economic: by ensuring fair market competition, the government creates the condition for not only the most efficient competitor to succeed, but also those with the most merit (for a summary see e.g., Amable 2011: 5). However, in neoliberalism, the responsibility for fair economic behavior lies with the individual as part of “individualized responsibility.”

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Thus, in my analysis I will investigate neoliberal conceptions of economic fairness. In particular, I will focus on conceptions of “individualized responsibility” and “fair market competition” (Vila-Henninger 2019a, 2019b)—which contributes to work on neoliberal frames (AventHolt 2012) and neoliberal moral economy (Wiegratz 2016).

Building on Direct Democracy Literature I conclude this section providing a brief overview of the relevant literature from political science and economics on direct democracy. I then discuss the debate about direct versus representative democracy. Literature in Political Science and Economics on Direct Democracy Studying voting behavior and decision-making in direct democracy faces an array of pitfalls. The extant scholarship on voter reasoning in direct democracy has largely investigated information processing (Banducci 1998; Bowler and Donovan 1998: Chapter 4)—with a special emphasis on information seeking, heuristics, and biases (Lupia 1994, 2016; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Gastil et al. 2007; Wells et al. 2009; Gastil 2014; Reedy et al. 2014; Bowler 2015; Achen and Bartels 2016: Chapter 3). Crucially, scholars have thoroughly documented how for most ballot measures, little information is available for voters and few cues are provided by elites (Bowler and Donovan 1998: 27–28; Gastil 2014; Gastil et al. 2007; Lupia 1994: 65; Bowler 2015: 189). Furthermore, when advertising is present it tends to be misleading or false (e.g., California Commission on Campaign Financing 1992: 199–201; Gastil and Richards 2013). Voters also often misunderstand ballot measures due to the complexity of the language used to describe the measure in official voter guides and in the wording of the measure itself (e.g., Center for Governmental Studies 2008). The key here is that information for voters in direct democracy is usually sparse, which then hinders consistent preference formation according to ideological position and forces citizens to rely heavily on prior political knowledge (Zaller 1992; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Crucially, however, my analysis is of voter legitimations. Thus, these pitfalls—which scholars of voting behavior are correct to emphasize— do not apply to the findings in this book and its investigation of the normative grounds upon which voters justify why they support or oppose

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DDEPs. Issues with information processing, availability, and accuracy do shape how voters support or oppose DDEPs. However, these factors are beyond the scope of this analysis. We then turn to the economic literature on direct democracy. This work looks at direct democracy and its economic consequences (Matsusaka 2005a: 166–7). On a macro-level, we see that direct democracy does not cause state-level fiscal gridlock (Matsusaka 2005b). Moreover, scholars have shown that business interests have less influence in direct democracy (Matsusaka 2018). Many debate the consequences of direct democracy. For example, Radcliff and Shufeldt (2016) demonstrate that direct democracy increases life satisfaction. Moreover, Feld and Kirchgassner make a variety of contributions. They show (ibid. 2000) that direct democracy makes better informed citizens. They also show (2001a) direct democracy is associated with lower spending, more efficient tax collection, and increased democratic satisfaction, as well as that (2001b) expanding direct democracy lowers public debt. Next, Olken (2010) shows direct democratic participation increases voter satisfaction and legitimacy. Finally, Arnold et al. (2016) provide evidence that support for direct democracy indicates dissatisfaction with representative democracy. Debate on Direct Versus Representative Democracy This then feeds into the representation in direct democracy versus representative democracy debate. A limitation here is that most of the research done on direct democracy has been carried out in Switzerland and the United States. Gherghina (2017) shows the effects of direct democracy as a system on political support—expanding Eastonian perspectives—across 38 countries. Prato and Strulovici (2017) show that direct democracy disincentivizes politicians. Leemann and Wasserfallen (2016) demonstrate that direct democracy improves representative democracy. Bauer and Fatke (2014) show that direct democracy increases political trust. However, Stadelmann-Steffen and Vatter (2012) find no evidence of the effect of direct democracy on happiness. Important literature has also emerged that demonstrates the pitfalls of classic arguments against direct democracy. Peters (2016) shows that sometimes direct democracy competes with representative democracy participation while in other instances it complements such participation.

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Silva (2018) shows that states in the United States with direct democracy pass more immigration laws. Four studies from the direct democracy literature are particularly important for this book. First, Colombo and Kriesi (2017) demonstrate that voters align policy arguments with partisanship. This finding then reaffirms this book’s framework for understanding the influence of the interaction of partisanship and self-interest. Second, DeAngelis, Colombo, and Morisi (2020) demonstrate that voters—especially less informed voters—tend to use heuristics. This complements the literature on heuristics (e.g., Baldassarri 2012; Lau et al. 2018) and suggests that voters likely use heuristics in their legitimation processes. Third, Colombo (2019) investigates determinants of when voters provide pragmatic versus moral justification in direct democracy. She finds that personal connection, ballot measure outcome, ideology, and campaigning influence voters’ justifications. Thus, my findings on the interaction between selfinterest and partisanship build on this study. Finally, Towfigh et al. (2016) demonstrate that direct democracy leads to greater acceptance of political outcomes. Thus, we see that direct democracy is a legitimating factor itself.

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CHAPTER 3

Analytical Approach and Broader American Political and Economic Discourses

Analytical Approach In what follows, I describe my application of the principle of “Reconstruction” from the Extended Case Method to my data through an iterative process in which I used theory and empirical findings to generate deductive thematic codes in an initial round of coding. I then developed inductive codes that accounted for any theoretically relevant anomalies or observations that extended beyond the scope of my initial theories. I used these inductive codes to engage in a broader literature review in an attempt to find additional theories and empirical literature that explained my inductive coding. Subsequently, I developed deductive codes from this broader literature review that allowed me to construct a strategically expanded coding scheme that—by nature—allowed for theory building and synthesis by incorporating multiple empirical and theoretical perspectives. I concluded by using this expanded coding scheme to reclassify my inductive codes and verify my initial coding. Thus, cases that were anomalous to my initial theories led to synthesis with other theories that provided explanations. In the event that there were no available scientific explanations of a given rationale, I then used this rationale to extend theory. Building on the work of sociologists who have emphasized the importance of “reflexivity”—or the “self-monitoring of behavior” (Burawoy 2009: 38)—ethnographer Michael Burawoy developed a method of qualitative inquiry that seeks to balance positivistic and reflexive social science. © The Author(s) 2020 L. A. Vila-Henninger, Social Justification and Political Legitimacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51716-8_3

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The logic here is that these two modes of knowledge production are complementary (Burawoy 2009: 39). Reflexive investigation and analysis, then, embraces and builds upon the reflexive elements of qualitative investigation that involve “intersubjectivity between participant and observer” (Burawoy 2009; see also Burawoy 1998; Sallaz 2009). Burawoy proceeds by developing tools for reflexive observation and analysis that are obstacles for “positive” social science but serve as strengths for qualitative research—and ethnography in particular—and dubs his approach “The Extended Case Method” (ECM). ECM consists of four “reflexive” principles: (1) Intervention, (2) Process, (3) Structuration, and (4) Reconstruction. A reflexive epistemology and full application of ECM to semi-structured, nonclinical interview data is beyond the scope of this book. Instead, this book will focus on the application of the principle of “Reconstruction” to the coding and analysis of semi-structured interview data. Semi-structured interview data can be seen as “reflexive” through the principle of “Intervention.” The researcher often “extracts” the respondent “from her own space and time and subjects her to the space and time of the interviewer” (Burawoy 2009: 40). Burawoy argues that this mode of data generation is a strength because “it is by mutual reaction that we discover the properties of the social order. Interventions create perturbations that are not noise to be expurgated but music to be appreciated, transmitting the hidden secrets of the participant’s world” (Burawoy 2009: 40). While the epistemology can be debated here, the important point is that through this qualitative “intervention” the intersubjectivity of the social scientist and respondent “reveals” the “social order” by investigating “the way it responds to pressure” (Burawoy 2009: 44). It is important to note here that Burawoy sees reflexive methods as complementary to positivism, such that they form a “methodological duality”—entailing “the coexistence and codependence of two models of science—positive and reflexive” (Burawoy 2009: 39). In ECM, a key part of the analytic response is the principle of “Reconstruction.” This principle recognizes that representation—in the positivistic sense—is not possible with this type of subjective and local qualitative data. Thus, rather than generalizing based on the data itself, the researcher should use these data to build theory. In ECM, this is done by starting with a “theoretical point of departure” and then using the data to engage in “dialogue” with theory (Burawoy 2009: 43). The advantage here is that by using theory, the analyst produces thematic codes that (s)he

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should observe in his/her data. When the researcher finds that the data present anomalies or stretch beyond the scope of extant theory, (s)he then uses these data to expand the theory at hand to explain these surprising or novel findings. This approach is based on the epistemological principle that “science offers no final truth… but exists in a state of continual revision” (Burawoy 2009: 44). Through this lens, then, reflexive data are used to revise and “reconstruct” theory empirically. The key here, as Burawoy explains, is that “instead of discovering grounded theory, we elaborate existing theory” (Burawoy 2009: 43). In other words, reconstructed theory building is the result of “dialogue” between the initial theory and empirical anomalies. The resulting process of “reconstruction” is similar to abduction (Peirce 1934; Swedberg 2017) in its ability to theory build through the identification of anomalies (Timmermans and Tavory 2012: 171; Tavory and Timmermans 2014). However, my approach differs from abduction in that it begins with a core set of theories used to generate the study’s research questions to classify anomalous cases as such (Timmermans and Tavory 2012: 181).

Generalizability The important point of distinction here is that I seek to contribute by expanding extant theories rather than generalizing to a population. By elaborating extant theory, this book can help facilitate future scholarship by contributing to the analytical framework that researchers can use in their research design and analysis. In this sense, my findings will be generalizable to the extent that any theory is generalizable.

Outline of Code Generation Process For my analyses, I began with my first empirical question: “How do partisanship and self-interest interact to shape partisan voters’ rationalizations of their position on direct democratic economic policy (DDEP)?” Based on the research question, I used theories of voter reasoning to identify expected relationships between “descriptive” and “thematic” codes. Here, I drew upon Bernard and Ryan’s (2010) discussion of code distinctions. My use of the term “descriptive code” refers “structural codes,” or codes that “describe things like…features of the respondent” (Bernard and Ryan 2010: 76). These descriptive codes then allowed me

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to identify the presence or absence of a given rationale across respondents for a given descriptive code. Next, I use the term “thematic code” to refer to what Bernard and Ryan (2010) call “theme codes,” which “show where the themes we’ve identified actually occur in a text” (Bernard and Ryan 2010: 76). The important distinction here is that while both thematic and descriptive codes are theory-driven in my analysis, descriptive codes refer to theoretically relevant characteristics of the respondents while thematic codes refer to theoretically relevant elements of discourse. Using my research question and theories of voter reasoning, I selected my two quasi-independent variables: “partisan affiliation” and “economic position.” As DDEP position also helped to shape legitimations, I created eight different comparison groups composed of all of the combinations of the dichotomous quasi-independent variables: economic position, partisan affiliation, and DDEP position. I then used a descriptive code for each of these comparison groups.

Coding: Turning Talk into “Rationales” Next, I analyzed respondents’ justifications of their position on each ballot measure. This helped me to investigate my second research question concerning the discourses that voters draw upon to rationalize their direct democratic economic policy (DDEP) position. To refine the operationalization of voter reasoning in respondents’ rationalizations of their DDEP positions, I used what I call a “rationale.” I define a “rationale” as a respondent’s application of a broader principle to justify the respondents’ stance on an issue or topic in terms that are relevant to said issue or topic. In the case of my analysis, an “issue” is defined as the policy domain of each ballot measure. Furthermore, I grouped rationales according to the widely accepted beliefs, norms, and values to which each rationale corresponded. I refer to these groupings as “rationale groupings.” This operationalization is similar to Legitimacy Theory’s distinction between an ALE and an RLF (Zelditch and Walker 2003). Thus, for my analysis, legitimations are only meaningful insofar as they correspond to a widely accepted political or economic belief, norm, or value. It is for this reason, then, that I grouped rationales according to the widely held beliefs, norms, and values from which they are derived in

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“rationale groupings.” I then investigated distinctive legitimations as they corresponded to widely held beliefs, norms, and values. The advantage of this definition of a “rationale” is that it enables “reconstruction.” Using my core theories, I generated descriptive codes and rationale groupings. I then used the empirical literature to identify ways in which broader principles—or beliefs, norms, and values—would apply to a given issue, or in the case of this analysis, the policy domain of a given DDEP. The process of reconstruction allows for theory building in two ways. First, it contributes to the empirical literature on a broader principle by using deductive coding. For example, my analysis contributed to the literature on political values by using deductive codes based in the political values literature. Next, reconstruction builds theory by pushing the analyst to find additional theories to explain inductive rationale codes that emerged in the process of coding. It was in this latter way that I created my rationales for “moral economy,” “libertarianism,” and “neoliberalism.” It is through this process of reconstruction that we create a dialogue between deductive and inductive analysis that avoids using the “rationale” concept as a tautology. A key application here is Boltanski and Thévenot’s (ibid. 2006; see also Barnard 2016; Hansen 2019) work on justification as employing “moral proofs.” The argument is that actors build their justifications on moral “proofs” that are “based on objects that are external to persons” (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006: 131; Barnard 2016: 1025). Rationales, in the sense that I use the term, serve to operationalize “proofs” by providing a coding and analytical strategy for moral proofs. Thus, the application of a moral principle in a concrete moral dilemma would serve as a rationale—and by extension evidence of a moral proof. This approach is particularly suited not only to voter rationalization, but to voter rationalization of policy position. Thus, I used the partisanship reasoning and self-interested reasoning literature, respectively, to generate “rationales” through a literature review of voter reasoning in a policy domain that was specific to each DDEP. Each issue-specific literature review allowed me to identify and select keywords, phrases, and examples for each thematic code. As I progressed with my coding, I was able to apply inductive codes as they emerged. I used this coding strategy as a way to develop initial inductive codes that enabled theory building by serving as reference points for a subsequent literature review that sought to address these anomalous codes

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with extant literature and theory that were outside of my initial theoretical framework. Given that these codes were preliminary documentation of theoretical and empirical anomalies, there was no need to recode every document every time an inductive code emerged because the first round of coding used inductive codes as tools for reconstruction rather than a definitive set of final codes. I also updated my preliminary codebook each time I introduced an inductive code in order to keep track of these inductive codes as they emerged. I divided each semi-interview transcription into a separate document for each respondent for each of three DDEPs I included in this book. For each DDEP, then, all of the data for a given respondent were in one document. I then coded entire documents, which allowed me to code for the presence or absence of a rationale in the legitimation of a respondent for each DDEP—rather than coding for utterances of each rationale for each respondent. Central to my inductive coding was my identification of instances/keywords of issue-specific cases that were used by the respondent that fit logically with a descriptive or thematic code but were not in my initial thematic coding scheme. Through this dialogue between deductive and inductive coding, I began my process of reconstruction. After I coded all of the interviews for a corresponding ballot measure in a first round of deductive coding, I used my inductive codes to conduct an expanded literature review of potentially relevant alternative theories and an expanded review of issue-specific empirical findings. Crucially, I asked “Is there evidence in further research that matches with the inductive codes?” If there was not, then my inductive codes extended theory. If there was further research that could be used to classify these inductive codes, I adopted this literature to help explain an inductive code and thus synthesized theoretical perspectives. My reasoning here was that I did not want to create inductive theory that was redundant. The advantage was that this approach allowed me to investigate whether the inductive code presented data that were anomalous to just my initial theoretical framework or if they were anomalous to work in sociology and political science on voter reasoning. I then used this additional relevant literature to rename my inductive codes and generate a second round of deductive coding. Often times, anomalous cases, which I documented with my inductive codes, forced me to extend beyond the voter reasoning literature and thus required a more extensive literature review. I then double-checked

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my codes for the whole case set for the entire ballot measure by using the “Quotations” function in the CAQDAS ATLAS.ti. Once I finished double-checking my coding, I used the theories upon which my first research question was based regarding partisan voter reasoning and self-interested voter reasoning to match rationales with descriptive codes for each comparison group of partisan affiliation, economic position, and DDEP position. In this way, I was able to isolate when thematic codes were present or absent for a given descriptive code, as well as identify corresponding inductively generated rationales. Specifically, I performed this task with the “Query Tool” in ATLAS.ti. The “Query Tool” was especially useful for helping me find cases in which thematic rationale codes fit or contradicted theoretical expectations for descriptive codes. For example, I was able to identify rationales for high-income self-interested reasoning that were used by low-income respondents. This was then a second tool for identifying anomalous cases. ATLAS.ti thus enabled me to reconstruct theory not only via coding, but also via the “Query Tool.” In my subsequent analysis, I systematically reconstructed partisan reasoning and self-interested reasoning voting theories, along with other theories of voter political and/or economic reasoning that extended beyond my core theories.

Core Theories This book empirically addresses two research questions. First, I investigate how partisanship and self-interest interacted to shape partisan voters’ legitimations of their position on direct democratic economic policy (DDEP). Second, I investigate the widely accepted political and economic beliefs, norms, and values that voters drew upon to rationalize their direct democratic economic policy (DDEP) positions. Using ECM (Burawoy 1998, 2009), I began my analysis with a set of core theories that I used to generate my research questions. The idea, then, was to use the voting literature in sociology and political science to create an initial framework for the qualitative analysis of the widely accepted political and economic beliefs, norms, and values that voters used to legitimate their DDEP positions. The second question helps us to understand the normative basis of the political legitimacy of DDEPs. In particular, I investigated the values (Lipset 1963), standards of governance (Beetham 1991; Beetham and

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Lord 1998), and normative ends (Spillman 2012; Spillman and Strand 2013) that actors use to (de)legitimate DDEPs.

Core Theories: Most Sacred Values Psychologically, there appears to be a broad divide in the political ideology of American liberals and conservatives in terms of “universalism” versus “parochialism.” Liberals tend to be universalists and conservatives tend to be parochialists (for a summary see Waytz et al. 2019). The key here is that “[u]niversalism refers to moral regard directed toward more socially distant and structurally looser targets, relative to socially closer and structurally tighter targets. Parochialism refers to moral regard directed toward socially closer and structurally tighter targets, relative to socially more distant and structurally looser targets” (ibid.: 2). This distinction is based on decades of theory and empirical work in moral and political psychology (e.g., Singer 1981; Deutsch 1990; Jost et al. 2009; Waytz et al. 2019). For my analysis, I focused on the core moral differences between American liberal and conservative political ideology by using Jonathan Haidt’s work on “most sacred values” (Haidt 2012; Graham and Haidt 2012). This work draws upon the scholarship of Philip Tetlock (Tetlock et al. 2000; Tetlock 2003) on the concept of a “sacred value”—defined as a core moral value that a community will not compromise at any cost. I analyze the “most” sacred values (Haidt 2012; Graham and Haidt 2012) of liberals and conservatives rather than the broader “universalist versus parochial” divide. This is because the most sacred values of American political ideology potentially represent the core moral distinctions between universalism and parochialism in the American political context. This research contributes to the literature that has established the importance of these most sacred values in the legitimations of American voters (Vila-Henninger 2018, 2019a, 2019b). Using this framework, we can identify the influence of collective American political ideology in individual political rationalizations by finding evidence of a given “most sacred value.” Haidt (2012) identifies three primary American political ideologies: Liberal, Conservative, and Libertarian. Liberals’ “most sacred value [is] care for victims of oppression” (ibid.: 345), and more broadly protecting “the rights of certain vulnerable groups” (ibid.: 212). Conversely, Conservatives’ “most sacred value” is preserving “the institutions and traditions that sustain a moral community” (ibid.: 357)—or

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“in-group” more broadly (Waytz et al. 2019). For government regulation, Haidt (2012) explains that “liberals are most concerned about the rights of certain vulnerable groups…[while] conservatives…hold more the traditional idea of liberty as the right to be left alone” (Haidt 2012: 212). The Libertarian “most sacred value” is the protection and promotion “individual liberty” (Haidt 2012: 352), defined as the rejection of “the idea that the needs of one person impose a moral duty upon others”—a position known as “negative liberty” (Berlin 1969; Iyer et al. 2012: 2; also see Haidt et al. 2009; Haidt 2012: 350). This means that liberty is seen as a moral goal for its own sake (Iyer et al. 2012; Haidt 2012). As such, government regulation serves as a foil and thereby an enemy of liberty (Iyer et al. 2012; Haidt 2012). Thus, we can expect Libertarians to exalt liberty and individual rights in the face of government regulation. Conservatives and Libertarians have overlapping policy stances on government regulation of commerce (Haidt 2012: 212). However, these two camps diverge when addressing the relationship of morality to liberty and government regulation. Recall that liberty is a moral end for Libertarians, while for Conservatives it is a key tradition for maintaining a moral community or protecting their in-group. Therefore, the government is seen by Libertarians as fundamentally inefficient—and by extension immoral—when limiting liberty. However, for Conservatives, a government’s moral character is judged according to its role in fostering a moral community or aiding an in-group. In this sense, both Conservatives and Libertarians would judge a government that limits economic liberty as immoral, but would differ on the moral character of government: Conservatives would judge government action according to its role in supporting a moral community or in-group, while Libertarians would judge such government restrictions as fundamentally inefficient and immoral (Iyer et al. 2012; Haidt 2012). Furthermore, a key libertarian ideological perspective that stems from its most sacred value is that government economic regulation is fundamentally inefficient (Iyer et al. 2012). This characteristic of libertarianism is distinct from the conservative most sacred value because of its relationship to morality. For conservatives, economic liberty is moral because it is a tradition that sustains a moral community or helps their in-group. For libertarians, liberty is a moral goal in and of itself, and thus government

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regulation is fundamentally inferior because of its interference in individual freedom. In the context of economic liberty, government inferiority takes the form of “inefficiency” for libertarians.

Normative Ends: Norms of Self-Interest The contemporary self-interest perspective begins with the work of Anthony Downs (1957), who argued that actors seek to maximize utility through voting. Furthermore, the representative democratic voting literature has demonstrated that historically, the American citizen tended to vote for the American presidential candidate whose economic policy aligned with the voter’s economic policy interests (e.g., Stonecash 2000; McCarty et al. 2006; Baldassarri and Gelman 2008; Gelamn 2008; Gelman et al. 2010) and that voters’ political views often correspond with these interests (e.g., Weeden and Grusky 2012; Dodson 2017). However, scholars have found that there are key limitations to voters’ pursuit of self-interest. First, voters primarily pursue short-term selfinterested ends, but only when either both the stakes are high and the issues are clear, or there are “dangerous or ambiguous threats” (Sears and Funk 1991: 76; see also Bartels 2005). Research has also shown that voters greatly struggle to accurately identify policy that supports their long-term self-interest (Bartels 2005). Thus, we can expect short-term self-interest to influence reasoning on direct democratic economic policy (DDEP) positions when the issues are clear and the stakes are high, or when there are “ambiguous” threats to self-interest. Furthermore, I operationalized self-interest as economic position, and subsequently divided economic position into “high-income” and “low-income.” Thus, I treated each level of the dichotomous quasiindependent variable of economic position as an economic incentive. I then used the literature on each ballot measure to find norms of selfinterest that corresponded to each income level for each policy domain for each ballot measure. By “norms of self-interest” I am referring to actors’ vocabularies of motive about self-interested action that is socially acceptable. In other words, people tend to discuss interest situations in terms of normative conceptions of the kind of self-interest that should be pursued (Spillman 2012; Spillman and Strand 2013; Vila-Henninger 2017). This work builds on findings in sociology and psychology on actors’ socialization into discourses of self-interested action, which they then use at times to

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justify their own action (Eliasoph 1998; Miller 1999; Holmes et al. 2002). These norms can then influence behavior (e.g., Gardner and Ryan 2020) and are treated as normative ends for governance when used by voters in their political legitimations (Vila-Henninger 2017). I conceptualize norms of self-interest as socially acceptable vocabularies of motive about self-interest. In this context, a given DDEP would be justified because it allows a voter to pursue a socially acceptable self-interested goal. Furthermore, drawing upon folk economics (Boyer and Petersen 2017; Swedberg 2018; Patrick 2018; Strand 2020) we could then understand these self-interested vocabularies of motive as folk “causes” of economic action that would then facilitate small group cooperation and the acceptance or rejection of political power.

Inductively Generated Codes The theme of “fairness” as a basis for legitimation arose in my analysis inductively. Building on David Beetham (Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998), I found inductively that respondents legitimated their stances on DDEPs in terms of shared standards of governance. Thus, I discuss two theoretical frameworks that I used to understand the shared standards of governance that respondents used in their legitimations. These two perspectives are “Moral Economy” and “Neoliberalism.” Fairness: Moral Economy The term “Moral Economy” was coined by E. P. Thompson (1971), who argued that eighteenth-century English bread riots were caused by popular outrage over the British government’s permittance of merchants to sell flour well above normative prices—thus violating the popular consensus that everyone had the right to subsistence. In contemporary scholarship, the term refers to the “shared moral intuitions, assumptions, beliefs, rationales, and norms” (Kissane 2012: 190) in which market action is embedded. A moral economy is a consensus about economic action—including policy—based in a moral principle—such as fairness. The consensus arises when actors use the moral principle to evaluate and (de)legitimate said economic action (Thompson 1971; Mau 2003; Svallfors 2006; Western and Rosenfeld 2011; Kissane 2012; Sachweh 2012). Crucially, scholars operationalize “consensus” as agreement among citizens across

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key economic, social, or political divides (Svallfors 2006; Sachweh 2012; Vila-Henninger 2017, 2019a, 2019b). Here, we can define “fairness” as “proportionality”—or people getting “what they deserve” (Haidt 2012: 212–213). However, political ideology shapes how and when proportionality is applied. For example, liberals use proportionality in defense of vulnerable groups while conservatives tend to use proportionality regardless of group vulnerability in favor of an in-group (Haidt 2012; Waytz et al. 2019). The prevalence of partisan applications of proportionality across economic position to legitimate a position on a given DDEP would then constitute a consensus—as it spans a key economic divide (Svallfors 2006; Sachweh 2012; Vila-Henninger 2019a, 2019b). As moral economies would be indicated by legitimations that emerge across partisan affiliation and economic position in my data, these cases are thus anomalous to my two quasi-independent variables—partisan affiliation and economic position (see Chapter 4, Data and Methods for more on this study’s quasiindependent variables). In the fourth empirical chapter, I will then analyze moral economies for each of the three ballot measures that I selected for my analysis. Furthermore, the moral economy literature does not specify the social sources of moral principles—such as fairness. Given this gap in the literature we can imagine that moral economies could be partisan—in that they draw on a given party’s “most sacred value” to make fairness (de)legitimations. Fairness: Neoliberalism Drawing upon scholarship that documents neoliberal ideology, I define “neoliberalism” as “the set of discourses, practices, devices which determine a new mode of governance of humans according to the general principle of competition” (Amable 2011: 7). Venugopal (2015) has astutely critiqued the imprecise use of the term “neoliberalism” in the social sciences. In many instances, scholars mistakenly use “neoliberalism” to refer to economic “liberalism”—or the belief that markets are self-regulating. Conversely, neoliberal ideology sees the market as a social construct that needs to be constantly protected. This has resulted in a neoliberal political project that seeks to “reregulate”—instead of simply deregulate—markets in order to foster market order by ensuring fair individual

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competition. Thus, state actions that enhance and promote individual competition are seen as “moral” by neoliberals across partisan affiliation (Amable 2011: 6, 9–11). In other words, neoliberals see state intervention that “reregulates” markets to foster fair individual competition as necessary. The aim of such intervention, then, is to shift risk, achievement, and responsibility away from groups, institutions, and collective processes onto individuals so as to sustain and foster market order. Neoliberalism was created in Paris in 1938 at the Colloque Walter Lippmann (Denord 2001, 2007; Foucault 2004; Amable 2011). The colloquium was organized by Louis Rougier—who published a foundational book on neoliberalism in the same year (Rougier 1938). An important element of the ideology of “neoliberalism” is its development of Social Darwinism and the prioritization of “fair” individual economic competition (Rougier 1938; von Hayek 1960; Foucault 2004; Amable 2011). A key difference between Social Darwinism and neoliberalism is the belief in neoliberal ideology that the market is socially constructed and thus fragile. It is in this light that many neoliberals see state intervention that reregulates—rather than deregulates—markets in order to foster fair individual competition as necessary to maintain a fundamentally fragile, socially constructed market order. As opposed to liberalism or Social Darwinism, where economic competition is a natural law that will allow for the self-regulation of the market—thus justifying economic deregulation—neoliberal ideology asserts that a successful economy depends on individual-level competition—but that individuals themselves are responsible for economic competition and for integrating themselves successfully into the economic order. Given the belief in the social construction of the market, neoliberal ideology shifts the responsibility for risk and achievement in economic competition away from groups, institutions, and collective processes and onto individuals so as to sustain and foster market order (Bourdieu 1998; Fantasia and Voss 2004; Harvey 2005; Shamir 2008; Dardot and Laval 2009, 2013; Wacquant 2009, 2010, 2014; Amable 2011, 2014; Centeno and Cohen 2012; Hall and Lamont 2013; Schmidt and Thatcher 2013; Reich 2014; Mijs et al. 2016; Vila-Henninger 2018, 2019a, 2019b). This shift of responsibility for economic action away from collectivities and onto individuals in neoliberal ideology is key for both moral and economic reasons: by ensuring fair market competition, governments claim that they create the conditions for not only the most efficient

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competitor to succeed, but also those with the most merit (for a summary see e.g., Amable 2011: 5). Neoliberalism is then a fusion of moral ideology with economic ideology. The neoliberal adaptation of Social Darwinism, then, is one in which the “fittest” individuals succeed in economic competition—with “fitness” being just as much economic as moral. The implication, which can then be seen as a tool of political rhetoric, is that the outcomes of economic competition in a neoliberal system are moral. In this sense, neoliberal ideology claims that it is advancing conditions for the “fittest” moral competitors to succeed. Those who emerge as successful in this system are then morally justified in any gains they accrue, and therefore economic inequality is a product of the economic and moral failure of the impoverished rather than due to injustice that is inherent in the economic system. We can then understand the moral dimension of neoliberal ideology in terms of two important pieces. The first is the emphasis on the fairness of market competition and the responsibility of the government to ensure this fairness (Rougier 1938; Dardot and Laval 2009; Amable 2011, 2014). This conception of fairness is distinct because rather than focusing on promoting fairness to protect or preserve a moral community or in-group as in conservative ideology (Haidt 2012), or curtailing the rules of proportional fairness to protect vulnerable groups as in politically liberal ideology (Haidt 2012), neoliberal fairness focuses on the importance of individual responsibility to follow market rules for the sake of reinforcing “fair” individual economic competition (Amable 2011). Second, Loïc Wacquant notes that central to the neoliberal project is the “cultural trope of individual responsibility” (Wacquant 2009: 307). In this frame, individuals are conceptualized as “self-governing autonomous subjects” (Reich 2014: 4). This individualization shifts achievement, responsibility, and risk away from collectivities and onto individuals (Bourdieu 1998; Fantasia and Voss 2004; Harvey 2005; Shamir 2008; Dardot and Laval 2009; Wacquant 2009, 2010, 2014; Amable 2011, 2014; Centeno and Cohen 2012; Hall and Lamont 2013; Schmidt and Thatcher 2013; Reich 2014; Mijs et al. 2016; Vila-Henninger 2018, 2019a, 2019b). Individual responsibility then becomes a key component for fair neoliberal action in many situations—as economic actors who shirk individual responsibility are delegitimated as behaving unfairly (Vila-Henninger 2019a, 2019b).

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There are areas of overlap with conservatism and neoliberalism. Harvey (2005) notes that neoliberalism “required both politically and economically the construction of a neoliberal market-based populist culture of differentiated consumerism and individual libertarianism” (ibid.: 42, also see Diamond 2010). This is because the application of neoliberalism entailed “the liberty of consumer choice, not only with respect to particular products but also with respect to lifestyles, modes of expression, and a wide range of cultural practices” (Harvey 2005: 42). Thus, in the case of consumerism (Dardot and Laval 2013), liberty of individual economic choices—when responsibility for those choices lies solely with the individual—is a neoliberal application of liberty. Conversely, concern for individual choice that does not address individual responsibility, but does acknowledge the role and responsibility of other market actors, is an application of liberty that does not overlap with neoliberalism. Libertarianism and neoliberalism are then distinct because while libertarianism stresses the importance of freedom of all private actors from government intervention, neoliberalism stresses the importance of government action in the form of reregulating markets to maintain economic order by shifting responsibility for market action solely onto individuals.

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Bernard, H. R., and G. W. Ryan. 2010. Analyzing Qualitative Data: Systematic Approaches. Los Angeles: Sage. Boltanski, L., and L. Thévenot. 2006. On Justification: Economies of Worth. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Bourdieu, Pierre. 1998. Acts of Resistance: Against the Tyranny of the Market. New York: New Press. Boyer, P., and M. B. Petersen. 2017. “Folk-Economic Beliefs: An Evolutionary Cognitive Model.” The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2017: 1–51. Burawoy, M. 1998. “The Extended Case Method.” Sociological Theory 16 (1): 4–33. ———. 2009. The Extended Case Method: Four Countries, Four Decades, Four Great Transformations, and One Theoretical Tradition. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Centeno, M. A., and J. N. Cohen. 2012. “The Arc of Neoliberalism.” Annual Review of Sociology 38: 317–40. Dardot, Pierre, and Christian Laval. 2009. La Nouvelle Raison du Monde: Essai sur la Société Néolibérale. Paris: Découverte. ———. 2013. The New Way of the World: On Neoliberal Society. London/New York: Verso. Denord, Francois. 2001. “Aux origines du neo-liberalisme en France Louis Rougier et le Colloque Walter Lippmann de 1938.” Le Mouvement Social 195: 9. ———. 2007. Néo-libéralisme, version française: histoire d’une idéologie politique. Paris: Demopolis. Deutsch, M. 1990. “Psychological Roots of Moral Exclusion.” Journal of Social Issues 46: 21–25. Diamond, Andrew J. 2010. “The Long March Toward Neoliberalism: Race and Housing in the Postwar Metropolis (Colored Property: State Policy and White Racial Politics in Suburban America Chicago) (Black on the Block: The Politics of Race and Class in the City Chicago) (Book Review).” Journal of Urban History 36 (6): 922–28. Dodson, Kyle. 2017. “Economic Change and Class Conflict Over Tax Attitudes: Evidence from Nine Advanced Capitalist Democracies.” Social Forces 95 (4): 1509–38. Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper. Eliasoph N. 1998. Avoiding Politics: How Americans Produce Apathy in Everyday Life. Cambridge, UK/New York: Cambridge University Press. Fantasia, Rick, and Kim Voss. 2004. Hard Work: Remaking the American Labor Movement. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Foucault, M. 2004. Naissance de la biopolitique: Cours au Collège de France, 1978–1979. Paris: Seuil/Gallimard.

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Gardner D. M., and A. M. Ryan. 2020. “What’s in It for You? Demographics and Self-Interest Perceptions in Diversity Promotion.” Journal of Applied Psychology. Advance Online Publication. Gelman, Andrew. 2008. Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State: Why Americans Vote the Way They Do. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Gelman, Andrew, Lane Kenworthy, and Yu-Sung Su. 2010. “Income Inequality and Partisan Voting in the United States.” Social Science Quarterly 91 (5): 1203–19. Graham, J., and J. Haidt. 2012. “Sacred Values and Evil Adversaries: A Moral Foundations Approach.” Pp. 11–31 in Herzliya Series on Personality and Social Psychology: The Social Psychology of Morality: Exploring the Causes of Good and Evil, edited by M. Mikulincer and P. R. Shaver. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Haidt, J. 2012. The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. New York: Pantheon Books. Haidt, Jonathan, Jesse Graham, and Craig Joseph. 2009. “Above and Below Left–Right: Ideological Narratives and Moral Foundations.” Psychological Inquiry 20 (2–3): 110–19. Hall, Peter A., and Michèle Lamont. 2013. Social Resilience in the Neo-Liberal Era. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hansen, Magnus. 2019. The Moral Economy of Activation: Ideas, Politics and Policies. Bristol, UK: Policy Press. Harvey, David. 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Holmes, J. G., D. T. Miller, M. J. Lerner. 2002. “Committing Altruism Under the Cloak of Self-Interest: The Exchange Fiction.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 38: 144–51. Iyer, R., S. Koleva, J. Graham, P. Ditto, and J. Haidt. 2012. “Understanding Libertarian Morality: The Psychological Dispositions of Self-Identified Libertarians.” PloS One 7 (8): e42366. Jost, J. T., C. M. Federico, and J. L. Napier. 2009. “Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective Affinities.” Annual Review of Psychology 60: 307–37. Kissane, R. J. 2012. “Poor Women’s Moral Economies of Nonprofit Social Service Use: Conspicuous Constraint and Empowerment in the Hollow State.” Sociological Perspectives 55 (1): 189–211. Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1963. The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective. New York, NY: Basic Book. Mau, Steffen. 2003. The Moral Economy of Welfare States: Britain and Germany Compared. London: Routledge.

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McCarty, Nolan M., Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2006. Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Mijs, Jonathan J. B., Elyas Bakhtiari, and Michèle Lamont. 2016. “Neoliberalism and Symbolic Boundaries in Europe Global Diffusion, Local Context, Regional Variation.” Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World 2: 1–8. 237802311663253. Miller, D. T. 1999. “The Norm of Self-Interest.” American Psychologist 54: 1053–60. Patrick, Mary. 2018. “Gift Exchange or ‘Quid Pro Quo’? Temporality, Ambiguity, and Stigma in Interactions Between Pedestrians and Service-Providing Panhandlers.” Theory and Society: Renewal and Critique in Social Theory 47 (4): 487–509. Peirce, Charles. 1934. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Vol. 5, Pragmatism and Pragmaticism, edited by C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Reich, J. A. 2014. “Neoliberal Mothering and Vaccine Refusal: Imagined Gated Communities and the Privilege of Choice.” Gender & Society 28 (5): 679– 704. Rougier, L. 1938. Les Mystiques Economiques; Comment L’on Passe Des Democraties Liberales Aux Etats Totalitaires. Paris: Librairie de Medicis. Sachweh, P. 2012. “The Moral Economy of Inequality: Popular Views on Income Differentiation, Poverty and Wealth.” Socio-Economic Review 10 (3): 419–45. Sallaz, J. J. 2009. The Labor of Luck: Casino Capitalism in the United States and South Africa. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Schmidt, Vivien Ann, and Mark Thatcher. 2013. European Political Economy: Resilient Liberalism Through Boom and Bust. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sears, David O., and Carolyn L. Funk. 1991. “The Role of Self-Interest in Social and Political Attitudes.” In Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, edited by Mark P. Zanna, vol. 24, 1–91. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Shamir, R. 2008. “The Age of Responsibilization: On Market-Embedded Morality.” Economy and Society 37 (1): 1–19. Singer, P. 1981. The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press. Spillman, Lyn. 2012. Solidarity in Strategy: Making Business Meaningful in American Trade Associations. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Spillman, L., and M. Strand. 2013. “Interest-Oriented Action.” Annual Review of Sociology 39: 85–104. Stonecash, Jeffrey M. 2000. Class and Party in American Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

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Strand, M. 2020. “Sociology and Philosophy in the United States Since the Sixties: Death and Resurrection of a Folk Action Obstacle.” Theory and Society 49 (1): 101–50. Swedberg R. 2017. “Theorizing in Sociological Research: A New Perspective, a New Departure?” Annual Review of Sociology 43: 189–206. ———. 2018. “Folk Economics and Its Role in Trump’s Presidential Campaign: An Exploratory Study.” Theory and Society 47 (1): 1–36. Svallfors, S. 2006. The Moral Economy of Class: Class and Attitudes in Comparative Perspective. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Tavory, I., and S. Timmermans. 2014. Abductive Analysis: Theorizing Qualitative Research. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Tetlock, P. E. 2003. “Thinking About the Unthinkable: Coping with Secular Encroachments on Sacred Values.” Trends in Cognitive Science 7: 320–24. Tetlock, P. E., Kristel, O., Elson, B., Green, M., & Lerner, J. 2000. “The Psychology of the Unthinkable: Taboo Trade-Offs, Forbidden Base Rates, and Heretical Counterfactuals.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 78: 853–70. Thompson, E. P. 1971. “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century.” Past & Present 50: 76–136. Timmermans, S., and I. Tavory. 2012. “Theory Construction in Qualitative Research: From Grounded Theory to Abductive Analysis.” Sociological Theory 30 (3): 167–86. Venugopal, Rajesh. 2015. “Neoliberalism as Concept.” Economy and Society 44 (2): 165–87. Vila-Henninger, Luis Antonio. 2017. “The Moral Economies of Self-Interest: The Popular Confluence of Norms of Self-Interest and Norms of Solidarity.” Sociological Perspectives 60 (1): 168–85. ———. 2018. “The ‘Medicinal Cannabis Question’: How Actors Legitimate Vote Choice on Medical Marijuana Policy.” The Sociological Quarterly 59 (2): 180–203. ———. 2019a. “Turning Talk into ‘Rationales’: Using the Extended Case Method for the Coding and Analysis of Semi-Structured Interview Data in Atlas-ti.” Bulletin of Sociological Methodology 43 (1): 28–52. ———. 2019b. “The Moral Economy of Neoliberalism: How Voters Use Neoliberal Ideology to (De)Legitimate Undocumented Worker Access to Labor Markets.” Sociological Inquiry 89 (2): 239–62. von Hayek, Friedrich A. 1960. The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Wacquant, L. J. D. 2009. Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. ———. 2010. “Crafting the Neoliberal State: Workfare Prisonfare, and Social Insecurity.” Sociological Forum 25 (2): 197–220.

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———. 2014. “The Global Firestorm of Law and Order: On Punishment and Neoliberalism.” Thesis Eleven 122 (1): 72–88. Waytz, Adam, Ravi Iyer, Liane Young, Jonathan Haidt, and Jesse Graham. 2019. “Ideological Differences in the Expanse of the Moral Circle.” Nature Communications 10 (1): 1–12. Weeden, Kim A., and David B. Grusky. 2012. “The Three Worlds of Inequality.” American Journal of Sociology 117 (6): 1723–85. Western, B., and Jake Rosenfeld. 2011. “Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality.” American Sociological Review 76 (4): 513–37. Widestrom, A., Hayes T. J., and Dennis, C. 2018. “The Effect of Political Parties on the Distribution of Income in the American States: 1917–2011.” Social Science Quarterly 99 (3): 895–914. Zelditch, Morris, and Henry A. Walker. 2003. “The Legitimacy of Regimes.” Pp. 217–49 in Power and Status. Bingley: Emerald (MCB UP).

CHAPTER 4

Data and Methods

Semi-structured Interview Procedures I conducted semi-structured interviews in the second congressional district of Tucson, Arizona from 2013 to 2015. The scope of my research questions and theoretical framework called for semi-structured interview data. The goal of this research was not to elicit “accurate” accounts of the “true” motives of respondents. Rather, I sought to understand voter legitimations and the widely held beliefs, norms, and values upon which these legitimations drew. My data collection consisted of recorded semi-structured interviews with participants. I divided my semi-structured interviews into two phases. In the first phase, I prompted respondents to rationalize six different vote choices. Second, I administered a brief questionnaire to obtain written responses concerning demographic and other background information about the respondents—such as indicators of partisanship (partisan affiliation) and self-interest (economic position). On average, interviews lasted approximately one hour. Given the scope of this book, it was appropriate to use data gathered with questions that asked respondents why they voted, or would have voted, for different direct democratic economic policies (DDEPs). This allowed my respondents the opportunity to rationalize their stated position—in the form of a “Yes” or “No” vote—on each DDEP. The justifications respondents offered of their DDEP positions were legitimations and thereby differed from classic qualitative sociological approaches (e.g. Lamont 1992, 2000; Swidler 2001; Lamont and Swidler 2014) © The Author(s) 2020 L. A. Vila-Henninger, Social Justification and Political Legitimacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51716-8_4

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in an important way. Rather than gathering data about categorization systems, I gathered data about the widely held beliefs, norms, and values that respondents used in their legitimations. The point was therefore not simply to elicit respondents’ accounts of their DDEP positions, but instead to prompt respondents indirectly to draw upon widely held beliefs, norms, and values that would legitimate a given DDEP position. My techniques built on those of classic qualitative sociologists (e.g., Lamont 1992, 2000; Swidler 2001; Lamont and Swidler 2014), which emphasize asking indirect open-ended questions about how the respondent engages with the relevant aspect of social life so as to elicit systems of classification or evaluation indirectly. While my study investigated legitimation instead of classification, my qualitative approach to data collection was analogous in many ways. For example, a key similarity of my data collection techniques to classic qualitative sociological approaches was my use of indirect questions. In order to ask indirectly about legitimation, I asked respondents directly about their voting motives. This is because in the context of a semi-structured interview about voting, a description of “why” a respondent voted a certain way is actually a legitimation. Furthermore, my questions did not give respondents any indication of the widely held beliefs, norms, and values they should use. Furthermore, my interview questions, ballot measure selection, and post-interview questionnaire were developed through pilot interviews and then subjected to trial in the field. As this study aimed to understand how individuals legitimated DDEP positions, key elements of voter decision-making—such as political knowledge—are not relevant here. I began each interview by asking the respondent how and why he voted for the presidential candidate he selected in 2008 and 2012. Next, I asked respondents about the same four different DDEPs that appeared as ballot measures on the Arizona state ballot in 2008, 2010, or 2012. Before I interviewed respondents about each DDEP, I provided a short summary of the DDEP. I described this summary to participants as the “[a]ctual proposition description on the ballot.” Each text was actually the legally required unofficial summary of the DDEP that was written by its proponents and made available to voters online through the Arizona Secretary of State (2008a, 2008b, 2010, 2012). The detail in the summary—as well as it bias—were useful for indirectly prompting respondents to legitimate their DDEP position by drawing upon widely held political beliefs, norms, and values in a manner that was relevant to the measure’s legitimation at the time of the election. Providing the summary under the guise of being the “actual” wording

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on the ballot allowed me to prompt participants to respond to this summary as a representation of the proposed political power of the DDEP. Presenting the summary as written by the DDEP’s proponents could have risked its outright dismissal by participants—thereby rending it useless as a prompt. Furthermore, participants’ responses to the actual wording on the ballot of a DDEP would tell us about how the respondents would legitimate their position on a DDEP in the context of a semi-structured interview that took place 1–7 years after the election. Conversely, the legitimations that respondents gave after reading the DDEP supporters’ legally required summary, which was itself a legitimation, are relevant to my research question because the summary offered cues about a DDEP’s legitimation at the time of the election. In this sense, my respondents’ (de)legitimations potentially provided insight into the widely held beliefs, norms, and values relevant to voters to (de)legitimate a DDEP that span from before the election to the time of the interview. My use of the summary prompts thus allowed me to take advantage of the rich cues the summaries provided about a DDEP’s legitimation as they were relevant to voter legitimation without triggering a dismissal of the summaries by respondents as political rhetoric. More broadly, this study was not designed to simulate a “real” voting environment. Instead, my approach and empirical scope take seriously the admonition that “retrospective accountings…are not causes, but effects, of actions” (Martin 2011: 310). Regardless of whether respondents used their memory or cues from the prompt—or a mix of both—to generate responses, the key is that respondents were given the opportunity to legitimate their stance on DDEPs in the context of a social interaction. If respondents had little or no political knowledge, were highly influenced by the prompt, misunderstood the prompt or the ballot measure, or were swayed by the social context, then it is all the more compelling when those respondents generated legitimations that aligned their stance with the same widely held beliefs, norms, and/or values as other respondents. Furthermore, the bias introduced by the prompt as a legitimation provided politically relevant cues about the widely held beliefs, norms, and values used to (de)legitimate a DDEP leading up to the election. If anything, then, this bias prompted respondents to legitimate their position in a way that was more relevant to the DDEP at the time of the election. I interviewed respondents about why they voted the way they did for each of four DDEPs. First, I asked each respondent to read the unofficial

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summary of the DDEP. Next, I interviewed respondents. I interviewed those who recalled their vote about what they remembered concerning why they voted the way they did. For those who said they did not recall their vote, as well as those who said they did not vote on the DDEP, I offered to provide a list of the DDEP’s supporters and opponents. Subsequently, I prompted these respondents to tell me how they would have voted and then interviewed them about why they made their hypothetical “vote choice.” It is important to note that this book does not treat these data as accurate recollections of voter decision-making processes, but rather as impromptu legitimations that draw upon widely held political and economic beliefs, norms, and values. As such, the distinction between whether the respondents “actually” voted on the measure—or “actually” remembered why they voted on the measure—is inconsequential. The key feature of these data is that all respondents voted for a major party presidential candidate in 2008 and/or 2012 and were given the option to take a stance, and legitimate that stance, on the same four DDEPs1 after reading the summary prompt for each DDEP. Thus, I discuss respondents taking a “position” on each measure rather than discussing their “vote choice.” Furthermore, respondent’s position and legitimation are social to the extent that they emerged in the context of a semi-structured interview interaction. Participant rationalizations of ballot measure position were legitimations to the extent that they socially aligned the acceptance or rejection of political power—manifested in their position on the ballot measure—with widely held beliefs, norms, and values. My interview questions, ballot measures, post-interview questionnaire, and coding schema were developed from several iterations of pilot surveys, interviews, and prompts. Each iteration was developed according to findings in relevant literatures and then subjected to trail in the field. My instrumentation represents a synthesis of findings from political science, political psychology, political sociology, moral psychology, and economic sociology.

Quasi-Experimental Research Design In order to employ my analytical approach to build theory in response to the book’s two research questions, I used data from respondents who were recruited based on two quasi-independent variables that correspond to voter partisanship and self-interest: partisan affiliation and

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economic position—respectively. It is crucial to note that in my research design, instead of standard quantitative “variables,” partisan affiliation and economic position are each instances of a “quasi-independent variable.” As defined by the American Psychological Association Dictionary of Psychology, a quasi-independent variable is “in experimental design, any of the personal attributes, traits, or behaviors that are inseparable from an individual and cannot reasonably be manipulated. These include gender, age, and ethnicity. Such attributes may be modeled and treated as statistically independent but are not subject to random assignment, as are independent variables.”2 It is also important to recognize that “in lieu of fully randomized assignment of the [treatment]”—in this case partisan affiliation and economic position—quasi-experimental design seeks “to define a comparison group or time period that reflects the counterfactual (i.e., outcomes if the [treatment] had not been implemented)” and thus “identify a comparison group or time period that is as similar as possible to the treatment group or time period in terms of baseline ([pre-treatment]) characteristics” (Handley et al. 2018: 7; also see Shadish et al. 2001). It was for this reason that I held key sources of variation constant— such as race, ethnicity, and gender—that were beyond the scope of this initial analysis. In quasi-experimental terms, I minimized “selection differences”—which is a central element of maintaining construct validity for quasi-experimental research (Privitera and Ahlgrim-Delzell 2019: Chapter 13). For reasons that I will discuss later in the chapter, I operationalized each quasi-independent variable—partisan affiliation and economic position—as dichotomous: Democrat vs. Republican and High vs. Low Income—respectively. Because I address the empirical puzzle of how partisanship and self-interest interact to shape voter rationalization, each quasi-independent variable is categorical and cannot be operationalized in terms of “treatment” versus “pre-treatment.” Thus, rather than comparing a pre-treatment group to a treatment group, I compared four different comparison groups that constituted the four different possible combinations of each of my two dichotomous categorical quasiindependent variables (Shadish et al. 2001). This means that I used a quasi-experimental design that implemented a “Posttest-Only Design with Nonequivalent Groups” (Shadish et al. 2001: 115–7; Privitera and Ahlgrim-Delzell 2019).

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It is important to note that my findings on the causal role of the interaction of self-interest and partisanship on voters’ rationalizations are intended to build theory (e.g., Burawoy 1998, 2009; Timmermans and Tavory 2012; Tavory and Timmermans 2014; Vila-Henninger 2019) and not to generalize to a population. In quasi-experimental terms, the aim of this research is to “generate causal hypotheses for further study” (Shadish et al. 2001: 134). Furthermore, I recognize that a necessary limitation to my analysis is that my quasi-independent variables—by nature—were not randomly assigned. However, these findings still maintain a high degree of internal validity that allows me to build theory concerning the effects of the interaction of partisanship and self-interest on voter rationalizations.

Operationalization of Quasi-Independent Variables Following the literature, I operationalized “partisan affiliation” as vote choice for president, and “economic position” as household income distribution tercile. These two indicators are used in the empirical research on trends in American presidential voting that is in line with or in opposition to voters’ economic policy incentives (e.g., Bartels 2006; McCarty et al. 2006; Gelman et al. 2007, 2010; Gelman 2008; Widestrom et al. 2018). These indicators are also often used in investigations into associations between economic incentives and political attitudes (e.g., Brooks and Brady 1999; Manza and Brooks 1999; Weeden and Grusky 2012; Baldassarri and Goldberg 2014; Boutyline and Vaisey 2017; Dodson 2017). Thus, these indicators are appropriate for my investigation into how the alignment or opposition of self-interest and partisanship influenced voters’ rationalizations of real DDEPs. Operationalization of Partisanship as Partisan Affiliation I determined participant partisanship according to presidential vote choice (Brooks and Brady 1999; Manza and Brooks 1999; Bartels 2006; McCarty et al. 2006; Gelman et al. 2007, 2010; Gelman 2008; Baldassarri and Goldberg 2014). The important element here is that this operationalization measures partisanship as it manifests in actual voting behavior. This is because I sought to operationalize voter partisanship. As this study is about voting, the most concrete indicator of partisanship is voters’ revealed preference in their consistently partisan vote choice. Thus, in selecting respondents, I explicitly excluded those who

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voted for third parties. I also excluded participants who changed parties from one election to the next. However, I did include respondents who did not vote in one election but voted for either the Republican or Democratic candidate in the election in which they voted. Therefore, I only included respondents who voted for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate in 2008 and/or 2012. I recognize that this is an imperfect measure; however, this measure is an efficient way to classify respondents whose partisanship manifests as voting behavior. For this book, I defined “partisan affiliation” as reported actual vote choice for the Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama (Democrat) in 2008 and 2012 or the Republican presidential candidates John McCain in 2008 and Mitt Romney in 2012 in the United States general elections. It is very important to note that for presidential vote choice I did not ask respondents how they “would have voted,” but rather used their reports of their actual voting behavior. I classified respondents who voted in either 2008 or 2012 according to the partisan affiliation of the major party candidate for whom they voted. However, recall that I excluded respondents from my analysis that voted for a third party in 2008 and/or 2012, or changed parties between 2008 and 2012. This operationalization differs slightly from my previous work because in this analysis I am utilizing these data as they correspond to partisan affiliation as a quasi-experimental quasi-independent variable that potentially affects respondents’ legitimations. Operationalization of Self-Interest as Economic Position In the voting literature, household income has been established as an important indicator of respondent economic position. Household income has been empirically linked to respondents’ political opinions, policy evaluations, and voting behavior (Brooks and Brady 1999; Stonecash 2000; Brewer and Stonecash 2001; Bartels 2006; Gelman et al. 2007, 2010; Baldassarri and Gelman 2008; Gelman 2008; Prasad et al. 2009; Fiorina et al. 2011; Baldassarri and Goldberg 2014; Prasad et al. 2016; Widestrom et al. 2018). All of these findings—and especially the literature on the alignment of household income level and presidential voting— support the use of household income level as an empirical indicator of self-interest. Household income level has been used as a similar indicator in the economics literature (e.g., Carvalho et al. 2016).

