Social Change in Medieval Iran 132-628 AH (750-1231 AD): The Perspectives of Persian Historiography 9789048556304

Table of contents :
Table of Contents
Preface
Introduction
Author’s Notes
Part I The Formation of Iranian Authority under the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate
Introduction
1 The Formation of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate.
2 Establishment of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate
3 Split in the ʿAbbāsid Political Structure
Part II The Structure of Iranian Dynasties. From Dependence to Independence
Introduction
4 The Rule of the Tāherids in the Shadow of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate
5 The Structure of the Sāmānid Government. Moving in the Direction of Cultural Independence
6 The Saffārid Dynasty . A Power outside the ʿAbbāsid Structure
7 The ʿAlawites of Tabarestān, the First Shiʿite Dynasty in Iran
8 The Buyid Dynasty . A Turning Point in Iran’s Social Change
Part III The Rise of Soltānates in the Power Structure
Introduction
9 The Formation of the Ghaznavid Soltānate
10 The Saljuq Dynasty . The First Islamic Empire in Iran
11 The Khwārazmshāhi Dynasty: Emerging from the Saljuq Structure
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Social Change in Medieval Iran 132–628 AH (750–1231 AD)

Social Change in Medieval Iran 132–628 AH (750–1231 AD) The Perspectives of Persian Historiography

Maryam Kamali

Amsterdam University Press

Cover illustration: image of Tārikhāna by Mehdi Saʿidi/source: Wikipedia; the two lines of the manuscript: Tārikh-e Beyhaqi, National Library of Iran, Manuscript code: 1716308 Cover design: Coördesign, Leiden Lay-out: Crius Group, Hulshout isbn 978 94 6372 198 1 e-isbn 978 90 4855 630 4 doi 10.5117/9789463721981 nur 684 © M. Kamali / Amsterdam University Press B.V., Amsterdam 2023 All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this book may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the written permission of both the copyright owner and the author of the book.



Table of Contents

Preface 9 Introduction 11 Author’s Notes

39

Part I The Formation of Iranian Authority under the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate 1 The Formation of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate

45

2 Establishment of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate

63

3 Split in the ʿAbbāsid Political Structure

81

From Secret Daʿva to the Rise of Siyāh-Jāmegān (The Black Garments)

The Restructuring or Displacement of Agents

A Prelude to the Independence of Khorāsān

Part II The Structure of Iranian Dynasties

From Dependence to Independence

4 The Rule of the Tāherids in the Shadow of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate 103 5 The Structure of the Sāmānid Government

113

6 The Saffārid Dynasty

129

7 The ʿAlawites of Tabarestān, the First Shiʿite Dynasty in Iran

141

8 The Buyid Dynasty

151

Moving in the Direction of Cultural Independence

A Power outside the ʿAbbāsid Structure

A Turning Point in Iran’s Social Change

Part III  The Rise of Soltānates in the Power Structure 9 The Formation of the Ghaznavid Soltānate

175

10 The Saljuq Dynasty

209

The First Islamic Empire in Iran

11 The Khwārazmshāhi Dynasty: Emerging from the Saljuq Structure 235 Conclusion 255 Bibliography 263 Index 275

To my mother, Talʿat, and my father, Hosseyn and to the Iranian people fighting for the freedom of Iran #MahsaAmini

Preface What compels the historian to write is undoubtedly the intention to record events that have already ended or are about to end, and the narratives created based on what they have heard or observed take on the lasting color of history. The historian who seeks to immortalize their age never sees themself as separate from the past or the future. Hence, today’s researcher needs to look for the roots of current social change in history. Today, social change is one of the most important topics in the social sciences, including history and sociology. In recent decades, researchers in the social sciences, especially sociologists, offered different definitions for social change. Still, none of these definitions can be used as an accurate template for assessing social change in different societies. Social change in any country is the product of the social characteristics of that country. Therefore, to achieve an acceptable definition of social change in Iran, we must make use of the tools of sociology and historical studies to provide detailed information about the events that happened over time in Iran. This study aims to achieve a new perspective on the study of social change in medieval Iran from the rise of the ʿAbbasid Caliphate (132–656 AH/750–1258 AD) to the collapse of the Khwarazmshahi (469–628 AH/1077–1231 AD) by relying on readings of Persian historical texts, on the one hand, and applying theories of sociology and historical research, on the other. Iranian historians played an essential role in shaping the Islamic historiography in the Arabic language, but with the development of the New Persian language from the language of the people of the street and bazar to the written and scientific language, a new age of historiography began in Iran. Tarikhnama-ye Tabari (352 AH/963 AD) by Abu ʿAli Balʿami was the first work that was produced in the court of the Samanid dynasty and became a model of Persian historiography for the historians that followed. Writing historical texts in Persian, and translating others into Persian, became so popular in Iran that later, during the rule of the Ghaznavids, the Saljuqs, and the Khwarazmshahi, Persian was more commonly used for the composition of historical texts than Arabic. This study examines the history of medieval Iran through the perspective of Tarikhnama-ye Tabari by Abu ʿAli Balʿami (d. 363 AH/974 AD), the first known Persian historian, until the time of ʿAta Melak Joveyni (623–681 AH/1226–1283 AD), the great historian in the time of the Mongols. In this study, Arabic works have been referenced to provide a more accurate picture of social change in Iran.

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Social Change in Medieval Ir an 132–628 AH (750–1231 AD)

I am eternally grateful to Dr. Erin Thomas Dailey for his sincere support for publishing the book and his excellent comments promoting it. I am also so grateful to late professors, Dr. Mohammad Ebrahim Bastani Parizi, Dr. Ehsan Yarshater, Dr. Mohammad Ali Eslami Nodushan, and dear professors Dr. Shirin Bayani, Dr. Sunil Sharma, and Dr. Roy Mottahedeh for their exceptional guidance. I sincerely thank my husband, Habib Hajiheydari, who accompanied me in all stages of creating and compiling the work. His reading of the drafts of every chapter and challenging my arguments and style were very helpful. I also thank my friend Krystyna Colburn for helping me with editing the book and Parisa Ghasemi for helping me with the cover image. I also need to thank my little children, Paria and Arash, for their patience during the long time I was working on this book. I greatly appreciate the help from the publishing and editorial team members of Amsterdam University Press for their marvelous work. Maryam Kamali Fairfield University

Introduction History is the mediated account of past events in human life, an image of a series of events narrated in oral and written reports from multiple and sometimes conflicting points of view. It originates in ancient times and continues to accumulate data points even up to the present moment. Social change is one of the critical topics in the humanities today, including history and sociology, and its importance needs to be taken into consideration in interdisciplinary studies. This research is based on rereading Persian history using sociology and historical research theories, with a new perspective on the study of Iran’s social changes in medieval times from the rise of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate (132–656 AH/750–1258 AD) to the collapse of the Khwārazmshāhi (469–628 AH/1077–1231 AD). The written legacy of the historians writing in Persian reflects their accounts of the process of social change in its close connection with historical events, to the extent that history may not even be conceived without the concept of social change. However, the search for historical texts, especially when they are at a great distance in time from when they were written, is not easy for the humanities researcher because it requires familiarity with the science of history and a closer look at the historical texts. The history researcher is responsible for finding statements in the texts that reveal social changes occurring in specific periods and the changes whose impacts and replicas can be traced through the texts of subsequent generations of historians. To achieve this objective, they need to be equipped with research methods and a good understanding of the essential issues in humanities theories. This work aims to discover the causes and foundations of social change, one of the primary concepts common to the science of history and sociology in medieval Iran (132–628 AH/750–1231 AD), and to examine the links between these changes diachronically. The study claims that the key to the treasures of the past can be traced back to the illumination of the modern disciplines of the humanities. A key lost in the past may open up multiple vistas for searching deeper into human and political history. Examining the ancient roots of a historical experience will inevitably lead us to long and arduous periods of history. Searching for a reverse path

Kamali, M. Social Change in Medieval Iran 132-628 AH (750-1231 AD). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2023 doi: 10.5117/9789463721981_intro

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Social Change in Medieval Ir an 132–628 AH (750–1231 AD)

from the present to the past to reach the roots of an event may connect us to the causal propositions whose roots are even further away in history. In the interconnected chain of causes and effects, we can discover the origin of specific historical events. By originality, I mean that the events that shape social changes are unique and related to one particular time and place. In other words, the cause-and-effect relationship implies that the presence of the same causes may end with the same results, so they are not necessarily unique. However, the specialty of time and place differentiates social change in different areas of the world in various phases of time. In this study, I deal with social change as an integral part of historical events that are connected by the rings of cause and effect. Considering the concept of social change from the point of view of historians writing in Persian, this book examines those interconnected circles of social changes that Iranian dynasties shaped to gain independence from the Umayyads (41–132 AH/661–750 AD) and the ʿAbbāsids. To achieve a significant perspective on studying historical texts, I must initially present my definition of history. History in this study is intended to mean the originality of historical periods in which the characteristic of their separation from each other is manifested by a change in the structure of power and subsequently a change in the agents active in society’s structure. Since I consider three stages (formation, consolidation, and degeneration) for each historical period, I will also separate each period’s social changes to have a more accurate view of the very process of social change. Based on this process of social change, this study is divided into three parts covering three historical phases: – Part I, “The Formation of Iranian Authority under the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate,” covers Iranian agents and structures in the establishment of the caliphate. – Part II, “The Structure of Iranian Dynasties: From Dependence to Independence,” recounts the reign of the first Iranian local dynasties. – Part III, “The Presence of Turkish Agents in the Power Structure,” addresses the rise of the soltānate.

Historians Writing in Persian (352–658 AH/964–1260 AD) The arrival of Islam in Iran was accompanied by social changes in Iranians’ language of science and thought systems. Islam’s emphasis on writing history and the spread of Revāyat-e Hādith (The knowledge of narration of

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Hādith) helped Iranians access Arabic scholarship and thus keep up with other Muslim historians. The Pārsi-ye dari, which was popular in Iran from the Sassanid era (224–651), especially in the eastern parts, was recognized as the scientific and cultural language of the Iranians until the end of the third century and was used alongside Arabic to write both scientific and literary works.1 Before the eleventh century, Arabic, as a scientific language, required historians and other scholars to transfer their knowledge through this language. However, many Iranians were unfamiliar with Arabic; therefore, there was a gap between them and the knowledge of their times. The efforts of the Sāmānids (203–389 AH/819–999 AD), especially during the reign of Mansur ibn Nuh (r. 350–365 AH/961–975 AD), to translate essential works, including Tafsir-e Tabari and Tārikh-e Tabari, were in line with the community’s need to access scientific productions in Arabic.2 Thus, the translation of works from Arabic to Pārsi-ye dari, which was more pleasant and accessible to the Persian-speaking people,3 continued throughout the period from 352 AH/963 AD to 658 AH/1260 AD. The translations of Tārikh-e Bokhārā by Narshakhi and Tārikh-e Yamini by ʿOtbi are good examples of works written during this time that were primarily summarized or expanded versions of the original texts. 4 For some historians, including Jorfādeqāni, the translator of Tārikh-e Yamini, translating from Arabic into Persian was not easy. They believed that Arabic had more capacity to convey scientific topics in terms of structure and vocabulary. However, the persistent efforts of Iranian intellectuals, including Bu Nasr Moshkān, Beyhaqi, Ibn Balkhi, Afzal Kermāni, and Jowzjāni, gradually demonstrated the Persian language’s capacity to convey meanings and discuss highly complicated issues. These efforts culminated with Beyhaqi, Joveyni, and, later, Rashid al-Din Fazlollāh. It seems that in this direction, the Persian language gradually created a separate identity for historians writing in Persian, which I do not intend to address in this study. This study examines the history of social change in Iran through historians’ perspectives from Balʿami (d. 363 AH/974 AD) to Joveyni (623–681 AH/1226–1283 AD). After the Muslim invasions of Iran, Arabic became 1 Safā, 2000, vol. 1, p. 130. 2 Meisami, 1999, p. 13; Melville, 2012, p. xxx; Peacock, 2007, p. 53. 3 Narshakhi, 1984, p. 5; Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939. p. 8. 4 The anonymous author tries to bring Persian poems in his work as much as possible, “Arab poets have written about him [Abu Jaʿfar] in many of their poems, but in this book we have restricted ourselves to the Persian except where writings in the Persian either do not remain or cannot be found. Tārikh-e Sistān, 1987, p. 324; tr., 1976, p. 265.

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the predominant language of learning and science throughout the Islamic Empire. As a result, eminent scholars wrote their works in Arabic. However, after two centuries, Iranians began to revitalize the Persian language as their language of science and learning. Historians were one group of these scholars who conveyed their understanding of Iran’s social changes through the Persian language. Balʿami is the first known historian writing in Iran to report on social change. His work is a summarized translation of Tārikh-e Tabari. However, Balʿami also contributes his understanding of the history of Iran to his translation. Tārikh-e Jahān-goshā, the previous historical work of the study, ends with the fall of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. Social changes in Iran will be examined based on the most significant Persian historical texts written in the period between 352 AH/693 AD (Tārikhnāma-ye Tabari) and 658 AH/1260 AD (Tārikh-e Jahān-goshā). The books used in this study are: Tārikhnāma-ye Tabari attributed to Abu ʿAli Balʿami (352 AH/963 AD),5 Zeyn al-Akhbār or Tārikh-e Gardizi (404 AH/1013 AD),6 Tārikh-e Sistān (445–725 AH/1053–1324 AD),7 Tārikh-e Beyhaqi (448–468 AH/1056–1075 AD),8 Siyar al-Moluk or Siyāsatnāma (484 AH/1091 AD),9 Fārsnāma-ye Ibn Balkhi (510 AH/1116 AD),10 Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas (520 AH/1126 AD),11 ʿAtabat al-Kataba (528–548 AH/1133–1153 AD),12 Tārikh-e Bokhārā (557 AH/1161 AD),13 Tārikh-e Beyhaq (563 AH/1167 AD),14 Saljuqnāma (571–590 AH/1175–1194 AD),15 Tārikh-e al-Vozarā (584 AH/1188 AD),16 ʿAqd al-ʿAla Lel-Mowqef al-ʿAlā (584 AH/1188 AD),17 Rāhat al-Sodur va Āyat al-Sorur (599 AH/1202 AD),18 Tārikh-e Yamini (603 AH/1206 AD),19 Tārikh-e Afzal or Badāyeʿ al-Zamān fe Vaqāyeʿe Kermān (606 AH/1209 AD), 20 Tārikh-e Tabarestān (613 AH/1216 AD), 21 Nafthat al-Masdur (632 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

Balʿami, 1999. Gardizi, 1984, p. 985. Tārikh-e Sistān, 1987. Beyhaqi, 1995. Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, 1999. Ibn Balkhi, 2006. Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939. Atābak Joveyni, 2005. Narshakhi, 1984. Ibn Fondoq, 2011. Zahiri Neyshāburi, 2011a. Abol Rajāʾe Qomi, 1984. Afzal Kermāni, 1977. Rāvandi, 2011. Jorfādeqāni, 2003. Afzal Kermāni, 1947. Ibn Esfandiyār, 2011.

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AH/1234 AD), 22 Sirat-e al-Jalāl al-Din Mengeborni (639 AH/1241 AD), 23 Tabaqāt-e Nāseri (658 AH/1259 AD),24 and Tārikh-e Jahān-goshā (651–658 AH/1253–1259 AD).25 The long period under study and the diversity of texts limit me to examining the published works of this time; therefore, this study does not attempt to cover any unpublished manuscripts. In this book, as needed, Arabic works and historical sources from later medieval periods are referenced to provide a clearer picture of social change in Iran.

Theoretical Framework The study will approach social change in medieval Iran from the rise of the ʿAbbāsid era (132–658 AH/750–1258 AD) to the collapse of the Khwārazmshāhi (469–628 AH/1077–1231 AD) through the main elements of structuration theory as proposed by Anthony Giddens. In The Constitution of Society,26 Giddens presents the most extensive and explicit statement concerning this theory: “Every research investigation in the social sciences or history is involved in relating action to structure.”27 The aim is to create an encompassing social theory that does not focus simply on human agents or structures but rather the interaction between these two elements of society to reach and consolidate power. These interactions take place in specific places and phases of time.28 Human agents or actors interact with social structures through invented values, norms, and social acceptance. Therefore, the role of the human agents is neither based solely on volunteerism nor restricted by the social structure.29 Giddens infers a hierarchy of mental activity with discursive consciousness at the top, practical consciousness in the middle, and the unconscious at the bottom. This hierarchy comprises the centerpiece of the theory of the acting subject.30 Practical consciousness bears significant theoretical weight because it refers to the knowledge of how to act. Understanding how to act is nonverbal 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Nasavi, 2006. Nasavi, 1987. Jowzjāni, 1984. Joveyni, 2006. Giddens, 1984. Ibid., p. 219. Ibid., p. 219. Lamsal, 2012, pp. 112–113; Turner, 1986, p. 972. Stones, 1998, pp. 37–40.

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tactical knowledge, which means that we learn much of it without didactic instruction and we take it for granted most of the time. Each day we perform a myriad of practices without conscious reflection.31 Discursive consciousness is a state of awareness of our thoughts when, for any reason, a situation arises where we lack the ability in a way that is normal.32 Giddens claims that human conduct is always subject to a compelling unconscious motivation, which is the need to maintain ontological security.33 In this theory, the emphasis is on the dialectic interactions of agents and structures to attain power: Being an agent is to be able to deploy a range of causal powers, including that of influencing those deployed by others. Action depends upon the capability of the individuals to make a difference to a pre-existing state of affairs or course of events. An agent ceases to be such if he or she loses the capability to make a difference, that is, to exercise some sort of power.34

For Giddens, structures do not exist without agents. In other words, he believes that if structures have a locus, it is in the heads of the social agents.35 He argues that the dualisms between agency and structure, and individual and society cannot be overcome merely by bringing these two types of approaches together.36 To overcome the problems of traditional dualism, he proposes the duality of structure. In this regard, the structure comprises two parts: the resources that enable and the rules that constrain.37 In other words, social change is produced through the interaction of agents with social structures, agents which play the two roles of constraining and enabling.38 Giddens describes social practices not as having structures but as exhibiting structural properties.39 In short, the center of Gidden’s structuration theory does not emphasize agents or structures but on the process of production, reproduction, and transformation of structures in a particular time and place. 40 31 Ibid., p. 283. 32 Ibid., p. 284; Bryant and Jary, 1991, pp. 7–8. 33 Stones, 1998, p. 284; Bryant and Jary, 1991, p. 7. 34 Giddens, 1984, p. 14. 35 Craib, 1992, p. 42. 36 Loyal, 2003, p. 28. 37 Ibid., p. 76. 38 Giddens, 1984, pp. 16–17; Lamsal, 2012, p. 112; Craib, 1992, p. 35; Stones, 2005, p. 16. 39 Giddens, 1984, p. 17. 40 Craib, 1992, pp. 43–44; Stones, 1998, p. 24; Loyal, 2003, pp. 93–94.

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The concept of power in structuration theory focuses on the agents and structures that are connected in order to reproduce structures.41 Power is tied to agents who make a difference in society. 42 Therefore, in his theory, these elements are interconnected. Agents and structures in connection with power shape a triangle that reproduces the remnant structures of society. Thus, social change is not the outcome of the complete alteration in the current structures, but includes their reproduction. The basis of this study into the phenomenon of social change is the work of historians writing in Persian and some elements of Gidden’s theory of structuration. Social change is def ined as social reproduction, i.e., the product of interactions between agents and structures to achieve power. Putting structuration theory in this context, this study examines the social change in Iran during the ʿAbbāsid reign, which emerged from the interactions between social agents and structures aimed at achieving power in the medieval territory that is currently called “Iran.” To achieve power manifested in independence, social agents’ social change was developed by dealing with the rules and resources of structures.

Key Terms of Research Social change: Considering the structuration theory of Anthony Giddens and Persian historical works, this study defines social change as the result of the dialectical interactions between social agents and structures in a specific time and place to achieve power. Through these interactions, entirely new structures are not produced, but previous structures are reconstructed. Regarding this study, social changes are the interlocked rings of reconstructed structures that develop into Iran’s historical phases. Power: The aim that inspires the interaction between social agents and structures. In this study, power is manifested in achieving political independence in Iran from the ʿAbbāsids. Based on Persian historical works, the Iranians always maintained the ideal map of the pre-Islamic territories of Iran under the Sāssānids. In this study, independence does not mean a national movement as it is defined in modern times, but it does involve having a distinct political structure involving territories in the Sāssānid map of Iran. 41 Craib, 1992, p. 50. 42 Loyal, 2003, p. 80.

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Social Change in Medieval Ir an 132–628 AH (750–1231 AD)

Structure: Structure is composed of two parts: the resources that enable and the rules which constrain agents. In other words, social structures themselves are both enabling and constraining. Here, the structures are caliphate, soltānate, vizierate, and amirate. Agent: Social agents are the people in power who interact with social structures through invented values, norms, and social acceptance to reconstruct the structures. In this study, the intended agents include: – Caliph/king/soltān (shāh/shāhanshāh) in the leadership structure – Vizier (minister) or another bureaucrat in the vizierate – Amir (military commander) in the amirate Place: The place under study is greater Iran, i.e., the eastern Islamic territories from Mā Varā al-Nahr (Transoxiana) in the east to Baghdad in the west. This study’s geographical region shifts along this terrain based on the development of different local and regional dynasties. Time: This study covers the history of Iran from the rise of the ʿAbbāsids (132–656 AH/750–1258 AD) to the collapse of the Khwārazmshāhi (469–628 AH/1077–1231 AD). Based on the social changes that develop through the interactions of different agents and structures, the study is classified into three historical phases: 1. The establishment of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. 2. The reign of the first Iranian local dynasties, including the Tāherids (205–259 AH/820–872 AD), the Sāmānids (203–389 AH/819–999 AD) the Saffārids (247–393 AH/861–1003 AD), the ʿAlawites (250–316 AH/864–928 AD), and the Buyids (320–448 AH/932–1056 AD). 3. The rise of the soltānates, including the Ghaznavids (351–582 AH/963–1187 AD), the Saljuqs (429–590 AH/1037–1194 AD), and the Khwārazmshāhi (469–628 AH/1077–1231 AD). Social Change vs. Social History As this book intends to show, social change has quite a different meaning from social history. Social history is the branch of history that emphasizes social structures and the interaction of different groups in society rather than affairs of the state. An outgrowth of economic history, it expanded as a discipline in the 1960s. As a field, it often borders on economic history on

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the one hand and sociology and ethnology on the other.43 As G. M. Trevelyan, the British historian, defines it, social history is the history of a people with the politics left out. 44 Therefore, social history merely examines the actions and structures of social actors insofar as they deal with people’s daily lives and thus distances itself from addressing the dialectics of actors and structures in line with the will to power. This study is not concerned with social history, but instead with social change. It focuses on the actions of social structures such as the caliphate, soltānate, vizierate, and amirate. Even ordinary people are essential in interacting with the existence of power. In other words, unlike social history, which does not deal with power directly and may even “leave out the politics,” this study focuses on the political and administrative mechanisms by which society is shaped and examines how agents’ will to power and their interaction with social structures led to extensive and lasting changes in medieval Iran. Social Change vs. Nationalism The topic of this book is social change and not nationalism. It concerns the dialectic interactions of agents and structures in the process of gaining power in Iran from 132 AH/750 AD to 628 AH/1231 AD. During this long period, Arabic, Iranian, and Turkish agents and structures were involved. The fluidity of “Arabs,” Iranians, and Turks who embraced diverse identities that intersected in complex ways regarding place of origin, lifestyle, language, and social status, and that absorbed other identities through mixed lineage families, religious conversion, language acquisition, and other strategies of integration is an essential element that must be considered in this book. This book examines the production and reproduction of structures resulting from dialectic interactions of different agents and structures that had roots in Arab, Iranian, and Turkish ethnicities. For example, in the first chapter of the book, the structure of daʿva will be examined and how the ʿAbbāsids used this structural resource to spread their words throughout Khorāsān. Daʿva was one of the main traditions (sonna) of the prophets, inviting people to monotheism, and it has had a long chapter in the history of religions. The religion of Islam was essentially founded on daʿva by which Mohammad spread his message in Arabia. Chapter 5 shows how this 43 Encyclopedia Britannica, 2016. 44 Burke, 2005, p. 6.

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structure was reproduced by the Ismāʿili dāʿies, including Hasan Sabbāh, and helped them establish their power in some regions of Iran. To give another example, Chapter 9 examines the structure of kingship (shāhi) and how it was reproduced by ʿAzod al-Dowla with the title of shāhanshāh. In Chapter 9, the Ghaznavid dynasty will be studied and how Soltān Mahmud could reproduce this structure with the title of soltān. In these two examples and other structures and agents that are examined, the book does follow the circle of social change in Iran as it was shaped in different ways by Arabs, Iranians, and Turks. In this regard, ethnic identity was produced and reproduced under social pressures in a complex way that interacted with other identities, and its permeability best defines that. This book contributes a Persian writing-based report of the social changes that took shape during the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. It provides a narrative of social changes shaped by different agents over a long period of time through the eyes of historians writing in Persian. This book focuses on these historians because there is no other study that provides a narrative of the history of Iran based on historical works in Persian. It does not mean that book’s theme is one of nationalism. Indeed, many medieval Iranian historians wrote their works in Arabic (such as Abu Hanifa Dinevari in Akhbār al-Tevvāl) and were nationalistically inclined, but these works are not used the basis of this book. However, Arabic works are referenced, as needed (for example, for the Buyid dynasty, Arabic works are consulted to provide a clearer picture of social change in Iran). Many Persian historians whose works were introduced and used in this book have not been seriously considered before. In this sense, this book contributes to medieval historiography.

Research Methods and Theoretical Framework for Reading Historical Texts The definition of social change used in this study is based on the work of historians writing in Persian and Giddens’ theory of structuration. Thus, social change is defined as social reproduction, which results from the dialectic of agents and structures to achieve power. All my efforts in this research project provide a clear and historical account of the social changes in medieval Iranian history by preserving the existing lines and boundaries in interdisciplinary study and approaching a new perspective on historical events. Therefore, we only deal with those social changes that can be examined according to the definition provided.

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Besides all my attempts to keep moving within interdisciplinary studies, I intend to present a clear historical narration of social change in medieval Iran under the ʿAbbāsids. My main objective is to introduce a new perspective of Iran’s social changes; therefore, I have restricted the focus to those kinds of social changes that are accessible through the definitions given. The research method in this book will be descriptive-analytical. Based on this, the social changes resulting from the dialectic of agent and structure to achieve power are introduced, and the process of their formation is evaluated. As the most important factor in the agent’s move toward structure and engagement with its rules and resources, power forms a circle of social change by reproducing social structures and institutions. In this analysis, attention to the source of power and how it is legitimized, as well as the role of the two factors of religion and war as effective tools in the dialectical mode of action and structure, are emphasized. This study argues that the circles of social change in its historical process are never separate, but all of them reproduce past structures and institutions whose social actions have changed their construction according to the needs of the day. This book tries to find the social changes of Iran and their links during the Middle Ages (132–628 AH/750–1231 AD) by using Giddens’ theory of structuration.

Review of Related Research Ann K. S. Lambton’s Continuity and Change in Medieval Persia: Aspects of Administrative, Economic and Social History, 11th–14th Century (1988) is one of the few works of independent historical research on the social changes of medieval Iran. This work, which is the expansion of five lectures given at Columbia University in 1981, covers administration, law, landed property, taxes, and social classes under the Saljuqs, Khwārazmshāhi, and Mongols. Lambton emphasizes continuous development and constant change throughout the three centuries under consideration and that continuity and change should not be seen in sharp contrast. Overall, the most obvious break in continuity, and therefore the sharpest contrast, occurred in the early Mongol period, before Ghāzān’s conversion to Islam. Lambton believes that the developments in Iran were related to the rulers, and its continuation was associated with the institutions and affairs of the judiciary. At the same time, religious and social affairs and other institutions witnessed a very calm and gradual change. The author emphasizes the role of military forces, especially that of the Turks, as the source of fundamental

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Social Change in Medieval Ir an 132–628 AH (750–1231 AD)

changes in the rule and governance of Islamic societies and the beginning of a new era politically. Lambton opens a new window into the medieval history of Iran. However, she seeks to prove her theory of the role of the bureaucratic and military structures rather than revisiting developments in Iran through the lens of historical texts. Jürgen Paul (2016) in Lokale und imperial Herrschaft im Iran des 12. Jahrhundrets. Herrschaftspraxis und Konzepte focuses on the pre-Mongol history of Iran and how political rule was organized there. It examines the connections between the sultan and the local lords and the important people of the empire who belonged to the sultan’s household. This book aims to teach the reader about the social ties between representatives of different power levels, including caliphs, sultans, governors, and amirs. In another book, Herrscher, Gemeinwesen, Vermittler: Ostiran und Transoxanien in vormongolischer Zeit, Paul (1996) examines the reach of state power in Iran, including Khorāsān, Mā Varā al-Nahr, and central Iran, and the activity of those who mediated between the state and local communities, including towns, villages, special interest groups, in the pre-Mongol era in three key areas: irrigation and water distribution; taxation; and the military. He argues that the decentralized society with a multilayered power structure and a wide range of informal, personal networks limited the sphere of direct action by the ruler or central administration. Din va Dowlat dar Iran-e ʿAhd-e Moghol (2002) by Shirin Bayāni analyzes Iran’s political, social, and religious conditions in the Mongol era. In this book, while reporting on the events in Iran during the era, Bayāni discusses the social changes resulting from the Khwārazmshāhi rule and the Mongol invasions and how the attitude of important actors shaped transformations in the religious and political systems of that time. The researcher’s problemoriented approach and the rereading of firsthand works and references to various sources according to the developments of the Mongol era cause the reader’s mind to be eager to learn more about the social changes of the Khwārazmshāhi and Mongol eras. The editors’ introductions to the Persian historical works under study provide a solid basis for learning about these sources and their authors. These introductions were produced by Mohammad Roshan (Tārikh-e Tabari), ʿAbdol Hayy Habibi (Tārikh-e Gardizi), Mohammad ʿAli Bahar (Tārikh-e Sistān and Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas), Khalil Khatib Rahbar (Tārikh-e Beyhaqi), Mohammad Qazvini (ʿAtaba va al-Kataba and Jahān-goshā), Modarres Razavi (Tārikh-e Bokhārā), Mohammad Bahmanyār (Tārikh-e Beyhaq), Mohammad Dāneshpajuh and Badiʿ Al-Zaman Foruzānfar (Rāhat al-Sodur Va Āyat al-Sorur), Mehdi Bayān (Tārikh-e Afzal), ʿAbbās Eqbāl (Tārikh-e Esfandiyār),

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Amir Hosseyn Yazdgerdi (Nafsat al-Masdur), Mojtabā Minovi (Sirat-e Jalāl al-Din Mengoberni), Abdol Hayy Habibi (Tabaqāt-e Nāseri), and Mohammad Qazvini (Tārikh-e Jahān-goshā). Besides, works such as the book Tārikh-e Adabiyāt dar Iran by Zabihollāh Safā, Tārikh-e Adabiyāt-e Iran by Edward Brown, and Sabkshenāsi by Mohammad ʿAli Bahār provide us with a list of the historical works of this period and in the light of Persian literature. Julie Scott Meisami’s book Persian Historiography to the End of the Twelfth Century (1999) examines some of the leading historical texts of the Sāmānid, Ghaznavid, and Saljuq dynasties. It concentrates on the emergence of Persian historiography relying on pre-Islamic Persian and Arabic works, its connection with Iranian and Arabic models, and its political and cultural functions. This study addresses issues relating to the motivation for writing the works in question, its purpose, the role of the author, patrons, and audiences, the choice of language, and the reasons for that choice. Meisami aims to emphasize that historians, in addition to narrating events, have provided a meaningful account of their contemporary society. Persian Historiography (2012), edited by Charles Melville, comprehensively introduces historical works in Persian. In this work, which has been written in collaboration with prominent researchers and experts in the history of Iran, the process of writing historical texts from the Sāmānid period to the Pahlavi period has been studied and the important chronicles of each period have been introduced. The course of Persian historiography in other countries, including the Ottoman Empire, India, Afghanistan, and Central Asia, has been followed, and significant works have been briefly introduced. In the introduction to the work, Melville emphasizes that Persian historiography has always been on the margins of Arabic historiography and has been neglected. Therefore, their work is merely an attempt to provide an overview of the state of Persian historiography. In this work, the historiography of the period (352–658 AH/964–1260 AD) is introduced by Julie Scott Meisami, Daniel Elton, and Charles Melville. Each of these authors looked at historical works from different perspectives. In this work, the emphasis is on the Persian language, and historical texts are examined as a subset of Persian literature; therefore, this book informs the reader about the historical and literary aspects of chronicles. In Mediaeval Islamic Historiography and Political Legitimacy: Balʿami’s Tarikhnamah, A. C. S. Peacock (2007) examines Balʿami’s Tārikhnāma as the oldest political and surviving cultural work of Persian prose and how political circumstances influenced its composition and reception. This research’s primary purpose is to answer the question of to what extent and how the political conditions and historical context have been influential in the authorship, content, public acceptance, and subsequent developments

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Social Change in Medieval Ir an 132–628 AH (750–1231 AD)

of this text. While addressing the central issues in Balʿami’s history, Peacock compares the structure and content of Balʿami’s translation with Tārikh-e Tabari. By enumerating the differences between the historiography and the history of Tabari, Peacock intends to introduce Balʿami’s main purpose in competing with Tabari and the famous authority of his work. He concludes that the variety of topics in Tārikhnāma is more diverse and that are no conclusive answers about the number of narrations in the history of Tabari. The current study approaches the social changes in the medieval period through a coherent process based on interdisciplinary studies. Mimi Hanaoka’s Authority and Identity in Medieval Islamic Historiography: Persian Histories from the Peripheries (2016) is a notable contribution to medieval Islamic historiography, especially in regard to local chronicles. Considering five cities and regions in Iran (Bokhārā, Beyhaq, Qom, Sistān, and Tabarestān) the first three chapters focus on five chronicles that were written between the tenth and thirteenth centuries: Tārikh-e Bokhārā, Tārikh-e Beyhaq, Tārikh-e Qom, Tārikh-e Sistān, and Tārikh-e Tabarestān. The subsequent chapters are dedicated to the discussion of different discursive elements. This book is an essential companion on how to read local chronicles in the medieval Islamic world. Examining works created by historians writing in Persian, this study presents a coherent narrative of the changes that occurred in Iran due to the activities of social actors and to the structures that arose during the period from the rise of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate (132–656 AH/750–1258 AD) to the collapse of the Khwārazmshāhi (469–628 AH/1077–1231 AD).

A Review of the Main Sources of the Research Tārikhnāma-ye Tabari, Attributed to Balʿami (352 AH/963 AD) Tārikhnāma-ye Tabari is the translation of Akhbār al-Omam va al-Moluk by Mohammad ibn Jarir Tabari. After the Introduction to Shāhnāma-ye Abu Mansuri in 346 AH/957 AD, Tārikhnāma-ye Tabari is the second known prose text in the Persian language. 45 In 352 AH/963 AD, Tārikhnāma-ye Tabari, was translated under Mansur ibn Nuh ibn Ahmad ibn Ismāʿil (350–365 AH/961–976 AD), the Sāmānid amir. There is some controversy about 45 ʿAbdol Razzāq Tusi, the commander of Khorāsān, commissioned his vizier, Abu Mansur Marmari, to supervise the compilation of a prose Shāhnāma. Of this Shāhnāma, only the preface survived (Balʿami, 1999, vol. 1, p. 12; Meisami, 1999, p. 20).

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whether this book was translated by Abu ʿAli Mohammad ibn Mohammad ibn ʿAbdollāh al-Tamimi al-Balʿami (d. 363 AH/974 AD), the vizier of Mansur ibn Nuh, 46 or by scholars in Bokhārā employed by Balʿami. 47 At any rate, because of the critical role of Balʿami either as the translator of the book or the person in charge of employing others to translate it, Tārikhnāma-ye Tabari is attributed to him. It relates events that happened from the time of Adam to that of the author. It contains invaluable myths, stories, national and ritual legends, and original words and expressions in Pārsi-ye dari. The first section of the book covers the history of the prophets and the preIslamic kings of Iran. It was edited by Mohammad ʿAli Bahār and Mohammad Parvin Gonābadi in 1962. The second part constitutes the history of medieval Iran from the arrival of Islam to the time of the ʿAbbāsid caliph, al-Mostarshed Bellāh (r. 496–513 AH/1118–1135 AD). The second part, titled Tārikhnāma-ye Tabari, was edited by Mohammad Roshan and published in four volumes in 1987.48 Although Tārikhnāma-ye Tabari was essentially intended to be the translation of Tārikhnāma-ye Tabari, it differs from Tabari’s work.49 In this research, Tārikhnāma-ye Tabari is the basis for the examination of social changes in Iran from the establishment of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate (132– 656 AH/750–1258 AD) to the reign of the Sāmānids (203–389 AH/819–999 AD). The book places emphasis on the Iranian agents of the military and the bureaucrats in shaping the power structure of the ʿAbbāsids. It examines the Iranian dynasties of the Tāherids, the Saffārids, the Sāmānids, the ʿAlawites, and the Buyids. The author is not confined to narrating social changes, but analyzes the interactions of social agents compared with contemporary structures to portray a full picture of the social changes of this time. Zeyn al-Akhbār (404 AH/1013 AD) Abu Said Abdol Hayy-e Gardizi50 wrote Zeyn al-Akhbār as a general history at the court of Abdol Rashid, the son of Soltān Mahmud Ghaznavi (r. 441–444 AH/1049–1052 AD).51 It is a brief account of pre-Islamic dynasties in Iran, the 46 Nezāmi ʿAruzi, 2004, p. 23. 47 Balʿami, 1999, vol. 1, p. 13; Balʿami, 2001, vol. 1, pp. 7–8. 48 Balʿami, 1999, vol.1, p. 33. 49 Peacock, 2007, p. 3. 50 Zeyn al-Akhbār lacks a preface and the ending pages; therefore, it is not known whether Gardizi was a scribe or a minor official at Soltān Mahmud’s court (Meisami, 1999, p. 68). 51 ʿAbdol Hayy-e Habibi, the editor of the book, states that Gardizi, the author of the book, had taken the name of the book from the title of Soltān ʿAbdol Rashid, i.e., ʿEzz al-Dowlat va Zeyn al-Mellat, Seyf Allah ʿAbdol Rashidʿ, which was inscribed on Ghaznavid coins (Gardizi, 1984, p. 20).

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Social Change in Medieval Ir an 132–628 AH (750–1231 AD)

history of Islam from the beginning to the time of the ʿAbbāsids, and the history of medieval Iran under the dynasties of the Tāherids, the Saffārids, the Sāmānids, and the Ghaznavids to the time of the author. Hence, it is oriented toward the history of Iran.52 Like the works of the Sāmānids, Zeyn al-Akhbār is written in simple language.53 In this study, Zeyn al-Akhbār is used to examine the history of the Ghaznavids. Although the author summarizes the circumstances of this era, we can still explore the origins of many social changes, particularly the passing of power from Mahmud to Masʿud. The problem of succession and the status of bureaucrats in the power structure of the Ghaznavids are some of the main issues that Gardizi examines. Tārikh-e Sistān (445–725 AH/1053–1324 AD) The Tārikh-e Sistān is the local history of Sistān from 465 AH/1072 AD to 726 AH/1325 AD.54 Several anonymous authors wrote it in different periods, so the book’s style varies from the simple language in the first part to rhetorical language in other sections.55 Because the work’s original title is unknown, Mohammad Taqi Bahār, the book’s editor, named it the Tārikh-e Sistān.56 Tārikh-e Sistān was used to examine the social changes developed from the emergence of Abu Moslem Khorāsāni, the Tāherids, the Saffārids, the ʿAlawites, and the Sāmānids. The historian’s attention to the power structure of the Saffārids and how they could establish an independent political structure from the ʿAbbāsids turned Tārikh-e Sistān into a significant source for the examination of social changes. Tārikh-e Beyhaqi (448–468 AH/1056–1075 AD) Tārikh-e Beyhaqi or Tārikh-e Masʾudi by Abol Fazl Mohammad ibn Hosseyn Beyhaqi (385–470 AH/995–1077 AD) is one of the primary sources 52 Gardizi’s main source in writing his book Zeyn al-Akhbār is Al-Tārikh fi Akhbār Volāt-e Khorāsān by Abu ʿAli Salami Beyhaqi Neyshāburi (300 AH/912 AD), one of the scholars in the court of Chaqānids (Gardizi, 1984, p. 9), and the works of Biruni, Ibn Moqaffaʿ, Abu Zeyd Balkhi, Ibn Khordādbeh, and Abu ʿAbdol lāh Jeyhāni (ibid., p. 21). However, he wrote the accounts of the reigns of Soltān Mahmud and Soltān Masʿud based on what he witnessed (ibid., p. 379). Meisami, 1999, p. 68; Melville, 2012, p. 124. 53 Zarrinkub, 2007, pp. 14–18. 54 The first part of Tārikh-e Sistān draws on many sources, including ʿAjāyeb al-Boldān or ʿAjāyeb al-Barr va al-Bahr by Abol Moʿayyed Balkhi (early eleventh century) (Tārikh-e Sistān, 1987, p. 12). 55 Tārikh-e Sistān, 1987, p. 61; Meisami, 1999, pp. 108–109. 56 Tārikh-e Sistān, 1987, p. 5; Meisami, 1999, p. 108.

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that examines the social changes of medieval Iran. Beyhaqi served in the Ghaznavid chancellery (Divān-e Rasāʾel) as an assistant to its head, Abu Nasr Moshkān (d. 431 AH/1039 AD).57 It covers the history of Soltān Masʿud (r. 421–432 AH/1030–1040 AD) and the conflicts between the Ghaznavids and the Saljuqs (429–590 AH/1037–1194 AD), which led to the domination of Toghrol I (r. 429–455 AH/1037–1063 AD), the first soltān of the Saljuqs. Working within the Ghaznavid chancellery, Beyhaqi had full access to the archives of the dynasty. In addition, he was a witness to many of the events he recounts.58 As Khalil Khatib Rahbar, the book’s editor, notes, Tārikh-e Beyhaqi was compiled in 30 volumes, but only six volumes have survived.59 The style of the book is both rhetorical and pleasant. Beyhaqi’s attention to social changes under the Ghaznavids, the interactions between social agents and structures, and his precise attention to the details of events distinguish his work from others. His attention to the issue of succession, the conflicts between two generations of the Ghaznavid agents under Mahmud and Masʿud, and the irrational measures of Soltān Masʿud, which challenged the power structure of the Ghaznavids, can be thoroughly followed in Tārikh-e Beyhaqi. The presence of Beyhaqi as a bureaucrat in the court provides the readers with a vivid picture of social changes under the Ghaznavids that would be inaccessible without him. Siyar al-Moluk or Siyāsatnāma by Khwāja Nezām al-Molk Tusi (479–484 AH/1086–1091 AD) Siyar al-Moluk or Siyāsatnāma by Khwāja Nezām al-Molk (d. 485 AH/1092 AD), the vizier of the Saljuq, is the most outstanding work in the genre of mirrors for princes. Khwāja Nezām al-Molk composed it for Soltān Malekshāh (r. 465–485 AH/1072–1092 AD) in 479–484 AH/1086–1091 AD. It contains the knowledge and experience of Khwāja Nezām al-Molk about politics and political structures. He draws upon the past for exemplary accounts of past rulers.60 It contains 50 chapters on different social topics, including the role of different social agents in the political structure. These include the kings, viziers, amirs (military men), judges, spies (monhis or jāsuses), and messengers (envoys).61 Written in simple language, it forms a bridge 57 Meisami, 1999, pp. 79–80. 58 Ibid., p. 80. 59 Beyhaqi, 1995, vol. 1, p. 24. 60 Meisami, 1999, p. 145. 61 Safā, 2000, vol. 2, p. 906.

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Social Change in Medieval Ir an 132–628 AH (750–1231 AD)

between two phases of Iranian historiography, the Ghaznavid and the Saljuq.62 What highlights the significance of this book concerning social changes is the interactions between social agents such as soltāns, viziers, and amirs. Writing about his problems in managing the extensive empire of the Saljuqs, Khwāja Nezām al-Molk highlights his conflicts with the social structures of the soltānate and the amirs. The conflicts between religious structures (including the Sunnis and Ismāʿilis) are some of the main social changes covered in Siyāsatnāma. Khwāja Nezām al-Molk points to his religious policies in establishing Nezāmiya schools (religious colleges) to consolidate Saljuq central power. Fārsnāma-ye Ibn Balkhi (510 AH/1116 AD) Fārsnāma, the local history of Fars from pre-Islamic times to the reign of the Saljuqs, was written by an anonymous writer whose father was from Balkh. Therefore, Le Strange, the editor of the book, has called the author Ibn Balkhi.63 He was appointed by Barkiyāroq ibn Malekshāh (r. 485–498 AH/1092–1104 AD) in 492 AH/1098 AD to serve as a mostowfi (financial administrator) in Fars.64 Examining the religious conditions of Fars under the Saljuqs in simple language, Fārsnāma provides valuable information on social changes of this era. Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas (520 AH/1126 AD) Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas is a general history compiled in 25 chapters by an anonymous historian from Hamedān. It begins with the myth of creation and goes to 520 AH/1126 AD under the Saljuqs.65 As the name of the book implies, the style of the book is a brief account of events in simple language.66 Even though the book’s content is brief and does not include details, it constitutes precious information on social change under the Buyids, the Ghaznavids, Ziyārids, and the Saljuqs. What is critically useful

62 Meisami, 1999, p. 162; Bahār, 2003, vol. 2, p. 110. 63 Ibn Balkhi, 2006, p. 3; Meisami, 1999, pp. 162–163. 64 Ibn Balkhi, 2006, p. 3; Meisami, 1999, pp. 162–163. 65 It goes through political events, but also the geographical history of cities. In addition, the author sometimes includes legends and folklore about historical places and figures (Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939, p. 16). 66 It draws on signif icant sources like Tārikh-e Tabari, Tārikh-e Beyhaqi, Tārikh-e Yamini, Ketāb-e Tāji, and Riyāz al-Ons le ʿAqd al-Anās (ibid., p. 16).

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to this study is the chapter on the consolidation of the Shiʿite structure of the Buyids in Baghdad and the heartland of Sunni structures. ʿAtabat al-Kataba (528–548 AH/1133–1153 AD) ʿAtabat al-Kataba is a collection of letters of Montakhab al-Din Badiʿ Atābak Joveyni (681 AH/1282 AD), the scribe of Soltān Sanjar (511–552 AH/1117–1157 AD) and the chief of the chancellery of the Saljuqs. The author lived in the time of Rashid Vatvāt (d. 577 AH/1181 AD), the famous poet of the Khwārazmshāh, and Anvari (d. 575 AH/1179 AD), the prominent poet of the Saljuq court and the person who intervened for the life of Rashid Vatvāt in the court of Sanjar.67 ʿAtabat al-Kataba contains two sections. The f irst is the Soltāniyāt, which introduces the duties of different agents such as judges, mohtaseb (a supervisor of bāzārs and trade in the medieval Islamic countries), and rulers of cities and the people in charge of eqtāʿ (land grants). The second part, Ekhvāaniyāt, examines the political, social, and economic conditions of Khorāsān after the death of Soltān Sanjar when the amirs achieved great authority.68 ʿAtabat al-Kataba is written in a difficult rhetorical language and is full of Arabic words. It provided valuable insight into the structural resources of religion and science and, particularly, Nezāmiya schools under the Saljuqs. Tārikh-e Bokhārā (557 AH/1161 AD) The original text of Tārikh-e Bokhārā by Abu Bekr Mohammad ibn Jaʿfar Narshakhi (286–348 AH/899–959 AD) is in Arabic. It was written under Amir Mohammad Nuh ibn Nasr, the Sāmānid amir, in 343 AH/954 AD.69 Abu Nasr Ahmad ibn Mohammad ibn Nasr Qabāvi summarized and translated it into Persian in 522 AH/1128 AD. Then Mohammad ibn Zafar ibn ʿOmar modified it in 547 AH/1152 AD. What we have now is no longer a literal translation of the Arabic text.70 It is instead a brief account of the local history of Bokhārā from pre-Islamic times to the time of the author under the Sāmānids. The book is written in simple language. It provides information about the events 67 Dowlatshāh-e Samarqandi, 2006, p. 35. 68 Rezāiyān, 2000, pp. 16–21. 69 Narshakhi, 1984, p. 6. 70 Narshakhi, 1984, pp. 12, 16. It drew on several sources, including Mohammad ibn Sāleh al-Leysi and Abol Hasan Meydāni (ibid., p. 180).

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in Bokhārā under the Sāmānids and the relationship between Iranian bureaucrats and Turkish military men. Tārikh-e Beyhaq (563 AH/1167 AD) Tārikh-e Beyhaq by Zahir al-Din ʿAli ibn Zeyd Beyhaqi, known as Ibn Fondoq (d. 565 AH/1169 AD), a prominent scholar of the Saljuqs, is the local history of Beyhaq in Khorāsān. It examines the historical geography of Beyhaq, the geography of its cities and villages,71 and the life of prominent intellectuals, especially religious scholars, in lively rhyming prose.72 One of the main reasons for the significance of Tārikh-e Beyhaq is that it draws upon primary sources, many of which do not exist any longer.73 It contains information about what the author witnessed. Ibn Fondoq’s attention to the religious and philosophical structural resources and rules of the Saljuqs provide us with precious information about their society. Saljuqnāma (571–590 AH/1175–1194 AD) The oldest dynastic history of the Saljuqs still available today is the work of Zahir al-Din Neyshāburi (d. 582 AH/1186 AD), a prominent figure in the court of the Saljuqs.74 It is considered the fundamental source from which other comparable histories are derived.75 Zahir al-Din Neyshāburi wrote the history of the Saljuqs from the rise of Toghrol I (r. 429–442 AH/1037–1063 AD), the founder of the Saljuq dynastic power, until the death of Moʿez al-Din Arsalān (d. 555 AH/1160 AD) and the rise of Toghrol III to the throne (r. 571–590 AH/1175–1194 AD).76 In 599 AH/1203 AD, Abu Hāmed Mohammad 71 Ibn Fondoq, 2011, p. 26. 72 Ibid., pp. 22–25; Meisami, 1999, p. 209. 73 Some of these works are Ketāb-i Beyhaq by Ibn Fondoq (ʿAbdol Karim Rāfeʿi Qazvini, 1997, p. 22), Tārikh-e Neyshābur by Hākem Neyshāburi (d. 405 AH/1014 AD), the works of Abol Qāsem Kaʿbi Balkhi (d. 319 AH/931 AD) on the history of Khorāsān, specifically Neyshābur (Ibn Fondoq, 2011, pp. 154, 156, 225), Tārikh-e Neyshābur by Ahmad Qāzi (ibid., p. 21), Tārikh-e Beyhaqi (ibid., p. 175), Mazid al-Tārikh by Abol Hasan Mohammad ibn Soleymān (ibid., pp. 132–133), Tārikh-e Yamini by Mohammad ibn ʿAbdol Jabbār ʿOtbi, and Tārikh-e Marv by Abol ʿAbbāss Maʿdani (ibid., pp. 20, 26, 87, 93, 176, 227). 74 Zahir al-Din was in the service of Soltān Maʿsud b. Mohammad (1133–1152) as the tutor to two Saljūq princes, which included Masʿud’s nephew of Arsalān b. Toghrol (1176) (Melville, 2012, p. 150). 75 Cahen, 1962, p. 73. 76 He wrote his book after the accession of Toghrol b. Arsalān (1176) and before the death of Atābak Jahān Pahlevān (1186) (Rāvandi, 2011, pp. 64–65).

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ibn Ebrāhim wrote the last chapter of the book and ended it with the death of Toghrol III, the last Saljuq soltān. Ismāʿil Afshar edited and published the book in 1953.77 Saljuqnāma is written in nonrhetorical and straightforward language. It is a relatively brief text and likely to be “regarded as disappointing” by anyone looking for substantive historical information.78 However, since it is the first Persian historical work of the Saljuq era with an analytical view of historical events, considering the scarcity of historical works under the Saljuqs, this book’s real importance continues to stand.79 Saljuqnāma provides us with information about the social changes of the Saljuqs, the status of military men in their political structure, and the fruitless attempts of bureaucrats to reconcile military men with the civil structures. Tārikh al-Vozarā (584 AH/1188 AD) Tārikh Vozarā by Sharaf al-Din Abu Nasr Anushirvān ibn Khāled Fini Kāshāni (459–533 AH/1066–1138 AD), the vizier of Caliph al-Mostarshed Bellāh. ʿEmād al-Din Kāteb Esfahāni (d. 597 AH/1200 AD) translated the book into Arabic in 597 AH/1200 AD and Bondāri Esfahāni summarized it in 623 AH/1226 AD and named it Tārikh-e Dowlat-e al-Saljuq. It constitutes the history of the Saljuq viziers in elegant figurative language, full of similes and metaphors.80 It was edited by Mohammad Taqi Dāneshpajuh and published with the name Tārikh al-Vozarā.81 This book gives us rich information about the power structure of the bureaucrats under the Saljuqs and the serious challenges the agents of this power structure faced. ʿAqd al-ʿOlā lel-Mowqef al-ʿAlā (584 AH/1188 AD) ʿAqd al-ʿOlā lel-Mowqef al-ʿAlā was composed by Afzal al-Din Abu Hāmed Ahmad ibn Hamid Kermāni in the late Saljuq period in 584 AH/1188 AD. Afzal dedicates his book to the Ghoz conqueror Kermān Malek Dinar (r.

77 It was believed to be irrevocably lost, but Ismāʿil Afshār discovered an incomplete manuscript of it within the book Tārikh-e Gozida and a complete copy of it within Zobdat al-Tavāriḵh by Abol Qāsem Kashāni and after comparing them with yet another copy, published Saljuqnāma in 1953 (Zahiri Neyshāburi, 2011a, p. 8; Cahen, 1962, p. 73; Meisami, 1999, p. 229). 78 Morton, 2004, p. 30. 79 Cahen, 1962, p. 289. 80 Abol Rajāʾe Qomi, 1984, p. 16. 81 Ibid., p. 14.

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582–591 AH/1186–1194 AD).82 It was edited and published by ʿAli Mohammad ʿĀmeri Nāʾieni in 1932. During the uprisings of the Saljuqs, Afzal wrote three other works, including Badayeʿ al-Zamān fi Vaqāyeʿ-e Kermān and ʿAqd al-ʿAlā lel Mowqef al-Aʿlā.83 In ʿAqd al-ʿOlā lel-Mowqef al-ʿAlā, Afzal, using rhetorical literary language, criticizes the chaos-creating measures of the rulers in Kermān. It examines in detail the social changes caused by the arrival of the Turks in the political structure of Iran during the late Saljuq period. Rāhat al-Sodur va Āyat al-Sorur (599 AH/1202 AD) Mohammad ibn ʿAli Rāvandi, the scribe of the Saljuq, wrote Rāhat al-Sodur va Āyat al-Sorur in 599–603 AH/1202–1206 AD and dedicated it to Qiyās al-Din Key Khosrow ibn Qalaj Arsalān-e Saljuqi (r. 601–607 AH/1204–1210 AD). 84 It covers the history of the Saljuqs in Jebāl from the beginning until the collapse of the dynasty in Ray by the Khwārazmshāhi (469–628 AH/1077–1231 AD). One of the main features of this book is its focus on the atābaks (governors) of Iraq and Azarbāijān. Rāvandi draws on Saljuqnāma by Zahir al-Din Neyshāburi.85 It contains a chapter on nonhistorical topics that form an appendix to the history in an excessively rhetorical language.86 This study examines Rāhat al-Sodur to learn about the social changes occurring under the Saljuqs and the Khwārazmshāhi. The author’s attention to the religious and thought structures in the late Saljuq period provides valuable information about the social changes of this era. Tārikh-e Yamini (603 AH/1206 AD) Tārikh-e Yamini by ʿOtbi includes the circumstances of the late Sāmānids and reaches the time of Soltān Mahmud. He primarily details the Ghaznavid campaigns in India, the history of the dynasties of the Ziyārids, the Simjurids, the Khāniāns, the Fariqunids, the Ghurids, and the Khwārazmshāhi.87 Encouraged by the vizier Abol Qāsem ʿAli ibn Abi Hanifa, Nāseh ibn Zafar ibn Saʿd Jorfādeqāni, a Saljuq scribe, translated it into Persian in 603 AH/1206

82 Meisami, 1999, p. 234. 83 Afzal Kermāni, 1977, p. 5. Rāvandi, 2011, p. 15. 84 Ibid. 85 Melville, 2012, p. 247; Meisami, 1999, p. 238. 86 Meisami, 1999, p. 238. 87 Rāvandi, 2012, pp. 12–13.

Introduc tion

33

AD.88 Jorfādeqāni generally follows ʿOtbi’s elegant rhetorical language, although he tries not to conceal the book’s purpose and meaning with excessive ornament.89 Tārikh-e Yamini examines the social changes under the Ghaznavids and the Saljuqs. The author’s attention to the formation of the Ghaznavids by military agents is incredibly useful for this study. Tārikh-e Afzal or Badāyeʿ al-Zamān fi Vaqāyeʿ-e Kermān (606 AH/1209 AD) Tārikh-e Afzal or Badāyeʿ al-Zamān fi Vaqāyeʿ-e Kermān by Afzal al-Din Kermāni in 606 AH/1209 AD covers the history of the Saljuqs in Jebāl, Khorāsān, and, especially, the history of Kermān under the Saljuqs until the time of Malek Dinār, the Qoz ruler (d. 590 AH/1194 AD). Mehdi Bayāni edited it in 1947.90 The role of Turkish amirs in the political structure of Iran and especially in Kermān is one of the main topics of this book. Tārikh-e Tabarestān (613 AH/1216 AD) Tārikh-e Tabarestān by Mohammad ibn Hasan, known as Ibn Esfandiyār (d. 613 AH/1216 AD), is the oldest local history of Tabarestān.91 It describes the formation of the power of the ʿAlawites in Tabarestān by Hasan ibn Zeyd (d. 270 AH/880 AD) and his descendants.92 It was written in 613 AH/1216 AD using rhetorical language. Tārikh-e Tabarestān provides us with useful information on the uprising of Iranian agents, including Bābak, Māziyār, and Afshin, against the ʿAbbāsids and the formation of the ʿAlawites, the first Shiʿite power structure in Iran. Nafsat al-Masdur (632 AH/1234 AD) Nafsat al-Masdur by Nasavi Khorandezi is the tragic biography of the author, the scribe of Soltān Jalāl al-Din Mengoberni (r. 617–628 AH/1220–1230 AD),93 88 Jorfādeqāni, 2003, p. 10; Bahār, 2003, vol. 2, pp. 387–388; Meisami, 1999, p. 238. 89 Jorfādeqāni, 2003, pp. 10–11. 90 Afzal Kermāni, 1947, p. 4. 91 Ibn Esfandiyār, 2011, vol. 1, p. 5. 92 Ibn Esfandiyār draws on Tārikh-e Tāji by Abu Eshāq Ebrāhim ibn Helāl Sābi and Al-Ifadā fi Tārikh-e al-Aʿemat al-Sādāt by Abu Tāleb Yahyā ibn Hosseyn Hāruni (d. 424 AH/1033 AD) (ibid., p. 86). 93 Nasavi came from a prominent family in Khorāsān where they owned the Khorandez castle in Zeydar, one of the districts of Nesā (Nasavi, 2006, p. 45).

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the last Khwārazmshāhi soltān, as he accompanied the soltān in his last campaign against his local rivals as well as the Mongols.94 The book was written in 632 AH/1234 AD in figurative rhetorical language, full of Qorʾān verses, Hādith, and Persian and Arabic verses.95 This book introduces us to social changes under the Khwārazmshāhi and early Mongols. The transformation of the Khwārazmshāhi from a local group to a vast empire and the measures taken by Soltān Mohammad (r. 596–617 AH/1199–1220 AD) and Soltān Jalāl al-Din to fight the Mongol invasions are the issues scrutinized by Nasavi. Sirat-e Jalāl al-Din Mengoberni (639 AH/1241 AD) Sirat-e Jalāl al-Din Mengoberni by Nasavi Khorandezi is the primary source for the history of the Khwārazmshāhi dynasty (469–628 AH/1077–1231 AD) under the last years of the rule of Soltān Mohammad (r. 596–617 AH/1200–1220 AD) and the reign of Soltān Jalāl al-Din (r. 617–628 AH/1220–1231 AD). An anonymous person translated Sirat-e Jalāl al-Din into very expressive Persian language in the late thirteenth century AD. Compared to the Arabic text, the Persian translation omits some parts that contain Nasavi’s autobiography.96 In 1891, O. Houdas found a copy of the work’s original Arabic text, which was copied and published.97 In 1953, Hāfez Hamdi re-edited the same manuscript and published it in Egypt. Mojtabā Minovi found a single manuscript of the book in the personal library of Khalil Yenānj, a professor of history at the University of Istanbul, and edited and published it in 1966.98 The vivid analytical report of Nasavi from events he witnessed amplifies the unique value of his work.99 Sirat-e Jalāl al-Din helped us learn about social changes in the late Khwārazmshāhi and early Mongol eras. The development of the Khwārazmshāhi from a local dynasty to an empire in the Islamic world and its conflicts with the ʿAbbāsids before the Mongol invasions are the intriguing subjects of this book.

94 Nasavi draws on Tārikh-e Yamini and its translation, Monshaʾāt-e Badiʿ al-Zamān Hamedāni, Maqālāt-e Hariri, and Kelila and Demna (Nasavi, 2006, p. 19). 95 Nasavi, 1987, p. 13. 96 Ibid., p. 10. 97 Nasavi, 1987, p. 9. 98 Nasavi, 1987, pp. 8–9. 99 Ibn Asir is one of the primary sources that Nasavi draws on to write his book (Nasavi, 1987, p. 34). Ibn Khaldun and Abol al-Fadāʿ referred to this work to complete their chapters on the Khwārazmshāh (Nasavi, 1987, p. 9).

Introduc tion

35

Tabaqāt-e Nāseri (658 AH/1259 AD) Tabaqāt-e Nāseri was written by Menhāj al-Serāj Jowzjāni (d. 589 AH/1193 AD) in 658 AH/1259 AD. He served Nāser al-Din Mahmud, one of the local rulers of Ghur in present-day Afghanistan, so Minhaj al-Siraj Jowzjāni called his book Tabaqāt-e Nāseri. The book is a general history of the lives of prophets, kings, caliphs, and rulers of dynasties in Muslim territories up to the Mongol invasions of Iran and Baghdad. Tabaqāt-e Nāseri examines the reign of the Ghurids, the soltāns of India, and the Mongols, which the author either witnessed or obtained quotes about from reliable oral and written sources.100 In this study, Tabaqāt-e Nāseri is used to contribute to an analysis of social changes from the formation of the Tāherids to the collapse of the ʿAbbāsids. The historian’s attention to social changes under the Mongols opens new windows for us to see the social changes of Iran under the Khwārazmshāhi and Mongols. Tārikh-e Jahān-goshā (651–658 AH/1253–1259 AD) ʿAtā Malek Joveyni, an outstanding f igure in the time of the Mongols, wrote Tārikh-e Jahān-goshā in 650–658 AH/1252–1259 AD. He was revered among the Mongols, particularly Hulegu Khān (615–663 AH/1218–1264 AD). Following the capture of Baghdad in 656 AH/1258 AD, Hulegu appointed Joveyni as the governor of all the territories that the ʿAbbāsid caliphs had directly held.101 Therefore, he witnessed many significant events under the Mongols. He had access to the archives of many libraries, including that of the Ismāʿilis, that the Mongols destroyed.102 Tārikh-e Jahān-goshā covers the history of the Khwārazmshāhi and the rise of the Mongols and their invasions of Islamic territories until the fall of the Ismāʿilis (483–654 AH/1090–1256 AD). It is divided into three sections or volumes: 1) the rise and career of Genghis Khan and his successors until the deaths of Geuk (644–647 AH/1246–1249 AD) and Jaghatāi (d. 640 AH/1243 AD); 2) the history of the Khwārazmshāhi dynasty (491–616 AH/1097–1219 AD); and 3) the history of other khāns of the Mongols to the reign of Hulegu 100 Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 1, p. 15. 134. Some of Jowzjāni’s sources are Tārikh-e Volāt-e Khorāsān, Takmelat al-Latāyef, Tārikh-e Beyhaqi, Ehdās al-Zamān by ʿAbdollāh ibn ʿAbdol Rahmān Sheybāni, Sonan-e Abu Dāvud Sajestāni by Soleymān ibn al-Ashʿas-e Sajestāni, Al-Badʿ va al-Tārikh by Maqdasi, Tārikh-e Yamini by ʿOtbi, Nasabnāma-ye Ghuriyān by Fakhr al-Din Mobārakshāh, Tārikh-e ibn-Heysam by Nabi, and Aqāni by Abu Eshāq Museli (Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 2, p. 285). 101 Joveyni, 2006, vol. 1, p. 54; tr., Juvaini, 1997, pp. xxx–xxxvii. 102 Joveyni, 2006, vol. 1, pp. 12, 101.

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Khān and his conquests of the castles of the Ismāʿili in Khorāsān and Jebāl.103 Although completed in 658 AH/1259 AD, Tārikh-e Jahān-goshā does not cover the collapse of Baghdad, which had occurred two years previously. It seems that he did not want to end his book with the decline of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate, which had been honored by Sunni Muslims like Joveyni. Joveyni writes his book in an elegant figurative language and decorates it with Qorʾān verses, Hādith, and Persian and Arabic verses.104 Tārikh-e Jahān-goshā was particularly useful for learning about the social changes of the Khwārazmshāhi and Mongols in Iran. It provides a detailed introduction to Mongol thinking, their political, military, and religious structural resources, and their agents and how they clashed with Iranian structures. Tārikh-e Jahān-goshā is a precious source of social change in medieval Iran.

Bibliography ʿAbdol Karim Rāfeʿi Qazvini (1997). Al-Tadvin fi Akhbār-e Qazvin, ed. ʿAzizollāh ʿAtārodi, Tehrān: ʿAtārod, Anjoman-e Makhtutāt-e Iran Abol Rajāʾe Qomi, Najm al-Din (1984). Tārikh al-Vozarā, ed. Mohammad Taqi Dāneshpajuh, Tehrān: Moʾasses-ye Motāleʿāt va Tahqiqāt-e Farhangi Afzal Kermāni, Ahmad ibn Hāmed (1947). Tārikh-e Afzal ya Badāyeʿ al-Zamān fi Vaqāyeʿe Kermān, ed. Mohammad Bayāni, Tehrān: Tehrān University Press Afzal Kermāni, Ahmad ibn Hāmed (1977). ʿAqd al-ʿAlā Lel-Mowqef al-Aʿlā, ed. ʿAli Mohammad Amiri Nāyini, intro. Mohammad Ebrāhim Bāstāni Pārizi, Tehrān: Ruzbahān Atābak Joveyni, Montakhab al-Din Badiʿ (2005). ʿAtabat al-Kataba, ed. Mohammad Qazvini ʿAbbās Eqbāl, Tehrān: Asātir Bahār, Mohammad Taqi (2003). Sabkshenāsi ya Tārikh-e Tatavvor-e Nasr-e Pārsi, 3 vols., Tehrān: Farāsugostar Balʿami, Abu ʿAli Mohammad ibn Mohammad (1999). Tārikhnāma-ye Tabari, ed. Mohammad Roshan, 5 vols., Tehrān: Sorush Balʿami, Mohammad ibn Mohammad (2001). Tārikh-e Balʿami, ed. Mohammad Taqi Bahār and Mohammad Parvin Gonābādi, 2 vols., Tehrān: Hermes Bayāni, Shirin (2002). Din va Dowlat dar Iran-e ʿAhd-e Moghol, 2 vols., Tehrān: Tehrān University Press

103 Ibid., pp. 31–54. 104 Ibid., p. 101.

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Beyhaqi, Abol Fazl Mohammad ibn Hosseyn (1995). Tārikh-e Beyhaqi, ed. Khalil Khatib Rahbar, 3 vols., Tehrān: Mahtāb Bryant, Christopher G. A., and David Jary (1991). Giddens’ Theory of Structuration: A Critical Appreciation, London and New York: Routledge Burke, Peter (2005). History and Social Theory, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press Cahen, Claude (1962). “The Historiography of the Seljukid Period,” in Historians of the Middle East, ed. Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt, London: Oxford University Press, pp. 59–78 Craib, Ian (1992). Anthony Giddens, London and New York: Routledge Dowlatshāh-e Samarqandi (2006). Tazkerat al-Shoʿarā, ed. Fātema Alāqa, Tehrān: Pajuheshgāh-e ʿOlum-e Ensāni va Motāleʿāt-e Farhangi Encyclopedia Britannica (2016, November 18). “Social History,” https://www.britannica.com/topic/social-history Gardizi, Abu Saʿid ʿAbdol Hayy ibn Zahhāk (1984). Zeyn al-Akhbār, ed. ʿAbdol Hayy Habibi, Tehrān: Donyā-ye Ketāb Giddens, Anthony (1984). The Constitution of Society, Cambridge: Polity Ibn Balkhi (2006). Farsnāma, ed. Guy Le Strange and Reynold Nicholson, Tehrān: Asātir Ibn Esfandiyār, Bahā al-Din Mohammad ibn Hasan (2011). Tārikh-e Tabarestān, ed. ʿAbbāss Eqbāl, 2 vols., Tehrān: Kolāla-ye Khāvar Ibn Fondoq, ʿAli ibn Zeyd Beyhaqi (2011). Tārikh-e Beyhaq, ed. Ahmad Bahmanyār, Tehrān: Asātir Jorfādeqāni, Abol Sharaf Nāseh ibn Zafar (2003). Tārikh-e Yamini, ed. Jaʿfar Shoʿār, Tehrān: ʿElmi va Farhangi Joveyni, Atā Malek (2006). Tārikh-e Jahān-goshā, ed. Mohammad Qazvini, 3 vols., Tehrān: Donyā-ye Ketāb Jowzjāni, Menhāj al-Serāj (1984). Tabaqāt-e Nāseri, ed. ʿAbdol Hayy-e Habibi, 2 vols., Tehrān: Donyā-ye Ketāb Juvaini, Ata-Malik (1997). Genghis Khan: The History of the World-Conqueror, trans. J. A. Boyle, Manchester: Manchester University Press Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, Hasan ibn ʿAli ibn Eshāq (1999). Siyar al-Moluk (Siyāsatnāma), ed. Hubert Darke, Tehrān: Entesharāt-e ʿElmi va Farhangi Lamsal, Mukunda (2012). “The Structuration Approach of Anthony Giddens,” Himalayan Journal of Sociology & Anthropology, 5, pp. 111–122 Loyal, Stephen (2003). The Sociology of Anthony Giddens, London: Pluto Press Meisami, Julie Scott (1999). Persian Historiography to the End of the Twelfth Century, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press Melville, Charles, ed. (2012). Persian Historiography, London: I. B Tauris Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas (1939). Ed. Mohammad Taqi Bahār and Behjat Ramezāni, 2nd ed., Tehrān: Kolāla-ye Khāvar

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Morton, A. H. (2004). The Saljuqnameh of Zahir al-Din Nishapuri, London: Gibb Memorial Trust Narshakhi, Mohammad ibn Jaʿfar (1984a). Tārikh-e Bokhārā, trans. Abu Nasr Ahmad ibn Mohammad ibn Nasr Qabāvi, summarized by Mohammad ibn Zafar ibn ʿOmar, ed. Modarres Razavi, Tehrān: Tus Nasavi Khorandezi, Shāhāb al-Din Mohammad (1987). Sirat-e Jalāl al-Din Mengoberni, Tehrān: Entesharāt-e ʿElmi va Farhangi Nasavi Khorandezi, Shāhāb al-Din Mohammad (2006). Nafsat al-Masdur, ed. Amir Hosseyn Yazdgerdi, Tehrān: Tus Nezāmi ʿAruzi, Ahmad ibn ʿOmar (2004). Chahār Maqālat va Taʿliqāt, ed. Mohammad Qazvini, Mohammad Moʿin, Tehrān: Sedā-ye Moʿāser Peacock, A. C. S. (2007). Mediaeval Islamic Historiography and Political Legitimacy: Balʿami’s Tarikhnamah, New York: Routledge Rāvandi, Mohammad ibn ʿAli (2011). Rāhat al-Sodur va Āyat al-Sorur, ed. Mohammad Eqbāl, intro. Badiʿ Foruzānfar and Mojtabā Minovi, Tehrān: Asātir Rāvandi, Mohammad ibn ʿAli (2012). Bargozide-ye Rāhat al-Sodur va Āyat al-Sorur, ed. Jaʿfar Shoʿār, Tehrān: Asātir Rezāiyān, ʿAli (2000). “Barresi va Moʿarefi-ye Ketāb-e ʿAtabat al-Kataba,” Ketāb-i Māh-e Tārikh va Joqrāfiyā, 32, pp. 16–21 Safā, Zabihollāh (2000). Tārikh-e Adabiyyāt-e Iran, ed. Mohammad Torābi, 3 vols., Tehrān: Qoqnus Stones, Rob (1998). Key Sociological Thinkers, New York: New York University Press Stones, Rob (2005). Structuration Theory, London: Palgrave Macmillan Tārikh-e Sistān (1976). Trans. Milton Gold, Roma: Instituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente Tārikh-e Sistān (1987). Ed. Mohammad Taqi Bahār, Tehrān: Padida-ye Khāvar Turner, Jonathan H. (1986). “The Theory of Structuration,” American Journal of Sociology, vol. 91, no. 4, pp. 969–977 Zahiri Neyshāburi, Zahir al-Din (2011a). Saljuqnāma, ed. Ismāʿil Afshār Hamid al-Molk and Mohammad Ramezāni, Tehrān: Asātir Zarrinkub, ʿAbdol Hosseyn (2007). Tārikh-e Iran baʿd az Islam, Tehrān: Amir Kabir



Author’s Notes

Transliteration The transliteration will be based on the system used in the Journal of Persianate Studies and according to the following list: ʾ‫ء‬ B‫ب‬ P‫پ‬ T‫ت‬ s (or th) ‫ث‬ j‫ج‬ ch ‫چ‬ h‫ح‬ kh ‫خ‬ d‫د‬ z (or dh) ‫ذ‬ r‫ر‬ z‫ز‬ zh ‫ژ‬ s‫س‬ sh ‫ش‬

s‫ص‬ z‫ض‬ t‫ط‬ z‫ظ‬ ʿ‫ع‬ gh ‫غ‬ f‫ف‬ q‫ق‬ k‫ک‬ g‫گ‬ l‫ل‬ m‫م‬ n‫ن‬ v (w) ‫و‬ h‫ه‬ y‫ی‬

Vowels I‫ی‬ a- َ u‫و‬ e- ِ ey (or ay) ِ ‫ی‬ o- ُ ow ‫َو‬ ā- ‫ا‬-/‫آ‬ The silent final ‫ ه‬-is transcribed as “a.” Date Dates are according to the Hijri calendar (HA) and Common Era (AD). Translations All translations of primary sources are my own, except where otherwise indicated.