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Scholars have commonly used relative measures of inequality to link economic position to policy stances or vote choice (e.g., Bartels 2006; Gelman et al. 2007; Gelman 2008; Brady 2009). Following in this tradition, I used a measure of household income disparity relative to household income distribution. For my analysis I selected a relative measure of household income gradation—placement in the upper or lower third of the household income distribution (Bartels 2006). Similar or identical relative measures of household income have been linked empirically to economic policy position/evaluation or vote choice (Brooks and Brady 1999; Stonecash 2000; Bartels 2006; Baldassarri and Gelman 2008; Gelman 2008; Prasad et al. 2009; Gelman et al. 2010; Fiorina et al. 2011). I recruited my case set (Small 2009) from the second congressional district in the City of Tucson, so I used the City of Tucson’s household income distribution to determine the range for the household income terciles relevant for my case set. Using publicly available data from the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey, I used a one-year estimate that corresponded to the year the respondent was interviewed to determine the household income distribution for the City of Tucson. Based on these data, I defined the lower tercile of household income for the City of Tucson as approximately $25,000/year or less and the upper tercile as approximately $50,000/year or more—as the distribution essentially held steady during the period of time I collected data (from 2013 to 2015) as it related to the City of Tucson’s household income distribution terciles. I included respondents whose household income was in the upper or lower tercile of the City of Tucson’s household income distribution. I excluded respondents who were in the approximate middle tercile of the City of Tucson’s household income distribution in order to maximize the effect of household income and thereby more clearly match self-interest and economic position. The key selection criterion here was that respondents must have had a household income that fell in the approximate upper or lower tercile of the City of Tucson’s household income distribution at the time of the interview. This operationalization differs slightly from that of my previous work because in this analysis I am utilizing these data as they correspond to economic position as a quasi-experimental quasi-independent variable that potentially affects respondents’ legitimations.

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Summary of Quasi-Independent Variable Operationalizations To summarize, the book’s two quasi-independent variables are economic position and partisan affiliation. These two dimensions are each be binary: high vs. low household income and Democrat vs. Republican party affiliation. As shown in Table 4.1, I combined these binary quasi-independent variables to create four comparison groups of participants: low-income Democrats, low-income Republicans, high-income Democrats, and highincome Republicans. Furthermore, regardless of the mechanisms that produced each respondent’s position on a measure, I treated respondent DDEP position as a quasi-independent variable that shaped the participants’ legitimations. Thus, for each ballot measure, I had eight comparison groups: lowincome Democrats who supported the measure, low-income Democrats Table 4.1 Quasi-independent variable operational definitions Term

Definition

High-income

Respondent’s household income was in the approximate upper tercile of the City of Tucson’s household income distribution ($50,000/year or more) for the year the respondent was interviewed Respondent’s household income was in the approximate lower tercile of the City of Tucson’s household income distribution ($25,000/year or less) for the year the respondent was interviewed Respondent voted for John McCain in the 2008 American Presidential Election and Mitt Romney in the 2012 American general election or Respondent vote for John McCain in the 2008 American general Election and did not vote in 2012 or Respondent voted for Mitt Romney in the 2012 American general election and did not vote in 2008 Respondent voted for Barack Obama in the 2008 and 2012 American general elections or Respondent voted for Barack Obama in the 2008 American general Election and did not vote in 2012 or Respondent voted for Barack Obama in the 2012 American general election and did not vote in 2008

Low-income

Republican

Democrat

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who opposed the measure, low-income Republicans who supported the measure, low-income Republicans who opposed the measure, highincome Democrats who supported the measure, high-income Democrats who opposed the measure, high-income Republicans who supported the measure, and high-income Republicans who opposed the measure. As respondent DDEP position often varied from one ballot measure to the next, so did their placement in a proposition-specific comparison group for a given DDEP.

Theoretical Sampling Strategy Theoretical sampling, or sampling “directed toward gathering information relevant to a specific working hypothesis,” is designed to “achieve a rigorous test of a hypothesis” (Singleton and Straits 1999: 333). In this case, I used data that implemented theoretical sampling that would allow me to address my research questions empirically. Contemporary sociologists have used this strategy fruitfully in empirical analysis of issues such as race and social class (e.g., Lamont 1992, 2000; Jimenez 2008; Armstrong and Hamilton 2013). Furthermore, this sampling strategy is standard in quasi-experimental research (for a summary see e.g., Handley et al. 2018). A foundational element of quasi-experimental research designs is creating a case set (Small 2009) that is structurally homogenous in theoretically and empirically relevant ways to limit structural sources of variation. Thus, in order to execute a quasi-experiment design, it was necessary for me to implement a theoretical sampling strategy. As it is impossible to assign partisan vote choice or household income tercile randomly in ways that would correspond with the experiences of voters, it was therefore necessary for me to implement a quasiexperimental design and to recruit respondents based on respondents’ real-world partisan vote choice and household income. Recruitment Criteria In order to collect data according to my theoretical sampling strategy, I made the difficult decision to exclude respondents based on a wide range of characteristics—such as gender, race, and ethnicity—that have been shown to correspond to variation in economic policy attitudes and legitimacy (e.g., Bobo 1998; Manza and Brooks 1999; Gelman 2008; Prasad et al. 2009). This approach is also typical for qualitative studies

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whose research questions involve tracing how common systems of classification or evaluation correspond with distinct social or economic factors (e.g., Lamont 1992, 2000; Armstrong and Hamilton 2013). In addition to recruiting a group that had homogeneous gender, racial, and ethnic characteristics, my recruitment criteria included congressional district and urban residence. First, I recruited respondents within a congressional district because the relationship between household income and voting varies according to region, state, county, and congressional district within the United States (e.g., Gelman 2008). Second, I recruited urban respondents because rural versus urban residency is associated with voter attitudes about government regulation via direct democracy (Salka 2003). Following the literature, I did not hold religious affiliation (Ansolabehere et al. 2006; Bartels 2006; Greeley and Hout 2006) or age constant (e.g., Manza and Brooks 1999).3 Thus, I recruited participants in Tucson from the second congressional district who voted in 2008 and/or 2012 for a Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and were non-Latino Caucasian males of European ancestry. It is important to note that I included some respondents with mixed racial or ethnic backgrounds. This is because my recruitment was designed to hold factors constant that were not related to partisanship or selfinterest. The reason for holding race and ethnicity constant was that race and ethnicity constitute key cleavages for voters based in racial and ethnic identity (Manza and Brooks 1999; Dalton 2020). Therefore, if respondents with mixed racial or ethnic backgrounds identified themselves as “white” then I included their data in my analysis.

Recruitment Practices I recruited respondents from 2013 to 2015 by employing a variety of techniques. Combining the techniques of foundational qualitative interview studies in the sociology of culture and economic sociology, I used a combination of canvassing, locating gatekeepers, classified ads, and referrals (e.g., Lamont 1992, 2000; Swidler 2001; Prasad et al. 2009; Sachweh 2012). Recruitment was difficult to some degree because I used a number of sampling parameters. However, with a strategic use of recruitment techniques I overcame these barriers.

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First, I used the “City of Tucson Poverty and Urban Stress Report, 2012,” which provided a map with ranges of median household income for each census tract. I began by consulting with a management analyst for the City of Tucson to select and recruit from low-income or high-income neighborhoods that had a high concentration of white males. Next, I created a database of all of the census tracts in the second congressional district in the City of Tucson that had a median household income that fell within either the bottom or top tercile of the city’s household income distribution. I then used a random number generator to select census tracts from this database in which to canvass. While recruiting for my pilot study, I was warned by several different sources against door-to-door recruitment in low-income areas, as well as in areas with neighborhood associations. For this reason, I notified homeowner and neighborhood associations about my canvassing efforts. These associations served as gatekeepers, so I worked with them to assure that my presence in their neighborhoods was welcome. Neighborhood and homeowner associations also helped facilitate recruitment, often by allowing me to send a flyer for my study to their members via their listservs and allowing me to speak at their meetings. By going through these gatekeepers, I was able to recruit a number of respondents. Furthermore, after I interviewed each respondent, I gave him a flyer describing my research and asked him to refer anyone he knew who qualified for my study. This generated some snowball sampling—especially for high-income Republicans. I also recruited participants through the social networks of my research assistants and in classified ads for volunteers in local newspapers. Finally, I recruited respondents in public places where low-income respondents would logically congregate. For example, I obtained permission from the Arizona Department of Economic Security to canvass at two of their largest branches in the second congressional district in Tucson. By utilizing these diverse recruitment techniques, my aim was to recruit respondents efficiently and to minimize the bias created by any given recruitment technique. This strategic and systematic recruitment of respondents who meet all of my theoretical sampling requirements is in line with best practices of qualitative research (e.g., Lamont 1992, 2000; Swidler 2001; Newman and Chen 2007; Sachweh 2012; Silva 2012, 2013; Armstrong and Hamilton 2013).4

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Achieved Case Set The data from my respondents constitute a “case set” rather than a sample (Small 2009). I used quotas of 20 for each comparison group (e.g., lowincome Democrats) in an attempt to reach saturation (Lamont 2000; Sachweh 2012). Volunteers constituted the first 100 participants in my case set. The majority of these respondents were high-income, leaving me short of my low-income quotas. To address this problem, I used a small grant to remunerate low-income participants. I sought out 20 additional low-income participants by posting in the “Jobs” section of a popular online classified advertisement website. This allowed me to fulfill my quota for low-income Democrats. This also allowed me to increase the total number of low-income Republicans to 14 for the analysis in this book. As with all of the comparison groups, I could not utilize all respondents for a given ballot measure because of proposition-specific nonresponse. Despite falling short of the quota for both categories of Republicans for this book, I researched saturation for all four comparison groups (Glaser and Strauss 1967). As we proceed to the analysis, it is important to keep in mind the achieved case set (Small 2009) for my study. Over roughly a three-year period (2013–2015), I conducted semi-structured interviews with 120 respondents. We see below in Table 4.2 the initial projected case set sizes for each comparison group. In Table 4.3, we see the achieved case set for each comparison group for this book. Finally, given the criteria outlined above for data I used for this book, I provide Table 4.4, which summarizes the cases that I was not able to use. It is important to note that my achieved case set N and comparison group Ns for this book are different Table 4.2 Initial comparison groups with projected number of respondents

Table 4.3 Achieved case set for the analysis in this book

High-income Low-income

High-income Low-income

Republican

Democrat

20 20

20 20

Republican

Democrat

19 14

36 20

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Table 4.4 Unusable cases from project case set for analysis in this book

Number Third party Middle income Changed party Missing data (Incomplete audio or interview)

5 13 8 5

from my previous empirical work because my selection criteria for this book differ slightly.

Notes 1. With the exception of the first three interviews. I did not interview these first three respondents about Proposition 204 (2012) because after these first three interviews I decided to supplement my data collection with a fourth DDEP prompt—Proposition 204 (2012). 2. https://dictionary.apa.org/quasi-independent-variable. 3. Following Prasad et al. (2009), I began my study by only recruiting respondents from the ages of 25–65, but upon further review of the literature (e.g. Manza and Brooks 1999) I dropped this recruitment criterion. 4. Portions of this section were circulated in the American Sociological Association’s Political Sociology Section Summer 2020 Newsletter.

Bibliography American Community Survey, United States Census Bureau. Retrieved June 17, 2020. https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs. American Psychological Association. 2020. Dictionary of Psychology American Psychological Association Dictionary of Psychology. Retrieved June 19, 2020. https://dictionary.apa.org/quasi-independent-variable. Ansolabehere, Stephen, Jonathan Rodden, and James M. Snyder, Jr. 2006. “Purple America (Voting Behavior of Americans).” Journal of Economic Perspectives 20 (2): 97–118. Arizona Secretary of State. 2008a. Proposition 201. Retrieved June 15, 2020. https://apps.azsos.gov/election/2008/info/PubPamphlet/english/Pro p201.htm. Arizona Secretary of State. 2008b. Proposition 202. Retrieved June 15, 2020. https://apps.azsos.gov/election/2008/info/PubPamphlet/eng lish/Prop202.htm.

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Arizona Secretary of State. 2010. Proposition 203. Retrieved June 15, 2020. https://apps.azsos.gov/election/2010/info/PubPamphlet/Sun_Sou nds/english/prop203.htm. Arizona Secretary of State. 2012. Proposition 204. Retrieved June 15, 2020. https://apps.azsos.gov/election/2012/info/PubPamphlet/english/Pro p204.htm. Armstrong, Elizabeth A., and Laura T. Hamilton. 2013. Paying for the Party: How College Maintains Inequality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Baldassarri, Delia, and Amir Goldberg. 2014. “Neither Ideologues, Nor Agnostics: Alternative Voters’ Belief System in an Age of Partisan Politics.” American Journal of Sociology 120 (1): 45–95. Baldassarri, Delia, and Andrew Gelman. 2008. “Partisans Without Constraint: Political Polarization and Trends in American Public Opinion.” The American Journal of Sociology 114 (2): 408–446. Bartels, Larry M. 2006. “What’s the Matter with ‘What’s the Matter with Kansas?’” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 1 (2): 201–26. Bobo, Lawrence. 1998. “Race, Interests, and Beliefs About Affirmative Action: Unanswered Questions and New Directions.” American Behavioral Scientist 41 (7): 985–1003. Boutyline, Andrei, and Stephen Vaisey. 2017. “Belief Network Analysis: A Relational Approach to Understanding the Structure of Attitudes.” American Journal of Sociology 122 (5): 1371–447. Brady, David, 2009. Rich Democracies, Poor People: How Politics Explain Poverty. New York: Oxford University Press. Brewer, M. D., and J. M. Stonecash. 2001. “Class, Race Issues, and Declining White Support for the Democratic Party in the South.” Political Behavior 23: 131–56. Brooks, Clem, and David Brady. 1999. “Income, Economic Voting, and LongTerm Political Change in the U.S., 1952–1996.” Social Forces 77 (4): 1339– 74. Brooks, Clem, and Jeff Manza. 2007. Why Welfare States Persist: The Importance of Public Opinion in Democracies. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Burawoy, M. 1998. “The Extended Case Method.” Sociological Theory 16 (1): 4–33. ———. 2009. The Extended Case Method: Four Countries, Four Decades, Four Great Transformations, and One Theoretical Tradition. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Carvalho, Leandro S., Stephan Meier, and Stephanie W. Wang. 2016. “Poverty and Economic Decision-Making: Evidence from Changes in Financial Resources at Payday.” The American Economic Review 106 (2): 260–84.

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City of Tucson. 2012. City of Tucson Poverty and Urban Stress Report 2012. Retrieved June 16, 2020. https://www.tucsonaz.gov/files/hcd/PovReport 2012final.pdf. Dalton, Russell J. 2020. Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies. London: Sage. Dodson, Kyle. 2017. “Economic Change and Class Conflict Over Tax Attitudes: Evidence from Nine Advanced Capitalist Democracies.” Social Forces 95 (4): 1509–38. Fiorina, Morris P., Samuel J. Abrams, and Jeremy Pope. 2011. Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America. Boston, MA: Longman. Gelman, Andrew. 2008. Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State: Why Americans Vote the Way They Do. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Gelman, Andrew, B. Shor, J. Bafumi, and D. Park. 2007. “Rich State, Poor State, Red State, Blue State: What’s the Matter with Connecticut?” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 2 (4): 345–67. Gelman, Andrew, Lane Kenworthy, and Yu-Sung Su. 2010. “Income Inequality and Partisan Voting in the United States.” Social Science Quarterly 91 (5): 1203–19. Glaser, Barney G., and Anselm L. Strauss. 1967. The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research. Chicago: Aldine Atherton. Greeley, Andrew M., and Michael Hout. 2006. The Truth About Conservative Christians What They Think and What They Believe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Handley, Margaret A., Courtney R. Lyles, Charles McCulloch, and Adithya Cattamanchi. 2018. “Selecting and Improving Quasi-Experimental Designs in Effectiveness and Implementation Research.” Annual Review of Public Health 39: 5–25. Jimenez, Tomas R. 2008. “Mexican Immigrant Replenishment and the Continuing Significance of Ethnicity and Race.” The American Journal of Sociology 113 (6): 1527–67. Lamont, Michèle. 1992. Money, Morals, and Manners: The Culture of the French and American Upper-Middle Class. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ———. 2000. The Dignity of Working Men: Morality and the Boundaries of Race, Class, and Immigration. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Lamont, M., and A. Swidler. 2014. “Methodological Pluralism and the Possibilities and Limits of Interviewing.” Qualitative Sociology 37 (2): 153–71. Manza, Jeff, and Clem Brooks. 1999. Social Cleavages and Political Change: Voter Alignments and U.S. Party Coalitions. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. Martin, John Levi. 2011. The Explanation of Social Action. New York: Oxford University Press.

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McCarty, Nolan M., Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2006. Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Newman, Katherine S., and Victor Tan Chen. 2007. The Missing Class: Portraits of the Near Poor in America. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Prasad, Monica, Andrew J. Perrin, Kieran Bezila, Steve G. Hoffman, Kate Kindleberger, Kim Manturuk, Ashleigh Smith Powers, and Andrew R. Payton. 2009. “The Undeserving Rich: ‘Moral Values’ and the White Working Class.” Sociological Forum 24 (2): 225–53. Prasad, M., S. G. Hoffman, and K. Bezila. 2016. “Walking the Line: The White Working Class and the Economic Consequences of Morality.” Politics and Society 44 (2): 281–304. Privitera, Gregory J., and Lynn Ahlgrim-Delzell. 2019. Research Methods for Education. Los Angeles: Sage. Sachweh, P. 2012. “The Moral Economy of Inequality: Popular Views on Income Differentiation, Poverty and Wealth.” Socio-Economic Review 10 (3): 419–45. Salka, William M. 2003. “Determinants of Countywide Voting Behavior on Environmental Ballot Measures: 1990–2000.” Rural Sociology 68 (2): 253–77. Shadish, William R., Thomas D. Cook, and Donald T. Campbell. 2001. Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Generalized Causal Inference. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Silva, J. M. 2012. “Constructing Adulthood in an Age of Uncertainty.” American Sociological Review 77 (4): 505–22. ———. 2013. Coming Up Short: Working-Class Adulthood in an Age of Uncertainty. New York: Oxford University Press. Singleton, Royce A., and Bruce C. Straits. 1999. Approaches to Social Research. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Small, Mario. 2009. “How Many Cases Do I Need?” Ethnography 10 (1): 5–38. Stonecash, Jeffrey M. 2000. Class and Party in American Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Swidler, Ann. 2001. Talk of Love: How Culture Matters. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Tavory, I., and S. Timmermans. 2014. Abductive Analysis: Theorizing Qualitative Research. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Timmermans, S., and I. Tavory. 2012. “Theory Construction in Qualitative Research: From Grounded Theory to Abductive Analysis.” Sociological Theory 30 (3): 167–86. Vila-Henninger, Luis Antonio. 2019. “The Moral Economy of Neoliberalism: How Voters Use Neoliberal Ideology to (De)Legitimate Undocumented Worker Access to Labor Markets.” Sociological Inquiry 89 (2): 239–62. Weeden, Kim A., and David B. Grusky. 2012. “The Three Worlds of Inequality.” American Journal of Sociology 117 (6): 1723–85.

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Widestrom, A., T. J. Hayes, and C. Dennis. 2018. “The Effect of Political Parties on the Distribution of Income in the American States: 1917–2011.” Social Science Quarterly 99 (3): 895–914.

Part II

CHAPTER 5

Proposition 201 (2008)

Introduction This chapter begins my analysis of voters’ legitimations of their positions on different direct democratic economic policies (DDEPs) and how such legitimations are structured by the interaction of self-interest and partisanship. For this analysis, I selected Arizona’s Proposition 201 (2008): “Homeowners’ Bill of Rights.” This DDEP sought to protect new home purchasers by extending home warranties and increasing transparency in the relationship between house manufacturers and financial institutions. For this ballot measure, I used data from 66 respondents who took a position on Proposition 201 (2008) during their interview, legitimated their position, and fit my other sampling criteria (see Chapter 4). Furthermore, it is important to remember that in the context of justifying political positions, justifications and rationalizations are legitimations. Recall that I implemented a quasi-experimental design and recruited respondents according to economic position and partisan affiliation (see Chapters 1 and 4) in order to address the book’s two research questions: RQ1: How do partisanship and self-interest interact to shape partisan voters’ rationalizations of their position on direct democratic economic policy (DDEP)? RQ2: What are the discourses that voters draw upon to rationalize their direct democratic economic policy (DDEP) position? In this way, partisan affiliation and economic position are quasiindependent variables (see Chapters 1 and 4). Given the design of the © The Author(s) 2020 L. A. Vila-Henninger, Social Justification and Political Legitimacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51716-8_5

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study, the position that a respondent took on a DDEP before providing a legitimation also acted as a quasi-independent variable. The empirical task laid out by the first question was then to investigate how selfinterest, partisanship, and DDEP position interacted to structure voter legitimations. I performed this task by identifying legitimations that were distinctive to each comparison group of my three quasi-independent variables (economic position, partisan affiliation, and DDEP position). Furthermore, the task for the book’s second research question was to examine the widely held political or economic beliefs, norms, and values that voters drew upon in their legitimations of their DDEP position. I carried out this task by providing a qualitative analysis of the distinctive legitimations I identified for each comparison group of quasi-independent variables. As discussed in the theory chapter (Chapter 2), respondents’ use of widely held political or economic beliefs, norms, and values in their legitimations serves as evidence of their socialization into these beliefs, norms, and values. Understanding such socialization provides a window onto the forms of legitimate political and economic discourse in the United States from the late 2000s through the mid-2010s regarding economic policy. This is because my data for this measure were collected from 2013 to 2015 and were facilitated by my use of a prompt with respondents that was a justificatory summary of Proposition 201 (2008) that was provided to voters online via the Arizona Secretary of State prior to the election in 2008. My findings also help us to understand political socialization processes in the United States more broadly. Finally, the analysis in this chapter applies the principle of “reconstruction” from the Extended Case Method (e.g., Burawoy 1998, 2009; Sallaz 2009) to semi-structured interview data in order to build theory by identifying cases in the data that are novel or anomalous to relevant theory and empirical literature (Vila-Henninger 2018, 2019a, b). This approach is analogous to qualitative uses of abduction (Peirce 1934; Timmermans and Tavory 2012; Tavory and Timmermans 2014; Swedberg 2017). In this chapter, my analysis identifies novel and anomalous cases in my data. In the final chapter (Chapter 9), then, I build theory using both novel and anomalous cases.

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Arizona’s Proposition 201 (2008): “Homeowners’ Bill of Rights” Social Context While consumer protection regulation has a long history in the United States, the foundation of contemporary legislation was laid by the New Deal and mushroomed in the post-WWII era (Silbey 2009: 347). This process accelerated in the 1960s, as social movements successfully pressured regulators and policymakers to implement extensive consumer protections—largely via federal agencies. Subsequently, there was a substantial backlash against these protections in the 1970s and 1980s (Vogel 1989; Carrigan and Coglianese 2011). Part of this was instigated by influential public policy scholar Theodore Lowi’s book The End of Liberalism (1969)—which argued that congress had delegated too much regulatory control to federal bureaucracies. This was important because it facilitated a shift in congressional consumer protection policy away from federal agencies and toward implementing specific regulations via legislation (Gormley 2007: 307). Since then, consumer protection became increasingly politicized and by the 1990s many Republican lawmakers advocated economic deregulation. Conservative federal judges played a key role in this process by dismantling consumer protection laws when they were challenged in court (Skrentny 2006: 228). The strategy economic deregulation via the judiciary largely began with the Reagan administration, which implemented a system in which “nominees to the federal courts were systematically screened for their partisan conformity with a less law, less rights agenda” (Silbey 2009: 347). Despite conservative pushback, social movements continued to achieve key legal protections by framing such protections as “rights.” This framework of “legal protections as rights” has been successfully used by social movement organizations since the 1960s (Pedriana 2006; Amenta et al. 2010). Some private interests have responded by achieving regulatory capture or spearheading alternative consumer protection laws (Talesh 2009). The influence of private interests and their success in shaping consumer protection regulation varies according to state, but often utilizes the social movement “rights” frame to implement so-called “consumer protection” policy that in fact affords consumers less protection (Talesh 2014).

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In 2008, the American housing market had important gaps in consumer protection regulation. Most notably, the financial deregulation of banks that began in the 1980s with the Reagan administration—which was seriously accelerated by the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act by Bill Clinton’s 1999 Financial Services Modernization Act—greatly facilitated the rise of predatory lending practices and played a major role in bringing about the subprime mortgage crisis of 2008 (Harvey 2005; Fligstein and Goldstein 2010). Similarly, low-income renters faced a dwindling supply of affordable housing—a problem that was insufficiently addressed by federal policy (for a review see Desmond and Bell 2015: 18). Conversely, during this time the supply of high-quality homes that were affordable only for affluent buyers increased (Pattillo 2013). In response to these issues, affordable housing activists attempted to decommodify housing by promoting the conception of housing as a right. Such language has been consistently used by the United Nations since the 1940s, but has been avoided by the United States federal government. Nonetheless, there has been a great deal of local activism in the United States, often by social movement organizations, that advocates for housing as a “right.” Such activism centers on providing affordable housing for low-income tenants (Patillo 2013). The importance of consumer protection is clear—although frequently taken for granted. One must look no further than the “Flint Water Crisis” to see the human cost of the failure to protect consumers or correctly implement consumer protection legislation. Furthermore, the use and importance of the “rights” frame to implement legal protections has been thoroughly documented. With the failure of the federal government to protect consumers in the housing market, the importance of local consumer protection legislation has grown in importance. Background of the Measure Arizona was a locus of the American housing boom in the 1990s and 2000s. State-level attempts to protect homebuyers at the time manifested in legislation that protected purchasers of new homes. In 2002, the Arizona state legislature passed the “Purchaser Dwelling Act”—which implemented a system of arbitration through which homebuyers and manufacturers could settle disputes concerning defects in new homes and avoid litigation. According to housing rights advocates, a major shortfall of this system was that this mediation period only lasted for 90 days after

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the purchase of a new home. It was in this context that Proposition 201 (2008) “Homeowners’ Bill of Rights” emerged. Crucially, the measure only sought to amend the “Purchaser Dwelling Act” (2002) and thus did not attempt to address subprime lending or the needs of low-income tenants. Furthermore, Proposition 201 (2008) attempted to advance its agenda by employing the well-established frame of housing as a “right” by describing itself as a “bill of rights.” Spencer Kamps, who at the time was vice president of the Homebuilders Association of Central Arizona, claimed that Proposition 201 (2008) was the result of unions trying to implement collective bargaining in the Arizona homebuilding industry. According to Kamps, unions contacted his association—which refused to collaborate—thus prompting labor interests to spearhead the proposition (Rice 2008). In this light, we can see Proposition 201 (2008) as primarily the result of a conflict between homebuilders and unions. On November 4, 2008, this ballot measure failed with 78% of the voters choosing to reject it. As Proposition 201 (2008) was primarily the result of a conflict between homebuilders and unions, pro-business groups opposed the measure while a pro-labor ideological group (Interfaith Worker Justice of Arizona) and a social justice group (Arizona Alliance for Retired Americans) supported the proposition. In terms of media coverage, the measure was officially opposed by the Arizona Republic—a major Arizona state newspaper that has been owned by a media conglomerate since 2000. In total, Proposition 201 (2008) opponents raised $3,498,487.1 While accounts vary on how much supporters raised, it was no more than $1.6 million.2 As expected, this translated into very unequal campaign expenditures. For example, the largest opponent of the measure (“Arizonans Against Lawsuit Abuse”) filed over $2.5 million in campaign expenditures, while the largest supporter of the measure recorded $946,384 in expenditures. Major supporting contributors included trade unions, law firms, and transportation unions. Donations from opponents came mostly from homebuilding companies and associations—as well as real estate companies. Summary of Arizona’s Proposition 201 (2008): “Homeowners’ Bill of Rights” The following is the unofficial summary of the measure provided to the State of Arizona, as required by law, by the official proponents of

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Arizona’s Proposition 201 (2008): “Homeowners’ Bill of Rights.” This summary was made available to voters online via the Arizona Secretary of State. I provided this text to participants as a prompt before I interviewed them about their position on the measure (for further discussion see Chapter 4): HOMEOWNERS’ BILL OF RIGHTS. Ten-year warranty on new homes. Right to demand correction of construction defects or compensation. Homeowners participate in selecting contractors to do repair work. They can sue if no agreement with the builder. No liability for builders’ attorney and expert fees but homeowner can recover these costs. Homeowners can sometimes recover compensatory and consequential damages. Disclosure of builders’ relationships with financial institutions. Model homes must reflect what is actually for sale. Right to cancel within 100 days and get back most of the deposit. Prohibiting sellers’ agents from participating in false mortgage applications.

On November 4, 2008, this ballot measure failed with 78% of the voters choosing to reject it. Conversely, a vast majority of my respondents (53/66, 80%) who took a position on the measure during the interview supported the proposition. The goal of this analysis is to build theory about the discourse that respondents use to legitimate their stances on different DDEPs. Thus, any bias in respondent memory or interpretation of the measure is not relevant for my qualitative, theory building analysis of voter legitimations.

Quasi-Experimental Design and Quasi-Independent Variables Research Design In order to employ my analytical approach to build theory in response to the book’s two research questions, I use data from respondents who were recruited based on two quasi-independent variables that correspond to voter partisanship and self-interest: partisan affiliation and economic position—respectively. It is crucial to note that in my research design, instead of standard quantitative “variables,” partisan affiliation and economic position are each instances of a “quasi-independent variable.” As defined by the American Psychological Association Dictionary of Psychology, a quasi-independent variable is “in experimental design, any of the personal attributes, traits, or behaviors that are inseparable from an individual

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and cannot reasonably be manipulated. These include gender, age, and ethnicity. Such attributes may be modeled and treated as statistically independent but are not subject to random assignment, as are independent variables.”3 I operationalized each quasi-independent variable—partisan affiliation and economic position—as dichotomous: Democrat vs. Republican and High vs. Low Income—respectively. Because I address the empirical puzzle of how partisanship and self-interest interact to shape voter rationalization, each quasi-independent variable is categorical and cannot be operationalized in terms of “treatment” versus “pretreatment.” Thus, rather than comparing a pretreatment group to a treatment group, I compared four different comparison groups that constituted the four different possible combinations of each of my two dichotomous categorical quasi-independent variables (Shadish et al. 2001). This means that I used a quasi-experimental design that implements a “PosttestOnly Design with Nonequivalent Groups” (Shadish et al. 2001: 115–7; Privitera and Ahlgrim-Delzell 2019). Furthermore, regardless of the mechanisms that produced each respondent’s position on a measure, I treated respondent DDEP position as a quasi-independent variable that shaped the participant’s legitimation. Thus, for each ballot measure, I had eight comparison groups: lowincome Democrats who supported the measure, low-income Democrats who opposed the measure, low-income Republicans who supported the measure, low-income Republicans who opposed the measure, highincome Democrats who supported the measure, high-income Democrats who opposed the measure, high-income Republicans who supported the measure, and high-income Republicans who opposed the measure. As respondent DDEP position often varied from one ballot measure to the next, so did respondent placement in a proposition-specific comparison group for a given DDEP. Thus, this analysis investigates how these three quasi-independent variables—Economic Position, Partisan Affiliation, and DDEP Position— interact to shape respondent legitimations. Quasi-Independent Variables In this section, I discuss my three quasi-independent variables: Economic Position, Partisan Affiliation, and DDEP Position (i.e., respondent position on Proposition 201). First, I outline both of the quasi-independent

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variables on which I sampled—economic position and partisan affiliation. In particular, I provide an overview of how each quasi-independent variable is expected to vary with Proposition 201 (2008), as well as how this variation is expected to be linked to respondents’ DDEP position legitimations. Finally, for DDEP position, I discuss expected variation according to the two quasi-independent variables on which I sampled: economic position and partisan affiliation. This then helps us to understand how each DDEP position could potentially act as a quasi-independent variable that helps to shape respondents’ legitimations. Quasi-Independent Variable 1: Economic Position According to the literature on self-interest and political reasoning (Downs 1957), economic position should correspond with economic policy incentives, which would then motivate self-interested voter reasoning. Sears and Funk (1991) demonstrate that actors vote for short-term self-interest when they perceive the stakes to be high and the issues to be clear. In the wake of the Great Recession, low-income homebuyers were facing rising levels of foreclosure and were particularly vulnerable to being targeted by subprime mortgage lenders (for a summary see Pattillo 2013; Zavisca and Gerber 2016). Furthermore, there is a well-documented diminishing supply of affordable housing for low-income buyers and increasing supply for the affluent (for summaries see Pattillo 2013; Desmond and Bell 2015). This dynamic was then amplified by the measure’s opposition— which very publicly claimed that the proposition would raise housing prices. There were then relatively high stakes and clearly defined issues that tied position on Proposition 201 (2008) to level of affluence. Given this background, we would expect low-income voters to legitimate their opposition to the measure by appealing to the potential for increased in housing prices and high-income respondents to legitimate their support for the measure by appealing to the potential for it to boost the value of their home and provide them with protections when purchasing (a) new home(s). Crucially, the qualitative literature suggests that when citizens see rational economic action as normative they justify such action by appealing to popular beliefs about self-interest (Spillman 2012; Spillman and Strand 2013; Vila-Henninger 2017). Thus, rather than understanding participants’ “actual” self-interested motives, respondents’ legitimations that appeal to self-interest provide a window into what kinds of self-interest are considered to be normative.

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Quasi-Independent Variable 2: Partisan Affiliation For my analysis, I focus on the core moral differences between American liberal and conservative political ideology by using Jonathan Haidt’s work on American ideological “most sacred values” (Haidt 2012; Graham and Haidt 2012). This research draws upon the scholarship of Philip Tetlock (Tetlock et al. 2000; Tetlock 2003) on the concept of a “sacred value”— defined as a core moral value that a community will not compromise at any cost. I analyze the “most” sacred values (Haidt 2012; Graham and Haidt 2012) of liberals and conservatives because most sacred values potentially represent the core moral distinctions in American political ideology. This research contributes to literature that has established the importance of these most sacred values in the legitimations of American voters (Vila-Henninger 2018, 2019a, b). According to partisan voting theories, voters should provide partisan rationalizations for their policy positions (Achen and Bartels 2016). In terms of political ideological reasoning, Jonathan Haidt (2012) theorizes that liberals’ “most sacred value [is] care for victims of oppression” (Haidt 2012: 345), and more broadly protecting “the rights of certain vulnerable groups” (Haidt 2012: 212). Conversely, conservatives’ “most sacred value” is preserving “the institutions and traditions that sustain a moral community” (Haidt 2012: 357). For government regulation, Haidt (2012) theorizes that “liberals are most concerned about the rights of certain vulnerable groups…[while] conservatives, in contrast, hold more traditional idea of liberty as the right to be left alone, as they often resent liberal programs that use government to infringe on their liberties in order to protect the groups that liberals care about most” (Haidt 2012: 212). Subsequent work has established that conservatives are mainly concerned with protecting an in-group (Waytz et al. 2019). Using the government to protect certain vulnerable groups by limiting some individual liberties would thereby undermine a “tradition” (liberty) that supports a “moral community” or in-group for American conservatives. Thus, we can expect Democrats to apply the liberal most sacred value of protecting vulnerable groups, such as homebuyers, when discussing this DDEP—thereby legitimating their support for Proposition 201 (2008). Conversely, we can expect Republicans to apply the conservative most sacred values of protecting a moral community or ingroup by preserving traditions and institutions—in this case homebuyer liberty—thereby legitimating their opposition to Proposition 201 (2008).

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Quasi-Independent Variable 3: DDEP Position In this section, I discuss DDEP Position as a quasi-independent variable that corresponds with each of the first two quasi-independent variables. This discussion should help us to understand how DDEP Position as a quasi-independent variable that potentially shapes respondents’ legitimations. a. Economic Position: In 2008, when this measure was on the ballot, low-income homebuyers were facing rising levels of foreclosure and were particularly vulnerable to being targeted by subprime mortgage lenders (for a summary see Pattillo 2013; Zavisca and Gerber 2016). Similarly, low-income renters faced a dwindling supply of affordable housing (for a review see Desmond and Bell 2015: 18). The result was that low-income homebuyers were more vulnerable to predatory lending and subsequent foreclosure (Pattillo 2013; Desmond and Bell 2015; Dwyer and Lassus 2015; Zavisca and Gerber 2016). Furthermore, there is a well-documented increase in the supply of housing for the affluent (for summaries see Pattillo 2013; Desmond and Bell 2015). This dynamic was then amplified by the public messaging concerning the economic effects of the measure.4 Opponents publicly argued that the measure would increase housing prices and litigation. Conversely, supporters publicly claimed that the measure would provide much-needed protections to homebuyers by guaranteeing a 10-year warranty on all new homes and increase transparency in the home selling process. Thus, it appears as if the public discourse, as well as the dynamics of the housing market in the United States during and post-Great Recession, publicly established the perspective that the measure would increase housing prices but protect buyers of new homes in a market in which lowincome housing was diminishing and housing for the affluent was increasing. Given these dynamics and public messaging, we see the incentive for low-income voters to oppose the measure based on the pubic messaging that this DDEP would increase housing prices. Conversely, we see the incentive for high-income voters to support the measure due to the prospect of increased protections for their potential new home purchase(s). b. Partisan Affiliation: As is often the case for DDEPs, partisan elites did not provide clear cues for how voters should align Proposition

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201 (2008) with partisanship. Neither the Democratic nor Republican party on local, state, or national levels took an official stance on the measure. Furthermore, Republican Arizona state senator Barbara Leff was the only politician to take a public position—officially opposing the proposition. The measure was also opposed by libertarian and conservative online media sources (libertariansolution.com and sonorannews.com). Thus, given opposition by a state-level Republican political elite, and a lack of opposition from Democratic political elites, there were consistent—although weak—partisan cues that signaled Republican voters should oppose the measure. Given the increasingly polarized nature of partisan politics in the United States by 2008 (e.g., Baldassarri and Gelman 2008; Brooks and Manza 2013), we can then interpret a corresponding lack of opposition from Democratic elites as an implicit cue not to oppose the measure. This was echoed by opposition from an ideologically conservative online media outlet (sonorannews.com) and support from a pro-labor ideological group (Interfaith Worker Justice of Arizona) and a social justice group (Arizona Alliance for Retired Americans). Thus, we can expect Democratic voters to support the measure. c. Expected DDEP Position: In Table 5.1 we can see the expected respondent position on Proposition 201 (2008) for each combination of economic position and partisan affiliation. Table 5.1 Proposition 201 (2008): expected Proposition 201 position by economic position/partisan affiliation comparison group and percentage Proposition 201 support Economic position/partisan affiliation

Expected Proposition 201 position

Respondent Proposition 201 position (majority)

Percentage respondent Proposition 201 Support

High-income Democrats High-income Republicans Low-income Democrats Low-income Republicans

Yes

Yes

22/26 (85%)

Conflicting expectations Conflicting expectations No

Yes

7/13 (54%)

Yes

14/15 (93%)

Yes

10/12 (83%)

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Quasi-Experimental Anomalies: Legitimations that Span Economic Position and/or Partisan Affiliation It is important to consider the widely held beliefs, norms, and values that respondents across partisan affiliation and/or economic position could draw upon to (de)legitimate this DDEP. In my analysis, I found three such widely held beliefs, norms, or values: Libertarianism, Neoliberalism, and Moral Economy. Libertarianism The libertarian “most sacred value” is the protection and promotion of “individual liberty” (Haidt 2012: 352)—defined as the rejection of “the idea that the needs of one person impose a moral duty upon others.” This position is known as “negative liberty” (Berlin 1969; Iyer et al. 2012: 2; also see Haidt et al. 2009; Haidt 2012: 350). This means that negative liberty is seen by libertarians as a moral goal for its own sake (Iyer et al. 2012; Haidt 2012). As such, government regulation serves as a foil and thereby an enemy of liberty (Iyer et al. 2012; Haidt 2012). Furthermore, a key libertarian ideological perspective that stems from its most sacred value is that government economic regulation is fundamentally inefficient (Iyer et al. 2012). This characteristic of libertarianism is distinct from the conservative most sacred value because of its relationship to morality. For conservatives, economic liberty is moral because it is a tradition that sustains a moral community. For libertarians, liberty is a moral goal in and of itself, and thus government regulation is fundamentally inferior because of its interference in individual freedom. In the context of economic liberty, government inferiority takes the form of “inefficiency” for libertarians. Given this belief about government regulation, I expect the libertarian most sacred value to be used to legitimate their opposition to the measure. Neoliberalism Since the 1980s, neoliberalism has become prevalent in American politics and popular culture. Scholars contend that neoliberal ideology has enjoyed bipartisan support from American policymakers (Wacquant 2009, 2014; Amable 2011), as well as acceptance in popular culture by citizens across the political spectrum (Centeno and Cohen 2012: 328). The use of neoliberal ideology in voters’ policy legitimations constitutes a gap in the literature that corresponds with an empirical puzzle. First, researchers

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have thoroughly documented the use of neoliberal ideology in institutional (e.g., Fantasia and Voss 2004; Lee et al. 2013) and macro-level policy contexts (Mudge 2008; Livne and Yonay 2015). However, scholars are only beginning to investigate how voters use neoliberal ideology to legitimate their position on economic policy (Vila-Henninger 2019a, b). The corresponding empirical puzzle concerns the political nature of neoliberalism—as many also contend that neoliberalism converges with American conservatism rather than being bipartisan (Garland 2001; Harvey 2005; for a review see Gross et al. 2011; Gauchat 2015). In this light, we can see the “Great Risk Shift” (Hacker 2006)— or the general transfer of risk and responsibility for market action onto individuals—as a process of neoliberalization. In the housing market, this manifests itself as a shift of risk and responsibility for homeownership onto individual consumers (Dwyer and Lassus 2015). As applied to consumer protection regulation, we can expect a neoliberal opposition in the form of an emphasis on maintaining the fairness of market competition and placing responsibility for homebuying onto individual buyers. Following scholars who argue that neoliberalism permeates American culture and spans affluence and partisan affiliation (Amable 2011; Centeno and Cohen 2012), I expect to see respondents use neoliberal fairness across economic position and partisan affiliation to delegitimate the measure. Here it is important to note that a neoliberal “most sacred value” has not been theorized. Moral Economy Furthermore, self-interest and partisan voting theories do not theorize how the intersection of economic position and partisan affiliation structure voter legitimation. In order to fill this gap, I turn to the moral economy literature. A moral economy is a popular consensus about moral principles used to (de)legitimate economic exchange (Thompson 1971; Mau 2003; Western and Rosenfeld 2011; Kissane 2012; Sachweh 2012). The moral economy perspective stands in opposition to exclusively rational choice models of action and emphasizes the importance of moral consensus that spans key economic or social divisions (Svallfors 2006; Sachweh 2012). Empirical work has found that fairness is a key moral principle for a variety of moral economies (e.g., Sachweh 2012; Vila-Henninger 2017, 2019a, b). Here, we can define “fairness” as “proportionality”—or people getting “what they deserve” (Haidt 2012: 212–3). However, political

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ideology shapes how and when proportionality is applied. For example, liberals use proportionality in the defense of vulnerable groups while conservatives tend to use proportionality regardless of group vulnerability to protect an in-group (Haidt 2012). Applied to consumer protection, we might expect a politically ideological moral economy to emerge in which voters draw upon their political ideology’s moral narrative about fairness to (de)legitimate said consumer protection. Thus, for Proposition 201 (2008), we would expect Democrats to support the measure and to legitimate their support by appealing to the fairness of protecting vulnerable groups. Conversely, Republicans should oppose the measure and appeal to the fairness of protecting a moral community or in-group. The prevalence of partisan applications of proportionality across economic position to legitimate a position on the measure would then constitute a consensus. This means that in and of itself, “proportionality” is neutral but is often applied by partisans to fit a given political ideology. The neoliberal conception of fairness could then be used across party and economic position (Amable 2011; Centeno and Cohen 2012)—or only across economic position for Republicans (Garland 2001; Harvey 2005; for a review see Gross et al. 2011; Gauchat 2015).

Legitimations: Operationalization as Rationales and Coding Rationales I used ATLAS.ti, a Computer Assisted/Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS), to code transcriptions of my interviews. I coded entire interview segments of Proposition 201 (2008), so each rationale I coded represents a case in which that rationale was used to legitimate a DDEP position rather than an “utterance” of a rationale within a case. Furthermore, I used ATLAS.ti to group cases according to code combination, which I then used to identify distinct legitimations manually. In order to study voter legitimations as a form of reasoning, I analyzed respondent rationalizations of their DDEP position. To refine the operationalization of voter reasoning in the form of rationalization, I use what I call a “rationale.” I define a “rationale” as any DDEP-specific example of a widely held belief, norm, or value. For this analysis there are four types

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of rationales: “self-interest rationales,” “partisan most sacred values rationales,” “economic ideology rationales,” and “moral economy rationales.” For a detailed discussion of “rationales” and my analytical framework, see Chapter 3. Rationale Types Within “self-interest rationales,” I operationalized theory and data-driven rationales that should be specific to each level of the “economic position” quasi-independent variable. Within “partisan most sacred value rationales,” I operationalized theory and data-driven rationales that should be specific to each level of the “partisan affiliation” quasi-independent variable. Within “economic ideology rationales,” I operationalized theory and data-driven rationales according to the literature on neoliberal and libertarian ideology—respectively. As there is work on the libertarian most sacred values (Iyer et al. 2012) but not on neoliberal most sacred values, I use the libertarian most sacred value as my basis for understanding libertarian ideology but do not identify a neoliberal most sacred value. Rather, I identified two key ideological principles from neoliberalism that are relevant for respondent legitimations of their positions on Proposition 201 (2008). Within “moral economy rationales,” I operationalized theory and data-driven rationales according to the literature on moral economy and economic fairness. Economic Position Rationales I used the self-interest voting literature to create deductive self-interest codes for Economic Position. The basic criterion for all “self-interest” codes was that the respondent must frame his position on the measure in terms of his material gain or loss. Based on the literature on economic incentives for homebuyers, as well as research on American post-Great Recession housing market conditions, I coded for two short-term selfinterest rationales: Lower/Preserve Housing Prices and Increase Home Price. I expect low-income voters to use the Lower/Preserve Housing Prices rationale to justify opposition to the measure and high-income voters to use the Increase Home Prices rationale to support of the measure. I coded for the Lower/Preserve Housing Prices rationale when respondents explicitly reported opposing the measure because they thought that it

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would lower or maintain housing prices and thereby benefit them materially. Here, respondents used keywords such as “lower” and “cheaper.” I coded for Increase Home Price when respondents claimed that they supported the measure because they believed it would have increased the value or price of the home that they currently owned. Here, respondents used keywords such as “increase” and “raise.” Additionally, two inductive self-interested rationales emerged: Help Respondent’s Business and Protect Investment . Given that high-income respondents were more likely to own homes and businesses than lowincome respondents, I expected high-income respondents to use both of these rationales. I coded for Help Respondent’s Business when respondents claimed to be supporting the measure to benefit themselves materially by protecting their business or increasing their customer base. Here, respondents used keywords phrases such as “protect my business” and “more customers.” I coded for the Protect Investment rationale when respondents reported supporting the measure because they thought it would protect their investment in, or the value of, their current home. I also coded for Protect Investment when respondents reported that they supported the measure because they believed the proposition would continually increase the value of a home that they hoped to one day be able to afford. Here, respondents used keywords such as “investment” and “value.” Partisan Affiliation Rationales My deductive coding for political ideology is based on work in moral psychology on “most sacred values” of political ideology and how they emerge in American political ideology (Tetlock et al. 2000; Tetlock 2003; Haidt 2012; Graham and Haidt 2012). Following this theory, I expected that Republicans would use at least one conservative rationale to legitimate opposing the DDEP and Democrats would use at least one liberal rationale to legitimate supporting the DDEP. For a thorough discussion of American political ideology—as well as liberal and conservative most sacred values—see Chapter 3. Based on the voter reasoning literature and its intersection with the research on government regulation and consumer protection, I selected two partisan most sacred value rationales for liberals and two partisan most sacred value rationales for conservatives. I begin with these most sacred value rationales based on my initial literature review (see the Social

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Context section of this chapter). The primary liberal most sacred value is protecting the vulnerable and/or oppressed. In the case of Proposition 201 (2008), this should manifest itself as a concern for protecting consumers in general, as well as homebuyers/owners, from being taken advantage of or from material loss. I coded for Consumers in General when respondents reported voting to protect all consumers from being taken advantage of or from material loss. To apply this code, respondents must have legitimated their position on the measure by appealing to its benefits for “society” or “everyone.” I coded for Homebuyers/Owners when respondents reported voting in order to protect homebuyers or homeowners from being taken advantage of or from material loss. Here, respondents used keywords such as “homebuyers” and “homeowners.” Furthermore, four data-driven rationales emerged for liberals. I coded for First Time Homebuyers when respondents specified that first time homebuyers were particularly vulnerable in the homebuying process, so the respondent reported voting to protect these buyers from being taken advantage of or from material loss. Here, respondents used keywords such as “first time homebuyers.” I coded for Middle Class when respondents reported voting in order to protect middle-class homebuyers from being taken advantage of or from material loss. Here, respondents needed to specifically refer to the “middle class” or a synonym. I coded for Poor/ Working Class when respondents reported voting in order to protect working class or low-income homebuyers from being taken advantage of or from material loss. Here, respondents needed to specifically refer to helping the “working class,” the “poor,” or a synonym. Finally, I coded for Elderly when respondents reported voting to protect elderly homebuyers from being taken advantage of or from material loss. Respondents must have specifically referred to the “elderly” or a synonym. The primary conservative most sacred value is to preserve the traditions and institutions that maintain a moral community or protect an in-group. In the case of consumer protection regulation, this should manifest itself as a concern for protecting the tradition of individual economic liberty—especially for homesellers and homebuyers. I coded for Homeowners/ Buyers ’ Liberty when respondents reported voting to protect the “liberty” or “freedom” of those buying a home, or those who own a home, from government interference. I coded for Home Sellers’ Liberty when respondents reported voting to protect the “liberty” or “freedom” of those selling homes from government interference. This use of liberty in this context overlaps with the libertarian most sacred value

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but is distinct in that libertarian ideology sees liberty as the primary moral end and conservative ideology sees liberty as a means for maintaining a moral community or protecting an in-group. These two rationales qualify as instances of the conservative most sacred value because they advocate for the liberty of a specific in-group. Anomalous Rationales: Libertarianism A key libertarian ideological tenet is that government economic regulation is wasteful due to government inefficiency—which stems from the libertarian most sacred value of individual liberty as the most important moral end (Iyer et al. 2012). This characteristic of libertarianism is distinct from the conservative most sacred value because of its relationship to morality. As previously stated, for conservative ideology, economic liberty is a means to maintain a moral community or protect an in-group. For libertarians, however, liberty is the most important moral end. Based on this belief in liberty, libertarian ideology sees government regulation as fundamentally inferior because of its disruption of individual freedom. In the context of economic liberty, government inferiority takes the form of “inefficiency” for libertarian ideology. Because government inefficiency is a distinctly—but not uniquely— libertarian belief, I coded for the libertarian rationale Government Inefficiency when respondents reported that their vote was motivated by a belief that government spending or operation could not improve its efficiency or was fundamentally inefficient. Here, I used keywords such as “inefficient,” as well as related terms—such as “waste.” While libertarians do not have a monopoly on this argument, it nonetheless constitutes an iteration of their “most sacred value.” Although this critique can be used in politically motivated ways by partisans to criticize governments controlled by opposing parties, libertarians use it to characterize government regardless of partisan control and in relation to liberty as the most important moral goal. Anomalous Rationales: Neoliberalism There are two primary neoliberal ideological beliefs that apply to this measure: fair economic competition and individual responsibility for economic competition and the outcomes of said competition. I created

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a code for each of these beliefs as they manifested in corresponding rationales. First, given the focus on the individualization of risk and responsibility in the literature on housing, I coded for Individualized Responsibility/Risk (Dwyer and Lassus 2015). The housing literature does not link individualized risk to legitimations of market fairness, so I coded for individualized risk without coding for fairness. I coded for Individualized Responsibility/Risk whenever the respondent reported that his opposition to the measure was motivated by his perception that responsibility for buying a quality home, and/or the economic risk that comes with homeownership, lay solely with the individual consumer. There is some overlap with the conservative liberty rationale—which in this context is distinct from libertarianism—the rationale of Homeowner/Buyer’s Liberty. This is because “liberty” implies a degree of individual responsibility and risk for the consumer during the act of purchasing. However, I did not code for Individualized Responsibility/Risk unless the respondent clearly argued that the responsibility for choosing a quality home, as well as the risk involved in buying a home, lay solely with the individual consumer. Furthermore, I coded for Individualized Responsibility/Risk, and not Homeowner/Buyer’s Liberty, when the respondent focused on the consumer’s responsibility and assumption of risk for the quality of the home after it was purchased, rather than on the consumer’s responsibility during the act of homebuying. Furthermore, the Conservative Homeowner/Buyer’s Liberty rationale stresses the importance of the economic liberty for an in-group, while the Neoliberal Individualized Responsibility/Risk emphasizes that the responsibility for homebuying and the associated risk for all damages after the purchase lay soley with the individual consumer. Second, I coded neoliberal Fair Market Competition when a respondent reported that he opposed the measure because government regulation would impede fair economic competition. Thus, respondents had to discuss Proposition 201 (2008) as making competition in the housing market “unfair.” I coded for “fairness” when respondents used keywords such as “fair,” “unfair,” “right,” “wrong” “ripped off,” “scammed,” “cheated,” “accountable,” “honest,” “dishonest,” “transparent,” or “level playing field.” Here, respondents specifically had to discuss the measure as affecting the “fairness” of “competition” in the “housing market” between “builders” or “sellers.” For a thorough discussion of the neoliberal ideology, see Chapter 3.

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Anomalous Rationales: Moral Economy I operationalized “moral economy” as the use of a moral criterion for evaluating the fairness of Proposition 201 (2008) across a major social division in my data (Svallfors 2006; Sachweh 2012; Kissane 2012). I coded for Market Fairness when respondents provided an explicit evaluation of the fairness of the regulations proposed by Proposition 201 (2008)—either by directly (de)legitimating the regulations as fair/unfair or by justifying their DDEP position by appealing to the fairness of market action that was taking place that the measure would regulate. This means that I coded for Market Fairness when respondents used words that explicitly appealed to the fairness of market action—by which I mean Proposition 201 (2008) or any type of economic exchange that would be regulated. I coded for “fairness” when respondents used words such as “fair,” “unfair,” “right,” “wrong” “ripped off,” “scammed,” “cheated,” “accountable,” “honest,” “dishonest,” “transparent,” or “level playing field.” Neoliberal Fair Market Competition was thus a subset of the Market Fairness code that was specifically applied to competition in the housing market. An inductive rationale that emerged here was Liberal Market Fairness . I coded for this rationale when respondents legitimated the measure as “fair” because it would protect one of the oppressed or vulnerable groups I coded for with the liberal rationales. It is important to note that all cases coded for Liberal Market Fairness were also coded for Market Fairness and a liberal rationale. Furthermore, given the application of proportionality in the conservative ideology relative to a moral community or in-group rather than to vulnerable groups (Haidt 2012; Waytz et al. 2019), I coded for the inductive rationale of Conservative Market Fairness when respondents made explicit evaluation of the proportionality of the economic regulations proposed by Proposition 201 (2008) for Americans as a moral community or in-group. These rationales were then the basis for analysis of moral economies that I provide in Chapter 8. For a thorough discussion of the conceptual framework behind “moral economy,” see Chapter 3.

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Analysis Rationales and Rationale Groupings I used the ATLAS.ti “Quotation Manager” function to group cases according to combinations of rationale codes, which I then used to identify distinct legitimations manually. Recall that I am using rationales to operationalize respondents’ DDEP-specific uses of widely held beliefs, norms, and values to justify their DDEP position. Furthermore, I grouped rationales according to the widely held belief, norms, or value to which each rationale corresponded. I refer to these groupings as “rationale groupings.” By “legitimation” I am referring to a respondent’s justification or rationalization of his position on a DDEP. I classify legitimations according to the rationale grouping(s) that correspond to the rationale, or combination of rationales, used in a respondent’s justification. I operationalized legitimations using rationale groupings rather than individual rationales because of the aim of the analysis. Thus, while I am analyzing distinct legitimations, these legitimations are only meaningful to my analysis insofar as they correspond with a widely held political or economic belief, norm, or value. It is for this reason, then, that I grouped rationales according to the widely held beliefs, norms, and values from which they are derived. Table 5.2 displays a list of all of the rationales derived from widely held political and economic beliefs, norms, and values that I observed in my respondents’ rationalizations for Proposition 201 (2008). Thus, these findings help to address the book’s second research question empirically. For each rationale, I also specify the rationale grouping to which it belongs as well as the position on Proposition 201 (2008) that it is expected to be used to justify. Rationales are indicated in the text by the use of italics. Furthermore, I capitalized the names of rationale groupings but not the discourses to which they refer. Thus, “Liberal” refers to the rationale grouping while “liberal” refers to the ideology. For this ballot measure, Liberal Market Fairness is a combination of the Market Fairness rationale and any Liberal rationale. Similarly, Conservative Market Fairness is a combination of the Market Fairness rationale and any Conservative rationale. Thus, when I listed a respondent as using the Liberal Market Fairness rationale, to avoid redundancy, I did not also list the Liberal and Moral Economy rationale groupings. Similarly, when I listed a respondent as using the Conservative Market Fairness rationale, to avoid redundancy, I did not also list the Conservative and Moral Economy

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Table 5.2 Rationales and rationale groups for Proposition 201 (2008) Rationale Self-interest Lower/Preserve Housing Prices Increase Home Price Protect Investment Help Respondent’s Business Political ideology First Time Homebuyers Consumers in General Protect Oppressed Racial/Minority Groups Poor/ Working Class Middle Class Elderly Homeowners/Buyers Homeowners /Buyers’ Liberty Home Sellers’ Liberty Economic ideology Government Inefficiency Individualized Responsibility/ Risk Fair Market Competition (Also Moral Economy) Moral economy Market Fairness Liberal Market Fairness Conservative Market Fairness

Rationale grouping

Expected position on Proposition 201

Low-Income Self-Interest High-Income Self-Interest High-Income Self-Interest High-Income Self-Interest

Oppose

Liberal Liberal Liberal

Support Support Support

Liberal Liberal Liberal Liberal Conservative Conservative

Support Support Support Support Oppose Oppose

Libertarian Neoliberal Neoliberal

Oppose Oppose Oppose

Moral Economy Liberal Moral Economy Conservative Moral Economy

Neutral Support Oppose

Support Support Support

rationale groupings. This coding differs from the Moral Economy coding for both Proposition 202 (2008) and Proposition 204 (2012).

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Distinctive Partisan Affiliation (Partisanship) and Economic Position (Self-Interest) Legitimations In the following analysis, I investigate the legitimations that were distinctive to each comparison group of quasi-independent variables (economic position, partisan affiliation, and DDEP position). I did not recruit respondents based on their DDEP position, but for the sake of my analysis it acts as a quasi-independent variable. During each interview, I asked each respondent for either his vote choice or—if he did not vote or did not remember voting—how he “would have voted.” Each respondent’s initial position on the measure then affects the legitimation he offered because, in this case, a legitimation is a justification of a DDEP position. I begin by analyzing distinct legitimations for partisan affiliation and DDEP position alignment. Second, I analyze distinct legitimations for economic position and DDEP position alignments. Third, I analyze distinct legitimations for different alignments and oppositions of economic position, partisan affiliation, and DDEP position. This process allows me to build theory by identifying cases that empirically extend theory. In the last chapter (Chapter 9), I will elaborate upon the analyses provided in this chapter. Furthermore, in Chapter 8, I will discuss fairness legitimations that span economic position and partisan affiliation. Legitimations Distinctive of Partisan Affiliation (Partisanship) and DDEP Position Alignment and Opposition Findings for RQ1 As we can see (above in Table 5.3), no distinct legitimations emerged for the alignment of Democratic Partisan Affiliation and DDEP Support (Expected). For the alignment of Republican Partisan Affiliation and DDEP Opposition (Expected), no distinctive legitimations emerged either. There were also no distinctive legitimations for the alignment of Democratic Partisan Affiliation and DDEP Opposition (Unexpected). For the alignment of Republican Partisan Affiliation and DDEP Support (Unexpected), one distinctive legitimation emerged. Surprisingly, this did not completely align ideologically with Republican partisan affiliation. Also surprisingly, this legitimation also did not completely align ideologically with support of the DDEP. The legitimation used the Liberal and

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Table 5.3 Legitimations distinctive of partisan affiliation and DDEP position alignment and opposition for Proposition 201 (2008) Number of types of unique partisan affiliation/DDEP position legitimations Democrat and DDEP support (expected) Democrat and DDEP opposition (unexpected) Republican and DDEP opposition (expected) Republican and DDEP support (unexpected)

Unique legitimation (rationale grouping combinations)

0

NA

0

NA

0

NA

1

1. Liberal AND Conservative Moral Economy

Conservative Moral Economy rationale groupings in conjunction (Liberal AND Conservative Moral Economy). Findings for RQ2 Harold, a low-income Republican who supported the measure, used First Time Homebuyers , Poor/ Working Class , Middle Class , and Homeowners/Buyers rationales from the Liberal rationale grouping. He then legitimated his support of the measure separately using the Conservative Market Fairness rationale from the Conservative Moral Economy rationale grouping. Harold began by explicitly stating that he thought he remembered voting for the measure because “I thought that was fair.” Later, when asked what role his “values” played in him voting for the measure, he explained “The value of equanimity, to be treated fairly in business dealings, you know what I mean? Sort of the Biblical thing…like if it weighs an ounce, call it an ounce.” Here, the respondent did not frame fairness—or being “treated fairly in business dealings…if it weighs an ounce, call it an ounce”—in terms of concern for a vulnerable or oppressed group. The respondent instead explained his conviction in this sort of fairness as being “[s]ort of the biblical thing”—thus providing a religious undertone for his legitimation. Of importance here is that we see Conservative Market Fairness being applied into society relative to an in-group—Christians—which is a key component of conservative ideology and central to conservativism as “parochial” (Haidt 2012; Waytz et al. 2019). Thus, the

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implication was not that only Christians should be treated fairly, but rather than Christian beliefs should be used to determine fairness in society—thereby privileging the Christian in-group. Harold was also concerned with protecting vulnerable and oppressed groups—and thus evoked the liberal most sacred value. He legitimated his support by providing context that drew upon the liberal most sacred value. I think that’s when the whole crunch, the real estate crunch was happening, and people were losing homes left and right. Then, I had just come from the east coast and I remember driving through a slew of neighborhoods and seeing every other house with foreclosure signs and furniture on the lawn, and I thought, “man, there’s got to be a different way to go around this, you know, to help folks.” So, in coming back to Arizona by 2008 and seeing this on the ballot, it would have just made sense to vote for it.

We see Harold evoke the context of the real estate crash and the Great Recession when legitimating the measure. Here, of concern were homeowners whose homes were being foreclosed on. This then employed the Homeowners/Buyers rationale. Harold’s memory of homeowners at their most vulnerable moment served to legitimate his support for the measure. Harold continued his use of this rationale, elaborating that “without this kind of measure we’d have more folks losing their homes.” In particular, the respondent was attracted to “[t]he language [of] rights. [For example,] right to cancel within one hundred days get the most deposit.” Harold then specified that he was particularly worried about certain subgroups of Homeowners/Buyers. In expressing this concern, Harold mobilized the First Time Homebuyers , Poor/ Working Class , and Middle Class rationales from the liberal rationale grouping. The respondent referenced these groups when asked “what specific groups did you think would benefit from this?” Harold responded “The poor, definitely. The poor tend to rent, so the extremely poor would benefit, but it was mostly the middle class folks, the double income, and first-time buyers.” These are then examples of vulnerable or oppressed groups that Harold used to legitimate his support of the measure.

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Table 5.4 Legitimations exclusive to economic position and DDEP position alignment and opposition for Proposition 201 (2008) Number of types of unique economic position/policy position legitimations High-income and DDEP support (expected) High-income and DDEP opposition (unexpected) Low-income and DDEP opposition (expected) Low-income and DDEP support (unexpected)

Unique legitimation (rationale grouping combinations)

0

NA

0

NA

0

NA

1

1. High-Income Self-Interest AND Liberal

Legitimations Distinctive of Economic Position (Self-Interest) and DDEP Position Alignment and Opposition Findings for RQ1 For Economic Position and DDEP Position Alignment, one distinct legitimation emerged (see Table 5.4). As we can see, no distinct legitimations emerged for the alignment of High-Income and DDEP Support (Expected) or for Low-Income and DDEP Opposition (Expected). There were also no distinct legitimations for High-Income and DDEP Opposition (Unexpected). For the alignment of Low-Income and DDEP Support (Unexpected), one distinctive legitimation emerged. This legitimation combined rationales from the High-Income Self-Interest and Liberal rationale groupings (High-Income Self-Interest AND Liberal). Findings for RQ2 Ken, a low-income Democrat who supported the measure, legitimated his support for the measure by employing the Protect Respondent’s Business rationale from the High-Income Self-Interest rationale grouping in conjunction with the Homeowners/Buyers rationale from the Liberal rationale grouping. He began by invoking his own business interests. Ken stated he thought if the measure passed he would gain “personally…because I’ve been a real estate investor.” When asked how in particular he would benefit, he elaborated: “Just more, you know, more rights. I mean,

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when you’re gonna buy a house or an apartment building or anything, you know, disclosure of billers’ relationships with financial institution. Right to cancel. Prohibiting seller’s agents from participating. You know all of that, it’s very important. It’s like a no brainer.” Ken concluded the interview by estimating that “50%” of his vote was motivated by the “actual positive benefits that I, as an investor or purchaser or seller, might receive.” Ken clearly legitimated his support for the measure in terms of protecting his business interests. As a former real estate investor who would potentially reenter the market, Ken appealed to his business interests to justify his support for the measure. The self-interest rationale groupings are defined by respondents’ direct appeals to material gain—of which Ken’s legitimation is a clear example. Furthermore, I coded for Help Respondent’s Business when respondents claimed to be voting to benefit themselves materially by protecting their business or increasing their customer base. In this instance, Ken’s business was his potential future investment activity in the housing market. I expected this rationale to be employed by high-income respondents due to the amount of capital required to invest in housing. Ken then utilized the liberal rationale of Homeowners/Buyers. He explained that he thought that homebuyers would benefit from these rights because most people who buy homes were largely ignorant and could be taken advantage of easily. This was due, in large part, to what he saw as a predatory system of home selling set up by real estate interests: Most people have no clue what they’re signing. When they’re buying a house they don’t know what they’re doing. They just sign whatever you put in front of them. So any rights you can give them, you know, they need. ‘Cause the banks, the title companies, and the real estate brokers have huge staffs of excellent attorneys advising them. So all the rights we can have to offset that…Everything is so [real estate agents] can make a sale and get their six percent commission. It’s not about getting the customer the property they want under the terms that are advantageous to them.

In this line of reasoning, Ken clearly saw homebuyers as a group that was vulnerable and being taken advantage of by predatory real estate interests. The respondent’s support for the measure, then, was then justified by his appeal to promoting the proposition as a way to protect homeowners and homebuyers. We can see then that this is an application of the liberal

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most sacred value of protecting vulnerable or oppressed groups. For Ken, the measure would protect these two vulnerable groups. It would do so by giving them rights that would help offset what Ken perceived as the information asymmetry homeowners and homebuyers faced in the home purchasing process—which then exposed them to predatory business practices by vendors and financial institutions.

Legitimations Distinctive of Alignments and Oppositions of Economic Position (Self-Interest), Partisan Affiliation (Partisanship), and DDEP Position Expected DDEP Position for Economic Position and Partisan Affiliation Findings for RQ1 Table 5.5 shows the legitimations that are exclusive to the expected DDEP Position for economic position and partisan affiliation. For the alignment of Democratic partisan affiliation, high-income, and DDEP support, no distinctive legitimations emerged. For the alignment of Republican partisan affiliation, low-income, and DDEP opposition, one distinctive legitimation emerged which combined High-Income Self-Interest, Liberal, and Neoliberal rationale groupings (High-Income Self-Interest AND Liberal AND Neoliberal). Table 5.5 Expected: legitimations exclusive to the expected DDEP position for partisan affiliation and economic position for Proposition 201 (2008) Number of types of unique economic position/party/policy position legitimations Democrat and high-income and DDEP support Republican and low-income and DDEP opposition

Unique legitimation (rationale grouping combinations)

0

NA

1

1. High-Income Self-Interest AND Liberal AND Neoliberal

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Findings for RQ2 This legitimation was used by Jonathan—a low-income Republican who opposed the measure. This respondent is an interesting case because in 2008 his household income was more than $100,000 per year. However, in 2009 the respondent retired, which dropped his household income at the time of the interview (2014) to $25,000—an amount that was in the lower tercile of the household income distribution in Tucson in 2014. As a respondent’s economic position at the time of the interview should act as an economic incentive that structures said respondent’s economic legitimation, I expected Jonathan’s legitimations to be similar to others whose household income fell in the bottom tercile of Tucson’s household income distribution at the time of the interview. Jonathan first and foremost portrayed himself as self-interested by using the Help Respondent’s Business rationale from the High-Income Self-Interest rationale grouping. Jonathan reported voting “No” because “as a homebuilder I don’t have to sit there and take care of somebody’s screw-ups for ten years.” He elaborated: “I was hoping I wouldn’t have to increase the price of my house and drive away potential buyers.” However, Jonathan’s concerns extended to protecting homebuyers’ economic interests as well. He explained that he was motivated to protect the “health of my industry.” In doing so, he wanted to keep housing affordable and protect the economic interests of consumers: Everyone else was screaming about how expensive houses were. Well you want to be able to control expenses? If I got to guarantee a house for ten years am I going to sell it for the same price as I would if I had to guarantee it for two years? Hell no. I’m just going to add another ten thousand bucks. Right off the get-go. Who does that hurt? The guy who’s trying to buy that house. He might not be able to afford it.

In Jonathan’s logic, then, self-interest became intertwined with helping consumers—who were ultimately made vulnerable by the unintended consequences of the additional market regulation proposed by the measure. In this sense, the respondent employed the Homeowners/Buyers rationale from the Liberal rationale grouping in his delegitimation of Proposition 201 (2008). Breaking from partisan tendencies in the use of ideology, Jonathan justified his opposition to the measure by appealing to homeowners and homebuyers as groups that would be made economically vulnerable by the proposition. The respondent then applied the liberal most sacred value of protecting the vulnerable to oppose the measure

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and subvert the narrative provided by the proposition’s proponents that the measure would protect homeowners and homebuyers. Finally, Jonathan employed the neoliberal rationale of Individualized Responsibility/ Risk. Jonathan explained that his company already offered a two-year warranty on new houses. “Two years is more than enough if something is going to go wrong. Why leave the [homebuilder] on the hook for ten years when the new homeowner has eight years to screw up the house and then turn around and tell the contractor to fix it because they didn’t maintain it.” This line of reasoning clearly placed the economic risk for homebuying fully on the consumer after the warranty that was offered by the homebuilder expired. This assumption of consumer responsibility was clearly exhibited in the respondent’s assertion that homeowners would take advantage of an extended warranty that would be determined by the government. Jonathan’s argument was that responsible consumers would not need such a long warranty because they would not “screw up” the house and that all risk for homeownership after a privately determined warranty expired lies with the individual consumer. Unexpected DDEP Position for Economic Position and Partisan Affiliation Findings for RQ1 In Table 5.6 we see the distinctive legitimations that emerged for the Alignment of Partisan Affiliation and Economic Position, and Opposition of DDEP Position. Table 5.6 Unexpected: legitimations exclusive to the unexpected DDEP position for economic position and partisan affiliation for Proposition 201 (2008) Number of types of unique economic position/party/policy position legitimations Democrat and high-income and DDEP opposition Republican and low-income and DDEP support

Unique legitimation (rationale grouping combinations)

0

NA

1

1. High-Income Self-Interest AND Neoliberal AND Libertarian AND Liberal Moral Economy

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For the alignment of Democratic partisanship and high-income, and opposition to the DDEP, we did not see any legitimations. For the alignment of Republican partisanship and low-income, and support of the DDEP, we saw the emergence of one distinct legitimation that combined the High-Income Self-Interest, Neoliberal, Libertarian, and Liberal Moral Economy rationale groupings (High-Income Self-Interest AND Neoliberal AND Libertarian AND Liberal Moral Economy). Recall that I coded for the Liberal Moral Economy rationale grouping when respondents used a Liberal rationale and a Market Fairness Moral Economy rationale. Findings for RQ2 Shawn, a low-income Republican who supported the measure, used the following rationales in conjunction: Protect Investment (High-Income Self-Interest rationale grouping), Individualized Responsibility/ Risk (Neoliberal rationale grouping), Conservative Market Fairness (Conservative Moral Economy rationale grouping), Homeowners/Buyers (Liberal rationale grouping), Government Inefficiency (Libertarian rationale grouping), and Liberal Market Fairness (Liberal Moral Economy rationale grouping). First, Shawn explained that he voted out of self-interest. At first this respondent, like many low-income respondents who utilized this rationale, was skeptical about his ability to “benefit financially” from this ballot measure because of his lack of purchasing power. Instead, Shawn explained that his vote was “part of my commitment to love my neighbor by protecting him when he goes to buy a house.” However, later in the interview, the respondent elaborated: “I’m not in a position to buy a house, so no [I wouldn’t gain financially]. If I was in a position to buy a house the gain would be protection from loss.” However, also like many low-income respondents who employed this rationale, he eventually justified his support in terms of his belief that one day he would have such purchasing power to own a home. Shawn explained that “10%” of his vote was motivated by his desire to have “protection” in case “I ever happen to buy a house,” while “about 90% [was my concern] for the community.” Thus, the respondent explained part of his vote was motivated by a desire to have protection for his investment in a home in case he ever experienced upward economic mobility—which is an example of the Protect Investment rationale.

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Next, the respondent admitted that he was divided—or in his words “[felt] both ways about”—this measure. Shawn partially attributed this to his beliefs in individual responsibility for economic decisions—which was an instance of the neoliberal Individualized Responsibility/ Risk rationale. In the course of delegitimating the measure, he explained that “on the one hand you want protection, on the other hand it’s ‘caveat emptor.’ Buyer beware. It’s not really the government’s job to wipe your butt and give you a napkin every time you sit down, you know, it’s just not made to do that.” Once again, we saw the neoliberal tenet of shifting responsibility for market outcomes onto the consumer. Recall that this draws upon Social Darwinism, but is distinctly neoliberal to the extent that most neoliberal ideology contends that markets are fragile social constructs for which it is each individual’s duty to successfully integrate (Foucault 2004; Amable 2011). This belief in the fragile social construction of markets is then what morphs the Social Darwinist exaltation of individual competition into the belief that individuals—and not institutions or other social bodies—are fully responsible for the outcomes of their own market actions. Next, Shawn employed the libertarian rationale of Government Inefficiency to delegitimate the measure. “Even if [the government] could [take care of consumers], it can’t do it efficiently. That’s why George Washington said this is a government for a religious and a virtuous society. It’s totally unsuitable for any other [purpose].” This commitment to “buyer beware” and the principle of “caveat emptor” were, in this context, a manifestation of the neoliberal belief that the consumer assumed full risk and responsibility for his or her purchase that was then buttressed by the libertarian belief in the inefficiency of government regulation. Recall, that the belief in government inefficiency is not uniquely libertarian, but is a key element of the libertarian most sacred value of liberty as an ultimate moral principle (Haidt 2012; Iyer et al. 2012). Ultimately, however, Shawn supported the measure, and legitimated his support in terms of what he described as his “Christian” commitment “to love my neighbor by protecting him when he goes to buy a house.” Here, we see how this Biblical value of “love thy neighbor” coincided with the primary liberal most sacred value of protecting vulnerable groups—in this case manifesting in the Homeowners/Buyers rationale. Shawn was committed to helping “his neighbor” by providing people with protection in the homebuying process.

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When asked about to summarize his motivations for voting, Shawn explained that he voted to ensure “the protection of homebuyers and prohibiting sellers from taking unfair advantage, perhaps of some naïve buyers.” This was then an instance of the Liberal Market Fairness rationale. Notice that Shawn appealed to the fairness of the market action that he sought to regulate by voting to protect homebuyers from “unfair” business practices. This line of reasoning perceived the homebuyer, especially “naïve buyers,” of being at risk of predatory business practices and thus meriting protection via market regulation. We thus see Shawn use a moral principle that expanded beyond self-interest—fairness—to legitimate economic action—i.e., his vote for the measure. Recall that when a moral principle is used in a consensus to (de)legitimate economic action it constitutes a “moral economy” (Thompson 1971; Mau 2003; Sachweh 2012). As defined in this book, delegitimation of economic unfairness that a vulnerable or oppressed group faces is then part of the process of a “Liberal Moral Economy.” Thus, this rationale is the first step in providing evidence of a Liberal Moral Economy. Conflicting Expectations: Expected DDEP Position for Economic Position, Unexpected DDEP Position for Partisan Affiliation Findings for RQ1 In Table 5.7 we see the legitimations that are exclusive to the expected DDEP position for economic position and unexpected DDEP position for partisan affiliation (conflicting expectations). Table 5.7 Conflicting expectations: legitimations exclusive to the expected DDEP position for economic position and unexpected DDEP position for partisan affiliation for Proposition 201 (2008) Number of types of unique Unique legitimation economic position/party/policy (rationale grouping position legitimations combinations) Democrat and low-income and DDEP opposition Republican and high-income and DDEP support

1 1

1. Neoliberal AND Moral Economy 1. High-Income Self-Interest AND Conservative Moral Economy

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In Table 5.7 we see the distinctive legitimations that emerged for the Alignment of Economic Position and DDEP Position, and Opposition of Partisan Affiliation. One distinctive legitimation emerged for low-income Democrats who opposed the measure which used rationales from the Neoliberal rationale grouping (Neoliberal AND Moral Economy). Findings for RQ2 Travis, a low-income Democrat who opposed the measure, used the Individualized Responsibility/ Risk and Fair Market Competition rationales from the Neoliberal rationale grouping. Note that Fair Market Competition is also part of the Moral Economy rationale grouping. Travis explained that I think it’s something that wouldn’t necessarily be taken care of by a 10year warranty. I think it’s something that should be taking care of earlier on, like after the house is built. I mean you should know if something is not at building code or something like that. After 10 years, there is too much gray area. I think there is too much ability for people to be able and say like, ‘well that beam has broken before’ [when actually] that beam was broken from negligence of the homeowner.

In this line of reasoning, Travis placed responsibility for long-term maintenance and risk on the homeowner. Due to the “grey area” that long-term damages can fall into, as well as the possibility of negligence on the side of the homeowner, Travis fully rejected a government-enforced long-term warranty. This, then, individualized risk for home defects by rejecting collectively provided protection for liability beyond the warranty provided by the homebuilder. Notice that for the respondent, the homebuyer was responsible for detecting defects “earlier on, like after the house is built.” The buyer needed to be responsible here. “I mean you should know if something is not at building code or something like that.” This respondent applied the neoliberal rationale without incorporating a concern for protecting liberty. This is because he emphasized individualized responsibility and risk for the consumer after, but not during, the business transaction. Thus, rather than individuals having the liberty to conduct business without a warranty, Travis emphasized the need to place responsibility for damage onto the homeowner after the sale. Furthermore, the respondent’s rationale emphasized the potential for state regulation to allow consumers to behave immorally and thus cheat

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the system by lying in order to exploit the warranty. As we will see with Bert in a subsequent section, the concern here is to prevent the pursuit of self-interest from slipping into immoral behavior. One may then correctly argue that there is some overlap with the conservative ideological frame of protecting a tradition that would sustain a moral community. Indeed, this is an element of liberalism that is incorporated into American conservative political ideology (e.g., Haidt 2012) as well as appropriated by neoliberal ideology (Foucault 2004; Amable 2011: 14–5). However, the element that is distinctly neoliberal here is the shift of responsibility of market outcomes onto the individual consumer (Dwyer and Lassus 2015)—which is part of a broader shift in the economy to individualize economic risk (Hacker 2006). Recall that a key element of neoliberalism—and a major reason for its adoption of the individualization of market outcomes—is the conception that the market is a fragile social construction. In this framework, markets are not deregulated but reregulated in order to ensure that the immediate conditions of individual competition are equal—thus making the outcomes of individual economic competition moral. From this perspective, it is then the individual’s responsibility to compete and assume the consequences of his/her economic competition. In this light, we can understand other elements of Travis’ interview. For example, he stated that “I get that [the measure is] designed to kind of protect homeowners and home buyers but I just don’t see that. I see [it] as being taken advantage of a lot for a little minor things and I don’t see who would oversee that.” Notice that the issue was not deregulation, or the inefficiency of regulation, but rather the failure to ensure the fairness of market competition. Here we see Travis evoke the Fair Market Competition rationale from the Neoliberal rationale grouping. This is because the respondent’s portrayal was that homesellers simply could not compete in an environment where homebuyers would cheat them after the sale was completed. Furthermore, Travis argued that the measure would lead to an increase in prices, but “that’s not really the right type of increase in price. Not because the market’s going up, but because people are trying to have to recoup cost because of the previous home buyers.” The respondent continued with the theme of this measure disrupting competition and thus the importance of the consumer assuming responsibility for the outcome of the sale. “It’s kind of similar to in medicine if you know, if a

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doctor has a malpractice suit or something like that, that’s something that they have to deal with and it makes them doing their job less desirable.” Although Travis did not use terms from neoliberal ideology, we can see him relay its worldview. The issue was not deregulation, but rather the appropriate reregulation of the market to ensure fair competition. From this perspective, the market was socially constructed and fragile—as we can see from the malpractice example or from the discussion about the “right type of increase in price.” The problem was then creating market regulation that could be enforced to ensure fair market competition (“I see [it] as being taken advantage of a lot for a little minor things and I don’t see who would oversee that”). Thus, the issue was not simply protecting a tradition that would preserve a moral community, but rather delegitimating state regulation that Travis saw as disrupting fair market competition. Similarly, Travis was not simply concerned that prices would rise, but rather was against prices rising from state regulation and not individual economic competition. Findings for RQ1 One distinctive legitimation emerged for high-income Republicans who supported Proposition 201. This legitimation combined the HighIncome Self-Interest and Moral Economy rationale groupings (HighIncome Self-Interest AND Conservative Moral Economy). Findings for RQ2 Troy, a high-income Republican who supported the measure, first used the Increase Home Price and Protect Investment rationales from the High-Income Self-Interest rationale grouping. Recall that these two selfinterest rationales are evidence of norms of self-interest rather reports of self-interested motives (Spillman 2012; Spillman and Strand 2013; VilaHenninger 2017). The respondent explained that if the measure passed it would help raise the value of homes by benefitting the housing market: “As the housing market comes back, it benefits homeowners. So [voting ‘Yes’ is] kind of an indirect benefit.” Here, we see that Troy legitimated his support by referencing the benefits of a strong housing market—and the rising home prices it entailed. This was then an instance of the Increase Home Price rationale. Troy legitimated his support by drawing attention to the measure’s supposed benefits for the housing market, which would “benefits homeowners” and would result in “an indirect benefit” for the respondent.

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Troy elaborated by claiming that the measure would “keep people out of the housing market that really had no business buying a house, that were only going to foreclose on it a year later, driving the housing market even lower than what it was. So [a ‘Yes’ vote was] a safeguard against those kind of people.” In this line of reasoning, the respondent wanted to increase the quality of new homes, which would keep lower socioeconomic consumers who “really had no business buying a house” from disrupting the housing market—and by extension lowering house prices. Troy claimed that he was also voting to benefit himself because “at this time we were thinking at some point down the road we’d be buying another house.” Thus, Troy portrayed himself as a potential purchaser of a new home, which then facilitated his use of the Protect Investment to legitimate his support for this consumer protection regulation. Troy then concluded by using the Conservative Market Fairness rationale. In the following exchange, we see a perfect example of this Conservative Market Fairness as Troy summarized his support for the measure being because “I like the…right to cancel within 100 days. Sometimes people make impulsive decisions…I think it promotes integrity, people dealing fairly. What you see is what you get.” Troy then reported that “75%” of his vote was motivated by his “[interviewer’s words] values or beliefs,” which he defined as “honesty, being fair.” While this legitimation did not constitute a moral economy as it was only used by Troy, we see that the respondent’s legitimation of the measure was similar to one that might be used in a moral economy because it conceptualized and legitimated the measure in terms of economic fairness. We see that this rationale was distinct from the Liberal Market Fairness rationale as Troy did not apply this fairness to a vulnerable group. Here, the most specific Troy was about the application of fairness was that “sometimes people make impulsive decisions.” This hardly constituted a conception of fairness in which protecting vulnerable homebuyers is central. Conversely, Troy discussed market fairness as a concept that should be applied as part of maintaining a moral society. Conflicting Expectations: Expected DDEP Position for Partisan Affiliation, Unexpected DDEP Position for Economic Position Findings for RQ1 In Table 5.8 we see the legitimations that are exclusive to the expected DDEP position for partisan affiliation and unexpected DDEP position for economic position (conflicting expectations).

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Table 5.8 Conflicting expectations: legitimations exclusive to the expected DDEP position for partisan affiliation and unexpected DDEP position for economic position for Proposition 201 (2008) Number of types of unique economic position/party/policy position legitimations Democrat and low-income and DDEP support Republican and high-income and DDEP opposition

Unique legitimation (rationale grouping combinations)

0

NA

4

1. Conservative 2. Conservative AND Liberal AND Neoliberal 3. High-Income Self-Interest AND Conservative AND Neoliberal AND Libertarian 4. Low-Income Self-Interest AND Liberal

There were no legitimations that were distinctive to the alignment of Democratic partisanship and DDEP position, and the opposition of economic position (low-income Democrats who supported Proposition 201). For the alignment of Republican partisanship and expected DDEP position, and the opposition of economic position, four distinctive legitimations emerged. The first used the Conservative rationale grouping (Conservative). The second combined Conservative, Liberal, and Neoliberal rationale groupings (Conservative AND Liberal AND Neoliberal). The third combined High-Income Self-Interest, Conservative, Neoliberal, and Libertarian rationale groupings (High-Income Self-Interest AND Conservative AND Neoliberal AND Libertarian). Finally, the fourth combined the Low-Income Self-Interest and Liberal rationale groupings (Low-Income Self-Interest AND Liberal). Findings for RQ2 Bert, a high-income Republican who worked as a lawyer, legitimated his opposition to the measure using both rationales from the Conservative rationale grouping: Homeowners / Buyers ’ Liberty and Home Sellers’

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Liberty. The respondent began by explicitly discussing the issue of liberty: “I probably would have voted against this because this is over regulation by the state. Let homeowners and home builders decide what they work out. We have sufficient remedies in law right now if there are latent defects.” Bert continued: “[The measure] would hurt society, it would hurt business, it would just engender a lot of litigation which my law firm could benefit from but didn’t seem that it was going to help the state…this is just something for the attorneys to make a lot of money…a lot of times people bring suits they shouldn’t bring.” Here, Bert overtly identified what his self-interested position on the measure would be and then rejected this position on moral grounds. Rather than promoting a measure that the respondent believed would increase litigation and thus benefit him and his firm, Bert explained that he was concerned for the wellbeing of “society” and “business.” Notice that this is not an example of the neoliberal Individualized Responsibility/ Risk, as the respondent did not assert that consumers should be responsible for making an astute purchase or for “latent defects.” Neither was this an instance of the libertarian Government Inefficiency rationale. The issue here was not that the government would inefficiently regulate homebuying. Instead, Bert was concerned about the liberty of homebuyers and homebuilders. As Haidt (2012) explains, conservatives’ “most sacred value” is preserving “the institutions and traditions that sustain a moral community” (Haidt 2012: 357). For government regulation, conservatives apply this most sacred value through the belief in “liberty as the right to be left alone, as they often resent liberal programs that use government to infringe on their liberties in order to protect the groups that liberals care about most” (Haidt 2012: 212). This is then an example of “negative liberty”—defined as the rejection of “the idea that the needs of one person impose a moral duty upon others” (Berlin 1969; Iyer et al. 2012: 2; also see Haidt et al. 2009; Haidt 2012: 350). Most conservatives and libertarians overlap in their ideological preference for negative liberty. However, the key difference is in the application of most sacred values. For libertarians, liberty in and of itself is the most important moral goal— and thus their most sacred value. However, applied through the lens of the conservative most sacred value, liberty is a tradition that is employed to maintain a moral community or protect an in-group. For Bert, the issue was protecting liberty—or preventing “overregulation by the state…[in order to] let homeowners and home builders

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decide what they work out.” However, the key here was that liberty was not a moral goal in and of itself. Instead, promoting liberty was a means to a different end. Liberty was important, because passing the measure and adding these regulations “would hurt society, it would hurt business.” The issue was then protecting American society and business. In the conservative worldview, the pursuit of self-interest is considered to be a moral act (Lakoff 2002; Haidt 2012). Thus, from this perspective, disrupting individuals’ and businesses’ pursuit of their self-interest through increased regulation was a form of disrupting a moral society and the successful economy that this ideology claims accompanies the pursuit of self-interest. Furthermore, Bert explicitly addressed how the measure’s disruption of liberty would undermine a moral society. “[The measure] would hurt society, it would hurt business, it would just engender a lot of litigation which my law firm could benefit from but didn’t seem that it was going to help the state…this is just something for the attorneys to make a lot of money…a lot of times people bring suits they shouldn’t bring.” We then see that on top of disrupting actors’ pursuit of self-interest in a way that was productive to society and the economy, this regulation would then, according to the respondent, incentivize people to bring frivolous lawsuits. From this perspective, imposing these government regulations would infringe upon liberty so as to encourage actors to behave immorally and bring unfair lawsuits against homebuilders. Thus, Bert legitimated his opposition to the measure in terms of conservative most sacred value rationales by promoting liberty so as to ensure the productive and moral pursuit of self-interest rather than dishonest and unfair self-interested action. Sylvester, a high-income Republican who also opposed the measure, employed the Lower/Preserve Housing Prices rationale (Low-Income SelfInterest rationale grouping) along with the Homeowners/Buyers rationale (Liberal rationale grouping) to legitimate his opposition to Proposition 201 (2008). The respondent explained that passing the measure “would’ve added 20% or something on top of the home price and in the long run it would’ve made it worse for the homeowner…I think it would’ve made houses not affordable, I think it would have been very bad for the housing market in general.” Here, Sylvester clearly legitimated his opposition in terms of protecting a vulnerable group, homebuyers, whom

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he estimated would have lost purchasing power due to what the respondent predicted would be an exorbitant increase in the cost of new homes. This was then an example of the Liberal Homeowners/Buyers rationale. Next, Sylvester justified his opposition in terms of his own self-interest. The respondent replied to the follow-up question of “were you voting for yourself…voting for society, or was it too hard to separate?” by invoking the Low-Income Self-Interest rationale of Lower/Preserve Housing Prices . Sylvester explained that “I think it’s the same, because the thing is I don’t think it would have been good for society or myself.” Given the diminishing supply of affordable housing for low-income buyers (for summaries see Pattillo 2013; Desmond and Bell 2015), we can expect legitimating opposition to the measure in terms of lowering or preserving housing prices to be used by lower income respondents. We saw the opposite here—as Sylvester was a high-income respondent. More interestingly, we saw the respondent frame his justification of his self-interest in terms of being “the same” as society. In terms of economic voting, the literature (e.g., Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; for a review see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2019) has long established two key axes: retrospective (looking at past events) vs. prospective (thinking about the future) and egotropic economic (self-interested or “pocketbook”) vs. sociotropic economic (“public interest” or “national” voting). The recent literature has found that voters tend to be sociotropic economic voters (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2019). However, recall that actors legitimate their economic behavior in terms of norms of self-interest that they perceive to be socially acceptable (Spillman 2012; Spillman and Strand 2013; Vila-Henninger 2017). It is then interesting to see the sociotropic vs. egotropic dichotomy disappear in the political and economic rationalizations of voters. For Sylvester, egotropic economic voting was not opposed to sociotropic economic voting, but rather egotropic economic voting was justified in terms of sociotropic economic voting. Thus, we see a norm of self-interest emerge in which sociotropic and egotropic economic voting are “the same.” While Sylvester invoked the LowIncome Self-Interest rationale of Lower/Preserve Housing Prices , we see that this was part of a more complex norm of self-interest in which egotropic economic voting was justified in terms of—and equated with— sociotropic economic voting. Recall that this does not explain why the

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respondent “actually” voted, but rather demonstrates a socially acceptable understanding of self-interest—i.e. a norm of self-interest.

Notes 1. https://www.followthemoney.org/entity-details?eid=10246669. 2. https://apps.azsos.gov/apps/election/cfs/search/BallotMeasureSearch. aspx. 3. https://dictionary.apa.org/quasi-independent-variable. 4. https://apps.azsos.gov/election/2008/Info/PubPamphlet/Sun_Sounds/ english/prop201.htm.

Bibliography Achen, Christopher H., and Larry M. Bartels. 2016. Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Amable, B. 2011. “Morals and Politics in the Ideology of Neo-Liberalism.” SocioEconomic Review 9 (1): 3–30. Amenta, Edwin, Neal Caren, Elizabeth Chiarello, and Yang Su. 2010. “The Political Consequences of Social Movements.” Annual Review of Sociology 36: 287–307. Baldassarri, Delia, and Andrew Gelman. 2008. “Partisans Without Constraint: Political Polarization and Trends in American Public Opinion.” The American Journal of Sociology 114 (2): 408–46. Berlin, Isiah. 1969. Four Essays on Liberty. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. Brooks, Clem, and Jeff Manza. 2013. “A Broken Public? Americans’ Responses to the Great Recession.” American Sociological Review 78 (5): 727–48. Burawoy, M. 1998. “The Extended Case Method.” Sociological Theory 16 (1): 4–33. ———. 2009. The Extended Case Method: Four Countries, Four Decades, Four Great Transformations, and One Theoretical Tradition. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Carrigan, Christopher, and Cary Coglianese. 2011. “The Politics of Regulation: From New Institutionalism to New Governance.” Annual Review of Political Science 14 (1): 107–29. Centeno, M. A., and J. N. Cohen. 2012. “The Arc of Neoliberalism.” Annual Review of Sociology 38: 317–40. Desmond, Matthew, and Monica Bell. 2015. “Housing, Poverty, and the Law.” Annual Review of Law and Social Science 11: 15–36.

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Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper. Dwyer, Rachel E., and Lora A. Phillips Lassus. 2015. “The Great Risk Shift and Precarity in the U.S. Housing Market.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 660: 199–216. Fantasia, Rick, and Kim Voss. 2004. Hard Work: Remaking the American Labor Movement. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Fligstein, Neil, and Adam Goldstein. 2010. “The Anatomy of the Mortgage Securitization Crisis.” Pp. 29–70 in Markets on Trial: The Economic Sociology of the U.S. Financial Crisis: Part A, edited by Michael Lounsbury. Bingley, UK: Emerald. Foucault M. 2004. Naissance de la biopolitique: Cours au Collège de France, 1978–1979. Paris: Seuil/Gallimard. Garland, David. 2001. The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gauchat, Gordon. 2015. “The Political Context of Science in the United States: Public Acceptance of Evidence-Based Policy and Science Funding.” Social Forces 94 (2): 723–46. Gormley, W. T. 2007. “Public Policy Analysis: Ideas and Impacts.” Annual Review of Political Science 10: 297–314. Graham, J., and J. Haidt. 2012. “Sacred Values and Evil Adversaries: A Moral Foundations Approach.” Pp. 11–31 in Herzliya Series on Personality and Social Psychology: The Social Psychology of Morality: Exploring the Causes of Good and Evil, edited by M. Mikulincer and P. R. Shaver. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Graham, J., J. Haidt, and B. A. Nosek. 2009. “Liberals and Conservatives Rely on Different Sets of Moral Foundations.” Journal of Personal Social Psychology 96: 1029–46. Gross, Neil, Thomas Medvetz, and Rupert Russell. 2011. “The Contemporary American Conservative Movement.” Annual Review of Sociology 37 (1): 325– 54. Hacker, Jacob S. 2006. The Great Risk Shift: The Assault on American Jobs, Families, Healthcare, and Retirement and How You Can Fight Back. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Haidt, J. 2012. The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. New York: Pantheon Books. Haidt, Jonathan, Jesse Graham, and Craig Joseph. 2009. “Above and Below LeftRight: Ideological Narratives and Moral Foundations.” Psychological Inquiry 20 (2–3): 110–19. Harvey, David. 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Iyer, R., S. Koleva, J. Graham, P. Ditto, and J. Haidt. 2012. “Understanding Libertarian Morality: The Psychological Dispositions of Self-Identified Libertarians.” PloS One 7 (8): e42366. Kinder, Donald R., and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1981. “Sociotropic Politics: The American Case.” British Journal of Political Science 11 (2): 129–61. Kissane, R. J. 2012. “Poor Women’s Moral Economies of Nonprofit Social Service Use: Conspicuous Constraint and Empowerment in the Hollow State.” Sociological Perspectives 55 (1): 189–211. Lakoff, George. 2002. Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lee, C. W., K. McNulty, and S. Shaffer. 2013. “‘Hard Times, Hard Choices’: Marketing Retrenchment as Civic Empowerment in an Era of Neoliberal Crisis.” Socio-Economic Review 11 (1): 81–106. Lewis-Beck, M., and M. Stegmaier. 2019. “Economic Voting.” In The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1, edited by Roger D. Congleton, Bernard Grofman, and Stefan Voigt. https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10. 1093/oxfordhb/9780190469733.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190469733e-12. Livne, Roi, and Yuval P. Yonay. 2015. “Performing Neoliberal Governmentality: An Ethnography of Financialized Sovereign Debt Management Practices.” Socio-Economic Review 14 (2): 339–362. Lowi, Theodore J. 1969. The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority. New York: Norton. Mau, Steffen. 2003. The Moral Economy of Welfare States: Britain and Germany Compared. London: Routledge. Mudge, Stephanie Lee. 2008. “What Is Neo-Liberalism?” Socio-Economic Review 6 (4): 703–31. Pattillo, M. 2013. “Housing: Commodity Versus Right.” Annual Review of Sociology 39: 509–531. Pedriana, Nicholas. 2006. “From Protective to Equal Treatment: Legal Framing Processes and Transformation of the Women’s Movement in the 1960s.” The American Journal of Sociology 111 (6): 1718–61. Peirce, Charles. 1934. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Vol. 5, Pragmatism and Pragmaticism, edited by C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Privitera, Gregory J., and Lynn Ahlgrim-Delzell. 2019. Research Methods for Education. Los Angeles: Sage. Rice, Alison. 2008. “Voters Face Controversial Ballot Proposals Affecting Builders in Arizona, Georgia.” Retrieved August 7, 2017. http://www.bui lderonline.com/building/regulation-policy/voters-face-controversial-ballotproposals-affecting-builders-in-arizona-georgia_o.

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Sachweh, P. 2012. “The Moral Economy of Inequality: Popular Views on Income Differentiation, Poverty and Wealth.” Socio-Economic Review 10 (3): 419–45. Sallaz, J. J. 2009. The Labor of Luck: Casino Capitalism in the United States and South Africa. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Shadish, William R., Thomas D. Cook, and Donald T. Campbell. 2001. Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Generalized Causal Inference. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Skrentny, John D. 2006. “Law and the American State.” Annual Review of Sociology 32 (1): 213–44. Sears, David O., and Carolyn L. Funk. 1991. “The Role of Self-Interest in Social and Political Attitudes.” Pp. 1–91 in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, edited by Mark P. Zanna, Volume 24. San diego: Academic Press. Silbey, Susan S. 2009. “Taming Prometheus: Talk About Safety and Culture.” Annual Review of Sociology 35 (1): 341–69. Spillman, Lyn. 2012. Solidarity in Strategy: Making Business Meaningful in American Trade Associations. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Spillman, L., and M. Strand. 2013. “Interest-Oriented Action.” Annual Review of Sociology 39: 85–104. Svallfors, Stefan. 2006. The Moral Economy of Class: Class and Attitudes in Comparative Perspective. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Swedberg R. 2017. “Theorizing in Sociological Research: A New Perspective, a New Departure?” Annual Review of Sociology 43: 189–206. Talesh, Shauhin A. 2009. “The Privatization of Public Legal Rights: How Manufacturers Construct the Meaning of Consumer Law.” Law & Society Review 43 (3): 527–61. ———. 2014. “Institutional and Political Sources of Legislative Change: Explaining How Private Organizations Influence the Form and Content of Consumer Protection Legislation.” Law & Social Inquiry 39 (4): 973–1005. Tavory, I., and S. Timmermans. 2014. Abductive Analysis: Theorizing Qualitative Research. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Tetlock, P. E. 2003. “Thinking About the Unthinkable: Coping with Secular Encroachments on Sacred Values.” Trends in Cognitive Science 7: 320–24. Tetlock, P. E., O. Kristel, B. Elson, M. Green, and J. Lerner. 2000. “The Psychology of the Unthinkable: Taboo Trade-Offs, Forbidden Base Rates, and Heretical Counterfactuals.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 78: 853–70. Thompson, E. P. 1971. “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century.” Past & Present 50: 76–136. Timmermans, S., and I. Tavory. 2012. “Theory Construction in Qualitative Research: From Grounded Theory to Abductive Analysis.” Sociological Theory 30 (3): 167–86.

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Vila-Henninger, Luis Antonio. 2017. “The Moral Economies of Self-Interest: The Popular Confluence of Norms of Self-Interest and Norms of Solidarity.” Sociological Perspectives 60 (1): 168–85. ———. 2018. “The ‘Medicinal Cannabis Question’: How Actors Legitimate Vote Choice on Medical Marijuana Policy.” The Sociological Quarterly 59 (2): 180–203. ———. 2019a. “Turning Talk into ‘Rationales’: Using the Extended Case Method for the Coding and Analysis of Semi-Structured Interview Data in Atlas-ti.” Bulletin of Sociological Methodology 43 (1): 28–52. ———. 2019b. “The Moral Economy of Neoliberalism: How Voters Use Neoliberal Ideology to (De)Legitimate Undocumented Worker Access to Labor Markets.” Sociological Inquiry 89 (2): 239–62. Vogel, David. 1989. Fluctuating Fortunes: The Political Power of Business in America. New York: Basic Books. Wacquant, L. J. D. 2009. Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. ———. 2010. “Crafting the Neoliberal State: Workfare Prisonfare, and Social Insecurity.” Sociological Forum 25 (2):197–220. ———. 2014. “The Global Firestorm of Law and Order: On Punishment and Neoliberalism.” Thesis Eleven 122 (1): 72–88. Waytz, Adam, Ravi Iyer, Liane Young, Jonathan Haidt, and Jesse Graham. 2019. “Ideological Differences in the Expanse of the Moral Circle.” Nature Communications 10 (1): 1–12. Western, Bruce, and Jake Rosenfeld. 2011. “Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality.” American Sociological Review 76 (4): 513–37. Zavisca, Jane, R., and Theodore P. Gerber. 2016. “The Socioeconomic, Demographic, and Political Effects of Housing in Comparative Perspective.” Annual Review of Sociology 42: 347–67.

CHAPTER 6

Proposition 202 (2008)

Introduction This chapter continues my analysis of voters’ legitimations of their positions on different direct democratic economic policies (DDEPs) and how such legitimations are structured by the interaction of self-interest and partisanship. For this analysis, I selected Arizona’s Proposition 202 (2008): “Arizona Stop Illegal Hiring.” This DDEP sought to limit Arizona’s “Legal Arizona Workers Act” (LAWA)—a law passed by Arizona state government that attempted to surpass the George W. Bush administration’s crackdown on undocumented workers (Rosenblum and Gorman 2010: 122). Not only did this proposition fail, but LAWA was upheld by the Supreme Court in 2011—setting the stage for the spread of similar workplace legislation across the country (Liptak 2011). For this ballot measure, I used data from 80 respondents who took a position on Proposition 202 (2008) during their interview, legitimated their position, and fit my other sampling criteria (see Chapter 4). Furthermore, it is important to remember that in the context of justifying political positions, justifications and rationalizations are legitimations. Recall that I implemented a quasi-experimental design and recruited respondents according to economic position and partisan affiliation (see Chapters 1 and 4) in order to address the book’s two research questions:

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RQ1: How do partisanship and self-interest interact to shape partisan voters’ rationalizations of their position on direct democratic economic policy (DDEP)? RQ2: What are the discourses that voters draw upon to rationalize their direct democratic economic policy (DDEP) position?

In this way, partisan affiliation and economic position are quasiindependent variables (see Chapters 1 and 4). Given the design of the study, the position that a respondent took on a DDEP before providing a legitimation also acted as a quasi-independent variable. The empirical task laid out by the first question was then to investigate how selfinterest, partisanship, and DDEP position interacted to structure voter legitimations. I performed this task by identifying legitimations that were distinctive to each comparison group of my three quasi-independent variables (economic position, partisan affiliation, and DDEP position). Furthermore, the empirical task for the second question was to examine the widely held political or economic beliefs, norms, and values that voters drew upon in their legitimations of their DDEP position. I carried out this task by providing a qualitative analysis of the distinctive legitimations I identified for each comparison group of quasi-independent variables. As discussed in the theory chapter (Chapter 2), respondents’ use of widely held political or economic beliefs, norms, and values in their legitimations serves as evidence of their socialization into these beliefs, norms, and values. Understanding such socialization provides a window onto the forms of legitimate political and economic discourse in the United States from the late 2000s through the mid-2010s regarding economic policy. This is because my data for this measure were collected from 2013 to 2015 and were facilitated by my use of a prompt with respondents that was a justificatory summary of Proposition 202 (2008) that was provided to voters online via the Arizona Secretary of State prior to the election in 2008. My findings also help us to understand political socialization processes in the United States more broadly. Finally, the analysis in this chapter applies the principle of “reconstruction” from the Extended Case Method (e.g., Burawoy 1998, 2009; Sallaz 2009) to semi-structured interview data in order to build theory by identifying cases in the data that are novel or anomalous to relevant theory and empirical literature (Vila-Henninger 2018, 2019a, b). This approach is analogous to qualitative uses of abduction (Pierce 1934; Timmermans and Tavory 2012; Tavory and Timmermans 2014; Swedberg 2017). In

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this chapter, my analysis identifies novel and anomalous cases in my data. In the final chapter (Chapter 9), then, I build theory using both novel and anomalous cases.