Part I The Formation of Iranian Authority under the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate

The Iranian role in the transition from the Umayyads (41–132 AH/661–749 AD) to the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate (132–656 AH/750–1258 AD) shaped a circle of social change in the medieval history of Iran. Medieval Iran had become a part of the Islamic territories yet had intense memories of its position as a great empire in pre-Islamic times. It went through a period of silence and self-examination during the Umayyad Caliphate. The Umayyad Caliphate barred various Muslim sects of differing worldviews and did not hesitate to commit all kinds of violence and repression. The massacre of Shiʿites during various movements (from Āshurā–Moharram 10, 61 AH/10 October 680 AD) to the uprising of Zeyd ibn ʿAli (Safar 122 AH/ January 740 AD) and Yahyā ibn Zeyd (Shaʿbān 125 AH/June 743 AD), and the humiliation of the mavāli (non-Arab Muslims) are just a few examples of the repressive and monopolist actions of the Umayyad Caliphate. Despite the Umayyads’ oppressive policies, the Iranians continued to search for an opportunity to regain their lost authority by re-establishing the previous power structure. The establishment of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate was pivotal for Iranians in their move toward independence. The historical experience of ancient Iran and the period of Islamic rule until the end of the Umayyad Caliphate had shown the Iranians that they had to equip themselves with the correct religious beliefs and substantial military resources in order to participate in the power structure. These two structural resources enabled them to legitimize their power. It helped them to arrive at a political structure as religious and military agents and achieve the highest ranks of power as a result. The first chapter examines the processes the ʿAbbāsids went through first to achieve power. Abu Moslem Khorāsāni, the great dāʿie of the ʿAbbāsids, was the first Iranian military man to initiate any movement against the Umayyads in Khorāsān where the last Sāssānid king, Yazdgird III (r. 11–30 AH/632–651 AD), had been killed by an unknown person. Abu Moslem established his way toward reaching social change and managed to reinvent himself not as the initiator of a single rebellion but as an influential agent in the circle of social change. His persistent attempts and those of other dāiʿes, aiming to establish other structures like the ʿAlawites, finally led to the rise of the ʿAbbāsids. The second chapter examines whether the ʿAbbāsids merely displaced the monopolized power of the Umayyads or developed a different political structure. Coming to power with the cooperation of different agents, the ʿAbbāsids followed the Umayyads’ ways of establishing exclusive power. Consequently, another result of the persistent efforts of the Iranians and the ʿAlawites to establish the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate was the massacre of the

44 

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dāʿies, including Abu Moslem. It involved the suppression of numerous Shiʿite revolts questioning ʿAbbāsid legitimacy. Abu Moslem’s effort to establish an independent political structure failed in the short term, but the torch of social change he lit was never extinguished. To consolidate their power, the ʿAbbāsids had to employ Iranian bureaucrats, and the ʿAbbāsids used this critical structural resource to reproduce the political structure in their favor. Chapter 3 examines the social changes from the establishment of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate to the departure of Maʾmun (r. 198–218 AH/813–833 AD) from Marv in Khorāsān to Baghdad. The death of Hārun al-Rashid (145–193 AH/762–808 AD) and the rivalry between Amin (r. 193–198 AH/809–813 AD) and Maʾmun began a new chapter of social change in Iran. The division of the ʿAbbāsid power in Khorāsān and Baghdad paved the way for the independence of Khorāsān. It discusses the role of Shiʿite structural resources in creating the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate and the revolts after the formation of this caliphate.

1

The Formation of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate From Secret Daʿva to the Rise of Siyāh-Jāmegān (The Black Garments)

Abstract Social change in post-Islamic Iran was tied to the formation of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. The ʿAbbāsids took full advantage of their potential against the Umayyad Caliphate. Using tools such as daʿva, which takes up a long chapter in Islamic history, exploiting Shiʿite structural resources such as the imamate, and identifying Khorāsān as a suitable place to start daʿva, was part of the ʿAbbāsid plan to gain religious legitimacy among the people. In addition, the Iranians, who were to reproduce their pre-Islamic power structures and independence, came to the scene with all their strength. The presence of many of them as dāʿies, including Abu Salama Khallāl and commanders such as Abu Moslem-e Khorāsāni, eventually led to the fall of the Umayyad Caliphate. Keywords: ʿAbbāsid Caliphate, Khorāsān, daʿva, Abu Moslem-e Khorāsāni

The Structure of Daʿva, as the Means to Convey the Message The discriminative policies of the Umayyads paved the way for social changes in Islamic territories. Their deterministic and monopolistic ideas were not acceptable to Islamic communities made up of diverse cultural and intellectual groups. Instead, they provided the ground for the reproduction of opposing structures and creating fundamental changes. Even though the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate was formed in response to widespread protests against the Umayyad Caliphate structure, its character was linked to the Umayyad Caliphate with the reproduction of its existing structures. The ʿAbbāsid use of already existing resources in the political structure

Kamali, M. Social Change in Medieval Iran 132-628 AH (750-1231 AD). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2023 doi: 10.5117/9789463721981_ch01

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of Islam and its invitation to agents who had been restricted during the Umayyad period but who were able to alter the power structure provided the ground for the formation of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. In their effort to gain power, the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate ultimately marked an important chapter in Iran’s social change. The ʿAbbāsids were not the only opponents of the Umayyads nor the sole claimants of power. The Khārejis, ʿAlawites, and ahl-e zemme (non-Muslims who lived under Muslim leadership) who had already paid a heavy price for a change in the power structure, comprised the other main groups of Umayyad opponents.1 However, the ʿAbbāsids, with a deliberate plan, used the structural resources of the opponents of the Umayyads only when the Umayyads were about to collapse. The ʿAbbāsids ultimately imposed themselves on the political structure as the most powerful claimants. The starting point for the ʿAbbāsid movement to take the stage was their use of daʿva (invitation) tools. The secret invasion of the ʿAbbāsids, which began in 113 AH/731 AD, had innovative and shrewd aspects which helped them outdo their rivals. Agents opposed to the Umayyads’ repressive and racist structures were among the resources that the ʿAbbāsids identified and used to their full potential. Daʿva was one of the main traditions (sonna) of the prophets, inviting people to monotheism, and it had a long chapter in the history of religions. The religion of Islam was essentially founded on daʿva,2 by which Mohammad had spread his message in Arabia. Mohammad’s word-based message and his miracle, the Qorʾān, provided a structural resource that could be reproduced in other times. Using daʿva secretly was not an innovative method, but the ʿAbbāsids used it with knowledge and prudence. They became aware of the structural resources of secret daʿva, and the ʿAbbāsid reproduced this tradition effectively. Suppressive measures in the Umayyad structure and their repression of opponents provided optimal conditions for developing subversive opposition to the Umayyads. The experience of other opponents who helped the ʿAbbāsids’ achievements should not be ignored. The oppression of the Khāreji, who always put all their energy into dealing with the Umayyad Caliphate at once, forced the ʿAbbāsids not to reveal their names as primary claimants of power since this would enable the Umayyads to recognize them quickly and massacre their leaders. It was evident that the massacre of the 1 Yaʿqubi, 1992, vol. 2, pp. 325–326; Ibn ʿAsam-e Kufi, 1991, pp. 285–295; Abol Faraj Esfahāni, 1965, p. 133; Hātam, 2006, p. 101. 2 Armstrong, 1993, p. 138.

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ʿAbbāsids was significantly more straightforward due to their reputation for more minor sacrifice and jihad for Islam compared to the ʿAlawites. The Use of the Structural Resources of the Imamate by the ʿAbbāsids The violence and humiliation experienced by the Shiʿites during Umayyad rule3 provided the rising ʿAbbāsids with potential power resources. The ʿAbbāsids confused many dāʿies and thus provided the rationale for those people to accept their daʿva, and thus paved their own ways to achieve power.4 Some prominent dāʿies, such as Abu Salama and Soleymān ibn Kasir, called themselves “ʿAlawites” before the military revolt of Abu Moslem. As a result, the claims of the “Al-e Hashem va Abu Tāleb” after the rise of the ʿAbbāsids to the throne were not as Balʿami had identified because of “dāʿies falling into greed.”5 Calling themselves imams provides undeniable proof of the ʿAbbāsids’ taking advantage of the ʿAlawites’ structural resources of daʿva. “Imam” was a title that encompassed the accounts of a hundred years of Shiʿite revolts and struggles. The rich structural resources existing in the imamate provided the right conditions for grasping power.6 The unquestioning obedience to the ʿAbbāsid imam’s orders equipped the ʿAbbāsids with a political resource which they applied most effectively. Thus, the ʿAbbāsids began their social action program by designing an invitation program and using agents who were dissatisfied with the Umayyad Caliphate. According to Balʿami: The whole account is that Mohammad ibn ʿAli ibn ʿAbdollāh ibn Al-ʿAbbās was the first descendant of ʿAbbās who invited people to himself. In 113 AH [731 AD], under the rule of Heshām ibn ʿAbdol Malek, Mohammad sent his dāʿies everywhere and told them, “Invite people to us secretly!” In his invitation, he asked whoever had pledged allegiance to him to 3 Yaʿqubi, 1992, vol. 2, p. 326; Masʿudi, 1991, vol. 1, p. 81; Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. 4, p. 297; Ibn Kasir, 1990, vol. 4, p. 475. 4 The Shiʿite uprisings that took place after the Āshurā uprising in 61 AH/681 AD and, inspired by it, continued throughout the Umayyad period and were always repressed. Among these uprisings were the Keysāniye uprising led by Mokhtār Saqafi (63–67 AH/683–687 AD), the revolt led by Soleymān ibn Sadr Khazāʿie (65 AH/685 AD), Zeyd ibn ʿAli (122 AH/740 AD), and Yahyā ibn Zeyd’s uprising (125 AH/743 AD). For more information, see Shaykh Mofid, 1997, pp. 493–494; Nobakhti, 1994, p. 90; Shahrestāni, vol. 1, 1971, p. 139. 5 Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, p. 1023. 6 In fact, to avoid confrontation with the ʿAlawites, the ʿAbbāsids at all stages refused to mention the name of the person they called on the people to follow and pledge allegiance to (Amin, 1962, vol. 3, pp. 380–381; Shebli, 1982, vol. 3, p. 20).

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renounce the allegiance to Heshām, Bani Marvān, and all Umayyads and to recognize Mohammad ibn ʿAli as his imam…. He asked the dāʿies to maintain all those pledges of allegiance until he [Mohammad] rose: “When he rises, fight with his enemies, and if he dies or is killed, fight with the enemies of his successor that is the next imam. And as long as it is not reveled, you need to hide this Hādith [issue] and do not say it to anyone except the one who believes in your religion and is with you in this allegiance.”7

Unlike its literal meaning, the ʿAbbāsid daʿva was based on a sense of condemnation of the Umayyads. The ʿAbbāsid propaganda against Umayyad rule drew the attention of the members of society toward the transformation of the caliphate. This ʿAbbāsid policy caused the social agents who accompanied the ʿAbbāsid imam to use all their energy toward changing the existing structures. Therefore, the ʿAbbāsids were able to distract the Umayyads’ opponents from following their objectives after overthrowing the Umayyad structure. The ʿAbbāsids tried to understand how to reproduce the existing structures within a veil of ambiguity, and they gradually turned it to their advantage. They refrained from using positive slogans because the dāʿies would have expected a subsequent division of power. For this reason, the ʿAbbāsids pointed out the hatred of Hisham, Bani Marwān, and all the Bani Umayyads at the beginning of their invitation. This hatred included all the Umayyads, both those who, like Āl-e Marwān, were in power, and those who, like Āl-e Moʿāviya , did not have much power. The goal of the ʿAbbāsids was to recruit all the agents and structural resources that opposed the Umayyad Caliphate. The ʿAbbāsid imam referred to the issue of paying zakāt (alms) to the poor, which is critical in the structural resources of the imamate: “And give zakāt and sadaqa [charity] to that leader who is the imam’s deputy in this city, so that he can give them to the poor believers of this religion in this city.”8 The economic aspects of the imamate’s structural resources equipped the ʿAbbāsid imam with the authority to receive and distribute zakāt and alms. The daʿva and allegiance’s first achievement was to determine the source of zakāt and sadaqa, and the ʿAbbāsid imam was well aware of that. He strengthened his legitimacy among his supporters by using the imamate’s structural resources and donating alms to those who had accepted his daʿva. 7 Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, p. 1006. 8 Ibid.

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The Shiʿite imams’ historical experience and charismatic personality gave the ʿAbbāsids a structural resource to gradually gain popularity. The ʿAbbāsids’ use of the general slogan “Al-Rezā Men Āl-e Mohammad,”9 which had particular significance for the ʿAlawites and those who still wanted to revive the Prophet Mohammad and Islamic tradition without the Arab aristocracy, showed that the ʿAbbāsids were aware of the intellectual and social structures of society. ʿAbbāsid agents never effectively participated in the Umayyad Caliphate’s political structure, which resulted in their anti-Umayyad claims being accepted by the people. Using the slogan “Al-Rezā Men Āl-e Mohammad” was the ideal message and resulted in promoting the credibility of the ʿAbbāsids. The ʿAbbāsids seemed to have taken a risky move by using the general slogan and ignoring their name, which might have directed the invitation toward other opponents of the Umayyads. The ʿAbbāsids were well aware of their position among the other claimants to power, especially the ʿAlawites. That use of the general slogan and keeping their names secret, even from the dāʿies, illustrates that the ʿAbbāsids were not confident of their popularity and their ability to diminish their opponents’ authority. So, they used the general slogan to try to form a strong nucleus of opposition against their opponents, and after gaining power and creating social change, to establish their power structure by suppressing other claimants: When Mohammad ibn ʿAli who started daʿva, died, he had five sons, Ebrāhim, Abu al-ʿAbbās al-Saffāh ʿAbdollāh, Abu Jaʿfar al-Mansur, Yahyā, and the youngest one, ʿAbbās. Before his death, Mohammad designated Ebrāhim as the next imam, and dāʿies invited people to swear allegiance to him. Abu Moslem rose as the dāʿie, and he did the same. Dāʿies did not openly mention the name of Ebrāhim. Instead, they said, “We invite you to join al-Imam al-ʿĀdel men Āl-e Mohammad ʿalayh al-Salām.”10

From the beginning, the ʿAbbāsids showed that they were not looking to completely change the power structure but only to overthrow the Umayyads and replace them. Mohammad ibn ʿAli, the first imam of the ʿAbbāsids, assumed possession of this power as his personal property by naming his children as his successors in his will. The appointment of a successor showed that the ʿAbbāsids considered the structural resources of the imamate to be 9 Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, p. 1230; Tabari, 1967, vol. 9, p. 268; Masʿudi, 1991, vol. 2, p. 190; Jaheshyāri, 1980, p. 138. 10 Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, p. 1031.

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so powerful that it enabled them to move from their position as imams to become caliphs. In the Islamic tradition, there were various other methods, including the sheykhs’ council, used to appoint a caliph and a successor,11 but the ʿAbbāsids, who never wanted to compete with other claimants to power, paved the way for their sons by appealing to the imamate and its right to advise the next imam. Undoubtedly, they knew that the ultimate end of these imamates would lead to a caliphate. They tried to use all available resources to strengthen their religious legitimacy during the secret invitation. The use of verses and Hādiths brought the ʿAbbāsid closer to the hearts of the people who knew Islam not through Umayyad violence but through the Qorʾān and the sunnah (tradition) of the Prophet. Balʿami, for example, reports: They said, “O, al-Imam! when will be the time of rising?” Since the rule of the Umayyads has lasted so long. Mohammad ibn ʿAli answered, “It will be in our time. I heard from my father that when the year of al-Hemār comes, God will reveal our power, and our prayers will come true. The Umayyads will end, and black banners will appear in Marv and Khorāsān, and the Umayyads will be killed even if they are hidden everywhere under every stone and clump.” The people asked, “O al-Imam, what is the year of al-Hemār?” He answered, “It never happened that a dynasty lasted for more than a hundred years unless it went through [many] vicissitudes.”12

The ʿAbbāsid imam tried to bring himself closer to the hearts of the people by using the method of prophecy (and its structural resources) that was part of the Prophet’s ability and of the Shiʿite imams. Citing Qorʾānic verse and interpreting it according to existing conditions, the ʿAbbāsid imam called all dynasties, including that of the Umayyads, unstable. For the people, who saw the oppression of the Umayyad Caliphate as unending, to speak of its end was to create hope for a change in the unfavorable situation. Determining the time of that change made its occurrence seem inevitable. The use of the structural resources of Qorʾān verses and Hādiths helped the ʿAbbāsids strengthen their religious legitimacy in the minds of the people who accepted the invitation and emphasized God’s will in bringing the ʿAbbāsids to power. The ʿAbbāsid imam knew that every action and change in Islamic society required legitimacy through attribution 11 Arnold, 2001, p. 8; Madelung, 2020, p. 6. 12 Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, pp. 1021–1022.

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to revelation and Mohammad. Therefore, his acquaintance with the structural resource of interpretation and Hādith paved his way to gaining power. Khorāsān, the Starting Point of the ʿAbbāsid Daʿva The covert daʿva (invitation) had to stand in a place where, when exposed, it would be able to gather and organize the necessary forces against the Umayyads. At the heart of the ʿAbbāsid daʿva was Khorāsān, which the repressive Umayyad government had turned into a place where uprisings against the Umayyads originated.13 At the start of the ʿAbbāsid revolts, the people of Khorāsān had become the greatest threat to the Umayyads. The rivalry between the Arab tribes of Mozri (Bani Tamim) and Azadi (Yamāmi) and the intra-tribal rivalries that had always constituted part of the problems facing the Arab community continued during this time.14 Khorāsān’s Arab tribes also opposed the centralist policies of the Umayyads and were reluctant to send Khorāsān’s revenues to Syria. The arrival of great commanders such as Nasr ibn Sayyār and their policy of oppression and violence made the situation even more difficult. The Iranians living in Khorāsān were also considered mavāli and were discriminated against and humiliated.15 The focus was on spreading daʿva in Khorāsān and expanding it to other places with the Iranians’ cooperation and efforts. Besides, Khorāsān was able to become a center of action against the Umayyad Caliphate due to its considerable human resources and its inhabitants’ belief in the Prophet’s Ahl-e Beyt (holy family). According to Akhbār al-Dowlat al-ʿAbbāssiya, Mohammad ibn ʿAli, the ʿAbbāsid imam, had commanded his followers: Leave Kufa since they do not support anyone but ʿAli. The Syrians are also attached to Abu Sofyān and his sons, and the Hejāz people still look to the time of Abu Bakr and ʿOmar. Basra’s people are supporters of ʿOsmān, and the people of Jazira are the fans of the Khārejites. Khorāsān is the land of many strong people who are far away from sharp and biased thoughts, and they support the Prophet.16 13 To learn more about the significance of Khorāsan, see Tor, 2017, pp. 1–12. 14 Tabari, 1967, vol. 5, pp. 38–40. 15 Ibn Nadim, 2002, p. 338; Abol Faraj Esfahāni, 1990, vol. 14, p. 150; Rāgheb Esfahāni, 1902, p. 218. 16 Ibid., vol. 5, p. 199.

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Abu Moslem Khorāsāni: The Iranian Founder of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate With the arrival of military commanders and soldiers in Khorāsān, the Iranian agents had initiated a more profound contribution to the fight against the Umayyad Caliphate.17 The presence of the military alongside the Iranian claimants working to shift the structure of the Islamic caliphate, in the long run, changed the very process of social change in the Islamic world. Although this change gradually manifested itself, it was a continuous and uninterrupted process. The validity of the Iranian presence in changing the caliphate’s political structure from the control of the Umayyads to that of the ʿAbbāsids was recorded under the name of Abu Moslem Khorāsāni. Much has been said about the name and lineage of Abu Moslem, and this underlines the importance of this agent in the power structure at this pivotal time. According to Balʿami: And this was Abu Moslem ʿAbdol Rahmān. They disagreed on his lineage. A group says that he was the slave [gholām] of ʿIsā ibn Maʿqal, and this ʿIsā was a great man from Iraq and the agent of Khāled Ibn ʿAbdollāh al-Qorayshi. When Yusef Ibn ʿOmar ibn Habira came to Iraq by order of Heshām, he imprisoned Khāled, his agents, and ʿIsā. And this Abu Moslem was his servant, and he was a black slave.… When he became free from prison, Bokayr sent him to Ebrāhim al-Imam as a gift. And Ebrāhim set him free and named him ʿAbdol Rahmān, and his nickname was Abu Moslem. And another group says that Abu Moslem was not a slave but was free, and his father was a draper living in Kufa. It was his father who named him ʿAbdol Rahmān and his nickname was Abu Moslem. He served ʿIsā Ibn Maqʿal. Bukayr requested him from ʿIsā and then sent him to Ebrāhim al-Imam.18

In terms of historical sources and social change, what is important to us is his role as a military agent in Iran’s social change.19 Indeed, Abu Moslem never emphasized his identity as an Iranian amir. Many of his actions, including 17 Abu Hanifa Dinevari, 1985, p. 378; Yaʿqubi, 1992, vol. 2, p. 336; Masʿudi, 1991, vol. 2, p. 243; Spuler, 2014, p. 36; El-Hibri, 2021, pp. 33–35. 18 Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, p. 1021. 19 In the book Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, quoting Hamza ibn Hosseyn in the book of Esfahān, he mentions his lineage to Shidush, the son of Goodarz Keshvād (1939, p. 315; see also Ibn Khallekān, 1986, vol. 1, p. 280; Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. 5, p. 93; Māforukhi, 2006, p. 24).

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his attempt to suppress Beh Āfarid’s movement,20 were incompatible with the process of Iranian patriotism at that time. But the uprisings that took place after Abu Moslem’ death constituted the next circles of social change in Iran, which began in Khorāsān and spread to other cities and regions of Iran. These revolts emphasized the role of Abu Moslem as an essential agent in changing the power structure from the Umayyads to the ʿAbbāsids. One of the critical issues to consider in social change is the source of power. In this regard, the ʿAbbāsid imam illustrates the origin of ʿAbbāsid power very vividly: the will of God and the sword of Abu Moslem. These two structural resources constituted the power structure of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate with which they ruled for centuries (132–656 AH/750–1258 AD). Balʿami writes, So, Mohammad ibn ʿAli turned to the people who were his Shiʿites [followers] and said, “Be aware that you are in the year of al-Hemār, one hundred years have passed since the rule of the Umayyads. And it is as if I am looking at the fact that this slave [gholām], that is, Abu Moslem, has risen for our work. You must be ready to support him as soon as he rises openly against the Umayyad. And you will not see me after this year because I see a weakness in myself, which shows that my death is approaching. However, I do this for my son Ebrāhim who settles in Khorāsān. So, if he falls into trouble, my next son, ʿAbdollāh Abol ʿAbbāss al-Saffāh, will be your imam, and if he dies, my third son, ʿAbdollāh Abu Jaʿfar Mansur Budavāniq will be the next imam.21

Hence, the ʿAbbāsid imams predicted the upcoming events by quoting the Qorʾān verses and Hādiths. Balʿami’s emphasis on the role of Abu Moslem in the ʿAbbāsid imam’s speech and the process of events highlighted his unfortunate end. Elsewhere, Balʿami indicated to the ʿAbbāsid imam quoting the Prophet’s Hādith, that the ʿAbbāsids would come to power and that the place from which they rose had also been predicted. Imam referred to the East, i.e., Khorāsān, as the origin of the ʿAbbāsids’ power. In this Hādith, all those 20 Beh Āfarid or Māh Āfarid was from Zuzan, a village in Neyshābur. Most sources argue that Beh Āfarid believed in Zoroastrianism and intended to reform Zoroastrianism with the help of the rules and regulations of Islam. Abu Moslem sent one of his commanders, Abdollāh ibn Shoʿba, to suppress Beh Āfarid and his followers. Beh Āfarid was arrested in Kuhsār-e Bādgheys and killed by Abu Moslem (Gardizi, 1984, p. 119; Ibn Nadim, 2002, p. 407; Shahrestāni, 1971, vol. 1, p. 218). 21 Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, p. 1022.

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coming to power from Ebrāhim to Saffāh and Mansur were enumerated. Consequently, the ʿAbbāsid imam was well aware of the conditions of a suitable place for the uprising, i.e., Khorāsān, and that the military power of the amirs, especially Abu Moslem, promoted it.22 From Religious Legitimacy to Military Victory The ʿAbbāsid imam’s path to power provided him with the structural resources to make the necessary social changes. The ʿAbbāsid use of Iranians and the ʿAlawite structures formulated the direction of their revolt. When the secret invitation was being issued, the ʿAbbāsids paved the way for religious legitimacy by using the credibility of Mohammad and the family of the ʿAlawites in addition to taking advantage of the structure of the invitation. Despite all its resources of power, this direction still encountered obstacles. The ʿAbbāsids had dāʿies and supporters who worked with them yet were potentially their rivals. Hence, they needed a strong military force that, while using the capacity of its opponents to disperse the Umayyads, would eventually end the invitation in favor of the ʿAbbāsids. According to Balʿami, Ebrāhim wrote a letter to Abu Salama in Iraq and gave him the leadership of Khorāsān. Abu Salama designated Soleymān as his successor in Khorāsān. And Soleymān went to Marv. Khorāsān was full of the Khārejites, and seditionists had become very common. [Soleymān] wrote a letter to Abu Salama asking him to send a message to Ebrāhim saying: “Now is the time for the uprising, so send a capable warrior from your family to reveal the daʿva.”23

The ʿAbbāsids’ invitation first proceeded with the help of the religious structural resources and the use of force. In Islamic law (shariʿa), Muslims are allowed to use force to defend their religion. In order to examine the rapid social changes of this period, it is necessary to take a look at the events that took place on the decisive days leading up to the Abbāsid uprising. Ebrāhim ibn ʿAli, who had led the uprising after his brother Mohammad in 125 AH/742 AD, sent Abu Moslem to Khorāsān in 128 AH/745 AD to inform the dāʿies of the need to reveal their invitation and conduct military operations against the Umayyad Caliphate. The ʿAbbāsids asked Abu Moslem to

22 Ibid., p. 1032. 23 Ibid., pp. 1007–1008.

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contact Soleymān ibn Kasir in Khorāsān and Abu Salama in Kufa and get them to obey their orders.24 At that time, the situation in Khorāsān was very chaotic. The Arabs of Khorāsān, under the banner of Nasr ibn Sayyār and Jodayʿ ibn ʿAli Kermāni, had turned Khorāsān into a battlefield.25 Therefore, Abu Moslem was to realize the works of dāʿies such as Soleymān ibn Kasir and Abu Salama by issuing an open invitation and taking the initiative militarily. Soleymān ibn Kasir did not consider Abu Moslem suitable for managing an open invitation due to his youth and possible inexperience.26 According to Balʿami: Abu Moslem went to Iraq, found Abu Salama, and gave him a letter. And then took Abu Salama’s reply to Soleymān ibn Kasir and went to Marv. Soleymān read the letter and did not like it. And he said that Abu Moslem was young…. And he [Soleymān ibn Kasir] wrote a letter to Abu Salama asking him to write to the imam that an old and prudent man from your family needs to do this job.27

With the movement of Abu Moslem to Khorāsān, the first seeds of discord were sown among the ʿAbbāsid dāʿies, but the ʿAbbāsids later took advantage of this disagreement to consolidate their power. The reaction of other ʿAbbāsid dāʿies to Soleymān ibn Kasir’s opposition is noteworthy. According to Balʿami: And in Marv, there was a great dāʿie, a man more prominent than Soleymān ibn Kasir among people who was called Abu Dāvud. When Abu Moslem came to Marv, Abu Dāvud had gone to Balkh on a personal errand. So, when he came back, the people told him that a man had come from the imam to reveal the daʿva, and Soleymān returned to him. He said, “Why?” They said, “Because [Soleymān said he believed] he was young, and he was not entitled to do that.” Abu Dāvud said to Soleymān, “You are an infidel who disobeyed the command of the imam. If the imam had known that he wasn’t entitled to do that, he wouldn’t have sent him here.”28

Abu Dāvud, who replaced Abu Moslem in Khorāsān after the ʿAbbāsids came to power,29 interpreted Soleymān’s opposition to the ʿAbbāsid imam’s 24 25 26 27 28 29

Ibid., p. 1009. Masʿudi, 1991, vol. 2, pp. 248–251; Ibn Khaldun, 2010, vol. 2, pp. 164–165; ʿOmar, 1977, p. 45. Zarrinkub, 2007, p. 13; Spuler, 2014, p. 32. Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, p. 1010. Ibid., p. 1010. Ibid., pp. 1085–1086.

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decree as blasphemous. Accusing Soleymān of infidelity showed that the ʿAbbāsids had equipped themselves with religious legitimacy. Apart from creating popularity, this religious legitimacy brought them immunity from charges of opposition and disobedience. The secret invitation of the ʿAbbāsids relied on the use of certain signs to notify their allies to gather and integrate them under one banner at the time of the revelation of the uprising. The Umayyads used the color green for their clothes, banners, and other markings. This prompted Abu Moslem to create a group called Siyāh-Jāmegān (the Black Garments) to oppose them. Balʿami writes: Madaʾeni says that they wore black clothes since they were in mourning for Zeyd ibn ʿAli and his sons, Yahyā and Fazl. And the real news is that the Umayyads wore green robes and had green banners. Abu Moslem intended to change this tradition. Therefore, he sat down alone in a house and asked one of his gholām to wear a white turban and come to him. Then he asked him to wear a red turban and robe, then a yellow turban and robe. Finally, he said, “Get dressed in the black turban and robe.” When Abu Moslem saw him, he was horrified. He knew that no other color was more terrifying than black. Therefore, he wore black clothes.30

Thus, Abu Moslem used all available means to create and strengthen the power structure of the ʿAbbāsids. The use of the structural resource of the color black was reminiscent of the mourning of Shiʿite martyrs during the Umayyad period31 and its transformation into a symbol of the ʿAbbāsid uprising showed Abu Moslem’s awareness of the distinction between the ʿAbbāsids and other groups in society. The ʿAbbāsids, who had avoided distinguishing themselves and other anti-Umayyad groups throughout the secret invitation, were now linking the secret invitation to an open uprising by introducing themselves as the Siyāh-Jāmegān. Abu Moslem, who had fulfilled the ʿAbbāsids’ trust, along with that of the ʿAlawites and the Iranians, fought faithfully in favor of the ʿAbbāsids: “Abu Moslem sent someone to Gouzgānān to respectfully bury Yahyā ibn Zeyd, who was killed in the time of the Umayyads.… And in revenge for his blood, Abu Moslem killed 80,000 Umayyad supporters.”32 30 Ibid., p. 1024. 31 Bolāzari, 1959, p. 446; Abol Faraj Esfahāni, 1990, vol. 1, p. 143; Ibn Taqtaqā, 1971, p. 179. 32 Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, p. 1024; see also Abol Faraj Esfahāni, 1990, vol. 1, p. 161; Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. 4, p. 291; Akhbār al-Dowlat al-ʿAbbāssiya, 1977, p. 327.

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The ʿAbbāsid imam had asked Abu Moslem that if he did not find anyone in Khorāsān who knew Arabic, he should tell them that the ʿAbbāsid Shiʿites are from ʿAjam (Iran) and all Arabs are our enemies. According to Balʿami, The letter of Ebrāhim al-Imam came in with a lavā [banner], and he told Abu Moslem that when the letter and lavā reach you, reveal the daʿva. And if you cannot find anyone in Khorāsān who speaks Arabic, find the Shiʿites among ʿAjam, since all Arabs are our enemies. And obey the command of Soleymān ibn Kasir and consider him great. And send us your requests by the naqibs [representatives] to inform us of the work of Khorāsān. There was a letter from the imam to Soleymān as well as to the naqibs of all cities stating that he would obey Abu Moslem.33

Abu Moslem’s military strength could be used in two different ways. On the one hand, he had the power to completely undermine the relative security of the people in Khorāsān, to plunge them into chaos. On the other hand, he could bring lasting protection to the people by changing the structure of power and creating a new political structure. Therefore, a split developed among the people of Khorāsān, who were either the advocates of the Umayyads or the ʿAbbāsids. Balʿami writes: Abu Moslem’s success was increasing every day, and his love and glory were always in the hearts of the Khorāsānis. In the khotba [sermon] that they read from the pulpits of Khorāsān, they said, “O God, promote al-Amir Abu Moslem, the trustee of Mohammad’s family, peace be upon him.” And Khorāsān was divided into two groups; one delivered a khotba in the name of Marvān [the last Umayyad caliph] and the other in the name of Abu Moslem. Tensions arose between [the supporters of both] Abu Moslem and Nasr. Whenever these two groups met, they cursed each other. The people of Khorāsān appealed to Abu Moslem and became his followers. They obeyed his orders and paid tribute to him. So, Nasr knew that he would not be able to resist Abu Moslem. He went to a house in Marv and stayed there.34

Khorāsān, which had experienced one of its most violent periods during the time of Nasr ibn Sayyār, the commander of the Umayyad army, quietly transformed the caliphate. The measures of Abu Moslem gradually increased 33 Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, p. 26. 34 Ibid., pp. 1026–1027.

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the legitimacy of the ʿAbbāsid imam against the Umayyad Caliphate in Khorāsān. Balʿami’s account of Nasr’s departure from Khorāsān confirms that Abu Moslem’s social base, and not just his military power, thwarted the Umayyads in Khorāsān. It also indicated the appropriate structural resources to use to influence the hearts and minds of the people of Khorāsān in order to create social change without violence. The people of Khorāsān obeyed the orders of Abu Moslem and paid him tribute to prove their structural resources and critical roles as active agents of social change. Giving tribute was vital in accepting Abu Moslem as the essential agent in the power scene in Khorāsān. He received the honor of guaranteeing security for the people, so the people were looking for additional opportunities to gain power and create safety and freedom of thought; these were the resources that the oppressive Umayyad structure provided to Abu Moslem. The uprising of Abu Moslem in Khorāsān, which at one time was considered an enormous resource for the Umayyad Caliphate, soon brought the Umayyad Caliphate to the brink of collapse. With Nasr ibn Sayyār’s departure from Khorāsān, the ground for Abu Moslem’s rise to power was increasingly prepared.35 Finally, the secret invitation of dāʿies and the sword of Abu Moslem and his shrewd policies elevated the ʿAbbāsids to power. Balʿami writes, Marvān ibn Mohammad was murdered on Thursday, 25 Ze al-Hajji 131 [749 AD]. ʿĀmer ibn Ismāʿil killed him in Damascus. He ruled for four months and ten days. The rule of the Umayyads collapsed with him. Abu Moslem went to Iraq and brought Abol ʿAbbāss and his brothers from Medina to Kufa to pledge allegiance. And he [Abol ʿAbbāss] was the first caliph from the decadents of ʿAbbāss ibn ʿAbdol Motalleb.36 With the failure of the Umayyad troops under Qahtaba, Abu Moslem’s amir in Iraq, and the assassination of Marvān ibn Mohammad (r. 127–132 AH/745–750 AD), the last Umayyad caliph near Egypt, a new caliphate was established in the Islamic world.37 Abu al-ʿAbbāss ʿAbdollāh al-Saffāh (r. 132–136 AH/750–754 AD), appointed as the ʿAbbāsid imam by his father, officially announced the beginning of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate at the Kufa Mosque. 35 Abu Hanifa Dinevari, 1985, p. 380; Masʿudi, 1991, vol. 2, p. 248; Yaʿqubi, 1992, vol. 2, p. 341; Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. 9, p. 154. 36 Tārikh-e Sistān, 1987, p. 135; see also Bennison, 2009, p. 26. 37 Hawting, 2000, pp. 137–139.

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The invitation of the dāʿies, despite all its complexities, ended in the ʿAbbāsids’ favor. Still, the presence of various agents as dāʿies who both openly and secretly worked against the Umayyad Caliphate soon became a significant obstacle to the consolidation of ʿAbbāsid power. The conflicts between the dāʿies and the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate started a new phase in the social changes occurring in Iran. Apart from gaining control of the caliphate, which was seen in the title of the caliphate, there was a continuation of the power of the Umayyads. The ʿAbbāsids had now drawn new agents into the political arena who found themselves deprived of their share of power. These agents never gave up their efforts to gain power, and their presence in the later stages of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate directed the process of social change in other ways.

Bibliography Abol Faraj Esfahāni, ʿAli ibn Hosseyn (1965). Maqātel al-Tālebiyin, Najaf Ashraf: Maktabat al-Heydariya Abol Faraj Esfahāni, ʿAli ibn Hosseyn (1990). Al-Aqāni, Beirut: Dār al-Ehyāʾ-e al-Torās al-ʿArabi Abu Hanifa Dinevari (1985). Akhbār al-Tavvāl, trans. Mahmud Mahdavi Dāmghāni, Tehrān: Nashr-e Ney Afzal Kermāni, Ahmad ibn Hāmed (1977). ʿAqd al-ʿAlā Lel-Mowqef al-Aʿlā, ed. ʿAli Mohammad Amiri Nāyini, intro. Mohammad Ebrāhim Bāstāni Pārizi, Tehrān: Ruzbahān Akhbār al-Dowlat al-ʿAbbāssiya va Fih Akhbār Al ʿAbbās va Valadah (1977). Ed. ʿAbdol ʿAziz Al-Dori, ʿAbdol Jabbār al-Motallebi, Beirut: Dār al-Taliʿa Amin, Ahmad (1962). Zahya al-Eslām, Cairo: Maktabat al-Nehzat al-Mesriya Armstrong, Karen (1993). Mohammad, A Biography of the Prophet, New York: Harper San Francisco Arnold, Thomas W. (2001). The Spread of Islam in the World: A History of Peaceful Preaching. New Delhi: Goodword Books Balʿami, Abu ʿAli Mohammad ibn Mohammad (1999). Tārikhnāma-ye Tabari, ed. Mohammad Roshan, 5 vols., Tehrān: Sorush Bennison, Amira K. (2009). The Great Caliphs: The Golden Age of the ʿAbbāsid Empires, London: I. B. Tauris Bolāzari, Ahmad ibn Yahyā (1959). Ansāb al-Ashrāf, ed. Mohammad Hamdollāh, 4 vols., Cairo: Dār al-Maʿāref be Mesr El-Hibri, Tayeb (2021). The Abbasid Caliphate: A History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

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Gardizi, Abu Saʿid ʿAbdol Hayy ibn Zahhāk (1984). Zeyn al-Akhbār, ed. ʿAbdol Hayy Habibi, Tehrān: Donyā-ye Ketāb Hātam, Nuri (2006). Zeyd ibn ʿAli va Mashruʿiyāt al-Shurāt ʿend-a Ahl -al-Bayt, Bitā: Markaz al-Qāder al-Derāsāt al-Eslāmiya Hawting, Gerald (2000). The First Dynasty of Islam: The Umayyad Caliphate A.D. 661–750, Oxon and New York: Routledge Ibn Aʿsam-e Kufi, Ahmad (1991). Ketāb-e al-Fotuh, ed. ʿAli Shiri, 5 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Azvāʿ Ibn Asir, ʿAli ibn Mohammad (1965). Al-Kāmel fi al-Tārikh, 13 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Sāder Ibn Kasir, Ismāʿil ibn ʿOmar (1990). Al-Bedāyat va al-Nehāyat, 15 vols., Beirut: Maktabat al-Maʿāref Ibn Khaldun, ʿAbdol Rahmān ibn Mohammadi (2010). Tārikh-e Ibn Khaldun, trans. ʿAbdol Mohammad Āyati, 6 vols., Tehrān: Pajouheshgāh-e ʿOlum Ensāni va Motāleʿāt-e Farhangi Ibn Khallekān, Ahmad ibn Mohammad (1986). Vafiyāt al-Aʿyān va Anbāʾ-e Abnāʾ-e al-Zamān, ed. Ehsān ʿAbbās, 8 vols., Qom: Manshurāt al-Sharif al-Rāzi Ibn Nadim, Eshāq Ibn Mohammad (2002). Al-Fehrest, Tehrān: Asātir Ibn Taqtaqā, Abu Jaʿfar Mohammad Ibn ʿAli (1971). Tārikh-e Fakhri, trans. Mohammad Vahid Golpāyegāni, Tehrān: Bongāh-e Tarjoma va Nashr-e Ketāb Jaheshyāri, Mohammad ibn ʿAbdus (1980). Al-Vozarā va al-Kottāb, ed. Mostafā al-Saqqā, Ebrāhim al-Biyāri, Cairo: Matʿaba al-Bābi Madelung, Wilferd (2020). Religious and Ethnic Movements in Medieval Islam. London: Routledge Māforukhi, Mafzal ibn Saʿd (2006). Mahāsen-e Esfahān, ed. ʿAbbās Eqbāl Āshtiyāni, trans. Hosseyn ibn Mohammad Anvari, Esfahān: Makaz-e Esfahān-shenāsi va Khāna-ye Melal Masʿudi, ʿAli ibn Hosseyn (1991). Moruj al-Zahab, trans. Abol Qāsem Pāyanda, 4 vols., Tehrān: ʿElmi va Farhangi Nobakhti, Abol Hasan ibn Musā (1994). Feraq al-Shiʿi, trans. Mohammad Javād Mashkur, Tehrān: Bonyād-e Farhang-e Iran ʿOmar, Fāruq (1977). Bahus fi al-Tārikh al-Abbāsi, Beirut: Dār al-Qalam, Maktab al-Nehza Rāgheb Esfahāni (1902). Mohāzerat al-Odabāʾ va Mohāverat al-Shoʾarāʿ va al-Bolaqā, ed. Ebrāhim Zeydān, Maktabat al-Helāl Shahrestāni, Abol Fath, Mohammad ibn ʿAbdol Karim (1971). Al-Melal va al-Nehal, trans. Sadr Tarka Esfahāni, ed. Mohammad Reza Jalāli Nāʾini, 2 vols., Tehrān: Eqbāl Shebli, Ahmad (1982). Tārikh-e Amuzesh dar Eslām, trans. Mohammad Hosseyn Sāket, Tehrān: Daftar-e Nashr-e Farhang-e Islām

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Shaykh Mof id (1997). Al-Ershād, trans. Mohammad Bāqer Sāʿedi Khorāsāni, 2 vols., Tehrān: ʿElmi Spuler, B. (2014). Iran in the Early Islamic Period: Politics, Culture, Administration and Public Life between the Arab and the Seljuk Conquests, 633–1055, ed. R. G. Hoyland and G. Goldbloom. Leiden: Brill Tabari, Mohammad ibn Jarir (1967). Tārikh-e Tabari, ed. Abol Fazl Ebrāhim, 11 vols., Beirut: Dar al-Torās Tārikh-e Sistān (1987). Ed. Mohammad Taqi Bahār, Tehrān: Padida-ye Khāvar Tor, D. G. (2017). “The Importance of Khurasan and Transoxiana in the Persianate Dynastic Period (850–1220),” in Medieval Central Asia and the Persianate World: Iranian Tradition and Islamic Civilisation, ed. A. C. S. Peacock and D. G. Tor (Bloomsbury), pp. 1–12 Yaʿqubi, Ahmad ibn Eshāq (1992). Tārikh-e Yaʿqubi, trans. Ebrāhim Āyati, 2 vols., Tehrān: ʿElmi va Farhangi Zarrinkub, ʿAbdol Hosseyn (2007). Tārikh-e Iran baʿd az Islam, Tehrān: Amir Kabir

2

Establishment of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate The Restructuring or Displacement of Agents

Abstract The ʿAbbāsid Caliphate was a reproduction of the Umayyad Caliphate, which tried to rule with the same monopolistic power. After using the power of Iranian amirs and dāʿies, the ʿAbbāsids began their efforts to consolidate power by fomenting rivalry between the dāʿies and eliminating them, including Abu Moslem, whose name was associated with Khorāsān and the victory of the ʿAbbāsids. The circle of Iranians’ connection with the ʿAbbāsid power framework continued with the Barmakids’ presence in the caliph’s court. The ʿAbbāsids interpreted the presence of the bureaucrats as a division of power and therefore eliminated the Barmakids. However, it provided the ground for Khorāsān’s independence in the long run. The Khorāsān riots were the first result of the massacre of the Barmakids. Keywords: ʿAbbāsids, dāʿies, Abu Moslem, Iranian viziers, Barmakids

The Removal of the Dāʿies The formation of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate resulted from the persistent and tireless efforts of the dāʿies, many of whom thought only of ending Umayyad rule and had no clear picture in mind of what should happen afterward. Thus, on the very eve of success, the ʿAbbāsid power saw stubborn rivals who could challenge the power of the newly established caliphate. Yesterday’s dāʿies, who had been formed as resources in the Umayyads’ repressive structure and saw the result of their actions favor only the ʿAbbāsid imams, were now gradually becoming serious obstacles to establishing the power of the ʿAbbāsids.

Kamali, M. Social Change in Medieval Iran 132-628 AH (750-1231 AD). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2023 doi: 10.5117/9789463721981_ch02

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Abu Salama Khallāl and Soleymān ibn Kasir were among these dāiʿes. Many considered Abu Salama and Soleymān to be supporters of ʿAli’s family, who had been deceived by the ʿAbbāsids’ secrecy and had accompanied them until the ʿAbbāsids came to power.1 On the threshold of the revelation of the ʿAbbāsid invitation, Abu Salama consulted with some of Kufa’s elders and decided to form a shorā (council) of ʿAli’s descendants and ʿAbbāsids so that they could choose someone from themselves to lead the caliphate.2 But as he was worried about a possible rift between council members, he wrote separate letters to Jaʿfar ibn Sādegh, one of the Shiʿite imams, and ʿAbdollāh ibn Hasan and ʿOmar ibn ʿAli ibn Hosseyn, two ʿAlawite elders,3 asking them to accept the caliphate. But before the plan came to fruition, Abu Moslem’s envoys found the hiding place of Saffāh and swore allegiance to him as the caliph. 4 The way that the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate dealt with the dāʿies can lead us to a better understanding of the consequences of this social change. After taking over the caliphate, the ʿAbbāsids sought to create a monopoly of the power structure; therefore, they eliminated other claimants, including the dāʿies, who were supposed to have a share in the power structure of the new government. The ʿAbbāsids could have used the power of the dāʿies to strengthen their political structure, but they preferred to reproduce the Umayyad tyranny by creating discord among the dāʿies and removing them from the power structure. The ʿAbbāsids used all the resources in the existing structures and agents, including the dāiʿes, to eliminate their main rivals, i.e., the Umayyad Caliphate. The ʿAbbāsid policy of eliminating one rival by another competitor in the caliphate’s early years helped them remove the dāʿies and seize the caliphate seat exclusively. Abu Moslem Khorāsāni, himself a great amir and a member of the proʿAbbāsid dāʿies, began to eliminate agents who were beneath to him in popularity and military power. His attempt to assassinate ʿAli Kermāni, the son of Jodaiʿ-e Kermāni from the Yemeni tribe (d. 130 AH/747 AD), who had conducted many battles against Nasr ibn Sayyār and Soleymān ibn Kasir (d. 132 AH/750 AD) under the pretext of their turning to the ʿAlawites, were some of Abu Moslem’s actions after the rise of the ʿAbbāsids.5 1 Bolāzari, 1959, p. 85; Abu Hanifa Dinevari 1985, pp. 314–315; Yaʿqubi, 1992, vol. 2, pp. 321–329; Jaheshyāri, 1980, pp. 119–122; Shebli, 1982, vol. 3, p. 254. 2 Jaheshyāri, 1980, p. 57. 3 Yaʿqubi, 1992, vol. 2, p. 349. 4 Tabari, 1967, vol. 6, p. 81; Jaheshyāri, 1980, p. 129; Shebli, 1982, vol. 3, p. 256. 5 Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, pp. 1025, 1060.

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Balʿami interprets Abu Salama’s turning away from Saffāh and his unsuccessful attempt to raise the ʿAlawites to power as his infidelity and blasphemy. In Islamic law, this sin is punished by death: One night, Abol-ʿAbbāss was sitting with Dāvud ibn ʿAli and his family, and they talked about everything. The Hādith [issue] of Abu Salama came up. Saffāh recalled his oppression and the fact that he wanted the daʿva to end up favoring the ʿAlawites. So, one of them said, “O Amir al-Moʾmenin, it is lawful to shed his blood because of what he [Abu Salama] did. He became kāfar [apostate] and broke his allegiance and became disobedient to the imam.”6

The ʿAbbāsids, who used religious resources to bring themselves to the highest level of power in the Islamic world, the caliphate, now saw the conversion of the dāʿies and their criticism of the actions of the ʿAbbāsids as a denial of their spiritual claims. As the Prophet’s successor, the caliph had religious immunity, and criticism of him was considered blasphemy. The ʿAbbāsids appealed to Abu Moslem to remove Abu Salama so that he, and not they, would be more responsible for the elimination of this notable dāʿie. The ʿAbbāsids hoped they would pay a lesser price for this deed. Thus, Saffāh, with Dāvud ibn Ali’s help, commissioned his brother Jaʿfar to go to Khorāsān and ask Abu Moslem to kill Abu Salama. Balʿami writes: Abu Moslem asked [Abu Jaʿfar], “Why didn’t you behead him?” He said: “Amir al-Moʾmenin told me he did not want to do anything about this without consulting you. Now that you [have] found it sound [to kill him], you need to send someone to do it.” Abu Moslem said, “I will.” Abu Moslem appointed Marār ibn Anas, and said to him, “Go to Kufa and say to the imam that I have sent you to finish Abu Salama’s work; then do as he orders.”7

By engaging the dāʿies in the field of power, the imam diverted the focus of the attack away from his throne and the court. With this policy, Abu Salama was killed by Abu Moslem to defeat a real enemy and weaken a potential opponent. The murder of Abu Salama, the Vizier-e Āl-e Mohammad, and one of the ʿAlawites damaged Abu Moslem’s popularity.

6 Ibid., p. 1057. 7 Ibid., p. 1059.

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The ʿAbbāsids believed that with the removal of other agents who had gained more legitimacy and popularity than them, they could strengthen the foundation of their power. However, by eliminating those agents, the structural resources developed by them did not collapse but were reproduced by other agents as the base of a different power structure. Elimination of Abu Moslem Khorāsāni from the Power Structure The Iranian amirs made a serious effort to form the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. So, when they took power with such difficulty and put it in the hands of the ʿAbbāsids, the distance between the Iranians and power became extremely narrow. At this time Abu Moslem, apart from his sense of purpose and beliefs, developed the capacity to become an independent agent. He went to war with the Umayyad government when the ʿAbbāsids’ distance from power was farther than Abu Moslem’s. Moreover, Abu Moslem could have taken his share of the newly gained power by declaring the independence of Khorāsān. By increasing the mobility of social classes, the agents had the opportunity to elevate themselves to a higher social class. The process of forming the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate provided an opportunity for social agents to gain the necessary awareness of their ability to bring about social change. Abu Moslem, even though he had emerged from a lower social class, had learned about mobility in social class and proved himself to be a competent amir. From this he developed a power structure fitting his agency. Although history speaks infrequently from the perspective of Abu Moslem, his power in Khorāsān on the eve of the defeat of the Umayyads was undeniable. Abu Moslem’s rise to power from being a simple gholām (slave) to a powerful amir and his subjugation by Mansur was a unique historical experience. It is as if the power of Abu Moslem’s sword was greater than that of the ʿAbbāsids’ religion. This frightened Mansur, so he asked Saffāh to remove Abu Moslem from the political scene. On his return from Khorāsān, to attract Abu Moslem’s attention to the assassination of Abu Salama, Mansur warned Saffāh of Abu Moslem’s power and popularity: “So Abu al-ʿAbbāss turned to Abu Jaʿfar [Mansur] and said, “How did you see Abu Moslem?” He said, “[He is] a tyrant among tyrants. I think that your life is not guaranteed as long as he is alive.”8 Although the phrase “a tyrant among tyrants” had a negative connotation, it indicated the royal power of Abu Moslem in Mansur’s eyes. Mansur pointed 8

Ibid., p. 1056.

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out to Saffāh that as long as Abu Moslem ruled in Khorāsān, one could not hope for the continuation of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate.9 Mansur’s concern was that he considered Abu Moslem’s power in Khorāsān to be not just the region’s independence but the destruction of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. This showed that the ʿAbbāsids were not confident in their religious legitimacy in the first steps toward establishing power and considered the Khorāsān military force an important obstacle to their survival. Saffāh was skeptical about killing Abu Moslem and stressed to do so could jeopardize the legitimacy of the ʿAbbāsids and undermine their fledgling power structure.10 Using inverted logic, Mansur tried to change Saffāh’s view of Abu Moslem’s role in bringing the ʿAbbāsids to power. He claimed that the ʿAbbāsid power structure and the caliph’s religious legitimacy empowered Abu Moslem’s sword. Balʿami writes, “Whatever he did was under the rule of Amir al-Moʾmenin, and whoever the amir had nominated would have been able to do this. Saffāh said, ‘How can I kill him with the several armies that are with him?’”11 Abu Moslem’s popularity and authority was based on his military presence in Khorāsān, so Saffāh refused to accept his brother’s offer. According to this, Abu Moslem, whose presence was the guarantor of preserving the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate and was cooperating in the assassination of many of his companions to establish this caliphate, was now considered by Mansur as a major obstacle to stabilizing the power structure. On the other hand, the ʿAbbāsids owed their rule to Abu Moslem’s sword and he never threatened their survival. After all, Abu Moslem remained loyal to the ʿAbbāsids until the last moment. His only resistance to the ʿAbbāsids was his opposition to moving away from his center of power in Khorāsān.12 The uprisings that occurred after Abu Moslem showed that sufficient human resources and agents existed in Iran to gain independence from the ʿAbbāsids, but the ground for that independence was not ready in terms of political structure. However, Abu Moslem’s uprising had two different results: one was the establishment of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate, which soon began, and the other was the provision of Iran’s independence from the structure of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate, whose structural resources were not yet available. 9 Ibid., pp. 1061–1062. 10 Ibid., p. 1069. 11 Ibid., p. 1069. 12 Bolāzari, 1959, p. 86; Abu Hanifa Dinevari, 1985, p. 313; Yaʿqubi, 1992, vol. 2, p. 321; Jaheshyāri, 1980, p. 119; Shebli, 1982, vol. 3, p. 251.

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After ascending to the throne, Mansur (r. 136–158 AH/753–774 AD) removed Abu Moslem from the circle of power,13 a priority in his plans. Of course, Mansur took some time to distance Abu Moslem from his center of power in Khorāsān and create a gap between him and his troops, paving the way for his removal from the power structure. After all, Abu Moslem’s popularity among the people was more significant than his sword’s, so “he thought to himself, ‘I will not be able to kill Abu Moslem right away because the people would blame me.’”14 Mansur’s first step in eliminating the rival was to offer control over Syria and Egypt to Abu Moslem to isolate him. Mansur was well aware that Abu Moslem, as a political agent, could pose a severe threat to the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate as long as he was present in Khorāsān; Abu Moslem without Khorāsān would be like a whale far from the sea. Abu Moslem received the offer to rule over Syria and Egypt when he returned from the war against ʿAbdollāh ibn ʿAli, Mansur’s uncle, another ʿAbbāsid claimant15 who expected special attention from Mansur. According to Balʿami, Abu Jaʿfar sent the mandate of the reign of Syria to Abu Moslem by his agent, Yaqtin. He sent him the message that “Khorāsān is far from us, and you will always do something for us, and Syria is better than Khorāsān and beyond that region. And it would help if you stationed yourself in Syria so that you may be closer to us. So send a caliph [deputy] to Egypt so that whenever we call for you, you will come soon.” … Abu Moslem became angry at him and said to Yaqtin, “Go to Abu Jaʿfar and say that Syria and Egypt are for you. Khorāsān is enough for me since I have many jobs to do here.”16

Abu Moslem’s refusal of the reign of Syria and Egypt forced Mansur to weaken his power by destroying Abu Moslem’s military backing and turning him into a well-known but helpless agent. Therefore, he sent Abu Dāvud to Khorāsān to replace Abu Moslem. Abu Dāvud, who played a vital role in the indictment against Soleymān ibn Kasir and Abu Salama, appeared in Khorāsān in the absence of Abu Moslem and incited the Khorāsān army 13 El-Hibri, 2021, pp. 44–50. 14 Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, p. 1081. 15 ʿAbdollāh ibn ʿAli ibn ʿAbdollāh, Mansur’s uncle, claimed the caliphate in 136 AH/753 AD. Mansur ordered Abu Moslem to remove the sedition. After many battles, Abdollāh ibn ʿAli was defeated and fled to Basra (Hamdollāh Mostowfi, 1985, p. 293). 16 Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, p. 1082.

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against him. The troops’ willingness to forget their former leader and to serve a new amir who made a better offer is remarkable.17 Balʿami writes: Abu Dāvud was the leader of the Khorāsān’s army, and the army of Khorāsān regarded Abu Dāvud superior to Abu Moslem and obeyed his command more than Abu Moslem’s. And when the news came to Abu Jaʿfar that Abu Moslem had set out for Khorāsān, he sent the mandate of the rule of Khorāsān to Abu Dāvud and wrote, “You were our supporter and obeyed Abu Moslem because of us. And now that he has gone out of our obedience, it is not permissible to obey him. After we gave him the reign of Syria and Egypt, he did not like it and sent back the mandate. Now gather the army, read my letter to them, and take allegiance from them. And if it is so that he comes to Khorāsān, do not withdraw, fight with him, and take him and send him to me.”18

Abu Dāvud, who had previously accused Soleymān ibn Kasir and Abu Salama al-Khallāl of blasphemy for opposing the imam’s views, and the ʿAbbāsid caliph called Abu Moslem a heretic, cursed him, and threatened him with the army.19 Abu Moslem’s silence in the face of Abu Dāvud indicated that the change was unexpected and far from his liking. Abu Moslem had resisted obeying Mansur’s instructions (sent in letters and by couriers), but when he learned about the presence of Ibn Dāvud in Khorāsān, he had no choice but to go to Mansur.20 Balʿami beautifully and accurately describes the death of Abu Moslem. Balʿami’s account of Mansur and Abu Moslem’s question-and-answer scene provides an innovative perspective on the process of change that led to Abu Moslem’s death. Balʿami shows the scene of the clashes between the powerful agents and their former allies, who were considered partners in power. With each question, a pillar of the authority of the former ally, Abu Moslem, collapsed. These scenes spoke accurately of the social changes of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate from a fledgling power to a pervasive dominion. In 137 AH/754 AD, at the invitation of Mansur and with his friends’ encouragement, Abu Moslem set foot in the caliph’s palace, the palace that became a court as soon as he entered it. Mansur addressed Abu Moslem with 17 18 19 20

Bennison, 2009, pp. 25–28; Arnold, 1965, pp. 50–51. Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, p. 1085. Ibid., pp. 1085–1086. Ibid., p. 1085.

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the name “Abu Mojrem” (Guilty Man). He did not mention Abu Moslem’s services in elevating the ʿAbbāsids to power. Instead, he simply accused him of betrayal. Balʿami writes: “Abu Mojrem [Guilty Man], tell me why you killed Soleymān ibn Kasir. I was there, and you did not ask me—you did not think of me.” Abu Moslem said: “O Amir al-Moʾmenin, Ebrāhim al-Imam told me to kill anyone I suspected of his intentions. And I doubted Soleymān’s intention. I killed him for your good.”21

Mansur’s first charge was the assassination of Soleymān ibn Kasir without Mansur’s permission. Abu Moslem recalled his role in the rise to power of the ʿAbbāsids, with subtle references to his efforts in the era of daʿva and the authority given to him by Ebrāhim, Mansur’s brother, to intentionally remind Mansur of his role in helping the ʿAbbāsids ascend to the throne. When the ʿAbbāsids needed his sword, his decision-making position was higher than that of Mansur, the imam’s brother. However, Mansur stated other reasons for accusing him without accepting Abu Moslem’s reasoning. According to Balʿami, Mansur said, “What was your rank, that you wrote a letter to me from Khorāsān and wrote your name before mine? Then you wrote a letter to Saffāh and proposed to ʿAli ibn ʿAbdollāh ibn ʿAbbāss’s daughter. Did did you not know your status? You wrote us a letter and mentioned that it is not halāl [lawful] to eat tāfi f ish, and you taught us [all about our] religion.” So, Abu Moslem did not answer the first three questions and then answered the question about the Hādith [issue] of tāfi f ish and said, “O Amir al-Moʾmenin, I did not teach you [your] religion since I learned the religion from you. I supposed that tāfi f ish was harām [unlawful], [but] after you said that it was halāl, I took your word for it.’”22

The difference between the two political agents in the power structure is evident in Abu Moslem’s failure to answer Mansur’s accusations. Abu Moslem was the agent of the ʿAbbāsid rise to power and the guarantor of their survival throughout Saffāh’s reign, so he considered his role in the power structure much more prominent than that of Mansur. The 21 Ibid., p. 1089. 22 Ibid., pp. 1089–1090.

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reminding of his name to Mansur indicated that Abu Moslem paid attention to his vital role in the power structure of the ʿAbbāsids. Mansur blamed Abu Moslem for proposing to the daughter of an important ʿAbbāsid, accusing him of not knowing that his social position was inferior to that of the ʿAbbāsids. In the face of this accusation, Abu Moslem’s silence was a cry of protest against the reproduction of the same inflexible structures of the Umayyads that Abu Moslem had once fought to abolish. The ʿAbbāsids, who had reached the caliphate’s throne using the structural resources of the imamate, did not consider it permissible to be criticized, especially in religious matters. Therefore, Mansur considered the decision in jurisprudential affairs and the lawfulness and prohibition of affairs as his right and condemned Abu Moslem for interfering in religious affairs. Furthermore, Mansur accused Abu Moslem of making decisions about the spoils of the battle with ʿAbdollāh ibn ʿAli, calling it his right to decide on this issue. Balʿami writes, [Abu Jaʿfar] asked, “What did you do with the booty you took from ʿAbdollāh ibn ʿAli and his camp?” He [Abu Moslem] said, “I gave it to my troops who fought since I believed they deserved it more.” Mansur said, “Why didn’t you show it to Abol Khasib, whom I sent to see what it was? Instead, you cursed him and me.” He [Abu Moslem] said, “I didn’t curse you. Abol Khasib is lying. If I did what you ordered, the army would have blamed you and been told that you [Abu Jaʿfar] took their spoils, and I didn’t want them to blame you.” He [Abu Jaʿfar] said, “So, what about the kaniz [slave or concubine] of ʿAbdollāh ibn ʿAli who was the mother of his child? Why did you take her with you? What did you think? The army would not stop you from taking her?” He said, “If I had left her amid the soldiers, she would have been spoiled. I acted to send her intact and respectfully to her master.”23

Mansur’s accusations narrowed the range of Abu Moslem’s influence. Abu Moslem, who inevitably considered religious decision-making to be the caliph’s domain, did not believe that he should be silent on military affairs, over which he thought himself to be in charge. He quietly let it be known that spoils was the entitlement of those who wielded the sword, and so the troops deserved more. Moreover, regarding ʿAli ibn ʿAbdollāh’s concubine, Mansur realized that he had a better understanding of how the troops would 23 Ibid., p. 1090.

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behave. In the end, Abu Moslem stated that his sudden move to Khorāsān was because he was afraid of Mansur. It is as if he knew that he was already condemned in this court. According to Balʿami: [Abu Jaʿfar] said, “When I called for you, why did you take the path to Khorāsān and disobey me?” He [Abu Moslem] said, “I did not want to disobey you, but I was afraid of you. I knew that you were angry at me. I decided to go to Khorāsān and from there convey my excuses and after I could convince you, I would come to you.”24

Mansur’s allegations briefly describe the course of social change from the Umayyads to the ʿAbbāsids. The ʿAbbāsids took advantage of the power of great agents such as Abu Moslem and pushed their efforts to the highest point. Where they had to make a difference between themselves and the Umayyads by dividing power among their allies, they led them to the abyss of death. Mansur considered Abu Moslem’s power not as a resource in the service of the ʿAbbāsids, but as an obstacle in the consolidation of their power. Therefore, he confiscated all the credibility of Abu Moslem in his name and dragged him to the slaughterhouse. Balʿami writes: Mansur said, “Damn you, O Abu Mojrem! Whatever I say, you have an excuse to acquit yourself.” So, Mansur clapped his hands. ʿOsmān ibn Nohayk entered the tent with his warriors and raised their swords. Abu Moslem said, “O Amir al-Moʾmenin, do not kill me. Keep me alive, so I may sacrifice my life for you whenever an enemy is against you.” Mansur said, “Damn you! I have no enemy worse than you on the earth.” Mansur ordered, “Kill him.” The first strike of the sword cut off his leg. Mansur yelled at them, “May your hands and legs be cut off! Strike his head!” So, they did and killed Abu Moslem.25

The death of Abu Moslem can be considered one of the most important social changes in Iran. Abu Moslem created ideas and ideals in Iran that stimulated various intellectual and military agents against the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. Perhaps only the reign of Tāher, as a military amir in Khorāsān, with all its differences and distinctions, was a reproduction of the unsuccessful 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid., pp. 1091–1090. In Tārikh-e Sistān, the historian describes the terror of Abu Moslem in such a way that even the slaves hesitated to kill Abu Muslim, and no one would take up the sword until Mansur himself stroke Abu Moslem (Tārikh-e Sistān, 1987, pp. 138–139).

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movement of Abu Moslem-e Khorāsāni, who challenged the ʿAbbāsid monopoly power structure. The Structure of Abu Moslem: From the Creation of Intellectual Currents to Vengeance Abu Moslem’s movement in Khorāsān created critical social changes that culminated in the formation of the caliphate. Abu Moslem’s death at the hands of the ʿAbbāsids did not extinguish the process of social change but directed the attention to the other side of the scene of social change, to the people who, along with Abu Moslem, were taking steps to revive Iran’s independence. Abu Moslem’s movement introduced structural sources of power to society that continued to operate after his death. As a military figure, Abu Moslem devoted his efforts to the rise of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. In this regard, he fought fiercely against any current thought contrary to the general ʿAbbāsid movement. His efforts to eliminate Behāfarid 26 can be seen in this context. But his movement in Iran, as a power source, led to a series of revolts, including the uprising of Sanbād,27 Ostādsis,28 and Ibn Moqanna,ʿ29 which were ultimately subjugated by the ʿAbbāsids. 26 Gardizi, 1984, p. 119; Ibn Nadim, 2002, p. 407; Shahrestāni, 1971, vol. 1, p. 218. 27 Ibn Esfandiyār considers the beginning of the Sanbād uprising from Ray and believes that Abu Moslem appointed Sanbād on his behalf before leaving for Iraq and entrusted his treasury to him (Ibn Esfandiyār, 2011, vol. 1, p. 174). He calls Sanbād a gabr (Zoroastrian) and considers his thought to be influenced by the Zendiqs because Abu Jaʿfar Mansur Bu-Davāniq killed Abu Moslem, Sāheb al-Dowla (peace be upon him) in Baghdad in 137 AH/754 AD. Sanbād was the head of the city of Neyshābur. Sanbād and Abu Moslem were old friends, and Abu Moslem had elevated him to the rank of troop leader. After the assassination of Abu Muslim, Sanbād revolted in Neyshābur and called the Zoroastrians of Ray and Tabarestān to war. First, he killed Abdol Hanafi, who was Mansur’s agent in Ray, and took the treasures that Abu Moslem had left in Ray (Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, 1999, p. 280). Mansur sent Jahur ibn Marār al-ʿEjli with an army of 10,000 or 20,000 men to fight Sanbād. In this war, which took place in late 137 AH/754 AD or early 138 AH/755 AD in Jorjānbān, a village between Ray and Sāva, Sanbād was defeated (Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, p. 1094; Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, 1999, p. 261; Maqdasi, 2003, vol. 1, p. 953; Ibn Kasir, 1990, vol. 9, pp. 10, 75; Bolāzari, 1959, p. 248; Fasih-e Khwāfi, 2008, vol. 1, pp. 210–211). 28 In 150 AH/767 AD, Ostādsis revolted to avenge Abu Moslem’s blood. About 300,000 fighters from Harāt, Sistān, and Bādgheys joined him. Eventually, Mahdi, the son of Mansur, who on behalf of his father was in charge of the eastern government of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate, sent Khāzam ibn Khozayma to fight him, which eventually led to the defeat of Ostādsis in 151 AH/768 AD in Marvrud; Narshakhi, 1984, p. 92, Gardizi, 1984, p. 278; Tabari, 1967, vol. 6, pp. 285–288; Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. 3, pp. 603–605; Yaʿqubi, 1992, vol. 2, p. 380). 29 The Uprising of Moqannaʿ, known as the Uprising of Sepidjāmegān, was led by al-Moqannaʿ (ʿAtā or Hāshem ibn Hakim) in 159 AH/776 AD in Mā Varā al-Nahr, and especially in Kāsh,

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Baghdad: A New Center for a New Empire One important social change that Mansur made to stabilize the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate structure was the construction of Baghdad in 143 AH/761 AD. It was a move that, unlike his other repressive actions, was about establishing and developing something new. As mentioned earlier, the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate was formed in an anti-Umayyad atmosphere and was carried out by many dāʿies who, in their efforts to suppress the Umayyad Caliphate, never thought of creating a caliphate in the name of the sons of ʿAbbās. The ʿAbbāsid Caliphate did not try to form a coalition government of all those who opposed the Umayyads and at least played an essential role in creating the caliphate. Therefore, building a suitable platform for strengthening the ʿAbbāsid power structure was inevitable. Although all the cities that were centers of power, including Damascus, Kufa, and Khorāsān, were under the ʿAbbāsids, they each had long experience of various power structures, including the Umayyads and the Shiʿites, and the structural resources of these former governments were still in place.30 With the construction of Baghdad, Mansur built a new center for the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. His criteria for choosing the capital included proximity to the centers of power, the scope of the military presence, and the pleasant local climate. According to Balʿami: In 143 AH [760 AD], Mansur was heartbroken about Kufa and the Hāshemids. He wanted to build a city and station there. So, he sent people from all sides to the banks of the Tigris and said, “Find a place on the banks of the Tigris between Mosul, Basra, Kufa, Madāʾen, and Vāset as it is near from all sides. Build a city better and bigger than any other city in the world, so that we can station there with the troops. I would like it to have northern weather so that the north wind blows and there is no seasonal disease in the summer. And that north wind can become gentle from water, sea, and trees. And the winter will be nice, so when the south wind blows and everything freezes, it does not ruin the palm trees, and orange and bergamot trees can survive. I want the city to include meadows, plants, and farms so that everything is abundant. The Bokhārā, and Soghd. Those dressed in white to protest the black-dressed ʿAbbāsids revolted for the blood of Abu Moslem. It is said that Al-Moqannaʿ also claimed to be God and Prophet. Eventually, the revolt of Al-Moqannaʿ was suppressed by Saʿid Harshi Amir of Harāt (Biruni, 2011, p. 211; Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. 3, p. 638; Zarrinkub, 1992, pp. 172–173). 30 Lassner, 1980, pp. 78–82.

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domestic animals should have pastures on the outskirts of the city, so it should be close to the water on all sides.”31

With the establishment of a new central location, Mansur tried to build a suitable power resource for the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate’s structure similar to the important cities of that time. The newly established ʿAbbāsid Caliphate needed agents loyal to the ʿAbbāsids to consolidate its power. The ʿAbbāsids could not fulfill this objective in Kufa, Medina, and Hejāz due to the presence of the ʿAlawites and in Syria due to the Umayyads and the people who lived with memories of their presence. Undoubtedly, the establishment of Baghdad was one of Mansur’s more prudent measures for, at various times, including during the ʿAlawite uprisings, its existence ensured the continuation of ʿAbbāsid rule. Referring to predictions made about the construction of Baghdad, Balʿami emphasizes the importance of establishing this city and its role in social change. According to the prophecies of a Christian who narrated the construction of the city of Baghdad32 and the verse in the Qorʾān that Mansur quoted to introduce himself as one of those whom God wants to inherit the earth, the use of structural resources of religion was to create more legitimacy for ʿAbbāsid rule. During his rule, Mansur tried to cover up the role of military commanders, especially Abu Moslem, by strengthening the religious aspects of ʿAbbāsid power. According to Balʿami, “Mansur lay the first brick of the city and said, ‘In the name of Allāh and praise be to Allāh.’”33 For Mansur and successive caliphs, Baghdad was a holy part of the earth God devoted to the ʿAbbāsids.34 With the change of the caliphate from the Umayyads to the ʿAbbāsids, the public and the main agents expected to see fundamental social changes, but the ʿAbbāsid caliph, by seizing power, fostered social changes by cementing his authority and constructing a new center of power for his newly born caliphate. The establishment of Baghdad consolidated the political structure of the ʿAbbāsids and guaranteed the continuance of their power for centuries. Iranian Viziers: Agents of the Court of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphs Khorāsān was one of the leading platforms of social change during the time of the first ʿAbbāsid caliphs. In its historical course, social change found a 31 Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, p. 1129. 32 Ibid., p. 1130. 33 Ibid., pp. 1131–1132. 34 « ‫»بسم ال لّه و الحمد ل لّ ‏ه و َْاأْل ْر َض لِ لَّ ِه يُ و ِرث ُها َم ْن يَ شا ُء ِم ْن ِع با ِد ِه َو الْعا ِق بَ ُة لِ لْ ُم تَّ ِق َني‏‬. Qorʾān, 7: 128; see Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, pp. 1131–1132.