Arizona’s Proposition 202 (2008): “Arizona Stop Illegal Hiring” Social Context Undocumented immigration is, to say the least, a hot button issue in the United States. From 2000 to 2009 the United States saw its highest levels of immigration—totaling more than 13,000,000 immigrants—a large percentage of whom were Hispanic/Latino (Vaughan 2012: 320). During this period, the southwest was particularly affected. For example, in 2000, 36% of the city of Tucson, Arizona—the location from which this study’s respondents were recruited—was Hispanic/Latino. In 2010, this number jumped to 42%—more than 2.5 times the national average of 16% (Census.gov). If nothing else, local, state-level, and national politics over the past several decades have demonstrated the increasing pressure on American policymakers to address “illegal immigration.” A central concern in the public’s reaction against immigration is the number of undocumented workers and their informal participation in labor markets. Donald Trump and other American right-wing populists have mobilized support by framing undocumented immigrants as a source of an array of problems in the United States. These themes have a long tradition in American conservative political rhetoric (Flores and Schachter 2018) and have become self-reinforcing, as this rhetoric is formalized in policy that shapes public opinion (Flores 2017). For at least the past two decades, American anti-immigrant political rhetoric has portrayed undocumented migrants as a threat to jobs (Shapira 2013), community safety (Sohoni and Sohoni 2014), and social programs (Santa Ana 2002; Brown 2013). This rhetoric is then often mobilized by those attempting to exclude undocumented workers from labor markets. Behind these fears lie concerns for potential inequalities that undocumented workers are perceived to create. Conversely, advocates of undocumented workers increasingly express concern for the inequality faced by these immigrants in the labor market as victims of exploitation (McDonald and Erez 2007), as well as for inequality in undocumented

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workers’ access to social benefits (e.g., Fox 2004; Rueda 2005, 2006; Brown 2013; Berens 2015). A widely used concept in the inequality literature is Max’s Weber’s “social closure”—or exclusionary judgments that rely upon cultural criteria of group membership (Weber [1922] 1978: 43–6). Stratification scholars (e.g., Weeden 2002) have used the social closure concept as it relates to inequality and a sociopolitical struggle over economic resources. From analyses of racial and ethnic boundaries (Wimmer 2008) to income inequality and occupations (Mouw and Kalleberg 2010), the literature has established the importance of social closure. Legislating undocumented workers’ access to labor markets is then an issue of “labor market closure.” Scholars have studied labor market closure in a variety of contexts. Some study how those in formal labor markets seek to exclude those in informal labor markets from welfare state benefits (Fox 2004; Rueda 2005, 2006; Brown 2013; Berens 2015). Other strands of research focus on the motives that drive actors, especially those in the dominant ethnic or racial group in the United States (Young 2013), to exclude competing racial or ethnic groups from labor markets (e.g., Bonacich 1972, 1976; Bobo 1998; Tilly 1998; McVeigh 2009; Valdez et al. 2019) and distinguish themselves from Latinos (Abascal 2020). Most high-profile immigration policy qua social closure is created by federal lawmakers—such as Donald Trump’s “Travel Ban.” However, most exclusionary immigration policy is enacted by local or state lawmakers—who have a long history of attempting to bypass or enhance federal regulation. Laws such as Arizona’s SB 1070 that are crafted by state legislatures are highly controversial, and such policy is effective in creating or intensifying public anti-immigrant sentiment (Flores 2017). However, analogous direct democratic policy, while growing in number and importance, has been largely overlooked. For example, California’s proposition 187 (1994) created considerable attention and attempted to exclude undocumented workers from social services. Though much has been written about this measure and other attempts to limit undocumented immigrant access to welfare state benefits (e.g., Santa Ana 2002; Fox 2004; Jacobson 2008; Brown 2013; Steil and Vasi 2014), few scholars have investigated direct democratic attempts to implement other forms of social closure against undocumented immigrants.

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Background of the Measure In order to address this gap, I take the case of Arizona’s Proposition 202 (2008): “Arizona Stop Illegal Hiring.” The topic of closing labor markets to undocumented workers hits home in Arizona—which as a border state is particularly divided. On the one hand, undocumented workers are integral to the state’s economy (Rosenblum and Gorman 2010: 121). On the other, Arizona has a history of anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric (Brown 2013). While many business interests favor lax regulation of undocumented workers, there is also ideological and partisan resistance to their participation in the state labor market (Quinn 2008; Shapira 2013). With growing public pressure to stem the tide of undocumented workers throughout the mid-2000s, Arizona state legislators sought to act. In the mid-2000s, Arizona became one of 13 states that sought to surpass federal regulation of undocumented workers. In particular, in 2007 Arizona passed HB 2779—“The Fair and Legal Employment Act” or the “Legal Arizona Workers Act” (LAWA). At the time, LAWA was considered to be the strictest legislation of its kind (Rosenblum and Gorman 2010: 120–1). LAWA was spearheaded by State Senator Russell Pearce—who made a career of mounting legislative attacks against undocumented immigrants. LAWA mandated that employers use e-verify to confirm the legal status of workers. This legislation also increased penalties for businesses that were caught employing undocumented workers—including the suspension of business licenses—and imposed severe penalties for identity theft. LAWA was based on an unsuccessful 2006 Arizona state ballot measure. The Arizona State Senate then intensified LAWA in 2008 with HB 2745— which extended the mandate to use e-verify to all government contractors (Kubrin et al. 2012: 68–9). LAWA immediately faced business-led opposition. A coalition soon formed that drew together business interests and immigrant rights groups—all of which vocally opposed the bill. Proposition 202 (2008) “Arizona Stop Illegal Hiring” was subsequently created—which aimed at rolling back some key elements of LAWA (Rosenblum and Gorman 2010: 122). Not only did Proposition 202 (2008) fail, but LAWA was upheld by the Supreme Court in 2011, which paved the way for similar workplace legislation to spread across the country (Liptak 2011). Proposition 202 (2008) “Arizona Stop illegal Hiring” is a complex case. On the one hand, Proposition 202 (2008) attempted to scale back

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the regulation of businesses that hired undocumented workers. On the other, the measure utilized a “get tough on illegal immigration” rhetoric associated with the Republican backed LAWA. Proposition 202 (2008)’s use of anti-immigrant rhetoric was portrayed in the media as an attempt to “fool” voters who were ideologically opposed to undocumented worker labor market participation. As I will discuss later, regardless of whether respondents “actually understood” the measure—i.e., whether or not they were “fooled” by the measure’s rhetoric—respondents’ usage of such rhetoric in their legitimations of their position on the measure demonstrates their socialization into this rhetoric, as well as the legitimacy of the ideology of this political discourse among its supporters. The measure was officially endorsed by a variety of business associations (e.g., Westmark, Arizona Farm Bureau).1 The measure’s leading financial supporters2 were business associations—whose donations totaled more than $750,000. Next were agricultural sector groups ($35,000), followed by the food and beverage industry ($29,000), the livestock industry ($10,000), and an agricultural insurance agency called “The Farm Bureau” ($9500). In total, the proponents garnered $874,719 in campaign contributions. The opposition was primarily funded3 by anti-immigration ideological groups and PACS. The right-wing Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) donated $40,000—which was matched by the conservative political action committee “Team America PAC.” The next highest category was individual donations. In total, 286 individual citizens donated a combined $25,235 to support the measure’s opposition. There were also miscellaneous small businesses that made separate contributions—usually of no more than a couple hundred dollars per donor. In total, the opposition raised approximately $140,000. Despite the major financial advantage that the measure’s supporters had, the ballot measure was defeated—with 59% of the electorate voting “No.” This defeat might be attributed in part to press coverage—which portrayed the measure as spearheaded by businesses that were attempting to avoid tougher e-verify employment restrictions (Quinn 2008; Lobeck 2008). The proposition’s defeat was covered in a similar light, with the US Newswire reporting that “by rejecting Proposition 202, Arizonans sent a message that they will not be fooled by special interests into scrapping the states [sic] best instrument to fight illegal immigration” (Anonymous 2008).

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In the larger legislative and market context, the dynamics of the ballot measure are clear. Dominant market actors reacted to new restrictions on hiring undocumented workers by spearheading a ballot measure that sought to loosen these restrictions. This was countered by anti-immigrant ideological groups, like FAIR, that had a powerful foothold in the Arizona legislature (Kubrin et al. 2012: 65–6). The media then interpreted the failure of the measure as popular rejection of market elites’ attempts to ease LAWA’s restrictions. Summary of Arizona’s Proposition 202 (2008): “Arizona Stop Illegal Hiring” The following is the unofficial summary of the measure provided to the State of Arizona, as required by law, by the official proponents of Arizona’s Proposition 202 (2008): “Arizona Stop Illegal Hiring.” This summary was made available to voters online via the Arizona Secretary of State. I provided this text to participants as a prompt before I interviewed them about their position on the measure (for further discussion see Chapter 4): “Stop Illegal Hiring” Act is an initiative designed to crack down on unethical businesses who hire illegal immigrants. This initiative targets employers who hire workers and pay under-the-table in cash, which fuels illegal immigration in Arizona. It revokes the business license of employers who knowingly or intentionally hire illegal immigrants. This initiative increases penalties for identity theft, as illegal immigrants often use stolen identities to conceal their undocumented status. Fines collected as a result of this initiative will be distributed to schools and hospitals to help deal with the financial burden placed on Arizona because of illegal immigration.

On November 4, 2008, this ballot measure failed with 59% of the voters choosing to reject it. Conversely, a strong majority of my respondents (54/80, 68%) who took a position on the measure during the interview supported the proposition. The goal of this analysis is to build theory about the discourse that respondents use to legitimate their stances on different DDEPs. Thus, any bias in respondent memory or interpretation is not relevant for my qualitative, theory building analysis of voter legitimations.

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Quasi-Experimental Design and Quasi-Independent Variables Research Design In order to employ my analytical approach to build theory in response to the book’s two research questions, I use data from respondents who were recruited based on two quasi-independent variables that correspond to voter partisanship and self-interest: partisan affiliation and economic position—respectively. It is crucial to note that in my research design, instead of standard quantitative “variables,” partisan affiliation and economic position are each instances of a “quasi-independent variable.” As defined by the American Psychological Association Dictionary of Psychology, a quasi-independent variable is “in experimental design, any of the personal attributes, traits, or behaviors that are inseparable from an individual and cannot reasonably be manipulated. These include gender, age, and ethnicity. Such attributes may be modeled and treated as statistically independent but are not subject to random assignment, as are independent variables.”4 I operationalized each quasi-independent variable—partisan affiliation and economic position—as dichotomous: Democrat vs. Republican and High vs. Low Income—respectively. Because I address the empirical puzzle of how partisanship and self-interest interact to shape voter rationalization, each quasi-independent variable is categorical and cannot be operationalized in terms of “treatment” versus “pre-treatment.” Thus, rather than comparing a pretreatment group to a treatment group, I compared four different comparison groups that constituted the four different possible combinations of each of my two dichotomous categorical quasi-independent variables (Shadish et al. 2001). This means that I used a quasi-experimental design that implements a “PosttestOnly Design with Nonequivalent Groups” (Shadish et al. 2001: 115–7; Privitera and Ahlgrim-Delzell 2019). Furthermore, regardless of the mechanisms that produced each respondent’s position on a measure, I treated respondent DDEP position as a quasi-independent variable that shaped the participant’s legitimation. Thus, for each ballot measure, I had eight comparison groups: lowincome Democrats who supported the measure, low-income Democrats who opposed the measure, low-income Republicans who supported

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the measure, low-income Republicans who opposed the measure, highincome Democrats who supported the measure, high-income Democrats who opposed the measure, high-income Republicans who supported the measure, and high-income Republicans who opposed the measure. As respondent DDEP position often varied from one ballot measure to the next, so did respondent placement in a proposition-specific comparison group for a given DDEP. Thus, this analysis investigates how these three quasi-independent variables—Economic Position, Partisan Affiliation, and DDEP Position— interact to shape respondent legitimations. Quasi-Independent Variables In this section, I discuss my three quasi-independent variables: Economic Position, Partisan Affiliation, and DDEP Position (i.e., respondent position on Proposition 202). First, I outline both of the quasi-independent variables on which I sampled—economic position and partisan affiliation. In particular, I provide an overview of how each quasi-independent variable is expected to vary with Proposition 202 (2008), as well as how this variation is expected to be linked to respondents’ DDEP position legitimations. Finally, for DDEP position, I discuss expected variation according to the two quasi-independent variables on which I sampled: economic position and partisan affiliation. This then helps us to understand how each DDEP position could potentially act as a quasi-independent variable that helps to shape respondents’ legitimations. Quasi-Independent Variable 1: Economic Position According to the literature on self-interest and political reasoning (Downs 1957), economic position should correspond with economic policy incentives, which would then motivate self-interested voter reasoning. Sears and Funk (1991) demonstrate that actors vote for short-term self-interest when they perceive the stakes to be high and the issues to be clear. For Proposition 202 (2008), the stakes for many low-income white male voters should be high and the issue should be clear because these citizens often perceive themselves as competing with undocumented laborers for work (Bonacich 1972, 1976; Bobo 1998; McVeigh 2009; Valdez et al. 2019). High-income citizens should be similarly invested, as many employ undocumented workers (Fussell 2011). Given these conditions, I expect low-income voters to legitimate their support for the measure

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by appealing to competition with undocumented workers for opportunities on the job market. Conversely, I expect high-income respondents to legitimate their opposition to the measure by appealing to their desire to avoid stricter penalties for employing undocumented workers. Crucially, the qualitative literature suggests that when citizens see rational economic action as normative they justify such action by appealing to popular beliefs about self-interest (Spillman 2012; Spillman and Strand 2013; Vila-Henninger 2017). Thus, rather than understanding participants’ “actual” self-interested motives, respondents’ legitimations that appeal to self-interest provide a window into what kinds of self-interest are considered to be normative. Quasi-Independent Variable 2: Partisan Affiliation For my analysis, I focus on the core moral differences between American liberal and conservative political ideology by using Jonathan Haidt’s work on American ideological “most sacred values” (Haidt 2012; Graham and Haidt 2012). This research draws upon the scholarship of Philip Tetlock (Tetlock et al. 2000; Tetlock 2003) on the concept of a “sacred value”— defined as a core moral value that a community will not compromise at any cost. I analyze the “most” sacred values (Haidt 2012; Graham and Haidt 2012) of liberals and conservatives because most sacred values potentially represent the core moral distinctions in American political ideology.. This research contributes to literature that has established the importance of these most sacred values in the legitimations of American voters (Vila-Henninger 2018, 2019a, b). According to partisan voting theories, voters should provide partisan rationalizations for their policy positions (Achen and Bartels 2016). In terms of political ideological reasoning, Jonathan Haidt (2012) theorizes that liberals’ “most sacred value [is] care for victims of oppression” (Haidt 2012: 345), and more broadly protecting “the rights of certain vulnerable groups” (Haidt 2012: 212). Conversely, conservatives’ “most sacred value” is preserving “the institutions and traditions that sustain a moral community” (Haidt 2012: 357). For government regulation, Haidt (2012) theorizes that “liberals are most concerned about the rights of certain vulnerable groups…[while] conservatives, in contrast, hold more traditional idea of liberty as the right to be left alone, as they often resent liberal programs that use government to infringe on their liberties in order to protect the groups that liberals care about most” (Haidt 2012: 212).

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Subsequent work has established that conservatives are mainly concerned with protecting an in-group (Waytz et al. 2019). Given the measure’s anti-immigrant rhetoric, we can expect Democrats to apply the liberal most sacred value of protecting vulnerable and oppressed groups by seeking to protect undocumented workers—thereby legitimating their opposition to Proposition 202 (2008). Conversely, we can expect Republicans to apply the conservative most sacred value of preserving institutions and traditions that uphold a moral community or protect an in-group by defending immigration laws in the face of the perceived dangers of undocumented immigrants—and thus legitimate their support for Proposition 202 (2008). These predictions are supported by work from political science on the intersection of partisanship and attitudes on undocumented immigration (e.g., Hopkins 2010: 43). Quasi-Independent Variable 3: DDEP Position In this section, I discuss DDEP Position as a quasi-independent variable that corresponds with each of the first two quasi-independent variables. This discussion should help us to understand how DDEP Position as a quasi-independent variable that potentially shapes respondents’ legitimations. (a) Economic Position: In 2008, when this measure was on the ballot, Tucson—the city where these data were collected—saw a spike in its Hispanic/Latino population. From 2000–2010, the percentage of Tucson that was Hispanic/Latino rose from 36 to 42%. This is notable because in 2010, the national average was 16%—more than 2.5% times lower than that of Tucson. Furthermore, these data were collected from 2013 to 2015. By this time, the percentage of Hispanics/Latinos in Tucson had dropped slightly—to 37.7% in 2013 and 38.7% in 2015. However, by 2015, the United States’ Hispanic/Latino population was 17.65 — more than two times lower than that of Tucson. These population dynamics are important for the economic incentives of Proposition 202 (2008) regarding labor market closure. Research has focused on the dynamics of labor market closure in which lower income members of a dominant ethnic or racial group are motivated to exclude competing racial or ethnic groups from labor markets (Bonacich 1972, 1976; Bobo 1998; Tilly

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1998; McVeigh 2009; Valdez et al. 2019) and distinguish themselves culturally from these competing groups (Absacal 2020). In the United States, a key feature of this dynamic discussed in the aforementioned literature is that low-income white citizens of European descent often perceive that they are in competition with Hispanic/Latino undocumented workers for labor market opportunities. This is key because the theoretical parameters of my study led me to recruit lower income white males of European descent. Thus, given the relatively high percentage of Hispanics/Latinos in Tucson, as well as Proposition 202 (2008)’s use of rhetoric that legitimates the exclusion of undocumented workers from the labor market, we can expect low-income respondents to support the measure. Furthermore, there is ample literature that demonstrates a long history of American rhetoric that equates undocumented workers with Hispanics/Latinos (Santa Ana 2002; Jacobson 2008; Brown 2013), as well as evidence that the formalization of this rhetoric in policy creates or intensifies anti-Hispanic/Latino attitudes (Flores 2017). Given this literature, we can see the language used by Proposition 202 (2008) as additionally incentivizing low-income voters who perceived themselves as competing against Hispanic/Latino undocumented workers for employment to support the proposition. Regardless of the intention of the measure, the rhetoric it employed created inverse incentives for affluent white Tucsonans of European descent. Research has documented the tendency of Americans who are more well-off to employ undocumented workers (e.g., Fussell 2011). Given the measure’s rhetorical targeting of employers, we can see the proposition’s framing by its proponents as portraying an incentive for affluent respondents to oppose the measure in order to undermine the political support and legitimacy of anti-immigrant policy that targets employers. Such policy would not only affect current or previous employers of undocumented workers, but would also jeopardize future opportunities to employ such laborers. (b) Partisan Affiliation: As is often the case for DDEPs, partisan elites did not provide clear cues for how voters should align Proposition 202 (2008) with partisanship. The chair of the ballot measure committee “Stop Illegal Hiring Prop 202” was

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Andrew Pacheco—a former Assistant US Attorney with a history of endorsements from Arizona state Republican politicians. For example, in 2010, Pacheco was recruited by Arizona’s right-wing Attorney General Tom Horne. Conversely, Proposition 202 (2008) was officially opposed by an anti-immigration ideological group (RidersUSA) and several local-level Republican groups (Maricopa Country Republican Committee and LD 9 Republican Executive Committee)—but not by any individual politicians. This division between conservative supporters and opponents shows a rift within the Republican Party between ideological groups and business interests. While partisan elites did not provide clear cues for how to interpret the measure, the proposition’s rhetoric did. Research has established that anti-immigrant rhetoric formalized in policy creates or intensifies public anti-immigrant sentiment (Flores 2017). Furthermore, the Republican affiliation and conservative ideological nature of the themes and language used in the measure’s rhetoric has long been established (Santa Ana 2002; Fox 2004; Jacobson 2008; Rosenblum and Gorman 2010; Hopkins 2010; Kubrin et al. 2012; Brown 2013; Sohoni and Sohoni 2014; Steil and Vasi 2014; Flores 2017; Flores and Schachter 2018). Thus, in the absence of clear partisan cues by elites, as well as the history of the use of the rhetoric employed by this measure in the public speech of Republican partisan elites and in Republican policy, the rhetoric of this measure cued Republican voters to support the measure and Democratic voters to oppose the measure. It is important to note that because this book analyzes forms of political and economic ideology that are shared by segments of voters, and are subsequently used by said voters in their (de)legitimations of a given measure, ideological cues in the wording of the proposition on the ballot and in the summary I used as an interview prompt were the most important partisan elements of a DDEP for this study. (c) Expected DDEP Position: In Table 6.1 we can see the expected respondent position on Proposition 202 (2008) for each combination of economic position and partisan affiliation.

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Table 6.1 Expected Proposition 202 (2008) position by economic position/partisan affiliation comparison groups and percentage Proposition 202 support Economic position/partisan affiliation

Expected Proposition 202 (2008) position

Respondent Proposition 202 (2008) position (majority)

Percentage respondent Proposition 202 (2008) support

High-income Democrats High-income Republicans Low-income Democrats Low-income Republicans

No

No

15/31 (48%)

Conflicting expectations Conflicting expectations Yes

Yes

12/16 (75%)

Yes

12/18 (66%)

Yes

15/15 (100%)

Quasi-Experimental Anomalies: Legitimations That Span Economic Position and/or Partisan Affiliation It is important to consider widely held beliefs, norms, and values that respondents across partisan affiliation and/or economic position could draw upon to (de)legitimate this DDEP. In my analysis, I found three such widely held beliefs, norms, or values: Libertarianism, Neoliberalism, and Moral Economy. Libertarianism The libertarian “most sacred value” is the protection and promotion of “individual liberty” (Haidt 2012: 352)—defined as the rejection of “the idea that the needs of one person impose a moral duty upon others.” This position is known as “negative liberty” (Berlin 1969; Iyer et al. 2012: 2; also see Haidt et al. 2009; Haidt 2012: 350). This means that negative liberty is seen by libertarians as a moral goal for its own sake (Iyer et al. 2012; Haidt 2012). As such, government regulation serves as a foil and thereby an enemy of liberty (Iyer et al. 2012; Haidt 2012). Furthermore, a key libertarian ideological perspective that stems from its most sacred value is that government economic regulation is fundamentally inefficient (Iyer et al. 2012). This characteristic of libertarianism is distinct from the conservative most sacred value because of its relationship to morality. For conservatives, economic liberty is moral because it

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is a tradition that sustains a moral community. For libertarians, liberty is a moral goal in and of itself, and thus government regulation is fundamentally inferior because of its interference in individual freedom. In the context of economic liberty, government inferiority takes the form of “inefficiency” for libertarians. Given this belief about government regulation, I expect libertarian reasoning to be used to legitimate their opposition to the measure. Neoliberalism Since the 1980s, neoliberalism has become prevalent in American politics and popular culture. Scholars contend that neoliberal ideology has enjoyed bipartisan support from American policymakers (Wacquant 2009, 2014; Amable 2011), as well as acceptance in popular culture by citizens across the political spectrum (Centeno and Cohen 2012: 328). The use of neoliberal ideology in voters’ policy legitimations constitutes a gap in the literature that corresponds with an empirical puzzle. First, researchers have thoroughly documented the use of neoliberal ideology in institutional (e.g., Fantasia and Voss 2004; Lee et al. 2013) and macro-level policy contexts (Mudge 2008; Livne and Yonay 2015). However, scholars are only beginning to investigate how voters use neoliberal ideology to legitimate their position on economic policy (Vila-Henninger 2019a, b). The corresponding empirical puzzle concerns the political nature of neoliberalism—as many also contend that neoliberalism converges with American conservatism rather than being bipartisan (Garland 2001; Harvey 2005; for a review see Gross et al. 2011; Gauchat 2015). For a thorough discussion of neoliberal ideology, see Chapter 3. To summarize, we can understand the moral dimension of neoliberal ideology in terms of two important pieces. The first is the emphasis on the fairness of market competition and the responsibility of the government to reregulate the economy in order to ensure this fair individual economic competition (e.g., Amable 2011). This conception of fairness is distinct because rather than focusing on promoting fairness to protect or preserve a moral community or in-group as in American conservative political ideology (Haidt 2012; Waytz et al. 2019), or applying the rules of proportional fairness to protect vulnerable groups as in American liberal political ideology (Haidt 2012), neoliberal fairness focuses on the importance of individual responsibility to follow market rules for the sake of reinforcing fair market competition (Amable 2011). This

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later point then segues into the second key moral dimension of neoliberal ideology: individualized responsibility. For example, Loïc Wacquant notes that central to the neoliberal project is the “cultural trope of individual responsibility” (Wacquant 2009: 307). In this frame, individuals are conceptualized as “self-governing autonomous subjects” (Reich 2014: 4). From the perspective of neoliberal ideology, then, individuals are responsible for their own successful participation in the economy—thus making economic participation and its outcomes the individual’s responsibility. Following the perspective that neoliberalism has been accepted into popular culture across the political spectrum and levels of affluence (Amable 2011; Centeno and Cohen 2012), I expect voters across partisan affiliation and economic position to use the neoliberal belief in individual responsibility to make fairness legitimations. We would thus expect voters using these neoliberal beliefs to legitimate their support for Proposition 202 (2008) due to the neoliberal mission of economic “reregulation” to promote fair individual economic competition by shifting responsibility for said competition onto individuals. Moral Economy Furthermore, self-interest and partisan voting theories do not theorize how the intersection of economic position and partisan affiliation structure voter legitimation. In order to fill this gap, I turn to the moral economy literature. A moral economy is a popular consensus about moral principles used to (de)legitimate economic exchange (Thompson 1971; Mau 2003; Western and Rosenfeld 2011; Kissane 2012; Sachweh 2012). The moral economy perspective stands in opposition to exclusively rational choice models of action and emphasizes the importance of moral consensus that spans key economic or social divisions (Svallfors 2006; Sachweh 2012). Empirical work has found that fairness is a key moral principle for a variety of moral economies (e.g., Sachweh 2012; Vila-Henninger 2017, 2019a, b). Here, we can define “fairness” as “proportionality”—or people getting “what they deserve” (Haidt 2012: 212–3). However, political ideology shapes how and when proportionality is applied. For example, liberals use proportionality in the defense of vulnerable groups while conservatives tend to use proportionality regardless of group vulnerability to protect an in-group (Haidt 2012). Applied to immigration policy, we might expect a politically ideological moral economy to emerge in

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which voters draw upon their political ideology’s belief about fairness to (de)legitimate said immigration policy. Thus, for Proposition 202 (2008), we would expect Democrats to support the measure and to legitimate their support using a fairness legitimation that expresses concern for protecting vulnerable groups. Conversely, Republicans should oppose the measure and legitimate their opposition by appealing to fairness in conjunction with a concern for protecting a moral community or in-group. This means that in and of itself, “proportionality” is neutral but is often applied by partisans to fit a given political ideology. The neoliberal conception of fairness could then be used across party and economic position (Amable 2011; Centeno and Cohen 2012)—or only across economic position for Republicans (Garland 2001; Harvey 2005; for a review see Gross et al. 2011; Gauchat 2015). The prevalence of partisan applications of proportionality across economic position to legitimate a position on Proposition 202 (2008) would then constitute a consensus—as it spans a key economic divide (Svallfors 2006; Sachweh 2012; Vila-Henninger 2019a, b). Furthermore, the prevalence of neoliberal standards of fairness across partisan affiliation and economic position to legitimate a position on Proposition 202 (2008) would also constitute a consensus—as partisan affiliation is a key social divide and economic position an important economic divide. A consensus about the use of proportionality (fairness) to legitimate a position on Proposition 202 (2008) would therefore provide evidence of a moral economy. A moral economy is thus anomalous to my core theories about partisan affiliation and economic position, which predict that legitimations should not be shared by Democrats and Republicans, or by high and low-income respondents. I will thus analyze moral economies as anomalous separately in Chapter 8.

Legitimations: Operationalization as Rationales and Coding Rationales I used ATLAS.ti, a Computer Assisted/Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS), to code transcriptions of my interviews. I coded entire interview segments of Proposition 202 (2008), so each rationale I coded represents a case in which that rationale was used to

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legitimate a DDEP position rather than an “utterance” of a rationale within a case. Furthermore, I used ATLAS.ti to group cases according to code combination, which I then used to identify distinct legitimations manually. In order to study voter legitimations as a form of reasoning, I analyzed respondent rationalizations of their DDEP position. To refine the operationalization of voter reasoning in the form of rationalization, I use what I call a “rationale.” I define a “rationale” as any DDEP-specific example of a widely held belief, norm, or value. For this analysis there are four types of rationales: “self-interest rationales,” “partisan most sacred values rationales,” “economic ideology rationales,” and “moral economy rationales.” For a detailed discussion of “rationales” and my analytical framework, see Chapter 3. Rationale Types Within “self-interest rationales,” I operationalized theory and data-driven rationales that should be specific to each level of the “economic position” quasi-independent variable. Within “partisan most sacred value rationales,” I operationalized theory and data-driven rationales that should be specific to each level of the “partisan affiliation” quasi-independent variable. Within “economic ideology rationales,” I operationalized theory and data-driven rationales according to the literature on neoliberal and libertarian ideology—respectively. As there is work on the libertarian most sacred values (Iyer et al. 2012) but not on neoliberal most sacred values, I use the libertarian most sacred value as my basis for understanding libertarian ideology but do not identify a neoliberal most sacred value. Rather, I identified two key ideological principles from neoliberalism that are relevant for respondent legitimations of their positions on Proposition 202 (2008). Within “moral economy rationales,” I operationalized theory and data-driven rationales according to the literature on moral economy and economic fairness. Economic Position Rationales I used the self-interest voting literature to create deductive self-interest codes for Economic Position. The basic criterion for all “self-interest” codes was that the respondent must frame his position on the measure in

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terms of his material gain or loss. I used previous research on the intersection between immigration and economic position to code for three such rationales: Jobs , Anti-Regulation, and Cheap Labor. For a thorough discussion of norms of self-interest, see Chapter 3. I expect low-income voters to use the Jobs rationale to justify their support, and high-income voters to use the Anti-Regulation and Cheap Labor rationales to justify their opposition. I coded for the Jobs rationale when respondents reported voting for the measure for their own self-interest by attempting to save or increase the number of jobs available. Here, keywords were that respondents wanted “save” or “protect” “American jobs” or “our jobs.” I coded for the Anti-Regulation rationale when respondents reported voting against the measure in order to benefit their businesses by preventing new regulations. I also applied this code when respondents reported opposing the measure in order to benefit themselves as employers by avoiding legal penalties for illegal hiring practices that would be penalized by the measure. Respondents used keywords such as “avoid penalties” or “not get fined.” Finally, I coded for Cheap Labor when respondents reported voting against the measure in order to benefit themsevles by preserving access to undocumented workers as a source of cheap labor. Keywords that respondents used here were “cheap labor” and “hire” or “employ.” Additionally, three data-driven self-interested rationales emerged: Reduce Taxes and Fees , Benefit Economy, and Protect Social Services . Given that low-income actors are more likely to vote for short-term self-interested ends (Bartels 2005), I expected all of these rationales to be employed by low-income respondents to legitimate supporting the measure. I coded for Reduce Taxes and Fees when respondents reported voting for the measure as an attempt to “lower taxes” or some type of socially allocated fee, such as “insurance premiums.” Participants must therefore have reported that they were voting in order to reduce taxes and/or fees that they were, or would have been, required to pay. I coded for Benefit Economy when participants reported voting for the measure in order to “benefit the economy” and by extension improve their job prospects or “help my business.” Keywords here for job prospects were “more jobs” or “increased jobs.” Finally, I coded for Protect Social Services when respondents reported voting for the measure to protect the social services they were receiving.

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Keywords here were “protect” or “preserve” “social services” or “social security.” I also coded legitimations for this code when participants reported wanting to exclude undocumented workers from the healthcare system in order to benefit from lower healthcare prices. Partisan Affiliation Rationales My deductive coding for political ideology is based on work in moral psychology on “most sacred values” of political ideology and how they emerge in American political ideology (Tetlock et al. 2000; Tetlock 2003; Haidt 2012; Graham and Haidt 2012). Following this theory, I expected that Republicans would use at least one conservative rationale to legitimate supporting the DDEP and Democrats would use at least one liberal rationale to legitimate opposing the DDEP. For a thorough discussion of American political ideology—as well as liberal and conservative most sacred values—see Chapter 3. Given the research on partisan reasoning and its intersection with issue positions on undocumented immigration, I selected three most sacred value rationales for liberals and five for conservatives. I expected Democrats to use at least one liberal rationale to justify opposing the measure and Republicans to use at least one conservative rationale to justify supporting the measure. First, liberals are primarily concerned with caring for “victims of oppression,” which should manifest itself in concerns for immigrant civil rights and racial equality (Hopkins 2010). I coded for Civil Rights when respondents explicitly described the ballot measure as taking away the rights of Hispanics/Latinos. Here, keywords were “civil rights” or “rights” of “undocumented workers” or “Mexicans.” Second, I coded for Racial Equality when respondents described Proposition 202 (2008) as causing, or being intended to cause, discrimination against Hispanics or Latinos based on their Hispanic ethnicity or country of origin. Keywords included “Hispanics,” “Mexicans,” or “Latinos” being “discriminated against” or describing the proposition as being “racist.” Finally, I used a data-driven code of Economic Oppression. I used this code when respondents reported voting in order to protect undocumented workers because of their extremely vulnerable economic status. Here, respondents described voting in order to “help” or “protect”

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“undocumented workers” or “immigrants” because they were “poor,” “desperate,” or “vulnerable.” Conservatives’ most sacred value of preserving a moral society or protecting an in-group should manifest in rationales that revolve around this theme in order to justify supporting the measure. According to the literature on undocumented immigration and partisanship, this concern manifests itself in five different forms. First, Brown (2013) finds that there is a “racialized” frame in antiimmigrant American rhetoric. This frame emphasizes the moral worth of white culture while perceiving Hispanic culture as a threat. I operationalized this with the American Culture rationale—which I coded as instances in which respondents perceived undocumented workers as a threat because of their Hispanic ethnicity or culture. I applied this code specifically when respondents described Hispanic ethnicity and/or culture as a threat to, or problem for, Anglo culture or the “American way of life.” I only used this code when respondents directly contrasted American or Anglo culture with Hispanics in a way that portrayed Hispanics as a cultural or ethnic threat. This is an instance of the conservative most sacred value because Americans and/or Anglos are portrayed as a moral community or in-group that needs protection from an outside threat. Second, Brown (2013) also documents a political discourse that portrays undocumented workers as threatening social programs and raising taxes for law-abiding citizens. I coded the Social Programs rationale as instances in which respondents perceived undocumented workers as a threat because they drained social programs or the tax base. Here, respondents must describe undocumented workers as “draining” social programs or “scamming” the government to get benefits. This is an example of the conservative most sacred value because Americans are portrayed as moral contributors to the tax base, and thus deserving recipients of social programs, while undocumented workers are portrayed as stealing from these programs. Third, Lakoff (2002) and Hopkins (2010) both show that conservatives view undocumented workers as a threat to “law and order” due to their undocumented status—which then is perceived to undermine a moral society. I coded the Law and Order rationale as instances in which respondents perceived undocumented workers as a threat to legal order— and the rule of law more generally in the United States—because of their “illegal” immigration status. Here, then, respondents often argued that there was a need to apply the law “equally” to everyone or that

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allowing undocumented workers in the country was a “double standard” in which some could break the law without sanction. Mentioning a desire to protect “the rule of law” was also another indicator of this rationale. This is an example of the conservative most sacred value because following the law is generally seen by conservatives as a moral obligation and the foundation of American as moral nation (Lakoff 2002; Haidt 2012). Thus, from this perspective, undocumented workers represented a threat to the foundation of America as a moral community. Fourth, undocumented workers have been portrayed as a threat to American jobs by “cheating” the legal system (e.g., Shapira 2013). I coded for the American Jobs rationale as instances in which respondents perceived undocumented workers as a threat because they were “stealing” American jobs or “cheating” Americans out of jobs. Here, undocumented workers are portrayed as immorally gaining access to the American job market by disobeying the law. Americans who are here “legally” are then framed as being morally deserving of the opportunity to compete for said jobs. Conversely, by being here “illegally,” undocumented workers are being “immoral” or “cheating” and thus any access they have to the job market threatens the moral community of the United States in which its citizens benefit from its economic opportunities. Notice that here the emphasis is on the morality of access to American jobs and undocumented workers as “stealing” jobs or “cheating” Americans out of jobs. This differs from the Self-Interest rationale of Jobs in two key regards. First, I coded for the Jobs rationale when respondents reported wanting to protect American jobs for their own gain. Conversely, I coded for American Jobs when respondents reported or implied wanting to protect American jobs for American citizens or those who were here “legally.” Second, the conservative American Jobs rationale stressed the immorality of the undocumented worker out-group taking jobs from deserving American citizens or those who were here “legally.” Thus, this rationale qualifies as an instance of the conservative most sacred value because it emphasized protecting a moral in-group from an immoral out-group. Fifth, undocumented workers have been portrayed as a criminal threat—thus putting (“moral”) American citizens at “risk” (Sohoni and Sohoni 2014). I coded for the Safety rationale as instances in which respondents perceived undocumented workers as a “threat” to public safety. Here, undocumented workers were portrayed as “dangerous” or “criminals.” Often, Hispanics were described as “drug dealers” or “gang

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members.” This is an example of the conservative rationale because it portrays undocumented workers as a threat to the physical safety of those who are “legally in the country.” Once again, the emphasis is on America as a moral community to the extent that its citizens are “legal” members of the country. The emphasis is then on the “threat” posed to those “moral” members of society by the out-group—who did not follow the moral code. Anomalous Rationales: Libertarianism A key libertarian ideological tenet is that government economic regulation is wasteful due to government inefficiency—which stems from the libertarian most sacred value of individual liberty (Iyer et al. 2012). Because government inefficiency is a distinctly—but not uniquely—libertarian belief, I coded for the libertarian rationale Government Inefficiency when respondents reported that their opposition to the measure was motivated by a belief that government spending or operation could not improve its efficiency or was fundamentally inefficient. Here, I used keywords such as “inefficient,” as well as related terms—such as “waste.” While libertarians do not have a monopoly on this argument, it nonetheless constitutes an iteration of their “most sacred value.” Although this critique can be used in politically motivated ways by partisans to criticize governments controlled by opposing parties, libertarians use it to characterize government regardless of partisan control and in relation to liberty as the ultimate moral goal. For a thorough discussion of the libertarian ideology and its most sacred value, see Chapter 3. Anomalous Rationales: Neoliberalism There are two primary neoliberal ideological tenets that apply to this measure: fair economic competition and individual responsibility for economic competition and the outcomes of said competition. I created a code for each of these beliefs as they manifested in corresponding rationales. For a thorough discussion of neoliberal ideology, see Chapter 3. First, I coded for neoliberal Fair Market Competition when a respondent reported that he supported the measure because he argued that government regulation would impede fair economic competition or that a party has an unfair advantage in the labor market—which by implication impinges upon fair market competition. Thus, respondents had

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to discuss undocumented worker participation in the labor market as “unfair.” I coded for “fairness” when respondents used keywords such as “fair,” “unfair,” “right,” “wrong” “ripped off,” “scammed,” “cheated,” “accountable,” “honest,” “dishonest,” “transparent,” or “level playing field.” Subsequently, respondents must have discussed this unfairness in the context of the labor market and thus used key phrases such as “finding a job,” “taking jobs,” or “stealing jobs.” Thus, if respondents discussed wanting to protect American jobs for their own self-interest, I coded for the Self-Interest rationale Jobs. If respondents discussed how undocumented workers “stole” or “took” jobs from Americans, I coded for the conservative rationale American Jobs. If respondents discussed how it was unfair that undocumented workers were “finding work,” “getting hired,” or “getting work,” I coded for Fair Market Competition. Second, I coded Individualized Responsibility as a respondent’s placement of responsibility onto an individual market actor to act “correctly,” “fairly,” or “follow the rules.” This kind of responsibility is distinctly neoliberal because it focuses on beliefs about fairness according to individual responsibility for economic action rather than on the broader value of promoting a moral society by ensuring that everyone gets “what they deserve.” A key element of neoliberal individualism is the shift of responsibility for economic outcomes onto individuals. However, an important moral component of the individualization of market outcomes is the mandate that individuals are themselves responsible for following market rules and acting “fairly.” Thus, I coded for Individualized Responsibility when respondents applied this principle to economic behavior, as well as the outcomes of economic competition being an individual’s responsibility. Thus, I coded for Individualized Responsibility when respondents discussed undocumented workers as needing to act or behave “correctly,” “follow the rules,” or having to come to the United States “the right way.” These are examples of neoliberal Individualized Responsibility because respondents are placing responsibility for immigration, as well as the outcomes of immigration (e.g., job market participation), on individual immigrants instead of social or governmental systems. The Individualized Responsibility code for this measure is distinct from Neoliberal Individualized Responsibility codes from Proposition 201 (2008) and Proposition 204 (2012) in this book because, due to the context of Proposition 202 (2008), the Individualized Responsibility code in this chapter also involves fairness.

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The Neoliberal Individualized Responsibility code is distinct from the Conservative rationales. For example, this neoliberal rationale emphasizes the responsibility of the migrant for being in the United States legally, while the Conservative American Jobs rationale frames undocumented workers as immoral for taking opportunities away from those who are “legal” members of the job market. The neoliberal Individualized Responsibility code emphasizes morality as stemming from the duty to immigrate legally and places this responsibility on the individual migrant. Thus, “legal” immigration and participation in the job market are moral responsibilities of the individual migrant. Conversely, the conservative rationales emphasize the morality of those who are here “legally” and the “immorality” of those who are not as stemming from the threat they pose to the moral/law-abiding members of society—or “Americans” more generally—rather than from “fair” economic competition. For a thorough discussion of the neoliberal ideology, see Chapter 3. Anomalous Rationales: Moral Economy Given previous work and definitions, I operationalized “moral economy” as the use of a moral criterion for evaluating market fairness across a major social division in my data—thus constituting a “consensus” (Svallfors 2006; Sachweh 2012; Vila-Henninger 2017, 2019a, b). The two “major social divisions” in my data are the two dichotomous quasi-independent variables—economic position and partisan affiliation. This means that respondents across both levels of a quasi-independent variable must have used the same criterion for a market fairness legitimation for there to be evidence of a moral economy. I coded for Liberal Market Fairness when respondents applied at least one Liberal rationale to make an explicit fairness delegitimation of Proposition 202 (2008) or its ramifications—rather than of individual immigrants participating in the labor market. Second, I operationalized the Conservative Market Fairness rationale as occurring when respondents applied at least one Conservative rationale to make an explicit fairness legitimation of Proposition 202 (2008) or its ramifications—rather than of individual immigrants participating in the labor market. Furthermore, I coded for “fairness” in both of the Liberal Market Fairness rationale and Conservative Market Fairness rationale when respondents used words that explicitly made a (de)legitimation by appealing to the fairness of market action that would be regulated—such as “fair,” “unfair,”

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“right,” “wrong,” “cheated,” “accountable,” “honest,” “dishonest,” “transparent,” or “level playing field.” For a thorough discussion of the conceptual framework behind “moral economy,” see Chapter 3.

Analysis Rationales and Rationale Groupings I used the ATLAS.ti “Quotation Manager” function to group cases according to combinations of rationale codes, which I then used to identify distinct legitimations manually. Recall that I am using rationales to operationalize respondents’ DDEP-specific uses of widely held beliefs, norms, and values to justify their DDEP position. Furthermore, I grouped rationales according to the widely held belief, norm, or value to which each rationale corresponded. I refer to these groupings as “rationale groupings.” By “legitimation” I am referring to a respondent’s justification or rationalization of his position on a DDEP. I classify legitimations according to the rationale grouping(s) that correspond to the rationale, or combination of rationales, used in a respondent’s justification. I operationalized legitimations using rationale groupings rather than individual rationales because of the aim of the analysis. Thus, while I am analyzing distinct legitimations, these legitimations are only meaningful to my analysis insofar as they correspond with a widely held political or economic belief, norm, or value. It is for this reason, then, that I grouped rationales according to the widely held beliefs, norms, and values from which they are derived. Table 6.2 displays a list of all of the rationales derived from widely held political and economic beliefs, norms, and values that I observed in my respondents’ rationalizations for Proposition 202 (2008). Thus, these findings help to address the book’s second research question empirically. For each rationale, I also specify the rationale grouping to which it belongs as well as the position on Proposition 202 (2008) that it is expected to be used to justify. Rationales are indicated in the text by the use of italics. Furthermore, I capitalized the names of rationale groupings but not the discourses to which they refer. Thus, “Liberal” refers to the rationale grouping while “liberal” refers to the ideology.

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Table 6.2 Rationales and rationale groups for Proposition 202 (2008) Rationale Self-interest Jobs Reduce Taxes and Fees Benefit Economy Protect Social Services Anti-Regulation Cheap Labor Political ideology Racial Equality Civil Rights Economic/ Social Vulnerability Law and Order Social Programs American Jobs American Culture Safety Economic ideology Government Inefficiency Individualized Responsibility (Also Moral Economy) Fair Market Competition (Also Moral Economy) Moral economy Liberal Market Fairness Conservative Market Fairness

Rationale grouping

Expected position on Proposition 202

Low-Income Self-Interest Low-Income Self-Interest Low-Income Self-Interest Low-Income Self-Interest High-Income self-Interest High-Income Self-Interest

Support Support Support Support Oppose Oppose

Liberal Liberal Liberal Conservative Conservative Conservative Conservative Conservative

Oppose Oppose Oppose Support Support Support Support Support

Libertarian Neoliberal

Oppose Support

Neoliberal

Support

Liberal Moral Economy Conservative Moral Economy

Support Oppose

Contrary to Proposition 201 (2008), for this ballot measure, Liberal Market Fairness is its own code and not a combination of a Market Fairness rationale (which I did not make for this measure) and any Liberal rationale. Similarly, Conservative Market Fairness is not a combination of a Market Fairness rationale (which I did not make for this measure) and any Conservative rationale. Thus, I note when a respondent uses

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both a Liberal Moral Economy rationale grouping and a Liberal rationale grouping or both a Conservative Moral Economy rationale grouping and a Conservative rationale grouping. This coding differs from the Moral Economy coding for Proposition 201 (2008) and Proposition 204 (2012) due to the different context of Proposition 202 (2008).

Distinctive Partisan Affiliation (Partisanship) and Economic Position (Self-Interest) Legitimations In the following analysis, I investigate the legitimations that are distinctive to each comparison group of quasi-independent variables (economic position, partisan affiliation, and DDEP position). I did not recruit respondents based on their DDEP position, but for the sake of my analysis it acts as a quasi-independent variable. During each interview, I asked each respondent for either his vote choice or—if he did not vote or did not remember voting—how he “would have voted.” Each respondent’s initial position on the measure then affects the legitimation he offered because, in this case, a legitimation is a justification of a DDEP position. I begin by analyzing distinct legitimations for partisan affiliation and DDEP position alignment. Second, I analyze distinct legitimations for economic position and DDEP position alignments. Third, I analyze distinct legitimations for different alignments and oppositions of economic position, partisan affiliation, and DDEP position. This process allows me to build theory by identifying cases that empirically extend theory. In the last chapter (Chapter 9), I will elaborate upon the analyses provided in this chapter. Furthermore, in Chapter 8, I will discuss fairness legitimations that span economic position and partisan affiliation. Legitimations Distinctive of Partisan Affiliation (Partisanship) and DDEP Position Alignment and Opposition Findings for RQ1 As we can see, no distinct legitimations emerged for the alignment of Democratic Partisan Affiliation and DDEP Support (Unexpected). Neither were there distinct legitimations for the alignment of Republican Partisan Affiliation and DDEP opposition (Unexpected) (Table 6.3).

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Table 6.3 Legitimations distinctive of partisan affiliation and DDEP position alignment and opposition for Proposition 202 (2008) Number of types of unique partisan affiliation/DDEP position legitimations

Unique legitimation (rationale grouping combinations)

Democrat and DDEP support (unexpected) Democrat and DDEP opposition (expected)

0

NA

3

Republican and DDEP opposition (unexpected) Republican and DDEP support (expected)

0

1. Liberal AND Libertarian 2. Liberal AND Liberal Moral Economy AND Libertarian AND Neoliberal 3. Liberal AND Liberal Moral Economy AND Libertarian NA

0

NA

There were also no distinctive legitimations for the alignment of Republican Partisan Affiliation and DDEP Support (Expected). For the alignment of Democratic Partisan Affiliation and DDEP Opposition (Expected), three distinctive legitimations emerged. Here, we need to note two key aspects of these distinctive legitimations. First, in line with expectations for Democratic partisan affiliation, all three legitimations included a rationale that was derived from liberal ideology—that is to say a rationale from the Liberal Rationale Grouping. Second, the surprising finding is that each legitimation included a rationale that was derived from an Economic Ideology—that is to say from either the Neoliberal Rationale Grouping or the Libertarian Rationale Grouping. The surprising element is that neoliberal ideology is supposed to be used to support the measure, while liberal ideology and libertarian ideology are both supposed to oppose the proposition. There were three distinct legitimations: the first combined the Liberal and Libertarian rationale groupings (Liberal AND Libertarian), the second combined the Liberal, Liberal Moral Economy, Libertarian, and Neoliberal rationale groupings (Liberal AND Liberal Moral Economy AND Libertarian AND Neoliberal), and the third combined the Liberal,

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Liberal Moral Economy, and Libertarian rationale groupings (Liberal AND Liberal Moral Economy AND Libertarian). Findings for RQ2 This section empirically addresses the book’s second research question. Travis, a low-income Democrat who opposed the measure, used the Liberal, Liberal Moral Economy, Libertarian, and Neoliberal rationale groupings in conjunction. He started by using the Racial Equality rationale from the Liberal rationale grouping. He also legitimated his opposition to the measure using the Liberal Market Fairness rationale from the Liberal Moral Economy rationale grouping, the Libertarian Government Inefficiency from the Economic Ideology rationale grouping, and the Neoliberal Individualized Responsibility rationale from the Economic Ideology rationale grouping. Travis legitimated his opposition to the measure by using the Liberal Racial Equality rationale. In doing so, he emphasized that the measure singled out Hispanics and thus saw the proposition as legitimating racial hate. Travis explained that this ballot measure was “similar to [SB] 1070. I mean it’s just like what sort of metric are you going to go by for choosing people, to say are you illegal or not?… I mean it gets into the whole profiling of it.” Travis continued, saying “just because in theory it sounds like a good idea…I can see it being abused a lot.” Here, Hispanics are seen as a vulnerable group that is singled out by the measure. Passing this proposition would have then created a system of racial “profiling” that would be “abused a lot.” From here, the respondent segued into the Liberal Market Fairness rationale. Recall that I coded for this rationale when respondents delegitimated the measure as unfair because it would jeopardize the protection of one of the oppressed or vulnerable groups I coded for with the liberal rationales. The vulnerable group for the participant was clearly Hispanics—who were perceived to be threatened by the racial profiling they would face if this measure would have passed. Recall that as this measure was a form of labor market regulation, any fairness (de)legitimation in the context of this DDEP qualifies as a (de)legitimation of economic fairness. Thus, we see Travis employ the Liberal Market Fairness rationale, as he used the metric of racial profiling of Hispanics to delegitimate the measure’s proposed labor market closure as unfair: “If you would have some legal way in determining if people were illegal immigrants or not then I think that that’s sort of system would be, it would be good because I mean it’s just the law. You shouldn’t

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be here illegally, but I think it has too much potential to be abused.” In response to a follow-up question, Travis confirmed that fairness was “the main thing that I’m going after.” Thus, Travis reasoned that the measure should be rejected based on his delegitimation of the measure as unfair, which drew upon his assessment that the measure had the potential to use racial discrimination as a metric for labor market closure. In the above passage from Travis, we saw two additional rationales: Neoliberal and Libertarian. First, we see Travis use the Neoliberal Individualized Responsibility rationale to delegitimate undocumented workers in conjunction with his delegitimation of policy that would racially profile Hispanics: “If you would have some legal way in determining if people were illegal immigrants or not then I think that that’s sort of system would be, it would be good because I mean it’s just the law. You shouldn’t be here illegally, but I think it has too much potential to be abused.” Here, the illegitimacy of the proposition comes not from a perceived right of undocumented workers to access the labor market, but rather the unintended consequences of policy that try to remove undocumented workers yet target Hispanics more broadly. In this passage, Travis employed the Neoliberal Individualized Responsibility rationale by emphasizing the responsibility of individual immigrants to follow the law and immigrate legally. Note that this was not an example of the Conservative Law and Order rationale as the respondent did not discuss the need for the law to be applied equally or the “threat” that immigrants posed to “legal” members of the United States. Instead, the respondent emphasized legitimate participation in the American labor market as stemming from the individual migrant’s responsibility to follow the law. Thus, the respondent framed legal immigration as a moral issue, arguing that “I mean it’s just the law. You shouldn’t be here illegally.” The migrant was not threatening legal members of American society per se, but rather was unfairly participating in the labor market. This sort of delegitimation of undocumented workers leaves room for the legitimacy of anti-immigrant policies that do not threaten Hispanic citizens. Finally, Travis used the Libertarian Government Inefficiency rationale. Recall that for Libertarians, liberty is their most sacred value (Haidt 2012). Thus, any government interference in economic liberty was seen as fundamentally inefficient due to its obstruction of “free” economic exchange. We see, then, that the respondent’s delegitimation of the measure as discriminatory also draws from the libertarian most

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sacred value of liberty—and the subsequent argument that government regulation of the economy is inefficient. Note that Travis was discussing what he perceived to be the measure’s racial profiling from the perspective of economic efficiency. The respondent explained that Propositions 202 (2008) was “similar to [SB] 1070. I mean it’s just like what sort of metric are you going to go by for choosing people, say are you illegal or not…I mean and then [it] gets into…profiling.” The implication, then, was that the government could not efficiently regulate the labor market so as to implement labor market closure against undocumented workers using this measure. Here, we see the Libertarian and Liberal rationale groupings converge. The government could not efficiently regulate the labor market with the means proposed by this measure—which is an application of the libertarian most sacred value to Proposition 202 (2008). The wider discourse that this delegitimation appeals to is the libertarian ideology in which the government fundamentally cannot efficiently or effectively regulate market activity. This dovetails with the liberal most sacred value, as the respondent delegitimated the inefficiency of the proposed policy by arguing that it would threaten a vulnerable group—Hispanic citizens. Thus, this proposed form of government regulation was illegitimate because it impinged upon liberty in such a way that would enact ethnic discrimination. Legitimations Distinctive of Economic Position (Self-Interest) and DDEP Position Alignment and Opposition Findings for RQ1 Below we can see the legitimations that were distinctive of alignments and oppositions of Economic Position (Self-Interest) and DDEP Position (see Table 6.4). As we can see, no distinct legitimations emerged for the alignment of High-Income and DDEP Opposition (Expected) or Low-Income and DDEP Support (Expected). There were also no distinct legitimations for Low-Income and DDEP Opposition (Unexpected). For the alignment of High-Income and DDEP support (Unexpected), two distinctive legitimations emerged. The first legitimation combined rationales from the Conservative, Libertarian, and Neoliberal rationale groupings (Conservative AND Libertarian AND Neoliberal). The second legitimation combined rationales from the

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Table 6.4 Legitimations exclusive to economic position and DDEP position alignment and opposition for Proposition 202 (2008) Number of types of unique economic position/policy position legitimations

Unique legitimation (rationale grouping combinations)

High-income and DDEP support (unexpected)

2

High-income and DDEP opposition (expected) Low-income and DDEP opposition (unexpected) Low-income and ddep support (expected)

0

1. Conservative AND Libertarian AND Neoliberal 2. Conservative AND Liberal AND Libertarian AND Neoliberal NA

0

NA

0

NA

Conservative, Liberal, Libertarian, and Neoliberal rationale groupings (Conservative AND Liberal AND Libertarian AND Neoliberal). Findings for RQ2 Charlie, a high-income Republican who supported the measure, used the Conservative, Liberal, Libertarian, and Neoliberal rationale groupings in conjunction. He started with the Neoliberal Fair Market Competition rationale as he discussed life as a business owner: “[Illegal immigration is] something we have to deal with on a regular basis around here and it keeps prices low and it makes it hard for a company trying to do things right to get stuff done and to do it correctly.” He continued, explaining that “business-wise, you’re trying…to level the playing field to where everyone plays by the same rules.” This is a classic example of the neoliberal principle of fair market competition. For Charlie, the goal was not to deregulate the market, but rather to reregulate so that competition was fair. Notice that from this perspective, the market is not some selfsustaining natural phenomenon, but rather something that is fragile and needs to be carefully managed so that “everyone plays by the same rules”—thus ensuring fair market competition. We can see evidence of this in Charlie’s discussion of the presence of undocumented workers as deleterious for the market because “it keeps prices low and it makes it

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hard for a company trying to do things right to get stuff done and do it correctly.” The problem was that Charlie was playing by the rules and others were not. This then made it difficult for those who were doing things “correctly” to “get stuff done” and to compete more generally. Thus, for the respondent, Proposition 202 (2008) was legitimate because it would reregulate the market in order “to level the playing field to where everyone plays by the same rules.” This belief that markets need to be reregulated in order to ensure fair market competition is the core of neoliberal ideology—which we see echoed by Charlie in no uncertain terms. Next, Charlie used the conservative Social Programs rationale. Recall that respondents used this rationale when they portrayed undocumented workers as “threatening” social programs. The emphasis was on those who were in the United States “legally”—and thus “morally”—having access to programs to which they are “entitled” as citizens. Undocumented workers are then portrayed as threatening American citizens by immorally using these services or benefits. We see this as Charlie segued from market fairness to discussing how undocumented workers threatened his right to healthcare. The respondent claimed that due to the use of American hospitals by undocumented workers, when “I wanna take my son to the emergency room for a concussion, after five hours I pull out a flashlight and I start doing stuff with his eyes because you can’t go and see a doctor.” Here, the implication is that undocumented workers overwhelmed American healthcare services and made it impossible for his son to receive treatment in the emergency room. Charlie used this example to legitimate his support for the measure—thus portraying himself and his son as cheated and endangered by undocumented workers. Here, we see the application of the conservative most sacred value, as the respondent and his son are portrayed as moral members of a community whose institutions—in this instance, the healthcare system—are threatened by immoral outsiders. Thus, policy that would exclude these outsiders would help to preserve the institutions that support a moral community of lawabiding American citizens—as for Charlie, citizens are entitled access and undocumented workers are not. Charlie then switched his emphasis to concern for the wellbeing of undocumented workers. In this excerpt, Charlie portrayed these workers as members of an economically vulnerable group who were in jeopardy if this measure was not passed—thus employing the liberal Economic/ Social

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Vulnerability rationale. In legitimating his support for the measure, the respondent explained that “people that are coming over here, I don’t blame them necessarily. They are trying to make a better living—I mean I’d probably do it.” Charlie later elaborated: “Well, again this was one of those things where everyone could benefit. We keep people from trying to get over here illegally and taking their lives from their hands. The motivation for them to come over is great enough that they are willing to trudge through the desert when it’s summer or it’s winter you can freeze just as easily as you can die of heat out there.” Here, then, undocumented workers were a group that was economically vulnerable and desperate for a better life. If the current system was left in place, this group would risk their lives to come to the United States. However, for the respondent, if Proposition 202 (2008) was put in place it would make it impossible for these migrants to work in the country and thus force them not to immigrate. This seems to be a sign of tough love, wherein the liberal most sacred value of caring for the vulnerable was employed to justify enacting measures that would, in the respondent’s eyes, stop these migrants from putting their own lives at risk. Next, the respondent used the neoliberal Individualized Responsibility rationale. He legitimated his support for the measure by explaining that for immigration, enacting labor market closure against undocumented workers was justified because they were putting themselves at risk. Ultimately, such closure was important because, as previously mentioned, it would save these workers from themselves by removing the temptation to migrate. This closure was justified because it was not seen as a form of economic exclusion, but rather a way “to do it correctly.” Here, the respondent placed responsibility for migrating “correctly” on the migrants. This was an example of the neoliberal Individualized Responsibility rationale because while policy could plug holes in the immigration system, the responsibility for legally participating in the American labor market ultimately laid with the individual immigrant. The idea, then, was that responsibility for fair competition in the labor market fell on the individual migrant. Finally, Charlie employed the libertarian rationale of Government Inefficiency. While he was in favor of Proposition 202 (2008) as a means to prevent further illegal immigration and ensure fair market competition, ultimately the entire system needed to be overhauled: “Everyone else is going to benefit if we had a…less regulated, easier way to get things done without so much freaking red tape. Then everyone would benefit: the

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people in Mexico, us. If things are done properly it can work out for everyone.” Here, we see a striking contradiction. Charlie evoked libertarian ideology by discussing the need “to get things done without so much freaking red tape”—which is part of the rhetoric of economic liberalism and deregulation. This draws upon the assertion from economic liberalism that is at the heart of the libertarian most sacred value of liberty: that markets are self-regulating and need to be deregulated in order to allow individuals’ economic liberty and thus create a prosperous economy. This is in direct contradiction with the rationales employed earlier by Charlie regarding the necessity of the measure in order to ensure fair market competition—which rests on the neoliberal assertion that markets are fragile and socially constructed—and thus need to be reregulated in order to enhance economic competition. In the conclusion to this book (Chapter 9) I will discuss this contradiction further.