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new direction for itself with the idea of the independence of Khorāsān and the reproduction of the Iranian bureaucracy as the viziers of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. After military commanders like Abu Moslem Khorāsāni it was now the viziers as the second group of agents who entered the high-risk scene of social change in Iran by the tactic of reviving Iranian bureaucracy. The Barmakids, originally from Balkh in Khorāsān, helped the ʿAbbāsid government to establish their power structure.35 The Barmakids had been in charge of essential government affairs since the beginning of the ʿAbbāsid era and received excellent positions in the military and the vizierate structures. The Barmakids, who were in charge of the administration of Balkh and its religious affairs before the rise of Islam, converted to Islam in the late Umayyad period. Khāled Barmaki, one of the commanders of Abu Moslem’s troops,36 was the first member of this family to join the ʿAbbāsids after the collapse of the Umayyad government. Khāled was appointed ruler of Ray and Tabarestān during Mansur’s reign, and his son Yahyā became the father’s successor in Ray. Yahyā served him during the presence of Mahdi (r. 158–169 AH/774–785 AD) in Ray and attracted his attention. Before Hārun’s reign (r. 170–193 AH/786–808 AD) Yahyā enjoyed a friendly relationship with Hārun and assisted him in ascending to the throne against his brother, Hādi (r. 169–170 AH/786–787 AD).37 In this way, the Iranian ministers followed the unfinished path of Abu Moslem by entering the administration of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. They provided a prelude to making the power structure of the ʿAbbāsid dependent on themselves. According to Balʿami: No one should ever say that in the world, from the Persian kings and the caliphs of Islam, a minister or a king was elevated to the point where Yahyā and his family could reach them. But two or three unexpected events happened to them. Whenever a man was engaged in a job for a long time, he would be surrounded by many enemies since no one could ever please the whole world. Yahyā knew that these hostilities would be due to his long time vizierate, so he asked for his resignation.38

The active structure of the bureaucracy, which was mostly the legacy of pre-Islamic Persian empires, provided full-fledged power to the agents in 35 36 37 38

Tabari, 1967, vol. 4, pp. 618–619. Lassner, 1980, pp. 76–78; Ibn Taqtaqā, 1971, p. 185; Qomi, 2010, p. 172. Tabari, 1967, vol. 3, p. 320; Ibn Taqtaqā, 1971, pp. 185–186; Qomi, 2010, p. 178. Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, p. 1194.

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its reproduction in the role of viziers. The complexity of the administration of the vast Islamic territories required experienced and skilled bureaucrats who had the management of government affairs in their historical memory. That was to bring the Iranian-born Barmakids closer to the viziers. However, the immobility of the power structure due to the same agents’ long presence in the structure increased the number of their enemies since, according to Balʿami, “no one could please the whole world.”39 There was a good and pious man in Raqqa from the Prophet Mohammad’s family. He used his knowledge to advise the public. His name was Mohammad ibn al-Leys, and his nickname was Abu Rabiʿ, and he was also a secretary because of his knowledge. He was upset with Yahyā, so he wrote a letter to Rashid: “O Amir al-Moʾmenin, how can you answer God on the day of resurrection and what rationale do you have for appointing Yahyā ibn Khāled and his sons and entrusting Muslims’ affairs to Yahyā? Yahyā is a zendiq [heretic] at heart, and his sons and family have the same religion. None of them believe in the true religion.” Yahyā learned about this letter and was silent.… Rashid was offended because of the letter and asked everyone about the religion of the Barmakids. And whoever was offended by Yahyā rejected his religion and slandered him so that the resentment grew in Rashid’s heart. 40

The structure of the Iranian bureaucracy left behind by the pre-Islamic empires, with all the power it gave to the agents in its reproduction, posed a signif icant threat to them in its friction with religious structures. As the leading agents in the bureaucracy, viziers were frequently accused of following pre-Islamic beliefs and religions. The accusation of bad-dini (sacrilege) was a strong reason to dislodge these powerful agents from their positions of authority by threatening them or even physically removing them. This would have made the structure of the vizarate vulnerable. The accusation that Barmakids were bad-din was one of the same threats that eventually led to their death. According to Balʿami, “the Barmakids’ free hand in managing the country’s affairs and the army extended the slanderer’s tongue against them and worried the caliph about their increasing power.”41 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid., p. 1195. 41 Ibid.

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That is why, according to Balʿami, Hārun al-Rashid finally removed these critical agents from the vizierate, 42 until one night after the hajj, and on his way back to Baghdad, he suddenly implemented his decision. Historians have cited the sexual relationship between Jaʿfar and ʿAbbāsa, Hārun’s sister, as the ultimate reason for the caliph’s revenge; however, this would only have exacerbated the situation and would not have been the caliph’s main reason for the massacre of the Barmakids. It seemed that the relationship between Jaʿfar and ʿAbbāsa had taken place much earlier and that the caliph’s attempt to marry them was a cover-up for a scandal, as Balʿami points out.43 What forced Hārun to hide his intentions was the incredible power of the Barmakids and the caliph’s need to keep them in power. On the one hand, the caliph, as the undisputed power agent of the Islamic Ummah, had waited for the riots to subside to assassinate his minister, while, on the other hand, he carried out a coup d’état outside the capital so that this assassination would not shake his position in public opinion. Balʿami writes: Yahyā witnessed Rashid’s sharp and biting words every day, and he could not ask for his resignation. That year he [Rashid] intended to go on the hajj and took Yahyā and his sons with him and performed the hajj. So, he asked ʿAbbāsa’s son to come to him, and he was very handsome and similar to ʿAbbāsa and Jaʿfar, and he wanted to kill the child. So, he thought [to himself], “What a sin he has committed!”44

These events were clear proof of the bureaucratic structure’s deep resources in finding the power of Iranian ministers as effective agents in this field. The presence of the Iranian bureaucracy in the power structure was far more complicated for the ʿAbbāsids than the crisis of Abu Moslem and the Iranian amirs. Due to its nature, bureaucracy requires wisdom and institutionalization in a power structure. The ʿAbbāsids, who had appointed Iranian ministers to rule the country, faced a serious crisis on the eve of 42 Ibid., pp. 1195–1196; Yaʿqubi, 1992, vol. 2, pp. 430–433; Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. 4, p. 58; Abol Faraj Esfahāni, 1990, vol. 3, p. 164; Ibn Khallekān, 1986, vol. 1, p. 413; Nakhjavāni, 1979, p. 152; Shebli, 1982, vol. 3, pp. 300–301. 43 “And the people rebuked Rashid for this action and said, ‘If it hadn’t been related to your sister’s Hādith [case], you would have been allowed to do whatever you did.’ Because his sister’s Hādith was involved, everything he did was a disgrace. And if you had been patient, no one would have known that Hādith except the people of this time.… But from today to the Day of Resurrection, people will read this news and learn that your plan was not according to wisdom or the king’s traditions’” (Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, p. 1199). 44 Ibid., pp. 1196–1197.

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their removal. On the one hand, the ʿAbbāsid monopoly approach did not tolerate the division of power, but, on the other hand, the ʿAbbāsids faced a severe obstacle to their survival by eliminating the critical agents of bureaucracy. Therefore, it is inconceivable that Hārun was unaware of the potential outcome of the massacre of the Barmakids, but he could not tolerate their power any longer.

Bibliography Abol Faraj Esfahāni, ʿAli ibn Hosseyn (1990). Al-Aqāni, Beirut: Dār al-Ehyāʾ-e al-Torās al-ʿArabi Abu Hanifa Dinevari (1985). Akhbār al-Tavvāl, trans. Mahmud Mahdavi Dāmghāni, Tehrān: Nashr-e Ney Arnold, T. W. (1965). The Caliphate, New York: Routledge Balʿami, Abu ʿAli Mohammad ibn Mohammad (1999). Tārikhnāma-ye Tabari, ed. Mohammad Roshan, 5 vols., Tehrān: Sorush Bennison, Amira. K (2009). The Great Caliphs: The Golden Age of the ʿAbbāsid Empires, London: I. B. Tauris Biruni, Mohammad ibn Ahmad (2011). Āthar al-Bāqiya an al-Qorun al-Khāliya, Tehrān: Ferdows Bolāzari, Ahmad ibn Yahyā (1959). Ansāb al-Ashrāf, ed. Mohammad Hamdollāh, 4 vols., Cairo: Dār al-Maʿāref be Mesr El-Hibri, Tayeb (2021). The Abbasid Caliphate: A History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Fasih-e Khwāfi, Ahmad ibn Mohammad (2008). Mojmal Fasihi, ed. Mohsen Nasr Ābādi, 3 vols., Tehrān: Asātir Gardizi, Abu Saʿid ʿAbdol Hayy ibn Zahhāk (1984). Zeyn al-Akhbār, ed. ʿAbdol Hayy Habibi, Tehrān: Donyā-ye Ketāb Hamdollāh Mostowfi, Ibn Abi Bekr (1985). Tārikh-e Gozida, ed. ʿAbdol Hosseyn Navāie, Tehrān: Amir Kabir Ibn Asir, ʿAli ibn Mohammad (1965). Al-Kāmel fi al-Tārikh, 13 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Sāder Ibn Esfandiyār, Bahā al-Din Mohammad ibn Hasan (2011). Tārikh-e Tabarestān, ed. ʿAbbāss Eqbāl, 2 vols., Tehrān: Kolāla-ye Khāvar Ibn Kasir, Ismāʿil ibn ʿOmar (1990). Al-Bedāyat va al-Nehāyat, 15 vols., Beirut: Maktabat al-Maʿāref Ibn Khallekān, Ahmad ibn Mohammad (1986). Vafiyāt al-Aʿyān va Anbāʾ-e Abnāʾ-e al-Zamān, ed. Ehsān ʿAbbās, 8 vols., Qom: Manshurāt al-Sharif al-Rāzi Ibn Nadim, Eshāq Ibn Mohammad (2002). Al-Fehrest, Tehrān: Asātir

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Ibn Taqtaqā, Abu Jaʿfar Mohammad Ibn ʿAli (1971). Tārikh-e Fakhri, trans. Mohammad Vahid Golpāyegāni, Tehrān: Bongāh-e Tarjoma va Nashr-e Ketāb Jaheshyāri, Mohammad ibn ʿAbdus (1980). Al-Vozarā va al-Kottāb, ed. Mostafā al-Saqqā, Ebrāhim al-Biyāri, Cairo: Matʿaba al-Bābi Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, Hasan ibn ʿAli ibn Eshāq (1999). Siyar al-Moluk (Siyāsatnāma), ed. Hubert Darke, Tehrān: Entesharāt-e ʿElmi va Farhangi Lassner, Jacob (1980). The Shaping of ʿAbbāsid Rule, Princeton: Princeton University Press Maqdasi, Motahhar ibn Tāher (2003). Āfarinesh va Tārikh, trans. Mohammad Rezā Shafiʿe Kadkani, 2 vols., Tehrān: Āgāh Nakhjavāni, Hendushāh ibn Sanjar (1979). Tajāreb al-Salaf, Dar Tavārikh-e Kholafā va Vozarā-ye Ishān, ed. ʿAbbās Eqbāl, Tehrān: Ketābkhana-ye Tahuri Narshakhi, Mohammad ibn Jaʿfar (1984a). Tārikh-e Bokhārā, trans. Abu Nasr Ahmad ibn Mohammad ibn Nasr Qabāvi, summarized by Mohammad ibn Zafar ibn ʿOmar, ed. Modarres Razavi, Tehrān: Tus Qomi, Shaykh ʿAbbās (2010). Tatemmat al-Montahā: Vaqāyeʿ-e Ayyām-e Kholafā, trans. Qolām Hosseyn Ansāri, Tehrān: Sherkat va Nashr-e Beinol Melal Shahrestāni, Abol Fath, Mohammad ibn ʿAbdol Karim (1971). Al-Melal va al-Nehal, trans. Sadr Tarka Esfahāni, ed. Mohammad Reza Jalāli Nāʾini, 2 vols., Tehrān: Eqbāl Shebli, Ahmad (1982). Tārikh-e Amuzesh dar Eslām, trans. Mohammad Hosseyn Sāket, Tehrān: Daftar-e Nashr-e Farhang-e Islāmi Tabari, Mohammad ibn Jarir (1967). Tārikh-e Tabari, ed. Abol Fazl Ebrāhim, 11 vols., Beirut: Dar al-Torās Tārikh-e Sistān (1987). Ed. Mohammad Taqi Bahār, Tehrān: Padida-ye Khāvar Yaʿqubi, Ahmad ibn Eshāq (1992). Tārikh-e Yaʿqubi, trans. Ebrāhim Āyati, 2 vols., Tehrān: ʿElmi va Farhangi Zarrinkub, ʿAbdol Hosseyn (1992). Tārikh-e Mardom-e Iran, Tehrān: Amir Kabir

3

Split in the ʿAbbāsid Political Structure A Prelude to the Independence of Khorāsān Abstract The Shiʿites, who saw the ʿAbbāsids as indebted to their structural resources, began an uprising against the ʿAbbāsids. Although the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate tried to repress the Shiʿites, the power structures of the ʿAlawites became more cohesive and stable with the physical elimination of their agents. To appease them, Maʾmun, the ʿAbbāsid caliph, elected ʿAli ibn Musā, one of the well-known Shiʿite figures, as the crown prince. Maʾmun chose Khorāsān as his throne and from there ruled the vast territory of the caliphate, but Baghdad’s ʿAbbāsid opposition to the caliph’s decisions, including ʿAli ibn Musā’s election and the transfer of power to Iran, pushed Maʾmun to the brink of losing power. Eventually, Maʾmun left Khorāsān for Baghdad, sending Tāher to Khorāsān to form the first Iranian government. Keywords: ʿAbbāsids, Khorāsān, Baghdad, Maʾmun, Tāher

Khorāsān’s Riots: The Introduction to the Movement of Power toward Iranians (Khorāsān) An uprising in Khorāsān was the first disturbance to the caliph’s sweet dream after the massacre of the Barmakids. This region, which was calm and obedient under the Barmakids’ vizierate, revolted against the ʿAbbāsids, and there was no one to control the crisis. According to Balʿami: When ʿAli ibn Isā ibn Māhān brought gifts from Khorāsān to Rashid and Rashid saw the many gifts, he was surprised. He said to Yahyā, “Where was the wealth of Khorāsān before today?” This comment insulted him since Khorāsān had been in the hands of his son for a few years. Fazl and Yahyā said, “This wealth belongs to the subjects and those dervishes

Kamali, M. Social Change in Medieval Iran 132-628 AH (750-1231 AD). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2023 doi: 10.5117/9789463721981_ch03

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whom ʿAli ibn Isā has suppressed. And if it was worth it, we could go to ʿOwn ibn ʿAbdollāh, the sarrāf [money changer], and some other sarrāfs and provide more gifts in an hour.”1

The first consequence of removing the Barmakids from power was the chaos in the ʿAbbāsid lands. Khorāsān, which had always seemed calm under the Barmakids’ tutelage, suddenly set foot on the path to independence and became the scene of serious uprisings and riots against the ʿAbbāsid caliph. As Balʿami writes: When they were massacred, and all Rashid’s affairs were disturbed, and sedition developed, the Khārejites rose in every city. And Rashid was not able to keep the country. ʿAli ibn Isā had clamped down on Khorāsān several times, but Khorāsān had revolted again. Therefore, Rashid himself had to go to Khorāsān.2

In the last years of his rule, Hārun faced a crisis, a revolt against Rafeʿ ibn Sayyār and Hamza-ye Khāreji in Khorāsān,3 which had been fostered under the rule of ʿAli ibn Isā ibn Māhān and by his extravagances, forcing the caliph to move from Baghdad to Khorāsān. Maʾmun accompanied Hārun on the advice of Fazl ibn Sahl. According to Balʿami: When the letter from Harsama arrived, Rafeʿ had [already] captured all Mā Varā al-Nahr and had come to Bokhārā from Samarqand. When Rashid read the letter, he decided to go to Khorāsān. He left Raqqa and came to Baghdad. He intended to put Mohammad Amin there and advised him about the people and the army.… And Fazl ibn Sahl … said to Maʾmun, “Ask Rashid to take you with him since he will not give you any territory if you do not ask him.” Maʾmun went to Rashid and asked him to take him. Rashid … took him to Khorāsān. Hārun left Iraq with 50,000 men and stationed Mohammad Amin in Baghdad … and Rashid 1 Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, p. 1201; Yaʿqubi, 1992, vol. 2, p. 433; Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. 6, p. 61; Abol Faraj Esfahāni, 1990, vol. 3, p. 167; Ibn Khallekān, 1986, vol. 1, p. 418; Nakhjavāni, 1979, p. 159; Shebli, 1982, vol. 3, p. 305. 2 Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, p. 1199. 3 Among these uprisings, we can mention the rebellion of Hamza-ye Khāreji, which began in the regions of Sistān and south Khorāsān in 180 AH/896 AD and continued until the time of Tāherids. One of the causes of this uprising was the rule of ʿAli ibn Isā ibn Māhān in Khorāsān and Sistān and oppression and economic pressure on the people of this region (Ibn Fondoq, 2011, p. 44; Baghdadi, 1966, p. 59; Tārikh-e Sistān, 1987, p. 156; Yaʿqubi, 1992, vol. 1, p. 45).

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took Maʾmun with him to hand over the reign of the eastern territories to him. 4

The reproduction of social structures in the form of Shiʿite and Khārejite uprisings in Khorāsān jeopardized the balance of power of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. Hārun’s movement to Khorāsān to suppress the rebellious activities of Rafeʿ ibn Leys was accompanied by the division of the territories under his control among his children. This action led to fundamental social changes in the ʿAbbāsid power structure in which Khorāsān and the Iranian agents played a key role. The Victory of the Khorāsān Faction over the Baghdad Faction Maʾmun’s presence (r. 198–218 AH/813–833 AD) in Khorāsān marked another social change and took Iran one step closer to independence. By dividing the great territory of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate among his sons,5 Hārun sought a way to prevent parts of the Islamic domain from gaining independence, especially Khorāsān. However, the dispute between Amin and Maʾmun and the great civil war turned the dream of preserving Khorāsān into despair. Maʾmun’s presence in Khorāsān transferred part of the ʿAbbāsids’ power from Baghdad to Khorāsān. The formation of the Khorāsān faction ahead of the Baghdad faction provided the ground for the presence of more and more Iranians in the ʿAbbāsid power structure. Now that Khorāsān had mobilized the ʿAbbāsids’ rigid structures, it could gradually become an independent center of power. During Amin’s caliphate (r. 193–198 AH/808–813 AD) and Maʾmun’s domination of the eastern parts of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate, agents and poweroriented structures began to emerge. The Iranian bureaucracy, which had been deeply wounded by the death of the Barmakids in connection with the consolidation of the caliph’s power, did not give up at this time and launched yet another campaign for authority. Another bureaucrat from the Khorāsān 4 Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, p. 1199. 5 The division of the caliphate’s territories, based on necessity and awareness, could have brought peace to the great ʿAbbāsid Empire. He ceded to Qāsem the remote areas of Jazira and the borders of the Byzantine Empire, where insecurity and crisis were more likely to occur. His presence was enough to protect these areas. He handed over to Amin Iraq and the Hejāz and parts of Yemen where there were more Hāshemites and Amin supporters. He also left the eastern regions of the territory, including Khorāsān, to his other son, Maʾmun (Masʿudi, 1991, vol. 2, p. 357; Abu Hanifa Dinevari, 1985, pp. 404–415; Ibn Qotayba Dinevari, 2001, pp. 399–400; Maqdasi, 2003, pp. 970–972; Hamdollāh Mostowfi, 1985, p. 307).

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region, Fazl ibn Sahl-e Sarakhsi, stepped into the high-risk struggle for social change to bring Iran at least one step closer to independence. Encouraging Maʾmun and the caliph to attack Khorāsān, he drew the highest officials of the ʿAbbāsid power to Khorāsān as his first act.6 For Mohammad Amin, as a caliph who shared power with his brothers, Maʾmun’s influence and popularity were issues that challenged Amin’s monopoly. Maʾmun’s successful presence in Khorāsān, as well as the subject of his crown prince after Amin made the new caliph try to appoint his son as his successor. An intra-structural dispute between the two capitals of Marv (Khorāsān and Baghdad) confronted the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate with a disintegration and fragmentation crisis. Amin’s efforts to elect his son as crown prince and oust Maʾmun’s name from khotbas marked the beginning of severe conflicts between Amin and Maʾmun, which weakened the ʿAbbāsid power structure. Amin’s excuse was that Maʾmun had refused to accept the caliph’s representative in Khorāsān and to let him collect tributes and taxes in Maʾmun’s territory. According to Balʿami: Mohammad [Amin] sent three messengers to Maʾmun. So, the messengers arrived and delivered the messages. Maʾmun answered their messages. The messengers returned to Baghdad. And Mohammad [Amin] wrote to Maʾmun, “You do not need to have too much wealth and territory because the army is with me and needs paying. Leave Ray, Qumes, Gorgān, and Tabarestān to me so that I can send my agents to bring me the wealth [tributes] from these cities. And I will send a sāheb barid [trustee] to sit in your court in Marv. Send me the news of Khorāsān every day so that I can have control over it.” Maʾmun refused to do so. Mohammad [Amin then] developed an intention to overthrow Maʾmun.7

Although the caliphate’s authority provided a kind of religious legitimacy for Amin, he needed to expand his army because he intended to disobey his father’s order and appoint his son as the next caliph. Fazl ibn Rabiʿ, Amin’s vizier, played a critical role in encouraging Amin to stand against his brother.8 By deleting Amin’s name from the khotbas, Maʾmun announced his determination to confront Amin. Balʿami writes: 6 Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, p. 1207. 7 Ibid., p. 1214. 8 Ibid., p. 1214.

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After that, Mohammad [Amin] deleted the name of Maʾmun from all the khotbas in his kingdom and removed Maʾmun’s name from the garments, dinars, and dirhams, and replaced them with Musā’s [Amin’s son]. And he ordered to tear down the notice that Rashid had written and hung on the wall of the Kaʿba. And the news reached Maʾmun. He also deleted the name of Mohammad [Amin] from khotbas and dinars (coins), called himself imam, and ignored the crown prince’s position. So Fazl [ibn Rabiʿ] was afraid that Maʾmun would send an army soon. He encouraged Mohammad [Amin] to send the army and said: “No one but ʿAli ibn ʿIsā ibn Māhān deserves to command the army.”9

While sending ʿAli ibn Isā to Khorāsān, Amin asked him to win the hearts of the people of Khorāsān with the promise of justice and the forgiveness of the tribute from which Maʾmun had already benefitted. He should also avoid war with Maʾmun as much as possible and consider his campaign as a demonstration of his power to frighten Maʾmun. Balʿami writes: You should practice justice in every city you arrive in. And write a secret letter to the people of Khorāsān and promise justice and forgive a quarter of their tribute as Maʾmun forgave it. And whoever seeks refuge with you from his army, be kind to him and promise him good treatment on my behalf. And when Maʾmun comes to you, send him to me right away in the hand of your trusted person, and put a silver shackle on his feet, and if he foolishly tries to attack you, avoid killing him.10

Granting tax amnesties and exemptions from tribute were actions used by rulers to curry favor with their people. Maʾmun used them to increase his popularity and legitimacy. Balʿami’s emphasis on Amin’s advice to protect Maʾmun’s life may be a critique of Maʾmun’s violent treatment of his brother after defeating Amin. However, the growing structure of the Khorāsān faction, with Fazl ibn Sahl’s measures, became more decisive step by step and led to a severe defeat for Amin and the Baghdad faction. The premeditated plan of Fazl ibn Rabiʿ to send Khorāsān a commander like ʿAli ibn Isā, a hated figure among the Khorāsānis, became a significant obstacle to Amin’s victory. ʿAli ibn Isā ibn Māhān, despite his greater military might, was defeated in the first decisive battle in Ray against Tāher, and once again awakened the 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid., p. 1215.

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memory of the victory of the Khorāsān troops, but this time in a civil war and the confrontation with the ʿAbbāsids.11 Military power brings a kind of legitimacy and assurance of victory, but its loyalty and stability can never be guaranteed.12 Instead of Amin complaining about his troop’s failure against Maʾmun, the troops blamed him for the breach of the covenant with Maʾmun that had resulted in God’s turning away from Amin and therefore in his defeat.13 They broke away from Amin and joined Maʾmun with the promises given by Tāher and Harsama. Therefore, the conquest of Baghdad was much easier than even Maʾmun and the Khorāsān faction had imagined. According to Balʿami: A dispute arose between them, and group after group withdrew to Baghdad until all the troops returned to Baghdad without fighting. And Tāher … wrote a letter: “I went to Aqaba and went as far as Iraq.” And Maʾmun rejoiced at it and sent him a robe [of honor] and disgraced Fazl ibn Sahl, who had advocated recalling Tāher.14

The role of Tāher’s military intervention in the victory of the Khorāsān faction complemented the tactical force of Fazl ibn Sahl. Tāher ibn Hosseyn, who had become the commander of the Khorāsān troops at the behest of Fazl ibn Sahl, was another Iranian-born man who overcame the Baghdad division with intelligence and military tact; he was given the title Zu al-Yaminayn. Balʿami beautifully depicts the history of the formation of the conflicts between Amin and Maʾmun. The story of the dispute between Amin and Maʾmun and the minister’s prominent role in leading the events is reminiscent of a game of chess. The adventurous contest that had started with these two brothers’ presence in the centers of power of Baghdad in the west and Marv in the east was exacerbated by two outstanding bureaucrats, Fazl ibn Rabiʿ and Fazl ibn Dahl. Fazl ibn Sahl’s astute decision to involve Tāher in comparison to the injudicious appointment of ʿAli ibn Isā by Fazl ibn Rabiʿ ended the game earlier than expected, and Amin, overwhelmed by defeat, withdrew from the competition. With the arrival of Tāher and Harsama ibn Aʿyan’s troops in Baghdad in 198 AH/813 AD, Amin’s troops failed, and 11 Ibid., pp. 1215–1216; Masʿudi, 1991, vol. 2, p. 358; Abu Hanifa Dinevari, 1985, p. 417; Ibn Qotayba Dinevari, 2001, pp. 399–400; Ibn Moskuya, 2000, vol. 4, p. 108; Maqdasi, 2003, vol. 2, pp. 970–972; Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939, pp. 349–351; Mir Khwānd, 2002, vol. 5, pp. 261–267; Hamdollāh Mostowfi, 1985, p. 307; Khwāndmir, 2009, vol. 2, pp. 246–253. 12 Peacock, 2010, p. 61; Arnold, 1965, pp. 134–135; Bennison, 2009, pp. 16–17. 13 Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, pp. 1123–1127. 14 Ibid., p. 1218.

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Amin was killed by Tāher’s gholām while taking refuge alone in the house of Ebrāhim ibn Jaʿfar Balkhi, a man from Khorāsān. His death finalized the defeat of the Baghdad faction. Balʿami writes: Tāher and all the people thought that Mohammad [Amin] was drowned. Ebrāhim went to him and said, “He was about to be drowned, and now he is in my house wrapped in a rug.” Tāher had a gholām. His name was Qoraysh and he had such long teeth [dandān] that he was called Qoraysh-e Dandāni. Tāher called Qoraysh and said, “Go to Ebrāhim’s house, cut off his head, and bring it to me.” Qoraysh went and found Mohammad sitting alone.15

The two fought, Qoraysh killed the caliph, cut off his head, and brought it to Tāher.16 Amin’s death brought about significant social changes in the structure of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. On the one hand, the assassination of Amin normalized this method of eliminating caliphs and it was used in later periods. On the other hand, the succession of Maʾmun provided a good experience for social agents. By removing the current caliph, they could change the unfavorable conditions of the existing structure and reproduce the caliphate structure by appointing another caliph from the same family. Fazl ibn Sahl’s clever decisions cemented the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate as a guarantor of stability in society. The continuation of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate for 524 years, despite the unstable and changing situation of the caliphs themselves, showed the political agent’s awareness of the caliphate’s role in creating stability in society and the continuation of the Islamic Empire. Shiʿites to Demand their Share of Power Shiʿites and ʿAlawites were among the most challenging obstacles in the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate’s efforts to stabilize the political structure. The ʿAbbāsid use of the name and reputation of the Shiʿites at all stages of the secret invitation required the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate to find convincing answers to the questions of the people who sought social change resulting from the rise of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. 15 Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, pp. 1225–1226. Also see Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939, pp. 349–351; Ibn Kāzeruni, 1970, pp. 130–133; Mir Khwānd, 2002, vol. 5, pp. 261–267; Hamdollāh Mostowfi, 1985, p. 307; Khwāndmir, 2009, vol. 2, pp. 246–253. 16 Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, pp. 1225–1226. Also see Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939, pp. 349–351; Ibn Kāzeruni, 1970, pp. 130–133; Mir Khwānd, 2002, vol. 5, pp. 261–267; Hamdollāh Mostowfi, 1985, p. 307; Khwāndmir, 2009, vol. 2, pp. 246–253.

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For Shiʿites, the structure of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate was more complex than that of the Umayyads. The ʿAbbāsids used the Shiʿites’ structural resources to establish the degree of power that the Shiʿites felt they deserved. From the very beginning, the first ʿAbbāsid claimants, Mohammad and Ebrāhim ibn ʿAli, called themselves imams and claimed to be the Shiʿite imams and “avengers of the martyrs.” The ʿAbbāsids’ use of Shiʿite intellectual and political structures was not acceptable to the ʿAlawites; therefore, they took serious actions against the ʿAbbāsids. In the early stages, the ʿAbbāsids tried to prove that the Shiʿites had ceded power to them willingly, using subtle historical and propagandistic arguments. This claim was made based on a well-known account narrated by many historians and scholars, Al-Melal va al-Nehal (Religious schools and sects). According to this account, the Keysāniya sect believed that the imamate and caliphate after ʿAli was the rightful inheritance of his son, Mohammad ibn Hanafiya, and then his son, Abu Hashim. However, subsequent developments showed that the Shiʿites had never intended to surrender this authority.17 Thus, with the formation of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate, the Shiʿite uprisings began on a larger scale, and the Shiʿite structural resources that the ʿAbbāsids had used to gain full power became a serious obstacle to the consolidation of their power. The ʿAbbāsids, who had killed their earlier allies, including the dāʿies, waged extensive and repressive wars against the widespread Shiʿite uprisings to consolidate their power. The main difference between the Shiʿite claimants of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate and other opponents was that the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate was able to remove influential figures from the scene with accusations that they were heretics. However, the Shiʿites had structural resources that held most of the ʿAbbāsid power over the same structures so, inevitably, the only practical ʿAbbāsid method was the physical elimination of their Shiʿite opponents, while the Shiʿite structures remained dynamic. Nafs al-Zakiyya’s uprising was the first Shiʿite revolt suppressed by the ʿAbbāsids during Mansur’s reign. Mohammad considered the caliphate his entitlement because, according to one interpretation proposed by a group of historians, a council composed of ʿAbbāsids and ʿAlawites had chosen him as the imam before the victory of the ʿAbbāsid movement. According to Balʿami: In 141 AH [758 AD], when Mansur settled the tensions of Rāvandis, he appointed his son, Mohammad ibn ʿAbdollāh, as his successor and his caliph. He titled him Mahdi, since Mohammad and Ebrāhim, the sons of 17 Ibn Qotayba Dinevari, 2001, p. 135.

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ʿAbdollāh ibn al-Hasan ibn ʿAli ibn Abi Tāleb arose. They secretly invited the people of Hejāz and Khorāsān to join them, and many people warmly welcomed them. And ʿAbd al-Jabbār ibn ʿAbd al-Rahmān, who was the amir of Khorāsān after Abu Dāvud, sent a letter to Mansur stating that there was a group of people in Khorāsān who secretly invited people to join one of the descendants of ʿAli ibn Abi Tāleb. Mansur answered, “Whenever you find them, take them and kill them, and do not let any of them rise in Khorāsān or even stay alive on the earth.”18

The ʿAbbāsids used Shiʿite names and titles at all stages of the caliphate’s formation and establishment. Using the names “Mahdi” and “Hādi” for the ʿAbbāsid successors was an attempt to legitimize the Shiʿites. The continued revolt of Nafs al-Zakiyya and his brother Ebrāhim left Mansur, who was only thinking of eliminating the claimants, with no choice but to suppress these uprisings. Mohammad and Ebrāhim, whose names were reminiscent of the names of the first two ʿAbbāsid imams, began their uprising before the Umayyad Caliphate’s fall and made a deal with the ʿAbbāsids that whoever achieve success first would be obeyed by the other.19 They chose the names of Mahdi and Hādi, which had a highly regarded meaning in Shiʿite culture, and after the rise of the ʿAbbāsids, rebelled against them. The names of Mahdi and Hādi for the next two caliphs of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate could have been chosen simply to mislead the Shiʿites.20 Despite his success in gaining religious legitimacy, Mohammad could not resist the ʿAbbāsids’ military might and was killed in Medina in 145 AH/763 AD. In the same year, Ebrāhim was killed in a battle in the village of Bākhamri near Basra.21 The uprising of Yahyā ibn ʿAbdollāh, one of Nafs al-Zakiyya’s preachers in the Deylam and Tabarestān districts, resulted in a better outcome for the ʿAlawites. Although the rebellion failed with the dominance of Fazl 18 Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, p. 1100. 19 “Mohammad enjoyed the support of many jurists, including Mālek ibn Anas, the Māleki sect’s great leader. Mālek issued a fatwā violating the allegiance of the people to Mansur, because, in his opinion, ‘Mansur has taken allegiance from the people by force, his covenant [peymāna] is void and unreliable’” (Tabari, 1967, vol. 6, p. 190; Ibn Qotayba Dinevari, 2001, p. 199). Mohammad sent his brother Ebrāhim to Basra to publish the daʿva (Yaqʿubi, 1992, vol. 2, p. 376). Ebrāhim soon captured Basra and released the prisoners. Abu Hanifa wrote a letter to Ebrāhim and expressed his support for him (Akhbār al-Dowlat al-ʿAbbāssiya, 1977, pp. 173–165; Shahrestāni, 1971, vol. 1, p. 243; Yaʿqubi, 1992, vol. 2, p. 137; Tabari, 1967, vol. 6, pp. 252–250). 20 Balʿami, 1999, pp. 1100–1102, 1132. 21 Ibid., pp. 1186–1187; Yaʿqubi, 1992, vol. 2, p. 378.

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ibn Yahyā-e Barmaki over Tabarestān and his peace treaty with Yahyā,22 it showed that Tabarestān could be an excellent place to form an ʿAlawite government. The uprising of Hosseyn ibn ʿAli in Medina during the reign of Hādi (r. 169–170 AH/786–787 AD) and its continuation until the Hārun period followed along the unfinished path of Nafs-e Zakiyya. The uprising broke out in the Fakh region near Mecca. It was a wake-up call for Maʾmun, the ʿAbbāsid caliph, who responded to it seriously.23 By suppressing these uprisings and killing their leaders the ʿAbbāsids tried to rid themselves of the presence of active Shiʿite agents, but they gradually realized the weakness of their own power structures and the solid foundations of the Shiʿite struggle. Shiʿite uprisings called into question the religious legitimacy of the ʿAbbāsids and undermined their claims to power based on it. Moreover, the Shiʿites did not compromise by delegating part of their authority. Maʾmun’s different treatment of the ʿAlawites and appointing one of them as his crown prince was a new chapter in the ʿAbbāsid relations with the ʿAlawites. As previously described, Maʾmun remained in Marv after coming to power and appointed Hasan ibn Sahl Fazl’s brother to rule Baghdad, the center of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. Balʿami emphasizes that Hasan, like his brother, was a scribe, but he was not well versed regarding political or military affairs,24 so the ʿAlawite uprisings continued. Hasan ibn Sahl appointed Abu Sarāyā, who had a strong sympathy for the ʿAlawites, as a commander. Abu Sarāyā went from Baghdad to Kufa and handed over power to Ibn Tabātabā, one of the ʿAlawite leaders. Although there was a sharp dispute between Abu Sarāyā and Ibn Tabātabā over property and spoils of war, which led to Ibn Tabātabā’s death, Abu Sarāyā continued cooperating with the ʿAlawites and appointed them to rule the cities under his control.25 The association of Abu Sarāyā as the commander of the Baghdad troops with the Shiʿites tied religious power to military force. The Shiʿites’ infiltration into the military layers of the ʿAbbāsid power structure created a new concern for the ʿAbbāsids. This happened when Maʾmun was miles away in Marv and did not intend to come to Baghdad. According to Balʿami: Wherever an ʿAlawite rose, Abu Sarāyā … wrote a letter to him and gave him the reign of that city. Then he stationed in Kufa with this ʿAlawite 22 23 24 25

Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, pp. 1187–1188. Ibid.; see also Ibn Taqtaqā, 1971, p. 190; Masʿudi, 1991, vol. 3, p. 336. Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, pp. 1230–1232. Ibid., pp. 1230–1231.

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and made him Amir al-Moʾmenin. And he deleted the name of Maʾmun from the khotba. And he sent ʿAli with troops to Kufa and captured it. And he [Abu Sarāyā] sent another ʿAlawite, Zeyd ibn Musā ibn Jaʿfar ibn Mohammad ibn Ali ibn Hosseyn ibn ʿAli ibn Abitāleb, to Basra and captured that city.26

Abu Sarāyā’s removal of Maʾmun’s name from the khotbas and the reading of allegiance to the Shiʿites posed a serious threat to the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. Hasan ibn Sahl sent Harsama ibn Aʿyon, who played a crucial role in bringing Maʾmun to power alongside Tāher and once served as Abu Sarāyā’s commander, to fight against him. Harsama started the war with Abu Sarāyā when the ʿAlawites were stationed in many power centers in Iraq and the Hejāz.27 Abu Sarāyā was eventually defeated near Basra, and he and the ʿAlawites were beheaded,28 but the ʿAlawite uprising continued. The rebellion of Zeyd ibn Musā ibn Jaʿfar, known as Zeyd al-Nnār in Basra, and his brother Ebrāhim in Yemen, known as Ebrāhim al-Jazar, was a sign of fiery flames that could not be extinguished.29 The continuation of the Abu Sarāyā uprising by his brother and his cooperation with Zeyd al-Nnār in Basra showed that the conditions were ready for the Shiʿite uprisings. Although the Shiʿite revolts were suppressed, they did not cease. The continuation of Shiʿite uprisings showed that in Shiʿite thought, the power structure was more important than the agents; therefore, with the removal of one person, another person picked up the banner of the uprising and carried it forward.30 Promise of the Shiʿite Succession Maʾmun chose perhaps the riskiest but most clever way to escape the numerous Shiʿite uprisings. His decision to select one of the ʿAlawites as the crown prince and transfer power to them confronted the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate with a new issue. Maʾmun, after consulting with Fazl ibn Sahl, chose ʿAli ibn Musā, Zeyd al-Nnār’s brother, as one of the wisest and most pious ʿAlawites to elevate and thereby quench the flames of the ʿAlawite uprisings. Balʿami writes: 26 Ibid., pp. 1231–1232. 27 Ibid., pp. 1232–1233. 28 Ibid., p. 1233. 29 Ibid., pp. 1238–1239; see also Yaʿqubi, 1992, vol. 2, p. 112; Ibn Kasir, 1990, vol. 10, p. 217; Masʿudi, 1991, vol. 2, p. 227; Abol Faraj Esfahāni, 1990, vol. 2, pp. 202–205; Shahrestāni, 1971, vol. 1, p. 241; Ibn Taqtaqā, 1971, pp. 164–165. 30 Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, pp. 1234–1235.

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Zeyd al-Nnār had a brother. His name was ʿAli, and of all the ʿAlawites, no one was wiser and more pious than him, and he was the grandson of Jaʿfar al-Sādeq. And this was ʿAli ibn Musā ibn Jaʿfar ibn Mohammad ibn ʿAli ibn Hosseyn ibn ʿAli ibn Abi Tāleb, peace be upon them. And he had a boy named Mohammad ibn ʿAli, who like him possessed knowledge and goodness. So Maʾmun made a plan to bring him from Baghdad and appoint him as his crown prince. And they spread the Shiʿite religion among people so that they could settle the sedition of the ʿAlawites and end their revolts against Maʾmun. And Maʾmun and Fazl put their plan into practice.31

The Shiʿites’ insistence on uprisings and their attempts to overthrow the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate eventually led Maʾmun to embrace a compromising but risky response. ʿAli ibn Musā al-Reza’s election as crown prince was Maʾmun’s reply to the Shiʿite uprising. According to Balʿami: So Maʾmun sent his uncle, Rajā ibn Abi Zahhāk, and a Khādem named Fanās from Marv to Baghdad to bring ʿAli ibn Musā. And Maʾmun intended to bring the Shiʿite religion to Marv and said, “After me, ʿAli will be the caliph, and he will be the imam, and it will not be permissible to suppress him. And the Umayyads suppressed Abu Tāleb’s sons, and the ʿAbbāsids suppressed them while they were right. And I could not dismiss myself, but I gave them the caliphate after me, and I made ʿAli ibn Musā ibn Jaʿfar my crown prince.” And Maʾmun said to him, “You deserve it more than my sons and all the sons of the ʿAbbāsids.” And he called him Reza … and abandoned the black clothes and banners and put on the green clothes and said, “Black clothes are for the people of Hell, and green is the adornment of the people of heaven.”32

Numerous Shiʿite uprisings underlined the strength of the ʿAlawite political structure. It was as if with the death of every Shiʿite agent, more and more forces were added to the foundation of the Shiʿite uprising. The ʿAbbāsids, who came to power on the ladder of Shiʿite ideas and reached the caliphate under the banner of the imamate, had created a fierce rival for themselves, challenging the nature of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. The ʿAbbāsids, who had shown that they could defeat many enemies with their political tactics and

31 Ibid., p. 1240. 32 Ibid., pp. 1240–1241.

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religious tricks, now faced an opponent who never surrendered and aimed to overthrow the ʿAbbāsid power structure once and for all. In this way, Maʾmun inevitably played a major political game and, by selecting one of the ʿAlawites as crown prince, brought the ʿAbbāsid power structure in a new phase of social change. The election of ʿAli ibn Musā as crown prince and his presence in Khorāsān had an essential effect on strengthening the Khorāsān faction against Baghdad, which never complied with Maʾmun’s decision. Undoubtedly, Maʾmun, by removing ʿAli ibn Musā from Medina, which was one of the critical centers of the Shiʿite uprising, tried to keep the Shiʿites satisfied and isolate their leaders in an atmosphere like Khorāsān, which did not have Shiʿite grounds. By using Shiʿite characteristics, even by changing the black clothes of the ʿAbbāsids to green and creating marital ties with them, he tried to keep the ʿAbbāsids in line with the ʿAlawites. The Departure from Marv to Baghdad and the Independence of Khorāsān Fazl ibn Sahl was the first to mention the need for Maʾmun to move to Baghdad, and that was when Maʾmun defeated Amin, and the throne of Baghdad awaited the presence of the new caliph. Balʿami writes: Fazl ibn Sahl said to Maʾmun, “We should go to Baghdad to reside there.” And Maʾmun liked Khorāsān more and did not intend to leave. Fazl said, “Khorāsān is on the side of the world [where your territories are] and is to the east, and you cannot keep the western regions from here. And Iraq is in the middle of the territory.”33

Maʾmun’s movement to Baghdad at that time could have had a significant impact on reducing the crisis in Iraq. On the one hand, with the caliph’s presence at the center of ʿAbbāsid power in Baghdad, it would have been possible to suppress the insurgency, from Shiʿites to the claimants in the ʿAbbāsid family. On the other hand, it gave the Khorāsān faction a chance to take their f inal decisive steps in their push for the independence of Khorāsān. In the light of the successful presence of Maʾmun and the measures of bureaucrats such as Fazl ibn Sahl, and the situation of Khorāsān, which had rich structural resources, all that was needed was a powerful agent to make Khorāsān independent from the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate and pave the way 33 Ibid., p. 1229.

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for the formation of an Iranian government. But Maʾmun’s insistence on staying in Marv and keeping Khorāsān under the banner of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate once again turned Baghdad into a scene of opposition to Maʾmun and the Khorāsān faction. In Maʾmun’s absence, Hasan ibn Sahl, Fazl’s brother, was in charge of Baghdad.34 It caused the ʿAbbāsids of Baghdad to be dissatisfied with Maʾmun because they did not accept the presence of an Iranian agent in charge of the caliphate’s throne. But Maʾmun, who had come to Khorāsān with his father, Hārun, years ago to quell the Khorāsān uprising, knew that his departure from Khorāsān would mean the end of the ʿAbbāsid domination of this region. The structural resources of this land and its reliance on Iranian agents were not hidden from Maʾmun.35 Meanwhile, the Baghdad faction interpreted the capital transfer to Khorāsān as weakening the ʿAbbāsid political structure. Maʾmun’s war with his brother, which was the victory of the Khorāsānis over the elders of Baghdad, made the ʿAbbāsids more pessimistic about Maʾmun. Eventually, with the election of ʿAli ibn Musā al-Reza to the position of crown prince, which Maʾmun had inevitably carried out due to the successive Shiʿite uprisings, the ʿAbbāsids of Baghdad took action to find a more reliable agent for the structure of their power in Baghdad. After making arrangements for the ʿAlawite’s appointment as the crown prince, Maʾmun wrote a letter to Hasan ibn Sahl in Baghdad, asking him to pledge allegiance of the troops to ʿAli ibn Musā. Maʾmun’s attention to the troops’ allegiance confirmed the strong connection between the ʿAbbāsid power structure and the military forces. However, Baghdad’s commanders and elders strongly opposed the choice of an ʿAlawite as crown prince and the withdrawal of power from the ʿAbbāsid dynasty. They attributed Maʾmun’s action to a trick by Fazl ibn Sahl and revolted against Maʾmun. According to Balʿami: All rose against it and said, “We do not like it, and this is Fazl ibn Sahl’s trick, and he wanted all people to obey Maʾmun on this pretext and to silence the ʿAlawites. And we don’t accept that the caliphate would be transformed from the ʿAbbāsids. We are the ones who served Rashid, Mansur, and Mahdi. And we don’t want Maʾmun to be our caliph; therefore, we will raise another person to the throne. The caliphate is for the ʿAbbāsids.”36 34 Ibid., p. 1230. 35 Yaʿqubi, 1992, vol. 2, p. 112; Ibn Kasir, 1990, vol. 10, p. 217; Masʿudi, 1991, vol. 2, p. 277. 36 Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, p. 1242.

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The assassination of Amin, the transfer of the capital to Marv, and the choice of an ʿAlawite as the crown prince shook Maʾmun’s position in the eyes of the ʿAbbāsids. So, the ʿAbbāsids decided to continue the caliphate in the ʿAbbāsid family by electing new caliphs in Baghdad. Now, the troops who during the conflicts between Amin and Maʾmun had prepared the ground for the fall of Amin in Baghdad by turning their backs on him, gathered around Ebrāhim ibn al-Mahdi, Maʾmun’s uncle, and tried to transfer power to the new caliph. According to Balʿami: All the ʿAbbāsids gathered in Baghdad and cursed Maʾmun and said that he was a bastard and, if not, he should not take the caliphate out of [the control of] his family. So, they all came together to dispose of Maʾmun and appoint another caliph from the descendants of ʿAbbās. They went to Mansur ibn al-Mahdi, but he did not accept their suggestion. And Mansur had a brother. His name was Ebrāhim ibn al-Mahdi. [They went to Ebrāhim] and he replied, “I do not like the way Maʾmun is taking the caliphate away from [the control of] his family.” And on Friday, all the armies in Baghdad and the ʿAbbāsids gathered in the Masjed-e Jameʿ [Grand Mosque]. And Ebrāhim ibn al-Mahdi came at the time of the prayer and sat on the pulpit. And he delivered a khotba and deposed Maʾmun in order to claim the allegiance of the people. This occurred on Zel-Hajja 21, 201 AH [10 July 817 AD].37

The new caliph’s power depended on the troops, so as soon as the commanders pledged allegiance to him, he gave them what was in the treasury and promised them that he would give them even more rewards after receiving the tribute.38 Baghdad played a pivotal role in maintaining the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate during Maʾmun’s time and on the verge of his removal from power. Baghdad was full of the ʿAbbāsid claimants who tied themselves to the structure of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. They considered the capital of the ʿAbbāsid government to be Baghdad; therefore, they were not satisfied with Maʾmun’s plan to station himself in Khorāsān. They began to abuse him with the label harāmzādeh (bastard), which was a reference to the fact that Maʾmun had taken power from his half-brother, Amin, and that his mother has been a kaniz (slave woman).39 This attack accused him of turning away from the 37 Ibid. p. 1242. 38 Ibid., p. 1244; Yaʿqubi, 1992, vol. 1, p. 112; Ibn Kasir, 1990, vol. 10, p. 217; Masʿudi, 1991, vol. 2, p. 277. 39 Some historians argue that Maʾmun was from Khorāsān (Ibn Khallekān, 1986, vol. 1, p. 39).

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ʿAbbāsids and joining the Iranians and ʿAlawites. Balʿami writes: “When the sedition spread to Baghdad and Iraq, Hasan ibn Sahl wrote a letter to Maʾmun, declaring why this sedition arose, and why this army opposed Maʾmun, and why they chose Ebrāhim. And in all cases, he told them the truth and informed Reza and Maʾmun of everything.”40 Eventually, Maʾmun had to choose between Khorāsān and Baghdad. He did not want to start another civil war and tried to satisfy Baghdad’s elders in any way possible; therefore, he eliminated the causes of their dissatisfaction on the way and before leaving Khorāsān. The assassinations of Fazl ibn Sahl and ʿAli ibn Musā guaranteed Maʾmun’s distance from the Iranians and Shiʿites and, as a result, the consent of the elders of Baghdad to his sitting on the ʿAbbāsid throne. 41 Aware of the situation in Khorāsān and its structural resources for independence, Maʾmun set out for Baghdad, and he tried to keep Khorāsān at least in the shadow of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate by choosing a reliable agent who had gone through the process of gaining power in the caliphate. After arriving in Baghdad in 204 AH/820 AD and securing the attention of the commanders and the elders, he appointed Ahmad ibn Abi Khāled as a minister and, in consultation with him, appointed Tāher as the amir of Khorāsān. Balʿami considers Maʾmun’s relationship with Tāher to be full of fear and hope.42 Interestingly, Tāher was the first to propose the change of the ʿAbbāsids’ color from green to black, as was the tradition of the ʿAbbāsids, a pattern that Abu Moslem had previously embraced as a sign of the ʿAbbāsid uprising. According to Balʿami: Every day Maʾmun fulfilled Tāher’s requests. And one day, Tāher went to Maʾmun and wanted everyone to wear black clothes. Maʾmun accepted this request and ordered them to put on green robes and raise green banners.… And on Friday, Maʾmun sat in the court hall and ordered them to bring him a black robe and a black turban. And they dressed Tāher and other commanders in a black robe and black hat. 43

40 Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, p. 1247. 41 Historians have pointed to the role of Fazl ibn Sahl in concealing the events that took place in Baghdad, including the numerous ʿAlawite uprisings and the allegiance of the Baghdad faction to Ebrāhim ibn al-Mahdi, Maʾmun’s uncle (Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939, p. 352; Yaʿqubi, 1992, vol. 2, p. 112; Ibn Kasir, 1990, vol. 10, p. 223; Masʿudi, 1991, vol. 2, p. 287; Abol Faraj Esfahāni, 1990, vol. 2, p. 213; Shahrestāni, 1971, vol. 1, p. 248; Ibn Taqtaqā, 1971, p. 169). 42 Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, p. 1250. 43 Ibid.

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Returning to Baghdad, Maʾmun left the Shiʿites’ demands unanswered; however, by sending Tāher to Khorāsān, he inevitably started a new era of social change in Iran that took Iranian agents a big step closer to their primary objective of attaining independence in the power structure.

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Khwāndmir, Qiyās al-Din (1977). Dastur al-Vozarāʿ, Ahvāl-e Vozarā-ye Islam ta Enqerāz-e Teymuriyān, ed. Saiʿd Nafisi, Tehrān: Eqbāl Khwāndmir, Qiyās al-Din (2009). Tārikh-e Habib al-Siyar fi Akhbār-e Afrād-e Bashar, ed. Dabir Siyāqi, 4 vols., Tehrān: Hermes Maqdasi, Motahhar ibn Tāher (2003). Āfarinesh va Tārikh, trans. Mohammad Rezā Shafiʿe Kadkani, 2 vols., Tehrān: Āgāh Masʿudi, ʿAli ibn Hosseyn (1991). Moruj al-Zahab, trans. Abol Qāsem Pāyanda, 4 vols., Tehrān: ʿElmi va Farhangi Mir Khwānd, Mohammad (2002). Tārikh-e Rowzat al-Safā fi Sirat al-Anbiyā va al-Moluk va al-Kholafā, ed. Jamshid Kiyānfar, vols. 4, Tehrān: Asātir Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas (1939). Ed. Mohammad Taqi Bahār and Behjat Ramezāni, 2nd ed., Tehrān: Kolāla-ye Khāvar Nakhjavāni, Hendushāh ibn Sanjar (1979). Tajāreb al-Salaf, Dar Tavārikh-e Kholafā va Vozarā-ye Ishān, ed. ʿAbbās Eqbāl, Tehrān: Ketābkhana-ye Tahuri Peacock, A. C. S. (2010). Early Seljuq History: A New Interpretation, London and New York: Routledge Shahrestāni, Abol Fath, Mohammad ibn ʿAbdol Karim (1971). Al-Melal va al-Nehal, trans. Sadr Tarka Esfahāni, ed. Mohammad Reza Jalāli Nāʾini, 2 vols., Tehrān: Eqbāl Shebli, Ahmad (1982). Tārikh-e Amuzesh dar Eslām, trans. Mohammad Hosseyn Sāket, Tehrān: Daftar-e Nashr-e Farhang-e Islāmi Tabari, Mohammad ibn Jarir (1967). Tārikh-e Tabari, ed. Abol Fazl Ebrāhim, 11 vols., Beirut: Dar al-Torās Tārikh-e Sistān (1987). Ed. Mohammad Taqi Bahār, Tehrān: Padida-ye Khāvar Yaʿqubi, Ahmad ibn Eshāq (1992). Tārikh-e Yaʿqubi, trans. Ebrāhim Āyati, 2 vols., Tehrān: ʿElmi va Farhangi

Part II The Structure of Iranian Dynasties From Dependence to Independence

When ʿAbbāsid caliphs used Iranian structural resources to gain power, they did not believe that Iranians would be able to gradually change the structure of ʿAbbāsid power in their favor. But, the persistent efforts of the Iranian agents marked the second season of post-Islamic social change in Iran, a season in which Iranians reproduced their prior structures. Although the Iranian dynasties each formed a different set of social actions and structures in the history of this land, each of them was also completed the social changes of the previous dynasties. In this phase of change, the Iranian dynasties gradually expanded their sphere of influence, forcing the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate to accept the social changes brought about by these dynasties. The formation of the Tāherids (205–259 AH/820–872 AD) and Sāmānids (203–389 AH/819–999 AD), although each were founded by Iranian amirs, was different. The actions of the Tāherids were not entirely independent of Baghdad, and amirs of the Tāherids defined their activities according to the structure of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. Meanwhile, the Sāmānids, while being loyal to the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate, began to reproduce their power structures by addressing cultural issues, strengthening Iranian bureaucracy, and maintaining their role as border guards of the eastern territories. The establishment of the Saffārid dynasty (247–393 AH/861–1003 AD), whose authority originated not from the caliph’s approval, but from military power, posed a serious challenge to the legitimacy of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate and provided the prelude to greater independence for Iranian governments. This time, the power originating in Iran moved toward Baghdad, a city that Mansur had built several years before, defining the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate’s identity independent of previous governments in the Islamic realm. The Saffārids’ unsuccessful move to Baghdad was completed with the rise of the Buyids (320–448 AH/932–1056 AD). The establishment of the Shiʿite Buyid dynasty and the domination of their power over Baghdad and the ʿAbbāsid caliph was an essential social change that linked the efforts of the Iranian amirs and the ʿAlawites. The formation of the Buyids was the reproduction of a wide range of social changes by small local governments such as the ʿAlawites of Tabarestān (250–316 AH/864–928 AD), the Ziyārids (318–482 AH/930-1089 AD), and the Saffārids (247–393 AH/861–1003 AD). Aware of its position right at the threshold of Baghdad’s gates, the Buyids changed the direction of social change from Iran to Baghdad by focusing on their position between the two great caliphates of the ʿAbbāsids and the Fatimids, on the one hand, and the Ismāʿilis, who incessantly sent their dāʿies throughout the Islamic lands, on the other.

4

The Rule of the Tāherids in the Shadow of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate Abstract The formation of the Tāherid dynasty was the first result of the consistent efforts of Iranian agents fighting to gain independence in Iran. The Tāherids used the resources of a borrowed structure approved by the caliph’s mandate. The actions of the Tāherids were not wholly independent of Baghdad, and the Tāherid rulers primarily def ined their activities according to the ʿAbbāsid structure. Being aware that the nature of their power depended on loyalty to the ʿAbbāsid caliph, they were armed with swords to obey Baghdad’s orders. Their wars against the ʿAlawites and their conflicts with Bābak, Māziyār, and Afshin separated their path from those power structures that opposed the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. Keywords: Tāherid dynasty, Bābak, Māziyār, Afshin

Tāher’s Sovereignty and Borrowed Structure With the departure of Maʾmun to Baghdad, the Khorāsān faction had the opportunity to move on to shape an independent dynasty by surmounting factional structures. Perhaps Maʾmun’s victory over Amin with his Khorāsāni allies’ help can be considered the beginning of the rule of the Khorāsān faction over the Baghdad faction. But the point was that the main actor of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate, Maʾmun, who had regained his lost power with the help of this faction, was familiar with its independent structural resources. Maʾmun’s presence in Khorāsān was an obstacle to the establishment of an independent Iranian dynasty, but at the same time, it provided an opportunity for this fledgling structure to undergo a period of consolidation in the shadow of the ʿAbbāsid caliph’s power. The ʿAbbāsids had shown that they had no tolerance for accepting rival agents or structures that divided their power, and they destroyed them with the most severe attacks.

Kamali, M. Social Change in Medieval Iran 132-628 AH (750-1231 AD). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2023 doi: 10.5117/9789463721981_ch04

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In contrast, Maʾmun, recognizing the favorable atmosphere of this new environment, came up with new ideas and distanced himself from his predecessor’s oppressive shadow. The caliph’s inevitable action to move the capital from Marv to Baghdad brought many social changes. It seems that the caravan of the caliph, along the way of this journey, marked another path for the future of Iran. Maʾmun knew that returning to the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate’s previous center was a return to the original structures of the Baghdad faction, the most obvious requirement of which was the acquittal of existing Iranian and Shiʿite structures and the removal of their active agents from the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. With the assassination of the ʿAbbāsid minister Fazl ibn Sahl in a bathhouse in Khorāsān, Maʾmun sent the first message to Baghdad that he was turning away from Iranian structures. The next step was in Tus, in Khorāsān, where his crown prince and the Shiʿite imam, ʿAli ibn Musā (d. 203 AH/818 AD), was poisoned. Therefore, before Maʾmun reached Baghdad, he had left behind all those agents and structural resources he had used to gain power. He also tried to restore the early traditions of the ʿAbbāsid caliphs. To this end, he took off the green robe that represented the ʿAlawites and wore the black robe to represent himself, both in action and in appearance, according to the requirements of the ʿAbbāsids. Now the Baghdad faction had found their representative, and it was Khorāsān that demanded a new agent. Under these conditions, Maʾmun was on the verge of making a critical decision, which was the choice of an appropriate ruler for Khorāsān. He had to choose an agent who the people of Khorāsān trusted and who was loyal to the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. Tāher was selected to fill this need.1 Maʾmun, who had defeated Amin with the military assistance of Tāher, after reaching the caliphate, asked Tāher to go to Raqqa.2 Although Tāher had proven his power, military prowess, and tact in various f ields, his abilities worried Maʾmun, because he knew that Khorāsān had grounds for achieving independence after the uprising of Abu Moslem, and if Tāher was not loyal to the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate, it could be thoroughly independent of the ʿAbbāsids. Balʿami writes: 1 Lassner, 1980, pp. 76–82; Bosworth, 2004, p. 76. 2 For Tāher, Raqqa (one of the island cities on the east side of the Euphrates) was like exile, which was never acceptable to him. Maʾmun’s pretext for sending him to Raqqa was the war with Nasr ibn Shabas Aqili. Tāher also dominated Mosul, Syria, and the Maghreb. Shortly afterward, Tāher went to Khorāsān. In 206 AH/821 AD, Maʾmun handed over the amirate of Raqqa from Tāher to his son Abdollāh. The main reason for sending Abdollāh to Raqqa was to suppress Nasr ibn Shabas (Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, p. 1230; Yaʿqubi, 1992, vol. 2, p. 463; Ibn Khaldun, 2010, vol. 2, p. 375). Shortly afterward, Tāher went to Khorāsān.

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Tāher was worried about Maʾmun because of the blood of Maʾmun’s brother Mohammad Amin. Maʾmun had resentment in his heart, and Tāher was aware of that. Tāher asked Ahmad Abi Khāled to ask the reign of Khorāsān for him from Maʾmun. Maʾmun was afraid that if he sent Tāher to Khorāsān, he would rebel. Ahmad ibn Abi Khāled said he would guarantee [Tāher’s loyalty], so Maʾmun gave Tāher the mandate of Khorāsān. And Ahmad ibn Abi Khāled had a gholām, a wine butler, whom Ahmad gave to Tāher. And in secret, Ahmad gave the gholām a dose of poison and said: “I will give this to you for Tāher so that if one day Tāher is rebellious and disobeys Maʾmun’s commands and deposes him, you will give Tāher this poison. Put it in his wine and kill him.”3

Eventually, Tāher (r. 205–207 AH/820–822 AD) left for Khorāsān, while the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate’s sword accompanied him so that he would not suddenly separate himself from the ʿAbbāsids. Tāher’s reign was the reproduction of the unfinished movement of Abu Moslem and the Iranian bureaucrats that finally came to fruition in the Khorāsān region. It was as if Tāher was accompanied by Abu Moslem and the Barmakids when he went to Khorāsān with the caliph’s mandate. Tāher’s lineage reached back to the kings and nobles of Iran. 4 Having or creating a lineage was an issue that was seriously pursued at that time by other Iranian local dynasties. It also suggests the attention paid by historians to this type of social change in Iran. This genealogical view was vital because it showed that the founders of local dynasties considered themselves descended from Iranian kings; therefore, they ruled in their ancestral lands and within the region’s power framework. The introduction of Iranian amirs and their unique features illustrated the historians’ attention to the presence of new power structures in Iran. From this period onwards, Iranian historians reported Iran’s events not under the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate but rather as independent events and presented their structures and agents differently. Balʿami recognizes Tāher’s deleting the name of Maʾmun from the khotbas as a sign of Tāher’s planning to seek independence: Tāher went to Khorāsān, and after a few days he rebelled against Maʾmun and deposed him, and called on the army and the people of Khorāsān to dismiss Maʾmun. The news came to Maʾmun. He said to Ahmad ibn 3 4

Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, p. 1251. Jowzjāni, 1984, vol., 1, p. 190.

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Abi Khāled, “You gave a guarantee about Tāher, and you are responsible for him.” He said, “O Amir al-Moʾmenin, wait until tomorrow.” When the gholām saw that Tāher had rebelled and deposed Maʾmun, the next day, he put the poison in some wine and gave it to Tāher. The day after, Maʾmun was informed of Tāher’s death.5

Tāher’s disobedience proved that a political agent could not claim independence by relying on borrowed power structures. But the omission of an agent like Tāher failed to suppress the power structure formed in Khorāsān. The succession of the Tāherid dynasty in Khorāsān guaranteed the continuation of Tāher’s rule. It defined the Tāherids as the first independent Iranian dynasty in the mind of the historian Balʿami. Tāher’s rebellion and the issue of his children’s succession to the reign of Khorāsān, although seemingly contradictory, provided a way to create relative stability in Khorāsān due to the rule of Tāherids, who continued operating in the shadow of the caliphate in this region. The Tāherids inherited a power structure that, due to the reproduction of strong structures during the presence of Maʾmun in Marv, had roots in the caliphate. Thus, Tāher’s sons continued serving the ʿAbbāsids as military commanders, and it did not develop structural changes. ʿAbdollāh ibn Tāher, Enacting the Will of the ʿAbbāsids The dependence of the Tāherids on the ʿAbbāsids’ structural resources continued until the end of the rule of the Tāherids and directed all their actions. The ʿAbbāsids’ military power, however, was dependent on the sword of the Tāherids, which made it possible for the Tāherids’ borrowing structure to continue. The absence of significant bureaucrats alongside Tāherid rulers was one of the government’s hallmarks. For them, the rule of Khorāsān was only the maintenance of the caliphate’s structural values​, and any change in it was considered an illegitimate innovation. The absence of great bureaucrats in this power structure showed that the Tāherids did not define a specific cultural mission for themselves. In the case of ʿAbdollāh ibn Tāher, it is recounted that when someone gave a copy of the classical love story of Vāmeq and ʿAzrā to him, he threw it into the water and said that in his realm, wherever anyone saw a book of “ʿAjam and Moghān’s works,” they 5 Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, p. 1251. See also Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939, p. 374; Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 1, p. 192.

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ought to burn it.6 This narrative indicates that the Tāherids, even in their use of language, adhered to the ʿAbbāsid structures and the Arabic culture and did not consider changing it. The Tāherid government was run by actors who built their work on stabilizing Khorāsān and other parts of Iran to ease the caliph’s mind and continue their political life in the shadow of this peace. Thus, any intellectual or social movements that had been a source of concern for the caliph were suppressed by the Tāherids, including the efforts of Talha ibn Tāher (r. 207–213 AH/822–828 AD) in the war against Hamza ibn Al-Khāreji and the removal of their remains by ʿAbdollāh ibn Tāher (r. 213–230 AH/828–844 AD).7 Tāher’s successors, even though they initiated the independence of Iranian dynasties in the context of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate, opposed any anti-ʿAbbāsid activity or notions that arose in Khorāsān. ʿAbdollāh ibn Tāher, the most prominent amir during the rule of the Tāherids in Khorāsān, fought fiercely against any opinion that challenged the power structure of the ʿAbbāsids. Mohammad ibn Qāsem was one of the ʿAlawites who went from Kufa to Marv in 219 AH/834 AD and then to Tāleghān. After waging two wars, ʿAbdollāh ibn Tāher finally arrested Mohammad ibn Qāsem in the city of Nesā and sent him to Baghdad.8 ʿAbdollāh chose Neyshābur as his capital for the military purpose of being better able to control any rebellious activity or uprising.9 For ʿAbdollāh, there was no difference between the Khārejites, the ʿAlawites, and even the Iranian amirs as long as they opposed the caliphate’s power structure. The stance of the Tāherids against the uprising of Bābak-e Khorramdin and their stance against Māziyār and Afshin indicated their government’s borrowed structure. The Link between the Siyāh-Jāmegān and the Khorramdinis: From Khorāsān to Azarbāijān The independence-seeking movements in Iran, which began in Khorāsān with the uprising of Abu Moslem and was eventually partially achieved by Tāher in Khorāsān, penetrated Iran’s internal regions with Bābak’s uprising. Bābak’s uprising, which began late in Maʾmun’s rule and continued during 6 7 8 9

Dowlatshāh-e Samarqandi, 2006, p. 35. Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 1, pp. 192–193. Tabari, 1967, vol. 11, pp. 42-45. Hākem Neyshāburi, 1997, pp. 268–269.

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the Moʿtasem’s period (r. 228–238 AH/842–852 AD), was one of the most critical uprisings that seriously challenged the structure of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate, both militarily and religiously. The uprising spread to Tabarestān and ʿAbdollāh’s throne in Neyshābur.10 The structure of Abu Moslem was so alive in the minds and thoughts of the people of Khorramdin that, according to Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, they said: “Abu Moslem is alive! Let us seize the kingdom and give it back to him.”11 Abu Moslem’s uprising, which had inspired many bloody uprisings, 12 eventually infiltrated central Iran with the Bābak uprising. The geographical distribution of Khorramdinis was not limited to Azarbāijān and included many parts of central Iran.13 To what extent historians’ accounts of Khorramdin’s thoughts and activities were based on reality and without exaggeration is an issue that we do not intend to address. A noteworthy point in terms of social change is the acceptance of this idea among people who were not yet accustomed to Islam; therefore, they were ready to accept ideas different from Islam. The expansion of Bābak’s uprising and its continuation worried the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate as well as the Tāherids. Khwāja Nezām al-Molk considered the movement of the Khorramdinis and the Bātenis to be interconnected and in line with each other: Wherever the Khorramdinis have arisen, the Bātenis have made common cause with them and strengthened them, and whenever the Bātenis appear, the Khorramdinis join with them and provide them with men and resources. This is because the origins of these two religions are the same and they have but one object: to corrupt the faith.14 10 Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, p. 1257; Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, 1999, p. 312. 11 Ibid., p. 312; tr., 1960, p. 238. 12 Most insurgent sects believed in reincarnation because their leaders wanted to portray themselves as successors to past heroes (Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, 1999, p. 235). 13 The Khorramis included two groups: one group followed Javidān, the son of Shahrak (Sahl), known as Jāvdāniyān. The other group followed Bābak and became known as Bābakiya (Bayāt, 1992, p. 233). Khwāja Nezām al-Molk numerates the off icials of Khorramiya (Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, 1999, p. 320; see also Hamdollāh Mostowf i, 1985, p. 204). ʿUf i states: “There remained a group of Mazdaki citizens who called him Mazdakiyya, and that Mazdak had a wife named Khorramak and his followers are named Khorramdin, in tribute to his wife” (ʿUfi, 1993, p. 251). Regarding the name “Khorramdin,” Yāqut Hamavi says in Moʿjam al-Boldān: “Khorram is a village in Ardebil and its meaning in Persian is ‘master’” (Hamavi, 2002, p. 316). Shahrestāni considers the Khorramis to be one of the Iranian sects (Shahrestāni, 1971, p. vol. 2, p. 324). 14 Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, 1999, p. 319; tr., 1960, p. 238.

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The Tāherids, who considered their power based on the power of the caliph, stood against Bābak.15 ʿAbdollāh ibn Tāher, who had just become the ruler of Khorāsān, sent his brother ʿAli to Khorāsān and moved toward central Iran to suppress Bābak. But when the news of the Khārejite uprising reached him, he left for Khorāsān on Maʾmun’s orders.16 Bābak’s uprising was finally ended after 20 years by Afshin, another Iranian commander.17 But ʿAbdollāh, who had always been victorious in battle and surpassed others in dealing with anti-ʿAbbāsid uprisings, regarded Afshin as his rival and did his best to remove him. Māziyār, one of the princes of the Tabarestān area, helped ʿAbdollāh unintentionally change the status of Afshin in the eyes of Moʿtasem (r. 228–238 AH/842–852 AD), the new ʿAbbāsid caliph. Māziyār was obliged to provide the tribute from the Tabarestān region to the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate through the Tāherids, but he considered this issue a subordination of the Tabarestān government to the Tāherids and started a revolt against the ʿAbbāsids and the Tāherids. ʿAbdollāh ibn Tāher arrested him and sent him to Samārrā, the center of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate.18 In Tārikh-e Tabarestān, Afshin, Bābak, and Māziyār are mentioned as a coalition against the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. Ibn Esfandiyār writes: When ʿAbdollāh ibn Tāher captured Māziyār, he sent him to Iraq. On the way, Afshin gave Māziyār alcohol to drink. Māziyār, while he was drunk, said, “You should know that Afshin Khizar ibn Kawus and Bābak and I have all pledged allegiance to … transfer power to Kasrā’s family.”19

In this way, Afshin was accused of having intimate relations with Māziyār and Bābak, and Moʿtasem sentenced Afshin to death despite all his prior services to the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate.20 15 “Now the basis of the religion of the Khorramdins is that they avoid all kinds of physical exertion or trouble, and they reject the divine law, renouncing prayer, fasting, pilgrimage, holy war, and ablution, while they permit the use of wine and the sharing of wives and property – in fact, they discard all obligatory observances. Whenever they hold a meeting or deliberate a matter of importance, they always commence the proceedings by bewailing the death of Abu Moslem Sāheb al-Dowlat and cursing his killer” (Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, 1999, pp. 319–320; tr., 1960, p. 244). 16 Zarrinkub, 1999, p. 14. 17 Balʿami, 1999, vol. 4, pp. 1275–1258; Masʿudi, 1991, vol. 2, pp. 442, 468, 471; Abu Hanifa Dinevari, 1985, pp. 444–447; Gardizi, 1984, p. 180. 18 Zarrinkub, 1999, p. 146; Frye, 1965, p. 118. 19 Ibn Esfandiyār, 2011, vol. 1, p. 220. 20 Yaʿqubi, 1992, vol. 2, pp. 503–504.

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The unfortunate ends of Bābak, Māziyār, and Afshin, their deaths at the ʿAbbāsids’ hands, and the continuance of ʿAbdollāh’s reign indicated that the Tāherids had better structural resources for survival than these three actors, who wound up being the friends of yesterday and the enemies of today.

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Lassner, Jacob (1980). The Shaping of ʿAbbāsid Rule, Princeton: Princeton University Press Masʿudi, ʿAli ibn Hosseyn (1991). Moruj al-Zahab, trans. Abol Qāsem Pāyanda, 4 vols., Tehrān: ʿElmi va Farhangi Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas (1939). Ed. Mohammad Taqi Bahār and Behjat Ramezāni, 2nd ed., Tehrān: Kolāla-ye Khāvar Shahrestāni, Abol Fath, Mohammad ibn ʿAbdol Karim (1971). Al-Melal va al-Nehal, trans. Sadr Tarka Esfahāni, ed. Mohammad Reza Jalāli Nāʾini, 2 vols., Tehrān: Eqbāl Tabari, Mohammad ibn Jarir (1967). Tārikh-e Tabari, ed. Abol Fazl Ebrāhim, 11 vols., Beirut: Dar al-Torās ʿUfi, Mohammad ibn Mohammad (1993). Javāmeʿ al-Hekāyāt va Lavāmeʿ al-Revāyat, ed. Mohammad Moʿin, 4 vols., Tehrān: Tehrān University Press Yaʿqubi, Ahmad ibn Eshāq (1992). Tārikh-e Yaʿqubi, trans. Ebrāhim Āyati, 2 vols., Tehrān: ʿElmi va Farhangi Zarrinkub, ʿAbdol Hosseyn (1999). Do Qarn Sokut, Sargozasht-e Havades va Ozaʿ-e Tārikhi-ye Iran dar Qarn-e Avval-e Islam az Hamle-ye ʿArāb ta Zohur-e Tāheriyān, Tehrān: Sokhan

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The Structure of the Sāmānid Government Moving in the Direction of Cultural Independence

Abstract Like the Tāherids, the Sāmānids drew on a borrowed structure approved by the caliph’s mandate. The Sāmānids, who had taken over Mā Varā al-Nahr as a reward for quelling the revolt of Rāfeʿ ibn Leys, reproduced the structures of their dynasty by addressing cultural issues, strengthening Iranian bureaucracy, and maintaining their role as Iranian border guards. Using bureaucracy and cultural agents alongside the commanders was one of the social changes of the Sāmānid dynasty, whose roots can be traced back to pre-Islamic Iran. Training enslaved people and allowing them to reach the highest levels of power was a social change that developed from the egalitarian culture of the Sāmānids. The Sāmānids’ attention to various intellectual and cultural structures paved the way for the influence of Ismāʿili thought in Mā Varā al-Nahr and Khorāsān. Keywords: Sāmānid dynasty, Iranian border guards and bureaucrats, Ismāʿilis

The Sāmānid rule: Borrowed from the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate The borrowed nature of the Sāmānid dynasty prompts one to examine the structure of this government in the persistence of the Tāherid government. One must note that the Sāmānids, in light of their geographical location, cultural thinking, and intellectual currents, reproduced the borrowed structure in a different direction. The sources of power derived from the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate after Khorāsān reached Mā Varā al-Nahr under the Sāmānids and made significant and wide-ranging social changes. Those far-reaching changes became the model for the Sāmānids and the dynasties that followed.

Kamali, M. Social Change in Medieval Iran 132-628 AH (750-1231 AD). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2023 doi: 10.5117/9789463721981_ch05

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The formation of the Sāmānid dynasty, like that of the Tāherids, was the result of delegating the reign of Mā Varā al-Nahr to the Iranians.1 The starting point for the presence of the Sāmānids in Mā Varā al-Nahr was the revolt of Rāfeʿ ibn Leys, which forced Hārun al-Rashid, the ʿAbbāsid caliph, to move to Khorāsān. This revolt, which could have posed a great danger to the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate’s eastern frontier, was resolved by the Sāmānids. It ended without war or bloodshed at the lowest possible cost. According to Narshakhi: When Rāfeʿ ibn Leys revolted against Hārun al-Rashid and seized Samarqand, Hārun al-Rashid sent Harsama ibn Aʿyon to fight him. Rāfeʿ fortified Samarqand and Harsama was unable to do anything. Maʾmun had come with Hārun al-Rashid to Khorāsān because of this affair. Hārun was very concerned about this difficulty. Maʾmun wrote a letter to the sons of Asad and ordered them to aid Harsama in the war against Rāfeʿ. The sons of Asad induced Rāfeʿ to make peace with Harsama. Marriage alliances were made between them, and Hārun was freed from that worry. There was a danger that Rāfeʿ would seize all of Khorāsān.2

Hārun left the work to Harsama and the sons of Assad-e Sāmāni while Rāfeʿ ibn Leys was likely to dominate Khorāsān, but Assad’s sons extinguished the fire of sedition by creating peace between Rafi and Harsama. Their ability to solve problems by negotiation instead of fighting elevated them in the eyes of the caliph. Therefore, after reaching the rule of Khorāsān, Maʾmun left the administration of the cities of Mā Varā al-Nahr to the Sāmānids. Narshakhi writes: When the caliphate passed to Maʾmun, Ghasān ibn Abbād became the amir of Khorāsān. Maʾmun ordered him to give the children of Asad ibn Sāmān Khodāh districts [to rule] among the cities of Khorāsān. He gave each an important city in recognition of what they had done. Ghasān ibn Abbād made Nuh ibn Asad the amir of Samarqand and Ahmad ibn Asad, the amir of Marv. This was in the year 202 AH [817 AD].3

The four sons of Asad ibn Sāmān Khodāt, who were able to subdue one of the ʿAbbāsid power’s main claimants, found each of themselves in charge of main cities of Mā Varā al-Nahr as a result of this service. 1 2 3

Jowzjāni considers the Sāmānids to be descendants of Bahrām-e Chuibn (1984, vol. 1, p. 201). Narshakhi, 1984, pp. 104–105; tr., 1954, p. 76. Narshakhi, 1984, p. 105; tr., 1954, p. 76.

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The interaction of the Sāmānids and the Tāherids in establishing the balance of power provided the most fundamental bases for strengthening the structures of the amirate during the consolidation of power of the f irst Iranian dynasties. The Tāherids considered themselves the general amirs of Iran, who had earned this amirate for their service to the caliph. And the Sāmānids saw themselves as the f irst Iranian amirs who had been able to establish a dynasty in Iran. Undoubtedly, the Sāmānid path to power was much smoother than that of the Tāherids. However, understanding their historic opportunity, they did not waste their energy engaging in friction with each other and did not jeopardize their position to form Iranian dynasties at the beginning of their path. According to Jowzjāni: When his majesty, the caliph, nominated Amir Tāher-e Zu al-Yaminayn, son of Hosseyn, to the government of Khorāsān, all of the four Sāmāni amirs, who [as already stated] were four brothers, were confirmed by him in the territories and cities they were then holding. When the sovereignty passed from Amir Tāher to his son, ʿAbdollāh-e Tāher, he confirmed the Sāmānids in their government roles as his father had done and made no change with respect to them. 4

After achieving the rule of Khorāsān, Tāher reappointed Assad’s sons to rule the cities of Khorāsān and Mā Varā al-Nahr and sent a khalʿat (robe of honor) to Nuh ibn Assad, who reigned in Samarqand. Narshakhi writes: “When Ghasān was recalled from Khorāsān, Tāher ibn al-Hosseyn became the amir and confirmed these districts on them. He gave the robe of honor to Nuh ibn Asad the eldest, who was in Samarqand till he died.”5 Thus, while receiving the mandate and lavā from the caliph, the Sāmānids, under the supervision of Tāherids, managed the affairs of Mā Varā al-Nahr. It indicated an essential social change in the management of the eastern parts of Iran, including Khorāsān and Mā Varā al-Nahr. According to Mojmal al-Tavārikh: When Maʾmun came to Iraq from Khorāsān, Nuh ibn Asad was with him. After that, the Tāherids gave him Mā Varā al-Nahr. And after that, Moʿtazed gave Mā Varā al-Nahr, and the areas [around it] and Khorāsān to Ismāʿil ibn Ahmad in 287 AH [900 AD], and Hamza al-Esfahāni says 4 5

Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 1, pp. 202–203; tr., 1881, vol. 1, p. 28. Narshakhi, 1984, p. 105; tr., 1954, p. 76.

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in his history [book], “Before Ismāʿil, the Tāherids had given Mā Varā al-Nahr to his brother Nasr ibn Ahmad.”6

As long as the Tāherids ruled in the Khorāsān region, they oversaw the affairs of Mā Varā al-Nahr and at least ceremoniously approved the caliph’s chosen rulers. After the transformation of the Sāmānids’ position from the guards of Iran’s eastern borders into the rulers of Mā Varā al-Nahr, the following social change was the use of the structural resource of the hereditary governments to consolidate and maintain as much power as possible in the Sāmānid-influenced region. Nuh (r. 331–344 AH/942–955 AD) kept the government in his family by choosing his brother Ahmad and Ahmad by choosing Nasr ibn Ahmad.7 The inheritance of the Sāmānid government in Mā Varā al-Nahr was, in all respects, effective in stabilizing the region. The Sāmānids had previously proved their loyalty to the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. They thus maintained their relative independence in Mā Varā al-Nahr by accepting the reading of the khotba in the caliph’s name and the minting of the ʿAbbāsid coins. The succession of the government also relieved the caliph from maintaining the eastern borders of the Islamic world, and this two-way relationship led to further consolidation of Sāmānid power in Mā Varā al-Nahr. The gift basis and the borrowed source of the power of the Sāmānids lasted until the end of the dynasty; therefore, they always needed the caliph’s mandate and the lavā to consolidate their power.8 For example, after coming to power in 251 AH/865 AD, Nasr ibn Ahmad received a mandate from Caliph Vāseq.9 The Sāmānid approach to the passing of authority from one generation to the next was to carry out the will of the caliph regarding the maintaining of the Sāmānids in Mā Varā al-Nahr and then Khorāsān. Their dominance in Mā Varā al-Nahr and their loyalty to the caliph was an essential structural resource that made it possible for them to maintain their power in Mā Varā al-Nahr. Jowzjāni writes: “When Ahmad, son of Sāmān, died at Samarqand, he nominated his son, Nasr, as his successor; and, during the sway of the Tāherids, the territory, which Nasr’s father had held, was confirmed to him.”10 6 Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939, p. 386. 7 Narshakhi, 1984, p. 105; Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939, p. 387; Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 1, p. 208. 8 Gardizi, 1984, pp. 375–323; Narshkhi, 1984, p. 108; Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939, p. 382; Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 1, p. 208. 9 Narshakhi, 1984, p. 105. 10 Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 1, p. 204; tr., 1881, vol. 1, p. 29.

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The Sāmānid Agents in the Service of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate The borrowed power structure of the Sāmānid forced the main actors to exercise power in the region as the arm of the caliph of the time. The experience of the Tāherids had shown the Sāmānids that as long as the resource of their power was borrowed from the caliphate, they needed to follow the commands of the caliphs. The battle of ʿIsmāʿil ibn Ahmad Sāmāni (r. 279–295 AH/892–907 AD) with ʿAmr ibn Leys (r. 265–287 AH/878-900 AD), the Saffārid ruler,11 as well as his conflict with Hasan ibn Zeyd (r. 250–270 AH/864–883 AD), the ʿAlawite ruler, can be evaluated in this regard. Jowzjāni writes: Amir al-Moʾmenin al-Moʿtazed dispatched a commission to him, with directions to free the regions of Tabarestān and Gorgān from the sway of Amir Mohammad-e Zeyd-al-ʿAlawi, who had possessed them. Amir Ismāʿil appointed Ahmad-e Hārun to the command of his army and sent him on in advance with that portion of his forces.12

The caliph of the time may have had the least power compared to the scale of his previous or even future caliphs, but this power of the caliph did not cause the Sāmānids to refuse to carry out his orders, and this was due to the caliph’s religious legitimacy in the minds of the Sāmānids.13 The Sāmānids’ obedience to the caliph did not mean that their governing structure depended on him, as we saw under Tāherid rule. The Sāmānids built a structural resource of loyalty to the caliphate to maintain their independence. This was the issue that put their government’s structure on the margins of security against the caliphs’ objections. It was on this basis that Caliph al-Moʿtazed (r. 279–289 AH/892–901 AD) preferred the obedient Sāmānids over Yaʿqub-e Leys (r. 247–265 AH/861–878 AD), the founder of the Saffārid government, who revolted against the caliph and, in 260 AH/873 AD, resent them the mandate of Mā Varā al-Nahr to further establish the power of the Sāmānids in the region. According to Narshakhi: Nasr ibn Ahmad was sent a mandate for the rule of all of the districts of Mā Varā al-Nahr, from the Oxus river to the extremity of the lands of the 11 Narshakhi, 1984, p. 126; see Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939, p. 387; Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 1, p. 209. 12 Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 1, p. 206; tr., 1881, vol. 1, p. 32. 13 Montgomery, 2004, p. 83.

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East, from the caliph Mowaffaq bellāh. The khotba of Bokhārā was read in the names of Amir Nasr ibn Ahmad and Amir Ismāʿil, and the name of Yaʿqub [ibn] Leys Saffār was dropped from the khotba.14

Knowing this, the Sāmānids built a structural resource of loyalty to the caliph to strengthen power foundations, especially in cultural affairs. They thus took a step forward from the Tāheri government, which had completely taken over its structural resources from the caliph. The Sāmānids: Guards on the Eastern Frontier of the Islamic Lands As the eastern frontier of Islamic territory, Mā Varā al-Nahr’s position provided the Sāmānids with unique structural resources. Jeyhāni refers to the Sāmānids as “guards of the caliphs” and the guards of the eastern frontier and their credibility in the caliphs’ eyes.15 Hence, the Ma Varā al-Nahr’s security and the preservation of stability in this region ensured the survival of other parts of Islamic territories. The powerful presence of the Sāmānids on the eastern borders and their loyalty to the caliph guaranteed the safety of the Islamic world’s eastern frontier. However, guarding the Muslim world’s eastern frontier posed a threat to the Sāmānids and always kept them in a state of fear and hope. Because of that, we can always see the war readiness in the narratives of historians of the Sāmānids; this war readiness overshadowed most of the social changes in this dynasty.16 Besides, the thriving presence of the Sāmānids in the pursuit of security of the eastern borders led to the neglect of central–local dynasties to strengthen their defensive structures against foreign invading tribes that crossed the boundaries of the Islamic world and entered Muslim territory. The Turks, Turkmen, and then the Mongol invasions showed that the local dynasties ruling central Iran were very resistant to other local Iranian dynasties and very vulnerable to attacks by tribes. They considered it the responsibility of the Sāmānids to maintain the eastern frontier of the Islamic world and did not have the right mentality toward their essential role in the face of foreigners. Therefore, their inattention became a major structural obstacle to 14 Narshakhi, 1984, p. 109; tr., 1954, p. 80. 15 Jeyhāni, 1989, p. 108. 16 “Amr-e Leys consulted with the amirs and the elders and asked them for help in the work of Amir Ismāʿil-e Sāmāni … and wrote a letter and mentioned that ‘you have to keep the Mā Varā al-Nahr since it is on the border of the enemy’” (Jeyhāni, 1989 p. 120).

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maintaining Iran’s borders, mainly the eastern borders. Thus, after breaking through the boundaries of the Sāmānid territories, the nomadic people could advance to the farthest lands in central and western Iran. The reign of the Sāmānids as the guards of the eastern borders is the reproduction of the border-guarding structure of pre-Islamic dynasties ruled in Mā Varā al-Nahr. By reviving this ancient structure, Sāmānid activists turned their geographical location into a valuable resource for achieving lofty economic and cultural goals. The Sāmānids, the first Iranian-Islamic dynasty that dominated the eastern part of the Islamic world, added new concepts to territorial development. Narshakhi writes: When the news of the death of Amir Nasr came to Amir al-Moʾmenin Moʿtazed bellāh [279–289 AH/892–901 AD], he gave Amir Ismāʿil a mandate for the dominion of Mā Varā al-Nahr in Moharram 280 AH [March/ April 893 AD]. At the same time, he [Ismāʿil] went to fight at Tarāz, where he experienced great difficulty. Finally, the amir of Tarāz came out with many dehqāns and accepted Islam. Tarāz was thus subjugated. A large church was turned into a grand mosque, and the khotba was read in the name of the Commander of the Faithful Moʿtazed bellāh.17

Islam’s development of the idea of jihad against non-Muslim peoples was one of the Islamic traditions embraced by the Sāmānids and later dynasties. They recorded their names as Muslim ghāzis (warriors) by reproducing the pre-Islamic border-guarding structure and perpetuating the tradition of war with non-Muslim peoples. Slavery and the Training of Power Agents The pursuit of jihad and advancing in other regions provided the means for growth of trade,18 which was highly valued by the Sāmānids.19 But what is vital in terms of social change was the expansion of the slave trade in the Sāmānid period. The expansion of the use of slaves in Mā Varā al-Nahr and in Baghdad meant that expanding the slave trade was a necessary action pursued by the Sāmānids. The use of gholāms (slaves), previously carried out by Moʿtasem, the ʿAbbāsid caliph, was reproduced during the Sāmānids and continued with different components. Training slaves and allowing 17 Narshakhi, 1984, p. 118; tr., 1954, pp. 86–87. 18 Nafziger and Walton, 2003, p. 207; Peacock, 2007, p. 36; Herzig and Stewart, 2012, p. 10. 19 Bayāt, 1992, p. 68.

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them to reach the highest level of power was an issue that can be seen in the Sāmānid dynasty and in the light of the structure of their egalitarian culture. Some even went so far as to overthrow the Sāmānid amirs, imprison them, and even kill them.20 This approach paved the way for widespread social change that affected the Mā Varā al-Nahr and other Islamic territories and called for new actors in the political structure. The formation of the Ghaznavid dynasty, which arose from the Sāmānid slavery structure, was the first product of this idea. Alptegin and Saboktegin, who created the foundations of Ghaznavid rule in Mā Varā al-Nahr, were among the Turkish slaves purchased from the slave market for Ahmad ibn Ismāʿil, the Sāmānid amir.21 Thus, slavery, in the long run, became an essential obstacle to the continuation of the Sāmānid reign. The Sāmānid Bureaucracy and Revival of Iranian Culture The use of the bureaucracy and educated agents alongside the rulers was one of the social changes of the Sāmānid dynasty, the roots of which can be traced back to pre-Islamic Iran. Using educated activists and prominent ministers, the Sāmānids defined the path to independence differently from the Tāherids. They were aware that political independence could be enjoyed if intellectual and bureaucratic structures were recreated based on Iranian culture. Therefore, while being loyal to the caliph, they took effective steps to reproduce Iranian culture. The use of prominent ministers such as ʿAbdollāh Jeyhāni, Abu Ali Balʿami, and Abu ʿAbdollāh Ahmad ʿOtbi illustrated the strength of the Iranian bureaucratic structure in the Sāmānid government.22 Iranian ministers saw enriching the cultural legacy, including the Persian language, as the first step toward the independence of Iran’s cultural border from the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate and worked hard to revive and strengthen it. The use of Arabic as the language of science and scholarship by Iranian scholars in the first two centuries of Islam had distanced Persian-speaking people from the latest intellectual achievements. Therefore, the translation of practical texts became a priority. The Sāmānids encouraged scholars to use the Persian language to write literary and historical works and revive pre-Islamic history and literature.23 The writing of prominent Persian 20 21 22 23

Maqdasi, 2007, vol. 1, p. 325. Hamdollāh Mostowfi, 1985, p. 389. Peacock, 2007, p. 36; Herzig and Stewart, 2012, p. 10. Meisami, 1999, p. 22; Melville, 2012, pp. 89, 184–185; Young et al., 1990, p. 219; Peacock, 2007, p. 37.

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texts under the Sāmānids and its reproduction and continuation under later governments further distinguished Iran’s borders and the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. The attention of the Sāmānids to Iranian culture and civilization and particularly the Persian language was a meaningful social change. The presence of intellectuals and literary men in the Sāmānid court and at the level of political agents is significant. The Ghaznavids reproduced the same cultural and bureaucratic structure, and Soltān Mahmud filled his court with Iranian literary men and scholars.24 The Iranian bureaucrats furthered the horizons of Iranian culture by using other civilizations’ intellectual and cultural achievements. Gardizi writes about the Vizierate of Jeyhāni. According to Gardizi: Abu ʿAbdollāh was a wise man, vigilant, brilliant, and insightful in everything. And he had written much on every technique and science. When he sat in the vizierate’s court, he wrote letters to [correspondents in] countries all over the world, asking about the customs in other courts. He ordered bureaucrats to record those traditions and bring them to him.… He discarded what was unworthy and kept the good, so that all the members of the [vizierate’s] court and the teachers in Bokhārā could apply them.25

Although the Sāmānid government had built its foundation on the use of bureaucracy alongside military power,26 with the weakening of the Sāmānid ministers, the balance of power in Sāmānid rule gradually shifted, and the power of the military surpassed that of the ministers. We will examine this social change later in the chapter on the Ghaznavid dynasty. Ismāʿili Invitation and Conflict in the Sāmānid Structure The Sāmānids’ attention to various intellectual and cultural structures paved the way for the influence of Ismāʿili views in Mā Varā al-Nahr and Khorāsān. This influence was so significant that the Ismāʿilis mobilized the agents’ power in the Sāmānid government and shifted the balance of power between the bureaucrats and the military. The encounter between the Ismāʿilis and the Sāmānids became the resource of many social changes in Mā Varā al-Nahr. 24 Frye, 1965, p. 83; Zarrinkub, 1992, vol. 2, p. 393; Safā, 2000, vol. 1, p. 397; Bahār , 2003, vol. 2, p. 38. 25 Gardizi, 1984, p. 330. 26 Frye, 1965, p. 90.

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There are many controversies about Ismāʿili thought and ideas. Some historians refer to them with different titles and some with antipathy. By assuming that Ismāʿili views were known to the people, many historians leave the reader unaware of their beliefs. Khwāja Nezām al-Molk is the only historian who elaborates on these views in detail. He traces the reproduction of Ismāʿili thought from the Zendiq and Khorramdini,27 and, therefore, considers it contrary to the religion of Islam. According to Khwāja Nezām al-Molk: Whenever the Bātenis have appeared, they have had a name or a nickname, and in every city and province, they have been known by a different title, but, in essence, they are all the same. In Aleppo and Egypt they call them Ismāʿilis; in Qom, Kāshān, Tabarestān, and Sabzevār they are called Shiʿites; in Baghdad, Mā Varā al-Nahr, and Qazvin they are known as Qarmatis; in Kufa, Mobārakis, and Basra as Rāvandis and Borqāʿis; in Ray as Khalafis; in Gorgān as the Wearers of Red; in Syria as the Wearers of White; in the west as Saʿidis; in al Ahsā and Bahrain as Janābis; and in Esfahān as Bātenis. In contrast, they call themselves Didactics and other such names, but their whole purpose is only to abolish Islam and to lead mankind astray.28

The different names used to introduce Ismāʿili thought suggest that society did not have a clear definition of the views of the Ismāʿilis. It was only after the cessation of their activities in Iran and the collapse of their power structure during the Mongol period that Atā Malek Joveyni, due to his access to the Alamut Library, acquired a better interpretation of the process of formation and evolution of their thought. Joveyni regards Ismāʿilis’ beliefs to be close to those of the “the Majus” (Zoroastrians) and therefore considers the essence of their religion contrary to Islam. According to Joveyni: “In the early years of Islam, after the times of the orthodox caliphs (God’s blessing upon them all), there appeared amongst the Muslims a sect of people whose minds had no sympathy with Islam and in whose hearts, there was rooted a fellow-feeling with the Magians.”29 Like Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, Joveyni points to the similarities between the ideas of the Ismāʿilis and Zoroastrians and considers the Ismāʿili intellectual 27 Later, Hasan Sabbāh attracted the remnants of the former Khorramdinis of Azarbāijān, who called themselves “Persians,” to his message and daʿva (see Fazlollah Hamedāni, 2006, pp. 149–153; Kāshāni, 1964, pp. 186–190; Daftary, 2018, pp. 225–226; Madelung, 2020, p. 95). 28 Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, 1999, p. 311; tr., 1960, p. 238. 29 Joveyni, 2006, vol. 3, p. 142; tr., Juvaini, 1997, p. 641.

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structure to be the reproduction of Zoroastrian thought. An emphasis on philosophy30 and the importance of reason seem to be the main similarities between the views of the Ismāʿilis and those of the Zoroastrians. Joveyni considers the origins of Ismāʿili thought in transcending the appearance (zāher) of the shariʿa and addressing its inner layers (bāten) and holds the Ismāʿilis to be essentially esoteric (bātenis) thinkers who constantly changed their ideas and turned to a new sect. Joveyni writes: “In support of these lies, they adduced propositions that had come down to them from the Greek philosophers. They also incorporated several points from the tenets of the Magians.”31 Joveyni claims that the Ismāʿili sect’s distinction from other sects of Islam is the Ismāʿilis’ attention to the interpretation of religion (taʾvil-e din), which brings them closer to Greek philosophy. The historian traces their movement from the uprising of Hosseyn ibn ʿAli to the revolt of Mokhtār-e Saqafi and then the passage from the Zeydi to the Ismāʿili. He emphasizes that their name is linked to Ismāʿil, the son of imam Jaʿfar Sādegh, to distinguish themselves from other Islamic sects. The goals were power-seeking and achieving political structure. The Ismāʿilis opposed the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate and its affiliated powers since they introduced themselves independently of other Shiʿite sects. The Ismāʿilis’ use of the structural resource of daʿva (invitation) to propagate religion and thought was a reproduction of the daʿva of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate from the turbulent times of the end of the Umayyad Caliphate. But the Ismāʿilis, unlike the ʿAbbāsid dāʿies, did not focus on the negative goals. Instead, they emphasized goals interpreted by the intellectual community of that day as anti-Islamic goals. Joveyni writes: When Ismāʿil died, his son Mohammad, who was already grown up during the lifetime of Jaʿfar and was older than [Jaʿfar’s son] Musā, made his way to Jebāl and came to Ray and from thence to Solma in Damāvand. Mohammadābād in Ray is named after him. He had sons who went into hiding in Khorāsān and, making their way to Qandehār, which is in the province of Sind, settled down in that country. The dāʿies or missionaries of the Ismāʿilis now poured into every land and called on the people to embrace their tenets. Many answered their call.32

30 Mojmal al-Tavārikh wa al-Qesas, 1939, p. 371. 31 Joveyni, 2006, vol. 3, p. 143; tr., Juvaini, 1997, p. 641. 32 Joveyni, 2006, vol. 3, pp. 148–149; tr., Juvaini, 1997, p. 645.

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In contrast to the ʿAbbāsids who sent their dāʿies only to specific centers, especially Khorāsān, the Ismāʿilis sent their dāʿies throughout the Islamic world to take full advantage of the existing capacities. The Ismāʿilis reproduced the imamate structure differently from other Shiʿite sects and used it in their invitation program. The ʿAbbāsid caliphs, who had used the Shiʿite structure of imamate in the war with the Umayyads, were well aware of the resources of this structure, especially the way the Ismāʿilis reproduced it weakened the foundations of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. The Ismāʿilis believed that the imams were descendants of Mohammad ibn Ismāʿil and thought that from ʿAli’s time, the first Shiʿite imam to Mohammad, the imamate was open (zāher), and after Mohammad ibn Ismāʿil it became a secret daʿva.33 This idea had worried the Muslim community concerning the imams who were supposed to appear in the Ismāʿili political structure. In this way, the Ismāʿilis considered the imam’s existence necessary for the revelation of religion (taʾvil-e din). Therefore, the transition from appearance to the inner layers of religion (from zāher to bāten-e din) opened the door for other claimants to enter this power structure framework. With the coming to power of the Buyids (320–448 AH/932–1056 AD) and due to their religious tolerance,34 the Ismāʿilis openly and in various parts of Iran began to propagate their views. Their coming to Mā Varā al-Nahr and Khorāsān marked a new chapter in social change for the Sāmānid dynasty. The Sāmānids, which had achieved a kind of open-mindedness by embracing rationalism and culture, prepared the ground for propagating Ismāʿilis’ ideas in Mā Varā al-Nahr. The Ismāʿili emphasis on wisdom (kherad) was perhaps the most critical resource of their intellectual structure and drew the Sāmānid court’s attention to the Ismāʿilis. The presence of prominent figures among the dāʿies, including Nāser Khosrow Qobadiyāni, Abu Hātam Rāzi, Mohammad Nakhshabi, and Yaʿqub-e Sajestāni,35 and the effect of their daʿva (invitation) among prominent Sāmānid court members, such as ʿAbdollāh Jeyhāni and Abu ʿAli Choghāni, show that the two groups had reached common ground in their thinking. Nasr ibn Ahmad Sāmāni’s (301–331 AH/913–942 AD) conversion to the Ismāʿili religion posed a serious challenge to their invitation to Mā Varā al-Nahr. According to Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, “At 33 Joveyni, 2006, vol. 3, pp. 148–149. 34 Ibn Jowzi, 1992, vol. 7, p. 9; Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. 9, p. 26; Ibn Moskuya, 2000, vol. 6, p. 408; Frye, 1965, p. 175. 35 Baghdadi, 1966, p. 203.

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every opportunity, Mohammad brought a part of his teaching to the amir’s attention, and whatever he said, the amir’s companions added their approval and applause saying, ‘It is so.’ Nasr ibn Ahmad treated him with increasing favor and at last accepted his solicitation.”36 The Ismāʿilis’ attempt to infiltrate the Sāmānid court indicated their plan to change the structure of Sāmānid power. The establishment of the Qarmati government37 and the Fatimid Caliphate in those years, and the association of the Ismāʿili dāʿies with these governments,38 made the Sunni scholars pessimistic about the actions of the Ismāʿilis and paved the way for divisions in the Sāmānid court. The Ismāʿili influence in the Sāmānid court and the creation of conflicts among the courtiers prepared the ground for upsetting the balance of power. The dependence of the Sāmānids on the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate and the Sunni community tipped the balance of power in favor of the Sunni clergymen and the Turkish courtiers, who were primarily military commanders.39 Their work progressed to the point where they formed a council and decided to oust Nasr ibn Ahmad. 40 Eventually, Amir Nasr, aware of the intentions of the insurgents, stepped down in favor of his son, Nuh ibn Nasr (r. 331–342 AH/943–954 AD). 41 The rise of Amir Nuh ibn Nasr began with the massacre of the Ismāʿili dāʿies and their followers. 42 For the Sunni community, which had precise knowledge of the power structure, the Ismāʿilis’ relationship with the Fatimids and Qarmatis was very meaningful. The Ismāʿilis in Mā Varā al-Nahr began a different program than in other parts of Iran and tried to shorten the path to power by infiltrating the Sāmānid court. The conversion of many bureaucrats to the Ismāʿili religion and, therefore, their exclusion 36 Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, 1999, p. 289; tr., 1960, p. 219. 37 Joveyni, 2006, vol. 3, pp. 153–154. During the time of Moʿtazed, Qaramtis were massacred in Bahrain, where they had gathered for hajj, and one of their leaders, Ibn al-Qows, was dismembered and then hanged (Mojmal al-Tavārikh wa al-Qesas, 1939, p. 369). But the story of the dāʿies was not limited to daʿva. Some of these dāʿies, including one of Abdollāh ibn Meymun Qadāh’s sons, claimed an imamate in the Maghreb and called himself Abdollāh Mahdi. He established a dynasty in Qiravān in Maghreb in 258 AH/871 AD (Joveyni, 2006, vol. 3, pp. 156–157). Qarmatis attributed to Hamdān ibn Ashʿas (known as Qarmat) was one of the religious-political movements in Iran, Mesopotamia, Syria, and North Africa from the ninth century AH onwards. The attempt by the Qarmatis to spread the Ismāʿili daʿva in Iraq led historians to call the Ismāʿilis of Iraq, Bahrain, and the Levant (Nobakhti, 1994, p. 511; Ibn Nadim, 2002, p. 118). 38 Zarrinkub, 1992, vol. 2, p. 201. 39 Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. p. 225; Ibn Moskuya, 2000, vol. 6, p. 408. 40 Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, 1999, pp. 287–289. 41 Ibid., p. 294. 42 Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 1, pp. 212–213.

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from the power structure during the rule of Nuh and his successors shifted the balance of power in favor of the military men. The Ismāʿilis’ influence in the Sāmānid court started a new round of religious charges, this time in the form of accusations against “the Qarmatigari.” Although many Sāmānid activists, especially in the first round of the Ismāʿili massacre in Mā Varā al-Nahr, were attributed to belonging to this religion, the struggle against the Qarmatis became a significant structural resource for politicians to fight against their rivals. Thus, the accusations against the zendiqs and the magus previously used against the Barmakids and Fazl ibn Sahl were reproduced under the name of the Qarmatigari and Rafizi against the Sāmānid bureaucrats. The Sāmānids’ intense confrontation with Ismāʿilis in Mā Varā al-Nahr continued in Iran’s other local dynasties. 43 Although these actions halted the Ismāʿilis’ open daʿva in Mā Varā al-Nahr, they continued their subversive activities and, as an unresolved issue, marked a season of social change for subsequent governments, including the Ghaznavids. The Ghaznavids used the same anti-Ismāʿili space with the slogan of fighting against bad-dini (sacrilege) and using its structural resources to reproduce the Sāmānid structures, which will be examined in the chapter on the Ghaznavid dynasty.

Bibliography Baghdadi, Abu Mansur ʿAbdol Qāher (1966). Al-Feraq Bayn al-Feraq dar Mazāheb-e Islam, trans. Mohammad Javād Mashkur, Tehrān: Amir Kabir Bahār, Mohammad Taqi (2003). Sabkshenāsi ya Tārikh-e Tatavvor-e Nasr-e Pārsi, 3 vols., Tehrān: Farāsugostar Bayāt, ʿAzizollāh (1992). Tārikh-e Iran az Zohur-e Islam ta Diyālama, Tehrān: Daneshgah-e Melli Daftary, Farhad (2018). Ismāʿili History and Intellectual Traditions, London: Routledge Fazlollāh Hamedāni, Rashid al-Din (2006). Jameʿ al-Tavārikh, ed. Mohammad Roshan, 3 vols., Tehrān: Mirās-e Maktub Frye, R. N. (1965). Bukhara: The Medieval Achievement, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press Gardizi, Abu Saʿid ʿAbdol Hayy ibn Zahhāk (1984). Zeyn al-Akhbār, ed. ʿAbdol Hayy Habibi, Tehrān: Donyā-ye Ketāb

43 Gardizi, 1984, p. 187; Jorfādeqāni, 2003, p. 180.

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Hamdollāh Mostowfi, Ibn Abi Bekr (1985). Tārikh-e Gozida, ed. ʿAbdol Hosseyn Navāie, Tehrān: Amir Kabir Herzig, Edmund, and Sarah Stewart, eds. (2012). Early Islamic Iran, Volume V: The Idea of Iran, London: I. B. Tauris Ibn Asir, ʿAli ibn Mohammad (1965). Al-Kāmel fi al-Tārikh, 13 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Sāder Ibn Jowzi, ʿAbdol Rahmān (1992). Al-Montazam fi Tavārikh al-Moluk va al-Omam, ed. Mohammad ʿAbdol Qāder ʿAtā, 19 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Kotob al-ʿElmiya Ibn Moskuya, Ahmad ibn Mohammad (2000). Tajāreb al-Omam va Taʿāqeb alHemam, ed. Abol Qāsem Emāmi, 6 vols., Tehrān: Sorush Ibn Nadim, Eshāq Ibn Mohammad (2002). Al-Fehrest, Tehrān: Asātir Jeyhāni, Abol Qāsem ibn Mohammad (1989). Ashkāl al-ʿ Ālam, trans. ʿAli ibn ʿAbdol Salam Kāteb, Tehrān: Behnashr Jorfādeqāni, Abol Sharaf Nāseh ibn Zafar (2003). Tārikh-e Yamini, ed. Jaʿfar Shoʿār, Tehrān: ʿElmi va Farhangi Joveyni, Atā Malek (2006). Tārikh-e Jahān-goshā, ed. Mohammad Qazvini, 3 vols., Tehrān: Donyā-ye Ketāb Jowzjāni, Menhāj al-Serāj (1881). Tabaqāt-e Nāseri, trans. H. G. Raverty, London: Gilbert and Rivington Jowzjāni, Menhāj al-Serāj (1984). Tabaqāt-e Nāseri, ed. ʿAbdol Hayy-e Habibi, 2 vols., Tehrān: Donyā-ye Ketāb Juvaini, Ata-Malik (1997). Genghis Khan: The History of the World-Conqueror, trans. J. A. Boyle, Manchester: Manchester University Press Kāshāni, Abol Qāsem (1964). Zobdat al-Tavārikh, ed. Mohammad Taqi, Tabriz: Tabriz University Press Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, Hasan ibn ʿAli ibn Eshāq (1960). Siyar al-Moluk (Siyāsatnāma), trans. Hubert Darke, New Haven: Yale University Press Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, Hasan ibn ʿAli ibn Eshāq (1999). Siyar al-Moluk (Siyāsatnāma), ed. Hubert Darke, Tehrān: Entesharāt-e ʿElmi va Farhangi Madelung, Wilferd (2020). Religious and Ethnic Movements in Medieval Islam. London: Routledge Maqdasi, Mohammad ibn Ahmad (2007). Ahsan al-Taqāsim fi Maʿrefat al-Aqālim, trans. ʿAlinaqi Monzavi, Tehrān: Kumesh Meisami, Julie Scott (1999). Persian Historiography to the End of the Twelfth Century, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.Melville, Charles, ed. (2012). Persian Historiography, London: I. B Tauris Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas (1939). Ed. Mohammad Taqi Bahār and Behjat Ramezāni, 2nd ed., Tehrān: Kolāla-ye Khāvar Montgomery, James, E., ed. (2004). ʿAbbāsid Studies: Occasional Papers of the School of ʿAbbāsid Studies, Leuven: Peeters

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Nafziger, George F., and Mark W. Walton (2003). Islam at War: A History, Westport, CT: Praeger Narshakhi, Mohammad ibn Jaʿfar (1984a). Tārikh-e Bokhārā, trans. Abu Nasr Ahmad ibn Mohammad ibn Nasr Qabāvi, summarized by Mohammad ibn Zafar ibn ʿOmar, ed. Modarres Razavi, Tehrān: Tus Narshakhi, Mohammad ibn Jaʿfar (1984b). Tārikh-e Bokhārā, trans. Richard N. Frye, Cambridge, MA: Medieval Academy of America Nobakhti, Abol Hasan ibn Musā (1994). Feraq al-Shiʿi, trans. Mohammad Javād Mashkur, Tehrān: Bonyād-e Farhang-e Iran Peacock, A. C. S. (2007). Mediaeval Islamic Historiography and Political Legitimacy: Balʿami’s Tarikhnamah, New York: Routledge Safā, Zabihollāh (2000). Tārikh-e Adabiyyāt-e Iran, ed. Mohammad Torābi, 3 vols., Tehrān: Qoqnus Tārikh-e Sistān (1987). Ed. Mohammad Taqi Bahār, Tehrān: Padida-ye Khāvar Young, M. J. L., J. D. Latham, and R. B. Serjeant (1990). Religion, Learning and Science in the ʿAbbasid Period, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Zarrinkub, ʿAbdol Hosseyn (1992). Tārikh-e Mardom-e Iran, Tehrān: Amir Kabir

6

The Saffārid Dynasty A Power outside the ʿAbbāsid Structure Abstract The establishment of the Saffārid dynasty, which took its structural resources not from the caliph’s approval but military power, posed a severe challenge to the legitimacy of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate and provided the prelude to greater independence for the subsequent Iranian dynasties. Yaʿqub-e Leys came to power when he had neither received a mandate from the caliph nor could rely on his genealogy to hope for the attention of the people of Sistān and other parts of Iran. Instead, Yaʿqub managed the power in Sistān’s military, including the ʿAyyārs and the Khwārejites. However, his defeat against the ʿAbbāsids in Deyr al-ʿĀqul and then his brother ʿAmr’s defeat against the Sāmānids turned the Ghaznavid rule into a local but ineffective dynasty in the region’s power structure. Keywords: Saffārid dynasty, Yaʿqub-e Leys, Sistān, ʿAyyārs

Yaʿqub, an Activist with Military Legitimacy While the Tāherids and Sāmānids, by obeying the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate, developed their power structures in Khorāsān and Mā Varā al-Nahr, some Iranian amirs, without serving the ʿAbbāsid caliph and only by relying on military force, were able to establish new dynasties in Iran. The establishment of the Saffārid dynasty was the beginning of the way for the Iranian amirs to create political structures independent of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. The Saffārid government founded its structure on military force and far from the ʿAbbāsid power framework. By questioning the caliph’s religious legitimacy, it provided the ground for the reproduction of successive Iranian local governments. The social changes brought about by the Saffārid dynasty paved the way for Iranian agents to take a different path to power from the Tāherids and Sāmānids and gradually gain a greater share of it.

Kamali, M. Social Change in Medieval Iran 132-628 AH (750-1231 AD). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2023 doi: 10.5117/9789463721981_ch06

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Unlike the rule of the Tāherids and Sāmānids, which had been formed with the ʿAbbāsid caliph’s approval, Saffārid rule was shaped in Sistān in the dust of conflicts among different rivals, none of whom had any mandate from the caliph.1 The historians’ accounts of the formation of the Saffārid government detail a number of conflicts before Yaʿqub eventually, after many years of co-operation and struggles with different amirs (such as Sāleh ibn Nazr and Derham ibn Nazr) and with a coalition of different religious and intellectual groups (namely, the Khārejites and the ʿAyyārs), was able to come to power in Sistān.2 With the independence of Khorāsān and the formation of the Tāherid dynasty, Hosseyn ibn Ebrāhim was appointed by the Tāherids as the ruler of Sistān. Hosseyn ibn Ebrāhim sent Sāleh ibn Nazr to the reign of Sistān on his behalf.3 Yaʿqub first served Sāleh ibn Nazr and then Derham ibn Nazr. He was not merely a simple military man. His ability to recruit and organize the troops frightened his commanders. According to Tārikh-e Sistān: Afterwards, when Derham saw the effects of the bravery, daring, and awe-inspiring qualities of Yaʿqub ibn Leys upon the minds of the people, he was afraid and sought the safety of his home, offering the excuse that he was sick. Yaʿqub mounted and sent a message to Derham, saying, “Come out and mount up, for he who would rule Sistān cannot claim [the excuse] of illness.” Derham ordered his army to kill Yaʿqub. But since Yaʿqub knew what was going on, it was he who took the offensive and killed many of Derham’s men while the rest took to flight. Yaʿqub captured Derham ibn Nazr, took him from his house, and put him in prison. And on Saturday, with five days remaining in the month of Moharram 247 AH [861 AD], the people of Sistān swore allegiance to Yaʿqub ibn Leys. 4

Yaʿqub, as a military activist, had unparalleled organizational power. He came to power without receiving a mandate from the caliph, nor could he rely on his lineage to attract the support of the people of Sistān or other parts of Iran. But by managing the situation, he used the structural resources hidden in Sistān to gain power.5 He also used the tool of opposition to the caliph as a significant resource to gain legitimacy among those who were 1 2 3 4 5

Yaqmāie, 1991, p. 71. Ibn Howqal, 1967, p. 156; Estakhri, 1994, p. 197; Yaqmāie, 1991, p. 112. Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939, p. 338; Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 1, p. 197. Tārikh-e Sistān, 1987, pp. 199–200; tr., 1976, p. 198. Ibn Howqal, 1967, p. 156; Estakhri, 1994, p. 197.

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against the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. This power structure gradually granted popularity to Yaʿqub along with military legitimacy. Yaʿqub, like his father, was a coppersmith, although the author of the Tārikh-e Sistān introduces Yaʿqub as the descendant of the legendary king Kiyumars6 in order to consider his rule as a reflection, albeit a dim one, of the ancient Iranian power structures. Yaʿqub proved his power in organizing the military by using the Khārejites. The Khārejites in the historical books of this period were always described as a demonic group who were constantly harassing the ʿAbbāsids and the local dynasties, particularly the Tāherids. Historians consider the Khārejites to have been a well-known force and write little about their thoughts and beliefs. The actions of Hamza-ye Azarak,7 ʿAmmār-e Khāreji (d. 251 AH/865 AD), and Abdol Rahmān Khāreji (d. 251 AH/865 AD) were the prominent examples of Khārejite rebellious activity in Khorāsān and Sistān.8 Yaʿqub deliberately took control of the Khārejite forces and used them against other local dynasties to pursue his expanding goals. Though being associated with the Khārejite troops was notorious for Yaʿqub, he used their military power to eliminate their great commanders, including ʿAmmār-e Khāreji and Abdol Rahmān-e Khāreji.9 Thus, by reproducing the Khārejites’ military power under his leadership, Yaʿqub provided the ground for their more profound suppression. This is what the ʿAbbāsids and the Tāherids had failed to accomplish. They had only been able to remove some Khāreji activists and had been unable to weaken their power structure. The Saffārid Dynasty and Challenging the Religious Legitimacy of the Caliphate After eliminating his rivals and gaining control of Sistān, Yaʿqub targeted the Tāherid territory and conquered the cities of Khorāsān, including Balkh and Harāt. According to Tārikh-e Sistān: Yaʿqub appointed Mohammad ibn Bashir to the rule of Balkh, while he marched on Harāt where ʿAbdollāh ibn Mohammad ibn Sāleh was located. However, ʿAbdollāh fled in advance of Yaʿqub’s arrival and went to Neyshābur. Yaʿqub entered Harāt, held court there, and showed concern 6 7 8 9

Tārikh-e Sistān, 1987, p. 202. Ibn Fondoq, 2011, pp. 44–45. Narshakhi, 1984, p. 108. Tārikh-e Sistān, 1987, p. 203.

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about the people, both in his words and in his actions. The people of Harāt had already been followers of Yaʿqub and were deeply attached to him.10

The historian points to the killings and the looting in Balkh by Yaʿqub and considers it a source of the popular attention he received. Emphasis on Yaʿqub’s military operations and his conversations with individuals using only the language of war signify the historian’s attention to the source of Yaʿqub’s power, i.e., military force. Unlike the Tāherids and the Sāmānids, who inherited a part of the ʿAbbāsid power structure by receiving the caliph’s mandate and without a military confrontation with the people, the Saffārid imposed themselves on the ʿAbbāsid power structure by resorting to war and violence and invading lands under the caliphate. Yaʿqub could not use the structures applied by the Tāherids and Sāmānids to found his government because the origin of his power was different. He was not like the Tāherids as the military agents in the service of the caliph, nor like the Sāmānids, who were in a geographically strategic location to serve the caliph as guards on the frontier of the Islamic world. So, he used the structure of opposition to the caliph to achieve power. The Saffārid dynasty, which was shaped by breaking through the boundaries of the caliphate structure, allowed Yaʿqub to seize as much territory as he could. He had in mind a realm as vast as the ʿAbbāsid territories. Therefore, with each victory, he planned another operation. Finally, Yaʿqub expanded his territory from Sistān to Khorāsān by capturing the Tāherid throne in Neyshābur in 259 AH/873 AD. According to Tārikh-e Sistān: The incentive for Yaʿqub’s attack upon them, his detaining and imprisoning them, occurred one day during the period when he was fighting and [was eventually] killed in Bost. On that day, incognito, Yaʿqub was in the outskirts of Bost, strolling about in the company of one of his secretaries. He entered a [ruined] house that had belonged to Sāleh ibn Nazr, but, shortly after his death had been destroyed. His secretary observed that a poem was written on the wall, and he read it and shook his head. Yaʿqub asked him about it, and he replied by translating the verse.… Whereupon the secretary recounted the story of Barmak from beginning to end, explaining the reason for the misfortune and the killing and the extirpation of their house. Then he explained the meaning of the second verse concerning the story of the Tāherids. Yaʿqub replied, “It can only be a miracle that the Almighty brought us to these ruins in order to read and understand this 10 Ibid., p. 217; tr., 1976, p. 172.

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poem, for [direct] revelation is for Prophet [alone]. This indicates that I shall be the cause of the extermination of the Tāherids and their tyranny over Muslims. Write down the poem and keep it until such time as I ask for it.”11

Although Yaʿqub built his power structure on military might, he could only hope to establish a government by gaining religious legitimacy. His success in consolidating his power structure could pave the way for other Iranian dynasties. Therefore, the attack on the Tāherids’ territory was considered a pre-determined plan in which he played only an active role. But the people of Neyshabur felt Yaʿqub had no legitimacy because of the conquest of the capital of the Tāherids, who had the caliph’s mandate. According to Tārikh-e Sistān, “Yaʿqub does not have the patent and mandate for Neyshābur from the caliph, and [besides] he is a Khārejite.”12 Yaʿqub’s historical response to the people who questioned his legitimacy was a testament to the profound social change that was taking place in Sistān under the shadow of Saffāri’s rule. Public acceptance of a government means, first and foremost, its approval by the people. The use of term the Khāreji to describe Yaʿqub showed the opposition of Neyshābur’s people to the power structure of the Saffārid and its exclusion from the caliph’s approved framework of power. Yaʿqub, who was well aware of the significance of legitimacy and the consequences of questioning it, ordered the elders (bozorgān), scholars, jurists, and heads of Neyshābur to come to him so that he could present the mandate of the caliph in his possession. Yaʿqub arranged a rigorous display of military power. He called on the slaves (gholāms) to stand in a long line and equip themselves with shields, maces, and swords taken from Mohammad ibn Tāher’s treasury. This time Yaʿqub was not a standing military man but a powerful king sitting on his throne. Upon the arrival of the elders of Neyshābur in the court, Yaʿqub called on the hājeb13 to read the covenant of Amir al-Moʾmenin to them. “The chamberlain entered, bringing with him a Yemen sword concealed in a cloth of Egyptian make. Then he … removed the sword, and placed it before Yaʿqub, who took up the sword and brandished it. Most of the notables were frightened.”14 11 Tārikh-e Sistān, 1987, pp. 220–221; tr., 1976, pp. 174–175. 12 Tārikh-e Sistān, 1987, p. 222; tr., 1976, p. 176; see also Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 1, p. 195. 13 An administrative and then military office in the pre-modern Iranian world (Bosworth and Matthee, 2012). 14 Tārikh-e Sistān, 1987, p. 222; tr., 1976, p. 176.

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Yaʿqub, who had achieved his goal of showing off his power, reassured them that he did not intend to kill them and only wanted to show them the caliph’s mandate, which was the sharp sword. “Yaʿqub replied, ‘I have not produced the sword in order to take anyone’s life. However, you complain that I don’t have the caliph’s patent. I want you to know that I have.’”15 By this act, Yaʿqub provided a more subtle definition of the legitimacy of the caliph. He referred to the ʿAbbāsid caliph with the phrase “that Amir al-Moʾmenin” to introduce himself as the other Amir al-Moʾmenin. Moreover, he considered the caliph’s legitimacy to be derived from the sword, covered in the caliphate’s sheath, and no one dared to question its nature. Yaʿqub was the f irst ruler that not only imposed his will on the structure of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate, but, by questioning the caliph’s legitimacy, strengthened the foundations of his legitimacy. Yaʿqub stated that his goal was to establish justice. This justice only made sense in the shadow of the sword. “I have risen in the name of justice for the creatures of God (Blessed and exalted is He!) and for the detention of the people of unrighteousness and perversity. If this were not so, the Almighty would not have assisted me until now. But this is no concern of yours. Take care of your own business.”16 Yaʿqub sought to restore the power of the caliph from another direction. If the ʿAbbāsids first gained religious legitimacy to gain control and then strengthened it with the sword’s influence, Yaʿqub, on the other hand, would emphasize God’s will in his numerous victories, providing religious cover for his military actions. Yaʿqub, in the end, stressed that politics should be handed over to its agents, although the provision of a luxurious court to demonstrate the legitimacy of the sword suggests his need for the public good. The burden of publicizing and hearing the adherents’ speeches is one aspect of Yaʿqub’s justice.17 To take advantage of the anti-Khārejite structural resources, after defeating the Khārejites, Yaʿqub sent Abdol Rahmān-e Khāreji’s head with the message about the fall of the Tāherid dynasty and the captivity of Mohammed ibn Tāher to Moʿtamed, the ʿAbbāsid caliph. The caliph was pleased with the death of Abdol Rahmān-e Khāreji but not with the detention of Mohammed ibn Tāher, who had the caliph’s mandate. However, Yaʿqub’s sword silenced the caliph. 15 Tārikh-e Sistān, 1987, p. 222; tr., 1976, p. 176. 16 Tārikh-e Sistān, 1987, p. 223; tr., 1976, p. 177. 17 Tārikh-e Sistān, 1987, pp. 265–266.

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Yaʿqub’s Early War with the Caliph and Weakening His Power Structure The Saffārids were not content to establish a local dynasty in Iran. Yaʿqub’s attack on Tabarestān and his battle with Hasan ibn Zeyd in 260 AH/873 AD,18 and his expedition to Fars and Khuzestān in 262 AH/875 AD,19 showed that Yaʿqub pursued higher goals. In Yaʿqub’s view, as long as the caliph ruled in Baghdad, the Saffārid power was vulnerable and could not reach the establishment stage. So, he decided to take the lead and attack Baghdad. Yaʿqub’s presence in Iran was an important chapter in the caliphate’s relations with the local dynasty. The caliph, who could not tolerate the independence of local dynasties in Iran before forming the Tāherid government, now faced Yaʿqub, an amir who considered his power outside the caliphate’s legitimacy and acted as if the caliph was his rival. Caliph Moʿtamed (r. 256–279 AH/869–892 AD), who did not have a strong military force to repel Yaʿqub, sent Yaʿqub the mandate of the rule of the conquered lands, trying to set more precise boundaries for the increasing advances of Yaʿqub. Therefore, after successive conquests of Yaʿqub in Fars and Tabarestān, the caliph sent his brother Movaffaq with the mandate of the conquered areas to Yaʿqub.20 Successive attacks by Yaʿqub on lands outside Islamic territory under the pretext of jihad and the spread of Islam raised fears and anxieties about Yaʿqub’s conquests even in the hearts of the rulers of India and other eastern lands beyond Sistān. Yaʿqub’s growing power and expansion toward Baghdad forced the envoys of various lands to see him as the addressee of their letters and did not name the caliph. According to Tārikh-e Beyhaqi: Yaʿqub remained in the army camp while envoys arrived from Torkestān, India, the Indus Valley, the Chinese Empire, Ethiopia, Byzantium, Syria, and Yemen, all with the purpose of conveying to him letters and gifts, of paying him homage and acknowledging his rule. He stayed on there until [all the envoys arrived], and he gave them letters and robes of honor and then sent them back.21

The military structure of the Saffārid government and Yaʿqub’s expansionist policies faced the ʿAbbāsid court with a severe obstacle. Therefore, Moʿtamed 18 19 20 21

Ibn Esfandiyār, 2011, vol. 1, p. 245; Āmoli, 1969, p. 91. Ibn Esfandiyār, 2011, vol. 1, p. 231. Tārikh-e Sistān, 1987, p. 228; Ibn Khallekān, 1986, vol. 2, p. 473. Tārikh-e Sistān, 1987, p. 233; tr., 1976, pp. 182–183.

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asked his brother, Movaffaq, who had been able to approach Yaʿqub and had shown his support for his decisions, to deceive him. According to Tārikh-e Sistān: Abu Ahmad al-Movaffaq became aware that such was the case and that the people of the world were attached to him because he was just and that wherever he appeared, no one rebelled against him. So, Al-Movaffaq wrote a letter to Yaʿqub, saying, “Would you be kind enough to come see me? I shall entrust the world to you, and you shall be its protector. The entire world has become subject to you, and whatever your orders, I shall carry them out. You know that I am content with the khotba, since I belong to the house of Mostafā. You continue to strengthen his religion, and you have made many holy wars in the land of the infidel. You entered India and Ceylon by way of the Indian Ocean, [you entered] the Chinese Empire, and you have attacked Torkestān and Byzantium. Infidels everywhere have seen the effect of your sword, and all those professing Islam are indebted to you. Therefore, I have given orders so that in Mecca and Medina the khotba shall be said in your name since there are so many good deeds of yours in this world, and there has been justice and prosperity under your rule, such as has been unknown since the days of Abu Bakr and ʿOmar. Now I, together with all Muslims, will support you so that by your guidance, everybody will turn back to the one [true] religion, which is the religion of Islam.”22

To deceive Yaʿqub, the ʿAbbāsid caliph referred to him as a ghāzi (warrior) and the founder of unparalleled justice. By exaggerating the extent of Yaʿqub’s actions in conquering non-Muslim lands, the caliph magnified Yaʿqub’s religious role in order to enchant Yaʿqub with special praise and by doing so disarm him. In a message of friendship, Movaffaq introduced the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate as a continuation of the tradition (sunnah) of the Prophet Mohammad in order to restrict the ʿAbbāsid power to religious legitimacy and implicitly refer to Yaʿqub’s military might. He urged Yaʿqub to stop attacking Baghdad and be content to visit the caliph. But Yaʿqub, determined to fight with the caliph, eventually conducted a campaign against him, which led to his loss at Dayr-e al-ʿĀqul in 264 AH/878 AD.23 Although Yaʿqub never gave up his 22 Tārikh-e Sistān, 1987, p. 231; tr., 1976, p. 183. 23 Tārikh-e Sistān, 1987, pp. 231–232; Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, 1999, pp. 21–22; Ibn Khallekān, 1986, vol. 2, pp. 279–280.

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desire to capture Baghdad, his defeat and early death in 265 AH/879 AD brought the structure of the Saffārids’ power to the brink of collapse.24 It is as if Yaʿqub never considered that he could be defeated by the caliph and had made no contingency plans. Failure of the Saffārid Structure While he had not consolidated his power infrastructure, Yaʿqub’s invasion of Baghdad brought the Saffārids to an early decline. Khwāja Nezām al-Molk describes the caliph’s power as a continuation of the Prophet’s power, and by emphasizing the verse “Obey God and obey the Messenger and obey the commandments,”25 considers Yaʿqub’s refusal to obey the caliph’s rule equal to his apostasy.26 Caliph Moʿtamed, who defeated Yaʿqub by using deception, cursed Yaʿqub’s brother and successor, ʿAmr (r. 265–287 AH/987–999 AD) in his khotbas and asked the pilgrims of Khorāsān and Mā Varā al-Nahr to disobey him.27 This is the first time historians have written about the caliphs’ use of the hajj structure against a local government. As a gathering place for Muslims, hajj rituals had a robust structure that the ʿAbbāsid caliphs, aware of their functions and structural resources, used to maintain and strengthen their caliphate. Yaʿqub’s power structure was built through military force, and his brother ʿAmr inherited opposition to the caliph along with the lands he had conquered. The caliph, who was not yet sure of ʿAmr’s specific goals, sent the mandate of the conquered lands to ʿAmr to prevent further conflict.28 The origin of the Saffārids’ power and Yaʿqub’s efforts to conquer Baghdad prompted the caliph to weaken the Saffārids as much as possible. Moʿtazed, the new ʿAbbāsid caliph (r. 256–279 AH/870–892 AD), began a new chapter of relations with the Saffārids. Moʿtazed knew that the Saffārids could always question the legitimacy of the caliphate, therefore, by creating seemingly good relations with ʿAmr and sending him the mandate,29 he tried to push the power of the Safavids in a different direction. ʿAmr’s unplanned campaigns and the caliph’s opposition to him were important obstacles to establishing the Saffārid power. ʿAmr, trying to 24 Tārikh-e Sistān, 1987, p. 233. 25 «‫ »اطیعوا الله و اطیعو الرسول واولی االمر منکم‬Qorʾān, al-Nesaʿ, 59. 26 Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, 1999, p. 22. 27 Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939, p. 366. 28 Tabari, 1967, vol. 11, p. 225. 29 Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939, p. 367; Joveyni, 2006, vol. 1, p. 200.

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take advantage of the caliph’s concern for the power of the ʿAlawites of Tabarestān, the ʿAbbāsids’ new rival, demanded the caliph hand over to him the mandate of Mā Varā al-Nahr. Instead, he pledged to suppress the ʿAlawites in Tabarestān. According to Tārikh-e Sistān, he said, “If with your consent I am given this position, I shall expel ʿAlawites from Tabarestān; but if it is not given to me, I will have no choice except to exterminate Ismāʿil ibn Ahmad.”30 At that time, Mā Varā al-Nahr was under the control of the Sāmānids, who had the caliph’s mandate and ruled the region for many years. Accordingly, the Sāmānid power structure was more acceptable to the caliph than the Saffārid. But the caliph, who did not want to turn his relations with them into animosity, apparently agreed with ʿAmr: The caliph lowered his head for a while, then he raised it and said, “Answer ʿAmr’s letter by granting his request, for I know that it will bring about his destruction. Also, write a letter to Ismāʿil ibn Ahmad, saying: “I have not curtailed your authority [by my action], and that is all [there is to be said about it].”31

ʿAmr’s invasion of the Sāmānid realm in 287 AH/900 AD and the caliph’s implicit support for Ismāʿil, the Sāmānid ruler,32 paved the way for the decline of the Saffārid government. After this failure until the rise of the Ghaznavid dynasty, which ultimately led to the collapse of the Saffārids in 393 AH/1003 AD, the Saffārid rule became a local government but ineffective within the region’s power structure.33 Yaʿqub’s early death and ʿAmr’s lack of success made it very difficult for society to accept Yaʿqub’s military authority. The fact that Ismāʿil considered the Saffārid government to be run by the descendants of coppersmiths and humiliated them34 indicates that the power of the Saffārids did not pass through the actions of successful agents to create stable structures and remained incomplete. With the defeat of ʿAmr and his death in Baghdad,35 the Saffārids turned to a local dynasty in Sistān, but Yaʿqub’s efforts to influence the power structure of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate and move to the threshold of Baghdad paved the way for other local dynasties, especially the Buyids. 30 31 32 33 34 35

Tārikh-e Sistān, 1987, p. 254; tr., 1976, p. 202. Tārikh-e Sistān, 1987, p. 255; tr., 1976, p. 202. Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, 1999, p. 24. Narshakhi, 1984, p. 127; Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, 1999, p. 27. Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, 1999, p. 28. Tārikh-e Sistān, 1987, p. 262; Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939, p. 370.

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Bibliography Āmoli, Oliyāollāh (1969). Tārikh-e Ruyān, ed. Manuchehr Sotuda, Tehrān: Bonyād-e Farhang-e Iran Bosworth, C. E., and R. Matthee (2012, December 15). “Ḥājeb,” in Encyclopædia Iranica, https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/hajeb Estakhri, Ebrāhim ibn Mohammad (1994). Masālek va Mamālek, trans. Mohammad ibn Asʿad-e Tostari, ed. Iraj Afshār, Tehrān: Bonyād-e Moqufāt-e Mahmud-e Afshār Ibn Esfandiyār, Bahā al-Din Mohammad ibn Hasan (2011). Tārikh-e Tabarestān, ed. ʿAbbāss Eqbāl, 2 vols., Tehrān: Kolāla-ye Khāvar Ibn Fondoq, ʿAli ibn Zeyd Beyhaqi (2011). Tārikh-e Beyhaq, ed. Ahmad Bahmanyār, Tehrān: Asātir Ibn Howqal, Mohammad (1967). Surat al-Arz, trans. Jaʿfar Shoʿār, 2 vols., Tehrān: Bonyād-e Farhang-e Iran Ibn Khallekān, Ahmad ibn Mohammad (1986). Vafiyāt al-Aʿyān va Anbāʾ-e Abnāʾ-e al-Zamān, ed. Ehsān ʿAbbās, 8 vols., Qom: Manshurāt al-Sharif al-Rāzi Joveyni, Atā Malek (2006). Tārikh-e Jahān-goshā, ed. Mohammad Qazvini, 3 vols., Tehrān: Donyā-ye Ketāb Jowzjāni, Menhāj al-Serāj (1984). Tabaqāt-e Nāseri, ed. ʿAbdol Hayy-e Habibi, 2 vols., Tehrān: Donyā-ye Ketāb Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, Hasan ibn ʿAli ibn Eshāq (1999). Siyar al-Moluk (Siyāsatnāma), ed. Hubert Darke, Tehrān: Entesharāt-e ʿElmi va Farhangi Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas (1939). Ed. Mohammad Taqi Bahār and Behjat Ramezāni, 2nd ed., Tehrān: Kolāla-ye Khāvar Narshakhi, Mohammad ibn Jaʿfar (1984a). Tārikh-e Bokhārā, trans. Abu Nasr Ahmad ibn Mohammad ibn Nasr Qabāvi, summarized by Mohammad ibn Zafar ibn ʿOmar, ed. Modarres Razavi, Tehrān: Tus Tabari, Mohammad ibn Jarir (1967). Tārikh-e Tabari, ed. Abol Fazl Ebrāhim, 11 vols., Beirut: Dar al-Torās Tārikh-e Sistān (1976). Trans. Milton Gold, Roma: Instituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente Tārikh-e Sistān (1987). Ed. Mohammad Taqi Bahār, Tehrān: Padida-ye Khāvar Yaqmāie, Hasan (1991). Tārikh-e Dowlat-e Saffāriyān, Tehrān: Donyā-ye Ketāb

7

The ʿAlawites of Tabarestān, the First Shiʿite Dynasty in Iran Abstract The Shiʿites, who had long struggled to gain power, finally achieved their goal in Tabarestān. With the support of the ʿAlawites and the structural resources of Shiʿism, the first Islamic rule was established in Tabarestān. The people of Tabarestān invited Hasan ibn Zeyd, one of the ʿAlawites who was hiding in Ray, to take the lead in this uprising. Hasan ibn Zeyd used the title of the dāʿie to reproduce the social structure of the daʿva in northern Iran. Although the ʿAlawites fought against other local dynasties, their main force was exhausted in the dispute with the Deylami soldiers. The Deylamites, a large military force in Tabarestān which had played a significant role in the establishment of the ʿAlawites, opposed the structure of the ʿAlawites’ power and even cooperated with regional powers in eliminating the ʿAlawites. Keywords: ʿAlawites, Tabarestān, Hasan ibn Zeyd, dāʿie, Deylamites

The Presence of Shiʿite Agents in the Iranian Structure of Tabarestān The Shiʿites, who had endured a long history of conflict in their struggle to achieve power in the region, finally succeeded in Tabarestān. The formation of the ʿAlawite government of Tabarestān (250–316 AH/864–928 AD) was the Shiʿites’ response to the question posed by the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate (and that had never been answered). The ʿAbbāsids, who had come to power with the use of Shiʿite structures and on the pretext of protecting their active agents, including Yahyā ibn Zeyd (d. 125 AH/742 AD), now faced a government based on the same structure and in a territory far from the ʿAbbāsids’ reach. This increased their worry.

Kamali, M. Social Change in Medieval Iran 132-628 AH (750-1231 AD). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2023 doi: 10.5117/9789463721981_ch07

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The presence of Muslims in Tabarestān in the first century of Islam seemed unlikely to achieve due to natural obstacles. 1 The writings of historians show that Zoroastrianism had deep roots in this land, and the people of this region refused to convert to Islam even though it had been spreading into many other parts of Iran for more than two centuries. The Iranian religion had influenced Islam in these lands. Gardizi refers to the people of Tabarestān as “mortad [apostates],” which indicates the presence of Islam in this land.2 Once people converted any apostasy would be in relation to their former religious beliefs. The coming together of different faiths provided many structural capacities for social change in Tabarestān. The spread of Islam in Tabarestān by the ʿAlawites and the formation of the first ʿAlawite dynasty in this region revealed profound signs of these social changes. The presence of the people was significant in the historical events of the Tabarestān region. The persistence of the Tabarestān people to hold on to Zoroastrianism during the Umayyad Caliphate showed their deep belief in this religion and their strong resistance to the forced acceptance of Islam in different periods of the Umayyad invasion of Tabarestān. For example, during the second period of the Arab invasion of the lands of Tabarestān and Gorgān, which took place in the time of Soleymān ibn ʿAbdol Malek (d. 99 AH/717 AD), led by Yazid ibn Mohallab,3 the people of Tabarestān resisted strongly against the Arabs. Despite the extraordinary violence of Yazid and his massacre, which eventually led to the taking and selling of 6,000 slaves from Gorgān, the people of this region remained loyal to the Zoroastrianism. Gardizi writes: Yazid ibn Mohallab went from Gorgān to Marv in 78 AH [697 AD] through Nesā … and conquered Gorgān [and converted them to Islam]. After he returned [home], the people of Gorgān committed apostasy. So Yazid ibn Mohallab gathered another army and went to Gorgān. The people of Gorgān fled into the mountains, and Yazid entered the mountains after them, killed 12,000 of them, and swore that he would not leave until he could run enough Gorgān blood through a mill to grind it into flour, bake bread from it, and eat it. The people were killed and their blood spilled 1 Ibn Esfandiyār, 2011, vol. 1, p. 74; Hodud al-ʿĀlam, 1983, p. 144; to learn further about the geographical status of Tabarestān, see Yaʿqubi, 1992, vol. 1, p. 52; Hodud al-ʿĀlam, 1983, pp. 144–146; Ibn Tabātabā, 1993, pp. 217. 2 Gardizi, 1984, p. 251. 3 Abol Faraj Esfahāni, 1990, p. 451; Āmoli, 1969, pp. 43, 63.

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[and they still did not relent], so Yazid was told. He ordered water to be added [to the blood], and they rotated the mill and ground the wheat, and they baked bread from the flour so that he could eat it, and he fulfilled his oath. Then he took 6,000 people from Gorgān and sold them into slavery.4

ʿAbbāsids in different periods, especially Mansur, tried hard to infiltrate Tabarestān,5 but the people of Tabarestān resisted the power of the ʿAbbāsid caliphs.6 Their dependent dynasties, including the Tāherids, refused to accept Islam despite the caliph’s use of force.7 It was only with the arrival of the ʿAlawites that Islamic structures took root in this region. With the ʿAlawites and the structural resources of Shiʿism, the first Islamic rule was established in Tabarestān. The people of Tabarestān, who had resisted Islam for many years, gradually embraced the ʿAlawite intellectual and practical structures. Therefore, an essential chapter of social change began in Tabarestān. The ʿAlawites were already familiar with Tabarestān and its structural resources and used them to create an ʿAlawite dynasty. The influence of Yahyā ibn ʿAbdollāh in Tabarestān during the reign of Hārun al-Rashid, the ʿAbbāsid caliph, was suppressed by Fazl-e Barmaki under a peace treaty in 170 AH/786 AD8 and showed the capacity of this region as a source for shaping a Shiʿite power structure. The assassination of ʿAli ibn Musā al-Rezā confirmed for the ʿAlawites that the ʿAbbāsids would never share power with them; therefore, they took shelter in the lands that were relatively out of reach of the ʿAbbāsids and their dependent local dynasties, including the Tāherids and the Sāmānids. The time of the ʿAlawites in Tabarestān was in the time of Maʾmun and after the death of ʿAli ibn Musā al-Rezā. According to Ibn Esfandiyār: When the news of the trick they performed with Reza reached the Sādāt, wherever they were, they took refuge in the mountains of Deylam, Tabarestān, and Ray. Some were martyred here, whose tombs remain, and some left their homeland until the time of Caliph Motavakkel, whose oppression of the Sādāt was harsh. They fled and settled in the mountains, in Tabarestān, and in the neighboring forests.9 4 Gardizi, 1984, p. 251. 5 Yaʿqubi, 1992, vol. p. 14; Marʿashi, 1976, p. 63; Ibn Tabātabā, 1993, pp. 217–219; Bayāt, 1992, p. 115. 6 Ibn Esfandiyār, 2011, vol. 1, p. 277. 7 To learn further about the ʿAlawite revolts after Maʾmun, see Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939, p. 363. 8 Hamza Esfahāni, 2007, p. 312; Ibn Tabātabā, 1993, p. 219. 9 Ibn Esfandiyār, 2011, vol. 1, p. 227.

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From the rule of Maʾmun onwards, the ʿAlawite Sādāt began to move from Hejāz, Syria, and Iraq to Tabarestān.10 At this time in history, Shiʿites realized that by forming a Shiʿite government in a territory other than the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate, they would gradually strengthen their power structures; therefore, they would be able to fight the caliphs with more force. The daʿva of the people of Tabarestān’s to the ʿAlawites to take power was an essential social change in this region of Iran. For decades, people had demonstrated their resistance against Islam’s influence in this region. Now they were looking for someone among the Muslims to establish an Islamic political structure in Tabarestān. The need of the people of Tabarestān to do this, apart from their knowledge of the ʿAlawites, was the cruelty of the Tāherid governor, Mohammed ibn ʾUs, who was appointed by Mohammad ibn Tāher ibn ʿAbdollāh (r. 245–258 AH/859–871 AD) to rule in Tabarestān and Ruyān. By exerting economic pressure on the people and increasing taxes, he brought the people of Tabarestān to the brink of a critical choice.11 That is why the people of Tabarestān invited Hasan ibn Zeyd, one of the ʿAlawites who was hiding in Ray, to take the lead in this uprising: We are exhausted by the oppression of this community [the ʿAbbāsids]. Islam and the true faith are with you. We want to appoint a seyyed from the family of Mohammad (peace be upon him) as our ruler to enforce justice and follow the tradition of Mohammad (peace be upon him). What if we pledge allegiance to you so that this oppression may be removed from us with your blessing?12

Hasan ibn Zeyd (r. 250–270 AH/865–884 AD), a great Shiʿite scholar and jurist ( faqih),13 responded positively to this invitation and went to Tabarestān. With the help of the people of Tabarestān, in 250 AH/865 AD, he defeated Mohammed ibn ʾUs, the Tāherid governor, and established the ʿAlawite Zeydi dynasty in Gilān, Deylam, Tabarestān, and part of Khorāsān.14 Hasan ibn Zeyd, by appointing new agents, established a new power structure in Tabarestān. Hasan ibn Zeyd used violence to dominate the region. Ibn Esfadniyār writes: “Hasan ibn Zeyd used to punish and rebuke any creature who supported the Mosavvadin [ʿAbbāsids] so that the hearts 10 11 12 13 14

Rabino and Māz̲ andarānī, 1958, p. 131. Tabari, 1967, vol. 7, p. 431. Āmoli, 1969, p. 87. Ibn Nadim, 2002, p. 274; Ibn Esfandiyār, 2011, vol. 1, p. 228. Tabari, 1967, vol. 7, pp. 431–432; Masʿudi, 1991, vol. 4, p. 153.

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of the people became so frightened that there was nothing left but obedience and consent.”15 His violent behavior was reminiscent of the Umayyad and ʿAbbāsid violence in the region. Thus, the first Shiʿite government in Iran was shaped by Zeydi ʿAlawites in Tabarestān. Zeydi was a Shiʿite sect that, after Imam Hasan and Imam Hosseyn, believed in Zeyd ibn ʿAli ibn Hosseyn as the next imam, and held that the subsequent imams were just the leaders of Shiʿite theology. In their view, Zeyd ibn ʿAli believed in the imamate of his father, brother, and nephew and did not claim to be the next imam. Instead, he revolted with their consent and with the motive of taking revenge on Hosseyn, the Shiʿite third imam, and then handing over the power to another ʿAlawite imam. Although Zeydi scholars believed in Zeyd’s practice (Sire-ye ʿAmali), they were influenced by the Moʿtazelites in terms of intellectual beliefs and Abu Hanifa’s school in jurisprudence. Their emphasis on rising with the sword and the armed movement separated them from the Imami Shiʿite (the Twelvers). The presence of the people of Tabarestān on the scene of social change was manifested by inviting Hasan ibn Zeyd, the founder of the ʿAlawite dynasty, and supporting him in forming the government. The uprising of the people of Tabarestān stemmed from economic obstacles and the caliph’s agent’s oppression in collecting taxes and did not necessarily have religious or ideological causes. Thus, due to economic pressure, the opposition’s structural resources overshadowed other reasons and shaped a Shiʿite dynasty in Iran. Development of the Shiʿite Structures by ʿAlawite Agents The daʿva (invitation) structure previously reproduced by the ʿAbbāsid caliphs to fight the Umayyads was now reproduced by the ʿAlawites as a powerful resource for spreading Islam in the Tabarestān region and fighting the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. Hasan ibn Zeyd used the title of the dāʿie to reproduce the social structure of the daʿva in northern Iran. The founder of the ʿAlawites in Tabarastān was nicknamed “Dāʿie-ye-Kabir, Dāʿie-ye elal-Haq” or “the first dāʿie” (Dāʿie al-Awwal) and proved the effectiveness of the structural capacity of the daʿva. The ʿAlawite dāʿies established the first Shiʿite dynasty in Tabarestān that belonged to the people with a strong belief in Zoroastrianism. The understanding of Islam held by the people of Tabarestān was different from 15 Ibn Esfandiyār, 2011, vol. 1, p. 242.