Legitimations Distinctive of Alignments Economic Position (Self-Interest), Partisan Affiliation (Partisanship), and DDEP Position Expected DDEP Position for Economic Position and Partisan Affiliation Findings for RQ1 Table 6.5 shows the legitimations that are exclusive to the expected DDEP Position for economic position and partisan affiliation. Table 6.5 Expected: legitimations exclusive to the expected DDEP position for partisan affiliation and economic position for Proposition 202 (2008) Number of types of unique economic position/party/policy position legitimations Democrat and high-income and DDEP opposition

1

Republican and low-income and DDEP support

0

Unique legitimation (rationale grouping combinations) 1. Conservative AND Liberal AND Liberal Moral Economy NA

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There were no legitimations that were exclusive to the expected lowincome Republican respondents who supported Proposition 202 (2008). There was one legitimation that was exclusive to high-income Democratic respondents who opposed Proposition 202 (2008). This legitimation paired rationales from the Conservative, Liberal, and Liberal Moral Economy rationale groupings (Conservative AND Liberal AND Liberal Moral Economy). Findings for RQ2 Duane, a high-income Democrat who opposed the measure, combined rationales from the Conservative, Liberal, and Liberal Moral Economy rationale groupings. More specifically, Duane used the Liberal Economic Oppression, Liberal Moral Economy Liberal Market Fairness , and Conservative Safety rationales. The respondent reported at the beginning of this section of the interview that he felt “conflicted about this issue.” Subsequently, he used contradictory rationales. Duane explained that he thought that undocumented workers were “exploited by unethical businesses” and that “my concern at the time if I even remembered correctly is that the consequences would come out in some cases on employers but just as much on individual people. And I see [undocumented workers] as more the victims than the perpetrators.” Recall that the liberal most sacred value is protecting the oppressed or vulnerable. Here, we saw the respondent delegitimate the measure by using the liberal Economic Oppression rationale—which I coded for when respondents reported attempting to protect undocumented workers because of their extremely vulnerable economic status. Thus, opposing the measure was a way of protecting undocumented workers because the respondent feared that cracking down on businesses would “come out…just as much on individual [undocumented workers].” Here, the respondent appealed to the liberal most sacred value by explicitly stating that he saw undocumented workers “as more the victims than the perpetrators.” Later in the interview, Duane continued his description: “some of the exploitation which was legendary of [undocumented workers is] not getting paid, or in jobs has no health benefits, any benefits that most people would ordinarily expect.” Duane, then, legitimated his position by describing undocumented workers as a group that was extremely economically vulnerable and thus needed protection from policy that would worsen their economic vulnerability.

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Recall that I coded for Liberal Market Fairness when the respondent applied at least one Liberal rationale to make an explicit fairness delegitimation of Proposition 202 (2008) or its ramifications. Duane continued his description of undocumented workers as economically vulnerable and then delegitimated the measure as unfair—and thus an unfair form of labor market regulation. Duane described how he opposed the measure because he wanted to see “fairer treatment for people who are here fulfilling what turns out to be a central role in society: taking jobs that other people don’t want. And any kind of exploitation by employers of workers is a fundamental value question for me.” Thus, for Duane, the fairness of economic regulation—in this case Proposition 202 (2008)—depended on its treatment of an economically vulnerable group: undocumented workers. For the respondent, these workers were exploited—later describing them “as a group they are an exploited class of workers”—and thus any policy that regulated the labor market needed to avoid worsening the exploitation of these workers. Duane then perceived that the measure would lead to poorer conditions for undocumented laborers, whom he argued would be targeted by penalized employers. Thus, the fairness of economic policy, for the respondent, depended upon his legitimation of undocumented workers as an economically vulnerable group—and thus a group that deserved protection. However, Duane expressed mixed feelings about immigration and in doing so used the conservative rationale of Safety. Recall that I coded respondents as using this rationale when participants portrayed undocumented workers as a threat to public safety. It was in this light that we saw the respondent discuss his reservations about immigration from Latin American: “So the reason that I am little more hesitant about this is after all, undocumented immigrants in United States, especially this part of United States, are two broad kinds: people that are here for economic reasons and people that are here for illegal activity.” The respondent elaborated by describing the mixture of people coming across… It’s understandable why people want to have a control of their borders so that they you know …so especially people who are criminals don’t come in because that is not a theoretical possibility, but a very real problem with the drug trade. That definitely colors my thinking, so I’m kind of conflicted around this in a way that I’m not around issues like… you know climate change or gun control.

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Here, we see the respondent use a classic trope from the Safety rhetoric by portraying undocumented immigrants as criminals and part of the drug trade (Sohoni and Sohoni 2014). Regardless of whether or not this assessment of “illegal immigration” is true, the discourse is an application of the conservative most sacred value. This is because the respondent portrayed the United States as threatened by these “dangerous” immigrants. The belief is that there are law-abiding “people” and then those who are a threat to safety. Thus, in order to protect the in-group of law-abiding “people,” countries must act to maintain “control of their borders” to keep out criminals. In this light, then, immigration institutions that keep out immigrants who are part of the “drug trade” are necessary to maintain the moral community of people in the United States who follow the law. Notice that the respondent included economic migrants as part of this community. The implication is that these migrants are not dangerous and only come to work. Duane continued with this rhetoric, explaining that “I’m well aware for lots of reasons, not all people who crossed the broader illegally are here for reasons that are benign.” Thus, most undocumented immigrants in the United States are “benign” and thus do not pose a criminal threat—making them part of the in-group of law-abiding members of the United States. Unexpected DDEP Position for Economic Position and Partisan Affiliation Findings for RQ1 In Table 6.6 we see the legitimations that are exclusive to the unexpected DDEP position for economic position and partisan affiliation. There were no legitimations there were exclusive to low-income Republican respondents who opposed Proposition 202 (2008). There were four legitimations that were exclusive to high-income Democratic respondents who supported Proposition 202 (2008). The first legitimation employed a rationale from the Neoliberal rationale grouping (Neoliberal). The second legitimation combined rationales from the Liberal and Liberal Moral Economy rationale groupings (Liberal AND Liberal Moral Economy). The third legitimation combined rationales from the Liberal and Neoliberal rationale groupings (Liberal AND Neoliberal). The fourth legitimation used rationale from the Conservative rationale grouping (Conservative). Findings for RQ2

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Table 6.6 Unexpected: legitimations exclusive to the unexpected DDEP position for economic position and partisan affiliation for Proposition 202 (2008) Number of types of unique economic position/party/policy position legitimations Democrat and high-income and DDEP support

4

Republican and low-income and DDEP opposition

0

Unique legitimation (rationale grouping combinations) 1. Neoliberal 2. Liberal AND Liberal Moral Economy 3. Liberal AND Neoliberal 4. Conservative NA

Don, a high-income Democrat who supported the measure, utilized a legitimation that employed the Fair Market Competition rationale from the Neoliberal rationale grouping. The respondent began by describing how important he believed it was to follow the law; however, his concern was not with protecting a moral community. Instead, the respondent reported wanting to ensure that employers followed laws in their employment practices in order to ensure fair market competition: “I certainly think if it’s illegal to hire illegal aliens that the law should be enforced…I believe if the law is such that you’re not supposed to hire illegal aliens, then you should enforce the law.” This conviction that employers should obey the law segued into the respondent’s discussion of fairness: “I believe you should play by the rules…I believe that there’s a sense of fairness involved, that if there are rules, you should obey them.” Don concluded by discussing the unfairness of the immigration system more broadly: “I do think there’s a far bigger problem with immigration though. And this [ballot measure] addresses just this tiny little part of it.” Here, we see that Don employed the Fair Market Competition rationale. In neoliberal ideology, government reregulation is justified to the extent that it optimizes fair market competition. Moreover, reregulation in order to ensure fair market competition is a hallmark of neoliberal government action (Amable 2011). Don’s discussion of hiring undocumented workers as unfair (“I believe if the law is such that you’re not

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supposed to hire illegal aliens, then you should enforce the law”) could be seen as his shifting the responsibility for hiring onto individuals who make hiring decisions, but as this was unclear in his discourse I did not apply the Individualized Responsibility rationale code here. Instead, we can see this discussion in the context of the respondent qua voter supporting a ballot measure that was portrayed as cracking down on employers who hired undocumented workers. The context, then, was the reregulation of the labor market in order to ensure fair competition. With this in mind, we can see Don’s discussion of the unfairness of hiring undocumented workers as speaking to the reregulation of the immigration systems in order to ensure fair market competition. The respondent explained that “I believe you should play by the rules…I believe that there’s a sense of fairness involved, that if there are rules, you should obey them.” In this context, “the rules” are not rules in general, but instead rules of economic competition. Similarly, “there’s a sense of fairness involved,” given the context of the ballot measure, refers to fairness in hiring—and thus fairness in labor market competition and economic competition more broadly. Thus, “if there are rules, you should obey them” refers to the respondents’ legitimation of a measure that was portrayed as reregulating the labor market in order to ensure fair competition in hiring. In this light, we can understand Don’s assertation that “there’s a far bigger problem with immigration though. And this [ballot measure] addresses just this tiny little part of it” as referring to a more general need to reregulate the immigration system to restore or optimize fair competition. Thus, the respondent applied neoliberal ideology—likely implicitly—to portray this measure as part of a broader agenda of reregulating immigration for the sake of fair competition—as “this [ballot measure] addresses just this tiny little part of it.” Conflicting Expectations: Expected DDEP Position for Economic Position, Unexpected DDEP Position for Partisan Affiliation Findings for RQ1 In Table 6.7 we see the legitimations that are exclusive to the expected DDEP position for economic position and unexpected DDEP position for partisan affiliation (conflicting expectations). There were no legitimations that were exclusive to low-income Democratic respondents who supported the measure.

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Table 6.7 Conflicting expectations: legitimations exclusive to the expected DDEP position for economic position and unexpected DDEP position for partisan affiliation for Proposition 202 (2008) Number of types of unique economic position/party/policy position legitimations Democrat and low-income and DDEP support Republican and high-income and DDEP opposition

Unique legitimation (rationale grouping Combinations)

0

NA

1

1. Libertarian AND High-Income Self-Interest

There was one legitimation that was exclusive to high-income Republican respondents who opposed the measure. The only distinctive legitimation that emerged paired rationales from the Libertarian and HighIncome Self-Interest rationale groupings (Libertarian AND High-Income Self-Interest). Findings for RQ2 Elias, a high-income Republican who opposed the measure, used the Libertarian Government Inefficiency rationale combined with the Anti-Regulation rationale from the High-Income Self-Interest rationale grouping. The respondent very explicitly legitimated his opposition to the measure in terms of libertarian ideology. He explained that “I’m…more of a Libertarian than a Republican. The idea of free markets is free markets. We need to pay taxes—there are some levels of regulation— but this part of the economy is called the grey or the black economy and it’s part of the economy.” Here, Elias set the stage for the justification of hiring undocumented workers in terms of the economic liberty. For the respondent, the “grey or black economy” is “part of the economy” that was justified from the perspective of “free markets.” Thus, Elias established in no uncertain terms his exaltation of liberty as his primary value—or in the terms of moral psychology, a “most sacred value” (Tetlock et al. 2000; Tetlock 2003; Haidt 2012; Graham and Haidt 2012; Iyer et al. 2012). Having laid this ideological framework, Elias legitimated his opposition to the measure:

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I’ve actually worked construction with some people from Mexico. One guy, I remember he had to cross 40 days through Mexico to get here. He was working concrete with my buddy who owns the company in California and I worked like a week with him, so I was doing concrete work…My buddy knows him, he pays him weekly in cash. He looks the other way, most people look the other way and the reality is it’s better for the economy. If that white guy who doesn’t want to work hard concrete, [to] work get off his ass and work for that salary he would take [then the undocumented worker deserves the job]…this is the idea of a free economy. I have another friend that works for [a poultry company] in Arkansas, and Arkansas came in with a law like this [that] went really hard at people. No one would kill the chickens. None of the local lazy white folk would kill the chickens. They got rid of all the Mexican illegals, no one’s killing the chickens. Guess what happened to the price of chicken at the market! Customers aren’t happy, and so guess what the idea of a free economy [is] just let the economy be.

Elias then legitimated his opposition to the measure by explaining that “One, I have personal interest. Two, I have friends that have personal interest. And three, I have a belief in a free public economy.” The respondent discussed what he perceived as the benefits of a laissezfaire approach to market regulation. In particular, Elias explained his opposition to the measure in terms of his concern for dealing with more business regulation. Furthermore, Elias legitimated his position in terms of a desire to avoid penalties for hiring employees under the table as a business owner. I coded for the Libertarian Government Inefficiency when respondents reported that their vote was motivated by a belief that government spending or operation could not improve its efficiency or was fundamentally inefficient. Here, I used keywords such as “inefficient,” as well as related terms—such as “waste.” We can then clearly see that Elias’ most sacred value was economic liberty. He used this value to then delegitimate the measure as fundamentally inefficient due to its obstruction of the free market. The clearest example of this was “[a poultry company] in Arkansas”—where government regulation against the black market and hiring undocumented workers resulted in an inefficient economic process that, according to the respondent, collapsed production and spiked the price of chicken. This is a classic example of libertarian ideology and the application of economic liberty to delegitimate regulation as inefficient due to its

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curtailing of economic liberty. As such, it is a clear example of “negative liberty”—defined as the rejection of “the idea that the needs of one person impose a moral duty upon others”—which is the foundation of libertarianism (Berlin 1969; Iyer et al. 2012: 2; also see Haidt et al. 2009; Haidt 2012: 350). For Elias, hiring “legal” workers did not make sense economically, and so seemed to be more of a cultural norm or perhaps what some would perceive as a moral duty. For the respondent, then, the imposition of the norm or moral duty to hire “legal” workers rather than let the economy be “free” and determine who gets hired without regulations was also a clear evidence of negative liberty. It was then in this framework that Elias employed the AntiRegulation rationale. Recall that when actors report motives of selfinterest, they likely report what they perceive as socially acceptable forms of self-interest rather than their actual self-interested motives (Spillman 2012; Spillman and Strand 2013; Vila-Henninger 2017). Elias explicitly reported opposing the measure out of self-interest as an employer who sought to avoid what were portrayed in the measure’s description as increased penalties. Conflicting Expectations: Expected DDEP Position for Partisan Affiliation, Unexpected DDEP Position for Economic Position Findings for RQ1 In Table 6.8 we see the legitimations that are exclusive to the expected Table 6.8 Conflicting expectations: legitimations exclusive to the expected DDEP position for partisan affiliation and unexpected DDEP position for economic position for Proposition 202 (2008) Number of types of unique Unique legitimation economic position/party/policy (rationale grouping position legitimations Combinations) Democrat and low-income and DDEP opposition Republican and high-income and DDEP support

0

NA

2

1. Conservative AND Conservative Moral Economy 2. Conservative AND Conservative Moral Economy AND Liberal AND Neoliberal

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DDEP position for partisan affiliation and unexpected DDEP position for economic position (conflicting expectations). In Table 6.8 we see that there were no legitimations that were exclusive to low-income Democratic respondents who opposed the measure. We also see that there were two legitimations that were exclusive to high-income Republican respondents who supported the measure. The first distinctive legitimation combined rationales from the Conservative and Conservative Moral Economy rationale groupings (Conservative AND Conservative Moral Economy). The second distinctive legitimation combined rationales from the Conservative, Conservative Moral Economy, Liberal, and Neoliberal rationale groupings (Conservative AND Conservative Moral Economy AND Liberal AND Neoliberal). Findings for RQ2 Sherman, a high-income Republican who supported the measure, used the Conservative Law and Order, Safety, and American Jobs rationales, along with the Conservative Moral Economy rationale. Recall that I operationalized the Conservative Market Fairness rationale as occurring when a respondent applied at least one Conservative rationale to make an explicit fairness legitimation of Proposition 202 (2008) or its ramifications. Furthermore, I coded for American Jobs as instances in which respondents perceived undocumented workers as a threat because they were “stealing” American jobs or “cheating” Americans out of jobs. In this rationale, undocumented workers are portrayed as immorally gaining access to the American job market by disobeying the law. Finally, I coded Safety as instances in which respondents perceived undocumented workers as a threat to public safety. Here, undocumented workers were portrayed as “dangerous” or “criminals.” Sherman began by employing the American Jobs , Safety, and Conservative Market Fairness rationales: I believe in immigration – blah, blah, blah. But, we have to take care of our own. Nobody has a job. Why are we letting people come in…when we’re not taking care of what we got here already? And, by not securing our border, and I’ll tell you, this is what I see is going to happen… If I was Iran, and it’s a heck of a lot cheaper to buy a truck than it is a missile…So, once they get the bomb, and they probably will…they’re going to drive it across in a truck across this porous border we got.

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Sherman legitimated the measure in terms of the fairness of in-group access to job opportunities. Fair market participation, in this sense, stemmed from group membership. Americans should have access to the American job market because they are Americans. Thus, the focus is parochial in its emphasis on group boundaries and membership. Notice here that the respondent evoked a moral community by arguing that “we have to take care of our own.” The focus, then, was on maintaining the economic and security institutions that maintain American society (Haidt 2012). Notice that instead of shifting all of the responsibility for fair market participation to individual immigrants, Sherman placed this responsibility onto lawmakers—who he portrayed as recklessly “letting people come in” who did not belong. From this perspective, the onus for ensuring fair market participation lies with the federal government, which was responsible for enforcing rules of fair market participation. This is thus an example of the Conservative Market Fairness rationale as it was a fairness legitimation that drew upon a conservative rationale. This segued into a use of the Safety rationale, as the respondent highlighted the threat that the moral American community faced from outsiders and subsequently lax enforcement of laws that protected Americans from physical danger. Sherman justified his “Yes” vote by evoking an imminent threat from an ominous nation. In these terms, the problem of a “porous border” and “[taking] care of our own” started with policymakers regulating labor market participation and continued with larger issues of border security. I coded the Law and Order rationale as instances in which respondents portrayed undocumented workers as a threat to legal order, and the rule of law more generally in the United States, because of their “illegal” immigration status. Here, then, respondents often argued that it was necessary to apply the law “equally” to everyone or that allowing undocumented workers was a “double standard” in which some could break the law without sanction. We can see this very clearly as Sherman continued: We’re a nation of laws not myth. Okay? And, if we got all these laws and right now Obama…[and] Congress [are] sitting there and looking down [their] nose at you wanting you to do this healthcare law, well they exempted themselves [from the law]. You know, I’m sorry, but the law’s the law. If you don’t like the law then change it, but everybody has to abide by it.

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In this account we can see that Sherman claimed that Barack Obama— who was president at the time—and his supporters in congress “exempted themselves” from the “law” when they passed and implemented the Affordable Care Act. Sherman used this negative example from Democratic politicians to evaluate Proposition 202 (2008) and justify his “Yes” vote as maintaining the rule of law and moral governance—thus using the Law and Order rationale to delegitimate Democratic politicians. As Sherman summarized at the end of the interview, his vote “has everything to do with protecting our sovereignty, as a nation. That’s what it’s all about.” By protecting American sovereignty via the rule of law and American security, Sherman appealed to protecting law-abiding American citizens and “take care of our own” in his legitimation. His ire, then, was directed at those he perceived to be threatening this sovereignty, and by extension moral societal order, who he portrayed as not protecting moral law-abiding citizens. Here it is important to understand that Sherman’s market fairness legitimation was distinct from the neoliberal fairness criteria because the respondent placed responsibility for maintaining a moral society, and by extension market fairness, with branches of the federal government: The Executive (“Obama”) and The Legislative (“Congress”). Sherman’s focus was not on placing responsibility for market fairness onto individual market participants but was on protecting a moral in-group (“our own”). The respondent argued that the responsibility for maintaining a moral community and market fairness lies with the federal government, and thus shifted blame to government bodies such as “congress” instead of individual market participants. This is distinctly not neoliberal ideology— which shifts responsibility away from collectivities and onto individuals. Sherman was then able to blame Democratic politicians for the failures of the federal government to maintain a moral community and fair market competition by not protecting the rule of law. Notice, again, that the respondent was not blaming policymakers for failing to reregulate the market so as to maintain market fairness—which would have been a neoliberal perspective—but instead was blaming them for not upholding the basic responsibilities of protecting the border and the rule of law so as to maintain a moral community and protect “our own.”

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Notes 1. http://apps.azsos.gov/election/2008/Info/PubPamphlet/Sun_Sounds/ english/Prop202.htm. 2. http://www.followthemoney.org/entity-details?eid=10246670&default= ballot. 3. http://www.followthemoney.org/entity-details?eid=10246670&default= ballot. 4. https://dictionary.apa.org/quasi-independent-variable. 5. US Census, American Community Survey 2015.

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CHAPTER 7

Proposition 204 (2012)

Introduction This chapter continues my analysis of voters’ legitimations of their positions on different direct democratic economic policies (DDEPs) and how such legitimations are structured by the interaction of self-interest and partisanship. For this analysis, I selected Arizona’s Proposition 204 (2012): “The Quality Education and Jobs Act”—which attempted to renew a temporary one-cent sales tax in order to fund public education and a variety of other public services. For this ballot measure, I used data from 83 respondents who took a position on Proposition 204 (2012) during their interview, legitimated their position, and fit my other sampling criteria (see Chapter 4). Furthermore, it is important to remember that in the context of justifying political positions, justifications and rationalizations are legitimations. Recall that I implemented a quasi-experimental design and recruited respondents according to economic position and partisan affiliation (see Chapters 1 and 4) in order to address the book’s two research questions: RQ1: How do partisanship and self-interest interact to shape partisan voters’ rationalizations of their position on direct democratic economic policy (DDEP)? RQ2: What are the discourses that voters draw upon to rationalize their direct democratic economic policy (DDEP) position? In this way, partisan affiliation and economic position are quasiindependent variables (see Chapters 1 and 4). Given the design of the © The Author(s) 2020 L. A. Vila-Henninger, Social Justification and Political Legitimacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51716-8_7

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study, the position that a respondent took on a DDEP before providing a legitimation also acted as a quasi-independent variable. The empirical task laid out by the first question was then to investigate how selfinterest, partisanship, and DDEP position interacted to structure voter legitimations. I performed this task by identifying legitimations that were distinctive to each comparison group of my three quasi-independent variables (economic position, partisan affiliation, and DDEP position). Furthermore, the empirical task for the second question was to examine the widely held political or economic beliefs, norms, and values that voters drew upon in their legitimations of their DDEP position. I carried out this task by providing a qualitative analysis of the distinctive legitimations I identified for each comparison group of quasi-independent variables. As discussed in the theory chapter (Chapter 2), respondents’ use of widely held political or economic beliefs, norms, and values in their legitimations serves as evidence of their socialization into these beliefs, norms, and values. Understanding such socialization provides a window onto the forms of legitimate political and economic discourse in the United States from the late 2000s through the mid-2010s regarding economic policy. This is because my data for this measure were collected from 2013 to 2015 and were facilitated by my use of a prompt with respondents that was a justificatory summary of Proposition 204 (2012) that was provided to voters online via the Arizona Secretary of State prior to the election in 2012. My findings also help us to understand political socialization processes in the United States more broadly. Finally, the analysis in this chapter applies the principle of “reconstruction” from the Extended Case Method (e.g., Burawoy 1998, 2009; Sallaz 2009) to semi-structured interview data in order to build theory by identifying cases in the data that are novel or anomalous to relevant theory and empirical literature (Vila-Henninger 2018, 2019a, 2019b). This approach is analogous to qualitative uses of abduction (Pierce 1934; Timmermans and Tavory 2012; Tavory and Timmermans 2014; Swedberg 2017). In this chapter, my analysis identifies novel and anomalous cases in my data. In the final chapter (Chapter 9), then, I build theory using both novel and anomalous cases.

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Arizona’s Proposition 204 (2012): “The Quality Education and Jobs Act” Social Context Funding for public education in America has been historically intertwined with efforts to remedy inequalities in the education system (for a summary see Leyden 2005; Ingram 2014). Starting with the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education Supreme Court ruling, the federal government began to tackle structural inequalities in public education via desegregation. By the 1960s, education reformers began to address issues of resource inequality between school districts. This led to the 1971 Serrano v. Priest California Supreme Court ruling that school districts must be equally funded. In 1973, the US Supreme Court ruled that interdistrict resource equality was not constitutionally guaranteed, thereby leaving individual states to determine how public education funding was to be allocated (Leyden 2005). New efforts to link public education reform to federal funding came from the George W. Bush administration’s 2001 No Child Left Behind (NCLB) program—which tied district achievement to the allocation of federal funds. This program reformed the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), which provided federal funds to supplement local and state revenue sources. It must be emphasized, however, that the ESEA and NCLB were auxiliary sources of public education funding. For example, the US Department of Education estimated that for the 2004– 2005 school year, local and state governments provided an average of 83% of public education funding (Department of Education 2005). While states have traditionally relied on local-level property taxes to finance public education, this is changing—primarily due to state-level political contestation of property tax as a funding source (Kenyon and Reschovsky 2014). Simultaneously, there has been substantial voter pushback against property taxes. This movement began in California in 1978 with Proposition 13—which successfully amended the California state constitution to limit property tax growth. The success of such a conservative stance on taxation via direct democracy indicated the broad political appeal of this type of fiscal reform. State and federal politicians quickly followed suit and proposed legislation to lower or repeal an array of taxes (Martin 2008: 23).

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With the shift away from property taxes, there was also a direct democratic reaction to try to preserve public education funding. A decade after Proposition 13, California passed Proposition 98 (1988)—which required a minimum level of state spending on public education. The measure placed responsibility for raising these funds on the state’s government, which was then required to allocate this money to local governments (Matsusaka 2004). A key part of this direct democratic reaction was the emergence of ballot measures that sought to fund public education via sales taxes. For example, in 1994 Michigan voters approved “Proposal A,” which raised the state’s sales tax rate, in lieu of increasing property or income taxes, in order to fund public education (Papke 2008). Background of the Measure Arizona’s Proposition 204 (2012): “The Quality Education and Jobs Act” was part of a trend in American direct democracy over the past fifty years to increase funding for public education via increases in the sales tax rate. In 2009, the state of Arizona faced a multibillion dollar budget shortfall that was exacerbated by the state’s heavy reliance sales taxes and income taxes—both of which decreased substantially from 2008 to 2009 due to the Great Recession. In response, Republican Governor Jan Brewer addressed the impacts of the shortfall on public education funding by proposing a three-year, one-cent increase in the state sales tax rate. The responsibility for ratifying this increase was given to voters, as the state legislature created and placed Proposition 100 on the 2010 ballot. This measure passed with 64% of the voters approving the proposition. A second measure, Proposition 204 (2012): “The Quality Education and Jobs Act,” was subsequently created and placed on the ballot through the efforts of citizens (Citizen Initiated State Statute). This measure sought to make the temporary sales tax rate increase permanent in order to address Arizona’s chronic problems funding public education. On November 6, 2012 this ballot measure failed with only 36% of voters supporting it. As we can see from financial contributions, the measure was partisan and represented a clash between retail and public education interests. Supporters of the measure raised a total of $2,269,058 and opponents raised $1,801,084. Major supporters included ideological groups ($757,140), public sector unions ($710,836), educational associations

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and boards ($325,370), education policy groups ($125,253), and business associations ($60,000). Notably, supporters of the measure received donations from the National Education Association ($500,000). The highest single contributor was an advocacy group called “We Build Arizona” ($757,000). Major opponents included Conservative policy organizations ($925,000), anti-tax groups ($260,000), and big-ticket retail interests like automotive dealers ($352,974) and real estate companies ($47,500). Opposition to the measure was also funded by a range of business interests, such as insurance companies, business associations, and the dairy industry. The highest opposing donors were the political nonprofit group “Americans for Responsible Leadership” ($925,000), the “Arizona Automobile Dealers Association” ($346,974), and the “Arizona Free Enterprise Club” ($260,000).

Summary of Arizona’s Proposition 204 (2012): “The Quality Education and Jobs Act” The following is the unofficial summary of the measure provided to the State of Arizona, as required by law, by the official proponents of Arizona’s Proposition 204 (2012): “The Quality Education and Jobs Act.” This summary was made available to voters online via the Arizona Secretary of State. I provided this text to participants as a prompt before I interviewed them about their position on the measure (for further discussion see Chapter 4): The Quality Education and Jobs Act will strengthen Arizona’s economy by equipping children to succeed in the classroom, ensuring an educated workforce and creating jobs . This act, which renews the one-cent sales tax, will provide dedicated funding linked to performance and accountability for students of all ages and prevent legislators from cutting K-12 funding. Scholarships will ensure that universities and community colleges remain affordable. Investment in vocational educational education will allow students to graduate ready to work. This act protects public safety by ensuring continued funding for DPS officers and creates jobs by funding road, rail, transit and other transportation projects.

On November 6, 2012 this ballot measure failed with 63% of voters deciding against it. As with other measures in this book, the electorate’s

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voting tendency for this proposition diverged from the positions that respondents took during the interview. Approximately 66% (55/83) of my participants who took a position on the measure during the interview supported the proposition. The goal of this analysis is to build theory about the discourse that respondents use to legitimate their stances on different DDEPs. Thus, any bias in respondent memory or interpretation during the interview is not relevant for my qualitative, theory building analysis of voter legitimations.

Quasi-experimental Design and Quasi-independent Variables Research Design In order to employ my analytical approach to build theory in response to the book’s two research questions, I use data from respondents who were recruited based on two quasi-independent variables that correspond to voter partisanship and self-interest: partisan affiliation and economic position—respectively. It is crucial to note that in my research design, instead of standard quantitative “variables,” partisan affiliation and economic position are each instances of a “quasi-independent variable.” As defined by the American Psychological Association Dictionary of Psychology, a quasi-independent variable is “in experimental design, any of the personal attributes, traits, or behaviors that are inseparable from an individual and cannot reasonably be manipulated. These include gender, age, and ethnicity. Such attributes may be modeled and treated as statistically independent but are not subject to random assignment, as are independent variables.”1 I operationalized each quasi-independent variable—partisan affiliation and economic position—as dichotomous: Democrat vs. Republican and High vs. Low-Income—respectively. Because I address the empirical puzzle of how partisanship and self-interest interact to shape voter rationalization, each quasi-independent variable is categorical and cannot be operationalized in terms of “treatment” versus “pre-treatment.” Thus, rather than comparing a pretreatment group to a treatment group, I compared four different comparison groups that constituted the four different possible combinations of each of my two dichotomous categorical quasi-independent variables (Shadish et al. 2001). This means

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that I used a quasi-experimental design that implements a “PosttestOnly Design with Nonequivalent Groups” (Shadish et al. 2001: 115–7; Privitera and Ahlgrim-Delzell. 2019). Furthermore, regardless of the mechanisms that produced each respondent’s position on a measure, I treated respondent DDEP position as a quasi-independent variable that shaped the participant’s legitimation. Thus, for each ballot measure, I had eight comparison groups: lowincome Democrats who supported the measure, low-income Democrats who opposed the measure, low-income Republicans who supported the measure, low-income Republicans who opposed the measure, highincome Democrats who supported the measure, high-income Democrats who opposed the measure, high-income Republicans who supported the measure, and high-income Republicans who opposed the measure. As respondent DDEP position often varied from one ballot measure to the next, so did respondent placement in a proposition-specific comparison group for a given DDEP. Thus, this analysis investigates how these three quasi-independent variables—Economic Position, Partisan Affiliation, and DDEP Position— interact to shape respondent legitimations. Quasi-independent Variables In this section, I discuss my three quasi-independent variables: Economic Position, Partisan Affiliation, and DDEP Position (i.e. respondent position on Proposition 204). First, I outline both of the quasi-independent variables on which I sampled—economic position and partisan affiliation. In particular, I provide an overview of how each quasi-independent variable is expected to vary with Proposition 204 (2012), as well as how this variation is expected to be linked to respondents’ DDEP position legitimations. Finally, for DDEP position, I discuss expected variation according to the two quasi-independent variables on which I sampled: economic position and partisan affiliation. This then helps us to understand how each DDEP position could potentially act as a quasi-independent variable that helps to shape respondents’ legitimations. Quasi-independent Variable 1: Economic Position According to the literature on self-interest and political reasoning (Downs 1957), economic position should correspond with economic policy incentives, which would then motivate self-interested voter reasoning. This

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is echoed by recent literature on economic inequality and tax attitudes (Dodson 2017). There are two strands of literature that specifically apply to the relationship between economic position and voter attitudes about taxation. One line analyzes voter preferences for using taxation to fund public services—including education. Economic models postulate that both low and high-income voters would oppose funding public goods, such as education, via taxation. The theory is that low-income voters prefer consumption over taxation to fund public goods, while highincome voters are more likely to utilize private alternatives (Epple and Romano 1996; Mohl and Pamp 2008). The second strand is in the tradition of rational choice theory, where the expectation is that those with children in public schools would vote for an increase in taxation to fund public education as a matter of selfinterest, while those without children in public schools would not share this motive (Cataldo and Holm 1983). This theory has received limited support. For example, Tedin et al. (2001) found that whites in the United States with a child enrolled in a large urban public school district were more likely to vote in favor of a bond that would fund that district. This study replicates similar findings on the relationship between support for education funding via local taxation and having a child enrolled in a corresponding public school or district (Rasinski and Rosenbaum 1987). Given the literature on self-interest, child public school enrollment, and voter preference—along with recent data that shows that students from low-income families make up more than half the public school population (Southern Education Foundation Bulletin 2015)—we might expect some low-income respondents with children to support the measure out of “self-interest” for their children’s education. However, work by Sears and Funk (1991) demonstrates that actors vote for short-term self-interest when they perceive the stakes to be high and the issues to be clear. This measure was clearly framed as a tax. As such, many economic models would then predict that low-income voters would reject the measure in response to its proposed increased tax rate (Epple and Romano 1996; Mohl and Pamp 2008). Following these models, I expect low-income voters to delegitimate the measure. Similarly, I expect high-income voters to legitimate the measure in response to short-term self-interest in response to the clear issue of shifting the funding burden from property tax to sales tax to legitimate shifting the economic burden away from property taxes (Martin 2008). The picture becomes more complicated when we consider the influence of

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long-term self-interest, but such an analysis extends beyond the voting theories on the link between short-term self-interest, economic position, and voter issue position that I use for this book. However, research has demonstrated that voters struggle to recognize what is in their long-term self-interest (Sears and Funk 1991; Bartels 2005; Franko et al. 2013). Crucially, the qualitative literature suggests that when citizens see rational economic action as normative they justify such action by appealing to popular beliefs about self-interest (Spillman 2012; Spillman and Strand 2013; Vila-Henninger 2017). Thus, rather than understanding participants’ “actual” self-interested motives, respondents’ legitimations that appeal to self-interest provide a window into what kinds of self-interest are considered to be normative. Quasi-independent Variable 2: Partisan Affiliation While qualitative research has been done on popular narratives about taxation (Kidder and Martin 2012; Williamson 2017), there has yet to be any empirical work that connects these narratives to broader ideological values that are employed in American political reasoning. For my analysis, I focus on the core moral differences between American liberal and conservative political ideology by using Jonathan Haidt’s work on American ideological “most sacred values” (Haidt 2012; Graham and Haidt 2012). This research draws upon the scholarship of Philip Tetlock (Tetlock et al. 2000; Tetlock 2003) on the concept of a “sacred value”—defined as a core moral value that a community will not compromise at any cost. I analyze the “most” sacred values (Haidt 2012; Graham and Haidt 2012) of liberals and conservatives because most sacred values potentially represent the core moral distinctions in American political ideology. This research contributes to literature that has established the importance of these most sacred values in the legitimations of American voters (Vila-Henninger 2018, 2019a, 2019b). According to partisan voting theories, voters should provide partisan rationalizations for their policy positions (Achen and Bartels 2016). In terms of political ideological reasoning, Jonathan Haidt (2012) theorizes that liberals’ “most sacred value [is] care for victims of oppression” (Haidt 2012: 345), and more broadly protecting “the rights of certain vulnerable groups” (Haidt 2012: 212). Conversely, conservatives’ “most sacred value” is preserving “the institutions and traditions that sustain a moral community” (Haidt 2012: 357). For government regulation, Haidt (2012) theorizes that “liberals are most concerned about the rights of

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certain vulnerable groups…[while] conservatives, in contrast, hold more traditional idea of liberty as the right to be left alone, as they often resent liberal programs that use government to infringe on their liberties in order to protect the groups that liberals care about most” (Haidt 2012: 212). Subsequent work has established that conservatives are mainly concerned with protecting an in-group (Waytz et al. 2019). In this context, the conservative most sacred value overlaps with the libertarian emphasis on liberty—as conservatives fight to protect the tradition of economic liberty in the face of “redistributive taxation policies” (Iyer et al. 2012: 15). For conservatives, part of preserving a moral community means promoting an ethic of self-disciplined market competition, and by extension the liberty to control earnings garnered from this competition. Economic liberty is then a “tradition” that is used to “sustain a moral community” by facilitating a work ethic of self-discipline and ultimately promoting distributional fairness (Haidt 2012: 210, 213). This extends beyond fairness in market participation because it concerns government involvement in the redistribution of income, and in particular the belief that those who take advantage of the economic liberty to participate in the market should be afforded liberty with regard to the control of earnings (Haidt 2012: 210; also see Lakoff 2002). Thus, conservatives should legitimate their opposition to the measure by drawing upon the conservative most sacred value and its appeal to protecting the tradition of economic liberty, thereby promoting a moral community. Conversely, liberals should legitimate their support for the measure by drawing upon their most sacred value and thus legitimate public education funding by discussing its benefits for certain vulnerable populations. Quasi-independent Variable 3: DDEP Position In this section, I discuss DDEP Position as a quasi-independent variable that corresponds with each of the first two quasi-independent variables. This discussion should help us to understand how DDEP Position as a quasi-independent variable that potentially shapes respondents’ legitimations. a. Economic Position: The economic incentives of the measure stem from the complex history of tax policy in America. There has been a sustained American “revolt” against taxes in general and property taxes in particular (Sears and Citrin 1985; Martin 2008). This

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movement began in California in 1978 with Proposition 13, which proposed an amendment to the California state constitution to limit property tax growth and was ultimately approved. State and federal politicians quickly followed suit through attempts to lower or repeal an array of taxes (Martin 2008). With the shift away from property taxes, there was also a direct democratic reaction to preserve public education funding—primarily via sales tax increases (Papke 2008). In the end, there was a well-established economic incentive for affluent citizens to support Proposition 204 (2012) in order to shift the economic burden for education funding away from property taxes. This may seem counterintuitive in the face of research that suggests voters struggle to decipher long-term incentives that stem from economic policy and instead tend to respond to short-term self-interest when the issues are not clearly defined or the stakes are not high (Sears and Funk 1991; Bartels 2005; Franko et al. 2013). However, because the stakes of increasing property taxes are high, we would expect affluent respondents to support a regressive sales tax that shifts the economic burden for public education funding away from property taxes (e.g., Sears and Funk 1991). Alternatively, the absence of high economic stakes related to the measure for lowincome voters suggests that they would respond to the proposition’s short-term economic incentives of a lower sales tax rate by opposing the measure (Epple and Romano 1996; Mohl and Pamp 2008).2 b. Partisan Affiliation: Unlike some measures, partisan elites provided clear and consistent cues for interpreting party position on Proposition 204 (2012)—as many Republican state lawmakers who had supported Proposition 100 (2010) reacted by strongly opposing Proposition 204 (2012). The measure was endorsed by the Democratic mayors of Tucson and Phoenix, respectively, as well as by Fred DuVal—the 2014 Arizona Democratic gubernatorial candidate. Given these endorsements, I expect Democratic voters to support the proposition. Conversely, the measure was strongly opposed by prominent state-level Republican lawmakers, such as then Governor Jan Brewer and then State Treasurer (and 2014 Arizona Gubernatorial race winner) Doug Ducey. These cues from state Conservative elites are important because Conservative and Libertarian state-level lawmakers tend to select regressive taxation

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above other sources of state funding (Newman and O’Brien 2011; Bjorklund 2019). Arizona Republican partisan elites’ rejection of the measure was in line with Conservative and Libertarian ideological narratives, which are opposed to taxation as a violation of economic liberty (Iyer et al. 2012). Furthermore, there are contradictory findings on popular attitudes and narratives concerning taxation in the United States. While some find evidence of a prevailing narrative that taxes exploit citizens by infringing on personal liberty (Kidder and Martin 2012), others have documented a counter narrative that taxes are a “civic responsibility and a moral obligation” that the government unevenly enforces (Williamson 2017). The clear and consistent rejection of Proposition 204 (2012) by Arizona Republican elites provided strong cues to Republican voters to oppose the proposition. I thus expected Republican voters to oppose the measure. The proposition was also opposed by online conservative media outlets such as azconservative.org and sonorannews.com. c. Expected DDEP Position: In Table 7.1 we can see the expected respondent position on Proposition 204 (2012) for each combination of economic position and partisan affiliation. Table 7.1 Proposition 204 (2012): expected Proposition 204 position by economic position/partisan affiliation comparison groups and percentage Proposition 204 support Economic position/partisan affiliation

Expected Proposition 204 position

Respondent Proposition 204 position (majority)

Percentage respondent Proposition 204 support

High-income Democrats High-income Republicans Low-income Democrats Low-income Republicans

Yes

Yes

27/33 (82%)

Conflicting expectations Conflicting expectations No

No

9/20 (45%)

Yes

15/16 (94%)

No

4/14 (29%)

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Quasi-experimental Anomalies: Legitimations That Span Economic Position and/or Partisan Affiliation It is important to consider widely held beliefs, norms, and values that respondents across partisan affiliation and/or economic position could draw upon to (de)legitimate this DDEP. In my analysis, I found three such widely held beliefs, norms, or values: Libertarianism, Neoliberalism, and Moral Economy. Libertarianism The libertarian “most sacred value” is the protection and promotion “individual liberty” (Haidt 2012: 352)—defined as the rejection of “the idea that the needs of one person impose a moral duty upon others.” This position is known as “negative liberty” (Berlin 1969; Iyer et al. 2012: 2; also see Haidt et al. 2009; Haidt 2012: 350). This means that negative liberty is seen by libertarians as a moral goal for its own sake (Iyer et al. 2012; Haidt 2012). As such, government regulation serves as a foil and thereby an enemy of liberty (Iyer et al. 2012; Haidt 2012). Furthermore, a key libertarian ideological perspective that stems from its most sacred value is that government economic regulation is fundamentally inefficient (Iyer et al. 2012). This characteristic of libertarianism is distinct from the conservative most sacred value because of its relationship to morality. For conservatives, economic liberty is moral because it is a tradition that sustains a moral community (e.g. Haidt 2012) or is advantageous for an in-group (Waytz et al. 2019). For libertarians, liberty is a moral goal in and of itself, and thus government regulation is fundamentally inferior because of its interference in individual freedom. In the context of economic liberty, government inferiority takes the form of “inefficiency” for libertarians. Given this belief about government regulation, I expect libertarian reasoning to be used to legitimate their opposition to the measure. Neoliberalism Since the 1980s, neoliberalism has become prevalent in American politics and popular culture. Scholars contend that neoliberal ideology has enjoyed bipartisan support from American policymakers (Wacquant 2009, 2014; Amable 2011), as well as acceptance in popular culture by citizens across the political spectrum (Centeno and Cohen 2012: 328). The use of neoliberal ideology in voters’ policy legitimations constitutes a gap in

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the literature that corresponds with an empirical puzzle. First, researchers have thoroughly documented the use of neoliberal ideology in institutional (e.g., Fantasia and Voss 2004; Lee et al. 2013) and macro-level policy contexts (Mudge 2008; Livne and Yonay 2015). However, scholars are only beginning to investigate how voters use neoliberal ideology to legitimate their position on economic policy (Vila-Henninger 2019a, 2019b). The corresponding empirical puzzle concerns the political nature of neoliberalism—as many also contend that neoliberalism converges with American conservatism rather than being bipartisan (Garland 2001; Harvey 2005; for a review see Gross et al. 2011; Gauchat 2015). For a thorough discussion of neoliberal ideology, see Chapter 3. To summarize, we can understand the moral dimension of neoliberal ideology in terms of two important pieces. The first is the emphasis on the fairness of market competition and the responsibility of the government to reregulate the economy in order to ensure this fair individual economic competition (e.g., Amable 2011). This conception of fairness is distinct because rather than focusing on promoting fairness to protect or preserve a moral community or in-group as in American conservative political ideology (Haidt 2012; Waytz et al. 2019), or applying the rules of proportional fairness to protect vulnerable groups as in American liberal political liberal ideology (Haidt 2012), neoliberal fairness focuses on the importance of individual responsibility to follow market rules for the sake of reinforcing fair market competition (Amable 2011). This later point then segues into the second key moral dimension of neoliberal ideology: individualized responsibility. For example, Loïc Wacquant notes that central to the neoliberal project is the “cultural trope of individual responsibility” (Wacquant 2009: 307). In this frame, individuals are conceptualized as “self-governing autonomous subjects” (Reich 2014: 4). From the perspective of neoliberal ideology, then, individuals are responsible for their own successful participation in the economy—thus making economic participation and its outcomes the individual’s responsibility. From this perspective, the state would be justified in “reregulating” the market in order to foster market competition by funding investment in human capital (Amable 2011). An important caveat in this ideology is that public providers of human capital must be improved through market competition with private providers (Amable 2011; Hayek 1960). Here, Hayek (1960) is a key thinker. The principle is that laws for private individuals apply to the state as well. It is then under this provision that public services can exist. As long as public services are subject to competition on

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the open market, they are seen as beneficial in a neoliberal society. We must see human capital from this perspective. Following the perspective that neoliberalism has been accepted into popular culture across the political spectrum and economic divides (Amable 2011; Centeno and Cohen 2012), I expect respondents across economic position and partisan affiliation to use neoliberal ideology to legitimate the their support for the measure. Moral Economy A final perspective of use here comes from the moral economy literature. E.P. Thompson (1971) coined the term “Moral Economy” in his analysis of eighteenth-century English bread riots. Thompson argued that these British riots stemmed from a “popular consensus” about legitimate market practices (Thompson 1971: 79; see also Sayer 2007). In the contemporary literature, a moral economy is a popular consensus about moral principles used to (de)legitimate economic exchange. Concerning public spending, scholars have examined moral economies that emerge as a popular consensus about the government’s role in economic redistribution (Mau 2003, 2005; Sayer 2007; Svallfors 2006; Sachweh 2012; Koos and Sachweh 2019; Taylor-Gooby et al. 2019). In Steffen Mau’s (2003) classic analysis, citizens’ attitudes about government redistribution stem from their understanding of the welfare state as engaging in a reciprocal relationship with its members. Moral economy scholars conceptualize “popular consensus” as agreement or (de)legitimation across key economic, political, or social divisions (Svallfors 2006; Sachweh 2012; Vila-Henninger 2017, 2019b). As such, (de)legitimations from respondents that span partisan affiliation and/or economic position that draw upon conceptions of fairness concerning government redistribution would constitute a moral economy for this proposition. Thus, from the Moral Economy perspective for Proposition 204 (2012), we would expect Democrats to support the measure and to legitimate their support using an economic redistribution legitimation that expresses concern for protecting vulnerable groups. Conversely, Republicans should oppose the measure and legitimate their opposition by appealing to economic redistribution in conjunction with a concern for protecting a moral community or in-group.