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the knowledge of the people of other regions of Iran, who were familiar with Islam from a context different from the ʿAlawites. The ʿAlawites of Tabarestān can be considered the f irst Shiʿite jurists who established a government. It was at a time when the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate considered itself the jurisprudential authority of the Islamic world. The rise of the f irst Shiʿite jurisprudential rule in Iran led to many social changes in this context. When Hasan ibn Zeyd’s authority increased, he issued a proclamation (fatwā) to all areas of Tabarestān to say Be Esm-e Allāh (In the Name of Allāh) when saying prayers in a loud voice. He was the first Shiʿite ruler in Iran to issue a government proclamation on performing religious rites. The dāiʿes of Tabarestān also attached great importance to the tombs of the imams. According to Ibn Tāvus, Hasan ibn Zeyd was the first person to build a wall for the shrine of Imam ʿAli and he repaired the shrine.16 Most historians who narrate the movement of the ʿAlawites in Tabarestān have attributed the conversion of the Deylami Muslims from Zoroastrianism to Islam due to Hasan ibn ʿAli Otrush Nāser-e Kabir’s persistent efforts (230–304 AH/845–917 AD). By resorting to the daʿva structure, he propagated Islam in various parts of northern Iran, especially Tabarestān. He accomplished what the Umayyad and ʿAbbāsid caliphs had failed to do without bloodshed.17 Since the ʿAlawites, like the ʿAbbāsids, claimed the caliphate, their power structures are comparable. The ʿAbbāsid had gained power by relying on the Shiʿite structures. It was vital for various movements, including the movement of the people of Tabarestān, who opposed the ʿAbbāsids. These movements sought leaders to legitimize their opposition and struggle against the ʿAbbāsids under their auspices. Although this issue provided the ground for the influence of the ʿAlawites in Tabarestān in the short term, it further damaged their power structure in this region. Deylami Military Men and Opposition to ʿAlawite Agents One of the serious challenges for the ʿAlawite dynasty dealt with other Iranian dynasties. The Tāherids and Sāmānids, dependent on the caliphate structure, went through a long history of wars and conflicts with the ʿAlawites. Even other Iranian dynasties, especially the Saffārids and the

16 Nurollāh Shushtari, 1997, p. 206. 17 Marʿashi, 1976, p. 145.

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Ziyārids, which were separated from the caliphate structure, agreed with other Iranian governments on attacking Tabarestān.18 Although the ʿAlawites went through many ups and downs in the war against other local dynasties, their main force was exhausted in the dispute with the Deylami army. The Deylamites, who had formed a large military force in Tabarestān and had played a significant role in the establishment of the ʿAlawites, opposed the structure of the ʿAlawite power and even cooperated with the regional powers in eliminating the ʿAlawites.19 For the Deylamites who demanded a significant share of power for themselves, the ʿAlawite jurisprudential power and their recourse to religious rule were not acceptable. To eliminate the ʿAlawites, the Deylamites needed excuses other than their military supremacy, mainly because the ʿAlawites had gained popularity in Tabarestān and other cities in the southern parts of the Māzandarān Sea. Thus, the Deylamites questioned them using the resources of the ʿAlawite power structure that lay in the Shiʿite religion. Khwāja Nezām al-Molk writes: Then it happened that the Deylamites revolted against the ʿAlawites of Tabarestān, saying, “You say that yours is [the true] religion, but Muslims keep writing to us from surrounding places telling us not to listen to your words because they are heresy. Your argument is that true knowledge has gone from our tribe. But knowledge is common property; it does not go away. If you learn, you know; whoever learns knows. Knowledge is not inherited. God (to him be power and glory) sent the Prophet (upon him be peace) to all mankind alike. He did not distinguish some people as noble, and others as common, for them to say that His commands are this for the nobility, or that for the commoner. So, it is clear to us that you are liars.20

The ʿAlawites defined themselves as the Sādāt and from the family of the Prophet and ʿAli. They believed that they had particular knowledge that distinguished them from the rest of the Muslim community. The Deylamite military questioned the ʿAlawite beliefs and they considered knowledge of any kind to be not just the legacy of the Prophet and the imams but acquired knowledge available to all. Accordingly, there was no difference between the ʿAlawites and the others. Even the Deylamites went so far as to 18 Ibn Esfandiyār, 2011, vol. 1, p. 242; Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 1, p. 206; Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. 7, p. 362; Marʿashi, 1976, p. 131; Ibn Khaldun, 2010, vol. 3, p. 309. 19 Ibn Esfandiyār, 2011, vol. 1, p. 247. 20 Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, 1999, p. 286; tr., 1960, p. 217.

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portray the ʿAlawites as lying people because of the belief of the ʿAlawites in their superiority over others. Disagreements between ʿAlawite rivals strengthened the forces of the Deylamite and Gili chiefs. Therefore, the conditions were ready for the rise of commanders and independent amirs like Makān ibn Kāki, Asfār ibn Shiruya, and Mardāvij, who once served the ʿAlawites. It should not be overlooked that it was easier for the ʿAbbāsid caliph to accept the Deylamites, who were satisfied with a share of power, than with the ʿAlawites, who questioned the ʿAbbāsid legitimacy and considered themselves worthy of the caliphate. Eventually, the ʿAlawites of Tabarestān were suppressed not by the caliphs or the Sunni Iranian local dynasties of the Tāherids and Sāmānids but by the Shiʿite Buyids.21 Thus, an essential chapter of the rivalry between the two major powers, namely the ʿAlawites of Tabarestān and the forces of Deylam, finally ended with the supremacy of the Deylamites.22

Bibliography Abol Faraj Esfahāni, ʿAli ibn Hosseyn (1990). Al-Aqāni, Beirut: Dār al-Ehyāʾ-e al-Torās al-ʿArabi Āmoli, Oliyāollāh (1969). Tārikh-e Ruyān, ed. Manuchehr Sotuda, Tehrān: Bonyād-e Farhang-e Iran Bayāt, ʿAzizollāh (1992). Tārikh-e Iran az Zohur-e Islam ta Diyālama, Tehrān: Daneshgah-e Melli Fuess, Albrecht, and Jan-Peter Hartung, eds. (2011). Court Cultures in the Muslim World, Seventh to Nineteenth Centuries, New York: Routledge Gardizi, Abu Saʿid ʿAbdol Hayy ibn Zahhāk (1984). Zeyn al-Akhbār, ed. ʿAbdol Hayy Habibi, Tehrān: Donyā-ye Ketāb Hamza Esfahāni, Ibn Hasan (2007). Tārikh-e Pādeshāhān va Peyāmbarān, trans. Jaʿfar Shoʿār, Tehrān: Sāzmand Hodud al-ʿĀlam men al-Mashreq ela al-Maqreb (1983). Ed. Manuchehr Sotuda, Tehrān: Tahuri Ibn Asir, ʿAli ibn Mohammad (1965). Al-Kāmel fi al-Tārikh, 13 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Sāder 21 Ibn Esfandiyār, 2011, vol. 1, p. 300. 22 The interference of the military men in the country’s affairs and their presence in the people’s daily lives forced dāʿie Hasan Qāsem to at least separate the place where the military lived from the ordinary people. The presence of the army and the people, rather than guaranteeing the security of the people, caused insecurity in the region due to the military’s excessive demands (Ibn Esfandiyār, 2011, vol. 1, pp. 276–277).

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Ibn Esfandiyār, Bahā al-Din Mohammad ibn Hasan (2011). Tārikh-e Tabarestān, ed. ʿAbbāss Eqbāl, 2 vols., Tehrān: Kolāla-ye Khāvar Ibn Khaldun, ʿAbdol Rahmān ibn Mohammadi (2010). Tārikh-e Ibn Khaldun, trans. ʿAbdol Mohammad Āyati, 6 vols., Tehrān: Pajouheshgāh-e ʿOlum Ensāni va Motāleʿāt-e Farhangi Ibn Khallekān, Ahmad ibn Mohammad (1986). Vafiyāt al-Aʿyān va Anbāʾ-e Abnāʾ-e al-Zamān, ed. Ehsān ʿAbbās, 8 vols., Qom: Manshurāt al-Sharif al-Rāzi Ibn Nadim, Eshāq Ibn Mohammad (2002). Al-Fehrest, Tehrān: Asātir Ibn Qotayba Dinevari, ʿAbdollāh ibn Moslem (2001). Emāmat va Siyāsat dar Tārikh-e Kholafāʾ, trans. Nāser Tabātabāie, Tehrān: Qoqnus Ibn Tabātabā, Abu Esmāʿiel Ebrāhim ibn Nāser (1993). Mohājerān-e Āl-e Abu Tāleb, trans. Mohammad Reza ʿAtāʾie, Mashhad: Āstān-e Qods Jowzjāni, Menhāj al-Serāj (1984). Tabaqāt-e Nāseri, ed. ʿAbdol Hayy-e Habibi, 2 vols., Tehrān: Donyā-ye Ketāb Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, Hasan ibn ʿAli ibn Eshāq (1960). Siyar al-Moluk (Siyāsatnāma), trans. Hubert Darke, New Haven: Yale University Press Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, Hasan ibn ʿAli ibn Eshāq (1999). Siyar al-Moluk (Siyāsatnāma), ed. Hubert Darke, Tehrān: Entesharāt-e ʿElmi va Farhangi Marʿashi, Seyyed Zahir al-Din (1976). Tārikh-e Tabarestān-e Ruyān va Māzandarān, ed. Mohammad Tasbihi, Tehrān: Sharq Masʿudi, ʿAli ibn Hosseyn (1970). Al-Tanbih va al-Eshrāf, trans. Abol Qāsem Pāyande, Tehrān: Bongāh-e Nashr va Tarjoma-ye Ketāb Masʿudi, ʿAli ibn Hosseyn (1991). Moruj al-Zahab, trans. Abol Qāsem Pāyanda, 4 vols., Tehrān: ʿElmi va Farhangi Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas (1939). Ed. Mohammad Taqi Bahār and Behjat Ramezāni, 2nd ed., Tehrān: Kolāla-ye Khāvar Nurollāh Shushtari, Qāzi Nurollāh (1997). Majāles al-Moʾmenin, 2 vols., Tehrān: Enteshārāt-e Eslāmiya Qomi, Shaykh ʿAbbās (2010). Tatemmat al-Montahā: Vaqāyeʿ-e Ayyām-e Kholafā, trans. Qolām Hosseyn Ansāri, Tehrān: Sherkat va Nashr-e Beinol Melal Rabino, H. L., and Vaḥīd Māz̲ andarānī (1958). Māzandarān and Astarabad, trans. Vaḥīd Māz̲ andarānī, Tehran: Bongāhe Tarjuma va Nashre Ketāb Tabari, Mohammad ibn Jarir (1967). Tārikh-e Tabari, ed. Abol Fazl Ebrāhim, 11 vols., Beirut: Dar al-Torās Yaʿqubi, Ahmad ibn Eshāq (1992). Tārikh-e Yaʿqubi, trans. Ebrāhim Āyati, 2 vols., Tehrān: ʿElmi va Farhangi

8

The Buyid Dynasty A Turning Point in Iran’s Social Change Abstract The combination of the strength of Iranian military men and the religious legitimacy of the ʿAlawites provided the necessary push to enable the Buyids to enter the power structure in Iran. Aware of the conflicts between the Sunni ʿAbbāsids and the Shiʿite Fatimids, the Buyids shifted social change from Iran to Baghdad by conquering Baghdad. This social change brought together Iranian and Shiʿite agents and minimized the ʿAbbāsids’ share of power. The Buyids adopted a tolerant policy toward other sects and religions. Their dependence on the Deylami army forced them to reproduce the eqtāʿ (land grant) system in order to pay the solders. In the end, the creation of a split between the Deylami soldiers and the Buyid amirs led to the decline of the Buyid dynasty. Keywords: Buyid dynasty, Deylamis, Shiʿites, eqtāʿ

The rise of the Buyids at a particular point in Iran’s history gave the structure of this government a great deal of potential for social change. The rule of the Buyids was shaped during the time that the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate had changed from being a dominant structure in the Islamic world to being a limited power in Baghdad and in the surrounding towns. Only a few local dynasties in Iran, including the Sāmānids, still valued the caliph’s mandate and based their structure’s legitimacy on the caliph’s approval. Amir al-ʾOmarā of Baghdad, who was of Turkish descent, played a crucial role in the caliph’s death and life as the most remarkable figure in the Islamic world. At the same time, the rise of local dynasties, including the Ziyārids, was shaped outside the caliphate’s framework. Even their founders thought of dominating Baghdad, which posed a great challenge to the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. This was because the

Kamali, M. Social Change in Medieval Iran 132-628 AH (750-1231 AD). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2023 doi: 10.5117/9789463721981_ch08

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ʿAbbāsid caliph had the Fatimid Caliphate as its main rival, which, unlike many local dynasties, was not content with the established division of power with the ʿAbbāsid caliph. The Fatimids def ined a new legitimacy that endangered the resources of the ʿAbbāsid power. The Buyids, whose power was derived from the military might of the Deylamites, succeeded in establishing a government in Iran using historical conditions, but their social changes influenced the course of post-Buyid dynasties, namely the Saljuqs. Although the Buyids made critical social changes in the history of medieval Iran, the lack of historical sources in Persian about this dynasty has prevented us from addressing all the social changes that took place during this period. Therefore, we have used the available Arabic sources to address some of the social changes made under the Buyids, in addition to the Persian accounts. The Formation of the Buyid Dynasty in Conjunction with Military Agents and Religious Structures The extent of social change in the Buyid dynasty on religious and military grounds makes it possible to study this period’s social changes with an approach based on two factors: religion and military power. The intertwining of the two components of religion and military power is so great that it is inevitable that the two factors must be dialectically put together and that no precise line can be drawn between the two. On the threshold of the Buyid rise to power, Iran assumed a special religious status and composition that overshadowed all the region’s social changes. The ʿAbbāsid Caliphate, which had adopted a strict policy against divergent views, such as those of the Moʿtazelites,1 since the time of Motavakkel (r. 232–247 AH/846–862 AD), the Shiʿites provided the foundation for these thought currents to move to neighboring lands, including Iran.2 The mechanism of ideology in Islamic rule silenced any call that seemed to be against the official religious system.3

1 To learn further about the Moʿtazelis, see Ashʿari, 1963, vol. 1, pp. 260–270; Al-Neshār, 1972, p. 91; Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939, pp. 359–361; Tārikh-e Sistān, 1987, p. 192. 2 He considered the revival of Moʿtazilite-Shiʿite against the shariʿa currents of the Hanbalis and the Hādithists. The Moʿtazelites in Iraq, Fars, Jabal, Khuzestān, Ray, and Tabarestān developed and promoted their religion, and even some of the bureaucrats of the Buyids, such as Sahib Ibn ʿEbād, had Moʿtazilite tendencies (Madelung, 2020, p. 109). 3 Masʿudi, 1991, vol. 4, p. 3.

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The migration of opposition forces to find breathing space, eliminating the existing religious monopoly over the surrounding lands, and synchronizing the military forces with these movements, gradually provided the resources to create new structures of power. As a result, the Deylamite military, which was able to realize this potentially powerful structure to its rise to power and recruit its activists, quickly and safely reached the path of achieving power. The power structures of the Ziyārids and the Buyids were based on this ground. The structure of the Buyid dynasty, on the one hand, was the reproduction of the Saffārids’ power, which, relying on military force and disregard for the caliph’s approval, took its first steps toward power. In the time of Yaʿqub, the Saffārid ruler, the caliph, by using his prudence and religious legitimacy, thwarted Yaʿqub, who had relied on the sword. But this time, the Buyids came to use the ʿAbbāsid caliph’s weakness to conclude Yaʿqub’s unsuccessful attempt. The ʿAlawites, whose years of struggle had led to the establishment of their local dynasty in Tabarestān, could stand firm against the regional powers of the Tāherids, the Sāmānids, the Saffārids, and the Ziyārids with the resources of the Deylamites’ military power. However, now the Deylamites, who considered themselves descended from the pre-Islamic Iranian amirs, were to take full advantage of the ʿAlawites’ power resources to establish their independent dynasty. Therefore, relying on the structure of Shiʿite power, they announced that they, like the ʿAlawites and the Sādāt, deserved to gain power. This move was a new approach to the creation of a religious power structure. At this time, Shiʿite scholars and jurists created new structural resources through their jurisprudential knowledge and activities. As the founders of the ʿAlawites of Tabarestān, the Shiʿite jurists strengthened their intellectual capacity by rebuilding and creating their social structures. The rule of the Buyids provided the environment for this historic opportunity. The presence of Shiʿite scholars alongside the Deylamite amirs as government advisers and supplicants to the amir created a new circle of social change. The combination of the strength of Iranian military men and the religious legitimacy of the ʿAlawites provided the necessary push to enable the Buyids to enter the power structure. It might be hard to believe that the ʿAbbāsids, who had formerly controlled local dynasties, unwittingly prepared the conditions for establishing a Shiʿa dynasty in the heart of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate in Baghdad. More strangely, the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate maintained its power structure by relying on the power of the same Shiʿites and Iranian princes against whom it had fought for years.

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The Buyid Actors and Benefiting from the Military Power of the Deylamites The sons of Buya did not follow in the the footsteps of their father, who was a fisherman. They became soldiers, instead. 4 Eventually they rose to be the military commanders of the Ziyārids, and from there they began to gain power from the army. The military spirit of the Deylamites was always famous, and the Deylamite soldiers were among the most famous military groups in ancient Iranian history. The rise of the Buyid brothers should be considered regarding the role of the military in creating political structures in general and the prominent role of the Deylamites at this point in Iranian history, in particular. The formation of the Buyid government was militarily the result of the reproduction of the movement launched by the Deylamites and their eminent agents, especially Mākān-e Kāki, Asfārbān Shiruya, and Mardāvij, and the sons of Buya f inally used the result. According to Jowzjāni: The f irst person of the family of the Deylami who rose to power was Mākān-e Kāki Deylami, who was the governor of Gorgān until the reign of Abu ʿAli Sāmāni, who succeeded in wrestling Gorgān from him, after considerable f ighting. Mākān retired toward Ray and sought shelter from Voshmgir, son of Ayāz. Abu ʿAli went in pursuit of him, and fought an engagement with both of them, slew Mākān-e Kāki, and became powerful in that region.5

The Buyids were the Deylamites from the Shirdel-e Avandān tribe, living in the highlands of Gilān, south of the Caspian Sea.6 The Deylamites mainly served in the infantry and were known for their immense stubbornness and strong independence spirit.7 Since the origins of some dynasties, including the Ziyārids and the Buyids, are from the Deylamites, these dynasties’ social changes were primarily intertwined. 8 4 Historians trace the lineage of the Buyid to Shāpur ibn Ardeshir (Ibn Jowzi, 1992, vol. 7, p. 140) and Bahrām Gur (Ibn Kasir, 1990, vol. 11, p. 173; Khwāndmir, 1977, p. 115; Hamdollāh Mostowfi, 1985, p. 409; Shabānkāreʿie, 1996, p. 89; Fasih-e Khwāfi, 2008, vol. 2, p. 52; Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939, p. 391; Zarkub Shirāzi, 2011, p. 46; Mir Khwānd, 2002, vol. 4, p. 142). 5 Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 1, p. 218; tr., 1881, vol. 1, pp. 55–56. 6 Minorsky, 1932, pp. 46–51. 7 Kraemer, 1992, pp. 87–91. 8 See Kasravi, 2009, p. 36, Bosworth, 2004, p. 76.

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The rivalry between the Deylamite commanders finally ended with the victory of Mardāvij (r. 316–323 AH/929–935 AD), the founder of the Ziyārid dynasty, over Asfār ibn Shiruya near Qazvin in 319 AH/931 AD.9 The Ziyārids, descendants of Ziyār ibn Vardān Shāh, belonged to the Gili kingdom (Padeshāhi-ye Gili), and lived in Iran’s interior. Like other Iranian dynasties, they extended their lineage to the Iranian pre-Islamic kings, claiming that they were the descendants of the Arghash-e Farhādān, the governor of Gilān during the reign of Key Khosrow, the legendary Iranian king.10 Thus, the Ziyārid government was formed by relying on military tools in a structure outside the structure of the caliphate. Mardāvij sought to reproduce the pre-Islamic Iranian power structure by relying on military forces and emphasizing pre-Islamic Iranian culture, both of which had a long history in the Deylam regional structure.11 After the Saffārid dynasty, led by Yaʿqub, severely challenged the caliphate’s power structure, the Ziyārids was the next dynasty by advancing toward ʿArāq-e ʿAjam, when Hamedān and Khuzestān were getting closer to the ʿAbbāsid throne in Baghdad.12 This time coincided with the end of the reign of Caliph al-Moqtadā (r. 295–320 AH/907–932 AD) in Baghdad. For the first time, the ʿAbbāsid caliph had to send mandates covering the central regions of Iran to the Iranian rulers that were backed up by the authority of the Buyid brothers. This gave them a place of greater confidence with the caliph, who gradually distanced himself from Mardāvij and became closer to the Buyid brothers.13 The Ziyārid dynasty at the time of Mardāvij provided a valuable source of power to the Buyid brothers. The Ziyārids originated from the northern region of Iran, which until then had retained a solid link with Iran’s pre-Islamic 9 Kraemer, 1992, p. 87. 10 Ibn Moskuya, 2000, vol. 5, pp. 317–318. Marʿashi writes in the history of Tabarestān, Ruyān, and Māzandarān about the Ziyārid dynasty: “They were always in Gilān.… [T]hey were an old, honorable and proud family” (Marʿashi, 1976, p. 68). 11 Ibn Moskuya, 2000, vol. 5, p. 419. 12 When Mardāvij came to power, he tried to at least subjugate the central regions of Iran. He f irst conquered Tabarestān and Gorgān and then Esfahān (Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. 13, p. 258; Masʿudi, 1991, vol. 2, p. 749; Ibn Moskuya, 2000, vol. 5, p. 113). Mardāvij then invaded Hamedān and destroyed the caliph’s army, which had come to confront him under the command of Hārun Ibn Gharib, and made the land from Hamedān to Helwan the arena of his killing (Masʿudi, 1991, vol. 2, p. 747; Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. 13, p. 256; Hamdollāh Mostowfi, 1985, p. 414). We can mention Mardāvij’s relationship with the Fatimid caliph and the transfer of much property and many gifts to Obaidullah Mehdi, the Fatimid caliph of Egypt, as well as the announcement of a competition to enter into his obedience (Safā, 2000, vol. 1, p. 247). 13 Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939, p. 389; Ibn Moskuya, 2000, vol. 5, pp. 279–296; Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. 13, p. 296; Ibn Khaldun, 2010, vol. 3, p. 617.

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culture and thought. However, the Buyid brothers, who were influential military leaders and, like Mardāvij, commanded Deylamite soldiers, took a different path from Mardāvij. ʿAli-e Buya, who had dominated Karaj, attacked Esfahān with his troops, and when Mardāvij came to Arjān, he advanced toward Shirāz. Mardāvij sent an army to Ahvāz to block the way of ʿAli, who was now in an alliance with Caliph al-Rāzi,14 and attacked him.15 The Buyid brothers, who once served in the army of Mardāvij, became a cause of concern for him. However, before Mardāvij could move against the Buyid brothers, he was assassinated by his Turkish gholāms16 and the Buyid path to power became smoother. Hasan-e Buya, who was a hostage to Mardāvij, fled to his brother Ali in Shirāz. This moment (323 AH/935 AD) was the beginning of the Buyid rise to power.17 The Structure of the Buyid Government in Connection with the Two Structures of the ʿAbbāsids and the Fatimids The Buyids maneuvered themselves between the two ʿAbbāsid and Fatimid Caliphates (297–567 AH/909–1171 AD), which never compromised, and used these two levers to bring about profound and extensive social changes in the Islamic world. Only by being aware of their sensitive position between the two great Islamic caliphates and other political agents and by emphasizing their military characteristics and Shiʿite tendencies did the Buyids complete the movement toward forming a government far from the heavy shadow of the ʿAbbāsids. At this point in history, the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate faced serious and unprecedented challenges that endangered its survival. The formation of the Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt,18 based on the foundation of a new fledging structure, was one of the issues that the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate was unable to deal with. The Ismāʿilis, relying on these governments’ power, entered the lands controlled by the ʿAbbāsids and propagated their religion to establish 14 During the rule of Caliph Rāzi Bellāh, ʿAli ibn Buya came to power, just as Fars fell into the hands of ʿAli ibn Buya. After conquering Fars, he sent an ambassador to mediate the arrangement that Fars should be entrusted to him by Caliph al-Rāzi. He agreed to send 8 million dirhams to the caliph every year in addition to the usual and exceptional expenses. He sent a garment with a flag to ʿAli ibn Buya (Ibn Moskuya, 2000, vol. 5, p. 399). 15 Ibn Kasir narrates the reason for Mardāvij’s opposition to the Buyids as follows: “ʿAli ibn Buya’s love took root in the hearts of the people and caused Mardāvij to be jealous” (1990, vol. 11, p. 174). 16 Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. 13, p. 258; Masʿudi, 1991, vol. 2, p. 749; Ibn Moskuya, 2000, vol. 5, pp. 233–234. 17 Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939, p. 376. 18 Walker, 2002, p. 22; Walker, 2008, p. 113; Halm, 1996, p. 21.

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an Ismāʿili government in the territory of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. The Ismāʿilis’ presence in the realm of power was not always with the structural resources of daʿva and propaganda. They linked their social activities to the violence and murder of innocent people. Their assassination of hājis and the creation of insecurity in the main centers of Islam, and the caliph’s inaction against them, provided the ground for the Buyid presence in the power structure.19 With the formation of the Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt, which was itself one of the rings of the reproduction of the Ismāʿili power structure in northern Africa and the extreme west of Asia, the integrity of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate was questioned.20 The Fatimid Caliphate was formed in 297 AH/909 AD in Ifriqiya and expanded its religious influence into Syria, Mā Varā al-Nahr, India, Yemen, and Hejāz.21 The Fatimids never stopped trying to influence the structure of ʿAbbāsid power. The invitations of the Ismāʿili dāʿies and their killing of Muslims in different areas were part of their efforts to control the power structure.22 The Fatimid foreign policy was based on war and expansionism,23 therefore, the possibility of a conflict between the ʿAbbāsids and the Fatimids was very high. In this situation, the ʿAbbāsid caliph was looking for new agents who it could rely on to keep the structure of its power together, even though it was unstable. It can be said that the Buyid dynasty was the result of the historic opportunity created by the establishment of the Ziyārid dynasty, the decline of the ʿAlawites, and the violent activities of the Ismāʿilis. While the ʿAbbāsid caliphs had always suppressed the Shiʿites, a new group was emerging from among the Shiʿites, namely the Ismāʿilis, who also felt no mercy for Muslims. For example, by killing hājis and stealing the property of Muslims, the Ismāʿilis had turned the act of the hajj, a pious pilgrimage intended to fortify the beliefs of Muslims, into a locus of chaos.24 Talking about complaints and security is tied more than any part of history to the people and their anonymous agents. Although the caliph’s status had declined under the local dynasty, it was still considered an 19 Ibn Nadim, 2002, p. 189; Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. 9, pp. 39–40; Daftary, 2018, pp. 13–15. 20 Walker, 2008, p. 15; Walker, 1998, pp. 36–39; Halm, 1996, p. 148. 21 Walker, 2002, p. 22; ʿEbādi, 1948, pp. 247–249. 22 Beyzun, 2013, pp. 56–57. 23 Halm, 1996, p. 213; Beyzun, 2013, p. 198. 24 In 319 AH/931 AD, the people of Baghdad went to Ibn Habira, the caliph’s vizier, to complain about the atrocities that the Qarmati and Mardāvij had inflicted on them (Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939, pp. 376–377).

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off ice that could protect people and meet their needs. This was in the time of Caliph al-Rāzi (r. 322–329 AH/933–940 AD), Mottaqi (r. 329–332 AH/940–943 AD), and Mostakfi (r. 333–334 AH/944–945 AD): “Inflation in Baghdad rose. The people were eating grass. [The number of] [d]eaths became so high that they buried several people in a grave without bathing and prayer. A group of people demonstrated [their] religiosity and gave shrouds as a charity.”25 People suffering from Mardāvij and the Qarmatis turned to the caliph to demand security from this structure that had hitherto ruled their lives. The Fatimid Caliphate’s presence in Egypt as a rival for the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate could seriously challenge its power. What prevented the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate from confronting the Fatimids was not the Ismāʿilis’ religious strength but the caliph’s slippery position in Baghdad. During the rule of the Caliph al-Rāzi, effective power was transferred to Amir al-ʾOmarā, and the caliph remained merely the nominal ruler of the Islamic Empire.26 It turned out that even before the Buyids came to power, the authority of the caliphate was reduced to covering only religious matters, and Amir al-ʾOmarā, who was a Turkish agent, came to be in charge of the political affairs of the caliphate.27 Amir al-ʾOmarā’s power had been elevated so high that Caliph Al-Mottaki was blinded by Amir al-ʾOmarā and removed from the caliphate. Jowzjāni writes: When the Turks of Baghdad, whose chief and commander was Tuzun, seized the person of the Lord of the Faithful, Al-Mottaki Bellāh, and deprived him of his sight, they set him aside and gave him a stipend for his support. Having done this, Tuzun set up the dethroned caliph’s son, Al-Mostakf i Bellāh, in his stead, while Tuzun himself became Amir al-ʾOmarā and assumed the direction of the whole of the affairs of the caliphate.28

These issues were in addition to active agents like Mardāvayj, who, by relying on the Deylam military force and the idea of reviving Iranian culture, moved closer and closer to Baghdad. 25 Ibn Moskuya, 2000, vol. 6, pp. 34–35. 26 Kraemer, 1992, p. 31. 27 Amir al-ʾOmarā replaced the vizierate in 324 AH/935 AD by the Caliph al-Rāzi. Caliph al-Rāzi appointed Ahmad ibn Rāyeq to the rule of Vāset and Basra and named him Amir al-ʾOmarā (Ibn Moskuya, 2000, vol. 1, pp. 351–352). 28 Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 1, p. 220; tr., 1881, p. 58; see also Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939, p. 379.

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In this kind of situation, when he did not have an independent military force to resolve a crisis, the ʿAbbāsid caliph always looked to Iran for assistance. If, during the Saffārid period, the caliph had relied on local Iranian dynasties, including the Sāmānids, who had formed their power structure based on obedience to the ʿAbbāsid caliph at this time, the ʿAbbāsids would not have had this resource. The Sāmānids, who had always been loyal to the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate, faced serious problems during this period, including the rise of the Ismāʿilis and intra-governmental rivalries between bureaucratic and military agents. Therefore, they were unable to take serious action in support of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. Thus, when the Buyids began their activities and conquered Esfahān and Shirāz, Motaghallebs ruled in Maghreb and Egypt. The caliph ruled only in Iraq, which was challenged due to Amir al-ʾOmarā’s military power. 29 The conquests of the Buyid brothers in Iran’s central regions, including Esfahān and significant parts of Shirāz, created a new source of power against the ʿAbbāsid caliph. Increasing the number of Shiʿites in Baghdad and the emergence of other Shiʿite dynasties such as the Fatimids, Al-Hamdān (317–394 AH/929–1003 AD), and the Qarmatis, as well as the social chaos in Iraq, the fear of the caliph and the Muslims of the actions of Mardāvij Ziyāri in ʿArāq-e ʿAjam,30 and the caliph’s acceptance of the Buyids’ power to neutralize Mardāvij and Amir al-ʿOmarā provided the ground for the Buyid domination of the caliph. In 334 AH/945 AD Ahmad-e Buya marched with a large army toward Baghdad. In the same year, Ahmad entered Baghdad and landed at Bāb al-Shamasiya (Darvāze-ye Keshishān), and the next day he approached the caliph and pledged allegiance to him. According to Mojmal al-Tavārikh, After that anxiety and sedition calmed down, Moʿezz al-Dowla had the status of a pādeshāh [king] in the system,… and the caliph obeyed his commands. The caliphs were left with nothing but [the ability to] grant a khalʿat [robe of honor], a mandate, and a patent, and exchange letters with the surrounding kings. After that, they deposed and arrested Mostaqafi and appointed Motiʿ.31

29 Ibn Moskuya, 2000, vol. 1, p. 351. 30 Masʿudi, 1970, p. 748. 31 Mojmel al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939, p. 379; Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 2, p. 220. Ahmad proposed the title of ʿEzz al-Dowla, but Mostaqafi objected and eventually accepted the title of Moʿezz al-Dowla (Sābi, 1958, pp. 108, 119; Gardizi, 1984, p. 200; Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939, p. 379; Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 1, p. 220).

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Thus, the rise to power of a Shiʿite government in the realm of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate, and more importantly, their presence in Baghdad, which had been unprecedented among Iranian dynasties until then, took place in the context of a large number of Shiʿite dynasties surrounding the caliphate. For Ahmad Moʿezz al-Dowla, being in Baghdad was not an easy task. His stay in Baghdad was as tricky as the installation of two kings in the same palace, yet the Buyids made it possible using prudence and politics. The power that existed in Baghdad was like a crystal bowl, slippery and fragile. Undoubtedly, its greatness was such that the Buyids and the caliph decided to maintain it so that it would not suddenly break apart. On the one hand, the caliph, due to the lack of a military force that always, as Ibn Esfandiyār observed, prevented him from gaining independence, looked to the Buyids’ sword to defend the caliphate from other local dynasties, including the Ziyārids and the Turkish authorities in Baghdad. Some historians have described the Buyid presence in Baghdad as the transfer of power from the ʿAbbāsids to the Buyids. In the late reign of Mottaqi (r. 329–333 AH/940–949 AD) and the early rule of Al-Moktafi (r. 289–295 AH/902–908 AD) the power was transferred from the ʿAbbāsids to the Buyids; therefore, only religious authority remained for the caliph.32 His commands in other matters were ineffective.33 Although the Buyids were Shiʿites, they never sought to overthrow the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. Even after the conquest of Baghdad, Moʿezz al-Dowla intended to hand over the caliphate to the ʿAlawites or Fatimids, but Moʿezz al-Dowla’s minister, Abu Jaʿfar Mohammad ibn Ahmad al-Saimiri, prevented him from doing so. This is not correct, because you believe that the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate is not right and if you order your relatives to kill the caliph, they will kill him. And when the ʿAlawites sit on the caliphate throne, they may order your assassination, and you will not be able to stop them. You will be restrained, and you will inevitably have to obey the caliph.34 32 Biruni, 2011, p. 203. 33 “Moʿezz al-Dowla and his secretaries dominate Moti’s work and supervise the affairs of the caliphate court and, at present, that is, the year 345 AH [956 AD], the customs of the vizierate and the caliphate have disappeared. Mostakfi and Motiʿ have been abandoned, and they could not do anything” (Masʿudi, 1970, p. 386). “The land of Iraq was the base of the ʿAbbāsid caliphs. Their commands had always been obeyed until they stopped issuing them when the Deylamites took over. Now they do not have a say and no one listens to their orders” (Maqdasi, 2003, vol. 1, p. 182). 34 Ibn Kasir, 1990, vol. 11, p. 213; see also Nakhjavāni, 1979, p. 233.

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It should not be overlooked that the presence of a Shiʿite structure in Baghdad could have been another stimulus for the Shiʿite dynasties of the Islamic world, especially the Fatimid Caliphate, to overthrow the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate by approaching the Buyids.35 The Buyids, because of being Shiʿites, could have repelled and even reconciled with the Ismāʿili forces that were killing Muslims in Hejāz and Iraq. The Buyids initially believed in Zeydi Shiʿite,36 but after taking control of Baghdad they became Twelvers and distanced themselves from Zeyd and other Shiʿite sects that needed the imam’s presence on the power scene.37 Thus, the arrival of the Buyids in Baghdad was an excellent opportunity for the caliph, who could no longer trust that his power in the structure would continue. Numerous Shiʿite uprisings had made it clear to the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate that it must continue to rely on the Shiʿite power structure. This structure, despite the Ismāʿilis and the Fatimids, on the one hand, and the Turkish presence in the caliphate court, on the other, could support the caliph against Shiʿite uprisings. There was a serious change in the caliph’s role in the power structure during this period. The caliph had little power except to send mandates, lavās (banners), and khalʿats (robes of honor), or to communicate with neighboring kings. In essence, his authority was reduced to ceremonial matters.38 The Buyids, instead of eliminating the structure of the caliphate, changed the caliphs to take control of this structure. The change in the caliphate’s power (363–381 AH/973–991 AD) and the overthrow of al-Qāher (320–322 35 During the reign of Moʿezz al-Dowla (320-356 AH/932–966 AD), Ismāʿili dāʿies appeared in almost every city in Mesopotamia and their books were widely distributed. But this extensive activity diminished in 356 AH/967 AD (Ibn Nadim, 2002, p. 189; Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. 9, pp. 39–40). The relations between the Fatimids and the Buyids can be divided into two distinct periods: the first period in which the Fatimid state coincides with the power and strength of the Buyids. It mainly includes the era of Moʿezz al-Dowla and Az al-Dowla (338–372 AH/949–982 AD). Moʿezz al-Dowla conquered Baghdad but was unable to establish political ties between Iran and Iraq. At the same time, ʿEzz al-Dowla was able to bring the lands of Iran and Iraq under a single ruler. The relations of the Fatimid Caliphate with the Buyids were good and noteworthy during this period to the extent that the Buyids left the Fatimid dāʿie in the east of the Islamic world to express their goodwill to the Fatimids, and they became active. However, this had sometimes been controversial (Bardi, 1989, vol. 4, p. 125). 36 Kraemer, 1992, p. 169; Madelung, 2020, p. 281. 37 According to Mustafa Kamel al-Sheybi and Joel Kramer, the Buyids, after dominating Baghdad, sought independence from the Zeydis and relied on another Shiʿite sect converted from the Zeydi to the Twelver, which did not officially have an Imam to invite him to rule. Therefore, they refused to overthrow the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate and declare the ʿAlawite Caliphate (Sheybi, 1995, p. 41; Kraemer, 1992, p. 221). 38 Hanne, 2007, pp. 133–141.

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AH/932–934 AD) due to al-Tāyaʿ’s disobedience from Bahāʾollāh and his arbitrariness.39 From the time of al-Tāyaʿ, the ʿAbbāsid caliphs had been deprived of even the same ceremonial responsibilities. According to Mojmal al-Tavārikh: “They covered themselves and went behind the curtain, and were content to give orders from within the harām.”40 However, there was legitimacy in the caliphate structure that was never abolished, and the caliph’s name can be seen in the lowest degree of his power on the coins. 41 Of course, the caliphs gradually, especially in the time of al-Qāher, ensured the survival of their lives by using the weak power of the Buyids and using other sources of power that the Ghaznavids shaped at the farthest point of the Islamic caliphate.42 During the reign of the Buyids, the ʿAbbāsid caliphs were all dismissed, except for the fourth, al-Qāder (r. 381–422 AH/991-1091 AD), who still held the office of the caliphate and then handed over power to his son, al-Qāʾem (r. 422–467 AH/1031–1074 AD), indicating that the caliphs were gradually trying to increase their share of power. 43 39 Jorfādeqāni, 2003, pp. 298–299; Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939, p. 381. 40 Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939, p. 382. 41 Hanne, 2007, p. 254. 42 In the second phase, the ʿAbbāsid caliph al-Qāder issued a decree in 382 AH/993 AD forbidding mourning on the day of Āshurā, and the judge of Baghdad, who was a Shiʿite, was dismissed. At the same time, the amir of Mosul, Abu Dardā Mohammad ibn Musāyyeb Aqili (d. 383 AH/993 AD), refused to obey the ʿAbbāsid caliph and started a rebellion. In Mosul, he invited the Fatimid caliph, Al-ʿAzizbellāh (365–386 AH/976–997), to join him (Bardi, 1989, vol. 4, pp. 227–224). Four years later, Shiʿites in Baghdad staged an armed uprising and appealed to the Fatimid caliph al-Hākem (375-411 AH/996–1021 AD). They shouted in the streets of Baghdad: “Either Hākem or Mansur,” which was met with a strong reaction from Qāder, the Abbāsid caliph, and their revolt was suppressed (Bardi, 1989, vol. 4, pp. 227–224). Following these uprisings and to prevent further attempts, an official gathering was held in 402 AH/1012 AD attended by scholars, jurists, judges, and dignitaries, including Qāder, Sharif Rāzi (d. 406 AH/1016 AD), his brother Mortezā (d. 436 AH/1046 AD), Abu Hamid Esfārāyeni, the shaykh of Iraq, and Imam Shāfeʿie. They issued a statement: “The Fatimids are the brothers of the infidels and their dāʿies are Khārejites, and their lineage does not go back to Amir al-Moʾmenin, ʿAli ibn Abi Tāleb. God has decreed shame and corruption on the person who appeared in Egypt and is nicknamed ‘the Ruler,’ and he and the Fatimid ruler before him are f ilthy and impure. They are infidels and heretics who have imposed limitations on the divine and considered the prohibition of God lawful.” This statement was signed by the people present in that assembly (Ibn Jowzi, 1992, vol. 15, pp. 82–83; Bardi, 1989, vol. 4, p. 229; Ibn Kasir, 1990, vol. 11, p. 345; Hanbali, 1998, vol. 3, p. 302). Qāder, the ʿAbbāsid caliph, also gave a sum of money to ʿAli ibn Saeed Estakhri Moʿtazeli (404 AH/1014 AD to write a treatise on the rejection of the Fatimids (Daftary, 2018, pp. 124–127). Under Qāder, after the death of ʿEzz al-Dowla, the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate flourished. 43 Hanne, 2007, p. 145.

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Religious Politics and Avoidance of Religious Rule Although the use of Shiʿite structural resources and rituals had socially legitimized the rule of the Buyids, 44 their power structure was not totally based on religious beliefs. Historical evidence does not show that the rulers of the Buyids had a strong religious faith. Rather than pursuing the formation of an all-encompassing religious power structure, they sought only a religious policy in governing the state. The preservation of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate structure, while entirely dominating it and not declaring the Shiʿites as the state’s official religion, can be analyzed in this regard. The complexity of the religious situation and its close connection with politics is one of the hallmarks of this period of Iranian history, in which the Buyids, with awareness, were able to seize power and rule over a large part of the Islamic world, adopting a different policy for more than a century. The structure built by the Buyids can only be understood by examining the ʿAlawite structures and activists in Tabarestān, the Ismāʿilis in the Hejāz, and the caliph in Baghdad. Relying on military power, the Buyids, who had gradually seized power in the Jebāl region, reproduced the power structure of the ʿAlawites of Tabarestān and the Ziyārids and established a different government in the Jebāl region. The Buyids, who had previously practiced as Zeydi, 45 began to criticize the ʿAlawites and questioned their religious legitimacy. Other Deylami rulers, especially Mardāvij, had previously traversed the path of criticizing the ʿAlawites, but the Ziyārids lack of recourse to Islam, especially during the Mardāvij period and their conflicts with the caliph, put the Buyids in a superior position. At the beginning of their power, the Buyids, aware of the great potential they saw in the Shiʿite-oriented structures in the central and mountainous areas of Iran and Deylam in northern Iran, took full advantage of the existing structural resources in this religion. Despite adopting a tolerant policy toward other Islamic sects and religious groups, the Buyids never strayed from the origins of their source of power, i.e., Shiʿism, and worked hard to strengthen it. 46 44 Gordon, 2005, p. 89. 45 The ʿAlawites of Tabarestān, who ruled the region of Tabarestān by resorting to the Zaidi Shiʿites and using the sword of the Deylamites, gradually lost their religious legitimacy to rule these regions. This issue became more serious, especially in the time of the dāʿie Saghir (Āmoli, 1969, p. 115). The disputes and conflicts between dāʿie-ye Saghir and his other ʿAlawite rivals strengthened the forces of the rulers of Deylamites and Gili (Frye, 1965, p. 139). 46 Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. 8, p. 546.

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Attention to the Shiʿite religious ceremonies was in earnest during the Moʿezz al-Dowla period. 47 The beginning of these religious demonstrations and the holding of Shiʿite rites led to the development of a strong social structure in Iran, accompanied by fundamental actions in Iran’s social changes. Although the ʿAlawites in Tabarestān were the initiators of these rituals, their holding in Baghdad, the center of the Islamic world, significantly contributed to its expansion and socialization. The arrival of the Buyids in Baghdad and their domination of affairs resulted from the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate and the Buyids’ awareness of their current conditions. Persian sources provide an incomplete picture of the formation of the Buyid power, a picture in which only the Buyids, relying on their military power, invaded Baghdad and removed the weakened caliph’s status. 48 The Buyids were Shiʿites, but they chose tolerance and good policy to govern their region. After coming to power, the Buyids tried to promote the Shiʿa religion and its slogans. But their relationship with Sunnis was also good. Shaykh Mofid and his students had not written any book on governance, and it seems that they did not even want to implement the Shiʿite jurisprudence in their rule. That is why the Buyids used a Shāfeʿie scholar named Māvardi or Abi Yaʿli Hanbali in their legal system. Even if sometimes an incident caused Sunnis to suffer, the Buyids soon tried to compensate for it and resolve the misunderstanding, such as what Moʿezz al-Dowla did. He was impartial in the clashes between the Shiʿites and the Sunnis. He even once arrested the Hāshemites and silenced sedition. 49 Many followers of other religions, including Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, and the Sābeanes, who could afford to pay the jeziya (non-Muslim poll tax), lived among the Muslims. Some of them were elevated in the courts of the kings and caliphs. For example, Abu ʿAlā ʿIsā ibn al-Hasan ibn Abazunā was a Nasrānī man whom Mohallabi had informed of all his mysteries. 47 In response to this kind of Shiʿite propaganda, the Sunnis announced that they would visit the grave of Musāb ibn Zobeyr on the 18th of Muharram, coinciding with the anniversary of his assassination, and thus performed their religious rites. Also, eight days after Eid-ul-Ghadir, they determined the year of the Prophet and Abu Bakr’s presence in the cave and celebrated and danced (Ibn Jowzi, 1992, vol. 15, p. 14; Hanbali, 1998, vol. 3, p. 260). Despite establishing a religious reconciliation policy between the Sunni and Shiʿite religions, Moʿezz al-Dowla endorsed Shiʿite customs. In 351 AH/962 AD, he ordered that God’s curse in all mosques be written on the oppressors to the family of the Prophet and Moʿāviya (Ibn Jowzi, 1992, vol. 14, p. 140; Ibn Kasir, 1990, vol. 5, p. 327). In 351 AH/962 AD, the first Āshurā mourning was held in Baghdad (Hanbali, 1998, vol. 3, p. 104; Ibn Jowzi, 1992, vol. 15, p. 14; Bardi, 1989, vol. 4, p. 25). 48 Ibn Khallekān, 1986, vol. 3, p. 222; Hanbali, 1998, vol. 3, p. 22; Kraemer, 1992, p. 33. 49 Ibn Moskuya, 2000, p. 408.

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One of the members of the ʿAzod al-Dowla was Nasr ibn Hārun-e Masihi.50 Abu Eshāq-e Sābi was the most famous non-Muslim in the court of ʿAzod al-Dowla. Revival of the Iranian Kingship in the Form of a Shiʿite Government Apart from the military, the Deylamites paid close attention to Iranian culture and to the revival of pre-Islamic styles of kingship.51 The Buyids modeled themselves on the leaders of the Sassanid Empire, on the one hand, and through divine and religious genealogies to the Prophet Mohammad, on the other.52 The Buyids’ attention to ancient Iran showed itself more and more in the era of ʿAzod al-Dowla. By using the title shāhanshāh, the Buyids started a new form of leadership along with the caliphate in the history of Islamic Iran. According to Mojmal al-Tavārikh: His lineage was as follows: Buya, the son of Fanā Khsorow, the son of Tamām, the son of Kuhi ibn Shirzil ibn Shirānshāh, the son of Sistān ibn Sāʿes Jarrāh, the son of Shozil, the son of Sanbād, the son of Shāh Bahrām-e Gur, and back to Ardeshir Bābak, whom you called shāhanshāh. Therefore, the children of Hasan-Buya were called shāhanshāh, too.53

But choosing the title of shāhanshāh for the Buyids was not without its problems and provoked the protests in Islamic society.54 The Eqtāʿ System in Line with the Consent of the Deylamite Commanders The Buyids, who recognized the Deylami military men as one of the most critical pillars (resources) of their power structure, sought to ensure the continuity of power by keeping them satisfied. The Buyids were pioneers in granting land to soldiers for their services. Later, under the Saljuqs, this action was used as an essential power source and was called eqtāʿ. The soldiers’ salaries and expenses were a constant concern for the Buyid commanders. The occupied territories in Iraq and western Iran were 50 Ibid. 51 Mardāvij’s effort can be examined in this light (Safā, 1994, p. 63; Frye, 1965, p. 175). 52 Ibn Taqtaqā, 1971, pp. 150, 378. 53 Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939, pp. 390–391. 54 Ibn Kāzeruni, 1970, p. 193; Ibn Khallekān, 1986, vol. 4, p. 51; Ibn Jowzi, 1992, vol. 7, p. 114.

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flourishing. The Buyids established a method based on eqtāʿ to pay their soldiers.55 In this method, some taxes derived from property or region were given to the eqtāʿ dār.56 The taxpayer was not established in his tax office, so his representatives were assigned to collect the tax.57 Deylami Agents against the Buyids’ Structure The military origins of the Buyids greatly influenced their form of power structure. With the emergence of this government in Iran, a different structural situation was created, and the social changes that resulted were remarkable. From the mountainous region of Deylam, military men arose who had always been in the service of various powers and eventually succeeded in forming a dynasty.58 The rigid structure of their military characteristics, like a strong dam, resisted the reproduction of pervasive regional structures and great dynasties. All the actions of Ibn ʿAmid,59 the minister of the Buyids, was summed up to pay soldiers’ salaries and obtain their approval. This approach led to many political and military upheavals during the Buyid reign, but ʿAzod al-Dowla and Fakhr al-Dowla were the only amirs to take a different approach to this issue.60 Military dependence on the indigenous element was one of the structural characteristics of the beginning of the Buyid dynasty. To maintain these conditions, they had to organize actions, the first of which was to respect the lineage and the commitment of the tribe.61 They seemed interested in 55 Bosworth, 1965/1966, pp. 155–161. 56 Zarkub states in his book Shirāznāma that cruelty and unrest were two factors that caused the evacuation of many lands and their conversion from private property to government lands (diwani) (2011, p. 26). As in the Tārikh-e Qom, the work of Hasan ibn Qomi mentioned that when the Deylamites and Gilānis came to Qom, they established a tyrannical system there (Hasan Qomi, 2006, p. 53). The system of paying the salaries of the divisions through eqtāʿ was not a complete and comprehensive system for the entire duration of Buyid rule, but this system was the most prevalent when the amirs had no funds and were forced to make grants of land instead. Many troops received their salaries and pensions in cash and bonuses at certain times of the year. Kharāzmi called this method the ration system (Bosworth, 1965/1966, p. 166). 57 Ibn Moskuya, 2000, vol. 2, pp. 173–174; Maqdasi, 2003, vol. 1, pp. 399–400. 58 Bosworth, 1965/1966, p. 166. 59 Abu al-Fazl ibn al-Umayyad, the famous minister of Rokn al-Dowla, whom Ibn Moskuya called Ostād Raʾis (the Master or the Chief) (Ibn Moskuya, 2000, vol. 5, pp. 280–281). 60 Bosworth, 1965/1966, p. 166. 61 Hamza Esfahāni, 2007, p. 174.

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the purity of the blood, which was expected of the mountainous and proud people disconnected from other tribes.62 In 388 AH/998 AD, Samsām al-Dowla, the governor of Fars and Kermān, ordered the preparation of genealogical certificates for all the Deylamites in the areas under his control so that those of pure lineage could be identified and those whose lineage was in doubt could be taken off the rolls, along with any foreigners. By doing so, the amir tried to remove non-Deylami groups from his eqtāʿ and, as a result, decrease the number of claims he had to pay to soldiers.63 Although the Buyid military consisted primarily of Deylamites, it did employ Turks in the cavalry, as did the Sāmānids and the caliphs.64 With the arrival of the Turks, a deep rift formed among the military, increasing the distance between the Deylamites and the Buyids.65 In 334 AH/945 AD, a revolt broke out in the Moʿezz al-Dowla army. The amir was forced to pursue a reform policy against the insurgents by distributing property between them and the Turks in Savād-e Iraq. The lands were the property of the ʿAbbāsid caliphs or fugitives. After that, Moʿezz al-Dowla preferred the Turks. When the treasury emptied, the rights of the Deylami also ceased. While the Turks’ salaries were still paid, “Moʿezz al-Dowla was forced to get close to the Turks and help them against the Deylamites; therefore, both groups embraced deviance and laziness. The Turks fell into disdain and lust with greed and misery.”66 Historians attribute the end of the Buyids’ work not to the Turks but to the Deylami soldiers, who disrespected the kings and engaged in robbery and banditry at the Buyid power centers, especially Baghdad, Ray, and Tabarestān. Again, the story of the insecurity of the hājjis (pilgrims) was repeated. The rise of the Ismāʿilis to power and the beginning of chaos coincided with the decline of the power of the Buyid amirs. According to Mojmal al-Tavārikh: “The bloodshed was exceeded, and they revealed the Rāfezi and Bāteni religion and philosophy, and Muslims did not dare to come before them until God Almighty appointed Soltān Mahmud ibn Sabokategin upon them.”67 As the Deylami military men withdrew from the Buyids and joined other local dynasties, they gradually paved the way for the downfall of the Buyids. 62 Hodud al-ʿĀlam, 1983, p. 55; Biruni, 2011, p. 224; Ibn Moskuya, 2000, vol. 2, pp. 235–236; Bosworth, 1965/1966, p. 167. 63 Ibn Moskuya, 2000, vol. 5, pp. 190 321, 331, 334. 64 Estakhri, 1994, p. 205. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibn Moskuya, 2000, vol. 2, pp. 96–100; see also Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. 8, pp. 342–343. 67 Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939, pp. 403–404.

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Bibliography Al-Neshār, ʿAli Sāmi (1972). Feraq va Tabāqat al-Moʿtazela, Dār al-Matbuʿāt al-Jāmeʿiya Āmoli, Oliyāollāh (1969). Tārikh-e Ruyān, ed. Manuchehr Sotuda, Tehrān: Bonyād-e Farhang-e Iran Ashʿari, ʿAli ibn Ismāʿil (1963). Maqalāt al-Eslāmiyin va Ekhtelāf al-Mosallin, ed. Helmut Riter, Fisbādān: Dār al-Nashr Ferānz Shetāiner. Bardi, Ibn Taqri (1989). Al-Nojum al-Zāherat fi Moluk Mesr va al-Qāhera, Cairo: Vezārat al-Seqāfat va al-Ershād al-Qomi. Beyzun, Ebrāhim (2013). Al-Fātemiyun Qorāʾaho Mokhtalefa fi Tārikh-e Moltabes, Beirut: Dār al-Movarrekh al-ʿArabi. Biruni, Mohammad ibn Ahmad (2011). Āthar al-Bāqiya an al-Qorun al-Khāliya, Tehrān: Ferdows. Bosworth, C. E. (1965/1966). “Military Organization under the Buyids of Persia and Iraq,” Oriens, vol. 18/19, pp. 143–167 Bosworth, C. E. (2004). The New Islamic Dynasties: A Chronological and Genealogical Manual, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press Daftary, Farhad (2018). Ismāʿili History and Intellectual Traditions, London: Routledge ʿEbādi, ʿAbdol Hamid (1948). Sovar va Bahus men al-Tārikh al-Eslāmi, Eskandariya: Ibnā Estakhri, Ebrāhim ibn Mohammad (1994). Masālek va Mamālek, trans. Mohammad ibn Asʿad-e Tostari, ed. Iraj Afshār, Tehrān: Bonyād-e Moqufāt-e Mahmud-e Afshār Fasih-e Khwāfi, Ahmad ibn Mohammad (2008). Mojmal Fasihi, ed. Mohsen Nasr Ābādi, 3 vols., Tehrān: Asātir Frye, R. N. (1965). Bukhara: The Medieval Achievement, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press Gardizi, Abu Saʿid ʿAbdol Hayy ibn Zahhāk (1984). Zeyn al-Akhbār, ed. ʿAbdol Hayy Habibi, Tehrān: Donyā-ye Ketāb Gordon, Matthew S. (2005). The Rise of Islam, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press Halm, Heinz (1996). The Empire of the Mahdi: The Rise of the Fatimids, trans. Michael Bonner, Leiden: Brill Hamdollāh Mostowfi, Ibn Abi Bekr (1985). Tārikh-e Gozida, ed. ʿAbdol Hosseyn Navāie, Tehrān: Amir Kabir Hamza Esfahāni, Ibn Hasan (2007). Tārikh-e Pādeshāhān va Peyāmbarān, trans. Jaʿfar Shoʿār, Tehrān: Sāzmand Hanbali, Ibn ʿEmād (1998). Shazarāt al-Zahab fi Akhbār men Zahab, Beirut: Dār al-Ketāb al-ʿElmiya Hanne, Eric, J. (2007). Putting the Caliph in His Place: Power, Authority, and the Late ʿAbbāsid Caliphate, Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press

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Hasan Qomi, Hasan ibn Mohammad (2006). Tārikh-e Qom, trans. Tājoddin, Qom: Ketābkhāna-ye Marʿashi Najafi Hodud al-ʿĀlam men al-Mashreq ela al-Maqreb (1983). Ed. Manuchehr Sotuda, Tehrān: Tahuri Ibn Asir, ʿAli ibn Mohammad (1965). Al-Kāmel fi al-Tārikh, 13 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Sāder Ibn Jowzi, ʿAbdol Rahmān (1992). Al-Montazam fi Tavārikh al-Moluk va al-Omam, ed. Mohammad ʿAbdol Qāder ʿAtā, 19 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Kotob al-ʿElmiya Ibn Kasir, Ismāʿil ibn ʿOmar (1990). Al-Bedāyat va al-Nehāyat, 15 vols., Beirut: Maktabat al-Maʿāref Ibn Kāzeruni, Mohammad ibn ʿAli (1970). Mokhtasar al-Tavārikh men Avval al-Zamān ela Montahā Dowlat Bani Abbās, ed. Mostafā Javād, Baghdad: Moassesa ʿĀmeʿa Matbaʿa al-Maʿāref Ibn Khaldun, ʿAbdol Rahmān ibn Mohammadi (2010). Tārikh-e Ibn Khaldun, trans. ʿAbdol Mohammad Āyati, 6 vols., Tehrān: Pajouheshgāh-e ʿOlum Ensāni va Motāleʿāt-e Farhangi Ibn Khallekān, Ahmad ibn Mohammad (1986). Vafiyāt al-Aʿyān va Anbāʾ-e Abnāʾ-e al-Zamān, ed. Ehsān ʿAbbās, 8 vols., Qom: Manshurāt al-Sharif al-Rāzi Ibn Moskuya, Ahmad ibn Mohammad (2000). Tajāreb al-Omam va Taʿāqeb alHemam, ed. Abol Qāsem Emāmi, 6 vols., Tehrān: Sorush Ibn Nadim, Eshāq Ibn Mohammad (2002). Al-Fehrest, Tehrān: Asātir Ibn Taqtaqā, Abu Jaʿfar Mohammad Ibn ʿAli (1971). Tārikh-e Fakhri, trans. Mohammad Vahid Golpāyegāni, Tehrān: Bongāh-e Tarjoma va Nashr-e Ketāb Jorfādeqāni, Abol Sharaf Nāseh ibn Zafar (2003). Tārikh-e Yamini, ed. Jaʿfar Shoʿār, Tehrān: ʿElmi va Farhangi Jowzjāni, Menhāj al-Serāj (1881). Tabaqāt-e Nāseri, trans. H. G. Raverty, London: Gilbert and Rivington Jowzjāni, Menhāj al-Serāj (1984). Tabaqāt-e Nāseri, ed. ʿAbdol Hayy-e Habibi, 2 vols., Tehrān: Donyā-ye Ketāb Kasravi, Ahmad (2009). Shāhriyārān-e Gomnām, Tabriz: Āydin Khwāndmir, Qiyās al-Din (1977). Dastur al-Vozarāʿ, Ahvāl-e Vozarā-ye Islam ta Enqerāz-e Teymuriyān, ed. Saiʿd Nafisi, Tehrān: Eqbāl Khwāndmir, Qiyās al-Din (2009). Tārikh-e Habib al-Siyar fi Akhbār-e Afrād-e Bashar, ed. Dabir Siyāqi, 4 vols., Tehrān: Hermes Kraemer, Joel L. (1992). Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam: The Cultural Revival during the Buyid Age, Liden: Brill Madelung, Wilferd (2020). Religious and Ethnic Movements in Medieval Islam. London: Routledge Maqdasi, Motahhar ibn Tāher (2003). Āfarinesh va Tārikh, trans. Mohammad Rezā Shafiʿe Kadkani, 2 vols., Tehrān: Āgāh

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Marʿashi, Seyyed Zahir al-Din (1976). Tārikh-e Tabarestān-e Ruyān va Māzandarān, ed. Mohammad Tasbihi, Tehrān: Sharq Masʿudi, ʿAli ibn Hosseyn (1970). Al-Tanbih va al-Eshrāf, trans. Abol Qāsem Pāyande, Tehrān: Bongāh-e Nashr va Tarjoma-ye Ketāb Masʿudi, ʿAli ibn Hosseyn (1991). Moruj al-Zahab, trans. Abol Qāsem Pāyanda, 4 vols., Tehrān: ʿElmi va Farhangi Minorsky, V. (1932). La Domination des Dailamites, Paris: E. Leroux Mir Khwānd, Mohammad (2002). Tārikh-e Rowzat al-Safā fi Sirat al-Anbiyā va al-Moluk va al-Kholafā, ed. Jamshid Kiyānfar, vols. 4, Tehrān: Asātir Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas (1939). Ed. Mohammad Taqi Bahār and Behjat Ramezāni, 2nd ed., Tehrān: Kolāla-ye Khāvar Nakhjavāni, Hendushāh ibn Sanjar (1979). Tajāreb al-Salaf, Dar Tavārikh-e Kholafā va Vozarā-ye Ishān, ed. ʿAbbās Eqbāl, Tehrān: Ketābkhana-ye Tahuri Sābi, Helāl N. Mohsen (1958). Al-Vozarā: Tohfat al-Vozarā fi Tārikh al-ʿOmarā, ed. ʿAbdol Sattār Ahmad Faraj, Cairo: Mohammad Abol Fazl Ebrāhim Safā, Zabihollāh (1994). Ganj va Ganjina, Nasr, Sheʿr, ed. Mohammad Torābi, Tehrān: Qoqnus Safā, Zabihollāh (2000). Tārikh-e Adabiyyāt-e Iran, ed. Mohammad Torābi, 3 vols., Tehrān: Qoqnus Shabānkāreʿie, Mohammad ibn Ali (1996). Majmaʿ al-Ansāb, ed. Mir Hāshem Mohaddes, Tehrān: Amir Kabir Sheybi, Mostafā Kāmel (1995). Tashayoʾ va Tasavvof ta Āghāz-e Sade-ye Davazdahome Hejri, trans. ʾAlirezā Zekāvati, Tehrān: Amir Kabir Tārikh-e Sistān (1987). Ed. Mohammad Taqi Bahār, Tehrān: Padida-ye Khāvar Walker, Paul E. (1998). Abu Yaʿqub Al-Sijistani: Intellectual Missionary. London: I. B. Tauris Walker, Paul E. (2002). Exploring an Islamic Empire: Fatimid History and Its Sources, London: I. B. Tauris Zarkub Shirāzi, Ahmad ibn Abi al-Kheyr (2011). Shirāznāma, ed. Akbar Nahvi, Shirāz: Dāneshnāma-ye Fārs

Part III The Rise of Soltānates in the Power Structure

The Turkish presence at the apex of their power marked a new arena for reproducing structures of a very different nature in Iran. The Turks who entered the power structure with Moʿtasem in the court of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate and with the Sāmānids and the Buyids in Iran reached the pinnacle of the power structure with the Ghaznavid dynasty. The two Iranian dynasties of the Ghaznavids (351–582 AH/963–1187 AD) and then the Saljuqs (429–590 AH/1037–1194 AD) took advantage of the valuable resources provided to them by previous Iranian dynasties, especially the Sāmānids and the Buyids. Significant social changes in Iran, including the formation of essential power structures of the soltānate, and the reproduction of the vizierate and the amirate, took place during this period. Chapter 9 examines how the shāhi (kingship) structure, which had been reproduced based on pre-Islamic structural resources by the Buyids, especially by ʿAzed al-Dowla, was reproduced by the Ghaznavids in the structure of the soltānate. It examines historians’ viewpoints about the soltānate and how it was reproduced concerning other power structures, especially the caliphate. By using the structural resources of pure religious propaganda (tabliq-e pāk-dini), the Ghaznavids conducted extensive expeditions against Hindus, Ismāʿilis, and Shiʿites attributed to heresy. Simultaneously, the presence of the greatest artists, poets, and scientists in the Ghaznavid court brought the Ghaznavid soltānate closer to the court of the pre-Islamic kings. With the coming to power of Soltān Mahmud, the Ghaznavid dynasty, which had authoritatively reproduced the structures of the Sāmānid power, defeated the Buyids in central Iran and advanced to Baghdad as the supporter of the caliphate, the central pillar of the Sunni power structure. Even though, under his son, Soltān Masʿud, the rift in the political structure, on the one hand, and the alienation of the new agents with Soltān Mahmud’s legacy, on the other, blocked the way for the Ghaznavids to move farther. Their efforts paved the way for the presence of the Turkmen Saljuqs. The Chapter 10 is devoted to studying the powerful Saljuq dynasty, which ruled the Islamic world from Mā Varā al-Nahr to the Mediterranean Sea for nearly a century and a half. The Saljuq tribes, who were allowed by Soltān Mahmud to settle in Mā Varā al-Nahr, with the Ghaznavid resources of religious purity (pak-dini) and supporting the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate as well as a military power, reproduced the structures of Ghaznavid power under the name of a new dynasty. Relying on military power, the Saljuq agents, who had seized vast territories, took advantage of Iranian dynasties’ structural resources from the Tāherids to the Ghaznavids to achieve a new kind of legitimacy. By taking advantage of their tribal traditions, they could transmit power more

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efficiently and ruled for a long time. The two power structures of the vizierate and the amirate played essential roles in the Saljuq rule as the two wings of the soltān’s power in the course of social change. This chapter studies these two power structures and the role of their agents and structures in the scene of power. Under the Saljuq Empire structure based on the division of power between the atābaks (governors) and the various amirs, many local dynasties were formed, which gradually became independent by weakening the central power. The Khwārazmshāhi, as one of these local dynasties, abolished the Saljuq Empire with the support of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. However, the rivalry between the Khwārazmshāhi, who were to gain the structural resources of Saljuq power, and the ʿAbbāsid caliph, who sought to return to the golden age of their power, marked a new round of social change. In Chapter 11, we will examine the structure of Khwārazmshāhi power as a local dynasty associated with Khwārazm, which gradually became a large empire in Iran. However, the expansionist policies of the Khwārazmshāhi paved the way for their collapse, and so led to the rise of the Mongols in Iran.

9

The Formation of the Ghaznavid Soltānate Abstract The Ghaznavids, relying on widespread expeditions and religious wars until the reign of Soltān Mahmud, created a powerful dynasty. Among these structural resources was to engage in large-scale developmental battles, combine them with ghazva and jihad, and set up a considerable court with educated scholars and thinkers. Attention to scholarly studies, including historiography and the Persian language, were other critical structural resources used by the Ghaznavids. The divisions in the power structure and the removal of key agents, including the military and the bureaucrats, and their replacement by immature and ignorant agents led to the decline of the Ghaznavid dynasty and the establishment of the Saljuq Empire. Keywords: Ghaznavid dynasty, Soltān Mahmud, Soltān Masʿud

The Ghaznavid Amirs: From Serving the Sāmānid Structure to Their Rise to Power As pointed out in Chapter 5 on the Sāmānids, the Sāmānids’ attention to the Turkish slaves and their training provided the basis for changing the social class of the Turks from court slaves to powerful amirs. The end of the Sāmānid period was tied to the rise of the Turkish commanders.1 The Sāmānids tried to seize power by giving power to the Turkish commanders, especially Alptegin and Saboktegin, but, eventually, the same Turkish commanders paved the way for the collapse of the Sāmānid dynasty. Narshakhi writes: When Amir Hamid died, allegiance was sworn to Amir Rashid, who was ten years old when he ascended the throne. When the news of the death 1

Maqdasi, 2007, p. 325.

Kamali, M. Social Change in Medieval Iran 132-628 AH (750-1231 AD). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2023 doi: 10.5117/9789463721981_ch09

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of Amir Hamid arrived in the provinces, everyone coveted a district. The amir sent Ashʿas ibn Mohammad to Khorāsān. He had to fight many times in Harāt and Esfahān. He subdued the provinces and was engaged in that and fighting battles when Amir Rashid fell from his horse and died the same night. That night was Wednesday; eight days of the month of Shawwāl had passed of the year 350 AH [20 November 961 AD].2

Instead of naming Turkish commanders, the historian states that “allegiance was sworn to the amir.” This shows that the action of the commanders to replace the Sāmānid amirs with a new amir was common at the time of the historian. Alptegin was the first Ghaznavid amir who dominated Neyshābur in the turbulent situation of the late Sāmānid period.3 After having drastic conflicts with Amir Sadid, the Sāmānid amir, in 350 AH/962 AD, Alptegin crossed Jeyhun to become independent from the Sāmānid structure and to establish an independent dynasty. According to Narshakhi: The commander of the army, Alptegin, was in Neyshābur. When news of the death of Amir Rashid reached him, he resolved to seize Amir Sadid. The latter sent an army [so that when the army of Alptegin] reached the Oxus and wanted to cross it, it would not be able to because a large army had arrived [on the opposite bank]. He [Alptegin] wanted to return to his province of Neyshābur. Amir Sadid wrote a letter to Mohammad ibn Abd al-Razzaq in Neyshābur, [telling him] not to allow [Alptegin] to enter the city. Alptegin received this information and knew he could not go to Neyshābur, so he crossed the Oxus and went to Balkh. He seized it and raised a rebellion.4

Alptegin, as a military agent, had rendered many services to the Sāmānids and supported them against their rivals, but when he saw the Sāmānid opposition to himself, he separated himself from the Sāmānids. Alptegin’s separation from the Sāmānids paved the ground for other military amirs to compete with the Sāmānids and overthrow their dynasty. The Sāmānid amirs were unable to keep the military men loyal to 2 Narshakhi, 1984, p. 134; tr., 1954, p. 98. 3 Alptegin was among the gholāms of Ahmad, the son of Ismāʿil-e Sāmāni. Nasr, son of Ahmad, liberated him, and Nuh, son of Nasr, appointed him to command a section of his army, and he was gradually promoted to Hājeb al-Hājji. For fear of his power, Abd al-Malek ibn Nuh appointed Alptegin as the general of Khorāsān (Khalili, 2011, pp. 41–42; Shād, 1956, vol. 4, pp. 36, 40; Ibn Khalaf, 1990, vol. 3, p. 53). 4 Narshakhi, 1984, p. 135; tr., 1954, p. 99.

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themselves. The revolt of Abu ʿAli Simjur during the time of Nuh ibn Mansur (r. 365–387 AH/975–997 AD) started a serious crisis in the power structure of the Sāmānids. Jorfādeqāni writes: The vestiges of the weakness and the indications of the disability of the army of Khorāsān became known and disseminated, and the honor and the exultation of the enemy, and the strength of their opponents, became manifest, and every look and every day afforded room for some fresh blow and some new injury to the prince’s warriors. But there is an end to everything and a limit to every kingdom, to every condition happens decay and to every dynasty applies the quotation: “God erases and establishes whatsoever He willeth, and with Him is the Book of Fate.” And when Abul Hasan Simjur became sensible of the badness of this business and the dullness of this market he attached himself to traitorous determinations, and he constructed the measure of self-protection, and from preserving the good state of the kingdom, and establishing conservative regulations, betook himself to laxity and indifference, and fell into the habit of leaving and carelessly neglecting the duty of the accumulation of reinforcements and the thickening the army, and the strokes of the billows of troops.5

Khwāja Nezām al-Molk’s view of Alptegin as one of the Turkish commanders in the structure of Sāmānid power is striking. Khwāja Nezām al-Molk considers the Ghaznavids, particularly Alptegin, not to be the amirs who came to power under the Sāmānids, but recognizes them as military agents who acted to maintain the power structure of the Sāmānids. Referring to the account of Amir Sadid’s invitation from Alptegin to Bokhārā and then his recall from Khorāsān, Khwāja Nezām al-Molk considers it a conspiracy to assassinate Alptegin. He addresses this event as one of the factors discouraging Alptegin from the Sāmānids and then argues that the declining structure of Sāmānid power was dependent on his sword.6 The issue of succession as one of the structural resources of social change that played a critical role in the rule of the first Ghaznavid amirs. Relying on military force and prudence, Saboktegin, a former slave elevated by Alptegin, founded his power structure. According to Jorfādeqāni: There was no one in his family who possessed the fitness [to rule an] empire, and superiors and chiefs, free and bondmen, needed someone 5 Jorfādeqāni, 2003, p. 44; tr., 1888, pp. 54–55. 6 Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, 1999, p. 147.