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The prevalence of partisan applications of conceptions of fairness concerning economic redistribution across economic position to legitimate a position on the measure would then constitute a consensus—as it spans a key economic divide (Svallfors 2006; Sachweh 2012; VilaHenninger 2019a, 2019b). As a moral economy is indicated by legitimations that emerge across partisan affiliation and economic position in my data, these cases are thus anomalous to my core theories about partisan affiliation and economic position, which predict that legitimations should not be shared by Democrats and Republicans, or by high and low-income respondents. I will thus analyze moral economies as anomalous separately in Chapter 8. Legitimations: Operationalization as Rationales and Coding Rationales I used ATLAS.ti, a Computer Assisted/Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS), to code transcriptions of my interviews. I coded entire interview segments of Proposition 204 (2012), so each rationale I coded represents a case in which that rationale was used to legitimate a DDEP position rather than an “utterance” of a rationale within a case. Furthermore, I used ATLAS.ti to group cases according to code combination, which I then used to identify distinct legitimations manually. In order to study voter legitimations as a form of reasoning, I analyzed respondent rationalizations of their DDEP position. To refine the operationalization of voter reasoning in the form of rationalization, I use what I call a “rationale.” I define a “rationale” as any DDEP-specific example of a widely held belief, norm, or value. For this analysis there are four types of rationales: “self-interest rationales,” “partisan most sacred values rationales,” “economic ideology rationales,” and “moral economy rationales.” For a detailed discussion of “rationales” and my analytical framework, see Chapter 3. Rationale Types Within “self-interest rationales,” I operationalized theory and data-driven rationales that should be specific to each level of the “economic position” quasi-independent variable. Within “partisan most sacred value rationales,” I operationalized theory and data-driven rationales that should be specific to each level of the “partisan affiliation” quasi-independent

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variable. Within “economic ideology rationales,” I operationalized theory and data-driven rationales according to the literature on neoliberal and libertarian ideology—respectively. As there is work on the libertarian most sacred value (Iyer et al. 2012) but not on neoliberal most sacred values, I used the libertarian most sacred value as my basis for understanding libertarian ideology but did not identify a neoliberal most sacred value. Rather, I identified two key ideological principles from neoliberalism that are relevant for respondent legitimations of their positions on Proposition 204 (2012). Within “moral economy rationales,” I operationalized theory and data-driven rationales according to the literature on moral economy and economic redistribution. Economic Position Rationales I used the “self-interest” voting literature to code any rationale in which a respondent claimed to be voting to benefit himself materially as “self-interested.” Drawing upon findings on economic incentives for taxpayers, I coded for two rationales: Sales Tax Instead of Property Tax and Against Economic Burden. I expected low-income voters to use the Against Economic Burden rationale to justify rejecting the DDEP and high-income voters to use the Sales Tax Instead of Property Tax rationale to justify supporting the DDEP. For a thorough discussion of norms of self-interest, see Chapter 3. I coded for the Against Economic Burden rationale when respondents explicitly reported opposing the DDEP because of the economic burden that would be placed on them from the sales tax. This means that I only used this code when respondents reported being against the sales tax specifically due to the tax’s economic burden. Thus, when respondents used phrases such as “I can’t afford it,” “it adds up,” or the tax would “hurt me” financially/economically, I coded for Against Economic Burden because these express opposition to the tax based on conceptualizations of it as an economic burden. I coded for the Sales Tax Instead of Property Tax rationale when respondents reported voting for the sales tax specifically to avoid paying more in property taxes for education. Here, respondents needed to mention voting for the measure in order to avoid or lower property taxes explicitly. Additionally, three data-driven self-interested rationales emerged: Benefits of Economic Growth, Reduce Taxes and Fees , and Improve Education for Respondent or Respondent’s Child. Due to the tenuous financial

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situation of low-income respondents, I expected these respondents to prioritize preventing additional immediate costs—i.e., a continuation of the sales tax rate increase. Conversely, due to their more flexible economic position, I expect high-income respondents—in addition to being influenced by short-term self-interest—to be additionally influenced by the pursuit of longer-term gains. Following this logic, I expected high-income respondents to use the Benefits of Economic Growth and Improve Education for Respondent or Respondent’s Child rationales, and low-income respondents to use the Reduce Taxes and Fees rationale. While for previous measures I expected that Benefits of Economic Growth would correspond with short-term self-interest, for this measure I expected it would correspond with long-term self-interest—and thus be used by high-income respondents—because for Proposition 204 (2012), benefitting from economic growth would require the respondent endure an immediate material cost by foregoing a reduced tax rate. I coded for Benefits of Economic Growth when respondents reported voting in order to benefit themselves materially via economic growth spurred by the increased sales tax rate. These benefits can be indirect or long-term, such as eventual increased high-income job opportunities or funding for social services that the respondent could receive in the retirement—such as social security. I coded for Reduce Taxes and Fees when respondents explicitly attributed their vote on the measure to their desire to avoid or reduce taxes or other related fees—such as increased insurance premiums. I only coded for this rationale when respondents did not report a desire to avoid these taxes or fees due to economic hardship or necessity—which I coded for with the Against Economic Burden code. Next, Finally, I coded for Improve Education for Respondent or Respondent’s Child when respondents reported that they voted in order to benefit by improving the public education system for their children—or for themselves, if they were college students. Here, respondents needed to explicitly mention the measure benefitting themselves or their children by improving public education. Partisan Affiliation Rationales My deductive coding for political ideology is based on work in moral psychology on “most sacred values” of political ideology and how they emerge in American political ideology (Tetlock et al. 2000; Tetlock 2003;

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Haidt 2012; Graham and Haidt 2012). Following this theory, I expected that Republicans would use at least one conservative rationale to legitimate opposing the DDEP and Democrats would use at least one liberal rationale to legitimate supporting the DDEP. For a thorough discussion of American political ideology—as well as liberal and conservative most sacred values—see Chapter 3. The liberal most sacred value is the protection of the vulnerable or oppressed, which should manifest itself in a concern for protecting those who are threatened by a weakened public education system. Three datadriven rationales emerged for Liberals. I coded for Protect Students when respondents reported voting to “benefit” or “protect” “children,” “kids,” or “students.” I coded for Protect the Impoverished/High Economic Vulnerability when respondents reported voting to “protect” or “benefit” “lowincome” or “poor” “families” or “children,” or those who were especially economically vulnerable—such as students who had large amounts of “student debt” or who were affected by the “affordability” of higher education. I coded for Protect Oppressed Racial/Minority Groups when respondents reported voting in order to protect or benefit historically oppressed or marginalized minority racial and/or ethnic groups—such as African Americans, Hispanics, and/or Native Americans. Here, respondents needed to have explicitly mentioned a historically marginalized racial or ethnic group. The primary conservative most sacred value is to preserve the “traditions and institutions” that maintain a “moral community” or protect an in-group. In the case of taxation, this should manifest itself in a reported motive to protect the tradition of liberty for individual taxpayers—which would then help sustain a moral community. I coded for the deductive Taxpayer Liberty when respondents explicitly reported voting to protect the “liberty” or “freedom” taxpayers from government interference. It is important to note that libertarian and conservative beliefs regarding liberty are distinct, as libertarian ideology sees liberty as the primary moral end and conservative ideology sees liberty as a means for maintaining a moral community or protecting an in-group. Additionally, I coded for one data-driven rationale that is exclusively conservative. Many respondents reported seeing the government as an institution that was not trustworthy and therefore immoral. Thus, I coded for Distrust of Government Tax Rate when respondents reported voting

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to stop the government from changing the sales tax rate due to a distrust of the government’s inability to “refrain” from continuing to raise the tax rate. As this rationale concerns a perception of the government’s inability to “control” itself, it is making an assessment about the moral character of government. This rationale was conservative because the moral tradition of self-disciplined action helps determine the moral character of a community for conservatives. For a thorough discussion of liberal and conservative ideology and most sacred values, see Chapter 3. Anomalous Rationales: Libertarianism I coded for an exclusively libertarian belief about government regulation as fundamentally inefficient. I coded for this libertarian rationale, Government Inefficiency, when respondents reported that their DDEP position was motivated by a belief that government was “inefficiently” “operating” or “spending money.” I also applied this code when respondents characterized the “market” or “consumers” as using money more in a way that was “more efficient,” “effective,” or “beneficial” than government spending. While other political perspectives have mobilized arguments about government efficiency, government inefficiency as it relates to the violation of individual liberty is a distinct manifestation of the libertarian most sacred value. Notice that the libertarian belief in government inefficiency does not involve supporting a moral community, but instead implies a perception of government performance as inferior relative to unregulated market institutions that require individual liberty. For a thorough discussion of the libertarian ideology and its most sacred value, see Chapter 3. Anomalous Rationales: Neoliberalism I operationalized the application of neoliberal beliefs to this measure with two different rationales. I coded for Enhance Market Competition through Investment when respondents reported supporting the measure in order to benefit or improve education so as to preserve or enhance market competition for individuals, businesses, the state of Arizona, and/or the United States. The keyword that I coded for here was “invest” and synonyms of “invest” or “investment.” Respondents had to discuss public education as an investment that would preserve or enhance market competition.

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A subsequent neoliberal belief is that public schools should be subject to market competition. I coded for this, or Public School Market Competition, when respondents reported voting to support a system in which public schools would compete with private providers. Here, respondents needed to have mentioned that they supported private alternatives, such as “charter schools” or “vouchers,” or must have explicitly discussed how public schools need to “compete” in the marketplace. These two codes are both neoliberal, as a primary goal of neoliberalism is to reregulate the market in order to enhance competition and maximize economic growth (for a summary see Amable 2011). Both of these codes also involve the “Human Capital” element of neoliberalism (Amable 2011; Hayek 1960). For a thorough discussion of neoliberal ideology, see Chapter 3. Anomalous Rationales: Moral Economy I coded respondents’ legitimations concerning the fairness of government redistribution as “moral economy.” Two inductive moral economy codes emerged that corresponded with the American political ideological narratives I was investigating: liberal and conservative. First, there was the rationale I classified as “Conservative Moral Economy.” The specific rationale is Distrust of Government Allocation of Money. This rationale applies the conservative most sacred value to government redistribution. I applied this code when respondents reported opposing the measure due to their “lack of trust” or “distrust” that the government would spend the money as specified in the ballot measure. Here, respondents often characterized government spending or handling of money as “dishonest” or lacking “transparency.” Respondents’ portrayal of the government as unable to manage money responsibly by allocating it as promised implies that the government is immoral due to insufficient self-discipline. The point of emphasis here is on the moral character of the government stemming back to its lack of self-discipline. This moral emphasis makes this rationale an instance of the conservative most sacred value rather than the libertarian concern for the inefficiency of government action in the face of individual liberty. This coding differs from the Moral Economy coding for Proposition 201 (2008) and Proposition 202 (2008).

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I coded for “Liberal Moral Economy” when respondents used a liberal rationale in combination with a legitimation of government redistribution. The inductive rationale that emerged was Redistribution of Income/Using Taxpayer Money to Help Students or Impoverished as Fair. I coded for this rationale when respondents legitimated the measure as fair because it would allow the government to spend taxpayer money so as to benefit two distinct oppressed or vulnerable groups: students and/or the impoverished. Thus, respondents must have discussed the fairness of the measure as well as using taxpayer money to help students and/or the impoverished. I coded for “fairness” when respondents used words that explicitly made a legitimation by appealing to the fairness of the increased sales tax rate—such as “fair,” “unfair,” “right,” “wrong,” “cheated,” “accountable,” “honest,” “dishonest,” “transparent,” or “level playing field.” This coding differs from the Moral Economy coding for Proposition 201 (2008) and Proposition 202 (2008). For a thorough discussion of the conceptual framework behind “moral economy,” see Chapter 3.

Analysis Rationales and Rationale Groupings I used the ATLAS.ti “Quotation Manager” function to group cases according to combinations of rationale codes, which I then used to identify distinct legitimations manually. Recall that I am using rationales to operationalize respondents’ DDEP-specific uses of widely held beliefs, norms, and values to justify their DDEP position. Furthermore, I grouped rationales according to the widely held belief, norm, or value to which each rationale corresponded. I refer to these groupings as “rationale groupings.” By “legitimation” I am referring to a respondent’s justification or rationalization of his position on a DDEP. I classify legitimations according to the rationale grouping(s) that correspond to the rationale, or combination of rationales, used in a respondent’s justification. I operationalized legitimations using rationale groupings rather than individual rationales because of the aim of the analysis. Thus, while I am analyzing distinct legitimations, these legitimations are only meaningful to my analysis insofar as they correspond with a widely held political or economic belief, norm, or value. It is for this reason, then, that I grouped rationales according to the widely held beliefs, norms, and values from which they are derived.

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Table 7.2 is a list of all of the rationales derived from widely held political and economic beliefs, norms, and values that I observed in my respondents’ rationalizations for Proposition 204 (2012). Thus, these findings help to address the book’s second research question empirically. For each rationale, I also specify the rationale grouping to which it belongs as well as the position on Proposition 204 (2012) that it is expected to be used to justify. Rationales are indicated in the text by the use of italics. Furthermore, I capitalized the names of rationale groupings Table 7.2 Rationales and rationale groups for Proposition 204 (2012) Rationale Self-interest Oppose Economic Burden Reduce Taxes and Fees Benefits of Economic Growth Sales Tax Instead of Property Tax Improve Education for Respondent or Respondent’s Child Political ideology Protect Students Protect Impoverished/High Economic Vulnerability Protect Oppressed Racial/Minority Groups Distrust of Government Tax Rate Taxpayer Liberty Economic ideology Government Inefficiency Enhance Market Competition through Investment in Public Education Public School Market Competition Moral economy Redistribution of Income/Using Taxpayer Money to Help Children or Impoverished as Fair Distrust of Government Allocation of Money

Rationale grouping

Expected position on Proposition 204

Low-Income Self-Interest Low-Income Self-Interest High-Income Self-Interest High-Income Self-Interest High-Income Self-Interest

Oppose Oppose Support Support Support

Liberal Liberal

Support Support

Liberal Conservative Conservative

Support Oppose Oppose

Libertarian Neoliberal

Oppose Support

Neoliberal

Support

Liberal Moral Economy

Support

Conservative Moral Economy

Oppose

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but not the discourses that which they refer. Thus, “Liberal” refers to the rationale grouping while “liberal” refers to the ideology.

Distinctive Partisan Affiliation (Partisanship) and Economic Position (Self-Interest) Legitimations In the following analysis I investigate the legitimations that were distinctive to each comparison group of quasi-independent variables (economic position, partisan affiliation, and DDEP position). I did not recruit respondents based on DDEP position, but for the sake of my analysis it acts as a quasi-independent variable. During each interview, I asked each respondent for either his vote choice or—if he did not vote or did not remember voting—how he “would have voted.” Each respondent’s initial position on the measure then affects the legitimation he offered because, in this case, a legitimation is a justification of a DDEP position. I begin by analyzing distinct legitimations for partisan affiliation and DDEP position alignment. Second, I analyze distinct legitimations for economic position and DDEP position alignments. Third, I analyze distinct legitimations for different alignments and oppositions of economic position, partisan affiliation, and DDEP position. This process allows me to build theory by identifying cases that empirically extend theory. In the last chapter (Chapter 9), I will elaborate upon the analyses provided in this chapter. Furthermore, in Chapter 8, I will discuss fairness legitimations that span economic position and partisan affiliation. Legitimations Distinctive of Partisan Affiliation (Partisanship) and DDEP Position Alignment and Opposition Findings for RQ1 As we can see, one distinct legitimation emerged for the alignment of Democratic Partisan Affiliation and DDEP Support (Expected). Furthermore, two distinct legitimations emerged for Republican Partisan Affiliation and DDEP Opposition (Expected) (Table 7.3). For the alignment of Republican Partisan Affiliation and DDEP Opposition, two distinctive legitimations emerged—both of which align ideologically with Republican Partisan Affiliation. The first legitimation combined Conservative and Conservative Moral Economy rationales groupings (Conservative AND Conservative Moral Economy) and the

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Table 7.3 Legitimations distinctive of partisan affiliation and DDEP position alignment and opposition for Proposition 204 (2012) Number of types of unique partisan affiliation/DDEP position legitimations

Unique legitimation (rationale grouping combinations)

Democrat and DDEP support (expected) Democrat and DDEP opposition (unexpected) Republican and DDEP opposition (expected)

1

1. Liberal AND Neoliberal

0

NA

2

Republican and DDEP support (unexpected)

0

1. Conservative AND Conservative Moral Economy 2. Conservative AND Conservative Moral Economy AND Low-Income Self-Interest NA

second combined Conservative, Conservative Moral Economy, and LowIncome Self-Interest rationale groupings (Conservative AND Conservative Moral Economy AND Low-Income Self-Interest). Findings for RQ2 Freddie, a low-income Republican, provided an of the “Conservative AND Conservative Moral Economy” legitimation. He utilized the Conservative Distrust of Government Tax Rate rationale along with the Conservative Moral Economy Distrust of Government Allocation of Money rationale. Freddie began by expressing his distrust of the government’s control of the tax rate: “One cent is just an excuse. They’re going to keep tacking on one cent.” He continued, explaining, “I was thinking in the long term. It said [the tax rate increase was] temporary and it’s not going to be temporary…this is just the first step.” Here, the respondent portrayed the government as being untrustworthy and deceptive due to its lack of self-control. It seemed that for the Freddie, the government’s control of the tax rate could not be trusted because the proposed incremental increase was “just an excuse” that would lead to continued tax hikes. It is in this light that the respondent portrayed the government as immoral. A “temporary” tax increase was “just the first step”—a mere

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deception, meant to trick people into accepting one in a never-ending series of tax increases. This lack of self-control seemed to be tied into a perception of the government as dangerously powerful and greedy. Freddie explained that he could not trust the government to refrain from raising the tax rate because “a government that’s big enough to give you everything you need is big enough to take away everything.” Thus, the power asymmetry between the government and its citizens created the likelihood of an abuse of power via the government’s greedy continual increases in taxes. This ballot measure was then an expression of the government’s lack of self-control and subsequent proclivity to abuse its power over individuals. As previously mentioned, scholars have examined moral economies that emerge as a popular consensus concerning the government’s role in redistribution via public spending (Mau 2003, 2005; Sayer 2007; Svallfors 2006; Sachweh 2012; Koos and Sachweh 2019; Taylor-Gooby et al. 2019). We see an example of this in the Conservative Moral Economy Distrust of Government Allocation of Money rationale, which pairs the conservative most sacred value of protecting the traditions and institutions that maintain a moral community (Haidt 2012) or in-group (Waytz et al. 2019) with an evaluation of the fairness of government redistribution via taxation. Specifically, Freddie discussed his distrust of government allocation of taxpayer funds, insisting that the government was not being truthful in how it would spend the additional revenue: “Either you tell us exactly what we’re going to put it towards or just don’t [raise the tax rate].” He continued, arguing that the measure was deceptive because it was “so large and encompassing in what it said it would cover that…I didn’t believe that.” For Freddie, voting “No” was important because it symbolized the voters standing up to the government: “Just if enough people voted ‘No,’ it would tell the Arizona government ‘Hey, you know what, we’ve had enough. Either you tell us exactly what we’re going to put [taxpayer money] towards or just don’t [tax us].’” In this delegitimation of the measure, the respondent painted the government as being dishonest in its reallocation of taxpayer dollars. This deceptive spending of taxpayer money, which diverged from the ways in which the government publicly claimed it would spend tax revenue, then constituted unfair governmental redistribution of money.

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Findings for RQ1 For the alignment of Democratic Partisan Affiliation and DDEP Support (Expected), one distinctive legitimation emerged. The legitimation combined the Liberal and Neoliberal rationale groupings (Liberal AND Neoliberal). Findings for RQ2 By examining how respondents combined Liberal and Neoliberal rationales to legitimate the measure, we see how Neoliberal ideology is flexible with regard to partisan affiliation as well as how it enabled respondents across economic divides to legitimate the proposition. Tony, a high-income Democrat who supported the measure, utilized the Liberal “Protect Students ” and “Protect the Impoverished/High Economic Vulnerability” rationales in combination with the Neoliberal rationale of “Enhance Market Competition through Investment.” Tony argued that “it’s important that more money goes towards education for kids…they’re our future”—which is an example of the Neoliberal Enhance Market Competition through Investment rationale. He explained that “in this country, the education level, in competing with other countries” is “falling behind. I think we need to put more emphasis on the education for our kids. Taking better care of the teachers, too.” When asked about who he thought the measure would benefit, Tony responded that it would be the “lower class and middle class.” Tony elaborated that “it would be tough for the country to compete if we don’t have the educated young people to, you know, to build things, create things, things like that. I think it’d be better for society as a whole to have better educated kids.” Thus, the promoting measure was an issue of investing in the public education system to insure the United States maintained a competitive edge in the global market place. At the same time, Tony was concerned that “kids get a good education and that they have opportunities to get funding to continue with their education if they want to.” Legitimations Distinctive of Economic Position (Self-Interest) and DDEP Position Alignment and Opposition Findings for RQ1 For Economic Position and DDEP Position Alignment, no distinct legitimations emerged (see Table 7.4).

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Table 7.4 Legitimations exclusive to economic position and DDEP position alignment and opposition for Proposition 204 (2012) Number of types of unique economic position/policy position legitimations High-income and DDEP support (expected) High-income and DDEP opposition (unexpected) Low-income and DDEP opposition (Expected) Low-income and DDEP support (unexpected)

Unique legitimation (rationale grouping combinations)

0

NA

0

NA

0

NA

0

NA

Legitimations Distinctive of Alignments and Oppositions of Economic Position (Self-Interest), Partisan Affiliation (Partisanship), and DDEP Position Expected DDEP Position for Economic Position and Partisan Affiliation Findings for RQ1 Table 7.5 shows the legitimations that are exclusive to the expected DDEP Position for economic position and partisan affiliation. For the alignment of Democratic partisan affiliation, high-income, and DDEP support, four distinctive legitimations emerged. The first combined Liberal and Low-Income Self-Interest rationale groupings (Liberal AND Low-Income Self-Interest). The second combined Liberal, Liberal Moral Economy, and High-Income Self-Interest rationale groupings (Liberal AND Liberal Moral Economy AND High-Income SelfInterest). A subsequent legitimation combined Liberal, Neoliberal, and Conservative Moral Economy rationale groupings (Liberal AND Neoliberal AND Conservative Moral Economy). Another legitimation combined Liberal, Liberal Moral Economy, Neoliberal, and High-Income SelfInterest rationale groupings (Liberal AND Liberal Moral Economy AND Neoliberal AND High-Income Self-Interest).

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Table 7.5 Expected: legitimations exclusive to the expected DDEP position for partisan affiliation and economic position for Proposition 204 (2012) Number of types of unique economic position/party/policy position legitimations Democrat and high-income and DDEP support

4

Republican and low-income and DDEP opposition

2

Unique legitimation (rationale grouping combinations) 1. Liberal AND Low-Income Self-Interest 2. Liberal AND Liberal Moral Economy AND High-Income Self-Interest 3. Liberal AND Liberal Moral Economy AND Neoliberal AND High-Income Self-Interest 4. Liberal AND Neoliberal AND Conservative Moral Economy 1. Conservative 2. Conservative Moral Economy AND High-Income Self-Interest

Findings for RQ2 Pete, a high-income Democrat who supported the measure, used the Liberal AND Liberal Moral Economy AND High-Income Self-Interest rationale groupings. Pete began with the Improve Education for Respondent or Respondent’s Child rationale—which is part of the high-income self-interest rationale grouping. A key element of expected high-income self-interest is that respondent affluence provides the voter with the luxury to privilege long-term self-interest. Here, the respondent legitimated education funding in terms of improving education for his children: “My kids would still go to public school…I want them to have a better quality education just like the bill says.” Next, Pete used the Impoverished/High Economic Vulnerability rationale—which is part of the liberal rationale grouping: “A well-educated populace is the fundamental building block for a healthy state and country and not everybody can send their kids to a private school. I mean if you

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don’t educate them, then you might as well start building prisons just like Arizona’s doing.” Here we see the respondent interpreted public education funding as the key to protecting Arizona’s children whose parents cannot afford private school. Pete continued, explaining: “I just voted for the kids. It’s the right thing to do.” This expressed a broader concern for protecting children in Arizona that attend public school. Pete then elaborated, drawing upon Impoverished/High Economic Vulnerability and Oppressed Racial/Minority Groups rationales. The respondent explained that he was particularly concerned about “the group closest to the poverty line or below. [They] need the most help.” However, he was worried because these same people “are disproportionately affected by a one-cent sales tax. Both in their daily lives and in their schools. So yeah, I thought about the south side [a predominantly lowincome Hispanic area of Tucson] just taking a big hit.” Pete justified this drawback by explaining that the impact of the sales tax would be attenuated because “we don’t tax food in [this] state.” Thus, the respondent recognized that there were important costs and benefits of the implications of the measure passing for economically vulnerable groups—and for Hispanics in particular. This cost/benefit analysis—which was ultimately used to legitimate supporting the measure—drew upon the most sacred value of protecting vulnerable or oppressed groups. Pete concluded by using the rationale Redistribution of Income/Using Taxpayer Money to Help Children or Impoverished as Fair from the Liberal Moral Economy rationale grouping. Recall that the Liberal Moral Economy rationale grouping consists of a rationale that combines the liberal moral sacred value of protecting vulnerable or oppressed groups with a fairness evaluation of government redistribution via taxation. The respondent demonstrated this rationale in his legitimation of Proposition 204. Pete argued that voting for the measure was “right thing to do” because it increased education funding via sales tax. Pete explained that “I just voted for the kids. It’s the right thing to do. I pay my taxes and I want more for education.” Thus, for Pete, government redistribution of money from citizens to public education was fair—or “the right thing to do.” The fairness of this redistribution stemmed from its benefit for children. Given the respondent’s earlier uses of liberal rationales, it was clear that Pete portrayed education funding as benefiting vulnerable or oppressed groups—and that this use of public funds was fair. In particular, Pete claimed to have “voted for the kids.” Thus, for Pete the redistribution of money from taxpayers to public education to benefit children—and in particular low-income and Hispanic children—was fair.

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Findings for RQ1 For the alignment of Republican partisan affiliation, low-income, and DDEP opposition, two distinctive legitimations emerged. The first only used the Conservative rationale grouping (Conservative) while the second combined the Conservative Moral Economy and High-Income SelfInterest rationale groupings (Conservative Moral Economy AND HighIncome Self-Interest). Findings for RQ2 Tyler, a low-income Republican who opposed the measure, delegitimated the measuring by using a rationale from the conservative rationale grouping: Taxpayer Liberty. Recall that this rationale is an instance of the conservative most sacred value and not the libertarian most sacred value because of its emphasis on protecting a moral community or in-group. Therefore, this use of liberty was an example of conservative ideology and part of the Conservative rationale grouping. Tyler explained that by voting “No” he “felt we had to gain more personal freedom.” The respondent elaborated, stating that he was motivated by the “Bill of Rights,” which maintained “the supremacy of the individual over the group.” This led him to legitimate “anything that will get off this dependence on government and get us back to an individual mandate.” This was a clear example of the Taxpayer Liberty rationale, as Tyler rejected control of the individual by the government, as well as dependence on the government, by opposing the measure— thus supporting “the supremacy of the individual over the group” and by extension “personal freedom.” We can see that this application of liberty is an example of the conservative most sacred value because of its emphasis on promoting a moral community or in-group. Note that the respondent did not say he was motivated by “liberty,” which would have been libertarian, but rather that he was motivated by the “Bill of Rights.” This emphasis on preserving the traditions established by the Bill of Rights is then a conservative concern about protecting liberty as a tradition that helps to sustain the American way of life. Supporting “the supremacy of the individual over the group” and “get[ting] off this dependence on government” is part of a broader conservative ideology in which individuals maintain a moral community by being self-sufficient. It is the individual’s moral duty to pursue his/her own self-interest. From this perspective, it only through the pursuit of self-interest that economic order is maintained and thus society functions

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properly (Haidt 2012; see also Lakoff 2002). Note here that for Tyler, the problem was dependence on the government. Such dependence—often in the form of social programs—undermines self-sufficiency and individual work ethic in the eyes of the respondent. Unexpected DDEP Position for Economic Position and Partisan Affiliation Findings for RQ1 In Table 7.6, we see the legitimations that are exclusive to the unexpected DDEP position for economic position and partisan affiliation. For high-income Democrats who opposed the measure, we saw the emergence of three distinct legitimations. The first used the Libertarian rationale grouping (Libertarian). The second combined Libertarian and Low-Income Self-Interest rationale groupings (Libertarian AND Low-Income Self-Interest). Finally, the third combined Conservative and Low-Income Self-Interest rationale groupings (Conservative AND Low-Income Self-Interest). Table 7.6 Unexpected: legitimations exclusive to the unexpected DDEP position for economic position and partisan affiliation for Proposition 204 (2012) Number of types of unique economic position/party/policy position legitimations Democrat and high-income and DDEP opposition

3

Republican and low-income and DDEP support

1

Unique legitimation (rationale grouping combinations) 1. Libertarian 2. Libertarian AND Low-Income Self-Interest 3. Conservative AND Low-Income Self-Interest 1. Liberal AND Neoliberal AND Low-Income Self-Interest AND High-Income Self-Interest

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Findings for RQ2 Greg, a high-income Democrat who opposed the measure, combined the Low-Income Self-Interest Reduce Taxes and Fees rationale with the Libertarian Government Inefficiency rationale. The respondent began by explaining that he would gain financially because a “No” vote would mean that “I’m off saving money” because he would not have to pay the increased sales tax rate. However, the respondent immediately shifted the focus from short-term self-interest by explaining that “at the same time I don’t mind paying taxes cause there would be [a] benefit [to] a lot of people.” Instead, the problem was that the government would not be able to effectively use its funds. According to Greg, the “government and government agencies should be able to budget and do the job with what they have…so that’s why I thought I initially voted against it.” The respondent then expanded upon this point by emphasizing the fundamental inefficiency of government action. Responding to a question about what motivated him to vote the way he did, Greg said he was tired of politicians having a mindset that more money is going to fix education. We’ve tried that for decades, and I don’t believe that it has worked. Um, I think upgrading and improving our standards in holding administrators [accountable] would be a better solution than just putting more money into the situation because I don’t think it’s used properly.

Here the respondent discussed government waste through the perspective of government inefficiency rather than a distrust of the government in general to allocate funds properly. The key here is that “more money” is not “going to fix education.” The issue then is one of government efficiency. The government should “be able to budget and do the job with what they have.” The problem for the respondent, then, is that administrators are inefficient with the money they have. Instead of giving more money to administrators, Greg asserted that said administrators need to be held accountable and face higher standards. Given the framework of government waste, the rationale is then one of efficiency. Note that administrators were not untrustworthy in the legitimation because of some moral deficiency, but rather were inefficient. The implication is then that government and government administrators are using taxpayer money inefficiently if they could not make due with the funds they were allotted. Thus, the solution is to hold them accountable for spending

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the money they have more efficiently rather than continuing to try to fix problems with increased funding. Findings for RQ1 For low-income Republicans who supported the measure, we saw the emergence of one distinct legitimation. This legitimation combined Liberal, Neoliberal, Low-Income Self-Interest, and High-Income SelfInterest rationale groupings (Liberal AND Neoliberal AND Low-Income Self-Interest AND High-Income Self-Interest). Findings for RQ2 Roland, a low-income Republican who supported the measure, began by using the rationale of Benefits of Economic Growth from the High-Income rationale grouping. He stated that he thought we would gain financially from the measure because it would lead to a “stronger workforce,” and a “stronger workforce would export more of our product outward.” This would then benefit the respondent through economic growth—or in his words, “because more money would be coming in” for the country as a whole. This self-interest rationale was ultimately, however, connected to the Enhance Market Competition through Investment in Public Education rationale from the Neoliberal rationale grouping: “So I think if we put out a good product and we put out a good person that is skilled [to compete with] the rest of the world” the US economy would “do…a lot better.” Here, we see the respondent link neoliberal ideology to longterm self-interest. By investing in human capital through funding public education, the United States would be more competitive—and ultimately generate more revenue from consumers—in the global marketplace. Thus, investing in human capital was legitimated by the respondent linking this neoliberal ideological tenet to economic growth and his own self-interest. Next, Roland utilized the Liberal Protect Impoverished/High Economic Vulnerability rationale. He argued that passing Proposition 204 (2012) would benefit the “underprivileged.” The respondent explained this would help the disadvantaged because the affluent always have—in the respondent’s eyes—the option to pay for better education, while the economically disadvantaged have to use public education: “[No]ne of these schools have a regular budget for each school. You got a guy in Connecticut, if they don’t like the school and they got the money they can go to a private school.” Roland elaborated that the measure would

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then “break that vicious circle. If you’re underprivileged and all you know is welfare and food stamps and underachieving, that’s all you’re gonna know.” The respondent then tied this back to this Neoliberal rationale of market competition and investment in human capital: “If you want a guy in New York to do the same job you do in Arizona here, you’ve got to teach them the same thing.” Note that this was not an example of the Liberal Moral Economy code Redistribution of Income/Using Taxpayer Money to Help Children or Impoverished as Fair because the respondent was not discussing the fairness of Proposition 204 (2012)’s proposed redistribution of income. Rather, the respondent combined neoliberal ideology and liberal American political ideology by emphasizing how investment in human capital would ultimately help to benefit those who were historically disadvantaged through economic competition. Finally, Roland utilized the Low-Income Self-Interest rationale grouping by employing the Reduce Taxes and Fees rationale. The respondent reasoned that with a “better worker, productivity goes up, wages go up, taxes go down.” With this rationale, we see Roland seamlessly tie rationales from the Liberal, Low-Income Self-Interest, and High-Income Self-Interest rationale groupings into neoliberal ideology. The policy goals that legitimated the measure for the respondent were self-interest and liberal ideology. However, it was only through a neoliberal strategy of investing in human capital that Roland saw these goals coming to fruition. For the participant, developing human capital helps to improve the economy and reduce taxes. Developing human capital also helps to balance out historic and geographic inequalities—thus protecting the economically vulnerable. Once again, we see that neoliberal ideology is merged semlessly with liberal American political ideology. For Roland, it was through neoliberal strategies of market development that society can protect the vulnerable. This finding contradicts traditional wisdom about the relationship between neoliberalism and American political ideology (Garland 2001; Harvey 2005; Gross et al. 2011; Gauchat 2015). Conflicting Expectations: Expected DDEP Position for Economic Position, Unexpected DDEP Position for Partisan Affiliation Findings for RQ1 In Table 7.7 we see the legitimations that are exclusive to the expected DDEP position for economic position and unexpected DDEP position for partisan affiliation (conflicting expectations).

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Table 7.7 Conflicting expectations: legitimations exclusive to the expected DDEP position for economic position and unexpected DDEP position for partisan affiliation for Proposition 204 (2012) Number of types of unique economic position/party/policy position legitimations Democrat and low-income and DDEP opposition Republican and high-income and DDEP support

Unique legitimation (rationale grouping combinations)

0

NA

1

1. Neoliberal

In Table 7.7 we see the distinctive legitimations that emerged for the Alignment of Economic Position and DDEP Position, and Opposition of Partisan Affiliation. No distinctive legitimations emerged for low-income Democrats who opposed the measure. Conversely, one distinctive legitimation emerged for high-income Republicans who supported Proposition 204 (2012) from the Neoliberal rationale grouping (Neoliberal). Findings for RQ2 Owen, a high-income Republican who supported the measure, used the Neoliberal Public School Market Competition rationale. For this rationale, the logic is that human capital can be developed through public education, but that public education must be subject to market competition with private providers (Hayek 1960; Amable 2011). Owen began by explaining that “I think that the public schools here need help.” However, the logic here was to develop public education through increased funding but in such a way that public providers competed in an open marketplace. The respondent developed this logic by attacking unions: “The teachers’ union has ruined schools here. They’re teaching everything but reading, writing, and arithmetic. And then you can’t get rid of the bad ones. It’s terrible.” The solution for the respondent, then, was market competition: “It’s terrible and that’s why we need to have vouchers and kids need to go to what school works for them.” According to Owen, allowing public education to exist without market competition ended up “protecting a class of people [public school teachers] that have gotten just remarkably bad. I mean, I know there’s some good teachers out there but there’s a whole lot of them that just

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should not be teaching. They’re terrible.” The idea, then, was reform via market competition. I want to see the public school get better, don’t get rid of it. I want to see them fix it, and we’re kind of going the other way where we have to get rid of it. I think you need to have the big high school where people can have sports and all that, and you know, to go away from that, in my opinion, is bad for kids…I could also see where these parents don’t want their kids just going to there to learn about LGBYT [sic] instead of learning science and math. You know, they spend a lot of time on political correctness and all this stuff…we need to bring back mining and manufacturing and you know, we spend a lot of time on higher education and we need both higher education and we need middle education. We need to have jobs for people that aren’t the smartest people in the world, and we do nothing for those people. We don’t have jobs for them. We don’t have school for them. We don’t teach welding or woodworking in high school like they did when I was a kid, so we now have a shortage of plumbers, electricians and drywallers, because we don’t teach that kind of thing. And, everybody thinks they’re going to be a computer programmer. Well, not everybody can, so I think high school and middle school education needs to go back to the basics…so I just think it’s important to maintain the public school rather than give up on it.

Owen’s logic in this lengthy excerpt is classically neoliberal. The idea is that society needs to invest in public education in order to develop. However, public schools need to be subject to market competition. Thus, the solution is not deregulation but reregulation. It is crucial to remember that reregulation to foster market competition, rather than deregulation, is the hallmark of neoliberal ideology. In this instance, by creating an education marketplace, public schools would be forced to hold “bad” teachers accountable and would also be forced to weaken or abandon unions. According to the respondent, an array of education market competitors would then be better for the economy and the development of human capital by eventually diversifying options for education programs and ultimately increasing the supply of blue-collar labor. This increased blue-collar labor supply would then help to meet market demand and decrease the surplus of highly educated labor. Thus, by applying neoliberal ideology, the respondent argued that only through a reregulated marketplace that has room for public education will optimal market outcomes be achieved.

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Conflicting Expectations: Expected DDEP Position for Partisan Affiliation, Unexpected DDEP Position for Economic Position Findings for RQ1 In Table 7.8 we see the legitimations that are exclusive to the expected DDEP position for partisan affiliation and unexpected DDEP position for economic position (conflicting expectations). There was one legitimation that was distinctive of low-income Democrats who supported the measure. This legitimation used the Liberal and Conservative Moral Economy rationales in concert (Liberal AND Conservative Moral Economy). For the high-income Republicans who opposed the measure, four distinctive legitimations emerged. The first legitimation combined Conservative Moral Economy and Libertarian rationale groupings (Conservative Moral Economy AND Libertarian). The second used Conservative, Libertarian, and Low-Income Self-Interest rationale groupings (Conservative AND Libertarian AND Low-Income Self-Interest). Table 7.8 Conflicting expectations: legitimations exclusive to the expected DDEP position for partisan affiliation and unexpected DDEP position for economic position for Proposition 204 (2012) Number of types of unique economic position/party/policy position legitimations Democrat and Low-Income and DDEP Support Republican and High-Income and DDEP Opposition

1

4

Unique legitimation (rationale grouping combinations) 1. Liberal AND Conservative Moral Economy 1. Conservative Moral Economy AND Libertarian 2. Conservative AND Libertarian AND Low-Income Self-Interest 3. Conservative AND High-Income Self-Interest 4. Conservative Moral Economy AND Low-Income Self-Interest

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The third combined Conservative and High-Income Self-Interest rationale groupings (Conservative AND High-Income Self-Interest). The fourth combined Conservative Moral Economy and the Low-Income Self-Interest rationale grouping (Conservative Moral Economy AND Low-Income Self-Interest). Findings for RQ2 Edward, a high-income Republican who opposed the measure, combined the rationale of Distrust of Government Allocation of Money from the Conservative Moral Economy rationale grouping with the rationale of Government Inefficiency from the Libertarian rationale grouping. The respondent began by insisting that maintaining the tax rate increase was not necessary if the government operated efficiently: “I feel like there’s so much wasted money out there and I didn’t feel like it was necessary for them to take more of our money.” He then summarized his opposition to the measure as motivated by his belief that “I didn’t think they needed any more of my money to do their job. I think they should do their job…I know teachers, I think they’re paid well.” Here, the problem for the respondent was that government workers were not operating efficiently and were not cost-effective. The respondent continued, insisting that “I don’t think that people need to pay more money for the teachers to do their jobs.” Notice that for the respondent, the problem was the inefficiency of public sector workers. While this issue was derived from the most sacred value of liberty, I did not code for the Conservative Taxpayer Liberty because the respondent did not discuss liberty or freedom that would protect or preserve a moral community or in-group. Instead, the respondent delegitimated the measure by appealing to the wastefulness of the public sector—thus, making this an example of the Libertarian Government Inefficiency rationale. Edward then used the Distrust of Government Allocation of Money rationale from the Conservative Moral Economy rationale grouping to delegitimate the government’s allocation of funds: “I don’t trust that the money goes to the children…I see a lot of things at schools. I see schools that have way too many administrators and not enough teachers, and it gets old.” The portrayal here was that school administrators could not be trusted to spend the money they were provided with appropriately because they lacked the discipline to manage public education funding responsibly.

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Notice again the delegitimation of the measure in terms of government irresponsibility. Administrators could not be trusted to responsibly allocate funding and, instead, were deceiving the public about how they were actually spending public funds. This is then a clear demonstration of the Conservative Moral Economy Distrust of Government Allocation of Money code, as the respondent portrayed the government as unable to manage money responsibly due to its insufficient self-discipline. To conservatives, the tradition of self-discipline is central for maintaining a moral community (e.g., Lakoff 2002; Haidt 2012). Through exercising self-discipline, members of society help maintain moral order in their community. Conversely, for the respondent, public administrators were deceiving hardworking taxpayers and lying to them about the real use of tax revenue. Public administrators were then portrayed in opposition to the ideal of self-discipline, and instead, for Edward, were untrustworthy as they could not refrain from misappropriating public funds. For the respondent,Distrust of Government Allocation of Money and Government Inefficiency then justified opposition to Proposition 204 (2012).

Notes 1. https://dictionary.apa.org/quasi-independent-variable. 2. The picture becomes more complicated when we consider the influence of long-term self-interest according to the enrollment of respondents’ children in public schools, but such an analysis extends beyond the scope of this book.

Bibliography Achen, Christopher H., and Larry M. Bartels. 2016. Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Amable, B. 2011. “Morals and Politics in the Ideology of Neo-liberalism.” SocioEconomic Review 9 (1): 3–30. ———. 2014. “Four Books on (Neo-)Liberalism.” Socio-Economic Review 12 (4): 813. Anonymous. 2008. “Arizona Proposition 202 Flunks Truth in Advertising Test.” U.S. Newswire, October 30. Retrieved August 17, 2017. http://ezproxy.lib rary.arizona.edu/. Bartels, Larry. 2005. “Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the American Mind.” Perspectives on Politics 3 (1): 15–31.

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CHAPTER 8

Moral Economies

Introduction This book was motivated by two empirical puzzles. First, the voter reasoning literature sees partisan voters’ rationalizations of their policy positions as based on discourses that are carefully constructed and supplied by their affiliated political party (for a summary see Achen and Bartels 2016: 12, 268, 310–11). However, this perspective cannot explain how actors utilize ideological rationalizations across partisan affiliation (Vila-Henninger 2019b). Second, the narrative around American politics in popular culture is that citizens have rejected economic voting and are instead engaged in a culture war (e.g., Frank 2004; Kirk 2020). In social scientific terms, the picture is much more complex but is in some ways analogous: rather than responding out of self-interest to economic policy incentives (Downs 1957), Americans’ voting decisions are largely driven by group allegiances—such as partisanship (for summaries see Young 2013; Achen and Bartels 2016; Bailey 2019). However, historically, the American voter has tended to vote for the political party that passed economic policy that benefited those in his/her economic position—thus making it appear as if voters were acting out of self-interest in response to economic policy incentives (Stonecash 2000; Brewer and Stonecash 2001; Bartels 2006; McCarty et al. 2006; Volscho and Kelly 2012; Franko et al. 2013; Widestrom et al. 2018).

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In other words, for decades, self-interest and partisanship have appeared to align to predict—on average—Americans’ vote choices for presidential candidates (for summaries see Bartels 2006; Gelman 2008). Thus, the empirical findings suggest that an interaction between selfinterest and partisanship affects voter reasoning. This is supported by work in direct democracy, which demonstrates that policy positions and partisanship can align (Colombo and Kriesi 2017) and that conservative political identification often aligns with pragmatic justifications (Colombo 2019). However, these findings fly in the face of theory from neuroscience in which scholars posit that self-interest and partisanship compete during voter reasoning (Jenke and Huettel 2016). As previously discussed, my book applies Burawoy’s (1998, 2009) principle of reconstruction to build theory in a manner that is analogous to abduction (e.g., Timmermans and Tavory 2012; Tavory and Timmermans 2014). Thus, this chapter proceeds by using unexpected findings to build theory. A major unexpected finding of my analysis relative to the aforementioned empirical puzzles was the emergence of a “moral economy”—defined as a popular consensus of (de)legitimation of economic exchange based on noneconomic moral principles (Thompson 1971). Partisan respondents, in addition to justifying their DDEP positions by appealing to norms of self-interest and/or political values, often justified their position in terms of beliefs about fairness. When respondents across partisan affiliation and economic position legitimated their position using the same concept of fairness, this provided evidence of a moral economy. For example, respondents across economic position and partisan affiliation justified their support for Proposition 201 (2008) by delegitimating those in the real estate market who took advantage of economically vulnerable homebuyers as unfair. Here, the moral principle of fairness was applied specifically through the American politically liberal ideological value of protecting the vulnerable (e.g., Haidt 2012). This demonstrated that in the context of economic policy, voters crossed ideological lines in their legitimation of their policy stance. This is surprising in the face of literature that demonstrates that partisan American citizens use heterogenous political reasoning (e.g., Brooks and Manza 2013).1 In order to address both aforementioned empirical puzzles, I created two quasi-independent variables: economic position and partisan affiliation. In the first three empirical chapters of this book I investigated how economic position and partisan affiliation interacted to shape respondents’

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DDEP position legitimations. In this chapter, conversely, I analyze legitimations of fairness that span economic position and partisan affiliation. These fairness legitimations then provide evidence of moral economies. Thus, the research question for this section is: What are the discourses that voters across economic position and partisan affiliation draw upon to rationalize their direct democratic economic policy (DDEP) position?

Literature Review: Moral Economy In contemporary literature, a moral economy is a norm, evidenced by a popular consensus about the moral principle(s) used to (de)legitimate economic exchange. This norm, and moral principle(s) upon which it is based, then serve as nonrationals source of popular economic legitimacy, attitudes, and behavior (Mau 2003, 2005; Sayer 2007; Svallfors 2006; Sachweh 2012; Koos and Sachweh 2019; Taylor-Gooby et al. 2019). Empirical work has found that fairness is a key moral principle for a variety of moral economies (e.g., Sachweh 2012; Vila-Henninger 2017, 2019a, 2019b). Here, we can define “fairness” as “proportionality,” or people getting “what they deserve” (Haidt 2012: 212–3). However, political ideology shapes how and when proportionality is applied. For example, liberals use proportionality in the defense of vulnerable groups while conservatives tend to use proportionality regardless of group vulnerability (Haidt 2012). Moral economy scholars conceptualize “popular consensus” as (de)legitimations or attitudes that span key economic, political, or social divisions (Svallfors 2006; Sachweh 2012; Vila-Henninger 2017, 2019b). Thus, I operationalize a “moral economy” as (de)legitimations among my respondents that span both economic position and partisan affiliation. As with the rest of the book, I use fairness as the moral principle that respondents use in their moral economy (de)legitimations.

Qualitative Approach Rationales I used ATLAS.ti, a Computer Assisted/Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS), to code transcriptions of my interviews. I coded entire interview segments of each ballot measure from the previous three empirical chapters, so each rationale I coded represents a case in which

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that rationale was used to (de)legitimate a DDEP position rather than an “utterance” of a rationale within a case. Furthermore, I used ATLAS.ti to group cases according to code combination, which I then used to identify distinct legitimations manually. In order to study voter legitimations as a form of reasoning, I analyzed respondent rationalizations of their DDEP position. To refine the operationalization of voter reasoning in the form of rationalization, I use what I call a “rationale.” I define a “rationale” as any DDEP-specific example of a widely held belief, norm, or value. For this analysis there are four types of rationales: “self-interest rationales,” “partisan most sacred values rationales,” “economic ideology rationales,” and “moral economy rationales.” For a detailed discussion of “rationales” and my analytical framework, see Chapter 3. Legitimations and Rationale Groupings I used the ATLAS.ti “Quotation Manager” function to group cases according to combinations of rationale codes, which I then used to identify distinct legitimations manually. Recall that I am using rationales to operationalize respondents’ DDEP-specific uses of widely held beliefs, norms, and values to justify their DDEP position. Furthermore, I grouped rationales according to the widely held belief, norm, or value to which each rationale corresponded. I refer to these groupings as “rationale groupings.” By “legitimation” I am referring to a respondent’s justification or rationalization of his position on a DDEP. I classify legitimations according to the rationale grouping(s) that correspond to the rationale, or combination of rationales, used in a respondent’s justification. I operationalized legitimations using rationale groupings rather than individual rationales because of the aim of the analysis. Thus, while I am analyzing distinct legitimations, these legitimations are only meaningful to my analysis insofar as they correspond with a widely held political or economic belief, norm, or value. It is for this reason, then, that I grouped rationales according to the widely held beliefs, norms, and values from which they are derived. For each rationale, I will specify the rationale grouping to which it belongs. Rationales are indicated in the text by the use of italics. Furthermore, I capitalized the names of rationale groupings but not the discourses that which they refer. Thus, “Liberal” refers to the rationale grouping while “liberal” refers to the ideology.

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Furthermore, for each of the three ballot measures I analyze in this book, I created codes for “fairness.” Thus, my analysis of moral economies will be of “fairness” codes, often paired with other codes, that span economic position and partisan affiliation. There are discourses that span partisan affiliation and economic position that are not moral economies—these are the subjects of future investigation that is beyond the scope of this book.

Proposition 201 (2008) Here I will analyze any emergent moral economies for Proposition 201 (2008) for the codes that I used in my empirical analysis for this proposition in this book (see Chapter 5). I will start by providing the summary of the proposition that was provided online to voters and which I provided to respondents. I will then discuss the rationale codes used in the analysis. Finally, I will provide empirical analysis of any moral economies for Proposition 201 (2008) that emerged among supporters and then opponents. Summary of Arizona’s Proposition 201 (2008): “Homeowners’ Bill of Rights” The following is the unofficial summary of the measure provided to the State of Arizona, as required by law, by the official proponents of Arizona’s Proposition 201 (2008): “Homeowners’ Bill of Rights.” This summary was made available to voters online via the Arizona Secretary of State. I provided this text to participants as a prompt before I interviewed them about their position on the measure (for further discussion see Chapter 4): HOMEOWNERS’ BILL OF RIGHTS. Ten-year warranty on new homes. Right to demand correction of construction defects or compensation. Homeowners participate in selecting contractors to do repair work. They can sue if no agreement with the builder. No liability for builders’ attorney and expert fees but homeowner can recover these costs. Homeowners can sometimes recover compensatory and consequential damages. Disclosure of builders’ relationships with financial institutions. Model homes must reflect what is actually for sale. Right to cancel within 100 days and get back most of the deposit. Prohibiting sellers’ agents from participating in false mortgage applications.

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On November 4, 2008 this ballot measure failed with 78% of the voters choosing to reject it. Conversely, a vast majority of my respondents (53/66, 80%) who took a position on the measure during the interview supported the proposition. The goal of this analysis is to build theory about the discourse that respondents use to legitimate their stances on different DDEPs. Thus, any bias in respondent memory or interpretation of the measure is not relevant for my qualitative, theory building analysis of voter legitimations. Proposition 201 (2008) Rationales For a full discussion and list of definitions of codes for Proposition 201 (2008) see: Chapter 5. Table 8.1 is a list of all of the rationales derived from widely held political and economic beliefs, norms, and values that I observed in my respondents’ rationalizations of their position on Proposition 201 (2008). For each rationale, I also specify the rationale grouping to which it belongs as well as the position on Proposition 201 (2008) that it is expected to be used to justify.

Empirical Analysis for Proposition 201 (2008) For this analysis, I focus on fairness (de)legitimations. Findings for RQ1: I begin the discussion by investigating moral economies that emerged among my respondents for this measure. In Table 8.2 we see legitimations that were distinctive of DDEP position on Proposition 201 (2008) and thus spanned both partisan affiliation and economic position. Moral Economy of Support In Table 8.2 we see the distinctive legitimations that emerged for the DDEP Position across partisan affiliation and economic position. Two distinctive legitimations emerged for DDEP support. The first used the Liberal Moral Economy rationale grouping (Liberal Moral Economy) and the second was a combination of Liberal Moral Economy and HighIncome Self-Interest rationale groupings (High-Income Self-Interest AND Liberal Moral Economy)

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Table 8.1 Rationales and rationale groups for Proposition 201 (2008) Rationale Self-interest Lower/Preserve Housing Prices Increase Home Price Protect Investment Help Respondent’s Business Political ideology First Time Homebuyers Consumers in General Protect Oppressed Racial/Minority Groups Poor/ Working Class Middle Class Elderly Homeowners/Buyers Homeowners /Buyers’ Liberty Home Sellers’ Liberty Economic ideology Government Inefficiency Individualized Responsibility/ Risk Fair Market Competition (Also Moral Economy) Moral economy Market Fairness Liberal Market Fairness Conservative Market Fairness

Rationale grouping

Expected position on Proposition 201

Low-Income Self-Interest High-Income Self-Interest High-Income Self-Interest High-Income Self-Interest

Oppose

Liberal Liberal Liberal

Support Support Support

Liberal Liberal Liberal Liberal Conservative Conservative

Support Support Support Support Oppose Oppose

Libertarian Neoliberal Neoliberal

Oppose Oppose Oppose

Moral economy Liberal moral economy Conservative moral economy

Neutral Support Oppose

Support Support Support

Findings for RQ2: The first legitimation is a “Liberal Moral Economy,” as the Liberal Market Fairness rationale was utilized across social divisions (“partisan affiliation”) and economic divisions (“economic position”). In fact, multiple respondents from each subset of partisan affiliation and economic position used this distinctive Liberal Moral Economy rationale grouping legitimation alone. Because of the way I coded for this proposition, respondents who were coded for Liberal Market Fairness were also

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Table 8.2 Legitimations distinctive of DDEP position for Proposition 201 (2008) Number of types of unique policy position legitimations

Unique legitimation (rationale grouping combinations)

DDEP support

2

DDEP opposition

1

1. Liberal Moral Economy 2. High-Income Self-Interest AND Liberal Moral Economy 1. Conservative AND Neoliberal

coded for Market Fairness and at least one rationale from the Liberal rationale grouping. Recall that I coded for Liberal Market Fairness when respondents legitimated the measure fair because it would allow the protect an oppressed or vulnerable group. Shannon, a high-income Democrat who supported the measure, employed the First Time Homebuyers , Homeowners/Buyers, and Middle-Class rationales from the Liberal rationale grouping. Shannon began by invoking a desire to protect homebuyers from material loss caused by homebuilders: This was protection from shoddy building, you know. There were communities being put up overnight. 200 unit communities, developments being put up overnight with shoddy building. And so this protects people when they buy a home, they’re investing their life saving in something, so I wanted them to be protected…[this was] pushing for was the rights of people buying a home in one of these new developments.