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who should be apt and capable for their sovereignty. And whomsoever they discussed, when brought to the touchstone of estimation, did not possess the perfect standard, until all agreed and in one conjoined voice said that there was no one of such worthiness, with the right qualifications for rule, with better or nobler qualities than Nāser al-Din Saboktegin. They gave their assent, therefore, to him, to be ruler and governor. They covenanted to accept his sway and rule, and they inaugurated him, and Nāser al-Din Saboktegin took all under his protecting pastorate. He settled upon a firm basis the safety of the state and the prosperity of all, and everyone by his powerful plans and happy arrangement obtained secure portions [fiefs] and arranged comforts.7

The selection of Saboktegin as Alptegin’s successor, who became the founder of the Ghaznavid dynasty, was based on his military prowess and ability to lead the army. Saboktegin came to power when Alptegin had died, and all commanders had agreed upon Saboktegin’s supremacy.8 The presence of Saboktegin and his son Mahmud in Khorāsān, especially in Neyshābur, brought security to Khorāsān because Simjur had dragged Khorāsān into chaos and war for years.9 For people who had experienced years of the weakness of the central power structure, the inefficiency of bureaucracy, and, ultimately, the collapse of the Sāmānids, the rise of a powerful dynasty that would guarantee security, peace, and stability was vital. However, the security provided by the Ghaznavids as military commanders was not very reliable.10 The Link between Religion and the Sword in the Ghaznavid Rule With the arrival of the Turkish amirs, the presence of the military in the scene of power became more complex. As one of the essential tools influencing the social changes in Iran, religion played an important role in reproducing 7 Jorfādeqāni, 2003, p. 20; tr., 1888, p. 23. 8 Jorfādeqāni, 2003, p. 20; Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, 1999, p. 157. 9 Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 1, p. 227. 10 For Narshakhi, the Sāmānid rule ended very quickly. At the end of the book, the names of the Turkish rulers are mentioned in the same rank as the Sāmānid amirs because they played a more significant role in determining the fate of the government. The historian’s narration after the coming to power of Amir Nuh ibn Mansur and the ministry of Mohammad ibn ʿAbdollāh ibn ʿAziz was very brief and hasty (Narshakhi, 1984, pp. 137–136). Mentioning military men’s names in succession indicates the prominent role of military commanders in the structure of power and the marginalization of bureaucrats in this period.

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various social structures in the Ghaznavid period. By emphasizing Shiʿite structures, the Buyid religious policy was able to capture Baghdad, the center of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate and the heart of the Sunni world, and brought brilliant figures such as Moʿezz al-Dowla and ʿAzod al-Dowla to power. In addition to the new Shiʿite structures founded by the Deylamites, the caliph, relying on the history of his power structure, was able to keep up the flag of religious thought, albeit half-raised. Although the Buyids did not make Shiʿism the state’s official religion, their government’s apparent inclination toward this religion reinforced the claim that Shiʿite structures in Iran were stabilizing and taking root in the depths of society, but the course of social change was quite different. Alptegin was the f irst Ghaznavid amir who separated himself from the Sāmānids and established a new government. Khwāja Nezām al-Molk writes that he said, “For I intend to go to Hindustan and engage in holy war against the infidels; if I am killed, I shall be a martyr, and if I am given grace to succeed, I shall turn the house of idolatry into the house of Islam, in the hope of paradise and for the sake of God and the Prophet.”11 Alptegin’s departure for India was the structural source of the religious warfare that was being reproduced this time by the Ghaznavids’ fanatical religious agents. The Turkish amirs also used the weakening of the Sāmānids as an essential resource to pave the path to power by establishing a strong link between religion and war. The Ghaznavid dynasty, which relied on Sunni Hanafi,12 essentially had a military base; Saboktegin, titled Jadid al-Islam,13 and Mahmud, titled Nāser al-Din and Seyf al-Dowla by Amir Sāmānid, were Khorāsān’s army commanders who were recruited to defend the Sāmānid dynasty and fight against its rivals.14 From the time of his reign, Mahmud claimed to be fighting against the Bātenis of Khorāsān,15 and after that, he legitimized his sword by attacking India. According to Jowzjāni: When Soltān Mahmud ascended the throne of sovereignty, his illustrious deeds became manifest unto all mankind within the pale of Islam. When he converted so many thousands of idol temples into masjids, and captured so many of the cities of Hindustān, and overthrew and 11 Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, 1999, p. 148; tr., 1960, p. 113. 12 Khalili, 2011, p. 174. 13 Beyhaqi, 1995, vol. 1, p. 227. 14 Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 1, p. 227. 15 Ibid.

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subdued its Rāis. Jeypāl, who was the greatest of the Rāis of Hind, he made captive, and kept him [prisoner] at Man-Yazid, in Khorāsān, and commanded that he might be ransomed for the sum of 80 derhams. He led an army to Nahrwāla of Gojarāt, and brought away Manāt, the idol, from Somnath, and had it broken into four parts, one of which was cast before the entrance of the great masjid at Qazvin, the second before the gateway of the soltān’s palace, and the third and fourth were sent to Mecca and Medina, respectively.16

Undoubtedly, one of the characteristics of the Ghaznavid dynasty was its persistent efforts to legitimize the sword’s power through its strong connection with religion. The Tāherids and the Sāmānids had already paved the path of religious legitimacy by receiving a mandate of power from the caliph and fighting the ʿAlawites of Tabarestān who opposed the caliph. As mentioned earlier, Yaʿqub Leys, the founder of the Saffārid dynasty, who from the very beginning had questioned the caliph’s religious legitimacy by relying on military force, tried to gain religious legitimacy by invading India in the name of fighting the infidels and recording his name on the list of ghāzis (warriors). War throughout history was in the hands of agents as a powerful resource to reproduce existing structures in their favor. In a world where the highest ranks of power could not be achieved except by war, the sword was an essential tool in the hands of the power actors to establish a new structure on the ruins of past structures.17 After the capture of Mā Varā al-Nahr and Khorāsān, Sistān was attacked by the Ghaznavids. Sistān after Yaʿqub-e Leys was no longer known for its greatness. According to the Tārikh-e Sistān: The day when the khotba was delivered from the pulpit of Islam in the name of the Turks, marked the beginning of a period of calamity for Sistān, and Sistān had not experienced a calamity until that time. During the reign of Yaʿqub and ʿAmr, there had not been a more prosperous country in the world than was Sistān.18

The report of the author of Tārikh-e Sistān shows the Ghaznavids’ warlike, destructive temperament. The historian depicts the Turkish’ domination over Sistān as a dark period in the history of the city, which was more devastating 16 Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 1, p. 229; tr., 1881, pp. 81–82. 17 Shabānkāreʿie, 1996, p. 68. 18 Tārikh-e Sistān, 1987, p. 354; tr., 1976, p. 289.

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due to the nature of the war, in general, and the Ghaznavids’ invasion, in particular. Tārikh-e Sistān shows the people’s dissatisfaction with Soltān Mahmud’s rule over Sistān. People did not even want to pray in the mosque where the khotba was read in the name of Soltān Mahmud: “Nobody prayed in the mosque on Friday night [because people] at in the city and in the citadel were [so] broken-hearted.”19 At least for the people of Sistān, Mahmud’s sword seems to be more influential than his religious attitudes. Mahmud’s domination over Sistān was not just the removal of the Saffārid amir and reciting a khotba in Mahmud’s name. The looting of the city and the killing of people from Muslims to tarsā (Christians) and the destruction of mosques and churches, was an alarm notifying all of a new round of social change in the history of Sistān. According to the Tārikh-e Sistān: All the slaves of Mahmud’s household had climbed up to the fortress and scaled the walls. Whereupon they went to beat their drums, shouting slogans for Mahmud. Then they went about burning and plundering. Bāzārs and houses were set aflame. The Friday mosque was plundered.20

The historian highlights Mahmud’s violent and disrespectful actions toward people of all faiths and religions. Mahmud, relying on religious purity (pākdini) and fighting against any heresy (bedʿat) and emphasizing his adherence to the ʿAbbāsid caliph, attacked various lands from Mā Varā al-Nahr to India and from Khorāsān and Sistān to Tabarestān and Ray to be known as the Seyf al-Dowla in the Islamic world.21 Invasion of India: A Structural Resource in the Service of the Ghaznavids In the battle against the infidels, the invasion of India as a tool to achieve religious legitimacy provided wealth, satisfied the soldiers who knew nothing but plunder and conquest, and gradually became a structural resource for gaining power. This structural resource initially used by Saboktegin prompted the Ghaznavids to pursue their developmental goals. Jorfādeqāni writes: Then he turned his face unto the sacred warfare with the infidels and the humiliation of the enemies of the faith, and began to make war upon 19 Tārikh-e Sistān, 1987, p. 357; tr., 1976, p. 291. 20 Tārikh-e Sistān, 1987, p. 357; tr., 1976, pp. 291–292. 21 Shabānkāreʿie, 1996, p. 60.

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the country of Hindustān, whose inhabitants are universally enemies of Islam, and worshippers of images and idols. He turned then upon these regions and provinces and extinguished by the water of his sword wounds, the sparks of idolatry struck from their fire altars and gave to the winds. The temples and the meeting places of those base ones, and in their room placed fabrics of mosques and shrines. He received those who believed into the protection of quarter, and caught the idolaters in the net of destruction, and between him and the rebellious contests of those cursed ones and the resistance of those devils, lamentable affairs occurred, the record of which will remain upon the page of time until the last day.22

To keep the commanders satisfied, the Ghaznavids were to obtain a significant amount of booty. This booty could be obtained from India under the name of ghazva to legitimize multiple attacks and strengthen the foundations of the political and economic structure of the dynasty. Building mosques instead of temples and teaching Islam had always been a religious action for Muslims.23 The war with the Indians was adorned with raising the banner of Islam in that land.24 Moreover, according to Islamic tradition, being killed in a war with infidels was tantamount to martyrdom and going to heaven. Saboktegin encouraged soldiers to accompany him with the promise of martyrdom if they died.25 With the coming to power of Soltān Mahmud, the link between religion and war took a more complete and meaningful form. Soltān Mahmud took full advantage of the resources of power of the Sāmānid dynasty to prove his religious legitimacy in the Islamic world by relying on the religious structure of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. He made sitting on the Sāmānid throne legitimate in the eyes of the caliph and the people, so that those who were religiously Sunni and respected the caliphate structure could see the Ghaznavids as a continuation of the Sāmānids.26 Mahmud aimed to fight the Ismāʿilis and the Buyids, and the ʿAlawites of Tabarestān, who were essential obstacles for Mahmud in establishing a Sunni empire. Soltān Mahmud used the resource of defending the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate and its current leader, Qāʾem (r. 422–467 AH/1031–1075 AD), to fight against the Shiʿites, who at that time ruled in various regions.27 Thus, 22 23 24 25 26 27

Jorfādeqāni, 2003, pp. 20–21; tr., pp. 23–24. Gardizi, 1984, pp. 394–395; see also Shabānkāreʾie, 1996, p. 60. Jorfādeqāni, 2003, p. 27. Ibid., p. 32. Safā, 2000, vol. 1, p. 229. Bosworth, 2004, pp. 76–78; Barthold, 1968, pp. 337–338.

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the Ghaznavids, relying on religious wars, built a rich power resource for their use.28 Soltān Mahmud’s attacks on India were so numerous that one historian has no hesitation in pointing to his war with “the atheists [molhedin] and the infidels [kafarān]” as well as Mahmud’s material motives.29 By replacing mosques with temples, Soltān Mahmud stepped in the direction of the forced spread of Islam in India and established significant forced changes. In this period of historiography, historians write about the many spoils that Soltān Ghāzi had acquired during the war with the Indians, which was a perfectly justified action. According to Jorfādeqāni: It came to the ears of the soltān, that in the country of Tenishar there were many of that peculiar species of elephant, which they call silamān. The prince of this country was high amongst the ungrateful deceivers and of exalted relations amongst the rebellious and the sinful. Therefore, he was one who merited that they should give him to drink a cup of the wine of the strokes of Islam’s sword and that by means of the flame of the onset of the champions, they should strike into his essence the due of wickedness, so making him know, that to drink in their turns of this cup, and in their turns of this calamity is the doom of the universal kāfar [apostate] people and that as other chiefs and deceivers of India have been sharers and partakers thereof, so his face could not be free, nor his path an asylum from the equitable sword. The soltān thought it good then to plan this conquest, so that the standard of Islam might be exalted by victory, and the figures of idols might be cast down by success in war. Accordingly, he marched toward Tenishar.30

The historians’ strong emphasis on Mahmud’s looting attacks has overshadowed his other efforts. In the Tārikh-e Beyhaq, Soltān Mahmud’s attempt to seize Indian property was interpreted as looting.31 For Ibn Fondoq, who looks at historical events through the lens of “ʿolum-e ʿaqli va ʿolum-e naqli” 28 Jorfādeqāni, 2003, pp. 334–335. 29 Ibid., pp. 331–334. 30 Jorfādeqāni, 2003, p. 335; tr., 1888, pp. 393–394. Gardizi stated that Soltān Mahmud’s goal in invading India, in addition to f ighting the inf idels, was to gain booty: “They killed 5,000 infidels and captured Jebāl, along with fifteen of his sons and brothers. They found much loot from wealth, slaves and bigots” (Gardizi, 1984, p. 386). See also Gardizi, 1984, pp. 412, 427. For this reason, in some cases, the Indians, by paying the spoils, freed themselves from facing Soltān Mahmud (Gardizi, 1984, p. 433). 31 Ibn Fondoq, 2011, p. 18.

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(“rational knowledge and narrative knowledge”), a figure like Soltān Mahmud is not viewed approvingly. Ibn Fondoq emphasizes that “[t]here was not much justice and good work left by Mahmud.”32 Thus, although Mahmud waged a great religious war against the Hindus as infidels and the Ismāʿilis defined as Qarmatis, these measures were not rooted in justice from the point of view of a religious figure.33 Numerous wars in India agitated the Ghaznavids’ military men, the effect of which during Masʿud’s time was his unexpected assassination. Although the ghazva was accepted in the Islamic world, the Ghaznavids’ extravagance in the war in the east and west of the Islamic world led to religious violence under the name of spreading pāk-dini (religious purity). There is no doubt that violence was inevitably part of converting to Islam for the Indians, who received Islam under the Ghaznavid sword. This issue, which had previously manifested itself in the Arab invasions of Iran and the spread of Islamic conquests, was pursued more vigorously in the Ghaznavid era, creating successive changes in people’s viewpoints about Islam.34 Masʿud and his successors’ reliance on India and their carelessness about Khorāsān while the Saljuq Turkmen were to conquer it prevented Soltān Masʿud from resisting them seriously. The same elephants that historians considered as part of the legendary power of Soltān Mahmud and then Soltān Masʿud became the scourge of their armies and reduced their agility against the Turkmen. The elephants enabled their defeat in various wars, especially in fthe Battle of Dandānqān (431 AH/1040 AD). Historians’ Viewpoints about the Structure of Kingship (Shāhi) One of the main issues historians of the Ghaznavid period seriously pursued was the structure of kingship (shāhi) and the king (shāh) as an active agent in the realm of power. In the worldview of historians writing in Persian, the king is the pinnacle of the power structure. Khwāja Nezām al-Molk writes: 32 Ibid., p. 18. 33 Jorfādeqāni, 2003, p. 336 and pp. 377–381, 391. The invasion of India is so extensive and widespread that Jorfādeqāni never neglects to describe the devastation and looting goals of Soltān Mahmud (p. 385). 34 Mahmud’s invasion of India and its infinite riches, including the use of elephants, which were added to some of the techniques of the Ghaznavids, continued during the reign of Soltān Masʿud. ʿAzod al-Dowla had also experimented with new military techniques. The use of elephants in wars, which was not common in Iran until the time of Islamic conquests, was started by ʿAzod al-Dowla (Ibn Moskuya, 2000, vol. 3, p. 368).

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In every age and time God (be He exalted) chooses one member of the human race and, having adorned and endowed him with kingly virtues, entrusts him with the interests of the world and the well-being of His servants. He charges that person to close the doors of corruption, confusion, and discord, and he imparts to him such dignity and majesty in the eyes and hearts of men, that under his just rule they may live their lives in constant security and ever wish for his reign to continue.35

In addition to making accounts of events that they defined as their most crucial task, the historians wrote about their viewpoints of the ideal world of power. In his introduction to Saljuqnāma, Zahir al-Din Neyshāburi describes the status of the king along with the status of the prophets and emphasizes that those kings who are equipped with religion and a knowledge of history have a status that is close to that of the prophets.36 The king was at the highest point after the Prophet and even sided with him with this attitude. This was when the ʿAbbāsid caliph was still at the forefront of religious and sometimes political leadership, and the amirs and soltāns considered the consolidation of their power subject to his approval and receiving his mandate. The structure of kingship had its roots in pre-Islamic Iran, which was to be reproduced by Iranian and Turkish agents to separate their power structures from the caliphate. After praising God and the Prophet of Islam in Persian historiography, the king is praised. Although historians dedicate an essential part of their works to the history of the caliphs, the caliphs never held the same status as kings in the political assessments of the historians. The historians consider the decisions of kings to be based on God’s will. It is as if the king is the only executor of a plan that God has predetermined. According to the Mojmal al-Tavārikh, “God appointed them a king, whom he saw worthy of his dignity, [the king] who made the world prosperous in justice and set them on the right path.”37 The Muslim agent, who was to reproduce the structure of kingship, had to be adorned with wisdom and thought and associated with the scholars of religion, the wise and the learned, the pious and the ascetic. According to Khwāja Nezām al-Molk:

35 Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, 1999, p. 11; tr., 1960, p. 9. 36 Zahiri Neyshāburi, 2011a, pp. 9–10. 37 Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939, p. 1.

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The soltān is the shadow of God and the ruler in the religion of Mostafā. If he does benevolence for the sake of the kingdom and the observance of the rights of the people, God will help him. And if he acts contrary to God’s commands and prohibitions, God will leave him to himself to bring corruption, prohibition, immorality, and destruction and then send him to Hell. He must choose justice to see prosperity.38

Khwāja Nezām al-Molk stresses that the most important pillar for kingship is to practice the right religion: Kingship and religion are like two brothers. Whenever disturbance breaks out in the country, religion suffers, too. Heretics and evil-doers appear, and whenever religious affairs are in disorder, there is confusion in the country. Evil-doers gain power and render the king impotent and despondent. Heresy grows rife and rebels make themselves felt.39

Undoubtedly, when Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, along with other historians, wrote about the Iranian kings, he not only looked at pre-Islamic models such as Ardeshir and Anushirvān, but also looked at examples such as Ismāʿil, the Sāmānid amir, ʿAzod al-Dowla, the Buyid amir, and Mahmud, the Ghaznavid amir, who served their people and did not pay attention to gold and silver. 40 This suggests that Khwāja Nezām al-Molk pursues a realistic plan to establish institutions rooted in pre-Islamic Iran and recent history. From the viewpoints of historians writing in Persian, the kingship was manifested in its independence from the caliphate. The more the king was adorned with the ornaments of religion, morality, and knowledge, the more he was honored. The king should accept changes and adjustments according to the needs of his time. 41 Religion and justice are not merely two adornments but two important structural resources for kingship in the realm of power. Ibn Balkhi writes: The greatest favor that [God] does for the king in particular and to the public in general is … to direct the efforts of the king to knowledge and justice, because all the skills are included in these two virtues … and the 38 39 40 41

Rāvandi, 2011, p. 125; see also Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, 1999, p. 13. Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, 1999, p. 62; tr., 1960, p. 80. Ibn Moskuya, 2000, vol. 3, p. 368. Zahiri Neyshāburi, 2011a, pp. 9–10.

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public is relieved and sheltered in justice, kindness, and affection, and the king finds happiness in the two worlds. 42

Although oppression by anyone is displeasing to the historian, it is commendable if the oppressive king can use his authority to prevent the oppression of others. According to Afzal Kermāni, “They said, ‘You are the most just king.’ He said, ‘I am not the most just king, but if I enforce justice, the army will not be able to oppress my subjects.’”43 For the historians writing in Persian, kingship has high status; they refer to the king as the God (khodāvand) and the leader (malek) of the world. 44 In this way, historians place the king at the top of the power structure so that his words will be the main guidelines of the power structure. For these historians, the king is the incarnation of God on earth, and his deeds should be praised rather than criticized. However, some historians openly or covertly criticized the kings and their actions. 45 Al-Ghazāli introduces the king as the “olol ʿazm” (“[one] with high authority”), according to verse 58 of Surah An-Nesāʿ, and argues that because the soltāns are like “olol ʿazm” prophets, the pious people must love and obey the kings, because God has given them the kingship.46 Najm al-Din Rāzi also advises that the king’s decrees are like divine commands and, therefore, they should not be degraded. 47 The historians try to use the verses of the Qorʾān and the Hādiths of the Prophet to prove the supremacy of kingship over other structures of power, including the caliphate. It seems that the historians, emphasizing the status of kingship, sought to separate Iran’s political borders from the caliphate by prudence and not warfare. Besides, contemporary historians warned the kings about their wrongdoings with their advice and criticism. 48 From the point of view of Qābusnāma, the difference between a king and a subject is that the king commands and the subject obeys. Key Kāvus writes: In a kingship, do not let anyone disregard your command, since he has disregarded you. In a kingship, all happiness is commanding since the king’s appearance is the same as a servant. The difference between a 42 Ibn Balkhi, 2006, pp. 1–2. 43 Afzal Kermāni, 1977, p. 84. 44 Ibid. 45 Beyhaqi, 1995, vol. 1, p. 189. 46 Ghazāli, 2010, pp. 81–82. 47 Najm al-Din Rāzi, 2002, p. 112. 48 Key Kāvus, 1996, p. 198.

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king and a servant is that the king commands and the servant obeys those commands. 49

The historians’ efforts can be considered in line with the efforts of the great Iranian poet, Abol Qāsem Ferdowsi, whose ideal viewpoint was to see a unified Iran,50 independent from the caliphate. Soltān Mahmud-e Ghaznavi: The First Soltān The idea of r​​ eproducing the structure of kingship, which had been gradually introduced with the formation of the first Iranian dynasties, finally became more serious with the formation of the Ghaznavid dynasty. The Ghaznavids’ descent from the Turks and their affiliation with the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate may be contrary to r​​ eproducing the structure of pre-Islamic Iranian kingship, but the significant social changes that the Ghaznavids made in the structure of power paved the way for the reproduction of the kingship. During the Ghaznavid period, when the circle of social changes in the reproduction of the kingship structure became more complete, Ghaznavid amirs introduced themselves in connection with pre-Islamic Persian kings. Saboktegin, who founded the Ghaznavid rule, attributed himself to Yazdegerd III (d. 651 AD), the last Sassanid last king. Jowzjāni writes: “Imam Mohammad ʿAli, Abul Qāsem, ʿEmādi, in his work, the Tārikh-e Majdul, states that Amir Saboktegin was a descendant of Yazdgerd-e Shahriyār, the last of the sovereigns of Persia.”51 It emphasized the structural resources that lay in the name of the last Sassanid king, who had been killed by an unnamed man in Khorāsān, and now Saboktegin, the founder of the Ghaznavid dynasty, was rising to power from Khorāsān. The Ghaznavids sought to identify themselves as surviving agents from the generation of pre-Islamic Iranian kings by attributing themselves to the last cycle of pre-Islamic kings. Thus, the Ghaznavids, using the Sassanid government’s resources, considered their dynasty to be a reproduction of this empire.52 With the coming to power of the Ghaznavids, especially Soltān Mahmud, an important chapter of social change was shaped in the history of the Iranian leadership. The use of the title shāhanshāh had previously been used for ʿAzod al-Dowla, the greatest amir of the Buyids, but historians 49 50 51 52

Ibid., p. 230. Nodushan, 1994, pp. 63–68. Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 2, p. 226; tr., 1881, vol. 2, pp. 69–70. Jorfādeqāni, 2003, p. 19.

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refer to Soltān Mahmud as the first soltān in the Islamic world. According to Jowzjāni, “Soltān Mahmud-e Ghāzi was a great monarch, and was the first among the sovereigns of Islam, who was styled soltān by the court of the khalifas of Baghdad.”53 The persistent efforts of the Iranian amirs, especially during the reign of the Buyids and the person of ʿAzod al-Dowla, to revive pre-Iranian kingship, were finally reproduced by the Ghaznavids. Unlike many historians, Beyhaqi does not generate any genealogy for Yaʿqub and the sons of the Buyids. Accordingly, he considers Soltān Mahmud a simple and ordinary person. Instead of emphasizing his sword’s power, he emphasizes God’s favor with the Ghaznavid amirs and that without God’s help, they could not reach the throne. However, this idea creates a special kind of legitimacy for these agents who come to power because of God’s will. The beautiful analogy that Beyhaqi uses for Mahmud and his son Masʿud is very thought-provoking. They are like flames rising from the ashes. Beyhaqi writes: If a mighty and commanding prince from the stock of Mahmud and Masʿud has ascended the throne, there is no cause for wonder. Yaʿqub ibn Leys was the son of a coppersmith and Bu Shojāʿ ʿAzod al-Dowla va al-Din was the son of Hasan-e Buya, who fled as a rebel to the Sāmānids from the midst of the Deylamites, and by dint of his mettle and firm resolution, and through the grace of the divine decree of God Most Mighty, he turned from the state of being a rebel to becoming a king. Then his son ʿAzod, through his lofty resolution and bold spirit, became ever more powerful than his father and kinsmen, and he wrought those deeds and attained those achievements which have been set forth in the Ketāb-e Tāji of Bu Eshāq al-Sābi. They also recount many tales of Abu Moslem, the leader of the ʿAbbāsids’ successful bid for power, of Tāher Zol-Yamineyn and of Nasr ibn Ahmad amongst the Sāmānids. God, the Most Exalted One, has said, regarding Saul [Tālut] and He’s the most veracious of those who speak: “And he increased him amply in knowledge and bodily strength.” Whenever the care and solicitude of the Creator Most High come into play, He makes evident virtues and acts of greatness, and out of the ashes He kindles a blazing fire.54

Ash is the same structure that has provided the resources to create such characters. 53 Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 1, p. 228; tr., 1881, vol. 1, pp. 75–76. 54 Beyhaqi, 1995, vol. 2, p. 516; tr., 2011, vol. 2. pp. 24–25.

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Undoubtedly, an essential part of the grandeur of the Ghaznavids is tied to Beyhaqi and his great work. We do not intend to write a separate chapter for Beyhaqi here. We only point out that Beyhaqi has conquered the highest peak of historiography in medieval times due to his point of view and the content and structure of his work. Beyhaqi emphasizes that Iranian dynasties, from the Saffārids and Sāmānids to the Buyids and the Ghaznavids, were all built by anonymous people, separating himself from other historians who have sought to generate a genealogy for pre-Islamic kings to link them to the founders of local dynasties. What makes Mahmud an extraordinary king in the eyes of Beyhaqi was his astonishing power in the reproduction of past structures and agents. Among these structures was expanding wars on a large scale in the name of the ghazva and jihad.55 Apart from setting up a magnificent court decorated with learned men and sometimes prominent ministers, including Hasanak, Soltān Mahmud himself became accustomed to the tyrannical nature of kings and thus had a common point with them. Beyhaqi considers Soltān Mahmud and Soltān Masʿud to be tyrants, but he distinguishes between their tyranny. Mahmud is a far-sighted man who, despite all his despotism, tries to compensate for his mistakes, while Masʿud was a man who persisted in his errors.56 Continuation of Strengthening the Persian Language and Iranian Culture in the Court of the Ghaznavid Turks The Ghaznavid amirs considered the presence of Iranian intellectuals necessary for the court’s prosperity and cultural structures. Attention to the Persian language and Iranian culture was a valuable legacy of the Sāmānids and used as a potent resource by the Ghaznavids. While the Buyids, one of the pioneers of Iranian culture, insisted on using Arabic, the courts of Soltān Mahmud and Soltān Masʿud in Ghazna were among the flourishing centers for Persian language and culture.57 The Majmaʿ al-Ansāb states that “Soltān Mahmud loved poetry and considered poets superior to all scholars and increased their gifts.”58 During his conquests, Soltān Mahmud brought many books to Ghazna, and he was very interested in bringing together poets and intellectuals in his court. 55 56 57 58

Gardizi, 1984, p. 379. Beyhaqi, 1995, vol. 2, p. 627; see also Katouzian, 2003, pp. 251–254. Bosworth, 2004, p. 131; Safā, 2000, vol. 1, p. 100. Shabānkāreʾie, 1996, p. 69.

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Beyhaqi writes: “Whenever he came across a man or woman who was an outstanding exponent of his or her craft or profession, he would dispatch that person there.”59 When Mahmud sent his ultimatum to Abu al-ʿAbbāss Maʾmun al-Khwārazmi, he made this request: I heard that some people in the court [majlis] of Khwārazmshāh are graceful and unique, including so-and-so. You need to send them to our court so that they may be honored there, and we can be encouraged by our knowledge and sufficiency, and we will have the blessing from the Khwārazmshāh.60

Some scholars believe that Soltān Mahmud’s insistence on inviting poets and intellectuals to attend the court was not a sign of friendliness, but really a deception on his part, and that he actually behaved disrespectfully toward them,61 but it seems that Soltān Mahmud did indeed reproduce the Iranian kingship and establish a glorious court.62 Although the Persian language and literature continued to grow and develop during the Ghaznavid period, the Ghaznavids’ attention to Baghdad and the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate effectively supported the use of Arabic over Persian. During the Ghaznavid period, Khorāsān’s relations with Baghdad and the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate increased, and these relations naturally attracted more attention to Arabic.63 For example, communications in the chancellery (Divān-e Rasāʾel), which was conducted in Persian at the behest of Abu al-ʿAbbās Fazl ibn Ahmad Esfārāyeni, was changed to Arabic by Ahmad ibn Hasan Meymandi,64 the new Ghaznavid minister. Gradually, knowing Arabic enabled a person to gain a worthy position in the court, and the influence of Arabic on the Persian language became more prominent.65 The story of Ferdowsi’s visit to Mahmud to preserve his great work, Shāhnāma, always remains an unresolved issue in Mahmud’s cultural record,66 but Mahmud’s many services in preserving the Persian language and culture cannot be ignored. Undoubtedly, Ghaznavid interest in learning 59 Beyhaqi, 1995, vol. 1, p. 254; tr., 2011, vol. 1, p. 304. 60 Nezāmi ʿAruzi, 2004, p. 118. 61 Bosworth, 1963, p. 175. 62 Ibid. vol. 1, p. 133. 63 Bahār, 2003, vol. 2, p. 554; Bosworth, 2004, p. 38. 64 Khwāja Ahmad Ibn Hasan Meymandi was a resourceful and prudent minister called Shams al-Kofāt (Nodushan, 1994, p. 38). 65 Safā, 2000, vol. 2, p. 948; Haqiqat, 1994, p. 78. 66 Safā, 2000, vol. 1, pp. 477–484.

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and culture was a reproduction of the structures that the Sāmānids had worked hard to create and develop. The Structural Resource of the War with the Ismāʿilis and the Fatimids The mission that the Ghaznavids began in legitimizing their swords by invading India and trying to revive the ʿAbbāsid power led to large-scale religious wars with the Shiʿites, especially the Ismāʿilis and the Deylamites.67 Even one of the main reasons Mahmud cited for his attack on India, apart from the fight against the “infidels Hindus” (“kāfarān-e hendu”), was the fight against the Ismāʿilis settled in Pishāvar and Multan in India.68 Soltān Mahmud sent a letter to Qāder, the ʿAbbāsid caliph (336–422 AH/947–1031 AD), informing him of the massacre of Shiʿites in Ray. In this letter, Soltān Mahmud accused the jurists ( faqihs) of Ray and the Shiʿites,69 especially the Ismāʿilis, of not performing their acts of worship, such as prayer, paying the zakāt, etc. They stated that they did not believe in the Day of Judgment and the angels and did not differentiate between things that were halāl and those that were harām. He concluded that God would help reestablish the sunnah (tradition) of Islam in Cairo.70 Fighting against bad-dini (sacrilege) was fighting against any kind of thinking that was interpreted as heresy in terms of power. The Ismāʿilis, who propagated their religion in different areas during the Buyid reign and whose will to power had been previously established by the Qarmatis and Fatimids in the Levant and Egypt, faced a strong barrier during the Ghaznavids.71 The Ghaznavids, who had based their development on religious wars, massacred the Ismāʿilis in the conquered lands to separate themselves from the Shiʿites. This went so far that even Fatimid religious ambassadors or envoys who were sent to persuade Soltān Mahmud to their religion were sentenced to death.72 Rather than seeking to uncover differences, the debate was a one-sided trial of an Ismāʿili ambassador whose sentence to death was issued even before his voice was heard. Gardizi even denies the existence of this court and states that the envoy was killed without a trial.73 67 Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939, p. 404. 68 Jorfādeqāni, 2003, pp. 182, 279; Safā, 2000, vol. 1, p. 137; Frye, 1965, p. 166. 69 Soltān Mahmud fought against all kinds of Shiʿites (Shahrestāni, 1971, vol. 1, p. 38), but Mahmud treated Imam Reza’s pilgrims with respect (Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. 9, p. 401). 70 Ibn Jowzi, 1992, vol. 15, p. 171. 71 Gardizi, 1984, p. 418. 72 Jorfādeqāni, 2003, pp. 371, 370. 73 Gardizi, 1984, p. 393; see also Hamdollāh Mostowfi, 1985, p. 394.

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The Fatimid Caliphate, which considered the Ghaznavid dynasty to be the most important defender of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate and wanted influence in their court, did not just send an ambassador to their court. Hākem, the Fatimid caliph (r. 386–411 AH/997–1021 AD), tried to prevent the drastic actions of Soltān Mahmud against the Shiʿites, especially the Ismāʿilis, and attempted to create a split between the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate and Soltān Mahmud. Therefore, Hakem sent a khalʿat for Soltān Mahmud and not to the court of Qāder, the ʿAbbāsid caliph. Qāder gathered the elders at the Dār al-Hekmat, where one of the elders read a letter by Soltān Mahmud expressing his loyalty to the ʿAbbāsid caliph. In this letter, Soltān Mahmud introduced himself as a servant of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate and opposed anyone who was an enemy of the caliphate.74 Mahmud’s f ierce religious war against the Shiʿites was a sign of the significant social and religious change that was taking place in the Islamic world. The Shiʿites, who dominated the world during the Buyid period, were now under the pressure of the caliph and the Ghaznavids. However, other schools of thought, especially Sufism, which were being formed at this time, were also considered bad-din and their followers were persecuted.75 Split in the Power and Premature Aging of the Power Structure The power structure established by Soltān Mahmud must have increased in stability during the period of subsequent agents. It required the election of a suitable successor and the preparation of the ground for his presence in the power structure, an issue that Mahmud disregarded by creating a split between his sons, Mohammad and Masʿud, and thus paved the way for the fragmentation of power and the premature aging of the power structure. The issue of succession became a structural obstacle to the consolidation of power, the first result of which was to find a domestic enemy for the political structure. Referring to Alexander’s life as one of the most powerful kings in the history of the world, Beyhaqi accuses him of merely conquering new lands and failing to manage them and then covertly criticized the structure of Soltān Mahmud’s government. Soltān Mahmud, who spent all his time in the conquest of other lands, did not make a sound decision on an important matter such as succession and provided the seeds of the split in the power structure. According to Beyhaqi: 74 They then burned the robe in the presence of the elders, but its 4,562 pieces of silver were distributed among the poor people of Bani Hashem (Ibn Jowzi, 1992, vol. 15, p. 171). 75 Jorfādeqāni, 2003, pp. 394–395.

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I begin by stating that, among the excellent kings of the past are a group who can be regarded as outstanding, and among them two have been singled out as particularly memorable. One is Alexander, the Ancient Greek [yunāni], and the other is Ardeshir, the Persian [pārsi]. But since our own lords and monarchs have surpassed these two in all things, one should necessarily know that our kings have been the greatest on the face of the earth; for Alexander was a man whose royal flame took light strongly, flared up for only a very short while, and was then turned into ashes. His manner of conquering those mighty kingdoms and traversing the inhabited regions of the world was akin to that of a sightseer passing through different places. As for those monarchs whom he subdued, when he asked them to submit to him and style themselves his inferiors, it was as if his actions were constrained by a solemn oath that he had once vowed to perform and was how going through with it so that he would keep to his word [i.e., all this was triggered by the whim of a moment]. But what is the point of just wandering around the world? A monarch must keep a tight rein, or by seizing some realm and region but failing to maintain his grip, and then impetuously moving on to invade yet another land, and repeating the same process and abandoning it, he would have given fall scope for all and sundry to call him weak and impotent.76

The historian considers the need for the continuation of power not in the conquest of new lands but in the establishment of power, which Soltān Mahmud, by focusing on his expanding campaigns and disregarding the issue of succession, paved the way for the early destruction of the power structure. The power structures established by Soltān Mahmud, including the invasion of India, religious wars, and the escalation of differences between his two sons, Mohammad and Masʿud, made social changes that led to the decline of the Ghaznavids. Analyzing the causes of the division in the structure of Ghaznavid power, Beyhaqi argues that the Ghaznavid agents appointed by Soltān Masʿud were responsible for widening this division of power, but he emphasizes that this split originated during the reign of Soltān Mahmud and the issue of his secession. Referring to Alexander and Ardeshir as two successful kings, Beyhaqi considers the Ghaznavid kings superior to them, but by referring to Alexander’s conquests and his indifference to the issue of succession and how to govern those conquered lands, Beyhaqi blames Mahmud for all these failures. By creating conflicts between his sons and

76 Beyhaqi, 1995, vol. 1, p. 150; tr., 2011, vol. 2, p. 179.

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implicitly supporting his older son, Soltān Mohammad, Mahmud paved the way for the division in the power structure.77 In the reign of Soltān Masʿud, the split in the power structure became evident. These disputes turned Soltān Masʿud against the Ghaznavid agents loyal to his father, Mahmud, and then his brother, Mohammad. The formation of two groups of agents, known as Pedariyān (those who were loyal to Mahmud) and Pesariyān (those who were loyal to Soltān Masʿud), points clearly to the deep split between the loyalists of Mahmud and his son Masʿud. Gardizi writes: Whoever had violated Amir Masʿud, may God have mercy on him. He regarded his enemy, arrested them, punished each of them, and made everyone desperate. And he took Ahmad Yenāltegin Khāzan, the treasurer of Amir Mahmud, and ordered the confiscation of much of his property. And when he received the property, he sent him to India … and those wraths, confiscations, sufferings, and abuses that had befallen Ahmad Yalnātegin were in Ahmad’s heart.78

The difference between Pedariyān and Pesariyān that the historian constantly emphasizes was that the Pedariyān, because of the shaping of the Ghaznavid power structure, had a better understanding of its effectiveness than the Pesariyān, who only sought to remove the active agents of the Mahmud era from the power structure. They were unaware that the structural resource that he had created would be destroyed by eliminating any agent. Beyhaqi writes: “The old guard [pedariyān va mahmudiyān] had put up with that situation in order for each to save his own skin. I had never seen my master, Bu Nasr, so apprehensive and perturbed in mind as I saw him then.”79 The difference between the Pedariyān and Pesariyān was based on the hostility started by the Pesariyān and continued until the fall of the Ghaznavid dynasty.80 Soltān Masʿud, who structurally continued the path of Soltān Mahmud, paved the way for social change in the power structure by eliminating prominent agents in military and bureaucratic structures and replacing them with immature agents. These eliminated agents included Altuntāsh,81 77 78 79 80 81

Beyhaqi, 1995, vol. 1, p. 277. Gardizi, 1984, p. 425. Beyhaqi, 1995, vol. 1, p. 237; tr., 2011, vol. 1, p. 199. Beyhaqi, 1995, vol. 2, pp. 277–278. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 51.

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the ruler of Khwārazm, ʿAli Hājeb, and Hasanak-e Vazir.82 Beyhaqi compares ʿAli Hājeb and other likewise agents to Abu Moslem-e Khorāsāni, who was removed by the same power structure he had played a key role in its construction.83 By narrating a story about Yaʿqub and his reactions to his opponents, Beyhaqi warns Soltān Masʿud of his extremist actions against Pedariyān.84 Beyhaqi’s aim in telling this story is to emphasize to Masʿud that the Pedariyān should be expected to be loyal to Mahmud and pay attention to Masʿud so that there is no dichotomy or gap in the power structure. It was eliminating key agents and replacing them with immature and ignorant ones that led to the collapse of the dynasty that was on the verge of becoming an empire at the threshold of Soltān Mahmud’s death. Murder of a Vizier on Charges of Bad-dini (Sacrilege) The structure of the bureaucracy that was so prominent in the court of Iranian dynasties, especially the Sāmānids and the Buyids, was reproduced during the Ghaznavid period with the appointment of prominent ministers, including Abu al-ʿAbbās Esfārāyeni, Hasanak-e Vazir, and Hasan Meymandi. Soltān Mahmud’s reign was linked to military power in terms of the soltān’s military personality and the nature of Ghaznavid power, which was partially based on war and conquest. But Mahmud, who claimed to establish a kingship, emphasized the bureaucrats’ role in regulating military affairs. With the reign of Masʿud, the court gradually became devoid of prominent bureaucrats, and the voices of those who were still in the power structure were rarely heard. As the structure of Iranian bureaucracy was reproduced, the structural barriers to their power by religious pretexts and accusations of bad-dini were also reproduced. The assassination of Hasanak-e Vazir under the pretext of Qarmatigari was an example of Soltān Masʿud’s distancing from the agents of his father’s time, who had formed part of the Ghaznavid power structure. It was as if the structure of the fight against bad-dini, with which 82 From the list of prominent people who have been immersed in the time of Masʿud, the following examples can be mentioned: ʿAli Qarib and his brother Mankitrāk (Beyhaqi, 1995, vol. 1, pp. 53–54), Amir Yusuf, uncle of Soltān Masʿud (ibid., pp. 57–60), Aryāroq, the ruler of India, and Hājeb-e Ghāzi, the military commander (ibid., 225–229). 83 Beyhaqi, 1995, vol. 1, p. 49. 84 When the supporters of the Tāherids were brought before Yaʿqub, who had now defeated them, they said that they owed it to Tāherids and therefore did not want to betray their leaders (Beyhaqi, 1995, vol. 2, p. 398).

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Mahmud had waged many campaigns, was now being reproduced against a powerful bureaucracy by removing a prominent minister. Hasanak-e Vizir was executed on the pretext of accompanying the Qarmatis, confiscating his properties.85 To describe Hasanak’s character more accurately as one of Mahmud’s most prominent agents and his role in social change, Beyhaqi describes Bousahl-e Zuzani as an agent who played a vital role in the downfall of Hasanak and many other Pedariyān. According to Beyhaqi, “Despite his pomp and rank, wealth and number of followers, Bu Sahl was a mere drop of water to an ocean.”86 Thus, Beyhaqi emphasizes the differences between the structures of Mahmud and Masʿud’s era, emphasizing the differences between these two bureaucrats. Beyhaqi’s detailed description of Hasanak’s story, from his dismissal to his execution, informs the reader of a closed-door conspiracy to remove conscious agents. Beyhaqi pointed to Mahmud’s strong reaction to Hasanak’s redemption and dealings with the Fatimid caliph. Mahmud vehemently denied the accusation, which was repeated by the ʿAbbāsid caliph and Hasanak’s opponents and specified that he and Hasanak were pak-din (religiously pure). Beyhaqi writes: A letter must be written to this dotard of a caliph that in order to show my esteem for the ʿAbbāsids, I have exerted my power throughout the whole world, seeking out Qarmatis, and if found and proven, I will have them hanging from the gallows. If it had been proven to my satisfaction that Hasanak was a Qarmatis, a report would have reached the Commander of the Faithful concerning what has been done regarding him. I have raised him myself, and he is on a level with my own children and brothers. If he is a Qarmatis, then I, too, am a Qarmatis.87

But this old accusation was repeated during Masʿud’s reign to drag Hasanak to the gallows. Beyhaqi writes: In the midst of all this, Ahmad, the keeper of the royal wardrobe, came along mounted, turned to Hasanak, and delivered this message: “The lord soltān says, ‘This is your own wish which you had sought, saying, “When you become monarch, hang me from the gallows!” We wanted to spare you, but the Commander of the Faithful has written that you have 85 Gardizi, 1984, pp. 424–425. 86 Beyhaqi, 1995, vol. 1, p. 227; tr., 2011, vol. 1, p. 271. 87 Beyhaqi, 1995, vol. 1, p. 230; tr., 2011, vol. 1, p. 275.

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become a Qarmatis and you are being put to death in accordance with his command.’” Hasanak, of course, made no reply.88

Beyhaqi beautifully refers to the obvious and the hidden reasons for Hasanak’s execution. The apparent reason was the same accusation against the Qarmatigari that was not proven in all the accounts that Beyhaqi and other historians narrated about Hasanak’s death. Hasanak’s disagreement with Masʿud and his association with his brother Mohammad during Mahmud’s time was hidden, but this was the main reason for Hasanak’s death. This was told to him on the eve of his execution. Hasanak’s silence about this accusation is his clear response to all the allegations of bad-dini attributed to the bureaucrats. Hasanak, charged with religious misconduct without the right to selfdefense in the court of the Pesariyān, was acquitted in public by the people. Beyhaqi writes: Hasanak was brought to the foot of the gallows. We seek refuge in God from an evil fate! The two messengers were stationed there, supposedly having just arrived from Baghdad, and the Qorʾān reciters were intoning the Qorʾān. They ordered Hasanak to take off [his clothes]. He put his hand inside his clothes and secured the strings of his ezār [pants] and tied its ankle strings and drew off his gown and his shirt and threw them away together with his head covering. He stood there naked except for his ezār, with his hands held together, with a body as white as silver and a face finer than many a painted picture. All the people were weeping from grief. They brought along an iron helmet with a visor, intentionally narrow so that his face and head would not be covered. An order was shouted out, “Cover his head and face lest they be marred by the stones, for we shall be sending his head to Baghdad for the caliph.” They kept Hasanak in this state. His lips were moving and reciting something, until a larger-sized helmet was brought.89

Although the ʿAbbāsid caliph had previously confirmed the accusation of the Qarmatigari, it was pursued at this time using the name of the caliph. A few people in the uniform of the caliph’s messengers stood in the corner of the execution scene only to convince the people that Hasanak was Qarmati. However, the people were not convinced. They were unable to 88 Beyhaqi, 1995, vol. 1, p. 234; tr., 2011, vol. 1, p. 280. 89 Beyhaqi, 1995, vol. 1, pp. 234–239; tr., 2011, vol. 1, p. 279.

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stop the execution and they cried and cursed the main perpetrators of Hasanak’s execution for immortalizing his name in history as an actor killed innocently. The Arrival of the Saljuq Turkmen and the Early Defeat of the Ghaznavid Structure In examining the results of the wars between the Ghaznavids and the Saljuqs, Beyhaqi seeks it out at the Ghaznavid court rather than in the battlefield. Therefore, in describing the reasons for the victory of the Turkmen and the loss of Khorāsān, instead of focusing on the military superiority of the Turkmen, he considers the premature aging of the Ghaznavids as the cause of their early defeat. The roots of this exhaustion lay in the people’s despair of Masʿud and the diminished legitimacy of the Ghaznavid dynasty. Suri was one of the Ghaznavid agents appointed by Soltān Masʿud to the rule of Khorāsān. He sent valuable gifts to the soltān by imposing high taxes on people. Beyhaqi writes: Suri was ruthless and tyrannical. When he was given a free hand over Khorāsān, he destroyed the notables and local leaders, extracted large sums of money, and afflicted the poor and weak with his oppression. Out of every ten dirhams that he took, he gave the soltān only five. These notables were brought to destruction, and they sent envoys and wrote letters to Mā Varā al-Nahr, and made complaints to the leaders of the Turks, which made them incite the Turkmen [i.e., to take over Khorāsān]. Likewise, the poor and the weak raised up supplications to God (His mention is exalted). The agents of the postal and intelligence service did not have the courage to send a true report of Suri’s doings, and the amir would not hear a word against him, and seemed only concerned with those lavish presents of his.90

Soltān Masʿud was pleased with the gifts, while the Ghaznavid agents behind these gifts saw the suffering of the people as threatening to the legitimacy of Masʿud’s reign in Khorāsān.91 The continuous tyranny of the soltāns and their disregard for the votes of key agents led to the transfer of power from the Ghaznavids to the Saljuqs. Zahiri Neyshāburi writes: 90 Beyhaqi, 1995, vol. 2, p. 638; tr., 2011, vol. 2, pp. 64–65. 91 Beyhaqi, 1995, vol. 2, pp. 637–638; Ibn Fondoq, 2011, pp. 78–82.

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They sent someone to Mahmud, saying: “Our people, followers, and animals have become too much for us, and, due to the great numbers, the crowding and the multitude of the group, our meadows and pasture lands have become too small for us. These pastures are not sufficient for our animals and our abundant following. What we hope for from the perfect generosity of the soltān is that he will give permission for us to cross the river and settle in Khorāsān between Nesā and Bāward.” Arsalān Jāzeb, the governor of Tus, who built the stronghold of Sang-Bost and is buried there, said: “Letting them into Khorāsān is not the right thing to do, for there are a lot of them and they have endless amounts of equipment and provisions for war. One should not allow mischief to arise from them.” The soltān, seeking support and an increase of his treasury, sick with cupidity and desire for wealth, gave them permission to cross the river, paying no attention to his well-reasoned discourse. The wise have said that among the covetous and greedy, affairs are quickly advanced. While Soltān Mahmud lived they made no move, nor did they cause any opposition or rebellion.92

By accepting the Turkmen in Khorāsān, Soltān Mahmud unconsciously reproduced the action of the Sāmānids, who had once accepted the presence of the Turks on their land93 and into their court and made them serious structural obstacles to continuing their power. The arrival of the Turkmen in Khorāsān marked the beginning of a change in the Ghaznavid power structure. However, from the very beginning, Ghaznavid agents warned the soltān of the consequences of this action. According to Gardizi: Amir Tus, Abu al-Harith Arsalān-Jāzeb came to Amir Mahmud and said, “Why did you let these Turkmen arrive in the province? It was a mistake you made. Now that you have brought them, kill them all or let me cut off their point fingers so that they cannot shoot.” May God have mercy on him, Amir Mahmud was surprised by it and said: “You are a ruthless and hard-hearted man.” So Amir Tus said, “If you do not do this, you will be very sorry.” And it was as he said, and so far, this problem has not been solved yet.94

Although the number of Turkmen did not exceed 3,000 or 4,000 people at their arrival, they soon became a significant obstacle to the Ghaznavids’ 92 Zahiri Neyshāburi, 2011a, pp. 13–14; tr., 2011b, p. 33. 93 Gardizi, 1984, p. 411. 94 Ibid. See also Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 1, p. 246.

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authority in Khorāsān. Soltān Mahmud temporarily defeated them; however, the presence of Turkmen became an essential obstacle to the continuation of the Ghaznavid power. The Turkmen’s presence in Khorāsān soon became an unresolved crisis during the reign of Soltān Masʿud.95 Zayn al-Akhbār considers the basis of Soltān Masʿud’s attention to the issue of Turkmen to be the people’s grievances over the killing and looting by the Turkmen.96 In this regard, the historian deals with the conditions of the people of Neyshābur, who witnessed the Saljuq invasions of the cities of Khorāsān and the killing and looting of the people. Now they were on the verge of a great decision to resist the Turkmen or surrender to them.97 The remarkable example that Qāzi Sāʿed cited for the people of Neyshābur indicates the difficult conditions that the Iranian people always faced in medieval times.98 People were asked to submit and accept the new claimants of the power structure. Although the transfer of power, both within the dynasty and from one dynasty to another, has always been costly for the people, their resistance was far more irreparable in the absence of the Ghaznavids’ military power. According to Beyhaqi: Qāzi Sāʿed said: “Your assessment is a fair one. Ordinary folk cannot be expected to face up to an army. You have a powerful lord like Amir Masʿud. If this province is of any use to him, perforce he will come himself or send someone to secure it. But for now, a fierce fire is leaping up and is spreading, and a horde ready on [spilling] blood and bent on pillage has appeared on the scene. We have no choice but to comply.” The Imam Movaffaq, who was the sāheb-Hadithān, and all the nobles agreed that “this is the only sensible course of action, or else would have allowed the town to be sacked for no good reason. The soltān is far away from us. We can seek pardon for our present conduct later, and he will accept it.”99

The issue of people’s resistance to the new power structures, which was repeated many times in medieval times, intensified during the Mongol invasion. The responses of power agents, on the one hand, and the reactions 95 96 97 98 99

Basan, 2010, p. 24. Gardizi, 1984, p. 428. Beyhaqi, 1995, vol. 3, p. 882. Paul, 2005, pp. 577–581; Durand-Guedy, 2005, p. 600. Beyhaqi, 1995, vol. 3, p. 882; tr., 2011, vol. 2, p. 230.

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of the people to this question, on the other, led to extensive social changes in Iranian history, which will be examined in Chapter 11. Going to India and Losing Khorāsān The fact that the Saljuqs were able to occupy Khorāsān during the reign of Soltān Masʿud, and to limit the Ghaznavid rule to India was a sign of the premature weakening of the Ghaznavid rule. Beyhaqi argues that Masʿud’s departure from Khorāsān and his preoccupation in Āmol while the Saljuqs attacked Khorāsān, and then his departure for India after his f irst defeats against the Turkmen, were the main reasons for the Ghaznavid defeats.100 Khwāja Hasan, the soltān’s vazier, listed Soltān Masʿud multiple reasons about moving to Ray. First, it was because of his brother Mohammad, who might sit on the Ghaznavid throne in his absence. The second reason was that Caliph Qāder was dying, and his son Qāʾem was to sit on his throne in Baghdad, so it would have been better for the soltān to be in Khorāsān. And a third was because of the Turkmen. But Masʿud ignored his vizier’s advice101 and without proper preparation moved to Āmol.102 While the Turkmen were gradually settling in many cities of Khorāsān and seeking to increase their power, Bu Nasr and the Khwāja Hasan-e Vazir refrained from telling the truth to Soltān Masʿud. Beyhaqi writes: My master replied: “This situation has got beyond that point when it can possibly be salvaged, and it is better to keep unpalatable counsel to oneself. At present, the words of old men like us sound odious to the lord; this is the situation favored by these untested youths, and it explains why they depict old men in such an unfavorable light. We have no choice except to remain silent.” The vizier said, “Just so. And if he does broach the subject and asks us about it, we shall remain silent.”103

Thus, the bureaucrats, who saw Masʿud’s high wall of spontaneity and deliberation in the face of their advice,104 took refuge in silence and waited for the unfortunate events to play out. 100 Paul, 2005, pp. 577–581; Durand-Guedy, 2005, p. 600. 101 Beyhaqi, 1995, vol. 2, p. 435. 102 Ibid., vol. 3, p. 920. 103 Ibid., vol. 3, p. 920. vol. 2; tr., 2011, vol. 2, p. 276. 104 Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 913–914.

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The Battle of Dandānqān, the most critical moment of the confrontation between the Ghaznavids and the Saljuqs, ended with Soltān Masʿud, a defeat whose effects were evident even before the start of the war in the behavior of the Ghaznavid troops. According to Beyhaqi: The amir mounted and he set off along the road to Marv, but his troops were going along in an apprehensive and despondent fashion as if they were being pulled from behind. The heat was fierce, there was a dearth of provisions, food and fodder were nowhere to be found, the beasts were emaciated, and the troops were having to fast. On the road, the amir passed several of the troops who were in tears as they led their horses on the way. He was struck to the heart and said, “This army has become reduced to a terrible state.”105

The image that Beyhaqi presents of the soldiers’ morale was the exact opposite of the image in the previous conflict, the victorious Ghaznavid wars under Mahmud’s command against the Indians. Ghaznavid advisers and elders were worried about the soltān’s sudden departure for Marv without considering the necessary supplies for his army. The advisors did everything they could to stop him, but the soltān threatened to kill them. This was when Toghrol, the chief of the Turkmen and the founder of the Saljuq dynasty, was consulting with the Turkmen rulers before fighting against Soltān Masʿud. Toghrol’s idea was not to fight against Soltān Masʿud in Khorāsān but to move to Gorgān or Ray in central Iran. Still, he listened to the advice of his military commanders like Dāvud and decided to fight against Masʿud in Khorāsān, which ended up with the victory of the Turkmen in the Battle of Dandānqān (431 AH/1040 AD).106 The actions of Soltān Masʿud and his authoritarian temperament disappointed the two main resources of Ghaznavid structure, the bureaucrats and the eminent amirs. The abandonment by military men of Soltān Masʿud led to his defeat in the Battle of Dandānqān. According to Beyhaqi, “Soltān Masʿud sent someone to the commanders of his army and ordered them to fight. They did not fight and retreated, and he was still fighting until there were not many people around him and he saw that it was hopeless.”107

105 Ibid., vol. 3, p. 947; tr., 2011, vol. 2, p. 309. 106 Zahiri Neyshāburi, 2011a, pp. 15–14; see also Beyhaqi, 1995, vol. 3, p. 954. 107 Gardizi, 1984, p. 437.

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The Death of Soltān Masʿud and an Early End for the Ghaznavid Structure The structure of the invasion of India, which was once helpful in strengthening the political and economic foundations of the Ghaznavid dynasty, was now a testament to his defeat in preserving Khorāsān. The minister’s efforts to deter the soltān from turning his back on Khorāsān as the most important base of Ghaznavid power did not help.108 Soltān Masʿud, who had voluntarily set out on his way back to India, accused the vizier of ignorance to cover up his tyranny. Beyhaqi writes: When the amir had read this letter, he straightaway said to me, “This man has become a dotard and doesn’t know what he is talking about. Write the reply, ‘The right course is the one we have discerned. The vizier set forth his view on the basis of giving sincere advice. He is to await the command until what the soltān deems necessary first ordained, for I can see what you are unable to see.’”109

The assassination of Soltān Masʿud by his army and his brother Mohammad’s transfer of power arose from Masʿud’s self-centered and unwise actions. Many military commanders who had looted many lands, including India during the Ghaznavid rule, now looted Masʿud’s property to compensate for the failure at the Battle of Dandānqān, which they saw as the result of the soltān’s ruthlessness. To prevent him from returning to power, the military men killed him and crowned his brother Mohammad, who was captive.110 The circle of social change, which ended with the insistence of Soltān Masʿud in favor of the Pesariyān, began a new round of tensions within the structure of Ghaznavid power. Thus, Soltān Mahmud’s goal of establishing a great Islamic empire was reproduced not by the Ghaznavid agents but by the Saljuq Turkmen.

Bibliography Afzal Kermāni, Ahmad ibn Hāmed (1977). ʿAqd al-ʿAlā Lel-Mowqef al-Aʿlā, ed. ʿAli Mohammad Amiri Nāyini, intro. Mohammad Ebrāhim Bāstāni Pārizi, Tehrān: Ruzbahān. 108 Beyhaqi, 1995, vol. 3, p. 994. 109 Ibid., pp. 994–995; tr., 2011, vol. 2, p. 366. 110 Beyhaqi, 1995, vol. 3, pp. 963–980.

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Bahār, Mohammad Taqi (2003). Sabkshenāsi ya Tārikh-e Tatavvor-e Nasr-e Pārsi, 3 vols., Tehrān: Farāsugostar Barthold, V. V. (1968). Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion. London: Luzac Basan, Aziz (2010). The Great Seljuqs: A History, London and New York: Routledge Beyhaqi, Abol Fazl Mohammad ibn Hosseyn (1995). Tārikh-e Beyhaqi, ed. Khalil Khatib Rahbar, 3 vols., Tehrān: Mahtāb Beyhaqi, Abol Fazl Mohammad ibn Hosseyn (2011). Tārikh-e Beyhaqi, trans. Clifford Edmund Bosworth and Mohsen Ashtiāny, 3 vols., London: Ilex Foundation Bosworth, C. E. (1963). The Ghaznavids: Their Empire in Afghanistan and Eastern Iran, 994–1040. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press Bosworth, C. E. (2004). The New Islamic Dynasties: A Chronological and Genealogical Manual, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press Durand-Guedy, David (2005). “Iranians at War under Tukish Domination: The Example of Pre-Mongol Esfahān,” Iranian Studies, vol. 38, no. 4, pp. 587–606 Frye, R. N. (1965). Bukhara: The Medieval Achievement, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press Gardizi, Abu Saʿid ʿAbdol Hayy ibn Zahhāk (1984). Zeyn al-Akhbār, ed. ʿAbdol Hayy Habibi, Tehrān: Donyā-ye Ketāb Hamdollāh Mostowfi, Ibn Abi Bekr (1985). Tārikh-e Gozida, ed. ʿAbdol Hosseyn Navāie, Tehrān: Amir Kabir Haqiqat, ʿAbdol Rāfeʿ (1994). Vazirān-e Irani az Bozorgmehr tā Amir Kabir, Tehrān: Kumesh Ibn Asir, ʿAli ibn Mohammad (1965). Al-Kāmel fi al-Tārikh, 13 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Sāder Ibn Balkhi (2006). Farsnāma, ed. Guy Le Strange and Reynold Nicholson, Tehrān: Asātir Ibn Fondoq, ʿAli ibn Zeyd Beyhaqi (2011). Tārikh-e Beyhaq, ed. Ahmad Bahmanyār, Tehrān: Asātir Ibn Jowzi, ʿAbdol Rahmān (1992). Al-Montazam fi Tavārikh al-Moluk va al-Omam, ed. Mohammad ʿAbdol Qāder ʿAtā, 19 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Kotob al-ʿElmiya Ibn Khalaf, Mohammad Hosseyn (1990). Borhān-e Qāteʿ, Tehrān: Amir Kabir Ibn Moskuya, Ahmad ibn Mohammad (2000). Tajāreb al-Omam va Taʿāqeb alHemam, ed. Abol Qāsem Emāmi, 6 vols., Tehrān: Sorush Jorfādeqāni, Abol Sharaf Nāseh ibn Zafar (1888). Tārikh-e Yamini, trans. James Reymolds, London: Printed for the Oriental Translation Fund of Great Britain and Ireland Jorfādeqāni, Abol Sharaf Nāseh ibn Zafar (2003). Tārikh-e Yamini, ed. Jaʿfar Shoʿār, Tehrān: ʿElmi va Farhangi Jowzjāni, Menhāj al-Serāj (1881). Tabaqāt-e Nāseri, trans. H. G. Raverty, London: Gilbert and Rivington

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Jowzjāni, Menhāj al-Serāj (1984). Tabaqāt-e Nāseri, ed. ʿAbdol Hayy-e Habibi, 2 vols., Tehrān: Donyā-ye Ketāb Katouzian, Muhammad ʿAli (2003). Iranian History and Politics: The Dialectic of State and Society, London and New York: Routledge Curzon Key Kāvus, ʿOnsor al-Maʿāli (1996). Qābusnāma, ed. Qolām Hosseyn Yusefi, Tehrān: ʿElmi va Farhangi Khalili, Khalilollāh (2011). Saltanat-e Ghaznaviyān, ed. Mohammad Sarvar-e Molāyi, Kābol: Enteshārāt-e Amiri Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, Hasan ibn ʿAli ibn Eshāq (1999). Siyar al-Moluk (Siyāsatnāma), ed. Hubert Darke, Tehrān: Entesharāt-e ʿElmi va Farhangi Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, Hasan ibn ʿAli ibn Eshāq (1960). Siyar al-Moluk (Siyāsatnāma), trans. Hubert Darke, New Haven: Yale University Press Maqdasi, Mohammad ibn Ahmad (2007). Ahsan al-Taqāsim fi Maʿrefat al-Aqālim, trans. ʿAlinaqi Monzavi, Tehrān: Kumesh Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas (1939). Ed. Mohammad Taqi Bahār and Behjat Ramezāni, 2nd ed., Tehrān: Kolāla-ye Khāvar Najm al-Din Rāzi, ʿAbdollāh ibn Mohammad (2002). Marmuzāt-e Asadi Dar Mazmurāt-e Dāvudi, ed. Mohammad Reza Shafiʿi Kadkani, Tehrān: Sokhan Narshakhi, Mohammad ibn Jaʿfar (1984a). Tārikh-e Bokhārā, trans. Abu Nasr Ahmad ibn Mohammad ibn Nasr Qabāvi, summarized by Mohammad ibn Zafar ibn ʿOmar, ed. Modarres Razavi, Tehrān: Tus Narshakhi, Mohammad ibn Jaʿfar (1984b). Tārikh-e Bokhārā, trans. Richard N. Frye, Cambridge, MA: Medieval Academy of America Nezāmi ʿAruzi, Ahmad ibn ʿOmar (2004). Chahār Maqālat va Taʿliqāt, ed. Mohammad Qazvini, Mohammad Moʿin, Tehrān: Sedā-ye Moʿāser Nodushan, Mohammad ʿAli (1994). Sarv-e Sāyefekan Darbāri-ye Ferdowsi va Shāhnāma, Tehrān: Yazdān Paul, Jürgen (2005). “The Seljuq Conquest(s) of Nishapur: A Reappraisal,” Iranian Studies, vol. 38, no. 4, 575–585 Rāvandi, Mohammad ibn ʿAli (2011). Rāhat al-Sodur va Āyat al-Sorur, ed. Mohammad Eqbāl, intro. Badiʿ Foruzānfar and Mojtabā Minovi, Tehrān: Asātir Safā, Zabihollāh (2000). Tārikh-e Adabiyyāt-e Iran, ed. Mohammad Torābi, 3 vols., Tehrān: Qoqnus Shabānkāreʿie, Mohammad ibn Ali (1996). Majmaʿ al-Ansāb, ed. Mir Hāshem Mohaddes, Tehrān: Amir Kabir Shād, Mohammad Pādeshāh (1956). Farhang-e Annederaj, ed. Dabir Siyāqi, Tehrān: Khayyām Shahrestāni, Abol Fath, Mohammad ibn ʿAbdol Karim (1971). Al-Melal va al-Nehal, trans. Sadr Tarka Esfahāni, ed. Mohammad Reza Jalāli Nāʾini, 2 vols., Tehrān: Eqbāl

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Tārikh-e Sistān (1976). Trans. Milton Gold, Roma: Instituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente Tārikh-e Sistān (1987). Ed. Mohammad Taqi Bahār, Tehrān: Padida-ye Khāvar Zahiri Neyshāburi, Zahir al-Din (2011a). Saljuqnāma, ed. Ismāʿil Afshār Hamid al-Molk & Mohammad Ramezāni, Tehrān: Asātir Zahiri Neyshāburi, Zahir al-Din (2011b). Saljuqnāma, From the Jameʿ Al-Tawārikh, trans. Kenneth Allin Luther, ed. C. E. Bosworth, London and New York: Routledge

10 The Saljuq Dynasty The First Islamic Empire in Iran Abstract The Saljuq dynasty, which ruled the vast Islamic lands from Mā Varā al-Nahr to the Mediterranean Sea for nearly two centuries, based its power on the division of power between various structures, namely the soltānate, the caliphate, the vizierate, and the amirate. Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, the vizier of the Saljuq dynasty, by establishing Nezāmiya schools (religious colleges), wanted to draw the religious scholars and young generations of the Saljuq Empire to this region and establish intellectual harmony. Instead, Khwāja Nezām al-Molk’s political-religious ideas fueled religious differences and created a suffocating environment. Eventually, with the weakening of the bureaucratic structure and the expansion of the monopolistic power of the military, the Saljuq territories were divided among princes, amirs, and atābaks (governors). Keywords: Saljuq dynasty, Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, Nezāmiya school

Division of Power and Gaining Political Legitimacy After the Sassanid Empire, Iran under the Saljuqs (429–590 AH/1037–1194 AD) once again experienced the structure of an empire, but this country was far from its pre-Islamic structures. Apart from the fading of national and religious identity, these differences included the disappearance of the country’s integrity and its transformation into part of the great Islamic empire. During the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate and with the formation of the Tāherid dynasty, the Iranians again tried to establish dynasties independent of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. This resulted from the efforts of various agents and the formation of Iranian dynasties, including the Sāmānids and the Buyids. But before the rise of the Saljuq dynasty, Iran, in comparison to its pre-Islamic terrain, had become a fragmented territory ruled by various dynasties

Kamali, M. Social Change in Medieval Iran 132-628 AH (750-1231 AD). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2023 doi: 10.5117/9789463721981_ch10

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under the shadow of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. Those who wanted to cross Iran from east to west had to travel across various borders, and even these lands included only part of the Iranian identity and not all of it. The Saljuq Turkmen, as described in the previous chapter, set out on the same path as that covered by the agents of the Ghaznavids, including Mahmud. Crossing the border of Ray, invading Baghdad and the surrounding cities, and governing all the territories from Mā Varā al-Nahr to the Mediterranean Sea was a preliminary plan designed by the Ghaznavids and carried out by the Saljuq Turkmen. But it was difficult to preserve and rule these lands. At this time, Iran was controlled by Turkmen military men who were alien to Iran. The vizierate was the only narrow structural string that could bind the Saljuqs to pre-Islamic Iran. Ibn Esfandiyār, while describing the patterns of the moluk al-tavāyefi (tribal rule) system, which the Saljuqs used, delicately refers to Alexander who brought Iran from Achaemenid rule into part of the great Greek empire. Referring to Aristotle’s point of view advising Alexander, the historian suggests that the way to rule over Iran was to use Iranian agents and apply moluk al-tavāyefi. Ibn Esfandiyār writes: The opinion is that you should distribute the kingdom of Iran to the sons of their kings, … and not give any one superiority over another. Since each of them sits in the position of a king, [they] will become tyrannical because kingship brings pride and every king whose head carries a crown will not accept paying tribute [to another] and will not bow before anyone. And there will be so much interference, haughtiness, domination, antagonism, and confrontation between them that … they will not take revenge on you. When Alexander understood Aristotle’s answer, he decided to divide ​​ Irān-shāhri (greater Iran) among Iranian sons and kings, [to use the] moluk al-tavāyefi [system].1

Muslim Saljuq agents at this time were far more acceptable to Iranians than Alexander, whose religion was entirely foreign to Iranians. The Saljuq dynasty, centered on the soltānate and the division of the territories among important administrative and military officials, ensured the rule of the vast empire for nearly two centuries over vast Islamic lands from Mā Varā al-Nahr to the Mediterranean Sea.2

1 2

Ibn Esfandiyār, 2011, vol. 1, p. 13. Helmi, 2005, pp. 166–168; Melville, 1998, p. 56.

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The Saljuqs from Serving the Caliphs to the Competition with the Structure of the Caliphate The Saljuqs shared religious and political responsibilities between themselves and the caliphate, based on the division of the power structure. According to the shariʿa writers (theologians) of this period, such as Māvardi (364–450 AH/975–1059 AD) and Ghazāli (505–450 AH/1059–1112 AD), the caliph was responsible for the religious activities of the society. In contrast, the soltān was accountable for world affairs.3 The Saljuqs, who had set foot on the path of the Sāmānids and Ghaznavids in terms of paying attention to the powerful resources hidden in the structure of the caliphate, approached the caliph from the very beginning. Before the invasion of Mā Varā al-Nahr and Khorāsān, they converted to Islam and became subject to the “enna al-moʾmenunal-ekhva” (the believers are brothers) rule. 4 After winning the war, the Turkmen wrote a letter to the caliph justifying their violence, murder, and looting, legitimizing their power with his approval. Zahiri Neyshāburi writes: The notables and well-known people of Khorāsān asked us to undertake to give them aid and assistance and protect them. His amirs and troops set out against us several times, and between ourselves and them, there were many attacks and counterattacks, battles, and strife. Most of the same victory and success (which are the vanguard of statehood and the signs of good fortune) were with us. Finally, with the aid of God most high and his assistance (for “There is no victory save with God”) and the good fortune conferred by your sanctified prophetic excellence, victory was ours. We were the winners and conquerors. In thanks for this gift and special grace, giving praise for this victory and good fortune, we have spread justice and its administration among the people, and we have kept away from the path of injustice and oppression. We want this affair, on the path of religion and in accordance with the laws of Islam, to be according to the command of the caliph.5

At a time when the Turks were fighting over Khorāsān, they never thought of getting the approval of the ʿAbbāsid caliph, but their continued presence 3 Māvardi, 2001, pp. 3–15; Ghazāli, 2010, pp. 63–69. 4 (10 :‫ (الحج رات‬.‫ امَّنَّ َا الْ ُم ْؤ ِم ُن و َن إِ ْخ َو ٌة فَ أَ ْص لِ ُح وا بَ ْ َنْي أَ َخ َويْ ُك ْم َواتَّ ُق وا ال لَّ َه لَ َع لَّ ُك ْم تُ ْر َح ُم ون‬Ibn Howqal, 1967, p. 510; Barthold, 1968, p. 68. 5 Zahiri Neyshāburi, 2011a, p. 17; tr., 2011b, pp. 39–40; see also Bondāri Esfahāni, 1977, p. 8; Rāvandi, 2011, pp. 102–103.

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in society while the Ghaznavids had already proved their allegiance to the ʿAbbāsid caliph required the caliph’s approval.6 The caliph approved their presence in Khorāsān by replying to the Turkmen’s letter and asking them to behave in a way that was far from violent with the Muslims. According to Zahiri Neyshāburi: When their letter reached Caliph al-Qāʾem be Amr Allāh, he sent Hebat Allāh ibn Mohammad al-Maʾmeni with their messenger to Toghrol at Ray and he answered the message in the best possible way.… He advised them with warnings, saying, “Do not be overbearing toward the servants of God, and do not ruin the land.” He [the caliph] sent admonitions and promises, and dispatched a robe of honor and a standard. In sum, what they hoped for was entirely bestowed.7

The Saljuqs, who had been kept from power during the Buyid period,8 came back into power under the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. This was a good opportunity to make use of this new, strong, obedient, and, most importantly, allied rival of Buyids and even the Fatimids to reproduce their own power. Therefore, the caliph confirmed the rule of Toghrol: “The caliph ordered them to give the Friday khotba in Toghrol Beg’s name from the pulpits of Baghdad. They struck his name on the coins of the mint.”9 The Saljuq soltān legitimized his rule by using the caliph’s name, and the caliph paved the way for his return to the golden age of power by using the military power of the Sunni Saljuqs.10 The Saljuqs needed a caliph to legitimize their rule, but they also saw him as an essential obstacle to their absolute power. Thus, while retaining the caliphate, they also made it clear to the caliph that he was not allowed to reproduce his worldly power. The Saljuqs sought to monitor and dominate the caliphs by appointing their ministers and establishing alliances based on marriage.11 After the capture of Baghdad, Toghrol (r. 429–455 AH/1037–1063 AD) appointed a shehna to oversee the caliph and gave him a certain number of pensions to cover his expenses. Zahiri Neyshāburi writes, 6 Safi, 2006, p. 12; Melville, 1998, p. 53. 7 Zahiri Neyshāburi, 2011a, p. 18; tr., 2011b, p. 41. 8 Helmi, 2005, pp. 154–156; Hosseyni, 2003, pp. 55; Hanne, 2007, pp. 182–183. 9 Zahiri Neyshāburi, 2011a, pp. 18–19; tr., 2011b, p. 41. 10 Safi, 2006, p. 248. 11 Zahiri Neyshāburi, 2011a, p. 21; Rāvandi, 2011, p. 111; Bondāri Esfahāni, 1977, p. 8; ʿAqili, 1985, p. 204; Hamdollāh Mostowfi, 1985, p. 100.