Here, Shannon used the Liberal First Time Homebuyers and Homeowners/Buyers rationales. For Shannon, homebuyers were clearly seen as a vulnerable group that needed protection provided by government regulation. The respondent then used the Middle Class rationale in his explanation that he was particularly concerned for “middle class families buying their first home. People starting out. You know, when you’re buying your first home, you’re starting out in your career, you may be starting your family… People who have a lot to lose if that big investment goes sour.” For the respondent, middle-class families buying their

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first home were particularly at risk because of their fragile financial situation of “starting out in your career, you may be starting your family.” Shannon thus legitimated his support for the measure by framing Proposition 201 (2008) as protecting middle-class first time homebuyers as an economically vulnerable group. The respondent then seamlessly transitioned to a fairness legitimation. Shannon explained that his vote was motivated by a desire to see “fairness and transparency” in the housing market in order to protect the vulnerable groups for which he was voting. He elaborated: “That’s the reason we have regulations, you have to do it in a fair way. You can’t be selling people a $200,000 thing that’s a lemon. That’s $200,000, they’ve taken out a mortgage, they’re signing away their future financial life. And if you’re selling them a lemon, that’s not good.” Thus, supporting the measure was a way of supporting fairness in the homebuying process for economically vulnerable homebuyers—and first time and middle class buyers in particular. Anyone who violated this standard of fairness, by perhaps selling a “lemon,” was then behaving unfairly. This sense of protecting vulnerable groups by maintaining and promoting market fairness extended across economic position and partisan affiliation. Dustin, a low-income Republican who supported the measure, also provided evidence of this Liberal Moral Economy. The respondent used the Liberal Homeowners/Buyers and Middle-Class rationales as he explained that he voted to protect “homebuyers,” most of whom were “middle class.” He saw homebuyers, and in particular middleclass homebuyers, as particularly vulnerable due to “the high cost of housing.” Dustin discussed his support for the proposition as motivated by “just sort of an indignation about the high cost of housing.” He continued: “All I can say is, that you know, again, if you’re borrowing twice what it’s worth, you deserve a little more protection.” Dustin portrayed housing prices as unfairly elevated, which forced homebuyers into the vulnerable economic position of taking out extremely large mortgages. This unjust economic vulnerability, then, merited “more protection” and provoked the respondent’s moral ire. Next, Dustin employed the Liberal Moral Economy rationale of Liberal Market Fairness . The respondent claimed that “[Homebuyers are] signing their lives away, often for a house that isn’t anywhere near their first choice.” He concluded that he was then motivated “mostly just by a general sense of fairness…I see this particular sort of thing as being sort of an outrage against the middle class. The idea of houses costing

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too much…the homebuilders benefit, the unions benefit, and it’s the buyers, that overall in so many ways get screwed…it’s just a general sense of unfairness.” Dustin then clearly invoked protecting homebuyers—and the middle class in particular—as part of a discourse that legitimated the economically vulnerable and delegitimated unfair housing costs. These unfair housing prices then, in the respondent’s very words, constituted an “outrage against the middle class.” Moral Economy of Opposition Findings for RQ1 and RQ2: In Table 8.2 we see the distinctive legitimation that emerged for the DDEP Position across partisan affiliation and economic position. The one distinctive legitimation that emerged for DDEP opposition was a combination of conservative and neoliberal rationale groupings (Conservative AND Neoliberal). This legitimation is an example of a discourse that spans partisan affiliation and economic position that is not a moral economy as I have operationalized it here. These discourses will be the subject of future investigation that are beyond the scope of this book. In this case, however, I will not analyze this crosscutting delegitimation as it did not meet the operational definition of moral economy for this book because it did not employ a “fairness” rationale.

Proposition 202 (2008) Here I will analyze any emergent moral economies for Proposition 202 (2008) for the codes that I used in my empirical analysis for this proposition in this book (see Chapter 6). I will start by providing the summary of the proposition that was provided online to voters and which I provided to respondents. I will then discuss the rationale codes used in the analysis. Finally, I will provide empirical analysis of any moral economies for Proposition 202 (2008) that emerged among supporters and then opponents. Summary of Arizona’s Proposition 202 (2008): “Arizona Stop Illegal Hiring” The following is the unofficial summary of the measure provided to the State of Arizona, as required by law, by the official proponents of Arizona’s Proposition 202 (2008): “Arizona Stop Illegal Hiring.” This

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summary was made available to voters online via the Arizona Secretary of State. I provided this text to participants as a prompt before I interviewed them about their position on the measure (for further discussion see Chapter 4): “Stop Illegal Hiring” Act is an initiative designed to crack down on unethical businesses who hire illegal immigrants. This initiative targets employers who hire workers and pay under-the-table in cash, which fuels illegal immigration in Arizona. It revokes the business license of employers who knowingly or intentionally hire illegal immigrants. This initiative increases penalties for identity theft, as illegal immigrants often use stolen identities to conceal their undocumented status. Fines collected as a result of this initiative will be distributed to schools and hospitals to help deal with the financial burden placed on Arizona because of illegal immigration.

On November 4, 2008 this ballot measure failed with 59% of the voters choosing to reject it. Conversely, a strong majority of my respondents (54/80, 68%) who took a position on the measure during the interview supported the proposition. The goal of this analysis is to build theory about the discourse that respondents use to legitimate their stances on different DDEPs. Thus, any bias in respondent memory or interpretation of the measure is not relevant for my qualitative, theory building analysis of voter legitimations. Proposition 202 (2008) Rationales For a full discussion and list of definitions of codes for Proposition 202 (2008), see: Chapter 6. Table 8.3 is a list of all of the rationales derived from widely held political and economic beliefs, norms, and values that I observed in my respondents’ rationalizations for Proposition 202 (2008). For each rationale, I also specify the rationale grouping to which it belongs as well as the position on Proposition 202 (2008) that it is expected to be used to justify.

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Table 8.3 Rationales and rationale groups for Proposition 202 (2008) Rationale Self-interest Jobs Reduce Taxes and Fees Benefit Economy Protect Social Services Anti-Regulation Cheap Labor Political ideology Racial Equality Civil Rights Economic/ Social Vulnerability Law and Order Social Programs American Jobs American Culture Safety Economic ideology Government Inefficiency Individualized Responsibility (Also Moral Economy) Fair Market Competition (Also Moral Economy) Moral economy Liberal Market Fairness Conservative Market Fairness

Rationale grouping

Expected position on Proposition 202

Low-Income Self-Interest Low-Income Self-Interest Low-Income Self-Interest Low-Income Self-Interest High-Income Self-Interest High-Income Self-Interest

Support Support Support Support Oppose Oppose

Liberal Liberal Liberal Conservative Conservative Conservative Conservative Conservative

Oppose Oppose Oppose Support Support Support Support Support

Libertarian Neoliberal

Oppose Support

Neoliberal

Support

Liberal Moral Economy Conservative Moral Economy

Support Oppose

Empirical Analysis for Proposition 202 (2008) For this analysis, I focus on fairness (de)legitimations. Findings for RQ1: I begin the discussion by investigating moral economies that emerged among my respondents for this measure. In Table 8.4 we see legitimations that were distinctive of DDEP position on Proposition 202 (2008) and thus spanned both partisan affiliation and economic position.

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Table 8.4 Legitimations distinctive of DDEP position for Proposition 202 (2008) Number of types of unique policy position legitimations

Unique legitimation (rationale grouping combinations)

DDEP support

3

DDEP opposition

2

1. Conservative AND Neoliberal 2. Conservative AND Neoliberal AND Low-Income Self-Interest 3. Liberal AND Conservative AND Neoliberal AND Low-Income Self-Interest 1. Libertarian 2. Liberal AND Liberal Moral Economy AND Libertarian AND High-Income Self-Interest

Moral Economy of Support In Table 8.4, we see three distinctive legitimations emerged: all three of which are moral economies because both of the codes in the Neoliberal rationale grouping for Proposition 202 (2008) coded for fairness due to the context of the proposition. The first combined Conservative and Neoliberal rationale groupings (Conservative AND Neoliberal). The second combined, Conservative, Neoliberal, and Low-Income Self-Interest rationale groupings (Conservative AND Neoliberal AND Low-Income Self-Interest). The final legitimation combined Liberal, Conservative, Neoliberal, and Low-Income Self-Interest rationale groupings (Liberal AND Conservative AND Neoliberal AND Low-Income Self-Interest). My empirical analysis in this chapter will cover the first two moral economies. Findings for RQ2: The first moral economy combines conservative and neoliberal rationales. Harold, a low-income Republican who supported the measure, used the Conservative Law and Order and Neoliberal Individual Reasonability rationales. Recall that I coded for Law and Order when respondents perceived undocumented workers as a threat to legal order, and the rule of law more generally in the United States, because of their “illegal” immigration status. Here, then, respondents often argued that it was necessary to apply the law “equally” to everyone or that

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allowing undocumented workers was allowing for a “double standard” in which some could break the law without sanction. I also coded for this rationale when participants discussed undocumented immigration as an issue of “the rule of law.” In his interview, Harold explicitly discussed Proposition 202 (2008) as a matter of the “rule of law.” When asked why he voted for the measure, Harold explained that “it was the rule of law that really motivated me to vote for this one.” He then used this rationale to delegitimate the opposition—which he characterized as framing the measure as “discriminatory.” The respondent explained that There’s nothing discriminatory about the rule of law. You want to come to this country? Do it legally. Most people do. I’m not saying that they’re sub-human because they’re not doing it or that we should mistreat them or anything like that, but…it’s the rule of law…respect for the rule of law…The rule of law is sort of the equalizer, you know what I mean. So then, everybody has certain rights, you know, that are not necessarily guaranteed, but sort of a privilege, and then rules help to govern society so that we have a safe, secure society, and that everybody needs to abide by the laws.

This is a classic example of the conservative most sacred value of preserving the institutions and traditions that maintain a moral community. For Harold, the issue was upholding the “rules [that] help to govern society so that we have a safe, secure society.” To do so, “everyone needs to abide by the laws.” Thus, the maintain a moral community—“a safe, secure society”—the law needs to be applied equally. From this perspective, “the rule of law is…the equalizer.” Everyone needs to follow the rule of law because laws govern the institutions that maintain a moral society. The issue here is maintaining the institutions that preserve a moral community and promote Americans as the in-group. From this perspective, outsiders were threatening this in-group by flouting the institutions that sustain American society. Thus, this was an issue of ensuring that everyone who comes to the United States abides by its laws. We can see this as delegitimating members of an out-group who refuse to conform to the rules of the community they have entered. This is evidenced when the respondent asserted that “[t]here’s nothing discriminatory about the rule of law.”

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Next, Harold employed the Neoliberal Individualized Responsibility rationale: You want to immigrate into a country? Then do it legally…On my side of the family, you know, some of us came through Ellis Island…We came here legally, got our visas, our family did what was legal and right. Then, by coming here legally and rightfully, then you don’t have to worry about La Migra or you anti-immigration legislation.

Here, the emphasis was on individual migrants following the rules and migrating in a way that “was legal and right.” It was then the migrant’s responsibility to come to the United States “legally and rightfully.” We see then that this is an example of the Neoliberal rationale of Individualized Responsibility because it placed full responsibility for migration on the migrants and did not address the immigration system on a structural level. For Harold, it was as simple as “coming here legally and righfully”—as he claimed his family did. We also see that this was an issue of fairness. Undocumented workers were not only here, in Harold’s eyes, illegally, but were also immoral and behaving unfair. Obtaining “legal” migration status was not only a question of legality for the respondent, but was also an issue of doing what was “right.” Thus, we can see that for Harold, undocumented workers were behaving unfairly, as it seems that it the respondent’s eyes they were shirking their legal and moral responsibility to migrate the “right” way. Most of the Democrats who supported the measure employed a mixture of conservative rationales and neoliberal rationales. David, a high-income Democrat, was extremely blunt. “I mean, it’s almost selfexplanatory. If they’re ‘illegal’ in the country, then they shouldn’t be allowed to work.” He described undocumented workers as “committing a crime” and the benefit of excluding them as “a lot more income tax, and federal tax,” thus alluding to their threat to social programs. Ultimately, protecting moral citizens came down to individual responsibility: I just don’t believe that [undocumented workers] should have the right to take a job from someone who’s done the right things along the way. Like, was here legally, or has done the process to become legal in the United States. They shouldn’t be able to take that opportunity away from somebody else…[for] the same reason you don’t get to walk out of a store by stealing something. You’re committing a crime. So you shouldn’t be rewarded for it.

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Thus, we saw David employ both codes from the Neoliberal rationale grouping, Fair Market Competition and Individualized Responsibility, in conjunction with the conservative Law and Order, American Jobs , and Social Programs rationales. According to David, undocumented workers were stealing taxes and jobs from Americans, which was enabled by their violation of American law. This violation, a shirking of individual responsibility to follow the law, then unfairly granted these workers access to American labor markets. Undocumented workers’ avoidance of individual responsibility, which for David resulted in unfair market competition and the depletion of the tax base, provided ample ground for his delegitimation of undocumented worker labor market participation as unfair. Darrell, a low-income Democrat, also drew upon a combination of conservative and neoliberal rationales. He explained that “I think anyone who’s going to be working here needs to be legal.” This delegitimation boiled down to the neoliberal rationales of Individualized Responsibility” and Fair Market Competition: “I just felt that if you’re going to work here, do it legally, otherwise you’re taking jobs away from regular Americans.” For Darrell, the onus to obtain legal status was on the individual immigrant: “I don’t have a problem with people coming from out of other countries, doing it legally, doing it a legal way.” The respondent then gave an example in which he took the responsibility to obey labor laws: Early on in my life, when I graduated…I had a desire to go over to England and work for the BBC. And I looked into it, it would be like jumping through hoops to try to get a job there, ‘cause they don’t favor people from other countries coming in and taking jobs away from Brits. So, I looked into it, I could have tried to do it illegally, but it just wasn’t the right thing to do… Same thing in this situation…do it legally.

From this perspective, the responsibility for legal immigration was wholly on the immigrant. This responsibility, then, formed the ground for a moral delegitimation of undocumented worker labor market competition: “My disability would not allow me to really work so they wouldn’t be taking jobs away from me necessarily, but I think personally our country, as far as a personal aspect, my patriotism says ‘I think it needs to be an American or someone that has a green card that is able, that’s done it legally, that’s able to work.’ I think everyone has the innate right to

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work wherever they are, but they need to do it by law.” This interest is not partisan, but “American,” and came from his “patriotism.” As a “patriotic” American who saw immigration as an individual responsibility, Darrell justified his vote in terms of maintaining fair access to, and competition for, jobs. Those who avoided their individual responsibilities were immoral and thus, in Darrell’s eyes, did not deserve to participate in the job market due to their unfair competition in said market. This was another case in which a respondent appropriated the neoliberal criteria for fair market participation as forming a set of traditions that needed to be protected in order to maintain a moral society. Thus, this convergence of neoliberal and conservative ideology constituted a powerful basis for respondents across economic position and partisan affiliation to delegitimate undocumented workers. The second moral economy combined the Conservative, Neoliberal, and Low-Income Self-Interest rationale groupings (Conservative AND Neoliberal AND Low-Income Self-Interest). First, Howard, a highincome Democrat who supported the measure, used the Low-Income Self-Interest Jobs rationale, as well as Neoliberal and Conservative rationales. He first justified his vote by claiming that he was voting mainly for himself, “maybe hoping I’d get a job sooner.” Howard quickly utilized the Neoliberal Individualized Responsibility rationale and Conservative Law and Order rationale to make sense of the broader issue: “We have all our laws and if there isn’t a law like this, then people don’t feel like they have to appreciate any law…I think we have immigration laws and I think that’s a good one…All laws should be protected and obeyed.” Thus, Howard framed the maintenance of law and order as an issue of undocumented immigrants being responsible for following market rules, and by extension the traditions that upheld an orderly society where all citizens followed their moral duty to obey the law. Jack, a high-income Democrat, used the Low-Income Self-Interest rationale of Reduce Taxes and Fees by explaining that he might benefit by voting “Yes” if it made “medical insurance cheaper for me down the line because we’re not taking care of illegals in the hospital that can’t pay.” However, his rationales quickly evolved past this self-interested concern. First, Jack used the American Culture, American Jobs , and Law and Order Conservative rationales. He then elaborated by using the Neoliberal Individualized Responsibility rationale by fully shifting responsibility for correct market participation onto immigrants: “If you’re going to live here then you need to be able to speak the language of the U.S. which

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is English….You know if you want to speak Spanish, or Portuguese, or Somali, or whatever in your home, fine, teach your kid, that’s great, but teach them English.” Jack expounded by explaining that his family would benefit from preventing foreign languages, Spanish in particular, from replacing English as the primary language in the US: “If it’s my son or my grandchildren that don’t have to learn Spanish in order to be able to find a job because you have such a large population of undocumented people in this country that can’t speak English then, yeah, I benefit down the road.” Notice that Jack subtly framed this issue as moral citizens being under attack. The major cultural threat to his American offspring would be the number of undocumented immigrants speaking Spanish. Jack justified voting “Yes” by appealing to this cultural threat, which he framed as stemming from undocumented immigrants shirking their responsibility by not learning English and thus not appropriately participating in society or market activity. He then employed the Neoliberal Individualized Responsibility rationale, as well as the Conservative American Jobs and Law and Order rationales: I think that it’s fair to say that to some degree, jobs are being taken away from college kids, high school graduates, people who want a part time job, or people who have lost a job and they can’t find one now because it’s like, why do I want to hire you and pay minimum wage when I can hire an illegal an pay them half that under the table and not even have to pay taxes on it. Again, you’re, it’s illegal. You’re cheating people that legally belong here.

Jack framed this problem as a breach of fairness in the labor market that resulted from undocumented workers entering the country illegally. He saw these workers as “cheating” moral citizens who “legally belong here.” The respondent argued that both the undocumented immigrants and their actions were “illegal.” This delegitimation employed both the Neoliberal rationales of Fair Market Competition and Individualized Responsibility by reasoning that immigrants who avoided their individual responsibility to migrant legally then gained an unfair advantage in the labor market. Jack used these Neoliberal rationales, combined with Conservative rationales, to delegitimate undocumented worker participation in the labor market as unfair and thus justify his “Yes” vote.

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Tyler, a low-income Republican who supported the measure, claimed to be motivated by self-interest and supplemented this rationale with Conservative and Neoliberal rationales. Tyler said that his vote was motivated by a desire to see economic growth, thus employing the Low-Income Self-Interest Benefit Economy rationale: “My job is tied to society,” which he thought would be harmed by undocumented workers because “most of the money that the illegals earn is funneled back to Mexico, so it’s not going to Americans, at all. So, I think that with less money around, well, it’s not gonna be valuable to Americans.” Notice that this problem essentially came down to individual responsibility for market action. For Tyler, “illegals” were making the decision to come to the United States illegally and then to “funnel” money back to Mexico. He elaborated, explaining that his vote was motivated by “my desire that American society would remain American…[and] my desire that the people that do the work get paid for it. And that the America is an important country in the world view.” Echoing Brown (2013), Tyler clearly used a racialized frame to elevate American culture and characterize Hispanic culture as a threat—thus employing the Conservative American Culture rationale. Furthermore, he used the Neoliberal Fair Market Competition rationale to legitimate Proposition 202 (2008), stating that he was motivated by his desire that “the people that do the work get paid for it.” This communicated Tyler’s stated motivation to protect American wages from unfair market competition from “illegals,” which implied that Tyler saw undocumented workers’ participation in the labor market as giving them an unfair advantage in market competition due to their undocumented status, which then subsequently undercut wages for American citizens. Archie, a low-income Republican, used the Low-Income Self-Interest Jobs rationale. He began by stating that “I think that there would be a lot more people out there looking for jobs that would be able to get jobs and a lot more people that are working jobs that could be able to get paid more if we weren’t hiring people that weren’t supposed to be working here and paying them under what they should be paid.” Archie argued that this was “affecting me definitely, because a lot of these jobs that I’m looking at, I can’t work that much because I’m looking for crappy jobs but they’re being taken by people who shouldn’t have them. So, it does affect me and it’s hurting me.” The respondent expanded on this concern by invoking neoliberal rationales of Fair Market Competition” and Individualized Responsibility.

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First, he explained that “I feel so strongly that if you come here illegally, the operative word here is illegal, you need to go back. There is legal ways to get here. I have a very close friend that is here illegally going through the Dream Act right now. He’s going back to Mexico for the next two years. So, he can do it the right way.” Archie, like other respondents, seamlessly transitioned from Neoliberal to Conservative rationales. The respondent mobilized the conservative most sacred value of attempting to uphold moral society by protecting “people here that are paying taxes, that are here legally,” thereby utilizing the American Jobs and Social Programs Conservative rationales: I really am against anybody giving them jobs, knowingly, because they’re usually paying them way less than they should be anyway. Um, us giving them free healthcare, free housing, I’m just 100% against it. It, honestly, makes me mad…I think it’s completely not fair. There are people here that are paying taxes, that are here legally, that can’t find jobs, can’t find housing, and yet, we’re supposed to pay our taxes to take care of people that aren’t supposed to be here. And that’s what really makes me angry…I’d say I’m just kind of against people getting something for nothing and plus just basically getting away with breaking the law.

Here, Archie’s portrayal of undocumented workers as a threat to American jobs and to social programs was clear. In the process of using these Conservative rationales, Archie invoked the Neoliberal Individualized Responsibility rationale, explaining that “there’s right ways to do it and wrong ways to do it” and that the “Dream Act” would be an important step because it would give undocumented immigrants “an opportunity to become legal” by taking responsibility for their actions and having to “jump through lots of hoops.” He then explained that hiring undocumented workers was unfair because they were being paid “way less than they should.” Subsequently, Archie saw this as undercutting the labor services of citizens who “are paying taxes” and “are here legally, that can’t find jobs.” In this way, Archie invoked the Fair Market Competition Neoliberal rationale. Thus, while Archie used a Low-Income Self-Interest rationale in claiming his vote has aimed at protecting employment opportunities for himself, we saw that he also employed Conservative rationales that drew upon the ideal of protecting “moral” citizens and upholding a “moral” society—while also using Neoliberal rationales to make fairness delegitimations of undocumented

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workers participating in the labor market. Once again, we see Neoliberal and Conservative rationales combine to form a powerful delegitimation of undocumented workers that spanned economic position and partisan affiliation among my white male respondents. Moral Economy of Opposition Findings for RQ1: As we can see in Table 8.4, two legitimations emerged that were distinctive to DDEP position. While the first legitimation does not involve fairness, and thus does not meet this book’s operational definition of a moral economy, the second legitimation does. This second legitimation was only used by two respondents but nonetheless cut across both partisan affiliation and economic position as it was used by a high-income Republican and low-income Democrat. This legitimation combined the Liberal, Liberal Moral Economy, Libertarian, and HighIncome Self-Interest rationale groupings (Liberal AND Liberal Moral Economy AND Libertarian AND High-Income Self-Interest). Findings for RQ2: First, Chris, a high-income Republican who opposed the measure and owned a small construction company, used the High-Income Self-Interest Anti-Regulation rationale and Libertarian Government Inefficiency rationale. He explained that he voted “No” partially because “I already have a bunch of compliance crap I got to go through, and so, anymore immigrant compliance crap is just… I am not interested…It would have just been more bureaucratic stuff I had to fill out – forms, and answer questions on and everything else.” For Chris, the stakes had to do with the cost of business operation, as he clearly understood avoiding further regulation as being in his small business’ interest. Chris elaborated: “Yeah, I suppose I would have been positively affected by a ‘No’ vote on that, because if I needed to hire somebody that was illegal it would have reduced the penalties if I got caught.” Chris then supplemented his reasoning by rejecting the measure on the grounds that it would promote racial hate, thus utilizing the Liberal rationale of Racial Equality: “I think these kinds of [antiimmigrant laws] increase the propensity of people to be ugly. You know, any time you legitimate hate at some level, you’re doing society a disservice.” While Chris was interested in helping society, he aimed to do so by protecting a vulnerable group from “hate.” Chris then employed the concept in fairness in this context, explaining that he was motivated by his values to oppose the measure. When asked to elaborate, he explained

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that it was because “I don’t think it’s fair to treat people badly.” Thus, the respondent used the Liberal Racial Equality rationale in the context of delegitimating the measure as unfair. Nelson, a low-income Democrat, used the High-Income Self-Interest Cheap Labor rationale in conjunction with the Libertarian Government Inefficiency rationale, several Liberal rationales, and the Liberal Moral Economy Liberal Market Fairness rationale. He mentioned that he might benefit financially from voting “No” if one day if “I owned a home, you know, I [could] have somebody that can do my…do my upkeep.” However, this rationale was essentially an aside. Nelson primarily portrayed himself as concerned with protecting undocumented workers due to their vulnerable socioeconomic status, as well as in preserving fairness in the labor market—thus using the Economic Oppression and Racial Equality Liberal rationales. Nelson delegitimated Proposition 202 (2008) as “not fair, and…hateful…It’s hateful and it’s a form of discrimination. For the ones that are here trying to make a better life because that’s what this country is supposed to be. Come and make a better life.” His fairness delegitimation of this attempt to regulate the labor market was then based on his argument that it would have discriminatory ramifications and would therefore be an unfair way to regulate labor market participation. This is an example of using a market fairness legitimation that drew upon the liberal most sacred value in the form of protecting racial equality. Furthermore, Nelson legitimated undocumented workers as deserving protection due to their difficult living conditions: “They’re supporting their family back home. They don’t steal, they don’t rob, they just work; because [citizens] that [should]…want those positions won’t take those positions.” Thus, Nelson argued that undocumented workers were worthy of protection due to their economic vulnerability—as well as their contributions to the American economy. He concluded by using the rationale from the Libertarian rationale grouping—further delegitimating the measure by highlighting the economic inefficiency of regulating immigration: “[Allowing undocumented workers to be in the United States benefits American citizens because] [t]hey don’t have to break their back in the fields because they’re not going to anyway. The prices go up and you know process for food goes up, prices for basic services that we take for granted go up.” Thus, regulation was inefficient because it disrupted the invisible hand and thereby interfered with the economic liberty of undocumented workers—which then resulted in economic inefficiency for the economy in general that would negatively impact US citizens.

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In sum, Nelson’s reasoning combined a High-Income Self-Interest rationale and Liberal rationales with a fairness delegitimation. Thus, we see a delegitimation of unfairness of proponents of the measure. Taken together with the analogous legitimation of Chris, we see what is perhaps the seeds to a more complex moral economy. This finding, combined with the moral economy of support for Proposition 202 (2008) that I previously discussed, extends Vila-Henninger (2017) by providing evidence of additional moral economies of self-interest for American political ideological discourses.

Proposition 204 (2012) Here I will analyze any emergent moral economies for Proposition 204 (2012) for the codes that I used in my empirical analysis for this proposition in this book (see Chapter 7). I will start by providing the summary of the proposition that was provided online to voters and which I provided to respondents. I will then discuss the rationale codes used in the analysis. Finally, I will provide empirical analysis of any moral economies for Proposition 204 (2012) that emerged among supporters and then opponents. Summary of Arizona’s Proposition 204 (2012): “The Quality Education and Jobs Act” The following is the unofficial summary of the measure provided to the State of Arizona, as required by law, by the official proponents of Arizona’s Proposition 204 (2012): “The Quality Education and Jobs Act.” This summary was made available to voters online via the Arizona Secretary of State. I provided this text to participants as a prompt before I interviewed them about their position on the measure (for further discussion see Chapter 4): The Quality Education and Jobs Act will strengthen Arizona’s economy by equipping children to succeed in the classroom, ensuring an educated workforce and creating jobs. This act, which renews the one-cent sales tax, will provide dedicated funding linked to performance and accountability for students of all ages and prevent legislators from cutting K-12 funding. Scholarships will ensure that universities and community colleges remain affordable. Investment in vocational educational education will allow students to graduate ready to work. This act protects public safety by

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ensuring continued funding for DPS officers and creates jobs by funding road, rail, transit and other transportation projects.

On November 6, 2012 this ballot measure failed with 63% of voters deciding against it. Conversely, approximately 66% (55/83) of my participants who took a position on the measure during the interview supported the proposition. The goal of this analysis is to build theory about the discourse that respondents use to legitimate their stances on different DDEPs. Thus, any bias in respondent memory or interpretation of the measure is not relevant for my qualitative, theory building analysis of voter legitimations. Proposition 204 (2012) Rationales For a full discussion and list of definitions of codes for Proposition 204 (2012), see: Chapter 7. Table 8.5 is a list of all of the rationales derived from widely held political and economic beliefs, norms, and values that I observed in my respondents’ rationalizations for Proposition 204 (2012). For each rationale, I also specify the rationale grouping to which it belongs as well as the position on Proposition 204 (2012) that it is expected to be used to justify.

Empirical Analysis for Proposition 204 (2012) For this analysis I focus on fairness (de)legitimations. Findings for RQ1: I begin the discussion by investigating moral economies that emerged among my respondents for this measure. In Table 8.6 we see legitimations that were distinctive of DDEP position on Proposition 204 (2012) and thus spanned both partisan affiliation and economic position. Moral Economy of Support For supporters across partisan affiliation and economic position, there were five distinctive legitimations (see Table 8.6). The first used rationales from the Liberal (Liberal) rationale grouping. The second used a rationale from the Liberal Moral Economy rationale grouping (Liberal Moral Economy). The third used the Liberal and Liberal Moral Economy rationale groupings (Liberal AND Liberal Moral Economy). The fourth

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Table 8.5 Rationales and rationale groups for Proposition 204 (2012) Rationale Self-interest Oppose Economic Burden Reduce Taxes and Fees Benefits of Economic Growth Sales Tax Instead of Property Tax Improve Education for Respondent or Respondent’s Child Political ideology Protect Students Protect Impoverished/High Economic Vulnerability Protect Oppressed Racial/Minority Groups Distrust of Government Tax Rate Taxpayer Liberty Economic ideology Government Inefficiency Enhance Market Competition through Investment in Public Education Public School Market Competition Moral economy Redistribution of Income/Using Taxpayer Money to Help Children or Impoverished as Fair Distrust of Government Allocation of Money

Rationale grouping

Expected position on Proposition 204

Low-Income Self-Interest Low-Income Self-Interest High-Income Self-Interest High-Income Self-Interest High-Income Self-Interest

Oppose Oppose Support Support Support

Liberal Liberal

Support Support

Liberal Conservative Conservative

Support Oppose Oppose

Libertarian Neoliberal

Oppose Support

Neoliberal

Support

Liberal Moral Economy

Support

Conservative Moral Economy

Oppose

legitimation used rationales from the High-Income Self-Interest rationale grouping (High-Income Self-Interest). The fifth legitimation combined rationales from the Liberal and High-Income Self-Interest rationale groupings (Liberal AND High-Income Self-Interest). Of these five legitimations, only the Liberal Moral Economy and Liberal AND Liberal Moral Economy legitimations meet the operational criteria for “moral economy” that I define for this book. Note that for Proposition 204 (2012), I created distinctive “moral economy” codes for Liberal Moral Economy and Conservative Moral

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Table 8.6 Legitimations distinctive of DDEP position for Proposition 204 (2012)

DDEP support

DDEP opposition

Number of types of unique policy position legitimations

Unique legitimation (Rationale grouping combinations)

5

1. Liberal 2. Liberal Moral Economy 3. Liberal AND Liberal Moral Economy 4. High-Income Self-Interest 5. Liberal AND High-Income Self-Interest 1. Conservative Moral Economy 2. Libertarian AND Conservative Moral Economy AND Low-Income Self-Interest

2

Economy. As moral economy in Proposition 204 (2012) is about the fairness of economic redistribution rather than simply the fairness of the proposition, this nuance merited a different coding strategy. Findings for RQ2: Randy, a high-income Democrat who supported the measure, used the Liberal and Liberal Moral Economy rationale groupings in his legitimation. Randy began by using the Liberal Protect the Impoverished/High Economic Vulnerability and Protect Oppressed Racial/Minority Groups rationales. He explained that he voted “Yes” in order to “provide people with opportunities…Give everybody a fair shake. People that don’t come from affluent, educated households—let’s help them compete for jobs and so on.” This rationale appealed to the idea of helping students whose career trajectories are precarious due to their parents’ lack of economic and formal cultural capital—and thus was an example of the liberal most sacred value. Randy continued, explaining that he voted to “support public education [because of] my concern for low-income people and their right to have a quality public education.” The respondent expressed his belief that low-income students’ futures were dependent upon the quality of public education; therefore, providing more funding for public education was a way of giving these socioeconomically vulnerable children a “fair

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shake” and an opportunity to succeed. Notice that protecting this vulnerable group was an issue of fairness for the respondent—which is a key component of a moral economy. Subsequently, the participant transitioned into a discussion of voting to help disadvantaged minority groups: Low-income tends to overlap with Mexican Americans and Native Americans…An attack on low-income people tends to impact more non-white people than white people…There tends to be a racist element to cutting programs for the poor…The folks on the reservation need education. They have been beaten up so bad for so many centuries that society as a whole needs to treat them better. Let’s fund public education.

Here, Randy described how he saw historically disadvantaged minority groups as especially vulnerable and in need of increased funding for public education. Thus, the respondent reported not only voting to help the economically vulnerable, but also that he was attempting to improve the circumstances of vulnerable ethnic and racial groups that would be especially at risk if public education did not receive the funding it needed. Finally, for the respondent, economic redistribution through education funding was a massive part of addressing historic inequalities and leveling the playing field for the historically disenfranchised. Randy described his hesitance regarding the measure but why he ultimately supported it: “Sales taxes are inherently regressive so I did a lot of soul searching with this one. Ultimately, there were many people in the educational field that told me that we really need this money, and these are human beings talking to me about their programs so I need to tilt in that direction.” Recall that this funding was important for Randy preceisely for the sake of fairness. The respondent spoke of education funding in terms of “provid[ing] people with opportunities…Give everybody a fair shake. People that don’t come from affluent, educated households—let’s help them compete for jobs and so on.” Randy then elaborated on the importance of using taxation to redistribute wealth: If the tax burden is shifted to the sales tax then middle class people suffer and working class people suffer, rather than taxing affluent elements of society, taxing the lower income people could ultimately hurt them. I guess it comes back to real class war, which is something that ruling class wants people to believe we started. The rich and power have an easier

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time staying rich and powerful when the masses are ignorant. So to be a malicious minority that owns and operates society will have a hard time controlling people if people are more educated.

For Randy, this measure was the first step. Education funding needed to be increased to address historic inequalities. However, ultimately for the respondent the tax structure needed to be reformed to eliminate regressive taxation. For the respondent, regressive taxes—along with policies that hurt the historically disenfranchised—were all part of a “class war.” The goal, then, was to redistribute wealth through a reformed—ultimately progressive—tax system. We see this Redistribution of Income/Using Taxpayer Money to Help Children or Impoverished as Fair rationale from the Liberal Moral Economy rationale grouping also utilized by Ira—a high-income Republican. Ira used this rationale grouping in tandem with the Protect Students and Protect Impoverished/High Economic Vulnerability rationales from the Liberal rationale grouping. Ira legitimated his support in terms of addressing economic inequality that students—who are a vulnerable group—face, and thereby used the Liberal Protect Students rationale. He then extended this reasoning to address economically vulnerable students—thus using the Liberal Protect Impoverished/High Economic Vulnerability rationale: “I guess [I voted because of] morals in a way because I do think it should be equal. It shouldn’t be just rich kids that can have good education.” Ira then emphasized that he supported the measure because it would redistribute wealth by providing funds directly to students—explaining that “scholarships [proposed by the measure] would help that [inequality] too.” This is then an example of the Redistribution of Income/Using Taxpayer Money to Help Children or Impoverished as Fair rationale from the Liberal Moral Economy rationale grouping. For Ira, it was paramount to use the increased sales tax to redistribute revenue from citizens to the public school system in order to address unfair conditions that some students faced. Most importantly for Ira’s legitimation was the use of these funds to lower university tuition costs and provide scholarship for students. He explained that “kids shouldn’t have to graduate with so much debt. It’s messed up.” Ira elaborated, saying that for him, the most important element of the measure was “affordability, for kids to be able to go to college and just the whole thing with everybody being on just

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a little higher of a plain.” Thus, state economic redistribution was a basis for Ira’s delegitimation of student debt. Thus, we see that Ira legitimated his support for Proposition 204 by arguing that the funds it would raise were justified because they would be redistributed to public school systems in order to help ease the financial burden that students faced. This was especially important for the respondent because it would help to level the playing field for economically disadvantaged students. Thus, we can see a Liberal moral economy emerge in support of the measure. Respondents across economic divides (economic position) and political divides (partisan affiliation) used the Liberal and Liberal Moral Economy rationale groupings to legitimate the measure. This then constitutes an ideologically-based consensus of support based on the concept of redistribution. Moral Economy of Opposition Findings for RQ1: As we see in Table 8.6, for respondents who opposed the measure, two different distinct legitimations emerged that spanned partisan affiliation and economic position. Crucially, both of these legitimations utilized the Conservative Moral Economy rationale grouping. This then provides evidence of a consensus of opposition and thus a moral economy based in American conservative political ideology. There were two legitimations: the first used the Conservative Moral Economy rationale grouping (Conservative Moral Economy) and the second used the Libertarian, Conservative Moral Economy, and Low-Income Self-Interest rationale groupings (Libertarian AND Conservative Moral Economy AND Low-Income Self-Interest). Findings for RQ2: Luke, a high-income Democrat who opposed the measure, used the Conservative Moral Economy rationale of Distrust of Government Allocation of Money in his delegitimation of the measure. Luke explained that “I think there were special interest groups.” He elaborated: “The 1% sales tax, where’s that really going? I think that Tucson’s notorious for it, not doing with the money what it was designated for.” Luke went further, even insisting that lawmakers in Tucson were known for “hiding” money. His response to this dishonesty was simple—insisting that “there should be transparency for it.” Based on this delegitimation of the government as dishonest the respondent concluded that he “just didn’t think that [passing the measure] was a good idea.”

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Arnold, a high-income Republican, uses the same of Distrust of Government Allocation of Money rationale from the Conservative Moral Economy rationale grouping in his legitimation of his opposition to the measure. The respondent explained that “the increase would have hurt me [financially] on some level, and a lot of other people, but that wasn’t my main consideration.” Instead, Arnold deeply distrusted the government. He explained that he voted “No” because of “my lack of confidence that they would actually use these things for.” Arnold continued to explicitly discuss his distrust for the government, summarizing his opposition in terms of “the fiscal irresponsibility of the state legislator, my skepticism that the money would go where it wasn’t supposed to go, and the negative effects that the increased tax would have on the general population.” Arnold elaborated, explaining that “[i]n some sense it’s [that] they wouldn’t of continued to get the money that they had been getting…I’m sure that someone got this money. So whoever is getting the money they would have stood to lose [by the measure not passing]. I don’t know who those people are but there is someone who is getting the money.” Luke and Arnold explicitly discussed their distrust for the measure and the government’s allocation of the funds that the proposition aimed to raise. The fundamental element here was a strong assertion of the unfairness of the government’s use of money. This then provides evidence of a moral economy by showing how respondents across economic position and partisan affiliation used a moral principle to (de)legitimate economic exchange—in this case, the government’s redistribution of taxpayer dollars. The respondents among whom this conservative moral economy emerged delegitimated the government’s reallocation of taxpayer money based this shared criterion of fairness—which drew upon a deep distrust of lawmakers to spend tax revenue honestly. Additionally, this moral economy rationale draws upon conservative ideology because of its portrayal of the government as immoral and lacking an ability to display self-control. The government was described by Arnold as being “fiscal[ly] irresponsible.” For Luke, “special interests” were “hiding” taxpayer revenue. The key, then, was the portrayal of the government as dishonest. However, more fundamentally, respondents asserted that they could not trust the government because of its moral failings. According to respondents, the government and lawmakers deceive the public and redirect funds—and thus are irresponsible and untrustworthy.

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From this perspective, the portrayal of the government is similar to that of a drug addict: continually demanding more and more money to spend in ways that benefit the addict but do not benefit moral members of his/her community. As the conservative most sacred value is to protect the traditions and institutions that uphold a moral community or protect an in-group, the immorality of the government from this perspective stems from its lack of self-control—which then makes the government unable to support a moral community. Thus, rather than representing the people, lawmakers were portrayed by respondents as deceiving the very citizens they are supposed to serve.

Note 1. Portions of this section were circulated in the American Sociological Association’s Political Sociology Section Summer 2020 Newsletter.

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———. 2009. The Extended Case Method: Four Countries, Four Decades, Four Great Transformations, and One Theoretical Tradition. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Colombo, Céline. 2019. “Principled or Pragmatic? Morality Politics in Direct Democracy.” British Journal of Political Science 1–20. https://doi.org/10. 1017/S0007123419000218. Colombo, Céline, and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2017. “Party, Policy—Or Both? Partisan-Biased Processing of Policy Arguments in Direct Democracy.” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 27 (3): 235–53. Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper. Frank, Thomas. 2004. What’s the Matter with Kansas?: How Conservatives Won the Heart of America. New York: Metropolitan Books. Franko, William, Caroline J. Tolbert, and Christopher Witko. 2013. “Inequality, Self-Interest, and Public Support for ‘Robin Hood’ Tax Policies.” Political Research Quarterly 66 (4): 923–37. Gelman, Andrew. 2008. Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State: Why Americans Vote the Way They Do. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Haidt J. 2012. The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. New York: Pantheon Books. Jenke, L., and S. A. Huettel. 2016. “Issues or Identity? Cognitive Foundations of Voter Choice.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 20 (11): 794–804. Kirk, Charlie. 2020. The MAGA Doctrine: The Only Ideas That Will Win the Future. New York: Broadside Books. Koos, Sebastian, and Patrick Sachweh. 2019. “The Moral Economies of Market Societies: Popular Attitudes Towards Market Competition, Redistribution and Reciprocity in Comparative Perspective.” Socio-Economic Review 17 (4): 793– 821. Mau, Steffen. 2003. The Moral Economy of Welfare States: Britain and Germany Compared. London: Routledge. ———. 2005. “Moral Economy” pp. 466–469 in Beckert, J., and Zafirovski, M., eds. International Encyclopedia of Economic Sociology. London: Routledge. McCarty, Nolan M., Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, 2006. Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Sachweh P. 2012. “The Moral Economy of Inequality: Popular Views on Income Differentiation, Poverty and Wealth.” Socio-Economic Review 10 (3): 419–45. Sayer, A. 2007. “Moral Economy as Critique.” New Political Economy 12 (2): 261–70. Stonecash, Jeffrey M. 2000. Class and Party in American Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Svallfors, Stefan. 2006. The Moral Economy of Class: Class and Attitudes in Comparative Perspective. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

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CHAPTER 9

Conclusion and Theory Building

Introduction This book investigated two empirical puzzles. First, while voter reasoning and rationalization are seen as primarily driven by partisanship (e.g., Achen and Bartles 2016), American citizens appear to vote for parties that they are economically incentivized to support (e.g., McCarty et al. 2006). This raises the question: How do partisanship and self -interest interact to shape partisan voters’ rationalizations of their position on direct democratic economic policy (DDEP)? Second, the voter reasoning literature sees actors’ rationalization of their policy positions as based on discourses supplied by political parties (for a summary see Achen and Bartels 2016). Such a perspective overlooks the role that nonpartisan discourses play (Taylor-Gooby et al. 2019), as well as how party-transmitted discourses extend beyond any given party (Vila-Henninger 2019b). This raises a subsequent question: What are the discourses that voters draw upon to rationalize their direct democratic economic policy (DDEP) positions? In this chapter I use my findings from this book’s empirical analyses to address these two questions in order to build theory. I begin by summarizing this book’s theory building agenda and generalizability. Next, I summarize and elaborate upon my findings in order to build theory. In particular, I address my first research question by building upon theories of individual-level processes of legitimation. I then mobilize my findings to respond to my second research question by expanding upon theories © The Author(s) 2020 L. A. Vila-Henninger, Social Justification and Political Legitimacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51716-8_9

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of legitimacy and legitimate American political and economic discourses. I conclude by discussing the implications of my findings for future research.

Theory Building Agenda and Generalizability The theory building agenda of this book has multiple elements. First, I aim to contribute to qualitative work on citizens’ political legitimation (Duchesne et al. 2013; Van Ingelgom 2014; Vila-Henninger 2017, 2018, 2019a, b). This book also builds upon a tradition of sociological work that uses semi-structured interviews to understand how everyday people use culture in the political and economic realm—whether it be mental maps (Lamont 1992, 2000), repertories (Swidler 2001) or frames (Díez Medrano 2003). More specifically, the data I collect are most similar to “discourses of (de) legitimation” (Van Ingelgom 2014). The legitimations I analyze have two primary components—each of which corresponds to an empirical puzzle and subsequent research question of this book. In order to address the first research puzzle empirically and respond to the first research question, I mobilize my findings on voter legitimations to build theories of individual-level processes of legitimation, voter reasoning, rationalization, and justification. I then address the second research question empirically in order to build theories of the legitimate discourses upon which citizens’ legitimations draw. This helps us to build theories of legitimacy, as well as to develop accounts of American political ideology and values, neoliberalism, moral economy, and norms of self-interest. Answering these two questions will help to address some key gaps in the qualitative work in sociology and political science. For example, Perrin (2005) and Stoker et al. (2016) use focus group data to analyze citizens’ democratic deliberation. Lane (1967), Prasad et al. (2009, 2016), Eliasoph (2010), Kidder and Martin (2012), Cramer (2016), Hochschild (2016), Kidder (2016), Pacewicz (2016), Skocpol and Williamson (2016), Williamson (2017), Andreouli and Nicholson (2018), Duina (2018), Wuthnow (2018), Silva (2019), Curtis (2020), Hull and Edgell (2020), and Leeds (2020) all use ethnography and/or semi-structured interviews to understand issues such as identity and citizens perspectives on politics. However, these literatures have largely overlooked both legitimation as well as the values, normative ends, and standards of governance upon which legitimation draws.

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My analytical approach employs Michael Burawoy’s “Extended Case Method” (ECM) (Burawoy 1998, 2009; Sallaz 2009) to interpret my findings and engage in theory building (Vila-Henninger 2017, 2018, 2019a, b). Specifically, I use Burawoy’s principle of “reconstruction” in the coding and analysis of my data. Reconstruction uses a core theory to identify anomalous cases in the data in order to build theory. In particular, my analysis consists of identifying policy-specific iterations, or “rationales,” of widely held beliefs, norms, and values that are available in public discourse. The process that results from this strategy of “reconstruction” is a mode of analysis that is similar to abduction in its theory building logic based on identifying anomalous cases (Timmermans and Tavory 2012: 171; Tavory and Timmermans 2014), but is distinct to the extent that it starts with two core theories in order to identify theoretically anomalous cases. The important point of distinction here is that I seek to contribute by building theory (Burawoy 1998, 2009; Timmermans and Tavory 2012: 171; Tavory and Timmermans 2014) rather than generalizing to a population. By elaborating extant theory, this book can help facilitate future scholarship by contributing to the analytical framework that researchers use in their research design and analysis—as well as in formulating hypotheses (Shadish et al. 2001). In this sense, my findings will be generalizable to the extent that any theory is generalizable.

Research Question 1: How Do Partisanship and Self-Interest Interact to Shape Partisan Voters’ Rationalizations of Their Position on Direct Democratic Economic Policy (DDEP)? Legitimation Recall that this book defines power as legitimate when it is accepted, complied with, or acknowledged (Walker 2014) on normative grounds. A foundational element of the Weberian perspective on legitimacy is the idea that legitimacy needs to be analyzed as actors’ “belief in legitimacy”— which enabled sociologists to study legitimacy as a social phenomenon rather than a philosophical issue (for empirical analysis see Van Ingelgom 2014). Furthermore, power is legitimate to the degree that it is widely perceived as legitimate (Weber 1978 [1922]; Johnson et al. 2006; Van Ingelgom 2014). This means that individuals do not need to agree with

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the exercise of power or the collective beliefs, norms, and values with which power is aligned. Rather, individuals need to perceive both power and the collective elements it is justified in terms of as being widely accepted (Johnson et al. 2006: 55–6; Van Ingelgom 2014). My findings then expand accounts of legitimation by showing concrete processes through which legitimation is undermined or spread. We see that respondents’ processes of justification of their support of a measure encourage actors to believe in the legitimacy of the measure, while respondents’ justifications of their opposition to the measure can possibly encourage other to stop believing in the legitimacy of a measure. My work thus builds on theories of legitimation as a type of belief in legitimacy that facilitates others’ beliefs in legitimacy (Weber 1978 [1922]; Van Ingelgom 2014). The first thing to note is that all of the DDEPs I used in this analysis failed. As such, voters’ delegitimations would then seek to erode others’ beliefs that such policies—and other similar policies—are legitimate and should be enacted. As these DDEPs failed, voters’ legitimations of these policies would seek to build others’ beliefs that these policies—and other similar policies—are legitimate and should be enacted. By helping to reaffirm or expand others’ beliefs in failed policy, voters’ legitimations of these policies then seek to spread beliefs in the legitimacy of these policies—and thus spread their legitimacy. This then could then make it easier for similar policies to pass in the future and politicians who support such policies to get elected. Crucially, such legitimations spread legitimacy by spreading the perception that others see these DDEPs as legitimate (Weber 1978 [1922]; Johnson et al. 2006; Van Ingelgom 2014). By delegitimating the measure, which could then dissuade others from believing in the legitimacy of the measure, actors are then undermining the measure’s—and other similar policies’—legitimacy. These legitimation processes then seek to undermine the legitimacy of the failed DDEPs— and similar policies and political figures that support such policies—by counteracting beliefs in the legitimacy of a given DDEP and similar policies. This then could make it harder to pass similar policy in the future or make it more difficult for politicians who support such policy to get elected. Crucially, such delegitimations undermine legitimacy by undermining the perception that others see these DDEPs as legitimate (Weber 1978 [1922]; Johnson et al. 2006; Van Ingelgom 2014). The legitimations I analyze—in that they are justifications of power on normative grounds—are also crucial for compliance when used by organizations (Weber 1978 [1922]). Thus, I theorize that the justifications that my respondents use facilitate potential future compliance with, or

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resistance to, policies similar to the DDEPs they (de)legitimate. We can then extend this theorization. Actors’ legitimation of a failed measure would then potentially facilitate compliance through voting for future ballot measures that take a similar stance, or encourage other voting behavior or forms of participation in support of such policies. Similarly, a delegitimation helps to facilitate compliance with the current political system in which the DDEP does not exist. It also discourages compliance with a failed DDEP by encouraging voting behavior and other forms of participation which would oppose making similar DDEPs or policies law or bringing those who support the failed DDEP into power. As such, legitimation and delegitimation are forms of social control or political resistance—depending on how they are used. Furthermore, we can see from the empirical analysis of legitimations provided in the empirical chapters in response to the first research question the combinations of discourses that actors use to facilitate or undermine beliefs in legitimacy. This then provides us with the foundation for a typology of actors’ legitimations as beliefs in legitimacy. This perspective builds on Lipset (1959, 1963, 1990). From this perspective, if popular values do not align with political institutions, then the institutions are not legitimate (see especially Lipset 1963). Thus, I theorize that beliefs in legitimacy are fostered through actors’ alignment of policy not only with values, but also normative ends and standards of governance. We can thus see the empircal analyses I provided in response to the first research question as different forms of legitimation through which actors attempt to foster beliefs in legitimacy by aligning policy with different combinations of legitimate discourses. Motives That Influence Legitimation In response to the first research question, and thus to the first empirical puzzle, we can see from the distinct legitimations for each of the eight comparison groups for each DDEP I analyzed that the interaction of self-interest and partisanship does seem to shape legitimation. Below, I discuss the ways in which this influence appears to have taken place. This answers the research puzzle of the influence of self-interest and partisanship. In terms of voter reasoning in the form of rationalization, distinctive legitimations consistently emerged for the interaction of self-interest and partisanship. Answering this question is important because it helps us to understand political legitimation. For Weber (1978 [1922]) we can see an important gap concerning the motives that drive legitimation. According to

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Weber, compliance with legitimacy may be based on interest or subjective motives (ibid.: 33, 213). Individuals’ ascription of legitimacy is then based on normative factors (ibid.: 36) including a “belief in legitimacy” (ibid.: 213). The gap in Weber’s work then concerns factors that motivate legitimation. Turning to the rationalization literature, scholars have established that actors rationalize for a variety of reasons: to comply with social pressure (e.g., Haidt 2001; Vaisey 2009), in response to group loyalties— including partisan allegiances—to reaffirm “prior beliefs” (e.g., Achen and Bartles 2006, 2016), to perform information transfer (Cushman 2019), to respond to moral intuitions (e.g., Haidt 2012), for consonance of behaviors and attitudes (Heider 1958), to “sound rational” and avoid cognitive dissonance (e.g., Festinger 1962), and/or to avoid social or existential threats—thereby defending the status quo (e.g., Jost et al. 2009). However, while some have begun to theorize the role of selfinterest in rationalization (Jost et al. 2017), the literature is in its infancy and has yet to investigate how partisanship and self-interest interact to structure political rationalization. Various studies have investigated the relationship between partisanship and self-interest—or indictors of these two—(Hersh and Nall 2016; Bosancianu 2017), or how policy positions and partisanship can align (Colombo and Kriesi 2017), but scholars have yet to investigate the interaction between self-interest and partisanship as it pertains to rationalization. This is important, because work in neuroscience suggests that in voter reasoning self-interest and partisanship compete (Jenke and Huettel 2016). The key here, then, is that rather than competing (Jenke and Huettel 2016), my research demonstrates how self-interest and partisanship interact to affect legitimation. This builds on work decades of election results (e.g., McCarty et al. 2006; Widestrom et al. 2018) as well as the research on attitudes (Brooks and Brady 1999; Weeden and Grusky 2012; Dodson 2017) and voting behavior (Hersh and Nall 2016).1 The finding of this book that self-interest and partisanship interact to shape voter legitimation then bridges the gap between rational choice perspectives on legitimacy (Rogowski 2016) and partisanship (e.g., Achen and Bartels 2016). Furthermore, this finding addresses a gap in Weber’s (ibid. 1978 [1922]) theorization of legitimacy. Furthermore, I have responded empirically to the agenda to find evidence that self-interest and partisanship interact in order to develop dual-process models of voting (Jenke and Huettel 2016) and rationalization (Haidt 2001, 2012; Vaisey 2009; Vaisey and Lizardo 2010; Lodge

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and Taber 2013). This work can then be used to build on scholarship that applies dual-process models to qualitative findings on legitimation in order to build a model of political socialization (Vila-Henninger 2018).