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When he set out for the palace of the caliph, on the way he came faceto-face with the vizier of the caliph. He said, “I am bringing a message to the soltān.” ʿAmid al-Molk went back along with him and did not indicate where he had been going and what he had been going to say. He came before the soltān and said, “The vizier of the caliph has come with a message, and the guess of this slave is that he will ask for an income on behalf of the caliph. If he says something in this vein, answer, ‘I am in favor [of this] for I myself was thinking of this. Let me tell the Master to arrange it.” It happened that the vizier brought the same message before the soltān that ʿAmid al-Molk had supposed. The soltān answered just as he had been prompted and turned the matter over to the Master. After that, ʿAmid al-Molk called the scribes, asked for the tax list of Baghdad and set the income of the caliph. He took all the official government correspondence under his control in such a manner that the dust of affliction settled nowhere, and the fortune of the ʿAbbāsids again became fresh and green.12

The caliphs were allowed to select their ministers during the Saljuq period. In the first year that the Saljuqs entered Iraq, the caliph had the opportunity to select Abu al-Qāsem ʿAli ibn Hasan ibn Salma as his prime minister,13 but the caliph’s minister did not have much power and served under the Saljuq minister. It was only after the death of Soltān Mohammad Malekshāh (r. 464–484 AH/1072–1092 AD) that the caliphate took serious measures to seize power. The selection of the shehna as the caliph was a sign of the profound social change that was taking shape during the Saljuq period. With the establishment of this agent in Baghdad, the Saljuqs monitored the power of the caliph. By establishing a family bond with the caliph and appointing a shehna in Baghdad,14 the Saljuq soltāns, while strengthening the foundations of the legitimacy of their rule, controlled the caliphs.15 Relations between the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate and the Saljuqs, which were initially very friendly, cooled in the late Malekshāh period,16 and a new era of relations developed between the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate and the Saljuqs, which fundamentally changed the fate of the Saljuqs. Historical accounts of this period in history is replete with the many conflicts between these two structures of power. The wars with Mostarshed (r. 512–529 AH/1119–1134 12 13 14 15 16

Zahiri Neyshāburi, 2011a, p. 21; tr., 2011b, p. 44. Ibn Jowzi, 1992, vol. 2, p. 91. Bondāri Esfahāni, 1977, p. 8; Hosseyni, 2003, p. 73. Bondāri Esfahāni, 1977, p. 8; Hosseyni, 2003, p. 73. Mir Khwānd, 2002, vol. 4, p. 282; Ibn Taqtaqā, 1971, p. 339.

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AD)17 and Rashid (529–530 AH/1135–1635 AD)18 were two examples of a change in the relationship between the Saljuqs and the caliphs. Unlike the Ghaznavids and the Sāmānids, the Saljuqs did not remain loyal to the caliph, and their conflicts led to the conspiracy of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate to overthrow Toghrol III and bring the Khwārazmshāhi to power. Nezāmiya Schools and the Creation of Religious and Intellectual Integration Khwāja Nezām al-Molk’s political and religious ideas played an essential role in the nature of the Saljuq structure during the reign of Alb Arsalān (r. 455–465 AH/1063–1073 AD) and then Malekshāh (r. 465–485 AH/1073–1093 AD). In many ways, the Saljuqs were different from previous dynasties. Taking advantage of political thinkers and intellectuals such as Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, this dynasty tried to turn Iran into an independent and integrated country. Khwāja Nezām al-Molk’s idea of I​​ rān-shāhri was derived from the idea of ​​political unity in the shadow of the Sassanids’ religious unity. Khwāja Nezām al-Molk wanted to achieve the unity of the country through religious unity. The establishment of Nezāmiya schools (religious colleges) was done in this regard. Khwāja Nezām al-Molk took decisive steps to minimize religious differences by recognizing the Shāfeʿie religion and creating intellectual homogeneity in government agencies. The most crucial goal of the Nezāmiya schools was to train Shāfeʿie missionaries to counter the methods and words of the Ismāʿili and Moʿtazelites.19 The establishment of Nezāmiya schools provided the basis for sectarianism and religious tensions. This point confirms that while Islamic jurisprudence and mysticism continued progressing and well-known individuals in these areas emerged, other areas of academic and theological thought were stifled during this period 20 and imitation overcame research and critical thinking.21 Although Abu Rajā emphasizes the importance of science,22 he denies the importance of great philosophers such as Ibn Sinā and equates their 17 Mir Khwānd, 2002, vol. 4, p. 320; Hosseyni, 2003, p. 128, 134; Ibn Asir, 1965, 11, pp. 281-283; Rāvandi, 2011, p. 237; Joveyni, 2006, vol. 3, p. 221; Khwāndmir, 2009, vol. 2, pp. 320–322. 18 Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. , 11, pp. 48-62; Ibn Taqtaqā, 1971, p. 415; Ibn al-ʿEbri, 1998, vol. 2, p. 271; Hosseyni, 2003, p. 14; Khwāndmir, 2009, vol. 2, p. 322; Joveyni, 2006, vol. 3, p. 221. 19 Almāsi, 1991, pp. 315–329. 20 Beckwith, 2009, p. 178. 21 Abol Rajāʾe Qomi, 1984, p. 86. 22 Ibid., pp. 253–254.

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philosophy with delusion. It seems that the historian’s emphasis on knowledge only applies to religious knowledge. Students were not allowed to read books on rational studies in religious schools, especially philosophy, and were barred from discussing philosophy, geometry, and astronomy.23 The Nezāmiya schools insisted on religious unity when religious dispersal was very diverse in the Saljuq dynasty.24 They attracted many influential agents to the Shāfeʿie religion. But it sparked religious strife and created a suffocating environment for freedom of thought, which was more dangerous than the fragmentation of ideas and opinion. Ismāʿili Castles on the Heights of Islamic Lands The establishment of the Saljuq dynasty and their fanatical inclination toward the Sunnis limited the activities of the Shiʿites.25 The limitations of the Ismāʿili sect were the highest among the Shiʿites. For the Muslim community, the Ismāʿili movement was defined as a continuation of anti-Islamic movements that began with the uprising to take revenge for the murder of Abu Moslem and continued until the uprising of the Khorramdinis and then the Ismāʿilis.26 This sectarianism and incitement to religious differences, especially violence against the Ismāʿilis, was one of the reasons they moved from daʿva to violence. The Ismāʿilis, who had not stopped propagating their religion from its inception to the time of the Saljuqs, finally underwent profound structural changes with Hasan Sabbāh (430–518 AH/1050–1124 AD). Joveyni writes: I followed the religion of my fathers, that is, Twelver Shiʿism. There was a person in Ray called Amira Zarrāb who held the beliefs of the Bātenis of Egypt. We constantly disputed with each other and he tried to destroy my beliefs. I did not give in to him but his words took root in my heart. Meanwhile, I was overcome with a very dreadful illness and I thought to myself: “That is the true religion and because of my fanaticism I would not admit it. If, which Heaven forfend, my appointed hour should come, I shall have perished without attaining the truth.” It so happened that I recovered from that illness. Now there was another Bātenis called Bu-Najm 23 24 25 26

Helmi, 2005, pp. 254, 389. Golden, 1972, p. 100; ʿAbdol Jalil Qazvini, 2012, p. 459. Ibn Kasir, 1990, vol. 12, p. 69. Joveyni, 2006, vol. 3, p. 188.

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Sarrāj. I questioned him about their religion. He expounded it to me in detail so that I became conversant with its hidden secrets.27

Hasan Sabbāh later tied the name of the Ismāʿilis of Iran to his name, set out on this path at the invitation of the dāʿies. Undoubtedly, in that period, the Ismāʿili religion more than the Twelver Shiʿites provided the ground for political agents to gain power. Hasan Sabbāh’s conversion from the Twelver Shiʿite to the Ismāʿili religion testifies to this claim. Joveyni writes: There was another called Moʿmen, who had been authorized by ʿAbdol Malek, son of ʿAttāsh, to carry out propaganda. I asked him to administer the oath of allegiance. He replied, “Thy rank, since thou art Hasan, is higher than mine since I am but Moʾmen. How then shall I administer the oath to thee? That is, how shall I ask thee to swear fealty to the imam?” However, after much insistence on my part, he administered the oath to me. In the year 464 AH [1071–1072 AD] ʿAbdol Malek, the son of ʿAttāsh, who at that time was the dāʿies in Iraq, came to Ray. I met with his approval, and he made me a deputy dāʿies and indicated that I should go to His Majesty in Egypt, who at the time was Mostanser.28

ʿAbdol Malek ibn Attāsh was one of the Ismāʿili dāʿies who preached in the service of the Fatimids in Esfahān and led the Ismāʿili in western Iran.29 ʿAbdol Malek asked Hasan Sabbāh to leave for Egypt in 469 AH/1077 AD. Egypt was a holy center for the Ismāʿilis, whose circumambulation was obligatory. The path to Egypt for Hasan Sabbāh, who had previously served the Saljuqs,30 was like crossing the Saljuqs and the ʿAbbāsids and entering the land of their enemies. It should not be forgotten that great officials such as Hasanak-e Vazir were accused of going to Egypt and were executed in the not-so-distant past. Joveyni writes: I finally arrived in Egypt in the year 471 AH [1078–1079 AD]. I stayed there nearly a year and a half, and during my stay, though I was not admitted before Mostanser, he knew of me and several times spoke in 27 Ibid.; tr., Juvaini, 1997, vol. 3, pp. 667–668. 28 Joveyni, 2006, vol. 3, pp. 188–189; tr., Juvaini, 1997, p. 668. 29 Rāvandi, 2011, p. 159; Haqiqat, 1994, p. 146. To learn further about his life, see Mojmal alTavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939, p. 408; Fazlollāh Hamedāni, 2006, vol. 1, p. 122; Daftary, 2018, pp. 181–184; Lewis, 1968, p. 151. 30 Some of the Ismāʿilis had already been working in the Saljuq apparatus (Bondāri Esfahāni, 1977, p. 75; Joveyni, 2006, vol. 3, p. 191).

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praise of me. Now Amir-al-Joyush, his commander-in-chief, who was an absolute and all-powerful ruler, was the father-in-law of his younger son, Mostaʿli, whom by a second designation he had made his heir. Now, I, in accordance with the principles of my religion, conducted propaganda on behalf of Nazār.31

Finally, Hasan Sabbāh returned to Esfahān in 481 AH/1081 AD after an adventurous journey. Hasan Sabbāh’s difficult trip to Egypt was a turning point in the history of the Ismāʿilis. Many dāʿies had already paved the way that Hasan had taken to return with more faith and work to develop the region. But Hasan Sabbāh left Egypt when the Fatimids were experiencing a rift in the power structure. While the Fatimid caliph was still alive, there were many conflicts over his succession among power agents. These differences were so significant that Hasan Sabbāh, who had not been in Egypt just for a year, had reached a position where he could easily propagate in favor of Nazār, one of the claimants to power. His actions went so far that he was expelled from Egypt. His expulsion from Egypt, which five years later was accompanied by the succession of Mostaʿli (r. 487–495 AH/1094–1102 AD), another Fatimid claimant,32 separated the Iranian Ismāʿilis from Egypt. By this time, the Ismāʿilis had reached a point where they could distinguish themselves from the Fatimids of Egypt in terms of maturity of thought and structural capacity. After arriving in Iran, Hasan Sabbāh called himself a Nazāri Shiʿite and sent his dāʿies to various regions. For Hasan Sabbāh, the story of the Fatimids and the propaganda for them ended with his return from Egypt. After settling in Alamut in 483 AH/1091 AD, which was never easy,33 he sent a call to various regions to propagate the Ismāʿili religion.34 As mentioned earlier, many Ismāʿili dāʿies accepted this religion not as the legacy of their ancestors but with their choice. Nāser Khosrow Qobādiyāni (394–481 AH/1004–1089 AD) and Hasan Sabbāh were among these dāʿies. But if Nāser Khosrow insisted on wisdom and prudence in his religion, Hasan Sabbāh insisted on an imamate and imitation of him, which required the imitator to pass over his wisdom. 31 Joveyni, 2006, vol. 3, pp. 189–190; tr., Juvaini, 1997, p. 668. 32 Fazlollāh Hamedāni, 2006, vol. 1, pp. 77–79; Kāshāni, 1964, pp. 114–115; Bardi, 1989, vol. 5, pp. 142–145; Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. 11, p. 370. 33 Joveyni, 2006, vol. 3, pp. 188–190. 34 Ibid., pp. 195–196.

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The structure that Hasan Sabbāh founded also was a further reproduction of the Shiʿite Buyid structure. If the Buyids tried to resort to religious policy to survive between the two ʿAbbāsid and Fatimid Caliphates and take advantage of the structural resources of both, the Ismāʿilis with an agent like Hasan Sabbāh moved away from the Fatimids and went to fight against the ʿAbbāsids. The establishment of Hasan Sabbāh (settlement) in Alamut35 marked the beginning of the formation of an Ismāʿili dynasty (483–564 AH/1091–1169 AD) in Islamic Iran.36 The path taken by the Ismāʿilis was structurally the opposite of that of the Prophet of Islam. The Prophet of Islam, who was engaged in worship in the mountains before preaching his ideas, descended from the mountain to begin his invitation among the people. The Ismāʿilis, on the other hand, had been sending their missionaries to many cities for many years to preach their beliefs. But, when most of the community still saw them as Rāfezi and their ideas heretical, they took refuge in the heart of the mountains to gradually find their place in Islamic society.37 By taking refuge in the castle, Hasan Sabbāh reproduced the structural resources that Bābak Khorramdin had previously used. He expanded his relations with other Ismāʿili dāʿies so much so that in 483 AH/1091 AD he established an Ismāʿili movement in the castles of Iran, including Alamut and Lamsar, and soon his command spread among the Ismāʿilis of Iran in the north, northwest, east, and central regions.38 The assassination of key figures accompanied the establishment of forts previously used for military purposes.39 The main agents of the Ismāʿili power needed agents who were fascinated by their religion, and one of their religious duties was to volunteer to kill defenseless people as well as powerful agents in the Saljuq and the ʿAbbāsid power structures to reach high spiritual levels. 40 The Ismāʿilis’ attempt to assassinate them was due to the limited number of them in the society and their illegitimacy among most Sunni people. In fact, Khwāja Nezām al-Molk al-Tusi was the first victim of the Ismāʿili assassinations. 41 35 Fazlollāh Hamedāni, 2006, vol. 1, p. 112; Kāshāni, 1964, p. 148. 36 Daftary, 2018, pp. 183–185. 37 Among those assassinated by the Ismāʿilis were Borsaq-e Kabir, Soltān Sanjar’s military commander (Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939, p. 409), and ʿEzz al-Molk ʿAbdol Jalil, Barkiyāroq’s vazir (Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas, 1939, p. 410). 38 Bondāri Esfahāni, 1977, p. 76. 39 Rāvandi, 2011, p. 157; Afzal Kermāni, 1947, p. 17; Nakhjavāni, 1979, p. 288. 40 Walker, 2008, p. 136. 41 Joveyni, 2006, vol. 3, pp. 203–204.

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The establishment of the Ismāʿili dynasty in Iran marked the beginning of a new round of wars and violence in Islamic lands.42 Like the Ghaznavids, the Saljuqs went to war with the Ismāʿilis. The Ismāʿilis, now a lever for social change in the Saljuq government structure, had themselves gone through a complex cycle of changes. 43 However, their power was so great that the Saljuq Empire, despite all its efforts, failed to eliminate them, and the Ismāʿilis continued their way to social change until the arrival of Helegu (d. 663 AH/1265 AD), the Mongol Khan, and the founder of the Il-Khānid dynasty in Iran. The Role of Amirs in the Power Structure: Inclusiveness or Monopoly? Military men were forced to cooperate with civil society and the bureaucracy to establish themselves in society and institutionalize their power. Therefore, they gradually delegated parts of their power to the bureaucrats, and while sharing power with them, they used the power of the prudence and pen of these agents. As one of the essential pillars of civil society, the bureaucracy has a traditional and long-standing legitimacy that puts an end to the violence and riotous behavior of the military and leads its forces to create stability in society. Although military men used bureaucrats and politicians to gain power and establish their power, they tried to minimize the role of the bureaucrats as much as possible and keep them under control. 44 In the Saljuq dynasty, three groups of amirs were working under the soltān’s supervision: First, they were in charge of the soltān’s court, where they carried out its day-to-day affairs. Second, there were the governors who managed the provincial government or the administration of the governorates. Third, there were the nomadic or displaced military men, who did not have a special commitment and wandered throughout the empire and, if necessary, rushed to the aid of the various amirs of the empire. 45 Rāvandi considered the commanders an essential part of the power structure and made important recommendations.46 He called on the king to do justice 42 Zahiri Neyshāburi, 2011a, pp. 41–42; Rāvandi, 2011, pp. 155–161; Fazlollah Hamedāni, 2006, vol. 1, pp. 120–122; Kāshāni, 1964, pp. 156–157; Ibn Khaldun, 2010, vol. 3, p. 3; Daftary, 2018, p. 228; Lewis, 1968, p. 149; Rāvandi, 2011, p. 155; Joveyni, 2006, vol. 3, p. 211. 43 Bayāni, 2002, vol. 1, p. 184. 44 Robertson, 1993, p. 117. To learn more about the military system of the Saljuq Empire, see Peacock, 2015, ch. 6. 45 Lambton, 1988, pp. 231–232. 46 Rāvandi, 2011, p. 238.

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to all elements of society, including the army, the religious scholars, and the ordinary people. 47 Amirs had always been powerful agents in the Saljuq power structure, and because of the collective nature of their roles, their power was less challenged than that of a soltān or a minister. 48 A secret alliance involving the military brought them together. In one account of the assassinations and looting carried out by the amirs, a historian points out that they acted in groups because of their tribal origins, 49 which played a crucial role in establishing their power. Khwāja Nezām al-Molk writes: “When troops are all of one race, dangers arise; they lack zeal, and they are apt to be disorderly. It is necessary that they should be of different races.”50 Khwāja Nezām al-Molk cites Soltān Mahmud as a successful example in the administration of the amirate, which included several divisions of the army, such as Turks, Khorāsānis, Arabs, Hindus, Ghurids, and Diyālamis. He recommends that the king choose his troops from different ethnic groups; therefore, he would prolong his rule by creating divisions among them. Ethnic divisions always fostered competition among the soldiers and encouraged them to make a greater effort to be successful so that their ethnic group would not be accused of laziness.51 The amirs of all post-Islamic Iranian dynasties, from the Tāherids to the Buyids, played a key role in social change and even the reproduction of structures, but with the arrival of the Turks, who were known for their military prowess and horse-riding skills,52 their role in social change became much more prominent. The presence of the amirs in the power structure made society more militarized.53 One of the hallmarks of insecurity was the Turkish amirs’ invasions of cities and the looting of ordinary people and writers. Afzal al-Din has interpreted the action taken by the amirs as “resurrection.”54 The Saljuq amirs were well aware that their strength came from the unity and empathy of their commanders, so they tried at all times to maintain that empathy, and that empathy led them to victory in the decisive Battle of 47 Ibid., p. 209. In ʿAtabat al-Kataba the commanders are mentioned as revivers of the cause of jihad, and a lot of information is given about them (Atābak Joveyni, 2005, pp. 19–20, 25, 28). 48 Golden, 1972, pp. 45–84; Peacock, 2007, p. 62. 49 Mottahedeh, 2001, pp. 122, 125. 50 Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, 1999, p. 136; tr., 1960, p. 103. 51 Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, 1999, pp. 136–137. 52 Ibn Fondoq, 2011, p. 322. 53 Afzal Kermāni, 1947, pp. 18-19. 54 One of the hallmarks of insecurity was the invasion of Turks in the cities, the looting of peasants and writers. Afzal al-Din has interpreted the action taken by the amirs as “resurrection” (Afzal Kermāni, 1977, pp. 65, 70, 87, 88; see also Afzal Kermāni, 1947, pp. 89–90).

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Dandānqān (431 AH/1040 AD).55 But the extravagance of the amirs caused the caliph to worry about them from the very beginning, so in response to the Turkmen’s letter, he asked them to stop the looting and violence. However, after capturing each city, the amirs only thought of looting it. Toghrol, who did not want to oppose the caliph’s request and yet wanted to keep the Turkmen commanders satisfied, paid them a sum of money to prevent looting on the day of Eid (religious holiday). Zahiri Neyshāburi writes: When Toghrol Beg left Baghdad in the year 449 AH [1057–1058 AD], Basāsiri, who was the commander and chief of the army of Baghdad, turned away from Caliph al-Qāʾem be-Amr Allāh and became the follower of the caliph of Egypt, al Mostanser bellāh, took Baghdad, and imprisoned the caliph…. The caliph was shackled and bound. He sent a message to Toghrol Beg and appealed to him for help and sought his assistance. He called on him to come back with the utmost haste. Toghrol took the path of submission and set out for the caliph’s offices. Fearing him, Basāsiri and his followers fled toward Syria. Ebrāhim Ināl turned back from Toghrol Beg and went to Hamedān, intending to take the soltān’s treasure. Toghrol Beg pursued him, and he killed him at Ray.56

Shortly afterward, Chaghari Beg attempted to plunder Neyshābur, but when Toghrol prevented him, he seized a knife and threatened to commit suicide. With Pujgān’s support, Toghrol gave Chaghari Beg money and persuaded him to stop thinking about looting Neyshābur.57 The issue of succession was one of the areas of social change in which the amirs played a key role.58 Because he had no son, Toghrol appointed his nephew, Alb Arsalān, as his successor. At the same time, Qoltamesh considered himself worthy of power. Eventually, Alb Arsalān won and decided to kill Qoltamesh and his fellows, but Khwāja Nezām al-Molk stopped him and advised him to send them to the borders and use their talents there. During the Saljuq reign, the tensions between the soltān and the ministers against the amirs continued.59 His relationship with the vizier always overshadowed the soltān’s relationship with the amirs. Under Toghrol, Alp Arsalān, and Malekshāh, 55 56 57 58 59

Zahiri Neyshāburi, 2011a, p. 16. Ibid., p. 18; tr., 2011b, p. 42. Zahiri Neyshāburi, 2011a, p. 18; Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. 9, p. 458; Mir Khwānd, 2002, vol. 4, p. 250. Zahiri Neyshāburi, 2011a, pp. 22, 66, 69, 73; Lambton, 1988, p. 246. Zahiri Neyshāburi, 2011a, p. 22; Lambton, 1988, p. 231.

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the bureaucracy played a key role in consolidating Saljuq power, but, after Khwāja Nezām al-Molk’s death, the amirs gradually withdrew power from the bureaucracy. After him, no court off icial could exercise control or influence over the amirs.60 Key Kāvus in Qābusnāma emphasizes that the vizier must always keep an eye on the army’s situation because if there is a tension between viziers and the commanders and military, the king would inevitably eliminate the ministers because removing the minister is much easier than the army that is potentially independent and insurgent.61 Ministers were easily captivated by conspiracies and were assassinated on various charges without the opportunity to defend themselves. Abol Mahāsen Saʿd al-Molk Āvi, despite launching a successful operation against the Ismāʿilis of Esfahān in 500 AH/1107 AD, was accused by the Esfahān qāzi (judge) Abu Ismāʿil ʿObeydollāh ibn al-Khatibi of supporting the Ismāʿilis. Soltān Mohammad ibn Malekshāh (r. 489–511 AH/1096–1118 AD) imprisoned him and sentenced him to death after accusing him of heresy.62 Another example was Kamāl al-Din Mohammad ibn Hosseyn, the vizier of Soltān Masʿud ibn Mohammad ibn Malekshāh (574 AH/1179 AD), who tried to establish order in the system of intersections and organize the disruptive affairs of the financial organization.63 However, in 553 AH/1159 AD, with the conspiracy of the military and at the instigation of Qarāsonqor, the governor of Arāniya, he was killed. Accordingly, the efforts of the bureaucrats to limit the power of the amirs failed.64 Zahiri Neyshāburi considers the invasion of Khwārazmshāh’s and the destruction of the Saljuq Soltānate provoked by the amirs,65 who, according to the historian, were known as “famous amirs.” These “famous amirs” were the ones who, with their monopolistic power, intervened in all matters and became great obstacles to the continuation of the structure of the Saljuq government. The Atābaks and the Eqtāʿ System: Continuation of the Saljuq Power or the Independence of the Amirs? Since the Saljuq soltān was a military agent and descended from the military tribes of the Turkmen, he had a particular respect for the amirs and troops, 60 61 62 63 64 65

Rāvandi, 2011, pp. 145–147; Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. 9, p. 526. Key Kāvus, 1996, pp. 217–218. Zahiri Neyshāburi, 2011a, p. 41; Daftary, 2018, pp. 235–236. Zahiri Neyshāburi, 2011a, p. 57. Ibid., p. 57. Ibid., p. 91.

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especially since he knew the military men would do anything to gain power. The soltān tried to use his military power and legitimacy by dividing authority among the amirs and involving them in the administration of affairs. In addition, by sending commanders to various provinces, he expanded the Saljuq structure from a small government to a vast empire spreading from Mā Varā al-Nahr to the Mediterranean Sea. The term eqtāʿ refers to a long-term transfer of land. In the Saljuq period it was used to mean all types of land transfers or related income sources tied to military service and duties. Eqtāʿ were also awarded for work and administrative responsibilities and given as tax exemptions.66 However, in Siyāsatnāma, Khwāja Nezām al-Molk devoted a chapter to the recipients of eqtāʿ, stating that the new land owners had no right to possess the people living in the land.67 In practice, however, in the Saljuq period, the owners of eqtāʿ dominated the lives and property of the subjects working the lands. The eqtāʿ system, previously used by Iranian dynasties such as the Buyids, was reproduced in a new version to satisfy the Saljuq amirs performing military services. The structure of the Saljuq government was formed with the alliance of various amirs who were claimants. According to several historians, when Toghrol ascended the throne as the king in Neyshābur, he divided power among the multiple claimants from the very beginning.68 The Saljuqs reproduced the atābaki structure common to the Turkish tribal system to use the resources of this structure to govern its vast territory. If a prince was appointed to a province, the provincial court would be entrusted to him during the prince’s childhood.69 The atābak (governor), in addition to teaching the prince the craft of running the government and managing the army, controlled his behavior and actions to prevent his possible revolt.70 66 Basan, 2010, p. 24. 67 Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, 1999, p. 43. 68 Rāvandi, 2011, p. 104; Zahiri Neyshāburi, 2011a, p. 18; Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 1, p. 249. 69 Lambton, 1988, p. 229. 70 The Saljuq soltāns attached special value to the military men, especially since he saw himself as a descendant of them and the power of their swords, and he knew that they could function as two swords because of their overt and covert power, which lies in formal and informal institutions. Also, their fluid status, from being simple soldiers to provincial or Atābak princes, or members of the administration of the eqtā, had linked their military power to political and economic power. Therefore, the Saljuq soltān tried to use his potential power to govern parts of the Saljuq realm by sending powerful military men to the provincial amirates, granting them privileges, or giving them the role of princes to maintain his rule in the vast Saljuq realm for a long time (Lambton, 1988, p. 121).

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It should not be overlooked that the Saljuq moluk al-tavāyefi (tribal rule) system and the intensification of centrifugal tendencies in some Saljuq provinces, and the reduction of central supervision and authority in remote areas, required the Saljuq soltāns to use the atābaki system. Sending atābaks with the princes to the states while maintaining the power of the Saljuq soltān in these areas served to prevent the princes from distancing themselves from the center and to train them to adhere to the rule of the Saljuq soltān. Thus, according to their tribal-primitive tradition, the Saljuqs tried to secure their rule over the vast conquered territories by dividing the territory among the great amirs while keeping them satisfied.71 The Structure of the Vizierate and the Creation of a Balance of Power Iranian bureaucracy was one of the critical power structures that, by reproducing itself, had always played a substantial role in the history of Iran. Within the Iranian bureaucracy, despite all the changes that had taken place over time, there had been powerful structural resources to link Iranians to their glorious past. The history of the minister’s presence at the top of the administrative pyramid dates back to pre-Islamic times. During the Achaemenid period (550–330 BC), the hazārpati was the first agent after the king. This position remained until the Parthian period (247 BC–224 AD). The minister of Iran was the official title of the great minister in the Sassanid era (224–651 AD), who, under the supervision of the shāh, was responsible for running the country and sometimes for the military command. The ʿAbbāsids learned the formation of the court and the establishment of administrative organizations from the Iranians, and during the time of Mansur, the second caliph, they established a bureaucracy according to the model of the Iranian bureaucracy.72 The agents of this institution were more concerned with reading and writing than other structures, and therefore these teachings could be at least helpful to them. These ministers had a number of duties. One of their important tasks was to 71 Afzal al-Din-e Kermāni considers the power of the Saljuq government when it was in the hands of the soltāns and their ministers, and he considers the decline of the Saljuq power since it fell into the hands of the Atābaks and the Turks. After the reign of Soltān Mohammad Malekshāh, which Khwāja Nezām al-Molk organized, many Atābaks took power on their own, including the Saljuqs of Anatolia, Kermān, Atābaks of Fars and Lorestān (Afzal Kermāni, 1977, pp. 71–72). 72 Before the ʿAbbāsids, the vizierate did not have fixed rules and regulations, and his function was reduced to writing and secretarial work (Ibn Taqtaqā, 1971, p. 206).

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appoint government agents to collect taxes in the different regions and transfer them to the government treasury.73 Another of the duties of the minister was to provide the expenses of the commanders,74 to manage the administration of state affairs, and, sometimes, to command troops.75 In essence, the minister administered the country under the supervision of the soltān. The minister was allowed to meet the soltān whenever he wished and to possess knowledge of the king’s secrets.76 The ministers’ most important responsibility was to balance the various power structures, including the kingship, the caliphate, and the amirs. The extravagance of some structures, especially the amirs, led to drastic social change and established an atmosphere of insecurity and anxiety. The structure of the vizierate more than the amirate could create stability amid social change and could provide a degree of constancy amid insecurity and unrest. The presence of an informed and authoritative agent at the head of the vizierate could guarantee security and balance in society. Religiosity (dinparvari),77 a sense of justice, and moral values78 were among the characteristics that it was necessary for a minister, as the representative of the soltān, to possess.79 Since the vizierate was rooted in the traditions of pre-Islamic Iran, historians considered it necessary to pay attention to pre-Islamic patterns in order to use the vizierate’s structural resources and reproduce them in society. Referring to the Iranian kings, Beyhaqi considers their attention to knowledgeable and prudent ministers as the key to their success in managing their affairs. Beyhaqi writes: I read in the Akbbār-e Moluk-e ʿAjam [Historical accounts of the Persian kings], as translated by Ibn Moqaffaʿ, that it was the custom of their greatest and most virtuous monarchs to have the wisest sages of the age present and seated in their company at all times of day and night until they retired to sleep. These men would restrain them and enlighten them about events and would point out whatever was worthy of praise or blame in the affairs, customs, and commands of their proud and powerful 73 Ibn Jowzi, 1992, vol. 8, pp. 22–23. 74 Ibn Moskuya, 2000, vol. 6, p. 339. 75 Khwāndmir, 1977, p. 119. 76 Ghazāli, 2010, p. 176. 77 Afzal Kermāni, 1977, p. 71, pp. 139–140. 78 Rāvandi, 2011, p. 145. 79 Najm al-Din Razi, 2002, p. 58; Afzal Kermāni, 1977, p. 138; Esfahāni, 1985, pp. 26–44; Tārikh-e Shāhi-ye Qarākhatāiyān, 2010, pp. 11–29; Rāvandi, 2011, p. 110; Ghazāli, 2010, pp. 175–185.

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monarchs. Then, when the king was stirred by a reprehensible passion and wished to give vent to and exercise his wrath, thereby causing much bloodshed and the destruction of notable families, those wise men would delve into that matter and lay before him the good and bad consequences of his actions and would recount to him stories and chronicles of past kings, cautioning and advising him by appealing to the divine law [sharʿ]. In this way, they enabled him to evaluate the situation through his own intellect and reasoning; his anger and impetuosity would subside, and he would do what was incumbent upon him according to the norms of justice and uprightness. For when he is carried away by anger and displays of impetuosity, it signifies that a great affliction has overcome his intellect and that he has become needful of a physician who can cure that affliction so that the turbulence subsides.80

Accordingly, as long as the ministers played a key role in decision-making structures, the country was governed in the right direction, but when the king listened to the views of other actors, the balance of the political structure was disturbed.81 Tārikh-e Beyhaqi is better than any other work in dealing with social actors and structures. Khwāja Hasan, the minister of Soltān Masʿud, when the soltān neglected his measures, said ironically, “I see many ministers here.”82 As the critical administrative structure of society, the vizierate had been the most vulnerable power structure. Dynasties established throughout the history of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate in Iran were founded primarily by military agents and were of a military nature, so the minister would have to deal with and sometimes confront the monopolistic agents and structures in order to run the society. Contrary to its militaristic and collectivist nature, the members of the vizierate acted individually. Although the vizierate was structural, the minister’s power could guarantee the functioning of the structure in society, and so with the disappearance of influential ministers, the structure of the bureaucracy and subsequently the government became unbalanced and insecure. There was no more powerful tactic used to eliminate ministers than to accuse them of bad-dini (sacrilege). As mentioned in the previous chapters, 80 Beyhaqi, 1995, vol. 1, p. 159; tr., 2011, p. 189. 81 Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, 1999, p. 223. 82 Beyhaqi, 1995, vol. 1, p. 200; Key Kāvus in Qābusnāma emphasizes that the minister must always be wary of the army, because if the commanders and the army revolt, the king will inevitably have to remove the minister, because removing the minister was much easier than leaving the army dissatisfied while they had the structural resources of rebelling and independence (Key Kāvus, 1996, pp. 217–218).

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the great ministers of each era, from the beginning of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate to the Ghaznavid era, were eliminated from the power structure under allegations of bad-dini in various guises. For example, Abu Salama was accused of bad-dini on the pretext that he turned away from the ʿAbbāsids and turned toward the ʿAlawites, the Barmakids were accused of being heretics, Fazl ibn Sahl was accused of being a majus, and Jeyhāni and Hasanak-e Vazir were accused of being Qarmatis. Many of these allegations were baseless, and historians have not found any evidence to prove them or recount that ministers defended themselves against them. This shows that these allegations, apparently unverifiable, were structural barriers to the perpetuation of the power of bureaucratic agents and could be used to justify bloodshed in the minds of the questioning members of the community and so prevent them from investigating the cases. Khwāja Nezām al-Molk on the Top of the Structure of the Iranian Vizierate The Saljuq dynasty, as the first Islamic empire, needed a solid and centralized bureaucracy to govern its vast territories, especially since the management of the decentralized structure of the Saljuqs83 was possible only in the shadow of a powerful bureaucracy. The use of Iranian bureaucracy, which had over a thousand years of experience, as a model provided a structural resource for the soltān to institutionalize his power in the territories through the traditional legitimacy of viziers’ agents.84 While the Turkmen military power reproduced the structure of the Buyids and the Ghaznavids and achieved their goal of conquering vast lands from Mā Varā al-Nahr to the Mediterranean Sea, the plan of Khwāja Nezām al-Molk (397–471 AH/1088–1093 AD) was to direct the Saljuq military power and to build a strong structure based on Iranian bureaucracy and to ensure the stability and continuity in this structure until the end of his work.85 He reproduced the structure of the vizierate according to the ideal he had of a cohesive and centralized empire, a structure in which kings used their structural resources to make their names immortal in history. Khwāja Nezām al-Molk writes: “The good vizier enhances the fame and character of his sovereign; and the kings who have become great and whose names

83 Basan, 2010, p. 165. 84 Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, 1999, p. 13. 85 Ibn Fondoq, 2011, p. 73.

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will be blessed until the resurrection, have all been those who had good viziers, and the same is true of the prophets.”86 Khwāja Nezām al-Molk gradually rebuilt and regulated power in the structure of the vizierate. The most crucial goal pursued by him was to manage the decentralized Saljuq structure. As mentioned earlier, the Saljuq Empire was created with the help of the Turkmen amirs, each of whom possessed a share of power. Toghrol was not a king for the amirs but a military leader and commander who was in charge of dividing the territories and determining the place of their rule. The efforts of bureaucrats such as ʿAmid al-Molk Kondori elevated Toghrol’s position among military commanders to the level of a soltān. But for Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, the Saljuq dynasty was to build a single empire under the will of the soltān. His first attempt to concentrate power was to increase the minister’s authority. The minister, on behalf of the king but with full authority, dealt with administrative and judicial matters. The vizier divided the administrative duties of the government among the four main divāns (vizierates), namely, the estifā, the eshrāf, the toghrā or enshā, and the divān-eʿarz. He was in charge of all the state-run organizations managed under the central government.87 Khwāja Nezām al-Molk believed that the king should always be aware of the situation of his ministers and trustees, because the ministers were the structural resource of planning and enforcing rulings in society, and therefore played an important role in effecting social change: It is necessary to enquire secretly into the affairs of ministers and confidants, especially the vizier, to see if he is fulfilling his function properly or not, for the good or ill of king and kingdom depends on him. When the vizier is of good character and sound judgment, the kingdom is prosperous, the army and peasantry are contented, peaceful and well supplied, and the king is free from anxiety. But when the vizier is bad, irreparable harm is done to the kingdom, the king is constantly perplexed and distressed, and the provinces are in a state of disorder.88

He always considered the vizierate and the amirate as two essential pillars of the government. He believed that “the negligence of the amir and the betrayal of the minister of the kingdom will win.”89 86 87 88 89

Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, 1999, p. 233; tr., 1960, p. 178. Melville, 1998, p. 41; Lambton, 1988, p. 121. Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, 1999, p. 31; tr., 1960, pp. 23–24. Ibid., p. 41; tr., p. 32.

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The shaky position of the ministers was one of the points of concern for Khwāja Nezām al-Molk. Unlike the soltān and the amirs, the ministers lacked the military to support themselves; they needed to deal with various agents, especially the amirs, because of their role in balancing the power structure. Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, who saw the vulnerability of the vizierate as a major obstacle to stabilizing and perpetuating the power of bureaucracy, hired military gholāms (slaves)90 and added them as a structural resource to the vizierate power structure. Khwāja Nezām al-Molk argued that another vulnerability in the vizierate’s structure was the lack of continuity among its agents. Historically, he had seen powerful and worthy ministers who had struggled to reproduce the bureaucracy structure, but with their departure, the institutions became disorganized or forgotten. The vizierate structure was always subject to change as long as its agents could not be sure of the continuation of their power, so the military system raised the issue of inheriting the vizierate. Many of Khwāja Nezām al-Molk’s sons later served in the court of the soltāns and Saljuq governors.91 With the inheritance of this structure, ministers could transfer their experiences to their children and train a generation of educated ministers. In a letter to his son Fakhr al-Molk, Khwāja Nezām al-Molk advised him to respect the commanders.92 In some parts of the Siyāsatnāma he expresses his displeasure with the Turkmen’s indomitable domination over Iran.93 A chapter entitled “On Keeping Turkmen in Service Like Pages” mentions that in the beginning, Turkmen amirs did a lot of services to establish the rule of the Saljuqs: Although there has arisen a certain amount of aversion to the Turkmen, and they are very numerous, still they have a long-standing claim upon his dynasty, because at its inception they served well and suffered much, and also they are attached by ties of kinship. So, it is fitting that about a thousand of their sons should be enrolled and maintained in the same way as the pages of the palace. When they are in continuous employment, they will learn the use of arms and become trained in service.94

Although Khwāja Nezām al-Molk successfully reproduced the vizierate structure, some of his actions became a significant obstacle to the bureaucracy’s 90 91 92 93 94

Ibid., p. 46. Ibn Fondoq, 2011, p. 74. ʿAqili, 1985, p. 214. Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, 1999, pp. 136–137. Ibid., p. 139; tr., 1960, p. 105.

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stability and, consequently, Saljuq power, which weakened the bureaucracy’s strength, the structure of Saljuq power, and the vizierate in the long run. By establishing Nezāmiya schools in various cities, Khwāja Nezām al-Molk spread Shāfeʿie and Hanafi ideas, which in his view were considered the correct view of Islam and prevented the spread of the other sects via formal education.95 His goal was to promote the concentration of power, while his extravagance in fighting various ideas fueled sectarian divisions and led to incoherence in society. Khwāja Nezām al-Molk took effective steps to guarantee the continuation of power in the bureaucratic structure, but his efforts to oust Minister Vazir al-Molk Kondori, Seyyed al-Vozarā96 became a serious obstacle to the cohesion of the vizierate power. Rāvandi considered ʿAmid al-Molk Kondori as a worthy minister who guaranteed the survival of the political structure.97 The vizierate structure, which was supposed to moderate violence in society and bring it into line with the law, became a relic tree, one of whose fruitful branches, namely Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, had removed another great agent from this tree.98 One of the crucial issues in the study of social change is the creation of new traditions in society, traditions that become a serious obstacle to the successful reproduction of social structures. The story, quoted by ʿAmid al-Molk as addressing Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, points to ʿAmid al-Molk’s correct understanding of the ministers’ fragile positions in power.99 Referring to the same anecdote, Rāvandi interprets Khwāja Nezām al-Molk’s action as an unforgivable sin. In particular, it was when the historian saw his society as empty of worthy ministers: “It is a pity that in those days there were so many virtuous, wise, prudent, and capable viziers, and today the vizierate was in the hands of Qolām.”100 The post-Khwāja Nezām al-Molk era witnessed the weakening of the power structure of the bureaucracy. Abu al-Rajāʾi Qomi’s book can be considered the mourning letter of the ministers who did not have a happy ending in the power game. Abu Rajā considers that one of the reasons for the ministers’ uncertain fate was that most of them had to deal with critical 95 Ibid., p. 234. 96 In his time, the business of the divān was conducted in Persian, and so he encouraged the Turks to learn Persian (Haqiqat, 1994). 97 Ibn Fondoq, 2011, p. 76. 98 Rāvandi, 2011, pp. 23–24. 99 Abol Rajāʾe Qomi strongly criticizes Khwāja Nezām al-Molk for killing Amid al-Molk Kondori (1984, p. 99). 100 Rāvandi, 2011, p. 129.

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events. The ministers played the most crucial role in the administration of the power structure; however, they were the most vulnerable agents in the power structure because they were not endowed with the military strength of the amirs.101 The historian considers the vizierate in the hands of the ministers to be like a lamp in the hands of a blind person and as a beautiful bride with an old and torn dress. Of course, such people could not bring security to society. The historian regards the ministers’ ignorance of the current affairs as the cause of the decline in the bureaucracy.102 Abul-Rajā’s sharp criticism should not be overlooked. Although he mentions some ministers, including Qavām al-Din Dargozini, he does not consider the ministers of his time worthy of this serious position. He considers them merely unknowing agents whose ignorance had, ironically, elevated them to high positions.103 The decline of worthy bureaucratic agents, stemming from the monopolistic power of the military and the internal strife of the bureaucratic structure, played a significant role in the decline of Saljuq power. Due to the structure of the bureaucracy, it was reproduced during the Khwārazmshāhi period and seriously hindered the continuation of Khwārazmshāhi power.

Bibliography Abol Rajāʾe Qomi, Najm al-Din (1984). Tārikh al-Vozarā, ed. Mohammad Taqi Dāneshpajuh, Tehrān: Moʾasses-ye Motāleʿāt va Tahqiqāt-e Farhangi ʿAbdol Jalil Qazvini, Ibn Abol Hosseyn (2012). Baʾz-a Fazāʾel-e al-Ravāfez, Naqz, ed. Mohammad Hosseyn Derāyati, Qom and Tehrān: Dār al-Hadis va Ketābkhāna-ye Majles Afzal Kermāni, Ahmad ibn Hāmed (1947). Tārikh-e Afzal ya Badāyeʿ al-Zamān fi Vaqāyeʿe Kermān, ed. Mohammad Bayāni, Tehrān: Tehrān University Press Afzal Kermāni, Ahmad ibn Hāmed (1977). ʿAqd al-ʿAlā Lel-Mowqef al-Aʿlā, ed. ʿAli Mohammad Amiri Nāyini, intro. Mohammad Ebrāhim Bāstāni Pārizi, Tehrān: Ruzbahān Almāsi, ʿElmi Mahmud (1991). Tārikh-e Amuzesh va Parvaresh Islam va Iran, Tehrān: Amir Kabir ʿAqili, Seyfollāh Haji ibn Nezām (1985). Āsār al-Vozarā, ed. Jalāl al-Din Armavi, Tehran: Ettellāʿāt 101 Abol Rajāʾe Qomi, 1984, pp. 28–30. 102 Ibid., p. 30. 103 Ibid., p. 37.

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Atābak Joveyni, Montakhab al-Din Badiʿ (2005). ʿAtabat al-Kataba, ed. Mohammad Qazvini ʿAbbās Eqbāl, Tehrān: Asātir Bardi, Ibn Taqri (1989). Al-Nojum al-Zāherāt fi Moluk Mesr va al-Qāhera, Cairo: Vezārat al-Seqāfat va al-Ershād al-Qomi Barthold, V. V. (1968). Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion. London: Luzac Basan, Aziz (2010). The Great Seljuqs: A History, London and New York: Routledge Bayāni, Shirin (2002). Din va Dowlat dar Iran-e ʿAhd-e Moghol, 2 vols., Tehrān: Tehrān University Press Beckwith, Christopher I. (2009). Empires of the Silk Road: A History of Central Eurasia from the Bronze Age to the Present, Princeton: Princeton University Press Beyhaqi, Abol Fazl Mohammad ibn Hosseyn (1995). Tārikh-e Beyhaqi, ed. Khalil Khatib Rahbar, 3 vols., Tehrān: Mahtāb Bondāri Esfahāni, Fath ibn ʿAli (1977). Zobdat al-Nosrat va Nokhbat al-ʿOsra, trans. Mohammad Hosseyn Jalili, Tehrān: Bonyād-e Farhang-e Iran Daftary, Farhad (2018). Ismāʿili History and Intellectual Traditions, London: Routledge Esfahāni, Mahmud ibn Mohammad (1985). Dastur al-Vozarā, ed. Rezā Anzabinejād, Tehrān: Amir Kabir Fazlollāh Hamedāni, Rashid al-Din (2006). Jameʿ al-Tavārikh, ed. Mohammad Roshan, 3 vols., Tehrān: Mirās-e Maktub Ghazāli, Mohammad ibn Mohammad (2010). Nasihat al-Moluk, ed. ʿAzizollāh ʿAlizāda, Tehrān: Ferdows Golden, Peter B. (1972). “The Migrations of the Oquz,” Archivum Ottomanicum, 4, pp. 45–84 Hamdollāh Mostowfi, Ibn Abi Bekr (1985). Tārikh-e Gozida, ed. ʿAbdol Hosseyn Navāie, Tehrān: Amir Kabir Hanne, Eric, J. (2007). Putting the Caliph in His Place: Power, Authority, and the Late ʿAbbāsid Caliphate, Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press Haqiqat, ʿAbdol Rāfeʿ (1994). Vazirān-e Irani az Bozorgmehr tā Amir Kabir, Tehrān: Kumesh Helmi, Ahmad Kamāl al-Din (2005). Dowlat-e Saljuqiyān, Qom: Howze va Dāneshgāh Hosseyni, ʿAli ibn Nāser (2003). Zobdat al-Tavārikh, Akhbār al-ʿOmarā va al-Moluk al-Saljuqiya, trans. Jalil Nazari, Tehrān: Āzad University Press Ibn al-ʿEbri, ibn Hārun (1998). Mokhtasar-e Tārikh-e al-Dowal, trans. ʿAbdol Hamid Āyati, Tehrān: ʿElmi va Farhangi Ibn Asir, ʿAli ibn Mohammad (1965). Al-Kāmel fi al-Tārikh, 13 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Sāder Ibn Esfandiyār, Bahā al-Din Mohammad ibn Hasan (2011). Tārikh-e Tabarestān, ed. ʿAbbāss Eqbāl, 2 vols., Tehrān: Kolāla-ye Khāvar Ibn Fondoq, ʿAli ibn Zeyd Beyhaqi (2011). Tārikh-e Beyhaq, ed. Ahmad Bahmanyār, Tehrān: Asātir

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Ibn Howqal, Mohammad (1967). Surat al-Arz, trans. Jaʿfar Shoʿār, 2 vols., Tehrān: Bonyād-e Farhang-e Iran Ibn Jowzi, ʿAbdol Rahmān (1992). Al-Montazam fi Tavārikh al-Moluk va al-Omam, ed. Mohammad ʿAbdol Qāder ʿAtā, 19 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Kotob al-ʿElmiya Ibn Kasir, Ismāʿil ibn ʿOmar (1990). Al-Bedāyat va al-Nehāyat, 15 vols., Beirut: Maktabat al-Maʿāref Ibn Khaldun, ʿAbdol Rahmān ibn Mohammadi (2010). Tārikh-e Ibn Khaldun, trans. ʿAbdol Mohammad Āyati, 6 vols., Tehrān: Pajouheshgāh-e ʿOlum Ensāni va Motāleʿāt-e Farhangi Ibn Moskuya, Ahmad ibn Mohammad (2000). Tajāreb al-Omam va Taʿāqeb alHemam, ed. Abol Qāsem Emāmi, 6 vols., Tehrān: Sorush Ibn Taqtaqā, Abu Jaʿfar Mohammad Ibn ʿAli (1971). Tārikh-e Fakhri, trans. Mohammad Vahid Golpāyegāni, Tehrān: Bongāh-e Tarjoma va Nashr-e Ketāb Joveyni, Atā Malek (2006). Tārikh-e Jahān-goshā, ed. Mohammad Qazvini, 3 vols., Tehrān: Donyā-ye Ketāb Jowzjāni, Menhāj al-Serāj (1984). Tabaqāt-e Nāseri, ed. ʿAbdol Hayy-e Habibi, 2 vols., Tehrān: Donyā-ye Ketāb Juvaini, Ata-Malik (1997). Genghis Khan: The History of the World-Conqueror, trans. J. A. Boyle, Manchester: Manchester University Press Kāshāni, Abol Qāsem (1964). Zobdat al-Tavārikh, ed. Mohammad Taqi, Tabriz: Tabriz University Press Key Kāvus, ʿOnsor al-Maʿāli (1996). Qābusnāma, ed. Qolām Hosseyn Yusefi, Tehrān: ʿElmi va Farhangi Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, Hasan ibn ʿAli ibn Eshāq (1999). Siyar al-Moluk (Siyāsatnāma), ed. Hubert Darke, Tehrān: Entesharāt-e ʿElmi va Farhangi Khwāndmir, Qiyās al-Din (1977). Dastur al-Vozarāʿ, Ahvāl-e Vozarā-ye Islam ta Enqerāz-e Teymuriyān, ed. Saiʿd Nafisi, Tehrān: Eqbāl Khwāndmir, Qiyās al-Din (2009). Tārikh-e Habib al-Siyar fi Akhbār-e Afrād-e Bashar, ed. Dabir Siyāqi, 4 vols., Tehrān: Hermes Lambton, Ann K. S. (1988). Continuity and Change in Medieval Persia: Aspects of Administrative, Economic and Social History, 11th–14th Century, Albany, NY: Bibliotheca Persica Lewis, Bernard (1968). The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam, New York: Basic Books Māvardi, ʿAli ibn Mohammad (2001). Al-Ahkām al-Soltāniya va al-Velāyāt al-Diniya, ed. Jāsem al-Hadisi, Baghdad: Manshurat al-Majmaʿ al-ʿElmi Melville, Charles (1998). “History, from the Saljuqs to the Aq Qoyunlu (ca. 1000–1500 CE),” Iranian Studies, vol. 31, no. 3–4, pp. 473–482 Mir Khwānd, Mohammad (2002). Tārikh-e Rowzat al-Safā fi Sirat al-Anbiyā va al-Moluk va al-Kholafā, ed. Jamshid Kiyānfar, vols. 4, Tehrān: Asātir

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Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas (1939). Ed. Mohammad Taqi Bahār and Behjat Ramezāni, 2nd ed., Tehrān: Kolāla-ye Khāvar Mottahedeh, Roy (2001). Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society, London: I. B. Tauris Najm al-Din Rāzi, ʿAbdollāh ibn Mohammad (2002). Marmuzāt-e Asadi Dar Mazmurāt-e Dāvudi, ed. Mohammad Reza Shafiʿi Kadkani, Tehrān: Sokhan Nakhjavāni, Hendushāh ibn Sanjar (1979). Tajāreb al-Salaf, Dar Tavārikh-e Kholafā va Vozarā-ye Ishān, ed. ʿAbbās Eqbāl, Tehrān: Ketābkhana-ye Tahuri ʿOmar, Fāruq (1977). Bahus fi al-Tārikh al-Abbāsi, Beirut: Dār al-Qalam, Maktab al-Nehza Paul, Jürgen (2005). “The Seljuq Conquest(s) of Nishapur: A Reappraisal,” Iranian Studies, vol. 38, no. 4, 575–585 Peacock, A. C. S. (2007). Mediaeval Islamic Historiography and Political Legitimacy: Balʿami’s Tarikhnamah, New York: Routledge Peacock, A. C. S. (2015). The Great Seljuk Empire, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press Qalqashandi, Ahmad (1960). Sobh al-Aʿshā fi Senaʿāt al-Eteshāʾ, 14 vols., Cairo: Nāsher Rāvandi, Mohammad ibn ʿAli (2011). Rāhat al-Sodur va Āyat al-Sorur, ed. Mohammad Eqbāl, intro. Badiʿ Foruzānfar and Mojtabā Minovi, Tehrān: Asātir Robertson, David (1993). A Dictionary of Modern Politics, 2nd ed., London: Europa Safi, Omid (2006). The Politics of Knowledge in Premodern Islam: Negotiating Ideology and Religious Inquiry, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press Tārikh-e Shāhi-ye Qarākhatāiyān (2010). Ed. Mohammad Ebrāhim Bāstāni Pārizi, Tehrān: ʿElm Walker, Paul E. (2008). Fatimid History and Ismāʿili Doctrine, Aldershot, Burlington: Ashgate Zahiri Neyshāburi, Zahir al-Din (2011a). Saljuqnāma, ed. Ismāʿil Afshār Hamid al-Molk & Mohammad Ramezāni, Tehrān: Asātir Zahiri Neyshāburi, Zahir al-Din (2011b). Saljuqnāma, From the Jameʿ Al-Tawārikh, trans. Kenneth Allin Luther, ed. C. E. Bosworth, London and New York: Routledge

11

The Khwārazmshāhi Dynasty: Emerging from the Saljuq Structure Abstract The Khwārazmshāhi used the Saljuq structural resources to transform their local dynasty into an empire. The lack of effective bureaucracy widened the gap in the power structure between Soltān Mohammad and his mother, Tarkān Khātun. The heterogeneity of the goals of the Khwārazmshāhi and the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate brought the power structures of the caliphate and the soltānate face to face. The unending expansionist policies of the Khwārazmshāhis in the eastern territories made them neighbors with the Mongols, who were far more militarily powerful than the Khwārazmshāhis. Soltān Mohammad’s rapid and hasty escape fastened the process of these conquests and with the death of his son, Soltān Jalāl al-Din, the Khwārazmshāhi ended in Iran. Keywords: Khwārazmshāhi dynasty, Soltān Mohammad, Tarkān Khātun, Soltān Jalāl al-Din

The Saljuq dynasty was the first empire in post-Islamic Iran. As noted in the previous chapter, the Saljuqs, based on the experience of other Iranian dynasties from the Tāherids to the Ghaznavids, found it impossible to rule over vast territories by relying on a centralized power structure, in particular, due to the fact that there were many claimants to power. The powerful Iranian bureaucracy helped the Saljuqs divide power between the amirs and the atābaks (governors) and kept the various agents under the central government’s control. The Khwārazmshāhi rule was based on the Saljuq Empire structure, which was governed by military amirs like many other local dynasties. Anushtegin, the ancestor of the Khwārazmshāhi dynasty, was one of the Saljuq army commanders who Soltān Malekshāh (r. 465–485 AH/1073–1093 AD) appointed to hold the position of tashtdāri (keeper of the royal washing

Kamali, M. Social Change in Medieval Iran 132-628 AH (750-1231 AD). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2023 doi: 10.5117/9789463721981_ch11

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bowls) and shehnegi (a military governr) of Khwārazm.1 Anushtegin fought many times against the claimants to the Saljuq throne,2 and by expressing obedience and submission, he attracted the attention of the Saljuq soltān and paved the way for the reign of his sons.3 With the coming to power of Atsez (r. 522–551 AH/1128–1157 AD), who was supported by Soltān Sanjar (511–552 AH/1117–1157 AD), relations between the Khwārazmshāhi and the Saljuqs entered a new round of change. Jowzjāni writes: Be it known that one night, at a convivial entertainment, Soltān Sanjar conferred sovereignty upon three persons: to Malek Atsez, he gave the throne of Khwārazm; to Atābak Ilatgez, the throne of Azarbāijān; and the throne of Fars to the atābak of Sonqor. When the next day came round, a number of his viziers, confidants, and advisers represented to the soltān, that, on the previous night, his Majesty had given thrones away to three different persons, out of whose hands he would not, hereafter, be able to disengage them. 4

As long as the bureaucracy managed affairs, the soltānate ruled the vast lands of the empire, but with the weakening of the ministers and the amirs’ empowerment, the various regions gradually reduced their ties with the imperial center and the amirs took steps to gain independence. The Khwārazmshāhi from the time of Atsez opposed the Saljuq soltān, namely Sanjar.5 Historical texts are full of Atsez’s fierce rivalry with Soltān Sanjar, who in all cases forgave Atsez, who constantly disobeyed him, and he retained Atsez in rule over Khwārazm. Joveyni writes, Arriving in Khwārazm, Atsez entered upon the path of forwardness and rebellion, and day by day the ill-will increased on both sides and finally reached such a pitch that in Moharram of the year 533 [SeptemberOctober 1138 AD] Soltān Sanjar marched into Khwārazm to do him battle. The Khwārazmshāh got together an army to oppose that of the soltān and even set it in fighting array; and then, without making any attempt to offer battle, realizing he could place little confidence in his troops, he sought 1 2 3 4 5

Joveyni, 2006, vol. 2, p. 2; Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. 11, p. pp. 67-70; Qalqashandi, 1960, vol. 5, p. 454. Ibn Jowzi, 1992, vol. 9, p. 205; Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. 9, pp. 82–183. Joveyni, 2006, vol. 2, pp. 2–3; Fasih-e Khwāfi, 2008, vol. 2, pp. 208 and 228. Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 1, p. 268; tr., 1881, vol. 1, pp. 169–170. Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 1, p. 299.

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safety in flight…. And Atsez continued in the path of forwardness and rebellion until the year 536 AH [1141–1142 AD], when Sanjar was defeated in the battle against Khatāi at the gates of Samarqand and came fleeing to Balkh (the story is well known): Atsez then seized his opportunity and marched against Marv, looting the city and making great slaughter of the inhabitants.… The soltān was mollified and turned back along the path of peace and reconciliation, whereupon Atsez raised the head of rebellion in his wonted manner. The soltān then sent Adib Sāber upon a mission to him, and Adib remained for some time in Khwārazm. Meanwhile, Atsez had suborned two Khwāzmian ruffians of the sect of the Heresy, buying their souls and paying the price, and had sent them to slay the soltān unawares.6

The rivalry between Soltān Sanjar and Atsez was so serious and controversial that it became part of the epic literature of that time, and even great poets such as Anvari (d. 575 AH/1180 AD) and Rashid al-Din Vatvāt (481–573 AH/1089–1178 AD) had debates about it.7 Soltān Sanjar, who saw the capacity for independence in Khwārazm and its agents, tried to keep it as an essential part of the Saljuq territories in any possible way, but with his death and the weakening of Saljuq power, Khwārazm became independent.8 With the coming to power of ʿAlāʾoddin Takesh (568–596 AH/1173–1200 AD), a new round of competition started between the Khwārazmshāhi and the Saljuqs. With the death of Soltān Sanjar, Takesh, who had conquered the eastern parts of the Saljuq territory,9 took advantage of the moluk al-tavāyefi (tribal rule) structure of the Saljuq government, which in the absence of a cohesive bureaucracy had become a significant obstacle to the continuation of Saljuq power and expanded his power over Khorāsān and Jebāl. The Saljuqs used the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate, their second most powerful structural resource, to defeat the Buyids. The ʿAbbāsid Caliphate was then forced to experience its relative weakness in the shadow of the new local dynasties: the Buyids and then the Saljuqs. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the Saljuq period was characterized by intense competition between the ʿAbbāsid caliphs and the Saljuqs. With the coming to power of Caliph Nāser (r. 575–622 AH/1180–1226 AD), a new chapter of tensions between the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate and the Saljuqs began.10 6 7 8 9 10

Joveyni, 2006, vol. 2, pp. 5–8; tr., Juvaini, 1997, pp. 280–282. Joveyni, 2006, vol. 2, pp. 9–10; Dowlatshāh-e Samarqandi, 2006, pp. 90–91. Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 1, p. 300. Joveyni, 2006, vol. 2, pp. 23–25. Ibn Taqtaqā, 1971, p. 432.

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Caliph Nāser, who saw the Khwārazmshāhi as a powerful resource for the extermination of the Saljuqs, encouraged Takesh to defeat Toghrol III (r. 571–590 AH/1175–1194 AD).11 The Khwārazmshāhi, who had begun their rule as the Khwārazm government, saw in themselves the capacity to become an empire. In contrast, the Saljuq government, which began with the conquest of vast lands and the formation of an empire, became a local dynasty in the Jebāl region with its capital in Ray. They used the structural resources of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate to legitimize their efforts to destroy the Saljuq Empire with the help of Caliph Nāser. Finally, by attacking Ray, Takesh defeated the last agent (soltān) of the Saljuq Empire.12 With Toghrol’s death, the Saljuq Empire collapsed, but local dynasties such as the atābaks of Azarbāijān and Fars and the Saljuqs of Rom that came from the Saljuq structure survived. And along with the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate, they also played significant roles in preventing the occupation of all Saljuq lands by the Khwārazmshāhi.13 The Competition between the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate and the Khwārazmshāhi After the collapse of the Saljuq dynasty, the caliph expected the Khwārazmshāhi to consider themselves soldiers of the caliph and to be content with their territories in Khorāsān and Khwārazm. The Khwārazmshāhi agents, who like the Ghaznavids and the Saljuqs called themselves soltāns, sought to reproduce the structural resources of the Buyids and the Saljuqs to control the caliph in Baghdad and keep them under their heavy shadow. Takesh considered himself the heir to the Saljuqs and expected the caliph to approve his rule over the occupied territories and limit his power to religious affairs. Having succeeded in defeating Toghrol and capturing the central cities of Jebāl, Takesh refused to hand them over to the caliph: Now the Commander of the Faithful, al-Nāser al-Din-Allāh, wished the soltān to surrender Iraq or part of it to the Supreme Divān. Messengers 11 Joveyni, 2006, vol. 2, pp. 29–30; Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. 11, p. 232. 12 Among the great claimants such as Atābakan of Azarbāijān and Fars, who were born from the heart of the Saljuq Empire, Takesh was the only winner on the battlefield (Bondāri, 1977, p. 363; Rāvandi, 2011, p. 331; Jorfādeqāni, 2003, p. 422; Joveyni, 2006, vol. 2, p. 32; tr., Juvaini, 1997, p. 303). 13 Joveyni, 2006, vol. 2, pp. 32–33; Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. 11, pp. 232–233; Ibn Taqtaqā, 1971, p. 324; Fazlollāh Hamedāni, 2006, vol. 1, pp. 350–351.

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passed to and fro between the two parties, and as the soltān would not agree the caliph sent his vizier, Moʾayyed-ad-Din Ibn-al-Qassāb, to him with robes and gifts and all kinds of honorable presents.… The honor and the mandate of soltānship have been bestowed by the Supreme Divān, and the surety for the affairs of the realm, that is the vizier, has come hither on that errand.… The pride of kingship and the soltānate, and the knowledge of the guilt and treachery of such a meeting, and the good fortune that attended him caused the soltān to ward off that treason by dispatching an army to greet him; and before the men of Baghdad had eaten supper they gave the vizier a taste of breakfast. He fled, bringing disgrace on the caliphate, and the army pursued his forces as far as Dinevar.14

The ʿAbbāsid caliph could not counter the Takesh militarily and sent his minister to Takesh to perhaps prevent him from taking over the central areas of Jebāl. The caliph’s minister conveyed the caliph’s message to Assadābād to receive the caliph’s gifts and khalʿat and go back to Khwārazm, but Takesh confronted the minister with his army to prove his dominance in the conquered areas.15 However, the vastness of the territories of Khwārazmshāhi and the great distance between Khwārazm, the capital of the dynasty, and the recently conquered regions in Jebāl made it impossible for Takesh to consolidate his power there. Therefore, as soon as Takesh returned to Khwārazm, Ray fell back into the caliph’s hands.16 But Takesh, who did not intend to give up Iran’s central regions, regained Ray in 592 AH/1196 AD.17 This time, in addition to sending gifts and khalʿat, the caliph sent Takesh the mandate for the rule of Khorāsān, Turkestan, and ʿArāq-e ʿAjam.18 But this did not mean that the caliph was turning a blind eye to political power. The coming to power of Soltān Mohammad (r. 596–617 AH/1200–1220 AD) can be seen as the continuation of Takesh’s efforts to seize power in the western parts of Iran to dominate the ʿAbbāsid caliph. The Khwārazmshāhi 14 Joveyni, 2006, vol. 2, pp. 32–33; tr., Juvaini, 1997, pp. 303– 304. 15 Jowzjāni has considered turning Takesh away from giving in to the caliph’s demands and handing over the Jebāl region to him as one of the reasons for the fall of the power of Takesh and the Khwārazmshāhi. 16 Fazlollāh Hamedāni, 2006, vol. 1, p. 258. 17 He even asked the caliph to give him Khuzestān and Baghdad, but the caliph refused (Joveyni, 2006, vol. 2, p. 38; Nakhjavāni, 1979, p. 332. 18 Joveyni, 2006, vol. 2, p. 43; Fazlollah Hamedāni, 2006, vol. 1, p. 294; Banākati, 1999, pp. 205–206; Mir Khwānd, 2002, vol. 4, pp. 377–378.

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knew that as long as the caliph did not submit to their power and did not limit his authority to religious affairs, he would be a great rival to them.19 Instead of accepting the demands of the ʿAbbāsid caliph and acceding to his demand for control of the eastern regions, Soltān Mohammad preferred to compete closely with the caliph. Joveyni writes: The soltān regarded himself as in no way inferior to the Buyids and the Saljuq soltāns, nay he considered even one of his amirs to be on a par with the Buyids whilst he held his own worth and dignity to be vastly superior to those of the Saljuqs. Now the kingdom of Baghdad, though in the possession of the caliphs, had in fact been under the sway of the Saljuqs, and the caliphs of that time, such as Tāyeʿ, Mostarshed, etc., had been subject to their rule and obedient to their commands and prohibitions, as has been recorded in every history.20

The Khwārazmshāhi dynasty, which considered itself the heir of the Saljuq Empire, expected the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate to accept the Khwārazmshāhi as its supporters and to delegate to them the authority over their caliphate structure once enjoyed by the Saljuq soltāns. But Caliph Nāser tried to revive his religious and political power, which had been restricted since the time of the Buyids and the Saljuqs. K hwārazm’s distance from the wester n prov inces and the Khwārazmshāhis’ conflict with their eastern neighbors also provided space for expanding the caliph’s rule in the western states.21 Thus, the caliph refused to accept Soltān Mohammad Khwārazmshāh’s request to include his name in the khotba, which was equivalent to the caliph’s withdrawing from a political position.22 The distance of Khwārazm from the central regions of Iran and the dependence of the Khwārazmshāhi on Khwārazm was a major obstacle to the Khwārazmshāhi government. This was used by the caliph as a major resource. By writing a letter to the eastern neighbors of Khwārazmshāh, including the Ghurids and Qarākhatāyids, and encouraging them to fight 19 The Khwārazmshāhi not only continued the path of the Saljuqs, but also made the remnants of the Saljuq system, such as the Atābaks of Persia and Azarbāijān, their enemies. The defeat of Saʿd ibn Zangi in 614 AH/1218 AD and the Uzbek ibn Behlun Atābak of Azerbaijan was in this direction (Bondāri, 1977, p. 363; Rāvandi, 2011, p. 331; Jorfādeqāni, 2003, p. 422; Joveyni, 2006, vol. 2, p. 114). 20 Joveyni, 2006, vol. 2, p. 121; tr., 1997, vol. 2, pp. 391–392. 21 Abol Fadā, 1907, vol. 3, p. 143. 22 Nasavi, 1987, pp. 19–20.

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the Khwārazmshāh, the caliph caused Soltān Mohammad to become preoccupied with the eastern borders of his territories and to give up control of ʿArāq-e ʿAjam and Baghdad. Joveyni writes, These secrets were revealed when the soltān came to Ghazna, and a search being made in their treasuries the correspondence came to light in which the caliph egged and incited him to attack the soltān and asked him to render aid to the army of Qarākhatāy. The soltān did not reveal this secret but kept those letters for use as evidence.23

The caliph established good relations with the Ismāʿilis, who had always been a serious enemy to the ʿAbbāsid caliph, to use their structural resources as leverage against Soltān Mohammad-e Khwārazmshāh. This went so far that the caliph, as usual, placed Amir al-Hāj-e Ismāʿili in a higher position than Amir al-Hāj-e Khwārazmshāh.24 The caliph’s attempt to create hostilities between the Qarākhatāyids, and the Ghouris with the Khwārazmshāhi, to pay more attention to the Ismāʿilis, and most importantly, his refusal to mention the name of the soltān in his khotba were not acceptable to Soltān Mohammad. Finally, in 614 AH/1218 AD, Soltān Mohammad removed the ʿAbbāsid caliph’s name from the khotba and declared a Shiʿite scholar named ʿAlā al-Molk Tarmazi as the caliph of the Muslims. Joveyni writes: However, the soltān needed some excuse whereby he might be secured from the reproaches of mankind and the rulers all around him and such as might prevent its being said that a soltān professing Islam had, out of lust for empire, attacked that imam to do homage to whom is to complete the pillar of Islam and in so doing had cast his faith to the winds. The Prophet of God (may God bless him and give him peace!) hath said: “Whosoever dieth without having done homage to an imam, hath died as though be lived in the Days of Ignorance.” And the poet hath said: “We pray and the completion of our prayer is that we believe thee to be the best imam before God.” He therefore asked the imams in his own kingdom for a fatwā to the effect that the imamate of any imam who committed such acts as have been mentioned was not a true imamate; and that when such an imam made an attack upon a soltān who supported Islam and 23 Joveyni, 2006, vol. 2, p. 120; tr., Juvaini, 1997, pp. 390–391; see also Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. 12, p. 440. 24 Joveyni, 2006, vol. 2, p. 121; Nasavi, 1987, p. 22.

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had passed a lifetime in holy war, that soltān had the right to reject that imam and to set up another [in his place]. Furthermore, the Sayyids in the line of Hosseyn had the right to the caliphate and the ʿAbbāsids were usurpers. Having obtained fatwās to this effect he removed the name of the caliph from the khotba throughout his kingdom. However, this attack on the ʿAbbāsids was to turn out ill for the soltān.25

Soltān Mohammad tried to define a new kind of legitimacy for himself by replacing the ʿAbbāsids with the ʿAlawites.26 The plan to bring in a Shiʿite caliph instead of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate shows the competitive base of these two religious power structures. After this action, he set out for the western parts of Iran with a large army to overthrow the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate, which challenged his legitimacy among the people who valued the caliph.27 Joveyni cites Soltān Mohammad’s conducting a campaign toward Baghdad, which failed due to snow and cold, as his first strategic mistake. From the historian’s point of view, it was due to disrespect to the caliph. According to Joveyni, From Hamedān the soltān proceeded in the direction of Baghdad. By the time he had reached Asadābād it was mid-autumn. The vanguard of Dey (the first month of winter in Iran’s calandar)28 made an assault and struck with their swords in the shape of snow that descended like showers of arrows. In that night the soltān’s army witnessed the Day of Judgment, and from the spears of the cold and the wind, which no breastplate could ward off, they experienced the terrors of zamharir [winter]. Many persons perished in the snow, and of the animals there was left not even a trace, so that in the hands of Resolve there remained only Repentance and Regret.29

Soltān Mohammad’s failure in his political struggle with the caliph had a significant impact on the continuation of the Khwārazmshāhi power in the western areas and the limitation of their power in Khorāsān and Mā Varā al-Nahr. 25 Joveyni, 2006, vol. 2, pp. 121–122; tr., Juvaini, 1997, p. 390; see also ʿUfi, 1993, vol. 1, pp. 142–143; Fazlollāh Hamedāni, 2006, vol. 1, p. 341, reads, vol. 4, p. 398. 26 During his reign, Caliph Al-Nāser rebuilt the tombs and shrines of the Shiʿite imams in order to gain the support of the Twelver Shiʿites (Ibn Taqtaqā, 1971, p. 432). 27 Barthold, 1968, p. 27. 28 . The first month of the year in Iran’s calendar. 29 Joveyni, 2006, vol. 2, p. 98; tr., Juvaini, 1997, p. 366.