Research Question 2: What are the Discourses That Voters Draw Upon to Rationalize Their Direct Democratic Economic Policy (DDEP) Position? Values, Normative Ends, and Standards of Governance Second, I investigate the widely held political and economic beliefs, norms, and values that voters use to rationalize their DDEP positions. Recall that political legitimation in this book is defined as the justification of political power on normative grounds. The second question thus helps us to understand the normative basis of the political legitimacy of DDEPs and related policy. In particular, I investigated the values (Lipset 1963), standards of governance (Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998), and normative ends (Spillman 2012; Spillman and Strand 2013) that actors used to (de)legitimate DDEPs. These values, ends, and standards of governance are thus part of the normative basis upon which respondents socially accept (legitimate) or reject (delegitimate) of the political power of DDEPs and similar policies. Subsequently, these values, normative ends, and standards are then theorized to constitute part of the basis of actors’ compliance or cooperation with political power, as well as their personal belief in the legitimacy of DDEPs and the American political system more broadly (Weber 1978 [1922]: 212–6 (esp. 213), 953–5; Lipset 1959, 1963, 1990; Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998; for qualitative analysis see Van Ingelgom 2014: 5–6). This research is important because there is a gap in the literature concerning the actual values, normative ends, and standards of governance that actors use in their legitimations and upon which political legitimacy is based. Recent quantitative work has been done on values (Ciuk 2017). Qualitative work has also been done on the role of nonpolitical values in economic situations (Livne 2019; Altomonte 2020). Furthermore, much work has also been done on public forms of culture (Swidler 1986, 2001; Lamont 1992, 2000; Eliasoph and Lichterman 2003; Patterson 2014; Lizardo 2017). However, this work largely focuses on schemas, frames, and narratives and ignores values, normative ends, and standards of governance (for a review see Wood et al. 2018; also see

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Tavory and Swidler 2009; Vaisey 2009; Vaisey and Lizardo 2010; AventHolt 2012; Ghaziani and Baldassarri 2011; Frye 2017; Hull and Edgell 2020). Finally, qualitative work has focused on legitimacy and the use of state force (Gordon 2020; Rios et al. 2020) or meso-level processes (Luft 2020), but not on political legitimacy or the values, normative ends, and standards of governance that actors use to (de)legitimate power. We know that these values, normative ends, and standards of governance are of importance because of the work being done on the role of partisan morality. For example, Jung (2020) demonstrates that partisan moral rhetoric mobilizes voters by activating emotions related to partisan preference. Furthermore, Luttrell et al. (2019) provide evidence of the effectiveness of political moral appeals. Finally, Vössing (2020) shows the importance of partisan justifications for public opinion. Following my theory building approach, I will thus review novel and anomalous findings from my empirical chapters on normative ends (norms of self-interest), values (most sacred values), and standards of governance (fairness) in order to build theory on each as it relates to legitimacy and legitimation. Normative Ends (Norms of Self-Interest) For norms of self-interest, we see that the unexpected findings from my empirical chapters expand the literature. For example, the use of selfinterested rationales by voters for Proposition 201 suggests that voters are sensitive to norms of long-term self-interest. For this measure, lowincome respondents used the Protect Investment rationale, suggesting that voters also respond when long-term self-interest is threatened, as well as when the stakes for long-term self-interest stakes are high. In this case, the measure proposed enacting a “bill of rights” for purchasers of new homes. Low-income respondents, who may not be have been in the position to purchase a new home at the time of their vote choice, seemed to envision a future in which they experienced enough economic mobility to purchase a new home and, in such a case, wanted to ensure that their investment in such a massive purchase was protected. This finding extends recent quantitative work (Manza and Brooks 2020). To elaborate, I provide examples from two empirical chapters. Proposition 201 Here we take at the case of Ken, who is a low-income democrat who supported the Proposition 201 and legitimated his support for the measure in part by employing the Protect Respondent’s Business rationale from the High-Income Self-Interest rationale. People tend to justify their

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economic action in terms of the forms of self-interested action that they perceive to be normative (Spillman 2012; Spillman and Strand 2013; VilaHenninger 2017). We can then understand Ken’s appeal to real estate investment as normative in terms that are similar to what Leslie McCall (2013) calls the “rising tide” trope about economic opportunity. McCall (ibid.) establishes that one way in which economic opportunity is justified among Americans is if it benefits everyone—referred to in an idiom as a “rising tide” that lifts all boats. Here, despite the real estate crash, Ken still seemed to see investing in the housing market as a socially acceptable way to pursue economic self-interest. From this perspective, the issue was ensuring that the housing market would be a “rising tide” and would thus benefit buyers, sellers, builders, and investors alike. We can then see his legitimation of the measure in terms of its language of “rights” as legitimating the housing market as a “rising tide” Jonathan is a low-income republican who opposed the measure in part using the Help Respondent’s Business rationale from the High-Income Self-Interest rationale grouping. In terms of Jonathan’s self-interest rationale, the respondent portrayed himself as protecting his self-interest and the “health of my industry.” This low-income respondent saw protecting his business—by opposing a measure that he saw as potentially raising home prices and destabilizing his business’ industry—as normative (Spillman 2012; Spillman and Strand 2013; Vila-Henninger 2017). Of importance for this study is not whether Jonathan actually voted out of self-interest to protect his business—or even if he owned a business at the time of the interview or at the time of his vote—but rather that the respondent used the legitimation of protecting one’s business as a way to justify his opposition to the measure socially. Once again, we see that the use of a rationale that draws upon a trope that is analogous to the “rising tide” trope used among Americans to discuss economic opportunity and inequality (McCall 2013). According to Jonathan, in order for the housing industry to benefit, all prices must stay low. Any state regulation that disrupted the pricing equilibrium established in the housing market thus threatened the socially justifiable self-interest of protecting one’s business. With Shawn, a low-income Republican who supported the measure, we see a logic similar to what McCall (2013) labels the “equal treatment” trope of opportunity. In this trope, McCall (ibid.) explains that Americans tend to support economic situations in which everyone—regardless of class background—is treated equally. This would then explain why Shawn saw protecting homeowners’ rights as an investment even if he did not have access to the capital necessary to buy a home at the time.

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In terms of economic voting, the literature (for a review see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2019) has long established two key axes: retrospective (looking at past events) vs. prospective (thinking about the future) and egotropic economic (self-interested or “pocketbook”) vs. sociotropic economic (“public interest” or “national” voting). In this instance, we see that both the work on tropes of economic opportunity (McCall 2013) and the economic voting literature (for a summary see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2019) can be applied. As with other respondents, the norm of self-interest (Spillman 2012; Spillman and Strand 2013; Vila-Henninger 2017) for Shawn was one in which egotropic economic voting was justified in terms of—and equated with—sociotropic economic voting. Using the frame that was analogous to “equal treatment” in which protection benefited all homebuyers, Shawn justified his support of the measure in terms of a sociotropic “commitment to love my neighbor,” as well as a prospective economically egotropic concern for ensuring financial protection if he ever were to buy a house. Here, the “equal opportunity” trop unites sociotropic and egotropic economic reasoning. It is precisely the economic norm of “equal opportunity”—or in this case “equal protection”—that allowed Shawn to simultaneously utilize sociotropic and egotropic economic legitimations. This finding then replicates and extends results from survey reserach (Manza and Brooks 2020). Proposition 202 Elias high-income opposed the measure, employed the Anti-Regulation rationale. Recall that when actors report motives of self-interest, they likely report what they perceive as socially acceptable forms of selfinterest (Spillman 2012; Spillman and Strand 2013; Vila-Henninger 2017). Elias explicitly reported opposing the measure out of self-interest as an employer who sought to avoid what were portrayed in the measure’s description as increased penalities. For Elias, opposition to the measure based on a desire to avoid penalities for employing undocumented workers was not sufficient justification. Rather than simply using a norm of self-interest to legitimate his opposition, the respondent evoked a moral economy of self-interest that relied on the justification of self-interest by appealing to the social benefits of self-interest (Vila-Henninger 2017). Thus, the respondent reported not only voting for his self-interest, but also for that of his friends, and for a free market—which in his description benefitted the economy (lower prices) and undocumented workers.

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Implications for Findings: Norms of Self-Interest as Folk Economics The literature on norms of self-interest dovetails nicely with literature on folk economic beliefs. Richard Swedberg (2018) outlines a theory of lay economic beliefs that are popular in Trump’s rhetoric. These folk beliefs outline economics in terms of cause, effect, and remedy. Swedberg’s theory is proving to be the foundation of an emerging literature on folk economics (Patrick 2018; Strand 2020). Analogous work has been done on folk economics in neuroscience. Pascal Boyer and Michael Bang Petersen (2017) have described folk economics from the perspective of evolutionary psychology. The idea here is that the mechanism that shaped folk beliefs about economics was humans’ evolution in small groups. Thus, these folk economic beliefs are designed for life in small group settings. From this perspective, we turn to the qualitative literature on norms of self-interest (Spillman 2012; Spillman and Strand 2013; Vila-Henninger 2017). If we apply the folk economic perspectives, we can understand norms of self-interest as part of a broader narrative in which everyday people justify behavior in terms of economic explanations that specify a cause for voting behavior and strategic action that helps facilitate a narrative about causes, effects, and remedies that are conducive for small group life. Thus, I investigated the norms of self-interest, or socially acceptable vocabularies of motive about self-interest, in order to understand the normative ends through which governments can potentially achieve legitimacy. In this context, a given DDEP would be justified by the voter because it allows the voter to pursue one or more of these normative selfinterested goals. From the perspective of folk economics, we could then understand these self-interested vocabularies of motive as folk “causes” of economic action that would then facilitate small group cooperation and the support of, or opposition to, political power. This work builds on sociological and psychological findings about actors’ socialization into discourses of self-interested action, which they then use at times to justify their own action (Eliasoph 1998; Miller 1999; Holmes et al. 2002). These norms can then influence behavior (e.g., Gardner and Ryan 2020) and are treated as normative ends for governance when used by voters in their political legitimations. This also supplements classic work on the role of self-interest as an end for governments trying to establish or maintain legitimacy. Classic political theory (Smith 1776; Kant 1785 [1969]) and contemporary perspectives in social psychology (e.g., Zelditch and Walker 2003) have established that a legitimation that appeals to self-interest can only help

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to legitimate political power if the conditions for competition are fair. Contemporary qualitative work (Vila-Henninger 2017; This Book) has buttressed this argument by demonstrating that norms of self-interest and fairness converge in voters’ legitimations of DDEPs. Values (Most Sacred Values) My findings on partisanship are important because they build evidence of collective most sacred values and their application in voter reasoning. The operationalization of “rationales” proved to be a key step in studying how voters used these values to reason about policy, as well as the policyspecific forms of these partisan most sacred values that emerged across voter reasoning. This serves to confirm Haidt’s theory of individuallevel explicit post hoc partisan reasoning and its connection to collective partisan moral narratives. My research also begins to bridge the moral psychological research on political reasoning (e.g., Haidt 2012) and the literature in political science, political sociology, and political psychology on models of voter issue reasoning developed from rational choice theory (for a review see Brooks and Manza 2013). The key here is that while theories that developed as a response to rational choice specify the forms of information gathering and cognitive shortcuts that emerge for decision-making and issue position formation, Haidt’s model provides a theory of how policy reasoning is tied to collective moral partisan narratives. My research not only provides evidence of Haidt’s theory of partisan values through an analysis of voter reasoning, but suggests that these partisan most sacred values may predominantly serve as the “prior beliefs” that correspond with the heuristics and information gathering biases that have been so well-documented. These findings suggest not only a synthesis between these literatures, but also supports future research on how most sacred values are connected to other domains of policy reasoning, as well as the connection between most sacred values and voting biases, preferences, and heuristics. To elaborate, I provide examples from two empirical chapters. Proposition 201 Harold is a low-income Republican who supported the measure. In Harold’s interview, we can see an important contradiction in the work in Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) resolved. Recall that the MFT literature has generally found that conservative ideology is parochial while liberal ideology is universalist (Waytz et al. 2019). However, Haidt (2012) stresses that liberal ideology values protecting vulnerable groups while

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conservative ideology values protecting moral communities. In this way, conservative ideology applies principles of fairness regardless of the needs of vulnerable groups (Haidt 2012). This initially appears contradictory, but when seen through the eyes of these respondents, this contradiction is resolved. The key appears to be the application of principles for determining fairness relative to the standards of an in-group. For Harold, for example, the key was to apply Christian standards for determining fairness. In this way, the principles that maintain a moral community are used in conservative ideology to help maintain said moral community—regardless of individual groups. As the size of a moral community is relative to the community member, the key distinction becomes group membership. Thus, principles for maintaining a moral community are applied regardless of their effects on out-groups or nonmembers—thus proving to be an example of parochialism. Conversely, liberals apply universalist moral principles—regardless of group membership. This then brings attention to vulnerable groups that merit aid—regardless of group membership. For conservative ideology, then, this way of thinking is a threat because it disregards the needs of the moral community in-group. Troy, a high-income Republican who supported the measure, explicitly legitimated his support of the measure as being in conflict with the interests of economically vulnerable groups. For this rationale, it appears as if Troy introduced group conflict into the concept of sociotropic economic voting. The norm here was one in which markets were defined by group boundaries. Notice that this was not a moral issue for Troy. The respondent was not concerned with protecting moral homebuyers from immoral homebuyers—which would have made the rationale part of the Conservative rationale grouping. Instead, it was an issue of group membership as defined by economic capital—or trying to “keep people out of the housing market that really had no business buying a house.” This is a classic example of boundary work (e.g., Lamont 1992, 2000). Combined with the economic voting literature (for a review see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2019), we see an interesting finding emerge. Troy’s legitimation did not simply appeal to public interest (sociotropic). Rather, Troy’s appeal to the public interest came from his delegitimation of a stigmatized social group: low-income homebuyers who default on their mortgages. Thus, the public interest was relationally defined in economic and political terms by the exclusion of economic undesirables.

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Proposition 202 Duane is a high-income Democrat who opposed the measure. Here, we see the respondents use opposing ideologies to express his mixed feelings about undocumented workers. Many who have studied political attitudes (e.g., Converse 1964; Zaller 1992; Miller and Shanks 1996) and citizens’ discourse (Swidler 2001; Vaisey 2009) argue that citizens lack coherence because they contradict themselves or are not politically sophisticated. Conversely, we see Duane explain his conflicting feelings about immigration in coherent terms. Each side of the respondent’s argument draws clearly upon liberal or conservative ideology. Thus, rather than contradiction as indicating lack of coherence or lack of political sophistication, we can take this as an indicator of complex processes of political socialization. Duane was familiar with both the Democratic and Republican stances on immigration and was able to defend each side using the corresponding political ideology. This suggests in fact that the respondent was quite politically sophisticated had not been polarized in this policy area. We do see, however, that the respondent was socialized into both political ideologies—as he used both to defend the associated position of each. Elbert, a high-income Democrat who supported the measure, used only the Social Programs rationale from the Conservative rationale grouping. He explained that “some benefits I did see though [for the measure passing], why it did help, why I did vote ‘yes,’ for the fines collected from it will be distributed to schools and hospitals, because working in schools and also seeing medical stuff around, there’s a huge financial burden that’s placed on those social groups that have to deal with everybody whether they’re here legally or not.” Elbert continued: “As a society we could kind of gain financial help to deal with some of the issues that happen as a result of illegal immigration…I’m kind of voting for schools and hospitals, I’m voting for the social groups that will benefit from some of the fines collected.” Elbert clearly perceived “illegal immigration” as putting a strain on American social programs and elements of the welfare state—such as the public school system. He reported voting to protect those who were following the law and paying into these systems—and by extension promote a moral society. Elbert’s legitimated his position in terms of an aim to generate some revenue to counteract the perceived financial burden placed upon American social programs by “illegal immigration.” The conservative most sacred value is to promote and protect institutions that sustain a moral community (Haidt 2012). This is in line with years of findings from Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) that conservative ideology is “parochialist.” This means that conservative ideology

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focuses on protecting an in-group (Waytz et al. 2019). Applied through the conservative most sacred value, members of a moral community are the in-group of concern for conservative ideology. The goal, then, would be to protect and promote the institutions and traditions that sustain this moral community in-group. For my respondents, the Conservative Social Programs rationale’s moral community is composed of American citizens who have been paying into social programs and for whom said programs are designated. From this perspective, undocumented workers who take social programs are immoral because they are in the United States “illegally” and are thereby “stealing” from American citizens by using American social programs. Thus, this double transgression serves to reaffirm undocumented workers as an out-group. We can see this evoked by Elbert, who discussed undocumented workers’ use of American social programs as creating a “financial burden.” As a result, Elbert claimed to have voted for the measure—and thus legitimated his support—by appealing to his solidarity with members of the American community. Specifically, Elbert claimed to be “voting for schools and hospitals, I’m voting for the social groups that will benefit from some of the fines collected.” Here, the respondent identified members of American society as part of an in-group that were threatened by the “burden” undocumented workers placed on the social system. Elbert thus was legitimated his support for the measure in terms of helping these members who were at risk. The goal portrayed in this legitimation was to right the wrong of undocumented workers cheating Americans out of social programs and thus “gain financial help to deal with some of the issues [specifically financial strain on social programs] that happen as a result of illegal immigration.” Sherman, a high-income Republican who supported the measure, also provided an interesting case. A widely used concept in the inequality literature is the Weberian conception of “social closure”—or exclusionary judgments that rely on cultural criteria of group membership (Weber 1978 [1922]: 43–6). Research has focused on the dynamics of labor market closure in which lower-income members of a dominant ethnic or racial group are motivated to exclude competing racial or ethnic groups from labor markets (Bonacich 1972, 1976; Bobo 1998; Tilly 1998; McVeigh 2009; Valdez et al. 2019)—and subsequently seek to distinguish themselves form Latinos (Abascal 2020). For the United States, a key feature of this dynamic discussed in the aforementioned literature is that low-income white citizens of European descent often feel that they are

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in competition with undocumented workers for labor market opportunities. Furthermore, there is an ample literature that demonstrates a long history of American rhetoric that equates undocumented workers with Hispanics/Latinos (Santa Ana 2002; Jacobson 2008; Brown 2013), as well as provides evidence that the formalization of this rhetoric in policy creates or intensifies anti-Hispanic/Latino attitudes (Flores 2017). Given this literature, we can see the language used by Proposition 202 (2008) as additionally incentivizing low-income voters to legitimate the proposition by appealing to discriminatory attitudes against Hispanics/Latinos stemming from the perception of labor market competition. To understand the ethnically-based labor market closure, we can turn to work on ethnic boundaries. In the eighteenth century, philosopher Johann Herder conceived of ethnicities as distinct social groupings. This perspective sees ethnic groupings as “self-evident” and ethnicity as the most important division to study (Wimmer 2009: 247; Wimmer 2013). This heritage has echoed throughout social science and would postulate that respondents should self-identify and differentiate first and foremost according to broad ethnic groupings (Wimmer 2013: 16– 21, 124–5). Andreas Wimmer sharply critiques this perspective. His analysis of symbolic boundaries among second-generation Swiss immigrants finds, echoing Michèle Lamont (1992, 2000), that different ethnic groups perform in-group/out-group categorization. This categorization is based on a respondents’ conception of the moral worth of their class position—which is independent of ethnicity (Wimmer 2013: 124–5). Here, we see Sherman’s boundary work deviate from the Herdian perspective in that it used nationality instead of ethnic boundaries as the fundamental criterion for deciding group membership. While the literature then suggets racial bias may motivate labor market closure behavior for some, we see that these biases do not constitute a legitimate discourse for justifying labor market closure in my data. As Sherman explains, “the majority of them are from Mexico. We get a lot from China, but who knows what we’re getting from Saudi Arabia or Pakistan, with nefarious ideas… So, if we don’t have that then we don’t have that going on. We’re much better to protect ourselves as a society.” Here, instead, we see Wimmer’s (e.g., 2013) critique of the Herdian perspective maintained. As with previous research on ethnic justification (Lamont 2000; Wimmer 2013), the focus for Sherman was on moral worth. Thus, the problem was not ethnicity, but instead protecting the boundaries of the American in-group. Rather than a distinct ethnic identity, we see the legitimacy of labor market closure defined in terms of moral worth—which

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is defined by national identity. For Sherman, the United States was a moral community that needed to “protect our own” from foreigners of all backgrounds. Moral worth, in this context, was then defined by the political ideology of American conservativism. This speaks to recent literature on attitudinal variants of American nationalism (e.g., Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016) and the reemergence of the legitimacy of nationalist discourse. Given that this interview was conducted in 2013, it provides evidence of the emergence of nationalism through the lens of conservative ideology as a socially acceptable belief among Republican voters for justifying the exclusion of undocumented workers from the American labor market during the Obama administration. The use of this rhetoric by the Trump campaign then appears to have drawn upon a conservative interpretation of nationalism that was already socially acceptable for some Republican voters. Crucially, this finding extends work on American nationalism beyond attitudinal data to the legitimations of voters and the widely held ideological beliefs from which these legitimations are derived. Implications This suggests that voters, with at least some level of coherence, used partisan most sacred values to reason about their DDEP positions. This extends the heuristics and biases literature (e.g., Lau and Redlawsk 2006; Baldassarri 2012; Brooks and Manza 2013; Lodge and Taber 2013) by demonstrating how partisan most sacred values (Haidt 2012) are employed in voter reasoning. This supplements theories of voter economic reasoning by adding judgments of market fairness to the use of partisan most sacred values to assess economic policy, which is never explicitly predicted by partisan reasoning theories or by the literature on voter economic policy reasoning (Ansolabehere et al. 2006; Haidt 2012; Brooks and Manza 2013). Taking this approach then helps to extend the literature on morality and politics (for a review see Miles and Vaisey 2015). This also supplements the quantitative work that shows the influence of legitimacy and values on behavior (Besley and Persson 2019), as well as the importance of moral discourse in political parties’ mobilization of voters (Jung 2020). Furthermore, my findings extend work on the use of values in economic contexts (Livne 2019; Altomonte 2020) by demonstrating how ambiguity in political moral values allows partisans to use these values to interpret different economic situations (DDEPs) differently.

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Libertarianism (Most Sacred Values) Another striking finding was how seldom respondents used rationales that only drew upon the libertarian most sacred value. If the two-party system is forcing citizens with a variety of partisan views into a binary partisan system, we would expect respondents to use rationales that were exclusively attributable to third parties. While it is important to note that my sample parameters excluded respondents who did not vote for either a Republican or Democratic presidential candidate in 2008 and/or 2012, the relevant case here is how partisan voters used libertarian ideology. Surprisingly, I found that while some respondents used libertarian rationales, very few respondents used libertarian rationales without also using other rationales. To elaborate, I provide examples from an empirical chapter. Proposition 202 Elias, a high-income Republican who opposed the measure, used the Libertarian Government Inefficiency rationale combined with the Anti-Regulation rationale from the High-Income Self-Interest rationale grouping. In previous work (Vila-Henninger 2017), I identified Elias as part of a “moral economy of self-interest.” I was able to replicate this analysis upon my revisit of this case. However, as moral economies are a form of consensus that span social and economic divisions and the current analysis is one of the distinctive legitimations that emerge according to social (partisan) and economic (income level) divisions, this moral economy of self-interest helps in my theory building process as respondents who used this moral economy of self-interest are examples of anomalous cases relative to my two core theories. Neoliberalism (Standards of Governance) My primary finding regarding neoliberal ideology regards the confluence of neoliberal ideology and American liberal political ideology in the legitimations of voters, which flies in the face of almost two decades of scholarship that argue neoliberalism converges with conservative ideology (Garland 2001; Harvey 2005; Gross et al. 2011; Gauchat 2015). Neoliberalism is seen by some as bipartisan (Amable 2011; Centeno and Cohen 2012), but neoliberal ideology is typically seen as being in opposition to

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American liberal political ideology. For example, Democratic politicians who are neoliberals are then seen as shifting toward conservativism. Here we see that for voters, neoliberal ideology and liberal ideology fit together to legitimate opposition to policy that is perceived to be antiimmigration (Proposition 202), as well as to legitimate funding for public education (Proposition 204). We see then that neoliberal ideology itself then appears to be ideologically flexible. While some elements of neoliberal and American politically liberal ideology contradict each other, these two ideologies are complementary for Democratic voters across economic positions. Thus, we see that a potential effect of Democratic partisanship on legitimations that span economic position is a push towards neoliberal ideology. We could thus be seeing a process of policy feedback—whereby neoliberal policy is adopted by Democratic partisan elites, who then influence voters to fuse neoliberal ideology and American politically liberal ideology. Republicans and conservative ideology, in this study, were much more predictable. We see, however, for immigration policy and antiundocumented worker rhetoric, the effect of Republican partisanship appears to be to appeal to fairness and conservative ideology in order to delegitimate undocumented workers. This is striking because these data were collected from 2013 to 2015. Thus, this suggests that the antiimmigrant rhetoric of Donald Trump had roots in popular legitimations that applied the concept of fairness through a conservative ideological lens in order to delegitimate undocumented workers. This may also suggest that the Republican party pushed for this pairing of fairness and conservative ideology to delegitimate undocumented immigration. This speaks to the literature on conservative ideology on immigration (e.g., Brown 2013; Flores 2017; Flores and Schachter 2018) and helps us to understand the centrality of neoliberal fairness for conservatives on the issue of immigration. We see the extent of the association between Republican partisan affiliation and neoliberal fairness in delegitimations of undocumented workers by Republican voters. Republican voters across economic position used neoliberal ideology to delegitimate undocumented workers, and then applied conservative ideology through the neoliberal lens of fairness to understand immigration. Thus, we see the power of neoliberal rhetoric and its potential to mobilize Republican voters to employ its ideological perspective on fairness.

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Neoliberalism emerged as an important set of principles for all of the measures I analyzed in this book—even for the highly partisan Proposition 204 (sales tax). I found that neoliberalism had two important components. First, as discussed in the literature on neoliberalism, it has a bipartisan, or in some instances apartisan, nature (Amable 2011; Centeno and Cohen 2012). Second, we saw that neoliberal principles were consistently paired with, and/or coopted, other rationales by shifting the responsibility for economic competition and outcomes onto individuals alone rather than collective or private actors. The importance of neoliberalism is a key contribution to the gap in the literature on processes that supplement partisan reasoning on economic policy when self-interest is meager or nonexistent (e.g., Ansolabehere et al. 2006; Gelman et al. 2010; Brooks and Manza 2013). My findings on libertarianism and neoliberalism, but on neoliberalism in particular, demonstrate the policy-specific partisan alignment of these economic philosophies. These findings also demonstrate the central role that neoliberal conceptions of fairness play in supplementing self-interest and/or partisan reasoning. This suggests that when voters reason about economic policy, they supplement partisan and/or self-interested reasoning with moral beliefs from neoliberalism concerning fairness. Such an insight can be fruitfully integrated into experimental and quantitative research on voter reasoning and decision-making. In sum, it appears as if neoliberal ideology embeds and, in many cases, ostensibly replaces or overshadows self-interest in voter reasoning on DDEPs. To elaborate, I provide examples from all three empirical chapters.

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Proposition 201 Jonathan is a low-income Republican who opposed the measure. This legitimation draws upon a key aspect of neoliberal ideology regarding the responsibility of consumers for the outcomes of market transactions. Central to this neoliberal tenet are both Social Darwinism and a distinctive element of neoliberalism. Neoliberal ideology is Social Darwinist to the extent that it asserts that individual competition needs to be an organizing principle for society. For Social Darwinists as well as neoliberals, society advances through individual competition and it is thus through individual competition that one proves one’s worth. However, unlike Social Darwinism, neoliberals believe that the market is fragile and socially constructed. Thus, it is the individual’s responsibility to successfully integrate his or herself into the economy (Foucault 2004; Amable 2011). As such, individuals assume all responsibility for their market participation—including the outcomes of the economic competition and market exchanges in which they participate. Here, a key element is that responsibility is transferred from collectivities and onto individual market competitors (Foucault 2004; Amable 2011). It is then not the government’s responsibility to ensure the fairness of market outcomes, but rather the government’s role to ensure the immediate fairness of the playing field on which market competition takes place. Thus, by rejecting government interference in determining the outcomes of home purchases and instead shifting all such responsibility onto consumers, Jonathan used a key element of neoliberal ideology to legitimate his opposition to the Proposition 201 (2008). Proposition 202 Charlie is a high-income Republican who supported the measure. For his legitimation, he used libertarianism and neoliberalism in conjunction. This raises an important contradiction, because neoliberalism and libertarianism hold competing views on economic regulation. While libertarianism stresses deregulation, neoliberalism emphasizes reregulation to enhance individual economic competition. Thus, we are forced to ask: How can we explain this contradictory use of neoliberal and libertarianism in conjunction? As discussed in the theory section, this book does not argue that most citizens use rationales as a conscious application of an ideology or widely held beliefs. Instead, I argue that rationales are evidence of socialization and the influence of policies and institutions in shaping socialization. As such, I draw upon the moral economy literature on “Normative policy feedback” (Svallfors 2006; Koos and Sachweh

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2019) and the Policy Feedback literature (e.g., Kumlin and StadelmannSteffen 2014; Dupuy and Van Ingelgom 2014). My argument is that ideology and moral principles are formalized in, for example, partisan institutions and neoliberal policies. These institutions and policies then shape the experiences of citizens. Furthermore, institutions and policies— and their proponents—use the ideology and moral principles that they formalize in their legitimations of said institutions and policies. It is in part through experience with these legitimations—whether it be through the discourse of the institution or policy, or its proponents—that individuals are socialized. Thus, when asked to legitimate institutions or policy, citizens draw upon the ideological or moral legitimations that they have heard used to (de)legitimate institutions or policy in order to provide what they see to be a socially accepted legitimation. Such legitimation processes accommodate contradictory legitimations, as citizens are often socialized into contradicting legitimation discourses. Thus, discursive contradiction in citizens’ legitimations is not a sign of incoherence (e.g., Swidler 2001; Vaisey 2009), but rather an indicator of the competing institutional or policy legitimations into which citizens have been socialized. This discursive contradiction also provides evidence of the social acceptability of political and economic beliefs. As such, we can understand Charlie’s contradictory discourse as evidence of two processes. First, this is evidence that Charlie was socialized into both neoliberal and libertarian political legitimations. Second, these contradictory rationales indicate the respondent’s acknowledgment of both neoliberal and libertarian ideology as socially acceptable political and economic beliefs. Thus, the contradiction inherent in this legitimation is not problematic, but rather quite informative—given that we interpret this citizen discourse as providing insight into political legitimacy and not voter decision-making. Proposition 204 By examining how respondents combined Liberal and Neoliberal rationale grouping to legitimate the measure, we see how Neoliberal ideology is flexible with regard to partisan affiliation by enabling respondents across economic divides to legitimate the proposition. Tony, a high-income Democrat who supported the measure, utilized the Liberal “Protect Students ” and “Protect the Impoverished/High Economic Vulnerability” rationales in combination with the Neoliberal rationale of “Enhance Market Competition through Investment.” The typical perspective about neoliberal ideology in the context of American politics is that it aligns with conservative ideology and is utilized

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to mobilize right-wing voters (Garland 2001; Harvey 2005; Gross et al. 2011; Gauchat 2015). The argument is that Democratic politicians and voters shift to the right ideologically when adopting neoliberal policies— e.g., Bill Clinton’s collaboration with Republicans to pass “workfare” as welfare reform (Amable 2011). Instead, we see that in the legitimations of voters, neoliberal ideology and liberal ideology are perfectly compatible. For Democratic respondents who used neoliberal ideology and liberal ideology, an important facet was both protecting vulnerable groups—children and the “lower class”—as well as investing in human capital in order to improve or maintain the United States’ competitive edge on the global marketplace. For Tony, these two logics are inextricable. In order for the United States to stay competitive in the face of globalization, it must protect students—especially those from the “lower class and middle class”— by investing in them as human capital. We can see this in Tony’s claim that “it’s important that more money goes towards education for kids…they’re our future.” For Tony, then, protecting and promoting the well-being of children—who are a vulnerable group—means investing in education. It is in this light that we can understand the respondent’s claim that “in this country, the education level, in competing with other countries” is “falling behind. I think we need to put more emphasis on the education for our kids.” The goal then is to simultaneously promote the United States’ well-being and the future of “our kids” by investing in them as human capital. This then promotes children’s prosperity within the country as well as the prosperity of the United States in the global marketplace. It is for this reason that “it’d be better for society as a whole to have better educated kids.” Moral Economy (Standards of Governance) A key finding was that respondents very seldomly reported voting solely out of self-interest. Furthermore, my findings on rationale usage, as well as my qualitative findings, helped to establish the potential existence of moral economies for Propositions 202 and 201. This is important because it supports the critique of rational choice from the moral economy literature that actors supplement economic voting by drawing upon popular beliefs about market fairness. Drawing on the qualitative data we can see that the emergent moral economies demonstrated the importance of both partisan values and nonpartisan economic philosophical beliefs in guiding

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voter reasoning about market fairness. To elaborate, I provide examples from two empirical chapters. Proposition 201 Shannon is a high-income Democrat who supported the measure and Dustin is a low-income Republican who supported the measure. Shannon and Dustin provide nice examples of the Liberal Moral Economy that spanned economic and social divisions among my respondents. We see evidence of a moral economy in respondents’ fairness (de)legitimations (Thompson 1971; Mau 2003; Svallfors 2006; Sachweh 2012). Here, fairness is applied through the political-ideological lens of the liberal most sacred value (Haidt 2012). Respondents across partisan affiliation and economic position provided evidence of this Liberal Moral Economy by legitimating their support for the measure through their fairness delegitimations of those involved in the real estate market who took advantage of economically vulnerable homebuyers. Thus, respondents applied fairness specifically through the lens of protecting the economically vulnerable. This contributes to the moral economy literature by providing evidence of the role of partisanship in generating moral economies. These findings also greatly complicate literature on the polarization of the American electorate (e.g., Brooks and Manza 2013) by demonstrating that in the context of economic policy, partisan boundaries can become fluid as voters cross ideological and economic lines in their legitimation of policy. The second moral economy here is important because it provides evidence of a “Moral Economy of Self-Interest” (Vila-Henninger 2017). In previous work, I investigated the different norms used to legitimate and justify the pursuit of self-interest employed by voters during their interpretation and evaluation of direct democratic regulation of undocumented labor in Arizona labor markets in Proposition 202 (2008). I found three distinct moral economies that spanned economic position and partisan affiliation for respondents who identified as voting out of self-interest. These three moral economies drew upon norms of social solidarity to legitimate and justify norms of the pursuit of self-interest. These three moral economies all demonstrate ways in which norms of solidarity

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constituted the “rules of legitimacy” by which norms of self-interest were justified. Building on Spillman’s (2012) findings, my research revealed that market orientations can be generated by synthesis, or at least a confluence, of norms of self-interest and norms of solidarity. In the context of Proposition 201 (2008), we see another Moral Economy of Self-Interest emerge. This moral economy represents the confluence of rationales from the High-Income Self-Interest rationale grouping with the Liberal Market Fairness rationale. Like in the previous discussion, this represents a “Liberal Moral Economy” in which respondents apply fairness through the lens of protecting the economically vulnerable to legitimate economic action. In addition, this moral economy consists of respondents simultaneously using a rationale from the HighIncome Self-Interest rationale grouping. This finding complexifies my previous work, as it demonstrates the confluence of social solidarity and norms of self-interest, as well as political ideology. Norms of self-interest are then in line with social solidarity based on political ideology that in some cases transcends partisan affiliation. Toby, a high-income Democrat, used the Help Respondent’s Business and Protect Investment rationales in conjunction with the liberal Help Homebuyers /Owners rationale, and subsequently used a fairness legitimation. First, Toby reported voting out of self-interest in order to help his business. He explained that he was voting for “my clients. I was a real estate agent at the time so I felt my clients would have recourse.” When asked if he thought this would “benefit” him, Toby responded that it would “keep my clients happy. Whatever keeps my clients happy keeps me happy, at least that’s the way I looked at it.” In this sense, Toby reported voting out of self-interest to help his business as a realtor. He portrayed his material well-being as connected to his clients’ level of satisfaction. This quickly transitioned to reasoning about ballot measure as being beneficial because it would protect homebuyers. Toby wanted to make sure that his clients had “recourse.” He then explained that he also voted “Yes” “because I’m a homeowner.” He elaborated, arguing that a “No” vote would result in people “losing their money, and their homes. That’s always the number one risk right? Family, money. This is definitely [an issue of] los[ing] your money.” For Toby it came down to consumer protection. “I know it didn’t pass [so] I see myself as a consumer [i.e. homebuyer] who lost some protection.” This means that the respondent perceived the ballot measure as protecting his investment in his home.

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Toby then employed the Liberal rationale of Homeowners/Buyers, which emphasized protecting homebuyers and owners from exploitation and material loss. He explained that the measure was “prohibiting a seller’s agent from participating a false mortgage applications. That’s very good “cause that’s what was going on. I had a friend of mine removed from Sun Mortgage and put in jail because they were pulling that kinda shit.” This prohibition of fraudulent practices was then meant to help himself as a homeowner, as well as his customers and thus his business. Furthermore, it was also meant to help protect “homeowners and the consumer.” Toby then stated that he saw himself as “part of the consumer group,” thus intertwining the liberal most sacred values of homebuyer and homeowner protection with self-interest rationales. In the process of attempting to benefit himself and his business, Toby was also trying to protect vulnerable groups—in this case homeowners and homebuyers. Finally, the respondent concluded by connecting these self-interest and most sacred value rationales to a market fairness legitimation, and thus used the Moral Economy Market Fairness rationale. He explained that he voted “Yes” “because it’s right.” When asked “What makes it right?” he responded: “The fact that it’s protecting the consumer…I believe everybody deserves an equal shake and shouldn’t be walking to the door with a steel ball hanging on your neck because you don’t know what’s going on.” Here, Toby explicitly connected fairness with his desire to protect his customers and homebuyers. Specifically, he discussed trying to protect unwitting homebuyers from unfairly being taken advantage of by dishonest sellers. In prior work (Vila-Henninger 2017), I investigated the different norms used to legitimate and justify the pursuit of self-interest employed by the same respondents I used in this analysis. I did not reproduce these results because my scope and research question were different from this prior investigation Vila-Henninger 2017)—for which I used different codes that were analogous to concepts from economic voting (for a review see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2019) rather than the ideological codes I used in this analysis. However, my findings in this chapter extend the aforementioned article because I discovered additional moral economies of self-interest. Here, in particular we saw a moral economy of self-interest emerge that combined low-income self-interest rationales with conservative and neoliberal ideological rationales. This suggests that the phenomenon of moral economies of self-interest extends beyond solidarity.

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Proposition 202 Travis, a low-income Democrat who opposed the measure, provided an important example of the basis for a moral economy. The moral economy literature has emphasized the importance of moral principles formalized by welfare states (e.g., Mau 2003; Sachweh 2012; Koos and Sachweh 2019) as shaping popular economic attitudes and legitimation. Here, we saw the moral principle of protecting vulnerable groups—the “Most Sacred Value” of liberal ideology—used by a respondent to delegitimate a proposed labor market policy (Proposition 202). The key here is that rather than moral principles that are formalized by the state shaping popular delegitimation of policy, we saw a moral ideological principle formalized in the United States by a political party (Democrats) used by voters to delegitimate economic policy. This supports my own theorization of partisan ideological moral economies that are based on moral principles from political ideologies that are formalized by political parties as the basis for popular (de)legitimation of economic policy—and economic exchange more broadly. This finding extends both the moral economy literature and the policy feedback literature (e.g., Kumlin and Stadelmann-Steffen; Dupuy and Van Ingelgom 2014) by expanding our knowledge of the processes through which the formalization and institutionalization of moral norms shape popular attitudes and legitimation.

Implications and Future Directions Socialization This book opens up major questions about socialization. My findings speak to work that analyzes legitimation as an indicator of an individual’s socialization into—and internalization of—collective beliefs, norms, and values (Easton and Dennis 1967; Zelditch 2001; Johnson et al. 2006; Jost et al. 2017; Vila-Henninger 2018). The next step is to theorize how actors are socialized into different discourses that they use in legitimation, and then provide an account of the legitimation mechanisms that mobilize this socialization as political rationalizations. Voter Ignorance Concerning voter ignorance and “innocence,” Achen and Bartels (2016) argue that direct democracy, and democracy in general, is based on an

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idealistic, and false, conception of voter capability. Their argument is that democratic institutions are based on a “folk” notion of democracy in which voters are rational, or at least “know what they want” (ibid.: 30). Voter preferences then drive voting behavior and force democratic government to be responsive to their needs and effective in its response. Achen and Bartels (2016) contend that instead voters are driven by partisan and/or group biases (ibid.: 17–8) and are largely incapable of selecting responsive politicians, let alone effective policy via direct democracy. A key shortcoming of with this argument is that it does not understand political rationalization as legitimation. Many who have studied political attitudes (e.g., Converse 1964; Zaller 1992; Miller and Shanks 1996) and citizens’ discourse (Swidler 2001; Vaisey 2009) argue that citizens lack coherence because they contradict themselves or are not politically sophisticated. Conversely, we saw respondents in this book’s empirical analyses legitimate their position in terms that are coherent in the context of a given DDEP. Thus, rather than contradiction as indicating lack of coherence or lack of political sophistication, we can take this as an indicator of complex processes of political socialization. Again, this demonstrates the need for a theory of legitimation that incorporates socialization. Populism What do these findings tell us about our current political climate, in which both progressive and conservative variants of populism have struck a particular chord with the electorate? Recent work on populism demonstrates that it is used, in the American context, by politicians who are outsiders to the political field (Bonikowski and Gidron 2016). Thus, populism is a rhetorical tool that gains popular support by contrasting the virtues of the public with the corruption of elites (ibid.). With this definition we can understand the reason why progressive (Bernie Sanders) and conservative (Donald Trump) variants of populism were employed in the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections. My findings begin to shed light on the appeal of this rhetoric to voters, rather than how it is utilized by politicians. In particular, my findings documented two variants of the “corrupt elites” populist narrative. First, Proposition 204 produced a conservative rationale concerning the moral corruption of government and public officials, which rendered the proposed continuation of the tax rate increase immoral. Recall that this

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rationale portrayed the government and public officials as untrustworthy, morally corrupt, and thus unable to responsibly control the tax rate. This populist rhetoric seems to lay behind the tax revolt (e.g., Martin 2008) and was central for respondents who justified rejecting the measure. Conversely, in Proposition 202 we saw hints of a variety of populism that is derived from the “immoral” status of those who were being protected by elites. The neoliberal moral economy around undocumented workers (see Chapter 8) posited that these immigrants were “immoral,” and thus did not deserve to participate in the labor market due to what was perceived as their shirking of individual legal responsibilities. We saw, in some respondents, a reaction against Democratic politicians based on this moral economy. This type of discourse was relatively rare due to the ballot measure-specific nature of the semi-structured interviews, but this populist reaction that characterized Democratic politicians as corrupted because they sought to protect undocumented workers was present in at least one case. We can then speculate that this populist bent supplemented the neoliberal moral economy and was successfully utilized by Candidate Trump to mobilize voters using his brand of populism.

Note 1. For a review of the self-interest and partisanship literature see the introduction.

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Index

A Abduction, 11, 67, 106, 152, 206, 252, 287 Anomalous cases, 11, 70, 106, 153, 206, 287, 302 Anti-regulation, 169, 177, 192, 194, 262, 271, 294, 302

B Beliefs, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 27, 30–35, 37–39, 41, 68, 69, 71, 75, 85–88, 106, 112, 116, 122, 125, 136, 141, 152, 160, 164, 166, 173, 174, 176, 206, 213, 217, 223, 224, 226, 254, 256, 261, 274, 287–291, 295, 296, 301, 304–307, 311 Benefit Economy, 169, 177, 262, 269

C Civil rights, 170, 177, 262

Comparison groups, 13, 14, 68, 71, 89, 93, 94, 97, 111, 115, 158, 159, 164, 210, 211, 216, 289 Compliance, 2, 4, 6–9, 27, 28, 30–32, 34, 35, 37, 271, 288, 290, 291 Consumers, 45, 79, 107, 108, 117, 118, 120, 121, 123, 133, 134, 136, 138, 139, 141, 143, 224, 238, 305, 309, 310 Culture, American, 117, 171, 177, 262, 267, 269 D Delegitimation, 9, 28, 133, 175, 181, 182, 230, 244, 260, 266, 268, 270, 272, 273, 279, 288, 289, 297, 308, 311 Direct Democratic Economic Policy (DDEP), 2–4, 7, 9, 27, 34, 36, 37, 67, 71, 74, 105, 152, 205, 253, 285, 287, 291 Discourses, 3, 7, 9, 11, 28, 31, 36–38, 41–44, 68, 74, 76, 105, 106, 110, 114, 125, 152, 157, 165,

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 L. A. Vila-Henninger, Social Justification and Political Legitimacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51716-8

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328

INDEX

168–171, 173, 175, 176, 182, 189, 191, 205, 206, 210, 228, 251, 253, 254, 256, 260, 261, 273, 274, 285–287, 289, 295, 298, 300, 301, 306, 311–313 Distinctive legitimations, 69, 127, 130, 132, 134, 138, 140, 142, 179, 182, 192, 195, 228, 231, 232, 235, 240, 242, 256, 260, 263, 274, 289, 302 Distrust of government, allocation of money, 225, 227, 229, 230, 275, 279, 280 of government, tax rate, 223, 227, 229, 243, 244, 275 E Economic burden, 212, 215, 221, 222 Economic growth, 222, 238, 269 Economic growth, benefits of, 221, 222, 227, 238, 275 Education, 5, 207, 208, 212, 221, 224, 231, 233, 234, 237, 238, 241, 277, 278, 307 Elderly, 121, 126, 257 Empirical puzzles, 3, 13, 14, 89, 111, 116, 158, 165, 210, 218, 251, 252, 285, 286, 289 F Fairness, 7, 9, 34, 37, 39, 43, 44, 46, 75, 76, 78, 117–119, 123, 124, 127, 128, 135, 137, 139, 141, 165–168, 174, 175, 178, 180, 181, 184, 188, 190, 191, 195–197, 214, 218, 219, 225, 226, 228, 230, 234, 252, 253, 255, 256, 259, 260, 262, 265, 268, 271–274, 276, 277,

280, 296, 297, 301, 303, 305, 307–310

G Governance, 4, 7–10, 27, 28, 31, 32, 36–39, 43, 44, 71, 75, 76, 197, 286, 289, 291, 292, 295 Government inefficiency, 122, 126, 135, 136, 143, 173, 177, 180, 181, 192, 224, 227, 237, 243, 244, 257, 262, 271, 272, 275, 302

H High-income self-interest, 71, 126, 130, 132–135, 137, 140, 142, 177, 192, 227, 232, 233, 235, 236, 238, 239, 242, 243, 256, 257, 262, 271–273, 275, 292, 293, 302, 309 Homebuyers, 14, 108, 112–114, 119, 121, 126, 128, 129, 131, 133, 137–139, 141, 143, 144, 252, 257–260, 294, 297, 308–310 Housing prices increase, 114 lower/preserve, 119, 144, 145, 257

I Ideology conservative, 41, 72, 78, 113, 122, 124, 128, 139, 160, 163, 165, 213, 218, 224, 235, 267, 279, 280, 296–299, 301–303, 306 economic, 78, 119, 126, 163, 168, 177, 179, 180, 220, 221, 227, 254, 257, 262, 275 liberal, 78, 165, 179, 218, 239, 252, 296, 302, 303, 307, 311

INDEX

neoliberal, 44, 45, 76–78, 116, 117, 122, 123, 136, 139, 140, 165, 166, 173, 175, 179, 184, 190, 191, 197, 217, 218, 225, 231, 238, 239, 241, 302, 303, 305–307, 310 Immigration, 48, 153, 154, 156, 157, 161, 166, 167, 169–171, 174, 175, 181, 185, 188–191, 195, 196, 263, 265–267, 272, 298, 299, 303

J Jobs, 15, 97, 153, 169, 172, 174, 177, 187, 188, 209, 243, 262, 266, 267, 269, 270, 276, 277 Jobs, American, 169, 172, 174, 175, 177, 195, 262, 266–268, 270 Justification, 2, 8, 10, 11, 28, 29, 33–35, 38, 39, 42, 48, 68, 69, 105, 125, 127, 145, 151, 176, 178, 192, 205, 226, 228, 252, 254, 286, 288, 292, 294

L Labor, cheap, 169, 177, 262, 272 Law and order, 171, 177, 181, 195–197, 262, 263, 266–268 Legitimacy, belief in, 288 Libertarian, 73, 115, 116, 119, 121–123, 126, 134–136, 142, 143, 164, 168, 173, 177, 179–183, 185, 186, 192, 193, 214, 215, 217, 221, 223–225, 227, 235, 236, 242, 243, 257, 262, 263, 271, 272, 275, 276, 279, 302, 306 Liberty homebuyers, 113, 121, 123, 126, 142, 257

329

homeowners, 121, 123, 126, 142, 257 homesellers, 121, 126, 143, 257 tax payers, 243

M Market competition, Public school, 225, 227, 240, 275 Market fairness conservative, 124–126, 128, 135, 141, 175, 177, 195, 196, 257, 262 liberal, 124–126, 135, 137, 141, 175, 177, 180, 187, 188, 257, 259, 262, 272, 309 Middle class, 121, 126, 128, 129, 231, 257–259, 277, 307 Moral economy conservative, 126, 128, 135, 137, 140, 177, 178, 194, 195, 225, 227–230, 232, 233, 235, 242, 243, 257, 262, 275, 276, 279, 280 liberal, 126, 134, 135, 137, 177–180, 186, 187, 189, 190, 226, 227, 232–234, 256–259, 262, 263, 271, 274–276, 278, 279, 308, 309

N Normative ends, 4, 7, 9, 10, 27, 28, 33, 36–39, 42, 43, 72, 74, 75, 286, 289, 291, 292, 295

O Oppose, 46, 114, 115, 118, 133, 163, 167, 212, 219, 227, 271, 275

330

INDEX

P Partisanship, 1–4, 6, 12, 13, 15, 27, 34, 36, 40, 41, 48, 67, 69, 71, 85, 88–91, 105, 106, 110, 111, 115, 132, 135, 142, 151, 152, 158, 161, 162, 171, 186, 205, 206, 210, 232, 251, 252, 285, 287, 289, 290, 296, 303, 308 Policy feedback, 303, 305, 311 Political ideology, American, 72, 120, 170, 222, 286 Poor.. See Working class Populism, 312, 313 Power, 2, 4, 6–9, 27, 28, 30–35, 37, 43, 75, 87, 88, 135, 145, 230, 271, 277, 287–289, 291, 295, 296, 303 Property tax, 207, 212, 214, 215, 221, 227, 275 Protect impoverished/high economic vulnerability, 223, 227, 231, 233, 234, 238, 275, 276, 278, 306 investment, 120, 126, 135, 140, 141, 257, 292, 309 oppressed racial/minority groups, 126, 223, 227, 234, 257, 275, 276 social services, 169, 177, 262 students, 223, 227, 231, 275, 278, 306, 307 Public education, 3, 15, 205, 207, 208, 212, 214, 215, 222–224, 227, 231, 234, 238, 240, 241, 243, 275–277, 303 R Racial equality, 170, 177, 180, 262, 271, 272 Rationale grouping, 68, 69, 125, 126, 128–135, 137–140, 142, 144,

176–180, 182, 183, 187, 189, 190, 192, 194, 195, 226, 227, 229, 231–236, 238–240, 242, 243, 254, 256–258, 260–263, 266, 267, 271, 272, 274–276, 278–280, 293, 297, 298, 302, 306, 309 Reconstruction, 11, 65–67, 69, 70, 106, 152, 206, 252, 287 Redistribution, 214, 219–221, 225, 226, 230, 234, 275–279 Republican, 2, 5, 12–15, 89, 91, 93–97, 107, 111, 113, 115, 118, 120, 127, 128, 132–135, 137, 140, 142, 144, 156, 158, 161, 163, 164, 167, 170, 178, 179, 183, 186, 187, 189, 190, 192, 194, 195, 208, 210, 211, 215, 216, 219, 223, 228, 229, 233, 235, 236, 238, 240, 242, 243, 259, 263, 269, 271, 278, 280, 293, 296, 297, 299, 301–303, 305, 308 Resistance, 155, 289 Responsibility, 45, 46, 77–79, 117, 122, 123, 126, 134–136, 138, 139, 143, 165, 166, 173–175, 177, 180, 181, 185, 191, 196, 197, 208, 216, 218, 257, 262, 265–270, 304, 305 Rhetoric, 10, 78, 87, 153, 155, 156, 161–163, 171, 186, 189, 292, 295, 300, 301, 303, 312, 313 Risk, 45, 77, 78, 87, 117, 123, 126, 134–139, 143, 172, 185, 257, 259, 277, 299, 309

S Safety, 153, 172, 177, 187–189, 195, 196, 209, 262, 273

INDEX

Sales tax, 15, 205, 208, 209, 212, 215, 221, 222, 224, 227, 234, 237, 273, 275, 277–279, 304 Self-interest, norms of, 34, 37, 43, 74, 75, 140, 145, 169, 221, 252, 286, 292, 295, 296, 309 Semi-structured interviews, 2, 10, 38, 66, 85, 87, 88, 97, 106, 152, 206, 286, 313 Social control, 289 Socialization, 36, 37, 42–44, 74, 106, 152, 156, 206, 291, 295, 298, 305, 311, 312 Social programs, 153, 171, 177, 184, 236, 262, 265, 266, 270, 298, 299 Spread, 8, 28, 29, 35, 151, 155, 288 T Taxes and fees, reduction of, 169, 177, 221, 222, 227, 237, 239, 262, 275 Theory building, 10, 11, 15, 65, 67, 69, 110, 153, 157, 178, 210, 256, 261, 274, 285–287, 302 Trump, Donald, 153, 154, 295, 301, 303, 312, 313

331

Typology, 289

U Undermine, 28, 29, 113, 144, 162, 171, 236, 288, 289 Undocumented workers, 151, 153– 157, 159–162, 169–172, 174, 175, 181–185, 187, 188, 190– 192, 195, 196, 263, 265–272, 294, 299, 300, 303, 313

V Voter reasoning, 2, 3, 6, 36, 46, 67–71, 112, 118, 120, 159, 168, 211, 220, 251, 254, 285, 286, 289, 290, 296, 301, 304, 308 Vulnerability economic, 177, 185, 187, 223, 227, 231, 233, 234, 238, 259, 262, 272, 275, 276, 278, 306 social, 177, 184, 262

W Working class, 121, 126, 128, 129, 257, 277