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Soltān Jalāl al-Din inherited the disputes between Soltān Mohammad and the caliph. At a time when the Islamic world needed a robust military agent like Soltān Mohammad, and he needed the support of the ʿAbbāsid caliph to defend the Islamic world as a stronghold against the Mongol invasions, the caliph continued to be hostile to the soltān, and in this regard advanced to the point of political alliance with the Mongols. According to Joveyni: When his horses had recovered their strength he set out for Baghdad expecting the Commander of the Faithful an-Nāser le-Din-Allāh to render him assistance and make of him a bulwark against the foe. He sent a messenger on in advance to announce his arrival and explain his intentions. But the Commander of the Faithful paid no attention to his words, for he still harbored resentment for what he had suffered at the hands of the soltān’s father and grandfather. Instead, he deputed Qostamir, one of the gholāms holding the rank of amir, together with an army of 20,000 valiant men and illustrious heroes, to expel the soltān from his territory; and at the same time carrier pigeons were dispatched to Erbil with the message that Mozaffar al-Din should likewise send 10,000 men so that the soltān might be caught between them.30

Soltān Jalāl al-Din’s response to the caliph’s troops, who instead of helping him to defend Islamic lands lined up against him, was based on a wisdom that showed its results two decades later, when the Mongols caused the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate to collapse. Joveyni writes: The soltān sent someone to Qostamir with a message to the effect that the purpose of his coming was to seek refuge under the far-reaching shadow of the Commander of the Faithful, inasmuch as powerful foes had gained the victory and conquered the lands and peoples of Islam, and no army could withstand them.31

Joveyni is writing history as he witnesses the capture of Baghdad and the collapse of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate.32 The ʿAbbāsid Caliphate considered Mongol power as the reproduction of the power structures of the Ghaznavids, Saljuqs, and even Khwārazmshāhi, who once rose from the East and revived 30 Joveyni, 2006, vol. 2, p. 154; tr., Juvaini, 1997, p. 422; see also Fazlollāh Hamedāni, 2006, vol. 1, p. 393; Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. 12, p. 440. 31 Joveyni, 2006, vol. 2, p. 154; tr., Juvaini, 1997, p. 422. 32 Nasavi, 1987, pp. 189–190; ʿUfi, 1993, p. 332; Joveyni, 2006, vol. 2, p. 175.

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the structure of the caliph’s power by defeating his current rivals. But, for the Mongols, the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate was the continuation of the rule of the Khwārazmshāhi and the Ismāʿilis; consequently, they saw eliminating it as an essential part of their conquering goal. The Expanding Policies of the Khwārazmshāhi Leading to the Mongol Invasions The Khwārazmshāhi tried to establish a vast empire by reproducing the structure of the Saljuq dynasty. Unlike Saljuq rule, the Khwārazmshāhi government was based on a centralized power structure stationed in Khwārazm, in the northeastern corner of the empire. Therefore, its path to building an empire seemed much more complex than that of the Saljuqs stationed in central Iran. Moreover, the Khwārazmshāhi concentrated on expanding policies and were unaware of creating security and stability in the conquered lands. The history of the Khwārazmshāhi dynasty began with wars and never-ending expansion, which led to the decline of the Khwārazmshāhi dynasty before it went through the stage of stabilization. After a great deal of competition with the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate and atābaks for the conquest of ʿArāq-e ʿAjam,33 the Khwārazmshāhi turned their attention to the eastern lands. This was mainly in the time of Soltān Mohammad. In the first years of the seventh century AH, Soltān Mohammad Khwārazmshāh, pursuing a policy of expansionism, seriously competed with the Ghurid dynasty, which had formed an important and influential dynasty in the eastern part of present-day Afghanistan as far as Lahore. The Turkish Ghurids had long been a source of concern for Iranian dynasties, including the Ghaznavids and the Saljuqs. The Ghurids, who considered the Khwārazmshāhi to be their serious rivals, were encouraged by the ʿAbbāsids to capture the city of Khwārazm. Soltān Mohammad was able to save Khwārazm only with the help of the people of Khwārazm and the Qarākhatāyids.34 To defeat the Ghurids, Soltān Khwārazmshāhi enlisted the help of the Qarākhatāyid and Ilakkhānid dynasties and united with the Gurkhān in exchange for recognition and a promise that their territory would not be invaded. Thus, Soltān Mohammad attacked the city of Ghazna, the capital of the Ghurids, with a force that was twice as large in 612 AH/1216 AD and occupied it after a fierce battle. With the capture of the capital and the 33 Bondāri, 1977, p. 363; Rāvandi, 2011, p. 331; Jorfādeqāni, 2003, p. 422. 34 Nasavi, 1987, p. 33.

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assassination of Ghiyās-ad-Din Ghuri, Shahāb al-Din’s brother, the rule of the Ghurids collapsed.35 Soltān Mohammad continued to occupy other cities beyond Seyhun one after another. The Khwārazmshāhi borders now extended from the Indian subcontinent to Lahore and from Mā Varā al-Nahr to Samarqand, across the Seyhun from the Farqāne to the Aral Sea. The Khwārazmshāhi intended to be the only undisputed power in the eastern world, so after defeating the Ghurids in 606 AH/1210 AD, they started to conduct new campaigns against the Qarākhatāyid tribes who were their former allies. The Qarākhatāyids were the only stronghold between the Khwārazmshāhis and the Mongols.36 The proximity to the Mongols, who had previously conquered the lands beyond the Great Wall of China, and the absence of Khwārazmshāhi rule within its borders, exposed Khwārazm to more unexpected incidents. Soltān Mohammad’s extravagance in capturing eastern territories effectively incited the Mongols to invade Iran. It was from the words of ʿEmād al-Molk Tāj al-Din Dabir Jāmi, who was one of the pillars of Khwārazmshāhi, that Soltān Mohammad longed for the conquest of the Chinese lands. He constantly explored those lands and asked about them from whoever had visited the Chinese territories and beyond Turkestan. We, the servants, tried to distract him from this news; however, the soltān did not give up the idea of doing so.37

The Khwārazmshāhi dynasty, after defeating its rivals, left the reign of the conquered lands to the Khwārazmshāhi amirs. The extravagance of the Khwārazmshāhi amirs, their killings and looting, and the repression of former allies who gradually became the sworn enemies of the Khwārazmshāhi, led to the decline of the dynasty.38 The Split in the Power Structure and the Fall of the Capital The split in the power structure of the Khwārazmshāhi, who relied on a centralized political structure, and being in a situation where their capital was on the borders of their empire, posed serious problems to the 35 Amitai-Preiss and Morgan, 2000, pp. 93–94; Amitai and Biran, 2005, pp. 102–103; Abol Fadā, 1907, pp. 112–116; Bardi, 1989, p. 213. 36 Hamdollāh Mostowfi, 1985, p. 492. For information on the rule of the Qarākhtayāns in Mā Varā al-Nahr and their beliefs and opinions, see Amitai and Biran, 2005, pp. 175–180. 37 Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 2, p. 102. 38 Joveyni, 2006, vol. 2, pp. 122–125; Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 2, pp. 95–96; Jackson, 2017, pp. 71–81.

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Khwārazmshāhi dynasty. Soltān Mohammad Khwārazmshāh, who came to power through the support of his mother, Terkān Khatun, and her tribe, was never able to make a decision without her or her tribe’s intervention. There was a split between the soltān and his mother throughout his reign, and the effects of this split continued during the reign of Jalāl al-Din Khwārazmshāh. Nasavi writes, “The soltān did not oppose his mother’s commands … since most amirs and commanders were from Terkān Khātun’s tribe.… Moreover, he conquered the Qarākhatāy Khānāte based on the assistance of her tribe.”39 Bureaucracy was the most crucial power structure that could have paved the way for filling the gap in the Khwārazmshāhi. But the Khwārazmshāhi structure lacked great and resourceful Iranian ministers and bureaucrats. The Khwārazmshāhi were unaware of the value of eff icient ministers in expanding their rule; therefore, powerful ministers such as Khwāja Nezām al-Molk Tusi were not part of their structure. Soltān Mohammad Khwārazmshāh, after the overthrow of Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, Mohammad ibn Sāleh, who was supported by Terkān Khatun, the mother of the soltān, did not appoint a minister to head his government and left the vizierate to six people to jointly manage the empire. This continued during the reign of Soltān Jalāl al-Din. 40 The lack of unity and cohesion in the Khwārazmshāhi government went so far that some agents who were once in the Khwārazmshāhi system joined the Mongols and encouraged Genghis Khan to widen this split until the Khwārazmshāhi empire was destroyed. Take Badr al-Din ʿAmid, for example, an agent of the soltān who had been recruited by his relatives, including his father and uncle. He encouraged the Mongols to write separate letters to Terkān Khatun and Soltān Mohammad to show that they were plotting to betray each other. Badr al-Din ʿAmid, despite being one of the Khwārazmshaid rulers and a relative of the soltān’s mother, wrote letters to Genghis Khan to let him know that the Turkish tribes and clans and many others who served the soltān were aware of the growing conflict between the soltān and his mother. Badr al-Din told Genghis Khan that they preferred her rule to that of the soltān.41 This and similar events caused the soltān, who had left Khwārazm, to expand his campaigns and not return to the capital,42 hence, the capital of the Khwārazmshāhi was left without the soltān. 39 40 41 42

Nasavi, 1987, p. 42. Ibid., pp. 137, 189. Ibid., pp. 55–56. Ibid., p. 56.

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In the absence of Soltān Mohammad, Khwārazm was under the control of Terkān Khatun. Stories about the Mongol invasions of Mā Varā al-Nahr and Khorāsān reached Khwārazm one after another, which discouraged Terkān Khatun from staying in the capital and defending it against the invaders. Therefore, Terkān Khatun handed over responsibility for the capital to one of the amirs of the Khwārazmshāhi government and left for Yināl Castle in Māzandarān. Before fleeing from Khwārazm, Terkān Khatun ordered the deaths the all the members of the elite and any capable men, the very people who, in the absence of the soltān, could have been a powerful stronghold against the Mongols. This action of Terkān Khatun in fact paved the way for the Mongol’s conquest of Khwārazm. 43 Joveyni considers the resistance of the people of Khwārazm against the Mongols, which resulted in many casualties, to be one of the most critical events in history. After scattered clashes between the city’s defensive forces and the Mongol troops, which began in late 617 AH/1221 AD, the invaders, numbering more than 100,000, laid siege to the city. They conquered Khwārazm in 618 AH/1222 AD after an intense siege of five to seven months.44 Although Qāzi ʿAli al-Din Khayāti, the mohtaseb (supervisor of bāzārs and trade) of the city, went to Jochi on behalf of the people and asked for safety, his request was not heeded. 45 Joveyni writes that the Mongols were able to easily take the town, “quarter by quarter, house by house,”46 destroying buildings and slaughtering inhabitants until the formerly splendid city was finally in their hands. The Mongols drove the people out into the open, and those who were artisans or craftsmen, of whom there were more than 100,000, were separated from the rest, the children and the young women were reduced to slavery and borne off into captivity; and the men who remained were divided among the army, and to each fighting man fell the execution of twenty-four persons.47

Thus, the power structure of the Khwārazmshāhi, which was formed by relying on the concentration of power in the capital, declined with the departure of the soltān from Khwārazm. 43 Ibid., p. 60. 44 Joveyni, 2006, vol. 1, pp. 98–100; Barthold, 1968, p. 429. 45 Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. 12, p. 373; Hamdollāh Mostowfi, 1985, p. 492. 46 Joveyni, 2006, vol. 1, p. 100. 47 Joveyni, 2006, vol. 1, pp. 100–101; tr., Juvaini, 1997, pp. 127–128; Nasavi, 1987, pp. 171–172. The number of the slain in Khwārazm was larger than the entire population of other Khwārazmshāhi cities (Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. 12, p. 373).

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The Soltān’s Insecurity in the Homeland and Escape from the Battlefield The Mongol invasions, on the one hand, and the split in the power structure, on the other, turned the vast conquered territories of the Khwārazmshāhi into an insecure place for Soltān Mohammad. In particular, the violence of the Khwārazmshāhi in the occupied territories and their hostile treatment of the caliph became major obstacles to the continuation of the Khwārazmshāhi. Soltān Mohammad, who had won most of the battles in the eastern regions, did not have a precise plan for the war against the Mongols, so instead of a comprehensive confrontation with the Mongols, he divided his forces among different cities in Mā Varā al-Nahr and Khorāsān. Joveyni writes: When the soltān withdrew from the conflict, the levers of control slipped from his hands and the appearance of constancy was replaced by the reality of flight, perplexity and doubt established itself in his nature. He deputed the protection of most of his lands and territories to his generals [qovvād] and allies [ansār]. Thus to Samarqand he has assigned 110,000 men, of whom 60,000 were Turks, with their khans, who were the soltān’s elite and such that had Esfandiyār of the brazen body felt the prick of their arrows and the thrust of their lances, he would have had no resource but [to acknowledge] his weakness and [beg for] quarter. The rest of the army consisted of 50,000 Tājiks, picked men [mofradin], each of whom was in himself the Rostam of the age and the cream of the armies; together with 20 elephants of perfect shape and div-like appearance, who twisted columns and played with serpents. And the king’s cavalry wore multicolored coats of mail for protection [ farzin-band] … that they might not avert their faces from attack and assault. 48

With his belligerent and militant actions, Soltān Mohammad quickly came back from all the paths he had passed to conquer more regions in eastern territories. The Mongol invasions occurred so suddenly and rapidly that Soltān Mohammad could not react appropriately. Soltān Mohammad’s lack of connection with the cities he conquered49 made it easier for Genghis Khan to defeat them and required the king’s rapid and even hasty escape. In 616 AH/1220 AD, when Genghis Khan invaded 48 Joveyni, 2006, vol. 1, p. 91; tr., Juvaini, 1997, pp. 116–117; Nasavi, 1987, p. 54. 49 Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. 12, pp. 373-374.

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Mā Varā al-Nahr, only eight years had passed since Soltān Mohammad’s reign had started in Bokhārā and Samarqand. The lands of western Iran had joined the empire just three years earlier, and the Khwārazmshāhi had no opportunity to consolidate their power there.50 After the Mongols conquered Mā Varā al-Nahr and crossed the Jeyhun, those who still hoped to restore the power of Khwārazmshāhi called on Soltān Mohammad to confront the Mongols seriously and choose another city in Iraq and Khorāsān as his new capital. This issue did not come to the attention of Soltān Mohammad. Joveyni writes: Those who had been tested with the practice of a lifetime, and had experienced good and evil, and had thought deeply on the administration of affairs, suggested as follows: “The position in Mā Varā al-Nahr has passed out of our control and it is no longer possible to hold that area; but we should do everything in our power not to lose the kingdoms of Iraq and Khorāsān. The armies which have been stationed in every city and upon every side must be recalled; a general advance must be made; the Oxus must be converted into a moat and they must not be suffered to set foot across that river. Happily, God will of Himself bring about some victory or event of His ordering.”51

The structure of the soltānate, on which the soltān had advanced in the direction of forming a vast empire as far as the Mongols’ borders, was now a heavy burden on Soltān Mohammad’s shoulders. Without defending Khwārazm as the center of power or defining a new center, Soltān Mohammad provided the necessary structural resources for the Mongols to advance further into the Khwārazmshāhi territories.52 The power of Soltān Mohammad in the absence of a bureaucracy was based on the military men who accompanied him from city to city, but the military, whose nature was defined by the power of the sword and the hope of conquering and looting new lands, saw no willingness in Soltān Mohammad to change the status quo. Therefore, in despair of Soltān Mohammad, they took the path of rebellion against the soltān. Jowzjāni writes: When the accounts of these disasters came to the hearing of Soltān Mohammad, the forces, then along with him before the gates of Balkh, 50 To learn further about the Mongol invasions of Iran, see Manz, 2022, ch. 11. 51 Joveyni, 2006, vol. 2, pp. 106–107; tr., Juvaini, 1997, p. 376. 52 Ibn Asir, 1965, vol. 12, p. 375.

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consisted almost entirely of Tātār and Khātāy troops, whilst his own old soldiers and vassals had been left behind by him in Mā Varā al-Nahr; and those people, on whom the most implicit trust and confidence could be placed, were also all away in those parts. The troops who were along with him [now] conspired together to seize him and to make that act of perfidy and treachery the means of their own deliverance; and, having seized the soltān, to take him and deliver him over as an offering to Genghis Khan.53

The soltān did not stop anywhere, and despite the presence of troops who saw in him a valuable gift to the Mongol khan, there was no hope of a change in the status quo. The choice of Abeskun Island as the last resort and the only haven was the result of successive Mongol invasions and the retreat of the borders of the Khwārazmshāhi government, as well as the soltān’s fear of facing the Mongols and, more importantly, his lack of roots in the Khwārazmshāhi territories. The soltān was fleeing to the island so that he might be able to find a place to pass the last days of his life: “He cried and said, ‘After conquering many territories, today I am not able to find a small piece of land to dig a grave and to bury my afflicted body.’”54 Soltān Mohammad’s homelessness resulted from his hasty policies of turning a local government into a vast empire without taking advantage of the structural resources of former dynasties like the Saljuqs. Soltān Jalāl al-Din and the Government without a Capital The social changes of the Khwārazmshāhi dynasty, which began with Atsez and Takash’s efforts to turn the local government of Khwārazm into an empire, collapsed with the rise to power of Soltān Mohammad at the height of his power. Unlike other local governments, such as those of the Ismāʿilis and the atābaks of Fars, who negotiated with the Mongols, the Khwārazmshāhi withdrew everywhere. They turned their territories into a ruined, defenseless land against the Mongols. Soltān Jalāl al-Din was the last of the Turkish soltāns to rule Iran before the Mongol invasion, although he insisted that he should not be called soltān. Jowzjāni writes: “He always disliked to be called soltān, but they did not pay attention because it was still common to call a great ruler ‘soltān.’”55 53 Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 1, p. 312; tr., 1881, vol. 2, p. 275. 54 Nasavi, 1987, p. 68. 55 Ibid., p. 282.

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In the last days of his life, Soltān Mohammad made one of his independent decisions, which was always opposed by Terkān Khatun and the amirs of Khwārazmshāhi, and appointed his son Jalāl al-Din to be his successor and gave him his sword as his legacy.56 But the heavy shadow of discord and division in the structure of power, as an inevitable outcome, was also left to Soltān Jalāl al-Din. The Khwārazmshāhi amirs, who were the heirs of Khwārazm in the absence of Terkān Khatun and Soltān Mohammad, chose Shāh Qotboddin, another of Soltān Mohammad’s sons, as their crown prince and with their swords waited for the arrival of Jalāl al-Din.57 When Jalāl alDin returned to the capital, the location of the remnants of Khwārazmshāhi power, most of which belonged to Terkān Khatun’s tribe, they revolted against Soltān Jalāl al-Din and drove him out of the capital.58 At the same time, with the arrival of Jalāl al-Din in the capital, the people had new hope of preserving their lives and their land, Khwārazm. Jowzjāni writes: Qotb al-Din, was the son of Soltān Mohammad, and his mother was a kinswoman of his father’s mother and the family of Qadr Khan of Qabchāq; and he was the heir-apparent to the throne of Khwārazm. When the calamities consequent on the irruption of Genghis Khan arose, Soltān Mohammad was obliged to fly from the banks of the Jeyhun and the vicinity of Balkh, and he retired to Neyshābur, the grandmother of Arzalu Shāh, the mother of Soltān Mohammad, and the people of Khwārazm, the maleks, and the amirs, came together and raised Qotb al-Din, Arzalu Shāh, to the throne of Khwārazm, and the whole of them applied themselves to his service. The soltāns and maleks, from both the east and west, and of the countries of Iran and Turān, who were imprisoned at Khwārazm, were all drowned in the Jeyhun; and not one of them was left alive, by the time that one of the sons of Genghis Khan, Tushi by name, with a numerous army, from Mā Varā al-Nahr, was nominated to march into Torkestān and Khwārazm.59

With the expulsion of Soltān Jalāl al-Din from the capital, Khwārazm fell into the hands of the “king of Nowruz.”60 56 57 58 59 60

Nasavi, 1987, p. 84; Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 1, p. 313. Nasavi, 1987, pp. 59–60. Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 1, p. 313. Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 1, p. 313; tr., 1881, vol. 1, pp. 279–280. Joveyni, 2006, vol. 1, p. 98.

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Soltān Jalāl al-Din Khwārazmshāh, who had fled to India61 after a war against the Mongols, in the hope of finding better opportunities and regrouping, eventually returned to Iran in 620 AH/1224 AD to confront new rivals in Iran. But after the collapse of Khwārazm, which was a rich structural resource for the Khwārazmshāhi dynasty, he could find no new center to consolidate his power. The east and the northeast were in the hands of the Mongols; the new Mongol-based Qarākhatāyid government governed Kermān, and Esfahān was in the hands of Qiyās al-Din Mohammad, the brother of Jalāl al-Din, who refused to accept his brother’s authority.62 On the other hand, the atābaks of Fars, Azarbāijān, and the Ismāʿilis ruled their territories.63 The ʿAbbāsid Caliphate, which was to strengthen his power in western parts of Iran, did not let Jalāl al-Din gain new territory in Khuzestān. To gain power, Jalāl al-Din moved from Kermān, Esfahān, Fars, and Azarbāijān and fought with the Georgians, who invaded the borders of Azarbāijān and provided the means for the persecution of the people. He wandered everywhere without a precise map of the geography of his territories.64 The looting was a vital part of military practice during this chaotic period. For a king who had no land to rule and was threatened by his armies and did not have a proper bureaucracy, the troops became structural barriers that took advantage of the soltān’s structural legitimacy for their insurgents.65 While a group of people in Mā Varā al-Nahr and Khorāsān were massacred by the Mongols, another group in the Jebāl and Azarbāijān regions worried about the massacre and lootings conducted by the Khwārazmshāhi. Nasavi adds: He [Jalāl al-Din] wanted to protect the city from his soldiers’ looting, but the khans and commanders of the army showed up and said, “The siege had weakened the army for a long time, and their animals were dead. If you stop the army from looting, they will weaken and cannot resist the enemy.” Such enchantments were blown upon him that he consented to this corruption.… The army had been plundering for three days; they arrested the people and tortured them to learn about their hidden treasures.66 61 The structural resource of the invasion of India, which began during the reign of Yaʿqub Leys and culminated with the Ghaznavids, changed during the Khwārazmshāhi period and on the eve of the Mongol invasion, to the structure of taking refuge in India (Jowzjāni, 1984, vol. 2, p. 76; Bayāni, 2002, vol. 1, p. 35). 62 Nasavi, 1987 p. 98. 63 Ibid., p. 20. 64 Bayāni, 1973, p. 112. 65 Nasavi, 1987, pp. 132–133. 66 Ibid., p. 212.

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His move from Kermān to Esfahān, in the northwest, and his return to the regions that revolted, indicated that he had no plan and was disappointed. Nasavi considered Soltān Jalāl al-Din to be an imaginary ship that “reached out to everything for survival,”67 so that it may one day extend the life of the Khwārazmshāhi government. Perhaps the Khwārazmshāhi government had fallen many years before with the conquest of Khwārazm by the Mongol armies.68 The historian effectively describes the last serious confrontation between Soltān Jalāl al-Din, the last Amir al-Khwarizmi, and the Mongols. All the social changes that the Mongol invasion had brought to Iran had pushed social agents, including the Khwārazmshāhi, into a deep sleep. The last night that the historian regrets passed in oblivion, neglect that brought the destruction of structures and the killing of agents and directed Iran’s social changes to move in another direction. The death of Soltān Jalāl al-Din was the end of the Khwārazmshāhi Soltānate in Iran.

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Fasih-e Khwāfi, Ahmad ibn Mohammad (2008). Mojmal Fasihi, ed. Mohsen Nasr Ābādi, 3 vols., Tehrān: Asātir Fazlollāh Hamedāni, Rashid al-Din (2006). Jameʿ al-Tavārikh, ed. Mohammad Roshan, 3 vols., Tehrān: Mirās-e Maktub Hamdollāh Mostowfi, Ibn Abi Bekr (1985). Tārikh-e Gozida, ed. ʿAbdol Hosseyn Navāie, Tehrān: Amir Kabir Ibn Asir, ʿAli ibn Mohammad (1965). Al-Kāmel fi al-Tārikh, 13 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Sāder Ibn Jowzi, ʿAbdol Rahmān (1992). Al-Montazam fi Tavārikh al-Moluk va al-Omam, ed. Mohammad ʿAbdol Qāder ʿAtā, 19 vols., Beirut: Dār al-Kotob al-ʿElmiya Ibn Taqtaqā, Abu Jaʿfar Mohammad Ibn ʿAli Ibn Tabātabā (1971). Tārikh-e Fakhri, trans. Mohammad Vahid Golpāyegāni, Tehrān: Bongāh-e Tarjoma va Nashr-e Ketāb Jackson, Peter (2017). Mongols and the Islamic World from Conquest to Conversion, New Haven and London: Yale University Press Jorfādeqāni, Abol Sharaf Nāseh ibn Zafar (2003). Tārikh-e Yamini, ed. Jaʿfar Shoʿār, Tehrān: ʿElmi va Farhangi Joveyni, Atā Malek (2006). Tārikh-e Jahān-goshā, ed. Mohammad Qazvini, 3 vols., Tehrān: Donyā-ye Ketāb Jowzjāni, Menhāj al-Serāj (1881). Tabaqāt-e Nāseri, trans. H. G. Raverty, London: Gilbert and Rivington Jowzjāni, Menhāj al-Serāj (1984). Tabaqāt-e Nāseri, ed. ʿAbdol Hayy-e Habibi, 2 vols., Tehrān: Donyā-ye Ketāb Juvaini, Ata-Malik (1997). Genghis Khan: The History of the World-Conqueror, trans. J. A. Boyle, Manchester: Manchester University Press Manz, Beatrice Forbes (2022). “The Mongol Conquest of Iran,” in The Mongol World, ed. Timothy May and Michael Hope, London: Routledge Mir Khwānd, Mohammad (2002). Tārikh-e Rowzat al-Safā fi Sirat al-Anbiyā va al-Moluk va al-Kholafā, ed. Jamshid Kiyānfar, vols. 4, Tehrān: Asātir Nakhjavāni, Hendushāh ibn Sanjar (1979). Tajāreb al-Salaf, Dar Tavārikh-e Kholafā va Vozarā-ye Ishān, ed. ʿAbbās Eqbāl, Tehrān: Ketābkhana-ye Tahuri Nasavi Khorandezi, Shāhāb al-Din Mohammad (1987). Sirat-e Jalāl al-Din Mengoberni, Tehrān: Entesharāt-e ʿElmi va Farhangi Nasavi Khorandezi, Shāhāb al-Din Mohammad (2006). Nafsat al-Masdur, ed. Amir Hosseyn Yazdgerdi, Tehrān: Tus Qalqashandi, Ahmad (1960). Sobh al-Aʿshā fi Senaʿāt al-Eteshāʾ, 14 vols., Cairo: Nāsher Rāvandi, Mohammad ibn ʾAli (1997). Majmaʿ al-Ansāb, ed. Mirhāshem Mohaddes, Tehrān: Amir Kabir ʿUfi, Mohammad ibn Mohammad (1993). Javāmeʿ al-Hekāyāt va Lavāmeʿ al-Revāyat, ed. Mohammad Moʿin, 4 vols., Tehrān: Tehrān University Press

Conclusion Social change in post-Islamic Iran was tied to the formation of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. The ʿAbbāsid ploy to exploit dissident agents and mobilize them against the Umayyad Caliphate led to the formation of various social groups. Aware of their historic opportunity to bring about social change, the ʿAbbāsids took full advantage of their potential. The use of tools such as daʿva, which had a long history in Islamic history, exploiting Shiʿite structural resources such as the imamate, and identifying Khorāsān as a suitable place to start daʿva, was part of the ʿAbbāsid plan to gain religious legitimacy among the people. The Iranians, who had not forgotten the memory of their glorious preIslamic history and looked to reproduce those structures in order to gain independence, came to the scene with all their strength. The presence of many of them as dāʿies, including Abu Salama Khallāl and great commanders such as Abu Moslem-e Khorāsāni, eventually led to the fall of the Umayyad Caliphate. The ʿAbbāsid Caliphate can be considered a reproduction of the Umayyad Caliphate, which tried to rule with the same monopolistic power. Although the ʿAbbāsids used various structural resources and agents to gain power, they chanted only negative slogans during the invitation and did not promise to make fundamental changes. But ʿAbbāsid efforts to overthrow the Umayyads had brought new agents to the scene who never intended to give up their share against the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. The Shiʿites, who saw the ʿAbbāsids indebted to their structural resources for recruiting dissidents, renewed their rebellious activity more strongly than before. The ʿAbbāsids were aware that the Shiʿites were not looking for a share of the power, but to possess all of it; therefore, the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate tried to subdue the Shiʿites with a policy of repression. But, the power structures of the ʿAlawites became more cohesive and stable with the physical elimination of their agents. Eventually, Maʾmun, who saw that the policy of repression was unsuccessful, complied with the Shiʿites’ demands and, by electing ʿAli ibn Musā as the crown prince, took a different approach to dealing with them. Although this action led to the Shiʿites’ defeat due to the opposition of the ʿAbbāsids and Maʾmun’s

Kamali, M. Social Change in Medieval Iran 132-628 AH (750-1231 AD). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2023 doi: 10.5117/9789463721981_conc

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deception, with ʿAli ibn Musā’s arrival to Khorāsān, a new arena of social change started in their favor. The second group, Iranian agents, sought to reproduce pre-Islamic political and intellectual structures during the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. Although the Iranians were active in all stages of the daʿva, especially during the ʿAbbāsid war with the Umayyad caliphs, they sought only Iran’s independence and the reproduction of pre-Islamic Iranian structures. After using the power of Iranian amirs and dāʿies, the ʿAbbāsids began their efforts to consolidate power by fomenting rivalry between the dāʿies and eliminating them one by one. They attempted to assassinate Abu Moslem, whose name was associated with Khorāsān and the victory of the ʿAbbāsids. Although they kept Khorāsān in the hands of the ʿAbbāsids for some time, this region’s dynamic structures sought another Iranian agent to establish an independent power structure in the region. The connection of the circle of Iranians with the ʿAbbāsid power framework continued with the presence of bureaucrats in the caliph’s court. The presence of the Barmakids in the court of the ʿAbbāsid caliphs, as a reproduction of the pre-Islamic Iranian bureaucratic structure, helped Iranian agents to overshadow the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. Although the ʿAbbāsids interpreted the presence of the bureaucrats as a division of power and therefore eliminated them, this provided the ground for Khorāsān’s independence in the long run. The Khorāsān riots were the first result of the massacre of the Barmakids. To preserve the territorial integrity of the caliphate, Hārun divided its lands among his sons. Amin’s dispute with Maʾmun, who was in Khorāsān with the help of his minister, paved the way for the formation of the two factions of Khorāsān and Baghdad and their confrontation. The Khorāsān faction, led by Fazl ibn Sahl, Maʾmun’s vizier, and Tāher ibn Hosseyn’s sword, succeeded against the Baghdad faction and raised Maʾmun to the throne of the caliphate. Maʾmun chose Khorāsān as his throne and from there ruled the vast territory of the caliphate; but Baghdad’s ʿAbbāsid opposition to the caliph’s decisions, including the election of ʿAli ibn Musā as crown prince and the transfer of power to Iran, pushed Maʾmun to the brink of removal from power. Eventually, Maʾmun left Khorāsān for Baghdad, sending Tāher to Khorāsān to form the first Iranian government. With the Khorāsān faction’s victory over Baghdad and Maʾmun’s departure for Baghdad, the efforts of Iranian agents to gain independence from the caliphate structure came to fruition. The formation of the Tāherid dynasty was the first result of this social change in Iran. Iranian local dynasties, from the Tāherids to the Sāmānids, the Saffārids, the ʿAlawites, the Ziyārids, and

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the Buyids used the resources they found in Iranian and religious structures to advance to the throne of power. Throughout this period, the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate moved in the direction of losing its structural resources, but it was strong enough to overshadow local dynasties in Iran. The path of the Iranian dynasties to independence from the ʿAbbāsid structure was not the same. The Tāherid and Sāmānid dynasties used the resources of a borrowed structure approved by the caliph’s mandate. Although Iranian agents established both, the formation of the Tāherid and the Sāmānid dynasties was different. The actions of the Tāherids were not wholly independent of Baghdad’s, and the Tāherid rulers primarily defined their activities according to the ʿAbbāsid structure. Meanwhile, the Sāmānids, while being loyal to the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate, began to reproduce the structures of their dynasty by addressing cultural issues, strengthening Iranian bureaucracy, and maintaining their role as Iranian border guards. The Tāherids perpetuated their names as the founders of the first independent Iranian dynasty. Being aware that the nature of their power depended on loyalty to the ʿAbbāsid caliph, they were armed with swords to obey Baghdad’s orders. Their wars against the ʿAlawites and their conflicts with Bābak, Māziyār, and Afshin separated their path from those power structures that opposed the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. Despite the borrowed nature of their power, the Sāmānids reproduced different structures in their dynasty. The borrowed nature of the Sāmānid structure forced its main agents to sometimes act as the caliph’s arm. The Sāmānids who had taken over Mā Varā al-Nahr’s reign as a reward for their efforts to quell the revolt of Rāfeʿ ibn Leys continued to serve the caliph as the top priority in their plans. The Tāherids’ experience showed the Sāmānids that as long as they were dependent on the resources of the borrowed power and the caliph’s mandate, they needed to obey the caliph’s orders. The use of bureaucracy and cultural agents alongside the commanders was one of the social changes of the Sāmānid dynasty, the roots of which can be traced back to pre-Islamic Iran. By using educated agents and prominent ministers, the Sāmānids defined the path to independence differently. The attention of the Sāmānids to various intellectual and cultural structures prepared the way for the influence of Ismāʿili thought in Mā Varā al-Nahr and Khorāsān. This effect was so significant that the Ismāʿilis mobilized the agents’ power in the structure of the Sāmānid dynasty and enabled the shift in the balance of power between the bureaucrats and the military. Training slaves and allowing them to reach the highest levels of power was a social change developed in light of the egalitarian culture of the Sāmānids.

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The successful presence of the Sāmānids as border guards paved the way for the indifference of central–local dynasties to strengthening their defense structures against the nomadic people who were crossing the borders of the Islamic world and entering Muslim territory. The arrival of the Turks and the Turkmen, and then the attacks of the Mongols, showed that the dynasties of central Iran, despite their ability to stubbornly resist the encroachments of other local dynasties, were very vulnerable to the movements of nomadic peoples. They considered it the duty of the border dynasties, including the Sāmānids, to protect the borders of the Islamic territories and neglected their essential role in protecting the borders. The Saffārid dynasty, which based its power first and foremost on the might of military rulers, created a different power structure in Islamic Iran. The establishment of the Saffārid dynasty, which took its structural resources not from the caliph’s approval but military power, posed a serious challenge to the legitimacy of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate and provided the prelude to greater independence of the next Iranian dynasties. This time it was the transfer of power from Iran to Baghdad, a city that Mansur had built years before to define the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate’s identity independent of previous governments in the Islamic realm. Yaʿqub-e Leys came to power when he had neither received a mandate from the caliph nor could rely on his genealogy to hope for the attention of the people of Sistān and other parts of Iran. Instead, Yaʿqub managed the power in Sistān’s military, including the Ayyārs and the Khwārejites. He used the tools of opposition to the caliph as a significant source of legitimacy. However, his defeat against the ʿAbbāsids in Deyr al-Āqul and then the defeat of his bother ʿAmr against the Sāmānids turned the Ghaznavid rule into a local but ineffective dynasty in the region’s power structure. The rise of the Buyid dynasty completed the unfinished path of the Saffārids to Baghdad. The establishment of the Buyid dynasty and its domination over Baghdad and the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate was an essential change in the structure of power shaped by the Deylamite military men on the one hand and the ʿAlawites on the other. The structure of the Buyids can be considered as the reproduction of a wide range of social changes created by different local dynasties, including the ʿAlawites of Tabarestān, the Ziyārids, and the Saffārids. Aware of the conflicts between the two significant power structures of the Sunni ʿAbbāsids and the Shiʿite Fatimids, the Buyids shifted social change from Iran to Baghdad by conquering Baghdad. By dominating the caliph, they reproduced the power of the earlier Iranian dynasties. This social change brought together Iranian and Shiʿite agents and minimized the ʿAbbāsids’ share of power.

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The Deylamite military men rejected the ʿAlawite belief that power was the legacy of the Prophet and the imams. Instead, relying on the Shiʿite power structure, they claimed that, like the ʿAlawites and the Sādāt (descandats of the Ismalic prophet, Mohammad), they deserved to shape the power structure. Thus, the connection of the sword of the Iranian military men and the religious legitimacy of the Shiʿites provided the necessary factors for the Buyid presence in the power structure. The ʿAlawites, who had always dreamed of overthrowing local powers, and the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate shaped a Shiʿite dynasty in the heart of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate in Baghdad. Surprisingly, the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate maintained its power structure by relying on the Shiʿites and the power of the Iranian agents against whom they had fought for years. The Buyids, while paying attention to the origins of their religious power, i.e., Shiʿism, adopted a tolerant policy toward other sects and religions. Their dependence on the Deylami military men forced them to reproduce the eqtāʿ (land grant) system in order to pay their soldiers. The creation of a rift between the Deylami military men and the Buyid amirs led to the decline of the Buyid dynasty. The Ghaznavids, by associating themselves with the Sassanids, sought to identify themselves as surviving agents of the last generation of pre-Islamic Persian kings. Historians refer to Soltān Mahmud as the first king in the Islamic world because he could reproduce the structures and actors of the past with astonishing power. Among these structural resources was to engage in large-scale developmental wars, combine them with ghazva and jihad, and set up a huge court with educated scholars and thinkers. Attention to intellectual studies including historiography and the Persian language that began in the Sāmānid period were other critical structural resources used by the Ghaznavids. Writing outstanding works such as the Tārikh-e Beyhaqi was one of the achievements of this period. Throughout history, the war was in the hands of agents as a powerful tool to reproduce existing structures in their favor. In a world where access to the highest level of power, i.e., kingship or caliphate, could only be achieved through war, military power was an essential structural resource in the hands of the agents of power to establish a new structure on the ruins of past structures. The Ghaznavids, relying on the expeditions and religious wars that were widespread until the reign of Soltān Mahmud, created a powerful resource from the semi-dormant structure of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate for strengthening the Ghaznavid dynasty. The Turkish amirs followed the path of gaining power through joining religion and war. The separation of Alptegin and Saboktegin from the

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Sāmānids and their departure for India was a reproduction of the structure of religious wars. Although ghazva and jihad were accepted in the Islamic world, the Ghaznavids’ extravagance led to the massacre of many Ismāʿilis under the pretext of spreading religious purity. This wealth also led to the extravagance of the military, which during the reign of Soltān Masʿud became a major obstacle to his stability at the helm of power, so much so that the amirs assassinated Soltān Masʿud and raised his brother Mohammad to power. By accepting the Turkmen in Khorāsān, Soltān Mahmud set out on the path of the Sāmānids who had once taken the Turks into their court and, by doing so, turned them into powerful rivals. The arrival of the Turkmen in Khorāsān marked the beginning of a change in the structure of the Ghaznavids. The Battle of Dandānqān (431 AH/1040 AD), which was the most important confrontation between Ghaznavids and the Saljuqs and the result of the tyranny of Soltān Masʿud and his disregard for the opinion of the bureaucrats and the military, led to the defeat of Soltān Masʿud. The actions of Soltān Masʿud and his authoritarian temperament disappointed the two mighty wings of the Ghaznavid structure, the bureaucrats and the eminent amirs. The divisions in the power structure and the removal of key agents, including the military and the bureaucrats, and their replacement by immature and ignorant agents led to the decline of the Ghaznavid dynasty and the establishment of the Saljuq Empire. After that, the Ghaznavid turned into a local dynasty in northern India. The Saljuqs, using a bureaucratic, structural resource run by prominent agents such as ʿAmid al-Molk Kondori and Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, realized the long-time goal of the Ghaznavids to conquer Baghdad and established a world empire. The Saljuq dynasty, which ruled the vast Islamic lands from Mā Varā al-Nahr to the Mediterranean Sea for nearly two centuries, based its power on the division of power between various structures, namely the soltānate, the caliphate, the vizierate, and the amirate. The vizierate was the only structure that could create stability and social security amid social change. The ministers’ most fundamental responsibility was to create and maintain the balance between various power structures, including the kingship, the caliphate, the vizierate, and the amirate. Khwāja Nezām al-Molk, the vizier of the Saljuq dynasty, by establishing Nezāmiya schools, wanted to draw the religious scholars and young generations of the Saljuq empire to this region and establish intellectual harmony. Still, Khwāja Nezām al-Molk’s political-religious ideas fueled

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religious differences and created a suffocating environment. Eventually, with the weakening of the bureaucratic structure and the expansion of the monopolistic power of the military, the Saljuqs were divided among different princes, amirs, and atābaks (governors). The post-Khwāja Nezām al-Molk era was soon tied to the weakening of the power structure of bureaucracy. Continuation of power in the bureaucracy structure was a goal that Khwāja Nezām al-Molk took adequate measures to achieve, but his efforts to remove the minister, ʿAmid al-Molk Kondori, were seriously reproduced by other ministers and turned into a structural obstacle to the consolidation of the Saljuq power structure. The Khwārazmshāhi used the Saljuq structural resources to transform their local dynasty into an empire. To coordinate their power structure as a centralized government, the Khwārazmshāhi needed to have a powerful capital at the center of their empire, expand central power to other regions, and maintain cohesion and unity in the power structure. However, these needs were never met. The split in the power structure and the fact that the Khwārazmshāhi capital was at the edge of the empire posed serious problems for the Khwārazmshāhi government. The lack of effective bureaucracy widened the gap in the power structure, especially between Soltān Mohammad and his mother. The caliph expected the Khwārazmshāhi to consider themselves his soldiers and to be content with their territories in Khorāsān and Khwārazm. In contrast, the Khwārazmshāhi expected the caliph to limit his reign to Baghdad and Iraq and to disregard Hamedān and other parts of western Iran. The heterogeneity of the goals of the Khwārazmshāhi and the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate brought the power structures of the caliphate and the soltānate face to face. The campaign conducted by Soltān Mohammad to conquer Baghdad and replace the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate with the ʿAlawite Caliphate failed because the soltān was unaware of the political geography of his territories and the structural resources of the caliphate in delegitimizing Khwārazmshāhi power. The Khwārazmshāhis’ unending expansionist policies in the eastern territories made them neighbors with the Mongols, who were far more militarily powerful than the Khwārazmshāhis. Soltān Mohammad’s lack of roots in the cities he had recently conquered made it easier for Genghis Khan to conquer the Khwārazmshāhi territories, and the soltān’s rapid and hasty escape sped up the process of these conquests. Although his son, Soltān Jalāl al-Din, tried to restore the Khwārazmshāhi power structure, inherited structural obstacles hindered his success, and his death led to the end of the Khwārazmshāhi in Iran.

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Index ʿAbbāsid Caliphate 3, 11, 14, 18, 20, 24, 25, 36, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 52, 53, 58, 59, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 81, 83, 84, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 101, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 109, 113, 114, 116, 117, 120, 121, 123, 124, 125, 129, 131, 134, 136, 138, 141, 144, 145, 146, 151, 152, 153, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 168, 173, 174, 179, 182, 188, 191, 193, 209, 210, 212, 213, 214, 226, 227, 232, 235, 237, 238, 240, 242, 243, 244, 252, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 261, 267 ʿAbbāsids 12, 17, 18, 19, 21, 25, 26, 33, 34, 35, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 81, 83, 86, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 101, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 110, 124, 129, 131, 134, 138, 141, 143, 144, 146, 151, 153, 156, 157, 159, 160, 189, 197, 213, 216, 218, 224, 227, 242, 244, 255, 256, 258 Abazunā 164 ʿAbdol Malek 216 ʿAbdol Motalleb 58 ʿAbdollāh-e Tāher 115 Abi Yaʿli Hanbali 164 Abol Faraj Esfahāni 46, 51, 56, 59, 79, 91, 96, 97, 142, 148, 263 Abol Rajāʾe Qomi 14, 31, 36, 214, 230, 231, 263 Abu Bakr 51, 136, 164 Abu Eshāq-e Sābi 165 Abu Moslem 26, 43, 44, 45, 47, 49, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 96, 104, 105, 107, 108, 109, 189, 196, 215, 255, 256 Abu Rajā 214, 230 Abu Salama 45, 47, 54, 55, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 227, 255 Abu Sarāyā 90, 91 Abu ʿAli Balʿami 9, 14 Abul Hasan Simjur 177 Abul Qāsem ʿEmādi 188 Adib 237 Āfarid 53 Afshin 33, 103, 107, 109, 110, 257 Afzal Kermāni 13, 14, 32, 33, 36, 59, 187, 204, 218, 220, 224, 225, 231, 263 ahl-e zemme 46 Ahmad-e Hārun 117 ʿAlāʾoddin Takesh 237 ʿAlawite 54, 64, 75, 90, 91, 92, 94, 95, 96, 117, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 161, 163, 259, 261 ʿAlawites 3, 18, 25, 26, 33, 43, 46, 47, 49, 54, 56, 64, 65, 75, 81, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 101, 103, 104, 107, 138, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 151, 153, 157, 160, 163, 164, 180, 182, 227, 242, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259

Alb Arsalān 214, 221 al-Ghazāli 187 ʿAli ibn Abi Tāleb 89, 92, 162 ʿAli ibn Isā 81, 82, 85, 86 ʿAli ibn Musā 81, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 104, 143, 255, 256 Al-Movafffaq 136 Alptegin 120, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 259 al-Qāder 60, 162, 267 al-Qāher 161, 162 al-Qāʾem 162, 212, 221 al-Tāyaʿ 162 ʿAmid al-Molk 213, 228, 230, 260, 261 Amin 44, 47, 59, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 93, 95, 103, 104, 105, 256, 263 Amir al-Moʾmenin 65, 67, 70, 72, 77, 91, 106, 117, 119, 133, 134, 162 Amir al-ʾOmarā 151, 158, 159 Amir Rashid 175, 176 Amir Sadid 176, 177 Amir-al-Joyush 217 Āmol 202 ʿAmr 117, 129, 137, 138, 180, 258 Ansār 248 Anushtegin 235, 236 Anvari 29, 60, 237, 269 Arab 13, 19, 43, 49, 51, 61, 142, 184, 273 Ardebil 108 Arghash-e Farhādān 155 Arsalān Jāzeb 200 Arzalu Shāh 251 Asfārbān Shiruya 154 Atā Malek Joveyni 122 Atābak Joveyni 14, 29, 36, 220, 232, 264 atābaks 32, 174, 209, 224, 235, 238, 244, 250, 252, 261 ʿAttāsh 216 Atābaks 222, 224, 240 Atsez 236, 237, 250 ʿAyyārs 129, 130 Az al-Dowla 161 Azarbāijān 32, 107, 108, 122, 236, 238, 240, 252 ʿAzod 20, 165, 166, 179, 184, 186, 188, 189 ʿAzod al-Dowla 20, 165, 166, 179, 184, 186, 188, 189 Bāb al-Shamasiya 159 Bābak 33, 103, 107, 108, 109, 110, 165, 218, 257 bad-dini 77, 126, 192, 196, 198, 226, 227 Baghdad 18, 29, 35, 36, 44, 73, 74, 75, 78, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 101, 103, 104, 107, 119, 122, 135, 136, 137, 138, 151, 153, 155, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 167, 169, 173, 179, 189, 191, 198, 202, 210, 212, 213, 221, 233, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 268, 270

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Bahāʾollāh 162 Bahrām Gur 154 Balkh 28, 55, 76, 131, 132, 176, 237, 249, 251 Balʿami 9, 13, 14, 23, 24, 25, 36, 38, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 104, 105, 106, 108, 109, 110, 120, 128, 234, 264, 271 Bani Marvān 48 Barmaki 76, 143 Barmakids 63, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 105, 126, 227, 256 Basra 51, 68, 74, 89, 91, 122, 158 bāten 123, 124 bātenis 108, 122, 123, 179, 215 bedʿat 181 Beyhaqi 13, 14, 22, 26, 27, 28, 30, 35, 37, 97, 135, 139, 179, 187, 189, 190, 191, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 225, 226, 232, 259, 264, 267 Biruni 26, 74, 79, 160, 167, 168, 265 Bokhārā 13, 14, 22, 24, 25, 29, 30, 38, 74, 80, 82, 118, 121, 128, 139, 177, 206, 249, 271 Bolāzari 56, 59, 64, 67, 73, 79, 265 Book of Fate 177 Borqāʿis 122 Bu-Najm 215 Buya 154, 156, 159, 165, 189 Buyid 3, 20, 101, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 159, 160, 164, 165, 166, 167, 169, 179, 186, 192, 193, 212, 218, 258, 259, 269 Buyids 18, 25, 28, 29, 101, 124, 138, 148, 151, 152, 153, 154, 156, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 173, 179, 182, 188, 189, 190, 196, 209, 212, 218, 220, 223, 227, 237, 238, 240, 257, 258, 259, 265

daʿva 19, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 54, 55, 57, 65, 70, 89, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 141, 144, 145, 146, 157, 215, 255, 256 Dehqāns 119 Derham ibn Nazr 130 Deylam 89, 143, 144, 148, 155, 158, 163, 166 Deylamite 147, 148, 153, 154, 155, 156, 165, 258, 259 Deylamites 141, 147, 148, 152, 153, 154, 160, 163, 165, 166, 167, 179, 189, 192 Deyr al-ʿĀqul 129 Dinevari 20, 52, 58, 59, 64, 67, 79, 83, 86, 88, 89, 97, 109, 110, 149, 263, 268 Dinparvari 225 Divān-e Rasāʾel 27, 191 divān-eʿarz 228 Dowlatshāh-e Samarqandi 29, 37, 107, 110, 237, 253, 265 Ebrāhim Ināl 221 Egypt 34, 58, 68, 69, 122, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 162, 192, 215, 216, 217, 221 Egyptian 133 El-Hibri 52, 59, 68, 79, 265 ʿEmād al-Molk Tāj al-Din Dabir Jāmi 245 Empire 22, 28, 34, 43, 174, 177, 182, 188, 196, 204, 209, 210, 219, 223, 227, 228, 235, 236, 238, 241, 244, 245, 246, 249, 250, 260, 261 enshā 228 Eqtāʿ 165, 222, 223 Esfahān 52, 60, 122, 155, 156, 159, 176, 205, 216, 217, 222, 252, 253, 265, 269 eshrāf 228 estifā 228

Caliph 18, 31, 116, 117, 135, 137, 143, 155, 156, 158, 168, 202, 212, 221, 232, 237, 238, 240, 242, 267 Chaghari Beg 221 Choghāni 124 Christians 164, 181, 273 Court 9, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 63, 65, 69, 72, 84, 96, 121, 124, 125, 126, 131, 133, 134, 135, 160, 161, 165, 173, 175, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 196, 198, 199, 200, 219, 222, 223, 224, 229, 256, 259, 260

Fakhr al-Dowla 166 Fanā Khsorow 165 farzin-band 248 Fatimid 125, 152, 155, 156, 157, 158, 161, 162, 170, 192, 193, 197, 217, 218, 234, 273 Fatimids 101, 125, 151, 152, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 168, 192, 212, 216, 217, 218, 258, 266 Fazl 26, 37, 56, 61, 80, 81, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 98, 104, 111, 126, 139, 143, 149, 166, 170, 191, 205, 227, 232, 256, 264, 272, 273 Fazl ibn Rabiʿ 84, 85, 86 Ferdowsi 188, 191, 206, 271

Damascus 58, 74 Dandānqān 184, 203, 204, 221, 260 Darvāze-ye Keshishān 159 Dāvud 35, 55, 65, 68, 69, 89, 203, 253, 264 Dayr-e al-ʿĀqul 136 Dāʿie al-Awwal 145 Dāʿies 20, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 54, 55, 58, 59, 63, 64, 65, 74, 88, 101, 123, 124, 125, 145, 157, 161, 162, 216, 217, 218, 255, 256 Dāʿie-ye elal-Haq 145 Dāʿie-ye-Kabir 145

Gardizi 14, 22, 25, 26, 37, 53, 60, 73, 79, 109, 110, 116, 121, 126, 142, 143, 148, 159, 168, 182, 183, 190, 192, 195, 197, 200, 201, 203, 205, 266 Genghis Khan 35, 37, 127, 233, 246, 248, 250, 251, 254, 261, 268, 272 Ghasān ibn Abbād 114 Ghāzi 183, 189, 196 ghāzis 119, 180 Ghazna 190, 241, 244 Ghaznavid 3, 20, 23, 25, 27, 28, 32, 120, 121, 126, 129, 138, 173, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 184,

Index

186, 188, 189, 190, 191, 193, 194, 195, 196, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 227, 258, 259, 260 Ghaznavid Soltānate 173 gholām 52, 53, 56, 66, 87, 105, 106 gholāms 119, 133, 176, 229, 243 Giddens 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 37, 265, 266, 269 Gilān 144, 154, 155 Gili kingdom 155 Goodarz Keshvād 52 Gorgān 84, 117, 122, 142, 143, 154, 155, 203 Hādi 76, 89, 90 Hādith 12, 13, 34, 36, 48, 51, 53, 65, 70, 78 Hādiths 50, 53, 187 hajj 78, 125, 137, 157 hājjis 167 Hākem Neyshāburi 30, 107, 110, 266 Harāt 73, 74, 131, 132, 176 Harsama 82, 86, 91, 114 Harsama ibn Aʿyon 91, 114 Hārun al-Rashid 44, 78, 114, 143 Hasan ibn Sahl 90, 91, 94, 96 Hasan ibn Zeyd 33, 117, 135, 141, 144, 145, 146 Hasan Meymandi 191, 196 Hasan Sabbāh 20, 122, 215, 216, 217, 218 Hasanak 190, 196, 197, 198, 199, 216, 227 Hāshemites 83, 164 Hejāz 51, 75, 83, 89, 91, 144, 157, 161, 163 Hindus 173, 184, 192, 220 Hindustān 179, 182 Hosseyn ibn Ebrāhim 130I Ibn Ahmad al-Saimiri 160 Ibn al-Mahdi 95 Ibn Asir 34, 47, 52, 56, 58, 60, 73, 74, 78, 79, 82, 97, 124, 125, 127, 147, 148, 155, 156, 157, 161, 163, 167, 169, 192, 205, 214, 217, 221, 222, 232, 236, 238, 241, 243, 247, 248, 249, 254, 267 Ibn Balkhi 13, 14, 28, 37, 186, 187, 205, 267 Ibn Esfandiyār 14, 33, 37, 73, 79, 109, 110, 135, 139, 142, 143, 144, 145, 147, 148, 149, 160, 210, 232, 267 Ibn Fondoq 14, 30, 37, 82, 97, 131, 139, 183, 184, 199, 205, 220, 227, 229, 230, 232, 267 Ibn Howqal 130, 139, 233, 267 Ibn Kasir 47, 55, 57, 60, 4, 68, 69, 70, 73, 79, 91, 94, 95, 96, 97, 154, 156, 160, 162, 164, 169, 215, 233, 268 Ibn Kāzeruni 87, 97, 165, 169, 268 Ibn Khaldun 34, 55, 60, 104, 110, 147, 149, 155, 169, 219, 233, 268 Ibn Khallekān 52, 60, 78, 79, 82, 95, 97, 135, 136, 139, 149, 164, 165, 169, 268 Ibn Nadim 51, 53, 60, 73, 79, 125, 127, 144, 149, 157, 161, 169, 268 Ibn Sinā 214 Ibn Taqtaqā 56, 60, 76, 80, 90, 91, 96, 97, 165, 169, 213, 214, 224, 233, 237, 238, 242, 254, 268 Imam Movafffaq 201

277 India 23, 32, 35, 135, 136, 157, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 192, 194, 195, 196, 202, 204, 252, 260 Iraq 32, 52, 54, 55, 58, 73, 82, 83, 86, 91, 93, 96, 109, 115, 125, 144, 152, 159, 160, 161, 162, 165, 168, 213, 216, 238, 249, 261, 265, 273 ʿIsā ibn Maʿqal 52 Ismāʿili 20, 36, 113, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 157, 161, 168, 192, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 232, 234, 241, 257, 265, 273 Ismāʿilis 28, 35, 101, 113, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 156, 157, 158, 159, 161, 163, 167, 173, 182, 184, 192, 193, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 222, 241, 244, 250, 252, 257, 260 Jaheshyāri 49, 60, 64, 67, 80, 268 Jalāl al-Din 15, 23, 33, 34, 38, 231, 235, 243, 246, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 261, 264, 271, 272 Jāvdāniyān 108 Javidān 108 Jeyhāni 26, 118, 120, 121, 124, 127, 227, 268 Jorfādeqāni 13, 14, 32, 33, 37, 126, 127, 162, 169, 177, 178, 181, 182, 183, 184, 188, 192, 193, 205, 238, 240, 244, 254, 268 Jorjānbān 73 Joveyni 9, 13, 15, 35, 36, 37, 122, 123, 124, 125, 127, 137, 139, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 233, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 245, 247, 248, 249, 251, 254, 268 Jowzjāni 13, 15, 35, 37, 105, 106, 107, 110, 114, 115, 116, 117, 125, 127, 130, 133, 139, 147, 149, 154, 158, 159, 169, 178, 179, 180, 188, 189, 200, 205, 206, 223, 233, 236, 237, 239, 245, 249, 250, 251, 252, 254, 268 jurisprudential 71, 146, 147, 153 Juvaini 35, 37, 122, 123, 127, 216, 217, 233, 237, 238, 239, 241, 242, 243, 247, 248, 249, 254, 268 kāfar 65, 183 Kamāl al-Din Mohammad 222 Kāsh 73 Kāshān 122 Kermān 14, 31, 32, 33, 36, 167, 224, 231, 252, 253, 263 Key Kāvus 187, 206, 222, 226, 233, 269 Key Khosrow 32, 155 Khalafijis 122 khalʿat 115, 159, 193, 239 Khāreji 46, 82, 107, 131, 133, 134 Khārejite 83, 109, 131, 133, 134 Khārejites 51, 54, 82, 107, 130, 131, 134, 162 Khodāvand 187 Khorāsān 3, 19, 22, 24, 26, 29, 30, 33, 35, 36, 43, 44, 45, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 113, 114, 115, 116, 121, 123, 124, 129, 130, 131, 132, 137, 144, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 184, 188, 191, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204,

278 

Social Change in Medieval Ir an 132–628 AH (750–1231 AD)

211, 212, 237, 238, 239, 242, 247, 248, 249, 252, 255, 256, 257, 260, 261 Khorramdin 107, 108, 218 Khorramdini 122 Khorramis 108 khotba 57, 91, 95, 116, 118, 119, 136, 180, 181, 212, 240, 241, 242 Khuzestān 135, 152, 155, 239, 252 Khwāja Nezām al-Molk 14, 27, 28, 37, 73, 80, 108, 109, 110, 122, 124, 125, 127, 136, 137, 138, 139, 147, 149, 177, 178, 179, 184, 185, 186, 206, 209, 214, 218, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 233, 246, 260, 261, 269 Khwāndmir 86, 87, 98, 154, 169, 214, 225, 233, 269 Khwārazm 174, 196, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 244, 245, 246, 247, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 261 Khwārazmshāh 29, 34, 191, 222, 236, 240, 241, 244, 246, 252 Khwārazmshāhi 4, 11, 15, 18, 21, 22, 24, 32, 34, 35, 36, 174, 214, 231, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 261 Khwārejites 129, 258 Kufa 51, 52, 55, 58, 64, 65, 74, 75, 90, 91, 107, 122 lavā 57, 115, 116 Mā Varā al-Nahr 18, 22, 73, 82, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 124, 125, 126, 129, 137, 138, 157, 173, 180, 181, 199, 209, 210, 211, 223, 227, 242, 245, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 257, 260 Madaʾeni 56 Madāʾen 74 Magians 122, 123 Mahdi 73, 76, 88, 89, 94, 95, 96, 125, 168, 266 Mahmud Ghaznavi 25 majlis 191 Majus 122 Mākān-e Kāki 154 Malek 187 Malekshāh 27, 28, 213, 214, 221, 222, 224, 235 Mansur 13, 24, 25, 49, 53, 54, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 88, 89, 94, 95, 97, 101, 126, 143, 162, 177, 178, 224, 258, 264 Maqdasi 35, 73, 80, 83, 86, 98, 120, 127, 160, 166, 169, 175, 206, 270 Mardāvij 148, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 163, 165 Marv 30, 44, 50, 54, 55, 57, 84, 86, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 104, 106, 107, 114, 142, 203, 237 Masʿud 26, 27, 30, 184, 189, 190, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 201, 202, 203, 204, 260 Masʿudi 47, 49, 52, 55, 58, 60, 83, 86, 90, 91, 94, 95, 96, 98, 109, 111, 144, 149, 152, 155, 156, 159, 160, 170, 270 Māvardi 164, 211, 233 Māziyār 33, 103, 107, 109, 110, 257

Maʾmun 44, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 114, 115, 143, 144, 191, 255, 256 Maʾmun’s 83, 84, 85, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 103, 104, 105, 107, 109, 255, 256 Mecca 90, 136, 180 Medina 58, 75, 89, 90, 93, 136, 180 Mediterranean Sea 173, 209, 210, 223, 227, 260 Mesopotamia 125, 161 military 18, 21, 22, 25, 27, 30, 31, 33, 36, 43, 47, 52, 54, 57, 58, 64, 67, 68, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 85, 86, 89, 90, 94, 101, 104, 106, 107, 121, 125, 126, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 141, 147, 148, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 158, 159, 160, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 173, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 184, 195, 196, 199, 201, 203, 204, 209, 210, 212, 218, 219, 220, 222, 223, 224, 226, 227, 228, 229, 231, 235, 236, 243, 249, 252, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261 minister 18, 76, 78, 86, 96, 104, 160, 166, 191, 197, 204, 213, 220, 222, 224, 225, 226, 228, 230, 239, 246, 256, 261 Mir Khwānd 86, 87, 98, 154, 170, 213, 214, 221, 233, 239, 254, 270 Mo- tavakkel 152 mofradin 248 Mohallabi 164 Mohammad ibn Abd al-Razzaq 176 Mohammed ibn ʾUs 144 Mojmal al-Tavārikh va al-Qesas 13, 14, 22, 28, 37, 52, 86, 87, 96, 98, 106, 111, 116, 117, 127, 130, 137, 138, 139, 143, 149, 152, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 162, 165, 167, 170, 185, 192, 206, 218, 234, 270 Mokhtār Saqafiji 47 moluk al-tavāyefiji 210, 224, 237 Mongol 21, 22, 34, 35, 36, 118, 122, 201, 205, 219, 232, 243, 244, 247, 248, 249, 250, 252, 253, 254, 263, 264, 265, 269, 270 Mongols 9, 21, 34, 35, 36, 174, 235, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 252, 253, 254, 258, 261, 263, 268 Moqafffaʿ 26, 225 Moqanna 73 Mostafā 60, 80, 97, 136, 169, 170, 186, 268, 272 Mostakfiji 158, 160 Mostaqafij, 159 Mostarshed 25, 31, 213, 240 Mostaʿli 217 Mostowfiji 68, 79, 83, 86, 87, 97, 108, 110, 120, 127, 154, 155, 168, 192, 205, 212, 232, 245, 247, 254, 266 Mosul 74, 104, 162 Motavakkel 143 Motiʿ 159, 160 Moʿāviya 48, 164 Moʿezz al-Dowla 159, 160, 161, 164, 167, 179 Moʿtamed 134, 135, 137 Moʿtasem 108, 109, 119, 173

279

Index

Moʿtazed 115, 117, 119, 125, 137 Moʿtazelites 145, 152, 214 Musā ibn Jaʿfar 91, 92 Nafs-e Zakiyya 90 Najm al-Din Rāzi 187, 206, 234, 270 Narshakhi 13, 14, 29, 38, 73, 80, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 128, 131, 138, 139, 175, 176, 178, 206, 271 Nāser 35, 97, 124, 146, 149, 178, 179, 217, 232, 237, 238, 240, 242, 243, 267, 268 Nāser al-Din Saboktegin 178 Nasr ibn Ahmad 116, 117, 118, 124, 125, 189 Nasr ibn Hārun-e Masihi 165 Nasr ibn Sayyār 51, 55, 57, 58, 64 Nasrānī, 164 Nazār 217 Nesāʿ 187 Neyshābur 30, 53, 73, 107, 108, 110, 131, 132, 133, 176, 178, 201, 221, 223, 251, 266 Nezām al-Molk 27, 28, 73, 108, 122, 177, 209, 214, 220, 227, 228, 229, 230, 246, 260, 261 Nezāmi ʿAruzi 25, 38, 191, 206, 271 Nezāmiya 28, 29, 209, 214, 215, 230, 260 Nuh ibn Asad 114, 115 ʿObeydollāh ibn al-Khatibi 222 Olol ʿazm 187 Ostādsis 73 Oxus 117, 176, 249 pādeshāh 159 Padeshāhi-ye Gili 155 pāk- dini 173, 181, 184 pak-din 197 Persian Historiography 9, 23, 185 Persians 122 post-Islamic 45, 101, 220, 235, 255 pre-Islamic 17, 23, 25, 28, 29, 43, 45, 76, 77, 113, 119, 120, 153, 155, 165, 173, 185, 186, 188, 190, 209, 210, 224, 225, 256, 257, 259 Prophet 49, 50, 51, 53, 59, 65, 74, 77, 133, 136, 137, 147, 164, 165, 179, 185, 187, 218, 241, 259, 264 Qarākhatāy Khānāte 246 Qarākhatāyid 244, 245, 252 Qarmatigari 126, 196, 198 Qarmatis 122, 125, 126, 158, 159, 184, 192, 197, 198, 227 Qavām al-Din Dargozini 231 qāzi 222 Qāzi Sāʿed 201 Qazvin 36, 122, 155, 180, 263 Qiyās al-Din Mohammad 252 Qom 24, 60, 79, 97, 122, 139, 149, 166, 169, 231, 232, 263, 267, 268, 273 Qoraysh 87 Qorʾān 34, 36, 46, 50, 53, 75, 137, 187, 198 Qostamir 243

Qotboddin 251 qovvād 248 Rāfeʿ ibn Leys 113, 114, 257 Rafiji 114 Rafijizi 126 Raqqa 77, 82, 104 Rashid al-Din Vatvāt 237 Rāvandi 14, 30, 32, 38, 186, 206, 211, 212, 214, 216, 218, 219, 222, 223, 225, 230, 234, 238, 240, 244, 254, 272 Rāvandis 88, 122 Ray 32, 73, 76, 84, 85, 122, 123, 141, 143, 144, 152, 154, 167, 181, 192, 202, 203, 210, 212, 215, 216, 221, 238, 239 Religiosity 225 Religious purity 173, 181, 184, 260 Religiously pure 197 Samarqand 114 Sābeanes 164 Saboktegin 120, 175, 177, 178, 179, 181, 182, 188, 259 Sabzevār 122 Sādāt 33, 143, 144, 147, 153, 259 Sādegh 64, 123 Safffāh 49, 53, 54, 58, 64, 65, 66, 67, 70 Safffārid 3, 101, 117, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 135, 137, 138, 153, 155, 159, 180, 181, 258 sāheb-Hadithān 201 Sahl 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 90, 91, 93, 94, 96, 104, 108, 126, 197, 227, 256 Sāleh ibn Nazr 130, 132 Saljuq 3, 4, 23, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 173, 174, 175, 184, 199, 201, 203, 204, 209, 210, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 235, 236, 237, 238, 240, 244, 260, 261 Saljuq Empire 174, 175, 209, 219, 228, 235, 238, 240, 260 Saljuqs 9, 18, 21, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 152, 165, 173, 199, 202, 203, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 219, 223, 224, 229, 233, 235, 236, 237, 238, 240, 243, 244, 250, 260, 261, 270 Sāmānid 3, 23, 24, 29, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 138, 173, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 182, 186, 257, 259 Sāmānids 13, 18, 25, 26, 29, 30, 32, 101, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 124, 125, 126, 129, 130, 132, 138, 143, 146, 148, 151, 153, 159, 167, 173, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 182, 189, 190, 192, 196, 200, 209, 211, 214, 256, 257, 258, 260 Samarqand 82, 114, 115, 116, 237, 245, 248, 249 Samārrā 109 Sanbād 73, 165 Sang-Bost 200 Sanjar 29, 80, 98, 170, 218, 234, 236, 237, 254, 270 sarrāf 82

280 

Social Change in Medieval Ir an 132–628 AH (750–1231 AD)

Sassanid 13, 165, 188, 209, 224 Saul 189 Sāva 73 Savād-e Iraq 167 Saʿd al-Molk Āvi 222 Sepidjāmegān 73 Seyf al-Dowla 179, 181 Shabānkāreʿie 154, 170, 180, 181, 206, 272 Shāfeʿie 162, 164, 214, 215, 230 Shāh Bahrām-e Gur 165 Shāhanshāh 18, 20, 165, 188 Shāhi 20, 173, 184, 225, 234, 273 Shāhnāma 24, 191, 206, 271 Shahrak 108 Sharʿ 226 Shaykh Mofijid 47, 61, 164, 272 Shirānshāh 165 Shirāz 156, 159, 170, 267, 274 Shiʿite 3, 29, 33, 44, 45, 47, 49, 50, 56, 64, 81, 83, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 101, 104, 123, 124, 141, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 151, 152, 153, 156, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 179, 216, 217, 218, 241, 242, 255, 258, 259 Shiʿite Imam 104, 124 Shorā 64 Shozil 165 silamān 183 Simjur 177, 178 Sistān 13, 14, 22, 24, 26, 38, 58, 61, 72, 73, 80, 82, 98, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 152, 165, 170, 180, 181, 207, 258, 273 Siyāh-Jāmegān 3, 45, 56, 107 slave 52, 53, 66, 71, 95, 119, 120, 177, 213 slaves 72, 119, 120, 133, 142, 175, 181, 183, 229, 257 Soghd 74 Soleymān ibn ʿAbdol Malek 142 Soltān 18, 20, 27, 31, 34, 174, 180, 183, 186, 189, 196, 197, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 211, 212, 213, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 252, 261 Soltān Mahmud 20, 25, 26, 32, 121, 167, 173, 175, 179, 181, 182, 183, 184, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 200, 201, 204, 220, 259, 260 Soltān Masʿud 26, 27, 173, 175, 184, 190, 194, 195, 196, 199, 201, 202, 203, 204, 222, 226, 260 Soltān Mohammad 34, 195, 213, 222, 224, 235, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 261 Somnath 180 Sunni 29, 36, 125, 148, 151, 164, 173, 179, 182, 212, 218, 258 Surah 187 Suri 199 Syria 51, 68, 69, 75, 104, 122, 125, 135, 144, 157, 221

Tabarestān 3, 14, 24, 33, 37, 73, 76, 79, 84, 89, 90, 101, 108, 109, 110, 117, 122, 135, 138, 139, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 152, 153, 155, 163, 164, 167, 170, 180, 181, 182, 232, 258, 267, 270 Tabari 9, 13, 14, 22, 24, 25, 28, 36, 49, 51, 59, 61, 64, 73, 76, 79, 80, 89, 97, 98, 107, 110, 111, 137, 139, 144, 149, 264, 273 Tāher 72, 80, 81, 85, 86, 87, 91, 96, 97, 98, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 115, 133, 134, 144, 169, 189, 256, 270 Tāherid 103, 106, 107, 113, 117, 130, 131, 132, 134, 135, 144, 209, 256, 257 Tāherids 3, 18, 25, 26, 35, 82, 101, 103, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 120, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 143, 146, 148, 153, 173, 180, 196, 220, 235, 256, 257 Tālut 189 Tamām 165 Tarāz 119 Tārikh-e Majdul 188 Tarkān Khātun 235 Tashtdāri 235 Taʾvil-e din 123, 124 Terkān Khatun 246, 247, 251 Tigris 74 Toghrā 228 Toghrol 27, 30, 31, 203, 212, 214, 221, 223, 228, 238 Turkish 3, 12, 19, 30, 33, 120, 125, 151, 156, 158, 160, 161, 171, 173, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 185, 220, 223, 244, 246, 250, 259 Turkmen 118, 173, 184, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 210, 211, 212, 221, 222, 227, 228, 229, 258, 260 Tus 38, 80, 104, 128, 139, 200, 206, 254, 271 Twelver Shiʿism 215 Umayyads 12, 43, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 63, 66, 71, 72, 74, 75, 88, 92, 124, 145, 255 Vāseq 116 Vāset 74, 158 vizier 24, 25, 27, 31, 32, 84, 157, 202, 204, 209, 213, 221, 222, 227, 228, 239, 256, 260 vizierate 18, 19, 76, 78, 81, 121, 158, 160, 173, 174, 209, 210, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 246, 260 Yahyā 33, 43, 47, 49, 56, 59, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 89, 90, 141, 143, 265 Yahyā-e Barmaki 90 Yaqmāie 130, 139, 273 Yāqut Hamavi 108 Yazdegerd III 188 Yazdgird III 43 Yazid 142, 143, 180 Yazid ibn Mohallab 142

Index

Yaʿqub 117, 118, 124, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 153, 155, 170, 180, 189, 196, 252, 258, 273 Yaʿqub ibn Leys 130, 189 Yaʿqubi 46, 47, 52, 58, 61, 64, 67, 73, 78, 80, 82, 89, 91, 94, 95, 96, 98, 104, 109, 111, 142, 143, 149, 273 zāher 123, 124 Zahir al-Din Neyshāburi 30, 32, 185 Zahiri Neyshāburi 14, 31, 38, 185, 186, 199, 200, 203, 207, 211, 212, 213, 219, 221, 222, 223, 234, 274 zakāt 48, 192 Zel-Hajja 95

281 Zendiq 122 Zendiqs 73 Zeyd al-Nnār 91, 92 Zeyd ibn ʿAli 43, 47, 56, 60, 145, 267 Zeyd 47, 145, 146 Zeydi 123, 144, 145, 161, 163 Ziyārid 155, 157 Ziyārids 28, 32, 101, 147, 151, 153, 154, 155, 160, 163, 256, 258 Zol-Yamineyn 189 Zoroastrian 73, 123 Zoroastrianism 53, 142, 145 Zoroastrians 73, 122, 123, 164 Zu al-Yaminayn 86, 115 Zuzan 53